Written Statements

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

I
MEMOIRES, PLAIDOIRIES ET DOCUMENTS

CERTAINES DÉPENSES
DES NATIONS UNIES

(ARTICLE17, PARAGRAPHE 2DE LA CHARTE) CONTENTS - TABLE DES MATJ~KES

PART 1.-REQUEST FOR AUVISORY OPINION,
DOCUMENTS AND WRI'TTEN STATEMENTS

PREM IÈRE PARTIE. - KEQU~TE POUR AVIS

CONSULTATIF, DOCUM ENTÇ .ET EXPOSÉS ÉCRITS

SECTION A.-REQUEST FOR AUVIÇORY OPINION

Page
1. Letter fromthe Acting Secretary-Generaof theUnited Nations
to thePresidentof theInternationaCourtof Justice(21 XII61)
- Lettre du Secrétairegénéra lar intérimdes Nation snies
au Présidentde la Courinternationalede Justice(21 XII61) . I

II. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 1086th
Plenary Meeting on 20 December 1961 - Résolutionadoptée
par l'Assemblée générale sa xo8Gmeséance plénièrc le
20 décembre 1961 ................... 2

SECTION B.-DOSSIER TKANSY ITTED RY THE ACTING SECRETAKY-
GEWERAL OF THE UNITED NA'TIOWS (ART.65, I'AK. 2, OF THE STATUTE)
SECTION B. - DOSSIER TRANSMIS PAR LE SECRETAIRE C~NERAT.
P.4R INT~RIM DES NriTIOSS UNIES (ART. 65, PAR. 2, DU ÇT..\TWT)

Introductory Note. - Introduction.............. 4

Note by the Controller- Note du ContrOleur ......... 37
Contents of the othcr documents filed. - Liste des autres dom-
ments déposis ...................... 90

SECTION C.-WRI11'EN STATERSENTS
SECTION C. - EXPOSES EÇRITS

r. Expose bcridu Gouvernement de la Rkpublique de Haute-
Volta ....................... 123

2. Expose Ccritdu Gouvernement de la Républiq~ieitalienne. I25
3. Lettre du Gouvernement de la République française au
Grefier ....................... Il0
Writteii Statement of the Government of the Kingdom of
4. Denmark. ..................... '37

1. Scope of the question subtnitted tthe Court .... r37 CONTENTS - TABLE DES ~T~IAT~~RES

II. The substance of the General Assernbly resolutioi~s
concerning expenses ofUNEF and ONUC . . . . . .
A. United Nations Emergency Forcc . . . . . . . .
B. United Nations operations in the Congo . . . . .
III. 1s the practice ofthe GeneraZAssembly in budgetarÿ
inatters relevant to the question? . . . . . . . . .
IV. The fiscd power of tlie Organization is vcstcd in the
General Assem bly excluçively . . . . . . . . . . .
V. Formal vdidity of the decisions by which UNEF and
ONUC were establislied . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. UNEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. ONUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VI. 1sArticle 43 of thc Charter relevant to the question? .
A. UNEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. ONUC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
VII. Whüt is the substarrtivc legal bais of theaction taken!
V1II.The perspective in which the case should be seen . .
IX. Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. WriNetherlands .n. . . . .e G. .r. . . . . . . . . .m of . . .

6. Writteiz Statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak
Socialist Repriblic. . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Written Statement subrnitted by the Coverilnient of the
United States of Ainesica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
'l'àlcQuestion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tlie Juriçdictionof the Court . . . . . . . . . . . .
Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) .
B. United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC)
C. Financial Consequcnccs . . . . . . . . . . . .
Surnmary of Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.before the Court, unmistakably manifested its inten-s
tion to trcat expenditures for ONUCand UNEF ac;
"Expenses of the Organization" under Article 17 of
the Charter, to be apportioned among the States
Rilembers of the United Nations
A. Assessment resolutions relating to UNEF . .
B. Assessrnent resolutions relsting to ONUC . .
11.The legal consequcnce of the General Assembly
ac;sessmeilt resolutions, invoki~iand exerciçing the
Assembly's authority under Article r7, was to creste
binding legal obligations on Member States Fagc
17. Letter from the Governrnent of thc Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Kepublto the President.......... 275
18. Note du ministére des Affaires ktranghdcslaRépublique
populaire dcBulgarie au PrBsiden........... 276
LettrcclministreadjointdesAffairesktrangkredc laRépu-
19. blique socialiste soviétique d'UkrailPrésident... 277

20. Lettrede laIégatiode la République populaire roumanie eil
Belgique etau Luxembourg au Prkçident....... 279

PART II.-ORAL STATEMENTS
IJEUXIÈME PARTIE. - EXPOSES ORAUX

ANXEXE AUX PROC~~S-VERBAUX
Exposé oral deM. Cadieux (Canada),14-1 5 ai....,

OralStatement ofMr. Riphagen (Netherlands)15-16May .
Exposé oral dM. R. Monaco (Italie)16-r7 mai......
Oral Staternenof SirReginald Manninghsm-Ruller (United
Kingdom), 17May. .................
OralStatement ofMr. Jens Evensen (Norway), 17-18 May .

Oral ~tstenienofSir Kenneth Bailey (Atistral18-19May
OralState~ncntaf Mi-6 Caaimh (Ircland)19 May ....
Oral Staten~ent of Mr. Tunk(USSR), er hfay ......
OralStatemetltofAh-.Chayes (USA),21 May .......

PART III.-DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT
GFTER THE CLOSURE OF THE WRITmTEN PROCEEDINGS
[No doc.time~zs er#sztbwzitted]

TROISTEME PARTIE. - DOCUMENTS PRÉSENTGS A LA
COUR APRES LA FIN DE LA PROC~DURB ÉCRITE

fAztcztndocz4~nenn'a&téprése.ntE]

PART IV.-CORRESPONl3ENCE
[-Tee$9- 432-4641

QIJATRIÈ~M-EPARTIE. - CORRESPONDANCE
[VO~Y j$. 432-4641 SECTION C.-WRITTEN STATEMENTS '

SECTION C. - EXPOSES ECRITS'

These ';tatcrnenls printediiitheçhronulogical order in which theywere
filed- Leç p&sents exposés sont reproduisuivant l'ordre chronologique de
leur dépbt au Greffe. x.ExPOSÉ ÉCRIT UU GOUVERNEMENT 121.3I,A
REPUBLIQUE BE HAUTE-VOLTA

22 janvier 1962.
Monsieur le Grefiïer,
Coinme suitc i la correspondance en rkférence, par lacjuelle la
Cour internationale de Justice dernande l'avis du Gouvernement de
Haute-Volta àl'effetde savoir si les dépensesautoriséespar diverses

rbolutions de I'Asseinblée gknbrale de l'organisation des Nations
relatives aux opérations de la Force d'urgence de 1'0. N. Ii. au
COKGOc,onstituent des rdcpcrises clc l'Organisation a au sens du
paragraphe 2 de l'article17 de la Charte des Nations Unies, j'ai
l'honneur de vous faire tenir ci-après les arguments exposés par
riion Gouvernement :

Le paragraphe 2 dc l'article17 de la Charte de l'O. N. U. énonce:
(cLes dépenses de l'organisation sont supportkes par les Membres
sclon la répartition fixée par l'Assemblée gérikralr: ii;m'fait, il

s'agit des dépensesinhérentes au fonctionnement normal des divers
organismes relevant de l'Organisation. Il est regrettable que la
Charte ne prkvoit pas de discrimination entre les dépenses rcordi-
naires iret (extraordinaires ilLes dépenses de la Forcc d'urgence
iz'entrent pas dans les dkpençeç courantes, puisque destinees à sub-
venir aux besoins et au maintien d'un organe transitoire appelé à
des opérations de caractère militaire à effetslimités dans le temps.
La constitution d'urie forcc d'urgence est privue expressément
par le paragraplie 5 de I'uticlcz de la Charte, inais le paragraphe 4
du meme article précisebien que crles Membres de l'Organisation
s'abstienrient clans leurs relations interrlationalcs de recourir à la
menace ou à l'emploi de la force, soit contre l'intcgriti. territoriale
ou I'indépendance politicjuc de tout État, soit detozttattire nzanière
irtconzp~ztibl!vecles butsdes 1ZialioasUaies 1).
II est indeniable que les buts fixéspar l'article r de la Charte

rr..réaliserpar des moyens pacifiques, conformérncnt aux principes
de justice et du droit irzternatioi~al, l'ajustement ou le rkglernent
de diffhends ou de situations, de caractkre international, suscep-
tibles de mener A une rupture de la paix ii,ile pouvaient &tre
atteints par une intervention armée en contradictiori avec les
principes rnêniesde la Charte.
L'intervention de PaForce d'urgence au Congo n'a pas permis ail
peuple coi~golaisdc disposer de lui-mgme, et la poursuite d'opéra-
tions contre desfractions trèsimportarites de la population constitue
une violation fla~ante du principe énoncédans la résolutioninitiale
de la Charte: (Resolus ..à acccytcr des principes ct instituer desméthodes garantissant qu'ilne sera pas fait usage de la forcc des
armes, sauf dans i'intéretcommun. e
Le Gouvernement de la Haute-Volta estime pour toutes ces
raisons que lesdépensesde laForce d'urgence des Nations Unies au
Congone constituent pa des depenses de l'Organisation et devraient
êtrelaisséesà la charge des États volontaires pour participer A la
poursuite des opdrations entreprises.

Veuillez agréer,etc.
(Sigfié) Lompolo ICONE. 2. EXYOS~ ÉCRIT DU GOUVERNEJ'IENT 13E LA
l K~PUB~,IQUE ITALIENNE

Le Gouvernement de la Rkpublique italienne a l'honneur de
1 soumettre à la Cour internationale de Justice le présent mernoire
rédigéaux termes de l'art. 66 du Statut, et avec référence5 la
I lettredu 27 décembre 1g61 du Greffier de la Cour. Par cettelcttre,
Monsieur le Greffier a bien voulu informer le Gouvernement italien
que Monsieur le President de la Cour, avec son ordonnance en date

du 27 décembre 1961, a fixCle terme du 20 fevrier 1962pour la
présentation d'exposésécrits sur la question concernant la requgte
d'avis consultatif que l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies lui
a adresséepar ça résolution du 20 décembre 1961.

Le Gouvernement italien estime que la reclu&ted'avis consultatif
de l'Assembl&egénérxleconcerne deux points essentiels qu'il sera
opportun dc traiter sbparément.

A) Les dé#enses des Nadions Iiaies +our L'UNEF et I'ONUC
doivent-ellestire considkéesGumnze rddpenses de I'Urga?zz'salioii
sess d$~fiaragrufihe2 del'art.17de la Cha~te des Nations Unies?

Une recherche tendant h établir si les dépenses en question sont
cffeçtivernei~t comprisesparmi celles qui sont propres aux Nations
Unies doit Etre poursuivie, selon l'avis du Gouvernenlent italien, en
tenant comptc des buts fondamentaux de l'0rganisation. Ces buts
sont dkfinis par l'artI dc la Charte. Le paragraphe I dudit article,
en particulier, dispose :
Lcs buts des Nationç Unies sont les suivants: r.Rlnintenir la
paix etla sCcuritéinternationales cA cettefiilprendre des inesures
collectiveç eficaces en vue de prévei~irct d'ecnrter les meilaccInà
paix et de reprimer tout acte d'agression oti autre rupturede la
paix et rbaliser, par des rrioyeils jîaçificlues, coi1form4rncaux
princilics delajustice et di1 droit inteinationaI'ajusten~cntmi le
règlc~nent de clilféreildsou situatioils, de caractère intcsnationül,
susceptihlcs de inener h une rupt~ii-edc p--Y. w

D'autre part, en vertu çlel'art. 2, par. 5,
I
((Les Mernbrcs de 1'ç)rganisation donnent à cellc-ci plcine assis-
tance dans toute action entreprise par ~llc conformément aux
dispositionsclcla prCsente Charte et s'abstienneilt de prcteassis-
taiice 3un État contrc lequel l'organisatioil eiiti-epriineaction
préver-itivou cocrcitivc.ri

Par conséquent, tous les fitats Membres de l'Organisation sont
également et sans aucune distinction obligésA coopkrer afinque
17126 EXPOS~ ÉCHIT DE LA R~PUBL~QUE ITALIENNE

L'Organisation des Nations Unies puisse atteindre ses buts irîstitu-
tionnels.
11est hors de doute que les Nations Unies ont effectud les opéra-
tions UNEF et ONUC, respectivement au Moyen-Orient et au
Congo, àla suite de délibérationsrégulièresdu Conseil de Sécuriti:
et de l'Assembléegénkrale.La requête d'avisconsultatif mentionne
exactement toutes ces délibkrations. L'activité des Nations Unies
dont il est question n'est pas seulement fondée sur une proc4dure
absolument correcte du point de vue formel, mais elle rcrztre, sans
aucun doute, dans les pouvoirs des organes des Nations Unies. On
doit, d'autre part, reccinnaitre que lesdites dépenses ont étéqunli-

fiées comme rdkpenses de l'Organisation » par de nombreuses
rCsolutions de l'Assembléeghérale; en effct, celle-ci a affirméplu-
sieurs fois trks clairement que (les dkpenses entrainées par les
opkratinris des Nations Unies au Congopour l'annde 1960 constituent
des dkpcnseç de l'organisation e; cfr. résolution de l'Assemblée
généralc 1583(XV).
Il s'agide résolutions qui ont étkadoptées.&une grande majorité
des Membres des Nations Unies. Il existe donc déjàun consentement
généraldans le sens que ces depenses sont non seulement (de
l'organisation IImais qii'elles doivent êtreconsidérbescomme des
a dépenses ordinaires ii,yuisqu'elles orif été autorisées pour la
rkalisation des buts des Nations Unies.

Il apparait superflu d'ajouter que,A la suite d'une skie de résalu-
tions ~Sgulikrement approuvkes par l'Assembléegénkrale, chacun
des États Membres est obIigk de réaliser la volorzté des Nations
Unies, teUc qu'elle a étéexpriinke par son organeprincipal, l'hssem-
blCe gknérale. Par consbquerit, selon l'avis du Goiivernement
italien,aucun des fitats fifernbresnepeut sesoustraire Al'obligation
de contribuer aux dépenses entraînees parl'activité des N- Ct1011s
Unies dans l'accomplisseme~it de leur mission institutionnelle.
Le fait que les dépensesdont il est question se rbfèrent àl'activité
d'un organe, tel que la Force d'urgence, qui n'existait pas encore
lorsque la Charte des Nations Unies a été conçue, n'einpeche en rien
d'aboutir aux conclusions que nous avons déjà indiqukcs.
En vertu de l'art.zz de la Charte, (1'Assemblkeghndrale peut

créerdes organes subsidiaires qu'elle juge nécessaires à l'exercicede
ses fonctions ii.C'est préciskment sur cette base que YUNEF a kt6
instituée; or il est &videntque, du fait mkme de son existeilce ct de
son rattachemerit direct à l'Assemblée,cet organe est couvcrt par
la règle de l'art. 17, gar. 2, de la Charte (cfr. CHSU~IONT ((, a
situation juridique des Etats Membres àl'égardde la force d'urgence
des Nations Unies iidans 1'Afifiuaz'rfrançais dg droit.internatiofiaZ,
199, P. 419).
lenant,conzpte des cas prkcédents, on arrive à la conviction quc
tous les Etats Membres doivent supporter les dépenscs entraînées
par la crCation et le fonctionnement d'organes subsidiaires, m&me

clans l'hypothèse où fl n'y a pas eu unc clkcision unanime. On peutrnentionncr le Comitéad /tocsur les territoires non autonomes, cré&

par la rksolution du 4 décembre 1946, jugéillégalpar les Piiissançes
administtanteç; la Commission intérimaire de l'Assembléegkngrale,
créée en 1948, qui n'a pas eté admisc par l'URSS et les pays de
démocratiepopulaire ;la Commission des mesures callectives, formée
en vertu de la résolution du 3 novembre 1950, dont l'existence
légitime a été également contestée par lesdits pays; le Cornite du
Sud-Ouest africain, qui n'apas Ctéreconnupar l'Union sud-africaine.
Malgrécela, tous ces organes ont étéintégrbs dans le budget de
l'Organisation, et les États protestataires,en payant leur contribu-
tion annuelle, ont parlà m&meparticipé à l'entretien de ces organes.
La pratique qui s'est ainsi développée au sein des Nations Unies
confirme donc le principc que le Secrktaire générala énoncéclans
soi1 rapport du g octobre 1957 (Doc. A 3694, par. 106) en disant
quc crlorsque l'Assernblke elle-meme prend des décisions qui ont

d'importantes consbquences financières, ces décisions emportent,
pour les Gouvernements de tous les Etats Membres, l'obligation de
fournir 1cs ressources ou autres moyens qu'exige leur mise en
ceuvre M.

B) A qstel organe des Mations Ubes a$$artient la cow#étenceen.
nzatièreadmifiist~aliveetbudgkiaire

Le Gouvernemer~t italien croit avoir démontréla régularitéfor-
melle et substantielle de la procédure suivie par les Nations Unies
lorsqu'elles ont décidéde prendre des mesures pour lc maintien de
la paix et dc la sécuritéir~ternationalcs nu R'loyeli-Orient et au
Congo. Cela Ctabli, on doit voir si, dans le sjrstème constitutionnel
des Nations Unies, les délibkrationç financieres relatives auxdites
mesures ont étépriscs par l'organe compétent. Ida solutiori est très
si~nplc:la conipktence relativeà toutc gestion friar~cikredesNations
Unies appartient à I'dssernbléc générale. Tlsuffit de lireI'art. 17
(par. I et21, qui est ainsi coi~çu:

rr 1L'Assemblic générale examirie et approuve le budget de
lJOrganiat'ion.
selonlasripartitiofixke par 1'AssemhlCcgénérale.1)ar les Membres

Il s'agit de la seule clisposition de la Charte qui a pour objet la
gcstion financière de l'Organisation. 11faut encore reinarquer que
rnêrne les dispositions des règlements ne viscnt la comykteizce
d'aucun autre organe des Nations Unies. En effet, le règlenlentde
1'Assernblke générale spécifie les compéteiiceç de l'Assemblée
généraledans ce domaine comrne suit: (rL'hssernblke générale
arrete le règlement relatif i la gesticiides firiances de I'Organi-

çation ii(art. 153). D'autrc part, l'art. I54 conflrrne que toute
dkpense doit étrc appruuvke par 1' Assemlrilkegkrikrale. Cette der-
nière a doilc tous les pouvoirs en matière budgétaire, y compris
le pouvoir de nommer des organes auxiliaires comme le Cornit6consultati i pour les questions administratives et budghtaires et le
Comité tcchi~ique des contributions. Ces deux orgünes sont siib-
ordonnés dans leur activité à l'Assen~blce.gknhrale.
La formule ernployke au parügyayhe r indique clairemeiit que
toute décisionobligatoire pour les Etats Rlcinbres en cc qui concerne
le bilan de l'Organisation relkve de la cornpétcnce de 1'Assernbléc
générale.A vrai dire, quand on a voulii attribuer à 1'Asseinblke
une compétence d'une autre nature, clépourvue d'emcscitk déci-

soire, on l'a dit d'une faqoil expresse. Tel est le cas du paragraphe 3
dudit article 17, qui donne 5 l'Assembléele pouvoir de faire aux
institutions sp&cialiséesde simples recommandations çiir leurs bud-
gets administratifs. Ide paragraphe z de l'article 17 corzf~~irmseans
posçibilitk de doute que I'Asse~~~blégeériéraleest compétente
iixcr le barème des contributions aux clépeilsesde I'Orgai~isation.
Dails l'espèce,I'Assemblkc a exercéce pn~ivoir,car elle n dgrogéen
favenr de certains Membres au barème ordinaire établi your les
dépensesdc l'Or~ai~isation. En cffet, le par. 5 de la résolution 1583
(XI?) dit que l'Assembléegiilésale :

ciDEcide en outre que lcs contributions b&névolcsclkj:dniionckeç,
en sus de celles qui sonmentionnéesau pdr. 3 ci-dessus, seront em-
ployCes, lorsquc I'Etat hleri~breintércçsk en aura fait la dcmnnde
avant le 31 mars rgG~, à rbcltiire~50 ~iuui-~oo xu rnaximutn:
a) Idaçoiltribution que les Etats Membres admis pei~dant la
quinzième session de l'Assemblée génkrale doivcnt acquitter polir
l'exercice1960 conformément: 5 la résolution 1532 (i;Vde 1'Asscm-
blke,cildate du 18 décembrc ~960;
6) 1.n.contribution de tous les autresl?tiltMetnbrcs hériéfiçiant
cn 1960 d'une assistancc ai1titrc du programme tlrirgd'assislancc
te~l-iniquc, en comrnei-iyat par les gtats dont la quote-part est
f~skeau minimum de 0,04 your lociet en continuant, succeçsivcmcrit,
par les Riats ~crsant uiic quote-part supérielire, jusqu'icc que
le totaldes contributions hbnévolcs ait étéentierernei~t employé. 3

A peu prks de la rnt.me façon s'exprime larésolution 1732 (XVI)
de ladernikre slssernbléeg61iéralc.
II faut aussi souligner que la cornpétcnce de I'Asçemhlée en
rilatière budgétaire est nori sasseuIement gknérale - c'est-A-dirc
consistant à examiner et i approuver le bilan de I'Osganisatiori -
rnais aussi exclusive. Aucun article, en effet, ne corif6reà un organe
autre que 1'Açsenibli.egénkralele pouvoir de preridre des décisions

eri matière budgétaire, mCme lorsqu'il s'agit de questioi-is tout à
fait particuliEres.
Aucun desarticles concernant le Conseil de Sécurité, par exemple,
ne se riifèrei une coriipétence administrative ou budgétaire de cet
organe. D'autre part, or1ne pourrait pas kvncluer l'articlc 43 de la
Cllarie qui prevoit des accords spéciauxentre le Coriseilde Çkcurité
et les États Meinbres pour niettrc à sa disposition les forces arinkes,
I'assistance ct les faciIit6s nkcessctisesau maintien de la paix et de
la securité internationales. EXI~OS~?ÉCHIT DE 1.4 HEPURT.IQU IEALIENNE
12g
Le systèmc d'accords prévu àl'art. 43 pour la créationde contin-
gents militaires à la dispçisition du Conseil de Sécuritk n'a jnniajs
&téréalise. On peut, en outre, remarquer que cet article, qui spkcifie
avec de nombreux détails les modalités et la substance desdits
accords, nc prévoit pas un régime fiiîancier particulier pour les
dépensesentraînées par leur réalisation. Les accorclsmentionnés à

l'art. 43, en effet, devraient aidcr à la rdalis:ition des buts de la
Charte ci1fournissant au Conseil de Sécuritéles moyens de remplir
ses fonctioi~s institutionr~clles. Les dépenses entrainees par les
accords auraicnt dUktre considkréesen tout cas comme Mdkpenses
de l'Organisation )au sens du par. 2 de l'art.17 de la Charte des
Nations Uriics.
La question qui nous occupe a donc Btétranchée d'une fqon
trés claire par les dispositions clela Charte. Mais mêmeAdéfaut de
normes spécifiques, la solution ne pourrait pas diffkrer. Il s'agit,
en effet, (l'atteindre un des buts essentiels de YCIrganisation, qui
engage dans son ensemble son action ct sa resporisabilitk. On ne

pourrait donc pas en attribuer la compdtence à un organe autre
que l'Assemblée génkrale,le seul organe dans letliiel tous Ies Menî-
bres sont représentés: d'autant plus que les dispositions de Iri
Charte (art. IO et syg.)lui donnent le pouvoir de discuter toute
question ou affaire rentrant dans les buts des Mations Unies. Par
consi.quent, on ne pourrait jamais suhstitucr ii l'Assernbl&egéné-
rale un organe de compétence spécifiquen'ayant, en outre, aucun
pouvoir en matière administrative et budgktaire.
Sur la base des considérations qui précedent, le Gouvernen~ent
italien résumeson point dc vue dans les termes suivants :l'article 17,
paragraphe 2,de la Chartc des Nations Unies doit $tre interprkté

dans le sens que les dépenses entraînkes par le financement des
opkrations des Nations Unies au Congo et au Moyeiî-Orient, auto-
riskes par les tksolutions dc 1'Assembli.~génhrale mentionnées
dans la rcquète d'avis consultatif, constitucilt des dkpcnses de
l'organisation 11au sens dudit article.
Rome, le 14 février ~962.3. LETTRE DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE AU GREFFIER DE LA COUR

15 février1962.
Monsieur le Greffier,

Par lettre34891 du '27décembre 1961 voiis avez voulu me rappe-
ler que, par une rksolution du 20 dkccmbre 1361, l'.Assemblée
générale desNations Unieç avait demande àla Cour un avis corasul-
tatif et quf le Président avait fixau 20 février1962 le ddlai dans
lequel Ics Etats Membres de l'organisationdes Nations Unies pour-
raient fournir des renseignements sur la question.
J'ai l'honneur de vous indicluer brikvement par la présente lettre
les raisons pour lesquelles le Gouverncmeilt de la République
française n'a pris et ne peut prendre parà l'examen de la question

posé&à la Cour par la rksolution du 20 décembre rg61.

Le zo décembre 1961 ,u cours de l'Assembléegknkrale (procès-
verbal provisoireA/PV 1086, p. 561le dklkguéde la France a dit :
Le projet de résolution qui figure dans le docurne~it AI5062 a
pour objet de demander Ala Cour internationale de Justice unavis
consultatif afin dc déterminer si les dépenses autorisées par un
ensemble de résolutions de l'Assemblée génkrale constituent des
dépenses de l'Organisation au sens du paragraphe z de l'articl17
dc la Charte. Ce texte a étéadopté sansque TaSixi6me Commission
de 1'Assernbli.eait pu etre consult&e comme clle aurait dû I'étre
conformCrnent à la rbolution 684 (VII), qui a kt6 incorporhe sous
forme d'annexe au reglement intkrieur de llAssembl&egknérale.
t(De l'avis de la déltgation franpise, la question poséela Cour
ne permet pas a celle-ci de se prononcer en toute clart6 sur la
source juridique des obligations financières des htats Mcmbreç.
La Cour, en effet,ne peut pas apprécier laportée de ces résolutions
sans déterminer quelles obligations celles-ci peuvent faire ndtre
pour les Etats Membres d'aprks la Charte.
clC'est pour cette raison que la délégationfrançaise soumet a
l'Assemblée I'arnendernent contenu dans le document AIL. 378,

dont l'adoption permettraità la Cour de determinersilesrésolutions
de 1'Assembl&eayant trait aux conséquencesfinancibres des opéra-
tions des Nations Gnies au Congo et au Moyen-Orient sont ou non
conformes à la Charte. Ce n'est que dans ces conditions que, si la
Cour devait etre saisie, elle le serait d'une. maniére qui tienne
compte de l'étendue etde la nature des problhes évoquésdans la
proposition de demande d'avis. M
Selon l'amendement proposépar la délégationfrançaise (AIL.378
- 16 d&cen~bre 19611,la question devenait: ((Les dépenses auto-. risées,etc., oat-elles étdécidéc eosnjo~mé@zea lutx:disFositi on a
Clzarte,et dam I'afirmatci orstituent-ellesrtdes dkpenses de l'Or-
ganisation M au sens du paragraphe 2 de l'article17 de la Chartc
des Nations Unies? ii
A la suite du rejet de cet amendement, le projct de résolution
ayant étkadopté par 52 voix contre xr (dont la France) avec 32
abstentions, le représentant de la France a expliqué de la maniére
suivante le vote contre la deniande d'avis: cIda France a voté

contre la demande d'avis A la Cour internationale de Justice parce
que la question est posk d'une nqanikre équivoque et que l'hssem-
b16e a refusél'amençlernent que nous avons propos4 pour l'améliorer.
IIl estnécessaire que I'Assembliiesaisisse clairement ce qu'ily a
del-rikre la demande d'avis qui lui est proposke. On veut, par une
proddure détournée, régler des questions fondamentales sur les-
quelles la France prend les positions suivantes:
rPremikreinent, l'Assembl6e génkrale n'apas le droit, par le
simple vote d'un budget, d'&tendre les compétences de lJOrgani-
. sation, sinon, à ele seule, la cornpetence budgbtaire de l'Assemblée
conféreraità cet organe les pouvoirs d'un gouvernement mondial.

(Deuxiknieme~lt, pour tout organe des Nations Unies, le pouvoir
d'adresser aux Etats Membres des recommandations ne suffit pas
pour leur imposer, sous quelque forme que ce soit, des obligations.
tTroisièmement, le pouvoir juridique d'adresser aux États
Mcmbres des recommandations ne permet pas, par le détour d'une
décision qui est adressée au Secrétaire g6riéral- comme dans Pe
cas de la résolutionS/438~-de créer des obligations pour les Etats.
<Si la Cour était saisie dc l'ensemble de ces problèmes, elle serait
saisie des vraies questions; mais m&me dans cette lzypothèse, la
France kprouverait lcs plus grands doutes sur l'opportunité de
mettre en jeu la procédure envisagée, qui n'est d'ailleurs que
consultative. Toutefois, commc la qucstion posée ne rkpoild pas
aux exigences de sincéritéque mérite I'Ltude de tels problkmes, la

dklkgation française n'a éprouvéaucune hksitation à voter contre. 3)
Ces deux dkclarations permettront à la Cour de saisir les raisons
graves pour lesquelles le Gouvernemeilt de la République française
a considhé qu'il devait s'opposer à la demande d'avis. J,a France
ayant Ctkpartie à sept clifférendçdevant la Cour n'est pas de ces
I?tats dont la position généralevis-à-vis de la Cour et du droit
international puisse être contestke. Mais il lui importe que ça
position ne soitpas mal interprétée.Tc1est le seul motif des expli-

cations déjj donnéesi 1'Assemblkegénéraleet de celles que conticnt
la prbente lettre.
Les problémes financiers sont, de manière gknérale,d'une irnpor-
tance considerable pour les Nations Unies; ces probl4mes ont fait
l'objet d'études approfondies par divers organismes des Nations
Unies qui ont fait ressortir des divergences de vues entre les États
Membres sans que, sur aucun point, une majorite constante ou
importante se soit jamais dégagée.Il suffira d'appeler l'attention de la Cour sur Icsrapports du groupe de travaiI des 15 pour I'examen
des proc6dures admiriistratives et budgétaires dc l'Organisation
des Nations Unies (A/+g?r, 1g.xr.rg61). Sur une question capitale
telle que celle exposee au paragraphe IO dudit rapport (p. 4) et
intéressant le Conseil dc Sécurité,deux membres permanents ont
votépour, deux autres ont voti: contre et le cincjuièniea r&servE sa
position.
Cc groupe d'experts, qui n'a pu se mettre d'accord, a rendu le
service d'cxposer clairement les divergences d'opinions entre les
Etats Membres sur tous les aspects du finailcement des opérations
relatives au maintien de la paix. Les eléinents d'étude de ce pro-

blkme du financement ont Sté considérés sous huit chapitres diffb
rents (p. 3 du rapport). Sur aucunde ces chapitres un accord n'a
.&trirkalisé,et la lecture attentive des paragraphes 7 i 47 du rapport
inontre que le groupe ~rn'a pas pu trouver un terrain d'entente
sufisanlrnent étendu qui lui aurait permis de présenter A l'examen
de l'Assembléegknkrale des recommandations. Tl se rend compte
que, en raison des divergences d'opinions existant entre ses R'lein- .
hrcs, le prksent rapport n'a pas pu formuler d~s rkgles prkcises en
vue d'une solution aux problen~cs que pose le finailcenient des
operations relatives au maintien de la paix entrepris par I'Urgani-
sation des Nations Unies B(S 47,p. ~j).
Le paragraphe 25 du rapport des experts dcs 15 est airisi coilç:

rL'Assemblée gé:éntra levrait demander à la Cour internatianüle
de Justice un avis consultatif concernant la divtrgcnce d'opilzzons
qui se faitjour au sujet de la natiarizwtdiquedes obligationsfizuiz-
ciires dCcoulant des opcrntioiis rcIatives au maiiltien lapais. e

Airisi, Iorsqu'un organisme spécialeinent désignk à cet effet a
ktiidik les problhn-iesde financement, ila constaté des divergences
d'opinions sur la nature juridique des obligations et sur quarante
aspects du problème. Les questions qu'il ktait utile de poser 5 la
Cour ktaient donc éclaircies par les étiides fsitcs par ce groupe
spécial. La lecture des procès-verbaux dc la jme Comrnissioil (par
exemple: 24.x.1961, procks-verbal provisoire ACs/SR.S63, goo,gor,
etc.) montre la diversité des opinions exprimées au seiil des
Nations Unies.
Pour certains fitats il n'y a.pas de dipcnses del Nations Unies,
puisque la dicision &taitirrégulikre ;pour d'autres Etats il peut bien
,y avoir dépensesdes Nations Unies, mars a condition qye ces rnêrnes
Etats n'en prennent pas la charge, pour d'autres htats enfin il
s'agit de dkpençes courantes des Natjons Unies 2 repartir sur la
basc des barkrnes.

Le Gouvernernent de la République fran~aisc voudrait tout
d'abord rappcler qu'il ne convient certes pas d'attacher une trop
grande importance à dcs déclarations votées sur un plan politique
et au cours d'une longue &tude d'une question difficile. 13ememe
que, dans tine nkgociation entre États, la Cour a decidi: que des succeçsives yar l'un des Btats ne pcuvent être invo-
qukes contre lui aprCs la fin de cette n6gociation lorsque l'affaire
passe sur le plan contentieux, de mgme le Gouvernement de la
Képubliquc française reconndt qu'une affaire port& à la Cour
2 lasuite d'une demande d'avis consultatif prend une physiono-
mie nouvelle et que seuls les arguments de droit doivent et peuvent
&tredi.sormais évoqui.~.
Puisqu'il s'agit donc de placer le problkme du financement de

certaines opérations sur un plan juridique, ce plan ne peut êtreque
celui de la Charte.Les États Membres des Nations Unies ont sous-
crit, qu'ils soient Membres originaires ou non, aux engagements
de la Cliarte, inais rien de plusIdaCharte estun traité par lecluel
les États n'ont aliénéleur compétcncc que dans la stricte: mesure oh
ils y ont consenti. Depuis le début du fonctionnement des Nations
Unies, il n'apu se créerde rkglescoutumières ou de pratiques con-
trairesà la Charte que si ces règlescoutumières ou ccs pratiques ont
étéconstantes et non controversées. Telles sont les rEglcsjuridiques
selon lesquelles,cl'aprks le Gouvernement de la République fran-
çaise, le problémedu financement doit êtrektudié.
Ce n'est pas la première fois que, dcvant la Cour, la nature juri-
dique de ce qu'on n<appeléle pouvoir budgktaire de l'Assembléea
étk &voguée.Lcs Etats Membres des Nations Unies n'ont pas
acceytd autre chose en 1945 que de permettre à l'Assembléegéné-
rale d'autoriser et d'évaluer raisonnablement toutes les dkpenses
dont le principe &tait posé par la Charte comme une obligation
juridique pour les Etrtts, c'est-à-dire les dépenses administratives
des Nations Unies.
Toutes dépenses autres ont fait l'objet, depuis le debut de l'Or-
ganisation, de plans de financement particuliers r&dids par des
contributions volontaires, \
La résolution57 (1)du 14décembrey946sur le F.1. S. E. déclare:
((Le fonds sera constitué à l'aide de tous les avoirs disponiblesde
YUNKKA airisi que de toute contribution volontaire des gouverne-
rnentç...1)
Pour le programme élargi d'assistance technique, 1s résolution
304 (IV) du 16 novembre 1949 (invite tous les gouvernements à
apporter au compte spécial pour l'assistance technique une contri-
bution voIontaire aussi imyortante que possible ii.
L'UNWRA fut ktablie par une résolutian 3oz/IV du 8 décembre
1949 de l'Assembléeg&nérale,sur la base de contributions volon-
taires, eneçpéceset en nature.
Le budget de I'UNKRA, cr6é. par rksolution de l'Assemblée
généralepour rktablir l'kçonornie corkenne, a atteint une somme de
14o.Soo.ooo dollars, fournie par 34 États, volontairement.
Le statut juridique dcs dépensesdu Haut Commissariat pour les
réfugiésest établi sur les mdrnesbases: toutes dépensesautres que
les depenses administratives sont couvertes par des contributions
volontaires. Le Fonds spécialfut crEépar larésolution 1240 (XIII) du 14 oc-
tobre 1958,dontlapartie B, paragraphe 45, ii~dique: (Les ressources
financières du Fonds spécial proviendront de contributions volon-
tairesdes gtats hlcmbres. 1)
Toute autre interprktation du rôle budgétaire de l'Assembl$e
gknérale conduirait à instituer un pouvoir législatif mondial. La
Cour internationale de Justice a décidkdans son avis du rI avril
1949, page 179, trque l'organisation n'est certainement pas un
État, que ses droits n'ktaient pas les memes que ceux d'un Etat et
encore moins que l'organisation ne poiuvait &tre un super-État ii.
Or les vraics questions n'ayant pas étéexactement posbes dans la
demande d'aviç, alors que ces questions avaient etd énurnkrkes
soigneusement dans le rapport du groupe des 15, il està craindre
que l'on soit tenté de dkduire de celles qui ont étésoumises A la
Cour l'existence d'un pouvoir budgétaire discrktionnaire et illimité
\de l'Assembléegénkrale.

Un te1pouvoir ne s'exercerait pas dans l'abstrait. Voter, c'est-à-
dire accepter des dkpenses, entraîne des obligatioi-ispour lesEtats,
celles d'imposer leurs citoyens, d'amener leurs parlements à voter
les crédits décidkspar l'Assemblke et les irnpbts nécessaires pour
les payer.
Il suffit, de l'avis du Gouvernement de la Kkpublique française,
d'inrtiquer les conskquences d'une telle interprétationyour dgmon-
trer qu'elle est erronée. L'Assembléegkilkrale n'aurait en effet qu'à
donner 21toutes ses résolutions tine expression finançikre pour
qu'elles comportent pour les États les m&niessuites que si I'Açsem-
blée avait étédotde de coinpétences illimitées.
Cet ternaniérede procéder serait d'ailleurs contraireà la pratique
des Nations Unies elle-ineme. Sur le pIan administratif, les Nations
Unies ont assumé la gestion de nombreuses entreprises d'assis-
tance hu~nnliitaire ou kconomique ; mais les obligations financières
qui en découlaient n'ont jamais peséque sur les États qui lcs avaient
acceptées ct dans la mesure où ceux-ci les avaient acceptées; la
cluestion de savoir si, sur le plan de la technique financière, les
procédures et mécanismes propres à l'organisation ktaicnt mis en
Œuvre n'a été d'aucune pertinence pour trancher la question de la
responsabilité financière.

Lors de la mise en cetivre des opérations militaires en CorBe,
entreprises 5 la suitc d'une recommandation du Conseil de Sécuritk,
ces principes ont Cti:respectes, et il devait en êtrde meme lors de
cet accord entre Etats qui a pris la forme de la rksolution 377 (V)
si diversement apprkciée par la suite suivant les circonstances.
Toute autre conception conduirait à donner aux Nations Unies des
pouvoirs que les États .ont donnCs A aucune organisation, m&me
plus intkgrée. Un tel abus de la personnalité i~$ernationale des
Nations Unies conduirait à fairc d'clles le super-btat dont parlait
la Cnur en 1949. En définitive, le Gouvernement de la Rkpublique française
estime que lesconditions dans lcsquelleç la Courest consultée ne
permettent px d'obtenir l'opinion de droit qui serait nécessaire.
Il n'est pas question d'autre part d'aboutirA une revision de fait
des rkgles constitutionnelledes Nations Unies qui irait au-delAde
la lettre et de l'espdetla Charte.

P. le Ministre et par son ordre,
Le Directeur des Affaires politiques,
(Sig~zé) harlesLUCET. 4. WRZ'IqTEN STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNhlENT
OF THE KENGDOM OP OENMARK

ln pursuance of Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Jnteri~ational Court of Juçtice, and with reference to the Order of
thc President of the Court, dated 27 Decernber rg61, the Royal
Danish Government have the honour lo subrnit this written state-
ment relating to thc question concerning Financial Ol~ligations of
hlenlbers ol the United Nations, on which the General Assembly,
by a resolution üdopted on zo Deccrnber 1961, requeçted the Court
to give an advisory opinion.

1. Sco$e of theque.~ttuws.b~nittedtuthe Court

In order to clarify the issuc bcfore the Court iii the present case,
as the Danish Govcrnmeilt understand it, it may hc helpful, by way
of introduction, to present a few observatioiis coiicerning the scuye
of the questioil whic1-ithe General Asserribly has subinitted ta the
Court.
The Assembly has asked whether or not expenses relating to the
Linited Nations Ernergency Force (UNEF) and the Operations of
the United Nations in the. Congo (ONUCJ are "expenses of the
Organizatioil within the meaning of Article 17, yarngraph 2, of the
Charter". Thisparagraph provides that expenses of the Organization
slrall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General
Assembly, and thc qucstion thereforc conccrns the Manner in which
the expenseç arising out of the tivo operatioris shall be coverccl. As
a matter of fact, current expençes for tliese purposes have been
defrayed upto i~obrby the Secretary-Geileral in his officialcapacity,
and tliere is rzo question ol casting doubt on the legality of this
concluct, nor of attempting to determine any rcsponsibility for the
pavmeilt or ta have the money recovered. The question çubnlitted
to the Court rclatcs exclusively to the mnnner in ivhich these ex-

penses, which to a grcat extent have been drawn proviçional1y froni
various furids, shall be finally coverecl. In othcr tern-is,it is aquestion
concerning the mefhod of financing thc opcratioi~s in Gaza and the
Congo.
An affirmative answer would mean that the expenses ate ainong
those to which the Mcnlber States are legalljr obliged to contribute
according to a scale oi assesçrnents adupted by the General Assem-
bly. It is gentrally apccd that Article 17, paragraph z, enipowers
tlie General Assembly to take decisions which are binding cital1
Rlernber States (cf. Blairle Sloa: "Tlie binding forcc of a 'Recom-
mendation' of the General Asseinhly ofthe Uilited Nations", British
k'ear Book O/ Irzter+tationaLaw, Vol. 25, ~gqSp ,p. 4-5). Further-138 WHITTEN STATEfiIENT OF THE K1I;GDOR.I OF DEWh-lBRK
more, as a consequence of an affirmative answer, it woulrl follow
that Article 19 of the Charter applied. Arrears in the payrnent of
tliis contribution worrlddeprive the faulty Member State of its riglit

to vote in the General Assembly, prooided they-alone or jointly
with unpaid contributions to other expenses-eqi~alled or exceeded
two years' total coiltributions by that State.
A negative answer, on the otkier hand, would rnean that the
operations would have tobe financcd exclusi.r~eIjf7rarn otlier sources,
in particularby voluntary contribution, or would have to be called
off preniaturely if thenecessary ineanç were not forthcorning from
suck othet sources.
*Chequestion subniitted tothe Court does not concern the method
of accouriting. Whetller or not the expenses in question sho~dd be
fncorporated in the regular budget of the United Nations or should
be carried tnone or more spccial accaunts-which they have actual-
ly been-is outçide the scope of the question. This does not neces-
sarily mean, on the other hsrid, that the rnethod of açcounting is
irrelevant tothe opinion ~vliichthe Court is asked togive. It jsan
open cluestion, on which certain observations will be made below,
whether or iiot any conclusion can be drawn fronl tIie fact that the

General Assembly lias decided to establish special nccounts for the
two operationç.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the ryuestionçuhmitted to
the Court has nothing to do with the scaleof assessnîents accordiiig
to ivhich Mernber States should bear the expeiiseç, in case of an
affirmative answer. Article 17 does iiot riecessarily require that the
same scale should be used for apportioning al1categories of expenses
ainong Mcrnber States. As a matter of fact, the scale of assessmerits
under which expenses arising out of the regular budgetof the Organ-
ieation are apportiorled hns ùeerz applied izritticoiisiderable niodifi-
cations to the expenses arisiiig out of the two operations in question,
cf. resolution1441 (XIV) (UNEF) and resolution 161g (XV) (Opera-
tions in the Congo). An afîirrnative answer by the Court would in
no way prejudge this issue, and wouId not establish a cluty for the
General Assernbly to apportion al1 categories of expcrises açcording
to one and the same scale of assessinents.

II. Tlze sztbstanceof the Gelteral Assembljt ~~sohttio~z s once~ni~g
expenses of UNEF a.nd ONUC

A. United Nalions Em~~geqzcF yorce

At tlie 596th plenary meeting on 26 November 1956 the General
Assembly of thc United Nations debated tlie fiiiancing of tlie IJnited
Nations Emergericy Force (UNEF). Originally subinitted by tlie
Secretary-General as s draft resolution, it was adopted by the
General Assernbly later in the session and becanle resolution r122
(Xl). This reçolutio~zreacls in part: IVHIl'TEN STATERIENT OF THE KIXDGOhl OF DENMARK 139

"The General Sssernblÿ,
.............................
Haviiig coilsidered and provisianally approved the recommen-
dations made by the Seci-etüry-General concerning the finai-icing of
the Force iil paragraplirg ofhis report el 6Noveinber 1956,
I. Authorizes the Secret;iry-General ta establishaUnited Nat ions
Erncrgency Force Special Account to which funds rcccivcd by tlic
United Nations, outside the rcgular budget, for thc purpoçc of
meeting the expeilses oftlic Force shall be credited, and fmni which
payinents for this piirpose shall be inade;
.............................

4. Rcquests the Secretary-General to establisli such riilcsand
procedures for the Special Account and make such administrative
arrangements as hc nlay consider necessary to ensure effectivefi-
nancial adrniriistrntion and controof tliat Accouiit ;
5. Rcquests the Fifth Çommittec aiid, as approprintc, the Ad-
visory Committee on Adrninistrativc and Budgetnry Questions, to
consider and, as soon aspossible, toreport on iurtlier arrange~nerits
îhaî need to be adopted regnrdirîg the costs of rnaiiitainingthe
Iïorce."

In his report (Document A/~~oz) the Secretary-General states
(paragraph 15):
"The question of how the 'Force should be financed like~visc
1-eyuireçfurtl~estudy. A basic rule ruhich, rit lcast, could be npplicd
provisionally, woulcl bc that a nation providing a unit would be
responsible {or allcostsfor cquipinent a~lrlsalaries, ~i~hileal1 othcr
costs should be finnnccd outside the ilormnl budget ofdze United
Nations."

While the reçolution itself does not stipulate Iiow the expenses
rclating to the Force should be met, the Secretary-Gerierril in liis
speech in the Gcneral Asseinbly stated the following :

"1 \vis11to rnakc it equal1.vclear tliat while fuiids received :ti~d
payrnents made mith respect to thc l'orce are to be coilsidered as
coming outsidc tlic rcgular budget of the Organization, the operatiori
is esçcntially a Unitcd Nations resporiçibility, and the Special Ac-
coiint to be established rnust, thcrefare, be constrilcd as cominç
ivithin the meaning of hrticle 17 of the Charter." (CC. Official
Records of thc Uriited Natioiis, Eleven th Session, 596th plenary
meetilig, paragraph 225.)

Trnniediately after the Secretary-General's speech the draft
resolution was adopted by 52 votes to g urith 13 abstentions.
It shouId bc notcd at the oiitsec that the General Assembly
carinot have been under any illusion asto hou1 the experzscs finaly
were to be covered,namely as expenses coming within the.rneaning
of Article 17 of the Charter and consequently to be borne by al1
Member States.
Leçs than a month later the General Assembly expressed itself

more clearly about the cliaracter of the expenses relating to the \VRITTEN STATEhIENT OF THE KINGDORI OF UEXhIARK
I4O
Force by adopting, at its 632nd plenary meeting on 21 December
1956, resolution 1089 (XI), the lourth prcambular paragraph of
whic11reads :

"Considering that tlie Secretary-General, in his reports dated
21 Novcmber and 3 Decernher 1gj6, lias recomrnended tliat tliex-
pcnseç rclating to the Forcc shoiild lie apportio~ied in the snme
nianncr as the expenses of thc Orgnnization."

Furtfiermore, iri tlie first operative paragrapli of the same reso-
lution the General Assembly exylicitly

"Dccides tllat the expenscs 01 the United Nations Enîcrgency
ITnrcc, othcr tkan for such pay, cquipineilt, supplies and serviçcs
as may bc furnished without charge Iiy Governinents of Memher
States, shallbe borne by the United Natioris and shall be apportion-
cd among tl-ieMernber States, to the eatent of $10 million, zvtaccord-
ance with tlzsculeof rcssessnzentsdopted hy the Geileral Asse~ilbly
for contributions to tlie ailnual budget ofthe Organizütioil for the
finailcial year1957." (Uncl~rlined liere.)

In the opinion of the Danish Government this kvording c1e:irly
indicates that the above-mentionccl $10 million, covering the period
up to 31 neçernber 1957, were considered to be "3?7xpcnsesof the
Organization" within the rlieaning of Article 17, paragrayh 2, of
the Cliarter.
At its 662nd pler~ary meeting on 27 February 1957, the Gener-ai
Assembly again debated administrative and linancial arrangements

for the United Nations Enlergency Force. The deb~itewas coricluded
by the adoption of resolution rogo(XI) in which
"The Gencral Assemhly,

Recalling its rcsoliition1122 (XI) of 26 Novcmbcr 1gj6 author-
izing the establishiricnt of û United Natio~is Emergency Force
Çpecial Accoirnt in an initial arnoiint oi 8&orniIlion ai-iresolution
1089 (XI) of21 December 1956 apportioiiii~g tkiis irii$10lmillion
among the Mernber States in accordarlcerr:i!dE~sctzleofasscssrnd?zts
adoptcd hy tlie General Asçcnibly for contril>utions to the anntial
budget of the Orgailizdtion for 1957, (Underlincd lierc.)
.............................
Noting the requeçt of tlic Secretnry-General lor authority to
entcr into cammitmcnts for the Force up to a total of$16.5 inillion,

I. rlutliorizes the Secrctnry-General to incur expenses for thc
United Nations Emergency Force up to a total of $16.5 million in
respect of the periad of 31 Dccember 1357 ;
2. Invitcs Member States to make voluntaïy contributions to
~neet the sum of 56.5 millioiiso as toease the fiil~ncial burdcn for
T957 on the membership as a rvhole ;
.............................

4. Decides that the General Assctnbly, rtt itç twelfth session,
sliall consides thc brtsis for fiilananÿ costs of Ihc Force in excess
of 8ro niilIion not covei-edby rroluntai-ycontributions." WHITTEN STATEMEWT OF THE KINGDOM OF DEWIYIARK 141

The amount whick was thus to be assessed againçt Member
States totalled Srg,oz#,gS8 up to 31 December 1957.
En its resolutionIT5I (XII) adopted nt the~~1st plenary meeting

on 22 Novembcr 1957, the General AçsemhIy again took action
concerning the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force.
Operative paragrapk 3 of the above-cited resolution reads:
"3. Aiitlzorizesthe Secretary-General to cxpend art additional
amount for the Force, forthe period ending 31 Dcceinber 1957,
111to a.rnasinlurn of $13 .million and, as necessary, an amount
for the contintiing operation of the Force beyond that date up
to amaximum of$25 inillionsubject to ailydecisions taken oithe
basiçof the revicw provideci for in paragraph 5belaw",

and further
"4. Decicles thüt tlieexpenses authorixed in paragraph 3 above
shall beborne hy theMernbers of the Unitcd Nations in accordancs
wilh the scaleof fissessm~ntadopted by thc General Assembly for
the financialyears 1957 and 1958rcspectively, sucElother resources
as may havc becorne available for the purpose in question heing
applied to reduce tllc expensesbefclrethe apportionment for the
pcriod ending 31 Uccember 1957;" (Underlined here.)

In paragrnph 5the Fifth Comrnittee, with the assistance of the
Advisory Cornmittee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions,
is requested to examine the cost estimates.
For the purpose of the present case itis subniitted that the
arnount which was to be assessed against Rlember States çon-
sequentIy had now risen to $25 million for the second financial

period.
The exainination of the cost estinlates, which the Adviçory Com-
mittee on Administrative and Rudgetary Questions rvaç asked to
ui~dertake, cf. paragmph 5 of resolution rI5r (XII), is found in
1I)ocumcnt A/3761. The Cornmittee does not discuss the rnethods
of firiancing, and resolutiori 1204 (XII) whick "takes note with
approval of the Con~mittee's~cport" hasno bearing on the question
as to how the expenses shall he apportioned anlong RileinberStates.
During its tl~irteentk session the General tllssernbly adoptcd re-
solution 1337 (X111) at the 790th ylcnary ineeting on rg Dcceinbcs

1958.
After having referred to resolutions previously adopted con-
cerning the cost estimates for the inaintenancncof the United Nations
Emergency Force, the resolution reads in part :
"The GcneralAsscrn'uly,
..,............*.............

I. Confirms its authorizationto the Sccretargr-Genernlto expend
up to a n~nximumof $2j million for the operation ofthe United
Nations Emergeiicy Force during 1958 ;
2. Authorines the Secretary-Generalto expend up to a maximum
of $19millionfor the continilingoperationofthc Force during ~959;
r8- - -

WRITTEN STATEBIBNT OF THE KINGT~M OF DEWBIARK
142
.............................

4. Decides that the expeizses authorized iii paragraph 2 above,
lcss aily ainounts pledged or contrilriuted bÿ Govcrriments of Mem-
ber States as specialassistance prior to 31 December 1958, shall bc
bortle by the Members of the United Nations in nccorrlt4~zcr~eith,e
scaleo./nssessmcnls adopted by the General hssembly for the finail-
&al year 1959 ;" (Uilderlined here.)

For the jrear 19 jg the arnouilt to be apportioned among Rlember
States was tkuç $19 million (maximum) less the voluntary contri-
butions amounting to s total of $3?7g5,ooo. The anzount to be
assessed against al1 Member States for the year 1959 represei-iteda
total of $rg,zog,ooo.
As a result of arguments put forward by several Allember States,
the General Assembly, in its debate 011 tliefinancing of the UNEF
in the aiiturnn of 1959, shaped its resolution on the subject so as

to meet at least some of the suggestions advanced by those Rilember
States which liairethe least capacity to coritribute to the financiiig
of the Force.
Resolution 1441(XIV) adopted at the 846th plenary meeting
on 5 December 1959 reads in part:

"The Genei-alAssembly,
.............................
Considering thnt it is desirable taapply voluntary contributions
of special financialassistance in such a inanner as to rediice tlie
financial burdcn 011thosc Governments which have tfie least capaci-
ty, as indicatcd by thc regular scale of assessments, to contribute
towards tlieespenditui-es for miiintaining the Force,

I. Authorizes the Secretary-General to espend up to a.masiilium
of $20 inillion for the continuiiig operationof the United Nations
Ernergency Forcc during 1960;
2. Decides to assessthe amoulit of $20 million ngninst al1Members
ofthe United Nations ovzthe basis ofthe regular sclabeofassessments,
subject to the provisions ofparagn~phs 3 arid 4 below;
3. necides that voluntary contributions piedged prior to 31 De-
ccniher 1959 tomai-ds expeilclitures for thc Force in 1960 sliallbe

applied as a credit to reduccby 50 per cent the contributions of as
many Governmcnts of Mernher States as possible, commencing
with those Gavernnients assessed at the minimiin1 percentagc of
0.04percent and thcn including, inorder, those Governmcnts assess-
ed at the next highest percentages until the twtal amoiint of volun-
tary contributions has been fully applied;
.................... " (Undei-lined here.)

As the ~oluntitry contributions for I&O totalled $3,475,000 the
ainourit to be assesçed against a11 Mernbcr States of the United
Nations for the year 1960 represcrits a total of $20 million (cl.
paragraph 3 of rcsolution 1441 (XIV)).
At its Kfteenth session the General Asçembly again debated thefinancing of UNEF and the result was incorporated in resolution
1575(XV), whick reads in part:
"The Geiieral Asçcmhly,

Having considered the observations macle by Mernber States on
the financingof the United Nations Emergency Force,

I. Authnrizes the Secretary-General toexpend up to a maximum
of $1g rnillion for the continuing olieration of the United Nations
Emergency Forcc during 1961,
2. Decides toassess the amount of $19 rnrllion ugainst ull States
Members of the United ATatz~nsort the busisoj the segwlar scale of
assess~n~le~~uh,ject to the provisions of paragsaphs3 and 4 below;

3. Decidcs further tliatthe voluntary coiitributions pledgcd prior
to 31 December 1960, including tliose already announceci and re-
ierrcd to ithe fourtli prcambular paragaph above, shall be appiied,
at thc reqziest of the Rjcniber Statc concerned madc prior to 31
Marc11 1961, to rcduce by i~pto 50 per cent :
(a) ?'lieassessrnent that thc NIember States which were admitttd
during the fifteenth sessioof the General Assembly arc required to
pay for the financialyenr 1961 in accordancc with Assembly reso-
Itition1552 (XV)of 18Dcçember 1940;
(b) 'J'hassessrrientof alothcr Mernb~rStates receiving assistance
during 1960 ililder the Erpnnded Programine of Technical Asçist-
ance, coniinencing with tliosc States assessedat the miniinurn of
0.04 pcr cent and then including, in order, tliose Stateç assesscd at
the ncxt highest pcrceiitages i~r-ititltie total amofnthe voluntary
contributions has becn full)?applied;
4. Decides that, if Membcr States do not avail thernselves of
credits provided for in yaragraph 3 above, the amovnts ir~volved
shall be creditedtosection g of the 1961 budget for the Force;
.................. ." (Underlined here.)

For thc purpose of the preçent case, itis partlcularly important
to note that since resolution 1089(XL)was adopted un 21 Decernber
1956 the General Assembly has used the wording "Decideç that the
expenses ... shall be apportioned arnong Mernber States ...in
accordance irrith the scale of asçessmentç.. ." in its resolutions
concerning the financing of the UNEF.
>.
1he legal implications hereof are develoyed in subsequent sections
of this statement. In the present context the conclusion may be
clrawn that the wording of the resolutions aclopted by the Assembly
leaves no room for doubt. mie terms of the resolutions clearly
reflectthe intention that expenses shall be assesçed against Mernber
States to the extent specifiedby each particular resolutioli.

B. United Natiorzs Ofie~gtiofisin.the Colzgo

The first ~esolution which the General Assernbly adopted con-
cerning the financial implications of the United Nations operationsin the Congowaç adopted at the 960th plenary meeting on 20 De-
cember 1960. The resolution 2583(XV) reads in part :
"The General Assernbly,

Recogriizing that the.cxpenses involleed in thc United Nations
operations i~ithe Congo for 1960 consditute'e?c$ejzss ftheOrgarni-
zatiolz'wztlzithemcannzg O/Article17, $nragra$h,2, of the Charter
of theUnited Kations and that the assessmentthereoagainstMernber
States creates2iz~dzmlgegalobiigutiolzoia such States to pay their
assessedstiares,

I. Decides to estnbIisli niad hocaccuunt ior thecxyenses of thc
United Natioi~sin the Longo ;

4. Decidcs that the amouiit ai $48.5niillion sliall hc up$ovLa'oized
amolzgthe Membcr SSlateoizthe blzsiojtheregulavsc&b O! nssessmei~t,
subjectto thc provisions ofparagrnpl-r5 belorv;
5. Decides furthei- that the voluiltary contributioils already
announced, in addition to tliosereferredto in paragrnph 3 above,
s11,iEe applied,at the request oftlie Mernber State concerned made
priorto 31 March 1961, to reduce by up to 50 Iîer cent:
(LX)The assessment thüt the ~crnbcr'States hliidzwere adrnitted
cluringthe fiftccnth sessionof the General Assemblÿ are required
to pay for the financialycar ig60 in accordance with Asseinbly
resolution1552 (XV) of 115 Deccmbcr 1-60;
(b) The assessment ofal1 otlieMcrnberStatcrs eceiving assistance
during 1960 uilder the Expanded l'rogramme of Technical Assis-
tance, cotnmcilcing with those States assesçed at the rniilirnutn of
0.04 Fer cerit and theil including, order, those States nssessed rit
rhe next fiighcstpercentage tiiltil tlie total amooftthc voluntary
contiibulionç l-iasheen fiilly applied.
..................... " (Uildcrlined here.)

The preambular paragraph cited sbove (which isthe tlzird of the
resolution} states very clearly the opinion ofthe GencraLAssembly
as te how thc expenses involved in the United Nations operdtions
in the Congo should be considered, and operativc paragraph r,
which psovides for the establishment of an ad hoc account, does not
contsadict this opinion.

Resolution 1590 (XVJ,~~hick the GeneraI Assembly adopted on
thc samc day as sesolution 1583 (XV), authorizes the Secretary-
General to incur commitments for the operation in the Congo up
to a total of $24 million for the period frorn rJanuary to 31Rlarch
1961, but does not deal with the question as to how the expenses
shall be covered.
In continuation of reçolirtion rggo (XV), the General ~ssembly
adopted reçolution 1595 (XV) authorizing the Secretary-General to
continue ta incur cornmitments until 21 April 1961at a levcl not
to exceed $8 million per month. WRl'F1'EX STATE3qEh-T OF THE KINGDORI OF DENM.AHK
145
Wot until the adoption of resolution 1619 (XV) on 21 April rg61
did the General Assembly decide on the metkod of hnancing the
United Nations operations in the Congo,beariilg in rnind the variaus

suggestions put forward by Member States about the sharing of the
costs.
The resolution reads in part:
l "The General Assctnbly,
~

Bearing iil n~iilthat thc extraordinary expenscs for thc Unitcd
Nations operations intlie Congo are essentiallÿ diffcrcnt in nature
fiom tilc cxpensesOF the Orgariization unclethe regular budget and
tlzat thercfore a procedure different from tkiat apylied inthc case
of the regiilar budget içrcquircd for meeting these ex traorditzary
expenses ,
JJcaring in inind that the permancnt rnembers ol the Security
Couticilhave n speciai respunsibility fothe nraintenance oIinter-
national peace and security and therefore for contributing to the
financing of peace and security operations;

1. Decides to open anad hocaccoiznt for the expenses of the Unitcd
Nations operations in the Congo for 1961 ;

3. Dccidcs to approprintc atzamount of $100 million for the
operations ofthe United Nations in the Congo frotn r January to
31 Octobcr ~961:

4. Decid~s lurtherto a$portiou as ex$a?zsesofllaOrganization the
arnount of $100 i?zilla'olzarnong the Member States in accorda~zce
uith thscale O/assessmeittfor the regtilbudgct subjeçt to the provi-
siorzsofparagi-aplzS bclow, peildiilg the estnhlishment oadiffcrcnt
scale of assessinent to dcfray the extraordinary expenses ol the
Organization resulting from these operCt'ion;

6. Appeals to al1 othei- Mernber States who are Ina position to
assistto make vaiuilt;iry coritributions.
................... " (Underlincd here.)

Operative paragraph 8 of the above-cited reçolution regdates
the reduction to which certain Member States are entitled, but the
princiyle that al1Member States shall participate in the expeiises
in accordance with the scale ofasçessments is not waived.
Kesolution 1633 (XVI) adopted on 30 Octoher 1961 is a conti-

nuation of resolution 1595 (XV), with the modification that the
Secretary-Cenerd is now autkorized to incur cornrnitments until
31 Decelnbes 1961 at a level not to exceed $10 million pcr month.

It is clear from the Generai Assembly's resolutionç concerning
both the finançing ofthe UNEF and the operations in the Congo,146 \\rRITTE-iSTATEBIENT OF T1.K KINGDOBI OP DENEiIAKK

cited in this section of the Staterncnt, that tlze Assembly is of tlie
opinion that di Member Statcs sliould contributc to the expenses
involved, and consequently that the expenses constitute "expenses
of the Organization" within the meaning ofArticle 17,paragraph 2,
of the Charter. This is particularly clear in rcsolution 1441 (XIV)
UNEF and, espeçially, i11resolution1583 (XV) ONUC.
On the otl-icr haad, the General Asse~nbljrhas not stated that
the çcale of asçessments used for expenses relating to the regular
hudget should necessarily be applied. Although the regular scale
of assessments ha5 been the point of departure when decisions re-
garding the assessrnent of shares were adopted, the hssernhly has
modified that scale in its application to these particillar categories
of exyenses, to the extent that appears from the resolutians quoted

above.

111.1s the:$ractfce of the GeneraLAssernbly iw bztdgelary watters
releuantto the qwestz'o?$
Having examined the intentions of tlie General hssernhly as
reflected in the wording of the variouç resolutions concerning the
financing of UNEF and ONUC, one rnight ask whether the con-
clusions resulting from this exa~nination are compatible with thc
mles andprinciples on which the General Assembly acts in budget-
ary matters.

Itmight be argued that certain general usages have developed
in the praçtice of the General AssembIy with respect to the items
of expenditure which are considered expenses of the Organixation
within the rneaning of Article 17,paragrapli z,and tlzat suchusages,
whetlier or not they have attained the character of customsry
legal principles, are relevant for thc yurpose oi interpreting the
scope and mcaning of resolutions adopted by the Assembly con-
cerning specific questions.
First, the question rnight be raised whether it has 110t been a
gencral practice to confine the budget of the United Nations as
adopted under Article 17, paragraph r, to expenses arising out of
ordinary administrative tasks and other routine dtitiesofthe Organ-
ization, in contradistinction to what has usually corne to Iriecaled
special peace-keeping operations. A brief glance at the regulür
budget will confirrn that this is nat Part VIof the budget for 1962
lncludes expenses for several peace-keeping operations initiated by
the General hssembly or the Çecurity Council in the: exercisc of
their general powers mith respect to themaintenance of internatio-
nal peace and security, narnely the following:

I. UN Truce Supervision Organization i11Palestine :established
iriaccordance with resolutionSI1376 adopted hy the Security
Council on II Aupst rgqg.
2. UN Conciliation Cornrnissio~ifor Palestine :established by
General AssemhIy resolution 194(ITT) of Lr December 1948. WRITTEN STrl'ïEMEXT OF THE KINGDOIif OF DENhIARF;
I 147
3. UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; es-
tablished following Security Council resolution Slr469 of
14 March 1950.
4. UN Representation for lndia and Pakistan; appointed
under Security Council resalutionSl1469 of14 Marc11 1950. ',

j. UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Korea; established by General Assembly resolution 376 (V)
of 7 October Igjû.
4. Cornmittee on South Wcst hfrica; established by GeneraZ i
Assernhly resolution 1568 (XV) of 18 Decernber 1960.

An examination ofearlier budgets will reveal that other oper-ions
ofa sirnilar chsracter, which have since been calleoff,have also
been financed in tliis way.
Far from supporting the argument tkat expenses relating to
peace-keeping operations cannot be considered expenses of the
Organisation within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, thiç
practice indicates that over the years it ha been considered a
nonnal and mua1procedure to include ssuh operations in the regular
budget whiclz is financed according to the method provided for by
Article r7, paragraph 2, that is by assessment against Member
States. It is true that objections have been rsised from tirne to tirne
against the inclusion aione item or another in the regdar budget,
but the General Assemtly bas not hesitated to override such objec-
tions, and in the end the objecting States have açcluiesced in the
decision of the Assernbly and paid their contributionsüccoi-dingto
the assessment adopted under Article 17, yaragrapli 2.
On the other hand, not al1 expenses have been included in the
regular budget. Special Accounts have been estabiished for a
number of different purposes in cases where the General Açsembly
has deciclcd to use othet rnethods of iançing than the assessmerzt
of expenses against RIernber States. Such Special Accountç have
been establisked fol- the foiioivinigprogramme:
I. The Expanded Programme of Tecfinical Assistance,

2. The United Nations Special Funcl,
3. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
4. The United Nations ReIief and Work Agency for Palestine
Refugeeç in the Near East (UNRWA),

5. The Programmes of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees.
In al1 these cases it lias been foiind desirable or necessary ta
rely wholly or partially on voluntary contributions from Member
States for the hnancing of the special activities. Every ycar since
19j~ the Assernhlv has established a Negotiating Cornmittee for
Extra-Budgetary Funds for the purpose of corisulting with Mcmberand non -rnernber States asto the amounts wkich Governments may
be willing to contribute on a voluntaqr basis to the programmes
mentioned above,
"and forsi~chotherprogrammes asinay bc approved by the Gcneral
Assembly for which funds arc not arrailabIethrough the regular
budget of theUnited Natioiis and Lorwhich tlze Negotiating Com-
mitiee is spcciticallrequested by the Gcneral Assembly to obcain
pledges of voluntary contributions from Governnients" (resolittion
693 (VII), cfresolution571 13(VI)).

Special Accounts have a2so been established in respect of cx-
penses relating to UNEF and O-JUC. This is clearly an indication
of thc intention that these expenses should not be included in thc
regidar budget. The question is, however, whether it also indicates
an intention that expenses should only be covered by voluntary
contributions or other similar rnetlzods to the exclusion of asçess-
ment5 against Member States. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the question might be doubtful. The use of a Special
Account rnight create .apresurnption in favour of financing by
voIuntary contributions. In the circumstançes of the present case,
however, there is no doubt. The answer is clearly to the contrary.
It is significant, although it rnay not be considered important,
that the Yegotiating Cornmittee for Extra-Budgetary Funds has
not been requested to include the Special Accounts for UNEF and
ONUC withn the range ofitç activities. R'loreimportant, and de-

cisive, are the express terrnç adopted bgr the General AssenzbZyin
the variouç resolutions analyçed in the preceding section, wlzich
clearly reveal the intention to provide the necessary fundsnat only
through voluntary contributions but dso, and to a very large es-
tent, by assessrnent against Member States.
This procedure, althciugh viitho~it precedent, is by no means in-
compatible with the legal ruleç and principles governing the finan-
ual problerns ofthe United Nations. The eçtablishment of Special
Accounts for specified purposes is notking morc than an adrnini-
strative conoenience from wliich na legal conclusions can be drawn.
Such accounts are not provided for by the Charter, nor are they
ruled out by the Charter. Article 17leaves a very wide measure of
discretion to the General Assembly as to the budgetary system and
the methods of açcounting to be adopted. The usage of adopting
the device of aSpecial Account for purposes to be financed through
voluntarycontributions isno more than a usage which dues not reflect
any juridical opinion to the effectthata Special Account could only
be financed in that way. Consequently, khis usage cannot have the
effect of limiting the discretionary powers of the Assembly in its

choice betweeen various budgetary techniques and accounting
rnethods. The choice of the method of s Special Accourit does not
prcjudge the question as to what method should be selected for
raising the funds ~vhjchare necessary to cover the expenses charged
against the Special Account . IVRITTEN ST.4TEMENT OF THE RTNGDOhI OF DENMARK 149
In the prescnt case there are yerfectly good reasons for keeping
the expenses of UNEF ànd ONUC outside the regular budget. In
the first place, the Assembly lzas considered it desirable that part
of the expenses should be covcred hy voluntary contributions.

That policy has required a special accounting method, since it
would be dificult to 'have only part of one separate item of the
regular budget covered in that way. Secondly, tlze Assembly has
found it desirable tkat, even with respect to tlze part of the ex-
penses to be assessed against Member States, a particulsr scale of
assesçments should be applied, clifferent from the scale according
to which the regular expenses are apportioned. That again re-
quires aspecial accounting rnethod. It is submitted thatthe Speçial
hccount isa convenient instrument in these çircumstances, but
no particular legalconclusions can be drarvn from the choicc of
that instrument.
Tlie wording of the Charter is no obstacle to the adoption of
such flexible methods. Paragrsphs I and 2 of Article 17are urorded
in such a way that their sçope alid field of application are not
necessarjly identical. Tlze"expenses of the Organization" mentioned
in paragraph z are ncit necessarily those arisinout of the budget
mentioncd in paragraplz I, or what is called the regular budget.
1hey may be expenses forrvhich no budgetaqr provision has been

made (such as ernergency expençes provisioncdy charged against
the Working Capital Fundj, or they magr be expençes for wllich
spccial budgetary provisions have been made. On the other hand,
it \vould15ean unduIy rigid interpretation ofArticle 17, paragraph
z, ta maintain that al1 exyenses of the Organization should ne-
cessarilybe borne by hlernber States as apportioned by the General
Asçembly, to the exclusion of voluntary contributions in cases where
çucl-i contributionsare forthcoming. 'The purpose of Article 17,
parügrapli z,isto yrovidc for a sure and effective method of covering
the expenses, and not to prevent that exyenses which are essential!y
expenscs of the Osganization are defrayed out of funds collected in
different mays, including a combination of voluntsry contrihutions
and compulsory assessment.
Tn concluçion, it iç submitted that the establishment of Spccial
Accounts for UNEF and ONUC is not a decisivc element in the
analyses of the legal problems at issue in thc present case, and
does not warrant the contention, against clcar evidence to the
contrary, that the Generül i\ssem2>ly kas thescbÿ chosen to hiing
thc expenses outçide the scoye of Article 17, paragraph z.

117T .he fiscnlpower o/ the Orgmizatio?zis vesEedin ~JLG L!neral
A ssemblyexclzisive.ly

Tlie next problem to be conçidered is the relationship exiçting
under the Charter between the fiscal ppo~ers and the non-fiscal
powers of the Organization in matters concerning international
peace and security. For the purpose of the following observations, the term "fiscal
power" of the United Nations is understokd to denote the power
to adopt the budget of the Organization, to authorize expenditure,
ta make provision for the necessary revenue, and to assesa sgainst
Member States such contributions as are deemcd necessary to cover
the expenses.
An examination of tlie Charter leaves no doubt that this fiscal
polver is vcsted in the General AsscmbIj?,and in that body only.
Articles 10-17 define the functionç and powers of the Gencral
Assembly in various fields. In so doing, certain of tkeçe articles
çircumscribe the functions and powers of the Assembly in order to
safeguard, and to avoid enczoachments upon, the po'ivers of other
priilcipal organs of the United Nations, in particular the Security
Council. Thus, Articles 12 and 14 reçtrict the poicrs of the General

Assembly to a certain extcnt in matters relating to international
peace and security in order to allob\;the Security Council to exercise
the functions which Article 24 confers upon it asthe organ having
"primary reçponsibility for the maintenailce of international peace
and security".
The fiscal powcr as defined by ArticIe 17 is not subject to any
similar limitation. No share ofthe fiscal power is left to any other
osgan of the United Nations. Even the rnost independent of al1
the principal organs, the International Court of Justice, is subject
to the fiscal power of the General Asseinbly. Itis true that this is
not in al1 respects a free anddiscretionary power. In its Advisory
Opinion of 13 July 1954 concerning the Efect ofAwards ofCognpen-
satio?$made by tlzeU .N. Admirtislralz've TribunnE, the Court said :

"... tlie function of approving the budget docs not mean that the
GeiîeraI Assembly has an absolute power to approve or disapprove
tlie espenditureproposed to it; for some part of that expeiiditure
ariscs oiit of obligations already incurrIrithe Orgariization, and
to this cxtent the General Assembly has no alternative but to
lionour these engagcrrients". (I.J. Hqbi~iir~sgj#, p.59.)
For this reason the Court stated

"that tlie assjgilinent of the budgett~ry fuiictioito the General
Assenibly cannot be rcgarded as confesriiigupon it thc right to
refiiçe to give effect to tlie obligation5 aoutiof an nw~rciof the
Administrative 'I'ributinl". (Ibidem.)
There \vas no question, however, of denying that the budgetary
function as such was vested exçluçively in the General Assembly, or

of considering this yower as divided between the Assembly and the
Tribunal.The budgetary power wasin the Assembly whiclz,however,
IKLS uildcr a duty to exercise it in such a rnanner as to honotir the
obligations arising out of lawful acts or decisions by other organs
of the United Nations.
111the present case the problem is different. It has never been
alleged that the Açseinbly, in the exercise of its fiscal power with respect to tlie expenseç ofUNEF and ONUC, has fdiled to honour
any obiigation incursed by the Organization. What has heen argued
by certain delegates in the General Assembly is that the Assembly,
in açsessirig the expenses against IVIernbcrStates, lias transgressecl
its powers and encroached upon tkose of the Security Coiuncil.
in the opinion of the Danish Government, this argument is not
valid. Whatever organ is competent to adopt a decision of sub-
stance, thc birdgetary iinplications of çuclz a decision is a nlatter
for the General Asscmbly. No othcr cirgan has any share jn the
fiscal power, and as loi-igas the Assembly respects the decision of
stibstance it rernains its owi-imaster mith regard ta the solution of
any budgetary problern to which that decision may give rise. When
I the Security Council has decided to adcipt a rneasure within its
cornpetence under the Charter, tlie General Assembly cannot
nullify the effects of that decision by refusing any necessary appro-
priation. Subject to tkat, howevcr, the Couilcil has no authority to
interfere withthe solution which the Assembly chooses tu adopt witlz
regard to the financial aspects. The mere fact that the substance
of the measure lies within the field of another organ does not give

that other organ a share in the fiscal power.
This assertion conçernii~gthe exclusive character of the Gerieral
Assembly's fiscal power is borne out not onIy by the tvorclingoi tlie
Charter, but also by the genesis of Article 17. The history of that
articlecal1bc trüced baclr to one of the early Amcrican drafts. In
1g-p the Secretary of State of the Unitcd States established an
aclvisory cornmittee on Post-War Foreign Policy, a sub-corrimittee
of ~vhich~sreparcd a "Draft Constitutiori of Interriational Organ-
ization", dated 14 July 1943. Article 5, paragrapli j, of that Draft
was worded asfollows:
"Thc hudgetary estirnatesofthe International Organization ancl
its constituent hodies shall bc subjectesamination and approval
by the Gei-ieral Assembly andby theCoiincilwhich shalldetcrmine
tlic mcthod tiy wliiclz the necessary funds sliall be provided and
propeily allocated ainong the Meinbers." (Post-War Fo~~igl~
Poiicy Pre$aratio?zI93g-4j W,ashington, 1945 ,. 475.)
The fundarilental principle of this provision was to establish a
concurrent authority of the two bodies on lines similar to those of
a bicarneral system. A latcr draft, written shortly afterwards by
the Research Staff of thc Department of State, rnodified that

prinçiple in so far as the General Conference should vote the
appropriations for the varicius orgürts (Article 3, paragraph 3).
The approval of the Council would be necessary onfy with respect
to the basison which the General Conference woirId apportion the
expenses arnoi-ig Member States (Article 13,paragraph I, ibidem,
VP. 529-31).
The problcm was further studied in \il;ashington, arid Russel and
Mutlzer, in their tJistory O,/tlteUnited Nations Charter, writc as
follows : WRETrE?J STXrERIENT OF THE KINGDO31 OF DENMARK
IjZ
'+JVi?;htehnc budgctary provisior~srverreviewed by thc 1nformal
PoliticalAgenda Graup in early July 1944, Som" concern \vas cx-
prossecllest .Asseinbly control of the budgct might enable ito con-
trol decisionsofthc Esecutive Council. Itwas suggcsted that eithcr
direct or concurrent controlby the Council of iisown budget might
be allowed. On the utlicr hariditwas pciinted out that the Esecutive
Council wouId draw its fundç from thc total resourçes of tlieOrgan-
ization conti-ibutédby a11Mernber States, and they shoulcl therefore
be entitledto decide thc budgcts of al1 organs tliroughthe Generrll
Assenlbly." (Ruth B. Russel and Jeanctte E. Muther :A Histnry uf
theUnitedNations Çhavier, WasliingtotiD.C., 19 jS, p. 378.)

Coilsequently, the "Tentative Proposaisfor a General Inter-
nationai Organization" whidi the United States Government sub-
lnitted to the Governments of China, the United Kingdom and
tlieU.S.S.R. in preparation of the conference at Diirnliarton Oaks
gave tlie Council no share in the fiscal potver. Among the principal
powers of the Genersl Açsembly was listed as point ll..B.z.i:
,L
...to approve tl-icbudget of the organs and agencies of thc orgail-
ization, to dctermirie a.provisianand continüing bnsis ofapportion-
mcnt of expenses of the organizrition among thc Meinber States
togcther witli the procedureof apportionmeilt, and toreview, make
secomn~endations on, and take otl-icraction concernimg tlie budgets
of spccialized ngencics...".(Post-TVar Foreign Policy Preparation,
P-597.)

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference confirrned the principle tliat
fiscal pwer should be vested esclusively in the Assembly (the
problem of the budgetary authority over the specialized agencies
is leEt outof considcratir~i~as irrelevant to the present case).Chap-
ter V, section B, paragraph 5, of the proposnls adoptcd at the
Confcrence rcads as iollows :

"The Gerleral Assernbly should apportion thc cxpenses among the
NIcnibers ofthe Organizatiun and should be e~npo\vereclto approve
the budgets of the Organization."

At the San Francisco Conference the principle underlying this
provision gave rise to no serious controversy. Budgetxry questions
were included arnong thc irriportant: questions on which decisions
would require a two thirds niajority undcr Article 18, and the
obligation of Mernber States to pay their apportioned share of the
expenses was stressed by a redrafting to the effect tkat exycnses
"shall be bornc by the Mcmbers ...". Thc exclusive fiscal power
of the Assernbly was accepted without dissent.

In a recent study by J. David Singer: Financilzg I~dcrnatiotzal
Organization, 7'he United Natz'o?zBs udgetP~ocess(Thc Hague, 1961),
the resiilts of the San Francisco Conference in this field ate sum-
mazized as follows:
"... tlie deliberaiions at Sail l~raiicisco, wliile avoiding detailed
secommendations, did set fortk certain important and basic prin-l
WRII-I'EN STATEMLIEKT OF TBE KINGDO31 OF DENRIAKK
153
ciplesgoveriiing thc iisml process.111 Article 17, three significairt
points weremade. The Asscrnbly,and rioother body, would esercise
the tiudgetary power; the Asscmbly itselwouldlater determine the
bnsis for apportionrrient,eliminatiiigthe dangers of a fixed,inflexi-
ble, and pcrhaps tinv,roiAltatbariis, and the Assembly wciuld have
(furmally,nt:lenst)the finalwordon thc hudgetary arrangements of,
and witli, the specializedagencics.Article 18,by omission,precluded
any weightedvoting baçed upon tllc sizeof Mernber's contribution,
and made itclea~that plenary sessions woiild require a t\votkirds
inrzjoritforpassageofbudgetary matters. And ArticIc19rcpresented
nt Icast an dfort to inhibit arreürage in paynient of contributions.
It can be said, without liesitation, thatthe franiersof thc Urîited
Nations Clîartcr hrtd succesçlullyavoided three of the pitfallwhich
had so hainçtrung the finailcidl activities of the League : divided
fiscalauthority, an inflexible basiof apportioniiîeiit anda reqilire-
ment ofuiianimitp on budgetary mattei-S." (Op. cit.,p.8.)
For the reasons set out above it is sub~nitted that al1fiscal power
apycrtains exclusively to the GeneraI Assembly, even iri matters

the non-fiscal aspects olwhich are wirithin the competerice of another
organ of the United Nat'ions.

17. Formal validity ofthe:decisiowsby zwhzcltUNEF and ONUC were
eslablished

It may be arguccl-as indeed it has been-that thc fiscal power
of the Gencrnl Assembly canriot he lawfully exercised in relation
to any n-tertsurctirhichhas i~otbeen lawfully takeri. Morespccifically,
if it can be proved tliat the establishment of UNEF and ONUC was
r~ot validly adopted under the Charter, the conclusion may be
drawn that the Gerieral Assernbly caiînot 1awfulIy vote any a1313ro-

priation for these operations, let alone impose upon Rlember States
any obligation to sharc the exPenses.
This argurncnt, as such, is not cntircly unreasonnble. In certain
coritingeiicies it may Irieadmittecl that the fiscal power cannot be
exercised in relatioiî to an invalid decision by the competent organ.
The fol1owing hypothctical case rnay he rnentioned by way of
illustratiori: The president of the Securitÿ Council declares a
proposal adoytcd although lcss than sevcri rzzernbers have cast an
afirmative vote (tg. 6 votes in favoiir-5 abstentions). It follows
clearly from Article 27 of the Charter tIiat no valid decision csn be
adopted by such a vote. The dccision, if there is any decision at all,
is nul1nid void. Corisequently, no effect can be given to a resolution
iv17ichhas been declarecl adopted in these circumçtances, ai~d the

Generlil Asseinbly cannot authorize any expencliture for rneasures
talcen on the basis of such a resolution. If,nevertheless, the Gei~eral
Assembly, invokirig its autonomous fiscal power, approves the
cxperisc and assesses it against Meriîker States, itstems justified
to conclude that no Meimher Stnte is under a lcgal obligation to
pay its share, ' 154 WRITTEN STATERIENT OF THE ICIKGDOhI OP DESMARK

From a legal point of view, a simiIas situation would exist if,
say, the Hcoilon~icand Social Council adopted a rcsolutio~zwithiri
the field of competence of the Securjty Couilcil.
In the present case, however, the circumstances are entirely
different. The decisions by which the operations were initiated and
have been carried on are ~serfectlyvdid urider the Charter, having
been adopted In due forin by a cornpetent body. This assertion
seems so obvious as hardly to require any demoi~çtration, but for
the sake of completencss a few salient facts rnay be pointed out.
It will be necesçary to deal ivitli the two operations separdtcly.

A. UNEF. The establishment of this Force waç decided by the
General Assembly iil the course of a Special Ernergençy Session,
the first to he called urider the GenerAssembly's resolution377 (V)

-"Ui-iiting for Peace".
It has occasionally been asserted that the transfer of authority
froin the Security Council to the GeneraI Assembly resulting from
this resolution violates the Chartcr, Inore s~~ecificallyArticle 24
under which primary responçibility for the nlaintenance of inter-
national peace and security is conferred upon the Sccurity Council.
The Dlinish Goverilment do not sliare that opinion. For the pur-
poses of the present case it will suffrce to point out that the resolu-
tion by which the Security CounciI decidecl, oil 31 October 1956,
trical1an Emergency Session of the Assembljr, with explicit refer-
ence to resolution 377 (V), was adolsted by a procedural votc of 7
in favour (China, Cuba, Iran,Peru, U.S.S.R., U.S.A. and 17ugoslavia),
2 against (France and the United Kingdom), and 2 abstentions
(Ausfralia and Helgium), the affirmative votes including one
permanent Rlember which on rither occasions has contestecl the
legalityof resolution 377 (V) . Whatever the general consetluences
of that votemay be, it secms justiîied toconclude that the Members
which voted infavour are debarred frorn challenging the cornpetence
of the General Asscmbly in that particular case.
More generally it is subrnitted thnt Article 24 of the Chnrter

cannot reasoriably be interpreted to cast aily doubt OIIthe legrility
of resolution 377 (V) or on any decision adopted acçording to its
terms. The special procedure laid down by that resolution, and the
transfer of authority to the General Assembly which it involves,
üpply, iil the words of the resolution, ordy "if the Security Couilcil,
because oflack of unanimity of the permanent Memberç, fails to
exercise its primary rcsporisibility for thc maintenancc ofintcrilü-
tiond peace ancl security ". Purtherrnore, on the supposition that
1 the tcxt of tlie Qiarter might be considcrcd to leave rooni for doubt
as to thc co~iipatibilitj~of the resolutioil with tlie Charter, develop-
ments subsequent to its adoption have' dispelled any suc11doubt.
1Xesolution377 (V)ha5 beeri acted uyon in other cases presenting
widely differcnt political aspects (the question of Hui-igary,Novernber
1956; the question of Lebanon, August 1958; the Congo question IVKITTEN STATEMENT OF THE lClNGDOY OF DENnIARK
155
Septemher 1960). It is a general yrinciple of interpretation, 011
which the International Court and its predecessor, the Permanent
Court of International Justice, have consistentlgf acted, that a
treaty provision may he interpretecl in the ligkt of the subsequent
conduct of the contracting parties. 111its Advisory Opinion of

3 hlarch 1950 concerning the Col.n#etence oJ the Ceneml Assembly
regarding admission to the United Nations, the Court relied on the
sense in whicli the Security Council and the General Assembly had
"consistently interpreted the text" of Article 4 of the Charter
I (I.C.J. Reports Tg-jo, p.9). The Zate Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has
drawn thc following conclusion :

"It woiild thus appearthat the Court equated with 'subsequcnt
coilduct'theuniform practicc pursucd by the organs ofthc Organi-
z~tionestablished by the autliors of the Charter and acquiescecin
by them." (The Develo$ment O/ I.i~ler~zalialaw Zlythe T.izterlantiolza1
Court, Lonclon,I958,p. 171.)

For the purposes of the present case it is submitted that the
Security Council and the Gencral Assembly have consistently
pursued the practice of conçidering the General Açsenzblycon~petent
to deal with a inatter transferred to it from the Security Council ii~
the circumstances defined by resolution 377 IV).
,4sto the forma1 valiclity of resolution roor (ES-1) by. which the
Gencral Assembly, having been validly seized of the mattcr,

clecided to establish the Emcrgency Force, it is suficient to point
out that the resolution was adopted by a vote of 57 to O, with
19 absteritions.
En conclusion, it is subrnitted that the establisliment of the
UNEF wllsa meaçure adopted by tlie General Assembly in circurn-
stances which do not affect the forma1 validity of the decision and
which, consequently, do not prevent the Assembly, acting in the
exercise of its fiscal powcr uilder Article T7, froin assessing the
ensuing expenses against Mernber States.

E. ONUC. For the purpose of the present case it is hardly neces-

sary to go into the detailed history of the operations of tlie United
Nations in the Congo. Suficc it to recall that the United Naticins
Force in the Congo was established by the Secretary-Gencral under
the authority of the resolution adoptccl by the Security Council 011
14 JuIy 1960. Apart frorn one particular phase of ifs rlevclopment,
the Congo problem has not been brought before the General As-
sernbly, but has co~~tinuciuslybeen dealt with by the Security
Council. The: exception was the calling of an EmeÏ-gencg~Session
un 20 SepteInber 1960, aiter a rcsolutio~zcor~cerningthe policy to

be pursued in the Congo had been clefeated in the Security Council
by the iiegative.votc of rtPermanent Mernber. Since.then, however,
the protilem liasrevertcd to the Security Council which adoptcd
important reçolutionç in the matter on SL Fehruary and 24 Novern- \\rR17TEX STATEMEXT OP THE KINGDURI OF UENMARK Ij7

nor thc ONUC, are governeci by Articles 42-47 of the Charter. In
order to substantiatc this submission it will be neceççq to examine
in some detail the legal basis on which these operations were
jnitiatcd.

A. UNEF. Fjrst, as far as the UNEF is concerned, no better
guidance can be found in this respect than the Report, datecl 6 No-
vember 1956, wllich the Secretary-Gencral suhmitted to the
General Assembly on the plan for an Emergency International
United Nations Force (Document A/33oz). ?Xe relevant parts of
this Report were expressly approved by the General Assembly by
resolution 1001 (ES-I), adopted on 7 November 1956.
As to tlie functions and task of the Force, there was no question
of cnforcement action of the charaçter envisaged by Article 42 of

the Charter. Paragraph 12 of the Report stated that
"the functions of the United Natioiis Force would be, rvhcn a cease-
iireisheing estahlished, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent
of theEgyptian Government, in order to help maintain quiet durlng
and aftei- withdra~val of non-Egyptian troops, and to secvre com-
pliance with the other terms establishcd in the resolution of
2 November rg55. The Force obviously should have 110rig'ktsother
than tliosenccessaty for theexeciitionof its functions in CO-opcration
with local authorities.It would be more than an ohscrvers' corps,
liutin no wagr a military forcc temporarily controlling the tcrritory
In which it is stittioned, nor, rnoreovcr, should the Force havc milita-
ry iunctionç excceding thosc iiecessary to secure peaceful conditions
on the assumption tllat the parties to the conflict take ,neceçsary
stepsfior cornpliancc with the recornmendations of tlie Gerleral
Assernbly.''

This definition of the functions attributed to the Force was
approved by resolution 1001 (ES-1) mentioned above, paragraph 2
of urhichreadç as followç:

" (7'heCicrieraAssernbly,)
..............*............~ *
2. Concurs iil the definition of the functions of the PO~CE as
statcd in paragrnph rz of the Secrctary-General'sreport."

Again,thc samc basic concept is reflected in the followjng passage,
quoted from paragraph 8 of trieReport:

".. .there no intent in the establishment of tlie Forcetoinfluence
the rnjlitary balance iii the presconfiictand, thereby, the political
balance affecting effortto settle the coilflict".

ASto the guiding legalprinciplcs for the functioning of the Farce,
paragraph g iç particularly important. It reads as follows:
"Fiinctiorîirigas it would, on tlie basis of a decision reaclied
under the tcririsofthe rcsolution 'Uniting for Pexe', the Force, if
cstabllsliecl, woiibc limited in itç operations tothe extent that

19158 IVRII- EN STATERIENT OF THE KINGDOM OB"DENMARK

consent of the parties concernedis recluiredrindcr generally recog-
nized international law. Whilethe Geiieral Açsernblyis enabled to
establistlie forcewith the conseritof thosparticswhickcontribute
unitç to the force, icould not request the force to be stationador
operateon the territorrrfa given country without the consentof the
Government of the country. This cloesnot esclude the possibility
marginseprovidedyunderciChnpterVI1e ofitheaUnited Nations Charter.er
I %~ouldnot for the present consider it necessary toelaborate this
point Lurthcr,since no use ci/tWcfarcezinder Cha$kr VII, with the
rightsirtrelatiostoMzmber comt~iss thnt thz'swodd entail, has beela
snvisaged."(Underlined here.)

The endorsement by the GeneraI Assernbly ofthis opinion is found
in the firçt paragraph of resolution 1001 (ES-1), which reads as
follows:

"Expresses its approval of the guidingprinciplesforthe organiza-
tionand functioningof the emergencyinternational United Nations
Force as cxpounded in paragraphs 6-9 of the Secretary-General's
Report. "
The task assigned to the Force and the principleç governing its
operations and funçtioning have remained unchangecl. At the thir-
teenth session of the General Assembly, the Secretsry-General sub-

mitted a report containing a "Surnmary study of the experience
derived frorn the establishment and operation of the Force", dated
9 October 1958 (Document Aj3943).Various passages of this report
çonfirm that the basic principles, aç initially adopted, had been
maintained. The following statements are particularly relevant:
"The Force was not used in any wa57to eriforcewithdrawal~but,
in the successive stages of the withclra~vals,followed the with-
drawing tsoopçto the 'dividing lincof each stage." (Paragraph 149.)
"As the arrarigcmerits discusçed in this reportdo not cover the
type of forcc envisagedunder Cliapter VI1 of thcCharter, itfollowç
from international law and the Charter tbat the United Nations
carinot undertake toirnplement them by stationing uriits on the
tersitoryof aRiIembcr Statc without théconsent ofthe Governtnent
concerned." (Paragraph 153.)

Consequently, there is ample evidence to show that there was no
doubt in the mind of the Secretary-General. There \vasno question
of taking action under Chapter VI1 of the Charter. The General
Assernbly expressly approved thiç basic concept. Excluding Chapter
VII, it excluded each and al1 of the articles contained in that
Chapter, and the applicability ofArticle 43is consequently mled out.

B. ONUC. Whde the problem relating to UNEF gives rise to no
doubt, the corresponding problem witk respect to ONUC might at

firstsigbt appear to be lesç clex-cut. The decision to initiate the
operations in the Congo was taken by the Security Council and not
by the Assembly acting under the resolution "Uniting for Peaçe".160 \\'RITTEK STATEMEXT OF THE KIKGDOM OF DENBlAKEi

toilcerningthe presenceeandgfunctioriingofthe United NatioiisForcerr
inthe Loi~goit wiIl be pidcd, iil good faitliby the iact that it lias
requeçted military assiçtarîcefrom thc United Nations aiid 13y its
açccptance of the resolutions of thc Security Councilof 14 and 22
Jury ~gGo; . . . . . . . .. . . , . . . . . . . . : . . . .
The United Nations takcs note of this state~nentO[ the Govern-
ment ofthe Republicofthe Congo and stcltesthat, witli regatu the
actir-icsof the UnitedNations Forcc irithe Coilgo,itwillbe guidecl,
in goocltath,bÿ the task assignedto tli1;orce."(Document 5143891
Add. j, 29 July 1960.)

The reference to "the soverejgn rigtits" of tlze Government
indicaies that the operation of the Force is not a military action
within the meaning of Article42 of the Charter. Uader tliat article,

enforcement measures can be taken even in derogation of the SOV-
ereign rights of the State againçt which the measures aredirected.
Thirdly, the Secretary-General rnaintained this basic'conception
during subseq~ient stages of the operations. When the situation
deteriorated in August 1960 because of the oppositioli by the local
rkgime in Katanga, and the Security Council considcred this new
development on 8 August 1960, the Sccretary-General introduced
the debate by astatement setting forth the political and Zegalback-
ground of the problem before the Council. He refcrred to the ahli-
gations of Member States under Article 49to render rnutual assist-
ancc in the carrying out of the measlires dccided upon by the
Security Council. He further quoted Article 40 about provisional

rneasures for the protection of peace and security, and he also
remindcd tlze Council of Article 41 concerning measurcs not involv-
ing the use of arrned force. He added:
"The rcsoliitionsofthe Seciirity Couricilof T4 duly and 22 Jiily
were not cxplicitly aclopted under Chapter VI1, but they wcrc
passed onthc basis of an initiativeunder Articlegy. fiortht reason
1 hairefelt entitIec1toquote three articlcsunder Charter VI 1 and 1
repeat what 1 have already said in thisreport: In a perspective
whiclirnay well be short rnther than long, the problcm Iaciiigthe
Congo isoneof pcace or war-ailcl not otzlyin the Longo." (Security
Council,0@îcialRecords,884th meeting,S August 1960,paragraph 26.)

However serious the situation was, the Secretary-General did not
rely on ArticIe 42 concerning rnilitary measures of enforcement.
Along the same line of reaçoning, the Secretary-General at a later
meeting referred to the problem arising out of Article 2,paragraph
7. It is wclI knorvn that this paragraph protectç Member States
against interventi~in in rnatters which are essentiaIIy within thcir
domestic jurisdiction. The provision goes on to Say, however, that

this psinciple çhall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII. Speaking about the attitude of tlie
United Nations Force towards the revolting provincial authorities
in Katanga, the Secretary-Gcncral said: WRITTEK ÇTATEBIENT OF THE KTNCiUOBl OF DENnTARR 161

"Morcover, in the light of the domcstic jurisdiction limitatioof
theCliarter, imust he assiimed thst the Counciwould not authorize
the Secretarÿ-General to iiltervcnc witarrned troopsin an internai
canflict, whcnthe Council had not specificalladoptecl enforcement
measureç tinderArticles4~ or 42 of ChaptcrVTT." (Securitj~Coiiiicil,
l O#imal Rccords,887th meeting, paragrdph M.)

These principlcs have beeri maintained throughout the subse-
quent developments of the Congo question. No decisian has been
taken by the Securitv Council which expressly or iniplicitly in-
voked-or could reasonably be interpreted as invoking-Article 42
of the Charter. l'he use of force which has been authorized by the
reçolutions of zr February and 24 November 1961 does not serve
the purpose rit enforcing decisions of the United Nations against
national authorities which are internationally responsible for their
conduct, but the much more limited purposes of presewing law
and order in the Republic of the Congo, of preventing civil war,
and of apprehending certain grouys of individuais whose acti-
vities were particularly yrejudicial to the maintenance of law
and order. This is far short of the military action envisüged by

Article 42.
.Finally, if further substaritiation of this thesis were necessary,
it might be found in the provisions and arrangements concerning
the direction of the Force. Article 47, parügraph 3, provides, in the
most syecific and unarzîbiguous terms, that the nlIilitary Staff
Cornmittee-consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of tlze permanent
members of the Security Council-shall be responsible for the
strütegic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the
Sccurity Council. The provision is categorical and not subj eçt to
any exception. It is well kno~vnthat the United Nations Force in
the Congo-like the UNEFLoperates under the authorit y and
direction of the Secretary-General who, in turn, acts under the
iilstructions and direction of the Council and tlic Assenîbly. It lias
been a point of principle for the Secrctary-General not toassociate

the permanent niembers ofthe Security Council with the operations
of the Force, and the Council and the Assembly have approved this
principle. For present purposes it is not necessnry to go into the
reasons for this policy; tkey are fairly obvious. Mlhritrnatters in the
present coiltext is the line of conduct consistently purçued by the
organs of the United Nations. 'l'hessential elernents of thisconduct
are clearly incompatible with the principle laid down by the Charter
for the directiori of military forces which are n~adeavailable to the
Security Council for the purpose. of action under Article 42. The
on157reasonable conclusion to be drawn from this finding is that
the action taken has not been envisüged as enforcement nzeasures
under Article 42, and that none of thc articles relating to such
action apply in the present case. More specifically, the inescapable
conçliiçion is that Article43 does not aptpply. 162 WRITTEN STriTEMENT OF TI-IE KINGUOfil OF IlEWMhRK

VII. What Zs thesubstantivelegal basis ofthe action takert?

Having discarded Articles 42-47 asthe legal basis of the operations
in the Conga, one might reaçonably ask: What is the basis on which
these operations have actually been undertaken? For the purpose
of the present case it seems hardly necessary to examine this
question in aIiy detail. Indeed,itwould be meaningless to maintain
that action taken with the active support of an overwhelming
niajority of the Member States in a situation of ext~eme gravity
should be considerecl illegal. For the sake of corn~ileteness,however,
the follotving observations are made.
The legal basis of the action rnay be found in Article 40concern-
ing provisional measures, or it may be found in the irnplied powers
of the Security Council. It is well known that the system of en-
forcement action envisaged by Articles 42-47 of the Charter has
riever materialised because of fundamental divergences be tween

the permanent mernhers. Maintaiaing, in those circumstances,
that the responsibility of the Security Council for the preservation
of international peace and security can only be discharged under
the conditions and modalities laid down in Chapter VI1 would
be tantamount ta reducing the United Nations to an extrenzely
inefficient instrument for the realizatioii of the purposes and prin-
ciples to tvhich Member States are committed under Article I.
In its Advisory Opinion of II Ayril 1949 concerning ReParation for
I~juriessugered intheService olthe Uwited Natiolzs the Court said:

"Under iritcrnational law,the Orgariizationmust be deemcd to
Chartcr, areoconferredhupon it by neceçsaryre~mplicationas beinge
essentialto the performance of its diitieç.(T.C.J. Xe$orEs1949,
p. 182.)

Tt issubrnitted that tl~içfundamental prirlciyle is relevant also
to the present case. The conclusion that Articles 42-47 are inappli-
cable docs not leave the operations in the Congo suspended in the
air. They are firmly bnsed upon the irnplied powers of the United
Nations, if not in any specific article of the Charter. In discnrding
Article 43 and the other provisions of Chapter V11relating to inili-
tary enforcement action, one may safely rely on these implied
Pwers to justify the action taken by the Security Council in
situations of the gravity described by the Secretary-General in

hisseveral staternents Sefore the Council and the Assernbly.
The preceding observations concernjng the action of the Security
Council in the Congo apply mzbtatis mzttandis to the action éaken by
tlie Geileral Assernbly in instituting thUNEF. It liasheen argued
, above that the resolution "Uniting for Peace" established the
co~npetence of the Assembly to deal with the matter. The power to
set up a military force suck as theUNEF nîay be derived from the
general powers of the Assembly in nlatters relating tointernational
peace and security, or fronl the right of the AssembIy under Article22 to establish such subsidiary orgails as it cleenlsnecessary for the

performance of its functions, or it may finally be coizsidered as
appertaining to those implied powers without which the Assernbly
could not discharge its heavy and far-reaching rcsponsibilities in
the present world situ at'ion.
VIII. The flerspectz'ir,which thecase shoztldbe seen

At firstglance the uninitiated observer might gain the impression
that this isa case abolit a few hundred million douars. Tliat would
not in itself be an ilriimportant subject-matter, and Denmark,
beilig a small country of limited resources, cannot remain indiffe-
rent to financial problemç of that orcler. But it woulclbe a n~istake
to take thiç to be tlie only issueofthe case. Something much more
fa-teaching and important is at stake. It is no exaggeration to
say that the future rôle and functions of the United Nations as a
peace-preserving instrument depend upon the answcr which the
Court will give to the question before it.
The immediate question concerns two distinct and separate
operations, each of which, in their respective geograpliic areas,
has contributed essentially-and continues to contribute-to the
stabilization of dekate situations pregnant with grave iisks to
international peace. Itis a matter of course that these operations
are not intended to be carried on indefinitely. They should be
brought to an end at the earliest possible date. The determination
of that date, haivever, should depend exclusively upon the political
evaluation of the situation by the competent organs of the United
Nations. The operations should not be discontinued prematurely
for reasons extraneous to their purpose. In particular, finanrial
factors should not be allowed to prejudice the decision. History

wvuld condcmn those whci allowed essential peace-keeping opera-
tions like UNEF and ONUC to be. hamstrung or suffocated by
lack of funds. The only sure and effective rnetliod of financing these
operations is to levy the expenses upon Rleinber States. The United
Nations has no other reliable source of revenue. A negative answcr
to the question before the Court ivould invariably deprive the
Organization of an indispensable ineans to an imperative end.
The issue, hobrever, reaclies beyond the two operations actually
in yrogress. Situations may very well arise which will require
çimilar action. The exact nature and scope of such action cailnot
be determined in advance. In each particular case the competerit
body of the United Nations wiIl have to decide the question in the
light of specific circumstances. Whatever the scope and character
of the nleasures adopted, any action woul~lbe paralysed aLthe very
outset if the cornpetent organ could not rely on effective rnethods
to cover the expenses involved. Indeed, in order to ensure a bare
mininium of effeçtivencss, it rnust be justifiableto daim thst the
General Açsernbly, acting by a two thirdç rnajority, çhould be
legally entitled, if it so chooses, to levyupon Member States the necessary contributions to an operatiori wkich the Assemhly itself

or the Security Council has initiated in the urgent interests of
internatiorial peace.
It might be argued that there is an aIternative solution. Expe-
rience çcen~sto indicate that voluritary contributior~s to çuch opera-
tioils will in the end corne forth to Save the Organization froin
bankruptcy . This, however, is a most unsatisfactory alternative.
Quite apart frorn the uncertainty it involveç and the unreasonable
strain it places upon those who are entruçted with the execution
of deciçions taken by the pofitical organs, it introduces an undesir-
able element of instabiIity intothe functioning of the Organiza tion.
It is tantamount to nîaking the execution of any important opera-
tion contingent upon voluntary support from financially stroilg
States. Operoitions may tend to become operations of certain States
rather than of the Unitecl Nations. Thc pursrrit of particular
national interests may become the predominant motive, and the
gerieral conimon iilterest of the United Nations in the maintenance

of peace arid security may rccede into the background. The value
and effectjveness of the United Nations as an instrument of peace
will be reduced, andthe trerzd of developrnents which has çharacter- .
izeclthe Organizaticrn through recent years will be reversed.
The Court ought not to leavc suclr factors out of consideration.
Co~içistent with its jurisprudeilce, the Court should interpet the
provisions of the Charter in such a way as toensure a maximum of
efkctiveness with a view to the fullest possible realization of the
aims and purpoçeç ta which Mernbers of the United Nations are
comrnitted by the Charter. The late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht found
that

"in relation to the interpretatiofthe Charter of the United Nations
the Court has repeatedly and on a large scale actcdupon the prin-
Jlate~nalionalCourt,pp. 274-75.)lopmentof InternationalLaw tiy the

It is resyectfully suhrnitted that the circumstances of the present
case ;Iresuch as to justifyonce again the reliance upon that principle.
Furtherrnore. the application of the principle to the problem at
issue in the present casc requires no departure from even the most

cautious judicial method, because there is really no room for doubt.
As pointed out in the preceding sections of this mernorial, there is
solid legal ground for an affirmative aiiswer 50 the question on
whiclz the Court is asked to give its advisory opinion.

IX. Conclusion

For the reaçoils developecl in the preceding sections the Danish
Governrnent rcspectfully subn~it that the question before the Court
shoulcl be answered in the affirmative on the basis of the followirig
considerations :1 WRITTEN STATEMENT 01: THE I<I?\iGDOOP UENJ4ARK 165

The Gencral Assernbly has clearly expressed its ir~tcntioi~that
the expcnçeç relating to the UNEF and the ONUC skould be
assessed against n'IèmbcrStateç to the extent specified in each
particular resolution.
In so deciding, the Assernbly has lawfully exerciçed its fiscal
power under the Charter and 11asnot encroached upon the powess
of the Security Council.No provision of the Charter, andparticu-
larly not the budgetary provisions or Article 43, affords any basis
for challenging thc validity of thesc decisions.

In apportioning the expenses among Mernber States the General
Assembly haç acted under Article 17, paragraph z, whick is the
only provision of the Charter authorizing this proceclure. Conse-
quently, these expenses must be considered expenses of the Organi-
zation within the meaning of Article17, paragraph 2. 5. WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

I.The Netherla~ids Government desire to submit for the con-
sideration of the International CourtofJustice certain observations
with respect to the question, referred to the Courtfor an advisory
opinion by the General Assernbly of the United Nations, coricerning
the financial obligations of Member States.
z. In its resolution adopted on 20 Decen~ber 1961(1731 (XVI))
the General Assembly expresses its need for authoritative legal
g~iidaliceas to obligations of Member States under the Charter of

the United Nations in the rnatter offinancing the United Nations
operations in the Congo and in the Middle East.
3. By its resolutions 1583 {XV) and 1619(XV) the General
Assembly decided fo apportion certain specified expenses of the
Organization, relating to the UN operations in the Congo, among
thc Rlember States. By its resolutions 1089(XI), rlgr (XII), 1337
(XIII), 1441 (XIV) and 1575 (XV) the General Assembly decided
to apportion certain specified expenses of the Organization,
relating ta the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force
in the Middle East, among the Member States.

4. The aforernentioned General Asseinbly resolutions were
adopted under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United
Nations. They jnterided tu creatc-and, in the çubrnissioliof the
Netherlands Government, actually do çreate-finrancial obligations
of al1 Member States towards the United Nations Organization, to
the arnount., resulting from the figures nlentioninthe resolutions,
in conjunction with the scale of assesçment and further partjculars,
referred to in those reso2utions.
5. It has becn contended that the resolutions rcferred to above
are contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and,
as such, do not create finariciai obligatiofthe Member States, or,
at least, that the General Assembly cannot,inthefuture, apportion,

under Article 17 (z), further expençes relating to United Nations
operations uridertaken iri pursuance of tlie Security Council and
General Assembly resolutions, mentioned in the request for an
advisory opinion, or relating to United Nations operations of a
siinilar character, to be undertaken in pursuance of comparable
Security Council and Gcneral Assembly resolutio~ls.
6. With al1 due respect it would seern doubtful whether the
International Court of Justice, by way of an advisory opinion,
could declürc that the resolutions, mentioned under 3 above, were WRITTEN STXTEMENT OF THE NETFIERLANDS 167

a nullity and therefore did not create financial obligations of the
Member States towards the UNO. Thiç point niay, however, be left
aside, since the question submitted to the Court is couched in the
general termç of the interpretation of Article 17 (2) of the Charter
, and does not refer to the validiz'tyof decisions already taken bÿ tlie
General Assembly undcr Article 17 (2).

7. According to Article 17 (2)of the United Nations Charter,
"the expeilses of the Orgailization shall be borne by the Mernbers
as apyortioned by the General Assembly". It has been contended
that there is an irnfilieexc@tion to this general rule, which excep-
tion would reslilt frorn Article 43 of the Charter. Under Article 43,
para. (I),"al1Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute
to the maintenance of international peace and security, uildcrtake

to make available to the Security Council, on its cal1and in accord-
ance with a special agreement or agreements, arrned iorces, assist-
ance, and facilitics ..necessarjr for the purpose of rnaintaini~ig
international peace and security".
Apparently the çuntei~tion is that, since the Member States have
already, by virtue of Article 43, undertaken to provide the "assist-
tance aild facilities ...necessary for the purpose of maintainhg
international peace and security", they cannot, either alternatively
or curnulatively, be under ail obligation to pay financial contribu-
tions under Article 17 (21,in so far as tkose contributions are rneant
to cover expenses of the Organization, resulting from its operations
for the purpose of maintaining international yeace and security.

This contention seenis to be contrary to generally accepted canons
of interpretation. The unclertaking, provided for in Article 43, is
subj cct to an agreement or agreements to be concluded between the
Çecurity Council and Members or between tlie Security Council and
groups of Meinbers. Under paragraph 2 of the article "such agree-
ment ...shall goveni the nuinbers an3 types of forces, their degree
of readiness and general location, andthe nature of thc facilities and
general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to
be provided". It is obvious that if such agreements were concluded,
and cfthey would provide that al1costs relating to the use of the
forces and ta the iaçilities and assistance yrovided are borne by the
Member States concerncd, and if al1 the help yrovided by the
Mernber States under such agreements would be sufficient to enable
the United Natio~~sto fulfil itspurpose of maintaining international

peace and çecurity , the Organization covld accornplish itç task under
Article I of the Charter without incurring considerable expenses.
Even then there would be some expenditures of the Organization
itself, relating more spccificalZy to the operations for the main-
tenancc of intcrriational peace and security, whicli could only be
covered by contributicins of the Member States under Article 17 (2)
of the Charter.
As it is, hotvever, no agreeinei~t, as referredto in Articles 32 and168 IVRI'iTI'EN STATEMEXT OF THE NETHEKLANDS

44 of the Charter, has ever been concluded, and, though several
Aleinber States have voluiltarily assisted the Uriited Nations in its
peace-kecping operations, eithes by providing the necessary per-
sonal services and matericil at their own rost, or by providii~gfinan-.
cial assistance, the Organization has had to iilcur heavy expeiiscs
in order to fulfil its tasks ithis field.
Articles43 and 44of the Charter do ~zoprescribe tliat the Meniber
States with which the agreements are concluded skall benr al1 the
costs relating to both the maintenance and the employment of the
forces,fricilities and other assistance provided. Those articldo not
specifiçally refer to financial implications. The agreements nlay
provide that the Organization shall bear the costs of employinent,
or everi al1 the costs-including those of maintenance-of the
forces made available. If only for this reason, there is no room for

the interpretation according to which the method of ageenlents
between the Security Council and Mernber States would bc the only
possible one to cover the exyenses relating to pence-keeping
operations of the Ijriited Nations, and, conseyuei~tly, would exclude
the normal rnethod of covering the expençes, made by the Organiza-
tiori itself, by apportionment among its Mernbers under Article r7
(2).There can, therefore, be no doubt that the authorized expendi-
tures of the Organization itself, made in connectior-iwith itç peace-
keeping operationç-such as tliose refesred to in the reqirest for an
advisory opinion-shall, just like other expenses of the Organization,
be borne by the Members as apportioned by the Generiil Assembly
under Article 17 (2)of the Charter.

8. Anuther argunlei~t, based 011Articles 43 and 44 of the Charter,
kas sornetimes becn advanced, to the effect that it aypears from
those Charter provisions, in' conjunctiorl with othcrs, that the
Charter alloirs the peace-keeping oflerationsthemselves to be under-
taken only by way of action thrciugh the use of forces, facilities and
assistance, made available urider these articles and the agreements
provided therein. Ohviously this interpretatian would result in a
complete "iminobility" of the Organization, siilce, up till the
present mornei~t, no such agreement has ever been concluded. But

evcn apart from that, this argument clearly does not bear on the
question whether or not certain exfie?zdiizrre.sp,rovided for in the
budget of the Organization, considercd and approved by thc
General Asseinbly under Article 17 (I),are "expenses of the Organi-
zation" in the seilse of ArticI17 (2).The argument rather refers to
the question of the validity and effect of the resolutioi+ $ztrs.uancô
of which.the Organization has undertaken its operations. Itiç sub-
mitted that thc latter questiori is irrelevant for the present request
for an advisory opinion. Indeed the request deals with certain
expenditures already aztthorized by the Generfil A ssewzblythrough
the adoption ofthe budget of the Organization. TIieapproval of the
budget by the General Asseinbly veçts iri the Secretary-General the authority to incur obligations and ninke payments for the
purposes for whicll the appropriations contained in the budget were .
votcd and up to the arnou~it:so voted. There is clearly n direct
liilk-both iii thc tcxt of Article 17of the Charter and in the general
yrinçiples of law in respect of public finance-between the powcr to
authorize expenditure and the power to levy charges covering this
expenditure. 7'he power of thc General Assernbly to consider
and approve the budget of the Organization would be meaningleçç
if the Gerieral Asseinbly could not at the çarne time decide, with
binding forcein respect of the Memher States, un thc contributions
to be paid hy each Rlcnlber State in order to cover the expençes
authorized in the budget.
In view ofthe above it is clear that exfiendit5tremade or ordezed
by the Secretarÿ-General ui~der his authority clcrived from the

approval oi the budget are "expeiises of the Organization" under
Article 17 (2)of the Charter, irrcspective of the nature of the ope-
~aliotztvhich entai1 these cxpenditures (provided, of course, that
they correspond to the appropriationscontained in the budget) and,
afortiori,irrespective oi the validity and effect of the resolzalionsof
thc various organs of the United Nations which request or ordcr
such operations.
In ckher wordç, whenever the Gcnerxl Assernbly, by approving
the budget of the Orgariization, lias autllorized expenditures in
accorclance with specified appropriations, these expenditures are
expenses of the Organization, to be borne by the Mernber States.
Wliether the operations, which entai1 ttieseauthorized expenditures,
meet or do riot rneet with the approval of one or more hlember
States islegally irrelevant for the fi~zancial obligations of such
Mernber States, resulting from thc apportioiling of those expençes

ky tlie Gener:il Assernbly. l'he qucstion trhethcr or not a Mernber
State is le&allyobliged to ndrnit or to assiçt thoscoperatioris within
its jurisdictiori is cornpletely separate fron~the obligation of that
Men?ber State to pay its contribution tu the United Nations.
Accordingly, it is eclually irrelevant for the obIjgation to pay
contributions wliether the United Nzttioi3sofierationsare cffected in
pursuance 01 a task of the Unitcd Xations, cntrustcd to it directly
by the Charter, iw by a resolutiûri of a United Nations organ and,
if so, by whicli United Nations organ, provided always that the
exfiendifareis autliorized by the: budget approved by the General
Assembly.

g. Now it might perhaps be argued that the General hssembly
shoelld not ct.uthorizeexpenditures relating to operations of the
- Organization which are not allowcd under the pro\;isions of the
Charter. Again, it would seern that tlie request for an advisory
opinion does ]lotimply a giraycr to the Court to declare whether or
not the General Assenibly rightly exercized its power to authorize
-in its rcsolutions referred to in the request-expenditures rclating=?O WRITTEN STATEMEN'lY OF THE NETHERZhNDÇ

to United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East.
The request rather starts frorn the fact that these expenditures
art: authorized. However, in view of possible discussions 011 the
legdity of these mthorizations, a few words rnay bc devoted to this
question, without irnplying in an? way itç relcvancy in respect of
the interpretation and application of Article 17 (2)of the Charter
and in respect of the financial oblig,ationclof Membetsof the United
Nations resulting from that provision.

xo. It isno doubt true that the Gcneral Assernbly, inthe exercise
of its budgetary power under Article 17 (1)of the Charter, is bound
by some legal rules. As tlie Court stated in its advisory opiriioof
13 July 1954, "...the function of approving the budget does not
mean that the General Assembly has an absolute power to approve
or disapprove the expenditure proposed to it; for some part of that
expenditure arises out of obligations alrendy incurred by the Organi-
zation, and to this extent the General Assembly has no alternative
but to honour these engngemcnts" (I.C.J.Reports 1954p ,. 59).
In the casc ~whichgave rise to that advisory opinion, the Court
held that the General Assembly was legally bound to a$prove a

certain item of the budget which Iiadbeen propoçed to it. In the
present case, the question rnight be raised whether the General
Assembly is legally boundnot to authorize the expci~ditures relating
ToUnited Nations opcrations in the Congo and in thc Middle East.
It rnay be sepeated that an affirmative ançwer ta this question
would not neccsçarily irnply the "nullity" of the authorizations
made, nor deprive the apjiortioning, effected on the basis thereof,
from its legal effect oi creating a financial oùljgation of tMember
States to pay contributions.
But qvite apart from that the question muçt clearly be ançwered
in the negativc. "Miereis nu provision in theCharter ~vhichcould he
lzeld legaliy to prevent the General Assembly from approving the
items ofthe budget ralating to eitker the United Nations operations in
the Congo or to operations of the United Nations Emergency Force.
Legal limitations of the power of the General Assembly to
authorize expenditures of the Organization cannot be preçun-ied;

they should resdt from express and unequivocal provisions of the
Charter. In this connection it should be noted that under Article 18
(a)of the Charter al1decisions of the General Assembly on budgetary
questions are made 657 a two-thirds rnajority of the Mernbers
present and voting. Furthermore, such decisions, whiIe vesting in
the Secretary-General the power to effectthe ex9enditu-?easuthoriz-
ed do not oblige the Secretary-General to do so. Neither do such
deciçions purport to implgr a binding statement on the legality of
the operatiortsor any part thereof.
Under those circumstances it is in itself already higlily improbable
that the Charter would yrovide for any limitation in the General
Assernbly's power to approve the budget proposed to it. WRrLLEN STATEhlENT OF THE NETBERLANDS 171

II. But let us assume, for the sake of argument, thatthe Charter
forbids the General Assembly to approve a proposed item of the
budget, if the appropriation proposed to it relates to activities of ,
the United Nations, whicpi are çonsidered by soine filembers to be
incompatible with the Charter provisions. Then the question could
xriçe whetker the United Mations operations corresponding to the
authorized expenditures, mentioned in the request, are prohibited
by the Charter or incompatible witli its provisions.

12. Se United Natians operations in question are undertaken in
pursuance of certain Sccwrity Council resolutions and certain
General Assembly resolutions, mentioned in the request for an
advisory opinion.
In the suhmission of tlze Netherlands Government, the General

Asscmbly cannot be considered to be Iegally obliged not to approve
expenditurcs ofthe Organization resulting from the implementation
of resolutions of the Security Council an3 the General AssembZy,
whatever the criticism to which such resolutions rnight be subjected
in respect of tlleir contents or the way in which tkey might have
been adopted.
In other words, even if it could bedoubted whethersuch resolutz'ofts
were in full conforrnity with the provisions of the Charter, and
irrespective of the consequences such doubt might entai1 as to the
validity and legal effects of these resoIntions inolher respects,such
resolutions, once adopted, ernpomer the General Assembly to vote
-ivith the required two-thirds rnajority-the expenditures of the

Organization neceçsary for their implementation by the Organiza-
tion, and to apportion the reç~ilting expenses of the Organization
between the Member States.
The Charter of the United Nations provides forsafeguards against
activities of the United Natioi~s, whether resolutions or operations,
wl~ichwould infringe legitimate interests of Rlember States. Such
safeguards are laid down in various provisions relating to the
powers of the United Nations organs, to the substantive rules to
be observed iii the exercise of these powers and to the procedure to
be followed. Generall~ çpeaking, most, if not all, actual and alleged
legal limitationsuf the activities of theUnited Nations are discussed
before decision is taken by any United Nations organ. Suc11dis-
cussiorzdoes not necessarily Iead ta a conclusion which corresponds
to the legal views of al1 the Mernber States concerned. Now ob-

viouçly the fact that a decision is taken by a United Nations organ
(other than the Court) is not neceçsarily conclusive in respect of the
express or implied interpretation of the Charter provisions for al1
other United Nations organs and for al1 Mernber States. On the
other hand, It isequally obviouç that the United Nations as a
wkole would be doomed to complete failure if any and every deciçion
of its organs could, in ail respectsbe treated üç a nullity by other
organs and by one or more Member States on the account that the172 ~IIKI'l~l'I~kSTATEMEXT OF THE NETHERLAXDS

underlying interpretation of the Charter provisions did not cor-
respond to the legal vjews of suc11other organ(s) or R'IerllberState(s).
In connection with the prescnt rcquest for ail advisorgr opinion,
it is not necessary to eilter into a detailed cansideration of the
exact balance between the requirements of an effective world
organization and the legitirnate interests of Mernber States in this
field.
It inay he sufficient to note that, in this rcspect, r-distinction
should be macle between the legal effects of n dccision of a Ui-iited
Nations orgai1 mithin the framework of the Organization itself
(internal legal efferts} and the legal effccts of such decisions within

the jurjsdiction of a Mernber State and on its Iegal relationships
with other States (external legal cffects). The effect of justifying the
authorization of expenditures and the collateral effect of the
financial obligations of n'IeinberStates to pay contributions to the
Qrganizatioil clearly fa11under the firçt category, i.e. the internal
lepl. cffects of a decision of the Security CounciI or the General
Assembly to undertake peace-keeping and other operations.
Whatever views a Member State might bc cntitled to hald in respect
of the legalvalidity of such resolutions and of the opcratioi-isof the
United Nations in pursuance thereof, the authorization of cxpen-
diturcs 111the budget, the apyortioning of the resulting eupenses
between the Men-iberStates and the obligation of Meniber States
to pay contribution are uilassailable in law.

13. Though-even if the legal validity of thc Sccurity Council
and Gellerd Assembly resolutions in pursuarice of which the
operations in the Congo and the Middle East were lindertaken could
be queçtioned-the rcply to the yuestion çubmitted by the General
Assembly dleuld be in the positive sense, sorne rernarks may be
made \vit11regard to tliese resolutions.
Some of these resolutions are Security Council resolutions, others
resolutions of the Gene~alAssembly. Thc opiniori has been advanced
that United Nations operations which inteilcl to serve the cause of

maintenance of international peace and sccurity and involve the
use of armed forces lnay be undertaken only in pursuance of a
binding dccision to that effect of the Security Council under the
provisions of Chapter VI1 of the Charter. According to this opinioil,
United Nations operations irivolving the use of arn~ed forces could
onIy be undertalcen on llzesire-th of rt decisin11of the Security
Council under Article 42 of the Charter and only by means of arrned
forces made available to the Security Council under agreements
with Member States, as ptovided for iri Articles 43 and 45 of the
Charter. Both elements of this opinion çeem tu be legally un-
warsanted. In itself there is no validity in the argument that the
fact that the Charter prouidesfur particular United Nations opcra-
tions "involving the use of arrned force" in Articles 42,43 and 45,
rneans that the Charter exçlz6desal1otker United Nations operatioris WRITTEN STATEMEKT OF THE NEL13ERLANDS I73

"invrilving tlieuse of armed force". Once again it is necessary to
distinguish between thr, various legal qwstions involvcd in tkiç
inattcr.
First of al], the question may he put whether the Uiiited Nations
operations uridettaken in pursuance of the sesolutions rnentioned
1 in tlie rcqueît for an advisory opinion are the type of "action" in
respect of which Chapter VI1 of the Charter contains certain rules.
Now itis significant that Chapter VI1 of the Cliarter deals with
rneasures to be npplied by Member States or through arrned forces
of a Member Stale; furthermore, those mcasures are preventlve or
enforcement mcüsures against a State.In other words, the provisions
of Cliapter VII, relevant here, are dealing with the conditions under
which an armed conflict between States Es "legalized" by way of
dccisions of the Security Council. The operations undertaken in
pursuance ofthe resolutionsmentioned inthe request for an advisory
opinion are of a different kind; they are United Nations operatioi~s,
undertaken by the Secretary-Geiieral iii the performance of the

functions entrustcd to him by other United Nations organs (cf.
Article 98); they are rzoldirected against a State.
In vietv of the dissimilarity between the two types of "açtioi~",
there does not secm to be any ground for holding that the second
type is excluded by the Charter beçause the first type is expressly
mentioned in the Charter.
Since the second type of "action" does not involve an armed
conflict betiveen States, there iç no need for a decision of the
Security Council binding 011the States taking part in such armed
confiict. The Unitecl Nations operations undertaken Fythe Secre-
tarÿ-General magr involve the estabhshment of suhsidiary organs
and other osganizational nieasures. In respect of suclt rneasures the
diçtinction between "binding decisions" and "recornrnendatioiis"
is irrelevant. The same gocs fcrrresolutioris indicating the aims to
be pursucd and the policies to be followed by the Secretary-
General by and in the course of the United Nations operations.
E'rornthe strjctly legai point of view, such resolutions do not create
any other obligation than one incurnbeill upon the Secretary-
General towards the otker United Nations organ which haç adopted
the resolution. Both the organizationzl ineasures and the instruc-

tions given are, therefore, ii~tcrnal decisionç of the Organizatior~,
which as sirclz are iîeither dccisions "binding" the BrIember States
nor "recoinrnendations" acldrcssed to Rlcmber States.
Another argument haç been advanced to tlie effect that under
Articles II,para. 2, in fine,and rz, para. I,the General Assernhly
isaot competent to deal with rluestions "on whiclz action is neces-
sary", nor to make recornrnendations with regard to a dispute or
situatio~l"while the Security Council is exerciçing the iunctions
açsigned to it inthe Cliarter" in respect of such dispute nr situation.
Here again it is çuhmitted by the Netherlands Government that
the aforementioned provisions of the Charter are not applicable171 IVKITTEN STATEMERT OF THE NETIlRRLANDS

to the General Assembly resolutions referred to in the request for
an advisriru opinion.
The provisions of Article 12, para. 1, tend to avoid a conflict
between resolutions of the Gcneral tlssembly and resoliitions of tlîe
Security Council. In theory such conflict rnigllt arise in three cases:
(1)if the General Assernbly decided to intervent and the Seciirity
Council decided not tointervene, (2)if the GeneraI Assembly decided

not to interveiîe and the Security Counçii decidcd to intervenc, and
(3) if both the General Assernbly and the Security Council decided
to intervene but in contrary directions.
In order to avoid tllese three contingencies, Article rz of tlie
Charter provides that, tvllile the Security Council is still in tlie
course of considering whether to decidc to intervene or tci dccide
not to intervene, the GcaeraI Assemhly shall ilot decide to intervene.
In other words, as stated in Article 24 of the Charter, the Security
Council haç p.ïimar?)reçponsihility for the mainteriance of inte;-
national peace and security. The implication is, of course, that once
the Security Council Ilas taken a decisioil-to intervene or not to
intervene-the General Aççembly shall not pass a reçoliition in
a contr?ry sençe. If the Seci~rity Council has not taken a

decision in respect of a dispute or situation submitted to it, the
General Assembly is free to deal with the n-iütter, either on the
reyucst of the Security Council (Article 12, para. I,irifime)or under
its getzeral powcrs (Articles IO and II). Articlc II, para. I,z?cfine,
does no more thaii state the obvious fact that if tlie General As-
scrnbly is of the opinion that the dispute or situation caUs for the
"action" of the Security Coilncil, expressly provided for in the
Charter, it shoilld refcr this matter to the Security Council. Act tially
ths is nothirig else but an application of Articlero, whick empowers
the General Asçemhly tr>make rccommendations tu the Security
Council.
'The Gcneral Assembly resolutions, mentioncd in the request for
an ndvisory opinion, in pursuance of wliiçh the United Nations
operations were undcrtaken, do in no way confiict with aily Security
Council decision ; ncitlzer were they adopted while the Security

Council was exercising its functions in respect qf the situations they
deal with. Tkercfore, Articles 10 to 12 »f the Chartcr cannot be
invokcd to challenge the legal validity of the Gcneral Assembly
resolution~ üuthorizing the United Nations operations in the Congo
and in tlic Middle East.

14. The submisçions of the Netherlands Government, as elabor-
ated above, rnay be summarized as follo~s:

-legal obligations of thc Mernber States of the United Nations to
pay contributions result from resolutions ofthe GeneraI Assembly
adopted under Article 17, pua. 2,of theCharter; çuch resolutions
could only be challenged on the ground (a) tlzat they were not IITRITL'EN STATEBIENT OF THE NETI.IERLrZKDS I7j

adopted with the required rnajority, or(b) that they apportion
expenses not iriiact provided forin the budget ofthe Orgnnization ;
-such resolutions, and, cnnsequently, the resulting financial
obligations, cannot be challcnged on the ground that the General
Assembly should not have awtlzovixedany particular type of
expenditure wkich was in fact autkorized bjrit under Article 17,
para. I, of the Charter;
l
-even if the financial obligation could be challenged on tlieground
that it is based on the apportioning of cxpenses wllich should not
liave been authorized, there is no legal foundation for the state-
ment that the authorization of the expenditures, referred to in
the request for an advisory opinion, was contrary to the provisions
of the Charter;
-those expenditures rclate to United Nations operations, undcr-
taken in pursuance of certain Security Council and Gcneral As-

sernbly resolutions; whatever legal objections a Rlember State
might have against these United Nations opcrations as such,
the authorized expenclitures relating to those operations are in
any case cxpenses of the Organization, to beborne bg7the RiIember
States ;
-there is no provision in the Charter ivhich proliibits the Geiieral
Assembly to authorize expenditures relating to United Nations
operations, undertaken in pursuance ofresolutions of the Security
Council or the General Assembly, men if the validity of those
res~l~fionsrniglit bc challenged by one or more Mernber States;

-even if tlie validity of the resolutions, in pursuance. of wkich
United Nations operations were undertaken, could he considered
relcvant for tlie question wkether thc General Açsernbly was
cornpetent to avthorize cxperiditiireç relating to such operations,
the reply to the question suhnîitted to thc Court should bc
positive, since the Security Council and Geiieral Açsernbly
resolutions, rnentionecl in tlic rcquest, and relating to operations
in tlle Congo and the Middle East, are legally valid iznder the
Charter ;
-in particular the fact that according to cxpreçs provisions of the
1 Charter the Security Council magr decicle on action to bc taken

by rnilitary forces of the RIIemberStates, made avüilable to the
Security Council, dcies ncit exclude United Nations opcrations,
such as tkose undertakcn in the Congriand the Middle East;
-neitkier arc the General Assembly resolutions, méntioncd in the
request, çantrary to Articles JO to 12 of the Charter, since they
tvere not taken wliile the Seçurity Council was exercising its
functions in respect of the situatioiis to \+hich tliose Gencral
Asscrnkiy resolutions referrecl, and çi~ice they did ncit provide
for an "action" in the sençc of Article II, para. 2, Zmfilze, of
the Charter.v6 IYRITTEX STATEMENT OF THE NETBERLAPI DÇ
15. In conclusion, the Netherlands Governrnent may remark that
the foregoing Iscornpletely without prejudice to the scale of asseçs-
ment of expenses ofthe Organization to Se adoyted by the General
Assembly in respect of the expendituye relating to United Nations
operations of the kind referrcd to in the request for an advisorgr

opinion. There may perhaps be good reasons for distinguisliing, for
the purpose of apportioning the expelrses of the Organixation,
between the various types of expenditure. l'hcse consideratioils are,
however, not germane to the issue submitted to the Court, since
they do not relate to the power of the General Asçemblytoapportion
the expenses ofthe Organization but to the use the General hssembly
rnight make of its discretion in this respect.

The Hague, February 16, 1962. 6.WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALTST REPUBLIC

With rcference to the letter of the Registrar of the International
Court of Justice No. 34891 of q 7~"cember 1961, the Legation of
the Czeçhoslovak Socialist Republic, upon instructions frorn its
Government, fias the honour to advise the Court of the follawing
position on the subject of the proceedings for advisory opinion
instituted in purçuance of General Assembly resolution 1731(XVI)
of 20 December 1961 :

The question of financing the operations of tlze United Nations
referred to in General Assembly resolutians 1jS3 (XV) and 1590
(XV) of20 December 1960,1595 (XV) of 3 April1961,16zg (XV) of
21 April 1961 and 1633 (XVI) of 30 October 1961 relatingto the
United Nations operations in the Congo undertaken in pursuance
of thc Sccurity Council sesolutions of 14 Ju22,July and g August
1960 alid21 Fehmary and 24 November 1961, and General As-
sembly resolutions 1474 (ES-IV) of 20September 1960,1599(XV),
1600(XV) and 1601(XV) of 15Ayril1961, as iell asthat offinancing
the operations rcfcrred ton Generül Assembly resolution1122 (XI)
of 26 November 1956, 1089(XI) of 21 December 1956, logo (XI)

of 27 Februai-y 1957 ,151 (XII) of 22 November 1957, 1204 (XII)
of 13Uecernber 1957 ,337 (Xlll) of13 Dece~nbcr1958, 1441 (XIV)
of 5 I3eccmher Igjg and 1575 (XV) of 20December 1960 relating to
the operations ofthe United Nations Emergency Force undertaken
in pursuailce of General Assembly resoIzrtion997 (ES-1) of 2 No-
vcrnber rgg6, 998 (ES-1)and 999 (ES-l) of4 November 1956, 1000
(ES-I} of5 November 1956, 1001 (ES-1) of7 November 1956, 1121
(XI) of 24 Novelnber 1956 and 1263 (XTII) of 14 November 1958,
must be considered in strict accordance with the provisions of the
United Nations Charter relating to the functions andpriwers of the
United Nations in the rnatters of the maintenance of international
peace and security. The financial iniplicationç of al1 operations
unclertaken by the United Nations are inseyiarably linked with the
legalhasis on which each of the opcrations undertaken by it rests.
Under Article 24,paragraph z, of the Charter, the primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenancof international peaceand security
isentrusted to the Security Council. Erom the responsibility resting
on the Security Council in this respect there ensues its exclusive
potver to take decisions under Chapter VI1 of tlze Charter for the
maintenance and restoration of peace and security, including the
use of armed forces.All nîeasures connected with the useofarmed
forces on behaZf of the U~iitcd Nations fall, of neceçsity, under
Chapter VI1 and, accordingly, also the Ineasures connected withproviding the material and financialcoverage of armecl actions laIl

linder this Chapter . The pertinent prrivisioils of the Charter, in
particular Articles 43 and 48, provide the basis for the assistance
to be made ltvailable by filember States in al1operations undertakcn
in thc namc of the Organization. Only the Security Council may
decide the nature and extent of assistance requested frorn Member
States, and conclude agreements with thern governing their duties
including their financial obligations involveci in the operatiori in
qiiestion. The i-iegotiatinof every suck agreement necessitates the
al?proval lsy the Security Council of the terms of the agreement.
Under Articlc 43, paragraph 3, these terms must be accepted by
the countrics providing sucli assistance.
Any other way of undertaking actions by the Organizaticin witli
the use of armed forces goes beÿond the principles of international
co-operationin the efforts for the preservrttion of peace and çecurity,
enunciated by the United Nations Charter, and cal1 in no way
establish legal obligations bincling the Mcrnber States under
Article 2, paragrayhs 2 and 5, of the Charter.
In adopting the respective resolutions conceriling the establish-

ment of the United Nations Ernergency Force (UNEF) and the
United Nations Operations in the Congo (UNOC) and iri approving
the mcthod of their financing, the Gcneral Assembly acted zrltrvires
and in disregard of the irnperative provisicins of Chqter VI1 of tlie
Charter stipulating that issues ofthis kirid fa11under the exclusive
authority of the Security Council.
The Czeckoslovak Governinent liolds a firm opinion, based 011 a
distinct differentiation between fir~ancing of normal expenditures
of the Organization and financing of actions uiidertakcn in pur-
suance of Chapter VI1 of the Charter, that the costs for the main-
tenance of the United Natiorls units in the Middle East and in tiie
Congo cannot be regarded as "expenses of the Organization" witl~in
the rneaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
Tlie expenscs referred to in Article 17,paragraph 2,arc thc nor-
mal, current expeiises of the United Nations incliided in the regular
budget mentioned in paragrayh I of the sarne article. On the other
hand, the expenses ronriected with the maintenance of armed forces
emploÿed in the Organization's actions for the maiiltcnance orresto-
ration of yeace represent, by thcir very nature and way ufcoverage,
exyenses of a different charaçter, andtheir apprcival is governed by
the procedure set forth in Clïalîter VI1 of the Chsrtcr.

In this connection the interpretation offered at the San Francisco
Confercnce in 194 j is not \vithout legal importance. Tlze pertinent
reports clearly differentiate. betweei~ cxpenses falling undcr thc
present Article 17of the Charter and expenses involved in enforce-
ment actionç undcrtaken by thc Security Council. The report of the
rapporteur of Cotnmittee 1111çays that "the Cornmittee thcreforc
rccommends that the Gcneral .4çsernbly be empotmred to apportion
the expenses arnong the Members and to approve the budget of the WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CZECIIOSLOVAKIA I79
Organization" (U.N.C.I.O. Doc~imcnts,Vol. 8,p. 453). The report of

Rapporteur M.Paul Boncour deals witll the other group of expenses,
andin the chapter entitlcd"Econo~wicP.p.obLe~?ozEdorce.i?.~ern4tcliow"
rends ;LSfollows : "Tn conclusion ...the Cornmittee declarcd itself
satisfied with thc provisions of paragraphs IO and 11 (the present
Articles49 and 50-?zole). A desire however was cxpressed that the
Organization sfiould, in the future, seek to prornote a system aitiming
at the fairest possible distributioofexpenscs jncursed as a result of
enforcenient action." (U.N.C.I.O. Documents, Vol. 12, p.513.)
Sirnilar drfferentiation between the current expenses of the
United Nations apportioned by the General Asscrnbly and the
expenses authorized by the Secilrity Council for actioris undertaken
with the usc of armed forçcs is made also by the commentators of
the Charter, MM.L. M. Goodrich and E. Hanlbro, who exyressed
their opinion that "expenses referred to in this paragraph (i.e.
paragraph 2,Article 17 of the Charter-note) do not includc the

cost ofcnforcement acticin" (Charteroj .theU?zit.cNatioxs, Comm~n-
tary and Docztments, Second Revised Edition, Boston, 1949,p. 184).
The latter category of expenses is different from the former not
only hecausc of itç different naturebut a'isobecause of the different
method of their coverage ta bc deterrnined by the Security Council
in full conformity with the relevant provisions of Chapter V1I of
the Charter and according ta the specific conditions of eacli indi-
vidual case. It should be noted that iriternational responsibility of
the country ~vhichthrouglz ifs illegacts brought about the situation
whiçk prompted intervention on thc part of the United Nations is
one of the impcistant factors that must he takcri into account in the
consideration of the qucstion of financial coverage of the Organi-
zation's oyerations. Attention should be paid in this connection to
tlze aforementioned repart of Rapporteur M. Paul 13cincourwhich
declares that "thc cxpenses of enforcement action carried out
agüinst a guilty State should Iallupon that State" (U.N.C.1.O.

Documents, Vol. 12. p. 513).
The fact that thc: Organization's actions falling by tlieir nature
under the authority of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VI1
of the United Nations Charter were, in coritravention tothe Charter,
undertaken on the basisof General Assembly resolutionç, cannot in
legal way change the nature of expenses related to tliem. Such
expenses cannot bc regarded as "expenscs of the Organization"
within the rneaning of Article 17,paragraph 2, of the Charter, and
the General Assembly thercfore is not authorized to consider and
apyrove them mithin the framcwork of thc Organization's budget.
Procceding frrim al1the aforemcntionecl rcasons, the Czechoslovak
Government recornmcnds that the question formulatecl in the
General Assembly 'sresolution No, 1731 (XVI) of 20 Decernber 1961
should ha a?zswcredzlz thencgative.

The Hague, 20 Fcbruary 1962. WRITTEN STA'SEMENT OF THE UNITEU STATES OF AhlERICA 181
l imposing assessments upon States Members, have tlie effect of

creating financial obligations binding upon those States.

The jurisdictiowoftlaeÇoztrl:

The jurisdiction of the Court is founded 011Article 96 (1) of the
1 Charter, which provides that:
"The General Assenihly ..may request the International Court
of Justice to givan advisory opinion on any legaiquestion."

Article65 of the Statut? of the Court authorizes the Court to res-
pond to such a request.
ïïze question presented is a "legal cluestion". It concerns the
legal.consequences of assessrnent resolutionsof the General Asscm-
bly in the light of Article 17 of the Charter. The question is whether
the cxpenditures authorized hy these resolutions are "expenses of
the Organization" within the meaning of the Charter, and therefore
give rise to a legal obligation of States Members to pagrthese
expenses "as apgortioried by the General Assembly". The question

clearly fallç within the jurisdictional ainbit rnarked out by this
Court in earlier opinions. See Admissiorz of a Stcclelo theU~tited
ilration(Charter, Art. 41, Advisory Opiwion : I.C.J. Repo~ts ~g&,
p. 57; Competenct: of Assernbly regardiwgadmission to the Ukted
Natiows,A hisory Oflinion: I.C.J. Repovts1-950,p. 4; Interflretation
oJ Peace l'reatiesAdvisory Ofiiniom:I.C.J. RefiortsIgjo, p. 65.

A. Tke United Nations Emergency Forct (UNEF)
I
On 29 October r9 56, Israeli armecl forces advanced into Egyptian
territory, and large-scale hostilities broke out between Israel and
Egypt. On 30 Octoher, the Governments of the United Kingdom
and France issucd an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to cease
military opcrations and to withdraw their forces to a distance of
te11miles from the Suez Canal. Tlze Security Council met urgently
in response to theçe developments. Rcsolutions were introduced
calling for a ccasc-fire and withdrawal of lsraeli forces and calling
on al1parties to refrain from the use or threat of force in the area.
These resolutions were not adopted because of the negative votes
cast by two permanent rnembers of the Council, the United King-
dom and France. Me~inwhile, the Anglo-French ultimatum was
rejected, and British ai~dFrench forces intervened militarily .
On 31 October, the Security Council adopted a resolution sub-
mitted by k'ugoslavia, which recited that the lack of unanirnity
of the perrnancnt rnembers had prevented the Council from exer-
cising its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace,
and called an enlergency çpecial session of the General Asscmbly suant to General Assembly Kesolution 377 IV) ("Uniting for
Peace") .
'lT1i~eneral Assembly coi~venedon I November. Early the fol-
lowing morning, it adopted a resoliition urging that "al1 States"
ir~i~nediatelcease fire, withdraw belzind the armistice lines,ceaçe
border raids, observe scrupulously the armistice agreement, and
halt the movement of rnilitary forces into the areaIt also called for
reoyening of the then blocked Suez.Canal. U.N. Uoc. No. A/RES/gg7
(ES- ]1956).On 3 Noveinber, the Secretary-General reported tl~at
Egypt and Içrael were preyared to accept a cease-fire. He Iater
reported tliat the United Kingdom and l'rance appeared willing
to stop military action provided that, among other things, the
Egyptian and Israeli Governrnents agreed to accept a United

.Nations'forcc capable of achieving the objectives of the ccase-rire
resolution.
On 3 Novernber, the General Assembly reitcratcd its rcsolution
of 2November. îlien, by a vote of 57in favor, O opposcd, with ~gab-
stentions, the Assembly adopted a Canadian resolution requesting
the Secretary-General to submit within fort y-eigkt hours "a plan
for thc setting up, with the consent of the nations con-cerned,.of
an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and
supervise the cessation of hostiliti...".U.N. Doc. No. AIRES1998
(3.35-1)1956).
The same day, the Secretaq-General subrnitted his first report
on the creation of the United Nations Ernergency Force, or, as it
came to be known, UNEF. U.N. Gen. Asç. Off. Rec. 1stEmergency
Spec. Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5, at 14 (A13289) (1596).
On 5 November, the Assembly, acting upon the Secretary-General's
report, adopted bgr a vote of 57-0-19 resoIution Iaoo (ES-1), which,
by its own tcrms, established a United Naticiris Comn~and for an
emergency international force. Thc resolution appointed a Chief of
Cornmand of the Force, and asked the Secretary-General tn take
the neçeçsary administrative rneasures for prompt execution of its
resolurion. By midnight of 6-7 November, a cease-fire was aclzieved.
On 7 November, the Sccretary-General sribrnitted his second
report on the plan for UNEF. Id. 1st Emergency Spec. Sess.,
Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5,at 19 (Aj3302) (1956).By the tcrms
of his proposal, the deployment andoperationç of the Force ~vould
bc stibject to the consent of the Governments concernecl. Thus,
the Force would be dcsigned to induce and facilitate a cease-fire
and withdrawal of troops, ratlzer than to impose withdrawal.
UNEF was conceived, frorn the outset, as a subsidisry organ of
the General Assembly within the ternis tiArticle 22 of the Clzarter.
This was expressly confirmecl by the Secretary-Gcr~cral in kis
summary study of tlie experience derived from the establishment
and operation of the Forcc. Id. r3th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item
No. 6 j,at 24 (A13943) (1958 It.is also reflected in the Regulations
uf the Force. U.W. Doc. No. Sï'/SGB/UNEF/r, at 2 (1957). The TVRITi'Eh'WATEBIENT OF TtIC UKITEU S'TA.TES OF ABIERILA 183
Agreement between the United Nations and Egypt concerning
the status of UNEF in Egypt cqually specifieç thnt UNEF is an

orgai-iof the General Assembly established in accordance with
Article 22. Jd. 11th Sess., Annexes, Agenda ltem 66, at 52-53
(-41526) (1957) U NEF \vas to be an international organ, with its
rcsponiible oficcrsappointed by the United Nations. Itrvas,i-obe
a United Matioris instrument fullgr indeyelidentof the policies of
any one nation. UNEF iv9s to fulfil a dual role: supervising the
cease-fire and withdrawal of fol-eign arrned forces frorn Egyptian
tetritory, and rnaintaining peaceful conditions in the area by jts
deployment along the armistice line and international irontier.
The Assembly approi~ed the guicling principles set out in the
Secretary-Genernl's report for the organization and fur~ctioning
of UNEF on 7 November ky a vote of 64-0-12. U.N. Duc. No.
A/RES/IOOI (ES-1) (1956).Hy July 1957 ~ NEF had gro~~nto a
complement ofçome 6,000 officersand men voluntarily contributed
bg7ter? MernberStates.From the outset, ithas discharged its duties
with conspiçuous suçcesç. It continues to rnake an esscntial contri-
bution to perice in the Middle East.

B. United AiaiionOs+eration isnthe Congo(ONUCj

On 30 June 1960,the Kepublic oftlie Congo (Leopoldville) was
proclaiined independent. Rioting broke out two days later. Congo-
lese soldiers mutinied o5 July, and by 8 July scrious disorder had
spread, ûccomyanicd bjrviolence against tlze European population.
More tlzan 1,300 worncn and children, principdy Belgians, fled to
Brazzaville. That day, Belgian paratroopers were flown into
Lcolioldville to seinforce Belgian bases in the Congo. More Belgian
troops followed with the mission of protecting Belgian Iives and
property.
On II July, Premier Lumiirnba requested technical assistance
frorn the United Nations to aid in organizing and developing the
Congolese army. On the saine day, tlie Congolese province of
Katanga issued a claim of independence. 30th the Preçident and
the Prcmier of the Congo un 12 July 1960 cabled the Secretary-
Gericral of the United Nations requesting the "urgent disyatch"
of Unitcd Nations i-iîilitary assistance in response to "the unsoli-
cited Bclgian action". The appeal stated that "The essential pur-
pose of thc rcquested rnilitary aid is to protect the national terri-
tory of the Congo against the preçent external aggressicin whicis

a threat to internationalpeace". U.N. Doc. No. 514382(1960).
United Nations technical assistance of a civil chitractewas ah
requested. For its part, the Belgian Government made clear that
it rvould \relcome United Nations troops to keep order in placeof
theBelgiai~forces.
Acting under Article gg oi the Clzartcr, the Seçretary-General
convoked an imrnediate n-ieeting of the Security Council in res-
ponse to the Congolese pleü. That meeting culmiilated in the 184 WHI-III'ESSTATELlENT OF THE UNlTED STATES OF AMERICA

adoption of a Tunisian-sponsored resolution, bas~d on the Secretary-
General's recommendstion, which caIled upon Belgium to with-
draw its troops frorn Congolese territory and authorized the Secre-
tary-General to provide the Congolese Government ivith the neces-
. sary militas. assistance until its national security forces were
able to meet fully their tasks. U.N. Doc. No. SI4387 (1966). That
military assistance-the United Nations Opcrations in the Congo
(ON UCj-was organized and dispatclied with great speecl. It
quickly became, in Dag Harnrnarçkjiild's words, the "biggest
single effort under United Nations colours, organized and directed
'by the United Nations itself". U.N. Security Council Off. Rec.
15th year, 877th meeting 4 (ÇIPV. 877) (1960). That effort lus since

been endorsed, suçtained and broadened by the Security Council
and General Assembly in a.series of resolutions, carried by very
large majorities. U.N. Docs. Nos. SI4405 (1960), SI4426 (1960)~
S/4741 (1961 )~/~OOZ (1961), AIRES(r474 (ES-IV}(1940)~ AIRES/
1599 (XV) (1961)and A/RES]I~OO (XV) (1961).
When, in September 1g60, the Sec~rit~yCouncil reached an im-
passe, the General Assembly was seized of the problem, pursuant
to Resolution 377 (V), in ernergency syeçial session. The Assembly
reaffirmed the resolutions of the Security Council and rcqirested
the Secretary-Genesal ta

"continue to tabcvigorous action in accordaricewith the tcrms of
thcaforesa iedoliitions and assistthe Central Gnvernmrnt of the
Coiigoin therestoration and maintenance of lawand orclethmiigh-
out thetcrritoi-of tliRepublic ofthe Loilgo and to safeguardits
unity,territorial iiitegandypoliticalindependence in the jnterestç
ol intelnational pcaceand çecui-i...yU.N. Doc. No, AIRESI
1474 (Es-IV) (~g60).
The votc on that resolution \vas 70 in favbi-, none opposed, with II
abstentions.
The Congo situation continues to command the Organizatio~z's

attention. Large numbers of United Nations troops-some rg,ooo
on r. 'Januay 1962-and United Nations civilian and technical
assistance personnel are being devoted to a bold enterprise, the
attitude towards which, in the mrds of the late Secretary-G eneral,
iç of "decisive significance...not only forthefuture of this Organi-
zation, but also for tlie future of Africa. And Africa may well, in
present circurnstances, mean the world." U.N. Security Coulicil
Off. Rec. 15th year, 877th meeting 4 (ÇlPSr. 877) (1960).

The forces estsblished in response to the Middle Hast and Congo
crisesplainly had to be paid for. The scaleofthe requisite financing,
in cornparison with traditional United Nations biidgeting,tvss and
is large.In fact, the combined annual assessrnent for UNEF and
ONUC kas amounted tomore than twice the cost.of the remainder- -

186 IVRITTEN STATEhIENT OF 'l'HEUNITED STATES OF AAlBRIC.4

II

A. 'hc consequence ofsuch General Assembly action is to create
bindiiîg lcgal obligatioils uyon the Menibcr States. The language of
Article 17 is mandatory: "expenses sltall be borne". (Emphasis
added.) It answerç the prescription of the Advisorgr Comrriittee of
Juristç kt the San Francisco Conference for a "clear statement of
the obligations of fileinbers to meet the espenses of the Organiza-
tion". The Charter adopts the language of the corresponding article
ofthe Çovenant of the Lengue of Nations, which has been authorita-
tively construed to empower the League Assembly to create a
binding legal obligation.

6. This power to create binding obligations by assessinent ex-
tends to assessments for expenditures relating to operations for the
rnaintenailce of international peace and security. Altliough the
Security CounciI has "priinary resporisibility" in tlliç field, it bas
no budgetary or fiscal authority under the Cliarter. The practice
of the J,eague, the budgetary and financial practice of the United
Nations and the applicable judicial decisions all hear out the con-
clusion that thc Assembly's fiscal power is exclusive.

C. Piilally, the sarlze authorities Icad to the conclusion that the
Assembly may create binding obligations to fiiîancc operational
expenditures, cven though, as regards contributions of troops, the
substantive resolutions are only recornmcndatory for the Mernber
States.
Il. To construe the General Assemhly's fiscal power Inore natrow-
ly than is here suggcsted woiild seriously limit the capacity of the
Organization for effective action in ptrrsuit of its pnramount pur-
pose the maintenance of international peace and çecurity.

III

The clucstion submitted to the Court, as frarned, is not directed
to the validitycifthc underlying resolutions cstablishing UNEF and
UNOC. The question can be answered without addressing those
issues. For, ata nîinirnum, the Secretarjr-General could make c.0~-
niitmcnts to States and third parties in the execwtion of the direc-
tives laid upon him bj7 those resolutions, absent an authoritative
determination ii~validating them. She General Assenibly has poiver
to raise moilcy to discharge thc financial obligations arising froin
such commitments. Indeed, "to tlzis extent rit] has no alternative

but to honour these engagements". hloreover, in anÿ event, the
underlying resolutions arevalid. They were adopted by the General
Assembly and Security Couilcil in the exercise of the authority,
expressly granted in the Charter, to conçides and deal ivith questions
involviilg the maintenancc oi international yeacc and security.

IV
Miscella~ieouscontrary arguments are not persuasive. WRITTEIV STATEMEXT OF THE UYITHD STATES OF ARIERICA r87
AHCV-IIENT

1. THE GENERAI A-SÇEMBLY, IN THE ASSESSMENT RESOLUTIONS
REFOHE THE COUKT, UNBllST.4ICABLY B4NIFESTED ITS INTENTIOK
TO TKEAT EXPENI)I~'URES FOR ONUC AWD UNEF AS L ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

OF THE ORGANIZATIO UNUEK -ARTICL I7 OF THE CHARTER T,
BE APPORT~ONED AhIONC THE STATES ME~IBER SF THE UW~TEU
NATION s

A. Assessrnent resolzitioizsrelatito UNEF

During thc first days of the lifeof UNEF the rnost pressing
questiorls coilceriling the Force were questions of action-recruit-
inent, cornmand and staff problems, transportation, and the details
of supervisiilg, on the scene in the Middle East, a cease-fire and
tvithdra~vai of troops. Fiilancial problerns were secondary, and at
this stage were treated in a provisional fashion. Hy 26 Noveinber,
tl~ree weeks later, the Force \vas operating succcssfully ailcl the

General Asscnibly was ahle to turn its attention to definitive
arrangements for financing the enterprise.
On 21 Deccrnber 1956, after an exhaustive debate, the General
Assembly aclopted, by a vote of 62-8-7, resolution 1089(XI) levying
assessments for the Force in the a~nount of$10 million. The relevant
operatjve paragraph of that resolution provides :

"The Geiaer~'Essemtrly,
....................*.l.. "...

I.Decidcs that the expenses of the United Natiniis Emergençy
Force,other than for such pay,equipment, siipplieçand serviceas
may be furnishecl without chai-ge by Governmcnts of Member
States,shall be borne bÿ thUnited Natioilsand shall happortion-
ed anlong theMeinbei-States, tthe estent of$10million,rn accord-
ance withthe scaleof asseçsmentsadopted hy thcGeileralAçsemblÿ
for contributionto the anniial budgetof the OrgnnizaOioi~.forhe
financialyear 1957."
It will be seen that thc resolutioil adopts the langtiage of Article

17 (a) of thc Chartcr, which provitles: "The expenses of the Organ-
ization slialbe borne by the Meriibersas apportioned by the General
Assembly." In an unrnistakable parallelism, the resolution preçcribes
that "the expenses of the United Nations Ernergency Force" shall
be "borne by the United Nations" and shall be "apportioned among
the R4emberStates" in accorclnnce witk a defined formula. Thus,
the language of the resolution at the çame time invokcs and exerciscs

the authority of Article 17 (2).
'The iritentiori to act under Article 17 ernerges equally clenrly
froni the record of General Asçembly consideration whicli preccded
adoption of the resolution. 'I'tleresoliitiori appeared first in draft
form as an ailnex to tlic Secretary-General's report o21 Novenlber
1956 on administrative and fi~iancialarrangcineilts Corthe United

Nations Ernergency Force. U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 11th Sess.,188 7VRITTEN SThTEhlENT OF THE CiXI'TEU STATES OF AMERICA

Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, at23 (A!3383)(1j9 6). The resolution
was drafted to emhody the position set fortk by the Secretary-
General in that report. He expreçsed this position iiz categorical
and unrniçtakable terms :
"1 wish to makc it equally clear that rvhile funds received and
payments made with respect to the Force are tobe considered as
coming outsidc ofthe regularbudget ofthe Organization,the opera-
tion is essentially United Nations responsibility, and the Special
Account to be establishedmust, thercforc,be çonstrued as curning
witliinthc meaning of Article ~7 of tl-rcCharter." Id11th Sess.,
J31cnary343 (AIPV. 596) (156).

The Controller, as well,speaking in the Fiftiz Cornmitteeon behalf
of the Secrelary-General, reiterated that "the operation was neces-
sarily and essentially a United Nations responsibility and the
Special Xccount must therefore be regadcd as coming under
Article 17 of the Charter...". Id., 11th Sess., 5th Coninz. 32 (AIC.51
SK.538)(1956).
Kesolution 1089 (XI) established the pattern for the successive
resolutions adopted by the General Assembly annually thereaiter
to provide for the expenses of the Force. U.N. Docs. Nos. AIRESI
II jI (XII) (19571,AlRESlr337 (XITI) (19581,AIIIESII~~I (XIV)
(1959) ai~dAIRES11575 {XV) (1960 O).these, resolutions~r5r (XII)

and r337 (XIII) repeat in almost ideritical language the formula of
the first reçolution,1089 (XI), which, as has been shown, uses thc
very language of the Charter. Like it,they provide that the es-
penses of the Force are to be borne by the Menzbersas npportioned
by the Assernbly. The last two ailnual rcsolutions, r44r (XIV) and
1575 (XV), demonstrate thc same intention in different language.
Thuç, thc operative paragraph of resolution 1441 (XIV) reads:
"The GemraE Assembly,
.......,+.................-.-

2.Dccz'desto assesthe amount of $20 nîillion against al1Members
ofthe United Nations on the basis of the regular scalof assess-
ments. .."
The Açsemblyysuse of voluntary contributions as a supplement-
ary nîeans offinancing UNEF emphasizes that the assessrnents levied
by the foregoing resolutions were intended to be obligatory. In
resolution 1090 (XI), adoptecl 27 February 1957, thc General As-
sembly took note of its earlier authorization of expenditures in the

arnount of $IO million tobe apportioned arriong filember States, and
authorized the Secretary-General "to incur expenses forthe United
Nations Emergency Force up to a total of $16jmillion" in respect
of the period ending 31 December 1957. The additional $6.5million
was not to be assessed at that time.Instead, because of the "grave
unanticipated financial burclen for many Governinents" resulting
from the financial obligations created by the previous assessment,
the Açsernbly decided to "lnviLe[s] Member States to make volun- WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA 189
tary contributions tomeet the suni of $6.5 million so as to ease the

financial burden for 1957 011the lnembership as a whole ...".Thus
the Gcneral Assembly distinpçhed sharply, in a single resolution
dexling with the î~naricing of UNEF, those expenses that were
assessed under Article r7 from thc additional sumç to be solicited
through voluntary contributions.
The distinctjon between assessed expenscç and voluntary contri-
butions waç reiterated in reçolution 1441 (XIV). Ry the terms of
tkat resolution, the General Assembly decided "to assess the amount
of $20 million against rtll lkrernberso.f the United Nations on the
basiç of the regular scale of assessn~erit..."The scale of apportion-
ment u7açqualified hy a proviso under which voluntary contributions
plcdged by 31 December I9jg would be applied to reduce by one-
half the açscssments ofas many governmentç as possible, beginiiing

with tliose assessed at the niinimum percentage of 0.04 per cent,
Resolution 1573 (XV), adoptcd on 20 December 1960, made sirnilar
provision for the application and use of voluiltary contributions.
Thcse actions of the General Assembly in providing specially for
voluntary contributions, and showing thcir relatjonship to assess-
rnents intended to be obligatory, denionstratc the Assembly's
concern witk the unusual financial burde~ibeing irnyosed on Mernber
States by the Article 17 asseçsinents. The very vividiiess of this
concern rnakes unmistakably clear that those assessmentç were
iiitended alid conceived as creating legally binding obligations.
The provisional consideration ofthe financial problerns of UNEF,
in trie wcekç before the adoption of the basic financial resolution,
1089(XI), discussecl above, is consistent ririth, and indeed tends to
confirm, the foregoing analysis. The Secretary-Geaeral's report of

6 November 1gj6 made hiç first reference to financing the Force.
He said:
"The questioil of how the Force slioilld he financecl likewise rc-
c~uiresfusther stiidyA basic rulewhich, at leac;t, coiilci be applied
psovisionally,would be that s nation provicling a unit would be
resporiçiblfor al1coqts forcqilipn~et~tand salarieswiiilc al1 other
çoçtsshould be tinznced outside the ilormalbudget: of tlie Unitcd
iVatioi~s.Itis obviously impossible to makc any estimate of the
çostswitliouta knowledge ol thc sizeofthe corps and the lcngth of
itsassignment. The only practical course,tlierefore, wouldbe for
the GeneralAssembly to vote a gei~eralauthorizationfor thecost of
the Force on the baçis of gei~eralprincil-ilcçsuc1as those here
suggested." U.N. Gcn. Ass. Off. Rec. 1st ITmergency Spec. Seçs.,
Annexcs, Agenda Item No. 5, at 21 (AIj302) (1gj6).
111resolution 1001 (ES-l}, the General Assembly approved pro-

visionally "the basic rule coricerniiig the financing of the Force laid
down in ..the Secretary-General's Report". TThreeweeks later, the
Assenibly irnplemetited those principles by authorizing tlie Secre-
tary-General "to establish a United Nations Emergency Force Spe-
cial Acçount tu which funds receiveclby the United Nations, outside
ZITg0 WRITTEN ÇfATLRlENT OF THE UWITED STATES OF AASEHICA
of the regular budget, forthe purpose of meeting the expenses of
the Force skall be credited ...".U.N. Iloc. No. L4/RES/~~zl (XI)
(1956)-
Aç the Secretary-General later pointed out, the proposa! for a
special account was made not in order to qualify the obligation of
Mcmbers to support the Force, but as an accounting canvenience.
A special account wnç desirable to avoid the dclay that inight have
occurred had the Force heen financed from accounts witkiin tlie

regular budget. fiforeover, it was uncertain how long the Force
would be needed. There waç disagreement arnong Members over
whether the norrnal scale of apportionment should apply.And there
were special bookkeeping problerns involved in the management
of such a large force. These considerations are set forth in the
Secretary-General's svmmary of the experience derived frrim the
establishment and operation of the Force. U.N. Gen. -4s~.Off.
Rec. 13th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 65, at 21 (A13943)
(1958)-
In addition to settiiig uy a sptcial account, resolutlo1122 (XI)
authorized the Secretary-General ttodraw on the IVorking Capital
Fund in order to meet expenses cilargeable to the Special Account,
pending the receipt of funds for that account. The Working Capital
Fund of the United Nations is a fund of $25 million to beused for
meeting unforeseen and extraordinary expenses. Asseçsments to
replenisk the ZVorking Capital Fund are levied on Members of the
United Nations in the same manner and atthe çame tilne as other
parts of the budget. 'Shus, tlie General Assemhly authorization to
the Secretary-General to draw on the Working Capital Fund gives
a further indicationofthe Assembly's view that the costs of UNEF
were expenses of thc Organization to Fe apportioned xinong the
Members in accordance with Article 17.
Einaly, it is to he rzoteclthat the budgetary processes followed
by the General Assembly in dealing with the expcnditures of UNEF
have been the same as those employed for approving the regular
budget in accordance with Article 17 (1).The financial regulstions
prepared hy the Secretary-General for UNEF are analogous to the
Organization's Financial Regulations and Ruleç for the regular
budget. U.N. Doc. No. STISGB/Finsncial Rules11 (1g50). In each

case, estirnatesof expenditures are prepased by the Con'crolleron
behalf of the Secretary-General, These estirnates are exarnined by
the Advisory Cornmittee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions. Subsequently, they are coi~sidered in the Fifth Corn-
mittee, and finally in Plenary Session of the General hssembly.
In summary, the resalutions ofthe General Assembly, the parlia-
mentary history leading totheiradoption, and theconsistent practice
of the Assenlbly demonstrate that the assessecl expenditures for
UNEF were intended by the Assernbly to be "expenses of the
Organization" within the meaning of Article 17. WRITTEN STSTEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Tg1

The first of the Congo financial resolutions recognizes expressly
that "the expenses ii~volved in the. United Nations operations in
1
the Congo for 1360 constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within
the meaning of Article 17, paragrnph 2, of the Urzited Nations )
Charter. ..". It stipulates that "the assessrnent thereof against \
M~rnber States creates binding legal obligations on suçh States to
pay tkeir assessed shareç". U.N. Jloc. No. AIRESIxj83 (XV) (1960).
Thus the Asseinbly articulated its conclusion that its characteriza-
tion of expenditureç as "expenscs of thc Organization" has the
legal conseqiience that assessments to mcet those expe~lditures
create binding obligations on the Mernber States.
The Assembly's decision was made as a rnatter of deliberate

choice among available alternatives. Discussions in the Fifth Corn-
mittee preceding Assembly consideration of that basic financial
rcsolution discloçed that Member States had varying views about the
method by whicll the expenses of the Congo Force should be met.
The rapporteur of the Fifth Cornmittee sumrnarized tkese views as
follows:

of"policu in relationtosUnitednyNations operations iii tlieCoiigo.
ln addition, delegations proposcdvarious metliods of financing the
operation, as follows:

(a) The expeiises should be included in the regular budget and
apportioned amoiig the Merilber States in accordancc with the1960
scale of assessmentsior Merilbers'contributions;
(b) Thc expenses should be enteredin aspecinl accnunt and apycrr-
tjoned among the Member Statcs in acçordai~cewith the 1960scale
of assessrnentsfor Mcmbers' contributions to the 1-egularbudget ;
voluntai-y contribtitions should he apglicd,at the request of the
hlernher State concerned, tu reduce the açsessmclîts of Meinbers
with the least capacity to pay;
(c) The expcnses should be met under special agreements con-
cluded in accordiuicc with Article 43 of the Charter between thc
Security Coiincil and the countries providing troops;

(cl) The expenseç should be borne in larger part by the permanent
for the maintenance of peace arid securit;g a major responsibility

(8)The expciises sliould be borne in larger part by thc former
administering Powl-e;
(j)Tfie expenses skould be financed cntirely out of voluntary
contrihutionç." U.N. Gen. hss. Off, Rec. Ijtli Sess., Annexes,
Agenda Ttems Nos. 49/50,at xr (Xl4676) (1960).

Thus the Assembly had before it a variety ofGewsfor the financing
of ONUC. Drawing on the exyerience witk UNEF, it chose, in
resolution 1583(XVJ, to establish a special account forthe Congo
Force, in this case designated an ad hoc account. This action, in WiiITTEA7STATEMHNT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AJIERICA 193

reached. Like the UNEF resolutions,the operative paragraph of
resolution1619(XV) ernyloys the very wosds ofArticle17:
"The GeweralAssernbly,
..........*..................

Decides J~vthertoapportionas cxpenseç of the Orgnnization the
amount of $100 million among thc Member' States in accordance
with the scale of asscssmcnfor the regulai- budgsubj'ectto the
provisions of paragraph 8 belo.".
Paragraph 8 alteredthe scale of assesçment to reduce sharply the
cornpillsory assessrnenton States less able to bear the financial
burden. Eut the modifications in the apportionment of expenses
leave untouched the proposition that the costs of ONUC were
intended to be "expenses of tlze Organization" within the meanii~g

of Article17.

II. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE GENERA L SSEMBLY ASSESS-
MENT RESOLUTIONS, IWVOKIWG AND EXERCISIWG THE ASSEMBLY'S
AZTTT~ORITYUNDEH ARTICLE 17, IVAS TO GREATE RINUING LEGAL
OELIGATIONS ON R~EMBE STATES

A. The Gelz~rccA l ssembly ise~nfiowered to create legclllbirtding
financial obligations0% 114emberStates by Zevying ussessments
for "exfienseof the Orgafii2ationw.nderArticle r7ofthe Charter
The previous section has shown that the Gerieral Asscrnbly

unequivocally manifested its intent to make payment ofUNEF and
ONUC assesçmentç a maîter of bincbng legal obligation. Tt will now
be demonstrated that the legal effectof such an expression is to
create a binding obligation.

r. The langztageofthe CI~arier
This conclusion flows from the grant of power to the General
Assembly in the singIe governing text, Articl17 of the Charter of
the United Nationç. The meaning and effect of the language of the
article are confirmed by the travawx$ré+llaratoi.ïes.
Article 17 (2)provides: "The expenses of the Organization çhd
be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."
The language of the provisicin is mandatorgr: expenses "shalZ be
borne". (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the Geileral Assembly's
adoption andapportionment of the Organization's expcnses creatc
a binding international legal obligation on the part of States

Mcrnbcrs to pay their assessed shates.
The kistory of the clrafting of Article (2)demonstrates that it
was the design of the authors of tlze Organization's constitution
that the membership be legally bound to pay apportioned expenses.
The draft that ernerged from the Dumbarton Oaks Conference
provided, in Chapter V, Section B, paragraph 5: "The Gencral
Assembly should apportion the expenses among the Members of Xg4 Ji'RITïETr-KSTATEA'iEXT OF THE UNITESTATES OF AMERTCh
the Organization and should be ernpowered to approve the budgets
of the Organization." Doc. No. s, GII, 3 U.N. Conf. Int'lOrg.
Docs. j(1945).
It 1vil1be noted tliat the Dumbarton Oaks text did not explicitly
state that the expenses "shalbeborne" by the mernbership'.Com-
mittee 1111 of Commission TTat the San Francisco Conference
corrected. this deficiency by approving a revised text the Ilum-
barton Oaks proposal which ultirnately was embodied in Article
- '7 (2: "The expenses of the Organiwtion shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the Generd Assembly." The summary 1
report of the 15th meeting of that Cornmittee declares: "ln taking I
this action, the Cornmittee considered the view of the Advisory
Committee of Juriçts that a clear staternentof the obligation of l
Members to meet the exp=es of the Organizationshould be found ,
in the Charter." ]=NO. 1094, 11/1/40,8 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org.
Doçs. 487 (1945 W) hen, during the debate on the Cornmittee text,
theChairman of the Cornmittee suggested that "allocated" would
be a better term than "borne", his suggestion was rejected in
express reliailce on the opinion of the Jiirists. Doc. No. WD427, ~
COllgx, 17 U.N. Conf. Int.'l Org.Docs. 198 (1945).See alsu Roc.
No. WD 431, C01195, id., at 236,and Doc. No. WD 268, COIIIO,
id.,,at406.Article 17(2)ofthe Charter is the "clear staternent of the
obligation of Members to rneet the expenseç of the Organization"
called for by the Adoisory Committee ofJurists.

The mandatory character of the English textof Article17 (2)is
confinned by a study of the Charter in its other authentic texts.
sont supportées par les R~Iembres"inthe Spanish that "LOSMiem-ion
hros sufragarjn los gastos de la OrganizaciOn", and in the Russian

obligatory characterisoforcefully stated in the English rendering.
Equally the Chinese text,

conveys mandatory force, irnporting the rneaning of obligation on
the part of Members.

Inusing these words, the framers ofthe Charter chose language
illurninated by a history of constructio~i and practice. The very
same worcls were used in the Covenant of the League ofNations.
Originalljr the Covenant ptovided "The expenseç of the Secretariat
skall he borne by the Mernbers of the Leaguc in accordance with
the apportionment of the expenses ofthe International Bureau of
the Universal Postal Union." League of Nations Covenant Art. 6, C
para. j.Articlc 6 tvas later amended tread : "Tlze expensesofthe
League shall be borne by the Mernhers of tLeagwe in the propos- WKLTTEN ST=1TERIENT OF THE UNITED ST.4TES OF AMERICA 195

tion decided by the Açsembly." In both texts, there appears the
injunction that expenses "shall be borne by the hlernbers".
While the provision was in its earlier forrn,the Governrnent of
El Salvador disputed itsobligation to pay certain assesçments. In
response to this contention, the First Committee of the Assembly
of the 1-eague appointed a distinguished Sub-Corrimittee of Jurists,
on which Sir Cecil Hiirst, hl.Henri Rolin, M. G. Noblemaire and
M. A. H. Struycken sat. The Sub-Comniittee held, contrary tu tlze
contention of El Salvador, that Article 6 imposed a binding obliga-
tion to pay the assessments. In conçtruing the Article, the Sub-
Committee relied on

"the generalprinciplea principle applicable al1associations,tkt
legallyincurreclexpenses of an associationrnustbe borne by al1its
rnernbers in cornmon". Contributzon O/ theState oJ Salu-undolothe
Ex$mses of theLeagzte,Report presenteclto the Asscnlbly by the
First Committee, Leaguc of Nations, 3rd Ass., l'lenary, Vol. II,
at 193 (A. 128. 1922.\T) (1922).
The Sub-Cornmittee pointed out that the practice of the League
Assembly, as expressed in itç Riiles of Procedure, confirmed this
interpretation of the financial provisions of the Covenant.

B. The ;bower ofthe General Assembly tocrecltelegaliy bbindiagfinan-
cialobiigafio issotli??zibt yche facttkattheUNEF a~~ dNUC
assessmemts weye Zeviedtofiance activitiesof the Orgawizalionfor
th ~?tai?tt~n 0a1bnlernalional+eace and seczrrify

It can hardly be contended that the United Nations, as an orgaa-
iaation, lacks power to finance activities in purçuit of its paramount
purpose, the maintenance ofinternational peace and security. The
most that is suggested is that this power is not vestedinthe General
Assernbly. I<atIier, it has been rnaintained that, sinçe the Security
Councii 1x1s primary responsihility for the maintenance of peace
and security, the General Assernbly lncks power to provide fundç
to rncet expenses in this spbere.
>Ihe proposition isan obvious no?z scq~~itur. oreover, it contra-
dicts the tcrms of the Charter, the practiceof the Organization, and
available judicial pi-ecedents.
\
I. The langztag~ ofthe Charter
The fiscal power of the General Assembly is exclusive. Article 17 1

(1) of the Chartcr provides: "The General Assernbly shall consider
and approve the budget of the Organization." It is the General
Asçeinbly alone which isrefersed to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article
17. No article of the Charter allots fiscal pomerta any other organ.
While the powers of other organs are set fortli in the Cliarter in some
detail-particularly those of the Security Council-tl-iere is no
mention O£ any power over finance,except in Articles 17,18 and 19.
A11of these articles are found in Cllapter IV of the Charter, titled:
"The Genesal Açsernbly."196 WHITTE-J STATEMENT OF THE UXIPED STATES OF XMERIÇA

Article 18, by requiring a voting majority of two-thirds in the
General Asçemhly on budgetary questions, further emphaçizes that
itis the General Assembly which is cancerned with the Organiza-
tion's fiscaaffrtirsThere is no comparable provision in the article
of the Charter which is concerned with the voting of the Securitji
Council, ArticIe27, nor indeed in the voting provisions for any other
organ established by the Charter. See Article 67 (Economic and
Social Council); Article 89 (Trusteeship Council). The several
officia1elaborations of the Security Council'svoting provisions make
no mention of fiscal authority. There is no mention of finance in the
Statement of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Pro-
cedure in the Security Council, made at the San Francisco Con-
ference. The Provisional Rules ofProcediire of the Security Council
do not advert to budgetary questions. The Report: of the lnterirn
Cornmittee of the General Açsembly on the Problem ofVoting in
the Security Council (U.N. Gen. Ass. Off.Rec. 3d Sess.,Supp. No. IO,
at r (A1.578) (1948)),and the resolution of the General Assernbly

adopted in response to tkat Report, Resolution 267 (III), make no
reference to budgetary questions.
2. The,Fractz'çof theLeagzteofNations

The exclusive power of the General Assembly in regard to bud-
getary rnatters builds on the experience of tlzeLeague of Nations in
fiscal afiairs. Ithe Covenant of the 1-eague as originally adopted,
Article 6 (5) providing for approval of the budget and apportion-
ment of expençes, did not expressly asçign ths function either to
the League Assembly or to the Council. At:first the League Couacil
asserted fiscal autliority. Tlie KuIes of Proceduof both the Council
and the Asçemhly reflected an arrangement under which each organ
kad a financiai role. Rules ofProcedure ofllze Cowncil.Arts. II, rz,
League of Nations Off. J.,Council, 6th Sess. 274 (~gzo) :Rules of
P.~.ocecZz&o~eIhe Assembiy, rulc 4 (2)(0, League of Nations Doc.
No. zo(481143, at 3 (1921) B.udget estimates were prepared by the
Secretariat and submitted first to fhe Courzcil; ultirnate decision
was taken by the Assembly.
Divided authority did not long siirvive in practice, and inTg24
Article 6 (5)of the Covenant was amended to teacl: "The expenses
of the League shall be borne by the RiIerribersof the Leaguc in the
proportion decided by the Assembly " ï'he change confirmed that

it waç the Assembly which had exclusive power to determine the
budget of the League and the manner in tvhiçk its expenses ivould
be apportioned among the Mernbers. The United Nations Charter
\vas written against the background of tliiç history.
3. Tkr:+ract.icof the UwitedNations

As this Court and its predecessor have held, the practice of the
parties in interpreting a constitutive instrument iç a guide to that
instrument's true rneaning. 1;nte~natz'olzakStatzcrof Sowth-West WHl'ITEW STATEhIENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AhlERICA 197

Af~ica, Aduisory O#z*niow I:.C.J R.efiort~gsjû, p. 128; cf.Cor/%
Chawtel case,Jwdgnzent ofAfin! gth,1949 :I.C.J. RePortsrg4girp.,4;
l3raziLia.nLoalzs Case,P.C.I.J.,Ser. A, Nos. 20121, at rrg (xgzg ;)
see also Contributi oofthe Siale of Salvadortothe Exfiensesof the
League, Report presented to the Assembly by the First Committee,
League of Nations, gd Ass., Plenary, Vol. II, at 191 (A. 1xgz2 .)
(1922).The practice ofthe UnitedNations fully bears out the exclu-
sive character ofthe fiscai authority of the General Assembly.
The first officia1interpretationof Article17 of the Charter \vcas
by the Executive Committee of the Preparatory Commission of the
United Nations. 'hat Cornmittee's draft ofthe provisional agenda
for the first part of the first session of the General Assembly included
an item entitled:"The provisionalbudget, financial organization and
methods of asçessing and collecting contributions from Mernberç."
U.N. Doc. No. YC/EX/II~/R~V. x, at 18(1945 ) .e provisional
agenda which it propoçed for the first meetings of the Security
Council contained no çuch item. The portion oftlze Report of the
Executive Cornmittee dealing with budgetary and financial arran-
gements yrovides : "[Tlhe Secretary-General, as chicf administrative
officer,rshall] formulate and present to the General Assembly the
Budget of the United Nations ..."Id., at 96. The Report of the
Preparatory Commission itself contains identical provisions with
respect to agenda and presentation of the budget. U.N. Doc.
No. PC/2o, at8, 24, 104 (1945).

The General Assembly, acting pursuant to the recommendations
of the Preparatory Commission, subsequently adopted its Rules of
Procedure, U.N .Doc. No. A1520 (1948)(subsequently revisedj, and
the Financial Regulations of the United Nations. U.N. Doc. No.
ST/SGB/Financial Rulelr (1950) Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure
stipulatcs that the provisional agenda of a regular session shall
include :"Al1 Items pertaining to the budget for the next financial
ycar and the report on the accounts for the last financial year."
U.N. Doc. No. -414700a,t 3 (1960).Rule153 provides: "The General
Assembljr shall establish regulations for the financial administration
of the United Nations." Id., at 27.
Pursuant tu this latter provision, the General Assembly adopted
the Organization's financial Regulations hy a unanirnoi~s vote.
U.N. Gen. Asç. Off. Rcc. 5th Sess.,Plenary 384 (A/PVn30j) (1950).
In accordarice with those Regulations, the Seçretary-General has
prornulgated Financial Rules. Regulation 1.1provides that :"'l'hese
Regulations shall govern the financial administration of the United
Nations. .."U.N. Doc. No. STISGBlFinancial Ruleslz, at 5 (1950).
Regulation 3.4 provicles that the budget estimates shall be sub-
mitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Id.,at 6.
Regulation 3.7 provides: "The budget for the followiyingfinancial
year shall be adopted by the General Assembly after consideration
and report on the estimates by the Administrative and Budgetary
Committee of the Assernblgr." Id., at 7. A rule annotating that LVRITTEN Ç'irZTEMENT OF THE UXlTED STATES OF AMERICA
198
regulation provides that, apart from the annual budget estirnates,
revised estimatesmay he submitted to the General Assembly when,
inter alia, "ayproval is reguired as a matter of urgency in theinterests
of peace and security ...".Ibid. That sarne rule provides for the
submission to the General Assernbly of such estimates "in respect
of declsions of the. Security Council, the Economic and Social
Council or the Truçteeship Council...". Ibid. Finally, 'Regulations
13.1 and 13.2restate the exclusive fiscal power of the General
Assembly in these terrns:
"Regalalion 13.1: No council, commission or otker competent
before it a report frtheiSecrctary-Generalondthe administrative
and financialimplications of thc proposal.
KeguZation13.2 :Where, in theopinion ofthe Sccretary-General,
the proposcdexpenditure cairnot bemade frorn the cxisting appro-
priations, itliall not be incurred vnttheGencral Assernbly has
made the necessary appropriations,unless the Secretary-Gelleréal
certifiethat provisioncan be made under the conditions ofthe
reçolutionof thGeneral Assembly relatitîtounforeseen andcxtra-
ordinary espenscs."Id., a133.
As the RefiertoryofPracliçeof United Nutiows Organs put it, "apy
resolution involving expenditures" considered by the Security
Council, the Economic andSociaI Council, the Trusteesliip Council,
and cornmittees of the General Assernbly "is subjed:to the budget-
ary control set out in the Financial Regulationç'". r Repertory
of Practicc ofUnited Nations Organç j22 (1955).
The foregoing practice embraces expenditures "in the interests
of peace and security" asmuch as other expenditures. Peace and
security opcrationshavc always loomed large in the Organizatiori's
activitles. They include operations in Palestine, U.N. Doc. No.
SI137 619491,Kashrnir, U.N. Doc. No. SI1469 (1g50), and Lebanon,
authorized by the Sec~irityCouncil, some hy the General Assembly,
and some hy botb Council and Assembly actio'n. Nevertl~eiess, in
each case the exyenses twre included in the regular budget, pro-
cessed acçording to the Financial Regulations, approved by the
; General Assembly, andassessed as a rnatter of obligation against
the Mcrnber States. E.g.,U.N. Doc No. A/REs/1338 (XIII) (1958).
U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 13th Sess., Supp. No. gB, at 4 (A14079)
31959)-
1 he General Assembly is,and always has bcen, the organ of the
United Nations which approvcd and assesseclal1such expenditureç
as "expenses of the Organization". One searches the records of the
Secunty Council in vain to finda single resolution which Iîas ever
i purported to asçess States bfembers for,the expenses of action
jauthorized by the Corincil or of other mgans of the Organization. .
In fact, of dl the resolutioris adopted by the Security Council,
researchhas disclosed only three .~vl~icihn any way relate to financial WRITTEW STATERIENT OF THE UUITED STATES OF BBIERICA 199

expenditure, and these say nothing of assessment. Indeed, they
imply that financing of the activities in question is to be sought
elseurkere. On 15 July 1948, the Council adopted a resolution
ordering the parties to the Palestine dispute to cease firin which
the Council: "Keqz~esL tat the Secretary-General make appropriate
arrangements to provide necessary funds to meet the obligations
arising from this resolution." U.N. Doc. No. Slgoz (1948). On
18 September 1948, the Council, recording its çhockat the death of
Count Bernadotte, resolved: "to authorize the Secretary-Generd
ta meet from the Working Capital Fund al1expenses connected with
the death and buriai of the United Nations Mediator". U.N. Doc.
No. S11oo6(1948). On 28 January 1949, irzdealing ~yitlithe Indo-
nesian question, the Council adopted a resolution concerning the
United Nations Commission for Indoneçia whch: "Requests the
Secretary-Generai to rnake available for the Commission such staff,
funds and other facilities as are required by the Commission for

thc discharge of its functions." U.N. Doc. No. Slrz34 (1949).
It will thus be seen that, in two cases, the Council confined its
reference to funds to a request ttothe Secretarjr-General to provide
such funds. These evidently were to be secured in the customary
fashion: either by a charge against surns already allotted to pertinent
items of the budget whickithe Gencral Assembly had adopted, or
by a draft on the Working Capital Fund. In the third case, that
concerning the death of Count Bernadotte, the Council exprcssly
referred tri the Working Capital Furid which is authurized and
assessed by the General Asçembly "to mect unforeseen and extra-
ordinary expenses" .
Itmay he added thatthe Military Staff Cornmittee, eçtabljshed to
advise and assist the Securitu C*ouncil,did not deal with financial
expenditures in its recornmendatioris on the basic principles to
goverii the orgailization of arrned forces under Article 43. U.N.
Security Council Off. Rec. zd year, Spec. Supp. No. I(51336)(1947).
111short, the practice of ttie Serurity Council, as -\vellas of the
Gcneral Assernbly, dernonstrates thnt the power to approve and
apportion the budgct of the United Nationç is recogilized tu be tlie
province of the Gcneral Açsernbly alone.

4. Jl~dz'c +iac~'~de~zt

This Court has çonfirrneclthat, without the action of the General
Açsernbly, "there can be no budget". In Eflect of uwards ofcomflea-
scctior~nadebythe U.N. A~ha'lzistra lribwqzal,AduisorO ypilzion
of JuLy 13th,rgjq: I.C.J. Xe+orts1954 p. 47, 59,it said:
"The Cotirt notes that Article17 of the Clurtcr appcarç in a
sectionof Chapter IV relating to the GencralAçscmbly, whic: is
entitled 'Funçtions arid Powers'. This Article deals wifunctroii
of thc Gciieral Açsembly and provides forthc c~nsiclerationand
approval by it ofthe budget of thc Organizntion.Consideration of
tliebtidgct is thuan act\vhiclirnust beperformed and the same is WRITTEK ST.4'rEBIENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEKICh 201

impose binding financial obligations to defray expenses incurred in
carrying out the resolutions, For those resalutions did include
directives to the Secretary-General as autkorized in Article 98. And
they did jnclucle decisions to establish subçidiary organs as author-
ized in Articles 22 and 19. As suçh, they engagc the reçponsibility
of the Organization as a whole. Hence financial expenditures In-
curred in carrying out such directives and in maintaining suck
organç, even though execution depends on the CO-operation of
Mernber States, become obligations of the Organization?Tlie General
Assembly's power to levy assessments to defray "expenses of the
Organization" cxtends to such operational obligations and is not
confiiled to administrative exyenditures of tlie Organizati 'on. 1 '
Article 17 (1) refers to "the budget of the Organization". This
rneanç the whole budget \vithout any lirnitütion, as is seen by
coniparison wit.11Article 17 (3),which limits the Açsernbly's fiscal

power over specjalized agencieç to exainination of "the adminis-
trative budgets of such specialized agencies". The practice of the
Uriited Nations is ccjudly relevant to this issue. The financial
procedures, the Regulationç and thc rules irnplementing them makc
.no distiilctionbe-t--en_.._.__instrativ-_+ncd- gp-_ati_ongI items,
Sirriilarly, thc practice, prior ttKUNEF operation, ofincludii~g
thc expenses of peace-keepii~goperations witl~inthe regular budget
is instructive.'1
Again, the report of the Sub-Cornimittee of Jurists of the First
Coinmittee of the Assembly of the League in the Salvador case is
illuminating. It will be recalled that, at the relevant period, Artic6e
(j) of thc T,eagiieCovenant provided: "The expenses of the Secre-
tariatshall be borne bÿ nIenibers of the League.,." (Emphasis added.)
El Salvador, as has been said, disputedathat it was obliged to pay
'assessrncntç for items rvhich were not expenses of the Secretariat.
Deçpitc the apparent lin?it;ition in the governing language of Arti-
cle 6, the Sub-Cornmittee decided against El Salvador. Tt clisnzissed
the issue, saying :

"Jt isdifficulttu uridcl-stand why the Covenanttnentioris only
thc expenses oE the Sccretariat rvhen dealing with the distribution
ofexpenses. At the süme time, the restricted cxpressioiieinployed
intlie Covcnantci~nnutbe an obstacleto the applicatlonof thegene-
ral principle...that lcgnllyin~urrcd cxpcnses of an association
must be borne by al1 itmembers in con~mon." Co~zt~ibt4lioz1the
Sialeof Salvador tothe srpensesof theLengue, Xcport presei~tedto
thc Assenihly by tlic 17irConlmittee, Lca~e of Nations, 3d Ass.,
Plennry, Vol.II, at 193(A. 128. 1922.v) (~922).

If the asçessing power of the League Assernbly extended to al1
expenses of the Organization, despite the restrictive Ianguage of
Article 6 (51 he power of the United Nations General Asçembly
çurely haç a similnr scope under governing language which is in
terlns çornprehensive. 202 WRITTEX STATEhIENT OF THE UNITED STATI:S OF AMERICA

The discussion in PartTT of this statement haç been directed to

establishing the folIowing propositions :
A. The General Assembly is ernpowered to create legally
binding financial obligations on Member States by levying assess-
inents for "expenses of the Organization" under Article 17 of the
Charter.

B. The power of the General Assembly to create legally binding
financial obligationsis not lirnited by the fact that the UNEF
and ONUC asseçsments were Ievied to finance activities of the
Organization for the maintenance of international peace and
çecurity.

C. The power of the General Assembly to create legaliy binding
finaricial obligations is not lirnited by the fact that thUNEF
and ONUC assessments were for the purpose af financing expencli~
tures under sesolutions which, with respect to contributioiis of
forces, are rccomrneridatory rather than ohligatory for Mernber
States.

These conclusions are based on the language ofthe Charter, on
the liistory of its drafting, or1the practice of the United Nations
under the Charter, on the experience of the League of Nations, and

on the relevant judicial opinions. And these conclusions are required
if the General Assembly is to have a fiscalpower capable of pro-
viding financial support for the entire range of operations of the
world Organization under ItsCharter.
The alternatives to recognizing that the General Assembly has
suçh power are two: First, it inigktbe cqntended that thc Orgni~i-
zation must finance what isits parasnoilnt fiinction hy solicitation
rather than assessment. The most important means hy which the
Organization ha5 thus far contributed tothe n-iaii~telîanceof inter-
national peace and security has not been through mandatory
decisions of the Çecurity Council, but through recommendations of
the Council and of the Assembly. If the implementation of such
recomrnendations, and the functioning of the neccssary subsidiary
organç, svereto be made dependent on voluntary contributions, the
poçsibilities for effective action of thiç kirid would be drnstically
çurtailed.

Second, it might be contended that the Security Council is the
1 organ ~rliichmust authorize and levy açsessrnents for peace-keeping
activities,either alone or acting jointly with the General Asscnibly.
As haç beeil shown, this contention has no founclation in the pro-
visions of the Charter, or in history, or in practice. Moreover, to
adopt that contention ~~ouldexterid the vetoand give the permanent
members oi the Security Council not only the intended oyy ortunit y
1 to exert their will at the stageofsubstantivedecision inthe Council IVRITTEN STATEMEXT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMEKICA 203

but recurrent opportunities to hobble and undercut entesprises
already authorized and undertaken by the Organization.
In the view of the Government ofthe United States, such a rcsult
cannot be attributed to the dispositions made in the Charter for a
living and growing world Organization, the United Nations. It is a
cardinal rule of interpretation that an instrument should be givei-i
the meaning necesçary to make it effective.

"International jurispruclence-and particularly that of the Per-
manent Court of International 'Justicand its successor-has con-
stantly acted upon the principle of effcctivcnessas the governing
cationoi interpretation." LatiterpachtRestrictivirzterj5retatizdjn
the +rinci$lof ejJ~ctivevzen the irzterpretationof trsdie26 Hrit.
Yb. Jnt'lL. 48, 68 (1949).

This iç espccially so when the instrument being construed iç a
constitutional docu'rnent like the Charter of the United Nations.
When the Court w-as~alled upon to detamine ivliether the United
Nations has çapacity to rnaintain an international clairn, it declared :
"Tt must be acknowledged that its Mernbers, by entrusting
certain functiotto it, wittheattendant duties and responsibilities,
have clothed it with the compctencc required to enable thrise
Ziinctions to bc effectively discharged." Ra$arutiolzfor i*izjurzes
sugered itz theservice of the Uded Nations, Adsisory 0par;ion:
I.C.J. Re4orts1949,pp. 174, 179.

Equalljr, in thicase,the Court should hold that the Mernhers have
clothed the Organization with the fiscalcornpetence required to
enable itç functions to he effectively discharged.

III. THE VALIBITY OF THE RESOLUTIONS ESTABLISHING UNEF
AND ONUC IS NOT IN ISSUE AND, EN hNY CASE, IS CLEARLV
ESTABLTSHED

The question whiçh the General Assembly has addressed to the
Court does not put in issue the validity of the resolutions establish-
ing UNEF and ONUC. An analysis of the structure of the question
rnakes tkis clear. The Court is asked: "130 the expenditures author-
ized" in certain General Assembly resolutions "constitute 'expenses
of the Organization-ithin the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2,
of the charter of the United Nations?" Thus phrased, the question
is directed to the effect of the açsessing resolutions.

Ths construction of the question is borne out by the record of
the consideration Ieading to the adoption of resolution 1731 (XVI),
which requested the advisory opinion. France proposed an amend-
ment to the resolution which would have revised the question
submitted tothe Court as followç:

"IEYerethe expenclitvresauthorized in General Açsembly resolu-
tions Tj83 (XV) ..[etc.] and 1263(X1II) of 14 November 19 jo
decirle0.92 rzon.forwziyilhthe Charterad, ifso,dothey constitute204 WRITTEX STATEMENT OF THE UKTTED STATES OF AMEHICB

'expenses of the Organization' witkin the meming of Articlc 17,
Ait.g378 (1961).(Amcndatoryoflanguuagediii italics.).N.Doc. No.

The delegate of France declared that adoption of the amendment
would '"rnake it possible for the Court to deterrnine whether the

resolutions of the Assembly, relating to the financial consequences
of the operatians ofthe United Nations in the Congo and the Middle
East, are or are not in conforrnity with the Charter".
In opposing the amendmcnt, the delegate ofthe United Kingdom
said it
"would complicate the clear and exact question ...framed in the
draft rcsolutionforsubrnission to theCourt. In addition,my delc-
gation does not believe tliat at thijuncture in the affairsof the
United Nations this Assembly will wislï to framitsqiiestion to tlie
Intcr~iatinilCourtinsuch a way as toconlpel the Court to corisider
i the validityof a largnumber of resoliitionadoptecl b?;tlie Geiieral
Assernbly itself at successive sessionsarover a period ofthe past
several years." Id.at 62-65.

The French amendment was sejeçted by a vote of 47 opposed,
5 in favor, and 38 abstentions.
In responding to the question put by the Assemblÿ the Court
need not address itself to the issue of the validity of the resolutions
establiçhing UNEF and ONUC. The Security Couricil and' the
General Assembly, acting upon a considered judgment of their
power under the Charter, âuthorized the Secretary-Genesal to
incur financial commitments to governmentç and contractors for

the requirements of UNEF and ONUC. In the aùsencc of a deter-
mination invalidating those actions, the Secretary-Gerieral was
bound to execute them and third parties wre justified in dealing
mith the Organization in reliance upon them. These dealings gave
ris6 to lawful debts, and the Asçembly must have power to assess
Members to discharge those debts, Indeed, "to this extent the
General Asçembly Iîas no alternative but to honour theçe engage-
ments". Egect of awards ofcow.@emaiim oa.~etby tlzeU.N, Adwzinis-
trativePibtw~al, Advisory O$i.niof ifJzily r3i:I1954 :I.C.J. Refiorts
1954, pp. 47, 59. To hold otherwiçe would be to impose the risk of
loss upon innocent third parties dealing with the United Nations,
or upon States which have advaneed goods and services in reliance
upon reimbursement.
Even ifthe Court should believe that issues going to the validity
of the underlying resolutions are germane to the question priseclby

the, Assernbly, these issues need to be approached in the light of
theihiçto ofryonsideration and action upoil the resolutions by the
General Assembly and the Çecurity Council, the political orgsns
of the United Nations. The history is a long one. in the case of
UNEF it begins in1956; and ONUC has been in the field for alrnost
two years. Uuring tkese pesiods, the respective Forces have beenthe subject of intensive and sometimes alrnoçt continuous dehate
in tfie halls of the United Nations. me gravity of the issues and
the intensity of the Organization's yreoccupation with tkem is a
meaçure of the seriousness of these deliberationç.
UNEF waç established pursuant to resolutions of the General
Assembly, ONUC by action of the Security Council. In each case,
the constitutive resolution was adopted by a heavy majority and
without a single negative vote. At the tirne, neither the General
Açsembly nor the Çecut-ity Council conçidcred that any issue con-
ccrning their power to act çhould be put to this Court. By adopt-
ing the resolutions in these circumstances, the Council and the
Assembly construed the Charter as granting the power thus exer-
çised. As the Commission on 'Judicial Organization at the San

Francisco Conference stated:
"Tn the course oi thc operatioiîfrom dagrto day of the various
organs of the Organization, it is iiievitable thateach organ will
interpretsucfi parts otlie Charter asarpapplicable toitsparticular
t'uilctions.This processis inherentirithe functioning of any body
rvhichoperates under an instrument dcfiningits functionç and pow-
crs.It willbe manifestecl in the funçtioningof sudi a.body aç the
General Assernbly, the Security Council, orthe International Court
of Justice." Doc. No. 333, IV12/4z 13 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs.
709 (1945).
The interpretation that such a body gives to its own powers in
yractice is entitled to the greateçt weight in any subsequent judicial
review.

Evert apart from these applicable canons of construction, the
valldity of resolutionç estahlishing UNEF and ONUC is ço clear
as not to warrant extended analysis. 'lie resolutions were adopted
in the exercise of powers expressly granted by the Charter. The
establishment of UNEF and ONUC as subsidiary organs is author-
ized by Articles 22 and 29 of the Charter. In the case of ONUC,
which was established by Security Counçil resolution, substantive
authority is found in the Council's "primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security; ...".U.N. Charter
Art. 24, para. x.In the case of U-JEP, which waç established by
rcsolution of the General Assembly, the Charter is equally explicit.
Article ir (2)provides:

"The Gencral Assernbly may discuçs any qiiestiorîrelatii~gto the
maintenancc of iiiternational yeace and security brouglit beforeit
or by aMState rvl-iiisnotiaeMembcronof the United Nations C...and,
except as providcd in Articler2, may makc reromrnendations with
regard toany suc11questions to tliState or States concernedor to
the Security Coiincil oto both. Any such question on ~vhicliaction
isnecessary shallbe referredto the Seçurity Council bythe General
Assembly eithcr beforeor after discussion."

Indeed, Article ro iç even broader, providing:
22206 IYHITTEN STATEIiIEWT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AhIEKIÇA
"The General Assembly may cliscussalquestions orany rnattcrs
within the scope of the prerentCharter or relating to tlio powers
and functioiiofany organs provided forin the present Charter,.."
(Emphnsis added.)

The çame article authorizes the Assemhly to "make recommen-
dations to the Members ... on any such questions or rnatters".
The solelimitation an this power is specified in Articl12,whiçh
psecludcs the Açsembly frorn making recornmendations with regard
to'any dispute, "while the Security Council is exercising ...the

functions assigrzedto it in the preçent Charter" with respect to that
dispute. It is not contended and could rzot be contended that the
exception iç applicable inthis instance.
'Nordoes the last sentence of Article 11 (2)operate to linlit the
Asçembly's power in this situation. TZiatsentence çpecfiesIhat angr
question relating to the maintenance O€ international peace and
security "on which action is necessary shall be referred to the
Security Council by the General Assernbly either before or after
discussion". Paragraph 4 of Article II states expressly thst tlzat
article is complementary to rather than a limitation upon Articl10.
Accordingly, the sentence in question can only bc read as recluiring

reference to the Çecurity Council where, in the judgment of the
General Asscmbly, the dispute cannot be dealt with by a resolution
of the Assembly but wauld require action of a mandatory cha~acter,
and tkierefore a decision of the Security Council. Both as tUNEF
and ONUC, the constitutive resolutions, in so far as they are
directed to Nernher States, are essentiallgr recommendatory in
character. The contributions of troops and suyyorting equipinent
are voluntary, The presence of those forces in the field is with the
consent ofthe hoçt countries. U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 13th Çcss.,
Annexes, Agenda Item No. 65 at 8 (A13943) (19581,U.N. Sccurity
Council Off. Rec. 15th year, 873d meeting 5 (SjPV. 873) (1960).
I

IV. COXTKAR YONTFXTIUWS ADVANCED IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE
GENERAT A,SSE~ZBL YND ITS SUBORDINATE ORGANS AKE UN-
1 PERSUASIVE
ln the course of United Natianç debates, a rninorityof Itembers
have advanced miscellaneous arguments agairistthe legally binding

character of the assessments wliicli have been levied to finance
UNEIT and ONUC. Some of theçe arguments have been dealt with
ahove. It may be uscful atthis junctilre, however, to surnmarize and
dispose of tlzese contentions.
(1)It kiaç been said that UNEF and ONUC asseçsments are
aiitinct £rom thc "regular" United Nations budget and that,
accordinglgi, they fa11outside the mandatory scope of Article17 (2).

To recapitulate what has been said above, firsUNEF and ONUC
asspssrnents, wkile n»t part of the so-called "regular" budget, are
part of the budget of the Organization. They are simply distinct \$'RITTEX STATEMENT 01:THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA 207

accounts of that budget establislied for accounting convenience.
They are as much "expenses of the Organization" as is the Working
Capital Fund whch is also asçessed by speciaE resolution, apart
frcirn the "regular'3uddget. Second, the resolutions appropriating
funds for UNEF and ONUC prescribe, in the case of UNEF, that
itç exyenses "shall be borne by the United Nations", and, in the
case of ONUC, explicitly recogriize tliat itsexpenses are "expenseç
of the Organization" within the meaning of Articlc 17.
(2) A second argument against the binding character of the
assessments in question iç this: The Assembly, it is said, is not
authorized to adopt binding decisions. It may only adopt recom-

rnendations. Recommcndationç lack legally binding force. Accord-
ingly, it is contended, the Assembly cannot adopt binding assess-
ment resol~ztionsto finance recommendationç that are not l~iilding.
In rcply, it should first be noted that the General Assembly is
authorized to adopt binding resolutions in some splietes. A resolu-
tion of the General Assembly admitting, suspending, or expelling
a Member iç binding. A resolution of the General Assembly electing
a rnember of the Security Council or other Councils iç binding. A
sesolution of the General Assemkly appointing the Çecretarjr-
General is hinding. A resolution of the General Assembly giving
directions to tl~c Secretary-General is binding. Most pertinently,
hudgetary resolutions of the General Assembly are binding, as the

maridatory language of Article 17 (2)demonstrates. As one cornmen-
tator kias put it:
"Perfiaps the most iinportaiit group of rcsolutiorzç [tliat have
binclinglorccfallingviithin this firstcntegoryofspecificallyenumer-
ated powers are thosc authorized iinder Article17 of the Charter
wliicl~establid~esthc Geiiernl Açsembly as ~hcfinancial authority
ofthc Ui-iitcdNations 114thrhc pnwer to consicler and npprovc the
Imdget of thc Organizntion and apportion espeiises arnong the
hlemher States. Resolutions adopted withiri the purvicrv ol this
articlenot 01115 :reatc ohligntioils hindingupon Mernber States,
but are sniictioncdbv the dcnialor the iiglit to votin theGeneral
Assembly to a hfernber whidi is in arrears in 'thepayrnent of it~
financialco~itributiot~s.Authority ovcr the budget, in addition,
offersto £lieGeneral Assenibly the poisibility of effective coiitrol
over the activities of tlie Organization." SloThe Hindirag./orccO/
a "i?ecornr.iaartdat?~fthe CerzerltJssc~~~blof the United Arntiojzs,
25 Brit. Yb.Tnt'lL. T, 4-5 (1948).(Footnote ornittecl.)

Second, the budgetary provisions of the Chartes make no dis-
tinction bctween expenses occasioned by recommendatory resolu-
tions and other expeiises. in pursuance of Article 17, the Assembly
has regularly approved items in its budget to finance recommen-
datory resolutions. If the United Nations lacked that authority, it
,is difficzilt to see how most of its customary activity under the
Charter could be supported.
(3) A third argument has been put in the form of the following1 208 WRITTLN STt\TtMilENTOF TI.IE UNITEU STATES OF AMERICA
çyllogisrn whch purports to demonstrate that expenses arising
from UNEF and ONUC are not "expenses of the Organization"
withn the meaning of Article 17 (2):

(a) All "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning of
Article 17(2) are subject to the sanction provided for in Article19.
(b) Expenditures such aç those arising from UNEF and ONUC
were excluded by the San Francisco Conferencefrom the çariction
provided by Article 19.
I/c)Accordingly, these expenditures are not "expenses of the
Organization" within the meaning ofArticle 17 (2).

The syllogism fails becauçeits minor premise is wholly erroneous.
The sole support for thispremise is ail amendment introduced by
Australin in Cornrnittee 1111 at the San Francisco Conference,
which read :
"A R4crnber shall have no vote if it l-iasnot carried out its obli-
I gations as setforthin ÇliapterVIII, SectionB, paragraph 5 [of the
Durnbatton Onks yroposals)."Doç. No. SOS,IIj1/34, 8 U.N. Coilf.
ht'i Org. nocs. 470(1945).

Chapter VIlL, Section K, paragraph 5, corrcspondç to Articlc 43
of the Charter. Cornmittee 1111postponed discussion of the Austra-
lia11 amendment and the amendment was later tvithdrawn. The
syllogism presupposes that il: was the function of Chapter VIII,
Section B, paragraplz 5 (now Article 43 of the Charter), to provide
for the financing ofsuch operations as UNEF andONUC. In fact,
Article 43 servcs no such function. That article calis or1Members
of the United Nations

"to inake availahle to thSecurity Counçil,on its cal1anin accord-
ance, and facilitics, incltiding sightspasstige,necessary for the
purpose of rnaintainiiig internationpeace and security".

The Xustralian amendment was, in reality, an attempt to extend
the sanction whiçh Article 19 provided for the failure of a State
to meet its financial obligations to a wholly different arrea, namely,
the failure ofa State to meet the obligatioils impoçed on it by an
agreement undet Article 43.
Moreover, the çyliogisrn depends, for itç efficacy,on the assump-
tion that the failureto act on the Australian arnendrnent, and its
subsequent rvithdrawal, was tantamount to a rejection of the

amendment. But the assumption is unsound. The unexplained
withdrawal of an arnendment, witliout action having been taken
on it,does not give rise to any inference as te the meaning of the
teit adopted.
Lastly, it should be noted that the Go~ernmcnt of Australia lzas
officially affirmedthat its position at San Francisco was that al1
United Nations expenses arising out of decisions of United Nations
organs were to be borne by the Memberç, and created binding \VRITTEN STATE31ENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AkIERICA
209
obligations upon them. U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 15th Sess., Fifth
Comm. 60 (AIC.51SR.839)(1961).
(4) Still another argument that has been advanced in opposition
to the binding character of UNEF and ONUC expenses is that, in
the case of UNEF, its costs should be met by the so-called "aggres-
sors", and, in the case of ONUC, by parties having a particular

interest in the Congo.
The reply to this argument is plain. The Charter provides that
the expenses of the Organization "shail be borne bythe Members as
apportionedby the General Assembly". The language contemplates
a policy judgment by the Assembly. Arguments asto the considera-
tions bearing on that judgment, therefore, should be addressed
to the Assembly and not to this Court.
(5) One last argument may be recapitulated and rebutted. It is
that UNEF and ONUC represent "action" for the maintenance of
international peace and security whicli is exclusively within the
cornpetence of the Security Coiincil under Articles II, 43, and 48;

that the General Assembly lacks cornpetence in the sphere of peace
and security; that the financial procedures of the United N t' a ions
must conform to this alleged distribution ofsubstantive powers ;and
that, consequently, the authority of the General Assembly under
Article 17 (2) does not extend to the financing of such operations.
To this contention there are three answers. First, the Security
Council does not have exclusive competence in the field of main-
taining peace and security. Article II (2) expressly gives the General
Assembly pourer to discuss questions and make recommendations
in this field. The reference in the last sentence of ArticleII (2)is to
"action" having mandatory force, if and when such action is needed,

as determined by the General Assembly. No such "action" is in-
volved in these cases. Second, as has also been shown above, the
establishment of UNEF by the General Assembly andthe directions
given to ONUC by the Assembly arc within the Assembly's pon7ers.
Accordingly, their financing is within the Assembly's power. Third,
while the right of the Security Council to take decisions under
Articles 43 and 48 is unquestioned, once the Council has taken a
valid decision under tliese or any other articles which gives rise to
financial obligations, thesc costs are "expenses of the Organization"
within the meaning of Article 17 (2). Accordingly, they must be
approvcd and apportiorled by the General Assembly.

Conclusion
For the reasons advanced in this statement, the Government of

the United States of America respectfully submits that the espen-
ditures authorized in the resolutions of the General Assembly
enumerated in the question submitted to the Court "constitute
'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17,
paragraph 2,of the Charter of the United Nations". 8. WRITTEN STATEhlENT OF THE GOVERNMENT

OF CANADA

February 16, 1962.
Part I

Introductory reniarks

The General Assembly of the United Nations, by a resolution

adopted at its 1oS6th meeting held on 20 Deceinber 1961 in connec-
tion with its consideration of the report of the working group
appointed uncler General Assembly resolution 1620 (XV) of 21 April
1961 to examine the administrative ancl budgetary procedures of
the United Nations, recluested the International Court of Justice to
give an advisory opinion on the following question:

"Do the espenditures authorized in Ge~ieralAsseinbly resolutions
1583 (XV) and rj O (SV) of 20 December 1960, 1595 (SV) of
3 April i 61, 1619 &I;) of 21 April 1961ancl 1633 (XV1)of 30 OC-
tober 198 Irelating to the United Nations operations in the Congo
undertaken in pursuance of the Securitv Council resolutions of 14
July, 22 July and g Aiigust 1960and 21 itebniary and 24November
1961,and GeneralAssembly resolutions 1474(ES-IV) of 20 Septem-
ber 1960and 1599(SV), 1600(XV) and IGOI(XV)of 1.5April1g61,
and the cspenditures autllorized in Geiicral Assembly resolutions
1122 (XI) of 26 November 1956, 1089 (XI) of 21 Decembcr 1956,
1090 (ST) of 27 February 1957, ïljï (XI1) of 22 November Igj7,
1204(XIT) of 13December 1957,1.337(SIII) of 13:December1958,
1441(XIIT)of j Deceniber Igjg and I57j (SV) of20 December 1960
relating to the operations of the United Nations Emergeilcy Force
undertaken in pursuance of General Assemblyresolutions 997 (ES-1)
of2 November 1gj6, ggS(ES-1)and 999 (ES-1)of 4 Noveniber 1956,
1000 (ES-1) of j November 1956, 1001 (ES-1)of 7 November ~gjG,
1121 (XI) of 24 Noveniber 1956 and 1263 (XIII) of r4 November
1958,constitute 'espcnses of the Organization' witliin the meaning
of Article 1.7,paragraph 2,of the Charter of the United Nations?"

2. By an Order of the President of the International Court of
Justice clated 27 December 1961 issued under parag-raph 2 of Arti-

cle 66 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the
President iiidicated that States Menibers of the United Nations
were being invited to submit written statements in relation to
this question and the Order fixed 20 February 1962 as the tinie-
linlit witliin which such statements should be filed. The terms of
this Order were comniutiicated by the Registrar of the Court to
Mr. C. P. Hébert, Ambassador of Canada to The Hague in Note

No. 34891 dated December 27, 1961. \\rRITTEN STATEMENT OF CA~ADA 211
3. In accordance with the right thus made available to Member

States, the Government of Canada wishes to present this statement
setting forth its views regarding this question.

Part II

Article 17 (2) ofthe Charter applies to the espenses of ONUC
and UNEF by virtue of the fact that these espenses forni
part of tlie United Nations 13udget

(a) Gelaeralprinciples applicable
4. The key provisions of the Charter relating to the U.N. budget
are paras. I ancl 2 of Article 17, which are as follows:

"1. The GeneralAssernblysliallconsiderand approve the budget
of the Organizat'ion.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be bomc by the Meni-
bers as apportioiieclby the General Assembly."

5. U.N. practice lias established that the term "expenses" in
para. 2 of Article 17 means thc espenscs of the U.N. Organization
as authorized by the approved U.N. budgct l.The U.N. budget
itself consists of the estirnates of U.N. espenditures and of miscel-

lancous inconle received by the Organization as approved by
the Assembly, the budget being iinanced from thc contributions of
the Neinbers and from the revenue derived by miscellaneous in-
conle '. Approval of the budgct by the Assembly vests in the
Sccretary-General the authority to incur obligations and niake pay-
mcnts for the purposes for which the appropriations contained in

the budget were votcd and up to thc amounts so voted 3.
6. In determining the method by wliich the expenses of the
Organization should be apportioned amongst the Members, the As-
sembly recognjzecl from the outset that the espenses of the Organ-

ization shoulcl be apportioned amongst the Rlembers "broadly
according to their capacity to pay" and the scale of assessments of
the amount of eacli Member's contribution to the budget is based
on this principle 4.
7. While the normal continuing programmes of the U.N. are

financed from tlie U.N. budget, there are, however, a number of
programmes approved by the Assembly wliich have been financed
in whole or in part by voluntary contributions from Rlembcr States

l In U.N. budgetary practice the cost estimates for special accounts reltoing
UNEF and ONUC have been presented separately from the annual estimates which
cover thc normal prograinmcs and administrativcosts of the Organization.
Art. III of the Financial Regulatiof thegU.N. ascontained as an annex to G.A.
liesolution 456 (V) of 16NOV.1950.
LISee ibid. U.N. Repertory, para. 19,p. 519;see ibid. Financial Regiilations of
U.N., Article IV.
See ibid. U.N. Repertory. pa5,p. 533;see ibid. FinancialRegulationU.N.,
ArticleIV.212 \VKITTEX STATEMENT OF CANADA

or from other sources. These voluntary contributions are not in-
cluded in the budget of the U.N. and have becn designated as estra-
budgetary funds. In some cases these voluntary contributions have
been used to extend the programmes initiated under the regular
U.N. budget

8. There have also been programmes which have been financed
by the U.N. budget with assistance from voluntary funds. The
projects involving the establislimcnt and maintenance of ONUC and
UNEF fa11into this category.

(b) A7zalysis of fîna?zciaZaspects of resolzctio?zrelatinglo UNEF

9. The General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-]) adopted on
j November 1956 established a U.N. Command for an Emcrgency
International Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hos-
tilities in the Middle East connectcd with the 1956 Suez crisis. By
resolution 1001 (ES-1) of 7 November 1gj6 the General Assenibly
approvccl provisionally the basic rule concerning the financing of
the Force laicl down in para. I j of the Secretary-Gencral's Report
to the Gencral Assembly dated 6 November 1956 8.Para. Ij of this
Report provided in part as follows :

"The (luestion of ho\v the Force should be financed likewise
recluiresfurthcr stiidy. Abaçicnile which, at least, could be applied
provisionally would be that a nation providing a unit \\~oulclbe
responsible foral1costs for ecluipmentand salaries, ~vhileal1other
costs should be financed outside the normal budget of tlic U.N.
It is obviouslyimpossibleto makeany estirnatc of the costs witliout
a knowledgeofthe sizcofthe corps and tlielength ofits assignrtient.
The 01113;practical course, therefore, ~zrouldbe for the General
Asscmbly to vote a geiencraaliithorization for tlie cost of the Force
on thc basis of gencral principlessuch as those here suggestcd."
IO. By resolution 1122 (XI) of 26 Novembcr 1956, the General
Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to establish a U.N.
Enlergency Force Special Account for an initial amount of $IO

million to which fuiids rcceived by the U.N. outside the regular
budget for the purpose of meeting the espenses of the Force "shall
be credited froni which the paynicnts for this purpose shall be
made". This resolution also authorized the Secretary-General pend-
ing the receipt of funds for the Special Account to advance from
the IYorking Capital Fund "such sums as the Special Account niay
require to meet any cxpenses chargeable to it".

II. Hocvever, by G. A. resolution ~oSg (SI), clatcd21 Dcceiilber
1956, thc Gencral Assen-iblyindicated that the espenses for UNEF
would be financed in part out of the U.N. budget. In this resolution
the Gcneral Asseinbly also noted that the Secretary-General had

See zbad. U.N. liepcrtory, p. 527.
See Doc. .4/3302 as coiitainOfficia1Records of the General .AssetublyFirst
Emergency Special Session, 1-10 Nov. 1956. WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CANADA 213

recommended that the UNEF expenses should be apportioned iii
the same manner as the espenses of the Organization, and that
several divergent views, notyet reconciled, have been held by various
Member States on contributions or on the method suggested by the
Secretary-General for tlie payment of such contributions. The
Resolution also indicated that the matter of ail expenses of UNEF
beyond the $IO million already authorized in the resolution necessi-
tatecl furtlier study in al1 its aspects.

12. By G. A. resolution 1090 (XI) dated 27 February Igj7 the
Geileral Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to incur es-
penses for UNEF up to a total of $16.5 million in respect of the
period of 31 Deceinber 1957 and invited &lember States to inake
voluntary contributions to meet the sum of $6.5 million so as to
ease the financial burden for 1957 on the membership of the United
Nations as a whole.

13. The Secretary-General in a Report dated g October 1957 to
the General Assenibly espressed grave doubts as to the workability
of the method of financing UNEF as set out in G. A. resolution
1090 (XI). He reaffirmed a view previously espressed to the
General Assembly
"tliat decisionshich are taken by the Assembly itself and which
have important financialconsequences carry with them an obligation
on the part of al1 Mcniber Governments to inake available the re-
quisite resources of other means for their implementation. In the
light, howcver, of the estremely lirnited response to date by Meinber
States to the appeal for voluntary contributions and of the complesi-
ty and scope of the operations in which UNEF is involved, lie is
constrained to question whether it is either feasible or prudent to
place aiiy undue reliance for the fiitiire on this method of obtaining
the necessary budgetary provisioii. The Secretary-General is bound
to stress thgrave risks inherent in the present inadcquate and un-
certain basis of UNEF's finances. Unless indeed the possibility of
UNEF successfully completing its mission is to be seriously jeopar-
dized, it is esscntial that thisU.N.aunclertakiiig be assiireclof the
same degree and certainty of financial support as afforded to other
U.N. activities which have as their purpose tlie maintenance of
security and peace."
14. Resoliition 1151 (XII) of 22 November 1957 provided a
solution to the problem which hacl been raised by the Secretary-
General by giving greater certainty to the procedures for financing

the UNEF budget. In this resolution, the General Assembly
authorized the Secretary-Gcneral to expeiid the sums as therein
mentioncd for the continuing operation of UNEF. It also decidecl
that the espenses so authorized "shall be borne by the Members
of the United Nations in accordance cvitli the scale of asscssmcnts
adopted by the General Asscmbly for the financial years 1957 and
7 See OfIicial Records of the General Assembly,, 12th Scssion, annexes, Agenda
item 65, Document A/3694, par106.1958 respectively, such other resources as may become available
for the purpose in question being applied to reduce expenses".
15. 13y resolution 1337 (XIII) dated 13 December 1958 the

General Assembly, after confirming its authorization to the Secre-
tary-General to espend up to a maximum of $25 million for the
operation of UNEF during 1958and after nuthorizing the Secretary-
General to expend up to a maximum of $19 million for continuing
operation of the Force during 1959 statcd that the espenses so
authorized "less any amounts pledged or contributed by Govern-
ments of Member States as special assistance prior to 31 Decem-
ber 1958 shall be borne by the Members of the U.N. in accordance
with the scale of assessments adopted by the General Assenibl~r
for tlie financial year 1959".

16. By resolution 1441 (XIV) datcd 5 December 1959, thc
General Asscmbly noted with satisfaction that special finailcial
assistance in thc amount of $3,475,000had been pledged voluntarily
toiyards the expcnditures of the Force in 1960. In this resolution,
the General Assembly also indicatecl that "it is desirable to apply
voluntary contributions of special financial assistancc in such a
manner as to reduce the financial burden on those govcrnnients
which have the least capacity, as indicated by the regular scale of

assessments, to contribute towards the expenditure for maintaining
the Force".
17. This resolution then went on to authorizc the Secretary-
Gencral to expcnd up to a masimun~ of $20million for tlie continu-
ing operation of UNEF during 1960 and to assess the amount of
$20 1nil110nagaiiist al1Members of the Unitcd Nations on the baçis

ofthe regular scale ofasscssments subjcct to the foliowingconditions:
(1)"Voluntary contributions pledged prior to 31 December
Igjg towards expenditures for the Force in 1960 shall be
applied as a credit to reduce by 50% contributions of as
. niany governinents and Member States as possible com-
nicncing with those governments nssessed at the minimum
percent of 0.04% and then including in order those govern-
ments assessed at the nest highest percentages until the
total amount of voluntary contributions has been fuUj7

applied."
(2)"If the governments of Member States do not avail them-
selves of thecredits provided for under condition (1)above,
these amounts involved shall be creclitecltothe 1960budget
for thc Force."

18. By G. A. resolution 1575 (XV)dated 20 December 1960, the
General Assembly introduced for 1961 furthcr refinements to the
pattern for financing the Force as developed for 1960 under the
terrns of G.A. resolution 1441 (XIV). FVRITTEN STATEJIENT OF CANADA 215

19. It reaffirmed the principle that the Force should be financed
from the U.N. budget, making clear at the sanle time that voluntary
contributions of special financial assistance should be applied in
such a rnanner as to reduce the financial burden on those govern-

ments which have the least capacity to contribute towards the
espenditures for maintaining the Force.
(c) Alzalysis of fina~zcialasfieofsresolz~tionsrelati?zgONUC

20. The U.N. Force in the Congowas created under the authority
of the resolution adopted by the Sccurity Council on 14 July 1960
concerriing the situation in the Republic of the Congo In approach-
ing the problenl as to how the Congo U.N. Force should be
financed, the General Assembly proceeded on the only premise that
had proved workable in relation to financing the UNEF operation,

namely, on the basis that the Congo Force should also be financed
from the U.N. budget, subject to having certain assessr-iients
reduced through voluntary contributions on a siinilar basis to that
established in relation toUNEF.

21. Thus by General Assembly resolution 1583 (XV) of 20 De-
ceniber 1960, the General Assembly recognized that "the espenses
involved in the United Nations operations in the Congo for 1960
constitute 'espenses of the Organization' within the n~eaning of
Article 17, para. 2, of the U.N. Charter and that the assessment
tl-iereofagainst Meinber States creates bincling legal obligations on
such States to pay their assessed shares".

22. This resolution also recognized "that in addition to espenses
for the regular and continuing espenses of the Organization, the
estraordinary espenses arising froi-ilU.N. operations in tlic Congo
will place a severe strain on the limited financial resources of a
number of States".

23. By this resolution ihere is, liowever, established an ad hoc
account for the espenscs of the U.N. in the Congo and the resolution
goes on to indicate that the amount of $48.5 million should be
apportioned amoi-igMcmber States on the basis of the regular scale
of assessment subject to voluntary contributions being applied to
reduce by up to 50% the assessment of Member States falling
witliiii the special category set out in the resolution. Member States
falling within this category included those which wcre admitted
during the 15th Session of the General Assembly and al1 others

receiving assistance during 1960 under the Espanded Programine
of Technical Assistance.
24. The pattern established by General Assembly resolution
1583 (SV) of 20 December 1960 is further refined by General AS-

sembly resolution 1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961 and by resolution

S73rdMeeting, sce DoS/43S7.216 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CANADA
1732 (XVI) adopted by the General Asseinbly on 20 Deceinber 1961.

It should be particularly noted that in both resolution 1619 (XV)
and resolution 1732 (XVI) the principle was stated that "the extra-
ordinary espenses for the U.N. operations in the Congo are essen-
tially different in nature froin the espenses of the Organization under
the regiilar budget and that therefore a procedure different froin
that applied inthe case of the regular budget is required for meeting

these estraordinary expenses". These two resolutions also state that
the "permanent members of the Security Council havc a special
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security and thercforc for contributing to the financing of peace and
security operations".

25. JYhileboth these resolutioiis underline that the estraordinary
expenses of the U.N. operations are essentially different in nature
from the expenses of the Organization under thc regular budget,
neverthelcss at thc same time they state in express terms tliat the
amounts being assigned to finance these operations are regarded

"as expenses of the Organization" to be apportioned among the
Member States in accorclaiice with the scale of assessment for the
regular budget subject to reclucing by the percentages set out in the
rcsolutions thc assessment of &lembersStates nrhich have the least
capacityto contribute totvards the expenditures for these operations.

Part III

The resolutions adopted by the General Assernbly concerning
the establishment of UNEF are resolutions which the General
Assembly has the full power and competence to enûct under
the Charter of the United N t' a ions

(a) Analysis of the GeneralAssefnbly "Uniting for Peace" Resolz~tioîz

26. Tlie General Asscmbly resolutions concerning the establish-
ment of UNEF were adoptecl in accordance with the inaster plan
set out in G. A. resolution 377 (V) dated II March 1950, otherwise
knowii as the "Uniting for Peace" resolution 1°.
27. The Assembly in this resolution categorically asserted its

competence to consider any case "where there appears to be a
threat ta the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" \vit11
respect to which the Security Council "because of lack of unanimity

O G. A. resolution 161(XV),para. 4, G-4.resolution 1732 (XVI20Dccember
1961, para. 4.
Io For a discussion of the "Uniting for Pcace" rcsolution and tlie relative com-
petencc of the Security Council and the General Assembly in regard to collective
nieasures, see pa42s and subscquent of "The United Wations and Cenerai Assein-
Wash~ngtoii, D.C., and "Recent trends in the United Nationby Hans Iielsen.e,
which also deals with thc "Uniting for Peace" resolChapter 4,page 953 and
subscqoent,with particu1a.r reference to pages 959 and subseq962 and sub-
sequent, 967 and suhsequent, 970 and subsequeiit, 974 and subsequent and gSo and
su bsequent. IVRITTEN STATERIENT OF CANADA 217
of tlze permanent Mernbers, fails fo exercise ifs primary responsi-

bility". The Assernbly ~vouldact with a view to making appropriate
"recommendations" of collective measurcs to maintain or restore
international peace and security, "including in the case of a breach
of the peace or act of aggreçsion the use of armed force when
neccssary" ll.

28.III taking this action, the General Asseinbly ivas authorixed
to do so by reason of the broad powers of discussion and recom-
menclntion that the Assemhly possesses under Article IO of the
Charter, qualifiecl only by the provision of Article 12 that tlie
Assembl-y could not make a recon~meridatiori with respect to a

dispute or sitiiation where the Council was excrcising its function
in relation to that dispute or situation. In this regard, it is perhaps
çignificant to note that this limitation in reality affects not the
con-ipetence of the Assembly "but the time when that conipeteiîce
coulcl be exerciscd" lZ.

29. To maintain or restore the peace 11y usc of force if necesçary
is a function conferred by the Charter upon the Organization as a
collective body13. 'l'bus Article zq of the Charter givcs the Securitjr
Courlcil only the primary, 11otthe exclusive responsibility for the
maintenailce of international peace. The General Asseinbly kas a

secondary responsibility for the maintenance of ii~teniational peace
aiîd security which it has not onFy the power but the obligation
to perforin j11accordance with its powers as set out in Chapter IV
of the Charter, with particular reference fo Article IO. In addition
the Assembly has heen vested with particiilar powers in relation to
the ~zzaintenanceof international peace and security which are at

the same time covered under Article IO. These particular powers
are set out in Articles II and 14.
30. The claim has been frequently made that the last sentence
of paragraph 2 of Article II reading "any such question (i.c. any
question relating te tlie maintenance of 'peace and security brougl~t

hefore the General Assembly in the rnanner indicated in Article II,
paragraph 2) on which action is necesçary shali be referred to the
Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after
discussion" places a further restriction on the Assembly's powers
undcr Article 10.

31 It is subrnitted, however, that this portion of paragraph 2,
Article II may not be interpreted in this fashion. This is clear from
the ivording of Article xo itself wnich states that the only article

11Pt. ASec. (A)1.
'2 This \vas an agreed iiitcrpretarcached during discussions of the "Uniting
for Pcacc" resolution. Seo page 432"The United Nations and the Maintenance
of Tnternational Peaçc and Security", by LapanM. Goodrich and P. Simons.
la Seein particiilar the followiiig articles of the ChartI,paras.r and'2.
Article2,paras.z. 34,5 and 6, ArticleIO,Ir,12,14, 24,39,42,43, 44, 4547,$T
and 106to which it is made. mbjeçt is Article 12. This interpretation is
further confirrned by paragraph 4 of Articlc rz which reads: "the
powers of the General Açsembly set forth in this Article shctllnot
limit the general scope of Atticle IO".

32. This view iç also confirrned by Article 14, which re-empha-
sizes that Article 12 js the only article to which the powcrs of the
General Assernbly in Article 10 are made suhjcct.

33. The plan envisaged by Articlc 43 of the Charter for tlie

recruitment of arined forces for Member States for use by the
Securitjr Çouncil and for the Transitional Security Arrangements
that may be taken under Article 106 pending the coming into force
of such plan do not in any way place a restriction on the Asçernbly's
riglzt to take action under its broad powers aç set out in Chapter IV,
having in rnind, in particular, Article 10.Tliiç is~nacleclear from
the; fact that the only article to which Article IO iç subject is
Article 12 14.

34. Undoubtedly a. case rnight be made for sayirig that the
framers of the Charter intended thüt the only metliod of organizing
an armed force of thc Uiiited Nations was that provided for in
Article 43 as çupplernented bj7a number of othet- articles, lnrluding
Article 106. But for the reasons already given the worcling of the

Charter does not exclude an intcrpretation wkich does not corre-
spond to this intention 15.

35. mile the Assernbly's powers are only at most of a recom-
mendatory nature, there is no restriction on the content of such
recommendntions otker tlzan tliosc sct out in Article xo. The
position taken by the Assembly that the "Uniting for Yeace"
rcsolution is in accordancc with these pourers is of course only one
of a number of interpretatirins tlzat the Assernbly rnight have
adopted. Undoubtedly, other interpretations of a more restrictive
ckaracter which are consistent ~vith the Charter çan be advanced
to the effect that the "Uniting for Pcacc" resolution or important
parts of it shouldbe held to be tdltravires thc powersofthe Assernbly.

36. The clecisive factor is that the General Assembly did not
deci,deon a more restrictive course of action. Considering the wide
latitude the General Assernbly haç in regard to the rnanner in tvhich
it may interptet itsfunctionç andpowers, it is submitted that it

was clearly within tlze cornpetence of the Açsembly to enact the
"Uniting for Pcace" resolution ln.
" 'kora detailed discussiofthe Assembly powers, see paras. 2and subse-
guent.
See "Eeçeat Trends ithe United Nations" (Kelsen), page 980.
18See alsoPartV dealing withthc interpretatiof tlie Charteas seout on
page,167and subsequent of this statement.
I WRI'TTEN STATEhlENT OF CANADA 219

(b) The GeneralAsselnbly resolutions relatingtothe UNEF operations
are consiste~~t ith th" Uniting for Peace" resolzdion.

37. Thc "Uniting for Peace" resolution is careful in its language
to restrict action to considcring any case where there appears to be
a breach of the peace or act of aggrcssion with a view to making
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective xneasures
including in the case of a breach of thc peace or act of aggression
the use of armed forcc when neccssary to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and secunty. In line with the "Uniting for Peace"
resolution, the Gcneral Assembly rcsolutions concerning the estab-
lishment of UNEF arestrictly limited to making recommendations.

38. Thus by resolution 998 (ES-1) of 4 November 1gj6, the Gen-
eral Assembly requests as a mattcr of priority that the Secretary-
General submit to it "within 48 hours a plan for the setting up
zuitk 21zcoitseî~tof the nations concernel7of an international emer-
gency force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in
accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution" l8.

39. Again, by resolution 1000 (ES-1) of j November 1956 the
General Assembly established a United Nations Command for an
cmergency international force, with this force having been re-
cruited voluntarily by Members States on the basis solely of General
Assembly rccommendations.

40. Having in mind that the resolution relating to the establish-
ment of UNEF is within the framework provided by the "Uniting
for Pcace" resolution and that the General Assembly had the
competence to adopt the "Uniting for Yeacc" resolution, it follows
that the General Assembly had also the neccssary competencc to
adopt the specific UNEF resolutions.

The General Assembly Resolutions concerning the financ-
ing of U.N. operations in the Congo were enacted in imple-

mentation of Security Council resolutions
41. The U.N. Forcc in the Congo was created by the Secretary-
General under the authority of the resolution adopted by the
Security Council on 14 July 1960, concerning the situation in the
Republic of the Congolo. By this resolution, the Security Council
authorized the Secretary-General "to take the necessary steps in

consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo
to provide the Government ~6th suc11military assistance as may
be nccessary until, through the efforts of the CongoleseGovernment
with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national

17Undcrlining supplifor emphasis.
'8(Le. Resolution 997 (ES-1z Novcmber 1956.)
Sce Doc.S/4387.220 WRITTEN STATERIENT 01: CANADA

security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to
meet fully their tasks".
42. The Security Council subsequently adopted a series offurther

resolutions deçigned to reinforce in appropriate fashion the purpose
and objectives set out in its above-cited resolution of 14 J'uly
1960 20.

43. The General Assembly has in turn adopted a series of reso-
lutions regarding the financial arrangements required to imple-
ment the directives of thc Security Council.

44. Having in mind the unquestioned competence of the Security
Council to act in the way it clid concerning the situation in the
Congoz1,it is clear that the General Assembly was both competent
and had the duty to enact the resolutions it did for the purpose of

cstablishing the necesçary financial arrangements required to im-
plement the directives of the Security Council.

Part V

In interpreting the Charter of the United Nations, the
General Assembly, as a principal organ of the U.N., has the
competence to interpret such parts of the Charter as are appli-
cable toits particular functions

45. Many international treaties and agreements contain special
stipulations regarding their interpretation. This was true, for in-
stance, of the constitution of the International Labour Organisa-

tion, though not of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article
423 of the I.L.O. constitution provided that "any question or dis-
pute relating to the interpretation" of the constitution should be
referred for decision to the Permanent Court of International
Justice. This provision proved, however, in practice to be largely a
dead letter, though questions of interpretation did come before the

Court under the advisory opinion procedure 22.
46. The framers of the Charter decided as a deliberate act not to
include in the Charter any provision regarding how the Charter

should be interpreted 23.
47. The question of interpretation of the Charter was discussed

at considerable length at the United Nations Conference at San
x0 See Sec. Council resolution 22 JulyIGo-879th Meeting, Doc. SI4405 Sec.
Council resolution ofAug.160-88GthBIeeting. Doc. S/4426. Sec. Colincilrcsolution,
of 21Feb./Gr-g4znd Meeting, Doc. S14741. Sec. Council resolution of 24 Nov./G1-
982nd Mecting, Doc. S/-joo2.
Scc inparticular in this connection the functions and powers of the Security
Council as setup in Chapters 5, 6 an7 of the Charter.
92 See page 548 of Goodrich and Hambro's Revised Edition of the Charter of the
U-.-.
83 See UNCIO Rcport of Rapporteur of Cornmittee IV/2, Doc. 933 1V/z/42 (2).
pp. 7-8 (Doc. XIII, pp. 709-10). WRITTEN STATEMENT OF CRSADA 221

Francisco, and a most significant statement was included in the
final report of Con~mittee IV/z 24.

48. The salient points in thiç report rnay be summarized as
follows :

(1) Each organ of the United Nations must necesçarily intcr-
pret such poirzts of the Chartcr as are applicable to its

pürticular functions. Accordingly, it is not necessary to
include in the Charter a provision either authorizing or
approving a normal operation of this principle.

(2) If there is a dispute as to how the Charter should be in-
terpreted, recourse rnay bc had to various expedents in
order to obtain an appropriate interpretation includiag of
course the International Court of Justice, and it would

appear neither necessary nor desirable to list or to de-
scribe in the Charter the various possible expedients.

(3) If an interpretation "made by any organ of the Organi-
zation or by a committee of jurists iç not generalEyaccep t-
able, itwill be without binding force".

24The following is an excerpt froin the statement (for document reference, see
footnote 23 on pago 220):
"ln the course of the opcrations irom day to dny of thc various organs of the
Orgaiiizatian, 1.tis iiievitable that each organ rvdlinterprct such parts of the Cliartex
a5 are appiicabIc to its particular functionsThis process isinhcrent in the function-
ing of any body ~vhichoperate? under an instrument defining its functions and p0W-
ers. Ttwill Le nianifestcd in tlle functioning of such a body as the Gencral Assernbly,
tlie SecuriCy Council, or the international Court ofJustice. Accordingly, it 1s not
necessary to include in the Charter a provision eitlier authorizing or approving the
nornial operation of thirj principle."
"Difficulties rnay ctinceivably arise in the event that tlierc should be a difference
of o~inion among tlie organs of the Organization cancerning the correct interyre-

tai.ion of a provision ofthe Charter. Thus, two organs rnay conceivably liold and
governmcnt the fiilnldeterminationcliof suchiawquestion may be vested in the Iiighcst
court or in somc otlier national authorities. However, the nature of thc Orgari-
ization and ofits operatioriwould nut seem to be siicli a5to invite the inclusioil in

the Charter of any provision of this iinture.If tivo Member States are at variance
concerning the correct interpretation ofthe Chartcr, t1ieyare ofcourse free to subrnit
the dispute to the lntcrnütional Court of Justice as in the case of any otiier trcaty.
Similarly, it would always be opcn to the Gencral Asseinbly or to thc Security
Council. in appropriatc çircumstancer;, to ask the Intcrnatio~iat Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion cancerning the meaning of aprovision ofthe Charter. Sliould
tlic Generd Assernbly or the Security Counc~l pr~fer another course, an ad 1106
committee ofjurists niight beset up to examine the question and report ifx viexvs,
or recourse miglit be Iiad to a ]oint conferencc. In brief, thc Members ofthe Organ-
iration rnigiit have recourre to varions expcdient.in order to obtun an appropriate
intqretation. Xtwould appear neither nccessary nor desirable to list or to descnbe
in the Charter the varioiis possible expedients."
"It is to be understood, of coursc, tkiatif an interpretation niade by any organ
of the Organization or by a committee of jurists irj not generally acceptable, it will
be without binding force. In such çircumstanccs, or in cases where it 1sdesired to
establish an authontative interpretation as a prccedent for the future, itrnaybe
riecessary to embody the interprctation in an amendment to the Charter. This
niay always bcaccomplislied by recourse to the procedure provided for amendment." g. WRITTEN STATEMENT

OF '!'HEGOVERNMENT OF J'APAN
ON THE QUESTION OF FINANCING ONUC AND UNEF

1. The question on which an adviçory opinion is asked
The cluestion on wliich an advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice is asked by the General Asseinbly pursuant toits
resolutioil1731(XVI) of December 20 1961 is, in substance, whether

or not tlie expenses relating to ONUC and UNEF constitute the
"expenses ofthe Organization" under paragrapli 2 oi Articlc 17 of
the Charter, that is, the expenses which the General Assembly is
ernpowered by the Charter to apportion among the Member States.
The question put to the Court is not as tu whether the establish-
ment of ONUC and UNEF is in itself a violation of the Charter.

Il.Jurisdiction ofthe Court
Under paragraph I of Artide 96 of the Charter and paragraph I
of Article6j of the Çtatute, thCourt may give an advisory opinion
on any legai question at the request of the General Assembly. As
the subject-matter of the present request concerns the interpre-
tation ancl application of paragraph2 of Article17 of the Charter,
jtis evidentthat the Court is competent togive an advisory opinion
thereon.

III. Applicability oparagrapli 2 of Article 17of the Charter
to the expençes of ONUC and UNEF

1. I?tter#retcltiof$aragra#h z ofArticle17
Under the Charter al1the financial questions of the Orgztnization,
including consideration and approval of the budget of the Organi-
zation and apportionrnent of the exper-ises,conlewithin the exclusive
powers of the General Açsembly. The provisions of paragraphs 1
and z of Article17 govern al1the expenses required for performance

of the functions of the Organization, whicli, in accordance with
Article 7, comprises'all the principal and subsidiary organs.
Sherefore, none of the following arguments seems valid eitlzer
from the language (a) of tlze Charter or practices of the Organi-
zatioil (b) :
(1) that the expenses are to be divided into regular or special,
general or ad hoc, etc., and that Article 17 deal only with

the regular or general expenses so that the General Assembly
has no pawer to take decision under Article 17 on special or ad
hoc expenses ; I l

z24 WRITTEN STATEhIENT OF JAPXW
(2)that thc expcnses are to be divided according to the objectives
for which they are used and that the power of making a decision
on the expenses for mc~intenancc ofpeace belongs tothe Security

Council;
(3) that the expenses necessitated as laresvlt of the mensures
taken in pursuance of a recornrnendation of the General Asseinbly
çannat be included anlong the expençes under Article 17.
(a), The are no provisions in the Charter governing the expenses
'for the U.N. Organizatiorz escept those paragraph r and para-
graph 2 of Article 17.

Under paragraph zof Article 18,budgetary qucstioils are enurner-
atèd an-iongimportant questioiis requiring decisions ofthe General
Assembly by a two-thirds majorit y,while Article 19 stipulates for
the measures to be taken in case of failurein püyrnent of the finan-
cial contributions to the Organization. If Thc Chnrtcr envisaged thc
podsibi2iy ofanyother financial questions than those provided for
in Article 17, provisions for such possihilitieç would naturalIy hnvc
been laid down together with incasures in case of failure of payment.

jnthe course of drafting the Charter, it was aever questioned
that t11eGeneral Asseinbly has the power to approve the budget of
the Organization and tu apportion the expenses among the Member
States. There waç a unanin~ous agreemerit at the San Francisco
Conference on the proposal to that effect, as clraftcd atthe .Uumbar-
ton Oaks Conference.
(Note) Durnbarton Oaks Conference Proposal. Chapter V
(General Assembly) B (Functions and Powers), Paragraph 5.
"(The General Assembly dlould appor&on the expenses among
the Ilfernbers of the Organizntion and should be cnipowered to

approve the bi~dgets of the Organization."
(bJ lTlle past practice ofU.N. shows that ,the questions relnting to
financiiig of the Organization have alWays been decided by the
General Asçembly.

For example, the expenseç of the subsicliary organs established
by the Security Council for maintenance of peace have always been
apportioned among the Aleinber States by decisions ofthe GeneraI
Assembly in accordance with the regular procedure under paragraph
2 of Article 17. I
2. Case whem certain eqbe~zsei;incurred ultra vires are inqqwestiorz

The provisions of paragraph 2 of Article ~7 that "the expenseç
of this Organizatioii sliall be borne by the Fembers as apportioned
by the General Assembly" presupy ose that the General Assembly
has the Iiower to decide whether certain expençes are thc expenses
of the Organization.
It, fol1'0that the General Assembly 11+ the powes toapportion
any expcnsc among the Mernber States by a vote of two-thirds

1
I !

l I LVRITTEN STATEhlENT OF JAPAN 225

majority under paragrayh 2 of Article 18, over arid above any
objection whicli might be raised by some hlenîher States that such
an expcnse has been incurred ultra vires or in violation of the Charter,
unless the General Assembly itself decides to the effect that the
action which ha5 entailed suc11an expense is zbltviresor a violation
of the Charter. Admittedly, tlie Gcneral Assembly is competcnt to
decide on the constitiitionality of the establishment of ONUC or
UNEF at the request oi a ïIIeinher State raising the objection, but,
unless such a decision hx bee~zrnade, the General Assernblg~has the
power to apportion the expenses upon the PYiernber States in
accordance with pasagraph 2 of Article 17.

(a) It is theoretically correct that if certain expenses accrueto
the Organization on account ofactivities ullra vires or in violation
of the Charter, such expenses clo not corne within "tlie expenses
of the Organization" under paragrapli z of Article 17,in which cases
the General Assembly is not empowered to apportion the expenses
among the Mernber States pursuant to pararaph 2 of Article 17.
However, in order to conclude, on this liiie of reasoiîing, that the
cxpenseç of ONUC and UNEF do not constitute the "expenses of
the Organization", the illegality of ONUC ancl UNEF or the inva-
lidity of the consequent actions oî the Secretary-General as ultra
virelsias to bc cstablished by tlie competent organ OCU.N.
The objections of this kind against ONUC and UNEF have

always been rejected by the General Asçembly.
(b) Tn fact, in apportioning espcnseç of ONUC and UNEF, the
General Assembly has acteclon the interpretation that the General
Assembly is empowered not onty to apportion the expenses of the
Organizatitionbut dso to take decision, as logical pre-recliiisite to
such powcr, as to tvhcther certain expenses constitute the expenses
of the 0rg;iriiza ti.n

(Aiote) (i) ResolutioI583 (XV), Preamblc, paragraph 3,reads :
"Xecogvii:ilzgthat thc cxpenses involvecl in the U.N. opera-

tions in the Congoior 1960 constitiite 'cxpenses of thc Orgail-
ization' \vithiil the nieaning of Article 17,paragra2,of the
U.N. Charter..."
(ii) Staternent of Mr. Turner, Controller, Dec. 3, 1956. 5th
Committee.

(c) Were thc provisions of paragraph 2of Article17 to mean that
thc General 4çsembly is empowered only to apportion the expcizscs
among the Rfembers but not to deçide whcther such expenses
conçtitute the expenses of the Organization, it woiild follow tl~at,
whenever an objection is raised by ü Mernber State, tlie decision 01
the General Assembly on the açsessments of the expenses loçes its
validity autornatically, thus paralyzilig the effective functioning
of the U.N.226 IVRITLEN STXTEBIENT OF JAPAN

(For a satisfactory performàiiçe of U.N. functions. the Organiza-
tio~zmust enjoy an autonorny concerning the fiscamatters. For
this purpose, it is essentiai that the Organization and its organs
should be independent ofits Member States, in this respect. This
principle of independence of the Organizt~tion and its organs has
clearly been recognized by the International Court ofJustice in its
advisory opinions on the Repuration for Inj~ra'essueered l;n.the
Servic ef theUrzitedNatiows (1949 )nd the Eflect of Awards of
COmpensatio mnade by the United Naliods Admi4st~ative T~ibztaal
(1954).

Cd) A preçedent in the U.N. can be cited to iliustrate the point
that the General Assembly has been ernpowered to make decision
onmwhether certain expenses constitute the "expenses of the Organ-
ization" within the meaning ol the Charter. At the 9th session of
the General Asçembly, Byelo-Kussia demanded in the 5th Coinmit-
tee the deletion of the expenses for the U.N. Tribunal in Libya
from the budget of U.N. on the ground that creation of the Tribunal
\vas a violation of the Charter, The proposa1 by Byelo-Russia \vas
rejected asunfounded by a vote of 5-37-1. Although the question
was related to the budget ai the ~r~ahization, the sarne result
would have been obtained in case ofapportionment.

15 February 1962.
I IO. EXPOSÉ ÉCRIT DU GOUVERNEMENT PORTUGAIS

Le Gouvernement portugais est d'avis que les dépenseseffectuées
par les Nations Unies en exécution de décisions du Conseil de
Sécurité,et par conséquent les dépenses relatives aux opérations
des Nations Unies au Congo, ne constituent pas des ((dépenses de

l'organisation »au sens de l'article17, 52, de la Charte des Nations
Unies.
L'opinion du Gouvernement portugais est basée sur les raisons
suivantes, qui sont exposéesen une forme synthétique, mais qui
pourraient êtredéveloppées,si nécessaire, dans les termes de l'ar-
ticle66, § 4, du Statut de la Cour:
1) La Charte des Nations Unies prévoit pour la couverture des
dépensesqui dérivent des activités de l'organisation deux systèmes
totalement distincts: l'un, d'une portée générale,prévu dans l'ar-

ticle17 ;l'autre, quis'applique aux dépensesquirésultent desactions
entreprises par suite des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité,et qui
est définipar l'article49.
2) L'article 17 fait partie du chapitre qui s'occupe de 1'Assem-
bléegénérale;entre les pouvoirs de celle-ci il y a le pouvoir d'exa-
miner et d'approuver le budget de l'organisation (art. 17, 51).
L'article 17, 5 2, prévoit la forme de couverture des dépenses

mentionnées au paragraphe premier. La comparaison des deus
paragraphes permet donc de conclure sans doute que les « dépenses
de l'Organisation » ($2) sont celles du (budget de l'organisation s
(§ 1).
3) Or le «budget de l'organisation 1)au sens du paragraphe
premier est naturellement le budget ordinaire. Les opérations
décidéespar le Conseil de Sécurité conformémentaux articles 39
et suivants sont par définition des opérations imprévues, des opé-
rations d'urgence, qui ne sauraient êtreprévues dans un budget

ordinaire. C'est pour cette raison que la Charte a prévu une forme
spéciale de couverture des dépenses décidéespar le Conseil de
Sécurité,en déclarant dans l'article 49 que ces opérations devaient
être,esécutées à travers «l'association et l'assistance mutuelle ))
des Etats Membres.
4) Le système prévu par la Charte pour la couverture des dé-
penses des opérations décidéespar le Conseil de Sécuritéest donc
leur exclusion du budget ordinaire - qui seul est obligatoire aux

termes de l'article 17, 2 - et la déclaration de principe que les
États Membres doivent volontairement s'associer et se prêter
assistance mutuelle pour en assurer l'exécution. C'est ainsi que l'un
des plus distingués commentateurs de la Charte, M. Hambro, trèsdistingué Greffier à la Coiir internationale de Justice, affirme dans
son commentaire que les dépenses prévues dans l'art. 17, 5 2, ne
comprennent pas les mesures de coercition décidéespar lc Conseil
de Sécurité,qui sont régléespar l'art. 49 (Goodrich and Hambro,
((Charter of the United Nations - Comnlentary and Documcnts D,
2nd edition, page 184): cExpenses referred to in this paragraph
(17, $2) do not include the cost of enforcement action-see Ar-
ticle49 and comment. ))

5) Ainsi, les dépenses des opérations décidéespar le Conseil de
Sécurité nesont pas comprises par le paragraphe 2 de l'article17.
Et en effet tout le système dc la Charte impose cette solution. Le
pouvoir d'approuver le budget est un pouvoir de contrôle sur toutes
les activités prévues par le budget, tout comme il arrive à l'inté-
rieur des États pour le contrôle parlementaire des budgets. Et la
Charte prévoit que l'Assembléegénéraledoit approuver le budget
et surveiller les dépensesde toutes les activités dont elle a le con-
trôle, c'est-à-dire des activités ordinaires de l'organisation, afin
de donner plus d'efficacité à ce contrôle. «The power to approve
the budget carries with it, of course, the important ponrer of
reviewing thc work of the Organization, and controiiing its acti-

vities.1)(Goodrich and Hambro, 09. cit., page 183.) Or parmi les
organes des Nations Unies l'Assembléegénérale exerceun pouvoir
de contrôle sur le Conseil économique et social (art. 63, S 1, et
art. 66, $2) et sur le Conseil dc Tutelle (ar87). fMais elle?$'aaucztn
9ozrvoirde contrôlesur le ConseildeSécztrité A.u contraire, celui-ci a
la I(responsabilité principale pour le maintien de la paix et de la
sécurité internationales 1)(art.24), et sa compétence a la préfé-
rence, en cas de conflit, sur celle de l'Assembléegénéralc(art. 12,
1).Donc, l'Assembléegénérale,qui n'a aucun pouvoir de con-
trôle sur le Conseil de Sécurité,ne peut êtreamenée à exercer le
contrôle indirect qu'est l'approbation di1 budget. Toute autre
interprétation amènerait en fait lJAssembléc à exercer une domi-
nation sur le Conseil qui serait contraire à la lettre età l'csprit cle
la Charte.

6) Cette interprétation dc la Charte est la seule possible d'après
les textes; et cela peut aussi êtreprouvé d'une façon indirecte.
Comme l'Assembléen'exerce pas de poiivoir de contrôle sur les
agences spécialisées, ellen'a pas le pouvoir d'approuver leur budget,
mais seulement celui de faire des recommandations sans force obli-
gatoire (art. 17, $ 3).A quel titre est-ce qu'elle aurait un pouvoir
plus étendu sur les opérations décidéespar le Conseil de Sécurité?

7) Finalement, la règle de l'article 19 prouve également que la
thèse du Gouvernement portugais est la seule valable. En effet, cet
article, qui se rapporte évidemment aux dépenscs prévues par
i'article17, prévoit que l'État Membre quin'aura pas payé sa part
des dépensesde l'article 17 peut en certaines conditions êtreprivé
du vote à l'Assemblée générale - mais à l'Assemblée générale ESPOSÉ ~CRIT DU GOUVERNMENT PORTUGAIS
229
seulement, et pas au Conseil de Sécurité,car il n'y a pas dans
la Charte de règle analogue pour celui-ci. Donc, d'après la
thèse qui prétend que les dépenses qui sont dues à l'exécution de
décisions du Conseil de Sécuritérentrent dansla catégorie prévue
par l'articl17, $ 2, un Membre qui n'aurait pas payé sa part se
verrait privé de vote dans l'Assembléegénérale, maiscontinuerait,

le cas échéant, de voter au Conseil de Sécurité!Il apparaît au
Gouvernement portugais (lue l'absurde d'une telle situation est
évident, et que si le Membre qui n'a pas payésa part desdépenses
de l'article17,$i2,ne se voit pas privédevote au Conseilde Sécurité,
c'est parce que les dépensesdécidéespar le Conseil ne rentrent pas
dans la catégorie de l'article 17, S 2; et d'un autre côté,s'il n'y a
pas dans la Charte de règle pour le Conseil de Sécurité analogue à
celle de l'article 19, c'est parce que les contributions prévues à
l'articl49 sont totalement volontaires.

C'est pour ces motifs qu'il se réservede développer, si nécessaire,

que le Gouvernement portugais considère que les dépenses relatives
aux opérations des Nations Unies au Congo, entreprises en exé-
cution des résolutions du Conseil de Sécuritédu 14 juillet et9août
1960, et du 21 février et 24 novembre 1961, rentrent dans la caté-
gorie des dépenses dues à l'exécution de mesures arrêtéespar le
Conseil de Sécuritéau sens de l'article49 de la Charte, et non dans
la catégorie des « dépenses de l'organisation s au sens de l'article
17, $ 2, de la Charte des Nations Unies.II. WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
AUSTRALIA

The Government of Australia is of opinion that the question
stated in the Request for Advisory Opinion should be answered
'Yes'. The Government accordingly submits that the expenditures
authorized by the resolutions specified in the Request, and relating
respectively to the operations of the United Nations in the Congo
and to the operations of the United Nations Emergency Force
likeuise specified in the Request, do constitute "expenses of the
Organization" within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2,
of the Charter of the United Nations.

2.The submissions to be made in this Statement are-
(a) positively, that the financial provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations, interpreted in the light of established
legalprinciples and given their ordinary natural meaning,
plainly include within the category of "expenses of the
United Nations" expenditures of the kirid authorized by

the relevant resolutions;
(b) negatively, that the travaz~xpréparatoiresat the United
Nations Conference on International Organization at
San Francisco in 1945 (even if it be proper for present
purposes to take them into consideration, \vliich is not
conceded) afford no reason for giving to Article 17, para-
graph 2, of the Charter an artificially restricted meaning,
so as to exclude espenditures of the kind authorized by
the relevant resolutions.

3.The budgetary provisions of the Charter are few and simple.
Article 17 imposes on the General Assembly the duty to "consider
and approve" the budget of the Organization. No budgetary
authority is conferred on any other organ of the United Nations.
"Budgetary questions", that is to Say, al1budgetary questions, are
listed among the "important questions" wliich by virtue of Article
18 are to be decided by a two-thirds majority in the General Assem-
bly. The importance of this provision is emphasized by the terms
of Article 17,paragraph 2, which not only authorizes the General
Assembly to apportion among the Members "the expenses of the
Organization" but itself directly imposes on theRlembers the legal

obligation to bear their respectiveshares of the espenses so appor-
tioned.
4. Article 17 of the Charter is in the foliowing terms:
"1.Tlie GcncralAssemblysliallconsiclerand approve the budget
of the Organization. WRITTEN STATEMENT OF AUSTRALIA 23 1

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.
3. The General. Assembly shall consideand approve any financial
and hudgetary arrangements with specializedagencies referredto
inArticle 57and shall exarriintheadministrative budgets of such
specialized agenciewith a view tornaking recornmendations to the.
agencics concerncd."

5. In mangr matters, responsibility under the Charter of the
United Nations is shared between the General AssembIy and the
Secrrrity Counçil, or between other organs of the United Nations.
Illustrntions are to be found in such matters as membership of
the. Organization ; the pacific settlernent of disputes; the mainte-
nance of international peace and security ; international economic
and socid CO-operation, and the international trusteeship system.
In a11these instances where functions and responsibilities are
shared hy more tkan one of the principal organs, the Charter
explicitly delirnits the functions and responsibilities ofeach. This
characteristic of the Charter strikingly reinforces tlie inferences

which would naturally be drawn fram the fact that no organ otber
than the General Assembly is vested with any explicit authority
to make budgetary decisions. The inference is that the budgetary
authority of the General Assernbly is both comylete and exclusive.
6. Itfollows, and must follow, that the budget to be considered
and approved by the General Assembly ind derArticle 17 of the
Charter must be the whole budget of the Organization, and the
expenses to be apportioned by tlie General Assembly under that
Article must be all the expcnses of the United Nations, unless of
course some other means of meeting thern, such as voluntary contri-
bution, is approved. Tlie Charter drawç, and knows, no distinction
between "ordinary" and "special" or "extraordinary" budgets os

expenses. Such distinctions,as a matter of administrative practice or
accounting procedure, are appropriate enough, and have in fact been
adopted in the United Nations. Rut they cannot and do not derogate
£romthe coniprehensive and unqualified budgetary authority of the
Generai Assembly, not only in the authorizing of expendituses
but in apportioning them among the Members.
7. In the making of an apporlionmeizt, the Government of
Australia observes, the Cliarter leaves to the General Assembly a
plenary and unfettered discretion. In respect of certain extra-
ordinary expenses, for example, it may decide to make an appor-
tionment on the same scale as that currently laid down by it t~
cover the ordinary annual expenditure of the Organization. But
equally the General Assembly may make a quite different appor-

tionment, and draw up a special scalead hoc.
8. In ascertaining what "expenses" rnay be apportioned among
the Memberç inpursuance of Artide 17, paragraph 2,of the Charter,
it rriay on oneview be sufficient to ask what in any particular casehas been done by the GeneraZAssembly in pursuance of Article 17,
plagsaph I, in considering and apprpving the budget of the
Organization. Inorder to "consider and approve the budget" the
General Assembly muçt at least decide to autliorize certain ex-
penditures in connection wiiiththe operations ofthe United Nations,
and mwst determine also the manner in tvhich the necesçary moneyç
are to be obtained-ordinarily, ofcourse,,by apportionment arnong
the Alernbers.On thiç viewof the article, ilie very act of the General
Assernbly, under Article 17, paragraph r, in authorizing the rele-
vant expenditures will give to the ekpenses so authorized the
character of "expenses of the Organization" within the rneaning
of IArticle17, paragrapk z, and will thus sufice to answer in the
affirmative the question for opinion.
g. Itcannot seriously be argued in the present mattet that the
expenses autl~orized by the resolutions çpecified in the Request for

Ad,viçory Opinion are not properly desccibed aç "expenses of the
Organizatioil", if those words arc tu be given their ordinary natural
meaning. In substance, the expenditures authorized are those
incurred or to be incurred by the Secretary-General, in the exercise
of ;functions entruçted to him by one qr other of the principal
organs of the United Nations (Charter, Article 98).
IO.The functions authorized by the resolutions specified in the
Request for Advisory Opinion, however, are for the most part
known aç "peaçe-keeping" in charaçter. In so far as activities of
thiS kind are not only concerned with the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security but are lindertaken in pursuance of
Chapter VI1 of the Charter, it is necessary to examine certain
contentions that special rules apply. For instance, the learned
authorç of Goodrick and Hambro on "Tp Charter of the United
Nations" state categoricaliy, ina footriote to page 184, that "ex-
referred to in this paragrapk-i .e.Article 17, paragraph z-
do not include thc cost of cnforcement action". For the reasons
stated ahove, the Government of Australia subrnits that no warrant
foriexcIuding expenses under Chapter VI1 can be foiind in the
wording of the Charter itself, if the text isto be understood accord-

ing to itç ordinary natural meaning, and that the si~ggested limi-
tation must be rejected.
IL. It iç scarceljr necessary toadduce, in detail authotity for
the fundamental rule of interpretation thac ordinarilgr "particular
words and phrases are to be given their normal natural and un-
strained meaning in the context in whicl-ithey occur". This rule
has been authoritatively forrnulatcd by the Court itself. Reference
may be made in particulas to the secoizd"4 ~iwissiows' ':ise(I.C.J.
rg$, p. 8). More generally reference may bc made to an article by
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in (1957 B)ritish Yearbook of International
Law, pp. 210 et SE^.
12. At this point, the Government of,Australia turns to the
I I WRITTEX STATEMENT OF AUÇTRALT-4 %33

negative limb of its contentions, as stated in paragraplz z above.
For it has been suggested-by tlle lcarned authors Goodrich and
Harnbro on one ground and by the Govcrnment of Mexico in the
General Assembly on a partly different grourid-that the proceed-
iilgs of thc San l?rancisco Conference in 1945 supply reasons for
conclucling that what may compendiously be called "Ckapter VII,
expenseç" were understood not to fali within the apportionment and
obligatory contribution provisions of Article 17, paragraph z.

13. The Government of Australia submits that in interyreting
Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations no
warrant at dl cal1he found in the estahlished rulcs of interpretation
for a resori:to the fravaztxfl~E+aratoireast San Francisco. The text
of tl-ieCharter is, in the submission of the Government of Australia,
clear andunamhiguous, and, as the Court said in the Ambatielos
case (1st Phase) :
"Ili ail>'casewherc ...the test tu hc interpreted iclear, there is
IIQoccasion to rcsort to preparatorywork." (I.C.,[19.52,p. 45.)

14. 'The San Francisco discussions having been canvassed,
tiowever, during the debates at the Fifteenth Session of the
General Assemblg, and in order that the matter may be fully con-
sidered by the Court andthat certain erroneous impressions arising
from those debates may be removed, the Govcrnment of Australia
further submits that when the San Francisco records are closely
exarnined thcy do not in any event warrant any inferences as to the
intention of the Charter ~vhichdcpart from the ordinary natural

meaning of the expressions used in the text.
15. Dr. Goodrich and Dr. Hambro, as çtated above in paragraph
ro, state tliat the expenses referred to in Article17, paragraph z, do
not include the cost of enforcement action. They elaborate thiç
statement in a passage: atpp. 295-296 (Second Edition) in comment-
ary upon Article 49 of the Charter. That Article is in the following
tcrms :

rriutual a;sistancein carrying out tlieçmeasures dccidedn iipon byg
tlicSccurity Counçil."

With regard to this article, the Icarned authors Say:
"ln the GQilrSCof the discussion of thispriiiçiple in Cornmittee
III13 ofttie UrzitedNations Cotifcrcnce, concern was exprcssed by
the Delegatio~~of the Union of South Africa with regard to the
shariiigof expenscs of enforcement action. Althougli accepting the
view that no specific provision sliould be put into the Charter
covering this point, the Cornmittee expresscd the desire that the
Orgnnization should inthe future seek to promote a system aiming
at the 'lairest possibledist~.ibutioiiexpenses incurred asa result
of eilforcemcnt action."

16. In the submiççion of the Australian Government, the dis-
cussion at San Francisco isnot correctly represented by the passagetion 1441 (XIV) on the United Nations Ernergency Force, wkich
for the sake of convenience is here set out in full:
"The General Asscmbly,
Recalling its resolutionç 1089 (XI) of 21 Decernber 1gj6, 1151.
(XII) of22 November 1957 and 1337 (XIII) of 13 Deceinber 1955,

Rairing considered the observations made by Mcrnber States
concerning thc finaiicing of the United Natioiis Ernergcncy Force,
Having examined the budget estimates forthe Force submitted
Ily theSecretary-General ior the year 1960 and the observations
and recornrnendatio~isof the Advisory Committee on Administrative
atid Budgetnry Questions thcreon in its eleventh and twenty-eighth
rcports to tlic General Asscrnbly at its fourteenth session,
Having noted w~th satisfaction that special financial assistance
in the anmunt of ahout S3,47s,ooohas been pledged voluntarily
tonards the expenditures fortkc Force in1960,
Considering that it is dcsirablto apply voluntary coritributions
of special financial assistance in such a manner as to reduce the
financiai burden on thosc Governmetits which have the least
capacity, as indicated bÿ the regular scalcof assessments, to cori-
tribute towards the expenditures for maintaining the Force,
I. Authorizes the Secretary-General to expend up to a maximilm
ol $20 million for the contintiing operation of the United Nations
Emergency Forcc during 1960 ;

2. Decides to assess the amotint of $20 million against al1Members
of the United Nations on thebnsisof the regular scalofassessments,
subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 below;
3. Decides that voluntnry contributions pledged prior to 31 De-
cckber 1959 towards expenditureç for the Force in rg6o shall be
applied asa credit to reducc by 50 per cent the contributionsof as
msny Governrnents of Mcrnber States as possible, commencing
wlth those Governments asseçsed at the minimum percentagc of
0.04 per cent and then including, in order, those Governments
:tssesscd at the next highest percentages until the total amountof
r70luntary contributionshas been fully applied ; ,
4. Decides that, if Governments of Member States do not'avail
thernçelvesof credits provided for in paragraplz 3 above, then the
amounts involved shall be credited to section 9of the 1960budget
for the Force."

Lo the çame effect is resolution r6rg (XV) on the United Nations
operations in the Congo. There iç no need to itemize further. The
two rescilutionscited are mercly illustrations of the ordinary practice
of the General Assembly in considering and approving the budget
for the peace-keeping activities of the Organization.

19. The representative of the Government of Mexico, in a state-
ment made at the 837th meeting of the Fifth Committee of the
General Assembly on 13April 1961 (document AIC. 5/86z), con-
tended that an analysis of the records of the San Francisco Con-
ference ledto three conclusions, as follows: --

236 WKITTEN STATEMEMT OF AUSTRALTA
"Firstly, at the San Francisco Conferencc al1 cxpenscs of, the
Organization ~vithinthe meaniilg ofArtide 17,paragraph 2,were
subject withoutexceptionto the sanction yrovidcd for in Article rg.
Secondly, espenses of the character of thosc arising from the
Conp operations werp deliberately ancl aclvisedly cxcludeby the
San Francisco Conferei~ceironlthe sanction provided for inArticlc
xg. Thirdly,iilconsecluence,the expenscs of the Congo operatioil
are notevpenses ol the Organizntion within the rneaning of Article
r7&paragraph 2."

zo. With the firstof tliese conclusions the Government ofAustralia
isin f31 accord. The çecond conclusion, however, rests basically on
inferences drawn frorn certain amendments proposed by the Delega-
tion of Australia at the San Francisco Cor-iference.The Government
of Australia çubmits that the Mexican staternent misunderstands
the legal effect of the Australian proposal, and draws from it an
altogether erroneous inference as to the lnterpretation of Article 17,
paragraph 2. The contention of the Australian Governrnent may be
most broadly stated by sirnply saying thatthe proposed AustraEian
amendment in question was not directed at the question of expenses

at di, andthat no inference whatever can be drawn frorn it as to
the scope of ArtiJe 17.The Government of Australia çubinits accord-
ingly that the second conclusion of the Government of Mexico
çhould be rejected; that this rejection leaves without foundation the
third conclusion ; and that the Cornmittee discussions at San
Francisco do not justify the writing into Article 17 of any implied
exclusion of expenses of the kind specified in the Kequest for
Advisorgr Opinion.
21. The Delegation of Australia initially subrnitted tmo selated
but distinct proposais for the amendment ofthe Dumbarton Oaks

text in respect of voting rights at the General Assembly. The first
was designed to supply an effectivesanction for failure by a Mernber
to pay its apportioned çhare of the expenses of the Organization.
The second \vas designed to supply the like sanction for failure to
enter into a special agreement in accordance with the provisions
which now appear as Article 43 of the Charter.
22. The text ofthe two Australian amendments waç as follo\.:ç
(a) to add to paragraph zof chapter V, section C (voting in the

Ge~ieralAssembly), of the Dumbarton Oaks text the following
paragraph-
"(3) A rnember of the United Nations shall be disqualified for
voting in the election to fiIithe non-permanent seats in the
Security Council if-
(a) under paragraph (4) of Section (A) of Chapter VI it is
itselfineljgible for election to the Security Council: or

6) ifs contribution to the expenses of the United Nations
için arrears beyond a period to be prescribed by the
General Assembly. "238 WRITIEN STATEhENT OF AUSTRALLA
article. Itisto negotiate as soon as possible, and on the initiative
of the Security Council, a special agreement with regard to the
forces and facilitieto be provided by the Mernber. The second,
again in point both of time andof logic, is to make available to the
Security Counul, on its cd, the militargr assistance specified in the
special agreement so negotiated. The Australian amendment, in its

initial form, dealt exclusively with the first of these obligations. The
revised form caught up both the obligation to enter into amilitary
agreement and the obligation to provide, as required, the assistance
agreed upon. Neither in its initiai nor in its revised forrn, however,
\vas tlie Auçtralian amendment directed toany question of failure
to pay the expenses of operations under Article 43. The proposal was
equally consistent with the view that the expenses of operations
under Article 43 were budgetable and apportionable under Article
17 and with the contrary view tliat they were not. In short, no
inference can legitimately be dralvn frorn the Cornmittee discussion
at San Francisco of the Australian amendment as to the scope of
Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
25. Inasmuch asneither of the operations to which the Requeçt
for Advisory Opinion relates answerç the description of operations
in pursuance of Article 43 of the Charter, conclusions as to the
budgetary position of expenses incurred under that article can

scarcely determine the status under Article17 of expenseç of the kind
now relevant. This point was cogently made by the late Secretary-
General at the 839th meeting of the Pifth Comrnittee on 17 Xpril
1961 ; seedocument A1C.s1864. Further examination hotvever of the
San Francisco records makes it possibleto deal with the matter on
even broacler grounds, and shows that the proposed Auçtralian
amendment cannot properly be used to exclude frorn Article 17,
paragraph 2, any expenses whatever of the United Nations.
26. The view that expençes of the kind specified in tlie Kequest
for Advisory Opinion fa11outside the scope of Article 17, paragraph
2, of the Charter not only finds no support in the trava~x préfiara-
toiresat San Francisco; it is also radicaily inconsistent with the
uniform practice of the Generai Assembly itself, as evidenced in
particular by the two series of resolutions specified in the Request
for Advisory Opinion. If the proper interpretation of Article 17,
paragraph 2, were left indoubt by an examination of the ordinary
meaning of the words uscd, in their context, and by any necessary
and permissible resort to Irauaux préfiaratoires,which in the sub-

mission of the Government of Australia it is not, tlie practiof the
General Assembly itself, in the exercise of its budgetary powers,
should sufficeto resolve inthe afirrnative the anslver to the question
stated in the Request for Advisory Opinion.24a WRlTTEN STATEMENT OF THE UNITED KIKGDOM

not necesçary for the Court to consider what would be the position
if expenses were incurred by the United Nations, in stationing and
operating troops in a territory without the consent of the Govern-
ment of that territory ; nor is it necessary toconsider the position
wkere it iscontended that the expenses were incurred in relation
to an operation ~irkichran counter to the Charter.
5. With respect to UNEF, the point was made by the late
Secretary-General, in paragraph 15of his Çurnrnav Study of the

Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of
UNEF (A13943of October g, 1958), as fo1lows:-
"Tlic firsernergencyspecial sessionof the General Assernbly, at
ulhich itwas decided to estabiiçh an etnçrgency forcc,had been
called iiito sessiounder the terms of the 'Uniting for Peüce' TC-
soli.itioThus, UNEF has heen necessarilylimted in its operatioils
tothe estent that consent of the parties c~ncerncdis requirunder
geiierally recognizedinternationalaiv.It followedthat, whiie the
General Assernhly could establish the Force, subject only to the
concurrenceof theStates providing contingents,the consent of the
Goverilmentof tllc couiltry concerned\YS rrequiredliefore the As-
sernblÿcould request the Force to be stationeor to operatc oithe
territory of d~at country. The Force hano rights otlier than those
rlecessaryforthe execution of the functions assigned to itbg the
Gcneral Assembly and agreed to by the cotintry or countries
concerned."
6. 145th respect to the Congo, the same point is made by the
terms of the cable sent to the United Nations by the Governm'ent
of that country on the 12th July, 1960 (Document SI4382 ofJuly 13~
1g60) ,he resolutions of the Security Council (S14387 of July 13,
1g60, SI4405of July 22, 1960, SI4426of August g,1960, 514741 of
February zolzr, rg61) t,e Agreement between the United Nations
and the Congolese Government of the ~7th April, rg61, and the
resoIutions of the General Asçembly (x474iRev.r (ES-IV) of Sep-

ternber 16, 1g60, 1600 (XV) of April 17, 1961). In the view of the
British Government, it is clear from these documents that the
United Nations force was sent to the Congo at tlie express request
of the Government of the Republic of the Congo, remained there
with the consent of that Government and operated with due respect
for Congolese sovereignty.
7. In these circurnstances, in the viewofthe British Government,
no question arises as to the financid obligations of Members of the
United Nations in regard to expenses incurred in connexion with
operations initiated and carried out otherïvise than at the request

or with the consent of the Government ofthe territory in which the
operations are carried out. The British Government submit the
foilowing observations on the assumption that, in the case ofUNEF
and the Congo operation, the United Nations forces have acted
with the consent of the Governments concerned. They therefore
reserve ttheir view, in case it should appear that any steps have ~VRITTENSTATEMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
21 *
been taken against the will of any of the Governments concerned,
although it isthe belief of the British Government that this has not
happened in either case.
8. The validity of the relevant Security Council and General

Assembly reçolutions authorizing the UNEF and the Congo oper-
ations is not in terms submitted to the Court. However, if and so
far as the answers to the question referred to it by the General
Assembly may depend on the validity of those resolutions, the
British Govemment would support their validity on the assumptions
and to the extent that (i)they were within the purposes of the United
Nations as expressed in the Charter, and (ii) they required the con-
sent of the Governments concerned.

III. General Observations
g. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the British Govern-
ment submit that the question put to the Court should be answered

in the affirmative. The second paragraph of Article 17 of the United
Nations Charter provides that "The expenses of the Organization
shall be borne by the Members as àpportioned by the General
Assembly". These words should be interpreted in their natural and
ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. As the Court
held in itsAdvisory Opinion on the Conzpetenceof the GeneralAs-
sembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations (I.C.J.
Reports1950 at p. 8)the first duty of a tribunal which is cailed upon
to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty is to endeavour
to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the ,
context in which they occur, and "when the Court can give effect
to a provision of a treaty by giving to the words used in it their
natural and ordinary meaning, it may not interpret the words by
seelung to give them some other meaning".

IO. In the view of the United Kingdom, these principles apply
in the present case. No limitation is placed on the words "expenses
of the Organization" by Article 17, or by any other provisions of
the Charter. For the purpose of deterrnining what expenses are
"expenses of the Organization" so as to be subject to apportion-
ment among the Member States, no distinction is made in that
article or elsewhere in the Charter between normal and exceptional
expenses, or between the administrative expenses of the Organi-
zation and expenditures of other kinds which the Secretary-General
is authorized to incur in pursuance of the purposes of the United
Nations. ln the view of the United Kingdom, al1expenditures duly
authorized for the purpose of giving effect to valid resolutions of

the Security Council and the General Assembly are expenses of
the Organization within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 17
of the Charter.
II. It is believed that al1the expenditures to which the question
before the Court relates were authorized by the General Assembly WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 243
1956, the General Assembly authoized the Secretary-General to

establiçh a special account "in an initial amount of $10 million"
(reçolution 1122 (XI)). Successive resolutions increased the ex-
penditures authorized. These expenses were apportioned by the
General Assembly among the Member Stateç. This could only have
been in the exercise of its pon7ers mder Article 17, paragraph 2,
of the Charter and on the basis that they were regarded as "ex-
penses of the Organization" within the meaning of that paragraph.
1.5 .n fact, by resolution 1151 (XII), it was decicled by the
General AssembJy that these authonzed Expenses should be borne
by Member States in accordance with the scale of assessmentç
adopted hy the General Assernbly for the financial year 1957158.
This was inaccordance with the view expressed by the Secretary-
General (A/3943, paragraph r89) that the costs of United Nations
operations such as UNEF, based on resolutions of the General
Assemblÿ or the Security Council, should be allocated amongst aU
Members of the Organization on the normal scale of contributions

to the budget of the Organization. Subject to adjustment having
regard to specid cirçumstances, the current regular scale of assess-
ments was also used as the basis of apportionment of UNEF ex-
penses in 1959,1960 and 1961in Generai Assembly resolutions 1337
(XIII), 1441(XIV) and 1575(XV).

UlzitedNafi0pl.sQfie~atiolsn theCongo

16. 'I'heprecedent established in the case oUNEF was followed
by the General Assembly in the case of the operations in the Congo.
Under resolution 1583 (XV) the General Assembly decided to
establish an ad hoc account for expenses in the Congo, and decicled
that, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of that resolution,
the amount of $48.5 million "shall be apportioned among the
Rlember States on the basis of the regular çcale of assessment".
The second preambular paragraph of that resoliition expresslre-
cognized "that the expenses involved in the United Nations opera-
tions in the Congo for 1960 constitute 'expenses of the Organi-
zation' within the meaning of Articl17,paragraph z, of the Charter
of the United Nations and that the assessment thereof against
Member States creates binding legal obligations on such States to
pay their assessed shares".
17. Although resolution 16x9 (XV) adopted on April 21,1961,

\vas prefüced by the preambular statement "that the extraordinary
expenses of the United Nations operations inthe Congo are essen-
tially different in nature from the expenses of the Organization
under the regular budget and that therefore a procedure different
from that applied in the case of the regular budget is required for
meeting these extraordinary expenses", it waç decided in the
operative part of the resolution to appropriate an amount of $100244 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE UNITED XINGDOM
million for the operationof the United Nations in the Congo fron
x January to 3r October 1961 and to apportion that amount "a
expenses of the Organization" arnong the Mernber States.

C

Budgetary Procedt4res
18. The treatment of UNEF and ONUC expenses wlzich thu
appearç in the operative parts of the resolutions quoted above i
refiected in the procedures which have applied to budget eçtimate
for UNEF and Congo operations. Like the annual estimates fo
th? regdar budget, these estirnates have been :

(a) prepared and submit ted by the Secretary-General ;
('B Ixamined and reported on by the Advisory Cornmittee or
Administrative and Budgetary Questions of the General As
1 sembly, which is appointed under and performs the function
prescribed in Rules 156 to 155 of the General Açsembly'
Rdes of Procedure;

(EJ considered, debated and reported on bÿ the Fifth (Adrninis
, trativeand Budgetary) Cornmittee of the General Assembly
(d) adopted as the basisfor resolutions appropriating finance an(
authorizing the incurring of obligations and the making o
payrnents by the Secretary-General, subject to the relevan
financialregdations and rules.
I

rg. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, in the sub
mission of the British Governrnent, the expenditures authozizel
by the General Asçernbly mentioned in the question referred to th1
Court constitute "expenses of the Organization" within the meanini
of Article17, paragraph 2, of the Charterof the United Nations. 13.LETTRE DU GOUVERNEMENT ESPAGNOL AU
PRÉSIDENT DE LA COUR

La Haye, le zo février1962.
Monsieur le Président,

Le Gouvernement espagnol, vu la faculté offertdans le dernier
paragraphe de la communication adressée par leGreffierde laCour
que vous avez l'honneur de prksider à I'ambassadeur d'Espagne
aux Pays-Bas en date du 27 décembre 1961 concernant l'avisde-
mandépar l'Assembléegénkrale des Nations Unies dans sa résolution
du 20 décembre,désireporter àla connaissance de Votre Excellence
ce qui suit.
L'Assembléegdnéraledemanda à la Cour si les frais autorisés par
ses résolutions relatives aux opérations des Nations Unies au Congo
d'une part2 et aux forces d'intervention des NationsUnies, d'autre
part, çonçtituent des fraisde l'organisation dans le sens dii para-
graphe z de l'article17 de la Charte des Nations Unies.
Le Gouvernement espagnol entend que les frais de manutention
des Forces en question ne peuvent être considérhs comme frais
ordinaires de l'organisation, puisque d'après leur propre nature il
est évident qu'ils'agit dc frais extraordinairdus àdes cirçonçtan-
ces spéciales et transitoires.
Si la phrase ((dans le sens du paragraphe zde l'articlr7 de la
Charte des Nations Unies 1)veut dire que quoiqu'il s'agisse de
sommes qui figurent dans des comptes spbciaux ad hoc et n'ont

jamais figuré dans le budget ni ordinaire ni extraordinaire des
Nations Unies elles doivent étre homologuées (aux seuls effets du
paiement des quotes-parts respectives par tous lesgtats Membres)
aux sommes que ceux-ci doivent verser comme étant leur partici-
pation dans la distribution des frais budgktaires (autant en cequi
concerne les conséquences du dbfaut volontaire de paiement qu'au
prorata des quotes-parts correspondant à chaque etat Membre),
le Gouvernement espagnol ne peut être d'accord avec une telle
interprétation.
Considérant que les frais extraordinaires dont il s'agit dans cette
note ont &téfaits dans le but de maintenir la paix et la sécurité
et que d'aprésles article24,39 et suivants de:la Charte des Mations
Unies il est admis que certaines Puissances se réservent un rOle
prépondérant avec dcs droits différents et supérieurs h ceux des
autres fitats Membres de l'organisation et ceci prkcisément dans
le but de maintenir la paix et la sécuritéinternationales, il est
également logique que de tels États aient des obligations majeures
lorsqu'on demande une action spécifique de l'Organisation pour
accomplir les buts susmentionnés.246 LETTRE DU GOUVERNEMENT ESPAGNOL
Par conskquent, le Gouvernement espagnol estime (tout en réser-
vant sa position en cequi concerne les conséquences que le defaut
de'paiements de certaines contributions extraordinaires puisse en-
trainer pour les&ats qui n'acceptent pas le critére suivi pour le
prorata des sommes dont ilçkagit)que le critkre Asuivre pour ladite

distribution ne ,peut &trecelui $appliquer les mêmes coefficients
utilisés pour le budget des Nations Unies et que, pour qu'il soit
kqbitable, il doittenir compte des droits et devoirs spéciaux des
membres permanents du Conseil de Sbcuritk,de la situation spéciale
des gtats dzrectement rnêléo çu irnpliqub 52l'origineet au dhelop-
pement des questions dont il s'agit, et de la capacité de paiement
de5 autres Membres des Nations Unies.
Le Gouvernement espagnol attire l'attention de Votre Excellence
sur le faitque son point de vue coincide avec celui qui se trouve
exposéaux paragraphes 3 et 4de la partie expositive de la rksolution
no ,16rg(XV) de l'Assembléegénérale des Nations Unies du 21 avril
1961, et se permet de rappeler que le paragraphe 4 de la partie
dispositive de ladite résolution soulignaique la rkpartition de cent
millions de dollars conformément à l'kchieue des quotes-parts du
budget ordinaire se faisait((enattendant que soit établieune échelle
de 'quotes-parts diffkrentepour subvenir aux frais extraordinaires
des Nations Unies àl'occasion de telles opCrationsM.
IdeGouvernement espagnol croit ainsi remplir son devoir dkex-
poser AVotre Excellence son opinion sur la question qui concerne
la demande d'avis que l'Assemb16e généraledes Nations Unies a
ndiesske Ala Cour.
Veuillez agrker, etc.
(Signb) Comte DE MONTEFUERTE,
Chargd:d'affaires a.2.

I 14. WRITTEN STATERlENT OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF IRELANB

Ey resolution adopted atits 1086th meeting the General Assembly
of the United Nations on the 20th December, 1961, decided to
sequest the International Court of Justice to give an advisory
opinion respectiilg expenditures in connection with operations

undertaken in pursuance of certain resolutions of the Security
Council and of the General Assernbly; and by order of the 27th
December, 1961, the Court fixed the 20th February, 1962, as a
time-limit for the submission of ~irritten statements. The Govern-
ment of Ireland accordingly submits the following observations:-

1, The Reqzfiest

The question on which the Court isrequested to give an advisory
opinion isas follows :-
"DOthe expenditures autliorized iiGencral dssernbly resolutions
1583 (XV) and 1590(XY) of 20 Decembcr 1960, r595 (XV) of
3Ayril I GI,r61g (XV) of 21 April1961and 1633 (XVI) of 30 Oc-
tober 19 2I relating to the Unitcd Nations operations ithe Congo
undertakeri In pursuünce of tlieSeciirity Council resolutions of
14July,223 ulyand gdugust 1960and 21 Fcbriiaryand 24 November
rgGr,aridGeneralAssembly resolutions1474(ES-I\7)of20 Scptember
1960 aiidr599 (XV), 1600(XV) and 1601 (XV) of 15 April 1961,
and the expenditures aiithorized in Generül Assembly resolutions
1122 (XI) of 26 Novenlber 1956, 1089(XI) of 21 December 1956,
1090(XI) of 27 Fcbruary 1957, 115r (XII) of 22 Noveinber 1957,
xzoq (XII) of 1December 1937 ,337 (XIII) of 13Decernbet r958,
1441 (XIV) of 5Decen~her19jgand ~57 j (XV) of 20Deceinber1960
relatingtothe operations ofthe United Nations Emergency Force
undertalccnirpursuance ol Generalhssernbly resolutioiis997 (ES-)
of2 Movcmber1956,998 (ES-I) and 999(ES-I)of4 Wovernber1956,
1000 (6s-1)of5Novernber1956,1001(ES-1)of 7 h'overnber1956,r IZI
(ILI)of 24 November 1956 and ~263 (XIII) of14 November 1958,
constitute'expcnscs of the Organization' within the rneanirigof
.4rticl17, paragraph 2, ol theCharter of the United Nations?"

2. The Pztrposes O/the Ulzited Nations .
In order to decide wlzether any particular expenses can be said
to be "expenses of the Organization" it is cibviously necessary to

have regard to tlie purposes of the Organization. Expenses incurred
by an organization in furtherance of the purposes for ~vhichit was
established may, in the fullest sençe, he said to be expenses of the
organization. The purposes of the United Nations are set out clearly
and explicitlgrin ArticleI of theCharter, the firstof these purposes I
248 WRITTEN STATEhTEKT OF IRELAND

being to take effective collective measures to maintain international
peace and security. The article reads as foliows:-

"Tl~e purposes of thc United Watioiis are:
(r) To maintain international peace and security, and to thatend:
totake effective collective rneasures for the prevention and removnl
ofthreats to thc peace, and for the suppression ofacts ofaggression
I or other brcachesof thepcace, and to bring i~boutby peaceful means,
and in conformit y with the principles of justice and international
law, adjustment or çettlei~ie~of internationaldisputes or situations
which rniglit lead to a breach of the peace.
, (2) To develop iriendly relations atnong natioits based on respect
/ for the principleof equnl rights and self-determination of peoples,
and to take other appropriate measures to strengtkien universal
peace ;
(3) To achieve international çooperation in solving intertîational
problems of an ecoi~omic,social, culturalor humani tariatl çharactcr,
i ancl in promoting and eiicouraging respect for human rights atid
for fundamental freedoms for al1without distinction as torace, ses,
Eanguage, or religion;and
(4) To he a centre for harmonizing tlie actionsof nations in tlie
, attainmct~t of the.% coinmon ends."
I
It wili thus be apparent that the firststated purpose of the
United Nations is to preserve international peace andthat the first
drty imposed on the Mernber States isto take collective rneaçures
fo: the prevention and rernoval of threats to the peace and for the
suppression of breaches of the peace. The Mernber States for their

part undertake that in order to ensiire to alof them the sights and
bencfits resulting from rnembership thcy shali fulfilin go~d fait11
the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter
(A~ticle 2 (2)).

3. Fina~zcingthe Unite Ndations
The Charter, in Article 17, rnakes explicit provisiorl for meeting
expenditure. It provides as fo1lows:-

: "r. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget
of the Orgailization.
2. The espenses of theOrganization shallbe borne by the Mernbcrs
as apportioned by the General Assembly.
' 3. The General Asscmbly shall consider and approve any hnancial
and budgetary arrangements witli specialized agençies referred to
iriArticle3.7and shall esanîine the administrative budgets ofsuch
specializedagencieç with a.view tomaking recomrnendatinns to the
agençies coaceriled."

This is the only provision in the Charter for meeting expenditiire;
no other article contains any express reference to "expenses", "expen-
diture" or budgetary matterç (except Articles 18 and 19 which follorv
Article 17 and bear directly on it).The only powers given to the
I

1l IVRETTEN STATEMENT OF IRELAND 249
Assembly to take decisions on expenditure are contained in Article
17 (and 18 and 19). It haç never purported to act under any other
articlend none of the other principal organs of the United Nations
has clairned for itself the right to take decisions on questionsof
expenditure or suggested that other provisionsof the Charter gave

itpower to do so.
The terrns of Article 17 (2)are quite clear. They make no dis-
tiriction between "administrative" and "other" exlîençes, Articl17
(3) howeverdoes, in contrast, rnake such a distinction in the caof
the budgetsofthe SjiecializedAgenciesby givingpower to the Assem-
bly to "examine the ccd~nz'lzist~-ïbtdegets" of those Agencies.The
General Assembly iç given the powcrunder Article 17 (r)to consider
and approvc the budget ofthc Organization. This paragraph, read in
conjunction with parctgraphs z and 3of Article17, clearly indicates
that the Assembly has the power (and the obligation) to decide
what expenditiireç constitute expenses af the Organization. It rnay
validly be contendecl that "expenses of the Organization" aresuch
expenditures duly inciirred as the AssernbIy in exercise of its
mandatory budgetary powers may decide are to be apportioned
among the Members. By authorizing the expenditures and ap-
portioning them arnong the Members, the Assembly exercises these
potvers, and the expenditures in questionrnay therefore be said to
constitute "expenses of the Organization".

4. Resoldions ref~~redto inEheRequest

Two categories of reçolutions are referred to in the request to
I the Court for an advisom opinion, narnely ~esolutions relating to
ONUC and resolutions relatingto UNEF. It is convenient to deal
çeparately with these resolutions.

The expenditures in connection with the United Nations opera-
tions in the Congo were authorized by the folloiving resolutions of
the General Assembly :-
1583 (XV) and
,1590(XV) of20 Decernber 1960
1595 (XV) of3 April 1961

1619 (XV) of 21 April 1961and
r633 (XVI) of 30 October 1961.
1
The operations in question were undertaken in pursuance of the
following resolutions of the Security Council and the General
l Assernbly.

Resolutions of 14 July,22 July and g August 1960
and 21 Febmary and 24 November, 1961.General Assembly

/solutions 1474 (ES-IV)of 20 September rg40,
1599EXV),
1600 (XV) and
1601 (XV)of 15 April rg6r.
The initial decision of the Security Council in relation to the

operations in the Congoiscontained in itç resolutio~i14 July 1960.
In adopting tllis resolution the Security Council was exercising its
functionç in fullcanfonnit wyith the Charter and with the con-
currence of dl itsmernbers. The operation thus jnitiatcd was
continued by further Security Council resolutionsofthe 22July and
g August rg60 and 21February and 24Novernber 1961. In beginning
and continuing the action in the Congo, the Çecurity Council has
been acting in the proper discharge of the pri~nary responsibility
for the maintenance of international peaçe and security conferred
on liby Article 24 (1)of the Charter.The decisions of the Assembly
in relationto the operation in the Congo, undertaken in pursuance
of the Security Council resolutions, have recommended support for
those resolutions and continuation of the action taken. Thus the
Assembly by resolution of the zoth September 1960 confirmed lts
support for the action taken and requested the Secretaqr-General
to continue to take action in accordance with the terms of the
Security Council resolutionç. On the 15th April1961, it re-affirmecl
its own earlier resolution of the 20th September and previous
Security Council resolutionç. The earliest af the General Assembly
resolutionscame after the initial decisions of the Security Council;
the latest came before tlzelater decisions of the CounByladopting
these resolutions the Assembly waç exercising its functions undcr
Arlcleç IO to r5 of the ClzarterTtiç clear that action in the Congo
was author-ized initially and is continued by decisions of the
Security Council.
There can be no question that expenditurcs incurred in pursuance

of decisions properly taken by the Securitjr CouncPlin the excrcise
of itçpomrs and duties under the Charter constitute "expenses
of the Organization" withzn the rneaning of Article 17(2) of the
Chartes. Keferences to Article 43 of the Charter are irrelevant in
the context of theONUC operations since the Security Council was
not acting under thiç article, nor have the "special agreements"
referred totherein been drawn up.

U.N.E.F.

The expenditures in connection with the United Nations Emer-
gency Force were authorized by the Assembly in the followjngreso-
lutions :
rlzz (X1)of 26 Novernber 1956
1089 (XI) of21 Decembcr y956 WRITTEN STSTEMENT OP IRELAXD
1090 (XI)of z7 Febmary 1957
xrgl:(XII) of22 November 1957
1204 (XII)of 13 December 1957
1337(XIII) of13Decernber 1958
1441 (XIV) of 5December rggg
1575 (XV) of20 December rg6o.

The expenditures thus authorized related to operations under-
taken in pursuance of the following resolutions of the General
Assembly :

997 (ES-I)of zNovember 1956
998 {ES-1)and
999 (ES-1)of 4Novernbet 1956
xooo (ES-1)of 5November 1956
1001 (ES-1)cif7 November 1956
1121 (XVJ of 24 November 1956 and
1263 (XIII)of 14 Novernber 1958.

The sequence of events tvhich led to the establishment oUNEF
in 1gg6 was as fol1ows:-
The Securitgr Council, chargea with the primary responsibility
for the maintenance of the peace, considered a situation inthe
Middle East. For lack of unanimity arnong its permanent members
it courd take no action; hostilities in the MiddlEast continued.
The ÇecurityCouncil thereupon çalled the General Açsembly into
emergency special session. In accordance with the (Uniting for
Peace) resolution (377 (V))of 3 November 1950, the Assembly-
facing a situation where the Security Council, because of laçk of
unanimity of the permanent members, had failed to exercise its
prirnary responsibility for the maintenance of internationapeace
and security-then considered the matter "uritha view tu making
appropriate recommeridationç to members for collective rneasureç
including, in the case of a breack of the peace osan act of aggression,
the use of armed force..."(resolution 377 (V)).
Employing the powers to "recornmend rneasures" and "make
recommendations" which it enjoys under Articles IO to 15 of the
Charter, the Assembly tlzen urged a cease-fire. The Assembly then
%venton to establish under resolution 1000 (ES-1) of5 November
1956 a subsidiary organ-the United Nations Emergency Force-

to supervise the cessationof lzostilitieç which it haurged in its
previous resolutions. Tlzis the Assernbly was empomered to do
under Article zz of the Charter, which rea"*fie GeneralAssembly
may establiçh such subsidiary organs asitdeems necessary for the
performance of its functions.The subsequent Assembly resolutions
listed above have maintained the Force thus established.
The United Nations, in addition to thpowers expressly provided
for in the Charter,must be recognized as having by implication
those powerç which are necessary for it to discllaitsduties.This2j2 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF IRELAND

position was recognized by the International Courtof Justice in
the Refiaratioas case, when the Court stated that:

"Undcr international law, the Organization must be deemed to
have those pori'ers wllich, though not expressly provided for in the
1 Charter, are conierred upon it by necessary implication as being
essential to the performance of its duties. This principlof law was
applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice to thc
InternatioilalLabour Organisation in its advisory opinion No. 13
; of July 23, 1926 (Series B, No. 13, p. iS), xnd must be applicd to
the United Nations." (Advisory Opinion-Rc$aration /or imjxries
sz$#ered in the Service oj the United A'ations-I.C.J. lie$orLs1949,
p. 182.)
I
The argument inrelation to the expendtures incurred in con-
nection with UNEF has been well surnmarized in the following
extract from an article by Professor Chaumont in the Annztaire
f~an~ais de Droit international :-

"Cet article r7,aprhs avoir donni: (par. I)à 1'AssemblCegénkrrtlc
le pouvoir d'approuver le budget, stipulc (par.2) que 'les depenses
i de l'organisation sont supportées par les membres selon la reparti-
tion fixéc par l'Assembléegénkrale'. 1-e langage est impkratif: il
s'agit ici, non'un pouvoir de recommandation, mais d'un pouvoir
de décision de l'Assenibl&e.En vertu de ce langage, ilon seulement
les meinbres doivent participer aux dépenses, mais cette obligatioii
1 n'est pas affectéepar le modc dc répartition choisi par I'Assernblée,
puisque ce choix est une décision de 1'AssemblCe. I3oiîc rneme les
ctats qui figurent dans la minorité (c'est-à-dire qui ne figurenpas
dans les 213 de votants exiges par l'article18de la Charte pour les
1 questions biidgétaires)sont lits par le principe de la contribution,
et par les modalités fixéespar 1'Assembli.e.Il cn est ainsi dans la
mesure bien entendu oh l'on corisidèrc la Force cl'urgence comme
un organe subsidiaire de l'Organisation, créé conformément A
1l'articl22 de la Charte. La création d'un tel organe n'cst pas une
recommandation mais une décision et, par suite, du faitmême de
son existence,cetorgatie est couvert par la stipulation de l'arti17,
par. z,de la Charte. C'est d'ailleurs bien ainsi que les chosscsont
passées pour des organes qui, 3 dcs mornelits et à des degrks divers,
1ont été créés dans des conditions qui ont soulev6 Icsprotestations
de certains Etats: par exemple leConseil de Tutelle (iest vrai or-
gane principal)aétéconstitué en 1946 d'une rnanikre que I'U.R. 5. S.
a jugéeirrégulihreet qui a motivéson absence k la première session
idu Conseil; le Comitéradhoc SUI les territoires non autonoines, crEk
par la résolution du 14dkcernhre 1946, a &té jugé illégal par les
Puissances administrantes; 3'U.R. S.S. et lespays de démocratie
populaire n'ont pas admis la Commission intérimaire de l'hsseinblée
1générale, créée cn rgqS, et la Commissiotz des mesures collectives,
forrnee en vertu cle larésolution Açhesan du 3 novembre rg5o;
. l'Ail-iquedu Çiid n'a pz admis le Comité du Sud-Ouest africain, etc.

Tous ces organes on; cependant kt6 integrés dans le budget de
;l'organisation, et les ktats protestataires, en pâyan t leur contribu-
,tion annuelle, ont parla merne participé &l'entretiende cesorgarîes.a4 WKITTEN ÇTATEWENT OF IRELAWD

lt is submitted that for the foregoing reasons theançwer to the
Request trançmitted to the Court under the resalution of the

General Assernbly ofzo December 1961 should be "yes". I

Tib WHI1TEN STATERIENT OF SOUTH AFRTCA
as was done in General Assernbly resolution 1583 (XV), or by
apportioning them in the same rnanner as expenses falling under
ArticIe 17.2, the question as to whether they are to be regarded in
that light isnot necessarily answered. If the General Asçembly

apportions expenses arnong hlember States, the only effect that a
reference to Article 17.2 rnay have iç to render it clear that the
intention ww that the contributions should be obligatory and not
voluntary. Even if Article 17.2is not mentioned, however, the in-
tention that tliis Article shall apply ma' be gathercf drom the
tenor of the text of a rcsolution or surroilnding circuinstances. But
althougb the General Assernbly can apportion the expenses of the
Organizatioil in terins of Article 17.2itcannot apportion anything
othet than the "expenses of the Organization", nor Gan it iricrcase
its yowers by simply labelling expenditure as "expcnseç of the
Organization" and authorizing it, if the expenditure is not in fact
what is underçtood by "expenscç of the Organization". For the
purpose of deterrnining the meaning of this term, sesolution 1583
(XV) nced not, therefore, be conçidered urltil itis clear that such
expe~isescan potentially fall under Article 17.2. Were the position
otherwise, the Assembly would not be bound by the provisions of
the Charter, but would bc a body \vhicli could define itsowri powers,
irrespective of these provisions. It is clear that this was not the
intention of the Charter.

5. Only after it is establishecl that specific expenditures fa11
within the definition of "esycnses of the Organixrition" can General
Assernbly resolutionç becoriie relevant in order to ascertain xvhether
the Asçembly, in passing the rcsolution, regarded such expenditures
as "expenses of the Organization" or as costs to be met from volun-
tary contributionç.
I
6. It rnay well be argucd that, if the General Assembly had for
a long pei-jodof time regarded certain expenditures as faling under
Article 17.2,and al1 hlember States had acquiesced tkerein, ex-
penses which the Charter had not intended to fa11under that
Article rnight be said to faIl thereunder, either by tacit consent of
hlember States, or bjrcustom. But even if there were substance in this
argument, neither tacit consent not custom ariseç in this case.
Tl~ere was, in fact, corzsiderable opposition to General Assembly
res/olution1583(XV) and it cannot, therefore, be regarded as having
received tacit consent of Member States.

7. '1-hcquestion whether certain costs were intended by the
Charter to tie "expençes of the Organi~atioii" will therefore have
to pe determined objectively. Thc General Asseinbly's powers are
lim'ited to the apportionmei~t of expenditures which fa11withiil
that term and da not ii~clude the power te dctcrniine that costs
whic1-1worrld not otherwise be fncl~idedthereunder are neverthcless
to be regarded as "expenses of the Organization". WHITTEN STATEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA 257

8. It is clear that the term "expenses of the Organization" will
include the ordinary administrative expenses arising from the
functioning of the United Nations as an organization. It is sub-

mitted that the word "of" should be interpreted as "pertaining to",
not as "authorized by", "supervised by", "recomrnended by the
General A~ssernblyof ", "pertaining to subsidiary organs of", nor
as "pertaining to measures taken by Members in consequencc of

Security Council resolutions of ". Since Article 17.2 imposes a
financial obligation on Members of the United Nations, it shoiild
not be thus extensiveky interpreted. Only such expenses as would

normdly pertain to the United Nations, taking its Charter into
account, can be regarded as "expenses of the Organization".

g. In answering the question in respect whereof an advisory
opinion has been requested, it will be necessary to deterinine in

the first place under what provisions of the Charter the relative
resolutions were adopted. There is, however, no çlear answer on
this point. The relative reçolutions do not state under what article

or articles they were adopted and their wording does not give suf-
ficient indicatioris in this respect. Various opinions rvere expresçed
in this connexion. So, for instance, the representative of tlie
U.S.S.R. staied that "expenditure incurred by the United Nations

in connexion witk the situation in the Republiç of the Congo should
...be considered under (Article 43) of the Charter and possjbly
others such as Article 59, but not in the context of the regular

United Nations budget" 4. On the oiher hand, the Secretary-

Mr. Roshchin in thc Fifth Cornmittee (G. A., O. R.,Flflernth Sess., Fifth
Go*?tw~8..o~rd Mccting, 2g Noveniber 1960,p. 247). Vzdc also n41st Meeting, 18April
1961,pp. 70-72, and 995th Plenary Mccting. 21 April 1961. Ano'cher articlc ofthe
Chaster wliich, according toMr. Roçhchin in the Fifth Cornmittee on zgth Eovtmber,
1960, rnight be applicable was Article 59 See also: tlie statenzent oi thc lndian
delegtite (G. A., 0,R , F%Jtt'ea#Shcss ,Fifiih Co~n,l, 817th Meeti~ig, 13 Dccember
ryGo. p. 321):-

"...the oliligationsof RIcmbcr States derived from thc CIiartcr of the United
Nations The Axsembly could not require States to assume obligations wllich
wcnt beyurid tliosc providcd for in the Charter urilesç those obligatiunswere
ivillingly acceptedLiyStt~tes. Xirliile tlic activiofthe United Nation:. in the
Congu iindoubtedly came within the scope of Clinpter VI1 oI the Charter,
certain provisions of that Chapter had not been cornpliecl witki. Article 43,
forexnmple, prnvided forapecial agreerneiitsbetwecn the Se~urity Council and
United Nations Membcrs whcn thc Criuncil took certai~i ineasurcsfor the
niaintenancc of internaticinal peace and security. The fact tliatrio special
agreement had been concluded strengtliencd the argument that the Charter
could not be çited as authorrty for imposing the financial respo~lsibilityfor
OflUC on the Mernber States. Under Article 35, the hlembers of the Uiiited
Nations agreed to accept arid carry out the decisions of the Security Counclt,
'in accordance witli the presentChartcr' That meant tliat decisions wliichhad
iiot becn taken in accordfince with thc Charter u7ere not binding."

Lhc Indraiidelegate therciipon pointed out tliat finaiiciareguld'cioii13.1 and
rule t54 of the ridesof procedurc should have been crirnylied with,
The statement ofthc Bulgarian delegate (G.A .,O. R.,Iriflss~tSess.,FzJllaÇurnt~z..
838tli Meeting, 14 April 1961, p. 56):- cls WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SOUTH AERICA

General denied that these:Articles applied. He stated that resolu-
tions telatipg to the operations in the Congo "could be considered
ad having been irnplicitly adopted under Article 40, but certainly
ilot under Articles 41 or 42" 5. (ArticIe 40 ernpowers the Security
Council to "cd rrpon tlie parties concerned to comply with such
provisio~ial rqeasures as it deems necessary or desirahle" in "order

ta, prevent an aggravation of the situation" before Ineasures
provided for in Article 39 (which includes action under Articles 41
and 42) are decided upon.)
The Laliadian delegate, again, expressed the view that Articles 24
and 25 of the Charter applied to United Mations' action in the
Congo e.

10. In considering the provisions of the Charter under which
the relative resolutions were said to have heen or co~ildhave beeri

adopted, the foiloiving points arise :
II. If Security Council action was taken urider Articles 42 and
43, Articles 44, 48 and 49 would xlso apply.

Article 43 provideç that Memhers undertake to make armecl
forces available to the Security Council in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements. According to Article 44, a Member whick
has been called upori to provide armecl forces çhall be invited to

sit in th'e Security Council to participate in decisions concerning
the eniployment thereof.

I Article 48 provides that :-
"I. 'Theaction reqiiired to carry out the decisions ofthe sccurity
Çouncil for the miiintenance of internatiorial peace alid security
shall betaken by al1the Membcrs OS the United Nations or ùy sorne
, of thern,as the Security Councilmay determiile.
2. Such dccisionç çhall be carried out by thc RlIernbers of the
United Natiotîsdirectly and through their action iiithe approyriatr.
intei-iiationalügencicsof which thcy are Members."

Article 49 provides that :-
I
"Thc Members of the United Nations shall jojn in affording
mutual assistance in çarrying out the meaiires decided upon by the
Security Council."

, "Thc fiiiancing of action to mailitairi peace and sccurity beogoverncd
1by the special agreements concltided under Article 43. paragraph2, of the
Cliarter hetiveen the Security Council and the Memher States whicwere t0
carry out the Council's decisia"s
' G. A.,0. R.,FifleentlSsss, PiJila Coliim839th Meeting,I7 April1961, p. 59.
See alsn.The $taternentof thcPakistani dclegatein the FifthCornmitteeto the
effe~that Article 156showed thatArticles42 and 43 could not a~i~itothc Congo
operations inasmuch as Articl106prcscribed tliat, pending the special agreeme~lts
consult: ivithviewtto joint actionand thisbwa.5iiot donc (G.A.,O.X ,i17zftssflih
Sess.IGfth Comm.. 81 th Meeting, 7December igSr, p288).
' G A.,O. R.,Fz/leeullhSess.,fiLomwi.,808th Meeting. 5Decernkr rgCiop.270.
I 12. Leaving aside for the moment the point that al1 measures
decided upon by the Security Council must be measures consonant
with the Charter in order to qualify for the mutual assistance
mentioned in Article 49, there is no reason to suppose that assis:
tance does not also include financial assistance in order to meet

espenses of action under Security Council resolutions.

13. The inference to be drawn from the above provisions is that
action undertaken under Security Council resolutions is action
directly undertaken by the individuai Members in accordance
with agreements with the Security Council. Member States have to
assist each other in this connection(Article 49).The Security Council's

own functions are to call upon Men~bers to provide the armed
forces and indicate what measures such armed forces have to take
"with the assistance of the Military Staff Comniittee" (Articles 45
and 46) established under Article 47. Even assuming tliat expenses
relating to the functioning of the Military Staff Committee could

be regnrded as espenses of the United Nations, the costs of the
military forces employed would not bc such expenses. Such arnled
forces 3s are provided by individual Rlembers, although acting in
pursuance of Security Council resolutions, would still be the finan-
cial responsibility of the relevant Member States, and action taken

by them would still be action of units of armed forces of Mcmber
States. Their espenses could not, thereforc, be regarded as expenses
of the "international organization to be known as the United
Nations" (Preamble) '.

14. It is to be noted that the costs of United Nations action in
Korea were not regarded as "expenses of the Organization" and

were not paid from United Nations' funds. On the contrary, tlie
costs ofthe action were borne by those States which responded tothe
call of the Security Council in its resolution of 20 June 1950 for

As was said by the South African delegate in tlie Fifth Conimittee (G. A.,
0.R..FifteeiztlSESS.. Fiffh Co?wnt., 807th Meeting,2 Deceniber 1960, p. 2G7):
"the authors of the Charter had regarded the cost of peace and security actiass
constituting a scparate type of expensc, not to be included in the regular budget...".
Includitig thc cost of such activities in the rcgular financial budget would lead to
grave dificulties.
The Iiidiaii delegate stated A.,O. R.,FifteevalhSessFilth Co?~n.,817tli Meet-
ing, 13December 1960, pp. 321and 322):-
"Ordinary cxpenses mcre, of course, those wliich related to the current
operations of the Unitcd Nations. Accordingto the RepertoryO/ Pvadice, the
normal continuing functions of the Or~anization were financed from the
, reglilnr budget. l'lic activities of the United Natioin the Congo and the
mcasures taken at the time of the Suez crisis were not, howcver, normal
contiiiuiiig activitieONUC, likc UNEF, could thercfore bc financed by
voliintary contributionsbut iiot through the regular budget. If al1 Ivlember
States mcre automaticallyrequired to participatin peace and security opera-
tions, those aniong them whose financial capacities were limited would even-
tiially conie to regard membership in the United Nations as an expensive
Iiisiiry."260 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

assistance to repel an arnled attack on the Republic of Icorea and
"to restore international peace and security in the area".

15. The view that expenses of military action in conscquencc of
Security Council resolutions cannot be regarded as "expenses of the
Organization" is supported by what happened at San Francisco
when the Charter was drafted. On 18 May 194j, the Australian
delegate proposed at the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Organization that a Membershould be deprived ofhis voting

rights in the General Assembly if he failed to carry out his obliga-
tions under provisions which were subscquently to become Article 43
of the Charter This proposa1 was made during the discussion of
the financial obligations of Members ancl would not have been
made had financial obligations under Article 43 been regarded as
"expcnses of the Organization" within the meaning of Article 17.2.

The opposition to a provision ayplying the sanction of Article 19
to financial obligations under provisions which subsequently
became Article 43 was such that the proposa1 was withdrawn on
8 June 1945, after discussion on it was deferred several times
As the Mexican delegate stated in the Fifth Cornmittee Io:-"Ex-
penses resulting from operations involving the use of arnied forces,

as in the case of thc Congo operations, were deliberately and intcn-
tionally excluded by the San Francisco Confcrcnce from the appli-
cation of the penalty provided for in Article 19."

16. During the discussions relating to the nature of the Congo
costs, the Secretary-General denied a statement made by the
representative of the U.S.S.K. to the effect that United Nations
action in the Congo \$rasin pursuance of Articles 42 and 43. The
Secretary-General stated that Congo action "could be considered
as having been inlplicitly adopted under Article 40" 11, which

cmpowers the Security Council to "cd1 upon the parties concerned
to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or
desirable" in order to prevent an aggravation ofthe situation before,
inter alin, measures under Article 42 are decided upon.

17. It is to be noted that the Secretary-General dicl not assert
unecluivocally that measures relating to the Congo fell under

U.N.C.I.O. DOCS.\.ro1. 8, pp. 364 and 365; seealso the statemcnt of the Rlcsican
dclegatc (G.A., O.R., rgtlr Sess., FiftlzCo»t~n.,837th Mecting, rq April 1961.Doc.
A/C.5/862) and the answer by the Secretary-Gento the effect that the Austra-
lian amendinent "had not referred in any general sense to operatinvolviiig
the usc of armecl forces biit had referred speand esclusively to obligatioiis
under Article 43 of the Charter". (G. A., O. R., 15th Sess.,Z3, th Meeting,
17 April 1961, p. 59.)
'OThe Mexica.n statement of 14April 1961, szcpvaa.t p. 33.
l1G. A .O.A., Filteenth Sess.. Fifth Coinrn..839th Mee17April 1961, p. 59.
The Secretary-Gcneralstated that lie had quoted Article 40 in this connection
before without contradictionbut did not categoricallasscrt thatArticle 40
applied. WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA 261

Article 40, but merely that they "could be considered as having
been implicitly adopted" under that Article. Nevertheless Article 40
hardly seems applicable to the two Security Council resolutions of
21 February and 24 November 1961. The resolution of 21 February
1961 urged "that the United Nations take immediately al1 appro-
priate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil urar in the Congo,
including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of al1 military
operations, tlie preventing of clashes, and the use offorce, if neces-
sary, in the last resort ...".The resolution of 24 November 1961
"strongly deprecates the secessionist activities illegally carried out
by the provincial administration of Katanga, with the aid of

external resources and manned by foreign mercenaries", and
"authorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action, includ-
ing the use of requisite measures of force, if necessary, for the im-
mediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or
deportation of al1foreign military and para-military personnel and
political advisers not under the United Nations Command, and
mercenaries.. .".1t might possibly be said that the Security Council
acted under Article 40 when it called "upon the Government of
Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Kepublic
of the Congo" in the resolution of 14 July 1960. But it is difficult to
see how Article 40 could have applied when the Security Council
decided in the same resolution "to authorize the Secretary-General
to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government
of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with

such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the
efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance
of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in
the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their task".

18. Thc provisional measures contemplated by Article 40 seem
to have been directions of the Security Council to disputing parties,
not action by that body and certainly not military action by the
United Nations. Article 40 provides that the parties had to "com-
ply" ("conformer") with mcasures which the Security Councildeems
necessary or dcsirable. In other words, the parties themselves had
to take the active steps. That the United Nations was to give the
Republic of the Congo military assistance could hardly be regarded
as a "ineasure" with which parties had to "comply" within the
terms of Article 40. In any event, the provisional measures provided

for in Article 40, if deemed necessary by the Security Council,
must be taken before making recommendations or deciding upon
ineasures provided in Article 39. The type of situation coi-itemplated
by Article 40 must have been a dispute between States, and the
provisional measures contemplated must have been measures to
be taken by the disputing States in order to prevent such dispute
from leading to any hostilities, e.g. withdra~ral of armed forces,
aircraft or ships from frontiers, cessation of mobilization of fifth262 IVRITTEN 'STATEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

column activities in another State, etc. Withdrawal of Belgian
troops from the Congo might, assuming tliat a dispute existed, be
regarded as such a provisional measure undcr Article 40, inas-
much as it was an active step wliich had to be taken by one of
the parties to the dispute. If, ho\i~ever,active steps to bc taken,

gzot by the parties, but by the United Nations, were to be im-
plicitly included under the provisional measurcs with which the
parties had to comply under Article 40, this Article ivould be given
a wide meaning deviating from the ordinary meaning of the
words used. But evcn assuming that Article 40 \srasintended to
have such a \vide meaning and that the sending of United Nations
forces to the Congocould be included under the provisional measures
of Article 40, there is no reason to assume that the costs thereof
should be regarded in a different liglit from costs incurred under
Articles 42 and 43.The provisional measures were to be taken pend-

ing action under Articles 41, 42 and/or 43. An anomalous position,
which could not have been contenlplated when the Charter was
drafted, \irould have arisen if the costs of provisional measures
ii7ere"expenses of the Organization" for which Members were liable,
whereas costs of action undertalcen thereaftcr were not to be regard-
ed as such.

19. Ancl it seems clear from Article 43, other articles of the
Charter and the proposais and discussions at San Francisco, that
costs of armed forces made available under Article 43 are to be
mct by means of special agreements or mutual assistance under
Article 49, but shall not be "expenses of the Organization" undcr
Article 17.3T .he Secretary-General, in stating that the Austraiian
proposal at San Francisco referred "specificaliy and exclusively
to obligations under Article 43 of the Charter" and not "in any
gcneral scnsc to operations involving the usc of arn-iedforces", and

that the Congo operations "did not constitute sanctions or enforce-
ment action as contcmplated by Articles 42 and 43 of the Char-
ter" 12, did not seem to dispute tliat the costs of action under
Article 43 fell outside the provisions of Article 17.2.
20. The above rcmarks are specifically directed to Security Coun-
cil action under Chapter VII. What would the position be if the

Security Council action relating to tlie Congo can be said to have
been taken in pursuance of Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter?
Article 24.1 provides :-

"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its Members confer on tlie Seciirity Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of iiiternational peace and
security and agreethat incarrying out its dutics underthis respons-
ibility tlic Security Councilacts on tlibehalf."
21. In the case of Article 24.1 the Security Council.acts because
United Nations Members confer on it "primary responsibility for

l2Ibid. IVRITTEN STATEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA 263

the maintenance of international peace and security" and as such
"the Security Council acts on their behalf". In other words, the
Security Council is authorized in Article 24.1 to act on behalf of
Rlembers of the United Nations and not on behalf of tlic United
Nations. But when thc Security Council acts in piirsuance of Article
24, its action ~nustat the same time be governed by some provision
specifically "laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VI11 and XII", as
providecl for in Article24.2.The only chapter which seems relevant
in the case of action in the Congo would secm to be Chapter VII.
Consequently, authority for the activities engaged in in the Congo
must again be found in Chapter VIX. It has already been argued

above that espenditures relating to the operations in the Congo
under Chapter VI1 do not constitute "espenses of the Organization".

22. It is submitted that, in view of the above, al1the espenditures
relating to the United Nations operations in the Congo do not con-
stitute "espenses of the Organization" within the meaning of
Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

23. But, even if the Court wcre to hold that expenditures
authorized in Gencral Assembly resolutions relating to the opera-
tions in the Congo xiiay constitute "espenses of the Organization"
within the meaning of Article 17.2, the matter is not thereby con-
cluded. Before the Court can find that al1 the espenditures autho-
rized by the resolutions quoted are "expenses of the Organization",
it inust also be established that such cxpenditures are legal and
valid and arose from lcgal and valid activities. It is patent that deci-
sions and activities which are ultra vires the Cliartcr cannot consti-
tute obligations on Rlcmbcrs and expenditures resulting there-
froni cannot therefore fa11niithin the terms of Article 17.2. The
United Nations can only engage in activities which are sanctioned
bj7 the Charter. Activitics outside the scope of, in conflict ~ith or

prohibited by the Charter, whether cspressly or by implication,
cannot be regarded as valid activities of the United Nations. The
fact that çuch activities are expressly or impliedly authorized by
Sccurity Council or Gencral Assembly resolutions does not render
tliem valid.

24. It \vil1 therefore still have to be determined whether the
activities to wliich such espenditures relate are valid activities
falling within the provisions of the Charter. In cases where a
Security Council or General Assembly resolution is necessary in
order to ensiire the validity of any activity engaged in bythe United
Nations, the followiiig requirements would be essential:

(a) The resolution must be valid in that it must be within the
terrilof the Charter;
(b) The activity must be covered by and not esceed the terms
of such resolution; and264 WRITTEN STATEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(c) The activity must be consonant with and not esceed the
provisions of the Charter.

In other words, although expenditures may have been authorized
by a resolution of the General Assembly, the expenditures may
still be invalid, because the causa for such espenditures is not a
iusta caztsa. Only if there is a izbsta caztsa for them can the
expenditures andthe resolutions which authorized them be valid. In
the case of the Congo operations, the iusta causa canonly be con-
stituted by activities in pursuance of valid resolutions within the
terms of the Charter.

25. It is submitted, however, that there is justifiable reason to
question the validity of certain resolutions in pursuance whereof
activities in the Congo were undertaken in that they esceeded and
were in conflict with the provisions of the Charter. Furthermore,
it is submitted that tliere is justifiable doubt as to the validity of

certain activities engaged in by the United Nations in the Congo
in that they may well have exceeded and conflicted with the terms
of the relevant resolutions and the provisions of the Charter.
26. One of the resolutions in pursuance whereof activities in the

Congo were undertaken \vas the Security Council resolution of
24 November 1961, whic1.iprovides inter nlia:-

"Tlie SecurityCowncil,

Defilori?zgal1 armecl action in opposition to tlie authority of the
Government of the Republic of the Congo, specifically secessionist
activities and armed action now being cairriedon by the Provincial
Administration of Katanga with the aid of esternal resources and
foreign mercenaries, and comfiletelyrejectiitgthe claim that Katanga
. is a 'sovereign independent nation', .............
Recognizingthe Governinent of the Republic of the Congo as
esclusively responsiblc for the concluctof the esternal affairs of the
Congo, ..........................

'1.Slvo~tglyde9recatesthe secessionist activities illcgrilly carriecl
csternal resources and manned by foreign merceiiarics;li the aid of

'2. I;urtlzerdefirecalesthe armed action against United Nations
forces and personnel in the pursuit of such activities;
'3. I?zsislsthat such activitics shall cease forthwith, and cnlls
upon al1concerned to dcsist therefroin ;
'4. Autlzorizes the Secretary-General to take vigorous action,
inclucling the usc of requisite measure of force,if necessary, for the
immediate apprehension, detention pending legal action and/or
deportation of al1foreign military and para-inilitary personnel ancl
political advisers not under the United Nations Comand, and
mercenaries...' WRITTEN STBTEMENT OF SOUTH AFRIÇA 265

8. DecEares that al1 secesçionist activities agaiilst tlze Republiç
of the Congo arc contrary to the Loi fondamentale and Security
Council dccisionsaiid specificaldernarzdsthat such activities which
arenow taking place in Katanga shall ceasc forthwith;
g. Declares&il and firrn çupiort forthe Central Government of
the Congo, and the determination to assist that Government in
accordance with thc decisiuns of the United Nations to maintain
law and order and national integrity, to provide technical assistance
and to implement tliosedecisions;
IO. Urges al1Member States to lend their support, according to
thcir national procedurestothe CentralGovernmentofthe llcpublic
ofthe Congo, in conformity with the Çtiarter and the dccisions of
theUnited Nations."
27. The question ariçes as tu whetker this resolution does not
exceed the powers conierred by the Charter, in the letter aricl the

spirit, and whethcr it does not also contravene Article 2 (7) by e.g.
"coinpletely rejecting the daim that Katanga is a 'sovereign inde-
pendcnt nation' ", deprecating "the secessionist activities illcgally
carried out bÿ the provincial administration of Katanga", insisting
"tlzat such activities shxll cease forth-rvith" ,declaring that "al1
sccessionist activities" of this nature "are contriry to the Loi
/onda.i?zentale" and finally demanding "that such activities ...
sllall cease forthwith".

28. If this resoIution is to be interpret ed accordance witli the
provisions of the Charter, it must be held only to jiistify measures
taken in order to prevent foreign interference ai-id not to justify
i~~easurcsto suppress interna1 political activities by the people of
the Congo.

29. The Charter certainly did ncit intend that United Nations
activities should be utilised for the purpose of maintainhg the
internal unity of a State or of maintaining the statusgzto artificially,
as the Holy Alliance did during the first half of the nineteenth
cenfury. Tri quote extreme examples: if the United Nations had
existed in the flrst half of the nineteenth century, it would have

bccn agninst the letter and the spirit of the Charter to "deprecate"
and authorize action against "secessiorzist activities" in Belgium
(against the Union of the Netherlands and Belgium of 1815-1830),
Poland, Ireland, Italy and tlie Balkans, and "comflletely.y~jectthe
clairns" that "such States are sovereign independent natioris".
Sirnilar examyles can be given in respect of the twentieth century,
even in recent times.

30. But apart from this, the Charter expressly provides that the
United Nations is nat authorized to intervene in "matfers which
are essentially within the domestic jurisrliction of any State".
Endeavouring to force peoples to submit to a particvlar form of
governmen t is typical intervention in mattets essentialy within WRITTEN ÇTXTERIENT OF SOUTH AFRTCA
l
thé doniestic jnrisdiction of a State la. le exception mentioned in
Article 2.7 as regards enforcement oileasures under Chapter VIT

wodd not be applicable to tlie cases in cpnnection with whicli the
prdsent advisory opinion is being reqyested, because the only

in$?rvention in domestic affairs thua aqthorized by the Cliarter
would be that which would be naturally bpund up with enforcement
rn(surcs. In other words, even if action lere taken under Chapter

VlI, this does not mcan that any typc of intervention in a State's
intkal affaiss is authorized by the cxcebtion in Article: 2.7. Only
l
l8 Thc South African Minister of Foreign Afisirs,Mr. Eric Louw, speaking on
resdlution 1474 (XV), stated irî Scptember 1960 (6.!4 ,O. JJ ,qllaEmevgeizcySpeciai
.Ses:., B6znd TSIcnary Meetriig, rg Septeinber 1960. p! p) :-
I
"Coming iiow to the draft resoluticinwhich js befrirc thc GeiieralAsscmbly,
I wish to say thnt quite ayart frorri the doubtg whicli rightly or iifrotigly exist
as to u'lietlier action talreil by the Uriited Natioïis yrin~arily for tlie purpose
. of restoring iriternnl ordcr \vas in al1 respects Iii..ified or \vas, shall we Say,
perhaps over-hasty, Uiere is tbc impurtant question as to whetlier the United
Natioiis liasthe right to intemene-and I quole the irrords of the draft rcsolu-
1tlon-in the 'interna1 co~iflictsof the Congo or in the 'political coizditinns' in
the country. Also, in thisdraft reçalutirin, thcrclarrepeated rcfcrences to ivliat
lis termed tlie unity 01 the Reputilic This ra+s thc furtlier question as to
rvhcther the type of Stnte whicll ivill evcntually enierge in the Coiigo is any

concern of this Organi~ation. For instarice. 1 lave iii mind the intention al-
ready expiessed Liy lcaders of Katanga province to havc a difiereut constitu-
tional arrangement This surely is a rnattcr for the Cnngolese theiriselves,
ivhose dccision 1 subniit çhoiild ~iot be irifluended eitherby resolutions of this
lorgai~izntion or by the actions of this Orgsnization or by any other Statc."
And in October, rgbr, he statcd (G.A., O. R., .5LxkeenE k ess.,Verbatini rccords,
ro3ird Plenasy &Jleet.ing.rI October rgur) :-.

"CVhen this mattcr was disciissed at the spoclal scssioti of tkie Gencral hs-
sernbly liist year, T warned against precipitite action. The history of the
Uriited Nati-ons actions in the Coiigo is not. a 1h:ippy one, and rio one knows
where it is goiiig to end.
Hecently, there has dso hecn thc actiori takenI by thc United Nations Furces
against t-'resideiit Sshornbe of Katanga Condztions in Katanga have ùeen
relativelu stabIe, both politically and econornically. liistcad of appreciating
those conditions, the Unitcd Natioris militari forces, acting under the Sc-
curity Council reçulution of sr Fcbruary 1961. swooped down on Katanga,
(thereby creat~ng those very conditions which dhe Organization %r7a.sjupposcd
to prcvent.

At Iast year's special session, 1 stated from tliis rostrum thnt, quite apart
from the doubts whicli existed as to wliether action taken Liythe Uiiited Nations
yrirnarily for the purpose of
there rvns the important question
to interuene in the interna, conflirts of in politicai canditiani iii
the Congo, as providecl for iii thercsolution the Assembly lart year.
(Tsaid at that tima:
'This ra1sc.j the further

kxitudiy çrnerge in tho
hecords of tllGeneval Assei~liiy,
1 1 referred to the kt thnt the leaders of Konoga had expreaed tlie desire
to have a different constitutional arrangenient, and I then said:

i 'This surely c*r matter hr the Cvngolenc ithemselre~, ivhw drcisinn, 1
~ubmit, should not bc influencecl either hy resoliitions of this Orgaiiizatioli
or Liy the actions of this Organization or ariy dther Statc.' (Ibzd.)" WRITTEN STATEiîlENT OF SOUTH AFRICA 267

such iiitervention can be authorized as is i~ecessaryfor tlre yroper
executioil of the relative enforcement nieasures. In any event, it
is not char whether the Congo operations ¢an be coiîsidered aç
eniorcement rneasures under Chaptcr VII. Only if the Ccingoopera-
tionç can be regarded as such need the exception to Article z.7 be
taken into consicleration at all.

JI.Similar comment niay*be made in respect of General Assernbly
reçolution 1474 (XV) which provicles, imter alin, thnt the General
Assernbly-

"1. Fzkllysuppurts thercsolutionsof 14 and 22 July ariclg hugust
1960 of the Secutrty Louncil;
2. Reytwsts tlzc Sccretary-General ta continue to take ,'gorous
action iri accordancwith theterrns of the aforesaid rcsolutiomcl
to assist theCentral Government of the Congo in the reçtoration
Kepublic ofathe Congo and to orsafeguarduitçunity, territorialintc-
grity and itldependence in the interestsof intcrnationalyeace and
security."

32. The provisions quoted seem to exceed rneasures for dealin'g
with the situation conternplated in the Security Council resolutio~ls

of 14 and 22 Jdy and 9 August 1960. Admittedly, the Security
Council resolution which was quoted above and which was adopted
more than a year later, narnely on 21 November 1961, even exceeds
Gencral Asseinbly resolution 1474 (XV) in the nature of its provi-
sioris. But this General Assembly resolution also authorizes inter-
ference in the interna1 affairs of the Congo by recluesting the Çecre-
tary-General to take vigorous action to safeguard the unity of the
Republic of the Congo.

33. 1t is accordingly subrnitted that activi tiesin pursuance of
those parts of the abovenamed resolutions which exceed or are in
conflict with the provisions of the Charter are invalid and that
expenditures made in çonnection with such activiticç are conse-
quently also invdid and cnn under no circurnstances he "expenses
of the Organization".
34. But irrespective of the validity of provisions of resolutions,

Unitcd Nations activities tkernselves, in order to be valid, rnust not
exceed or be in conflict with either the terrns of the relevant reso-
lutions or the provisions of the Charter. And cxpenditures made in
respect of invalid activities cannot be valid expenditures which
may be "expenses of the Organization".
35. The resolutions authorizing various expenditures, as quoted

iri the request for an adviçory opinion, as well as the other.resolu-
tions quoted, furnish insuffrcient information as to whether the
activitieç in respect whereof costs are iricurred arwithin the powerç
conferred by the Charter or the resolution(s) in pursuance of which
the activities were undertaken. Only the amouiîts which thc Secre- WRJTTEN STATEMBNT OF SOUTH AFRICA 269

(c) the whole question submitted for an advisory opinion çould
only be answered ifthe Court iç fvlly inforrned as to the
cazjsaof the expenditures authorized by the relative Gerieral
Assernbly resolutions. 16.MEMORANDUM OF THE USSR GQVERNMENT
ON,THE PROCEDURE OF FINANCINE THE OF/ERATIONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS EMERGBNCY FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED

NATIONS OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO

[U[lzoficiatraaslationsztpijZ.ied !
totheRegist~yby theEmbassy of
the USSR inthe hretherlalzds]

The USSR Delegation to the Sixteenth Session of the United
Nations General Assembly has stated tl?e positionof the Soviet
union on the procedure of financing the ayerations of the United
Nations Ernergency Force in the Middle East and the United
Nations operations in the Congo.
The puryose of this repIy to a request by the Secretariat of the
International Court of Justice is to clarify once again theposition
of the Soviet Union on this question,

z. The Soviet Government isof the view that the operations of
the United Nations En~ergency Force inthe Middle East, aswell as
th6 United Nations operations in the Congo, impose no financial

obligations on the Mernbers of the United Nations, sinçe those
operations are carried out not in accordance with the requirements
of the United Nations Charter.
I
(a)'7-hagz<crliaof fi?za+tcithe Uwiled Nations Emergency Force in
the Middle East

For the establishment of Emergcncy Force in the Middle East
thelUN Secretary-General tised a~ a pretex,t the resolutions adopted
at the first Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly on
Xovember 3, 1956 (resolution gg81ES-I}, and on November 5
(resolutionIQQO/ES-I) in connection with the arnied aggression of
Britain, France and Israel against Egypt, that is in connection with
the 'violation of international peace and security.
From the very rnornent the Emergency Force had been es-

tablished the Soviet Government has thought and continues to
think that it isnot within the General Assembly's cornpetence to
take decision on the çetting up of internaFiona1 armed forces.
According to the United Nations Charter al1questions involving
actions for rnaintaining international peace and security-tlrhich
includes the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force as
well-corne under the cornpetence of the Security Council alone.
I I llEhlORANDUM OF THE USSR GOVERNBIENT 27I

In this connection it would be relevant to refer tothe provisions
of Article 39 of the Charter, whiçh reads: "The Security Council
shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations, or
decide xvhat measures çliall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."
In so far as the General Assembly is concerned, it "may consider
the generxl principles of CO-operationin the: maintenance of inter-
national peace and security" (paragraph L, Article II) ; ."may
discuçs any questions relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security"; "may make recommendations with regard to
any such questions to the State or States concerned or ta the

Security Council or to both" (paragraph 2,Article II).
But the General Assernbly is not çornpetent to take decisioi~son
the carrying out of any action to maintain international peace and
security. Paragraph 2, Article II of the Charter reads: "Anysuch
question on which action is nccesçary shall be referred to the
Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after
discussion."
Being guided by these Charter provisions the representative of
the Soviet Union, speaking on the decisiori to create an Ernergency
Force, stated at the 567th meeting of the first Extraordinary Ses-
sion of the General Assembly on November 7, 1956, that, as for the
creation and stationing in tlze territory of Egypt of international
arrned forces, the Soviet 13elegation deemed necessary to point out
that those forces were created in violation of the United Nations
Charter, that the resolution of tlie General Assembly on the basis
of wich it was proposed to form those armed forces was in con-
tradiction to the United Nations Charter; that Chapter VI1 of the
Charter envisaged that it was thc Security Council alone and not
the General Assenlbly that rnay set up international armcd forces

and take such action as might be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security, including the use of such arrned
forces.
Tkus, as the Emergency Force for the Middle East was set up
in violation of the United Nations Charter, circurnvcnting the
Security Council, their financing cannot bc regarded as an obligatioil
which lies upon the Mernber States of the United Nations under
the Charter.

(b) The UnitedNations operationsinthe Congo
The Security Council'sresolution SI4387of July 14, 1960, scrved
as a basisfor the United Nations operation in the Congo. However,
that resolution has heen implenlented in violation of the provisions
of the United Nations Charter.
Linder thc United Nations Charter the Security Council deter-
mines which States are to participate in carrying out its deciçions
which jilvolve the maintenance of international peace and securit~. MEBIORANDURIOF THE USSR GOVERNBlENT 273

Article 17 of the UN Charter provides for appropriations and the
manner of their reimbursement only in the regular budget of the
United Nations. Paragraph 1,Article 17 reads: "The General As-
sembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization",
and paragraph 2: "The espenses of the Organization shall be borne
by the Members as apportioned by the General Asscmbly", i.e. they
bear expenses in the Organization's budget.
This is the meaning which was put in the Article 17 of the UN
Charter at the San Francisco Conference which was convened to

work out the United Nations Charter. It can be seen from thc
documents related to the working out of the Article's provisions
that in the First Committee of the second Commission of the
Conference the cspenses of the Organization wl-iichfa11under Ar-
ticle 17 of the Charter were considcred as different in their nature
from the expenses under Article 43 of the Charter. In particular,
this is attested to by the fact that the San Francisco Conference
did not approve the Australian ameiidment to Article 19 of the
Charter, cvhich proposed to estend the provisions of that Article
to the expenses connccted witli the fulfilment bjr the UN Illember
States of their obligations for practical implementation of measures

for keeping the peace. So, the above-mentioned Committee of the
San Francisco Conference \iras of thc view that the Australian
amendment referrcd to the obligations connected with thc espenses
which were not "the expenses of the Organization" as is stipulated
in paragraph 2, Article 17 of the Charter.
As to the General Assembly it has never considered the espenses
of the UN Emergency Forcc as the espenses of the Organization
nlithin the meanii-igof paragraph 2, Article 17 of the UN Charter.
Regarding the UN operations in thc Congo it is stated outright in
the General Asscmbly resolution of Deccmber 20, 1961, that "the
estraorclinary espenscs for the United Nations opcratioiis in the

Congo are essentially difîerent in nature from the espenses of the
Organization under the regular budgct and that thcrefore a pro-
cedure differcnt frorn that applied in the case of the regular budget
is required for meeting these extraordinary expenscs".
The financial obligations of the UN Mcmber States concerning
the actions for holding the universal pcace and security, which
includc the UN operations in the Congo and in the Middle East,
can be determined only 011the basis of special agreements to be
concludcd by the Security Council and the Rleinber States of the
Organization. As it is stated in the UN Charter those agreements
become binding only after "ratification by the signatory States in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes" (Article

43 of the Charter). No such agreement is known to have been
concluded.
It should be added that the resolutions of the UN General As-
sembly, as it is stipulated in Article IO of the Charter, are of the
nature of recommendations and are not binding upon States. The MEMORANDUM OF THE USSR GOVERNBIENT
274
UN Member States themselves determine their attitude tthese
resolutions. Al1 measures that follow from the General Assembly
resolutions are also of only recommendatorynature and cannot
establish legal obligations for the Member States of the Organiza-
tion.
.* * *

Being guided by the above-said considerations tUSSR Gov-
ernment believes that the operations of UNe Emergency Force
in the Middle East as well as theoperationsin the Congoimpose
n.o financial obligations on UNe Members both for the reason
these operations were carried out not in compliance witli the re-
quirements of theUN Charter and because the expenses for these
operations are not the expenses referred to in para2,aArticle
17 of the Charter. 17. LETTER FROM THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE BY ELORUSSIAN SOVIET SOC1ALIST REPUBLIC
TO THE PKESTDENT

[UnoficiaZ trlan.sla sui$plied
lo theRegistr by theEmbassy of
iht:USSR in.theNelherla.izds]

Minsk, February 16, 1962.

Dear hlr. Preçident,
Replying to your eçteerned letter of Decemb27,1961,No. 34891,
1 have thc honour to inform you, that theU.N. Emergency Force,
operating in the Middle East, as weas the operations by the UN0

Force in Congo, from their very beginning have been financed in
defiance of the existence of the Security Council.
'ïhis fact represents a most flagranviolation of the Charter of
the United Nations, particularly of that Charter's Artt. 43 ana 48.
The standpoint the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Repiibliç has
been taking and is now taking in this issue iç well-known. This
standpoint fias repeatedly been set forth by the sepresentativof
the Hyelorusçian Soviet Socialist Republic in their speeches, held
at the sessions of UNO's General Assernbly.
In the opinion of the Government of the Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Repuhlicthe operations, undertaken by the Emergency
Force in the Middle East, as wellas those exercised by the UN0
in Congo eannot impose any financial obligation on the Members
of the UNO, considering that theseoperations are being carried
thro~igh not in accordance with the. stipulations of the UN0
Charter and having regard to the fact that the expenditures, made
on hehalf of these operations, do not represent expenses in the
senseof the wording of paragraph2 of Article 17 oUNO's Charter.
Respectfully Fours,
(Signcdj A. GURINOEVITCH,

Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Byelorussian
Soviet SocialisticRepublic.18. NOTE DU MINIST~RE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANG~RES
DE LA R~?PUHLTQUEPOPULAIRE 13E BULGARIE AU

PRÉSIDENT DE LA COUR
(RE~UE AU GREFFE DE LA COUR LE 14 BIAI 1962)

Au sujet de la discussionCtla Cour internationalede Justice de
la question des obligations financiéres des gtats Meinbres de:
l'Organisation des Nations Unies, le ministkre des Affaires étrangères
de la République populaire de Bulgarie estime nécessairede déclarer
qu'il est d'avisue les opérations des Forpes d'urgencedes Nations
Udies dans le Proche-Orient et cellde l'ONU au Congo n'imposent
pas d'obligations financièraux Membres des Nations Unies vu que
lesdites opérations n'ontpas 4té effectuées enconformitf: avec les
dispositions dela Charte des Nations Unies.
' laes représentants de la Rkpublique populaire de Bulgarie aux
Nations Unies ont souligné dans leurs interventions au sujet des
operations des Forces dhrgence de l'ONU dans le Proche-Orient
que seul le Conseil de SCcuritti.a conipktencc pour prendre de:
dkcisions quant à la création de forces armkes internationdes et

non 1'Assembli.e gdnérale. Ceci est clairement indiquk au para-
graphe 2 de l'art.11 ainsi qu'à l'art. 3de la Charte.
Des violations de la Cliartdes Nations Unies ont kt6 coinmises
égalementlors de l'application de la résolution SI4387du 14 juillet
1960 du Conseil de Sécurit6,relative au: operations de l'ONU au
Congo. Conformdrnent i l'art.48 de la Charte, c'est au Conseil de
Shcurité qu'appartient le choix des Gtats Membres qui devraient
prendrc part aux opérations vissi~t l'application des décisions prises
par lui, tandis que d'après l'art. 43 cette participation est rkglée
par des arrangements spéciaux conclus ;entre lesdits États et le
Conseil de Sécurité.
De pareils arrangements cependant n'ont point dtk conclus et le
Secrktaire gknkral de l'ONU a nommé seul 1cspays qui devaient
prendre part aux opératioiis ct seul il a risçum& la direction des
opérations au Congo.
Iln'y a aucun doute que les frais des opérations au Congo et dans
le Proche-Orient ne sauraient etre considbbs cornme des frais de
l'organisation doritilest question A l'art17, paragraphe 2,de la
Charte, d'autant plus que 1'Assemblkegénérale,dails sa résolution
du lzo décembre 1961, ne les conçidere pas comme tels. Aussi ne
saurait-oil pas les inclure dans le budget ordinaire de l'ONU.
Il faut également avoir en vue le faique les résolutionsde !'As-
sernblbe ne peuvent créer d'obligation jlutidique pour les Etats
Membreç dc l'ONU vu que d'aprks la Charte ellesont le caractère

de recommandations.
Sofia, le11 mai 1962.

[Calet du rninistéredesAffaires étrangeres,ÇOFIA.]
Izg. LETTRE DU RIINISTRE ADJOINT DES AFFAIRES
ETRANGCRES IIE LA K~?PuBLIQuE SOCIALISTE
SOVII?TJ.QUED'UKKAlNE AU PR~~SIDEN'TDE LA COUR

Kiev, le14 mai 1962.
Cher Monsieur le Prksident,
Eiz réponse à votre lettre no 34891 du 27 décembre 1961 j'ai
l'honneur de vous communiquer que la position de la République
socialistesoviktique d'Ukraine au sujetdu financement des opkra-
tions d'urgence des Nations Unies au Rloyen-Orient et au Congo a
été à maintes repriscçexposéedans les discours des représentants
de 1'ITkrailîeaux sessions de l'Assembléegénérale de l'ONU.
Aux termes de la Charte des Nations Unies la décisiondes ques-
tions du financement des opérations de ce genreestuniquement de
la cornpetence du Conseilde Sécuritk.Tel est justement le sens qui
est donné A l'articlII de la Charte selon lequel toute question se
rattachant au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales
estrenvoyée au Conseil de Sécuritkpar l'Assembléegénérale,avant
ou aprhs discussion.
Les articles43 et 48 de la Charte fixent le droit exclusif du
Conseil de Sécurité de prendre deç decisions sur les questions
concernant la participationde tel ou tel Etataux actions ou aux
opérations de l'ONU visantA maintenir la paix etla sécuritk ainsi

que sur l'ktendue et les conditions de la participation de tout
Menibre de I'ûONU àces opkratioilç.
L'article 43 de la Chartene prévoit aucunement la création de
forcesarmées de l'ONU, il énonceseulement la miseA la disposition
du Conseil de Sécuritédes forces arm&es des Etats Membres des
Nations Unies eiivertu d'accords spkciaux.
Aucun accord de ce gcnre ayant trait aux questions susnommées
n'a kt4 conclu par le Consede SécuritÉ,pour autant qu'on Iesache.
Guidés parles consid&rations qui prkçkdent, nous sommes d'avis
que les operations de l:t Force d'urgence des NJations Unies dans le
Moyen-Orient ainsi que l'opération de l'ONU au Congo n'imposezzt
aucune obligation financière aux Membres de l'ONU étant donné
que ces opérations sont effectuees en violation des obligations de
la Charte des Nations Unies.
C'estprkcisiment en raison de ces considérations que la délégation
d'Ukraine aux Nations Unies a voté contre laproposition touchant
les contributions pour l'application de ces opérations. Quant à la
question de savoir si les dépenses entraînées par les opCrations de
l'ONUau Congo et auRloycn-Orient sont.des(dkpenses de l'organi-
sation3 au sens de l'articl17, paragraphe 2, de la Charte, nous LETTRE DE LA RSS D'UKRAI~NE(14 V 62)
l
devons nous référerà la repense non jquivoque que contient la
rébolution du 20 dkcembre de l'Assembl6e gknérale au sujet des
oq6rations des Nations Unies au Congo; résolutionindiquant très
alxteopérations des NationseUnieseauesCongoaoest essentiellements
distincte dcelle desdépensesde lJ0rgan)sation inscrites au budget
orainairesibien qu'ifaut appliquer, pou: les couvrir, une procédure
différentede celle quest appliquéedans/lecasdudit budget n.
vous pouvons nous réfererégalementaux r&solutions antérieures
de'YAçsenlbléegénkralelaucune d'dles nb considerelesdépensesde
laFo durcenee de l'ONU comme les ?&pensesde l'organisation
au,sens del'articl17,paragraphe z, de la Charte dl'ONU.
ne vous pried'agréer,etc.
I

Ministre adjoin\des Affaires ktrangèreç
dela R.S.S. d'Ukraine.20. LETTRE DE LA LÉGATION DE LA RI?PUBLIQUE
POPULAIRE ROUMAINE EN BELGIQUE ET AU

LUXEMBOURG AU PRESIDENT DE LA GOUR

Bruxelles, l21 mai 1962.
Monsieur le Président,

En réponse A la lettre n34891 du 27 décembre 1961 de la Cour
internationale de Justice, relativelarbsolution nQ1731(XVI) du
20 décembre 1961 de 1'AsçernblkegCn6ralede SONU, en vertu de
laquelle un avis consultatia étS demandé A la Cour concernant le
financement des opérations de la force d'urgence des Nations Unies
au Moyen-Orient etdes opérationsdcs Nations Unies au Congo, l'ai
l'honneur de porterà votre connaissancece qui suit:
La République populaire roumaine réaffirme la position que ça
dklégationa maintes fois exprimde à cet égard aux sessions de
l'Assembl&egénéralede l'ONU, à savoir que les depenses en question
ne peuvent pas etre considkréeçcomme s'encadrant dans les prd-

visions du paragraphe 2 de l'article 1de la Charte. En effet, ce
paragraphe prévoit que: ((Les dépenses de l'organisation sont
supportées par les Membres selonlarkpartitionfixéepar l'Assembl4e
générale. )Dans Je paragraphe I du même article ilest préciséde
qucllcç rdépenses de l'organisation ij il s'agit :rl'Assemblke
généraleexamine et approuve le budget de l'organisation p.De la
rédaction meme de ces textes il résulte qu'il s'agit des dkpenses
ordinaires de l'Organisation, qui constituent le budget annuede
celle-ci. Les clépensespour les actions nbcessaires au maintien de la
paix et de la sécuritéinternationalesont réglementéespar le chapitre
VI1 clela Charte et en particulier par son article 43, qui prévoitpour
elles un régime diffkrent de celui des dkpenses ordinaireset ilne
procbdure spéciale.Conformément aux prévisions de cet article, les
Membres de l'ONU, à Eademande du Conseil de Skcuriti, concluent
avec celui-ci des accords spkciaux afinde réglementer tous les
problèmes qui ont trait aux actions suçviskes, Conformément aux
prbvisions duparagraphe 3 de l'article 43 de la Cliarte, ces accords
speciaux deviennent obligatoires aprèsleur ratificatpar les Gtat~
signataires selon leurs règles constitutionnellesrespectives.Les
-dépensesafférentesA l'exercice des attributions rkservéesexclusive-

ment au Conseil de Securitd concernant le maintien de la paix et de
lasécuritéinternationale sont donc des dépensesextraordinaireset
n'ont pasle caractère des dépenses ordinaires dbudget annuel de
l'organisation. L'existence ddeux catégories de dépenses dans le
cadre de l'ONU - les dépenses ordinaires, prkvues dans le budget
annuel de l'organisationetliéesà l'exercice dc l'activité courante,280 LETTRE DE LA &PUBLIQUE POPULAIRE ROUhlAINE (21V 62)
habituelle de celle-ci, et les dépensesextraordinaires likeà d'autres
activités- est un fait quia étkrccoiînu dèsla création de 1'Organi-
sation. Ce fait a étéreconnu ineme dans la rksaIution no 1732(XVI)

du 20 dkcembre 1961 de 1'Assenibldegénérale,qui dit que rcla nature
des dkpenses extraordinaires afférentes aux opérations des Nations
Unies au Congo est essentiellement distincte de celle des dépenses
de, l'Organisation inscrites au budget ordinaire e et que, pour les
couvrir, ilfaut Nune procédure differento ude celle qui est appliquee
dans le cas dudit biidget. Bien que - ainsi qu'ila étémontré plus
haut - cette rprocédure diffCrentc i)existe, &nt expressément
prévue par l'articl43 de la Charte, qui la réserveexclusivement au
Cqnseil de Skcurité, 1'AssemblEe générallea approuvé et reparti
illégalement les dépenses extraordinaires en question, malgr&
l'opposition de ceux des Ctats Membres qui ont fait valoir leurs
arguments politiques et juridiques pour le respect de la Charte. La
creation, par une rCsolution de 1'Assemblpegknérale,d'un rtbudget
adlhuc 1pour les dkpenseç extraordinaires afkfentes aux actions pour
le maintien de la paix et de la sécuritéinternationale constitue donc
une violation des dispositions de l'article 43de la Charte. E~Icon-
clusion, de ce qu'il a été dit plus haut, il ressort que les dépenses

occasionnées par les actions nécessairespour le maintien de la paix
et de lasécuritéinternationale soiit des dCperzsesextraordinaires, de
la. compétence exclusive du Conseil de Sécurité,et qu'elles sont
réglementéespar l'article 43 de la Charte, qui prévoit pour elles un
régimediffkrent de celui prkvu pour les lépenses ordinaires et une
pr4cédure spkcirtle. Ilen rksulte indubitablement que ces dépenses
ne 'sont et ne peuvent pas &trereglementées par le paragraphe 2 de
l'article 17, qui a trait exclusivement au budget ordiriaire de
l'Organisation. Dans ces conditions et &tant donné l'illégalitédes
décisions de l'Assemblée génkrale en 17 matière, la Rkpublique
populaire roumaine ne saurait admettre - ainsi que sa delkgation
l'a clairement exprimé aux scssions de l'ONU - l'inclusion de ces
dépenses extraordinaires de I'Orgariisation des Nations U~iiesdans
le budget ordinaire de celle-ci.

Ministre de la
Républiquepopulaire roumaine,