Reply submitted, under the Order of the Court of 26th March, 1948, by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

COWRINTERNATIONI)EJUSTICE

MEMOIREPLAIDOIRIEETDOCUMENTS

AFFAIRE DU DÉTROIT

DE CORFOU

TNTERNATIONLOUROF JUSTICE

PLEADINGS, ORARGUMENTSDOCUMENTS

THE CORFU

CHANNEL CASE

VOL- Il
Documenothewritterr prriceedhgsr (cont.)Tous droits réserv6s par la
Cour internationalede Justice.

AI1 rightç reserve bdy the
Tnternational Court ofJustice. AFFAIRE DU DI?TROPT,DE CORFOU

. : b -.". . I. .

THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE ~~ÉMOIPLAIDOTETDOCUMENTS

AFFAIREDU DETROIT
DE.CORFOU INTERNATIONALOFJUSTICE

PLEADLNORAARGUMENTS,DOCUMENTS

THE CORFU

CHANNEL CASE

VOLUME II (suite)

PART 1(CO&.)

DOCUMENTS OF THE WRITTEN

PROCEEDINGS (cont.) 5.-REPLY SUBMI~ D NDER THE ORDER OF THE
COURT OF 26thMARCEL 1,948B,Y THE GOVERNMENT OF
TWE UNITED KINGDOM OP GREATBRTTALN
AND NORTI-TERNIRELAND

This ReplyissubrnittedtotheCourt inpursuanceof theOrder
of the Courtof26th Nkch, rg48, and in replyto the Counter-
Mernorialsubmittedby theGovernmentof the People" Rqublic
of Albmia on 15thSune, 1948.
2. The Çovexnment of the United Ringdom agee that the
' futureprocedure in the pi-esentcaseis now basecf upon the
agreement signed behveethe Agents of the trvoGovernmmts on
25th Bfarch, 1948, They observe that the Albaninsvmment
persists in critîcinngprocedure,lvhich the Gavernment of the
United Kingdom adopteclprior tothe signatureofthiç çpecial
agreement. On thispoint theUnit~d Kingdorniscontent torely
upn the judgment of the Court (unmimous excepforthe judge
adhoc)ddiveredon ajth March,1948 ,vhichtheAlbania Gnsvern-
ment appearsfoignore. Thc Goverrimentofthe United Kingdorn
canriot accept the suggestion madin the introductionof the
Alb=mianCawter-Mernorial that this special agreementtotal1y
changed thc naturof thecasebeforethe Court. As the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdamhavemnde clearfrrim thbeghning,
theyhave never hadatany timeany intention otryingtocontest
thejurisdictioof the Court to deal with the claims now made
by Albania nilderthe second question subrnitteto theCourt
under the speciagreement. Alhaniacodd Thercfoh reve made
these ch equaily wdl inher Cçonnter-Mernorjal even if the
special agreemenhad not been concluded.
The Government of the United Kingdamdoesnot assrnttothe
proposition(1) that the principal questiat issue is not the
the United Kingdom isnotbbasedeon facts legaily ascertainable,

or (3) that thAlbanian clah is so based.242 REPLY OF UNITED KINGDOM (30 ViI 48)

PART T '

1st Question.-"1sAlbanla responslbleunder lnternatlond lrtwforthe
explosloas which mcurredon 22ndOotobsr, IW6, In Albanian waters
and for the damageand-iossof human 1iPewhlah resultefiom them,

and ts.efe any duty topay cornpensatton?"

3. The Eovernment of the United Kingdom now proceedsto
deal sePaatimwith the facts andarguments setout in the Albanian
Coiinter-Meniorid. Insodsingtheydesiretos~te,astheAZbanian
Governrnent havedone in paragraph 5 oftheir Caunter-Mernorial,
that the Governent ofthe United Kingdom seserves itsposition
~4th regard to al1 factç andarguments adduced inthe Albanian
Counter-Mernorial,not expressly admit td in this Reply.

A. TKE FACTS

(Cornter-Mernorial,paragraph 6-9.)

4, The Ladu Channel may indeed nothave been usedbg shipping
on a largescale,like thegreater intan~tiond sbaits such as the
Sound or the Dardaneiles. It muçt, hotvever,have had greater
importance than is indicated in paragraphg of the Albanian
Counter-Mernorial ; atherk-visethe Germans ad ICaiians would
nrit have been at pains tu lay so many minefields in that area
during the Second Wqld 'IYw, and, atthe same time, to establish
and maintain there a swept çhannel for navigation, Moreover,
whcn the Rrea was liherated, oneofthe frst actions of the Allies
vas, as has already been shown, to resweep the channel. But,
iiiany case,the character of the channelas an international soute
depends on the fact that it connects't tvrts ofthe open sea
and is useful ta navigation, not on the volume of traffic pashg
through it. Evidence of the character of the Corfu Channel as
an inte~natioiial Uade route iisdorded by the ordulary cvm-
mercial atlases mhich -;hoiv.three trade routespassing through
this çhannel ;examples are Bartholurnew'sCitizens' Atlas of the
Wmld, 1944edition, page 74, and Philips New Commercial Rlap
of Europe, scale 48 miles to I inch, 1944 print, That it isused
as a route is admitted by the Albanian Governrnent itçelf ivhen
it says in paragraph 135 of itsÇounter-Mernorial:-

"En fait, lepassage des navires marchands de tonte sorte
et de toute nationdit6 nonsuspects n'a kt6 interférépar les
autorités albanaises ni avant lerg mni 1946 ni aprks."

5, Although the Corfu Channel may be used prlncipally(but
not exclusively)by coastal trafic,this does not deprive itof its statuças atl international highivay and it does not appear very
1 profitabletu discuss the question whethersuch a highway isof
1 major or minor importance. The right of passage through snch
a highway does not depend on the iyilof theAlbanian Statc;but
isbased on the larvofnations, accordingto which (unless rnodified
bp treaty) there isa general sight of navigation through straits
rrsefulfornavigation andconnecting i~vo parts of the open sca
and this Tlght enures Eo the benefit tifdl States, whoever the
littoraSCate may be. In the onecase wherethe right is restricted
by treaty, both. shores ofthe straitbelong tothe ijarne Power.
It Isrelevant hcre tù point out that Albania isnot, as somany
parqraphs of her Counter-Mernoriaa ippear ta assume, the only
State with an interest in the waters ofthe Channel orthe trafic
pasçing thrùugh it. One hdf of the Channel at its narrowest
portion isGreek territor \iater and the Charnel is priricipally
used asan approach toCorfuand other Greekports. Albania is
in fact trying to daim to control the traficin an iriterna.tiona1
strait, which isof more importance to Gseece than to Albania.
6. The Alhanian Government refers to 20 milliontons of trafic
pIying tothe major Adriaticports of Trieste, Venice,etc.,inrg34,
most of which, it says, would natwdy take the itreçtcrn and
shortcr soute through the open seas. This may he sa but ships
plying between Corfiiand the Adriatic, as well as betweeri the
Adriatic and other Greek ports, such as Preveza and Patras,
inevitably ux the Corfu Channel. Inthis connexion it shsirld
be noted that on 15th R'lay,1946, the tivo British cruisers were
proceeding to Çorfu, and that on ~2ndOetober, 1946, the four
British ships, after sojourningat Corfir,cvereproceedin tgthe
waters north-west of Corfu, Ta have taken a course west of

Corfu, instead of through the Straits,wouId have involved for
therefore, made,atthe end of puagraphIW6ofithe AlbaniangCounter-

Mernoriai,that the British warslups had another purposeinpassing
through the CorfuChannel, kas no foundation. The Govwnment
of the United Kingdom wishes to make clex that if oilly contends
that the righof passage applies totheChannel and net to national
(interior) watersoi~tside tlieChannel, for exarnple the Bay of
Saranda north-eagt of the Channel. Further reference ta this
distinction betweeri territoriand national waters is made later
in tkisReply.
7.' The sizeof Albania's navyand merchant marine and the
condition ofitsports and harborirs do net aHect the statiisof.the
Cliannel asan international high~vay. In Iaterparagraphs of this
Rcply (paras.96-101) it is shown that a littoralStzte,whatever
other measures it is erititlto tàke in the interestç of defençe,
is not entitled to denypassagethrough an intemationa1 straitto
war vesel$ or merchant ves&. .-. - ..
- T* NAVIGABL C HANN~ --
. (Counter-Mernorial,paragrap Is-14.)

8. The Albaian Governrnent mmplains that 318 evidence is
adduced ta prove that aswept charnel had existed since June 1940.
. Ttsexistence,however, wasknown to the Allied Cornmancl. This
howledge and the &man mine-information chart (ftied as
Annex 2 to the United Ikgdom Mernorial)show that, according
to aU available information,no minefieldwaç laid by the German
authmities in theCllarine1ccoveringtheBay of Saranda or in,any
other area east of the çhannel irnmediatelyadjacent to that bay,
althwgh they had laid minefields west ofthe channel protecting
the entry into the narrowrestpoint ofthe Channel. Fdher, the
swept clzannelwaç searched by British rninesureeperisnOctober
1944 and January and Febniary 1945. The Government of the
Unitd ICulgdom have shotvn that no mines exiçted in this area
at the conclusion ofhoçtilities and that mines were found in
Novernber 1946 right acrass the stvept channel. Thesc mines
cauIdnot haveremained there without încidcnt foreighteen months
after the end of hostilities, since shipping (includingHis Majesty's
shipsin Rlap 1946 h)ad forseveral.months preceding October 1946
passed through thesrveptchannel safely. Furtticrthere isdccisive
evidence that the mines foundhad beenrecentiy laid. TheGovern-
ment of the Ui-iited Kingdam refers againinthis connexion to
paragraphs rr, 12 and 73 and to Annex 18of its 5X~morial. The
presumptioriis thcreforethat the rninefrclfoundon 13th Novem-
ber, 1946,in Albanian territorialwaters tms laid in the Channel
after the closeofhostilities byor with the knowledge orconnlv-
ance ofthe territorial %\ver. It is for the AlbanianGovernent
to àisprave ta presumption andto explain the existence of -that
minefield.
9. The Albania n overnment seeks, in paragraph II of its
Counter-Mernorial, to throw discredit upon the German mine-
informgtion chart by alleging that it içno£ dated, that itdoes
not indicate the swept channeland that, inany case,it frequenfly
happened thatmiTieshave been fomd dich wre n~t marked on
the German charts,
In reply the Government of the United Xingdorn points out,
fîrst that numerous other Geman charts have corne inta the pos-
session of theMes, tvhich showed the same fields and the sarne
channel, and that the information contained in these charts tvas
verifiedby laterexperience, S~CMG~ tEat,the date of theGrman
chartisirrelevant,becausethe Government of theUnitedRïngdom
is not seekingtoshow that this chart proved the existence of the
charme1 aita given date, but sjrnply toshow the position of the
German minefield,mcl to show that,at some tirnepnor to ûctober
~944~ the Germaris maintrtined a swept charnel. This the chart
clearlyproves, .,, IO.The Conter-Mernorial stateçthat the chart doesnot indicate
the smpt channe1"si ce n'estune lignepassant Atravers lecanal
etqui ne protive rien"'. I3utthe general direction ofthe swept
route is indicated ; and the chart dues not purport to definethe
limits of the swept charnel, and \vasnot fil&by the Gavernment
of the United Kingdam to show such limits, butrnerely to prove
the fact Siat suçh a ckiannel \vas established by the Gesmans,
The çhart proves this fact tisincorrect toSay lt pr0ves ntithing,
XI.It is not denied that in other areas mines laid by the
Germanshave been found, tvhichwere natrnarked on the approp-
riate German chah. This fact is,howevcr, irrelevant for the
followîng reasons :Cr)a swept channel existed in tliNorth Corfu
Channel at the conclusionof hostilitie;accordinglg mines found
inthat Chanel cmld not possiblyhavebeen laid by t3e Germms ;
(2) in generaI the only mines xvhichhave beeni found in svept
channels, and tvhich were ncitrnarked cinGerman charts,,have
been pourid mines, ~vhichhad not responded to siveeping-na
grouiil mines, however, could have been effcctiveiy laid in the
Grfu Channel on account of its depth; (3)in afew casesrnoored
mines have been found out of the position sho~m on the German
chart, becmse the minclaycrs which laid the mines had not been
able accirratelyto plut-the position ofthe mines, In Annex 26,
there is now attached a tractngof Mine-Information Chart 2711,
a chart issued bythe British authoritieç tomembers of the Inter-
national Mine-Cléamnci:Organization for the guidanc ef mine-
sweeping authorities. On. this chasf: are rnarkedthe position in
othm parts of the Adriatic of miLiefieldsas shom on Germc7.n
charts, orregorted byGerman autharities. It isnpon thischad

ment swith Annexecha14s of theaCounter-Niernorjaklare based.ernA

cautionary note (Ne. 2 in left-hand bottom corner) appears in
Mine-Information chid 27rx that, siucethe minelays areplotted
frcm positions given by the minelayers themselves, it must n~t
be assumed that the extremities of the minefields are strictly
accurate. Owing to inadepate instruments errorç inposition up
distance from land. It is statedpconspicrxouslythat the Chartonis
not to be used for navigation.
12. The examplesgi-iveninparagraph rr of the AlbanianCounter-
Mernorialare whully misleading. The mines aileged tohave been
found at Boka Kotor~ka,and on the tvestcoast ofthe Island cif

Krk, were not notified tuthe International nrfinesweepingOrgan-
ization, oftvhich Yugosfavia is a member, and cannot thérefore
beaccepted as establiskù- The examples at the end of thesamc
paragraph en page 14 of the Albanian Coiinter-hfemurialare
equally of novalue. In the case of mines inthe FarezinaChmnel
~lrhici~ in the North Adriatic,Yugoslav oficialreports show that
thirtem mines were cut uithin one mile, and seven mines t\rithin4 mile, of the reportecl positioofthe Grman minefieldA.R. ru,
md not "twelve mines" "one mile away to the north and south"
as stated in Annex14 ofthe A1bania.nCuunter-Mmorial. Further,
in order to suppwrk this inaccusate staternen t, adotted llne repre-
senting part of this minefield has ken wrongly plotted on one of ,
the sketchesattachecito hnex rq,namely, that which is described

in the bottom right-hand corner as "Décalqu6 de lacarte britan-
nique". Tb truc position of this minefieid is shown on hiinc-
Information Chart No. zpr, Annex 26 of this Reply, by the red
dbtted line w&ch appears above A.R. ro in xed letter is the
riorthern portion ofthe chart.
In the Albanian Anrrex 14, reference is made in Examplil 3
(Sketch fi. 3) to a"2 mine" where,in fact, an "obs~ctor" was
cut. An "obstnictor" is not a mitlébut an anti-sweeping device
the object of ~vhicisto fou1the slveepand 'ihusprevent itcutting
the pines. In Example 4 ofAnnex 14 (SketchNa.4),the southern
limit of where the mineswere swept iç givenas 44" 33'32" North,
\%-hm,in factn,o mine from this field\vascut south of#.u jj'ro"
North. This representsthe mines 1.7 mileç South of their true
position, The mines were, infaci, founci appraxirnately irithe
position çhotvn on the Geman chart. The position of a SI+-ept
mine givenIn Example 5 of Annex 14, and illustrateclinSketch8,
is ten milesinlan dnd the referencetothis mine isnot undetstood.
As a fmer example, in minday No, 127 the following words
were printed on the chart,but are ornitted from the sketch hled
with Annex 14 of the Aibanian Caunter-MernorîaE: "scatf er~d
probably furfher to northward*'. This is preciser iyhere the
mines mre found to be (çeesketch No. 7 attached to Anriex 14
of the Albanian Com~ter-Mernorialand Arinex 26 hereto).
The discrepançiesbetiveen the examples given in the Conter-
Mernorial and the officialreports submitted tothe International
Mine-Clearance Organization by Yugoslavia, on which the corn-
rnents here made are basd, show clearly that the former are
totalIy rnisleading,
13.The Government ofthe United Içlingclorsubrnits that the
existence ofan unknown Germa minefield right acrassa channel
of navigafiorkn common use, ad only discovered eightecn months
after theconclusion of hostiEties, mhen al1 the evidence availa'lsle
goes to shotv that the channe1 had been swept, and remaincd
smpt atthe conclusion of hostilities, is animpossible supposition,
contrary to cornmou sense and the facts of general expenence.
14. The Albanian Eovernrne~~tprofesses to finddisc~epancies
belhvcen the cbartscontained in hnex 5 and Annex 7 of the
Mernorial xvhich a brief studyof the charts theaiselves \vil1show
to h non-existelit, Annex 5 contains a portion af "an I'PZ~~X
MechiCIiiart" (aswas made plain inpara. IIofthe United KingdorrÈ:
Mernorial). This chart, being an index or key only, was intended
to be used with the relevant Medri pamphlets (alw in Annex 5) which give detaîlecland akurate parhiicular*ofthe routes for
the. g~neraldirection oftheiroute.puOnothe other hand the chart
in Annex 7 shows the swept Channelitself. Again the German

Mine-Information Chart (Amex 2 of theMemeriaI,) onlypuqml-ts
to show the centralliae ofthe swept channel and not its breadth.
15.The Albanian Government repeats,in pragrapk 13 of the
existenceeofarwpt itchanneIlnotxvithçtanding thenfactthiat,Medri

(askproveddbyhAnnex 4 ofthe United KingdomornMaMernorial).cItr1s

true that thelast issue (dated7th September, 1946) was setmed
adilressedaIiadhçlosedndown.ionThet eleven previous issues were

apparently receivedfor they were sirnilarly adaressedand were
net returned. Paragraph 14of the Counter-Mernorial, moreciver,
shows that atany rcrtfrom Janilary xgq6,ivhen General Hdgson
gave it a copy, the Albanian Govemment was fully marc of the
course of the navigable channel.

THE ~~INE-SWFEPINGS ,944-1945

l 16,The Government of th United Kingdom, having dated as
factç within its own knowledgc that the Channel was swept or
searched by British mincsweepers in October 1944 ,anuary and
February 1945, it is no evidence to the coatrary that ~lbama
tvas notaware ofthe swcepiügs or that,in some United Kingdom
communications, ttvo out ofthe three operations only were men-
boned. It isfurther incorrectto say that the United Kingdom
Governmen s the sole and exclusive judgeof theresdts of these
opcrations (para. r& of tha Caun+er7Meac3rial). In fact the
routes 18/32 and 18/34 through the Coriu Straits were approvd
as fit for navigation by the Internabunnl Routeingand Repurtiiig
Atithcirity and so declared through the Medri pamphlets. This
action woulcl aot have been taken-had aot thé Authority beeri
satiç.fiedtvith the sweepings carrout. It istruethat nowritten
reports of the rest~lts of these siveepings were produced to the
~ Medzon Board. In fact no written reports Iveremade because
it ?vasnot the practiceofAlliedmines\vecpersin \var-tirnto make
such reportsimless mines had been fou@, but merely ta report
1 by signal thatan area had been swept with negative results,
17. In hex 27 to thisReply are ho signal5 relating to the
sweeping, in Odciber rg44, of the CorluChannel. The fint dakd
l 13th Octaberreports "negative results"in thenorth-west portion.
As tkis was only asignal from the ofFicercarryingout the sweep
to hislocal forcecommander, itisa pure accidentthat it happened
to have ben, pickd iip by the Adrniralty wireless and. thpspreserved T,he ather signalsrelathg to the remainder ofthis
meep were not $a picked up. The second signal vas one sentto
al1Ailied naval authoritiebythe senior British navnficer inthe
Levant and rep& that as,a result of thissveepin g channe1
safe for naPigation one mile widehad been established. Captain
Blackburn, when he stated (p.130,Annex 15 af Mernorial) at a
meeting of the MedzonBoard that tvritten reportwould be pro-
duced, ws not mare of,oroverlooketi,thefact thatvr7henegative
results were obtained no written reports were made.
18.The Goverment of the United Kingdom notes that no
particulars are given of the enquiries in paragraph rg of the
Counter-Mernorialalleged to have been made by the Albanian
authorifiesofEheBritisli Military Nission. Foritpart thGovern-
ment of th^ United Kingdom knows of riasach enquiries. The
Albanian Goverment in fact. although supplied&.th alrelevant
information, manifested up till May 1946 a cçirnpletiiidifference
regarding the condition oits territorial waters, anwaç content
to leave their clearance, and the provisiof information relating
toroutes, to the %\vers responsible.
The Albanian Governent refers, inpampaph 19, to General
Hodgson's 14th in which he sfates "the green lineon the chart
show sweptchannels. Cornrnqder-Mhief, Mediterranean, takes
no responsibi flithe awuracy of this chartandany Albanian
vessels using the information given inido sa at theiown risk.'"
In thisletter heral 'Hdgson, ~4th the usual offcial caution,
was rnerely disclaiminany legal responsibilittowards those who
rnight use the s\vept charnel in relimceon the charts. Such.a
disclaimer of respomibility isnoymeans the sam thing as saying
thnt the channe1 cmnot in fact be considered saie. It is the
common practice for authoritiestvhengiving most reliable iorm-
ation for tke benefit oofher perçonsat thesame time to indicate
that theyacceptnofinanclai or kgal responsihityto thosepefions
who may make use ofit.
The.fa& that preçise datéshave not been specicifdfthe sweep-
'ingsin October xg& and January and F~bruary 1945 {asdated
in para. zo of the AIbanian Counter-Rlemorial) does not seem
pwtinent since it isûifiçult ta swhatdifferenceit woü1dmake
sofar asthe questions atissue inthesep~oceedings are concerned
what the exactdate ofthe sweepings inmch ofthese threc months
was. In fact,as Annex 27 shows, the sweeping in Octohr rg*
began on 13th Octuber,

(Counter-Mernosil, paragraphs z1-27 ).

29. Beforcdzalrnglvith the'interpreto aftheonAgreement for
the InternationalMinesweping Organization and .theposition ofAlbaaiain regard theretothe Government of the United Kingdom
thinks iEisnecessar tyrecite certain factshowing the atlomalouç
position in which Albania was atthe time thiç Agreement vvas
concludad. In ~938,Albania was an independent kingdom, but
on Good FIlday, 1939~ the Italian Gol~ement under Mmsolini
invaded Albania and, after a short spacei of time, al1 çirganized
Albania npposition tvas overcorne, A ''Constituent Aççembly"
clairningto he sepresentativeof the prefectures and of the three
religions >vas convoked under Italim auspices and offered the
Crown of Albanla to the King of Italy. The kgal position of
Albania as rïefinedbyItaly waç thatit remalneda Stateinpersona1
unionrtrithItalyundertheTtalian crown. Thissituation,brought
about by the conduct of the Fascist I-talian Government,though
condemecl by the United Kingdom and other coiintries, was
neverthelessby implication recognizd on a defach hasisbyapplic-
,ationsto the Italian MinistryofForeign Affairçfor exequaturs in
revect of consriIarofficetobestatimed in Albania. An Albanian
Govtimment, setup in 1939 under Shevket VerIaci, remainecl in
power until Decernber 1941, Tliishvernment, on 17th June;
1940, apppraved a decree, according ta rvl~chAlbania declared
herseifait\var with al1corntries at\var with Italy, The Italian
invasion of Greecehok place tliroughthe temitory of .Mb;mia and
the Mbanian Government facilitated that invasion, In conse-
qnençe of ttris, Greece considered herselat \var wi& Albania.
The United ICingdomdid not declare >varon Albania. but treated
Albania as enemy territoryin conduding hostilities against the
Axis.
zo.In the courseof hostilitiesresistancernove&ents amse in
Albania, as inother Balkan cowbies. The Governrnent of the
United Kingdom naturaily mcouraged al1 rresistance movements
xfivelyengagedagainst theenemy. In Albania,asi theseother
couniries, more than one resistance rnovemcnt cm into being
and the differentresistance movemënts did not altitays work in
harmony with eachother. Inallcicating theassistance whittiit
was ina position togive to resistancc movements in Mbania, the
Government of the United Kingdam supported any resistalice
movernent whi& I~S embarrassing itsmemies. Çonsequently,

it gave assistance notrnerel trythe movernent, \vhiçh ultirnately
beçami. the Albanian Gov~rnment under Geneml Enver Hoxha,
but also to other movements which, $0 far as Albania intemal
politics were concened, were oppased tohim. Tt was only in
November, 1945 (thesame month in which theAgreement for the
International Minesweepin Organimtion was sipecl}, that the
movernent undes General Enver Hoxha \vas recopized by the
Governent of the United Kingdom as the provisional Govm-
ment of Abnia, and Albania can be said to have again started
on her course (albeitstilon a somavhat provisional footing)as
an indeyendent State. This recognition'1v-agiven after asur- anceç had ben received that free electionswdd be heïd in the
country, on the baçis of which the future Government of Albania
wouId he chosen. The interna1 position of Albania continu&,,
ho~veves, throughout the ensuing mont hs,to be momalous .and

uncertain. The Governrnentof the United Kingdom had a Militxy
hfission in Albania from ApriIr943p tilApril,1946, throvgh which
rc1:lhtions ith the Albanianautherities Tvere conduçted, and the
question of estahllshing dtplomatic relations witli the Aibanian
Governrnent was stiIl under considerationbythe Guvernmezrtof
the United Kingdom when the incident of rgthBIay,1946 occurred.-
q 21.Albanla had never been invited to sign the I'lyashingtan
DecIaration of 1942,and consequently was not considered to be
in a positiontc}becorneari originalMemberof the United Nations.
She was in the course of transition fromanenemy territory to a
Pmrer in friendly reIa€ionswith theUnited Nations countries, but
the state of \varbetwen Albania and Greece,tvhich had restdted.
from theAlbanian declaration of~7th June, rg40 ,nd the invasion
of Greecethrough Albanian terrltory, had neverbeen teminatcd.
The position .of Albariiawas ariom~lousbut has some analogies
to thaf of Austria, Both conntries lost their independence asthe
result of aggressive acts of Powers, who becarne the enemies of
tkie Allies, éhough,whereas Austria was simply included as part
of Gerrnanj~, Albwn was leftby Itafy as a nominally separate
State. As arcsult,both corntries were in 1940 enemy countries,
but in both cases the Alliesentertain4 the most friendly feelings
towards the people and desired that theyshould regain their
independence. In the case of both countries the Govemment of
the United ICingdommade or joined indeclarations in this sensc ;
inthe yew 1942 as regardsAlbmia, and as regardsAustda in 1943.
The declaration selating to 'Albania was made by the Foreign
Secretaryin Parliment and isquoted in,Annex 28. Ttis agajnst
this background that Ailiania's position with regardiothe Agree-
ment fer the International Mùiesweeping Organization should be
considered,
22.It fs natv desirable ta cousider the interpretation O£ this
Agreement md in iarticular ofparagrapli 12, on ~vhichAlbania
- has place$ çuch stress.It rnust, however, be pointed out in the
first place tllathasAgreement applied to the meping pf mines
thsoughout Europe, andtliat, from this point of view, therewere
atleast five categosies ofStates,narneIy : (1)Allied Powers such
as the United Xfingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. which

had not been occupied, and possessed naval forces and mine-
sveepin facklities(2)Allied Powers such as France or tlle Nether-
lands which had sufferedgreatiy £mm the occupatioii andin conse-
quence had little or no facilities for minesweeping; (3) neutral
hwers such as Sweden ; (4) enemy States such as Italy and
Cjennariy ;(5) AIbania, which does not faU prwisely into any of
the above categories,but was cornpleting heremergence fmm the REPLV OF UNITED KINGDUM (30 VIï 48) 2gr
position of an enemy c~unt~rg,..One thing, hotvever,,isperfectly

clearin the opemtion ofthis Agreement,and that isfhat, inthe
case of the enemy, or ex-cnemy, States,the responsibility for
minesweeping in their territorial watermç nat entrusteclto the
Governrnents of tlieseStates, but to the naval anthoritiesof the
Allies,thaugh naturally these enerny os ex-enemy States trrere
required togive al1 the assistance tks respect that theyiverein
a position to afford,
23. In Novembes, 1945 A,lhaniri'status vasstillso equivocal
that thcrtl mas then no question of entrusting her mith any
responsibility for minesweepingher waters, apart altogetherfram
the fact (indlcated in the Albanim Coiznter-Mernorial)that she
lacked thc maritime and other resourc wehich ~vauldenable hes
to give any assistance in the matter of mine clearance, The

Agreement of aand Nov~mber,1945 ,etting up the International
Organieation for the Çlearmce of bines in European waters
(hereinstfter refendto as "the Mineçweeping Agreement") wEch
\vas accepted manimously by the Four Powers, including Sie
W.S.S.R., didnot attribzitto Albania mernbership of the s~levant
%ne Briard, the Medzon Board, nor did it provide for kherepse-
sentation of Aibania even by observer. On the other hand,
the Agreement did ao*torder Albania, as it did Gerrnariyai~d
Italy as enemy or ex-enemg States,to send representatives te
give information when reqtiired and to receivc directions, The
provisions of the Agreement illustrate, in fact, perfectly the
intermediate status of ,41bania at the time it \vasdrawn up.
24@ As the composition of the ~xious Zone Boarrts is defined
exclusivelyby the Agreement, nofurther additions ta the Medzon
Board could be made Save by the unanimous agreement of al1
the Poivers parties tomthe Agreement, As stated above, hhe
"exclusion" of Nbania from the hledzon Board %vas the result
of unanimous agreement of aii the ITour Great Powers. Subse-
quently, inthe Medzan Board, suggestions were made, principlly
by the Yugoslriv member, that AIbania shoulcl be admitted,
Alhania' position was, as stated above, complicated inkr alio
by die fait that, from thepeint of view of Greece, she remained
technicaiiy an enerny country,and was stillngt in i-iorrndiplo-
matic relations with a aumber of other cowtries. Neverthcless
it is possible that, but for the incident of May 1946, which
prevented the establishment of normal dipIomatic relations
beheen Albania and the United Kingdom, the counlries con-

cerned rnight have agreed to the admission of an Albanian
observer,in çpiteof thefact thatAlbailia ~ould have been unable
to give any practical assistance. Again, it is possible that
agreement might 1.iac.been renched later for the admission of
- Albania insome form, if theincident of Octobes 1946 had not
' occumd. The Medzon Board, which, acting#under pampph 7 (4
of the MinesweepingAneement, had the duty to divideits zone
. into sub-areas and assik responsibility fothe clearance of sub
areas amongst the "Powers involvd," by uunanimous agreement
at its fust meeting on 5th November, 1945, aIIocated ta Greece
area r8 [subsequently sub-divided into areas 18A, r8B, etc. ;
and àsea 18A contains the Corfu Channel). (The minutes of
the mlim meetings of the Medrmn Board are aot at presmt
avajlable inLondon. One complete copy of these minutes is,
~omever, being forwarded to the Registy of the Court. 'EVhen
dahg so, the G017enimen.tof the United KingBorn will alço malte
the extract, ivhich it desires to file as an additionalannex to
this Reply.) This decision baving been taken, the result was

that the sesponsibility for the su~eepinginarea 18A of any mines
xvh~chhad to be swept feu te Erecce by internationalagreement,
and it xvould consequently appeczr fhat, under the Agreement,
the only Foiver whose consent !vasnecessary for a siireepinof
the Co& Channel by the British Navy, after mines had been
discovered therein, was Greece, which consent was given. In
the hght of the foregoing fach, tli Geoverment of the United
Kingdom will noiv approach the interpretationof paragraph 12
of the Minesfveephg Aptemen t.
26. The Albanian Government states th'at paragraph rz of
the Agreement ("Each Po~.rre.rvfl uldertake the clearance of
itsom cmstal waters") is based on the principle that a State
has sovereignty' over its own territorial waters, and fhat itis
dificult tset hclwother StaPesconld supplatlt this rightMbania
therefore cantends thatthe word "Power" in paragraph zz refers
to any State dlatever, premmably, therefore, indudifig littoral
enerny States suchas Germany or Italy. An examination of
the Agreement shows that the provision in paragraph 12 does,
not bear the construction for which the Aibanian Government
cantends.
27, The Agreement of 1945 was directed to an immediate
practical purpose-Hie clearance of mines- Article z is the k5.G
provision whch is rdetiant, and states that the zones "shall be
divided into areas and sub-areas the clearance of kvhich sliall
be alIoc-ated'tothe interested littoral andother Po~vers under
the direction of Boardssetup under Artide 7 below'', It emerges
from Article 2 that: (ilthe clearanceof zones is docated to the
interesteeIdforal and other amal Pomms ; [iithis clearance is
subject to the direction of the Boards. Article7 (a)refers to
the mmner inLwhich the Boarcls proceed and states that the
Zone Board "shall divide the zone in2.0sub-areas" and "assign
responsibility for theclearance of sub-areas among the Powers
ifiwolved". This expressio "the Powers involvcd" must be
connectecl wifh Artide z, which sef feto the interestedlittoral .
and other naval Pawers. Fsom this itwould appear that respons- has been pointed out, under Asticle 7 (d)onlyPowets repre-
sented on the Board are ttobe allacated mhesweeping forces
from outside. Consequc~itly,the Governrnent of t,heUnited
Kingdom contend that this pasagraph has no application to
Albnia at al1 becnuse she was npt a Pawer repsesented on the
Board. In fact, under the Agreement, Albania in fieanomalous
internationalpositionat the tirne wastreated whlhevas an Allied
Power nor as aneutral Poxve9tor8S an enernyor exenerny Power.
.Slze was not given representationon the Board but she was nwt
ordered, as ex-enemy Po\vers were, ta send representali denes
required. The weeping ofher waters in the Corfu Channel was
simply entrusted entirely to Greece, the-citatewhich possessed
the ofl~erhdf of the Cliarinel.

CONDTTIQ INSTHE NORTH COWU CHANNEL 194j-rg46
(Counier-Mernorial,paragraphs 28-30.)

29.It shouldXremade elear that the statle of \var referrto
in paragmph 28 of the Counter-Mernorial as existing between
Greece and Albania was, as the observations of M. Dendrarnis
thernselves make çlear, a trichnicastate ofwar, not arising out
ofany incidentsin the Channel or on the frontier but derived
frsm the situation described paragraph18 above, For the rest
the Governrnent of the United Kingdom considersi-t.superfluous
to embarkupon an examination ofthe merits ofthemal1 incidents
between Greece md Albania here referred to, since the dispnte
hefore the Court is betureen the United Kingdom and Albania.

INCXDENT OF 15thMAY,1946

(Cornter-Mernorial, paragraph 31-37,)
30.The Govctnment ofthe United Kingdom dms not accept
the accou~rtgiven by the Albani,m Governme~it of this incident
and submitstha ttis notborne out bythe evidençe. His Maj esty's
ships,as already stated inparagraph 14 of the Mernorial, wvere
passing thraugh the swept ciiannel "exhibitineir national naval
~nsign in accordancc rvithnomaJ procedure and replations in
forcein the Royzl Navy'". The alkgahon, in patagraph 31 of

the Counter-Mernorial,that these shlps were nnot shotviag their
flag.iincorrect, andçàn only be understood as showing that the
Mbanian gmds were wfarniliar 114thmaritirne.flags. The tele-
gram hm the Flag OfficesCornmanding 15th Cruiser Çquadron,
in hex 29 to this RepEy, shows that the White Ensign, the
British navalflag,had been worn throughout the night and, as
the shipswere approaching land, large Wliitefnsigns (6feet and
74 feethoad mspectivelg) had ben hoisted eiight minutes before
the first shotcvaçfired ai His Majexty's ships. Moreaver, the
ICing'sRegulations and AdrnirriltyInstructions oder the flyingofthe ensignin these cirmmstances and there inodoubt whatever
that itwas soflown, No waminf: of any kind was received from
the Albanian coast, as isproved by the tetegram in Anne ag,
and it is quitinaccurate to say that "some tvarning shots"were
fired. Infaçt twelve shots were fued with high explosive not:
across the bows of the shps but astern of them.
31. As ~egardsthe position of the ships,regardirrglvhich the
Aibanian Gounter-Mernorial (in paras.31 and 32) rnakes a number
of allegations, thGovemment of the United Kingdom replies as
fol1w s:-
His Majesty'sships never left theswept channel and, fherefore,
never penetrnted into Albanian national (interior) ~vaterç. The
course taken 'by theskips, asplotteclby the most modern navig-
ationd instruments, is shownon the second ofthecharts inAnnex 7
of the Mernoriai and is obviously more reliable than the rough
reckonîngs made by a coastal battery not equipped, as para-
pphs 40,gr (a)and gr (d) of the Aibanian Counter-Mernorial
admit, wjtb scientific instruments. The ships made no sudden
change of direction to-cvardsLimioni as the Albanian Counter-
Memotîal suggests. On the cùntmry, following Sie Channel, they
turned away £rom Sarandn when offDenta Point, As regards
the position of the shipsat themoment when they ivese hred on,
the Governrnent of the United Kingdom reiffims that ehey were
nt a distance ofj,ooo yards. This distarice is notof course, the
distance of the ships from the coast but their distance from the .
Albanian batteries from which the shots kere frred.
32. In paragrapl-i31,the Coiïiiter-Mernorialrefers to a secret
report dated zgth Ju1y from General Hodgsoa, the Chiefof the
British nlilita Mrission iAlbania, and purport in their Anriexrr
to give a photostat copy of this report, A glarrce at Annex II ,
in fact shows that itis a putting tegether of five separate pieces
of papei. The firstfour ofthese pieces areextractsfrom the first
ttvo and a half pages ofthereportand the la& is simply the sign-
ature. The whole of these two and a hatf pages are noiwmnexed
as Annex 30 to this Reply. ~he first extract Itl~eheading; the
second is+lielast sentence ofpage 2 ;the third extract is the first
three tines of page 3, The Albanian Government has then deli-
berately cutout the nex-televen Iinesand added the fourth erdract,
also on page 3, which begins with the words "Srich incidents".
It will be seen that, by the omission of the eleven lines which
come between the thid'an dourth extract gven by the Albanian

Goverrimelit,the sençcjof the report:has ben campletely invcrted.
So far, from the report canfirming the exisktsnceof cznumber of
incidents calçulated tocreate a srate of tension,it says that,in
gtneral, the situation onthe Gontier appeared remarkablyquiet
and peaceful, and that the statpents made by the Albanian
National Fmnt about frrintier incidents \vert:laryeexaggerated
and had becn put out ta counter Greek hvernrnent staternerrts,236 XEPLY.OF mmn KINGOOM (30 VII 48)

of .theAlbanian maitreatment of the Greek mlnorjiy. Itms ody
after thisthatthe report said thatsuch incidentsas have occurred
(which it will be çeen were not numerouç m important) would
appear to have ken caused either by irresponsible Greek elements,-
etc. The Government of the United Kingdom will ask the Court
to take prticn,lar notice of Annex 11 of the Albaian Gounter-
Mernorialas a ddiberate attempt ta mislead the Court. It tvas
quite possible that a fulcopy of Gs reportby General Hodgson
might not have been traced by the Governent of the United
Kingdom and,indeed, the expectafion fl1a-t: this moirld beSQ ail
be the amly explanafion of 'the filinof an Annex wbich 3s so
.~;ompletelymisIeading as to the sense. -
The Government of the United Kingdom wish to statetEzatno
copy of thissecretreport was omcially hnsmitted tothe Albanian
Government and the Albania Gnovernrnent do not account for
their possessionof it.
33.The endof pragraph 33 of the Gounter-Mernorialdistorts
a çtatement madein parégraph 88of the United Kingdom Mernoriai,
The United Kingdom Governrnent did not sày that the $~inci$le
oJ i9'~.1u,e+ttssageisstrictly li,mitas,dleged,; they stated that
the ""nght to restripassage"must "in view of therightofpassage
through straits be a strictly limited one"'.
34- In parapph 3'4 the Albanian Govmrnent decIares that it
"recogni~es and respects the principle of innocelit passage but
cannot tùlerate that use shordd be made of internai Albanian
waters of the pmt of Saranda.,,.", As statedabove, EIisMajesty's
ships in May 1946 never entered Albmian internal waters. The
paragtaph proceeds to refer to a iiutification madeby the Chief
of General Çtaft ofthe Albanian army cf ~flh May (that isto Say,
a notification made two daysaftm th6 incident which isbeing
discussed) andthen proceeds ta quote this iiotifrcatinn incorrectly.
In the Counter-Mernorialreferenceismade to foreign ships penet-
rating in Ablia~iu.fimis uithout previous noticeor authorization,
but in the full text of the notification given on page17 ofddocu-
ment Sjpo, in Anriex 23 ofthe Unitecl Kingdom Mernorial,the
notificationrefers to "fomign battlmkips aiid merchant vesseIs
entering Albanian territoridwaters rvithout pror notificatienor
permission of our autl-iorities, Please infom your at~thorlties that
such vesselçmust not sail in Albanian behferid wattws without

notification and permission from this Goverment." If wiilbe
observed that this notification refersnot rnerely to foreign warships
but also tomerchant vesselç, and that itrefers not to Albanian
intanal waters but to Albanian tenitorial waters. The Govern-
ment of the United Ihgdrim wish agak~,inconnexion with this
notice,to draw attention to the confusion bebveen territorial.
waters, on the one band, a~d interna1 waters on the other hand,
which \vas canstantly made b$ the Albanian authorities during
this period. If the distinctibehveen the two, whichthe Çounter-Mernorial now admiis, had been properly appreciatcd by the
Mbaniari authotities at an earlierstage,it is possible that great
many of the ilifficulties which have ari.sen twuld have heea
nvoided. If the notificationhad, as the Caunter-Mernorial says,
ken confined tocnteringin20ports, the Government ofthe United
Ringdom wouldnever have thought of takirtgobjwtion toit, but
as applied to territorial waters,induding the navigable charnel
of the Corfu Straitand applying to merchant shipç as wsl? as to
warsliips,thisnotification most ckarly exceeded any rights which
Albania could posçibly have had under internationallaw. It will
aiso he observed Chatthe notification does not parpartto justify
itself upon the baçisof the allegedly special conditionsto .cvhich
reference is made in fie Counter-Mernorial.
35. 1t is subrnitted that na crehble evidencehas bccn adducd
bj- the Albanian Govcrnment in support of itç contention that
His Majesty's shipç behaved in a provocative maliner or in aily
\vay so asto indicate amenace to Albanian security. Indted the
rnanner in ~vhiclithe ships passed through the Channel, elcposing
themxlves to attack at close range, the fact that they did not
xeturn fire when theyhad every reason so todo, and the fact that

diplornaticrelations were aboutto be established betweenAlbania
md the United Kingdom (towhich the Albanian Government
itselfrefersinpara. 35 of the Counter-Mernorial) al point most
clearly inthe oppsite direction.
36. The Governmeni of the United Ringdom agreestha+ inits
Note ofalid Airgus+,19.46,it inforrned the Albanian Government
that if, ifuture, fire were openedon His Majesty's skips by Alba-
nian mstal batteries fi~would he returned, The descriprtion of
this actionas "tlveatening," afteHis Majesty's ships had already,
under extrerne provocation, not returned fise, can onbeerrplained
on the basis that Albania regardcd herselfas entifled to open fire
onthe shipsof afriendIy Potver passingthrough the Str~ts intime
ofFace. This masin fact the conclusioto whicb the Governent
of the United Kingdom was driven after receiptof the Aibanian
Note of 19th June, 1946,aIthaugh prior ta thisitwdasprepared to
affrib~de theincident to the incornpetenceof the local commander.

37.The Government of the United Kingdom takes note of the
Albanian Govemment's forma1 sstaternentht itdid not hy the;
minefield and was nat in a position to do so. It observes the
stateinent inparagraph 8 of the Courtter-Rlernmia(bottomofp. 35)
that Mbania possesses no navy, and that on the wholc Albanian
littoral the Albnnian anthoritics only disposed ofa few launches
and mator boah. 112the light of these staternents, the Gorfern-
ment of the United ICingdom callsupon the Albanian Governrnent todisclosethe ckciimstaancesi,nwhlch hvo Yugoslav war vemlç,
Mirjeand hdetjine,carrying contactmines ofthe German Y type,
sailed smthwards fromthe FOI?of SibenikOn or about18thOctober,
1946 ~ndproceeded to theCorfu Channel. The Government of the
United Kingdom will allege, andwill seeleave te cal1evidence to
show, tlmtthe saiclessels,M&je and Metji~e,with the knowledge
and connivance of the AIbanian Government, laid mines in The
Corfa Çhnnnel justbefore zznd October, 1946.
38, The Albanian Government in paragraph 40 of its Counter-
Memorial appear to attach importance to a distinction bctween
Irieasuresof '%iggila-nand of "special vigilance'"The Govem-
ment of the'United Kingdom is content toleave thi psointto be
developed by the Albanian Govemment, The Court is asked to
take note that measures of vigilance existed, anthat thisfact is
admitted bythe Albanian Govemment.
These admissions and .fads; together withthose deged in the

Memorial(paras. 6, Ir, rz,13, 14,24 and 251,are suffieient upon
which tobase the conclusionwhich the Government of the United
Kingdom invites the Court to draw, narnely, that in the circum--
stances then prevailing thAibanian authorities çonld not have
remained ignoran of the existence ofthe mines.
39. The suggestion made inpamgraph 40 of the Albanian Cour-
fer-Mernorialthat theiiicidenof the Tana isa pure invention is
inadmissible having regardta the positive evidence filedby'the
Government of the United Kingdom on thiç point {Annex zz ofits
Mernorial). The Court's attention is invitto The PoZZsh Up;ber
,C,laiacas (Series A, No. 7, p. 1731t,vherdie Permanent Court
said it \vas alivaysfree to estimate the value of any evidence
presented to it,and likewise to estimate the due of staiternents
made by the parties,
40. The Government of the United Kingdom expressly con-
. trovertseach and every one ofthe allegations made in pangraph41
of the Counter-Mernorialregardin tge easewitlzivhich mines can
be laid without belng detected- Theçe allegations are elabarated
in pasagmphs 66, 76 and 77 ofthe Çoun-ber-Mernorial,and further
comaients wili be made cm them later, (Paras. 59and 65.)
Furthemore, théallegationthat the wezithewas stormy between
~2nd Qctober and 12th November, which isnot admitted, is not
relevant, asthe mines, inthesubmission of,theGov'rnment of the
United Kingdom, were Iaid bleforezznd October,
Inpragmph 43the Albanian Government does not shrink bom
aecusing the Government of the United State osfa deliberate
invention.of a libellous statement againstAlbania "inordes tû
support the violation of Albanian watersby the BritishNavy". qx. Itis3rne that no noticetvasgiven by the Government of the
United Kingdom to the ~lbinian authorïties of the intencled
passageby BiçMajasty'sships. Inthe siibrnissioof theGovernd -
ment of the United Kingdom na such noticewas neceçsary. It
doeç not folloifrom thiç, however,that the Aibanian Government
did not in fact houi that the squadron waç intending to pass
through the Channel, As stated in'theSecurity Council, the
programmeof naval cruisesof this kind in peace liane isnot a

secret,
statedGthat notice off the Uintendedinpassage ofevthe s&psallon

z~ndOctohr, 1946m ,s given, andCaptain Nicholsin the Central
Mine-Clearan Bcodrd, when he çaid notice had bezngiv$n, \vas
speaking !vithout instructionsand, infact, incorrectly.
The statement in paragraph (second sub-paragraphjof,the
Coi~nter-Mernorialthat the passage of the British çquadmn WGI;
. inconsistw enihtthe orders,stated by the Representative of the
United Kingdom before the SecurityCorncil to have ken given ts
Hiç Majesty'sships, is inexact.The orders which were @en after
the incident of 15th May,1946 w,ereorderçgiven tu -thet-wo partic-
uiar shipçH.M.SS. Omo% and Saperb, not to retum through the
North Corfu Channel soasto avoid the poçsibility affreshincident
while ternpers were hot, and are evidence of non-provoative
conduct. Suchorders werein no way applicableto the passageof
otlier shipat other times.
42. It is deged by the Albanian Governrnerit that 'on
zznd October the ships had gnns trained on the coaçt, were in
combat forrnatiot-had troops on board and were ready to fite
(para.46). These allega+ionsare untrue and have been repeatedly
deriled by the Governmerrt of the United Kingdom. They are
proved tobe untrue by the photograph fled in Annex 8 ofthe
United Kingdom Mernorial and by other photogaphs shown as
Exhibit II tiin Security Council 0fcciaE Records, Second Year,
S~rpplement No. 6. These photographs clearly show the guns
bined fore and aft. Lhere \vasno hostileactor intend4 hostile
act,but themeasures of alertness svliich were ordered were a
reasonableprecaution having regard to the incident oi15th May.
Annex 8 of the Albanian Couriter-Mernorial purports togive the
texk ofAdmira1WiUis'sstatement of26th October, 1946. It is
based on .Reuter's inaccurateseport of the statement, A fdler
and correct report appeared in Tlze Tikes of 28th October,
Reuter'sreport omitted the important tact that file gunwere not
loaded. The text of Adrniral IVilIis'çstaternent is attached
(Annex 31). 43. There were nosoldiers on bard the Slzips,only the normal
complemenkof sailors and marinesand also aband.
some of the sailors and marines wtre \ve;iring armykhaki vifhich
had been issued in the Naw and was anthorized for use as "sea-

going rig". This fact probably led ta the Aibanian supposition
that there were soldie orsboard, Famgraph 46 of the Albanian
Couniter-Mernoriam 1 isquotes itsown Annex 8 ; the tvords "prets
à fairefeu" do no-tappearthere.
44. The ships were never in diamond formation but in Eine
throughout. Moreover, the cruiser rmcjahead of the destroyer in
each pair of bships,which would not have been the case Ilad the
squadron, as rillegdbythe AIbanlanGoverment, been contern-
plating host5le action. Nane of the dlegritions regardhg the
position ofthe ships made in pa~agraph 46or in Annex rzare truc,
Tlie positions of the ships were, in this case ton, plotted by
accuraie navigational instruments and are correctas show in the '
firstand tlzird of the charts in Annex7 af the Mernorial of the
Governrnentof the Unitcd Kingdom. None ofthe vesselslef the
swept channel except the two destroyers, which, after they had
both been damaged, and were strttgghg to make Corfu, were
carried ,y thewind sliglititofie East of the Channel.
45. It isquiteincorrect,asstated inparagraph47 offhe Albanian
Cornter-Mernorial, ta say that the British Governmeat hxs con-
thually modifiecfthe Medri mutes 18/32 and 18/34 iowards the
Albanian coast. In .the first place the fixing of these routes \vas
not a matter for the 13ritish Government but for the International
Routeing andRepotting Authority. Secondly these routes, oiice
fixecl (anditisagreed that forFurposes af safety fhey were ked
further towards the e-t than was the previous German Channel)
sverenot nltered,as referene to the detailed bearings in the MedrE
pamphlets \vil1 readiEy prove. (See Annes 5 of the Mernorial of
the Goverriment ofthe United 1Cingdorn.E
46. The tirneçof thepassage of the ~ritish'ships~zreinmnectly
stated inpa~agraph47 oftlie Conter-Mernorial of the Albanian
Governrnent. AEtbougli ït is possible that the ships may have
been sighted from Cape Long shortly aeer 1300 hourstlie first
ship in factpassed Cape Long at 14.43hours.
Itwill be nùted tkat thereport contained in Annex 7 of the
Albanian Comter-Mernoriai [the acciiracyof which, kowcver, is
in no way adrnitied) does not itselfstate that shps were at Cape
Long at 1300 hours but enly that they ivereseen art thistirne.
The Albanian Goverriment, in theirGounter-Mernorial, apparently
misread the report contained in tI-ieo-ivnAnna 7, and tliis haç
cansed them in their Counter-Memarial to dispute, upon no
ground at all, the speed of the ships and their course as given
by the Government of the Uni teclKingdam,
47. The end ofparagraph 47 of theAlbanian Counter-Mernoria1
states th~t the British sqt~adron %vas firçt seen from Cape Longat 1300 houts arid that the explosion mder the Sawma~~ztook
place at xjooliours, that isto say, two hours iifter the skips
were fint sem. Consequenfly, the contention inpcz~agraph92
of the Mernorial tht the Albanian authorjties had mple time
in wvhich to warii the ships that they were approaching a dan-
gerous rninefidd, is more than milfirmed. The passage in the
Mernorial readç as follows:- "Even ifthey [the Aïbanian author-
ities] 11ere unacvare of theprogramme of the cruise afthis part
of theBritish Mediterranean Fleef, .theycould observe -thprogress
of the shi~s up te the swept chanel for some time before the .
minefield %vas'kpproached. .. Even if, tlierefore,they were net
seen imtil they were fivemiles a\yay-tvhich is most unlikely,
the xveather bcing quite clcar-this would allow 30 minutes for
a ~amii~g +Obe given." Ilifa&, the Albanian Counter-Mernorial
shows that they had twn hoirfs for this purpose.
48. The Albsnian Governrnent cor~ectly points out in par&-
graph 49 fi~at the photogmph taken of the Saumar~xafter the
explosion, and filedin Annex S ofthe United Kingdom Mernorial,
couldsnot have been takeiz 30 secondsafter the explosioti. The
GovernmenP of the United Kfngdom expresses to the CouTt its
regret thIl tte photograph, which was so taken, was by inad-
vertellce omitted from Annex 8. This photograph, whch %vas
taken hom the bridge of H.M.S. Mau~a'ltas,is now filed as
Anriex 32. This same phot~graph \vas filed in Exhibit II (b)
before the Security Council (O@cid Records, Second Year, Sv'
plernent- No, 63, ~vhere no question was raised regarding its
authenticity.
The photograph filedin Alinex 8 was talcen some tirne czfter .
the explosion when the ather ships had rnoved up, and sholvs
Vohp taking Sazt~~zarezn tow.
49. There is no discrepancy, as alleged by the Albanim
Govenlment, betweeli tlie kwo staternents quoted by it in para-
graph 50 of the Chunter-Mernoriil, since The fsrstclearly refers
.ta'\bore-batteries" and aie second ta "rnachine-gun fire".
30. The Government of the United Kingdom notes that the
Albanian Government profesç ignorance of the explosion under
H.M.Ç. Volage. Tl~efact that this explasion,which was sufficient
to blci~off the ship's bows, was not obçerved by the coastal
authcirifies,althoiigli the ships were, accordiugto the Albanian
account, only x,ooo rnetres from the shore, thrù~vsserious doubt
on the accttacy ofthe Albanian report inhnex 7 ofits Counter-
Mernorial. The explosion mdw EE.fi5.SVohge took place after
slie had conie forrvard tassist H-M-S. Swl~erex and had actnally
taken her in ~OW (as is statedin Exhibit XI (G)(i)filedwith fhe
Security Council). Annm g of the Mernorial shows the exact
place ~vhere it occursed, The interva bltween the explosions
(83 minutes) is explaineil by the factthat W.1T.S. Volcxggwas
at -dietirneof .thîirst explosioiiabout t~vomilesastcrilof K.M.S. a6z REPLY OF UNITED KZMGOOY (30 YII48)

Sauwme~, and had to close thisdistance and takethe flarnaged
shipiii tow. No other manoeuvres were carried out during this
period.
51. The staternent mode by the Àlhnian Governent in
paragsaphSC that "hundreds" ofvesselsnavigatîmg international
routeswhich have been doclared safehave encountete adcidents
isunime. Wkile Incidents haveoccurred, some of a deplorable
chamcter, theseeither have arisen fram navigation outside the
swept channel, or have been the result of grousid mines (not
moored mines) whichhad nd tesponded. stoeping, No ground
mines were laid, ar could havebeen efi&ctiveIylaïd, in the Corfu
Channel, asitwas too deep.
The caseofthe Cassious Hzkdsrmwhich is citedin paragraph53
is an illustratioofthe danger ofattempting to navigate outside
a swept charnel. The ship in question was ro miles out ofthe
swept chanriel,and entered Medrj Danger Area 15 which was
an existing and notified dangerarea on 16th October, 1946~in
position 45" 32' N. and.1rz' E. inthe North Adriatic, Details
ofthiswere published inthe Third JnterirnReport by the ~Tnter-
national Central Mine-Clearance Board,.page rr, of which the
relevant extractis given in Amex 33.
Further,the ten examples of '"casedf ~liips that have struck
mines" given in Annex 15of the Coirnter-Mernorial are totally
misleading.
This Amex 15 purports tu*show that casiialties, suas the
rnining of H.M.SS. Sau.maw and Volage,are "everyday occur-
rences"' whereas.in facthese two casualties aretheonIy knu\.rn
-ses ofvessels strikincontact, momed lines ina swept channel
since the cessatio of hostrlities,
Of the ten cases representedby the hbanian Governent in
hex 15, two are casesof fishing vessqls whicwere ças~ialties
because they were fishing in declared mined watemsix are cases
of merchant vesselshaviiig heeomecasualtieby entering declared
e minefields:a tliird fishivesse1$vasstruckby a Aoa-tingRussian
mine ; lastly,the S.S.William Bardey,, which the Government
of Albaniaclairnsstmck a mine on 8* May, 1948, in iacttoiiched
a submerged object in the open seawhich ca6sedsIight damage.
The Gavement of the United Kingdom asscrts that the
conrses of the vessels, 'athe places where explosims occurred,
are çorrectly shawn in Annex 7 (fi& and third chasts) and in
Annex9, and theAlbanianCoiinter-Mernorial producesno evidence
.toshow that thisis not accurate.
TEE DIPLOBTA TOIRRESPONDE NE+XEN zzndOCTOBE'K
AND 12th NOVEMBER

(Couriter-Mernoriapatagra$hs 54-58.)
jz.The Nbanian Govemment -was ihformed nd: only on
26th October of the general intentions of,tGovernment of theUnited Kingdom with regard to the proposed sweeping of the
Channel, but also on 10th Novemkr of theexact date on wkch
srveepingswere totake place. The, Note of 10thNovember was
delivered to the Albanian diplornatic representativeat Belgrade
ontht ddte, If,as is aUegedin paragraph 58,this came to the
knowledge of.the Albanian Government only a few hours befise

the actualtime of sweeping, that cannotbechargea ta theGovern-
ment ofTheAlbanian Govexnment contends that aftertheIncident
53.
of ~2nd October, the Government of the United Kingdom should
have soughtagreement tvith Albânia and the Mine-Clearançe
Board regarding the sweeping of the minefield. This contention
isoniy relevant tothe daim put furward by theAlbania novem
ment in the second part ofits Cnunter-Mernorial thatitssover-
ejgnty bas been infringed and the Governmerrt of the United.
Kingdom willdeal with itin ifs place(see paras. $0-83 of this
Reply), It has no bearing on this part ofthe case where the
Government of the United Kingdom içsetting out the fa& that
the sweepingtuok place and tErata number of new-lylaid mines
were discovered. On this part of Thecase, the proceedings in
the Mine-Clearance hards and the lack of previous agreement
with the Govemment of Albania, I~aveno relevance.

,54" .In thse pamgraphs the Albanian Eovemrnent seeks to
attack the credibiliiyof the account given by the Govez-nment
of the United Kingdom af the sweeping of the Channel on
13th November, 1946. The Albanian Government asks the
Court tobelieve, as one explanation of the minefield discovered
in the smept charinel, that the mines were kid by British Naval
Forces on 12thNovember inthe absence ofthe French observer,
in orderthat they might be stvept upin his presexce the foUo~ving
day, the 13th November. (See the end of para. 62,the second
sentence ofpara. 72,para, 74 last sentence, par77 fint sentence,
pwa, 78third sentence,) The object ofthis extnordinary '3rîtitish
machination" (videthe penultimate sentence of para. 73) was to
crreate evidence ta support the accusation, whick the United
Kingdom had already deterrnined to make againçt Albarila,and,
at the sme hme, to exercise on Albania politic. pressur ey
means of anirnportank part ofthe British Fleet (endof para. 74)
and to obtain from Aibania material damagc and poIitica1con-
dernnation fur the incident of zznd Odober (para, 77). This
%rnazingaccusation ischiefly supportedon the basisofa pxagraph
of the Report of Commander Whitford, whicl~ is quoted at the
end of pai-agraph 62. In thisparagraph Commander Whitford
stated that he had given orders that the personnel engagcd in
1 the minesweeping SlouId not allude to the operations exçept to
say that a nomal minesweeping operation had taken place and
that mines had beerr cut. There is a simple explanation of these
paragraplis whiçh will be given later (para. 58 (c)).
55. Sensational joiirnaliçts and hidorians have in the gasi, in
connexionwith tlieEms telegram just before the FrCmco-Prussian
%varand in connexion with the murder of the ArchdukeCharlqs at
Sarajevo jat before the fitsWorld War, suggested. deep machina-
tions ofais kind for the purpose of provoking afi&-class tmr, the
Pomr which induIged iiithese machinations eqecting that their
traces ~vouldbe buried in the dust of the confiict. The Alhanian
Gavement asks the Court tr,believe thai:the United Xingdom
indulged.in such a machination, net as apreparatory step tu the
destruction ofthe principalAlbanian ports Sy theBrifish Navy or
the rcuing of Tiranato the ground by the bombs of the Royal Air
Force, but merely for thepurpose of producingevidence befox-et:he
Security Council.(or tPLeCourt) with a view to obtaining from
Albania some pecuniary compensation. The United IGngdorn,
ino.tfier~rwrds,fabricated evidence, in orderto have the incident
examined meticuiously by an internationitl tirgan obytheInter-
national. Court and then obtigingly disdoçed to the Court, tvhiçh
isinvestigatingthe matter, theevidence from \&ch these machina-
tions are clearly to be seen. Leaving aside the aspersioils thus

, and against the officerand men Gofthe RoyalfHavy Uinvolvecl, tvhich
theGwernment of the United Kingdom deeplyresents, the sugges-
tion irnpliesonthe paf* ofthe Governrnent of thfiUnited Kingdom
an almost inmeditde naïvete and tlie reckless taking of risextra-
orharily dis-propodionate to the end deçired. In the clrcum-
stances, it is to be wondered why the Albanian Goverilment,
taking this vjewof the Governrnent of the United Kingdom, has
not also suggested thatthe United Kingdom laid the milies lrhich
blew up I3,M.S.Saumvez and H.M.S. Volug8.Mareover, it isto
be notecl,asthe Counter-Mernuria ltself poinbut:inparagraph60,
that thelate arriva1of tlie French observer was unexpected and
çonsequently, ifhehad arrived at the tirne eqected, he tvould
presumably dso have ken present at the the when the mines
were supposed to have been laid by the British Navy. Further,
as pointed out in paragraph 40, the Alba~lian Government has
not hesitaied to irnplicafe in thisplot the Goventment of the
United States w hich isaleged to have fahrlcated ottherevidence.
Further, any theory that the mines were laid after zznd Oc-
tober, 1946, affords no explanation how it was that twa British

destroyers %truck mines in the swept channel onthat date.
56. The account of the operatiün given by the Governent of
the United Ringdom iç based upon first-hmd accounts ef respons-
iblenaval officersmade cüntemporaiieously in the course of their
du*, tlapported by the evidence of an independent observer and A11thesé reports have been hi~llkly laid
af research experts.
before the Court:exactly as they were \vritteiat the time with no
attempt to elirninate aayimperfections orinccmsistencies, Against
theseaccounts, the Alhanian Governent offernopositive euidence
but linlya nurnber of criticisms based rnainlyupon incolisi~;tencies
in the various accounts. Though these are not so nunieraus as
the Mbanian Government çuggests,the Goverment ci£the United
Kingdom would nat attempt:to deny that tlierare certai rninor
discrepancies. TIiediscreparrciesareno greatertb~n aEecoanmonlj~
met with, w*henCLifferenptersans setout lionestly todescribe wht
they hnueseen, and, in thesubmission of the Government of the
United Ringdom, so farfrom destroying the effect ofthe evidence,
establiih its genwe chancter particularly when regard is had tb
the inuch larger rneasure rrfagreement behveen thewitnesses.
57, The Albanian Governme~it asks the Court to treata11these
report5 as hving novalue ascvidence becxuse they emanatc from

an intercsted party and thereport ofthe French observer as hailing
no ~vidirntial valilobecause he was not designated officially by
eit2ierofthe mine-clearance boards. Sofiiras thc Government of
the United bgdorn knou\.s,ithas neva been contendkd in any
case before the Court, or itçpredeceçsor the Permanent Court, iii
cases wherethe.Coiut had ta deal with questions of fact, thatthe
Court should reject al1 evidence ~roduced wkrch emafiates from
the servjçes of either the plaintiff or defendcuiState, or that it
shoold seceive as evidencc oidy the reports of some witness
appointecl by an infcrnatiriiml authority, and, Irrdeed,the Pa-
manent Court in its judgmerrts has fomd facts based on evidence
whicl~according taAIb,uiia should he rejected, In this conilexion
reference may again bc made ta the Polish Up$eu Silesiwcase
already referred toin patagrapb 39 above. Moreover, itisdifficult
tu believe how any case could be proved or disproved befwe the
Court if al1 such étridence were excluded, Whilc making this
contention, the Alhanian Gevernment submits, and bases inos2 of
itsCa.%, on evidence from Albanian sources.
53. Th Governrnent of the United Kingdom natv proceeds to
examine the Albanian criticlsms of the account, given in the
Menlorial, of the sweeping of 13th November, 19~6, and to avoid
repetition it cviidea3 on this occasion both with the criticims .
containecl iiiparagraphs 59 to 80 and with those cantained in
paragraphs 98 to 106 of the AUxtnian Counter-Mernorial, ~vhich
largely cover the same pund.
(,Gï'lw Governrnent of the United Kingdom a@es ~at it
attached importance to thepreseilce of an independent observer,
and that instructions ivele given thatthe opwation shodd not be
hgun until he was present, It also aptes thnt detailed orders
were given tb the Rritisli Naval Forces to ensure the çarrect
canduct of the operation ~nd to avoid any action,whidz codd be266 RsPLY OF UNITED Kfh'GDOM (30 VI1 48)
construed aç promative or agg~essive, These orders mre
scrupulously carried out.
(b) Capitaine Mestre was,infact, the acting French represent-
aEive onthe Mediterranean Zone Board, butit isnui suggested that
he ms present asrepteçenting the Board. He \vasa properperson
ta açt as observer and no attack has been or cm be made upon
his professionalcornpetence, Integrity and impartiality,
It is aiieged inparagraph 99 of 'the Counter-Mernorialthat the
report ofCapitaine Meçtrewas entireiy basedupon hearçay. This
is contrary to the fact. From his own report it appears that hz
tvas,during the greates part of the day of13thNovember, on

board B,Y.M.S, 2075, which tookpart diretrtly iu &e mine-sweeping
operations : hewas equipped with brriocuiarsand \vas in probably
a better position than anyone to see the initialsweepings, He
himself statesSiat he '"ersonallysaw" mines stveptinthe first
and second (i.~second and thid) sweeps (see Id(i)beiow). The
fact that there are certain discrepncies bettveen his report and
the reportsof the British officerç-to~vhichtheAlbanian Govern-
ment itself points-is alonesufficientto show that hisreport tvas
not mereEycopied fmm theirs but was independent. Though
Cnpitaine' Mestre had no special international authority on the
occasion of the srveepof 13th-13t Nhovember, his evidence is that
of an independent trustworth y witness with expert knowledge,
whose testimony ought to be acceptcd, as in fact itwas by the
majority of the rnerntsers ofthe Security Couricil.
(G) Paragmph 15 of Commander Whitfùrd'sreport, on which
theAlbanian Govermen t bases the astonistring suggestions referred
to in parapph 54 above,is; infact,capable ofthe simplestexpla-
nation. The personnel ofthe British Naval Forces were, atthe
time of the operation, fullyaware that 'unly threeweeh earlier,
44 of lheir cornradeshad lostthe% lives and 42 more hd been
jnjured tlhrough explosions in these waters. In these circum-
stances the Albanian Governrncnt rnight have been expected to
understand that therecovery fmm thesesame waters of more than
twenty newly-laid and highly dangerriusmines wonld give rise to
strong feelings of anger andresentment in the United Kingdom.
The order given by Commander lfitford, which was thathis men
shouId not individually make public the results of theçweeping
untiI higher authoritiehad been able to consider the reports\vas
the action which anyrespunsible ofliceswould taketo-id adding
to the already considerable intehnational tension. The suggeç-,
tiom made by the AZbariian Governrnent that,there wre '"certain
circtrmstances" mnnected ~viththe opelion known to some but
not al1the pe~onnel stems .tabe based upon-a rnisinterpretation
ofthe rvordzngof theparagrap hin question. The"'circumstances"
were, in fact,that two explosions on zznd October had caused a
serious loss of life and thatthe operations had resulted in the
discovery at thaplace urherethe explosionsoccilrred oa minefield WCk' OF UNITED KINCDOFiI (30 Vll 48) 267

of recently-laid mines, and these circiimstances,lkely to create
anger and resentrnent, were known (as the paragraph states)to
al1officers andmen and not rnerely to a section.
(d)The discrepanc ie he descriptions of the mines as to
colouring,markiirg, etc., and infilenumbers ofthe mines cut in
the varioussweeps are no greater thanmight normally be expected
in the accounts of differentobservers who were not at thesame
spot al1 the tirne. The foIlowing observations are made with
regard to the aileged discrepancies:-

(i} The total number of sweeps ar laps carried out in the
ChanneI on x3th November, 1946 (i.e., apartfrom the .
preliminary sweeping of a different areaon 12th Nowm-
bdr),\vas four, The kst sweep tms from N.W. to S.E.,
and was carried outby the fourB.Y.M.S.-no mines tvere
cut. The second sweep ms also from N.W. to S.E. and
\vascarriedout by the fivefleet rninesweepers:twomines
were cut, one eicplodingin the siveep. The third sweep
was from Ç,E. to N.W., carried out by both B.Y.M.S.
andAeetminesweepers :eight minestverecut. The fourth

stveepwas fromN.W. toS.E.,carried out by bathIB.\'.M.S.
alid fleetminesweepers, and twelve mines were çut.
Owing to the façtthat the firsta~d second sweeps'were
carried out in the samedirectionand at ashort interval,
it would be quite naturalforthem to be regarded as bvo
parts of onesweep. Tlie report of the Cornmander-in-
Chiefto the Mediterranean Zone Boardof 14th Novernber
referredto four stveeps. The report of Admiral Rinahan
(paras. II to 13, Anna 17, p. 157) aIso refersto four
sweeps, as does the preliminary report of Commander
Whitford (para. 5, Annex 17, p. 152). This, holvever,
Iikehis final report, treats the fisweep as a searching
stveeponly and therefore refersto three effective sweeps
only. The report of CapitaineMesfre treats the Eirsand
second sweeps, which were inthe same direction, as one
aiidthereforeonly referstotlireeeffectivsweeps. There
isthus çornpleteconsistency between the reports except
as to the terminology employed. lyinally, the reportof
Admiral Kinahan referred to in paragraph 73 of the
Albanian Counter-Mernorial as dated 16th November (i t
was in fact dated 24th Novernber] does not referasthere
aIleged,to one mine being Jomd in the secondsweep but
to one being sscrfnwd. This \vas perfectiy correct,as
one had exploded when cut.

(ii) Asto the number of the mines cut, the Albania Gnovern-
ment'correctlypoints out in paragrrsphggofits Counter-
Mernorialthat Capitaine Mestre, \hile agreeing tviththe
0th \itnessesin stating that 22 mines in aH were cut,26s REPLY OF UNITED KINGDOM (30 vft 48)

differçfromthemin hisallocation ofthese mines between
the varioiissweepç. Capitaine Mestre says that 13 mines
were cut in the last sweep, whereas in fact, as theother
reports show, 12 mines wrere cut in the last slveep. 'In
the last stveep but one, Capitaine Mcstre says that 7
mines tvere ciit, whereas in fact there were 8. The
explailation ofthis diçcrepanic syas follaivç Capitaine
Mestre, as paragraph 2 of his report shows,did not actu-
ally seemines taken in the finalsiveeppersenally becatise,
as he said, it !vas dark before hecould arrivat the spot.
He did seeyersonally al1 the cither sweepsand he states
that he personally saw S mines. In fact, ro mines were
cut in these first thresiveeps (Capitaine Nestre refersto
them as two sweeps, as alsendy ~~plained, ?mt that is
iinmateriallospresentpurposes) anclthat therefore leaves
z mines tobe accoimted for. Oiie ofthcse \vas the first
mine encountered, ~vhicli irnmediately exploded, and
tlierefore Capitaine Mesire did not see a niine but an
explosioi, and the othes tirain fa& taken iiithe penult-
imate sweep, but appatently lie cîinot seethis mine and
therefore attributed it rnistakenlyto the final stveeptlre
mines taken in which he cmild not inspect. In fact he

probably failed to see tliis minebecause, cluring part of
the pendti mate stveep, he \vasalso engaged in ii~çpeçting
the mines which Iiad first been cut (seethe report of
Gunner Pùwning, !hich appears at p.168, Annex 17, of
the Mernorial).
(iii~ltliou~h itdoee not specify dehils,the report of Capitaine
Rfeçtrcof 23rd Hovember provides defrnite confisrnatioii
sf the fact that Sie rnarkiiigs oii the mines were con-
spicuoiis, dthough the mrioi~s wîtnessesrefer todifferent
cletails,they are al1 (Commander JTQitford, Capjtaine
Mestre, Gunner I'owning and the Superintendent of the
Admira1ty BTiningEsta blishincn t) in agreenient that the
mines were xvellpreserved. Roth CommanderMshitfosd
:ind the Superintendent refer to the black paint on tlie
surface as ingood condition ; both referto the red paint
an the horns, Commander IVhitfo draIs in Iiis report
\trith the med~anism ancl mooring niire and notliing
çontradicts iiis evidei~cezhat thitirasstilgrcasecl. Thc
Superintendent is tIionly witnesslvho referstO the fact
that the serial number had been recently painted in
white. T1ier.is nothing surprising inthe fact thnt this
was not mentioned by Cummander Whitford, since hs
S~IV the mines in the water. The white painting is
entirely consistent 114th the observation of &pi taine
Milllestn hissecotid report made after he had seen the
inines at Maltn that ththrnarkingswerestill very visible.. rvriting this report he\vasriotin paçs;essionof the revised con-

cIusions,~vhichhad been quickly teached byLieutenant PMlips
after a closerinspection of the mines.
(g)The report of Capitaine Mestre, as paragaph ;2 of the
Csunter-Memonal states,did not describe in detail thepmitionç
of themines which rvere cutnor did he listhe naGa1 forcestaking
. part. It \vasriot his dilty tdo $0 but rnerely,as observer, to
see whether f&e operations were correctIy.carried out and to
vesifythe generalresults obtahed. He did,however, inhisreport,
give a detailed and accurate accoimt of the sweeping operations
caMed out which agrees with the. accounts oftheother tvitnesses.
,Thedefailèdpositions ofthemineswere Iîxedby the forcesengaged
in the sweeping and are set crut inthe table of Mine Records
attached to the %e-siveeping Report No. z (Annex r? af United
Kingdom hfemorial, p. 167).
{h) As to theAag carsied by the Albanian launch, Capitaine
Mestre, whïIe stating that it casried what he thought was the
hlbanian flag,di$ not say, as aîleged in paragraph 33 of the
AlbaniariCounter-Mernosial,that it carriêdno cithegag. It mil1
be noted that the whiteflagwas a srnallflagcarried hlow amuch
lar er Albanian flng(Report of Commander 'LVhitford,14thNov-
ern er, 1946, para. 12).
.59. With regard ta paragraph 75 of the Counter-Mernorial,
the Government of fhe United Kingdom maintains its contention
that mines of this type could not have betn laid in thesewaters
xvithout theknowledge of the Albanian a-uthorities. lt isMe
that nurnberç ofmines were laid inwcu time off erilemy-helcoasts
in the English Chasinel. They were not in fa& laid so close to
the mast as the fines in the CorfuChannel were to the Albanian
coast and, moreover, there is no proof that the rninelapng was
nst observed from the shore, No type. of mine with a diameter
greater fhan 21" codd be Iaid by the subma~ine mentioned or
hy any other type in commission iiz 1946.
60, With regard to pmgraph 78 of the Couilter-Mernofial,
the Government of theUnited Kingdom dwes mi understand
on what basis the Eovernment of Albania contends that, technic-
ally,it was not necessaay to çwegs the portion ofwater in the
noighbourhood of Cape Kiephali or what expert evidence it is
psepared to set up againsi the opinion,that it was sonecessary,
of the experiericed Rear-Admira1 in charge of the British Naval
Force. The decision to sweep these waters and the reasonf sor
it are explainedin paragratphs 2,4 and 5 in the report ofRear-
Admira1 IGnahan, dated 14th November, 1946 (Annex 17 of the
United ICingdom's Mernorial, pp.155-136).
Gr. With regard to paragraph 79 of the Çounter-Memonal,
after the discovery othe newly-laid minefield un 13th Novernber
tlieNorth CorfuChannel \vas closed by the Intmtiond Reuteing
and Repoxting Authority to maritime traffic, which\vas the onlyhumane course, It still remains closed, sinct lrvanot possible
for any further steps to be taken by the Government of the
United Kingdom orby Greece while the present dispute (in which
AIbania contends that no stveeping can take place without her
assent) isstill szsb jdicû.

(Cou er-Mcmorial, paragraph 81 .)'

62. The Governmént of the United Kingdom contends that
paragraph s9 et sgq.ofthe Mernorialpresent a fair accowit of
the proceedings in the Security Corncil. The salient fact of
these proceedingsis that seven State'svoted in favour of a resol-
ution finding that a minefield mas laidin the irnmediate vicinity
of the coast resulting in damage to two of His Majestyk sships
and loss of lifeof their crews, and that the minefield could not
have been laid without the knowledgeof the Albanian authorities.
Syria abstained and the U.S.S.R. and Poland alone voted against
this resolution.The Counter-Mernoriai quuotesjlrnost exclusivey
from the statements of the Polish and Soviet mernbers and
attempts noexplanation as to how seven membersof the Security
Council voted in favour of this finding.
The incidents to the Co~lzpièga on 26th June, 1946, and the
Christian Huygms on 26th August, 1945, are irselevant. These
iricidents weredue to grounclmines, not rnoored mines. In the
CorfuChannel a minefield of rnooredmines was disco\-ered.

THE LAW
(Coun ter-Mernari l, paragraphs Sz-$.)

63. The secoficparagraph of Article5 of Hague Convention
VITI reads :-
"As regardsanchored automatic con tactmines laid by one
of the belligerents off thecoast of the other, theis position
must be notified tothe ather party by the Pokverwvhichlaid
them and erich Poher must proceed with the least possible
delay to reniove the mines in its own waters."

It will be seenthat this referIo mints laid by'onebelligerent
offthe coastof the other and the provision that each such Power,
when notified of their position, muçt remove the mines in its
own waters was due ta the fear tliat the operation ofdearing
the mines of one Power by the forces ofa Power which had Iately
been its enemy might be likelyta lead to incidents. It 1snot
clear how this provisio~ihas any relevance to the psesent case,
or can bear the interpretationthe AibaniaC nounter-Mernorial
has çeught to put upon it, and that is why the United Kingdom
Rlemorial, though mentioning it, did not lay stress upon it.The theweather had been asbad as the . lbanian Government con-
tends, anyone wishing to lay mines in the Channel mould have
set out from Saranda, The statement, undet (b),that the mines
criutd have been laid by submarine is irrespansible, being corn-
pletely at variance with eqert knowledge. The facts are that
these mines could not have been laid by any submarine in cum-
mission at that time.
Itiç possibletolaunch mines hm rails immersed in themter. '
This wouldhardy affect the noise of the launcking unlesç the
descent of the mines down the incIined rails were.controlled.
Such a procedure, evenif practica'liTat dI woald bi;very slow
and cumbrsus, and even if amine is dmppd from the IeveI of
the surface a substantial noise Uri1nevertheless be auùible,
There are no electnc motor-bats laiown to be in existence
whiçh could have çarried thesé mines, or any mines at aH.
Itisadmitted that mines çnn be laid iria very short time, if
no regard is paid to the noise of the operation.
The statements -in (cl,(d) and {e) of paragraph go are not

admitted, In any event they throw no light on the possibility
of laying K-ton mines in slieltered rvaterç.

66. Zt doesrtot seem necessary to deal with mùst of the a?@-
ments in this section of thCounter-Mernorial. The Gowrnment
of the United Kingdam tvishes, however, to repeaf that the
attitude of the Alhanian Rep~sen tative beflrre the Security
Council totvards the minefield àiscovered in the Channel was
remarkable. He did, indeecl, contend that Albania had known
riothingof theexistenceof themines, and indignantly repudiated
the United Kingdom charge that Albmia was respansible for
laying them. He: did not, hoivever, suggest, as the Couriter-
1 Mernorialhas done, that the Unitecl Kingdomhad laid this mine-
field onrzSi November for 'thepqoçe ofbasing a case against
Albariiaon fabriçated evidence. But, façed with a situation in
which, on his own view, a minefield unknom to Albania had
been discovered inAlbanian waters. he inveighed strongty against
the United Kingdom which had discovered it and stvept itbecanse,
as he said, the United Kingdom had done so ilegally and without
Albanian permission, but he showed no par tic da^concern about
the minefield having been laid there. He asked for no inter- .
national enquirg to discci\-thow what (in his view) must have
been a serious violationofAlbanian sovereignty hacl kn corn- '
mitted. His anger 7vasconfineclto the State which,wrongfully
or rightly,had discovered and made knoivi-i ta Aibania and the
wodd ths great danger to navigation,Eying unh-own to AIbania
in front of an Albanian port, and h:id indeed greatly Zeisenedif nOt removed thiç danger. It wodd appear that a minefield in
this spotwas, to say the leaçt ofit, nat un~velcometo ,4lbania,
although .theAIh~ian Representative professed to be surprised

, ai its discovery.The same ctiriouattitude towardsthe existence
of the minefieldivas divlayed by the AIbania n ovemment in
its Notes immediately after 22nd October- These Notes are
full ofcharges and cornplaints agaimt the thrtsugh the
Straits of theçguadron of the Royal Navy, but tllere seemed to
be nosurpriseor concern fhat trvovessels had met in theChannel
immediately opposite an Albanian port rvlth an accident which
shodd, on the Albanian Govenment's case, have hm a most
surpnsingone, nor indeed the leastregret that such an accident
involving a loss of life hahappened.

67. inthis connexion the Governrnentofthe United Kingdom
referstoparagraph 58 of this Rqly which containç replieçto the
Albanian cri-ticisrnsofthe reports offhe sweepingof 1November,
1946 a,nd in addition, observesas fo11ows:-

(a) CapitaineMestre ~as entitled to express the opinion that
the Channel muld be upened fOr surface navigation. In
vim, ho~vcver,of the fa& that a ch~ck stveep had not
been carried out, the Mediterranezn Zone Board decidecl
tliat it should remairi closed, This decision in no1va.y
invalidatcd Capitaine Mestre'srepart.
(b) Itappears tobe suggeçted by tire Goverriment of Albania
thstthe Royal Navg having recovered mines of the type
G.R., aftertvads substihted for them mines O€ the type
G.Y, before Capitaine Mestre inspectecl them at Maita
(para. 106, Caunter-hlernoria,) This suggestion-which
ispresumably put fonqard as an alternative tthe eqriaity
extravaga nfggestionthat the mines were "planted" bg-
fie BritishGovernment-the Government of the United
Kingdom repudiates with qud indignation. Tt içinfact,
proved fatse by the reports, The stveeping tmk place
on 13th November, 1946 : dready in hisrepmt dated
14th Novcmber, 1946 C,ommander Whitford had rqorted
that the mines were of type G.Y. By ais time the two
mines had been dimantled and embarked on H.M_S.

Shtpjah for Rlalta. Annex 34 contains an affidavit by
the Commanding OflSicer, .liI.S,Skjack, identifyinthe
mines brought by his ship to Mdta with thow examintd
bv Lieutenant Phillipsat Corfil. They were seen and
ideniifieby Capitaine Mestre on 23rd November. 1t can.
ha~dly bbeconsidered as credible that Ilvithintwenty-four

1. hours aiter the stveeping the British Naval Authorities
had already decidecl to substitute the mines, that they
succeededwvithinnine days inarranging for two dismantled
G.Y. mines ito be placed at Malta and that they ivere
prepared totake the riskofexposingthese mines to jnspec-
tionbyCapitaine Rlest wreohad (if this tlieoriscorrect)
seen much srnaller mines only ten days earlier. In any
caseçuch a substitution seems singdarly pointless,since
if it had been the fact that G.R. mines were originally
diçcoveredAlbania'sliability would be the same as if they
were G.Y. inines.

GS. The argurnen tputforward iiparagraph IQ~ oftheCounter-
Mernorial, wliich isdesigned to show that the mines encountered
on zznd Octaber, 1946, were old Geman-laid mines, only at tains
a measure of plausibility if it is assurnethat the minefield dis-
covered on 13thNovember did motexist. If itis accepted that
this minefield did exist anclthat itran tight acrossthe navigable
channel, it is quite inconceivxble, having regard to the trafic
passing through the Channel from Mayr945 ontvards,and partic-
ularly Iiaving regard to the passage of the Orion and S~+erbon
15th May, 1946, that the mines, by wl~ichthe ships were struçk
in Octobm 1946, were not mines forming prt of this minefield.
69. 11paragrciph 104 the allegation is repeated that tlBritish
' squadronon aznd October navigated in Albaian interi oiafers,
outsicle theswept channel, and that H,M.S. Sauma.~ez \vas, atthe
moment she struck themine to theeast ofthe Channel, inAlbanian
national waters. This aFIegationhas dready been deaft with in
paragraph 44 ahave. The Government of the United Kingdorn
merely lvishes to point out that these allegations, that the vessels
tvere outside the swept chaiine1, are probably due to thc legal
advice on international law, ~vhichAlbania has no doirbtreceived
since the present proceedin tarted. No suchdistinctionbetlveen
the Channel and Albaninn national tvaters is made in the diplornatic
Notes of the Albanian Govemrnent of zxst May, 19th June and
zzst Decernber, 1946.

date0theifacts, the Government of the United Kingdoln observesuci-
that the only offer in fact made by the Albanian Government(in
jts Note of11th Novernber, 1946)was to establisha mixed Corn-
mission to decide what ares shodd be considered to constitute

the chmnel of navigation. The Government of tlieUnited King-
dom refers to pamgraph $3 (6below forthe reasons ~vhythio sffer
ivas not accepted. Albania never offerecl to appoint obsen-ers
to he present at the sweeplng.
71. Comltrsa'ons,
The Governmentofthe United Kingdorn maintains the conclu-
sions set forth in paragraph 96 of its Mernorial, In further276 REPLY OF UNITED KINGDOM (30 VI148)

support ofConcIusion2, theGovernrnent ofthe United Kingdom
Infefusthcr supportof,ConcIusion9,3, the Governmentisofethe. -

United Kingdom refers to paragraphs 4, 5,15 and 16 of this
Reply. In further supportof Conclusion 5, thGovernrneo nt
the United Kingdom refers to paragraph 47 ofthiç Reply. In
furthes support of Conclusion6,the Goernment of theUnited
Kingdom refers to paragraphs 96-ro of this Reply. In further
support ofConclusion7,the Governrnen tof the United Kingdom
teferstu paragraphs 85-10 1fthis Reply. Infurthes support
of Conclusion8, the Government of the United Kingdom refers
toparagraph 64 of this Reply,

PART LT

Question No.2.-"Bas the UnitedKingdomvr'alatedthe sovereignty
of the People'Republiçaf Albaniabythe actsof the BritisNavy
in Albanian waters an zznd October, 1946,and on 12th and

13th November, 1946, and is therea duty to make reparation?"

THE FACTS

72. The question whiçh is raised in this part of the Albanian
Mernorial is whetherthe Eovernment of the United Kingdom has
violated the sovereigntyof Albania either-

(a) Ry thepassageofthe British shipon aznd October,1946 ;or
(b) By thesweeping ofthe North CorfuChannel on 13th Novem-
ber, 1946.
A correct answer to this question depends(1)uponan cxamin-
ation of the cirçurnstancesin lithich these respective events took
place, which mamination be pursued in theparagraphs whlch
follow, and (2)upon a considerationof the position under inter-
nationallaw, uthichwill be found below in pngraphs 84--roqas
regards (a)and paragraphs 80-83 as regards (b).TheAlbanian
Government, however, introduces itcaseunder this heading with
a diatribe ofa politicachasacter against the Government of the
United Kingdom seeking tomake out that the Government of the
United IQngdom \vas at thematerialtirneçanimated by hostilify
against the Government ofAlbania and was concerned in some
way to arrange what are deçcribed as "provocative incidents''.
The Govemrnent of Albania does not explain what ndtrantage
codd passibly be gained bjt arranging sudi incidents whiclicansisted, accosdingto theGounter-Mensrial, of exposing valuable
British ships and British Zives to the close-range fireof coastal
batteries and to the hazards of waters under the control of what
(acmrding to the Albanian hypothesis) {vas a hostile Power. If
action of this kind was in fact intended to bar a provocative
character itseernsdificultto understand why, when thepresumed
objective had been achieved on 15th May, 1946, by the opening
of fire by Albanian batteries and on zznd October, xg46, by the
explosions, instant advantage was nut taken to repiy with ac$s
of a sirnilar charaçter. In fact, although, in each case, retal-
iatoray ction ofa sevetecharact e ruld have been justified under
international law, and also could have been cmied out without
the slightest dificulty, the British forces refrained from theuse
of any force and the incident{vasfollowedup in a lpeacefulrnanner
In the firstcase by diplornatic protests and inthe second case,
after an operation to sweep the minefield in the Channel, by .
recourse to the Security CounciI of the United Nations.
73.In paragraph ~ogthe Albanian Govenment contends that
the United Kingdom has adopted a generaI politicalattitude of
hostility torvards Aibania and endeavourç to supportthis general
allegationby a number of particulascharges, In paragraphs 19-21
above the Government of the United ICingdom has given a short
summary of the anomalous poçition in ~vhichAlbania waç from
1939 on\vasds.' 11:there statedthat,as thc World \Vas progressecl,
various political groups and resistance movernents came into
being in Albania, that the United Kingdom, so faras itsresources
3t thetime permitted, helpcd each such gmup which engaged in
embarrassing the Germari enerny. British officers were attached
to the various bands and material help was furnished. Wnfor-
tunately, these bands sometirnes engaged in coiiflict with each
other to the detriment of theirefforts agwist the Gerrnans. It
is quiteuntrus that the Governnrent ofthe United Kingdom, by
ariy means whatever, endeavoured to maken Albanias svar of
national libezation or to deçtroy its political unity. On the
contrary, itwas alrvaysthe policy of the United Kingdom actively
to foster political unity in Albania as indicated amongst 0th
thiiigs by the stipulationfor free elections and the constitution
of a Government based on the results thereaf, made at the time
of the provisional recognition of GcneralHoxha's Government in
Novernber 1945. The charge at the bottom of page107is merelyan
instance of the Goverriment of the United Kii-igdomendeavouring
to indvce the Albanian resistancemovements to concentnie theIr
efforts, iricludithe assistance given them by the AZIies,against
the Gemans instead of using it againçt each otlies.

74. The Government of the United Kingdom has noi-nfomation
of the alleged attempted lancling of British miIitary forces in
Albania under the cover of a Military liaison mission to assist
AIbania eçonomically pending the arriva1 of U.N.R.R.A. St is 378 REPLY OF UNITED KIYGDQM (30 VI148)

true that the Government ofthe WnitedTGingdompraposed to
seiiclan U.N.R.R.A. mission consistingof less than 40 persons,
most of ~vhornwere mernbeis of the forcesor had remntly served
therein, headed by CoIanel Oakley-Hill, tirho had been second in
qçornmand of the Albanian gendarmerie before the Italian annex-
ation of Albania, and that at first the Albanian Government were
ui~tvillinto receit-eit, tliough aftenvards they consent4 ta d56.
75. The United Kingdom denies the charge that the British
Military Mission acted as an agency of eçpionage, sabotage or
conspiracy and al1 the othes charges made onpage 108.If the
Anglo-Ameriçan forceshad wished to land inAibania they were
easily ina positionto do sewithout firstengagingin the activlties
rvliicare aleged. In fact,sofas from shotvjrigahostile attitude
towardsAlbania the Goverfimentof the United ICingdom, after
the British natal forces had liberated the port ofSwarida at the
same time as the Greekport of Corfu, contributed 20 per cent of
the $27 million worth of assistance wvhichAlbania received from
U.N.R.R.A. Further, having futnishe supplies to tlie valueof
£r$o,ooo to Albania, atthe closeofhostilitiethe U~litedKingdom
waived al1clairn torecoverany payment therefor. Itiç truetiiat
the United Kingdom, together with a large majcrity of other
Memberçof the United Nations, has opposedthe applicationmade
by the present Govemment of Albanin for admission to that
Organization. Opposition tothe application ofa government for
entry infothe United Nations is not asign of any hostilityto that
country ;nor do His Majesty's Government entertain anyIiostility
to the peopleof Albania.
76. Both in paragq& 108 and 1x0 the Government of Albani9
repeats the allegationthat both in October and Novernber r946
British vessels penetnted into Albanian iiiteriorwaters outside
the stveptchannel. Theçeallegationsare dealt with fuilyinpara-
graph 44 above (October)and paragraph 84 (c)bdow (Navernkr).
Thc Government ofthe United Kingdom wishes to repeat that on
neitheroccasion did theBritishnaval veçselspetïetrate into lnterjor
\vaters except ttlat on zznd OctoberHïs Majes ty'sshipsSrsz~marez
and Vohge, wvhenbothbadly damaged, were unabIe to avoid
being carriedby wincleast ofthe swept channel. On tlie13th XQV-
ember W.M.S.SyZvic z~veptvery slightly E. of the Channel on
thc last lap.The Government ofthe United Kingdoin repeats that
it makes nQcIaimthat foreign warships have a sight to enter the
interiorwaters of any State without thepern~issiorios authoriza-
tion of theterritoriauthcirity.

77. In thi section theAlbanianGovernmen-t:again assertstliat
it requestedthe United Kingdom to give notice ofany lntendedpassage, and that the passage bore an offensive character. The
United Kingdom Government repeats itscontention that no çuch
notice >vasriecessary,and that the passage \vas entirely innocent
niid inoffensive. Itrefers to paragraphs rg and 85 to go of its
Mernorial and 4r-jo and 87-104 of &s Reply, ivhere these
contentions are justifiedin detail.
76. In addition. the Governmentof the UniteclKingdom maks
the followingobservations:-
(a)Tlie foundafions upon which the Goverliment ofAlbania,
in pangraph 115 ofits Memorial, bases itscasethat the pasçage of
the ships possessed an offensive character are entirely unsoiind.
There were notroops on theshipç ;the ships were not in combat
formation ;they carriedout no"manoeuvres'hat any time or place,
un til the exploçiontook place, when they carried out tlie rnanoeu-
vreçneçessary to bringthe darnaged ships tosafety; thecrewswere
rnerelyondefensive rtlert; the ships did not enter interior waters,

but were merely passin through tlie tecognized channelon normal
passage. (hVithregard to Admira1Willis' staten~ent,seepara. 42
above.)
(b) The Albania lnunch ernergedhm Saranda aftes the first
explosion took place. At this time al1crews were conceriied with
the urgent tasks ofsaving the ships and of rescuingthe men, In
these conditions, and havingregard tothe possibilitof anincident
cleveloping,itwas not thought necessary to engage in pmlonged '
çliscussionwith the Albanian launch, whicliwas offering no help.
The Government of the United Kingdom understands that certain
coi~versationsdid take place which, as they were conducted in
Itdian, the ady commoii language, were necessarily of a iimited
character.
(G)The Goverment of the United Kingdom observe that the
Albanian authoritieç did not even mention the damage to the
Volage,and that the report contained in the Albanian Annex 7
omits al1 reference tu it. The due of the evidence contained
in that Annex issubstantiallp diminished, as, if the Albanian
azitliorities failed to observe thsecond explosion, it cannot be
supposed that their observation of other detailsset forthin the
,4ni1ex was correct.
Id) The Govcrnment tif the Unitecl Kiiigdom deny that the
ships had instructionsto, or that they.did infact, carry out act~
of espionage. After the firstexplosion had taken place, carising
serious damage and loss of life, and rendering one ship helpless,
and bearingin mind the fire that {vasopened on xjth May, and
particlxl aterythe first e~plosîoi~ had taken place, al1 ships
were naturally and propcrlyconcerned kokeep a closewatck on
shore agaiiist the development of furthe acts of hostility. The
observations made, anclsubsequently recordedon the map repro-
dirced as Anilex 21 of the United lGngdomls Memorial, tverethe 280 REPLY OF UNITED KINGDOM (30 VI148)
reçdt of direct observations made by the ships in the abave
çircumstançes.
(e)Although the Government of AIbania maintains that three-
mgined aircraft, one of which bore the rnarkingç P K 4, flew

over Albanian territory (Albanian Note to United Nations,
Annex 6 ofUnited Kingdom Mernorial, Second Incident,No. III),
the Gaveniment of the United Kingdam has pointed out that
it possessed and possesses no aircraftofthis type or with these
markings and denies that any of its aircraf few over Mbania
at the time in question. (SecurityÇouncil Records, 107th Meet-
ing, p. 217.) Further, although it is allegedthat other British
aircmft flew over Albanian territory at a very low altitude
(Albanian Mernorial, para. ~rz), no particalars of markings are
given bywhich suçh aircraft could be identified.

79. The account given by the Albanian Government of the
operations of the rztll-13thNovember iç substantiaily inaccurate
as to thefacts, and quite unjustifiecl iits treatment of these
operations as' a violation of Mbanian sovereignty. In para-
graphs 80-83 below, the Government of the United Krngdom
give grounds an which they clah that they tvere jnstified in
international law inundertaking the sweeping of the mines ia
- the Channel. Independently of this coritention the Government
of the United Kingdom submit that there was nothing in the
manner in which the operation was conducteci towhich objection"
codd reaçonablybe taken (seeparas. 84-85below).
80. The Government of the United Kingdom do not contend
that any decision of either the Centrd or Medzon Board, taken
after zznd October, 1946, autharised the Government of the
United Kingdom to sweep the CorfuChannelwithout the consent
of AIbania. Roth Boards did, Ilowever, declare that it was
important that the Channel should be reswept (Minute 326, Central
Board, United KingdomMernorial,Annex 15. p.104 ;Minute 138,
Medzon Board, ibid.,p,1253. There are two separate independent
grounds onwhicli the Governrnent of theUnited Kingdom contend

that their action isweepirigthe Çorfu Straiitjustified, narnely-
[a)in view of the fact fhatthe Gorfu Channel FV~S in the sub-
area allocated toGrcecefor rninesweeping purposes,the
Greek Government had the right to sweep the Channel
itselfor to aathorize the Government of the United
Kingdom to do sa,and the Greek Government did consent
to the sweping ;
(b)as, on zmd October, His Majesty'ç ships hridbeen struck
by mines in the Channel inçirçumstanceis which created justifiable suspicion that thesmines had ken delibera-
tely placed there, and fhat His Rlajesty ships had been
deliberately allowed by the Albanian authorities to run
into them, the Govesnrnent of the United Kingdom las
entitledto sweep the Channel, both to removean irnrne-
diate source of danger to shipping and to imtestigate
whether there was any foundation for these suçpicjons,
and to da so withaitt delay to prevent the rernoval of
the evidence,if there!vasany, justifyingthese suspicions.

81. The first coiitentio(a,) nparagraph 80 is supported on
the faiiowing grounds. Inparagmphs 25-28 above, it has been
shown that , under the Mineswveeping Agreement, the Corf u
Channel \vasincluded in the snb-area for the sweeping of which
Greece was made responsible, and that paragraph 12 of the
Agreement, referring ta the sweeping of littorawaters by the
constal:Potver, only refers to Powers who were rnernbers of a
Board. Itis clear that,so far as the Agreement iç concesned,
Greece \vas entitlecto sweep any part ofher area, includingthe
Gifu Channel, where minesiveeping !vas reqWred.
It istrue that Albania waç not a party tothe Agreement, and
therefore itmay be arped that the Agreement could not affect
any righfs uthich Albania rnight çithenvisehave. The anornalous
status, however, of Albania in Novernber 1945 has been shown
In paragraph 19 above tohavebeen tha tof aState justcompleting
itç ernergence from the position of an enemy country, and the
first recognition of Albania's independence in that month was
clearly intendedto be on the baçisthatshe acceptedarrangements
such as this, lvhich the Allied Rwers haby unanirnous agreement
made. Further, theGovernmentof the United Kingdom contends
thai, under internationai lam, Albania had no right to abject
to the clearing of the Corfu Channel of mines, notwltl-istanding
the fact that partoftheChannel lies in Albanianterritor wiatrs.
The Corfu Channel is an internatiqnalhighway subject to the
important right of passage. From the point a£ view of territorial
waters it may he divided betweeil Greece and Albania, but, as a
highway, it has to be considereclas one entity. If,as is shown
in pai-agraphs g6~o1 belotv, neither Greece not Albania had the
riglitto prevent the passage of trafic through thiç highway, it
is subrnitted that neither of them alone hnd the rjghttoprevent
the clearaiiçeof obstructions to tliis passage (cp. par89 below
with regard tothe laying of mines instraits). Ifthis is not$0,
the right ofpassage through an international straimtay becorne
nugatory, seeing that the territorial Power çan prevent it t>3r
refusing to consent t0 the removal of obstructions.

82. The arguments on tvhich the Government of the United
Kingdom bases its contention in (b)of paragraph 80 above are
as follows:-282 REPLY OF UNITED KINGDOM (30 Y11 48)

(a) There is recognizedin internationallaw the right ofa State,
tvhen a state ofaffairs involving a serious andflagrantbreach of
the law lias beeiz hronght about by another State or has been
permitted to corne about, to interven by direct action, The
purposeof such intervention may be to prevent the continuance
of the sitiiation ~vhichiç in breach of the law, or, where the
interveni Snate has suffered an injiiry of a nature capable of
being reclressed, to fnrther the adminfsiration oi international
justice by preventing the rernovalof the evidence.
(IiLn tliis =se it \vasplain from the nature of the incident
of zznd Octcsber that a serious breach ofintcrriational Emvhad
Iieen cornmitteclby some State tvhether Albania oranother. Not
oiily had a ciangerous obstruction ken piaced right across ail
international highgvay of navigation, thus constitutitia thteat
to the shippingof allnations, but thisobstruction took the form
of a minefield the laying of which \vas a manifest breach of the
Hague Convention VI11 of 1907. Either of these pounds was
in ihelfsuficient to justifyinterventionhy the United Kingdom,
the State which had suffered from it.
(cl Thus Oppenheim, Volume 1, 6th edition (Section 135 (4)),
rccognizes the riglitof a State to interven ifeanother State in
time of peace or war violates such rules of the Law of Nations
as are urzlversallyrecognized by custom and to make the defin-
queiit svbmit to the rides çoncerned. The right of innocent

passage through straits is one of such rules. Hall, 8th eclition
{Section go), recognizes the right of intervention by tvay of
opposition to ~vrongdoing, and a sirnilar doctrinc is hnnd in
Fa uchille-bonf fi(~gzz) (Section304 l). This right is çometirnes
described as the right to abate an international nuisance by
analogy to the right which is recognissedby tliecornmon law to
allate (Le., to reinove)a nuisance (Le., a date of affairs which
clonstitutes an interferencc with the right of another). Thtis
Moore ("Principles of American Diplomacy", p. 208) quoted in
Stowell, "lnterven tion in International Law", page 62, says :-
"The interventioiiof the United States in Cuba ....rested upon
the ground that there existed inCuba conditio sosinjuriaus to
the United States as a neighbouring nation that the}?coulù no
longer be endured, Its action [vasanalogous to wl-ratis known
in private Eaw as the abatement of a nuisance. On this grourid
tlieintervention was justifieci by Rivier, one othe most eminent

publicists in Europe, and on this groiind its justificatiomust
continue to sest.'"
Bluntschli(Sections471 and 472) recogiiizesa generaI right of
intervention in casesrvliesa breach ofinternational law, creating
a cornmon danger, has been cornrnitted, He lists a nwber of
specificsituatioi~s suchas pisacy, the disturbame oJ inter%ati#tal
traficrotdes (dic Zerstornng der'Ivetverkehrswege),the assedion of exclusive sovereignty over the sea (die Anrnassrng einer aus-
schliessli cheeresherrschafZj, and then statesthxt generally
any serious and imdoubted breach or çorltempt of international.
latv çan justify the interventie o:en of Stcztesnüt directly
concerned.
(ri) The situation bmught aboutby the placing ofthese mines
in an international channel, cotipleù witthe attitudeof the Alba-
nian Government as shotvn by the di plornatic correi;pondetic~
foIlotving the incidentof rgtlt May, thus çlea~lyfallswithin the
class of situation recognized by internatiortal law as justifying
intervention. Moreover, evei-ion the hypothesis that Albania
was not Htselfactively responsible for the Eayiof the mines, tiie
sameright exists. Hyde (2nd edition), page247,note 5, states :-
"'It should be observed that the wong with which a Statc
mny be chargenbIe rnay be attributable to its ocvnimpotence to
mairitain its suprernacy infact ovec its own domain or itsotiv
property or tl~erebypermit their use in such a \va!by a foreign
Power as to cause injury to a thisd State."
Violation ofthe Hague Convention VI11 restsupon a similarfoot-
Thus Oppenheim (Luc. cil.) stattha t,ifaparty to theHagae
Regulations çonceming Land Warfare were toviolate one of those

I replations, ailother signatory Powers would have a rigl-itto
I intervene. The same rule must apply to the Hague Convention
No. VI11 of 1907 and, although Albania \vas not a signatory of
this Convention, she has admittecl that slierecognize as,it rnay
be assumedthat al1 civilizeStatesrecognize, the principleoflaw
declaredtherein.
(e)Apart from thisgeneral right, it must be remernbeted that
the United Kingdom %vas itself an Tnjured party.The loçsof life
anddamage to itsships which had been sustained mas an injury
of n nature for \vhiclredresç \vas capabIe of being recovered bj7
process oflaw. The right ofthe United Ringdom ta take, \vithout
deli~y,such steps aç were necessary to secure itsposition in this
respect istherefor aealogous to the recognized doctrine of "hot
pursuit" which is iiecessary for the effective aclministration of
justice anclthe secureenjoyment offishery rights in tirne of peace
(WestIake,Vol. 1, p. 177). In view ofthe secrecÿ cvithlvhich these
supposeiatliat the cor9ovadelicti z'woSedrernoved, if opportunity

to do so wvasgiven,before the necessary evidenceto enable repara-
tion to be obtained, cou18 be recovered.
(/)The Government ofthe United Kingdom fully recognizes
that the exercise of this rightofdirect action iscxceptional and
must be justificd açcording to the cirçumstances of each case,
As Hyde (2ndedit., p. 247) says :-
1 "The grarritofwhat takespIaçc whenever an actof intervention
is committed is,holirevers~ichas toreqiiire1~yzvayof justification284 REPLY OF UNITED KINGDOM (30VIL 48)
thepresence of unusualifnot e~%raordinar yircumstances. More-
over, the legal value othese forsuçh purposesis not to be derived
from the powerof the intervening State but rather from thesinister
and lawlessconduçt of that other whosefreedom ofwill Esopposed."

Further, the Goveinment of the United Kingdorn recognizes,as
it didat the time, that the rightmust be exercisedin a reasonabIe
manner 50 as to ause the minimum interference with the sover-
eignty of the State concerned. That this requirement mas amply
fiilfilledishown inparagraph 84 of thisReply.
(g) Ifit s argued that this right ofself-helporinterventioncar1

only be exesciçed then there is an imrnediate necessitg and that
in this case the proper course for the United Kingdom to have
taken \vas tohave applied tu the Security Council irnrnediately
afterthe incidentof zznd Octuber,and to have asked the Security
Council to arrange forthe stveeping ofthe Channel under inter-
national auspices instead of acting herself,'theanswer iç that it
\vasurgent totake thisaction qtiickly. The Security Council took
a period of many iveeks to deal with the Corfuissue tvhen itlas
brought beforei tand could noteven begin thehearingof the case,
until the Albanian representative arrivecl,lvhichhe did not do till
after a considerable delay, Consequently,there would have ken
wesy opportuni ty for the removal ofthe evidence w,hichit wouId
be theobj ectofthe sweepingunder internationalauspices ta obtain.

Owingto the attitude ofa rninority ofthe representatives thereon,
neither the Central Mine-sweeping 'Boarn dor the Medzon Board,
both of them bodies which couid onlytake decisiansby unanimous
vote, were inaposition to takea decisionto act without theconsent
of Albania. The United Kingdom only attempted to secure such
a deciçion because it desired that the'sweeping should take place
under international ailspices and not because it doubted its right
to sweep the ÇhanneI, rvhen the Greek Government consented.
The United Kingdorn did itsbest inthe short time avaiIable ta
obtain impartial observers for itç own sweeping and, as ithaç
already been shown, it succeeded on1jrin obtaining the services
of one such impartial observer, namely, the French officer, Capi-
taine Mestre. Moreover, ifitwere held (contraryto the arguments
put forward in paras. 25 and 81 above) that the United Kingdom
ilrasnot entitled to stI1eethis Channel (with the consent of the
GreekGovernrncnt because the Channel had been allocated to the
Greek sub-area) on the ground that Albania \vas not a party to
the Agreemeiit and the Agreement could not affecttlierights of
Albania, the position would have been exactly the same, even if
eithet of the Boards had taken a unanimou slecisionauthorizing
the sweeping of the Channel beuusc evena unanimaus deçisioii
oi-ithat view mrdd not have prejudicbd the rights of Afbania,
which was nota party to tlie Agreement. 83. Accomlt must alse be taken of the diplornatic correspond-
ence immediately preceding the sweeping of 13th November, 1946
(Anne?<6 of United Kingdom Mernorial, pp. 72-75).
(a)The Albania Gnovernrnent \vasnotifiedoii 26th Oçtobex of
the intentionto sweep,and, on 3rst October,the AlbanianGovern-
ment replied that it had no objection to the siveeping provided
that Albanian territorial waters ivenot entered (p.76of Annes6
to the United Kingdom filernorial). It willbe observecl that iti
this Note Albania makes no distinction between territorial waters
and intesiorwaters. Af ter theCentralMine-cleara n cerd had,
on 1stNovember, decided that it\vas desirable that the Channel
shoulclbe swept, subject to theapproval of Nbania, the Gevern-
ment of the United Kingdom an 10thNovembernotified the Govern-
ment of Albania that the proposed sweeepingmorildtake place on
12th Xovember, and said that this wouId be carried out in the
çame manner asprevioussweepingsin Octo berrg++ and inhbruary
1945,to whichthe AIbanian Goverriment had not raised any objec-
tion.
(b)On 11th November, x946,the Albaniaii Gavernrnent replied
protesting against the "uniIa teralecision of khe Government of
the United Kingdom", but went on to state that it did not
consider it incorivenient that the Britishflet shauId undertake
the sweqing of the waters of the channel ofnavigation, adding
that "before the sweeping is çarrieout the AlbanianGevernrnent
consider it indispensableto decide ivhat area ofthe sea should
be considered to constitutethe channel of navigation and te
this end propose the establishment of a Mixed Commissioncorn-
petent ta submit to the two Governments an actual solution".
The Albanian Government continuedthat it requested theGovern-
ment of theUnited Kingdom "ta drawthe attention to al1subor-
dinate authorities, when they undertake the sweping of the
Channel, tothe necessity of confiningthemselveç strictl ty the
sweeyingof the determined passage in accordamccrvith tlie British
Note of 10th October", and concluded that kay sweeping under-
triken !vithout the consent ofthe Albanian Government outside
the determined passage, i.,~inside AIbantan territorial waters
where foreign ufarships have no reason to sail, can only be co~i-

sidered as a deliberate violation of Albanian sovereignty. The
Albariian Government attaches partictilar importance to this
staternent because the two British warships which were ship
iwecked were saiiing,as comptent British authorities have
themseives admitted, outside the Straits and within Albanian
territorial waters."
(cj From the terms of the Albanian Notes of 3rst October and
11th November, the Government of the United Kingdom con-
cluded that the Albanian Government, while not able to put
fonvarcl any substantial objectioto the scveepingof the Channel,
was anxious to delay the sweepingorat leasttodivert the sweepiitgatvay irom those portions of Albanian territorialwaters wl~ere
incriminating evidence was likely to be found. AIthougk the
ferminologyis confusing,it would appear from the general tenor

ofthese notes that, at leastat this stage,tlie Albanian Govern-
ment did not consider itself sustified in Farvinobjecting tothe
çiveepingprovided that it?vasconfined to thelimitsof the Channel,
ancieven thougll this rnightinvolveentry into Albanian territorial
waters : nor did the Albanian Government raiseany objections
in ptinciple to the sweeping being undertaken by ships of the
Royal Eavy. Objections on theçe points \verreoniy made after-
\vards. At that tiine it only objecteclto entsy jnto Albanian
internal waters outside the Channel.
At this tfme the efforts of ille Albanian Govemment, as is
shown by itsproposal to establish a Rlixed Commission ta decide
what area should be considered to constitute the Channel,were
clirectecto limiting the area to be swept and to delaying the
execution of the operation, In view of the fact thatthe Channel
liacl beenlongestablisl-iedwithin qiiite definite limthe,Govern-
ment of the United Kingdoin rvas fully justified inasçuming
thai: either-
(i) theproposalof the Governrnentof Aibaiiia \vasnot a genuiiie
one ancl that it \iras seeking to obstruct the sweeping
because it \vas irnplicated in the Iaying of mines ; or
(ii) ifthe Governinent of Albania was xzot sa irnplicated,jt
had no substantial objection tathe Channe1 being swept
by ships of the Royal Navy.

Th& Goverriment of the United Kingdam accordingly submits
that in the circumstancss it acted reasonably and legitirnately
in proceecling at once to the sweeping of the mines.
84. As to the rnanner in ivhich the operation \va'conducted,
the Governmc;nt of the United Kingdom in fact took the utmast
precautions to ensure that al1 aggressive and provocative acts
wereavoidecl and that Albaniansovereign rightswere not infringed.
The orders given to this end were cletailecl ancl were fully
carrieci out.
(a) Orclers\ver@given that no shiys wcrreto approach within
zo miles of the Albanian coast untilat least one independent
foreign observer niaspreçent. These orclers were carried out and
the order tomove east ofthis limit was not given untir233 houts
on 12th Navember, when Capitaine Rilestre landed on H.3t.S.
Ocsafi. (Report of AcirniraKinahan dated 14th Wovember, 1946,
,tilnné17, ofthe United Kingdom Mernorial.) The allegation in
paragraph 1x3 ofthe Counter-filernorialthat in the moriiing of
12th November a largentirnberof marçhipsiiavigated nloiigthe
AIbanian shore isthus inaccurate. It is further incorrecto state
tlzatfive ships, onthe same day, sailecas far asButrinto. Opcr-
ations on12th Novembes werein factconfined to preliminasy sweep- ing operations north-wst of the Cfiannel. Annex 35 of tTÜs
Reply showsthe three areas swept on this day. The pri~lcipalarea
ismarked "Searched (h)area". This area is also defined reference
t~ latitnde andlongitude onpage 161ofhnex 17 of theMernorial,

Serial 2, x (b). The approaches to thisarea x.vereaIso s~vepton
12th Noveirnber and they are marked on Annex 35 as "norith
appioach Channel (a)" and "north-west approach Channel (c)".
Further, itisinaccinratetastate tfiat British shipscruiseinAlha-
niari waterstill laat night,Sweeping \vas concluded at 1842hourS
and the minesweepu~g flotillwas anchored east of MerleraIsland
at 1950hours. minesweeping Report No. 2, Annex 17,ofUnited
Kingdom Mernorial,p. r64.1
(b)Ttiçentirely incorrect state,asis aileged isub-paragmph 4
ofparibgraphxx8 ofthe Albanian Mernorial,that on13th November,
1946g ,roups ofshipsin combat formatjon approached the Aibanian
coast. No shipswere in combat formation at any time, No guns
were Gained oui the land (Report ofCapitaine Mestre dated 16th
November) . The oelyships 'infoma.tion'hi?ere thclminesweepers,
tvhich rwre irithe formation necessary to carryout the sweeping.
The fiveships refend to inthis sub-pampph mere merely the

frvefleetsweepers which, aftersweeping to thesouth-east,returned
in a sweepto thenorth-west. They had, Izowewr, anchored oser-
night eaçt of Merlera Island (seeabove] and lad made a sweq
from north-tvest to south-east hefore rcturning up the Channel.
Tlie r~turs ntveep(No, 3)\vas not begun untiI approxirnately1245
i hours.
(c)Theshipsnot engcrgdin rninesweepirig were, with theexcep-
tion of H.M.S. Qcem, rvhich \vaswest of fino Island, station& in
seasch (b)area (see Annex 353and thus were at:least4 niilesfrom
the Albanian coast. H.M.S. St. Bride'sBay (which is czfrigate and
~iotacrtiiser\vasstationed south-eastofCape Kiephali in thes~vept
charnel. This position was not takenup ferany offensivcse.on
biit soIelyto enable the Renr-Admiml in corninand effectivelyto
suyèrvisethe operation,
(4 No arms or machine-guns were hed in the afrortotvardsthe
Albanian coast ;on the çontrary, strict orders were givethat the
rifle firnecessaq io destroy thecut mines should lxclirectedaway
from the coast (Report a£ Rear-Admd Kinahan, para, sr),and
these tverecompIied rvith throughout the operation (Report of
Capitaine Rfestredated 16th irlovember,para. 5).
(e)It is quiteantrue to saythat the Albanian lavnch nms fired
on by machine-guns orotherwise. No machine-guns were fird
at clny tirne, 'Itiscqualiy incorrect to state thatBritish ships
approaçhed withiil300-j00 metres of the port ofSaranda. Apart
from H.M.S. Syhia, rvhichon the iast lap slveptslightlyte the
east ofthe s.tvepchannel, na ship \ventoutside the Channel, and
noship rcpproactiec\lvithonemile ofthe portof Saranda. (f)Itis admitted that aircraffieivoverthe minescveepingforces
soas,tobe ready tcprotectthem against anyattempted interference
by force.
(g) Rrostrreepiawas carriedout iritheextrere nastm partsof
the Channel wliere this closely approachedthe Albanian shore,
A sketch of water in theChannel south-east ofCapeKiephali and
another stretchabreastof Denta Point were lefunsivep.t, (Report

of(h) No ''specialobse~vations" wese caniedout apart,frornthose

necesq to ensure the safety of the operatiom. The cruisers
themselves being atsome distance fiom the wast, it waSa natural
course to detach a few observes to accompany tlie minesweqers
aperxtin ig the Channel. Apart from the 200-300 Aibanian
troops in unifmm and the inscription above Saranda no special
observations kre in fact made. It iç evident from the Report
of CommanderWhitfurd that these obseritationswerenot made
inany spirit ofhostility.
II) Iiwas unfortunately impossibleto destroy the majmity of
minescut. The reasonfor thiswasthe latehour atwhich they were
fowd and the çevere restrictioplaced upon the use oflveapons
to destroy thcm. At the same time, cuntraryto the satement of
the Albanian Government, mines of thistype tvhenf oating const-t
ute a far lesmenacetonavigation than when m~ored below ivater.
85- Erom the above alid kom reports given ofais operation,
includingthe Report ofCapitaine Mestre,itappears beyond dispute
that the sweeping was carried out without any elment of offence .
or provocationand undes conditionstvhichwere entirely inaccord-
ance with the request made by Alhnia inher Note of I th Novm-
ber that the sweeping shbuld be confined to the "determïned
passage", i,e.MedriRoute 18j3z and 18/34. Theaction taken by
the Govemment of the United Kingdom \vas amply justifiein its
resultç, when twenty-two highly dangerousmines were cut. Zncid-
enk of'any kind were avoided, and thiswds due bof% to thetare
-çvjtnhich theoperation was planned and also ta the scrnpulous
manner inwhich orders were carried out ancl the disciplofethe
British creiirs.In these Çitcumstances the Government of the
United Kingdom cannot admit any daim by the Gsvernment of
Albania that its sovereign htysbeen violated ortllatan inter-
national wmng has been committed.

THE LAW

(Gounter-Mernoriap l,aragraphs131-135 ).

36. The Godrnment of the United Kingdom mil1 dkcuss the
Zegalpositionwith regard, tothe passageof wkrships bath through
territoriawaters,which are not straits forming internat1onal-high-ways, and dso throughsuch straits, lieeause the AlbcmianCounter;
Mernorialhas dane sa. Xt ishowever, strictly onlthelatterques-
tion which is relevantOthe psesericase and the formerispertinent
only in safar asit throws the lightiipon the latter. As already
stated the Governent ofthe United Kingdom clairnsno right of
entry into,or UEpassage throngh, mtional (interior)waters. The
cuntentions ofthe Crovernment of theUnited Kingdom with regard
to passagethrough strclitswilbe found atparagraphs g8.101below.

87. The Gounter-Memarial represents as incorrect the view
evpfesse bd theUnited Kingdam inits Mernorial that under inter-
national law warships have a right of innocent passage thrqugh
territori waters and in phcular through temtorial waters in
strâits. The Counter-Mernorial snpports thisproposition. by
reference ta sslecteclpassagesfrom the proceedings of the Hague
CodificationConferenceof 19x0and to the opinions oftlireese\ected
writers oninternational law. Iiis ta be obçervedthat it does not
refer in &s connexion to thepractice ofStates tvhichin questions
ofcustornagr law is of decisivimportance as evidence of theexist-
Uig lm. The reason fortkrsomission no doubt is thatthe practice
of Statesstrongly supports thvietvofthe United ICingdomGovern-
ment that warshlps have in geneml a right of in1iocen.passage
through territoriawaters,
88.-(a) The Counter-Mernoria1 cites the pmcedngs of the
Hague Coderence of 1930to sliowthat passage ofwarshipsfhrough
territoriawaters is a matter of comjty mcl not of legal right, and
it relies partiçularly on staternents of the United Kingdom and
United States delegates. It is admitted tkdt the United States
ddega te maintained the opinion previously expressed by his
Gcvernment in its reply to the questionnaireaddressed tu States
before the Conference (Leagiieof Nations, No. C74M3g. 1929. V,
p. Gli),that warslilpshavenota~ighlofpassage. Itis alsoadmitted
that SirKauriceGwyer,the British deleste, inilicatedhisreadiness
to fail in with the proposa1of the United Statesdelegate tliat in
i?h firaposadCnmemtio~'tIthis shouldbe treateas a matter ofinter-
national comi tyand courteç though \vithout necessarilyadopting
every rine ofthe arguments used by him" Feague of Nations,
C35r(b). Mr45tbl.1930 ., p, 63). It is, however,enkiselyincorrect
tclSay, as the Counter-Mernorial says, that the United Ringdom
delegate heated the pasçageofwarships not as alight butasdepend-
ing on the:camiiasgcrstiztm, The United Kingdom Government in
theirrepZyto the questionnaire hacl expressed thepassage of war-
shipsunequivecally as a rjght (League of Nations, C74M3g. 1929.
V, p.67).and Sir MilauricGtvymatthe 6th Meeting oftlieSecond
Cornmitteerms maiung a concession to the United Statespoint

of viewfor thesolepurposeof promoting an agreement on the dmft To date that a coasialState willnot forbid the innocent
passage of foreign wrships js but to recognize existing
prüctice. That practice aIso without laying doum ariy
strict and absolute rule Teaves to the Cjtatethe power in
exçeptional cases to prohibit thepassage offoreignwarships
in its territoriasea. Tlie coastal State rnay regulate the
conditions of psage, particuIarIyas regards the nurnbcr
offoreign units passing çimultaneou~lytlirough ifs territorial
sea-or through any particulas portion of that sea-though
as a general rule no previous authorization or even
notificationwill be reqaired. Under no pretext, howver,
may there bexny interferencewith the passage of bvarships
thmugh strats constituthg a route for international
maritime Mc, betiveen tivoparts of the high sens."

(Ii)Thisdmft articleand the observations appendedtv it rvere
preparedbythe suh-cornmittee inthe light of.theTRews expressecl
by the United Statesand United ICingdorn deI~gates in discussion,
The pr~poseclarticle isplajdy a compromise formula to meet both
points of view. AdmiHedly it does not, in terrns, express the
passage of warships asün absolute right inal1circumstances, but
at the same tirne it doesrequire thc coastal State not to forbid
passage Save in cxceptiorial,cases. The language isby no means
appropriate to express the passage of ~vasçhips as a mére matter
of cornity. It is aIsoto beobseimed thatat the 6th meeting of the
second cornmittee (ZOG c.it., pp58-59 t)heUnited States delegate,
in putting forward his draft, aG first proposedas the text, that a
coastalState "sl~ouldordinarElyas a ~71&2erfcmrzty permit innocent
passage", etc., and that, nevertheless,the draft: article evçntually
subrnitted was expresçed as a ruIe of law. It iç furfher to be
observed tht the United St~tes delegate proposed thnt, in the
second rde in Basis ofDiscussion No, 20,''Acoastal $tateis entltlecl
ta make sules regMing the conditions of çuch passage withairt,
however, linving the right to reguire a previous tzutharization",
the ~vordsconcerning previous authorization shouIc2k stsuçk out
, , p.. He explained that, if passage tvasa matter of
cûmity, these words were inap~ropriat.~. Yet the draft article
tvhm in itsfinal form expressly states that as a general mle the
cuastal Stczteismottorequire a previous authorization. IR these
circumstances the United Kingdom Govesnmentsu'krnitsthat it is
impossiMe toregard the drait Artide rz asrepresenbng the passage
of ~mrships merely as a matter of comity-
go, It iç hue that M. Gide1 (Le &oit Z&d~mtiod $a6Eicde la
Mer, III, p. 284.),basi-righirnse iprf the distinction in%vçirding
between h-kicle 4, dealing with merchant ships, and bide 12,
dealhg rvith warships, conclud~s tht the liberty of passage of
warships is nota right,but a tolerance on the partofthe territorialState. But M: Gidel talces insuficient accountof the factsthat
Artide 12,as explained above, represents a cbmpromlse formula
reached de legaferda and that itsorvn language by na means
expressedthe passageof warships asa rnatter ofcomfty. M. Gidel
also takesinsufficient ztccountof the praciofeStates,under which
warships navigate in territorial watersasaf right. Thc Conter-
Mernorial claims that a number ofother witers adopt the same
view as M, GideI. There are some tvsitk wrho do so,but M. Gidel
himself {o*. eit.p.279) ackno~vledges that ivriterswho deny
warships a legal right ofpassage arein a srnaIImjiiority. Inany
event, ashas already been stated,itIs the pctice ofStata -rvhiç;h
is of decisive importancin tliis rnatter,and the wtiters whooppose
a right of passage for r~arçhipçdo not~ F Vtheir conclusioasfrom
an analysiç of that practice but a.@"ori from their concepts of
territorial sovereipty,
gr. The Government of theUnited Kingdom çubmits that the
best evidence of the existing lawiste be found in the practice of
Stata as show by the regulationsthey have issued in regard ta
the entry offoreip warship nto theirwaters and by their replies
to the qzflstio~~c~iaddressed ta gotvrnmenfs before the Hague
Conference of 1930 (Leape of Nations, C74M39 . 929.V, p. 72)-
The Officeof Nava1Intelligence othe United StatesNavy pubLished
the regulationç oStates concerning theentry of~varslripas knatvn
to that Officup to 1916, and these regdations are lepintecl in the
America-nJotwd of Intamatéonid Law-Volume 10, Supplen~ent I,
pages ier-178. The replations of 37 States wttrethere setout,

of which 34 eiffier declased simplythatthere are no resb-Ictions
affecting entry Intaports (zr States) or pmrnulgated des
concerning entry into ports ad interior waters or amhoring in
territorial water(13 States) S,omeof these 13 Statesprescribed
specia-lrules in time of waf and in addition made regulations
prohibikingcertain actswithin territoria\vates. But none 05
34 reguiations,either by way of formal grant.of permission or by
formal disclaimer of ,myrestrictions, make any mention whatever
of aright for~varshipsto traverse territorial waters, although thcy
all stated intems whether they did or did not impose restrictions
on viçitsto ports. This omission isof pat sjgnificance, for the
plain factis thatthtregulationç of 34States out of 37 were issued
on the ammption that foreign warships did not require to be
infomed that in time ofpeace they had full right of innocent
passage thouglx territorw iaalers. In short,these regdatic.ns
appear to assume arightof passage for~varshipsthrougi territorial
waterssubject only ta certain Iirnited rightaX regulatirin The
three remaining States wese Denmark, the Netherlands and
Roumania. Denmark expresdy conceded permission to foreign
warships tu navigate in i;kterritoriawaters, and itis clear, from
Denmark's sep1y to the questionnairebefore the r93o Conference,
that Denmarksecognized \varsh,ips tahave a rightof passage (Joc. REPLY OF UNITED KINGDOBI (30 VIT48) 293

cil.,pp. az3-124), The Netherlandsregufatims, after making a
reservation about sea openings lexding to interior ivaters, also
concededpermission to foreign tvarshipçto enter territorial waters
"providecl such Es done by the shartest possible course". This
replation ended with the daternent that "'thiprovision does not
prevent the freepassage through territor waters insofar as such
is recognizedby internationallatv", nstatement whichis reprrated
in the Regulations of 1931. Roumania %vas alone in forbidding
cruising in Rournanian waters without previous notification and
even it did not requisea previou authorization.
92. The Governmentofthe UniteclKingdom submits that the
abovc-mentionedregdations are stsongevidence that the custornary
law recogriized a definite rightof passage for warships through
territorial waters.This s borneout by t11efact that, inthereplies
ofgovernments to the qtrirstionnawsbefore thexggo Con ference,
Ij States recognizedthat xvarshi have siiçhright ofpassage and,
apart from Roumania, only 3 States,the Uniteci States, Bulgaria
and Latvin, denied the right. Of these three, theUnited States
did not base its reply upon itsobvn practice but merely upon a
dictum of Mr, EIiliu Rootin argument during the North Atlantic
Fisheries Arbitration. IIIfactthe Navy Replations No.78 issued
by the United States Government concerning ~e admission of
foreign warsliipsinto portsof the United States çontain no sules
regarding passage through territorial ivaters. Buigaria did not
rcferto itspractice and in fact itown regulationç of1916 gIaced
no restriction tvhatever onthe generan lavigation of warships in
territorial waters.Nor is it at al1 clear that the reply of Latvia
\vas by any means intended ta deny ta warslips a right ofmere
passage, since the regu2ationsto whichit referçappearprirnarily
directed tomrds entry in to ports and aHckorilzwithin territorial
waters.
93. The Government of the United Kingdom emphasizes that
itdo es not claim asidlianeverlclaimed any large rght ofpassage
for warships than that of mere passage in the normal courseof
navigation, but théevidenceofthe praçtice oEStatesadduced above
establisliethat this reaçonribleand Iiecessaryright doesekst for
tvasshipsunder custornaryinternational la\r7.Inaddition to this
dacinmentary evidcnce infavour of a customn~ riglzt of passage
for warships,it isthe undoubtedfact that warshipsintime of peace
have habi tuallyand as ofright made passagtehrciuglifoseign teni-
torialwaters, wvhensuch passage ivasnecessary inthe ordinary
ç.ourseof navigation withovt authorization or even notificatioIt
is alsa the façsubject tothe limitedexceptions rnentioned beIow,
that in time ofwar even belligerent warships have nlso habitually
and as of right made passage through neutml territor iaters
when requlredinthe ordjnarycourçeof navigation N.otwithstand-.
ing the stricconcepts of neiitralitupon which arebasd the laws

relatingta neutral rightsand dutles in maritime war in the 13th 294 REPLY OF UNITED KlNGDO?l (30 VI1 48)

HagueConvention of 1907 t,e passage ofwarships though neutral
territorial watersIS stated, in Article IO,not to compromise the
neutrallty of the territorial Power. IIis true that Great Britain
proposed an articlestatirigthat "no provîsionsin the Conïlention
should be intmpreted so as to pruhibit the innocent passage of
neutralwaters in time of kvas by a warshipsof a belligetent", and
thnt ülis\as net acçepted, but, as was expiainecl by the eminent
Rapporteur of the TIlirdCornmittee, RI.Renault, thls luas because
the generai feeling\vasthat a neutral State ought to be able to
forbid even innocent passage "so faras ilwlasmcsssa.p.5o wan7,'rtlai.n
ifsrzeutraliiy(Ades elDoczunssztsV, ol.x,p.30 3). In otherwords,
the Report of the Rapporteur at the 1907 Conferencereçagnizetl
the passage of ivarskips tlirough neatraI territorial watersas n
right subject onlytothe needs of the territor State to protect its
neutrality. The course ofthe discussion atthe 4th Meetingof the
2nd SiibCornmittec of the 3rd Cominissionheld on 30th July,rgoz
(loc.cil.Vol. 3, pp. 95-96), makes it plainthatthe delegates were
assuming that warships had a right of innocent passage airclthat
theonly question waç ho\\?far ishoulcibe qilalifiedithe intercsts
of neutmls in xmr tim. Moreover, in practice, States have not

. attempted to forbid the passage of belligerent warships through
neutraI waters, except under the rnost:urgent needto grotect their
neutrality in regard to the abuse of neutral waters by Gerrnan
U-beats. IVhen in the 1914-19 \18arthe Netherlands went so
far as to make a general prohibition of passage hy klligerent
warships for the protection of itç neutrality,Germanyprotested
vigorously. This was thefirsttime that any neutralStatehadmade
such ageneral prahibition, andthe NetherIandsultimately adrnitted
that thcis tegiilationmight lx in conflictwith international lawif
applied toordinary navigation through territorial waters (Vanden-
bosch-Ncutvality of lVellzerEandswing ihe Mforld.War,pp. 88-89).
1tisnoteworthjr that in 1939the Netherlands neutrality regulations
clidnotrepeat thisgeneral prohibition, but allowecl"free passage
insa far as thisis recognized iiinternational law".
94. lï~e Govemrnent ofthe Unitecl Kingdom emphasizes tlrat
thelaw applicableinthepresen t caseiçthat relatingto the innocent
passage of warsliipsintime ofpeace. Refereiiceliasbeen made te
the practiceofStates in time of lvaronly for the purposeof showing
thesanctity, with~vhichthe freedomof inriocent passage ofwarships
in territor wialrs is regarded even in the circumstances of war.
This practice sesvcsto confirm that warshipç enjoy a geiremlright
of innocent pasçage throisgh territorial waters in the ordinary
course of navigation and that thiç right is subject to restriction
an1y in very exceptional çircumsfancesforthe security othe coastal
State.

9;. It jsnot disputedthat the practiceof States, while semg-
nizing a rightof passage for warships,also concedes to the coastnl
State the right to ma ke rensonable regulations for navigational, RE.PLY OF UNITED KTNGWM (30 VI1 48) z95

fiscal,sanitaryand other administrativepurposes. But such regula-
tions must plahly have fullregard to the right of passagepsssessed
by wdrçhip snd merchant ships and avaid aaneceçsary hindranc~s
ta navigation M,oreaver,asstated in paragraph 88af the Memaial
and expnded nbove, the piactice of States does not recognize as
included in thisordinary right of replation, a power in the coastal
State torequirepreviovs authorjzationor notification of the passage.
The Çovernment of the United Kingdom again does nrstdispute
that apart £rom Straits the practice oi State recognizesthat in
exceptional circumstances the coastab State may take specid
measures restricting navigation in Ilsterritoriawaters forits om
safety including, as a tirmpwq rde, the requirement of ncitlfic-
ation for the passage of warships. But such çpwial circurnstances
must be of compelliiigmgency before the cmornargr right of naviga-
tion veyted in otherStates can be autailed and plainly any limita-
tion thus placed upcisnavigation is on1yladu1 when exescised bom
fideand'tvhen striqt neyessaryfor the secilrity ofthe coastaState.

36. The right ofpassage of warshipsthrougfrterritorid watm
frirming part of straits follows afodion' from what has been said
concerning the practice ofStates in regardto passage thrtlugh terri-
torial tvaters generally. NatonIydo States intheir practice accord
a right of passage for warskips through straits but they recogsiize
it to be ~f evenhighes degree than the right of passage through
other temitarial waters. Statesdo notsecope that theterritorial
State has the powerin any circumstmces to interfere withpassage
thmugli $traits forrning a route of international maritime naviga-
tion, Thiis, the Observation uponfhe draft Artide 12 annexed
to the Report of the Second Cornmittee of the 1930 Conven.tion,.the
text of\vhichis setout inparagraph 89 (a)above, declares explicjtly
"under no pretext, however, rnay fiere be any interference with
the passage of warships tlirough stralts consiituting a roiitefor
international maritime kafficbet-weee t~vopart$ of the high seau.
Ncvertheless, theCounier-Mernoriea lontests thecontention
of the United Kingdom set forttiin paramph 88 ofthe Mernorial .
that Albania had no right to interfere wiU the passage of British
~vasshipsttiroug11tlie CorfuChannel, Cr)by aiiegtng that the Observ-

Observation-Albania herseif relies ony the tthi~dsentcnce) has less

authority than the text ofArticle 12,and (2)by disputing thxt this
Observation is czcorrectçtaternent of the law. Itissaid that the
Observation "wasin no way oneof the Articles drafiedby the corn-
mittee in question but was only snexplanatory note inserted at
the end in a spiritof compromise rvithoutany discussion on snch
a profound subject having takenplace", The implication isthat
the lasi sentence ofthe Observation is therefore of less forcethanArticle12 upon the textofwhichAlbania haç hérselpflacedLE iance.
(See para. 132of the Gounter-Mernorial.) This argument is corn-
plete1:emisleading, As expiained in paragmph 89 (b) above,

Article rzwaç jtselfnomore than a compromisenot adopted by the
Confcrence but merely transmitted as a basis for further çtudy,
The last sentence of the Observationwas originally intendedtofind
a place in the Diaft Convention and to be numbered Article rg.
It \vas only because the work of Sub-Cornmivttee 2 was rendered
nugatory by th@ Second Cornmittee's failure toagree concerning
the extent of territoriwaters, that draftArticles14 to rgrelating
to the legalstatus of straitswwe abanduned Feague O£ Nations,
C.351. W.145, 1930. V,p. 125). This \vasdone in order that some
dkft rnight go fornard canceming terTitoriawaters. In point
of fact there appears ta have been unnnimityinSub-Gomittee 2
cuncerningthe content ofArticlerg and alço afterwards in Corn-
mittee 2, whcn t repeated the substance of Article rg as thelast
sentence of the Observation on Article12. Ifthere was no discus-
sion, itwas because there rms no disagreement about a rulewhich
was an established part of customary law. Furthemiore, the
circumstances surraunding the introduction of the Observation
into thetext of thedraft annexed to the reportof theSemnd Corn-
mittee compIeteIy disprove Aibania's contention that it \vas
intended to have les forcethan Article 12, Nter ;hrticx lchad
been read in thc Second tommittee, Dr. Schücking (Sixteenth
Meeting, loc.kt.p. r7r)said itwas necessary to introducea reserv-
ation ofthe right oftmships to pass fhrsilgb straitseven if terri-
tonal waters, He had inmuid that under Article zz a coastal
State rnight in exceptional circumstances interferewitfi passage
tlirough territorial waters,In discussion, M.Giamjni suggested
that the words '"as a general rule" in Article 12 really met
Dr, Schüçhng's point. It istme that, as the Counter-Iîfemorial
says, M. Gjanninj asked that his view shodd he recorded in the
minutes, but the Chairman then insisted that the position of straits
is a special one and praposed that the sense of ArticIe rg should
be includedin the Observations onArticle rz. This proposal was
adopted without commen,t. Thus, the inclusionof the Observation
was a consider& decision of the Second Cornmittee and was in-
tended ta make it plain that any rights possessed by a coastal
State to interferewith passage through the tmitoria1 waters do
not apply- to straits constituting a route for internationalmari-
time kaffic between two parts of the high seri.
The Obsmulion, ~~tzks Arficlexz itseJ, aswù£ a com$rnm.isebat

a sWme.rzd of wht was ~ega~ded as alzaccep~edrtd~ ofkaw that
$assaga th~aughstraiis may flobe bamd inswy ca'rcwmstames.
98. Nor is the Observation on Artide 12 the only evidence
that the right ofpassage of warships throtqh territorial waters
within strait is a special right in internationaIaw. The ques-
tion of the rig-hta close stsaitswas considexedin trveconnpixions REPLY 01; UNITED KTNGOQhl (30VIE 48) 29?

at the 1907 Hague Csnferençe, and in both the principle that
navigation thraugh straits should not be barred was asserted.
Firstly, in the discussion on Convention VTILregarding the
laying of mines, the Ned~erlands, in proposing tliat neutrals
should equally be allo~vedto lay mines, qualifiedtheir proposal
bjra provision thatin no çase rnjghtstraits untingt\voopen seas
be barrecl (Actes~i!Docu~zents,Vol. 3, p.661, Annex rz), This
principlewas not contestecl, though ultimately it waxnot incor-
porated inthe Convention. Secondly, the qvestia\vasdealt with
in the Rapporteur's Report on Article ro of Convention XII1
aIready rnentioned in paragraph 93 above. M. Renault, after
stating that the resulofthe Sub-Cornmittee'sdiscussion \vasthat
a neutral couEdprohibit even innocent passage tliroughterritorial
waters so far asisnecessar tymaintain neutrality, added, "but
this prohibitiomay not extcnd to straits unitintwo open seas".
&ai$, the point clid noultimatelyfinda place inthe Convention,
but thcm çan be no doubt that States at the 1907 Csnferençe
rcgarded a coastal State as having no right to prohibit innocent
navigation of tvarships d~roughthe territorw iaters of strats
even In time of war.
99.In addition, the lnternational Law Associatioin itResolu-
tions of1895 (Report,Seventeenth Conference,p. 116,Article 1ot4))
and -1922(Report, Thirty-FirstConference, p. 99,Artide g) laid
clown that straits ivhich serve aa passage from one open sea to
another open sea çan iievebe dosecl. These Resolutions notonly
accord with the vietrrsexpressed by Statesat the 1907 and 1930

Hague Conferences, but refiect the consensus of the opinion of
writers, So far as concerns the evidence of trcaties establishing
special régimesfor particular straits, it habeen pointed out in
paragaph 5above that inonly one caseare restrictions imposed
upon the right of passage for warships, namely, in the Montreux
Convention of 1936,and that there both shores of the straiatre
in the possessionofthesame State,and that in thatçase there are
unique historicaland geograpliical circumstances.
roo. Albania seekç in paragraph 132 ofthe Counfer-Mernorial
to impiy that the United Kingdom has nevcr itself subscribeto
the view that the right of passage through territorial (vaters wvithin
straitiss a special right. Itcites in this connexionan abstract
from volume 2 of H. A. Smith's book, Great B.P.itaand blu Law
oj Natzo?ss. Butso faxasconcernsthe ~ightof passage,it sentirely
incorre tcsaythat Great Britain has motsubscribedto anÿ partic-
ular doctrineforGreat Britain \vasaparty to both the proceedings
ofthe 197 and 1930 Cunferencesand endorsedthe views expressed
against there being any right to closestraits,
ror. The Counter-Mernorial secondly maintains (para. 134)
that,even if internatioiiLaw recogniz a çpecialrightof passage
through the territor iaaers of straits, iisconfincd to straits
constituting "anordinar ryiiteforinterna tlonshjpping" and Siatthe WorthCorfu Channel isnot such a strait. This argument bas
been dealt with in paragraphs 4-6 above, The Corfu Channel
constitutes a route for international maritime trafficwhichis the
ordinary and seamanIike route forsluppingto take when proceeding
to Corfu froM the north or from Corfu to the north,as were the
British warships on 15th May and zznd October, 1946. The
United Kingdom Govertirnent accordinglysubmit that on tliose
dates Albania was not entitlecto baror makesubject to itsauthor-
iwtion the passage of British warships througl~the North Corfu
Channel,
IOS. Ifthe United Kingdom are rightin their contention that
the NostliCorfuChannel is "a.strai constituting aroute for iater-
national maritime traffic between tmo parts ofthe klgh seah,-the
authorities relied iipby Albania as establishing arightto restrict
innocent passag ehroughterritorialwaters are not pertinentto the
present case. Tlie Çoun ter-Mernorial (para. rgj) nevertlieless
maintains that Albania \vas wjthin her rights inrequiringprior
notice ofthe passage of British warshipswith a view to granting
authorization. If, contmry to the contention of the UnitedKing-
dom, Albania possessed any srich rights,it issubrnitted that they
were not exerciseclforgood and sufficientreasons, butmala fide,
with the mere intention of barring the right of iiinocenpassage
enjoyed by the British warships under international law. The
United ICingdomGovernment acknozvledges that on 29th May,
1946, itreceiveclacopy ofthe Note addreçsed to the United States
representative at Tirana in ~vluch the Governrnent of Aibania
purported to impose a restriction on passage through the Corfu
Strait, It pointout, however, thatthis Note w:csdated 17th May,
1946, ive.,t~vo days after British tvarships hacl already been
attacked in the North CorfuÇhannel by Albanian sliorebatteries.
It is to be observed that this Note does not invoke any special
circumstancespretended to exist inthe area as a justification for
this serious derogatiori from the custornary rigof passage vested
in other Statesby Internationaltaw. The Bote, on the contrary,
appeass +o claim an absolute rightto subject al1 prissga ofwar-
ships cfndnacrclta.shiflsto the priorauthorizationofthe Albanian
Government.
103. This interpretat iibonrne outby adetailed examination
of the terms of the Note. It referst he~f~rst placeto"penetra-
tion into Albanian territorial waters".Na refercnccismade to the
established and recognizedchannel of navigation and, ashas been
pointed out inparagaph 83 (cof thisReply,the Albanian Govern-
ment has dsewhere used the expression "territorial waters" as
meaniiig"watersoutsidethechannel". Next,theNotemakesna

distinction between warshipsand rnerchant sllipçbut appears to
apply indifferentIytoboth classesand thereforeasregardsrnerchant
shîpsviolated al1the authoritieinciudingthose cited inthe Counter-
Mernorial. It 1sto be notecltliatAlbanian batteries did in fact AlbanianGevemment hadno knowvledgo efit. It admits that the
AI baniannotice of 17thMayrequiringpermission was not complied
with,but contends that tliiç requirementwas ilIegalunder inter-
national law with regard to passage through a strait-suchas the
Corfu Channel. It is not Article12 of the draft Hague Rules of
1930 which is applicable to the casebut thelast sentence of tlie
Observation which, ascxplainedabove, really haçgreater nuthority
than draft Rule 12. The navaI vesselsdid ignore a rcquirement,
t\rhich Albaniillegallytriedto impose. Until the frrstdestroyer
strucka mine, the vessels keptto the Channel and passed dongit
normally. The only "opcrations"thereafter wre that the second
destroyerproceeded to theassistance of the firsandthen she too
strucka mine, but, nevertheless, succeeded withthe first destroyer
intow in turning about and stmggling with dificulty toCorfu, in
the courseofwhichthe destroyersdrifted slightleast of the Chan-
nel..No other entsy into the iriterier waters was made. The
Government of the United Kingdomhas dealt in paragraphs 73 (b)
and 76 (d)of this Reply with the cornplaints of thAlbania Gnov-
eriïment regding the Iaunch wvhichappeared £rom Saranda and
regarding alleged espionage of British ships.

6 In these paragraphs the Albanian Government repqts
its chargesregasdingthe "invasionrJof ts waters on 12th and 13th
November, 1946. The justification for the action of sweeping thc
Channel has been given in paragtaphs above in 79-83. Tlie an-
stverçtothe chargesrelating to the rnanner in which the operation
\vascarrieci out are found in paragraph 84. Those chargeswere,
- naturally,not dealt with in the Mernorial of theUnited Kingdonl
because the legality or.othertviseof thesxveepingof 13th Xovember,
1946 s not material to tlie daim of the United Kingdom against
Mbanja in respect ofthe laying of the mines and twas for AlGania
to make her claims before the United Kingdom answered them.
107. Tlre Gover~~meno tf the United XCingclorndds that, con-
ttaryto what is çtated in paragraph 143 of the Counter-Mernorial,
the Rritisli Naval forces at no timc andin no rnanner desireclor

attempteclto ordid in fachinder whatever actions theGovernment
ofAEbania desired te carryout initsterritoriawaters.
The only operationcarried out by the Government ofthe United
Kingdom in tfiosewaters was thepeaceable taskof swveepingthe
mines fromthe ChanneI,a task which, upon any hypothesis, except
thatAlbania herself laid orwas partytolaying themines, was Inno
sense hostiletoAJbania. The factthat Albaniachooses toregard
the objectives purçued on tIiis occasionas Iiostileto her-"fins
- hostilesau Gouvernement albanaism- (para. 143 of the AlbanianCorinter-Mernorial)isnlst without bearing upùn the truth of this
hypothesis.
The Goverment of the UnitedKingdom masdetemined ta ensure
that the task ofç~veeping the Channel \vasnçitinterruptedand that
incidents whichmight have &d senous resultsdid not owur, andit
took precautions w1iich,having regard to the previous incidents,
an, in its subrnission, be regarcleas inno way unrcaçonable. It
is aatbue ,tliaG.Y. mines which have been crutand Ieft floating
are more dangerous thn they are when rnoored. Inthe first place
tlzey are visible and secondly their existence kriown. The dan-
gerous character ofthe Chme1 had been notified, The charge
at the top of page 140 is tl-ierefore nbsurd.
108.With regard to paragraph of the Albanim Cornter-
Mernoriai, as has already been pointed out,Article j of the Hague
Convention VJXZ of1907 isdealing with the duties ofbdligerents
at the close ofa war. It haç no application to the present case.
The .passage quoted in the Gounter-Mcrnorr'al frorn the report of
the 'HagueConference points out tliat, in a casecvherett~ohostile
Powers have each laid min= dong each other'sshores, anarrange-
ment by wfriçh each Foiver is ohliged to clear itsotvn coasts is
preferable to one by which each Power is obliged to remove its
ottfnmines, This report shows thatthc Article has no applicatiori
to the present case.

PART ITT

CONCXS UION S

rog, The GQvernrneiit of the United Kingdom askthe Court
to jndge, and detlare as follo~vs:-

1.-Relating to the passageof the cruiser+Ifu~riCiuasnd Leader
and the destroyersSaztrnar~zanclIraZq($in sznd October, 7946,
(1)that thepassage of this squadron through the srvept Corfu
Channel \vas in exercisc of the right of innocent passage
ad involved no violation ofasiyright of Albania (paras.
86-ZOI) ;
(2)that,with the exct+ptionfhat thet\vodestaoyersinduntrtrily
drifted east of the Charnel after they had been se~iously
injurcd by mines, na vessc3of the squadrozaentered Alb-z-
nian interior tvaierc;('para3x and 34) ;
(3)that nofing done by any vesse1of the squsdrori constituted
a violation ofany Albanian cight ;
(4)that the s~vept Corfu Channd is an international hiilghway,,
ivhich ir,siibjectto the speqial rtlleof international law
which apply to such high~pays (paras.4 and 5); that the Albanian notice of May 1946 requiring buthforeign
~vmhips and foreign merchant ships to ohtainpermission
of the Albanian anthoritieç before navigating through
Albanian waters \vas,inrelationto the Corfusiwpt çha~m-
nel, not justified by Albanian rights unclerinternational
laiv (paras,roz-104).

1'3.-With referencetu the siveepingofthe Channel on 12th and
13th November, r946,

(1) that the Government of the United Kingdom wre legdly
juçtjfied in saïreepthe Channel for mines (paras. 79-83 ; )
(2) thatno improper actcmçtituting aviolation of any Albanian
right was done by any British vesse] cluzingthe operatioxi

of s~veepiri(para. 84).
111.-With regard to both the passage of the squadron on
zznd October and the siveeping operation on 12th and 13th Wov-
ernhr, to reject al1alkgations made in the Albanian Gounter-
Mernorialwhichare aotadmitted in this Reply.

TV.-That the Government ofthe United KingdomFias commit-
ted no violztion of therights ofAlbania under international latv
and in conçequence oweç to Albanja no apologiesor satisfaction.

110. The fallowingpassage occurs inHudson anthe Permanent
Colittof Internn*tionaJustice,page 565:-

'Werc a question of fact aises, the Courtmust usuaiiy base its
finding on skatements made on behlf of the parties either in the
docnmcrntsof the proçeedings or inthe course of oral proceedings.
On several occasions theCourt has refecredtrithe birrdenof proof
as f'dllingonaparticular pxty, but \vithout distinguishing it from
the burclen of going forward with proof.,,. The Court isal~vays
freeto estirnate the value oany evidenç presented tolt, hk~.cvirje
to estirnate the value of statements made by the parties..,. In
general, the Court lias rehined £rom mqi~iringspecifk types of
pmof for particdarmatters ; thusin the German interests in Upper
Shlesiacase, it reject aedontention tbat theacquisitionof Czecho-
slovak nationality carild'besstnblished only hy a cerfificatfrom
the Czechoslovak Government ,"

Article 34 ofthe RiiresofCourt provides:-

"The Court may request the partiesto cal1witnesses orekpjerts,
or may ml1 for the prodtidion of any other evidcnce onpoints of
fact in regard ttwhich the parties are not inagreement."' The Governeni of the United Kingdom suppuzs that itis for

the Court to decide ~vhethwit will determine the issues of fact
sirnplyonthe written evideace placed bcfore it or whethcs, acting
under Article j4 of the Rules, it wiIldirect tlieparties to call any
of their tirihesses before the Court for amination there.
The Guvernment *of thc Unitcd ICingdom therefase \vil1 mit
any direction tvhich the Courtmny çeefitto git-e on this point.

Dated this goth day efJuly, 1948,

Agent forthe Govmmen-t
ofthe United Kingdom.

LIST or: ANNEXES
Page
rlnnex 25. Mine Information ChnrNP, 27zr ...... spen'n!sdime -

haex 27. TWOsiph rdatingtu thcsrteepinginOctober 1944ofth Cariu
Channel ................... 204
Annex 211.Exf;ractsfmm fla~sav dPatliamen+ary Debntes) conttthing
tat te mentathe SecrcMryof State foFureignAffairsregarding
AlIiania...............-... - 3%

lbx 30. Phottnstatcopiesof extractfrom Politid Report, portions of
.wriicappear inhnex 11 ni theAlbanian Countcr-Mernorial 307

Anncx 32. Phbtogmph of Smimrcfea omittcd îrom Annex 8 cifUbitM
Kingdom Meemon'd ......... sficr;mJuwf

Annex 33.' H~YRC~ fr- Third hkrifn Report ofCentral Mine Clearance
Bard.. ......-...-....... 317
Annex 34. Afidavikby Camimnding Officer of SItipjacidentifyj mnnes
bronght tohTalta with thofonnd atCoriii ....... 3,tx '
Annca:26 ta No. 5,

MINE TNFQRNATION ÇHART No. 2711

Seespecialv~rolurne.

TIVO SIGNAIS RELATING TO THE SwEEPING
OCTOBER 1944 OF THE ÇORFW CIUN~L

From : S.O. MlSF153.
To. :N.F.C.
(Important.}
Dater: rj.lo.++.
.Recd. 2227.

Swecprooper wn t, and checkstveepcompleted to a depth offive
fathoms. h'egativrcsult. Particularsof areas follom -
Rectanplaz area with N.E.corner bearing3x0 degs, Cape ICiephali
distrtncr+ milesand running4 miles in directi130 degs.and I mile
indirection220<legsdnd the edgcof the area fmN.lllrtoS.W. corlier
ismarked by three dansIri folIowing pasitions-
N.W. Dun. 039degs j4' B. org degç,3: jj" Ezt.
Mid. Dm. 039degs, 53' N. org degs,55 30'' ExÇt.
S.W. Dan. 039 degs. gz' N. org degs.57' IO" East.
- (Coptficaewtian.)
From :P.0.L.E.M.
To : Q.B.C.Addressees.
(I@artmtd.)
07134~jBNovember , I&.

Q.E.C,9 j, Corfu. Admiralty Çhart 206.
A safe charnelr mileivide except asrestrict-edblandwith centre
linc passing throughthefollotvinpositions :-
A. 39°-55'-30'N. 1ÿ~-~2'-30E,
B. 39°-j0'-00rW. 20401rOof'E.
C. 3g8-47'-24N. zoo-oo'-rz" E.
n, 39"43'-00" N. r9" 7'-24"E.
E, 39"-37'-36'*N. 1g0-57'-24'".
Time of Origino71345B Novernber,194.4. ANNEXES TO UNITED KINGDOM -REPLIr(WW. 28-29) 305

EXTRACTFROMEIANSARD, 18thNOVEAICBER r,94z

MI. Mafideraskedthe SecretaryofStak for ForeignAffairwhether
he will give an assuratextthe Government,at th^finalpeaççsettle
ment,irisofar as Albania is concemed, winot be influencedbymy
changes broughtaboutby Ztdian aggresçion ?
Mr. Eden : Yes, Sir.

EXTRACT FROM KANSARD, 17th DECEMBER, rg42

Mr, B~ftJ~easkedthe Stcretary oState for Foreign Affairsv~hetlier
be hasany stdement to makeon the policyof IHiMsajestyAsGovern-
ment towards Albania?
Mr. Ede~t: Yeç, Sir. His Jfajesty 'çovrrrnmentsympathize \.th
tbe fate oAlbsnians,a peopleamangstthe earliestvictirnofFascist
aggression. Theywish tosee Albaniafmed kom the Xhiian yake and
restoretd her independence. Tlieformof régimemd Government to
bc introduced into Albaniwillbe a matter for the Albanianpople
tl~ernselvtodecideat theend ofthe tvar- tVhaf I have çaid donot
inany way prejudge the qiiestiof Albania's position in rdatito
such fut~uearrangements as may be teached beheen the various
Balkan States. His hlajestyG'svernmmt regard thequestion of tIle
frontiers of the AlbaniStateafter the +vaasa question which will
have to he considereat the Face settlement.

df~nexzg to Ne. 5.

TELEGRAM FROM IXAG OFFICER

COMM_4NDmTG ~5thCRUISER SQTSADRON
DESCIXEING SHE INCIDENT OF 15th MAY

To :C. in C.Med. Fleet (A).
Info; C.in Ç. Med. Fleet,S.B.N.O. Grecce, Admiralty.
[lmme&iute.)
Anstvers to paragraph6 A.M. 232343.
NO s~nals or activity of anysort rvseenon shoreand no message
\mastecciwd by Wn fçom Albaniansr. Fht rorlndwas R.E. anclfeH
asternso could not be mistaken forheave-to signal.Second round
1 foLlo~vedwitllia minute.
z, R.A.'sFIag at the foreiH.M.5, Ovim andensignsin bothships
haci beenwosn throughout the night,At Ieast eight minutes before
hst roirnd 8 and10 breadth ensigns mere hoisteathign Staffsin

20H.M.S. Sabfisrand R.M.S. Orim sespectively and peak ensips sub-
sequently liauled dom. No additionalensigns were hoisted sub-
squently.
3- It was broad daylightwith (? fair)visibilitand bright Sun.
4- Ships wem in Medri Channel which is onlyI mile \videand in
feIt juçtifiincontinuingmy passage aIurtheroff shorevenTif askeclta

do $0. ANNEXES TO UNITED KINGDOM REPLY (NO.30) 3O7

Amex 30 lo No. 5.

PHOTOSTAT COPIES OF EXTRACT FROMPOLZTTCAL REPORT,
PORTIONS OF WHICH APPEAR IN ANNEX rr
OF THE ALBANIAN COUNTER-MEBIOKTAL

BMMIIoI~E. Secret,
BRITISH MILITARY MISSTONALBANIA

FERIODICAL POL~TICAL REPORT NO. JO DATED 29 JOLY 1945. REPORT
ON VISIT TOSOWTHERNALBANIA BY BRlGADlEB D.E. P.HODGSOM,O.B.E.,
AND LT.-COLONEL C. A. S.PALMER
Reteue~tcelfup: x:SW,UOO ALbmZu.

I. O-ject.-

The objects ofthe tour were:-
(a)To investietethe military situatioin the South,wlierelarge
concentrationsof Albanian and Jugoslav troopswere nimoured
to be. and
(b) To getsomefrcst-handinformationanthe tteatmentof theGreek
minorityin South Albania,andothermattersaffecting thGreekf
Albanian frontierquestion.

2. f~inerary.
20 July TIRANA-VALONA.
21 July G JINOICASTER-LLBOHOVO (R.593.
22 July DELVINE-HIMARE.
23 july SARANDE-PElIMET (M.61).
24 July PERAT (~I.S~J)-~~~LISHT (N.23)-LARE PRESPA(N.27).
2j J~ly ICORCA.
26 July FOGRADEC.
27 July ELBASAW.

3. The FNC insisted ona parrd of two offIcerand twelve ORs in
two vehicles accompanying thBritish partyinspite oa direct request
to the contsary. Ho~vevcr, this guarcl andtwo othes guards, sub
seqnentlyattaclied tthe party atvarious points on the route, djd not
in fact influencin any way the contactsmade or the conversations
Iielda5 ttlieywerquiteincapable, duetocontinual mccl~aniçal break-
downs, of keeping wÎth thc party.
The party was consequcntly abltr,have openconversationswith di
sectionsofthe people,Albaniaonr Gmek, Beysl and peaçantsiawyers,
shopkeepers,fanners, FNÇ officiais, military Icadcrçathe cornmon
partisans without interferenfrom its escort.

(a) PrimarySchooIs in whichthe Greeklanguageis taughtfor So %
of the tirne and Albanianfor20 % esist icertaintawns such aç DELVLUEwith an autstanding\y large Greek paputation.
Such a school \vas visited in KIMAKE.
Xo SecondarySchoals exist in ~vhich Greekis taught.
(6)'A Greek papcr AA.I.KOBHMA is produced in GJtNOKASTER
on alternate days. Thispaper, a propagandatveapon of FNC,
isdistributedte al1Greek speaking villages.
(c) In DELVISE, wherc a rnajority of thc pepuiatianisfrom the
Greekminority, thelatter has :imajority ofseats on thc local
council.
(d) Certain instanc eerefound inthe SARRNDE areaofthe removal
North of familieswith eitheranti-FRC or pro-Greeksympathies .
but such casesappear to be the exception rather than tlie rule.
(8) Of the Greeksquestionerlonly a very srnaIproportion espressed
thedesire forSouth Albania tobe underGreeksule. The Greek
Governrnent'ç present bysterical propaganda employing as it
does sornany unreasoned and incorrectstatemcnts has certainly
had the efkçt of discouraging such irredentist sentiments.
{fi The FNC has alwayç firmly statedthat the Greek ininorityis -
treaterinjustthe same way as areotherAlbanians. The inform-
ation gainedduringtlie tour.woidseem tO inclicatietthe FXC's
statements arelargef tue. Thcre \vas no indication thatany
measuses of thseveritysuggested by the GreekGovernmen thave
been taken by Itie FNC against individuals orgtoups for the
reason tliat they are Greek.
As haç been previauslyreported (BNM PoliticaiReport No. g
dated 27July para. 1-5(d)the only firmreasonsfor Gseekclairns
may bc that :-
(i)the families of descrters ~ho happcn to be of the Greek
minosity are rnaltreated inthe samc way as the fainilies of
Albanian deserters, that isby confiscatioof property and
rcmoval fo an area of conccntratio~;
(ii) CertainGreekfamiliewhose prescnceintheSouthofAlbania
is thought by FNC to conskitute a danger to tbeir controI
liave been moved North. The number of such cases in no
,tway indicates ayolicy ofremoving tlieGreekrnii~orityfrom
tlie disputed area ofSouth Albania.

(a)A'A.A\'nesuren5Mthe FNC hasaRemade several çtatements alleging
theviolationof the Southern frontierbyGteck National Guards.
(b) Tliefrontierwas visited at PElW (R.89 )nd KAPESHTICE
(X.25)wherethe Albanian frontier poswas questioned. Other
enquiriesivetemade of Partisanoficialsin al1areaswhere news
01frontierincidents miglit be availalile.
A partisan at thePEIUT post stated thathe had been there
fartwo mmanths dtiringmhich timc no incidentof any kind had
occurred.
A partisanatKAPESHTICE reportedone minor incident,stating'
that someonc had appeared a week before on the Greck side of
the frontier, fired one shot in his direction f500 yardsand
disappeared, AWNEKES TO UNITED NJXGDOh! REPLY (WO. 31) 3O9

Confirmationwas receivedof the incidentreportein BMM Polit-
Greekeboats approaçhjng2SARANDEppenand firingmachine-guns tat
the Albanian Coast.
(c) Tn generalthe situation othefronfierappearedremarkablyquiet
and peacefuland wliiIe the ptesence of Albanian 'formations,
including special frontier battalionsguarding the approaches
wns asccrtainedtherc appeareclto be no excitement or woq on
the partof individualor offrcialç.Inparticularthe Commander
of3 Div. in Xorca appeared perfectlyhappy about the situation.
(d) It would appcarthat the statementsmade by FNC about fronticr
incidentsare largely esaggeratedand are put out tocounter the
Greek Government's statements of thc Albanian maltreatmciit
of the Greek minority,
Such incidents asliave occurrewould appear to be causedeither
I->irreçponsibleGreek eIements or possiblyby Albanians tvho
have deserted into Greecefrom ANA formations.

6.A. S.PALMER,

Brigadier Commanding
~~hl/~or /rz/ British Military Mission
29.7-45- Albania.

2. 13egias,-The Carnrnancler-in-Chi efediterranean,has issueclthe
folIowing statement xvith referencto the damage sustained by H.M.
Ships Snumarez and Volageon Tuesday.zznd Octokr.
3. H.M, Ships Moiwili,us, Leader, Sazi?nlarexancl Volage, under
cornmand ofRear-i-\dmiralH. R.G, Kinahan, were proceedir~gby the
North Corlu Channel to carry out exercise with H.M.S. Ocean. In
October19w this Channelwas establisliefor the use of shippingand
has been useclsinceby H.M. Ships. It isone mile wicle and paçsecl
dose to thc Albanian coast near Sarande.
4. On tiie lasoccasionofH.M.Ships usingthis ChannelinMay1946,
H.M. Ships Oriolaand Swfwrb were firedonby Albanianshom batteries.
On this occasionthereforethe passage was madc mith ships ~t action
stations inordcr that they might bc able to rctaliateqiiickly if fired
upon again. To avoid provocation, however, the guns were trained .
fore andaft,whichis tlieir normposition atsea in peace time md were
not loacled. The facttiiatships wercataction stations reduced consid-
erably thenumber of casuatiessustauied.
j. Sbore batteries were clearly seenivithmen in their immecliate
vicinitybut no hostileaction was taken by them.
6. White the darnagedships were endeavouring to cxtnçatethem-
selves,R boatflyingthe Albanian ensignand the white flügcarnealong- 3x0 ANNEXES TO UNITED KINGDOM REPLY (NO. 32)
side Ydage and askedwhat the ships weredoing. Apartfrom thino
- actionwas taken by the localauthorîties.
7. B dintof fineseamanship Tfolagesteaming stem firstmanaged
totow 2awrtarez also stem finoutof the Channeland back toGorfu,
the cruiserwereordered tocontinuetheir passagethroughthe Channel.
8. It is much regrettedthat there rire23 ratings ofSawmareand
one oficer and five ratingof Volage rnissingbelieved killed.Tcn
ratingsofSUUW~Z and t~voratings of Voingwho werekilledor died
of their injurieswerburicd in theBritish Cemeteoyat Corfuon 24th
and 2jth Octoberwith fui1naval honours. The injuted,arnounting to
threeofficerand thirty-nine ratings of Sassmaand t\voratings of
Volage are inthe HospitalShip Maipie and, apart from a few on the
Dangerous List,arc pr~gressingsatisfactorily.

PHOTOGRAPH OF "SAUMAREZ"OMITTEDFROMANNEX 8
OF UNITED KINGDOM MEMORIAL.

See sptcial volume, Jaccordinlglyçomveythe saitwa mines toMdta foraxamination
and handed them to threpresentafiof the Naval Armment Store
Oficer.

(Sa'gm) RICHAR DREVEWN WILSON,
Courtsof Judicid Proof.

Signedand sworn before me,
This5th day of September1947.
(Magishte.)

CHARTLET SHOITTNG AREAS

SWEPT ON 1ztl-iXOVEMBEl?, 1g46
See speckl volume.