DECLARATION OF JUDGE XUE 1. With regard to Colombia’s third counter-claim relating to the artisanal fishing rights of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago, I agree with the Court’s conclusion that Colombia fails to prove the existence of its traditional practice of artisanal fishing that extends to the area that falls within Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone. In regard to traditional or historic fishing rights, however, I wish to make a few observations in this declaration. 2. First of all, traditional fishing rights are recognized and protected under customary international law. Under the law of the sea, traditional fishing generally refers to artisanal fishing that may have existed for centuries. Although there may be improvements in the techniques of navigation and communication or in the techniques of fishing, traditional fishing is distinct from habitual fishing and traditional industrial fishing. Traditional fishing rights are acquired from a long process of historical consolidation of socio-economic conditions and conduct, which reflects certain cultural patterns, local customs and traditions. Given their nature, substance and origin, the existence of traditional fishing rights must be examined and determined on a case-by-case basis. 3. At the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, when the breadth of the territorial sea was being considered, fishery limits was one of the issues raised by States, as expansion of the breadth of the territorial sea from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles would inevitably have a bearing on the fishing interests of States in coastal waters. It was realized, nevertheless, that there were diverse situations in different parts of the world and that it was impossible to take account of every special case (Eighth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 30 March 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.8, paras. 6-12 (Brazil); Fifteenth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 5 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.15, para. 12 (New Zealand); Nineteenth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 7 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.19, paras. 34-36 (Lebanon)). Meanwhile the idea to set up an exclusive fishing zone, separate but adjacent to the territorial sea, to give the coastal State certain rights in respect of the exploitation of fishery resources in the zone so as to satisfy the growing needs of its people was gaining wide recognition, particularly among the developing countries (Eighth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 30 March, 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.8, paras. 34 and 39-40 (Yugoslavia); Fifteenth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 5 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.15, para. 24 (Ceylon); Nineteenth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 7 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.19, para. 7 (Tunisia)). 4. At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, States held divergent views as to whether a coastal State should enjoy exclusive rights to exploit living resources in the exclusive economic zone and to what extent traditional fishing may be maintained. In this regard, both traditional artisanal fishing and long-established industrial and commercial fishing were mentioned. 5. In the present case, examples cited by Nicaragua, which refer to the positions taken by States such as Japan, the Soviet Union, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, on the protection of traditional fishing rights, largely concern the long-established industrial and commercial fishing. Contrary to Nicaragua’s assertion that the developing countries “strenuously objected” to the protection of traditional fishing rights, these countries were actually very critical of foreign industrial and commercial fishing practices, particularly of those “prescriptive rights” acquired under colonialism (Summary Records of Plenary Meetings, 23rd plenary meeting, 1 July 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/SR.23, para. 53 (Argentina); Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 22nd meeting, 31 July 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, para. 72 (Zaire); Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 29th meeting, 6 August 1974, - 2 - UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.29, para. 3 (Burma)). They were mainly concerned about “leav[ing] the door open for the traditional distant-water fishing nations which had enjoyed and sometimes abused the freedom of fishing in a region with which they had no geographical or economic connexion” (Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 22nd meeting, 31 July 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, para. 92 (Barbados) (emphasis added)). At the same time, they were sympathetic to the fishing interests of the developing countries whose economy depended on fisheries. In Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, a document to which Nicaragua refers in support of its claim, it is stated that “the ‘historic rights’ acquired by certain neighbouring African States in a part of the Sea which may fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of another State w[]ould be recognized and safeguarded” (Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (1972), UN doc. A/8721, Annex 3, p. 75). Apparently, traditional fishing rights have to be considered in each specific context. 6. The establishment of the exclusive economic zone régime is one of the major achievements of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which largely responds to the general concerns of the coastal States over the exploitation of living resources by industrial and commercial fishing of foreign fleets in their coastal waters and the need to ensure optimum utilization of natural resources of the sea. Under Part V of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter “UNCLOS”), the coastal State is entitled to establish a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea. It enjoys sovereign rights in the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources in the exclusive economic zone and has the jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, marine scientific research as well as the protection and preservation of the marine environment in that zone. It shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources and take conservation and management measures to ensure sustainable development and utilization of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone. This new régime has fundamentally changed the fishery limits in the sea and put an end to the freedom of fishing in the areas that fall within the exclusive economic zone of the coastal States. 7. Article 51, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS explicitly recognizes the traditional fishing rights of the immediately adjacent neighbouring States in the archipelagic waters. According to Nicaragua, this provision is the only exception, as a carve-out, that preserves traditional fishing rights under UNCLOS. The drafting history of Part IV on archipelagic States, however, does not support that interpretation. The travaux préparatoires show that Article 51, paragraph 1, is the outcome of the negotiations of States on the recognition of the status of archipelagic States. It was intended to maintain a balance of rights and interests between the archipelagic States and their regional neighbours whose fishing interests would be substantially jeopardized by the enclosure of the archipelagic waters (see Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 36th meeting, 12 August 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.36; Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 37th meeting, 12 August 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.37, on the positions taken by Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan). Confined to a special régime, Article 51, paragraph 1, concerns solely traditional fishing rights in the archipelagic waters. There is no legal basis in international law to preclude the existence of traditional fishing rights under other circumstances. 8. Article 62, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS provides a number of relevant factors for giving access to other States to the surplus of the allowable catch in the exclusive economic zone, among which is the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone. According to Nicaragua, by taking into account this “habitually fished” factor, the Convention has settled the relationship between the exclusive economic zone and traditional fishing rights; the former thereby supersedes the latter. This conclusion is apparently over-sweeping. Among all - 3 - relevant factors, Article 62, paragraph 3, highlights five factors for consideration, namely national interests of the coastal State, rights of land-locked States and geographically disadvantaged States, the requirements of developing States in the subregion or region, and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose foreign nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks. Those factors reflect the principles of distributive justice and fairness that underlie the régime of the exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS. Habitual fishing may include certain types of traditional fishing activities carried out by individual fishermen of other States, but in the context of the Article, that factor alone cannot be taken to presume that all situations relating to traditional fishing rights are encompassed by that Article. 9. The advent of the régime of the exclusive economic zone, as set forth in UNCLOS, does not by itself extinguish traditional fishing rights that may be found to exist under customary international law. According to the settled jurisprudence of the Court, a treaty provision may “embod[y]” or “crystallize[]” a pre-existing or emergent rule of customary law (Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 38, para. 24), or may “constitute[] the foundation of, or has generated a rule which . . . has since passed into the general corpus of international law” (North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 41, para. 71). For pre-existing rights under customary international law, however, unless and until they are explicitly negated by treaty law or new customary rules, they continue to exist and apply under customary international law, even as regards States that are parties to the relevant treaty (see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 424, para. 73). The Court has also held that where the content of a customary rule is “confirmed and influenced by [a treaty referring to and embodying this rule]”, the fact that the treaty “does not go on to regulate directly all aspects of [the] content” of the rule in question, “demonstrates that . . . customary international law continues to exist alongside treaty law. The areas governed by these two sources of law thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content.” (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 176.) 10. The existence of traditional fishing rights must be proved by evidence. As noted, such rights are derived from long, continuous and peaceful exercise of certain practices. In the absence of specific conventional provisions that expressly negate all traditional fishing rights, general international law will continue to govern on the matter, whenever a case arises. As the Preamble of UNCLOS affirms, “matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law”. 11. Indeed, States party to UNCLOS continue to recognize, through bilateral agreements, historic and traditional fishing rights that existed prior to the conclusion of the Convention. For example, in 1974 India and Sri Lanka agreed on the delimitation of historic waters of Palk Bay, where the traditional fishing rights of both States’ fishermen are recognized and protected. Article 6 of the Agreement provides that “[t]he vessels of Sri Lanka and India will enjoy in each other’s waters such rights as they have traditionally enjoyed therein” (1974 Agreement between India and Sri Lanka on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries and Related Matters, United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS), Vol. 1049, p. 26). Likewise, the 1978 boundary agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea acknowledges and protects the “traditional way of life and livelihood” of the local population, including traditional fishing, in the Protected Zone established (Article 10 (3) of the 1978 Treaty between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two Countries, including the Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, UNTS, Vol. 1429, p. 215). - 4 - 12. Traditional fishing rights are also recognized in international jurisprudence. For instance, in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) case, Tunisia claimed that it had had historic rights over sedentary and other fisheries in a certain zone since time immemorial, “deriv[ing] from the long-established interests and activities of its population in exploiting the fisheries of the bed and waters of the Mediterranean off its coasts” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 72, para. 98). Although the Court did not find it necessary to address Tunisia’s claim, it clearly acknowledged that such rights exist under customary international law, notwithstanding the exclusive economic zone régime (ibid., p. 74, para. 100). 13. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the issue was squarely addressed by the tribunal. It explicitly recognized the existence of traditional fishing rights of Eritrea’s fishermen both within and beyond the territorial sea around the Yemeni islands (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), Decision of 9 October 1998, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXII, pp. 329-330, para. 526; Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Decision of 17 December 1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 361, para. 109). In reaching its conclusion regarding traditional fishing rights, the tribunal emphasized that “[i]n finding that the Parties each have sovereignty over various of the Islands the Tribunal stresses to them that such sovereignty is not inimical to, but rather entails, the perpetuation of the traditional fishing regime in the region” (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), Decision of 9 October 1998, RIAA, Vol. XXII, pp. 329-330, para. 526). On the relationship between the traditional fishing régime and UNCLOS, the arbitral tribunal observed: “By its very nature, [this traditional fishing régime] is not qualified by the maritime zones specified under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea . . . The traditional fishing regime operates throughout those waters beyond the territorial waters of each of the Parties, and also in their territorial waters and ports . . . Accordingly, it does not depend, either for its existence or for its protection, upon the drawing of an international boundary by this Tribunal.” (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Decision of 17 December 1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 361, paras. 109-110.) 14. The findings in Eritrea/Yemen were cited by the arbitral tribunal in the Abyei arbitration concerning the delimitation of land boundaries in the Abyei area between Sudan and South Sudan. That tribunal concluded that, according to general principles of law, “traditional rights, in the absence of an explicit agreement to the contrary, have usually been deemed to remain unaffected by any territorial delimitation” (Arbitration regarding the Delimitation of the Abyei Area between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Movement/Army, Final Award, 22 July 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXX, pp. 408-410 and 412, paras. 753-760 and 766). 15. In the present case, Nicaragua refers to the case concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area ((Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246) in support of its claim that traditional fishing rights have been extinguished by the establishment of the exclusive economic zone and that the coastal States now enjoy a “legal monopoly” over the living resources of the exclusive economic zone. This is a far-fetched claim. In the Gulf of Maine case, first of all, the dispute between the parties did not concern traditional fishing rights. The United States claimed a certain “predominance” of its fishing activities in the relevant area, which related to established industrial and commercial fishing. Secondly, the United States - 5 - invoked its preferential situation as a relevant circumstance for the purpose of equitable delimitation, which was rejected by the Chamber of the Court. Neither in law nor in fact is this case relevant to the issue of traditional fishing rights. 16. Two principal elements have been mentioned in jurisprudence for the establishment of traditional fishing rights: first, traditional fishing rights had to be borne out by “artisanal fishing”, and secondly, such fishing activities continued consistently for a lengthy period of time (see Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Decision of 17 December 1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 359, para. 103; Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), Decision of 9 October 1998, RIAA, Vol. XXII, pp. 244-245, para. 129). As the Eritrea/Yemen tribunal stated, at the core of the traditional fishing activities is “the presence of deeply-rooted common patterns of behavior”, which is often linked with local traditions and customs that continued consistently for a long time (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), Decision of 9 October 1998, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 244, para. 129). The first element is applied primarily to distinguish traditional fishing from industrial fishing, while the second element has to be assessed under the circumstances of each case. In principle, the duration of the fishing activities cannot be measured by a fixed number of years, but it has to be sufficiently long to reflect the existence of such tradition and culture. In this regard, certain flexibility with regard to the types of evidence and duration of time may be called for. In the present case, although the evidence adduced by Colombia is not considered sufficient to prove its claim, the statements of the Nicaraguan President do not deny the existence of traditional fishing of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago, particularly of the Raizales. In order to preserve the local tradition and custom of the San Andres Archipelago, an agreement on fisheries for the benefit of the Raizales community between the Parties, in my view, would contribute to a stable and co-operative relationship in the region. (Signed) XUE Hanqin. ___________
404
142
DECLARATION OF JUDGE XUE
1. With regard to Colombia’s third counter-claim relating to the artisanal
fishing rights of the inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago, I
agree with the Court’s conclusion that Colombia fails to prove the existence
of its traditional practice of artisanal fishing that extends to the area
that falls within Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone. In regard to traditional
or historic fishing rights, however, I wish to make a few observations
in this declaration.
2. First of all, traditional fishing rights are recognized and protected
under customary international law. Under the law of the sea, traditional
fishing generally refers to artisanal fishing that may have existed for centuries.
Although there may be improvements in the techniques of navigation
and communication or in the techniques of fishing, traditional fishing
is distinct from habitual fishing and traditional industrial fishing. Traditional
fishing rights are acquired from a long process of historical consolidation
of socio-economic
conditions and conduct, which reflects
certain cultural patterns, local customs and traditions. Given their nature,
substance and origin, the existence of traditional fishing rights must be
examined and determined on a case-by-case basis.
3. At the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
when the breadth of the territorial sea was being considered, fishery limits
was one of the issues raised by States, as expansion of the breadth of the
territorial sea from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles would inevitably
have a bearing on the fishing interests of States in coastal waters. It was
realized, nevertheless, that there were diverse situations in different parts
of the world and that it was impossible to take account of every special
case (Eighth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 30 March 1960,
UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.8, paras. 6-12 (Brazil); Fifteenth Meeting of
the Committee of the Whole, 5 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/
SR.15, para. 12 (New Zealand); Nineteenth Meeting of the Committee of
the Whole, 7 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.19, paras. 34-36
(Lebanon)). Meanwhile the idea to set up an exclusive fishing zone, separate
but adjacent to the territorial sea, to give the coastal State certain
rights in respect of the exploitation of fishery resources in the zone so as
to satisfy the growing needs of its people was gaining wide recognition,
particularly among the developing countries (Eighth Meeting of the Committee
of the Whole, 30 March 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.8,
paras. 34 and 39-40 (Yugoslavia); Fifteenth Meeting of the Committee of
the Whole, 5 April 1960, UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.15, para. 24
404
142
DÉCLARATION DE Mme LA JUGE XUE
[Traduction]
1. En ce qui concerne la troisième demande reconventionnelle de la
Colombie portant sur les droits de pêche artisanale des habitants de l’archipel
de San Andrés, je souscris à la conclusion de la Cour, selon qui la
Colombie n’a pas démontré l’existence d’une pratique traditionnelle de la
pêche artisanale par ces habitants jusque dans des espaces maritimes relevant
de la zone économique exclusive du Nicaragua. Je souhaite cependant
formuler dans la présente déclaration quelques observations au sujet
des droits de pêche traditionnels ou historiques.
2. Tout d’abord, les droits de pêche traditionnels sont reconnus et protégés
par le droit international coutumier. En droit de la mer, la pêche
traditionnelle renvoie généralement à la pêche artisanale qui a pu être
pratiquée pendant des siècles. Même si les techniques de navigation, de
communication ou de pêche peuvent évoluer, la pêche traditionnelle se
distingue de la pratique habituelle de la pêche et de ce que l’on entend
généralement par pêche industrielle. Les droits de pêche traditionnels
s’acquièrent au fil d’un long processus de consolidation historique de
conditions socio-économiques
et de comportements qui reflète certaines
particularités culturelles et coutumes et traditions locales. Compte tenu de
leur nature, de leur teneur et de leur origine, il y a lieu d’examiner et de
déterminer l’existence des droits de pêche traditionnels au cas par cas.
3. A la deuxième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer,
au cours des discussions portant sur la largeur de la mer territoriale, les
Etats ont notamment soulevé la question des limites des pêcheries, car
l’élargissement de la mer territoriale de 3 à 12 milles marins allait inévitablement
avoir des incidences sur leurs intérêts en matière de pêche dans les
eaux côtières. Ils ont néanmoins pris conscience que les différentes régions
du monde présentaient des situations variées et qu’il était impossible de
prendre en considération chaque cas particulier (8e Séance de la Commission
plénière, 30 mars 1960, Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.8,
par. 6‑12 (Brésil), 15e Séance de la Commission plénière, 5 avril 1960,
Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.15, par. 12 (Nouvelle‑Zélande),
19e Séance de la Commission plénière, 7 avril 1960, Nations Unies, doc. A/
CONF.19/C.1/SR.19, par. 34‑36 (Liban)). Pendant ce temps, l’idée d’établir
une zone de pêche exclusive, distincte de la mer territoriale mais
adjacente à celle-
ci, pour y donner à l’Etat côtier certains droits en matière
d’exploitation des ressources halieutiques de sorte qu’il puisse satisfaire les
besoins croissants de sa population était de plus en plus largement admise,
en particulier parmi les pays en développement (8e Séance de la Commission
plénière, 30 mars 1960, Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.8,
par. 34 et 39‑40 (Yougoslavie), 15e Séance de la Commission plénière,
405 sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. xue)
143
(Ceylon);
Nineteenth Meeting of the Committee of the Whole, 7 April 1960,
UN doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.19, para. 7 (Tunisia)).
4. At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
States held divergent views as to whether a coastal State should enjoy
exclusive rights to exploit living resources in the exclusive economic zone
and to what extent traditional fishing may be maintained. In this regard,
both traditional artisanal fishing and long-established
industrial and commercial
fishing were mentioned.
5. In the present case, examples cited by Nicaragua, which refer to the
positions taken by States such as Japan, the Soviet Union, Australia,
New Zealand and the United States, on the protection of traditional fishing
rights, largely concern the long-established
industrial and commercial
fishing. Contrary to Nicaragua’s assertion that the developing countries
“strenuously objected” to the protection of traditional fishing rights,
these countries were actually very critical of foreign industrial and commercial
fishing practices, particularly of those “prescriptive rights”
acquired under colonialism (Summary Records of Plenary Meetings,
23rd plenary meeting, 1 July 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/SR.23, para. 53
(Argentina); Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee,
22nd meeting, 31 July 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, para. 72
(Zaire); Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee,
29th meeting, 6 August 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.29, para. 3
(Burma)). They were mainly concerned about “leav[ing] the door open
for the traditional distant-water fishing nations which had enjoyed and
sometimes abused the freedom of fishing in a region with which they had
no geographical or economic connexion” (Summary Records of Meetings
of the Second Committee, 22nd meeting, 31 July 1974, UN doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.22, para. 92 (Barbados) (emphasis added)). At the
same time, they were sympathetic to the fishing interests of the developing
countries whose economy depended on fisheries. In “Conclusions in the
General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the
Sea”, a document to which Nicaragua refers in support of its claim, it is
stated that “the ‘historic rights’ acquired by certain neighbouring African
States in a part of the Sea which may fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of another State w[]ould be recognized and safeguarded” (Report of
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (1972), UN doc. A/8721,
Annex I, p. 75). Apparently, traditional fishing rights have to be considered
in each specific context.
6. The establishment of the exclusive economic zone régime is one of
the major achievements of the Third United Nations Conference on the
droits souverains et espaces maritimes (décl. xue) 405
143
5 avril 1960, Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.19/C.1/SR.15, par. 24 (Ceylan),
19e Séance de la Commission plénière, 7 avril 1960, Nations Unies, doc. A/
CONF.19/C.1/SR.19, par. 7 (Tunisie)).
4. A la troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer,
les Etats avaient des vues divergentes sur la question de savoir si un Etat
côtier devait bénéficier de droits exclusifs d’exploitation des ressources
biologiques dans la zone économique exclusive et sur la mesure dans
laquelle la pêche traditionnelle pouvait être préservée. A cet égard, tant la
pêche artisanale traditionnelle que la pêche industrielle et commerciale
pratiquée depuis longtemps avaient été mentionnées.
5. Dans la présente espèce, les exemples cités par le Nicaragua, qui renvoient
aux positions adoptées par des Etats tels que le Japon, l’Union
soviétique, l’Australie, la Nouvelle‑Zélande et les Etats‑Unis d’Amérique
s’agissant de la protection des droits de pêche traditionnels, avaient pour
une grande part trait à la pêche industrielle et commerciale exercée de
longue date. Contrairement à ce qu’a prétendu le Nicaragua, selon qui les
pays en développement s’étaient dits « vivement opposés » à la protection
des droits de pêche traditionnels, en réalité, ces pays désapprouvaient fortement
les pratiques des navires étrangers en matière de pêche industrielle
et commerciale, notamment les « droits acquis par prescription » à l’époque
du colonialisme (Comptes rendus analytiques des séances plénières,
23e séance, 1er juillet 1974, Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.62/SR.23, par. 53
(Argentine) ; Comptes rendus analytiques des séances de la Deuxième Commission,
22e séance, 31 juillet 1974, Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/
SR.22, par. 72 (Zaïre), et Comptes rendus analytiques des séances plénières,
29e séance, 6 août 1974, Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.29,
par. 3 (Birmanie)). Ils craignaient surtout de « laisser la porte ouverte aux
nations qui se livr[ai]ent traditionnellement à la pêche hauturière et qui
[avaie]nt usé et souvent abusé de la liberté de pêcher dans une région éloignée
avec laquelle elles n’[avaie]nt aucun lien géographique ou économique »
(Comptes rendus analytiques des séances de la Deuxième Commission,
22e séance, 31 juillet 1974, Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.22,
par. 92 (Barbade) (les italiques sont de moi)). Dans le même temps, ils
étaient sensibles aux intérêts en matière de pêche des pays en développement
dont l’économie dépendait des pêcheries. Dans les conclusions du
rapport général du séminaire régional des Etats africains sur le droit de la
mer, document évoqué par le Nicaragua à l’appui de sa demande, il est
indiqué qu’« [i]l conv[enai]t de reconnaître et de sauvegarder les « droits
historiques » acquis par certains Etats africains limitrophes sur une partie
de la mer [pouvant] relever de la juridiction exclusive d’un autre Etat »
(Rapport du comité des utilisations pacifiques du fond des mers et des océans
au‑delà des limites de la juridiction nationale, 1972, Nations Unies,
doc. A/8721, annexe I, p. 84). Selon toute vraisemblance, il y a lieu d’examiner
les droits de pêche traditionnels dans le contexte particulier de
chaque situation.
6. La mise en place du régime de la zone économique exclusive est l’une
des réalisations majeures de la troisième conférence des Nations Unies sur
406 sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. xue)
144
Law of the Sea, which largely responds to the general concerns of the
coastal States over the exploitation of living resources by industrial and
commercial fishing of foreign fleets in their coastal waters and the need to
ensure optimum utilization of natural resources of the sea. Under Part V
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter
“UNCLOS”), the coastal State is entitled to establish a 200‑nautical-mile
exclusive economic zone beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea. It
enjoys sovereign rights in the exploration, exploitation, conservation and
management of the natural resources in the exclusive economic zone and
has the jurisdiction with regard to the establishment and use of artificial
islands, marine scientific research as well as the protection and preservation
of the marine environment in that zone. It shall determine the allowable
catch of the living resources and take conservation and management
measures to ensure sustainable development and utilization of the living
resources in the exclusive economic zone. This new régime has fundamentally
changed the fishery limits in the sea and put an end to the freedom
of fishing in the areas that fall within the exclusive economic zone of the
coastal States.
7. Article 51, paragraph 1, of UNCLOS explicitly recognizes the traditional
fishing rights of the immediately adjacent neighbouring States in
the archipelagic waters. According to Nicaragua, this provision is the
only exception, as a carve-out, that preserves traditional fishing rights
under UNCLOS. The drafting history of Part IV on archipelagic States,
however, does not support that interpretation. The travaux préparatoires
show that Article 51, paragraph 1, is the outcome of the negotiations of
States on the recognition of the status of archipelagic States. It was
intended to maintain a balance of rights and interests between the archipelagic
States and their regional neighbours whose fishing interests would
be substantially jeopardized by the enclosure of the archipelagic waters
(see Summary Records of Meetings of the Second Committee, 36th meeting,
12 August 1974, UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.36; Summary Records
of Meetings of the Second Committee, 37th meeting, 12 August 1974,
UN doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.37, on the positions taken by Singapore,
Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan). Confined to a special
régime, Article 51, paragraph 1, concerns solely traditional fishing rights
in the archipelagic waters. There is no legal basis in international law to
preclude the existence of traditional fishing rights under other circumstances.
8. Article 62, paragraph 3, of UNCLOS provides a number of relevant
factors for giving access to other States to the surplus of the allowable
catch in the exclusive economic zone, among which is the need to minimize
economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually
fished in the zone. According to Nicaragua, by taking into account this
“habitually fished” factor, the Convention has settled the relationship
between the exclusive economic zone and traditional fishing rights; the
droits souverains et espaces maritimes (décl. xue) 406
144
le droit de la mer, en ce qu’elle répond dans une large mesure aux préoccupations
des Etats côtiers concernant l’exploitation des ressources biologiques
de leurs eaux côtières par les flottes étrangères y pratiquant la pêche
industrielle et commerciale et à la nécessité de garantir une utilisation optimale
des ressources naturelles de la mer. En vertu de la partie V de la
convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer (ci‑après la « CNUDM »
ou la « convention »), l’Etat côtier a le droit d’établir une zone économique
exclusive de 200 milles marins au‑delà de sa mer territoriale et adjacente à
celle‑ci. Il y jouit de droits souverains aux fins d’exploration, d’exploitation,
de conservation et de gestion des ressources naturelles et a juridiction
en ce qui concerne la mise en place et l’utilisation d’îles artificielles, la
recherche scientifique marine, ainsi que la protection et la préservation du
milieu marin dans cette zone. Il fixe le volume admissible des captures en
ce qui concerne les ressources biologiques et prend des mesures de conservation
et de gestion pour garantir un développement et une exploitation
viables des ressources biologiques dans sa zone économique exclusive. Ce
nouveau régime a fondamentalement modifié les limites des zones de pêche
en mer et mis fin au libre exercice de cette activité dans les espaces maritimes
relevant de la zone économique exclusive des Etats côtiers.
7. Le paragraphe 1 de l’article 51 de la CNUDM reconnaît expressément
les droits de pêche traditionnels des Etats limitrophes dans les eaux
archipélagiques. Selon le Nicaragua, cette disposition est la seule exception,
énoncée isolément, qui préserve les droits de pêche traditionnels au
titre de la convention. Or la genèse de la partie IV de la convention, relative
aux Etats archipels, n’étaye pas cette interprétation. Les travaux préparatoires
montrent que la disposition en question, qui est le résultat des
négociations menées entre les Etats sur la reconnaissance du statut des
Etats archipels, visait à préserver un équilibre entre les droits et intérêts
des Etats archipels et ceux de leurs voisins régionaux dont les intérêts en
matière de pêche seraient sensiblement mis en péril par la délimitation des
eaux archipélagiques (Comptes rendus analytiques des séances de la Deuxième
Commission, 36e séance, 12 août 1974, Nations Unies, doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/SR.36, et Comptes rendus analytiques des séances plénières,
37e séance, 12 août 1974, Nations Unies, doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.37, où
sont consignées les positions adoptées par Singapour, la Thaïlande, les
Philippines, l’Indonésie et le Japon). Son application étant circonscrite à
un régime spécial, le paragraphe 1 de l’article 51 ne porte que sur les droits
de pêche traditionnels dans les eaux archipélagiques. Rien dans le droit
international ne fait obstacle à l’existence de droits de pêche traditionnels
dans d’autres situations.
8. Le paragraphe 3 de l’article 62 de la convention prévoit un certain
nombre de facteurs pertinents pour accorder à d’autres Etats l’accès au reliquat
du volume admissible dans la zone économique exclusive, dont la
nécessité de réduire à un minimum les perturbations économiques dans les
Etats dont les ressortissants pratiquent habituellement la pêche dans la
zone. Selon le Nicaragua, en prenant en considération la « pratique[] habituelle[]
[de] la pêche », la convention a réglé le rapport entre la zone écono-
407 sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. xue)
145
former thereby supersedes the latter. This conclusion is apparently over-sweeping.
Among all relevant factors, Article 62, paragraph 3, highlights
five factors for consideration, namely national interests of the coastal
State, rights of land-locked
States and geographically disadvantaged
States, the requirements of developing States in the subregion or region,
and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose foreign
nationals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial
efforts in research and identification of stocks. Those factors reflect
the principles of distributive justice and fairness that underlie the régime
of the exclusive economic zone under UNCLOS. Habitual fishing may
include certain types of traditional fishing activities carried out by individual
fishermen of other States, but in the context of the Article, that
factor alone cannot be taken to presume that all situations relating to
traditional fishing rights are encompassed by that Article.
9. The advent of the régime of the exclusive economic zone, as set
forth in UNCLOS, does not by itself extinguish traditional fishing rights
that may be found to exist under customary international law. According
to the settled jurisprudence of the Court, a treaty provision may
“embod[y]” or “crystallize[]” a pre-existing
or emergent rule of customary
law (Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 38, para. 24), or may “constitute[] the foundation
of, or has generated a rule which . . . has since passed into the general
corpus of international law” (North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic
of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 41, para. 71). For pre‑existing rights
under customary international law, however, unless and until they are
explicitly negated by treaty law or new customary rules, they continue to
exist and apply under customary international law, even as regards States
that are parties to the relevant treaty (see Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 424,
para. 73). The Court has also held that where the content of a customary
rule is “confirmed and influenced by [a treaty referring to and embodying
this rule]”, the fact that the treaty “does not go on to regulate directly all
aspects of [the] content” of the rule in question,
“demonstrates that . . . customary international law continues to exist
alongside treaty law. The areas governed by these two sources of law
thus do not overlap exactly, and the rules do not have the same content.”
(Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1986, p. 94, para. 176.)
10. The existence of traditional fishing rights must be proved by evidence.
As noted, such rights are derived from long, continuous and peace-
droits souverains et espaces maritimes (décl. xue) 407
145
mique exclusive et les droits de pêche traditionnels, la première rendant
ainsi les seconds caducs. Cette conclusion paraît trop catégorique. Parmi
tous les éléments pertinents, le paragraphe 3 de l’article 62 met en évidence
cinq facteurs dont il convient de tenir compte, à savoir les intérêts nationaux
de l’Etat côtier, les droits des Etats sans littoral et des Etats géographiquement
désavantagés, les besoins des Etats en développement de la
région ou de la sous-région
et la nécessité de réduire à un minimum les
perturbations économiques dans les Etats dont les ressortissants pratiquent
habituellement la pêche dans la zone ou qui ont beaucoup contribué à la
recherche et à l’inventaire des stocks. Ces facteurs reflètent les principes de
justice distributive et d’équité qui sous‑tendent le régime de la zone économique
exclusive prévu par la CNUDM. Si l’on peut considérer que la pratique
habituelle de la pêche inclut certains types d’activités relevant de la
pêche traditionnelle exercées par des pêcheurs d’autres Etats, aux fins de cet
article, cela ne suffit toutefois pas pour en inférer que celui-
ci couvre toutes
les situations relatives aux droits de pêche traditionnels.
9. La mise en place du régime de la zone économique exclusive tel que
défini dans la CNUDM n’éteint pas en soi les droits de pêche traditionnels
qui pourraient exister en droit international coutumier. Selon la jurisprudence
constante de la Cour, une disposition conventionnelle peut « consacre[
r] » ou « cristallise[r] » une règle de droit coutumier préexistante ou en
voie de formation (Plateau continental (Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 38, par. 24) ou « servi[r] de base ou de point de
départ à une règle qui … se serait depuis lors intégrée à l’ensemble du droit
international général » (Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (République
fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark ; République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays‑Bas),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 41, par. 71). En revanche, des droits préexistants
en droit international coutumier subsistent et continuent de
s’appliquer même à l’égard des Etats parties au traité en question, à moins
et jusqu’à tant qu’ils soient expressément exclus par le droit conventionnel
ou par de nouvelles règles coutumières (Activités militaires et paramilitaires
au Nicaragua et contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis d’Amérique), compétence
et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 424, par. 73). La Cour a
également jugé que, lorsque le contenu d’une règle coutumière est « confirmé
par [un traité faisant référence à cette règle et la consacrant] et influencé par
[lui] », le fait que ledit traité
« n’en réglemente pas directement la substance sous tous ses
aspects … atteste … que … le droit coutumier continue d’exister à
côté du droit conventionnel. Les domaines réglementés par l’une et
par l’autre source de droit ne se recouvrent donc pas exactement et
les règles n’ont pas le même contenu. » (Activités militaires et paramilitaires
au Nicaragua et contre celui‑ci (Nicaragua c. Etats‑Unis
d’Amérique), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 94, par. 176.)
10. L’existence de droits de pêche traditionnels doit être démontrée par
des éléments de preuve. Comme il a été noté, ces droits découlent de
408 sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. xue)
146
ful exercise of certain practices. In the absence of specific conventional
provisions that expressly negate all traditional fishing rights, general
international law will continue to govern on the matter, whenever a case
arises. As the Preamble of UNCLOS affirms, “matters not regulated by
this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of
general international law”.
11. Indeed, States party to UNCLOS continue to recognize, through
bilateral agreements, historic and traditional fishing rights that existed
prior to the conclusion of the Convention. For example, in 1974, India
and Sri Lanka agreed on the delimitation of historic waters of Palk Bay,
where the traditional fishing rights of both States’ fishermen are recognized
and protected. Article 6 of the Agreement provides that “[t]he vessels
of Sri Lanka and India will enjoy in each other’s waters such rights as
they have traditionally enjoyed therein” (Agreement between Sri Lanka
India and on the Boundary in Historic Waters between the Two Countries
and Related Matters, 26 and 28 June 1974, United Nations, Treaty
Series (UNTS), Vol. 1049, p. 26). Likewise, the 1978 boundary agreement
between Australia and Papua New Guinea acknowledges and protects
the “traditional way of life and livelihood” of the local population,
including traditional fishing, in the Protected Zone established (Article
10 (3) of the 1978 Treaty between Australia and the Independent State
of Papua New Guinea concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries
in the Area between the Two Countries, including the Area Known as
Torres Strait, and Related Matters, UNTS, Vol. 1429, p. 215).
12. Traditional fishing rights are also recognized in international jurisprudence.
For instance, in the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya) case, Tunisia claimed that it had had historic rights over sedentary
and other fisheries in a certain zone since time immemorial,
“deriv[ing] from the long-established
interests and activities of its
population
in exploiting the fisheries of the bed and waters of the Mediterranean
off its coasts” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 72, para. 98).
Although the Court did not find it necessary to address Tunisia’s claim, it
clearly acknowledged that such rights exist under customary international
law, notwithstanding the exclusive economic zone régime (ibid., p. 74,
para. 100).
13. In the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration, the issue was squarely addressed
by the tribunal. It explicitly recognized the existence of traditional fishing
rights of Eritrea’s fishermen both within and beyond the territorial sea
around the Yemeni islands (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first
stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty
and Scope of the Dispute) Decision of 9 October 1998, United
Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA), Vol. XXII,
pp. 329‑330, para. 526; Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage
of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation),
droits souverains et espaces maritimes (décl. xue) 408
146
l’exercice continu et pacifique de certaines pratiques pendant une longue
période. En l’absence de disposition conventionnelle spécifique excluant
expressément tous les droits de pêche traditionnels, la question reste régie,
s’il y a lieu, par le droit international général. Ainsi que l’énonce le préambule
de la CNUDM, « les questions qui ne sont pas réglementées par
la Convention continueront d’être régies par les règles et principes du
droit international général ».
11. De fait, des Etats parties à la CNUDM continuent de reconnaître,
au moyen d’accords bilatéraux, des droits de pêche historiques et traditionnels
qui préexistaient à la conclusion de la convention. Par exemple,
en 1974, l’Inde et Sri Lanka ont conclu un accord sur la délimitation des
eaux historiques de Palk Bay, par lequel les droits de pêche traditionnels
des pêcheurs des deux Etats sont reconnus et protégés. L’article 6 de cet
accord prévoit que « [l]es bateaux sri lankais et indiens jouiront dans les
eaux des deux pays des mêmes droits que ceux dont ils ont joui traditionnellement
» (Accord entre le Sri Lanka et l’Inde relatif à la détermination
des limites dans les eaux historiques entre les deux pays et aux questions
connexes, 26 et 28 juin 1974, Recueil des traités des Nations Unies
(RTNU), vol. 1049, p. 29). De même, l’accord frontalier passé en 1978
entre l’Australie et la Papouasie‑Nouvelle‑Guinée reconnaît et protège le
« mode de vie traditionnel et les moyens d’existence » de la population
locale, y compris la pêche traditionnelle, dans la zone protégée établie
(Traité entre l’Australie et l’Etat indépendant de Papouasie‑Nouvelle‑Guinée
relatif à la souveraineté et aux frontières maritimes entre les
deux pays, y compris dans la région dénommée Détroit de Torres, et à
des questions connexes, RTNU, vol. 1429, p. 246, art. 10, par. 3).
12. Les droits de pêche traditionnels sont également reconnus dans la
jurisprudence internationale. Par exemple, dans l’affaire du Plateau continental
(Tunisie/Jamahiriya arabe libyenne), la Tunisie a dit avoir eu des
droits historiques sur les pêcheries sédentaires et autres dans une certaine
zone depuis des temps immémoriaux, qui « résult[ai]ent de l’ancienneté
des intérêts et activités de sa population pour ce qui [étai]t de l’exploitation
des pêcheries situées au large de ses côtes, en mer Méditerranée et sur
le fond de cette mer » (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1982, p. 72, par. 98). Même si
la Cour n’a pas jugé nécessaire d’examiner la prétention de la Tunisie, elle
a clairement reconnu l’existence de ces droits en droit international coutumier,
indépendamment du régime de la zone économique exclusive
(ibid., p. 74, par. 100).
13. Dans l’arbitrage entre l’Erythrée et le Yémen, la question a été traitée
sans détour par le tribunal. Celui‑ci a reconnu expressément l’existence
de droits de pêche traditionnels des pêcheurs érythréens tant dans la
mer territoriale entourant les îles yéménites qu’au‑delà de celle‑ci (Sentence
du tribunal arbitral rendue au terme de la première étape de la procédure
entre l’Erythrée et la République du Yémen (souveraineté territoriale
et portée du différend), décision du 9 octobre 1998, Nations Unies, Recueil
des sentences arbitrales (RSA), vol. XXII, p. 329‑330, par. 526 ; Sentence
du tribunal arbitral rendue au terme de la seconde étape de la procédure
409 sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. xue)
147
Decision of 17 December 1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 361, para. 109)). In
reaching its conclusion regarding traditional fishing rights, the tribunal
emphasized that “[i]n finding that the Parties each have sovereignty over
various of the Islands the Tribunal stresses to them that such sovereignty
is not inimical to, but rather entails, the perpetuation of the traditional
fishing regime in the region” (Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first
stage of the proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty
and Scope of the Dispute) Decision of 9 October 1998, RIAA,
Vol. XXII, pp. 329‑330, para. 526). On the relationship between the traditional
fishing régime and UNCLOS, the arbitral tribunal observed:
“By its very nature, [this traditional fishing régime] is not qualified
by the maritime zones specified under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea . . . The traditional fishing regime operates
throughout those waters beyond the territorial waters of each of the
Parties, and also in their territorial waters and ports . . . Accordingly,
it does not depend, either for its existence or for its protection, upon
the drawing of an international boundary by this Tribunal.” (Award
of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings between
Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Decision of 17 December
1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, p. 361, paras. 109‑110.)
14. The findings in Eritrea/Yemen were cited by the arbitral tribunal in
the Abyei arbitration concerning the delimitation of land boundaries in
the Abyei area between Sudan and South Sudan. That tribunal concluded
that, according to general principles of law, “traditional rights, in the
absence of an explicit agreement to the contrary, have usually been
deemed to remain unaffected by any territorial delimitation” (Award in
the Arbitration regarding the Delimitation of the Abyei Area between the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army,
Award of 22 July 2009, RIAA, Vol. XXX, pp. 408‑410 and 412,
paras. 753‑760 and 766).
15. In the present case, Nicaragua refers to the case concerning Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/
United States of America) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 246) in support
of its claim that traditional fishing rights have been extinguished by
the establishment of the exclusive economic zone and that the coastal
States now enjoy a “legal monopoly” over the living resources of the
exclusive economic zone. This is a far-fetched
claim. In the Gulf of Maine
case, first of all, the dispute between the parties did not concern traditional
fishing rights. The United States claimed a certain “predominance”
of its fishing activities in the relevant area, which related to established
industrial and commercial fishing. Secondly, the United States invoked its
preferential situation as a relevant circumstance for the purpose of equitable
delimitation, which was rejected by the Chamber of the Court. Nei-
droits souverains et espaces maritimes (décl. xue) 409
147
entre l’Erythrée et la République du Yémen (délimitation maritime), décision
du 17 décembre 1999, RSA, vol. XXII, p. 361, par. 109). Lorsqu’il est
parvenu à sa décision concernant les droits de pêche traditionnels, le tribunal
a rappelé que, « [e]n concluant que les Parties [avaie]nt chacune
souveraineté sur diverses îles, [il] soulign[ait] à leur intention qu’une telle
souveraineté n’exclu[ai]t pas, mais impliqu[ait] plutôt, la perpétuation du
régime de pêche traditionnel dans la région » (Sentence du tribunal arbitral
rendue au terme de la première étape de la procédure entre l’Erythrée et la
République du Yémen (souveraineté territoriale et portée du différend),
décision du 9 octobre 1998, RSA, vol. XXII, p. 329‑330, par. 526). En ce
qui concerne la relation entre le régime de pêche traditionnel et la
CNUDM, le tribunal arbitral avait fait observer ce qui suit :
« De par sa nature même, [ce régime de pêche traditionnel] n’est
pas restreint par les zones marines spécifiées aux termes de la Convention
des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer… Le régime de pêche
traditionnel s’applique dans la totalité de ces eaux au‑delà des eaux
territoriales de chacune des Parties, ainsi que dans leurs eaux territoriales
et leurs ports… En conséquence, il ne dépend pas, du point de
vue de son existence ou de sa protection, du tracé d’une frontière
internationale par le présent Tribunal. » (Sentence du tribunal arbitral
rendue au terme de la seconde étape de la procédure entre l’Erythrée et
la République du Yémen (délimitation maritime), décision du
17 décembre 1999, RSA, vol. XXII, par. 109‑110.)
14. Les conclusions de la sentence arbitrale Erythrée/Yémen ont été
reprises par le tribunal arbitral appelé à statuer sur la délimitation des
frontières terrestres de la région de l’Abyei entre le Soudan et le Soudan
du Sud. Ce tribunal a conclu que, selon les principes généraux du droit,
« sauf accord contraire exprès des parties, toute délimitation territoriale
est habituellement réputée laisser intacts les droits traditionnels » (Sentence
arbitrale relative à la délimitation de la région de l’Abyei entre le
Gouvernement du Soudan et le Mouvement/Armée populaire de libération
du Soudan, sentence du 22 juillet 2009, RSA, vol. XXX, p. 408‑410 et 412,
par. 753‑760 et 766).
15. En la présente espèce, le Nicaragua a invoqué l’affaire de la Délimitation
de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada/
Etats‑Unis d’Amérique) (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p. 246) à l’appui de
son argument que les droits de pêche traditionnels ont été éteints par la
création de la zone économique exclusive et que les Etats côtiers jouissent
désormais d’un « monopole de droits » sur les ressources biologiques de
cette zone. Cet argument est peu convaincant. Dans l’affaire du Golfe du
Maine, tout d’abord, le différend entre les parties ne concernait pas des
droits de pêche traditionnels. Les Etats‑Unis d’Amérique revendiquaient
une certaine « primauté » de leurs activités de pêche dans la zone pertinente
qui était liée à la pêche industrielle et commerciale qu’ils pratiquaient
de longue date. Ils ont ensuite fait valoir que leur situation
privilégiée était une circonstance pertinente aux fins d’une délimitation
410 sovereign rights and maritime spaces (decl. xue)
148
ther in law nor in fact is this case relevant to the issue of traditional
fishing rights.
16. Two principal elements have been mentioned in jurisprudence for
the establishment of traditional fishing rights: first, traditional fishing
rights had to be borne out by “artisanal fishing”, and secondly, such
fishing
activities continued consistently for a lengthy period of time (see
Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings
between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation), Decision of
17 December 1999, RIAA, Vol. XXII, Vol. XXII, p. 359, para. 103; Award
of the Arbitral Tribunal in the first stage of the proceedings between Eritrea
and Yemen (Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute), Decision of
9 October 1998, RIAA, Vol. XXII, pp. 244‑245, para. 129). As the Eritrea/
Yemen tribunal stated, at the core of the traditional fishing activities is
“the presence of deeply-rooted
common patterns of behavior”, which is
often linked with local traditions and customs that continued consistently
for a long time (ibid., p. 244, para. 129). The first element is applied primarily
to distinguish traditional fishing from industrial fishing, while the
second element has to be assessed under the circumstances of each case.
In principle, the duration of the fishing activities cannot be measured by
a fixed number of years, but it has to be sufficiently long to reflect the
existence of such tradition and culture. In this regard, certain flexibility
with regard to the types of evidence and duration of time may be called
for. In the present case, although the evidence adduced by Colombia is
not considered sufficient to prove its claim, the statements of the Nicaraguan
President do not deny the existence of traditional fishing of the
inhabitants of the San Andrés Archipelago, particularly of the Raizales.
In order to preserve the local tradition and custom of the San Andres
Archipelago, an agreement on fisheries for the benefit of the Raizales
community between the Parties, in my view, would contribute to a stable
and co-operative
relationship in the region.
(Signed) Xue Hanqin.
droits souverains et espaces maritimes (décl. xue) 410
148
équitable, ce que la chambre de la Cour a rejeté. Ni du point de vue du
droit ni de celui des faits, cette affaire ne présente de pertinence pour la
question des droits de pêche traditionnels.
16. Deux conditions principales sont mentionnées dans la jurisprudence
pour établir l’existence de droits de pêche traditionnels : premièrement, ces
droits doivent être associés à la « pêche artisanale » et, deuxièmement, les
activités de pêche en question doivent avoir été exercées de manière continue
pendant une longue période de temps (voir Sentence du tribunal arbitral
rendue au terme de la seconde étape de la procédure entre l’Erythrée et
la République du Yémen (délimitation maritime), décision du 17 décembre
1999, RSA, vol. XXII, p. 359, par. 103 ; Sentence du tribunal arbitral rendue
au terme de la première étape de la procédure entre l’Erythrée et la
République du Yémen (souveraineté territoriale et portée du différend), décision
du 9 octobre 1998, RSA, vol. XXII, p. 244‑245, par. 129). Comme l’a
indiqué le tribunal dans l’arbitrage Erythrée/
Yémen, la présence de « modes
de comportement communs, profondément enracinés », souvent liés à des
traditions et coutumes locales suivies régulièrement pendant longtemps,
est au coeur des activités de pêche traditionnelle (ibid., p. 244, par. 129). Si
la première condition vise essentiellement à distinguer la pêche traditionnelle
de la pêche industrielle, il y a lieu d’apprécier la seconde au vu des
circonstances propres à chaque affaire. En principe, la durée d’exercice des
activités de pêche ne se mesure pas en nombre fixe d’années, mais doit être
suffisamment longue pour refléter l’existence d’une tradition et d’une
culture dans ce domaine. A cet égard, il peut être nécessaire de faire preuve
d’une certaine souplesse en ce qui concerne les types d’éléments de preuve
et la durée des activités. Dans la présente espèce, même si les éléments de
preuve produits par la Colombie ne sont pas jugés suffisants pour démontrer
le bien‑fondé de sa revendication, le président du Nicaragua ne nie
pas, dans ses déclarations, l’existence des droits de pêche traditionnels des
habitants de l’archipel de San Andrés, notamment des Raizals. Afin de
préserver la tradition et les coutumes locales de l’archipel, un accord entre
les Parties relatif aux pêcheries au bénéfice de la communauté raizale
contribuerait, selon moi, à établir une relation stable de coopération dans
la région.
(Signé) Xue Hanqin.
Declaration of Judge Xue