,.
Observations
of the FR of Yugoslavia
on the Second Request made on 27 July 1993 and
the Amended second Request made on 4 August 1993
by the so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
for the indication of provisional measures
To the President and Judges of the International Court
of Justice,
The undersigned, being duly authorized by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia,
Having in mind the Second Request made on 27 July 1993 and
the Amended Second Request made on 4 August 1993 by the so-called
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 for the indication of
provisional measures,
In view of Article 74, para 3, of the Rules of the Court,
Has the honour to submit the following Observations:
1. In the Case concerning the Application of the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9
December 1948 (hereinafter marked as "the Genocide Convention"),
instituted against the FR of Yugoslavia by the Application filed
in the Registry of the Court on 20 March 1993 by the so-called
Using the expression "the so called Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina", the FR of Yugoslavia wishes to indicate that its participation
in the proceedings before the Court cannot be understood as de jure
recognition of the Applicant State.
1Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Applicant State submitted
to the Court the Second Request for the indication of provisional
measures, dated 27 July 1993;
Wishing to protect the following rights:
" (a) The right of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
physically to survive as a People and as a State;
(b) The rights of the People of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to life, liberty, security, and bodily and mental
integrity, as well as the other basic human rights
specified in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights;
(c) The right of the People and State of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to be free at all times from genocide and
other genocidal acts perpetrated upon them by
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), acting together
with its agents and surrogates in Bosnia and
elsewhere;
(d) The right of the People and State of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to be free at all times from the use or
threat of force directed against them by a foreign
state acting in conjunction with its agents and
surrogates on their sovereign territory and
elsewhere;
(e) The Right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to conduct its
affairs and to determine matters within its domestic
jurisdiction without interference or intervention by
any foreign state acting directly or by means of
agents and surrogates, or both;
(f) The right to self-determination of the People and
State of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
(g) The basic right to sovereign existence for the People
and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
(h) The right of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to continue to exist as a Member State of the United
2
Nations Organization itself."
And requesting the following provisional measures:
11. That Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) must immediately
cease and desist from providing, directly or indirectly, any type
of support including training, weapons, arros, ammunition,
supplies, assistance, finances, direction or any other form of
support- to any nation, group, organization, movement, military,
militia or paramilitary force, irregular armed unit, or
individual in Bosnia and Herzegovina for any reason or purpose
whatsoever.
2 Request for the indication of provisional measures of protection
submitted by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 July
1993, p. 50.
2 2. That Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and all of its
public officials - including and specially the President of
Serbia, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic - must immediately cease and
desist from any and all efforts, plans, plots, schemes, proposals
or negotiations to partition, dismember, annex or incorporate the
sovereign territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3. That the annexation or incorporation of any sovereign
territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) by any means or for any reason shall be
deemed illegal, null, and void ab initie.
4. That the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina must have
the means 'to prevent' the commission of acts of genocide against
its own People as required by Article I of the Genocide
Convention.
5. That all Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention
are obliged by Article I thereof 'to prevent' the commission of
acts of genocide against the People and State of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
6. That the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina must have
the means to defend the People and the State of Bosnia and
Herzegovina from acts of genocide and partition and dismemberment
by means of genocide.
7. That all Contracting Parties to the Genocide Convention
have the obligation thereunder 'to prevent' acts of genocide, and
partition and dismemberment by means of genocide, against the
People and State of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
8. That in order to fulfill its obligations under the
Genocide Convention under the current circumstance, the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina must have the ability to
obtain military weapons, equipment, and supplies from other
Contracting Parties.
9. That in order to fulfill their obligation under the
Genocide Convention under the current circumstances, all
Contracting Parties thereto must have the ability to provide
military weapons, equipment, supplies and armed forces (soldiers,
sailors, airpeople) to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina
at its request.
10. That United Nations Peace-keeping Forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (i.e. UNPROFOR) must do all in their power to ensure
the flow of humanitarian relief supplies to the Bosnian People
through the Bosnian city of Tuzla.
F. The Court should Also Indicate Provisional Measures
Proprio Motu".
2. Reserving all rights of objections to jurisdiction of
the Court and to admissibility of the Application, the FR of
Yugoslavia asks the Court:
3 Ibid. p. 52, 53.
3 to reject all requested provisional measures indicated
from No. 1 to No. 10,
A) because the court has no jurisdiction to indicate them;
B) because they are not founded on the new legally relevant
facts;
C) because of the abuse of the right of the request for
provisional measures;
D) because they will seriously endanger the right of the FR
of Yugoslavia to request that the so-called Republic Bosnia and
Herzegovina fulfills its obligations under the Genocide
Convention concerning the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
E) because they look to the past, not to the future;
F) because they mean an interim judgment; and
to reject the provisional measure indicated under the letter
"F",
G) because it has no legal basis in the Rules of the court.
3. A) The Court has no jurisdiction ratione materiae in
relation of all provisional measures indicated from No. 1 to No.
10. The arguments for this contention are to be found in the
Order of the Court, made on 8 April 1993 on the requests for the
indication of provisional measures submitted by both parties.
(The Applicant State on 20 March 1993 and the Respondent State
on 31 March 1993.)
The Court said,
In para. 14 of the Order:
"Whereas on a request for provisional measures the Court
need not, before deciding whether or not to indicate them,
finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on the merits of
the case, yet it ought not to indicate such measures unless the
provisions invoked by the Applicant or found in the Statute
appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction
4of the Court might be established; whereas this consideration
embraces jurisdiction both ratione personae and ratione materiae,
even though, inasmuch as almost all States are today parties to
the statute of the Court, it is in general only the latter which
requires to be considered;" and
In para. 26 of the Order:
"Whereas Article IX of the Genocide Convention, to which
both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia are parties, thus appears
to the Court to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the
Court might be founded to the extent that the subject-matter of
the dispute relates to 'the interpretation, application or
fulfilment' of the Convention, including disputes 'relating to
the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of act
enumerated in Article III' of the Convention;" and
In para. 34 of the Order:
"Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional
measures under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court has as its
object to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending
the decision of the Court, and presupposes that irreparable
prejudice shall not be caused to rights which are the subject of
dispute in judicial proceedings; and whereas it follows that the
Court must be concerned to preserve by such measures the rights
which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either
to the Applicant or to the Respondent;" and, especially
In para. 35 of the Order:
"Whereas the Court, having established the existence of a
basis on which its jurisdiction might be founded, ought not to
indicate measures for the protection of any disputed rights other
than those which might ultimately form the basis of a judgment
in the exercise of that jurisdiction; whereas accordingly the
Court will confine its examination of the measures requested, and
of the grounds asserted for the request for such measures, to
those which fall within the scope of the Genocide Convention; ... "
4. Since the rights the Applicant State wishes to protect
as well as requested provisional measures are not within the
scope of the Genocide Convention, the Court ought not to indicate
the provisional measures. It is notorious that the protected
subject of the Genocide Convention, according to Article II of
the Genocide Convention, is "in a whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such". There is no
provision in the Genocide Convention concerning the protection
5of a State or of citizens, or concerning human rights, or
concerning the use or threat of force directed against a State
or a population of a State, or concerning interference in a
domestic jurisdiction, or concerning the rights to self
determination, or concerning the basic right to sovereign
existence for a population of a State and a State, or concerning
the right of a State to continue to exist as a Member State of
the United Nations. Consequently, all suggested provisional
measures indicated from No. 1 to No. 10 are outside the scope of
the Convention of Genocide.
s. The requested provisional measures indicated under Nos.
1, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are not within the jurisdiction of the Court
ratione personae. It is well known that the Court can regulate
by i ts decision the relations between the parties, but not
between the parties and third States. It is very clearly stated
in Article 59 of the Statute of the Court:
"The decision of the Court has no binding force except
between the parties and in respect of that particular case."
Consequently, the Court can not regulate by its provisional
measures the relations between the parties and third states or
international organizations.
6. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia contests the
legitimacy of the Applicant again. At the moment of the secession
of the "Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina", carried out in
contravention of the Constitution of this former Yugoslav
republic, as well as the rules of international law, the
President of the Presidency, Presidency and the Government of the
"Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" ceased to be the legitimate
6representatives of all three constituent peoples, and became the
representatives only of the Muslim population. Following the
expiry of their terms of office on 20 December 1992, the terms
thus established have not been renewed in a legal way. Their
legitimacy and terms of office are contested both by the Serbs
and Croats of this former Yugoslav republic. Of late even some
of the remaining members of the "Presidency of the Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina", in which only the representatives of the
Muslim population remain, expressed open disagreement with the
policy of Alija Izetbegovic. This is why they cannet be accepted
as legitimate representatives of the so-called Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
The fact that Alija Izetbegovic figures in negotiations of
the Yugoslav crisis within the International Conference on former
Yugoslavia (under the auspices of the United Nations and the
European Community) only as a representative of the Muslim
population, is sloquent proof that he is not accepted also in the
international community as the legitimate President of the whole
former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The recently adopted document on the Union of the Republics
of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Geneva, 30 July 1993) has only borne out
the Yugoslav position on an premature recognition of the
"Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" (despite of the fact that no
legally relevant condition was fulfilled), and the illegitimacy
of Alija Izetbegovic and ether organs of the "Republic of Bosnia
Herzegovina" (who have not established an effective power over
the whole territory and population of the former Yugoslav
republic Bosnia-Herzegovina for a single moment) .
7 This position is gaining increasing acceptance in
international political and professional circles.
7. B) The legally relevant facts, which could provide the
basis for the indication of provisional measures, is, inter a lia,
the evidence related to the attribution of acts of genocide to
a State. Who has real control over the territory on which the
alleged acts of genocide were committed and who are the
perpetrators of these acts or the acts described in Article III
of the Genocide Convention are the relevant questions.
8. At the same time two State entities have appeared on the
territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina: the Republic of Srpska and the so-called Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first of them, the Republic of
Srpska, is recognized only as a de facto government. The other
State, the so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
recognized prematurely at the time when customary international
conditions for the recognition were not fulfilled. 4 It seems
that a third State entity, that of Herzeg-Bosna, appeared in the
last few months by way of separation from the so-called Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leaders of the three State
entities are recognized by the United Nations and the European
Community as equal participants at the Geneva negotiations which
began on 27 July 1993.
9. All three new State entities are equally independent. The
Republic of Srpska demonstrated its independence during the
session of the Republic' s Assembly held on 4 and 5 May 1993.
Inspite of the fact that the President of the FR of Yugoslavia
4 See the Annex I.
8Mr. Dobrica Cosic, the President of the Republic of Serbia Mr.
Slobodan Milosevic, the President of the Republic of Montenegro
Mr. Momir Bulatovic and the Prime Minister of the Republic of
Greece Mr. Constantin Mitsotakis, cal led on the Assembly to
accept the Vance-Owen Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Assembly rejected their call and decided that the said Plan be
put to the referendum of the citizens of the Republic of Srpska.
As is well known, after the decision of the Assembly, the FR of
Yugoslavia adopted certain economie measures against the Republic
of Srpska. In view thereof, it is far from accurate that the
authorities and population of the Republic of Srpska are agents
and surrogates of the FR of Yugoslavia. To contend that about 1.5
million people who declared themselves in a number of referendums
in faveur of their own State are agents and surrogates of a
foreign State serves only to question the sincerity of those who
make such contentions.
10. Following the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army
in May 1992, the FR of Yugoslavia has had no organ on the
territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Since three independent State entities have been
formed on the said terri tory, the FR of Yugoslavia cannet
exercise any power on that territory. The acts or failures to act
of the three State entities cannet be attributed to the FR of
Yugoslavia.
11. The FR of Yugoslavia has not directed, supported or
influenced anybody to exercise the crime of genocide or any act
described by Article III of the Genocide Convention against the
Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any ether
9national, ethnical or religious group. There is no evidence to
corroborate the allegation, while evidence is abundant in support
of quite a different attitude of the Yugoslav State. Substantial
humanitarian aid to towns and areas under the control of the
authorities of the so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
is being shipped from and through the territory of the Yugoslav
State with the permission of the competent Yugoslav organs. A
large number of refugees of Muslim nationality have fled to the
territory of Yugoslavia or through its territory to other
countries. A number of the Muslim children or students who fled
Bosnia and Herzegovina attend Yugoslav schools and universities.
A number of wounded Muslim soldiers and civilians are treated in
Yugoslav hospi tals. If the Yugoslav State had any genocidal
intent towards the Muslim ethnie group, would the said facts be
possible?
12. The request for the indication of the provisional
measures submitted by the Applicant State is not legally based,
since the Applicant State has provided no new legally relevant
fact and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that the
Second Request for the indication of provisional measures is not
based on Article 75, para 3, of the Rules of the Court, and
therefore it requests the Court to reject the Second Request.
13. C) The intent of the Applicant State is not to protect
the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, rather than
that, its principal aim is to establish a unitary State of the
so called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the whole
territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina against the will of the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia
10and Herzegovina.
At the time when the Geneva negotiations began and when the
leaders of the three state entities reached the constitutional
agreement on the Union of three Republics, on 30 July 1993, the
so-called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested the Court
to indicate the provisional measures which would have contrary
effects. It could not be legally acceptable. The intent of the
Applicant State is, it is becoming even more obvious, to break
and occupy the Republic of Srpska by armed help from outside.
14. Prominent statesmen have recognized the fact that the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an internal, inter-ethnie and
inter-religious conflict between three national groups. 5 The war
was caused by the dispute of the three national groups over the
nature of internal relations between them and by the intent of
the authorities of the so-called Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to impose its solution by force.
15. The tragedy of all national, ethnical and religious
groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina is enormous. But is there
anybody who does not know that the prolongation of the war means
the extension of the suffering of Serbs, Croats, Muslims and
ethers living on that territory. Yet, the Applicant State is
persistent in asking the Court to legalize a foreign armed
intervention. Since this is an obvious case of the abuse of the
right of request for the indication of provisional measure, the
Court ought not to indicate provisional measures requested under
No. 1 to No. 10.
16. D) If the provisional measures, requested by the
5 See Annex I.
11Applicant State, were indicated, they would prolong the civil,
inter-ethnie and inter-religious war. The prolongation of the war
would ensue in the commission of new acts of genocide against the
Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the last few weeks
the military forces of the Applicant State committed new acts of
genocide by destroying Serb villages and killing their
inhabi tants. The evidence thereon is contained in the second
Request for the indication of provisional measures which will be
filed by the Respondent State.
17. E) The reason for the indication of provisional
measures is to provide legal possibility, available to both
parties and the Court, to prevent, pending the final settlement
of a dispute, the deterioration of that dispute. The provisional
measures are instituted under Article 41 of the Statute of the
Court "to preserve the respective rights of either party". They
can be indicated to prevent illegal acts and omissions in a
process of commission or acts and omissions which can be
committed in future. They cannot be used to remove the
consequences of alleged or real illegal acts and omissions.
Consequences of international delict are removed exclusively by
the judgement of the Court.
18. The existence of the three State entities (the Republic
of Srpska, the so called Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Herzeg-Bosna) on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the fact. The provisional measures
could not be directed to negate or change that fact. By their
nature, they should look to the future not to the past.
19. F) Some of the provisional measures, like the one
12requested under No. 3, have the character of a judgment. They are
intended to legally resolve the subject-matter of the dispute.
Disputes are settled with judgements, not by provisional
measures. (Chorzow Factories Case, P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 12, p.
10.)
20. G) The Court ought not to indicate the provisional
measure requested under letter "F", because it has no basis in
the Rules of the Court. Article 75, para. 1, of the Rules of the
Court reads:
"The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu
whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of
provisional measures which ought to be taken or complied by any
or all of the parties."
Consequently, for a decision which the Court may take
proprio motu, the request of a party is superfluous. The FR of
Yugoslavia sees no justification for the Court to keep the
situation under daily review, all the more so since the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations, remains seized with the overall situation. Since such
a request is not based on the Rules of the Court it ought not to
be accepted.
x x x
21. The Applicant State amended, by the written submission
dated 4 August 1993, its Second Request in the following way:
"I hereby amend:
Our Second Request for an indication of Provisional Measures of
27th July 1993 ('The Second Request') and our outstanding Request
for an immediate hearing thereof by submitting a request for an
13immediate Order without hearing pursuant to the Second Request,
in accordance with Article 75 (1) of the Rules of the
International Court of Justice."
22. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the Court
to reject the Amended Second Request for the reasons stated above
and because it is not based on the Rules of the Court.
23. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia requests the Court
to reject the Amended Second Request for the reasons stated above
and because it is not based on the Rules of the Court. As well
as because it is contrary to the well-established practice of
the Court. The indication of provisional measures on the basis
of the Amended Second Request is legally impossible. An Applicant
State cannet base its Request for the indication of provisional
measures on Article 75, para. 1, of the Rules of the Court
because, according to the said rule, "the Court may at any time
decide to examine proprio motu whether the circumstances of the
case require the indication of provisional measures ... "
According to the said rule, it is the Court that has the power
to act, not an Applicant State. And the Court acts proprio motu,
not at a request of a party. A Party may to base its request for
the indication of provisional measures only on Article 73, para.
1, and possible on Article 75 para. 3 of the Rules of the Court.
According to Article 74, para. 3, of the Rules of the Court, if
a Party has made a request for the indication of provisional
measures, "the Court, or the President ... shall fix a date for
a hearing which will afford the parties an opportunity of being
represented at i t." There is no legal provision according to
which the Court could decide on a request made by a Party without
affording an opportunity to the opposite party to be heard.
14Consequently, since the Amended Second Request is not based on
the Rules of the Court, and since it is contrary to the well
established practice of the Court, the Court ought to reject it.
24. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not wish to
discuss the allegation contained in the written submission dated
4 August 1993, because they are outside the jurisdiction of the
Court. Only as an information for the Court, legally irrelevant
to the Case (except some parts of the first document related to
the continuity of the international personality of Yugoslavia),
enclosed to the Observations as annexes are the following
documents: Declaration adopted by the Federal Assembly on 27
April 1992, 6 , Interview of the President of the FR of
Yugoslavia Mr. Zoran Lilic to Tanjug News Agency on 8 August
1993, 7 Statements of the Yugoslav Government of 5 August
1993, 8 and the Statement of the British Brigadier-General, Vere
Hayes, UNPROFOR chief of staff, carried by the Reuters on 4
August 1993. 9
Belgrade , 9 August 1993
Agent of the FR of Yugoslavia
6
See Annex II.
7
See Annex III.
8
See Annex IV.
9
See Annex v.
15 Annex I
STATEMENTS CONCERNING THE PREMATURE RECOGNITION OF AND
CIVIL WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLA V REPUBLIC
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
British Defence Minister, M. Ritkind said that NATO would not resort to military
intervention to stop the bloodshed in former Yugoslavia. He added that there was no
aggressor to be driven out of Bosnia and assessed that the Bosnian conflict was
characterized by elements of civilwar.
According to Rifkind even though the international community considers Belgrade
responsible for much of the bloodshed the current fighting is going on among various
Bosnian groups of Serbs, Croats and Muslims.(REUTERS, 16 February 1993)
* * *
Henry Kissinger:
"An understanding of the situation we face in Bosnia must begin with a definition
of whatis not at stake there.
Itis a three-sided civilwar, not an invasion of a sovereign country by neighbour.
Itis not a holocaust in the German sense, and not only because the number of
casualties is mercifully not comparable to the Nazi crimes. The Holocaust represented
a Nazi attempt, in pursuit of warped racial theories, to exterminate a peaceful minority.
The Bosnian atrocities - appalling and inexcusable as they are - represent the barbarie
methods of Balkan civil war which, with a few interruptions, have been going on for
centuries.
In making that judgment, it isimportant to understand that Bosnia bas never been
nation; there is no Bosnian ethnie group or specificallyBosnian cultural identity. Located
at the intersection of the Muslim, Greek Orthodox and Catholic religions and at the
dividing line between thetoman and the Habsburg empires, Bosnia-Hercegovina bas
been the no man'sland where nationalities displaceddless Balkan wars were thrown
together.(THE WASHINGTON POST, 16 May 1993)
* * *
US Secretary of State, W. Christopher considers that by its early recognition of
the former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Bosnian-Herzegovina as independent
States, Germany is responsible for the outbreak of the civil war in the region. In his
interview to the American magazine "US Today" he said that serious mistakes had been
made in the whole process of the early recognition, and that the Germans were
responsible in particular for that since they bad pressurized their partners and the
EC.(AP, 17 June 1993) Annex Il
DECLARTION
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AND THE
REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO,
- EXPRESSING THE WILL OF THE CITIZENS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE REPUBLICS TO STAY
INTHE COMMON STATE OF YUGOSLAVIA;
- ACCEPTING ALL BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
THE CSCE HELSINKI AND PARIS CHARTERS, AND PARTICULARLY THE PRINCIPLES OF
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, MARKETECONOMY AND RESPECT FORHUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES;
- REMAINING STRICTLY COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE YUGOSLAV
CRISIS,
WISH TO STATE IN THIS DECLARATION THEIR VIEWS ON THE BASIC, IMMEDIATE AND
LASTING OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICYOF THEIR COMMON STATE, AND ON ITS RELATIONS WITH
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS.
IN THAT REGARD, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
AND THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO DECLARE:
1. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, CONTINUING THE STATE, INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL AND POLITICAL PERSONALITY OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA,
SHALL STRICTLY ABIDE BY ALL THE COMMITMENTS THAT THE SFR OF YUGOSLAVIA ASSUMED
INTERNATIONALLY IN THE PAST.
AT THE SAME TIME, IT SHALL BE READY TO FULLY RESPECT THE RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS OF THE YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS WHICH DECLARED INDEPENDENCE. THE
RECOGNITION OF THE NEWLY-FORMED STATES WILL FOLLOW AFTER ALL THE OUTSTANDING
QUESTIONS NEGOTIATED ON WITHIN THE CONFERENCE ON YUGOSLAVIA HAVE BEEN
REGULATED.
REMAINING SOUND BY ALL OBLIGATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
INSTITUTIONS WHOSE MEMBER IT IS, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA SHALL NOT
OBSTRUCT THE NEWLY-FORMED STATES TO JOIN THESE ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS,
PARTICULARLY THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES.
THE FR OF YUGOSLAVIA SHALL RESPECT AND FULFIL THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
THE SFR OF YUGOSLAVIA ASSUMED VIS-A-VISTHE TERRITORIES OF KRAJINA WHICH HAVE BEEN
PLACED, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION,
UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATION.
THE FEDERAL REPUBUC OFYUGOSLAVIA ALSO REMAINS READYTO NEGOTIATE, WITHIN
THE CONFERENCE ON YUGOSLAVIA, ON ALL PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DIVISION OF ASSETS,
WHICH MEANS BOTH TO ASSETS AND DEBTS ACQUIRED JOINTLY. IN CASE OF A DISPUTE
REGARDING THESE ISSUES, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA SHALL BE READY TO
ACCEPT THE ARBITRATION OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION IN THE HAGUE.
2. THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
YUGOSLAVIA ABROAD SHALL CONTINUE WITHOUT INTERRUPTION TO PERFORM THEIR
FUNCTIONS OF REPRESENTING AND PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF YUGOSLAVIA.
UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE, THEY SHALL CONTINUE TO TAKE CARE OF ALL THE ASSETS
OF YUGOSLAVIA ABROAD.
THEY SHALL ALSO EXTEND CONSULAR PROTECTION TO ALL NATIONALS OF THE SFR
OF YUGOSLAVIA WHENEVER THEY REQUEST THEM TO DO SO UNTIL A FINAL REGULATION OF
THEIR NATIONALITY STATUS.
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA RECOGNIZES, AT THE SAME TIME, THE FULL
CONTINUITY OF THE REPRESENTATION OF FOREIGN STATES BY THEIR DIPLOMATIC AND
CONSULAR MISSIONS IN ITS TERRITORY.
3. THE FR OF YUGOSLAVIA IS INTERESTED IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC,
TRANSPORT, ENERGY AND OTHER FLOWS AND TIES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE SFR OF
YUGOSLAVIA. ITIS READY TO MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUTION TO THAT END. Annex III
Statement of Mr. Lilic, the President of the FR of Yugoslavia
The President of the FR of Yugoslavia said that, by the establishment
of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the last condition is being fulfilled for the
lifting of the blockade. The FR of Yugoslavia is doing an it can to bring
about peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The isolation of an entire people and
a State by the international community for something taking place outside
the borders of that State has no precedent in contemporary political history.
Unfortunately, we are not in the situation to solve the Bosnian
problem an by ourselves. Ali that the FR of Yugoslavia could have done, the
FR of Yugoslavia has done- it invested maximum efforts to bring about a
quicker political solution. The world has not understood that thus far. It is
only now that it has finany began to understand an the seriousness to put
us in total isolation. This change in its understanding is important and 1am
confident that it represents a first big step towards a graduai normalization
of the relations of the FR of Yugoslavia with the world- towards the lifting
of sanctions and the return of our country to international economie,
political, scientific and other flows. This is our priority task.
The blockade of the FR of Yugoslavia bas affected very seriously its
neighbours as weil. It has thwarted the flow of goods and money and
disrupted the principal transport routes between East and West. If the
Geneva talks are concluded successfuny, I believe that developments will
take a different tack and that the logic of economie interests will prevail in
the relations among ali countries in this part of Europe. President Lilicwent
on to say that he was confident that however negative an impact the
sanctions may have had on Yugoslavia's relations with these countries, they
have not damaged its relations with neighbouring peoples.
President Lilic pointed out that the Geneva talks demonstrated
unequivocany that the nationalism and religious intolerance of sorne Muslim
leaders had prevailed over the most vital interests of their own people. As
far as the Bosnian Serb side is concerned, it can only benefit from the
dilemma that is graduany emerging in the international public opinion that
the "aggressor" may indeed be the victim.
lt is upon the FR of Yugoslavia to continue to invest every effort to
bring about an early end to the warin Bosnia-Herzegovina. But to reach an
agreement it is necessary to have at least two, and in this case, three sides.
Precisely for these reasons the hints of a possible military intervention,
initiated by the United States, are far from being conducive to the solution
that we are in favour of. A military action, even most limited in scope,against responsible Bosnian Serbs,aswritten in NATO documents, does not,
I am deeply convinced, solve the problem, all the more so since the Geneva
negotiations have yielded the most fruitful results thus far. (TANJUG, 8
August 1993) Annex IV
Statement of Yugoslav Government concerning the Peace Talks on Bosnia
Herzegovina
On Thursday, the Yugoslav Government addressed an appeal to all
three warring sides in former Bosnia-Herzegovina to invest all their efforts
towards the continuation and successful conclusion of the peace process
within the Geneva Conference. Concern was expressed at the
Government session, presided over by Prime Minister R. Kontic, that the
Geneva talks have come to a standstill which could encourage extremist and
other militant forces who stand for a war option in the resolution of the
Yugoslav crisis.
The Government underscored that the standstill in the talks among
three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a result, first and foremost, of the
influence of certain members of international community who are
encouraging with their actions the Muslim side to black the peace talks and
opt for military solution.
The FR of Yugoslavia, on its part, continues to be actively involved
in the Geneva peace talks in arder to bring about a quick and just solution
to the crisis in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (TANJUG, 5 August
1993) Annex V
A U.N. general in Bosnia-Herzegovina said wednesday the Moslem offensive, and
not Serbs assaults, were preventing humanitarian aid from reaching Sarajevo.
As Reuters reported, British brigadier general Vebe Hayes, who is chief of staff
of UNPROFOR in Bosnia, said the media represented the Serb attacks on mount Igman
as an attempt to strangle Sarajevo and prevent inflow of humanitarian aid.
"Ifyou are talking about strangling Sarajevo and getting humanitarian aid through,
the crucial thing that is blocking that is the Bosnian (Moslem) offensive in Central
Bosnia, which is blocking the only raad up which humanitarian aid can be brought by
anybody'',gen. Hayes told Reuters.
The Serb attacks on mount Igman only threatened the chief Moslem military
supply line into Sarajevo,he said.
Gen. Hayes' statement was issued after a meeting at Sarajevo airport between
UNPROFOR commander for Bosnia-Herzegovina, gen. F. Briquemont and commander
of Bosnian Serb forces, gen. R. Mladic. (TANJUG, 4 August 1993)
Written Observations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Second Request made on 27 July 1993 and the Amended Second Request made on 4 August 1993 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the Indication of Provisional Measures