Separate opinion of Judge Nolte

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164-20230330-JUD-01-10-EN
Parent Document Number
164-20230330-JUD-01-00-EN
Date of the Document
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Bilingual Document File

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE NOLTE
1. I wish to explain why I voted against the finding that the United States has violated Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity (I), and to make some observations relating to the jurisdictional objection concerning Bank Markazi (II).
I. Article III, paragraph 1
2. In my view, the United States has not violated Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity.
3. According to the Court’s 2019 Judgment on preliminary objections, “an entity may only be characterized as a ‘company’ within the meaning of the Treaty if it has its own legal personality, conferred on it by the law of the State where it was created, which establishes its legal status”1. By using the phrase “its own legal personality”, the Court did not address, much less resolve, the question whether Article III, paragraph 1, merely protects the legal existence of a company or whether it also protects the separate legal personality of companies which possess such a personality by virtue of the domestic law under which they were established. This phrase does not imply, contrary to what paragraph 136 of the present Judgment affirms, that “[t]he recognition of a company’s own legal personality entails the legal existence of the company as an entity that is distinct from other natural or legal persons, including States”. A closer analysis in fact reveals that Article III, paragraph 1, does not protect any legally distinct (separate) existence of companies.
4. The ordinary meaning of the terms contained in the first sentence of Article III, paragraph 1, (“shall have their juridical status recognized”) is open to several interpretations. “[T]heir juridical status” may mean the juridical status of companies as under the applicable law of either High Contracting Party, as Iran claims2, but it may also mean their juridical status as entities which are legally existent, as the United States claims3. The second sentence of Article III, paragraph 1, makes clear that the “juridical status” of companies, as determined by the applicable law of the respective High Contracting Party, “does not of itself confer rights upon companies to engage in the activities for which they are organized”. Thus, if the legal status of a company allows that company to engage in certain activities in the territory of the State party under whose laws it is constituted, the implications of that legal status need not be recognized by the other party for such activities within its own territory. Here again, the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article III, paragraph 1, is open to several interpretations. The legal separateness of a company can be regarded as a defining element of its “juridical status”, but also as a right enabling the company to engage in activities for which the limited liability of its associates or shareholders is essential.
5. The context of Article III, paragraph 1, consists, first and foremost, in the fact that it precedes, and leads to, Article III, paragraph 2. That provision guarantees companies’ freedom of access to courts “both in defense and pursuit of their rights”. To be able to exercise this freedom, it is necessary, but also sufficient, for a company to be legally existent. If Article III, paragraph 1, guaranteed the separate legal personality of companies, in addition to their legal existence, it would be guaranteeing a right that is unrelated to Article III, paragraph 2. This element of the context
1 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 37, para. 87.
2 CR 2022/15, pp. 65-66, paras. 40 to 42 (Thouvenin).
3 CR 2022/17, p. 60, paras. 3 and 4 (Daley).
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suggests that Article III, paragraph 1, guarantees only the “juridical status” of companies in so far as this is necessary to safeguard the right of access to courts (Article III, paragraph 2).
6. A restrictive interpretation of Article III, paragraph 1, as guaranteeing only the legal existence of companies (mainly for the purpose of claiming their rights before courts), would not leave unprotected the separate legal personality of companies which possess such a personality. In my view, such protection rather derives from Article IV, paragraph 1 — the fair and equitable treatment clause — which is another element of the context of Article III, paragraph 1. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides protection, in an appropriately balanced way, against an unreasonable disregard of any separate legal personality as well as the possibility for States parties to engage in regulation, including reasonable forms of lifting the corporate veil. Indeed, a guarantee of legal separateness has a different character than a mere guarantee of legal existence, because it must be open to certain exceptions4. Many domestic legal orders treat the rules on legal personality and the rules on liability separately, and a variety of corporate forms establish legal personality in respect of which associates or shareholders remain fully liable for the activities of these legal persons. Different domestic legal orders also provide a variety of rules relating to the conditions under which any separate legal personality of companies may be disregarded5. Against this background, it appears counter-intuitive to assume that the parties to the Treaty of Amity envisaged that Article III, paragraph 1, would guarantee the separate legal existence of companies without at least hinting at possible exceptions. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides a more appropriate standard for the protection of the separate legal personality of companies because it leaves room for generally recognized exceptions.
7. The object and purpose of the Treaty of Amity, which is to facilitate and increase commerce between the two States, does not require that Article III, paragraph 1, be interpreted as guaranteeing the separate legal personality of companies involved in such commerce. Rather, it is sufficient that Article III, paragraph 1, ensures that companies can enter into legal obligations and invoke substantive and procedural rights before domestic courts without the need to prove that they meet requirements other than those resulting from the domestic law under which they were established. An additional protection of any separate legal status would go beyond the guarantee that companies be treated on an equal basis with other companies under the law of the State party in whose territory they operate. The object and purpose of the Treaty is rather appropriately furthered by a balanced protection of any separate legal personality under Article IV, paragraph 1.
8. The travaux préparatoires confirm a restrictive interpretation. An aide-memoire by the US Embassy in Tehran, dated 20 November 1954, according to which Article III, paragraph 1, provides for the “recognition as corporate entities”, suggests that this provision primarily serves to recognize the company as a legal entity for the purposes of asserting or defending claims in a judicial proceeding6. The United States has convincingly argued that, at the time of the adoption of the Treaty, “many countries would impose additional tests before recognizing a company’s existence within its
4 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, pp. 38-39, paras. 56-58.
5 Ibid.
6 Aide-memoire of the US Embassy in Tehran, dated 20 November 1954 (Reply of Iran, Ann. 1): “The provision is intended to confer no right upon corporations to operate in Iran, but merely to provide their recognition as corporate entities, principally in order that they may prosecute or defend their rights in courts as corporate entities.” See also Telegram No. 936 from the US Department of State to US Embassy in Tehran, dated 9 Nov. 1954 (Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, Ann. 135) (“It merely provides their recognition as corporate entities principally in order [that] they may prosecute or defend their rights in court as corporate entities. In this sense paragraph one [is] related [to] paragraph two . . . [c]orporate status should be recognized [to] assure [the] right [of] foreign corporate entities . . . [to] free access [to] courts [to] collect debts, protect patent rights, enforce contracts, etc.”); Telegram No. 1176 from the US Embassy in Tehran to the US Department of State, dated 27 November 1954, p. 1 (Memorial of Iran, Ann. 4).
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borders, such as the location of its seat, the nationality of its ownership, or the character of its aims”, and that the purpose of Article III, paragraph 1, was to abolish such requirements and to recognize the legal existence of a company that was established under the domestic law of the other party
7. The documents submitted by the United States, which have also been referred to by Iran, suggest that Article III, paragraph 1, was only intended to allow corporate entities to enter into legal rights and obligations within the territory of the other State (“legal capacity”) and to have standing before the domestic courts. There are no indications in the documents that the parties wanted to go further and to provide protection against any form of lifting of the corporate veil.
9. For all these reasons, I consider that the protection afforded by Article III, paragraph 1, is narrow, and limited to the recognition of the legal existence of a company. In contrast to Article IV, paragraph 1 (see paragraph 6 above), this provision does not include a broader guarantee of the separate legal existence of companies. Therefore, the United States has, in my view, not violated Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity. This conclusion does not, however, affect the finding of the Court, with which I agree, that the disregard by the United States of the separate legal personality of certain Iranian companies violated Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.
II. Bank Markazi
10. The Court’s determination, in the present Judgment (para. 54), that Bank Markazi is not a “company” within the meaning of the Treaty of Amity is in line with its 2019 Judgment on preliminary objections. In that Judgment, the Court explained that “an entity carrying out exclusively sovereign activities, linked to the sovereign functions of the State, cannot be characterized as a ‘company’ within the meaning of the Treaty”8. At the same time, the Court held that
“there is nothing to preclude, a priori, a single entity from engaging both in activities of a commercial nature (or, more broadly, business activities) and in sovereign activities.
In such a case, . . . the legal person in question should be regarded as a ‘company’ within the meaning of the Treaty to the extent that it is engaged in activities of a commercial nature, even if they do not constitute its principal activities.”9
Since the Court then took “the view that it does not have before it all the facts necessary to determine whether Bank Markazi was carrying out, at the relevant time, activities of the nature of those which permit characterization as a ‘company’ within the meaning of the Treaty of Amity”, it held that would be able to rule on that question “only after the Parties have presented their arguments in the following stage of the proceedings”10.
11. The Parties’ arguments during the merits phase of the proceedings were then limited to the 22 security entitlements which had been at issue in the Peterson litigation. In its submissions regarding these security entitlements, Iran did not call into question the position Bank Markazi had taken before United States courts according to which “[a]s part of its foreign currency reserves, Bank Markazi held $1.75 billion in security entitlements in foreign government and supranational bonds
7 CR 2022/20, p. 30, para. 21 (Daley).
8 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 38, para. 91.
9 Ibid., pp. 38-39, para. 92.
10 Ibid., p. 40, para. 97.
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at Banca UBAE S.p.A., an Italian bank”
11. The question of the status of Bank Markazi as a “company” under the Treaty of Amity thus turned on the question whether this specific activity, i.e. the maintaining and managing of foreign currency reserves (in the form of the 22 security entitlements) by the bank in its capacity as a central bank, is a commercial activity within the meaning of the Treaty of Amity. The Court has now responded to this question by finding that
“the operations in question were carried out within the framework and for the purposes of Bank Markazi’s principal activity, from which they are inseparable. They are merely a way of exercising its sovereign function as a central bank, and not commercial activities performed by Bank Markazi ‘alongside [its] sovereign functions’” (Judgment, para. 50).
This is the crucial element of the Court’s reasoning, with which I agree.
12. I am writing separately to express my view regarding the scope of the Court’s characterization of the activity undertaken by Bank Markazi as “a way of exercising its sovereign function as a central bank” (ibid.). Would this characterization also apply, for example, to the purchase or holding of security entitlements by a sovereign wealth fund for the purpose of accumulating and managing sovereign wealth or to the issuance of bonds by a central bank as part of a debt-financing program12? Would such activities be (inherently) “commercial” within the meaning of the Treaty or also a “way of exercising [a] sovereign function” which would exclude their commercial nature? This question is, in the first place, one of treaty interpretation.
13. To answer this question it is, in principle, necessary to interpret the treaty term “company” and to define more precisely the term “commercial activity” (which is itself derived from the treaty term “company”). However, the definition of a term not only involves a positive determination of what falls within its scope; it also involves a negative determination of what does not (per genus et differentiam)13. In the present case, the Court has found that activities which are of a sovereign nature do not fall within the scope of the term “commercial activity” and that a line must be drawn between commercial activities and activities of a sovereign nature.
14. This distinction brings to mind questions which arise in the context of the international law on sovereign immunities. Can the law on sovereign immunities be helpful in determining the scope of what constitute “commercial activities” under the Treaty and thus the line between commercial activities and activities of a sovereign nature? In paragraph 48 of the Judgment, the Court strongly suggests that this is not the case, affirming that “it is not required to ascertain whether the entity in question could claim, with regard to those activities, immunity from jurisdiction or enforcement under customary international law”, that “[t]hese are two separate questions” and that “[t]he rules on sovereign immunities and those laid down by the Treaty of Amity concerning the treatment of ‘companies’ are two distinct sets of rules”.
11 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 7-8, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, No. 14-770 (Dec. 29, 2014) (contained in Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, Ann. 117, and cited in Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, para. 9.13, fn. 243). Furthermore, Iran did not call Bank Markazi’s representation into question (ibid., para. 9.15).
12 Supreme Court of Sweden, Ascom Group S.A. et al. v. The Republic of Kazakhstan et al., Case No. Ö 3828-20, Decision of 18 November 2021, English translation available at: https://www.domstol.se/globalassets/filer/domstol/ hogstadomstolen/avgoranden/engelska-oversattningar/o-3828-20-eng.pdf/; see also U.S. Supreme Court, Republic of Argentina et al. v. Weltover, Inc. et al., 504 U.S. 607 (2d Cir. 1992), p. 614.
13 See, for example, Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), pp. 321-322, paras. 92-96, where the Court held that Article 4 of the Palermo Convention, in referring to “sovereign equality”, does not “incorporate” the rules on State immunity under customary international law.
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15. This repeated affirmation is certainly true in the most immediate sense, and the Court has thereby made clear that it does not intend to overstep the limits of its jurisdiction by adjudicating rights and obligations of the Parties under the law on sovereign immunities. However, this affirmation does not preclude the Court, in a less immediate sense, from taking “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” into account when interpreting a rule under the Treaty of Amity (see Article 31, paragraph 3 (c), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a provision which reflects customary international law)14. Such relevant rules of international law include the customary rules on sovereign immunities. While the Court has not explicitly taken them into account, I think it worth noting that the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty of Amity conforms with practice, which indicates that the holding and managing of currency reserves by central banks abroad is an activity which is generally recognized as a typical sovereign activity in which the central banks of most States regularly and reciprocally engage, and which is specifically protected by customary rules on State immunity15. The same does not seem to be true for the activities of sovereign wealth funds16.
16. In my view, this background confirms that the Court has appropriately determined, in conformity with the 2019 Judgment17, that the relevant activities of Bank Markazi are not commercial in nature and that Bank Markazi is therefore not a company within the meaning of the Treaty of Amity.
(Signed) Georg NOLTE.
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14 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003, p. 182, para. 41.
15 See Art. 21 (1) (c) of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (adopted on 2 December 2004, not yet in force), UN doc. A/RES/59/38; Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 April 2011, paras. 574-592, particularly para. 592; AIG Capital Partners, Inc. and CJSC Tema Real Estate Company v. Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/6, Judgment of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales [2005] EWHC 2239, 20 Oct. 2005, para. 58; Federal Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof), Order of 4 July 2013 – VII ZB 63/12, published in NJW-RR 2013, 1532-1535; United States Court of Appeals, NML CAPITAL, LTD v. BCRA, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011), 194-195; United States Court of Appeals, De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985), 1392-1393.
16 Supreme Court of Sweden, Ascom Group S.A. et al. v. The Republic of Kazakhstan et al., Case No. Ö 3828-20, Decision of 18 November 2021, English translation available at: https://www.domstol.se/globalassets/filer/domstol/ hogstadomstolen/avgoranden/engelska-oversattningar/o-3828-20-eng.pdf/.
17 See Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), pp. 38-39, para. 92.

Bilingual Content

226
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE NOLTE
1. I wish to explain why I voted against the finding that the United States
has violated Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity (I), and to make
some observations relating to the jurisdictional objection concerning Bank
Markazi (II).
I. Article III, Paragraph 1
2. In my view, the United States has not violated Article III, paragraph 1,
of the Treaty of Amity.
3. According to the Court’s 2019 Judgment on preliminary objections, “an
entity may only be characterized as a ‘company’ within the meaning of the
Treaty if it has its own legal personality, conferred on it by the law of the
State where it was created, which establishes its legal status”1. By using the
phrase “its own legal personality”, the Court did not address, much less
resolve, the question whether Article III, paragraph 1, merely protects the
legal existence of a company or whether it also protects the separate legal
personality of companies which possess such a personality by virtue of the
domestic law under which they were established. This phrase does not imply,
contrary to what paragraph 136 of the present Judgment affirms, that “[t]he
recognition of a company’s own legal personality entails the legal existence
of the company as an entity that is distinct from other natural or legal persons,
including States”. A closer analysis in fact reveals that Article III,
paragraph 1, does not protect any legally distinct (separate) existence of
companies.
4. The ordinary meaning of the terms contained in the first sentence of
Article III, paragraph 1, (“shall have their juridical status recognized”) is
open to several interpretations. “[T]heir juridical status” may mean the
juridical status of companies as under the applicable law of either High Contracting
Party, as Iran claims2, but it may also mean their juridical status as
entities which are legally existent, as the United States claims3. The second
sentence of Article III, paragraph 1, makes clear that the “juridical status” of
companies, as determined by the applicable law of the respective High Con-
1 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 37, para. 87.
2 CR 2022/15, pp. 65-66, paras. 40 to 42 (Thouvenin).
3 CR 2022/17, p. 60, paras. 3 and 4 (Daley).
226
OPINION INDIVIDUELLE DE M. LE JUGE NOLTE
[Traduction]
1. Je tiens à expliquer pourquoi j’ai voté contre la conclusion selon laquelle
les États-Unis ont violé le paragraphe 1 de l’article III du traité d’amitié (I)
et à formuler quelques observations sur l’exception d’incompétence concernant
la banque Markazi (II).
I. Paragraphe 1 de l’article III
2. Je suis d’avis que les États-Unis n’ont pas violé le paragraphe 1 de l’article
III du traité d’amitié.
3. Aux termes de l’arrêt que la Cour a rendu en 2019 sur les exceptions préliminaires,
« une entité ne peut être qualifiée de “société” au sens du traité
que si elle possède une personnalité juridique propre que lui confère le droit
de l’État où elle a été créée, lequel détermine son statut juridique »1. En
employant l’expression « une personnalité juridique propre », la Cour n’a pas
traité, ni a fortiori réglé, la question de savoir si le paragraphe 1 de l’article
III protégeait seulement l’existence juridique d’une société ou s’il
protégeait également la personnalité juridique distincte des sociétés qui possèdent
une telle personnalité selon le droit interne sous le régime duquel
elles ont été constituées. Contrairement à ce qui est indiqué au paragraphe
136 du présent arrêt, cette expression n’implique pas que « [l]a
reconnaissance de la personnalité juridique propre d’une société suppose
l’existence juridique de cette société en tant qu’entité distincte d’autres personnes
physiques ou morales, dont les États ». Un examen plus attentif révèle
en fait que le paragraphe 1 de l’article III ne garantit nullement aux sociétés
une existence juridiquement distincte (séparée).
4. Le sens ordinaire des termes employés dans la première phrase du paragraphe
1 de l’article III (« Le statut juridique des sociétés … sera reconnu »)
se prête à plusieurs interprétations. « Le statut juridique des sociétés » peut
en effet signifier leur statut juridique fixé par le droit applicable de l’une
ou l’autre des Hautes Parties contractantes, comme le soutenait l’Iran2, mais
il peut aussi signifier leur statut juridique en tant que personnes morales
ayant une existence juridique, comme le soutenaient les États-Unis3. La
deuxième phrase du paragraphe 1 de l’article III indique clairement que le
1 Certains actifs iraniens (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (I), p. 37, par. 87.
2 CR 2022/15, p. 65-66, par. 40-42 (Thouvenin).
3 CR 2022/17, p. 60, par. 3-4 (Daley).
227 certain iranian assets (sep. op. nolte)
tracting Party, “does not of itself confer rights upon companies to engage in
the activities for which they are organized”. Thus, if the legal status of a
company allows that company to engage in certain activities in the territory
of the State party under whose laws it is constituted, the implications of that
legal status need not be recognized by the other party for such activities
within its own territory. Here again, the ordinary meaning of the terms of
Article III, paragraph 1, is open to several interpretations. The legal separateness
of a company can be regarded as a defining element of its “juridical
status”, but also as a right enabling the company to engage in activities for
which the limited liability of its associates or shareholders is essential.
5. The context of Article III, paragraph 1, consists, first and foremost, in
the fact that it precedes, and leads to, Article III, paragraph 2. That provision
guarantees companies’ freedom of access to courts “both in defense and
pursuit of their rights”. To be able to exercise this freedom, it is necessary,
but also sufficient, for a company to be legally existent. If Article III, paragraph
1, guaranteed the separate legal personality of companies, in addition
to their legal existence, it would be guaranteeing a right that is unrelated to
Article III, paragraph 2. This element of the context suggests that Article
III, paragraph 1, guarantees only the “juridical status” of companies in
so far as this is necessary to safeguard the right of access to courts (Art. III,
para. 2).
6. A restrictive interpretation of Article III, paragraph 1, as guaranteeing
only the legal existence of companies (mainly for the purpose of claiming
their rights before courts), would not leave unprotected the separate legal
personality of companies which possess such a personality. In my view, such
protection rather derives from Article IV, paragraph 1 — the fair and
equitable treatment clause — which is another element of the context of
Article III, paragraph 1. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides protection, in an
appropriately balanced way, against an unreasonable disregard of any
separate legal personality as well as the possibility for States parties to
engage in regulation, including reasonable forms of lifting the corporate
veil. Indeed, a guarantee of legal separateness has a different character than
a mere guarantee of legal existence, because it must be open to certain
exceptions4. Many domestic legal orders treat the rules on legal personality
and the rules on liability separately, and a variety of corporate forms
establish legal personality in respect of which associates or shareholders
remain fully liable for the activities of these legal persons. Different domestic
legal orders also provide a variety of rules relating to the conditions under
4 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962)
(Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, pp. 38-39, paras. 56-58.
227
certains actifs iraniens (op. ind. nolte)
« statut juridique » des sociétés, tel qu’il est déterminé par le droit applicable
de la Haute Partie contractante où elles ont été constituées, « ne donnera pas
aux sociétés le droit de se livrer à l’activité en vue de laquelle elles sont organisées
». Par conséquent, si le statut juridique d’une société permet à celle-ci
d’exercer certaines activités sur le territoire de l’État partie sous le régime
des lois duquel elle est constituée, l’autre État partie n’est pas tenu de reconnaître
les implications de ce statut juridique en ce qui concerne l’exercice
desdites activités sur son propre territoire. Là encore, le sens ordinaire des
termes du paragraphe 1 de l’article III se prête à plusieurs interprétations. Le
caractère juridiquement distinct d’une société peut être considéré comme un
élément constitutif de son « statut juridique », mais aussi comme un droit lui
permettant d’exercer des activités pour lesquelles il est essentiel que la responsabilité
de ses associés ou de ses actionnaires soit limitée.
5. Le contexte du paragraphe 1 de l’article III consiste, d’abord et avant
tout, dans le fait qu’il précède et introduit le paragraphe 2 du même article.
Cette disposition garantit aux sociétés libre accès aux tribunaux « tant pour
faire valoir que pour défendre leurs droits ». Pour qu’une société soit en
mesure d’exercer cette liberté, il est nécessaire, mais il est aussi suffisant,
qu’elle ait une existence juridique. Si le paragraphe 1 de l’article III garantissait
aux sociétés une personnalité juridique distincte en plus de leur existence
juridique, il leur garantirait un droit qui est sans rapport avec le paragraphe 2
du même article. Cet élément de contexte donne à penser que le paragraphe 1
de l’article III ne garantit le « statut juridique » des sociétés que dans la
mesure où cela est nécessaire pour préserver leur droit d’accès aux tribunaux
(paragraphe 2 de l’article III).
6. Une interprétation restrictive du paragraphe 1 de l’article III selon
laquelle celui-ci ne garantirait que l’existence juridique des sociétés (principalement
afin qu’elles puissent faire valoir leurs droits devant les tribunaux)
ne laisserait pas sans protection la personnalité juridique distincte des
sociétés qui possèdent une telle personnalité. À mon sens, cette protection
découle plutôt du paragraphe 1 de l’article IV — la clause du traitement juste
et équitable
—, qui est un autre élément du contexte dans lequel s’inscrit le
paragraphe 1 de l’article III. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article IV offre, avec un
juste sens de l’équilibre, à la fois une protection contre une méconnaissance
déraisonnable de toute personnalité juridique distincte et la possibilité pour
les États parties d’imposer certaines règles, y compris certaines formes
raisonnables de levée du voile social. De fait, il existe une différence entre
la garantie d’une personnalité juridique distincte et la garantie d’une simple
existence juridique, la première devant ménager la possibilité de certaines
exceptions4. De nombreux ordres juridiques internes traitent séparément
les règles applicables à la personnalité juridique et celles applicables à
la responsabilité,
et un certain nombre de formes sociales prévoient une
4 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (nouvelle requête : 1962)
(Belgique c. Espagne), deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970, p. 38-39, par. 56-58.
228 certain iranian assets (sep. op. nolte)
which any separate legal personality of companies may be disregarded5.
Against this background, it appears counter-intuitive to assume that the
parties to the Treaty of Amity envisaged that Article III, paragraph 1, would
guarantee the separate legal existence of companies without at least hinting
at possible exceptions. Article IV, paragraph 1, provides a more appropriate
standard for the protection of the separate legal personality of companies
because it leaves room for generally recognized exceptions.
7. The object and purpose of the Treaty of Amity, which is to facilitate
and increase commerce between the two States, does not require that Article
III, paragraph 1, be interpreted as guaranteeing the separate legal
personality of companies involved in such commerce. Rather, it is sufficient
that Article
III, paragraph 1, ensures that companies can enter into legal
obligations and invoke substantive and procedural rights before domestic
courts without the need to prove that they meet requirements other than
those resulting from the domestic law under which they were established.
An additional protection of any separate legal status would go beyond the
guarantee that companies be treated on an equal basis with other companies
under the law of the State party in whose territory they operate. The object
and purpose of the Treaty is rather appropriately furthered by a balanced
protection of any separate legal personality under Article IV, paragraph 1.
8. The travaux préparatoires c onfirm a restrictive interpretation. An
aide-memoire by the United States Embassy in Tehran, dated 20 November
1954, according to which Article III, paragraph 1, provides for the “recognition
as corporate entities”, suggests that this provision primarily serves to
recognize the company as a legal entity for the purposes of asserting or
defending claims in a judicial proceeding6. The United States has convincingly
argued that, at the time of the adoption of the Treaty, “many countries
would impose additional tests before recognizing a company’s existence
5 Ibid.
6 Aide-memoire of the United States Embassy in Tehran, dated 20 November 1954 (Reply
of Iran, Ann. 1): “The provision is intended to confer no right upon corporations to operate
in Iran, but merely to provide their recognition as corporate entities, principally in order that
they may prosecute or defend their rights in courts as corporate entities.” See also Telegram
No. 936 from the United States Department of State to United States Embassy in Tehran,
dated 9 November 1954 (Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, Ann. 135)
(“It merely provides their recognition as corporate entities principally in order [that] they
may prosecute or defend their rights in court as corporate entities. In this sense paragraph
one [is] related [to] paragraph two . . . [c]orporate status should be recognized [to] assure [the]
right [of] foreign corporate entities . . . [to] free access [to] courts [to] collect debts, protect
patent rights, enforce contracts, etc.”); Telegram No. 1176 from the United States Embassy
certains actifs iraniens (op. ind. nolte) 228
personnalité juridique dans le cadre de laquelle la responsabilité des
associés et actionnaires est pleinement engagée dans les activités des sociétés
considérées. Différents ordres juridiques internes prévoient également
un certain nombre de règles concernant les conditions auxquelles il peut
être fait exception à la personnalité juridique distincte des sociétés5. Compte
tenu de ce contexte, il semble contre-intuitif de présumer que les parties au
traité d’amitié envisageaient que le paragraphe 1 de l’article III garantirait
l’existence juridique distincte des sociétés sans donner le moindre signe
que des exceptions seraient possibles. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article IV constitue
un moyen plus approprié de protéger la personnalité juridique distincte
des sociétés puisqu’il ménage la possibilité d’exceptions généralement
reconnues.
7. L’objet et le but du traité d’amitié, qui sont de faciliter et d’accroître le
commerce entre les deux États, n’imposent pas d’interpréter le paragraphe 1
de l’article III comme garantissant la personnalité juridique distincte des
sociétés qui participent à ce commerce. Il suffit que cette disposition garantisse
aux sociétés la faculté de contracter des obligations juridiques et de
faire valoir leurs droits substantiels et procéduraux devant les tribunaux
internes sans avoir à prouver qu’elles satisfont à d’autres conditions que
celles qui découlent du droit interne sous le régime duquel elles ont été
constituées. Toute protection supplémentaire d’un éventuel statut juridique
distinct irait au-delà de la garantie voulant que les sociétés soient traitées sur
un pied d’égalité avec les autres sociétés sous le régime des lois de l’État partie
sur le territoire duquel elles exercent leur activité. L’objet et le but du
traité sont convenablement servis par la protection équilibrée d’une éventuelle
personnalité distincte assurée par le paragraphe 1 de l’article IV.
8. Les travaux préparatoires confirment cette interprétation restrictive.
Un aide-mémoire de l’ambassade des États-Unis à Téhéran en date du
20 novembre 1954, où il est dit que le paragraphe 1 de l’article III est destiné
« simplement à faire en sorte qu[e les sociétés] soient reconnues en tant
qu’entités commerciales », donne à penser que cette disposition vise principalement
à reconnaître les sociétés comme des entités juridiques pour leur
permettre de faire valoir ou défendre leurs droits devant les tribunaux judiciaires6.
Les États-Unis ont soutenu, de manière convaincante, que, à
5 Ibid.
6 Aide-mémoire de l’ambassade des États-Unis à Téhéran, en date du 20 novembre 1954
(réplique de l’Iran, annexe 1) : « Cette disposition ne vise pas à conférer aux sociétés quelque
droit de mener des activités en Iran, mais simplement à faire en sorte qu’elles soient reconnues
en tant qu’entités commerciales, principalement pour qu’elles puissent faire valoir ou défendre
leurs droits en justice en tant qu’entités commerciales. » Voir aussi le télégramme no 936 en
date du 9 novembre 1954 adressé à l’ambassade des États-Unis à Téhéran par le département
d’État des États-Unis (contre-mémoire des États-Unis d’Amérique, annexe 135) (le paragraphe
en cause « ne fait que garantir leur reconnaissance en tant qu’entités commerciales, principalement
pour qu’elles puissent faire valoir ou défendre leurs droits en justice en tant que telles.
En ce sens, le paragraphe 1 est lié au paragraphe 2 … Le statut d’entité commerciale doit être
reconnu afin de garantir le droit des entités commerciales étrangères … d’avoir libre accès aux
229 certain iranian assets (sep. op. nolte)
within its borders, such as the location of its seat, the nationality of its ownership,
or the character of its aims”, and that the purpose of Article III,
paragraph 1, was to abolish such requirements and to recognize the legal
existence of a company that was established under the domestic law of the
other party7. The documents submitted by the United States, which have
also been referred to by Iran, suggest that Article III, paragraph 1, was only
intended to allow corporate entities to enter into legal rights and obligations
within the territory of the other State (“legal capacity”) and to have standing
before the domestic courts. There are no indications in the documents that
the parties wanted to go further and to provide protection against any form
of lifting of the corporate veil.
9. For all these reasons, I consider that the protection afforded by Article
III, paragraph 1, is narrow, and limited to the recognition of the legal
existence of a company. In contrast to Article IV, paragraph 1 (see paragraph
6 above), this provision does not include a broader guarantee of the
separate legal existence of companies. Therefore, the United States has, in
my view, not violated Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Amity. This
conclusion does not, however, affect the finding of the Court, with which I
agree, that the disregard by the United States of the separate legal personality
of certain Iranian companies violated Article IV, paragraph 1, of the
Treaty.
II. Bank Markazi
10. The Court’s determination, in the present Judgment (para. 54), that
Bank Markazi is not a “company” within the meaning of the Treaty of Amity
is in line with its 2019 Judgment on preliminary objections. In that Judgment,
the Court explained that “an entity carrying out exclusively sovereign
activities, linked to the sovereign functions of the State, cannot be characterized
as a ‘company’ within the meaning of the Treaty”8. At the same time,
the Court held that
“there is nothing to preclude, a priori, a single entity from engaging
both in activities of a commercial nature (or, more broadly, business
activities) and in sovereign activities.
in Tehran to the United States Department of State, dated 27 November 1954, p. 1 (Memorial
of Iran, Ann. 4).
7 CR 2022/20, p. 30, para. 21 (Daley).
8 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), p. 38, para. 91.
certains actifs iraniens (op. ind. nolte) 229
l’époque de l’adoption du traité, « de nombreux pays imposaient des critères
supplémentaires avant de reconnaître l’existence d’une société dans [leurs]
frontières, tels que le lieu de son siège, la nationalité de son actionnariat ou
encore la nature de ses objectifs », et que le paragraphe 1 de l’article III
visait à éliminer ces critères et à reconnaître l’existence juridique d’une
société constituée sous le régime des lois de l’autre partie7. Les documents
produits par les États-Unis, auxquels l’Iran lui-même a renvoyé, donnent à
penser que le paragraphe 1 de l’article III avait seulement pour objet de permettre
aux entités commerciales d’être titulaires de droits et d’obligations
juridiques sur le territoire de l’autre État (« capacité juridique ») et d’ester
devant les tribunaux de cet État. Rien dans ces documents n’indique que les
parties aient entendu aller plus loin et offrir une protection contre toute
forme de levée du voile social.
9. Pour toutes ces raisons, je considère que la protection qu’accorde le
paragraphe 1 de l’article III est une protection étroite, limitée à la reconnaissance
de l’existence juridique d’une société. Contrairement au paragraphe 1
de l’article IV (voir le paragraphe 6 ci-dessus), cette disposition n’inclut pas
une garantie plus large de l’existence juridique distincte des sociétés. Il
s’ensuit
que, selon moi, les États-Unis n’ont pas violé le paragraphe 1
de l’article
III du traité d’amitié. Cette conviction n’a cependant pas d’incidence
sur la conclusion de la Cour, à laquelle je souscris, suivant laquelle la
méconnaissance par les États-Unis de la personnalité juridique distincte de
certaines sociétés iraniennes constitue une violation du paragraphe 1 de
l’article
IV du traité.
II. Banque Markazi
10. La conclusion à laquelle est parvenue la Cour au paragraphe 54 du
présent arrêt, à savoir que la banque Markazi n’est pas une « société » au sens
du traité d’amitié, s’inscrit dans la continuité de son arrêt de 2019 sur les
exceptions préliminaires. Dans cet arrêt, la Cour avait indiqué qu’« une entité
qui exercerait exclusivement des activités de souveraineté, liées aux fonctions
régaliennes de l’État, ne saurait se voir attribuer la qualification de
“société” au sens du traité »8, tout en précisant que
« rien ne permet[tait] d’exclure a priori qu’une même entité exerce à la
fois des activités de nature commerciale (ou, plus largement, des activités
d’affaires) et des activités souveraines.
tribunaux pour recouvrer des créances, protéger des droits attachés à des brevets, faire exécuter
des contrats, etc. ») ; télégramme no 1176 en date du 27 novembre 1954 adressé au
département d’État des États-Unis par l’ambassade des États-Unis à Téhéran, p. 1 (mémoire de
l’Iran, annexe 4).
7 CR 2022/20, p. 30, par. 21 (Daley).
8 Certains actifs iraniens (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2019 (I), p. 38, par. 91.
230 certain iranian assets (sep. op. nolte)
In such a case, . . . the legal person in question should be regarded as
a ‘company’ within the meaning of the Treaty to the extent that it is
engaged in activities of a commercial nature, even if they do not constitute
its principal activities.”9
Since the Court then took “the view that it does not have before it all the facts
necessary to determine whether Bank Markazi was carrying out, at the
relevant time, activities of the nature of those which permit characterization
as a ‘company’ within the meaning of the Treaty of Amity”, it held that it
would be able to rule on that question “only after the Parties have presented
their arguments in the following stage of the proceedings”10.
11. The Parties’ arguments during the merits phase of the proceedings
were then limited to the 22 security entitlements which had been at issue in
the Peterson litigation. In its submissions regarding these security entitlements,
Iran did not call into question the position Bank Markazi had taken
before United States courts according to which “[a]s part of its foreign
currency reserves, Bank Markazi held $1.75 billion in security entitlements
in foreign government and supranational bonds at Banca UBAE S.p.A.,
an Italian bank”11. The question of the status of Bank Markazi as a “company”
under the Treaty of Amity thus turned on the question whether this
specific activity, i.e. the maintaining and managing of foreign currency
reserves (in the form of the 22 security entitlements) by the bank in its capacity
as a central bank, is a commercial activity within the meaning of the
Treaty of Amity. The Court has now responded to this question by finding
that
“the operations in question were carried out within the framework
and for the purposes of Bank Markazi’s principal activity, from which
they are inseparable. They are merely a way of exercising its sovereign
function as a central bank, and not commercial activities performed by
Bank Markazi ‘alongside [its] sovereign functions’” (Judgment,
para. 50).
This is the crucial element of the Court’s reasoning, with which I agree.
12. I am writing separately to express my view regarding the scope of the
Court’s characterization of the activity undertaken by Bank Markazi as “a
way of exercising its sovereign function as a central bank” (Judgment,
para. 50). Would this characterization also apply, for example, to the purchase
or holding of security entitlements by a sovereign wealth fund for the
purpose of accumulating and managing sovereign wealth or to the issuance
9 Ibid., pp. 38-39, para. 92.
10 Ibid., p. 40, para. 97.
11 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 7-8, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, No. 14-770 (29 December
2014) (contained in Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, Annex 117, and cited
in Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, para. 9.13, note 243). Furthermore,
Iran did not call Bank Markazi’s representation into question (ibid., para. 9.15).
certains actifs iraniens (op. ind. nolte) 230
En pareil cas, … la personne morale dont il s’agit devrait être regardée
comme une “société” au sens du traité dans la mesure où elle exerce
des activités de nature commerciale, même si ce n’est pas à titre
principal. »9
La Cour ayant alors « estim[é] qu’elle ne dispos[ait] pas de tous les éléments
nécessaires pour déterminer si la banque Markazi exerçait, à l’époque pertinente,
des activités de la nature de celles qui permettent de caractériser une
“société” au sens du traité d’amitié », elle avait décidé qu’elle ne pourrait
statuer sur la question « qu’après que les Parties aur[aie]nt présenté leurs
arguments dans la phase suivante de la procédure »10.
11. Pendant la phase de l’examen au fond, les Parties ont limité leurs arguments
aux 22 titres de créance qui étaient en cause dans l’affaire Peterson.
À cet égard, l’Iran n’a pas remis en question la thèse qu’avait soutenue la
banque Markazi devant les juridictions américaines selon laquelle, « [d]ans
le cadre de ses réserves de change, la banque Markazi détenait auprès de
Banca UBAE S.p.A., une banque italienne, 1,75 milliard de dollars en droits
sur des obligations d’États étrangers et supranationales »11. La détermination
du statut de la banque Markazi en tant que « société » au sens du traité
d’amitié dépendait donc de la question de savoir si cette activité spécifique
qu’étaient la détention et la gestion de réserves de change (sous la forme des
22 titres de créance) par la banque en sa qualité de banque centrale était
une activité commerciale au sens du traité d’amitié. La Cour a maintenant
répondu à cette question :
« les opérations en cause ont été réalisées dans le cadre et pour les
besoins de l’activité principale de la banque Markazi, dont elles ne sont
pas séparables. Elles ne constituent qu’une modalité d’exercice de sa
fonction souveraine en tant que banque centrale, et non des activités
commerciales que la banque Markazi aurait exercées “à côté de [ses]
fonctions souveraines” » (arrêt, par. 50).
C’est là le coeur du raisonnement de la Cour, auquel je souscris.
12. J’exposerai également mes vues concernant la portée de la formule
par laquelle la Cour a qualifié l’activité exercée par la banque Markazi, à
savoir « une modalité d’exercice de sa fonction souveraine en tant que banque
centrale » (arrêt, par. 50). Cette qualification s’appliquerait-elle aussi, par
exemple, à l’achat ou à la possession de titres de créance par un fonds souverain
aux fins d’accumuler et de gérer des investissements souverains, ou
9 Ibid., p. 38-39, par. 92.
10 Ibid., p. 40, par. 97.
11 Demande d’ordonnance de certiorari, p. 7-8 de l’original, Bank Markazi v. Peterson,
no 14-770, 29 décembre 2014 (contenue à l’annexe 117 du contre-mémoire des États-Unis et
mentionnée à la note 243 du paragraphe 9.13 du contre-mémoire). De plus, l’Iran n’a pas
contesté la thèse soutenue par la banque Markazi (ibid., par. 9.15).
231 certain iranian assets (sep. op. nolte)
of bonds by a central bank as part of a debt-financing program12? Would
such activities be (inherently) “commercial” within the meaning of the
Treaty or also a “way of exercising [a] sovereign function” which would
exclude their commercial nature? This question is, in the first place, one of
treaty interpretation.
13. To answer this question it is, in principle, necessary to interpret the
treaty term “company” and to define more precisely the term “commercial
activity” (which is itself derived from the treaty term “company”). However,
the definition of a term not only involves a positive determination of what
falls within its scope; it also involves a negative determination of what does
not (per genus et differentiam)13. In the present case, the Court has found
that activities which are of a sovereign nature do not fall within the scope of
the term “commercial activity” and that a line must be drawn between commercial
activities and activities of a sovereign nature.
14. This distinction brings to mind questions which arise in the context of
the international law on sovereign immunities. Can the law on sovereign
immunities be helpful in determining the scope of what constitutes “commercial
activities” under the Treaty and thus the line between commercial
activities and activities of a sovereign nature? In paragraph 48 of the Judgment,
the Court strongly suggests that this is not the case, affirming that “it
is not required to ascertain whether the entity in question could claim, with
regard to those activities, immunity from jurisdiction or enforcement under
customary international law”, that “[t]hese are two separate questions” and
that “[t]he rules on sovereign immunities and those laid down by the Treaty
of Amity concerning the treatment of ‘companies’ are two distinct sets of
rules”.
15. This repeated affirmation is certainly true in the most immediate
sense, and the Court has thereby made clear that it does not intend to overstep
the limits of its jurisdiction by adjudicating rights and obligations of the
Parties under the law on sovereign immunities. However, this affirmation
does not preclude the Court, in a less immediate sense, from taking “any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties” into account when interpreting a rule under the Treaty of Amity (see
Article 31, paragraph 3 (c), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
12 Supreme Court of Sweden, Ascom Group S.A. et al. v. The Republic of Kazakhstan
et al., Case No. Ö 3828-20, Decision of 18 November 2021, English translation available at:
https://www.domstol.se/globalassets/filer/domstol/hogstadomstolen/avgoranden/engelskaoversattningar/
o-3828-20-eng.pdf/; see also United States Supreme Court, Republic of
Argentina et al. v. Weltover, Inc. et al., 504 U.S. 607 (2d Cir. 1992), p. 614.
13 See, for example, Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018 (I), pp. 321-322, paras. 92-96, where
the Court held that Article 4 of the Palermo Convention, in referring to “sovereign equality”,
does not “incorporate” the rules on State immunity under customary international law.
certains actifs iraniens (op. ind. nolte) 231
encore à l’émission d’obligations par une banque centrale dans le cadre d’un
programme de financement par emprunt12 ? De telles activités seraient-elles
(intrinsèquement) « commerciales » au sens du traité ou seraient-elles aussi
« une modalité d’exercice d’[une] fonction souveraine » qui exclurait qu’elles
fussent de nature commerciale ? Cette question est d’abord une question
d’interprétation du traité.
13. Pour répondre à cette question, il convient, en principe, d’interpréter le
terme « société » tel qu’employé dans le traité et de définir plus précisément
l’expression « activité commerciale » (elle-même dérivée de ce terme). Or, la
définition d’un terme ou d’une expression implique non seulement de déterminer
positivement ce qui en relève, mais aussi de déterminer négativement
ce qui n’en relève pas (per genus et differentiam)13. En l’espèce, la Cour a
conclu que les activités de nature souveraine n’entraient pas dans la définition
de l’expression « activité commerciale » et qu’une ligne devait être
tracée entre les activités commerciales et les activités de nature souveraine.
14. Cette distinction rappelle certaines questions qui se posent dans le
contexte du droit international des immunités souveraines. Ce droit pourrait-
il aider à déterminer le périmètre de ce qui constitue des « activités
commerciales » au sens du traité et, partant, la ligne de partage entre les activités
commerciales et les activités de nature souveraine ? Au paragraphe 48
de son arrêt, la Cour laisse fortement entendre que tel n’est pas le cas, affirmant
qu’« elle n’est pas appelée à rechercher si l’entité en cause pouvait
revendiquer, au titre desdites activités, une immunité de juridiction ou d’exécution
en vertu du droit international coutumier », que « [c]es deux questions
sont séparées » et que « [l]es règles relatives aux immunités souveraines et
celles que définit le traité d’amitié en ce qui concerne le traitement applicable
aux “sociétés” constituent deux corps de règles distincts ».
15. Cette affirmation répétée est certainement juste dans son sens le plus
immédiat, et avec elle, la Cour a clairement fait savoir qu’elle n’avait pas
l’intention de dépasser les limites de sa compétence en statuant sur les droits
et obligations des Parties selon le droit des immunités souveraines. Dans un
sens moins immédiat, cependant, elle ne fait pas obstacle à ce que la Cour
puisse tenir compte, lorsqu’elle interprète une règle découlant du titre du
traité d’amitié, « [d]e toute règle pertinente de droit international applicable
dans les relations entre les parties » (voir l’alinéa c) du paragraphe 3 de
12 Cour suprême de Suède, Ascom Group S.A. et al. v. The Republic of Kazakhstan et al., affaire
no Ö 3828-20, arrêt du 18 novembre 2021, traduction en anglais accessible à l’adresse suivante :
https://www.domstol.se/globalassets/filer/domstol/hogstadomstolen/avgoranden/engelska
-oversattningar/o-3828-20-eng.pdf/ ; voir également Cour suprême des États-Unis, Republic of
Argentina et al. v. Weltover, Inc. et al., 504 U.S. 607 (deuxième circuit), 1992, p. 614.
13 Voir, par exemple, Immunités et procédures pénales (Guinée équatoriale c. France),
exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2018 (I), p. 321-322, par. 92-96, où la Cour
conclut que l’article 4 de la convention de Palerme, lorsqu’il évoque l’« égalité souveraine
… des États », « n’incorpore pas » les règles du droit international coutumier relatives aux
immunités de l’État.
232 certain iranian assets (sep. op. nolte)
a provision which reflects customary international law)14. Such relevant rules
of international law include the customary rules on sovereign immunities.
While the Court has not explicitly taken them into account, I think it worth
noting that the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty of Amity conforms with
practice, which indicates that the holding and managing of currency reserves
by central banks abroad is an activity which is generally recognized as a typical
sovereign activity in which the central banks of most States regularly
and reciprocally engage, and which is specifically protected by customary
rules on State immunity15. The same does not seem to be true for the activities
of sovereign wealth funds16.
16. In my view, this background confirms that the Court has appropriately
determined, in conformity with the 2019 Judgment17, that the relevant activities
of Bank Markazi are not commercial in nature and that Bank Markazi
is therefore not a company within the meaning of the Treaty of Amity.
(Signed) Georg Nolte.
14 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2003, p. 182, para. 41.
15 See Article 21 (1) (c) of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Property (adopted on 2 December 2004, not yet in force), UN doc. A/RES/
59/38; Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v.
The Government of Mongolia, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 28 April
2011, paras. 574-592, particularly paragraph 592; AIG Capital Partners, Inc. and CJSC Tema
Real Estate Company v. The Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/6, Judgment
of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales [2005] EWHC 2239, 20 October 2005,
para. 58; Federal Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof), Order of 4 July 2013 —
VII ZB 63/12, published in NJW-RR 2013, pp. 1532-1535; United States Court of Appeals,
NML CAPITAL, LTD v. BCRA, 652 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2011), pp. 194-195; United States Court
of Appeals, De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985),
pp. 1392-1393.
16 Supreme Court of Sweden, Ascom Group S.A. et al. v. The Republic of Kazakhstan et al.,
Case No. Ö 3828-20, Decision of 18 November 2021, English translation available at:
https://www.domstol.se/globalassets/filer/domstol/hogstadomstolen/avgoranden/engelskaoversattningar/
o-3828-20-eng.pdf/.
17 Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2019 (I), pp. 38-39, para. 92.
certains actifs iraniens (op. ind. nolte) 232
l’article 31 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, qui est une
disposition reflétant le droit international coutumier)14. Or, les règles coutumières
sur les immunités souveraines font partie desdites règles pertinentes
de droit international. Bien que la Cour n’ait pas expressément tenu compte
de ces règles, il me semble important de faire observer que son interprétation
du traité d’amitié est conforme à la pratique, qui indique que la détention et
la gestion à l’étranger de réserves de devises constituent une activité généralement
reconnue comme une activité souveraine classique, à laquelle les
banques centrales de la plupart des États se livrent régulièrement et réciproquement,
et qui est spécifiquement protégée par les règles coutumières
relatives à l’immunité de l’État15. Il ne semble pas que ce soit le cas pour les
activités des fonds souverains16.
16. Selon moi, ce contexte confirme que c’est à juste titre que la Cour a
conclu, conformément à son arrêt de 201917, que les activités pertinentes de
la banque Markazi n’étaient pas de nature commerciale et que, partant,
celle-ci n’était pas une société au sens du traité d’amitié.
(Signé) Georg Nolte.
14 Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. États-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2003, p. 182, par. 41.
15 Voir l’alinéa c) du paragraphe 1 de l’article 21 de la convention des Nations Unies sur les
immunités juridictionnelles des États et de leurs biens (adoptée le 2 décembre 2004 mais pas
encore entrée en vigueur), Nations Unies, doc. A/RES/59/38 ; Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden
East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v. The Government of Mongolia, CNUDCI,
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Document file FR
Document Long Title

Separate opinion of Judge Nolte

Order
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