Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the question of reparations

Note: This translation has been prepared by the Registry for internal purposes and has no official
character
14681
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA)
SECOND PHASE
QUESTION OF REPARATION
MEMORIAL
OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
September 2016
[Translation by the Registry]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 1. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND THE METHODOLOGY FOLLOWED BY
THE DRC ....................................................................................................................................... 6
Section 1. The Parties’ positions on the issue of reparation in previous phases of the
proceedings .............................................................................................................................. 7
A. The DRC’s Memorial .......................................................................................................... 7
B. Uganda’s Counter-Memorial ............................................................................................. 11
C. The DRC’s Reply .............................................................................................................. 11
D. Uganda’s Rejoinder ........................................................................................................... 12
E. The oral phase of the proceedings ..................................................................................... 12
F. The negotiation phase following the Court’s Judgment of 19 December 2005 ................. 12
Section 2. The DRC’s current position on the issue of reparation .............................................. 12
Section 3. The methodology employed by the DRC in collecting evidence in support of
the present claim .................................................................................................................... 15
CHAPTER 2. THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
FOLLOWING THE INVASION OF ITS TERRITORY BY UGANDA ....................................................... 20
Section 1. The different stages of the Ugandan invasion ............................................................ 21
Section 2. The damage caused in North Kivu province .............................................................. 25
A. Beni (1999-2003) .............................................................................................................. 27
B. Butembo and the surrounding area (1999-2003) ............................................................... 30
C. Lubero (2000) .................................................................................................................... 33
D. Maboya and Loya (November 2000) ................................................................................ 34
E. Kikere (November 2000) ................................................................................................... 35
F. Bunyuka (April 2001) ........................................................................................................ 36
Section 3. The damage caused in Orientale province ................................................................. 37
A. Isiro (September 1998) ...................................................................................................... 38
B. Tele Bridge (September 1998) .......................................................................................... 39
Section 4. The damage caused in Equateur province .................................................................. 40
A. Mindembo (October-December 1998) .............................................................................. 41
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B. Mozamboli (November-December 1998) ......................................................................... 42
C. Pimu (May 1999) .............................................................................................................. 42
D. Libanda (June 1999) .......................................................................................................... 43
E. Gbadolite (June-July 1999) ............................................................................................... 44
F. Libenge (August 2000) ...................................................................................................... 45
G. Ubangi (August 2000) ....................................................................................................... 46
H. Gemena (1998-2003) ........................................................................................................ 47
Section 5. Evaluation of the damage caused by the Ugandan invasion ...................................... 48
A. Loss of human life ............................................................................................................. 48
B. Personal injury and bodily harm ....................................................................................... 51
C. Rape ................................................................................................................................... 52
D. Population flight and displacement ................................................................................... 53
E. Destruction and theft of property....................................................................................... 54
CHAPTER 3. THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
FOLLOWING THE OCCUPATION OF THE ITURI REGION BY UGANDA ............................................ 56
Section 1. The facts: the occupation of Ituri by Uganda and its consequences ......................... 56
Section 2. The damage resulting from Uganda’s failure to comply with its obligations as
an occupying Power in Ituri ................................................................................................... 60
A. Loss of human life ............................................................................................................. 61
B. Injury and mutilation ......................................................................................................... 69
C. Rape ................................................................................................................................... 71
D. The recruitment, training and deployment of child soldiers ............................................. 72
E. Population flight and displacement ................................................................................... 74
F. Destruction of property and infrastructure ......................................................................... 76
G. Looting .............................................................................................................................. 80
CHAPTER 4. THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
FOLLOWING THE HOSTILITIES INVOLVING UGANDA IN THE CITY OF KISANGANI ....................... 83
Section 1. The damage resulting from incidents which took place between August 1998
and the end of May 1999 ....................................................................................................... 89
A. Loss of human life ............................................................................................................. 89
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B. Persons injured .................................................................................................................. 90
C. Damage to property ........................................................................................................... 90
Section 2. The damage resulting from the clashes of August 1999 ............................................ 90
A. Loss of human life ............................................................................................................. 91
B. Persons injured .................................................................................................................. 91
C. Damage to property ........................................................................................................... 92
Section 3. The damage resulting from the clashes of May 2000 ................................................ 92
A. Loss of human life ............................................................................................................. 93
B. Persons injured .................................................................................................................. 93
C. Damage to property ........................................................................................................... 93
Section 4. The damage resulting from the “six-day war” from 5 to 11 June 2000 ..................... 93
A. Loss of human life ............................................................................................................. 95
B. Persons injured .................................................................................................................. 96
C. Persons who sought refuge in the forest ............................................................................ 96
D. Damage to property ........................................................................................................... 96
Section 5. The damage caused by mines laid during the six-day war and explosives
abandoned after the fighting .................................................................................................. 99
Section 6. Summary of the damage suffered............................................................................. 100
CHAPTER 5. THE PREJUDICE CAUSED TO THE DRC’S NATURAL RESOURCES BY UGANDA ............ 105
Section 1. Looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of minerals ......................................... 108
A. Looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of gold....................................................... 109
(i) Uganda’s role in the looting, plundering and exploitation of gold ......................... 109
(ii) The exporting of gold by Uganda ........................................................................... 119
(iii) Assessment of injury ............................................................................................... 123
B. Looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of diamonds .............................................. 125
(i) Uganda’s role in the exploitation of diamonds ....................................................... 125
(ii) Uganda’s diamond exports ...................................................................................... 132
(iii) Assessment of injury ............................................................................................... 134
C. Looting, plundering and wrongful exploitation of coltan ............................................... 134
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(i) Uganda’s role in the exploitation of coltan ............................................................. 134
(ii) Assessment of injury ............................................................................................... 136
Section 2. Prejudice caused to Congolese fauna ....................................................................... 137
A. The DRC’s national parks: world heritage and endangered species .............................. 137
B. Virunga National Park ..................................................................................................... 138
C. Garamba National Park ................................................................................................... 141
D. Okapi Wildlife Reserve ................................................................................................... 145
E. Maiko National Park ........................................................................................................ 147
F. Total numbers of animals and their offspring .................................................................. 148
G. Assessment of injury ....................................................................................................... 152
(i) Injury with regard to the development of ecotourism ............................................. 152
(ii) The commercial value of the various species.......................................................... 153
(iii) Virunga National Park ............................................................................................ 156
(iv) Garamba National Park ........................................................................................... 160
(v) Okapi Wildlife Reserve ........................................................................................... 163
(vi) Maiko National Park ............................................................................................... 164
(vii) Total amount ........................................................................................................... 165
Section 3. Looting, plundering and wrongful exploitation of Congolese flora ......................... 165
A. Uganda’s role in deforestation ........................................................................................ 166
B. Assessment of injury ....................................................................................................... 169
CHAPTER 6. THE MACROECONOMIC INJURY CAUSED TO THE DRC BY UGANDA .......................... 172
Section 1. A lucrum cessans for which Uganda must pay compensation ................................. 172
Section 2. The impact of armed conflict on economic growth ................................................. 173
Section 3. The analytical model used ........................................................................................ 174
Section 4. Analyses ................................................................................................................... 175
Section 5. Interpretation of the results of the analyses: calculation of macroeconomic
harm ..................................................................................................................................... 177
Section 6. Compensation owed by Uganda ............................................................................... 180
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CHAPTER 7. REPARATION OWED BY UGANDA TO THE DRC .......................................................... 181
Section 1. Compensation owed by Uganda ............................................................................... 181
A. Compensation for harm caused to persons ...................................................................... 182
(i) Compensation owed for human lives lost ............................................................... 184
(ii) Compensation owed for injuries and mutilations .................................................... 186
(iii) Compensation owed for incidences of rape ............................................................ 187
(iv) Compensation owed for the recruitment, training and use of child soldiers ........... 188
(v) Compensation owed for the flight and displacement of populations ...................... 189
B. Compensation for damage to property ............................................................................ 189
(i) Compensation owed for damage to property in Ituri .............................................. 190
(ii) Compensation owed for damage to property in Kisangani and the rest of the
territory invaded by Uganda.................................................................................... 192
C. Compensation for damage resulting from the illegal exploitation of natural
resources ......................................................................................................................... 193
D. Compensation for macroeconomic damage .................................................................... 193
E. Award of interest ............................................................................................................. 194
Section 2. Satisfaction ............................................................................................................... 196
A. Criminal investigation and prosecution .......................................................................... 197
B. Creation of a fund to promote reconciliation between the Hema and Lendu .................. 198
C. Payment of a lump sum to make good the non-material harm suffered by the
Congolese State .............................................................................................................. 199
Section 3. Payment of the costs incurred by the DRC .............................................................. 201
SUBMISSIONS .................................................................................................................................. 203
INTRODUCTION
0.01. In its Judgment rendered on 19 December 2005 in the case concerning Armed Activities
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), the Court found, in
particular, that:
 “the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the Democratic
Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by occupying Ituri and by actively
extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces
having operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of
force in international relations and the principle of non-intervention”;
 “the Republic of Uganda [violated] its obligations under international human
rights law and international humanitarian law in the course of hostilities between
Ugandan and Rwandan military forces in Kisangani”;
 “by the conduct of its armed forces, which committed acts of killing, torture and
other forms of inhumane treatment of the Congolese civilian population, destroyed
villages and civilian buildings, failed to distinguish between civilian and military
targets and to protect the civilian population in fighting with other combatants,
trained child soldiers, incited ethnic conflict and failed to take measures to put an
end to such conflict; as well as by its failure, as an occupying Power, to take
measures to respect and ensure respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law in Ituri district, violated its obligations under international
human rights law and international humanitarian law”;
 “by acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources
committed by members of the Ugandan armed forces in the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and by its failure to comply with its
obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri district to prevent acts of looting,
plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources, violated obligations
owed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under international law”;
 “the Republic of Uganda is under obligation to make reparation to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for the injury caused”;
 “failing agreement between the Parties, the question of reparation due to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo shall be settled by the Court, and . . . for this
purpose the subsequent procedure in the case [is reserved]”1.
The Court thus did not determine the nature, form and amount of the reparation, reserving those
steps of the procedure for a later phase in the event that the Parties were unable to reach an
agreement on the matter. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter “the DRC”) had
moreover “stated its intention to seek initially to resolve the issue of reparation by way of direct
negotiations with Uganda and to submit the question to the Court only ‘failing agreement thereon
between the parties’”2. The Court also stated that “in the phase of the proceedings devoted to
1Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 280-281, para. 345.
2Ibid., p. 257, paras. 260-261.
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reparation, neither Party may call in question such findings in the present Judgment as have
become res judicata”3.
0.02. Uganda is thus required to provide adequate reparation for the various forms of injury
suffered by the DRC and for which, by its 2005 Judgment, the Court found Uganda to be
responsible, on account of the various breaches of international law that it had committed4.
0.03. Shortly after the Judgment was delivered, the DRC began work on an assessment of the
damage with a view to opening discussions with Uganda. The Parties then conducted negotiations
for several years, without success. Without going into the details of the various procedures
involved, or recapitulating all of the work carried out by the services concerned in the DRC itself,
the principal official bilateral meetings that have taken place in recent years can be outlined briefly
as follows.
0.04. The issue of reparations was first raised in Ngurdoto, Tanzania, during a bilateral
meeting between the two Heads of State held on 8 December 2007. The DRC and Uganda reached
an agreement on bilateral co-operation, referred to as the “Ngurdoto Agreement”5. The Agreement
contains several provisions relating to defence and security, economic co-operation and political
and diplomatic co-operation. Article 8, entitled “Implementation of the Judgment of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ)”, provides for the establishment of an ad hoc committee for the
purpose of implementing the Court’s decision:
“The Parties agree to constitute, with each Party nominating not more than
7 members, an ad hoc committee to study the ICJ judgment in the Case Concerning
Armed Activities on the DRC Territory (DRC v. Uganda) and recommend to the JPC
modalities of implementing its orders on the question of Reparations.”6
0.05. A meeting between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Justice was
then held in Kampala on 24 and 25 May 2010. The DRC presented an initial assessment of the
damage suffered, with a number of supporting documents. That assessment was categorically
rejected by Uganda. A committee comprising seven experts from each of the two countries was
established, but was unable to reach agreement on the development of a timetable. It was
nonetheless agreed that certain meetings should be held in a neutral country, with South Africa
being designated for that purpose.
0.06. A meeting took place in Johannesburg on 13 and 14 September 2012 to discuss
Uganda’s response to the DRC’s requests. Since an agreement could not be reached, it was
decided that the experts should be tasked with preparing further documents in support of the
Parties’ respective claims.
3Ibid., and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 143, para. 284.
4Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 280-281, para. 345.
5Ngurdoto-Tanzania Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Uganda on
Bilateral Cooperation, Ngurdoto, Tanzania, 8 Sept. 2007, Ann. 0.1.
6Ibid.
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0.07. A few weeks later, from 10 to 14 December 2012, a technical bilateral co-operation
meeting was held in Kinshasa. All the documentation assembled by the DRC, including thousands
of forms establishing the identity of victims, was submitted to Uganda, which stated that it would
examine it thoroughly7.
0.08. A ministerial meeting took place in Johannesburg from 23 to 30 November 2014.
However, the Parties continued to have differing views on the parameters, methodology and
jurisprudence that are applicable to reparation. The Parties then agreed that a final attempt to
harmonize their positions should be made in early 20158.
0.09. A meeting was held in Pretoria from 13 to 19 March 2015. The experts convened from
13 to 17 March, followed by the ministers during the last two days of negotiations. However, a
joint communiqué from the two Ministers of Justice, dated 19 March 2015, observed that the
negotiations had failed: “Since there is no consensus reached, the Parties resolved that there should
be no further negotiations at technical and Ministerial level and that the matter should be referred to
the Heads of State within the framework of the Ngurdoto Agreement . . . of 2007”9. The same
document indicates the DRC’s intention to seise the Court pursuant to its Judgment of
19 December 2005: “The DRC insists that since there is no agreement, the matter should be
referred to the ICJ.”10
0.10. Thus, nearly ten years after the delivery of the Court’s Judgment on the merits, the
DRC had to resign itself to sending a letter to the Registry of the Court, asking the latter to settle
the Parties’ ongoing disagreement as to the amount of the reparation. Accordingly, on
13 May 2015, the DRC filed with the Registry of the Court a “New Application to the International
Court of Justice” signed by the Congolese Minister of Justice and Human Rights and Keeper of the
Seals. In the Application, the DRC observes that “the negotiations on the question of reparation
owed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Uganda . . . have failed, as is made clear in the
joint communiqué signed by both Parties in Pretoria, South Africa, on 19 March 2015”. It then
asserts that:
“it therefore behoves the Court, as provided for in paragraph 345 (6) of the Judgment
of 19 December 2005, to reopen the proceedings that it suspended in the case, in order
to determine the amount of reparation owed by Uganda to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, on the basis of the evidence already transmitted to Uganda and which will
be made available to the Court”.
0.11. In its Order of 1 July 2015, the Court indeed noted that:
“whereas although the Parties have tried to settle the question of reparations directly,
they have been unable to reach an agreement in that respect; whereas the joint
communiqué of the fourth ministerial meeting held in Pretoria from 17 to
7Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of Uganda and Congolese Experts on the Implementation of the Ruling of the
International Court of Justice of 19 December 2005, 10-14 Dec. 2012, Kinshasa; Ann. 0.2.
8Item 4.0, Agreed Minute of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of Uganda/Democratic
Republic of Congo on the Implementation of the Ruling of the ICJ (2005), 24-27 Nov. 2014, Indaba, Johannesburg;
Ann. 0.3.
9The Agreed Minutes of the 4th Meeting of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of
Uganda on the Implementation of the Judgement of ICJ of 19th December 2005, held in Pretoria, South Africa, on
17-19 Mar. 2015; Ann. 0.4.
10Ibid.
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19 March 2015 expressly states that the ministers responsible for leading the said
negotiations decided that there should be ‘no further negotiations’ since ‘no consensus
[had been] reached’ between the Parties”11.
Consequently, the Court decided to:
“resume the proceedings in the case with regard to the question of
reparations; . . . fi[x] 6 January 2016 as the time-limit for the filing, by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, of a Memorial on the reparations which it
considers to be owed to it by the Republic of Uganda, and for the filing, by the
Republic of Uganda, of a Memorial on the reparations which it considers to be owed
to it by the Democratic Republic of the Congo”12.
The Order thus set a time-limit of 6 January 2016 for the Parties to file their respective memorials
simultaneously.
0.12. The DRC having requested two extensions of this time-limit on account of difficulties
encountered in preparing its Memorial13, the Court made a further Order dated 11 April 2016.
According to the Order,
“Whereas, by a letter dated 31 March 2016 and received in the Registry on the
same day, the Congolese Minister of Justice and Human Rights and Keeper of the
Seals asked the Court, for the reasons given in that letter, for an additional time-limit
of ten months for the filing of his Government’s Memorial;
Whereas, by a letter dated 6 April 2016 and received in the Registry on the
same day, the Agent of the Republic of Uganda indicated, inter alia, that his
Government was prepared to agree to a three-month extension of the time-limit for the
filing of the Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on reparations;
Taking account of the views of the Parties;
[The Court e]xtends to 28 September 2016 the time-limit for the filing, by the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, of a Memorial on the reparations which it
considers to be owed to it by the Republic of Uganda, and for the filing, by the
Republic of Uganda, of a Memorial on the reparations which it considers to be owed
to it by the Democratic Republic of the Congo”14.
0.13. In accordance with that Order, this Memorial presents and explains the DRC’s
arguments on the reparations owed by the Republic of Uganda for all the breaches of international
law established by the Court in its Judgment of 19 December 2005.
0.14. Although it is difficult to draw comparisons in areas so varied as those which the Court
has had occasion to deal with over the course of its history, the present case is probably
11Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Order of
1 July 2015, para. 7.
12Ibid., para. 8.
13First see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Order
of 10 Dec. 2015.
14Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Order of
11 Apr. 2016.
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unprecedented. A State has effectively been convicted of serious breaches of the basic rules of
public international law. The principal elements of the operative part of the 2005 Judgment,
recalled above, speak volumes in this regard. By militarily intervening in DRC territory, by
lending military support to the irregular forces acting in that territory, and by being responsible for
“acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhumane treatment of the Congolese civilian
population” and “acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources”,
Uganda “violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of
non-intervention . . ., violated its obligations under international human rights law and international
humanitarian law [and other] . . . obligations owed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under
international law”15. Uganda was thus recognized as being guilty of breaches of such imperative
rules as the prohibition of the use of force and the prohibition of torture, as well as other
fundamental rules relating, in particular, to the right of occupation.
0.15. The DRC is entitled to reparation for all the damage resulting from the numerous
breaches of international law committed by Uganda in Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003.
The scale and diverse nature of these breaches have obviously made the task at hand particularly
difficult for the Applicant, which has had to identify, assess and prove the extent of particularly
serious damage occurring over a period of nearly five years in a territory covering several hundred
thousand square kilometres.
0.16. Never in the history of the Court has a State been faced with such a monumental task.
In the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case, which is undoubtedly
the one that bears most resemblance to the present case, a State that was the victim of serious
breaches of international law also had to conduct an assessment of the damage that had been caused
by foreign military intervention16. It should of course be noted, however, that the intervention in
that case cannot be likened to that for which Uganda was responsible, by invading and then
occupying a substantial part of DRC territory, thereby causing many human casualties and
considerable damage to property, and by massively plundering its very diverse natural resources.
0.17. In this Memorial, the DRC will endeavour to present and quantify the extent of the
damage in question. First, taking a geographical approach, the damage caused by the invasion as
such will be presented for each of the regions concerned (Chapter II), dealing separately with the
particular case of the occupation of Ituri (Chapter III) and that of the hostilities which took place in
Kisangani in 1999 and 2000 (Chapter IV). Next, the more specific damage caused by the illegal
exploitation of natural resources in the Congo will be examined (Chapter V). Lastly, the harm that
was done to the DRC’s economy as a whole by the war which ravaged the country between 1998
and 2003 will be reviewed, bearing in mind that only part of the overall damage will be attributed
to Uganda (Chapter VI). The final amount of the reparation requested will be determined on this
basis in the final section of the DRC’s arguments (Chapter VII). First, however, the DRC will
recall the legal principles which apply to this phase of the procedure (Chapter I).
15Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 280-281, para. 345.
16Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Memorial of Nicaragua (Compensation), 29 Mar. 1988, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9621.pdf.
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CHAPTER 1. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND THE METHODOLOGY
FOLLOWED BY THE DRC
1.01. The legal principles applicable in respect of reparation were set forth by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the Factory at Chorzów case. On that occasion, the Court pointed
out that it is well-established in international law that a State which is responsible for an
internationally wrongful act must make good the injury which it has caused17. In that precedent,
regarded as emblematic for all issues relating to reparation, the PCIJ stated that:
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act . . . is that
reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum
corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear . . . such are the
principles which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act
contrary to international law.”18
1.02. This conception was reiterated in the International Law Commission’s 2001 articles on
State responsibility. Article 31 provides that “[t]he responsible State is under an obligation to make
full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”, adding that the injury
“includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a
State”19. The principle of full reparation has also been systematically confirmed and applied in the
most varied international jurisprudence, including that of regional courts, arbitral tribunals and
claims commissions, as well as human rights bodies. With specific regard to the jurisprudence of
the International Court of Justice, the first case that should be mentioned is that of the Corfu
Channel, in which the Court affirmed that “there [was] a duty upon Albania to pay compensation to
the United Kingdom”20. A judgment specifically focusing on the issue of compensation followed a
few months after the Court’s Judgment on the merits in that case21. The principle of the obligation
to make reparation has since been consistently reconfirmed in extensive jurisprudence. References
to it have been made in the cases concerning Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations22, the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia)23, Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory24, Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro)25, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay)26 and
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo)27.
17Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21.
18Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47.
19Yearbook of the International Law Commission (YILC), 2001, Vol. II, and Annex to resolution 56/83 adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 Dec. 2001.
20Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 23.
21Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Assessment of Amount of Compensation, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1949, pp. 244 et seq.
22Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 184.
23Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 81, para. 152.
24Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 198, para. 152.
25Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 232-233, para. 460.
26Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), pp. 103-104, paras. 273-274.
27Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (II), p. 691, para. 161.
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1.03. On the basis of this very general principle, the DRC has already, in previous phases of
these proceedings, made several observations regarding the legal principles applicable in respect of
reparation. Before setting out the DRC’s current position on that issue (Section 2) and providing
details of the methodology employed for collecting the evidence used in this Memorial and
annexed to it (Section 3), the positions previously adopted by the Parties in this respect will be
briefly recalled, particularly in so far as a common position might be discerned from them with
regard to the applicable principles (Section 1).
Section 1. The Parties’ positions on the issue of reparation in previous
phases of the proceedings
1.04. The Parties, and more particularly the DRC, have presented relatively clear views on
the issue of reparation in previous phases of these proceedings. The relevant excerpts from the
various written pleadings filed during the merits phase will be reproduced here, with the aim of
recalling the positions previously expressed on this subject.
A. The DRC’s Memorial
1.05. In its Memorial filed on 6 July 2000, the DRC sought to identify the legal principles
which were to govern the reparation phase. Those principles have essentially been established and
defined on the basis of the International Law Commission’s proceedings relating to the
international responsibility of States, which are generally considered to have codified customary
international law to a large extent28. This applies in particular to what became Article 34 of the text
ultimately adopted in 2001, which establishes the principle of “full reparation”29, and to Article 36,
which focuses specifically on compensation. According to that provision,
“1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an
obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not
made good by restitution.
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including
loss of profits insofar as it is established.”30
1.06. In the present case, restitution can now be envisaged only on an exceptional basis. It
could be appropriate only in respect of the material losses suffered by the State (through its army,
whose equipment was destroyed or taken by the invader), by private individuals whose property
was stolen, by businesses whose equipment was damaged or taken by the invader, etc. Considering
how much time has elapsed since the events, however, this means of reparation appears largely
theoretical. One must therefore refer primarily to the principle of compensation in order to remedy
the breaches of international law committed by Uganda against the DRC between 1998 and 2003.
That forms the basis for all the legal principles that can be applied in the present case. Those
principles may be summarized as follows, moving from the general to the particular.
28James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and
Commentaries, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
29Draft articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Annex to resolution 56/83
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 Dec. 2001.
30Ibid.
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1.07. In general terms, the DRC first recalled in its 2000 Memorial that, since reparation had
to be “full” and to cover “any financially assessable damage” (according to the terms of the
above-mentioned Articles 34 and 36), the obligation applied:
 regardless of the international obligation that was breached31, whether it concerns jus contra
bellum, jus in bello, human rights or other applicable legal principles; there should thus be no
question of the Respondent claiming that the specific nature of a particular rule of law
precludes the Applicant’s right to reparation;
 no matter how remote the causal link between the wrongful act and the damage suffered32;
there should thus be no question of the Respondent claiming that a particular type of damage
cannot be made good because it is not the immediate consequence of the wrongful act;
 irrespective of the type of damage caused33; there should thus be no question of the
Respondent claiming that the specific nature of a particular type of damage, whether material
or moral, precludes the Applicant’s right to reparation.
Several references to the proceedings of the International Law Commission codifying customary
international law were provided in support of these three general principles34.
1.08. The DRC then focused on the more specific issue — particularly relevant in the present
case — of multiple causes of a particular injury. Indeed, some of the damage discussed in the body
of this Memorial was caused not only by wrongful conduct on the part of Uganda, but also by other
factors and conduct, sometimes attributable to other actors, such as third-party States or non-State
groups.
1.09. In this context, the DRC has relied on the following customary principle established by
the International Law Commission:
“[r]ather than the directness of the damage, the criterion is thus indicated as the
presence of a clear and unbroken causal link between the unlawful act and the injury
for which damages are being claimed”35.
Consequently, and in accordance with international jurisprudence, the only exclusion from the
obligation of reparation is:
“damage that is connected to the initial act only by an unforeseen chain of exceptional
circumstances which occurred only because of a combination of causes alien to the
author’s will and not foreseeable on his part”36.
On that basis, the Commission established the following criteria:
31Memorial of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MDRC), p. 248, paras. 6.34-6.35.
32Ibid., pp. 248-253, paras. 6.36-6.45.
33Ibid., pp. 254-258, paras. 6.46-6.56.
34Ibid.
35Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-fifth session (3 May-23 July 1993),
document A/48/10, YILC, 1993, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 69, para. 7.
36Naulilaa case (Portugal v. Germany), Award of 31 July 1928, United Nations Reports of International Arbitral
Awards (RIAA), Vol. II, p. 1031.
16
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“(a) Damages must be fully paid in respect of injuries that have been caused
immediately and exclusively by the wrongful act;
(b) Damages must be fully paid in respect of injuries for which the wrongful act is the
exclusive cause, even though they may be linked to that act not by an immediate
relationship but by a series of events each exclusively linked with each other by a
cause-and-effect relationship. Causation is thus to be presumed not only in the
presence of a relationship of ‘proximate causation’. It is to be presumed whenever
the damage is linked to the wrongful act by a chain of events which, however long,
is uninterrupted;
(c) Consideration must be given to cases in which injuries are not caused exclusively
by an unlawful act but have been produced also by concomitant causes among
which the wrongful act plays a decisive but not exclusive role [ . . . In this case,
t]he solution should be the payment of damages in proportion to the amount of
injury presumably to be attributed to the wrongful act and its effects, the amount to
be awarded being determined on the basis of the criteria of normality and
predictability.”37
The key is thus to establish an uninterrupted chain of events linking the damage to Uganda’s
wrongful conduct, even if there are also concomitant causes which may have played a role in the
occurrence or extent of the damage in question.
1.10. From the outset, these criteria were pointed to by the DRC as those which should guide
the Court in assessing the extent of the reparations owed by Uganda. More specifically, and to
quote the DRC’s Memorial again:
“If we apply these criteria to the instant case, we may state provisionally and
subject to adjustment in the light of the specific circumstances of each injury, that:
 damage caused by acts attributable directly to Ugandan agents falls into the first
category and therefore entails an obligation of compensation in full;
 damage that was caused by acts of Congolese irregular forces but could not have
been caused without the support of Uganda fall, in principle, into the second
category and should accordingly be compensated in full;
 damage flowing from the costs incurred by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in seeking to repel the attack by several foreign States fall
into the third category and should therefore entail compensation in proportion to
the wrongful acts attributable to Uganda.”38
Applying that rationale, the DRC then explicitly referred to the following approach in its
submissions39:
“To recapitulate, the compensation will cover damage that cannot be made good
by restitution in kind, including, purely by way of illustration:
37MDRC, pp. 252-253, para. 6.44; emphasis added.
38Ibid., p. 253, para. 6.45.
39Ibid., para. 4 of the submissions, pp. 274-275.
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 material damage caused by Uganda’s armed activities or its support to irregular
forces, such as the destruction of military matériel, buildings or public
installations, including components of road, rail or river communication facilities
and the exploitation and plundering of many natural resources;
 losses or loss of profits sustained by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, inter
alia as a result of the suspension or termination of economic, commercial or
financial activities, including mining — especially diamond mining —,
agriculture, fishing and stock farming, as well as losses of export earnings and the
resulting increase in the cost of imports;
 the costs incurred by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on a scale to be
determined in due course, in seeking to bring about the cessation of the Ugandan
attack and its consequences, in particular the increase in its military budget and its
disbursements for the purpose of territorial defence, including payments made to
secure external military assistance;
 the human losses sustained as a result of human rights violations ensuing from
acts of oppression committed by the Ugandan armed forces and from their support
for irregular forces operating on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo; the costs that these violations entailed, particularly in terms of health and
medical care, including non material injuries suffered by relatives and dependents
of the victims;
 in more general terms, the harm inflicted on the development potential of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, both by the direct economic losses referred to
above and the decline in short and medium term investment due to the climate of
insecurity prevailing on Congolese territory following the Ugandan attack, and by
the sense of insecurity that this climate may generate in the longer term, even after
peace has been restored;
 interest on the principal amount in respect of earnings on the sum that the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has been unable to use owing to all the
above-mentioned heads of damage.”40
1.11. However, from the beginning, the DRC also sought to temper the inherent complexity
of making reparation for such diverse types of damage, by pointing out that “there is nothing to
prevent the Court from fixing a global sum . . .”41. In view of the particular circumstances and
extreme difficulties which characterize the case under consideration, the DRC stressed from the
outset that such an approach presented significant advantages. It is difficult to imagine how war
damages could be calculated simply by making an exhaustive tally of individual injuries and then
adding them up mathematically. That is why the DRC’s Memorial indicated that an overall sum
was both necessary and desirable, “be it a global sum or a sum broken down more clearly into
compensation for damage stricto sensu and satisfaction consisting of damages reflecting the gravity
of the infringements . . .”42. The DRC did not, however, call into question the evidentiary
requirements applicable to the damage.
40Ibid., pp. 261-263, para. 6.65.
41Ibid., pp. 267-268, para. 6.76.
42Ibid., pp. 267-268, paras. 6.76-6.77.
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1.12. In short, from the moment the first written pleading was filed by the DRC in the
present case, the legal principles applicable to reparation were identified and clarified, and even
began to be applied to the proceedings.
B. Uganda’s Counter-Memorial
1.13. In its Counter-Memorial, filed on 21 April 2001, Uganda raised no objections to the
DRC’s arguments as to the legal principles applicable in respect of reparation. At most, the
Respondent characterized them as “abstract questions of the law of reparation . . .”43, without going
so far as to challenge them or even qualify their content.
C. The DRC’s Reply
1.14. In its Reply of 29 May 2002, the DRC noted this absence of protest and concluded that
there was:
“agreement between the Parties on all the principles relating to reparation which were
stated and elaborated by the DRC in its Memorial and were not disputed by Uganda.
The DRC notes this with satisfaction, and will therefore confine itself to restating in
the present Reply the claim for reparation already set out in its Memorial”44.
Accordingly, point 4 of the DRC’s submissions stated as follows:
“in light of all the violations set out above, the Republic of Uganda shall, in
accordance with customary international law: . . .
 make reparation for all types of damage caused by all types of wrongful act
attributable to it, no matter how remote the causal link between the acts and the
damage concerned;
 accordingly, make reparation in kind where this is still physically possible, in
particular in regard to any Congolese resources, assets or wealth still in its
possession;
 failing this, furnish a sum covering the whole of the damage suffered, including, in
particular, the examples set out in paragraph 6.65 of the Memorial of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and restated in paragraph 1.58 of
the . . . Reply;
 further, in any event, render satisfaction for the injuries inflicted upon the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the form of official apologies, the payment
of damages reflecting the gravity of the violations and the prosecution of all those
responsible . . .”45.
The DRC’s position on reparation was thus clearly reiterated, both in the Reply itself and in the
submissions formally transmitted to the Court.
43Counter-Memorial of the Republic of Uganda (CMU), p. 85, para. 123.
44Reply of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (RDRC), p. 35, para. 1.60.
45Ibid., p. 399.
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D. Uganda’s Rejoinder
1.15. In its Rejoinder filed on 6 December 2002, Uganda made no arguments in respect of
the right to reparation. It simply asserted that there was: “a fundamental confusion in the
Memorial between the proof of violations of legal obligations and the issue of quantum of damage
(or compensation) . . . the confusion persists”46. On the other hand, the substance of the DRC’s
arguments as to the principles which should guide the Court in assessing reparations was not called
into question. In a passage of fewer than 15 lines concerning the “alleged” or “so-called
admissions by Uganda”47, Uganda does not revisit this particular issue but seems instead to focus
its criticism on other elements of the DRC’s written pleadings48. Nor do the Respondent’s
submissions contain any refutation of the viewpoint expressed and set forth in detail by the DRC
with regard to the issue of reparation49.
E. The oral phase of the proceedings
1.16. The issue of reparation was not addressed during the oral proceedings, which took
place from 11 to 29 April 2005.
F. The negotiation phase following the Court’s Judgment of 19 December 2005
1.17. During the negotiations — briefly recalled above50 — which took place over a period
of several years after the Court had rendered its Judgment, the Parties put forward various claims
and arguments of fact and law. All the views expressed in this context were done so for the sole
purpose of the negotiations, and not in the context of judicial proceedings. In particular, neither
Party adopted any official, public legal position during that period. As recalled above, the dispute
could not be settled through negotiations, and hence was eventually referred to the Court. It is thus
only in the context of the present proceedings that legal positions will be officially exchanged, with
the Parties remaining completely free to revise, adjust or withdraw all or part of the positions they
expressed during the informal negotiation phase. Here, the DRC’s stance on the legal principles
applicable to the reparation phase remains unchanged from the position it has asserted in previous
phases of the proceedings before the Court.
Section 2. The DRC’s current position on the issue of reparation
1.18. The DRC fully stands by the position that it has expressed since 6 July 2000 with
regard to the legal principles applicable to reparation. As indicated above, this position is based on
the proceedings of the International Law Commission which have codified customary law to a
large extent51. Those proceedings form the basis on which all the issues relating to reparation in
the present case must be examined.
1.19. The Court applied these principles, moreover, in the Judgment of 19 December 2005,
in affirming:
46Rejoinder of the Republic of Uganda (RU), p. 10, paras. 30-31.
47Ibid., p. 15, paras. 43-44.
48Ibid., p. 15, para. 44.
49Ibid., p. 333.
50See above, Introduction to this Memorial, paras. 0.02-0.10.
51James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and
Commentaries, op. cit.
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“that it is well established in general international law that a State which bears
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by that act (see Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction,
1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 21; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 81, para. 152; Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2004, p. 59, para. 119). Upon examination of the case file, given the
character of the internationally wrongful acts for which Uganda has been found
responsible (illegal use of force, violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity,
military intervention, occupation of Ituri, violations of international human rights law
and of international humanitarian law, looting, plunder and exploitation of the DRC’s
natural resources), the Court considers that those acts resulted in injury to the DRC
and to persons on its territory. Having satisfied itself that this injury was caused to the
DRC by Uganda, the Court finds that Uganda has an obligation to make reparation
accordingly”52.
Accordingly, coverage extends to both the damage suffered by the Congolese State itself (whether
to its property or organs) and the damage suffered by persons (natural or legal) who were on the
DRC’s territory at the time of the events.
1.20. There is also extensive jurisprudence illustrating the relevance of the principles
established by the International Law Commission. For example, in its Judgment of 2012 on the
claim for compensation presented by Guinea in the case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, the
Court stated that, in the light of the “fundamental character of the human rights obligations
breached and [the] claim for reparation in the form of compensation, [ . . .it] is of the opinion that,
in addition to a judicial finding of the violations, reparation due . . . must take the form of
compensation”53. In that same case, the Court set forth the methodology to be applied in dealing
with such a claim — a methodology which fully reflects the customary principles recalled above:
“As to each head [of damage identified by Guinea], the Court will consider
whether an injury is established. It will then ascertain whether, and to what extent, the
injury asserted by the Applicant is the consequence of wrongful conduct by the
Respondent [ . . . analysing] whether there is a sufficiently direct and certain causal
nexus between the wrongful act . . . and the injury suffered by the Applicant
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2007 (I), pp. 233-234, para. 462). If the existence of injury and causation is
established, the Court will then determine the valuation.”54
A similar approach had been taken in the case concerning Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro. On that occasion, the Court examined “whether, and to what extent, the injury
52Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 257, para. 259; emphasis added.
53Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2010 (II), p. 691, para. 161.
54Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p. 332, para. 14.
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asserted by the Applicant is the consequence of wrongful conduct by the Respondent”, so as to
establish whether there was in fact “a sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the
wrongful act . . . and the injury suffered by the Applicant, consisting of all damage of any type,
material or moral”55.
1.21. However, it should first be noted that no particular precedent is transposable wholesale
to the present case. Without revisiting here all the cases in which the issue of reparation has given
rise to legal debate, it should be mentioned that a number of those cases are based either on
particular treaty régimes or the like (as in the case of the Treaty of Versailles and those that
followed it56, or the reparations sought from Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait57), or, in terms
of jurisprudence, on special agreements restricting the law to be applied by the tribunal in question
(as in the Eritrea/Ethiopia case58).
1.22. In the end, and while the DRC has already pointed out that the violations identified
were of a much smaller scale, the only precedent similar to the present case is that of the Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. In its Memorial on the question of
compensation, filed on 29 March 1988, Nicaragua asked the Court to apply legal principles that
bear some similarity to those which the DRC is reasserting now59. In particular, Nicaragua sought
reparation for all the injuries caused by the Respondent, regardless of the type of wrongful act or
damage concerned and no matter how remote the causal link between them. However, the case
was removed from the general list on 26 September 199160, and the Court therefore did not, in the
end, deliver any judgment that might have set a precedent with regard to injury caused by violation
of the principles of non-use of force, non-intervention or respect for human rights. In these
circumstances, it is necessary to refer to the general principles established by the International Law
Commission in its proceedings on State responsibility, which are reflected not only in the
jurisprudence of the Court, but also in scholarly opinion61.
1.23. As previously mentioned (see Section 1 above), Uganda has never challenged those
legal principles in these proceedings. One might even consider that, given its utter silence, Uganda
has implicitly accepted them, while the DRC, in contrast, has expressed and reiterated its position
in the body of its Memorial and Reply, as well as in its submissions. There is thus no reason, at
this stage, for the DRC to expand further on these legal questions. However, attention should be
briefly drawn to two points.
55Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), pp. 233-234, para. 462.
56Treaty of Versailles, 1919, pp. 5 et seq., [available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/must000002-
0043.pdf].
57See the exclusions established by the United Nations Compensation Commission in its decision
S/AC.26/1992/11 of 26 June 1992 and decision S/AC.26/Dec.19 (1994) of 24 Mar. 1994.
58Art. 5.1 in fine of the Algiers Agreement of 12 Dec. 2000 (doc. A/55/686-S/2000/1183); Eritrea-Ethiopia
Claims Commission, Final Award  Eritrea’s Damages Claims, 17 Aug. 2009, RIAA., Vol. XXVI, pp. 505 et seq.
59Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Memorial of Nicaragua (Compensation), 29 Mar. 1988, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/9621.pdf.
60Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Order
of 26 September 1991, I.C.J. Reports 1991, pp. 44 et seq.
61See, for example, Brigitte Stern, “The Obligation to Make Reparation” in The Law of International
Responsibility, James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds.), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010,
pp. 563-571.
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1.24. First, it is recalled that a distinction will be made between:
 the injury caused by the organs of the Ugandan State themselves — damage for which full
reparation will be sought;
 the injury caused by the irregular forces supported by Uganda in breach of international law —
damage for which full reparation will also be sought, given that, save in exceptional and
unforeseeable circumstances, such damage logically stems from that unlawful support, in the
sense that it could not have been caused without it; in this instance, it is not a question of
attributing the acts of irregular forces to Uganda, but of making reparation for damage which
presents an uninterrupted causal link with the wrongful conduct constituted by Uganda’s
support for those forces;
 the injury caused by the wrongful conduct of both Uganda and other States or groups which
were not supported by Uganda — damage for which partial reparation will be sought, taking
account of the multiple causes involved; more specifically, in light of the importance of
Rwanda’s role in the conflict, and the existence of the — more limited — role played by
Burundi, the DRC finds it reasonable that Uganda could be obliged to make reparation for only
45 per cent of the damage falling into this category.
1.25. Next, and as a preliminary, it needs to be explained why, in the remainder of this
Memorial, the DRC will not be distinguishing between types of injury according to the types of
rules of international law which have been breached by Uganda. In its Judgment of
19 December 2005, the Court condemned Uganda for violating the principle of non-use of force
and the principle of non-intervention (paragraph 1 of the operative part), international human rights
law and international humanitarian law (ibid., paragraph 3) and other “obligations owed . . . under
international law” (ibid., paragraph 4)62. In practice, however, all of the damage caused by
Uganda’s wrongful conduct actually stems from the invasion of Congolese territory that began in
August 1998 and from the support which Uganda provided to irregular groups as from that date.
There is no reason — and this is in keeping with the legal principles recalled above — to
distinguish between types of injury on the basis of the legal rule that was breached, even if the
specific nature of certain rules may on occasion be taken into account in order to gauge the
seriousness of the damage. What is important, on the whole, is to demonstrate that all of this
damage was in fact the consequence of wrongful conduct by Uganda, regardless of whether that
consequence was immediate or resulted from an uninterrupted chain of events.
1.26. This general approach will of course be applied according to the particular nature of the
events described in the following chapters. However, an explanation will first be provided as to the
methodology employed by the DRC in collecting the documents annexed to this Memorial, which
represent one of the principal factual bases for its claim.
Section 3. The methodology employed by the DRC in collecting evidence
in support of the present claim
1.27. Following the Judgment delivered by the Court on 19 December 2005, the DRC took
all reasonable steps in seeking to produce evidence that could be used to assess the countless
instances of damage which resulted from Uganda’s breach of its international obligations.
62Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 280-281, para. 345.
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1.28. After several months spent examining different aspects of the case in minute detail, the
DRC’s Ministry of Justice and Human Rights set up a commission composed of 23 Congolese
experts appointed by the Office of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister’s Office, the
Ministry of National Defence and Former Combatants, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Co-operation, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, the Planning Ministry, the
Budget Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the Economy Ministry, the Ministry of Mines, the
Environment Ministry, the Tourism Ministry, the Central Bank of the DRC and other public
services directly affected by the findings of the Judgment rendered by the Court63. The
commission included a co-ordination committee composed of a chairman (the Justice Minister), a
co-ordinator and a secretary. It met twice a week at the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.
1.29. Data was initially collected in 2007 by a group of civil-society investigators, with the
support of an international non-governmental organization known as the International Centre for
Transitional Justice (or ICTJ). A second phase was carried out in 2013 by a civil-society action
committee from Kisangani, composed of local non-governmental organizations and victims’
associations, with technical and financial support from the ICTJ. The victim identification
operations carried out by civil-society groups in those two years were limited to the cities of
Kisangani and Bunia, however.
1.30. More extensive data collection then took place in several stages. First, the groundwork
was begun, which involved developing a questionnaire to be given to victims. This questionnaire,
known as a “victim identification form”, includes essential information on the identity of the
victim, the nature of the injury suffered, the time and place of the events, and the type of reparation
envisaged. Teams were then sent to the communes in question to meet the victims where they
lived. These teams were made up for the most part of police officers and sworn public officials,
under the authority of senior members of the judiciary. They travelled to the cities of Kisangani (in
Orientale province at the time), Beni and Butembo (North Kivu province), Gemena and its vicinity
(in Equateur province at the time), and Bunia (administrative centre of the Ituri district). In order
to identify and subsequently to have access to certain victims, the investigators contacted, in
particular, the Fédération des Entreprises du Congo (Congolese business federation), the heads of
large public corporations, members of the national parliament elected in the areas in question, the
provincial and local administrative authorities, leaders of tribal communities, certain heads of
NGOs (such as FIDH), and various media outlets present on site.
1.31. In 2008, the Commission thus met face-to-face with thousands of victims who were
still alive, or with the dependants of victims who had died. Victims who could read and write
completed the forms on their own, in the presence of police officers who had come from Kinshasa
or been requisitioned locally by the Public Prosecutor’s offices in Kisangani, Bunia, Beni,
Butembo, Gemena and Gbadolite. Illiterate victims were accompanied by an interpreter and a
witness, whose names appear on the back of each form, so as to ensure the authenticity and
conformity of the declaration made and its translation into French. At the end of each interview,
the victim would append his or her signature or fingerprint, and the interpreter or witness would do
likewise. Many forms also bear the seal of the Congolese courts with jurisdiction in the areas
where the investigations took place.
1.32. All these forms were sorted into different categories (natural persons, the Congolese
State, public corporations, commercial companies, private establishments, not-for-profit
63Ministerial Order No. 0002/CAB/J&DH/2008 of 26 February 2008 establishing an Expert Commission in
charge of identifying and assessing the damage caused by Uganda to the DRC and its peoples following the armed attack
and occupation of Congolese territory by Ugandan troops between 1998 and 2003; Ann. 1.1.
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associations, NGOs and other entities) and then examined in detail and analysed using tables and
comparison grids, indicating, amongst other things, the locations involved and the types of injury
suffered. The latter varied, and included death, bodily harm, loss of property, and fleeing into the
forest as a result of the use of violence by the Ugandan forces or the groups supported by Uganda.
It also affected different categories of victims: public bodies or corporations, private commercial
companies, non-governmental associations, private individuals, etc. In addition to the forms, the
Commission also collected other evidence, such as documentary films, photographs, war-related
objects and remnants (shrapnel, ammunition, etc.), reports from local and international NGOs,
video testimonies of victims, death certificates and other medical or judicial documents.
1.33. This work of gathering information from the victims themselves, several years after the
end of the war, proved to be a particularly difficult and delicate task. A number of factors made
collecting evidence in the field more complicated, such as:
 the low level of education of the majority of the victims;
 the difficulty for the victims of remembering the precise circumstances of events which were
both deeply traumatising and, in some instances, took place long ago;
 the difficulties involved in finding official documents, such as identity papers and death
certificates, for the whole of the war period, which was characterized by serious
disorganization across all public and administrative services;
 the destruction of houses and buildings, which led to the deterioration or loss of evidence.
1.34. The administrations of certain ministries, public services, businesses and associations
also provided the Commission with documents showing the damage they had suffered as a
consequence of the internationally wrongful acts committed on the territory of the Congo
between 1998 and 2003, for which Uganda was responsible. These data were consolidated and
classified by category.
1.35. On this basis, almost 10,000 records (documents consisting of between two and
four pages) were drawn up, taken back to Kinshasa and subsequently studied by a new commission
created by a Ministerial Order dated 19 December 201564. Each record contains the information
collected in the field, including the victim’s name, details of the injury suffered and, in some cases,
an approximate evaluation of the damage. These records are annexed to this Memorial; they are
accessible via a piece of software which allows searches to be carried out using various criteria,
such as location, type of damage or a victim’s name65.
1.36. Alongside this empirical approach, based on research carried out on the ground, the
DRC collected information from reports drawn up by various — mainly international — sources
which had access to the areas in question during the critical period. These include, in particular:
64Ministerial Order No. 049/CAB/MIN/JGS&DH of 19 December 2015 establishing a commission responsible
for defending the interests of the DRC in the second phase of the proceedings before the International Court of Justice
relating to the fixing of the amount of the reparations owed by Uganda; Ann. 1.2.
65Ann. 1.3.
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 the Report of the Mapping Exercise of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (hereinafter “the Mapping Report”)66;
 a report drawn up in 2000 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on the
situation of human rights in the DRC67;
 MONUC’s 2004 special report “on the events in Ituri”68;
 various reports and addenda of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(hereinafter the “United Nations Panel of Experts”)69;
 the report of Uganda’s Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (hereinafter “the Porter Commission”)70.
1.37. The DRC’s use of the reports produced by international organizations (especially the
United Nations) and national and international NGOs, as well as various experts, has focused on
identifying as accurately as possible the injury caused by Uganda’s conduct. When cost
evaluations of the extent of the damage suffered were provided in these documents, they have
generally formed the basis of the claims presented in this Memorial.
1.38. Sometimes, the differences in assessment between these two approaches — one
inductive, based on research carried out on the ground once the conflict had ended; the other
deductive, based on local and international sources published during or after the war — are not
insignificant. There is nothing surprising in this. These differences are due above all to the fact
that the inquiries launched by the DRC in the regions concerned could only be carried out several
years after the facts — often long after most of the international reports had been produced on the
basis of information collected in situ at the time of the events.
1.39. They can also be explained by the methodologies used. The records were drawn up by
police officers on an individual basis, with a view to establishing the precise injuries suffered in the
course of the conflict. Despite the efforts of the Congolese State to conduct that exercise
66United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise
documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, Aug. 2010; Ann. 1.4.
67United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-sixth Session, Report on the situation of human rights in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/56, document E/CN.4/2000/42, 18 Jan. 2000; Ann. 1.5.
68MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003, document S/2004/573,
16 July 2004, Ann. 1.6.
69United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/357, 12 Apr. 2001;
Ann. 1.7; United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/1072,
13 Nov. 2001; Ann. 1.8; United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2002/565, 22 May 2002; Ann. 1.9; United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2002/1146, 16 Oct. 2002; Ann. 1.10.
70Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2001 (“Porter Commission”), Final Report, Nov. 2002; Ann. 1.11.
30
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thoroughly, the resources available to the investigators for the purpose were limited and did not
allow them to produce an exhaustive map of the damage suffered in this context. In particular, a
number of areas were still difficult to access at the time those inquiries were conducted, due mainly
to the continuing lack of security there. The international reports, on the other hand, clearly did not
have the same objective. Their purpose was to make a general assessment of the material and
human damage caused by the conflict. While they provide valuable information on a series of
specific events, they are in no way detailed enough to allow the injuries suffered on an individual
level as a result of those events to be established. The overall assessments they contain are
nonetheless of value, because they indicate the orders of magnitude of the injuries resulting from
Uganda’s breaches of its international obligations.
1.40. Consequently, in conducting these inquiries after the end of the war, the DRC does not
claim to have been exhaustive or to have succeeded in establishing all the injuries suffered. The
thousands of cases registered are merely examples illustrating the reality and extent of the damage
suffered on the ground. They must be viewed alongside the figures resulting from the various
reports, which have a more general and overall purpose. Ultimately, and in view of the particular
nature of war-related damage, which, by definition, cannot be identified and evaluated
systematically, the DRC has thus been obliged to make assessments which, while general, are
based on a variety of solid and reliable evidence.
1.41. This evidence will be presented in the following chapters, with the final chapter
devoted to an overall monetary evaluation, which will represent the DRC’s claim at this stage of
the proceedings.
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CHAPTER 2. THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
FOLLOWING THE INVASION OF ITS TERRITORY BY UGANDA
2.01. The advance of the Ugandan army (Uganda People’s Defence Forces, hereinafter
UPDF) into Congolese territory, from early August 1998 onwards, took place in several different
stages, each of which was marked by considerable damage inflicted upon the Congolese people and
State. In the terms of the Judgment handed down by the Court on 19 December 2005, “[t]he
evidence has shown that the UPDF traversed vast areas of the DRC, violating the sovereignty of
that country. It engaged in military operations in a multitude of locations.”71
2.02. The aim of this chapter is to determine the injuries arising from the invasion of the
DRC’s territory by Uganda, subject to both geographical and thematic limitations. First, the losses
and damage caused in Ituri province and in the city of Kisangani will not be included at this stage,
since they are the subject of separate chapters72. Nor will harm done to natural resources and
damage of a macro-economic nature be included here, since these issues are also dealt with in two
specific chapters73. At this stage the main focus will therefore be on harm done to persons (death,
injury, torture, deportation, abduction, arbitrary arrest, flight into the forest, etc.) or damage to
property (buildings or goods destroyed or stolen, extortion, looting, theft, embezzlement, etc.)
caused by the arrival and subsequent stationing of Ugandan troops in various parts of Congolese
territory, other than the Ituri region and the city of Kisangani.
2.03. The invasion of the DRC’s territory by Ugandan forces took place in various stages,
which will be outlined briefly in the first part of this chapter, taking the Court’s Judgment as a basis
(Section 1). Subsequently, a number of injuries will be described, following the order in which the
Ugandan troops advanced, province by province. That part of the chapter will thus start with the
damage caused in North Kivu province (Section 2) and continue with the damage recorded in
Orientale province (Section 3), then in Equateur province, in the north-west of the country
(Section 4). Finally, on the basis of these various findings, an overall assessment will be made of
the damage which occurred in those areas (Section 5).
2.04. Before the steps described above are taken, reference must be made to three
methodological precautions, which are derived from the legal principles set out above74.
2.05. First and foremost, no distinction will be drawn between injuries according to the rule
of international law which was broken in each instance  that is, whether they are primarily the
result of the breach of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations, the infringement
of the law of armed conflict, or the violation of international human rights law. In practical terms,
all the damage to persons and property in question results in any case from the invasion of the DRC
by Ugandan forces, whether in the short term (because such damage was incurred upon the arrival
of Ugandan troops) or the longer term (when it resulted from the repression of acts of resistance or,
more generally, from atrocities committed after the invasion strictu sensu had taken place).
71Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 224, para. 153.
72See Chaps. 3 and 4 below, respectively.
73See Chaps. 5 and 6 below, respectively.
74See Chap. 1, above.
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2.06. Secondly, and, as before, in accordance with the legal principles which were
highlighted in Chapter 1 of this Memorial, account will be taken of the damage caused both by the
Ugandan forces themselves and by the irregular forces with which the UPDF operated hand in
glove, in particular the self-styled Congo Liberation Movement (MLC, with its armed wing, the
“Congo Liberation Army”, ALC). In this instance, the approach is justified in so far as the damage
in question could not have been caused without Uganda’s support. It will be recalled that this
support was held to be contrary to international law by the Court, as shown by this passage from
the operative part of the Judgment of 19 December 2005:
“the Republic of Uganda, by engaging in military activities against the Democratic
Republic of the Congo on the latter’s territory, by occupying Ituri and by actively
extending military, logistic, economic and financial support to irregular forces having
operated on the territory of the DRC, violated the principle of non-use of force in
international relations and the principle of non-intervention”75.
Whether or not the damage in question arises from violations of humanitarian law or other rules of
international law on the part of the irregular forces concerned is, on the other hand, irrelevant.
Hence, for example, the killing of soldiers belonging to the Congolese armed forces by members of
the Congo Liberation Army, even though this practice allegedly complies, in theory, with the law
governing armed conflicts, constitutes an injury for which the DRC has a right to seek reparation.
The decisive criterion is not whether these acts are intrinsically lawful, still less whether they can
be attributed to Uganda. It lies in the finding that this harmful act would not have occurred without
Uganda’s support, which the Court explicitly deems unlawful, for these irregular forces.
2.07. Thirdly, and lastly, it should be noted that the DRC will highlight various examples
taken from international and national sources, and will also draw on the investigations it has carried
out on the ground76. Given the massive extent of the damage caused, it would obviously be illusory
to aspire to identify individually each specific injury caused during one of the deadliest conflicts of
recent decades. As a document on this subject drawn up by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights puts it: “No report . . . can adequately describe the horrors
experienced by the civilian population in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
where almost every single individual has an experience to narrate of suffering and loss.”77 It is
with this caveat in mind that the various stages of the Ugandan invasion and the ensuing damage
should now be reviewed.
Section 1. The different stages of the Ugandan invasion
2.08. From early August 1998 onwards, Ugandan forces invaded the DRC and took over a
significant number of localities in the east of the country. The progress of Ugandan troops can be
succinctly described in chronological order on the basis of the account provided by the Court in its
2005 Judgment. The maps, attached to the paragraphs which follow for purely illustrative
purposes, will clearly show how Ugandan troops gradually invaded substantial parts of Congolese
territory.
75Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 280, para. 345; emphasis added.
76See paras. 1.27 et seq. above.
77United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
Foreword, Navanethem Pillay, p. 1, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_
REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf; Ann. 1.4.
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2.09. The Judgment of 19 December 2005 first refers to the advance of Ugandan troops
along a route starting at Beni, in North Kivu, and subsequently moving northwards towards Bunia,
then Watsa: “The Court is satisfied that Beni was taken on 7 August, and Bunia on 13 August. . . .
[Subsequently, a 7th infantry Battalion operational force] ‘proceeded to Watsa which is 40 km
[away] where [it] arrived on 24 August 1998.’”78 The Court thereby makes explicit reference to the
taking of various localities, initially in North Kivu province, then in Orientale province, without, of
course, professing to describe every practical detail of the invasion during this first month.
Map No. 2.1.
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
2.10. In the next part of its account, the Court mentions troop movements along three routes.
The first two start from Watsa, one heading northwards up to Faridje, the other proceeding
westwards to Isiro via Munubele. The third route leads from Kisangani, a city taken under
Ugandan control on 1 September79, northwards towards Banalia, then Tele:
“Ugandan evidence before the Porter Commission in relation to the month of
September 1998 refers to Kisangani (1 September); Munubele (17 September);
Bengamisa (18 September); Banalia (19 September); Isiro (20 September); Faladje
(23 September); and Tele Bridge (29 September). Kisangani (1 September) and Isiro
(20 September) are acknowledged by Uganda as having been ‘taken’ by its forces (and
not just as locations passed through)”80.
78Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 207, para. 79; here the Court quotes a document from the Porter Commission (the mandate of this
body and the circumstances in which it was established are recalled in para. 18 of the Judgment; see also Chap. 5 below).
79For further details see Chap. 4 below.
80Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 207, para. 81.
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Here again, the Court confines itself to mentioning the best-known locations, and by no means
claims to provide an exhaustive list. Its account does, nonetheless, provide a clear picture of the
advance of Ugandan troops into northern DRC, and their movements from east to west and from
south to north, during this initial stage of the conflict.
Map No. 2.2.
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
2.11. The Court subsequently describes how Ugandan troops advanced and entered Equateur
province, following on from their previous movements. For example, although the Court does not
mention this explicitly, Isiro, which fell on 20 September 1998, was the starting-point from which
Ugandan forces made for Buta, to the west, then Dulia, in Equateur province. From there, they
followed two main routes: not only did they proceed down to Bafuasende, to the south-east, but
they also advanced on Bumba, Lisala and Benda, to the west. Furthermore, again with Buta as a
starting-point, Ugandan soldiers took Titure, and then Poko, before proceeding westwards, deeper
within Equateur province, towards Businga and Gemena:
“Both Parties agree that Buta was taken on 3 October and Dulia on 27 October.
The Porter Commission was informed that Ugandan troops were present at
Bafwasende on 12 October.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
There is agreement between the Parties that Bumba was taken on
17 November 1998.
Uganda claims that Lisala was taken on 12 December 1998. The list contained
in the Porter Commission exhibits makes reference to the location of Benda, with the
date of 13 December. Also listed are Titure (20 December) and Poko (22 December).
Uganda insists it ‘came to’ Businga on 28 December 1998 and not in early
36
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February 1999 as claimed by the DRC; and to Gemena on 25 December 1998, and
not on 10 July 1999 as also claimed by the DRC.”81
Map No. 2.3.
Legend:
République Ce = Central African Republic
Soudan = Sudan
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
2.12. The Court follows the same approach for the second year of the conflict, establishing
the chronological order of the various military operations, which led to the successive capture of a
number of locations during the first half of 199982. The Court also mentions the operations carried
out from Gbadolite in various parts of Equateur province83. The advance of Ugandan troops into
eastern DRC thus continued throughout 1999, and also during part of 2000.
2.13. In the next part of its Judgment, the Court mentions and analyses the Lusaka
Agreements (July 1999), which provided for the orderly withdrawal of foreign troops present in the
DRC, and the Kampala and Harare Disengagement Plans of 8 April and 6 December 2000
respectively. In that context, it describes “the major Ugandan military deployment across vast
areas of the DRC and the massive loss of life over the preceding months”84.
It cannot therefore be claimed that the presence of UPDF forces in the DRC was short-term,
nor that it was confined to a small portion of Congolese territory. The Court reconfirms this point
later on in its Judgment, noting that the UPDF “engaged in military operations in a multitude of
locations, including Bunia, Kisangani, Gbadolite and Ituri, and many others”85.
81Ibid., p. 208, paras. 82, 84 and 85.
82Ibid., para. 86.
83Ibid., para. 87.
84Ibid., p. 211, para. 99.
85Ibid., p. 224, para. 153.
37
38
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2.14. In more general terms, the Court’s Judgment shows that the invasion of the DRC took
place in two complementary ways. On the one hand, the Ugandan army crossed the border and
marched on various locations in the DRC, moving from east to west and concentrating on the north
of the country. On the other hand, Uganda also acted in close co-operation “with various factions
which sought to overthrow the Government of the DRC”86.
2.15. The next part of this chapter will focus on the specific material damage arising from
the violations of international law committed by Uganda when it invaded Congolese territory,
whether these were committed by its own agencies or by the irregular forces which would not have
been able to cause this damage without its unlawful support. It will follow the Court’s approach of
taking events in chronological order, starting with the province of North Kivu before moving on to
Orientale province and then Equateur province.
Section 2. The damage caused in North Kivu province
Map No. 2.4.
North Kivu province
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Tanzanie = Tanzania
Kasai Orientale = Kasai-Oriental
Kasai Occidentale = Kasai-Occidental
Zambie = Zambia
86Ibid., p. 225, para. 155.
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2.16. As the DRC described in detail in its Reply, filed during the merits stage, the irregular
forces used by Uganda were partly drawn from elements of the Congolese Armed Forces, led by a
senior officer who took his orders directly from Uganda and Rwanda, Colonel Kabarebe87.
In preparation for the invasion, the latter had deliberately deployed soldiers under his control across
all areas of eastern Congo. These were the units, commanded by officers on whose loyalty he
could count, that Uganda used, once it had “turned them” against the Kinshasa Government. At the
same time, Uganda made use of irregular Congolese forces, to which it provided substantial
support and de facto co-ordination.
2.17. The above circumstances explain the fact that, in a number of cases, the taking of
locations mentioned by the Court in its Judgment did not entail violent clashes, and hence did not
lead to extensive damage being incurred, in terms of loss of human life or direct damage to
property. This does not mean, however, that no reparation is due from Uganda for the conquest of
these locations. Macro-economic damage, due in large part to the utter chaos in the country that
was engendered by the war, and harm arising from the wrongful exploitation of natural resources,
as well as non-material damage caused by Uganda’s very serious violations of the rules of
jus cogens (in particular, the prohibition on the use of force in international relations which is set
out in Article 2 (4) of the Charter), will obviously need to be taken into account. As previously
stated, damage of a macro-economic nature and damage arising from the wrongful use of natural
resources will be covered in other chapters of this Memorial88, whereas non-material damage will
be dealt with in Chapter 7.
2.18. The remainder of this chapter, however, will identify cases in which damage to persons
and property was the direct result of Uganda’s violation of its international obligations. It will start
with the damage caused in the two large towns of Beni and Butembo, before giving some examples
relating to other localities in North Kivu.
87RDRC, pp. 73 et seq., paras. 2.21 et seq.
88See Chaps. 5 and 6 below.
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A. Beni (1999-2003)
Map No. 2.5.
Beni
Legend:
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
Ouganda = Uganda
2.19. This city in North Kivu, which had a population of approximately 200,000 at the time
of the events, was taken without a fight by the UPDF and their allies at the start of the invasion of
the DRC. The resistance which was subsequently organized led to appalling acts of repression on a
number of occasions. Hundreds of men and women were to be slaughtered there between 1999
and 2003.
2.20. For example, Roberto Garretón, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights on the human rights situation in the DRC, mentions the deaths of around a
hundred civilians caused by irregular forces supported by Uganda on 15 February 199989.
2.21. On 14 November of the same year, Mai-Mai fighters launched an attack in the course
of which a Ugandan officer, Major Reuben Ikondere, lost his life. The Ugandan army reacted with
extreme violence, firing indiscriminately. When the fighting was over, the Red Cross counted
89United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-sixth Session, Report on the situation of human rights in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/56, document E/CN.4/2000/42, 18 Jan. 2000, p. 33, para. 112, available at
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G00/102/29/pdf/G0010229.p…; Ann. 1.5.
40
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86 bodies in the streets, most of them in civilian dress. These facts are confirmed by the African
Association for the Defence of Human Rights in a report dating from late 199990.
2.22. In the course of March 2000, still in Beni, Ugandan soldiers, reigning supreme over
conquered territory, committed massacres, the direct effect of which was to inspire terror in the
civilian population. A report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (which may be referred to more succinctly as the Mapping Report) gives a good description
of the general situation prevailing at the time:
“[i]n the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for several years with
complete impunity. They carried out summary executions of civilians, arbitrarily
detained large numbers of people and subjected them to torture and various other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatments. They also introduced a particularly cruel
form of detention, putting the detainees in holes dug two or three metres deep into the
ground, where they were forced to live exposed to bad weather, with no sanitation and
on muddy ground.
 In March 2000, UPDF soldiers allegedly killed four civilians and wounded several
others in the town of Beni during an operation to quell a demonstration. The
victims had been protesting against the murder of a woman, the arbitrary arrest of
her husband and the pillaging of their house, committed a few days earlier by
UPDF soldiers.”91
2.23. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC mentions, more
specifically, that “[a] married couple named Joseph and Sylvia were murdered by Ugandan soldiers
in Beni”, that, likewise, “Prosecutor Kahanya was murdered by Ugandan soldiers”92, and that in
September 2000, “Kakule Gabriel, a Congolese citizen, was arrested and tortured in Beni by
Ugandan soldiers . . . He was scalded with boiling water, whipped, crucified and humiliated, and
died of his injuries.”93
2.24. The aforementioned Mapping Report confirms that over the course of 2001 there was
close co-ordination between Ugandan forces and the irregular forces they supported, noting
fighting “between the troops from the APC (the armed wing of the RCD-ML) and the UPDF on the
one hand and the various Mayi-Mayi groups on the other”. It goes on to record that “[i]n 2001,
elements of the APC allegedly killed at least five civilians and set fire to houses in the village of
Kiantsaba, 15 kilometres from Beni”94. It also states that:
“From 2001, Mayi-Mayi groups and UPDF soldiers, sometimes supported by
elements of the APC, engaged in fierce fighting to gain control of the village of
Irango, around 20 kilometres from Beni.
90African Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ASADHO), Uganda is sacrificing the Congolese
civilian population  Enquiry into violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in Beni Territory by
Ugandan troops and other armed groups, Feb. 2001, p. 7, RDRC, Ann. 93; Ann. 2.5.
91United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
p. 173, para. 349; Ann. 1.4.
92United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on the situation of human rights
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance
with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15, document E/CN.4/2001/40, 1 Feb. 2001, p. 64; Ann. 4.23.
93Ibid., p. 30, para. 112.
94United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
p. 243, para. 442; Ann. 1.4.
41
42
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 In 2001, elements of the UPDF allegedly killed an unknown number of people in
the village of Irango. The victims had been accused of supporting the Mayi-Mayi.
The soldiers also raped numerous girls. During the attack, they set fire to and
looted several houses.”95
2.25. The events described above are confirmed by the investigation carried out on the
ground years later by the Expert Commission of the DRC Government. The individual records
drawn up during this exercise add up to the following results as regards the town of Beni:
 642 cases of loss of human life were reported. In a number of cases, the relatives of the victims
of these massacres have provided the names of the deceased as well as indicating their
relationships with the latter. The list of these victims is annexed to this Memorial96.
 There were 132 victims of injury, bodily harm or rape. A list, annexed to this Memorial,
compiles the relevant information gleaned from the individual victims’ records97.
 At least 433 people had to flee into the bush, to escape the acts of violence perpetrated by
Ugandan soldiers. Here again, a table listing the victims identified as well as the number of
days spent in the bush is attached as an annex98.
 Finally, a number of documents list the damage to property suffered both by individuals and
their families and by various institutions, including local churches and public institutions which
had their premises destroyed and ransacked. A list of 816 victims is annexed to this Memorial,
giving details of the items lost by category and their market value99.
2.26. The most reliable and varied sources thereby attest to the scale and severity of the
damage arising from Uganda’s violation of its international obligations in the Beni region. And the
same is true of other regions, as can be seen from the situations which will now be described.
95Ibid., para. 443.
96Assessment of deaths in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total for Beni); Ann. 2.1.
97Assessment of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total for Beni);
Ann. 2.2.
98 Assessment of cases of flight into the forest in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total for Beni);
Ann. 2.3.
99Detailed assessment of loss of property in Beni, 1998-2003; Ann. 2.4bis.
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B. Butembo and the surrounding area (1999-2003)
Map No. 2.6.
Butembo and the surrounding area
Legend:
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
2.27. In December 1999, the village of Biambwe, north-west of Butembo, was the scene of
various atrocities and instances of looting, which are mentioned in the White Paper drawn up
shortly after the events. Numerous victims were recorded on that occasion, as well as considerable
damage to property:
“Ugandan troops laid waste to the village of Biambwe, located 62 km west of
the town of Butembo, on the road to Manguredjipa. According to local sources, more
than 250 civilians were murdered in cold blood and 150 houses were deliberately set
on fire. Women, children, elderly and physically handicapped people, who were not
able to flee the village, were burnt to death in their homes.”100
The following events are recounted in another part of the report:
“According to the information received from non-governmental organisations
based in Bukavu, as well as from the Beni-Butembo Civil Society Co-ordination
Office in North Kivu: . . . in North Kivu province, during the period from 28 March to
9 April 2001, 193 houses were torched, including 123 in Biambwe (62 km from
Butembo), 22 in Kirima (32 km from Butembo), 12 in Tihe (25 km from Butembo),
6 in Kambala (20 km from Butembo), and 30 in Katambi (15 km from Butembo),
causing a number of deaths among the civilian population, some of whom were buried
in clearly identified mass graves in Biambwe. These crimes were committed
immediately after the expedition made by Ugandan UPDF soldiers and
Congolese FLC soldiers to Manguredjipa, 92 km west of Butembo, for the purpose of
100See Congo European Network (Brussels), REC-info No.5/2001, 23 May 2001, heading “North Kivu”, point
No. 15, reporting news gathered from local sources on 14 Apr. 2001; RDRC, Ann. 98; Ann. 2.6 [translation by the
Registry; NB: this particular passage is not included in the Annex].
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collecting a consignment of at least 5,000 kg of coltan which had been stockpiled in
the Manguredjipa quarries.”101
2.28. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo states that “Ugandan troops . . . committed massacres . . . in a
restaurant in Kirima on 28 August, when the owners and 10 customers were killed”102; Kirima is
about 30 km west of Butembo.
2.29. In the course of 2000, in Butembo itself, UPDF soldiers murdered a number of
Congolese civilians. For example, “Muhino Fiston was murdered by Ugandan soldiers in Butembo
[just as Mr.] Kapisa was murdered by [the same] Ugandan soldiers in Butembo”103. A few months
later, on 25 April 2001, seven people were killed by gunfire, including four schoolchildren in
uniform. Congo European Network also reports that 14 vans were requisitioned by Ugandan
soldiers104.
2.30. Another local source also describes victims in the aftermath of fighting which had
occurred in the area at that time:
“The bodies of dozens of civilians lie unburied at Biambwe (. . . north-east of
Butembo, Nord-Kivu, in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo), after the
withdrawal of the Ugandan troops that attempted to take control of the area last week.
Almost all buildings have been destroyed . . . The terrified population fled, but has no
food.”105
2.31. The same source also records the murder of three Mai-Mai by Ugandan soldiers in the
same area106. A local NGO, the Société Civile du Grand Nord (the Far-North Civil Society),
informed MONUC that after the population had fled, almost all the houses in Biambwe had their
doors broken down and all their contents either carried off or burned. Even the Catholic church in
Biambwe was not spared107.
2.32. Several members of local civil society report that looting by Ugandan soldiers also
took place on other occasions:
“There have been many cases in which Ugandan soldiers have taken property
belonging to private individuals by force in the regions occupied by the UPDF. As we
have seen, it is not unusual for members of the UPDF to go as far as killing Congolese
101Report entitled The Société Civile Grand Nord’s view on Uganda’s military interventions in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, produced by the Beni-Butembo Civil Society Co-ordination Office in North Kivu, 25 June 2001,
p. 2; RDRC, Ann. 95; Ann. 2.7 [translation by the Registry; NB: this particular passage is not included in the Annex].
102United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on the situation of human rights
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/15, op. cit., p. 35, para. 148; Ann. 4.23.
103Ibid., p. 64.
104Congo European Network, REC-info No.5/2001, op. cit.; RDRC, Ann. 98; Ann. 2.6.
105Article by Missionary Service News Agency, 12 Apr. 2001, “Nord Kivu: Biambwe reduced to rubble by
Ugandan soldiers, several dozen casualties”, RDRC, Ann. 22; Ann. 2.9.
106Ibid.
107Société Civile du Grand Nord, Alarm call to the Head of MONUC in Kinshasa/DRC, June 2001; RDRC,
Ann. 96; Ann. 2.10.
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citizens, outside any context of military action, simply in order to steal from them.
However, even without going to such extremes, the acts of plunder or theft committed
by members of the Ugandan armed forces in the DRC are legion, whether they are
individual or collective. Some of them resemble organized crime pure and simple,
like the hold-up on 19 April 2001 in a shop in Biambwe by eight soldiers including a
Ugandan officer in which 60,000 United States dollars were stolen.”108
This example confirms that the consequences of the Ugandan invasion could be seen not just in the
short term, when the troops arrived, but also in the longer term, when some members of the UPDF
committed atrocities once the territories had been invaded.
2.33. The various accounts mentioned above tally with the outcome of the victim
identification exercises carried out by the governmental commission. These record many
statements of injury suffered by inhabitants during 2001 in Biambwe. Following the mass exodus
of civilian populations, there were reports of deaths in the bush, in addition to numerous cases of
serious bodily harm, systematic looting of goods and destruction of houses. The lists in the
annexes to this Memorial include the names of a number of victims who suffered harm in
Biambwe109. The damage assessment software accompanying this Memorial gives access to
individual handwritten victim forms which have been scanned in PDF format110.
2.34. In the area around Biambwe, the governmental commission also took statements from
relatives of persons who had lost their lives as a result of UPDF operations, as well as from victims
who had suffered serious bodily harm or loss of possessions, or spent several days in the forest to
escape the atrocities committed by Ugandan troops over the period from 1999 to 2003111.
2.35. In Kanyabayonga, also in the Butembo region, the victims, probably still in a state of
shock as a result of these traumatic memories, did not dwell on the losses of material possessions
that they had suffered. Instead, they focused on the numerous deaths which occurred, as well as the
acts of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment that they had had to endure. Out of ten cases of
rape recorded in Butembo and the surrounding area, six took place in Kanyabayonga. Those are
just a few examples. The damage assessment software provides direct access to the records of the
victims concerned112. Also reported in this area are ten cases of death or disappearance without
return113, eleven other cases of serious bodily harm114, and two instances of loss of property115.
108RDRC, p. 333, para. 5.39, quoting the joint letter to the MONUC by seven officials of organizations
representing civil society in the Far North (Beni-Butembo), 13 June 2001; Ann. 2.10.
109Assessment of deaths in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total Butembo); Ann. 2.1; Assessment
of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total Butembo); Ann. 2.2; Assessment
of cases of flight into the forest in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total Butembo); Ann. 2.3; Detailed
assessment of loss of property in Butembo, 1998-2003; Ann. 2.4ter.
110Ann. 1.3.
111See fn. 39 above.
112Report on cases of physical injury in Butembo, No. 2 (2 cases): Butembo CCF04032016_0006_011; No. 10:
Butembo CCF04032016_0013; No. 11: Butembo CCF04032016_0003; No. 27: Butembo CCF04032016_0004_02;
No. 31: Butembo CCF04032106_0005_007. These specific records can be accessed via the software included in
Ann. 1.3.
113Assessment of deaths in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total Butembo); Ann. 2.1.
114Assessment of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total Butembo);
Ann. 2.2.
115Detailed assessment of loss of property in Butembo, 1998-2003; Ann. 2.4ter.
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2.36. In Njapanda, a village a few kilometres from Butembo, the records compiled on the
basis of direct testimony by victims reveal enormous losses of property in 2001. These witness
statements make reference to a policy of systematic looting of homes, which led to damage of
various types: famine, disease, death, etc.
2.37. When missions were despatched to Butembo to assess the damage caused by the
Ugandan invasion, the DRC authorities managed to identify 37 deaths, 76 victims of injury and
other bodily harm, 216 victims of looting and 93 persons forced to flee into the forest116.
C. Lubero (2000)
Map No. 2.7.
Lubero
Legend:
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
2.38. This town, the principal one in the Lubero region, approximately 42 km south of
Butembo, saw sustained exchanges of fire between UPDF and Mai-Mai elements during
August 2000. According to the Mapping Report, this fighting caused “tens of deaths among the
Mayi-Mayi and an unknown number of civilian victims. Some sources suggest that 17 civilians
were killed and seven Mayi-Mayi prisoners summarily executed.”117
Consequently:
“[f]ollowing these incidents, the Mayi-Mayi restarted and intensified their attacks on
UPDF convoys between Beni and Butembo. In retaliation, the UPDF forces led
operations against villages suspected of sheltering Mayi-Mayi groups. UPDF soldiers
116These specific forms can be accessed via the software included in Ann. 1.3.
117United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
p. 172, para. 346; Ann. 1.4.
47
48
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often made disproportionate use of force during these attacks, killing combatants and
civilians indiscriminately.”118
This was also the case in the villages of Maboya and Loya.
D. Maboya and Loya (November 2000)
Map No. 2.8.
Maboya and Loya
Legend:
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
2.39. The Mapping Report mentions similar events in these two villages, located between
Butembo and Beni:
“On 1 November 2000, UPDF soldiers allegedly killed between seven and
eleven people during an attack on the population of the villages of Maboya and Loya,
16 kilometres north of the town of Butembo. A few hours before the attack,
four UPDF soldiers had been killed by Vurondo Mayi-Mayi during an ambush close
to the village of Maboya. During the afternoon, UPDF soldiers apparently launched
an indiscriminate attack on the inhabitants of both villages and set 43 houses on fire.
Some victims were shot and killed, whilst others were burned alive.”119
These events are recounted by another, local, source, according to which,
“[s]ince September 2000 fighting between the UPDF and the Mai-Mai has intensified.
The Ugandan troops have responded systematically to attacks by Mai-Mai fighters by
massacring civilian populations regarded as sympathisers of the native fighters, and by
deliberately setting fire to their villages. On 2 November 2000 the localities of
Maboya (between the towns of Butembo and Beni) and Loya were sacked by Ugandan
soldiers some hours after Mai-Mai fighters had passed through. More than 42 civilian
dwelling-houses were torched by Ugandan soldiers. When the local Red Cross aid
118Ibid., p. 172, para. 347.
119Ibid., pp. 172-173, para. 347.
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teams arrived they found 6 charred bodies in the houses, including the bodies of
Mrs. Kasereka and her baby, aged about 4 months. To this total should be added
7 dead, 5 women and two men, shot at point-blank range by Ugandan soldiers.”120
There is no doubt, given these victims and the torching of these additional houses, that a definite
policy of repression was being pursued, causing damage as considerable as it was wide-ranging.
E. Kikere (November 2000)
Map No. 2.9.
Kikere
Legend:
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
2.40. The Mapping Report also mentions that, on 9 November 2000 in Kikere, Ugandan
soldiers used their weapons indiscriminately, blindly slaughtering civilian populations and
destroying their belongings, animals and homes:
“On 9 November 2000, UPDF soldiers are alleged to have killed
indiscriminately 36 people in the village of Kikere, close to Butuhe, north of Butembo.
The soldiers fired blindly on civilians using rifles and rocket-launchers. Some
civilians died as a result of being burned alive in their homes. The soldiers also
systematically killed domestic animals and destroyed civilian property.”121
The systematic nature of the killing and the destruction of property is explicitly emphasized in the
report. The mindless violence exhibited by Ugandan forces in this region explains the scale of
material and human damage suffered by the Congolese people.
120African Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ASADHO), Uganda is sacrificing the Congolese
civilian population  Enquiry into violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in Beni Territory by
Ugandan troops and other armed groups, Feb. 2001, cited in the Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., pp. 172-173;
Ann. 1.4.
121United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
pp. 173, para. 348; Ann. 1.4.
50
- 36 -
F. Bunyuka (April 2001)
Map No. 2.10.
Bunyuka
Legend:
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
2.41. The Congo European Network reports an attack on four priests by Ugandan soldiers in
Bunyuka. The clergymen were ill-treated, and the collection money, microphones and a sound
system were stolen, as well as sundry personal effects122.
2.42. The manifold damage caused by Uganda in North Kivu province between 1999
and 2003 was sometimes the result of hostilities which erupted with local resistance forces, but at
other times it occurred outside any context of military conflict, as part of the looting and atrocities
committed by certain UPDF elements. The same pattern can be seen in Orientale province, as the
DRC will now describe.
122Congo European Network, REC-info No.5/2001; Ann. 2.6.
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Section 3. The damage caused in Orientale province
Map No. 2.11.
Orientale province
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
Tanzanie = Tanzania
Kasai Orientale = Kasai-Oriental
Sud-Kivu = South Kivu
Kasai Occidentale = Kasai-Occidental
Zambie = Zambia
2.43. Ugandan troops and their allies entered the DRC’s Orientale province soon after their
invasion of North Kivu province. This time, the first stage of the invasion was not concluded
without a struggle, nor was it, as a result, without victims. Witnesses to the troops’ advance have
drawn attention to several episodes which allow some of the damage caused to the Congolese State
to be identified. Once again, just a few examples will be mentioned, for the most part in
chronological order.
- 38 -
A. Isiro (September 1998)
Map No. 2.12.
Isiro
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
Sud-Kivu = South Kivu
2.44. The White Paper drawn up by the Congolese authorities at a very early stage of the
conflict allows the following facts to be established:
“On 20 September 1998, Ugandan troops, under the cover of the ‘rebels’,
entered Isiro after battles which caused 3 deaths, injuries and material damage:
 A tailor named Philippe, killed in his living room, where he was lying on the floor
out of fear of stray bullets. He lived in the N’Sele district;
 A mentally ill person in military gear, shot point-blank;
 The driver of the Dominican convent, severely wounded;
 A classroom in the ITCA-Isiro building, destroyed by a tank of the enemy forces;
 Among the losses of rolling stock, the following are attributed to elements of the
Ugandan Government forces;
 A Land Rover 110 belonging to the office of the superintendent of the religious
missions;
 A Land Rover 110 belonging to the Clinique de l’Est;
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 A private motorcycle.”123
B. Tele Bridge (September 1998)
Map No. 2.13.
Tele Bridge
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
Sud-Kivu = South Kivu
2.45. As previously mentioned124, the UPDF captured Tele Bridge on 29 September 1998,
following fighting with troops from the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC). The toll taken by these
battles was a particularly heavy one for the troops: 9 officers and 150 men lost their lives125.
2.46. The above examples attest to the violence of the fighting which accompanied the
advance of Ugandan troops into Orientale province, as well as to the significance of the damage
caused in its wake. This violence was also in evidence as Ugandan troops continued their advance
into the north-west of the country and when they entered Equateur province.
123White Paper on Massive Violations of Human Rights and of the basic rules of International Humanitarian Law
by the aggressor countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
covering the period from 2 August 1998 to 5 November 1998, Kinshasa, Dec. 1998, p. 31; Ann. 2.11.
124See para. 2.11 above.
125Verbatim record of the hearing of Kabengele Muvuale, 18 Nov. 2001; RDRC, Ann. 50; Ann. 2.12.
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Section 4. The damage caused in Equateur province
Map No. 2.14.
Equateur province
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Oriental province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
Tanzanie = Tanzania
Kasai orientale = Kasai-oriental
Sud-Kivu = South Kivu
Kasai occidentale = Kasai-occidental
Zambie = Zambia
2.47. In this province, it was in close co-ordination with Congo Liberation Movement forces
that Uganda caused major human and material damage. As the Court states in its Judgment of
19 December 2005, “[f]or its part, Uganda acknowledges that it assisted the MLC during fighting
between late September 1998 and July 1999”126.
The damage here was undoubtedly more extensive than that in evidence in eastern Congo,
since in this province it was not possible to implement the strategy of “turning” FAC troops against
the legitimate authorities of the DRC. As a consequence, the battles between the Congolese armed
forces and the UPDF and its allies in this region were the most ferocious of all. The book written
126Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 225, para. 157.
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by Jean-Pierre Bemba127, supreme leader of the MLC, a work deemed reliable in the Court’s
Judgment128, enables some of the injuries caused in this context to be quantified. These injuries are
also documented by other relevant sources, both national and international. Once again, a number
of examples will be given, with events categorized by location.
A. Mindembo (October-December 1998)
Map No. 2.15.
Mindembo
Legend:
République Centrafricaine = Central African Republic
Parc National de la Salonga = Salonga National Park
2.48. The MLC leader mentions an incident here which, in addition to material damage,
caused around 200 casualties among the Congolese armed forces, thanks to the support of the
Ugandan artillery:
“Major Fred Ngalimo, supported by the gunners of the UPDF 7th battalion, laid
an ambush in the plantations at Mindembo, 80 km from Lisala. In their flight from
Bumba, the FAC scattered and fell into a deadly trap. Nearly 200 FAC lay dead in the
plantation. A battle tank and an ammunition truck were destroyed.”129
This operation by the Congo Liberation Army could only have been carried out with UPDF
support. There is no doubt, therefore, that the 200 victims of this massacre were the direct
consequence of Uganda’s conduct.
127Jean-Pierre Bemba, Le choix de la liberté [I chose Freedom], Gbadolite (DRC), Ed. Vénus [English page
numbers for this source not available]; Ann. 2.13.
128Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 225, para. 158.
129Jean-Pierre Bemba, Le choix de la liberté, op. cit.; Ann. 2.13.
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2.49. AFP despatches add that on 3 December 1998, after the MLC had taken Mindembo,
once again with Ugandan support, ALC members killed two soldiers from the Congolese armed
forces and carried away various items of army equipment belonging to the FAC130.
B. Mozamboli (November-December 1998)
2.50. Mozamboli was likewise the scene of violent clashes between the Ugandan armed
forces and those of the DRC, which sustained major loss of life. When questioned on
20 November 2001, Major Buyuni Faray, who commanded the Congolese troops involved in these
battles, stated that “[o]n 4 December 1998, there was a skirmish at Mondjomboli, in the course of
which I lost one company commander, two platoon commanders and 37 men”131.
There was thus a death toll of 40 from this single day of fighting, in this small town in
the DRC.
C. Pimu (May 1999)
Map No. 2.16.
Pimu
Legend:
République Centrafricaine = Central African Republic
Parc National de la Salonga = Salonga National Park
2.51. The village of Pimu was also the scene of fierce fighting which caused major damage
to persons and property. The battle which took place there in May 1999 is described by
Jean-Pierre Bemba as follows:
130RDRC, Ann. 14; Ann. 2.14.
131Verbatim record of the hearing of Major Buyuni A. Faray (20 Nov. 2001), RDRC, Ann. 49; Ann. 2.15.
56
57
- 43 -
“After numerous and vain attempts, the FAC were discouraged. Each assault
ended with major losses among FAC ranks. They were unable to withstand an
ALC sortie and left behind four heavy machine-guns, two 82 mm mortars, four 60 mm
mortars, one 75 mm gun and several rocket-launchers.”132
Although the exact number of victims is not given (only “major losses” are mentioned), the
military equipment stolen from the Congolese army is clearly identified.
D. Libanda (June 1999)
Map No. 2.17.
Libanda
Legend:
République Centrafricaine = Central African Republic
Parc National de la Salonga = Salonga National Park
2.52. Another fierce fight in which the Congolese armed forces were pitched against the
MLC-UPDF coalition was the battle of Libanda, in June 1999. Jean-Pierre Bemba gives the
following account:
“At that point, the FAC leadership threw all its resources into retaking Libanda.
Two vessels docked at the river bank. FAC troops faced the 4th battalion. Hardly had
landing been completed when ALC men, who had been dug into trenches for the past
few weeks, opened fire. After their heavy shelling, the FAC were no longer expecting
to encounter the slightest resistance. From the moment the first shots were fired by
the ALC, the surprise effect created a movement of panic in the ranks of the young
recruits straight off the boat from Kinshasa. Many of them plunged into the river and
drowned. The boats abandoned two battalions on the shore. Dozens of bodies were
left to float with the current.”133
132Jean-Pierre Bemba, Le choix de la liberté, op. cit.; Ann. 2.13 [translation by the Registry; NB: this particular
passage is not included in the Annex].
133Ibid.; emphasis added; Ann. 2.13 [translation by the Registry; NB: this particular passage is not included in
the Annex].
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Once again, these are extremely significant losses, since reference is made to several dozen
victims.
E. Gbadolite (June-July 1999)
Map No. 2.18.
Gbadolite
Legend:
République Centrafricaine = Central African Republic
Parc National de la Salonga = Salonga National Park
2.53. Having pointed out that when this strategic town in the north-west of the DRC was
taken, “the ALC benefited from the effective support of the artillery of the 8th UPDF battalion”,
Jean-Pierre Bemba goes on to state that: “As they fled, the government troops abandoned more
than 400 tons of equipment and ammunition. These valuable reinforcements were to be put to use
when Gemena, Libenge and Zongo were captured.”134 Four hundred tons of equipment were thus
purloined from the Congolese armed forces with the “effective support” of the Ugandan army.
134Ibid. [translation by the Registry; NB: this particular passage is not included in the Annex].
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F. Libenge (August 2000)
Map No. 2.19.
Libenge
Legend:
République Centrafricaine = Central African Republic
Parc National de la Salonga = Salonga National Park
2.54. A report of the UN Secretary-General illustrates the intensity of the fighting which
occurred on the outskirts of Libenge during August 2000. Ugandan troops, in conjunction with the
armed wing of the MLC, carried out concerted attacks on the FAC:
“Following the reinforcements reportedly received by units of the Ugandan
People’s Defence Force (UPDF), MLC launched a major counter-attack in the south
of Libenge, resulting in a high number of casualties”135.
A reference to these events may also be found in the Mapping Report, according to which: “On
9 August 2000, a UPDF tank is said to have fired on a boat transporting FAC soldiers and at least
several dozen soldiers drowned near the Protestant Mission in Kala, a village 30 kilometres from
Libenge”136. Local sources give an idea of the number of victims. The declaration made by the
Council of the Apostolate of the Catholic Laity of the Congo (CALCC) states that 300 people were
slaughtered137.
135United Nations Security Council, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2000/888, 21 Sep. 2000, p. 4. para. 23, available at
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/649/45/IMG/N0064945.p….
136United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
p. 212, para. 392.
137CALCC declaration on the massacres in the RDC, particularly in the east of the country, annexed to the White
Paper on Massive Violations of Human Rights and the basic rules of International Humanitarian Law by the aggressor
countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo covering the
period from 2 August 1998 to 5 November 1998, op. cit., p. 31; Ann. 2.11.
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G. Ubangi (August 2000)
Map No. 2.20.
Ubangi
Legend:
République Centrafricaine = Central African Republic
Parc National de la Salonga = Salonga National Park
2.55. A record of these events exists in the narrative provided by one of the main
protagonists in the battle of Ubangi, Mr. Bemba. The supreme leader of the MLC, when describing
the build-up to the battle, mentions first of all that “a UPDF battalion was sent as
reinforcements”138. He then provides an account which is instructive, to say the least:
“The six vessels travelled back down the river towards Mawiya. Between
11 a.m. and noon, ALC artillery trained their guns on M.B. Ibeka and Accor 25. Both
were hit. The damage to the first two vessels prompted the others to flee downstream
towards Dongo. M.S. Kolwezi and M.S Gungu, both loaded with food supplies and
reinforcements, escaped our artillery fire. However, M.B. Lubue, carrying 500 barrels
of diesel plus an entire battalion, was hit with full force on the bridge. The vessel’s
engine continued to run, and the boat, in flames, carried on at full steam before
running aground a few hundred metres from the ALC’s defensive position . . .
Throughout the night, the fuel and ammunition transported by M.B. Lubue were
ablaze, causing a series of explosions and fireworks which could be seen for dozens of
kilometres around. The FAC 10th brigade of 4,000 men lost nearly 800, drowned or
burned, at a stroke. Along the river banks, the mayhem was in keeping with the
apocalyptic vision of the shattered boat. Kabila’s men abandoned all their equipment:
138Jean-Pierre Bemba, Le choix de la liberté, op. cit.; Ann. 2.13.
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8 trucks, 5 jeeps, heavy artillery, light weapons and hundreds of boxes of
ammunition.”139
During that battle alone, almost 800 men were thus killed thanks to the support given to the
irregular forces by the Ugandan army.
2.56. Just from these few examples, it can be seen that more than 1,000 Congolese soldiers
lost their lives in the wake of the invasion of Equateur province by Ugandan forces. Additionally,
there was material damage of various kinds on a scale which was considerable, to put it mildly.
H. Gemena (1998-2003)
Map No. 2.21.
Gemena
Legend:
République Centrafricaine = Central African Republic
Parc National de la Salonga = Salonga National Park
2.57. In its Judgment, the Court takes note of Uganda’s position that its troops entered
Gemena on 25 December 1998, in these terms:
“Uganda claims that Lisala was taken on 12 December 1998. The list contained
in the Porter Commission exhibits makes reference to the location of Benda, with the
date of 13 December. Also listed are Titure (20 December) and Poko (22 December).
Uganda insists it ‘came to’ Businga on 28 December 1998 and not in early
139Ibid.
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February 1999 as claimed by the DRC; and to Gemena on 25 December 1998, and
not on 10 July 1999 as also claimed by the DRC.”140
The Victim Identification Commission deployed by the Congolese Government was able to
compile precise information relating to events in Gemena between 1998 and 2002. The following
were recorded: four cases of loss of life141, five victims of physical injury142, twelve people forced
to flee into the forest143, and seventeen cases of loss of property144.
*
* *
2.58. In conclusion, these examples taken together give some idea of the scale of the damage
caused in the wake of Uganda’s invasion of North Kivu, Orientale and Equateur provinces.
Although the various localities concerned were sometimes initially entered without a fight, due to
the strategy outlined above145, the subsequent months and years have shown that Uganda, whether
through its soldiers or through the massive support it provided to irregular forces, caused manifold
and inestimable damage to both persons and property. Nevertheless, at this stage an attempt should
be made to evaluate the injury in question, in order to determine the extent of the reparation
claimed by the DRC from the Ugandan State.
Section 5. Evaluation of the damage caused by the Ugandan invasion
2.59. As just indicated, it is extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to determine
accurately the number of victims and the scale of the material damage arising from Uganda’s
invasion of a significant portion of the DRC’s territory. However, it is important to work out the
amount of reparation owed by Uganda in as specific a way as possible, by establishing distinct
categories: loss of human life (A), injury and bodily harm (B), rape (C), population flight and
displacement (D), and the destruction or theft of property (E).
A. Loss of human life
2.60. The sources mentioned in this chapter provide some indication of the number of
victims caused by Uganda’s invasion of substantial parts of the DRC, particularly in North Kivu,
Orientale and Equateur provinces. Perusal of the relevant documents will have shown, however,
that it is extremely difficult to engage in quantified assessments. Some texts describe an “unknown
140Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 208, para. 85.
141Assessment of deaths in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total for Gemena), Ann. 2.1.
142Assessment of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total for
Gemena), Ann. 2.2.
143Assessment of cases of flight into the forest in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003 (sub-total for Gemena),
Ann. 2.3.
144Detailed assessment of loss of property in Gemena, 1998-2003, Ann. 2.4quater.
145See para. 2.16 above.
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number”146, a “high number”147 or even “tens of”, “several dozen” or “dozens”148 of victims.
Others use terms such as “nearly 200”149 or “major losses”150.
2.61. Examination of the records drawn up by the Congolese mission of inquiry does not
enable an exact figure to be determined either. The documents do enable precise identification of a
number of victims151, but they merely illustrate examples of the injuries suffered and by no means
do they purport to be exhaustive.
2.62. In order to overcome these difficulties, another approach may be followed, involving
consultation of scientific studies in the fields of epidemiology or demography which have
examined the excess mortality caused by the conflict. Such studies allow all the deaths caused by
the war in the DRC between 1998 and 2003 to be taken into account. These deaths are not just
those which result from hostilities or atrocities. They may also have other causes, such as lack of
medical care due to healthcare systems being plunged into chaos, for example. The assessments of
the number of excess deaths are made using extremely sophisticated calculation models, based on
projection curves and a range of data. At this stage, however, the focus will be on the results
obtained, rather than the details of the methods and procedures employed by the studies in
question.
2.63. Some epidemiological studies were even published while the conflict was still ongoing.
For example, the International Rescue Committee, a British non-governmental organization active
in the field of humanitarian aid, has published various documents, including one entitled Mortality
in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The latter mentions that as early as June 2000, a survey
led to the conclusion that “1.7 million deaths occurred in excess of the number normally
expected”152, with the figure of 2.5 million reached in March 2001: “To update its findings, the
IRC conducted a second survey in March 2001. As a result, the IRC now estimates that 2.5 million
excess deaths have occurred during the 32-months period beginning in August 1998 and ending in
March 2001.”153 With these figures to hand, it becomes easier to gauge the scale of the devastation
which a conflict as deadly as that which afflicted the DRC between 1998 and 2001 can cause.
2.64. Most of the studies carried out after the end of the conflict have served to confirm these
findings. The International Rescue Committee puts forward a total of 3.9 million deaths, making
the war in the Congo the deadliest crisis since the Second World War:
“3.9 million people had died since 1998, arguably making DR Congo the
world’s deadliest crisis since World War II. Less than 10 per cent of all deaths were
146See paras. 2.24 and 2.38 above.
147See para. 2.54 above.
148See paras. 2.30, 2.38, 2.52 and 2.54 above.
149See para. 2.48 above.
150See paras. 2.50 and 2.51 above.
151Assessment of deaths in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003, Ann. 2.1.
152Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Results from Eleven Mortality Surveys, Final Draft 2001,
prepared by S. Roberts, IRC Health Unit, Charles Hale, Fethi Belyakdoumi, Laura Cobey, Roselidah Ondeko,
Michael Despines, IRC DRC Bukavu/Kisangani, John Keys, IRC Regional Director for Africa, p. 2.
153Ibid.
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due to violence, with most attributed to easily preventable and treatable conditions
such as malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia and malnutrition”154.
2.65. These findings have been featured in leading scientific publications. In an article that
appeared in 2006 in the prestigious journal The Lancet, which reiterated the figures previously
mentioned, it is stated that the high number of deaths is an evident consequence of the conflict:
“19 500 households were visited. The national crude mortality rate of
2.1 deaths per 1000 per month (95% CI 1.6-2.6) was 40% higher than the sub-Saharan
regional level (1.5), corresponding to 600 000 more deaths than would be expected
during the recall period and 38 000 excess deaths per month. Total death toll from the
conflict (1998-2004) was estimated to be 3.9 million. Mortality rate was higher in
unstable eastern provinces, showing the effect of insecurity. Most deaths were from
easily preventable and treatable illnesses rather than violence. Regression analysis
suggested that if the effects of violence were removed, all-cause mortality would fall to
almost normal rates.”155
The authors of the IRC report also published the results of their research in Disaster Medicine and
Public Health Preparedness, a journal published by Cambridge University Press156.
2.66. From these assessments alone, it can be seen that the conflict as a whole caused almost
four million victims, of whom more than 300,000 died as a result of violence. Most of the deaths
arising from the conflict are due to causes other than massacres or atrocities. As the DRC has
already mentioned, the advantage of this type of scientific approach is that it takes into account the
entirety of the war’s damaging consequences, including, in particular, the disruption to the services
of the Congolese State in the wake of the invasion of a substantial part of its territory.
2.67. This estimate, the outcome of the IRC studies, is generally considered to be reliable by
a number of observers. For example, in its portrayal of the second war in the DRC (1998-2003),
La documentation française refers to “more than three million victims”157. Likewise, the
organization Human Rights Watch considers that this was “one of the most deadly wars in the
world”158. Another report, also from 2004, states that “[t]he International Rescue Committee
154Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo. An ongoing Crisis, reported by Benjamin Coughlan (Burnet
Institute, Melbourne, Australia), Pascal Ngoy (International Rescue Committee, Kinshasa, DRC), Flavien Mulumba
(International Rescue Committee, Kinshasa, DRC), Colleen Hardy (International Rescue Committee, New York, USA),
Valérie Nkamgang Bemo (International Rescue Committee, Abidjan, Ivory Coast), Tony Stewart (Burnet Institute,
Melbourne, Australia), Jennifer Lewis (Burnet Institute, Melbourne, Australia), Richard Brennan (International Rescue
Committee, New York, USA), p. ii. (available at https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/661/2006-
7congomortalitysurvey.pdf); Ann 2.16.
155Benjamin Coghlan, MBBS; Dr. Richard J. Brennan, MBBS; Pascal Ngoy, MD; David Dofara, MD;
Brad Otto, BA; Mark Clements, PhD; Tony Stewart, MBBS, “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: a
nationwide survey”, The Lancet, Vol. 367, 7 Jan. 2006, p. 44; emphasis added.
156Benjamin Coghlan, Pascal Ngoy, Flavien Mulumba, Colleen Hardy, Valerie Nkamgang Bemo, Tony Stewart,
Jennifer Lewis and Richard J. Brennan, “Update on Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a
Third Nationwide Survey”, Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, Vol. 3, Issue 2, June 2009, pp. 88-96.
157http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/dossiers/conflit-grands-lacs/sep…; Ann. 2.17.
158Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity, Human Rights Watch
Briefing Paper, Jan. 2004, available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0104.pdf; Ann. 2.18.
65
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estimates that nearly four million Congolese have died since 1998 as a result of war in the Congo,
the great majority in eastern DRC”159.
2.68. However, other observers have questioned the generally accepted figure of four million
deaths. André Lambert and Louis Lohlé-Tart, two demographers working for the Association pour
le Développement de la Recherche Appliquée en Sciences Sociales (ADRASS), a Belgian
consultancy set up as a non-profit organization, are a case in point. In an article which appeared in
2008, these two authors use censuses, working on the basis of United Nations figures, for the
1984-2005 period160. Criticizing certain aspects of the methodology followed by the IRC, they
conclude that 200,000 deaths were due to the conflict, thereby dividing the initial number roughly
by 20. However, reservations have been expressed about this study, particularly in a report
published by the Health and Nutrition Tracking Service (HNTS) in 2009161.
2.69. The main sources available thus present quite a wide variety of figures for deaths
linked directly or indirectly to the war in the DRC, ranging from 200,000 (lowest estimate) to
four million (highest estimate).
2.70. Given the caution which should be observed within judicial proceedings, the DRC
considers it reasonable, in this context, to rely on a minimum estimate of 400,000 victims, that is,
one tenth of the IRC figure which emerges from studies published in the most renowned scientific
journals, including The Lancet.
2.71. Of course, there is no question of the DRC claiming that Uganda is responsible for all
the victims caused by the conflict. As stated at the outset, other parties bear responsibility for its
outbreak. An apportionment of 45 per cent was therefore made in Chapter 1 of this Memorial162,
taking account of the involvement of other States in initiating and continuing the invasion. The
application of this formula to the number of 400,000 adopted here thus gives a figure of
180,000 deaths which could reasonably be deemed a consequence of the invasion of a substantial
part of Congolese territory by Uganda. It should be noted that this figure covers all deaths caused
by the Ugandan invasion, including those in Ituri and Kisangani.
B. Personal injury and bodily harm
2.72. The reports from the national and international sources cited above document a
multitude of injuries and instances of bodily harm, some of which were the result of acts of plunder
or even torture. In practice, however, it is impossible to quantify such damage. Some documents
refer to “several”163 or “a high number”164 of persons injured, with no further details. Others
159Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Civilians at Risk during Disarmament Operations,
Human Rights Watch Background Briefing, Dec. 2004, available at https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/
africa/drc1204/drc122804.pdf.
160André Lambert and Louis Lohlé-Tart, La surmortalité au Congo (RDC) durant les troubles de 1998-2004: une
estimation des décès en surnombre, scientifiquement fondée à partir des méthodes de la démographie, available at
https://www.uclouvain.be/cps/ucl/doc/demo/documents/Lambert.pdf (in French only); Ann. 2.19.
161Re-examining mortality from the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1998-2006, available at
http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/hnts/hnts_drc_re_examinig_mortality….
162See para. 1.24 above.
163See para. 2.22 above.
164See para. 2.54 above.
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describe acts of torture or ill-treatment, mentioning the victims by name165. However, no overall
estimate can be made on that basis.
2.73. Some facts can, of course, be inferred from the work done by the Congolese mission of
inquiry, of which there is a summary record in the form of the lists annexed to this chapter166. The
cases included in the tables are merely examples, however.
2.74. Moreover, and in contrast to what has been presented above with regard to deaths,
there are no scientific studies, as far as the DRC is aware, providing estimates of the total number
of persons injured as a result of the second Congo war. There are some estimates for Ituri, and also
for Kisangani; these will be used in the corresponding chapters167. Outside those regions, there is
nothing which allows a specific number to be determined for North Kivu, Orientale and Equateur
provinces.
2.75. In these circumstances, the DRC, mindful of the need for seriousness and rigour which
are the hallmarks of the judicial process, is obliged to proceed as follows. For the district of Ituri
and the city of Kisangani, it will rely on the existing studies which provide reliable general
estimates168. On the other hand, for all the other towns and villages located in the three provinces
invaded by Uganda, it must confine itself to using the figures which emerge from the work of the
Commission of Inquiry. The latter make it possible to determine with certainty 203 cases of injury
and bodily harm (130 for Beni, 68 for Butembo and 5 for Gemena)169, leaving aside cases of rape,
which will be dealt with under the next heading. This is an excessively low figure, and certainly
does not cover all the injuries and bodily harm actually caused by Uganda in the regions concerned.
At this stage, however, the DRC, for the sake of rigour and restraint, is obliged to limit itself to this
number, although it may be that subsequent new findings will allow it, at a later stage, to overcome
its current difficulties in providing evidence.
C. Rape
2.76. As already noted, some sources mention that during an incident which took place in the
vicinity of Beni, Ugandan soldiers “raped numerous girls”170. However, no precise number is
given.
2.77. As described below, the work of the Congolese Commission of Inquiry provides a few
examples. But no exhaustive nor even general assessment can be made here, any more so than for
the other categories of injury.
2.78. The difficulty of accurately determining the number of persons who have suffered
sexual violence during an armed conflict is widely acknowledged. One of the factors underlying
this difficulty is the reluctance of the victims  or indeed the practical impossibility for them  to
report the acts inflicted upon them, essentially for social and cultural reasons. This obstacle is
165See para. 2.23 above.
166Assessment of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003; Ann. 2.2.
167See Chaps. 3 and 4 below.
168See Chaps. 3 and 4 below for details.
169Assessment of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003; Ann. 2.2.
170See para. 2.24, quoting the Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., p. 243, para. 443; Ann. 1.4.
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particularly evident in the Congolese socio-cultural context. As explained in a report published by
Amnesty International in October 2003,
“[i]n many African societies, there is a taboo about discussing rape in public . . .
Sexual violence is rarely reported, and the victims bear the physical and psychological
scars of the attack and its consequences, including a deep sense of shame and
isolation. Most women from Ituri chose to remain silent about the experience and
even their own families do not help them overcome the ordeal. As a result, many do
not receive any medical attention and develop sexually transmissible diseases and
other problems that will remain with them for the rest of their lives.”171
These findings refer to the situation in Ituri, which will be revisited in the following chapter.
Clearly, though, they can be transposed to the DRC as a whole. If victims are frequently obliged to
remain silent about the sexual violence they have endured, it is inevitable that ascertaining the
number of such atrocities will be an exercise laden with difficulty.
2.79. This context should be borne in mind when examining the confirmed cases emerging
from the records drawn up by the DRC’s inquiry team. The latter provide evidence of only
12 rapes (two cases reported for Beni172, ten for Butembo173), leaving aside the specific cases of
Ituri and Kisangani. This figure is undoubtedly well below the actual number, for the reasons
which have just been set forth. Given that it is common practice not to report such acts, it is
reasonable to estimate that the actual number of rapes for which Uganda is responsible, in the
regions examined in this chapter, is five times higher than the number declared, i.e., 60 cases.
D. Population flight and displacement
2.80. The documents mentioned above also show that many people were forced to flee in
order to escape the impact of the war, and to seek refuge in the forest or the bush, with all the
difficulties and damage this entailed, in terms of infectious diseases, or even bites and injuries
inflicted by wild animals. However it is not possible to derive any exact figures from them.
2.81. It is indeed the case that examples have been provided by the Congolese Commission
of Inquiry, and these can be found in the annexes to this chapter174. Once again, however, these are
only individual cases.
2.82. While more comprehensive figures do exist for the district of Ituri175, the DRC is not
aware of any overall assessments covering the three provinces concerned here.
171Amnesty International, Ituri: a need for protection, a thirst for justice, 21 Oct. 2003, p. 16 (AI Index
No. AFR62/032/2003); Ann. 2.20.
172Assessment of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003, Nos. 46 and 108
(accessible via the software designed for this purpose, Ann. 1.3); Ann. 2.2.
173Assessment of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003, Nos. 2 (2 cases), 6,
10, 11, 27 (2 cases), 31, 32 and 39 (accessible via the software designed for this purpose, Ann. 1.3); Ann 2.2.
174Assessment of cases of flight into the forest in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003; Ann. 2.3.
175See Chap. 3 below.
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2.83. For the same reasons as those mentioned in connection with instances of bodily harm
other than rape, the DRC will confine itself at this stage to the confirmed cases in the records
drawn up by its Commission of Inquiry, which allow the number of people displaced or forced to
flee to be set at 538 (433 for Beni, 93 for Butembo and 12 for Gemena).
E. Destruction and theft of property
2.84. Numerous cases of destruction of property have been mentioned in the sources cited
above. Alongside statements which are not always precise (such as the report that Ugandan
soldiers “set fire to and looted several houses”), some specific figures have been advanced:
“150 houses”, “193 houses” set on fire176, two cars and a motorcycle177, a hold-up for a sum of
60,000 United States dollars178, etc. This is extremely piecemeal information, however, and does
not enable general estimates to be made for the three provinces in question.
2.85. Once again, some examples are provided by the work of the Congolese Commission of
Inquiry, and these can be found in the annexes to this chapter179. By way of illustration, the
following table enables damage to the FAC’s military equipment to be identified, on the basis of
Jean-Pierre Bemba’s writings:
2.86. While there are many figures available which enable an assessment to be made for Ituri
or for the city of Kisangani180, the DRC is not aware of any source which would allow a
wider-reaching assessment to be made.
176See para. 2.27 above.
177See para. 2.44 above.
178See para. 2.32 above.
179Assessment of loss of property in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003; Ann. 2.4.
180See Chaps. 3 and 4 below.
No. Geographical area Damage
1. Pimu  Two 82 mm mortars
 Four 60 mm mortars
 One 75 mm [gun] containing ammunition
 Several rocket-launchers
2. Mindembo  One battle tank
 One munitions truck, destroyed
 Sundry equipment
3. Ubangi  Loss of two boats, incl. M.B. Lubue carrying 500 barrels of diesel
 Trucks
 Five jeeps
 Heavy artillery
 Light weapons
 Hundreds of boxes of ammunition
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2.87. Consequently, and even though this means radically underestimating the extent of the
damage caused by Uganda’s invasion, the DRC is obliged at this stage to settle for the lowest
estimate, as resulting from the above-mentioned annexes, still leaving aside Ituri and Kisangani. A
review of these annexes leads to a figure of 1,092 cases of destruction of property (816 for Beni,
216 for Butembo, 43 for Maboya and Loya and 17 for Gemena).
*
* *
2.88. An initial overview of the consequences of the Ugandan invasion gives some idea of
the scale of the ensuing damage, principally in terms of human lives lost but also in terms of the
other types of injury mentioned. The DRC will now focus more specifically on the particularly
tragic case of Ituri (Chapter 3), before describing that of Kisangani (Chapter 4).
- 56 -
CHAPTER 3. THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
FOLLOWING THE OCCUPATION OF THE ITURI REGION BY UGANDA
3.01. The situation which developed during the years of war in the Ituri region, in the east of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was given particular attention by the Court in its Judgment
of 19 December 2005. Indeed, it was the only portion of the DRC’s territory which the Court
considered to have been actually occupied, within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague
Regulations of 1907, by Uganda. The Court drew two specific conclusions from that observation.
First, it found that
“by its failure, as an occupying Power, to take measures to respect and ensure respect
for human rights and international humanitarian law in Ituri district, [the Republic of
Uganda] violated its obligations under international human rights law and
international humanitarian law”181.
Secondly, it established that
“by its failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri district to
prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources,
[the Republic of Uganda] violated obligations owed to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo under international law”.
3.02. In keeping with the approach adopted in this Memorial, this chapter will deal only with
the first of the claims upheld against Uganda by the Court in this context. The damage related to
the wrongful exploitation of natural resources in this part of Congolese territory will be addressed
in the chapter of the Memorial which is devoted to that specific issue182.
3.03. After describing how the occupation of the Ituri region by Uganda developed, and the
devastating consequences of that State’s failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying
Power (Section 1), this chapter will outline the extent of the damage that ensued (Section 2). That
damage will be quantified, and details provided of the practical arrangements for making the
reparation sought by the DRC, in Chapter 7 of this Memorial183.
Section 1. The facts: the occupation of Ituri by Uganda and its consequences
3.04. The Ituri region lies in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. When the
Ugandan invasion began, it formed part of Orientale province and covered an area of around
65,000 square kilometres. The city of Bunia, which had around 100,000 inhabitants at that time,
was its capital. In the absence of more precise figures from recent censuses, the overall population
of Ituri was estimated to be between 3.3 and 5.5 million, and made up of 18 ethnic groups184.
Relations between these different groups were generally harmonious, although there had previously
181Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 280, para. 345.
182See Chap. 5 below.
183See Chap. 7 below.
184MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 12; Ann. 1.6.
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been several localized outbreaks of violence between two of them, the Hema and the Lendu185. It is
a fertile region, with abundant natural resources: diamonds, gold, coltan, oil, timber, etc.
Map No. 3.1.
Ituri
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
3.05. Since Ituri borders Uganda, it was one of the first regions of the DRC to be invaded by
UPDF troops, who crossed into it unopposed in mid-August 1998186. The Ugandan forces provided
support to the rebels of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the movement under whose
administration the region was placed, along with the rest of Orientale province. By
November 1998 the Ugandan army had established a base in Bunia187, and it subsequently
intervened continuously in the rest of the region. When the RCD split into two rival factions, in
1999, it was the RCD-ML (Liberation Movement), backed by Uganda, which took control of
Ituri188. Over time, as the political situation evolved on the ground, and as the Congolese rebel
movements reconfigured, Uganda subsequently also gave its support to other groups in the region,
including the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC) and the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)189.
185United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document A/55/403, 20 Sep. 2000, para. 26; Ann. 3.1; United
Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/1005, 10 Sep. 2002, para. 25; Ann. 3.2.
186See Chap. 2 above.
187International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute, document ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 Mar. 2012, para. 72.
188MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit.; Ann. 1.6.
189Ibid., para. 27.
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This game of alliances gathered pace during the final period of the occupation, as eloquently
described in a report from MONUC in 2004:
“Uganda reconsidered its support to UPC because of close ties between UPC
and Rwanda, around December 2002. To counter that alliance, Uganda supported
several other Ituri armed groups. UPDF was involved in the creation of FIPI, a
platform including PUSIC, FPDC and FNI/FRPI. However, that Front did not last
long and de facto came to an end in February 2003 . . . In March 2003, FAPC was
created with direct Ugandan support. In March 2003 UPDF commanders also
supported FNI/FRPI, which assisted them in removing UPC from Bunia.”190
All the observers present in the region during the period of the conflict acknowledged the existence
of this power struggle. This summary, in a report on Ituri which was published by Amnesty
International in October 2003, speaks for itself:
“Today Uganda remains the main regional player in the Ituri conflict. Uganda
shares a border with the DRC in Ituri and, from this point of view, appears to be a
neighbour which is making and breaking ‘rebellions’ in Ituri to suit its interests. The
succession of armed groups that have controlled Ituri since the beginning of the crisis
shows their degree of dependence on Kampala. What is driving the conflict is not so
much the internal interests of the Congolese factions, but more the ambitions and
desires of Uganda.”191
3.06. As well as providing support to that array of rebel movements, Uganda interfered in the
Ituri region in a variety of ways throughout the period when it was under Ugandan occupation. Its
influence was even evident in the management of public affairs and the structure of the
administrative authorities, as demonstrated in particular by the fact that the most senior military
officer in charge of the UPDF’s operations in Congolese territory, General Kazini, decided in
June 1999 to separate the district of Ituri from Orientale province and to make it an independent
province, to be known as the “province of Kibali-Ituri”. In its Judgment of 19 December 2005, the
Court noted in this regard that “[v]arious sources of evidence attest to this fact, in particular a letter
from General Kazini dated 18 June 1999, in which he appoints Ms Adèle Lotsove as ‘provisional
Governor’ and gives suggestions with regard to questions of administration of the new
province”192. Above all, however, the Ugandan armed forces very quickly became embroiled in
local conflicts, which they dramatically exacerbated, plunging the entire region, and its population,
into repeated cycles of extreme violence, with horrific human consequences.
3.07. Very soon after the start of the occupation of Ituri, the UPDF began to provide
support — in exchange for financial “compensation” — to members of the Hema community in a
land dispute with members of the Lendu community193. In its 2005 Judgment, the Court held on
this subject that there was “persuasive evidence that the UPDF incited ethnic conflicts and took no
action to prevent such conflicts in Ituri district”194. A report produced in 2010 by the United
190Ibid., para. 28.
191Amnesty International, Ituri: a need for protection, a thirst for justice, 21 Oct. 2003 (AI Index
No. AFR 62/032/2003), p. 31; Ann. 2.20. Page 4 of the same report also states that “[t]he Ugandan government has
always pursued an active ‘divide and rule’ policy in the region, supporting different groups at the same time” (ibid.).
192Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 230, para. 175.
193MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 19; Ann. 1.6.
194Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 240, para. 209.
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Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provides a detailed account of the
origins of the conflict:
“The Hema-Gegere farmers who, a few years previously, had acquired new
concessions from the land registry in the Djugu region, took advantage of the new
political situation to enforce their rights. As the Lendu from the Walendu Pitsi
community, who held the customary rights to the land concerned, disputed the value
of their title deeds, the Hema-Gegere farmers appealed to the courts and had the
Walendu Pitsi expelled from the concessions they wanted. The latter refused to leave,
however, and clashes broke out with the police officers who had come to remove
them . . . In April 1999, the Hema-Gegere concession-holders paid UPDF and
APC soldiers to attack the Lendu villages located in the disputed concessions.”195
That triggered the endless cycle of violence which was to tear Ituri apart for several years.
3.08. From spring 1999 onwards, the Ugandan army was involved in a considerable number
of massacres, in the destruction of villages, and in various “punitive expeditions”, the tragic
consequences of which are described below. The members of the Lendu community subsequently
engaged in numerous acts of reprisal, which were all the more bloody for being carried out with
modern weapons, mostly bought in Uganda with the revenues from the gold fields196. The two
groups soon created armed militia for their own protection, and even more violent confrontations
followed. In many of those situations, UPDF forces provided assistance indiscriminately to either
one of the warring factions, and even on occasion to both at the same time.
3.09. Given the scale of the violence, the Ugandan authorities subsequently attempted to
restore calm in the region. They succeeded to a certain extent, with the conclusion at the beginning
of 2001 of a protocol of agreement between the traditional chiefs in Ituri197. However, this respite
was short-lived, and renewed fighting broke out between the rival groups, culminating in
August 2002 in violent battles between UPDF forces and Congolese APC rebels for control of
Bunia198. A peace agreement was concluded between the Congolese Government and Uganda in
September 2002, which provided, inter alia, for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from several
towns, the creation of a Peacekeeping Commission in Ituri, and the setting-up of an Interim
Administrative Authority for the region after the departure of the Ugandan soldiers. However,
once again the agreement failed to bear the desired fruit and, “far from stabilising the region, the
closer relationship between Kinshasa and Kampala prompted new patterns of alliances that made
the situation even more volatile”199. Once again, confrontations between armed groups in the
region ended in the deliberate massacre of civilians. It was not until May 2003 that the UPDF’s
occupation of Ituri came to an end, although Uganda continued to give open support to various
armed groups active in the region after that date200.
3.10. The assessment of the role played by Uganda in Ituri during its occupation of that
region which is contained in the Special report on the events in Ituri, produced in 2004 by the
195United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 365; Ann. 1.4.
196MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 23; Ann. 1.6.
197United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 408; Ann. 1.4.
198Ibid., paras. 412-413.
199Ibid., para. 415.
200MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 28; Ann. 1.6.
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United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), is
particularly damning:
“Uganda claimed on several occasions to be in Ituri to defend ‘its legitimate
security concerns’ and to be acting for reconciliation and the protection of civilians.
However, although in some cases UPDF did intervene to halt fighting between
opposing forces, its commanders were responsible for the creation of almost all of the
armed groups, training their militias — sometimes even in Uganda — selling weapons
and even lending their soldiers to rich Hema to massacre Lendu civilians and destroy
villages in Walendu Tatsi in 1999. UPDF also carried out widespread bombing and
destruction of hundreds of villages from 2000 to 2002 in the Lendu/Ngiti collectivités
of Walendu Pitsi and Walendu Bindi. The same UPDF commanders also became
businessmen who traded in the resources of Ituri.”201
The economic benefits derived by the Ugandan soldiers — and indeed Uganda itself — from this
situation are also highlighted by the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court in the
Lubanga case, which observes that the experts who appeared before it agreed that
“much of the violence in Ituri during the period from 1999 to 2003 was initially
economically motivated, and that the conflict was due in significant part to the
involvement of members of the Ugandan national army (the Ugandan People’s
Defence Force or ‘UPDF’), who exploited social unrest for their own economic
advantage”202.
3.11. Base economic considerations were therefore partly responsible for the tens of
thousands of victims of the bloody conflict which tore Ituri apart between 1999 and 2003. Far from
maintaining public law and order, as its status as an occupying Power of that region required,
Uganda set about exacerbating local conflicts until they reached apocalyptic proportions, including
by regularly permitting the members of its armed forces to perpetrate horrendously violent attacks
on innocent civilians.
3.12. Details will now be provided of the extent of the damage caused in this context and for
which the Democratic Republic of the Congo is seeking reparation in these proceedings.
Section 2. The damage resulting from Uganda’s failure to comply with
its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri
3.13. The damage resulting from Uganda’s failure to comply with its obligations as an
occupying Power in Ituri is incalculable. The inter-ethnic tensions stirred up by Uganda
throughout its presence in the region frequently culminated in large-scale massacres of civilians,
and many civilian lives were lost as a result of the fighting between rival factions (A). Many
survivors of such massacres suffered serious injury and mutilation, and were left permanently
disabled (B). Numerous cases of rape have also been documented (C). In addition, several groups
recruited and trained child soldiers, with the active support of Uganda (D). The massacres, and the
general climate of insecurity which prevailed for those long years in Ituri, also led to the
displacement of huge numbers of civilians, since those living in the affected areas fled their homes
in fear of their lives (E). Finally, the conflict was characterized by the large-scale destruction of
201Ibid., para. 27.
202International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute, document ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 Mar. 2012, para. 72.
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property and public infrastructure, with many villages being razed to the ground (F), and by acts of
systematic looting (G).
3.14. For each of these categories, a non-exhaustive list of the specific circumstances in
which the damage occurred will be provided. An assessment of the total damage caused in each
category will then be presented. This tally of the damage resulting from the violations of
international law for which Uganda has been pronounced responsible in Ituri has again been
compiled using data from two types of sources: on the one hand, international reports, most of
which have been produced by United Nations bodies; and on the other, records drawn up by the
judicial authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the basis of investigations and
interviews with the inhabitants of the regions concerned. Indeed, the gravity of the events which
took place in Ituri between 1999 and 2003 captured the attention of several United Nations bodies,
which investigated them in detail. A case in point is MONUC, which in 2004 produced a Special
report on the events in Ituri203. While that report relates more specifically to the period between
January 2002 and January 2003, it also contains a great deal of information about events in the
region as far back as 1999.
3.15. Similarly, entire sections are devoted to the specific situation of Ituri in the Report of
the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between
March 1993 and June 2003, which was produced by the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in August 2010204. These are reliable sources, which provide a
sound basis on which to assess the damage caused in Ituri throughout the period when it was
occupied by the Ugandan armed forces. The data extracted from them have been cross-referenced
and supplemented with data from the above-mentioned records, so as to present an account of the
damage that is as systematic as possible.
3.16. Where the reports put forward specific figures, those figures are used in this chapter for
the purpose of quantifying the damage suffered by the people of Ituri. Where no such figures are
included, the data in the records form the basis for the DRC’s claim for the specific categories of
damage concerned. In such cases, figures are generally extrapolated from the data in the records,
which are not exhaustive.
3.17. There is no doubt that there is a well-established causal link between all of these
injuries and the violations of international law which the Court found Uganda to have committed in
its Judgment of 2005. That link exists either because the damage concerned was directly caused by
the acts of the UPDF forces present in that part of the Congo, or because it was the result of the
resolutely passive attitude adopted by the Ugandan authorities, which failed to comply with their
obligations as an occupying Power in the region.
A. Loss of human life
3.18. Deliberate attacks on civilians were unfortunately one of the defining characteristics of
the Ituri conflict. Dozens of towns and villages were targeted by the conflict’s protagonists, and
their inhabitants systematically slaughtered, often by particularly cruel methods. Some of the
belligerents have attempted to defend their actions, arguing that weapons had been distributed to
203MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit.; Ann. 1.6.
204United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.;
Ann. 1.4.
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the civilians and that the latter should therefore be regarded as combatants205. However, the facts
indicate on the contrary that in the vast majority of cases, the victims were slaughtered simply
because they belonged to a particular ethnic group, which is consistent with the cycles of violence
described in the first section of this chapter. Alongside deliberate attacks of this kind on local
civilians, a number of situations have been documented in which those same civilians fell victim to
the indiscriminate use of force by the warring factions, in the course of the military operations
which they were carrying out in various parts of Ituri.
3.19. The list of attacks on the civilian population of Ituri, beginning in spring 1999, and the
massacres committed on those occasions, is a grim and seemingly never-ending litany of names
and dates. Here they are presented in chronological order, each event being represented by the
relevant extract from one of the above-mentioned reports (or supplementary international sources):
(a) “UPDF carried out its first attacks on the village of Loda, located between Fataki and Libi, in
the night of 29 to 30 May 1999, burning it down and burning alive several elderly persons and
women locked in their houses.”206
(b) “Between June and December 1999, UPDF and APC soldiers killed an unknown number of
Lendu civilians in villages in the Djugu region close to the concessions claimed by the
Hema-Gegere farmers. Villages in the Dz’na Buba, Linga, Jiba, Dhendo, Blukwa Mbi, Laudjo,
Laudedjo Gokpa, Nyalibati and Gbakulu groupements were particularly badly affected. Most
of the victims were Lendu but Hema were also killed during the attacks. Numerous victims
died when their village was set on fire or following heavy arms fire directed at their homes.
Some victims were shot dead at point-blank range.”207
(c) “Between June and December 1999, members of the Lendu militia killed several tens of
Hema-Gegere in the village of Libi from the Walendu Pitsi community and in the village of
Fataki from the Walendu Djatsi community.”208
(d) “On 20 June 1999, members of the Hema militias and UPDF soldiers killed at least 25 people,
including several civilians, during an attack on the village of Dhendro, in the Walendu Pitsi
community, on the border with the Dhendro groupement.”209
(e) “On 14 September 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Walendu Pitsi community
used edged weapons to kill several hundred Hema-Gegere, including a majority of civilians,
during widespread attacks on locations in the Dhendro groupement in the Bahema-Nord
community . . . The victims were buried in mass graves. According to several sources, the
massacre took place in retaliation for an attack committed on 20 June by members of the Hema
militias in the village of Dhendro.”210
(f) “On 14 September 1999, during a night-time offensive on the village of Fataki, in the Walendu
Djatsi community, members of the Hema militias and Hema soldiers from the APC killed
205MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 21; Ann. 1.6.
206Ibid., para. 19.
207United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 366; Ann. 1.4.
208Ibid.
209Ibid.
210Ibid.
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several tens of civilians with edged weapons, including at least 15 minors and several women.
The assailants then buried the bodies themselves.”211
(g) “In July 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Buba group in the Walendu Pitsi
community . . . killed over 100 Hema civilians in the fishing village of Musekere in the
Bahema-Nord community. Having encircled the village at dawn and forced six APC soldiers
there to flee, they massacred the population using machetes and other edged weapons.”212
(h) “On 1 December 1999, members of the Lendu militias confronted elements of the UPDF and
members of the Hema militias over control of the mining town of Bambou, in the Walendu
Djatsi community in the Djugu region. The fighting . . . led to the deaths of over 200 members
of the civilian population. Numerous victims were mutilated and the town looted. Most of the
victims’ bodies were thrown into the River Chari.”213
(i) One hundred miners lost their lives when the Gorumbwa mine collapsed in late 1999, because
of the decline in safety standards as a result of UPDF officers exerting pressure to extract the
gold more quickly.214
(j) “In January 2000, members of the Lendu militias from the Walendu Pitsi and Bahema-Nord
communities attacked people living in the Blukwa groupement, killing several hundreds of
Hema with edged weapons.”215
(k) “On 26 April 2000, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops attacked the Buba
groupement, in the Walendu Pitsi community, causing around 10 deaths, the majority of whom
were Lendu civilians.”216
(l) “At the end of 2000, the conflict between the Hema and Lendu finally reached the Irumu
region. The UPDF soldiers lent their support to the local Hema communities and violent
incidents broke out on the ground . . . Between 9 and 18 January 2001, members of the Hema
militias . . . killed around 60 people, including numerous Lendu and Ngiti civilians, in the
village of Kotoni, in the Irumu region and the surrounding area.”217
(m) “On 3 February 2001, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops killed 105 people,
including numerous Lendu civilians, in the villages in the Bulo groupement in the Ndo Okebo
community in the Djugu region. The victims often came from the Walendu Pitsi community.
They had taken refuge in the Bulo groupement following recent attacks on their village.”218
(n) “On 19 January 2001, Hema militiamen and civilians . . . killed between 200 and 250 civilians
from the Lendu, Ngiti, Nande and Bira ethnic groups in the Mudzipela neighbourhood in the
town of Bunia. The victims, who included a large number of women and children, were killed
with machetes, spears or studded batons. Most of them were subjected to mutilation. Some
were decapitated and their heads carried through the town as trophies . . . Shortly before the
211Ibid.
212Ibid., para. 368.
213Ibid., para. 369.
214Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold. Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005, p. 18, available at
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0505_0.pdf; Ann. 3.3.
215United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 370; Ann. 1.4.
216Ibid.
217Ibid., para. 406.
218Ibid., para. 405.
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massacre, UPDF officers and senior members of the Hema community in Bunia had held a
meeting and called on Hema civilians to attack the Lendu population.”219
(o) “In January 2002, UPDF troops and Hema militiamen opened fire on the population of the
village of Kobu in the Walendu Djatsi community in the Djugu region, killing 35 Lendu
civilians. As they entered the village, Ugandan soldiers killed four civilians in the marketplace,
including one [mentally] disabled person. Almost all of the population fled and hid in the
forest for nearly two months. On their return to the village, the villagers found 35 decomposed
bodies, which they buried in various places. Those responsible for the massacre were trying to
remove Lendu populations from the Kobu area, close to the Kilomoto gold mines.”220
(p) “On 26 January 2002, members of the Hema militias killed around 100 Lendu in a forest a few
kilometres from Datule, in the Bahema-Sud community in the Irumu region. The victims had
been chased from the village of Datule the previous day by a UPC commander. They were
killed with machetes, spears and studded batons. A young girl of 13 was the only person to
survive the attack.”221
(q) “From 9 February to 24 April 2002, UPDF based in Gety, together with Hema and Bira militia
groups, carried out large-scale operations against the Lendu villages of the Boloma, Bukiringi,
Zadhu, Baviba and Bamuko groupements, all located in the collectivité of Walendu Bindi, in
the territory of Irumu. Mass killings continued for another two weeks after the visit on 4 April
of the then Governor of Ituri, Jean-Pierre Lompondo Molondo, with Colonel Peter Karim, from
UPDF, who was sent by Kampala to investigate abuses committed by UPDF soldiers. Both
called upon UPDF to end the hostilities. A local non-governmental organization reported a
total of 2,867 civilians killed . . . The most serious mass killings were the following: on
10 February 2002, attack on the localities of Tsarukaka, Nombe, Tsubina and Kagaba with
173 civilians killed; on 15 February 2002, attack and destruction of the localities of Kagaba,
[R]udjoko, Biro, Kapalayi and Kinyamubaya with 120 civilians killed; on 21 February 2002,
attack on Bukiringi with 220 civilians killed; on 14 March 2002, attack on the locality of
Sadji/Kaguma [A] with 14[6] civilians killed; on 29 March 2002, massacre of the population
of Gety by UPDF based there with 109 civilians killed.”222
(r) “On 11 May 2002, the village of Walu, located in the collectivité of Babelebe in the territory of
Irumu, was attacked by Hema militias from 5 a.m. to 1 p.m. The attackers . . . killed civilians
who were not able to flee. Once the attack was over, the population came out of hiding to bury
the bodies. One of the eyewitnesses, who was present at the burials, reported having counted
42 bodies, including that of the Chief of the village. The village was attacked a second time a
few days later by the same militia, who killed four more civilians.”223
(s) “In early June 2002, elements of the UPDF and Hema militiamen indiscriminately killed
members of the Lendu militias and an unknown number of civilians in the Lendu villages in the
219Ibid., para. 407; see also, for a contemporary account of the acts, United Nations Security Council, Sixth
report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2001/128, 12 Feb. 2001, para. 56, RDRC, Ann. 31; Ann. 3.4.
220United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 408; Ann. 1.4.
221Ibid.
222MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 42 and fn. 21; Ann. 1.6.
223Ibid., para. 97.
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Walendu Pitsi community. By way of example, in June 2002, Hema militiamen and elements
of the UPDF killed at least 27 people in Buba.”224
(t) “On 12 June 2002, the Lendu quarters of Mongbwalu were attacked by APC soldiers based
there, together with Hema inhabitants of the town. APC had been bribed by rich Hema with
the aim of emptying Mongbwalu of its Lendu population. The attack lasted from 3 a.m. to
7 a.m. The attackers killed an unknown number of Lendu civilians, threw them into the
roadside ditches and set fire to Lendu homes . . . Towards the end of the attack, the Lendu
combatants arrived from their encampment. They destroyed Hema homes and killed
approximately 100 Hema civilians in an act of revenge.”225
(u) “On 9 August 2002, elements of the APC and Lendu and Ngiti militiamen killed tens of
civilians, mostly Hema, in the town of Komanda and the surrounding villages in the
Basili-Basumu community, in the Irumu region. Guided by the Ngiti militiamen who had
infiltrated the village and by local youths, elements of the APC and members of the militias
moved from house to house, killing Hema civilians purely on the basis of their ethnic origin.
Most of the victims were killed with edged weapons. Some were tied up and then killed with
spears.”226
(v) Following the attack on Bunia by UPDF and UPC forces in August 2002, “[s]everal mass
graves have been discovered, including two near the governor’s residence and others near the
prison and the hospital. According to MONUC, 110 people died in the violence in and around
Bunia, but local sources estimated the dead as at least 150. The victims included both Hema
and Lendu civilians many of whom had been targeted only on the basis of their ethnicity.
Several mass graves were subsequently discovered including one with twenty-six bodies of
mostly women and children, many with bullet wounds in their backs . . . The Ugandan army
backed the UPC attack that deliberately killed large numbers of civilians. In addition, they
failed in most cases to protect civilians who were being targeted for killing in and around the
town, despite having large numbers of troops available less than a mile away.”227
(w) “From 14 to 19 August 2002, elements of the UPC killed over 50 civilians from different ethnic
groups during an attack on the village of Komanda. Most of the victims were shot or killed
with edged weapons when they fled Komanda for Beni. Many of the victims had left Bunia a
few days previously following the takeover of the town by the UPC and had taken refuge in
Komanda. The aim of the UPC attack was to avenge the massacre committed in Komanda on
9 August.”228
(x) “On 28 August 2002, Hema-Gegere militiamen associated with the UPC killed [with edged
weapons] several tens of ‘non-native’ inhabitants in the gold-producing town of Mabanga in
the Mambisa community, in the Djugu region. The victims were killed either with machetes or
with studded batons. Sixteen of them were clubbed to death with planks of wood.”229
224United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 409; Ann. 1.4.
225MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 100; Ann. 1.6.
226United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 413; Ann. 1.4.
227Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo,
Vol. 15, No. 11(A), July 2003, pp. 20-21, available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/; Ann. 3.5. See also
MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 49; Ann. 1.6.
228United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 413; Ann. 1.4.
229Ibid.
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Although “UPDF had a military camp in Mabanga; the Ugandan army did not intervene to stop
the killing of civilians but gave refuge to those who were able to reach the camp.”230
(y) “On 31 August 2002, elements of the UPC supported by Bira militiamen killed at least
14 civilians, including women and children, in several villages in Songolo in the Walendu
Bindi community, in the Irumu region . . . Several victims were mutilated and killed in an
extremely cruel fashion. At least three women were impaled.”231
(z) “On 11 October 2002, Lendu combatants from Bambu and Mabanga attacked Nizi . . .
According to a local non-governmental organization, a total of 320 bodies were buried. The
persons who buried them were able to identify 69 of them.”232
(aa) “In 2002 and 2003, the [Lendu] groupement [of Bedu-Ezekele] experienced a total of
11 attacks with 445 civilian victims of killing, according to a Lendu teacher who took notes of
each event. The most serious attacks occurred on 15 and 16 October 2002, when Hema
militias, together with UPDF from Bogoro, attacked Zumbe and stayed there for 48 hours.
From Zumbe, the attackers burned all the surrounding villages, killed around 125 civilians and
planted several anti-personnel mines.”233
(bb) “On 20 October 2002, elements of the UPC from Bunia and Bogoro killed at least 10 Lendu
civilians during attacks on several villages, including Nombe, Medhu, Pinga, Kagaba, Singo
and Songolo in the Walendu Bindi community, in the Irumu region. A Bira woman married to
a Lendu civilian was also killed.”234
(cc) “Between 12 and 29 October 2002, elements of the ALC and RCD-N taking part in the ‘Clean
the blackboard’ operation [. . .] killed at least 173 Nande and Pygmy civilians in Mambasa and
in the villages along the main road between Mambasa and Beni, particularly in Teturi,
Mwemba and Byakato, in the Mambasa region. The soldiers also carried out acts of
cannibalism, mutilated an unknown number of civilians, raped a large number of women and
children and committed widespread pillaging. The victims were killed purely on the basis of
their ethnic origin”235.
(dd) “On 24 October 2002, elements of the UPC killed several dozen Lendu in the Walendu Bindi
community, particularly in the villages of Nombe, Kagaba, Lakabo, Lokpa, Medhu, Songolo,
Pinga, Androzo and Singo. Most of the victims were killed with edged weapons.”236
(ee) “On 5 November 2002, elements of the FRPI killed at least 14 civilians, including two
women, in the village of Saliboko in the Mobala community, in the Irumu region . . . Most of
the victims were Bira. They were attacked at night in their houses. First they were tied up and
then killed with machetes.”237
230MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 45; Ann. 1.6.
231United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 413; Ann. 1.4.
232MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 103; Ann. 1.6.
233Ibid., para. 63; see also United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the
Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 414; Ann. 1.4.
234United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 414; Ann. 1.4.
235Ibid., para. 416; see also MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 109; Ann. 1.6.
236United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 414; Ann. 1.4.
237Ibid.
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(ff) “On 20 November 2002, UPC and MLC jointly attacked Mongbwalu, using heavy mortars and
other explosive devices. The fighting lasted for two days and resulted in the killing of around
200 civilians”238.
(gg) “On 24 February 2003, Bogoro was attacked by Lendu and Ngiti militias at
5.30 a.m. . . . According to the testimony of 100 survivors, around 260 persons were killed and
another 70 are missing. Among the victims, 173 were under the age of 18.”239
(hh) “On 4 March 2003, early in the morning, the Lendu and Ngiti attack on UPC military
positions in Mandro lasted for no more than a few hours. The armed groups succeeded in
overrunning Mandro and attacked civilians, killing some 168 persons according to the
testimonies received by MONUC in Mandro and Bunia.”240
(ii) “On 6 March 2003, reportedly responding to an attack by UPC on their forces based in Ndele,
UPDF drove UPC out of Bunia and took control of the town with the assistance of Lendu
armed groups. On 6 and 7 March 2003, during and after fighting between UPC and UPDF in
Bunia, several civilians were killed, houses and shops were looted and civilians were wounded
by gunshots. According to the inhabitants of Bunia, fighting between UPC and UPDF began
around 6 a.m. and lasted until the end of the same day. Stray bullets reportedly killed several
civilians; others had their houses shelled. There were also selected killings of Hema civilians
who were known to have financed UPC”241.
(jj) “On March 10, 2003 the Ugandan and Lendu forces attacked Kilo, a town just south of
Mongbwalu, with the Lendu arriving several hours before the Ugandans. The Lendu
combatants met little resistance from the UPC and began killing civilians who they presumed to
be of Nyali ethnicity, accusing them of having helped the Hema. According to local sources,
they killed at least one hundred, many of them women and children . . . Residents walking on
the road near the town of Kilo nearly a month later still reported the smell of corpses rotting in
the forest.”242
(kk) “On 3 April 2003, . . . Drodro parish (located in Duma village) and the surrounding villages of
Dhassa (Largu), Nyali, Dzathi, Kiza, Ngazba, Jissa, Kpatiz, Koli, Lera, Ndjala and Kpaluma
were attacked between 5.45 a.m. and 8 a.m. by Lendu militias . . . A team composed of
personnel of MONUC and personnel of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights travelled to the affected areas, and received testimonies of survivors,
eyewitnesses, family members and church and administrative authorities, who reported the
killing of 408 civilians [and] the serious injury of 80 others, 48 of them still in the local hospital
at the time of the investigation”243.
3.20. Obviously it is crucial to bear in mind that, although this list is long, it is by no means
exhaustive, since it only includes those events which were documented — often in very difficult
conditions — by the United Nations bodies which were able to carry out investigations on the
ground. In any event, the names of the towns and villages affected, the macabre death toll and the
238MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 102; Ann. 1.6.
239Ibid., para. 65; the Second special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC reports 330 deaths (United
Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2003/566, 27 May 2003, para. 9; Ann. 3.6).
240MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 72; Ann. 1.6.
241Ibid., para. 73.
242Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, op. cit., p. 37; Ann. 3.3.
243MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 75; Ann. 1.6; see also United Nations Security
Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit., para. 9; Ann. 3.6.
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sequence of dates give some idea of the scale of the indescribable suffering inflicted on the civilian
population of Ituri throughout the region’s occupation by the Ugandan armed forces. The list
shows that there is sadly nothing journalistic or sensationalist about the title chosen by Human
Rights Watch for one of its reports on the human consequences of the war in the Congo — Ituri:
Covered in Blood244.
3.21. It also explains, despite the lack of definite figures, why the overall death toll in Ituri
that was established by the international institutions very quickly ran into the thousands, and then
the tens of thousands. For example, in March 2000, the IRIN information network reported that a
United Nations assessment mission of October 1999 had put the number of deaths at between 5,000
and 7,000 people after the first year of occupation245. In his report of September 2000, the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC put at 8,000 the number of people killed in
the violent confrontations which were tearing Ituri apart at that time246. Those estimates were
subsequently to rise dramatically. Thus, following the surge of violence in the region during
summer 2002, the United Nations Secretary-General noted in his Special report on MONUC that
“[t]he total number of killings in Ituri in recent weeks is impossible to ascertain”247. However,
immediately afterwards he added that
“[i]t is widely accepted that in Bunia itself there have been hundreds, but as the
violence has increased and spread to villages as far as 90 kilometres from Bunia,
figures provided by non-governmental organizations and other sources have suggested
that thousands may have died in August alone, with tens of thousands displaced,
although it has not been possible to confirm these figures independently”248.
Given the multitude of attacks either targeting civilians or of which civilians suffered the direct
consequences, which are listed above for August 2002 alone, that assessment is not at all
unrealistic. In fact, the list contains no fewer than five incidents for that month, in each of which
between 14 and over 300 individuals were killed249.
3.22. It is therefore not surprising that the most recent overall estimate available, the one
provided by the United Nations Secretary-General in his Second special report on MONUC of May
2003, puts the total number of people killed during the years of Ituri’s occupation at 60,000:
“[s]ince the first major onslaught of violence in June 1999, the death toll has been estimated at
more than 60,000”250. This appalling death toll also reflects the massive deterioration in the
region’s medical facilities and the problems experienced by aid organizations, which were further
consequences of the unrest which flared up throughout the region during that period. The same
report of the United Nations Secretary-General provides the clearest picture of the catastrophic
healthcare situation in Ituri in spring 2003:
244Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo,
op. cit.; Ann. 3.5.
245IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], Nairobi, 3 Mar. 2000, available at
http://www.irinnews.org/report/12699/drc-irin-special-report-ituri-clas…; Ann. 3.7.
246United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the DRC, op. cit., RDRC, Ann. 81; Ann. 3.1.
247United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit.; Ann. 3.2.
248Ibid., emphasis added.
249See para. 3.18 above.
250United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit.,
para. 10, emphasis added; Ann. 3.6.
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“Of the estimated 400 health centres, 212 have been closed, and not a single
surgeon is present . . . Moreover, the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity has
obstructed the humanitarian community’s access to sizeable areas of the region,
effectively denying the provision of aid to the most vulnerable populations.”251
Clearly, such a situation could only significantly increase the human cost of the conflict.
3.23. The Democratic Republic of the Congo will therefore take the figure of 60,000 killed
as a basis for this part of its claim in the present proceedings. Given that it is impossible to obtain
precise figures for each of the acts of violence experienced by the region during those grim years,
that figure is a reasonable estimate, which has been established by impartial and independent
international actors on the basis of information gathered over time on the ground. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo estimates that two thirds of that number (i.e., 40,000 people) died as a result
of deliberate violence against civilians, the remaining third (20,000 people) being inhabitants of
Ituri who lost their lives in other circumstances related to the conflicts which ravaged that region
between 1998 and 2003. This estimate is fully corroborated by a systematic analysis of the main
occasions on which armed force was used indiscriminately against the civilian population of Ituri.
The consequences of this breakdown for calculating the amount of compensation due in those
different cases will be presented in Chapter 7 of this Memorial252.
B. Injury and mutilation
3.24. As well as recording the tens of thousands of people who were killed during the
multiple attacks which targeted or affected civilians living in Ituri, the reports of the international
organizations state that a very large number of individuals were injured as a result of those acts. In
many cases, the victims suffered serious and life-changing injuries or mutilation253.
3.25. Here too, data will be provided in relation to specific incidents, before an estimate is
given of the total number of people who suffered serious injuries during the confrontations. It is
reported, for example, that 30 civilians were injured as a result of the fighting initiated by the
UPDF to retake control of Bunia in March 2003254, that 80 civilians were seriously injured in the
attack on Drodro parish and the surrounding villages on 3 April 2003255, and that a large number of
the local population were seriously injured or mutilated during the many attacks on civilians which
are listed above256.
3.26. Moreover, it is established that during the period concerned, a number of civilians were
the victims in Ituri of acts of torture or inhumane treatment which engage Uganda’s international
responsibility. In its Judgment of December 2005, the Court stated in very general terms that it
considered that it had “credible evidence sufficient to conclude that the UPDF troops committed
251Ibid.
252See Chap. 7 below.
253See, on this subject, for the initial stages of the war, IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], op.
cit.; Ann. 3.7. For the subsequent periods see, for example, the serious mutilation suffered by the survivors of the
attacks on Zumbe on 15 and 16 October 2002, or committed in the village of Saliboko on 5 November 2002 (United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 414;
Ann. 1.4).
254MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 74; Ann. 1.6.
255Ibid., para. 75.
256See para. 3.19 above.
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acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhumane treatment of the civilian population”257. A
considerable number of those acts were committed in the Ituri region, as attested in particular by
the Mapping Report of the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights:
“In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for several years
with complete impunity. They summarily executed civilians, tortured and arbitrarily
detained an unknown number of people, several of them in muddy holes two or three
metres deep.”258
The same techniques were employed by UPDF soldiers and their allies in other locations, including
Buta:
“From 2001 to January 2003, elements of the ALC/UPDF . . . tortured and
killed an unknown number of civilians in the town of Buta. Most of the victims were
held in muddy holes in conditions likely to cause death through disease or exhaustion.
After a human rights activist had been tortured and held in one of the muddy holes by
the soldiers, MONUC and United Nations organisations sent out an investigative
mission and had these prisons shut down.”259
Acts of torture were also reported to have been committed in the Walendu Bindi collectivité (Irumu
region) by UPDF soldiers and Hema militiamen, between February and April 2002260, and during
the attack on Mongbwalu by a coalition of Congolese rebel groups supported by Uganda, in
November 2002261. For the individuals who were subjected to such treatment, it clearly constitutes
an additional source of serious injury.
3.27. Once again, it is very difficult to establish a precise and detailed record of the total
number of people who were injured as a result of the attacks on the civilian population of Ituri
between 1999 and 2003. This is partly because those who had been injured often preferred to
remain hidden in the bush or forest, rather than seeking treatment in the hospitals or clinics in the
urban centres or villages, where they feared that their lives would be in immediate danger. As
stated in a report published in March 2000 by IRIN on the Ituri clashes, “[o]ne international
humanitarian organisation warns that Lendu victims may not be brought into town and are more
likely, particularly with bullet wounds, to remain in the bush”262. It is clear that such people could
never have been listed as injured. Moreover, in numerous places, the medical facilities were
themselves destroyed in the attacks, and with them all written records of hospital admissions and
treatment, thus eliminating all primary sources for ascertaining how many people were injured in
the areas concerned263. It will be recalled in this context that in May 2003, the United Nations
Secretary-General wrote that “[o]f the estimated 400 health centres [in the region], 212 have been
closed”264.
257Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 241, para. 211.
258United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 444; Ann. 1.4.
259Ibid., para. 402.
260Ibid., para. 408.
261Ibid., para. 417.
262IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], op. cit.; Ann. 3.7.
263See para. 3.21 above.
264United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit.,
para. 10; Ann. 3.6.
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3.28. In such circumstances it comes as no surprise that, in his Second special report on
MONUC, the Secretary-General gives an estimate of the number of deaths caused by the conflict,
but confines himself to stating that “countless others have been left maimed or severely
mutilated”265. In the absence of more precise data on this point, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo estimates that the number of people who suffered serious injury as a result of Uganda’s
failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri between 1998 and 2003
was 30,000. That is half the number of people who lost their lives in the region during the same
period266. The ratio of deaths to injuries chosen by the DRC in this particular context is much
lower than that seen in other recent conflicts267. This conservative method of calculation is justified
by the specific characteristics of the conflicts in Ituri during the period concerned.
3.29. Indeed, it is clear from the various reports mentioned above that the region’s medical
facilities were in a particularly parlous state at that time, and that many of the victims of the attacks
on civilians were forced to abandon their homes and seek refuge in the forests. This had the
inevitable consequence that a significant proportion of those injured or mutilated during the attacks
were unable to obtain the treatment they needed, and died as a result of their often severe injuries.
They must therefore be regarded as having already been counted amongst those who lost their lives
during that period, and will thus not be included in the tally of those injured. It is for these reasons
that the figure of 30,000 injured or mutilated will be taken as a basis for the reparation claim
submitted by the DRC for this category of damage in the present proceedings. In the
circumstances, it would appear logical to break that number down in the same way as for the loss
of human life268. In this instance, the DRC therefore estimates that two thirds (i.e., 20,000) of those
injured or mutilated were the victims of deliberate violence against civilians, the remaining third
(10,000 people) being inhabitants of Ituri who were injured or mutilated in other circumstances
related to the conflicts which ravaged that region between 1998 and 2003. The consequences of
this breakdown for calculating the compensation due in those different cases will be presented in
Chapter 7269.
C. Rape
3.30. During the conflict which devastated Ituri, as in so many other armed conflicts, the
massacres of civilians and other acts of oppression committed against them were frequently
accompanied by systematic rape. Thus, the international reports document
(a) the rape of at least 50 women during the attack on Zumbe, on 15 and 16 October 2002270;
265Ibid.
266See para. 3.21 above.
267Most of the data available relates to military victims. By way of example, 83 French soldiers lost their lives in
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2012, while 700 were injured, a ratio of one to more than eight (“Afghanistan: Inspection
du théâtre par le chef d’état-major des armées”, press release by the French Ministry of Defence, 11 May 2012, available
at http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/actualites/afghanistan-inspection…
(in French only)). The ratio was around one to three for soldiers in the United States army who served in
Vietnam (Congressional Research Service, American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics,
2 Jan. 2015, p. 3, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf).
268See para. 3.23 above.
269See Chap. 7 below.
270United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 414; Ann. 1.4.
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(b) the rape of “a large number of women and children” in Mambasa between 12 and
29 October 2002271; in connection with the same events, MONUC’s special report on Ituri
mentions “systematic rape” and the fact that “[t]he number of rape cases — mainly young girls
or women between 12 and 25 years old — [on this occasion] rose to an alarming level”272.
3.31. The difficulty of establishing precisely how many people were subjected to sexual
violence has already been pointed out above273, where reference was made to the socio-cultural
considerations deterring a large number of victims of such violence from formally reporting it. It is
clear that those factors played the same role in Ituri as they did in the other regions of the DRC,
which were dealt with in the previous chapter.
3.32. Congolese investigators were only able to identify 342 cases of rape during the process
of recording the damage resulting from the occupation of Ituri by Uganda274: 122 cases of ordinary
rape and 220 cases of aggravated rape. There is no doubt that this figure falls well below the actual
one, for the reasons which have just been reiterated. Given, on the one hand, the common practice
of not reporting such acts and, on the other, the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war against
the civilian population in Ituri, the Democratic Republic of the Congo estimates that the actual
number of rapes for which Uganda is responsible, because of its failure to comply with its
obligations as an occupying Power in that region between 1998 and 2003, is five times higher than
the number reported, in other words 1,710. That figure will therefore be taken as a basis for the
reparation claim submitted by the DRC for this category of damage in the present proceedings. It
will be broken down in line with the individual records, giving a projection of 610 cases of
ordinary rape and 1,100 cases of aggravated rape. The consequences of this breakdown for
calculating the compensation due in those different cases will be explained in Chapter 7275.
D. The recruitment, training and deployment of child soldiers
3.33. The recruitment, training and deployment of child soldiers by several of the
protagonists in the Ituri conflicts is well documented. The same is true, more specifically, of
Uganda’s involvement in those practices. In this context it should be recalled that, in its Judgment
of 19 December 2005, the Court found “that there is convincing evidence of the training in UPDF
training camps of child soldiers and of the UPDF’s failure to prevent the recruitment of child
soldiers in areas under its control”276. Once again, therefore, it is by virtue both of its own actions
and of its failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri that Uganda is held
responsible for these acts by the Court.
3.34. It should be recalled that these practices went well beyond the mere act — already
dreadful enough in itself — of catapulting children into the horrors of war. In fact, in the particular
case of Ituri, they were subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, in part to increase their level
of aggression and remove their inhibitions, thereby making them more inclined to commit atrocities
and acts of extreme violence. The Mapping Report, produced by the United Nations Office of the
271Ibid., para. 416.
272MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 108; Ann. 1.6.
273See para. 2.78 above.
274This figure was established using the software created by the DRC for the purposes of the present proceedings;
Ann. 1.3.
275See Chap. 7 below.
276Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 240, para. 210.
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High Commissioner for Human Rights, thus notes that during their military training, the thousands
of children recruited by the UPC “were often tortured, subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading
acts and raped”277. The extent of the long-term psychological, as much as physical, damage caused
by such practices can readily be imagined.
3.35. Several international sources provide a more precise idea of the number of children
who found themselves caught up in the machinery of war in this way. For example, in his Sixth
report on MONUC, dated February 2001, the United Nations Secretary-General states that
“a considerable number of Congolese children were taken from the Bunia, Beni and
Butembo region, apparently for military training in Uganda . . . As the present report
was being finalized, information was received that 600 children would be transferred
to the custody of humanitarian organizations next week.”278
Similar figures were mentioned before Trial Chamber I, with a few additional details, during the
Lubanga case. The Chamber thus notes that
“[s]ome of those who witnessed this transfer of about 700 youths to Uganda told
P-0116 [a witness in the trial] they had been taken on Ugandan cargo planes, and it
appeared that the accused was in contact with the Ugandan military authorities who
gave him the necessary military support”279.
More generally, the Mapping Report indicates for its part that “all the armed groups in Ituri (UPC,
FNI, FRPI, FAPC and PUSIC) [. . .] recruited thousands of children along ethnic lines”280. It
extends this finding to other rebel groups, stating that
“[t]he MLC’s army, the ALC, with the backing of the Ugandan Army, the UPDF,
allegedly also recruited children, primarily in Mbandaka, Équateur Province. In 2001,
the MLC admitted to having 1,800 CAAFAG within its ranks. The child soldiers were
involved in ALC offensives during which serious violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law were committed.”281
3.36. Although it is also very difficult to ascertain the exact scale of the child soldier
phenomenon during the conflict in Ituri, the data referred to above would appear to provide a
277United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 429; Ann. 1.4.
278United Nations Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit., para. 66;
Ann. 3.4; the first sentence of this extract refers to para. 75 of the Secretary-General’s previous report on MONUC, dated
December 2000. The figure given later in the Mapping Report is at first sight lower, since it states that “at least 163 of
these children were sent to Uganda to undergo military training at a UPDF camp in Kyankwanzi before finally being
repatriated to Ituri by UNICEF in February 2001” (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 429; Ann. 1.4). This is not in fact a contradiction, since the
Secretary-General’s report was produced before the children were repatriated (and therefore merely indicates what had
been planned), whereas the Mapping Report, which was produced several years after these events, states what actually
happened in February 2001 (only 163 children were repatriated, rather than the 600 initially planned).
279International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute, document ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 Mar. 2012, para. 1033.
280United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 429; Ann. 1.4.
281Ibid., para. 697. The term CAAFAG  “Children Associated to Armed Forces and Groups — is used to
describe every person aged 18 years or younger who currently is or in the past has been recruited or used in armed forces
or groups. This includes children, both boys and girls, used as combatants, transporters, cooks, messengers, spies or
exploited for sexual purposes” (Bureau pour le Voluntariat au Service de l’Enfance et de la Santé in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC); available at http://www.bves-rdc.org/CentresEn.htm).
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reasonable basis for such an assessment. Based on that evidence, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo estimates that the number of child soldiers recruited and trained by the various protagonists
in the conflict in Ituri between 2000 and 2003 was 2,500. That figure will therefore be taken as a
basis for its reparation claim for this category of damage in the present proceedings.
E. Population flight and displacement
3.37. The scale and extreme violence of the attacks on the civilian population in Ituri, during
the period when that region was occupied by Uganda, often impelled the inhabitants of the places
which were either targeted or the scene of fighting between the various protagonists in the conflict
to take flight, and abandon their home, their possessions, and their livestock or business, often for
lengthy periods. The statement made during his trial before Trial Chamber I by one of the former
protagonists in the conflict, Germain Katanga, probably conveys the reality of the situation most
effectively.
The accused noted in this context
“that the DRC had its own brand of warfare: ‘war is not waged the way it is in
Europe. In Europe people take cover in their homes. In our part of the world, it’s the
opposite. If you stay at home, your home will be set on fire and then . . . you’ll burn
inside it.’”282
The general climate of insecurity created by the use of such methods explains not only why so
many people fled and were displaced, but also why they stayed away for so long, in the wake of the
violence in Ituri between 1998 and 2003. Indeed, the attempts made by certain local authorities to
encourage people to return to their villages frequently ended in failure, as is plain from a report
produced by IRIN back in early 2000:
“As a ‘test of sentiment’, according to RCD-ML leader Ernest Wamba dia
Wamba, the authorities are encouraging people to return to their abandoned and
destroyed villages. But many of the displaced fear to return to villages where there is
inadequate security and no structure has been put in place for returnees.”283
Far from subsequently being reversed, this trend in fact worsened as the acts of violence and
revenge proliferated, and as the climate of impunity enjoyed by their perpetrators became more
pervasive, in the face of continued inaction by the occupying Ugandan authorities.
3.38. Once again, the international reports give a very good idea of the frequency with which
civilians were forced to flee their towns or villages during the conflict. The number of people
affected by each event clearly demonstrates the scale of the phenomenon. For example,
(a) the large-scale operations carried out by the Ugandan forces, together with Hema and Bira
militia groups, against the Lendu villages of the Boloma, Bukiringi, Zadhu, Baviba and
Bamuko groupements in the collectivité of Walendu Bindi, between 9 February and
24 April 2002, caused the displacement of no fewer than 40,000 civilians284;
282International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Judgment pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute, document ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 Mar. 2014, para. 518.
283IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], op. cit.; Ann. 3.7.
284MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 42; Ann. 1.6.
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(b) following the attack on Mabanga by Lendu militia groups in August 2002, “[s]ome 2,000
civilians, who sought refuge in the Ugandan camp, were escorted to Bunia the day after the
event”285;
(c) according to the humanitarian agencies present on the ground, the fighting which took place in
Bunia at the beginning of August 2002 displaced 10,000 families286;
(d) the attack on the lakeside groupement of Bandikado in the collectivité of Behema-Sud, in the
Irumu region, on 13 September 2002 “caused several thousand people to be displaced for
several years”287;
(e) during operation Chikana Namukono, which was carried out by the UPC in February 2003,
“[a]round 60,000 civilians were forced to flee to the relative safety of the surrounding bush,
and the number of those who died of hunger and sickness remains unknown”288.
3.39. It is crucial to realize that many of those displaced nevertheless failed to find safety in
flight. In fact, several cases have been reported in which displaced persons themselves were
targeted, either directly or indirectly, by one or other of the protagonists in the conflict. For
example, the Mapping Report explains that
“[o]n 26 April 2001, armed men killed six members of the ICRC during an attack on a
humanitarian convoy in the area around Fataki in the Walendu Djatsi community, in
the Djugu region. Local sources indicate that the attack is thought to have been
perpetrated by Ugandan soldiers and Hema militiamen. The attack was supposedly
aimed at ending the presence of humanitarian personnel in areas where the displaced
Lendu had taken refuge. During the period under consideration, numerous sources
indicate that Hema militias and armed groups severely hampered the work of
humanitarian organisations in areas populated principally by Lendu.”289
In other cases too, the refuge found by the displaced persons proved to be very precarious. The
same report thus describes how
“[o]n 28 January 2002, Hema militiamen killed and mutilated around 50 Lendu
civilians in Kasenyi in the Irumu region. Having been informed of the massacre that
had taken place on 26 January, the victims had fled the village of Datule on
27 January in the hope of reaching the Lendu villages in the Walendu Bindi
community. They were hiding behind a police station when they were surprised and
killed.”290
Events such as these certainly speak volumes for the insecurity and extreme anxiety faced by the
people of Ituri, even after fleeing the places where they had initially been exposed to the fighting.
285Ibid., para. 45.
286Ibid., para. 49; emphasis added.
287United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 413; Ann. 1.4.
288MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 70; Ann. 1.6.
289United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 408; Ann. 1.4.
290Ibid.
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3.40. In the light of the few specific situations described above, it is hardly surprising that the
international reports’ assessments of the number of individuals displaced in Ituri throughout its
occupation by the Ugandan army quickly run into the tens of thousands, and then the hundreds of
thousands of people. In September 2000, for example, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo records the displacement of 50,000 people
in Ituri291. These figures subsequently increased exponentially. In September 2002, in his Special
report on MONUC, the United Nations Secretary-General refers to “500,000 people . . . newly
displaced, with 60,000 displaced in Bunia alone”292. Finally, in March 2003, the Secretary-General
states that
“[t]he humanitarian impact of the armed conflict for the 4.6 million inhabitants of Ituri
has been catastrophic. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, between 500,000 and 600,000 internally displaced persons — many of whom
remain in hiding and cannot be accounted for — in addition to nearly 100,000
refugees from Uganda and the Sudan, are dispersed throughout the area.”293
3.41. These various figures, from impartial and well-informed sources on the ground, would
appear to provide a reasonable basis on which to assess how many people were forced to flee their
town or village as a consequence of Uganda’s failure to comply with its obligations as an
occupying Power in Ituri between 1998 and 2003. Based on that evidence, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo estimates that the number of people who were faced with such a situation
during the period concerned was 600,000. That figure will therefore be taken as a basis for its
reparation claim for this category of damage in the present proceedings.
F. Destruction of property and infrastructure
3.42. In addition to inflicting massive human damage, it is clear that the fighting which
ravaged Ituri throughout the region’s occupation by Ugandan forces caused very large-scale
material damage. Thus, numerous sources attest to the destruction on a massive scale of both
private property and a range of public infrastructure. For example, the national and international
reports describe the following acts of destruction:
(a) “UPDF carried out its first attacks on the village of Loda, located between Fataki and Libi, in
the night of 29 to 30 May 1999, burning it down . . . Later, the villages of Lubea, Buba, Giba,
Linga, Ladejo, Petro and Arr were reportedly all destroyed by UPDF forces under the
command of Captain Kyakabale, who was reportedly paid by Lobo Tasoro, and several Hema
concessionnaires. UPDF, together with Hema militias, continued their punitive actions,
burning down villages of first the collectivité of Walendu of Pitsi, then of Walendu Djatsi, from
1999 to the end of 2001.”294
(b) It is also reported, in relation to the first wave of violence, in spring 1999, that “[t]he deadliest
outbreaks are in Jiba and Blukwa, where entire villages have apparently disappeared:
inhabitants massacred or forced to flee, huts burnt down, houses destroyed, livestock
decimated, etc. In addition, several schools, administrative buildings and production facilities
291United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the DRC, op. cit., para. 26, RDRC, Ann. 81; Ann. 3.1.
292United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit., para. 25;
Ann. 3.2.
293United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit.,
para. 10; Ann. 3.6.
294MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 19; Ann. 1.6.
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have been destroyed. Around Blukwa, the villages of Nibi, Tsuki and Koo have been razed to
the ground (approximately 1,200 families).”295
(c) “Bedu-Ezekele, a Lendu groupement, located in the collectivité of Walendu Tatsi, was attacked
several times from January 2001 to March 2003 . . . its 24 localities were destroyed”296.
(d) “In 2002, important Hema South families were reportedly involved in financing the
involvement of UPDF in attacking the collectivité of Walendu Bindi . . . Hundreds of localities
were destroyed by UPDF and the Hema South militias.”297
(e) Between February and April 2002, following attacks by the UPDF together with Hema and
Bira militia groups on numerous Lendu villages in the collectivité of Walendu Bindi, “[a] local
non-governmental organization reported . . . that 77 localities were completely destroyed,
together with all social infrastructures”298.
(f) “On 11 May 2002, the village of Walu, located in the collectivité of Babelebe in the territory of
Irumu, was attacked by Hema militias . . . The attackers completely burned social
infrastructures, including two schools and three health centres.”299
(g) The residence of the Governor of Ituri was severely damaged during the attack on Bunia by
UPDF and UPC forces in August 2002300.
(h) On 31 August 2002, elements of the UPC supported by Bira militiamen set fire to over 1,000
houses in several villages in Songolo, in the Irumu region301.
(i) On 11 October 2002, elements of the FNI attacked the mining town of Nizi in the collectivité of
Mambisa; “[d]uring these attacks, the militiamen . . . set fire to numerous buildings, including
the community offices, schools and a hospital”302.
(j) From Zumbe, which was attacked on 15 and 16 October 2002 by Hema militia groups
accompanied by Ugandan soldiers, “the attackers burned all the surrounding villages”303; on
that occasion “more than 500 buildings, including health centres and schools”, were
destroyed304.
295Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple
congolais”, 31 Aug. 1999, available at http://www.congonline.com/Forum1/Forum04/RapJus01.htm (in French only) and
in Jean-Pierre Badidike (ed.), Guerre et droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo, Paris/Kisangani,
L’Harmattan, 2009; Ann. 3.8. [Translation by the Registry.]
296MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 62; Ann. 1.6.
297Ibid., para. 21.
298Ibid., para. 42.
299Ibid., para. 97.
300Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo,
op. cit.; Ann. 3.5.
301United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 413; Ann. 1.4.
302Ibid.
303MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 63; Ann. 1.6.
304United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 414; Ann. 1.4.
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(k) On 24 October 2002, elements of the UPC attacked several villages in the collectivité of
Walendu Bindi; “at least 351 houses, including schools and health centres” were burnt down
on that occasion305.
(l) “On 20 November 2002, UPC and MLC jointly attacked Mongbwalu, using heavy mortars and
other explosive devices. The fighting lasted for two days and resulted in . . . the destruction of
infrastructures.”306
(m) “On 6 March 2003, elements of the UPC and UPDF/FNI/FRPI fought each other with heavy
weapons in Bunia . . . Elements of the UPDF/FNI/FRPI also looted and destroyed numerous
buildings, private homes and premises used by local and international NGOs.”307
(n) According to local non-governmental organizations, 15 houses were completely destroyed
during the events of 12 March 2003 in Bunia308.
(o) “MONUC human rights investigators who travelled to Bogoro on 26 March 2003 saw that most
of the buildings and houses on the main road had been destroyed or burned.”309
(p) “MONUC human rights investigators were able to visit Lipri, Bambu and Kobu on
3 April 2003. The team saw several villages on the way that were burned . . . Operation
Chikana Namukono resulted in . . . the complete destruction of 26 localities.”310
(q) On 3 April 2003, the attack on Drodro parish and the surrounding villages of Dhassa (Largu),
Nyali, Dzathi, Kiza, Ngazba, Jissa, Kpatiz, Koli, Lera, Ndjala and Kpaluma culminated in the
destruction of 150 houses and shops311.
3.43. The massive scale and mainly systematic nature of the acts of destruction of dwellings
in the villages attacked by the various protagonists in the Ituri conflicts cannot fail to shock.
However, this is easily explained if the general context in which these events occurred is
considered, since in most cases their objective was to attack people of a particular ethnic group, and
thus drive them out of the territory coveted by the assailants. Completely destroying entire villages
was clearly a very effective way of achieving that objective.
3.44. This list might be impressive, but once again it is by no means exhaustive, either in
terms of the various events during which such acts of destruction were carried out, or in terms of
the types of property destroyed. As far as the latter is concerned, it is in fact vital to note that the
authors of the reports from which the above-mentioned information is sourced tended only to take
account of private property (dwellings) and public infrastructure (such as schools, clinics and
hospitals). Yet those categories of property are very far from being the only ones whose
destruction had a lasting impact on the lives of the people of Ituri. As IRIN reports, in more
general terms, as early as 2000, following the explosion of violence in the region, “[v]illages have
been razed to the ground, homes burnt, crops and land abandoned, and vital possessions including
305Ibid.
306MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 102; Ann. 1.6.
307United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 421; Ann. 1.4.
308MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 74; Ann. 1.6.
309Ibid., para. 66.
310Ibid., para. 70.
311Ibid., para. 75.
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seeds, agricultural tools and clothes destroyed”312. In other words, the inhabitants of the very many
locations attacked by the different protagonists in the conflict were not only brutally dispossessed
of their houses, but also of a wide range of other property that was essential to their survival.
Indeed, the records established by the DRC authorities on the basis of surveys of the people of Ituri
reflect the diverse nature of the damage suffered in the category under consideration here313.
3.45. It is obviously difficult to account for all the public and private property that was
destroyed by the various protagonists in the conflict which tore Ituri apart during the period when
that region was occupied by the Ugandan army. Nevertheless, a combination of the evidence from
the international reports — the source of the information reproduced above — and the records
established by the DRC makes it possible to produce the following assessment:
(a) In his Second special report on MONUC, dated May 2003, the United Nations
Secretary-General records the destruction of 200 schools in the region314.
(b) The same source indicates that “[o]f the estimated 400 health centres, 212 have been
closed . . .”315. There is no evidence, however, that all such closures were due to acts of
destruction, since they might equally be explained by a shortage of qualified staff, for example.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the acts of destruction carried out by the various protagonists
in the conflicts which tore Ituri apart between 1998 and 2003 also affected the region’s medical
facilities. Based on the data available, the Democratic Republic of the Congo considers it
reasonable to assume that 50 clinics and hospitals were destroyed as a consequence of
Uganda’s failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri between 1998
and 2003.
(c) According to the investigations conducted by the DRC in the region, the number of dwellings
destroyed as a consequence of Uganda’s failure to comply with its obligations as an occupying
Power in Ituri between 1998 and 2003 was 8,693316. This figure clearly encompasses a wide
range of very different constructions, and those differences will be taken into account with a
view to providing a financial assessment of the damage suffered that is as realistic as
possible317. Most of the dwellings destroyed in Ituri were in rural areas, and only a minority in
urban areas where constructions are more valuable. With that in mind, the DRC considers it
reasonable to break the figure down into the following categories of destroyed dwellings:
 light dwellings: 80% of the total, or 6,954;
 intermediate dwellings: 15% of the total, or 1,304;
 luxury dwellings: 5% of the total, or 435.
312IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], op. cit.; Ann. 3.7.
313Result of using the software created by the DRC for the present proceedings (by entering “Ituri” and
“Destruction of property”); Ann. 1.3.
314This figure is given by the United Nations Secretary-General in his Second special report on MONUC, op. cit.,
para. 10; Ann. 3.6.
315Ibid.
316Result of using the software created by the DRC for the present proceedings (by entering “Ituri” and
“Destruction of property”); Ann. 1.3.
317See Chap. 7 below.
103
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The consequences of this breakdown for calculating the amount of compensation due in these
different cases will be presented in Chapter 7 of this Memorial318.
(d) Finally, the records established by the DRC’s investigators also contain evidence of the
destruction of administrative buildings (offices, civil servants’ accommodation, prisons, etc.).
They document 12 specific cases of such buildings being destroyed, in all likelihood merely a
fraction of the damage of that kind which was actually suffered. The DRC therefore considers
it reasonable to assume that 50 administrative buildings were destroyed in the Ituri region
between 1998 and 2003.
3.46. These figures will form the basis for the reparation claim submitted by the Democratic
Republic of the Congo for this category of damage in the present proceedings.
G. Looting
3.47. In many cases, the destruction of public and private property was accompanied by
widespread looting. For the soldiers and militiamen involved in the attacks or fighting in question,
this was an easy way of supplementing their meagre wages, which were moreover often paid
erratically. The failure of their superiors to impose any sanctions, and the fact that the occupying
Power showed no inclination to maintain order in the Ituri region, obviously only served to make
such acts more frequent and more widespread, considerably increasing the vulnerability of the
civilian population. The international reports include the following acts of looting:
(a) when UPDF and UPC forces attacked Bunia in August 2002, a witness reports that he saw
Ugandan soldiers and Hema militiamen looting houses near the Governor’s residence; many
other houses in the town were also looted319;
(b) numerous acts of looting were committed by elements of the FRPI and APC at the time of the
attack on Nyakunde and the surrounding villages in the collectivité of Andisoma between 5 and
15 September 2002320;
(c) the same happened on 13 September 2002, when elements of the FRPI attacked the groupement
of Bandikado321;
(d) and on 11 October 2002, when FNI militiamen attacked the mining town of Nizi322;
(e) it is reported that large amounts of property were looted and 1,500 head of cattle stolen when
UPC militiamen attacked Zumbe on 15 and 16 October 2002323;
(f) similar acts are reported in connection with the UPC’s attack on the villages of Nombe, Medhu,
Pinga, Kagaba, Singo and Songolo, in the collectivité of Walendu Bindi, on
20 October 2002324;
318See Chap. 7 below.
319Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence in Northeastern DR Congo,
op. cit., pp. 20-21; Ann. 3.5; the same acts are reported in MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit.,
para. 49; Ann. 1.6.
320United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 413; Ann. 1.4.
321Ibid.
322Ibid.
323Ibid., para. 414.
324Ibid.
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(g) and in connection with the same rebel movement’s attack on the villages of Nombe, Kagaba,
Lakabo, Lokpa, Medhu, Songolo, Pinga, Androzo and Singo on 24 October 2002 (theft of
1,450 head of cattle)325;
(h) the village of Saliboko was looted by elements of the FRPI on 5 November 2002326;
(i) “widespread pillaging” was committed by ALC and RCD-N rebels taking part in the “Clean the
blackboard” operation in Mambasa and in the villages along the main road between Mambasa
and Beni327;
(j) “[o]n 6 and 7 March 2003, during and after fighting between UPC and UPDF in
Bunia, . . . houses and shops were looted”328;
(k) still in Bunia, “[l]ocal non-governmental organizations carried out investigations into the events
on 12 March 2003 and compiled a list . . . 60 [houses] including offices of the
non-governmental organizations Coopi, Aciar, J-plus, Hellenique and Cemif were completely
looted. Eyewitnesses accused UPDF of being directly involved in the looting”329.
3.48. In this instance, the data from international sources can be supplemented by data on
looting from the records established by the DRC. A detailed list of the different categories of
looted property (livestock, vehicles, goods, etc.), which has been established on the basis of those
records, is annexed to this chapter. That list will form the basis for the reparation claim submitted
by the Democratic Republic of the Congo for this category of damage in the present proceedings.
*
3.49. The extent of the damage resulting from Uganda’s failure to comply with its
obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri between 1998 and 2003 is thus established. That
damage can be summarized as follows:
(a) 60,000 persons killed, 40,000 of whom in the context of deliberate attacks on civilians, and
20,000 in other circumstances;
(b) 30,000 persons injured or mutilated, 20,000 of whom in the context of deliberate attacks on
civilians, and 10,000 in other circumstances;
(c) 1,710 cases of rape;
(d) 2,500 persons recruited, trained and deployed as child soldiers;
(e) 600,000 persons displaced or forced to flee their homes;
(f) the destruction of
325Ibid.
326Ibid.
327Ibid., para. 416.
328MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 73; Ann. 1.6.
329Ibid., para. 74.
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 8,693 dwellings;
 200 schools;
 50 medical facilities;
 50 administrative buildings or complexes;
(g) numerous acts of looting.
3.50. As previously stated, the reparation claimed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo
will be quantified on the basis of this information, and the practical arrangements for making that
reparation explained, in Chapter 7 of this Memorial, which is devoted exclusively to those matters.
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CHAPTER 4. THE INJURIES SUFFERED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
FOLLOWING THE HOSTILITIES INVOLVING UGANDA IN THE CITY OF KISANGANI
Map No. 4.1.
Orientale province and the city of Kisangani
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
4.01. At the time of the events under consideration in this case, Kisangani, the third largest
city in the DRC, was the capital of Orientale province, the most extensive and most highly
populated of the country’s provinces. The city of Kisangani had around 700,000 inhabitants, of
diverse cultural origins. It had two airports, one of them international (Bangboka) and the other a
military base (Simi-Simi), as well as a river port at the start of the waterway to Kinshasa. The city
of Kisangani consisted of six communes: Makiso, Tshopo, Mangobo, Lubunga, Kisangani and
Kabondo.
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Map No. 4.2.
The communes of the city of Kisangani
Legend:
Aeroport de SimiSimi = SimiSimi Airport
Aeroport de Bangoka = Bangoka Airport
4.02. Today, Kisangani is one of history’s martyr cities. From 1999 to 2000, it was the scene
of three major confrontations between Ugandan and Rwandan troops, which left a substantial
portion of the city in ruins and had a devastating impact on the civilian population. The final
confrontation, known as the “six-day war”, led the Security Council to adopt
resolution 1304 (2000) on 16 June 2000. In it, the Security Council condemned
“unreserved[ly] . . . the fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani
in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, and demand[ed] that these forces and those allied to them desist from
further fighting”330.
4.03. These violent clashes compelled the Democratic Republic of the Congo to submit to
the Court a request for the indication of provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute of the
Court, stating that
“‘[s]ince 5 June last, the resumption of fighting between the armed troops of the
Republic of Uganda and another foreign army has caused substantial damage to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and to its population
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
330United Nations, Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), document S/RES/1304, 16 June 2000, para. 2.
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[d]espite promises and declarations of principle, the Republic of Uganda has pursued
its policy of aggression, brutal armed attacks and acts of oppression and looting
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[t]his is, moreover, the third Kisangani war, coming after those of August 1999 and
May 2000 and having been instigated by the Republic of Uganda’”331.
On that occasion, the Court did not rule on the specific case of Kisangani, since Uganda had stated
that its troops had withdrawn from the city332.
4.04. However, in its Judgment of 19 December 2005, the Court referred in the following
terms to the damage suffered by the city of Kisangani at the hands of Uganda, and to the
consequent obligation to make reparation:
“The evidence has shown that the UPDF traversed vast areas of the DRC,
violating the sovereignty of that country. It engaged in military operations in a
multitude of locations, including . . . Kisangani . . . These were grave violations of
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Court further finds that there is sufficient evidence of a reliable quality to support
the DRC’s allegation that the UPDF failed to protect the civilian population and to
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in the course of fighting against
other troops, especially the FAR. According to the report of the inter-agency
assessment mission to Kisangani (established pursuant to paragraph 14 of
Security Council resolution 1304 (2000) (doc. S/2000/1153 of 4 December 2000,
paras. 15-16)), the armed conflict between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani
led to ‘fighting spreading into residential areas and indiscriminate shelling occurring
for 6 days . . . Over 760 civilians were killed, and an estimated 1,700 wounded. More
than 4,000 houses were partially damaged, destroyed or made uninhabitable.
Sixty-nine schools were shelled, and other public buildings were badly damaged.
Medical facilities and the cathedral were also damaged during the shelling, and
65,000 residents were forced to flee the fighting and seek refuge in nearby forests.’”333
4.05. In its Judgment, the Court also highlighted the fact that, in order to determine the
magnitude of the reparation owed by Uganda, it was necessary to take into account the support
which the latter had provided to the rebel movements having operated on the territory of the
DRC334. A brief history of the genesis and development of those movements in the region of
Kisangani is therefore required.
4.06. In the night of 28 July 1998, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced that he had
decided to request the forces of his two former allies (Uganda and Rwanda) to leave the territory of
331Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Provisional
Measures, Order of 1 July 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, p. 114, para. 10.
332Ibid., p. 120, para. 24.
333Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, paras. 153 and 208.
334Ibid., p. 280, para. 345.
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the DRC335. On 2 August 1998, however, troops in the tenth brigade of the Congolese Armed
Forces (FAC), stationed in Goma, mutinied against President Kabila’s régime336 and announced
their intention to overthrow him337. In their bid to do so, they benefited from “the support of
Rwanda [and] Uganda”338.
4.07. On 12 August 1998, in conjunction with the rebels, a structure for political and military
action was set up in Goma, and named the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). On 17 August,
the press announced the creation of the movement, chaired by Professor Wamba dia Wamba339.
While the latter initially had the support of both the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the
Ugandan armed forces340, he seems to have been a favourite of President Yoweri Museveni from
the outset, as recounted in an in-depth study on the rebel movements published by Human Rights
Watch:
“With a mind to preserving their stakes in the future of the DRC, the two allies
initially battled over the political control of the RCD. While Rwanda appeared more
focused on pursuing an outright military victory, the Ugandan government of
President Yoweri Museveni initially sought to foster the emergence of political and
military organizations modeled on its own ‘movement system’ and ‘people’s army’. It
offered top RCD leaders, including Wamba, and carefully selected young Congolese
intellectuals combined military and ideological training aimed at attaining that
objective.”341
4.08. When the Lusaka agreements were being negotiated, in February 1999, two factions
claimed to represent the RCD: one led by Wamba dia Wamba, the other by Emile Ilunga342. In
March 1999, Mr. Wamba dia Wamba, then still the chairman of a unified RCD, decided to move
away from Goma and set up his headquarters in Kisangani. The break-up of the various
RCD factions was sealed on 16 May in Goma, at the General Assembly of the RCD’s members,
when the founder members removed Ernest Wamba dia Wamba from the office of chairman of the
movement. On 21 May, Wamba returned to Kisangani on board a Ugandan army plane to set up
the so-called “progressive” wing of the rebellion there343. It was known as RCD-Kisangani to
335United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 324; Ann. 1.4.
336Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre du Congo à Kisangani et les violations des droits de l’homme du
2 août au 17 septembre 1998”, Kisangani, 18 Sep. 1998, in Jean-Pierre Badidike (ed.), Guerre et droits de l’homme en
République démocratique du Congo, Paris/Kisangani, L’Harmattan, 2009; Ann. 4.10a; and United Nations Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 319; Ann. 1.4.
337Communiqué of 2 August 1998 in Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 Oct. 1998,
Appendix 3, MDRC, Ann. 88; Ann. 4.11.
338United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the DRC pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/160 and Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1999/56, document A/54/361, 17 Sep. 1999, para. 13, MDRC, Ann. 41; Ann. 4.12.
339IRIN, Chronology of current crisis as of 30 September 1998, RDRC, Ann. 108; Ann. 4.14.
340Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 Oct. 1998, para. I.2.1, MDRC, Ann. 88; Ann. 4.15.
341Human Rights Watch, Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife, Vol. 13, No. 2 (A),
Mar. 2001, p. 10, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/03/01/uganda-eastern-drc/fueling-politc…;
Ann. 4.13.
342Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Seventieth Ordinary Session, Report of the
Secretary-General on the situation in the DRC, 6-10 July 1999, para. 11, MDRC, Ann. 49; Ann. 4.16.
343Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple
congolais”, 31 Aug. 1999, available at http://www.congonline.com/Forum1/Forum04/RapJus01.htm (in French only) and
in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10c.
110
111
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differentiate it from RCD-Goma. This rivalry between the two proxies would precipitate the
military confrontation between their sponsors for control of Kisangani344.
4.09. Following the victory of the Rwandan forces over the Ugandan forces in August 1999
in Kisangani, Wamba dia Wamba transferred his offices to a presidential guesthouse in Kampala.
There, in September 1999, he established the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation
Movement (RCD-ML), the successor to RCD-Kisangani345. While he was in Kampala, his two
deputies took effective control on the ground and engaged in a parallel recruitment process for the
Armée Populaire Congolaise (APC), the military wing of the RCD-ML. The Ugandan army
provided the instructors who trained and armed the recruits in camps at Beni and Bunia. The
situation is summed up in a Human Rights Watch report:
“The Ugandan army’s sector commanders in fact exercised ultimate authority
over all military and security matters in each district. Some RCD-ML units and cadres
operated directly under their command.”346
4.10. The same report observes that, ultimately, the RCD-ML was torn apart by power
struggles and internal squabbling:
“[I]n the year 2000 . . . [t]he three top officials of the RCD-ML,
Wamba dia Wamba, on one side, and his two deputies Mbusa Nyamwisi and
Tibasima Ateenyi developed parallel political and administrative structures in Bunia,
the RCD-ML’s capital, and in the town of Beni.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wamba’s two deputies attempted at least three times to overthrow him in 2000,
although he was nominally president of the movement. Uganda, which backs the
rebel faction, ultimately intervened. At each upheaval, the three contenders and their
top aides were summoned to Kampala for ‘consultations’.”347
4.11. All of the aforementioned events confirm that RCD-Kisangani, like the Congo
Liberation Movement (MLC)348, was under Ugandan control and benefited from Ugandan support.
Moreover, as the Court has recalled, Uganda has acknowledged the existence of those links:
“As for the support for irregular forces operating in the DRC, Uganda states that
it has never denied providing political and military assistance to the MLC and
the RCD. However, Uganda asserts that it did not participate in the formation of
the MLC and the RCD.”349
4.12. It follows that point (1) of the operative part of the Judgment of 19 December 2005, in
which the Court finds “that the Republic of Uganda, . . . by actively extending military, logistic,
344See Section 2 of this chapter, below.
345Human Rights Watch, Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife, op. cit., p. 11; Ann. 4.13.
346Ibid., p. 12.
347Ibid., p. 10.
348On this subject, see Chap. 2 above.
349Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 41.
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economic and financial support to irregular forces having operated on the territory of the DRC,
violated the principle of non-use of force in international relations and the principle of
non-intervention”350, applies to the support which that State provided to the RCD in all its various
guises.
4.13. Consequently, in line with the DRC’s general statement regarding the damage caused
by the irregular forces supported by Uganda, in breach of international law351, full reparation will
be sought for the damage inflicted on the DRC by the RCD, since that damage is the logical
consequence of Uganda’s unlawful support: the damage could not have been caused without it.
4.14. A further consequence of applying the rules on causality to reparation for the events
which took place in Kisangani concerns the damage caused both by Uganda’s wrongful conduct
and by that of other States or groups not supported by Uganda. In principle, as indicated above352,
the reparation claim for that damage will be adjusted to take account of the different contributing
factors in each circumstance. Nevertheless, since the hostilities in which Uganda was engaged in
Kisangani, against the Rwandan army and movements supported by Rwanda, would not by
definition have taken place had Uganda not entered Congolese territory in breach of international
law, Uganda must make reparation for all the damage caused by those confrontations. Full
compensation will therefore be claimed for them.
4.15. In the present chapter, the DRC will set out in chronological order the various
categories of damage caused in Kisangani as a consequence of Uganda’s failure to comply with its
international obligations between 1998 and 2000. First, the damage ensuing from incidents which
took place between August 1998 and the end of May 1999 will be considered (Section 1). Next,
the DRC will establish the extent of the damage that resulted from the clashes of August 1999
(Section 2), May 2000 (Section 3) and June of that same year (Section 4). A specific section
(Section 5) will be devoted to the damage which occurred after those events. Finally, a summary
of the damage suffered will be presented (Section 6).
4.16. In keeping with its approach in the other chapters of this Memorial, the DRC relies on
various different sources in order to present its claim. First, the damage  be it loss of human life,
bodily harm, damage to private property, or damage caused to public administrations or religious
organizations353  is identified as precisely as possible on the basis of documents produced,
mainly during or in the immediate aftermath of the fighting, by international or local observers.
Second, and by way of illustration rather than to present a comprehensive picture, the DRC draws
on the results of the work of the expert commissions set up for the purposes of the present
proceedings354.
350Ibid., para. 345.
351See Chap. 1, para. 1.24, above.
352Ibid.
353Loss of human life in Kisangani, Ann. 4.1; Persons injured in Kisangani, Ann. 4.2; Damage to property in
Kisangani, Ann. 4.3; Public administrations and religious organizations in Kisangani, Ann. 4.4.
354Work of the DRC’s Expert Commission set up to identify the victims and assess the damage they suffered as a
result of Uganda’s unlawful armed activities, Ann. 4.5; List of the victims of the various Kisangani wars
(14-17 August 1999, 5 May 2000 and 5-10 June 2000), Ann. 4.6; Digitized lists for Kisangani, Ann. 4.7; Individual
records from the six-day war, Ann. 4.8; Individual records of victims established by the Fonds de solidarité des victimes
de guerre de la Province orientale à Kisangani (a non-profit-making association), Ann. 4.9.
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4.17. In Chapter 7 of this Memorial, details will be provided of the amount of compensation
corresponding to the total damage suffered, together with the practical arrangements for making the
reparation required by the DRC355.
Section 1. The damage resulting from incidents which took place
between August 1998 and the end of May 1999
4.18. Trouble broke out in Kisangani at the very beginning of August 1998. According to
the Mapping Report, “[f]ollowing intense fighting, the FAC were forced to leave Kisangani and on
23 August, the town passed into the hands of the ANC/APR/UPDF troops”356. On 29 August, the
RCD’s political delegation arrived in Kisangani357. Although the city of Kisangani was only
“taken” by the Ugandan army on 1 September358, that act was the culmination of fighting triggered
several days earlier by elements of the UPDF and RCD359.
4.19. Following the clashes which marked the taking of the city by rebel forces, for which
“Rwanda and Uganda have openly acknowledged their support”360, insecurity reigned in Kisangani
until the end of May 1999. The city was in utter chaos as a result of the unspoken rivalry between
Rwanda and Uganda for its control, and crawling with both the soldiers of those foreign forces and
the militiamen of the RCD361. This led to acts of violence and looting, punctuated by frequent
military skirmishes. Various types of damage resulted from those events.
A. Loss of human life
4.20. The number of lives claimed by the clashes can be ascertained from lists compiled at
the time by independent observers. For example, in a report of 15 October 1998, the Kisangani
Lotus Group, a local NGO, noted ten fatalities362, to which must be added those who lost their lives
on 10 January 1999 in a raid by government air forces on military targets in Kisangani. During that
raid, stray shots from the RCD’s anti-aircraft defences killed ten people, according to the Groupe
Justice et Libération report of 23 May 1999363, and 12 according to a similar list in a report by
355See Chap. 7 below.
356United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 324; Ann. 1.4; IRIN, Chronology of current crisis as of 30 September 1998, RDRC, Ann. 108; Ann. 4.14; Lotus
Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 Oct. 1998, Appendix 2, MDRC, Ann. 88; Ann. 4.15.
357Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 Oct. 1998, Appendix 2, MDRC, Ann. 88; Ann. 4.15.
358Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 207, para. 81.
359Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre du Congo à Kisangani et les violations des droits de l’homme du
2 août au 17 septembre 1998”, Kisangani, 18 Sep. 1998, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10a. Groupe Justice et
Libération reports that, “[t]his armed movement seems to have three components: Ugandan, Rwandan and Congolese”
[Translation by the Registry].
360United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of
human rights in the DRC op. cit., para. 13, MDRC, Ann. 41; Ann. 4.12.
361South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth Organizations and Associations
(COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC — large-scale violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law reaching fever pitch, Six-monthly report covering the period from 1 April to 30 September 1999,
Oct. 1999, pp. 52-56, MDRC, Ann. 91; Ann. 4.17.
362Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 Oct. 1998, MDRC, Ann. 88; Ann. 4.15.
363Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés à Kisangani et le droit international humanitaire”,
12 May 1999, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10b.
114
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the NGO COJESKI dated October 1999364. That gives a total of 32 names, minus six which are on
both lists, meaning that 26 people were killed during this period; their names are listed in the
relevant annex365.
B. Persons injured
4.21. Only one person is recorded to have been injured in the events of the night of 26 to
27 August 1998. In contrast, shells from the RCD’s anti-aircraft defences landed in the commune
of Tshopo in January 1999, injuring 26 people, according to the Groupe Justice et Libération
report, and 14 according to the COJESKI report. A careful reading of those lists reveals that four
names appear on both and must be deducted, giving a figure of 36 (40-4)366. In total, then,
37 people were injured during this period.
C. Damage to property
4.22. As far as damage to private property is concerned, the report of the Kisangani Lotus
Group367 and COJESKI’s six-monthly report368 record around ten cases of theft, usually
accompanied by assault. In addition, during the air raid of 10 January 1999, a dozen houses were
destroyed by shells, along with their furnishings369. That therefore gives a total of 22 cases of
damage to private property during this period.
4.23. In addition, thanks to independent sources it is possible to establish that a dozen public
companies were either looted or bombed during these events370.
4.24. In total therefore, as a consequence of these initial clashes alone, 26 people were killed,
36 were injured, and there were 22 cases of damage to private property and 12 to public property.
Further damage was subsequently caused during the fighting in Kisangani of August 1999.
Section 2. The damage resulting from the clashes of August 1999
4.25. A lull in the fighting seemed to prevail during the negotiation, and then the signature,
of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 10 July 1999. Nevertheless, hopes that it would prove
successful were short-lived. According to information supplied by the Lotus Group371, open
364COJESKI, Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC, op. cit., p. 58, MDRC, Ann. 91; Ann. 4.17.
365Loss of human life in Kisangani; Ann. 4.1.
366Persons injured in Kisangani; Ann. 4.2.
367Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 Oct. 1998, MDRC, Ann. 88; Ann. 4.15.
368COJESKI, Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC, op. cit., p. 59, MDRC, Ann. 91; Ann. 4.17.
369Damage to property in Kisangani; Ann. 4.3.
370Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 Oct. 1998, MDRC, Ann. 88; Ann. 4.15. See also
Ann. 4.4 for details of public property and companies which suffered damage in Kisangani.
371Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and Factions in North-Eastern Congo.
The Kisangani War, Sep. 1999; Ann. 4.18.
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clashes between the Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces occurred for the first time in Kisangani in
mid-August372.
4.26. As several reports from local and international NGOs recount373, the fighting of
August 1999 in Kisangani was particularly destructive, with both sides using artillery, mortars and
automatic weapons. In addition to civilian deaths and injuries, and the death of many soldiers in
combat, the fighting resulted in serious damage to the power station, the hydroelectric dam, the
cathedral, and at least one of the city’s hospitals. Many dwellings, including those occupied by
MONUC military observers, were destroyed or seriously damaged. Electricity and water supplies
were cut off. Here too, therefore, several types of damage can be identified for which reparation is
owed.
A. Loss of human life
4.27. The reported numbers of victims of the fighting vary. Some local NGOs report that
31 people were killed and four went missing on the battlefield. Their names are listed in the
annex374. However, it is important to bear in mind that these records are far from exhaustive. For
example, the Lotus Group notes that 650 soldiers and around 100 civilians were killed. Its report
of September 1999 points out that,
“[u]nder such circumstances, determining the precise death toll is fraught with
practical difficulties. Humanitarian sources tell us that 63 civilians died. However,
that figure is disputable, since the bodies of some of the ‘civilian’ casualties were in
military uniform. Moreover, other bodies had been removed before the specialized
agencies were able to complete their work. In contrast, other sources put forward a
provisional civilian death toll of at least 100.”375
Moreover, the NGO COJESKI estimates that this confrontation claimed the lives of 175 people; it
does not distinguish between soldiers and civilians376. Only the Mapping Report puts forward a
lower figure, suggesting that just 30 people were killed.
4.28. In the light of these accounts, the DRC considers it reasonable to assume that
100 civilians were killed during these violent clashes.
B. Persons injured
4.29. Similarly, although some NGOs report that 11 soldiers and 22 civilians were injured on
the battlefield (and that there were five cases of rape)377, it seems reasonable to assume that a total
372Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple
congolais”, 31 Aug. 1999, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10c.
373Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and Factions in North-Eastern Congo,
op. cit.; Ann. 4.18; Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à l’autodétermination du
peuple congolais”, 31 Aug. 1999, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10c; Human Rights Watch, Uganda in Eastern
DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife, op. cit.; Ann. 4.13; United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.; Ann. 1.4.
374Loss of human life in Kisangani; Ann. 4.1.
375Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and Factions in North-Eastern Congo,
op. cit.; Ann. 4.18. [Translation by the Registry.]
376COJESKI, Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC, op. cit., p. 60, MDRC, Ann. 91; Ann. 4.17.
377Additional information can be found in Ann. 4.2, Persons injured in Kisangani.
117
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of 100 civilians were injured as a result of these events. That, after all, is the figure put forward in
the Lotus Group and Groupe Justice et Libération reports, as well as in the Mapping Report378.
C. Damage to property
4.30. Many examples of damage to private property can be found in the relevant annex379.
That damage falls into two categories. The first, and by far the most significant, comprises
buildings which were totally or partially destroyed by acts of war. The second covers looting of
movable property. There are at least 100 cases in the first category, and at least 25 in the second.
In addition, 23 companies suffered damage of various kinds during the clashes of August 1999.
4.31. Public establishments and religious buildings were also damaged, and details of the
following examples are provided in the relevant annex380:
 public establishments: the Central Bank of Congo, the offices of the Société des Chemins de
Fer des Uélé, the offices of the Caisse d’Épargne du Congo, the large post office, the Société
nationale d’électricité (SNEL) building, the SNEL power station (next to the dam on the River
Tshopo), the general hospital and the faculty of medicine, university clinics, etc.
 religious establishments: the dome of the central mosque, the archbishop’s palace, the
provincial house of the Priests of the Sacred Heart, Kisangani church, the office of the
superintendent of religious missions, the parish of St Martha, etc.
4.32. Overall, still on the basis of the above-mentioned annexes and solely in the period
under consideration, 100 civilians were killed and 100 injured, 100 houses were destroyed,
1,000 homes were made uninhabitable, and there were 25 cases of looting of private property, and
24 cases of damage to public property or religious buildings. Nevertheless these figures only
represent a fraction of the damage to Kisangani, since further clashes took place in May 2000.
Section 3. The damage resulting from the clashes of May 2000
4.33. Widespread fighting broke out again in Kisangani on 5 May 2000, claiming the lives of
many Congolese civilians381. The Ugandan and Rwandan troops were each occupying part of the
city and confronted each other. The hostilities began on 5 May at around 4 a.m. and concluded late
that evening, when a ceasefire was negotiated between the warring factions, with both sides
maintaining their positions. Though brief, the fighting was nonetheless fierce. This time, 60 and
80 mm mortars and rockets — particularly destructive weapons — were fired right in the city
centre. The number of casualties, and the extent of the material damage recorded during that day
of fighting, attest to the intensity of the clashes between the two armies.
378Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à l’autodétermination du peuple
congolais”, 31 Aug. 1999, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10c; Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within
the Rebel Alliances and Factions in North-Eastern Congo, op. cit.; Ann. 4.18; United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 361; Ann. 1.4.
379Damage to property in Kisangani; Ann. 4.3.
380Public administrations and religious organizations in Kisangani; Ann. 4.4.
381Lotus Group, Conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani, Kisangani, May 2000, MDRC, Ann. 93;
Ann. 4.19.
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A. Loss of human life
4.34. According to the Lotus Group report, 22 civilians were killed, whereas the Groupe
Justice et Libération puts the figure at 28382. The two lists are not fully congruent, since eight
names appear only in the second list. Thus a total of 30 people were killed; their names are listed
in the annex383.
B. Persons injured
4.35. The Lotus Group report identifies 80 people who were wounded, while the report of
the Groupe Justice et Libération counts 32384. Given that some duplication is likely, the number of
victims can be assumed to be 100.
C. Damage to property
4.36. According to the information annexed hereto385, 33 houses and other buildings were
damaged or looted, and 13 businesses suffered damage of various kinds as a consequence of the
clashes. These figures are only the tip of the iceberg, given that hundreds of houses were
destroyed, and homes were found to have been completely stripped of their furnishings when their
occupants returned to them after fleeing the city during the fighting386.
4.37. Based on all of the foregoing, the DRC assesses the consequences of the fighting in
Kisangani on 5 May 2000 as follows: 30 killed, 100 injured, 100 houses destroyed or damaged,
1,000 homes made uninhabitable, and 13 businesses affected.
Section 4. The damage resulting from the “six-day war”
from 5 to 11 June 2000
4.38. Several sources attest to the intensity of the fighting between the Ugandan and
Rwandan armies in Kisangani between 5 and 11 June 2000387. In its Rapport sur la guerre de six
jours à Kisangani, the Lotus Group describes the beginning of the operations as follows, very
clearly attributing responsibility to Uganda:
“It was around 9.45 a.m. when the Ugandans stationed on the right bank of the
River Tshopo began pounding the city with heavy weapons. At the same time, their
troops crossed the Tshopo bridge to take up positions right in the centre of Tshopo
382Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des Alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au 10 juin 2000) et le droit à la
paix”, 30 June 2000, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10d.
383Loss of human life in Kisangani; Ann. 4.1.
384Persons injured in Kisangani; Ann. 4.2.
385Damage to property in Kisangani; Ann. 4.3.
386Ibid.
387Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, July 2000, available at
http://blog.lotusrdc.org/public/Rapport_Guerre_6_jours_2000.pdf (in French only); Ann. 4.20; MONUC, Historic
record of Kisangani cease-fire operation, 19 June 2000, RDRC, Ann. 84; Ann. 4.21.
120
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commune and in Immotshopo, one of the residential districts in Makiso commune,
where a strong Rwandan military presence was in evidence.”388
The fighting between the two States on Congolese territory was to last six days and, as the
Secretary-General would observe in one of his reports, to prove “particularly destructive”389. As
might have been expected, almost a week of intensive and uninterrupted use of heavy weapons in
the heart of a city of 700,000 inhabitants caused enormous damage.
4.39. These dreadful events did not fail to arouse unanimous international condemnation. As
the DRC has already noted, on 16 June the Security Council adopted a resolution in which,
“Expressing in particular its outrage at renewed fighting between Ugandan and
Rwandan forces in Kisangani, Democratic Republic of the Congo, which began on
5 June 2000, and at the failure of Uganda and Rwanda to comply with their
commitment to cease hostilities and withdraw from Kisangani made in their joint
statements of 8 May 2000 and of 15 May 2000 (S/2000/445), and deploring the loss of
civilian lives, the threat to the civilian population and the damage to property inflicted
by the forces of Uganda and Rwanda on the Congolese population,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[it] Reiterates its unreserved condemnation of the fighting between Ugandan and
Rwandan forces in Kisangani in violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and demands that these forces and those allied
to them desist from further fighting”390.
Seised of the DRC’s request for the indication of provisional measures as a result of this
resumption of fighting, the Court allowed the request and issued an Order on 1 July 2000,
indicating that
“[b]oth Parties must, forthwith, take all measures necessary to comply with all of their
obligations under international law, in particular . . . with United Nations Security
Council resolution 1304 (2000) of 16 June 2000”391.
Fortunately, and following these condemnations and injunctions, this disastrous episode in the
Congo war came to an end. The Ugandan forces finally withdrew from the city, albeit leaving a
scene of devastation in their wake.
4.40. Indeed, the scale of the damage caused during that episode captured the attention of the
Security Council itself, which in its above-mentioned resolution 1304 (2000) expressed
“the view that the Governments of Uganda and Rwanda should make reparations for
the loss of life and the property damage they have inflicted on the civilian population
388Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, op. cit.; Ann. 4.20. [Translation by the
Registry.]
389United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2000/566, 12 June 2000, para. 15, MDRC, Ann. 26;
Ann. 4.22.
390United Nations, Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), document S/RES/1304, 16 June 2000, preamble and
para. 2.
391Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Provisional
Measures, Order of 1 July 2000, I.C.J. Reports 2000, para. 47, point (2).
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in Kisangani, and [requested] the Secretary-General to submit an assessment of the
damage as a basis for such reparations”392.
An “inter-agency mission” was therefore formed and despatched to the city to assess the damage
caused as precisely as possible. It is that work in particular which will form the basis for the
DRC’s own assessment of the injuries suffered as a consequence of the fighting.
A. Loss of human life
4.41. Thanks to various international reports, it is possible to ascertain the scale of the loss of
human life caused by the violent clashes in Kisangani in June 2000. For example,
 the Third report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, dated 12 June 2000, puts the number of
civilians killed during the fighting at 150: “[p]ersistent outbreaks of heavy fighting in the city
of Kisangani, Orientale Province, have caused an estimated 150 civilian deaths”393;
 the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC, Roberto Garretón,
considers for his part that, “[i]n addition to casualties among the soldiers, about
1,000 Congolese civilians died” in the renewed outbreak of violence394;
 the inter-agency assessment mission formed at the request of the United Nations Security
Council to assess the damage caused by this war states that “[l]osses among the civilian
population were high . . . Over 760 civilians were killed”395.
4.42. Other figures can be gleaned from non-exhaustive estimates made by local NGOs.
After carrying out an on-the-spot assessment, the Lotus Group suggested that the death toll could
be 279396, but was only able to record 67 names given the circumstances at the time. The Groupe
Justice et Libération397 counted 86 deaths in Tshopo and 78 in Mangobo398. However, those
numbers only represent a fraction of the actual totals, given the conditions under which the initial
damage resulting from the fighting of June 2000 was recorded.
4.43. In the light of this information, the DRC considers it reasonable to use the data from
the investigations of the United Nations inter-agency mission, which travelled to Kisangani shortly
after the fighting. It will therefore be assumed that 760 civilians were killed during the period in
question.
392United Nations, Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), document S/RES/1304, 16 June 2000, para. 14.
393United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit., para. 13, MDRC,
Ann. 26; Ann. 4.22.
394United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on the situation of human rights
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance
with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/15, document E/CN.4/2001/40, 1 Feb. 2001, p. 15; Ann. 4.23.
395United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission to Kisangani (pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), paragraph 14), document S/2000/1153, 4 Dec. 2000; Ann. 4.24.
396Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, op. cit.; Ann. 4.20.
397Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des Alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au 10 juin 2000) et le droit à la
paix”, Appendix 1B, “Deaths in the battle from 5 to 10 June 2000, provisional list”, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.;
Ann. 4.10d.
398See Ann. 4.1, Loss of human life in Kisangani.
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B. Persons injured
4.44. Here too, it is possible to rely on various reliable international sources, which mention:
 in the case of the Third report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, “more than
1,000 casualties”399;
 in the case of the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garretón, “thousands [of] wounded”400;
 in the case of the United Nations inter-agency mission, “an estimated 1,700 wounded”401.
4.45. These data seem to be corroborated by the local sources: for example, the Lotus Group
reported 1,065 wounded402, and the Groupe Justice et Libération more than 3,000403.
4.46. For the same reasons as those put forward in relation to the number of people killed,
the DRC will use the figure of 1,700, which was established in the report of the United Nations
inter-agency mission.
C. Persons who sought refuge in the forest
4.47. Full light was shed on this phenomenon, which clearly affected the city during each
confrontation, by the United Nations inter-agency mission. In relation to the events of June 2000,
it reported that, “[t]he fighting forced some 65,000 residents to flee Kisangani and seek refuge in
the nearby forests. Around 3,000 internally displaced people were housed in a camp at Katele.”404
The DRC will therefore assume that the total number of people who sought refuge or were
internally displaced was 68,000, and will take that figure as a basis for its reparation claim in this
category of damage.
D. Damage to property
4.48. As regards damage to property, the report of the inter-agency assessment mission
contains the following table, which relates specifically to damage to housing405:
399United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit., para. 13, MDRC,
Ann. 26; Ann. 4.22.
400United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on the situation of human rights
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, op. cit., p. 15; Ann. 4.23.
401United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission, op. cit.; Ann. 4.24.
402Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, op. cit.; Ann. 4.20.
403Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des Alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au 10 juin 2000) et le droit à la
paix”, Appendix 1D, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10d. See Ann. 4.2, Persons injured in Kisangani.
404United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission, op. cit. para. 57; Ann. 4.24.
405Ibid.
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Table 1
Damage to housing during the war of 5-11 June 2000
Commune
Scale of damage
Destroyed Heavy damage Light damage Total
Lubunga 34 11 24 69
Kisangani 2 0 0 2
Kabondo 1 0 16 17
Mangobo 30 100 195 325
Makiso 59 642 370 1,071
Tshopo 292 618 1,689 2,599
Total 418 1,371 2,294 4,083
These figures will form the basis of the DRC’s claim for this category of damage.
4.49. As well as housing being destroyed, this phase of the war, like the previous ones, saw
numerous acts of looting and destruction of movable property. This aspect of the war damage
could only be assessed once the commissions created in the aftermath of the conflict had identified
the damage suffered by private individuals. The DRC will therefore base its reparation claim for
this category of damage on the data collected by the Congolese investigators406.
4.50. In addition, like previous wars, this third war caused significant damage to businesses
in Kisangani. As the inter-agency assessment mission writes,
“[t]rading, the city’s main economic activity, was paralysed; furthermore the increase
in imported goods and difficulties in obtaining raw materials and equipment have
meant that many of the city’s industries have either shut down or greatly reduced their
workforce. Sotexki, a textile factory whose staff has fallen from 2,500 to just 130, is a
typical example of this.”407
Annex 4.3, “Damage to property in Kisangani”, contains a list of the compensation claims
submitted by around ten businesses for the damage they suffered as a result of the fighting of
June 2000 in Kisangani. That information will form the basis for the DRC’s claim for this category
of damage.
4.51. As far as damage to public property is concerned, the report of the United Nations
inter-agency mission also makes it possible to assess the damage inflicted on the city’s schools
during the war of June 2000, which particularly captured the attention of the mission’s members408.
406See Chap. 7 below.
407United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission, op. cit., para. 48; Ann. 4.24.
408Ibid., para. 57.
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Table 2
Damage to schools during the war of 5-11 June 2000
Commune
Scale of damage
No. of students Destroyed Heavy damage Light damage Total
Lubunga 3,829 0 0 7 7
Kisangani 758 1 1 1 3
Kabondo 4,387 0 3 7 10
Mangobo 5,103 5 4 3 12
Makiso 16,518 2 24 2 28
Tshopo 10,052 1 8 0 9
Total 40,647 9 40 20 69
Tables prepared from information supplied by United Nations country team and non-governmental organizations.
These figures will form the basis for the DRC’s claim for this category of damage [a section of the
French text has been omitted here, since it explains an error in Table 2 that does not exist in the
English version of the table]. However, schools were not the only public establishments to have
suffered significant damage during these events.
4.52. As regards hospitals and health centres, the Lotus Group reports that the following
buildings were damaged:
 Kisangani general hospital;
 Simama centre;
 Boyoma medical home;
 Kumbakisaka health centre;
 Alabul health centre409.
4.53. As for places of worship, the Lotus Group’s report mentions that damage was caused
to:
 the Cathedral of Our Lady of the Most Holy Rosary, on the avenue de l’Église;
 the Catholic parish of Christ the King in Mangobo;
 the Community of Free Pentecostal Churches in Africa (CELPA), Mangobo parish;
 the Assembly of Christians “Pepele” church, in Tshopo commune;
 the Catholic parish of St Joseph the Carpenter, in Tshopo commune;
 the Kimbanguist church in Saïo quarter, Makiso commune;
 the church of the Baptist Community of the River Congo, in Wagenya quarter, Mangobo
commune;
409See Ann. 4.4.
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 the church of the Baptist Community of the River Congo, in Bombula quarter, Mangobo
commune.
Details of the public property affected can be found in Annex 4.4, “Public administrations and
religious organizations in Kisangani”. The DRC will take the data therein as a basis for its claim
for this category of damage.
4.54. In total, across the various categories of damage, this particularly deadly episode left
760 civilians dead and 1,700 injured, while 68,000 people were forced to flee their homes. In
addition, 4,083 dwellings, around ten businesses, 69 schools, five hospitals or health centres, and
eight places of worship were damaged. However, the assessment of the damage caused by this
fighting does not stop there. First, the extent of the damage often only became apparent once the
victims or their beneficiaries had lodged their complaints with the commissions of inquiry set up by
the DRC. Second, reference must be made to certain injuries which occurred once the hostilities
had ceased, caused in particular by the mines used by the protagonists and the explosives which
they left behind.
Section 5. The damage caused by mines laid during the six-day war
and explosives abandoned after the fighting
4.55. Amongst the damage caused after the fighting itself, it is important to mention the
destruction inflicted by the laying of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, to which reference is
made by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DRC:
“Extremely serious incidents occurred during the Ugandan-Rwandan fighting in
Kisangani; in addition, combatants from both sides have placed anti-tank and
anti-personnel mines around that city and these will wreak enormous devastation
among the civilian population in the future.”410
4.56. Abandoned military supplies such as boxes of cartridges and explosives did indeed
cause civilian casualties after the end of the hostilities. For example, the Lotus Group reports that,
“[t]he day after the end of the hostilities (11 June 2000), three children, Paul Bobe
(aged 7), Kolia Bobe (male, aged 9) and Dorcas Bobe (female, aged 2), who lived at
7, 18th avenue, Tshopo commune, died when a grenade they were playing with
exploded.
Mr. Sylvain Ntewe, a farm labourer, who lived on the 3rd avenue transversale in
Kabondo commune, was on his way to the fields when he fell on an anti-personnel
mine near the Grand Séminaire. He was taken to Kabondo general hospital
(“la Référence”), and died on Monday 12 June 2000 (one day after the incident) due to
blood loss.”411
4.57. The DRC will therefore claim that four lives were lost as a result of mines being laid
during the war in Kisangani and explosives being abandoned by the belligerents.
410United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on the situation of human rights
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, op. cit., p. 36, para. 149; Ann. 4.23.
411Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, op. cit. p. 34; Ann. 4.20. [Translation by the
Registry.]
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Section 6. Summary of the damage suffered
4.58. The body of documentation recording the facts, produced by local NGOs and
international organizations at the time of the events or in their immediate aftermath, has made it
possible to identify several categories of damage: first, damage caused to persons (loss of human
life, bodily harm and enforced flight into the forest); second, material damage caused to the
property of private individuals, natural and legal persons; and finally, damage to public
administrations and religious organizations.
4.59. Nevertheless, in order to produce a summary of the damage suffered, as mentioned
above412, it is also necessary to take into account the results of the work of the expert commissions
set up for the purposes of these proceedings. Extensive documentation has been compiled, based
on the forms completed by the victims, which is presented in the form of lists or records. While it
does not provide a comprehensive picture, it draws together information about the victims and
examples of the various types of damage that they suffered.
4.60. The earliest of these lists is the result of the work of the DRC’s Expert Commission set
up to identify the victims and assess the damage they suffered as a result of Uganda’s unlawful
armed activities. The outcome of its work was published in November/December 2008 in the form
of a set of booklets for each region. These are the booklets for Kisangani:
(a) Persons killed — the list comprises a total of 922 names, predominantly from the year 2000413.
(b) Injuries, bodily harm, rape, etc. — the list comprises 527 names and includes 13 cases of rape
and five of torture414.
(c) Loss of property — the list comprises 1,807 records415.
(d) Flight into the forest — the list comprises 451 records416.
(e) Businesses and private establishments — the list comprises nine records417.
(f) Non-profit-making associations and other entities — the list comprises nine records418.
(g) the Congolese State — the list comprises two records (it is incomplete)419.
4.61. The second list is entitled “List of the victims of the various Kisangani wars
(14-17 August 1999, 5 May 2000 and 5-10 June 2000)”420. Despite its title, the list includes very
few victims from 1999 and, of course, none from 1998. It contains 91 pages and is divided into
three series:
412See para. 4.16 above.
413See Ann. 4.5a.
414See Ann. 4.5b.
415See Ann. 4.5c.
416See Ann. 4.5d.
417See Ann. 4.5e.
418See Ann. 4.5f.
419See Ann. 4.5g (sic) [Annex not included].
420See Ann. 4.6.
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 series A: injured (total: 493);
 series B: deceased (total: 701);
 series C: loss of property (total: 1,352).
4.62. A third file, comprising more than 10,000 handwritten records of victims from across
the entire territory of the DRC, together with various files provided by the victims associations, has
been digitized. A software application enables victims’ individual records to be consulted. It is
possible to extract the data for particular geographic areas and types of damage and, within each
category of damage, victims’ data can be displayed in alphabetical order421. These lists have the
advantage of also including a financial assessment of the damage. The data relating to Kisangani
have been extracted from this file and are reproduced in the following annexes:
 Annex 4.7a (those killed: 600 names);
 Annex 4.7b (those injured or wounded: 684 names);
 Annex 4.7c (flight into the forest: 550 names);
 Annex 4.7d (loss of property: 2,698 names).
4.63. Data have been manually extracted from the individual records of the victims of the
“six-day war” of June 2000 in Kisangani, and summary tables produced, which are in turn broken
down by type of damage. However, these tables only include the data from a selection of the
completed forms. They can be found in the following annexes:
 Annex 4.8a (loss of human life: 89 examples);
 Annex 4.8b (bodily harm: 99 examples);
 Annex 4.8c (material damage: 419 examples);
 Annex 4.8d (flight into the forest: 203 examples).
On the basis of these two sources of information, it is possible to produce a summary of the
damage suffered.
4.64. The following table provides an overview of the damage caused to persons. The data
therein are taken from the various sections of this chapter, in which justification is provided for
these figures.
421See Ann. 1.3.
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Phases of the
conflict
Deaths Injuries
May 1999 26 37
August 1999 100 100
May 2000 30 100
June 2000 760 1,700
Post-conflict period 4
Total 920 1,937
As far as the number of fatalities is concerned, the above-mentioned lists included the names of
922,701 and 600 people respectively, mainly from the year 2000. The names on the different lists
do not fully coincide, which means that the total number of deaths is very likely to be in excess
of 920. That figure would therefore appear to be fully justified, and will be used by the DRC as a
basis for its reparation claim for this category of damage in the present proceedings.
4.65. As regards the number of people injured, the above-mentioned lists included the names
of 527,493 and 684 people respectively, mainly from the year 2000. The names on the different
lists do not fully coincide, and their authors most probably included only the most serious
casualties, who were still suffering the after-effects of their injuries at the time when the lists were
drawn up (2008 or 2013). Consequently, the total of 1,937 people injured, which is given in the
summary table above, appears to be justified422. That figure will therefore be used by the DRC as a
basis for its reparation claim for this category of damage in the present proceedings.
4.66. As for the people who sought refuge or were internally displaced as a result of the
fighting, the figure of 68,000, established by the United Nations inter-agency mission, will be used
by the DRC as a basis for its reparation claim for this category of damage in the present
proceedings.
4.67. Where material damage is concerned, a distinction should be drawn between damage
caused to the property of natural persons and damage which affected private legal entities. The
damage incurred by public legal entities will be dealt with separately.
4.68. The material damage caused to private individuals falls into several different
categories. The first is housing which was either destroyed or damaged by the fighting. The
following figures have been noted for each confrontation: 100 in August 1999, 100 in May 2000
and 4,083 in June 2000 which, rounded up, gives a total of 4,300 damaged dwellings. That is the
figure which will be used by the DRC as a basis for its reparation claim for this category of damage
in the present proceedings.
4.69. Next comes the property of private individuals which was either looted or destroyed
along with their homes. The number of such incidents, which will be used by the DRC as a basis
for its reparation claim for this category of damage, is equivalent to the number of dwellings
destroyed or damaged during the different phases in the hostilities, i.e., a total of 4,300.
422See para. 4.64 above.
131
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4.70. Finally, there is the damage suffered by private companies. Twenty-three cases were
recorded for the 1999 war, 13 for May 2000, and around ten for June 2000. A number of those
companies subsequently reported the extent of the damage that they had suffered and the amount
that they were claiming in compensation. The damage suffered by one of Kisangani’s most
important companies, SOTEXKI (Société textile de Kisangani) is the subject of a separate
dossier423. Since the nature and scale of this damage varies, it is not possible to provide an overall
figure here. The DRC will claim reparation based on the data for each of the companies
concerned424.
4.71. In addition, many public administrations and places of worship were damaged. This
category includes public administrations and state-owned companies, schools, medical facilities
and places of worship.
4.72. During the period covered by this chapter, some 25 public administrations incurred
damage in Kisangani. To date, three of them have submitted claims, which are the subject of
specific dossiers:
 the Central Bank of Congo425;
 the Société nationale d’électricité (SNEL)426;
 the Régie des voies aériennes427.
4.73. With regard to schools, it was noted above that according to the report of the
inter-agency assessment mission, which was despatched to Kisangani pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1304, paragraph 14, 69 schools suffered damage during the war of June 2000428. That
figure will be used by the DRC as a basis for its reparation claim for this category of damage in the
present proceedings. Annex 4.4 provides several examples from NGO reports and individual claim
forms.
4.74. Medical facilities suffered damage throughout the war years as a result of the fighting,
in which neither the city centre nor the city’s hospitals were spared. A list of 13 hospitals can be
found in Annex 4.4 (Public administrations and religious organizations in Kisangani). That figure
will be used by the DRC as a basis for its reparation claim for this category of damage in the
present proceedings.
4.75. Places of worship were not spared either. Individual and collective claims have been
filed by the Archdiocese of Kisangani429, which manages various institutions that were damaged
during the fighting that is the subject of the present chapter. The institutions concerned are listed in
423See Ann. 4.25.
424See Chap. 7 below.
425See Ann. 4.7c (sic).
426See Ann. 4.26.
427See Ann. 4.27.
428United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission, op. cit.; Ann. 4.24.
429Dossier based on estimate of 26 July 2000, reproduced in Ann. 4.28.
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Annex 4.28. Reparation claims were also submitted by other religious associations430. Annex 4.4
contains a further list of an additional 12 places of worship which were destroyed or damaged by
acts of war in Kisangani.
4.76. There is wide variation in the cases of damage in the final categories which have just
been examined, and it is impossible to amalgamate them into one overall category, as was done
above for the damage caused to individuals and their homes. Each case will be the subject of a
separate reparation claim, and the DRC therefore refers readers to the final chapter of this
Memorial where, as far as possible, the compensation corresponding to each of these specific cases
of damage will be quantified431.
430Communauté des Nations du Christ en Afrique (Makiso), ECC/21st; Ann. 4.9 (sic).
431See Chap. 7 below.
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CHAPTER 5. THE PREJUDICE CAUSED TO THE DRC’S
NATURAL RESOURCES BY UGANDA
5.01. This chapter is devoted to the injuries that Uganda caused to the DRC’s natural
resources — namely, minerals (gold, diamonds and coltan) on the one hand, and national parks and
Congolese fauna on the other. Before we set out, for each resource in turn, the damage that was
suffered by the DRC, it is helpful to return briefly to the relevant passages of the Court’s Judgment
of 19 December 2005 and the main factual sources in this regard.
5.02. In point (4) of the operative part of its Judgment of 19 December 2005, the Court found
that Uganda was responsible both for the acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese
natural resources committed by the Ugandan army and for its failure to comply with its obligations,
as an occupying Power in Ituri, to prevent acts of looting, plundering and exploitation:
“the Republic of Uganda, by acts of looting, plundering and exploitation of Congolese
natural resources committed by members of the Ugandan armed forces in the territory
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and by its failure to comply with its
obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri district to prevent acts of looting,
plundering and exploitation of Congolese natural resources, violated obligations owed
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo under international law”432.
5.03. As regards the first of those issues, the Court considered, in particular, in the relevant
passages of its Judgment, that it was “not necessary for the Court to make findings of fact with
regard to each individual incident alleged” in reaching its decision on that matter433. Relying in
particular on the work of Uganda’s Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (hereinafter “the Porter Commission”), which was established by Uganda in order to
investigate allegations of looting, plundering and illegal exploitation434, the Court considered that it
had:
“ample credible and persuasive evidence to conclude that officers and soldiers of the
UPDF, including the most high-ranking officers, were involved in the looting,
plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources and that the military
authorities did not take any measures to put an end to these acts . . .”435.
5.04. The Court went on to analyse the international obligations in question, considering that
the acts and omissions of members of the UPDF engaged Uganda’s responsibility under jus in bello
in particular, whether Uganda was an occupying Power in particular regions or not:
“the acts and omissions of members of Uganda’s military forces in the DRC engage
Uganda’s international responsibility in all circumstances, whether it was an
occupying Power in particular regions or not. Thus, whenever members of the UPDF
were involved in the looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the
territory of the DRC, they acted in violation of the jus in bello, which prohibits the
commission of such acts by a foreign army in the territory where it is present. The
432Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 280-281, para. 345.
433Ibid., p. 249, para. 237.
434See para. 5.05 below.
435Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 251, para. 242.
134
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Court notes in this regard that both Article 47 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 and
Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 prohibit pillage.
The Court further observes that both the DRC and Uganda are parties to the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 27 June 1981, which in paragraph 2
of Article 21, states that ‘[i]n case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the
right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation’ . . .
The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support the DRC’s claim that
Uganda violated its duty of vigilance by not taking adequate measures to ensure that
its military forces did not engage in the looting, plundering and exploitation of the
DRC’s natural resources.”436
5.05. As regards the second issue referred to by the Court — that of Uganda’s specific
responsibilities as an occupying Power in Ituri — it has been established that the Respondent
violated its duty of vigilance in respect of the illegal activities carried out by both the UPDF and
private persons:
“the fact that Uganda was the occupying Power in Ituri district (see paragraph 178
above) extends Uganda’s obligation to take appropriate measures to prevent the
looting, plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory to
cover private persons in this district and not only members of Ugandan military forces.
It is apparent from various findings of the Porter Commission that rather than
preventing the illegal traffic in natural resources, including diamonds, high-ranking
members of the UPDF facilitated such activities by commercial entities . . .
Thus the Court finds that it has been proven that Uganda has not complied with
its obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri district. The Court would add that
Uganda’s argument that any exploitation of natural resources in the DRC was carried
out for the benefit of the local population, as permitted under humanitarian law, is not
supported by any reliable evidence.”437
The DRC touched on this particular responsibility earlier in this Memorial in the chapter devoted
specifically to the situation in Ituri438.
5.06. The DRC has also pointed out above that Uganda is under an obligation to make
reparation for any injury caused by the violation of the principle of non-use of force and the
principle of non-intervention that was established in point (1) of the operative part of the Judgment
of 19 December 2005439. That obligation also applies in respect of the injury demonstrated in this
chapter, including the damage caused to Congolese fauna and national parks. As we shall see,
some of that damage was certainly caused by poaching — inter alia, for the purpose of acquiring
ivory — which must constitute “looting and plundering” and “exploitation” within the meaning of
point (4) of the operative part of the 2005 Judgment. However, it was also caused by other acts,
such as the destruction of animals’ natural habitats. Even if those acts are not considered to
constitute “looting and plundering” or “exploitation”, the fact remains that they were caused by
436Ibid., paras. 245-246.
437Ibid., paras. 248-249.
438See Chap. 3 above.
439Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 280, para. 345, point (1). See also Chaps. 3 and 1 above.
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Uganda’s invasion of Congolese territory, in violation of the principle of non-use of force and the
principle of non-intervention.
5.07. Factual information and assessments of damage will be based not only on expert
reports and studies produced on the ground by the Congolese authorities and experts commissioned
by those authorities, but also on various international sources providing particularly rigorous
assessments. Most of those sources were identified at the start of this Memorial440. Particular
attention will be paid to the work of the United Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(hereinafter “the United Nations Panel of Experts”)441, and to the report of the aforementioned
Porter Commission442.
5.08. It should be noted that the United Nations Panel of Experts was established by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations following a request by the Security Council in the form of
a statement by its President on 2 June 2000443. The Panel of Experts was tasked with: collecting
information on all illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DRC;
researching and analysing the links between such exploitation and the continuation of the conflict
in the DRC; and reverting to the Council with recommendations. The Panel of Experts provided
an initial report on 12 April 2001444. The Panel’s mandate was then extended. The Panel was
asked to submit an addendum to its report including, among other things: updates to relevant data;
analysis of further information; information on the activities of countries and actors for which
reliable information was not yet available; and a response to the comments and reactions of the
States and actors cited in the first report445. The addendum to the first report was provided on
13 November 2001446. Then, following a further extension of its mandate, the Panel of Experts
submitted an interim report to the Security Council on 22 May 2002447. The Secretary-General sent
the final report to the President of the Security Council on 15 October 2002448.
5.09. It was in response to the work of the United Nations Panel of Experts that Uganda
established the Porter Commission. The first report by the Panel of Experts concluded that the
Ugandan Government had been involved in the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural resources
and pointed out that the Security Council had called on the various governments cited in the report
440See para. 1.36 above.
441United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit.; Ann. 1.7; United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, op. cit.; Ann. 1.8; United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, op. cit.; Ann. 1.9; United Nations Security Council,
Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources; Ann. 1.10.
442Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit.; Ann. 1.11.
443United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council on “The situation
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, document S/PRST/2000/20, 2 June 2000; Ann. 5.1.
444United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit.; Ann. 1.7.
445United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council on “The situation
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, document S/PRST/2001/13, 3 May 2001; Ann. 5.2.
446United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources, op. cit., Ann. 1.8.
447United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit.; Ann. 1.9.
448United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit.; Ann. 1.10.
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to carry out their own investigations into the allegations contained therein. Consequently, the
President of Uganda set up a judicial commission of inquiry through his Minister for Foreign
Affairs, which was chaired by David Porter, a British judge at the Ugandan High Court. The
Commission was tasked mainly with investigating the allegations made by the United Nations
Panel of Experts concerning (i) the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth of the DRC (minerals, coffee, timber, livestock, fauna, ivory, silver, etc.) and (ii) the
involvement of the Ugandan Government, the President of the Republic of Uganda and his family,
and high-ranking members of the UPDF in that illegal exploitation.
5.10. The Commission spent almost a year and a half analysing and responding to the Panel
of Experts’ report of 12 April 2001 and its addendum of 13 November 2001. It presented its final
report in November 2002449.
5.11. The Court’s Judgment of 19 December 2005 contained a number of references to the
Porter Commission’s report. The Court indicated at the outset that a high degree of credibility was
to be attributed to the report, particularly as it was based on the examination of persons directly
involved by judges skilled in the judicial establishment of facts. According to the Court:
“evidence obtained by examination of persons directly involved, and who were
subsequently cross-examined by judges skilled in examination and experienced in
assessing large amounts of factual information, some of it of a technical nature, merits
special attention. The Court thus will give appropriate consideration to the Report of
the Porter Commission, which gathered evidence in this manner. The Court further
notes that, since its publication, there has been no challenge to the credibility of this
Report, which has been accepted by both Parties.”450
On the subject of the interaction between the work of the Panel of Experts and that of the Porter
Commission, the Court stated:
“both the Porter Commission Report, as well as the United Nations Panel reports, to
the extent that they have later proved to be probative, furnish sufficient and
convincing evidence for it to determine whether or not Uganda engaged in acts of
looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources . . .”451.
5.12. Thus there is a solid basis for the DRC’s presentation of the injury suffered in relation
to the exploitation of minerals, such as gold, diamonds and coltan (Section 1), the prejudice caused
to Congolese fauna, in particular various endangered species and national parks classified as
UNESCO World Heritage Sites (Section 2), and that caused to Congolese flora, notably through
deforestation (Section 3).
Section 1. Looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of minerals
5.13. This section shows the role that certain members of the Ugandan armed forces played
in the massive exploitation of minerals — more specifically, gold (A), diamonds (B) and
coltan (C) — and the injury that resulted therefrom.
449Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit.; Ann. 1.11.
450Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 201, para. 61.
451Ibid., p. 249, para. 237.
138
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A. Looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of gold
5.14. In order to establish the injury caused by Uganda in relation to the looting, plundering
and illegal exploitation of the DRC’s gold, this subsection will begin by showing the extent and
diversity of the acts attributable to Uganda in this regard (i). It will then demonstrate that Uganda’s
gold exports increased exponentially during the war, despite the fact that Uganda produces hardly
any of that mineral itself (ii). On that basis, we shall establish the scale of the injury linked to the
illegal exploitation of gold, as well as the amount of compensation owed by Uganda on account of
the acts committed (iii).
(i) Uganda’s role in the looting, plundering and exploitation of gold
5.15. There was a particular rush for gold by members of the Ugandan armed forces in the
eastern part of the DRC, where the majority of the Congolese gold-mining areas are located —
more specifically, in what was then Orientale province, which included the districts of Ituri and
Haut-Uélé. Such actions were also seen in the district of Bas-Uélé — more specifically, Bondo
territory. The map below shows the main gold-mining areas in the east of the country.
Map No. 5.1.
Gold resources in the east of the DRC
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
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5.16. The analysis below looks first at the wrongful exploitation of gold resources in Ituri
district, where Uganda was an occupying Power (a); then at the involvement of members of the
UPDF in the looting, plundering and exploitation of gold in Haut-Uélé district, specifically the
Watsa gold mines (b); and finally at the involvement of members of the UPDF in the looting,
plundering and exploitation of gold in Bondo territory, in co-operation with Jean-Pierre Bemba’s
troops (c). This account will show the extent of Uganda’s involvement in the looting, plundering
and exploitation of gold resources in geographical terms, in terms of the quantity of resources
involved, and in terms of the diversity of the practices employed for the purposes of such looting,
plundering and exploitation.
(a) Looting, plundering and exploitation of gold in Ituri
5.17. Until 2015, Ituri was a district of Orientale province. It comprised five administrative
territories: Aru, Djugu, Irumu, Mahagi and Mambasa. The injuries caused by members of the
Ugandan armed forces in respect of the exploitation of gold in Ituri district primarily concerned the
administrative territory of Djugu.
Map No. 5.2.
The districts of Orientale province at the time of the events in question
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
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Map No. 5.3.
Detailed map of Ituri district at the time of the events in question
Legend:
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
Ouganda = Uganda
5.18. In 2002 and 2003, murderous attacks were repeatedly carried out in the village of
Kobu, notably by Ugandan troops, with a view to taking control of gold resources. They primarily
involved forcing away members of the population who were likely to oppose such endeavours.
The Mapping Report, which contains various testimonies, states that “[i]n January 2002, UPDF
troops and Hema militia apparently opened fire on the inhabitants of Kobu village (Walendu Djatsi
collectivité, in Djugu territory) in order to force the people away from the gold mines. During this
incident, 35 Lendu civilians were killed.”452
5.19. In August 2002, bloody attacks were carried out in the gold-mining town of Mabanga,
notably by militia linked to the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), who were supported by
Uganda, as the DRC showed earlier453. Each of those attacks was a further attempt to take control
of the gold and appropriate the minerals. The Mapping Report indicates the following on the basis
of various interviews:
“The gold mining town of Mabanga, in the local collectivité of Mambisa, Djugu
territory, was also the scene of bloody clashes. In August 2002, Hema Gegere militia
linked to the UPC allegedly killed several dozen ‘non-native’ inhabitants with
machetes and nail-covered sticks. They were suspected of helping the Lendu militia,
who were seeking to control the region’s mines and had previously committed
massacres.”454
452United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 756; emphasis added; Ann. 1.4.
453See Chap. 3 above, para. 3.05.
454United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 755; emphasis added; Ann. 1.4.
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5.20. The town of Mongbwalu changed hands several times in 2002 and 2003, with Hema
and Lendu armed groups belonging respectively to the UPC and the Nationalist and Integrationist
Front (FNI) battling for control455. According to the Mapping Report, the involvement of these
armed groups was largely dictated by economic interests and the lure of the gold mines456. In its
2004 report, MONUC described Mongbwalu as “a town to conquer for its natural resources”457.
Both the UPC and the FNI used forced labour in gold mines in 2002 and 2003458.
5.21. Finally, illegal exploitation of gold was recorded at the Adidi gold mine, which forms
part of the Kilo-Moto gold-mining area. The Kilo mines are situated in Ituri, while the Moto mines
are in the district of Haut-Uélé. Mining activities in that region were mainly carried out by the
Société des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Moto (SOKIMO), formerly OKIMO, which mined gold in three
concessions: Concession No. 38 in the district of Haut-Uélé (sites in Watsa, Durba mines,
Gorumbwa mine, etc.); Concession No. 39, straddling the districts of Haut-Uélé and Ituri; and
Concession No. 40 in the district of Ituri (site in Mongbwalu, Adidi mines, etc.). The location of
the mines is shown in the map below, as well as in the maps from the DRC’s mining register which
are annexed to this Memorial459.
Map No. 5.4.
Concessions Nos. 38, 39 and 40 in the Kilo-Moto gold-mining area
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Legende = Legend
Concessions Okimo = Okimo concessions
455Ibid., para. 753.
456Ibid., para. 754.
457MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit., para. 98; Ann. 1.6.
458United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 761; Ann. 1.4.
459Maps of OKIMO concessions from DRC mining register; Ann. 5.3.
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5.22. The concession situated in Ituri — more specifically, the Adidi mine — faced
numerous problems linked to the Ugandan invasion. A report by Human Rights Watch indicates
that the rebel armed forces immediately established an effective system of taxation:
“Upon taking control of Mongbwalu on March 13, 2003, the FNI militia
leaders, like the UPC previously, moved immediately to begin profiting from gold
mining. Artisanal miners resumed digging, but had to pay FNI combatants fees to
enter the mines, $1 per person at some mines. Based on entrance records kept by FNI
security guards at one mine and seen by Human Rights Watch researchers, the FNI
made $2,000 per month in entrance fees at this one mine alone.”460
The capture of the concession by those rebel forces led to the destruction of various infrastructure,
and of the Adidi mine itself. As Human Rights Watch further states:
“This has been a highly contested concession and is assumed to hold significant
gold reserves. It is home to the industrial mine of Adidi (now defunct), and the former
Belgian mines of Makala and Sincere. There was a Belgian-built processing factory
and a laboratory both of which were destroyed during the fighting in Mongbwalu
between November 2002 and July 2003. This concession was granted by the DRC
government to AngloGold Ashanti (formerly Ashanti Goldfields) in 1998. The
five-year war in DRC fractured OKIMO with armed groups attempting to control each
sector independently. In 2003 three separate individuals appointed by different armed
groups claimed to hold the position of General Director at OKIMO.”461
5.23. OKIMO reported at the time that a Ugandan brigade commander had met the
company’s management in March 2000 in order to listen to its complaints concerning the actions of
the Ugandan army on the company’s sites. While the commander recognized the seriousness of the
situation, he said that he was not in a position to put a stop to it462.
(b) The Ugandan army’s exploitation of the Watsa gold mines
5.24. The district of Haut-Uélé, which until 2015 was situated in Orientale province, is an
area with particularly large amounts of gold. Ugandan soldiers were personally involved in mining
in this district — more specifically, in Watsa territory. Uganda’s responsibility for the mining of
gold in Watsa is clear from various perspectives: first of all, from the presence of the Ugandan
army in Watsa territory (1); second, from the involvement of members of the Ugandan army and
the most senior military officials in the exploitation of gold reserves in that area (2); and finally,
from the involvement of members of the Ugandan army in the collection of “taxes” levied on
the — often forced — exploitation of mines by Congolese civilians (3).
460Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, op. cit., p. 51; Ann. 3.3.
461Ibid., p. 59.
462Message No. 40/27/2000 of 17 March 2000 concerning the UPDF/ISIRO brigade commander’s visit to Doko;
Ann. 5.4.
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(1) Uganda’s presence in Watsa territory
5.25. In its Judgment of 19 December 2005, the Court noted that the Ugandan army had
taken Watsa in August 1998463. The maps below show the location of the town and the gold
resources.
Map No. 5.5.
Watsa
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
Map No. 5.6.
Gold resources in Watsa
463Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 207 and 214, paras. 79 and 110.
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5.26. The presence of Ugandan armed forces in Watsa territory was also highlighted by a
Human Rights Watch report, which noted that three major gold mines were situated in that area:
“In August 1998, shortly after the start of the second Congolese war, Ugandan
troops occupied gold-rich areas of Haut Uélé, including the town of Durba, (Watsa
Territory, Haut Uélé District, Orientale Province), site of three important gold mines:
Gorumbwa, Durba and Agbarabo.”464
5.27. The Porter Commission’s report notes that Ugandan soldiers present in Watsa were in
conflict with Congolese civilians in relation to mining and had been tasked with guarding mines
there:
“As late as the 15th of February 2000 General Kazini was receiving reports
from Professor Wamba that UPDF soldiers in Watsa were in conflict with civilians in
relation to mining, and on 23rd February 2000, he sent a message in which he said that
he had seen three messages concerning uncoordinated deployments. He pointed out
that no soldier of the UPDF was supposed to guard mines, although Major Kagezi had
deployed soldiers to Durba. He directed that all soldiers must be withdrawn to
Isiro . . .”465.
In its 2005 Judgment, the Court also made reference to this passage from the Commission’s report
in substantiating its decision466.
(2) Uganda’s involvement in the exploitation of gold in Watsa
5.28. Members of the Ugandan army demanded that gold be extracted from the pillars of the
galleries in the Gorumbwa mines using dynamite, which resulted in the galleries collapsing and
caused the deaths of a large number of Congolese civilians467. Confirmation of this can be found in
the report sent by OKIMO to the so-called “Governor of Kibali-Ituri province” on
4 September 1999:
“following intensive unco-ordinated work by artisanal miners and soldiers in the
Gorumbwa mine, that mine collapsed on Friday 3 September 1999 from the surface
down . . . Surface water is currently entering the subterranean area via the quarry . . .
The ground is visibly deformed at the surface and is continuing to move. In other
words, the subsidence is increasing.”468
This was also confirmed by the Human Rights Watch report:
“Even the rock pillars that supported the roof in the mine were blasted to extract
any ore that might be inside them . . . [Local civilians] sought an end to the mining
and warned again that Gorumbwa mine might collapse if the practice of blasting the
supporting pillars continued. According to OKIMO officials, no action was taken by
Ugandan commanders. In late 1999 the Gorumbwa mine collapsed killing a reported
464Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, op. cit., p. 15; emphasis added; Ann. 3.3.
465Porter Commission, Final Report, op.cit. p. 20; emphasis added; Ann. 1.11.
466Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 251, para. 242.
467United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 57; Ann. 1.7.
468Report sent by OKIMO to the Governor of Kibali-Ituri province, 4 Sep. 1999; Ann. 5.5. [Translation by the
Registry.]
146
147
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one hundred miners trapped inside and flooding the area. According to one local
engineer: ‘The Ugandan army were responsible for the destruction of Gorumbwa
mine. They started to mine the pillars. It was disorderly and very widespread. People
were killed when the mine eventually collapsed.’”469
5.29. On 19 March 2001, the head of operations at the Moto site reported that he had been
arrested by Ugandan soldiers. Officials who had sought to chase illegal artisanal miners out of the
Durba mine had been pursued by soldiers470. On 23 May 2001, OKIMO’s management again
reported that illegal artisanal miners, overseen by Ugandan soldiers and the RCD-ML co-ordinator,
were occupying the Durba mine and company infrastructure471.
5.30. The local Ugandan commanders did not respond to the situations reported to them472.
Indeed, Human Rights Watch reports:
“Lt Okumu left the Durba area in early 1999 but other Ugandan commanders
continued with similar practices and took no actions to stop the illegal mining. In
June 1999 OKIMO officials reported again on the situation and asked Commander
Sula based in Isiro to intervene. He ignored the request and soon after the
Durba-based Ugandan officer Freddy Ziwa arrested one of the OKIMO officials.
According to an internal OKIMO memorandum, Commander Sula met with local
miners and Ugandan soldiers on July 12, 1999 in Durba and ordered them to organize
more extensive mining in the OKIMO concession.”473
5.31. In the same vein, the Porter Commission reported that Uganda’s Colonel Mugenyi had
ordered Major Sonko to investigate himself the accusations levelled against him and
Lieutenant Okumu regarding the mining activities that they had carried out in the DRC, turning that
process into a mere formality and even implicitly endorsing the conduct in question:
“There is also an incident where an allegation was made against a Senior Army
Officer and a Junior Army officer. The Local UPDF Commander asked the Senior
Army Officer to investigate himself and the Junior Officer and report to him. The
case in point relates to the instructions given by Col. Mugenyi to Major Sonko to
investigate the allegation made against himself and Lt. Okumu in respect of mining.
Further it appears that all an officer has to do is deny an incident for the investigation
to be dropped.”474
469Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, op. cit., pp. 17-18; Ann. 3.3.
470Handwritten letter dated 19 March 2001 from the head of operations at Moto to the Commissioner for
Haut-Uélé district, in particular pp. 2 and 3; Ann. 5.6.
471Letter No. DG/SDG/135/2001 of 23 May 2001; Ann. 5.7.
472United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 57; Ann. 1.7.
473Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, op. cit., pp. 17-18; Ann. 3.3.
474Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 107; emphasis added; Ann. 1.11.
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5.32. Finally, Ugandan soldiers requisitioned gold from OKIMO and appropriated other
property belonging to the company475, exploiting the company and its gold resources in a manner
that was both systematic and anarchic at the same time:
“On several occasions OKIMO officials protested to Ugandan army
commanders about the illegal mining, the theft of fuel and explosives from their stock,
and the possible damage to the mines through the explosions.”476
(3) The involvement of the Ugandan army in the collection of “taxes”
levied on the exploitation of gold in Watsa
5.33. Moreover, various sources indicate that certain Ugandan commanders and certain
soldiers guarding entry points to mining sectors in the mining district of Kilo-Moto allowed — or
even obliged — the local population to carry out gold extraction activities, with a tax being levied
on the gold that was removed. The United Nations Panel of Experts reports that each miner was
required to leave one gram of gold at the mine’s entry/exit point every day. Given the number of
people working in the mine each day  [2],000 people, working six days a week — roughly 2 kg
of gold was handed over to the person managing the network every day477. This is confirmed by
the Human Rights Watch report, which is based on testimonies collected on the ground:
“Local sources said that Ugandan Lieutenant David Okumu gave the initial
order to start mining in Gorumbwa. According to a report prepared by OKIMO
officials that provides further details, Ugandan soldiers took over mine security,
chasing away OKIMO guards and the local police in order to benefit from the gold
mining. Local miners went to work in the mines, even though they were required to
pay an entrance fee to Ugandan soldiers or to give them a portion of their ore when
leaving. Witnesses reported that Ugandan soldiers beat local miners who refused to
work under these conditions or who failed to deliver the expected amount of gold. To
speed extraction of the ore, Ugandan soldiers directed miners to use explosives taken
from OKIMO stocks.”478
5.34. The Porter Commission confirms the role played by the Ugandan army in this area. It
states that, despite certain inconsistencies in the information gathered, it is a fact that documents
signed by Ugandan officials ordered certain soldiers to put a stop to their behaviour in respect of
the mines, which shows beyond any doubt that wrongful acts were perpetrated in relation to the
extraction of gold and that the military authorities were aware of it:
“It was already known that there had been problems in the Watsa area before
Lt Okumu went there, which had reached Senior Levels. These problems no doubt
prompted the phraseology of the orders he received. Lt Okumu’s orders on arrival
from Lt Col Mugenyi (409 B/ Co) who was based in Isiro Exhibit FM/07/102
(inter alia) read:
No soldier should interfere with the authorities of the gold mining area without
consulting (B/ Co) into.
475United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 747; Ann. 1.4.
476Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold. Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005, p. 17; Ann. 3.3.
477United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 59; Ann. 1.7.
478Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, op. cit. pp. 16-17; Ann. 3.3.
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No Loitering of Soldiers in the centres and on the area of gold mining (must be
halted)
These orders were signed by Lt Col Mugenyi, and countersigned by Lt Okumu.
This Commission took Lt Col Mugenyi to task at length about these orders: it
suggested that the way in which they were phrased clearly indicated that soldiers had
been interfering with the authorities of the gold mining area, and that soldiers had
been loitering in the centres and in the area of gold mining: the orders specifically
said that this behaviour must be halted. Such allegations went a long way to support
the allegations in the original Panel Report. Lt Col Mugenyi was not prepared to
accept that this was the case.”479
5.35. The Porter Commission concluded that the role played by the Ugandan army in this
area was clear:
“Particularly this Commission is unable to reject the allegation by the original
Panel (for this is the purpose of the cover-up) that UPDF soldiers were posted at mines
to take contributions of gold from miners to allow them to mine. The evidence of
Major General Kazini, General Jeje Odong and Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo clearly
shows that the incident did happen and that the culprits were Lt. David Okumu and the
soldiers under his command.”480
(c) Uganda’s involvement in the exploitation of gold in Bondo
5.36. The Judgment of 19 December 2005 indicates that Bondo, which is situated in the
district of Bas-Uélé, was taken by the Ugandan army in April 1999481.
5.37. The work of the United Nations Panel of Experts reveals that Congolese civilians were
recruited in Bondo in order to extract gold from the mines on behalf of members of the Ugandan
army and Jean-Pierre Bemba, the supreme leader of the Congo Liberation Movement (MLC),
which was actively supported by Uganda in violation of international law:
“In the Bondo locality within Equateur Province, young men from 12 to
18 years were recruited by Jean-Pierre Bemba. The Ugandan allies trained the recruits
and shared with them the idea that the Ugandan army was an ‘army of development’
that aimed at improving ordinary people’s living conditions. After the one-hour
morning physical training session, they were sent to gold mines to dig on behalf of the
Ugandans and Mr. Bemba.”482
5.38. The Porter Commission took the view that it was not clear that child labour had been
used. It pointed out in this regard that Mr. Bemba denied these allegations, asserting that recruits
had to be at least 17 years old, which was apparently confirmed by Ugandan officers483. However,
479Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 65; emphasis added; Ann. 1.11.
480Ibid., p. 69.
481Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 208, para. 86.
482United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 58; emphasis added; Ann. 1.7.
483Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 71; Ann. 1.11.
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that denial by Ugandan officers regarding the use of child labour provides confirmation of the
essential point — namely, that Ugandan forces were indeed present on the ground and collaborated
with Jean-Pierre Bemba in the exploitation of gold.
*
* *
5.39. While the facts set out above are not, in isolation, sufficient to quantify the injury
suffered by the DRC, they do establish the extent of Uganda’s role in the looting, plundering and
wrongful exploitation of gold in the DRC:
 in geographical terms, the acts attributable to Uganda span Ituri, Haut-Uélé district (more
specifically, Watsa) and Bas-Uélé district (more specifically, Bondo territory);
 in terms of the amount of mineral resources involved, the acts attributable to Uganda relate to
the looting, plundering and exploitation of very large sources of deposits, such as the Adidi and
Watsa mines;
 in terms of the range of practices employed, in addition to Uganda’s failure to comply with its
obligations as an occupying Power in Ituri, the acts attributable to Uganda include the direct
involvement of UPDF members in the looting, plundering and exploitation of mines, the use of
forced labour and the collection of taxes in kind levied on the production of gold.
(ii) The exporting of gold by Uganda
5.40. It should also be noted that, as the United Nations Panel of Experts found484, Uganda’s
gold exports increased exponentially during the war, despite the country producing only a very
limited amount of gold (a). The fact that gold exports from the DRC to Uganda were not
controlled during the war (b), and that Uganda’s main commercial operators have indicated that
they acquired gold from the DRC during the period in question (c), confirms that this increase was
due to the illegal exploitation of Congolese gold resources.
(a) The increase in Ugandan gold exports during the war
5.41. First of all, the data provided to the United Nations Panel of Experts by the Ugandan
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development show that the volume of Ugandan gold exports
systematically exceeded the country’s gold production. Thus, the Panel of Experts indicates that
Uganda produced 0.0082 tonnes of gold in 1998, but exported 5.03 tonnes. In 1999, 0.0047 tonnes
of gold were produced, and 11.45 tonnes were exported. In 2000, 0.0044 tonnes were produced,
and 10.83 tonnes were exported485. The full set of data can be found in the table below486:
484United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 97; Ann. 1.7.
485Ibid., para. 96.
486Ibid., p. 20.
151
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Table 1
Uganda: mineral exports and production, 1994-2000
Year Gold Tin Coltan Cobalt
A. Mineral exports (tons)
1994 0.22
1995 3.09
1996 5.07 3.55
1997 6.82 4.43 2.57
1998 5.03 18.57
1999 11.45 69.5 67.48
2000 10.83 275.98
B. Mineral productions (tons)
1994 0.0016 3.704 0.435
1995 0.0015 4.289 1.824
1996 0.003 0.38
1997 0.0064 1.81
1998 0.0082 1.102
1999 0.0047 76.74
2000 0.0044 287.51
Source: Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 2000 data are from January to October.
5.42. The annual reports of Uganda’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development show
that the same was true of the period from 2001 to 2003, which was not analysed by the Panel of
Experts. In 2001, according to those reports, Uganda produced 0.000142 tonnes of gold itself and
exported 6.09 tonnes. In 2002, Uganda produced 0.002565 tonnes of gold itself and exported
7.589 tonnes487. In 2003, Uganda produced 0.040 tonnes of gold itself and exported 4.16 tonnes488.
5.43. Thus, the aforementioned sources indicate that Uganda produced a total of 0.06 tonnes
of gold itself between 1998 and 2003, and exported 45.149 tonnes.
5.44. The Porter Commission, which noted that figures varied from source to source,
confirmed that there was a discrepancy between Uganda’s gold production and gold exports during
the war:
“This Commission’s observation of the practice and procedure of, at least,
artisanal gold production was that it would be very difficult, if not impossible to
control gold imports from across the border, or to produce production statistics of any
kind. Therefore, even if the Uganda Government ought to have noticed that
production figures did not match export figures, there was very little that could be
done about it.”489
5.45. Furthermore, while the figures collated by the Porter Commission do not tally with
those of the Panel of Experts (which are, moreover, incorrectly presented in the Porter
Commission’s table), it is useful to compare them with the figures — also cited by the Porter
Commission — in the Comtrade database maintained by the Statistics Division of the Department
487Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, Annual Report 2002, p. 40, Table 5 (production in
2001 and 2002) and Table 6 (exports in 2001 and 2002); Ann. 5.8.
488Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, Annual Report 2003, p. 35, Table 5 (production) and
Table 6 (exports); Ann. 5.9.
489Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 111; emphasis added; Ann. 1.11.
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of Economic and Social Affairs at the United Nations. The Comtrade figures cited by the Porter
Commission are generally higher than those of the Panel of Experts. According to Comtrade,
Uganda exported 3 tonnes of gold in 1998 (less than the 5.03 tonnes indicated by the Panel of
Experts), but that figure then rises to 21 tonnes in 1999 (compared with 11.45 tonnes according to
the Panel of Experts) and 43 tonnes in 2000 (compared with 10.83 tonnes according to the Panel of
Experts), before falling to zero in 2001 (a year for which the Panel of Experts does not provide
figures). The Porter Commission’s report does not provide figures for 2002 or 2003. The full set
of data can be found in the table below490:
(b) The smuggling of gold between the DRC and Uganda during the war
5.46. This increase in gold exports by Uganda during the war should be seen in the light not
only of the information above showing the involvement of the Ugandan army in the exploitation of
gold in the DRC, but also of the absence of border controls between the DRC and Uganda.
5.47. Human Rights Watch noted that there were no effective controls on the border between
the DRC and Uganda during the war:
“Import statistics fail to show the real scale of the gold trade. Officially, gold
brought into Uganda should be declared upon entry as an import if expected to stay in
the country, or as a transit good if intended for another final destination. But official
Ugandan import statistics show a tiny amount of gold imported to the country and
show no statistics for transit goods. The unofficial trade in gold is likely facilitated by
the lax enforcement of regulations at the Uganda-Congo border posts. According to a
study conducted in 2004 by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), over 50 percent
490Ibid., pp. 111-112.
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of all imports and exports went unrecorded at six border posts. In cases where people
wanted to hide precious minerals, the study estimated the entry of such goods went
completely unrecorded.”491
5.48. This practice was made possible by the fact that the Ugandan commercial companies
which subsequently purchased that gold were not obliged to enquire as to its origin:
“Most of this gold is exported illegally from Congo: traders have no export
permits or exchange documents, are not authorized trading houses, do not keep
accounts at the Central Bank of Congo and do not pay relevant taxes and duties as
required under Congolese law. [ . . . ] The gold is ‘legalized’ in Uganda. Traders in
Kampala do not require their Congolese clients to present documents authorizing the
export of gold, operating on an ‘ask no questions’ basis. They treat the gold as if it
were a transit good, filling out customs forms and other documents required to make
its export legal from Uganda and acceptable in the unregulated global market.”492
5.49. Admittedly, as the Porter Commission noted, there is probably significant smuggling of
artisanal gold, which is difficult to detect, regardless of the inefficiency of the Ugandan customs
authorities and the porous border493. In fact, that probably explains the difference between
Uganda’s production and exports of gold prior to the war. Those difficulties cannot, though,
explain the considerable increase in Uganda’s gold exports during the war.
(c) Confirmation by Ugandan commercial operators
5.50. Finally, it has also been established that the gold which was exported by Uganda
during the war did indeed come from the DRC.
5.51. Interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch with Ugandan traders show that the
majority of the gold which they exported came from the DRC. The two largest gold-exporting
companies in Kampala, Uganda Commercial Impex Ltd and Machanga Ltd, which control around
70 per cent of Uganda’s export trade, told researchers from Human Rights Watch that their gold
came from the Congo (more specifically, Ituri)494.
5.52. That is not disputed by the Porter Commission. After noting the existence of massive
smuggling of artisanal gold495, the Porter Commission indicates that the Ugandan town of Arua,
situated on the border with the district of Ituri, played a central role in smuggling operations:
491Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, op. cit., pp. 107-108; Ann. 3.3.
492Ibid., pp. 105-106.
493Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 109; Ann. 1.11.
494Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold, op. cit., p. 109; Ann. 3.3.
495Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., pp. 110-111; Ann. 1.11.
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“For the same reason, it might be impractical to require source figures, because
gold smuggled through the border would be unlikely to be declared as sourced from
outside Uganda, so that it was not dutiable. This Commission was told that the
sources were all within Uganda: but looking at some of the names involved, and
bearing in mind the fact that the client was from Arua, this was unlikely.”496
(iii) Assessment of injury
5.53. As demonstrated above, the injuries caused to the DRC in respect of the illegal
exploitation of its gold resources fall into four categories: exploitation of resources in Ituri;
exploitation and spoliation by certain members of the Ugandan army in Watsa (mines operated by
OKIMO); destruction and flooding of the Gorumbwa and Adidi mines; and exploitation and
levying of taxes on — often forced — exploitation by civilians in Bondo, in co-operation with
troops allied to Jean-Pierre Bemba.
5.54. Because of the circumstances in which that exploitation was carried out, there is no
direct proof of the quantity of gold that was extracted. As demonstrated below, however, it is
possible to determine the injury suffered by the DRC on the basis of Uganda’s gold exports during
the war. Since Uganda produces hardly any gold of its own, most of the gold that was exported by
Uganda will have been the result of illegal exploitation in the DRC during that period.
5.55. As shown above, there are various sources available, and they report the following
figures:
 According to the statistics that the Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development
supplied to the Panel of Experts and the annual reports published by that ministry, Uganda
exported 45.149 tonnes of gold between 1998 and 2003, having produced 0.0[0]6 tonnes itself.
Thus, 45.143 tonnes of exports could not be explained by Uganda’s own production figures.
 According to the Comtrade statistics cited by the Porter Commission, Uganda exported
3 tonnes of gold in 1998, 21 tonnes in 1999, 43 tonnes in 2000 and zero tonnes in 2001 — i.e.,
a total of 67 tonnes in the period from 1998 to 2000. The Porter Commission did not cite any
figures for 2002 or 2003.
5.56. The price of gold was historically low throughout the period in question, as the table
below shows497:
496Ibid., p. 111.
497Source: http://www.macrotrends.net/1333/historical-gold-prices-100-year-chart.
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Date US$ per ounce US$ per kg
(1 ounce = 0.0283495 kg)
January 1998 424.18 14,962.52
January 1999 414.24 14,611.90
January 2000 399.47 14,090.90
January 2001 359.47 12,679.94
April 2001 (trough) 349.04 12,312.03
January 2002 376.94 13,296.18
January 2003 465.70 16,427.10
January 2004 529.65 18,682.87
January 2005 527.07 18,591.86
January 2006 657.63 23,197.23
January 2007 739.10 26,071.00
July 2011 1,694.18 59,760.49
5.57. In the context of the spoliation economy that the DRC suffered, Congolese gold
resources were obviously exploited and sold as a matter of urgency, with no regard for market
conditions. Had they been exploited and sold legally, on the other hand, operations could have
been delayed until the market had recovered. Consequently, one should not look solely at the
prices that applied during the war — that is to say, between 1998 and mid-2003. Thus, the injury
suffered by the DRC should, at the very least, be assessed on the basis of the average price of gold
during the period from 1998 to 2004, which was US$14,964.49 per kilogram498.
5.58. On the basis of that average price, the total value of the aforementioned exports is as
follows:
 on the basis of the quantities indicated by the Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral
Development, the 45.143 tonnes of Ugandan gold exports for the period between 1998 and
2003 that could not be explained by the country’s own production activities had a commercial
value of 45,143 x US$14,964.49, which equals US$675,541,972 (six hundred and seventy-five
million, five hundred and forty-one thousand, nine hundred and seventy-two United States
dollars);
 on the basis of the Comtrade statistics cited by the Porter Commission, the 67 tonnes of gold
that were exported by Uganda between 1998 and 2000 had a commercial value of
67,000 x US$14,964.49, which equals US$1,002,620,830 (one thousand and two million, six
hundred and twenty thousand, eight hundred and thirty United States dollars).
5.59. Given that it is based on export figures produced by the Ugandan Government, it is
indisputable that the first of these sums represents, as set forth above, the minimum amount that
Uganda owes on account of the looting, plundering and exploitation of the DRC’s gold. The
second sum, which is based on the Comtrade statistics cited by the Porter Commission, does not
cover the entire duration of the war, and as such therefore does not allow us to assess the total
injury suffered by the DRC.
5.60. On that basis, the DRC claims, at this stage of the proceedings and without prejudice to
any increase in the course of the proceedings, compensation equal to the first of the figures
above — namely, US$675,541,972 (six hundred and seventy-five million, five hundred and
forty-one thousand, nine hundred and seventy-two United States dollars).
498Average calculated by adding together 14,962.52, 14,611.90, 14,090.90, 12,679.94, 13,296.18, 16,427.10 and
18,682.87 and dividing the total by 7.
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5.61. It is up to Uganda to provide the DRC and the Court with Comtrade export statistics
(based on the same criteria as the figures cited by the Porter Commission) for the years 2001, 2002,
2003 and 2004. The DRC reserves the right to supplement its claim in the light of those new
statistics.
B. Looting, plundering and illegal exploitation of diamonds
5.62. This section will show the extent of the role played by Uganda’s armed forces in the
exploitation of diamonds in Congolese territory (i) and the exponential increase in Ugandan
diamond exports during the war (ii), before establishing the amount of compensation owed by
Uganda in this regard (iii).
(i) Uganda’s role in the exploitation of diamonds
5.62(sic). The extent of Uganda’s role in the illegal exploitation and exporting of the DRC’s
diamond resources is clear from various perspectives: first, from Uganda’s occupation of the
DRC’s diamond-mining areas (a); second, from the involvement of certain members of the
Ugandan army in the provision of security services to companies exploiting diamonds and the
collection of “taxes” by rebel groups allied to Uganda (b); third, from the involvement of the most
senior military officials in the exploitation of the DRC’s diamond reserves (c); and fourth, from
the role that Ugandan military transport played in the exporting of diamonds (d).
(a) Uganda’s control of diamond-mining areas
5.63. First of all, the fact that the Ugandan army had control of the diamond-mining areas in
the east of the DRC throughout the war is not in dispute. The Porter Commission notes the
following in this regard: “In his evidence Col. Mayombo stated that most of the diamond areas of
the Democratic Republic of Congo were in the North or in the areas of Bafwasende which were
already controlled by UPDF.”499 The map below shows the location of the diamond-mining areas
relative to Bafwasende:
499Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 140; Ann. 1.11.
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Map No. 5.8.
The diamond-mining areas in the east of the DRC
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
Legende = Legend
Diamant = Diamonds
5.64. Similarly, the United Nations’ Mapping Report notes: “The Rwandan and Ugandan
armies and the RCD-Goma obtained significant revenue from trading diamonds in and around
Kisangani.”500
(b) The involvement of Ugandan agents in the provision of “security” services to
companies exploiting diamonds and the collection of “taxes”
5.65. Second, certain members of the Ugandan army — specifically, General Kazini — were
heavily involved in the collection of taxes by rebel movements, notably the MLC, and the
provision of “security” services to companies exploiting diamonds.
5.66. The Porter Commission notes in this regard that the Ugandan authorities, and
General Kazini in particular, received payments in return for ensuring the security of the “company
Victoria”, allowing that firm, which also paid “taxes” to the MLC, to exploit diamonds in the DRC:
“However, the Commission has received documentary evidence implicating
General Kazini in other local administrative matters. In one case he instructed UPDF
Commanders in Isiro, Bunia, Beni, Bumba, Bondo and Buta to allow one company, La
Societe Victoria, to do business in coffee, diamonds, gold uninterrupted in areas under
their control as it had been cleared of taxation by the President of MLC,
500United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 748; Ann. 1.4.
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Jean Pierre Bemba. He concluded by saying that: ‘Anything to do with payment to
you in form of security funding, it will be done through OSH-Tac HQS’, i.e. his office.
In another letter addressed to the Governor of Kisangani, the Major General
attached a copy of communication from the chairman of MLC and his own comments
and stated that VICTORIA had officially cleared taxes with MLC authorities and
asked the Governor ‘to leave VICTORIA do his business and he will continue to pay
taxes to MLC to back up the effort in the armed struggle’.
While General Kazini and other UPDF officer denied collecting or receiving
any money from Congolese for their services, the General’s first letter above leaves
little doubt that some of the UPDF Senior Officers expected money from Congolese
for security purposes. His evidence makes clear that he also expected it, and that the
Commanders would keep the money for themselves, rather than accounting to him for
it.”501
In its 2005 Judgment, the Court made reference to this passage from the Commission’s report in
substantiating its decision502.
5.67. Later on in its report, the Porter Commission sets out in detail the documentary
analysis and witness testimony that led it to this conclusion. In so doing, it confirms that the
exploitation of diamonds was carried out with the endorsement and under the direct control of
members of the Ugandan army:
“The first document was a receipt for payment of ad valorem tax in advance to
MLC of $100,000 each from Siporia Diamonds and Victoria Diamonds. The payer on
behalf of Victoria Diamonds was Abbas Kazal, a connection which helps to confirm
this Commission’s above finding.
The receipt was attached to a note on MLC notepaper signed by Mr. Bemba
addressed to all civil and military authorities, dated 26th June 1999 which states that
La Societe Victoria was authorised to proceed with purchases of gold, coffee and
diamonds in Isiro Bunia Bondo Buta Kisangani and Beni, and that all the local taxes
would be paid to MLC.
The note was an interesting document in itself, confirming that Mr. Bemba
initially lied to this Commission, and confirming what appears to have been a
universal practice of pre-payment of taxes.
But also endorsed on the note were the comments of General Kazini addressed
to the Commanders in all of the mentioned towns, except Kisangani, also dated
26th June 1999. From other writings of General Kazini this commission had no doubt
that it was in his handwriting: and there is quite a large sample in this case. It was
therefore astonishing to hear General Kazini deny flatly that he wrote it. It was not
until it was pointed out that in another document with which this Commission will deal
below, the comments were referred to, and that it would be a simple matter to call
handwriting expert evidence that he admitted that he was indeed the author. This was
not a mistake: having watched General Kazini giving evidence, this Commission is
fully satisfied that it was a deliberate lie by Uganda’s Acting Army Commander,
501Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 89; emphasis added; Ann. 1.11.
502Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 251 and 253, paras. 242 and 248.
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displaying an arrogance and contempt of civil authority similar to that which has been
displayed by other witnesses in the UPDF.
General Kazini’s comments were actually instructions to his Commanders,
pointing out that La Societe Victoria had been granted permission to do business in
coffee, gold and diamonds in their areas, that taxes were to be paid to MLC, and that
the Commanders should ‘let Victoria to do its business uninterrupted by anybody’.
This makes one wonder what the Commanders would have done if they had not
received this instruction.
In his last paragraph General Kazini instructed the commanders that anything to
do with payment to them in the form of security funding, it should be done through
OSH TAC HQS, that is, through himself. Throughout these proceedings, every UPDF
witness, including General Kazini, has denied that any such funding was taking place,
but it clearly was. Senior Officers have again been lying to this Commission.
All of the above documents were copied in a letter from General Kazini on
UPDF notepaper addressed to the Governor Kisangani, datelined July 1999. The letter
referred to Mr. Bemba’s letter and General Kazini’s comments endorsed on the same
document. He informed the Governor that Victoria had officially cleared taxes with
MLC authorities and MLC was a recognised organisation by all Congolese and allies.
He asked the Governor to ‘leave Victoria to his business and he will continue to pay
taxes to MLC to back up the effort in the armed struggle’.”503
In its 2005 Judgment, the Court also made reference to this passage from the Commission’s report
in substantiating its decision504.
(c) The direct involvement of Ugandan agents in the looting, plundering and
wrongful exploitation of diamonds in the DRC
5.68. Moreover, as the DRC has already pointed out, General Kazini was directly involved in
the operations of a commercial company called Victoria, which was active in the diamond sector,
among others. The Porter Commission notes:
“Though General Kazini has denied on numerous occasions that he has any
connection with Khalil and that he only knew him casually, from the special favours
he gave to La Societe Victoria and the lies he told about his dealings with the
Company, one cannot resist the conclusion that he has some interest in the Company,
though this Commission has no conclusive evidence to prove it.”505
The Porter Commission finds confirmation of General Kazini’s involvement in the role that he
played in Adèle Lotsove’s appointment as “Governor” of Ituri506. The Commission notes that
when General Kazini wrote to the existing Governor of Kisangani on this subject, he copied
Victoria, as if informing the company that he had obeyed its instructions:
“General Kazini therefore was involved in secretly appointing, or conspiring in
the appointment of Adele Lotsove to take administrative control of the mineral
503Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., pp. 119-120; emphasis added; Ann. 1.11.
504Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 251 and 253, paras. 242 and 248.
505Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 82; Ann. 1.11.
506Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 230, para. 175.
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producing areas. This can only have been because she was a sympathetic
administrator. In appointing her, General Kazini was acting against the existing
Governor who clearly was not sympathetic, as is revealed by the phraseology of the
last paragraph of General Kazini’s letter to him: ‘Let me hope that I have been clearly
understood’ . . .
It is also revealing that, amongst others, he copied his letter to Victoria, as
though reporting that he had obeyed his instructions, and done what he had been asked
to do by Victoria.
These conclusions put General Kazini at the beginning of a chain as an active
supporter in the Democratic Republic of Congo of Victoria, an organisation engaged
in smuggling diamonds through Uganda: and it is difficult to believe that he was not
profiting for himself from the operation.”507
The Commission goes on to say:
“Certainly the evidence against General Kazini shows intimidation on behalf of
Victoria: and his correspondence implies that without his assistance, a company
trying to work in the Democratic Republic of Congo would run into all sorts of
problems with the UPDF, whose Commanders were warned off Victoria by
General Kazini. This evidence also shows that an attempt was being made to control
the various administrations, including those who had no alliance with Uganda, and this
Commission therefore agrees with the reconstituted Panel that a façade in the case of
Victoria was being used.”508
In its 2005 Judgment, the Court likewise made reference to several of these passages from the
Commission’s report in substantiating its decision509.
5.69. The Porter Commission also reports that, following a warning by President Museveni
regarding this issue, General Kazini responded as follows on 20 December 1998: “What is
happening is that some Ugandans could be in business partnership with some commanders but no
officers or men are directly involved in trade in Congo.”510 The Commission goes on to note:
“The speed at which General Kazini replied shows that he was aware of all these problems, would
take no real action until the matter became public, and had not previously himself made His
Excellency the President aware of them.”511
5.70. In its Judgment of 19 December 2005, the Court also made reference to the
above-mentioned passages from the Porter Commission’s report concerning General Kazini’s
intervention:
“the written message sent by General Kazini in response to the radio message
broadcast by the Ugandan President in December 1998 demonstrated that the General
was aware of problems of conduct of some UPDF officers, that he did not take any
507Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., pp. 121-122; emphasis added; see also pp. 173, 177 and 202;
Ann. 1.11.
508Ibid., p. 177; emphasis added.
509Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 251 and 253, paras. 242 and 248.
510Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 16; Ann. 1.11.
511Ibid., p. 17.
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‘real action until the matter became public’ and that he did not inform the President.
The Commission further states that it follows from General Kazini’s message that he,
in point of fact, admitted that the allegation that ‘some top officers in the UPDF were
planning from the beginning to do business in Congo was generally true’; ‘that
Commanders in business partnership with Ugandans were trading in the DRC, about
which General Kazini took no action’; and that Ugandan ‘military aircraft were
carrying Congolese businessmen into Entebbe, and carrying items which they bought
in Kampala back to the Congo’. The Commission noted that, while certain orders
directed against the use of military aircraft by businessmen were made by
General Kazini, that practice nonetheless continued. The Commission also referred to
a radio message of General Kazini in which he said that ‘officers in the Colonel
Peter Kerim sector, Bunia and based at Kisangani Airport were engaging in business
contrary to the presidential radio message’. The Commission further stated that
General Kazini was aware that officers and men of the UPDF were involved in gold
mining and trade, smuggling and looting of civilians.”512
The Court added:
“The Commission noted that General Kazini’s radio messages in response to the
reports about misconduct of the UPDF did not intend, in point of fact, to control this
misconduct. It stated as follows:
‘There is no doubt that his purpose in producing these messages
was to try to show that he was taking action in respect of these
problems . . . There appears to have been little or no action taken as a
result of these messages . . . [A]ll this correspondence was intended by
General Kazini to cover himself, rather than to prompt action. There also
appears to be little or no follow up to the orders given.’”513
Looking more specifically at the links between General Kazini and Victoria, the Court noted the
following:
“The Commission found that General Kazini was ‘an active supporter in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo of Victoria, an organization engaged in smuggling
diamonds through Uganda: and it is difficult to believe that he was not profiting for
himself from the operation’. The Commission explained that the company referred to
as ‘Victoria’ in its Report dealt ‘in diamonds, gold and coffee which it purchased from
Isiro, Bunia, Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani’ and that it paid taxes to the
MLC.”514
(d) The role of the Ugandan army in the transporting of natural resources from the
DRC to Uganda
5.71. Finally, the Ugandan army played a crucial role in the transporting of contraband
between the DRC and Uganda. The Porter Commission notes in this regard that Ugandan military
aircraft transported around 4,000 non-UPDF members out of the DRC over a period of just under
three years:
512Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 249-250, para. 238.
513Ibid., p. 250, para. 239.
514Ibid., para. 240.
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“In numbers, the evidence revealed that Immigration checked in nearly 4000
travellers from the Congo on Military airplanes over a period of just under 3 years.
No doubt those travellers had either come from Uganda and were returning, or were
coming from the Congo and planning to return. Only sometimes were these travellers
recorded on outgoing military flights. There is no UPDF record of incoming
flights.”515
5.72. The Porter Commission then seeks to determine whether these were civilian or military
flights, observing that some of them (which, according to the Commission, could only have been
used to transport natural resources) were military flights, and that the use of Kampala’s military air
base for commercial purposes had been concealed:
“So far as this Commission can tell, whilst military transport of goods from the
Congo, which cannot have been anything else than natural resources, has been proved
to have been taking place, by far the largest number of flights were private, carrying
merchandise to and from the Congo . . .
Evidence before this Commission clearly shows that trade through the Military
Air Base was being hidden, and that those involved were perfectly prepared to lie to
this Commission to cover it up.”516
5.73. Once again, certain extremely senior Ugandan military officials were involved in these
operations — including General Salim Saleh, through his airline companies Air Alexander
International Ltd. and Take Air Ltd.517, and General Kazini. The Porter Commission notes that
General Kazini was one of the people who gave clearance instructions to the liaison officers at the
military air base:
“Perhaps also an answer to the question posed above, as to how Lebanese were
being allowed to fly on Military Aircraft to and from the Democratic Republic of
Congo, in breach of the President’s Instructions, is beginning to appear.
General Kazini according to the evidence, was one of those who gave clearance
instructions to the Liaison Officers at the Military Air base.”518
In its 2005 Judgment, the Court also made reference to this passage from the Commission’s report
in substantiating its decision519.
*
* *
515Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., pp. 32-33; Ann. 1.11.
516Ibid., p. 38; emphasis added.
517Ibid., pp. 80-81.
518Ibid., p. 122.
519Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 251 and 253, paras. 242 and 248.
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5.74. Once again, the facts established above show the extent of Uganda’s involvement in
the looting, plundering and exploitation of diamonds in the DRC from various perspectives:
 first, in geographical terms: Uganda controlled the main diamond-mining areas in the east of
the DRC during the war;
 second, in terms of the range of practices employed for the purposes of looting, plundering and
exploiting diamonds: those practices included involvement in and support for the spoliation
activities of commercial companies (Victoria), the levying of taxes, and considerable assistance
with transport to Uganda.
(ii) Uganda’s diamond exports
5.75. The exponential increase that was seen in Ugandan diamond exports as of 1998,
despite Uganda not producing diamonds, provides further confirmation of Uganda’s role in the
illegal exploitation and exporting of the DRC’s diamond resources, as well as allowing us to
quantify the injury suffered by the DRC.
5.76. According to a report by a British all-party parliamentary group, based largely on
statistics from the Diamond High Council520, Uganda did not export any diamonds between 1994
and 1996. In 1997, its exports were worth US$198,302. Exports then increased dramatically:
US$1,440,000 in 1998; US$1,813,500 in 1999; US$1,263,385 in 2000; and US$2,539,000
in 2001 — i.e., a total of US$7,055,885 between 1998 and 2001. These figures can be seen in the
right-hand column of the table below521:
5.77. The fact that Uganda does not produce diamonds itself, or does so in negligible
quantities, is not disputed, so its exports cannot be explained by local production in Uganda. The
Porter Commission confirms that Ugandan diamond production is practically non-existent:
“It is quite clear from URA, BOU and Uganda Bureau of Statistics data to
COMTRADE that there is no record whatever of diamond production in Uganda.
There is a slight possibility of some artisanal surface diamond collection, but nothing
has been officially declared.”522
520All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention, Cursed by Riches: Who
Benefits from Resource Exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?, Nov. 2002, p. 18; Ann. 5.10.
521Ibid.
522Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 113; Ann. 1.11.
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5.78. The Porter Commission also cites the case of a man named Khalil, who admitted to
obtaining diamonds in the DRC in April 2000, transporting them by plane to the military air base in
Kampala and then having them transported to Entebbe International Airport, where they were sold
in a clandestine manner for US$550,000. The Porter Commission notes that, according to the
declaration that was made to the Belgian authorities by the courier involved in this smuggling
operation, the diamonds originated in Uganda. In reality, the Commission notes, the diamonds
came from the DRC:
“For example this Commission has traced a Police case in Uganda where one
Khalil, who is mentioned in the original Panel Report, admitted to obtaining diamonds
in the Democratic Republic of Congo in April 2000, flying them in to the Military Air
Base523, and ultimately sending a packet of them through associates to the
International Airport524, where the diamonds were exchanged (in the Gents toilet at
the airport) for $550,000 in cash with a courier from Belgium who caught the next
flight back. This was hardly an honest exchange, particularly as there is no record of
import, export or transit through Uganda. The reason the matter was reported to the
Police in Uganda was because on the way back to Kampala, the car was stopped by
armed men and the money stolen. The case is dealt with more particularly at
Paragraph 21.3 below. The point is that the source of information in Belgium that the
diamonds originally came from Uganda (which they did not) was the courier who had
been involved in this shady deal. Had the original Panel known all this, perhaps they
would not have been so hasty as to lay the blame at Uganda’s door: and to establish
the source of the information upon which they relied was only a telephone call away,
for that is how this Commission established this information. There is no doubt that
diamonds are being smuggled, and falsely declared as sourced in Uganda. Bearing in
mind that a fortune can be carried in a pocket, it is difficult to see what Uganda as a
State can do about this. Partner Countries must be aware that Uganda is not a
diamond producing country, and yet are prepared to publish figures which deny that
fact. The original Panel acknowledge the difficulty, and make recommendations in
respect of it, which the Uganda Government, in its response, accepts.”525
5.79. Contrary to what the Porter Commission seems to believe, the fact that this Khalil
falsely declared to the Belgian authorities that his diamonds had been mined in Uganda does not in
any way excuse Uganda. It clearly shows that private individuals are able to deceive the Belgian
authorities as to the true origin of diamonds imported into Belgium, but that is not the point. The
important thing here is that this event reported by the Porter Commission confirms that private
individuals were using UPDF military transport to channel diamonds stolen from the DRC to
Uganda.
5.80. Thus, Ugandan involvement in the looting, plundering and exploitation of diamonds
went hand in hand with an exponential increase in Ugandan diamond exports, which could not have
stemmed from Ugandan production. Indeed, the Porter Commission admits that this had its origins
in the DRC.
523Uganda’s military air base: ibid., pp. 29 et seq.
524Entebbe International Airport: ibid., p. 39.
525Ibid., pp. 113-114; emphasis added.
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(iii) Assessment of injury
5.81. On the basis of the foregoing, the DRC estimates, at this stage of the proceedings, that
the injury it suffered in the period from 1998 to 2001 totalled US$7,055,885 (seven million,
fifty-five thousand, eight hundred and eighty-five United States dollars) — i.e., the total value of
Ugandan diamond exports during the period in question.
5.82. That amount needs to be supplemented with a figure for Ugandan diamond exports in
2002 and 2003. To that end, the DRC has asked the Diamond High Council (now the Antwerp
World Diamond Centre) to provide equivalent statistics for those years, in line with those that it
provided to the United Nations for the period from 1998 to 2001. At the time of filing of this
Memorial, the DRC was still waiting for those statistics.
C. Looting, plundering and wrongful exploitation of coltan
5.83. Coltan (columbite-tantalite) is a combination of two minerals: columbite and tantalite.
Coltan is used for a range of purposes, including the manufacturing of various electronic devices.
It is therefore of strategic importance.
5.84. This section will demonstrate the role that Ugandan armed forces played in the
extraction and exploitation of coltan in the DRC (i), before establishing the amount of
compensation that Uganda owes the DRC in this regard (ii).
(i) Uganda’s role in the exploitation of coltan
5.85. The fact that coltan-rich Congolese territory, including the Mambasa and Bafwasende
mines526, was under the control of the Ugandan army is not in dispute527.
5.86. In its final report, the United Nations Panel of Experts noted that the Ugandan army
was also involved in the exploitation of the DRC’s coltan in Orientale province:
“A number of coltan operations, especially under the supervision of UPDF
Colonels Muzora and Burundi, have been coordinated under the front company Trinity
Investment, where UPDF Major General Kazini is the principal figure. Armed groups
frequently identified with militias under the command of UPDF officers manage sites
in remote locations where diggers pay a daily fee to exploit an area.”528
5.87. The Panel of Experts then presented a case study, which was based on an interview
with a woman named Valentina Piskunova and a document in the Panel’s possession:
526All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention, Visit to Democratic
Republic of Congo 2nd - 6th August 2001; Ann. 5.11.
527As regards Bafwasende, see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 208, para. 84, and Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit.,
p. 140; Ann. 1.11. As regards Mambasa, see United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 416; Ann. 1.4, and MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, op. cit.,
para. 109; Ann. 1.6.
528United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 108; Ann. 1.10.
169
170
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“During March 2002, Panel members met with Valentina Piskunova who,
together with her husband Anatoly Piskunov, represents and operates the company LA
CONMET from its base in Kampala . . . the company continued to buy coltan from its
office at Butembo in the Democratic Republic of the Congo . . .
Ms. Piskunova went on to tell the Panel that the company’s coltan was
transported by road across the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda at Kasindi to Entebbe International Airport, where it was then transported
by Boeing 707, via Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, at a cost of $140,000 per flight, to
Ulba, Kazakhstan, for processing.
In addition to the profit made on the sales of coltan, LA CONMET also
experienced savings by being granted ‘full exoneration’ for ‘all activities involving
exploitation for the territory of Beni-Lubero’ (Democratic Republic of the Congo),
including freedom from paying fiscal and customs duties. The document granting the
exonerations is in the possession of the Panel. It was signed at Kampala by
Mbusa Myamwisi, then Commissioner General for RCD-Kisangani, on
5 January 2000, identifying [Ugandan general] Salim Saleh as the owner of LA
CONMET and designating his representatives as ‘the Russian group LA
CONMET’.”529
5.88. The conclusions of the Panel of Experts are therefore not affected by the analysis
carried out by the Porter Commission, which accepts that “there undoubtedly was coltan from the
Congo transiting through Uganda”530.
5.89. The Mapping Report produced by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights also details retaliatory measures carried out by the UPDF in revenge for an
attack on one of their coltan convoys on the road to Butembo:
“In North Kivu, in revenge for an attack on their convoy of Mayi-Mayi coltan
on the road between Mangurejipa, an important mining area, and Butembo, Ugandan
soldiers from the UPDF allegedly killed 36 inhabitants of the village nearest to the
place of ambush.”531
These facts are confirmed by a Congolese NGO, which reported at the time of the events in
question that a “consignment of at least 5,000 kg of coltan” had been recovered by Ugandan
soldiers in that area532. This clearly shows that, in addition to the transporting of this mineral to
Uganda, UPDF members themselves were directly involved in the theft and trafficking of coltan in
Congolese territory.
529Ibid., paras. 109-111.
530Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 110; Ann. 1.11.
531United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op.cit.,
para. 743; Ann. 1.4; footnote 1342 refers to Human Rights Watch, Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and
Ethnic Strife, Mar. 2001, p. 44.
532Report entitled The Société Civile Grand Nord’s view on Uganda’s military interventions in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, produced by the Beni-Butembo Civil Society Co-ordination Office in North Kivu, 25 June 2001,
p. 2; RDRC, Ann. 95; Ann. 2.7.
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(ii) Assessment of injury
5.90. As regards the value of the coltan that was illegally exported from the DRC as a result
of Uganda’s failure to comply with its international obligations, the United Nations Panel of
Experts cited statistics showing that Uganda, which does not produce coltan, exported several
million United States dollars’ worth of it during the war533. The graphics presented by the Panel of
Experts534 have been reproduced below:
5.91. According to the report by the British all-party parliamentary group, which is based,
inter alia, on statistics provided by the Ugandan Government, Uganda exported a total of
90.64 tonnes (i.e., 90,640 kilograms) of coltan between 1998 and 2000535. Ms Piskunova stated
that LA CONMET bought coltan at a price of US$10 per kilogram and sold it on at a price of
US$17 per kilogram536. Thus, the 90,640 kilograms reported by the Ugandan Government have a
533United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., pp. 23-24; Ann. 1.7.
534Ibid.
535All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention, Cursed by Riches, op. cit.,
p. 18.
536Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 182; Ann. 1.11.
172
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value of US$1,540,880 (US$17 x 90,640). That same report also indicates that exports of
niobium — one of the minerals extracted from coltan — had a total value of US$1,375,000 in the
period from 1998 to 2000. Consequently, exports of coltan and niobium between 1998 and 2000
had a combined total value of US$2,915,880.
5.92. On the basis of the foregoing, the injury suffered by the DRC in this regard is
considered to stand at a minimum of US$2,915,880 (two million, nine hundred and fifteen
thousand, eight hundred and eighty United States dollars).
Section 2. Prejudice caused to Congolese fauna
5.93. Several of the national parks in the east of the DRC are on UNESCO’s World Heritage
List and home to numerous animal species that are threatened with extinction. Uganda’s invasion
of the DRC inflicted considerable damage on that natural wealth as a result of a variety of different
factors: the killing of animals by soldiers for food and other purposes; the destruction of animals’
habitats as a result of military operations; the fact that Congolese civilian populations fled into the
forests, resulting in them exploiting those resources for subsistence purposes; and finally, the
elimination of all administrative control over the parks and protection of animal species.
5.94. After providing a general overview of the parks and the species that they are home
to (A), the DRC will provide details of Uganda’s harmful acts in relation to each of those
parks (B et seq.), before assessing the resulting injury (G).
A. The DRC’s national parks: world heritage and endangered species
5.95. The DRC has five sites included on the World Heritage List under Articles 2, 3
and 11 (2) of the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, which was adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 16 November 1972537 and
to which both the DRC and Uganda were parties at the time of the events in question538. These are
Virunga National Park, Kahuzi-Biega National Park, Garamba National Park, Salonga National
Park and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve539.
More specifically, each of these parks features on the List of World Heritage in Danger540,
following a decision by the World Heritage Committee in accordance with Article 11 (4) of the
Convention. Looking only at the parks that are the subject of claims by the DRC against Uganda,
Virunga Park was added to that list in 1994, Garamba Park in 1996, and the Okapi Wildlife
Reserve in 1997541. Thus, all three were on the List of World Heritage in Danger prior to Uganda’s
invasion of the DRC.
537http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf.
538The DRC ratified the Convention on 23 September 1974, and Uganda acceded to it on 20 November 1987:
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties.
539http://whc.unesco.org/en/list; see also United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources, op. cit., para. 51; Ann. 1.9.
540http://whc.unesco.org/en/danger.
541Ibid.
173
174
- 138 -
5.96. The DRC also has other national parks which are not on UNESCO’s World Heritage
List but are nevertheless of exceptional value. Maiko National Park, for example, is situated to the
west of Virunga Park in the provinces of Orientale and North Kivu.
5.97. These parks are home to several animal species that are threatened with extinction, as
recognized by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (CITES) of 3 March 1973, to which both the DRC and Uganda were parties at the time of the
events in question542.
5.98. Appendix I to CITES lists the species that are under the greatest threat of extinction
pursuant to Article II (1) of the Convention. Numerous species living in the DRC’s national parks
appear in Appendix I, including the following543:
 elephants, in particular Loxodonta africana (except the populations of South Africa, Botswana,
Namibia and Zimbabwe, which appear in Appendix II);
 gorillas (Gorilla beringei and Gorilla gorilla);
 chimpanzees (Pan spp.);
 rhinoceroses (Rhinocerotidae spp.), with the exception of the white rhinoceroses
(Ceratotherium simum simum) of South Africa and Swaziland, which appear in Appendix II.
Uganda’s wrongful acts caused the killing of thousands of these animals and resulted in their
habitats suffering serious damage.
5.99. The prejudice that Uganda caused to national parks and Congolese fauna is analysed
below for the four parks that were most affected by Uganda’s actions — Virunga Park, Garamba
Park, the Okapi Wildlife Reserve and Maiko National Park, looking at each park in turn.
5.100. The above-mentioned Kahuzi-Biega Park is not the subject of a claim by the DRC
against Uganda. It is situated to the west of the border with Rwanda, near Lake Kivu, and the
damage that it suffered during the war was not caused by Uganda.
5.101. The losses experienced by the various animal species have been assessed by the
Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation (ICCN), the public body in the DRC that is
responsible for managing national parks. Where possible, those data are compared with data from
UNESCO.
B. Virunga National Park
5.102. Virunga National Park is 300 km long and 150 km wide (covering almost
800,000 hectares). It features an exceptional variety of biological environments, such as
Lake Kivu, the Virunga volcano chain and Lake Edward. It boasts a wide range of biotopes
(volcanoes, savannahs, rainforests, lakes and permanent glaciers) and a very wide range of animals
542The DRC acceded to it on 20 July 1976, and Uganda acceded to it on 18 July 1991:
www.cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php.
543https://cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php.
175
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(fish, aquatic birds, hippopotamuses, elephants, gorillas, buffalo, lions, antelope, warthogs, hyenas,
etc.)544.
5.103. Virunga Park is situated in North Kivu province. Most of it borders Uganda, with the
southernmost part bordering Rwanda. The park accounts for around one third of the border
between the DRC and Uganda. Lake Albert to the north of the park makes up another large section
of that border. Hence, the park represents about half of the entire land border between the two
countries. Consequently, the UPDF was practically obliged to pass through the park when entering
the DRC.
Map No. 5.9.
Virunga National Park
Legend:
Province orientale = Orientale province
Ouganda = Uganda
Parc National de Virunga = National Park Virunga
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
5.104. In its interim report of 2002, the Panel of Experts noted that the war and the passage
of various armed forces had had a disastrous impact on the DRC’s national parks, including
Virunga Park:
“The combination of the exploitation activities and ongoing conflict has
effectively eliminated State administrative control over the parks and led to the
militarization of many of them, for example, the Virunga, Kahuzi-Biega and Okapi
reserves. These parks are strategically located along the eastern border, and are
regularly used as crossing points by military forces to gain access to the interior of
the eastern region. The increased presence of foreign military, local rebel forces and
armed groups, some of which occupy areas within the parks on a semi-permanent
basis, has resulted in the development of highly organized and systematic exploitation
activities at levels never before seen. These activities include poaching for ivory,
game meat and rare species, logging, and mining for coltan, gold and diamonds.
544See, for example, www.virunga.org.
176
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Exploitation activities reportedly involve a wide range of Congolese operators and
armed groups. They are mostly carried out under the control of foreign military,
however, often with their logistical support and under their protection. Much of the
production or bounty is transported first to neighbouring countries, to be exported to
third countries. Poaching activities and the massive military presence have given rise
to arms trafficking within some parks. The reserves are also occasionally the sites of
violent clashes between some of the armed parties. Armed conflict has exacted its toll
in human lives in the parks. Over 50 park guards and other staff employed by the
Congolese Institute for Nature Conservation have been killed since 1996.”545
5.105. The Mapping Report also highlighted the attraction of Virunga Park for foreign armed
forces and rebels:
“It would be wrong, however, to assume that the warring parties competed only
for coltan and other raw materials. The Virunga (North Kivu) and Kahuzi-Biega
(South Kivu) national parks were a particular magnet for rebel and military forces
because of the wildlife found there, and the ivory that could be obtained from
poaching elephants.”546
5.106. In March 2003, a scientific team comprising staff from the ICCN, the Zoological
Society of London and the International Rhino Foundation counted various species of animal in the
northern sector of the park547. After describing the methodology used and the results of the counts,
their report revealed a devastating finding: there were 21 elephants, 52 buffalo, 533 western kob,
42 waterbucks, 73 warthogs, 21 bushbucks, 104 baboons, 84 mongooses and 21 crocodiles
remaining in the northern sector of the park548. As for hippopotamuses, a key species in the park549,
81 animals were counted, resulting in an estimate of 101 animals living in that area550.
5.107. The ICCN estimated that the following numbers of animals had been lost in Virunga
Park — and more specifically, its northern sector — during the war: 20,000 antelope,
1,229 elephants, 107 hippopotamuses, 67 warthogs, 96 baboons, 77 mongooses, 72 crocodiles,
9,048 buffalo, 160 western kob, 39 waterbucks and 19 bushbucks551.
5.108. These estimates can be compared with figures published by UNESCO552, which are
based on parameters that differ from those of the ICCN in various respects. UNESCO seeks to
determine the evolution of the number of animals, rather than the number of animals killed as such.
In addition, it only counts protected animal species whose preservation is under severe threat, so
545United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 52; emphasis added; Ann. 1.9.
546United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit.,
para. 745; emphasis added; Ann. 1.4.
547A. K. Kes Hillman Smith, Emmanuel de Merode, Fraser Smith, Amube Ndey, Norbert Mushenzi and
Guy Mboma, Virunga National Park — North — March 2003 aerial counts; Ann. 5.12.
548Ibid., notably Table 1.
549Ibid., introduction, p. 3.
550Ibid., Table 2.
551DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to Congolese fauna by Uganda between 1998 and
2003, Sep. 2016; Ann. 5.13.
552UNESCO, Promoting and Preserving Congolese Heritage: Linking biological and cultural diversity,
proceedings of the conference and workshops, 13-17 Sep. 2004, p. 113; Ann. 5.14.
177
178
- 141 -
does not take account, for example, of the decimation of warthogs, baboons, etc. UNESCO
provides figures for “before 1996”, “during the war” and “after 2000” (which generally means
2003), so the figures do not cover exactly the same period. Moreover, UNESCO’s statistics do not
always cover the entire park: the statistics on elephants relate only to the central sector of the park,
while the figures on hippopotamuses relate to the northern and southern plains. On that basis,
UNESCO presents the following figures:
5.109. With regard to elephants, UNESCO’s belief that 221 animals were lost (the difference
between its estimates of 486 “during the war” and 265 “after 2000”) in just the central sector of the
park is compatible with the assessment of the ICCN, which believes that 1,229 elephants were lost
across the park as a whole between 1998 and 2003.
5.110. For hippopotamuses, UNESCO’s belief that 27,000 animals were lost (the difference
between its estimates “before 1996” and “after 2000”) far exceeds the ICCN’s figure of 107 lost
animals in the period between 1998 and 2003.
5.111. In terms of buffalo, UNESCO points to a loss of 7,460 animals over a longer period of
time (the difference between estimates of 9,700 in 1981 and 2,240 in November 2003). The
buffalo population may have increased in this period before falling during the war, as indicated by
the evolution of the numbers of gorillas and elephants, for which figures “during the war” are
available. UNESCO’s figures are therefore compatible with those of the ICCN, which indicates
that 9,048 buffalo were lost between 1998 and 2003.
5.112. The ICCN’s figures are thus fully justified and bear witness to the dramatic losses
suffered between 1998 and 2003.
C. Garamba National Park
5.113. Garamba National Park is situated close to the Sudanese border in what was at the
time Haut-Uélé district. It covers 492,000 hectares. The park is composed of vast grassy and
wooded savannahs. It is home, in particular, to rare animals such as the white rhinoceros, the
giraffe and the Lord Derby eland553.
553See, for example, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/136.
179
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Map No. 5.10.
Garamba National Park
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
5.114. On the basis of accounts and statistics from regional conservation organizations, the
United Nations Panel of Experts noted the presence of Ugandan military forces in Garamba
National Park and highlighted the colossal damage that was done to fauna and flora in that area:
“Wildlife has also suffered a great deal from the conflict. Numerous accounts
and statistics from regional conservation organizations show that, in the area
controlled by the Ugandan troops and Sudanese rebels, nearly 4,000 out of
12,000 elephants were killed in the Garamba Park in north-eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo between 1995 and 1999 . . .”554
5.115. The United Nations Panel of Experts provides very specific details of the trafficking
of elephant tusks by high-ranking members of the Ugandan army in the area around Garamba Park:
“The Panel has indications that, in most cases, poaching of elephants in
violation of international law (Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)) was well organized. Either soldiers hunted
directly with the consent of the commander or they provided equipment and protection
to local villagers to execute the task with the objective of collecting elephant tusks.
554United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 61; emphasis added; Ann. 1.7.
180
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For example, in August 2000, UPDF Colonel Mugeni and a crew of his soldiers were
discovered with 800 kg of elephant tusks in their car near Garamba Park.”555
5.116. The Porter Commission confirms that a detachment of the Ugandan army was
stationed in Durba, near the park. It notes that the detachment was not specifically in charge of the
park556. However, it also notes that Uganda’s Colonel Mugenyi stated that the park was under his
jurisdiction and that his colleague Colonel Sonko Lutaya testified that Colonel Mugenyi frequently
passed through the park on the way to Isiro. The Porter Commission considered Colonel Mugenyi
to be unreliable on the subject of the smuggling of elephant tusks:
“Lt. Col. Mugenyi denied the incident though he stated further that the area of
Garambwa National Park was under his jurisdiction during Operation Safe Haven and
the District Administrator of the area did inform him of various problems, with SPLA,
poaching and other problems in the Park. Lt. Col. Mugenyi said during investigations
which were started after the original Panel Report:
‘I told them (Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence) that I do not
know anything as regards those 800 kilograms of elephant tusks because I
have never operated in those areas not even passed through those areas.’
Lt. Col. Sonko Lutaya testified that Lt. Col. Mugenyi passed through the
Garambwa National Park regularly on his way to Isiro. Although this Commission
has problems with Lt Col Sonko’s evidence in other respects, the route he describes
makes sense, and his evidence is probably true.
This shows that Lt. Col. Mugenyi was not being truthful and one wonders what
he was hiding. This Commission was unable to visit the area or find out which crew
Lt Col Mugenyi may have been with. However, since the army was in the area they
should have been able to carry out an exhaustive investigation. The matter should be
investigated more thoroughly by the responsible organs. Too long has passed now for
meaningful further investigations to be made.”557
5.117. According to assessments by the ICCN, 5,000 antelope, 5,000 elephants, 92 giraffes,
21 white rhinoceroses, 3,905 warthogs, 17 Lichtenstein’s hartebeests, 808 waterbucks and
135 bushbucks were lost558.
5.118. Aerial counts carried out between 1998 and 2003 by an international team559 reported
declines in the numbers of giraffes (down 82), warthogs (down 3,976), hartebeests (down 461),
waterbucks (down 961) and kob (down 270)560.
555United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 62; emphasis added.
556Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 72; Ann. 1.11.
557Ibid.; emphasis added.
558DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to Congolese fauna, op.cit.; Ann. 5.13.
559Kes Hillman Smith, Fraser Smith, Amube Ndey, Mbayma Atalia, Jean Mafuko, Paulin Tshikaya,
Giningayo Panziama and John Watkin, Garamba National Park and reserves — general aerial counts 1998, 2000, 2002
& 2003 and evaluation of the effects of the civil wars on the ecosystem, pp. 3-4; Ann. 5.15. The figures cited in this
report relate only to the park and do not cover the hunting reserves.
560Ibid., p. 5, Table 2.
181
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5.119. These counts also reported increases in the elephant, buffalo and hippopotamus
populations561, as well as stability in the number of rhinoceroses562. However, these figures show
the difference between the evolution of the total number of animals and the number of animal
deaths. The fact that the total number of animals has remained stable, rather than increasing, may
be attributable to a large number of deaths. On the subject of rhinoceroses, the report indicated the
following:
“Rhino numbers increased exponentially before the wars, doubling in eight
years . . . However according to the rate of reproduction and the previously
demonstrated rate of increase, the population should be over 60 individuals now,
double current numbers. We cannot be complacent about relative stability and must
do all possible to improve protection . . . to avoid loss of this, the most endangered
large mammal sub-species.”563
The significance of the evolution of the total number of animals is shown in greater detail below,
on the basis of UNESCO statistics.
5.120. UNESCO gives the following statistics564:
5.121. With regard to rhinoceroses, the UNESCO statistics do, admittedly, point to a lower
number of animals killed than the ICCN figures. It should be noted, however, that UNESCO’s
estimates of the number of rhinoceroses after the war — “between 14 and 20” — are uncertain.
Moreover, as has already been pointed out, the evolution of the total number does not indicate the
number of animals killed. If no animals had been killed, the population would have increased
strongly.
5.122. For giraffes, the figure of 92 killed animals indicated by the ICCN is supported by
UNESCO’s table, which puts the number of giraffes lost between 1996 and the post-war period
at 116.
5.123. In respect of elephants, UNESCO cites figures of 5,878 in 1998 and 5,983 in 2000.
However, this increase in absolute terms masks significant losses. An elephant population is, on
561Kes Hillman Smith, Fraser Smith, Amube Ndey, Mbayma Atalia, Jean Mafuko, Paulin Tshikaya,
Giningayo Panziama and John Watkin, Garamba National Park and reserves — general aerial counts 1998, 2000, 2002
& 2003 and evaluation of the effects of the civil wars on the ecosystem, p. 5, Table 2. The figures cited in this report
relate only to the park and do not cover the hunting reserves.
562Ibid., p. 7.
563Ibid., p. 13.
564UNESCO, Promoting and Preserving Congolese Heritage, op.cit., p. 113; Ann. 5.14.
182
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average, 50 per cent male and 50 per cent female, and a female will give birth to an average of one
baby per year565. The increase from 5,878 to 5,983 therefore conceals an enormous loss. The same
is true of the increase from 5,878 animals in 1998 to 6,848 animals after the war. Indeed, it is for
this reason that UNESCO’s table contains a reference to “armed poaching (meat/ivory)”.
This analysis is supported by the evolution of the hippopotamus and buffalo populations,
which grew strongly between 1998 and 2003.
5.124. The above analysis thus fully confirms the validity of the figures presented by the
ICCN and, consequently, the enormous losses suffered in Garamba Park between 1998 and 2003.
D. Okapi Wildlife Reserve
5.125. The Okapi Wildlife Reserve contains an exceptionally diverse range of flora and is
home to endangered species of primates and birds, as well as around 5,000 of the 30,000 okapis
living in the wild566.
5.126. The reserve occupies around one fifth of Ituri Forest in the north-east of the DRC,
between Virunga Park and Garamba Park. As the map below shows, the reserve is mainly situated
in Ituri, so most of it was under Ugandan occupation during the war.
Map No. 5.11.
Okapi Wildlife Reserve
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Reserve Okapi = Okapi reserve
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
565See the statistics in para. 5.139 below.
566http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/718.
183
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5.127. In its first report, the United Nations Panel of Experts stressed the grave and chaotic
situation in the Congolese national parks, including the Okapi Wildlife Reserve:
“The situation in other parks and reserves is equally grave, including
Kahuzi-Biega Park, the Okapi Reserve and Virunga Park. The number of okapis,
gorillas and elephants has dwindled to small populations.”567
The Panel of Experts went on to highlight the militarization of the reserve and its strategic position
in terms of the ongoing conflict:
“The combination of the exploitation activities and ongoing conflict has
effectively eliminated State administrative control over the parks and led to the
militarization of many of them, for example, the Virunga, Kahuzi-Biega and Okapi
reserves. These parks are strategically located along the eastern border, and are
regularly used as crossing points by military forces to gain access to the interior of the
eastern region. The increased presence of foreign military, local rebel forces and
armed groups, some of which occupy areas within the parks on a semi-permanent
basis, has resulted in the development of highly organized and systematic exploitation
activities at levels never before seen.”568
5.128. In its report entitled “World Heritage in the Congo Basin”, UNESCO describes the
situation in the Okapi Wildlife Reserve (looking specifically at the town of Epulu, which is situated
in the middle of the reserve) and highlights the causal link between the presence of the Ugandan
army and the damage done to fauna:
“During the civil war Epulu was the front line between the warring parties. The
breakdown in law and order during the 90’s provided the opportunity for thousands of
itinerant miners, as well as elements from the Ugandan army, to enter the forests of
eastern DRC to extract timber and mine for gold, diamonds and coltan. Temporary
mining camps composed of miners, their families, hunters, itinerant traders and other
hangers-on appeared all over the forest. The effects on wildlife were devastating as
the mining camps became centres for the commercial bushmeat and ivory trades.”569
5.129. According to the ICCN’s assessment, 1,000 antelope, 2,000 elephants, 1,000 okapis
and 2,000 chimpanzees were killed in the course of the war570.
5.130. These figures are not directly comparable with those of UNESCO571, since
UNESCO’s inventory was still ongoing at the time of its conference in 2004. The table below
contains figures for “before 1996” and “during the war” (i.e., up to 2000, given the heading of the
third column). It shows that the elephant population suffered a loss of between 950 and
2,200 animals over that period, while the chimpanzee population suffered a loss of between 1,500
and 2,000 animals.
567United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 61; Ann. 1.7.
568United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 52; emphasis added; Ann. 1.9.
569UNESCO, World Heritage in the Congo Basin, 2010; emphasis added; Ann. 5.16.
570DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to Congolese fauna, op. cit.; Ann. 5.13.
571UNESCO, Promoting and Preserving Congolese Heritage, op. cit., p. 113; Ann. 5.14.
184
185
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5.131. Again, when interpreting these figures, it must be borne in mind that the lack of an
increase in the number of animals often masks unnatural losses. On average, females make up
50 per cent of the okapi population, and each female produces an average of four babies every
five years. A stable number of okapis in the period to 2000 is not, therefore, inconsistent with the
loss of 1,000 animals reported by the ICCN for the period from 1998 to 2003.
E. Maiko National Park
5.132. Maiko National Park, which covers 600,000 hectares, is situated in what were at the
time Orientale and North Kivu provinces. It was created with the aim of protecting okapis,
mountain gorillas and Congo peafowl, in addition to preserving an area of rainforest572.
Legend:
Soudan = Sudan
Ouganda = Uganda
Province orientale = Orientale province
Parc National de la Maiko = Maiko National Park
Nord-Kivu = North Kivu
5.133. On 21 August 1998, rebel RCD—ML brigades, supported by the APR and the UPDF,
launched a ground operation along the Lubutu road, which borders the park. Following that
operation, Ugandan troops arrived in Kisangani on 21 and 22 August 1998573.
5.134. The ICCN’s counts suggest that an estimated 1,000 antelope and 2,000 elephants were
killed574. UNESCO does not provide statistics for Maiko Park.
572http://www.congonline.com/Tourisme/lesparcs.htm.
573Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre du Congo à Kisangani et les violations des droits de l’homme du
2 août au 17 septembre 1998”, Kisangani, 18 Sep. 1998, in Badidike (ed.), op. cit.; Ann. 4.10a.
186
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F. Total numbers of animals and their offspring
5.135. Animal deaths during the war had a direct impact on their respective populations.
They also had an indirect impact, since the animals that were killed did not then give birth to
young.
In other words, while the subsections above have shown that a stable population can be the
result of killings combined with actual births, account should also be taken of the lost births caused
by killed animals’ inability to produce offspring.
5.136. The DRC has taken account of those unborn offspring by adding to the animals killed
the number of animals to which they would have given birth in the five years of war. This
approach is doubly conservative. First, it takes no account of any animals that might have been
born after the war. And second, for certain species of animal, the first unborn generation could
potentially have given birth to a second generation in the space of those five years of war.
5.137. The DRC will begin, therefore, by recalling the total number of animals in each
species that were killed in the various national parks in the course of the war, before then
determining the number of offspring in the next generation that remained unborn as a result.
5.138. On the basis of the data provided by the ICCN, the total numbers of animals killed in
the various national parks covered here are as follows575:
Table No. 1
Species/Park GARAMBA VIRUNGA MAIKO WILDLIFE
RESERVE
Total
ANTELOPE 5,000 20,000 1,000 1,000 27,000
ELEPHANTS 5,000 1,229 2,000 2,000 10,229
HIPPOPOTAMUSES 0 107 0 0 107
BUFFALO 0 9,048 0 0 9,048
GIRAFFES 92 0 0 0 92
OKAPIS 0 0 0 1,000 1,000
RHINOCEROSES 21 0 0 0 21
WARTHOGS 3,905 67 0 0 3,972
BABOONS 0 96 0 0 96
MONGOOSES 0 77 0 0 77
CROCODILES 0 72 0 0 72
LICHTENSTEIN’S
HARTEBEESTS
17 0 0 0 17
WESTERN KOB 0 160 0 0 160
WATERBUCKS 808 39 0 0 847
BUSHBUCKS 135 19 0 0 154
CHIMPANZEES 0 0 0 2,000 2,000
5.139. The numbers of males and females in an animal population vary from species to
species. The report annexed to this Memorial576 establishes the sex ratio for each species — i.e.,
the percentages of males and females in each species’ population. It also establishes the rate of
574DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to Congolese fauna, op. cit.; Ann. 5.13.
575Ibid.
576DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to Congolese fauna, op. cit.; Ann. 5.13.
187
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reproduction — i.e., the number of young born per year per female. This information, which is
accompanied in the report by the relevant scientific references, is as follows:
Table No. 2.
Sex ratios and rates of reproduction of various species
No. Species Sex ratio (%) Rate of reproduction
Female Male
1 Elephant 50 50 1 baby per year
2 Hippopotamus 50 50 1 baby per year
3 Antelope 69.5 30.5 2 babies per year
4 Western kob 62.9 37.1 3 babies per year
5 Bushbuck 58 42 2 babies per year
6 Waterbuck 69.5 30.5 1 baby per year
7 Lichtenstein’s hartebeest 60 40 1 baby per year
8 Gorilla 60 40 2 babies in 5 years
9 Buffalo 54.3 45.7 1 baby per year
10 Giraffe 50 50 4 babies in 5 years
11 Rhinoceros 50 50 2 babies in 5 years
12 Crocodile 50 50 50 babies per year
13 Warthog 63.3 36.7 16 babies per year
14 Baboon 50 50 2 babies in 5 years
15 Mongoose 40 60 12 babies per year
16 Chimpanzee 60 40 2 babies in 5 years
17 Okapi 50 50 4 babies in 5 years
5.140. The sex ratio allows us to estimate the number of animals of each sex that were lost
during the war in each of the national parks in question:
Table No. 3.
Numbers of males and females per species per park
Species/Park GARAMBA VIRUNGA MAIKO WILDLIFE
RESERVE
Total
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
ANTELOPE 3,475 1,525 13,900 6,100 695 305 695 305 18,765 8,235
ELEPHANTS 2,500 2,500 615 614 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 5,115 5,114
HIPPOPOTAMUSES 0 0 54 53 54 53
BUFFALO 4,913 4,135 4,913 4,135
GIRAFFES 46 46 46 46
OKAPIS 500 500 500 500
RHINOCEROSES 11 10 11 10
WARTHOGS 2,472 1,433 42 25 2,514 1,458
BABOONS 48 48 48 48
MONGOOSES 31 46 31 46
CROCODILES 36 36 36 36
LICHTENSTEIN’S
HARTEBEESTS
10 7 10 7
WESTERN KOB 101 59 101 59
WATERBUCKS 562 246 27 12 589 258
BUSHBUCKS 78 57 11 8 89 65
CHIMPANZEES 1,200 800 1,200 800
188
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5.141. Turning now to the rates of reproduction for the various species, the figures above
allow us to determine the number of young in each species that would have been born in the next
generation had those adult females and males not been killed.
189
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- 152 -
G. Assessment of injury
5.142. When assessing the injury suffered by the DRC in this regard, it should be noted first
of all that this decimation of fauna took place in the DRC’s national parks. No animal — whether
an endangered species or not — may be hunted in these parks, which are not hunting reserves.
5.143. This is not, therefore, a question of measuring the impact that the animal losses
detailed above had on the consumption and sale of animal products. It is a question of measuring
the prejudice caused to the national parks and their fauna and the damage done to biodiversity, as
well as to tourism and its development.
5.144. Before providing more details regarding the calculation method for the compensation
that it is seeking, the DRC will first show the impact that the decimation of Congolese fauna —
more specifically, endangered species — has had on the development of ecotourism in the DRC.
(i) Injury with regard to the development of ecotourism
5.145. One possible method of assessment would be to assess the economic value of the
various animal species in terms of the revenue they are able to generate in relation to tourism —
more specifically, ecotourism. This would mean assessing the injury suffered by the DRC in terms
of the economic value of an animal living in its natural habitat, rather than the price of a dead
animal.
5.146. This approach is particularly relevant for animals that are threatened with extinction.
Trade in such animals is largely precluded by CITES577, and at the same time they generate the
largest revenues in terms of ecotourism.
5.147. For example, according to a study carried out by the David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust
in South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, an elephant brings in almost €18,000 per year in
ecotourism578. With an average lifespan of 70 years, each elephant brings in €1.6 million (around
US$1,788,234) in the course of its life.
5.148. Admittedly, ecotourism in the DRC is not currently — and was not before the war —
as well developed as it is in, say, South Africa. However, the damage done to endangered species
in the DRC will have repercussions for future generations. At the same time, ecotourism is
experiencing very significant growth, which will strengthen further in the decades to come.
Following the United Nations General Assembly’s adoption of resolution 53/200 proclaiming 2002
the International Year of Ecotourism, various studies have confirmed the economic importance of
this sector. For example, a joint study by UNEP and the World Tourism Organization entitled
Tourism — Investing in energy and resource efficiency observes the following:
“Tourist choices are increasingly influenced by sustainability
considerations . . . Choice experiments conducted in Uganda conclude that
biodiversity attributes increase the willingness to visit tourism attractions,
independently of other factors . . . ecotourism, nature, heritage, cultural and ‘soft
577See, inter alia, Art. II (1) of the Convention.
578David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust, Dead or Alive? Valuing an Elephant, n.d.; Ann. 5.17.
190
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adventure’ tourism, as well as sub-sectors such as rural and community tourism are
taking the lead in tourism markets and are predicted to grow most rapidly over the
next two decades. It is estimated that global spending on ecotourism is increasing at a
higher rate than the industry-wide average growth . . .
There is empirical evidence that tourists seeking environmental and culturally
differentiated destinations are willing to pay more for this experience.”579
5.149. A study entitled Towards Measuring the Economic Value of Wildlife Watching
Tourism in Africa conducted by the World Tourism Organization in 2015 fully supports the above.
While noting that the ecotourism sector remains underdeveloped in the DRC580, the study observes
that ecotourism, which generates an average of US$488 of expenditure per day per person581, is
experiencing very considerable growth: “The global market size of wildlife tourism has been
estimated at 12 million trips annually and is growing at a rate of about 10% a year.”582
5.150. In the light of this information, the economic value of the elephants killed between
1998 and 2003 should therefore be assessed in terms of the contribution that they would have made
to the Congolese economy in decades to come, rather than on the basis of the size of the DRC’s
ecotourism sector before or during the war.
5.151. In Virunga Park alone, a total of 1,250 elephants were killed or remained unborn. If,
given that another State also invaded and damaged the park, Uganda is considered responsible for
50 per cent of those losses, Uganda’s wrongful acts caused the loss of 625 elephants. At a rate of
US$1,788,000 per animal, the injury in relation to this one specific aspect — looking only at
elephants — would stand at US$1,117,500,000.
Similar assessments would need to be carried out for the gorilla population in Virunga Park
and the okapi population in the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, which are even more exceptional.
5.152. While it notes the significance of this approach in terms of assessing the order of
magnitude of the injury suffered, the DRC will use an alternative calculation method, as set out
below, based on the value attributed to each animal killed.
(ii) The commercial value of the various species
5.153. The calculation method employed below is based on the prices applied in the — often
unlawful — markets where the aforementioned wild animal species are traded.
579UNEP and UNWTO, Tourism — Investing in energy and resource efficiency, 2011, p. 420; Ann. 5.18.
580UNWTO, Towards Measuring the Economic Value of Wildlife Watching Tourism in Africa, 2015, p. 25:
“Countries with a limited number of visitors in protected areas: between 1,000 and 90,000 visitors per year. It is
estimated that they have receipts between US$20,000 and 700,000 per year. (Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Niger)”; Ann. 5.19.
581Ibid., p. 3 and, in more detail, pp. 26-27.
582Ibid., p. 6: “a typical wildlife watching tour involves on average a group of six people, lasts 10 days, has an
average daily price per person of US$433 and captures an additional US$55 in out-of-pocket expenses per person, per
day. The findings also indicated the differences between standard and luxury segments with the greatest variation being
in both average daily price per person per day (US$753 for a luxury package and US$243 for a standard package) and in
out-of-pocket expenditures (US$59 for a traveller on a luxury package and US$44 per person per day on a standard
package).”
191
192
- 154 -
5.154. The use of this criterion for assessment does not mean that the DRC intends to claim
compensation for a commercial injury assessed on the basis of the prices applied in those markets.
As indicated above, several of the species in question are threatened with extinction, such that trade
in those animals is precluded by CITES. And even in the case of species that are not threatened
with extinction, trade is precluded where those animals live in the DRC’s national parks. This is
not, therefore, about claiming a commercial value as such, but about using that value in order to
assess the ecological and economic injury suffered by the DRC.
5.155. The expert report annexed to this Memorial has used various sources to determine
such prices for each of the animal species covered by this claim:
 Where species are threatened with extinction and trade is strictly prohibited by CITES,
reference is made to the prices applied in unlawful markets, as detailed, for example, for
certain animal species, in a report produced for the United States Congress, which is annexed
to the expert report583. Those prices have, where appropriate, been extrapolated to other
animals in the same family.
 Some species can be purchased live in certain countries, such as South Africa, or traded in
other forms in international markets. The prices applied in such markets, as published on the
internet by companies such as Wildlife Auctions584, Wildlife Trading585 and Kirkwood Game
Auction586, have been used, e.g., for antelope.
 Other species may be hunted. In this case, the price used is that of a hunt, including the trophy,
as indicated for example on the website of the South African company African Sky Hunting587.
5.156. Where different prices apply for the males and females of a given species, an average
has been used. For offspring that have remained unborn on account of deaths in the existing
population, a price equivalent to half of the adult price has generally been used for the assessment.
Exceptionally, a different price has been used for certain young. This is the case for crocodiles,
which give birth to a large number of young each year, resulting in the use of a price for their
young which is less than half the adult price.
5.157. Moreover, the assessments for the various species also take account of the fact that
the protection status of the species in question may vary from one country to another. Thus,
rhinoceroses (Rhinocerotidae) are generally listed in Appendix I to CITES. Only the southern
white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum simum) populations of South Africa and Swaziland appear
in Appendix II, for the exclusive purpose of allowing international trade in live animals to
appropriate and acceptable destinations, and in hunting trophies588. Consequently, the DRC’s
rhinoceroses, including the northern white rhinoceroses found in Garamba Park, appear in
Appendix I to the Convention; they are under serious threat of extinction, and trade in them is
strictly precluded. Similarly, South Africa’s elephant populations appear in Appendix II to CITES,
583Liana Sun Wyler and Pervaze A. Sheikh, International Illegal Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S. Policy,
CRS report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 3 Mar. 2008, particularly p. 7; annexed to the expert report
Evaluation of the damage caused to Congolese fauna by Uganda between 1998 and 2003; Ann. 5.13.
584www.wildlifeauctions.co.za.
585www.wildlifetrading.co.za.
586www.kirkwoodgameauction.co.za.
587www.africanskyhunting.co.za.
588https://cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php.
193
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while the DRC’s elephant populations appear in Appendix I. These differences in status must be
taken into account in the assessment.
5.158. In general, horns have not been assessed separately. Exceptions have been made for
rhinoceros horns, which are ground into powder and sold in unlawful markets on account of their
supposed medicinal properties, and elephant tusks, the ivory in which is likewise sold for very high
prices. The prices used in this regard are those applied in unlawful markets, as detailed, for
example, in the above-mentioned report produced for the United States Congress589.
5.159. The components and outcomes of these assessments are essentially as follows:
1. For antelopes, the assessment is based on live animal prices for two types of antelope —
namely, the sable antelope and the impala — as published on the websites of the
above-mentioned South African companies. An average of US$2,488 has been used for adults.
The same approach has been followed for bushbucks (US$1,028), Lichtenstein’s hartebeests
(US$9,494) and western kob (US$8,344). For waterbucks, the price of a live animal has been
combined with the price of a hunt in South Africa (US$2,451).
2. For chimpanzees, the price applied is that of an orang-utan in unlawful markets, as cited in the
above-mentioned report prepared for the United States Congress — namely, US$50,000.
These species belong to the same family and are both in Appendix I to CITES.
3. For elephants, the assessment reflects the price of a hunt in South Africa, as indicated by the
South African company African Sky Hunting. It also takes account of the fact that South
Africa’s elephant population is in Appendix I to CITES  whereas the DRC’s is in
Appendix II  and therefore more endangered. A price of US$50,000 has been used.
4. For hippopotamuses, which are in Appendix II to CITES, the price applied is the average price
for a public sale in South Africa — namely, US$5,198.
5. For warthogs, the international market prices indicated on the internet relate to hand-reared
babies and average US$5,055. Since it is difficult to compare tame and wild animals, the
average price of US$5,055 has been used for both adults and babies. In other words, the price
of an adult has not been calculated by doubling the price of a baby.
6. For baboons, the price applied is the international market price indicated on the internet
(US$2,000). The same price has been used for mongooses, for which no other information
could be found.
7. For crocodiles, the assessment is based on the price of a Chinese alligator in unlawful markets,
as cited in the report for the United States Congress (US$15,000), with both the DRC’s
crocodiles and the Chinese alligator appearing in Appendix I to CITES. In this case, the price
of offspring is US$3,750 per animal.
8. As regards giraffes, the population in the DRC — more specifically, Garamba Park — belongs
to an exceptional subspecies which is severely endangered. The above-mentioned census
report states: “This giraffe population is the only one extant in DRC and probably the only
representative of the sub-species (Giraffa Camelopardalis congoensis). It is classified as
endangered by the IUCN red list categories (IUCN/SCC 1995). The northern white rhinos and
589Liana Sun Wyler and Pervaze A. Sheikh, International Illegal Trade in Wildlife, op. cit., particularly p. 7;
annexed to the expert report Evaluation of the damage caused to Congolese fauna by Uganda between 1998 and 2003;
Ann. 5.13.
194
195
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the giraffes were the main reason for the creation of the park in 1938 and for its world heritage
status in 1981.”590 Consequently, while prices for ordinary giraffes range between US$1,300
and US$80,000, the value used here is that of a severely endangered primate — namely,
US$50,000.
9. The same value — US$50,000 — has also been used for okapis, which belong to the same
family as the giraffe and are only found in the DRC.
10. For rhinoceroses, the assessment took account of the prices of live animals sold in South
Africa, which averaged US$28,000. That price was then revised in the light of the differing
protection statuses of different rhinoceros populations; given the CITES listings explained in
para. 5.157 above, those animals sold in South Africa were necessarily in Appendix II to the
Convention and subject to regular trade. Their value was necessarily lower than that of the
DRC’s rhinoceroses, which are listed in Appendix I to the Convention and are very severely
endangered. For the DRC’s rhinoceroses, therefore, the price has been set at US$50,000.
5.160. The results of the application of these prices to the various national parks are set out
below.
(iii) Virunga National Park
5.161. The losses in Virunga National Park during the Ugandan invasion are summarized in
Table No. 3 above591.
Combining the column listing those losses with the values for each species indicated above,
and in the expert report592, results in the following assessment of the damage done to the animal
species in this park:
Antelope (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Antelope
Females (69.5% of total) 13,900
Males (30.5% of total) 6,100
Total 20,000
Reproduction (2 baby antelope per year per female) 139,000
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (69.5% of total) 13,900 US$2,488.00 US$34,583,200.00
Males (30.5% of total) 6,100 US$2,488.00 US$15,176,800.00
Reproduction (2 baby antelope per year per female) 139,000 US$1,244.00 US$172,916,000.00
Overall total US$222,676,000.00
590Kes Hillman Smith et al., Garamba National Park and reserves, op. cit., pp. 13-14; Ann. 5.15.
591See para. 5.140 above.
592See para. 5.159 above and, as regards offspring, DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to
Congolese fauna, op. cit.; Ann. 5.13.
196
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Elephants (Virunga National Park)
I. Estimated figures
Elephants
Females (50% of total) 614
Males (50% of total) 614
Total 1,228
Reproduction (1 baby elephant per year per female) 3,070
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 614 US$50,000.00 US$30,700,000.00
Males (50% of total) 614 US$50,000.00 US$30,700,000.00
Reproduction (1 baby elephant per year per female) 3,075 US$25,000.00 US$76,875,000.00
III. Quantity and value of ivory Kg Price/kg [Total price]
Ivory (no. of elephants x 50 kg/tusk x 2 (pair of tusks)) 122,800 US$650.00 US$79,820,000.00
Overall total US$218,095,000.00
Hippopotamuses (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Hippopotamuses
Females (50% of total) 54
Males (50% of total) 53
Total 107
Reproduction (1 baby hippopotamus per year per
female)
270
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 54 US$3,775.00 US$203,850.00
Males (50% of total) 53 US$3,775.00 US$200,075.00
Reproduction (1 baby hippopotamus per year per
female)
270 US$1,887.50 US$509,625.00
Overall total US$913,550.00
Buffalo (Virunga National Park)
I. Estimated figures
Buffalo
Females (54.3% of total) 4,913
Males (45.7% of total) 4,135
Total 9,048
Reproduction (1 baby buffalo per year per female) 24,565
II. Estimated cost of animals lost Number Unit price Total price
Females (54.3% of total) 4,913 US$25,000.00 US$122,825,000.00
Males (45.7% of total) 4,135 US$25,000.00 US$103,375,000.00
Reproduction (1 baby buffalo per year per female) 24,565 US$12,500.00 US$307,062,500.00
Overall total US$533,262,500.00
197
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Warthogs (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Warthogs
Females (63.3% of total) 42
Males (36.7% of total) 25
Total 67
Reproduction (16 baby warthogs per year per female) 3,360
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (63.3% of total) 42 US$5,500.00 US$231,000.00
Males (36.7% of total) 25 US$5,500.00 US$137,500.00
Reproduction (16 baby warthogs per year per female) 3,360 US$5,500.00 US$18,480,000.00
Overall total US$18,848,500.00
Baboons (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Baboons
Females (50% of total) 48
Males (50% of total) 48
Total 96
Reproduction (2 baby baboons per female in 5 years) 96
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 48 US$2,000.00 US$96,000.00
Males (50% of total) 48 US$2,000.00 US$96,000.00
Reproduction (2 baby baboons per female in 5 years) 96 US$1,000.00 US$96,000.00
Overall total US$288,000.00
Mongooses (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Mongooses
Females (40% of total) 31
Males (60% of total) 46
Total 77
Reproduction (12 baby mongooses per year per
female)
1,860
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (40% of total) 31 US$2,000.00 US$62,000.00
Males (60% of total) 46 US$2,000.00 US$92,000.00
Reproduction (12 baby mongooses per year per
female)
1,860 US$1,000.00 US$1,860,000.00
Overall total US$2,014,000.00
Crocodiles (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Crocodiles
Females (50% of total) 36
Males (50% of total) 36
Total 72
Reproduction (50 baby crocodiles per year per female) 9,000
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 36 US$15,000.00 US$540,000.00
Males (50% of total) 36 US$15,000.00 US$540,000.00
Reproduction (50 baby crocodiles per year per female) 9,000 US$3,750.00 US$33,750,000.00
Overall total US$34,830,000.00
- 159 -
Western kob (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Kob
Females (62.9% of total) 101
Males (37.1% of total) 59
Total 160
Reproduction (3 baby kob per year per female) 1,515
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (62.9% of total) 101 US$8,344.00 US$842,744.00
Males (37.1% of total) 59 US$8,344.00 US$492,296.00
Reproduction (3 baby kob per year per female) 1,515 US$4,172.00 US$6,320,580.00
Overall total US$7,655,620.00
Waterbucks (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Waterbucks
Females (69.5% of total) 27
Males (30.5% of total) 12
Total 39
Reproduction (1 baby waterbuck per year per female) 135
II. Value Number Unit price Total price
Females (69.5% of total) 27 US$2,451.00 US$66,177.00
Males (30.5% of total) 12 US$2,451.00 US$29,412.00
Reproduction (1 baby waterbuck per year per female) 135 US$1,225.50 US$165,442.50
Overall total US$261,031.50
Bushbucks (Virunga National Park)
I. Numbers
Bushbucks
Females (58% of total) 11
Males (42% of total) 8
Total 19
Reproduction (2 baby bushbucks per year per female) 110
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (58% of total) 11 US$1,028.00 US$11,308.00
Males (42% of total) 8 US$1,028.00 US$8,224.00
Reproduction (2 baby bushbucks per year per female) 110 US$514.00 US$56,540.00
Overall total US$76,072.00
5.162. Thus, the injury in respect of Virunga Park totals US$1,038,920,273.
5.163. In establishing these data, the ICCN concentrated on the northern sector of the park,
which bore the brunt of Uganda’s internationally wrongful acts. This can be seen, for example,
from the fact that mountain gorillas, which live mainly in the south of the park, where Rwanda
played the dominant role, are not included.
5.164. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that its claim is entirely fair and reasonable, the DRC
has carried out a further adjustment in order to take account of any losses that may not have been
associated with Uganda’s wrongful acts.
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5.165. On the basis of the information above, the injury caused by Uganda’s wrongful acts in
Virunga Park is estimated to account for (at least) 80 per cent of the aforementioned amount — i.e.,
US$1,038,920,273 x 80per cent, which equals US$831,136,218 (eight hundred and thirty-one
million, one hundred and thirty-six thousand, two hundred and eighteen United States dollars).
(iv) Garamba National Park
5.166. The total animal losses experienced in Garamba National Park during the Ugandan
invasion are summarized in Table No. 3 above593.
Combining the column listing those losses with the values for each species indicated above,
and in the expert report594, results in the following assessment of the damage done to the animal
species in this park:
Antelope (Garamba National Park)
I. Numbers
Antelope
Females (69.5% of total) 3,475
Males (30.5% of total) 1,525
Total 5,000
Reproduction (2 baby antelope per year per female) 34,750
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (69.5% of total) 3,475 US$2,488.00 US$8,645,800.00
Males (30.5% of total) 1,525 US$2,488.00 US$3,794,200.00
Reproduction (2 baby antelope per year per female) 34,750 US$1,244.00 US$43,229,000.00
Overall total US$55,669,000.00
Elephants (Garamba National Park)
I. Numbers
Elephants
Females (50% of total) 2,500
Males (50% of total) 2,500
Total 5,000
Reproduction (1 baby elephant per year per female) 12,500
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 2,500 US$50,000.
00
US$125,000,000.00
Males (50% of total) 2,500 US$50,000.
00
US$125,000,000.00
Reproduction (1 baby elephant per year per female) 12,500 US$25,000.
00
US$312,500,000.00
III. Quantity and value of ivory [Kg] Price/kg [Total price]
Ivory (no. of elephants x 50 kg/tusk x 2 (pair of tusks)) 500,000 US$650.00 US$325,000,000.00
Overall total US$887,500,000.00
593See para. 5.140 above.
594See para. 5.159 above and, as regards young, DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to
Congolese fauna, op. cit.; Ann. 5.13.
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Giraffes (Garamba National Park)
I. Numbers
Giraffes
Animals lost
Females (50% of total) 46
Males (50% of total) 46
Total 92
Reproduction (4 baby giraffes per female in 5 years) 184
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 46 US$50,000.00 US$2,300,000.00
Males (50% of total) 46 US$50,000.00 US$2,300,000.00
Reproduction (4 baby giraffes per female in 5 years) 184 US$25,000.00 US$4,600,000.00
Overall total US$9,200,000.00
Rhinoceroses (Garamba National Park)
I. Numbers
Rhinoceroses
Females (50% of total) 11
Males (50% of total) 10
Total 21
Reproduction (2 baby rhinos per year per female) 22
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 11 US$50,000.00 US$550,000.00
Males (50% of total) 10 US$50,000.00 US$500,000.00
Reproduction (2 baby rhinos per year per female) 22 US$25,000.00 US$550,000.00
III. Quantity and value of horns Unit price Total price
Rhino horns (1 full-size, 1 half-size per rhino)
=
[31.5] US$25,000.00 US$787,500.00
Overall total US$2,387,500.00
Warthogs (Garamba National Park)
I. Numbers
Warthogs
Females (63.3% of total) 2,472
Males (36.7% of total) 1,433
Total 3,905
Reproduction (16 baby warthogs per year per female) 197,760
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (60% of total) 2,472 US$5,500.00 US$13,596,000.00
Males (40% of total) 1,433 US$5,500.00 US$7,881,500.00
Reproduction (16 baby warthogs per year per female) 197,760 US$5,500.00 US$1,087,680,000.00
Overall total US$1,109,157,500.00
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Lichtenstein’s hartebeests (Garamba National Park)
I. Numbers
Lichtenstein’s hartebeests
Females (60% of total) 10
Males (40% of total) 7
Total 17
Reproduction (2 baby Lichtenstein’s hartebeests per
year per female)
100
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (60% of total) 10 US$9,494.00 US$94,940.00
Males (40% of total) 7 US$9,494.00 US$66,458.00
Reproduction (2 baby Lichtenstein’s hartebeests per
year per female)
100 US$4,747.00 US$474,700.00
Overall total US$636,098.00
Waterbucks (Garamba National Park)
I. Numbers
Waterbucks
Females (69.5% of total) 562
Males (30.5% of total) 246
Total 808
Reproduction (1 baby waterbuck per year per female) 2,810
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (69.5% of total) 562 US$2,451.00 US$1,377,462.00
Males (30.5% of total) 246 US$2,451.00 US$602,946.00
Reproduction (1 baby waterbuck per year per female) 2,810 US$1,225.50 US$3,443,655.00
Overall total US$5,424,063.00
Bushbucks (Garamba National Park)
I. Numbers
Bushbucks
Females (58% of total) 78
Males (42% of total) 57
Total 135
Reproduction (2 baby bushbucks per year per female) 780
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (58% of total) 78 US$1,028.00 US$80,184.00
Males (42% of total) 57 US$1,028.00 US$58,596.00
Reproduction (2 baby bushbucks per year per female) 780 US$514.00 US$400,920.00
Overall total US$539,700.00
The total from animal losses in Garamba Park thus stands at US$2,070,513,861.
5.167. Not all of this injury was caused by Uganda’s wrongful acts. In particular, Sudanese
rebels were operating in certain parts of the park and caused damage in those areas. It is therefore
reasonable and fair to consider that 50 per cent of that total injury was caused by Uganda’s
wrongful acts — i.e., US$2,070,513,861 divided by 2, which equals US$1,035,256,930
(one thousand and thirty-five million, two hundred and fifty-six thousand, nine hundred and
thirty United States dollars).
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(v) Okapi Wildlife Reserve
5.168. The total numbers of animals lost in the Okapi Wildlife Reserve during the Ugandan
invasion are summarized above595.
Combining the column in that table which lists the losses experienced in the reserve with the
values for each species indicated above, and in the expert report596, results in the following
assessment of the injury suffered by the DRC:
Antelope (Okapi Wildlife Reserve)
I. Numbers
Antelope
Females (69.5% of total) 695
Males (30.5% of total) 305
Total 1,000
Reproduction (2 baby antelope per year per female) 6,950
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (69.5% of total) 695 US$2,488.00 US$1,729,160.00
Males (30.5% of total) 305 US$2,488.00 US$758,840.00
Reproduction (2 baby antelope per year per female) 6,950 US$1,244.00 US$8,645,800.00
Overall total US$11,133,800.00
Elephants (Okapi Wildlife Reserve)
I. Numbers
Elephants
Females (50% of total) 1,000
Males (50% of total) 1,000
Total 2,000
Reproduction (1 baby elephant per year per female) 5,000
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 1,000 US$50,000.00 US$50,000,000.00
Males (50% of total) 1,000 US$50,000.00 US$50,000,000.00
Reproduction (1 baby elephant per year per female) 5,000 US$25,000.00 US$125,000,000.00
III. Quantity and value of ivory Kg Price/kg [Total price]
Ivory (no. of elephants x 50 kg/tusk x 2 (pair of tusks)) 200,000 US$650.00 US$130,000,000.00
Overall total US$355,000,000.00
Quantity of ivory exported Beni-Butembo
Bunia (18%) 36,000 US$650.00 US$23,400,000.00
Isiro (3%) 6,000 US$650.00 US$3,900,000.00
Aiiwara (5%) 10,000 US$650.00 US$6,500,000.00
595See para. 5.140 above.
596See para. 5.159 above and, as regards young, DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to
Congolese fauna, op. cit.; Ann. 5.13.
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Okapis (Okapi Wildlife Reserve)
I. Numbers
Okapis
Females (50% of total) 500
Males (50% of total) 500
Total 1,000
Reproduction (4 baby okapis per female in 5 years) 2,000
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 500 US$50,000.00 US$25,000,000.00
Males (50% of total) 500 US$50,000.00 US$25,000,000.00
Reproduction (4 baby okapis per female in 5 years) 2,000 US$25,000.00 US$50,000,000.00
Overall total US$100,000,000.00
Chimpanzees (Okapi Wildlife Reserve)
I. Numbers
Chimpanzees
Females (60% of total) 1,200
Males (40% of total) 800
Total 2,000
Reproduction (1 baby chimpanzee per year per female) 6,000
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (60% of total) [1,200] US$50,000.00 US$60,000,000.00
Males (40% of total) 800 US$50,000.00 US$40,000,000.00
Reproduction (1 baby chimpanzee per year per female) 6,000 US$25,000.00 US$150,000,000.00
Overall total US$250,000,000.00
Thus, the total injury in respect of all animal species in the Okapi Wildlife Reserve stands at
US$716,133,800.
5.169. Most of the Okapi Wildlife Reserve is situated in Ituri, so Uganda was responsible for
most of the surface area of the park as an occupying Power, without that responsibility being
shared with any third country. Uganda is therefore responsible for 90 per cent of the
aforementioned injury — i.e., US$716,133,800 x 90%, which equals US$644,520,420 (six hundred
and forty-four million, five hundred and twenty thousand, four hundred and twenty United States
dollars).
(vi) Maiko National Park
5.170. The total losses in Maiko National Park during the Ugandan invasion are summarized
in Table No. 3 above597. Combining the column listing the animal losses in the park with the
values for each species indicated above, and in the expert report598, results in the following
assessment of the injury suffered by the DRC in respect of this park:
597See para. 5.140 above.
598See para. 5.159 above and, as regards young, DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to
Congolese fauna, op. cit.; Ann. 5.13.
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Antelope (Maiko National Park)
I. Numbers
Antelope
Females (69.5% of total) 695
Males (30.5% of total) 305
Total 1,000
Reproduction (2 baby antelope per year per female) 6,950
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (69.5% of total) 695 US$2,488.00 US$1,729,160.00
Males (30.5% of total) 305 US$2,488.00 US$758,840.00
Reproduction (2 baby antelope per year per female) 6,950 US$1,244.00 US$8,645,800.00
Overall total US$11,133,800.00
Elephants (Maiko National Park)
I. Numbers
Elephants
Females (50% of total) 1,000
Males (50% of total) 1,000
Total 2,000
Reproduction (1 baby elephant per year per female) 5,000
II. Value of animals Number Unit price Total price
Females (50% of total) 1,000 US$50,000.00 US$50,000,000.00
Males (50% of total) 1,000 US$50,000.00 US$50,000,000.00
Reproduction (1 baby elephant per year per female) 5,000 US$25,000.00 US$125,000,000.00
III. Quantity and value of ivory Kg Price/kg [Total price]
Ivory (no. of elephants x 50 kg/tusk x 2 (pair of tusks)) 200,000 US$650.00 US$130,000,000.00
Overall total US$355,000,000.00
The total from animal losses in Maiko National Park thus stands at US$366,133,800.
5.171. Here too, it should be borne in mind that some of this total injury was not caused by
Uganda, being due, inter alia, to the wrongful acts of Rwanda. Uganda’s wrongful acts are
estimated to account for 50 per cent of the injury — i.e., US$366,133,800 divided by 2, which
equals US$183,066,900 (one hundred and eighty-three million, sixty-six thousand, nine hundred
United States dollars).
(vii) Total amount
5.172. On the basis of the calculation method set out above, the total injury attributable to
Uganda in respect of all the damage caused to fauna in the DRC’s national parks is therefore
US$2,692,980,468 (two thousand six hundred and ninety-two million, nine hundred and eighty
thousand, four hundred and sixty-eight United States dollars).
Section 3. Looting, plundering and wrongful exploitation of Congolese flora
5.173. The invasion and occupation of vast areas of Congolese territory by Ugandan armed
forces also damaged the DRC’s flora, particularly through deforestation.
This section will show the role that Uganda played in the deforestation of areas of the DRC’s
territory (A), before assessing the resulting injury (B).
204
205
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A. Uganda’s role in deforestation
5.174. The United Nations Panel of Experts noted on the basis of a series of satellite images
that Orientale province had suffered major deforestation between 1998 and 2000, especially in the
forests around Djugu, Mambassa, Beni, Komanda, Luna, Mont Moyo and Aboro599.
5.175. The Panel of Experts noted that timber was being harvested in areas where the
Ugandan army was operating and transported exclusively to Uganda:
“Timber harvested in this region, which is occupied by the Ugandan army and
RCD-ML, has exclusively transited or remained in Uganda. Our own investigation in
Kampala has shown that mahogany originating in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is largely available in Kampala, at a lower price than Ugandan mahogany.
This difference in price is simply due to the lower cost of acquisition of timber.
Timber harvested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Uganda pays very little
tax or none at all. In addition, customs fees are generally not paid when soldiers
escort those trucks or when orders are received from some local commanders or
General Kazini. Timber from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is then exported
to Kenya and Uganda, and to other continents. The Panel gathered from the Kenyan
port authorities that vast quantities of timber are exported to Asia, Europe and North
America.”600
The Panel of Experts collected supporting evidence in relation to this issue:
“On the basis of eyewitness accounts, satellite images, key actors’
acknowledgements and the Panel’s own investigation, there is sufficient evidence to
prove that timber extraction is directly related to the Ugandan presence in Orientale
Province. This has reached alarming proportions and Ugandans (civilians, soldiers
and companies) are extensively involved in these activities. In May 2000, RCD-ML
attributed a concession of 100,000 hectares to DARA-Forest. Since September 1998,
overall DARA-Forest has been exporting approximately 48,000 m3 of timber per
year.”601
5.176. In the addendum to its report, the Panel of Experts did, admittedly, amend its analysis,
noting that it seemed that the Government of the DRC was continuing to recognize the companies
operating in rebel-held areas:
“In fact, civil servants appointed by the Government are still performing such
duties as customs control and tax collection in rebel-held areas. However, the taxes
are not received by the Government in Kinshasa but are diverted for the use of the
rebels and Uganda and Rwanda. This is acknowledged by the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which, offered in September 2001 to pay the
37-month arrears and salaries of those civil servants. Furthermore, the Government in
Kinshasa appears to have recognized the activities of the commercial entities in the
rebel-held areas. One of the many examples is the German-owned company
Somikivu, which operates in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, but
continues to pay taxes to the rebels and maintains an office in Kinshasa. When asked
599United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 47; Ann. 1.7.
600United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources, op. cit., para. 48.
601Ibid., para. 54.
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about the legal status of the commercial entities operating in the rebel-held and
occupied territories, the Congolese Minister of Justice informed the Panel during a
meeting in September 2001 that none of the concessions had been revoked thus far,
and that an evaluation on a case-by-case basis would be conducted when the
Government regained control of the areas in which they are operating.
To further demonstrate this, the Panel has taken a closer look at the legal status
of DARA Forest, a Thai-owned company operating in North Kivu Province. DARA
Forest is a Congolese-registered logging company owned by five shareholders. Royal
Star Holdings is the main shareholder, and is partly owned by the managing director
of DARA Forest, John Kotiram. Besides Mr. Kotiram, there are three Congolese
shareholders. In March 1998, DARA Forest registered as a Congolese company in
Kinshasa, after which work was begun on building a sawmill in Mangina in North
Kivu Province. In June 1998, DARA Forest was granted a 35,000-hectare logging
concession from the North Kivu Provincial Authority, which grants these concessions
following registration with the central Government. DARA Forest also acquired an
exploitation licence from the same authority to buy and export from local loggers. Its
exports, which were to the United States and China, started early in 1999, months after
the beginning of the war.
DARA Forest, which the Panel has found to have complied with all the
regulations in effect, currently pays its taxes at the same bank as it did before the area
came under rebel control. It also deals with the same customs officials as it did before
the rebels took control of the area when it exports its products and imports production
equipment. The Panel of Experts has also learned that a bimonthly check is conducted
by the local Congolese authorities in North Kivu to ensure that DARA Forest is
complying with the terms of licences granted to it. Furthermore, DARA Forest was
granted on 12 September 2001 a certificate of registration from the Ministry of Justice
in Kinshasa. This would appear to be a clear sign of recognition of the company and
acceptance of its work in the rebel-held areas by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.”602
5.177. Nevertheless, this extremely complex situation pointed to by the Panel of Experts is
not relevant to this claim for reparation. First of all, no authority in the DRC could legally
authorize DARA Forest to operate in areas occupied by rebels, pay taxes to the rebels, and export
smuggled Congolese timber to Uganda. Moreover, it would have been surprising to say the least if
DARA Forest had availed itself, vis-à-vis the Ugandan authorities, of authorization granted by the
DRC.
5.178. The Porter Commission, for its part, disputed many of the assertions that the Panel of
Experts had made in its initial report, including the claim that the Ugandan authorities were
involved in the company DARA Forest603. Nevertheless, the Commission’s detailed analysis does
indicate various aspects for which Uganda was responsible.
602United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources, op. cit., paras. 71-73; Ann. 1.8. It should be noted that there remains a contradiction between the
findings of this addendum and the conclusions of the Porter Commission. In response to the initial findings of the Panel
of Experts, according to which “[i]n March 1998, DARA-Forest applied for a licence to carry out logging activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, but was denied a forest concession by the Kinshasa authorities”, the Porter
Commission states: “Mr. John Supit Kotiram, the managing Director of Dara Forêt, denied before this Commission that
he had ever made any application to Kinshasa authorities. This Commission has no evidence of any such application.”
Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., pp. 54 et seq.; Ann. 1.11.
603Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., pp. 54-64; Ann. 1.11.
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5.179. The Porter Commission notes that Mr. Kotiram admitted having purchased timber
from the Congolese in order to export it to Uganda:
“The evidence of Mr. Kotiram was that the company was buying individual
trees from Congolese, with the assistance of Local Chiefs in the Congo. He was then
shipping them in transit through Uganda (with the exception of a trial run of two
containers which he imported to Uganda and in respect of which he has produced the
relevant customs documents) to foreign destinations.”604
The fact, as subsequently noted by the Commission, that Mr. Kotiram states that he himself never
chopped any trees down does not, therefore, alter the finding that DARA Forest exported
Congolese timber to Uganda.
5.180. The Panel of Experts’ assertion that DARA obtained a concession from RCD-ML in
2000 (“The same year, DARA engaged in industrial production with the construction of a sawmill
in Mangina. By 2000, it had obtained its own concession from RCD-ML.”) is confirmed by the
Porter Commission (“So far as this Commission can ascertain, this is correct.”)605.
5.181. As regards the logging in the areas around Djugu, Mambassa, Beni, Komanda, Luna,
Mont Moyo and Aboro, the Porter Commission challenged the assertion that the Ugandan
Government was directly involved in those activities, but confirmed that Congolese timber was
being smuggled into Uganda:
“There is no evidence before this Commission that Uganda as a country or as a
Government harvests timber in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This Commission
doubts that the allegation in the Report is correct. Timber does come across the border
as an import, and there is no doubt that timber is also smuggled through the porous
borders. Congo timber is cheaper in the market because it is usually cut by chain
saws, which are not allowed in Uganda. Such documentation as this Commission has
seen indicates that timber cut in the Democratic Republic of Congo is dutiable there
on export, and that such duties are levied by the rebel authorities and paid. This
Commission toured the Kampala Timber Market at the Ndeeba area. The
Commission found that timber from Congo is available in the market.”606
It went on to state:
“This Commission has had evidence that there are Ugandans who go over to the
Congo and buy trees by negotiating with individual Congolese permit holders or
Chiefs, and import the timber once cut to Uganda, which helps to account for the
presence of Congolese hardwood in the Uganda market.”607
5.182. Finally, the Porter Commission also confirmed the role of the Ugandan army, as well
as the figures cited by the Panel of Experts. The Panel of Experts had claimed the following:
“The logging rate was alarming around Butembo, Beni, Boga and Mambassa.
The RCD-ML administration acknowledged its lack of control over the rate of
604Ibid., p. 54.
605Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 54.
606Ibid., p. 55.
607Ibid., p. 56.
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extraction, the collection of taxes on logging activities and the customs fees at the exit
points. On the basis of eyewitness accounts, satellite images, key actors’
acknowledgements and the Panel’s own investigation, there is sufficient evidence to
prove that timber extraction is directly related to the Ugandan presence in Orientale
Province. This has reached alarming proportions and Ugandans (civilians, soldiers
and companies) are extensively involved in these activities.”608
The Porter Commission responded to that assertion in the following terms: “UPDF presence in
Orientale Province provided the security and access to overseas markets denied to the Congolese
for so long. One would therefore expect to see increased activity in the area, not only by
Dara Forêt but by other companies as well.”609 The Panel of Experts had also cited the following
figures: “In May 2000, RCD-ML attributed a concession of 100,000 hectares to DARA-Forest.
Since September 1998, overall DARA-Forest has been exporting approximately 48,000 m3 of
timber per year.”610 The Porter Commission’s report endorsed those figures:
“So far as Dara Forêt is concerned, while Mr. Kotiram agrees the figures
quoted, he tells this Commission that in his concession he has not cut even a single
tree, and he has given this Commission good and sufficient reason for this. The
source of his timber has been from individuals, in accordance with a long standing
practice outlined to this Commission by another witness.”611
5.183. It follows from the above that there was intensive illegal exploitation of the forest
resources in Ituri while the latter was under Ugandan occupation.
B. Assessment of injury
5.184. The injury suffered by the DRC comprises several elements: the commercial value of
the timber and the various taxes that should have been paid on it, but also the damage done to
biodiversity and the habitats of animal species.
5.185. The scale of the commercial injury is illustrated by the commercial value of the
48,000 m3 of timber that DARA Forest exported annually as from September 1998.
5.186. The database of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) allows us to
determine the average export price, by exporting country and per year, for different types of timber.
Between 1998 and 2003, the average export prices for tropical sawn timber from the DRC were as
follows:
608Quoted by the Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 61; emphasis added.
609Ibid., p. 61; emphasis added.
610Quoted by the Porter Commission, Final Report, op. cit., p. 61.
611Ibid., pp. 61-62; emphasis added.
209
210
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Source: http://www.itto.int/annual_review_output/?mode=searchdata
Legend:
NC.T. = non-coniferous tropical
The average price for this period is therefore US$436.00 + US$370.91 + US$479.37 + US$470.91,
divided by 4, which equals US$439.2975 (rounded up to US$439.30 below).
5.187. Bearing in mind that DARA Forest’s wrongful exports spanned a period of four and a
half years, with an annual volume of 48,000 m3, those exports have a total commercial value of
48,000 x 4.5 x US$439.30, which equals US$94,888,800 (ninety-four million, eight hundred and
eighty-eight thousand, eight hundred United States dollars).
5.188. Looking beyond this particular case, the DRC wishes to highlight the fact that a
scientific study has shown that the massive deforestation in the east of the country is most
pronounced in those areas where the Ugandan armed forces were operating612. This suggests that
the losses caused by Uganda’s wrongful acts total hundreds of thousands of hectares and thousands
of millions of dollars. The DRC reserves the right to supplement its claim in this regard in the
course of the proceedings.
5.189. On the basis of the foregoing, the DRC is requesting, at this stage of the proceedings,
compensation totalling US$100,000,000 (one hundred million United States dollars).
*
* *
612See Ann. 5.20.
211
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5.190. In conclusion, the DRC is seeking, at this stage of the proceedings and without
prejudice to supplementary claims of the type indicated above, the following compensation for the
injuries caused to its natural wealth by Uganda:
 For the exploitation of gold: US$675,541,972
 For the exploitation of diamonds: US$7,055,885
 For the exploitation of coltan: US$2,915,880
 For prejudice caused to fauna: US$2,692,980,468
 For deforestation: US$100,000,000
The total compensation claimed by the DRC for this category of damage is therefore
US$3,478,494,205 (three thousand four hundred and seventy-eight million, four hundred and
ninety-four thousand, two hundred and five United States dollars).
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CHAPTER 6. THE MACROECONOMIC INJURY CAUSED
TO THE DRC BY UGANDA
6.01. In addition to the specific harm described in previous chapters, Uganda’s invasion of
the DRC also caused more general injury. The war had macroeconomic consequences which can
be seen in the trends in economic growth and, more specifically, gross domestic product (GDP)
during the war and in subsequent years. In the following section, the DRC will show that that
macroeconomic injury constitutes a loss of revenue for which Uganda must pay compensation (1),
and will describe in general terms the scale of this form of injury (2), before going on to explain the
model used (3), how it was applied in the present case (4) and how the results were interpreted (5).
The final stage will then be to calculate the amount owed by Uganda (6).
Section 1. A lucrum cessans for which Uganda must pay compensation
6.02. The effects of armed aggression are not confined to the battlefield. The use of
large-scale force, such as that inflicted on the DRC between 1998 and 2003 by Uganda, also causes
a considerable slowdown or even halt in economic activity, as well as destroying the economic
fabric. During a war of aggression, many of the production units on which a State’s economy and
growth rely are brought to a standstill. Where the aggressor sets about looting and destroying
production units, and where the population  an important factor of production  are forced to
leave their homes, it is obvious that a State’s economy will face extremely serious upheaval.
6.03. The resulting macroeconomic injury constitutes a loss of revenue for which
compensation must be paid. The Articles of the International Law Commission on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, which codify a practice on this issue
that is accepted as law, provide in Article 31 (1) that “[t]he responsible State is under an obligation
to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”613. Full reparation
requires not just restoration of the situation as it was before the wrongful act occurred, but also
restoration of the situation that would have existed had the wrongful act not taken place. As the
PCIJ stated in the Factory at Chorzów case:
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act  a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by
the decisions of arbitral tribunals  is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe
out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would,
in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed [ . . .]”614.
The Articles on the Responsibility of States similarly provide that the compensation “shall cover
any financially assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established”615.
6.04. It was in accordance with that principle that, in its Judgment of 19 June 2012 in the
case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Compensation), the Court observed that, in general, a
613YILC, 2001, Vol. II and Annex to resolution 56/83 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
12 Dec. 2001; emphasis added.
614Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47, and, above, Chap. 1 of
this Memorial, para. 1.01; emphasis added.
615Art. 36.2; YILC, 2001, op. cit., and Chap. 1 of this Memorial, para. 1.10.
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claim for income lost as a result of unlawful detention is cognizable as a component of
compensation616.
6.05. The macroeconomic injury caused to the DRC by Uganda’s invasion thus constitutes a
loss of revenue requiring compensation from Uganda.
Section 2. The impact of armed conflict on economic growth
6.06. War not only destroys infrastructure, but also has a very significant impact on growth
in gross domestic product (GDP), production in all sectors of the national economy, the current
account balance (because of changes in the balance of trade, and outflows linked to payments for
imported weapons and military equipment), the level of tourism and services, debt, currency
reserves, public finances and gross investment. Not only does existing infrastructure no longer
work properly, but other infrastructure is also destroyed or looted.
6.07. War thus affects the growth trajectory of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP),
which measures the wealth created by national and foreign economic operators in a given national
territory. It disrupts economic activity both in areas affected by military operations and also in
those not affected, since economic operators in the latter are nevertheless involved in the war
effort, and their market is necessarily smaller in size.
6.08. In peacetime, a country’s businesses are free to distribute their products throughout the
territory, according to the outlets they have available. Without war, energy saving and economies
of scale can develop, while outlets can be explored and exploited between firms, thus encouraging
trade between and within sectors. People, goods and services move freely, and money circulates,
in the form of financial flows, throughout the national territory and the country’s economy. When
these microeconomic variables are aggregated into macroeconomic factors, they produce the
country’s economic growth.
6.09. War, on the other hand, disrupts the entire life of the country, which becomes
completely unattractive and uncompetitive; it frightens off existing and potential investors, deters
tourists and reduces final household competition, which is a significant component in a country’s
wealth formation. Furthermore, war results in increased imports of consumer goods and therefore
currency shortages. This leads to or exacerbates the trade deficit because, by contrast with the
growth in imports, exports decline heavily because of weak production.
6.10. The economics literature, in exploring the damage resulting from armed conflict,
currently focuses on the impact of war on economic growth and its effect on the organization of
production activities and in terms of the increase in poverty. A study by the World Bank has thus
shown that, in countries where there is civil war, the growth rate is, on average, 2.2 per cent weaker
than in peacetime, and the incidence of poverty 30 per cent greater617.
616Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), pp. 339-340, para. 40.
617Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict, 2002,
World Bank, Washington DC, pp. 2-4; Ann. 6.1.
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Section 3. The analytical model used
6.11. It was on the basis of the literature mentioned above that the specialists appointed by
the DRC estimated the macroeconomic damage caused by the 1998-2003 war. The DRC called on
a team of economists from Kinshasa University, whose study is annexed to this Memorial618. The
study applied a tried and tested econometric model used in many international assessments,
particularly on the impact of war on the global economy.
6.12. The following section will demonstrate that this model is appropriate for the situation
experienced by the Congolese economy, because its statistical data and its analysis of the impact of
the conflict can be validated; it will then be explained how the model was applied in order to
evaluate the amount of compensation demanded by the DRC.
6.13. The econometric analysis used to determine the scale of the macroeconomic harm
caused by the Ugandan army’s occupation of the DRC was based on the model by P. Collier and
A. Hoeffler619. These two World Bank economists specialize in modelling the impact of war on the
performance of the economies affected, using time-series.
6.14. This model is a nonlinear endogenous growth model. It uses gross domestic
product (GDP) as a dependent variable, and, as explanatory variables, other macroeconomic
aggregates such as population (POP), exports (Export), imports (Import) and foreign direct
investment (FDI), and includes a special variable (WAR) measuring the effects of war. This then
allows the effects of war on gross domestic product to be determined.
6.15. Endogenous development is understood as a development model which, in order to be
successful, has to be based on the realities within a country, but without eliminating the
international dimension. The aim with endogenous development is to achieve a comprehensive
approach, incorporating economic expansion, cultural development, respect for the country’s
historical identity, the assimilation of local technologies, the involvement of the population and the
satisfaction of various essential needs as a priority. It aims to meet all kinds of fundamental needs
relating to living standards, medical services, education, culture, communication and politics.
6.16. Collier and Hoeffler’s model has the advantage, unlike other models focusing on
countries’ endogenous development, that it determines how the growth of gross domestic
product (GDP) is affected by changes in variables other than war: population, exports, imports and
foreign direct investment. It can thus determine how a country’s economic growth is specifically
affected by war.
6.17. The data on these variables were obtained from the database at Sherbrooke University
in Canada, which is used in many international studies. The database is impartial and regularly
updated, covers every country in the world, and was itself developed from the World Bank
database. Called “Perspectives Monde”620, this teaching resource shows the main global trends
since 1945.
618Ann. 6.2.
619See the references in Ann. 6.2.
620http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca.
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Section 4. Analyses
6.18. First of all, the study on which the DRC’s claim is based analysed the characteristics of
the descriptive statistics for the different variables. The aim was to determine the general trend of
the different variables studied. The figures obtained show that:
 the DRC’s average annual GDP was US$12.8 thousand million between 1960 and 2008,
having reached a peak of US$19 thousand million in 1987. It was narrowly dispersed around
the average;
 the average annual Congolese population (POP) was 36 million; it was narrowly dispersed
around this average during the period under consideration;
 exports of goods and services (EXPORT) represented an annual average of US$1.39 thousand
million; they were very narrowly dispersed around this average during the period under
consideration;
 imports of goods and services (IMPORT) represented an annual average of US$1.32 thousand
million and were very widely dispersed around the average during the period under
consideration;
 foreign direct investment (INVEST) represented an annual average of US$144 million and was
very widely dispersed around the average.
6.19. A correlation analysis was then conducted in order to identify the binding force or
degree of association between the variables in question, using a correlation matrix provided by a
computer program for analysing statistical and econometric data.
6.20. In economics, where two phenomena develop in parallel with each other, they are said
to be correlated. Although a correlation may show that armed conflict has some influence on the
pace of economic development or decline, it does not establish or prove the causality between that
impact and the conflict itself. This is why, in addition to the correlation analysis, an actual
econometric study was conducted, in order to evaluate the impact on the Congolese economy of the
war of aggression waged by Uganda. The loss of revenue sustained by the Congolese economy
could then be calculated.
6.21. The table below shows a negative correlation between production (GDP),
population (POP), foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 1998-2003 Ugandan war (WAR) and
vice versa. It also identifies a positive correlation between GDP and net exports. The table shows
each of the variables in columns and lines. It thus shows the same results twice, in the two
triangles above and below the diagonal line of 1’s where the same variables meet. By way of
illustration, where the first column (GDP) and the second line (POP) intersect, the figure -0.41030
shows a negative correlation between those two variables. In the next line down, the figure
[-0.0034], in other words three in a thousand, shows the probability of that correlation.
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Table 6.1.
Correlation matrix with significance level
GDP Population Exports Imports Investment War
GDP 1 -0.41030 0.00080 0.00510 -0.19150 -0.54900
Prob. [ . ] [-0.0034] [0.9955] [0.9721] [0.2429] [0.0000]
Population -0.41030 1 0.77250 0.74180 0.53070 0.45080
Prob. [ . ] [-0.0034] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0050] [0.0012]
Exports 0.00080 0.77250 1 0.96980 0.69090 0.18130
Prob. [ . ] [0.9955] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.2124]
Imports 0.00510 0.74180 0.96980 1 0.73950 0.11190
Prob. [ . ] [0.9721] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.4438]
Investment -0.19150 0.53070 0.69090 0.73950 1 -0.0180
Prob. [ . ] [0.2429] [0.0050] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.9132]
War -0.54900 0.45080 0.18130 0.11190 -0.0180 1
Prob. [ . ] [0.0000] [0.0012] [0.2124] [0.4438] [0.9132]
This analysis of the six variables used clearly shows that there is a negative correlation between
production (GDP), population (POP), foreign direct investment (FDI) and the 1998-2003 Ugandan
war (WAR) and vice versa.
6.22. A model estimation was then produced using two statistical methods (the ordinary least
squares (OLS) method and the generalized method of moments (GMM)), which enabled the
coefficients of the model to be calculated in the form of elasticities in order to measure the
sensitivity of economic growth to variation in one of the model’s exogenous variables. The results
are shown in the table below. The OLS method again shows that war has a negative effect
on GDP.
Table 6.2.
Impact of the war on the DRC’s economic growth
Explanatory
variable
Gross domestic product (Ln_GDP)
OLS method Generalized method of moments
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Constant 118.9006 3.42** 35.188228 15.02***
Population
(Ln_POP)
-5.763812 -2.74** -1.322793 -6.43***
Exports
(Ln_Export)
0.70795135 2.41**
Imports
(Ln_Import)
-0.1770564 -0.88
Investment
(Ln_FDI)
1.05e – 10 1.90*
Ugandan war
(WAR)
-0.0753868 -1.81* -------------- Var. instrument
Time (Trend) 0.1567149 2.57**
R2=0.5155 F(1; 44)=4.03 R2=0.2841 Wald, chi(2)=48
N=48 DW-stat=1.61 SCR=0.13 426 Root MSE = 0.18
Key: ***, **, * = degree of significance at threshold of 1 per cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively
OLS: Ordinary least squares method
Source: Calculated using the Eviews 9.0 program
6.23. The model was then validated using two methods. The first consisted in validating the
linear relationship resulting from Table 1, by comparing it with the parameters of a theoretical
linear relationship through hypothesis testing  the hypothesis here being that the war had a
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negative influence on GDP. The second consisted in obtaining a small number of statistics
providing an overall view of the relationship between the explanatory variable (or independent
variable) and the explained variable (or dependent variable).
6.24. These operations, analyses and tests demonstrate that the model is valid and support the
conclusion that the war which affected the DRC between 1998 and 2003 had a negative influence
on its GDP growth: the POP, WAR and Time variables broadly account for the negative impact on
the GDP dependent variable. The graph below illustrates the annual change in GDP between 1975
and 2008. It shows that from 1998 to 2003 the GDP of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
underwent unprecedented falls, which coincided precisely with the period of the war waged by the
Ugandan army.
Graph 6.1.
CUSUM structural stability test
Source: Calculated using the Eviews 9.0 program
Section 5. Interpretation of the results of the analyses:
calculation of macroeconomic harm
6.25. The results of the analyses were then interpreted in order to calculate the
macroeconomic harm caused by the war. The following procedure was used, the results of which
are shown in the table below.
1. Using the Collier and Hoeffler model, the steps described above enabled the estimated GDP to
be calculated, in other words, the GDP reflecting the effect of the war (second column in the
table below).
2. From that estimated GDP, the annual GDP growth rate was calculated (third column in the
table below). In particular, the table shows negative growth in 1999 and 2000.
3. The third operation was to evaluate constant GDP at 1998 prices, in other words to eliminate
inflation (fourth column). This reflects the GDP which the DRC would have had if the war had
not taken place. For example, in 1999, GDP was US$4,711,254,228.13 (first column), whereas
it should have been US$6,412,404,422.
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4. The difference between constant GDP (fourth column) and GDP at 1998 prices (second
column) gives the deficit, in other words the loss of revenue suffered by the DRC as a result of
the war (fifth column).
5. These deficits were capitalized at a discount rate of 5 per cent (sixth column).
Table 6.3.
Calculation of macroeconomic harm suffered by the DRC
as a result of the 1998-2003 war
Estimated
GDP growth
rate
Constant GDP
(1998 prices)
Deficit Capitalization at
Year Estimated GDP at 3.13 per cent 5 per cent
1998 6,217,787,667.74 0.020846057 6,217,787,668
1999 4,711,254,228.13 -0.24229413 6,412,404,422 1,701,150,193.60 1786207703
2000 4,305,805,218.67 -0.086060 6,613,112,680 2307307461 2543806476
2001 4,691,836,872.61 0.089654 6,820,103,107 2128266234 2463734200
2002 5,547,704,080.91 0.182416 7,033,572,334 1485868253 1806082149
2003 5,673,204,712.25 0.022622 7,253,723,148 1580518436 2017186539
2004 6,570,002,171.76 0.158076 7,480,764,683 910762511.1
2005 7,103,546,476.39 0.081209 7,714,912,617 611366141.1
2006 8,543,358,205.97 0.202689 7,956,389,382 -586968823.6
2007 9,378,915,735.00 0.097802 8,205,424,370 -1173491305
2008 10,365,615,877.22 0.105204 8,462,254,153 -1903361724
10,725,239,231.13 10,617,017,066.98
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the econometric estimation
6.26. It is thus clear from the calculations that the macroeconomic harm between 1999
and 2003 amounted to US$10,617,017.066.
6.27. However, the effects of armed conflict are not time-specific. They persist long after
the events which caused them have faded away. They are what are known as the “hysteresis effects
of armed conflict”, which include, for example, post-traumatic stress and psychological disorders,
permanent physical injuries, bullet and shell impacts, displaced persons, refugees and rape victims,
children forcibly recruited as soldiers, etc.
6.28. In fact, the study shows that the effects of the war lasted until 2005. There was a
cumulative increase in the loss of revenue of US$1,220,508,870.80 in 2004, and of
US$860,253,555.49 in 2005. This brings the total loss of revenue to US$12,697,779,493.27, as can
be seen from the table below.
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Table 6.4.
Data from the corrected study
Data from the corrected study GDP growth
rate
Constant
GDP (1998
prices)
Inflation Capitalization at
Exp(ln_GDP_estimated
GDPF1)
at
3.13 per cent
deficit 5 per cent
1998 6,217,787,667.74 0.0208 6,217,787,668
1999 4,711,254,228.13 -0.2423 6,412,404,422 1,701,150,193.60, 1,786,207,703.28
2000 4,305,805,218.67 -0.0861 6,613,112,680 2,307,307,461.47 2,543,806,476.27
2001 4,691,836,872.61 0.0897 6,820,103,107 2,128,266,234.41 2,463,734,199.61
2002 5,547,704,080.91 0.1824 7,033,572,334 1,485,868,253.37 1,806,082,148.65
2003 5,673,204,712.25 0.0226 7,253,723,148 1,580,518,436.09 2,017,186,539.17
2004 6,570,002,171.76 0.1581 7,480,764,683 910,762,511.12 1,220,508,870.80
2005 7,103,546,476.39 0.0812 7,714,912,617 611,366,141.07 860,253,555.49
2006 8,543,358,205.97 0.2027 7,956,389,382
2007 9,378,915,735.00 0.0978 8,205,424,370
2008 10,365,615,877.22 0.1052 8,462,254,153
10,725,239,231.13 12,697,779,493.27
Source: Calculated on the basis of data from the econometric estimation
6.29. This trend in the loss of revenue can be visualized using the graph below, covering the
whole of the period concerned, from 1998 to 2005. The blue line shows the estimated GDP
(including the effect of the war), while the red line shows constant GDP (that would have existed
without the war). The graph also shows that from 2006, the effects of the war diminished as peace
returned and was consolidated after the end of the conflict. The deficit or loss of revenue decreased
and the Congolese economy started to recover and increase growth. This once again confirms the
direct link between the war and the harm suffered by the Congolese economy as a whole, in other
words the causality between the harm and the internationally wrongful act.
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Graph 6.2.
Visualization of the trend in the loss of revenue recorded by the DRC
Legend:
Retard occasionné par la guerre (manque à gagner) = Gap caused by the war (loss of revenue)
Exp(ln_PIB_estimé PIBF1) = Exp(ln_GDP_estimated GDPF1)
PIB constant (prix 1998) = Constant GDP (1998 prices)
Manque à gagner (déficit) = Loss of revenue (deficit)
Source: Calculated on the basis of model data
Section 6. Compensation owed by Uganda
6.30. On the basis of the foregoing, the total macroeconomic injury suffered by the DRC as a
result of the war is estimated at US$12,697,779,493.27.
6.31. However, the harm was not caused solely by Uganda’s wrongful acts. It was also a
consequence of the acts of other States involved in the war of aggression waged from 1998 against
the DRC. In accordance with the breakdown set out in Chapter 1 of this Memorial621, Uganda’s
share in the compensation owed in this respect amounts to 45 per cent of the total.
6.32. The compensation for macroeconomic damage owed by Uganda thus amounts to
US$12,697,779,493.27 x 45 per cent, or US$5,714,000,775 (five thousand seven hundred and
fourteen million seven hundred and seventy-five United States dollars).
621See para. 1.24 above.
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CHAPTER 7. REPARATION OWED BY UGANDA TO THE DRC
7.01. This chapter determines what kind of reparation the Democratic Republic of the Congo
is seeking and the amount of that reparation. In the main, the reparation sought by the DRC is
financial compensation (Section 1). This form of reparation appears the most appropriate in the
situation at the heart of this case, in which the damage caused to the DRC can no longer be made
good by means of restitution622. Furthermore, in the light of the gravity of the acts which occurred
in its territory following its invasion by Uganda and the scale of the resulting damage, the DRC
considers that, in addition to paying compensation for those acts, the other Party must also give
satisfaction (Section 2). These two aspects of the DRC’s claim for reparation will be detailed in
turn. Finally, the DRC will set out the reasons why it considers that the costs it has incurred in the
present proceedings should also be borne by Uganda (Section 3).
Section 1. Compensation owed by Uganda
7.02. There are considerable technical difficulties in evaluating the compensation owed by
Uganda to make good the damage resulting from the many breaches of international law which it
committed during the invasion and then occupation of substantial areas of Congolese territory.
This is, inter alia, because of the time that has elapsed since the events, and, as was shown in
previous chapters, because the many instances of damage caused fell into very different categories.
The harm resulting from Uganda’s illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources was
described in Chapter 5 of this Memorial, where its monetary value was assessed623. The amounts in
question will therefore merely be reiterated at the end of this section (C). The same will apply for
the macroeconomic damage suffered by the DRC as a result of the invasion and occupation of parts
of its territory by Uganda, which were described in Chapter 6 (D). The DRC will also explain at
the end of this section that the principle of full reparation for the injury suffered by the Congolese
State and by those present in its territory at the time of the facts requires the application of
compensatory interest (E).
7.03. The early part of this section will look at the monetary evaluation of the damage caused
to persons and property as a result of Uganda’s invasion of Congolese territory from August 1998
and its support for a number of Congolese rebel movements (Chapter 2), Uganda’s breach of its
international obligations as the occupying Power in the region of Ituri (Chapter 3) and the violent
fighting involving the Ugandan armed forces in the city of Kisangani (Chapter 4). The facts
examined in these chapters have certain problems in common when it comes to the monetary
evaluation of the damage at issue. A distinction will be made between harm caused to persons (A)
and damage caused to property (B), since the components of the injury to be made good are not the
same in both cases.
7.04. In particular, the extremely tragic circumstances surrounding the conflict in eastern
Congo  especially in the region of Ituri  and the violence and cruelty that were typical of most
of the personal assaults mean that in some cases, account must be taken of the non-material damage
as well as the material harm resulting from these violations. In addition, the compensation for the
damage in both categories will be evaluated on the basis of two separate types of factors: a flat-rate
evaluation will be made for the harm caused to persons, whereas this approach will be used less
systematically for the damage to property, which will instead be quantified on the basis of the
records drawn up by the DRC’s investigators.
622See Art. 36.1 of the ILC’s articles on Responsibility of States (YILC, 2001, op. cit. and Annex to
resolution 56/83 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 12 Dec. 2001) and, for the application of this
principle to the facts in this case, Chap. 1 above.
623See Chap. 5 above.
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A. Compensation for harm caused to persons
7.05. The general principles applicable in respect of reparation were set out in detail in
Chapter 1 of this Memorial. More specifically, in assessing compensation for the harm caused to
persons as a result of the violations of international law for which Uganda was responsible in
Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003, the DRC also broadly followed the guidelines laid
down by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 in the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”624. These include the
general principle that “[r]eparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the
harm suffered”625.
7.06. As was stated by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation
and guarantees of non-recurrence, “the magnitude of reparations needs to be commensurate with
the gravity of the violations, the consequences they had for the victims, [and] the vulnerability of
victims”626. More specifically, the Principles then clearly identify elements of the harm for which
the victims of such acts must be compensated. They provide that:
“Compensation should be provided for any economically assessable damage, as
appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of
each case, resulting from gross violations of international human rights law and
serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as:
(a) Physical or mental harm;
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social benefits;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning potential;
(d) Moral damage;
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and medical services, and
psychological and social services.”627
7.07. Clearly, it is not possible, in a situation such as that before the Court in the present
case, where there have been tens of thousands of violations of laws resulting in harm, to examine
each of the individual situations at issue. Given that it is impossible to take account of the specific
impact on each victim, in socio-economic terms for example, the DRC has had to calculate the
amount of compensation owed for each category of harm caused to persons on a flat-rate basis,
which is intended to cover all the elements of damage identified by the General Assembly in the
above-mentioned Principles. In doing so, the DRC based its assessment on various sources which
appeared particularly appropriate for each of the categories of acts in question.
624Annex to resolution 60/147 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 Dec. 2005; Ann. 7.1.
625Ibid., p. 7, para. 15.
626United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-ninth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, document A/69/518, 14 Oct. 2014, p. 24, para. 87; Ann. 7.2.
627Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law; Annex to
resolution 60/147, op. cit., p. 8, para. 20; Ann. 7.1.
226
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7.08. For all cases where the harm suffered by individuals was the result of acts of violence
deliberately targeted at civilian populations (massacres, rapes, injuries or mutilations, etc.),
the DRC based the monetary evaluation of the damage in question on the judgments of the
Congolese courts which tried and convicted those responsible for serious violations of human
rights law and international humanitarian law in eastern Congo. The defendants were mostly
members (or former members) of the Congolese armed forces. In the vast majority of cases, the
courts found them responsible and, in addition to their criminal conviction, they were sentenced
under civil law to pay compensation for the damage suffered by the victims628. The Congolese
State itself was more or less systematically ordered to pay compensation for the damage, along
with the perpetrators. The sums awarded in that respect vary considerably from one court to
another, and the reasoning for the decisions often does not go into detail on this point.
Nevertheless, the decisions still constitute the principal point of reference for the exercise facing
the DRC  and the Court itself  here, in that they establish scales of payments corresponding to
the living conditions and living standards found in that part of the Congo. It was therefore on the
basis of the average of the sums awarded by way of compensation in those judgments, having
eliminated those without any statement of reasons or that were manifestly arbitrary, that the DRC
determined the amount of compensation owed for each of the categories of harm to persons
included in the categories identified earlier.
7.09. For all cases where the harm suffered by individuals was not the result of deliberate
acts of violence against civilian populations (deaths of or injuries to “collateral victims” of the
fighting, or to members of the Congolese armed forces, for example), the DRC based the monetary
evaluation of the harm on a mathematical formula used in similar circumstances in the context of
compensation for harm suffered by persons. A traditional method was used here, which essentially
calculated the future income which the victim would have earned, expressed in terms of present
value, if the deceased had attained normal life expectancy629. It was therefore a case of estimating
the years of life lost by the deceased by comparing the average age of the victims and their average
life expectancy. An estimate of the human assets lost can thus be obtained by multiplying the
number of years left to live by the average income anticipated over the corresponding period.
Largely relying on an international database630, the DRC used the life expectancy in 2003, the year
when the fighting ended, which was 52.11 years. The average age of the victims, as far as can be
ascertained from the records produced by the DRC investigators, was 27 years. The average
income anticipated over the period was calculated on the basis of the per capita gross domestic
product (GDP), which was US$753.2 for 2015, and this was assumed to be the future income
aspired to631. This gives the amount of US$18,913, obtained by multiplying 753.2 (GDP per year
and per capita) by 25.11 (corresponding to the years of life lost, i.e., the difference between 27
and 52.11).
7.10. It is mainly on the basis of these figures that the DRC will calculate the amount of
compensation owed by Uganda for human lives lost (i), injuries and mutilations (ii), incidences of
628See in particular the decisions examined in the report by the International Centre for Transitional Justice
entitled The Accountability Landscape in Eastern DRC. Analysis of the National Legislative and Judicial Response to
International Crimes (2009-2014), July 2015, and the attached tables, pp. 39 et seq.; Ann. 7.3.
629This method is explained, for example, in Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), Handbook for estimating the socio-economic and environmental effects of disasters, p. 12. This lengthy
document, cited purely for methodological purposes, is not produced in an annex. Available at
http://docplayer.fr/1275847-Manuel-pratique-d-evaluation-des-effets-soc….
630See the figures reproduced in the Sherbrooke University database, available at
http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/pays/COD/fr.html.
631Figure obtained from the Sherbrooke University database, available at http://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/
pays/COD/fr.html.
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rape (iii), the recruitment, training and use of child soldiers (iv) and the flight and displacement of
populations (v).
(i) Compensation owed for human lives lost
7.11. The human lives lost as a result of Uganda’s breaches of its international obligations in
the context of the invasion and occupation of large areas of Congolese territory between 1998
and 2003 come under the two situations described above. A considerable number of people lost
their lives in deliberate acts of violence against civilian populations. That was particularly the case
in Ituri, as a result of Uganda’s breaches of its obligations as the occupying Power in the region
between 1998 and 2003. The material and non-material harm caused by the losses of human life in
this context cover the following aspects. The material harm largely took the form of loss of income
for the families of those who died. As for the non-material harm, this was particularly severe in the
Ituri cases, because of the often horrifying conditions in which the civilian populations were
massacred. It should be remembered that international reports mention victims’ bodies impaled632
or nailed to wooden planks633, others tied up and speared to death634, burned alive in their homes635,
massacred with studded clubs636 or machetes637, sometimes after being tied up638. In some cases,
victims were then decapitated and their heads carried as trophies by the attackers639; more
generally, there were frequent reports of victims’ bodies being mutilated640 and even, in exceptional
cases, of cannibalism641. As the Court noted in its Judgment of December 2005, “the civil war and
foreign military intervention in the DRC created a general atmosphere of terror pervading the lives
of the Congolese people”642. It is thus not difficult to imagine the scale of the psychological
suffering of the families, knowing that the deceased had been exposed to such cruel treatment, as
well as the distress of the survivors, with local authorities refusing to take action or to prosecute the
perpetrators of the crimes.
7.12. The amounts of compensation awarded by the Congolese courts to the families of those
killed in the context of the perpetration of serious international war crimes varied between
US$5,000 and US$100,000, the average sum being US$34,000. In the light of the factors
described above, the Democratic Republic of the Congo considers it reasonable to apply this sum
for each person who lost his or her life as a result of deliberate acts of violence against civilian
populations following Uganda’s breach of its international obligations in the context of the
invasion and occupation of large areas of Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003. As noted
632Songolo massacre, 31 Aug. 2002, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report
of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 413; Ann. 1.4.
633Mabanga massacre, 28 Aug. 2002, ibid.
634Komanda massacre, 9 Aug. 2002, ibid.
635Attack on the village of Loda, night of 29 to 30 May 1999; MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri,
op. cit., para. 19; Ann. 1.6.
636Attack on the district of Mudzipela in the city of Bunia, 19 Jan. 2001; United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 407; Ann. 1.4.
637Attack on the district of Mudzipela in the city of Bunia, 19 Jan. 2001; ibid., para. 368.
638Attack on the village of Saliboko, 5 Nov. 2002; ibid., para. 414.
639Attack on the village of Musekere, July 1999; ibid., para. 368.
640Victims of the fighting for control of the town of Bambou, 1 Dec. 1999, United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, op. cit., para. 369; Songolo massacre, 31 Aug. 2002,
ibid., para. 413; village and region of Mambasa, 12-29 Oct. 2002, ibid., para. 416.
641Village and region of Mambasa, 12-29 Oct. 2002; ibid., para. 416.
642Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 241-242, para. 212.
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above, these crimes were mainly recorded in Ituri, during the period when the region was under
Ugandan occupation. It should be remembered that the number of those who lost their lives here
was put at 60,000643.
7.13. In view of the scale of the massacres recorded by international organizations in this
region during the period in question, a non-exhaustive list of which was given earlier644, it may be
considered that two thirds of these persons  40,000 individuals  lost their lives as a result of
acts of violence deliberately targeted at civilian populations. The total amount of compensation
claimed by the DRC for this category of harm is therefore 40,000 x US$34,000, giving a total of
US$1,360,000,000.
7.14. As regards those who lost their lives as a result of Uganda’s breaches of its
international obligations in the context of the invasion and occupation of large areas of Congolese
territory between 1998 and 2003 in situations other than those of deliberate acts of violence against
civilian populations, the DRC has based its assessment of harm on the formula described earlier645.
Its application produced an average figure of US$18,913 per victim. The victims included in this
category are as follows:
 individuals who died in Ituri as a result of Uganda’s breach of its obligations as the occupying
Power in this region between 1998 and 2003, in situations other than those of deliberate acts of
violence against civilian populations: 20,000 persons;
 victims of the fighting between Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces in the city of Kisangani in
1999 and 2000, attributable to Uganda’s breach of its international obligations: 920 persons646;
 direct and indirect victims of the fighting in other parts of the Congo between 1998 and 2003
attributable to Uganda’s breach of its international obligations: the DRC explained earlier that,
across the entire country, there were 400,000 cases of excess mortality resulting from the war
conducted in its territory between 1998 and 2003, of which 180,000 were attributable to
Uganda’s actions647. From those must obviously be deducted all the deaths already taken into
account for the Ituri region (40,000 as a result of deliberate acts of violence against civilian
populations and 20,000 in other circumstances, giving a total of 60,000) and for the city of
Kisangani (920). This gives a balance of 119,080 persons to be taken into account at this stage.
There were also the soldiers and officers of the Congolese armed forces (FAC) who died in the
fighting with the Ugandan army or the rebel movements that it supported. The DRC discussed the
estimated 2,000 deaths in the FAC in Chapter 2 of this Memorial.
7.15. The total amount of compensation which the DRC is claiming for losses of human life
is thus:
 human lives lost as a result of deliberate acts of violence against civilian populations (Ituri):
US$1,360,000,000;
643See paras. 3.22-3.23 above.
644See Chap. 3 above.
645Para. 7.09 above.
646See para. 4.64 above.
647See paras. 2.77-2.78 above.
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 human lives lost in circumstances other than deliberate acts of violence against civilian
populations:
 specifically for Ituri: 20,000 x US$18,913 = US$378,260,000;
 specifically for Kisangani: 920 x US$18,913 = US$17,399,960;
 for other regions of the Congo (119,080 civilians and 2,000 military):
121,080 x US$18,913 = US$2,289,986,040,
giving a grand total of US$4,045,646,000 (four thousand and forty-five million six hundred
and forty-six thousand United States dollars).
(ii) Compensation owed for injuries and mutilations
7.16. Here again, a distinction must be drawn according to whether the injuries or
mutilations suffered resulted from deliberate attacks against civilian populations, on the one hand,
or as collateral damage from military operations, on the other. In the first case, the material and
non-material harm which ensued from the injuries and mutilations inflicted on large numbers of
people as a result of Uganda’s breaches of its international obligations in the context of the
invasion and occupation of large areas of Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003 cover the
following aspects. The material harm includes the cost of medical treatment, loss of income
because of temporary or permanent physical incapacity resulting from the injuries, and loss of
opportunity. The non-material harm includes trauma resulting from the atrocities committed, fear
that the crimes will be repeated, suffering as a result of problems in accessing treatment, distress
resulting from the local authorities’ failure to take action and the failure to prosecute the
perpetrators of the crimes, the permanent impairment to the quality of life of the victims of
mutilations and the irreparable damage to their self-image and self-esteem.
7.17. The amounts of compensation awarded by the Congolese courts to those injured or
mutilated in the context of the perpetration of serious international crimes varied between US$550
and US$5,000, the average sum being US$3,500. For minor injuries, compensation varied from
US$50 to US$200, the average sum being US$150. In the light of the factors described above, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo considers it reasonable to apply these sums for persons who, as
a result of deliberate acts of violence against civilian populations, suffered injuries or mutilation as
a consequence of Uganda’s breaches of its international obligations in the context of the invasion
and occupation of large areas of Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003, according to the
seriousness of their injuries.
7.18. It was mainly in Ituri that a large number of people were found to have been seriously
injured or mutilated during deliberate attacks on civilian populations. The number of victims in
this category in Ituri was put at 15,000, and the total amount of compensation claimed by the DRC
for this category of damage is therefore US$52,500,000 (15,000 x US$3,500). The number of
victims of minor injuries was put at 5,000, and so the total amount of compensation claimed by the
DRC for this category of damage is US$750,000 (5,000 x US$150). The total for this sub-category
is therefore US$53,250,000 (52,500,000 + 750,000).
7.19. The situation is slightly different for the victims of injuries or mutilations suffered
outside situations where civilian populations were specifically targeted by acts of violence. In such
cases, although the material harm is similar to that described above (cost of medical treatment, loss
of income and loss of opportunity), the non-material harm is more limited and is largely confined
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to incapacities resulting from those injuries. It is therefore by reference to the amounts of
compensation awarded by the Congolese ordinary courts to the victims of accidental injuries or
mutilations that the compensation owed by Uganda in this respect will be evaluated. The amounts
here varied between 100 and several thousand dollars. For the purpose of the present proceedings,
the DRC will apply the minimum sum of US$100 for this category of damage.
7.20. The numbers of victims in this category are as follows:
 those who suffered injuries or mutilations as a direct or indirect consequence of the fighting in
eastern Congo between 1998 and 2003 attributable to Uganda’s breach of its international
obligations: 203 persons648;
 those who suffered injuries or mutilations in Ituri as a result of Uganda’s breach of its
obligations as the occupying Power in that region between 1998 and 2003 in situations other
than deliberate acts of violence against civilian populations: 10,000 persons649;
 those who suffered injuries or mutilations as a direct or indirect consequence of the fighting
between Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces in the city of Kisangani in 1999 and 2000,
attributable to Uganda’s breach of its international obligations: 1,937 persons650.
The total amount of compensation claimed by the DRC for damage suffered by the victims of this
type of act is therefore US$1,214,000 (12,140 x US$100).
7.21. This gives a total, for all the victims of injuries and mutilations, of US$54,464,000
(fifty-four million four hundred and sixty-four thousand United States dollars) (53,250,000 +
1,214,000).
(iii) Compensation owed for incidences of rape
7.22. The material and non-material harm ensuing from the sexual violence suffered by large
numbers of people as a result of Uganda’s breaches of its international obligations in the context of
the invasion and occupation of large areas of Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003 cover the
following aspects. The material harm mainly involves the cost of the medical treatment given to
the victims. The non-material harm suffered by the victims of such acts is particularly significant.
It is the consequence of the humiliating nature of the crime of rape, and the ostracization of the
victims by their family members or society in general651. When rape occurs, it can result in
problems within the household or repudiation of the wife. Similarly, unmarried young girls who
have been raped have less chance of finding a husband. Lastly, account must be taken of more
particular  but far from exceptional  circumstances, especially where rape was accompanied by
other ill-treatment (aggravated rape), or has resulted in persistent pain or infection with a sexually
transmitted disease, or where a female victim has lost the child she was carrying or finds herself
pregnant by her assailant.
7.23. The amounts of compensation awarded by the Congolese courts to those who suffered
simple rape in the context of the perpetration of serious international crimes varied between
648Para. 2.75 above.
649Para. 3.29 above.
650Para. 4.65 above.
651Paras. 2.78 and 3.32 above.
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US$700 and US$50,000, the average sum being US$12,600. For aggravated rape, the sums
awarded by the same courts varied from US$10,000 to US$750,000, the average sum being
US$23,200.
7.24. In the light of the factors described above, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
considers it reasonable to apply these sums for each person who suffered sexual violence as a
consequence of Uganda’s breaches of its international obligations in the context of the invasion of
large areas of Congolese territory and the occupation of Ituri between 1998 and 2003.
 The number of victims in the first category (simple rape) may be put at 610 for Ituri652, 18 for
Kisangani653 and 12 for the other areas of the DRC invaded by Uganda654, giving a total of 630.
The amount of compensation claimed by the DRC for this sub-category is therefore
US$7,938,000 (630 x US$12,600).
 The number of victims in the second category (aggravated rape) has been put at 1,100655, and
so the total amount of compensation claimed by the DRC for this sub-category is
US$25,520,000 (1,100 x US$23,200).
7.25. The total amount of compensation owed for the harm suffered by the victims of rape
for which Uganda is responsible is therefore US$33,458,000 (thirty-three million four hundred
and fifty-eight thousand United States dollars).
(iv) Compensation owed for the recruitment, training and use of child soldiers
7.26. It was mainly in the region of Ituri that these violations of international law were seen,
even though such practices were also reported in other regions, including the province of
Equateur656. The material and non-material harm ensuing from the recruitment, training and use of
child soldiers as a result of Uganda’s breaches of its international obligations cover the following
aspects. The material harm lies, for the direct victims, in denial of access to education and loss of
opportunities, and, for their families, in loss of the contributions which these children normally
make to the family economy (household chores, minding livestock, etc.). The non-material harm
lies in the trauma resulting from the children being torn from their families and exposed to various
forms of abuse and the violence of war.
7.27. In the light of the scales of compensation identified from the awards made by the
Congolese courts for the victims of acts which caused harm similar to that suffered by the child
soldiers, the Democratic Republic of the Congo considers it reasonable to apply the sum of
US$12,000 for each person recruited, trained and used as a child soldier in the DRC as a
consequence of Uganda’s breach of its international obligations between 1998 and 2003.
652See para. 3.32 above.
653See paras. 4.29 and 4.60 above.
654See para. 2.79 above.
655See para. 3.32 above.
656See para. 3.30 above.
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7.28. The number of victims in this category has been put at 2,500657, and so the total amount
of compensation claimed by the DRC for this category of harm is US$30 million (2,500 x 12,000).
(v) Compensation owed for the flight and displacement of populations
7.29. Here again, a distinction must be made between the situation of persons who fled their
homes in order to escape deliberate acts of violence against civilian populations and the situation of
those who were driven from their homes by the fighting.
7.30. The first of these two scenarios mainly occurred in the region of Ituri. The material
and non-material harm caused by the flight and displacement of populations as a result of Uganda’s
breaches of its obligations as the occupying Power in this region between 1998 and 2003 cover the
following aspects. The material harm is chiefly the result of the fact that those who had to flee
ceased working for the whole of the period when they were in hiding. The non-material harm
consists in the trauma for those displaced resulting from the atrocities committed against other
members of their group, the fear that similar crimes would be repeated, and the distress resulting
from the local authorities’ failure to take action and the failure to prosecute the perpetrators of the
crimes. The Democratic Republic of the Congo considers it reasonable to apply the sum of
US$300 for each person forced to flee their home as a consequence of Uganda’s breaches of its
obligations as the occupying Power in Ituri between 1998 and 2003. The number of victims in this
category has been put at 600,000658, and so the total amount of compensation claimed by the DRC
for this category of harm is US$180 million (600,000 x US$300).
7.31. The second scenario is that of people who fled as a result of acts of war not directly
targeted at civilian populations, which mainly included those who fled their homes for shorter
periods in regions of eastern Congo, except for Ituri, and in Kisangani. While the material harm
was on a similar scale, the non-material harm was confined to their suffering at having to abandon
home and the fear of returning to find it damaged, destroyed or looted. For situations in this
category, the Democratic Republic of the Congo considers it reasonable to apply the sum of
US$100 for each person forced to flee their home as a consequence of Uganda’s breaches of its
international obligations in the context of the invasion of large areas of Congolese territory between
1998 and 2003. The number of victims in this category has been put at 68,538 (68,000 in
Kisangani and 538 in the other regions of eastern Congo)659, and so the total amount of
compensation claimed by the DRC for this category of harm is US$6,853,800 (65,538 x US$100).
7.32. The total amount of compensation claimed by the DRC for this category of harm is
therefore US$186,853,800 (one hundred and eighty-six million eight hundred and
fifty-three thousand eight hundred United States dollars).
B. Compensation for damage to property
7.33. The amount of compensation owed by Uganda to make good the damage caused to
property in the DRC as a result of Uganda’s breach of its international obligations will be
determined, for each category and sub-category of damage, on the basis of data from international
or national reports and the records drawn up by the DRC’s investigators. The amounts of
657See para. 3.36 above.
658See para. 3.41 above.
659See paras. 4.47 and 2.83 above, respectively.
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compensation owed will be detailed in the following pages, separated into cases in Ituri (i), and
those in Kisangani and the rest of the DRC territory invaded by Uganda (ii).
(i) Compensation owed for damage to property in Ituri
7.34. A more precise distinction will be made between compensation owed for the total or
partial destruction of dwellings (a) and infrastructure (b), while cases of looting are dealt with more
specifically (c).
(a) Destruction of dwellings
7.35. In absolute numbers, the destruction of private dwellings comes top of the list of
damage caused to property as a consequence of Uganda’s breach of its international obligations in
the context of the occupation of the region of Ituri between 1998 and 2003. The dwellings were
obviously not all of the same type. They were often very rudimentary in rural areas, more
luxurious in some urban areas, and of medium quality in others. The DRC has therefore used a
graduated scale to assess the value of these different categories of property. The scale was drawn
up on the basis of the reconstruction cost for the dwellings in question. The details are as follows:
 basic dwellings: US$300;
 medium-quality dwellings: US$5,000;
 luxury dwellings: US$10,000.
Given the characteristics of the housing in Ituri, it may reasonably be considered that the dwellings
there can be broken down as follows: 5 per cent luxury dwellings, 15 per cent medium-quality
dwellings, and 80 per cent basic dwellings660.
7.36. The damage resulting from the destruction of 8,693 dwellings in this region661 can thus
be calculated as follows:
 basic dwellings: 6,954 x US$300 = US$2,086,200;
 medium-quality dwellings: 1,304 x US$5,000 = US$6,520,000;
 luxury dwellings: 435 x US$10,000 = US$4,350,000.
7.37. The amount of compensation claimed by the DRC for this category of damage is
therefore US$12,956,200 (twelve million nine hundred and fifty-six thousand two hundred
United States dollars).
(b) Destruction of infrastructure
7.38. As well as private dwellings, various types of infrastructure were also destroyed as a
consequence of Uganda’s breach of its international obligations in the context of the occupation of
the region of Ituri between 1998 and 2003. They included, in particular, numerous schools (public
660Para. 3.45 above.
661See para. 3.38 above.
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and private), local clinics, health centres and hospitals, administrative buildings and places of
worship.
7.39. There are 200 schools in Ituri for whose total or partial destruction the DRC is seeking
compensation662. The scale of the damage obviously varies considerably from one school to
another. In some, only the classrooms and their furniture were destroyed, the buildings having
often first been looted of all material capable of being reused or resold (windows and doors, metal
roofing, etc.). In others, the damage was sometimes much more significant, with the destruction of
scientific or experimental equipment or experimental crops, for example. Overall, the average
value of an educational establishment may be estimated at US$75,000. The total amount of
compensation claimed by the DRC in this regard is therefore 200 x US$75,000, that is,
US$15,000,000 (fifteen million United States dollars).
7.40. As regards local clinics, health centres and hospitals, there are 50 in Ituri for whose
total or partial destruction the DRC is seeking compensation663. Here again, the scale of the
damage does of course vary from one case to another. Overall, the average value of a healthcare
establishment may be estimated at US$75,000. The total amount of compensation claimed by the
DRC in this regard is therefore 50 x US$75,000, that is, US$3,750,000 (three million
seven hundred and fifty thousand United States dollars).
7.41. In terms of administrative buildings, there are 50 in Ituri for whose total or partial
destruction the DRC is seeking compensation664. Overall, the average value of an administrative
building may be estimated at US$50,000, The total amount of compensation claimed by the DRC
in this regard is therefore 50 x US$50,000, that is, US$2,500,000 (two million five hundred
thousand United States dollars).
7.42. The total compensation claimed by the DRC for damage to public infrastructure in Ituri
between 1998 and 2003 is therefore US$21,250,000 (twenty-one million two hundred and
fifty thousand United States dollars).
(c) Looting
7.43. The only tangible figures on which the DRC is able to base its claim for compensation
for the many cases of looting which resulted from Uganda’s breaches of its international
obligations in Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003 are those taken from the records drawn
up by the DRC’s investigators in the different regions of the country that were affected. According
to those figures, the damage resulting from looting in Ituri during the period when the region was
under Ugandan occupation amounts to a total of US$7,318,413 (seven million three hundred and
eighteen thousand four hundred and thirteen United States dollars).
7.44. The total damage caused to property in the region of Ituri therefore comes to
US$41,524,613 (12,956,200 + 21,250,000 + 7,318,413).
662This figure was given by the United Nations Secretary-General in his second special report on MONUC,
document S/2003/566, 27 May 2003, para. 10; Ann. 3.6.
663See para. 3 above.
664See para. 3 above.
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(ii) Compensation owed for damage to property in Kisangani and the rest of the
territory invaded by Uganda
7.45. Outside the region of Ituri, the DRC’s investigators were able to draw up detailed lists
indicating the type of damage caused to property, the name of the persons affected and a monetary
evaluation of the appropriate compensation. These lists are included in various documents annexed
to this Memorial665, and the resulting amounts may be summarized as follows.
7.46. The total sums for the damage resulting from attacks on property in the various
locations affected by the consequences of the violations of international law for which Uganda was
responsible in Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003 are as follows:
 Kisangani: US$17,323,998;
 Beni: US$5,526,527;
 Butembo: US$2,680,000;
 Gemena: US$97,550.
The total for all of these towns and cities combined is therefore US$25,628,075
(twenty-five million six hundred and twenty-eight thousand and seventy-five United States
dollars).
7.47. In addition to these sums, there was also the damage caused to the Societé nationale
d’électricité (SNEL, National Electricity Company), a detailed evaluation of which is provided in
an annex666. The figure here is US$97,412,090 (ninety-seven million four hundred and
twelve thousand and ninety United States dollars).
7.48. Account must also be taken at this point of the material damage suffered by the
Congolese armed forces. The destruction of vehicles, arms and equipment suffered by the
Congolese army in the fighting with the UPDF and the rebel movements that it supported were
described in Chapter 2 of this Memorial667. The total amount of damage sustained in this respect
was US$69,417,192.00 (sixty-nine million four hundred and seventeen thousand one hundred
and ninety-two United States dollars)668.
7.49. The total damage to property outside the region of Ituri therefore amounts to
US$198,447,357 (one hundred and ninety-eight million four hundred and
forty-seven thousand three hundred and fifty-seven United States dollars) (25,628,075 +
97,412,090 + 69,417,192).
7.50. Except for the amounts intended as reparation for the public infrastructure and
buildings destroyed, all of the sums produced by the above evaluations are designed to compensate
private individuals who have sustained physical and/or material harm as a result of Uganda’s
665Anns. 2.4 and 4.3.
666Ann. 4.26.
667See para. 2 above.
668Ann. 7.4.
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breach of its international obligations in the context of the invasion and occupation of large areas of
Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003. It is to these men, women and children that the
compensation will ultimately be paid.
7.51. In order to ensure that the compensation is distributed as fairly and effectively as
possible to those concerned, the Democratic Republic of the Congo intends to set up a
fund/commission run jointly by the Congolese authorities on the one hand and representatives of
international humanitarian bodies on the other. This institution will be responsible for establishing
the procedure for victims to submit individual compensation claims, examining those claims and
distributing the sums owed by way of compensation. The Democratic Republic of the Congo will,
in due course, submit to the Court the regulatory framework governing the setting-up and operation
of the commission and the fund.
C. Compensation for damage resulting from the illegal exploitation of natural resources
7.52. In Chapter 5 of this Memorial, the DRC gave a detailed account of the scale of the
damage resulting from Uganda’s attacks on its natural resources in breach of international law
between 1998 and 2003. It will therefore confine itself here to restating the amounts of
compensation it is claiming from the Respondent in this respect:
 damage resulting from the illegal exploitation of gold: US$675,541,972;
 damage resulting from the illegal exploitation of diamonds: US$7,055,885;
 damage resulting from the illegal exploitation of coltan: US$2,915,880;
 prejudice caused to fauna: US$2,692,980,468;
 prejudice caused to flora: US$100,000,000.
7.53. The total obtained by adding these sub-categories together is US$3,478,494,205
(three thousand four hundred and seventy-eight million four hundred and
ninety-four thousand two hundred and five United States dollars).
D. Compensation for macroeconomic damage
7.54. In Chapter 6 of this Memorial, the DRC gave a detailed account of the scale of the
macroeconomic damage which it suffered as a consequence of Uganda’s breaches of its
international obligations in the context of the invasion of large areas of Congolese territory and the
occupation of Ituri between 1998 and 2003. It will therefore confine itself here to restating that the
amount of compensation it is claiming from the Respondent in this respect is US$5,714,000,775
(five thousand seven hundred and fourteen million seven hundred and seventy-five United
States dollars)669.
669Para. 6.32 above.
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E. Award of interest
7.55. As the DRC recalled in detail in Chapter 1 of this Memorial, the rules on reparation in
international law are based on the principle that damage must be repaired in full670. That would
clearly not be the case if the victims of the wrongful acts committed by Uganda in Congolese
territory between 1998 and 2003 had to be content only with the amounts claimed by the DRC by
way of compensation, as set out in the previous paragraphs.
7.56. A considerable period of time will have elapsed between the point when the damage
occurred, the point when it was evaluated, the point when the present claim was formulated and the
point when the victims actually receive compensation. This passage of time will necessarily entail
the depreciation of the sums in question, because of inflation, among other things (even though the
rate of inflation has slowed markedly in the DRC in recent years). The award of compensatory
interest on the sums owed by Uganda by way of compensation is the most effective way to remedy
this loss in value.
7.57. The role of interest as a factor in the full reparation of damage was clearly highlighted
by the International Law Commission in its Articles on the Responsibility of States. Article 38 (1)
provides that: “Interest on any principal sum due under this chapter [on reparation] shall be
payable when necessary in order to ensure full reparation. The interest rate and mode of
calculation shall be set so as to achieve that result.” The interest rate and mode of calculation of
compensatory interest must therefore be set so as to ensure full reparation of the damage suffered.
7.58. This requirement implies that interest must start to run from the time when the
internationally wrongful act is committed. That is the point at which the entitlement to reparation
of the victims of such acts begins. This starting-point for the calculation of compensatory interest
is also frequently used in arbitration awards671.
7.59. In the present case, however, determining the dies a quo presents considerable practical
difficulties. The dies a quo is likely to vary according to the different heads of claim submitted in
the present Memorial. In particular, some of the individual records of damage to property reflect
prices at the time the records were drawn up, a few years after the Court’s Judgment of
December 2005, while others reflect the prices which applied when the wrongful acts were
committed. The amounts used to calculate compensation for injury to persons, on the other hand,
are based on decisions of the Congolese courts delivered on a range of dates between 2009
and 2015. The damage to natural resources was also evaluated at various points between the
Court’s Judgment and recently. The macroeconomic damage was evaluated up to 2005, so that the
interest on this item might start to run from 2006.
7.60. The complexity of the figures in the present case has led the DRC to consider other
possibilities, without prejudice to its position of principle, which is that interest must start to run
from the time of the wrongful act. A first option would be to fix as the starting-point for
calculating compensatory interest the date when Ugandan troops finally completed their
670See Chap. 1, section 2, above.
671See, for example, Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award,
30 Aug. 2000, para. 128, or Venezuela Holdings B.V. and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/27, Award, 9 Oct. 2014, para. 397.
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withdrawal from Congolese territory, that is, 2 June 2003672. However, this would be problematic,
since, as indicated above, a significant number of damage assessments were conducted after that
date. Another option, therefore, would be to select as the dies a quo a single date after the final
evaluations conducted by the DRC for the purposes of this dispute. The date would be that on
which the present Memorial was lodged with the Court. This option would be far from ideal for
achieving the full reparation for damage that is now being sought. On the other hand, it appears to
reflect a certain international practice, no doubt because it is simpler. In its commentary on
Article 38, cited above, the International Law Commission states that:
“Using the date of the breach as the starting date for calculation of the interest
term is problematic as there may be difficulties in determining that date, and many
legal systems require a demand for payment by the claimant before interest will run.
The date of formal demand was taken as the relevant date in the Russian Indemnity
case [UNRIAA, vol. XI, p. 442 (1912)], by analogy from the general position in
European legal systems.”673
7.61. In the light of all these factors, the DRC considers it reasonable and fair to fix
28 September 2016 as the dies a quo for the calculation of compensatory interest, which it seeks to
have applied in these proceedings.
7.62. Lastly, as regards the interest rate to be applied in calculating the compensatory interest
payable in the present case, the DRC considers that an annual interest rate of 6 per cent would
adequately compensate for the loss in value resulting from the late reparation of the damage at
issue.
7.63. The DRC would reiterate that this aspect of its claim is without prejudice to the request
that it will also submit to the Court to have moratory interest added to the compensation awarded to
the Congolese State, should Uganda be unreasonably slow in carrying out the compensation
obligations imposed on it by the Court. As the ILC has stated, these are two separate types of
interest, and only compensatory interest is covered by the Articles on the Responsibility of States.
As the commentary on Article 38 explains, that article
“does not deal with post-judgement or moratory interest. It is only concerned with
interest that goes to make up the amount that a court or tribunal should award,
i.e. compensatory interest. The power of a court or tribunal to award post-judgement
interest is a matter of its procedure”674.
672This was the date taken by the DRC as the end of the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from its territory (see
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2005, p. 255, para. 254); it was not called into question by the Court.
673Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, YILC, 2001,
op. cit., p. 109, fn. 619.
674Commentaries, p. 296.
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It is clear, however, that compensatory interest and moratory interest must be adjusted in order to
avoid duplicating compensation for the same elements of damage.
*
* *
7.64. The following is a breakdown of the reparations sought by the DRC in the form of
compensation in the present case:
 compensation for injury to persons: US$4,409,108,839, representing the sum of
US$4,045,646,000 for human lives lost, US$54,464,000 for injuries and mutilations,
US$33,458,000 for incidences of rape, US$30,000,000 for child soldiers and US$186,853,800
for the flight and displacement of populations;
 compensation for damage to property: US$239,971,970, representing the sum of
US$41,524,613 for Ituri and US$198,447,357 for the other sub-regions;
 compensation for damage resulting from the unlawful exploitation of natural resources:
US$3,478,494,205;
 compensation for macroeconomic damage: US$5,714,000,775.
The total for reparations in the form of compensation is therefore US$13,478,122,950
(thirteen thousand four hundred and seventy-eight million one hundred and
twenty-two thousand nine hundred and fifty United States dollars).
Section 2. Satisfaction
7.65. It is evident that, regardless of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court to
make good the damage caused to the DRC and its population, this type of reparation will not be
enough to remedy the scale of the damage and suffering caused by Uganda’s breach of its
international obligations. That is particularly true for the region of Ituri, where the human
consequences of Uganda’s breaches of its obligations as the occupying Power were extremely
tragic, especially as, in fomenting ethnic conflict in the region, Uganda introduced elements of
long-term instability whose harmful effects have continued long after the occupation of this area of
Congolese territory ended. The exceptional scale of the damage caused and the terrible acts
committed during the Ugandan occupation fully justify an application for exceptional satisfaction
to be given, pursuant to Article 37 (1) of the Articles on the Responsibility of States. According to
that provision: “The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to
give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or
compensation.”
7.66. The DRC therefore requests the Court to order that satisfaction be given in two ways
for the damage caused in Ituri, in addition to the compensation that it awards for those acts: the
criminal investigation and prosecution of UPDF officers and soldiers involved in the acts in
question (A); and the creation of a fund to promote reconciliation between the Hema and Lendu in
Ituri (B).
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7.67. It is also evident that, besides the extremely tragic impact which it had on the region of
Ituri in particular, the war triggered by Uganda in August 1998 and the many breaches of
international law which ensued over the following five years caused considerable non-material
harm to the Congolese State itself. It is in order to obtain reparation for this non-material harm
resulting from Uganda’s breaches of fundamentally important international obligations that the
DRC is seeking satisfaction in the form of payment of a comprehensive lump sum (C).
A. Criminal investigation and prosecution
7.68. On several occasions, the seriousness of the violations of international law committed
against the civilian population in Ituri led international human rights bodies to call for
investigations to be conducted into the events in question and for those responsible to face criminal
prosecution. Following the massacres in Bunia in January 2001, for instance, the Special
Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the DRC called on the Ugandan Government and the
FLC to “launch investigations of the above-mentioned incident with a view to identifying those
responsible and bringing them to justice”675.
7.69. To date, the DRC has not received any document or information demonstrating that
criminal investigations have been launched by the Ugandan authorities into events in which
UPDF officers or soldiers committed violations of international humanitarian law or international
human rights legislation, either in Ituri or anywhere else in Congolese territory. In particular, the
DRC has not, to date, received any document or information demonstrating that members of the
UPDF involved in such acts have faced criminal prosecution or been convicted. As the file
currently stands, there is no reason to think that the Ugandan authorities have taken such measures,
even though it is evident that they are required to bring such prosecutions under international law.
As the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law, mentioned earlier, state:
“[i]n cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations
of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, States
have the duty to investigate and, if there is sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to
prosecution the person allegedly responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the
duty to punish her or him”676.
7.70. The facts set out in Chapter 3 of this Memorial confirm beyond any doubt that acts of
this nature were indeed committed by members of the Ugandan armed forces while Ituri was
occupied by the UPDF. The same applied in other regions of the Congo where the Ugandan army
was present677. In view of the extremely tragic human and material consequences of these acts, the
total impunity of the presumed perpetrators resulting from the absence of any criminal
investigations or prosecutions is especially shocking. That is why, irrespective of the
compensation for material damage caused by the violations of international humanitarian law or
international human rights legislation suffered by the Congolese people, the pursuit of prosecutions
675United Nations Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, op. cit.; RDRC, Ann. 31.
676Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, op. cit., para. 4; Annex 7.1.
677See Chap. 2 above.
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is a major element of the reparation owed to the DRC for these acts, by way of giving
satisfaction678.
7.71. The DRC therefore requests the Court to order that the reparations owed to it by
Uganda for violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights legislation
committed in its territory should include, by way of giving satisfaction, the criminal investigation
and prosecution of UPDF officers and soldiers involved in the acts in question.
B. Creation of a fund to promote reconciliation between the Hema and Lendu
7.72. The policy pursued by Uganda during its occupation of Ituri created deep antagonism
between the two main communities living in this region679. Uganda’s actions completely upset the
balance in which these people had previously been living. The consequences continue to be felt to
this day: relations between members of the two main communities are now marked by fear and
mistrust, and there is a risk that the desire for vengeance could, at any moment, trigger further
inter-ethnic clashes, with disastrous human consequences. It is much easier to fan the flames of
hatred than to extinguish them. It was Uganda which started this conflict and plunged an entire
region and the millions of people living there into barbarity. Yet it is now up to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo to try to manage the consequences of those irresponsible actions and to
maintain civil peace in this area of its territory. The task is all the more difficult because the DRC
has few material resources to do this.
7.73. This is why the allocation of a sum for the creation of a fund to promote reconciliation
between the Hema and Lendu appears an appropriate measure of satisfaction. Resources from such
a fund could, among other things, establish an effective land registry system to help settle the
problems of land ownership caused by Uganda, provide financial support for children’s education
and for the establishment of memory and reconciliation programmes in schools and communities,
and enable the creation of psychological support and monitoring programmes to help the direct
victims and also their descendants, many of whom are suffering inter-generational trauma680.
7.74. It is fully accepted that giving satisfaction may, in certain circumstances, consist in the
payment of a sum of money. In the Diallo (Compensation) case, the Court recognized that
reparable damage may include non-material injury and that payment of compensation could in such
cases constitute adequate reparation681. The award, by way of giving satisfaction, of a sum of
money earmarked for a particular purpose, usually as a symbolic gesture, is not unprecedented. It
occurred, for example, in the Rainbow Warrior case, where the Arbitration Tribunal recommended
that France should pay two million dollars to a fund “to promote close and friendly relations
between the citizens of the two countries” involved in the case682. This element of the DRC’s claim
for reparation follows exactly the same lines.
678For example, criminal prosecutions were demanded against the individuals responsible for the assassination of
Count Bernadotte in Palestine in 1948 (Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 8, pp. 742-743), and following the
assassination of two American officers in Iran (RGDIP, 1966, p. 257).
679See Chap. 3 above.
680International Criminal Court, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Application by the victims seeking,
through the Chamber, the involvement of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the reparations process,
24 Mar. 2016.
681Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), paras. 18, 21 and 24.
682RIAA, Vol. XX (1990), p. 274, paras. 126 and 127.
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7.75. The DRC therefore requests the Court to order that the reparations owed to it by
Uganda for violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights legislation
committed in the territory of Ituri should include, by way of giving satisfaction, payment of the
sum of US$25 (twenty-five) million, for the creation of a fund to promote reconciliation between
the Hema and Lendu. The Democratic Republic of the Congo formally undertakes to ensure that
this sum is used for that specific purpose. It will be administered by the mechanism that will be set
up in order to distribute the compensation owed to the civilian population of the DRC683.
C. Payment of a lump sum to make good the non-material harm suffered by the
Congolese State
7.76. By invading huge areas of Congolese territory, actively supporting a number of rebel
movements engaged in the armed struggle against the ruling government, triggering ethnic conflict,
committing massive humanitarian and human rights violations, and looting the DRC’s natural
resources, Uganda was responsible for serious breaches of the most fundamental norms of the
contemporary legal order. The Court made a point of emphasizing several times, in its
2005 Judgment, how serious these breaches were. Thus it condemned Uganda for “grave
violations” of the peremptory norm prohibiting the use of force in international relations684.
Likewise, it held that Uganda was responsible for “massive human rights violations and grave
breaches of international humanitarian law”685.
7.77. It is evident that, beyond the immeasurable material damage caused by these breaches
of international law, Uganda’s actions also caused large-scale non-material injury in the DRC.
These actions were deeply humiliating for the Congolese State, whose authority over large areas of
its territory was radically undermined by a foreign State. The same was true, at certain points in
the conflict, for the country’s territorial integrity, which was clearly in jeopardy686.
7.78. Uganda deliberately waged a war of aggression against one of its neighbours, helping
to trigger a conflict which has frequently been called “Africa’s first world war”687, because of its
scale and the number of protagonists subsequently involved. Uganda treated the Congo like a
conquered country, shamelessly exploiting its natural resources, subjugating the local people and
going as far as to change the administrative organization of some of the areas under its control.
Furthermore, there can be no doubt that the outbreak and continuation of the war caused
considerable distress to the whole of the Congolese population, on top of the economic impact
which the conflict had on them. It is this non-material injury for which the DRC is now seeking
reparation in the form of satisfaction. The DRC considers that, given the scale of the consequences
of the breaches of international law at issue, only the payment of a lump sum is capable of
constituting adequate satisfaction.
683See paras. 7.48-7.49 above.
684Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 223 and 227, paras. 153 and 165.
685Ibid., p. 239, para. 207.
686The United Nations Security Council expressed constant concern in this regard: see, among others,
S/RES/1234 (1999), para. 1; S/RES/1279 (1999), preamble; S/RES/1304 (2000), preamble; S/RES/1376 (2001),
preamble.
687See, for example, https://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/101008/rdc-congo-retour-…-
africaine?onglet=full.
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7.79. Its request is all the more justified since Uganda was fully aware of the unlawful nature
of its actions, but that did nothing to dissuade it from pursuing them. At the end of August 1998,
the Security Council reaffirmed, in a statement by its President, “the obligation to respect the
territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other
States in the region and the need for all States to refrain from any interference in each other’s
internal affairs”688. In December 1998, the Council called, in the same way, for “the orderly
withdrawal of all foreign forces” from the territory of the DRC689. In April 1999, the Security
Council deplored “the presence of forces of foreign States in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in a manner inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and calls
upon the States to bring to an end the presence of these uninvited forces and to take immediate
steps to that end”690. Uganda loftily ignored all these calls. Subsequently, other breaches of
international law observed in the conflict were also highlighted by the Council. In February 2000,
for instance, it expressed “its serious concern at reports of illegal exploitation of natural resources
and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including in violation of the
sovereignty of that country, [and] calls for an end to such activities”691.
7.80. Far from complying with this request, the Ugandan troops in the territory of the DRC
redoubled their efforts to maximize the wrongful exploitation of the wealth of the areas they
controlled. Uganda would, a few months later, show the same contempt for the Security Council’s
firm demands following clashes between the Ugandan and Rwandan armed forces at Kisangani.
Yet the Council had reiterated its “unreserved” condemnation of this fighting “in violation of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” and demanded
“that Uganda and Rwanda, which have violated the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, withdraw all their forces from the
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without further delay, in conformity
with the timetable of the Ceasefire Agreement and the 8 April 2000 Kampala
disengagement plan”692.
As everyone knows, it took more than another three years for Uganda to comply with this demand,
despite the Council’s regular reminders between 2001 and 2003693. The Respondent has not yet, on
the other hand, complied with the Security Council’s call in the same resolution “to make
reparations for the loss of life and the property damage [which Uganda and Rwanda] have inflicted
on the civilian population in Kisangani”694.
688United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council on “The situation
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, document S/PRST/1998/26, 31 Aug. 1998.
689United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council on “The situation
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”, document S/PRST/1998/36, 11 Dec. 1998.
690United Nations, Security Council resolution 1234 (1999), document S/RES/1234 (1999), para. 2.
691United Nations, Security Council resolution 1291 (2000), document S/RES/1291 (2000), para. 17; see also
United Nations, Security Council resolution 1376 (2001), document S/RES/1376 (2001), para. 8.
692United Nations, Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), document S/RES/1304 (2000), paras. 2 and 4.
693See, among others, United Nations, Security Council resolutions 1341 (2001), para. 2; 1355 (2001), para. 3;
1468 (2003), para. 12.
694United Nations, Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), para. 14.
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7.81. Similarly, it should further be pointed out that Uganda has also not complied with the
Court’s Order indicating provisional measures of 1 July 2000, as the Court itself found in its
Judgment of 19 December 2005695.
7.82. Despite these many calls, demands and condemnations by the highest international
authorities from the very start of the conflict, Uganda did not amend its conduct in the slightest.
On the contrary, it chose to continue deliberately to violate the most fundamental norms of the
contemporary legal order and persisted in inflicting immeasurable damage on the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and its people. Clearly, this was something that had to be taken into
account by the DRC in determining the measures of satisfaction it would request for the
non-material damage that it has suffered.
7.83. In the present case, the Democratic Republic of the Congo considers that payment of
the sum of US$100,000,000 (one hundred million United States dollars) would be appropriate
reparation, by way of giving satisfaction, for the non-material damage suffered by the Congolese
State and population as a consequence of Uganda’s violation of the most fundamental norms of the
international legal order between 1998 and 2003.
7.84. The reparations sought by the DRC by way of giving satisfaction in the present case
are therefore as follows:
 the criminal investigation and prosecution of officers and soldiers of the UPDF involved in the
violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights legislation
committed in Congolese territory between 1998 and 2003;
 payment of the sum of US$25 million for the creation of a fund to promote reconciliation
between the Hema and Lendu in Ituri;
 payment of the sum of US$100 million to provide compensation for the non-material harm
suffered by the Congolese State as a result of the outbreak and continuation of the war
from 1998 to 2003.
Section 3. Payment of the costs incurred by the DRC
7.85. As well as the compensation and satisfaction described above, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo requests the Court to adjudge and declare that the costs incurred by
the DRC in the present case must be borne by Uganda. From the initial citing of Uganda’s
responsibility before the Court to the claim for compensation, the proceedings brought by the DRC
to ensure that its most basic rights as an independent State  and those of its people  are
protected have proved long and costly. It therefore seems only fair that the Ugandan State, which
the Court recognized in the most unambiguous terms in its Judgment of 19 December 2005 as
having been fully and entirely responsible for the many violations of international law which it
committed during the invasion and occupation of large areas of Congolese territory between 1998
and 2003, should be ordered to pay those costs.
695Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2005, pp. 258-259, para. 264.
255
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7.86. The DRC is well aware that such requests are rarely made to the Court, and that the
application made by Guinea in the Diallo (Compensation) case was dismissed. It was not
dismissed absolutely, however, as the relevant extract from the decision clearly shows:
“The Court recalls that Article 64 of the Statute provides that, ‘[u]nless
otherwise decided by the Court, each party shall bear its own costs’. While the
general rule has so far always been followed by the Court, Article 64 implies that there
may be circumstances which would make it appropriate for the Court to allocate costs
in favour of one of the parties. However, the Court does not consider that any such
circumstances exist in the present case. Accordingly, each Party shall bear its own
costs”696.
7.87. The DRC considers that such special circumstances exist in the present case, and that
they justify the request it is making here. In this regard, the DRC earlier recalled the gravity of the
violations of international law which the Congolese State and its people have suffered. The
catastrophic scale of the damage which resulted from these serious breaches of fundamental
international norms has been amply demonstrated in this Memorial. As a consequence, the DRC
has faced an enormous task in identifying and assessing that damage. This has placed an additional
burden on already impoverished public finances, a burden which the DRC would obviously not
have had to bear if large areas of its territory had not been invaded and occupied by the Ugandan
armed forces for a number of years. Those circumstances therefore fully justify an exception being
made, in the present case, to the general rule set forth in Article 64 of the Statute.
7.88. In the final stage of these proceedings, the DRC will submit a breakdown of all the
costs incurred by the Congolese State in the present case, in support of this final part of its claim.
696Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), para. 60.
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SUBMISSIONS
7.89. For the reasons set out above, and subject to any changes made to its claims in the
course of the proceedings, the Democratic Republic of the Congo requests the Court to adjudge and
declare that:
(a) Uganda is required to pay the DRC the sum of US$13,478,122,950 (thirteen thousand
four hundred and seventy-eight million one hundred and twenty-two thousand nine hundred
and fifty United States dollars) in compensation for the damage resulting from the violations of
international law found by the Court in its Judgment of 19 December 2005;
(b) compensatory interest will be due on that amount at a rate of 6 per cent, payable from the date
on which the present Memorial was filed;
(c) Uganda is required to pay the DRC the sum of US$125 million by way of giving satisfaction
for all non-material damage resulting from the violations of international law found by the
Court in its Judgment of 19 December 2005;
(d) Uganda is required, by way of giving satisfaction, to conduct criminal investigations and
prosecutions of the officers and soldiers of the UPDF involved in the violations of international
humanitarian law or international human rights legislation committed in Congolese territory
between 1998 and 2003;
(e) in the event of non-payment of the compensation awarded by the Court by the date stipulated,
moratory interest on the principal sum will be payable at a rate to be determined by the Court;
(f) Uganda is required to reimburse the DRC for all the costs incurred by the latter in the context
of the present case.
(Signed) Agent of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
___________
258
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LIST OF ANNEXES
Introduction
0.1 Ngurdoto-Tanzania Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
Republic of Uganda on Bilateral Cooperation, Ngurdoto, Tanzania, 8 September 2007
0.2 Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of Uganda and Congolese Experts on the Implementation of the
Ruling of the International Court of Justice of 19 December 2005, 10-14 December 2012,
Kinshasa
0.3 Agreed Minute of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of
Uganda/Democratic Republic of Congo on the Implementation of the Ruling of the
ICJ (2005), 24-27 November 2014, Indaba, Johannesburg
0.4 The Agreed Minutes of the 4th Meeting of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Congo
and the Republic of Uganda on the Implementation of the Judgement of ICJ of
19th December 2005, held in Pretoria, South Africa, on 17-19 March 2015
Chapter 1
1.1 Ministerial Order No. 0002/CAB/J&DH/2008 of 26 February 2008 establishing an Expert
Commission in charge of identifying and assessing the damage caused by Uganda to the
DRC and its peoples following the armed attack and occupation of Congolese territory by
Ugandan troops between 1998 and 2003
1.2 Ministerial Order No. 049/CAB/MIN/JGS&DH of 19 December 2015 establishing a
commission responsible for defending the interests of the DRC in the second phase of the
proceedings before the International Court of Justice relating to the fixing of the amount of
the reparations owed by Uganda
1.3 Software giving access to individual victims’ records (in electronic format only)
1.4 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping
Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010 (excerpts)
1.5 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-sixth Session, Report on the situation
of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the Special
Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1999/56, document E/CN.4/2000/42, 18 January 2000 (excerpts)
1.6 MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,
document S/2004/573, 16 July 2004
1.7 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2001/357, 12 April 2001
1.8 United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001 (excerpts)
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1.9 United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, document S/2002/565, 22 May 2002
1.10 United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, document S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002
1.11 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2001
(“Porter Commission”), Final Report, November 2002
Chapter 2
2.1 Assessment of deaths in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003
2.2 Assessment of injuries and other bodily harm in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003
2.3 Assessment of cases of flight into the forest in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003
2.4 Assessment of loss of property in Beni, Butembo and Gemena, 1998-2003
2.4bis Detailed assessment of loss of property in Beni, 1998-2003
2.4ter Detailed assessment of loss of property in Butembo, 1998-2003
2.4quater Detailed assessment of loss of property in Gemena, 1998-2003
2.5 African Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ASADHO), Uganda is sacrificing
the Congolese civilian population  Enquiry into violations of human rights and of
international humanitarian law in Beni Territory by Ugandan troops and other armed
groups, February 2001 (excerpts)
2.6 Congo European Network (Brussels), REC-info No.5/2001, 23 May 2001, heading “North
Kivu”, point No. 15, reporting news gathered from local sources on 14 April 2001
2.7 Report entitled The Société Civile Grand Nord’s view on Uganda’s military interventions in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, produced by the Beni-Butembo Civil Society
Co-ordination Office in North Kivu, 25 June 2001, p. 2
2.8 Congo European Network (Brussels), REC-info No.5/2001 (text identical to Annex 2.6 —
please refer to the latter)
2.9 Article by Missionary Service News Agency, 12 April 2001, “Nord Kivu: Biambwe
reduced to rubble by Ugandan soldiers, several dozen casualties”
2.10 Société Civile du Grand Nord, Alarm call to the Head of MONUC in Kinshasa/DRC,
June 2001
2.11 White Paper on Massive Violations of Human Rights and of the basic rules of International
Humanitarian Law by the aggressor countries (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) in the
eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo covering the period from
2 August 1998 to 5 November 1998, Kinshasa, December 1998
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2.12 Verbatim record of the hearing of Kabengele Muvuale, 18 November 2001
2.13 Jean-Pierre Bemba, Le choix de la liberté [I chose Freedom], Gbadolite (DRC), Ed. Vénus
(excerpts)
2.14 AFP despatches, Extracts from the Ugandan daily, The Monitor
2.15 Verbatim record of the hearing of Major Buyuni A. Faray, 20 November 2001
2.16 Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo. An ongoing Crisis, reported by Benjamin
Coughlan (Burnet Institute, Melbourne, Australia), Pascal Ngoy (International Rescue
Committee, Kinshasa, DRC), Flavien Mulumba (International Rescue Committee,
Kinshasa, DRC), Colleen Hardy (International Rescue Committee, New York, USA),
Valérie Nkamgang Bemo (International Rescue Committee, Abidjan, Ivory Coast), Tony
Stewart (Burnet Institute, Melbourne, Australia), Jennifer Lewis (Burnet Institute,
Melbourne, Australia), Richard Brennan (International Rescue Committee, New York,
USA)
2.17 La Documentation française, 1998-2003: seven countries at war on the soil of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 8 December 2004
2.18 Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of the Congo: Confronting Impunity, Human
Rights Watch Briefing Paper, January 2004
2.19 André Lambert and Louis Lohlé-Tart, La surmortalité au Congo (RDC) durant les troubles
de 1998-2004: une estimation des décès en surnombre, scientifiquement fondée à partir des
méthodes de la démographie
2.20 Amnesty International, Ituri: a need for protection, a thirst for justice, 21 October 2003
(AI Index No. AFR62/032/2003)
Chapter 3
3.1 United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fifth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document A/55/403, 20 September 2000
3.2 United Nations Security Council, Special report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2002/1005, 10 September 2002
3.3 Human Rights Watch, The Curse of Gold. Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005 (excerpts)
3.4 United Nations Security Council, Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2001/128, 12 February 2001 (excerpts)
3.5 Human Rights Watch, Ituri: “Covered in Blood”. Ethnically Targeted Violence in
Northeastern DR Congo, Vol. 15, No. 11(A), July 2003
3.6 United Nations Security Council, Second special report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2003/566, 27 May 2003
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3.7 IRIN, Special Report on the Ituri clashes — [part one], Nairobi, 3 March 2000
3.8 Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à
l’autodétermination du peuple congolais”, 31 August 1999
Chapter 4
4.1 Loss of human life in Kisangani
4.2 Persons injured in Kisangani
4.3 Damage to property in Kisangani
4.4 Public administrations and religious organizations in Kisangani
4.5 Work of the DRC’s Expert Commission set up to identify the victims and assess the
damage they suffered as a result of Uganda’s unlawful armed activities
4.5a Identification of victims and assessment of damage: persons killed
4.5b Identification of victims and assessment of damage: injuries, bodily harm, rape,
etc.
4.5c Identification of victims and assessment of damage: loss of property
4.5d Identification of victims and assessment of damage: flight into the forest
4.5e Identification of victims and assessment of damage: businesses and private
establishments
4.5f Identification of victims and assessment of damage: non-profit-making
associations and other entities
4.6 List of the victims of the various Kisangani wars (14-17 August 1999, 5 May 2000 and
5-10 June 2000)
4.7 Digitized lists for Kisangani
4.7a Assessment: deaths
4.7b Assessment: injured
4.7c Assessment: flight into the forest
4.7d Assessment: loss of property
4.8 Individual records from the six-day war
4.9 Individual records of victims established by the Fonds de solidarité des victimes de guerre
de la Province orientale à Kisangani (a non-profit-making association)
4.10 Jean-Pierre Badidike (ed.), Guerre et droits de l’homme en République
démocratique du Congo, Paris/Kisangani, L’Harmattan, 2009 (excerpts)
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4.10a Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre du Congo à Kisangani et les violations
des droits de l’homme du 2 août au 17 septembre 1998”, Kisangani,
18 September 1998
4.10b Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés à Kisangani et le droit
international humanitaire”, 12 May 1999
4.10c Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des alliés en R.D.C. et le droit à
l’autodétermination du peuple congolais”, 31 August 1999
4.10d Groupe Justice et Libération, “La guerre des Alliés à Kisangani (du 5 mai au
10 juin 2000) et le droit à la paix”, 30 June 2000
4.11 Communiqué of 2 August 1998 in Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group,
15 October 1998, Appendix 3
4.12 United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-fourth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights in the DRC pursuant to General Assembly
resolution 53/160 and Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/56,
document A/54/361, 17 September 1999
4.13 Human Rights Watch, Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fueling Political and Ethnic Strife,
Vol. 13, No. 2 (A), March 2001 (excerpts)
4.14 IRIN, Chronology of current crisis as of 30 September 1998
4.15 Lotus Group, Report of the Kisangani Lotus Group, 15 October 1998
4.16 Organization of African Unity, Council of Ministers, Seventieth Ordinary Session, Report
of the Secretary-General on the situation in the DRC, 6-10 July 1999
4.17 South Kivu Civil Society — Collective of South Kivu (DRC) Youth Organizations and
Associations (COJESKI), Events in the occupied provinces of the DRC — large-scale
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law reaching fever pitch,
Six-monthly report covering the period from 1 April to 30 September 1999, October 1999
4.18 Lotus Group, The Consequences of Rivalries within the Rebel Alliances and Factions in
North-Eastern Congo. The Kisangani War, September 1999
4.19 Lotus Group, Conflict between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani, Kisangani, May 2000
4.20 Lotus Group, Rapport sur la guerre de six jours à Kisangani, July 2000
4.21 MONUC, Historic record of Kisangani cease-fire operation, 19 June 2000
4.22 United Nations Security Council, Third report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
document S/2000/566, 12 June 2000
4.23 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-seventh Session, Report on the
situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted by the
Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 2000/15, document E/CN.4/2001/40, 1 February 2001 (excerpts)
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4.24 United Nations Security Council, Report of the inter-agency assessment mission to
Kisangani (pursuant to Security Council resolution 1304 (2000), paragraph 14),
document S/2000/1153, 4 December 2000
4.25 Claim of Société textile de Kisangani (SOTEXKI)
4.26 Claim of Société nationale d’électricité (SNEL)
4.27 Claim of the Régie des voies aériennes
4.28 Claim of the Archdiocese of Kisangani
Chapter 5
5.1 United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council on
“The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”,
document S/PRST/2000/20, 2 June 2000
5.2 United Nations Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council on
“The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo”,
document S/PRST/2001/13, 3 May 2001
5.3 Maps of OKIMO concessions from DRC mining register
5.4 Message No. 40/27/2000 of 17 March 2000 concerning the UPDF/ISIRO brigade
commander’s visit to Doko
5.5 Report sent by OKIMO to the Governor of Kibali-Ituri province, 4 September 1999
5.6 Handwritten letter dated 19 March 2001 from the head of operations at Moto to the
Commissioner for Haut-Uélé district
5.7 Letter No. DG/SDG/135/2001 of 23 May 2001
5.8 Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, Annual Report 2002, p. 40,
Table 5 (production in 2001 and 2002) and Table 6 (exports in 2001 and 2002)
5.9 Ugandan Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, Annual Report 2003, p. 35,
Table 5 (production) and Table 6 (exports)
5.10 All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention,
Cursed by Riches: Who Benefits from Resource Exploitation in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo?, November 2002
5.11 All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region and Genocide Prevention, Visit
to Democratic Republic of Congo 2nd - 6th August 2001
5.12 A.K. Kes Hillman Smith, Emmanuel de Merode, Fraser Smith, Amube Ndey,
Norbert Mushenzi and Guy Mboma, Virunga National Park — North — March 2003
aerial counts
5.13 DRC national consultant, Evaluation of the damage caused to Congolese fauna by Uganda
between 1998 and 2003, September 2016
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5.14 UNESCO, Promoting and Preserving Congolese Heritage: Linking biological and cultural
diversity, proceedings of the conference and workshops, 13-17 September 2004
5.15 Kes Hillman Smith, Fraser Smith, Amube Ndey, Mbayma Atalia, Jean Mafuko,
Paulin Tshikaya, Giningayo Panziama and John Watkin, Garamba National Park and
reserves — general aerial counts 1998, 2000, 2002 & 2003 and evaluation of the effects of
the civil wars on the ecosystem
5.16 UNESCO, World Heritage in the Congo Basin, 2010
5.17 David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust, Dead or Alive? Valuing an Elephant, n.d.
5.18 UNEP and UNWTO, Tourism — Investing in energy and resource efficiency, 2011
5.19 UNWTO, Towards Measuring the Economic Value of Wildlife Watching Tourism in Africa,
2015
5.20 DRC, Directorate for Forest Management and Resources and Ministry of the Environment
and Sustainable Development, Projet TerraCongo — Protocole méthodologique de
l’évaluation du couvert forestier national de référence en République démocratique du
Congo, May 2015
Chapter 6
6.1 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil
Conflict, 2002, World Bank, Washington DC
6.2 Study by a team of economists from Kinshasa University on the effects
of the conflict on the economy of the DRC
Chapter 7
7.1 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law; Annex to resolution 60/147 adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on 16 December 2005
7.2 United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-ninth Session, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence,
document A/69/518, 14 October 2014
7.3 International Centre for Transitional Justice, The Accountability Landscape in Eastern
DRC. Analysis of the National Legislative and Judicial Response to International Crimes
(2009-2014), July 2015
7.4 Evaluation of the military damage suffered by the DRC armed forces and caused by the
Ugandan army and its allies, Kinshasa, 31 August 2016
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