Botschaft
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Den Haag
Gz.: Re-10 502.30
(Bitte bei Antwort angeben)
Verbalnote Nr. 5 4
The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the
International Court of Justice and with reference to the Ortler of the Court of 17 October
2008 inviting the UN and its Member States to submit written statements regarding the
request for an advisory opinion transmits the statement of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany avails itself of this opportunity
to renew to the International Court of Justice the assurances of its highest consideration.
Den Haag, 15April 2009
International Court of Justice
Peace Palace
Camegieplein 2
2517 KJ The Hague INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY THE
PROVISIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OF
KOSOVO
(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)
STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
April 2009 1
CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction 2
II. Background to the Request 3
III. The Wording of the Request 5
1. The Court should only respond to the question
asked by the General Assembly 5
2. The question's underlying assumptions 6
IV. Historical Background 8
1. Kosovo up to 1998/99 8
2. The events of 1998/99 13
3. Kosovo under Security Council resolution 1244(1999) 20
V. The Independence of Kosovo: A Case sui generis 26
VI. Legal Aspects
27
1. International law might be silent on Kosovo's
Declaration of Independence 27
2. In any event, and given the very special situation of
Kosovo, international law would not object to Kosovo's
independence 32
3. Security Council resolution 1244(1999)did not prohibit
the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo 37
VII. Conclusion 43 2
I. Introduction
In its Order of 17 October 2008 the Court invited the United Nations and its Member States to
submit written statements regarding the request for an advisory opinion on the "Accordance
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Govemment of Kosovo". The Court, by the same Order, further invited
"the authors of the above declaration" to make "written contributions" to the Court.
The terms of the request made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution
63/3 (A/63/L.2), adopted on 8 October 2008, are as follows:
"Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self
Govemment of Kosovo in accordance with international law?"
Germany abstained in the vote on resolution 63/3. As was made clear by the Permanent
Representative of Germany in his Explanation of Vote, Germany - while being a strong
supporter of the International Court of Justice - did not believe that the resolution would
contribute to advancing a stable andjust settlement for Kosovo and the Western Balkans.
General Assembly resolution 63/3 was adopted by a recorded vote of 77 in favour to 6 against,
with 74 abstentions. A significant number of Member States of the United Nations did not
participate in the vote.
Germany has .noted that the Court has invited "the authors" of the Declaration of
Independence to make written contributions on the question before the Court. Germany would
trust that the Court will also apply this principle of fairness to any hearings it may wish to
hold. 3
II. Background to the Request
On 17 February 2008 Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia and became the
Republic of Kosovo.
Kosovo's independence has been recognized by more than 50 States from all regi_onsof the
world, including three of its four neighbouring States (Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Montenegro ), and 22 of the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Kosovo's independence is and will remain a reality.
Serbia's initiative to seek an advisory opinion from the Court follows attempts to have
Kosovo's Declaration of Independence declared null and void by other organs of the United
Nations. A Note ("Pro-Memoria") issued on 17 February 2008 by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Serbia contains the following exhortation:
"[T]he Republic of Serbia insists that the UN Security Cormeil reacts firmly and
resolutely, and safeguards the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of
Serbia, in compliance with the UN Charter. We also expect the UN Security Cormeil
to take effective measures against the express violation of its own decisions - its
resolution 1244 (1999) and other resolutions relating to Kosovo and Metohija, and the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, in line with his powers, to
immediately annul the unlawful decision on the unilateral declaration of independence
and to dissolve the Kosovo Assembly." [Annex 1]
This call was repeated when the President of the Republic of Serbia, on 18 February 2008,
addressed the UN Security Council in the following terms:
"My country requests that the Security Cormeil tak:e effective measures in order to
ensure that all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of Cormeil
resolution 1244 (1999) are fully respected.
We request the Secretary-General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, to issue, in pursuance of the
previous decisions of the Security Cormeil, including resolution 1244 (1999), a clear
and unequivocal instruction to his Special Representative for Kosovo, Joachim Rücker, 4
to use his powers within the shortest period of time and declare the unilateral and
illegal act of the secession of Kosovo from the Republic of Serbia null and void. We
also request that Special Representative Rücker dissolve the Kosovo Assembly,
because it declared independence contrary to Secunty Council resolution 1244 (1999).
The Special Representative has binding powers, and they have been used before. I
request thathe use them again." (S/PV.5839, p. 5)
Neither the UN Security Council, nor the UN Secretary-General or his Special Representative
for Kosovo have heeded these requests. The UN Secretary-General, in letters to the Presidents
of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo has emphasized that the position of the
United Nations with respect of the status of Kosovo is one of "strict neutrality" (cf. letters
dated 12 June 2008, S/2008/354, Annexes I and II). The UN Secretary-General has
acknowledged that the declaration of independence of Kosovo, together with subsequent
events, have led to a "substantially changed situation in Kosovo" and a "profoundly changed
reality in Kosovo" (Security Council, 20 June 2008, S/PV.5917, p. 22). These events have led
the Secretary-General to .carry out a "reconfiguration" of the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), "in order to adapt UNMIK to a changed reality
and address current and emerging operational requirements in Kosovo" (Report of the
Secretary-General on the United Nations lnterim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 15 July
2008, S/2008/458, p. 2). This reconfiguration has paved the way for an enhanced role of the
European Union mission EULEX in Kosovo. The Security Council has welcomed the
cooperation between the UN and other international actors, within the framework of Security
Council resolution 1244 (1999), and the continuing efforts of the European Union to advance
the European perspective of the whole of the Western Balkans, thereby making a decisive
contributionto regional stability and prosperity (Presidential Statement of 26 November 2008,
S/PRST/2008/44).
Having failed to have Kosovo's Declaration of lndependence declared "null and void" by
otherUnited Nation organs, the Republic of Serbia tumed to the General Assembly in order to
request it to seek an advisory opinion from the Court. Serbia herselfhas admitted that the aim
of that request "is to transfer the issue from the political to the juridical arena" (Letter dated
15August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General, Explanatory Memorandum, A/63/195). 5
III. The Wording of the Request
1. The Court should only respond to the question asked by the General Assembly
In the past, the Court has observed in some cases that the wording of a request for an advisory
opinion did not accurately state the question on which the Court's opinion was being sought.
Consequently, the Court has in some instances been required to broaden, interpret and even
reformulate the questions put to it.
In the present case, however, such a need does not arise, and, indeed, broadening, interpreting
or even reformulating the question would run counter the request itself. The framers of the
question have chosen the wording with great care:
"Isthe unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self
Government of Kosovo in accordance withinternational law?"
The narrowness of the request before the Court is reinforced if read together with the
preamble of Genera_lAssembly resolution 63/3:
"Recalling that on 17 February 2008 the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government
of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia", (preambular paragraph 3)
and:
"Aware that this act has been received with varied reactions by the Members of the
United Nations as to its compatibility with the existing international legal order".
(preambular paragraph 4)
There can thus be-no doubt that the request only refers to the Declaration of Independence and
toits accordance with international law. As Serbia's Minister for Foreign Affairs stated when
introducing the draft resolution in the General Assembly, "the question posed is amply clear
and refrains from taking political positions on the Kosovo issue" (General Assembly, 6
8 October 2008, N63/PV.22, p. 2). What is more, Serbia emphatically ruled out any
reformulation of the question:
"We believe that the draft resolution in its present form is entirely non-controversialIt
represents the lowest common denominator of the positions of the Member States on
this question, and hence there is no need for any changes or additions." (Af63/PV.22,
p. 2)
Thus, the question put to the Court does not relate to Kosovo's present or future status or to
the issue of recognition. What is more, an advisory opinion on the "legality'' of the
Declaration of Independence could not by itself be determinative of Kosovo's present or
future status or on the effect of recognition ofKosovo's independence by other States.
2. The question's underlying assumptions
The wording of the question suggests that the Declaration of Independence was one of the
"Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo". Whether this was in fact the case
will have to be established by the Court.
While it is true that the Declaration of Independence was adopted at a special session of the
Assembly of Kosovo, one of the Provisional Institutions of Kosovo, it might be asked whether
the Assembly of Kosovo was in fact acting in that capacity. Certainly, this was no ordinary
act, but a constituent moment for the people of Kosovo. As those addressing the Assembly
said, Kosovo was "opening a new page ofhistory" (Assembly President Krasniqi); this was a
"historical moment" and "the end of a long process" (Prime Minister Thaci), ·a day that
"separates the history of Kosovo in two: the times before and after independence" (President
Sejdiu).
The Declaration of Independence itself does not carry as its author the "Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government", or the "Assembly of Kosovo". The text of the "Kosovo
Declaration of Independence", as it was communicated to Germany in a Ietter by President
Sejdiu to President Kohler on 17 February 2008, does not even mention the Assembly of 7
1
Kosovo (or the Pi-ovisional Institutions of Self-Govemment) • Rather, the first operative
paragraph of the Declaration makes it very clear who the authors were:
"We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an
independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people ... "
When reading out the Declaration in the special session of the Assembly of Kosovo of 17
February 2008, Prime Minister Thaci, said:
"We, the democratically elected leaders of our people, through this declaration hereby
declare Kosovo an independent and democratic state. This declaration reflects the will
of our people... "
There certainly can be no doubt that those who voted upon and signed the Declaration did so
not in their capacity as organs of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Govemment, but as the
representatives of the people of Kosovo and expressing the will of the people of Kosovo.
The framers of the question on which the Court is asked to respond have used the expression
"unilateral declaration of independence" (emphasis added). This is no accident. In fact, this
expression is evocative of the infamous "UDI" of 1965 by the Ian Smith regime in Southern
Rhodesia, and a calculated move designed to prejudge the outcome of the proceedings before
this Court.
Of course, a declaration of independence, by its very nature, is "unilateral" in the sense that it
represents a single expression or manifestation of will. The Declaration of Independence of
Kosovo - as any declaration of independence - was not dependent on it being accepted by
Serbia. However, as will be explained below, the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo did
meet the support of the international community.
1 Germany has noted that the Dossier prepared by the Office ofLegal Affairs contains as ,,Dossier No. 192" a
"Kosova Declaration oflndependence by the Assembly of Kosovo, 17 February 2008". That document is at
variance with the text of the declaration ofindependence that was included in President Sejdiu's letter to
PresidentKohler of 17February 2008. [Annex 2] 8
Germany, in its present statement, thus refers to the "Declaration oflndependence" of Kosovo
and would invite the Court to reject the notion ofbias that the wording "unilateral declaration
of independence" carries.
The Court is asked to find whether the Declaration of lndependence of Kosovo "is in
accordance with international law". This wording would appear to invite the Court to
positively est~blish a rule allowing Kosovo's Declaration of Independence. However, as
Germany will explain in point VI. 1below, there is considerable authority for the proposition
that intemational law in general is silent on Kosovo's Declaration of Independence. In any
event, Germany respectfully submits that the Court adopt the approach taken by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus Case (P.C.I.J., Judgment No. 9 of 7
September 1927, Ser. A., No.10, p.21): In that case, the Court took the approach that
anything not prohibited by international law is deemed to be permitted. Thus, it would suffice
for the Court to establish that Kosovo's Declaration of Independence did not contravene ahy
applicable rule of international law in order to·answer the question posed.
Finally the use of the word "is" - instead of the word "was" - at the beginning of the question
may suggest that the Declaration of Independence is an act having a continuing character.
However, a declaration of independence is an act completed at the moment it is made.
IV. Historical Background
Kosovo's Declaration of Independence of 17 February 2008 has to be assessed against the
background of the historical dispute between Serbs and Albanians over who is the rightful
·owner of Kosovo, the full context of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the humanitarian crisis
which led to the conflict of 1999, the long period of international administration under United
Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the unprecedented efforts of the
international community to facilitate a negotiated settlement between Serbia and Kosovo.
1. Kosovo up to 1998/99
During much of the Middle Ages, Kosovo Polje (the "field of the blackbirds") formed part of
th
the Greater Serbian Empire, which in the early 14 century extended south far into today's
Greece. Following the Serbian defeat by an Ottoman army on Kosovo Polje in 1389, Kosovo 9
became a part of the Ottoman Empire, which it remained until the First Balkan War of 1912.
In the late ih an_dearly 18 centuries, a considerable part of its Serb Orthodox population
emigrated and settled further north, while Albanians (many of whom had accepted Islam
following the Ottoman conquest) settled in Kosovo. As a result of the Balkan Wars of 1912-3,
Serbia annexed Kosovo. During part of both world wars, Kosovo was occupied by the troops
of Germany and her allies, but each time the occupation was ended, Serbia reasserted her
sovereignty over Kosovo. From 1945 Kosovo was an autonomous territory and from 1963 an
autonomous province. Under the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 Kosovo continued to enjoy
the status of an autonomous province, which according to the explanatioh given in Article 4
was an "autonomous, socialist, self-managing democratic socio-political community". Within
Serbia, Kosovo was given considerable autonomy including control of its_educational systems,
judiciary, and police. It enjoyed a status equivalent in most ways to that of the six republics
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia), with its own
representation at the main Yugoslav bodies.
Gradually, however, this status was abolished. In 1989, the Constitution was amended for the
first time to confer increased powers on central authorities in Belgrade. Use of the Albanian
language for official purposes was forbidden. With the imposition of a state of emergency,
Kosovo's autonomy camedefacto to an end.
In 1990, this de facto situation was quickly formalized. The Government of the Serbian
Republic first dissolved the Assembly and the Executive Council of Kosovo, and with the
adoption of a new Constitution of that Republic in September of that year the status of
autonomy of Kosovo lost all of its substance. Serbia assumed total control over the province.
When, after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a new
Constitution was adopted in April 1992, any hint at a status of autonomy for certain provinces
was deleted. In the terms of that Constitution Kosovo simply fornied part of the Republic of
Serbiawithout any special rights.
In September 1991, Kosovo _Albanians held an unofficial referendum in which they
overwhelmingly voted for independence. In May 1992, Kosovo Albanians held unofficial
elections for an assemqly and presidentfor the "Republic of Kosovo". , 10
Throughout late 1990 and 1991 thousands of Kosovo Albanian doctors, teachers, professors,
workers, police and civil servants were dismissed, and many judges were removed from their
posts.
Reports on the repressive measures of Serbian authorities reached international institutions,
which from then on continually expressed their dismay at what they had learned about serious
human rights violations in Kosovo.
ln July 1992, at its Helsinki summit, the then Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe adopted a Declaration on the Yugoslav crisis, in which it specifically addressed the
situatioi;iin Kosovo (para. 3):
"The situation in Kosovo remains extremely dangerous and reqmres immediate
preventive action. We strongly urge the authorities in Belgrade to refrain from further
repression and to engage in serious dialogue with representatives of Kosovo, in the
presence of a third party". (Document CSCE/HS/1, 10 July 1992)
A few months later,'out of growing fears that the ethnie conflict might escalate, it decided to
send a long-term mission to Kosovo.
ln August 1993,however, this mission had to be withdrawn since the competent authorities of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) refused to give their consent to the continuance of
its activities. The Security Council, in resolution 855 (1993), called upon them to reconsider
their refusai and to cooperate with the CSCE by taking the practical steps needed to the
resumption of the activities of the mission (op. para. 2). However, the FRY did not comply
with this call.
As from 1992, the General Assembly expressed its "grave concem" regarding the handling of
the situation in Kosovo. ln resolution 47/147 of 18 December 1992 it urged all parties there
(op. para. 14):
"to act with utmost restraint and to settle disputes in full compliance with human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and calls upon the Serbian authorities to refrain from the 11
use of force, to stop irnmediately the practice of 'ethnie cleansing' and to respect fully
the rights of persons belonging to ethnie cornmunities or minorities ..."
The text shows that already at this early stage, 'ethnie cleansing' was a charge brought against
the Serbian authorities.
In 1993, the accusations on gross human rights violations held against the Government in
Belgrade became even more specific. In resolution 48/153 of 20 December 1993, the General
Assembly had this to say:
"17. Expresses its grave concern at the deteriorating human rights situation in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro ), particularly in Kosovo, as
described in the reports of the Special Rapporteur, and strongly condemns the
violations of human rights occurring there;
18. Strongly condemns in particular the measures and practices of discrimination and
the violations of the human rights of the ethnie Albanians of Kosovo, as well as the
large-scale repression cornmitted by the Serbian authorities, including:
(a) Police brutality against ethnie Albanians, arbitrary searches, se1zures and
arrests, torture and ill-treatment during detention and discrimination in the
administration of justice, which leads to a climate of lawlessness in which criminal
acts, particularly against ethnie Albanians, take place with impunity;
(b) The discriminatory removal of ethnieAlbanian officiais, especially :fromthe police
andjudiciary, the mass dismissal of ethnie Albanians from professional, administrative
and other skilled positions in State-owned enterprises and public institutions, including
teachers from the Serb-run school system, and the closure of Albanian high schools
and universities;
(c) Arbitrary imprisonment of ethnie Albanian joumalists, the closure of Albanian
language mass media and the discriminatory removal of ethnie Albanian staff from
local radio and television stations;
(d) Repression by the Serbian police and military;
19. Urges the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro): 12
(a). To take all necessary measures to bring·to an immediate end the human rights
violations inflicted on the ethnic-Albanians in Kosovo, including, in particular,
discriminatory measures and practices, arbitrary detention and the use of torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and the occurrence of summary
executions;
(b) to revoke all discriminatory legislation, in particular that which has entered into
force since 1989;
(c) to re-establish the democratic institutions of Kosovo, including the pé:\.rliatnda
thejudiciary;
(d) To resume dialogue with the ethnie Albanians in Kosovo, including under the
auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia;
20. Also urges the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) to respect the human rights and fundamental :freedoms of ethnie
Albanians in Kosovo, and expresses the view that the best means to safeguard human
rights in Kosovo is to restore its autonomy."
Similar appeals to the FRY were made by resolutions 49/196 of 23 December 1994 (op. para.
19), 50/193 of22 Decerriber 1995 (op. paras. 16-18), 51/116 of 12 December 1996 (op. paras.
10-12)and 52/147 of 12December 1997(op. paras. 15-17).
In June 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in a
succession of wars fought in the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence :from the SFRY on
25 June 1991, followed by Macedonia on 17 September 1991 and Bosnia and Herzegovina on
6 March 1992. Active hostilities between forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
forces under the command of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the "Croat
Defense Council" only ceased with the signing of the Dayton peace agreement of
15December 1995.
Asfüis Court is painfully aware, unspeakable crimes were committed during the violent break
up of the former Yugoslavia. Most significantly, the Court has found that Serbia violated its
obligation under the Genocide Convention of 1948 to prevent genocide in Srebrenica 13
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007).
2. The events of 1998/99
Beginning in late February 1998, the conflict between forces of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and Serbia on the one hand, and a faction of Kosovo Albanians organized in the
"Kosovo Liberation Army", on the other hand, intensified. In response to these developments,
the Security Council, in resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998 condemned the use of
excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in
Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army. According to its
judgment, both sides had contributed to the spiral of violence.
In September and October 1998 the United Nations Secretary-General submitted two reports
to the Security Council in which he expressed serious concem over the deteriorating
·conditions in the province. In his first report of 4 September 1998 (Report of the Secretary
General Prepared Pursuant to resolution 1160 (1998) of the Secùrity Council, S/1998/834,
4 September 1998), which was complemented by an addendum on 21 September 1998
(S/1998/834/Add.1), he drew attention to the increasing number of persons displaced from
their homes, estimating that out of 230,000 such persons 170,000 were still living within
Kosovo.
This first report together with its addendum led the Security Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter, to adopt, on 23 September 1998,resolution 1199 (1998), in which it stated
(preamb.para. 10)that it was
"deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout
Kosovo, alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report
of the Secretary-General, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening,"
and demanded (op. para. 2) that 14
"the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian
leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert the
impending humanitarian catastrophe".
In addition, it demanded (op. para. 4) that the FRY
"(a) cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and
order the withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression;
(b) enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by the
European Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatie mission accredited to the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including access and complete fteedom of movement
of such monitors to, ftom and within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities,
and expeditious issuance of appropriate travel documents to international personnel
contributing to the monitoring;
(c) facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), the safe return ofrefugees and displaced persons to their homes
and allow ftee and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to
Kosovo;
(d) make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to in
paragraph 3 with the Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160 (1998),
with the aim of agreeing confidence-building measures and finding a political solution
to the problems of Kosovo."
The second report was issued by the Secretary-General on 3 October 1998 (Report of the
Secretary-General Prepared Pursuant to resolutions 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998) of the
Security Council, S/1998/912, 3 October 1998).In that report, he statedinter alia:
"7. The desperate situation of the civilian population remains the most disturbing
aspect of the hostilities in Kosovo. I am particularly concerned that civilians
increasingly have become the main target in the conflict. Fighting in Kosov? has
resulted in a mass displacement of civilian populations, the extensive destruction of
villages and means of livelihood and the deep trauma and despair of displaced
populations. Many villages have been destroyed by shelling and burning following 15
operations conducted by federal and Serbian government forces. There are concems
that the disproportionate use of force and actions of the security forces are designed to
terrorize and subjugate the population, a collective punishment to teach them that the
price of supporting the Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units is too high and will be
even higher in future. The Serbian security forces have demanded the surrender of
weapons and have been reported to use terror and vioience against civilians to force
people to flee their homes or the places where they had sought refuge, under the guise
of separating them from fighters of the Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units. The
tactics include shelling, detentions and threats to life, and finally short-notice demands
to leave or face the consequences. There have been disruptions in electricity and other
services, and empty dwellings have been bumed and looted, abandoned farm vehicles
have been destroyed, and farm animals have been bumed in their barns or shot in the
fields....
9. I am outraged by reports of mass killings of civilians in Kosovo, which recall the
atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina ...
11. The pattern of displacement is fast-changing and unpredictable as people flee in
response to the actions and real or perceived threats of the security forces. Even
though there have been some retums, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 200,000 persons
remain displaced in Kosovo and some 80,000 are in neighbouring countries and other
parts of Serbia..."
Itwas on the strength of these alarming reports that the NATO Council authorized, on 13
October 1998, activation orders for air strikes against Yugoslavia in an attempt to induce
President Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and to co-operate in bringing an end
to the violence.
Speaking of a "humanitarian catastrophe" was no hollow formula. What this meant in real
terms was clearly expressed in the report of the Secretary-General of 3 October 1998 (para.
17): 16
!'With only a few weeks before the onset ofwinter, the issue of the return of displaced
persons and refugees remains one of the most pressing issues. Sorne 50,000 intemally
displaced persons currently lack shelter or any support network, and are ill-prepared
for inclement winter weather that may arrive as early as next month. The priority of
any humanitarian strategy should be to assist these people. Children and the elderly
will almost certainly risk death from exposure if they remain at their current locations
-- especially the ones at higher elevations - into the winter."
Massive killings were perpetrated by Serbian forces even during the presence of the Kosovo
Verification Mission led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
and endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 12.03 (1998) of 24 October 1998. In
particular, at Racak ~n 15 January 1999 45 civilians were murdered. This atrocity led to
clearly worded reactions on the part of the international community. The Security Council
"strongly condemn(ed)" that massacre (Statement by the President of the Security Council,
19 January 1999, S/PRST/1992/2).
At that time, the situation in Kosovo raised indeed most serious concems. As indicated by the
UN High Commissioner for Refugees in February 2000, there were approximately 260,000
intemally displaced persons before the launching of the NATO operation, and some 35,000
persons had fled to countries bordering the former Yugoslavia (The Kosovo refugee crisis: an
independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response,
www.unhcr.ch.evaluate/kosovo/toc.htm, February 2000, paras. 80, 81).
The most detailed information on the situation was provided by the Kosovo Verification
Mission, deployed in the Yugoslav province from October 1998 to 20 March 1999. The
OSCE has submitted a detailed report (Kosovo/Kosova. As Seen, as Told. An analysis of the
human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999,
www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/partl/index.htm (undated)) on the atrocities committed by
Serbian security forces during that period of roughly six months, well before military conflict
began between NATO and the FRY, covering at the same time, however, the period up to 9
June 1999,the day when the military conflict ended. The general lesson to be drawn from this
report may be summarized in a few words. The Yugoslav Govemment had created a climate
of absolute lawlessiless irithe region. Abundant information demonstrates that the responsible
authorities not only failed to protect the life and physical integrity oftheir citizens of Albanian 17
.
ethnicity, but that these citizens had become objects of constant persecution, subjected to the
most complete arbitrariness. Generally it was clearly conveyed to all ethnie Albanians that
their presence was und~sirable in Kosovo and that they would do better to leave the region for
good. In the first place, it may be worthwhile to quote a "Background paper" which contains a
general summary of the report:
"The conclusions of the report's analysis are that clear strategies lay behind the human
rights violations committed by Serbian forces; that paramilitaries and armed civilians
committed acts of extreme lawlessness with the tolerance and collusion of military and
security forces whose own actions were generally highly organized and systematic;
and that the violations inflicted on the Kosovo Albanian population on a massive scale
after 20 March were a continuation of actions by Serbian forces that were well
rehearsed, insofar as they were taking place in many locations well before that date.
While both parties to the con:flict committed human rights violations, there was no
balance or equivalence in the nature or scale of those violations - overwhelmingly it
was the Kosovo Albanian population who suffered. The report also notes that
persistent human rights violations lay behind the security breakdown which plunged
Kosovo into armed conflict and a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe." (OSCE,
Background Paper- Human Rights in Kosovo, 1999, p. 2)
Forced expulsion was perhaps the most disturbing phenomenon of the somber human rights
situation. The OSCE report referred to above contains information to the effect that
systematic and widespread expulsions were carried out as soon as the OSCE Mission had left
the province on 20 March 1999, increasing in intensity after the start of the NATO operation
against the FRY.
"...Once the OSCE-KVM left on 20 March 1999 and in particular after the start of the
NATO bombing on 24 March, Serbian police and/or VJ, often accompanied by
paramilitaries, went from village to village and, in the towns, from area to area
threatening and expelling the Kosovo Albanian population. Those who had_avoided
this first expulsion or had managed to retum were then expelled in repeat operations
some days or weeks later. Others who were not directly forcibly expelled fled as a
result of the climate. of terror created by the systematic beatings, harassment, arrests, 18
killings, shelling and looting carried out across the province." (Kosovo/Kosova. As
Seen, as Told. An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission, October 1998 · to June 1999,
www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/partl/index.htm (undated), Chapter 14, p.1)
In sum, at the end of March 1999 the humanitarian catastrophe, which had been referred to as
an impending event during many months, had fully materialized. The Albanian population in
Kosovo lacked the most elementary guarantees which any civilized State must provide to its
citizens.
The disastrous wave of violence and crime unleashed by the Serbian security forces continued
on a massive scale during NATO's air operations, as evidenced by independent reports
published during or after the armed conflict.
Thus, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in a Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Kosovo of 31 May 1999, wrote with regard to forcible displacement:
"13. Forced displacement and expulsions of ethnie Albanians from Kosovo have
increased dramatically in scale, swiftness and brutality.
14. A large number of corroborating reports from the field indicate that Serbian
military and police forces and paramilitary units have conducted a well-planned and
implemented program of forcible expulsion of ethnie Albanians from Kosovo. More
than 750,000 Kosovars are refugees or displaced persons in neighbouririg countries
and territories, while according to various sources there are hundreds of thousands of
intemally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Kosovo. This displacement appears to have
affected virtually all areas of Kosovo as well as villages in southem Serbia, including
places never targeted by NATO air strikes or in which the so-called Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) has never been present.
15. This last fact strengthens indications that refugees are not fleeing NATO air
strikes, as is often alleged by Yugoslav authorities. The deliberateness of the
programme to expel ethnie Albanians from Kosovo is further supported by statements
made by Serbian authorities and paramilitaries at the time of eviction, such as telling 19
people to go to Albania or to have a last look at their land because they would never
see it again. However, in the light of the deteriorating security situation, some persons
have apparently decided to flee before being ordered to leave. A number of refugees,
particularly intellectul:,led after receiving threatening phone calls from unidentified
persons with detailed knowledge of their activities." (Report by the High
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo,
Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, 31 May 1?99, UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/7, paras. 13-15)
In a later report of 27 September 1999the High Commissioner for Human Rights states quite
bluntly (para. 7):
"Human rights violation were among the root causes of the mass exodus of more than
1 million ethnie Albanians from Kosovo. Out of 273 refugees interviewed, only 1
reportedly left his village out of fear of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
bombs, while all the others described how they were compelled, either by direct
violence or by intimidation, to leave their homes." (Report by the High Commissioner
for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, 27 September, UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/10)
Itis estimatedby the OSCE that over 90 percent of the Kosovo Albanian population had been
displaced by the end of the military operations in June 1999 (Kosovo/Kosova. As Seen, As
Told, Chapter 14, Forced Expulsion, p. 1). Such a tremendous dimension in the flow of
refugees, inside Kosovo and across its borders, would not have been possible had the
Yugoslav Government not drawn up beforehand an elaborate strategy to make Kosovo free of
Albanians.
There is no need to providè further details of the facts carefully assembled in the OSCE report
and the relevant UN reports. These facts, of which only a summary account is given here,
speakfor themselves. They fully confirm that at the beginning of 1999 there indeed existed,
as observed and documented by knowledgeable and impartial third-party institutions, a
humanitarian emergency, caused by serious crimes deliberately and purposefully committed
by the sectirity and military forces of the FRY, and that the criminal strategy gained
unprecedented momentum when the KVM Observer Mission was withdrawn, continuing
almost to the end ofNATO's air operations. 20
These crimes marked the tragic climax of more than a decade of systematic violations of the
human rights of the Albanian population in Kosovo.
On 26 February 2009, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
convicted former FRY Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic, former Serbian Interior Minister
Stojilkovic, former Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, General Ojdanic, and
three other high ranking Serbian officiais for crimes against humanity committed in Kosovo
in 1999.In the summary of thejudgment, read out by Judge Bonamy, it is stated:
"The Trial Chamber therefore finds that there was a broad campaign of violence
directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population during the course of the
NATO air strikes, conducted by forces under the control of the FRY and Serbian
authorities, during which there were incidents of killing, sexual assault, and the
intentional destruction of mosques. It was the deliberate actions of these forces during
this campaign that caused the departure of at least 700,000 Kosovo Albanians :from
Kosovo in the short period of time between the end of March and beginning of June
1999."
The Serbia of today is not the Serbia of 1998/99. It was Serbia that arrested former President
Milosevic and other ICTY indictees. Serbia is a potential candidate for EU membership and is
participating in the EU' s Stabilisation and Association Process. A stable and prosperous
Serbia fully integrated into the family of European nations is important for the stability of the
region. However, there can be no doubt that the events of 1998/99 have left an indelible mark
on the collective memory of the Kosovo Albanians.
3. Kosovo under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999)
On 10June 1999,the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999), and ~ATO operations
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ceased. The Council authorized the Secretary
General, with the assistance of the relevant international organizations, to establish an
international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo could enjoy substantial autonomy. Once
established under resolution 1244 (1999), and pursuant to that resolution, the United Nations 21
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) assumed all legislative, executive and judiciary authority
throughout Kosovo.
Under resolution 1244 (1999), and up to the present day, Kosovo and Serbia have been
govemed in complete separation. Serbia has not exercised any goveming authority over
Kosovo since June, 1999. ·
Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions were created and developed and increasingly
took on the responsibility of managing Kosovo's affairs.
In May 2000, UNMIK established the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS),
comprising, i.a. an Interim Advisory Council and a Kosovo Transitional Council. In May
2001, UNMIK promulgated a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Govemment in
Kosovo which established the Provisional Institutions of Self-Govemment (PISG). These
institutions of self-government in the legislative, executive and judicial fields were put in the
hands of Kosovo's leaders and civil servants after Kosovo-wide elections were held in
November, 2001. The PISG comprised the President of Kosovo, the Assembly of Kosovo,
which elected the President of Kosovo, the Govemment of Kosovo, headed by a Prime
Minister, nominated by the.President and endorsed by the Assembly, and the Judicial System
of Kosovo.
Since 2001, UNMIK had been gradually transferring increased administrative competencies
to the PISG. In the course of 2002, a set of UN-endorsed benchmarks for the democratic
·development of Kosovo were adopted (Standards for Kosovo). In 2003, the international
community, with the full support of the Security Council, articulated a policy of "Standards
before Status". The Standards covered e1ght key areas: functioning of the democratic
institutions, the rule oflaw, freedom ofmovement, the retum ofrefugees and IDPs, economy,
property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protection Corps. Meeting these
Standards was declared to be essential to commencing a political process designed to
determine Kosovo's future, in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999).
The work on the Standards for Kosovo was later complemented by an even more demanding
process of meeting standards for European integration as part of the EU's Stabilization and
Association Process Tracking Mechanism. 22
In June 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Kai Bide as his Special Bnvoy in order to
undertake a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo and to assess whether the
conditions were in place to enter into a political process designed to determine the future
status of Kosovo. In his report (S/2005/635, Annex), Mr. Bide recommended that the time had
corne to move to the next phase of the political process. The Security Council welcomed Mr.
Bide's report (S/PRST/2005/51).
In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Martti Ahtisaari as his Special
Bnvoy for the future status process for Kosovo.
While Mr. Ahtisaari was conducting talks, Serbia brought forward a new Constitution that
unilaterally re-asserted control over Kosovo, in effect tying the hands of the Serbian
negotiators. The new Constitution, which was adopted by the National Assembly of the
Republic of Serbia on 30 September 2006 and endorsed by a referendum on 28 and 29
October 2006, in its Preamble;does consider the "Province of Kosovo and Metohija" as an
integral part of theterritory of Serbia enjoying the status of substantial autonomy. However,
as was pointed out by the Council of Burope's advisory body on constitutiona~matters, the
BuropeanCommission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
"in contrast with what the preamble announces, the Constitution itself does not at all
guarantee substantial autonomy to Kosovo, for it entirely depends on the willingness
of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia whether self-government will be
realised or not." (Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, adopted by the Commission at
its 70 plenary session (Venice, 17-18March 2007), CDL-AD(2007)004, para. 8)
After more than one year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, the
Special Bnvoy concluded that Kosovo and Serbia were not able to reach an agreement on
Kosovo's future statµs:
"It is my firm view that the negotiations' potential to produce any mutually agreeable
outcome on Kosovo's status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the
format, will overcome this impasse." (S/2007/168, para. 3) 23
The Special Envoy continued:
"The time has corne to resolve Kosovo's status. Upon careful consideration of
Kosovo's recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the
negotiations with the parties, I have corne to the conclusion that the only viable option
for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international
community." (para. 5)
Mr. Ahtisaari's recommendation for "supervised independence" was accompanied by a 63-
page "Comprehensive Proposa! for the Kosovo Status Settlement" ("Ahtisaari Plan"),
consisting of a series of "General Principles" and twelve annexes detailing measures to ensure
a "viable, sustainable and stable" Kosovo. Pristina accepted the Ahtisaari Plan in its entirety,
while Belgrade rejected it.
The Secretary-General conveyed these documents to the Security Council on 26 March 2007
with his support of both the recommendation made by his Special Envoy and the Ahtisaari
Plan (S/2007/168 and S/2007/168/Add.l). The Security Council, however failed to agree on a
resolution that would have endorsed the Ahtisaari Plan (see the draft resolution introduced by
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, S/2007/437
Provisional [Annex 3]).
After a period of discussions in the Security Council, and a mission of the Security Council to
Belgrade and Kosovo, the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States) proposed that a "Troïka" of officials from the European
Union, the United States and Russia undertake yet another period of negotiations with the
goal of achieving a negotiated settlement between Kosovo and Serbia. On 1August 2007, the
Secretary-General welcomed this initiative, restated his assessment that the status quo was
unsustainable and requested a report from the Contact Group on these efforts by 10December
2007.
During the four month of its mandate, the Troïka undertook an intense schedule of meetings
with the parties. The parties reviewed outcomes ranging from independence to autonomy, as
·well as altemate models such as confederal arrangements, and even a model based on an
"agreement to disagree" based on the German "Grundlagenvertrag" of 1972 in which neither 24
pai-ty would be expected to renounce its position but would nonetheless pursue practical
arrangements designed to facilitate cooperation and consultation between them. Other
international models, such as Hong Kong, the Aland Islands and the Commonwealth of
Independent States, were discussed. None of these models proved to be an adequate basis for
compromise between the parties (cf. Report of the European Union/United States/Russian
Federation Troika on Kosovo, S/2007/723, Enclosure, para. 10).
In a letter dated 5 December 2007 and addressed to EU High Representative Solana, the
European Union representative within the Troika, Ambassador Ischinger, gave his summary
of the Troika process:
"The Troika has, as promised, left no stone untumed in trying to achieve a negotiated
settlement of the Kosovo status question. The positions of both parties on status have,
however, remained diametrically opposed. The potential to reach a negotiated
settlement is now exhausted. It is my view that the parties would not be capable of
reaching agreement on the issue if negotiations were to be continued, whether in the
Troika format, or in some other form." [Annex 4]
The Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdoin, shared this view:
"[It] has not proved possible to achieve sufficient common ground between the parties.
This is not because of lack of time or energy in the Troika Process. During the Troika
Process one or other of the parties rejected options including confederation, autonomy
and a status neutral way forward. This underlines the irreconcilable gap between the
positions of the two parties. We share Ambassador Ischinger' s firm view that further
status negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina would offer no prospect of reaching
an agreement. Indeed, they might even lead to a further hardening of positions on both
sides" (Letter of 7 December 2007 addressed to the Portuguese EU Presidency).
[Annex 5]
A similar sentiment was expressed by the Secretary General. In his periodic UNMIK report of
3 January 2008, he made the following observation: 25
"Expectations in Kosovo remain high that a solution to Kosovo's future status must be
found rapidly. As such the status quo is not likely to be sustainable. Should the
impasse continue, events ·on the ground could take on a momentum of their own,
putting at serious risk the achievements and legacy of the United Nations in Kosovo.
. (...) Uncertainty and a loss of forward dynamic in the future status process could
create a risk of instability, both in Kosovo and in the wider region; as well as a
potentialrisk to the safety of the United Nations staff'. (S/2007/768, paras 33, 34)
The Security Council met on 19 December 2007 in closed session to discuss the end of the
Troika Process. However, it could - once again - not agree on a way forward for Kosovo.
Further meetings on 16 January and 14 February 2008 failed to·resolve the deadlock within
the SecurityCouncil.
On 17 February 2008 the democratically elected Assembly of Kosovo adopted a Declaration
of Independence for the Republic of Kosovo. lt accepted the principles of the Ahtisaari Plan
and welcomed the continued support of the international community on the basis of resolution
1244(1999). In its final clause, the Declaration says:
"We hereby affirm, clearly, specifically and irrevocably, that Kosovo shall be legally
bound to comply with the provisions contained in this Declaration, including
especially the obligations for it under the Ahtisaari Plan. In all of these matters, we
shall act consistently with the principles of international law and resolutions of the
Security Council, including resolution 1244. We declare publicly that all States are
entitled to rely upon this Declaration, and appeal to them to extend us their support
and friendship."
On 15 June 2008, the new Kosovo constitution came into force, again in conformity with the
Ahtisaari Plan. The Assembly of Kosovo has passed a comprehensive set of new laws,
including laws to establish new state institutions, such as a security force, intelligence agency
and diplomatie service, laws on citizenship and on the protection and promotion of the rights
of communities. 26
V. The Independence of Kosovo: A Case sui generis
The sui-generis character of the Kosovo question is a recurring theme in the debate on
Kosovo's Declaration of Independence. Indeed the Declaration of lndependence itself, in one
of its preambular paragraphs, underlines the specificity of the Kosovo situation:
"Observing that Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia's non-consensual
break-up and is not a precedent for any other situation, ..." (Kosovo Declaration of
Independence of 17February 2008, preamb. para. 6)
The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the future status of Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari,
in his report ofMarch 2007, expressed himselfin the following terms:
"Kosovo is a umque case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a
precedent for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244,the
Security Council responded to Milosevic' s action in Kosovo by denying Serbs a role
in its govemance, placing Kosovo under temporary UN administration, and envisaging
a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future. The combination of these
factorsmakes Kosovo' s circumstances extraordinary." (S/2007/168, para. 15)
In fact, it would seem that the uniqueness of the Kosovo situation is a feature that unîtes
proponents and detractors of Kosovo's independence alike. Thus, EU Foreign Ministers,
while not being able to agree on recognition of Kosovo, did agree on the sui generis character
of the Kosovo issue:
"[The Council] underlines its conviction that in view of the conflict of the 1990s and
the extended period of international administration under SCR 1244, Kosovo
c6nstitutes a sui generis case (...)" (Council Conclusions on Kosovo, 18 February
2008, final para.).[Annex 6]
Several aspects combine to niake Kosovo a truly unique sui generis case, as previously laid
out in Part IV of this statement ("Historical Background"): 27
the antecedents of the con:flictof the 1990s, possibly as far back as 1912, but in
particular those of the late 1990s, as documented in relevant UN and other
documents;
the nature and scope ofwhat happened in 1998-99 (as documented): massacres and
pillaging, mass ethnie cleansing, necessity of international community intervention
to prevent, or rather put an end to this;
the involvement of the international community and in particular its most universal
institution, the UN: before and after 1999;
the earnest and intense, but ultimately unsuccessful search for a negotiated solution
in this framework (in other words: no other avenue left open, unilateral action is
ultima ratio).
VI. Legal Aspects
1. International law might be silent on Kosovo's Declaration of lndependence
There is considerable authority for the proposition that a declaration of independence leading
to a secession and secession itself are of an entirely factual nature and that intemational law in
general is silent as to their legality:
"International law has traditionally acknowledged secession subsequent to a factual
state of events which has led to a situation in which the constitutive elements of a
State are present rather than stating conditions of its legality." (Chr. Haverland,
"Secession", in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law,
Volume 4, pp. 354 et seq., at p. 355; see also Chr. Schaller, Die Sezession des Kosovo
und der volkerrechtliche Status der intemationalen Prasenz, in: Archiv des
Volkerrechts, vol. 46 (2008), pp. 131 et seq., at p. 134.; P. Hilpold, Die Sezession -
zum Versuch der Verrechtlichung eihes faktischen Phiinomens, in: Zeitschrift für
offentliches Recht, vol. 63 (2008), pp. 117 et seq., at p. 123-4.).
Indeed, it is striking that the intemational law experts from around the world whose opinions
were sought in the Supreme Court of Canada case Reference re Secession of Quebec, while
differing on many of the legal issues raised, seemed to agree on this one particular point. 28
In his report prepared for the Attorney General of Canada, Jatnes Crawford wrote:
"International law has been prepared to acknowledge political realities once the
independence of a seceding entity was firmly established .andin relation to the territory
effectively controlled by it." (A.F. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in International
Law: Quebec and Lessons Leamed (2000), pp. 31 et seq., at p. 36)
Later, Professor Crawford held:
"It is true that international law does not prohibit secession of any group whatever
within a state... The question of secession is a matter within the jurisdiction of the
metropolitan state... For international law specifically to prohibit secession, it would
need to address the seceding entity as such, and this it generally does not do."
(Bayefsky, op. cit., at pp. 160-161) ·
Professor Abi-Saab, in his expert opinion prepared for the Amicus Curiae acting on behalf of
the Quebec sovereigntists, wrote:
"While international law does not recognize a right t-0 secession, neither does it
prohibit secession, unless the latter results :froma violation of one of thefundatnental
principles of contemporary international law and perpetuates the effects of .such a
violation." (Bayefsky, op. cit., pp. 69 et seq., at p. 74)
In the same expert opinion, he maintained that
"[Secession] is basically a phenomenon not regulated by international law." (Bayefsky,
op. cit., at p. 72).
Professor Thomas Franck, also writing for the Amicus Curiae, emphasized this very same
point:
."The correct conclusion to be drawn :fromthe vast repertory of state practice... is that
international law maintains neutrality towards the secessionist impulse but recognizes 29
it when it succeeds... Quite simply, the law is neutral. It permits, and certainly does
not prohibit secession." (Bayefsky, op. cit., pp. 75 et seq., at p. 83)
The same position was expressed by Professer Malcom Shaw:
'
"[A]s a matter of law the international legal system neither authorises nor condemns
[secessionist] attempts, but rather stands neutral. Secession as such, therefore, is not
contrary to international law." (Bayefsky, op. cit., pp. 125 et seq., at p. 136)
Professer Alain Pellet wrote:
"[N]o principle of international law excludes the right of a people to secede, and when
such is the case, the law of nations simply takes notice of the existence of the new
state." (Bayefsky, op. cit., pp. 85 et seq., at p. 106)
In a further expert opinion prepared upon request of the Govemment of Quebec prior to the
proceedings before the Supreme Court of Canada, Professors Thomas Franck, Rosalyn
Higgins, Alain Pellet, Malcom Shaw and Christian Tomuschat held:
"[T]here is no legal rule precluding secess10n... Secession also appears to be a
political fact from which international law is content to draw conclusions when it leads
to the establishment of effective and stable authorities." (Bayefsky, op. cit., pp. 241 et
seq., at p. 284)
The issue of the legality of a declaration of independence may very well arise under domestic
(not international) law. This, however, is a question that cannot be properly answered by the
Court, as international law is the only basis for its decision (cf. Article 38 para. 1, Article 68
of the Statute of the Court).
In international practice, declarations of independence have only been held to violate
international law if conjoined with some other violation.
This has notably been the case when a declaration of independence has been brought about by
the illegal use of force by another state or in violation of an international agreement. A case in 30
point would be Security Council resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983, in which the
UN Security Council considered the -declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot
authorities as "legally invalid" and called "for its withdrawal".
International law distinguishes clearly between a change in territory brought about by the
illegal use of force by another State (in particular, an annexation), and a move by part of the
population in a State to secede from that State where such an element is lacking. An
·annexation is universally admitted to be contrary to international law; inoreover, international
law even forbids other States from recognizing the result of an annexation (see, e.g.,
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Rights and Duties of States, draft article 18,
which reads: "Every State has the duty to refrain from recognizing any territorial acquisition
made by another State through force or the threat of force.", Yearbook of the ILC 1949, p.
113). The ILC discussed whether or not to deal with changes in territory brought about by
secession in the same way, but decided with a clear majority not to do so (loc. ~it., at p. 112).
Thus, it would appear that while annexation is prohibited by international law, secession is
. neither encouraged nor forbidden.
In the case of Katanga, Security Council condemnation of the "secessionist activities illegally
carried out by the provincial administration of Katanga" was clearly predicated by the fact
that these activities were carried out "with the aid of external resources and manned by
foreign mercenaries" (Security Council resolution 169 (1961) of 24 November 1961,para. 1).
Interestingly enough, while the Security Council declared (in para. 8 ofresolution 169(1961))
that "all secessionist activities against the Republic of the Congo are contrary to the Loi
fondamentale" (and Security Council decisions), it did not hold "all secessionist activities" to
be contrary to international law
The case of Southern Rhodesia is another example where a declaration of independence was
declared "as having no legal validity" because it was conjoined with another violation,
namely racial discrimination. Thus, resolution 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965 makes
reference to "a racist minority" and an "illegal racist minority regime" in Southern Rhodesià;
similarly, resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November.1965 speaks of "a racist settler minority in
Southern Rhodesia." It is quite clear that the condemnation of the unilateral declaration of
independence of Southern Rhodesia by the UN Security Council was motivated by 31
considerations other than those norm:ally attached to a mere declaration of independence or
secession.
This does not mean that international law is not relevant in the context as a whole. Thus,
international law sets certain conditions that must be present before a newly self-declared
State may be recognized by other States, viz., the presence of the three elements of statehood:
a territory, a people, and effective govemment. It is indeed in the context of recognition that
international law cornes into play. The most recent case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
perfectly illustrates this point. When States and international organizations reacted to the
declaration of independence ofthese entities, it was invariably Russia's act of recognition that
was held to be in violation of international law, leaving aside the question of the "legality" of
the declaration of independence itself.
Thus, the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union declared:
"La Présidence du Conseil de l'Union européenne prend note de la décision prise par
les autorités russes de reconnaître l'indépendance del' Abkhazie et de l'Ossétie du Sud.
Elle condamne fermement cette décision. Celle-ci est contraire aux principes
d'indépendance, de souveraineté et d'intégrité territoriale de la Géorgie, reconnus par
la Charte des Nations Unies, l'Acte final de la conférence sur la sécurité et la
coopération en Europe et les Résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de sécurité."
[Annex 7]
The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, reacted in a
similar vein :
"The recognition of independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia violates
fundamental OSCE principles ... Russia should follow OSCE principles by respecting
the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia."nex 8]
United States President Bush stated:
"The United States condemns the decision by the Russian President to recognize as
independent states the Georgian regions of South Abkhazia and Ossetia. This decision 32
is inconsistent with numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions that Russia ·
has voted for in the past ... " [Annex 9]
A G7joint statement of 27 August 2008 held:
"We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United
States and the United Kingdom, condemn the action of our fellow G8 member.
Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia violates the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and is contrary to UN Security Council
resolutions supported by Russia." [Annex 10]
What follows from international practice is that intemational law neither expressly allows nor
condemns a declaration of independence, but is silent on the question of its legality. Itis,
however, only the compatibility of the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo with
intemational law that the Court has been asked to determine.
2. ln any·event, and given the very special situation of Kosovo, international law
would not object to Kosovo's independence
The principle of sovereignty and, as one of several aspects of sovereignty, territorial integrity
is an important, but not the only'important principle of intemational law. Another principle of
equal force is that of self-determination.
The right of self-determination of peoples as such is well recognized in intemational law. It
forms part of the Charter of the United Nations (article 1 para. 2; article 55) and is firmly
entrenched in customary intemational law.
Of particular relevance in this context are the "Friendly Relations Declaration" of 1970 and
the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It clearly emerges from both these documents that the
principle of self-determination is recognized as being on the same level as, and by no means
subservient to, the principle of the sovereignty, the sover-eign equality and the territorial
integrity of States. 33
The General Assembly's Declaration on Principles of International Law conceming Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (resolution 2625 (XXV) of24 October 1970) states:
"By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine,
without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social
and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in
accordance with the provisions of the Charter."
The relationship between territorial integrity and self-determination also become evident
when looking at Part VIII of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe:
"The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self
determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law,
including those relating to territorial integrity of States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples
always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their
internai and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as
they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development."
Self-determination may be exercised internally and externally. Internai self-determination
means enjoying a degree of autonomy inside a larger entity, not leaving it altogether but, as a
rule, deciding issues of local relevance on a local level. External self-determination means the
right of a group freely to determine its own political and constitutional status on. the
international level. This would include the right to leave a bigger constitutional entity
altogether. While most scholars agree that internai self-determination is an essential part of
this concept, opinion is divided as to the external form of self-determination.
There are those who say that - outside a colonial context, which is not at issue here - a right to
-Secession never exists. This, however, would also render the internai right of self- 34
determination meaningless in practice. There would be no remedy for a group which is not
granted the self-determination that may be due to it under international law. The majority in
the State could easily and with impunity oppress the minority, without any recourse being
open to that minority.
On the other hand, no-one claims that any group which is able to show some difference (of an
ethnie, religious, historical or other nature) between itself and the majority has the right to
secede, i.e. to declare its independence as a new State. Such a broad right of secession would
clearly endanger international peace by encouraging groups of all kinds and sizes, whether
enjoying autonomy and participation or not, to break away from their mother States. While
fear of secession is principally politically motivated, avoidance of the dangers created by a
liberal right of secession is also a legitimate objective of international law.
lt follows that international law neither totally excludes secession, nor does it give a liberal
right of secession to all and every group. While self-determination should, for the sake of the
stability of the international system, normally be enjoyed and exercised inside the existing
framework of States, it may exceptionally legitimize secession if this can be shown to be the
only remedy against a prolonged and rigorous refusai of internal self-determination. This kind
of remedial right of secession would not endanger international stability, as it would corne
into play only under circumstances where the situation inside a State has deteriorated to a
point where it might be considered to endanger international peace and stability in itself.
lt would, on the contrary, help to put meaning into the principle of self-determination as a
whole. The development of international law as a whole since the end of the Second World
War demonstrates that certain limitations to the sovereignty of States have become generally
acceptable. The very development of human rights (which every State owes to all men and
-women, including its own citizens), the concept of the "responsibility to protect", and the
enormous progress made by international criminal law in establishing criminal responsibility
even of holders of high office and thus pushing back impunity may serve to illustrate this
point.
lt is therefore submitted that the right to self-determination prevails, and tums into a right of
external self-determination, under two conditions, which must be met cumulatively. 35
The first condition is an exceptionally severe and long-lasting refusai of intemal self
determination by the State in which a group is living. This is not identical, but will often
coïncide with severe violations of human rights, such as the right to life and freedom, but also
the rights of association and assembly. For this condition to be met, it is required that the
authorities of the State in which a certain, distinct group is living consistently and over a
considerable period of time deny to this group any right to have a say in matters directly
conceming it, by denying it any decisional autonomy as well as any meaningful participation
in the deliberations on the central level. While this will usually - as in the case of Kosovo -
go hand in hand with severe human rights violations, such as suppression of demonstrations
of political opposition, arbitrary arrests and imprisonments, torture and maltreatment, it is
really the denial of intemal self-determination which counts for this argument. As the
Supreme Court of Canada has put it, "the underlying proposition is that, when a people is
blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination intemally, it is entitled,
as a last resort, to exercise it by secession"Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217, para. 134).
The facts preceding the Kosovo Declaration of Independence have been set out above. They
reveal a clear case of prolonged and severe repression and denial of all intemal self
detei-mination.
The second condition is that no other avenue exists for resolving the resulting conflict. It
follows from the nature of extemal self-determination as the ultimate remedy to the persistent
denial of intemal self-determination that it may be exercised only as an ultima ratio. This
means in practice that other possible ways of remedying the situation must first be exhausted.
These other ways may consist in, e.g., negotiations (direct or indirect, with the assistance of
facilitators, mediators, or otherwise ), or recoutse to relevant international organizations and
bodies, such as the United Nations. Only when all other possible routes to intemal self
determination can be shown to be blocked, the route to extemal self-determination opens. In
the case of Kosovo, this condition, too, is met. As has been set out in detail above, there have
been negotiations in several formats over a considerable period of time, the Security Council
has been called upon to impose a solution - all in vain.
If, under the rules just laid out, a right of extemal self-determination cornes into being, this
does not mean that it will exist for a limitless future. A situation may change, repression may 36
cease, the constitutional structure of the State in which the group in question is living may
change and, for example, federalize or decentralize, and so on. Whether or not such changes
make the right to external self-determination disappear must be judged on the merits of each
case, taking into account the severity of the situation prior to those changes.
Two considerations appear particularly important in this context.
First, if it is true that a right of external self-determination came into being because prolonged
and persistent denial of internai self-determination destroyed the basis on which the State
claimed its sovereignty over the group in question, then only the prospect of a safe and better
future can re-establish this basis.In other words, only if circumstances show over a certain
period of time that change for the better is pennanent and reliable, the right of external self
determination may be said to have disappeared again.
As has been said previously, the Serbia of today is not the Serbia of the past. However, the
reality is that the very legacy of the conflict, in particular the atrocities of the late 1990s, make
a return of Serb rule in Kosovo unthinkable. Certainly, in the eyes of the Kosovars, if not in
the eyes of the international community, the viability of a solution that would maintain Serb
sovereignty over Kosovo could not be established. To quote, once again, from the Report of
the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo' s future status, Martti Ahtisaari, a
"return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of
the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent
opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia - however national such
autonomy may be - is simply not tenable." In any event, Serbia did not offer Kosovo a
prospect for a better future, as evidenced by the adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia in
2006. As already pointed out, that Constitution itself does not at all guarantee substanti~l
autonomy to Kosovo, for it entirely depends on the willingness of the National Assembly of
the Republic of Serbia whether self-government will be realised or not.
Second, it has been said that other, lesser means of resolving the conflict must be tried and
exhausted before a group may have recourse to its right of external self-determination. It
would, however, be both illogical and unjust to hold the time needed for these attempts
against the group by holding that this lapse of time made the right of external self
determination disappear before it could even be used. In other words, the fact that over several 37
years, while they were already under UN administration and outside the scope of Serb State
generated violence, the Kosovars attempted to arrive at a consensual solution cannot now
serve as a basis for the argument that during this time the Kosovars have lost their right of
externat self-determination by this very lapse of time.
3. Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) did not prohibit the Declaration of
lndependence of Kosovo
Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) does mention "the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'' several times. As the FRY no longer exists,
this reference must now indeed be ta.kenas a reference to Serbia. These references are in
preambular paragraph 10: "Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
other States of the region,s set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2," (emphasis
·added)
and in
Annex 1 (sixth item): "A political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo,
taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of
the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA;" (emphasis added)
and
Annex 2 (para. 8): "A political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo,
taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of
the region, and the demilitarization of the UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a
settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-goveming
institutions." (emphasis added) 38
Both annexes (which reproduce documents antedating the resolution by a few days or weeks
respectively (cf. preambular paragraph 9 of the tesolution) .are incorporated into the operative
part ofresolution 1244 (1999) by operative paragraph 1.
Finally, operative paragraph 11 (a), which deals with the international civilian presence, again
refers to Annex 2.
A doser look at the words or groups ofwords set in italics in the fragments ofresolution 1244
(1999) reproduced above demonstrates, however, that all these references to the protection of
the Yugoslav (read today: Serb) sovereignty and territorial integrity appear in the context of
an interim framework for a transitional period. None of them can be found to refer to the
permanent and definitive solution to the status of Kosovo.
This interim framework, protected by an international civilian presence (UNMIK) and an
international security presence (KFOR), was set up in order to allow a political process to take
place, at whose end a definitive solution to the Kosovo status issue was to be found. The fact
that all references to Yugoslavia's territorial integrity occur in the context of the interim
framework, and not in that of any final settlement, clearly indicates the intentions of the
Security Council in June 1999: It wanted an end to violence and conflict, it wanted a political
process with a definitive status solution at its end, and it wanted some kind of "status
moratorium" while that political process was going on, in order to protect the process from
violent disturbances and to eliminate temptation to all parties to present this process with a
fait accompli. Seen this way, imposing such a moratorium on unilateral faits accomplis was
simply a necessary counterpart to the ouster of Serb military, paramilitary and police from
· Kosovo provided for in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution, and to the estabiishment of a
UN-led civil administration in Kosovo (UNMIK.).
It follows what was not the intention of the Security Council: It was not its intention to
impose any specified status as a final settlement. As to how the final settlement at the end of
the political process should look like, resolution 1244 (1999) is entirely silent.t does not ask
for complete independence, but neither does it exclude it.
This is confirmed by operative paragraph 11 (a) ofresolution 1244 (1999), which reads: 39
"11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will
include:
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy
and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet
accords (S/1999/648);"
By way of incorporating annex 2, this operative paragraph once more incorporates the call for
respect for Yugoslav territorial integrity into the resolution. Moreover, and more importantly,
it expressly requires the establishment of "substantial autonomy and self-government in
Kosovo", but not more, i.e., not its complete independence and Kosovo's own sovereignty. It
is crucial to note, however, that this autonomy is to be established "pending a final
settlement". Autonomy, under this operative paragraph, is to be established as a transitory
state, not as a final settlement.
Resolution 1244 (1999) does not say how exactly the "political process" established and
secured by the various provisions of the resolution was to look like itself. Itwas always clear,
however, that it should endeavour to find a mutually acceptable solution to the issue of the
definitive status of Kosovo, in other words, by way of negotiations of some kind.
It was also clear that any final settlement had to be arrived at on the basis of the will of the
people of Kosovo, as was expressly foreseen in Article I para. 3 of Chapter 8 of the
Rambouillet accords,
"Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting
shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the
basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts
regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act, and to
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and
to consider proposais by any Party for additional measures" (S/1999/648, emphasis
added),
to which operative paragraph 11 (e) ofresolution 1244 (1999) 40
"(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status,
taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648)",
refers.
This "future status" process finally began in autumn 2005. lt encompassed prolonged talks of
a Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General (Martti Ahtisaari), who finally
prepared a settlement package which in his view struck a compromise that should be
acceptable to both sides. When Serbia refused~the Security Council took up the matter but
was itself unable to make a decision. As a last resort, the Secretary-General mandated a
Troika consisting of the US, Russia and the EU to hold talks with the parties. The Troika
pursued its work from August to early December 2007 in an extremely intensive way,
attempting to find common ground by presenting the parties with a number of model
relationships. None of those, however, found the agreement of both parties. The political
process envisaged by resolution 1244 (1999) had thus been engaged in various fora and under
various angles, but it had definitely failed.
The process having failed, the question arises whether resolution 1244 (1999) continues to
prohibit any unilateral solution. This question must be answered in the negative. Answering it
in the affirmative would mean that the Security Council would have blocked any possible
solution for all time to corne, once it became clear th~t the parties were unable to find
agreement. lt cannot be imputed to the Security Council that it contemplated and, indeed,
intended such a solution, which would permanently Iock the parties in a frozen conflict. Such
an approach would indeed have been incompatible with the "will of the people" clause
contained in the Rambouillet accords, to which referertcehas already been made.
Itmust therefore be assumed that resolution 1244 (1999) prohibited unilateral steps of either
sideregarding the status of Kosovo before the beginning of the political process and while the
political process was on-going and had still some prospect of success. This prohibition on
unilateral steps ceased, however, the moment it became clear that the political process had
definitely and clearly failed. 41
It is against this background that certain decisions of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General concerning attempts by Kosovo institutions to declare independence in
2002 and 2003 make perfect sense. Thus, in a "Pronouncement" of 7 November 2002, Special
Representative Michael Steiner reacted to a resolution of the Kosovo Assembly on a "Serbia
and Montenegro Union" prejudging the determination of the "final and judicial status of
Kosovo" in the following terms:
"Kosovo is under the authority of UN Security Cormeil Resolution 1244 (1999).
Neither Belgrade nor Pristina can prejudge the future status of Kosovo. Its future
status is open and will be decided by the UN Security Council. Any unilateral
statement in whatever form which is not endorsed by the Security Council has no legal
effect on the future status of Kosovo." [OLA Dossier No. 187]
Sorne months earlier, another resolution of the Assembly of Kosovo "on the protection of the
territorial integrity of Kosovo" had been declared "null and void" by the same Special
Representative:
"By the powers vested in me by Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the
Constitutional Framework I hereby declare null and void the "resolution on the
protection of the territorial integrity of Kosovo" adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo
today'' (Determination by the SRSG of23 May 2002).[OLA Dossier No. 185]
The Security Council, in a Presidential Statement of 24 May 2002, concurred with the finding
of the SpecialRepresentative:
"The Security Council deplores the adoption by the Assembly of Kosovo, in its
session of 23 May 2002, of a "resolution on the protection of the territorial integrity of
Kosovo". It concurs with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General that such
resolutions and decisions by the Assembly on matters which do not fall within its field
and competence are null and void." (S/PRST/2002/16)
Inthe year 2002, discussio]).son the final status had not begun. Neither had these discussions
started in the year 2003. Yet, when the Assembly of Kosovo, in February 2003, again took up 42
the question of a "Declaration of Independence", UNMIK's response already contained an
important caveat:
"The principle of "Standards before status" received continued support, affirming that
moves to address the issue of final status for Kosovo are not supportedat this time by
the International Community. Action contrary to this view by the Kosovo Assembly
and beyond the scope of its competencies would have negative consequences for the
accomplishment of our important common objectives." (Letter by the Principle
Deputy Special Representative Charley Brayshaw of 7 February 2003 addressed to the
President of the Kosovo Assembly, Dr. Nexhat Daci, emphasis added) [OLA Dossier
No.189]
Then, in the year 2005, when the Assembly of Kosovo passed a resolution on the
"Reconfirmation of the Political Will of the Kosova People for Kosova as an lndependent and
Sovereign State" as the "platform" for the Kosovo delegation for the final status talks, the
Special Representative did not declare this resolution null and void, but instead issued the .
following statement:
"SRSG S0ren Jessen-Petersen has taken note of the resolution passed today by the
Assembly of Kosovo providing a mandate to the Delegation of Kosovo as the basis for
its platform for the upcoming status talks. As such, "the Assembly has appropriately
assumed its responsibility", said the SRSG." (UNMIK Press Release of 17 November
2005, UNMIK/PR/1445) [OLA Dossier No. 199]
Finally, when Kosovo declared its independence on 17 February 2008, the Secretary
General's Special Represe:r:itativedid at no time declare that act invalid, or null and void,
despite repeated calls by Serbia to that effect, and despite the fact that prior efforts by the
Kosovo Assembly had been set aside.
This only confirms the proposition that the prohibition of unilateral steps towards
independence, contained in resolution 1244(1999) for the interim framework, ended when the
political process foreseen by that resolution had finally collapsed. 43
VII. Conclusion
For the reasons set out in this Statement, Germany respectfully requests the Court to find that
the Declaration of Independence of Kosovo of 17 February 2008 did not contravene any
applicable rule of international law, including Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).
Kosovo is a unique case, resulting from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, including
the historical context of Yugoslavia's violent break-up, as well as the massive violence and
repression that took place in Kosovo in the period up to and including 1999, the extended
period of international administration under Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), and the
UN-led process that left no stone unturned in order to find a negotiated solution on future
status. As Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Special Envoy and 2008 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, has .
said, "the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period
by the international community''.
Kosovo independence is essential for stability in the Balkans. Over the past year, the people
and the Govemment of Kosovo have worked cooperatively across ethnie and religious lines to
develop a secure and prosperous future for Kosovo and the region. Re-introducing uncertainty
over the territory's status would be an obstacle to Kosovo's democratic development,
economic recovery and reconciliation. There can be no tuming back for Kosovo.
The Security Council, upon returning from its mission to Kosovo in May 2007, noted the
importance of promoting a European perspective for the region, including for Kosovo (Report
of the Security Council mission on the Kosovo issue, S/2007/256, para. 60). Germany actively
supports the European Union's leading role in strengthening stability in the region and in
offering a European perspective for the Western Balkans.
. /. u-r\
f ~ •
r. Georg Wltschel
Legat Adviser and Director Generat of the Legat Department
Federat Foreign Office INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE BY THE
PROVISIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT OF
KOSOVO
(REQUEST FOR ADVISORY OPINION)
STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
ANNEXES
April 2009 Annexes to the Statement of the Federal Republic of Germany
Table of Contents
Annex 1 "Pro-Memoria" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia,
17February 2008
Annex2 Letter of President Sejdiu to President Kohler, 17 February 2008 ·
Annex3 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdoni, United States: draft
resolution of 17 July 2007, S/2007/437 Provisional
Annex4 Letter of Ambassador Ischinger to European Union High Representative
Solana, 5 December 2007
Annex5 Letter of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the United
Kingdom to the Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union,
7 December 2007
Annex 6 Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Kosovo, 18 February2008
Annex 7 Declaration of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union,
26 August 2008
Annex 8 Statement of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, 26 August 2008
Annex9 Statement of the President of the United States, 26 August 2008
Annex 10 Statement on Georgia of Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom, 27 August 2008 Annex 1
"Pro-Memoria" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia,
17February 2008MINISTRYOFFOREIGNAFFAIRS
Of THEREPUBLICOFSERBIA
PRO-MEMO RIA
The ProvisionalInstitutionsof Self-governmentin Kosovoand Metohïja have adopted
today their illegal decision on unilateral declarationof independenceof Kosovo and
Metohija,a provinceof the Republicof Serbiaunder interimUN administration.They
have thusgrosslyviolatedUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil resolution 1244(1999)and all
other Councirs resolutionson Kosovoand Metohija (S/RES/1160 (1998), S/RES/1199
(1998), S/RES/1203(l998},S/RES/1239(1999)) explicîtlreaffirming the sovereîgnty
and territorialintegrityofthe RepublicofSerbiaoverKosovoand Metohija;
~ This decision is aoutrightviolationofthesovereignty and territorialimcgritof the
Republicof Serbiaanddirectlycontravenesthe United NattonsChaiter, the Helsinki
FinalAct and internationallaw.Furthennore,theterritoriaintegritandthebordersof
Statesthat haveemerged following thebreak-upof the former Yugoslaviahave aso
been guarartteed by other internationaldocuments, such as the Opinions of the
ArbitrationCommissionof the InternationalConferenceontheFom1erYugoslavia.
- This unilateradcclarationofindependence isan attemptat imposing.outsidethe UN
SecurityCouncil,a solutionforthe statusofKosovoandi\fotohijabyunilateralaction,
in flagranviolation of UNSC resolution1244 (l999) which provides that oneof the
principleson which thequestîon of Kosovoand Metohijashould be settled is "a
political process towards the establishment of an interim politîcal framework
agreement providingforsubstantialself-governmentinKosovo,takingfullaccountof
the Rambouillet accords and theprinciplesof sovereigntyand territoriaintegrity of
theFederal Republicof Yugoslavia ...(nowthe Republic of Serbia).,
Unacceptability of unilateral solutions for Kosovo and l\ktohija has been
unequivocally statedalso in paragraph6 of the Guidîng prlnciples of the Contact
Groupfora settlementof thestatusofKosovo ofNovember 2005{S/20051709).
A p<.iliticleulementreachedin accordancewiththe prîncipleslaid down ir1UNSC
resolution1244 (1999) must be endorsedby the UN Security ConricH.Therdorc.
attemptat imposinga solutionby afait accompliseriouslyundcrminesthe authorityof
the UN SecurityCouncil.
- This illegaactcouldalsocausedamagetotheentireinternationalorder.If, inthecase
of the Republicof Serbia,the UNCharterand theprinciplcsof internationallaware
a!lowedto be bteached,such infringementswouldgraduallybecomea practice,and
thewillof thestrongerwouldbecomethe soleprincipleto apply. ~ This attempt to take away from a sovereignState,a member of the UnitedNations,
againstit~ will and in titne of peace, a part of its territorycan have serious
consequencesfor peaceand securityintheworld.If sucha dangerousprecedentwere
to be set.that wouldleadtotheresurgenceofbreakaway claimsand resultingtensions
throug.houtthe region of SouthEast Europeand the world at large.There canbe no
doubt that numerous separatist movements worfdwide \vould invoke the case of
Kosovoand Metohija as the basis for füeir own aspirations,which would, in turn,
createnewand reigniteexistingcontlicts.
~ The Republic of Serbia insists that the UN SecurityCouncil reacts firmly and
resolutely,and safeguardsthe sovereigntyand territorialintegrityof the Republicof
Serbia, in compliancewith the UNCharter.Wealsoexpect the UNSec:urîty Cooncfl
to take effective measures against the express violation of its own decisions - its
resolution 1244(1999)and otherrcsolutionsrelatingto Kosovoand Metohija,andthe
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, in Hne \VÎth bis powers, to
immediately annulthe unlavvfuldecisicnon the unilateraldeclaratîonof indcpendence
andto dissolvethe KosovoAssembly. ·
·We furtherexpectthe OSCEandother internationalorganizationsto reactadequately
andraisetheirvoiceagainstthisunlawfulattemptat secession.
- The Republic of Serbia calls upon ail States. in !ine with their obligations under
inlemational law, UN Charter and resolutioo 1244 (1999), to fülly respect its
sovereîgntyand territorial integrityand to reject the illegal unilateral decfarationof
independence of KosovoandMctohija.
Belgrade,17February2008 Annex 2
Letter of President Sejdiu to President Kohler,
17 February 2008 The President of Kosovo
17February2008
DearPresidentKôhler:
You will know that on 17 February, 2008 the Assembly of Kosovo declared Kosovo's
independence. 1 attach a copy of the full text of that declaration. 1 want to underline
personally to you that with thisdeclaràtion we have irrevocably committed Kosovo to the
full implementation of ail obligations contained in the Comprehensive Proposai of the UN
Special Envoy, including of course a multi-ethnic, democratic future for Kosovo, protection
of the rights of ail Kosovo's communities and toall provisions concerning the international
supervisionof Kosovo.
Once aperiod of public consultationhas taken place we shallenact our new Constitution, but
1 can assure you unequivocally that this will fully and faithfully retlect the Comprehensjve
Proposai of UN Special Envoy. We are glad to be working closely with the International
CivilianOfficePlanningTeam as the Constitution text is finalized.
\\le reaffirm clearly, specifically and irrevocablythatKosovo shall be legally.bound to
comply with the provisions contained in our Declaration, and that your government is
entitledta relyupon this affirmation.
The Government of Kosovo looks forward to close and beneficial links with ail oui"
neighborsand ail EU Member States. Withthis letter I am fonnally inviting the Government
of the Federal Republicof Germany to recognize the Republic of Kosovo as an independent
state and to establish full diplomatie relations, and diplomatie mission, on the basis of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatie Relations. I should be grateful if you would confirm
whelher these proposais are acceptable to the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
On behalf of the people of Kosovo, I respectfully extend this request to you. Mr.
President, and to the people of the Federal Republic of Germany who have been so
supportive of Kosovo, to recognize our ncw state and to establish full diplomatie relations
with us on the basis ofthese assurances.
Sil).cerely, ~ .
l _{-L . f / ' '
~(r~~y,oL~
Fatmir Sejdiu
President of Kosovo
Enclosure:Declarationof lndependence
His Excellençy
HorstKohler,
Presidentof the Federal Republicof Gcrmany Kosovo Declaration of Independence
Convenedin an extraordinarymeetingon February 17,2008, in Pristina, the
capital of Kosovo,
Answeringthe call ofthe peopleto build a societythat honours human
dignity and affirmsthepride and purposeof its citizens, ·
Committedto confront thepainful legacyof the recentpast in a spirit of
reconciliationand forgiveness,
Dedicated to protecting,promotingandhonoringthe diversity of our people,
Reaffirmingour wishto become füllyintegratedintothe Euro-Atlantic
family of democracies,
Observing that Kosovois a specialcasearisingfromYugoslavia'snon
consensualbreakup and is not a precedentforany other situation,
Recallingthe years ofstrife and violencein Kosovo,that disturbedthe
conscience of ail civilisedpeople,
Grateful that in 1999the worldintervened,therebyremovingBelgrade's
.' governance ovel"Kosovo and placingKosovounder UnitedNations interim
i
administration,
Proudthat Kosovohas sincedevelopedfunctional,multi-ethnic institutions
of democracythat expressfreelythewillof our citizens,
Recalting the years of intemationally-sponsorcdnegotiationsbetween
Belgrade and Pristinaover the questionof ourfuture poHticalstatus,
Regrettingthat no mutually-acceptablestatusoutcome was possible, in spite
of the good-faith engagementof ourleaders,
Confirming that the recommendationsof UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari
provide Kosovo witha comprehensiveftameworkforits future development
and are in line with the highestEuropeanstandardsof human rights and
good govemance,Determined to see our statusresolvedinorderto giveour people clarity
about theirfuture, move beyondthe con:flictsofthe past and realisethe fü11
democraticpotential of our society,
Honouringallthe men and womenwho madegreat sacrificesto build a
better future for Kosovo,
1. We, the democratically-electedleadersof ourpeople, hereby declare
Kosovo to be an independentandsovereignstate.This declaration
reflects the will of oureople and îtis in full accordancewith the
recommendations ofUNSpccial EnvoyMarttiAhtisaariand his
ComprehensivePrùposal fortheKosovo StatusSettlement.
2. We declare Kosovo to be a democratic,secùlarand multî-ethnicrepublic,
guided by the principles of non-discriminationand equalprotection under
the law.Vveshallprotect andpromotethe rightsof all communities in
Kosovo and create the conditionsnecessaryfortheir effective
participationinpolitica1anddecision-makingprocesses.
3. We acceptfully the obligationsforKosovocontainedin the Ahtisaari
Plan,and welcomethe framework itproposes to guide Kosovo inthe
years ahead. We shall implementin full thoseobligations including
throughpriority adoptionofthe legislationincludcd in itsAnnex XII,
particularlythose thatprotect andpromote the rîghtsof communities and
theirmembers.
4. We sha11adoptas soon aspossiblea Constitutionthat enshrinesour
commitmentto respectthe humanrightsand fundamentalfreedoms of all
ourcitizens, particularlyas definedby the EuropeanConventionon
Human Rights. The Constitutionshallincorporateall relevantprinciples
of the Ahtisaari.Plan and be adoptedthrough a democratic and
deliberativeprocess.
5. Wewelcome the international community'scontinuedsupportof our
democratic developmentthroughinternationalpresences established in
Kosovo on the basis ofUN SecurityCouncilresolution 1244(1999). We
invite and welcomean international civilianpresenceto superviseour
implementationof the AhtisaariPlan,and aEuropean Union~ledrule of
law mission. We also inviteand welcometheNorth AtlanticTreaty
2 Organizationto retainthe leadershiproleofthe internationalmilitary
presenceinKosovo andto implementresponsibilitiesassignedto it under
UN SecurityCouncilresolution 1244(1999)andthe AhtisaariPlan,until
.suchtimeasKosovo institutionsarecapableof assumingthese
responsibilities.e shallcooperatefullywiththesepresences toensure
Kosovo'sfuturepeace,prosperityandstabîlity.
6. Forreasonsof culture,geographyandhistory,we believe our future lies
withtheEuropean family.Wethereforedeclareour intentionto ta.keall
stepsnecessaryto facilita.tefullmembershipinthe European Unionas
s0011as feasibleand implementthereformsrequiredfor European and
Euro-Atlanticintegration.
7.Weexpressour deep gratitudeto the UnitedNationsforthe work ithas
doneto helpus recoverandrebuild fromwar and build institutionsof
democracy.We are committedto workingconstructively ·withthe United
Nationsas itcontinuesits workin the periodahead.
8. Withindependencecornesthe dutyofresponsible membershipin the
internationalcommunity.Weacceptfully this duty and shallabide by the
principlesofthe UnitedNationsCharter,theHelsinkiFinal Act; other
actsofthe Organizationon SecurityandCooperationin Europe, andthe
internationallegal obligationsandprinciplesof internationalcomity that
marktherelationsamong states.Kosovoshallhave its international
bordersas set forth in AnnexVIIIofthe AhtisaariPlan, and shall fully
respectthe sovereigntyand te1Titoriailntegrityofail ourneighbors.
Kosovoshal1also·refrainfromthe threatoruse of force in anymanner
inconsistentwiththe purposesof theUnitedNatîons.
9. Weherebyundertakethe inten1ationalobligationsofKosovo, including
thoseconcludedon ourbehalfby the UnitedNationsInterim
AdministrationMissionin Kosovo(UNMIK) andtreaty and other
obligationsofthe former SocialistFederalRepublicofYugoslavia to
whichwe arebound as a formerconstituentpart, includingthe Vienna
Conventionson diplomatieand consularrelations.We shallcooperate
fullywiththe InternationalCriminalTribunalforthe Former Yugoslavia.
Weintendto seekmembershipin internationalorganisations, inwhich
Kosovoshallseekto contributeto thepursuitof internationalpeace and
stability.1O.Kosovodeclares its commitmenttopeace and stabilityin our region of
southeastEurope. Our independenccbringsto an end the proccss of
Yugoslavia's violentdissolution.Whilethis process has been a painful
·one, we shaltworktirelesslyto contributeto arecohciliationthat would
allow southeastEuropeto movebeyondthe conflictsof our past and
forge new linksof regionalcooperation.We shalltherefore worktogether
with ourneighboursto advancea comrnonEuropeanfuture.,
11. We express,inpartictilar,ourdesireto establishgood relations with al!
our neighbours,includingthe Republicof Serbiawith whom we have
deep historical,commercialandsocialtics that we seekto develop
further in thenear future.We shallcontinueoureffortsto contributeto ·
relations of füendship andcooperationwiththe Republic of Serbia, while
promoting reconciliationamongourpeople.
12.Wehereby affirm,clearly,specifically,and irrevocab1y,that Kosovo
sha11be legally boundto complywiththe provisionscontained in this
Declaration,including,especially,the obligationsfor it under the
Ahtisaru:iPlan. In all ofthese matters,we shallact consistenwith
principlesof internationallaw andresolutionsof the SecurityCouncil of
the UnitedNations,includingresolution1244(1999). We declare
publiclythat all states are entitledto rely uponthis declaration, and
appeal to them to extendto ustheir supportand friendship.
4 Annex3
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States:
draft resolution of 17 July 2007, S/2007/437 Provisional United Nations S120011431
(~) Security Council Provisional
~ 17 July 2007
~
Original: English
Belgium, France, Germany, ltaly, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America:
draft resolution
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter ·of the United
Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance
of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolutions1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of
23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of24 October 1998, 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,
and 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, and the relevant Statements of its President, in
particular its statement of 24 October 2005 (S/PRST/2005/51),
RecaUing the Security Council's missions on the Kosovo issue, particularly the
mission undertaken from 25 to 28 April 2007, which provided the Security Council
with an opportunity to gain first-hand information on the situation in Kosovo, and
it·sreport of 4 May 2007 (S/2007/256),
Recognizing the specific circumstances that make Kosovo a case that is sui
generis resulting from the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, including the
historical context of Yugoslavia's violent break-up, as well as the massive violence
and repression that took place in Kosovo in the period up to and including 1999, the
extended period of international administration under resolution 1244, and the UN
led process to determine status, and that this case shall not be taken as a precedent
by the Security Council,
Reaffirming its commitment to a multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo, which
will reinforce regional stability,
Recalling the Guiding Principles of the Contact Group,
Recognizing the progress that has been achieved in the implementation of the
standards for Kosovo, and calling for their continued implementation in accordance
with·the Europea·n Partnership and the Comprehensive Proposai for the Kosovo
Status Settlement (S/2007 /l 68/Add. l),
Reaffirming the urgent necessity for more progress on the return of internally
displaced persons and refugees,
Underscoring its determinationnot to tolerate violence, provocation or
intimidation,
170701(E)S/2007/437
Recalling the jurisdiction and mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, and the need for full cooperation with it,
Underlining the importance of the EU-Western Balkans Summit Declaration
adopted in Thessaloniki in June 2003, and welcoming the reaffirmation by the
European Union of its commitment to providing the countries of the region a
èoncrete, tangible European perspective,
Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of
conflicts and peacebuilding, as reflected in its resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October
2000,
Acknowledging that the status quo in Kosovo is not sustainable,
Determining that the unresolved situation in Kosovo continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
l. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for
his Report on Kosovo's Future Status (S/2007/168) and his Comprehensive Proposai
for the Kosovo Status Settlement (S/2007/168/ Add.l);
2. Takes note of the declaration of the Kosovo Assembly of 5 April 2007,
concerning the Special Envoy's proposais, and recalls the commitments therein to
the rights of communities and their members;
3. Welcomes the willingness of participants in the Contact Group, including
the European Union, to encourage and facilitate a further 120-day period of
negotiations following adoption of this resolution, in support of the Secretary
General and his Special Envoy, to determine whether common ground can be found,
calls upon the parties to engage constructively, requests the Member States referred
to above to brief the Council on developments, and ajfirms its readiness to review
the situation further in light of those negotiations;
4. Welcomes the willingness of interested parties to appoint an International
Civilian Representative ("ICR"), who shall be the same person as the Special
Representative of the European Union; of the European Union to establish a
European Security and Defense Policy Rule of Law mission ("ESDP Mission"); and
of NATO to continue leading an International Military Presence ("IMP");
5. Expresses its appreciation to the international civil presence in Kosovo
for its efforts during the period of interim administration of Kosovo under resolution
1244 (1999), and decides that the mandate of the international civil presence shall
terminate at the end of a 120-day transition period following adoption of this
resolution and that the existing international civil presence shall implement with the
ICR and ESDP during this period ail appropriate arrangements for the details and
modalities of the transition;
6. Decides that the powers and authorities of the ICR shall include powers
and authorities to advance democratic, effective and inclusive governance and
institutions~ the rights of Communities and their members, decentralization of local
government, justice and the rule of law, protection of religious and cultural heritage,
protection of property rights and the general welfare of the people, and to supervise
the decisions of the relevant authorities in Kosovo in this regard and ensure full
respect for these principles, calls upon the ICR to establish appropriate mechanisms
2 S/2007/437
to help coordinate the activities of other international actors, and also ca/ls upon
other international actors to support the ICR's efforts, particularly by providing
information relevant to the exercise of the ICR's fonctions;
7. Authorizes the establishment of a European Union ESDP Mission and
decides that the Mission shall have powers and authorities set forth in Annex I of
this resolution after the end of the transition period referred to in paragraph 5;
8. Notes that the international security presence established under resolution
1244 shall continue to be authorized to carry out its responsibilities for a 120-day
transition period following the adoption of this resolution, and decides that after
completion of this period its powers and authorities shall be those of the IMP and
that it shall have the powers and authorities set forth in Annex II to this resolution,
and that it shall be authorized to use ail necessary means to carry out its
responsibilities;
9. Urges the ESDP Mission and the IMP to provide mutual support and,
together with the ICR, to coordinate closely on security-related issues in Kosovo;
10. Decides that the ICR and the ESDP Mission, and their personnel (and
their families), premises, archives and other property, shall have the same privileges
and immunities as are enjoyed by a diplomatie mission and its personnel (and their
, families), premises, archives and other property under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatie Relations, and that the IMP shall have the status, privileges and
immunities currently provided to the international security presence under UNMIK
Regulation 2000/47;
11. Requests the ICR to report periodically to the Council, beginning with .,
the first report three months following the adoption ofthis resolution;
12. Urges the Secretary-General to appoint promptly a separate Special
Envoy to provide a report to the Secretary-General and the Security Council on the
situation concerning refugees and internally displaced persons in the region, and on
issues related to missing persons;
13. Requests the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to
continue to maintain a Mission in Kosovo, including a comprehensive field
presence, to support the democratic development of Kosovo and the work of the
ICR;
14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
3S/2007/437
Annex I
ESDP Mission
1. The ESDP Mission shall assist Kosovo authorities in their progress towards
sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an
independent judiciary and police, ensuring that these institutions are free from
political interference and in accordance with internationally recognized standards
and European best practices. It shall provide mentoring, monitoring and advice in
the area of the rule of law generally, while retaining certain powers, in particular,
with respect to the judiciary, police, customs and correctional "services, under
modalities and for a duration to be determined by the Council of the European
Union.
2. The ESDP Mission shall, under the dfrection of the European Union Special
Representative (EUSR), be authorized to:
(a) Ensure that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organized crime, corruption,
inter-ethnie crimes, financial/economic crimes, and other serious crimes are
properly investigated according to the law, including, where appropriate, by
international investigators acting with Kosovo authorities or independently;
(b) Ensure that cases described in paragraph (a) are properly prosecuted
including, where appropriate, by international prosecutors acting jointly with
Kosovo prosecutors or independently. Case selection for international prosecutors
shall be based upon objective criteria and procedural safeguards, as determined by
the Head of the ESDP Mission. International prosecutors shall serve in accordance
with Kosovo law;
(c) Ensure that cases described in paragraph (a) and property related civil
cases are properly adjudicated, including, where appropriate, by international judges
sitting independently or on panels with Kosovo judges in the court which has
jurisdiction over the case. Case selection for adjudication involving international
judges shall be based upon objective criteria and procedural safeguards, as
determined by the Head of the ESDP Mission. International judges shall enjoy full
independence in the discharge of their judicial duties and shall serve w.ithin the
Kosovo judicial system in accordance with the law;
(d) Ensure that decisions of cases described in paragraph (a) are properly
enforced according to the law by the competent Kosovo authorities;
(e) Assume other responsibilities independently or with. the competent
Kosovo authorities to ensure the maintenance and promotion of the rule of law,
public order and security;
(f) In consultation with the ICR, reverse or annul operational decisions taken
by the competent Kosovo authorities, as necessary, to ensure the maintenance and
promotion of the mie of law, public order and security;
(g) Monitor, mentor and advise on ail areas related to the mie of law, and the
Kosovo authorities shall facilitate such efforts and grant immediate and complete
access to any site, person, activity, proceeding, document, or other item or event in
Kosovo;
4 S/2007/437
(h) Appoint ESDP mission personnel to perform the fonctions accorded to
the ESDP Mission.
3. The Head of the ESDP Mission shall be appointed by the Council of the
European Union.
4. The Head of the ESDP Mission may establish whatever presence he or she
deems necessary, at a central and/or local level, to ensure full implementation of the
tasks set out in section 2 of this Annex.
5. The ESDP Mission shall have a unified chain of command.
6. Kosovo shall facilitate ail appropriate assistance to the ESDP Mission
necessary for the efficient and effective discharge of its duties, including the
provision of logistical and administrative support as necessary.
5S/2007/437
Annex II
International Military Presence
1. The International Military Presence (IMP) shall be authorized to:
(a) Ensure the security of Kosovo from external threats until Kosovo
institutions can take responsibility;
(b) Provide a safe and secure environment throughout the territory of
Kosovo, in conjunction with the ICR and in support of the Kosovo institutions until
such time as Kosovo's institutions are capable of assuming responsibility, on a case
by-case basis, for the security tasks performed by the IMP;
(c) Supervise and support, with the assistance of others, the establishment
and training of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF); this would include vetting
potential members to ensure professionalism; striving to achieve appropriate ethnie
representation, and, the right of sanction for inappropriate conduct of members of
the KSF in coordination with the ICR;
(d) Support, and coordinate dosely with the work of the ICR, as well as
providing military advice to the ICR;
(e) Assist and advise with respect to the process of integration in Euro
Atlantic structures;
(t) Within means and càpabilities, and until tasks can be relinquished to
others under programmes to be agreed, assist local authorities and the ICR in:
(i) Responding to violent extremists;
(ii) Ensuring freedom of movement;
(iii) Facilitating refugee return;
(iv) Removing, safeguarding and destroying unauthorized weapons;
(v) Protecting designated religious and cultural sites;
(vi) Conducting border monitoring duties as required; and
(vii) Providing support, on a case-by-case basis, to the international
community and key civil implementation organizations, in the fulfilment of
their respective mandates;
(g) Supervise, monitor and have executive authority over the KSF until the
Force is judged by the IMP, in coordination with the ICR, to be self-sustaining and
capable of fulfilling its assigned tasks in accordance with international standards;
(h) In consultation with the ICR and Kosovo, have executive authority over
the KPC, and to decide on the timing of the KPC's dissolution;
(i) Continue the established practice of the current Joint Implementation
Commission with the Republic of Serbia. Over time, the activities of the Joint
Implementation Commission will be subsumed by a new Joint Military Commission
with authorities from Kosovo and the Republic of Serbia to address military security
issues of common concern;
6 S/2007/437
U) Establish confidence-building measures between the KSF and defence
institutions of the Republic of Serbia, in coordination with the ICR;
(k) In the longer term, remain engaged with the KSF to provide àdvice aimed
at Kosovo's further integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures and the
involvement of elements from the security force in internationally mandated
missions;
(1) Support the development of structures and expertise in Kosovo to ensure
the effective civilian control and management· over the KSF, in particular in the
areas of strategy development, force planning, personnel management, Planning,
Programming and Budgeting (PPBS), exercise planning and procurement.
2. The IMP will operate under the authority and be subject to the direction and
political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO Chain of
Command. The IMP shall have a unified chain of command.
3. In fulfilling the IMP's responsibilities, the Head of the IMP shall have the
authority, without interference or permission, to do ail that he/she judges necessary
and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the IMP and other
designated personnel and to carry out its responsibilities. The Head of the IMP is the
final authority in theatre regarding military tasks of the IMP.
4. The IMP will have the following authorities:
(a) The right to carry out its responsibilities as it deems appropriate,
including the use of ail necessary force where i'equired and without further sanction,
interference or permission;
(b) The right to exercise complete and unimpeded freedom of movement
throughout Kosovo, by any means;
(c) The right to re-establish immediate and full military control of the
airspace (or parts thereof) should military requirements so dictate. The Head of the
IMP will ensure that Civil Aviation Authority of Kosovo is fully informed about any
such decision;
(d) The right to conduct inspections of premises and facilities in connection
with the fulfilment of its tasks;
(e) The right to approve and supervise, in coordination with the ICR, the
establishment of ail non-police, security-related forces proposed by Kosovo;
(f) The right to take action as it deems appropriate in support of its mandate.
5. In ail cases, the authorities of the IMP will be kept under review and, after
consultation with the relevant parties and decision by the NAC, adjusted
accordingly, on a case-by-case basis, as Kosovo institutions develop capacity and
increase ownership and responsibility.
7 Annex4
Letter of Ambassador Ischinger to European Union High Representative Solana,
5 December 2007 Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger
London, 5 December 2007
Dear Javier:
As the Troïka process on Kosovo concludes, I have the privilege to transmit to you a
copy of the report which the Troïka prepared and which will be submitted by the Contact
Group to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by 10 December. This report offers an
account of the negotiation process which the Troïka has conducted during the last four months
between Belgrade and Pristina about the future status of Kosovo.
Throughout this process, I have made every effort to keep you personally, the
Presidency, and European Union member states informed about the ongoing negotiations,
including through repeated briefings of Ministers and of the PSC. In addition, I visited a
number of EU capitals for bilateral consultations, and maintained close contact, at various
levels, with member govemments. I am very grateful indeed for the guidance and support
which I have received from you personally, from the Presidency, and from member states
throughout this process.
In the course of the Troïka process, we met with both parties in ten major sessions,
including a final three-day conference in Baden, Austrfa. I travelled several times to Belgrade
and_Pristina, both with the Troïka and separately, to explore in-depth the positions of the
parties, most recently on 3 December, 2007.
Under the Troika's guidance, the parties reviewed the widest possible range of options
for the status of Kosovo, as listed in our report. Regrettably, ail of these status options were
rejected by one or both sides. In addition, the idea of a status-silent agreement of cooperation
between Serbia and Kosovo was elaborated by the Troïka. This would have allowed both
sides to maintain their respective position on Kosovo' s status, but would have created a
"community" between Belgrade and Pristina, established common bodies designed to
facilitate cooperation, and created mutually binding obligations and consultation
arrangements, including asymmetrical ones, on issues of common concem. Although it could
not be presented as an official Troïka proposai when Russia decided that it could not endorsethe presentation of this text as an official document, the draft text of such an agreement was
made available to both parties. This "agree to disagree" option was, however, also rejected by
Belgrade.
Regardless of their inability to agree on the fundamental question of status, the Troïka
process was an important opportunity for both parties to build trust and identify common
interests. Most notably, both share the determination to eventually become members of the
European Union. In addition, ·the Troïka has been able to secure commitments from the
parties regarding the security situation: both parties reaffirmed the importance of maintaining
peace and pledged to refrain from actions that might jeopardize the security situation in tlie
region. They made these commitments unconditionally, without prejudice to their positions
on status or any future developments. We should express our firm expectation that these
commitments will be fully and unconditionally respected and implemented by both sides.
Allow me to summarize the Troïka process as follows:
The Troïka has, as promised, left no stone untumed in trying to achieve a
negotiated settlement of the Kosovo status question. The positions of both parties
on status have, however, remained diametrically opposed. The potential to reach a
negotiated settlement is now exhausted. It is my view that the parties would not be
capable of reaching agreement on this issue if negotiations were to be continued, ·
whether inthe Troïka format, or in some other form.
Belgrade engaged actively and on a high level in the Troïka process. In the course
of this process, Belgrade presented various versions of its offer of substantial
autonomy, but displayed no flexibility on the core issue of Serbia' s territorial
integrity and sovereignty.
The Kosovo Unity Team has fully participated in the negotiation process that
started in the fall of 2005, and it has continued to be engaged throughout the
Troïka process. But Pristina's ability to participate in an intemationally-supervised
negotiation process is, however, now coming to an end.In mr vièw, the international community will need to be prepared to take decisions with
respect to Kosovo's status in the very near future. Further delays would, in my view, not tend
to reduce, but rather to enhance potential risks of instability. Today, even more so than on 1
August:the status quo is not sustainable.
In my persona! view, the question of Kosovo's future status is, first and foremost, an issue for
which the European Union carries responsibility. The European Union should not relinquish
the leading role which it has played throughout the last period, in particular during the Troïka.
process. Instead, the European Union should seek to retain initiative and to demonstrate
continued leadership by rapidly establishing and coordinating a managed international process
on Kosovo in order to enhance stability and to minimize risks in the days and weeks ahead.
While a continued common approach with regard to Kosovo has to be our most immediate
concern, in my view this issue cannot be addressed in isolation from our relationship with
Serbia, and our relations with the region as a whole, on the basis of the commitment at the
European Council of Thessaloniki in June 2003.
Such a process, to be launched immediately, could, in my view, take the following elements,
i.a., into account:
- A message to Pristina setting out the European Union's expectations that Pristina will
act in close coordination with its international partners and will continue to demonstrate its
commitment to a democratic and multiethnic Kosovo, in which minorities and religious and
cultural heritage will be fully protected.
- Reaching agreement within the European Union on how ·to handle, and react to,
possible and expected developments on Kosovo's status. A joint EU approach is the conditio
sine qua non to ensure that the European Union will lead this managed·process and determine
its parameters. Such a common approach should also enable the European Union to allow
·rapid deployment .of the envisaged ESDP Mission as well as the contribution to the
International Civilian Office (ICO) as part of the international presence.
- An additional element might focus on the region north of the Ibar, taking into
accolint the special situation on the ground in this part of Kosovo, and aiming to minimizesecurity risks in the weeks ahead, i.a., by endorsing and supporting the positions established
by UNMIK and KFOR.
- Inparallel to the message to Pristina, a message could be addressed to Belgrade. We
might wish to stress that our relationship with Serbia remains a matter of the highest priority
for us, regardless of decisions which might be taken with respect to Kosovo. We might also
address the wider issue of Serbia's path towards the EU, as well as study options that could
allow for more direct inter-action of its citizens with those in the European Union.
- Finally, a message addressed to the countries of the region, taking into account their
conc~rns about regional stability and prosperity, as well as their European aspirations. In this
connection, we might also wish to stress the uniqueness of the case of Kosovo which can
therefore not serve as a precedent.
I am copying this letter to the Presidency and to Commissioner Olli Rehn, and would
be grateful if it could be made available to member states, along with the Troïka Report, in
preparation of the discussion on Kosovo at the GAERC on 10 December. May I suggest that
the Troïka Report be treated as a confidential document, because it has not yet been presented
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Contact Group.
Yours sincerely AnnexS
Letter of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom to the.
Portuguese Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 7 December 2007 7Peéembe 2r007·
HisEx.celtcncyDrLuisFilip~MarquesAmado
ThoContactGroupis submittingto theUNSeorctaryGen~ralitsreportonthework
oftheEU/Russia/USTroikaaimedatachievinganegotiatedsettlem.entforJC.osovo's
futurestatus.WewelcomethefactthattheEUasawhole- whichwillultimately
havetotrucerosponsibilitinKoSôVO -wa.srepresenteddireotlyin theTroik.a.
Ambassador Isohinger,heEUrepresentative onthoTroika,baswrittento Secretary
GèneralandHighRepresentative Javii;rSolanasettingouthiaconclusionsand
.recommendationfsrom the TroikaProeess.As the ForeignMinistersofthefour
EuropeanUnion001111.trricesresentedintheContactOroup,weagre~fullywitb
Ambaasador l$chinger'views, Wewouldli.ketoofferourthoughtsontheîroika
Processandontheway fotwa:rd.
Theîroika wastasked withex.plorinallavem1eisnordertoidentifycommon gro1111d
foranagreementonKosovo•sfuturestatus. Wearesratefulfor the extraordînary
levelofcommitment,applicationandereativityshownbytheTroika. TheTroika
bothfacilitateddiscussionsandproactivelydevelopedpossibleclcmcintsfora
negotiatedsolution.Theyworkedintensivelyand cmployed a varietofmcthods-
directtalks,proximitymeetings.tripstotheregioand aconference .
.Nevcrthcless.ihasnotprovcdpossibletoachievesufficientcommongro\l.nd
betwecntheparties.
Thisisnotbec11.\losflack oftimeorenergyintheTroi.ka Proci:ss.DuringtheTroïka
ProcessoneorotheTofthepartiesrejectedoptionsinctudingconfedera.tion afutonomy
anda statusneutralwayforward.Thisunderlinestheitrcconcilablegapbetweenthe
positionsofthetwoparties. WeshareAmbassador lschinger'sfüm viewthatfurther
statusnegotiationsbetweenBelgradeandPristinawouldoffernoprospectofreaching
a11agreement.Indccd,they rni_gcvc;nleadta aftlrtherhardrminofpositionsonboth
sides. ·
Aga:!nstthisbackground,itisnowessentialthattheEUdemonstratesitsreadinessto
meetitsresponsibilitiesandobjeetiveinrespectofstabilityandsecurityinE\lrope,
inthespiritorunity,solidarltyandcohcsion,LikeAmbassadoll'schinger1webelieve
thequestionofKosovo•sfuturestatusisamajorrosponsibility fortheEU. Kosovois
partofEuropeandsltuatedless than 50kilometresfrom the e)(Îstingbord.ersof the
EùropeanUnion. Securinga viableandsustain.ablfeutureforKosovoandtheregion
ia.anEUresponsibilily,Theeffectivenessandcohesiveness ofourCo-mmon Foreign
andSecurityPolîcy willb'11judgedgainstou.rabilitytodeliveronthisresponsibility.
·Wethereforebelievetha.ttheforthcoming EuropeanCouncitshouldsendaclear
message onKosovo. Inoutvicw,theEuropcanCounoilshould,asthePresidenccy
hasproposed,indicatcinitsconclusionsthat:·
- theTroikahasnillyex.ploredalloptionsforaehievinganegotiatedsetrJcmcnt
withoutan agreementhavingbeenfound; - Kosovo'a$tatusnow needstobeurgentlyrŒsolved;
- Wê arefimtlyresolvedtoplayaleadingroleinbringingthe stitusproc~i: through
tocompletionandin implementingascttlement;
- andthatwearcintensivelyengagedinthenecessaryprc:.parationttl meetthcse
responsibilities.
Ourprcferenoeis that,:uchasertlementahô'ubesupported by thepassageofa
resolutionofthe UNSecurityCouncUW . ebelievetheresb.ouldbe furthe:rrapid
consultationsinNew York toth:isendbcforetheendoftheyear. Howeverinthe
absenceofanasreemtnt betwee.ntheparties,we needtobercalisticaboutthestim
prospectsof seeuringthenecessarylevelofconsensusintheSccurityCounei1.
Insuchçircurnstances.cgionllllitabilitywilldependcrucfallyonthe BU'scapacityin
thebeginningof2008rapidlytoestablishandooordinate al'internationalproces~in
ordertomanagee"pecteddeveloprnents onKosovo'::s;tatus. Wemustensurethat
Kosovo fasu~l'\'i&eb)'internationalpresencesandthatit is firm)yandef!ectively
boundtotheprotectionsandsafeguard& foral1Kosovo'scommunîtiesset ollt ithe
CornprehensiveProposaioftheUNSpecialEnvoy,Theprovisionsofthe
Comprehensive Proposaifortheinterna!govemanceofKoi,;ovoa ,nd theallocationof
responsibilitiestheyconl:ài, ustbethefoundationforhow wc:dcliversecurityand
helpKosovoimprovc itsabilitytmcct Eu.ropea.sntandards.
Wcthereforebelicvctha.tthe:EuropcanUnion,houldbeready,inoooperationwith
theUNSecrc:,tarG yeneral,toprnvideanESDPpolicing/ruleoflawmissionwhich
would dtaw uponthe authorityprovidedbyUNSCR1244'sauthorisation of
intcmationalpolicepersonneltomaintaincivillawandorder. Similarly,imdagainin
cooperationwith theUNSccretary0-eneral,theEurop~anUnionshouldbereadyto
makea rnajorcontn"butionto an[ntcrnational ivilîaOfficeinKosovo,drawing
authorityfromUNSCR1244's widerangingmandatefor an IntemationaCl ivil
Presencc. As partofthisnew internationaarchitectureinKosovo,theEUshould
alsobereadytocon trbutewithanEUSRandanintensified rolefortheCommission.
We shouldsignaltotheUnitedNatioi;sSecretaryGenaralthatthlsis 011intention.
·Thegoa.lshouldbe teachievecerta.intandpermanenceinrespectafKosovots future
status. WhilercspcctingnationalprcrogativeitwiJlbe importantto haveacomrnon
EUapproachto establishclarityonKosovo'sfutureidentity.Thisis arequirement
fQlrcgionalstabilityandforthelong-tcrmprospectsfortheregion'sEuropean
integr~tion.
WerecognisethatmovingthroughthisphasewillbedifficultforSerbia,aswellas for
othercountriesin theregion. Wcmustbeelearandfar.sightèd in ourcommit:mentto
~el2,i't~emmeet EuroEean_?!anda ~~_è?.Y.!ÛY!lh!êrtowll!As !,?!~l!!l
!,SS;~SW Dn-particular,ifilÏCnccc:,sconditiônla!riemet,webelievethEurope1U1
·nionshouldbe aimin to achi1:vSecrbia,srapiprW~$J~ariît .îfprij~poct2f
.sandidatstatgs. owev~r,au o ecowi~e resic)1 stand to lifwc are
u.n"iîîo chanaelearwayforward.'fbestatusquoisunaustainableforKosovoand
fo:thetegion as a wbole.We an:copyingthislctt~ tootMinisterioolleaguetoJavierSolanaandtoOlli
RŒhn.
Massimo D'Alema BetnardKoucbnerDavidMiliband Fra.nk-Walre rteinmcier
-- Annex6
Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Kosovo,
18 February 200819-FEB-2008 09:14 AUSW.AM5 T00-S +49 1888 174044 S.01/02
COUNCILOF
THEEUROPEAN UNION
Couilcil Conclusions on Kosovo
2851stEXTERNALRELATIONS Councilmeeting
Brussels,18Februa.r2y008
TheCounciladoptedthe followingconclusions:
"On17 February2008the KosovoAssemblyadoptedaresolutionwhichdeclaresKosovoto be
independent. heCounciltakesnot1rthattheresolutioncommitsKosovototheprinciplesof
democracy andequalityofallitcitizens,theprotectionofthe Serband otherminorities,the
protectionotheculturalandreligiousheritageandinternationalsupervisThe.Council
welcomesthecontinuedpresenceoftheinternationalcommunitybasedon UNSecurityCouncil
resolution1244.
TheCouncilnotesthatMemberStateswilldecîde,inaccordancewithnationalpracticeand
internationalIaw,ontheirrelationswithKosovo.
l
TheCouncilrecallstheEuropeanUnion'sIongstandingcommitmentto the stabilityoftheWestern
BalkansregionThe CouncilreiteratestheEuropeanUnion'sreadinesstplay aleadingrolein
strengtheningstabîlityintheregion,andrecallstheEuropeanUnion'scommitruentscontainedin
theconclusionsofthe EuropeanCouncilof 14December2007,aswellasthe agreement toJoint
ActionsestablishinganESDPPoliceandRuleofLawmissionandappointinganEU Special
RepresentatiinKosovo.TheEuropeanUnionwillcontinuetocooperatewîththeUN,KFOR,
OSCEandotherinternationalactorsinordertopreservestabilityineregion.
TheCouncilreaffims itscommitmentto fultyandeffectîvelysupportthe Europeanperspectivefor
theWesternBalkans.ItaskstheCommissiontouse communityinstrumentstopromoteeconomic
andpoliticaldèvelopmentandto proposetothebroaderregionconcretemeasuresinorderto
advanèeinthatdirection.
PRESS
Rue de la Loi 17B - 1048 BRUSSEl.,T~I.: +32 (0)2 281 8239 / 6Fax; +32 (0)2818026
prcss.ofticef?{J.COl:lsilhai::u//.www.consilium,çun)pa.cu/Newwoom
l
EN19-FEB-200800:14 AUSW.AM5 T00-S +49 1888 174044 S.02/02
TheCouncilreiteratestheEU'sadherencetotheprinciplesoftheUNCharterandtheHelsinkiFinal
Act,intera/iatheprinciplesof sovereigntyandterritorialîntegrityandallUNSecurityCouncil
resolutions.Itunderlinesitsconvictionthat inviewoftheconflictof the 1990sandthe extended
periodofinternatldministraunderSCR1244,Kosovoconstitutsuigenercasewhich
doesnotcallintoquestiontheseprinciplesandresolutions."
~
PRESS
llu(: de 111Loi l?.!B~~SSELSTel.+32 (0)2 281 8239 Fu:3+32 (0):2 281 8026
press.Qf_!1ce,u1cons1tp://W\,YV\',.,Ç,onsiliurn.euroi,o.s,u/Ncwsroom
2
EN
GESAMTSEITEN02 Annex7
Declaration of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union,
26 August 200827-AUG-2008 00:35 AUSW.AM5T00-S +49 1888 174044 S.01/01
La présidence duConseilde l'UE
condamne fermement la reconnaissa·nce
par les autoritésrusses de
l'indépendance del' Abkhazie et de
Il
l'Ossétie du Sud (26 août2008)
Déclarationdelaprésieu Con,ell de l'UE
LaPrésideduConseilde l'Unioneuroerendnotedeladécisionpriseparlerussesdereconnaître
l'indépendde!'Abkhazieetde l'duSud.e
d'intégterritorialeéorgier,econnusparlaChartedesNationsUnies,!'Actefinaldelaconférencesurla
sécuritéacoopéraenEuropeet lesRésolupertineduConseildasécurité.
DansccontexteprésidenduConsedel'Unirappelleaforcesonattaohementau principed'intégrité
territorialedelaGéorgiedanssesfrontièreslrtconnues.lemen
conséquencseladécisionde la Russie.ltltiuedesconflitsenGéorgie.Elleexamineradecepointdevue les
1,,$lte_ofitfaprésidenfançai1duConHildel'UE
GESAMT SEITEN01 Annex8
Statement of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office,
26 August 200827-AUG-2008 09:32 . AUSWA.MT500-S +49 1888 174044 S.01/01
·--
Press release
OSCEChairmancondemnsRussia'srecognitionof South
Ossetia,·Abkhaziaindependence
HELSINKI,26August2008 - The OSCEChairman-in-Office,FinnishForeign MinisterAlexander
Stubb,todaycondemnedthe decisionby Russiato recognîzethe independethe:reakaway
GeorgianregionsoSouthOssetiaandAbkhazia.
"TherecognitioofindependenceforSouthOssetiaanAbkhazia violatesfundamental SCE
principles.As ail OSCEparticipati.ngStates,Russiais committedto respectingthe sovereigntyand
territorialintegrityof others."
"RussiashouldfollowOSCEprincipleby respectingtheterritorialintegrity and sovereigntyof
Georgia.Russiashouldimm.ediatelywithd:rawalltroopsfromGeorgiaand implementthe ceasefire
agreement,includin:gthemodalidefinedinthe 16AugustletterofFrench PresidentNicolas
Sarkozy.Theinternationalconununitycannotacceptunilaterallyestablishedbufferzones," said
Stubb.
TheOSCEwillcontinueto monitortheimplementatioofthe ceaseflagreement t standsreadyto
furtherassistin stabilthesituation.
Contacts
MartinNesirky
Spokesperson
• OSCESecretariat
• PressandPublicInformationSection
• Wallnerstrasse6
• 1010Vienna
• Austria
• Tel:+43 151436 6150
• Fax:+43 151436 6105le)
• S..e.E-.mail
JubaKirstila
PressAttachetotheMinisterforForeignAffairs
• MinistryforForeign.AffairsofFinland ·
• 00161Helsinki
• Finland
• Tel:+35840 5528200(mobile)
• +3589 16055012
GESAMTSEITEN01 Annex9
Statement of the President of the United States,
26 August 200827-AUG-2008 09:35 AUSW.AM5 T00-S +49 1888 174044 S.01/01
ForlmmedleteRelè11se
OfllŒaf thePra; acretaty
Augus26,2008
President Bush Condemns Actions Taken by Russian President in Regards to
Georgia
TheUnitedStatescondemnsthedecisionbytheRussianPresidentto
recognlzeasindependentstates the GeorgianregionsofSouthOssetia a White House Ne.w~
andAbkhazia. This declsionisinconsistentwithnumerousUnited Nations
SecurityCouncilResolutlonsthatRussiahas votedforinthepast,and is ~ En Espatiol
alsoInconsistanwt iththe French--brokerdix-pointceasefireagreement
whichPresidentMedvedevsignedonAugust12,2008.*Thesix-pointagreementoffereda peacefulway
forwardtoresolvetheconfllct.eexpectRussiatoliveuptoitsinternationac l ommitments,reconsiderthis
irresponsibdecision,andfollowtheapproachsetout inthesix-pointagre,ement.
TheterritorialntegrityandborderaofGeorgiamustberespectedj,ustasthoseof Russlaor anyother
country.Russia'sactiononlyexacerbatestensionsandcomplicatesdiplomatlcnegotiations.ln accordance .
wlth UnitedNationsSecurityCouncîlResolutionsthatremaîninforce,AbkhaziaandSouthOssetlaarewithîn
thelnternationalreoognizedbordersof Georgia,andtheymustremalnso.
###
- August16,2008
Returnto thisarticleat;
httP.://wwwh.tehouse[.Qj![news/releases/2008/D_~/2008082ht-2l.
a CUCI< Hl!lli'<RlNT
'Il •,, GESAMT SEITEN01 Annex 10
Statement on Georgia of Foreign Ministers of
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom,
27 August 2008• Germany - Statement on Georgia of Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany,... Seite 1von 1
Statement on Georgia of Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom
27.08.2008
We,the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom, condemn
the action of our fellow G8 member. Russia's recognition ofthe independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia violates the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia and is contrary to UN Security Council Resolutions supported by Russia.
Russia's decision has called into question its commitment to peace and security in the Caucasus.
We deplore Russia's excessive use of military force in Georgia and its continued occupation of parts of Georgia. Wecall
unanimously on the Russian government to implement in full the six point peace plan brokered by President Sarkozy on
behalf ofthe EU, in particular to withdraw its forces behind the pre-conflict lines. We reassert our strong and continued
support for Georgia's sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders and underline our respect and support for
the democratic and legitimate government of Georgia as we pursue a peaceful, durable solution to this conflict.
August 27, 2008
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/lnfoservice/Presse/Meldungen/200
8/080827... 02.04.2009
Written Statement of Germany