INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION
OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
(Ukraine v. Russian Federation)
REJOINDER
Submitted by the Russian Federation
Volume VIII
(Annexes 177 - 216)
10 March 2023
TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME VIII Annexes 177-216 Annex 177 Reuters, Ukraine rebel commander says will not pull out of Donetsk (10 July 2014). Annex 178 U.S. Agency for International Development, Ukraine, 2023. Annex 179 Ned.org, National Endowment for Democracy.Ukraine. Annex 180 The World, Who Were the Maidan Snipers? (14 March 2014). Annex 181 BBC News Ukraine, The Maidan Shooting: a Participant’s Account (13 February 2015). Annex 182 Intentionally omitted Annex 183 Intentionally omitted Annex 184 Intentionally omitted Annex 185 BBC News, Ukraine crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call (7 February 2014). Annex 186 Reuters, Special Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacre (10 October 2014). Annex 187 Sputnik International, Incidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017 (31 August 2017). Annex 188 Unian.ua, Military warehouses with weapons burn in Lvov (19 February 2014). Annex 189 KPHG, Ukraine follows Russia in dubious ‘State treason’ arrests (16 February 2015). Annex 190 Human Rights Watch, Ukraine Foreign Journalists Barred or Expelled (1 September 2017). Annex 191 The Guardian, Rebel Leader Alexander Zakharchenko Killed in Explosion in Ukraine (31 August 2018). Annex 192 Deutsche Welle, Alexander Zakharchenko: The Latest Ukrainian Rebel Leader to Face an Abrupt Death (2 September 2018). Annex 193 European Pravda, No pressure over Concessions: Kuleba on Negotiations with Germany’s Foreign Minister (7 February 2022). Annex 194 Uryadovy Kuryer, On the Future of Donbass in Terms of Numbers (21 July 2018). Annex 195 Interfax-Ukraine, Rada Appoints Next Elections to Local Self-Govt Bodies for Oct 25 (15 July 2020).
Annex 196 NBC News, MH17 Investigators Face Huge Challenges in Ukraine ‘Combat Zone’ (18 July 2014). Annex 197 Expert report of Mr Akash Rosen, 26 May 2019. Annex 198 CNN, Kerry: ‘Drunken separatists’ interfering at MH17 crash site (24 July 2014). Annex 199 DNA, Ukrainian investigators found 196 bodies at #MH17 crash site (20 July 2014). Annex 200 The Dutch National Police, Official Report Concerning Disclosed Intercepted Conversations, 16 December 2019. Annex 201 Financial Express, What are they trying to hide, cries Barack Obama even as Malaysia Airlines MH17 bodies, black boxes handed over (22 July 2014). Annex 202 Stuff, MH17 wreckage 'cut into pieces' (23 July 2014). Annex 203 New Straits Times, MH17: Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong at his final resting place (4 September 2014). Annex 204 Dutch Safety Board, Draft Final Report. Crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, May/June 2015. Annex 205 AstroAWANI, #RememberingMH17: The Funeral Of Wan Amran Wan Hussin (3 September 2014). Annex 206 New Straits Times, MH17: Two more remains to arrive on Sunday: Liow (22 August 2014). Annex 207 BBC News, MH17 crash: My revealing fragments from east Ukraine (16 April 2015). Annex 208 RT, Serial numbers of missile that downed MH17 show it was produced in 1986, owned by Ukraine - Russia (17 September 2018). Annex 209 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Richard Reid's Shoes. Annex 210 The New York Times, Explosive on Planes Was Used in Past Plots (30 October 2010). Annex 211 The Kyiv Independent, British instructors train Ukrainian military to operate NLAW tank killers (PHOTOS) (25 January 2022). Annex 212 Reuters, Ukraine holds military drills with U.S. forces, NATO allies (20 September 2021). Annex 213 Gallup, Russian Language Enjoying a Boost in Post-Soviet States (1 August 2008). Annex 214 Opinio Juris, Kevin Jon Heller, MH17 Should Be Framed as Murder, Not as a War Crime (11 August 2014). Annex 215 Intentionally omitted
Annex 216 5.ua, Kharkov Stena Pub Terrorist Attack: Prosecutors Demand 12 Years’ in Prison for Accused Bomber – Details (27 September 2019).
Annex 177 Reuters, Ukraine rebel commander says will not pull out of Donetsk (10 July 2014)
Annex 177
Ukraine rebel commander says will not pull out of
Donetsk
Maria Tsvetkova
DONETSK Ukraine (Reuters) - An enigmatic Russian leading separatist rebels in the eastern
Ukrainian city of Donetsk made a rare appearance in public on Thursday to say he would not
abandon the city though he defended his decision to pull out of the stronghold of Slaviansk.
Pro-Russian separatist fighters gesture from an armoured missile launcher at a checkpoint on the
outskirts of the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk, July 10, 2014. Ukrainian forces regained more
ground but sustained further casualties on Thursday in clashes with separatists, while two Western
allies urged Russia's Vladimir Putin to exert more pressure on the rebels to find a negotiated end to
the conflict. REUTERS/Maxim Zmeyev (UKRAINE - Tags: POLITICS CIVIL UNREST MILITARY
CONFLICT TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY)
Igor Girkin, a Muscovite who has the nom de guerre of Igor Strelkov, has been criticized by some
other rebel commanders for withdrawing from Slaviansk last weekend and allowing government
forces to savor a major victory.
Hundreds of his men headed south to Donetsk, the region’s main industrial center, after the rout
and are digging in now in the city of more than 900,000 people as government forces appear to be
preparing a blockade to break their resistance.
Asked by a journalist if he would make a similar tactical withdrawal from Donetsk to save people’s
lives, the reason he gave for quitting Slaviansk, the 43-year-old Strelkov said simply: “No”.
Alexander Borodai, the “prime minister” of the self-proclaimed “people’s republic” seated
alongside him, added: “Where would we go ? We will defend the territory of the Donetsk People’s
Republic.”
Strelkov, who disclosed on Thursday he had been a colonel in Russia’s Federal Security Service -
the successor agency to the KGB - has been on Ukraine’s ‘most-wanted’ list since he began
marshalling rebel forces against the Kiev government in April.
While he commanded forces in Slaviansk, the town became a citadel of fierce resistance and at
least two government military helicopters were brought down in the area by rebel fire.
HERO STATUS
Said to have a penchant for historical battle recreations and enjoying the profile of an elusive
adventurer dropping casually in and out of conflict zones, Strelkov began to take on hero status in
rebel quarters.
Ukraine rebel commander says will not pull out of Donetsk https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-strelkov-idUSKBN...
Стр. 1 из 2 06.03.2023, 12:33
But this reputation has been dented by the Slaviansk withdrawal and retreat to Donetsk in which,Strelkov admitted on Thursday, he lost a tenth of his men.On Thursday, the moustachioed Strelkov, dressed in combat fatigues with an antiquated pistolstrapped to his hip, spoke without emotion as he defended the move in which rebels broke outfrom a government noose around Slaviansk.“Militarily, the reason for withdrawal of the garrison from Slaviansk was obvious. My conscience isabsolutely clear,” he said. “More than 90 percent of the force got out of Slaviansk and safely got toDonetsk.”The need to justify the withdrawal from Slaviansk may have been his main reason for appearingbefore representatives of the world’s media on Thursday.He gave few details about his past though he said he left Russia’s FSB service with the rank ofcolonel.But he said he had battlefield experience as a volunteer fighter in Moldova’s rebel enclave ofTransdniestria and in Bosnia. He had also fought, he said, in Russia’s former rebellious region ofChechnya.He said he had been specifically asked to lead the separatist rebellion in Ukraine’s Russian-speaking east - but would not say by whom specifically.“I was asked to help in organizing a force, to lead a group which was ready to rise up in rebellion,”he said, saying only that the approach had come from people with whom he had been serving within Crimea which Russia annexed from Ukraine in March.“They considered I could do this successfully, more successfully than they could, and I agreed totheir proposal and so I came to the territory of Ukraine,” he said.Writing By Richard Balmforth; Editing by Robin PomeroyUkraine rebel commander says will not pull out of Donetskhttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-strelkov-idUSKBN...Стр. 2 из 206.03.2023, 12:33
Annex 178
U.S. Agency for International Development, Ukraine, 2023.
Annex 178
Ukraine | U.S. Agency for International Development
Ukraine’s commitment and capacity to progress towards self-reliance is hampered by an ongoing
two-front war -- against Russia’s full scale aggression on the one hand, and against its internal
legacy of corruption on the other -- with deep consequences for the future of Europe, regional
stability, and the United States, for whom a strong and free Europe is a cornerstone national
security goal.
USAID’s 2019-2024 Country Development Coordination Strategy calls for a specific focus on anticorruption
efforts, countering the impacts of Russia's aggression, and promoting economic
development and energy security in Ukraine. USAID will also continue to support efforts to
strengthen democracy and good governance, improve health care systems, and mitigate the effects
of the conflict in the east.
Since the start of the war on February 24, 2022, USAID has provided $9.88 billion in development
and humanitarian assistance.
Official USAID solicitations occur only through www.grants.gov and www.fbo.gov
Ukraine | U.S. Agency for International Development https://www.usaid.gov/ukraine
Стр. 1 из 1 22.02.2023, 15:58
Annex 179
Ned.org, National Endowment for Democracy.Ukraine
Annex 179
The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20140831044648/http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/eurasia/ukraine
search
Ukraine
AHALAR Center for Humane Technologies
NGO Strengthening
$35,230
Furthering Ukraine's Democratic Transition
To increase civil society’s influence on Ukraine’s democratic transition by facilitating cooperation between NGOs and the media. AHALAR will organize three training
seminars for 60 representatives from the media and civil society, a four-day study trip to Warsaw for 12 participants focusing on successful examples and best
practices of cooperation between civil society and the media in the Polish context, a small grants competition and an online networking platform at
www.activarte.org.ua.
Alliance Center
Accountability
$24,758
Promoting Accountability in Eastern Ukraine
To increase the accountability of local governments in eastern Ukraine. The Donetsk-based Alliance will conduct four workshops and convene eight working groups to
strengthen the capacity of newly formed local civic councils. The events will focus on using tools and strategies for networking, monitoring and advocacy campaigns to
help the councils be more effective in engaging and influencing local government activities. Alliance will also develop and maintain a resource library to disseminate
information and best practices and hold a three-day final conference for 30 council members.
Association of Ukrainian Law Enforcement Monitors
Human Rights
$38,334
Monitoring Human Rights Compliance by Law Enforcement Agencies
To promote Ukraine’s adherence to international human rights standards. The Association will conduct three trainings in Ukraine’s regions for a total of 60 NGO
activists, monitor human rights violations by the police, and publish the results in its annual report, as well as develop recommendations to prevent future abuses. The
Association will also print and distribute 300 copies of the report in Ukrainian and English.
Center for International Private Enterprise
Developing Market Economy
$357,707
Building Advocacy Momentum
To build the capacity of Ukrainian business associations and improve the entrepreneurial climate through coalition-based advocacy. CIPE will build the skills of
reform-minded business leaders through training seminars, workshops and small grants designed to stimulate advocacy on targeted issues. CIPE will also support
partner business associations to advocate for improvements in the entrepreneurial environment with a focus on reducing corruption and improving public-private
dialogue.
Center for Research on Social Perspectives in the Donbas
Freedom of Information
$34,995
Supporting Independent Regional Media
To continue disseminating independent information about and for Ukraine's regions. The Center will maintain its popular news website, OstriV (www.ostro.org). NED
support will cover the costs of three correspondents, including two in the Donetsk region and one in Kyiv, who will produce more than 100 analytical and 5,000
informational items for the website. Assistance will also be used to cover a portion of the Center's basic operating costs.
Center for Society Research
Human Rights
$24,850
Promoting Freedom of Assembly
To promote greater awareness of the freedom of assembly. As part of a larger, national advocacy campaign, the Center will monitor freedom of assembly throughout
the country, including the reaction of the authorities, and disseminate the results of its monitoring via a website.
Center UA
Accountability
$22,600
Annex 179
Promoting the Accountability of Public OfficialsTo increase the accountability of public figures in Ukraine. The Center UA will continue to operate its unique interactive website, Vladometr.org (Powermeter), whichmonitors, documents and assesses promises made by politicians, officials and prominent public figures.Cherkasy Regional Organization of Committee Voters of UkraineAccountability$22,000Promoting Civic Activism and Government Accountability in Central UkraineTo promote civic activism and government accountability in the Cherkasy region. The Cherkasy CVU will hold five workshops for activists and local councilors onincreasing cross-sectoral communication, improving interaction between voters, civil society and local government, and working with the public to solve pressing localissues. The CVU will also conduct a campaign to monitor local councilors, MPs and mayors of major cities from the region that will analyze pre-election platforms ofthose elected officials and assess their performance since the elections. Results will be posted on a special section of the CVU's website, deputat.ck.ua.Chernihiv City Youth Organization Educational Center "Initiative"NGO Strengthening$28,270Promoting Local Activism in Chernihiv RegionTo strengthen civil society in the northern Ukrainian region of Chernihiv. The Initiative will organize a series of nine workshops and trainings for NGO representatives,journalists and members of district councils from seven districts in the Chernihiv region to resolve local problems through inter-sectoral cooperation. Following thetrainings, six teams of participants will receive small grants to address local challenges. The Initiative will also publish seven issues of its newspaper and convene afinal conference. Chernivtsi Committee of Voters of UkraineAccountability$33,650Promoting Accountability in Southwestern UkraineTo foster government accountability and transparency in southwestern Ukraine. The Chernivtsi CVU will monitor the activities of city council deputies in the Chernivtsiand Khmelnytsky regions, produce four monitoring reports and publish them in its Krok Zakhid newspaper with a print run of 1,600 copies. It will hold sevenroundtables to advocate for creating legal norms on public participation in self-governing bodies and to foster relations between deputies and the public. The CVU willalso convene seven training seminars and produce 600 copies of an advocacy manual for deputies, and launch an information campaign to promote publicparticipation in local communities. During the campaign, the CVU will survey 2,000 people and disseminate 1,500 copies of a "how to" booklet on civic activism. Chernivtsi Society “Ukrainian People's House in Chernivtsi”NGO Strengthening$25,020Enhancing Civic Journalism and NGO CooperationTo develop the communication skills of youth activists and enhance cooperation of NGOs in the Chernivtsi and Kirovohrad regions. The Society will organize a four-month course in civic journalism and a media competition for 70 youth leaders, as well as produce a website, guidebook and two issues of its Toloka (Community)newspaper. The NGO will also organize a study tour for the eight most promising participants and bring together 100 activists for a final conference. Coalition of Cherkassy Youth NGOs "Moloda Cherkaschyna"NGO Strengthening$31,855Promoting Youth Activism in Central UkraineTo strengthen youth involvement in civil society by enhancing a network of activists and organizations in central Ukraine. The Coalition will organize two networkingseminars and a six-day training for approximately 50 youth activists in four regions of central Ukraine: Kremenchug, Cherkassy, Kirovohrad and Poltava. The Coalitionwill also conduct an information and monitoring campaign on youth policy in the four regions, along with four civic actions developed by participating young activistsDniprovsky Center for Social ResearchFreedom of Information$23,830Promoting Freedom of Information and Accountability in DnipropetrovskTo increase access to independent news and information in Ukraine's eastern region of Dnipropetrovsk. The Center will continue producing its online newspaper NovyiFormat (www.nf.dp.ua), which features regional news and analysis in Ukrainian and Russian. The Center will monitor the activities of elected officials, conduct anopinion poll, and convene three roundtables to strengthen the professionalism of 20 journalists and NGO representatives. The Center will also maintain and update itswebsite on NGO developments in the region at www.dcsi.dp.ua.13-880Donetsk Press ClubFreedom of Information$38,000Fostering Freedom of Information in Eastern UkraineTo increase the capacity of journalists and improve the professionalism of media in eastern Ukraine. The Press Club will organize 20 meetings covering importantnational and regional issues for journalists and media outlets throughout the Donetsk region. It will also convene six online workshops on solving pertinent localproblems for 60 representatives of Donetsk-based NGOs, media, local authorities and experts. All activities will be publicized on the Club's website athttp://pclub.dn.ua. Donetsk "Committee of Voters of Ukraine"Freedom of Information$49,440Promoting Civic Journalism in Eastern UkraineTo promote civic journalism in the eastern Donetsk region. The Donetsk CVU will develop an online platform for civic journalism by holding a new media barcamp forbloggers and conducting a four-month school of multimedia journalism for 20 civic journalists. Twelve of the most promising participants will be selected to intern for sixmonths at the CVU’s portal, NGO.donetsk.ua. The CVU will also hold a public competition for reporting by civic journalists and bloggers on the "UnexpectedDonbass." Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation (DIF)Democratic Ideas and Values
Annex 179
$41,298Stimulating Dialogue on Transition ProcessesTo stimulate informed debate and dialogue among civil society, government and the general public on issues relating to Ukraine's transition to democracy. Throughthree national polls, eight expert surveys, 10 roundtables, monthly bulletins and a quarterly scholarly journal, DIF will help ensure that Ukraine's leaders are informedabout public opinion, while at the same time making the public aware about important policy debates.Independent Association of BroadcastersHuman Rights$44,875Promoting Youth Human Rights AwarenessTo raise awareness of human rights, protect freedom of speech, and educate youth about the role of media in democratic society. The Association will organize itsfourth annual Kinomedia Festival, which will include film screenings and public lectures at universities in nine Ukrainian cities. The Association will also conduct ashort film contest, focusing on media freedom, democracy and human rights, for students and young professionals from throughout Ukraine.Institute of Mass InformationFreedom of Information$36,450Monitoring Freedom of the Media in UkraineTo analyze current and pending legislation on the media and monitor violations of press freedom and attacks on journalists in Ukraine. The Institute will conductindependent field investigations into cases of extreme pressure or intimidation against journalists, publish an annual report on its monitoring, and disseminate thefindings to media outlets and the public though three press conferences and its website, http://imi.org.ua. Institute of Political EducationAccountability$38,500Strengthening Local DemocracyTo foster democratic local and regional government in Ukraine. The Institute will conduct three-day training seminars in the Lviv, Chernihiv, Donetsk and Kyiv regionsfor 125 newly elected local and regional councilors. The trainings will promote a better understanding of the role and responsibilities of an elected official and how tobest address local needs.Institute of the RepublicHuman Rights$32,609Promoting Freedom of AssemblyTo promote of freedom of assembly. As part of a larger, national advocacy campaign to defend and advance this human right following the 2012 parliamentaryelections, the Institute will conduct two training sessions for 24 campaign activists, organize six roundtables and six lectures in the regions on proposed legislationregulating freedom of assembly in Ukraine and the country’s international commitments, convene three press conferences in Kyiv, and print and distribute 15,000leaflets publicizing campaign events. International Republican InstituteAccountability$275,000Fostering Good GovernanceTo promote democratic governance practices in Ukraine. IRI will expand an innovative project model that has increased the capacity of the Cherkasy municipality toimplement best practices in good governance. IRI will expose new municipalities to the innovative reform ideas currently being implemented in Cherkasy, and mentorthe administrations in Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk during the reform process, bolstering existing demand for democratic reform amongst the citizenry, and developingthe advocacy capacity of civil society to channel that demand. Journal Krytyka Ltd.Freedom of Information$33,304Promoting Media SustainabilityTo strengthen independent media and democratic ideas and values. The Journal will launch an online version of its prominent intellectual publication, which containsanalytical pieces on important political, economic and social issues related to Ukraine’s democratic transition. The new website, Krytyka Online, will also serve as anetworking platform, attracting a new generation of readers and contributing to the journal’s sustainability strategy. Endowment funds will be used to support the re-design and re-launch of the Krytyka website and networking platform at http://krytyka.com.Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (KHRPG)Human Rights$32,717Providing Information and Analysis on Human Rights IssuesTo promote and safeguard human rights. During a year in which Ukraine’s human rights behavior will come under scrutiny while it holds the OSCE chairmanship, theKHRPG will produce a series of publications on human rights in Ukrainian, Russian, and English; maintain a virtual human rights library on its website www.khpg.org;and operate a separate website documenting and assisting victims of human rights abuses. It will also continue monitoring draft legislation and providingrecommendations to lawmakers. Finally, the KHRPG will organize a School for Human Rights Leaders, enabling 40 activists from human rights organizations todevelop management and financial skills.Kherson City Association of Journalists "South"Human Rights$31,195Promoting Human Rights through a Documentary Film FestivalTo cover the partial costs of its 10th annual human rights film festival, Docudays UA. The theme of this year’s anniversary festival is ‘Vybor – Yest!’ (There is aChoice!). The unique event will again feature domestic and international human rights documentary films and will include public discussions and debates led byhuman-rights NGO representatives and experts. Endowment support will be used to cover part of the festivals’ seven-day inauguration in Kyiv in March 2013. Kherson City Association of Journalists "South"Human Rights
Annex 179
$42,429Promoting Human Rights through a Traveling Film FestivalTo raise public awareness of human rights. The Association will organize the traveling version of its 10th annual human rights film festival, Docudays UA, in 24 regionsof Ukraine. The traveling festival will feature 25 domestic and international human rights documentary films and will include over 260 public discussions, seminars,performances and debates led by human rights activists and NGO representatives.Kherson Committee of Voters of UkraineAccountability$40,310Promoting Government Accountability in Southern UkraineTo monitor the work of local and regional councils in southern Ukraine. The Kherson CVU will track the implementation of local election platforms and promises in theKherson region. Focus groups in Kherson, Novokakhovsk, Kakhovsk, Tsurupynsk and Skadovsk will inform local citizens and officials about the monitoring program.The CVU will produce an analytical report, online postings, two special editions of a newspaper, and a summary booklet for distribution during four seminars, aroundtable and press conference.Kherson Regional Charity and Health FoundationAccountability$24,540Fostering Accountability and Transparency in Southern UkraineTo increase the accountability of local and regional authorities in the southern region of Kherson. The Foundation, which publishes the popular regional newspaperVgoru, will increase citizens’ access to information about the activities of local and regional governments by conducting and publishing a bimonthly newspapersupplement titled ‘People and the Authorities.’ The supplement will include columns focusing on different aspects of government performance and the activities ofelected officials, as well as four in-depth investigative journalism pieces on pressing issues in the region’s rural areas. All materials will be available online on thenewspaper’s website, www.vgoru.org. Lion SocietyNGO Strengthening$48,084Promoting Local ActivismTo continue promoting cooperation and local activism in central, southern and eastern Ukraine. The Society will organize 14 seminars for up to 220 local activists andrepresentatives of local authorities to promote best practices in engaging local governments to resolve local issues, Sixteen promising participants from NGOs will takepart in two, four-day study tours in western Ukraine, including two seminars in Lviv. The Society will also publish three brochures containing the seminar materials inprint runs of 300 copies each and distribute them to local activists, community leaders, local government representatives and the media.National Democratic Institute for International AffairsNGO Strengthening$371,000Building Capacity for Domestic Election MonitoringTo build the capacity of an indigenous monitoring initiative in Ukraine and promote a freer and fairer May 2014 presidential election. NDI will assist Opora in improvingthe governance, management, communications, strategic planning, and technical aspects of its election observation work by implementing a series ofrecommendations from an NDI-administered assessment.-020GGNew Generation Youth OrganizationNGO Strengthening$33,879Strengthening Local Civil Society in Rural CommunitiesTo increase the capacity of civic initiatives in rural regions of southern Ukraine. The organization will hold two, three-day trainings, one in each of the neighboringMykolaiv and Kherson regions, for 25 representatives of local NGOs. New Generation will work with 10 of the best participantsto carry out work plans tostrengthen their local organizations. To assist local groups with solving problems in their communities, New Generation will award eight mini-grants of up to $700. Aconference, bringing together all 50 participants, will be convened at the end of the project to facilitate an exchange of lessons learned and further collaboration. Odesa Committee of Voters of UkrainePolitical Processes$44,085Monitoring Local Government in Southern UkraineTo monitor the work of local elected officials in southern Ukraine. The Odesa CVU will conduct two training seminars on monitoring for 10 activists. It will continue tomonitor regional and local councils in Odessa, Kotovsk, Rozdilnya, Bilhorod-Dnistrovsk, Izmail, Pozdilnya Izmail, and Reni. To disseminate its findings, the CVU willproduce and distribute 6,000 copies of the preliminary monitoring results and 12,000 copies of the final monitoring results in its bulletin IzbirKom, regularly publishrelated articles through local online and print media, including its website at www.izbirkom.od.ua, and convene three roundtable discussions.Open Society Foundation (OSF) - UkraineAccountability$33,980Promoting Legislative AccountabilityTo continue monitoring and publicizing the activities of deputies and political parties represented in the Ukrainian parliament. The OSF will publish quarterly monitoringreports, prepare two versions of its annual monitoring report, and a series of regionally-focused quarterly reports all of which focus on the performance of electedofficials. All the reports will be available online at the OSF’s website, www.deputat.org.ua, and distributed electronically to parliamentarians, NGOs and the media. It willalso conduct nine regional public roundtables on the program for elected officials and NGO representatives.Polissya Foundation for International and Regional ResearchAccountability$20,000Improving the Accountability Skills of JournalistsTo increase the analytical skills of journalists so they can hold accountable deputies in the Chernihiv region. Polissya will conduct three trainings focusing on newmedia and analytical journalism for 12 local journalists. Each journalist will create a blog to monitor the fulfillment of electoral promises by local deputies. In addition,Polissya will produce and distribute an analytical report and convene two press conferences on the project.
Annex 179
Public Organization TelekritikaFreedom of Information$58,250Promoting a Pluralistic and Balanced Media Environment in UkraineTo foster transparency and promote the professionalism of the media sector. While serving as an independent resource to assist journalists, Telekritika will continue tomonitor Ukraine’s media outlets for censorship, restrictions on freedom of the press, and harassment and physical attacks against journalists. The monitoring resultswill be published on Telekritika’s website (www.telekritika.kiev.ua) and in its print journal, Telekritika. Regional Press Development Institute (RPDI)Accountability$50,000Promoting Government TransparencyTo promote government transparency and accountability by improving the quality and responsiveness of government-run websites and e-governance initiatives. RPDIwill monitor the effectiveness of 56 government websites, disseminate the findings of its monitoring, and work with government bodies on improving the sites' contentsand performance. To mark the end of the three-year project, RPDI will produce a comprehensive analytical report and present it at a press conference in Kyiv.School for Policy Analysis of the Kyiv-Mohyla AcademyDemocratic Ideas and Values$52,650Promoting Constitutional ReformTo promote constitutional reform. Building on previous NED-supported projects, which developed a series of proposals for constitutional reform, the organization willdeepen public engagement and broaden debate on the issue by conducting a nation-wide poll, publishing a set of online informational resources, producing 1,500copies of a brochure and a series of monthly articles, and convening a roundtable with 30 experts, government officials and NGO representatives. Sumy Regional Committee of Youth OrganizationsNGO Strengthening$49,866Promoting Civic Activism in Northeastern UkraineTo foster the development of civil society in rural areas of northeastern Ukraine. The Committee will work with its network of over 30 NGOs to increase civil societyinitiatives in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions. It will hold three trainings for 60 NGO activists, maintain its website at www.molod.sumy.ua, publish seven issues of itsbulletin Spalakh, support five local initiatives through a mini-grants competition, and convene a regional conference for 30 activists.2013-88Ukrainian Catholic UniversityHuman Rights$32,740Promoting Religious FreedomTo promote freedom of conscience through an informed analysis of religious rights and obstructions to religious freedom. The Ukrainian Catholic University willcontinue to operate its Religious Information Service of Ukraine (RISU), an online news agency (www.risu.org.ua) that covers issues of church-state relations, religiousrights, and conflicts between Ukraine’s various faith-based communities. NED support will cover the costs of staff salaries, website development and maintenance,news correspondents, and two roundtables. The unique website will publish more than 2,000 articles and analyses during the coming year. Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research Named After Oleksandr RazumkovDemocratic Ideas and Values$26,660Analyzing Ukraine's Democratic DevelopmentTo continue publishing National Security and Defense, one of the most widely read policy journals in Ukraine. NED support will be used to produce two issues in 2013.Each issue, to be published in an edition of 3,000 copies in Ukrainian and 800 copies in English, will provide a thorough examination of issues of particular importanceto Ukraine's democratic transition. Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR)Political Processes$79,250Promoting Transparency in Political Processes To promote public discussion on democracy-related topics in Ukraine. UCIPR will conduct nine research projects on various aspects of democratic development. Thethink tank will organize four focus groups bringing together representatives of civil society and the authorities, three roundtables, two in the country’s regions and onein Kyiv, and a conference. This year, UCIPR will focus on political party transparency and reform as well as examine the state of local democracy. Two studies, on localdemocracy and political party communications, will be published in 500 copies each.Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights UnionHuman Rights$49,960Promoting Human RightsTo raise awareness about human rights in Ukraine. The Union will produce the 2012 edition of its annual report on the country's human rights situation, publish 1,500copies in Ukrainian and 300 copies in English, prepare 300 copies on compact disc, and make the document available on its website at www.helsinki.org.ua. TheUnion will also organize a press conference and a roundtable to highlight the report's findings. Ukrainian Youth Association of Ukraine (SUM)NGO Strengthening$40,070Strengthening Civil Society in Central and Eastern UkraineTo strengthen youth civil society organizations in the Chernihiv, Donetsk, Zaporizha and Kirovohrad regions of Ukraine. SUM will conduct three training seminars for 30potential civic leaders in the Zaporizha region as well as one seminar for 30 NGO leaders from all four regions; organize four working meetings for 35 NGO leadersand a two-day conference for 40 participants and hold a mini-grant competition that will provide funding for six local civic initiatives. Vinnytsia Regional Committee of Youth OrganizationsNGO Strengthening$33,170
Annex 179
Mobilizing Communities in the Vinnytsia RegionTo develop the skills of local civil society leaders to more effectively mobilize communities and engage them in solving pertinent local problems. The program willinclude four trainings and three study visits for local activists, as well as a mini-grant program that will provide support to five community activism projects. TheCommittee will produce five video clips and three interviews about successfully implemented projects and publicize them through local websites, radio and TV stationsand a press conference. Youth AlternativeDemocratic Ideas and Values$68,170Preparing Ukraine’s Future LeadersTo promote youth activism and engagement in government processes. Youth Alternative will continue and expand its government internship program. The organizationwill select 35 students from leading Kyiv universities to serve eight-month fellowships in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's national legislature. In addition, it will select140 students to serve five-month fellowships at local councils in 20 regions. Interns will participate in 47 related events, including orientation, training seminars androundtables. They will also produce educational booklets, with a total print run of 500 copies. Zhytomyr Youth Civic Organization "Modern Format"Democratic Ideas and Values$39,962Promoting Civic Engagement Among Youth in Northern UkraineTo engage youth in the process of strengthening and implementing democratic ideas and values in their communities. Modern Format will organize two, parallel, year-long schools that will present the core ideas and values of democracy and human rights through two different perspectives. One school will target journalists; the otherwill be for civic activists. A total of 100 youth people in the Zhytomyr region will take part in the program.Accountability$31,293Strengthening Transparency in Northeastern UkraineTo promote transparency and accountability in the use of public funds in northeastern Ukraine. The organization will train civic activists to identify corruption in localgovernments. It will also produce a final report to be disseminated through press conferences. Freedom of Information$21,139Strengthening Investigative Journalism and Intersectoral CooperationTo boost the capacity for investigative journalism and increase cooperation between journalists and civil society. The organization will hold basic trainings andadvanced workshops for journalists and support a series of investigative pieces. It will also work with local community councils to monitor the impact of theinvestigative articles and produce a final report on best practices and lessons learned from the program. $36,882Analyzing Regional SecurityTo stimulate public discussion on and policy responses to threats to democracy in Ukraine’s regions. The organization will identify and foster debate on key issueswhile developing and advocating for policy responses. It will organize roundtables, print and distribute its bulletin, and publish articles in regional newspapers.$13,674Promoting Civic JournalismTo stimulate civic journalism among youth. The organization will trainings in for youth activists from local communities and NGOs. Young people will learn how todevelop and create content focusing on issues that affect the lives of citizens for social media. The most active participants will be selected to take part in a masterclass with a well-known Ukrainian journalist.Human Rights$20,287Defending Human RightsTo educate and inform youth about defending their basic civil rights. The organization will conduct seminars and trainings on recognizing, addressing and resolvingday-to-day civic rights violations. To inform and educate a wider audience, the organization will produce and post a series of online training videos and informationalmaterials, as well as publish 1,000 copies of a legal handbook.$40,892Promoting Awareness of Rights and Freedoms in Southern UkraineTo raise awareness of legal and human rights in southern Ukraine. The organization will maintain a legal clinic providing free legal aid to the public and organize aseries of events drawing attention to rights abuses, including roundtables for representatives of the local authorities, roundtables for the NGO community, and publiclectures on legal rights. It will also conduct an extensive advertising campaign on rights issues, including leaflets and other materials, billboards, banners and TV spots.It will also publish bimonthly columns in local newspapers and disseminate a monthly e-bulletin on legal and human rights. $30,000Fostering Human Rights NetworksTo strengthen a network of human rights organizations. The organization will convene a training for representatives of human rights NGOs and initiative groups,conduct trainings in towns and villages, and operate and publicize a human rights hotline and reception centers that will provide free legal assistance to citizens.$21,790Promoting Human Rights To promote human rights. The organization will conduct a training for regional activists to improve human rights monitoring. Following the training, the organization willorganize volunteer groups of training participants, lawyers, elected officials and other activists to monitor human rights abuses. These groups will track reported casesand utilize the information for broader advocacy campaigns.NGO Strengthening$29,469Fostering Intersectoral Cooperation in Central UkraineTo inform, educate and activate civil society. The organization will organize trainings on proposal writing, project development, and community and civil societydevelopment projects, as well as on project implementation, to foster civil society.
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$19,920Promoting Community Activism in Southern UkraineTo stimulate civic activism in southern Ukraine. The organization will conduct trainings in villages and towns to facilitate the implementation of local projects targetingcommunity problems, and convene a roundtable webinar with community representatives to present project outcomes and lessons learned for representatives fromUkrainian and international NGOs.$19,507Strengthening the Capacity of Youth NGOsTo strengthen youth activism. The organization will support a network of youth organizations and initiative groups through a series of trainings to increase members'capacity and professionalism. It will provide informational and technical support for the youth organizations’ events and activities. The organization will promote thenetwork by holding a press conference and disseminating a booklet highlighting the organizations' activities to local government offices, media, schools, and otherNGOs.Grant descriptions are from the 2013 NED Annual Report.
Annex 180 The World, Who Were the Maidan Snipers? (14 March 2014)
Annex 180
9/26/22, 3:01 PM Who were the Maidan snipers? | The World from PRX
https://theworld.org/stories/2014-03-14/who-were-maidan-snipers 1/8
Agence France-Presse
Who were the Maidan snipers?
GlobalPost
March 14, 2014 · 4:42 PM EDT
By Guest Writers
A man suspected of being a sniper and member of the pro-government forces is forced to pay his respects on
February 22, 2014 to the mourning place of a victim killed in the clashes in Kyiv.
Credit: BULENT KILIC
Before the current crisis in Crimea, the focal point of tensions in Ukraine was
Kyiv's Independence Square. During the bloodiest days of clashes last month,
dozens of protesters were shot and killed by sniper fire on the Maidan, as the
square came to be known.
By the end of the week, close to a hundred people were dead.
Annex 180
9/26/22, 3:01 PMWho were the Maidan snipers? | The World from PRXhttps://theworld.org/stories/2014-03-14/who-were-maidan-snipers2/8Initial reports seemed to indicate all the sniper fire came from the security forces,but some are now questioning that narrative as Ukraine's interim governmentinvestigates who was behind the fatal shootings.Oleksandr Yakymenko, the former head of Ukraine's Security Service, claimed thisweek in an interview with TV channel Rossiya that pro-Maidan (pro-Western)organizers were the ones behind the Feb. 20 shootings.Yakymenko said the shots came from Kyiv's Philharmonic Hall. That particularbuilding was overseen by the Fatherland Party's deputy Andriy Parubiy, knownunoicially as the "commander of Maidan." Aer President Viktor Yanukovych fledUkraine, Parubiy assumed the post of Secretary of the National Security andDefense Council for the interim Ukrainian government.Yakymenko said snipers started shooting at local police forces but then directedtheir fire on the anti-government protesters fighting the police. Aer the shooting,some of the snipers moved on to Hotel Ukraine. He added that the Maidenfighters appeared "prepared," leaving the barricades at the first sniper shot.Yakymenko said Ukrainian nationalist groups Pravij Udar and Svoboda requestedhis help in clearing out the snipers, but Parubiy wouldn't allow government forcesinto Maidan-controlled territory. Yakymenko went on to claim that among thesnipers were foreign mercenaries. While not making a direct connection betweenthe United States and the snipers, Yakymenko suggested that the US embassy wassomehow using Poland to orchestrate the overthrow of (now ousted) Yanukovych.Pro-Russian news networks were not the only ones that suggested pro-Maidansnipers may have taken part in the shootings."The majority of the gunfire seemed to be coming from police lines," said BBC'sGabriel Gatehouse. "But not all of it." Gatehouse said he saw one of the shooters"wearing one of the protesters' green helmets," and shooting from an openwindow in Hotel Ukraine.Gatehouse also spoke to British forensic experts on Feb. 24, who examinedevidence from the sniper fire. They said the gunfire came primarily from thepolice. At least one sniper shot from the ground, while three shot from higher
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9/26/22, 3:01 PMWho were the Maidan snipers? | The World from PRXhttps://theworld.org/stories/2014-03-14/who-were-maidan-snipers3/8vantage points, said the investigators, whose faces were blurred. They all fired inthe direction of Hotel Ukraine.The first suggestion that the snipers might be pro-Maidan supporters came from aleaked phone conversation published by Russia Today — which is funded by theKremlin — last week. The conversation, originally posted on YouTube, took placeon Feb. 25, between European Union Foreign Aairs Chief Catherine Ashton andEstonian Foreign Aairs Minister Urmas Paet.Paet is heard saying that a medic on site during the shootings said she thoughtthe snipers were shooting at both the police and the protesters. The medic, whomPaet later referred to as "clearly a person with authority," added there wasgrowing understanding that the shooters were not acting on the orders ofYanukovych, but rather the opposition. The Guardian ran with the storycautiously, headlining it with the words "bugged call reveals conspiracy theory."The Estonian Foreign Ministry confirmed the authenticity of the call but rejectedthe assertion that Paet "was giving an assessment of the opposition'sinvolvement." (Ashton's people declined to respond to several media outlets,saying that they don't comment on leaked information.) According to RussiaToday, the video was uploaded by members of Ukraine's Security Service whoremain loyal to Yanukovych.Russia's suggestion has been that the shooters were organized by the oppositionto increase outrage against the government.The Ukrainian authorities investigating the shootings, meanwhile, are lookingmore closely at Russia's involvement than at Yanukovych's government,according to the Associated Press."I think it wasnʼt just a part of the old regime that (plotted the provocation), but itwas also the work of Russian special forces who served and maintained theideology of the (old) regime," Health Minister Oleh Musiy told the AP. Interim Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, meanwhile, said the snipers were a "thirdforce" that was "not Ukrainian."Sign up for our daily newsletter
Annex 181 BBC News Ukraine, The Maidan Shooting: a Participant’s Account (13 February 2015) (translation)
Annex 181
Translation from Russian
BBC News Ukraine, The Maidan Shooting: a Participant’s Account (13 February 2015),
available at:
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2015/02/150213_ru_s_maidan_shootin
g
The Maidan Shooting: a Participant's
Account
Gabriel Gatehouse
BBC
13 February 2015
Almost a year ago, a day of bloodshed on Kiev's central square marked the end of a long
and cold winter of protests against President Viktor Yanukovych, who soon fled the
country.
More than 50 protesters and three policemen were killed that day. How did the shooting start?
The protest organisers have denied having anything to do with it. But one person told the BBC a
different story.
In the early hours of 20 February 2014, Kiev's Maidan stands divided - Berkut on one side,
protesters on the other.
This has been going on for more than two months. But events are moving into a decisive phase.
Before the end of the day, more than 50 people will be killed, most of them struck by security
agencies' bullets right in the middle of the street.
Annex 181
The violence will hasten the fall of Viktor Yanukovych. Moscow will call the day of February 20 an "armed coup" and use the idea to justify its annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine. The protest leaders, some of whom now hold positions in the government of the new Ukraine, insist that the security forces, who were acting on the instructions from the previous leaders, are fully responsible for the shootings. But a year later, some witnesses are beginning to "paint" a different picture. What actually happened on the Maidan? I didn't mean to kill "I was shooting at the feet," says a man we will call Sergei. He tells me that he took up a position in the Kiev conservatory, which is in the south-west corner of Maidan. "Of course, I could have hit somebody's arm or something. But I didn't shoot to kill," he adds. Sergei says he was a regular protester on Maidan for more than a month and his shots at the police in the square and on the roof of the underground shopping centre forced them to retreat. The shooting had already begun two days earlier, on February 18. On Wednesday, the 19th, it was calmer, but in the evening, Sergei says, he was set up with a man who offered him a choice of two guns: a 12-mm shotgun and a Saiga high-speed hunting rifle. He chose the latter and hid it in the post office building across the street from the conservatory. Both of these houses were under the control of the protesters. How the events of 20 February 2014 unfolded Under an onslaught of protesters, the Interior Ministry units retreated from their positions near Maidan to Institutskaya Street (on the north side of Hotel Ukraine). The protesters followed them and came under fire from the retreating special units and snipers from nearby buildings. More than 50 people were killed, the highest number of casualties in the clashes between protesters and police on Maidan. On the morning of 20 February, when the shooting started, Sergei, according to him, was taken to the conservatory, where he and another man were shooting at the security forces for about 20 minutes; this was before seven o'clock in the morning. His account is partially corroborated by other witnesses. That same morning, Andrey Shevchenko, then an opposition deputy and an active participant in the protests, received a phone call from the commander of special forces on Maidan. "He called and said: "Andrei, who is shooting at my guys?" He also specified that they were shooting from the conservatory," Mr Shevchenko said.
Annex 181
He contacted the protesters' chairman, Andrey Parubiy, who was described as the commandant of the Maidan. "I sent a squad of my best men to search the conservatory and identify the firing positions there," Parubiy said. Meanwhile, the deputy Andrey Shevchenko received several more phone calls, increasingly panic-stricken: "From time to time, an officer from the Interior Ministry called and said, 'I already have three wounded. I already have five wounded. One dead." Finally, he said: "We are retreating, Andrei, I don't know what is going to happen next". I clearly felt that something bad was going to happen," the deputy said. Andrey Parubiy, now First Deputy Chairman of the Verkhovnaya Rada of Ukraine, said his men did not find any shooters at the conservatory. But a photographer who visited the conservatory later that morning - after 8 o'clock - photographed people with guns there, although he did not see them shooting. What happened on the Maidan: a photographer's account Sergei's account differs from what Parubiy says. "I was just reloading my gun," he told me. - They ran up to me, one pressed me to the ground with his leg and said: "They want to talk to you. It's okay, but don't do it again." Sergei is sure that it was Andrey Parubiy's envoys who got him out of there, although he did not recognise him by sight. They took him out of the conservatory, drove him out of Kiev in a car and left him outside the city, from where he had to get home himself. By then three members of security forces had already been fatally wounded and the mass shooting of protesters had begun. The official investigation focused on what happened afterwards, after the special forces had withdrawn from Maidan. Video footage clearly shows them shooting at protesters as they retreated. Photos taken by a photographer at the conservatory on the morning of February 20
Annex 181
Only three people were arrested, all of them members of the Berkut special unit. Of the three, only two, low-ranking officers, remain in custody. The stay in custody for Berkut commander Dmytry Sadovnyk was replaced with house arrest, after which he disappeared. The three Berkut officers are accused of involvement in the killing of 39 people. But at least ten other protesters were killed and three members of the special forces died of their wounds. It is almost certain that some of the victims were killed by snipers who likely fired from tall buildings near Maidan. The attorneys for the victims and sources in the Prosecutor General's Office told the BBC that when it comes to investigating the deaths, which Berkut had nothing to do with, all their efforts are blocked by the courts. "In Yanukovych's time it was a Bermuda triangle: the prosecutor's office, the police and the court," Andrey Shevchenko says. - Everyone knew about their cooperation. They covered for each other, and it was the basis of large-scale corruption all over the country. These ties are still intact," the interlocutors say. Different versions of a conspiracy Earlier this week, Ukraine's Prosecutor General Vitaliy Yarema, who was heavily criticised for the way he handled the investigation, was sacked. Meanwhile, there are different conspiracy theories. "I am convinced that snipers who came from Russia and were controlled from there were behind the February 20 shooting," Andrey Parubiy, a former Maidan commandant says. "The shooters wanted to drown Maidan in blood," he adds. This is the position held by many Ukrainians. In Russia, however, many believe the opposite: that Maidan was a Western project inspired by the CIA to move Ukraine out of Moscow's orbit. Neither side adds convincing evidence to their claims. The vast majority of the Maidan protesters were peaceful, unarmed citizens who had endured months of bitter cold, demanding changes in the corrupt government. As far as is known, all those who fell on 20 February were unarmed. Maidan leaders have always stressed that they did everything they could to ensure that there was no fire on the Maidan. "We knew that our strength lay in not using force. To start shooting would have been weakness," Mr Shevchenko notes. Andrey Parubiy admits that a small group of armed protesters could have infiltrated Maidan; in that case it would have been a spontaneous and disorganised response to the violence of the security forces in the previous days. "I heard that after the February 18 shooting, some came to Maidan with hunting rifles. As I was told, these may have been relatives or parents of those who died on the 18th. So, I admit that
Annex 181
there could have been people with hunting rifles on the Maidan. When the snipers started killing our guys one by one, I can assume that the owners of hunting rifles opened fire," he said. Sergei's version is different again. According to him, he was recruited as a would-be shooter in late January. It was done by a man he describes as a retired military officer. Sergei himself also used to be in the military. "We started communicating and he took me under his wing. He saw something in me that he liked. Officers are good psychologists, they see what someone is capable of. He kept me close," Sergei said. That former officer refused to let him join any militant groups that were active on the Maidan: "Your time will come yet," he said. Or were they preparing him psychologically to take up arms? "We didn't develop precise plans. But we talked about it among ourselves, and he was preparing me," the interlocutor replies. The identity of that man remains uncertain, as well as whether he belonged to any of the known Maidan groups. Many things are still unknown to us - for example, who first opened fire on February 20. As for conspiracy theories, perhaps Sergei was manipulated and became a pawn in a larger game. He himself sees it differently. In his own words, he was a simple protester and took up arms in self-defence. "I didn't want to shoot anyone, to kill anyone. But the situation demanded it. I don't feel like a hero. On the contrary, I don't sleep well and have misgivings. I try to control myself, but I get nervous all the time. I have nothing to be proud of. Shooting is easy. Living afterwards is difficult. But you have to defend your country," he says.
Annexes 182 to 184 Intentionally omitted
Annex 185 BBC News, Ukraine crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call (7 February 2014)
Annex 185
Annex 185
Annex 185
Annex 185
Annex 185
Annex 185
Annex 186 Reuters, Special Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacre (10 October 2014)
Annex 186
Special Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of
Maidan massacre
Steve Stecklow, Oleksandr Akymenko
KIEV (Reuters) - For millions of Ukrainians, it was a crime against humanity. In February, more
than 100 protesters were gunned down in the Maidan uprising that toppled the president, Viktor
Yanukovich. The victims are now known as “the Heavenly Hundred.”
Smoke rises above burning barricades at Independence Square during anti-government protests in
Kiev in this February 20, 2014 file photo. REUTERS/David Mdzinarishvili/Files
In April, prosecutors arrested three suspects, members of an elite unit within the “Berkut” riot
police. Senior among them was Dmytro Sadovnyk, 38, a decorated commander, who was accused
of ordering his men to fire on the crowds on the morning of Feb. 20. The three stand accused of
massacring 39 unarmed protesters.
On Sept. 19, the case took a turn when a judge released Sadovnyk into house arrest – and, two
weeks later, he went missing.
Maidan activists were outraged, convinced that a corrupt system had let a killer escape. The judge
was placed under investigation. The prosecutor said in a statement: “D. Sadovnyk, suspected of
committing an extremely grievous crime, aiming to avoid punishment, disappeared from his place
of permanent residence.”
But in a country where justice often isn’t blind, there’s another possibility: Sadovnyk was being
framed, and saw flight as his best option. In court last month, he called the case against him “a
political lynching.” In the days before he vanished, his wife and his lawyer say, Sadovnyk and his
family received death threats.
A Reuters examination of Ukraine’s probes into the Maidan shootings - based on interviews with
prosecutors, defence attorneys, protesters, police officers and legal experts – has uncovered
serious flaws in the case against Sadovnyk and the other two Berkut officers.
Among the evidence presented against Sadovnyk was a photograph. Prosecutors say it shows him
near Kiev’s Independence Square on Feb. 20, wearing a mask and holding a rifle with two hands,
his fingers clearly visible.
The problem: Sadovnyk doesn’t have two hands. His right hand, his wife told Reuters, was blown
off by a grenade in a training accident six years ago. As prosecutors introduced the image at a
hearing in April, said Yuliya Sadovnyk, her husband removed a glove and displayed his stump to
the courtroom.
Special Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacre https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-killings-probe-special-repo...
Стр. 1 из 7 22.02.2023, 16:37
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“He can’t really shoot,” said Serhiy Vilkov, Sadovnyk’s lawyer. “To blame him for the crime is apolitical game.”The probes into the killings have been hindered by missing evidence. Many guns allegedly used toshoot protesters have vanished; many of the bullets fired were taken home as souvenirs.Barricades, bullet-pierced trees and other items of forensic evidence were removed, lawyers say.A former Berkut commander told Reuters that Berkut officers destroyed documentary evidencethat potentially could identify fellow officers. They did so, he said, because they feared the Berkut’sheadquarters would be attacked by a mob of revenge-seeking protesters after Yanukovich fled toRussia.The former president isn’t the only key figure missing. In an interview before Sadovnyk vanished,Ukraine’s general prosecutor, Vitaly Yarema, said investigators had identified 17 Berkut officers asalleged participants in the protester shootings, based on surveillance camera videos and mobile-phone location data. Of the 17, he said, 14 had fled to Russia or Crimea, including the Berkut’s topcommander in Kiev. Sadovnyk and his two co-defendants were the only identified suspects whohad remained behind.MILESTONEIndependence Square was the rallying point in Kiev where the anti-Yanukovich revolution largelyunfolded between November and February. (The word Maidan means “square” in Ukrainian.) Thekillings there quickly were recognised as a milestone in modern Ukrainian history, part of a chainof events that set off a separatist conflict and Russian incursions that have shaken the country toits core.Videos and photographs appear to show how Berkut officers shot at protesters and beat them withsticks. In one video, the Berkut are seen making a man stand naked in the snow.The public is demanding answers and justice. But the investigations are testing Ukraine’s ability torise above the kinds of failings that have hobbled the country ever since its independence from theSoviet Union in 1991.In contrast to, say, Poland, Ukraine has never gelled into a robust state. Kiev has had tworevolutions since independence. A host of endemic problems - political corruption, racketeering, adivide between speakers of Ukrainian and Russian - have left it feeble and fractious. Another of thestate’s chief failings, outside observers say, is a broken justice system.Under Yanukovich and his rivals before him, courts and cops were political instruments. YuliaTymoshenko, runner-up to Yanukovich in the 2010 presidential election, later was jailed in a casewidely criticised as political.In its 2013 report on human rights, the U.S. State Department cited the Tymoshenko conviction inobserving that Ukraine’s courts “remained vulnerable to political pressure and corruption, wereSpecial Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacrehttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-killings-probe-special-repo...Стр. 2 из 722.02.2023, 16:37
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inefficient, and lacked public confidence. In certain cases the outcome of trials appeared to bepredetermined.”The post-Yanukovich government acknowledged as much this July, in a report it prepared with theInternational Monetary Fund. “The tax administration, the police, the Prosecutor General’s Office,the State Enforcement Service, and the judiciary were noted as having traditionally been viewed asamong the most corrupt public institutions,” the report found.The past shows signs of repeating itself.The two prosecutors and a government minister who have led the Maidan shooting probes allplayed roles in supporting the uprising. One of these officials told Reuters that the investigatorsgathering the evidence are completely independent.Another gap in the prosecution: To date, no one has been apprehended in the shooting ofpolicemen. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior Affairs, between Feb. 18 and 20, 189 policeofficers suffered gunshot wounds. Thirteen died.In addition, the former acting general prosecutor who oversaw the arrests of the three Berkutofficers declared on television that they “have already been shown to be guilty.” That statement,said legal experts, could prejudice the cases. Ukraine is a party to the European Convention onHuman Rights, which states that criminal defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty.“A public statement by a prosecutor that directly challenges that presumption is a denial of dueprocess,” said Richard Harvey, a British barrister who specialises in international criminal law.Even some of the bereaved families question the fairness of the proceedings. Serhiy Bondarchuk, aphysics teacher, died of a gunshot wound to the back on the morning of Feb. 20. His son,Volodymyr Bondarchuk, said the killing is one of the 39 in which Sadovnyk and his two colleaguesare suspected. Volodymyr said that based on his own inquiries, he doubts the three wereresponsible for his father’s death.“They are trying to close the case because their bosses and the community just want to havesomeone to punish,” he said. “The investigation does not have enough evidence to prove the guiltof these three people.”Volodymyr Bondarchuk recently helped organise an association of about 70 families of deadprotesters. “The main aim for us,” he said, “is an objective and accurate investigation.”GOLDEN EAGLESFebruary 20 was the bloodiest day of the Maidan uprising. Scores of protesters and police officerswere shot and killed. A day later, opposition leaders signed a European Union-mediated peacepact.Public pressure mounted to prosecute the perpetrators. Within a week, Yanukovich, by then aSpecial Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacrehttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-killings-probe-special-repo...Стр. 3 из 722.02.2023, 16:37
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fugitive, was indicted for the mass murder of protesters. An interim government disbanded theBerkut, a force of several thousand whose name means “golden eagle.”On April 3, Ukrainian authorities announced the arrests of several members of an elite special unitwithin the Berkut. One was Sadovnyk, the unit’s commander. A father of three, he first joined theBerkut in 1996 after serving in the Ukrainian army. He later won numerous commendations for hispolice service.Also detained were two younger officers: Serhiy Zinchenko, 23, and Pavel Abroskin, 24.An internal prosecution document, reviewed by Reuters, sketches out investigators’ version ofevents. It is a “Notice of Suspicion” for Zinchenko, dated April 3.The document alleges that on Feb. 18, the Berkut’s top commander, Serhiy Kusiuk, gave an oralorder to Sadovnyk to deliver automatic rifles to his unit. Kusiuk is among the Berkut officers whofled to Russia, prosecutors say. He couldn’t be reached for comment.On the morning of Feb. 20, several members of Sadovnyk’s unit were shot. At around 9 a.m., thedocument alleges, Sadovnyk ordered his men to fire in the direction of unarmed protesters walkingup Instytutska Street in downtown Kiev. The shooting lasted nearly two hours, and more than nineprotesters were killed, the document states.Sadovnyk’s order to shoot was an abuse of power, “given that there was no immediate threat to thelives of the police officers,” the document alleges.Vilkov, Sadovnyk’s lawyer, disputes that account. Although the document indicates Sadovnyk wasat the scene, Vilkov said his client was not on Instytutska Street when the protesters were killed themorning of Feb. 20. Vilkov declined to discuss Sadovnyk’s whereabouts.In a telephone interview on Sept. 30, Sadovnyk told Reuters he was at a meeting on the morning ofFeb. 20 at Kiev police headquarters. It began sometime between 8 a.m. and 8:30 a.m., he said. Thepurpose, he said, was to deal with reports that many armed protesters would be arriving in Kievafter a call by protest leaders to mobilise.Sadovnyk said about seven police officials and officers were present, and he named three of them.Reuters was unable to locate the three for comment.At the meeting, Sadovnyk said, the attendees heard gunshots and screams over police radios. Theradios carried reports of the death of a Berkut officer and of other police wounded on InstytutskaStreet.Sadovnyk said at that point, he left and drove to the scene, taking about 15 minutes to get there. Hesaid he does not remember what time he arrived, but that investigators could figure it out bytracking his mobile phone. He said he brought a gun and protective equipment.When he arrived, he said, he found a nearly empty scene, with police officers running and thesound of ricocheting bullets. He said he neither received nor gave any order for his unit’s membersSpecial Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacrehttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-killings-probe-special-repo...Стр. 4 из 722.02.2023, 16:37
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to shoot at protesters, nor did he fire at anyone himself.“I deny killing,” he said.Vadim Ostanin, an attorney for the Berkut’s Kiev branch, gave a similar account to Reuters. Hesaid there is a video showing that Sadovnyk attended the meeting at police headquarters. Ostaninsaid that when Sadovnyk arrived at the scene of the shooting, his unit’s men already wereretreating.“GUILTY”The general prosecutor’s office declined to discuss the defence’s account. In a statement, the officesaid it has plenty of evidence against Sadovnyk. This includes videos of a protester being shot by agunman. The office believes the gunman is Sadovnyk, based on the “special way” the shooter isholding the weapon. In a previous statement, the office said: “The question of guilt or, conversely,innocence of mentioned persons will be resolved by the court.”Oleh Makhnitsky was Ukraine’s acting general prosecutor until June. In an interview, Reutersasked him about the purported photograph of a two-handed Sadovnyk, which was cited at ahearing in April.The purpose of that hearing, Makhnitsky said, was not to judge the reliability of the evidence but todetermine whether Sadovnyk was a flight risk. He said the evidence against Sadovnyk would bepresented at a future trial.Makhnitsky, now an adviser to President Petro Poroshenko, said he was a leader of a lawyers’group that provided legal assistance to anti-Yanukovich protesters during the Maidandemonstrations. He said politics played no role in the prosecution of the three Berkut officers.“The investigators are in a separate unit that can’t even be influenced by the prosecutor,” he said.On May 30, Makhnitsky gave an interview on local television about the arrests of the three officers.The suspects, he said, “have already been shown to be guilty.”Asked about those comments by Reuters, Makhnitsky said he meant that “enough evidence wasgathered to prove they are guilty.” A court ultimately will decide, he said.The extent of the prosecution’s evidence against the three officers remains unclear. Court filings inthe cases are not public.Attorneys for officers Zinchenko and Abroskin said that as far as they knew, much of the evidenceagainst their clients consists of videos that prosecutors allege show the officers holding guns. Theattorneys say the men in the videos - wearing masks and helmets - are not their clients.In one video, “only the eyes and nose are seen, and that guy isn’t shooting; he’s just turning aroundwith a gun and looking around,” said Stefan Reshko, an attorney for Abroskin. Reuters did notview the video.Special Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacrehttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-killings-probe-special-repo...Стр. 5 из 722.02.2023, 16:37
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Oleksandr Poznyak, who represents Zinchenko, said the evidence against his client includes avideo of a masked man holding a gun. The attorney showed the video to Reuters. The maskedgunman, he said, is taller and has bigger hands than Zinchenko, and is holding the gun in his lefthand. While Zinchenko writes with his left hand, the lawyer said he has photographs showing thathis client shoots with his right hand. Reuters didn’t view those pictures.Defence attorneys also plan to argue that the Berkut officers were entitled to fire in self-defence:They were in danger, as demonstrated by the fact that their colleagues were shot. Prosecutorsargue that the 39 protesters the three are accused of killing on Feb. 20 were all unarmed.The prosecutors “represent the whole picture as a peaceful protest,” Sadovnyk told a judge at ahearing on Sept. 5. But, he added, “On the 20th, early in the morning, as a result of the peacefulprotest, nearly 17 representatives of law enforcement were killed.”GRAPPLING HOOK & STEEL CLAWTo bolster Sadovnyk’s point, several ex-Berkut officers who still serve on Kiev’s police force agreedto meet a reporter and photographer. In a small room at their old headquarters, they produced aselection of what they said were weapons seized from demonstrators.The items included a grappling hook attached to a steel bar, wooden clubs affixed to chains, and asteel claw made of four welded nails. The ex-officers showed a burnt police shield with two bulletholes that they said had been struck by a Molotov cocktail.Alongside the weaponry were framed photos of two Berkut officers who they said were killed at thedemonstrations.“If these officials were fair, they would catch not only policemen, but also the activists from theother side,” said one ex-Berkut member.On Sept. 5, a tense crowd watched as a judge heard arguments over whether Sadovnyk should bereleased into house arrest. The defendant observed from inside a metal cage.The prosecutor, Oleksii Donskyi, called Sadovnyk’s claim that he was absent during the shootings“a complete lie.” When the judge retired to deliberate in chambers, an exasperated-looking YuliyaSadovnyk marched up to where the prosecutor sat and told him: “I’m waiting for your case tocollapse.” Donskyi declined to comment.The judge ordered that Sadovnyk be kept behind bars. Two weeks later, a different judge gave himhouse arrest. The prosecution appealed. Last Friday, Sadovnyk was called to a hearing todetermine whether he should be sent back to jail.That’s when he vanished. Yuliya Sadovnyk said he left their apartment at 7 a.m. last Friday, sayinghe felt ill. She hasn’t heard from him since, she said.In the days before the hearing, attorney Vilkov says, the Sadovnyks, their three children and thelawyer himself received death threats. Yuliya Sadovnyk read to Reuters a sample of texts sheSpecial Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacrehttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-killings-probe-special-repo...Стр. 6 из 722.02.2023, 16:37
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received.“Hey you, Berkut slut,” reads one. “Horrible death is waiting for you and your spawn. Glory toUkraine!”Abroskin and Zinchenko remain in jail. No trial date has been set. All three men face lifeimprisonment.Additional reporting by Elizabeth Piper in Moscow. Edited by Michael Williams and Sara Ledwith.Special Report: Flaws found in Ukraine's probe of Maidan massacrehttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-killings-probe-special-repo...Стр. 7 из 722.02.2023, 16:37
Annex 187
Sputnik International, Incidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017
(31 August 2017)
Annex 187
Incidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in
2014-2017
Sputnik International
MOSCOW (Sputnik) – Below is the list of other incidents with Russian reporters that took place
between 2014 and 2017 in Ukraine starting from the most recent ones.
2017
On Wednesday, the Rossiya 24 television channel crew came under fire by Ukrainian military
outside Donetsk as it was filming a story about observing the "school truce." No one was hurt.
31 August 2017, 04:06 GMT
On August 16, the TV Center television channel reporters came under fire from the Ukrainian
military in Horlivka. The fire came from the positions of the 128th brigade near the Novoluhans'ke
town. No one was hurt.
On August 15, Ukraine expelled Tamara Nersesyan, a Russian reporter and a special VGTRK
correspondent.
On July 26, it transpired that a Russian reporter, an employee of Rossiya 1 and Rossiya 24
television channels, Maria Knyazeva, was expelled from Ukraine and denied entry to that country
for three years. According to the SBU, Knyazeva led "subversive activities under the pseudonym
Saushkina."
On May 7, the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper reported that its two reporters Maria Remizova
and Elena Boduen, who were properly accredited for the Eurovision song contest, were denied
entry to Ukraine. They were taken off the train by Ukrainian border guards at the Konotop
checkpoint.
On May 6, Director of MIA Rossiya Segodnya’s Joint Photo Information Directorate Alexander
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Shtol said that the agency’s photo correspondent Ramil Sitdikov, who was properly accreditedfor Eurovision, was denied entry to Ukraine. He was issued an official entry denial letter saying hewas denied entry "due to an unconfirmed reason for the visit."On January 31, a cameraman from the Life television channel was wounded in the legduring shelling of the Kievsky district of Donetsk.On January 29, the crew of the NTV television channel found itself in the shelling zone in the townof Makiivka. The incident took place during recording of interviews with civilians in Makiivka'sdistricts, which came under fire the day before. No one was injured.2016On December 19, in Kiev, about 20 people broke into RIA Novosti office demanding to stop a videoconference with Ukrainian cities, which was held as part of the Ukrainian Compatriots Congressin Russia. Aggressive young people shouted out anti-Russian slogans. The reporters remainedin the office and called in the security and the police. After their arrival, the radical protesters leftthe building.On December 12, reporters from several Russian TV channels and news agencies working in thevillage of Sakhanka, came under machine gun fire. No one was hurt.On May 17, the NTV television channel film crew came under fire in the Donetsk region. Followinga meeting with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)in Dokuchajevs'k, the crew members went to the Yasinuvata checkpoint to monitor the situationand to shoot the ceasefire compliance video. Upon arrival, a Ukrainian sniper opened fire at thecrew. The correspondents managed to leave the place. No one was hurt.30 August 2017, 18:06 GMTOn May 15, the Rossiya television channel crew came under the mortar fire of the Ukrainianmilitary near the Yasinuvata checkpoint off the Donetsk-Horlivka motorway. The correspondentscame under a grenade launcher and small arms fire as well. No one was hurt thanks to the militiawho helped the reporters out of the danger zone risking their lives.Incidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017https://sputniknews.com/20170831/russian-reporters-ukraine-105694...Стр. 2 из 822.02.2023, 17:13
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On April 24, without any explanation, Ukrainian border guards denied entry to the country for aperiod of five years to VGTRK special correspondent Darya Grigorova, as they let her know about itupon her arrival at the airport.On March 26, the LifeNews television channel crew came under fire outside the Yasinuvatacheckpoint. The film crew was filming their story when shelling began in the vicinity of thecheckpoint.On March 14, a group of reporters came under fire outside Zaitseve village near Horlivka. No onewas hurt. The Russian reporters who came under fire were representing VGTRK, Channel One andZvezda.2015On September 24, a group of unidentified people detained the Central Television correspondentYekaterina Voronina on the Ukraine-Crimea border outside the town of Kalanchak. Being on aneditorial assignment, she and a Ukrainian stringer cameraman were filming a story about theblockade of Crimea by the Right Sector, an extremist organization outlawed in Russia. After manyhours of interrogation, the SBU let her go.On August 12, the REN TV crew, working outside the Donetsk airport, came under fire from theUkrainian military. The shelling took place in the Oktyabrsky district around noon. The groupconsisted of correspondent Stanislav Bernvald and cameraman Kirill Piktorinsky.On July 30, it became known that the REN TV television channel film crew came under mortar firein Horlivka. No one was hurt. The reporters spent the night in the school basement together with adozen of townspeople.On July 1, the Channel One television channel lost track of its correspondent AlexandraCherepnina. In a while, Cherepnina contacted her colleagues saying she was detained by the SBUand charged with making a fake video. Later, the security service's representatives said thatCherepnina was denied entry to Ukraine for three years, since the Russian reporter "was tryingto film a fake video discrediting the Ukrainian authorities."On June 15, the Russian REN TV channel correspondents came under fire as they were shootingvideo in Donetsk. No one was hurt.On June 2, the Rossiya 24 television channel reporters were detained on Maidan Nezalezhnosti(Independence Square) in Kiev. Cameraman Maxim Grinevich and reporter Ksenia Kolchina werearrested by the SBU and released shortly thereafter following an identity check.Incidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017https://sputniknews.com/20170831/russian-reporters-ukraine-105694...Стр. 3 из 822.02.2023, 17:13
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On April 14, journalist of the Russian Zvezda TV Channel Andrei Lunin tripped on a booby trapmine in the village of Shyrokyne. Heavily wounded in the head and a leg he was taken to hospitalin the city of Novoazovs'k in serious condition. NTV cameraman Stanislav Skripnik and NTVcorrespondent Daniil Levi came under shelling in Shyrokyne on the same day but emergedunscathed.On March 24, correspondent of the Russian REN TV Channel Dmitry Vakhnitsky and cameramanFyodor Boldyrev came under shelling by the Ukrainian side and were blocked in Shyrokyne.According to the channel, they managed to get out of the shelled car and hide in a house. Lateron it transpired that the journalists broke away from the settlement.On March 19, Leonid Muravyev, a correspondent of the Fifth Channel, was ousted by the SBUfor propaganda materials about the conflict in eastern Ukraine. He was banned from enteringUkraine for five years.On February 26, journalists of the LifeNews TV Channel Zhanna Karpenko and Alexander Ulyanovwere prevented from leaving the transit zone of Boryspil Airport in Kiev and using telephone andSkype.On February 25, SBU employees detained journalists of the Channel One Yelena Makarova andSergei Korenev and NTV correspondent Andrei Grigoryev. On February 26, it was reported that alldetainees returned to Moscow.On February 25, correspondent of the NTV TV Channel Inna Osipova was not allowed to enterUkraine. She arrived on a flight from Moscow to Kiev’s Zhuliany Airport but was not allowedto leave it on the grounds that she "cannot explain the goal of her planned stay in Ukraine."On February 17, correspondent of the RT broadcaster and two cameramen came under mortar firewhile filming in Donetsk Airport. Nobody was injured. A channel representative emphasized thatthe fire was opened at the film crew "despite the fact that the RT journalists were wearing bullet-proof vests with the word "Press."On February 22, the SBU detained in Mykolaiv Russian journalist, Ukrainian national AndreiZakharchyuk who worked part time for the Nevskiye Novosti news agency. According to theagency, he arrived in Ukraine on February 2 and was arrested by the SBU for "wrong coverageof events in Ukraine." Zakharchyuk was released on February 21 during prisoners’ exchange on theterritory of the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR).On February 6, journalists of RT Roman Kosarev and Anna Knishchenko came under fire in thecity of Vuhlehirs'k near Donetsk. Russian journalists Dmitry Malyshev and Artyom Kol also gotIncidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017https://sputniknews.com/20170831/russian-reporters-ukraine-105694...Стр. 4 из 822.02.2023, 17:13
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under fire.On January 30, correspondent Yelizaveta Khramtsova and camerawoman Natalya Kalyshevafrom LifeNews were detained by the SBU in Kiev. On January 31, they were deported from Ukraineat the Syn'kivka checkpoint on the Ukrainian-Russian border and prohibited from enteringUkraine in the next five years.On January 20, the film crew of the Rossiya 24 TV Channel came under fire in downtown Donetsk.The shelling began when the crew headed for the Kievsky avenue to check a report about theexplosion of a mine on a bus stop, as a result of which one man was killed and six people wounded.Journalists from other Russian and local channels were also at the street at the same time.On January 16, LifeNews reported that protesters in downtown Kiev attacked its journalists.During a rally for the resignation of Ukraine's Prosecutor General Vitaly Yaryoma, which wascovered by correspondent Zhanna Karpenko and camerawoman Alexandra Ulyanova, about 20people rushed to the women and broke their expensive equipment. The women managed to extracta video of the attack from a flash card.On January 1, unidentified people battered the LifeNews correspondent and camerawomanduring a torch march of nationalists in downtown Kiev. The channel reported that after thesepeople pushed the correspondent, she fell down and knocked her head. The hoodlums took hertelephone and destroyed the camera of the camerawoman.2014On November 26, LifeNews reported that its correspondent Yevgeniya Zmanovskaya was beatenin Kiev while fulfilling her editorial assignment. Zmanovskaya was covering the action of footballfans who gathered at the Ukraina Palace of Arts to wreck the concert of singer Ani Lorak.On November 19, the film crew of REN TV was not allowed to enter Ukraine. Accordingto Ukrainian customs officers, they were deported from Kiev’s Boryspil Airport because havingarrived as tourists they could not prove that they will spend all the time in Kiev.On November 14, the film crew of Rossiya 1 came under shelling in the Luhansk Region. Nobodywas hurt.On November 13, the film crew of the VGTRK came under shelling in the Kuibyshevsky Districtof Donetsk. Nobody was hurt.On November 3, Zmanovskaya was detained in Kiev while covering the Slavic March on theinstruction of her media outlet. She was surrounded by Ukrainian journalists who called apoliceman to check her documents. She had her journalist card but not her passport and wasdetained for this reason. Soon after that she had been released after her colleague brought herpassport.On October 23, Russian journalist Yevgeny Kiselev reported his deportation from Ukraine. He hadIncidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017https://sputniknews.com/20170831/russian-reporters-ukraine-105694...Стр. 5 из 822.02.2023, 17:13
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conducted political shows on the Ukrainian TV Channel Inter for several years. He said he was notallowed to cross the border in Kiev’s Boryspil International Airport and was given an order on hisdeportation. Soon after that Ukraine’s State Border Service allowed Kiselev to come to Ukraine.On September 29, a correspondent and cameraman of REN TV came under shelling near DonetskAirport but were not injured.On September 10, REN TV correspondent Nikolai Kubantsev came under fire in Ukraine but wasnot hurt.On August 28, photo correspondent of Novaya Gazeta Yevgeny Feldman was detained but lateron released by representatives of the Ukrainian National Guards in Mar'inka.On August 25, freelance correspondent of the Rossiya Segodnya International Information AgencyMaxim Vasilenko and his colleague, correspondent of the Krymsky Telegraf publication YevgenyKorolyov were detained by the militants of Ukraine’s Right Sector in the Donetsk Region. OnAugust 26, it was reported that they were released.On August 24, unidentified armed people stopped a car on Makeyevskoye Highway in Donetsk.Anna Mokhova, a freelance correspondent of the Pervy Krymsky TV Channel and journalist AlexeiShapovalov had to leave the car. Ukraine’s secret services kept Mokhova in the city of Izyum in theKharkov Region for over a month. She was suspected of illegally crossing the Ukrainian border "forcarrying out assignments of Russian secret services." Mokhova was released during exchangeof prisoners between the militia and the Ukrainian army on September 22.On August 22, journalists of Rossiya Segodnya, TASS, NTV and the Channel One, to name a fewcame under mortar fire while working on the territory adjacent to the city administrationin Luhansk. Nobody was hurt.Since August 5, special correspondent of Rossiya Segodnya Andrei Stenin stopped getting in touchwith the agency. He worked in Donetsk, Slovyansk and other cities of eastern Ukraine. On August5, the editorial staff received the latest material from him. On September 3, it became known thatStenin was killed on August 6 near Donetsk — the car in which he was traveling for an editorialassignment, was shot and burned on the highway. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed anexecutive order on awarding Stenin with the Order of Courage posthumously for heroism in theperformance of professional duty.On July 11, a LifeNews cameraman, Valery Moroz, was wounded in the arm with a mine fragmentduring the shelling in Luhansk.On July 3, the Channel One’s crew, who worked in Slovyansk, came under fire. The hotel, wherethe journalists were staying, was bombed. At that moment, the crew filmed a story, and at the timeof the explosion the camera was turned on.On July 1, REN TV journalist Denis Kulaga and cameraman Vadim Yudin were wounded in theLuhansk Region. A shell exploded near the correspondent, leading to hearing disorder. YudinIncidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017https://sputniknews.com/20170831/russian-reporters-ukraine-105694...Стр. 6 из 822.02.2023, 17:13
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received contusion.On June 30, the Russian Channel One’s cameraman Anatoly Klyan was killed by the Kiev securityforces in Donetsk. He was one of the passengers in a bus transferring soldiers' mothers whodemanded the dissolution of a military unit. He was wounded in the stomach as a result of theshelling and died on the way to the hospital. By presidential executive order, Anatoly Klyan wasawarded the Order of Courage posthumously.On June 24, the crew of the Channel One came under mortar shelling near Slovyansk, no one washurt.On June 17, Vesti correspondent Igor Kornelyuk and video engineer Anton Voloshin were killedas a result of mortar shelling of the village of Metalist and Mirne near Luhansk. The journalistswere buried at the Troyekurovsky cemetery in Moscow. By the presidential executive order, thejournalists were awarded the Order of Courage posthumously for courage and heroism shownin the performance of professional duty.On June 16, a group of journalists, including Stenin, freelance fellow with the Ruptly video agencyof RT Andrei Krasnoshchyokov, and correspondents of Komsomolskaya Pravda Alexander Kotsand Dmitry Steshin were shot near Slovyansk. As a result of the shelling, no one was hurt.On June 14, the Zvezda television channel reported the detention of its journalists in Ukraine.Correspondent Yevgeny Davydov and sound engineer Nikita Konashenkov were detainedin Dnepropetrovsk by officers of the SBU. On June 16, the journalists were released and flewto Moscow.On June 11, the Channel One crew came under fire in the village of Semyonovka near UkrainianSlovyansk. No one was hurt.On June 6, journalists of the Zvezda television channel Andrei Sushenkov and Anton Malyshevwere detained at a checkpoint near Slovyansk. They were accused of monitoring the checkpointand gathering information about it. They were transferred under control of the SBU. On June 9,the journalists were released and handed over to the Russian side.On May 29, the crew of the Rossiya 24 TV channel was bombarded in Donetsk, when they filmedfootage for their story near the airport. None of the journalists were injured.On May 27, the crew of the MIR 24 TV channel came under sniping fire in Donetsk, the journalistswere not injured and continued to work in the regular mode.On May 22, a car of LifeNews’ crew was fired upon near Lysychansk, the journalists were notinjured.On May 18, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry announced the detention of LifeNews journalists OlegSidyakin and Marat Saichenko near Kramatorsk. The Ukrainian authorities accused themof promoting "terrorism" in the east of the country. On May 25, the journalists were released, flewIncidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017https://sputniknews.com/20170831/russian-reporters-ukraine-105694...Стр. 7 из 822.02.2023, 17:13
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to the city of Grozny and later returned to Moscow.On May 15, the Fifth Channel crew came under fire of Ukrainian troops in Kramatorsk along withRT journalists. To evade the shelling, the driver made a sharp maneuver, because of which the carmoved into a ditch. None of the journalists were injured.On May 13, it became known that LifeNews crew was fired near Kramatorsk: the Ukrainian troopsopened fire from automatic weapons near the village of Oktyabrskoye. Correspondents OlegSidyakin, Marat Saichanko and Marat Abulkhatin managed to find shelter, so none of them wasinjured. On May 7, it was reported that Ukrainian military opened fire on LifeNews journalistsnear Slovyansk.On May 9, 23-year-old freelance cameraman of RUPTLY Fyodor Zavaleikov was woundedduring the fighting in Mariupol. With a heavy bullet wound in his stomach, he was taken to a localhospital, where he underwent an emergency operation. On May 12, Zavaleikov was takento Moscow, where he underwent a second operation. At the end of May, he was dischargedfrom the hospital.On April 16, Rossiya 24 crew — correspondent Yevgeny Reshetnev, cameraman Sergei Truskov andengineer Vadim Klivanov — was detained near the town of Izyum without explanation. On April 17,the crew was released.In April, correspondent of Segodnya.Ru online outlet Alexei Khudyakov was kidnapped by peoplewearing masks in the center of Donetsk. The kidnappers introduced themselves as officers of theSBU and took the journalist to the forest, where they intimidated and forced him to signdocuments indicating that he was ready to work for the security service as an agent in Moscow.Incidents With Russian Reporters in Ukraine in 2014-2017https://sputniknews.com/20170831/russian-reporters-ukraine-105694...Стр. 8 из 822.02.2023, 17:13
Annex 188 Unian.ua, Military warehouses with weapons burn in Lvov (19 February 2014)
Annex 188
Translation
Unian.ua, Military warehouses with weapons burn in Lvov (19 February 2014), available at:
https://www.unian.ua/politics/886677-u-lvovi-goryat-viyskovi-skladi-zi-zbroeyu.html.
Military warehouses with weapons burn in Lvov
UNIAN editorial board
Military warehouses are burning in Lvov / 032.ua
Pavel Vasilenko, head of the press service of the State Emergency Service in Lvov region, told
UNIAN that the fire started in the morning and was extinguished throughout the day, but has now
flared up with renewed vigour. The fire destroyed the barracks and spread from the barracks to the
ammunition depots. Explosions began to be heard.
According to Vasilenko, the rescuers were forced to leave the area near the ammunition depots to
avoid danger. Firefighters are staying nearby, waiting for the explosions to stop, as the rescuers do
not have information on the amount and type of ammunition on the territory of the unit.
"The firefighting work will continue when the explosions stop and people can feel safe. We don't
know what kind of ammunition is stored in the warehouses and, ultimately, we have no right to
know. The warehouses are sealed."
Annex 188
The activists who blocked the military unit are at a safe distance, and the military have been evacuated from the area. There is no information about the victims. As UNIAN reported, today, February 19, in Lvov, protesters seized the buildings of the regional state administration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine, the prosecutor's office, the tax office and two district police stations. Soldiers of the Internal Troops on Stryiskaya-Rubchak Street tried to leave the territory of the unit, but were blocked by Lvov residents, who gathered about 5,000. A fire broke out on the barricades, spreading to the checkpoint and barracks, one of which burned to the ground. The protesters disarmed the Internal Troops and sealed the weapons depots.
Annex 189
KPHG, Ukraine follows Russia in dubious ‘State treason’ arrests (16 February 2015)
Annex 189
Ukraine follows Russia in dubious ‘State treason’
arrests
Halya Coynash
In the last week two Ukrainian journalists have been detained on suspicion of committing ‘state
treason’. If the detention on Feb 8 of Ivano-Frankivsk blogger Ruslan Kotsaba was clearly
unjustified, but the charges seemed to warrant investigation, the new arrest of journalist Andriy
Zakharchuk can have no justification in a post-Maidan democratic Ukraine.
A Mykolaiv court remanded Zakharchuk in custody for two months on Feb 12, following his arrest
by SBU [Security Service] officers two days earlier. The 25-year-old Ukrainian national is living in
St. Petersburg working for the news agency ‘Nevskiye novosti’, and seemingly also writes for the
Russian Federal News Agency [FAN].
The journalist’s father Vasyl Zakharchuk told Prestupnosti.net that his son writes about sport,
culture and public life in St Petersburg. This can easily be checked and does indeed appear to be
the case. Vasyl Zakharchuk explains that FAN was starting up a project covering life in Ukraine
and his son’s work trip was to gather information about how people live in cities in the South-East
of Ukraine. Whatever the federal news agency’s plans, the article which Zakharchuk wrote about
his visit to Odessa contained nothing suspicious at all.
Nor is it clear what it could contain that would warrant being accused of ‘state treason’.
The charges appear to derive from his activities in Mykolaiv. The investigators have found
something deeply incriminating in the fact that a journalist should have taken photos of the
Inhulsky and some pedestrian bridges; a shipbuilding factory and the Mykolaiv armoured tank
factory. The two factories are part of the state defence industry.
A camera, tablet and laptop were taken away and the prosecutor informs “that in the journalist’s
technology correspondence was discovered that confirms that he belongs to a Russian news
agency”. It would have been simpler to just ask him.
Ukraine follows Russia in dubious ‘State treason’ arrests https://khpg.org/en/1423918032
Стр. 1 из 3 22.02.2023, 17:44
Annex 189
Most worryingly, the prosecutor’s request to remand Zakharchuk in custody began with referenceto the parliamentary resolution adopted on Jan 27 which declared Russia to be an aggressor state. The prosecutor then cited Article 65 of Ukraine’s Constitution which states that “Defence of theMotherland, of the independence and territorial indivisibility of Ukraine, and respect for its statesymbols, are the duties of citizens of Ukraine. Citizens perform military service in accordancewith the law.”He then asserted that “during armed conflict in the east of Ukraine in January 2015 Ukrainiannational Andrei Zakharchuk, working for the Russian news agency FAN and Nevskie Novosti,and in breach of Article 65 of Ukraine’s Constitution, and aware that he was in a criminal linkwith an aggressor state, in order to provide it with assistance in carrying out subversive activityagainst Ukraine, passed on photographic material for dishonest coverage of events in Ukraineand inciting separatist moods in Ukraine. The said information agencies are propagandavehicles, that is, they cover events in Ukraine by distorting facts and providing falseinformation.”The prosecutor then moves on to the specific photos taken “in order to pass the information to theRussian Federation aggressor state”. According to this version, Zakharchuk was passing on photos of the armoured tank factory to aRussian news agency “for the purpose of propaganda-filled and anti-Ukraine coverage of eventsin Ukraine, the anti-terrorist operation, including the technical state of the Ukrainian defencecomplex and the possibilities for countering illegal armed formations in the East of Ukraine, thusposing a threat to Ukraine’s national security in the information and military spheres”.On the basis of the above, the prosecutor concluded that Andrei Zakharchuk was “justifiablysuspected of state treason”.Andriy Lokhmatov, writing for Prestupnosti.net, demolishes the ‘evidence’ presented by theprosecution. He points out that it basically confirms only that Zakharchuk had the technology onemight expect a journalist to have, that he works as a journalist in general and that while in Ukrainehe was taking photographs. The one fact with marginally more substance is only incriminating atfirst glance. A photograph similar to one found on Zakharchuk’s equipment was used in an overtlypropaganda-filled article on FAN about Kharkiv supporters of the Kremlin-backed militants inDonbas. There is no evidence that Zakharchuk had any input in that article or, in fact, any materialwhich was overtly anti-Ukrainian. The article in question was signed by somebody called SergeiBendin who was interviewing a person in Moscow. This is the second arrest of a journalist. In the case of Ruslan Kotsaba, his behaviour andutterances were viewed by very many people as being against Ukraine, with some observerstherefore believing that the SBU might have other evidence to justify his detention. There washowever concern then about the measures taken, especially since they had followed a video inwhich he was expressing his opinion, no more, on the subject of mobilization.Ukraine follows Russia in dubious ‘State treason’ arrestshttps://khpg.org/en/1423918032Стр. 2 из 322.02.2023, 17:44
Annex 189
The arrest and detention of Andrei Zakharchuk are simply incomprehensible and a very worryingdevelopment. Russia may be following in the Soviet traditions of trying people for ‘anti-Sovietagitation and propaganda”. Ukraine has taken a different path and even in the face of openRussian aggression, cannot try journalists for ‘state treason’. Ukraine follows Russia in dubious ‘State treason’ arrestshttps://khpg.org/en/1423918032Стр. 3 из 322.02.2023, 17:44
Annex 190
Human Rights Watch,Ukraine Foreign Journalists Barred or Expelled (1 September 2017)
Annex 190
Ukraine: Foreign Journalists Barred or Expelled
(Kyiv) – Ukrainian authorities have detained and expelled several foreign journalists in recent
weeks, most recently Russian reporter Anna Kurbatova, Human Rights Watch said today. In just
over a month, the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) have expelled or denied entry to at least five
foreign journalists – three from Russia and two from Spain – for allegedly engaging in anti-
Ukrainian “propaganda.”
“The Ukrainian government’s practice of accusing journalists of anti-Ukraine bias, then expelling
them or denying them entry, is a serious violation of its international human rights commitments,”
said Tanya Cooper, Ukraine researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Barring journalists is shortsighted
and vindictive, and undermines Ukraine’s pledges on democratic reforms and the rule of
law.”
On August 30, 2017, the SBU in Kyiv detained Kurbatova, a journalist with Channel One, a major
Russian television station. An SBU spokesperson announced via Facebook that Kurbatova had
been expelled and banned from Ukraine for three years. The spokesperson also said that this
would happen to “anyone who allows themselves to discredit Ukraine.”
In one of her latest reports from Kyiv, Kurbatova described Ukraine’s Independence Day
anniversary as a “sad celebration” due to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine and economic
hardships in the country.
Kurbatova’s detention and removal from Ukraine is the latest example of mistreatment of foreign
journalists.
On August 25, the SBU denied entry to two Spanish journalists, Antonio Pampliega and Manuel
Ángel Sastre, and barred them for three years. Pampliega and Sastre work for several media
outlets, and had covered the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine. The SBU accused the journalists of
carrying out “activities countering national interests of Ukraine.”
On August 29, Ukraine’s Ministry of Information Policy released a statement expressing concern
about the journalists’ situation and claiming that it had “filed requests to the relevant law
enforcement agencies, including the SBU, asking for a detailed explanation.” The journalists wrote
on Twitter that they had been detained in the Kyiv Boryspil airport for 20 hours, “treated like
criminals,” and then sent back to Spain without explanation. The journalists covered a variety of
issues related to the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, including the plight of civilians in the
conflict zone, and criticized the Ukrainian government for not doing enough to protect them.
On August 14, the SBU detained and expelled Tamara Nersesyan, a correspondent with the
Russian state television and radio company VGTRK, accusing her of “actions damaging to
Ukraine’s national interests.” Nersesyan was banned from entering the country for three years.
Ukraine: Foreign Journalists Barred or Expelled https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/01/ukraine-foreign-journalists-bar...
Стр. 1 из 2 22.02.2023, 17:57
Annex 190
Another VGTRK journalist, Dariya Grigorieva, was expelled from Ukraine in April and banned forfive years.On July 26, the SBU expelled Maria Knyazeva, a journalist with Russian television channelsRossiya 1 and Rossiya 24. The SBU also banned Knyazeva from entering Ukraine on the grounds of“biased coverage of the situation in Ukraine.”The Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organization for the Security and Cooperationin Europe (OSCE), Harlem Desir, expressed concern over the detentions and expulsions ofjournalists. Ukraine is a member of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, as well as a party to theEuropean Convention on Human Rights and has taken on specific obligations to respect andprotect freedom of expression and support media freedom.Much of the mainstream media in Russia, including television, print, and online outlets, are eitherowned or indirectly controlled by the state and have become the voice of the government.Moreover, some use elaborate propaganda tools, including blatant misinformation, to mobilizepatriotic support for the government and its agenda, including support of armed groups in easternUkraine and Russia’s occupation of Crimea.“Ukraine has legitimate reasons to be concerned about biased or false media reports, particularlyRussian propaganda, but barring journalists is not the answer,” Cooper said. “The authoritiesshould make Ukraine a country where media can convey different views without fear ofretaliation.”Ukraine: Foreign Journalists Barred or Expelledhttps://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/01/ukraine-foreign-journalists-bar...Стр. 2 из 222.02.2023, 17:57
Annex 191 The Guardian, Rebel Leader Alexander Zakharchenko Killed in Explosion in Ukraine (31 August 2018)
Annex 191
9/24/22, 3:22 PM Rebel leader Alexander Zakharchenko killed in explosion in Ukraine | Ukraine | The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/rebel-leader-alexander-zakharchenko-killed-in-explosion-in-ukraine 1/3
This article is more than 4 years old
Rebel leader Alexander Zakharchenko killed in
explosion in Ukraine
in Moscow
Fri 31 Aug 2018 18.09 BST
The leader of a Kremlin-backed separatist republic in war-torn eastern Ukraine
has been killed in a blast that tore through a cafe close to his official residence in
Donetsk.
Alexander Zakharchenko, 42, was named prime minister of the so-called
Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) in November 2014. The DNR’s official news
agency confirmed his death and said the republic’s finance minister, Alexander
Timofeev, was injured when the explosive device went off in the Separ café in
the centre of Donetsk. The bomb was planted in a nearby vehicle, Ukrainian
media reported.
Zakharchenko is the latest in a series of separatist leaders to have been
i d d i h i fli i Uk i h h
Annex 191
9/24/22, 3:22 PMRebel leader Alexander Zakharchenko killed in explosion in Ukraine | Ukraine | The Guardianhttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/rebel-leader-alexander-zakharchenko-killed-in-explosion-in-ukraine2/3Related storiesassassinated during the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine, where more than10,000 people have died since fighting broke between Kremlin-backedseparatists and pro-Ukrainian government forces in 2014, according to UNfigures. More than 1.5 million people have been displaced by the fighting.Vladimir Putin called the killing a “dastardly” act that aimed to destabilise thefragile peace in the region and the Russian president expressed his condolencesto Zakharchenko’s family. The Russian foreign ministry was quick to react, accusing the Ukrainiangovernment of ordering the “terrorist attack”, although Putin’s later statementdid not blame Kiev for the killing.The Ukrainian security service chief, Igor Guskov, said Zakharchenko’s deathcould have been the result of infighting between rival separatist factions or anoperation by Russian special forces. Kiev has previously accused Russia ofkilling separatist figures who refuse to obey Kremlin orders.Separatist forces have detained a number of suspects, Russia’s Interfax newsagency reported, citing a security service source in Donetsk. “Several Ukrainiansaboteurs and people connected to them have been arrested on suspicion ofinvolvement in the assassination of the republic’s leader,” Interfax quoted thesource as saying.Numerous international attempts to secure a lasting ceasefire in eastern Ukrainehave been unsuccessful. The United States and European countries imposedeconomic sanctions on Russia over its military actions in Ukraine in 2014,including the Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea. Putin denies sending troops andweapons to eastern Ukraine, but admits that some Russian “volunteers” arefighting alongside separatist forces.Ukraine’s infrastructure minister, Volodymyr Omelyan, said this month thatKiev would sever all remaining public transport links to Russia over its militaryactions in eastern Ukraine, as well as an increase in Russian naval activity nearCrimea. There have been no direct flights between the two former Sovietrepublics since October 2015.
Annex 191
9/24/22, 3:22 PMRebel leader Alexander Zakharchenko killed in explosion in Ukraine | Ukraine | The Guardianhttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/31/rebel-leader-alexander-zakharchenko-killed-in-explosion-in-ukraine3/3Blast that killed UkrainePoWs was Kremlinoperation, Kyiv claims3 Aug 2022Former British soldierkilled ghting Russianforces in Ukraine12 Jun 2022French journalist killshrapnel from Russiashell in eastern Ukrai31 May 2022Authorities must‘deal decisively’ withprotests, says president1h agoAttemptsto delay MaraLagoinquiry largely fail as legalwoes mount3h agoPosttropicalcyclone hits easternCanada with hurricanforce winds21m ago
Annex 192 Deutsche Welle, Alexander Zakharchenko: The Latest Ukrainian Rebel Leader to Face an Abrupt Death (2 September 2018)
Annex 192
Alexander Zakharchenko: The latest
Ukrainian rebel leader to face an abrupt
death | DW | 02.09.2018
Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com)
Bomb attacks, ambushes, mysterious illnesses — militant leaders in eastern
Ukraine often die in violent and dramatic ways, even far away from the front
line. And now, Alexander Zakharchenko has died in a bomb blast.
Rebels in Ukraine are still reeling from the assassination of the head of the selfproclaimed
"Donetsk People's Republic," Alexander Zakharchenko, who was
killed by a bomb blast on August 31 while sitting in a coffee shop in downtown
Donetsk. The entity's "finance minister" and a youth leader were injured in the
attack. The rebels say they captured "Ukrainian operatives" after the bombing.
Russian news site Lenta.ru tweeted the CCTV video showing the moment of the
blast, which had been published by state-funded Rossiya 1.
However, 42-year-old Zakharchenko is only the latest in a line of rebel
commanders who have died in dramatic ways. Another Donetsk leader, Vladimir
Makovich, briefly served as the "vice speaker" of the rebel assembly in 2014
before fading into the background of the rebel administration. He died in 2017,
with the official cause of death being a brain tumor. He was 54 years old.
Shot during an ambush
Just a few months before Makovich's passing, battalion commander Mikhail
Tolstykh was killed when someone fired an incendiary rocket at his office outside
Donetsk. Tolstykh, better known by his nom de guerre "Givi," was 36 at the time.
Alexander Zakharchenko: The latest Ukrainian rebel leader to face an... https://www.dw.com/en/alexander-zakharchenko-the-latest-ukrainian-...
1 of 3 9/26/2022, 10:42 PM
Annex 192
Rebel commander Arsen Pavlov, also known as 'Motorola'In 2016, top militant leader Arsen Pavlov, also known as "Motorola," was killedwhen a bomb was placed in an elevator of his apartment building. The Russian-born warlord was 33, and the commander of the so-called "Sparta" battalion.Rebel officials blamed both of the commanders' deaths on "Ukrainianoperatives." Kyiv denied any involvement and pointed the finger at Moscow,describing such attacks as Russia-sponsored "purges."Heart attack at 46All in all, nearly a dozen high-ranking militants were killed in the last threeyears. Others faced unexpected diseases. The first leader of the "LuhanskPeople's Republic," Valeri Bolotov, 46, died in early 2017 while in his Moscowapartment. Heart failure was the reported cause of death, but some mediaoutlets speculated that the politician had been poisoned. Bolotov had resignedhis Luhansk function as early as August 2014 and had lived away from the publiceye until his death.Bolotov's close aide Gennadiy Tsypkalov, 43, reportedly killed himself in 2016while in custody. He was being investigated over an alleged coup attempt.Tsypkalov's death also sparked rumors that the politician, who once served asprime minister of the Luhansk-based entity, was murdered.Trading blame between Kyiv and MoscowThe attack that claimed the life of Zakharchenko has once again set off a spiral ofaccusations between Kyiv and Moscow. Russia quickly stated it has "all reasonsto believe" that Ukraine was behind the blast. This was corroborated by rebels,who referred to the suspects they had in custody.In turn, the Ukrainian security service SBU put forward two theories aboutZakharchenko's assassination, saying that he might have been killed due to apower struggle between the warlords or that he may have been removed byRussian agents after falling from Moscow's grace.Alexander Zakharchenko: The latest Ukrainian rebel leader to face an...https://www.dw.com/en/alexander-zakharchenko-the-latest-ukrainian-...2 of 39/26/2022, 10:42 PM
Annex 192
Zakharchenko is unlikely to be the last rebel leader to die a violent death in theUkraine fighting, which has already claimed over 10,000 lives.Alexander Zakharchenko: The latest Ukrainian rebel leader to face an...https://www.dw.com/en/alexander-zakharchenko-the-latest-ukrainian-...3 of 39/26/2022, 10:42 PM
Annex 193
European Pravda, No pressure over Concessions: Kuleba on Negotiations with Germany’s
Foreign Minister (7 February 2022)
(translation)
Annex 193
Translation
European Pravda, No pressure over Concessions: Kuleba on Negotiations with Germany’s
Foreign Minister (7 February 2022), available at:
https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/news/2022/02/7/7133666/
No pressure over Concessions: Kuleba on
Negotiations with Germany’s Foreign
Minister
MONDAY, 7 FEBRUARY 2022, 17:43
The Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba has assured that there is no pressure on Ukraine
from Germany for the sake of any concessions from the Ukrainian side in an attempt to reduce
tension between the West and Ukraine, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other.
According to a correspondent of the European Pravda, he said this at a joint press conference
with German Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, in Kiev.
Dmytro Kuleba stated that at the meeting he reiterated which issues were categorical "red lines"
for Ukraine: first, no concessions on territorial integrity, second, no negotiations with the
militants, and third, Ukraine's full right to determine its own foreign policy.
"By no means do I want to say that Annalena Baerbock said something to the contrary to me and
I was trying to persuade her. Now, the question about whether foreign guests are forcing us to
make any concessions is very popular in Ukraine. I declare with absolute responsibility that
neither during today's meeting nor before it did Annalena Baerbock force me to make any
concessions on the issue of the conflict resolution. It was an exchange of views between friends
and partners, who seek the same thing - to resolve this conflict by diplomatic means", Dmitriy
Kuleba stressed.
Let us recall that that the head of the German foreign ministry is one of the four EU foreign
ministers who are visiting Ukraine on 7 February. The foreign ministers of Austria, Slovakia and
the Czech Republic went to the frontline zone in Donbass.
Her French counterpart Jean-Yves Le Drian was due to arrive at the same time as Annalena
Baerbock, but his visit was postponed by a day in view of French President Emmanuel Macron's
visit to Moscow, where the foreign minister also went.
Annex 194
Uryadovy Kuryer, On the Future of Donbass in Terms of Numbers (21 July 2018)
(translation)
Annex 194
Translation from Ukrainian
Uryadovy Kuryer, On the Future of Donbass in Terms of Numbers (21 July 2018), available
at: https://ukurier.gov.ua/uk/articles/pro-majbutnye-donbasu-movoyu-cifr/
21 July 2018
SURVEY
On the Future of Donbass in Terms of Numbers
One third of Ukrainians are convinced that in order to establish peace in Donbass,
international sanctions and pressure by international institutions on the Russian Federation should
be strengthened. Half of the respondents believe that it is worth agreeing to compromises, but not
to all of them, for the sake of peace in Donbass.
The results of a nationwide public opinion poll, which was conducted by Ilka Kucheriva
Democratic Initiatives Foundation together with the survey research service of Razumkov Centre
from 19 to 25 May 2018 in all the regions except the Crimea and the occupied territories of Donetsk
and Lugansk regions, were presented at Ukrinform on Thursday. In addition, the main results of
the research by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, which was based on focus group
discussions held in February 2018 in cities in Donetsk region (Nikolaevka, Myrnohrad, Pokrovsk,
Slavyansk) and Lugansk region (Rubizhne, Svatove, Severodonetsk, Starobelsk) were released.
In sum, according to the results of the opinion poll, only 17% of the population support the
establishment of peace in Donbass by force. That said, the greatest proportion of those who support
the belligerent solution reside in the west (24%) and in the centre (19%) and significantly less such
supporters reside in the south (8%) and the east (11%). Only 20% agree to peace "at any price".
The important matters of reintegration are part of the social and humanitarian policy of the
state towards citizens from the non-controlled areas of Donbass. In fact, each of the steps proposed
for consideration was supported by the majority of the Ukrainian population. The most supported
steps in the social and humanitarian spheres are, first of all, simplifying access to education at
Ukrainian educational institutions of different levels for residents of non-controlled areas (67%
support and only 16% do not support this), strengthening of control over payments to internally
displaced persons to avoid abuses (64% support and 15% oppose this), providing (financial and
material) support to residents of isolated districts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions who want
to move to the Ukraine-controlled areas (60% support and 20% oppose this); and simplifying to a
maximum extent the use of any administrative services in populated areas near the front line (60%
support and 21% oppose this).
There was a more mixed public support for such steps as removal of restrictions on social
and pension payments to Ukrainian citizens living in the isolated districts of the Donetsk and
Lugansk regions (40% support and 35% are against this), maximum simplification of crossing the
line of demarcation, easing the access regime (48% support and 31% oppose this), tightening
control over crossing the line of demarcation (47% support and 26% oppose this) and permission
to trade in food and other basic commodities with non-controlled areas (46% support and 29%
oppose this).
Annex 194
The survey showed that there was no consensus on what Ukraine's policy towards the non-controlled areas should be. 17% of the respondents think it is necessary to officially recognize these territories as occupied and to end all trade, services, payments and contacts (in particular, movement of people from these territories); 20.5% believe that it is necessary to keep the economic blockade, but to maintain humanitarian relations (movement of people, payment of pensions, supply of water and electricity); 22% believe that it is necessary to allow trade in critical goods (trade in food and basic commodities by Ukraine and in anthracite from the isolated districts of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions) with the maximum support of humanitarian contacts, while 20% of the respondents support the proposal to develop relations, both humanitarian and trade ones, with the non-controlled areas to a maximum extent. A significant part of the population - every fifth respondent (20%) – are undecided about their view of the optimum Ukrainian policy towards the non-controlled territories. Among the solutions that should be adopted to establish peace in Donbass, the people consider only two to be really efficient: international pressure on Russia to force it to abandon interference in the conflict in Donbass (32%) and successful restoration of normal life in the controlled territory (31%). All other possible solutions are not considered efficient for the establishment of peace. The support for the idea of introducing an international peacekeeping contingent to Donbass has remained unchanged at 60%, the same percentage as last year. A total of 2,019 respondents over the age of 18 were interviewed. The theoretical sampling error does not exceed 2.3%. The survey was financed within the framework of the project called "Program for Promoting Social Activism, Join Us!", which is financed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented in Ukraine by Pact. Maria LAGIDNAYA for Uriadovy Kurier
Annex 195 Interfax-Ukraine, Rada Appoints Next Elections to Local Self-Govt Bodies for Oct 25 (15 July 2020)
Annex 195
Rada appoints next elections to local selfgovt
bodies for Oct 25
Interfax-Ukraine
The Verkhovna Rada has scheduled elections for local authorities on Sunday,
October 25.
Some 326 MPs voted for corresponding decree No. 3809 at the plenary meeting
on Wednesday.
According to the decision, on Sunday, October 25, the next elections of deputies
of district councils and rural, township and city mayors will be held.
Elections of deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea, deputies of local
councils and rural, township, city mayors in the temporarily occupied territories
of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, in certain areas, cities, towns and villages of
Donetsk and Luhansk regions are neither appointed nor held.
"Due to the impossibility of ensuring the representation of the joint interests of
the territorial communities of villages, towns, and cities of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions, elections of deputies of Donetsk and Luhansk regional councils are
neither appointed nor held," the resolution says.
In turn, MP Oleksandr Kachura (the Servant of the People faction), answering a
clarifying question whether elections to city councils will be held, told Interfax-
Ukraine: "There will be merged territorial communities. If changes, according to
perspective map, the territory joins, then it can be the first election, and if it does
not join, then the city council remains. For example, the city council will remain
in Kyiv, since it has a special status it is Ukraine's capital, and some 120 MP will
be elected to its city council."
According to him the next elections will be held everywhere, in district, rural,
village councils, as well as elections to the regional councils and the elections of
rural, village and city mayors.
According to adopted decision No. 3809, elections of deputies of the Supreme
Council of Crimea, deputies of local councils and rural, village, city mayors in the
temporarily occupied territories of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, in certain
districts, cities, towns and villages of Donetsk and Luhansk regions are not
appointed and are not held.
Rada appoints next elections to local self-govt bodies for Oct 25 https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/674837.html
1 of 1 9/26/2022, 10:54 PM
Annex 196
NBC News, MH17 Investigators Face Huge Challenges in Ukraine ‘Combat Zone’
(18 July 2014)
Annex 196
July 18, 2014
MH17 Investigators Face Huge Challenges in Ukraine
'Combat Zone'
nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-plane-crash/mh17-investigators-face-huge-challenges-ukraine-combat-zonen158881
July 18, 2014, 9:07 AM UTC / Updated July 18, 2014, 12:04 PM UTC
Investigators digging in to what happened to Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 face
enormous obstacles that go far beyond the obvious threat to their personal safety, as
armed fighters and even looters swarm to the site, aviation experts say.
"Oh, my gosh. I've done a couple of investigations in combat zones, and it's a huge
challenge," said Matt Robinson, a member of the International Society of Air Safety
Investigators who's a crash reconstruction specialist with the investigative firm Robson
Forensic of Pennsylvania.
"This is chaos here," Robinson added.
Aviation experts and government officials agreed that the top concern is the safety of the
investigators.
"Our efforts are complicated by the presence of insurgents in the area," a duty officer for
the Ukrainian State Emergency Service told NBC News. "The place is controlled by the
militants — our people at the crash site are followed by armed men."
But there are also political, military and economic factors at play that could severely
restrict how much time investigators could actually spend at the scene, Robinson said.
1/3
Annex 196
The site will attract Ukrainian security forces and rebels fighters alike eager to scorepolitical points by appearing to be in charge, he said. Pro-Russian separatists claimed tohave recovered most of the jet's black boxes, The Associated Press reported early Friday.And "an aircraft includes lots of valuable materials" — making the crash site a magnetfor scavengers, scrappers and other "interlopers," he said. Off-duty coal miners wereamong those gathering evidence at the site early Friday."This needs to be quarantined," Robinson said. "People will actually abscond withpieces and parts of the aircraft."Who'll Be in Charge?Senior U.S. officials told NBC News they believed the aircraft was shot down by asurface-to-air missile. But it could be months or even years before an officialdetermination could be nailed down. The first problem will be figuring out who'sultimately in charge of the international inquiry.The flight went down in Ukraine, so under regulations of the U.N.'s International CivilAviation Organization, it would have the lead role, but that assumes "everything is doneaccording to the book," which is highly problematic, said Kenneth Button, director ofthe Center for Transportation, Policy, Operations and Logistics at George MasonUniversity in Virginia."The other interests are purely subservient," Button told NBC News on Thursday. At thesame time, "all airspace is sovereign," he said, so "any country can do exactly as itwants," and there's no international aviation court to sort out the competing interests."I'm afraid it's going to be a real mess"As the country where the flight originated, the Netherlands could stake a claim. So couldMalaysia, where the flight was headed. And Ukraine could invite other countries, suchas the U.S., because the plane was manufactured by Boeing Corp."I'm afraid it's going to be a real mess," said Ross Aimer, a retired United Airlines pilotand chief executive of Aero Consulting Experts of Los Angeles.Ukraine initially proposed that the investigation be led by the Ukraine StateCommission, the ICAO and representatives of the Netherlands and Malaysia.A senior Obama administration official told NBC News that a coordinated internationalinvestigation was imperative."There were people on the plane for several nations, and due to the ongoing conflictbetween Russia and Ukraine, we believe strongly that the international communityneeds to play a role in determining what happen here," the official said.2/3
Annex 196
Greg Waldron, Asia editor for FlightGlobal magazine, told the BBC: “The plane hascome down in contested territory so there has to be some concern. By rights the aircraftis owned by Malaysian so under international law Malaysia should have a key role inany investigation.“If parts have been sent to Russia, as is reported, that it would be beyond standardoperating procedure, certainly.”Robinson said Malaysia's involvement would likely involve many of the same teams andexperts who have been working for months on the disappearance of another MalaysiaAirlines Flight MH370, which vanished March 8 on a flight from Kuala Lumpur toBeijing."That's their job," he said. "That's their expertise."But in the long term, Aimer agreed with Robinson that physical safety was still thebiggest barrier."You're in a war zone. That's going to be pretty tough," Aimer said. "If not invited, Icertainly wouldn't go there ... I would say good luck to anyone who takes it on."Jim Miklaszewski, Kristen Welker, Courtney Kube, Irina Tkachenko and Marc Smithof NBC News contributed to this report.3/3
Annex 197 Expert report of Mr Akash Rosen, 26 May 2019
Annex 197
Project-MH17
1
Confidential
Prepared By:
Rosen, Akash MSc, CHFI, GCIH, Assoc. ICFA, HCME
Computer Incident Response & Forensics
26th May 2019
Digital Forensic Services
Digital Forensic Reporting – Final Report V1.0
Bonanza Media
MH17 Video and Audio Forensic Analysis
Case: OGIT-001-095-08-04-2019
Annex 197
Project-MH17 2 Confidential Bio of Akash Rosen (A.Rosen) Hancom Certified Mobile Forensic Examiner–HCME Certified Hacking & Forensic Investigator –CHFISANS Hackers Techniques and Incident Handling –GCIH #18524Associate Member of Institute of Certified Forensic Account (0212221)Master’s in computer science(Dec 2010)University of Malaya, MalaysiaBachelor of Science Degree in Computer Science (2002)University of Technology Malaysia Certificate in Data Processing (1998)Polytechnic Sultan Ahmad ShahLocation: Malaysia A.Rosen is the founder of the 1st Private Digital Forensic Investigation firm, OG IT Forensic Services in Malaysia (www.ogitforensics.com). He has been providing digital forensic services for private companies in Malaysia since early 2010. He is an expert in Cyber Security Incident Response and Digital Forensics Investigation on all types of cybercrimes. A.Rosen holds a master’s in computer science, achieved various certifications and has undergone security technical training such as Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC) Certified Incident Handler (GCIH), and Certified Hacking & Forensic Investigator (CHFI). He is also an Associate Member of the Institute of Certified Forensic Accountants (CFA). A.Rosen has been working closely with law agencies, other International Digital Forensic Investigators and Forensic Accountants mainly handing digital crimes and providing relevant digital evidences related to financial frauds, IP infringement, contractual/employment issues, data theft and many other types of cybercrime. Since early 2010, A.Rosen, had been providing digital forensic analysis and verification services such as computer forensics, mobile phone forensic, email forensics, audio & voice biometrics, video forensics, digital images & pdf file forensics, social networking analysis, cloud forensics, database forensics, live security incident response and IoT forensics now. A.Rosen also provides cyber intelligence investigation solutions for banking and law enforcement agencies and support them by providing the latest awareness and prevention of cybercrimes such as due diligence countermeasures in respect of anti-money laundering, intelligent fraud, targeted threat Intelligence, and many more. A.Rosen has appeared as an expert witness in Malaysian courts and support many legal departments of local and international companies in digital forensic investigation for financial fraud, data theft and other digital crime cases. He has been working for more than 15 years in the IT Security field where he worked mostly on various types of security technologies, provided security solutions (including security risk consultation) and gained significant experience as well as developed the first global security operation center in a MSC Status company handling real time monitoring and investigating security threats for more than 100 clients globally.
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List of some of the court cases being an expert witness as Digital Forensic Investigative
1. A case of audio recording verification of an old parent (father) who had passed away. This
was a litigation on property. Authenticity of audio for tampering - Dec 2014
Civil Case No: 22NCVC-314-03/2012 (Kuala Lumpur)
Expert Witness: Yes
2. A conversation in audio conference recording system was recorded with the account owner
and the banking personal allegedly approving the money transfer. Voice biometric analysis on
the bank account owner to verify the speakers – Dec 2015
Suit No. 1047 of 2013 (Singapore)
Expert Witness: Not Required
3. Verification of audio recording performed by SPRM (Suruhanjaya Pencegah Rasuah
Malaysia). Engaged by a lawyer.
Criminal Case No: 61R-2-04/1250 (SJ4) (Johor Bahru)
Expert Witness: Not required
4. Raw oil stock was manipulated. This is financial fraud case – Jul/Sept 2016
Johor High Court Case No: 22NCVC – 28 – 02 / 2014 (Johor Bahru)
Expert Witness: Yes
5. An employer had transferred funds into an employee account and claim the employee had
done fraud – Oct 2013
Criminal Case No: 62D-(383-385)-10/2011 & 62D-(326-347)-9/2011 (Shah Alam)
Expert Witness: Yes
6. 2 directors had moved company’s money out of country, evidence was stored in old mobile
which was claimed not extractable – Apr 2014
Civil Case No: 22NCVC-78-01-2012 (Shah Alam)
Expert Witness: Yes
7. Spear phishing/email fraud by international fraudster causing loss of USD30 Million.
Civil Case No: 22NCC-465-12/2014 (Labuan/Kuala Lumpur)
Expert Witness: Yes
8. Audio Forensic and Verification of audio files for any tampering which is the main evidence of
the defence – May 2016
High Court Case No: 22NCC-135-05/2015 (Kuala Lumpur)
Expert Witness: Yes
9. Sales team diverting corporate business to own and Competitor Company – May 2016
Penang High Court: PA-22NCvC-78-05/2016
Expert Witness: Yes
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Project-MH17 4 Confidential 10. Software house internal fraud. Full email acquisition and forensics analysis – Jul 2016 High Court Case No: 22NCC-312-10/2015 (Penang) Expert Witness: Required 11. A small case involving a family matter – Apr 2017 Court Case No: PA-33-367-10/2016 (Penang) Expert Witness: Not required 12. Mobile phone audio verification - Mac 2017 Kuching High Court Case: KCH-22NCvC-10/2-2014 (Kuching) Expert Witness: Required 13. Anthon Piller Order – Jul 2017 Penang High Court Civil Suit: 22NCvC-91-05/2016 (Penang) Expert Witness: Required 14. Software development dispute – Oct 2017 KL High Court Case No: WA-22NCVC-91-02/2017 Expert Witness: Required 15. Financial fraud case in logistic sector – Oct 2017 Kuala Lumpur High Court Case: BA-22NCVC-463-08/2016 Expert Witness: Required 16. Internal property matter - Nov 2017 Shah Alam Court: BA-B52NCVC-127-04/2016 Expert Witness: Yes 17. Sales Fraud Case – Jan 2018 Ipoh High Court Case No: AA-22NCVC-38-05/2017 Expert Witness: Required Submit Forensic Report to Commercial Crime Investigation Department – Ipoh Ref No: JK KPN 168/17 No Repot: 478/18 18. Business fraud/property matter Kuching High Court Case No: 22NCVC-10/3/2016 Expert Witness: Required 19. Mobile Phone Chat Verification - Jun 2018 Penang High Court Case No: PA-22NCvC-184-09/2017 Expert Witness: Yes 20. Mobile Phone Chat Communication – WhatsApp Verification Negeri Sembilan High Court: NA-22NCVC-63-10/2017 Expert Witness: Yes
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21. Mobile Phone Chat Communication – WhatsApp, WeChat and Emails
Butterworth Sesyen Court: PB-A52NCC-57-07/2018
Expert Witness: Yes
22. Audio, Video and Photo Verification
Shah Alam High Court: BA-23NCvC-38-12/2018
Expert Witness: Yes
23. Many other digital forensics/cyber-crime investigative cases dealt with internal
management team
Education:
Certifications:
- Cisco Certified Network Associate - CCNA 2002
- Cisco PIX Firewall (CSPFA - Course) 2003
- Sun Solaris Administrator I & II & III (SCSA - Course) 2003
- Checkpoint System Administrator - CCSA (Course) 2005
- Hack In The Box, Hand on Hacking - Zone H 2007
- ITIL Foundation V2 2007
- Talent Selection 2007
- ITIL Foundation V3 2008
- Certified Hacking & Forensic Investigator - CHFI 2008
- HITB - Web Application Security Advance Attack & Defense 2008
- Manager Excellence Training 2009
- Managing People Through Change 2009
SANS Hackers Techniques and Incident Handling (GCIH #18524)
Dec, 2010
- Kepner & Tregoe (KT) Jan, 2011
- ITIL V3 – Intermediate Operational Support & Analysis (OSA)
Mac, 2011
- Associate Member of Institute of Certified Forensic Account (0212221)
Mac, 2012
- Managing Risk in The Enterprise
Apr, 2012
- Attending Security Conferences till now
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Project-MH17 6 Confidential WorkHistory:Private Digital Forensic Investigator/Examiner –Feb 2011 –Now •Digital Forensic Investigation (on Computer hard disk, mobile, clouds, social networking, audio & video etc…) for local clients in Malaysia, Borneo and aboard •Handling/Investigating Digital Crime (Financial Fraud & Data Theft) cases with Forensic Accountant/Lawyers 1.Total Financial Fraud Cases in Malaysia worth of < RM200 Mil –62.Total Financial Fraud Cases outside ofMalaysia worth of > RM200 Mil -23.Others/Data Theft Cases > 50 cases both inside and outside of Malaysia•Perform LIVE Security Incident Response on any compromised systems•eDiscovery & Digital Investigation Case Management expertise-all types of media, digital files, multimedia files (audio/videos/images)•Email server and client verification and forensic analysis•Image/Picture Forensic Analysis on editing and counterfeiting •Steganography Analysis (Image and Files-docs/PDF)•Audio and Video Forensic analysis for any manipulation/ tampering-Video Recording (With Audio)-CCTV Video Analysis-Verification of audio files from media-Audio transcript capturing (listening and reporting with support of audio forensic tools)-Image/Video Ballistics•Voice Biometric/Printing Forensic Analysis-Audio recordings identification from camera and mobile phones analysis for speaker•Social Networking analysis (Fb, Twitter, Internet mails, G+, etc...)•Analyze Digital Evidence (ESI) and writing report to be presented in court•Provide testimony in court as an expert witness for digital forensic evidencesMahkamah Kuala Lumpur (High Court), Mahkamah Shah Alam (High Court), Johor High Court, etc...•Working closely with law firms and lawenforcement as below;-Commercial Crime Division, Royal Malaysian Police,etc...•Provide Cyber security awareness for Law Enforcement and private industries•Design and Setup digital forensic labs and provide standard of Digital Forensics processProject-
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• Integrations solutions for SIEM/SIRT/eDiscovery/Incident Mgmt. tools
(PTK/INCMan/FTK/EnCase, Paraben, Belkasoft, Magnet, Intella, Cellebrite,
Systools, etc...)
• Mobile forensic expert – Device Seizure, Oxygen, Cellebrite, Mobiledit,
Tarantula, etc...)
• Audio/Video Forensic (Verifeyed, Audition, EVB, SISII,etc...)
• Open Source Digital Forensic Training (DEFT,SIFT - and education hands
on)
• Malware Botnet/Cyber Intelligence solution providers in Malaysia
• Reseller Digital Forensic solutions
- Paraben (USA), DFlabs (Italy), Decision Group (Taiwan), FFT (India),
Group-IB (Russia), CyFIR (US), IntelCrawler (US), etc…
• Computer Forensic Group, Consortium of Digital Forensic Specialist Group
and Mobile Forensic & Investigation Group
• Network Forensic Analysis and Threats monitoring using Open Source
Intelligence
• Security Incident Management solution provider
• Data recovery and analysis
• Provide Social Networking Analysis and cloud forensics acquisition
• Cloud forensic analysis and e-discovery
• Degaussing and Destroying data services
Other Information Security Experience:
Global Security Operation Center – APJ (GSOC APJ) Technical
Delivery Expert, Jun 2007 – Feb 2011 - EDS
The Global Security Operations Centers (GSOC) provides 24x7 staffed
centers for monitoring and managing all aspects of enterprise security (IDS,
IPS, WIDS, AV and SIEM) on a consolidated basis.
• Operation Management of GSOC APJ (Asia Pacific Japan) (multiple large
clients of all types of industries – Financial, Banking, Insurance, Energy,
Food, Gambling, etc..) - Mostly APJ and US Accounts
• Monitoring of all types of Security Events/Alerts/Attacks – both from
standard Security Dashboard and leveraged Security Management
Consoles: IBM ISS Site Protector, HP Tipping Point, MC Afee NSM,
Sourcefire Defense Center and Cisco SecureWork
• Provide In-Depth Security Incident Investigation
(identification/containment/eradication) for all types of attacks/threats
• Provide recommendation and consultation on current security
threats/malicious code
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Project-MH17 8 Confidential •Working with GSIRT/Forensic team on Access Data -eDiscovery•Prepare alert handling document and standardize the process for each Client/Environment.•Involved in escalations and perform client liaison role with Account Security Officers (ASO) for any security incident •Involved in analyzing risk (risk assessment) from current security trend for the clients•Work closely with GIS Engineering for new tools/system for future mode of operation (FMO) –Investigations tools, incident mgmt. tools •Work with End Point Security, SIEM, IDS/IPS, GSIRT (Forensic), TVMR team for GSOC Services •Growth and planning for GSOC worldwide (tools for Future Mode of Operation), work closely with GIS Engineering team•On boarding new account to GSOC (testing/implementing), leveraged solution •Review and provide security consultant on Infrastructure Security -GSOC worldwide•Certified ISO 20000 for GSOC APJOther roles;•Holding a Security Expert role within EDS Security •Involve and conduct a triage call with GCIRT for real security incident response •Manage team perform Vulnerability Assessment•Perform Live Security Incident Response for local clients •Compile and gather IDS alert trend for network forensic analyst from all source of Cyber Security Provider▪IBM ISS -X-Force ▪ThreatLinq –Tipping Point▪MC Afee NSM -Intruvert▪SourceFire -VRT▪iDefense, Bugtraq, CVE▪Other Security sites Symantec, CERT, Microsoft, Redhat, Solaris, IBM, etc..•Testing Proposed Security Solution/Product/Research with the teamInformation Security Analyst/Advance/Specialist, Nov 2003 –Jun 2007,EDS
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List of training provided by Akash Rosen:
i. BAR Council Kuala Lumpur - Fundamentals of Digital Forensic Evidence, KL, MY - March
2015
ii. ii. BAR Council Penang - Fundamentals of Digital Forensic Evidence, Penang, MY - Sept
2015
iii. 5th Annual Practical Forensic Auditing and Fraud Investigation Technologies, - Singapore
- Oct 2015
iv. Global Legal Confex 2016 Challenges in the Global Legal Industry: Digital Forensic
Evidences Challenges, Singapore - Feb 2016
v. Management Science University (MSU) - Computer Forensic Challenge -Digital Forensic:
Open Source Digital Forensic - Shah Alam, MY - Mac 2016
vi. 6th Annual Practical Forensic Auditing and Fraud Investigation Technologies, Kuala
Lumpur, MY - May 2016
vii. 10th Annual Alliance IFA Meeting (Talk on Digital Forensic), Kuala Lumpur, MY - Nov
2016
viii. Management Science University (MSU) - Computer Forensic Challenge - Mobile
Forensics - Shah Alam, MY - Dec 2016
ix. A Guide and Workshop for Forensics Skills, Kuala Lumpur - April 2017
x. Fundamentals of Digital Forensic Evidences, RHB Bank, KL, - May 2017
xi. Digital Evidence Workshop for Akademi Audit Negara 23rd -24th Oct 2017
xii. CYFRIC – UTM Digital Forensic Competition 2017 – Main Judge – 28th Oct 2017
List of cases online
1. Seeking the source of the data breach - 23/11/2017
https://themalaysianreserve.com/2017/11/23/seeking-source-data-breach/
2. Fake CORs costing Customs dearly – 13/11/2017
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/11/13/fake-cors-costing-customs-dearly-syndicatessiphoning-
out-millions-in-revenue-using-forged-documents/
3. Vodafone bags the Guinness World Record for creating largest ZooZoo album – 11/08/2016
https://brandequity.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/digital/vodafone-bags-the-guinness-worldrecord-
for-creating-largest-zoozoo-album/53649310
4. a.Mesiniaga faces contingent liability of RM8.2m in suit by Amanah Raya 07/03/2017
https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/mesiniaga-faces-contingent-liability-rm82m-suit-amanahraya
b. Mesiniaga cautions of RM8.23mil potential liability if it loses civil suit – 08/03/2017
https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2017/03/08/mesiniaga-cautions-of-rm823milpotential-
liability-if-it-loses-civil-suit/
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Project-MH17 12 Confidential Contents Digital Forensic Reporting – Final Report V1.0 ............................................................................................ 1 1.0 Document Control......................................................................................................................... 14 1.1 Distribution List ............................................................................................................................... 14 1.2 Purpose ........................................................................................................................................... 14 1.3 Disclaimer ....................................................................................................................................... 14 1.4 Terminology .................................................................................................................................... 15 1.5 Case Information ............................................................................................................................. 16 1.6 Forensic Analysis Process ................................................................................................................ 17 1.6.1 Video Forensic Process Flow .................................................................................................... 19 1.6.2 Audio Video Forensic Analysis Process ..................................................................................... 20 1.7 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 23 1.8 Timeline ........................................................................................................................................ 25 2.0 Acquisition and Verification .......................................................................................................... 26 2.1 Video Source Details ....................................................................................................................... 26 2.1.1 Video 1 - SSU, Radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash ................................................................................................................................................. 27 2.1.2 Video 2 - MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР. ........................................................................................................... 31 2.2 Video Acquisition and Verification .................................................................................................. 36 3.0 Video File Analysis and Audio Findings Statements ...................................................................... 44 3.1 Video File Analysis and Statements................................................................................................. 44 3.2 Audio Track Analysis and Finding Statements ................................................................................. 48 3.3 Video 1 Metadata - SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 ............................................................................................................................................. 55 3.4 Video 2 Metadata - MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4 ....................................................................................................... 60 4.0 Video 1 Analysis - SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 ................................................................................................................................................. 65 4.1. Audio 1, Track-1 – Duration 0:18.4 – 0:36.1, Conversation between I.Bezler ("Bes") and Vasyl Mykolaiovych Geranin (9031921428) ................................................................................................... 72 4.2 Audio 2 - Track 2, Track 3 & Track 4 – Duration 0.43.3 – 1:49.0, conversation between Major and Grek ...................................................................................................................................................... 78 4.2.1 Audio 2, Track-2 - 0.43.3 - 0.52.9 - Conversation between Major and Grek. ........................... 79 4.2.2 Audio 2, Track-3 – Duration 0.54.5 - 1:08.0, conversation between Major and Grek. ............. 84
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4.2.3 Audio 2, Track-4 – Duration 1:09.4 – 1:49.0, conversation between Major and Grek. ............ 89
4.3 Audio 3 - Track 5 - from time 1:50 to 2:22.8 ................................................................................... 94
4.4 Video 1 Audio Tracks Edit/Manipulation....................................................................................... 100
4.4.1 Audio 1, Track-1 .............................................................................................................. 100
4.4.2 Audio 2, Track-2 ..................................................................................................................... 104
4.4.3 Audio 2, Track-3 ..................................................................................................................... 105
4.4.4 Audio 2, Track-4 .............................................................................................................. 107
4.4.5 Audio 3, Track-5 .............................................................................................................. 111
4.5 Voice Biometric (Voice ID) Analysis - From Video 1 Audio Tracks ............................................... 114
4.5.1 Audio 1, Track 1 Voices .......................................................................................................... 120
4.5.2 Audio 2, Track 2 Voices .......................................................................................................... 122
4.5.3 Audio 2, Track3 Voices ........................................................................................................... 124
4.5.4 Audio 2, Track 4 Voices .......................................................................................................... 126
4.5.5 Audio 3, Track 5 Voices .......................................................................................................... 128
5.0 5.0 Video 2 - MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата
разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4 ......................................................................................................... 131
6.0 Summary ..................................................................................................................................... 139
7.0 Appendix ..................................................................................................................................... 143
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Project-MH17 16 Confidential 1.5 Case Information OG IT Forensic Services digital forensic expert was engaged by Yana Yerlashova and Max van der Werff, founder of Bonanza Media to collect, acquire, verify, and perform digital forensic analysis on uploaded video files on YouTube social media as listed as in Table 1.5.1 below. The main scope of this case is assigned to; i.Verify the video files are genuine based on the source ii.Verify the audio track in the video files are genuine especially in video 1 as listed in Table 1.5.1. iii.Verify any kind of manipulation seen in the audio stream in Video 1 as listed Table 1.5.1. Table 1.5.1: Video File Details Video Video File Name Source of the Video File Remark Video 1 SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw - Original Video uploaded by SSU - Consist of 5 audio tracks of intercepted audiosVideo 2 MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T34AB6CImTE - Original Video uploaded by Sound Russia - Showing part of audios in Video 1 are faked Refer to Table 2.1.1 showing the details of the video files. Incident/Case #:OGIT-001-095-08-04-2019Reported Date/Time:8thApr2019Report Compiled By:Akash RosenReport Recipient: Ms. Yana Yerlashova / Mr. Max vander Werff
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Project-MH17 18 Confidential evidence and to get it accepted as evidence in court if it’s needed as per the standard of ISO 27037 (Guidelines for identification, collection, acquisition, and preservation of digital evidence). The industry standard for computer evidence authentication is known as RSA Security MD5 (Message Digest 5) algorithm. Each file has a unique MD5 hash value. SHA1 and SHA2 is another hashing algorithm. Refer to section 2.0 showing the acquisition of the acquired image. The checksum value (MD5) of the media acquisition is listed in the Acquisition report. It is very important to have a forensic verification done from the source origin. Forensic software is read only tools and all attached evidence files (acquired image) can’t be tampered in any way. The forensic software maintains the preservation of digital evidence (electronic store information within the forensic software) as per ISO 27037 standard. The processing of the media is performed using the commercial forensic software, where media data recovery, indexing, system artefacts parsing, internet artefacts parsing, email recovery and parsing’s, keywords searches, etc... are done. The keyword search hits were reviewed, and the extraction of the files done accordingly by OG IT Forensic Services team. The analysis is performed based on the scope of the case and report are generated. The software used for this audio forensic analysis was; i.Adobe - Audition ii.Speech Technology Center - SIS II iii.MediaInfo - Extraction of Audio Video details/EXIF data iv.ExifData - Extraction of Metadata/Exchangeable Information of File v.FFMPEG - extraction of audio and video frames vi.FAW Project - FAW Professional – Web Acquisition vii.Magnet - WPS - Web Acquisition viii.X1 Social Discovery
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The audio stream can be used to validate the continuous and constant noise sound level
of the audio. The noise sound is the background sound of the recorded audio/video. The measure
of signal strength relative to background noise is called SNR (Signal to Noise Ratio). The ratio is
usually measured in decibels (dB) using a signal-to-noise ratio formula. Normally, any audio’s SNR
> 10 dB (decibels) are accepted. As long the background noise is constant, the audio can be
analyzed by looking the purple color of the noise level (in Audition CC audio analysis tool) if it was
edited or tampered because the noise sound can’t be regenerated to be as similar as during the
recorded time of the audio/video.
The analysis of the audio/video files are done as stated below (refer to Flow 1.3);
i. Firstly, analysis on the audio/video’s metadata (media info) from the video
- Review the detail format field of the metadata from the audio/video.
- Gather all information from metadata field extracted from the video file
- Analyzed the details of video stream and audio stream
- Analysis for any abnormal entry on the video.
ii. Gather information and details of the source of the audio/video recorder (source)
recorded the video. In this case are the digital media as listed in Table 1.5.1.
Note: If the date creation and the date modified are same or after adding the duration
of the audio/video recorded, the gaps between the date created and modified date
are meeting the duration, it means the recorded audio/video digital files are original
and not edited or tampered.
iii. Then, to verify the video are not tampered, the audio stream will be extracted and
analyzed further.
iv. Video frames are also extracted to identify the frames size and number of frames
showing continuous movement in each frame per second (not tampered). In this case,
the video frames are not analyzed as the audio tracks are the focus.
v. Extraction of audio stream from recorded video file is very important to validate the
video was tampered or edited. By reviewing the noise level, analyst can determine if
the audio was edited. By looking at the spectral wave, it can determine if the audio
was tampered or edited as well.
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Project-MH17 22 Confidential vi.Similar analysis is done for recorded audio files as per stated above (iv). vii.Reviewing the video are done as below; i.Review Identify if the video is continuously recorded such as below; a.No pause from the beginning of the video to the end of the video recording b.No stop from the beginning of the video to the end of the video recording c.The clarity of the video and the surrounding d.The sound of the background (noise) e.The quality of the video and others aspect related to video (duration, speech, etc...) ii.Identify any kind of digital watermarking on the video such as time or logo - Watermarking is a method to ensure the integrity of the video content and avoid tampering to the video frames. Note: i. Cepstrum view is main for pitch determination/analysis - vocal excitation (pitch) and vocal tract (formants) ii. Fast Fourier Transform is an algorithm that computes the Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a sequence, or its inverse (IDFT). Fourier analysis converts a signal from its original domain (often time or space) to a representation in the frequency domain and vice versa.
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1.7 Executive Summary
The Video 1 file named as “radio interception of conversations between militants, "Boeing-777" plane
crash.mp4” is actually a video file which was created and uploaded into You Tube media by Security
Service of Ukraine (SSU). This video contains 5 audio tracks related to the intercepted radio audio
conversation between few militants on the fatal incident day of MH17 flight - 17/07/2014. Video 1 file
with the 5 intercepted recorded audios tracks was converted and compressed into WeBM format and
uploaded into YouTube. Refer to Table 2.2.1 and 3.1.1 showing the details of the video file.
Firstly, and the most important fundamental ground of the audio/video forensic analysis is to ensure
to determine the original source and authenticity of the recorded video/audio file. This must be validated
to ensure the audio recorded is not tampered. All the 5 audio tracks which was embedded and showed
(aired) in the video had no details of the original sources of the recorded/intercepted audio are from.
Therefore, the audio files /audio tracks are highly potential of already been edited, tampered or had been
manipulated. Secondly, all audio tracks in the Video 1 were seen as incomplete audio conversations in.
Original audio recording files is compulsory required to validate the whether the recording is tampered or
legitimate. Unfortunately, that information is not available.
Nevertheless, since there is no original source of original recorded audio, the audio stream in the
video files was evaluated/analyzed based on the content of the audio signals/waves/spectrum. The noise
floor in the audio which is the background noise (sound) is important to validate the recording is normal.
The analysis of the audio signal/waves/spectrums) showing that:
i. The audio recordings are showing telephone conversation recording ~ 8kHz.
ii. Very short of audio conversation and there are inconsistencies of the audio tracks. Refer to
Section 4.0.
iii. Only part of the conversation is available. Refer to Section 4.0.
iv. Inconsistent of stereo and mono channel in the audio tracks seen – Track 1 and Track 5 had
mono recording. Track 2, Track 3 and Track 4 are Stereo. Refer to Section 4.0.
v. There were possible cuts and merging seen in the spectrum signal waves as it can be seen in
the background noise changes. Refer to Section 4.4.
vi. Absents of signal. It also means recording are cut or not the complete recording. Refer to
Section 4.4.
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Project-MH17 24 Confidential vii.The audio quality is low, where the audibility of the spoken voice is not very clear. Refer to Section 4.5. There are inconsistencies in the audio tracks and some part of the conversation was removed. It Is clear that only part of the original conversation was added into Video1 audio stream’s and make it available. Refer to Section 3.0 showing the Findings statements and Section 6.0 Summary.
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1.8 Timeline
17/07/2014
-Showing Published in YouTube Channel
-Video 1: SSU, radio interception of
conversations between terrorists,
"Boeing-777" plane crash
Refer Figure 2.1.1.4
26/07/2014
-Showing Published in YouTube Channel
-MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio
analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров
ополчения ДНР.
Refer Figure 2.1.2.4
17/07/2014
MH17 Plane Fatal Crash
1/11/2018
-Last Modified/Updated (Original header)
-Metadata showing 1/11/2018 (Encoded/Tagged)
-Video 1: SSU, radio interception of conversations
between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash
-Refer Figure 2.1.1.3
4/08/2014
-Last Modified/Updated (Original header)
-MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio
analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров
ополчения ДНР.
Refer Figure 2.1.2.3
2014 2018
Reference:
Table 2.1.1: Video Source Details
Table 2.2.1: Acquired (downloaded) Video Files Details
Table 3.1.1: Video File Analysis – Metadata from Video Files
Table 3.2.1: SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash Intercepted
Audio Tracks Analysis
Table 4.5.1: Voice Biometric (Voice ID) Analysis - Audio Tracks from Video 1
Table 4.5.2: Details of Individual Voice ID for Voice Biometrics Analysis Exported
Video 1 Audio Tracks Reference:
(Refer to Figure 4.4 & Diagram: 4.1)
i. Audio 1, Track 1 (Section 4.1)
ii. Audio 2, Track 2 (Section 4.2.1)
iii. Audio 2, Track 3 (Section 4.2.2)
iv. Audio 2, Track 4 (Section 4.2.3)
v. Audio 3, Track 5 (Section 4.3)
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2.1.1 Video 1 - SSU, Radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash
Figure 2.1.1.1: Video 1 - SSU, Radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw showing Published 17/07/2014
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Figure 2.1.1.4: Video 1 – Detail Acquisition using X1 Social Discovery - showing published time 81/7/2014 4:33 AM
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Project-MH17 32 Confidential 2.1.2 Video 2 - MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР. Figure 2.1.2.1: Video Source 2: MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T34AB6CImTE
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Project-MH17 36 Confidential 2.2 Video Acquisition and Verification YouTube has copyright of all YouTube videos and the permission to download the video file is restricted (nodownload) as shown in Figure 2.1.1.2 and Figure 2.1.2.2. The acquisition was done using a third-party website https://y2mate.com/ to acquire the two subject videos. This website maintains highest integrity of YouTube downloaded video files. Refer to Table 2.2.1 showing the acquired file. Acquisition was done using two tools, i.FAW Project – FAW Professional ii.Magnet – WPS
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Table 2.2.1: Acquired (downloaded) Video Files Details
Video 1 Video 2
Acquired Video
Source File Name:
SSU,radio interception of conversations
between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane
crash.mp4
MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio
analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения
ДНР..mp4
Checksum Value:
MD5: 43DC84D53A31B73E0D2188E9300E051F 725F08830E3D7782DF9248CE5F0DE5A4
Acquisition Details:
Start time: 13/4/2019 4:53:20 PM
[13/4/2019 4:53:20 PM] Setting up HTML index files...done.
[13/4/2019 4:53:20 PM] Starting capture...
[13/4/2019 4:53:20 PM] Capturing https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw
[13/4/2019 4:53:24 PM] Successfully captured https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw
[13/4/2019 4:53:24 PM] Capturing https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T34AB6CImTE
[13/4/2019 4:53:28 PM] Successfully captured https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T34AB6CImTE
[13/4/2019 4:53:28 PM] Finished.
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Project-MH17 40 Confidential i.SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 Figure 2.1.1: Video 1 - SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 (acquisition using Magnet WPS)
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Acquisition Details:
Software FAW version: 7.9.0.0 PROFESSIONAL
Owner: Akash Rosen - OG IT Forensic Services - [email protected]
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw
Host: www.youtube.com
IP Host: 216.58.196.46
User Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E;
.NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Capture Date/Time start UTC: 2019-04-15T09:15:27
Capture Date/Time end UTC: 2019-04-15T09:15:36
Capture Date/Time start computer time: 2019-04-15T17:15:27+0800
Capture Date/Time end computer time: 2019-04-15T17:15:36+0800
Ntp Server: Local machine
Is in use proxy: False
Proxy: www.google.com
DNS Local Machine 8.8.8.8
ExternalIpMachine:
Case ID: 20190415171057
Acquisition ID: 20190415171057#00001
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Project-MH17 42 Confidential ii.MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4 Figure 2.1.2: Video 2 - MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis.Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4 (acquisition using Magnet WPS)
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Software FAW version: 7.9.0.0 PROFESSIONAL
Owner: Akash Rosen - OG IT Forensic Services - [email protected]
URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T34AB6CImTE
Host: www.youtube.com
IP Host: 216.58.196.46
User Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E;
.NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)
Capture Date/Time start UTC: 2019-04-15T09:18:16
Capture Date/Time end UTC: 2019-04-15T09:18:25
Capture Date/Time start computer time: 2019-04-15T17:18:16+0800
Capture Date/Time end computer time: 2019-04-15T17:18:25+0800
Ntp Server: Local machine
Is in use proxy: False
Proxy: www.google.com
DNS Local Machine 8.8.8.8
Case ID: 20190415171057
Acquisition ID: 20190415171057#00002
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Project-MH17 44 Confidential 3.0Video File Analysis and Audio Findings Statements This section covers both Video files and Audio file finding statements. 3.1 Video File Analysis and Statements i.Two video files were acquired (downloaded) from YouTube video medial channel. Both Video 1 and Video 2 are referred as below (Refer to Table 2.2.1). a. Video 1 - SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash - URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw - Original Format: WeBM - audiovisual media file format - Option to Download only with Resolution of 360 pixel at size of 3.3 MB. Refer to Figure 2.1.1.2 - Downloaded file for analysis: SSU,radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash.mp4 (Refer to Table 2.2.1) MD5: 43DC84D53A31B73E0D2188E9300E051F b. Video 2 - MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР. - URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T34AB6CImTE - Format: MP4 - MPEG-4 Part 14 - Option to Download with multiple choice resolution of 360 pixel, 720 pixel and 1080 pixel. This is due to the quality of video uploaded into YouTube channel. Refer to Figure 2.1.1.2 - Downloaded file for analysis: MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4 (Refer to Table 2.2.1) MD5: 725F08830E3D7782DF9248CE5F0DE5A4 ii.In YouTube channel media, both video file (Video 1 and Video 2) was set to “no download”. Refer to Figure 2.1.1.2 and Figure 2.1.2.2 showing the setting in YouTube media channel. However, the acquisition of the video was done using a third-party tool https://y2mate.com/, FAW Project – FAW Professional and Magnet – WPS. Refer to Figure 2.2 showing the video Acquisition and Verification. iii.Analysis on both videos date published and date when exactly created showing inconsistence of dates. Published date is much earlier than last modified date, both videos had be modified. a.Video 1 - Showing Published date on 17th Jul 2014
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- Last Modified Date: 1st Nov 2018 (Similar with Date Encoded/Tagged Date)
Note: This clearly indicated, the video had been modified and it is clearly showing tampered
had happen.
b. Video 2
- Showing Published date on Jul 26, 2014
- Last Modified Date: 4th Aug 2014
iv. Video 1 - “SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane
crash.mp4” which contain the intercepted audio tracks (aired by SSU) was tagged/encoded on the
01/11/2018 ~ 02:44:30 (UTC). This is the only valid information were seen to be genuine. Refer to
Table 3.1.1 showing the detail metadata information from the video file.
v. Detail of title of Video 1 showing that ISO Media file produced by Google Inc. Created on:
10/31/2018. Refer to Table 3.1.1 and Section 3.3 showing the metadata of Video 1.
vi. MH17 flight fatal incident happened on the 17/07/2014, Video 1 was created after ~ 4 years 3
months of the recorded intercepted audio. Refer to Table 3.1.1 showing the detail metadata
information from the video file.
vii. There is basically no details of audio track and the the authenticity of the audio tracks file shown
or added in the Video file metadata which was uploaded into You Tube social media channel. Refer
to Table 3.1.1.
viii. Analysis on Video 2, MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis.Анализ перехвата
разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4 were done at very high level due to the focus of analysis is on
the content of Video 1. Video 2 is basically showing the audio tracks related in Video 1, but it does
not show the last audio (Audio track 5). Refer to Section 4.0.
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Project-MH17 48 Confidential 3.2 Audio Track Analysis and Finding Statements i.Video 1 " SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4” file (source from uploaded YouTube videos) analysis was focused more on the audio streams as the audio aired in the video was the intercepted recorded audio conversations. ii.There was no speaker in the video speaking before and after the aired audio conversation. It was intended to show the audio track with details who was speaking and the transcripts. Refer to Section 4.0. iii.The first main requirements and the dependencies for all audio tracks in the video file is the source and authenticity of the audio files. It is very important to know when the audio tracks were recorded, where it was recorded, how it was recorded/stored and how it was recorded. Since this information is not available and undetermined, none of the audio tracks in the video can’t be accepted as a valid, genuine and authentic source of audio recording. Refer to statement iv. and v. Also refer to Table 3.1.1 and Table 3.2.1. iv.Analysis in Video 1 metadata or content does not show any original source of the audio tracks, none of the audio tracks are genuine. Refer to Table 3.1.1, Table 3.2.1 and Section 4.0. v.YouTube only shows the only details of Video files uploaded as listed in Table 2.1.1 and Table 3.1.1, it does not show the content of the audio track aired in the video container. There is basically no way to get the details of each audio tracks in the audio stream due to it was compress and added into single Video 1 container and uploaded into You Tube social media channel. Video 1 container showing as single audio of Stream# 0.1 (und) below. Refer to Section 3.3 showing Video 1 Metadata detail. Stream #0.0(und): Video: h264, yuv420p, 480x360, 25 tbr, 25 tbn, 50 tbc Stream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16 vi.In a way, the audio stream (Stream #0.1) in Video 1 still holds the audio tracks (which was aired by SSU) which can be used analyze each audio tracks and verify the content of the audio. This analysis is based on the audio wave, the spectral of the speaker voice and the background noise floor which still can be analyzed of each audio tracks. Refer to Section 4.0 showing the audio stream analysis. vii.Analysis on Video 1 audio stream (Stream #0.1(und): Audio:) showing there are 5 intercepted audio tracks conversation which were added by SSU in the video file. Refer to Table 3.2.1 showing the details of each audio tracks. Refer to Section 4.0 showing the audio track analysis.
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Table 3.2.1: SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash Intercepted Audio Tracks Analysis
Audio Aired in
the Video
Audio Tracks Parties in the
Conversation
Audio Details Remarks
Audio 1
Time Frame:
0:18.3 – 0:36.1
Total Duration:
0:18.368
Track-1
Time Frame:
0:18.3 –
0:36.1
- Total 2 Speakers
- Speakers: I.Bezler
("Bes") and
Vasyl Mykolaiovych
Geranin (9031921428)
(Refer Section 4.1)
i. 0:18.3 – 0:36.1 (recorded time as shown in
the video 4:40 PM 17/07/2014)
Refer Figure 4.1.6.
ii. 2 person voices - I.Bezler and V. Geranin.
iii. Source of recording/Channel Type:
Telephone
- 2 difference channels
a. Left Channel - I.Bezler
b. Right Channel - V. Geranin
- Background noise in the left channel track is different
when V. Geranin speaks.
- Recorded Audio is tampered, where possible cuts and
edits can be seen. Refer Section 4.4.1
- Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis. Refer
to Table 4.5.1 (Voice ID Analysis)
- This audio track is tampered and not genuine.
Audio 2
Time Frame:
0:43.3 – 1:49.0
Total Duration:
0:43.289
Track-2
Time Frame:
0.43.3 -
0.52.9
- Total 2 Speakers
- Speakers: Major and
Grek (Refer Section
4.2.1)
i. 0.43.3 - 0.52.9 (recorded time as shown in
the video 4:33 PM 17/07/2014). Refer Figure
4.2.1.1.
ii. 2 person voices - Major and Grek (Left
and Right Channels)
iii. Source of recording/Channel Type:
Telephone
- Audio is tampered, 3 different tracks recorded in
different timings and merged as one segment.
- A new person voices start to appear instead of Grek’s
voice
- A new person voices start to appear instead of
Major’s voice
- Audio was cut between time frame 1.24.2 and 1.24.3.
- Refer Section 4.4.2, 4.4.3 & 4.4.4
- Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis
Refer to Table 4.5.1 (Voice ID Analysis)
- This audio tracks are tampered and not genuine.
Track-3
Time Frame:
0.54.5 -
1:08.0
- Total 2 Speakers
- Speakers: Major and
Grek (Refer Section
4.2.2)
i. 0.54.5 - 1:08.0 (recorded time as shown in
the video 5:11 PM 17/07/2014). Refer Figure
4.2.2.1.
ii. 2 person voices - Major and Grek (Left
and Right Channels)
iii. Source of recording/Channel Type:
Telephone
Track-4
Time Frame:
0.54.5 -
1:08.0
- Total 2 Speakers
- Speakers: Major
(Different Speaker) and
Grek (Different
Speaker) (Refer Section
4.2.3)
i. 1:09:4 - 1:49.0 (recorded time as shown in
the video 5:32 PM 17/07/2014). Refer Figure
4.2.3.1.
ii. 2 New person voices - Major and Grek
(Left and Right Channels)
iii. Source of recording/Channel Type:
Telephone
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Project-MH17 50 Confidential Audio 3 Time Frame: 1:50 - 2:22.8 Total Duration: 1:50.130 Track-5 Time Frame: 1:50 - 2:22.8 - Total 3 Speakers - Speakers: Kozitsyn and Militants (2 different militants speaker) (Refer Section 4.3) i. 1:50 - 2:22.8 (recorded time as shown in the video 5:42 PM 17/07/2014). Refer Figure 4.3.2 ii. Militant 1, Militant 2 (Left Channel) and Kozitsyn (Right Channel) iii. Source of recording: Telephone - Two different militants’ voices are identified speaking to Kozitsyn, - Edits are seen in this audio track - Different frequencies in the militant track. No background voice appears in Kozitsyn track. - Refer Section 4.4.5 - Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis Refer to Table 4.5.1 (Voice ID Analysis) - This audio track is tampered and not genuine. viii.The Audio 1 Track-1 spectral and noise analysis showing clear edition of the audio track (mono). a.In Audio 1, Track-1 - I. Bezler (“Bes”) and V. Geranin were talking in the conversation as per the video. b.Bezler (“Bes”) voice was recorded in right channel and V. Geranin was recorded in left channel. Original audio is actually a mono recording. c.It is clearly seen in the spectral analysis in audio Track 1 that, V.Geranin voice and Bezler voice speaking at the same time. This making the real conversation being overlapped with one another at 0.18.5, 0:25.75 & 0:31:5. The noise level are seen different for V.Geranin. It is possible phrases were taken from a different conversation and merged. Refer Figure 4.4.1.1. d.Frequency level in spectrogram appears in all three phrases are changing, first phrase appears very low, second phrase appears to be in high frequency, but middle spectrum was unseen, and third phrase shows medium frequency level. This shows phrases are from different conversations and a gap which appears at the end of third phrase uttered by V. Gernanin in the Audio 1 Track-1 is clear indication that his voices were overlaid and merged into the conversation. Refer Section 4.4.1. e.A gap which appears at the end of third phrase ~0:32.6 uttered by V. Gernanin in the audio Track-1 (Left Channel) is a definite possible indication that Geranin voices are merged into the conversation. Audio spectral at 0:31.75 – 0:31.85 (Left Channel) showing added cut, paste and merger of other sound in this audio. Refer Figure 4.4.1.1. f.Seen merged of audio at at 0:22.5, 0:23.5 and 0:30:5 (Refer to Figure 4.4.1.3). Different audio conversation starts at 0:23.30 (Refer to Figure 4.4.1.3).
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g. Voice samples taken but not meeting the requirement for voice biometric analysis as it
has very short speech below 15 second and the audio quality is low. Refer Table 4.5.1 and
Table 4.5.2 showing the audio samples details.
i. Bezler’s Audio recording (Refer to Section 4.5.1)
Frequency Response: ~ 2013 Hz
SNR 53 dB
Voice: 7.66 s
ii. V.Geranin’s Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~ 3510 Hz
SNR 53 dB
Voice: 2.24 s
ix. Audio 2 tracks spectral and noise analysis showing edition of the audio (Stereo);
a. The audio tracks are in stereo where both left and right channel are similar.
b. Analysis in Audio 2, Track-2 showing difference level of background noise level indication
tampering of the audio at audio duration between ~0:43.3 – 0:52.9. Refer Figure 4.4.2.1.
c. In Audio 2, Track-3, spectrograms show there were cuts and merging of conversation in this
part from ~0:58:75 and 0:59:0. At ~0:58.85 another difference noise were seen. Refer Figure
4.4.3.1.
d. In Audio 2, Track-3, second cut and merging can be seen between ~1:03.85 and 1:04.55. The
background noise suddenly appears at this duration doesn’t fit to both the speakers’
atmosphere. Refer Figure 4.4.3.2.
e. In Audio 2, Track-4, third cut and merging can be seen between ~1:13.55 and 1:13.5. The
background noise suddenly appears at this duration doesn’t fit to both the speakers’
atmosphere. Refer Figure 4.4.4.1.
f. In Audio 2, Track-4, fourth cut and merging can be seen between ~1:15.20 and 1:16.20. The
background noise suddenly appears at this duration doesn’t fit to both the speakers’
atmosphere. Refer Figure 4.4.4.1.
g. In Audio 2, Track-4, fifth cut and merging can be seen between ~1:18.80 and 1:19.30. The
background noise suddenly appears at this duration doesn’t fit to both the speakers’
atmosphere. Refer Figure 4.4.4.2.
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Project-MH17 52 Confidential h.In Audio 2, Track-4, failed to overlay the merging of other audio between time frame ~1.24.2 and 1.24.3, editing is very clear at this part. Another merging between ~1:24.50 and 1:24.85. obvious editing failure can be seen. Refer Figure 4.4.4.3 i.In Audio 2, Track-4, a new speaker (militant) voice appeared instead of Grek and Major voice speaking between ~1:09.5 and 1:49.0. However, SBU stated that the conversation was between Major and Grek. Refer Figure 4.4.4.4. j.Voice samples were taken for details voice analysis but none of the voices are meeting the requirement for voice biometric analysis as it has very short speech below 15 second and the audio quality is low. Refer Table 4.5.1 and Table 4.5.2 showing the audio samples details. a. Audio 2, Track 2 (Refer to Section 4.5.2) i. Grek’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2692 Hz SNR 13 dB Voice: 0.51 s ii. Major’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2810 Hz SNR 24 dB Voice: 4.13 s b. Audio 2, Track 3 (Refer to Section 4.5.3) i. Grek’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~1744 Hz SNR 16 dB Voice: 0.54 s ii. Major’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2627 Hz SNR 34 dB Voice: 5.11 s c. Audio 2 - Track 4 (Refer to Section 4.5.4) i. Grek’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2110 Hz SNR 38 dB Voice: 3.99 s
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ii. Major’s Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~2918 Hz
SNR 34 dB
Voice: 12.70 s
x. Audio 3 track spectral and noise analysis showing edition of the audio (mono);
a. Original audio track is a mono recording channel.
b. Audio 3 Track-5 begins from ~1:50.2 and ends at ~2:22.8. This segment of audio has 3 different
individual voices heard, it appears to be two different militants speaking to Kozitsyn, SBU
didn’t say anything about this in their video. Refer Figure 4.4.5.1
c. Militant voice between ~1:50.15 and ~2:02.93 is not the same as Militant voice appears after
~2:02.98 till the end of the audio. It is clear the merging can be seen between ~2:02.94 and
2:02.97, also sudden difference in the spectrum frequency from ~2:02:98 in Left Channel.
Refer Figure 4.4.5.2
d. Surprising to see that no background noise was seen in the Kozitsyn track, generally it can be
seen in the half duplex (walkie talkie) conversations. It is clear indication the audio track of
Kozitsyn was merged and background voices appears from ~2:12.3 until 2:22.28. Refer Figure
4.4.5.3.
e. Editing can be seen between time frame ~2:12.6 and 2:14.2, suddenly left channel’s spectrum
appearing in the right channel – this is clear editing. Refer Figure 4.4.5.3.
f. Voice Sample taken but not meeting the requirement for voice biometric analysis as it has
very short speech below 15 second and the audio quality is low. Refer Table 4.5.1 and Table
4.5.2 showing the audio samples details.
a. Audio 3 - Track 5 (Refer to Section 4.5.5)
i. Kozitsyn’s Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~2207 Hz
SNR 23 dB
Voice: 3.59 s
ii. Militant 1 Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~2186 Hz
SNR 35 dB
Voice: 6.02 s
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Project-MH17 54 Confidential iii. Militant 2 Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2885 Hz SNR 37 dB Voice: 6.64 s xi.Analysis on Video 2, MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis.Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4 were done at very high level. i.There were many pauses/mutes in the audio stream of Video 2. ii.Pauses/Mute were reasonable in the audio as the speaker was explaining the audio released by the SBU. iii.Original audio seems to be a mono recording. iv.There is only one speaker explaining about the audio released by SBU. v.Voices from the audio released by SBU was played in the video to explain about the tampering. vi.The speaker in Video 2 didn’t cover Audio 3, Track-5. The focus of this case is to analyze audio tracks in Video 1. Video 2 is just a reference. Refer to Section 5.0
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3.3 Video 1 Metadata - SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-
777 plane crash.mp4
Details of this video showing below streams using FFMPEG;
Input #0, mov,mp4,m4a,3gp,3g2,mj2, from 'SSU, radio interception of conversations between
terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4':
Duration: 00:02:23.77, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 190 kb/s
Stream #0.0(und): Video: h264, yuv420p, 480x360, 25 tbr, 25 tbn, 50 tbc
Stream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16
For the audio analysis, the audio stream - Stream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16
was taken for analysis into the forensic tool.
The audio channel is stereo, 44Khz and the audio code is AAC (Advance Audios Coding). There
are 5 audio coversation track as mention in Table 3.1.1
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Project-MH17 57 Confidential Figure 3.3.1b: MediaInfo results of video stream of SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 is produced by Google Inc.
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Project-MH17 58 Confidential Figure 3.3.1c: MediaInfo results of audio stream of SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 is produced by Google Inc.
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Project-MH17 59 Confidential Figure 3.3.2: Metadata (ExifInfo) results of audio stream of SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 is produced by Google Inc.
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Project-MH17 60 Confidential 3.4 Video 2 Metadata - MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4 Details of this video showing below streams using FFMPEG; Input #0, mov, mp4, m4a, 3gp, 3g2, mj2, from 'MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4': Duration: 00:08:06.20, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 1291 kb/s Stream #0.0(und): Video: h264, yuv420p, 1920x1080, PAR 1:1 DAR 16:9, 30 tbr, 30 tbn, 60 tbc Stream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16 For the audio analysis, the audio stream - Stream #0.1(und): Audio: aac, 44100 Hz, stereo, s16 was taken for analysis into the forensic tool. The audio channel is stereo, 44Khz and the audio code is AAC (Advance Audios Coding).
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Figure 3.4.1a : MediaInfo results of MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis.Анализ перехвата
разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4
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Project-MH17 62 Confidential Figure 3.4.1b: MediaInfo results of MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis.Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4
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Project-MH17 63 Confidential Figure 3.4.1c: MediaInfo results of MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis.Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4
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Project-MH17 64 Confidential Figure 3.4.2: Metadata (ExifInfo) of MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis.Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4
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Figure 4.3: SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 audio stream
Video 1 audio
stream sound wave
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Project-MH17 70 Confidential Table 4.1: Video 1 - SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4 Audio Tracks Audio Aired in the Video Audio Tracks Parties in the Conversation Audio Details Remarks Audio 1 Time Frame: 0:18.3 – 0:36.1 Total Duration: 0:18.368 Track-1 Time Frame: 0:18.3 – 0:36.1 - Total 2 Speakers - Speakers: I.Bezler ("Bes") and Vasyl Mykolaiovych Geranin (9031921428) (Refer Section 4.1) i. 0:18.3 – 0:36.1 (recorded time as shown in the video 4:40 PM 17/07/2014) Refer Figure 4.1.6. ii. 2 person voices - I.Bezler and V. Geranin. iii. Source of recording/Channel Type: Telephone - 2 difference channels a. Left Channel - I.Bezler b. Right Channel - V. Geranin - Background noise in the left channel track is different when V. Geranin speaks. - Recorded Audio is tampered, where possible cuts and edits can be seen. Refer Section 4.4.1 - Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis. Refer to Table 4.5.1 (Voice ID Analysis) - This audio track is tampered and not genuine. Audio 2 Time Frame: 0:43.3 – 1:49.0 Total Duration: 0:43.289 Track-2 Time Frame: 0.43.3 - 0.52.9 - Total 2 Speakers - Speakers: Major and Grek (Refer Section 4.2.1) i. 0.43.3 - 0.52.9 (recorded time as shown in the video 4:33 PM 17/07/2014). Refer Figure 4.2.1.1. ii. 2 person voices - Major and Grek (Left and Right Channels) iii. Source of recording/Channel Type: Telephone - Audio is tampered, 3 different tracks recorded in different timings and merged as one segment. - A new person voices start to appear instead of Grek’s voice - A new person voices start to appear instead of Major’s voice - Audio was cut between time frame 1.24.2 and 1.24.3. - Refer Section 4.4.2, 4.4.3 & 4.4.4 - Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis Refer to Table 4.5.1 (Voice ID Analysis) - This audio tracks are tampered and not genuine. Track-3 Time Frame: 0.54.5 - 1:08.0 - Total 2 Speakers - Speakers: Major and Grek (Refer Section 4.2.2) i. 0.54.5 - 1:08.0 (recorded time as shown in the video 5:11 PM 17/07/2014). Refer Figure 4.2.2.1. ii. 2 person voices - Major and Grek (Left and Right Channels) iii. Source of recording/Channel Type: Telephone Track-4 Time Frame: 0.54.5 - 1:08.0 - Total 2 Speakers - Speakers: Major (Different Speaker) and Grek (Different Speaker) (Refer Section 4.2.3) i. 1:09:4 - 1:49.0 (recorded time as shown in the video 5:32 PM 17/07/2014). Refer Figure 4.2.3.1. ii. 2 New person voices - Major and Grek (Left and Right Channels)
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iii. Source of recording/Channel Type:
Telephone
Audio 3
Time Frame: 1:50
- 2:22.8
Total Duration:
1:50.130
Track-5
Time Frame:
1:50 - 2:22.8
- Total 3 Speakers
- Speakers: Kozitsyn and
Militants (2 different
militants speaker)
(Refer Section 4.3)
i. 1:50 - 2:22.8 (recorded time as shown in
the video 5:42 PM 17/07/2014). Refer Figure
4.3.2
ii. Militant 1, Militant 2 (Left Channel) and
Kozitsyn (Right Channel)
iii. Source of recording: Telephone
- Two different militants’ voices are identified speaking
to Kozitsyn,
- Edits are seen in this audio track
- Different frequencies in the militant track. No
background voice appears in Kozitsyn track.
- Refer Section 4.4.5
- Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis
Refer to Table 4.5.1 (Voice ID Analysis)
- This audio track is tampered and not genuine.
Note: This Table is similar as Table 3.2.1.
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Project-MH17 72 Confidential 4.1. Audio 1, Track-1 – Duration 0:18.4 – 0:36.1, Conversation between I.Bezler ("Bes") and Vasyl Mykolaiovych Geranin (9031921428) Figure 4.1.1: Audio 1 Track in the Video 1 - Conversation between I.Bezler (“Bes”) and V. Geranin (9031921428) Time frame in the video between 0.18.4 and 0.36.1
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i. There are two channels in this Audio 1, Track 1, conversation between I.Bezler ("Bes") and
Vasyl Mykolaiovych Geranin (9031921428) and audio duration between 0:18.4 – 0:36.1. Refer
to Figure 4.1.2.
ii. Total Audio Selection view for Audio 1, Track 1 is 0:18.382 seconds. Refer Figure 4.1.3
iii. Recording Audio Source: Telephone. Refer to Section 4.5.
iv. Recorded time mentioned in Video 1 is 4:40 PM on 17/07/2014 which is on the same day of
MH17 fatal accident day, but none the audio track does not show same encoded date. Original
audio created date is unknown from the audio analysis.
v. Vasyl Mykolaiovych Geranin (9031921428) is speaking in the left channel and I.Bezler ("Bes")
is speaking the right channel.
vi. Imported Media format is in MPEG (Media Pictures Expert Group)
vii. Audio sample rate is 44100Hz.
viii. Audio bit depth is 32-bit (float)
ix. Audio channels are in stereo format, which are Left and Right channels.
x. The audio quality is very low although it is hearable.
xi. Figure 4.1.4 is showing the Cepstrum view which is used for pitch determination/analysis.
xii. Figure 4.1.5 is showing 3D Fast Fourier Transform (3D FFT) is an algorithm that computes the
Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a sequence, or its inverse (IDFT).
xiii. This Recorded Audio 1 Track 1 is tampered, as there are possible cuts and edits which can be
seen as the Background noises in the V.Geranin track are different when V.Geranin speaks.
Refer to Section 4.2.1
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Project-MH17 78 Confidential 4.2 Audio 2 - Track 2, Track 3 & Track 4 – Duration 0.43.3 – 1:49.0, conversation between Major and Grek Figure 4.2.1: Audio 2 Track - Conversation between “Major” and “Grek” had been recorded in 3 different timings. Time frame in the video between 0.43.3 - 0.52.9, 0.54.5 - 1:08.0 & 1:09:4 - 1:49.0
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i. There are two channels (Stereo) in this audio 2 - track 2, conversation between Major and
Grek audio duration between 0.43.3 - 0.52.9.
ii. Audio Selection view for audio 2, track 2 is 0:43.288 seconds. Refer Figure 4.2.1.2
iii. Recording Audio Source: Telephone. Refer to Section 4.5.
iv. Recorded time mentioned in the video is 4:33 PM on 17/07/2014 which is on the same day of
MH17 fatal accident. Original audio created date is unknown from the audio analysis.
v. Major and Grek both their voices can be heard in left channel and right channel.
vi. Imported media format is in MPEG (Media Pictures Expert Group)
vii. Audio sample rate is 44100Hz.
viii. Audio bit depth is 32-bit (float)
ix. Audio channels are in stereo format, which are Left and Right channels.
x. The audio quality is very low although it is hearable.
xi. Figure 4.2.1.3 is showing the Cepstrum view which is used for pitch determination/analysis.
xii. Figure 4.2.1.4 is showing 3D Fast Fourier Transform (3D FFT) is an algorithm that computes
the Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a sequence, or its inverse (IDFT).
xiii. Difference level of noise in the background seen, which clearly indicating of editing/addition
of different audio into this part of the audio track.
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Project-MH17 88 Confidential i.There are two channels (stereo) in this audio 2, Track-3, conversation between Major and Grek audio duration between 0:54.5 – 1:08.9. Refer to Figure 4.2.2.1. ii.Total Audio Selection view for audio 2, track 3 is 0:54.237 seconds. iii.Recording Audio Source: Telephone. Refer to Section 4.5. iv.Recorded time mentioned in the video is 5:11 PM on 17/07/2014 which is on the same day of MH17 fatal accident. Original audio created date is unknown from the audio analysis. v.Major and Grek both their voices can be heard in left channel and right channel. vi.Imported Media format is in MPEG (Media Pictures Expert Group) vii.Audio sample rate is 44100Hz. viii.Audio bit depth is 32-bit (float) ix.Audio channels are in stereo format, which are Left and Right channels. x.The audio quality is very low although it is hearable. xi.Figure 4.2.2.3 is showing the Cepstrum view which is used for pitch determination/analysis. xii.Figure 4.2.2.4 is showing 3D Fast Fourier Transform (3D FFT) is an algorithm that computes the Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a sequence, or its inverse (IDFT). xiii.Possible merging can be seen, and background noises appear to be different.
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i. There are two channels in this Audio 2, Track-4, conversation between Major and Grek audio
duration between 1:0.4 – 1:49.0. Refer to Figure 4.2.3.1.
ii. Total Audio Selection view for audio 2, track 4 is 1:09.382 minutes (1 minute and 09.382
seconds). Refer to Figure 4.2.3.1.
iii. Recording Audio Source: Telephone. Refer to Section 4.5.
iv. Recorded time mentioned in the video is 5:32 PM on 17/07/2014 which is on the same day of
MH17 fatal accident. Original audio created date is unknown from the audio analysis.
v. Major and Grek both their voices can be heard in left channel and right channels (Stereo).
vi. Imported Media format is in MPEG (Media Pictures Expert Group)
vii. Audio sample rate is 44100Hz.
viii. Audio bit depth is 32-bit (float)
ix. Audio channels are in stereo format, which are Left and Right channels.
x. The audio quality is very low although it is hearable.
xi. Figure 4.2.3.4 is showing the Cepstrum view which is used for pitch determination/analysis.
xii. Figure 4.2.3.5 is showing 3D Fast Fourier Transform (3D FFT) is an algorithm that computes
the Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a sequence, or its inverse (IDFT).
xiii. Audio seems to be cut between time frame 1.24.2 and 1.24.3. Different frequency level
appears in many places and different background noises level were seen.
xiv. A new person voice was heard between 1:09.5 and 1:49.0 throughout this track instead of
Grek.
xv. A new person voice was heard between 1:09.5 and 1:49.0 throughout this track instead of
Major.
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Project-MH17 94 Confidential 4.3 Audio 3 - Track 5 - from time 1:50 to 2:22.8 Figure 4.3.1: Audio 3 Track- Conversation between “Kozitsyn” and “Militant” had been recorded
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i. There are two channels in this audio 3, track 5, conversation between Kozitsyn and Grek audio
duration between 1:50.0 – 2:22.8.
ii. Total Audio Selection view for audio 3, track 5 is 1:50.209 minutes. (1 minute 50.209 seconds)
iii. Recording Audio Source: Telephone. Refer to Section 4.5.
iv. Recorded time mentioned in the video is 5:42 PM on 17/07/2014 which is on the same day of
MH17 fatal accident. Original audio created date is unknown from the audio analysis.
v. Militants 1 & 2 are speaking in the left channel and Kozitsyn is speaking the right channel.
vi. Imported Media format is in MPEG (Media Pictures Expert Group)
vii. Audio sample rate is 44100Hz.
viii. Audio bit depth is 32-bit (float)
ix. Audio channels are in stereo format, which are Left and Right channels.
x. Figure 4.3.4 is showing the Cepstrum view which is used for pitch determination/analysis.
xi. Figure 4.3.5 is showing 3D Fast Fourier Transform (3D FFT) is an algorithm that computes the
Discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a sequence, or its inverse (IDFT).
xii. Possible merging can be seen between 2:02.94 and 2:02.97, also sudden difference in the
spectrum frequency from 2:02:98.
xiii. Two different militants speaking in the track 5. But no information about this in the video.
xiv. Back noises were not heard only when Kozitsyn speaks background noise are heard.
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Project-MH17 114 Confidential 4.5 Voice Biometric (Voice ID) Analysis - From Video 1 Audio Tracks Voice biometric are used for voice Identification and verification from any unknown sample of voices to a known suspect voice speaker. It can access any source of audio recording, communication channels such as telephone or microphone for verification of a speaker. The voice speech is text independent and it can be any conversational style. Hearing analysis in Audio 2-Track 4 and Audio 3-Track 5 showing difference speakers as stated in Video 1 transcript. In order to determine they are same or difference speakers, a voice comparison can be done by taking the samples of each speaker’s voice from each audio tracks. Table 4.1.1 showing the list of voice captured and Table 4.5.2 showing the list of voice samples which was extracted in WAV (raw format) from video 1 audio tracks separately to confirm the speaker is the same in the video. By determining the speaker is the same as stated in the Video 1 transcripts, analysis can conclude the transcript shown with the speaker are genuine. Refer Table 4.5.1 showing Voice ID Analysis details. Minimum requirement of each speaker voice sample must be at least ~15 seconds and frequency response of ~3000 Hz. Unfortunately, the analysis of voice comparison can’t be performed due the quality of voice of each speaker was not meeting the requirement for the analysis. Analysis concluded based on hearing as there are difference speakers in the audio tracks of Audio 2-Track 4 and Audio 3-Track 5.
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Table 4.5.1: Voice Biometric (Voice ID) Analysis - Audio Tracks from Video 1
Audio Aired
in the Video
Audio
Tracks
Parties in the Conversation Time Frames of Voice Captured Audio Details Remarks
Audio 1 Track-1 - I.Bezler ("Bes") and Vasyl
Mykolaiovych Geranin
(9031921428) (Refer Section 4.1)
- Left and Right channels have
different speakers in Audio 1,
Track-1, Hence the original audio
recorded are Mono.
- Left Channel:
I.Bezler - 0:18.4 – 0:36.09
- Right Channel:
V. Geranin - 0:18.4 – 0:36.09
Refer to Section 4.5.1
i. Bezler’s Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~ 2013 Hz
SNR 53 dB
Reverberation Time: 222 ms
Dispersion 31
Voice: 7.66 s
Total 45.29 %
Source: Telephone
ii. V.Geranin’s Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~ 3510 Hz
SNR 53 dB
Reverberation Time: 228 ms
Dispersion 48
Voice: 2.24 s
Total 59.18 %
Source: Telephone
i. The voice of individual speaker is
in different channels, therefore the
entire signal of left and right
channels was captured separately
from Track-1.
ii. Bezler’s Audio recording cannot
be accepted for Voice ID Analysis.
(Refer to 4.5.1)
iii. V.Geranin’s Audio recording
cannot be accepted for Voice ID
Analysis (Refer to 4.5.2)
iv. Therefore the speaker voice in
the audio track cannot be validate
and verify
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Project-MH17 116 Confidential Audio 2 Track-2 - Major and Grek (Refer Section 4.2) - Both the left and right channels have the similar audio tracks in Audio 2, Track-2. Recording were in Stereo. - Grek: 0:43.55 – 0:44.08 - Major: 0:44.70-0:52.95 Refer to Section 4.5.2 i. Grek’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2692 Hz SNR 13 dB Reverberation Time: 0 ms Dispersion 0 Voice: 0.51 s Total 80.38 % Source: Telephone ii. Major’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2810 Hz SNR 24 dB Reverberation Time: 185 ms Dispersion 27 Voice: 4.13 s Total 67.97 % Source: Telephone i. The voice of individual speakers is in both channels. ii. Voice samples are not suitable, when two individuals are speaking at one time. Hence only single speaker voices are taken for analysis. iii. Major’s Audio recording cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis. iv. Grek’s Audio recording cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis v. Therefore the speaker voice in the audio track cannot be validate and verify Audio 2 Track-3 - Major and Grek (Refer Section 4.2) - Both the left and right channels have the similar audio tracks in Audio 2, Track-3. Recording were in Stereo. Grek: 0:54.25 – 0:55.40 Major: 0:55.70-1:08.10 Refer to Section 4.5.3 i. Grek’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~1744 Hz SNR 16 dB Reverberation Time: 0 ms Dispersion 0 Voice: 0.54 s Total: 66.41 % Source: Telephone ii. Major’s Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2627 Hz SNR 34 dB Reverberation Time: 221 ms Dispersion 24 Voice: 5.11 s Total 52.43 % Source: Telephone i. The voice of individual speakers is in both channels. ii. Voice samples are not suitable, when two individuals are speaking at one time. Hence only single speaker voices are taken for analysis. iii. Major’s Audio recording cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis. iv. Grek’s Audio recording cannot be accepted for Voice ID Analysis. v. Therefore the speaker voice in the audio track cannot be validate and verify
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Track-4 - Different speaker in place of
Major and Different speaker in
place of Grek (Refer Section 4.2)
Both the left and right channels
have the same values in Audio 2,
Track 4.
- Different Speaker of (Grek)
from Track-2 and Track-3
Time from:
1:1.30-1:12.20; 1:16.90-1:18.80;
1:22.22-1:24.23;
1:34.85-1:36.15; 1:42.75-
1:43.54 - Different Speaker of
(Major) from Track-2 and Track-
3:
Time from:
1:10.30-1:10.56; 1:12.80-
1:15.30; 1:19.35-1:22.15;
1:24.85-1:33.55
1:36.6-1:42.8;
1:44.0-1:49.0
Refer to Section
4.5.4
i. Grek’s Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~2110 Hz
SNR 38 dB
Reverberation Time: 195 ms
Dispersion 15
Voice: 12.70 s
Total 47.37 %
Source: Telephone
ii. Major’s Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~2918 Hz
SNR 34 dB
Reverberation Time: 243 ms
Dispersion 39
Voice: 3.99 s
Total 61.52 %
Source: Telephone
i. The voice of individual speakers
is in both channels.
ii. Voice samples are not suitable,
when two individuals are speaking
at one time. Hence only single
speaker voices are taken for
analysis.
iii. Major’s Audio recording cannot
be accepted for Voice ID Analysis.
iv. Grek’s Audio recording partially
be accepted for Voice ID Analysis.
v. Therefore the speaker voice in
the audio track cannot be validate
and verify
Audio 3 Track-5 - Kozitsyn and Militant1 and
Militant 2 (Refer Section 4.3)
Left and Right channels have
different values in Audio 3, Track
5
Left Channel Militant 1 –
1:50.40 – 2:02.90
Right Channel Militant 2 –
2:02.95 – 2:14.20
Right Channel – Kozitsyn –
2:14.80 – 2:20.20
Refer to Section 4.5.5
i. Kozitsyn’s Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~2207 Hz
SNR 23 dB
Reverberation Time: 328 ms
Dispersion 75
Voice: 3.59 s
Total 30.51 %
Source: Telephone
ii. Militant 1 Audio recording
Frequency Response: ~2186 Hz
SNR 35 dB
Reverberation Time: 296 ms
Dispersion 43
Voice: 6.02 s
Total 17.96 %
Source: Telephone
i. The voice of individual speaker is
in different channels, therefore the
entire signal of left and right
channels is captured separately
from track 1.
ii. Kozitsyn’s Audio recording
cannot be accepted for Voice ID
Analysis. (Refer to 4.5.5)
iii. Militant 1’s Audio recording
cannot be accepted for Voice ID
Analysis (Refer to 4.5.6)
iv. Militant 2’s Audio recording
cannot be accepted for Voice ID
Analysis (Refer to 4.5.7)
v. Therefore the speaker voice in
the audio track cannot be validate
and verify
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Project-MH17 118 Confidential iii. Militant 2 Audio recording Frequency Response: ~2885 Hz SNR 37 dB Reverberation Time: 226 ms Dispersion 24 Voice: 6.64 s Total 19.82 % Source: Telephone
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Table 4.5.2: Details of Individual Voice ID for Voice Biometrics Analysis Exported
No Individual Voice ID MD5 HashValue Speaker Remarks
1 Audio1,Track1-LeftChannel -
GeraninVoiceID.wav
E5EE5D0D3A0E175D93E6A595698473FB V. Geranin -Voices are captured from the Left Channel of Track-1.
Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
2 Audio1,Track1-RightChannel -
BezlerVoiceID.wav
1D79DB6EEFEC615595EA599C97440CBC I. Bezler -Voices are captured from the Right Channel of Track-1
- Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
3 Audio2,Track2- Grek-VoiceID.wav 5260DB415015836A26AA187EC320EDE2 Grek -Track-2 Grek is same as Track-3 Grek
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
4 Audio2,Track2- Major-VoiceID.wav 09734793E5B5B344E6C547133CBE6B90 Major -Track-2 Major is same as Track-3 Major
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
5 Audio2,Track3- Grek-VoiceID.wav 5DF78A4F06B8DD01C10A9B24A1D2AEE0 Grek -Track-3 Grek is same as Track-2 Grek
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
6 Audio2,Track3- Major-VoiceID.wav 94B165D00CFB1026B70DC4AF3512C010 Major -Track-3 Major is same as Track-2 Major
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
7 Audio2,Track4-
UnknownNewVoice(Grek)-VoiceID.wav
54DE1D3C7F9BD3E3BCA938339E60C911 Different Voice (Grek) -Track-4 Grek is not same as Track-2 and Track-3
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
8 Audio2,Track4-
UnknownNewVoice(Major)-
VoiceID.wav
10E7B587637B72307DE001A85479F9EC Different Voice (Major) -Track-4 Major is not same as Track-2 and Track-3
- Audio can be partially accepted Voice
biometric/comparison.
9 Audio3,Track5- LeftChannel-Militant1-
VoiceID.wav
394E9F22CBA24D5B5EF71D8D731AB2C4 Militant Voice 1 -Voices are captured from the Left Channel of Track-5,
Militant1 voice is not same as Militant2 voice.
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
10 Audio3,Track5- LeftChannel-Militant2-
VoiceID.wav
676760F206D9CE5963FC5CB5BA723227 Militant Voice 2 -Voices are captured from the Left Channel of Track-5,
Militant2 voice is not same as Militant1 voice.
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
11 Audio3,Track5- RightChannel-Kozitsyn-
VoiceID.wav
78C726BD29F7530C0E42B072B021E508 Kozitsyn -Voices are captured from the Right Channel of Track-1
-Not suitable for Voice biometric/comparison.
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Project-MH17 122 Confidential 4.5.2 Audio 2, Track 2 Voices Figure 4.5.2.1: Audio 2, Track 2 - Grek’s Voice Signal Characteristics - Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID analysis Audio 2, Track 2 - Grek’s voice Waveform (Entire Signal)
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Figure 4.5.2.2: Audio 2, Track 2 - Major’s Voice Signal Characteristics - Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID analysis
Audio 2, Track 2 - Major’s
voice Waveform (Entire
Signal)
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Project-MH17 124 Confidential 4.5.3 Audio 2, Track3 Voices Figure 4.5.3.1: Audio 2, Track 3 - Grek’s Voice Signal Characteristics - Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID analysis Audio 2, Track 3 - Grek’s voice Waveform (Entire Signal)
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Figure 4.5.3.2: Audio 2, Track 3 - Major’s Voice Signal Characteristics - Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID analysis
Audio 2, Track 3 - Major’s
voice Waveform (Entire
Signal)
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Project-MH17 126 Confidential 4.5.4 Audio 2, Track 4 Voices Figure 4.5.4.1: Audio 2, Track 4 - Grek’s Voice Signal Characteristics - Audio can be partially accepted for Voice ID analysis Audio 2, Track 4 - Major’s voice Waveform (Entire Signal)
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Figure 4.5.4.2: Audio 2, Track 4 - Major’s Voice Signal Characteristics - Audio cannot be accepted for Voice ID analysis
Audio 2, Track 4 - Grek’s
voice Waveform (Entire
Signal)
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5.0 5.0 Video 2 - MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата
разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4
Figure 5.1: MH17 crash leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров ополчения ДНР..mp4- Waveform Shows
there were no edits seen in the audio
Video 2 audio
stream sound wave
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6.0 Summary
In conclusion, the first and foremost analysis on the video files is the authenticity of the both videos
as listed in Table 1.5.1 and Table 2.1.1. In YouTube channel, Video 1 - `SSU, Radio interception of
conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash’ showing that it was published on the 17th
Jul 2014 but the encoded/created date was showing 01/11/2018 ~ 02:44:30 (UTC) which is after ~ 4 years
3 months of MH17 fatal incident happened (17/7/2014). Video 1 date modified (in YouTube header) is
also showing last modified on 1st Nov 2018 (Refer Figure 2.1.1.3). This clearly means that this video is not
genuine and had been tampered and can’t be accepted as digital evidence to relied upon. Refer to Section
1.8 showing the Timeline.
In Video 2 - 'MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата
разговоров ополчения ДНР.', the published date is showing as 17th Jul 2014 and last modified date (in
YouTube header) showing last modified on 4th Aug 2014 (Refer Figure 2.1.2.3). This also showing the video
is also considered not genuine. Refer to Section 1.8 showing the Timeline.
Forensic verification analysis of the audios in Video 1, there was no any metadata showing any
details of the audio tracks original source of the recorded audio tracks, thus making the audio tracks in
this Video 1’s audio stream cannot be trusted/relied upon, not genuine, as it has no authenticity and
cannot be accepted as any kind of digital evidence.
The audio forensic analysis on the main audio streams of Video 1 showing there are total of 3
separate audios files with 5 tracks of audio conversation between militants were aired in Video 1 audio
stream as listed below. Refer to Table 3.2.1 and Figure 4.4 showing the details of Audio tracks.
i. Audio 1, Track 1 - Time Frame: 0:18.3 – 0:36.1 (a mono channel recorded audio track)
ii. Audio 2, Track-2 - Time Frame: 0.43.3 - 0.52.9 (a stereo channel recorded audio track)
iii. Audio 2, Track-3 - Time Frame: 0.54.5 - 1:08.0 (a stereo channel recorded audio track)
iv. Audio 2, Track-4 -Time Frame: 0.54.5 - 1:08.0 (a stereo channel recorded audio track)
v. Audio 3, Track-5 - Time Frame: 1:50 - 2:22.8 (a mono channel recorded audio track)
All the recorded audios tracks quality is very low, and the original source of the intercepted audio
remain unknown. The audio recorded tracks channel in Video 1 are inconsistent with some are mono
recorded audio and some are stereo recorded audio. This clearly showing that multiple source of the audio
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Project-MH17 140 Confidential track recorded were taken to composed into Video 1 audio stream. Refer to Table 3.1.2 showing Video 1 Audio Tracks Analysis. Forensic analysis on these audio tracks spectral and noise floor showing there are several anomalies and few edits with missing/inconsistence of recorded audio tracks in Video 1 - SSU, Radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash.mp4. The edits, merging of other sources of audios tracks and cuts were seen as below. Refer to Section 4.0. a.In Audio 1, Track 1 - below are the edition/manipulation seen. i. Refer to Figure 4.4.1.1 -Background noises appear in the V. Gernanin’s part of audio Track-1 (Left Channel) are different at 0.18.5, 0:25.75 & 0:31:5. The noise is different suddenly once he starts to talk. The background noise in between of phrases present in Audio 1- Track 1 between the duration of 0:19.5 and 0:25.5, between 0:26.8 and 0:31.4 and between 0:32.6 and 0:36.0. -Arrows (bottom – up) showing merging of audios at 0:22.5, 0:23.5 and 0:30:5. ii. Refer to Figure 4.4.1.2: -Figure 4.4.1.2: A gap which appears at the end of third phrase ~0:32.6 uttered by V. Gernanin in the audio Track-1 (Left Channel) is possible indication that Geranin voices are merged into the conversation. -Audio spectral at 0:31.75 – 0:31.85 (Left Channel) showing added cut, paste and merger of other sound in this audio. iii.Refer to Figure 4.4.1.3: -Bezler’s voice audio Track 1 (Right Channel) have long pauses after each phrase, appears strange. -Long pauses seen between 0:24.7 and 0:25.7, between 0:26.55 and 0:27.55, between 0:36 and 0:31.45, between 0:32.4 and 0:33.5 -Arrows in Left Channel showing merging of audios at 0:22.5, 0:23.5 and 0:30:5. iv. Refer to Figure 4.4.1.4: -Right Channel - It appears that the audio was cut down and merged at 0:23.20 from the end of a conversation. Different audio conversation starts at 0:23.30. -Left channel (arrow up-bottom) showing merging of audio at 0:23.43. b. In Audio 2, Track 2 - below are the edition/manipulation seen. i.Refer to Figure 4.4.2.1: -SSU, radio interception of conversations between militants, Boeing-777 plane crash.mp4, Audio 2 and Track-2 conversation between -Major and Grek audio duration between 0:43.3 – 0:52.9. Possible edit can be seen as the noise level is different
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Project-MH17
141
Confidential
c. In Audio 2, Track 3 - below are the edition/manipulation seen.
i. Refer to Figure 4.4.3.1
- In Audio 2, Track-3, background noises are not similar in this part from 0:58:75 and 0:59:0.
- At 0:58.85 another difference noise was seen.
ii. Refer to Figure 4.4.3.2
- In Audio 2, Track-3, possible edits can be seen between 1:03:85 and 1:04:55, background noise
suddenly appears from nowhere completely unrelated to the speakers’ background atmosphere.
d. In Audio 2, Track-4 - below are the edition/manipulation seen.
i. Refer to Figure 4.4.4.1
- In Audio 2, Track-4 possible edits can be seen between 1:13:55 and 1:13:5 and between 1:15:20
and 1:16:20
- Background noise suddenly appears from nowhere completely unrelated to the speakers’
atmosphere.
ii. Refer to Figure 4.4.4.2
- In Audio 2 Track-4, possible edits can be seen between 1:18:80 and 1:19:30
- Background noise suddenly appears from nowhere completely unrelated to the speakers’
atmosphere.
iii. Refer to Figure 4.4.4.3
- Failed to overlay the merging between time frame 1:24.20 and 1:24.30 another merging between
1:24.50 and 1:24.85.
- Hearing showing different speaker in this track,
iv. Refer to Figure 4.4.4.4
- A new person’s voice appears between 1:09.5 and 1:49.0. However, SBU stated that the
conversation was between Major and Grek.
e. Audio 3, Track-5 - below are the edition/manipulation seen.
i. Refer to Figure 4.4.5.1
- Audio 3 Track-5 begins from 1:50.2 and ends at 2:22.7. This segment of audio has 3 different
individual voices.
- Two different channel seen showing two difference source of audio recordings.
- it appears to be two different militants speaking to Kozitsyn.
- Cut of audio in Right channel at ~1:51.0 – 1:54.0, ~1:57.5-2:00.0, ~2:01.0-2:02.5, ~ 2:04.5-2:07.5
& ~2:10.5-2:12.0
ii. Refer to Figure 4.4.5.2
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Project-MH17 142 Confidential -Possible merging can be seen between 2:02.94 and 2:02.97 (Left Channel), also sudden difference in the spectrum frequency -from 2:02:98 iii.Refer to Figure 4.4.5.3 -Muffled and no background noise appears were seen between 1:50.2 and 1:53.6 (Right Channel). -However, background noise appears normal after 1:53.8 till the end of the track. There are two different channels in this track. Left Channel - (Arrow Up-Bottom) showing adding of audio between ~2:12.6 and 2:14.2. -Right Channel (Arrow Up-Bottom) showing merging ~2:12.3 until 2:22.28. This is clear editing/adding of audios Further analysis on the audio tracks were performed where set of voice samples were taken for details voice analysis where comparison of voices can be performed to identify speakers on each audio track can be identified if they are same speaker or different but unfortunately none of the voices are meeting the requirement for voice biometric analysis/comparison as it has very short speech below 15 seconds and it is the audio quality is low. As a summary, all 5 audio tracks in the Video 1 - `SSU, Radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash’ published in YouTube by SSU is faked, tampered and not genuine. Release the original and genuine audio tracks officially is highly recommended. Refer to Section 1.7 showing the Executive Summary of the video and audio stream analysis and Section 1.8 showing the Timeline of the Videos. Refer to Section 3.1 showing the Video File Analysis and Statements and Section 3.2 showing Audio Track Analysis and Finding Statements for further reference.
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Project-MH17
143
Confidential
7.0 Appendix
i. Reference of Video
Video 1 - SSU, radio interception of conversations between terrorists, "Boeing-777" plane crash
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BbyZYgSXdyw
Video 2 - MH17 crash: leaked tape proven FAKE by audio analysis. Анализ перехвата разговоров
ополчения ДНР. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T34AB6CImTE
Refer to Table 2.1.1 and Table 2.2.1 for Video source and acquired videos details.
~END~
Annex 198
CNN, Kerry: ‘Drunken separatists’ interfering at MH17 crash site (24 July 2014)
Annex 198
Updated 1823 GMT (0223 HKT) July 24, 2014
Are the same separatists accused of shooting down Malaysia Airlines Flight
17 now looting, tampering with the evidence and stopping investigators
from combing through the wreckage?
Three days after the passenger plane plunged to the ground, criticism over
the handling of the crash site in rebel-controlled eastern Ukraine showed
no signs of slowing on Sunday.
Key questions remain unanswered: What will happen to the remains of the
298 people aboard the plane that crashed Thursday? Where are the black
boxes? And is there any hope investigators will be able to determine who's
responsible?
Malaysia's transportation minister said an international team was
"effectively being prevented from entering the crash site," adding in a
statement that officials were concerned that "the sanctity of the crash site
has been severely compromised."
In an interview with CNN's Candy Crowley, Secretary of State John Kerry
described what he said were "drunken separatists piling the remains of people into trucks in an unceremonious fashion ...
interfering with the evidence in the location."
He told NBC's "Meet the Press" that there is a "buildup of extraordinary circumstantial evidence" over the crash that Russia
"needs to help account for."
And British Prime Minister David Cameron didn't mince words when he
said who was to blame. In an op-ed in The Sunday Times, he called the
plane crash and its aftermath "an outrage made in Moscow."
Russian President Vladimir Putin fired back with a video statement
posted on the Kremlin's official website early Monday, arguing that his
country has been pushing for peace in Ukraine.
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"We have repeatedly called on all parties to immediately stop the bloodshed and to sit down at the negotiating table. We can confidently say that if June 28 fighting in eastern Ukraine did not resume, this tragedy most likely would not have happened," he said. "However, no one should have the right to use this tragedy to achieve selfish political objectives. Such events should not divide but unite people."He stressed that safety must be guaranteed for international experts investigating the crash."We must do everything to ensure their work has full and absolute security (and) ensure necessary humanitarian corridors are provided," Putin said.At the crash site, there were concerns the bodies had been picked over by thieves."The facts of looting, how the terrorists are dealing with the bodies, are beyond the moral boundaries," Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko tweeted.The local head of the rebels rejected accusations that his forces shot down the plane, denied accusations that they removed the bodies and denied responsibility when asked about people reportedly using stolen bank-issued cards taken from the victims' bodies."It is possible that some local residents could have searched the bodies of victims, found their cards and tried to use them. Unfortunately, I can't exclude the possibility of this," Alexander Borodai said Saturday.The situation at the crash site showed some small signs of improvement on Sunday, with more control and more activity. "Today was a better day for sure," said Michael Bociurkiw, a spokesman for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's monitoring team in Ukraine. "We were able to spend quite a bit of time out at the different crash sites."But it was still far from a well-organized investigation scene, and the area remained under the control of pro-Russia rebels.Government emergency workers prevented vehicles from driving up the road to the main crash site, but people could still roam the fields on foot.Search teams have found 251 bodies at the crash site, the Ukrainian Cabinet said on its website. Pro-Russian rebels are keeping the remains of nearly 200 MH17 victims in refrigerated train cars, Vice Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman said Sunday, adding that talks were ongoing for their release.OSCE observers went to a train station about 15 kilometers (9 miles) from the main crash site to see the bodies, Bociurkiw said."We were able to peer inside of the cars, and it definitely was refrigerated. There was no way we could verify the count of ... bodies, but there were dozens and dozens there," he told CNN. "We were told those railway cars will remain stationary until international experts arrive."Earlier Sunday, Russian state news agency RIA Novosti reported that the train was headed to Donetsk.Borodai told ABC News on Sunday that rebels want to release the remains."We can and we want to give bodies to the relatives, but experts have to examine the bodies here. That is international practice," Borodai told ABC.
Annex 198
If the remains are turned over to the Ukrainian government, Borodai said he feared that they would be used as evidence to blame his fighters for shooting down the plane -- an accusation he has repeatedly denied. He said he guaranteed the safety of international investigators "and their ability to work."But Ukraine's State Emergency Service said the search in the remote area of eastern Ukraine, roughly 25 miles (40 kilometers) from the Russian border, was being "complicated by armed separatists at the site who hinder the work of SES units."Hundreds of staffers from the agency are searching for the remains of the MH17 victims, covering an area stretching across 13 square miles (34 square kilometers).Busloads of volunteers from nearby coal mines also fanned out across the wheat fields where the bodies and debris from the plane fell.Malaysia is sending two large military cargo planes to bring back the remains, the country's official news agency Bernama reported.Pro-Russia rebels may have recovered the plane's flight data and cockpit voice recorders, Borodai said on the website of the self-declared Donetsk If experts determine the devices found are the so-called black boxes, they will be turned over to international investigators, Borodai said."These are some technical objects. We cannot say for sure these are black boxes," he said.Borodai said the devices are under guard in the region. They will not be given to Ukrainian officials, he said. Reuters distributed video on Sunday of what appeared to be an inflight recorder found by a worker in a field. The agency labeled the video, shot Friday, as showing one of the two flight data recorders from MH17.Bociurkiw said the OSCE had not confirmed whether the black boxes had been found."We will declare the black boxes found or located when we actually see them," he said.The observers intended to ask whether they'd been found at the crash site on Sunday, he said, but "there was no one produced who could answer the question in a credible way."Some Malaysian investigators flew to Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, on Saturday. But Malaysia's official news agency said they were still negotiating with rebels over access for their team. Law enforcement officials from the Netherlands, the United States and Australia will help with the investigation led by the Ukrainian government.Two FBI agents arrived in Kiev, a senior U.S. law enforcement official said. An investigator from the National Transportation Safety Board was also there.But three days after the deadly crash, it was unclear when an international investigation at the scene would be able to start.Journalist Noah Sneider, who's been covering fighting in Ukraine for months and was one of the first to arrive at the crash site on Thursday, said confusion at the scene is no surprise."All of this is happening in an active war zone. There's been a separatist uprising that began in April and has burned slowly up until this point. And security concerns are real, and the ability of any of the authorities on the ground here to effectively secure the area (is) minimal," he told CNN on
Annex 198
Sunday. "The rebels are a patchwork group, and they seem to answer to different forces at different times."For the families of the victims, the uncertainty only deepened their suffering.Silene Fredriks said her son and his girlfriend had taken Flight MH17 for a planned vacation in Bali. At Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport on Sunday, she laid flowers and signed the condolence book.She says she wants Russian President Vladimir Putin to ensure that the two young people's remains make it back to the Netherlands."I can do nothing but wait for their bodies," she said.Governments from around the world have expressed outrage at the disorderly situation at the crash site and called on Putin to use his influence on the rebels.Cameron called Putin on Sunday to urge him to do what he can to ensure the victims "have proper funerals." His opinion piece urged Putin to find a way to make the crash site more accessible and calm the strife between Ukraine and the rebels."If President Putin does not change his approach to Ukraine, then Europe and the West must fundamentally change our approach to Russia," Cameron wrote. Ten of the passengers on MH17, which was en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, were British.Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott, whose country had 27 citizens on the plane, added to the pressure on Putin.Describing the downing of the passenger jet as "a horrific crime," Abbott said he had summoned Russian Trade Minister Denis Manturov, who is visiting Australia, and "made crystal clear my concerns and dissatisfaction with the way this has been handled." "Russian-controlled territory, Russian-backed rebels, quite likely a Russian-supplied weapon," Abbott said in a television interview Sunday. "Russia can't wash its hands of this."Russia has denied any involvement, and Putin said Ukraine's military campaign against the rebels was to blame. He also has called for a "thorough and objective investigation" of the crash.Since the crash, the Ukrainian government and the rebels have traded bitter accusations over who was responsible and what has been done since. Ukrainian officials have said that a Russian-made Buk M1 missile system, brought into eastern Ukraine from Russia, had shot down the Malaysian airliner.The Ukrainian government has accused the rebels of removing debris and 38 bodies from the scene as part of an attempt to cover up what happened.Borodai has told reporters that the rebels lacked the firepower to hit an aircraft that high.The United States has said evidence suggests a Russian-made surface-to-air missile fired from the rebel territory took down jet.Kerry said a convoy of about 150 vehicles moved several weeks ago from Russia to eastern Ukraine. The military equipment included "multiple rocket launchers," he said."It's pretty clear that this is a system that was transferred from Russia in the hands of separatists," Kerry told CNN on Sunday. A written statement from the U.S. Embassy in Kiev also included mention of Russia providing training to separatists at a facility in southwest Russia."This effort included training on air defense systems," the statement said.U.S. officials believe the missile systems may have been moved back across the border into Russia.
Annex 199 DNA, Ukrainian investigators found 196 bodies at #MH17 crash site (20 July 2014)
Annex 199
July 20, 2014
Ukrainian investigators found 196 bodies at #MH17
crash site
dnaindia.com/world/report-ukrainian-investigators-found-196-bodies-at-mh17-crash-site-2003686
Ukrainian investigators have found 196 bodies at the crash site where a Malaysian
passenger plane carrying 298 people was brought down by a missile in pro-Russia
rebels-held eastern part of the country.
The Ukrainian State Emergency Service (SES) today said 380 staff were taking part in
the search that stretches across 34 sq km of eastern Ukraine.
But the search was being complicated by separatists at the site who were hindering the
work of SES units, the CNN reported, citing SES officials.
The Boeing 777 was on a scheduled flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur and it had
not made a distress call.
It is still not clear if the Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down purposely or
mistakenly on Thursday.
All 298 people on board were killed in the crash.
Latest figures released by Malaysia Airlines show the plane was carrying 192 Dutch
nationals, 44 Malaysians (including 15 crew), 27 Australians, 12 Indonesians and 10
Britons, four Germans, four Belgians, three from the Philippines, and one each from
Canada and New Zealand.
1/2
Annex 199
The Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian separatists in the east of the countryhave blamed each other for the alleged shooting down of the plane.Earlier, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) said it haddoubts over the number of bodies recovered from the downed MH17 or where they weretaken or who moved them.Michael Bociurkiw, a spokesman for observers from of the OSCE, told CNN the groupsaw men moving an unknown number of body bags yesterday, but that it wasn't clearwho they were.It's hard to get reliable information because several groups of pro-Russian rebels, some of them masked, control the area, he said, adding "there doesn'tseem to be one commander in charge."Three air crash investigators from Ukraine accompanied the OSCE observers but theydidn't have much time to do their work, he said. "They need a lot more time and a lotmore freedom of access." 2/2
Annex 200 The Dutch National Police, Official Report Concerning Disclosed Intercepted Conversations, 16 December 2019
Annex 200
1
APPENDIX 8
OFFICIAL REPORT OF 16 DECEMBER 2019
CONCERNING DISCLOSED INTERCEPTED
CONVERSATIONS
Annex 200
2 OFFICIAL REPORT CONCERNING DISCLOSED INTERCEPTED CONVERSATIONS My name is Gerardus Wilhelmus Christiaan THIRY, chief inspector with the National Crime Squad of the Dutch National Police. I have been working as coordinating team leader of the criminal investigation since the start of the investigation into the downing of MH17. I have over 42 years’ experience of combating organised crime, international crimes, gathering criminal intelligence, infiltration, and murder investigations. In addition I have been stationed abroad on several occasions as a liaison officer. The investigation team I lead consists of investigators and experts with specific skills or knowledge, such as aviation experts, high-tech crime specialists and analysts. In addition, as and when necessary, use was made of experts sworn in by the examining magistrate. This official report was drawn up by Primo-625, and I have read and approved its contents. On the basis of the findings of the investigation and my knowledge of the facts, I declare as follows:
Annex 200
3
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Identifying details
2.1 SBU
2.2 JIT
2.3 Coding
3. Published conversations
3.1 13 April 2014: direction from Russian territory
3.2 8 June 2014: request for anti-aircraft defence
3.3 11 and 12 July 2014: financial problems in the DPR
3.4 16 July 2014: obtaining a Buk
3.5 17 July 2014, morning: the arrival of the Buk-TELAR
3.6 17 July 2014, afternoon: the positioning of the Buk-TELAR
3.7 17 July 2014, afternoon: after the downing of MH17
3.8 17/18 July 2014, evening/night: the Buk-TELAR has to be driven away
3.9 18 July 2014, morning: confusion about the location of the Buk-TELAR
3.10 20-23 July 2014: support from Russia
3.11 2 June 2015: conversation about the launch location of the Buk missile
4. Conclusion
Annex 200
4 1. Introduction The JIT investigation has made use of various types of information, including recorded telephone conversations. Some of these conversations have been made public by various parties at various times since the downing of flight MH17. Through its own website, the Ukrainian security service SBU has released a number of these recorded conversations, using the social media platform YouTube. In addition, several of these conversations informed the SBU’s decision about whether to prosecute four separatists for involvement in terrorist activities. This decision was made public by means of a notice of suspicion. For its part, the JIT has released certain conversations in connection with its various appeals for witnesses. These conversations can be found on the JIT website and on YouTube. In a few cases the conversations were released in full, including the names of the participating separatists, the time and date when the conversation took place and the names of any other separatists that were mentioned. In most cases, however, only parts of the conversations were released; the names of the separatists concerned were anonymised, and/or the exact time of the conversation was omitted. This official report reproduces the content of these previously released, recorded telephone conversations. The recordings themselves were provided to the JIT by the Ukrainian authorities and then examined and translated by the JIT. 2. Identifying details So as not to compromise the (Ukrainian and Dutch) criminal investigation and prosecution, it is in many cases not (yet) possible to share all details related to these conversations. The transcripts of the conversations therefore vary in terms of the extent to which certain identifying details are included, such as the exact time of the call or the identity of the separatists concerned. The two organisations in question – the SBU and the JIT – make different assessments in this regard, as explained below. 2.1 SBU The conversations released by the SBU have all been anonymised in this report. The names of the separatists participating in the call and any other separatists mentioned in the course of the conversation (whether by name or by call sign) have been replaced by a code. The exact time when the conversation took place has been replaced by an indication of the time of day. In some cases more of the conversation has been included than in previously released versions, so the reader can better interpret
Annex 200
5
the context of the information that was shared previously. In a number of cases the reporting officer has
omitted part of a conversation from this report as well.
2.2 JIT
In the case of conversations released by the JIT, whether or not identifying details and times are included
depends on what has already been shared. When a conversation has been previously released by the JIT,
this will be noted. In instances where names of the separatists concerned – or call signs or first names
mentioned in the conversation – have already been released, they are not anonymised here. The same
applies to the exact time: if it has previously been shared, it will also be included in this report. In all
other cases this information will be anonymised or omitted. In some cases more of the conversation has
been included than in previously released versions, so the reader can better interpret the context of the
information that was shared previously. In a number of cases part of a conversation has been omitted
from this report as well.
2.3 Coding
Each conversation is marked with a date. Although an exact time is often not given, the conversations
have been arranged in chronological order. In cases where the exact time is not indicated, the time of
day when the conversation took place is noted:
Night (00:00-06:00)
Morning (06:00-12:00)
Afternoon (12:00-18:00)
Evening (18:00-00:00)
All times given are local Ukrainian times.
In cases where the separatists’ names have been anonymised, the report will indicate whether the
separatist has been identified, the separatist group to which he belongs and whether he ranks high or
low rank in the hierarchy. Separatists are deemed to be ‘high ranking’ if they have people under them or
have some kind of leadership position. The exact number of subordinates a person has is not relevant for
this classification system. ‘Lower-ranking’ separatists have no one under them. The coding system also
Annex 200
6 distinguishes between the tapped line (A) and the person on the other end of the line (B), and whether the call was incoming or outgoing. On the basis of this classification system each separatist in a given conversation has been given an identifying code, which is composed of the following information: Identified: I Unidentified: U Higher rank: H Lower rank: L Unknown rank: U DPR: D LPR: L Unknown: U Caller A: A Caller B: B So an identified DPR separatist with a leadership role would thus be given the code ‘IHD’. If he is calling on the ‘A’ line, his code would be ‘IHD-A’. An unidentified LPR separatist whose rank is unknown calling on the ‘B’ line would be given the code ‘UUL-B’. These codes are applied separately to each individual conversation. The same code, e.g. IHD-B, may be found in multiple conversations, but that does not mean it refer to the same individual. When an anonymised caller is addressed by their name or call sign, the latter will be replaced in the transcript by the relevant code, e.g. IHD-B. In cases where other separatists are discussed, they will be anonymised with the designation ‘[XX]’. Ranks such as ‘Colonel’ or ‘Pervii’ have not been anonymised because they are indicative of that individual’s place in the hierarchy and cannot as such be traced back to a particular person.
Annex 200
7
3. Published conversations
3.1 13 April 2014: direction from Russian territory
In mid-April 2014 there was heavy fighting in Donetsk Oblast between separatists and the Ukrainian
armed forces. On the afternoon of 13 April 2014 there were a number of conversations between an
identified, high-ranking DPR separatist (‘IHD-A’) and another high-ranking DPR separatist (‘IHD-B’) who,
according to what is said during the call, was in Russia at that time. Transcripts of three conversations
are included in this report.
In the first conversation IHD-B asks IHD-A how the situation is. IHD-A says that ‘they’ have repelled an
enemy attack. This was a serious unit with important people, and it suffered heavy losses. He did not
suffer any casualties. IHD-B says that reinforcements are on their way from Luhansk: ‘whatever “they”
had managed to arrange’.
Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the conversation.
1
Date: 13 April 2014
Time: Afternoon
Participant A: IHD-A
Participant B: IHD-B
Incoming
Conversation
Anonymised
Complete
C: Hello.
B: Hello.
C: Yes, yes.
B: Yes, put [IDH-A] on the phone.
C: Err.. hold on a second… who is asking?
B: [IHD-B]… he knows.
C: Hold on a second.
In de background:
C: {inaudible} the phone. [IHD-B] from Russia is on the line.
Voice 1: Where from?
C: From Russia. {inaudible}.
Back to the phone. A is putting C on the phone.
A: Hi. Hello.
B: Yes.
Annex 200
8 A: Hello. Yes. B: What is the situation there? A: Well, look… we defeated the first attack… so… err.. they bumped into our whatsit… screen… B: Uh-huh. A: …incurred big losses. Incurred big losses. We don’t even know who… who we crushed, but they were serious. So… B: I got it. Great. So, look, a company from Lugansk1 will move out to you. A: Uh-huh. B: I fucking […] them. A: A company consisting of what? B: Huh? A: A company consisting of what? B: Well, what we fucking managed to… those who have fighting experience, will move out. A: Okay. Let them move out. B: So,… A: But keep in mind that all the roads are sealed. They will have to fight their way through or bypass them. B: I know. They will at least hit their check points. A: Uh-huh. Okay, okay. B: Maybe they will not break through. They are terribly scared. Got it? As you can imagine. Maybe they will not break through. A: [IHD-B], throw… throw… now […[ the informa…2 we need the information regarding who we crushed. We crushed a very serious team. A very serious one. With some very serious and important people. So… err… they are keeping total silence… both on TV and the Internet. But we crushed them well. My guys did an excellent job. B: I got it. How many? A: I don’t know. 1 Luhansk (Ukr.) 2 Unfinished word.
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9
B: Do you have any losses?
A: We don’t have any losses. Not everyone has come back yet, but the main
team incurred no losses. And you know that if we had losses, they would
make much noise. So… err… and as the guys keep radio silence, it means…
you understand that {inaudible}.
B: Okay. So I will break through to Lugansk and form there…
A: Okay.
B: … with Lugansk teams I will […] to you.
A: Okay. Okay. Go ahead. Well, no… we… {inaudible} … we will stick it out for
several days. With fights of course. We will stick it out, you know. So… err…
let them take more anti-tank weapons. Okay?
B: Good. Okay. Deal.
A: We need anti-tank weapons. If we had any, we would cause everybody run
behind Mozhay.3 Bye. Good luck. Uh-huh.
B: I got it. Bye. Stay in touch.
A: Bye.
Later that same afternoon, half an hour after the previous conversation, the same identified, highranking
DPR separatists again spoke by telephone. IHD-B wants to arrange an interview with the Russian
news broadcaster Lifenews. IHD-A should have someone else give the interview. One of the subordinates
of IHD-A – someone with a Ukrainian accent – should explain the outcome of the recent fighting in which
IHD-A’s troops were involved in the interview. Then he says that the demands of the Ukrainian
separatists should be announced via the same medium.
Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the conversation.
2
3 A word for word translation of an idiom which means: “… we would cause everybody run far away from here.”
Annex 200
10 Date: 13 April 2014 Time: Afternoon Participant A: IHD-A Participant B: IHD-B Incoming Conversation Anonymised Complete A: Hello. Hello. B: Hello. [IDH-A]. A: Hi. Yes. Listening to you. B: Hi. So, look: Khokhly4are lying recklessly there. I want to arrange a LifeNews5 live stream for you. I will give this phone number. They will call, introduce themselves. LifeNews from Moscow. A: Listen up. B: Tell them a few words. A: Are you sure that I… that I need this? In terms of… B: Don’t introduce yourself. Okay. Take your deputy… A: Uh-huh. B: … the one who speaks with the Ukrainian accent. A: Uh-huh. B: Okay? Well, [XX] … or what is his name? Okay? Is his name [XX]? Well, it doesn’t matter. A: Yes. Uh-huh. B: In short, take your deputy… A: Uh-huh. B: … and describe… let him describe absolutely clearly… introduce himself as a deputy commander… A: Uh-huh. B: … and describe absolutely clearly what is going on. I mean… err… that everything is fine, everything is okay. We won, so to speak. Those ones retreated with big losses. We have no losses. Hello. A: Okay. Give […]. I will be waiting for the call then. B: And the demands… A: Yes. B: And the demands… that we are demanding the federalization of Ukraine, the elections of governors, the immediate elections of governors… okay? The 4 Khokhol (pl. Khokhly) – (literally ‘a forelock’). An old slur used by Russians to refer to Ukranians. 5 LifeNews (Life) is a Russian news website and 24-hour television channel that is onwed by the News Media holding company.
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11
elections of governors not later than the twenty fifth day of the month. We
are demanding the federalization of Ukraine, the elections of governors and
err… the condition that Rada6can’t take foreign loans without the two thirds
of vote of the regions. It is very important. It is a very essential demand.
Because they will now give Ukraine as a pledge for money.
A: I got it. Good. The person heard everything. He will say everything in the
phone. Okay? Bye. Talk to you soon.
B: Okay. Good. Deal.
A: Yes. So, here… here…
B: That we are demanding that, we will remain steadfast to the last.
A: Yes, yes. So, look… here helicopters are flying around. We are looking at
them with our hungry eyes. So… but…
B: I fucking understand.
A: Okay.
Off to the side:
A: Say what?
Back to the phone
B: I will try to make every effort to push this through.
A: Okay. I {inaudible}. Bye. Uh-huh. Bye. Bye.
In the background
Voice 1: The first channel {inaudible}.
Back to the phone
B: Yes. I…
6 The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine is the unicameral parliament of Ukraine.
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12 That afternoon the same identified, high-ranking DPR separatists spoke on the telephone once again. IHD-B said that IHR-D, an identified Russian businessman with contacts in high political circles, is with him, and then he hands him the telephone. IHD-A gives an update of the situation to IHR-D. IHR-D asks IHD-A if he has already told this to AKSYONOV, the leader of Russian-occupied Crimea. In response to IHD-A’s reply that he has not yet been able to get in touch with him, IHR-D said that he would be meeting with AKSYONOV the next day and that he would talk to him. In the meantime, he advised IHD-A to continue trying to contact AKSYONOV. IHR-D also said that IHD-A’s ambush has succeeded in wounding the head of the Ukrainian Anti-Terrorism Centre. Below is an anonymised transcript of the conversation. The reporting officer has omitted part of the conversation (indicated with ‘[…]’). 3 Date: 13 April 2014 Time: Afternoon Participant A: IHD-A Participant B: IHD-B Participant D: IHR-D Incoming Conversation Anonymised Abbreviated C: Hello. B: Hello. [IDH-A]?. C: Yes, yes. This is not [IDH-A].. B: Hello, hello. C: This is not [IDH-A]. B: Put [IDH-A] on the phone, please. Urgently. C: {inaudible}. B: [IDH-B]. C: Hold on. B: Uh-huh. Off to the side: C: I will call you back. I will call you back. In the background: Voice 1: {inaudible}. B: Listen, what’s the difference? Do you think I have any phone that is not being listened in now? Voice 2: {inaudible} A: {inaudible}
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13
Back to the phone, C is putting A on the phone.
A: Yes, listening, [IHD-B]?
B: [IDH-A].
A: Yes. Listening to you. Yes.
B: Yes. Hi. What is the situation like? [IHR-D] is here. I will put him on the
phone now.
B is putting D on the phone.
A: Yes.
D: Hello. Hello.
A: I wish you good health, [IHR-D].
D: Yes. Good morning. So, what’s up?
A: So, we have defeated the attack. The enemy has retreated in all directions
with big losses. So, err… from our side…
D: What does “big losses” mean?
A: Don’t know, but according to our estimates they have from fifteen to
twenty killed or wounded, including several senior special ops officers.
D: Uh-huh.
A: They got in our ambush.
D: Uh-huh.
A: We… so, our… our team shot at three VIP class vehicles…
D: Uh-huh.
A: Which they drove… destroyed both security and those who were there…
almost everybody. So, from fifteen to twenty.
D: And from our side? (…)
A: We have no wounded or killed from our side. The guys did a great job.
D: Have you reported to Aksionov?
A: No, I haven’t reported yet. I didn’t manage to establish communication
with him. So, if it is possible to call him…
D: Okay, okay. Then call him. I am meeting with him tomorrow here.
A: Uh-huh. Uh-huh.
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14 D: He is flying in this evening. We will have a talk with him, but try to get through to him yourself. With the report. A: Copied. Copied. Of course. D: Okay? A: Copied. Copied. D: Well. The further commander’s personal reconnaissance… I need hardly say, the whole world is now looking at this geographical point… so… now we shouldn’t be too clever-clever. A: I got it. So, from our side… we haven’t relinquished a single position. I mean they are lying about everything. We maintained all the positions in Kramatorsk and we will {inaudible}… […] A: ‘[IHR-D], from my side, I am asking to clarify… I mean… who did we beat after all? We’ve got completely different information… from Alfa7 to GRU8 special ops forces of whatsit… of Ukraine. D: Well, I can only give official information. That it was the head of the Anti-Terrorism Center of Ukraine. A: Killed? D: Well, they said wounded. [XX] said he is wounded. A: I got it. I got it. D: Well, it’s according to their TSN.9 So, you hit the right person. A: Well, I got it. Yes. Great. I mean… Thank you. Thank you. Uh-huh. D: Good luck. A: Yes. Thank you. Good bye. Uh-huh. D: Ok. Stay safe. And I also want to say that you celebrated the holiday very well. A: I did my best. {laughing}. Thank you. D: {laughing}. Bye. 7 Alfa is an elite, stand-alone sub-unit of country’s special forces. 8 Military Intelligence Agency. 9 Television News Service.
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15
A: thank you. Uh-huh.
3.2 8 June 2014: request for anti-aircraft defence
In June 2014 the rebels are in trouble. The Ukrainian armed forces have launched a counteroffensive and
are advancing towards the Russian border. In this call GIRKIN – the Minister of Defence of the DPR –
speaks with SHEREMET – AKSYONOV’s assistant – and tells him that the ‘enemy’ outnumbers them and
that the separatists need heavier equipment. GIRKIN asks, among other things, for anti-aircraft artillery
with trained crews because MANPADs – shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles – are no longer
adequate. He asks SHEREMET to pass on this message to ‘Pervyi’, i.e. the assistant’s superior, AKSYONOV
himself.
On 19 June 2019 the JIT gave a press conference. At this press conference portions of this telephone
conversation were made public, including GIRKIN’s identity. The exact time of the call was also released.
Below is a complete transcript of the conversation.
4
4
Date: 8 June 2014
Time: 11:30:47
Participant B:
SHEREMET, Mikhail
Participant C: GIRKIN,
Igor Vsevolodovich
Outgoing
Conversation
Not anonymised
Complete
B: Hello?
A: Hello. Hold on a minute please.
B: Ok.
<Party C is heard speaking on the phone in the background>
A: Hello? Speak.
B: Hello? Good morning, Igor.
A: Hold on, I’ll hand over the phone.
B: Ok.
C: Yes, I’m listening.
B: Good morning, Igor. This is Mikhail. You must remember me, I’m the
assistant of, uh, err, Pervyi10.
C: Yes, go ahead, Mikhail.
10 In fact, Pervyi (which translates as “First Man”, or “Number One”) can be any person who is the first in the line of
command within a given agency (most likely military or paramilitary) of which the speaker is a member.
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16 B: [Inaudible] Sergey brought me […], told me you wanted to get hold of me to share some information. C: Now I wouldn’t call that “sharing information” … In fact, this information is widely-known, and it reads that, err… that if no large-scale support arrives in the nearest time, the, err… they will smother/strangle (…). What we need is truly large-scale support, what […] is already not sufficient. Giving […] by dribs and drabs – as they do it now – can’t make a difference anymore. We are outnumbered by the enemy. Me, I’ve been around long enough and I can still hold ground here some time, but if they keep it at this pace and launch an offensive against other towns and cities where people are unprepared and have no combat experience, they’re going to crush them flat in no time. And then they will crush flat me, of course. If the issue of Russian support – air cover, or at least artillery support – is not dealt with, then we will not be able to hold ground here in the East, no way. … first, back when this support was needed in large numbers, as much as possible, they didn’t provide it; and what they are giving now is what we needed a month back. B: Uh-huh. C: Now all we get is only enough to barely get by, nothing more. We will not be able to turn the tide in any significant way, and they will be squeezing us on all fronts. B: I see. C: Hello? B: Yes, yes, I’m following you, I’m following. C: We need anti-tank artillery, we need tanks, we need decent anti-aircraft defense. Because we can’t last on MANPADS alone any more - all manned with trained personnel, of course, seeing as we have, and will have, no time to train them. That’s it… For example, four tanks are simply sitting on positions short of Semionovka11 and firing on (…) positions from a distance safe near the rear. They’ve kept it this way for three days now. But I have no single anti-tank canon to counter them. Just now they were pounding the 11 Ukrainian Semenivka.
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17
center of the city/town with howitzers, fired 30 rounds, some exploded
nearby, just 150 meters short of my headquarters. But I cannot reach them
because they are too far, in terms of range. That’s it. And that’s the case
everywhere. The entire Ukrainian army … […].
B: yes, yes, I get that. Yes, yes.
C: Now that’s the message to get across. Sooner or later they will have to
make a decision anyway, but by then a considerable part of the militia will be
destroyed and the front line will be pushed away to somewhere behind
Donetsk, to the east.
B: Uh-huh.
C: Now that’s the story.
B: Ok…
C: I’d ask you to get this across to Pervyi.
B: Yes, I het that. OK. Will do.
C: Uh-huh. OK then, talk to you later, thank you.
B: Later on.
A few minutes after the previous conversation GIRKIN spoke to AKSYONOV himself. Certain parts of this
conversation, including telephone numbers, were shown by the JIT at its press conference of 19 June
2019. AKSYONOV says, using veiled language, that he is aware of the situation and has told others. He is
awaiting an answer, and that evening he has another meeting to discuss the necessary support. After the
meeting he will contact GIRKIN again. He also says that a ‘joint coordination centre’ has been set up and
that the necessary documents for the support are already being prepared.
Below is a complete, partly anonymised transcript of the conversation.
5
Date: 8 June 2014
Time: 11:46:33
Participant C: GIRKIN
A: Hello?
B: Hello. I need to speak to Igor.
A: Hold on. [Off to the side:] May I come in? It’s him, once again.
C: Yes, [XX]? I’m listening.
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18 Participant D: AKSYONOV Incoming Conversation Partly anonymised Complete B: I’ll hand over the phone to Pervyi12. C: Uh-huh. D: Hello? C: Hello? D: Hey there, Igor. C: Greetings. I wish you good health.13 D: Het there, Igorioga14. Good job, you’re in your usual self, as I see. Now, in a nutshell, here’s the story: on Tuesday I went to, err… to where I was supposed to go in the light of this situation… If it weren’t for all those visits yesterday and today which, err, prevented […] from coordinating action / briefing in relation to the picture15… At 22 or so tonight I’ll get in touch with… well, with those who are, err… who have already made this decision. Just now… C: Uh-huh. D: …just now I got a visit from those who had worked here – you surely know all of them in the line of this situation. C: Well, yes, yes. D: Now all of them have already received the entire picture. I mean, all who sort of been to both buildings back then, err… Well you remember… C: I see what you mean. D: Yes, everyone has received the picture. I mean, we… I will need you to […] over the same channel/line at 22-22:30 today, me and you will need to talk over the same channel/line. I will then coordinate/brief you openly, and… There’s already a person and a joint coordination center in place that are dealing with this situation… I mean those who are/have been coordinating this picture – I just don’t want to give surnames openly over the phone. C: I understand. OK, I’ll be available at that time. But, in general, do you understand what the situation is like and that [… inaudible]? 12 In fact, Pervyi (which translates as “First Man”, or “Number One”) can be any person who is the first in the line of command within a given agency (most likely military or paramilitary) of which the speaker is a member. 13 “I wish you good health” is a traditional military greeting. 14 A very friendly short form of Russian and Ukrainian male name Igor. 15 Russian criminal jargon (the expression used was “stykovat po kartine”).
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19
D: I do understand what the situation is like, Igor. Listen up, that’s right what
I told them on Tuesday, that if we don’t take certain steps… I mean, I was,
err, where I was sort of supposed to be in light of this situation, and the
message I brought along was that if no concrete steps are taken, then we’re
going to sort of lose all these commodity markets which we’re sort of
speaking about in terms of this picture.
C: OK then, they just […inaudible]…
D: That’s what I was saying: we’re about to lose these commodity markets.
Well, me and you, we understand what that means.
C: Yes, yes.
D: And I sort of made it clear for […], and right in my presence the guy rang
up another pal who is responsible for the conduct of […], then I had a talk
with him about it once again on Wednesday, and then with [XX] on Thursday,
and today I’m still waiting – it’s just because all of them are gone for two
days, were in different places, and that’s why, err, that’s why they asked to
sort of […] for these two days because of this picture. Anyway, the documents
necessary for the support are already being prepared… I will also be […]
about all this stuff tonight, I will be coordinating/briefing [XX], err, [XX]’s
man, err, in relation to all this cookery16. And at 22-22:30 today I will
coordinate/brief you on all points of contact necessary for the entry.
C: OK, I’ll be waiting for you call.
D: Now Igor, I sort of, err… […inaudible] that’s what I told them, “If we don’t
know each other, if we didn’t keep in touch, I wouldn’t care that much”, I
said. “It would be easier for me”, I told my boss, “it would be easier for me to
withdraw someone and just say that, err… that it didn’t make sense. But”, I
said, “I’ve sort of seen this picture and I can’t just abandon them guys in this
situation”. So all necessary orders have been sort of given right in my
presence, and… Now, Igor, let’s get in […] at 22:30, over the same
channel/line.
C: OK then, I’ll be waiting.
16 Interpreter clarification: Refers to the person having various things to deal with which are not visible to everyone
or behind the scenes.
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20 D: Be sure to […] exactly […], yes. [XX] will be next to me by that time, and we’ll have a coordination/briefing… C: OK then, got it, deal. Uh-huh. D: Got it. Deal. Thank you, thank you. C: […inaudible] D: Yes, thank you. 3.3 11 and 12 July 2014: financial problems in the DPR On 11 July 2014 at 20:10:09, SURKOV, a staff member of the Presidential Administration of Russia, called BORODAI, who was then prime minister of the DPR. SURKOV says that he has had contact with ‘the ones who are in charge of this whole military story’, and that they have assured him that they are preparing something that will turn the tide. SURKOV then says that he wants BORODAI to take care of a number of matters in the DPR, including drawing up a list of what is needed (such as money or medicine), paying certain benefits or allowances and making a broadcast telling the population to ready themselves for the winter. On 19 June 2019 the JIT gave a press conference where the entire telephone conversation was made public, including both identities. Other names were made unrecognisable. The exact time was also made public. Below is a complete transcript of the conversation. 6 Date: 11 July 2014 Time: 20:10:09 Participant A: BORODAI, Alexander Yurevich B: Hello? A: Yes, Vladislav Yuryevichphonetically17, go ahead. B: Hello? A: Hello, hello, hello? Go ahead. B: Oh, hello, it’s me. A: Yes, I knew you. B: So, I had a conversation with, err, fellows back home, so to speak – the most senior folks who, um … well, you know, the ones who are in charge of this whole military story. A: Uh-huh? 17 Consider: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladislav_Surkov
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21
Participant B:
SURKOV, Vladislav
Yurievich
Incoming
Conversation
Partly anonymised
Complete
B: So I told them. [And they] went like, “Yes, we’re up to speed on everything,
don’t worry, we’re aware, but {part of the phrase is unintelligible} steps that
can/will turn the tide” – I already talked everyone’s ears off about it back
there. “Yes, we understand, we’re preparing…” But honestly, Sasha18, I can’t
really vouch that those answers can be relied upon, because, you know,
although I know all of them very well, but there’s no {unintelligible} to trust
[them] to whether or not they’re preparing something-
A: Yes, I completely understand that, {unintelligible}
B: {unintelligible}
A: We’ve managed to hold out for a week already – it’s hard, but we can hold
out some more.
B: Well, yes, kind of, Sasha, but frankly, by the sound of it, that’s about what
you’ll have to try to do. That’s why I tried to focus as much as I could – let’s
see what comes out of it. Right now, you… Now, I’ve spoken to the guest –
[XX], [you know who I’m talking about,) right? – and he told me pretty much
the same as what I already know from you, but for right now I (unintelligible).
It’s good he’s in a good, reasonable mood – which in itself is a big get for
these times. But, of course, his assessment [of) what’s happening there at the
moment and our capabilities there is also very, um, critical, to say the least.
Well, we-
A: Yes, I got it. Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. I see/ We’re still-
B: Now, why I called: because those territories come with population already,
and because you and I still have to keep the folks back [home] in the loop
about welfare matters … The man we wanted to send over … I’ve got a
certain guy named [XX] here – [you know who I’m talking about,] right? - and
it looks like he’s going to come back to you in the end –
A: Well, he [already] called me up, asked me to help out a man whose SUV
has been commandeered, which I just did. That’s about it –
B: <chuckles> I see.
A: Business as usual/ your own-
B: The life takes it course, yes.
A: Yes, the life takes its course.
B: That’s why he’s likely to come back to you, but for now, erm, I’m asking
you to – if you’ve got time and people to delegate it to – to at least scout the
situation in the city, in some of the neighbourhoods, and, um, place an order
with us {unintelligible} what you need to, say, prepare for winter, or, like,
some sort of social or statutory payments, or {unintelligible} maybe there’s
something new that the population needs, given the changing situation –
anyway, I need you to provide an order for what you need – money, and if
necessary, medicaments and whatnot {unintelligible}, if you require it – I
mean, as part of this civilian story.
18 Pet form of Russian masculine name Aleksandr
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22 A: {unintelligible} civilian story {unintelligible} come up with something, yes. The money that has been [previously] allocate, this money, it’s already running short. And will run out completely as soon as {unintelligible}. B: {unintelligible} A: … it will run out in one day by the looks of it. B: You already told me that. Now that’s why I’m asking you myself – get someone who knows at least a thing or two about this, sit together with them and come up with, um, a more or less adequate order for what is needed, [and] we’ll deliver quickly. A: All right, all right, I get that. B: Will you do it? A: Yes, {unintelligible} B: {unintelligible} for the population, Sasha, because you folks are under siege now, and it’s important as ever that you if not win their love then at least, you know, [make them feel that you] look after them and all that – because the last thing you need is them starting to shoot you in the back.’ A: Yes, I agree, because this situation {unintelligible} B: {unintelligible}, but I’ll fix it for you no later than Monday or Tuesday – you know, back at our […] it’s really no big deal, we’ll do it quickly. A: All right, all right, I get it, I see. B: The only thing I’m asking is an adequate order, alright? [One thing to consider is) preparations for the coming school year – see if you can make a gesture of some sort, for there is bound to be at least a small percentage of children who will stay there – I don’t know how many, though, if they don’t all scatter away. Number two is preparation for the winter, but it’s not just about money, it’s also about technical matters that might come up – like fuel, gas supply, water supply and so on. And of course it’s money – maybe you need to payout some benefits or allowances, or, say, some pensions or pension supplements. Or maybe you’ll find a new niche that you can explore to make people understand that they’re being looked after. That’s what I wanted to ask you to do. A: I get that, I get that, sure thing. B: About winterization – you know what I’m thinking, Sasha? What you need to do is to hold a publicly-broadcasted briefing, like governors elsewhere always do. And don’t take too long with it, now is the time. Yes, you should definitely hold a winterization briefing. Let everybody know that we’re there for long <laughs> A: All right, all right, consider it done/ B: … [and that) we’re preparing for the winter, <chuckles> all as one. OK then, Sasha, I will be contactable, (unintelligible) A: (unintelligible) B: … I’ll be out and about the whole day tomorrow, and I won’t be available all the time, but I’ll try to, um, keep you posted should anything pop up, alright? A: All right, all right, thank you. Good luck there! Goodbye!
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23
B: Uh-huh.
3.4 16 July 2014: obtaining a Buk
In the morning of 16 July 2014, in a conversation between two high-ranking LPR separatists (’IHL-A’ and
‘UHL-B’) preparations were announced to load ‘something’ onto a low-loader, camouflage it and drive it
away. It was important that this ‘something’ not be discovered.
On 28 September 2016 the JIT issued a call for witnesses, in which part of this recorded telephone
conversation was released. In this conversation the names of separatists can be heard. The identity of
the separatists in question has not been released.
Below is a transcript of this telephone conversation. The reporting officer has omitted part of the
conversation (indicated with ‘[…]’).
7
Date: 16 July 2014
Time: Morning
Participant A: IHL-A
Participant B: UHL-B
Incoming
Conversation
Partly anonymised
Abbreviated
A: Hello?
B: Hello?
A: Yes, Fiodorovich! I’m listening.
B: Have you already got up?
A: Yes, I have. …[inaudible]
B: What… what… what is the situation like?
A: Err… I’m just being reported.
B: Oh, you’re just being reported. As soon as the reports are made give me a
call.
A: Uh-huh…
B: And then whatsit… tell me… have you found this one? …err…
A: I have arranged everything on the lowboy and a crane.
B: On, it’ll be today, yes?
A: Yes-yes-yes. What time is it needed at?
B: Well, the sooner the better. It has to be loaded, camouflaged and driven
away.
A: Got it. Well, I have arranged it for the evening. …[inaudible] it… [inaudible]
at/for around 5-6 o’clock/hours.
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24 B: Well, for the evening. It’s ok. A: Well, not to be spotted and …[inaudible] quickly. […] On 16 July 2014 at 19:09:20 two identified, high-ranking DPR separatists (‘IHD-A’ and ‘IHD-B’) spoke on the telephone. IHD-B says that heavy Ukrainian equipment is reportedly underway. IHD-A thinks that it is intended for the town of Grigorovka. The Ukrainian troops are surrounded, and this is the only place where they can fight their way out. He says that there are two batteries in Grigorovka that are firing on his men. They must be silenced. IHD-A says that he does not know if his troops can maintain the encirclement, especially if the Ukrainian armed forces deploy ‘Sushkas’. He is hoping a Buk will arrive in the morning. He sees no other option. At a presentation on 28 September 2016 the JIT issued a call for witnesses on the basis of part of this telephone conversation. In the part of the conversation that was made public, the participants address each other by name. The identity of the separatists was not released. Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the conversation. 8 Date: 16 July 2014 Time: 19:09:20 Participant A: IHD-A Participant B: IHD-B Incoming Conversation A: Yes, Sanych19, I’m all ears. B: Are you OK to talk, …[inaudible] Nikolayevich? A: Yes, go ahead. B: I have two questions. We got a word that there’s some heavy equipment of the Ukrys20 moving in from the direction of Alekseyevka21 and, reportedly, they have Grads,22 too… A: Alekseyevka, where’s that? Hold on a second. B: It’s down there, Alekseyevka, look it up. There’s heavy equipment and Grads moving, so [XX] kind of said that… He recommended that they dig in… 19 A short and friendly-sounding form of Russian male patronymic, Aleksandrovich 20 i.e., Ukrainians 21 Ukrainian Oleksiivka 22 BM-21 Grad (“hail”) is a Soviet-design truck-mounted 122 mm multiple rocket launcher
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25
Partly anonymised
Complete
And look here, we can send over to you, to that area, our two mobile
intensive care ambulances…
A: Got it.
B: … manned with doctors, so if there’s a need, we can send them as
reinforcement over to that area, at least to the area of Snegnoye23
{phonetically}…
A: Wait, form the direction of Alekseyevskoye24or Alekseyevka?
B: Alekseyevskoye, Alekseyevskoye, oops, Alekseyev..
A: Aah… They’re moving to, whatsit, Grigorovka25. They are gathering a
force, because, you see, we’ve blocked their only way out of that pocket26.
That’s it.
B: I see, yes. But just in case, just for them to dig in, because they’re, err,
they’re moving…
A: They’re already digging in. I have my reconnaissance battalion there…
well, of course that’s not our objective. We took over Marinovka27and, err,
the hills/Gorki today, alright? Now the infantry’s getting seated in there. The
most important thing now is that we… […] to Moscow - … that we shut up
those two batteries in Grigorovka, you understand?
B: Uh-huh.
A: Otherwise they’ll […] us… For it’s their only way out of the pocket, you
understand? I mean… they’ve become fucking impudent. Whoops! – and
there we were, surrounding them, see? How come that and where they were
supposed to break out to. And those who are there now, they have no ammo
left. There in Grigorovka, they have less than one load of ammo left – for the
self-propelled howitzers, I mean.
B: Uh-huh.
23 Probably Snezhnoye was meant. (Ukrainian: Snizhne).
24 Ukrainian Oleksiivske
25 Ukrainian Hryhorivka
26 (literally “cauldron”) Russian military term for an encirclement where a strategic-level concentration of enemy
forces is trapped (other than a siege)
27 Ukrainian Marynivka
Annex 200
26 A: Screw it, Sanych, I don’t even know if my men will be able to hold there today or not. They start coming down on them with Grads, I’ll be left without my reconnaissance battalion and the spetsnaz company. This shit is fucked up. Oh crap… B: And… A: And there’s nothing we can do about it… Now, Grads are something we can fucking bear with, but if Sushkas28 strike in the morning… If I can receive a Buk in the morning and send it over there, that’d be good. If not, things will go totally fucked up. I’m going there myself at night, so… B: Yourself, eh? So you’re here for now, right? A: Well, I, err… When you left, I had a two-hour nap and then I went there, we took over the hills there and Marinovka itself. B: Uh-huh. A: Then I left. And after that the planes – the Sushkas – came back (phonetically). They were attacking from 5 or 6 kilometers, because they couldn’t even hear them… B: Dead right. I saw them flying in that direction all night long and {inaudible}… A: That’s it… They came down on them real hard. B: Real hard… A: Yes. Yes, yes, yes. B: Well, look here, Nikolayevich29, if you need […], we’ll send over to your area… A: {off to the side:} If that’s what I think, I’ll shoot you down, […]. If this is one of those thirty sets, I’ll shoot you down, I’m serious. {back to phone:} Sanych, I need to deal with {distorted}… B: Uh-huh… A: I’ll call you back. 28 Sushka (a “cracknel”) is Russian military slang for Sukhoi jet 29 A patronymic (Ukrainian counterpart is Mykolayovych)
Annex 200
27
3.5 17 July 2014, morning: the arrival of the Buk-TELAR
The next morning (17 July 2019) a Buk-TELAR was present in the DPR. Various DPR separatists, of both
higher and lower rank, were involved in transporting and positioning the weapon in the vicinity of
Snizhne and Pervomais’ke.
At 09:08:26 that morning a conversation between an identified, lower-ranking DPR separatist (‘ILD-B’)
and Sergey Nikolayevich DUBINSKIY, Igor GIRKIN’s deputy commander, that the Buk had arrived. In the
conversation ILD-B asks DUBINSKIY where he should unload and hide the ‘beauty’. It is clear from the
conversation that he is referring (in veiled language) to a Buk-M, or a Buk-TELAR. DUBINSKIY says that
the Buk-TELAR does not have to be hidden but should be taken immediately to a place known to ILD-B. It
emerges in the conversation that the Buk-TELAR is accompanied by a crew.
The JIT released this conversation in its entirety on its website in June 2019 in connection with a call for
witnesses. This conversation had previously been shown on 30 March 2015, but in 2019 the name of one
of the participants was released, namely DUBINSKIY. The identity of ILD-B was not released. The names
mentioned in the conversation have also been made public.
Below is a complete transcript of the conversation.
9
Date: 17 July 2014
Time: 09:08:26
Participant A:
DUBINSKIY, Sergey
Nikolayevich
Participant B: ILD-B
Incoming
B: [Speaking to the side] Guys, we need to stop, we need to stop.
[Voice in the background] C: … [inaudible]
B: [Speaking to the side] We need to stop. Let’s stand in the left lane…
[inaudible], occupy his lane. … [inaudidble].
[Voice in the background] C: to the right, in the right one.
B: [Speaking to the side] Stand in the left one, in the left one, there. Why the
fuck is he […] to the right one?
[Voice in the background] C: Because I showed […] to the right.
A: [Speaking to the phone] Yes, I’m listening, Buriatik30!
30 A nickname.
Annex 200
28 Conversation Partly anonymised Complete B: [Speaking to the phone] Hello, Nikolayevich. A: Yes. B: And where should we unload this beauty, Nikolayevich? A: Which one? This one? B: Yes, yes, the one I brought with me. I’m already in Donetsk. [Voice in the background] D: Let’s … [inaudible] A: The one I’m thinking about, yes? The one that is M? B: Yes, yes, yes, yes. Buk. A: Oops, BM. Yes, yes, yes. I got it. B: Buk. Buk, buk. A: So, so, so… And is it on whatsit… a tractor unit? B: Yes, it’s on whatsit… it needs to be unloaded somewhere in order to hide it. A: Is it with a crew? B: Yes, it’s with a crew. A: You don’t need to hide it anywhere. It will go over there now. Did you understand where I mean? B: I understood. But they need at least […] time so that they have a look at it. A: [Speaking off to the side] A certain Dimitriyevich31… [Voice in the background] E: …give some weapons… A: [Speaking off to the side] From whom? [Voice in the background] E: …[inaudible] B: [Speaking on the phone] Hello-hello! A: [Speaking off to the side]: And there? [Voice in the background] E: We can… [inaudible] this. A: [Speaking off to the side] Cripes! [To the phone] Wait, wait Bibliothekar.32 [Voice in the background] E: You are being asked to the phone. B: Aha. 31 A male patronymic. Derives from Dmitry (Rus)/Dmytro (Ukr). 32 A call sign/nickname. Literally means: “a librarian”.
Annex 200
29
Later in the morning of 17 July 2014 another conversation took place about the TELAR, in which an
identified, higher-ranking DPR separatist (‘IHD-A’) asks an identified, lower-ranking DPR separatist (‘ILDB’)
if he brought ‘one’ or ‘two’. ILD-B replies that he only brought ‘one’, that the vehicle crossed the ‘line’
in self-propelled mode and has now been placed on a low-loader. The JIT investigation assumes that, in
veiled language, this conversation is also about the expected Buk-TELAR, which has crossed the border
(the line) with the Russian Federation. IHD-A gives the order to bring the Buk-TELAR to the Vostok tanks.
On 28 September 2016 the JIT issued a call for witnesses in which part of this intercepted telephone
conversation was released. In the telephone conversation the names used by the participants to address
each other can be heard. The names of the separatists have not been released.
Below is a complete transcript of the conversation.
10
Date: 17 July 2014
Time: Morning
Participant A: IHD-A
Participant B: ILD-B
Outgoing
Conversation
Partly anonymised
Complete
B: Hello?
A: Hello? Where are you now? Have you brought one…
B: Hello, Nikolayevich? Now I’m…
A: …or two? Tell me.
B: No. One, one. Because they had an unclear situation there. They haven’t
brought our lowboy over here.
A: I got it.
B: They got it unloaded and brought it over here in self-propelled mode.
A: Look, you don’t whatsit… it. Did it come in self-propelled mode? Or on a
lowboy?
B: It crossed, crossed the line33.
A: Aaaah, and now you brought it in on a lowboy, yes?
B: Yes, yes, yes.
A: So, look. You don’t whatsit… it anywhere. I’ll say now where it should go. It
will go together with the Vostok tanks. Is it clear? Yes? Hello?
B: Aha. Hello. I got it. I got it.
33 This word is a figurative meaning.
Annex 200
30 A: Just a mment. Keep, keep in touch. Uh-huh. B: Ok. That’s it. Aha. After this call two identified, high-ranking DPR separatists (‘IHD-A’ and ‘IHD-B’) speak with each other on the telephone. IHD-A tells IHD-B in veiled language that there is something behind ‘Motel’ and that IHD-B should call another separatist there. After that, IHD-B is asked to assemble a number of people and escort the ‘thing’ – the Buk-TELAR – to a location in the vicinity of Pervomaiske (‘Pervomayskoye’). IHD-B is told to guard the Buk-TELAR in that region. The village of Pervomaiske (‘Pervomayskoye’) is around two kilometres from the eventual launch location Pervomaiskyi. Both villages are to the south of the village of Snizhne in Donetsk Oblast. Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the conversation. 11 Date: 17 July 2014 Time: Morning Participant A: IHD-A Participant B: IHD-B Outgoing Conversation Anonymised Complete B: [IDH-A]. A: Hello. B: Yes. A: [IHD-B]. Just listen to me attentively. So, now, behind the Motel rind road, call [XX], there will stay you know what? Yes? B: Yes. A: Hello. B: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. A: You take there only from those who returned as many as you need for escort. One. You got it, yes? B: Aha. A: You leave the rest here. One. B: Clear. A: You go there, there is Pervomayskoye34 nearby, check on the map. Hello. B: I got it. 34 Ukrainian: Pervomaiske.
Annex 200
31
A: You station yourself somewhere in that region, take yours there, take the
ones who are left. And your task is – reserve plus security guarding of this
thing which you’ll drive. Did you get it?
B: I got it.
A: [XX] well get there. Go on, anything happens – call me.
B: I got it.
A: Did you get it?
B: Aha. That’s it. Good. That’s it.
A: Yes, yes, yes, yes.
A short time later two identified, high-ranking DPR separatists (‘IHD-A’ and ‘IHD-B’) speak with each
other on the telephone. IHD-A says that the three ‘rhinos’ from Vostok are meant for another (identified)
separatist. From the context of all the conversations it appears that ‘rhinos’ probably refers to tanks. He
also says that there is a BM – a BUK-M, i.e. the Buk-TELAR – on the way. IHD-B is told to escort and guard
this BM, together with another separatist, on its way towards Pervomaiskyi and Pervomaiske.
Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the conversation.
12
Date: 17 July 2014
Time: Morning
Participant A: IHD-A
Participant B: IHD-B
Outgoing
Conversation
Anonymised
Complete
B: Yes.
A: Hello.
B: Yes.
A: So, look. Pass on... what’s it... to [XX} etc… to them…
B: [XX], etc are all near.
A: I got it. So there {inaudible} from Vostok went to them.
B: I didn’t get it.
A: Three rhinos from Vostok went to them. Hello.
B: Yes. Yes, yes.
A: Nosed. Three units. Yes.
B: I got it. I’ve just talked to the first.
A: I got it. Now listen. Errr. You take whatsit. Wait for [XX]. [XX] is now driving
this … BM. Did you get it? Yes?
Annex 200
32 B: Yes. A: Buk. Buk. Hello. B: Yes. Yes. Yes. I got it. I know wooden ones. Yes. A: I got it. So, you, [XX] and all ours find Pervomayka35, near Pervomayskogo36 in reserve you task is guarding of this Buk and organization of whatsit… Is it clear? Yes?’ B: Yes. A: So. Vostok Rhinos go to [XX]. Let them take a decision. Well, let.. B: Rhinos are for [XX], and I’ll leave the previous ones for [XX]. A: Yes, yes. So. B: Yes. That’s how I decided. A: And you, together with ours and [XX]. But send somebody to meet the rhinos.. did you get it, hello, [IHD-B]? B: Yes, yes. I’ll organize everything now. I will first take my whatsit spitters to their position. There… A: I got it. I got it. Then you take ours you know where to and your task is reserve and guarding of this B. You got it, yes? B: Yes, yes, yes. Plus, I also keep a corridor so that we could have unhindered delivery of … A: I got it. That’s it. B: To [XX]. A: Go on. Bye. B: Yes, yes yes. In the morning of 17 July 2014 an identified, high-ranking DPR separatist (‘IHD-A’) called an unidentified DPR separatist of unknown rank (‘UUD-B’). According to this conversation they are in contact with the highest levels in Moscow. Below is an anonymised transcript of the conversation. The reporting officer has omitted part of the conversation (indicated with ‘[…]’). 35 A slang term which refers to either Pervomaisk, Pervomaiske or Pervomaiskyi. 36 A term that refers to either Pervomaiske or Pervomaiskyi.
Annex 200
33
13
Date: 17 July 2014
Time: Morning
Participant A: IHD-A
Participant B: NOD-B
Outgoing
Conversation
Anonymised
Abbreviated
B: [IDH-A], good morning.
A: Good morning.
B: Good day already.
A: Did they stop ringing you?
B: [IDH-A], (inaudible) listen, the situation is like that. They called me.
A: Okay.
B: And this is what they said. I’ve seen [XX] yesterday. Are you aware of the
decision he’s made?
A: Yes, I am.
B: Well, today I’ve had a call from a man from Moscow who has told me: “If
you solve a problem with [XX] (inaudible) you go and talk, we’re leaving you
here with all the instruments and we’ll send to him another men”. Plus also
(inaudible) to you (inaudible) to help and send you some humanitarian aid
and so on.
A: No, no, no, I already know that you don’t need to go to [XX]. I already
know all this system and situation. We need nothing from them. All the same,
no one will send us anything. I already know this. I had a talk with Moscow
yesterday. [XX] had a talk with Moscow too.
B: Uh-huh.
A: We’ve reached the top level.
B: Uh-huh.
A: The instruction is as follows. Well, so… “Berkut37” group ostensibly exists
no longer. It exists, but we call it, for example, “Golub38” group. You got it,
yes?
B: Uh-huh.
A: And they all should go to hell. So I told Muscovites, if they keep calling and
pestering you, I will gripe their balls, that’s all.
[…].
37 The name of special Ukrainian police force. English – Eagle.
38 English – Pigeon
Annex 200
34 3.6 17 July 2014, afternoon: the positioning of the Buk-TELAR In the afternoon of 17 July 2014 at 13:09:27, a lower-ranking, identified DPR separatist and a higher-ranking, identified DPR separatist (‘IHD-A’ and ‘ILD-B’) speak with each other on the telephone about a checkpoint which is apparently beyond Snizhne and before Stepanivka. IHD-A tells ILD-B to go to Snizhne. From the JIT investigation it is clear that, that morning, the two separatists were involved in transporting the Buk-TELAR which was then near Snizhne. On 28 September 2016 the JIT issued a call for witnesses in which part of this recorded telephone conversation was released. In the conversation the names used by the participants to address each other can be heard, but the identity of the separatists has not been released. The transcript does contain the exact time, however. Below is a complete transcript of the conversation. 14 Date: 17 July 2014 Time: 13:09:27 Participant A: IHD-A Participant B: ILD-B Incoming Conversation Partly anonymised Complete A: Yes, Oleg. B: Yes, Lionia. Listen… whatsit… it turns to be the last checkpoint leaving Snizhne before Stepanivka… to the left… Is my sense of direction correct? A: You have to go rightwards in Stepanivka and across the field to this fucking whatsit… this fucking Snizhne? B: Yes. A: So, go to Snizhne. I’ll give you further directions there. B: Got it. Ok. Pervomaiske turns to be at the first checkpoint if the explanations I had received were correct. A: So, that’s it. We will meet there somewhere within these limits. B: Ah. See you then. A: See you. 3.7 17 July 2014, afternoon: after the downing of flight MH17 In the afternoon of 17 July 2014, at 16:20, flight MH17 was downed. After the downing of the flight there was confusion about what type of aircraft was hit and crashed. Initially, various separatists and groups of separatists assumed that it had to be a Ukrainian fighter aircraft – a Sushka – and that a crew member had parachuted from the aircraft.
Annex 200
35
That afternoon two identified, higher-ranking DPR separatists (‘IHD-A’ and ‘IHD-B’) spoke to each other
on the telephone. IHD-B says that people from the Chernukhino checkpoint have downed an aircraft.
Various teams are searching for, or are going to start searching for, a parachutist. IHD-B is going to the
checkpoint himself to assess the situation.
Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the conversation.
15
Date: 17 July 2014
Time: Afternoon
Participant A: IHD-A
Participant B: IHD-B
Incoming
Conversation
Anonymised
Complete
A: Yes, [IHD-B]
B: So, Chernukhino people shot down a plane. Pilots….
A: Who, who downed it?
B: From the Chernukhino checkpoint, the Cossacks that are stationed in
Chernukhino.
A: Aha.
B: Will look for the parachutist somewhere around Rozsypnoye. Teams from
Uglegorsk, Debaltsevo went there and my team from my Mogila will also go
there. To search the fields.
A: Go on, look for him wherever you want. Find whatsit… this parachutist.
B: I got it, of course. We’ll look for him.
A: Did he deplane?
B: I don’t know for sure. I’ll get to the Chernukhino checkpoint and find this
out and call you back, [IDH-A].
A: Ok, bye.
B: Bye.
That same afternoon an identified, high-ranking DPR separatist (‘IHD-A’) was called by another identified,
high-ranking DPR separatist (‘IHD-B’). IHD-A says that ‘they’ have shot down an aircraft. It is not clear
from the context who ‘they’ are. Another separatist’s group has gone to the crash area to take photos.
He says that it is a fighter aircraft, a Sushka.
Below is an anonymised transcript of this telephone conversation. The reporting officer has omitted part
of the conversation (indicated with ‘[…]’).
Annex 200
36 16 Date: 17 July 2014 Time: Afternoon Participant A: IHD-A Participant B: IHD-B Incoming Conversation Anonymised Abbreviated A: Hello, [IHD-B]! B: [IDH-A], tell me what: is there any progress with that two-hundreth39? What’s going on? A: Yes, they’re already taking him to Crimea. Don’t worry. B: Aah, then it’s OK, ‘cos I’ve fucking set people on alert… A: Just now they shot down a plane… The group of [XX], err… It40crashed outside of Yenakiyevo41… They’ve gone to42- B: Pilots, where are the pilots? A: … gone to search for the downed plane and to take pictures. There’s smoke - B: How many minutes ago? A: About thirty minutes ago. B: About half an hour, right? And what was it, another sushka43? A: Yes, a goddamn sushka. […] Later in the afternoon the separatists begin to realise that the downed aircraft is not a Ukrainian Sushka. In the afternoon of 17 July 2014 an identified, high-ranking DPR separatist (‘IHD-A’) was called by an unidentified, lower-ranking DPR separatist (‘ULD-B’). As the conversation proceeds, it would seem that the two separatists are misunderstanding each other. ULD-B says that an aircraft was shot down near his position, and that he is going to look for the black boxes to hand them over to IHD-A. IHD-A asks what was shot down, and says ‘we’ have shot down an aircraft too, a Sushka with a Buk-M. 39 Short from “Cargo 200”, a military jargon for “killed in action/casualty”. Here and elsewhere in this conversation, italicized words are used figuratively. If followed by remark “phonetically”, italicized text represents what the translator reasonably believes was said. 40 i.e., the plane 41 Ukrainian Yenakiieve or Yenakiyeve (different romanizations exist) 42 It does not necessarily follow from this phrase that it was the group of [XX] who downed the plane. More likely, they were the people who went to the crash site. 43 Sushka (literally a “cracknel”) is a slang term for a Sukhoi jet (Su)
Annex 200
37
It also emerges from the conversation that on the 17th, after the disaster, the fighting is still heavy. The
Ukrainian armed forces are trying to fight their way out of the encirclement in which they find
themselves, and the separatists are waiting for artillery fire from Russian territory.
Below is an anonymised transcript of part of this telephone conversation. The reporting officer has
omitted part of the conversation (indicated with ‘[…]’).
17
Date: 17 July 2014
Time: Afternoon
Participant A: IHD-A
Participant B: ULD-B
Incoming
Conversation
Anonymised
Abbreviated
A: Yes, [ULD-B]. It’s not very convenient now.
B: Hello.
A: Hello. Yes, [ULD-B]. I’m listening to you.
B: Hello, big brother, how are you?
A: I salute you. Not very good. We are in Marinovka now. So. Not very good,
what can I say. Holding the ground, damn.
B: Why is that?
A: And why do you think? They keep firing Grads at us. It’s only now that we
can have a little break. Damn.
B: I got it. And a plane was shot down here, I’m going to get the boxes,
A: Err. Whatsit. Well,…
B: If need be, I’ll hand them over to you, so that you handed them over
further, what about that?
A: What was shot down?
B: What are you saying?
A: I’ll be back in town as early as in two hours, damn. I’m telling you I’m in
Marinovka.
B: I got it. I got it.
A: We shot down a plane, a plane, too, fucking Sushka44. Right above Saur
Mogila. We got Buk-M, you know. Well, in about two hours I… when are
you… how long will you stay in town, tell me?
44 Translator’s remark: Sushka is a military slang for Sukhoi plane.
Annex 200
38 B: Now I am… I’ll be in Gorlovka some, I don’t know… I’ll be searching for {inaudible} now, searching for the boxes. And then, after I’m finished I think I’ll be heading home at once. A: Aha, boxes… boxes for what? Ah, the boxes… B: Yeah, the black boxes. A: I got it, I got it. Well, my people are also searching, although we’re under fire, have just fucking stopped firing Grads at us… B: Did they blanket you with Grad badly? A: Yes, of course. We’re holding ground in Marinovka and they… here… it’s the only way out of Lugansk region for them, fuck. You can imagine. B: Are many of your men down? A: Too many, errr. B: Cripes. A: We gained… Yesterday my reconnaissance battalion gained Marinovka. Special forces company fucking gained Tri Gorki. We sat infantry there. We were holding on together with them. Then more infantry came. It’s only in the morning when we left, the infantry was striken with Grads at all. We had to send reconnaissance battalion to Marinovka. And now they are fucking firing Grads at us again. B: I was in Lugansk tonight. I was in Lugansk tonight. A: They are trying to shoot a way out of Zelenopolye and the only way out is through me, do you understand me? So, fucking… Yesterday we downed two Sushkas, today the second one, fuck. Thanks God Buk-M came today in the morning, so it got a little easier, but of course it’s difficult. They plainly don’t send in tanks or anything, they plainly have 5 Grad batteries firing and 3 batteries of self-propelled artillery weapon, fuck. In a brief, we’re having fun here. B: Hold on. What can I tell you? If you need anything from me – call, I’ll come to you. A: No, no, thank you brother. In about two hours I’m going… it looks as if we have a period of inactivity here now. In about two hours I’m going to Donetsk
Annex 200
39
because I need… three Gvozdikas arrived... I will take the Gvozdikas here,
because it’s fucking very difficult here now.
B: Listen, may be we should blanket them with Grad?
A: Well, the thing is that we have a Grad but we don’t have an adjuster, fuck.
It’s the first reason. And the second is…
B: Adjusters are our sore subject.
A: And the second thing is, we’re waiting for Russia to fucking strike their
positions from that side. They stood near the border and fucking strike our
positions near Grigoryevka. That’s how it goes. Well, when I’m in the city, I’ll
call you, ok?
B: Go on, go on, I’ll be waiting.
[…]
3.8 17/18 July 2014, evening/night: the Buk-TELAR has to be driven away
That evening, at 21:32:39, it emerged in a conversation between the high-ranking DPR separatist
KHARCHENKO and an identified, high-ranking DPR separatist that a one of the Buk-TELAR’s crew
members has become separated from the rest of the crew. At this point he is at a checkpoint. IHD-B says
that KHARCHENKO must pick up the ‘fighter’ and take him to Snizhne.
On 19 June 2019 the JIT held a press conference. At the press conference the telephone conversation
below was shown, and the name KHARCHENKO was released. In this conversation the call sign of the
other separatist can be heard, and the exact time is indicated.
Below is a complete transcript of this conversation.
18
Date: 17 July 2014
Time: 21:32:39
Participant A:
KHARCHENKO, Leonid
Volodomyrovych
Participant B: IHD-B
A: Yes, Ryazan.
B: Hello, commander. Have you already left, yes?
A: Me? Yes. I have left for my task, you – for yours.
B: I got it. Within that very region or not?
A: No. I’m not within that region. I’m to the other direction.
B: …{inaudible} a fighter has got lost there from this one … {inaudible}
launcher. He has fucking lost his crew, fuck!
A: What a launcher?
B: From a Buk.
A: From a Buk?
Annex 200
40 Incoming Conversation Partly anonymised Complete B: Yes. A: And where is he, fuck? B: Here he is standing at the checkpoint. A: Take him and bring in here, fuck, I’ll be waiting for him in Snizhne near … {inaudible}. B: Ok. In the night of 17-18 July 2014 two identified, high-ranking LPR separatists (‘IHL-A’ and ‘IHL-B’) spoke to each other on the telephone about a party that did not wait for an escort and left in the direction of Snizhne. The JIT investigation revealed that this probably refers to the DPR escort that left the Buk-TELAR on the border of Luhansk without waiting for the escort from the LPR. The DPR escort then went back to Snizhne. IHD-A is asked to inform a separatist about the location of the Buk-TELAR. However, he is told not to do this over the telephone. On 28 September 2016 the JIT issued a call for witnesses in which this intercepted telephone conversation was released. In this telephone conversation the names of the separatists can be heard. The identity of the separatists has not been made public. Below is a complete transcript of this telephone conversation. 19 Date: 18 July 2014 Time: Night Participant A: IHL-A Participant B: IHL-B Incoming Conversation Partly anonymised A: Yes, Andrey Ivanovich! B: They are figuring it out among themselves now. I don’t know all the “whats” and “hows”. But I hope the fact that the vehicle’s make has been changed on move/ in the process couldn’t cause such… A: No-no. They said directly they hadn’t waited for any escort. B: They hadn’t, yes? A: Yes. “We weren’t waiting for the escort. We are heading to Snezhnoye45. Stand off for today” It’s the way it was said. B: Hell! I can’t… I can’t do anything. Let’s wait for 10 minutes more?! 45 Snizhne (Ukr).
Annex 200
41
Complete A: No-no. Don’t mind. It’s just…. It wasn’t caused by the vehicle’s make. It’s
for sure.
B: And… everything is ok with our convoy, isn’t it?
A: Well, we… Here I’m driving. The only thing is… err… the location: is our
comrade aware of it or not? Or should I inform him?
B: Give him a hint what settlement… Because… The only thing – do not do it
over the phone.
A: No, I’m not going to … [inaudible]
B: It’s… It’s not far from the place we usually go to, but not exactly this place.
It’s better for you to stop and clarify where you are going to… [inaudible]
A: Yes. No. He has a map there… the map dd. 1983,
B: Well, he’ll mention you the settlement area where it has to …
A: Aha. Well, good.
B: Make a stop and clarify.
A: Yes-yes. He hasn’t mentioned it yet. I got it. Good.
3.9 18 July 2014, morning: confusion about the location of the Buk-TELAR
In the morning of 18 July 2014 there was confusion among a number of high-ranking DPR separatists
about what had happened with the Buk-TELAR, and where it was now. A number of conversations then
ensued between separatists who were involved with the transport. Eventually, it emerged that the Buk-
TELAR had been taken across the border into Russia during the night.
Two identified, high-ranking DPR separatists (‘IHD-A’ and ‘IHD-B’) spoke with each other on the
telephone on the morning of 18 July 2014. The JIT investigation has revealed that during the night IHD-B
was involved in transporting the Buk-TELAR to the border between the DPR and the LPR. IHD-A asks why
IHD-B returned that night. IHD-B says that the vehicle – the Buk-TELAR – was left at the crossroads, after
which ‘the lads’ went on themselves. The vehicle went in the correct direction and arrived successfully.
IHD-B says that an identified separatist who was involved with the transport was being called constantly
and for that reason had turned off his phone. In response to IHD-A’s remark that they do not know
where the vehicle is now, IHD-B replies that it is in Russia.
Annex 200
42 On 30 March 2015 the JIT issued a call for witnesses in which part of this conversation was made public. Another part of the conversation was shown at the JIT press conference of 28 September 2016. The names of the participants could be heard in this telephone conversation. The identity of the separatists concerned has not been released. Below is a complete transcript of the conversation. The name of another separatist has been anonymised. 20 Date: 18 July 2014 Time: Morning Participant A: IHD-A Participant B: IHD-B Outgoing Conversation Partly anonymised Complete B: Good morning, Nikolaevich! A: Good morning, Lionia46. Yesterday it was just fucking hell, I have nothing to say, B: What’s up? A: Where is whatsit… err… Why did your fucking comrade [XX] return yesterday, fuck, such incomprehensible movements… I don’t know… what was going on yesterday? Tell me. B: They brought the vehicle up to the crossroad, left it there, the lads went on themselves. A: Well. B: So, the vehicle has left in the correct direction and arrived successfully. That’s it. A: I see… B: There was strange incoming calls which began suddenly, from 10 persons… A: Who were those 10? B: Err.. There were different incoming calls to his phone from people who begun to introduce themselves… err… one and then the second, then the third, then the fourth… he told that he was pissed off… Later, Strelkov began to phone up… A: So? B: He introduced himself. 46 A shortened form of a male name Leonid (Rus/Ukr).
Annex 200
43
A: And he turned off his fucking telephone. Fucking shit… err… and we don’t
know at all where the vehicle is.
B: The vehicle is in Russia.
A short time later, at 07:44:57, two identified, high-ranking DPR separatists spoke to each other on the
telephone about the events of the night before. The vehicle – the Buk-TELAR – was already in Russia,
according to IHD-A. IHD-C says that ‘those ones’ are certain that they did not encounter the separatists
with the Buk-TELAR. He is probably referring to LPR separatists. There is confusion about what has
happened with the TELAR. IHD-C says that they are going to sort it out right now.
On 28 September 2016 the JIT released part of this recorded telephone conversation in connection with
a call for witnesses. No names of separatists can be heard in this conversation. The identity of the
separatists concerned has not been made public. The transcript does contain the date and time of the
call, however.
21
Date: 18 July 2014
Time: 07:44:57
Participant A: IHD-A
Participant C: IHD-C
Incoming
Conversation
Anonymised
Complete
A: Hullo?
B: Hullo, I’m handing over the receiver.
C: My greetings, [IHD-A]!
A: My greetings, Comrade Colonel!
C: As far as I know, you have been out…?
A: I have just returned in whatsit… everything was going well, there… eight
different persons have called him, fuck! He handed over the vehicle, fucking
shit! Different eight people are calling him, fuck! Because of that he switched
off the fucking phone! And he wasn’t taking it back, fucking shit!
C: Err… so, why didn’t you report me about that?
A: What did I have to report, fuck!? I just…
C: Where…? Where is the vehicle now?
A: The vehicle is in Russia for a long time! He has handed it over at once,
fucking shit, to those people who were meeting…
C: To whom? To whom?
A: He handed over the vehicle…
C: To whom?
Annex 200
44 A: … to the people who were meeting, fuck… Then, the phone calls began! One and then the second, then the third, then the fourth, the fifth, the eighth, fuck! That is why the person switched off the fucking phone. He wasn’t taking it/her back anywhere at all! There, on the crossroad, where it must happened, he handed over the vehicle to the people who were supposed to meet it. C: The point is that those ones… they are asserting that the vehicle… that they haven’t met the, That they were not the ones… A: What do you mean?! He handed over the vehicle to people… to our people on the crossroad, and it was led further on, fuck… C: To our people? A: Yes, he handed it over to our men. C: We’ll sort it out right now. Keep in touch! A: The vehicle is there, a long time ago! C: If it is… err, if it is that one, if it is… all right… take a rest, I’m at the same condition as you are. That same morning, two identified, high-ranking DPR separatists (‘IHD-A’ and ‘IHD-B’) spoke on the telephone about the situation. IHD-A asks IHD-B to come, together with another separatist, to where he is to explain what happened that night. IHD-A says that no one knows where the vehicle – the Buk-TELAR – is and that it has not been seen anywhere. The person they were supposed to meet has returned without the Buk-TELAR. IHD-B responds by saying that he has just been in contact with a separatist with the call sign ‘Bibliothekar’, who took the vehicle to Russia and is already on his way back with a new vehicle from Russia. On 30 March 2015 the JIT issued a call for witnesses in which the conversation below was made public. In the call for witnesses the names of the separatists concerned were made unrecognisable. A call sign can be heard, however. Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the conversation. 22 Date: 18 July 2014 B: Yes, [IDH-A]?
Annex 200
45
Time: Morning
Participant A: IHD-A
Participant B: IHD-B
Incoming
Conversation
Partly anonymised
Complete
A: [IHD-B], you should take [XX], and come over to my place, fuck! There is no
fucking vehicle, no one saw it, fuck! That one, which was supposed to meet
[…], returned back without the vehicle, fuck. You know what I mean? Crap.
Where? To whom? Which way did he bring […]? Fucking disaster, you know…
B: Bibliotekar… This is the group of people, that brought it/her in…
A: Right.
B: … on the lowboy… I have just made a contact with them, they are already
in Russia, they carry a new vehicle from Russia.
A: Uh-huh… but that… err… He gave it to Bibliotekar, didn’t he?
B: Sure.
A: Now I got it.
3.10 20-23 July 2014: support from Russia
In the days after the downing of flight MH17 a number of calls were intercepted that show that Russia
was supporting the separatists in gaining an overview of the warzone and with artillery fire.
On 20 July 2014 two high-ranking LPR separatists – one identified, the other unidentified – (‘IHL-A’ and
‘UHL-B’) spoke to each other on the telephone. UHL-B says that Moscow has confirmed a moving convoy
and that ‘they’ see ‘it’. He asks IHL-A if it is a Ukrainian convoy.
On 28 September 2016 the JIT issued a call for witness in which part of this recorded telephone
conversation was released. In the conversation the names of separatists can be heard. The identity of
the separatists has not been released.
Below is a complete transcript of this conversation.
23
Date: 20 July 2014
Time: Afternoon
Participant A: IHL-A
A: Yes, Nikolay Fiodorovich.
B: Well, has Moscow/Moskva47confirmed the moving convoy?
A: Don’t hear, don’t hear.
47 Either a call sign or Moscow.
Annex 200
46 Participant B: UHL-B Incoming Conversation Partly anonymised Complete B: I am saying about the confirmation of the convoy that is going in the direction of the airport… Moscow/Moskva has confirmed… they see it. Is it err… whatsit… Ukrops48 convoy? A: The convoy that is going in the direction of the airport? Yes. B: And how did it go through? A: Most likely through Sabovka49. I’ll give the phone now… one moment, one second and I’ll call you back. A short time later two high-ranking LPR separatists – one identified and the other unidentified – (‘IHL-A’ and ‘UHL-B’) spoke with each other on the telephone. They were probably discussing the convoy mentioned in the previous conversation. They say that when the convoy reaches the airfield there will be fighting there. On 28 September 2016 the JIT issued a call for witness in which part of this intercepted telephone conversation was released. In the conversation the names of separatists can be heard. The identity of the separatists has not been released. Below is a complete transcript of the conversation. 24 Date: 20 July 2014 Time: Afternoon Participant A: IHL-A Participant B: UHL-B Incoming Conversation Partly anonymised In the background: C: I am saying that we arranged the power. C: Andrey Ivanovich B: Hello. C: Nikolay Fiodorovich, I am giving the handset to Andrey Ivanovich. Because it’s impossible to catch signal here. I am giving, giving […] now, one second. B: Ok. C: Ok. Am giving […]. 48 A scornful short nickname given to Ukrainian Army soldiers by CNR/LNR and their supporters. Literally means ‘dill’. 49 Sabivka (Ukr.)
Annex 200
47
Complete C is putting A on the phone:
A: Yes, Nikolay Fiodorovich.
B: So, the convoy is confirmed. Where the convoy can be from?
A: I don’t know where it is going from. It’s from west, isn’t it?
B: It’s somehow going from west. From west. Fucking one and a half
kilometres from the airdrome.
A: From the airdrome?
B: Yes.
A: It can’t be one and a half kilometres from the airdrome because there is a
populated locality there, there are positions there. Probably… I don’t know.
Will now try to do something. Unfortunately, we still don’t have any signal.
Hello.
B: Uh-huh. Yes, yes, yes.
A: We are sitting with no signal. We’ve just had the power back on. My
telephone is not working at all. Neither the first one, nor the second one. Now
what… We’ll try to clarify… the deputy will go now… I think we will be
receiving information soon… our groups have left.
B: Uh-huh.
A: Ok. Well, if they come in the airport, we will fight at the airport. What else
can we do?
B: Ok. I got you.
A: Yes. Well, we have no other options.
B: Uh-huh.
A: That’s it. I am passing the handset. Thank you.
B: Bye.
A is putting C on the phone:
C: Yes, Nikolay {inaudible}. Is that it?
B: Yes, yes. We’ve had a talk.
C: Yes. I got it.
Annex 200
48 B: Thank you for the connection, A few days later, in the morning of 23 July 2014, two identified, high-ranking DPR separatists (‘IHD-B’ and ‘IHD-C’) spoke to each other. IHD-B says that he is reporting to IHD-C by telephone because the secure line is currently not working. IHD-C asks if the artillery is working. IHD-B responds that he only has 60 shells left for the artillery. IHD-C replies that he was referring to the Russian artillery, to which IHD-B responds in the negative. This is why IHD-B is requesting support. 25 Date: 23 July 2014 Time: Morning Participant B: IHD-B Participant C: IHD-C Incoming Conversation Anonymised Complete A: Speaking. B: Have you just called, [XX]? This is [IHD-B]. A: Hullo B: Hullo, this is [IHD-B]. A: Yes, I see. B: Receive the information, because the secure line is always busy for some reason. A: So, maybe if the secure line is needed I’ll come in and tell him. [IHD-C] has just been speaking on the phone. B: Well, Ok, I’ll call once again. A: Wait, don’t hang up the phone, I’m not far away from him. In the background: A: [IHD-B says he can’t get through to you via the secure line. Back to the telephone: C: Speaking. Hullo. B: Hello, Comrade colonel, can I call you via the secure line. C: No, it’s out of service. B: Roger. C: Describe the general situation with the consideration of this […].
Annex 200
49
B: Errr, the exit from Hryhorivka, the last house on the right. There is bush
there and a lot of personnel, Grads and other stuff is consolidated there. Err,
they came here… they were here as long ago as yesterday and the
reinforcement came only one hour ago.
C: Uh-huh.
B: …they are the ones that will be thrown to a gulley… Where we now want
to occupy the terminal… We are going into the assault from Marynivka.
C: Uh-huh.
B: That’s how it is.
C: I got you.
B: They also have equipment on the hill again. We burned a lot of equipment
yesterday.
C: Uh-huh.
B: And today they again have 3 tanks. 4 BMP’s…
C: Is the artillery active there now or not?
B: The artillery… we only have 60 last shells and that’s it.
C: I mean the Russian artillery.
B: No, no. That’s why I’m asking to request support.
C: I got you. Talk soon. Uh-huh.
On the same day, in the afternoon of 23 July 2014, two identified, high-ranking DPR separatists (‘IHD-A’
and ‘IHD-C’) spoke to each other. IHD-A reports on the fighting and asks IHD-C to ask ‘them’ to provide
artillery support on certain targets. IHD-C says that one of the targets is already being shelled, but IHD-A
replies that ‘they’ missed. The JIT investigation revealed that ‘them’ and ‘they’ probably refer to the
Russian artillery support. IHD-C says that he will try.
Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the conversation.
26
Date: 23 July 2014
Time: Afternoon
Participant A: IHD-A
Voices in the background:
Voice 1: There’s only one bottle left to go!
Voice 2: Silence, crap.
A: {to the side, yelling} I said fucking silence! Shut the fuck up!
Annex 200
50 Participant C: IHD-C Outgoing Outgoing Conversation Anonymised Complete {B picks up} B: Yes, go ahead. A: [XX], this is [IHD-A]. I need to talk to Pervyi50. B: Now… {inaudible} That’s urgent, right? A: Yes, it’s urgent. B: Uh-huh. {There goes a knock on the door} B: {to the side} [IHD-A] there {inaudible} C: Go ahead. A: Good afternoon, [IHD-C]! C: Yes, greetings. A: I need (them to) cover (with fire) high grounds 198.3 and 185, uh, err… (the area) between the summer camp and high ground 185. They have trenches there, and these motherfuckers are dug in pretty well. They got mortar batteries, and tanks, and Grads dug in there. Looks like they’re running short of rounds… C: Uh-huh. A: …but still I can’t get closer to them. I now have the entire village of Dubrovka51… C: Uh-huh. A: …so now I need them to shell high ground 198.3. That done, I’ll go on and take it over. C: Uh-huh. 198.3, you think you can take it over? A: Well, we’ll see… if they shell it well, I’ll go at it. C: Now, look here, I’ll now try, err, to request a strike, err, and... – Look here, if… - I’ll now make a condition: if they don’t level 198.3 (to the ground) now, if they don’t level to the ground everything around it… What (…) will you need? 200 by 200? Or more? 50 A nickname.call sign. Literay “Number One” - TN 51 Actually Dibrovka (Rus.) / Dibrivka (Ukr.) - TN
Annex 200
51
A: More. Some 500 by 500.
C: 500 by 500, got it. Now, if they don’t level it to the ground, if they don’t
simply level the place to the ground, then there’s no sense in, err… then we’ll
fall back at night, because there will be no sense. You got me? I’ll be
badgering them now. But on the other hand, you must understand that…
A: And 18[x]… [IHD-C], I also need (them to) cover the area between 185 and
the summer camp.
C: I’ve already submitted this one, I’ve already submitted this one, I mean…
A: They missed! They aimed, err… they stroke a little bit closer.
C: I got it… I got it, I’ll make a try now. OK then, I’ll speak to you later.
A: I’ll speak to you later, [IHD-C].
C: Uh-huh, later on.
3.11 2 June 2015: conversation about the launch location of the Buk missile
On 2 June 2015 the Russian manufacturer of the Buk system, Almaz-Antey, held a press conference in
which it was said that flight MH17 had been shot down by a Buk system of the Ukrainian armed forces,
from Zaroshchenske.52
Following by this public announcement of an alternative launch location, an identified, high-ranking DPR
separatist called an unknown separatist and asked him if the area around Zaroshchenske was in the
hands of the Ukrainian armed forces (‘them’) or the separatists (‘us’) in the month of July, around the
time of the downing of flight MH17. The unknown separatist says that he is 100% certain that it was
under their (i.e. the separatists’) control. When the aircraft crashed, they were on duty there. He says
that it (the suggestion that the missile was launched from Zaroshchenske) is a lie.
On 28 September 2016 the JIT released part of the intercepted phone conversation. In this conversation,
which took place at 14:02:13, on the afternoon of 2 June 2015, no names of separatists can be heard.
The transcript does however contain the date and time of the conversation.
Below is a complete, anonymised transcript of the telephone conversation.
27
52 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GsohFzbJ-vs
Annex 200
52 Date: 2 June 2015 Time: 14:02:13 Participant A: IHD-A Participant B: UUU Outgoing Conversation Anonymised Complete [Voice in the background] C: What?! … [inaudible] B: [Speaking to the phone] Hello? A: [Speaking to the phone] Hello?! Hi!... [inaudible] B: Hi, bro! A: Listen! Your help is needed! B: Go ahead! A: Err… Please, refresh your memory… The month – July, the Boeing’s downing… do you remember? B: Yes-yes, I do! A: Err… there is some information appearing that the launch had been performed with an anti-aircraft defence system from the locality of Roshchino… Zaroshchino… being situated somewhere not far from Shakhtiorsk53. B: Uh-huh. A: Was the territory mentioned under54 them or under us? B: Err… A: Zaroshchenskoye55… B: Oh, Zaroshchenskoye?! A: Yes. B: Zaroshchenskoye- Zaroshchenskoye- Zaroshchenskoye… It was our territory… No! It was the territory of ours! A: Was it our one for sure?! B: It was our territory for sure! Well, in case the Ukrops56 happened to enter, they were never standing/deployed there densely/permanently… Zaroshchenskoye is just right over here, just close to us. Well, from the place I’m sitting at, it makes three kilometres. A: So, that’s why it was a surprise for me!.. B: …well, from the centre… …No! I’m giving you hundred percent57 it had not been downed from over there! As when it had been downed, we were at the place58/on duty! It’s not… 53 Shakhtarsk (Ukr.) 54 Here: was the territory under our control or under their control? 55 Zaroschchenske (Ukr.) 56 A derogatory way to address the Ukrainians. 57 Here: the person is expressing his/her utmost level of certainty and confidence on the matter discussed. 58 Here: could be referred to a workplace, on-duty service, etc.
Annex 200
53
A: I do remember this! [UUU], this is what I do remember! If this barrage had taken
place there, everyone would have heard it, right?
B: Well, of course! A hundred percent it’s not… [inaudible]
A: Uh-huh… Ok!
B: Even from the direction where it was falling down… where it was flying/falling past
– it wasn’t the direction the launch had taken place from! It’s a lie!
A: Uh-huh… Ok! Thank you!
B: Uh-huh. Bye!
Annex 200
54 4. CONCLUSION Done as an official report, drawn up under oath of office and concluded and signed by me, Gerardus Wilhelmus Christiaan THIRY, chief inspector with the National Crime Squad of the Dutch National Police, in Driebergen on Monday 16 December 2019. [signature]
Annex 201
Financial Express, What are they trying to hide, cries Barack Obama even as Malaysia Airlines
MH17 bodies, black boxes handed over (22 July 2014)
Annex 201
What are they trying to hide, cries Barack Obama
even as Malaysia Airlines MH17 bodies, black boxes
handed over
financialexpress.com/archive/what-are-they-trying-to-hide-cries-barack-obama-even-as-malaysia-airlinesmh17-
bodies-black-boxes-handed-over/1272346/
Written by Reuters | Donetsk | Updated: Jul 22 2014, 14:48pm hrs
The remains of some of the nearly 300 victims of the Malaysia Airlines MH17 plane
downed over Ukraine were making their way to the Netherlands on Tuesday as a senior
Ukrainian separatist leader handed over the plane's black boxes to Malaysian experts.
Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte told a news conference on Monday that a train
carrying around 200 body bags was on its way to rebel-held Donetsk and then to
Kharkiv, which is in Ukrainian government hands, from where the bodies would be
taken back to the Netherlands to be identified.
The train left the crash site after the Malaysian prime minister reached agreement with
the separatists for recovered bodies to be handed over to authorities in the Netherlands,
where the largest number of victims came from.
Early on Tuesday, senior separatist leader Aleksander Borodai handed over the black
boxes in the city of Donetsk.
"Here they are, the black boxes," Borodai told a room packed with journalists at the
headquarters of his self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic as an armed rebel placed
the boxes on a desk.
Colonel Mohamed Sakri of the Malaysian National Security Council told the meeting the
two black boxes were "in good condition".
The handover of the bodies and black boxes, and reports by international investigators
of improved access to the wreckage of the airliner four days after it was shot down,
occurred against calls for broader sanctions against Russia for its support for the
rebellion, although Western leaders are struggling to agree on a united response.
Shaken by the deaths of 298 people from across the world, Western governments have
threatened Russia with stiffer penalties for what they say is its backing of pro-Russian
militia who, their evidence suggests, shot the plane down.
At the United Nations, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution
demanding those responsible "be held to account and that all states cooperate fully with
efforts to establish accountability".
It also demanded that armed groups allow "safe, secure, full and unrestricted access" to
the crash site.
1/4
Annex 201
"We owe it to the victims and their families to determine what happened and who wasresponsible," said Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, who traveled to New Yorkto negotiate the U.N. resolution. Australia lost 28 citizens in the crash.The Kremlin said in a statement late on Monday that Vladimir Putin spoke to DutchPrime Minister Mark Rutte on the phone, with both giving a "high assessment of theresolution passed by the U.N. Security Council on the investigation into thecatastrophe."Meanwhile, European Union foreign ministers were scheduled on Tuesday to discussfurther penalties against Russia, but the most they are expected to do is to speed upimplementation of sanctions against individuals, and possibly companies, agreed inprinciple last week before the plane was brought down.But Western leaders struggled to come to a united response against Moscow. Francecame under pressure on Monday from Washington and London over plans to deliver asecond helicopter carrier to Russia.Diplomats say more serious sanctions against whole sectors of the Russian economywill depend largely on the line taken by the Dutch, because of the high number of Dutchvictims."It is clear that Russia must use her influence on the separatists to improve the situationon the ground," the Dutch prime minister said."If in the coming days access to the disaster area remains inadequate, then all political,economic and financial options are on the table against those who are directly orindirectly responsible for that," said Rutte.'WHAT ARE THEY TRYING TO HIDE'U.S. President Barack Obama said it was time for Russian President Vladimir Putin andRussia "to pivot away from the strategy that they've been taking and get serious abouttrying to resolve hostilities within Ukraine."He said Putin and Russia had a direct responsibility to compel separatists to cooperatewith the investigation, and that the burden was on Moscow to insist that separatistsstop tampering with the probe, he said."What are they trying to hide" Obama said at the White House.U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry laid out on Sunday what he called overwhelmingevidence of Russian complicity in the shooting down of the Malaysia Airlines plane, andexpressed disgust at how the bodies of the victims had been treated at the crash site.But Russia's Defence Ministry challenged accusations that pro-Russian separatists wereresponsible for shooting down the airliner and said Ukrainian warplanes had flownclose to it.2/4
Annex 201
The ministry also rejected accusations that Russia had supplied the rebels with SA-11Buk anti-aircraft missile systems - the weapon said by Kiev and the West to havedowned the airliner - "or any other weapons".Putin said in a televised address that the downing of the airliner must not be used forpolitical ends and urged separatists to allow international experts access to the crashsite.RECOVERY EFFORTSEuropean security monitors said gunmen stopped them inspecting the site when theyarrived on Friday, and Ukrainian officials said separatists had tampered with vitalevidence, allegations echoed by Obama.But the spokesman for the European security monitors said they had unfettered accesson Monday, and three members of a Dutch disaster victims identification team arrivedat a railway station near the crash site and inspected the storage of the bodies inrefrigerated rail cars.Peter van Vliet, whose team went through the wagons dressed in surgical masks andrubber gloves, said he was impressed by the work the recovery crews had done, giventhe heat and the scale of the crash site. "I think they did a hell of a job in a hell of aplace," he said.As they went about their work, fighting flared in Donetsk, some 60 km (40 miles) fromthe site, in a reminder of the dangers the experts face operating in a war zone.The government in Kiev denied sending the regular army into the centre of Donetsk,which pro-Russian separatists captured in April, but said small "self-organised" pro-Ukrainian groups were fighting the rebels in the city.Four people were killed in clashes, health officials said.The rebels' military commander Igor Strelkov said on his Facebook page up to 12 of hismen died in Monday's fighting.Donetsk is at the heart of a rebel uprising against rule by Kiev, and Ukrainian PresidentPetro Poroshenko has vowed to retake the city as part of what Kiev calls its "anti-terrorist operation" against the separatists.Television images of the rebel-controlled crash site, where the remains of victims hadlain decomposing in fields among their personal belongings, have turned initial shockand sorrow after Thursday's disaster into anger.Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott said an Australian investigation team was inKiev but had been unable to travel to the site. He said there had been someimprovement with the Ukrainian government offering access.3/4
Annex 201
"But there's still a hell of a long way to go before anyone could be satisfied with the waythat site is being treated," Abbott said. "It's more like a garden cleanup than a forensicinvestigation. This is completely unacceptable."4/4
Annex 202 Stuff, MH17 wreckage 'cut into pieces' (23 July 2014)
Annex 202
MH17 wreckage 'cut into pieces' | Stuff.co.nz
www.stuff.co.nz/world/10299196/MH17-wreckage-cut-into-pieces
more wo rld stories f rom stu ff
MH17 wreckage 'cut into pieces'
Nick Miller · 10:26, Jul 23 2014
1 OF 25 REUTERS
A guard stands on the train carrying the remains of MH17's victims as it arrives in the city of Kharkiv after days of
delays.
world
Annex 202
MH17 wreckage 'cut into pieces' | Stuff.co.nzwww.stuff.co.nz/world/10299196/MH17-wreckage-cut-into-piecesInternational observers say it appears part of the MH17 wreckage has been cut into, inwhat Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott calls "evidence-tampering on an industrialInternational observers say it appears part of the MH17 wreckage has been cut into, in what Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott calls "evidence-tampering on an industrial scale"."Major pieces, I'm looking at the tailn ... they do look different than when we rst saw them, in that they have been cut into," Organisation for Security and Co-operation spokesman Michael Bociurkiw told the BBC world service."One main cone section has been almost split in half."The OSCE has visited the crash site each day since Friday, though their access to the site was initially very limited.Two days ago they observed that the cockpit section and part of rst class were being cut into with a diesel power saw by uniformed men.He could not identify who was doing that work.1 OF 45REUTERSA man blocks access to the scene of the crash of Malaysia Airlines ight MH17 as emergency personnel removethe bodies of passengers.world
Annex 202
MH17 wreckage 'cut into pieces' | Stuff.co.nzwww.stuff.co.nz/world/10299196/MH17-wreckage-cut-into-pieces"The time has come for professionals to be here and do the analysis," Bociurkiw said.Abbott called it a "cover-up"."After the crime comes the cover-up," the Australian prime minister was quoted by the Guardian as saying."What we have seen is evidence-tampering on an industrial scale, and obviously that has to stop," Abbott said.He noted not only were "random individuals" seen picking over the site, but heavy equipment had been seen in footage.The OSCE has facilitated three different groups of experts getting access to the site: rst a Ukrainian group, then a Dutch forensic group on Monday, then three Malaysian experts on Tuesday.Ukraine army spokesman Colonel Andriy Lysenko claimed that Russian military experts, disguised as citizens, had been interfering with evidence at the scene since the crash.The site is still under separatist control. On Tuesday morning a team of international observers and a crash investigation group including some Malaysian members arrived to continue inspection of the wreckage under the watching eye of armed militiamen.REUTERSTAMPERED WITH?: A Malaysian air crash investigator inspects the wreckage of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17.world
Annex 202
04.12.2020MH17 wreckage 'cut into pieces' | Stuff.co.nzwww.stuff.co.nz/world/10299196/MH17-wreckage-cut-into-piecesMore than 140 square kilometres have now been examined by Ukraine emergencyservices since their arrival on Saturday, however professional crash investigators haveMore than 140 square kilometres have now been examined by Ukraine emergency services since their arrival on Saturday, however professional crash investigators have only recently arrived at the scene.Meanwhile, Ukraine continues to attack separatist forces in the country's east, even while investigations at the crash site continue, Colonel Lysenko told journalists.He said the army had committed to a ''non-combat'' area around the crash site with a "radius of 20 kilometres, a diameter of 40 kilometres".world
Annex 203 New Straits Times, MH17: Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong at his final resting place (4 September 2014)
Annex 203
MH17: Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong at his final resting place
MH17: Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong
By HARIZ MOHD - September 4, 2014 @ 10:14am
The urn containing Captaion Eugene Choo Jin Leong’s ashes, draped in Jalur Gemilang,
was put inside his plot together with a golf tournament trophy
NILAI: The ashes of MH17 pilot Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong was put
to rest at his nal resting place in Xiao En Memorial, Nilai here about
1.15pm today.
The urn containing his ashes, draped in Jalur Gemilang, was put inside his
plot together with a golf tournament trophy by his wife Ivy Loi Kwui Ting.
Earlier, over 200 people including 100 superbikers escorted Eugene's urn
in a funeral procession from his house in Sri Carcosa, Seremban 2.
MH17: Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong
By HARIZ MOHD - September 4, 2014 @ 10:14am
The urn containing Captaion Eugene Choo Jin Leong’s ashes, draped in Jalur Gemilang,
was put inside his plot together with a golf tournament trophy
NILAI: The ashes of MH17 pilot Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong was put
to rest at his nal resting place in Xiao En Memorial, Nilai here about
1.15pm today.
The urn containing his ashes, draped in Jalur Gemilang, was put inside his
plot together with a golf tournament trophy by his wife Ivy Loi Kwui Ting.
Earlier, over 200 people including 100 superbikers escorted Eugene's urn
in a funeral procession from his house in Sri Carcosa, Seremban 2.
https://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/09/mh17-captain-eugene-choo-jin-leong-his-final-resting-place MH17: Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong
By HARIZ MOHD - September 4, 2014 @ 10:14am
The urn containing Captaion Eugene Choo Jin Leong’s ashes, draped in Jalur Gemilang,
was put inside his plot together with a golf tournament trophy
NILAI: The ashes of MH17 pilot Captain Eugene Choo Jin Leong was put
to rest at his nal resting place in Xiao En Memorial, Nilai here about
1.15pm today.
The urn containing his ashes, draped in Jalur Gemilang, was put inside his
plot together with a golf tournament trophy by his wife Ivy Loi Kwui Ting.
Earlier, over 200 people including 100 superbikers escorted Eugene's urn
in a funeral procession from his house in Sri Carcosa, Seremban 2.
Annex 204 Dutch Safety Board, Draft Final Report. Crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17, May/June 2015 (excerpts)
Annex 204
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3 DRAFT FINAL REPORT
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38 The Hague, 2 June May 2015
39 The reports issued by the Dutch Safety Board are open to the public.
40 All reports are also available on the Safety Board’s website www.safetyboard.nl
Crash of Malaysia
Airlines Boeing
777-200, 9M-MRD,
flight MH17
Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014
Annex 204
- 2 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 2 3
Annex 204
- 3 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. Contents 1 Summary ...................................................................................... 7 2 Abbreviations & Definitions ....................................................... 9 3 1 Introduction ............................................................................... 16 4 1.1 The investigation ................................................................................ 16 5 1.2 Other, related, investigations .............................................................. 17 6 1.3 Purpose and scope of the investigation .............................................. 18 7 1.4 Investigation approach and parties concerned ................................... 18 8 1.5 Preliminary Report published on 9 September 2014 .......................... 20 9 1.6 Wreckage recovery ............................................................................ 22 10 1.7 Reading guide .................................................................................... 23 11 2 Factual information ................................................................... 25 12 2.1 History of the flight .............................................................................. 25 13 2.2 Injuries to persons .............................................................................. 29 14 2.3 Damage to the aircraft ........................................................................ 29 15 2.4 Other damage .................................................................................... 30 16 2.5 Personnel information ........................................................................ 30 17 2.6 Aircraft information ............................................................................. 32 18 2.7 Meteorological information ................................................................. 34 19 2.8 Aids to navigation ............................................................................... 38 20 2.9 Air Navigation Service Provider information ....................................... 39 21 2.10 Aerodrome information ....................................................................... 49 22 2.11 Flight recorders, satellite and other data ............................................ 50 23 2.12 Wreckage and impact information ...................................................... 60 24 2.13 Medical and pathological information ................................................. 73 25 2.14 Fire ..................................................................................................... 74 26 2.15 Survival Aspects ................................................................................. 75 27 2.16 Tests and research ............................................................................. 75 28 2.17 Organisational and management information ..................................... 78 29 2.18 Additional information ......................................................................... 78 30 2.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques ....................................... 84 31 3 Analysis ..................................................................................... 89 32 3.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 89 33 3.2 Before the moment of high-energy object impact ............................... 89 34 3.3 The moment of high-energy object penetration .................................. 95 35 3.4 Sources of in-flight aeroplane structural failure ................................ 104 36 3.5 Multiple weapon impacts .................................................................. 116 37
Annex 204
- 4 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 3.6 External damage exacerbated by airworthiness factors ................... 117 1 3.7 Source of the high-energy objects .................................................... 118 2 3.8 Launch area ..................................................................................... 131 3 3.9 Second progress meeting................................................................. 133 4 3.10 Blast damage ................................................................................... 133 5 3.11 After the high-energy object penetration .......................................... 136 6 3.12 Summary and possible impact on flight crew ................................... 156 7 3.13 Recording of surveillance radar data ................................................ 156 8 4 Conclusions ............................................................................ 159 9 4.1 Cause ............................................................................................... 159 10 4.2 Supporting conclusions .................................................................... 159 11 4.3 Excluding other causes .................................................................... 162 12 4.4 Other findings ................................................................................... 164 13 5 Recommendations .................................................................. 165 14 15
Annex 204
- 5 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. Appendicies 1 Appendix A: Explanation of the Investigation ............................................... 167 2 Appendix B: Responses received following review of the draft report ....... 179 3 Appendix C: Memorandum of Understanding ............................................... 181 4 Appendix D: Agreement between NBAAI and DSB ....................................... 183 5 Appendix E: Reference information ............................................................... 187 6 Appendix F: Air Traffic Control flight plan ..................................................... 191 7 Appendix G: NOTAM information ................................................................... 193 8 Appendix H: Load information ........................................................................ 203 9 Appendix I: Weather charts and images ........................................................ 205 10 Appendix J: Transcripts .................................................................................. 207 11 Appendix K: Recorder group work ................................................................. 219 12 Appendix L: Radar screen images .................................................................. 227 13 Appendix M: Aeroplane systems and engines information .......................... 233 14 Appendix N: Typical fracture modes .............................................................. 247 15 Appendix O: Wreckage location and distribution ......................................... 251 16 Appendix P: NLR report into the source of high-energy objects ................. 275 17 Appendix Q: Presentation by Almaz-Antey .................................................... 337 18 Appendix R: TNO report on the Numerical simulation of blast loading ...... 353 19 20 21
Annex 204
- 50 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 2.11 Flight recorders, satellite and other data 1 2.11.1 Recovery of Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder 2 The Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder were not recovered from the 3 wreckage site by investigators of the Annex 13 investigation team, but individuals 4 unknown to the team removed the two recorders from the accident site. On 21 July 5 2014, the recorders were handed over to a Malaysian official in Donetsk by 6 representatives of the armed group controlling the area. No evidence or indications 7 of manipulation of the recorders were found. On 22 July 2014, the recorders were 8 handed over to the Dutch Safety Board in Kiev. Appendix K contains further 9 information on the Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder. 10 11 It should be noted that the images for both recorders show two sets of texts, one in 12 Cyrillic text and one in French. The label in French, repeated in English on the other 13 side of the unit, is placed there by the manufacturer, Honeywell. The Cyrillic text on 14 the sticker on the unit states “The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Donetsk 15 People’s Republic” This was not added by the Dutch Safety Board but was on both 16 data recorders when they were handed over to the Safety Board. 17 2.11.2 Cockpit Voice Recorder 18 The housing of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (Figure 8) was damaged and, although 19 the model and serial numbers are unreadable on the datum plate, the serial number 20 1366, matching the one provided by Malaysia Airlines, is stamped on the underside 21 of the chassis. The external damage on the Cockpit Voice Recorder is consistent 22 with impact damage; the internal memory module was intact. The Cockpit Voice 23 Recorder was successfully downloaded and contained valid data from the flight. 24 25 26 Figure 8 – Cockpit Voice Recorder (Source: DSB) 27 28
Annex 204
- 51 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. The replay of the Cockpit Voice Recorder matched Air Traffic Control 1 communications with flight MH17 (see Air Traffic Control transcript). The recording 2 also included crew communication which gave no indication that there was anything 3 abnormal with the flight. The Cockpit Voice Recorder audio recording ended 4 abruptly at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET). A replay of the Cockpit Voice Recorder did not 5 identify any aeroplane aural warnings or alerts of system malfunctions. It was noted 6 that on one of the four channels of audio, the cockpit area microphone, the sound 7 quality was poor. The relevant parts of the Cockpit Voice Recorder recording are 8 integrated with the Air Traffic Control transcript in Appendix K of this report. 9 10 Crew communication gave no indication that there was anything abnormal with the 11 flight. At the very end of the recording, two peaks of sound were identified on the 12 last 20 milliseconds of the recording. A graphic representation of the two peaks of 13 sound for the four Cockpit Voice Recorder microphones are shown here. 14 15 Microphone 1 Microphone 2 Microphone 3 Microphone CAM Figure 9 – Sound peaks recorded at the end of the CVR recording (Source: DSB) 16 17 The time period shown on each image is four hundredths of a second. It is noted 18 that peak of sound ‘peak 1’ is only recorded on the CAM. 19 2.11.3 Flight Data Recorder 20 The housing of the Flight Data Recorder (Figure 10) Allied Signal Model Number 21 980-4700-003, has Serial Number 2196. The details match the details provided by 22 Malaysia Airlines. The recorder that was given to the Dutch Safety Board had no 23 Underwater Locator Beacon attached. As this beacon is activated by submersion in 24 water, its activation is not expected. 25 26 The recorder is damaged but the internal memory module is intact. The external 27 damage on the Flight Data Recorder is consistent with impact damage. The Flight 28 Data Recorder, which can record 25 hours of operational data, was successfully 29 downloaded and contained valid data from the occurrence flight. 30 31
Annex 204
- 60 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 2.12 Wreckage and impact information 1 2 The following paragraphs describe the geographic area of the accident and 3 wreckage as it was found. Details are provided on the location, identification and 4 observed damage of the wreckage pieces. 5 2.12.1 Accident site access 6 Due to the security situation within the geographic area of the crash, the Dutch 7 Safety Board was unable to start the collection and preservation of the wreckage 8 directly after the crash. 9 10 Under escort of the OCSE, air accident investigators from Australia, Ukraine and 11 Malaysia, the Australian Federal Police and journalists had access to the crash area 12 in the days following the accident. During these visits, the wreckage was 13 photographed extensively and showed the locations mostly undisturbed. 14 15 It was not until 4 November 2014 that the Dutch Safety Board was able to visit the 16 various locations where the wreckage was located, under the protection of the 17 Dutch Ministry of Defence’s Recovery Mission. On 15 November, after receiving 18 permission from local authorities, wreckage parts were collected during 6 days and 19 transported to the Netherlands for the investigation and partial reconstruction of the 20 fuselage. It was necessary to cut some parts into smaller pieces for transport. 21 22 It was not until 20 March 2015 that it was possible to gain access to the area 23 northwest of the village of Petropavlivka for the first time. From 19 April until 2 May 24 more pieces of wreckage were recovered with the assistance of the local residents. 25 26 It should be noted that many parts of the wreckage were not physically examined by 27 the Dutch Safety Board until four months after the accident. During this period parts 28 were also removed, taken away or collected. Wherever possible, the photographs 29 taken immediately after the accident were used in conjunction with the wreckage 30 found. 31 2.12.2 General distribution of wreckage and distribution diagrams 32 The wreckage parts of the aeroplane were identified in six concentrated areas to the 33 west and south-west of the village of Hrabove, within an area of approximately 50 34 km2. Figure 12 shows the geographic location of the six wreckage areas. Each 35 wreckage area has an associated colour, depicted in figures 13 and 14. 36 37
Annex 204
- 61 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 Figure 12 – Overview wreckage areas with wreckage parts 2 3 4 Figure 13 – Side view left and right. Identification of wreckage retrieved from the 5 wreckage areas (Source: DSB) 6 7 The following table gives an overview of the wreckage areas that are described in 8 this paragraph. A detailed description of the primary wreckage parts and their 9 location is presented in Appendix O. 10 11 12
Annex 204
- 62 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. Wreckage site no. Colour code Notes Paragraph Appendix O 1 Orange An open area of farming land 2.12.2.1 Fig. O.1 2 Red Residential area of Petropavlivka 2.12.2.2 Fig. O.1 3 Light grey An area of farming land south of the village of Rozsypne 2.12.2.3 Fig. O.1 4 Yellow A built-up area partially surrounded by a forest in a gully 2.12.2.4 Fig. O.2 5 Green An area of farming land separated by an elevated road 2.12.2.5 Fig. O.3 6 Blue An area of farming land separated by an elevated road southwest of the village of Hrabove 2.12.2.6 Fig. O.4 0 Black Parts of wreckage of which the initial location could not be verified 2.12.2.7 - Table 12 – Overview description of wreckage sites in this report 1 2 It was noted that no parts of wreckage were identified between the areas 3 and 4. 3 4 For each wreckage area, a description of the wreckage parts relevant for the 5 analysis is given. A more detailed description of the wreckage pieces of interest can 6 be found in Appendix O. 7 8 In the description of the damage to the aeroplane Boeing references such as 9 sections and stations (STA) are used. Information on these two means of reference 10 is provided under Abbreviations & Definitions. 11 2.12.2.1 Wreckage area 1 (orange) 12 Parts of the fuselage originating from section 41, including parts of the cockpit 13 fuselage, the fuselage above the business class, cockpit and cabin furnishing, and 14 fragments of two cargo containers, were located in area 1. This area of 15 approximately 3 km2, is located 8.8 km west of the village of Hrabove. Parts of 16 wreckage were distributed over three agricultural fields which were separated by 17 roads and vegetation. No fire nor infrastructure damage was observed in this area. 18 Due to shelling, the Dutch Safety Board was unable to access area 1 during the 19 recovery mission in November 2014. 20
Annex 204
- 63 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 2.12.2.2 Wreckage area 2 (red) 1 The pieces of wreckage of the forward section of the aeroplane, including the 2 doorframe and surrounding fuselage of doors 1L, 2L, 1R and 2R and the cargo 3 floor, originating from section 43 of the aeroplane, were located in area 2. This area 4 of approximately 2.5 km2, covers a large part of the village of Petropavlivka and is 5 located 8 km west of Hrabove. As a result of fallen debris, several structures within 6 the village of Petropavlivka had sustained damage. Due to shelling access to area 2 7 was restricted. The Dutch Safety Board was unable to retrieve all parts identified in 8 area 2 during the recovery mission in November 2014. 9 10 Fuselage with negative pressure relief valves 11 The fuselage containing door 2R was identified in the south-eastern region of area 12 2. The passenger door was positioned in its doorframe and the fuselage had 13 sheared below the frame of the left negative pressure relieve valve. The left 14 negative pressure relief valve was attached to the upper portion of the frame and 15 the door was pinned in its open position between the casing and the ground. 16 Neither the frame nor the valve of the right negative pressure relieve valve were 17 found in area 2. 18 19 Engine Inlet ring 20 The leading edge of the left engine casing was found in the south-eastern region of 21 area 2. The ring showed penetration damage on approximately the 40, 50, 60, 135, 22 180, 200, 290 and 300 degree positions, looking forward. 23 24 Figure 14 – Damaged left engine nacelle leading edge (left) and impact marks at 25 the 200 degree position shown from the rear side (right) (Source: DSB) 26
Annex 204
- 64 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 2.12.2.3 Wreckage area 3 (light grey) 1 The cockpit and surrounding fuselage of section 41 was found in area 3, 6.2 km 2 south-west of Hrabove. The area, approximately 67 x 37 m, was located in a 3 sunflower field situated on the southern corner of the village of Rozsypne. Within a 4 relatively concentrated area, cockpit instruments, avionics equipment and fragments 5 of cabin- and cargo furnishing were found. Aside from flattened vegetation, shallow 6 impact marks were observed on the ground 7 8 Photographic- and video evidence from the days after the crash indicated that area 9 3 had been disturbed and aeroplane parts and cargo had been removed from the 10 site. A number of avionics units, photographed by third parties following the days of 11 the accident, were no longer present during the recovery mission of the Dutch 12 Safety Board in November 2014. 13 14 General description cockpit and surrounding fuselage. 15 The forward portion of the aeroplane, part of the cockpit including the forward 16 bulkhead, was found in a tilted nose down position facing in easterly direction. The 17 cockpit and surrounding fuselage had separated in longitudinal direction of the 18 aeroplane revealing cockpit and cabin furnishing. 19 20 Within the relatively concentrated area, a number of wreckage pieces, varying in 21 size, lay in a heap. The nose landing gear wheel bay and the avionics compartment 22 had penetrated the cockpit and cabin floor pushing it in an upward direction. The 23 adjacent cabin floor had separated in the longitudinal direction of the aeroplane 24 after which two portions of the floor existed. The left portion of the cabin floor was 25 still attached to the fuselage and fragments of the left galley were observed. Other 26 than the severe structural damage of the fuselage, the bottom portion of the 27 fuselage was found as a whole. The fuselage on the right side of the aeroplane had 28 sheared behind the large cargo door and the adjacent cargo floor was visible. 29 30 On the left side of the cockpit, between STA132.5 and STA220.5 of the aeroplane, 31 no pieces of fuselage were observed. The left Angle of Attack sensor, still attached 32 to a portion of the fuselage, was located in the vicinity of the wreckage. 33 34 Aside from damage, the right side of the cockpit remained fairly intact. In contrast to 35 the left side of the cockpit, the lower right side showed little signs of penetration 36 from the outside as shown in Figure 15. It was noted that the upper portion of the 37 right side of the fuselage was penetrated and the windshield of the right cockpit 38 windows was still in place. 39 40
Annex 204
- 65 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 2 Figure 15 – Upper right hand side of the cockpit as found on the crash site (Source: 3 DSB) 4 5 Within close proximity of the wreckage, cockpit furnishing, including pilot seats and 6 cockpit instruments were identified. Together with the parts of the cockpit floor, the 7 throttle quadrant and pedestal had been pushed in an upward direction. The 8 remainder of the cockpit instruments such as the Mode Control panel and a number 9 of cockpit display units were found in a heap. 10 11 12 Figure 16 - Cockpit floor with floor parts showing penetration holes (red circles) 13 coming from above the floor, penetrating downwards (source: NBAAI) 14 15 A large part of the cockpit floor was recovered, Figure 16, broken up in several 16 parts, and stripped from most of its contents. Seats, centre console, wall structure 17 and most of the control mechanics were separated from the floor structure; only part 18
Annex 204
- 66 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. of the co-pilot control mechanism remained attached. Figure 17 shows an overview 1 of the recovered floor parts. 2 3 4 Figure 17 - Cockpit floor overview partially reconstructed in Gilze-Rijen (Source: 5 DSB) 6 7 The outer left side, effectively left of the captain’s seat, is covered in soot and has a 8 large number of holes of different sizes are noted. The curved metal parts on the 9 floor are the forward and aft tracks of the captain’s seat. Smaller numbers of impact 10 holes were present in other locations, including just left of the first observer seat and 11 below the second observer seat. 12 2.12.2.4 Wreckage area 4 (yellow) 13 The fuselage of the aeroplane between the wing- and the tail section was primarily 14 located in Area 4, approximately 2 km south-southwest of Hrabove. Parts of 15 wreckage, including both stabilizers and both wingtips were distributed over an area 16 of approximately 540 x 650 m. The area contains a number of buildings surrounded 17 by a fence. The area was partially surrounded by a forest which was located in a 18 gully. The right stabilizer was found in a pond in the south-easterly part of the area. 19 20 Right wing tip 21 The right wingtip was located near the buildings in the south westerly region of area 22 4. The wing tip was facing in a south easterly direction and was lying upside down. 23 The wing tip had sheared from the wing at the fourth fuel tank vent hatch, counting 24 from the tip towards the root. The Safety Line Attach Points were visible on the top 25 side of the wing tip. The aileron was missing. 26 27 28 29
Annex 204
- 67 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. Left wing tip 1 The left wing tip was located near the pond in the south easterly region of area 4, 2 with its top side facing upwards and the tip in a north westerly region. The Safety 3 Line Attach Points were visible on the top side of the wing tip. The tip showed signs 4 of impact damage on the top side and the leading edge. The wing tip broke off from 5 the wing at the fourth fuel tank vent hatch, counting from the tip towards the root. 6 7 8 Figure 18 – Left wing tip with impact damage (Source: ATSB) 9 Rear pressure bulkhead 10 The rear pressure bulkhead was separated into four pieces. A small portion of the 11 rear pressure bulkhead was still attached to the fuselage surrounding door 4L. The 12 largest piece was found in the forest in the gully in the northern region of area 4. 13 The remaining part of the rear pressure bulkhead is missing. 14 2.12.2.5 Wreckage area 5 (green) 15 The aft section of the aeroplane including the vertical tail and the surrounding 16 fuselage was primarily located in area 5, situated approximately 730 meters south 17 of Hrabove. Within the area, pieces of wreckage were distributed over 18 approximately 600 x 800 metres. On the western side of the elevated road a 19 concentrated debris area was identified. Within this area cabin items and cargo 20 were found. These parts were consumed by fire. Parallel to the elevated road on the 21 west side, there were power lines. It was noted that one of the power lines on the 22 west side of the elevated road had been clipped. 23
Annex 204
- 68 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. Photographic evidence and satellite imagery showed that the wreckage site was 1 disturbed on 17 July 2014 and pieces of wreckage were repositioned. 2 3 Horizontal stabilizer - front spar 4 The horizontal stabilizer front spar was detached from its housing and was situated 5 on the elevated road besides the aft portion of the tail. Fragments of the right 6 horizontal stabilizer were still attached to the front and rear spar of the horizontal 7 stabilizer. The front part of the stabilizer box showed impact marks in a lateral 8 direction. The left bushing of the horizontal stabilizer jackscrew fitting was missing. 9 10 Vertical stabilizer 11 The vertical stabilizer was located on the east side of the elevated road with the top 12 part of the stabilizer facing in the south-south-westerly direction. The left side of the 13 vertical stabilizer was facing upwards. The upper part of the leading edge including 14 the horn balance and rudder control surface were missing. A small portion of the 15 fuselage of the left hand side of the aeroplane was still attached to the vertical 16 stabilizer. 17 2.12.2.6 Wreckage area 6 (blue) 18 Wreckage area 6 is situated in the south-westerly corner of the village of Hrabove 19 and measures approximately 240 x 290 metres. Within this area, a smaller region 20 with a higher intensity fire was observed, measuring approximately 40 x 60 metres. 21 This smaller region contained all large pieces of wreckage except the forward keel 22 chord. Pieces of wreckage were distributed over two sub-areas, a northern and 23 southern area, separated by an elevated road. Photographic evidence and satellite 24 imagery showed that the wreckage site was disturbed on 18 July 2014 and pieces 25 of wreckage were repositioned. The centre section of the aeroplane, including parts 26 of the wings and both engines were located in area 6. 27 28 A fire occurred on the corner of the residential area on the east side of area 6. Both 29 sub-areas included vegetation, infrastructure and pieces of wreckage that showed 30 signs of fire damage. A wooden fence and a haystack were damaged by fire. 31 32 Fragments of the wings were primarily located on the southern region of area 6. The 33 remains of the wings showed extensive fire damage. The wings were found upside 34 down with the tank hatches, including the screws holes and placards and markings, 35 showing on the upward facing side of the wings. 36 37 38 39
Annex 204
- 69 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. The left wing was situated parallel to the elevated road in the western corner of area 1 6. The remains of the wing contained partial markings of the aeroplane’s 2 registration; “9” and “M”. The tank hatches as well as the screw holes were visible. 3 The left wing near the partial registration was relatively intact. Further along the 4 wing, towards the root, melted aluminium was observed. Based on the partial 5 registration, the presence of the tank hatches and the screw holes, it was 6 determined that the left wing was situated in the south side of area 6 with its wing tip 7 facing in south westerly direction. 8 9 The right wing was situated perpendicular to and across the road. The wing 10 contained placards and markings stating “Fuel Tank Vent Right Wing” indicating the 11 right wing. The portion of the wing, below the tip, was relatively intact and no fire 12 damage was visible. Further along the wing, towards the root, the tank hatches 13 were no longer visible. Pieces of melted aluminium suggest that parts of the wing 14 were consumed by fire. Based on the sequence of the tank hatches, the presence 15 of placards and markings and the visibility of the tank hatch screws, it was 16 determined that the right wing was situated across the elevated road with its tip 17 facing north. 18 19 Both the left and right engines were separated from the wing and had impacted the 20 ground in a slightly inverted attitude. Both fans were found detached and the fan 21 blades of both engines remained in place in their discs. The engines were located in 22 the southern region of area 6. 23 24 The left engine was located near the left wing. The main core of the left engine had 25 split into two sections. The front part of the engine was facing north and the aft part 26 of the engine was facing west. As the fan blades and the intermediate compressor 27 blades of the left engine showed little evidence of any rotation at impact. 28 29 The right engine was located on the south side of area 6, parallel to the elevated 30 road. The main core of the right engine was relatively intact with its forward side 31 facing west. The right engine was located near the right wing and was separated 32 from the wing. Both main landing gear legs were located on the side of the elevated 33 road. With the landing gear bogies still attached. All the tyres on the main landing 34 gear were consumed by fire and the wheel rims were visible. 35 36 37 38
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- 70 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 2.12.2.7 Wreckage area 0 (black) 1 Pieces of wreckage of which the initial location of impact on the ground cloud not be 2 verified due to insufficient photographic and video evidence are listed in area 0. 3 These wreckage pieces may have been moved or photographed at a different 4 location within the geographic area. The wreckage pieces of which the initial 5 location is uncertain are listed below. 6 7 Fuselage with a partial window frame 8 The fuselage, originating from the left hand side of the cockpit, was located at the 9 side of the road, in the central region of area 2, the village of Petropavlivka. 10 Residents of the village reported that the wreckage piece had been moved to 11 expedite the search and recovery mission (Figure 19). The fuselage contained 12 numerous puncture holes and pitting and showed traces of soot. Frames on the 13 inner side of the fuselage had been sheared. 14 15 16 Figure 19 – Handover of the left cockpit window to the DSB by members of the 17 SES. (Source: DSB) 18 Fuselage cockpit 19 A portion of the fuselage, originating from the left hand side of the cockpit, was 20 identified in a field in the central region of area 2 (the village of Petropavlivka). 21 22 Centre cockpit window left hand side 23 One of the layers of the centre window (window number 2) on the left hand side of 24 the cockpit was collected by local residents. The cockpit windows are made of 25 multiple layers of glass and plastic. The window had a total of 102 puncture holes 26
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- 71 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. and marks, varying in size and shape, as seen in Figure 20. Parts of the window 1 frame were still attached to the window. 2 3 Figure 20 – Centre cockpit window left hand side (Source: DSB) 4 5 The left nose landing gear door 6 Photographic evidence indicated that the left landing gear door had been placed in 7 front of the village hall in Petropavlivka, area 2. Nose landing gear related 8 components were all identified within or in close proximity of area 3. This included 9 the nose landing gear itself and the right nose landing gear door. 10 11 The rudder horn balance 12 The rudder horn balance was photographed for the first time in area 4 during the 13 recovery mission of the Dutch Safety Board in November 2014. Prior to this 14 mission, no photographs of this part were available. 15 2.12.2.8 Wreckage not recovered 16 As a result of shelling within the geographic area of the accident, the Dutch Safety 17 Board was not able to retrieve al identified wreckage pieces during the recovery 18 mission in November 2014. The area in which these wreckage pieces were located 19 was either not accessible to the Dutch Safety Board or the pieces were no longer 20 present at their impact location. Table 13 indicates the wreckage pieces not 21 recovered by the Dutch Safety Board. 22 23 24 25 26 Direction of flight
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- 72 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. Wreckage piece Section Location Cockpit fuselage top section Section 41 Area 1 Fuselage top near business class (2 pieces) Section 41 Area 1 Fuselage left hand side with positive pressure relief valves Section 43 Area 1 Fuselage with windows and door frame of door 1L Section 41 Area 2 Fuselage with door frame of door 1R and surrounding fuselage Section 41 Area 2 Table 13: Wreckage parts not recovered 1 2 Summary of the wreckage information 3 Within the geographic area, approximately 50 km2, six concentrated areas with 4 wreckage were identified. The areas were located west and south-west of the 5 village of Hrabove. 6 7 Area 1 is north of the village of Petropavlivka which is situated 8.8 km west of 8 Hrabove. Area 2 is the residential area of Petropavlivka and area 3 is southern 9 corner of the village of Rozsypne, 6.2 km of Hrabove. 10 11 Pieces of wreckage originating from section 41 and 43 of the aeroplane were found 12 in area 1, 2, and 3. Top portions of the fuselage of section 41 mostly located in area 13 1. Parts of the fuselage originating from section 43 were mainly found in area 2. The 14 fuselage of the cockpit and cockpit interior were primarily located in area 3. 15 16 The damage observed in the forward area of the aeroplane indicated that the 17 aircraft was penetrated by a large number of high energy objects from outside the 18 aeroplane. 19 20 Area 4, located southwest of Hrabove was adjacent to area 5, located 730 m south 21 of Hrabove. Area 6 was located in the south-westerly corner of Hrabove. 22 23 The mid and aft sections of the aeroplane were distributed over area 4, 5 and 6. 24 Area 4 contained mostly pieces of wreckage originating from section 44, 46 and 47. 25 Both wingtips and both stabilizers were also found in this area. In area 5, pieces of 26 section 48 were found, including the vertical stabilizer. This area was partially 27
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- 73 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. subjected to fire. Both the wings and engines were found in area 6. Parts of the 1 aeroplane in this area were damaged or consumed by fire. 2 2.13 Medical and pathological information 3 2.13.1 Flight crew autopsy 4 Identification of the flight crew members was based on clothing and general 5 appearance during the recovery process. Post-mortem examination was performed 6 on four possible flight crew members. Given the injury pattern, a full examination 7 including a body scan and toxicological examination was performed on two flight 8 crew members designated as body 1 and body 2. The post-mortem examination 9 revealed that both of the crew members sustained multiple fractures of the skull, 10 spine, pelvis, ribs, arms and legs. The injury pattern on torso, hands and feet was 11 consistent with flight crew seating and aeroplane control related injuries at impact 12 with the ground. In body 2 an aeroplane part, which was identified as belonging to 13 the right hand side of the aircraft, was found during the post-mortem examination. 14 The other two possible flight crew members (body 3 and body 4) showed dissimilar 15 injury patterns and are therefore considered not to have been seated in the front 16 two flight deck seats. 17 18 A body scan detected approximately 200 fragments in body 1 and approximately 19 120 fragments in body 2. In both cases the majority of the fragments were found in 20 the upper torso and very few fragments were found in the legs and lower torso. A 21 majority of the fragments were found on the left hand side of body 2. The fragment 22 scatter for body 1 was more uniform. A number of fragments were sent to the 23 Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI) for further examination (See 2.16 Test and 24 Research) and this examination indicated that all but one of the fragments 25 examined corresponded to high-energy objects. 26 27 Summary of injury of the operating flight crew 28 Both operating pilots sustained multiple injuries associated with high-energy 29 objects. 30 31 2.13.2 Toxicological examination of flight crew 32 Material was collected for toxicological research from the bodies of the two flight 33 crew members that were, in all probability, operating the aeroplane at the time of 34 the accident. The toxicological examination was performed by the NFI. 35
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- 74 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. It should be noted that the period of time between the accident and the toxicological 1 examination being conducted greatly affected the results of that examination. 2 3 For body 1 and body 2 there were no indications of the presence of medicines 4 (including sedatives), drugs or pesticides in the body. The results also show no 5 indication of Gamma-Hydroxybutyric acid or a substance from which this acid can 6 be formed. In both body 1 and body 2 traces of ethanol and metabolites of ethanol 7 (Ethyl Glucuronide and Ethyl Sulphate) were found in liver and muscle tissue. 8 These may have been formed, in whole or in part, post-mortem. There is insufficient 9 research data available on these metabolites in liver and muscle tissue. No blood 10 was available for toxicological analysis as a result of change post-mortem. 11 On the basis of the results of the toxicological it is not possible to determine when or 12 how the ethanol was formed. 13 14 Summary of the toxicological examination 15 A large number of high-energy objects were found in the operating flight crew’s 16 bodies. 17 18 Traces of medicines, drugs or pesticides were not found either body 1 or body 2. 19 20 Traces of ethanol and its metabolites were found in liver and muscle tissue which 21 may be formed, in whole or in part, post-mortem. No blood was available for 22 toxicological analysis as a result of change post-mortem. It is not possible to 23 determine when or how the ethanol was formed. 24 25 2.14 Fire 26 2.14.1 Pre-accident fire 27 No evidence was found in the wreckage or the recorded data for the ignition or 28 proliferation of an on-board fire prior to the aeroplane breaking up in flight. 29 2.14.2 Post-accident fire 30 Wreckage site number 6 contained evidence of a large fire that consumed much of 31 the fuselage in the centre section of the aeroplane. The two main landing gear legs 32 and wing centre box show evidence of fire damage. In addition, the engines show 33 signs of having been partially exposed to a fire. 34 35
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- 75 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. A second, smaller, fire was found to have burned at the location of the Auxiliary 1 Power Unit at wreckage site 5. 2 3 Summary 4 Fires erupted at two locations. 5 2.15 Survival Aspects 6 2.15.1 First responders 7 The human remains and corpses were initially recovered by the local State 8 Emergency Service (SES). The organisation received assistance in this from local 9 fire departments, emergency services, police and local inhabitants. 10 2.15.2 Survivability 11 The accident was not survivable. 12 13 2.16 Tests and research 14 15 During the investigation, forensic examinations of a large number of foreign objects 16 were undertaken by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). This work is described 17 in the following paragraphs. 18 2.16.1 Forensic examination 19 In the course of the investigation over 500 foreign objects were recovered. In the 20 wreckage of the aeroplane and in the bodies of the flight crew members a number 21 of non-aircraft fragments were found that were suspected to be high-energy objects, 22 or parts of them. A number of these fragments had a distinct butterfly or bow-tie 23 shape, such as the one shown in the images below, and were magnetic. 24 25 Figure 21 – Fragments found with butterfly or bow-tie shape. The right hand 26 fragment was found in the body of a flight crew member (Source: NFI) 27
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- 76 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. Forensic examinations were executed on a number of the selected objects as well 1 as on numerous objects that were taken as reference from the wreckage. The 2 selection was based on size, shape, mass and ferrous properties. In total 72 3 selected objects were further examined; 16 foreign objects found in the bodies of 4 the flight crew members and one passenger, together with 56 foreign objects 5 recovered from the wreckage. 6 2.16.2 Examinations of the selected objects 7 The origin and the qualitative elemental composition of 72 of the selected objects, 8 together with 21 reference objects (e.g. aeroplane metal structure, cockpit glass) 9 were examined by the NFI using a scanning electron microscope and an associated 10 energy dispersive X-ray analysis system. 11 12 The elemental composition of these objects was determined qualitatively and it was 13 found that 43 of the recovered objects consisted of unalloyed steel. Other fragments 14 were found to be non-metallic (coal-slag) or made of stainless steel. On 8 selected 15 objects of unalloyed steel a glass deposit (consisting of sodium, aluminium, silicon, 16 oxygen, and zirconium) was found. On other unalloyed steel objects deposits in the 17 form of molten and re-solidified aluminium were found. Both aluminium and glass 18 deposits were found in the form of thin layers having a thickness from a few 19 micrometers to tens of micrometers. On a small number of objects thin layers 20 containing traces of copper and plastic were found. 21 22 The elemental composition of the aluminium traces found was consistent with the 23 elemental composition of the aluminium obtained from the aeroplane as reference 24 material. The investigation did not analyse each trace of aluminium to identify which 25 aluminium alloys were present. 26 27 The glass deposits present on the surface of the 8 selected objects had an 28 elemental composition of sodium, aluminium, silicon, oxygen and zirconium. This is 29 similar to that of cockpit window glass from a reference piece held by the NFI and 30 with the cockpit glass obtained from the wreckage. The other pieces of glass that 31 were secured from the wreckage contained no zirconium. It is noted that common 32 types of glass, such as window glass, car windshields and glass on mobile 33 telephones do not contain zirconium. 34 35 The chemical composition of 22 selected objects from the bodies of the flight crew 36 members and one passenger as well as from the wreckage was determined by 37 means of laser-ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. These 38
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- 77 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. objects had either a very distinctive shape (e.g. butterfly or bow-tie) or a layer of 1 deposits was present. 2 3 A comparison between the objects and their composition was made using a 4 statistical analysis method; Principal Component Analysis. The analysis showed 5 that the 22 selected objects from the wreckage and the bodies can be divided in two 6 distinctive groups. Within such a group, no statistical difference could be determined 7 between the objects, indicating that the objects originated from the same source. In 8 other words the objects within a group were made from the same low alloy steel 9 plate. Two of the analysed objects could not be linked to a distinctive group. 10 11 The result of the examination was that from the 22 selected objects, 20 objects 12 were assessed to be high-energy objects; 8 originated from the flight crew and 12 13 from the wreckage. The other 2 objects of which one was found in a passenger 14 were not high-energy objects. 15 2.16.3 Explosive residue analysis 16 In addition to these examinations, the NFI took over 500 swab samples on various 17 locations of the wreckage of the aeroplane and analysed these for explosive 18 residues. 19 20 The investigation into the origin of the objects was made more difficult by the 21 amount of time that the objects had been outside. The possibility of contamination 22 during transport and by the fact that the wreckage lay in an area of armed conflict 23 was a concern for the explosive residue analysis. 24 25 Approximately 30 of the more than 500 swab samples showed traces of two 26 different explosives; nitro amine (RDX) and tri-nitro toluene (TNT). 27 2.16.4 Results of the NFI’s examinations 28 The following results are obtained from the forensic examinations: 29 Some of the over 500 objects recovered had distinctive shapes; cubic and in the 30 form of a butterfly or bow-tie, and were made of ferrous metal; 31 Of the 22 selected objects found in the bodies of the operating flight crew 32 members, one passenger and the cockpit area, 20 objects could be divided in 33 two distinct groups of low alloy steel. Within each group, the objects originate 34 from the same source. Two objects could not be linked to either group, one 35 originated from the passenger; 36 The 20 objects that originate from the flight crew members and the cockpit had 37 aluminium and glass deposits indicating that these fragments originated from 38 outside the aeroplane and penetrated the cockpit with high energy, and 39
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- 78 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. Some of the fragments recovered showed traces of explosive residues. 1 2 Summary of forensic investigation: high-energy objects 3 Some of the objects recovered have distinctive shapes; cubic and in the form of a 4 butterfly or bow-tie and were made of ferrous metal. 5 6 Traces of aluminium and glass were found on 20 objects, both in the bodies of the 7 flight crew and in the cockpit area of the wreckage. No such objects were found in 8 the bodies of the passengers. 9 10 The aluminium and glass deposits found indicate that the objects originated from 11 outside the aeroplane and penetrated the aeroplane with high energy leaving traces 12 of both aircraft aluminium and cockpit glass. 13 14 Some of the fragments recovered showed traces of explosive residues. 15 16 2.17 Organisational and management information 17 18 Factual information and its analysis relating to the decision making processes 19 around the flight routes is contained in the separate Dutch Safety Board report 20 entitled “Flight MH17 and flying over conflict zones”. 21 22 In that report, the following subjects relevant to this accident were investigated: 23 the selection of flight routes by Malaysia Airlines, with particular attention to the 24 route across Ukraine; 25 the oversight by the Malaysian authorities, and 26 the management of airspace in Ukraine, with particular attention to the restriction 27 of airspace made by the Ukrainian authorities. 28 2.18 Additional information 29 30 This paragraph contains a number of relevant subjects that have not been 31 addressed elsewhere in Section 2. These relate to: 32 a description to two different aeroplane systems; cabin pressurisation and cabin 33 emergency oxygen system; 34 background information on possible external sources of damage, and 35 the preventative actions taken following the accident. 36
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- 95 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 The weather is consistent with storms around which it is reasonably expected that a 2 flight crew would request to circumnavigate. 3 4 With the exception of a deviation requested by the flight crew to avoid bad weather, 5 the aeroplane followed the planned route, airway L980 across Ukraine, not leaving 6 the width of the airway by more than approximately 1.5 NM. 7 3.3 The moment of high-energy object penetration 8 9 3.3.1 Aeropolane data recorders 10 According to the information in Section 2.11, the following Flight Data Recorder 11 parameters as recorded 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) were: 12 Aeroplane position 13 o Latitude: 48.12715 N 14 o Longitude: 38.52630538 E 15 o Pressure10 altitude: 32,998 feet 16 o Indicated airspeed: 293 knots 17 o Magnetic Heading: 115 º 18 o Drift angle: -4 degrees 19 Weather 20 o Wind direction: 219 º 21 o Wind speed: 36 knots 22 o Static temperature: -44 ºC 23 o Air temperature: -12/-13 ºC 24 Small variations in the data are possible due to differences in resolution from the 25 various data sources. 26 27 Detailed analysis of the Cockpit Voice Recorder for the last 20 milliseconds of the 28 recording at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) as described in paragraph 2.11.2 showed that 29 two peaks of sound were identified in this timeframe. Using specialised audio 30 recording analyses software a graphical representation of the sound over time, its 31 waveform, could be established. The wave form analysis will assist in determining 32 the signal’s characteristics; for example, time duration and energy. 33 34 The first sound peak had a duration of 2.1 milliseconds and the signal was recorded 35 on the CAM channel only. As no other channels recorded this signal the direction of 36 the signal could not be established. Wave spectrum analysis suggests that the 37 10 Altimeter set to the standard pressure of 1013.25 hPa
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- 96 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. sound peak is representative for an ‘electrical spike’ as it shows the form of an 1 electro-magnetic pulse that could have been caused by static discharge, or similar. 2 3 The time difference between the first and second sound peak was determined to be 4 2.3 milliseconds. The second peak had a duration of 2.3 milliseconds and was 5 recorded by all 4 channels, but not all at the same time as some recordings had a 6 different timestamp. The phase difference between the channels shows that the 7 sound was recorded by the CAM and P1 microphones first, then the P2 one before, 8 lastly, the Observer microphone. The wave spectrum is representative for a sound 9 wave. This difference in time shows that the sound wave originated outside the 10 aeroplane starting from a position above the left hand side of the cockpit, 11 propagating from front to aft. 12 13 It is concluded that the event was highly energetic in nature based on the short time 14 duration of the event. 15 16 Signal triangulation was used to determine the origin of the second sound peak 17 recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. It was determined that the sound 18 originated outside the aeroplane on the left hand side. The fact that the microphone 19 cap of the CAM channel was missing did not influence the calculation. However, 20 during the investigation, the Safety Board noted that the sound peaks are of such 21 short time duration that any minor differences in recording will cause the signal 22 triangulation to be erroneous. For example, signal latency (refers to a short period 23 of delay between when an audio signal enters and when it emerges from a system) 24 can be influenced by the Cockpit Voice Recorder microphone wiring. When one 25 microphone wire is ‘longer’ compared to others this may affect the time for the 26 signal to reach the Cockpit Voice Recorder. Nonetheless, the signal triangulation is 27 consistent with the impact damage on the left side of the cockpit. Therefore it is 28 likely that the origin of the sound peak recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder is a 29 recording of the detonation of the warhead outside the cockpit. 30 31 The point of detonation, the impact damage and the type of warhead are analysed 32 elsewhere in Section 3 of this report. 33 34
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- 97 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 Figure 24 – second sound peak – graphic representation 2 3 4 The poor sound quality on the CAM channel noted during the investigation was 5 probably due to the missing microphone cap from the CAM. The fact that the 6 microphone cap was missing was noted on the deferred defects list for the subject 7 aeroplane. 8 9 The Flight Data Recorder data as described in paragraph 2.11.3 and Appendix K 10 was examined to try and identify any acceleration associated with the sound wave 11 that had been recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. The following three axes of 12 acceleration with their sampling rate are recorded on the Flight Data Recorder: 13 Longitudinal acceleration: 4 times a second (4 Hz) 14 Vertical acceleration: 8 times a second (8 Hz) 15 Lateral acceleration: 4 times a second (4 Hz) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
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- 138 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. The damaged area of the forward pressure bulkhead has very limited apparent 1 evidence of high-energy object damage on the bulkhead. 2 3 It is noted that the damage to the cockpit appears to be centred on the left hand 4 forward side, near the left hand seat position, where there is evidence of blast 5 deposit, direct pressure damage, and extensive fragmentation damage. The 6 apparent fragment damage pattern extends from the captain’s seat from the left 7 forward to the right hand aft side of the cockpit, and appears to be sharply bounded. 8 This matches the damage found on the outside parts of the nose of the aeroplane. 9 10 A number of parts are covered in soot, an indication of explosive residue on the 11 aeroplane. ‘Sooting’ is noted on the inside of the right hand cockpit windows 2 and 3 12 and on parts of the outside left hand cockpit fuselage. 13 14 The panel, a part of the fuselage to the right of the nose landing gear, between 15 STA250 and STA330, that shows damage considered to be ‘dishing’; a form of 16 damage associated with the effects of blast. Figure 23 shows that the panels’ skin 17 between the structural elements is deformed. The reason that an adjacent part of 18 the nose gear door (STA184) had no detectable blast damage is that this part is 19 made of a honeycomb construction that is highly resistant to the effects of excess 20 pressure. 21 3.11.3 Failure analysis 22 Paragraphs 3.11.3.1 to 3.11.3.7 contain an analysis of the way the aeroplane’s 23 structure failed after the impact of the high-energy objects. A number of definitions 24 of the types of failure displayed on the wreckage parts; essential to a better 25 understanding of the analysis, have been included in Appendix N. 26 3.11.3.1 General 27 Analysis indicates that, following the separation of the cockpit from the fuselage, the 28 cockpit descended with a steep angle. The distance between the last known 29 position of the aeroplane, recorded on the Flight Data Recorder, and the location of 30 the cockpit, including the nose wheel bay is about 2.3 km. There is general 31 evidence of overload break up, deformation by aerodynamic forces, impact damage 32 such as crushing, folding and bending, and in some cases burning. 33 34 Based on paragraph 2.12.2, examination of the wreckage parts of the fuselage 35 stiffened skin structures and their fracture surfaces has revealed the following 36 observations (see Figure 41): 37
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- 139 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. The upper left cockpit structure is missing, but the available pieces indicate 1 penetration holes. Starting from the cockpit window a rupture runs downward 2 toward to the passenger floor (stringer L27) at STA236.5.1. 3 The upper right cockpit section appears intact and exhibits a primary fracture 4 approximately along STA236.52. This fracture runs towards the passenger floor 5 (stringer 27R). This fracture seems to align with fractures observed with 6 photographic evidence obtained from Ukraine where panels contain failures 7 along STA236.50. These fractures develop approximately at the level of the 8 passenger floor backward parallel to the stringers 273L and 274R. 9 Another rupture has been observed at the circumferential joint at STA655.50 10 which seems to run almost entirely in the circumference of the fuselage with 11 intersections with the horizontal fractures along the passenger floors at STA655. 12 This circumferential fracture follows STA655 straight to the passenger floor in a 13 predominantly tensile mode. Below the passenger floor the direction of the 14 fracture at the left hand side initially continues towards the longitudinal joint at 15 stringer 34L6 after which its path is unclear. The fracture at the right hand side 16 seems to deviate from its path, heading slightly backward until it reaches the 17 longitudinal joint at stringer 34R after which it turns forward towards the bottom 18 of the fuselage panel 7. 19 Although certain pieces of the lower left structure were missing, the two lower 20 fuselage panels before and aft of STA613 indicate that this general rupture at 21 the location of the circumferential joint has continued entirely along the full 22 circumference of the fuselage. This rupture has led to separation of the forward 23 fuselage from the remainder of the fuselage. The outward bending of the lower 24 fuselage panel aft of STA613.80 indicates that final separation of the forward 25 fuselage section occurred at the bottom of the fuselage. 26 27 For the forward fuselage section up to about STA1032 a digital two-dimensional 28 reconstruction was made. The approach was to first generate a grid consisting of all 29 fuselage frames and stiffeners positions. Subsequently, the green-screen photos 30 that were made of structural parts were positioned onto the grid at the right scale 31 and orientation. The resulting final image is shown in Figure 52. 32 33
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- 140 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 Figure 52 – Grid reconstruction of the outside skin of the forward fuselage. Overlaid 2 outline indicates approximate boundary of the piece prior to dismantling for transport 3 to the Netherlands. Colour indicates wreckage site. 4 5 Note: 6 Unrecovered pieces are highlighted in blue and were reconstructed based on 7 accident scene photos. Piece A indicates a piece of skin attached to the nose 8 landing gear bay for which photographs are not available. All show tearing and 9 peeling damage. Close examination of the wreckage parts available revealed no 10 evidence of pre-existing structural faults (such as fatigue, corrosion or mechanical 11 damage) that could have contributed to the in-flight break-up. 12 13 For the forward fuselage section it was verified that the forward cargo door was still 14 closed. 15 16 Examination of the available wreckage pieces forward of STA888 revealed several 17 features that manifested during break-up of this section. These features include: 18 Tensile overload failure; 19 Isolated bending/peeling of wreckage pieces; 20 Regions of skin/sub-structure separation, and 21 Gross buckling damage. 22 23 The overall distribution of these observed features is illustrated on the 24 reconstruction grid in Figure 53. It is noted that some of these features are indicated 25
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- 141 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. for wreckage pieces not available to the investigation team for direct inspection. 1 Only features that were clearly visible in wreckage site photographs have been 2 included for those unavailable parts. 3 4 Figure 53 – Overview of the forward fuselage wreckage parts indicating major 5 break-up features 6 7 Each of these features will be briefly described and illustrated with representative 8 photographic evidence. 9 10 An example of tensile overload failure this type of fracture is given in Figure 54. 11 12 13 Figure 54 – Typical case of pure tensile overload failure; straight cracks in net- 14 section, paint cracks aligned with skin crack, stiffener coupling failure at the first 15 fastener 16
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- 142 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 A representative example of isolated bending/peeling is given in Figure 55. Note, 2 the arrow in the figure indicates the direction of peeling. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Figure 55 – Example of bending/peeling at a fracture line located along STA655 15 associated with the final separation between two pieces of wreckage. 16 17 A representative example of skin/sub-structure separation is given in Figure 56. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 Figure 56 – Example of skin/sub-structure separation in the nose section 32 immediately forward of the door 1R. 33 34 A representative example of gross buckling is given in Figure 57. 35 36
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- 143 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 Figure 57 – Example of gross buckling of the lower fuselage skin panel near 2 STA487. 3 4 5 6 Figure 58 – Overview of forward fuselage wreckage parts indicating the modes of 7 fracture in detail 8 9 Based on the different locations of wreckage parts found, it was concluded that the 10 separation between the centre part and the rear part of the fuselage occurred at 11 approximately fuselage station STA1546.5. This location coincides with the aft door 12 frame of passenger doors 3L and 3R. 13 14 A study of the fuselage parts, available in the data base, showed that a large skin 15 panel on the left upper side of the fuselage, extending from half way the main 16
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- 144 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. landing gear wheel bay in front of doors 3L & 3R to about 1.5 meters aft of door 3L 1 & 3R, was found at the same location as the parts of the rear fuselage (in wreckage 2 area number 4). This part probably separated just before the fuselage rear part 3 broke away. As this part separated, the section at the doors was weakened. The 4 weakened fuselage section then broke and the rear part separated. Top and bottom 5 panels were missing on the left hand side. 6 7 On the right hand side a larger severe deformed panel was available, running from 8 the top, about stiffener 11R, to about stiffener 40R at the bottom. 9 10 The fracture surfaces that were deemed to interface with the panels in the main 11 wreckage site were examined. 12 3.11.3.2 Fuselage left hand side 13 Only a panel of the side shell has been found and was examined. For the left panel, 14 this concerns fractures from the upper right door corner of passenger door 3L 15 upward, and fracture from the lower right corner downward. Both fractures together 16 align into a vertical fracture. Both fracture surfaces exhibit fractures consistent with 17 tensile overstress facture. 18 19 20 21 Figure 59 – Tensile overstress fracture at the upper right door corner of passenger 22 door 3L 23
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- 145 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 Figure 60 – Tensile overstress fracture at the lower right door corner of passenger 2 door 3L 3 3.11.3.3 Fuselage right hand side 4 At the right hand side, a single fracture starting at the lower left corner of the 5 passenger door 3R was present and has been examined. In figure 61, the lower 6 corner shows an overstress fracture mainly tensile (about 45 degrees with the 7 horizontal combined with some outward bending). 8 9 10 Figure 61 – Overstress fracture at the inside of the lower left door corner of 11 passenger door 3R (Source: DSB) 12 13 Upper door corner 3R 14 Figure 62 shows the structure aft of door 3R. The skin plus stiffeners far above the 15 door level show a tensile fracture. The fracture near the top of the door is more 16 complicated. It shows peeling of the skin combined with a complicated fracture of 17 the door frame adjacent to the door just above the door. 18
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- 146 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 Figure 62 – Tensile overstress fracture at the outside of the lower left door corner of 2 door 3R (source: DSB) 3 4 Lower door corner 3R 5 The fracture at the door corner is consistent with a tensile loading direction upper 6 left to lower right plus some out of plane bending. The fracture appears to be a 7 complex fracture surface consistent with tensile overstress, of which the load case 8 is not evident. The skin fracture surface directs in the vertical and under an angle of 9 45 degrees heading aft, with out-of-plane deformations of the sheet material, 10 together with fracture of the frame at STA1546.5. This frame fracture is, it was 11 concluded, the result of a combination of tension and bending in a direction 12 opposite to the frame curvature. The determination of the direction is based on the 13 alignment of the fracture surface. 14 15 In the area investigated, no repairs were observed. Traces of fatigue or corrosion 16 were not found. 17 18 19 Figure 63 – Severely deformed fuselage structure aft of passenger door 3R, 20 including aft cargo door surrounding structure (source: DSB) 21 22 23
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- 147 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 3.11.3.4 Cockpit and front fuselage 1 The rupture along the circumferential joint at STA655 appears to be consistent with 2 a downward bending moment applied unto the cockpit section causing tension in 3 the upper fuselage and compression in the lowest shells. The fracture surfaces in 4 the upper and side shells are consistent with tensile overstress fracture, while the 5 lowest shells exhibit indications of compression and bending, like for example 6 stringer crippling. 7 8 The forward fuselage section has separated approximately along the passenger 9 floor into a cockpit section connected to the lower fuselage sections until STA655, 10 and upper fuselage sections above stringers 27L and 27R. 11 12 The upper part between frame stations STA246 and STA655 was found at a 13 different site near Petropavlivka, whilst the cockpit section, mostly attached to the 14 lower fuselage sections, was found near Rozsypne. The upper fuselage sections 15 have not been retrieved and could therefore not been examined, while most of the 16 structure of the cockpit and lower fuselage section have been found and examined 17 for the fracture patterns and fracture surfaces. 18 19 After the full rupture of the forward fuselage at STA655, the remainder of the 20 fuselage in front of the wing seems to have developed fractures in longitudinal 21 direction at locations between stringer R4 and R79, and near stringer R2910 and 22 R3411 (longitudinal joint). At the left hand side a fracture has developed along 23 stringer L2912 with evidence of out-of-plane deformation of the skin. These fracture 24 orientations seem consistent with a radial opening of the fuselage. Many cases of 25 peeling and tensile fracture have been observed; the longitudinal joint at R34 failed 26 by separation rather than shear, and the skin near STA825 separated in tension 27 from the back-up structure. 28 29 All evidence and ruptured fuselage panels observed was limited to the area before 30 STA951. 31 32 Based on the position that the wreckage was found in, it has been determined that 33 the centre part of the aeroplane landed upside down facing aft. Given the positions 34 of the engines and the parts of the wings, this part tumbled forward during its 35 descent. It ois noted that this conclusion was confirmed on location after NBAAI 36 investigators had come to a similar conclusion on 18 July 2014 using a 37 photographic reconstruction. 38
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- 148 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 3.11.3.5 Rear fuselage 1 The separation of the rear fuselage probably took place after the separation of a 2 large skin panel on the left upper side of the fuselage, (data base number 40) 3 extending from half way the main landing gear wheel bay to about 1.5 meters aft of 4 door 3L & 3R) and possible of other upper fuselage parts at that area, not 5 recovered, immediately followed by the separation caused by failure of the 6 remainder of the fuselage at STA1546.5. 7 8 This last separation was caused by a bending moment to the right, as seen from the 9 direction of flight, that resulted in a shear load acting on the damaged, incomplete 10 aft fuselage at STA1546.6. 11 12 The distortion to the parts of the vertical stabilizer (indicated by two arrows in Figure 13 64) provides direct evidence of the overload that the aeroplane was subjected to 14 during its fall. The way that the parts are bent shows that these forces were from the 15 side, pushing the vertical stabilizer over to the right, as seen from the direction of 16 flight. 17 18 Figure 64 – Overload failure of the vertical stabilizer (Source: DSB) 19 3.11.3.6 Rear pressure bulkhead 20 The parts available belonging to the rear pressure bulkhead as discussed in 21 2.12.2.4 were examined. The fractures in circumferential direction followed the 22 intersection with either the fuselage, or at the stiffening straps. These fractures are 23 predominantly tensile overstress fractures in the net section. 24 25
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- 149 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. In addition, circumferential fractures were observed at the centre element of the 1 dome. Also these fracture surfaces are consistent with overstress fractures as result 2 of combinations of tension and out of plane bending. 3 4 In radial direction fractures were observed also consistent with tensile overstress 5 fractures. These fractures follow the fastener row underneath the radial stiffeners. 6 The plate in the vicinity of the fracture, as well as the stiffener, exhibits significant 7 deformations. 8 9 At some locations along the connection between pressure bulkhead and fuselage 10 the fractures deviated from their circumferential path, towards adjacent stiffening 11 straps. A few irregular fractures were also observed. 12 13 The fractures observed in the bulkhead were consistent with tensile overstress, 14 caused either a pressure difference or a disintegrating fuselage structure, where a 15 relatively flexible, thin, walled dome is pulled apart by the surrounding structure. 16 17 There are indications that there was no sudden failure by overpressure of the rear 18 pressure bulk head: 19 No damage or deformation consistent with an overpressure in the fuselage tail 20 cone structure. 21 Rear pressure bulkhead parts and parts of surrounding fuselages structure were 22 found at the rear end of the debris pattern, not at the beginning of it. 23 24 In the bulkhead dome no repairs were observed. Traces of fatigue or corrosion were 25 not found. 26 3.11.3.7 Wings and empennage 27 A review of the two wingtips and the horizontal stabilizers indicated the direction of 28 the failure. In the case of the wingtips, the stringers and ribs on both sides showed 29 signs of having been torn backwards. 30 31 The two horizontal stabilizers both showed evidence of having failed after bending 32 upwards. On the left stabilizer bolts and brackets exhibited the signs of the 33 bending. The evidence of upwards bending on the right stabilizer was seen in the 34 way that the stringers had been bent. The extensive use of composite materials in 35 the stabilizers made further analysis impossible. 36 37 The high-energy object penetration on the inboard flaperon on the left wing was 38 analysed as part of the analysis in the effects and origin of the high-energy objects. 39
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- 150 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 3.11.3.8 Negative pressure relief valve 1 A pressure relief valve from the right forward side of the aeroplane was found 2 opened into the extreme position. As the negative pressure difference over the 3 pressure relief valve is normally relatively small and builds up gradually, the 4 observed damage (See Appendix O) has to be the result of an unusual condition. 5 Because the valve is designed for the relief of small pressure differences, it cannot 6 be ruled out that the damage might have been the effect of a shock wave, caused 7 by the external detonation, which occurred on the left hand side of the aeroplane. 8 However, the relief valve found was from the right side of the fuselage. It might have 9 come into the extreme position due to ground impact or due to transportation and 10 handling. 11 3.11.3.9 Main landing gear 12 As evidenced by the recovered main landing gear assemblies there were no intact 13 lock links to secure the side/drag braces; both were sheared off. In addition, in an 14 in-flight breakup, air loads from the fall, collision with other debris, ground impact 15 and disturbance during recovery/transportation, could all randomise the motion of 16 unsecured side/drag braces. The Flight Data Recorder data indicated that the 17 landing gear was in the retracted position at the last recorded position of the 18 aeroplane. Therefore it is likely that landing gear extention of one of the gears is a 19 result of the in-flight break-up and/or the following ground impact. 20 21 Findings 22 The failure sequence is consistent with the failure initiating near the left hand side of 23 the cockpit. 24 25 There was an almost simultaneous separation between the cockpit with the lower 26 fuselage and upper fuselage at stringer 27 from nose to Station 655 and the heavily 27 damaged cockpit with lower and upper forward fuselage at Station 655, followed by 28 the fuselage between STA655 and STA951 opening in a radial fashion and 29 separating. 30 31 The fracture of the rear fuselage section near doors 3L and 3R at STA1546.5 (to 32 the rear of the wing) indicates a high lateral bending moment to the right on the 33 fuselage. The fractures in the rear pressure bulkhead are consistent with overstress 34 fractures. 35 36 The wingtips both failed, tearing rearward. After this, the stabilizer and fin separate 37 from the rear fuselage again with a high lateral bending moment to the right. 38 39
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- 151 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. It is likely that landing gear extention of one of the gears is a result of the in-flight 1 break-up and/or the following ground impact. 2 3 The investigation did not indicate the presence of pre-existing damage, such as 4 fatigue, corrosion or inadequately performed repairs. 5 6 3.11.4 In-flight break-up scenario 7 Following the separation of the cockpit from the fuselage, the cockpit descended 8 with a steep angle. The horizontal distance between the last known position of the 9 aeroplane, recorded on the FDR, and the location of the cockpit, including the nose 10 wheel bay is about 2.3 km. 11 12 The distribution of the aeroplane wreckage parts over a large area indicates that the 13 aeroplane broke up in the air. The forward parts of the aeroplane were found 14 closest to the last Flight Data Recorder point, indicating that these parts broke off 15 from the aeroplane first. Since the centre and aft parts of the aeroplane were 16 discovered significantly further to the east, this indicated that these parts continued 17 in a down and forward trajectory and disintegrated later. 18 19 The failure analysis of the aeroplane’s structure, as described in paragraph 3.11 20 shows a sequence whereby the aeroplane’s fuselage separates at STA655; a point 21 towards the rear of the business class section of the aeroplane. A second structural 22 failure occurs at STA1546.5 behind the wing, causing the rear fuselage and tail to 23 separate. The three parts of the aeroplane fell in different locations. The debris 24 locations of the remainder of the aircraft (near Hrabove) cannot be explained by a 25 ‘simple’ ballistic trajectory, suggesting that part still had some lift and thus continued 26 ‘flying’ for some time. 27 28 Aerodynamic stability 29 If one flies straight and level in an aeroplane, with the forces trimmed out and the 30 pilot makes no control inputs, the aeroplane will maintain a constant path through 31 the air (assuming still air). Moving the controls to a new positioning and holding 32 them there will cause the aeroplane to deviate slowly from the straight and level 33 flight. If only the ailerons are moved, the aeroplane starts slowly to bank and will 34 turn to the left or right as commanded. As it banks, it also slips so as to not only 35 deviate from its flight path but also it will start to descend. These movements 36
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- 152 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. intensify over time. The bank angle and the roll angle will increase over time whilst 1 the radius of the turn will decrease over the same time; the aeroplane flies in a 2 tighter and ever steeper spiral. The slipping flight causes lateral loads on the vertical 3 stabilizer and on the fuselage. This lateral load increases over time. Without 4 correction by the pilot, this continues until structural failure of the aeroplane in flight 5 or impact with the ground. 6 7 When the fuselage forward of STA888 separated from the aeroplane it caused the 8 centre of gravity of the rest of the aeroplane to move rearward. The influence of the 9 moment around the aeroplane’s lateral axis is considered to be relatively small. 10 There were no more control inputs from the flight crew possible and the control 11 surfaces would have been in their neutral positions. As a result of this, the 12 behaviour of the aeroplane, rotations round the three axes and thus the flight path, 13 were determined by the dynamic stability of the aircraft. 14 15 The flight path with respect to the ground will depend on the wind speed and 16 direction at the heights between the start of the event and impact with the ground. In 17 a situation without control inputs, the behaviour of the aeroplane is determined by 18 the dynamic stability of the aeroplane. In such a situation, the behaviour of the 19 aeroplane’s movement can be periodic, known as Dutch Roll, or be a-periodic; 20 spiral mode. The spiral mode is caused by the fact that, for most aeroplanes, the 21 static directional stability is larger than the absolute value of the static roll stability. 22 23 In the case of the accident aeroplane, a bank angle slowly increased after the 24 separation of the cockpit, causing the side slip angle to increase. From the positions 25 of the wreckage on the ground, it is certain that the aeroplane turned to the left in 26 slowly following an increasingly curved path. 27 28 Due to the tightening spiral and slip angle, the lateral load on the vertical fin and the 29 fuselage increased. This loading caused an increasing bending moment to the right 30 on the fuselage behind the wing, that eventually resulted in a structural failure of the 31 fuselage by a vertical bending moment. The failure occurred at a point close to the 32 passenger doors, 3L and 3R. As all of these parts aft of STA888 were found on the 33 ground closely spaced, it can be concluded that the structural failure described here 34 happened at a relatively low altitude. 35 36 The examination of the wreckage distribution also shows that the final heading of 37 the wreckage was to the north. This suggests that the final part of the descent 38 trajectory had a decreasing radius. This is consistent with a change to the dynamics 39 of the wreckage as the tail separates. 40
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- 153 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 1 After the separation at STA1546.5, passenger doors 3L and 3R, the wing with the 2 centre fuselage section, without the tail plane, is longitudinally unstable but the roll 3 stability is positive. In this situation the centre of pressure is behind the centre of 4 gravity, it becomes longitudinally unstable, causing it to tumble forward. The rotation 5 rate and the number of rotations is unknown, but it is expected to be few due to the 6 low altitude. 7 8 The centre section was found upside down with few indications on the ground of 9 horizontal movement having struck the ground in a nearly horizontal attitude, with a 10 large descent angle. This is a consequence of the forward rotation described above. 11 moving in rearward direction. 12 13 A part of the fuselage just in front of door 3R was found under the aeroplane’s keel 14 beam structure and a part of the lower fuselage, just in front of the centre wing, was 15 found just ahead of the main wreck. This is consistent with an upside down centre 16 section moving in rearward direction when hitting the ground. 17 18 It is not possible to accurately determine the time between the start of the break-up 19 and the impact with the ground. The wreckage distribution suggests that the forward 20 part of the aeroplane is unlikely to have fallen at the same speed as the remainder 21 of the aeroplane. Taking into account the descent speed and the path that the 22 remainder of the aeroplane followed (see explanation on aerodynamic stability 23 above), the centre and rear parts of the aeroplane were estimated to have taken 24 about a minute and a half to reach the ground. Other lighter parts (e.g. cargo and 25 baggage) will have taken longer to reach the ground. 26 27 Findings 28 The debris found near wreckage area 2 and wreckage area 3 is consistent with a 29 rapid separation of the cockpit section and numerous smaller parts of the front 30 section of the aircraft, that started at the last recorded aircraft location or slightly 31 thereafter. 32 33 The centre and rear part of the fuselage remained, initially, intact, gliding 34 aerodynamically and came to rest about 8.5 kilometres to the east. The centre 35 section travelled the further than the rear part of the fuselage. 36 37 The time between the start of the break-up and the impact with the ground cannot 38 be accurately determined. Taking into account the descent speed and the path that 39
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- 154 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. the remainder of the aeroplane followed, the centre and rear parts of the aeroplane 1 were estimated to have taken between 1 – 1.5 minutes to reach the ground. Other, 2 lighter parts, will have taken longer. 3 4 3.11.5 Passenger oxygen system 5 When the cabin of the aeroplane depressurised, the cabin altitude of 13.500 feet 6 was exceeded, which normally deploys the passenger oxygen masks. However, no 7 system data was found to confirm this, because it had not been stored in the 8 equipment recovered and the recorder that had the capability to store such 9 information was not recovered. FDR data shows that the cabin pressure altitude is 10 recorded as being 4,800 feet during cruise up to the moment that the recording 11 stopped at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) (see Appendix K). 12 13 According to the manufacturer, when depressurisation occurs the deployment of the 14 masks may take a few seconds. Since electrical power to the Cockpit Voice 15 Recorder and Flight Data Recorder was lost almost instantly after the penetration by 16 the high-energy objects, Electrical power to the solenoid was probably also lost 17 immediately making it unlikely the passenger emergency oxygen masks were 18 deployed. Nevertheless, the solenoid switches might have been moved into the 19 unlocked position as a result of the forces on them during the accident or due to 20 impact with the ground. 21 22 A visual examination of four generators recovered from the wreckage showed that 23 the metal wires that normally initiate the production of oxygen had been pulled out 24 and that the indicator stripe on the oxygen generators showed a black stripe 25 indicator suggesting that they had been ‘fired’, producing oxygen, see below figure 26 65. Some masks may have deployed as a result of the aeroplane’s disintegration 27 and all may have been exposed to strong winds or other dynamic forces during the 28 fall of the aeroplane. Additionally, as it requires only a small force of only a few 29 Newton (Federal Aviation Administration specification TSO-C64 refers) to remove 30 the firing pin from the oxygen generator, it is conceivable that the oxygen 31 generators were fired as a result of either the dynamic forces during the fall or from 32 the impact with the ground. 33 34
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- 159 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 4 CONCLUSIONS 1 The Dutch Safety Board determined the following conclusions in relation to the 2 accident to flight MH17 on 17 July 2014. 3 4.1 Cause 4 5 The Dutch Safety Board determined the following main conclusions regarding the 6 cause of the accident to flight MH17: 7 On 17 July 2014, a Boeing 777-200 with registration 9M-MRD, operated by a 8 licensed and qualified flight crew, was in cruise flight at flight level 330 close to 9 the Ukrainian / Russian Federation border and under the control of Ukrainian Air 10 Traffic Control. 11 At 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) the structural integrity of the airworthy aeroplane 12 was compromised and the flight crew were immediately incapacitated by the 13 detonation of a 9M314-model warhead containing pre-formed fragments. 14 The 9M314-model warhead carried by a 9M38-series missile was launched 15 from a Buk, Buk-M1 or Buk-M1-2 surface-to-air missile system in an area south 16 of Snizhne, Ukraine. 17 The aeroplane consequently broke up in flight and fell to the ground near the 18 town of Hrabove, Ukraine. All 298 occupants lost their lives. 19 Other scenarios that could have led to the disintegration of the aeroplane were 20 considered, analysed and excluded based on the evidence available. 21 4.2 Supporting conclusions 22 The Safety Board’s investigation’s main conclusion is supported by the following 23 material. 24 1. Moment of the in-flight break-up The establishment of the moment of 25 the in-flight break-up of the aeroplane is supported by the following findings: 26 a. The Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder stopped abruptly 27 at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) because the power supply was interrupted. 28 b. The automatic Emergency Locator Transmitter activated within 2 29 seconds of the Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder 30 ceasing to record. 31 c. The raw surveillance radar data from the Ukrainian Air Navigation 32 Service Provider and the radar screen video replay from the Russian 33 Federation’s Air Navigation Service Provider showed that flight MH17 34
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- 160 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. was in straight and level flight at FL330 until 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) 1 as it crossed the eastern part of Ukraine. 2 d. The raw data from Ukrainian Air Navigation Service Provider further 3 showed that flight MH17 was not transmitting any secondary 4 surveillance data from 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) onwards. 5 e. The Russian Federation’s Air Navigation Service Provider radar screen 6 video replay of the combined primary and secondary radar data showed 7 target tracks from the aeroplane from 13.20:03 (15.20:03 CET) onward 8 which were the result of coasting and of falling debris. 9 10 2. Sound peak The Cockpit Voice Recorder recorded a 2.3 milliseconds sound 11 peak that originated outside the aeroplane from a position above the left side 12 of the cockpit, propagating from front to aft. The signal triangulation was 13 consistent with the impact of a warhead detonating outside and to the left of 14 the cockpit. 15 16 3. No other aeroplanes There was no evidence of other aircraft, civilian or 17 military, in the direct vicinity of flight MH17. According to radar data only three 18 other aeroplanes were in Dnipropetrovs’k Control Sector 4 at the time of the 19 accident, all commercial air transport category aeroplanes. Two were flying 20 eastbound one was flying westbound. All were under control of Dnipro Radar. 21 At 13.20 (15.20 CET) the distance between the closest of these aeroplanes 22 and flight MH17 was 33 km. 23 24 4. High-energy object damage The damage observed on the forward 25 fuselage and cockpit area of the aeroplane indicates that there were multiple 26 impacts from a large number of high-energy objects from outside the 27 aeroplane. This caused sufficient structural damage to lead to an in-flight 28 break-up. The pattern of damage observed to the forward fuselage and cockpit 29 area of the aeroplane was not consistent with the damage that would be 30 expected from any known failure mode of the aeroplane, its engines or 31 systems. 32 33 5. Fragments from one location The aeroplane was struck by a large 34 number of small objects with different shapes and sizes; cubic and in the form 35 of a butterfly or bow-tie, moving at high velocity. The direction of both the 36 penetrating and the non-penetrating fragments originated from a single 37 location outside left and above the cockpit. The fragments caused damage to 38 the left side of the cockpit, the left engine cowling lip ring and the left wing tip. 39 40
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- 161 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 6. Damage pattern The location, shape and boundaries of the damage to the 1 wreckage of flight MH17 and the number and density of hits on the wreckage 2 was consistent with fragmentation spray pattern damage of pre-formed 3 fragments from different shapes and sizes in a 9N314-model warhead carried 4 on the 9M38-series of missiles and installed on the Buk, Buk-M1 or Buk-M1-2 5 surface to air missile system. 6 7 7. Pre-formed fragments High-energy objects found in the aeroplane and 8 the bodies of the flight crew were mainly of unalloyed steel some of which 9 showed evidence of having passed through the aeroplane’s exterior surface 10 and cockpit windows. Some of the objects showed traces of explosive 11 residues. There were no high-energy objects found in the bodies of 12 passengers. The objects found are consistent with the pre-formed fragments 13 in the 9N314-model warhead carried on the 9M38-series of missiles as 14 installed in the Buk, Buk-M1 of Buk-M1-2 ground to air missile system. 15 16 8. Blast Simulation of the blast after detonation of the 9N314-model warhead 17 creates an area of very high pressure (shock wave) near the cockpit. The 18 simulation showed that the blast causes structural damage to the aeroplane 19 structure up to 35 metres from the point of detonation. This was consistent 20 with the damage found on the aeroplane wreckage. 21 22 9. Failure sequence After the initial impact, the aeroplane broke up as follows: 23 a. There was an almost simultaneous separation of the cockpit from the 24 forward part of the fuselage when the high-energy objects penetrated 25 the cockpit. The cockpit from the forward part of the fuselage came to 26 rest 2.3 kilometres from the last position recorded on the Flight Data 27 Recorder. 28 b. The centre and rear part of the fuselage remained, initially, intact, 29 gliding aerodynamically and came to rest about 8.5 kilometres to the 30 east. The centre section travelled further than the rear part of the 31 fuselage. This part came to rest upside down in two parts with the 32 centre section beyond the empennage. The wreckage caught fire. 33 c. Some seats fell free of the fuselage, whilst others remained attached 34 to the floor. 35 d. The time between the start of the break-up and the impact with the 36 ground could not be accurately determined, but the centre and rear 37 parts of the aeroplane were estimated to have taken about 1 – 1.5 38 minutes to reach the ground. Other, lighter parts, will have taken 39 longer. 40
Annex 204
- 162 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. 10. Launch area The missile was fired from within an area of about 250 km2, that 1 is approximately 15 km by 17 km. This area is located to the south of, and 2 including, the village of Snizhne, Ukraine. 3 4.3 Excluding other causes 4 The Dutch Safety Board has investigated and analysed a number of different 5 possible causes of the accident. The Safety Board excludes the following matters 6 as having had a role in the accident to flight MH17. 7 8 1. Crew The flight crew members were properly licensed and qualified to 9 conduct the flight. There is no evidence that the crew handled the aeroplane 10 inappropriately nor were they under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 11 medicine. 12 13 2. Airworthiness and flight plan The aeroplane was in an airworthy 14 condition on departure from Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and there were no 15 known technical malfunctions that could affect the safety of the flight. An Air 16 Traffic Control flight plan had been filed and the flight crew had been provided 17 with an operational flight plan, NOTAMs, loading and weather information. 18 19 3. Loading and cargo The mass and centre of gravity of the aeroplane 20 were within authorised limits. There was no cargo classified as dangerous 21 goods on board the aeroplane, nor was any evidence found of explosion with 22 dangerous goods inside the aeroplane. 23 24 4. Airspace On 17 July 2014, airspace restrictions were in place for the 25 eastern part of Ukraine and parts of the bordering airspace in the Russian 26 Federation from ground level up to FL320. There were no restrictions for flight 27 MH17 to fly in Dnipropetrovs’k Flight Information Region planned flight levels 28 FL330 and FL350. 29 30 5. Climb The flight crew’s decision not to accept the air traffic controller’s 31 request to climb from FL330 to FL350 was determined to be a normal 32 operational consideration. Flying at the lower flight level had no influence on 33 the ability of the surface to air missile to engage the aeroplane. 34 35 6. Weather The weather on the planned flight route showed the presence of 36 thunderstorms moving north from the Black Sea. On request by the flight crew, 37 the air traffic controller authorised flight MH17 to circumnavigate this weather. 38 Flight MH17 did not deviate from the width of airway L980 by more than 39 approximately 1.5 NM. In the last recorded position at 13.20:03 (15.20:03 40
Annex 204
- 163 - This is a copy of the draft Final Report of this investigation intended solely for consultation as per ICAO Annex 13, paragraph 6.3. It shall not be released to or communicated with parties other than those to whom the report is addressed. CET), flight MH17 was within the width of airway L980. The weather had no 1 influence on the accident to MH17. 2 3 7. Pre-existing damage There was no indication of a presence of pre-4 existing airframe damage, including fatigue or corrosion or inadequately 5 performed repairs. There was no indication of engine failure. 6 7 8. No warnings Analysis of the Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data 8 Recorder confirmed the normal functioning of the aeroplane’s systems prior to 9 the accident. No warnings, failures or discrepancies were found in the data for 10 the accident flight. No aural alerts or warnings of aircraft system malfunctions 11 were heard on the Cockpit Voice Recorder. The communication between the 12 flight crew members gave no indication of any malfunction or emergency prior 13 to the occurrence. The engine parameters were consistent with normal 14 operation during the flight. The recorded aircraft data showed no malfunctions, 15 warnings, failures or discrepancies for the duration of the flight. 16 17 9. Other weapons 18 a. Air to air gunfire The high-energy object damage was not caused by air to 19 air gunfire because the number, the size and type of high-energy objects 20 impact damage is not consistent with gunfire impact damage and the 21 trajectories of the high-energy objects that struck the aeroplane are not 22 parallel but converge to a single location close to, and above, the 23 aeroplane. 24 b. Air to air missile The high-energy object damage was not caused by an 25 air to air missile because there was no military aircraft in the area of flight 26 MH17 to launch such a missile. Air to air missile warheads do not have 27 butterfly or bow-tie shaped fragments, and an infra-red guided missile 28 would have caused damage to the aeroplane nearer the engines. 29 c. It is extremely improbable that the aeroplane was struck by more than one 30 weapon system simultaneously. 31 32 10. Other scenarios Other possible scenarios that could have led to the 33 disintegration of the aeroplane were considered and analysed. These 34 scenarios were an on-board fire or a fuel tank explosion, the detonation of an 35 explosive device inside the aeroplane, lightning strike, and impact by a meteor 36 or space debris re-entering the atmosphere. All of them were excluded based 37 on the available evidence. 38
Annex 205
AstroAWANI, #RememberingMH17: The Funeral Of Wan Amran Wan Hussin
(3 September 2014)
Annex 205
#RememberingMH17 : The funeral of Wan Amran Wan Hussin | Astro Awani
https://www.astroawani.com/foto-malaysia/rememberingmh17-the-funeral-wan-amran-wan-hussin-1519/relatives-and-friends-of-captain-malaysia-airlin…
#RememberingMH17 : The
Funeral Of Wan Amran Wan
Hussin
September 3, 2014
Relatives and friends of captain Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, Captain
Wan Amran Wan Hussin do the special prays at Shah Alam mosque.
AWANI/SHAHIR OMAR
Foto
5/17
https://www.astroawani.com/foto-malaysia/rememberingmh17-the-funeral-wan-amran-wan-hussin-1519/relatives-#RememberingMH17 : The
Funeral Of Wan Amran Wan
Hussin
September 3, 2014
Relatives and friends of captain Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, Captain
Wan Amran Wan Hussin do the special prays at Shah Alam mosque.
AWANI/SHAHIR OMAR
Foto
5/17
Annex 205
#RememberingMH17 : The funeral of Wan Amran Wan Hussin | Astro Awanihttps://www.astroawani.com/foto-malaysia/rememberingmh17-the-funeral-wan-amran-wan-hussin-1519/relatives-and-friends-of-captain-malaysia-airlin… #RememberingMH17 : The funeral of Wan Amran Wan Hussin #RememberingMH17 : The funeral of Wan Amran Wan Hussin | Astro Awanihttps://www.astroawani.com/foto-malaysia/rememberingmh17-the-funeral-wan-amran-wan-hussin-1519/relatives-and-friends-of-captain-malaysia-airlin…
Annex 206 New Straits Times, MH17: Two more remains to arrive on Sunday: Liow (22 August 2014)
Annex 206
MH17: Two more remains to arrive on Sunday: Liow
https://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/09/25710/mh17-two-more-remains-arrive-sunday-liow
MH17: Two more remains to arrive on
Sunday: Liow
By Nuradilla Noorazam - August 22, 2014 @ 11:42am
Federal Territory Mufti Dr Zulkii Al Bakri leads the solat jenazah for Ahmad Hakimi
Hanapi (left) and ight attendant Nur Shazana Mohamed Salleh at Putra Mosque in
Putrajaya.
PUTRAJAYA: The remains of Malaysia Airlines (MAS) ight MH 17 co-pilot
Ahmad Hakimi Hanapi, 29, was nally laid to rest at the Muslim burial
ground, here in Presint 20 at about 3pm.
His remains was buried alongside crew member Nurshazana Mohamed
Salleh, 31, after the solat jenazah (nal prayers) at the Putra Mosque in
Presint 2 at about 12:35pm.
Nurshazana's body was buried rst before Friday prayers upon her
family's request, while Ahmad Hakimi was buried later following requests
from relatives and his MAS colleagues.
MH17: Two more remains to arrive on
Sunday: Liow
By Nuradilla Noorazam - August 22, 2014 @ 11:42am
Federal Territory Mufti Dr Zulkii Al Bakri leads the solat jenazah for Ahmad Hakimi
Hanapi (left) and ight attendant Nur Shazana Mohamed Salleh at Putra Mosque in
Putrajaya.
PUTRAJAYA: The remains of Malaysia Airlines (MAS) ight MH 17 co-pilot
Ahmad Hakimi Hanapi, 29, was nally laid to rest at the Muslim burial
ground, here in Presint 20 at about 3pm.
His remains was buried alongside crew member Nurshazana Mohamed
Salleh, 31, after the solat jenazah (nal prayers) at the Putra Mosque in
Presint 2 at about 12:35pm.
Nurshazana's body was buried rst before Friday prayers upon her
family's request, while Ahmad Hakimi was buried later following requests
from relatives and his MAS colleagues.
https://www.nst.com.my/news/2015/09/25710/mh17-two-more-remains-arrive-sunday-liow
MH17: Two more remains to arrive on
Sunday: Liow
By Nuradilla Noorazam - August 22, 2014 @ 11:42am
Federal Territory Mufti Dr Zulkii Al Bakri leads the solat jenazah for Ahmad Hakimi
Hanapi (left) and ight attendant Nur Shazana Mohamed Salleh at Putra Mosque in
Putrajaya.
PUTRAJAYA: The remains of Malaysia Airlines (MAS) ight MH 17 co-pilot
Ahmad Hakimi Hanapi, 29, was nally laid to rest at the Muslim burial
ground, here in Presint 20 at about 3pm.
His remains was buried alongside crew member Nurshazana Mohamed
Salleh, 31, after the solat jenazah (nal prayers) at the Putra Mosque in
Presint 2 at about 12:35pm.
Nurshazana's body was buried rst before Friday prayers upon her
family's request, while Ahmad Hakimi was buried later following requests
from relatives and his MAS colleagues.
Annex 206
MH17: Two more remains to arrive on Sunday: Liow
A minor commotion broke out over Ahmad Hakimi's burial time as a
uniformed pilot, believed to be his colleague, had insisted that the burial
be postponed pending the arrival of other mourners.
The shouting led to a slight commotion as several relatives prevented the
organisers from proceeding with the burial.
It was understood that while waiting for the mourners to arrive, those
present at the cemetery conducted another solat jenazah for Ahmad
Hakimi's remains in a surau there.
Ahmad Hakimi's wife Asmaa Aljuned, was also said to have seen his body
after the con was unsealed in the surau.
The sealed con draped with Jalur Gemilang was carried by eight
pallbearers from the Royal Malay Regiment.
The cons were slowly lowered down using four strands of ropes.
Many were seen wiping away tears and some were wailing as the soil
began covering the graves.
Additional reporting by Hani Shamira Shahruddin. Azim Idris, Rahmat
Khairulrijal.
MH17: Two more remains to arrive on Sunday: Liow
A minor commotion broke out over Ahmad Hakimi's burial time as a
uniformed pilot, believed to be his colleague, had insisted that the burial
be postponed pending the arrival of other mourners.
The shouting led to a slight commotion as several relatives prevented the
organisers from proceeding with the burial.
It was understood that while waiting for the mourners to arrive, those
present at the cemetery conducted another solat jenazah for Ahmad
Hakimi's remains in a surau there.
Ahmad Hakimi's wife Asmaa Aljuned, was also said to have seen his body
after the con was unsealed in the surau.
The sealed con draped with Jalur Gemilang was carried by eight
pallbearers from the Royal Malay Regiment.
The cons were slowly lowered down using four strands of ropes.
Many were seen wiping away tears and some were wailing as the soil
began covering the graves.
Additional reporting by Hani Shamira Shahruddin. Azim Idris, Rahmat
Khairulrijal.
Annex 207 BBC News, MH17 crash: My revealing fragments from east Ukraine (16 April 2015)
Annex 207
By Jeroen Akkermans Dutch RTL News
correspondent
MH17 crash: My revealing fragments from east Ukraine
bbc.com/news/world-europe-32283378
Image copyright Jeroen Akkermans
Image caption Firefighters put out flames in the main fuselage of flight
MH17
When a journalist investigates a crime scene something is wrong. It is not his job. We
leave the search for evidence in the hands of the police for a good reason.
But on 17 July 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 exploded over eastern Ukraine and the
remains of 298 passengers and crew fell in a warzone with frontlines instead of police
lines.
I visited the site several times and, after months of seeing evidence lying at the scene
undisturbed, I decided to take some small fragments with me. At least three of them
were later linked to a surface-to-air missile by forensic analysis and experts.
360 degree view of fragment linked by analysts to warhead
used by Buk missile launcher
Media caption360 degree view of a fragment linked by analysts to a Buk warhead
1/8
Annex 207
Men with gunsThe victims came from several countries; 196 were Dutch citizens and my country was inshock.The wreckage of MH17 was spread over more than 35 sq km (13.5 sq miles) and, when Ifirst arrived, flags had already been put in place locating where the body parts were.There was no order, just men with guns. But nobody stopped us entering and filmingwhat was dubbed "the biggest crime scene in the world".Everywhere lay desolate parts. It was a scene of war; death; hell.I took pictures of serial numbers, holes and craters in an attempt to understand themagnitude of it all.Russian-backed separatists had been fighting the Ukrainian army for control of theMH17-zone and the entrance to the area was obstructed by roadblocks manned byarmed rebels.Image copyright Jeroen AkkermansImage caption Part of the front of the plane landed in the main street of PetropavlivkaInvestigators from the Netherlands arrived four days later.By the time of their arrival, Ukrainian firemen had retrieved most of the bodies and bodyparts from the burning sun, put them in plastic bags and on to a waiting train withrefrigerated carriages.2/8
Annex 207
Soon the Dutch investigators were pulled out. Dutch authorities considered the warzonetoo dangerous for collecting evidence.Nevertheless the Netherlands was asked to take over the investigation from Ukraine.Initially the Dutch saw it as a logical and necessary step.When lines of coffins were flown back and driven by hearse to an army barracks, oursmall country was in tears.It felt as if everyone knew a passenger on board MH17.The Dutch expected nothing less than swift conclusions from their investigators. But theinvestigators' hands were tied by commitments to Ukraine - even though its army hadnot been ruled out as a suspect - and by a formal refusal to negotiate with separatists.Image copyright Jeroen AkkermansImage caption A preliminary Dutch report suggested the plane was downed by a large number of high-velocity objectsThe delay in collecting the wreckage and reports of body parts still at the scene left apopulation in mourning increasingly angry and frustrated.In September 2014 a preliminary report indicated MH17 was brought down by a greatnumber of objects piercing the plane with high velocity; there was no evidence of humanor technical failure.It was criticised as too little, too late.3/8
Annex 207
Personally, I saw the report as a clue that many of these objects might still be in thewreckage.But three months after the crash, still nobody had collected possible evidence.No investigators. No police lines.Image copyright Jeroen AkkermansImage caption Jeroen Akkermans with some of the fragments from the crash scene in eastern UkraineEarly in November, on my third visit to the MH17 zone, I took the decision to search forfragments that could not belong to a Boeing or the cargo. I picked up around 20"suspect" small pieces.My main suspect was a fragment that looked to me like cluster ammunition: rusty, heavymetal with sharp edges.I recognised this kind of ammunition from other warzones.A couple of days after I had left the area, Dutch investigators finally started transportingthe first parts of wreckage to the Netherlands.Getting my fragments out of the country was one thing, getting it analysed was another.4/8
Annex 207
Image caption Parts of the plane were found 8km (5 miles) from the main debris siteJeroen Akkermans' report for Dutch RTL NewsWhat we know about MH17 crashInvestigators appeal for Buk missile evidenceAir disaster that touched a nationForensic back-upThe theory about the downing of MH17 is divided into two camps.One side is convinced a Ukrainian SU-25 fighter jet shot MH17 down.5/8
Annex 207
The opposing side believes it must have been a Russian surface-to-air missile launchedfrom separatist-held territory.I spoke to many experts in different countries on possible air-to-air and surface-to-airweaponry and showed them the fragments.All ruled out air-to-air ammunition. Instead, they were convinced at least three of thepieces I had taken had the markings of a surface-to-air missile. Fired from a Russian Bukmissile launcher, perhaps?Forensic back-up is both essential and expensive.I was allowed to witness forensic analysis of a piece where the time-consuming peelingof the coating revealed the Cyrillic letter Ц.MediacaptionExtensiveforensic analysiswas required toremove thecoating fromone fragmentImage copyright Jeroen AkkermansImage caption Eventually the Russian letter Ц and number 2 became clear'Pure mathematics'6/8
Annex 207
The rusty fragment - my main suspect - indeed turned out to consist of the heavy metalyou would expect for this kind of ammunition, with damage typical of a fragment thathad pierced another metal-object with high velocity.Forensic analysis and experts from British defence analysts IHS Jane's linked thedamaged, hour glass-shaped fragment to a 9N314 warhead, which arms at least one typeof the Buk system's missiles.German missile expert Robert Schmucker went through all the data."Looking at the damage, the velocity, the height and the fragments, it all adds up to aBuk missile, to me it is pure mathematics," he told me.After four months of investigation, for the first time we were able to present the publicwith physical evidence of a Buk.Far bigger steps to the truth about MH17 still need to be taken. Who is responsible andwill they be brought to justice? Quite frankly, I am not optimistic.But was I entitled to do what I did?Since my work was broadcast, there has been a public debate in the Netherlands aboutwhether or not a journalist can take evidence from a crime scene.Some have called me a thief obstructing the rule of law.I see it instead as my journalistic obligation.The search for truth is my job. Many agreed.Unexpected backing came from Dutch Vice Prime Minister Lodewijk Asscher, who told anews conference: "RTL News and Jeroen Akkermans are free to pursue their owninvestigation."I have since handed the fragments over to the Dutch authorities. It will be part of theirinvestigation.298 victims from 10 countries7/8
Annex 207
Image copyright ReutersNetherlands: 196Malaysia: 42Australia: 27Indonesia: 11UK: 10Belgium: 4Germany: 3Philippines: 3Canada: 1New Zealand: 1Jeroen Akkermans is a correspondent for Dutch RTL News. His extensive collection ofphotographs covering the MH17 disaster can be found on Flickr.8/8
Annex 208 RT, Serial numbers of missile that downed MH17 show it was produced in 1986, owned by Ukraine - Russia (17 September 2018)
Annex 208
Serial numbers of missile that downed MH17 show it
was produced in 1986, owned by Ukraine - Russia
RT
The serial numbers found on debris of the Buk missile which downed Malaysian Airlines Flight
MH17 over eastern Ukraine show it was produced in 1986, the Russian military said. The projectile
was owned by Ukraine, they added.
There are two serial numbers found on fragments of the missile, which shot down the passenger
airliner in June 2014 according to an international team of investigators led by the Netherlands.
The numbers were marked on the engine and the nozzle of the missile.
The Russian military on Monday said they had traced them to a missile which had the producer
serial number 8868720.
Speaking to journalists, Gen. Nikolay Parshin showed a document trail of the Buk missile.
According to the documents, some of which have been declassified for the presentation, it was
produced at a military plant in Dolgoprudny in the Moscow region in 1986.
The missile was shipped from the plant on December 29, 1986 and delivered to military unit 20152
located in what is now Ukraine. It is now called 223rd anti-aircraft defense regiment of the
Ukrainian armed forces, the report said. The unit took part in Kiev's crackdown on rebels in
eastern Ukraine in June 2014, the general said.
The evidence disproves the accusations by Ukraine and some other parties, which claim that a
missile fired by a launcher, secretly delivered from Russia, was responsible for the downing of
MH17, the Ministry of Defense report said. All the materials have been sent to the Dutch
investigators, the Russian military added.
The Russian military also challenges video footage used by the UK-based group Bellingcat, which
calls itself a citizen journalism organization, to back its allegations about the delivery of the Buk
launcher from Russia. The Defense Ministry showed a video clip with some of the footage,
highlighting inconsistencies, which it said proved that the footage had been manipulated to place
images of the launcher into background which were not in the original.
The Bellingcat investigation was featured in the latest update by Dutch prosecutors involved in the
MH17 investigation, prompting them to directly accuse Russia of providing the launcher and the
missile. The Russian military said it decided after this to study the purported trail of photo and
video evidence showing the path of the launcher in detail. The Russian video showed an example of
how an Abrams tank can be shown to be carried by a trailer in the streets of Ukraine in the same
way.
Serial numbers of missile that downed MH17 show it was produced i... https://www.rt.com/news/438596-mh17-downing-russian-briefing/
Стр. 1 из 2 24.02.2023, 18:09
Annex 208
The third part of the presentation was what the Russian officials called a record of interceptedcommunications of Ukrainian officials discussing, in 2016, the risk of flying through restrictedairspace over Ukraine. Among a barrage of complaints one phrase says unless the restrictions arerespected "we'll f***ing f**k up another Malaysian Boeing".The Russian military say the complaints came from Col. Ruslan Grinchak, who serves in a brigaderesponsible for radar control in Ukrainian airspace. His unit tracked the MH17 flight in 2014, so hemay have information which is not publicly available about the disaster, and his outburst may havebeen factual rather than hyperbolic, they suggested.Gen. Igor Konashenkov, who hosted the briefing, said that Ukraine failed to provide radar datafrom its stations to the Dutch investigators. He also suggested that archive documents from theUkrainian unit, which received the Buk missile back in 1986, would be of use to the probe, unlessKiev claims that they are no longer available. He stressed rules are in place which mean that suchdocuments should still be stored in Ukraine.The Russian military said they had no evidence to disprove a scenario, involving the Ukrainianrebels capturing the missile from the Ukrainian army, but pointed out that Ukrainian officialspublicly denied anything like this had ever happened.Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over eastern Ukraine on July 17, 2014, falling in therebel-held part of the country. The crash claimed the lives of 283 passengers and 15 crew members,most of them Dutch nationals. Russia was blamed by Western media in the first days after thetragedy, even before any evidence had been collected on the ground.The Joint Investigation Team, which is lead by the Netherlands, includes Ukraine, but not Russia.Moscow believes that the investigation is biased, failing to obtain all necessary evidence fromUkraine and relying on questionable sources while ignoring evidence provided by Russia, whichdoesn't fit the theory favored by Kiev. For instance, Moscow said a theory was never tested that theairliner could have been downed by a fighter jet spotted by Russian radar stations near flightMH17. The theory was later proven false by the discovery of debris from the Buk rocket.Think your friends would be interested? Share this story!Serial numbers of missile that downed MH17 show it was produced i...https://www.rt.com/news/438596-mh17-downing-russian-briefing/Стр. 2 из 224.02.2023, 18:09
Annex 209 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Richard Reid's Shoes
Annex 209
Richard Reid's Shoes | Federal Bureau of
Investigation
This is the pair of shoes Richard Reid—also known as the shoe bomber—tried to detonate. (Click
image to view high-res.)
On December 22, 2001—just months after the 9/11 attacks—Richard Reid boarded American
Airlines Flight 63 from Paris to Miami with homemade bombs hidden in his shoes.
During the flight, Reid tried to detonate his shoes, but he struggled to light the fuse. Crew
members and passengers noticed and restrained him.
The plane diverted to Logan International Airport in Boston, and Massachusetts State Police
officers took Reid into custody. Reid told FBI agents that he made the shoes himself.
On October 4, 2002, Reid pleaded guilty to eight terrorism-related charges. A judge sentenced him
to life in federal prison.
This is the pair of shoes Reid—also known as the “shoe bomber”—tried to detonate. FBI bomb
techs determined that the shoes contained about 10 ounces of explosive material.
During a preliminary hearing, an FBI agent revealed how dangerous the homemade bomb was.
She said that bomb techs determined that the bomb would have blown a hole in the plane’s
fuselage and caused the plane to crash if it had detonated.
Richard Reid's Shoes | Federal Bureau of Investigation https://www.fbi.gov/history/artifacts/richard-reids-shoes
Стр. 1 из 1 22.02.2023, 23:42
Annex 210
The New York Times, Explosive on Planes Was Used in Past Plots (30 October 2010)
Annex 210
22.02.2023, 23:43 Packages’ Explosive PETN Used in Past Plots - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/world/middleeast/31petn.html 1/2
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/world/middleeast/31petn.html
By Kenneth Chang
Oct. 30, 2010
Pentaerythritol tetranitrate, or PETN, the explosive found in two bombs hidden in printer cartridges that were being shipped via jets
from Yemen to the United States, is a hallmark of earlier Qaeda-linked terrorism attempts on airplanes.
In 2001, PETN was found hidden in the shoes of Richard C. Reid during an American Airlines flight. Last Christmas, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab had three ounces of PETN hidden in his underwear on a Northwest flight from Amsterdam to Detroit.
An assassination attempt in August 2009 on Saudi Arabia’s intelligence chief, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, also employed PETN. Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, an arm of the terrorist network, claimed responsibility for the attack, which took the life of only one
person, the suicide bomber’s.
But other terrorist groups have also used PETN, and the presence of the explosive itself does not decisively point to Al Qaeda. “That’s
a very common explosive,” said Jimmie C. Oxley, a professor of chemistry at the University of Rhode Island. “There’s no reason to
think a lot of people didn’t have access to do that.”
PETN, a white powder that was introduced after World War I, belongs to the same chemical family as nitroglycerin. It is about 70
percent more powerful than T.N.T., and is stable. PETN generally does not explode when dropped or set on fire. Usually, a strong
shock wave from a blasting cap or an exploding wire detonator is needed to set it off.
Those properties make it well suited for a variety of commercial applications. PETN is a major ingredient of the plastic explosive
Semtex and is used in detonation cables.
For terrorists, PETN is an attractive choice for package bombs. Its stability means it is unlikely to explode prematurely, but at its
destination, it will go off with deadly force when detonated. (Conversely, the stability of PETN also thwarted the attacks of Mr. Reid
and Mr. Abdulmutallab, who were not able to detonate their explosives.)
Dubai officials said that the printer cartridge bomb intercepted there on Friday included lead azide, an explosive to detonate the
PETN, and a cellphone circuit, presumably to allow the bomb to be set off remotely. Neal Langerman, president of Advanced Chemical
Safety, a consulting firm in San Diego, said it appeared “to be a fairly sophisticated device.”
Judging from photos of the Dubai bomb, Dr. Oxley estimated that the printer cartridge contained about two pounds of PETN.
The British home secretary, Theresa May, said Saturday that the second bomb, intercepted in Britain on Friday, contained enough
explosive to bring down a plane.
The target of the bombs remains unclear; they could have been directed at the synagogues or Jewish community centers in Chicago
to which they were addressed.
Explosive on Planes Was Used in Past Plots
Part of a toner cartridge found onboard a cargo plane in Dubai. Dubai Police, via European
Pressphoto Agency
Annex 210
22.02.2023, 23:43Packages’ Explosive PETN Used in Past Plots - The New York Timeshttps://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/world/middleeast/31petn.html2/2Placement of a bomb in a plane can be as important as its size in determining the amount of damage it could cause, Dr. Oxley said.While the printer cartridge contained more PETN than Mr. Reid’s shoes or Mr. Abdulmutallab’s underwear, the bomb maker could notbe certain where in the airplane the package would be located. Mr. Reid and Mr. Abdulmutallab tried to detonate their devices close tothe wall of the respective planes on which they were flying, to increase chances that the explosion would blow a hole in the aircraft.“Last year, the guy had more control,” Dr. Oxley said, referring to Mr. Abdulmutallab. But the printer cartridge bomb, she said, had somuch more PETN that “my guess, and this is only a guess, it may have had a higher probability” of taking down an airplane.Dr. Langerman said it was curious that the two most recently intercepted devices apparently were different in design. That mayindicate that the explosive makers had different targets in mind.
Annex 211 The Kyiv Independent, British instructors train Ukrainian military to operate NLAW tank killers (PHOTOS) (25 January 2022)
Annex 211
British instructors train Ukrainian military to
operate NLAW tank killers (PHOTOS)
Illia Ponomarenko
A British military serviceman instructs his Ukrainian colleagues in operating NLAW anti-tank
grenade launchers at the Yavoriv training range in Lviv Oblast on Jan. 25, 2022 (Army Inform)
Ukrainian military service members have started mastering NLAW anti-tank grenade launchers
provided recently as defense assistance to Kyiv by the United Kingdom amid the looming threat of
all-out assault by Russia.
The studies began on Jan. 25 at the Ukrainian Armed Forces' 184th Training Center in Lviv Oblast,
under the guidance of British personnel, part of the U.K.'s training mission in Ukraine, Operation
ORBITAL, according to the military.
"Very soon, the first several dozens of Ukrainian military service members will be able to
effectively employ these anti-tank missile systems and also train other Ukrainian soldiers," said
Lieutenant General Pavlo Tkachuk, the Ground Forces Academy principal in charge of the training
center.
The U.K.'s Secretary for Defense Ben Wallace announced the decision to provide Ukraine with
NLAW anti-tank systems was announced by the in an address to the House of Commons on Jan.
18.
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Lieutenant General Pavlo Tkachuk, the Ground Forces Academy principal (ArmyInform)Shortly following the announcement, nearly 2,000 grenade launchers were transferred to Kyiv byRoyal Air Force transport aircraft, with minimal public awareness.The defensive weapons were sent as part of the U.K.'s additional assistance package for Ukraine.The U.K. also sent a small number of military instructors to provide appropriate training forUkrainian troops.Afterwards, Wallace also said London was considering sending even more assistance to Kyiv asRussia had failed to de-escalate despite intense Western diplomatic efforts.As of January, Russia is reported to have massed over 120,000 troops in and around Ukraine,raising fears of a large-scale invasion and occupation.The NLAW is known as a type of man-portable, short-range, fire-and-forget missile systemoperated by the U.K. and a number of other militaries across the world.It is a Swedish-British project designed by Saab Bofors Dynamics in the early 2000s andmanufactured by Thales Air Defence in Britain.According to the arms developer, those are easy-to-use, disposable tank killers most suitable forthe infantry. Launchers weighing 12.5 kilograms have a combat range between 20 and 800 meters,and they require just 5 seconds to detect and engage a target.Similar to American-made FGM-148 Javelin systems, the NLAWs supplement Ukraine's arsenal ofhighly-mobile tank killers at the right time for repelling Russian attacks in restrictive terrain,British instructors train Ukrainian military to operate NLAW tank kille...https://kyivindependent.com/national/british-instructors-train-ukraini...Стр. 2 из 323.02.2023, 0:19
Annex 211
especially in intense urban warfare.A NLAW grenade launcher demonstrated at the Ukrainian Armed Forces' 184th Training Center inLviv Oblast (Army Inform)British instructors train Ukrainian military to operate NLAW tank kille...https://kyivindependent.com/national/british-instructors-train-ukraini...Стр. 3 из 323.02.2023, 0:19
Annex 212
Reuters, Ukraine holds military drills with U.S. forces, NATO allies (20 September 2021)
Annex 212
Ukraine holds military drills with U.S. forces, NATO
allies
2 minute readSeptember 20, 20211:59 PM GMT+3Last Updated a year ago
[1/5] Servicemen of the U.S. and Ukrainian armies attend the opening ceremony of the "RAPID
TRIDENT-2021" military exercise at Ukraine's International Peacekeeping Security Centre near
Yavoriv in the Lviv region, Ukraine September 20, 2021. REUTERS/Gleb Garanich
YAVORIV, Ukraine, Sept 20 (Reuters) - Ukraine began joint military exercises with U.S. and other
NATO troops on Monday, at a time when neighbouring Russia and Belarus have been holding
large-scale drills that alarmed the West.
Ukraine, at war with Russia-backed separatists since 2014, has long sought closer integration with
Western militaries in the hope of one day joining NATO.
A Ukrainian defence ministry spokesman said 4,000 Ukrainian troops and 2,000 foreigners would
participate in the "RAPID TRIDENT - 2021" drill, due to run until Oct. 1.
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Annex 212
Register for free to Reuters and know the full story"I believe that each of you will concentrate all your knowledge, all your efforts in order to show theaggressor countries that they have no chance," Ihor Palahniuk, training commander of Ukraine'sforces, said at the opening ceremony at Ukraine's International Peacekeeping Security Centre nearYaroviv in the country's west.The U.S. military said in a statement the drill involved a brigade combat team of the WashingtonNational Guard, deployed in Ukraine since April as part of a multi-national training force. Troopsfrom 12 countries in total would be involved, "to enhance interoperability among allied and partnernations" and demonstrate readiness.Latest UpdatesView 2 more storiesThe exercise comes on the heels of huge war games staged by Moscow near NATO and EU bordersof Russia and Belarus in recent weeks, which Russia says involved 200,000 troops. Kyiv andNATO also accuse Russia of having deployed extra troops this year near Ukraine's frontiers. readmoreOn Monday, around 20 Russian warships began large-scale live fire exercises in the Black Sea.In June, Ukraine, the United States and other allies held a naval exercise, Sea Breeze, in the BlackSea and southern Ukraine, despite Russian calls for the drills to be cancelled.In July, Ukraine, the United States, Poland and Lithuania held another drill involving more than1,200 troops. read moreUkraine holds military drills with U.S. forces, NATO allieshttps://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-holds-mi...Стр. 2 из 323.02.2023, 0:21
Annex 213 Gallup, Russian Language Enjoying a Boost in Post-Soviet States (1 August 2008)
Annex 213
AUGUST 1, 2008
Russian Language Enjoying a
Boost in Post-Soviet States
Attitudes more favorable in Georgia, Moldova, and
Armenia
BY SERGEI GRADIROVSKI AND NELI ESIPOVA
This article is the first in a two-part series on attitudes toward the Russian language
in post-Soviet states. This first article reviews regional opinions toward learning
Russian; the second evaluates regional migration and the impact on emerging
European and Central Asian markets.
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- Former president Vladimir Putin decreed 2007 as "The Year
of the Russian Language." The declaration was not merely ceremonial -- the
number of Russian speakers has declined annually since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Gallup Polls reveal increasingly favorable attitudes toward learning the
Russian language in several post-Soviet states, most notably in Georgia, Moldova,
and Armenia.
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Russia is currently one of the top 10 spoken languages in the world, but someestimate the number of people speaking Russian is declining. In many Central andEastern European countries, older generations often associate Russian withcompulsory lessons under communism. Throughout the post-Soviet years,Moscow has stressed the significance of the Russian language as one ofcommunication and trust, of great literature, and of global science. In contrast,some opponents have branded it as a remnant of imperialism, and they haveencouraged a new generation toward fluency in their own national language.Despite the prolonged tension between Moscow and Tbilisi, in Georgia, 64% ofrespondents said it is "very important" for Georgian children to learn Russian,compared with the 43% who said so in 2006. In March 2007, shortly before theGallup survey, the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi expressed interest in opening aRussian Language Enjoying a Boost in Post-Soviet Stateshttps://news.gallup.com/poll/109228/russian-language-enjoying-boost...Стр. 2 из 523.02.2023, 0:26
Annex 213
Russian language school in the hopes of renewing declining interest in thelanguage among Georgian youth.In Moldova, the percentage of respondents saying it is very important for theirchildren to learn Russian rose 12 percentage points, from 27% to 39%, between2006 and 2007. This likely reflects a thaw between Moscow and Chisinau(Kishinev) resulting from the return of Moldovan wines and meat to the Russiandomestic market. Russia lifted the trade ban, which had put Moldova's economy injeopardy, in November 2006.Despite the small percentage of Armenian respondents (3%) who asked to take thesurvey in Russian, the percentage of respondents' saying it is very important fortheir children to learn Russian increased two points (from 73% to 75%) from 2006to 2007.Russian as the Mother TongueGallup Poll results underscore the prevalence of national language use overRussian; when asked in what language they preferred to conduct the Gallupinterview, only respondents in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus overwhelminglychose Russian. Ukraine and Kazakhstan retain larger Russian populations. InBelarus, where the interethnic differences between the Belarusians and Russiansare minimal, Russian is one of the official languages.Russian Language Enjoying a Boost in Post-Soviet Stateshttps://news.gallup.com/poll/109228/russian-language-enjoying-boost...Стр. 3 из 523.02.2023, 0:26
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Bottom Line"The Year of the Russian Language" was a momentous attempt to maintain thestatus of Dostoyevsky's language. But based on official language status, Russianhas fallen substantially since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russianlanguage's official status is granted in only three of the countries surveyed --Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. In three other countries -- Moldova, Ukraine,and Tajikistan -- Russian is identified as a "language of interethnic communication."Survey MethodsResults are based on face-to-face interviews conducted in 2006 and 2007 withRussian Language Enjoying a Boost in Post-Soviet Stateshttps://news.gallup.com/poll/109228/russian-language-enjoying-boost...Стр. 4 из 523.02.2023, 0:26
Annex 213
approximately 1,000 residents, aged 15 or older, in each country. For results basedon the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that themaximum margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points. In addition to samplingerror, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys canintroduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.Ian T. Brown contributed to this report.RELEASE DATE:August 1, 2008SOURCE:Gallup https://news.gallup.com/poll/109228/russian-language-enjoying-boost-postsoviet-states.aspxCONTACT:Gallup World Headquarters, 901 F Street, Washington, D.C., 20001, U.S.A+1 202.715.3030Copyright © 2023 Gallup, Inc. All rights reserved.Russian Language Enjoying a Boost in Post-Soviet Stateshttps://news.gallup.com/poll/109228/russian-language-enjoying-boost...Стр. 5 из 523.02.2023, 0:26
Annex 214
Opinio Juris, Kevin Jon Heller, MH17 Should Be Framed as Murder, Not as a War Crime
(11 August 2014)
Annex 214
MH17 Should Be Framed as Murder, Not as a War
Crime
11 Aug MH17 Should Be Framed as Murder, Not as a War Crime
It has become quite common to describe the downing of MH17 as a war crime. In late July, for
example, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said that “[t]his violation of
international law, given the prevailing circumstances, may amount to a war crime,” More recently,
William Burke-White has said that, for framing purposes, “[t]he time has come for governments
and international organizations to call the attack on MH17 a probable war crime.”
[I]f whoever launched the missile did so with the intent of killing the civilian passengers aboard
MH17, the act was unmistakably a war crime.
Even if the objective was to strike a Ukrainian transport aircraft, the act likely constitutes a war
crime. Fundamental to the law of war, including the law applicable in non-international armed
conflicts, is the principle of distinction – the requirement that fighting parties distinguish between
civilian and military targets. In the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross, that
duty of care includes doing “everything feasible to verify that targets are military objectives.”
In this case, many steps could easily have been taken to differentiate MH17 from a militarytransport
plane, including visual identification (perhaps with binoculars), radar-signature
analysis, and a check of the civilian aircraft transponder-code broadcast. If, as seems likely, these
basic steps were not taken, even an accidental strike on MH17 would constitute a war crime.
If the Ukrainian separatists did indeed intend to kill civilians, Bill and Navi Pillay are absolutely
right to describe the attack as a war crime — in this case, murder and/or intentionally directing
attacks at civilians or civilian objects (to use the Rome Statute’s terminology). But everything we
know to date about the attack indicates that the separatists honestly believed MH17 was a
Ukrainian military transport, not a civilian airplane. If so, that changes the legal assessment of the
attack considerably. The attack would still qualify as murder under domestic law — but it would
not qualify as a war crime, under either the Rome Statute or the jurisprudence of the ICTY. (The
latter likely representing the customary definition of the war crimes of murder and attacking
civilians or civilian objects, which most states would apply in a prosecution based on universal
jurisdiction.)
Let’s go in order. The problem with describing the attack on MH17 as a war crime under the Rome
Statute is Article 32(1), which provides that “[a] mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding
criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime.” The actus
rei of the war crime of murder and the war crime of intentionally directing attacks at civilians or
civilian objects each include a circumstance element: the individuals attacked must qualify
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Annex 214
as civilians (or as otherwise protected persons). The relevant mens rea for circumstance elementsis knowledge, pursuant to Art. 30(3) of the Rome Statute: “For the purposes of this article,‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists.” Black-letter criminal law provides thatan honest mistake of fact negatives any mens rea that requires subjective awareness. So if theseparatists honestly believed they were attacking a Ukrainian military transport, they were notaware that they were attacking civilians. In which case they could not be convicted of either the warcrime of murder or the war crime of intentionally directing attacks at civilians or civilian objects.The result is no different under the ICTY’s jurisprudence, even though the ICTY applies a lowermens rea to the war crimes of murder and attacking civilians. A complete discussion of the issue isbeyond the scope of this post; suffice it to say here that an accused will be responsible for eitherwar crime only if he was reckless toward the possibility that the objects of his attack qualifiedas civilian. (Dolus eventualis in civil-law terminology.) Recklessness is a subjective mental state inthe ICTY’s jurisprudence; as the Trial Chamber noted in Brdjanin, specifically in the context ofmurder, “the threshold of dolus eventualis… entails the concept of recklessness, but not that ofnegligence or gross negligence.” Like the ICC, the ICTY recognizes mistakes of fact. As a result, theseparatists could not be convicted of either the war crime or murder or the war crime of attackingcivilians under ICTY jurisprudence if they honestly believed they were attacking a Ukrainianmilitary transport: although that belief might have been negligent, even grossly negligent, itshonesty meant that they were not subjectively aware they were attacking civilians.The bottom line is that the accidental downing of civilian airplane based on an honest belief thatthe airplane was a military objective is not a war crime. Failing to take adequate precautions mayviolate IHL, but it is not criminal. The downing of MH17, therefore, should be framed not as a warcrime but as murder.TopicsCourts & Tribunals, Foreign Relations Law, International Criminal Law, International HumanRights Law, National Security Law, OrganizationsMH17 Should Be Framed as Murder, Not as a War Crimehttps://opiniojuris.org/2014/08/11/mh-17-framed-murder-war-crime/Стр. 2 из 223.02.2023, 0:46
Annex 215 Intentionally omitted
Annex 216
5.ua, Kharkov Stena Pub Terrorist Attack: Prosecutors Demand 12 Years’ in Prison for Accused
Bomber – Details (27 September 2019)
(translation)
Annex 216
Translation
5.ua, Kharkov Stena Pub Terrorist Attack: Prosecutors Demand 12 Years’ in Prison for
Accused Bomber – Details (27 September 2019), available at:
https://www.5.ua/ru/rehyoni/terakt-v-pabe-stena-v-kharkove-prokuratura-prosyt-12-let-tiurmi
-dlia-obvyniaemoi-podrobnosty-199997.html
Kharkоv Stena Pub Terrorist Attack: Prosecutors Demand 12 Years’ in
Prison for Accused Bomber – Details
The Kharkоv Stena pub terrorist attack case, Channel 5
The bomb attack took place back in 2014. The pub was a meeting place for volunteers and
activists where they collected aid for the military men and displaced people from the ATO zone.
Prosecutors demand 12 years’ imprisonment and seizure of property for the suspect in the
terrorist attack on the Stena pub, as reported by Channel 5.
The bomb attack took place in the pub on the 9th of November 2014. The pub was a meeting
place for volunteers and activists where they collected aid for the military men and displaced
people from the ATO zone.
The bomber left an explosive device next to the bar counter. 13 people were injured as a result
of the blast.
Marina Kovtun, the woman who is alleged to have activated the bomb, is charged with
committing a terrorist attack. Also, she is accused of the actions aimed at changing state
borders, sabotage, leading a terrorist group, and acquisition and storage of arms.
According to witnesses’ testimonies, the accused received training in acts of sabotage in the
Russian Federation. In a training camp in Belgorod, she was known under the call sign Z.
Later, she organised a sabotage group in Kharkоv.
From the very beginning of the trial Mrs Kovtun pleaded not guilty. Now she says the
indictment is unlawful. The court’s verdict is expected to be pronounced on the 7th of October.
Annex 216
Marina Kovtun states: “In 2014, I was abducted by people wearing black masks with machine guns. I was tortured, threatenedandblackmailed. Anyevidence obtained bytorture must be destroyed in accordance with Ukrainian and European law. I askthe Court for acquittal”.Responding to that, Vita Dubovyk, the press secretary for the Kharkоv regional prosecutor, points out: “We believe that adequate evidence has been collected and presented to the Court, thatithas beenduly examinedby theCourt,andthata verdictmayberenderednow.In the closing argument today, the lead prosecutor asked theCourt to impose a penalty of 12 years’ imprisonment, a maximum term provided by Article 258, under which Mrs Kovtun is accused”.As5.UAreported earlier, the bomb attack on the Stena pub took place in Kharkоv last November. The SBU detained 12 persons involved in the crime. In February 2015, the terrorists who committed the attack on the Stena pub were released as part of POW exchange.
Volume VIII - Annexes 177-216