INTERNATIONACOURT OFJUSTICE
CASE
CONCERNINGTHEGABC~UVO-NAGYMARUS
PR/JECT
COUNTER-MEMURIAL
OF THE REPUBLICOF HüNGARY
VOLUMEI
5DECEMBER1994Ir-
t
t
t TABLEOFCONTENTS
t
t Page
INTRODUCTION 1
PART 1:THE FACTS
CHAPTER 1 THE .AIMS OF THE ORIGINAL PROJECT AND THE 15
PROBLEMSOFTHEREGION
SectionA The UrrderlyingApproacliof the SlovakMenroriaI 16
t SectionB Aimsof tlreProject 20
SectionC The Lack of ari Irrtegrated Envirmr~nentaI T~npact 23
1 Assessrnent
SectionD The OrigirralProjecA:ScientificCritique 32
(1) The Positionsof the Parties 32
(2) TheTaskofthe Court 32
(3) A Surnmaryof RisksAssociated with tliOriginaIProject 34
(4) TIieCharacteristicof fie RegionRecaIIed 35
(5) RiverMoryhoIo~andRiverHydrauIicç 36
(6) SurfaceWaters andGroundwater 44
(7) Soils,AgricnItureand ForesQ 60
f8) FIoraand Fauna 05
(9) Seismicand Engin~eringRisks 76
(1O) UtfieRisk snd DeficienciesRelatto the Origi~ralProjcct 82
Section E The Questionof FIoodControI 82
SectionF The ProbIernsof Navigation 85
SectionG Slovakia'çInvocationof "Energy Policy" 89
Secrio1H A ComparisoriwithOther InternationDam Projects 94 N
CHAPTER2 THECONDUCTOFTHEPARTIES
SectionA Introduction
SectionB The Performanceof the Treaiybefure 1989
SectionC Hungary's Willingnessto Negotiats witfritheFrarnework
of the 1977Treaty(1989-1992)
j1) The Period hm 1989 toEarIy 1991'
(2) The 199 1IntergovernmentaINegotiations
(3) InvoIvernentof hir rdrties intlie'soiutionof the Dispute:
the Roleof the EuropeanCommission
(4) The LondonAgreement
(5) Bringingthe Casebeforethe IntsrnationCourt of Justice
SectionD The ContinuingMistoryof VariantC
The EarIyPlanningand ~rn~~ernsrrtatiofVariantC
(1)
(2) "Co-operation"with Hungaryon VariantC
. (3) Lack of LegaICandour
Section E Negot iations for a Temporary~a&r ManagementRegiine
andArticIe4 of the SpecialAgreement
SectionF Conciusion - Slovakia's ReIiance oBad Faith Arguments
in the Lightof tlreHistoryof theDispute
1
t CfIAPTER 3 THEIMPACTOFVARIANTC :
Section A The IrnplementafionofVariantC: An Overview
Section B TheFaiIrrreto CarryOut Environdenhl Impact Aççessment
of VariantC . CHAPTER 5 THEDISPUTEOVER PERFORMANCE AND ,201
SUBSEQUENTTERMiNATIONOFTHE 1977TREATY
BectiorA Treaty Law and the Law of StateRespansibiIiQasTIiey 201
ReIatto the Dispute
SectionB The Suspension and SubsequentAb'ridorr~nerrtf Wor-ks 207
and theTerminatiurrof theTreaty
(1) The Suspension andSubsequeriTt enrrirrarf Works 207
(2) TheTeminatiorr of ti1977 Treaîy
l
SectionC Consequencw ofTermination 215
! CHAPTER5 THELLLEGALITY OF VARIANT C 210
SectiorA TIreIIIegaIityof VariCnunderGeneralI~iter~ratioraw 216
(1) RespectiveRoIeof TreatyLaw and CustomaryI~itenratioriaI217
Law
(2) Identification and AppIication of tlre ReIevant RuIof 220
InternationalLaw
(3) BIovakia'sArgumentthat VariantC WasLawfuI Aparifrom 227
tfie 197Treaty t
Section B The IIlegaliS of VariCnunderun pli cabTreaties 234
(1) The 1975 Convention ori rIrel~e~ulrition ofWater 235
ManagementIssuesof Boundary'~qters
(2) ,The1948DanubeConvention 236
l
(3) The I958 Bucharest ConventionConcerning Fishing in the 238
Waters of the Danube
SectionC The IIIegalityof VariantC under,th; 1977Treaty 239
239
(1) VariantC WaçNot Authorisedbyth? 1977Treaty
(2) The So-called "Doctrineof ApproximateAppIication" 240 (3) "Mitigatiun of Damage" Does Not Excuse UnIawful
Conduct
Section D The IlIegaOperationof VariantC
CHAPTER 7 THEREMEDIALISSUES
SectionA TheRelationbetweenJudicial Rernediesand Self-pie1
SectionB The PrincipIe ûrat Damages May Not Be Awardadfor
UnIawfuIConduct
SectionC Rernedies'inRdationto theExpIoitationofShared Natura1
Resources
SectianD The"Qrrantificatio~of Loses
Section E The RealRemedialContext VI11
LIST OF COLOURPLATqS
! Facing
1 Page
EnvironrnenbIImpact Area - Original~roj&t.
II
ScaIe1 :300-000 \ I
EnvironmenialImpactArea- VariantC.
i
ScaIe I:300,000 I
UpperRhineBarrageBuilding
Grave1PIacementinstead ofBarrageBuiIdinginthe Upper
mine
PIate 5 Xrrrpacof DanubeDredgingonLuw-flowWater LeveIs
PIate6a Predicted Changes in Groundwater LeveIdue to the
IrnpIerneniatio~rfthe OriginaI Project (wijh 200 m31and 50
m31s Disdrarge inthe Danube).ScaIe I:175,000
Cariditionof Sub-irrigation ofthe Covering Layer(Simulation
before and afier the Implementationof the Original Project).
ScaIe 1:175,000
PIate 7 "A reguIarIydried rrpbranch nearthe commbnifyof Vujka- the
sarnebranchafter being filledwith water, May 1993"
PIate8 a)Afiemath of theDiversiorr
&The Danube,SixDayçafter the Diversion i
Plate9 Changes in the MonthIy Average Flow-Rate, I 391-1994.
Scale :175,000
r>ifferençes in Groundwater Levelr befh and afîer the
ImpIementationofVariantC. ScaIe1 :175,0#0
InfraredImagingof the DunaszigetBranchgystsm
Szigetkozand itsRiparianForestsDving Out.
Dunasziget,Jury 1994
PIate13 FishMorfaIitiesintheCikoIaBrancIr~~stei. October 1992
PIate 14 NavigationPrublems:
UJ Darnaged ~ock cite
6)ShipsWaitingto Pass . .
INTRODUCTION
1. On 14 JuIy 1993 the Court made an Order fixing
5 Decernber1994as thetime-limitfor the fiIingbyeaclr of thePartiesof
a Counter-Mernorial.ThisCounter-Mernorialofthe RepubIicof Hrrngary
is presented inaccordancewiththe Orderof the Court.Itrespands tothe
SIovakMemoriaI,and presentsfurîherevidenceand argumcnt in support
of the Hungarianposition irthiscase.
CIaimsofthe SlovakMemariaI
2. Ths SIovakMernoria1is unrrsuaIIyernotiona1,Iinkingthe dispute
with a thousand year-oId-history. I It iç sumetinles uncxpectedly arid
unnecesçariIyoffensive?
3. BIovakia'sapproach to tliepolitica1evolutionwhicli took place in
Centra1and EasternEuropean couritriesbeiween 1977 and 1392suggests
that forit theclackhasstoppedin manyrespects.The SIovakMernorial
strives to bIur the profound differences betwee~ithe period precediirg
1989-1990and the periodsince? irnplyingthe mairiterranceof continuity
and treatingchanges i~r tlieattitude of Hungary to the Project as due to
short-ternreconomicrn~tives.~It faiIç to meritionthat even in tlre 1980s
See cg., SM, para 6.103: "TheecoIogica1 absurdity ofHungary's supposd
terminaliosurpasseevm itseconurnicabsurdiv"; SM,para 7.52: "This cmim
oaIybe describeassurrealistic";Spara8.114:"It is extraordinary,arrandnt
unacceptablefor Hungary ru declarein its 1992 Declaration that Hungary's
perceptionof 'imminentperiI' isequalIytmetheSIova skdeoftheDanube...";
SM, para8.88:"Ttfindsitbreathtding thWungary shoulddaim material breach
by Slovakia",etc.
Seecg., SM, para 4.53.By contrat the cxtcn~ofchange was recognised,for
exampIein ttrecanlextminera1resourcesmanagemen!i,n the CSFRReporttu the
RioConference:
"The breaking point came in 1989,whenthe irrational, ideoIogy-driven
cconomyFameto a haIlandwas s10wIyrepfacedby a rationuseof ~ht
'pitifrernainsof themineralIreasure."
CzechosIo Amkadcmy ofSciences & FederaICrrmmitteefor theEnvironment,
Narioml Rem ofthe CzecIand SiovoRFedera RlepublictI~C UnifedNurioirs
Conferenceun E*~vimnreniand Development,BrazilJwre 1992Prague, Mach
1992),p40 (hereafterrefertoasCSFRRio Eiepoff(1932)).
SM, paras3.04,3.32,3.59.the doctrine of the parîy's dominafi011over ;scie~iceprecluded the
independenceof scientific research, the task of Which was ta jusfify the
!
precorrceptio~iosf power. I
1
4. DeveIoprnents irr Hungaria~iprrbIic opjriiorr which bega~ito
protest agairrst tlie Project in tlre earIy 1980s are aIso wiIfuIIy
miçnnderstood.At that time Hungary was a "socialist" country where a
progressivetransitiontowardsdemucracy was develuping.Thisevolution
was paraIIel tu a growirrg awarerress of tire,need tu proteci the
environment and of the environmenta1probIems which were ge~reraIIy
hidden frorn the public. For the first time since the nationaI insurrectiori
in 1955, pubIicdenroristrationstook place,precisdy in order to stop the
~onstruction ofthe Nagyrnarosbarrage. The "banube CircIe" waç a
focus for a large movenrent which fonndeclioes i~iotlrercountries under
Soviet domination. Speaking in such conditions of the "good dea1 of
manipulationof pubIicupinion7'5isa majorhistoricalerror.Nor doeç the
roIs of a parbarnent in a de~nocratic stak :appear to be c1earIy
under~tood.~
5. PubIic opinion and Parliament wsre not]alune in expressing a
new awareness of the importanceof environnrentalprotectiorr.Hungary
participated increasingIy in internationaI CO-operationin rliis fieId.
Beîween 1977 and 1989, Le.,during the periud beiwesn the concIusion
of tlre 1977Treaty7and the temporarysuspensionof its implernentation,
Hungaryratifiedor acccdetd o 12major intemationa1i~istrurrientr seIated
to environ~nentalprote~tion.~ During this peripd it also signal two
SM,para?3.54-3.5.5.
Scee.g.,SM,paras3.24,4.OIinfiire,4.69-4.71,5.83,&.84,5.85,7.07,8.44.
!
Hungary-C~hoslavakiaT ,reatyconcerningIh#nsi,ructioandOperationof the
GabEfknvo-Nagvrnaro Ssystem of Locks, Budapest,,16 Sepfember 1977,1109
WTS 235; 32 ILM 1247; HM, Annexes,voI3, mnex ZI(hereafterreferreruas
"the1977 Treaîy"). I
Thesa erthefoIIowing(dateof Hungarianratificat&:tinparentheses):
*
Convention Cunceming the ProIection of the WorId CuIUraIand Narural
Heritage,Paris,UNESCO,16No~ember1972(14po~ember1977);
* Conventionon InternationaITrade iEndangerid: peciesof WiIdFaunaand
FIora,Washington,3March 1973(29 May 19851;
.
* ProtocorAdditional10tht GenevaConventionof 12August 1949and ReIating
to Ihe Protection of Victirns of International Canfiicts, (ProfamIl,
Berir,8June 1977(12 Apri1989);
* Convtntion onlhcConser~ati~nof MigratorySpccies,Bonn,23 June1979(12
JuIy1383);conventionswitlra worId-widescope, the UN Conventionon the Law of
the Sea and the Base1Convention on tfie ControI of Transboundary
Movenientsof Hazardous Wastes and their Disposai. TIiiçattests tu tfie
growingconviction- bath publicand governrnental- that environmenh1
protectionwasa prioriS.
6. The SIovak conceptionof erivironment is by contrast strangely
ontdated. AftertIie politicaicllangesof 1989,it waç officiaIIycorrfirmed
that Czechoslovakia was among those countries whose environnrerits
were most harined during previous decades, in particular by careleçç
industriah~ation.~ Even now, the SIovak MenIoria1 reflects oId
techriocratic appi-oacl~esto environ1nerrta1 protection, seen as cunsisting
mainIyof the protectionof the popuIationagainst flooding. Orreexample
ilIustratesthis attitude. In the SluvakMerhorial,the mapaccompariyi~rg
tlre CIrart thar represents die responsibility of each Parîy to the 1977
*
Conuen~ionon the Conservation of EUTO~C~W ~IiIIdlife and NaturaI Habiiats,
Berri,19September 1379[16November19891;
* Convcrrtion on Long-Range Tmnsboundary Air PoIIr~tion, Geneva, 13
No~cmbcr 1979 (22 September 1960);andits proIomls: 28 September 1984,
Gene~a(8 May 19851; JuIy 1985,Helsink(1I Septenrber 1986), 31 OcIobcr
1988.Sofia (Hungarysigred on 3 May 84aid approved Ihis ProlocoI o12
November1991);
* Convention for the PmIection of the Omne Laye22 March 1985, Vicnrr(4
May 1988);
* Profoc01un SubstancetshatDepletetheOzoneLayer, Montreal,16 September
1987(24 ApriI1989);
+ Convention on EarIyNotificationoaNuclearAccident,Yienna,26 September
1986(IOMarch 1987) ;
* Convention on Assistancein the Case of a NucIear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, Vienna,26 September1986 (10March 1,987).
Thc foIIowi~igextracts frumCSFR RiaR~pori(1992)rnakethe poirri:
"The econonric groWIr characteristics in Ihe Cshow thatit w8.a
very ineffective economy, producatgvery high maferialand energy
costs,with.heavydependence on natural rcsources, and wiiIr a Iarge
i~npacton the environment." (p31)
"Thtenvironnrent in so~neregioniscatastmphic...PolIutiaffectsthe
air,waterand food; the soi1 quaIiv is poor; Inost of tIre forests are
severeIy damaged; the country isdevatated and has Iost i&ecological
s?abiIity;itsbiodiversityIiasbeenreduced." (p 37)
See also: UN Eco~romicandSociaI CuunciI,Economic Commissionfor Europe,
Scnior Adviserstu ECE Govemmenis on EnvironnrentaI and Wahr Problems,
"CzccIrosbvakia: Ecunomics md the Environmenf", EN VWAIWG.2CR.12,
EC.AD/WG. IIR.12,IONovember 1992.Treaty for tlrcosts of-the joininvestmentIDexcludes ilrose relating tu
the restorationof vegetationbothon Hungarianand SIovakterritury. For
Slovakia, the main environmental degradation rsrr Its from not fiI1ing
with water "a huge excavatedand reinforcd area of over 4,000
hectares". It addçrhat"[r]hecoIogi catstrophe of this inrmensearea
gouged ouf of the land, intended to be fiIIed with 196rnilIion cubic
metres of waters, but Ieft rrnfiIIed,staggerç the irnaginatio~r".~IFol-
Iowingthis Iogic"[$ isthns the abandonmentd'the Prcijectwhichdeals
a çevereblow to environmentalprotection".12It is no1surprisingin such
circurnstancesthat Slovakiacondemnsthe proteciionof the environment,
as it isgenerally understood, parodying it asa desireto "return to a
mythicaI pristins past".13 It is aIso characteristic trial, ignoring the
necessity of prevenfingenvimnrnentaldegradation, SIovakiaaffims that
al1 the probIernçwlricli arise in this field can and wiII be sulved by
adequate "monitoring rnethods",I4 without explainhg what içmea~rtby
suchrriet11odsE-Iernentaryand generaIiyaccepted principles, sucas trie
assessrnent of environrrre~itaIrisk, concern for long-term effects, the
interrelationsbetweenwater, soi1and biologicaldiversity,the importance
of ecuIogicaIprocessesand of Iife-supporiingsysfems,are ignored.
7. The difference berneen. this approach and generaIIy prevailing
environmenta1ccinceptsis sîrking T.Ireprinciplesof the 1972Stockiiolm
Conference, repeated in mariy respects in the Final Act of the 11975
HeIsi~ikiConference on Secnriv and Co-operation in Europe, were
reflectedinthe 1977Treaiy(ArticIes 5,19and 201,but were not appIied
by the parties,and inparticular by ~zechoslovakia wlrichhad the major
contracha1 reçponçibility for protection ofthe environment rrriderthe
Joint Coritractual Plan. Latsr devcIopmentç reflected-in internationa1
declarations, suchas the 1982 WorIdCharter for Nature, and tlre 1992
Rio DecIarationon Environmentand DeveIop~nent,and in internationa1
treaties, in parîicuItheconventionsoftlie UN Econornic Commission
for Europe, were equaIIy ignored. VariaritC was deveIoped during tlre
Iast rnontlrçof tlrepreparation of .the Rio de Janeiro Confereirce on
Environment and Developmentand its operation staried less fhan five
rnonthsafierthe procIarnationof the Rio DecIarationand of Agenda 2 1.
TIiereis rioi~rdicationthatSIovakiasought to incorporateinto its actions
the implementafioriof principles proclairneby thisConference, suchas
ID
SM,IIIusNro28 foIIowingp77. 1
II SM,para5.1O3.SeeaIsoSM,paras4.83,6.132,6.140,17.20,7.32,7.33,8.80.
IZ SM,pirrS.132. i
I3 SM,para7.87.
l4 SM,paras8.47,8.88. bsustainabIe developrnent, public participatiori, prior assessrnent of
foreseeabIe effects or the precautionary principle. SubsequentIy, by
withholding water from the old Danube, in spite of tlie conclusions of
internationalbodies and the provisiorrsof SIovakenvironmental and
waterIawitself, theSIovakGo~ernmerid trowsd what IiîîIerespect it had
for theenvironmentingeneraIand for the environmentof a rieighbouring
countv inparticular.Its strategyhaçbeen to create nniIateraIIyand step-
by-siepirreversibIesituations.
8. Perhapsthis Iackof awareness of erivironmenta1problemsand of
their importance is at the root of the repeated SIovak assertions that
Hungaryactedinbadfaith:
"~lthougli in iact nomorethana pretext,Hungary h& with
insistence invoked environmentai considerations in an atternpt
tojusfify itçprrrpartedtermiriatirf the 1977Treaty.'""
"...the environmeritcould cpnveniently be offered as an argu-
ment to bolstertherealreaon, which was economic irr~iahre."It
9. The evidence which SIovakia subrnits in order to justify its
a1Iegatio1ris a Ietteraddressedby the Hungarian Vice-PrimeMinister,
Mr Marjai, tothePresidentof theHungarian Academy of Sciences,dated
19March 1984.i7 TIiis Ietier is obviously a fragment of an infernal
dehte, whichwascurent inbot11 wuntries,anddoes nutjustify on its face
any asseriionof "pretext".TheIetterIiadno practicaleffect oevents; the
suspensionofwork at Nagymaros was decidcdononIy fiveyearçIater.Ig
IO. As wiII bedemonstrated, SIovakia'saccusationsthat Hrrngary
actedin badfaith have no basisinfact.19
II. There are significf ancrraI errorsin the SIovak Mernorial.
Accordi~rg to it"[a]short way downsireamof the step [of Nagyrnaros],
the Danube çplits into two channels creating a srnaII içIand caIIed
S~entendre''?~This "srnaIIisIarid"is 25 kiIo11letrlong, beginning two
kiIornetreçfrom Nagyrnaros and reachingthe outskirts of Budapest.It is
the mainsourceofdrinking waterforthe two millionpeopleof Budapest.
l5 SM,para6.131.
I6 SM,para8.38.SeeaIsoSM,paras3.5&8.29,8.34.
I SM,para3.37elseq.SeeaIsSM, annex29.
I8 FordiscussioftheMarjaiIertseebeIow,paras2.11-2.16.
f9 Seebeloru, aras27-2.27
SM.para2.56.Thr~ç itiç inexact toSay that "...theweIIssrippIyi~igBudapest were far
away fromthe regionwhosegroundwaters wouidbeafkcted bythe G/N
project" - unless one thi~iksof tlie Project as corifinedta tirs GabEikovo
region, which tlreSIovakMernorialpurports not todoz1 TIie protectio~t
of Budapest's drinkingwaterfrom the riçkof deterioration cauçed by the
Project was one of the main mnsiderations +hich lad Hungary to
susperidtlieworks at Nagyrnaros.TIreSIovakMènroriaIaIIegesthat "tfie
poor quaIity of Budapest's water is IargeIythe ieçirltof po1Iutionfrorn
B~dapeçt"?~In fxt, about two-thirdsof the tota1,drinking-waterderna~rd
ofBudapest isprovided by the upstrearn NorihérnWaterworks, which
cannot be poIIuted by ~udabest. TIre centre of tlrose wakrworks is the
islaridof Szentendre. In general, the quality of water abstracfed by tIie
weIIsis suitablefor humanconsurnptionwithorrtfurihertreatrnent.23
12. Slovakia presents factç in a way which:may Iead to incorrect
concIusiorrs. Its MenroriaI alleges tlrat Hurigav bases its energy
production on nucIear power pIarrts, while" Slovakia uses cIean
ItydroeIectric er~ergy.~~ If even reprodrrces a photograph of the
Hungarian nuclear power pIant on the ~anube'a Ptak~? ~t ornitsto
mention that in 1993 more than half of the eIectriciS production iri
Slovakia carne fmn rruclearpower (53.6%),sig~iificantly -more than in
Hungarj, (43.3%).ln addition, in 1993SIovakia was corrstructing four
morereactors at Mochovce,which wiIInearIydoubIe itsexistirignuclcar
capa~ity.~~Hungary has no sirniIar pIanç tb expand its nric~earpower
capaciiy, aird flrenecessi9 is rrot feto produce:photographs of BIuvak
nuclear energy plants,existingor underconstruction.
3 Another example is given by Illustration :No 19z7 in the SIovak
Mernoria1 which represe~itsthe percelitage of use of Irydrcielectric
potential. It is intendetodemonstratethat Hungary neglects this source
of energy with only 5.7% of the global potenfial used, while Slovakia
uses its poteritiaIa52.6%. WIiat is omitted hereis a description of tlre
methodologyused to estabIishfhs so-ca1led"potexrtiai",which obviously
does not take into account the simple fact that Hungary is a IargeI tat
I
I
21 SM, para3.55.
22 SM, para2.iO5-2.106. I
23 HM,voI 1,pp 427-428seeaIso Fig29atp489. '
24 SM, para 1.50-1.56,2.84.
25 IIIustrNo 1atSM,paraI.15.
26
Intemaliona.tomicEnergy Agency,DocumentPR 94117,IO May 1994;HC-M,
Annexes,vol 3,annex94. See furiherbelow, para1.203.
27 SM, p36.country, with a terrain rnostIy useless for the. production of hydro-
eleçtrici~-~~
14. The SIovakMernoria1continues the SIovakpolicy of çayingone
thing whiIedoing another, a strategythat can be describedas haçtening
the poilit of no reh~rn.It quotes a Ietter of 23 September 1992 by the
Czechoslovak Prime Minister which emphasises that "Variant 'C' - a
'provisional technical solution' - did not involve 'diverting the
Da1rube"'.~9 01remonth later,tfieoperatio11 of VariantC started witlrthe
diversionof aInrostaIIthe water fronrthe Danube.EIsewfierethe Sfovak
Mernoria1recognises that two important sets of works are plannecl in
order to optinrise the use of tlre Danube at Crrnovu, including the
constructionof two hydroelectricpowerpIant~.~O Itis notcIear how such
constructionçareconsisterit with a "provisional technicalsolution".
TheSIovakMemurialrefid
15. Against this presentation, which is a travesty of the
environmental,scientific and ecorromicdebatetfiat has occrrrred - arid
continues- Hungarytakeçthe opportunis to restate its position, anto
produce additional materia1 in support T.he foIIowing extracts are
intendedsimpIyas illustrativeof the issuespresented totlreCourt.
15. AIthough SIovakiaasserts tbat tfie Original Project would have
beenpmitively beneficial tothe environrner~t,~'in truth the Project was
an exampIe "of disturbanceof uniquewater and ruraIecoIogica1systems
due to large waterworks ...[whereby] trieIruge and unique voIunre of
urrdergroundwater is theatened and the systenrç of mead forests and
river tributaries are drasticaIIy In the words of another
ZS
' SeefuflherbeIuw,para1.200.Withoutseekirrto bc cornprehensive,other factuaI
errorsinSM may be nrentioned. Thctotal IenglIrof the Hungsectorof the
Danube isnot450 km (SM, paraI.04),but4II km,ofwhich 143km are shared
withSIovakiaand274 km areentirely Hringariaisno!the case thattherearcno
protecled arcasof the Szige(SM, para2.1IO)A Hungariandecrceof 4 ApriI
1987 decIaredas naTura1reserve915hectaresof the SzigetktS5948 hectares
(65%) of whicharecovered byforest; GovemmentaIDecreeII198 111.15)13
Mwch 1987:HC-M, Annexes,vol3,mntx 42.
29 SM, pam 4.86.
30 SM, para5.35.
31 S~,paras2.1~-2.11~.
32 CSFR Rio Repor(1492)p 92. toadapttlieconceptof theentire project tothe needs of theeco-
systernof the region..
20. AItlioughSIovakiaasserts that gencrali~iternatio~taI lawrules -
0th thanpam suntsserandu - are irrelevat tothe presentcase:' and
in pariicuIar.that ruIes of international Iaw relating to enviro~iment
protwtion can be relegated tc the category of "softI~w''$~ others have
pledgedt+
"~riakethe environrnent issue one of tfie priorities offoreign
policy... Wehave to reckon witfi great expenses i~icunnectiun
with the introductionof ecoIogica1noms corresponding to the
strictstandardofthe EuropeanComrnuniv c~rrntrieç"?~
2 1. AItIroughSIovakiaassertsthat the "Bioprciject" (1975- 1976) was
a cornpreIie~isivenvironmentalimpactsfrrdy which was "unusualdue to
the wide nature of its coverage =id itsdetaiIedapproacC4 rireHydro-
QuébecReport, commissionedby the SIovak Ministry of Water and
Forestsin 1990,wted flrat,as totlre"Bioproject":
"II faut rappeIer ici que Ie concept du projet étantÉjà choisi,
aucune co~nparaison de sariantes n'était requise par Ie
gouvernementau planeri~ironnernental."~~
Hydro-Quéibec was not alone in holdingthis view: as Iateas Deceniber
1992if waç said that the informationthen avaiIabIewas inadequateand
did notprovide a basisupon which to commenceoperation of VariantC;
in pariicular no sfudy had been prepared on tlre cornpIeximpact of the
GabE ikow Projectongro~ndwater.~~
4D 1 V~vi-au3ek.Chairman of the FederaI Cornmittee fur the CzechosIovak
EnvironmentaMinistryquoledinBBC, Sumq ofWorIdBroadcasts,EElI145
BIS,IAugust 1991;HC-M, Annexes,vu13, anne91.
41 ~eecg.,SM, para7.72.
43
CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa, quoted in BBC, Summary of WorId
Broadcasts,EE10809CIII, 5Jüly 1940;HC-M,Annexcs,vu1mnex 85.
44 SM, para2.20.
45 Hydro-Qutbec Report(1990)p 88;HM, Annexes, vo5 (part11,mnex 9. See
furthebeIvwpara 1.20-1.41.
46 Co~nrnuniquofthe SIowkMinistry of Environment 10the 4 Decembe~1992
Sessionofthe SIovak Govemmem, 4 December 1992 HC-M, Annexes, vol 3,
annex57. 12
dispute,demonstrating- contrarytothe clairnsoflthe SIovakMernorial -
that Hungary was prepared tu riegotiatea satisfactoryoutcorne of tfre
dispute, and that its concerns about the edironme~ital and &sr
consequerices of the Original Project were gebuine and çubshntial.
Chapter3 discussesVariantC itseIf,outIiningitsadverse impactsand the
continuing risks impased by its uperatio~i,It also cziIIirrto question
continuad SIovak claims that VariantC is in any sense intended as
temporarystructure.
26. Part IIdealswith the legalissues thatso karseparatethe parties,
responding to Part Ii oftfis SIovak ~ernoriai. CIrapter 4 gives 811
overview of the parties' IegaI positions,su far as they have beeri
disclosecland are iridi~agreernent.~CIiapter5 dkaIswitlicertain issues
relating to the suspensionof worksand thesubseijuenrterminationof tlre
1977 Treaîy,and with the IegaIeffecfs of termination. Chapter 6 deals
witlrthe ilIegaIityof VariantC, anof its operatibn.Chapter 7 deaIs ina
neceçsarilyprelirninaryway with the remedial issbes.
27. Inadditio1i,VoIume2offliis~o~inter-~~morialisaninhgrafed
presentation of the scientific issues raisedb.e dispute, prepar+edby
intemationa1 and Hungarian scientists. To it are annexed relevant
scientificpapersandthe resultsof work in progreksassessirigthe impacts
i
of VariantConthe region.PART 1:THE FACTS CHAPTER1
THEAIMSOFTHE ORIGINALPROJECT AND THE
PROBLEMSOF THEREGION
1.01. The SIovak Mernorial presents the Original Prqject as the
çoIrrtionto a serieç of "probIenis requiring rernediaa ction" in the
SIovaklHungariansection of the Danube(at the tirne itwas, of course,
the CzechosIoilaklHu~igariasrerctio).Moreover,accurding tothe SIovak
MernoriaI, theProject satisfiedthelied for "optirna1utilisation" of this
çection, even by today's standards of econornic arrd environmental
rrrtionaIi9aç disti~rctfrom tliose of the COMECONera under which if
was conceivedand jristified. TiçnotonIythat tlie Projectwas an agreed
solution- according to Slovakia it was and remains the best ~~Iutio~i
frorn every point of view.' Tiie SIovak Mernorialtlius puts in issunot
onIy tlie fact that the Origi~raIProjectwas provided for irr the 1977
Treaiybut the rneritsoffhe proposa1as ~uch.~
1.02. There are, Irodoubt, difficuities for tlreConin prorrouncingon
the merits of any large-scia ndkustriai project. On the other Iiaridmany
factual,scienfificand technicaIissues reIatingto the Project as weastu
VariarrtC are in dispute between the parties, and thus faII wit1ii1ithe
fr-arneworkof the factsof thecase. This ChapteraccordingIyrsponds, as
br-ieflyasmay be,to the substantia1treatrnentof these issues inChapters
1and IIof the SIovakMernoriaI.
1.03. In pariicuIarthiç Chapter deals with the foIIowing~riatterFirst,
it providesa brief critique of the urrderlyingphilosophyand appruach of
the SIovakMemoriaI so far as it relateto the OrigiriaI Project (below,
Secfion A, paragraphs 1.04-1.12).SecondIy,it contrasts the aims of the
OriginaIProject asauthoritatively described i~tlie 1977Treaty with the
reinterpretationoffered in the SIovak Mernorial (below, Section B,
paragraphs 1.13-1.19).TIrirdIy,it slrowthat therewas rioenvirorr~ne~~t
impactassessrnentprocedurecarriedoutinconfomity with international
standards, whether before or afler tlte coricIrrsionothe 1977 Treaty
(beIow, Section C, paragraphs 1.20- 1.35).Fourihly, it sumrnarises the
key Fmdingsof the Scientifc E~aluation,which is contained in voIrrme2
of this CoirnterMemoriaI, md wliicli is support&byexfernive annexes
I Seecg.,SM,chap 1s& 2passim.
Whilecornplaini~of tire "cxtra~rdiaroya,nt andunacceptabIHungarian
concemfor theenvironnrmia1impactsoftht Projectonboth sidesof t(SM,ver
para 8.1I4),Iovakisuggest hat the Projeetconfers"a sr1bstantia1benefi1" on
Hnngary(SM,para9.19).(below, Section D, paragraplrs 136-1.168).It then proceeds to consider
those specific issuesgivenprominenceinthe SIoirak Mernorial as virtues
of the Original Project, nanrely Rood cent- (1elow, Secfion E,
paragraphs 1.159-1 -1741, rravigaion(below, Section F, paragraphs
1.175-1.I86), the production of eIectricaI energy (below, Section G,
paragraphs 1.187-1.2003.FinaIIy it comparesthe OriginaI Project with
other internationa1hydropowerprojects,refuting;the Slovakdaim that it
isjust anofIrerdam(below,Section H, paragraplis1.201-1.Z10).
1.04. Hungary hassoright to approach the managementand use of the
natural resorrrcesof tlieDanubeina mannerconsistentwith the objective
of sustainabIe development, in particrrIar by :treating environmental
protectiorr as an integral part of the developmerit process. SIovakia
mischaracterises the corrapt of sustainabIe deGdopment, ig~roringthe
integity of environment and .deveIoprnent, the interdepende~iceof
natura1 resources and processes, and tlre reIevance of environmenta1
ham and risk toeconomic viabiIity. Itsagproaih is rerniniscentof tIiat
adopted to science and technulogy in the 1960s. At tfiat time IittIe
artentionwaspaidto consyuences of technicaldeve~o~merrtw , hich was
viewedas inItere~rtIybenefrcial.AIthoughthis approacIiexisted to some
extent in al1 indrrstriarisedcourrtries,under thelCMEA CIrarter it was
treatedas axiornatictiiat the function of the stawaç "to pro~riot..tlre
raiçirrgof the Ievelof industriaIizationof the cbuntrieçT,n aim given
priwiiy over a11 other goals? On the other hand the Stockholm
Declaratiorr of 1972 recognisedthe "growing 'evidenceof man-made
harm in many regions" and lhat a "point has 6een reached in history
wlien we must shape ouractions throughout !Ire wosId witlr a more
prudent care for tIieir environmental ~onseqwnces".~ Cliangeç irr
thi~ikingwere reflected in the I-IeIsinkiFiriaI A'ct,whicafimed that
"economic deveIoprnen tand technoIogica1progress must be compatible
with the protectionof the eriviru~rment".~
Chmer of1heCriuncilfor MuruEconomic~ssisb-ik, Sofi14Decernber 1959,
368UNTS237, Art1.
!
SfockhoIm DecIaration of the Unitcd Nations &onference on the Human
Environment, 15 June 1972PreanrbleUN Duc ~ICONF.481I4,reprinled in
(1972 )IILM 1416.
Conference on Sc~urityand Co-operation in~iro~e, HeIsinFiiFinaAct,
1Arrgust1975P,reamble fSectio5,"Environment':,reprin~(1975) 14ILM
1292atp 1307.1.05. TIrischangeinthinkirighascorne to berefiectedintheconceptof
sustainabledeveIaprnentE . conornicdevelopnientre~nains a fundamental
goaIarrda basicright of eveq state. As recognised inPri~rcipl3 e ofthe
Rio Deciaratiorr,Iiowever,fhafrighr"rnustbe fuIfilled so as to equitably
meet developmentaland environmental needs of present and future
generations" ,nd "environmentap lrotectionshallconstitutean integral
partof the development procesa sndcannotbe consideredin isolation
from it".6 The SIovak approach, by contrast, treats economic
development and environmental protectionas falling within separate
realmsof decision-making.
1.06. The Slovak Mernorial proclaims that the Original Project
constituted an "'environmentally sustainable devel~prnent".~
Nevertheless, its approach fo the Project was- arrd remains-
inconsistent with applicable internatiorla1 standardsof sustainable
deveIop~rre~it.
1.07. Fordevelopmenttu be sustainabIe it çhouldsalis@the foltowing
riter ria:^
1 environmentalprotection should constituteanintegralpart of the
developmentprocess;
(2) a prior environmentalimpact assessrnent(EIA) should be
undertakenfor proposedactivities that are likely to have a
significantadverseimpacton the environmentt;heconclusionsof
the EIAshouldbe taken into accountin decision-making a,nd
rhereshouid be systenraticobservation of majorprojects;g
(3) decisiun-makingshould t&e into accouritcorrservationneeds by
ensuring the sustainable use of resources so as tu profect
ecosystemsand ecoIogicaIprocesses which areslraredwith orher
States orwhich are essential for the hnctioning ofthe biosphere
andthepreseniation of bioIogica1diversis;Io
1992RioDeclaration, rinciple4, reprinn1992)31ILM 874 atp877.
SM, para2.18.SeealsoSM,paras2.14, 2.108, wheretheconceptof sustainability
isassociatwithstudiescarriedoutbefore1977.
Theconceptof sustainabiIisaddressein moredetailinScientijEvalualion,
HC-M, vol2,chap7.3.1.
Seebelow,paragraph s.21-1.2whereitis demonstratthatthis requiremenits
weII-recognS iseedsoScimi$c EvaIuutionHC-M. vol2,chap7.3.2.
I5 See Ihe Convenrion BioIogicaIDiversib,Rio de JsneSJunc 1492;inforce
29 Dcce~nbcr1993,reprinted in (19931 ILM 822, Art 2 ofwhich defines
"sustainabese"as"thuse of componentsof bioiogicaIdivcin way andat a a precautionaryapproaoh should be adoptéd; i.e.wherethere are
(4)
' threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certain9 is not tobe used asa reaçon forp&sfponing cost-effective
rneasrrrestopreveritenvironmentaldegradation ."
1.08. The actions of CzechosIovakia and subsequentlyof Slovakia faiI
to meet rhesecriteria, as shown, inferdia, bythe;folIowing:
(1) The SIovak MemoriaI ignores tIie need to treat econornic
development and environrnenp toltection in an integrated
rnanner.i2 i
(2) No prior environmentailmpact assessrnent was performed either
for the Original Projector for Variait C, and none of the studies
claimed by Slovakiato have constituted,! as it were, an ex p0.i.t
facto EIAwasadequateforthat purpose.t3
Slovakiacontinues to cause harmto the active floodplain of the
(3)
Szigetk62, Iirniting water discharge into the main bed of the
Danubebelaw Crinovoto Iiftfemorethan GO rn3is.14
SIovakia ignores the precautionary prinCipIe; it has repcatedIy
4
taken steps in the face of scierrfific un6ert;iintyand where the
conseqtrences couId be irreversibIe.lVhe main Iine of SIovak
i
i
ratethat does not lead to the long-termdecline of)biological diversity, thereby
maintainingits potentialto meetthe needs of anI aspirationsof presentand future
generntions".
I HM, paras6.56-6.69. i
12 See below paragraphs1.20-1.40. Sec al50 FIydro~Qutbec International; HM,
Annexes, vol 5, part 1, annex9, p 290, (hereafierbfertodas Hydro-Québec
Report):"Mis Bpm les sripcrficide foret débois~ret le caIcuIkconomiquedu
bois d rdrupCrerl,'importandu deboisementen mt que perregIabaIede foret
aIIuvialn'a paset& &valute". ntransialio:Apm 'from thearea afforesr!Obe
rIeared md the calcrilarcost to remver ttie wiod,the importanceof the
deforestatioinasmnchas thegIubaIIossof ~IIuvforesthas no!beenevaluated".
#
13 See discussiobeIoiv,parzigraphs.23-1.40.Sedso 'Scienr$cEvnhrniionHC-M,
rai 2, chap7.5. I
SM ScieniifirEvaluarion,HC-Mvol2, Tabk 2.6nnd;Phfe9.
The implementationof Variant C came suddenlyand without specifiwarning.
More than two years later thSlova Mkernorialstates with respect to flora and
fauna,that "[iisnotyet possiblto quantifythe irnbactof the implementationof
Variant C... due to the long responseofmnatural/ecosystems".SM, para 5.57.
Withrespectto agriculture,it states,that"[tlheimpactof Variant'C' on Hungarian
agriculturalproductionhanot yet been assesseà".SM, par5.60.See SM, para 19
reasuningstresses that a11i~rrgactsof the Prqject cari be predicted
witlr adequate certainfy to be rnanaged.16 A branch Iine asserts
that even if the i~npactsare not predictable now, they can, be
~rrarrageirrespectiveof their ~riag~iituder their irreversibility.i7
Butthe studiesthat nriglrsl~ow whetherthis confiderrceisor iç not
weII-fouridedIiaveeither not beeridone, or were started Iate and
have notyet producecisubstantialresults.Ig
1.09. As fuIIydescribed in the Scimific Evaluafionappendedro this
Counter-Mernorial, natr~ral ecosyskms are characteriçed by
cornplexi~.~~TIiernaintenanceof bioIogicaIdiversiv içan outstanding
vaIue, develripd over 1ni1Iionsof years. It is a value tlre SIovak
Mernoria1fails to mentiorr, let alone take into accuunt. The Hydro-
Québecand BechteI Reports, whicli are Iieavily reIied rrponfor other
purpwcs in the SIovakMemurial,statetl~attlie effects ofthe Pi-ojecton
rnaIry environmenta1 coIrcerns cannot be determined because of
insufficient data.20 Even wlrerr knowledge exiçted, environmerrta1
corrcerns were "çtudied airnost excInsivcIy in the context of their
econornicexploitatiun".2 I
1.1O. The SIovak Mernoria!, while acknowIedgirrgthat the Project
wuuld Iiave irreversible irnpa~ts:~ assumes that tlrese couId be
eIiminateciby appropriatetechnical interve~ition,and in parZicuIarby
"~rrorritoring".~~n additioii, wlriIeccincedingtlrat VariantC's inrpact iri
çomeareascannot yet be deternri~ied?~it ignoresthe c1~uciai1mportance
of rime iriassessing effects. Transformationin naturaI and semi-naturaI
ecogstems is a Iorrg-termprocesç.OnIy rliemost drastic envirarimenta1
i~iteirentionsresuIt i~rinrrnediateeffects. Otherçrrsuailyrequire several
generations. Far most higher pIarirs,for example, the generation tirne
1.72 rthere wiII bc environmentaeffects, somadverse"); seeaIso bclow,
paragmphs1.23-I.41demonstrati~igtnotEIA wasever dune.
l6 SM,para s.72,2.06,2.5 lI%,,5.57,5.60,5.61.
I7 SM,para5.57.CfaIsoSM,para~2.28,2.118.
'
SecbeIuw,paragraphs130- 136.
l9 SeeScie~~liEmhaii~li, HC-M,vol2, chap4.2.
SeebeIow,paragraphs.f0-1.36.
''
Hydro-QuebecReport,p298 (transIatdromFrench);HM, Annexes,vol5,part1,
mnex9.
22 SM, para1.72.
23 SeeSM,paras2.67,5.25,5.26,5.62,8.112.
24 SM,paras5.57,2.118,2.28.extends to seveeraIears;for treeçit extendsro decades.But if in tirnea
"keystorie" species disappaars,it can Icad tu coIIapseof a whole
comrnnni~of sgecieç.
1.I1. In inth, as the ScienfrficEvnlxutim annexed to this Counter-
Mernorialshows, tfiereareserious threatstodrinkingwater reso~rces$~
iricluding bot11bank-frltered W~IIS~ and in the Ionger term to the
aq~ifer.2~There is an inevitabIe Ioss of dora and fauna due to the
deçtmctioriof certain habitats,changed waterIeveIand flow conditio~is,
etc?x These and otlrer impacts are oritlined in this Chaptermd are
docurnented inmore detailintheScieni@ Evaiuation andin itsAnnexes.
SECTION l&AIMS OF THEPROJECT
1.12. TheSlavakMernoriai1 dentifiestheobjectivesoftireOriginaIProject
irrwayswhich aresignificantlydifferenfrom thke specifredin the 1977
Treaty itseIf? It assertsas basicobjectiveselementçwhich were eitlrer
inciderriatothemainpurposeorwereIarged Iisregard4 attfitirne.
1.3. The Treatyenvisagedaneconomicobjective("mutual interest in
the bruad utilizationof the riaturalresuurcesof1the Bratislava-Budapest
section of the Danube river...") and a strategic or paIitica1abjective
(strengtherrirrg"fraterna1reiations" and sigrificantly contributo~"tire
sociaIistinkgration of theStatesmerribers"of th'eCMEA)?OThe SIovak
Memurial faiIs aItogether to mention the second of tlreçe,
notwithstandingthe role itpIayedin fIieactuaIhistory of thePrcjec1.3~
Irrsteaditprescritthe foIlowingas "basicairns"of the 1977Treaty:
- Protectionof tlreen~ircinment3~
- Irnprovemenfoffre environ~nent~~ 1
- Revita1isaion ofthe side-armsy~tern~~
SeeScieniifc EvaiunfHC-M,vol 2,chap3.6.5.
SeeScic~rfrEcv~l~iafH,C-M, vu2,chap3.6.5.
SeefrienfifEvalxorion,HC-Mvol2, chap3.4.2.
SeeScierri@EvaIua~iu, GM, voI2, cha4.4.
HM, Annexes,vu13,annex21.
SeeHM, paras4.04-4.08,10.10.74.
As documenIedin HM,paras3.02-3.37.
SM, para6.132.
SM, pma6.132. - Preventingerosionof the riverb@
- Irnprovementof surface~ater~~
- Irnprovementof groundwaterj7
1.14. TIrereason for tIiis re-interpretationIater becumesclear: without
broadeningthe "basic airns"of tfie 1977Treafy it is impossible tojustify
VariantC by referenceta tfiat Treaty, and the"approximate appIicarion"
argurnerrt- SIovakia'spri~naryIegaIargument for VariantC - coIIapses
in limine.39
1.15. By connaçt, other benefits referred to in the Treaty (including
benefits ta agriculture and to "otfresectorsof the nationaI e~rromy"-
e-g., f0resh-y arid fisheries) are discrissed onIy briefly, presurnably
because SIovakirtrecognixs that those activities wouId Iiave suffered
from tlieTrea~.~~
1.16. Of the econumic objectives Iisted in the first paragraphof the
Prearnble, the SIovak Mernoria1 addresses tlrree in detail: energy,
navigationand floodcontroI.
1.17. At the time, production of energy was considered of dominant
importance, but if was tlre rnost vu1nerabIeto changes intechrioIogy -
nof to speak 8f tlie region's unforeseenexposure to the worId energy
market i~rthe Iate1980s.
As to the subardinate Treaty aims of navigafion and flood
1.18.
contro1,itwiIIbeshown that theçeproblemscuuld be addressedby0th
means; indeed, in certain cases the Project aciuaIIy impeded their
s~lution.~ Moreover,eriergyproduction and navigation were as nrrrch
relatedto tliesecon objectiveof tlreTreaty- the furtheranceof çociaIist
SM, para6.132.
SM, para5.26.
SM, para 6.132.
SM, para6.112.
SM, pW8 5.26.
Asshown in paragraph6.82-6.10beIow,thatargnnrentianyway unrenabIeaa
matteofIaiv.
SeebeIow,paragraph1s.122-1.155.
SeebeIorv,paragrap1.171-1.189.inkgration and fraternal relations- wIric11is igwred irrthe SIovak
Mernorial. Indeed, the Joint Corrtracfuar PIan's Srinrrnary
Documentation,iriitseconomicanaIysisstates:
"The exploitation of tire Danube as a shared Hurrgarian-
CzechosIovakeriergyresourceand tlreirnprovemeritof navigatiorr
conditiorrson this irnporta~if uropeantrafic route - besid~sother
important achievements- fornrs part of the nrutuaI close co-
operation of the COMECONcountries in the areaof optimal
utilisationof naturd - dominantlyenerg - resour~es."~~
1.19. The second objective is a key tu understariding the Originai
Project's origirialrationale. The froject had been pIanned as part of arr
overaII design for the industria1arrd ecunomic development of Eastern
Europe irt the context of COMECON relati~ns?~ COMECON had
approved atid recornmended a cornprehensive plan for tlie Danube
Section fromBratislava to the BIack Sea includingthe Origi~raI Projectin
1961 ,44 Iiad adopted conrpuIsory recommendations 011 the Original
Pr~ject?~ alid had adopted the Cornplex Progprnme for the FurtIrer
Deepeningarid Irnprovementof Co-operation and the DeveIoprnsntof
Social and Econonric Integrdion of tlie COMECON which mandated
"tlie construction arid operation of joint ventures for rireproductio~rof
eIectric energy"?~Iie ecorromicviabiIiQ of the Original Project was
prernised upon sig~ifiicant Soviet financial support, botIrbecarrseit was
intended ta reduce the demand for SovietoiI supplieclto Easterri Europe
rr~iderthe barteringsystemof COMECON,and becauseof Soviet i~rferest
in i~rrp~+ovn eavigation ji111971 the Soviet Urrion'sshare of Danubian
42 Sumrnary docr~rnentationof the Joint ~ontraclrrai PIan of the GabCIkouo-
Nngymaros Barrage Systcnr,0-6EconomicPart,Budapest,1978(In Hrrngarimand
SIovak)S, ection3. I
43 For the historyoCOMECON invoIvementin Ihe pIansfor the GNBS;see HM,
paras3.0 1-3.40The impor~anceof COMECONinv~Iveirrcnt isrecordedi~rtlie
SummaryDocrimentatia~ rIIIheJoint Contractna1PI-, 1978, SM,anncx 3, p36,
wherethe 1971"ComprehensivePrograrrr"of COMECOH wasdescribedasa "new
incentivèIO the P~ojecl.
44 HM, para3.2 1.
45 Sec discussion in HM, para 3-21. Thc CMEA Charter provided that
"reco~rrmendationsadoptd by member countries of rhe CounciI shaII be
implemmtcd by them thr~ugh decisions of the Governrnents or co~npetenl
auttroritiesof those countries,i~rconformity with ttreir Iauls". Although "the
membercoii~rtriesoncerne$'tech~ricalhadto"consent...beingenIitI10staIeils
interestin any qr~estion",in practicc,cuuntriesnormalIyfelto10"conseirt".
See Charter of fhe CounciIfor MulualEconornicAssisiance,Sofia, 14Deceniber
1959,36 U8NTS 237, Art4. - ,
45 ScediscussionbeIow,paragraphs1.194-1.139. 1 trafic was 29.4%). The Soviet U~rionhad a çtrorrgi~rterest indiipping
rniIitaryequiprnentaIong the Danube. The Project's tirnetable depended
upon the economic assistaiice of the Soviet Union, but tlre pronrised
assistaricewasneverp~ovided.4~
SECTIONC: THELACK OF AN INTEGRATED
ENVIRONMENTALIMPACTASSESSMENT
1-20. Environmental impact assessrnent (EIA) is a project evaluation
technique designed to assist in tire i~rtegration of economic and
e1ivironmenta1objectives. An EIA invulves acquiring, aaaIysing and
reporting on tfisocial, ecorromic and environrnenta1effects of econornic
deveIopment plans, programmes and pr~jects.~~It aIso encompasses
sribsequent monitoring and evaluation 10 ensure rhat environmental
concerns are addressed and that adverse srrvironrnerrtal cffects are
prevented to the extent possible.49
1.21. The use of EIA waç endorsed at the internationri1 IeveI by
Hungary and Czechoslovakia as earIy as 1975 fLe., before the 1977
Treaîy) in the prearnblcof the Helsinki Firra1 Act of the Conference on
- Securiv and Co-operation irrEurope.50 Hungary and CzechosIovakia
aIsosupporteclthe requirementof the 1982WorIdCharter forNature that
activities whic1rare IikeIyto pose a significant risk to nature "shaII be
preceded by an exhaustive examination" and tIreir proponentç "sIraII
demonstrate that expectd benefits outweigh potential damage to nature,
a~rd wfiei-epotenria1 adverse effects are not frrIIy understood, the
activities shouId not pr~ceed".~' More recentIy, bath signed the 1991
47 Sec 1976Agreementonthe Drafling of the loint Contractua1 PIa3(5);M,
hnexes, wI 3, annex18.Sce alsoHM, paras3.32-3.40detailingthe histof
pronriseSdoviet msisfanceHM. paras4.07-4.08, describi~rg acIuaI Soviet
assistance.
48 Espoo,25 Febmary 1991,reprintedin(1991)30 ILM 802. TheConventionhas
been signebyHungaryandC~chosIovakia in 1491.
49 For morede~iis on the EIAprocessecScienrgc EvuIi~a~iHi,C-M,vo!2, drap
7and Hens,HGM, Annexes,vol 4(par21,anmx 23.
50 HeIsi~rk1,August 1975,reyrinted in (1975) 14 ILM 1292'The participaring
Stat... [algree 1orhe foIIrrruingaims of co-operation, in ..kgaluand:.
adnrinistrntivemesures forthe proieof theenvironment incIudingprocedures
foestablishingenvironme~rtali.mpactassessments".Espoo Convention,sz and bath Iiad by 1992 enacted ~iatianal EIA
legisIati~n.~~
1.22. EIAs Iiave becorne accepted require~rre~itsduring tlie Iast 15
years; in addition their content has evoIved signifrcantIy. Before1970
project studies principaIIy addressed the economic and technologica1
feasibiliiy of projects, with onIy Iimited attention giveri to efficiency
criteria and safety concerns, and IittIe or ~ioipossibility for public
participation. Around 1970, the technique shified to a cost-benefit
anaIysis with multiple aimç, but stirlignored environnrerrtaiand sociaI
corisequerrcesof a project. By about 1975, the EIA was i~ltroduced,
focusing ori description and prediction of e~ivironmentaIchanges and
modifications irrIand use, and searchingfor rnitigatingmeasures.Public
participation in tlre decision-making was first introduced durirrg this
period. In the period1975-1980 muIti-dimensionalEIAwas encouraged,
with more attention paid to risk assessrnent and ariaIysisof dangerouç
instaIIationsBy the 1980s, EIAbecornescIasely Iinkedwitlrhigher IeveI
poIicy pIanning and more attention was paid to heaIth aspects. By the
199#s,when Hungary ternrirratedthe 1977Treaty, EIA was accepted as
an essential tool forthe integratioriofenvironmentanddeveIopment.S4
1.23. No properEL4 was ever performed for the Original Projcct,
eithcr before or after 1977. SIovakia assertç that the large nurnber of
studies prepared priorto 1973, as weIl as those preparedbetween1973
and 1990,dernonstratethat a11possibIeenvironmentaland otherconcerns
were addressed arrdresoIved in a suitable nianrrer.55 So far astaxi be
ascertaineclfromthe documentsavailableto Hungary,thisisnot thecase.
1.24. Theundocunienteciassertionthat "rnanyhundreds ofstudies were
carriedout"56 prior ttentering theProject,and that a nurnber ofschernes
and variants were considered,s7 duesnd amounr. carryingout a proper
EIA.What iscritical is not the numbw of studies, but the scopeof the
issues addresxed,the quaIity of each study, and the extentto which the
j2 Espoo,25Fcbruary I99I, repriin{1991)30ILM 802.
33 CzechoslovaFedera lnvionmenta1ActNo If-1992.Thisisnow in forcein both
successurStaIesof formerCzechosbvakia.
54
Rio deJaneirConference,genda21,chap 18.
55 SM,paras1.17,2.04,2.I4,2.18,2.II8.
SM,paras2.10-2.11.
j7 SM, para2.02. differesr tirdieshave been integrat sudas fo pmvide a coherent
overview oftheenvironmentap l roblemspo~ed.~~
1.25. AccordingtotheSlovakMeniorial,"[e]nvironmentailmpactshad
beencarefullyandextensivelystudied byboth partiesto the 1977Treaty
bothbefore andafterthe conclusionof the Treatym.s9 "[A] çtaggering
1 364research projecfswere takeninto accaunt in tireformulationoftlie
designof theGM Systernup to 1974".~~Inparticular, the srudieswhch
togerher fomed the BIOPROJECT "showed that the Projecf was
sustainableinenvironmental tems"-6'
1.26. These studies were riot annexed to the .SlovakMemuriaI, and
Slovakia has so far refused to provide them to Hungarydespite its
reque~ts.~I ~nreference totheBIOPROJECT andotherscientific studies
preparedbefore andafter 1977,63Slovakia has statedthatthestudies. .. .
"areadduced in support of thecontentionthat the G/N Project
was indeedverycarefuIIyresearched.This contentiondoes not
relate to the individua1findings of specific reports, butta rhe
factoftheirexistence.TheactuaIcontents off le reportsarenot
relevanttotheconfenti~n.'"~
Thissuggeststhatsomehowthenumberof studieçis suffificiertio t satiçiy
national and international EIA requirements irrespective of their
contents,scope,qualityorconclusions.
3s SeeScient* Kvuilitoiion.HC-vol2, cha7.5.
59
SM, para2.118seealsoSM,paras2.02,2.28.
60 SM,para2.10.
62 Hungaryfirst requestedthis documentationon 27 June 1994. See Note Verbale
from theRepublicofHungary tothe SlovakRepublicHC-M, Annexes, vol 3,
annex14.On 3 A~igus1994Slovakiarepliedthitwm inappropriatferequests
for documentto be nradeexceptrhraugh the Rzgisiof theCoun. Hungq
rtqustedthedocu~nentson 5 September1494.See Lenm from Dr G Çzenhi,
AgentoftheRepubIicofHungarytoMr E Valencia-Ospina,gisfra,nternational
Court of Justi6eSepteinbe1994;HC-M, Annexes,vol 3, annex24See also
LcnerfromDr GSzenhi, Agen1of the RepubIicof Hung10Dr P Tomka,Agent
oftheSLovakRepublic6September1994;HC-M, Annexes,vol3,mnex 21.
h3 SM, paras2.10-2.30.
64 LettcrfroDrPTomka , gentoftheSlovakRepublictoDr G Szénhsi, genof
theRepublicof Hungary,3 August1994;HC-MAnnexes,vol3,annex11. 1.27. Studies which are amilable to Hutigary do not supportt he
concIusiom "that theProject wassustainabie inenvironmentalterrns",or
that "the GIN Project was indeed very carefully reçearched"fron~ this
point ofview$5
-
1.28. Ofthe 360studiesprepared prior to 1973'andlisted in the Slovak
Mern0rial,~616 appear to haveaddressed the critical issues of water
- quality, biology and protection of nature; only three of those 16
addressedissuesof the natural habitatand nature itself.Of the 118listed
studies conducted between 1973 and 1990,67 only 11 focus an forest
ecosysterns, groundwater,locationalternatives: protection masures and
waterqtiality.
1.29. Canying out adequatestridieswouIdhaveben madedifficrrltby
the Iackof accurate data on the extent of bio-diversis in tIieregion.
There were no reliable,comprehensive lists of species or of plant
populations.Eventhose speciesor plants which enjoyedprotected status
were listed inconsistentlyHungary' "environmentalimpactstatement"
of 1985,68placed Iittleorno value on any of theregion's naturalassets.
This statement reflected nothing more than an a priora ittitudeof its
makers.
1.30. The BechteI Report and the Hydro-QuébecStudy, which are
heavily relied upon by SIovakia and are described as "important
doc~rnenfs",6~reinforcethe canclrrsion fhafstiIdiesand data pertaining
to bioIogicaI resaurceswereeithernon-existent or inadequate. Even in
1989 and 1990, when the documents were produced and after
constructionwas suspendedat Nagymarosand Dunakiliti,impacts of the
OriginalProject were unknownbecauseof insufficientdata and studies.
1.31. Thusthe BechtelReport statesthat:
65 See cg., the Standpointof Ecological Section,CzechoslovtkBiological Society,
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, to thwater dams system GabEikovo-
Nagymaros,14November 1988;HC-M,Annexesv,ol3,annex43.
66 SM,annex23. ,
67 SM,annex 24(presumablincludingthe BIOPROJECTstudies).
68 SeeSiimniayyolhisinHM, Annexesvol5(partI),annex4.This Hrrngaristudy
isconsiderdunsalisfactobecûuseof ornissi~nsand inadequacis:eL Hens,
ScienrifiEvnluatiofHC-M, Annexes, voI 4 (par21,annrx23; and Scienf$c
Ev~IrtafiHC-M, voI2,chap 7.5.1.
SM,para2.28.HUNGARY 1 "Ellesmontrentque ces faiII eesuventjouer vraisemb1abIernent
ànotre époque.Pour la moment iI n'a pas étéétablide relation
entreces donnéees t celiesde neotectonique."
"IIestprévu,en particuIier,de faire unsuivi des piémmktressur
une période d'un avant Ia mise eri eau. Aucun rapport
permettantdejuger des mesureseffectuks sur ces pi6zomètreç
misen pIaceen 1989n'avait encoreété produit."78 -
"Maiheureusernerrt,I'effet sur la suIubiIitédes métauxlourds
n'a pasét6examiné." 79
1.33. In addition to the BechteI and Hydro-Quebec Reports, tfie
INFORT study, the WorId WiIdlifeFund, and the BiologicalSocietyof
the Czechoçlovak Acaderny of Sciences al1 confirm Hungary's
concIusion that in 1989and 1990, when construction was suspended at
Nagymarosand subsequentlyat Duriakiliti,studies arrd data pertaining to
biological resourccs were stiIIeither nori-existentor inadsquale,or Irad
been ignored.Thus the INFORTstudy (1989)stated tfiat--
"tireprocess did rrot foilow the mle which we recommend
above- that impacts and alternativesbe expkred tfioroughIy
beforeaction istaken."8D
1
1-34. The WorIdWiIdIifeFund(1989s) tated:
"Ihe ne~workandsrudyprogrammebefarethe inr~ndiitianofthe reservoir
was not designed in tems of good documentation of the qua1itatii.e
regimc andthe piezometricsurfaceoIhewaler-UbIeb-ide theDanubc
andunderthe futureHruSovrescrvoir".
Hydro-QriébecRepori;HM, Annexes,voI 5 (pz1Il,anntx9, p252. In ttansIation
thisreads:
"[datafrom theGabCIkovruegion]showthatitis IikeIyforthese f8uItsto
movein ourlime. For the moment,Ihc reIationbet~veendataalrdrhe
ncotec~ondatahas no1ken esiabIished".
Hydr+Qu&becRepor~;HM, Annexes ,oI5 (pari 1),annei;9, p 263. IntransIation
this reads:
"[il1is predicted, in particular, tapiezometricstudyforaperiod
of oneyear before inundation. No reportyetbeen producedIojudge
the effeciiveneof thesepiemmefers put intopIin1989".
Hydro-QirébecReport;MM,Annexes,-5 vu(artI),annex9, p238. Intranslation
thisreads:
"[ujnfurtunateIyihe conseqüenceof heavymetal soiubiIiiy has not been
examined."
HM, Annexes.vol5@art Il,anne xi, p59. 29
.
"AI1 that we have corne tu know about tlre projeci rnakes us
bdieve tfratborh the Hurigarian and the Czechoslovakian
governmerrtapproved offhisconceptonthe basiçof insufficienf
and,for theproblemin question, inadequateinf~rmation."~~
1.35. The CzechoslovakAcademyof Sciences, Biological Society,
(1989) stated:
I "Governmentsof the interested states should reevaluate
basicallythewholeprojectand ..itsreali~ation.''~~
1.36. TheBechtel Report claims tohave"followedthe philosophythat
significantimpacts rnrrstbe ideritifrdprior to project constructiorand
operation, and qualifieci- or, wherepossibIe - quantified5'.g3That was
not the philosopfh ollowed by either of the partiesbefore or afterthe
197 7Treatyanduntil 1989.
1.37. The Hydro-Québec Sttrdy confirms that plans for the Original
Project were finalised before any "environmental studies" were
conducted,letaloneanEIA:
"En 1975, le groupeURBION ... etI'AcademieSlovaquedes
Sciences se voyaient confier le mandatd'analyserle projec:
GabEikovo-Nagymaro dupointde vueenvironnemental.
A cette époque, la conceptiontechnique étaitdéjà finalisée.Les
travaux de déboisement commencèrent en 1976, alors que
l'étuded'environnementvisait la description et l'analyse de la
siîuation de meme qiie I'eIaborationde propositions visant à
éhniner les irnpa~ts.''~~ 1
HC-M,Annexes,wI 4(pan I)anne x,p5.
82 Standpoint of EcoIagSectionCzechosiovakBioIogicaISocieryat Czechoslovak
Academy of Scienckto the WaterDamsSysfem GabtIkovo-Nagymwus (19891,
HC-M,Annexes,vol 3,annex43.
83 BechtelReport;HC-M,Annexes,vol4(partl), annex1,2-1.
84
Hydro-QuébeR c eport;HM, Annexes, vol5 (part1),annex 9, p 271-278. In
translatithireads:
"In1975,thegroupURBION (InstituofUrbanisationandDevelopmcnt
.oftheLandofBratislavaa)ndtheSlovkAcademy ofSciencese,ntrusted
thenrselveto analyse the Gabtikovo-Nagyma proecl from an
enuironmenra1 of vietv.
AIthattimethe trchniral designaIreadbeenfinaIiscd.Deforestation
work bnd begun in 1976,when rhe environmental audy satu the
descriptiatidanaIysis othtsiruatioalthe sxnetime as proposais
werebeingworkcdout sceinrueIirninrtheimpacts." "La solution technique étant déjh choisie, ces études ne
portaient passur unecomparaisonde variantes,mais bien plut61
sur l'optimisation du projet retenu ... II convient to~defoisde
mentionner qrieces ékments[la qualitéet la propagationde la
nappe d'ml souterraine lia a l'agriculture, l'exploitation
forestiére,l'industrieet l'approvisionnement en eau potable]ont
étk étudiés presqu'excIusiverne~rt en rapport mec Ieur
exploitation économique.Quant à I'evaluariondes impacts du
project, eIIene respectepasuncadrernéthodoIogique précis.EII
effet, I'identific daetiocurnesd'impacts ainsi que les impact
eux-mêmesne se retrouvent pas de façon systématiqueet
explicite dans les différents rapportsde synthèseconsuItés.Les
impacts se retrouvent plutôt dans la definition de la zone
d'étudeet dans les mesuresproposées.Ces mésures proposées
relèvent plusd'un objectif de mise en valeur du milieu que de
l'atténuationou lacorrection des impactsappréhendés ..85
1.38. At the same tirne as it suspendedconstruction a? Nagymaros,
Htrngarymlled for a comprefie~rsiveerivironrnenralstrrdy of the entire
Project. CzechosIovakia refused YO cal1 a haIf on constructiorr a~rd
ultirriatelrefrrsedro agree to long-ter~ne~rvironrnenraolr other studies in
co-operation with Hungary. However, at the meeting between Prirne
Minister Németh and Prime Minister Adamec, the latter expressal
Irirnselfwilling taexamine riew environmental and seîsmic factors, and
the two Prime Ministers agreed to establish joint study groups to
consider ecological, seismological and other a~pects.~bIn accordance
with prudent management practices,and anxious to ensure that the
85 Hydro-Québec ReportHM,Annexes,vol 5 (parl),annex9,p 298.Also quoted in
HM,para 6.34. Intranslationthisreads:
"Thetechnical solution having alxady beenchosen, iherefore rhese
studiescouIdno!c~nsistofacornparisunofalternativbutmtheron rhe
oprimisation of the adopted project... Thus in generaI, the principaI
gcvemmental risks co~rsidercd!hese sludies, rreated espccially tire
graundwaierqnality and the propgatiofrhegroundwter table Iinked
tu agricu1turee.xploitationofforestry, indnd supplyof drinking
warer...Ir is howeveradvisabtomentionthat theseeIemetihad been
studiedaImostexcIusi~eIyin thcmtextof their economic apIuitation.
As torfieevaIuationofthirnpacrof the pmjecit duesnohave aweii-
ordcredfrarneworkln. effect,the identificatiosourcesof impacts,
as wellas the impactsthemselvcs,cannot be found systematicallyand
explicitlyithedifferentreportsconsulted. To somc exttheimpacts
appear in the definitioof the zone of study and in the proposed
measures. The measures proposed are concerned more with
cnvironmentaldevelopmentthan the alleviation or correction of the
impacts learnt..."
g6 HM, paras3.78, 3.79.Project contributed to the çuçtai~iabIedeveIoprnent of tIre region,
Hungarydid not want to taketlre major and practicaIIyirrevcrsible step
of bIocki~rgthe Dariube tu fil1the reservoir (a step which had been
planned for 1989)wirhout aproperEN.
1.39. The SIovakGovernment itself irnplicitlyrecogniçed that no EIA
wasperformedand no EIS prepared. In its appIicationtu thEC PHARE
programmefor funds to engage i~ia fom of impact assessment çtudy on
the iitni Osmv regian, Siovakia stated that the GabEikovo sector
required a "fhorough,and cornpIexstudy of a proper irnpactassessment
rnodel, enabIing authorities to ensure the protection of 1iatura1and
anthropic resources, baIanced ecological deveIoprnent, as weII as
oytirnizeddecision nrakihgand managenre~it."~~ That shdy continues.
1.40. Subseqnently, tlre SIovak Ministry of the Environment Iras
wrifimed that no EIA has been perfornred, alrd that in par-ticulano
study Iradbeenpreparedontlreccimpleximpact oftheGabEikovo Project
on grorrndwater.88
1.41. It is usefto surnmariçethe position byadopting tlreconcIusions
of theScietrfifiEvaIuu~ion annexedto thisCounter-Mernorial,which are
as foIlows: 1
* AIthough EIA procedures and contents are continuously being
improved as a result of experierrcegained, tlrere Irave nor been
majorchanges or significantdeveIop~rie~itnthe stateof the artof
EIAduringthe 1980s; 1
* AIthoughEIAwasnotyet introdrrced in aIIcouritriesby theend of
the 1980s, it was generally avaiIabIc as an instrument for
environmenta1protection. At the end oftfie1980sit waç generally
acceptedthat largeinfrastructure prajects rnight cause substantial
environmentai effects and that EIA canbe used to detect and
mitigateadverse effects;
* No proper EIShasever beerrdone on theOriginaI Project.89
87
C~ch and SIovak RepubIic,FcdcraICornmirteefor the Environment, Rtoponse
Invitation of Propoof EC PHARE Programme,Surface Warer and Ground
WaterMode1of DanubianLowimd BetrveenBratisIavard Komhmo: EcoIogicaI
Mode1of WaterResourcesand ManagemenI,25 Uctober1990 (hereafi"CSFR
PHAREAppIication"),titIepage;II€-M,Anncxes,voannex48. SeealsobeIow,
paragmph2s.59-2.63.
gg
Seeabove,Introducrion,par1.
89 SeeScient* EvnlirafiHC-M, vu2,chap 7.5. SECTION D:THE ORIGINALPROJECE A SCIENTIFIC
CRITIQUE
(1)THE POSITIONSOFTHEPPJinES
1.42. It is Hungary'spositionthatthe BarrageSyçtemenvisaged by tfie
1977 Treaty would in al1IikeIihoodhave causedsubstantial damage to
the environment and in particuIar have imposed unacceptable riskç of
darnage to water resourcesand valuablenature interests. This Iikelihood
of damage,and these risks, existed for both parties in respect of the
GabCikovosector, but primarily for Kungary with respect to the
Nagyrnaros sector?O
I
1.43. By wntrast the SIovakMernoria1contends that there were no
risks thar couidnot bernanagedor rnitigated,or atthe very Ieasttfiathe
Project couIdhaveaIwaysbeenmodifiediftheneed arose.9'
(2) THE TASKOF THE COURT
I.44.The Court iscalledon tu resolvethe dispute betweeiithe parties,
notwitl~standirrgthat it involves scieritific arid teclrnical issues. Orr8re
other hand the assesçmentof cornplex risks in a large rrnimplemerited
project of this typeisextremerydifficrilt,with manyuncertaintieç. Riskç
and darnage can seldom be pruved with 100% certainty.
MetIrodoIogicaIIy,tlre onIyway to quanti& chariges in suc11a cornplex
set of interrelatcd processes is through simulation models based on
extensive EeId data, but tlrere are Iiniitatioris. The appIications of
integratd rnodels tu such cornplex systems is at the Ieading edge of
research, and it rnrrst be recognised rhat recliniques avaiIabIe for
u~iceriai~~inalysisof suchcornplex rnodelsare Iimited,and that Isvels
of unceriaintymaybeveryhigh?2
1.45. Morebver tireissuesraisedcorrcernnot just urie fieIdof expertise
but a wide range of technicaland çcientificfieIds, incIudingin pariicuIar
-a seismology, hydroIogy, Iiydrobiology, water chenrishy, sediment
. transport, river rnorpholugy,the soi1sciences, forestry, bioIogy,ecology,
fisheriesand environmenta1impactassesçment.
90 See HM, cIrap 5, for an initial preseofathe potentidamage and risks
associatewithrheOriginalProject.
9r Sc,SM, chap 2.
92 See Scieni* Evnf~rafioHGM, voI 2, chap 3.1.2, describingnncerfainty in
determininerecrs.1-46 Twocomments maybe madeaboutthe resu1tingsituation.CIearIy
no one can be absoIuteIy certain about the long-tem scieniific and
technical prognosis for a major project such as this, given the many
discipIinesinvolvedin makinganyprediction,the interactionsbetweenthe
variouseIernentsof thepiobhn, etc.93On the 0th handtheçeissuesare
in diçpritebe-n the parties;it isneceçsarto addresshem in order to
answerthe IegaI issuessetout inArticIe2 oftheSpecia1Agreement.
1.47. In these circumstanceçit is subrnirted that tfreCourt shciuIdask
itself:
(1) wheiher Hungary was reasonable in believirrgin 1989 that there
was a substantial Iikelihoudof major riskand damages fa)hm
the operation of the Nagymaros sector, especially in peakpower
niode; and (b) frorn closing the Danube at Ounakiliti (so as to
aIIowforthe filIingof the DunakiIiti-Hrubv reservoir).
(2) whether Hungary was reasorrablein beiieving in 1992that there
was a substantial Iikelihood of major risk snd darnagefrom
impIementationof tlreOriginalProject.
I.48. Tliese questions assume that the Hungariarr Governrnent did i~r
fact have these beIiefs at the reIevant time, sometlrirrg the Slovak
Mernorial denies. That issue is addressedirrChapter 2 of this Cuu~iter-
Mernorial.
1.49. In order ro assis?the Court in perfoming its iask, Hungary has
comrnissioneda goup ofscientistswiththe appropriaterangeof expertise
to producean overaIIassessrnentof the OriginalProject,andof Variant C,
from a scientific and interdiscip1inaiypoint of view. TIreirjoint repart,
erititled"ScientificEvaIuation of tlre Gabefkovo-NagymarosBarrage
Syste~n and VariantC" is attached as volume2 of this Counter-Memorial
(Irereafierreferred to as "Scienii$Evu/uufion"). Vdume 4 containç a
range of scientific md technical annexes referredto or reliaion in the
ScieniificEvaiuafion. These are supplementary to the scientific reports
annexed to the ~un~arianMernorial.Volunie 5 coritains rnaps, figures,
graphs and photos to be examiried in conjunctiun with the Scient&
E~uIuorioa.
Inthicontexttheabsdntecertainty,extendinaIIegatioos bad faitonthe
part oopponentsof the Original Project, whichdisplayein the SIovak
Me~norialis suspect.Given thc inherent scientific uncerîaintiesofr~cha IeveI
cenainrymustbeartificial. (3) A SUMMARYOFRISKSASSOCIATED WITI-ITHEORIGMALPROET
1SU. This Sectionof the Cuunter-Mernorialpresentsa summaryof the
risks associated with the Original Project, drawn frum the Scientific
E~aIutzfionand from the various annexes. The Couri is respectfully
referred tu those sources for more detailed discussion, analysis and
substantiationof the concIusions somnrarised intIisSection.
1.51. TIrissurnrnaryisaIsopresentedby way of Critiqueandcornrnentary
on the assertions madein the SIovakMenrorial,whichcorikrrdsthat the
"major impactoftheGINProjectun theenvironmentof the Danubebasin
had aIready beenfeItby 1989"P4This inrpactisdefinedas constitutirrgthe
Ioss of "managed poplar foresis" and "hectares of nahiral ~egetation"."~
The Slovak Mernorial states"these Iosses must be kept in perspective"
arguirigthat the serious probIemçof tlie region riecessitatedthese Iosses,
wi th, for example,farmore losses occurring from flooding, navigatiorr,
Iackof water in the side-am systerns,and river bed erosion?G Thus, the
purposeof th içsection istwo-foId:(1)todemonstratetliatthe rnajor impact
of the Project had not been feIt by 1989and tIratthe srrbsequentimpact
wuuldin riIIikelihoodhavebeensubstantiaIIygreater,and (2) to showthat
the prrrportedSlovak"lusses"are substantiallyoverstated and wuId be
"remedied"byothermethods.
1.52. One further preliminary comment must 'be made. The SIovak
Mernorial presents an image of fIexibIe project management, and
suggests that the OriginaIProject was un the verge of being modifred to
protect naturepreciçeIy at tlremorneritHmigarysuspended construction
at Nagymaros and Dunakiliti and upthrciughtlre Iast mpting of the
Pleriipotentiaries.g7
1.53. This is rnisleading.For exarnpIe, the SIovak Mernoria! asserts
that "the concIusionhad been reached" by 1989 toincreasethe discharge
from the reservoir into the Danube from 50 m31s to 350 rn31ç.38 This
seernsto have been an interna1"conclusion", since Hungarywas never
officiaIIypresented with such a proposal?9 The Slovak MernoriaIIistsa
94 SM, para2.109.
95 SM,para2.109.
96 SM, para2.1OP.
97 IISM, para2.70anumberof possibImodificatioarelisied.
SM, para2.59.
9s SpecificaIly,SM, p2.59,stalsfha"[B ISMay 1989,theccndusionhad been
reachedthat the DunakilweirshauId channel uto350 m31s into !he Danube
riverbed on a wntinua1bais, with the flow being ~emporarilyitur1,300
m31seachweek in orde10prevent ttredeposition of fine sediment in the riverbed".number of other rnodificationswhjchwere aIço foreseen in 1989- yet,
there is no indication of these modifications in the record available to
Hungary.looIn any event, the "foreseen" measures listed in the Slovak
Memorialwould nothave negatedthe impactto the area.lo1 It is also sig-
nificant that aftermore than 12years of technical alterations and treaty
modifications,majorpiece-mealmodificationswerestiil "foreseeri".
(4) THE CHARACTERISTI C STHEREGIONRECALLED
1.54. As explained in the Hungarian Memorial,l02 the affected region
consistsof an area extending from just below Bratislava to just above
Budapest. Specifically,it comprises two main sectors correspondingto
the locationsofthe twomainbarragesofthe OriginalProject: Dunakiliti-
GabCikovo and rlie surrourrdingarea, jn pariicularthe Szigetkoz, in the
upstrearnsector, andNagy~narosand ifssrirrou~ids,iricludingBudapestin
the downstrearnçector. Io3
" TG Dnnakiliti-Gab Cecorovontains the unique inland delta,
the Hungarian Szigetkoz and the Slovak iitni 0strov.I" This
inlanddelta is of international interestand has a patrimonial
value.I05Both are areasof exceptionallyhighdiversiy containing
flora and fauna uniquely adapted to their environment. The
Szigetkozconsiçts of approximately8,000 hectares of floodplain
This offwas nevermade ro Hüngq, then or sinAs.will bshown inchap 3,
SIovakiaturnedown IIretap from a temporaryreIeaseof m31salrheend of
1993,coincidingwitthterminationoftheCECnegotiations.
IO0 SM, para2.70. Itis not clearthat these modifications were ever presentaesd
proposalso theHungarianswithinthe framewokfthe JointOperationalGroup,
sinctheSlovakMemorialgivesnoreferences. umerous proposals were discussed
withinthe framework of the Joint Operational Group during the years it existed,
withourever being fonnaIisedor reacliingfnritio~r.
Io Forexample,awaterdischargeof 35rn'linsteaofrhenormal2,000might have
been bettIhan50 or 20butstiIIwouIdhavcauseddamage tothis vaIuabIe;irea.
SeeSrieni~$cEvaiuaiiochaps2,3,4 and5;see aIsu pmgraphs1.8139. Weirs
arealso harmful particulariyin the absenteof adequatedSeehparagraplrs
3.104-114.
O3 SeePlaie3 and 2.
'O4
Thesizeof~hisareacombinedivithiilny'0slrsurpassesirnilmarecslong the
Riiineand RhiineRivers.
'O5
See,cg.D,isteet niA NewSoIritionfor tDanube WWFStatemeriton thc EC
MissionRepo~sof Ihe"WorkingGroupof MuniIoring and ManagemenExpens"
-(Dec. 1993HM. Annexcs,vol5 (par21,anncx20. biotopes, confainin atg Ieasf80 diKerent plant comrnunities
(associations)comprisingthousandsof vascuiarpIants.The fauna
iseven richer comprisingthousandof taxa.lobAlso Iocated in the
!. areaisthe Iargestpotablegroundwaterreserve inCentralEurope.
* The Nagymaros sectorbank-filtered water provides 64% of the
water for Budapest, Hungary'scapital with over two million
inhabitants. This is also the richest area in Hungary frorn the
perspectiveof historyand archaeology. .
1.55. Thesetwosectors, however,can bebrokeninfo 3 distinct areas:
the Szigetksz region, the Danube VaIIey,and the Danube Bend. These
rhree areasneed to be dealr with separatelyin any analysis of damage
and risks.
(5) RIVER MORPHOLOGY ANDRIVER HYDRAULICS
1.56. Much ofthe SIovakMernorial'sjustification for the Origirial
Project resfson the foIIowingIineofreasoning:
"flood controland navigationmeaçures had Ied tu the Iowering
of the river water IeveIdownstream of Bratislava, Ieadir-tng
turnto a reduction in the level of the groundwater table and
therefore to a harmful impactboth on the riverine ecosystems
and to agricultural and forestryproductioin iitn~ Qstrovand
Szigetk0z."~~7
1.57. Tliis Iiof reasoning is basedunthree assurnptionç:
1) Measures to improveflood ccintroand navigarionhadto beîaken.
(2) Those rneasureçnecessarilyIeadto the reductioninthe level of the
groundwatertable.
Only the Treatycan solve problems of flood control, navigation,
(3)
and the reduction in the levelof the groundwater table, and in
çolvingthe latter, therebsuive theprobiernsof the environment
of the region.
1.58. Of thesethree assirmptions,thesecundis critical: it is the Iinkage
berwee~ithe works portmyed as essentiai for the region'ssurvival and
prosperiv- those relatingto navigation and flood control- and the
Io6 Sce HM,MészBro vol 1,appendi1.
Io7 SM, para157. environm2nta1problemsentaiIed by those works,which resuIt from the
drop in tlre groundwatertable. If this Iinkageis disproved, much of the
reasoriingcoIIapses.
1.59. This sub-section çeeks toshow (1 ) that the necessaryrneasures
for navigation and flood control were no1primariIyresponsibIe for the
reduction in the Ievelof thegruundwatertable in the 10-15 year period
prior to 1977; (2) that the OriginaI Project was and is not the only
soIution to problems of river beddegradation wlrich affect riavigatio~r
and Iislptoreduce groundwaterleveIs;and (3) that the OriginaI Project
wciuId have presented the region with further and substantial river
morphoIogica1pr~bIerns.~08
1.60. Section E wiII show that adequate floodprotection rnechariisms
were in pIace by 1977, indeperidentIyof the Project.Igg Section F wiII
demonstrate that tlie assumption that only the Project couId sdve the
*
probIemsof navigatiyn is nat true and that the relative importanceof the
navigationalirnprovementsofferedbythe Project wasIimitedaridis rrow
even InoreIirnitedIIo
faf TheargumentoftheSlovukMernoria{
1.61. The SIovak Mernorial argues that navigation works, prinrariIy
dredging, in mnjunction witli a decrease in sediment transport due to
upstrearn Austrian darns, resuIted in progressive degradation of bed
Ievels in the period before the 1977 Trea~.~I' III fact, however, the
decrease insedimentiramporf was not verysubstantial prior to the mid-
1960s,and nmiguiio~raldredgin igthe 1960s was not nearly as exten-
sive as the SIovak Mernoria1portrays. Had rheçebeen tlie onIy factors
affectirrgtlieriver'smorphology,no Iargedegradationinbcd Ievel,suchas
occrrrredinthe Iate 960sandhascontinuedsirrce, would haverakenpIace.
1.62. As tu sediment iramport, froman engineeringpointof view there
shouId be an equilibriurn betweeri tlre amount of sediment entering a
certain river sectionand Ieaving it at its downstream end, irr orderto
mainiain a cunsbnt bed arrd wakr Ievel.TheSIovakMernorial suggests
that reduced Ievels of sediment suppIy hm upstream Auçîrian dams
IOX Fora moreexrendedtreaImen1ofthese issonswhichthissecriondraws heavily,
seeScienlifirEvalüafion,vol2, çhap2.
III SM, paras1.35-1.49,1.57-150.playeda significant partin thedegradation of tliebanube iiver$ed I2lIfis
truetliatupstreambarrages,dueto tfieirretentionof the bedload, wiIIoften
Ieadtu degradationof bed Ievelsdownstream.However,this was not fie
case in th SlovaidHungarianreachcs of tlre Daiiube. The first Austrian
barrageQochenstein)was implementedin the year 1955, arrdthe çecond
one, Ybbs-Persenbeug, waç builti~i1958.Yet thediscllargeratingcurveof
the Bratislavagaugedoes not indicateany significantclrangeat IeastuntiI
tlre year 1967.I13 The ten-year period operatioilof Ybbç-Persenbeugdid
not significmtly affect river rnorphology in tfie SIovaIdHungarian
reaches.II4 Moreover, any sIight effect tlie upstream barrages may have
had,even whenc~upIedwith navigativna1dredging,coiildnot have caused
thesubstaritialsinkingof the rivw bed IeveIsIaterobserved.
6 As to navigationaldredgintg he SIovakMenlorial states that
"the maxirnumannuaI dredging quotas neceçsary to ensure the correct
navigation channel were 4 miIlion m3,wlrich was around 10tirncs more
than the anriuaIdeposition of sedirnent intlreregionW. lS This statement
is exaggerated. Datafor tlresection betweenRajkaandGonyufrorn 1963
to 1979 show tliat only an average of 0.4 milliorirn3of dredged deposit
was removecifor navigationa1purposes eery year,116 an arnourrt'stilI
Iessthan thearrivingbedloadfrornupstreamduringthat sarneperiod.
1.64. River regdation workç carr cerîainIy degrade bed Ievelç, as
Irappenedon tlie Rhi~~e."~ But theearIy river reguIafionon rhe Danube
did no1result incharme1 degradation; insteadof erosion, accumulationof
sedimentcontinued. Aggradation infhc BratisIava-Günyüregion wasstiI1
pr-evailing in the earIy 1960s, despite the fact that excavation for
navigational purposes had been occurring.I1"n fact, nreasured rates of
aggradation between rkm IBO0and rh 1841 amounted fo 2.4-.2.7
centimetresannualIy.IIgThis isconfimed by the ahost stabIe waterIeveI
rrntil the mid-1960s- indicating IittIeor no bed degradation was &king
Il2 SM,pm1.42.
I3 See SM, IIIustralion18,p3 1.
l4 Kern,Impactsof the Gabtikovo-NagparosProjecton RiverMorpIrulogy,FIuviaI
HydrauIicsand Habilais(hercafterrefetoas"Impacts")HC-M,Ari~rexe i1 4
{part1)annex 6,atp 12.
SM, para1.42,note 22.
IIG Kern;ScienfifirEv~Iua~iH,GM, vol2, cha2,~nbii2.1,
II SM, paras157, I.68
lI8 Kem, Impacîs,HGM, Annexes,voI4 {partI), ann6;
Il9 Sec Pjole2i; HC-M,Annexes,volS.SeeaIso Kem, Impacts,HC-M,Annexcs,vol
4 (part I), an6.x I
PhAS3E
RivBrarrage
.addiwinst&-,&44mtgi3
Çmlsmm athasd,of
the197QEi 4.
Theprtriec2darr-
fornahiregwe kVr-inle
hanagrmentbeniiperen
F- andGmq, ~.W
thebilateIre@ aS$969itsbedin the Szigetkozreachwithoutdredging-'even wiih the operation
of trpstrear narns.125 Althoiigh no certain mnclrision can be madefor
the SIovak reach of the Danube due to Iack of data concernirigdredged
voliimes,the suddendropof water IeveIsat BratisIava aftertheyear 1967
coincided with tlrebeginningof industrialdredging.
1.68. The Danube's riverbed degradation and the resulting poor
navigation conditions were not "tolerated by the Czechoslovakand
Hungarianauthorities onlyin the expectationof the irnplementationof the
G/N Pr~ject",'~Qut may even havebeen caused bythatexpe~tation.~~~ It
isironictlrattfisSIovakMernorial shouId stat teat 'bne oftheobjectives
of the GM project ..is to reversethe trendthat was causing the Danube
branches and side-arms ta dry up". It may wsII be that if rhe OriginaI
Projecthad never beenplanned,tfreerusiun and degradationof the riverbed
that existstoday - and the reçuking environmentae lffects- would have
been avoided;Indeed, attitudeshave changedextensivelyin Upper Rhine
barrage buildingti8 ascan be çeen inPlate 3, wheresedimentadditionhas
been shown to be a feasible solution to riverbed degradatioii.129
Prelirninaryfield tests are beingcarried out in the Ausirian reach of the
Danube tostabilise theriver below the lasi barrage.General mode1tesrs
provedthefeasibiIiq oftliis prn~edrire.'~~
fi) Theimpacronriverrnorphobgy
1.69. The Slovak Memorial claims that "[ais a result of the G/N
System, this [riverbed erosion] would be eliminated". On the contrary,
the degradationofthe MainChannel riverbedis likely to continue due to
the almost total retention of the bedload at the Dunakiliti barrage.
Without arriving bedload from upstream, degradationconldbe expected
even with o1i1ya few flood discl~arges per year. Erosion rrpto 3 rnetres
t
125 Kem,Impacts,HC-M, Annexes, voI4(partI), anne5,pp14-15.
SM,para 1.49(emphasisadded).
127 -Similarlythc "rock outcrops[that]started toappearin thc riverbednear
Nagymaros" (para 1.44) were not causedby crosios, the SlovakMemorial
assertb,utbecausof theindustril redging.
12*
See Plate3seedescriptiaofhistorybelow,par1.152.
129 See Pl& 4, vol. 1See also K Kern, Non-structuraloIrllianta Riverbed
Degradation- Experiencfrorn the UpperRhineandtheAusrrianDanube, 1994;
HCM. Annexcs, vol 4 (part annex7;and M BatikandJ KaIiS,Silting Problems
ArisingruiIthe RealisatofnrheGabEikovoWakrBcherne;HC-M.Anriexes, y01
4 (parI},arnexS.
130 Ibid.Mao-
jsocr-dwmn
m-ie
i 1
rw-
500-
-m could have been caused to some sections after50 yearsof operation131 .
This wmld have entailed a further drop of the planned50 m3/swater
disclrarge.
1.70. Table I shows themainhydrologicalandmorphoIogica1impacts
that could be anticipated in the mainchannel of the Danubein the
Szigetkozregionwiththe implementation of the OriginalProject. Table
2 shows theanticipatedeffects for theNagymaros area.13 Some ofthe
most importane tffects wiIIbe briefly summarised here; hrther defaiIs
aregrovidedin theScienrzjkE~ahiation,Chapter 2 and reIatedannexes. -
1.71. FortheDunakiliti-HruT;R oeservoir,it was expectedthat90%of
.the bedload would be deposited in the backwater reach, requiring
continuousdredging.77%of thesuspended load was expected to deposit
-in the reservoirwithacaIcuIatedIifetimeaf approximately6O years.133
1.72. For the mainchanne1of theDanubein theSzigetkozarea,during
350 dayçof the yearinçteadof an averageof 2,000 m3/s,50-200 m3/s
would have beenreleaçedfromthe reçervoir- 200 m31sonly in the
growing period .34 The water-table - lowered since 1967-68through
excessive industrialdredging - wouIdhavedropped by 2.5-3 rnetres in
certainareas. This water-tablewould have flrrctrrateonIy when the
inflow intothe reservoirexceeded 4,000 rn3/s,about 12daysof the year
onaverage.
13' MBatik & J Kali(1392)HC-M,Anriexes,vol4 (partI), an5.x
132 Table4(p51) shows thosanticipatfortheSzigetkofloodplain.
133 Kern,Impacts,He-M,Annexes,vol4 (parl)annex6,p 19.
134 AIIhoughir\vaneverspecifiinwhichperiadoftimeandinwhich case200m3/s
shouldbe~Ieased. TabIe1: fiydro-morphulogicd itnpaclsof[{teUrigi(ziraiojecl on rheDanube
~hanplell~~
DANUBE CHANNELINTHESZIGETKOZREGION
shortterm mediumterm Iongterrn
f5-10grs.) (10-20p.) (20-50yrs.1
Discharges 50/L00m3/sshouldbereIeasedfmmrhe reservoiint oheDanubechannel
higherreleasesonlyatdischargesexcecding4,0m'ls (ca.12dh.)
dailyflowreversafloa fewkilometresupstreamoftheconjunctionwith the
power canalaused bypeakingope,ration I
WaferteveIs wsuddendropof water pdnal reducti'mofthe waierIzvelsthrriughbrd
IeveIby severalrneEes crosinn
Flowveiocities reductiunofflowveIocifies m 1.2-2.0rdsto mincirvariationsoflow
lessthan1.0ds at50 rnY/s; velocitieswithchangesof
reducedflowvelocitiesinthebackwaterreachof bedmorphologv
thepowercanalconjunction
Fluctuationsof re~clrisiono81 dischar agndulsteIevehuchiationsforca.350dlyr.except
discharges& wafer for rhereachinfluericedbybackwaterhrre'dailfluctuationsof 4 metreswould
Ievels occur
wsudde11risand faIlofdischargesanfolw'veIociticscaseof flooddischxge
relax
Riverbed stability iduringaflowof afier20yrs.operation afte50yrs.operation
SOI200m3/s t,eDanube significantscoufiwg scounng waspredictedto
chmncI wauld predictewith riyerbd reach3 m insome
e~wtuaIIyforman dcgradarionupf#1.5m sectionsIeadinto a
adeqrratIeaw-fiowbed causedhy totaretcntIon severedropoftht
higirfloodin thefrrst ofbedbadinthe prevailiiigwaterIeveat
Dunakiliti-hSov 501200 m3/s
yearswouldyieldfirst
riverbecleformations Reservoir
Riverbed gradua1formationof a totaldestruction otfhelow-flowbedstructuats
structl~res low-flowbed;silting rrphigherflooddischargesor bmaintenancewith
ofreache svih smaIIer partialerosionofsilledrwheç
velucities - growthofwoody vegefationonhighereIevions in
spreadingofvegetation thechmnei presumedIy causina narrowingofthe
inthechanneloutside dixhargecross-sectio(withthethrcatoffurtherbed
thelow-flowbed erosion)ifnoiremoved by regularmaintenance
Riparianstructures i followingthedropof the formatiofthe Iow-flowbed wouldcreatea
(erotones) rhewaerIevelof several new riparimzone whichwould periadicaIIbe
metresthebanksofthe desmyec irhigherflooddischarg rhusheriparian
oIdchannelwau1d habitats ouldsuKerfrominsmbilirycausedby an
bewrneunçtable and unnaturd ciiffereneehveenaverageand flood
collapsepartialand discharges
locally
135 From ScientgiEcvaiuolionHC-M, vol2,chap 2. NAGYMAROSRESERVOIR
] shortterm (5-10yrs.) 1mediumterm(10-20 yrs.)1 Iongterm (20-50yrs.)
I
Discharges dailyfluctuationsfrorn1,000m3/stomoretha5,00 03/sdependhg on the modeof
peakoperation
ivithmode300nCiO no reke ofrvalerarGabfikuvo for18.5tirs.
Water IeveIs ar2,300m3kcornpared to pre-dm conditions(wi!houtpeaking):
+6 rnatNagymaros,*O atVénck-,2 mar PaIkovitovo(dredging)
FIOIS vmi&,,, flow velocitirhroughpcakoperation(mode 20UUî700):
velricities 0.0010.9m5 la1taiIwateGabtikovo{riun18 19.451,
0.021I.94m/saiPalkoviEwo (rkm 1811.051,
0.2811.59m/satthemouthofMosoniDanube (rkm1793.3),
0.32/1.19m/satKomho (rkr1768.3)(Kmdi andNagy, 1993)
Fluctuations about4,000 m3/sdailyfluctuations of discharges
ofdischarges dailywaterlevelfluctuatiothroughpeakoperation(mode20001700):
& water 4.64m attailwaterGabtikovo (rkm 1819.43,
levers 4.38m atWlkovituw(rkm180 I.05),
2.65rnnttirenroutofMosoniDanube(rh 1793.31,
1.O6rnatKomho (rh 1768.3)(Karâdiand Nagy,1993)
Riverbexi mtherhighfiawvelocity accordingra(Bognir mdRWczi, 1988) evenmaI
stabiIiiy fluctuationsrvithpeak "mnor1ritig"otheriverbewuuIdIieexpcckdby
operationwr>uIcause seletiviransporrofsrnallergrasi+= leavinga
- generalscouringitheenlire protectivcIayerofcoarsergrave1on the bnrtomofthe
reachexceptforthelast20 riverbedt;hereforescouringwasexpectedceasefier
kmupstream ofNagymaros 0.1-0.2 m depth
(Bopir and Rakoczi,1988)
Riverbed i al1islandsbehveenGonyu bankstability~voulbehighlyendangeredbytheshap
structures (rkm1791) andNagymaros riseandfallofwaterlevelsrequiringrip-rapprotection
worlldbeIostwith beriseof withfilterlayers
thewaterImeI evenniallnew riverbedstructurwould evolve
a11o~heraqiiarichabitats accordinia rheguverninghydraulicregirnecaused by
wauIdexperiene thorough peakapemtion;neveriheIesthehcnceprevaiIing
rlimgesincumnt, depositio~rconditionswouIbeu~rfavor~rabIealaquatichabitais;
pd scauring thedaiIyflnncmatiobresWeenIow-fiowconditionand
hi&flood fl0rr-natriraiIyoccui-ringonIthan5
manyriverbedstnictures
werealreadydestroyedby dîyr- imposeinstabilityoa1riverinehabitatsandmust
channeldredging be regardeasamajordmimentalimpact ofpeak
operation;
Riparian iwiththepermanent dailywaterlevelfluctuationsupto4.3m at
itructures inundationofnumerous largePalkoviEovo(rkm181 1)and 1.Om atKornho (rkrn
,ecotoaes)
isiands,valunbleecotones 1768)ivouldproducea devastatedstripof landofseveral
wuuld be Iostand a11ripariarr metreswidth(about3-atslopesof 13);no
smcnlresbetweenGOnyii vegetatinirawthwouIdbepossibleinrhis~rie;
and Nngymarr>ws ouibe 8theriparianhabitatsIhntarcIiigirlyvaIinbIarge
inundatedESweII riverswouldnotexisany more
j6 FmmScjeniijic Eval~rafiot,C-M,vol2, chap2. 1.73. Itwas expected that thedegradation of 'theriverbecipreviously
caused by excessive channe1dredgingwould Irave continned due to the
total reteritioriothe bedload aithe Dunakiliti barrage. The large daily
water IeveIfluctuations frornpeak power operationwould have affected
the partof the DanubecIiannelabove Palkovieovo,contrastingwiththe
'
steady low water discharge downstream from Dunakiliti. This would
have significantlyimpactedon fluvialandriparian habitats.t37
1.74. For the Szigetktizfloodplain,the consequenceswere likely to be
disastrous,changingthem todry habitats sirni lalarge floodplainareas
of the Upper Rhine near Breîçacf1.'~8They wou~hnot have preverrted"a
reperirionof thedisappearanceof the Rhine braich systern"as SIovakia
assefis.39
1.75. For illeNagrnaras reservoir, the dai1y fluctuations of water
levels by several metres with operation at peak power would have
yielded a devastatedstrip of riverbank,destroyedvaluable habitats and
generated unfavourable living conditions for theaquatic fauna in the
reservoir.140
(6) SURFACE WAERS AND GRO&WAER
1
1.76. Riverbedaggradafionbelow Bratislava has ied tothe foniiatioi~
of the wetIarrdsysternsofthe Szigetkozand iitnj Ostrov,located on a
deep alluvial cone which forms the largest high quality groundwater
aquifer in Centra1Europe.The Danube flows have regularlyflushed the
complexsysternof side-armbranches,but the Danubemain channel has
primarilydetermined the groundwaterrecharge and groundwater levels
throughoutthe Kisalfold [LittleHungarianPIainl.I4'
1.77. Further downstrearn, the aIIuviaI aquifers are mrrcli. Iess
extensive,but nevertheless are widely usedfor bank-frlteredgroundwater
strpply, incIrrdingthe supplyto Budapest. IIIadditiori, there is soms
137 Kern,Impacts ,C-M,Annexes,vol4(partl), annex6,atp20.
138 Sec Plale5.Sce also KernImpacts,HC-M, Annexes,vol 4 (par1). annex5,at
p 23.
39 SM, pam b7.
140 Kern,Impacts,HC-M, Annexes,voI4 (pal IXannex6,p22.Thedailyfluctuations
ofdischarger;f,iowvelocitiesand waI~veIduetopeakoperationatGabEIkovo
woulribedelrimenlatothe whoIeecosyslzminmanyrespects,s seein Tabl7.
l4] Sec above,paragraphs.69-1.75. IIinrited connection with the karst groundwater of the Transdanubian
rnountains.
1.78. A fuIIaccou~ro tf tlreimpactsof the OriginaI Projectcar1bs found
in the Scient& E~~iu~fion I.z The i~npactsare cornplex, inter-related,
and can onIywith difficultybe quantified;anyquantification is subject to
high IeveIs of uncertainty.Changesin Danube flows affect groundwater
directIy, but aIso have impacts ori surface water quaIiiy and the
depositionlmobiIiçationof river sediment. In turn, the distributiorr and
deptlrof sediment mudi@surface water-groundwater inter-reIatirinships,
and chenricalchangesinsurface water and sedirnentcarr !rave i~nportant
impIications for groundwaterquaIity.
1.79. It was cIcar in 1989 that an infegratcd programme of rnodeIIing
was rsquired to defins tfiess i~iteractions,arrdthat ihiswas an essential
pre-reqrrisite for erivironrrrenta1 impact assessmerrt. Nevertfieless,
throiighout its discussion of water issues, the SIovak Mernoria1
confinuuusly refers to rnatters having been fhoroughIy st~died;I~~ ir
relieç on rfieBeclitel Repofi wherever possible i~ran atternpt fa
dernonstrateeithw that no harm was expectedor that it couId have been
mitigated.144The BecIiteIReport itself was MUC~ inare caufious ~IIifs
assessments than the SIovak Mernoria1 porfrays and many
importantaspects of the projectand itsoperating modes, as the foIIowing
extractsslrow:
"'Potentialprrtblemsthat we believe requireadditianal strrdiesto
quarrtify impacts ...are the watcr quaIity and water level
fluctuatiorisdowristrea~noftheGabtikovo barrage."145
"DetaiIed studies of criticaI areas in Szigetkoz sliouId be
conducfed ...The hydrugeologiccharacteristicsof a specificarea
wi1lnrvstIikeIydiffer fromtlie honrogenons,isotopicconditions
assigned intheanaIogmode1ing tud dies.''^^^
142
SeeScknf$c Evalw~io~r. C-M,vvI2,chap 3.
143 1t contendsIhat37 studieweredevotd to probIemasrisingfrumdiffcrenwatw
regimes,andthatthat36major studiewerecarriedou1cxarnining~hteffcct of the
OriginalProject onsurface and gro~nd~aters;SM, pa2.15.Icitesthe BechreI
Report'sconclusionIhat'%NB surfaceand ground watw conditions have been
rhoror~ghlslr~diedbyVIZITERV and011ieexperts"SM, para2.90, ciriBechteI
Report{seeHC-M,Arinexcs,vol 4(part.)annexI, p 1-91.
144
Sete.g.SM, paras2.PI,2.95,2.97.
145 BechteIReport; HC-M,hncxcs, voI4 {parIl,wnex 1,p 1-9.
14u BechteIReport;HC-M, Annexes ,oI4 (par11 ,nnex 1p 1-10 "Exploratiorr arid instaIIation of rnonitorinb welIç shouId be
can-ied out iritliose areas where seepage is fiwçible,and where
previousstudiesIiavenot beeriadeq~ate."'~~ !
"ModeIing is nccded to assess the possibliiyof reduced DO in
thetworeservoirs.. ."145
"[With respecttu groundwater] another- 1O-'15 sites shoyld be
5eIect eor Iong-tennmeasurements. .."14"
"Groundwater quality sarnpling and qualiiy 'ana~ysisshould be
condrrctedmonthly for 2 years to eshblish baseline conditions.
Vertical sarnpIing of a few deep well? sliould alsu be
co~idrrcted."~~~
"Gi+orrridwater IeveI data shonld be co11ect;d at aII biologica1
monitoring stations to rnoniturhabitat changes. Stream gaiking
and water qualiiydata shouIdbecoIIectedat sensitivewaterfowl
Iocations...''151
1.80. The Iackof acomprehensivestudy was rebgnised by SIovakand
international experts152as weII as by Hung~iry!~bnd was the major
~riotivationfur the 1990 CzechosIuvakian application to PHARE to
engage ina "thoruugharidcornpIexstrrdyof a proper irnpactassess~rrerit
modeI". IS4 Its stated objectivewas "to evaluate and verify the effects of
previousactivities and by [sic]-the new hydraulic system of hydropower
de~eIoprnent".~ 55 ResuItsof the study areexpectedirr 1995.Discussi~tg
tliisproject,a rnernberof tlie ECExpertsGroup&te that:
"To understand and malyze the cornplexrel~tionshipsbetween
physica1,chernical and biological cltanges irithe surface and
srrbsrrrfacewater regimes reqrriresrnu~tidiscib~inar ~xpertise in
1
I
14' BechteIReport;HC-M, Annexes,wI 4 <part1).anneII,p 1-11.
'4g BcchteIReport;HGM, Annexes ,oI4 (part),annex,I,p 1-19.
149 BechteIRcport;HC-M,PiIrncxcs,voI4 (partIl, mn11,p 1-1.
lS0
BechteIReport; HC-M,Annexes,y014 (part 1),anIrex.I, p 1-22.
IS1 BechteIReport;HC-M, Annexes,voI4 (part),annex'1,p 1-22.
52 Sec cg.,Mucha,1930;HGM, Annexes, YO I(part2j,annex I1:andRefsgaardet
a& 1994;HC-M, Annexes,vol4 (part21annex12. .
IS3 SomIySdy et al,1989, WatcrQuaIiQ issr~esconccrriilht GNBS: ModeIs and
appIicabiIiq, Budape1989;HC-M,Ari~rcxesv,ol4 (part21,annex13.
Is4 PHAREAppIication,coverpage;HGM. Annexes.vob3, annex48.
IS5
PHARE AppIication,preambIe;HGM, Annexes ,oI 3,annex48. curnbinatiori with advanced mathematica1 modeIIing tech-
nique~."~56
Heconcluded tliat information fro~ntlieintegratedmodeIIingsystern ...
"constifutes a necessary kasis forsubseqrrent anaIysisof flora
aridfauna in thefl~odplain."'~~
1.81. Eventoday,altfiougfisignificantprogresshasbeen madebyboth
sides, an intcgrated erivironmenta1 assessrnent lias not yet beeri
cumpleted. ISX
fafSurface wafer hyd-oiogy
1.82. The dischargeregi~rreof theDanube is characterised by seasorial
variabiliiywhicIr isgoverned by the AIpirrecatchrrreritof the river,
yieldirig higher discharges in earIy srrnrrn(mean annuaI flood 5,300
1n3k )nda Iow-flow period in the winter (average848 m31s).Figure I
showsthe long-tenri~nonthlyhydrographof tIrsBratislava gauge.
156 JC Refsgaard,K Havnq and IK Jensen. 1994,An integrated em- and
hydrodynamicmode1for prediction of wetlmd rcgime in the DanubianIowland
underal~ernalioperationstrategiesfor TheGabEikovohydropowcr pIan4 Reporf
afthe confeencemr weilund mairagemenf2-3 lune, 1994.London; HC-M,
Annexes,vo4 (par21,annex12,atp2.
157
JC Refsgaard, K HavnoandJK Jensen An IntegrateEco and Hydrodynamic
Mode1 for Prcdiction oWetIarrdkegime in the Danrrbian Lowiand Under
AltemaliveOperatiStrategiesfor the ~abzfkovoHydropower P1994);HC-
M, Annexes,vo4(par!21annex 12,ap 13.
Seeabove ,aragraphs 1.23-1.41. Rnnuaaverage
--.-
! 1
Mm 1 mir .pi ni7 iummniul rug Fp osf no* d-
Figure 1: Averagermnfhlydischarge ofBraiisIma 1eiween lPB1and 1990
1.83. The design of the Original Projcct was based on tlie follawing
characteriçticdischargesat Bratislava and Naparos: '59
Bratislava ; Nagyrnaros
1901-1950 1 1901-1950
Averageflow: 2,025 m31s i 2,421 rnqs
Lowest fofw(year): 570m31s j1948) 590m31s (1947)
1
Higiiestflood(year): 10,400 m31s (1954) 8,180 m31s(1965)
I
20 yearflood: - 8,750 m31s j 7,650 m31s
100year flood: 10,600 m31s I 8,700 m31s
1,000year flood: 13,000m31s I 10,000m31s
10,000year flood: 15,000 m31s ! 11,100m~1ç
Under tlreOriginal Project, thedischarge to the &nube channe1from the
reservoir was to be 50 m31s(insteadof tlre traditionci1discharges sliown
in Figure i) , ifhunspecifiedincreasesof uptu 200 m3/sinthe growing
season. Flood discharges exceedin 4,000 m31swould be reIeased at
DunakiIitiiritotfiebedoftheDanube.
!
!
I
!
I33 JoinlConlractüaI PIan, SummarDescriptionsectioi 0{1977);HM, Annexes,
vol3,annex24. 49
1.84. The SIova k ernoria1srrggesfsthat therewotrldbe an increased
flow intfieDanubeside-arn~.~~~ This isno1 quite correctand ignores
the importantcffectsof floodflowsand theirassociaredfreqirencyun the
+
nattrraflrrnctioningof the SzigetkowetIands.161
1.85. Beforethedegradationof theriverbedstarted inthe 1950s,nrany
of the side braricheswere stiII open.162The discharge in the side '
branchesof the Szigetkozand iitny Ostrov, e.g., in the reach of
GabCikovo(rkm 1833-1816), amountedto about 20% for a total
dischargeof 1,005 rn3fs. At a dischargeof 1,958 m31s, which was
exceededon 168 days per year, the side branchescarried up to 500
m31s 163
1.86. Afterdegradation of theriverbedandthe closureof entrances of
side-arms to improvenavigation,the thresholdfor the branchsystem
inflow increasedto 2,500m3/ç whichtypicallyoccursfor 75-100 days
per year. Table3 showsthe 1980 flow regimefor the Danube and its
side-ar~nsF.rom this, itisclear thatal1of the side-ams were inundated
at least once a year and that many of the side-ams receive ad good
snpplyof waterfor a Iargeportionof theyear.
SM, para2.95, citing BechtelReport, p 2-7 and 2-8 (see NC-M, Annexes,vol 4
(partI)annex1).Itis alsosuggestedthattherewoubeanincreasedflorvinthe
MosoniDanubewiththe O+ginai Project(SM,para2.95) and thattheflowin the
seepage cannlswouldhelp to maintainsurfacewater levels (SM, para 2.96).
AlthoughitistruethattheOriginalProjectalloweda constantbutsmallsupply
ofwater to thc Mosoni Danube,inundationswouldseldomhave occurred,sce
beIowTubh 4.The seepzgecanaiswouidhaveonlymaintainesurfacwaterinthe
~arraIasndsidearn~s~thernsneast,intheçurroundingregions.
IfI SeebeIorv, abl4.
Sec the discussionabove, puagraphs I.SSrr.68,on industrialdrcdgingas being
primarilyrttspunsiblefor fhe degradationof theand otpossibIesoIirtions
tuthcexistingdegradation.
163 Mucha,Reporton Ternporar y ateManagementRegime - IndependenScmario.
BratisIav, ovember1993. kalile3: Flowregimo of theDanubein1980 164
-
1
Characteristicflow Discharge Water levels Flow ' Average Frequency
situation -1980- at veIocitin duration (events/
conditions Dunaremete main I fdayslyear) yem)
(m3ts) (m) channe1at
Dunaremete
(mis),
FIowIargeIconfinedto c 1,000 2.3 4 14 ; 12days Ser~erarIimes
groyneswithimain I perY=
chme1
Flowinmain channe1 1,00D-,800 3.7 1.4-1.8 f 142days SeveraItimes
aldpemranerrbranches peryear
i
Flowina ferrivermns 1,800-2,500 3.7-4.5 1.8-2.0 , 122days Sevcraltimes
I peryear
FIowin someriverms 2,500-3,500 4.5-5.2 2.0-2.2 1 68days Severaltimes
peryear
Flowinalmostal1river 3,500-4,00 5.2-5.6 2.2-2.3 ' 17days Severaltimes
arms I peryear
I
Completeinundatioonf > 4,500 5.6 2.3 , 3days Once per
floodplain I Year
Deepinundatio nf 6,000 6.2 2.4 I Iday Onceper
flodplain I 3 -4yeas
1
1.87. If the Original Projecf were to have bec; irnpltmented, average
discharges to the Hungarian branch systern u-ride nrormal operating
conditions worrld range fram 15-25 m3is.These/flows worrId onIy have
been exceeded if there was a discharge fromthereservoirinto the power
cana1 and Danubechanne1toiaIIing betwee sn,~Qo-~, so3ko,andthen
unly in sonle side branches. That nomaIIy occuis every 5-10 years. AI1
I
side brancires tvould only become inundate$ every 10-25 years,
correspond hg with 7,500-8,000 m31s. 15 I
I
1
164 Thedataforthistablecame fromCEC Working Grou peport,23 November 1992,
pp 16-17anditsappendixG, p2. The"duration" columninthistableis different
fromTable 3.1 in the Scienfifc Evaluati(vol2,chap3, Table 3.1) and from
annex 6 (Kern,vol 4 (part 2))Those two documentsreprintedthe CECTable
exactlyas it appeareintheWorkingGroup Report.,AfterHC-M,vols 2 and4
werefinalised,was discoveredthattheCECTableitselfcontainederrorsand that
thecorrecdataisintheAppendixto thatReport. ,
165 CEC,Fact-Finding Missionon VariantC, October1992;HM,Annexes,vol 5 (pari
S),annex13.Also discussedinScientl$EvaIrtaiioHC-M, voI2,ch2.3.2.
I i
inundations in the fioodplainandthe Iackof water fluctuationsgenerally
wouId have had seriousecci1ogicacIcinsequence, escribal elsewherIb7
39. Other effectç includethosedue to theNagyrnarosreservoirwhich
would have encompassed a 6 metre increase in water Ieveb at
Nagyrnarow s itha typical dailyvariationin water IeveIsof 4.4 rnetats
Sap. The prufound eRect of this on the environment of this reach is
discussed in theScient@c EvaIuatiun. ImpIicatiqns for water qua1iîy are
discussedbe1ow.
fb Sfurfac weafer guaIiQ
1.90. The SIovakMernorialarguesthat by ApriI 1989 if was accepted
that it wasto be "abasicrequirerne~i tffre impIernerrtatioif the G/N
Systern thatthere çhouIdbe no deterioration-ofthe water quaIity in the
Danube".1 6sBcan beseen fromthe Scienl$c Eva~ualio~,I~t~his is not
thecase.
1-91. The SIovak Mernoria1corrteridst11atthe-creatio~of the reservoir
upstream of Nagymaroscouid have a beneficia1effect because the
reservoir, by s1owingdown water flows,Ieds to increaseddeposition of
sediment and therefofe the clarification of water in the reservoir. The
increase in surface water area within the reservoir increases oxygen
absorption aridthusdissoIvedoxygencontent of the water. Finally,the
Iongerreterrtiontinre aIIowsthe breakingdown of the organic Ioad in the
,river170
1.92. -In reality there are both positive and negative effect~.T'h~'
probIernsare compIexand require detailed evaluation. But simulation -
'resultsindicatepredominantlynegatiyeeffecis17?
1.93. The SIovak Memorial aIso argues that the main threat to the
water quaIity of the Danube is not the OriginaI Project but human
polIutio~r.~~~
167 Scebclow, paragrnp1.149-1.153.SealsScieibgc EvaI~~a~in.C-M,voI2.
chap4;andHGM, Annexesv,ol4(par21,annexe15,16,17,18and 19.
168 SM, par2.W.
I ScienfificEvnltlafion,Hvo2, chap3.
SM, para2.92.
171 Sm aIsoScicnrifir EvnlmHGM,, voI2, chap3.3.2.
172 SecScienfGc Evui~~~~oC,-M,ml 2, chap 3.1.94. It shouId be noted thathistoricaItrends of surface water qualiry
show a dramatic increase since 1960 in the nutrients nitrogen and
phosphorus, whichare no longer limiting for eutrophication. Prior to
implementationof VariantC, an orderof magnitude increase in aIgal
biomasshad occurred,and a change in phytoplanktoncommunities,with
green sIgae, blue-green algae and flagelIates predomiriating under
srrrnmerconditions.174Increasing seasonal variabiI iitwyater quality
hadbeenobserveciand a çignificantiricreaçein die ditrrnafiuctuation of
dissolved oxygen in the vegetation growing season, leading to over-
saturation.Hence one primary concem is the impact of the Original
Projecton eutrophication.
1-95. RecenrçimuIaf ionrestrlts showa near-doubling of algal biomass
due to the DtrnakiIiti rese~0ir.I~~ SoIutio~isproposedby BechteI fo
mitigate these efle~tsI~~remain to be evaluated in detaiI, and departed
sigrrificantIyiom the Original Project. The fact remains, however,that
only a few months before the deadline for closing the Danube at
Dunakiliti to allow for the fillingof the reservoir, those two proposais
were not part of the Project. As to humanpollution, the effect of
increased algal biomass on biochernical oxygendernand (a primary
indicator of water quaIiv for aqtraric IifecaIi exceed the impacts of
waste water d ischarges. Eutrophication probIems are un1ikely tu be
resolvedwithout aregionalrestrictionon nutrientinputsto the Danube.
1.96. A second set of issues relates to the effects of peak power
generationon tributaryrivers. For example, flow reversal in the Mosoni
Danube is IikeIyto Ieadto unacceptable water qualiiy,giveneither waste
waterdischargesor stom water overflows.177
1.97. The SIovakMernorial acknowledgei as an area of concernthe
depositionof heavymetals inthe reservoir.It rnerelystates that tbest
method of eliminating this problem is by eliminating the industrial
discharge of heavy metals into the Danube. Alternativety,sediment
carryingIieavymetalscanbe dredged at 3-5year intervaI~.'~~
174 For explanatias thow VariantC hasaffectedthis,see belowparagraphs3.33-
3.34
175 Scient$Evaluation,HC-M,vol2,Figure3.6.
IT6 The BechtelRepor~proposedinrreased flo#verthe DunakiIiti weirduring ihis
time md operation of Gabtlkovoat this fime as a run-of-riv,e.onna
constanflowbasisSM,para2.93c,iting BechIeIRep(setHC-M, Annexes,vol
4, annex,pp2-4,2-5).
177 ScientificEvuluaiWn,-M,vol2,chap3.3.2.2.
178 SM,para2.94. 1.98. Dredging, however, resultsin a host of other problems, not least
disposal. In 1990, one year after Hungary called for thorough
investigation of this risk, Czechosiovakiaitse1fcame to the condusion
that rhese risks were serious indeed and urged that a more detailed
mode1Iing programmebe irnpIemented to detemine rnsthods for
containing the risks,stafing:
"Deposition of sediments containing heavy metals and organic
materialsin the reservoirshould be avoided.Percolationof such
contaminants into the aquifer could cause serious, irreversible
grciundwater quality problems."179
1.99. Itisevident that impacts of theOriginaIProject in fermsof water
quality were inadequately researched in the earIy studies of
environmentalimpact,and eventodayhaveyet to be fullyexplored. It is
clear, atleast,that the Original Projectwould increase existingproblems
of eutrophicationand exacerbate exisfingproblemsof effluent discharges
and 1that risks from Iong-lem acciirnuIatiorr of micropollrrtantç in
sedimentmuId arise.AdditionaIIy, itcanbe notedthat efntientfreat~nent
is not necessarilya soIrrtiontu theanticipafed water qualiproblems.
1.IOO.The SIovak Mernorialstates that duc tu the decrease inDanube
water ieveIs over the past 30 years, "the conditionsfor the recharge of
fhe aqrriferand ifs water.suppIywells were deteri~rating".~~~Citing fhe
BechtelReport,it contendsthat with seepage canaisrecharging the area,
the groundwatertable levelcould be maintained.181It alsocontendsthat
. the net changeto aquifer groundwater supply throughout the affected
areawould have been minimal,agaic nitingtheBechtel Report.182
I.IOI. It is me rhat in certain Iocationç of the Szigetk~z, tlre
groundwater 1eveIs have faIIen, as a result of bed degradation, by
approximately 1 metre. But groundwater simuiations show that the
impactof the Original Project wouldbe ta decrease groundwater levels
PHAREApplication;RC-M, Annexes,val3,mnex 48,p8.
1
SM,para1.62.
18' SM, para2.101,citingBechtelRepor(seeHC-M,Annexesv , ol4,annex 1,p 2-
s>.
Ig2 SM, para2.103, citingBechlcI-Rcp(seeHC-M, Annexes,voI 4,annex 1,p 2-
15). by 3 timw thisamountin someareas (PIafeda). The pr-edictedeffects are
hIIy describediritheScienrific valua arion ^nd^are sun~rnarisedbelow.
1.102. The extenf of the aIIuvia1aquifer underIyi11g the Little Danubian
Plain is illustratecl in Plares 3.2 and 3.3 irr VoIurne 5. Prior to tlre
diversion of the Danube, groundwaier Iavelçthroughout tIre Szigetkoz
andadjacent areas were deternri~ied by Danubewater Ie~eIs.~~C ~apiIIary
risecan provide a significant source of naturd srrb-irrigation, where
gruundwater Ieveb reacli the covei-ing fine soi1horizons {Phte Sb).'85
, Tlie average deptIrof groundwatw balow ground çrrrfaceis illustrated in
Volume 5, Phte 3.5,for 1980 co~rdiifons.The îypical seasonaIpattern of
Danube flows ge~ieratedmaximum groundwater IeveIs irithe surnmer
periodof nraximum water require~nentfor plants. CIoçe to tlre Danube,
fluciuations of two nretres or rnore occurred. Towards tlie Mosoni
Danube, these have reduced. to onemetre or Iess. Figare 3.9 in the
ScienrifirEvafwtion shows the seaçonaIvariabiliiy arrd histurica1trends
in groundwater IeveIsfor.a transecfof three weils, at i~icreasirdistance
frorn the Danube.IB6The ampIitrideof variatiorrhas remained Iar-geIy
unchangedçincethe 1950s,altlrouglrirtresponseto river bed degradation
a decrease in IeveIs of appraximateIy onenretre Iras occurred in the
UpperSzigetksz.
1.103. Sonregroundwater frum the Szigetkoz is used for water supply,
but the resource is as yet IargeIy urrexpluited.Estirnates of yield are
sirnijarto the needs of a capital city such as Budapest. The srnaI1er
ahvia1 aquifers downstreamare Inoreextensivelyus&, in particuiarfor
the Budapestwater supply.
1.104. Impacts of the Original Project have been investigated by
groundwater simulation çhown on PI& da. The regionaI flow patterns
change radicaIIY .g7 The prirnaryrechxge sourcesbecornethe reservoir
itseif and the side-ar~nsystem. Groundwater increases occur near the
reservoir, but dccreases in groundwatcr IeveIs are predicted to exceed
three metresand toaffect anarea ofapproximateIy300 square kilomemes
on the Hurigarianside.188Sub-irrigation would be reduced or lost over
IF3 Scieirt$Ev~iu~fionH, C-M,voI2, chap3.4.2.
IS4 See Piofe3.5,C-M,Annexes,volS.
I85 Sec Phfc 3.4, HC-M, Annexes,ol5.
IZCrScePla?~ 3.13WC-M A,nnexes ,u15forttheirlocation.
18' See Piaie3.10HC-M, An~rexcs,olS.
I"
SeePl& Sn;seeaIsoScienrijLvn/uafion,HGM, voI2,Table3.4.167 square kilometreças show in Plare 5b.Ip9 However, reçultç are
sensitive to tfie uriceriain effects of clogging associated witlr tlie
depasitio~ioffine sediment.
1.105. The SIovak Mernoria1argues tfiat the penetration of human
po1Iutionfrom the surfaceliascausedan increasc in certain poIIutantsin
the uppermostzoneof theaquifer. Butsuchpo1Iutionis IocaIised,and
Iimited tu the upperIayer (10-20 ~neires)of the aquifer. Most of the
aquifer isof goodquality.T 1fi1reare, however, very seriousconcerns
as to the impact of the Original Project on groundwaterquaIily of the
Szigetk~z, as detaiIed i~itlie Scient@ EvaIz(cf~ion v,olume 2, chapter
3.52, and as outIinedbelow.
1.106. It çhoulda150 be riotedtIrat,furtherdownstream,tfrere isa IikeIy
degradationof karst waters due to backwater effects of the Nagyrnaros
dam. But the main issues concera bank-filtered wells, which are \
consideredseparateIy,below.
(d Gfroundwaterqualip infhe Szigerkezandadjacentareas
1.107. Under natnraI conditions, recharge frorntlie Danube isof high
cliernical quaiity and this deterrninestlie present groundwaterquaIily.
However, sedimertt deposition in the side-arms has Ied to important
chernicaI changes. Organicdecay consumes oxygen; urider reducirig
conditions, iron,manganeseandarnrrionirrnr arereadiIyreIeased.
1.108. There are serious corrcerns for groundwater qnality associated
with the OrigirraI Project. Sediment deposition in the Dunakiliti
Reservoir is expecred to decay, and may Iead to Qre water quaIity
problems. This iç confirmed.by internationalexperience, incI uding, for
IBP SeePlate Sb:sceaIsoScienifEYUIIIQI ~C -M,vol2, Tabk 3.5.
SM, paraI.G2;IstaterhatIheaquifer ismadeup of waterbearingsedimentwhich
intheirdcepessectionreach"thicknesses300 m or more"SM, pam 1.61This
isonlytruefor IIregrave1Iaycrof highm grainsize,butthejoint SIovak-Hungarian
ge~pIrysica1nrcasuremeshowthatrheIota1grave1Iaycm reac600-700 m (see
fluse 3.3HC-M, Annexes,voI S), andünder thosc lie Iayerswhich werc not
penerratedevewitha driIlingof 2,000meIres. Thus, ttrcwatcrvuIiimewhichcm
becontaminatedimr~chgreater than is indicatcdEosiatemenf.
19'
Liebe, Enviro~rmentaI-EcoE IfgctsafItht GabEikovo-Nagynrarorsojecl on
SnbsurfacWatersin Budapest, 994;HM,vol1,appendis3.instance, the AItenworth rese~ciir,I~~and the Abwinden-Astenpower
bofh on. the AustrianDanube. Thcse concerns have been
acknowledged both by Sl~vakia'~~ and the CE Fact-Finding
Mission. 195 Predictions are highly uncertain, but a recent sensjtivity
analysis suggests thatsuchoccurrence is likelyin the reservoir.These
effects are alreadyobservedin the side-arm system;1g6 which would
become the other main source of groundwater recharge.There is a
significantriskthattheaquifer,over a periodof yearsordecades,would
becomeunfit for watersupply.
1.109. Citirig, again, the BechteIReport,the SiovakMernorial suggests
there Inaybe improvernent,or atthe very Ieastnorneasuredimpact, on
the weIIs"Iocated downstreamof Nagy~naros". It~ontinues with a
confusecidescripfion of effects to the Budapestwater works,most of
wlrichareupstream0fBudapest.'~8
1.110. While thereis somepollutionof wells downstream of Budapest,
this does not justify further darnageto the water supplies.But the
primaryconcernis for the well-fieldsto the northof Budapest,which
provideapproximatelytwo-thirdsof the Budapestsupply.Concern for
bank-filteredwells also applies to the river reach upstream of
Nagymaros. These issues are fully described in the Scient#c
EvaIu~tiar~,'~ andaresiirnmarised bdow.
Hq and Nachtnebel, Eco-systemsiuofAI~enwOrthC.hangesby the Danuhian
powerplant AIienwoninGzmran ivitEngIishsrrmmaries,Vicnna, 1989,rired in
Scieniz3EvaItl~iiuHC-M,vol 2,chap3.5.2.
Frischherz,von H, H Jung and W Urban,Impact ofBank Filtratiati on thc
Groundwater1 ,986, ~sterreichischeWasserwirtscha, p 222-233, cited in
ScientiJEvaluution,HC-M,vol2, chap3.5.2.
Muchq 1990, HC-M, Annexes, vol4 (par2), annex Il; Mucha& Paulikova,
CroundwaterQuality in the Danubian Lowland Downwardsfrom Bratislava,
EuropeanWatcrPollutionControl l(5): 13(1991)HM,Annexes,vol 5 (part1),
annex11.
CEC,FactFindingMission onVariantC,31 October1992;HM, Annexes,vol 5
(pan21,annex I3seeabove,aIs oatagraph3.33-3.34.
Pfnle3.15,HC-M,Annexes vol5.
SM, para2.104.
SM, para2.106.
ScienfljicEvu/~latHC-M, vol2, cha3.6.5.1.1.111. In the river reach frornGonyüto ~uda~est, bank-filtered wells
have beendevelopedto a varyingextent to exploit the aIIuviaIaquifer.
Behveen Gan@ and Nagymaros, the reach itjflrrencedby backwater
effectsfia; the proposeddam atNagyrnaros,majorwell-fieldshave an
existing capacify of approxinrately 30,000 n~~/i?a~,"~ and potential
resources of 19,000rn3kIay and75,000 rn31dajyhavebeen identified irr
the ~cs-~om~rom-~lm~sne snzmE~sz~ergo1reaches.201
1.112. BeIow Nagymaros, 54% of the Budapest WatenvorkssuppIy
cornes from the major well-fields to the north of the city, principally
SzentendreI~land.~o~ Jt is therefore anissueof national importance to
evaluate the potentialrisk to these resources,considering effects both
upstreamanddownstreamofthe Nagymarosdani.
1.113. Bank-filtrationis used extensivelyon thémajor Europeanrivers.
It.has been shown to be highly effectivein removingcontaminants, for
example inorganicand organic pollutants, *avy -metals, aIgae and
bac~eria,~~a~lthoughrhere is a dependenceof remuvalefficiency on the
lengh of the filter parhway.However,the water qtraIitof bank-filtered
weIIs is dependent on the cheniical conditions in the filter Iayer.If
chemically-redrrcingconditionsdevelop,mobilisationof metals such as
iron and manganese (and other heavy metal paIluranrsivhich may be
present in river sedimerrt)may occur, togethei with the generatio~rof
ammonium,and in addition serious cloggingprobiems cm arisedue to
bacterialacti~ity.~~~
1.114. The yield in termsof water quantityfrom bank-filteredwells is
dependent on river water levels and the hydraulic connection with the
river. This inturnis affected bythe ge,ometryandmaterialpropertiesof
the riverbed. The primary concernsfor bank-filteredwater supplies are
associatedwith a combination of these two factors. Changes to river
water levelç and riverbed IeveIswiII affect changing patterns of
çedimentafion wi1Icause depositionof organic-rich sediment.Their Iorig-
tem degradationcanchange the chernicalstateof the filter system, with
çeriousadverseconseqrrences.
200 SeePlate3.8,HC-M, Annexes ,ol5.
201 ScientifiEvaluafion,HC-M,vo2,chap3.6.1. '
. .
202 SeePlate 3.9,HC-MAnnexes ,ol 5. I
203 Se.ec.g.Sonthcimer,1980:Hermannet ai,1986;:~horurit al, 1992cited in
ScienttjicEvaluation,HC-M,vol 2, chap3.6.2.
1
204 vandcrKoaijetal, 198citedinSciefrr$cEvaluafion,HC-M,vol2, c3:h.Z. 1.11S. In addition, itis not uncornmon in intemationa1experience for
adjacent grctundwaterto have inferiorwaterqua1 iiytobarrk-fireredriver
water. Reductiorrin riwr bed hydrauIicconnection can Ieadto increased
_well capture ofpoorerquality water.
1.116. Twoexamples,discussed indetailin theScient#c EvaE~ation,~0~
demonstrate the occurrenceof these processes in the Gonyu-Budapest
reach.
1 ,117.River trainingand dredgingof the Danube channel adjacent to
thfiBudapestWatenvorkswell field on Szentendreis1and206led to the
Iocalised deposition offine sediment adjacentto certainbûnk-fiItered
W~IIS.~ ~ ~ter qriality prciblernsdeveloped over a period of years and
were firstinvestigatedin the mid A~nmcinirrm and manganese
conce~itrationswere observed which were 90 and 200 times EC guide
levels, respectively. FoIIawing changes in river training, sediment
rernovaIadjacent tu one of the affectecl we1Is led tu an increase in
qrraIity. eccntdata(1993) showthat at other affected wells, wherethe
sedimentremained,the problem hascontinued.209
1.118. The secondexarnpleconcems the NagymarosWatenvorks. Two
bank-filtration wells of the Nagymaros Watenvorksof the Danube
RegionalWater Company were operated on the lefbank of the Danube
at rkm1693between1963and 1988.Rapid water quality deterioration
began in both wells in the early 1980s.210 The manganese and
ammonium cortcentrations exceeded drinking water limits and the
operatinglicencesfor the weIIswerewithdrawn.A Raney-typeweIIwas
installecltwokilornetreçdownstreamin 1985.WitIiirrsix years the water
quaIity became linacceptable.The resuIts show a change of- redox
conditionsIeadingro increased manganeseand ammoniumand reduced
nitratec~ncentrations.I1
205 ScieniijicEuaiualion,HC-M2,chap3.6.3
Plate 3.9, HC-M,Annexes,vol 5.
207 ScientificEvaluation,HC-M,vol 2, Figure3.23.
LBszIel RIimpactsofrivetrainionthe qualitofbank-filtewaters(1986)
22 (5)WatSci Techat 167-172cirtinScienfificE~ulitajioii,HCM,2,chap
3.6.3.1.
Sciei~r& EvaI~~afn,C-M,val2,chap3.6.3.I
Io ScieirtificEvalnaiion,HC-M2,rhap3.6.3.2;anFigures3.30and3.31.
Z1I ScienrijicEvnhrari, C-M,vol2,chap3.5.3.2;andFigue.32. 1.119.The adverse changes in water quiilid in these three wells
occurreddue to bed sedimentdeposition. Iis,believedtobe adirect
resrrltoftheNagyrnaroscofferdamconstrucfion.,
1.120. In the back-water reach of the Nagymaros dam, sedirnent
deposition iscaIcuIato affectthequalie of existingwatenvorks.
1.121.Dowristrearnof Nagymaros, dredging was ro havetaken place
and simulations show that hrther bed degradaiion is expected dto
erosion.Theseeffectsarecompounded by'changing patternof sediment
deposition.It concludt ehdatheris a seriousris kfyiel rdeduction
andwaterqualitydeteriorationinthe major well fieldsprovidingwater
supplytoBudapest.
(7)'SOILS,AGRlCULTUR AENDFORESTRY
1.122.The SIovakMernorialpresentsthe OriginalPrajectas enliancing
theprodrtctiviryof the affectedregion:
"The Project worrId undeniablyhave had an effect on the
prodrrcfivi~ of these important regionsif-no plans had been
made fo mainQin water leveIs:withorrthededicationof new
flows, further productivitywou1d have been reduced by one
third."2L2
1.123. Accordingto this view, the Origin~rojectwàs neceçsaryfor
agricultureandforestrybecause of "sinkingground water levels and
insuscient water resourcesfor irrigatineedsw.21 3he argumentis
premisedon two mainassumptions:
* increased water flowing into the flaodplain and side-amç
improveçtherechargesystemand thuçgrqundwaterconditions;
*
the buildingofweks irnprovesmnditions'ithe longterm.
Neifterofthese assumptionscarbe sustained.
1.124. An initialandcrucialreasoniçthatthe recharge system wouId
not havebeen adeqrrate.he OriginalProjectwouid havedischargedon
the average15-25m3/sintothe side branch e sdonly 50m3/sinto the
, 212 SM,para2.116.
213 SM, para1.65.See also SM, p1.57,1.582.162.85For the cauof the
sinkinggrtiuridwaterlevels,seeabovep1.61-1.68.Danube bed, witlr up fo200 m31sailowedduring tirnesof need214 This
wouIdnot have been;idequate tomaintaingroundwaterrecharge, average
groundwatcr Ievels or fheir natrrral variabiIity. RZather, as
demonstrated iiiPIare 50, even in the beçt-case sceriarioof 200 m31s
discharge, there would have beeii a significant drop in groundwater.
What would happen in reality istliat theenormous reduction in Danube
flows,from2000 m31s to 50-200 rn31s,2]and the correçponding drop in
river water levels, would resultin a situation wherethe river bed is no
longerthemainsourceof groundwaterrecharge;on the contrary it would
tend toact asa drain.
1.125. As a conseqtrence the grorrndwatersin the key areas of the
Szigetkoz wouId tend not to reach the covering Iayer of fine soi1 to
provide sub-irrigation?I1 The differential before and afier the
implenreritationof the Original Projecf is even greater during periods of
highflows intothe Danubebed.21a
1.125. SecondIy, thebuilding ofweirsentaiIs a IossofnaîuraIecoIogicaI
f~nctioning.~'9In the shortterm, grorrndwaterIeveIscan be raised but
without reproducingtheir natural variability, which isessential both for
tlieadjacent habitats andthe more extensive groundwater systemI.n the
longterrn,serious questionsremainas to their sustainabilitywith respect
to sediment deposition and groundwaterquality changes. Moreover,
undenvaterweirs create an artificial and unrepresentativeenvironment,
with long-term ecological effects. The EC Experts Croup, which
recornrnendedthe buildingofweirsas an interimmeasure,acknowledged
the danger and fi~tilityof brriIdingweirs if the Danube were anly to
recsive a srnaIIfl~w.~~In fact, weirs were never provided for in the
OrigiriaIProject. As theSIovakMernoriaiacknowledgeç, these were only
"foreseen"existing in 1989.221
214 SeeTable4.
215
Forissueofwaterqualiiysee above,paragra1.76-1.121.
21
SeePlafe6b. ForafurtherdescriptseeHM,paras5.60-5.67.
218 SeeScienfifEvaiuation, C-M,vo2, Tabl3.5.
I9 SeeScieirceEvaI~zalH,C-M,val2,chap 4;seebeIorr,aragraph3s.I-3.105.
220 Worki~rgGronp of Monitoringand WaterManagementEirpensfur theGabtikavo
SysterofLoch, Repon on Ttmporary WaterManagemen tegime,1 December
1993;HM, Annexes,voI5(pari2), anr19,point 7.9.
Z21 SM,para2.70. I
(a) Theimpactonmils:
I
1.127. The area affected by tIreOriginal Projecflisa Iargealluvia1plain,
rich in varionsvaItiablenaturalecosysfems.At tfiesame rime, the area is
a traditionally importaniagricuItura1and foresfq region iriHungary.The
distribiition of soiIs.has developed in respon'seto-the groundwater
~girne.~~ The area has a continental clinlat weith exbernes of
temperattire and Iow precipitation. The rnoisturqregirne (the depth and
fluctuation of the groirndwater-table)and hydrqphyçicalcharacteristics
of the soiIçof the Danube alluvial terracegenerallymitigatethe impacts
of weather extrernesover much of the regi~n.~~~ The SlovakMernorial
ignoresthe importanceofthis naturalsub-irrigationsystem.
1.128. High quality groundwater is drawn up! by capillary action to
provide an importantcontributionto the water-useof natural vegetation
and cultivated crops. This can only occur, however, where the
groundwater-tablereachesthe fine-texturedsediment which overlie the
grave1aqrrifers of the aIlrrviaIterrace. Any chànge tu the gi-ourrdwater
table changes the soi1moistuw regime.This in Grn determines the water
available for plant-transpirationand aerationand temperatureof the soiI.
Thus the nutrient starus of the soi1is affectai, and itrthe Iongferm, soi1
stniciure. This modification affects agricrilti~re, forestry and the
ecosystem.
1.129. As conciuded in the Scientific~valuatibn, the Original Project
would have had different effectsin different areas dependingon the type
of soil: this is clearly shown inFigur e.224 Plate 68 demonstrates the
likely impact of the Original Project on capillary moisture supply. It is
estimated that 80 square kilometreswould have! suffereda total loss-of
moisture supply, and 167 square kilometres at leastsome reduction of
capillarywater.225 !
I
1.130. This losscorrld have beenexpected to re-It in importantchanges
to IacaIsoil moisture and dremical regimes, to species and to biologicâl
productivity, to soi1productiviv and to crop yi~Idsand the secürity of
yield (Le.,renderingthem nroredrorrghtse~rsitivef.~~~
i
222 ScientgcEvaiuation.HC-M.vol2, chap5.1.6.
223 HM, paras5.60-5.67.
224 SeealsoHM, paras5.60-5.67.
225 ScientiJEvaluatianHC-M,vol2, Table3.5 andPlate66.
226 HC-M,Annexes,vol 4 (parZ)annex20.
1 Case 1 Case2 Case 3
GraundwaierIeuet Groundwaterlevel Groundwaferlevel
wrthithe above the çinkfsromcaverIayer
graves:iata grave1strata tothegravelstrata
Predamcapillarynse . 0 mmlyear 100-150mmlyear 100-150 mmlyear
PostdarncapiIlaryriçe Ornmlyear 50-010rnrneear Ornmbear
Figure 2: The egecroftheIowerirtgof~hg erounha~er ableoncapiIIaty rise
I.i3 1. The dianges inthe rnoisrure regirneof soi15were aIçoIikeIy tu
result in importantlong-term changes to the biogeochemicaf cycleo sf
various elements,and the chernical regime of the soil. Of particular
concemis the potentialdeveloprnentof carbonateaccumulationlayers,
lime concretions and lime coated gravels.Changes to the soil water
regime can lead to carbonatehardpandevelopment, and hence a
reductionin effectivesoil depth,isolationfromunderlyinggroundwater
anddrought sensiti~ity.~~~
227 HC-M,Annexes,voI 4 (par2),annex20.1.132. Lowering of groundwater-tableswouIdhaveled to a loss of soil
fertility. While water-table increases might have:had favourable effects
from the perspective of iincreasedsub-irrigation, a ntrmber of adverse
consequences couId also have been anticipated. Tfiese would have
inclnded loss of aeration, Ieadingto unfavourablechanges in soil biota,
micrabioIogica1 processes and nutrient regirne;problems of fIIage and
general access byagricuIturalmachines; carbonateacctrrnulation,with
implications as described abovq secondaj salinisationialkaIisati011
processesunder the influencesof a stagnant sha11owwater-table and Irigh
gratrndwatersalinity.22g
1
1.133. For the light soils of theregion, with poor soil water retention
characteristics,frequent irrigationwould have been necessary to replace
the natural capillary supply to agricultural crops.Yet, irrigation would
not have improvedthe situation inal1 areas, ;or would it have been
beneficial tothe natural ecosystems.Not only isirrigation expensive,but
thereare potential adverseenvironmentalcon~equences.2~~ It canlead to
chernical leaching and soi1 structure degradation. SoiIs also becorne
vulnerable to surface degradationfrornfrequent irrigation.Sub-irrigation
frorna srrpplyof grotrndwaterhas noneof thesenegativeeffecrs.
1.134. Strrdieshave shownthatduringthe period 1980-1992,53% of the
farmland had sufficient groundwateravailable for natural sub-irrigation
due to capillaryrise.For al1cropspecieçandsoil,types,yields are linked
to water-table levels.For example,for averagerainfall years before 1992
areas with water-tables within2 metres of the surface showed a yield
increase of 10.8%; forwater-tables between 2 mies and 3metres below
the surface the yield increase was 7.4% as comparedto those without
sub-irrigation. Indry years, the effect of a high gronndwater-table Ievel
was muchgreater ( 15-19% y ieIdincreasefor higtiwater-tableconditions;
IO-11% increafs oer 2-3 rnetrewater-tabledepth~)?~~
, '
1.135. The koundwater-table wouId have been redrrced in much of the
Szigetküzif the OriginalProjecthad-beenirnj~Ie~&~ted.~~ A~Iready prior
to Hungary's termination, 130 hectares of fierds and 260 hectares of
l
\ I
228 ScientifîcEvaluation,HC-M,volchap5.1.Ci.
1
129 Scienti/icEvaiu~lion,HC-M,vol2,chap5.1.6.
230 SeeScient$c Ewluution,HC-M,vol 2,chap5.21;seIalso HC-M, Annexes,vol4
(parZ),SummaryReport, annex20. 1
231 Seesupraparagraphs1.69-1.75 grass lands were Iost for agriciiItnra1productiondue to cansfruction
activities.The decrease inprodrrctivityof the landwouId have rsrrlted in
significantagricultrrrallosses.
1,136. Furtherdownstream in the DanubeValleyregiondecreasesin the
'water-tablecould havedried out areas which are currently overlywet, as
the Slovak Memorial notedn2J2But it did not mentionthat those areas
would have becomemore sensitive to drought because of the change in
the soil regime.233
(cl Impnctonforets ry
1.137. TIre active floodplain in this area waç historically the most
productive region in Hrrngay for timbar production.zf4 The yearly
growth of timber was much higher than the nationaI average. Estirnates
Vary as to the average growth rate. Some indicate that the rate was 5-6
times greaterthan the national and others indicaterhe rate to
Iiavebeeritwice the national average.'% Inthis areawarefaund some of
the mostproductivewood speciesof the country;the "noble" po Iar and
P
the willow.Theaverageannualgrowthrate of thesewas 30-40 m /ha.237
1,138. Many of the areascurrently used for forestrywould have been
affected by the changes to soil and water quality from the
implementationof the OriginalPr~ject.~~~ EstimatesVaryas to how the
232 SM, para2.I17.
233 Moreover, ttie SIavakMetnoriaI's cirattothe Hydro-Qutbec report in para
2.117havebeeniakenoutof contexrHydro-Québec'spreviousparagmphsrates:
"La plainede dtbordernensiruéeentre Ie barragde DunakiIitetla
restitutiàrPalkovifovcisera draietil en rksuIfeunemodification
majeurede I'tquilibrebiolagdeücetrrégion."
"The alluvial plain situated bwween the DunakilitiBarrage the
reconnectioal PalkoviEovowillbedrained and will resuItin a major
modificationofthebiologicalequilibriurnofthis region"
HM,Annexes,vol 5 (part lanncx9,p 226.
234 SeealsoHM, paras5.72-5.74.
235 Standpointof ERTI[ScientificInstituForestry,udapest]8 November1994.
235 Scienigic Evl~lrrnf,C-M, vol2,chap 5.3.
237
L.Halupa,and1.CsbkBnBSzabadoT s,heForests in KisaIfdIdRegi(1994174 (5)
HydmISgiaiKdzIony,p271..
23g HM, paras2.60-2.74. Farexample,becauscof the seriously rednced discharge into
the partofrhe Danube flowing rhough the Szigetkij~the OriginProjcrthndgrowth rate of trees in the floodplain wouldhave been affected.It is
suggested however that with the changein the water regime and soi1
regimes, more than one-half ofthe treeç of thk SzigetkozwouId have
decayed or died out within 15 years of the OriginaI Pr~jecr.~~~ Itwas
proposed toreplacethe riparianforests with droughrtoleranr mecspecies -
and ro sufferthe drop in productivity; in this prupoçalecologicalaspects
werenotc~nçidered.~~~
(8)FLORA ANDFAUNA '
1.139. The impact of the Original Projec otn the natural environment
(flora andfauna)receivesjust three pages in the SlovakMern~rial.~~~
Eventhe chosen passagesfrom the BechtelandHydro-QuébeR ceports,
which arepresented to refuteHungary's"ecologicalstateof necessi@'
argument,242 do not incorporate a single sentenceon the core theme of
ecology,that isonhabitatsf ,loraandfauna.
1.140. This is not becausethe BechteIReport was silent onflora, fauna
and habitats.Of the 92 pages devoted to imIjact description, 31 are
devoted tu "biology". The failure of SIovakia' to address those parts
reflects rrneasewith concIrrsio~isuch asthe foII6wing:
"Due fo the uniqueness of this system [of habitats in the
Szigerküzdependhg onthe groundwaterregime]andthe Iackof
baselinedata,impactson wildlife,particularly waterbirds using
the sideam systemcannotbe assesse dccurately.Inthe event
thatsudace waterlevelsdroppedsignificantlyin theside arms,
importantbreedingand feeding habitat could be lost and
adverse impacts on waterbirdscould result, which shouldbe
avoidedbyal 1rnean~."2~3 1
I
!
-
envisianed replacing the riparianfwitha drriukht toleranr sptoiIet the
ma continuetu staygreen. The draught-IuIermt s'pewou1d not have been
nearIyasprodr~ctive.
233 1 Liirig,Environmental ProbIems(1994).Treeproductiviryhas been subsfantiaIIy
affectebythereduction iwa?erdischargfrom VarianC. See beIow,paragraphs
3.72-3.76. I
1
241 SM,pp97-1 00. , 1
242 SM, para8.28 1
4
243 BechtelReport;HC-M; Annexes v,ol 4(parl), an1ex1,p 2-29.Forothersuch
quotationsreflecting Bechtei's uneawith biological mattersee above,
paragraphs.30-1.31. i '
I
I
I "Changes in ground water and surface water IeveIscould also
potentially impact the sensitive wiIdIifeareanear~svin~raï-6,
the habitatof the.four protected birds discussed above, as weII
as other wiIdIifere~ources."~~~
"Tt is conçidered IikeIyThar the 95 percent reduction of flow to
the old cIra~irreIarrd resultant Ioss of aquatic and riparian
vegetation (within the zone betweerrthe ~nairrclrarrneland the
side arm systern) wiII affect a wide diversity of çpecies and
çubstantialnurnbersalong the 25 km reach.TIiis is expected to
bea regionailysigrificarit Iong-terminrpa~t.''~~~
"OveraII,Iossof and changesto the natural vegetationalong the
NyergesirjfaIuto Nagyrnarus reach are expected to affect a
substantial portion of the remaini~igfringe forest and utlrer
riparian vegetatio~i.Suchdianges are-expectedto be per~narient.
This içconsidered to be a long-tem çignificantimpact."z46
"TIieSzigetkozçidearmçwiIIbe diked,eliminatingaccess from
the ~anube. Fish populations which curre11tIyrriigrats to the
area to spawn wiII no Ionger be able to do so. A decrease in
thesepopulationsisanti~ipated."~~~
"Loss of migratoryfish access to spawning grounds in the side
channe1 system wiII resnlt from blocking the autIets to the
Danubeand instaI1ating Isic]theweir atAsvanyrar6to maintain
rhe water IeveIs inthe side anns. TIiiçis expected to resuItirra
regionaIIysignificant, Iong-tem impact on some fish çpecieç
inhabitingthe Dan~ba"2~8
"This Iws of vegetation wiII be a Io~rg-tem impact of the
project. Vegetation cIeared for the Dunakiliti reservoir is
peimanently Ioçt, and alternation [sico ]f wiIIow thicket and
wiIIow-poplar forest vegetation to associations requiri~ig Iess
water içalço expected to be permanent.. AdditionalIy, these
natura1vegetation typesareecoIogicaIIyimportantbecause they
support a greater diversiv and abrr~rdarrce of bird syecies than
244 BechfelReport;HC-M. Anncxcs, vol4 (part I), anrre1,p 1-12. IncidenkiIIy,
Bechtel\vasmistaken in beIieving that there wer4 birds deserving prolccted
status.Asdescribedin the Hu~rgarimMenroriaI,Appendicesand2, there are far
morethan4 birdscurrerrtlyprotectnotonlywithinHungary,butintcyirationally.
245
BechtelReport;HC-M, Anncxes,vol4 (partl), anne1,p2-26.
246 BechteIReport;HC-M,An~rexesv,ol4 (partI), annexI, p 2-45.
247 BcchteIReportHGM,Annexes ,oI4 (partIlmnex 1, p2-85.
245 BechteRI epor; C-M,Annexesv , o4(pari:11m,nex 1,p1-13. do the plantedpoplar stands in the floadpIain of the Danube.
Becauseof tfieimportanceof tfiisnatriralvigetation, the extent
of the area to beaffected,and thelong-km natureof the effect,
this is corisidered to be a long-tem regioriaIIy significant
impact.''249
I.I4 1. The Hydro-QuébecReport was aIsoclear:
"De faqon généraIe,outre les pertes économiquesliées à
l'occupation du territoirepar Ieprojet et les aspecb de qualité
des eaux souterraines, I'information fournie n'a pas perniis de
juger des impacts directs ou indirects associees à la gestion
courante de debits et des niveauxsur Ies diffsrents aspects de
I'envir~nnement."~~
1.142. Instead, the SIovakMernorialstresses: i
that nurnerouçstudieçwere d~ne;~~I
(1)
(2) that the bççeç ariçing from a "change :in Iand use" must be
examintd in Iightof thetypeof area affe~ted;~~~
3 that the major environmenta1effect to th; areahas aIready beeri
fek;2S3
(4) that mitigationmeasureswereenvirag aeiof 1989:~' and
(5) that tlre harrnfueffects of the Original ~foject have for the most
partoccurred duringconstruction.253
244 BechteI Report;HGM, Annexes ,ol4 (partI),annexIi,2-23
250
Hydro-Québec;HM, Annexes,ml 5 (pm 1),annex3, pp290-291.In translati~n
thisreads:
"Ingenerai ,ther thanrheecmmic Iosscsassocialed with use of the
Iand by the project and thc aspects of groundwater qüaIify, the
infomïationgiven doed ralIolvajudgementtobemade onthedirect or
indirect impactsassociatedwith thepremanagemen tf discharand
Ievelsondifferentenvironmeabl aspects".
2S SM, paras2.14,220-2.22.
252 SM,para 2.104.
253 ~~,para2.111
254 SM, para2.113.
235
SM, para2.104:"Iossof ove3AOOhectares offorest";SMpara2.112:"254 - 300
m wide zone of fiaodpIain vegetawonId be subjcctIoaridification"; para
2.114:"resultantreduction in natr~nl.vegelaSM,npara 2.1.15"TheeEect of
I - - - - - - - - .. -. -
I
59
TheMerriorialalsa argues thattheSzigetkljz'%il1actuaIIybenefit fromthe
Projecf which willnot only gguarantetehe required water flows in somc
areas but will also haltthe damagingsinkingof the Danube riverbed that
was dryingout the region'snaturalmeadowandforestland".25"
1.143. It has already been shownthat implementationof the Original
Projectwouldhavecauseda reductionin the ~ater-table~~~ and that there
were other possibilitiesfor haltingthe sinking of the riverbed.ls8 The
rernainderofffiissectionwillfocusonrefutingthefiveSlovakcontentions,
and inthatcontextwiIIbrieflydescribetherisksanddamagethat wouId,in
aIIIikelihood,havebeenencountered with the Pr~ject.~~~
1.144. The SIovakMernoria1clai~ns that "more than 200 proposals for
,ensuringsuch protection loftlreenvironment] were Fomuiated" and tire11
Iists a numberof areas relating to flora and fauna as among tlreareas
addressed by propos al^.^^ ^ o citation is provided indicatingwhere
these proposals originatedfrom or what consequences they produced.
Most of the proposals appear geared to forestry planning and fish
stockingrather than protectionof flora andfauna. To the extent they do
address flora and fauna, they faced the dificulty that insufficient
biological information existed both in 1977 and in 1989.26' If the
proposaisare proof of any contention, fhey demonstratethe out-datd
approach that srnaIIcomponents of the "naruraI environment" cari be
micro-managed toprovideirnprovernentç to na?xre.262
1.145. The SIovakMemorialrnakes the foIIowingcommentsabout the
affected area in Hungary, Ieading to the conclnsion rhat, Iooked at in
historical perspective, "it is quite clear that the major 'environmenta1
impact'had,alreadybeenfelt7'.263 It states:
the Projecton this vegetation woagainbe some reductiodue to construction
works".
236 SM,pata2.III.
257 See paragraphs1.69-1.75.
258 Sce paragraphs1.67-1.69.
159 Thesehave alreadybeen describedin delailtheHM, chap5, andAppendices 1
and 2.
260 The proposalspertainingto flora and fauna supposedlysuggested withithe
framework oftheBIOPROJEC TredescribedinSM,para2.20.
261 Seequotationsfromthe Bechteland Hydro-QuébeR ceportsseoutin paragraphs
1.31-1.32above.
262 SeecritiqueofthephitosophyoftheSM above atparas1.04-1.11.
263 SM,para2.111. "iitn);OstrovandSzigetkozare not nature&.serves."2~~
"16% (approximafe1y 6,500 hecrares) içm&e rrpof industrial
Iand,residentialIandand bytiatural habita1.''~6*
These areas are "heavily cultivated" and "significantIy
pop~Iafed."~~~
The vegetation cansisk of approximately "80% artificial(Le,,
managed)poplar trees."*67
1
-1tadds that one of the main polluting sources of the Danube is
agriculturaflertilisatioof Szigetkoz rig gin.^^^
I,146. Thischaracterisationof the area is inaccukate:
* In ~ungak the Govemment eçtablished the Szigetktk nature
protectionareaZbP on 9,158 hectares of which 5,948 lia(55%) are
forets; many of the species there are prbrected accordirig fo the
BerneConventiorrand TtTCN.270
* "Natural" Iandçcape, Le., forestsinciudingindigenousspecies and
free water surfaces (sides arms, lakes, dead side-ams),
encompassesat least one-fou~hof the ~zi~etkoz; at least 64% of
the Szigetkdz vegetation indicates a' quasi-natural status,
harbouringa largeamountof protectedHungarian fauna.271
*
These "artificial forests"have botanicaland zoological value, in
part because most of the originalvegetation rernainsaIIowingfor
high habit diversis. There are protected animais, protectedflora,
inclrrdingmanyspecies of or~hid.~~~
264 SM,para 2.110.
26s SM, para2.110.
266 SM, para2.111.
267 SM,para2.1 12.
26g SM,pm2.r1I.
GovemmentDecree 111987 (III.151,1March 1987;HC-M,Annexes,vol3, annex
42.
r
270 See HM, vol1,appendix2,TabIe1. I
Meszi~os,errrlThe Descriptioofthe EcaIogicaIValriofthe SzigetkGzIniand
Delta;HC-M,Annexes,vol 4 (par2)annex18. ,
272 For exampleHippIoaisicterina(IcterineWarblcr)canlbefthere.
1
i* FertiIisersarenotusedatalIinthefIoodplain,arenotusedinIarge
quantities elsewhere, and do not poliute the Da~iube, as distinct
fromthe shallowgroundwaterandthe MosoniDanube.
1.147. It is truethatthe area in question servesmultiple purposes, but
the economic values of forestry,agriculture, and fishing do not detract
from the value of the Szigetkozas su~h.~~T ~he alluvial cone of the
Danubeis principaIIya foçsil inlarrddelta.Thismeansthat the width and
thüs the size of the riparian habirat is Iarge. Its geographical,
geomarphologica1and hydrologicalfeaturesand the speciaIdimate lead
to the development of species combinations thatdiffer hm the usnal
species of European rivervaIIeys.
1.148. The Slovak Memorial argues that the losses could have been
mitigatedifthe OriginalProjectitself hadbeenmodifiedto include:
* an increasedflow totheDanubeof 350m3/s;
thebuilding of underwaterweirs;
* a revegetationpIana, nd
* an "unfunded pIan ta expand the rernnants of the native forest
along the MosoniDanube."274
1.149. But these mitigation measures were not incorporated into the
plans of the partieas of 1989.275Moreover,theywould not have solved
theproblems:
*
A discharge of 350 m31sis stilI only a small fraction of the
waditionaIdischargeof 2000m3/s.Manyof the problemscurrentIy
existing widi Variant C (which hashad a discharg ofbetween
200rn3is-350 m3k)wouIdstilI o~cur.~?"
273 ÇeeMtsziros,efal, The Descripiion of the EcoIoVdues of 1fiSzigetkiiz
InIand DeIfa; 1-IAnnexes,vol 4,annex18;see aIso HM, voII,paras5.15-
5.24.
274 SM, par2.1IR
275 The uncertaistatusof these proposaisandthe fact that Hungabasnever
officiallybpresented ita proposalofaincreasesndischargto350 rn3/s,as
wu discussedboveinparagraph1.53.
276 SeeScienf$c Evaiuatiochap3.* Weirs are problernafic, particuiarlyif they are coupIedwith low
discl~arge."~
* The Slovak Mernorial freats the revegerafion proposa1 in the
Bechtel ~e~ort~~ ~sa simpleoperationsirnilar to the replacement
of a shiplockgate.279Revegetationand expansionof the "native
forest"along the MosoniDanubewould not havebeen harmful,
butwouldnothavecompensatedforthedestructionof substantial
forests,faunaandflorain the Szigetkozwithinthe contemplated
lifeofthe ~roject.~~~ I
The prûposed mitigation measrires shwld bi measured against tlre
serious impacts to florstand fauna frein the operation of the _Original
Project,whichmaybesiimrnarised as foIlowçlB1
(a) ImpacaonJura andfauna
1.150. ThehydrologicalregimeenvisagedbythkOriginalProjectwould
have been likely ta have drastic effects on flora and fa~na.~~~The
See3.1O1-3.114fo riscussioafweirs.
27B SM, para 2.113,citing Bechte Repo(secHC-M. &nues, vol 4, mnex 1,p 2- -
23).
279 "The rnost,effectivemitigation[againstreductilvegetationinthe regionof
Nagymaros]would be re-vegetationprogmms.Thishas been consideredby the
parties"; M, par2.115.This statemensuggeststhatconsideratiois actioand
actionisalwayssuccessful.
280 The Slovak MernoriaWats rhc replacementof ffoodi~ainvegetafionby vcgeiation
adapted 10drier suil(such asoak steppe)iisan acceptableconsequence of
sîgniticmtly Iowerwaterdischarinthe Danube;SM pm 2.112.
2g1 Theçe impacfswere aIready exiensivelydescribed in'the Hungarian Mernoria1in
rhap 5, and~urrentare describeintheScienfz$Evaluation,HC-M,vol 2, chap
4,andHC-M,Annexes,vol 4, annex17.Thissectionwillhighlightthkey impacts.
282 The anticipatedhydrologicalimpactsof the OriginatProject influencinthe
ecosystemofthe Szigetkbcanbe surnmarisedsfolIows:
- a drastireductionofthe dischargeithe main channelof the Danubein the
Szigetktiregion;
- fioodsratoenterthe floodpIainexceatafloodpf6,Sf)Q-7,50rn3ts;
- rhose fcw floods'which mec1rhe necessarycritetobe dischxged intothe
Danubeenter the ffoodpIainand theaIrnoa deiiccated mainchanne1 in an
extremelyshortirneandwithhigh velocity,
1
!importanceofwetlandsand the potential effectçof hydrologic changes
aredescribed in detaiI inChapter 4 of the Science Appendixand in its
annexes. These changes wouId Iikely have included the foliowing:
changes of the çpecies composition, disappearance of more sensitive
species,andreplacement by species of lowersensitivity.In the Danube
ValleybetweenSapandNagymaros,thepeakpowerdailyfluctuationsof
benveenone and fourmetreswould have hada devastatingimpacton
aquaticspe~ies.2~~ Theinitial surge of waterreleasedintothe tailwater
canal when the turbines commence daily operations is extremely
turbulentwithrapidchangesindepthand velocity of the water.284 The
highly fluctuating water levels would have been unsuitabIefor rnost
terreçtriaIarid aquatic ~rganisrns. In~~t~e Nagymaros Reservoir,
approximateIy 20 islands, peninsulas and Iarge partsof the shoreline
wouldhavebeen submergecid ,esrroyingthe narrowbutactivefloodplain.
IIIthe section downstream ofNagymaroshabitats would have been Iost
becauseof theIowerjr~o gfthe riverbed.296
1.1S1. Peak power operation watrld not onIy have affected aquatic
habitats and other organisms in the irnpoundmentbetween GabEikovo
- daily fluctuationsof severmetresin the water level with inverse flow
directions,primarily in the middle and lower reaches, as a result of peak
operaiioitGabEikovo;
- significachanges in rhgroundwaterIevcIsnear the reservoir(primarily an
incremc), in the Szigetkfizregion fprirdecrine)and aIong the whde
sectionhm PaIkoviCo voNagymaros(bat ncreaseanddecIind e,pending
rIponthearea).
SclenlificEvatunrio~,HC-M,vol2,sh4.4.2.3.
283 Indeed,downsrrem of FaIko~i~ov (aap), Ihe SIovak Mernoriaadmiis that
"furthervegctationwoufdbelost",thieouIdhavebeee'"somechangesinspecies
type", and some areastherecouldhave been "colonisationof more hydrophilic
species".SeeSM,para2.114.
284 Inmanycase,thesuddenshifiinflowcanexceedthe rcactionrateof fauna,leaving
aquaticspeciesstrandatlowflowsorentrainedby high flows.
285 Spawning sitesandnursery zones for fish woulhave been unable to exist.
Embryo snd juveniles of fishescould not have survived.The rapid changes in
temperatureresultingfromthe fluctuationsalsohaveresultedin speciloss.
Z3u The Ioweringof rhe riverb- downstreaofNagyrnaroswouIdIiavedegradedthe
riverbedhy0.60-1.20 rnaverage ;em, ImpactHs,GM, Annexes v,ol4(par I,
annei;5.Thedmp inwaterIeveIsiuhichwor11dhaveaccornpmied the degradation
hasben showninanother stretcafthe Danube,atAitenwi)rihAustriq to cause
negaiiveffectto the vegetatofnthat particularstratthe AuslriaDanube.
Similar impacarefobeexpectedintheNagyrnaroarea,and Nagyrnaros, but would have resultedin changes to the habitat287
because of increasedsedimentationfurtherdown~trearn.~~T ~o tlieextent
dredging wottld then have been necessary, itwouId have had further
impactsonhabitats.
1.152. Many iloodplain ecosysternsof other rivers have experiençed
Barnage and destrncfiun caused by river regufation and waterpower
deveIoprnent.The Upper RIrirrebetweenBasel, Swifzerland,and Rastatt,
Gerrnany, isa usefr1e~arnple.~~T ~here three stepsof river training have
beencarriedout since thebeginning oflastcentury(see Plate 3). Every
stage of the regulation workswas accompaniedby unexpected,serious,
adverse effects which were meantto becorrected with thenextmeasure.
Nevertheless,othereconomicandecologicaldamage oc~urred.~~~ The
overall impactsweredisastrousforfloraand fauna.At the lowerportion
of the 70 kilometresection of the by pass canal, 81%of the alluvial
forestsdecayedordied (phase 1).Inthe partiallydivertedsection, only
some lyprcalvegetationandtheir fauna survived wifhinthe inundation
dykes, though wirh considerable change in the compositionof çpecieç
(phase 2). In thesection of riverbarrages(phase 31,theentirefloodplain
ecosystem no longer became inundated.Most of the vegetation (85%)
changedfrombeingfypicaland adaptedtu tlieecologicalconditionsof a
fioodpIain to beingunadaptedarrduninfluencedby grorindwater.In none
of the regrrfatedsectionsof the RIii~ie couid tlie nafuralvegetatio~iand
wildlife be preserved. TIre new communities have been judged
significantlylessvaluablefrom theecological andconservation pointof
view.291
!
287 ln the Nagyrnarossection,tSlovakMernorialadmitsthatin some areaswhere
waterlevel wouldhaveincreasedherewould havebeen "reductio..andchange
to more hydrophiliscpecies",andonceagainpropos+mitigntiby revegetation.
See SM, par2.115.
288 SC~R~$C EvQ!~~LT~ ~oR-, ,VGI ,chap2.3.2 i
289 For mm details,seeScienrfiEvaI~tafimHC-M, vol2,chap4.4.2.3and HC-M,
Annexes vol4,annex 16.
290 Sirnila effeclshabeenobservecflorexarnpetrheRh6ne River(Fmgef I9321.
Z9r SeeHagin,Theriparian rvuodsof the southernUpper-Rhva1Ie- Changingmd
endangering by Mine deveIopmen(1981);Disreret al,WaterManagementand
ecologicai perspectivof the Upper Rhine's floodplains(1990); Hügin &
Henrichfreise, egetationanwaterbalanceof the forestadjacentto the Rhine.
Assessmentfor natureprotectionin the Badenfloodplainothe Rhine(1992);
Losing Ecologicaleffects of the managemtysteniof connectesidebranches
demonstratedbytheexampleof theregulationof sidebranchesof the Rivermine
(1994),HC-M,Annexes, vol 4 (partZ),annex 15. The predominant plant
communitiesof thelowerand upperhardwood ripariy forestshabeen replaced
bythoseof theoldestanduppermosltevelsof thehoodplai nnd areno longer
influenceby groundwaterT.he influenceRonds haç become negIigibas weII.1.153. As described above>32 France and Gemany frnaIIy decided to
breakthevicious circle of correcting thenegative impactsof a barrage by
buildinganotherfurtherdownçtream and opted for a small-scale solution
with the controlledaddition of riverbedrnateriaLzg3About 10years ago
a large programme was started on the Upper Rhine to restore floodplain
habitats damaged or lost by the implementation of the Upper Rhine
barrage~ystern.~~~
1.54.Thus there is srrfficieievidencefrom borh Hungaryand abroad
tliattheOriginaIProjectwonIdbeIikeiyro havedestroyed one of the few
rernaining wetlands in a vaIuabIe riparian zo1ie296 and a
iiistoric inlanddelta. AIfIroughit is diffrcrrltto quanti@the impacts with
precision, examples of projects iri other countrieç are usefi1 iri
identifyinglikely resultsinH~ngary.*~~
(iS)Fisheries
1.155. No argument in the SIovak Mernorial specifically addresses
fisheries. The assurnption appearç to be, however, that rnitigation
measuseswiIIsolve anypossibIeproblerns.
1.156. The Original ~r~ject-was IiigfrIyIikely to have an exterisive
inipact on fauna, in pai-ticularfiçh: there worildhave been clrarrgesin the
species composition, disappearanceof more sensitive species, and
Due io the IorigIife-cycIeof rvspecies,theconversionof thefores~sis srin1
process,bu1therhataçferisticspcciesof rheherb Iayerhave m,mifestedthechange.
Z9Z See above,paragraph158.
293 Sce Plcite4, and Science ~YRIuu!~~ ~I~,M, vol 2, chap 2.6.1, and HC-M,
Annexes,voI 4 (pan I), annex7;andBatik & Kali?.,SiIting PrabIems;TICM,
Annexes, vol4 (part 11,ann5.
294 The programmecombinesflood protection measureswitecologica estorationand
is callcd the "Integrated Rhine Program"; see Plate5; see also Scientijic
Evaluafion,HC-M,vol 2,chap4.4.2.3.
295 For an indicationof its valucs, seMészBros ,t al, The Description of the
F~oIogicaIVaIuesof the Szige~koInland Della; HC-M,krnexes, vol4 (part21,
annex1%. p4.
296 In ~heIast 200Yeats,80%ofriparian zones in Europeand North hcrica have
disappeared.Sec Mbzhros, EcologicV aaIlues;HC-M, Annexes,voI 4 (pan 21,
annex 1S.p4.
297 HC-M, Annexcs,vol5;andScient$c EvaluariortHCM, vol 2, chap4.4.2.3.replacementbyçpecias of Iower sensitivi~.~~~This predictionis borne
outby rfieexperienwofVariant C.299
d
(9) SEISMIC ANDENGINEmG WSKS
1.157. Slovakia contendsthat "seismic activity is not of a degree
sufficiento posea threat...totheG/N System structureswhichhadof
coursebeendesigned to withstand seismicrno~ernents''.3~ O~ntheother
handHungaryhad andstillhas concerns overseismicrisksinthe region
of the locationof the OriginalProject.These will be assessedin this
section, which surnimarisesthe analysis in Chapter 6 offhe Scienfijic
Evafziaifon.
1.158. When Hungarysurrspended constructionat Nagymaros,merhods
appliedto seismiczoninganddesignfortheproject did rrotconformwith
currenrpractice.Theseismic zoning for theprojectwas establishedin
1965, beforethe methods of riskanalysis thatunderlie current practice
weredeveloped.The 1965zoningwas not intended to set the basisfor
finaldesign;itwas apreliminary assessment subjectto furtherstudyand
re~iew.~O~
1.159, TheSlovakMernorial statesthat"fslome 39 studiesweredevoted
tu researching the geology and seismologyof tlie [Original Project]
area".303The references to these studies dues not exrend ro the
substantiveconclusions conrainedin these reports,but rnerely "fo the
fact of theil-exi~tence".30~ That fact was not, however, sufficiently
reassrtringtothe engineersof Hydro-Québec,who were unable in 1989
298
See HM, paras 5.70-5.90; AVidq HM, vol 1, appendix2; HolEik,et 01,
Hydrobioloa and Ich~hyola ofthe Czechoslovak Danube in relatitorhe
, predictedchangea sfiethe constmctionof the GabEikovo-NagymarR tiisver
BarrageSyster(1981),3Prxe Lab. Rybh. HydrobioIog19I58.
299
SeeScie*~frjEI~~&~I~oH?,-M,va12, chap5.4andsec furtherbelow,paragraphs
3.78-3.80.
SM, para2.60.
301 SeealsHM, pm 5.99-5.105.
302 Minutesof the meetingof the NungarianandCzechoslovakianexpertheldin
Bratislav, 3-25 November,1965,on theseismic zonand itmappingof the
Hungarian-Czechoslo joatkiaaubeBarrageSystcm.
303 SMpara2.12. '
304 Forcorrespondenconbis pointsecabove,paragaph 1.26.to discerna safisfactor- reIationshipbetween existingdata and therisks
of futureseismicactiviiyinthe~egion.3~3
1.160.The SIovakMernorialincorrecflydescribes the relation berneen
the MSK and older MCS intensity scales, and as a result presents a
confused responseto Hungarianstatementson sei~rnology.~~T ~he 1965
seismic zoning, subsequently embodied in the Joint Contractual Plan,
required the Original Project to withstand the seismicintensities that it
prescribed.Theseintensitiesvariedbetween6 and 9 MCS, depending on
location.A level ofintensitycorrespondingto 6 MCS was prescribed for
D~nakiliti.3~~However, based on a probabilistic analysis of historical
data,the HungarianDecIarationsuggestedthat values of jntensity in the
region of 8.7-9.0 MSK rnighr be expected at Dunakiliti.The SIovak
Mernoriad leclaresthisfigure tobe "sirnplywrur~g''.~~~
1.151.This is based on a misinterpretation.The SIovak Mernoria1
assumesthat the MSKscaIe runs from 1 to IO,while the MCS scaIemris
from 1 to 12.3'39In fact both are 12-point scales and are directly
~orn~arable T.h~~SIovakMernoria1thus gives tlieimpressionthat the
1992 Hungarian Declarationof Termination,311which used the MSK
intensity scale, was exaggerated. It may also be a measure of this
confusion that the Slovak Mernorial contends- without any
documentation - that the structurwere originallydesigned to withstand
an earthquake of 9MCS, whereas,as alreadynoted,the JointContractual
Plan specifiedalevel of 6MCSh312
Hydro-QuebecRepor(1490);HM, Annexes,va15(partI)annex9,p252TPoiir
le mumen! il n'a pakte &bIi de reIatioerrlrces donnkeset ceIIesde
néotecIonique").
SM,para2.60note43.
SeeScientijEvaluatioHC-M, vol2, Table6.1, whichsetsforthdesignintensity
levels for varioussectionsof the OriginalProject.Dunaset a6 MCS,
GabEikovoat7 MCS,Komfiromat9 MCS.
SM, para2.62.
SM,para2.60, note43.
WorId Data€enter A for SoljdEarthGeophysics,Manual oJ Seismological
Ohseivaro~ Practire {RepoSE-20, US Depl. of Commerce, 1979,ed PL
WiIlmore,IGS,EdinbürgtSecrioi..4.
Hungarim DecIaratiunon Terminationofthe1977Treaty,15May1442; HM,
Annexes, I 4anne x2.
SM,para2.43.1.162. The SlovakMernorialfrequentlyrefers to the historicalrecord of
earthquakes3l' in justifying the Project's seismic zoning. It is nuw
widelyrecognisedthat hazardevaluation bas4 soIeIyon historica1data
is insirficientwhen applied to largeprojecrs having a wide sociaI and
econornic impact in an area i~r wI~icIi earthqtrakes are not very
f~equent.~'~ T11isis apparently accepted in the SIovakMernoria1whiclr
acknowledges that the structures should have "the abilis to handIe
possibie worçt case scenarius"."'" Inareas of Iowseisrnic tiisyi,plies
retum periodsof tens of tIrousa~rdsofyears, whereas the historicalrecord
is probabIycomplete in respect of large eventsfor a periodof only afew
hundred years. Any assessrnent of the "worst possible" event should
consider the seismicityof the region as a whole, as well as geological,
geophysical, macroseismic andtectonic evidence.
1.163.Various attempts have been made to assess the maximum
credibIeearthquake.The eminent Czech seismologist,Karnik,suggested
a range of maximumcredible earthquake of Richter magnitude, Mm,,
between 6.0 and 6.5.316 For sIralIowear-fhquakes,which predorni~ratein
the region, a Richter magnitude 6-0 to 6.5 earthqrrakcean be expectedtu
313 E.g.,SM,paras2.64,4.17,4.33.
3t4 The IiistoricaIapproacsetlinseisnriczones is adequfo"standard büiIding7",
butnot satisfactoryfor "criticai" structureswherea "more complexhazard must be
made"; KBrnIk ,tal, "Seismic Zoning Map of Czechoslovak-aVersion1987"
(1988) 32 Studiu Geophet Geod 44-150. Thz projecî,as originally envisaged,
cxtended over a 160 kilometresstretch of thc DanuThe largest impounded
volumes of water were the Dunakiliti-Hrukovreservoir (200 million m3),andthe
headracecanal(80milliom3).Impoundmentisprovidedbyan extensivesystem of
dykesihat expose toverallprojcct to agreseismic hazardthan thof a single
elementof thscheme. The depthof retained waterisgreatest at GabE, here
theheightof retained wateris 15metres above the levelof the surraunding land.
The cansequencesof n breachof the dykesystemntrii~ical locationswouId be
serions insarial, ecanornicand enuironmrems.1
315 SM, para2.61.A similarconcIusi~nis reached aysimpIeanalysisbasedon the
recommendationsof the InternationalCornnrissionon Lxge Damswhstatc:
"For dams whose failure woutd presenta great social hami, the
maximum designeanhqriakeruiI1normalIybe characterbyea levdof
motion equaItothat expccientthe dam site fmrn the occurrence of a
deterministicalIy evaluatedmaximumcredibieenhquake... It wibe
required at least that the impoundingcapacity of the dam bemaintained
whensubjecttothatload."
ICOLD (InternationalCommissiO? LargeDams),Bulletin72,"Selecting Seismic
Parametersfor LargeDams"(1989).
316 Kirnik,V,"Seismicityof the EuropeaArea(Part 2)", CzechoslovakAcademy
of Sciences, Prague, 1971.A vaIue Mm, = 6.0 was given for the region in
Khik's "Schemeof EarthquakeProvinces",ublishedin 1978.have arr epicentral intensity of abo8.0 MSK.Comparable values of
ground motion have been usedin tlre design of nuclear facilities in tlie
region(Bohuniceand MochovceinSIovakia,PaksinHungary).
1.154. TIie assessrneriof rriaximumcredible earthquakes in the range
6.0 to 6.5 (Richter magnitude) doeç not seern unreasonablewlren
compared to historicai data for the regiun. The foIIowingexampIes are
noteworihy:
* Ko~naroin Region, 1599: Reports of devastatio~i, a1thougIi
insufficieritiriformatitoassign i~itensiv.
* Ko~nhro~n 1753: 30% of houses irr Komarom were destroyed.
Estimatesof epiceritra1intensity range betweeri8.5ari9.5MSK,
magnitudeestimatedas Richter6-2.ForeshocksobservedinGyur.
* Komm5rom1 ,783: Extensive damage, intensity estimated as 8.0
MSK;magnitudeRicIiter5.3.Foreshocksobserved inGyor.
* Koma1'~~nRegion,1806,I822,1841,1851:Estimatedi~te~isities
of 7 MSK, 6.5.MSK,6.5MSK, 7 MSK, respectiveIy; magnitudes
5.0,4.7,4.7,5.0 respectively.
Thisfrequency ofdamagingearttiquake contrastswiththequies~encs of
theregionas portrayed inthe SIovakMem~riaI.~I~
1.155.Geophysical, geo1ogicaIand rnacroseiçmicstudies carried out by
Hungarian scientists Iiave aIIowed earthquakesource zones to be
identified. The principaI sourcedose to the project are the Mur-Miirz
Ii~re,which runs through BratisIava, and theGy6r-Becske Iirre,wlrich
passes throngh Gyur, KomarornaridNagymaro~.~~~ The most active of
a11sources isthe faulfpassing betweenGy& and Koniironi; at itscIoseçt
point, the fault zone is within about 20 kilometres of GabEikovo.
Dunakiliti is witlrirrabout 30 kiIometresof the Mur-Mün Iine. It is
accepted as currentgracticethat, in estabIishingthe worstcase scenario,
the maximumcredibIeearthquake is assuniedtoactanywhere within the
sourcezones identified.
1.165. The Slovak Mernorial atternptsto reassure Hungary by staririg
tlrat"asa result of such studies, the hydrotIectric plant and navigation
Iocks atGabEikovu were moved 700 rrietreçupstream and away from the
31g SeeBrilla, "Dccp Structure and SeHazardof rhe Gabtikouo-Nagymaros
Region"(Septmibe1944);HC-M,Annexes,vo4 (pa21,anncx21.areaof a geoIogica1fault Iir~e".~IB ~ut the effecis of an earthquakeare
nvt locaIised.Ths application of a maximum credibIeeartliquakeacting
anywherewithin rlie source zones identified would probabIy give a
"worst case scenario"peak grouna d~celeration~~~ of about 0.3 g over
rnucIrof tire project. This IeveIof ground motion isbroadly consistent
with an eartliqrrake intensily of 9 MSK, which the 1992 Hungarian
DecIarationof Temination suggestedrnightbeappropriateto DunakiIiti.
A systernatic analysis of hazard evaluation ris kould be required in
order to eva1uatethe safq of the Project.This Irasnot bsen carriedout. -
1.167. The Hydro-QuébecReport referred to in the SIovakMernorial
concluded that the Iiquefactionof silt and sands"were no? to fear"221
No daia is providedirrtheReport tosupportthiçstaternent.Anevolution
inseismicdesignrnethodobgytook place in the 1970sand 1980s whenit
becalrie apparent, afterthe co1Iapseof the Lower San Fernando Dam iri
California, Irat sirnpIe pseudo-shtic rncthods couId rrot predict tlre
response of water-saturated granuIar nrateriaIs during stro~rgshaking.
TIie Danube fluudplain is covered by recentIy depasited (Holucene)
rnaterials, whidi reach thicknessesof up to 30 rnetresnear GabEikovo.
Such nraferiaIshave been observedin theareain a Ioosecondition, arrd
would have the potential to Iiq~efy~~~ arrdseiile underground motionin
a "worst case scenario". There are four documented occur-rerrcesof
Iiqnefactionhavingoccurred i~ithe Carpathian Basin since 1763.Given
the HoIocene dcptisits' thickness, it is unIikeIy that a11 Iiqrrefiabie
materials have been removed fronr berieath the dykesof the headrace
canalarrdupstreamresewoir, as issuggestedby the SIovakMern~riaI.3~3
I9 SM, para2.12. If anyhing this movt is disrurbing. Il mayindicate thaisSlovakia
awareof datashowingThefauItIinecapableof producingshaking. If such a source
zone exists, lrigheraweIeratatGabEikovomaybe appIicable.Earthquakesin
thisregionare generallyshaIIorvevenls,and can be expectedthat,typicalIy,
.intensity wouIddecreasebyone dcgree wi!h20-km.fiornthe epicenfre. It should
be aoted, huwever, that in~e' ilrTaraccordingtoother factors,suchas Iocnl
gcoIogy, greaterintensicm be expeaed with the increasing thiçknesssoR
alluvialmatcria700 metresisinsignificant.
Peak ground accclerntion refeto the higIrcs1instantaneuus levcl of ground
acce1eratioi-imeasured.In WCis itcorresponds Io30% of gravitationa1 force.
Peak ground acceIentions iexcessd I.Og have been recordd during strong
earthquakes.
32I SM,para 2.60.
322 This occurs when soilIoe fheirsirengtmd aliow Iargedisplacemensto take
place.
323 SM, paras 2.61, 2.66. No datawere prescnted by Hydra-Quebec Io suppan their
stntementsconceming Iiquefaction.possibilityof larger infrequentevents by which to determinethe "worst
case scenario".327 I
1.170.Thus thore were reasonablegmundr for'conoern,review and re-
assessrnent of risks at the tirrrethat ~ungaryfsusper~ded construction
works atNagymaros328 and Dunakiiitiand Iate'rterminated the Treaty.
Those concerns have stIInotbeena1 leviated. j
(10) UTHERRISKSANDDEFICIENCESRELAED TO THEORIGINAL
PROJECT 1
1.171. As addressed in the Hungarian Mernorial,the Barrage System
would have ruined the landscape of both :the Szigetkoz and the
Nagymarosregion and consequentlyhad a negativeimpact on tourism,
particularly in the latter region, the location of the historic site of
Viseg~ad.~~~ Moreover, the groundwater table wonld have risen tu
andangerexcavation of sites datingback totheNeolifhicPeriod(3,500-
2,500 BC)~~ and some of the mostirriportanfsites forearIysetrlement.
SECTION E: THEQUESTION OF FLOODCONTROL
1.172. The SIovakMemwiaIIaysparticuIarernphasison the importance
of the OriginaIProject from the perspectiveof-floodpr0tection.33~It is
true thatthe Original Project wouldhave providedadditionalsecurityto
the region,surpassingthe generally agreed levelof floodprotection (the
so-called "100-yearflood"). But floodcontrol was certainly not a"prin-
327 See above,paragaphI.152.
328 ?he SM corrertStates"Ii]is vifathat lardam stmctutesihairetain hug
amoun!s of waterarsafe and can rvilhsriind naexrrerneflood or constant
undematererosioncondiiionbu!the possibiIity of earthqnakeconditionsaIsd'.
SM, para2.57 .iting the SchwartzStuinthe EcalogidFNFORTReport (HM,
Annexa, val5{paf I)annex6)theSM arguesthatthe prolwas"sound hm an
engineering viewpoinr". SM, para 2.59. CIeuIy if the seismic rwere
underestimatedt,heconstructioncnotbe sounfrom anengineeringviewpoint.
Schwarz wason thesitelessthanone week,renderingit diffictodetermine
whetherstandardswrittenpaperwerecarrieoutinpractice.
T29 SeeHM,photo Nos29and 31;Annexes,vol2. ~eeidescri~tof these impacin
HM,paras5.92-5.96.
SeeHM, Map No 8;Annexes ,ol2.
331 SM,paras1.21-1.34.
! cipar" concern of the TreaQ.332 On the contrary ir was a benefit that
couId have been achieved inother and cheaper ~ays.~~~
1.173. Sincethe 19th ceritury,great plains such as the Szigetkozhave
been protected froin flooding by the construction of levees along the
rivers. The early engineering measureswere more or less based on a
"trial anderror" method. Dykes were usuallybuilt to resistthe greatest
flood observed. When a flood overtopped or damaged the levees,
reconçtmction work adapted them to resist the latest conditions. As the
surror~ndingland becarne more developed and econornicalIyvaluable
over time, ifgradua1IybecameapparenttliattIiisapproacli to the problem
was insensible. The extetrt of economic damage resulring hm a flood
was simply too geaf in cornparison to the cost of added prevention. A
'new nieflrod of determining design standards thus became not only
juçtified butnecessary. The floods of 1954 and 1965 were the impetus
for creating thisnew designstandard; they were not "the impetus for the
[GNBS]" astlieSlovakMernorial con tend^.^^^
1.174 Afierthe flood of 1954, it was realised thatthe traditional "trial
and error"method was no longer appropriate. In 1957,reconstruction and
improvementof the levee systernwere based on a more comprehensive
statiçtica1basis, which caIcuIatedthe 100 year flood levelçand set the
design standards accordingIy .3JsHurigary's diligence in worki~rg tuward
Thisstaridardwas rewardedin 1965; the IiistoricaIDanube-floodof 1965
cauçed no major failures or breakthroughsalong the Szigetkozreach of
the Danube where Ievees had been reinforc'ed. At this time, Irowever,
94% of the Iength of the IeveesIrad not yet been modified to meet the
332
SM, para2.79seeaboveparagraphs1.12-1.19.
333 See Laczay,Flood Protection anthe Gabtikovo-NagymarosProject(hereafter
referrefoas"Flood Proteclion"), Oclo1394;HC-M, Annexes,vol 4 (part 1).
annex9;seealso siitntnaryof flood proiectionisSc'ien<iJcEv~iz~a~H.C-
M, val2,cliq 2.
334 SM, para 1.30.ontrarytothesfatemerin the SIovakMernorial,the deviistating
floodof1954causedfourleveebreaksalongtireHungarîansideof theDanube,not
ttrreSee T'/aie.1.HC-M, hnexes, wI 5; SM, para 1.31.Two-tIrirdsof the
Szigetkijatea wcre inundated, resnlting in sr~bsranrial damage tboth
Czechoslovakiand Hungary. hedamage sufferebyHungarywas383 mihn Ft,
not 15 billionFt (SM,para 1.31) See Laczay,Flood Protection;hnexes,
vol4 (part11,annex9,p5andTable1.
335 These standardwere reviscd in 1964 and 1976,being amended in the Danube
Subcommitteeof theHungarian/Czech/Slovakoundw Water Commissionand
approved by the Govemmcnt PlenipotentiariT.he 1976 standard is sused
today. design standardsfor the 100 year flood. Thus, Hungarydid suf'
damagefrom rIiisfIo0d.3~~
1.175. Despitethe success of the reinforced dykesagainsrcatastrophic
floods,the SIovak Mernoriai contends thatthe 1954 and 1965 flaods
"showed that traditiona1nretlrodspfflood confroI were insufficia endt"
fhar the "irnprovement of dykescouId not respqnd fo urgent needs to
protectthe territ0rf.33~Thisis untrue.By 1965hotal1mettherequired
standard;neverthelessthose that did resisted the flood. It was
acknowledged bybothsidesthatthe appropriate design standard was the
100-yearflood.
1.176. The Slovak Memorialcomparesthe Original Project design
standardsagainst"the existing smctures, which,.at thetirneof the 1965
flood, were onIy capableof handling the 100 year fIood".338 The
impIication iç rfiatno workç were undertakenduring the pcriad from
195'5tr, 1977 and thatsetting the skdard at the 100 year floodIeveI was
inadequate. Infact,substantial workswere carrieciout dong the Danube
between 1967-1977. By 1977, reinforcementof the dykesystem in the
Szigetkozreacli irrcorporateda safetyIeveIof 1.2metresabovethe 100
year flooddesignstandard as adoptedin 1976.339 C'ontraryto the Slovak
Memorial- which impliesthat the preventionof seepagethroughthe
grave1layersof the Danubecouldonlybeattained byconstructionof the
-OriginalPr0ject3~- O the necessary structures to preventseepage had
been incorporated intotheirnproved dykesby 1977.As to the 100-year
flood level itself, both sides had accepted this design Ievel, which
.complieswith intemationa1çtandards.341
I.177. This is no?todenythat tlieOriginalProjecrwouIdhave irnproved
existingfloop drotecfion in the region.342Bnr theOriginal Project would
336 SeeLaczay,FloodProtection; C-MAnnexes ,ol4 (partl), ann9.
337 SM,para 1.34.
338 SM,para 2.51.
339 The onlyexceptionwasalong theRajka-Dunakiliti,hertheDunakiliti-HruSov
Reservoidykewas planned.TheMosoni Danube 'efbank floosystemalsodid
no!meetthe requirements.
j4' SM, para 1.34.
j4* Se, HC-M,Scieiice Evalzzafivol2, chap2.2.4The SIovakMernoria1Iist19
floodoccumng affe1955(SM, para1.21.Of these4wereclassficdas "second
dcgree floods", 2 as'third degrec" floods. notrccord ofsignificantflood
damage &er 1965,and no evidcnce aa11that thedykesystm i~r1977 wiis
inadequate. !
342 Constnictiostillrernaitobedone -incorporatinhe1976standards.rnerelyhave addedadditionalsecuriry ru whatwas otherwisea secure
floodprotection~ystern.~~~
SECTION F: THEPROBLEMSOF NAVIGATION
1.178. The SIovak Mernorial emphasises and re-emphasises the
supposedbenefitsof theBarragesystemfor navigationontheDanube.It
recallsthehistory of theworksundertaken for improving
stressestheconsequentialdeclineof thewater andtheneed to
removethe obstacles to navigation,346 and suggests that the Barrage
Systemwouldhaveallowedfor a 100%increaseof ship trafficon the
river.J47
1.179 The navigatiori provisio in the 1977 Treaty was intricately
reIafed with the furtherance of social inkgration and fraternal
reIati0ns.3~8The Treatygave no elevatedstarilto navigation among its
purpases, as the SIovakMernoria1irnpIie~?~~ NevertheIess,navigation
oriintenrationalwatercorrrsessuch as the Danube isi~rrportant,nd itis
necessary to say somethingabout the SIovakMernorial'sdiscussion of
the issue.
1,180. The SIovakMernorial statesthat the BratisIava-Bud egponst
is "theonly remaining difficultstretchof the Danubefl.3so In fact both
belowBudapestandaboveBratislavashallowsexist which pose similar
constraint~.~~This is one of a number oftroubledlinks in the as yet
incompleteDanube-Main-Rhine river route.Moreoverthe Bratislava-
SeeScienlijicEvaluatWC-M, vo2, chap2.2.4.
SM, para 1.38-1.49,
SM, paras1.42-1-44.2.82.
SM,paras2.82-2.83,S.Og.
SM,parss2.82-2.83.
Sceabovcparagraph1.18and 1.4.
SecSM, para1.46"The 1977Treaiy haasone ofitscentraims Itreadoption of
rhe remediaI mauresta eliminatethe navigatiohazardsdong the Sbvak-
HungarianstrelchtheDanube."
SM,para2.82.
InAustribctwccn1 April1991and31 March 1992therewere116dayswhen the
navigationl epthremainbelow 2metresfor43daysitwasbelow1.7 metresIn
thesameyearontheYugoslavsectiotherewcrc122dayswhen navigationalepth
didnotreach2.5metresSee DanubeCommission", Infomationsurl'entretdun
chenalnavigableet surles seuils duDad'UlmA Sulin(du le'avri1991au
31mars 1992)"(Budapest, 993)pp140152.Budapestsector is- at present, at least- relatively unimportant in tlie
realrn of internationalcommerce.So Faras navigationis concerned, the
Original Project, although potentiallyuseful in +e Bratislava-Budapest
str&, was neither necessary from an economic point of view nor
critical for rivernavigation.
1.181. According tuthe Danube~onrrnission~~~ tiedeveloprnentof the
botfIeneckbetweeV nienna and Budapest wonld need to incIudea set of
four dams eqnipped wirh double Iocks: Hainburg(Austria), WoIfsthaI
(Aust ria),GabE ikova (CzechosIovakia),and Nagyrnaros (H~ngary)?~~
The investment required was estirnateclin 1392 at U.S.$I hiIIion (not
i~rcIudingGabCikov~).~~ T~his wouldproduceno,direct economic return,
since the resulting increaçe in traffic would prAbablybe very limited
(around 1.8milliontons per annum on the vienia-~uda~est stret~h~~ .
In 1990the cargo traffic on the Danube amounted to 66.6 milliontons,
which declinedto 43milliontons in 1992. !
1.182. TheSlovakMemorialsuggeststhat the requiredworks to ensure
safe navigationsimply could notbe undertaken:on the Danube without
interfering witli the environment.356But navigationalworks were not
responçibie for riverbed degradationand the isulting Iowered ground-
~ater-tables.~~~Sedimentsrernoved by.~ravi~atiinaldredging and other
necessaryriver workswere - and stiIwonld be -,Iessthan the amountof
sediment arrivirig from upstrearn.This wouId result in stable, or even
miIdIy aggrading, riverbed and grourrdwaterIeveIs- the simation that
existedbefore excessiveindnstrialdredging was &dertaker~.~~%
1
1.183. The SlovakMemorialcornp& the width Pnd depth of theDanube
navigation channe1 to the standards of the Danube Comrnis~ion.~~~
352 Establishedunder Sovietauspicesby the ~onventio~Regardingthc Regime of
Navigationonthe Danube,Belgrade,18August1948;HM,Annexes,vol3, annex
4.Themandateof theCommission islimitetonavigation.
353 EquipeCousteau,Final Report(1992);HM, Annexes,vol 5, (part1), annex 12,
p 364.
354
EquipeCousteauF , inal Report (1992); HM, ~nnexCs,vol-5 (part1), a12,
p 364.
355 As reported by EquiCousreau.TheDanube... For Yboinand For What(1993);
HM, Annexes,va15 (panII)mnex IGp,603.
356 SM, parasI.40-1.45.
357 Seeabow, paragraphs I.60.67.
358 See funher RiverMorphologand River Hydra1cs,kcieni$cEvn/ua!ion,HC-M,
voI2, chap 2. I
339 SM,pms1.37-1.38, 1.41,1.45.Although ifnotes on one occasion fhattfreCommission'ssrandards de
the form of recornmendations and are non-binding (and deçpite ifs
aversion in other contexts to so-called "soR fa^''^^^),the SIovak
Mernorial nonethelessrepeatedlycriticises Hungary for its failure to
comply with these criteria.36'It also relies on Article 13(1) of the
Boundary WatersConventionof 1976,362which, underthe title "The
Maintenance andMarkingofWatenvays",providesthat:
"Themaintenanceandrnarking of thewatenvays,as well asthe
location of the navigationaI routes,shaI1be undertaken by the
authorised bodies of the ContractirigPartieson the Danube, in
accordance with the recommendation made by the Danube
Coinmission."
But tlris provisiocanrrotbe readas creating an objigntion tu undertake
operationsaimed notatmaintenance and markingof existingnavigatiolr
routes,but atthe constructionofwideranddeeperfairways.
1.184.In fact the fulfilmentof the DanubeCommission'srecommen-
dationswas nevernecessaryto ensurea safe navigationalroute.The
large widthof the navigation channel recommende bdy the Danube
Commission (100-180 mefres) is simply not economically justified
havingregard ta thevoIumeof ship traffrc in the area- in 1977orat the
presenttime. It reflects an era that focused on militaryrrarisportand
logistics rather than com~nercial fran~portarion.~~~ An 80 rrietre
navigation widrh associateci1irit1 2.5 nretre deprh requirement wouId
have been - and wotrIdnow be - adequatsand appropriate. In fact the
regulationworks underiakenby Hungaryon the Danube sector between
1962and 1976conformed almostentirely tosuchastandard.364
360 SM,para7.748, I12.
36r SM,pam 1.46,1.48,2.82.
362 Forthe19?4ConventionseeHM, Annexes,vol3annex 19.
363 "[Tjh ensequencesofapeningtheRhine-Main-Danubecanal andrhepossibiIity
of switrhingtrafic hm one motoarottrer have been averestirnated... In spite of
financialadvanrages, rhc cxperienminWederncounthasshown ttrat there is
practicaliyno transfirfrotnroadtnnspoto waterwayswhiIeon the conIrary
roadand traintransportationgraduallyovertakemarketshareof watenvay
transportatio.quipeCousteau,eport(March1993);HM, Annexes,vol5 (part
II),anne16,p 554at p 569.Thewatenvaywhich connectthe Danubewith the
Rhinccurrentldoesnot alloaccestoal1shipswhichcouldpasstheGabEikovo
locks.
3u4 J Csornand~'~ovks, Impactsof rivertrainingworkscarrieoverthe Rajka-
Gljnyiisectionof the Dan(I981)VizügyiKtizlcrn2nye,p267,281. 88 1 ,
1.185. The SlovakMemorial sssetisthat a 100%increawin çhip traffic
on the river could be handIedwithout problem and that sucIrari increase
has been predicted wi thin ten~ears.3~~Howevir followingthe colIapse
of CMEA, navigation Irasdecreaçedin importance.Betweeri 1950and
1980freight transportonthe Danube increased,frorn9.7 miIIion to 95
million tons, wliereas during the Iast 15 years it has drarnaticaIIy
decreased - to 43 nriIIion tons in 1992.36" The total volurne of
CzechotSiovaktraffic on the Danubeshoweda 70-75% decreasefrorn
1985-86 to 1992-93.River traffic inSlovakiarépresentsabout 8 million
tons,of which2.5millioninvolvesinternationhltraffic.The remainderis
local(e.g.,sandandgravel),overanaveragedistance of 19kilometres.
I
1.186. Accordingto optimistioestimations, the trafficon the Danube
will increasefrom 34.7 billiorrtonskm in 1989 to 55.5 biIIiotonskm in
2020.367Most of this increase, however,wiII'occur downstrearn hm
Budapest: predictions are that approximately2 1 million metric tons
above thecurrenttrafficwiI1transit behveen the BIack Sea and harbotrrs
downsrream from Budapest,whereas the traffic increase tlirough the
BratisIava-Budapestsector wiIIonIyarnount tq 1.8miIIionrnetrictans.
This iswhy, according to informeclviews, "developing the Vienna-
Budapest sector will not be directlyprofitablfor navigation(negative
interna1rate ofret~rn)."3~~
1.187. In 1977,the Bratislava-Budapestsector'hadits problem sections
as did most other sectorsof the Danube, but theseproblems could have
been addressedin a much sirnpler way. By that time, due fo river
regiilationcarried ouf inthe1960s and 197fl ts,section between Rajka
and Sap was developed md only one difficuffsection remairied, at a
narrowand sharp bendat Baga~nér.~~ Even this problem,however, can
be handIedwithout difficulty if appropriateequipmcntis instaIIedon the
ships.
365 SM,para 2.82.
366 AnnuaireS~atisliqdela Commissi~nduDanube(1b93).
367 EquipeCousteau(September19921HM, Annexesv, .0{partI)annex 12,p364.
A ronkm isa ton carri1dkm;thusa bargewhich;carri100 tons for 100kms
carried 10,000tonlkms.
EquipeCousteau,Reprf (March1993);HM, Annexes.vol5 (partII), annex16,
p554 atp559.
369 Sec Lamy, "Traditionai olrititosme ~avigarir>alroblcmsof thSzigetküz
Stretch othe Danube[hereakr referretoas "TraditionSolutions"HC-M,
Annexes, vol (part11,annex 8.Another difficustretcin this sectihas
developedsince 1977whichisrelatedtothe constructionsite at Dunakiliti.Ibid. 1.188. Tfie more difficutt section of the river affecteby the Original
Project was the Nagymaros reach, and this is refiecfed in the
recommendation of the Danube Commission as to the Vienna-Budapest
sector, which identified Nagyrnaros (but not GabEikovo)as one of 4
sectors requiring attenti~n.~~OHowever, studies have shown that the
problems affecting theNagymarosreach cm nonethelessbe resolved by
traditionalmeans .J7l
. 1.189- Indeed, it seerns that the focus on the Project may have
aggravaiied the difficnhies, Ieadingfo negIectof standard river worksin
the affectedsectorsafier 1977.372Ifthese hadbeen contintred,and iftlre
necesary renewaI of the commerciaIfleet had taken place, traditional
methods of river replation couId have provided therequired navigation
standards tu a Iargerexfent than on other sections of the Danube riot
affected bytheProject.
SECTIONG: SLOVAKZA'S INVOCATION OF "ENERGY
POLICY"
1.190. The Slovak Mernorial says relatively little of the hydroelectric
capacis of the Original Project as such, despite its importance to the
present dispute. Instead, it speaksin general terms of the neceçsiv to
maximisethe utilisationof the "hydroeIecfricpotentiai" of the region. it
caIcuIatesthat, by the addition ofthe Gabeikovo power plant, it has
brought ifs uti1isaion of hydroelectric patentiaI to 52% (previousIy
30%), and anticipatesthat the constnrction of an extensive network of
small hydroelectricplants on riversin SIovakia'smountainousnorthern
regionswillallow itto utilisesome78%of its p~tential.~~~
1.191. Two further phases of the "provisional solution" are planned iri
order ta "optimise"the use ofthe Danube for this purpose.First, a
370 Seeabove,paragaph1.179.
371
SeeLnczay,TradifipnaISoIuriHC-M, Annexes,vol4@m I)mnex 8. SimiIar
conclusioiiswerereacheaReportonihissectwmmmissioned bytheWungarian
Govemment:DeIAHyd~uIics,Fred~ricR Harri, ITUKI,DantrbeEnvironmen~af
and Navigation Project. FeasibiudyRajka-Budape Fitl,Report, Strefch
BI: Szap-IpohMouth(August1994).Due to itslength,this Reportis not annexed:
copieshavehoweverbeenplacedintheLibmyofthe Court.
372
SeeLaczay,TraditionalSolutions;HC-M,Annex,ol4(partt), annexS.
373 SM, para 1.54.Accordingto the samecalculation,Frannoeless than 96.7%
ofithydroelectricpotential,and Denuses3.2% only.It is not clearhowthis
figureiscalcniate..hydroelectric power plant has been designe todiroducs 4GWhanntrally
from the constant flow directed into rfieMosbni Danube at Crrnovo.
Second, the middlesectionof the CunavocornpIéI xiasbeen preparedfor
.the instaIIation of four more turbines. This wiII enabIe Slovakia tu
hamess the flow into the oId Danube, producjng,a furtlier 174 GWh
anntra1ly.3T4 !
1.192. On the other handVariantC will coitribute at best 10% of
Slovakia'stotalelectricityproductionT . hisratherlowfigureisattributed
variously to the non-completionof Nagymarosand to voluntarily
increasedflows into the main bed of the Danube in 1993.375 But
Slovakiaadmitsthatthe OriginalProject, as originallydesigned,could
provideno morethana small portionof each country'stotal power
production. It fhen resorts to a portrayaiofhydroe1ectriçityas a "clean
alternative" tothermalor riucIearenergy376 without rnentioningitsown
ambitiousnncIearenergyprogramme.377
1.193. Bruader issuesof energypolicy are nof.before the Court in rhis
case. However given the SIuvakMernorial's,pejorative referenceç tu
Hungarian energypoiicy and itscriticismsin particularof its use of
nuclearenergy?78 somebriefaccountiscalled'for.Moreimportantly,it
is necessaryto putin perspectivethevalue ofpowergenerationthrough
theOriginalProjectandthroughVariantC.
1.194. Before the radical political changes in 1989, economic
developmeiitinCentralandEasternEuropewas'basedmainlyonenergy-
intensive ind~çtries.~~gTfius the priorify of- energy policy was the
"4 SM, para5.35.
375 SM,paras 5.51,9.39. I
I
376 SM,para2.84.
' I
377 Seeabove,Introduction,ara20.
378 SeethephotographoftheHungarian nuclearplantit PakinSM,Illustratio13.
That plantia latergenerationthanthe currentSlovakplantsandha beengivena
clean bill of healthby the IAEA:see IAEA,Operati~nalSafety ReviewTeam,
QperaiionnlSafv ofElicIeaInslaliarionHungaiy(1AEA-N ENSIUSARTi89119,
Februaryt9g3).CopiesofihisRepon havebeen placedintheCouriLibrxy.
379 InCzechoslavaliiaheratiof primaryenergyinteniity (energyconsumptiriniGNP)
was 0.80,twiceasmuch as thaof Easter~emany (0.40)andlhreetimes rhat of
fral<0.26):Equipe Cousteau,The Danube..For Whom and fur WImi? The
Gnbëikovo Dam: <rTexlbooCase (SepternbeI992) eproducedin HM, Annexes,
volS(pan Ij,annex12,p 324atp355 . lectricinte:wastalsoveryhigh (0.92),
two to threetimesgreaterthan thvalueof ECcountries(WesternGermanyin
1990,0.56;ltalyin 1990,0.36).Iatp356T.otal,consumptioofprimaryenergymaintenance of sufficient energysuppIies to fuel incregsing production
goalsw ,ithuut consideration of e~onurnic, environmenta1 w social
eflects. Two factors faciIitated this poIicy. Firçt, tfie Hungarian and
Czechoslovakeconomies were oriented towards the low-dernand markets
of other COMECONcouritries.This effectivclypostponed modernisation
of ecunornic struchrres or industrial technolog, and provided no
incentive for energy efficiency. Secoridly,this poIicwas eiicouragedby
etrer-expandi~rgenergj7 inrports froni the Soviet Urrion. These were
projscted tocontinue to be inexpe~isiveand inexhaustibIe.Consequently,
energy-intensiveand inefficienteconomicstructuresdeveIoped. .
1.195. Duringan initial period of strong ecoriomicgrowth (1950-1955),
the totaI incrcase in errera demand (9.2%) was roughIy doubIe the
irrcreaseÏIIGGNP (5.7%) i11the two countries. In subseque~itperiods,
however, the two indicators feII to roughly tIie same Ievel and then
declined. PoIiticaIchanges ~IIthe regiorrafter1989Iedtu the dissolution
of old i~rdustrialstructures and the coIIapseof trading relationAs GNP
was dramaticaIIy reduced, there was a considerable decIine in energy
demand in tlre region, witlrexcess production capaciw. TIiis period of
generaIdedine coincidedwith the planned firialphase of construction of
the OriginalProject.
1.195. Slovakiamaintains ari expansive eIrergy poIicy, in spite of a
steady decIi11ein eIectriciQ consurnption. In addition to tlre Bohrrnics
nuclear power plant, constructed in 1974-1976 near the border with
Austriaand Hungary(and thus the target of critici~m~~~)S , Iovakia is
buiIdinganother nucIearpIantatMod~ovce,Iesçtharr 50 kiIonretresfrorn
the Hungarianborder.MacIrovcsisdesigried tooperatefourunits (one of
wlrich is aIready operational) and wiII reach fulI capaciq in 1495. lts
total generation capacitywiII be 1760MW, the same as that of the oId
Bohunice~iuclearpIant.3g1
in1989 wasgreaterIhanthatoWesternGcrmany,iheIargestconsumerin the EC.
Ibiat355.
jBO ThiscriticismalIeastpartIyfounded ontIwoseriousaccidentsin BohuniA1
unit, one of which car~sedfueImeltingin theactivereactarzone and contanri~rated
part of the plart, lheDudvàh riverandsome groundwateAsea Fonsequene,
this bIowas shutdom in 1979,after7 yearsrifoperation.On theottrerhand,the
t~ u~rirs(out of thc originalfour) sfilI operati~rgat Bohuaice, whichare Soviet-
designed vereranfirst generationpower pIants (WWE440I230) Iack safcry
feaîures basbc rither pressuredwater reactors: IntcnrationaIAtomic Energy
Agency,The Safet of WWER 440 Model 230 Nurieni-Power Plants(Vienna,
1992)Iiisunderstoothatcontracttor~pgraIhescreaciarshavebeenagreed.1.197. Given this increasing rhclearcapaciiy, the eIectriciQ generated
byVariantC representsa ratlierçrnallpartof overa1Ipowerproduction in
both countries- the samewouId have been tnre of the planned ccapacity
of the Original Project. The pIanned built-in capaciiW. 720 MW at
GabEikovoand 168 MW atNagymaros,totalling 888 MW. The two
stateswere tu share this in roughly equaI parts. TheCtechoslovakshare
of 444 MW wouId now represent 7.5% of global SIovak bui1t-in
capacity. Projected electricity generation was to be about 1887.5
GWhlyear for each countra yItborrghproducfion rnight Vary between
1355 and 2335 GWh dependingonrveatherconditions.
1.198. The Original Project was tu have generated peak-mode
e1ecfrici~. Under Central European crimatic conditions, peak-mode
production içgensraIIyhigher in summer(when the dernand is less) and
faIIsin the winter months,when its reliabiiitiçprobIematic due toice
flows.
1.199. According to calculations in the I950s, when iwas coriccived,
the Original Projecf wouId Iravesuppliedmore than 30% of Hungarian
electricity needsIn the 196% when it was planned, its output wouId
have accounted for some 20% of demand. By.the 1970s,when it was
concIuded,ths Project's projected potentia1contribution haddecrinecl
just 8.5% of Hungarian energ yds. At curent (reduced) IeveIs of
eIectric dietyand,the Projectwould have accuuntecifor approximate1y
5%of Hungarianc~nsurnptiun.~~~
1.200. ForSIovaki te,significanceof the Project inenergy tems is not
much pater everrconsidering flrat,with the operation oVariant C, it
retainsa11hydroelectricproduction.This mounted to 223 GWhin 1992
and tu 1,952.82 GWh in 1993. TIruswhen al1four units of ihe Mochovce
nuclear pImt becorne operationalin I995,~ab~jkovo wi11contributeonIy
9.53%to thetotaIelectricityproduction(20,577GWh) in Sl0vakia.3~~
. ,
382 Thisisbasedon the followingcaIcuIatoperatinin peak-mode,the Original,
Projecrwouidhave used t$t toraliif888 MW buiI1-incapaciry,and wouId
havegiventoHungaryhaIfils production.The Gabtlkovopowerp360(MW}
constilut6.41% of the yearIy peak I{5,612.MW and4.89% of Ihe t01i11
instaIIcdcapaciv (7MW). TheNagyrnarups~werpIan(84MW) wouldhave
contributed1.49%IheyearlypeakIoaandonIy 1.14%10fhebuilt-incapacityof
Hungary.
383
EIecaicityprodu~byhydropowerpIantsin SIovain1493was 3,85GWhof a
roiaol.3,397GWh (i.e., around15%ofthetotalelectricitj.prr,boutlhe}a
s~unIeveasthepwer pImtoperationalsclf~onsum~~1,583GWh)added iothe
Iossesin thegrid(1,858GWh) The contributionof theGabpowerplantwas
1,952GWh, Iesthan th10% claimedbySlovakia.Slovakiaimpofled4,009 GWh
and expori2,906GW h:Si~venseeirergeiipudnik, 1993.1-201. An independentreport pub1içhedin Septemiser 392 analysedthe .
productionof electricitybytheOriginaI Proje~t.~~~The studypdicted
that, whileelectricintensityin Slovakia woulddecrease slightlyover th,
next 15years, it will nonethelessremainfargreaterthan current Western
European levels,owing to continued inefficien~y.~~~ Given improved
energy efficiency,a reductionofsome 30% couldbe achieved,assuming
an averagegrowth in GNPof 2% per annumfrom 1992to 2000, and of
3% from 2000 ta2010. According tothisbody, "the Cïxh and Siovak
Republics donot need anymore electricity upfo 2010 or even beyorid.
Frornthis pointof view,GabEikovoserves nopurpose".38"
1-202.AriotherindependentstudypubIishedin 1992sfatedthat:
"Technicallyviewed,the requirementsfor an alternative energy
policy are given. Thiugh utilisation of demand-side and
suppIy-sideefficiency potentials,as well as structuralpotential,
an energy-saving policyis fea~ible."~~~
The study notes, however,that there is opposition to such a policy in
SIo~akia.3~~
1-203. The HrrngarîanGovernrnentandParIiamenthave adopteda new
energp yoIicy,with an ernphasion increasedenerge yfficien~y.3~~teps
are beinglakento Annect theHungarianentrgy systern to tfiEuropean
networks (UCPTEPower System). Hungary has created the CENTREL
subsystem with the participation of the Czech Republic, Poland and
Slovakia.Hungary'saim is to solve energyproblems whichariseby CO-
operation with othercountries in a way which corresponds to present
economicrealitiesandwhichisrespectful ofthe environment.
384 See EquipeCousteau,Report (September1992HM, Annexes,vol5 (partI),
annex12,p 324atp354.
385
See ibiatp 357.
38u Ibidatp358.
387 H Haber1& Andrea HoItIin conjunctvitfiMarouwkB , Schwartzkogf & F
Christian Matthes,Et~rfyr Sbvakii~.OpiioirrrforE~rvirorrmerrl-orienrenot~me~~-~riented
folicy{AusrriEcoIogyInstitute,YienMay 19921, 6.
388 Ibid.
jg9 SeeM Pobs,The N~ingariG~ergy SiiuaiiorraEnergyPoiicy (Deparimentof
EnergyStrategMinistryoJndustrynd Trade,Budapest,Octu19941,p5. SECTIONR: A COMFARISONWITHOTHER
INTERNATIONALDAMPROJECTS
\
1.204. Ir iç suggesnd in the SIovak Mernoria1that the GabCikovo-
Nagymaros Barrage Systern worrld be jus' another hydropower
1 developmentdong the Danribe,constructedand-operated as many other
Europeanbarrage ~~sterns.~~ IllustrationNa 1l'in the SlavakMernorial
presents the location of al1hydropower stationsa'long the riversRhine,
Main,Neckar,Moselle and Danubewithout reference to details of their
construction or operation. In fact there are large differences between
existing hydropowersystemsandthe OriginalProject.
1.205. Any hydropower Bevelopment impacts on narural river
ecosysterns toacertain extent,deperidingorrtIre.typeof construction and
on theway the systein is operated.UntiI the 1970s the environmenraI
changes associatedwith the developmentof Iar'gehydropower schemes
were widely accepfedby Western socieries.But,growingpubIicconcern
in environmental issuesin the 1980sinitiated intensivedebates on major
water resource projects,leadingto the abandonment of a number oflarge
hydropower barrage systerns, e.g., Neuburgweier on the Upper Rhine
(1979-82),Hainburgon the Austrian Danube(1986).3" At presentthe
most debated waterpower developmentproject:in Germany includes a
70kilarnehe stretch of the Danube with a sequence of barrages
endangering the Iast major free-flowingreach of the river in Gemany,
aIrhoughthe expectedenvironmenrai impacts in this Danube reach can
by no means be cornpared fo thoçe which were IikeIy to have been
indricedbytlieOriginaIProject.
1.206. Along the Upper and MiddleDanube,the OriginalProject was
the only water power development planned to operate on large scale
peakingmodes. None ofthe Austrian or German barragesin the Danube
exploit the potentialenergyof the riverto a similaextentas theOriginal
Projectwould have done.3g2 I
1.207. The difference in water IeveI af ~ab:ikovo, used for energy
production, wouId Vary between 15.0 merresand 2 1.5metres depending
on the water IeveIfluctuations.No other barrage çyçternin fhe Geman
and AustrianDanubereachhascreateda similaritep inthe river.
390 SM, para1.16.
391 SeePlale3.
392 Someafthe adverseefectsofpeakingare describedin Ta1,2, and 4, anri in
paragnphs1.150-154.1.208, The envisaged peakingoperatioricarried with it Iwo technical
necessities. One was an operationa1resenwir volume in the npstrearrr
impoundment; the 0th was a seco~idbarragedownstream to avoid
riverbedinstabilitiescausedbypeak operation.None of the Germanand
Austrian barrage systemsalong the Danube has an operationalreservoir
volumewhich couldbe remotely cornpared to the plannedDunakiliti-
HrugovReservoir.Thus the residencetime, which is a crucialfactor with
respect to water quality,e.g.,for algae bl0oming,3~~is much shorter in
upstrearnreservoirs.
1.209. The firstsrepsin pIanningfor theNagyrnarosBarragewere takerr
in 1942,longbefore the GabCikovoproject was con~idered.~~~ But itwaç
never reaIised. Cornpared with aIiy orher river barrage çystems on the
Danube, the Rhine, or the FUiane, it içobvious that the gradieo nftthe
rivcr is veT Iow and unfavourabIefor IiydropowerdeveIop~nerrt.~~~
Given thesameheadanddischargea riverreachwith a gradientof onIy7
cmkm requires 5 times the reservoir lengthof a 35 cmkm reach to
producethe same energy output.This not onlyhas economicimplications
(requiringlongerresewoirdykesand systemsforartificialdrainagefor the
adjacentarea),but also ecologicalones. To produce the same amount of
energy5 times the lengthof the free flowing riverhas to be impounded,
with a11 the ecologic canlsequencesand riçksof degradingthe riverine
ecosy~tem.39~This is why fhere is noother barrage like the envisaged
Nagymarosalongthe Iowersectionsof the Datitrbeor the Rhine?g7 Italso
niakeç itclear thatthedecisionto builtNagymaroswas inexiricabIyrelated
to peakpoweroperationofGabcikovo.
1.210. Several modeswereconçidered for bath powerstations,
Gabeikovoand Nagyrnar~s,~~* including the option of a complete
393 See Scieni$c Evalunti1-IC-M,ol2, chap3.3
3'4 SM,annex21.
393 The mem gradients of lhese rivers 44ecmh forthe AnstriaDanube, 80
cmkm forrheRhine bcheen Lake#rrslan~and Gerstheimand 60-45cmh for
lirreachto Iffezhe brut,50chrn oveml1gradientfur the mûne hetween
Lyonand theMediterrancawitha minimumsIapeof 35 cmkm inthe IowesIQU
km reach. The Szigetktrzreach oftht Dahaseagradienof about 35cmlkm,
whichdropsto 17cmh a1Sap(rh IaIO), IOIDcmkm ar rkm1793 andtoon1y
7cmlkm atrkm 1768,which iabout70km upsuem ofNagymaros.
396 SeeScientiJEvaluationHC-M, vol2, cha4.4,
397 The Dutchbarrageçysternnearthe rnouthof the LowerRhinementionin SM, .
IllustrationNo 1have beeninstalledfofloodwatermanagementandnot for
waterpowerdeveloprnent.
348 SeeKem, Impacts;HC-M, Annexesvol4,annex6, intemaannexesA-6,A-7.closureof the turbinesatGabEikovofor 18hoursand a suddenreleaseof
4,200 m3!s increasinguptu 5,20m 031s during 5 hours per day.The rise
of thedischargefrom zero to the first peakwotr1,dhaveoccurred wirhin
30 minufes and the descent from the second pekk to zero in only 20,
carrsinga considerabIeartificialfloodwave intheNagyrnaros reservoir,
andseverely damaging the aquaric biocaenosis.3~9 A srnalier,but stiII
considerablepeakoperationwas plannedaf Nagymarostowardsthe fiee
flowingdownstreamriver section.400For instance, at low discharges of
the Danubea çuddenrise from 1,000m3/sto more than 2,000 m31s was
planned, followedby asuddendescentto the formerflow level.
1.211. Peak operationof barragesystemsis a frequentpractice, even on
lowland riversused for navigationsuch as the Danube andthe Upper
Rhine. If peak operationis dona in a moderate:way it may not cause
additiona1ham to the riverine ecosystem. At.the Upper Ririne, for
insrance,a maximumincrease of 300 m3/s abqve the naturalflow is
aIIowedwifhin thechainof 1Obarrages. On the orherhand beiow the Iast
barrage of Iffeztieima nraximumincrease of oiily 40 m3k above the
naturai flow is a1Iowedtowads the free flawing riversection.The Iatter
Iimitingvaluehaç to be cornpared with the modeatNagymaroç
andthe former withtheone at GabEikovo .he difierenceis morethan an
order of magnitude,althoughtheaverageflow atthe Project reach is only
twice as muchas onthe Upper Rhineriver.
1.22. Thus fie conception of the Original Project differs significantly
from other Europeanbarrage systems.This reinfhrcesconcernsthat the
OriginalProject woukI havecaused considerabIymore damage ttonature
and natural resotrrces thanother Enropean barragesystems, especial Iy
giventheoutstanding naturaIvalue ofthe impactedarea.
1.213.Changing attitudes toenvironmental issue have not onIy led the
abandonmentof variousbarrageprojectsbutaIsota new programmesfor
the restoration of riverine wetlandhabitatsaffeciedby existing barrage
sy~terns.~~]For examplean "Integrated Rhine Programme" combines
objectives of flood protection and the restoration,of wetlands along the
Upper Rhine riverwhich were damagedby the implementationof the
400 Thiswasdeniedby the SIovakMernorsratintha".i.tlNagyrnarosstepwouId
- genente powtr on a consbasi onIy,i.eiidischargeinto rireriverbedbeIow
ivouIdneveva? SV thar dorunstrearthispoinr n$ impact thewaterIeveI
ffucluationscobefelt"SM,para2.36. I
40t
ScientificEvaluatchaps2.6&4.4.2barragesyçtemtI~ere.~Q TzhsUpperRkineexperiencesuggests however,
that effortsto restorenaturalriverinesystemswili be in vain as long as
the dynamics of discharges and water levels rernain considerably
dist~rbed.~O~
L
- -
402 See ScientifEvaluation,chap4.4.2.3.
403 Sec Scienl#cEvnliiationchap4.6. CHAPTER 2 '
1
THE CONDUCTOF THE PARTIES
2.01. ThisChapterreviewstheconduct of thePartiesin relation tothe
dispute,in particularin the lightof the primaryandfundamentac llaim
presentedin the SlovakMemorialthat Hungaryactedin bad faith in
invokingenvironmentac loncerns asa basisfor the suspensionof works
and the subsequenttermination of the Treaty. First itis helpful to
strrnmariçe the Slovak argumentin this respect(beIow, Section A,
paragraphs 2.02-2.08).Againstthat background,'this Chapterdeais with
the SIovakargumentsreIating tothe performance of the 1977Treaty iri
the periodprior to 1989(Secfion B, paragraphs 2.09-2.251;then to the
negotiations intheperiod1989-1992(Section C,,paragraph2 s.26-2.88);
the history of VariantC (Section D, paragraphs 2.89-2.106); and the
negotiationsfor a temporarywatermanagementregime (Section E,
paragraphs 2.107-2.117).The Chapterconcludesby placingthe Slovak
argumentsbasedonbad faith in their legal contextand drawingthe
appropriatceonclusions(Section F, paragraphs2.118-2.128).
SECTION A: INTRODUCTION
2-02. SIovaki paaintsitsclairn of bad faith in broad, irnpressionistic
.strokeç.It is an ever-presentsubtext woven through itsMemorial. In
substance theSlovakargument isas follows. ,
2.03. WhereasHungaryfirst initiateddiscussionsover the cornmon
utiIisationof water energy on the Danube,! and then forcefully
advocated the adoption ofthe ~ab~ikovo-~agyri Prrjestover other
aItematives,Zitsubsequentlydemonsiratecl ashockingIack of respectfor
irs ubrigations under ûre1977 Treaty. Over th; "proIonged history of
prevarication andviolation"> Hnngaryproveditself both unwilling and
unable tohIfiI its treaty ~bfigationsFrom theoutset, Hungary sought
delays in the agreedschedule aswell as in the distributionofwork,5
SM,paras2.036.08. I
I
SM,para2.03.
SM,para7.IO.
SM, paras6.61,5.53.
SM,paras3.01,3.44.cauçing serious Iiar~nto Czechoslovakia.~ In this way, it soiighr
canstantIy io obstructand frustratethepurpose of the Treaiy.
2.04. Siovakiaremirids tlre Court of the general du@ of good faith
imposedonany State in the performarrceofirs internatiana IbIigations.~
Characterising Hungary as a "dificult Project partnerW8from the
beginning, SlovakiacIairnsthat Hungarydenronstratedan unwillingriess
to CO-operate in good faith? adoptedunconstructive and inflexible
positionsIDand sought to impose preconditions ca1cuIated tu render
negotiation impossible.1I This was amply demorrstrated when
CzechosIovakiasrrggestedthe irrvoIvernentof neutral rhird parties to
provide an objective determination of djsprrted issues.12 In sharp
contrast, Czechoslovakia and subsequently Slovakia conducted itseIf
throughout in a co-operative and accommodating manner,13 and only
reluctantlyresortedto Variant C at the lastminutein order "to secure the
achievementof the mutually agreedobjectivesof the 1977 Treaty".I4
2.05. Slovakia claims that "Hungary has in al1 cases acted
unilaterally",~5 citing in particular "successive .decisions for the
suspensionof works".'6 lt characterisesHungary'sbehaviourthroughout
as unpredictable and inconsistent with previous ~ornrnitrnents.~~
Hungaryis saidrepeatedlyto have failed to cornplywith the procedures
for consultationandnotificationset forth inthe Treatyand this is cited as
further evidence of -badfaith.S 1lovakia accuses Hungary of abusive
conduct, deIjberatelytaking advantageof its partner's efforts to resolve
disputed
SM, para6I 19.
SM, para5.158.
SM, para3.01.
SM, para6.58..
SeegeneraIISM, paras6.70-G.71,6.Iii5-6.156.
SM, paras4.54,4.94,8.57.
SM, paras4.92,8.50-5.57.
SM, paras5.106,b .I.
SM,para 7.10.
SM,para 6.156.
SM, para6.157.
SeeSM,paras3.31 4.07-4.08,4.35,6.16,6.63-6.64,68.49.
Seee.g.,SM,paras4.07,4.59,6.63-6.64,6.74,6.155,6.158.
SM,paras4.36,6.16. 2
i2.06. By refusing tocountenance any solutionotherthanthe outright
çancellstionof thePrpject, theHungarian ~ovemrnentallowedpolitical
pressuresto override,its internationalobligations,as the GabEikovo-
Nagyrnaros Project became a pawn in domestic poli tic^.^^
Environmenta protestsagainsttheProject aredismissed as relatedto the
"grievouseconomic,politicalandculturalinjustices"sufferedunderthe
commun ist regime,ratherthan any deep-seatedecological con~erns.~'
The issue was then seized upon by an rrnpoptIIarregime to divert
attentionfrom its own. failing~,~~and adopted -ythe oppositionas an
"id.iefixe7'>3aausef1utooi itfiestmggIe forpower.24
!
2.07. Hungary'spurported concern for the enyironmerit was in fact a
disirrge~ruou"spretext"for the serious economic difficulties which
preventedit frorn frrIfilIingifstreaty ~bIigations.'~Such argumentswere
advaiicedrnerelyas a tool inthenegofîatîons ajd were never seriously
enterîained.26 In spite of repeated requests,Hr~ngaryfailed fo provide
any cornpellingscientific basis for ifs positi~n;?~and even refused to
aIIowanyobjectiveassessrnentof its~Iairns.~"
2.08. The pirture is a dramaticone. But itbas the disadvantage ~f
being untrue in every nrateria1respect- as the'following sections will u
dernonstrate. l
SECTIONB: THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TREATYBEFORE
1989
I
2.09. In orderto createthe imageof Hungarya :s a "difficultpartner"
even before1989,the SlovakMernorialis forceato overlookimportant
facts'andtocontradict itsawnstatements. I
I'l '-
20 SM,paras2.23,3.51-3.52,3.56.
21 ~M,para3.~1.
22 SM,pams3.52,3.56.
23 SM, para3.56.
24 SM, para3.55.
25 SMv puas3.36, 3.40-3.43.533.56T.hisirnplicitlyacknorvIedgesthe reality of
theeconornimacerns.
I
2b SM? paras.35,3.55. !
1
27 SM, paras3.544.03,4.05. I
2g SM, para4.02,8.50-8.53,8.55-8.57.
1 roi
2.10. Hungary in no way denies tlrat the reaIisation ofthe Prciject,
adopted to a great extent for political reasons under veiy different
circurnstances and expectationç, posed an enormous firianciai burden
which the deteriorating sate budget couId hardly finance. This was the
reason forrequesfing- together with Czechoslovakia - a Soviet Ioanlg
for concIuding the Mutua1Assistance Agree~nent?~ and for suggesting
the suspension of construction workçfor nine years.31 With hindsight
poIiticiansorrboth sideshaveadmittedtlratthe Projectshouid neverhave
been~tarted.~"
2.11. In relationto the pre-1989period, the SIovakMemoriaI focuses
on a single Hungarian internai 'document, orre of many thorrsands
concerning the Prriject, nanreIy the Ietter that Depuiy Brime Minister
JirzsefMarjaisent on 19March 1984to Jinos Szentigothai, Presidentof
the Hungarian Acaderny of Scicnces.33 SIovakia daims that
environmentaj arguments "were developed as a pretext tu support
econornicmotives for de1ayingthe Project", and produces tfiis Ietter as
tfiecardinalevidenceinsupportofthat ~ontention.3~
2.12. The Mar-jaiIstter is implausible as evidence ofHungarian bad
faith, for a numberof reasons. First of aII, it was written in 1984 by a
ministeroffre formerregirne,whereastlreSIovakargumentrelatestu the
bad faith of the new governmenf irirelation toaction taken by it in and
afrer1989.
2.13. SecondIy,it was hardIysurprisingthat a Hungarianminister with
responsibiIityfor financial matters would comp1airiabout ttie financiaI
29 HM, para3.33.
HM, Annexes, voI3,annex22.
HM, pm 3.43.
3L See e.g.Vhciav Have1in Hnngarian TV progrne "Panorha", 15 February
1991, asreportcd in BBC, Srimmary of WorId Bruadcasis, EE/0999 A2i518
February 199;HGM, Annexes,voI3, annex88.
33 SM, paras3.37-3.44.
34
SM, para3.35 In I984 The Economisi rman aride in which qrii~ethecantrary
assurnptionwassirggesl-that behindthepIeaof 1heIxk of resaurces-
"thereaIreason is probabIy fierceoppositiHungary tothe scheme.
\
This surnmer, thousandsof peopIesignapetilion demandinkat the
governmenrabandonil altogetheThe pefitionersdaim ~hschemewiIl
costrwicea muchasa nornralpowersiatiriand damagewater suppIies
and IocaIwildlife."
The Economisf, (EurapcaEtlition8 Decembcr 1984: HCM, Annexes,vol 3,
anne 7x6.viabilityofthe Project.ItistruethatMrMarjaidi; notactoally say tl~atthe
Projectwasnot viable. Irra passagewfrichremaicd unqnoteddespite no
fewerthan25referencestoIrisletterinfre SIovakMemoriaI,liewote:
"1don? wanr ioassert thai {Jl cemirucii56 01 the Syster of
wi~ci.worksisinaurapinionu~econornicalb ,iutt issure that if
we had ta takedecisioiiconwrning the conspuction today,with
our modest investment possibiIitieswe wodd probably decide
to poçtponethe inve~trnent."~~ !
I
This is cautious langusge,anda thin reedon wliikhto rest a ~1ai.mof bad
faith.Onthe otherIiandthe Ietterhas to beread in tliecontext of its tirne.
In theconvoluted Ianguageof the Brezhnevera,.ltosay that one was not
assertingthat a project was uneconornical was Y 1ftuaI1a corrfessionthat
it wassu!
I
2.14. Hungay Irasnever denied that eco~iomici~ ssues were reiesant irr
1981,orcontinued to berelevant i~i1989and srrb~equentIyI .tiç SIrtvakia
which seeks toerect a rigidbarrier betweeneconurrricandenvironnrerrtal
arguments, whereastlre trut istliat the twoare EloseIyIinked.TIie reaI
cost of developrnent, inciuding its cost on the environment, has to be
taken into account i~deciding whether to proc<edwith a development
project." Alid this linkage was reaIised mri at the rime: as the
HungariariMernoriae lxplains, suspension was Suggested iii1983 "not
onIy becauseof Hungary's economic sifuatiori, but aIso for further
I
examinationof [theProject's]environmentalirnp~ts'',~~ Very liitle was
then knowa about tlre Barrage Systeni's knvironrnenta1 effects.
Environmental argumentswere reIied on neithq to hide the economic
concernsnor to repIacethern- which is tfis functionof a pretext- but to
shed Iight on aspects of the Project which had been iiradequateIy
investigated. Mr Marjaihirnse zdmitted that investigatioriswere stiII
outstanding in 1984 which ought to have beeri compIeted before the
investntertwas initial&. HeaIsoccinfimd the relevantfindingsof point
2 of tlie Academy's 1983Staternen~?~which i~ztirdia~aIiedfor furilrer
reçearch,planning and investrnentso asto ensureihat:
"al The pollrrtionof the water oftlieDanube-andchanges in the
bioIogicaIconditions must not endanger, nui even in the long
tem, the drinking water suppIy ..of the region and Budapest.
1
35 SM, Annex 56,p477 (emphmisadded)..
!
36 Sw Scien~ijiEvnIa(~!iun, C-M.vol 2, chap 7.3 the dose reIationshtri
pri~~cipbetrveenerironrnentnd econonricconside&i~ions.
I
37 HM, para 3.43. I
35 HC-M,Annexes,vol3,annex36. For this reasonthe waste waterof the catchmentareahas fo be
aIso bioIogicaIIypurified,prior to the puttinintooperation of
the Dunakiliti-HruSo reservoir.
dl The biological degradationof the Main Channelwater- and
its tributaries- has to be avoidedand thecharacteristicsworthy
of a boundary river have to be ensured providing, at the same
time, continuons operationalconditions for a well designed
navigationai
2.15. The trnderrying issue waç what to do in case of scientific
unceriairiîy.Whereas the Academy suggested that investigations and
csriairr rneasnres protectinwater quaIiiy and quantity in the Danube
sliouldprecede theoperationof the Project,Mr Marjai- while concedi~ig
the need for researchand acceptingthat thepurificationof waste water
shouldbe a prerequisite of the operationof the reservoir- thought the
available scientific evidencewas not sufficientojustify suspendingthe
construction, and thatthe availablefinancial resourcesof Hungary did
not permit environmentalrequirementsto be met.
2.16. Tt is true - and Mr Marjaiwas awareof this- that some sewage
treatment plants were under construction in 1984?O The SIovak
Mernoria141reveals that CzechosIovakiaplanned to buiId 25 plants
between1985and 1990,and almust fourtirnes as manyafter the startof
the operation of the Barrage Syste~n.But it does nof answer three
relevantquestions:
(a) How many of the planned sewage treatment plants were actually
readyand operationaleven in 1994?
(b) Whatwas the capacity of these installations, were they capable
aIso of biologicaltreatment,and what percentage of the sewage
waters hadtheirowntreatmentcapacities in 1994?
(c) Did the sewage treatment programme have any beneficia1
irifiuenceanthe waterquaIiiyof theDanube?
And ifthesequestions are not answeredin 1994, aforliorithe answerç to
them corrldnot have been avaiIabIea dtcade earlier.TIierewere obviouç
reasons forconcern.
39 HC-M,Annexes,vol3,annex36.
4* Se.SM, par3.48.
SM,paras3.18-3.21.2.17. Independens ttudiesrelyingon datapblished byMrVavrciukk,
the Federal Minister for EIIironmenf,and his ,cobagues indicatethar
60%of thewaste waterof Czechoslovakia was not adequatelytreated. in
1989 more than 50% of Bratislava'sindustrihlwaste and household
sewage was releaseddirectlyintothe Danube without purification,and
haIfofSlovaki ai'srswuId "nolongersupportaquaticIife".42
2.18. The SIovakMernorial failsto note the:intensive discussioonf
environmentalissues in Hungaryat the time. Not less than three
cornmittees of the HungarianAcademy of sciences wereactivebehveen
1981 and 1983.43 As a consequence of the$ repeatedfindings that
furtherinvestigationswerenecessary, two studie's ereproduced,one on
the cornplexutilisationof the Danube,the otheron the environmental
impacts ofthePr~ject.~~ t 1
2.19. The SIovak Mernoria1states that "CzechosIovakiawas never
given any... roposalsfor revisi~n".~~In fact it waç Deputy Prime
MinisterMariai himseIf who handed over the summaryof the 1985
Environmenta1Impact Staternenr'Qo his coinferpart, as was nofed
during his negotiations with CzechosbvakPrime Minister, Mr Strougal,
on 19August1985.47This visit to Prague was ,specificallyarrangedto
informthe CzechoslovakGovernment aboutthe modificationsof the
Projectrequired bythejustfinished"environmental impa~ ctaternent".~~
According to the Hungarianinterna1memo of the meeting,Premier
Strougalprornisedto çtudythe çtatementcaref(lly andagreedwith the
need for thoroughscientificinvestigationsin orderto conserve(in the
language of the lime, tu "prestrve')nature.He:recaI theefdteof:the
waterresemoir at Orlfkwherethe environment'ha1sufferedincreasing
I
HiIq F French, G&II Revofu~ions:ElivironmeRecomtructiorinEastern
EuropeandtheSovieUnion(WorldwatchPaperNo99,November 1990)p17.
43 HM,paras3.45-3.48. l
44 HM, para3.48,3.52.
46 HM,Annexes,vol5 (par1)annex4.
47
StricrIyconfrdentiailnterna1noteof the stfthe~nngarian~~ovemrnent,
MemnrmdrrrnOn the NegotiatioofCornradesStrriimda!lbwef Marjai HeId
On 14Augusr1985,19August 1985;HGM, Annexes,vol3, snnex40.Thehand-
yinen correctionsonthisdocumappeartbe byMr Marjai.
48 1
SeeHM, para3.55By iniemation1tandartdhsenyironmmt impactassessrnent
ofthe mid-1980swirsinadequatseeabove, paragwphs1.30-1.4But the fact
thatsuchstudieswereundcrtanhowsthatheissuwas acomptexeconomicand
environmentaolne,athathepartiewereawareofthis.
!damage,althoughscientists had assuredbefore theconstruction thar there
wouldbe no pr~blern.~~
2.20. The Czechoslovak Prime Minister's view that more attention
should be devoted to the environmentwas not unprecedented.Hungary
and CzechosIovakiahadaIready agreed in Juiy 1983 tliatthey"consider
it necessary,to seek rational soIutions rhrough necessary and possible
modification of the technica1plans for the avoidance of unfavourable
conseqrrenceswhich maybeidentified.. ."50
2.21. As already noted, the Slovak Mernorial cornplains about
Hungarianinconsistency,citing Hungary'srequest in the mid 1980sfor
an acceleration of the constr~ctioB nu.t~hat request was consistent
with earlierexpressed concerns, and even flowed from them. Precisely
becauseof the financial burdenand the weakeningHungarianeconomy,
as weII as Czechoslovakinsisfenceon the continuation of the Project
wifhatrfsfoppingfo investigateenvironmentaiwncerns, the Govemnreri t
began tosearch for ways of temporarilyrelievingthe cumentFive-Year
Plan frorn fie burdens of the invesmenf. Thus Hrrngarycoricluded
privatelaw contractswith two Austrian companies,whose capacityhad
beenfreedbythe abandonmentof a hydropower stationonthe Danube at
Hainburg in Austria. Having helped Hungary to secure reIatively
favourable conditionsfor a loan given by Austrian banks, the main
Atrsfriancontractor,Donarrkraftwerk coe,ld requirethatsuch relatively
minor issues asthe consirrrction scheduie be tailored to its unused
capaci~. ,'
2.22. The performance of the Partiesdurirrgthe years of construction
has to be understoodin the light of the realcharacterof the Project. This
was an enormoues ngineering project, whichby its scale and compIexity
required repeated modifications.Keeping to the scheduleand to decade-
old plans was never anticipated, which was why the schedule was not.
laid down in the TreaQ itself.A survey of the protocols of the
Government Plenipatentiaries reveals that almost every year major or
minor adjrrstmentstothe PIan were adoptecl?" cconsolidatedIist of
49 Strictlyconfidentialinnoteofthesecretariatof the [HungaGnovernment,
Memorandum On the Negotiationsof CornradesStroandJbzsefMrirjaiHeld
On 19August1985,19 August1985HC-M, Annexesv,ol3, annex40.
Aide Memoireon consultationof the CO-chaof the Hungarian-Czechoslovak
CarnrnissinnEconornic,SrientificaTechnicalooperation,9 July198HM,
Annexesvo,4,annex ItaIsoptibIishedinadifferenttranslatSM,aannex45.
51 SM,paras3.11-3.12.
52 Forexample, issuediscrisseat asingIe meetininclrrded the possibiIOty
estab6sa connectincanaibehireenthDanube and the taiI-race rtoabuiId 1
agreed modificatians ta the Joint Contracrua! Plan adopted before
31Decernber 1984 Iists 74 arnendmentç tu the original, incIudirigsuc11
significant changes as movingthe siteof the tai!-race cana1and altering
the isoIationmethodin thehead-race~anal.5~ :
2.23. The Hungarian suggestion in May 1989 ta suspend the
constructionternporarilypendingjoint environmentalinvestigations was
not ex&aordinary?given this background of repeated adjustments, and
this was understood at the negotiations of Prime Ministers Nimeth and
Adarnec.54 But within a few rnonths the Czechpslovakposition Iost a11
ifs flexibiIity,and active plaiinirrg for what was Iafer to be caIIed
Variant C cornmenced- or rather recommenced -as wilI be seeri.j5
2.24. The SlovakMemorialis particularlydismissiveof the motives of
the environmentalgroups arguing against the Pr,oject.The are accused
of pickingan "easytarget",the GabEikovo-Nagymaros project, insteadof
more pressing domestic issueç.56 That the ta& was vulnerable to
criticism may have been true- it was vigorou$y criticised from both
sides at the tirne.Brrtit was farfronran "easyf?rgefWg ,iven continuing
governrnental practices against dissent, such as disrnina1 from
employrne~rt,police çumeiIlarice, home search, arresr, etc., bath in
Hungaryand Czechosl~vakia?~ As a participantnotedIater:
"It is truethatthe aim was to stop completionof the dam, but
never, for a momenton nationalistic grounds.Highly respected
Slovak authors and academicsas well as en~;ironmentalists were
our partnersin providingcorrect informationand dernonstrating
against this mastodon of communist ideology. Hungarian
envirrinmentaIistshad a gre;rtdeaIof respect forthose wlro took
generatorsinto the Dunakilitiwechangethe constructionschedulethat weir,
etc.Seethe Protocolonthe NegotiatigntheGovernrnen PtIenipotentiariesof the
HungarianPeople's Republicandthe CzechoslovakSociaIistRepublic Concerning
theCo-operationon the Constructionof the GNBSHeld in BratisIava on 13-14
lunc 1985, 1June 1985;HC-M. Annexes ,u13,annex 38.
53 Agreed Iistothe modificationsof rlretechnicalçol{rionsof fhejoint contractua1
pIan,adoptedbefore31Decernber1984,An~rex3 tathe PratocoIof the meetingof
the GoycrnmentPIenipottntiaries,heI7oMarch 1985.
i
54 HM, para3.78. I
I
55 See belowparagraphs2.93-2.97. 1
56 SM,paras3.52-3.54.
57 HilaryF French, Green Revol~ztionEnvirmrnent$ Recomfrt~ciiorn Easfern
Europe andtheSoviet Unio(WorldwatchPapcr No.99, NovernberI990), 32. aIargerriskin the Iesstolerantand more oppressive comrnunist
regimein neighbouring~zechoslovakia."5~
2.25. The general point has atready been made that the Slovak
Memorisl dealswith the Project in a historical as well as an ecological
vacuum,as if the historicalchangeswhichculminaied in the revolutiws
of 1989-90had neveroccurred, arlymorethan the majordeveloprnentsin
environmental science and iri the understanding of environmental
.impact- deveIoprnentçintirnatelyIinked toenvironmenral catastrophes
a~rdconcerns in EasternEur~pe.~" ithin thiscontextit is nutçrrrprising
that Htrngary sotrght to riod d iee Project 50 as to redrrce the
disadvantageswhicb criticofthe Projectincreaslnglyperceived.
SECTIONC:HUNGARY'SWILLINGNESSTONEGOTLATE
WITHINTHEFRAMEWORK OF THE 1977TREATY (1989-1992)
2.25. SIovakia repeatedIy daims rfiatHungary was unwilting to
~iegotiate?~ However the chronicle of the three years between the
suspensionof the cançtructiorrworksatNagyrnarosun 13 May 1989and
tlietemination of flre1977Treaty inMay 1992 wit~ressedrepeatedgood
faith efforts bf Hungartoachieve a mutuallyacceptabIeresponse. WIrat
might havebeen a cautiousmeasureof a state acting reasonably in 1989
has matured into environmentallysound and required action by 1992,
reflecting growing awareness with respect to the vulnerability of
ecosysterns in general, and specificalty of the affected region. The
grnwing concern for the protection of natural resources was
sirnuItaneousIyreflected in the i~irreasingniirnborof majoririternational
treatiesprotectingelementsand processesof the environment,inclriding
in particrrlar the inçtrrrmeritsadopted at the Rio Corrference on
Environmentand De~eIoprnent.~~ WIratHnngarytr-iedin vain to achieve
with itstreaty part~rerwas precisely what the worId cummuniiy was
strivingfor: "Statesshall CO-operatein a spirit of gIobai partnersiiro
conserve,protect andrestore thehealth ofthe earth'sec~systern".~~
58 JtrdirGshrheIyi,"Gabtikovo: ttCase Againsi"h51 Europn Observer,
Septetnber-October199279HC-M, Annexes,vol3, annex32.
30 Setabbove,paragraphsI-1.22.2.91.
61 See nbove,Introduction, para5-7.SeealsoHM,paras6.576.64 ,.58.
u2 Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc
AICONF.15IIS,principle7.2.27. From the suspensio ofn the works at Nagyrnaros onwards,
Hungary was wiIIingto negofiatewith CzechosIokakiainorder tu reach a
rnutuallyageed solution to the environmental:problerns.The relevant
Resolution of the HungarianGovernment,dated i13 May 1989,provided
that:
"The Council ofMinistersrequestsParliamentto authorizeit to
enter intoprelirninarynegotiations withthe ~zechoslovakParty
regarding theamendmentofthe ~eaty."~~ ;
2.28. The HungarianMemurial has referredlto the mosr important
interactionsbetweenthe parties#verthe foIIowingrnonthsand years,and
its accoimt wilI not be repeated herea Betweec the decisitosuspend
the construction of Na~maros in May 1989 and thedecision toinitiate
'negotiationswith aview to abandoning Nagymkosin October 1989,no
less than five meetingstook place at prime ministerial or deputy prime
ministeriallevel.65Thesemeetingswere aceomdaniedbythree roundsof
meetings between different expert groupsand frequent meetings of the
Government~leni~otentiaries.~~
!
2.29. Slovakiasuggesfsthatthedecision 10sus!pendtheconsmictionof
Nagymams oiily three rnonths afterthe signing of the ProtocoI on
speeding upthe workscame asan trnexpected rnove?? Attention t5the
evenfsthemselves ssuggesta differentinterpretation.
2.30. The negotiationstoshortenthedeadlinebyoneyear were carried
out in 1986-87 and agreement on the new schedule was reached in
January 1988.6T 8he issue of substantive environmentalconcerns was
raised by a few members of the HungarianiParliament who were
independent fromthe Socialist Worker's ~a&'s instnrctions in Jrr~ie
1988?9 From that momentonwards the Hungwian Government was
anxious not toneglect theconcern of the pop4lation expressedby the
I
53
GoveritrneResoIutionNo 312511489,13May 1989;HM, Annexes,vol 4,
annex147.SceHM, para3.75-3.76. !
65 ThePrimeMinistermeton 24May,20 JulyIl 0ctdber a26October1989,the
DeputyPrimeMinisteon 9 Septembe1989. '
1
65 HM, paras3.78-3.99.
67 SM, pm? 4.07-4.08.
58 HM. para3.71.
6g HM, para3.50.liuge wave of public protestagairrst thProject, and commirted irselfto
act in a way consistent with the sustainable use of Hungary's natnral
resources. The reaI message of the 1988Octoberdecision of Parliament
was not the adoptionof the idea of continuationwith the construction,
but the identification of the environmental criteria without which the
Project was not to be operated. This was succinctly stated in the
Declaration:ecological interests should take priority over short-term
economiccon~erns.~~
2.31. Preciselyas a conseqirenceof the 1988OctoberdecisionHungary
and Czechoslovakiaagreed that a proposa1 grraranteeingthat tlie
environment in the region of the GabCikovc-NagymarosProject wouId
riot deteriorate be worked wt by the two ministers responsible for
environmenta1maffers.?' The Iegitimacyaridextentof the concern was
recognised atthetime; iwas notseen asa"pretext". ,.
2.32. As notedin both Memorials,72a proposalfor principiesof a new
treaty on waterquality to enable risk-free peakoperationwas presented
to the CO-chairmenof the Bungarian-Czechoslovak Cornmittee of
Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation.73 What the Slovak
Mernorialfail ts add is that this wanot yet a treatybut a pactum de
confrnhendo,and that it was actually signed by the two ministers, Mr
Marfithy and Mr Margerin, thereby establishingthe sarne level of
obligatio~iasthe signingof a protocolby the twodepnfyprime ministers
couIdhave prodncedon 3 May1989.
2.33. It may be true (albeit unducurn~nted~~ that the protocol of the
wurking meeting of the two GO-chairinen remained nnsigned. However
the report DeputyPrimeMinisterMedgyessysubrnirtedfothe Hurigarian
Government concerning this working meetingdoes not mention any
dispute overthe signing of the protocol. As to the fateof the planned
environmentaltreaty, the report states:
"During the meeting the Czechoslovak party brought to my
knowledgeunequivocally thatthey were ready to conclude the
treaty,butthey would be willing to negotiateon environmental
issues or conclude rhe treaty unly if the Barrage System would
70
HM, para3.43, quoting the ResoIuIionof the ParliHM,nAnnexes, vol 4,
annex145.
HM,paras3.68-3.69.
72 HM, para3.69;SM,para3.23
73
1-IM, nnexesvol4,annex15.
74 SM, para3.24offers no anyevidencefor the claim that the Hunga[Co-]
Chairman"refusetosigntheprotocol". 110 !
I
be built in its entirety, according to the original concept. In
connectionwith that I haveexplained:otrr Govenr~nent has riot
çtoppedany worksso far, tlie construction inclrrdingNagymaros
continues according to tfie agreed scheduk. Our Prime Minister
undertook the obligation atthe March sessibnof the Parliament
no1 to carry outaiiy irrwerçible work.At thé samelime we Iiave
ro wait unfiltheParIiarnentdecides on the &entua1 referendrr~~~
concerning the construction of the Nagymws Barrage. My.
parmer has noted my statement with lunderstanding,but
indicated that it woutd seriously preju'dice CzechosIovak
interests if eventuallythe NagymarosBarrage was not built. He
requestedunequivocal information stthe meeting of the heads
of governments. I
I
We agreedthat the drsftof the environ~ne agieelent would
be made by theexpertsrrntiItheend of June,"75
2.34. CIearIy Czechosiovakia was weII infomed about tlie
contingencies irrvolved in tfie Hrrngarian domestic dcliberatioris;
nonetheless ifs positiorionthe OriginaIProject was inflexÏbIe.Itinsisted
that the Project be co~npleted irrespective of the resufts of further
investigations or of the success or othenvise of ,theproposed agreement
on environment protection. The conclusionssought to be drawn in the
Slovak Mern~rial~~from Hungary's"refusal''to sign a protocol on
environmentalprotectionatthis stagearewithoutfoundation.
1
2.35. This inflexibility was seen follawing tbe agreement by Prime
Minister Adamec on 24 May 19a8 to set ip joint cornmittees tu
investigate the mo parties' concern~.~~The CzechosIovak experts Ieft
their Hrrngarian coIIeagues onIy four days fi3 examine their repiy
fprod~~ced onIyin SIovak).'g
i
2.35. Thusin the Iightof fundame~rfaIdisagreeinentaf the nreetirrgheld
on 17-19 JuIy 1984, Hungarian Prime Minisrer Német11 iriformed Iiis
counterpart Adarnec that Hungary thoughtit prudent not to proceed with
those,elements of the Projectwhich might preiempt the investigations
75 ReportfortheCouncilof Minister, May1989;HC-M,Annexes,vol 3, anne 4x4.
76 SM, para3.24. h
77
That Czechoslovakiitsewas aIsoentertainingseriois doubisabtheProjecis
refiecredby ~hefactlhat it feItthenetocommissionan"independent report"
15 months Iater(in Septcmber1340to"revierthe parenrialcontamination of or
reductionin!liewaterfable,theexistingenvironmentalsiridiesand, in addition,the
sccnriryof the variousconstructionworb",pmM,2.27.
1
78 SM, para4.13. I
I III
necessary roresolve the disagreementssurraunding the Project.Hrrngary
would continuework at GabCikovo except for the preparatjon for the
. closure of the Danubein October 1989,an act thatwouldbeeffectively
irreversibte. Otherconstructionworkson thesites continuedand orders
for the machinery tcibe instaiiedboth atNagymarosand atDunakiliti
were not revoked. In general, nothing was done which would have
prejudicedthe completionof theProject.
2.37. It musr be re-emphasisedfhaf the question raised behveen May
andOctober 1989waswhetherto continue or abandortifie consrnicrion
of theNagyrnarossector, and what kind of gnaranteeswererequired for
the erivironmentallysound operation of the GabEikovo sector, witIror
without peak mode operation. The Slovak Memorial asserts that
"Hungaryhad succeededin postponingthe dammingof the Danube for
three successiv eears, during which tirneno new scientific studiesof
Hungaryto justify its suspension of the GIN Project had been
~ndefiaken"?~ In fact, during the snmmer of 1989 a nurnber of new
studies had been pi.oduced.TIie annotated bibliography listing the most
important environmenta1 studies related fo the impact area of the
GabCikovo-NagynraroçProject Iist3 1 Hrrngariarrstudies for 1989 and
43 for the year 1990as a cIear sis of the scientific activity aimeat
identifyingtheparameters of expecteddamageandri~ks.~~
2.38. Internationalexperts'reports producedin this period confirmed
the well-founded character of the Hungarian reservations. The t989
Report of INFOR~/Ecologia,~~ after comparingthe Nagymaros section.
with other snggestedand abandorlec pirojectsebewherein the world,
came fo thefaIIowingconclusion:
"In srrmmary,a projectof the nature of the NagynrarusBarrage
WOLI I~Y~Y be penrritted today in many countries. In theUS,
the projectwould be impossibiefor a~y one of the following
reasons: environmental impacts (destruction of wetlands,
wildlife habitat, groundwater impacts, etc) c;ultural impacts
(histoiy, archaeology);scenicimpacts;or publicoutrageat the
degradationof a national symbol. If these problems were
cornbined,as they are at Nagymaros,opposition to the project
wanIdIikeIybe in~~rmountable-"~~
T9 SM,para 4.82.
Magyar Tudomhps Akadémia, A BÜs ~Vagy~narusFYirzl&pcso'r~ndsm
hur~steriilétrint+ntosabbkornyezetihtatusobb(Budapest1994).
HM, Annexes ,ol 5 (part1),annex6.
82 HM,Annexes,vol 5(part1)annex6,p 118(p68of theoriginal)(emphaadded).
The SlovakMernorialriticisesthisRepcontendinthatitwasnotbasedonnew2.39. The concIrrsions of rhe Atrgust1989 repop1 of the WorIdWiIdIife
Fund were to similar effect." The Projecr would trndoubtedly have a
negative impact on the environment, and because of rhe Iack of
appropriateinvestigationand data, a moratoriumof at Ieasrtfiree years
on construction of al1the componentprts oftlreI>roject was nessary.
scientific data and that was poorly received by'Hungarian scientists(SM,
para2.24). It relies particularlyupon tcriticisbf OVIBER,the Hu~igarian
Nation81 HydrauIic,lnvesring,Consultingand Engiyering Company which had
bcen ~ornmissirinedOy the HungarianG~iremment tobuiId the Bmge System
(SM,para 2.25). !
OVIBER specificaIIy criticised the PreIirninq PIFORT (EroIogia) study for
making fourrccornnrcndatianas toGNBS operatio~r~plre-conditions,name(1)
ha1 a monitoringsystem totrackwater qualitybein operationfor at leasyears
priorto diversion;(2) developmentoa3-dimensionalc;omputermodeHingsystem;
(3)establishmentof a Geographic InformatiSystemi(G1S)a;nd (4)the formation
of an independentwater authority. OVIBER'sresponsc asserted that al1 pre-
conditions weremet with the exceptionofa 3-D sys'tem,which couldbe a final
goal,since2-D modelswouldsufice. Sce SM, annex25,whichrcpradmes pg 1, 2
and 11 of tireOVIBER cammenrs. . I
The OVIBERanalysisis inaccurateandover-sirnpIifie'dF.irsr,aIthoif was tnre
rhaf a ~nonitorinspem had becri in place foyears, itneeded a nrrrnberof
modificationsto rnonitw adequately rfre Barrage System's itiipacon water.
SecondIy,the m~ddsinplacein Iafe1988were nat nebIy sufficientodescribethe
phenornena. Even Czechoslovakiarecognised that fact in 1990 whenapplyingfor
PHARE supportto engagein a large waterrnodellingbroject;it thenarguedfor an
integrated rnodellinsystem"to provide better understandiof the interrelated
processesinvolved,their interactionsand basis for decisionmaking... A detailed
three-dimensionalcornputerground watermode1interconnectedwith mode1 of
reservoir and river water quality, could reflect the iarious possible problems."
(Surface WatcrandGroundWaterMode1of DanubianLowlmd BetwccnBratisIa~s
and Komho: EcoIogicaI Mode1 of WaIer Resources and Management,pp 1, 3;
HC-M, Annexes, 'y013, annex48.) Rird, wilh rGpect to the GIS, MFORT
(EcoIagia)acknoruIedgedlater initçReportthat ihe isysteexiçted inWurlgary;
their recommendationwas rhat il should berrsedHM, Annexes,voI 5 (part I),
annex5, pp42-43 [ofthe annexvolume].
No doubtstudiesdone by scientists not intirnatelyinvolvedin the detaiIsof the'
GNBS may be hindercdbylackof accessto data.~hethreereports in the period
before andaroundMungary'ssuspensionofconstructidn(WWF 1986,WWF1989,
and INFORT(Ecologia)) were nonetheless importanitnsupportithe view thatit
was imperative that constructionbe stopped until a comprehensive impact
evaiuationcouldbe perfarmed .nd thisconclusionwasvalid even if the reports
contain minor inaccuracics.Thesame is true of the;Bechieland Hydro-Quebec
Reports, which were commisçionedby entities charged with cnnstmcting ?hi
BarrageSystembutwhich nonerheIers expressedcor&rns and admitteciIack of
knowledge of critical issue s:e rhe passage k?nr tIrose Reportsci!ed in
paragraphs1.30,1.37above. I
!
83 See'HM,para3.94. 2.40. ln these circumstancesthe HrrngarianGovernrnent was justifled
in assessingthe situation as one otruescientific uncertai~is,in whicli
continuation of the construction would have defied the principle of
responsiblegovernance.Sincethe investrnentin theNagymarossection,
although significant,was considerably smallerthan the expected risks
and damage linked to its operation,and since the works already carried
out011 the sire rhoughlarge-scakwere not irreversi belG,ovemment
suggested 10 Parliament that it be empowered tu rregotiate with
Czechaslovakiaaboutthe abandonmentof the Nagynrarosscition and a
correspondingmodificationto the 1977Treafy.
2-41. II maybe useful to recaIIatihispoint theexcharrgeof views in
lateOctober 1989,whenthere was the potentialfor a compromise.
, 2.42. At a meetingof the two Prime Ministerson Il October 1989,
CzechoslovakPrimeMinisterAdamecshowednowillingnessto agreeon
a suspensionof works at Dunakiliti until a treatyon the environmental
grrarantees couId be concluded a,d again threatened the unitateral
diversionof the Danube. On 26 October 1989, before the Hrrngarian
Government's fina1decision on what recornmendation to rnake to the
Farliz~rnent,a~d beforethe HungarianParliament'sdecisiori to suggest
negotiafionson the modificationofthe 1977Treaty with a view ru the
abandonment ofNagymaro~,~ t~etwo heads of government metagain in
a last effortto reconciletheirviews.No compromisesolution emerged,
and consequentlythe Government decidedthe next day to propose that
the Hungarian Parliamentadopt a resolution on an amendment of the
1977Treatyto eliminateNagyrnaros.
2.43. The SIovak Mernorialfailsto make it c1eathat thewillingness
reflecfed in the Czechoslovak' Nore Verbale to initiala treaty on
environmentalguarariteesbeforecontinuingpreparationfor tlrediversion
of the Danube was ~iotshown at the 26 Ocruber 1989 nleeting, but .
appearedas a newelemeritafterthe HungarianGovernment's decision of
27 October 1989. That Note Verbale was transmitted at 6p.m. on 30
October1989,whenthe Hungarian Parliamentwas alreadyseizedof the .
question.
2.44. The SlovakMernorialrefersto what itdescribesas a Hungarian '
Note Verbaleofthe same date.86This doctrrnentwas nota Nole Verbale
but anAide Mémoiro ef a meetingheIdon theafternoonon 30 October
1989befween a senior official ofthe HrrngarianForeign Minisfry(Mr
84
HM,Annexes,vol4,annex 150.
85 HM,Annexes,vol4,annex151.
86
SM,para4.46& annex75. si and the Creçlioslovak ambassador r Ehrenberger).s7 The
meeting was intended to infonn the CzechosIovakGovernrnentabout the
as-yet-unpublisheddecision of the Hungarian6overnrnent, adopted on
27 October 1989. Unlike the CzechosIovak ~61e Verbaleof the same
+y, itdid not incorparateanynew dernent wirI!respect ta thesubstance
of thenegotiationsheldbetweenthe two PrimeMinisters on 26 October.
!
2.45. To summarise, the "compromise off$' was delivered at a
moment when the offeringpartycould be ce&in that it could not be
incorporatedintothe decisionto be adopted by !theParliament20 hours
later. In addition, the "campromiseoffer" contained the folIowing
elements: (1) itdid not specify what tIre"ecologicaIguarantees"wouId
be- these were Iefl to fuhrre negotiations; (2) it required irnmediate
preparatiorrs Torthe cIosiire of the Danube;. 03) it contained a blank
refusa1 ro corrternplateany amendment to the 1977 TrearyifseIf; (4) it
threatened uniIateraI imprementationof a "provisional substitute
technical solution".88Curiously,the ~zechoçlo<akNote Verbaleirnpl ies
that limitingor excIudingpeakhour operation wouldbe compatiblewith
the 1977 Treaty- presumablybecause~zechoslovakiawas never willing
to amendthe 1977Treaty itself,andyet to insist!onpeak-hourproduction
wouldhaveinvolvedno element of compromise whate~er.~~
I
2-46. After the fundamental polirical charge4 of 1989 and 1990 die
new Hungarian Government decided on high level negotiations with
Czechoslovakia on the future of the ~roject.;This resulted in three
intergovernmentalnegotiationsbeingheld in ~Uda~es tnd Bratislavain
1991. i
1
I
2.47. TheSlovakMenlorial seeks topIay dowc the importance of these
riegotiations. They are presented in a 17-Iine paragaphPo rrnder the
inaccurate titIe"TheFisf Jilvolvemen~ of the Eui.oyeon Commurtiiies".
87 TheSiovak Memorial'sanne75produces atexhea$d:
"(Courtesies)
Note Verbale"
Infactthosewords arcnotinthecopy of the original Hungariandocumentfiled
with the Court, nareanycourtesies.IagenuinelNoteVerbale,rhtcourlesies
wonldfollowrather haprecedethe tifIeofdocument.
.- 8S SecHM, para 3.99.
90 SM, para468.TIiuças fotfie first round of negotiations,the Slovak Mernorial sirnpIy
says that: 'There was a rneetingof the recentIyappointecldeIegations,at
w1iichpositiorrpapers were exchanged".gl
2.48. The HurigarianMernoria1fuIIy describes these important taIks,
exyIaining the backgrou~idto the Hungariari position.92 lt is not
necessaryto repeatThisexplanation,but it is i~rrporiantto recaInumber
of Tacts:
*
During the 1991 negotiations both parties were represerrted by
.Iarge delegations which incIuded both high IeveI gowrnmental
oEciaIs and weII-knownexperts;
1
* The CzechosIovakdeIegation was IedoIral1rhreeoccasions bythe
SIovnk Prime Minister (Mr Metiar and subseque~rtIy Mr
~arnogrrrski},dulyaccreditedbythe.fede~'ila irrtlrorities;
* At tlre first meeting the ~uri~arian'delegation preçented four
essentid docr~nrerrts,including a drafi biIafera1rreaty on the
terminatio~~of the 1977Trearyand on compensationforthe Iosses
of CzechosIovakia,and another draRtreaty on the suspension of
corrstnrctionuntiltheerrdof Beptember 1993;93
* TIre Hurigarian delegation Irad receiveid riformatiori on the
Czxclroslovak rtim of constructing VarianlC before tlie firçt
meeting.
2.49. The SlovakMenlorial does no more thân state that af the firsr
meeting"bothsidesconfinned thevalidityof tlie 1977 Trea~". ~his is
seIf-evident.HungaryheIdthe 1977Treary valid untiI ils termination. In
1991, HrrngarystiII saw some chance tliat tfie 1977 Treav could be
arnended or terminatad by nrutualagreement and that the parties couid
agree on importantrelated issues (cg., assessrnentand compensatio of
losses,tirefateof the ilistallationaIreadyco~upIeted t,e resoIution of
the probiernsof navigationand flood protection,and the rehabilihtion of
the area).
2.50. The SIovak MemwiaI recaIIs that Hnngary propoçed at the
intergovernmental negotiations in 1991 tire suspençiorr of work by
CzecIiosIovakia, i~iorderto providesome time for experts to undertake
91 SM,pan 44.68.
92 HM,para3.121-3.145.
33 HM, para3.126-3.127.
94, SM,para4.68.confinriediri a "frankand notably courteciusIetter"Ioobefore the third
meeting that Czechoslovakia had commencecl the construction of
VariantC.Iol (This sequericeof eve~itsis not mentioned irrthe BIovak
Mernorial).
2.53. LegaIIythe hands-ofthe HurrgariarG r overnent were not tied by
the Resolution.ParIiamentaryresolutions do not Iiavs the force of Iaw,
although, Iikpearianrentaryreso1utionson issuesof govern~nentalpoIicy
i11many constitutiona1systerns,represen tguidelines of the Iegislators.
Any such reso1ution could be rescinded by Parliament in the same
mannerinwIiichit Iradbeenpassai.
2.54. At the same time the CzechoslovakGovernmenthad a free hand
ta refuseanyproposalonjoint researchand torefuseanythingeIse which
~nightIead to the abandorinlentof the Project. Wha~everHungary did
during the coming months, CzechoçIovakia was detsrmined toput the
Gabeikovosector intooperationunilaterallyandat the Iatestby 1992.
2.55. Chapter VI1 of the Slovak MtmoriaI briefly returnsto the 1991
intergovemrnentalnegotiations. t asseristha:
'4Thro~ghoutthe meetingsof govsrnmenta1delegationsof 199 1
Hungay insisted onIy upon a right of peopIe 10 thsir 'original
environment'and hencethecancslIationof the 1977Treaty."Ioz
Dnringthemeetingsthe Hungariandelegaliondid no1 refertoany
2.56.
rightto an'briginal environment"but siresseclthat duringthe timeof the
suspension of the constructiori,Hungaryhad becorneincreasinglycertain
that tlre Project would pose a serious riskof irreversible and darnaging
environmental processes, with adverse consequence o both
countries.103At no stage had Hungary"refuscd bilateral discussiorrs"at
theexpertIeveI.lo4
IOa PrdescribediSM, par4.73.
IO1 See Ietfrum SIovakPrimeMinisteJCamogurw, to HungarianPrimeMinister
J AntaII,30JuIy 1HM,; Annexesw14, mnex54.
SM,para7.08.
103 HM, 3.I2s.
Io4 SM,para7.08. l
(3) WOLVEMENTOF TH RD PARTIES iNTEk SOLUnON OF THE
DISPUTE:THEROLEOF THE EUROPE& COMMISSION
I
I
2.57. Hungary was always wi1Ii1rg to invtiIye tliird partiesi~rthe
soIution of the dispute. The SlovakMernoria1undar the ritie"The First
InvoIvement of the Europearr Cornmunities" jtries to establish that
Hungary was aIways hostile tothe i~ivolvement,ofthe EC. At tfie same
time the Mernorial porlraysCzechoçIovakiaas hàyingmade-
"repeated atteinpts...fobroadeii the biparti;e negotiations and
siudies into a tripartite format with EC participation,
gariicuIarIywith respect to scientifrcaspects...stariing with tlre
participationofCzecIrosIovakia(but rrot~in~ary) in the EC's
PHARE project."ID5 1
2.58. Again it is necessaryto go back fo the;histori~al record. It is
convenient tu startwiththe issueof the "parficipationoFCzechoçIovakia
(but not Hurrgary)inthe EC'PHAREproject". !
!
!
fa)The issue ofp~~#icipa rntoenPHRE Projecf
2.59. SIovakia rnisrepreçents tlre Hungariari ]response to the 1990
CzeclrosIovak proposa1 on participation in the] PHARE project. The
SIovakMernoria1assertstliat: I
I
"The resporiseof the HungariariGovernment: ..misdescribed the
proposed agreenient as being a bilaterai project between
Cxchoslovakia and the PHAREProgram, viith Hungary in the
posifionof a mereconsuItant.Thedrafl agreFmerrtforwarded to
Hungary by the CzechosIovakGovernment Nas nothing ofthe
kind;the two partieswereto participatejuintiy inthe strrdy."!06
And itconcludesthe çtorybystating thaf: i
"Aj2er Hungary refused to make a joint rFquest to the EC,
CzechuçIovakia,in October 1990, decided to participatein a
PHAREprojcct ..."IO7 I
I
1
SM, para4.32.
Iou SM, para4.64.Foi the Hvngarian responxe ref;oin thir passageree Leîîcr
hm GyOrgySimsondi Kiss, HungarianGovemmentiPIe~ripotentitoDominik
Kocinger, Czechoslovak Govemment ~~eni~ote~rti&; HM, Annexes,y01 4,
annex38.
IO7
SM, pam8.5I {ernp~rasdded).Thus according toSlovakiait waç not CtechosIovakiawhichappIied for
PHARE funds arrd invited Hrrngary to participate in the project: tlrere
was aCzechosIovakproposaltu submitajoint-application.
2.60. This is not the case. C~choçIovakiafirsr appIied for the funds
and then submitteda proposa1 to Hungary.The cupyof the "Agreerrierrt
on Joint Czeclio-Slovakia~a~nd HungarianCooperation on the PHARE-
EirvironrnentP~+oiection" a,rr~iexeto tlre SIovakMernorial, reveals a
sig~iificantdiscreparicy .Irat Agree~ne~rw t as a draft, which was not
sig~redby tliePIe~ri~oterrtiaries.~~n 26 October 1990if had beenserit
by the Slovak Plenipotentiary to his counterpart for signirrg,but the
Ianer, on 15Novernber 1990,refused tosign it'O9 But according totlre
SIovakMemorial,CzechuçIovakiaappIiedfor PHAREfurrdsin OcCober
1990.
2.51. Moreoverthe Czechoslovakproposa1stated fIra:
"SIovak, Hungarian arid foreign experts wi1I act and work
togetlier as an independent workirigteam arid wiI1take main
methodologicaI responsibilities in the organization and
execution of the project. TIris group wi11 be included in
cciordinativeand invesfigative group 'Groundwater' which hus
been established at the Faculîy of NaturaI Sciences, Cornerlius
Universityin ~ratisIava."Io
2.62. According tothe applicationto PHARE, thiç coordinative group
"Groundwater"would Ieadthe programme.Under itç auspices wouIdbc
a team made up of haIf SIovak arrd haIfEC experts.That team wouId co-
operatenot unly with a team of expertsfrom Hungary, but aIso with
other organisations dealing wifh reIated problems, as well as with
specialiçts"fronr al1over tlie world". The mandate of the group was to
establishrnodelstailoredfor iit~ii Ostrovconditions,and thtreby toseek
Contravto the inrprcssio~rgiveSM,ymnex 82. The original, I~dgedwith The
Court, isunsigncd.
IIo DraA Agreenrcnt on Joint Czecho-SIovak and Hungarian Co-operation on
PHARE- Environnrcnt Protect"SurfacWaterand GrriundWater Mode1of
DanubianLowIniidBetweenBratislavlad Komuno:EcaIogicalModelof Water
Resoiircand Management"P,roposal.handedovebyCxchosIovakiato Hungary
on 26 October 1990;SM, anne x2, p 189; HC-M, Annexes,vu1 3, anne49
lemphaisaddecl). I
to salvea numberof probIernsin tfis Bratislava-Komirno section of tlre
13anube.111 !
2.63. Thus tfie projecf was not meant to be a( analysiof the impacts
of the Barrage Systernon bofh HungaryandCgechoslovakiarather, by
studyingonlythesituationorrCzechoslovakterribry, theplanwaç to-
"evaIuateand verifythe effectsof previaus activities and by the
new hydrauIicaIsysternof hydmpower dev;eIopment.Tlie goal
is to definethe reniedia1actions and optimi&tion of ai1mutual
interferences.A permanentoptirnizationand nrariagementmode1
isto bedevelopedbythis project."' '2
1
At the end of tlre first phase,the designsfur technical soIutions.wtoe
be subrnittedtu a representativeof the CzechosIovakGovemnre~it.There
was no provisionfor"EC involvement"in the resolution of the dispute,
as suggested inthe SIovakMernoriaI.There wasinoprovisiorifor siudies
on Hungarian territory, either in rhe upstreok downstream sectors of
the GNBS. But aboveaII,the project assumed(rightly, as it turnedout)
that "the new IrydrauIicaIsystern of hydropower developrnsnt", i .e.,
VariantC, would be irr operation before any, conclusions had been
reached. Itairnedat "rernedia1actions" after-thejevent.In that conteif
isalso worth notingthat theenviçagedmode1is iot fuIIydevelopedeven
four years after the applicationand more tha&O yearsafterthe diver-
sion of the Danube.TfreprobIems foreseeninth$ fundingappIicationare
occurring,yet none ofthe "rernedialactions"içiI place.
1
@JTheissueofEC meditttion md thesus$ensionojYariant 2
!
2.64, Elsewhere the SIovakMernoria1attempts toshow that Hungary
was ulrwiIIinto involvethird parties in thedisjhte. Thus it assertsthat
Hungary was against the participation of EC experts and against
broadeni tngnegotiationsby establishinag triphitewmrnitiee. Il3
2.65. Infaot the ideaof EC involvernenthadlbeen raisod at an early
stage by Hungav- On 14 December 1390 the,new Hungarian Prime
Minister, Mr Antal 1,informed his CzechosIovak counterpart about an
agreement with an EC Commissioner that expertsof the Cornnruniv
I
I I
SurfactUaleandGrorrndWaterMode1of DanrrbianlLuwIandBeîweenBratisIava
andKomho: EcoIogicaIModcIof WalerResourcehd Management,25 October
1390,p12;HC-M,Annexes,vol3,annex48.Seeibidlpp 5-11fofurtherdetaiIs.
II2 Ibidatp3. I
I
II3 SM,para4.72. IwouIdassist the two countriesirithe resoIntianof their dispute.IIi4is
response dated 15 January 1991, the CzechoslovakPrimeMinister did
notreferto any EC participationbut merelystatedthatthe Czechoslovak
Governrnent-
"authoriseJ sosefVavrouBekM , inisterof the Governmentof the
Czech and SlovakFederal Republic (to] organizeinternational
assistanceinjtrdgingrheecoIogic prlobIems".lI5
This did not specie what kindof third pars assistancethe Czechoslovak
Govsrnmenthad in mind.
2.66. HungarywashoweverconcernedthatanyECinvolvementnot be
used as a cover for continuedwork on VariantC, which threatened to
pre-empt theverypurposeof that involvement.Thus- as pointedoutat
the third 1991 intergovemmental meeting- Hungary found the
establishment of the Cornmittee meaningless if Czechoslovakiadid not
rneanwhiIesuspendwork airnedat the irnplementationof Variant C.'16
The activiiy of the Cornmitteewould have legitimised the uniIafera1
cunduct of Czechoslovak whaieat thesame tirnetireCornmitteewonLd
havebeen actingunderthe pressureof briIIdozers.
2.67. The CzechosIovakposition can be seen froma Nute Verbale,
dated 27 August 1991, which containedwhat the Slovak Mernorial
characterisesasa "positivesuggestion":
"Provided the Hungarian sidesubmits a concrete technical
solution aimed at puttinginto operation the GabEkovo system
of Iocks...base4on the 1977 Treatyin force...theCzechos,slovak
sideis prepared toimpIernerrtthe mrrtrraliyagree~rtIrition."~17
Itis difficnlr losewIratthepasilive contentsof thesuggestian were,or
for thatmarter, whatexactly the authors ofthe Note had inmind other
than the Original Project. What kind of "technicaIsolutiorr"aimed af
puttingthe GabEikovosectorintooperation"based on the 1977 Treatyin
force" other than the Original Project, which also required the
constructionof Nagymarosand operationin peak power mode?This was
only anotherway of insisting that the whole Barrage System be
irnplementedwithoutsignificantalteration.
II4
HM, Annexes,vo4,anncx40;referrIOinHM, para3.114:SM,pam4.65.
II5 LetlerfmmCzcchoslovakPrimeMinisteM ?alfatoHungsrianPrime MinisterJ
AntaII,1Januar1991;HM, Annexesvol4,annex42.
lt6 SecHM, para3.144,3.149.
CzechoslovakNoieVerbaleof27 August 1991;SM, Annex 96,cited inSM,
para4.74. !
2.68. Hungary was not alone in seeking al çomrnitrnrnt fmm tlie
CzechosIovak pariy to discontinue work on Variant C pending
negotiations. ina lensrof 23 April 1992,~zdhoslovakia reiterated in
compIairr~sabout Hungary's unwillingness toitake part in tfiejoint
Cornmitteewith the participation of EC e~prts;'B "ut itfailed to refer
to the contents of a letter of EC Vice-PresidentjAndriessensent to both
Ministersof ForeignAffairs 10days earlier, on 13 April 1992.This letter
included a rather important point with1regard to the EC's
participation.119It stressed that any involvement of the Commission
woulddependupon threeconditions,thethird being that:
!
"each Government worrId not take arijr steps, while the
Cornmittee is at work,which wouIdprejir(ice possibIe actions
to be undertakenon the basis of the [Cornmittee] report's
findings."'"
The Slavak Mern~riall~~ refersto Mr.AndrieLsen9s letter but fails to
mentionthat it includedsuch a condition. I
i
2.69. Another letterof Mr Andriessensent on130July 1992again drew
the attention ofthe CzechoslovakMinisterof ForeignAffairsto the three
conditions outlined in his previous Ietter.'22:The SIovak Mernoria1
nonefheIessstates fiat-
"Htt~rgaryresuruec~ed [at a 13 October 1992meeting] the pre-
condition that Czechoslovakiasuspendat +ce a11work tu dam
tfieDanube, a condition that the CzechqsIovakGovernment
rejected."I23 I
I
Reference ismade in the sarneparagraphto the first Andriessenletter,
whichsetthe conditionthatnounilateraistep be takenbytheparties,and
to the Czechoslovak intentionto continue the unilateral construction of
Variant C. The twointentions were inoppositiohto each other. This was
I
120 LetterfromtheVice-Presiden tf the EuropeanCommunitieto theCzechoslovak
Ministerof ForeigAffairsSM, annex107. ,
I
I2l SM,para4.80.
122 i
Leneterof 30 Seplemberhm Vice-Preçidentof ;~he EC Canimissianto the
CzechoslovakForeignMinisler;SM,annex 124.SM;para 4.87,saysonlythaf such
a Ietterhabeensent, demonstrntingrhat"fie EC $omissionremained ready10
help". I
123 SM,pam 4.94(emphasiasdded).not "resurrecting" a precondition:the preconditionhad always besn
there,bothso faras Hungaryandthe EC were concemed.
2.70. As to the fate othe thirdcondition,at abilateralmeetingon 13
October 1992 Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Pirek stated that the
conditionscantained i~rMr Andriessen'sIetterof 13 April 1992were rro
Ionger appropriate, because the wark on VariantC had been
~rnpIered.'*~
(c)The"scheduled" Viennameeting
2.71. The Slovak Mernorial stresses that Czechoslovakia- while
working intensively on the completion of VariantC - was willing to
enrer into subsiantive negotiations with Hungaryand to accept the
invoIvernentof tlteCommunity,in spiteof tlrefact thatit was unwilling
to respect rhe third condition of Mr Andriessen.Itcitesa Ietterof the
Czechoslovak Prime Minister ta his Hungarian counterpart dated 23
September 1992,according to which:
"in May 1992 the two sides 'were very close to reachingan
agreement on involvement ofthe EC Commissionin settlingthe
dispute', but then Hungary refused to take part in the first
trilateraltalkthatwere convened,but not held,inVienna on18
May[1992]."125
It asserithat-
"A rneeririgin Viennawas schedrrledby the EC for 18 May
1992 and Czechoslovakia and Hungary were invited ta
attend...At the last minute (on 17 May), Hungary announced
that iwouIdnotattendthis meeting."l*6
2.72. These allegations do not correspond with the facts. What fact
happened was that the ambassadors to Budapestand Prague of the
European Commission,atîempring ru mediatebstweenthe partiesorally
çuggested a meeting in Vienna.127 In response to thiçsriggesrion, tlre
responsible Hungarian Minister, Mr Mid, agreed fo attend on the
understanding thatthe meetingwouid,inhiswords:
Iz4 SeeHM,para3.181.
125 SM.para4.85.
''15 SM, pua4.93.No further reférenceisprovidedivith rroaeither EC or
C~chusIovak documents.
IZ7HM,para 3.171. 124 I
'bnable the parties ro abandori any actions whiclr wouId
prejudicetheIaunchingandthe [co~ri~~etiono]f theworkof the
ExpertCornrnitree.Accordinglyit is expect'edrharthe meeting
will resultin thediscontinuationof the uniraterl orkson the
one hand andinthe non-effectuationof the abrogationof the
treatyof 1977ontheotherhand."Iz8
i
However,the SlovakGovemment declinedto Gkepartin a meeting on
thisbasis,and asa resultnobody"convened" anf,meetingin Vienna. Tt is
accordingly no1 true that Hirngaryrehsed toitake part in the first
trilateraltalks,othecontrary, itagreeto do soionthe reasonablebasis
thatneirher partywouldtake nniIateraIaction pending the completion of
the EC'swork. 1
!
(4 EC involvemenp t rior to thediversichoftheDanube
i
2.73. In October 1992, the Europeancommission, Iearningof the
growing tensionbetweenthe two countriesresultingfromtheacce1erated
work on VariantC, invited the iepresentativeç of the two partiesto
Brussels for furiher negotiations. The SlNak Mernoria1 rather
overestimatesthe powerof Hungaryvis-à-vis rhéEC inrelationtu these
negotiationsI.t statesthat:
"Afterthe failureof these negotiations,andwiththe damming
of the Danube imminent,Hungary increased itspolitical
pressures onmembersofthe EC.. .As a result,whentrilateral
discussions frnallydid take pIace in Brussels on 22 October
I992, CzechosIovakia found itseIf underIpressurefiom rhe
Com»rissiun ofrhe EC tu pastpone the dam&ing operation unri1
at Ieastmid-December 1992."1z9
I
But "Calsthe Czechoslovakdelegationexplained [to the Commission],
thiswastechnicallyimpossible" 130
,2.74. TheSlovak~emarkl assertsthatthere&asa chanceeven atthe
lut minutebeforethe diversion toreach acornifomise. One daybefore
the pontoon-bridgewas builoverthe Danub ed aftera Iargenurnberof
ForMr MidI7shand-wrinenconternporarynole;Orht proposedmeetin5e
Hand-writtNote ofFMal, MinistewithouPortfoliRegardintheProposed
ViennaMeeting,16May 1992;HC-M, Annexes,ol3,annex54.The contentof
thirnote wasreadMI Mhdlinatelephonconve wihtioEnCAmbarador
toHungaryon16May 1992.
129 SM,para4.95(emphasiadded).o furtherreferenceiaregiven.
30 SM,para4.95.trucks,carryinglarge çtones, had already Iined up af Cunovo, the
Czechoslovakdelegation - accordingto the Memorial - proposedat the
Brusselsmeetingon22October1992that:
"untilthe completionof the workof the tripartite[Committee]
the flow of the Danube wouldnot be divertedfromthe main
riverbed...This, of coiirse, \vasonIy a short-termcomrnitmenr,
for the tripartite {Carnmittee]was expected tu complete its
missionby theendof October..."'31
An Aide Mémoire"tabled at the meeting"in Brusselsconfirms this
statement butgoeson tosay that:
"Measures takenpresentlybytheCSFRcannotbeconsideredas
definite darnmingof the river. It will serve only to shift the
navigafion Iinetothebypasscanal."I~z
2.75. A day earlier, on 21 October 1992,the Hungarian Ernbassyin
Prague receivcd a CxchosIovak Note Verhaje, which the SIovak
Memorial failtosmention.According todieNote-
"The[Czechoslovak]Governmentdecided thatit willnot start
the closureof the Danubeuntilthebeginning ofthe work ofthe
Committeem , oreprecisely,until2 November11992 "133
By contrast tlreCzecIrosIovakdeiegatio~rdecIared at the meeting in
Brnssels that the closure of theDanubehad tobe carriedout in October,
otherwise "graveecoIogic caastrophe and fluoding" wouId endanger
thesùrroundina grea.134
Thus,the Hungariandelegation leamed from Czechoslovakia
2.76.
duringthenegotiationson21-22October1992 that:
SM,para4.96.
132 Ride Ménroiofthe CSFR Delegarion,22 October 199annex 126Theuiew
thatVariantC did notinvolvediversionof theDanubeenearherexpressed
bythe PrimeMinister,who had said that "the realizationof the provisional
technicalsolutiondoes not involve the divertingof the Danubebut only the
exploitationof partof theDawaterina wayenvisagedin the 1977Treaty."
Letterof CzechosloPrimeMinistetothe HungariPrime Minister2, October
1892SM, para4.89&annex 125.
'33 Nole Yerbnf~hm MinistiyofForeignMairs ofthe Czecand SIovakFederaI
RepubIitothe Embassy of the RepubIicof Mungary,21 Oci1992(at2:30
p.rn.1M;,Annexes,vol4annex101.
134 SceHM, para3.185SM para4.95similarisaysthatdiversion counot be
delayed"bevenaday". 126
l
*
The diversion of the Darrube would cokrnerice as planned on
23Octuber 1992. I
* The diversionof the Danubemight be poitponed untir the end of
Oçtober 1992,while theCornmittee war atwork.
* The diversion of the Danube might be postponed until
2November 1992, until the beginning of the work of the
Commitîee. I
I
* Thediversionofthe Danube was not tobeiconside aseaddefinire
darnrriirigothe river, but wouId servean& toshiftthe navigation
Iine. \
I
2.77. Faced with these inconsistencies, Hungary did not see any
possibility of reachinga compromise. On the followingday, it saw the
commencement ofthe diversion.135 1
!
(4) TE LOMX)NAGREEMENT
2.78. MeanwhiIe the BritishPresidentof the EC Courrcilwas meeting
the representatives of the Visegrid Group (~un~ar~,Czechoslovakia,
Poland) in London. On 28 October 1992Hungary,Czechoslovakia and
the Commission signed Agreed Minutes (khown as the London
Agreement).136 Itssecondparagraph reads as follows:
"The CSFRundertakesfo guarantee to rnaiifainthewhoIe[not
Iessthan 95%]traditionalquantityof water intothe whole Main
Channel riverbed ..and to refrain hm operating tlre power
plarit." I
1
2.79. The SlovakMernorialdoesnot deny thatthe London Agreement
gave riseto interriationalobligations for the Parties, but it offers the
I
following novelinterpretationas totheir duration;
"the text of the agreed minutes sirowsrhat the cornmitmentof
CzechosIovakia to maintain at Ieast95%:of the iraditionai
quantily ofwater info the Danuberiverbednand not ko operate
the GabCikovo hydroelectricpower plantwaj inrendeci torelate
1
13' The SM puts the FOInInenCeIneIof the div4rsion of the Danube on
24October1992.In fact tclosurestartewiththeconstnictionoa pontoon-
bridge on23 October 1992.
136 L
AgreedMinutesof the MeetingBeIweenthe~ura~eCommission,the CSFRand
Hringary,onthe GabEkfovo-NagymarProjectLanaon,28 October 1992;HM,
paras3.191-3.193,WM,Annexes,voI3,mn !ex31.I
127
to a very short period- the the-day period during which the
factfinding missionwascomplsted,i.eu .n,tiI31October 1392,
whenthe reportwas issued.Such an interpretationis confirmed
by the text of CzechoslovakA iidesMemoiretabled at the 22
Octobermeeting."13'
Czechoslovakiaitself neverasserted that the Agreed Minutes would be
valid forthreedays only.Neither does theSlovakMemorialexplain the
reasonsfor the unusuallyshortIife-spanof theAgreement.
2.80. It is also diffrcuItosee how the CzecliosIovakAide Mimoire
"tabledat the22 Octobermeeting" confirmçthe SIovakinterpretation of
the Agreement.ThatAide Mimoire states that:
"TheCzechand SlovakFederalRepublictakescornmitmentthat
undilthe completionofthework of the TripartiteCommissio itn
will not divert the flow of the Danube river from its present
mainriverbed,and al1the measures whichare nowundenvayon
the territorofthe CSFRwillensurethatthe wholenaturalflow
of theDanubewiIIpas tlirough theold riverbed.In cornparison
with the presenistate the hydroiogicaicondirions in the border
section ofthe riverwiIInot be~hanged."'~~
But the words itaIicised Ireredunor appear in the Lundon Agreement.
The Aide Mémoirecannot be used ta contradict the rneaning of an
Agreement reachedin differentwords some days a$er the diversionof
the Danube.
2.81. The subsequent practiceof the parties isalso inconsistentwith
Slovakia's viewof itsduration.On 4 November 1992the Czechoslovak
Government "notified the Commission that it had approved these
{~lintrtes.."I39 The first threc days had already passed, but the
Government- Far fror drawing attention tofhis cruciaI point- added
that:
"As regards the question of. ..aintaining of waters i~ithe
original riverbed of the Danube, [Czechoslovakia]wiII respect
thepositionsof thefact-findingmissionandthe expert working
13' SM,para4.99(emphmisaddedto"shows").
138 Aide MémoireoftheCSFRDeIegation,22 Oclober1992;M,aanex 126(emphasis
added).
139 SM,para4.I00. 128
I
groupwhich willbe an importantmeans of in~rpretationof the
ornmiiments arising from the Minutes."140 1
This entireIycontradictsthenorionthat thecomr&itments inquestion had
oIready expired.
!
2.82. "However, this issue was rendered irrelevant shortly
aftenvards"- accordingto the SlovakMernorial: referringto theresults
of thetrilateralmeetingsof 27 Novemberand 10-11December 1992.141
Itfailsto provideanyexplanationas to whythis/shouldhavebeen so. II
also failsto mentionwhat happenedin fact:~zechoslovakiadid not
provide95%of thewatertothemainDanuberiverbed atal!,even forthe
firstthreedays.Iir5th words, the Agreed Mi?utes were breafhed by
Czechoslovakiaforeveryminuteof those rhreedays.
1
2.83. The SlovakMernoriab l etraysçomeawariness of the diffrcnlties
in explainhg why an internationac lornmitment &as made for fhree days
on1y.-Itaddçthat- !
l
"it is apparent from the face of the documentthat these
[minutes werehurriedly prepared andtheiristatb uçtweenthe
partieswasnotentirely~lear."~~~
But as the Court pointed out in the Case ;conc~rniPlgMaritime
Delimitationund TerriiorQ iuaistions(Qa~ar YBahruin),"international
agreementsmay take a nurnberof foms and be given a diversis of
names"; what is cruciaIare .theactrraterms of Jheinstrument and the
snrrounding circurnstances.If these go beyand a description of
discussions and "enurneratethe camrnimenfs to 'wIzich the Parties have
consented" they will constitutean internationalgreement.143 Andthe
appIication of this principleto the London Agreement was expressly
acceptedbyCzechoslovakia atthe time:for it, thb issuewas ratherhow
to interpret"thecomrnitrnentasrisingfromthe inu ut es", o'^^ hichthe
I
140 tertehm theCzechosIovakGovernrnent[unsigniaTheVice-Presideritof the
Commission of Ihe Errropem Communities,: Mr Frans Andriessen,
4November 1932;SM,annex 129citediSM, para4.100.
14' SM,paraCIOZ. u
!
142 SM,para4.100. I
r43 ICJReports1994atp 121,citingAegeaSea~ontinebtaShelcase,ICJReports
1978atp39. I
144 LetterfrotheCzechoslovakGovernmen[tunsigneiothe Vice-Presidentof the
Commissionof theEuropeanComrnunities,Mr Andriessen4November
1992 SM,para4.100amex 129;above,paragrap2.8i(ernphasiasddcd).
! commîtmentas tothe quanti5of waterto be keptin the Danube was by
, farthe mostimportant.
(5) BlUNGING THECASEBEFORE THE INTERNATIONAC LOURT OF
rnsTICE
2.84. At a certain point Htrngay came to the conclusion tfiat the
dispute could not be setrled by furiher negotiations and recommended
bringing tricase beforethis Court.The SIovakMernorial admirs tliat it
was Hungary which initiated this proposal. On the other hand it
mistakenlystates thatHungary made this proposa1 on 18 August 1992
andonlywith regardto VariantC:
"The question proposed to be submitted concerned only
proceedi wnitlr Variant'C', as iftfiisalone comprisedthe
dispute betweenCzechosiovakiaandHu~igar~ ."145
2.85. In facr, the Hungarian Prime Ministerhad proposed earlier, ina
letterdated 4 Aupst 1992,to bringthe whoie dispute before the Court.
Mr Antall wrotethat:
"The construction [of Variant Cl, continuing without
interruption, strengthens the belief that the Czech and Slovak
parties do not intend tu resotvte he groblem within the
frarnework of bilateral negotialions. For this reason the
HungarianGovenirnerit willconsiderthe involvernentof highIy
respected non-partisan aurhorities in the resolution of the
Danubedispute,firstof a11the InternationaCourtof Justice in
The Haguewould be advisable...ln this spirit,Iemphasisethat
the Governmentof the Republicof Hungary is ready to enter
into bilateral negotiations concerning a settlement of the
consequences arising from the termination of the 1977
Treary..4"
Thus the HungarianPrimeMinister propoçedbringing the complete case
ofthe Gabeikuvo-Nagymaros Projectin its entireV before thCo& arrd
natonlywith regard to VariantC. Hiçproposa1receiv edresponse.
2.86. The specific proposal with regard to VariantC was sent to
Czechoslovakia on 18 August 1992, because the Hungarian Prime
'45*SM,para 4.85.
145 Lcner from MungarianrimeMinisterJ AntatuCzechosl~vakPrime MinisterJ
St&ky, 6 Ar~gust1392;HM, para3.158; Annexesvol4,annex90 (emphasis
added). * l
Minister had Iearned in tire rnearrti~ne that the Czechoslovak
representativeto the Danube Co~nrnission had annorincedofficially fhat
the diversion of the Danube WOU Id begin on 15 October 1392,147 The
, .
CzechosluvakPrime Minister- withaiit reçpondi~g toMrAritall'searlier
.letter- expressed hisdissatisfactionin a letterdated2 October 1992. In
his view, "[tlhe processof seekingmeans of sèttlementof the dispute
wduldthus againbe prolonged.. ."148 Ratherthdnseekingto expandthe
termsof referencsso as explicitly toinclude the .oie dispute,he simply
refused to disuss a SpecialAgreement. I
1
2.87. The SIovakMernorial- failing to referto the firçt Hungarian
proposa1- views the secondas a furtliekindof 'ipreiext":
"Itwas possiblythroughpolitenessthatthe CzechosIovakPrime
Minister did notcategoriseHungary'snew+ctic as deliberately
dilatory:in fact,the Hungarian proposalto divert attentionto a
different setof negotiations..had the additional, if disguised,
aim of postponingthe dammingof the Dan,ube for yet another
year."l49 I
And a sirnilar approach to rhe Hiingarian offe! of judicial senlement
trnderIaythe Ietterdated 2 Octuber 1992 fromthe CzechosfovakPrime
Ministertu the HnngarianPrimeMinister. AccorFing to thatIetter: .
-"The opening of new talks on referring !thedispute to the
International Court of Justice in ~he Hague would mean
impeding the resultsof the talks held sofar betweenthe two
sidesand theEC Cornrnis~ion."~50 !
!
2.88. In faci noiesult hadbeen reaclied befwe{n the ho sides and the
EC Commission inrhe trilateral talksu,ero the:Czechoslovakrefusa1tu
cornply with MT Andriessen'srhird condition. I
I
I
I
147 Letteof MTR Chmel',Vice Presidentof the Dancommission loMrH Strmer,
DirectorSeccefariaif the Dmube Commission5 &gris{ 1992;HM, para3.172;
Annexes,vvI4, mnex88. I
148 Letter from the CzechoslovakPriMinisterto théHungarianPrime Minister,
2October1992;SM, para4.88& annex 125.
I
149 SM para4.87(ernphasisadded).
150 Letteof the CzechaçlavakPrime Minisrerro the: Hungarian Prime Miaister,
!
2 Ocbber 1932SM, para439 & anncx 125. 1 SECTION D:Tm CONTINUHG HISTORYOF VARTANTC
2.89. On the subject of VariantC itself, theris a clear discrepa~icy
between the parties as tothe history of its planning and construction.
This essentially factual issue will be dealt with here, leaving an
assessrnent of the scientific and environmental impactsof Variant C to
the nextchapter.
2.90. According to the Slovak Mernorial, VariantC was adapted
reIuctantIy,only after Iengthycorisideratioofvarious alternatives, and
after public discussions of which Hungary was kept infomed. III
particular, VariantC is depicted as a response fo the Hrrngarian
Parliament's decision on 23 ApriI1991 empowering the Hrrngarian
Government to negotiatethe terminarionof the 1977Treaty.Isl
2.91. Thus according t~ tfie SIovak MernoriaI, Czechoslovakia
considered a "seriesof alternatives"as a response to the Hungarian
withdrawal frornthe Project:
"In total, Czechoslovakia considered six main vari-
ant~..carefulfystudied and assessedfor feasibility, withoutany
preconception as to the suitabilityof any particular variant.
Czechoslovaki ai'swas to find the variant that would be
ncceprabie rri bufh yariies..taking irito accounr specific
anxieiiesabout theen~ironrnent.''~~~
VariantC 11ad three,Variant D had as manyas six sub-~ariantT s.e'~3
SIovakMernoria1provides a short description of these, and reca1Isthe
conclusion that onIy VariantC was appropriate,despire the fact thait
was not "acceptable to both parties".But nothing was done without
carefulconsideration:
I5l SM,paras5.24,5.25.
lS2 SM,pan 5.14(emphasisaddzd).
Is3 SM,paraS.19. "The considerationofvariantswas carrieddpt openly;and atal1
stages,WungaryandCmhoslovakia were peeling at bot11the
political and technicI evel,a? some ofwhich meetings tlre
variantswerenaiuralIydiscussed."*
'The evidence of Slovakia' csoperathn witlr Hurrgary
regardi Vngriant'C' is ample."I55 l
2.92. Cioseranalysiç shows that plans for the unilateral diversion of
the Danube were made much earlier, and most probably were under
development continuous~yfrom summer 1989'onwards. There is rio
evidence that Czechoslovakia ever studied lin depth the various
alternatives othethan VariantC. The planning,and construction of the
latter hasalwaysbeena confidentialmatter in ~!~echoçlovakih,iddenas
muchas possible€rompublic view.lnparticrrlar,thronghouttlris process
Iitrleor noinformat ianmadeavailable toHungary.
I
(1) THEEAFLYPLANMNG AND IMPLEMENTATIO ONFY ARIANTC
I
2.93. Ir shouId be stressed thatthe "pr~visi6sn ub~titutetechrrica1
solution" frequently alludedtointhe discussions of 1989 was nothing
other than the firçtphase of VariantC, although the terrn "Variant C"
was not then current. The technical solutions actually carried out up to
the commencementof construction on the middlesection of the Cunovo
dam in 1994precisely correspond tothe schemeldescribedat the meeting
of Deputy Prime Ministers Medgyessy and Hrivnik on 9 September
1989.156The concept of diverting the Danube rhe sectionyhere both
embankments are under CtecIiosIovakjririsdictian, and ofutilising the
joint investment soIeIyfor CzechosIovak ecoSurnic purpoçes, was tfie
unchanged core of CzecIrosIovak plans .his a~ounted to anatternptto
exclude the otherriparianState frumcontra1over the upsneam sector of
the Project and over the water dischargeinto'ithe boundaryriver.No
doubt some detailsofVariantC were only eI&orated later- even afier
the actualconstruction,if regardbe had to the date on blueprintshanded
over to Hungaryin December 1993.But this does not alter the fact that
154 SM,para5.25
155 SM,para7.7% !
i
IS6 Viewofthe CzechosIovakParHM,Annexes ,ol4;anne25.thedeveIopmenrs fiom the firstofficia1threat of a unilateralsolution in
Ariguçt 198915u 'ntiithe diversionof thc Danube in Ocrober 1992form
one barely intempted continuum.
2.94. This interpretation is confirmedby the Slovak Memorial ilself,
which treatsthe 1989 threats as the background to variant c.IS Itg
revealsthat approxirnatelyfour months afterannouncingits intention to
proceedto a unilateraldiversion, Czechoslovakia"sropped design work
on the provisional solutionon Slovak territ~ry".'~~Given the rapid
constructioriof thefirstphase ofVariantC (requiringless than2 years
but saidto costmore than CSK 2.5 biIIi~n'~~), irseems IikeIythal four
rnonthsof design workbroughtthe piannedsolution toa fairlyadvancd
stage.Thisimpression isstrengthenedbythe factthatdesigncosts do not
appearlamong the costs relatectv VariantC enumerated inthe SIovak
MemoriaI,IS1although al1 manner of other costs, such as the cost of
protectingthe Project structures,"{ilncreasedoverheadcosts,additional
studiesand research"are separatelyli~ted.'6~
2.95. The early starton VariantC isreflected in a contemporarypress
reportthat:
"In connectionwiththe Hungariandecisionto interruptworkon
GabCikovo water projectand not dam the river at Dunakiliti,
Czechoslovakiahas been forced to applya ternporary soIntion
as a çribstittrte.Thepositionfarnew right-bankdam for a new
navigation channel begarito be rnarked out on 13thNovember
11989]."163
HM, para338.
SM,para7.07.
SM,para 7.0(etnphasdded).
AccordintoSM, pxa 9.37.hisicquivaIenIo US37d5 million.
SM,para9.37.
SM,para9.34.
BBC,Summaryof WorldBroadcastsEElWO10 5il30 November 1989referring
to~rniue1730grnt13Novernber1989HC-M, Annexes,vol3annex83.15 December 1989: Preparatory work on the modified alternative
soIutioniç srispended"IO show C~chosIovakia's willingne tss
camplete tlieGabEikovo-Nagyrn systorsjoi~itly".~'~
25 April 1990: Followingtwo Slovakreportscritical of the alternative
technical solution, the Slovak Government "orders
[Vodohospodirska Vystavba]to scale downconstructions"T . he
main statecontractinCompanyH , ydrostav, rejectsthorder".171
25 May 1990:SlovakMinisters faito agreeto scaledownconstructions
inaccordance withthedirectiveof 25 April1990andconstruction
continueç.1'2
27 September1990" :CzechosIovakeriergyofficiais have confimeclthat
thehydropowercomplexonthe Danub aetGabEikovowilg lo into
service in 1991. EarIier the government slowed workon the
Projed cue tocos?overrrr ansdHungary'sdecision tosuspend tlie
Nagymarcisprojecf.."'73
17 January 1991:It is reportedthatonthisdaythe SlovakGovernment
"approved furtherprogressin the construction"of thealternative
solution.t74
2 April 1991:"InSlovakiathe construction of the so-called'vérçionC'
of the[GabEikovop ]ower statiohas begun..."175
5 Apri11991:SIovakVice Premier J.Carnosirsu statesthat Slovakia
has"done no work whatsaever, that they had not begun the
report iheaded"Beginning of Czechoslovak workon new shipping channe1on
DaanbueneaGabE fovo".
170 &hi 15December 1988as reponed in BBC, Summary oWorIdBroadcasrs,
EElWO109AII, 4lanuary 199HC-M, Annexes,voI3mnex 84.
171 East-WestCentre,"Slovakia.The GabEIko aterWorks",Januar1993 ,6;
HC-M, Annexes,vol3annex93.
172
East-West Centr",SIovakia.The GabEikWaterWorks",January1993, p 6;
MC-M , nnexes,o3,annex93.
173 PowerEurope,27 September1990HC-M, Annexes, vol 3, an86(emphasis
added).
IT4 BBC,Sunrrnaryof WorIdBroadcasts, EE/09896 Febmary 1991,referringto
Praguehomeservic1500gmt,4 February 1991;HC-M,Annexes,voI3, ai87.x
The reportis heded "Sbuak government approvescompIefion of Gabzikovn-
Nagymaros".
175 Budapes HomeServic 1600gmt,2 Apri1991;cikd in BBSumq of WorM
Broadcasts,EH103A2D, 4ApriI1991HC-M, Annexes,vo3,annex89. constructionof the canal whichwoulddivert the Danube ont0
Slovakterrito'1y".l76
2.97. One further point mncerns the re~arive!timingof the plans for
Variant C and studiesof its environmenh1impact.The SIovakMernorial
sfatesthata Iargennrnber of studieson GnvironnjenraIimpactwere made
"from 199IW,wifh the impIicationthat everythingiiadstartedafterthe
23April 1991 Resolution of the Hungarian ParIiament.L77But the
Hungarianauthorities Iearnedas earIy asFebruary 1991that the SIovak
Governinent had alteady approvedthe plans,for VariantC.178That
decisioncouldnothavebeentakenwithouta majorplanningexerciseat
the level of bothconstructionanddesign:the evidencethatthis process
beganno laterthan 1989 was reviewedin the precedingparagraphsI .f
environmentas 1tudieswere indeed carriedout only afterApriI1991, it
was much too latetostoptheprocess.
I
1
(2)'m-OPERA~ON" ?WMHUNGARY h VARlANT C
!
2.98. According to the SIovakMernorial, SIovak iaasfrrIIyprepared
to CO-operate with Hrrngary inrespect of VariantC: "it is SIovakiawho
has cornplied with, and Hrrngary who has igrtored..the generaI
obligation ta cooperate...""g The Mernorialdoes not explain why the
CO-operationof thevicfimof an i~itemationallywrongful act isrequired,
nor doeç itprovideanyreferenceregarding the"total"non-CO-operation
of Hungary.
2.99. "Slovakia'scooperationwithHungaryrebarding Variant 'C"'l80
shouldhaveincluded,as a minimumt ,he provisionof informationboth
about VariantC itself and the various alternativesto it. The Slovak
Mernorias leeksto suggestthat therewas suchco-operati~n.~~I~ n fact,
I76 BudapestHomrService, 148gmt, ApriI199I;cited BBC, Srimmq of WorId
Broadcasrs,EElID~213,-10ApriI1991;HC-M,Annexes,ml 3,annex90.
I77 SM,para5.25.
IT8 SeeAide MgmoireoftheNego~iationsBerweenthe Experisof rheHungarian and
theSIotjakAcadernieof Sciencesignedby Dr M RuziEka,Ptesidentof the
EnvironmentCornmitteof theSlovakAcademy O!Sciences, anMr Berczik,
DirectoofResearcInstitufor EcologandBotanyoftheHungarianAcademyof
Sciences13-14February1991,penultimateparHMi i,nnexesvol4, annex43.
SeealsoHM, para3.122.
179 SM,para7.87. I
180 SM,para7.78;above,paragrap2.91. I
I
181 SM,para5.25;above,paragraph.91.
1the SIovak Mernoria1 was aImosttlre firsofficia1document handed ovw
to Mungary which confains a briefdascriptioiiof variousalternativesand
a Ionger description of VariantC. OnIy a Iist ofseven "hypothetical"
alterriativeshadbeen presentedon asingleoccasionby theCzechoslovak
E~rviranmentMinister tu his Hungarian counterpart in September
I990. On othsr occasions the ~zecho&vak negotiators always
stressed that either the OriginaI Prujsct should be completed, or the
CzechoslouakGovernnrent wuuid pruceed with the construction of
Variant Hungary haçnever beeninfomed about the details of the
discussionof alternatives, whichwas not carried out operrIy.The Slovak
Mernorial failstriprovide anyreferencetu the date and venue of such
discussions,or of the bilaterd rneetirrwith Hungarian experts. As far
as VariantC wasconcemed,the "ninety studies" carried out and listed in
Anneri 35 of the SIovakMern~riaII~~Iiave never beerr presented to
Hrrngary.
2.100. In fact Czechoslovakia never presented any plans or data
regarditn hgdiversion, nor did Siovakia do so afterifs indeperrdence
unti1 as Iate as Decenrber 1993. Ig5 Hungary repeatedIy requeçted a
detailed deçcriptio~rof the structureof VariantC. For example,such a
reqrrestwas made ata meetingof the Joint OperativeCroup in 199 1,but
the CzechosIovakdelegate stated that he waç not empoweredto provide
thésedescriptions.186 Hungary again requestedthe defaiIed plarrs of
ccinstruciton and docunienfation in Dece~nber 1993. SIovakia herr
handed over some maps,drawingsand brochures.Resporrding tofurtlrer
Hungarian requests, Slovakia statedon 1 February 1994 in a Note
kérbnlethat 0th documents couId be obtained from tfie GovernmentaI
PIenipotentiary.I87Bycontrast the PIenipotentiarystated that:
"the SIovakReprrbIichas not authurised me...tu releaw any
fundamenta1irrfomation tothe [Hungarian] party in reIationto
the proceedingsbeforethe InternationaICourtof Juçtice7'.'88
See HM,paras3-123-3.124.
SeeHM. p& 3.124.
SM,para5.25& annex36.
HM,para3.194.
82ndmeetingoftheJointOyerativeGroupfrom to21June1991.
HM,Annexes,vol4, annex 136.
LetteFromMr Kocinger,SlovakGovernmentIIenipotentia,o MrL Zshboki,
ManagingDirectoroOVIBER; HM, Annexes,voI4.annex138. 2.101. Accornpanying tfiis Iacof ceoperation as to the tecimica1and
-
pIming elements of VariantC was a faiIure to eIaborate or1ifs IegaI
justification.The SIovakMernorialdoesnotIistorquoteanyCzecIioçIovak
Ietferor diplornaticcorrespondencespellingoutthe reasorrswhy VariantC
içconsistentwiththe internatiorialIaw.Czechoslovakia was always conte~rt
to state flatry- as PrimeMinisterCa1fadidin one of his Ieitersquoted by
tlre SIovak Mernoria-l tfrat: "In any case, tlris decisiun [of the
CzedrosIovakGovernrnenton 12Decernber 1991 to cornpleteVariantCI
does not violate irifernationaIaw.-."IggThe o;Iy basisoffered in these
communicationsis- toquotethesarrreIetier- that:
"ProvidedtheseconcIuçionsand resuIis of monitoringthe test
operation of the Gabeikovo part confirm that negative
ecoIogica1effects exceed its benefits the CzechosIovakside is
I prepared tostop work on the provisiona1soIutionand contiriue
the constructionupan mutua1agreement."14?
2.102. This sentcricecontainsacertain contradiction:the Ietferpromises
cance1Iatiorrof the work on Variant C ajler the GabEikovosectar had
bcenput into operation, while any test operation presupposes the
cornpletionof VariantC befDrethat event. Suchcontradictio~iswerenot
reassrrring.It was niost nnlikely that Czedioslovakia wou1d corne tothe
conclusionthat "thenegativeeco1ogicaIeffects exceededthe benefits" of
the operatioriafter having incurred Furtherexpensesanrounting to many
millionsof dollars.This was al1the more so +ce the rnost important
envirorimentalprobIemsraised by the BarrageSysternwere Iong-term irr
nature. Thus the "Iegal" approach adoptedby~zechosiovaa kmiaunted
to a pre-judgenienlthat no scientificor other investigatioirswould stand
in the way of the operation of VariantC. And it waç entireIy co~~sistent
with this "legal" approaclr that the studies of environmenta1 impact
shorrIdpoçt-date,ratherthan prectde, the definitivedecision to go ahead
with theProject.IP1 I
;
2.103. NeveriheIess,it was maintainedcontin;ousIy byCzechoçIovakia
tliat construction of VariantC wouId be a "temporary soIution" only.
This was one of the vffIcianames of VariantC; even Chapter V of the
Ig9 Lettefrom the CzechosIovak PrimMinisrerIO&e Hungarian Prime Minister,
23 Janr~ary1992;SM,pa4.75& annex 102.
Letter from the CzechosiovakPrimeMinistorthe Hr~ngariPrime Minister,
23 January1992;SM,annexIM. Thisisqücitei~SM,para4.75.SlovakMernoria1is entitIed"The Temporary Solution: Variant 'C"'. Ig2
Czechoslovakia always rnaintained that if Hurigary returned to the
OriginaIProject, iwuuld reçtore thsfam quo ante.
2.104. The Slovak Mernorialrepeats this assertion on a nurnberof
occasions.193Elsewhere,however, itno longerforeseesdemolishingthe
structuresofVariantC underany circumstances:
"Once the Nagymaros section is completed...al1 weirs at
eunovo complexmay be opened. The reservoir in accordance
with the 1977 Treaty would therefore be created. The new
reçervoirdyke,constructedforVariant'C' wouldbe stirrounded
by water but corildfuIf tiI hncfion of directingthe xaterflow
i~rsidethe reservoir...[As far as riavigationwould concern]
auxi1iarynavigafion Iocks at the DunakiIiti weir worrId make
possible the navigation berneen the resenoir and the Maii?
Channelri~erbed."~ 94
III otfrer words, no stnrus quo onte is to be restored trnder any
circumstances. Apart frorrithe auxiliarylockthe structuresof Variant C
would remainuntouchedin the same place. The technical issueat stake
hereare develoied in Chapter 3 of this Counter-Me~norial,'~~ its legal
consequencesinChapter 7.196
2.105. In connectionwith VariantC the SlovakMemorialaIsorefersto
Hungarianallegations which have neverbeen made. For example, it
statesthat:
"It isa strange phenornenon for a Stateto insistthat ihas lost
territory to a neighbour wlienthe neighbour has madena such
daim.. .But this istheposition adoptedby Hungary- parîly, it
would seem, ro secrire same sort of psyc11oIogiac da-I
vantage..."]=
Elsewhere,and to ratherdiffereneffect,itassens:
19* SM,p 187.
193 Seee.g.,SM,pam7.28,7.29,7.44,7.91.
Iq4 SM,paras5.65-5.66.
193
See bebivparagraph3s.15-3.122.
SIXbeIow,pxagrayhs7.09.
197 SM, para 7-51. "Hungary ..proclaimsthat Slovakia.has alteredthe frontito
Hungarv's advantage and therebv violated ib territorial
integritv.This daical1onlybe described a~urrealistic.'''~~
2.105. HungaryhasnevercIairned thatif Iost territory, Ietalone that its
-
frontiers were alterto itsadvantage.The SIovakMernorial does not
quote anysourcewhich wou1d suppor this allegalion. Hungarylairned
merely that the Danube has Iost most of irs water and that
"'CzechosIova unilaeralactionchanged the'characfersf theborder
ina way which the 1977Treatycertainlydidnotauthorise".l99 Inform
andin law the lineoftheoriginalboundary remainedunchanged,whiie
itscharacterasa boundary riverwasdrasticallaffected.200
f
SECTION E: NEGOTIATIONSFOR A TE~ORAF~Y WATER
MANAGEMENT REGlME ANDARTICLE 4 OFTHESPECIAL
AGREEMENT 7
2.107. According toArticle4of theSpecial~grkernenf:
"The Parties agreethat,psnding the finai Jrrdgernentothe
Couri,-r hilyestabli asdhimplement a ternporarywater
management regimefortheDanube."
Hrrngary alwaysconsideredtliis Articleentra1and inseparablepartof
the Special Agreement.The implementation of VariantC deprivedthe
main riverbedof 80% of its water. A temporarywater management
regime was, and remains,absolutely necessary to reduce the damage
resultingon theHungariansideoftheriver.
2.108. By contrast Slovakiadoes not seem toconsider Article 4 asa
matterfortheCourt.The SlovakMernorialonli touches upon this issue
briefly?O1withoutcommentingondevelopmenfsafterApriI 1993andon
whyan agreementhasnot yetbeenreached.ItsfaresrnereIthat:
198 SM, para7.(emphasinoriginal).
199 HM,para7.1. I
200 SeeHM, para3.09, 3.16, 3.25,3.32, 3.37fpitlepre-1977negotiations
aboutachangeof boundarsssociawiththeProjecand HM ,ara10.111for
the legconclusionthatthe 1977Trwasnotonerelatingthe regimofa
boundary.
20i SeeSM,para5.41-5.43. "The hop is tuarrive at a ternporaryagreement...This hoped
for agreement willdetermine the amountof water to be refained
inthe old ri~erbed.''~~~
That which in the case of the 1977 Treaty is a rigid and immutable
obligation-pacta suntsewanda - is reducedin the case of Article 4 to a
merehope.
2.109. The Hungarian Mernorial dealt with this issue in detai!,lo3
outlining the positions of the partiesard the experts,of the Eiiropean
Commission. ItconcIudedbystating tfiar:
"At the time of thecompletion of this Mernorial [Spring 14943
thevegetation period is imminent,but there is'no sign at al1of
Slovak's cornpliance with Article 4 of the SpeciaI
Agreement ."204
Thiswas primarilydueto the fact that in February 1994Slovakiarefused
to accept the compromise presented by the experts of the European
Cornrnis~ion.~~S ~incethen, the situation has not changed. Slovakia had
not shown any interest whatsoever in increasing the water discharge to
the main Danube riverbed. In fact the average discharge has been
redrrced.
2.1IO. IIISpring 1994, the growingseasoribeing imminent, Hungarian
expertsexaminecithe possibilities of providingaddifionaI water to the
Szigetkozregion. The Szigetküz was facing irs secondgrowing season
since the diversion otlieDanubeand was ecologicaIIyina very serious
situatiori.Referringto the recomrncndationsof the EC experts - who
suggested both increasingthe water supplyto the main riverbed and the
construction of undenvater weirs- Slovakia suggested that the latter
should be built in the main Danube riverbed,thus enhancing the water
le~el.~~~However, Slovakiadid not promise any increase in the water
discharge at all. Hungarianexperts felt that undenvater weirs alone
wouId not solvethe problem.The EC experts agreed.207
202 SM, para7.71(ernphasisadded).
203 HM,pxas3.187-3.223.
204 HM, para3.223.
205 HM, para3.221. HungaracceptedtheECproposalin a letterof 14Janu1994:
seeHM, Annexes,vol4,annex132,andseealsoHM, paras3.218-3.9.
206 SeeLetterfrorMr JanLisuch,SlovakStateSecretaryfor ForeiAffairstoMr
Pablo Bcnavides,EC DirectorforExterl oliticalAffairs,8 Feb1994;HM,
Annexesv, o4, anne137.
207 See HM, para3.222;HM, Annexes,vol4,annea139.2.1 11. The issuewas alsodiscussed by the HungarianParliamentwhich
passed a Resolutionorr 29 March 1994.The ParIiament requested the
Governmenr tocontinueeffortç aimed atthe coniIusion ofan agreement
on the Ternporary Water Management Reginje with Slovakia. The
ResoIntionprovidedthat:
"Pending fhe concIuçionof the [Ternporary~ater Management
Regirne]rreaty...the water suppiyto the branch systern of the
Szigetkozshall be ensured by an appropriate sharingof water
çuppliedto the Mosoni Danube and by pumping from the
Dan~be.'l'~~~
2.112. Accordingly, Hungary started pumping:water from the main
riverbed,though aware of the factthat this woulnot provide a solution
for the problemseven prior to thejridgernentof the Court. This wasa
measitre which was short-term and reversibje. Slovakia, however,
expressed sharp -concernabout the Resolrition,In a No& Yerhuleof
8ApriI 1994it statedthat:
"the SlovakRepubIichas Iearned wifh geai ccincernabout the
recent decision ofthe Hungarian parliament which prevented
againtheconstructionof two underwaterweirs.. ."
It described this as a "categorical refusai" of the EC experts7
recommendation. The Nok did not promise more water to the main
riverbedbut saidthatSlovakia was ready toenternegotiationstowardthe
temporary water managementregime?OWungaY respondedin a Nole
YerbaIe dated 14ApriI 1994, pointingout thattheParliament's refusa1Io
constrnct. underwater weirs is entirely consistent wit1r ths EC
recornmendationb ,ecause
"the Resolution [ofthe Parliament]deals witiithe position
pending the mnclusiun ofan agreementon the ternporarywater
management regime [with Siovaki ..T]he' [EC] experts had
recommendedthe constructionof two weirs atdifferent places,
in connectionwith and subsidi torasubstantialincrease inthe
[water]dischargeregime."210 !
,208 Resolution of the National AssemOnythe~ecésrxy MeasuresDue tolhe
Unilateral Diversionof TheDanube,29 Mach 199HGM, Annexes, vol 3,
annex59. l
Noie YerbaIefromthe Ministryof Foreign flaitheSIo~akRcpubIicto~he
Embassyof the RepubIiof Hungary.8 ApriI 1414;HC-M, Annexes, vo3,
annex60.
210 Nute V~rbde from rhe Ministry ofForeignAfofthe Republicof Hungaryto
the Embassyof the SlovakRepubli14 April1994;HC-M, Annexes,vol 3,
annex62.2.113. Infurther exclranges, a Hungar ian Nolé Verbaleof 27 May 1994
repeatedly called the attention of Slovakia to the wording of the above
Resolutionofthe Parliamentwhichstatedthat:
"any provisional technical measures shall, pending the
c~rrclusion of the ngreement on the temporary water
manngeineiri regiine,be decided by Par1iament and shouid be
subject io~heacruu !~nouni ofihe warerto be dischnrgedby
the SIovakçide.
Theresolutionwas i11no senseintended fopreventtheapplication
of temporarytechnicalmeasureswhateverthey maybe, provided
that it can be consideredand decidedin the contextof the main
factoroftheregime,namelythearnountofwaterdis~harge."~Il
2.114. Slovakia responded in a Nole Verbak of 8 Jnne 1494,which .
statedthat "[f]Iidischargein the old riverbed isnot a goalin itseIf".212
2.115. Hungariandections wereheld inthespringof 1994, resuItingina
new coalition governme~itI .ts PrimeMinistar, GyuIa Horn, visited his
SlovakcounterpartJosef MoravEik on 5 August 1994in Bratislava,where
they discussed interaliathe problemsofthe temporarywater management
regime. Mr Horn described the situation in the Szigetkoz region and
demandedan increasein water supply.Mr MoravEik said that Slovakia-
due toteclinicafconditionsand the need to maintainthe recent level of
energyproductionatGabEikovo- did no1 seeany possibilityof increasing
the dischar igtlremainriverbed.However,Slovakiaseemed fobeready
to releasesameInorewater intothe Mosorr i Danube.
2.116 In itsNote Verbaleof 8June 1994,Slovakiadeclared a willingnesç
to increasethe dischargeatthe MosoniDanubeintakestnicture.213 At the
bilateralexpertmeeting on 24August1994Slovakiaonceagainundertook
21I Noie Yerbnie fro~htMinisty of ForeignAffairs ofthe SIavalrRepubIicIo the
Embassyof theRepublicof Hungary,27 May 1994; HC-M, Annexes, voI 3,
annex69(emphasisintheoriginal).
212
Nok VerbalefrorntheMinistry of ForeiAnairsof theSlovakRepublictothe
Embassy of the Republic of Wungary,8June 1994;HC-M, Annexes, vol 3,
annex70(emphasisadded).
213 As the Yerbak of25 May 1994putil"'TheMinistryof Fareigri Affairsof the
SIavalrRepubIicusesrhis opporfunÎiyIoinfurmthe Ministry of Affairof
theRepubIicof Hüngary,that startingJuned1994technica! conditions will be
createdon theSIovatemrorytoaIIowthe increaseof the dischargeofwaterfrom
therestrvoirto Mosoni Danube.'ThedischargecorrIdbe incrchm 20 m31s
upto 40m3/s.HC-M,Annexes, vol3,annex68.todoublethe dischargeînto the Mosoni ~anubei hm 20 to411m31s.214
HaGever,earIy Sepfernber witnessed an increa- tu only 25 - 35 rn31ç.
Cumntly (mid-November1994)for unexplainedi"tech~rical"reasons the
dischargeisagainabouthaIfofwhatSIovakiahad,undertake to providein
August.
2.117 Another issye taken up by the 24 ~ugust meeting was the
Hungarian proposal to increase water supply to the Szigetkto50-70
m3/s.Thiswouldrequirethe instaiiationof a new water intakestructrrre
in the reservoir dyke which currently has on$ a 40 m3/s discIiarge
capaciiy and is pIagned by technical probIerns. The SIovakside is
preserrtlyconçiderirthe proposal,whiIe maintaining Iimiteddischarge
throriglrthe MosoniDanubeinfakestructure.
SECTION F:CONCLUSION - SLOVAKIA'S RELIANCE ON BAD
FAïTH ARGUMENTS IN THELIGHTOF THE HTSTORY OF
THE DISPUTE
2.118. As shown in SectionA ofthis Chap~er>'~ a good pariof the
SIovakargument is bas& on a daim ofbadfaith.;Accordingto Slovakia,
Hungaryh'açfor decades beenanirnatedby a secretdesirtu disregardits
international obligations with respect to the ,GabCikovo-Nagymaros
Project, and this for reasons wholly unrelated'to any environmental
concerns,concernswhichthe Mernoriat1 reatsas minoror even spurious.
Such a broad and general contentioncan in no,way replace a rational
demonstrationof the badfaitb attributtoHungary.
2.119. As stated byrhisCourt"oneof the basicbrinciplesgoveniirthe
creation and performanceof IegaIobIigations, whatevetlreisource, is
the principleof goodf.ith."21The principleof good faithis reiterated,
for example, in Articl2(2) of the United Nations Charter, and in the
Declaration on Principlesof International Law concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operationamongStates.The fundamentalcharacter of
this principle explains precisely why a state should not lightly accuse
anotherof havingacted in bad faith. A daim of bad faith hasto be
cleariypruvedby substantialevidence.z17 I
I
214 SeeMemarialonthe ExpertTaIksMeIdin Bratis5 August199424August
1994;HC-M,Annexesvol3,mncx73.
?
'15 Above,paragraph2s.02-2.08.
216 NucIearTestsCaseICJReports1974,p 268Seealso Bordeand Transborder
ArmedAciions Case,ICJReports19p105.
211 Forthmost=nt of manyapplicaIisythe Courtof thisrequirsecCnse
concerniCertuiPhusphte LotrinNm, ICJRepons1992p240atp 255.2.120. IIIother words,ir isa weII established nrle of internationa1Iaw
that the bad faith of a statcanriotbe presurned. This is especiaIIyso
where,as inthe presentcase, the altegationof bad faitsisuch a diffuse
and manifold one. Thusthe onus of proof of bad faith is placed on the
statewhich invokesit.As statedby ProfessorElisabethZoller:
"Il faut remarquer que la bonne foi étanttoujours présumée,
c'est à la victime qu'il appartientde rapporterla preuved'une
intention malveillanteetque celle-ci ne sera admise que sur Ia
based'uneimputablitgde Iafaute à un agent déterminé."2Ig
2.121. Nol onIy haç this onus of proof not been discharged, but this
Chapterhasdernonstrated Hungary's goodfaithinreIarionrorhedispute.
Inparticular the constanteffortsmadebyHungarytu proposesustainable
sulutionsfor amendingthe OrigiriaIProjectthrorighnegotiations withitç
counterpar htavebeenrecalledand iIlustrated.2'9
2.122. Slovakiaargues that Hungaryraised the environmentalconcerns
onlyto divertattentionfromits own failing~:~~thisignores the fact that
the Hungarianecologicalconcernswere(and stillare) supportednot only
by the HungarianAcademyof Scienceand Hungariannon-governmental-
organisation bsut2lsa byinternationalNGOsacting in the field of the
protectionof theenvironrneritaridby nranyinternationalexpertsactivein
thesame field.
2.123. The SIovak argument irnplies that more than 230 non-
governmenra1organisations(includingGreenpeace, the Sierra Club and
WorId WiIdIifeFund USA) aIreadyin 1987,222then Ecolugia(USA)and
the World Wildlife Fund (Germany)in 1989,223thenEquipe Cousteau,
commissioned by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development in March 1993,224had as their purposeto participate,
together with the Hungarian Government,in a collective ecological
IS EZaIIerLa boaneloi endroit i~~icrnpublic (Paris, Pedane,p 247.On
/the principof gond faith generdIy, seRY lennings& A Watts (eds},
Oyyenheim3InfernoiionLow (9thedn,LongmansLondon .992)vol1p38.
I9 Seeaboveparagraphs.26-2.56.
Scee.g.,~~,p;iras3.52,3.55.
221 SeeHM, appendices-3,pp345-490.
222 HM, para3.58.
223
Se.,respectivHM, para3.74H;M, Annexes,vol5 (partannexes5 & 6; and
HM,para3.94.
224 SeeHM, Annexes,vol5 (part1)annex12 and HM, Annexes,vol5 (partII),
arnex 15.exerciseof "badfaith".Onthecontrary theirconcernç were genuine, and
were shared by prominent Czechoslovak figures, by Czech and Slovak
non-govemrnentaIorganisations,and by responsibIegoverrimentalbodies
borh in Pragueand Bratislava.
2.124. Moreover the concernç have been recéntly reaffinned by the
WorId W iIdIife Fund (W WF), a respectcd non-governmental
organisationwhichhad beenspecificalIybriefedon the Slovakposition
andhadspecificallyundertaken toconsiderthatpositioncarefullyandde
novo.InparticulartheWWFhadbeenpresented withadetailedreportby
Professor 1 Mucha,the head of Groundwater , onsulting~Ltd.22~In
response ,heWWFconcluded:
"thereportof Prof.Muchais seriouslylimited. It iconcerned
with only a pariid aspect of the changes bronght about by the
drasticalkation of tlie Iiydrology,deaIs wiihoniy a part of the
area affected,and encompassesa very Iimitedtims Iiorizon.It
therefore does not invaIidate W WF's scieritific'allybas4
argumentation.
In theIightofthesefacts,W WF can see noi-easonto changeits
positionlaidoutinitsstudypubIished inJanuary1 994..."226
All positions such as these the Slovak Mernorial infers to be
manifestationsof badfaith.
2.125. TheSlovakclaimof badfaithis notmerelyuntrue and unproven
infact.It iswhoIIy irnpIausibIe.fWOU Id be diffIcr-Ias a rne1.me arrer
ofhisrory, leaving aside tire requirementçof p@of which 'international
Iaw imposes on those who aIIege bad faith- even to unde~s~and the
action of strccessivHungarian Govenirnen:~ since1989, except on the
basiç thar they were acting ingood faith. Thejgravityof the issuesat
stake, theernphaticand eveiithreateningpostrrréof the orher Party,the
aggravation toHungarian-Czech and to Hungarian-Slovar kelations,the
damagedone to the region, the grievances of its inhabitants,al1these
werefaced by successiveHungarian govemmeritsacting- accordingto
the SlovakMernoria l inbadfaith.
225
1Mucha,"Gabiliko-oWWF.Thepros and cons(~;aris~ava,April1994);HC-M,
Annexes,va4 (par)anne2 x.
226 Leliehm C Martin, DirectGeneraIof ihWW tF , Kocinger, BIovak
Govemment CommissionerDYGNBS, 3 Ocfober1994;1-IGM,Annexes, vol 3,
annex74. Sealso WWFPressReIeaseReafirming theOrganisati on'sern
AbouttheGabEikovDoam",4Octobcr1994HC-M, hnexes, vol 3, ann75For
thearlieWWFReport seeHM, Annexes,vol (parI:Iannex20.,2.126. The Court is consequentlycalled on, in the very first place, to
vindicate the good faith of Hungary, which itselfinitiated the reference
tojudicial settlementofthis difficu1tand protracteddispute.
2.127. There is, however, a firnher irnpIicafionfo be drawn from the
peniasivecharacterof the Slovak bad faithargument.On theonehand,ir
suggests an unwilIingnesson the partof SIovakia tû engage in the reaI
issues whichhave divided the parties. On tlreother hand it supporttse
view that Slovakia, rather than attempting to undersfand Hungariari
concerns or to engage in genuine negotiation, was content to follow a
predeterminedpolicy ofthefaif accomplT io.dismissenvironmental and
other concerns about the Project under the all-embracingrubric of "bad
faith" ito faito negotiarewith a view tuthe setîlementof thedispute.
2.128. If the CourtacceptsHtrngary'ssub~riission rhat if waç acti~rgand
confintredto act in good faifh in relatioto the dispute, fhere itliusa
further IegaIconsequence to be drawn. The repeated SIovak relianceon
bad faith goes a long way to excIudingother Slovak arguments, or
rendering them wholly implausible.In particular Slovakia argues that
Czechoslovakia,and later Slovakia,wereprepared to negotiateseriously
with a view toarrivingat a satisfactorysoiutioto thedificulties. Yet if
itwas genui~ielybelieved thabHiingary was acting in bad faithhow can
thisbe trrre? How can genriinenegotiations be condncted betweerr hvo
Statesoneofwhichis canvincedthatthe other is acting in bad faith?Tfie
negotiationswouidb 'e a charade. THE IMPAC T FVARIANT C
3.01. This Chapterdiscusses the aims and:impactsof VariantC,
drawingon the dataand conclusionofthe scientfi Evaluationandits
annexes,landrespondingtoChapterV ofthe SlqvakMernorial.
SECTION A. THE WLEMENTATION OFVARIANT C: AN
OVERVIEW
3.02. SlovakiaarguesthatVariantC will allowehebasic objectofes
the 1977 Treatto be fulfilled.2Theseobjectivesit identifiesas flood
control, navigation, hydropotvergeneration,1irniting riverbed erosion,
restorationothe naturd balancein theside-arrns,and the esbbIishment
of a monitoring çyçtem.3 Hungary'smore focusedview ofthe 1977
Treaty'çtwofundamentalobjectiveç, objectivesexpreirifhafTreaty,
was describedinits Mernorial$ andis further elaboratedin Cha1ter
aboven5InthisChapterHungaryarguesthatthedesignandrealisationof
VariantC differsfundamentallfromthe OriginalProjectand hasaims
which aredistant indedromthoseof the 1977laty.
3.03. By suggerfinthatits unilaferalhamerring of the benefits of the
Gabtikovo installationis somehoweqnivalen4thejoint operation and
exploitatioofthe invesfmentenvisagedinthe OriginalProjact,SIovakia
rnisrepres teri19s7Treaîy.In particular,VariantC differsmarkediy
fromthe OriginalProjectbecauseit is premiseduponunilateral(rather
than joint) decision-makiand because it fatosapplythe carefully
draftedbalanceof powersand responsibilitiesyhich were intendedto
governtheconstructioandoperationof the Originlroject.
See below"ScientiEvaluatiof th~ab~ikovA~a~~rnaBsmageSystem
OriginalProjandVariantC",anfothescientificannexesseeHC-M,w,
Annexes,ol4.
* SM, par5.26.
SM, pam3.26.
HM,pams4.Q4-4.I18,I0.?3-10.75.
Seeabove,paragraphs1.12-1.19.3.04. The Original Project was designedand constructed in a spirit of
cornradeship.The parties agreedthat the inveçtorçand designers wouId
fom ajoirit co-ordinationteam whidi "continuously gives iisopinion of
and checks the compIet4 parts of the Joi~rt Contractua1 Plan".6
Engineering problerns were frequently soIved at a technical IeveI by
discussion, without baing reduced to writing. Sucfiarrangements rnight
be incorporated into forma1 protocoIs of the Goverirment
Plsnipotentiariesonly nronthsIater.
3.05. Key elements of theoperationof thecornpIetedinvestrnent were
to be distributedequally betweenthe parties. Hungarywould physicaIIy
control the distribution of discharges betweenthebypass cana1and the
main riverbed, and Czechoslovakia would control the srrppIyof
eIectriciiy gerierakdby Gabèikovoto the Hungarian and CzechosIcivak
grids.In this respectthe 1977Treatywas unequivocal:
"TIie Contracting Parties çhaIIparticipate in the use and tlre
benefitsof the Systern#f Locksin qua1 rneasure.TIieoutputof
the hydroelectric power pIants shall be avaiIabIe to the
Contracting Parties in quai rneasureand they shaII participate
in kind,inequal rneasure,in the baseloadand yeak Ioad power
gerreratedat andconducteclfromthesaid plant^."^
3.06. The 1977 TreaiyaIso providedthat:
"Worksof ihe Systernof Locksconstitutingthejoint propeq of
ttieContractingParties§haIIbeoperated,as a ceordinateclsingle
unit, and inaccordance with ttiejointly-agreed operating and
operationalprocedures,by the authorisedoperatingagencyof the
ContractingPae inwhmeterritorythe works werebui It-"s
3.07.VariantC was deçigned in full secrecy and Hungav had no
opportunib tocommentupunitsdesignor operation.VariantC provides
no econornic or politica1benefits for Hurigary, but brings about tire
extensive adverse effects descrbed in thisChapter,wIiic1 1upplementç
Chapter5of the HungarianMernorial.
3.08. VariantCwas constmcted in haste,without the beriefitof a prior
environmental impact assesçrnent, and without any assurances of the
AgreemerrlregardiCniedraftinofthe Joint Contraciml PIconcemingthe
GabEfkow-NagymaroB sarrageSysler5May 1976,Art 5;HM. Annexes,ml 3,
annex18.
1977Treaty,Art9HM, Annexes,wI 3, anne21.
1977TreatyArt 1O;HM,Annexes,vol3, anne21.proper applicationof sound engineering practicesand tedrnologies. This
isthe nioretroubIesumebecauserhereIravebeen nurnerous accidentsand
maIfunctionswith Variant C structures. Examples incIrrdea flood gate
being swept away, a barge sinkingduring the whstruction of the Cunovo
dam, the incompIefespiIIwaysof floodgates,thk partfyinoperable state
of the gatesofthe bypass weir and the shipIocksat Gabeikovobeirrgout
of operation forextendedperiodsof time (oneor over sevenmontlisand
the other for severaIweeks). These have considerably restricted the
operatingcapabilitiesuf VariantC.
3.09. The SIovakMernoria1refers tosix intendedberrefitsof VariaritC,
althonghit has moreto sayabout some thanothers:q
*
Itremairissilentabout floodwrrtroIconceking the period betwee~i
1992 and 1995 or 1495 when Plrase 2 of VariantC. is to be
cornpleted.
i
* Itdetails no actuaIbenefittonavigation, in terms of an increaseof
the number of sIiipscrossing this section,or a growih inharbour
use at Bratislava, or otlrer elernents whicirwould have ecorromic
significarrcejusti@ingthe irivestment,aIthoughif does referto ari
increaseirrcapacity.
* In termsof electriciy prodrrctiorrthe am.nt ofe~isrgyharvested
bySlovakia in 1993was estimated to be-2,000 GWh,Io whereaç
accordirrg to the Original Project it would Iiave been 1,838
GWh. II Other benefits includa productiori hm srnaIl
hydroeIectricpower plants i~tfiecourseof construction.'2
* It correctly stateç that riverbecierosion has haIted below
Bratislava, but does not mention the! riverbed srosion and
deformatiorioccurring on the 40 km sectkn betweet he cunovo
dam and thejunction beiweenthe taiIrace&anaa lnd theDanube.
*
Iriconnecfionwitlr tfirestorationof a natura1balance iiitheside-
arms "atIeaston SIovakterritory" the SI& ^ ernorialrefersto
uncertainty concemingfloraand fauna arrdnotes the ço far IargeIy
unevaluatedimpactson agricultureand fo+shy.'3
1 1
Seethe enurnerationinSM,para 5.26.
Io 1993DecemherEC report, po4.II; HM,Annexes,bo5 (par!II),ann1.9.
I
I-iM,para 1.15(3,675GWhsharedequally).
I2 SM,para5.51.
I3 SM,paras5.57,5.61. !-.- - - - --
I '
Plate7LLA~~4W~,b~~tbeeomm~ofVojkri-
thsame b-di '& M-W -lladitnnrterMay 1993"
Ona elosrnspectiontpi- wm %:ln &e me vegWon season,ith& QI& .
theleamofthetreeanbusZleamali#ie&la, i.eyounger,ithesbpem&s
thesamea1tbouthedetaid&e antmisenlatginthemmd meeAgaintheEiwbd
-mraw soi1withoanyplantThiprwrv&satthisi&mm,asalfheotherexampies
Mvm, is&ilaetive$h@~wing higwater.
- I,- -- -
I
i
151
*
The monitoring system is presentedas having been "evaluated
,favourably" by the EC Working Group Report of 2 November
1993; itfailsto addthatthe monitoringsystem forimpactsonflora
and fauna was found inadequate and that a seven point list of
requirements fomed partof the same Findings of the
monitoringsystemare not repruducedor referred to in the Slovak
Memoriaior in itannexes.
3.10. As comparedwith the benefits of Variant C claimeclby Slovakia,
the followingpoints shouldalso be noted:
* Variant C increasedthe floodrisk significantly;hm its inception
itwas unable to fiandlethe hundredyearflood.15
* Navigationon thissectionof theDarrubewas Iimitedbythe cIosure
itse1fand Iater by an icejamin the headrace canal, and by dre
accidents paralysingboth shiplocksat Gabeikovo çimultaneously.
UndertheOriginalPlanblockageof thebypass canalforany reason
would not have ledto atotalhaltof internationalnavigationbecause
the shiplockat Dunakilitiand the mainDanube channelwouldhave
providedan ernergency navigationroute.16 It itrue that there has
beenan increaseincapaciq, wliichnow vastlyexceedsdemand."
*
The erosionof the riverbedinducedby excessive dredgingcouldbe
hait4 by çtopping the dredging, but the operation of Variant C
entailsitsowneffectsonriverrnorphologicaldegradation,beginning
withtheenormouserosionfollowingthe floodofNovember 1992.18
*
VariantC has not restoredthe natural balance ithe Danube side-
ams, but has caused severe damageto the ecologo f tlioseon the
Hungarian side and signifrcant changes to those on the SIovak
side.As to the cIaimed bentfits of the artificia1dischargesystem
on the SIovak side,the SIovakMernorial itselstatesthat:
"lt is not yet possible to quantify the impact of the
implementationof Variant 'C' on the region's flora and
I4 WorkirrgGroupof Monitoriand WaterMariagementExpertsfor the Gabfikovo
Syskm ofLocks,Data Repan,2 Novernber1993;HM, Annexes,vol5 (parII),
mnex 18,poin8.4.
Sec above,paragra1.172-1.177.
l6
Seebelow,paragraps.90-3.3 937,.
I7 Seeabove,paragraphsI.185-1.187.
Ig SeebeIow,paragraph3.83. fauna, due to the Iong response time of naturaieco-
systems.'"g
* The puttingin piace ofa sophisticatedmonitoringsystemwould
indeedbeinaccordancewiththepurposesofthe 1977Treaty.But
eitherthatsystemisnotinplaceoritsresultsarebeingkeptsecret,
as shown by the absence of available data concerning
sedimentationintheCunovoreservoir.Inany event,even themost
perfect monitoring system can not by 'itseIf ensure the safe a
functioning of the System and the quaIity of surface atid
groundwater.Monitoring is simpIya fooI to observe adverse
changes. But these chaiiges may not be apparentfor years or
decades,andtechnologicalsolutionscannotbe presumedto exist.
Waîer qualitydependson the dischargesinto the river, flow
velocities,andotherfactors,ratherthan on monitoringper se.
1
SECTIONB. THE FAILW TU C,ARRY OUT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTASSESSMENTOF VARIANT C
3.11. SlovakiaclaimsthatVariantC was "carefullyconsidereà"from
anecologica1pointof view20 andthat"stepstowardsimplenientation of
Variant'C' were not madewithoutextensiveanddetailedresearchof its
specific impactson the Danubeba~in''.~I 'ndeed,Slovakiaclairnsthat
"frorn1991 nearIy, ninefy studies were carried out, a Iistof which,
togetherwith a bri&fsumnraryof eachstudy,appears riAnnex 3C.22
. Thereali? is ratherdiflerentNot oneof thenine'teenconditionsadopted
in the Dedarationof the SIovaE knvironrnenta CIornmitteeon 25 Jurie
1991 requiresa comprehensive assessment of the environmeritaelffects
ofVariant C.23 According tothe Communiqué ofthe Slovak Ministryof
Environmentto the4 December1992sessionof the SlovakGovemment,
no properenvironmentailmpact assessment was'performedprior to the
design or irnplernentatinf Variant C,or subseq~ently.z4
l9 SM, para5.57.
20 SM, para5.24.
21 SM,para5.25.
l2 SM, par5.25.
Z3 SeeHM,Annexes, y04, annex168TheDeclaratiw rcquirestheeffed of the main
river hcd onthegroundwatersystobeaîsesseonIy"foIIvwingIhecIosuof
theDanube river-bec {condition8). Mmy ofthe conditions required by the
Deciarationhanotbecnfulfillseebelowpmgraph6.124.
24 SeeHC-M,Introductiop,aragrah3,note53;HC-M,:Annexesvol3,annex57.3.12. Annex 36 does not withstandclosescnrtiny. If isentitIed "List of
Studies,ResearchTasksand Experts'AccountseIaborated forputting the
hydroeIectric power project GabEikovointo operation by means of the
Temporary Solution, Variant 'C',139 1-1993".These studies, tasks and
accounts were only prepared some two years aRer the decision ta
commenceworkonVariant Chadapparentlybeen &kmz5 Evenifthese
studies had been adequate, they couId onIy be an ex pusr fucto
justification of a decisionaIreataken.2s
;
3.13. The siudies, tasks and accounts listed in Annex 35 do not
individuaIIyor coIIectiveIyamounttu an environmenta1 impact statement
or assessnrentwithintheaccepteclmeanin gf thoseternis.Not oneof tlre
89 studies referred to in Annex 36 is described as an environn~entaI
impactassessment.Theyare anrotleycollectionof stirdiewtrichaddress
a range of mos[ly technica1 rnatters,such as the economic aspects of
VariantC(see e.g., No 23), hydraulicaspectsof proposedweirs (see cg.,
No 361,exploitation of grave1(seecg., No 461, and even a re-evaIuation ,
of research tasks(seee.g.,No 81).Not one of thesestudies purports to
addressthe overalI environrnentalimpacts ofVariantC, or-its effects on
such manersas biodiversityorwater qualiiyon the Hungarianside.
3.14. SIovaki haa cchose~niotto Annex these shdies foits Memurial.
Accordingly, rrocunclusionscanbe drawnasto theirfindinN gsor.canany
reliane be pIacedupon thebriefsummarieswhich Slovakiahas provided.
The siudiwlisted in Annex 36 do ncitsupport SIovakia'sdaim thatthe
environmenta1effc~tsof Variant C were "bcareflylconsidered". Ratfier
tfieyconfirmthe view thatVariantC was designeci,repared,impIemented
and operatedwithouteverbeingsubjectta a pmper environmentalimpact
assessrnentinaccordance withreIevanrinternationalstandards.
SECTION C. THE SIGNiFICANTADVERSEEFFECTSOF
VARIANT C
3.15. The unilateraldiversion of tfieDanube by kzechoslovakia in
October 1992 occasioned by VariantC has had significant adverse
effect~.~~Over thepast six months more information haç becorne
avaiIabIe on rhese adverse effects, and this is set out here and in the
appendedScienr@cEvaluafion.
15 Seeabove,paragraphs2.9.5,2.45.
26 AtthefimeVariantCwasirnpIemente, zechosIovahad sigrithe1991Espoo
Convention.Art 213)imposanobligatioto caq outanenvironnrmta1impacl
assessrnent"pr10adecisiotoauthoriseorundertake"amajor projecl.
l7 HM, para5.106-5.134. 154
3.16. It has to be ernphasiscd again that processes induced by the
uniIateraI diversion of the Danube unfoId accbrding to different tinre
scaIesand that considerabIe uncertaintiessurroirndsome of the impacts.
HydrogeoIogicaI processa or ecoIogica1 successions taks decades:
paintirrgto the absenceof certain IargescaIe changes in two years to
çlrow that no significant Iong-term adverse effects wiII occurx iça
fundamentalmisunderstanding.
3.17. Impacts of Variant C are presented below, broken dom by
different sectors.TIriçiçdone for the sake of clarity andwith a view to
the different time scaIes applying to the different sectors.Itshouldbe
noted rhat in the Ionger term the various &impactscan acquire a
synargistic character, reinforcing and accebrating each other. In
thernselveswntrulIable and remediabIe negative impacts may together
triggeroff unforeseenandunco~itainable effects;
3.18. The issue of degradation of the riverbtd, causing the drop in
surface water IeveIand the grorrndwatertabIe,tecIinica1though it may
be, occupies a centra1 position in this disputé.The Slovak Mernoria1
asserts that "flood contrai and navigation rneasures have led to the
Iowering of tfie waterlever downstream of B;atisla~a''~~Ieading to a
decIining groundwater tabIeTOand tfie dryi~ig out of riverside
vegetatior1.3~It is the remedyingof thesc impacts, sathsr than anything
actiIaIIstated inthe 1977Treaty,whichconstiruteitsrrrainaini.
3.19. This issue is sxtensively treatedin Cha$er 1,J2 in the Scientific
E~aiua~ion,f~ and i~ils annexes.34 T11s concllisionto be drawn is that
the Original Projectwas not so much the solutipn to the prob1ernasone
of .its causes, a1though the main cause was excessive industrial
dredging.33
CfSM, paras5.46 ,.53The pointiswnceded atSM, para5.57,bu"preIiminary
concIusionare~oIIc~~~IFpresented.
SM, para1.57.
SM, paraI.S8.
SM, para1.59.
Seeabove,paragraph1.55-1.75.
SC~~IIII@vChufion,HC-M,voI2, chap2.
HC-M, Annexes ,u14(partIbannex6.
Seeabove,paragraph1.65-1.68.3.20. As to the impacts of Variant C on river nrorphoIogy,certainIy
VariantC bas stopped the sinking of tlie rivsrbed downçtrearn of
Bratislavato rknr 1852,by tlreexpedisntof eliminatingthe rivcrbed itçeIf
(Plate 2). The reservoir has fundamerrtaIIychanged nrorphological
conditions, reglacing riverbed degradation with extensive dredging for
the present navigation channe1arrdproducing substantial sedirnentatiori
in areas which used to be floodpIai~rsarid are now more or Iess
permanentlycoveredwith wakr.
3.21. Downstreanr of f1re Cunovo reservoir in the main riverbed,
nlorphologicalprocesses have started which were rot described by tlre
SIovakMernorial." However that Mernorial gives a cIue to what iç
exgectedfo happeninthemai11 cbanrie1:
"...[I]n the oId riverbed the proposed uriderwaterweirç wouId
preverrtfurthercutting intthe terrai."37
3.22. Thus the inrpact of VariantC wiIi be furiher "cntting into the
terrain"unIess undenvater wsirs are b~ilt."~SIovakexpertspredict that
in the Iongnrn at rkm 1813.4iricisionmay reach three rnetres,39 butthe
overaI1picture is aIsodisquiding since the exherncly low base discharge
carrying no bedIoad at a11 wiII also degrade the riverbed af 0th~
locations,cntting into it by one rnetreor Inore.The unnaturaIIysudden
risc and faII of discharges during floods are believed to Iead to
destmct ionof riverbedstructuresand possibleriverbankfaiIureç.40
3.23. Riverbed degradation wiII qacerbate the present situation iri
wliich the side-ams are practically cut off frum the main cIranns1and
most can oriIy expect a naturd water supply in times of large floods,
occurring once in 5-10 years. That iç not only intolerabIe hm thé
ecoIogicaIpoint of view, but also meansthat the water supply avaiIabIe
nnder Variant C is inwfficient to prevent clogging and other negative
changes:'
36 ButseeHM, para5.I15.
37 SM, pir2.86.
38 On theeventualefect of undwwaterwesecbeIow,garagraphs.104-3.IO.
39 HC-M, Annexes,voI4(part Ianne x.
ScienrijîcEvaiuafion,HGM, 2,chap2, Table2.6.
Sciet~fiEvnhratioHC-M, voI2,chap2. T& 2.7. (2)SURFACEWATER
3.24. The SIova MkemoriaInotes with satisfactiontfiatthe water Ieve1
liasincreasedby 1-2metresat BratisIava, aridadds that:
"Downsîrearn of Cunovo there has been a decreae in surface
water IeveIs but...this has not necessarilyhad a significant
impact on groundwater IeveIs.Murmer, the IeveI of water in
the Danube main channe1 wuId easiIy be increased by
construction of the undenvaterweirs, originalIy designed by
Hu ngary ."4
3.25. The dramaticdrop of water Ievelsby 2.5-3memes, to IeveIsfar
be1owthose eeer previousIy measrrred in the main channe1and in the
side-ams, produced a severecontractionof the widthof tlreriver.This is
iIIustratein'thisCounter-MeniorialbyPlde
3.26. Not onIy fiave 1rarbou1-osf the affecte40 km section become
useIess,but resort sites have Iost their former value of being Iocatedon
the river bank. Inlandwater transporfation in the stretcfhas beco~ne
impossible.
3.27. The suggestion that wakr IeveIs in -the DariubecouId be
increased by unnderwater weirsis correct but sirnpIi~tic.The fact that
VariantC hasIed toa dramaticdrop inwater Ievelsand in water surface
area, radicaIIychangingthe characterof Europe'ssecond Iargesfriver, is-
indi~putabIe.~5The reasonswliy undenvater weirsdo notoffer a soIution
are diçcussedbe10w.~~
SM, para5.52.
SoealsoHM,para5.111;HM, Anriexesvvo2,photoNo 11-28.
Hrrngarydid not,however, designweirs1orestore Thewa10rits pre-existing
starus (cf paragraph3.24). The SIovak Mernorialrefhminsofferinany
documentaryevidence wnceming iheir "design". To ttre best knowIedge of
competent HringarianairtiriritiesonIy very Iow undematerswercuever
designed,not in ordeincreasthewatw IevebuttostabiIisethbonom of the
rir~rbed, preventfurihedegradation.PIans assucia~edwi~ [emporarywater
managemen t some of whichincorporateune ur more underwater-esIrouId
no1beconfusedrvifhdesigpredatinVariantC.
SeePh 9comparingfie rnrinthIyavefiowrates befm and aftcr the uniIatemI
diversion.
Seebelow, paragmph3.102-3.108.3.28. Contrary to the SlovakMernorial's~lairn?~ the drop in water
level has indeedhad a significantimpacton groundwater le~els:~~this
willbe discussed inthenext subsection.Theothermajor issuerelating to
surface watersisthat of changesinwaterqualiiy.
3.29. Dm tothe highvariabili~,andsensitivityfocombinedeffecrs of
fiow, meteoroIogyand rrpstrearnwater quality,trends in water quaIiry
frequentlymanifestthernselvesonly overa longperiodof tirne(yearsro
decades).Thereforethe findinginDecember1993accordingto which:
"With the exceptionof November-December1992,when sudden
changes of regimeand a highflood eventoccurred,no sigiificant
changes in surface water parameters as comparecl to pre-dam
conditionscanbedetecfedafierdamrning theDanube...".
isnot çurprisjng,or necessariiyanindication fortheFuture49
3.30. The Szigetkozhydrologicalsystem is complex.Not only are the
water quantityand quality of the mainchannel and the associated
patterns of sedimentation important; considerationhas to be given to
water qu&ti~ and qnality in the sidebranches,in the watsrbadiesan the
protectedside of the dykesand in the Mosoni DanGbe. AI1 these havea
significant influence an aquatic habitatsand frsheries as weII as an
shaIlow and deep groundwater,which in mm isa major factor in soi1
formation, and sets limits to developmentsconcerning drinking water
reserves,habitats,flora,fauna,forestryandagriculturalproduction.
3.31. Impactsof VariantConsurfacewaterqualityinthemainchannel
include actuaI and patential changes.50 As a resuIt of diverting the
Danube in 1392andof increasedsedirneritationin the new reservoir,the
suçpendedsoIids concentration dropped markedly iri 1993 :the annrraI
average at Medvewas 24 mg/I incornparison to48, 47, 36 and 35 mgll
monitoredin the course of the precedingfour years (1989-1992). Itis
noted that the'reduction is higher in the variance and extremevalues
characterisingfluctuationswithinthe year. Sirnultaneously,the chemical
and bioIogicai qualiîyalso showed slight changes: whereasCOD, and
CODdmeanvaIuesweresamewhatredrrced.The situationwithdissolved
oxygen shows a deterioratingtrend prirnariIywith respecto the smalIer
47 SM, para5.52proposingthatthe waterlevdecreasehasnot necessarilyhad a
significantimpongroundwatelrevels. .
49 ScienrijicEwhrntiHGM, va12,chap3.3.3.2.
50 The marerial.i~hispxagraphderives fram chap 3.3.3.2 oftheScierrt$c
EvuIzt~fiIK-M,val 2. rninimnnrvaluedetected(6.2 mgII) which was Iessthariobsenied fortlie
precedirrgten years.
3.32. Bacteriologicalquality data availablefor 1994do not supportthe
improvingtrend in bacteriologicalqualitywhich mightbe suspectedfrom
the 1993 observations. From the bacteriological point of view the
Danuberemainsof poorquality.
3.33. The aIga1bionrass depends on the processes in the reservoir.
Mode1 cornprrtationsshowcd that the increaseof aIgaI biomass in the
n-rai~ihanne! ofthe reservoir is reIativeIysrnail, aboutIO%, since the
residence time here changes only to a small extent. The situation is
different in floodplainregionsas the residencetime can be much longer
thanin the main channel.Also the water depth is significantlyless and
thus the relativephotic zoneis much thicker than in the main river. As a
result of aIItheçe factors, chIoropIiyl1-acan increase by 50% when it
Ierrvesrfiecrrnhvo reservoir. The expected eutrophication within rhe
reservoir5' mighr reqriiremodification of the techriuIogyof the surface
watenvorks as far away as Budapest; this surface water intakeis used .
, primarily duringthe summerperiod. It would also have impacts on,the
groundwaterrecharge system. Furthersignificant,impactsof the changed
water quality andpotential eutrophication relate,to groundwaterquality
andarediscussedinthe fuIIowirigs~~b-sec~ion.sz
3.34. Increased biomass causes an interna1 Ioad of urganic material
which - unlikeorganicmateria1of sewageorigin- increasesdownstrearn
in the vegetstion period when algal growth exceeds mortality. It was
noted for the Original Project, but essentiallyappliesalso in connection
with Variant C, that in the vegetation period the BOD5 increase
stemming from algal growthcan be equivalentto (or largerthan)the total
externa1 organic material Ioad between RajkaindBudapest, and thus
BOU5(bioIugicaI oxyge~i dernand) IeveIswouId.not improve even if al1
the waste water were treated biol~gically.~~CIear~~t,he soIrrtionof the
errtrophicationproblem of the Danube stretch dbeç not dependoniy on
waste water treatment along the given reach: it would require a-CO-
ordinatedinternational programme to reduce the phosphorusin the entire
upstreambasin.
HC-M. Annexes,vol4 (part2)annex ID.ProfessoA Berczik,of rhe Hungariarr
Academy of Sciencesmainlainthat "Aa result [of unlimitedphosphorus and
nitrogensupply,increasedtransparencyt,emperatureand reducedflowvanocity]
algalbloomisinevitab(p"15).
Seebelow,paragraph3s.38-3.41,andabove,paragra1.1071.121.
53
ScientiIEvulzmiion,WC-MvoI2, chap3.3.2.3.3.35. The surface water quality changes in the side branch system are
more radical. The total jackof floods in the side-armschanges tlre
chemicai and biological characterofthe waterbodies, providedfhey are
stiII inexisrence.TIie mosaic-Iike nature of the system has changed,
Ieadingtu a basicaIIydifferent patteniofwarerqualitythan in the past,
and havingnegativerepercussions on biodiversityin the region.
(3) SU5-SURFACE WATER
3.34. This subsection first reviews the Slovak view of groundwater
issuesandthen turnstothe observedimpactsonHungarianterritory.
3.37. The argumentinthe SlovakMernorialas to groundwater issuesis
as follows. The groundwaterIeveIin iitng Ostrovand Szigetkozwould
followthe dropofthe surfacewater level inthe Danubewhich isa major
~oncern.~~ Thereforetwo setsofcorrectingmasures shorrldbe taken:
- buiIdingawatersuppIyçyçtemwhichwouIdfeedtheside-ams
and repIacethe infiliratio~ifromthe riverbed intothe aquifer;55
- buildingunderwaterweirs inth!:mainchannel, thereby raising the
surface warer IeveIirrthe river and conseqrrentlthe groundwater
tabIe.56
3.38.. The ~lovak Mernorial refers to another major threat to the
groundwaterevokedbyVariantC, narnelytothe imp,actofthe reservoir:
"there was a concern that pollutants from the river [flowing
through the reservoir] might reach certain wells before
suficient purificationhadtakenplaceandthat these wouldhave
to be re-sited.This doesnot impIythe large scale contamination
of the aquiferin any way, it simpIyIrreansthat the poIIrttants
carried in tfieDanube are potentiallyreaching differenr areas
inclridingareas in which drinki~rgwafer weIIs have been strrik.
The strrdiescarried ouf in 1991 sirnpIy recommended rfie
driIIingof four new welIsatSamurinand proposedfurther water
freatment and monitoring atKalinkovoand Rnsa~ce."~~
54 SM,para5.54.
55 SM,paras5.54-5.55.
56 S~,para5.5~.
57 SM,para5.45. The direct threatto bank fitteredweH w&r supplieswas not the
3.39.
only concern. In 1991 Slovak experts reported dangersinvolved in
operating a reserroir as part of the Project. Thgy Iistedthe foIIowing
concerns: 58 !
* eutrophication;
*
fine sedimentdepositionwith highorganic'mattercontent,leading
to reductiveconditions59inthegroundwatef;
* clogging inthereservoir;
* grouridwater Ievelstagnation. I
3.40. As a response tu these concenis, w1Iichcoincide with rhose
snurnerated in the HtrngarianDeclaration onTreaty Termination,hoan
irnpressive Iistof rneasureswas designeclwith a kisw to avoidharm on
SIovak territory:
"- increasingof flow velocify in the reservbir ipIaces where
infiltrationoccurs; l
- prolongationof theflow routeof infiltraiedwaterby means
of sealingaprons; . I
- rneasuresto influenceflow directionof *ound watersinto
the territory;
- eliinination of stagnant water in the aquifer region by
providi digcharge intoriverbranches; !
- introducing monitoringsysterns for the weII sites, thns
ensuringoptimumprotectionof&ter an?awaming system
againstwater deteriorationin thefuture; .
-
rernoving tu thegreatest possibIeextent:theorganic matter
fibm the axa of the futurereservoir; I
-
preientingsedimentation in reservoirlocalitieswhere it
couldbe undesiredanddirectingit to areaswhereeither it
58 HM, Annexes ,ol5(partI),anne11. 1
59 As expIainedinthe Scient$= EYGIICII~Oe,ductiveconditions areexpec!Od
mobiIise iron, mangrnese anammonium. These concerns are borneoutby
internationa1 cxpcrimce, including on the AustDanube. See Scieniific
EuutriafioHC-M,vol 2,chap3.5.2.
50 HM, Annexesv, ol4anncx82. @)
g8
5 g,
431m
Lm
gm
l
.s:E
1
I a.3;
- -bB- r
=a
lg
, -... B.-
8
d '\* ---
,$ . .
9' ,),.h:
I couId notIram watersuppIies or wherethe bed is prutected
bya Iayerof plasticsIleeting.''~I
3.41. Inconnection with tlieserernediesa few generalpoiris should be
made.Sliifting the sedinrent aridits impact from one side to the other
dues not soIve tfisprobIem; it onIy re-alIocates the harm. Rernoving
organic matter from the area does not prevent degradation of
çribseque1it1y depmited sediment and other organic material.
Eutrophication riçkçare discussed above, and can be expected to arise
whereversectionsof sIow-muvingwater occur inthe reservoir.Providing
water dischargeinto the river brancheson a constantbasis doeç not Iead
tu the necessary groundwater table fluctuation$z whikh is the
prerequisite for gas exchange in the soiIsa~rdthe naturaI functioningof
ecosystems." In order to acliieve the ecoIogicaIIy Irecessary
groundwater fiuctuations 2-3 floads annuaIly must occur, whicli is
excIuded underthe cnrrent mode of opesafionof Variant C, and can not
be seplaced by a srna11fraction of the voIume of the flood water
"flushing"the side branches.
3.42. As already~ioted,changes in groundwater pattern of flow, its
quality and voIumecan have wide ranging repercussion~.~ Tuming to
actuallyobservedor expected impactsofVariant C on groundwater,onIy
direct impacts arid fhreats are ana1ysedin tliis sub-sectiorr:interfererice
wirh floraand fauna, agricuIturearid forestryare deaIt with irrIatersub-
seclWns.
3.43. The uniIateraI diversion of the Danube resulted in a drastic
decreaseof the groundwatertabIe.65The observedgrortridwatec rhanges
under average flow conditionsand under high watw flow are shawn in
Plate IO.Cornparisoriwithaverageflowshowsthat maximumreductions
in excess of 3 metres Iiave occurred in close,proxirniiy to the main
Danube(3 km2)inthe UpperSzigetkiiz. A riparianstripof 1.5kilonretres
in width incorporatingvaluable forest5experiences reductiorrs inexcesi
of 2 metres along moçt of the affect& mainDa~iubechanneI. A total of
SM,para5.45.
62 Plore3.13.HC-M,vu1S.
G3 SeeSci~~ziiEvalirajion,HC-M.vol2, ch4.3. 1.caIsûHC-M,Arinexeq vvI4
(par21,annexI1atp7.
64
See HM, paras5.43.5-43-46and above,paragraph1.104,see aIsScietjfGic
Evui~iario, C-MvoI2,espchaps4 & 5.
55
ThefoIIowingstaterneareeiaboratdin mordefaiin theSrieirtificEvalr~atian,
HC-M,vo.ol2c,hap3.4.3. I
297 km2suffers water IeveIreductions.66 Groundwater IeveIincreaçesof
upto0.25 metresoccuroveranareaof24 km2
I
3.44. Considering typicai high flow conditi8ris in the Danube, as
expe~ted,impactsare pater (fite IO). ~owevér, thetotal area affected
by reductions in groundwater levels is not much Iarger (346 square
-kiIornetres). The extent of major reductions (up to 2 metres) is
çignificantly increased. Reductions of 3 metrej or more appiy to a 22
square kiiometre strip,0.5-2 kilornetres wide à~irdome 25 kilometres
Iong. Reductioirs of 2 rnetres or more apply 10 an area of 69 square
kilornetres,extending nearly 5 kilumetres hri the Danube. The main
Danube charnel, fomerly a major recharge a& isnow acting as a
drain. The grirnaryrecharge to the aquifer is fr61nthe reservoir andthe
side-am çyçtem . 1
!
I
3.45. As a consequence there is a Iar-ge, decrease in the area
permaneiiilyor ternporarilysub-irrigatedby îap~llaryaction. The present
situation (generally 200m31sec discharge) cause 'aIoss in sub-irrigation
over a 90 square kiIonietre area as compated with average flow
conditions and 127square kiIometres aç co*pared with high flow
conditionsP7 The Iatter is especiaI1yimportant sincs that Ioss rnainly
occurs in tlresunrmergrowingseason whe~rbot?cropçand fores&wouId
rnainIyusesub-irrigation. I
i
3.46. Another major hamful impact condrns the ahange in tlie
recharge patiernof thedrinkingwater rekrve in:the aq~ifer.5~Results of
strrdiesproduccdafierthe suçpensionof the coistructioir in 1989IargeIy
confirmearlier predicti~ns.~~ I
!
.3.47. Recharge is now primariIy from the r&ervoir andthe side-arm
syçtern.Groundwaterquality probIernsaççociatedwiththe rservoir have
been discussed above."Hungarian observatio'nshave focuseclon the
qualiiy of groundwater recharged from dre Side-am system of the
Szigetkoz. A set of 62 observation wells in 1; groups was estabIished
dong the banksof side-dams and ~ana1sin 1994, sampiing the upper
l
i
66 SeeScieniijEvaI~taiio,C-M, vol2,Table3.5.]
67 Se SciPnii/icEvu/~tai,C-M,val 2,Tabk 3.7. /
1
Scien~ifE~aiua~io, GM, voI2, chap3.5.2.3. 1
69
Scient& Evaluatim, HGM, vo2, Table2.rc1ug;ing ha10 bee~pcctedinlarge
areaonboth sides"}. i
HM,para 5.53. !14.5 m. From the results7' it can be seen that in generat reductive
conditions predominate. Mean levels of iron exceed EC Maximum
Allowable Concentrations for drinking water, and mean levels of
manganese exceed EC guide levels. For al1 sites,maximum levelsof
ammoniumexceed EC guide levels.Nitrate levels suggest that two weI1
groupson the side-am recharge çyçfernmairrtain aerobic conditions
falthorrgfiunacceptablelevels of ironoccurat one),and these sites have,
as yet,IiîîIesedimentdeposition?incontrasr tofour Iocationçonthe side-
am çystern where cIearlyredrrcingconditionsapply.Toxic eIernentsare
generaIIy present below IirnivaIues for drinking water, but a notabIe
exception is arsenic, for which mean vaInes exceeded WHO Iirnitç at
sonie of the we1Igrorrps.Again,this occurrence is aswciated with t11e
releaseofnatrrrallyoccuring arsenic trnderreducingconditions.
3.48. A weII goup very close to the main Danube channe] i, of
pariicular i~iterestwas notedthat rechargefrom the Danubebefore the
impIementationof VariantC was of high quality water. In 1994, the
water quality at this sitea few metres distance from the Danube has
clearly shown reducing conditions and unacceptable groundwater
quality,followingthe changeinrechargepattern.
3.49. The ScierttiJicEvaluution,after noting that before thedarnrningof
theDanube,goodqualitybank-filteredwaterrecharged the alluvialaquifer
fromthegrave1bedoftheDanube,cornestothefollowingconclusion:
"After the darnrning, the recharge pattern hasdramatically
changed. Although subject to uncertainty,caIculationsindicate
that rechargefrom the reservoiris likelyfobe of pow quaIiq.
Concernover thisissue içevident fram SIovak activities.It Iras
been demoristratedfrom Htingarian data that poorwater quaIify
haçoccurred adjacenr to the side-am systern ...SirniIareffects
are also expectedas a resuItoftf~eremediaIrneasur~s."~2
3.50. Not onIy the qriaritofthe water in the aquiferislhreatened but
also itçquantity.As aIready rnentioned, themainriverbed over a 40 km
long section has reased to be the major recharge çource. Tl~ereforetlre
refredrmentof thewarerstored inthe aqriifernowrnainIydepend sn the
arnountinfiltratingfrom the reservoir andtheside-ams. Clogging of the
reservoirbedaridof the side-amis is expected,73even if emptyin gfthe
71 The followingthreeparagraphrseflectfindingselaboratedinmore intthe
ScientiEvaiuationHC-M,vol2, espchap3.
73 The detailcd findingappear in the ScienfifiEvaluation, HC-M, vol 2,
chap3.5.2.3. I
reservoir (which is technicaIIy impossible ar yresent) and a sudden
introduction ofa largeamouritof water throrrghfhesugpIysystem to the
side-arms (which is possibIe but not practised in Zifny Ustrov, and
impossiblein Szigefkiizdue toa Iackof water supply)conld wasliaway
partof the settIedsediment. Constructionof unrlerwater weirswithotrta
significant increase of water discharge corrld only exacerbate this
prabIem in the main ~hannel where veloci$ parameters would be
conducive to clogging, thereby neutralisingth1 eventttal beneficia1
impactof higherwater levelson infiltration.
3.51. The~l'ovak Mernorias leeksto createthe 'impressionthat theareas
affected bytheOriginal ProjectandVariantChaveundergone changesdue
to past anthropogenicactivitieç,andthat presentdevelopmentsconstitutea
logical and acceptable progression of human iimpacts. In effect one
artificiallandscapewillbe replacedby another,nothingmore:74
'9t is beyond questioiithat the current conditionof the Danube .
and ifs floodpIain is the resuit of cenrtrries of human
interventio... It is equa1Iy beyorid question that whenever
rneasuresare takento modifythe flowof a riveras contemplated
by the G!N Project,there will be environmentaleffects, some
adverse..One importantfactorinthepresentjcaseis tharthe same
inodern technologythat has madepossibleqrnplex riverprojects
hasaIsoIedto techniques to rneasrrrrhe environmenta1impacts
and toavoid,offset,mitigaie,orremedy tl~eq.''~~
3.52. Thus accordiiig to the SIovak ~emoiiul, the replacement of
floodplain vegetation by vegetationadaptedtoidrier soils (such as oak
steppe) is an acceptable consequence of significantly Iower water
dischargesin the Danube. The revegetationproposa1byBechte17G is seen
asa straightfon ~vperation.'~ I
I
3.53. The lirnited attention given by the ~iovak Mernorial to bio-
diversityandnaturalhabitats reflects alack of &derstanding of the need
to integrate developmentand environment in the pursuit of sustainable
development.It is an approach aligned with thI Joint Contractual Plan,
I
74 1
SM,para2.I12. l
75 SM,pmI.71-1.72.
I a
SM, para2.113,citiIheBechiel Report,p2-23. :
77 SM, para2.I15.which faiIed to incorporateany environmental protection measures and
Ieft it tu tlre partiesto realisessuchmeasures (incIuding water recharge
systenrs into the side brariches) as "national investments" (Le. as
add itionaIunquantifiedco~ts).~~
3.54. The impact of Variant C on the naturd enviroriment(flora and
fauna) receives haIf a page in the SIovak Mernorial,even Iess than the
three pagesgiven to the subjectin itstreatrnentof the OriginalProject.79
3.55. None of the Slovak annexes contains any çcientific text from
SIovaksources. Less than 6% of the Iong Iist of brief annotations on
unpublished preparatorycaIcuIations reIated to VariantC appearçto
relate to ecology.Thesestudieçhave not beenexpasedto re~iew.~
3.56. In Iiglitof tlie rapiddegradationof the habitats if is questionable
that the Iosses to the fauna of Szigetkoz wiII ever be fuIIy assesseci.
Losses recordedso far are 1ikelyto be or1y the firststageof degradatiori.
The determiningecoIogicaIfactor of floadplains is the cycle of flrioding
and drying. Othtrwise, the whole ecosystem with its Spical floodplain
forestsand othertypes of biotopeswuId notexist.The fish production of
the floodplainwaterbodies is highIy correlateclto the periodic floading,
as shawn bynumerousstudiescarriedout in the braided side-armsof the
Danube.8'
3.57. Since VariarrC t lias grodriced theçame water IeveI drop as the
OriginaI Project wouId have done, prognoses cuncerning the loss of
habitats in the main channe1 prepared iri connectiori wirh tlie
implernentationof the 1977Treaty appIyto VariantC (see Hate II).
According to the SIovakscientistJ HoICik,58%of the side-amis Iiabitats
were tobe l~st.~~
3.58. TfreIoss of floodplaincharacter and the natural vegetation and
wildlife on the areas nearbythe reguIated Rhin@ iIIustrateswhat the
"Iong responserimeof nahird eco~ysterns''~~ may bring about.
78 This doncsuggesr~thatthe improvemetf the conditions in the side-bw,uches
nota mainaimofrhc 1977Treaty.
CfSM,pp97-100,215.
See HC-M, Annexes,vol 3, annexes16,21, 24, 28, 3A 32 (Correspondence on
non-transfofdocuments,1994).
81 Sec HM, Appendix2;SC~~III@EvCaluaiion,HC-M,voI2,chap4,forreferences.
g2 ScienifiEval~ra!ion,C-M,vol2.chap 4.4.2.3.
83 ScitrnfrEvaluotiorHC-M, voI2,chzp4.4.2.3.
84 SM, para5.57. Plate11Wmmd Img&p$JIbaDw&get BranchSy-m
qupw;12June9W, beforSthdivérsbag~refnoCIR SZlG99ûû6U
Zow: 8September993afktt rmion.Imag&e. noCE SZIO 993a90'8
Borhmmaicwm tntegr~W#waWI wkiwir&dpht#. 611- 2,5m.
Hcwelbfad pucessbyARGl?SM4 BuIrpaf3.64. The impactof tlie diversionof the Danubeon the fis11fauna was
imrnediately feIt, gult wiIIcontinueto be felt alsover theIong
As a resuIt of the diversiorithe floodpiains in the Upper arid Lower
Szigetküz became characteristicaIIyseparatedfrurn each oflierand the
orderof and baIanceamongcornmunifiex was upsetbythedrasticchanges
in floodplainhabitats.A further corisequerrcwas the Iossof co~nrectiiin
between tlre main charme1and the branch systein,the diversityof which
was an important conservatio~rfactor for severa1specieç in the main
channeI.Thus,diurnara~idseamna1migrationsbetween tire two areas in
theseupperreachesof themainchanne1is no IorrgerpoçsibIe.TIiisis Iikely
to Iramthe benthosand the pIankiu~f iaunaas weII as Iead to a decIine in
fish popuIationsin the longer terni. Tlienamw main charinel in many
pIaces Iost its cunnection with the former riparian zone, whiclr was of
outçtandirigimportancehm the aspectof fish biology,representing die
exclusivehabitatforçeveraIspeciesinthemainchanneIo
3.65. Theseadverseeffectsand otlrersstill b be determinedhave tobe
consideredin the Iightof the specificvaIueof alluvialecusystems.One of
the nrostcomprehensivereportsontheDanube'secosystemsstatedtltat:
"These aIIuvia1p1ai11a snd forests are the richest regioris in
Europe,not wly in terms of diversis ofçpeciesbut in ternis of
biornass aridproductivityas weII.TIrisrichnessis directIylinked
to riverddynamics proportionalto the surfaceareaflooded - and
tlie extentandsteadinessofthe flooding.Becausethey combine
the murces and diversiiyof terrestria1aridaquatic ecosysterns,
whiIe remairiinga highIy dynarnic and original errvironmental
interface,aIIuvia1ecosystemsare the richestandmost productive
ecosystemsofthetemperate regions."g4
3.56. The SlovakMernorial wtes that Szigetküzand 2itni Ostrov are
highly feriiletracts ofIand, where the implemenbtion of the Origi~iaI
Project (Le., the decrease of the discharge to 50-200 rn31çeci~rthe
Danube bed) "would undeniably have had an effect on productivity of
SeeHM, appendix2.
92 ScierrliEvalua?iolr,HC-M,vol2, chap4.4.2.3and HC-M, Annexes, uoI4
(part21,anne17.
93
Scieni$cEvaIuafioiHC-M, vol 2, esp chap 4.and HC-M, Annexes, vol 4
@art21,annex17.
94
EqrripCousteauTlreDan~tbe..Fur Wh nndfar Wh!?Final Rem (Marcfi
1993)HM, Annexcs,vol5(pariII)annm 16atp 173. these important regions if no plans had been made to mairitain water
levels: without the dedication of new flows, fuithsr productiviv wouId
have been reduced by one ti~ird.''~~ VariantC is operateci with
approximately the same discharge into the Danube bed as the Original
Projecr, and water IeveIs in tlreIlanubsas welI as groundwater IeveIs
havedropped to unprecedenteddepthç.In addition rhe diversion resulted
in a water distribution regime which excludeil the operation of the
reclrarge systerri designedfor the Original Project, since the intake
I structureof the DunakiIiti Weir is rrnabIe to pwvids water into the
floodplain because of low upstreamwater 1eveIs:Thewater suppIy tothe
MosoniDanubealorreisnot adequateforthispurpose.
3.67. One solutionoffered isto build weirs in the Da~iubet;his is "not
feasibIe without the transferof navigation into the bypass cana17'.9G
TIlus, apart frorn ecoIogicaI considerations and flood management
constraints, tire trade-off for the rise and stabiIisatiof graundwater
Ievelsis the Iossof the Danube for international-andIocaInavigation, as
weIIasthe 10% of the emergencynavigation routewhen the bypasscanal
becornesun~ravigableforanyreason.
3.68. -The otheralternative is to endure significantIosseiragriculture.
Hungary doeç not have the option which is available tu SIovakia as a
cmrsequence of operating VariantC, nanleIy tu supply some of tlre
impounded water through gravitational metIiods into the side-ams and
canalçof the protectedarea.Whereasiitni Ostr~vcan be supplied from
the Mali Dunajand the intake structureat Dobohot', Szigetkot aridifs
agriculture rnayunly rely on pumping frm tfis deepw main riverbed or
the srnaIIaniorrntsletdown intheseepagecana1and tlirough the Mosuni
Darrubeintakestructure in SIovakia.
3.69. The deptli of tlie water-table beIow the surface is of major
importance forcapi1IaryrnoisturesuppIy.If the water-table risesin10the
finesoils overIyingthe coarsealluviurnof the aquifer,water canthrough
capiIIary action contribute to agriculture. The. cornplete Ioss of çub-
irrigatioon approximatelyone fifih of the arable Iand (approximataly
4,200 ha out of 22,000 ha)causes significantdamageto agriculture.
3.70. Irrigationrnaycompensa& forsunie of these lusses. Howeverthe
üsual water sources of irrigation (dugand bored weIIs) Iiave also been
affected by the Iowering of the groundwater table. In the Middle
Szigetkaz18%of the boreholes are unrrsabIe and 50% operateat half
95 SM,para2.116.
96 SM, para5.O.their potentialcapaciiy,though using the same amount of fuel.42 of the
44 dug weIIs provide a negIigib1eamount of water.OveraII, it has been
estirnateclthat irrigationsrippIyhaç been reduced by40% and irrigation
cosfsincreased by60-BCt%?7
3.71. The impactof the diversionof the Danube is howeverdifficuIt to
predictas other factors influenceannualagricuIturaIyieIds.frecipitation,
its teniporai and spatiaI distribution, agricuItura1 techniques and
organisation: crop variety, and the amount of chernicaIsu- sedin the
production a1so contribute to the fina1 results. 1993 was an
extraordinariIy dry year, whereas 1994 seerns fo provide a more
beneficiaI "rneteorologicar" background. However, Iong term trends
estabIished afiera series of years wi1Ienable the identificationof the
precise scale of impacto sf the man-madefactor, and within that of
VariantC. Precise quantifications are difficult tu arrive at dueto the
varie9 of f-rç at work during the reIevant period, incIuding major
readjustmenfs in the structure of farrning in tfieregion, variabiIib of
seasonal conditions, etc. But that there has been a significant ioss in
productiviiyattributableto changes ingoundwatcr IeveIsisnot in doubt.
3.72. In this connection SIovakia adrnits- although in somewhat
euphernistic Ianguage- that with the operation of VariantC "Iess
favourabIe conditions have been creafed in Hrrngary7'?~Afterquoting
the 1993 Novernber EC Working GroupReport,gsaccording to wlrich
forestry has been influenced negatively on the Hungarian side, it
forecasts that unfavourabls conditions wiI1continue unIess "undenuater
weirs areconstnrcted in theDanube"and"fulladvantage is fakenof the
artificialrechargesystemonthe right bank."
3.73. Hungary in fact does operatean artificialrecharge system to the
extentthat water is availabb, andinceriain periodsof the yearadds to it
appr~ximately15m31secpnmpedfiom thc maincharnel of the river. But
thisdoes not preveritcontinuousdeteriorationof the state of the foreçts.
That is not surprishg in Iight of the fact that BIuvakia,utilking müdr
Iargerqrranfitiesfor water suppIy in the iimy Ostrov area,cannot avoid
negative impactson itsforestç. Whereastrees inundatedwithwater dong
artificially and constantIy fiIIed-up side-arms are threatened with
97
Sckntif;, EvnI~<aH,C-M,vol2, chap5.2.3.
98 SM, par5.5I.
99 HM,Annexes,vol5{part1I),annex18."drowning", tlie o1derwhitewiIIows and 1ta1iarrpoplar in the riverside
zone aIong tfimainchannel seem to havediedout - as observedfrom
the other riverbank. The reason for this iç in the groundwater flow
patterns: on bot11sides the almost ernptyriverbed, with water IeveIç
several rnetresbelow the side branches' artific'ialwater Ieactsas a
drain,inIowhich- according.toVariant A sinrulations- water from the
çide branchesruns tlrroughthe grave1Iayer,nit reachingthesoi o1f the
ripariari forests. So far as the actrral experience of Variant C is
concerned, water-tabledecreases iri excess gf 3 ~netres'have been
observedadjacenttothe maincIianneI.
3.74. A further major, adverse effect of variant C is the virtual
elimiriation of fIoods on the HurigarianfIoodpIaiIOo FIoods provide
vital quantitiesof water and nutrierit-richscdimentto the variws forest
Spes.
3.75. The cornbinedeffectof the drop in the kater IeveIof tlie Danube
and the Iackof fluods bas aIready manifesteclibeIf in the foIIowing
symptoms:wiIIowsstarted todecIineand die alqngthe barrksof the ~rraiit
charnel;reduced growth liasbeenregistered;rodentsand secorrdarypeçtç
havebecurneabnridant(see PI& 12 A and B).93% of the tree speciesin
the floodplainrequiremore waterthan is suFFli~dby precipitatioTliey
wiIIwithal1IikeIihooddryoutas a cansequenceofVariantC.
3.76.
Their repIace~neirtwithmark drouught-tjblera'tçpeciheas been
wmpleted for 9.8 hectares near Kisbodakand Ilunasziget and further
replacements were accomplishedon an additional 8.5'hectares Irear
Rajka.The yieId of these trees wi1Ibë much kmallerand can onIy be
expected afterseveral,years. Mçiréoverreplaciiigtreesdoks not rnean
reconstnrcting aforest with itçcornplex web kf popuIation, involving
severalhundred macroscopiccomponents,no? tospeak of thouçands of
rnicroscopicones.
i :
3.77. The SlovakMerrioria1 issilentconcerningthe impactof VariantC
on fisheries. Nothing wuld be çaid under the heading "benefits of
VariantC" andthe M5moriaI does nutincludea sectionun darnagecaused
by VariantC. The Hungarian Mernoria1briefly recorded the maj-or
immediate irnpactsa Iod1subrnitteda detailed study on the darnage
IO0 HGM, ScienrificEvaltla,oI2,chap455.3.4,5.3.6.
IO1 HM,pxa 5.1265.129.causeb dy tfrerapiddryi~igoutof the çidebranchesand drop of water lever
inthe mainchannel.IO2
3.78. Observationsand studies performedsirrce tfisub~nissionof the
Mernorial confirm these staternerit(çee Piaie 13). According tu the
estimate of the AgricuIturaIOffice ofGyor-Moson-SopronCounty, the
reductiorrof the availablefis11yrciductiorrrnaybeoftlreorder of 75% on
the Danube betweeriBratislavaand Kornirom, as weIIas in tlie riversof
the Little DanubianPIain; in the Upper Szigetkozit cou14 be as hg11as
90%.Tliecorrrmercia1 and recreatiorialcatch decreasedby 19%(frorn 69
t tu 56t) in theDanube sectionbetweeriRajkaand Kornaromin 1493.1°3
3.79. At tlreerrof JuIy 1394tfierewas corisiderablefishdestruction in
the nrainçtreamof the Danubebetween DunakiIitiandNagybajcs(1842-
1802 rkrn).Its probablereasonswere a longhot periudand the Iowwater
IeveI. On 30 JuIy a hnge voIumeof warer was flush& into the bypass
canai at GabCikovoand the discharge damrnedup the water irr rhe
upçtreamsection of the Danube in the Szigetkoz.TIre fIow of the main
strearnstoppedand triggeredthe fish de;tths.It is eçtimatedthat 15tons
of fis11perislred(0.2 ton zander,0.3 ton carp, 0.5 ton asp, 4.0 tons of
barbe1arid 10.0tons of other cyprinidfish). FoIIowingcaîastrophic fish
mortality iri the SzigetkGzresuIfi~igfrorn Variant C, the Fiçhery
ManagementFund of the Miniçtryof Agriculturegave firrarrcia1 support
forfis11introductionto the localfisherycompany.104
3.80. TIretotal value of fishwfiicliperished due to the operation of
VariaritC, tiieIowof catch for 1393and 1994and thefinanciaIsupport
to save fisheries frumextinction amounts to an estimated US$ 583,000-
758,000. IO5
3.81. TIre expected corisequences of VariantC for fisheries are
surnrnedupinthe ScieiltifEvuIuaiiotrundertIiefollowi~ig headings:
* Biockingof the brandi syslems: Luss of fioodplain habitats for
spawning, nursery, feeding and wintering resuIt in a corisiderabls
decreaçeof fiçIprodlrctio~i. isherypotentialof the Szigetkozarea
wiII decline. Lack of large-scale fish recnritment wiII have
'O2
HM, Appendix2, IchthyoIogi Aspectsofthe GahElkovo-NagymarP orsoject,
SeclionIII.
For furtherdetseeScieid$c Evni~carizC-M, vol2, chn5.4.
'O4 Forreferencard furtherdetaseeScien~GcËvalxarioHC-M,voI2, chap 5.4.
IO5
DaIaframSrierrriEvnIuafioHH-M,voI 2,chap5.4. detrimenta1efiectç on the fish populationsof the MiddIe Danube
fora fewhundredkilomeiresdownstream. ,
* Changes in flood regime: Subsequent reduction af habitat
diversi@, Ioss of species, dirninishing pruductivifyat comrnunity
Ieveidue to the switch hm the Alpins characterflood regi~ne to
stablesystemdynamics. l
* Decrease of$ow rate: Shib from rheophilic to IimnophiIic
cornrnunitiesin the side-ams. Changesin flushingrate resultingin
accumulation or Iow dilution of toxic wasteç or anaerobic
conditiorisIeading tofish mortalities.
1
+ Decreme in smpended sifiIoud Watertransparency ishigher.
Increasein den si^ of subrnerged aquatic vegetation Ieads to arr
increase in phpophi1 fiçh. Changes in fish cornmunity,that is a
reduction in number of predators and omnivores. Risk of fish
martaliiy due to anaerrtbico~iditionscaused byeutroplrication.
* Diversiunofwuferir~fo fhe bypasc anal:The higherdischarge in
the hi 1-racecanal directs the shoalsof fish during their spawning
migration tothe tailwaterof the GabEikoyo Barrage,whicIris an
insurmountabIebarrier; the bypaçscana1is an nnwitabIe habitat
for spawning.
(8) ENGPEERMG ISSUES AND FLW CONTROL
3.82. The SIovakMernorialdeclaresthat the newstructures"havebeen
buiIt to the same high standards as applied 50 the originaI Project
c~nstnrctions."'~~However,due to the aImosttotal Iackof information
concerning engineering aspects of Variant C,Io Hungary is not yet in
the position ta offer a deiaiIedtechnical evaIriatiori. Requestsfor the
informationhavenotyet bsen ccimpIied~ith.'~~ ;
IO6 SM,gara5.30.
IQ7 The SIovakMernorialisconspicuonsIysilent aboutthe periodwhen 10.5km
dykeconnectingthe weito the bypassmd'was bniIt.The impactsof thweir
were iaveaigated in mid-1991. In Oc~ober 19,160 miIIionm' waterwas
imponndedby thegiII unfinisheddyk. herealhe.reservoirdykesaccurditng
the OriginaI Project whave been Iocateatthe.site of the pre-existingRood
protectiondykes,the neconnectindyke was bnili in area intenuovenwith
side-ms, deadms wheretheground stnIctrIreis muchIessstablt hanoutsidethe
fIoodpIain.
HC-M. Annexes ,oI3,annexes57,59.SeeaIsoabovè,paragaphs2.98-2IOO.3.83. The standards according to which the Original Project was
designed were tlroseofthe 1950s and 1950s. Severe inrporirestrictions
were imposed on sociaIist couniries, including COCOM regdations
banning the expartof sophisticatedtecIinaIogyand equipment,including
high capacity wrnpute~s,into the Eastern Bloc. As a comequence, in
many fields, standards suffered.For the SIovakMernoria1 to allude to
"the-samehigh standardsas applied tothe originalProjectconstructions"
isaccordingiynot reassuring.
3.84. The other indication is the actual functioning of installations.
There have in fact been severalfailures of key elements of the Original
Project and VariantC pointing either to faulty design or
implementati~n.~~~ For example,one episode involveda twentyton iron
flood gate being washed onta the Hungarian territory; it was
subsequenfIyhandedback toC~echoçIovakia.~
3.85. A worryingaspectof designand constrrrctioriis the increase in
flood riskproduceclbyVariantC.The SlovakMernorialdoes not discuss
the present Ievelof flood prote~tion,~IIalthotrghthe foIIowingfootnote
isrevealing:
"The designedcapacity and safereleasing ofa 10,000 year flood
will be achievedafterthe cornpletionof the second phase. In the
meantirneit was accepted that at certain flow and operation
conditions there was a certain risk of damageto the spillways
downstrearnof the weir,whichcould occur withoutendangering
the stabilitof the main structuresor inhabiteclareasdong the
Danube.This waç show during theNovember1992flood."I I2
This statement gIosses over the fact that Hungary never"accepted ...a
certain riskof damage". But the riskwas and remairrsreal.The capacity
ofPhase 1 of VariantC iç1,760rn31secIessthan that requiredto paçsthe
100yearflood (10,600 rn31sec )nd 2,220m3isIess than that requiredfor
the thousand years flood (13,000 m3/sec). 1ts3ould also be noted that
'O9See HM,para5.t32;below,paragraph3.92(breaka 500tonShiplockgate)HM,
para5.116(faultydesignof theby-passweir atCunovo,lirnitingits capacity
to halthatdesigned); SMpara5.30 (unfinished spillaltheçunovo dam,
failure of the turbine srnahydropowerpImr of rhe intakestmcrutathe
MosoniDanube).
Io HM,Annexes,,voI2, phrilograpIHM, para3.198.
]I3 Scieni!ficEvaluation,HC-M,2,Table2.8and chaps2.4.42.6.3.See alçoHM,
para5.116.the Novernber 1992floodcarrsedconsiderabledamageand irnperiIIedthe
structureof the CunovodamifseIf.' l4
SECTION D. THF,ISSUEOFNAVIGATION
3.86. The general issue of navigation has been discussed in Chapter
1.115It has been seen that the Original Project, although potentially
usefulin the Bratislava-Budapeststretch, was neither necessary from an
ecoriornicpoint of view nor critical for river navigation.This condusion
applies a.forliori VariantC.
3.87. CorrspicuuusIythe SIovakMernoria1doesnof refer tu ecorrornic,
business or trafic data or information in connection with navigatiorr
which courd be at Ieast rernotely reIatedto profit accnring either to
Slovak or to foreign companiesas a resuitof Variant C. The sirrgle
paragraph dealing with the "navigationaI benefits" of VariantC bas
nothing to Say about increase in traff~cas a consequence of the new
navigation route,or economicbenefits reaped from the operation of the
investrnent. It recounts the size of the shiplocks and reservoir and
declaresthatthe riverine-searoutehasreachedthe portof Bratislava.11"
3.88. The riverine-s& route may have reached Bratislava, but at
present not very rnanyshipsdo so. An average 6f Iessthan 1.5ships of
a11 sizes passed each hou thruugh the Iocks atGabEikovoin 1393.I I7
TotaI traffic othe Slovak fleetin 1993 was estimated atabout 2 miLIiori
metric tons, compared with 1.98 million metric tons in 1992, and
approximately6-8 million metric tws per annirn in the period 1985-
1990.11gThis reflectsthe overall decline in rive5navigation, which was
discussed in Chapter 1.l I9
3.89. The case for Variant C in terms of navi(gabi1ity of the relevant
Danubereach was weakerthan the navigationargumentsfor the Original
Project in two respects. First, theactual decline in navigation volumes
hadaIready set in by 1989, so that this aspect of the economiccase for
II4 SeeHM,para5.I15.
I I
Seeabove.paragraph1.178-1.183.
l6 SM, para5.50. ,
ECReport,Novernber1993:HM, ~nnexes,' v(p&t II), anne18,Table 12.1
(refcrritothepcriodJanuary-Augu1t993).
Il8
See theAnnuaireStatistiqueinCommissiondu Danube forthe rclcvanyears.
The figuresf1993 areanestimate.
I9 Sec above,paragaph 1.185VariantC had a1ready weake11ed.I~~ Secondly,the most diffrcult sectiori
of the river affectedby the OriginaI Project was the Nagymaroç reach;
this isreflectedin therecumrnendatio~i of the DanubeCornmissionas to
rhe Vienna-Budapest sector, which identifid Nagyrnaros(but not
GabCikovo)as oneof 4 sectors rquiring attention.lZ1
3.90. The remaining question relates to the ackaI performance of
Variant C frum the perspective ofriavigation.It was expectedthat the
operation of VariantC wouId improvethe conditions for navigation, but
the results have been mixed. On the one hand navigation is more
sbaightforwa inrhe bypass canal than it would be in the main river
bcd. On the other hand, there have been difficulties Ieading to a
suspensionof navigationaltogetherona numberof accasions.
3.91. The SIovakMemwial does not refer to the twoaccidents which
occurred in the GabEikovo sector at the beginning of 1994. On 11
February 1994 the Ukrainiariçliip Zernograd was impaled by the ice-
breakingdevice in the right lockwhiIeenteringthe charnberand passing
througIithe first lock. The gate had been cIosed before die ship gof
throughthe Icck.The ship sank and blucked navigation. 88.000 Iitres of
oiI Ieakedout.A group ofU krainianexpertscame toGabEikovo,but they
wereunabie to removethe ship before 27 ApriI 1394.
3.92. Afterthe accidentone of the chambers was stilI operating,buta
nont tIater,on21 March 1994,the hhuge gateof the Ieftchamber of Iocks
crashed dowi, blockingthis secondcharnber,and consequentlythe entire
navigationon tlieDarirrbe.The weightof the gate isabou500 tons.A new
gatehadto beconstnrctedand inNovember 1994is stiIIbting instaIIed at
Gabtikovo D.uringthefollowingweekshundredsof ships were stoppedat
the GabEikovo sector or ttirned back, causing considerabIe financia1
damage.This was the first occasionin its peacetimchistory that the river
wascompIetelycIosedto,alInavigation (seePlate 14).
3.93. Navigation was fuIIybIockedfor36 days.Evenaftefthe rernoval
of the UkrainiarrslriponIy one of tlreciiarnberswas in operation. In a
Note Verbaledated 24 March 1994 Hungarystatedthat:
"TheIackof serviceabi oIftteyweir system of the onIywater
way convenient for navigation conçtructed in the SIovak reacli
IZ0 Secabove,pmgraph 1.135.
121
Sceabovc,paragrap1.181.Asnoted there,the probIemsaffeciiNagymaros
reaccarberesoived bytradi!ir>naImeansfudherTraditionaI Sulurtothe
Navigationa.robIemsintheSzigctkezStretchthDanube, HC-M,Annexes,vol
4 (pm Il,anne x. ofthe Danube Ied tu the paralysationof navigation on the
Danube. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs holdç the
opinionthat theutilisatioofthe GabEikovopowercanalas the
only and exc1usive water way is doubthl because of the
technicaI and conçtructiorr[problerns] and errors which have
takenplace and the conçtructioof an alternativewaterway in
the region [would be inevitabIe1 for the maintenance of
continuouçand sak navigati~n."'~~
Hungarydid not receiveany response to thisNote.Neither did SIovakia
give anyexplmation to tfieDanubeCommission,as it had prornised. At
the time of compIetion of this Cuunter-Mernorial, onIy one of the
chambers isoperating.It is understoodthat thereIevaritSlovakcompariy
has cornmenced rfieconstruction of new Iocks within tlresystern of
Variant C in ordertoprovidean alternative navigation Iine the event
of futureaccidentsat GabEikovo.
SECTIONE.THECOSTS OF VARIANT C
3.94. The SIovakMernorialpresentswhat it describesasonIy"ger~eral
guides" to the cwts of constnictingVariant C, arid onIy "by way of
AI1of thosecostçare stated to have beerrincurred in tlre
years 1991-1992:there isno indicationofcosts incurredearlier,a1though
workonVariantC took plac esearlyas 1989;as has been shown.1z4IIis
tnrethat for the purposwof dealingwith any issuesofquantificationthat
may ariseunder ArticIe 2 paragaph (2) ofthe Specia1Agreement,no
detailed inquiryintcos& is requireat this stage ofthe proceeding~.~~~
On the 0th handthe costsof VariantC arerelevaritforother purposesat
thiççtage- forexample,to assist theCourinaçsessing whetherVariantC
wa in financia1 termsan "approximate appIicatiorr"ofthe Original
Project,or wlietherVariantC, in particularits Phase2, can reaIIybeseen
as a"temporary"solutionfiornthepointofviewof SIovakia.
* 3.95. The Slovak Mernorial contends that "by,May 1989, a total of
USS2.3 BiIIion(CSK13.8billion) hadbeenspeni byCzechoslovakiaon
IZZ
Ne Verbaie fromtMinistrof Foreign Affairsof the RepublicofHtongary
thc EmbassiofGcrmany,TheNetherIands,FranceandIMember Staresof the
DanubeCommission IincIudingSIovakia], 24 March 1494; HM,Annex4,,vol
anne x42.
SM, para9.33.
IZ4 SM, p366{headingD}.Forworbon rh"provisio snaurioduring 1989-1990,
seeabove,pwagraphs.89-2.47.
I25
See belvw,pamgrap7.01-7.02.the GINprcije~t."~~T ~hetota alrnuuntspenttu date (Le.asat earIy1994)
is statedin another section of the Mernorial,where it is said that the
"Prqject haç cost Czechuslovakiaand the SIovakRepublic $2.6 billion
(CSK24.3 billion) todate"IZ7Thissuggeststhat betweenMay 1989and
early 1394,onlyUS$300millionwas spent orrtheProject,alfhoughthat
figureis representedbyCSK10.5biIliun.Iz8
3.95. AItI~ougftihere is no explanatio~iin the Mernorial for this
discreparicy,itwouIdappearthat irarisesparilyat Ieastfromapplyingan
exdrange rateofUS$ 1 = CSK 6 for theperiodfrom 1977-1989and on
an exchangeratc of US$ I = CSK 35 for the period sinc 1e989.'" The
US% 1= CSK 6 rate, although it may havebeerrone of many possible
exchange rate ca1cuIationsbefore 989,I3O was not intematianally
accepteclor usedin inter-statetransactions.Indeed, it bore no relatita
tIrerea1valueof the two currenciesat the tirne.
3.97. By substantiaIIyoverstatirrgthe strengthof the Czechcurrency in
expendihrreçbefore 1989,theSIovakMernwialgiveçthe impression that
relntivelymoreeconarnicinvestmerit was at stakeduring the 1989-1992
negotiationstlianwas the case. Coriversely,the impressionis given tliat
Variant C invoIvedonIy a srnaIIpercentageof what IradaIready been
çpent on theOriginaIProject and that most of the money çpent on the
ProjecthadalreadybeenspentbytfistirneVariantC was cornmenced.
3.98. AccordingtutheSIovakMemoriaI,VariaritCwiIIuItimateIycost
approximateIySK8 biIIion.13 IOthersourcesindicareapproximateIySK
8.5 bilIion.132Thus,the expenditureo sn VariantC consfitute61-65% of
the st& expe~idiiureonthe Projectas a whoIe.
IZ5 SM,para5.01.
I27 SM, para2.O1.
12'
The expendimreup tu 1989were caicuiatetobe US%2.3 bilIf. {-SK 13.8
billion),and rheexpendituresiipwerecaIcuIatetobeUS% 2.6 b1111CSK
24.3 hiIIion).Thisis adifferUS%300 million{CSK10.5biIIian).
129 CSK 13.8biIIbn musbe dividd b5 toqua1US% 2.3 billion. Thediffcrcnceof
CSK 10.5biIIionmustbedividedby35to cquUS$300 miIIion.
Inannex 13of theSMitisacknowledgedthatvarietyof diiTerentratesexisted.
IJ1 Figures inwrporat10arriveat this amount aretafrom SM, para9.37ad
accompanyingnote 28, pa5.27fworks parofVariantCl, par5.28 (CSK 416
miIIion),para5(CSK203rrriIIion).
132 Report No 279, preparedby SIooak Governme~rtonJanuaryfor rhe SIovak
Na~iorialAssembIyabout the Construction Progressof the GaNagy~naros
PIant, giving lhe Expense CalcuIation of the Hydro-EIectricPoIObe Plat
Cornmissionedbythe ProvisionaISriluriqn,1991Price Indexes.The one item3.99. Moreover, of this toh1 amuunf spent on Variant C, Pliase 2 (the
Cunovo portion), which SIovakia began to construct onIy in 1993, is
costing BK 43 billion;the remainingwsts are for Phase 1 (BK 3.5-3.9
biIIion).
3.100. Tliere is cornparativeIylittIe information in the public domain
about the precisecosts ofVariant C, or of the time Iines within which
ilrosecostswere incnrred. HungarywiIIreturn tothis issue in ifs Reply,
in Iightof suchfurfheririfonna;ionas isthen available.
SECTION F.MTIGATION MEASURES. TAKEN BY THE
PARTES
3.IO 1.The underlying Slovakphilosophyis basedupon the assurnption
that negativeeffects of VariantC can becorrected,orrcethey Iiavebeen
discovered andrn~nitored.~~T ~he SIovak Mernoria1even indicatesthat
ailynegativa impacts of VariantC concerning flora, fauna, agriculture,
foresfry and surface alrd sbbsurface waters can be rernedied
immedinteb. I34
3.102. According totheSIovakMemoriaI:
"It is self evident that if Hungary were tu impiementthe full
recharge system planned for its side-am region, the impact of
the Iower flow in the Danube wouId be dramatically, if not
cornpletely,reduced - especiaIIyif this were corrpledwirh the
construction of at Ieasr sume of the Hungarian designed
uriderwapr.weirs irrfie main channel. It may be noted thât a
budgetof 2.4 biIIionCzechosIo~akCrownçwasset asidefor the
corrstructionofçuch weirs by the Czechuskvakgovtrnmsnt in
1992."135
3.103. It isof course Variant C which caIIsfor this remedial measure-
at a pria pf 2,400,000,000 crowns(US%80 million), 70% of the total
Iisledun the ExpenseCaIcuIa1ionis modificationof inworkover the area
ofthe by-pasmai. For thaTU be accompIishea,price o4 miIIiokronesis
Iisted.It is uncicarwhthe4rniiIIikronesisbeingcIaimedeIsewherein fhe
SIovakMcmoriaIunderoneof itsothercategories.
133 See e.g.Aide MÉmoir~ crincerninlhe consultation of scientific eonerts
17-19luIy1989:HM,Anncxes,vol3 annex 18.
134 SM,para5.52("IIisessentthatthe inrpactVarian'C' inal1taboveare=is
constantIyrnonifosodthatanynegativeimpaccan be ideniifiandremedied
immediaIe1yw).
135 SM, par5.55.~ost ofPhase 1 ofVariant C accarding to SIovakfigures.It is no1clear
wl~ethertl~is surn waç calculatecion the basis that Hungary would
wrltribute mne proportion ofthe total cost, but the resuIt is that for
sonrewhere between 70%and 140% of wliat is saidto be the cost of
Phase 1, some of its negativeimpactscould have been "dramaticalIy if
not cornpletely"neutralised.
3.104. The consequences of underwater weirs in entirely excluding
navigation have already been pointed 0ut.13~Underwater weirs have
other significant adverseeffects.137They create a series of impounded
reservoirswith significant water level differences. If water discharges
r.ernairrdose to present levels then the potential for eutrophication
increases.Colmatationof theriverbed cairsed by i~rcreasesedirnentafion
wouldwithina fewyears Iirnit the groundwaterrechargefunction of the
river and sedimerifationis IikeIy to create the adverse water qnaIity
sffects aIready observeciin the side-am system. Dredging to remove
scdiment wouId be expensive,ecoIogicaIIydamagingand has yet to be
prover1viable. There would be~'"Ioss of species pica alfor strearnsof
rhsophiIe organisrns, especialIy of fish specits spawni~rgon grave1
ground".'3*In short,accordingto the WWF:
"Fromthe many years of experienceabout these weirs on the
Upper Rhine and the many scientific data produced on its
impactsit can be statedthat [thebuildingof underwater weirs]
will be inappropriate,ineficient, and ecologically detrimental
forthe Danubeand it will ratherworsenthe situation."139
3.105. IIresponding to this view, Professor Igor Mucha who was the
Slovak member of the Working Group of Monitoring and Water
ManagerrientExpertsfor the GabEikovoSystem of Locks failedto ad-
dresscertain issues. His paper speaks of"very shallow weirs",whereas
tlioseactuaIIycontemplated in the 1993 Decernber ~eport]~~ WOU Id have
been 3-5 inetreç high, Ieaving only a srnaIIpart of the original water
136 See above,paragrah.67.
137 For a more detniled analysis of the impact of underwateseeScienfiJc
EvaluatioHC-M,vol2, chaps2.5,4.6.1.
138 WorkingGroup of Monitoringand Water Management Experts for the GabEikovo
SystemofLocks,Reporton TemporaryWater ManagementRegime, 1December
1993:HM,Annexes,vol5(pariII)annex19 apoint7.9.
139 WF, A new solutionfothe Danube (December1993): HM, Annexes, vol 5
(partID,anne20atp 853.
140 WorkingGroup of Monitoriand Water ManagementExpertsfor theGabEikovo
Sysre~nof LockReportonT~porary WaterManagementRegirne, 1December
1993:HM, Annexesvol5 {parII),anne19,Tabie7.1.depthabove the crestoftheweirs.Professor Mucha claims thatdischarges
would be large enough to ensure neededvelocities;the 1993 Repoj
however,unambiguoudy statethat even 400m3içec(i.e., approxirnateIy
double rhe present average Iow-flow discharge)worrld not allow flaw
velocifies ithemain river 70 provideadequnteIivingconditionsfur the
species requiring higher veIocities, for exampIe fish species Iike
Streber."I4'ProfessorMuchaalso deniesany "cascade" effecf,aIfhough
caIcuIationsshow that undemater weirs wouId definitely produce
IrydratIriceffectsseparatihedifferentsectionsinsuch a way that most
of the fish çpeciescould not cross the I-rydrauIicbarriers.'42Without
"cascades" noelectricitycouldbe generatedbythe headsattheweirs, as
contemplate n theoficialpublicatio nescribingVarianCt .143
3.106. Moreover, inherent in the Slovak approach to mitigation
measuresis the assumption thatthere will be no increase in water
discharges to the main ri~erbed.]~~This is, of course,drivenby the
desiretomaximiseelectricitygeneration.
3.107. In 1994 the base 1eveIof dischargeinto the main c11anneI has
beenabout 200 m31sec,lower even thanthe 1993average. At that rate
uriderwaterweirswouldhave IiifIe, ifany, beneficialimpact,but wudd
occasionsignificantadverse effects.Iwas tlriswhichIedtheEC experts
(incIudingProfessorMucha'scoIIeague inthePHARE programme, Mr
Refsgaard) to recomrnend asa temporarysolution "for theshortperiod
untiIthe concIiisionsfrom the judgement of the InreniationaI Court of
Justicecanbe itnplemented"t,fiat800 m3/secaverageyearlydischargeto
the mainchannel of theDanubebe çecuted by Slovakia,andthat this
increase in discharge be accompaniedby building two underwater
weirs.145
3.108. Hungaryacceptedthis recommendation w,hilepointingoutthat:
"[Tlhe proposedregime fallsshortoftheminimum necessary to
providereal protection to the environment,including natural
142 ScienfijicEvul~ra, C-Mvol2,chap2, Figure2.7.
43 "GabfikoveNagymaros Projeci, The Ternporary Sqnithe Territofthe
CSFR-SiovakiaS;M,annex37.
144 See e.g.the ProposalfotheTernporaryWater ManagementRegirne of the
GabEikovSoysternofLocks:HM,Annexevol4,annex137.
145 WorkingCroupof MonitorinandWaterManagemenE t xpertsforthe GabEikovo
SysternoLocks,ReportonTemporar)W; aterManagement egirn1 Decernber
1993,HM,Annexes,vol5(parII),annex19atpoint9.3.I , ,.
-181
resourceç,of théregion. It is in no way a mode1or even an
indicationofan acceptablelongtem ~oIution."~~6
SIovakiarejected the recommendation,and has done nothing sinc eo
cornpIy with its obIigation to agree on and implement a satiçfactury
temporarywater managementregime.147
3.109. The SIovak Menruria1 argues tliaf:
"Put sirnply,the sidearms,whichprior tothe irnplenientatio~rf
Variant 'C' were dying areas, are now fiourishing and even
replacing the function of the. Danube channel in terrns of
providingwatertu the regi~n."'~~
Ifadds:
"given thatground water IeveIsincreasedon SIovakterritoryas
aresuItof Variant 'C',anyimpacton flora and fauna shouId be
benefi~iaI"I~~
3.110. This faiI to grasp the various processes at work, or the
wmplexiiyof wetlandhabitatsandthe biodiversitythey support.150
3.II 1. TIie plrotographsin the BIovakMernorialreproduced in support
of these sstatementçare sIighrIymisleading.OnewouIdhaveexpectedthe
pairs of photographs to compare prediverçion conditioirs with post-
diversion wndirions. In fact, the pairs of photographswere taken afrr
the uniratera1diversionof the river.151
3.112. The subscripts in the upper photographsfaiI to çtat eire month
and yearin which they were taken,wggesting that this was the ordinary
conditionof the side-armsbefore the If tlie dry partsof the
riverbedhad Iost water for longer periods one would bave eripected
colonising weeds to have appeared within weekç, as occurred on tire
145 LetteroMT lhnos Martonyi, HungarianStateSecretq for Foreignm'torMr
PabloBenauides,EC Director for ExremalEconornic Rela14 Jannary 1994:
HM, Annexes,voI 4annei132.
147 HC-M, Annexes,voI3, annexes67,63,64,7#.
'48 SM, par5.43.
149 SM,para5.57.
150 SecSci~ntifEvaiu~iioHC-M, vo2,chap 4.3.3.4.
lS1 SeePlaie 7HGM, Anna-, vol 5.
'52 SM,pm 5.40.the frrçt turbine at Nagyrnarosentered into operatior~.~~~ Slovakia's
preserrtposition is that it will returnto theOriginaIProjectorily aJerthe
compIetionof theNagyrnarossection. IS6
3.117. From a tech~iicalperspective it is doubtful that hydroIugica1
conditions ~IItlie Dunakiliti-HruSovreservoir after stoppi~igVariant C
muld correspond to tlrosedesignedfor theOriginalProject. The massive
new structuresof tlie connectingdyke and tfie proIongationof tfie right-
sidedykeof the bypassca~taI,situakd intlrenriddleof thereservoir,aIter
the flow and sedinrentationco~rditions,with so-far uncaIcuIatedirnpacrs
on surface and ground water quality. Such effects wuuId occur in the
II kilometre Iongstagnantsection.downstreàmof the cunovo dam hm
whidi the water flow couId not enter the bypass cariai.This situatiori
wouId differ nrarkedly frorn tlie Original PIan, according to whicli the
whole discharge of tirs Danubewuuld Iravereached DurrakiIitiand have
provided aconstantreriewaIofthe waferbodyinthe whoiereservoir.
3.118. ~Iiè SIovakMernorial does not offer any hint with regard to tlie
prub1errisassociated with the VariantC structures wlrich would be
surrounded by water and subject to repeated water IeveI changes under
peakoperation mode.Neitherdoes it sayanythingabout rnanipulafionof
ice under the charigedconditiorrs - a major ccincemwlrendesigning the
operational regdations of the Original Project. The new dam'at Cnriovo
wou1d presentsevere dificulties, as wouIdthe 10.5km Iongconriecting
dykebetween the bypass weir arid tlre bypass carral. TIre four turbines
now being irrstaIIedin the Currovo dam (which worrIdbe surrounded by
water) wou Idbe useIess.
3.119. ~he SIovakMemurialreferstu the EC WorkingGroup Reportof
23 November 1492 as proof of the reversibiIity ofVariantC.IS7That
Reportenvisaged either the total dernolitionofthe VariantC structures
or the hl1 opening of a11gales and the rernovaI ofthe closure of the
Danube. ISBBy contrast the SIovakMernoria1 errvisagesneither.
IS5
Accordingto the Mr~tuAssistancAgreementof 1977and its1983 ProIocoIthe
time Iag between Ihe enIry intserviceof rhe firsr unit of GahEikovo and
Nagjmaros respectiwIy would have ken three yearsWM, Annexes, va13,
annexes22,291. AccordintoIhe1989Protom1(HM, Annexes, vol3, annex30)it
wouId Iravbeen2 years.
IS6 SM,paraS.65.
15' FI~,'hnexcs,vo15 {parII)mnex 14;SM, pua 5.55.
r58 Asan nI?ernativeiconsidersopeninganew bypasfor the river if the zrnofaI
TheclosurewouldbefooçompIicated.3.120. Inthiscontextit is importanttodifferentiatebeiweenPhase 1 and
Phase 2 of Variant C.ls9Phase I was already operational, aIthougfrnot
hIIy cornpleted,by the tirnethe SpeciaIAgreementto subrnitthis case tu
the Courtwas signed. Phase2 didn61 ex&. InNovember 1994,SIovakia
is entering into a venture estimatedto cost 5 Shousand million Kcs,
alrnost 50% more than the total cost of Phase I.160This venture is
intended tobecomplefedbefore fhecaseisdecidedbytlie Court. Phase2
wi1Inot rnitigate the Ipsses of Hnngary caused by Phase 1, with the
exception of reducing flood and ice risks and restoring 81naIIboat
navigation on the Danube. Witfi these exceptio~is,it onIy serves to
maximise berrefitsto SIovakiafrom the ilIega1.diversionof the water
fluw.
3.121. Phase 2 not only prejudices the rights and duties of the parties
whilst thecase içpending beforethe Court bu,t aIso seekstotransfom
VariantC into 2 permanent inshIlation, one which would rnaçsiveIy
increase the cosof rehrning the river to its namraflow.Nothing man-
made ispermanent,as history tells, butIrugestone or ancrete pyrarnids
tend to survive the regimes responsib firsthenr. The scaIe of the
construction,itscost, the design and nrountingof four turbines with 20
MW capacity which wouIdbe inoperativeunder the OriginaIProject, a11
indicatsthat SIovakiahas no intentionto abandon VariantC, but instead
planstooperate it on a permanentbasis.
3-122- The intention tooperate VariantC after the compIetionof Phase
2 .as a permanentstructure was confirmed during the August 1994
discussions on a ternporarywater management regirne.N Iob1here in
SIovakia's Decernber 1993 "Snmrnary technica1 description of
VariantC- Phase TIb2 isit stated or suggestedtthattlre construction is
temporary. Hungary is not awareof a single scientificor environmental
study comrnissioned by Slovaki wahich examines the feasibility of
reveriing€0 the OrigirralProjecAI1 theevidsnce suggeststhat Variant C I
is intended asa permanent çtructrrrSIovakiaorrce again is strivi~rto
create a situation ofair accompIi,saying one thing (incIuding in its
pleadingç beforethe Court) whiIedoinganother.
16'
"GIN ProjecThé TemporarySoIrrtionon the Territory of the CSFR-SIovakia";
SM,anne 37.
IG1 Seeabove,paragra2.116. CHAPTER 4
HUNGARY'SLEGALPOSITION
SECTIONA: OVERViEW
4.0 1. Hungary'çIegaIpositioriwas set out in detaï1i11its Menrorial.In
importa~ttrespects, the SIovak Mernorialfails to deal with the relevant
arguments. For exarnpIe, it hardly mentions tlie difficulty presented by
the disappearaiiceof CzecIiosIovakiaas a stateo~i3 1Decembei-1992.' If
does not deal witlr the issue of whether VariantC rnigfithave been
justifiecias a counterrnea~ure.~Ifassrimesthat there is Ironeed to analyse
irr any defail the SpeciaI Agree~rre~lw t hich is the forrrrdationof the
Court'sjurisdiction in the present case.3 Itassumes that the Court has Iro
inferest or concern witlr the issue of a temporary water manage~rrent
regirrre,despitetfiefoIIowingsaIientfacts: (1) rhe parties are obiiged by
Article 4 of the SpeciaI Agreement ro agreeon and impIenrentsucIr a
regirne, (2) this obligation is stated to be essential to the object and
purpose of the Special Agreement itself, arrd (3) the rrurrnpacia suar
servandia s deIiberateIy pIaced at the kart of the SIovakcase, to the
exclusion of almost al1 0th corrsideratio~is.~On tlie other ha~rdthe
SIovak Me~noriaIdoes deal at sonre Iengfhwitli rnatterç wlrich are rot
and IiaveIreverbeenat isçrrebetweenthe paarties.3
4.02. Under tlrese circurnstanceç ifis difficurr at this stage to forla
cornprehensiveview of the Iegalissues wllich divide flreparties. Irithis
Cf HM, paras7.88-7.18.
See-SM, Introduction,para 3 rno ~ieedfan extensiveanalysiof the SpeciaI
AgreemenI"].
Sc, SM, introduclion, pan 6. Cf SM, p6.90wIrereitis &cd thntHu~igarian
terminationof rh1977Treatywns a breachof that Trewithoufconsideringany
of the justifications for terininalion.This is one of a numherof indiaations of
failurtoconfrontHungary'sarguments.
Se SM,para6.14-6.23,whereit isarguedthattireTreaIywas iforceu1iti11992,
somettringHungaryhas neverdenied;SM, para6.92-6. w96ereit isarguedthat
Hungary was nd entitkdto withdraw fromthe Treaty under ~hecustornary law
equivalentoArt 56of the ViennaConvenIionYDenunciation or wifhdravralirom
a treatycontainiirg no provision iegardi~rgterminatioir, denunciawith-or
draiuai"),ûlthoughHr~ngaryat no stageronArt 55. 188
Counter-MernorialHungarywiIIdeaI witha numbsrof bgaI issues raised
intireSIovakMernorial,withouti-epeatingargumentsnutyetaddressedby
Slovakia.It will aIso britogthe Couri's attention developmentswhich
haveoccurred sinc freeffectivedate af Mungary's emurial.
4.03. Sp~ifically,tlrisCIiaptwiIIaddressthe followingissues:
* the reIationshipbeiween the 1977 Treaty and other relevant
agreements(see parrtgraphç4.03-4.09);
* the context of the interrratioIaw1 of the environment and its
relationshitoreIevanttreaties(see paragraph4.10-4.39).
TIris foms the necessarybackgrou~id to consider, in Chapter 5, the
dispute ovar suspension of performanceand subsequent termination of
the 1977 Treaiy; iCIrapte r,the iIlegaIiof VariantC, and in Chapter
7, the remedial issuesarisingin tcase,so far as theycan bedealt with
at this stage.
SECTIONB: THE 1977TREATYANDOTHERAGREEMENTS
(1) AGREEMENTS LMEDTOTHE 1977 TREATY
4.04. According to the SIovak Mernorial tlre 1977Treaty "refers to
several0th ageements thatsuppleme an dareaninseparablepartof the
Treaty"? In fact, twodiflerentQpes of agreementsrelatedto the 1977
Treaty wereertteredinto bythe ContractingParties. On tire orle haad,
Protoc01concernin treArnerrdrrretfthat Treaty, adoptedonIOOctober
1983,modifiedits ArticIe4(4) inordertu modifythecornrnencmentoftfie
operationof thepower generationplantskm the period 1985-1990ta the
period 1990-1994.This ProtocoIwasratifiedas required by its ArticIe2
and entered into force on the day of theexchange of i~istrurnerofç
ratification? In this it conformai with1977Treaty whicIritrnodified,
appIyirrg€IreruIeof "paraIIéIisdes actes".Nothing in the 1977Treaiy
providedformodifrcatiororamendmen of ilsclauses.
4.05. On the other Iiand, another agreement "linked to the 1977
Treaty", the Agreementon Mutual Assistaricein the Course of Building
the GabCikovu-NagyrnarcisDam, was signed at Budapest ori 16
Beptember 1977 and entered into force on the same day as the 1977
SM,para6.24.
HM, Annexes,YO3mex 23;SM, anne7Treaty (30 Jrrne 1978). It was not subrnitted to ratificati~n.~ Several
instruments Iater nrodifiedit. On IO Octobcr 1983,a Protom1anrending
tfie 1977Agreementon Mutual Assistancewas signed;under Article 5,
this was not subject to ratification either.9 This instrumerit was tfien
abrogatedby a Profoc01signed or?5 February 1989,which, again, was
not çubjectto ratificatio~o
4.06. There were thus twodifferent sets of treaties: the "basicTreaty"
of 1977 as anrended by the Protoc01 of 1983,both of which required
ratification,and, on theother harid,the Agreementon MuiuaIAssistance,
as arnsnded, which was in a simpIified form and did riot require
ratification. The latter had a purely technical cliaracter, çetting or
rnodifyingtfietinretablefor futureworks and thesharingof works and of
the expected production of anergy. Tfiis expIairis the difference in tlre
IegaI nature of the twosets of instruments. On the basis of the 1977
Treaty as arnended and its modification certain detaiIs - important, no
doubt, but which were considered as distinct frorn the 1977 Treaiy
itself- were settled by the seriesof Agreementson Mutual Assistance,
taki~igintoaccountthe factuaIsituation.It is cIear that tfieseagreemerrts
couId rot nrodie tlie Treaîy itself: thsy Irad to be- arid were -
instruments to further its impleme~itationin pursuance of ifs purposes.
Tliey had tliuç to bc in conformi@with the provisiorrsof tire Treaiy,
especially with its Article 15 reIated to tlre protection of water quality
arrdits ArticIe 19concerningthe protectionof the natura1envirorime~rt.
Whenthe requirementsresultingfromtheseprovisiorrs were riotfuIfiIIed,
the ContracfingParties had to adapt tlie tirnetabIeand the çharingof the
work iri order to implement their basic obligation. WIien Hurrgary
suspended work in accordance with the timetabIe set in the amended
Mutua1Assistance Agreements for a Iimited period, it used its right
flowing from tlre 1977 Treaty to açk for the hl1 and correct
irnpIementafionof ttietwoarticles.Tfiis was iricorifomity with tlie 1977
Treaiyit~eff.~~
4.07. This was cIearIyexpressedin the dernands for rrewnegotiatioris
on thisissue. Unrilthe beginningof work on Variant C by Slovakia,ttie
continucdvaIidiiyof the basic Treaîy was not contested.The çuspençion
onIy concerned secondaryinstruments, theapplicatiori of which irirfie
circurristaricescouId not ensure the fuII implementationof the principal
treaty.
. HM, Ânnexes,vol3,anne2 x2;SM, annex5.
HM,Annexes, y013, annex29;SM. anncx8. SeealsSM, para3.11.
Io HM, Annexes,voI3, annex30;SM, annex9.
II Cf HM, para4.15,6.46-5.49. 4.08. Two frirther rernarks shouId be rnade here orr the question of
relatedagreements.TIiefirstconcerrrsthe status of the Joint Contractua1
PIan, which was tlre set of snbstarrtiveplans and spccificatiorrsfor tlie
Barrage System.The Joint ContractualPlan waç subordinate to tfie1977
Treq: it was not çubject to ratificatiori, couln be arid =!as i-eadiIy
arnerrded,and wasrreverregisteredwiththe UnitedNations urrderArticIe
, 102of the Charter.12Indeedthe Agreementregardirrgthe DraFti~rg of the
Joint Contractual PIan of 197613 itseIf was not registered, and it
carefuIIydid ~iotgive to thePlan itselfany specific IegaIçtatus. Thuç it
is not tlre case that the Joint Contractua1 PIan was "no doubr...an
agreement attlre same IeveIas the other iriterrelatedtseaties and iriter-
State agreenrerits".14It had such skitus as was give~iit by the 1977
Treaty ifseIf
4.09. TIie second point corrcerns the "related instruments" to which
refer-ence isnrade in the first preambrrIar paragrxplr of the SpeciaI
Agreernerrt.The SIovakMernorialis unclearandeqrrivocalabout wl~at it
u~iderstandçto bethe"relateciinstruments7' which were terminatedaIong
wit11the 1977 Treaty i~rMay 1492.15The positioriis as explairredin the
Hungarian MemoriaI:there were in al1Severi"related instruments", ail
specificaIIydealingwitlrtireBarrageSysternin onerespect or a1rother.16
By contrast Hungary Irever suggested that the Boundary Waters
Corrventianof 1976 was a reIated instrumentorthat it was in any way
affectedby the events of 1989-1992. Onlhe contrary the Parties agree
tIratthe1976 Convention isstiI1inforce.I7
SECTION C: THE CONTEXTOFTHE INTERNATIONALLAW
OFTHEENVIRONMENT
4.10. The corrtrast betwee~rthe Hungariariand SIovakMernorials on
the issue of the internationa1Iaw of tfisenvironment is stark. WhiIe
SIovakiadaims thatVariantC isgood fortlreenvironmentof the regio~r,
it appearsecjrraIIto cIainrtlratthis benefit is on its pal?a volunta~yact,
IZ Cf HM, para4.15.
l3 HM, Annexes,vo3, annex15:HM, para4.03.
I As asse~tbcydSM,para6.11.
I3 Seee.g.,SM, In~roductio,ar4,and para6.42,6.54.
I7 SM, para5.43,5.46; HM,paras4.33-4.35IO.19,note124.The 1976Convention
remains inforce becauseit asIreaty reIatIothe rcgi~neoa bounday, anci
becausethepartieshavesoagreed:cfHM, paraIO .IOfincorporatingerrala).For
thetex1of the 1970ConventisceAnnexes,vol3, annex19.4.14. According 10 Article2(b) of the 1994Draft Articles:
'"Watercourse' means a system of surface waters and
goundwaters constiîuting by virtue of tlieir physica1
reIatiorrship a rrnitary whde and normaIIy flowing into a
communteminus.. ."z4
4.15. The Commentarystates that the term "underground waters" used
on firçt readingwas repIacedby the tem "groundwaters" tobetter refIect
contemporaryusage.It refers-
"to the hydro1ogicsystem cornposed of a number of differerrt
componerrtsthrough which water flows, both on and uridsr the
surfaceof tfie land. These cumpanents incrude rivers, Iakes,
aquifers, glaciers, reservoirs and canals. Su Iung as these
components are interreIatedwith orleariotlrer,they fom part of
the watercourse. Tfris idea is expressed in the plirase,
'constiiuting by virtueof fheir physicalrelatiunship a unitary
whole'. Thus, wabr may move from a çtreanr irrtothe ground
under the strearnbed,spreadingbeyondthe banksofthe sweanr,
tlretrre-ernergein the stream, flow into a Iake whicIiernpties
into a river, be diverteinto a carla1and carried tta reservoir,
etc. Because the surface and groundwaters forin a systern,and
constitute by virtue of their physical reIationsIiip a unitary
wIioIe,Irurria~iinterventionat one point ithe syçtenrrnay Irave
effects elsewherewitlri~it."25
4.16. A Note annexed tothe Second Rapportof the International Law
Commission on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of Iriternational
Watercourses a150 emp11asised ths importance of aquifers in rhe non-
rra\ligational uses of international waterc~rrrses?~ and in particuIar
stressed that aquiferç reIated to existirig surface waters are naturaIIy
incInded iritlremeasuresprotectingsurface waterç.Tlie Hrrngarianthesiç
is rei~iforcedby the insistenceof the SpeciaI Rapporteur on the needof
the managementof a11 waterresuurces inan integrated~rrarirrer.~~
24 Report offhe IirreriralionolLaruComnmisonorhe Work ofifs461hSession,
2 May-22July 1994(UN Doc A149110)atp 149.See aIsHM, Annexes, vol 3,
annex21.
23 Repoi-foJlire hrIerrtalioiraiLaw CommissioiroWorkrof ifs461hSesiion,
2 May-22JIlly1994(UNDoc A1491 1)atpp200-201.
26 Inlemational Law Commission, 46th Scssion, Mr R Rosenstock, SpeciaI
Rapporteur, SecondRepm un the Law of rire Non-Navigational Uses of
Intemali~naIWalercourses,UN DDCAlCN141462. 2pril1994,pp22-35.
"
Ibid, para3.SeeaIsoNote, ibid, p28,para22.4.17. The Note annexedto the Second Report refers to a series of
recommkidations and resoIutions orr the proper utiliçatiun and
na nage men tf waterresources, startingwith the United Natioris Water
Confernice atMardel Plata,Arge~ltiriai,n1977, w~itinuirigwith the1982
Dakar inter-regionalnreeting, the Charter on grou~idwarermanagement
adoptedby the EuropeanEco~io~niC communityand tIrerecommendatio~rs
of the United Nations Coriferenceon Desertification.28It co~icIudesby
quotingthe conclusionsof the InternationalConferenceon Water and the
Environmerri,IreIdatDublin fro m 5to3 1Janrrary1992:
'Tiie extent and severity of contamination of unsaturated zones
and aquifers Iras long been urrdereçtimateddue to the relative
inaccessibiIityof aquifers and the Iack of reIiable information
on aquifer systerrisA çtrategyfor he protectionof grolrndwater
must be airned at protecting aquifers frorn becoming
contarni~ratedand prevenfive efforts should be directed first at
Iand-use activities aridpoint and rion-pointsources that poçe a
Irighrisk of causing pollutiori.Care must be exercised to avoid
grouridwater develop~nerittlrat Ieads to €Ire degradation of
gronndwater qualiv or the deplefio~rof groundwafer srrppIieç.
By the year 2000 assessrnents of known aquifers and their
vuInerabiIiiy fo contamination shouId have comrnericed in a11
countries, whiIe potenfial sources of grouridwater pollutio~i
sIrouIdbe idenfifiedand plansfor their controldeveIoped".2"
4.18. These texts underIine the Iackof merit of SIovakia'çaIIegation
that the qrraIity of the water in the aquifer in the areas where the
Irydropowerplant was to be built couid beensured by simple monitoring
after tfieconstructiowas fi~rished.
4.1 9. No bettarconcIuçioncouIdbefolrndthan that of a formerSpeciaI
Rapporteur:
"Despite problems irr collecting data regarding gruundwater
under varyin g~ydrologicand geologic conditions,there caribe
~iodoubf that groundwater is an integral and vital part of
unbrokencycIeof rnwenrent through wfiichthe suppIy of freslr
water is continuaIly repienished...If neceççar tyconsidsr as
well tlre effects of the existence of avaiIabIe reserves of
28 Ibid,pp23-32.
29 Ihidp 33.The ILCdecidenottoincludeunreIatedtransboundv groundwatins
the DrnftArticlas adoptedon secu~rd~eading,but recommendedthat sirniIsr
principIesbeappliIoconfinedgroundrvateseeReyorfrlJtheInternariLowal
Coinn~ission rhe W~rkof ils4Slh Sessian, )May-2July 1994 (UN Duc
A/49/10atp326. gonndwater, and of the contributionofmter flowing in watcr-
coursesto the quantityufgo~indwater."~~ w
(2) GENERAL PRMCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
4.20, Accordiiigta AflicIe 2 of the SpecialAgree~rrent,tIie Court is
requested to decide on the basis of the 1977 Treaty and rules and
principIes of generaI i~rternationaIIaw, aweII as such otIrertreaties as
tlre Court may find appIicable. This nrearrsthat the Court's task is to
consider. both the Treaty, other relevant treaties and the rules a~rd
principlesof genera1interrrationalIaw.
4.21. Hungaryhas dernonsfratedthat the TreaiyitseIf alIowed for the
applicatiori of srich rules and -principIes, especiaIly for tlre
implementatiori of the twoarticles which are the most important for the
preçent issue,Articles15 and 19.These provisionsainrat preventi~~tg he
impairingof the qualis of the water"asa resuItof the coristmctioiiaiid
operation of the Systernof Locks", and atensuring"cornpliancewith tlre
obligations for the protection of nature arisirig in connection withthe
construction aridoperations of the Syste~nof Locks". In both cases the
appIicabls internatioriallawrulesare those which are inforce during the
whole Iifetirne of the Systernof Locks. This incIudes those riew ruIes
which Iraveappearedsince the errtryintoforce of the 1977Treaty.TIiese
must alsu be implementedfor every issue which coiicerns the operation
ofthe "System of Lock~",3~ irconfornri~ with ArticIc2 of the SpeciaI
Agreement. Slovakia's contention that the international Iaw rules
protecting the environment which Iiave emerged since tlie entry into
forceofthe 1977TreaQ are no1 10 beappliedbecausethe Treatyis a "/ex
syecialis"~ ignoresthe rextof rhe1977 Trcaly itseIf,as weIas Article2
of the SpeciaIAgreement.
4.22. The application of new noms tu asssss and interpret treatieiis
aIso supporîed by thejurisprudence of the Court:
30 Mr S SchwebcI,SpeciaIRapporie,irst Reporton Iawof thenon-naitigationa1
usesof international\vatercourses,ILC YeIP79,vol Il (Pari Unp)149,
para21.
HM,paras6.20,6.25.
SM,paras8.106-5.12.I
195
"...anirrternationalinçtrurnerithasto be irrterpretedand applied
withinthe frarneworkof the enlire Iegalsystemprevailirrgatthe
- timeofthe interpretati~n."~~
4.23. TIiisjurisprudencecarrbeappIied inthe present case 50 as ta take
inroaccount tIrei~nparta~rrtnodificatiorrswhich were introdrrcedinto tIle
internationa1IegaIçyçtem by the need to protect the environment at
differeritIeveIs,rratiorral,regional and wurId-wide. The principles arrd
rules whichwere adopted since the conclusion of the 1977 Treaiy by the
iriternationa1cornnruriitycanriobe ig~roredtoday.IIIorder to characterise
such transfom~ationone may qrroteArticIe22(1) of tlre Convention on
BioIogical Diversity, adopted at Rio de Janeiro on 5 June 1992,whicli
entered iriroforce on23 Decernber 1993and which has been ratified by
bot11HungaryandSIovakia:
"Tlre provisions of tlris Co~iveritionshaII ~iptaFCectthe righrs
and obIigations of any Contracti~rgPariy deriving from any
existing inkrnational agreement, except where the exercise of
those rightç and obligatio~rswouId cause serious damage or
fhreatta biologicaldiversiS." 34
4.24. TIrefu1rdamenta1 principleswhichhavethusemerged have already
beeninvoked by Hu~rgaiy:tlie pririncipof co-operationin order to protect
the envirunmenb35especiaIIyin trançboundaryrelariorrs,36the principles
of preve~ttiu~~3a7nd of precauti~n?~ the duties to perform thorough
environmentalimpacta~sessrnent~~ and to conserve biologicaldiversiv,40
tlie protectio~rof humanrights against the exerciseof counte~measuresP~
33 LegaI Consequences for States of the Cnntinucd Prese~rccof SoAfricain
Eraniibia(Soathr~est Africa) ~ro&ithstandingSecuCounciI ResoIution276
(1970). AdvisorOpinion,ICJReports1971,pp15 ffatp3 1.
34 UNEPIBio.DivlCONF IeLi2t,din(1992) 31 ILpp 822 ff,1p 532.
35
HM, paras6.70-6I.7
36 HM, para7s.45-7.82.
37 HM,para 6.57-6.63,7.05,7.75.
38 IIM,parers6.64-6.68,8.3I,I0.52.
39
See UN Convention on E~rvironmentaIImpact Assessrnent in a Trnrrsboundary
Contcxt (Espoo, Finland, Februa YyBI)(Arts2. 4and appendsI and II), M
ILM800 (1991). Appc~rdix1refcrsspecificIoactivities invuIvi~rgdamse
and reservoirs.
40 See UN Conferenceon E~rvironmenatnd DeveIopment:Convc~rtionon BioIogicaI
DiversiS.{Riode Janeiro5 Junt 1992)<Arts3,8,9, IOand 14131 1LM 818
(1992).
41 HM,para7.114. 196 1
i
the rightto Iife41and the dus of the State toprhect itP3as weIIas tlre
rigfittoahealtfryandecoIogicaIIysounderiviru~rmknt.~ ~Iovakiaco~itends
that the Stockhoh Declarationand other iritenia[ionaIinstrumentswfiich
rriakesuch principlcsexpIicitare'kt most softla? anddo not coristitute
discrete binding mles of international lawPS By co~rtrast,the SIovak
Mernorialitself invokesPrinoiple21 of the ~tocljholmaiid principle2 of
tlie Rio Declarationspa and the preserrtIegislationappIicabIin Sluvakia
refiects many sucIr priri~ipIes.4~Under that IegisIation,VariantC was
unIawfuI hm its inception alid until early 1I94 wfierr the relevant
Cornmittee foundit necessary to reduce ,the discllarge levelç,
coincidcntally,tothuseprovided for i~rfiJointCQntractuaIPIar1.~8
1
4.25. SIovakiairivokesits"right todeveIopment"arrdrelies on the fact
that PrincipIe2 1of the StoîWiolmDeclaration +as modified at tiie Rio
Coiiference by adding the words "ariddevelopniental" bsfore the word
"policie~".~~ In fact, PrincipIe 2 has tlre sarne,meaning and effect as
Principle 21, the modification rnereIy makingjcIear that which was
aIready irnplicit in PrincipI21. Even before the incIuçio~iof the new
words each statehad tlrerighttu exploit itsown resources pursuantto its
own developmentalpolicies. If States hadinfmded the in~odiiîtion of
the new wordsto aIter the rneaningof PrincipIe 2 1,tfieywouIdnot have
relied uponthe PrincipIe21 version of the texiritlrreeother instrumerrrs
wliiclr tfieyalso adopted in June 1992, narireIy AriicIe 3 of tire
Biodivcrsity Convention, Agenda 21 and thk Non-Legally-Binding
Authoritative Statement of Prirrciple for a ~lbbal Consensus on rhe
Managenreiil, Conservation and Siisiai~rablt ;Developnieit t of a11
for est^.^^SIovakia a1so ignores Principie 3 of the Rio DecIaration,
whiçh procIaimsthat the "right to development ?us? be fulfilled so ato
equitably rneet deveIoprnentaIand environrnental needs of preçent and
HM, para7.122.ScealsoArtIO(2)offhe ILCDraRbidcs onthe sprciaregard
rvhichmust be givetothe requirementsof vitaIhum'mneeinrhe eveIrof a
confid betweeusesofanin1ernati~naIwaiercourse.
i
HM, para10.24. i
HM, para10.38.
SM,para 8.112.
SM, para7.46. j
HM, pan 7.59. 1
#
For tireiIlegaIiv of VCrunderSIovakIawsee~dl,para7.51.
1
SM, para 7.46. 1
Agenda2 1para15.3U;N Duc AICONF. 151IZSIRevI (v1)<1993).
1
ParaI(a);UN Doc AICONF.15II24IRevIIVO I,48911993).
!future generations", and PrirrcipIe4 which states u~iequivocallythat "en-
virorrnrerita1protectiori çhall constitrrte an integraI part of the deveI-
opment processandcannot beconsidered inisoIationfrom it".
4-26. The ccinstructiorrand operation of VariaCtwas certainIy not an
appIicationof the righttosustairiabIedeveIopment, sinceitIiarmed and
on tir rueto harm the environmenta1 and probabIy also the
deveIopmentaIneedsof futuregeneratioris.
4.27. In addition, SIovakia disregards Hungary's right to permanent
sovereig~rtyover itçnaturalresources,which is arressentid conrponentof
developn~ent.~~
(3)THE CON ENTIONONCO-OPERATON FORTHEPROTECTION AND
SUSTANABLEUSEOF THE DANUBERIY ER,SOFIA, 29 JWE, 1994
4.28. This new C~r~verition~i~s based inIarge part on the Convention
on the Protectio~r and Use of Trarisboundary Watercourses and
InternationalLakes, draftedin tlre fiarnewcirkof the UN Ecorrornic
Conrrnissionfor Europe and adopted at HsIsirrkioIr17March 1992." It
hasbeerisigned by Hungay and SIovakia.
4.29. According tu its prearnbIe, tlre Convention aims at a Iasti~rg
irnprovement and protectiori of the Danube River and of tlie waters
within its catchrnent area by ensuring sustainable and equitabIewater
management, including the conservation, irnprovernentand the rational
use of surfacewaters and groundwater{Article2(1)). Likeother modern
interrrationa1 instruments,55itrecognises the unity of surface and
subsurfacewaters.ArticIe 2(5) recognisesthe needfor a sustainabIcand
equitabIe water management according the criteria of a stable,
environmentalIysounddevdopment-
"which areatthe sametimedirect4 to:
- maintaintheoveraIIqualityof Iife;
j2 HM,paras6.75,7.83-7.87.
33
See Convention oCo-operationfotheProtectioand SusrainabUse oftire
Danub e iver(DanubeRiverProtec1Cmvention],JuIy 1994;HC-M,Annexes,
voI3,annex71.
34 3IILM(1992),p13IZff;seeaIsoHM,paras6.6C>,7.5I,7.42.
j5 Sa HM, paras5.16-6.17. - avoidIastingeiivironmentaldainageandpr$tecteçosysiems;
It procIairnsthat tlie precautionary principle cokstituteç a basis for a11
meaçuresairningat the protectionof tireDanube: riverand of the waters
within itscatchrnentarea(Article 2(4)). 1
1
4.3 1. The dulies of Coiiîraîtiiig Parîiare to tpe a11appropriate legnl,
administrative arrdtechnicd rrreasures,to at Ieast mai rit ^n^d irnprove
rire çurrent enviroiiinentaland water quality cu:ditions of the Danube
river. andofthe watersin its catchrnentarea and tu preveritand reduceas
1
far as possible adverseimpactsalid changes oyurring or IikeIyta be
caused (Article 2(3)). nie urgency of wat+ poIIutio11abaternent
rneasuresand of sustainabIewater use is enrp11asised and taking this irrto
acçou~it, the Parties rhall stiengthen, harnbnise aiid CO-ordinate
rneasures aiming at srrstainabIe deve1opme;t and environmenta1
protectionof tlreDanuberiver.This objectiveis iaarticu~ardirected-
4
"tu ensure tlie sustainabluseof water resoirces for 1nunicipa1,
industrialand agricuIturaIpurgosesas weII hs the conservation
and restoration of eçosystenis aiid to coier also otl~er re-
quirementsoccurringas topublicIiealtli."5i
I
4.32. Tliese principles and rules confirm the views develuped by
Hungaryconcerningthe prioriv of tlreprotectionlofthe enviranment and
theappIicatior1of principlessuch as çrrsiainabledeve~o~rnentp, revention
and precautiori.The Conventio~iaIsocci~ifirms th1t not orrIyplanned, but
aIso ongoing measuses must be submitted tIrc ruIes concerning
environmenta1protection, as far as tlrey cause or are IikeIy to cause
transboundary irnpaots(Article3(2)).5' Tire~oniention mentions iitliis
regard planned activities andrneasures in the fieId of wattr coristmction
works, as weIIas otlIer planned activities and rndasuresforthe purpoçes
of water uçe, such as water powtr utilisatio'n, water transfer and
withdrawaland theoperationofthe existinghydrAtechnicalcoiistruofions
such as reservoirs and water power plants. S?me specific problems
resuIting frorn such activities are aIço rrienti~ned,such as eroçiorr and
abrasion. The Conventio~iis applicable to fishery and inland riavigatiori
as far as problemsof water protectionagainst p~~lution caiised by these
activities are corrcerned (Article 31, which shows how muclr this
insiniment is focuçed on the preservation of the qualiv of the Danube
Riva and of ile watersof itscatchmentarea.
'' Art2(3).
'' As arguediHM, paras6.20,6.25.4.33. Articles5 and S of the Convention cwicerIr prevention, confroI
and redlrctionof transbouridary impact arid provide for specific water
reçources protection measur-es.They seek to ençrrre efficient water
qualiiy protection arid sustainable water uçe and thereby tu preverit,
control aridreduce transboundary impact (AriicIe 5). Water yrotcctiorr
rneasuresare particuIarIyimportant:Ar-ticle6 providesfhat :
"TIieContracting Parties çhaIItake appropriate measuresaimirrg
attlrepreventionor reduction of transboundary impactsand at a
sustainablearrdequitable useof water resourcesas welIas attlie
conservatioriofecological resources,especialIy :
(a) errurnerate grourrdwater resources subject to Iong-term
protection as weII as protection zories vaIrrabIefor existing or
futuredrinking water supply purposes;
fb) preverrttfie poIIutionof grorrnd-waterresources, especiaIIy
those in a Iong-krrn perspective reserved for drinking water
suppIy...
(d) take into accourrtpossible influericesori the water quaIily
reçultingfrompIannedactivitiesaridorigoingmeasurespursuarit
to Article 3 parxgraph3;
(e} evaluate the importance of different biotope efernsrrtsfor
the riveri~~eecoIogyand propose measures for inrprovirigthe
aquaticand IittoraIecoIogicaIconditions."
4.34. hoag the particuiar rrieasureç, the Converrtion declares that
States shaII ensure tfrat environmental impact assessment in Iine with
supranational and international regulatioris or other procedures for
evaluation and assessmerrt of environme~ital effects are applied
(Article7(5)(f)).They also shaII repart to an International Corninission
created bythe Conventionon planned activities, wlrichby reason of their
character are IikeIytu cause transbouridaryimpacts (Article lO(f)).They
sIiaIIexchange information with other States invoIvedat the request of
one or several Cuntracfing Parties concernai arrd sIraII enter into
consuIfations on planned activities which are IikeIy tu cause
transboundary impacts: prior to a decision on çuch activities they shaII
wait for the resuItsof the consultations(ArticIe11).
4.35. By signirrgihis instrument,Huiigaryand SIovakiahave indicated
tfieir genera1 acceptancc of the principles and ruIes which are to be
appIiedforthe conservatiori riotheqrraliv of the waterof the Danrrbeand
iri the aquifer connected 10 it and for the protection of nature. This is
significant in theprese~rtase for severalreasurrs. i
4.36. First, aIthougIthe 1994 Convention is (wt retroçpecfive in tire
senseof makingunIawfuIactsdone priorto its&try intoforce, itappIies
to the fuiure cunduct of the parties even thqugh this rnay relate to
existingfacilitiesor projecfswhich niay impact'lntlre Danube. It makes
no provision for "vested rights" to harm tlre environment. Thuç irr the
event of co~iflictbetween the standards of the ~onventiorrin the future
and any provision of an earlier bilateral treaty, the Convention wilI
prevaiI.
i
4.37. Tliis conoIusionis explicitly drawn by Ihe Convention itself so
1
far as concerns existirigand supplenrentaryagreementç. Accurding to
Article21 : 1
"The Cmitracting Parties, on the basi; of equaIity and
reciprocity shall adapt existing biiak<a~ or rnultilateral
agreernerrtsor other arrangenrerrts,where nbcessarytoelirninate
contradictions with basic principIes of tkis Conventio~i,and
shaIIenter intosupplemenraryagreementsor otherarrangenrerrts
wtiereappropriate." 1
1
4.38. Secorrdly,according to Article 18 of tliéVienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,which now reilacts internationallawon the point, a
Srate which has signed a treaty muçt rrot under+~ie the object and the
purposeof a treaty,pendinga decisiunon ratifidat1on.The partiesto the
present caseare thur obligedto respectthe oblig~tionswhiohresultFrom
its signature, andto take ail appropriate measurqsto preventand reduca
adverçe irnpactç and changes occurring or IikeIy to be caused, if
necessary on the basiçof the precautionav pri~lciple,tu the extent that
this is necessary to avoid urrdermining tfieobj'ectand purpose of the
Converrtion. 4
i
4.39. Thirdly, the Conventionis an appropriatbreférencepoint for the
Court irrelationto the future of the regionaflected by the Project. The
Court isnot onIy concerned irrthis casewith the past, with a Iiioturical
dispute which has Iimited consequences for tle future. TIie essential
disagreement between tlieParties isas to the fQture.In tlris regard the
articnlated standards of -the Co~ivention,reflecfingas they do modern
Iegalprinciplesof protectionand use oftransbouAdaryrivers,are entirely
appropriateas grrideIinesfortlieCourt in seekingto resdve this dispute. CHAPTER 5
THEDISPUTEOVERPERFORMANCEAND
SUESEQUENTTERMINATIONOF THE 1977 TREATY
5.01. TIiis Chapter discusses a nrrnrber of issues relating to the
performanceand terminationof the 1977Treaty, tu the exterrtneceçsary
todeal withargumentson thow issuespresented in the SIovakMernoriaI.
5.02. SpecificaIIytire issudeak with are as follows:(1)the relation
between treatyIawand the Iawof stareresponsibilitsofar asit coricernç
the dispute(beIow,SectionA, paragraph s.03-5.22)(2) issuesrelatinta
the suspension and srrbsequent abandonment of works, and ta the
terminationof the1977 Treary(SectionB, paragraph 5s.23-5.48)and the
consequenres ofthat termination(SectioC,paragraphs 5.49-5.1).
SECTION A: TREATY LAW AND THELAWOF §TATE
RESPONSIBILITYAS THEY RELATETU THE DISPUTE
5.03. Throughout itç Mernoriai, SIovakia focuses, tu the viriuaI
exclusion of a11otherIegaIargurncnts,on the Iawof treaties. It asserts
and reassertsHungary's disregard of tfisinternatioïial law of treaties.
Withinthe Iawof treaties it focusetothe substantia1exclusion of otlrer
eIenrentsofthaf Iaw,on the norrnpucru sunt sservanda.CorreIativeIy it
seekç toexcludeor tosubordinateeIernentsof the Iawonwhich Hungary
hasreliedthroughout thedispute.Itdoestfiiina nrrrnberofways.
5.04. Itsf;r asgument irfhisregard istiiatHungaryseeks toevade the
application of the rules Iaiddown in the VierinaConvention on the Law
of Treaties by relying un the arguinent that the Convention erltered into
force forbotIrcountriesafter 1977I Hungary has aIready cIarified this
rnatrer i~iits Mern~riaI.~WhiIereafinrr irrg that the ViConvention
was not binding on the Pairies 1977,a point which is a pure matrer of
fact, it r-ecognises,as the Court ilseIf has repeatedIy rccogniçed, that the
Convention "may in many respectsbe conçidered as a codification of
existirrcusfornaryIaw..."3
I SM, para8IO.
SeeespHM, para 10.47.
FisheriesJrrrisdicliotiCases(J~riUKivIcelanICJRep1973 p3 alp18;
Federd Eiep~zbliocfiermvIcelanJICI Re1973p49atp63.5.05. There is then no difficulty i~rusing the Vienna Coriveritionas a
guide b the confer11of general i~ifernationa1 law, cven if, as tfie Conri's
statement cIearIyrequires, it must be verified in each case whether the
provisionreferred to doesreflect general irrternationallaw, or whether- it
constitutes a "progressive developrnent" in soma respect. As folIows
froni the argumerrtsdevelupedin its Mernorial, Hungary dies on the
custornary internatiorial Iaw of freaties in order to de~no~isiratetlie
IawfuInessof ifscondr~ct.~
5.06. The second way i~iwliich SIovakiaatteinpts to exdude al1other
nonns thanpacra suni .remndu meritsmore attention.It isthe atte~npttu
demonstratearrirrconsistencybetweentlre Iaw of treatieso~ithe one hand
and the law of state reçponsibiIityon the ofher, and thereby to exclude
the The purpose of this endeavour is to assert that Hurrgary
carinot invoke arry "circumstances pr+ecIrrding wrongfuIr~ess"heloriging
to the Iawof stateresponsibiIitytojustify its suspensionof performance
under the 1977Treaty,or its subsequerittermination.In SIovakia'sview,
the only grurrndsfor suspension or ternri~rationare contai~red i~rArticleç
54-62 of the Vienna Carivention. Accordirrg to SIovxkia,Article 42 of
the Vienna Conventionestablishesthe Iawof treaties as the oiily gi-ou~rd
forsusperidi~ig the performanceof a treatyor fortcmi~iatirrgit."
5.07. Without entering into an academic discussion, an initial
abservatio~rsliorr Id be made. 111the circumstances of the gresent caçe,
every e1enrentof Hungary'sconduct hasto be considered i~ithe context
SIovakia~IsoargucSthattheViennaConvention appIiede,~lutri qiteIO rhe 1977
Treaty because IIre1989Protoc01''affkrnedrIrtsubstantiveobIigationsof the 1977
Treaty",andthe Vienna Conventionwas by 1989 in force for thc parSM,: para
5.59. Thc argument is misconceived for a number of reaîons. First, the 1989
ProIocoldid notanrendthe 1977TreatybutonIytheMutuaI AssislanceA~ge~nent:
see above, paragraph4.06and aIso HM, para 4.23. The detaiIed tirnetablefor rIrc
cunrpIetionofwork was notcrintairiedin the 1977Treaty. Scco~rdlaccordance
with Art4 of the YiennaConvention, that Conventiondid not appIy to t1977
Treaty, and there is noIIringin the 1989 Protwhich wuuId have ~heeffect of
retrospectively appIying the ViennaConvention rua treatyconciudedIong before.
TIrirdIy,thereinoruIeof intemationa1Iawthaa protoc0or olher amendmentto a
maty is to be regardeassuhstantively re-enactingthe lreaty iasitwere by
implication;a protocororheramendme~rt ha independeniforceas far ait goes,
and 110more.The provisionsofrheVienna Convention on amendment tu treaties
(Arts39-41)dea1ruifhamend~nentsbaween al1orsomeparties to a trcata11~ht
footing ihat they arsepxatc agreenrents.Thus even if the1989 ProtocoI had
amended tht 1377Trenty (whichildid not),irwouldnot have had the effect of
appIyingthe ViennaConventionrelrospecliveIyto IIiatTreaiy.of the wrorrgfuI acts previorrsly cornmitted by CzechosIovakia. III
particular, the reasun Hurigary reIied on a state of "enviro~ri~~ental
rrecessify" firstto suspend tlie work and tliento terminate the 1977
Treaty is that it waç confront4 with a situatio~r creaad by
CzecIrosIuvakia'sbreadi of its keatyobIigatio11s.7
5.08. Br~ttlrere is- quite apartfram tlris consideration - 110 basis for
Slovakia'satternptto excIudetlreIawof state responsibility,eitf-ierirrtlre
mandate of the Couri in the present case or in public i~iternatiorraIaw
moregeneralIy.
9 As tu the rna~idateof fheCourt, u~iderArticle2(I) of the SpeciaI
Agree~nentthe Couri isrequested todecide"orrthe baçisof theTreaîy arid
rrrles and principles of generaI inteniational Iaw". TIiose rirIes and
pri~~ciplecsoverinfer diaMo brariches,tlre Iaw ofstate reçporrsibilityand
the Iawof treaties.According totlrewordirigof theSpecialAgreement,the
lawofstateresponsibilityisas relevant tothiscaseas thelawof treaties.
5.10. Moreover,the questionsput tu the Courti~rArticle2(2)(a)and (b)
of die Specia1Agreementare characteristic of a proceedinginvolvingstate
reçpo~isibility,ince they ask whether, first, Hungary'sconduct,and the11
CzcchosIouakia7s actioris,were IawfrrIor unIawfuIin regard to their IegaI
obIigations astIieyderivefiom thesourcesenunciated iriArticle2(1). Ttis
tlrereforeeiitireIynaruraltoappIythe Iaw of staterespwsibiIiiy.
5.11. As to the position under general international Iaw, SIovakia's
affernptto exclude the Iawof staR resporisibiliiyraises iniporîant issues
fortliesettIemerrtof the presentdispute.
5.12. SIovakiaarguesthat, underthe Iawof Weatiss,a par&y tu a treaty
is riotentitIedto reIyongroundsof general state responsibilityto excuse
ifs non-performarice. This suggests, frrst, that there is a substantial
inconsiste~icybetwee~i the provisionsof the Vienna Convention and the
generaI Iaw of state responsibiIity.If this werethe case, itrnightweIIbe
a sign tlrathe pertinent provisions of the Vienna Convention, and i~i
particularArticle60, are not consistent wit11the generaIintenrationaI iaw
of treaties. For there is at Ieasta very strongpreçrrrnptionthat thesetwo
branclresofcustornary i~rternationailaw, eçtablished by the practice ~f
statesthrongfroutthe centuries,fitonewitfitheotlrer, so as ro constitutea
cohereritcorpusjuris.
5.13. Assumingtliat the genera1Iaw of treaties and the generaI iaw of
state respansibiIifydo riot cunmadicteach other, the position takerr by
SccHM, chap5forparlicuIars.SIovakia worrId mean that tfreperti~ient provisions of the Vienna
Converrtiongo beyondthe general Iawof treaties- iriwhich case these
provisions wouId not be appIicabIe here. For tfre reasons recaIIed irr
paragraph5.04,the ViennaConventionis not applicablequa treatyto tfre
present case.
5.14. But it is also the SIovakview that tlre Iaw of treaties is distinct
fro~nand prevails aver the Iaw of state responsibiiity as faras the
consepences of the non-performance of treaty obligations are
cuncerned. According tothis position, ttie law otreaiiesor at Ieast the
provisiorisof the Vienna Convention reIating tothe consequencesof a
breach of treaty, are a kindof "self-contained regime" of responsibiIity
under Article 61f? completedbyArticles 61and 62 insofaras they deal
with the circumstances authorising the lion-performance of treaty
obiigations by a party. They wonId create a specific regime of
responsibility for breach of treaties, paralle1 to "normai" çtate
responsibilityforotliercangories of wronghl acts.
5.15. The BIovak view is not convincin Tghis very issue was
systematicaIIy exanrined by the Interiiational Law Commissiori when
drafting the first partofilsprojecton State ReçponsibiIity.In its Report
on ifs28111session,the C~mrnissionobservedinparticular that:
"...an examinatiori of the enormous number of intematioria1
decisions whicIi recog~~izethe existence of an internationaIIy
wronghl act (arid, consequently, of the international
responsibilityof the State), is sufficient to show that tlrewrong
attributedto the State in tfiese decisionsiç in some cases the
breach of an obIigation estabIished by a treaty, in others the
breach of anobligatiurrof customaryorigin, arrdmore rarely the
breach of an obligation arising from some other source of
internationalIaw. This alone should be sufficient proof tlrat, in
the opinion of tfiejudges andarbitrators who have made these
decisions, a breach of an iritemationalobligation iç aIways an
iriternationaliy wrorlgful acf, regardes5 of the origin of the
obligation in question. Furthemore, there are even cases in
which iniemationa1adjudicators and arbitrators have stated
expIicitIy the principle that the breach of an interriationar
obligation is arwaysan internationaIIywrongfu1act regardless
ofthe origin of theobligationiriquestion."'
' SM,paras 8.14-88.
ILCYbk 1975,volIl, p2,p81,para(8).5-16. The Cornmission'sReport thenturrred tothe question of whether
tfisorigin of the international obligations breached has any bearing on
the international responsibility arising from a wrongful act. Its
concIusion,again based oninternationa1jurisprudence, isclear:
'Tfrecustomary,conventional or otfrerorigin of the obIigation
breached is not invoked tojustib the choice of one form of
reparation inpreferencetu another. .."Io
5.17. These consideratioris persuadedthe Commission to adopt Draft
ArticIe 17 of Part 1 of the Law of BtateResponsibility, wIricIrreads as
foIIows:
"Article 17- IrreIevance of the origin of the international
ub1igatiorbreached
1. An act of a State which coristitutes a breach of an
international obligation is an internationaIIy wrongful act
regardes5 of tlre wigirr, whether cuçtomary, conventional or
otfier,of that obligation.
2.TIieorigin of the internationalubligatioribreached by a Srate
dues not affect the inter11atiortarIesponçibility arising from the
internationaIIywrorrgfu1act of thatState."
This Ieaves no room for ariyspecial regime of rsponçibility for breach
oftreaty in generaI irrternatio~raIlaw. AI1çubsequent ILC work on the
Iaw of stats resporrsibilityhas proceeded un the basis of these
concIusionç.
The position takeii by the TLCis furthemore consistent with the
5.18.
principIe Iaiddown in ArîicIe 73 of the Vienna Conve~itio~iitself, wlriclr
provides expresçIythat the Conventiondoes nof "prejudicc any question
that may arise..,fro~nthe inter~rationalresponsibiIity of a State."This
savings cIause rnaybe enyIai~red by the fact tlrat the drafrersof tlre
Vienna Convention were conscious of tlre incompIeterress of the
Convention,eçpeciaIIywith regard to daims of invaiidiv, suspension or
termikation, as weII as tu the IegaIconsequeIlces of suc11cIai~ns.TIiis
incompletenesshas beenstress4 byauthors. I
'O ILCYbk 1976,volIIpi2,p82,para(1 11.
II See 1 SincIair, The Yjrnmi Cmvenfion on rhe hw of Trenfies(Mmchestcr,
ManchesterUniversityPress,2ndedn, 138at p165:E Capotorti,"L'extinctetn
la suspensiondetraites(I97IIIiI) 134 Recedescorzrspp 527-535; PReuter,
Iniroducrioazzdroit des {mirés(PariPresse Universitairesde France, I985)
p 153 :Rosenne,RreachofTreow {Cambridge,GrotiusPublications,198p)72.5.19. Theseconclusions as to the reIationshipbetweenthe Iawof state
respansibility and the Iaw of treaties were endorsai and appIied i~ra
1.ecentarbitral awa1.d irr tlre Rainbow Wurrior CUSE between New
ZeaIand and France.'= There tlie Tribn~raIrefused to speculate on the
possibiliiy of contradiction between the Iaw of treaties alrd tlie Iaw of
state responsibiIity.13It rejected a New ZeaIand argument that France
cuuld not rely on the "circrimstanceç excIuding wrongfrrIrress" which
exist i~rtlre Iaw of state responsibility in the context of a treaty. TIie
Tribuna1said inparticuIartfiat:
"...the IegaIconsequencesof a breach of a meaty,incIudingthe
detennination of the circumstances that nray excIrrde
wrongfuIneçç (and render the breach orrIy apparent) and the
appropriate remedieçfor breach, are srrbjectsfrat belong to the
customary Law of State Responçibility.TIre reasoIr is tfiat the
garera1 pri~icipIeç of 111tenratiorraILaw concerning State
responsibility are equaIIy appIicabIe in the case of breach of
t~+eatybligatiorr,since in the international IawfieId tlrere is no
distinction betweencontractua1aridtortious respansibiIiiy.. ."14
5.20. Cunfronted with thisnrost recent reaffirrnatio~of a ~IassicaIrrrIe
of i~iter~ratiorrlliv,Slovakia shows an abrupt reaction whicli is of an
unusualcliaracter. It "corite~idsthat this arbitra1award doeç not correctIy
state the reIationçhip between rfie Iaw of treaties and the Iaw of state
responsibiliiy; and reserveçitç right to invitetlre Court so to find, in the
context of tfiedisputebeiweenHungaryand SIovakia" 3
5.21. Of course the Rainbow WarriorAward, as ariy uthcr judicial or
arbitral decision, may be uffered fur the pnrposeç of discussion. It is
nevertheIe ssrggestedtIiatthe Interrratiunal Court of Justice is not caIled
or1to play the yoleof acourt of appeaI vis-à-v aisarbitral decisiurr.This
is eçpecialiy so when the decisioridoes no more than deny that there is
anyspecialregimeof responsibilityfor breach ofa treaty, and affirmsthe
generaI cornpatibiIity of tlte Iaw of treaties and the Iaw of state
responsibility.
' Raif~boiWnrriorArbitraiio(1990)82ILR499.
I3 "...for tdecisioninthepresencase,bottrtireCusfornaryLaofTreatiesandthe
Customary Law of StateResponsibiIi~are rcIcvmiand appIicabIe."Rainhow
WurriorArbitraiio(1990)82ILR439, atp550,para 75.
I4 Ibidp 551,para 75.
I5
SM, para8.I6.Hungary acted in good faith througliout. The SIovak assertion, an
assertion which was~iot made by Czechoslovakiain 1989,that Hungary
did not beIievethat a stateof necessiwexisted isgroundIessI7 OnIytwo
pointsof a moregeneraIcharacterrernainto be na de.
faf The i~~ucafion ofnecessity
5-26. The first of these relates to the invocation of tfie defence of
necessity in the context of errvironmentalharm. That a sfate Inaybe
entitledto relyon that defenceto suspend or even terminatea treatylias
aIready been estabIished'8 That the circurnçtancesexistedtajustify die
invocation of necessity was shown in Chapter 9 of the Hungarian
Memorial.Ig In response tothe brief account of this issue in SIovakia7s
MernoriaPothe foIIowingpointsmaybebriefiy recalled.
5.27. Hungaryiradbecornemore and more concerrredabout the threatç
to tfie aquifer anto grorrndwaterIeveIand quality.2i At tlie rime when
suspensionof works was decided on, Hungary anticipatedsevere danrage
ta flora, fauna, agriculture and sylviculture in the regiorr, and had
concernç over tlie seismic integrity of the Project. But, above alI,
irreversibledamagewas foreseerrwliich~ouIdaffect the drirrkirrgwater
formiIIionsof people.
5 -28. That this was a matterof vital interewaç recagnised atthetirne
by more than 2011NGOs active in the fieId of the protection of the
environrnent, including Greenpeace, Ecolugia (USA), W WF (USA and
Genrrany), ârrdIater in the study by Equipe Cousteau comrnissioned by
the Europeari Bank for Reconstructionand DevéIop1nent.22 It was even
recognised by CzechosIovakiaitself, at Ieaçtdurirrga Iirnitedperiod, in
sprirlg 1989.Mr Paver~rivnik, tIlerFirst Deputy FederaI Premier; Iiad
decIared inan interviewon Czechoslovak televisionon 31 May 1989:
"Wehavebeen awarefrom tlre very beginningthat the project
wi1Irepresent, naturally, irrterferencewith nature. Tllawhys
ecologica1points of view have to be considered - firstIy- the
influence of the water barrage on forests, the influence of tlre
I7 SecSM, para8.29-8.57andforrcfutntionsee above,parags.117-227.
I8 Sccabove, paragra5s.03-5.22.
l3 Se HM, paras4.18-9.4andseealsoHM, paras I17-10.34.
l0 SeeSM,paras8.25-8.28,
Sc,HM, parasIO19-10.2210.27-10.2910.32
22 Secabove,paragraph.122. water barrage on the underground water level, the inflrre~rof
the water barrageorr the preservatiorioffauna and fl~ra...''~~
5.29. Sucha view was confirmeda year Iater by Czechoslovakia,wherr
it stated,on 26 October 1990, that "[tllre trends in the quaiity of
groundwaterare worrying.Degradatiurrand poIIurionof groundwater is
far moreseriousthan we tfr~ugfrtand that the quaIityof tfiegrourrdwater
içdeterioratingfasterthanhas hithertobeerrass~~rned.''~~
5.30. Despite çuch sfatcments, Czechoslovakia aIways refused to
suspend work at GabEikovoin order to facilita furiher çcientifrc
inquiriesand diplornaticnegotiations.TIrework on VariantC threatened
to redise tlieenvironmenta1risksHnngaryhad been trying for years to
EventuaIIyit became cIear that, to avoid any pretextfor the
diversion,Hungaryhad nootlreroptionthan to terminatethe Trea~?~
@] TherelevanceqfArficle 27of& Treafy
5.31. The second point relates to Article 27 ofthe Treaty, which
according toSlovakia"envisages its owIr dispute setîlement procedure-
~rarneIy,biIatera1negotiatio~r(~receççariIybased on objective scie~rtfiic
data and not on urrverifieduniIateraIassertion)".27
5.32. Ai7icIe27 paragraph I of tireTreaty provided for the seiiieme~it
of disputes in "rnatters relating ta the reaIiçationand operation of tlre
Systenrof Locks" to be deaIt with by tIre two PIenipotentiaries.If they
couId not reaclr agreementon the maiter, it was to be referredto "the
Govern~nentsof theContractirig Parties fordecision" (paragraph2).
5.33. In practice the system of Plcnipoterrtiaries and of reg111ar
cornrnunicationbetween the partiesoperated in a reIativelyflexible way.
l3 Depuq FcderaIPrime MinisterP HrivnakonCzcchosIouaTV, 31 May 1989, as
reportediBBC, Summaryof WorIdBroadcasts,EEM4lt A211,7 JuIy1989; HC-
M,Annexes,voI3, hrnex 95.
l4 DraA Agreement on Joint Czecho-SIovak and Hungariar Ceoperation on
PIIARE - Environrnen~ProtFciioSurfaceWaterand'Ciround Water ModeI of
Danubian LowIandBetweenBratislavaandKorniriro: EcuIogicalModeIoWater
Resourcesand Management", 26 Oclober 1990.Proposa1 handed over by
CzechosIovakia to Hu~rgaryo~r26 Ocluber 1390:SM, Annex 82, p 189; HC-M,
Annexes,uoI3,anne x9. Seeabove,Introduction,paragraph22.
l5 SeeHM, paras IC).Z6-11.3
l6 Se,IIM,paras10.32-10.34.
z7 SM, para8-58.Issueswouid be raised at different IeveIçdependingon their çeriousness
and on the percepTionsof those invoIved as to whether tlrey were of an
operationa1or poIitica1cliaracter.Thus issues rnighfbe deaIt with at the
Iowerofficial levd of the Plenipotentiaries,or by tlrerelevant Ministers,
or even atPrime Ministwial level. As the record of interactionsbetween
the paifies in the years before and after 1989 shows, the provisions of
Art icIe27 of tlreTreaiywere not takenas constirutiag a hierarchy. More
se~iiorrnemberç of the Govcrnment would not have bee~i- and were
1101- deterred from deali~igwith an issue because of anyihing the
Plenipotentiariesmayormaynot haved0ne.~8
5.34. riliat thiwaç weIIurrderstoodon bot11sides is shown by the fact
that no-onethoughfto compIain ir1989thatthe issue of suspensionhad
bar1 raid by Huiigarythroughdiplornaticchannels, ratfierthan througfi
tlreforum of the Plenipotentiaries.With an issueof this sig~rificance,hat
was preciçely wfrat the parties would have expected. On receiving
notification of the suspension, the Czecl~oslovakauthoritiex did Irot
cornplain about flrefact that it Iiad not beenconrmu~iicatedthrough the
"forum" of the Plenipotentiaries;on the contrary,theyagreed to consider
itoIr its rnerits,wIriIeobjectingtu tliesuspensionof workun substantive
groundç - i.e., on the grounds that the suspension was Iror IegaIIy
justifiai as s~ch.2~Nornerelyproceduralpoint was hkerr.
5.35. Moreover the plethora of "rnechanisms for monitoring 'and
addressing any ecoIogicaI probIerns", to whidi the Siuvak Mernorial
refers?O existed for tlie operational pnrpose of effectnati~rgthe Barrage
System, of "fixing" the problerns if would cause. The extent of these
probIems- not to mention their potenfial irreversibility- had gone
unexaminedrrotvvithstanding the many "mechani~ms".~~Whenan issue
arose no?about how the BarrageSystemcould be,madeto work but about
whetfrerit should be conti~iued,it was riotsurprisingtliattfiis wasraiçed
at a I~igherlevel, arrd at a lsvel not institutionally connected wirh the
BarrageSystern.
2g
This wiistme, for exarnp, henMr Marjai raiseddonbtsabout the Projata
ministerialmeetinon 21 September1981. No one suggestedttrat rhesefibct
discüssb eydthePlenipotentiariesHM, para3.43.
29
See HM, par= 3.74-3I15for8 deetileaccountand scefurrherabove,paragraphs
2.27-2.37.
30 SM, para8.60.
31 As man).sources,themd latercorrcedd:seecg.,ahove,Introduction,paragraphs
16-19.22-23. (2) THE TElWiNATUN OF THE 1977mEATI
5.39. In the context of temi~ration, the SIovak Mernoria1devotes a
surprising amourit of attentionto ArticIe 56 of the Vienna Convention,
which deals with denunciationor withdrawa1frorna treatycoritainingno
provision regarding temination, denunciation or withdrawal. Having
earIier castigated Hungary for seeking to"svade" the provisions of tlre
Yienna Convention (and liaving earIierargued that the Convention
appIied en fanr que tel to the 1977 Trea~~~), SIovakia now seeks to
show that theprovisionsof ArticIe56do not refiect general internationa1
Iaw.36This discussionis howeverirelevant.
5.40. In tliefirspIace, there is no reasonto doubt that Article 56 is
a~rytlrirbuta fairreflectionof the currentruIeof internationalI~W.~~
5.4I . SecondIy,Hungary at no stage suggested that the 1977 Treaty
was snbject to rrni1ateraldenunciation or withdrawal pursuarrt to the
customary internationa1IawequivaIerit of Article 56.A State which acts
under Article 56 need give no reason for termination or witfidywal. In
relation to a treaty to whichArticle 56 appiieç,the mere rrotification of
wifhdrawa1 in accordance with the Treatyis sufficient tu produce the
desired IegaIeffect. Thus wIiere Article 56 applies, the wifhdrawal by a
state is (subjectoany Iimitationinthetreaty ifseIf)a rnatterof policy for
that çtate to decide. Article 56 is not concerned witli terminafiorr of
treaties for cause, i.e., for one of the reasons referred to in other
provisions of tlre Vienna Convention such as breaclr (ArticIe 601,
irnpassibiliiy of performance (Article 61) or fundarnental change of
circumstanceç(ArticIe 52).
5.42. The SIovak Mernorial gives onIy a ratlrer cursory account of
these- which are arnong the reaI issues in the case- i~ritç Chapter
VIII?S By contrast the Hu~igarianarguments are set out in detaiI iri
Chapter IOof its MemoriaI, to whichtlieCourtis again referred.
5.43. Apari from disagreementson issuesof fact (which are discrrssed
in Chapter 2 of tliiç Counter-Mernoriai)and of scientific assessrnent
(which are discrrssedin Chapters 1and 31,there are oniy a few points in
theSIovakdiscussionof terminationwhichrequireconsiderationhere.
35
SM,para 5.59andforrefiilatiseeabove,paragmph5.05.
36 SM, para6.92-6.99.
Inferpretationof rhe Agreenre25oMarcIr 1951betweenthe WHOand Egypt,
AdvisoryOpinion,ICJReports1984p73. atpp94-95.
38 SM, paras8.61-8.97.5.44. Its reference to the South Wtiil A+icu Case-'9 in the corrtext of
termination of treaties by fundamentai change of circurns~ances is
eccentric. It is cIear that the Mandate for South West Africa qua treaty
hadexpiredwith the diçsoIution of one of the parties, the League of
Nations. TIreissue intfiat case was wfietherthe Mandateas an "objective
regime" hadalso been exti1iguished.40The Court's decisio~ithat ithad
not is irreIevanthere.SIovakiadoesnotcwtend that the 197 7Treaîy was
ariobjectiveregimeor a"real" trea~.~'
5.45. The BIovak Memurial treats tire fundamental change of
circurnstancesargument aç if it relatedsoIe1yto the "poIitica1changes in
Hungary and SIo~akia".4~ TIris çeriously ~nisapprehendstlre Hungarian
argu~ne~itas set out in its 1992 DecIaration arrd developed iri its
~emoriaI.~3
5.46. In and afkr 1989 the co~itral hithertu exercised by the Soviet
Union overEasternEurope,iirc1udingboth Hurigaryand CzechosIovakia,
was ended.The Berlin Wall feII,not Ieastbecauseof the access Hungary
providedto East Gerinarrstravellingto tlreWest. These eventsIedto the
termination of the Warsaw Pact and of COMECON,the withdrawal of
Soviet troops, tlie fIrst free eIections iany country in the regio~rsince
1948,draçticchanges iritheeconorniesof the region,tlieendof the CoId
War, etc.TIreçe the SIovak Mernorial describes as "interna1 politicaI
cIianges"P4
5.47. Hungary has Irever suggested tlrat these political clranges were
suficisnt by rhemseives to constitute a fundamental change of
circu~ristancesin relatiori to the 1977 Treaty, althougfr tlrey were an
essential partof the overaIIsituatioii.In its Declarafionof May 1992and
39
IarleiiratinSraiusofSouIli-WestAfrictr, Advisory Opinion, Rcporfs 1950,
p 128.
4u See ICJ Reports 1950 p 128 at p 132{"an in1ernationaI inslitutwith an
intemationalobjec- a sx~d trust of civilizatiSee)aIsoibidntpp 132, 133,
136wherethe kague's roIeis malyseaçthatof asupervisoror*, Rotan equal
IreatyprirtnSirniI Lard McNair stafedtha"thenew régime... ha morethan
purely wnIractua1 bais, and the 1erriloriessubjtotit areimpressed with a
speciaIIegasralus,designed ruIas.":SeparateOpinionby Sir Arnold McNair,
ibidaip 154.
Cf SM, para7.22rthe doctrineof approximateapplicationis mt Iimtotreaties
esrabIisIringa regimekm").Seebelow, paregraph5s.91-6.92,6.95.
42 SM, para8.71.
43 See HM,paras 10.59,10.7'2-10.77.
44 SM, para8.78. SECTIONC: CONSEQUENCES OF TERMINATION
5.49. T11econsequencesof terminationof the 1977Treaty are outIiired
i~iChapter II of the HungarianMe~noriaI.~' TIieprimaryand i~nrnediate
corrsequence was to terminate the nccessaryautlrorisatio~rto tfie parties
to carry out activities involving the waters of the slrared borrndary
river.52 LegaIIy that arrtlrorisationdit! not extend to VariantC, which
was cwrtrary to tlie 1977 Treaty. But the yroblem was tliat
CzechosIovakiaconçistentIypresentedVariantCas if if was the Origi~iaI
Project. The terminatio~rof tfie Treaty put an end to any residuaI
credibilitythatargunrenrnrayhavehad.
5-50. As pointcd out in CIrapter II, fie ternrinationof the Treaty did
nut putan e~rdtoproperlyrightscreatedprior to May 1992in accordance
with its ter~ns,or to tlieIegitimate financial daims of the parties irr
relation tu the situation as it theri exi~ted.~~Hungary was aIways
prepared to discuçs thesc, and everr to subnrit tlrernto internatio~ia!
adjudication. But of course tIrere couId be - and were - no propeq
rights irrthe waters of tlie Danube as srich. The 1977 Treaty does not
purport to coriferany veçted right to divert a riveraway from a shared
boundary. Any nuthorisatiori in reIation to the boundary waters (which
anyway had no application to Variant C) disappeared wfien Hungary's
consentto the 1977 Treaty was ~ithdrawn.5~
5.51. The SIovak Mernorial does not discuss the corrsequerrcesof
terrninatio~iof the 1977 Treaîy. It is accordingly not neceçsary to do
InoretfrarrrecaIIthese issuesI~ere.
52 Thataurhorisarionwasnecessiirybo~hungerreraIinternatiIawand ünderthe
1976BoundaryWatersConvention.SeebeIow,paragraphs 6.42-6.41andfor the
1975Convenlion zeealsHM, paras7.04-7.43.
54
See aIso beIow.paragra7.13-7.15fortheimpactofihe principleof pernrantnt
savereignovlr naturd resources. CHAPTER6
THE ILLEGALITYOFVARIANTC
6.01. This Chapter resporidsprincipallto Chapter 7 of the SIovak
Me~noriaI, which is devoted to dernonstrating tIre "IawfuIness of
VariantC".
6.02. The Mungarianargument wiII consider tlrewrongful acts of
SIovakia-first under generaI internationa1Iaw (SectiA, paragraphç
6.03-6-61], thcn under the applicable treaties (Section B, paragrapl~ç
6.62-6-77>and irr particular under the 1977Treaty itself (SectiC,
paragraphs 5.78-6.118).It is true that the Treaty had aIready been
1awfuIIyterminateclbyHungary in October 1992,when VariantC began
operation. But if was sti1I in force at tlre tirne when the operation of
VariantC Iradbeerrdecided on arrdundertaken,in cIear violation of its
provisions, The Chapter concIudes by demoristrating that, even if
VariantC was IawfirIin its inceptio~i,the way it has been operated is
unIawfuI(Section D,paragraphs6.119-6.138).
SECTION A: THE ILLEGALITYOF VARIANT C UNDER
GENERAI, INTERNATIONALLAW
6.03. Chapter 7 of the Hurigarian Mernorial established that tire
diversionof the Danube was,and as a continnirigact remains,unIawf~11
under generaI internatiorial Iaw.' Tt is not necessato repeat tiris
de~norrstratiuhere, but a nurnberof specif~nattersdealt with in the
SIovak mernoria1do requirattention:
1 the reIatiobetweencustomaryinternationalIaw and treaty ithe
presentcase((setbeIow,paragaplis 604-6.17);
(2) the identification and appIicationof the relevant ruies of
customaryinternationa1law(seebelow,paragraphs6.18-6.4Il;
(3) S10vakia7sargumentthat VariantC is 1awfrrapartfrorn the 1977
Treaty(seebelow, paragaplis 6.42-0.61).
8eeHM, para7.44-723. (1f RESPECTIVERULEOFTREATYLAWANDCUSTOMARY
PITERNATIONAL LAW
6.04. The Siovak argument on this point is suggested rather tfian
deveIoped, and this is symptomatic of Slovakia's approach to general
internationalIaw in this case. In paragraph 7.72, Slovakia begins by
saying that "Variant 'C' iç tu be understood in drewntext of treaty
arrangemerrtsentcred into in 1977 and which remain in existence tu this
day".It immediately adds that: "In painting to principles arising ur~der
the developing customary i1iternationa1Iaw, Hungary seeks to divert
attention froni the appIicabIe regirne of law: pack sunt servanda".
Accurding to SIovakia, customary internationa1 Iaw has IittIe or no
reIevanceIiere- with tlresingle and soIitaryexceptiorrof the ruIepacra
sunrsemanda,which it presentsnotas aruIebut as a ''regi~n~".
5.05. Hungaryçubrnits,first,thb ir Irasalwaysgive~rfull consideration
to the varioustreatyobIigationsbearing on the twoParties to the prese~it
dispute;second, that the SIovakviewof the relatiorrshipexistirigbetween
treaty Iawand customaryIawis inaccurate.
6.06. The Hungarian Me~norialdernonstrateclthat the diversion was
iIIega1undera nurnberof appIicabletreaties, incIrrdingbut not Iimitedto
the 1977 Treaîy it~eIf.~Theoperation of VariantC is primariIy to be
considered as a violatioriof Czechoslovakia'streaty obligations, which
in turn are manifestationsofthe obligation toCO-operate3and to protect
thcen~ironnrerrt.~
5.07. Neverttieless,this very"applicable regirneof law" entaiIs,on the
same footirig,the applicable ruIesof crrstornaryinternarional Iaw,a fact
SIovakiaevidently fi~~du sncomfortabIe,since its Memuria1devotes only
one brief passageto the point,affirmingby way of dernonstrationtl~at"in
any event,Variant 'C' aIso conformçwith generaI internationa1Iaw". It
adds ~rofurtherargu~rreritsnsupportof thisassertion?
6.08. Itmust be çtressedthat, as sliowninlei. diaby ArticIe 38 of the
Statute of the Court, the application of rfie pertinent treatieç tu an
interstate dispute does not excIude the concurre~it appIication of
cuçtornaryIawrulesbindingon bothparties.
SeeHM, pms 7.04-7.43.
HM, para7-06-7.15.
HM, para7s.17-7.43.
SM, par7.73.6.04. Itis a well estabrished and fundamenti1 rule thattlrere is nu
hierarcliicalrelafiorishipbeiweentreaties and custornaryrules in public
interirationalIaw. But quite apartfrom this, in sirnpIeterms of treaty
interpretationarticIe 31(3)(c)of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties Iays dow~r fIre classical ruie according to which, in the
interpretatiunof a treaty,"there shallbe takenintoaccount,togetfierwith
tftecuntext...any relevant rules of international Iaw appIicabIe in tire
relationsbetweerifIreparties".
6.10. Among die "relevant rules of internation31Iaw", orle must
co~~çider,evidently, the relevant customary iriternatio~ialrules. Three
consequencesfoIIow .
5.1 1. The firçt is that a treaty cannot be isolateclfrom €fiegeneral
interrrationa1law prevailingat flretime of itçconclusion. As stated by
ManleyHudson:
"Any international instrumentsmust be inferpreted in the Iighf
of tfieprevaiIir~internationalIaw,by which the parties~nuçtbe
taken toIravechariedtlieircuur~e."~
5.12. The second implicationwas stresçedbythe International Cour tf
Justice indieNamibiaCme,where itsaidthat:
"an internatiorialinstrumeritIras to be interpreted and appIied
witIrinthe frarrreworkof tlieentire IegaIçyçtemprevailirrat the
time ofthe interpretati~n."~
This is importantto the presentcase,since sumebasiccusturnaryruIesof
internationallaw such as tfteprinciplsofeqrritableuse of transboundary
naturd resourcesand the gerreralobIigations toco-operatc and to avoid
transboundarypoIIrition were alreadyin force attliethe of theconclusion
of the 1977Treaiy,and are reIevantinthe interpreiationof ifsprovisions.
5.13. The tlrird irnpIicationis that the interpretationof a treatyduring
the period of its implementatiori,in paiticular ifthat is a Iengthyperiod,
MO Hudson,The Permairenr Court ofIn&rnotionalJuiice, 19201942 19431,
p 555(para573).See alsriJridgc YerzijI,Presidcnt of the FrenchMixedcan
Commission,whosratecifhatthe genemIrulesof interpr-tion of Ireaties i~rcIudcd
rhe folIowing:"Toute convention infernationaleEireréputées'en dftrer
tacitementau droit internaticommun, pour rouleslesques~ionsqu'ellene
resoutpaselle-m&meen remesexpresetd'unefqun ciifferente".Georges Pinson
(France)vUniied-MexicaSlaies(1928)5UNRIAA 327at p422{par5a0).
'
Legd Co~~equence forS?aiesoffhe ConrinuzdPr~sence of SoufhAfrjcu in
hramibia(Sa~iWestA&) A'ofwiilr~fanSecurie CorrncilResoiulioii275,ICJ
Reports1971p 6atp3 1(para53).must take .irito consideration tlre evoTrrtionof tire pertinent ruIes of
general irrternational law taking place duri~igthe Iife of the rreaty.
Professor Mr~stafa Ka~rriIYaçseen,a former mernber of the ILC at the
tinre it codifiesithLaw of Treaties, declared whiIeco~nrneritingorrthe
scopeand bearingof articIe3 1(3)fc)of tireVie~rrConvention:
"Mêmeécriteç, les règles de droit ne sont pas à I'abri de
I'évoIutionsubséqueritede I'ordre juridique dont elles font
partie. IIestdo~rcaiséde presrinrerque les parties àces traités
ne s'opposent pas à ce quc ces traits ou certaines de leurs
dispositiorissoient i~rterpréts Ia Iumiire du droit i1itemationa1
en vigueur à I'époquedecette,interprétation."s
6.14. Suc11a skiternent is particrrIarIypertinenirithe çontext of the
protection of tlieenvironment, the rules for whic1-Ihave developed
1rrarkedIysince tlie 1970s. This is iIInstrated, for example, by tlre
development of the general obligation of preve~ition, whiclr has
progreçsivelygive~iriçe tothe precautionaiyprincipIe.'
6.15. Tliis positiorris colifimed and reiriforcedby the fact that in the
present case the Court is specificaIIyrequested, urrder Article2 of the
SpeciaI Agreement, to decide on tlre baçis of ruIes and principles of
general intemationa1 Iaw as weIIas or1the basisof the 1977 Treaty and
suchotlrertreatiesas the Court mayfi~idappIicabIe.
6.16. Furthemore, there içno contradiction betweerrthe 1977 Treaîy
and genera! inter1iationa1Iaw. Hr~ngaryhas alreadydemoristrated in its
Mernorialthat the Treaiy itseIfaIIowedfor the appIicationof custo~nary
ruks and pr-incipIesin particular in its ariicIeç 15 and 19.1° The
obligations of the Parties witfi regard tu tlre protection of tlre
environment werecontinuous: they had to be wmpiied with durirrgthe
wholeIifetirne ofthe BarrageSystcm.
5.17. This impIiestliat neurrules which have appeared si~icethe entry
in70force of the 1977 Treaty, makingmore precisethe sleme~itsof due
diligence necessaryfor the protectioriof the environment, ~nustalsu be
taken into accountin everyissuecuncerningthe operation of the Project.
And this iç perfectly in conformiQ with ArîicIe 2 of the SptciaI
Agreement.
MK Yasseen,"L'inrerprétatda Iraitésd'aprlaconventionde Viennesurle
droitdes trai(19761I 1II)Remeiidescours1atp 57.SeegeneraIIibid npp
62-68.
SeeHM, paras6.56-6.69.
lu SecHM, paras6I3-6.26,7.04-7.43. (2)IIltENTFICATTUN AM3 APPLICATION OF THE RELEVANTRULES OF
>. INTERNATIONAL LAW
{a)fdentijicc~fioofthereiev~ cz~.~fomam ~ies
5.18. In the present case, the appIicab1ecustomary intemationa1law
invoIveç,inparticular:
*
therule of preventionof transboundarydarnage;lI
+ the generalobligation toco-operate witIithe dher watercourse
states, aIduty which irnpliesin particuIartheobligation of prior
notificationandconsultation;'3
*
the obligation1101to cause damage to the environment beyond
o~is'sborder;14and
* respect for the principle of non-discrimination,I3which togetfrer
with the priricipleof preventionof transbûrrndarydarnagerequires
the establishmentofa reliableimpactâsseççrnent.15
6.19. The saIience and specific applicabilityof these rules were
dernonstratedin the Hrrngarian~ernurial. Theyhavebeenreaffimred as
the applicable rules iirrtlie relations beiween the Parties by tfie
Conventiorion Co-operation for the Protection and SustainableUse of
the DanubeRiver,Sofia,29dune 1994.17
6.20. It shouId benotedthat a close relationshipexistsbetweeach of
these nilesand arrother, wirichis at the core of the Iaw of non-
navigational uses of internatiorralwatercourses: the principle of the
reasoriableand equitab1e use of transboundary naturaI reçources, of
which an i~rternationalwatercourse such as the Danube provides an
archetype.18
I' 1-IMpar%6.55-6.69.
IZ HM, pras 6.10-6.81.
I3 HM, para7.57-7.55.
I4 HM,paras 7.45-7.56.
I HM, puas 7.69-7.82.
l6 HM, par7.59.
l7 Secabove,paragmphs.28-4.34.
I8 SeeHM, para7.59-7.82.6.21. Slovakia suggests that this principle constitutes only a "soft"
nom, and relies on the argument that the Hungarian 1992 Declardion
referredto varioils"soW instruments withregard to it.I9
6.22. No doubt the principle of equitabIe useof rransborrndarynatural
resources has been ftrrtherdevelopedduring the Iast two decades.But
this principle has for a Io~igtirne belonged tu generaI customary
international law as a "hard Iaw" gririciple. This was cIearIy
dernonstrated in198 1,iritheThird Repor of rhethen Speciai Rapporteur
to tliInternationalLawCommissionun the LawoftheNon-navigational
Uses of International Watercourses. He showed convincingly that the
principleis deeplyrooted in someof the mostessentialrules atthe basis
of the international legal order, suchas, in particular, the fundamental
principleofthe equalityofrightsof sovereignstate~.~O
6.23. As early as 1929,the Permanent Court of International Justicein
the Case concerningthe TerritorJ iuaisdiction ofthe International
Cornmission oftheRiverOderdeclared that:
"This cornrnrinityof i~iterestin a navigabr Ieer becomes the
basis of a cornmon IegaIriglit,the esse~rtialfeattrres ofwhich
are the perfect eqnaIity of al1riparian States in theuse of the
whole courseof the river and the exclusionof anypreferential
priviIegeof anyone riparianState irrelation fothe th ers."^^
6.24. As statedby the SpeciaIRapporteur,the manyagreements which,
explicitiyor impiicitly,put the notionof "equitable sharing" in concrete
form are illustrations of the strength of the principle in general
international This view is sharedby most authors and scientific
associationswhichhaveconsideredthe issuen23
SeeSM, para7.74.
20 S Schwebel, Third Report m thc Non-navigatianal Usesof TnternationaI
Watercaurses, DocNCN.41348IiDecember198 1,pm 41.
I Terrii~riJtrrisdicioflhe Inierncrliol oinn~idati theRiverOdw, PCIJ
SerA No 23(1929)atp27.
SchwebeI,ThirdReport,pa41
23
SeeHM,paras 7.69-7.82Amongthe aulliors affirmingrhecustocharacier of
the principle of cquituscof internatio~raIwarercourseein particuIar J
Lipper,"EquirabUtilizat inAn",arretson,Hayton& C Olmstead(eds),The
Law of IniernationalDrainageBasins(DobbçFerry,Oceana, 1967)espatpp
44-47 ; Johnson,"The ColumbiBasin",ibid, p168-70,203-207, 234-240J
BarberisLos recursos naturaiescornpartidoentre eslados y el derecho
internacion(Madrid,1979)pp 16-23;G Handl"The Principleof EquitableUse
and Transfrontier Pollutinn7ransfrontierPollutiand theRole of Smes
(OECD, Paris, 1981) pp 48-126; J Lammers, Pollrrfion of International5.25. No snbsequent ILC SpeciaI Rapporteur on this fopic chalIenged
the bearing and stattrs in ctrstomaryIaw of the principIe ofeqnitable
use.24 At thefina1stage ofdeveIopment ofthe DrafiArtides, theSpecial
Rapporteur,Mr RoberfRosenstockrecomniendedno change to Article 5
as adoptedonfirstreadingby tlieILCat its forty-thirdsession(1991).2"
6.26. In fact Article 5 was left unchanged in the final version of the
DraftArticles adoptedonthe secondreadingin 1994. Itreadsas follows:
"Article5
Equitableand reasonableutilizationandparticipation
1. Watercourse States shall in their respective territories
utilize an intemariona1 watercorrrse in an equiiabIc and
reasonable manner. In particnIar, an international watercourse
shalibe used and developed by wafercourseStafes with a view
toaitaining optimal tilizationthereof alid benefits tlierefrom
consistent withadeqtrateprotecfionof thewatercourse.
2. WatercourseStates shaII participate inthe use,developrnenr
and protection of an international watercorrrçein ari equitable
and reasonable manner. Such participation includesboth the
right toutilize thwatercourseand the duty to cooperate in the
protection and development thereof,as provided in the present
articles."26
6.27. The Commentaryto Article 5 Statesthat the principleis "one of
the mostbasic" inthe field,andthat it is "welle~tablished".~I~ tgoes on
to statethat:
"..there is overwhelming supporf tor tlre doctrirre of eqnirabIe
utilizatioas a general rideof Iaw forthe deternrinatio~of the
riglrts arobligations ofStatesin rhis fieId.
Watercourses(Martinus Nijhoff Publish1984)p580; J Bruhies, ThLnw of
Non-navigatio Wnaercourse{MartinusNijhoff Publishe1993 )p 155-185,
espatp 157.
24 See J Evensen,PirstReport,Doc A/CN.41367,19 April 1983paras80-86S ;
McCaRrey ,econdReport,DocAICN.413 99M,arch1986,para92ff.
25 SeeR RosenstockF,irstReport,Doc AICN.41451,April1993para22.
26
Report ofthe IniernationalLaw Commission ihe Workofifs46thSession, 2
May-22JI& 1894 (UN Duc A149110 )tp218. See also Art 6, which sets out
factors reIevmrta equitablrmonabIe uiiIizat withoutquaIifjringrbasic
obIigationinArt5: ibid,1.23
l7
Ibid,p 18. The basic principIes rinderlying the doctrine of eqrrirabIe
ufilisatio~iare reflected,explicIy or irripIicitIy,in nnmerous
international agreements between States i~ral1 parfs of the
world.. [Tlheiruni Fyingrheme istlie recognitionof righrsof the
parties to theuse and beriefrtsof theinternational watercourse
or watercourses in question that are equal in principle and
correlativeintheirapplicati~n."~~
6.28. Bearing in mind the ruleof interpretationof treatiesrecalled in
paragraph 6.11 above,the 1977Treatymustinthe firstplacebeinterpreted
inthe lightofthe inmational law prevailingat tIithe of ifsconclusion,
inclrrding the general principle of equitabIe use of international
watercourses,whichalreadybelonged rogeneraliritematianalIaw.This is
rrueafor~io ifwe considerthe rreatyin reIatiorto generaIinternational
law prevailingat tfietimeof irs inrerpretatiunand takinginto accountits
evolutiorsince thehaty was c0nciuded.~9
(21ViolationbySlovakiaoftheequitubleuse principle and ofthe
obligation not tocauseappreciab haermtuanotherwatercourse
state
5.24. As rroted in the Hungarian Mernorial,SIovakiahas violated a
number of reiated principles whicli are an estabrished pdut of
internationalIaw.30
6.30. There are several ways in which Slovakia has violated the
principle of equitable use ofshared nafural resources through the
operation ofVariantC.
6.31. Inparticular it has done so through its acquisition, through
unilateral.and unauthorised action, of exclusive control over ths
production of electrici nayigation and water discharge in a vitaI
cornmonreachof theDanube. Slovakiahas pIaced itçelfin the position
of exercising manifold pressure on itsdownçtream neighborir. This
creates a siîuation incompatible wifh the inherent "perfecr equality of
rights" characterisingthe communityof interest which is at the core of
the principleof equitableusen31 That positionmust be tnie afortiofr or
a boundaryriver, suchas the Danubeis inthe relevant sector.
28 Ibid, pp222-223{refereomitted).
AsexpressedbytheCouriintfieiYmnibOpinion:seeabove,paragrah.12.
30 SeeHM,para 7.44-7.87.
j1 Seeabove,paragaph6.23.6.32. With respect to tlre amount of water dischargeinto the main
Danube and its side-arrnswhich is of vital importanceforthe entire
Szigetkozregion,the HungarianMernorial stressedthedramaticdecrease
in the quantityof water received on Hungarian territory since October
1992.32 Sincethen, due in particularto the refusa1by SIovakia to accept
the compromisepresentedbythe expertsof the EuropeanCommissionto
establisha temparary water management regirneor othenvise to comply
with Article4 of the SpeciaI Agreement, the situation has becorne even-
worse.This has beendocunlentedinChapter3?3
6-33. If musf be stressedtfiatfieadverseconseqrrencesresuIting from
the operationof VariaritC arediffere ontboth sides of the river. Othe
Slovakside mainlylong-tem detrimenta1 effects to the environmentwiIl
occur. By contrast, Hungary has suffered severe environmental changes
immediatelyafter the diversion.34
5.34. In addition, the unilateral diversion of the Danube by
Czechoslovakia and subsequent deveIopmenr by SIovakia has created a
situationthatcunstihrtestIrearchevpeof a vioIatio~ioftfiobligcrriorror
<O cause appeciable or significanihnm to nmiher watercourse store.
This is one of the most esseritia1customaryrulesof tlre Iawof rerritoi-iaI
sovereigny,and isdeeplyrooted in international practiw.
6.35. Ttis set out, for example, in Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm
Conference's Declaration on the Human Environment and in Principle 2
of the 1992 Rio Declaration: these statements seek to incorporate the
undisputed principle "sic utere tuo ut afienum non Iaedas", othenvise
known as the principle of"harmIessuse ofterritory". The principleis
iIIustratedirr w lia,byt11eTrai Srinelm Case, trieCorfuChuanel Case
and the LacLanoux Case.35
6.36. This obligationhas a150been inclndedinfheDraft Articles of the
InternationaILawCommissionontheLaw of theNon-NavigableUses of
InternationalWatercoursesA , rticle 7 of which readsas follows:
" 1. WatercourseStatesshall exerciseduediligenceto utilise an
international watercourse in sucha way as not to cause
significantharmto other watercourseStates.
32 SeeHM, paras7.71-7.72.
33 Seeabove,paragraph3.106-3.110.
34 SecScienl$cEvaluntion,HC-M,vo2, chap4 & S. ,
35 SecHM,paras7.46,7.47,7.48respectively. . ' 2. W here, despite the exercise of due diligence, signifimnt
ham is caused tu anothérwatercourse State, theState whose
use causes the harm shall, in the absence of agreement to strch
use,consuItwith theState sufferingçoch harmover:
(a) tIie extent to which such use is equitableand reasonable
takingintoaccountthe factors listedin Article6;
(b) the question of ad hoc adjustments to its utilization,
designed to eliminate or mitigate any suchharm caused and,
whereappropriate,the questionof~ornpensation."~~
6.37. Article 7 differs from ifs eqtrivalentiri tfie ILC Draft ArticIes
adopfedorifirçtreding in 199 137 ina nu~nber of respects.
6.38. Firsf,the obIigationisnow oneof "duediligence"; a wafercourse
state does riofgrrarante hat another statewilInot susr harm as a result
of activitieson itsterritory.TheCommission explainedthischange in the
followingterms:
"The obligation of due diligence contained in article 7 sets the
thresholdfor lawfulStateactivity. It is not intended to guarantee
that in utilizing arr international watercourse significantharm
wonld riotoccur. It isan obligationof conduct, notan obligation
of result. Whaftfieobligation ent~iIs içtl~ata w;iterconrseState
whose use causes signifrcant harm cari be deerned ta have
breadred its obligation ro exercisc due diIigence so as not ta
: cause significant hm oniy when it has intentionally or
negligently caused the event which had to be prevented or has
intentionallyor negligently not prevented others in its territory
from causing that eventorhas abstainedfromabatingit."38
6.39. Secondly, Article 7 as now fomulated only applies to "signifi-
cant" as distinct from "appreciable" ham. TIie terIn "appreciable" was
seen to beequivoca1; it conld referto rneasurableham, in the sense of
harmthat could bedefecredby rneasrire~rients a,ItIroughtrivial in nature,
or ro ham wliicli.reacheda certain threshold of seri~usness.~~Crrrio~~sIy
36 Reportofthe InternationLaw Commission on theWork oJ irs46th Session,
2 May-22Jui) 1994(UN DocA/49/10} ap236.
37
Report ofthe InternationLaw Commission on the Workof its43rd Session,
29April- 1July1991 (UNDot Ai4M10 )tp164.
'' Rep~rfofthe Infernariono! Lfiw CoiffniioniI~IWork of ils 46th Sessio?~,
2 !May-2Jub 1994 (UN DusA1491 10)atp237.
j9 The rerm "app~-xiabIwas rcrainedirthc SpeciaI Rapporreur'sSeconReport
(AICN.4/462,21ApriI1994,a!p II)but wa alteredinthe DraftingCommitreefurthere is nodefinifian of"significant" inthe Camrnentary toArticle 7.But
the term is explained in this sense inthe Commentary to Article3, which
requires that watercourse agreements should not "adversely affect, to a
significantextent,the use by one or more other watercourseStatesof the
waters of the watercourse".TheCommentaryreadsas follows:
"...the terrn 'significant' is not used in the sense of 'sub-
stanrial'What are to ba avoided are Iocalizedagreements, or
agreements concerning a particuIarprojecl, programme or use,
which have a sig~ifiicantadverse effect ttpon thirdwatercottrse
States. WhiIe such an effecr must be capable of being
established by objectiveevidenceand nof be triviaIin nature, it
need notriseto tlielevel of beingsubstantial."40
6.40. Itisunnecessaryforthe purposesof the presentcase to determine
whether the changesmadeto Article7 by the ILC in 1994correspond or
not to the position under general international law.The reason is simple:
in the present case, there is no dorrbt (a) that Slovakia
"intentionally...causecithe eve~itwhich had tobe prevented", (b) that ir
has - in particrrlatIirougIiits studiefailure tuagree on an interirn warer
managementregirneas requiredby Afiicle 4 of the SpeciaIAgreernenr -
"abstained fromabating" the Iianriit hascaused,arid (cltlrat,as shown in
Chapter 3 and in furtherdetail in the Scie~ff~@cEvaIuntiorr to this
Counter-Memorial,the harm caused is~ignificant.~'
6.41. Moreover the possibility - contemplatedby Article 7 in its final
formulation- that significantharm mightbe caused to another State in
no sense absolv th eresponsible State from its obligationnot to use a
watercoiirseinan inequitableor unreasonabte way, as retlected in Article
5 of the Drafi ArticIeç. TIrat obligation js, in the ILC's words,
"fundamenraI", "basic"and"well-esiabli~hed".~=For the reasons given,
itwas cIearIyviaIated inthe present case.
thereasonexplainedinthe lext, "and no1asmeansof raising the threshoof"
hm: seeAlCN.41SR.23536, July1994 at p27(Mr Bowett, Chaiman of rhe
DrafiingCammitree).
40
Ibidatp 212.Forthetc~tof ArticIeseep206.
41 See above,paragraph3.15et seq. See beloScierrtiEvaiüaiiun,HC-M, vol 2,
chaps2,3,4 & S.
42 Reportofthe InternationalLaw Commission on the Workof ifs46th Session,
2May-22 July 1994(UN DocA14911 0tp218.And see above,paragraph6.27. (3) SLQVAKIA'S ARGUMENT THAT VA RIANT C WASLAwa APART
FROM THE 1977 TREATY
{a) TheargumenfofrheSlovakMemurid
6.42. The SlovakMern~rial~~ seeksto arguethat VariantC was and is
lawful under customary international law - while at the same time
disputingthe relevanceof any ruleof customaryinternationallaw otlier
thanthe normpactasuntservand~.~~
6.43. The questionhere is not whether there is a "peremptory ruIe
prohibiringthe diversionof tioundaryri~ers".~No doubt HirngarycouId
haveconsented to thediversionofthe Danube rhrough the construction
and operationofVariant C,but it is cIear thatdid riotso consent,and
as wiII beçhow11 Iater in fhis Chapter, t1977 Treatydid not involve
any consent to uniIatera1diversion. Quite apartfrornthe factthat the
Treaty was Iegally terminatedat the time of the diversion, Hungarian
consenthad been givenin theframework oftheorganisedjoint operation
and controlof a barrage system,andnot of the unilateral implementation
of a partialanddifferentsy~tern.~~
6.44. The section of the SlovakMernorial çpecifically devotecifothe
conformity of VariarrtCwith ciistomaryinternationa11aw,4?after casting
doubt on the"no-Iianri" principle athe grorrndotfiat it is "evdving" or
"soft Iaw",does Iiitlebutrefer back tothe 1977~reaty.~~ Despite the
vague and undocurnentd assertion thatVariantC is"well within the
accepted baundç of State practice",49the passageis IittIemore than a
repetition of the "approximate application"argument under another
guise. It fails to address the questofnwhether Variant C would have
been lawfulapartfromthe 1977Treaty,which isthe initial hypothesison
whichthe passageis ostensiblyba~ed.~O
SM,paras7.43-7.47,7.72-7.85.
SM,para1.72andcfabove, paragraph5.04.
SeeSM,para7.43.
Set: beiow, paragr6.82-6.104for rhe SIovak Mernorial's novei atoempt
justifyVariantCasa"approximatapplicatiof th1977Treaty.
SM,paras7.72-7.86.
SM,paras7.77,7,83,7.84, 77.86.
SM,para7.81.
SM, paa7.73("ln anyevenfi.e., apm frthe 1977Treaty], Vari'C'aIsa
conformswithgeneralinternatIaw"). At the same timetheSIovakMernoriac 1ontends thatHungaryhas
6.45.
sufferedno significant hm as a resulr of VariantC, asserti~rgfor
examplethatHungary "hasnot ..lostthe useof 40 km of its water~".~'
As the photographs of the reIevantstretchesof the Danubeshow,there
has beensucha loss (SeePlate8). Itis associatedwiththeloss of several
harbours in the affected stretch,and by damageand loss which were
identified in the HungarianMernorialand are furtherdiscussed in
Chapfer 3 of this Catrnter-~ernoria!? To assert that the loss of80per
ce~itarrd more of the flow of a river- quite apartfrom the threat to
groundwater and to the environment- is not "significarrtIram" is
rernarkabIe. Tt recaIIsthe çtatementof the EC Commissioners, in
response toa simiIarSIovakdaim:
"Itmaybethattheevaluationscalefor environmentalimpactsin
the Slovak Republicis quite different,butevery expert in the
restof Europewill regardit as a significantecological damage
if the averagedischargeof a river isreduced to about20%as
compared to naturalconditions,if 4500 haof alluvialforestsare
seized (see the Fauna-Flora-Habita Dtirectiveof the CEC), if
thereis a redtrctionof tlieriatufluctuationsoftlregronndarid
surface waterIeveIsnearIy tozeroandso on."53
6.46. Thus it is beside the point to specnIate whether a harmIess
uniIateraldiversionmightbe permittedunder generaI internationalIaw.
The point is thatthe unilateraldiversionoperatedunderVariantC was
farfromharmless.
(b)TheLacLanouxCase
6.47. Inrhis contextthe SIovakMernorialrnakesseveraI rkferences to
tireLac tanom case inorder tujrrstu ifdyergeneraIinternationa1lawifs
diversionof waterby tlreoperation oVariant C. According tu BIovakia,
thearbitralaward establishestherulethat:
"Solong as thewatersarereturned,even substantia1changes in
riverflowrequirenoconsentof theotherriparian".
52 SeeHM,Chapter5,SectionC;above,paragraps.24-3.35.
53 ProfessJSrhreiner, HcEC,hperrs GroupLcner tMrP Benrtvide,irecror.
Exiemnl PoIilicRelationsEuropean Commission, IO Februa1994; HM,
~nnexes, vo4, anne139.6-48. A carefuI reading of the arbitra1awards4 contradicts the SIovak
clainr. Lake Lanoux is entireIy situateclon Frerichterritory and receives
its waters fromsourcesand riversin France. Itso~rly orrt1eis thestrearn
Font-Vive whicli içone ofthe originsof the riverCarai, which flows for
25 hr on Frerrchterritory before reacfringSpai~iarid flows on Sparrisl~
territory for 6 km before joining rhe Spanislr river Skgre. Ar no stage
does itconçtitutetireboundarybetweentlre two States.Spainand Frarrce
signed at Bayonneon 26 May 1865 a Treaiy arrdan Acte Additionnel in
order to determinetfieboundaryand the regirneof the boundary waters.
The Acte Additionne1recognisesthe rightof eachState to usesuchwaters
(Article9), but tlreotherSiaie must be informeclof anyprojector works
which couId~harrgethe regi~neor the volumeof watercoursesto be used
by fIiotherSm, andhastherighttu beconsulted(Article 11J55
6.43. In 1950,the FrenchestablishmcrrtEIectricitéde France institut4
a projeci to diverithe watersof Lake Lanouxtowardsa differerrtFrench
river,the Ariége,tu use thern firstfor a hydroelectric power pIant and
tlren to take downstrearn an equivalent quantiv of waters from the
Ariège which wouId be restored to the Caro1 by a tunnel under the
niountains. Tlie Spariisharrthorities received tlie assurance tIiat the
project wouId nat change in arry way the water regirne on Spanish
territory, since a quantify of water strictIy qua1 to tlrat diverted from
LakeLanoux wouId be restared to tfieriver Carol, before it readred
Spain.56Moreover, tfiere was to be rrodifference in the quaIify of the
water returnedascornparedwithtIiatdiveried.
6.50. There is a huge differencebeiween the Lac Lanoux case and the
presentone.One of tlrebasiceIernerrtsinthe Lac Larroux case waç that an
equa1 quanti^and quali~ of water wuuId be restoredto tIie River Caro1
before it reachedSpariishterritory.Here,the buIkof the Danube'swater is
divertedbefore itreacheç Hurigarianterritory and is restored onIy 40
kiIornetresdownçtream,drying out a Iarge Hungarian area ontlre right
bank. WhiIe int1reLac Lanouxcase ircouIdbe arguedthat the obligation
to obtain prior agreementcouId not restrict fie territorialcornpetenceof
Francecoricerningmatferswhich took placeentirely on its territory, Irere
tlrediversionof thewaterdimirrishesconsiderablythequantityof the water
oftheDanubeonH~rgarianterritory,therebyviolatingitssovereignty.
6.51. There are otherdiffererrces.The Arbitra! Tribunal stated that its
decision sIiouIdbe basedon the 1856 Treaiy arid itçActe Additionnel,
34 (1957)12UNRIAA 285.
s5 (1957)12UNRIAA 285,atp289.
5b Ibida?p282.but it wouId aIço take into account the rules ofge1rera1inteniational
Ia~.5~ However, itco~~sideredtlratbyits rna~rdateit had to rernairrin tlre
franieworkdetemined by the hw parties. These corrsiderationsexplairi
the foIIowingparagrapl~s,whichare essential for the presentcase:
"...[G]râce a Ia restitution opérée selon le niécanisnredécrit
pIus haut, aucun usager garanti ne sera Iésédans sa
juuissance... l; voIurne à I'étiagedes eaux disponibles du
Carol, au passage de Ia frontière,ne subira, à aucun rnome~it,
urrediminution. ..
Onaurait pu attaquercetteconcIusiorrdepIuçieurçmanières.
011 aurait pu soutenirque les travauxauraient pour conséquence
une poIIution défirritivedes eaux du Carol, ou que les eaux
restituées auraient une cornposition chimique on une
température, ou telle autre caractéristique pouvant porter
préjrrdiceaux intérets espagnoIs. L'Espagneaurait aIors pu
prétendre qu'iI était porîi! atteints, contrairerne~rtk 1Acte
additionne1, à ses droits. Ni Ie dossier,riiles débatsde cette
affaireneportent Iatraced'unetelleaIIégation.
On aurait pu égalementfaire vaIoir que, par Ieurs caractkres
techniques, Ies ouvrages prévus par le projet français ne
pouvaient pas assurer en fait Ia restirution d'un voIurne qui
corresponde aux apports rratureIsdu Lanoux au Carol, par dé-
fectuosité soitdes i~istrurnende mesure, soit des mécanismes
de restitution. La questio~ra ite effleurée darrs le Contre-
MémoireespagnoI (p 86)- qui a souligné "I'extraordinaire
cornpIexité"des procidés de corrtroIe, leur caracrère "très
onéreux"et les "risques d'avaries ou de négIigcnce,dans le
maniernentde Iavanneet d'obstructiondans letunneIn.Mais iI
n'a jamais <té a1Ieguéque les ouvrages envisagés présentent
d'autres caractères ou entraînent d'autres risques que Ies
ouvrages du rnêrne genre qui sont aujourd'hui répandud sans le
rnunde entier. IIn'a pas et6affirmécIairementque les ouvrages
prévusentraîneraient un risque anonna1 dans Ies relatio~isde
voisinageoudans I'utiIisationdes ea~x."~S
57 Ibidatp301.
58
Ibidatp303.IntransIation(ILRp 123)thisreads:
"[Tjhanktotherestitutioneffectedbythe devicesdescribedabove,none
oftheguaranteeuserwiIIsuffeinhisenjoymenlof thewaters;atthe
IoruesruateIevcI,rheyo1u1of the surpIuswatersof the CaroI,at the
boundarywiIIano fimesuffeadiminution...
One mighthaveattackedthisconcIusioninscvdiKerc wnays. - -
I 231
6.52. The rneaningof this long quotation is that,although theparties to
the dispute did naf submit certain arguments,if they haddone so, the
Tribunal wouId have had to conçider tlremseriorrsly. AII these elamenfs
appearin thepresenrcase submitted to theConfi whîcich isbeing asked to
consider the pollution and thequant@of the water due to the diversion
aswell as the credibilityoftechnicalarguments.
6.53. It istrue that the Tribunal did notrequire prioragreement for a
project which only affects the territory of one of the States concerned.
However, having said rhat a "droit de veto" wouId be unacceptable in
this rnatter,theTribunal added:
"..IL]a pratique internationale recourt de préférence à des
çoIutionçmoins extrGrnes, eIi se boniant a obliger les Etats à
rechercherp ,ardes tractations préalables,lestermes d'un accord,
sans subordonnera laconcIusionde cet accordl'exercicede leurs
compétencesO . n a ainsi parlé,quoique souvent d'une manière
impropre,de 'l'obligationde négocierun accord'.En réalitél,es
engagements ainsi pris par les Etah prennent des foms très
diverseset ont une portéequivarie seIon la rnaniéredolitils sont
difinis et selon les procéduresdestinéesa Ieur miseen oeuvre;
mais Ia réalif6des obligations ainsi souscrites ne saurait Gtre
contestéeet peut E'e sanctionnéep , arexemple,en cas de rupture
injustifiéedes entretiens, de délaisanormaux, de méprisdes
procédures prévues, de refus systématiquesde prendre en
It couId have bexgued fhat the workswould bringabout an üItimate
poIIritionofrhe watersof theCarol or that the remrnedwaterhaveuld
a chemicaI mmpmitioti or a temperakrreor some other characteristic
whichcuuId injureSpanish interests. Srarildrhenhaveclainredthat
herrightshadbeenimpairedinviolationof theAdditionalAct.Neitherin
thedossier nor inthe pleadings incasesisthercany trace such an
allegation.
It could also havebeen claimedthat, by their technical character,the
works envisaged by the French projeccould not in effect ensurhe
restitutiofa vuIumeof ivaiercurrespondinIorhenaturaIcontribution
of fhe Lanoux to the Carol, eirher becauof deféctsin measuring
instrumentsor in merhanical devicestubeusedin making the restitution.
Thequestionivas IightIytouched upon in the Spanishruunter-Mernorial
(p 85)ruhichunderiinedthe'extraordi camaplyxiiy' of procedures for
cantrriI, ttieir 'very onwous'character,and the 'risk of damageor of
negligencein the handlingof the watergata,ndof obstnictiointhe
tunnel'But it has never beenallegedththe works envisagedpresent
anyothercharacterorwouldentailanyother risksthanotherworksof the
same kind which todayare found al1over the world. It has not been
clearlyafirmedthatthe proposed workswouldentailrnabnmat risin
neighbouriy relationsor inthe u~iIimtittrwarers." "...il fautsouligner combiensont intimementliéesl'obligation
de tenir compte,aucoursdes tractations,des intérêta sdverseset
l'obligation de faire a ceux-ci, dans la solution retenue, une
placeraisonnableU . n €ratqui a conduit des négociations, avec
compréhensionet bonne foi, selon l'article II de l'Acte
additionel,n'estpasdispenséde faire, dans la solution retenue,
une place raisonnable aux intérêtsadverses, parce que les
conversationsont été interrompuesf,it-ce par l'intransigeance
de son partenaire."G2
6.57. These principles are entirely applicable to the present case, in
both of itsstages. First, Hungary'sproposais to collect further scientific
data concerning the impact of the Project on vital aspects of its
environment before continuin the construction of the Nagyrnaros
barrage were not takenintoconsiderat ion. Later, CzechasIovakia agreed
to negotiate only while continuingto construct VariantC, and without
considerationforthe legitimateinterests of Hungary.
(c) TheDiversionofWuferfiumtheMeuse case
6.58. The SIovakMemorialalsorelieson the opinionof thePermanent
Courtinthe DiversionofWatersfromthe Meuse, arguingthat the test for
thelegality of unforeseenacts withinthe context of a watercoursetreaty
is whether the obligationsof the parties under the treaty are interfered
with and whether the achievement of the objectives of the treaty is
harmed. Accordingto the SlovakMemorial,the Court foundthat, in the
absence ofa provisionrequiringthe consent of Belgium,the Netherlands
was entitled to dispose of the waters of the Meuse at Maastricht,
providedthat the rreatyobIigationsincumbentuponit were notignored.
The Slovak Memorial concludes from this that VariantC is fully
compatiblewiththe objectivesof the 1977 Treatyregime.63
62 (957) 12UNRIAA 285 atp317.Iniranslati(24 ILRp 141)thireads:
"imustbe stresschowcloselyIinkedtogetherartheobligationtotake
inloconsidcratiointhe courseofnegotiatiadverseinterestsand the
obligationtgive areasonable plactothese interestsIhe solution
finaIIyadoptcd. A State ivhichhas conducted negotiations with
understandingnd good faithinaccordance with ArticlII of the
AdditionaAct is not relievedfrom givinga reasonableto adverse
interesin thesoIutioiadoptssimpIybecausethe conversatiohave
beeninterruptee,venthoughowingtotheintransigenceofpanner."
63 SM,paras7.82,7.83,7.96.6.59. An attentivereading of the opinion of the Permanent Court
undermines the Slovak alIegations. AIthough one ofthe main issues
raised in the case was Belgium'sdesire to obtain the Netherlands'
consent to the constructionofa new canal connecting Antwerp to the
Rhine, the Court declared that it was inno way concemed with this
question, stressithatitstaskwas-
"Iimitedta a decision on the IegaI points submittto it as to
whether or not certain works constructed by the Belgian
governrnentdo ordo not infringe the Treatyof 1863."#
6.60. The Courtaddedthat, although in the course of the proceedings
occasional reference had been made to the appIication of the general
rulesof internationallaas regardsrivcrs-
"the points submitteto itby the Partiesin the presentcase do
not entitle it to go outsithe field covered by the Treatyof
1863 .''Gs
In sirnilarvein thCour tefused toconsider an argument which "goes
beyondwhatthe textof theTreatywilIsupport".66
6.61. Thus,contrary to the allegations of Slovakia, the case related
excIusiveIyto the particulatreatyobligation in force between Befgium
and Netherlands.No generalprinciples were enunciatedor applied, and
the opinionthushas no bearingon thepresentdispute.
SECTION B: THEILLEGALITYOFVARIANT C UNDER
APPLICABLETREATIES
6.62. A number ofcomments are necessaryin responseto the sections
of the Slovak Memorial açserting the legaliîy of Variant C under
appIicabIe treaties:6t7ese remarkssupplement the treatmentof this
issuein Chapter 7 SectionBof the HungarianMemorial.
64 DiversiofWoierfrom~heMeusePCIJSerAIB No 70(937), p 16.
65
DiversionofWaferfi[heMeusePCIJ SeAIB No 70(9371 ,16.
66 Ibip,20.
67 . SeeSM, paras7.48-1.7 (1) THE 1976 CONVENTIONONTHEREGULATIONOF.WATER
MANAGEMENT ISSUESOFBOUNDARY WATERS
6.63. Slovakia recognises that the Boundary Waters Conventioii,
signedatBudapeston3 1 May 197G,6 i&an essentialinstrumentbetween
Hrrngaryand Slovaki wahich is sri11in force and governç trnarterof
water BrjthPartiesagreetliathe 19% Conventionis sil1
in force. This means tliat the twoParties hadtorespect the obligation
underArticle3(ap
"not to carry out any water management activities without
rnutnal agreement, which wouki adveriselyaffect tlre jointly
definedwatercoriditions."
5.64. Accor-ding toArticle2 of the Convention,the material scope of
"water management activities"is very large and includes in particular
activitieswhich may bringchanges in the naturalwater conditions,such
as, in particular,the reguIation of water courses, the constrnctioof
reservoirsand floodconIr01dykes,the utilisation of water resourcesand
hydroeIectric development. The Convention fmher providesthar the
partiesshall inforin eacother of theirIongferm deveIopmerrtplans of
water management,mainly concerning watermanagementactivities on
boundarywaters (Article 3(c)) and shallengage in prior negotiationon
the impactsofwater managementactivities(Article3(d)).
6.65. Inthe Hrnigaria~Mi ernoria1itwas sliownth, by not giving drre
notice roHrrngary of theconstrucrionof VariantC, and by not enrering
into corisuIfations, CzechosIovakiadid not observe these provisions,
which reflect general international lawn70Slovakia affirrnsthat such
obligations were in fact performed by the 1977 Treaty and its
implementing measures, which have tu be considered as a lex
speci~iis.~' Nothing supportsthis allegation. The obIigation to co-
operate inthe trtiIisatiofwater rewurces, to informthe other Party of
pIarrnedactivities havinariimpacton baundary waters and toengage in
prior negotiationson the impactsof water management activities, were
not performed by the mere adoption of the 1977 Treaty. They were
continuing obligationstobeperformedasoccasionrequired.
6B See HM, Annexes,vo3,annex19.
69 SM, paras6.43-6.46. It aIso recognises that water purityremains under the
regdation ofthe 19Agreement(SM,paras7.70,.40)SeealsoHM,paras6.50-
6.55,7.25-7.27analsHM paras4.33-4.35.
HM,paras7.57-7.63.
71 SM, paras7.55-7.66.6.66. In addition,Slovakiaitself recognisesthatthe 1976Convention
appliesto al1boundarywatersand not only tothe Danube.How then
cotrldthe 1977Treaty beconsidered asthe "rnutuaiagreement"foreseen
by tfiCorrventionon BoundaryWaters? Iiany case,VariarrtC was not
foreseenbythe 1977Treaty.
(2)THE1948 DANUBE CONVENTION
6.67. SIovakiainsi& on the strppoîedbe~iefitsof the BarragSystem
and especiaIIyof VariantC fornavigationonthe ~anrrbe.7Article 18of
the 1977TreatycontainspreciseobIigati011s ithregardto ~ravigrrtinn
one hand andrefersto the ConventionConcerningthe Regimeof the
Navigation on theDanube,signedatBelgradeon 18August1948,73on
the other.Itisthusnecessatytoexaminefirstthescopeandthe meaning
of ArticIe18.
6.68. SIovakiaignores inparticrrlarArtic18(4)accordingtu which:
"Theconditionsfor navigationin the old bed of the Danube
shallbespecifiedintheoperatingandoperationap l rocedures."
Thus it was agreedthat therewould benavigation in the old bedof the
Danube,tlie conditions for which were tobe defermined by the two
riparianStates.This was not done, and there is now w international
navigationin the main bed of the Danube,which has been IargeIy
deprivedofw-er.
5.69. Artide 1811) of the 1977 Treaty also provides that
Czechoçlovakia and Hungary sha1I ensure rininterruptedand safe
riavigatioron the international waterwaybothduring the co~rçtrrrction
and duringthe operation ofthe Systern of Locks, in conformi@ with
Article3 of the 1948 BelgradeConvention.The obligationirriposedby
Article3 on the Partiesistomaintaintheir sections of the Danubein a
navigable conditiona,s well as to cary out works necessaryfor the
mai~ifenanceand improvement ofnavigation, and not tu obstruct or
hinder navigationonthe navigablechanneIsof the Danube.
6.70. Essentially,theobjectiveofArticle I8 of the Treav i10ensure
uninterruptedand safe navigationon the Danubeduringwork on the
Frojectsaswell as duringthefunctioningofthé BarrageSystem,inorder
72 SM,paras4.47-4.49,6.143-6.155.
73 SeeConventioconcerningtheRegiofNavigationon theDanube,Belgrade,on
18Augusi1948,33UNTS18 1HM, vol3,annex4'. 237
to compIy with the 1948 Da~rubeConvention.In fact, VariantC is not
able to guarantee such functions, and the main bed of the Danube is no
longer available for navigation in emergencies, which can block
navigationfor weeks or evenrn0nths.7~
6.71. SIovakia argues thattfie 1977Treatyand relatedagreementswere
the means by wlrich Czechoçlovakiaand Hungary carried out their
obligationsunderthe 1948Treatyin respectto the portion of the Danube
affected by the Pr~ject.~Qut improvementof navigation is not one of
the major objectives of the 1977 Treaty,the preambleof which only
speakis n geriera1ternisof the interestof the ContractingParties-
"in the broad utiIization of the naîural resorirces of the
Bratislava-Budapestsection ofthe Danubefor the development
of water resources, energy, transport, agriculture and other
sectorsof the nationaleconomyofthe Contracting States."
6.72. SIovakiarefers tuArticIe3 of the 1948 Danube Convention to
counter the argument that Variart C contraver-resthat C~r-rvention.~~
According toArticle3:
"TheDanubian Statesundertake to maintaintheir sectionsof the
Danube in a navigabl cenditiori for river-going and, on the
appropriate sections, for sea-goingvessels, tu cany out tire
works necessary for the maintenance and irnprovement of
navigation conditions and not to obstruct or hinder navigation
onthe navigablechannelsofthe Danube.. ."77
6.73. VariantC is in clear Yiolationof this articIe.The operation of
Variant C madecommercial navigationand the transitof iriternational
shipping in the Danube between river kilometreç 1852-18 11 impossible;
it also elirninated growing small-boat touri~m,~~.nd impacted on the
rights of Hungary as a riparian state in matters such as emergency
preventionandmanagement, customs and healthregulations.
74 Seeaboveparagraphs.85-3.93.
73 SM,para6.49.
7o SM, paras7.48-7.50.Thireferencto theHungarianDeclarationof 1997 is
incorrectI.tshouldread"(5)ofPariIII", insteadof"para5(c)ofPartIII".
77 HM, Annexes,voI3,arinex4.6.74. Given the experience of the functioning of VariantC and of
Gabcikovo, it rnay be asked whether Slovakia could ever ensure
trninterruptedandçafenavigationonthe Danube.79
(3)THE 1958 BUCHAREST CONVENTIONCONCERNWG FISI-IiNiN THE
WATERS OFTHEDANUBE
6.75. Slovakia insistç on the links berneen the 1958 Bucharest
Convention wirhthe 1977 Treaty.80Accurdingtu Artic2 leof the 1977
Treaty, the Contracting Parties "shall take appropriateIneasuresthe
protection of fishing interesinconformity with the Danube Fisheries
Agreement, concluded at Bucharest on 29 January 195 Under
AriicIe 5 the Pa~fiesaIso had to carrjrout irhprovernenf works and
pisciculturaI operationsto ameliorate the naturaIconditions for tlre
breeding, growth arid normal increase instocko sffis11of economic
importance. However, Slovakiaomits to referto paragraphs 3 and 4 of
Article5 whichprovidethat:
"3. ln the sve~itof the erectio~i on the Danube of water
engineeri wngrkç,inparticular dams, whidi rnay change the
hydroIogica1and hydrobioIogi regirne of tfieriver, those
ContractingPartieswhich constructand use thesaid worksshaII
prepare in advance and apply jointly a plan of action to
safeguardthe normalmigratorymovementsof fish.
4. The Coriîracting PartiessIraIat the same tirnecar-ryout
such piscicultural operations as will safeguard the noniiaI
breeding and development of economicaIIyvaluablespecies of
fish, in the sections of the river situated above and below the
said works, under the new environmentalconditions createdby
tlreerection of thoseworks."
5.76. Article3 determin eesrerritosr coaei-ofthe application of the
Convention, includingthe tributaries of theDanube uptothe maxirnurn
extent of its flood waters, and lakes, estuaries and pools permanortly
temporarilyconnected withthe Danube.
5.77. Czechoslovakia didnet compIywith these provisions, either
before or afier theconstrrrco tfioVariantC. It did no1 prepare i~i
advanceand applyjointly withHungary - or evenunilaterali- a pian of
79 Seeabove,paragrap3.90-3.93.
8o SM,parasQ50-G.54.
HM,Annexes,vol3,annex2 1.actionto safeguard the migratorymovementsof fish. It didnothing to
safeguardthe nomal breedingand development offish inthesectionsof
the riversituatedabove and below thenew canal,especially under the
new environmetitalconditions createdby VariantC. In fact, important
spawningandbreeding watero sftliSzigetk -ozhich were coveredby
the 1958Convention - are dried out and lost for the purposes of that
Conventi~n.~~
SECTIONC:THE ILLEGALITYOFVARLANT C UNDER THE
1977 TREATY
6.78. Slovakiacontends that the 1977Treaty was stiIl in forceat the
time ofthe operation of VariantC in October1992,and seeks tojustify
its unilateral action byreferento theTreaty. That isnot an easy task
since noneof itsprovisions,even interpretedwith the greatestflexibility,
allowsany ground forsuch an operation which was never contemplated
by the drafters-anwhichpIainIycontradicts severalof its provisions,as
aIreadydemonstrated inthe Hungarian Mem~rial.~~
6.79. The difficulty of thetaskexplains Slovakia'sattempts torescue
Variant C underthe 1977Treatyby resort to bvo noveland peripheral
arguments.The first is that VariantCwas an "approximate application"
of the Trea~.~~ The second is that it was necessary by way of
"mitigationof da~nage".~ ~hesearguments willbe reviewedhere.
(1) VAM C WASNOTAtPI?IORISED BY THE 1977 WATT
6.80. SIovakia's attemptg6 to persuade theCourt that VariantC was
implementedin conformitywith the 1977Treatyfinds no ground in the
provisions of the Treaty itself- not one of which isreliedon in the
SIovakargument.Of course,the Treaîy was not in forcewhen Variant C
was implemented,and whateverargumentthere might have been on that
82 cf.A Vida, "IchthyoloAspectofthe Gabtikovo-NagymarProjeclHM, voI
1,appendix2, 372-38andConventionbeiwcenthe Govcrnmentof Romania,
Bulgaria,Yugosla, SSRconcemingfishininihe\vavaoftheDanubesigned
at Bucharcs,9January1958HM,voI 2,annex16.
83 SeeHM, paras1.16,7.04-7.43.
84 Sec SM,paras7.1-7.33.
85 SM,paras7.34-7.40.
86 See SM,para7.I ff. 24I
with in derai1 in Hrrngary'sMernorial as weII as eIsewhere in this
Counter-Memorial.93Let us simplyrecallat this point that Hungarywas
not in breach of its treaty obligationsrtthe time when Czechoslovakia
decided unilaterally to irnplementVariantC. Throughout,Bungary was
willing to resolve tfidispute bynegofiafians, by invoIvingrliird parties
and evenby resortto the Court.
6.84. Nevertheiess, Ietus forthe sake of argumentconsiderthe so-called
"approximate application"of a treaty in its own right. Slovakiapresents
this notionas ifitwerea well-establishedand self-evidentruleof positive
intemationallaw. This is ceriairrlyrrotthe case. Thereis nosrich rule in
irrteraationaIaw,and,parficularly,intlreintemafi011a awof rreaties.
6.85. SIovakia States in paragraph 7.17 of its Mernorialthat 'Yhe
entitlementofa Statetoput,asbestas itcan,atreaty into effectinthe face
of unlawfulrefusalby the other partyto fulfilits obligations,is entirely
consistent wiîh established principle It"'.cates its discusçion of
'bapproxirn eafppIication" under tfisauspices of "pacfu JUH~ servupfda"
(para.7.19) as weIIaspresentingitas the caunterpart of ffieruleacccirding
to which "a Statecannot benefitfrom itsown wrongdoing"(para. 7.24).
Both ideasare of longstandingin international law; itisremarkablethen
thatthe doctrineof"approximate application" is virtuallyunheardof.
6.86. The idea of an "appr.oxirnateappIication" of a treary finds
support.neirher in the practiceof stares nor in the jurisprudenceofthe
Courtor of any arbitrai tribunal.Forexainple,had the doctrine been an
estabiished principle, it could have been employed and should at least
have been referred tu in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Case
(SecondPhme].g4 Butthere is notraceof thedoctrine inthat Opinion.
6.87. The "approximate application" doctrine is not a customary rule,
nor is ifa generaI priricipleof Iawas understaad iriArticle 38(c)of tlie
Statutcof the Court. The Slovak Mernorial is unable to rely oii any
provision of the 1969Vienna Conventionon the law of treaties which
would, even indirectly, support the authority of "approximate
appIication" as a positive rute of public international Iaw. The only
articlewfiich deaiswiththe conduct to beadopted by one sfatepartyto a
treaty on account of breach by another paq isArticle50. This Ieavesno
other choicethan invokingthe breach "as a ground for Zerminatingthe
treaty or suspending itsoperation..."Neitherofthesealternativesmay be
assimilatedto an "approximate application"of the Treaty.
9f SecHM,paras 3.109-3.1216 06-..137;bove,paragrap3.07stseq.
94 Ahisov Opinionon the Interprefationof Peace TreatieswithBulgaria, Hungaty
andRomania {SecondPhase),ICJReports1950p 221.6.88. Nor is any trace of the so-called ruleto'be found in the law of
state responsibility. This envisages that counter-masures may be taken
in certain casesby a stateconfranred with an actrralbreach ofa treaty,
but in no way gives any credence to the idea that astaternay otherwise
rewrite trearyprovisions so as tagive effect tothem inan "appropriate"
way.
6.89. The Slovak Mernorialimplicitly recognisesthe non-existenceof
any suc11 rule by referring fo "approximate application" as a
"doctri~~e".~B~ureven as a "doctrine"it is virtnaIlyrrnkriown.As far as
cari be discovered, this doctrine has been discussed by onIyone aurhor,
namely ShabtaiR~senne,~~ who bases his discussionon one separate
opinion by Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in 1956 in Admissibili~ of
HeuringsofPetitioners by theCommitfee on South West ~frica.9 T7here
is no reference to the doctrine of "approxirnafe appIicationm in any
Ieading text,as illustra foreinstance,bythe silenceofthe ninthedifion
of Oppenheim3 J~l~rnafionniLm on that point.9g This aione would
sufice to cast very serious doubt on the intemationa1recognition of this
doctrine by statesas an applicableruleof internationallaw.
6.90. Inany event, Judge Latiterpacht's separate opi~rioir does not
support the views expresse8by SIovakia with respectto the value and
implications of the ço-called"dactri~ie".The same conclusiori can be
drawnfromthe commentaryproducedalmost30 years IaterbyRosenne.
6.91. The question asked of the Court in1956 was very specific. The
Court was açkedwhetherit was"consistentwith the advisoryopinion of
95 SM, pras7.2I,7.22,7.41.
96 SRosenne,Breach oJTrea~(Grotius,Cambridge,1985)atpp95-101
97
Advisory OpiniononAdmissibilityofHearings ofPetitioners by the Coanmittee
SouthWesiAfiiciICJReports1956 ap 45.
9s UppenfreilnIn~ernafia*rlaw (9h edn, edSir Roben Jenningsa?Sir Arthur
Watts,Longman,London, 1442).No referencetothesa-caIIeddoctrinei!Obc
found in the foliowingbooks(page referartosthesectionswhereone mi@
haveexpectedtofind some referenceto the doctrine, if it existed):Lord McNair,
TheLawofTreuiies(Oxford,ClarendonPress, 1961)pp 539-586;1Detter,Essays
on thLaw oJTreaties (Swee& Maxwell,London,1967)pp 89-94;C Parry,"The
Law of Treaties", iM Sorensen Id) Manuul of PrrbiichrfernnzionnLaw
(McMilIan,London,1968)pp 239-240;G Hariisai, SomFliirdufncnPmBlemir
drhe Law ojTrealies (AkadétiiiaKiadS,Budapest,1973)pp3IO-326,322-323;Sir
Ian SinclairThe Vienna Convention otr [Ire Law of Trmiks Mmchesfer,
Manchester UniversiPress,1973) pp 188-190TO Elias, The ModernLaw of
Treaties (Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publications, 1974) pp 14-118; Reuter,
Introductioaildroit detraite(PUF,Paris, 1985pp 158-168;AinericanLaw
Institute,Resiaienzenrtifthe Lnw Tfiird.Fareign RelationsLawof the Utiited Stares
{SfPaulMinn,AmericanLawInstitutePnblishers,1986)vo1pp216-2 18.the International Courtof Justice of11 July 1950for the Cornmitteeon
South West Africa,established by General Assembly resolution 749 A
(VITI)of 28 November 1953, to grant oral hearings to petitioners on
maners relating to the Territoryof South West Africa7'?9 The Iegal
problemto be solved by the COUR was conditioned by its institutional
character. The Court was deaIing with the legal powers of a body, the
Cornmitteeon South Africa, created by the GeneralAssembly acting in
effect as successor to the CounciI of the League of Nations as the
cornpetent body to supervisethe continuationof the Mandate for South
West Africa, after the Leagueof Nations haddisappeared.The question
askedof the Court was furthemore closely connected with the
obligations of the Mandatory under the Mandate System, the Court
having held in 1950 that those obligationscontinued "~nimpaired",'~~
nomithstanding the fact that the Mandateas a treaty disappeared with
the disappearanco efone of the partiestoit, thLeagueof Nations.
6.92. As stated by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, the legal rules to be
considered and appliedinthis contextwere-
"connected with the natureof the régimeof the territory of
South West Africa as declared in the Opinion of II JuIy
1950".'0'
He insistedthenonthe special characterofthisregime,which was-
"in thenature of an objectivelaw which [was] IegalIyoperative
irrespectiveof the conductof the Unionof SouthAfrica."'o2
Healsoexplainedthat-
"that status must be given effect except in so far as its
application is rendered impossible, in terms of ifs general
purpose,havingregard tothe attitudeadoptedby the Union."lo3
6.93. Interestingas itrnay be,this opinion was not suppartedin any
passageof the Advisory Opinion itself, from which Sir Hersch Lauter-
pacht's view may be considered avirtualdissent.Judge Lauterpacht was
able to arriveat the same result asthe Court, but did so by an entireIy
differentroute.
99 ICJReports1956atp24.
'OD Ibid,p27.
IO1 Ibid, p46.
IO2 Ibid,p46.
'O3 Ibid,46.6.94. Furthemore, there are striking differences between the legal
problemswhich arosein the AdvisoryOpinionof 1956,and those in the
present case. These differencesare due, inferalia, to the different IegaI
nature of the relationships in thetwo cases, and in pariicular to the
special rights and obligationsinvolvedin the Mandateas comparedwith
the 1977Treaty.
6.95. As tothe IegaInatureof the reIationships,the specificobligations
bearing on the Mandatorywere establishedon thebasisof a suigeneris
regime, characterised by its objective nature, in the very special
institutional contexof theLeague of Nations, and subsequentlyof the
United Nations. On the other hand, the 1977 Treaty was an ordinary
bilateral treaty, established in accordance with classical rules of
internationallaw.
6.96. Furthemore, in the case of the Mandate, the upholding of the
obligations of South Africa as a mandatory state was of paramount
importance; this was because, as mentioned by the Court itself, the
ultimatepurposeof this regime was the protectionand promotionof the
rightsof the peopIeof South West Africa.Io4Obviously,no such a right
was at stake in the situation in which VariantC was operated by
Czechoslovakia.In one situation, there was the prolongationof a legal
systeinplaced underthe authority and control of a universal institution
representing the internationalcommuniîy,with theaim of safeguarding
"the sacred trust of civilisation rhrough the maintenanceof effective
international supervision of the administration of the Mandated
Territory" InItesother case, there was a quite ordinarysituationof a
bilateral treaty between neighbouring states in a matterof specific
conceni to both.The two situationsarewholIydifferent.
6.97. Infact - and contrary to what appears to be suggested in the
Slovak Memorial- the opinion expressedbySir Hersch Lauterpacht in-
1956 insists very much on thisdifference ofkind betweenthe situation
created by the existence of the Mandate and an ordinary treaty
relationship between two statesJudgeLauterpacht stressed thatbreach
of theMandate-
"is unlikethe case of a breach of the provisionof an ordinary
treaty- which breachcreates,as a rule, a rightfor the injured
partyto denounceit and to cIaimdamage."I06
'O4 Ibid,pp27-28.
IDS Ibidp23.
[O6 Ibid,pp48-49.In other words, far from enumerating a doctrine on which SIovakiacan
rely,Sir Hersch Lauterpachtaflrmed the fundamentalrulethat a state
confronted with a breachof the provisions of a treaty has the option of
denouncing itand cIaiming damage,but cannot insiston its çpecific
performance - stilIIess imposesame approximation toperformanceon
the otherParty.
6.98.ln 'the present case, there is neither an objective regime nor a
specific wniractual relationship between an internationalinstitution and
a member statecommitted ta perform specific obIigationsaimed at
promotingthe rightsof a distinctpeopleplacedunder itsauthoriîy.
6.99. The same conclusion may be reached from Professor Rosenne's
discussion of the doctrineof"approximateapplication" (which he calls a
"the~ry").'~~ (It should be noted that, inthemeantirne, i.e.,from 1956
until 1985,this doctrine or theory had gained no weightin the actual
practice of states or in the process of preparation, conclusion and
implementation of the 1969 Vienna Convention whichtook place
preciselyduring that period.) In his cornmentary,Rosenne insists on the
fact that "Lauterpacht, with his characteristic caution, seems to have
presented his statement of doctrine as though it had a limitedforward
thrust''.1°8He stressesalso that"thiswas not a case of contractor even
of anordinarytreatyanalogous tocontract",but that Lauterpachtsaw it-
"as a case of the operation and application of multilateral
instruments creating an international status or an international
regimetranscending amerecontractualrelation."109
6.100. Of equal interestare the lessons which, according to Rosenne,
maybedrawn fromsuch a theory.Hedeclares:
"...what we have termed the doctrine of 'approximate
application' means that, faced with a situation of established
IO7 Rosenne,BreachofTrmw (19850)6.
log Ibidp 97.
IO9 Ibidp98.Rosenne adds:"Theessenceof such instrumenisthattheivalidity
continuesnotwithstandghangesintheattitudeorstatuortheverysurvivalof
the individul artiesorpersconcemed. Their continuivalidiimpliestheir
continueoperation..." breach (and not rnerely alleged breach), the parties themselves
in the first instance, renegotiate and apply tlie treatin good
faithand where theyare notsuccessfulin doingthisthemselves,
then acting through or with the assistance of a competent
internationalorgan,whetherjudicial or not, are legallyobliged
to take stepsto redrafithe treaty or refomulate the sub-system
so as taençureits conrinued effective application."10
6.101. Such a resuItmay only be achieved by way of negotiations. .
Accordingto Rosenne:
"The doctrineof approxirnateapplication...if skilfullyusedmay
serve as a prod ro the renegotiation, reinterpretation or
readaptationofa treaty ..."l'
It isonly in this respect, according to Rosenne,that the doctrine can be
said "tocontribute tothe generalstabilityofjuridical relations".
6.102. Thus even if the doctrinedid exist as part of international Iaw,
and even if(which JudgeLauterpachtdenied)it applied to "an ordinary
treaty", and eveniftltefacrualsituation inthe present case had warranted
having recourse to it, the doctrine would onIy have entitled
Czechoslovakia to renegotiate the substance of the treaty- something
that iconsistentlyrefused to do. There is no tracein thetwo sources for
the "doctrine" of any idea thatit justifies State adopting substantive
unilateral solutions inconsistentwith the treaty in question, especially
wherethe solution, aswith VariantC, is of a highlydarnaging nature.
6.103. Itshould be stressedthat "approximate application" is the only
Slovak argument seeking to demonstrate that no contradiction exists
between the operation of Variant C and the obligations Iaiddown in the
1977 Treaty. Theconsequencesof rejectionof thatdoctrine as a basis for
Variant C wilI be correspondingly fatal to the Treaty - even on the
assumptionsofthe Slovakargument.
6.104. Furthemore, evenon thoseassumptions, the criterion Iaid down
by SIovaki tajustify VariantC as an "approximateapplication"of the
1977Treaty isnot satisfiedIl2In thispassage of its MemoriaI,SIovakia
stressedthe "ternporarya "nd "reversible"character of VariantC. But the
reversiblecharacter of Variant C is highlyquestionable,quite apartfrom
Il0 Ibidp IOO.
Ibid,p100.
I SM, paras7.28, 7.29.the fact that its operation has alreadyproduced persistent damage,the
long-termconsequencesof which aredifficult to assesI l3
(3) "MITIGATION OF DAMAGE"DOESNOTEXCUSEUNLAWFUL
CONDUCT
6.105. The Slovak Memorial associates its argument from the
"approxirnateapptication"doctrine witha secondargument,accordingto
which "it is a general principleof internationa1law that a partyinjured
by the non-performanceof another contract party must seek tomitigate
the darnagehe hassustained.""4 Accordingto Slovakia,the operationof
VariantC is justified because it mitigatesthe damagecreated by the
purportedwrongdoingof Hungary.
6.106 L.ike "approximateapplication", the "mitigation of damage"
argument is difficulto reconcile both with the facts and thjaw.As for
the facts,itwas shown in theHungarianMemorialthat negotiationwas
the means to find practical solutions aimed at Iimiting the costsand
damagecreated by the partial reatisationofthe Original Project. OnIy a
negotiated solutionwouId have securedan equitableoutcorne,balancing
the shareof costsand benefitsamongthehvopartiesforthe readjustment
of the Project. Hungarywas ready toenvisagedifferentsolutionsand had
expressed its readiness to compensate for the lasses arising from the
situation.15
6.107. On the contrary, the ,unilateral operation of VariantC by
Czechoslovakiawasto produce inthe regionconcerned a wholerangeof
damage and risks, in particular to the aquifer,the groundwater, the
drinking-water supplies and the environment at large together with
economicconsequences,as alreadydescribecl.' l6
6.108. In such a context,it isironitchat Slovakia attempts to invoke
environmentaiarguments,narnely "theprospectofexpenditure to minimise
the environmentaldarnageand degradation caused by leaving existing
constructionsintheirunfinished statew.I IIis impossibleto regardin the
same lightorto placeon the samescale, on one hmd, the wide, multiple
Il3 Seeabove,pmgraphs3.l5,3.11Seiseq.
'l4 SM,para7.34.
l5 Seee.g.HM, par3.126.
I
Seeabove,par3.15etseq.
II7 SM,pan 7.37.and far-reaching environmentaland econornic darnage created by the
operationoftheOriginalProjectandmutatismufandisof Variant C and,on
the other hand,îhe Iimitedand definiteharmcreatedby the interruptionof
work in one part of the Project,for the compensatioof which technical
soIutionsas well asfinancial arrangements could have been,and were,
contemplated.
6.109. Turning to the IegaI vaIue of the "mitigation of damage"
argumentt he first obseniatioto be madeis that the SIovakargument
involves a categoricalrnistake.Assuming internationallaw to admit an
"obligation to mitigate losses",this rule wouldbe one of the "secondary
obIigations"; it would riotbe a primaryabtigation, intheteminologyof
the InternationalLaw Commissionsincte he beginningof its work in the
field of state responsibility. other words, SIovakia seeks to use an
argument concerningtheestimationof darnageto justify its engaging in
substantivelyunlawfulconduct. But mitigationofdarnage cannot excuse
unlawfulconduct.
6.110. Inanyevent,the SIovakMernorial isunable todemonstratewhere
thispurported"general principleofinternationallaw"cornesfrom.Itsonly
referencesare to certain decisions of the Iran-United States Clairns
Trib~nal,"~ a tribunal of a special charmer oriented rnainly to the
setîlementof commercialdisputesof a transnationalcharacter. InIIeed
the main Slovakreference isnot to a decision of the Tribunalbut toa
concurringopinion of one of its mentbers, Mr RM Mosk, in Craig Y
Minisîer ofEnerrn.1T 20at case involveda privatedisputebetween an
Arnerican citizenandtheMinistryof Energo yf IranItcornesthen as no
surprisethat the law applicableto the conbact between Craig and the
Ministry was not pubIicinternationaIawbutthemunicipalIawof Iran.I2I
Nowhere does theTribunal's decisionmentionwhat the SlovakMernorial
callsthe"mitigation ofdamage"principle.Nowhere does it speakof any
"generalprincipleof internationallawof anykindwhatever.
6.111. Nor does JudgeMosk himself speak of such a-"principle" inan
opinion servingas the main authoriîysupporting theSlovakassertionas
to thejuridical valueof this "principle". In hisconcurring opinion,Judge
Mosk simply expressed th¢ view that "the claimant is notentitledto
'l8 SM, par7.34,not18.
I9 Seee.g.,8 Audi"Les'Accordsd'Algedu 19Janvier198tendantaurèglement
des ciiffereentre les Etats-UnelI'Iran" (1981IO8 JournaldrrDroit
Internaiio713atp765.
I2O (19833 Iran-USCIaimTribunaleports280ap 293.
IZ1 Ibid,pp284,286,287.damage for Iosseshecould have avoidedby reasonableeffortç". AlZ2
dictated by the substanceof the case,he places his argumenton the
ground of municipallaw, referringin particular to the works of a
distinguishedcontractssch0Iar.'~3
6.112. Thetwo othercasesquotedbythe SIovakMernoriaa lre Watkim-
JohnsonCompany v Iran124andGeneral Eleciric Company iIran.125
Each of thesecases referstathe reasonableeffortsmade bythe private
claimantto limitingitlossesIn eachcase,theargument occurs asa very
subsidiaryone, and againin the framework of a decision basedon the
application of rnunicipaIIaw, not of any "generaI principle of
intemationaliaw".
6.113. What can be said in confomiS with the law iç that,when
canfronted withunexpected darnagecreatedbythe implementationof an
internationaltreaty, a stateparnay protect its own intereassbestas
itcan'anm daytake steps for the preventioof darnage . utthisissue
goes'to quantificatioof damage;as Judge Mosk pointedout, a party
cannotclairndarnage forIosseswhichitcouIdbyreasonable effortshave
avoided.This has nothing atal1todo withthequestionof self-help,of
unilateralmeasureswhichwouIdotherwise be unlawful. Mitigationof
Iossgoes toquantification,ottojustification;an injuredpariyis neither
justifiednorrequiredto engagein unlawfulconduct in orderto mitigate
itsloss.The recoveryofsuch Iossesis thefunctionof thIaw of darnage,
and on the internationaplane of thelaw of stateresponsibiliv- on
which theSlovakMemarialconspicuously failtorely.
6.1'14.This iseven more so when the treaty bindingon thetwo parties
contains a provision eshblishing negotiation asa regularprocess for
implementation of treatyobligationsas weIasthe chosenmeans forthe
settlementof disputes,as Article27 of the 1977Treaty does. If no
negotiationscould be achieved under Article 27, the dispute over
whetherthere was a potentialIossordangerfor Czechoslovakiaif the
works of theunitaryProjectwere interruptedwouldhaveto be resolved
by theother meansreferred toin Article 3of theCharterof the United
122 Ibid,p293
123 G ~reitel,"RemediforBreacofContraciparas75-77,n7Int'lEncyclopedia
ofCompara?ivLaw{ 1976).
12'
(1989)22 Im-US CIaimsTribunalRcpo218at p244.
125 (1991)26Iran-UClaimsTribunaRepori148atpp161-162.Nations.Hungaryrepeatedly çought ways ofresolvitn hge issueinsucha
way,includingby referenceto bindingarbitrationor tothis Court.t26
6.115. A final pointis made in the SIovakMernorial in support of the
"rnitigationofdarnage" argument.According ta the Slovakposition,this
argument is supportedby Drafl Article 24 of the ILCDraft Articles on
The Law of Non-NavigationalUsesof InternationalWatercoursesw , hich
concerns "Prevention and mitigation of harmfui conditions".i27 It was
adopted without changeonSecond Reading in 1994 as Article27, and
willbe cited inthis ver~i0n.I~~
6.116. Infull, Article27reads as follows:
"Watercourse States shall, individually or jointly, take a11
, appropriate rneasures to preventor rnitigateconditions thatmay
be hannful tootherwatercourse &ares,whether resulting from
natural causes or hurnan conduct, suchas flood or ice
conditions, water-borne diseases, siltation, erosion, salt-water
intrusion,droughtordesertification."
6.117. However, the way in which this article iscited by Slovakia is
misleading.It Ieavesout the wordsitalicisd, whichmake itclearthat the
"appropriatemeasures to prevent or mitigate conditions that may be
harmful" arethose which may affect the"0th watercourse States". By
ornitting this passage,Slovakia modifies entirely the meaning of the
article, which is aimed at the prevention or abaternentof environmental
darnage 10 olher waferourse SIovakia,s teoprkssentthe Drafl
Articleas ifitjustified VariantC as an act ofself-protection,excIusiveIy
dedicated to the protection of its own national environment.
UnfortunatelyVariantC caused, and causes, significantharm tothe other
watercoursestate, Hungary.
6.118. Hungary recognisestheprincipleenunciated in Article 27, which
is partof generalinternationallaw. Yet itshourdbe noticed nat only that
the rulelaiddown by Article 27 concerns the protection of the environ-
ment of other watercourse states but aIso that it occurs inthe gerieral
Iz6 SeeNole Verbaiefrumthe HungarianMinistryofForeignAfftothe Embassyof
the Czechoslovakocialist Republic, 1 Septembet 1989, Annexes,vol 4,
annex24; Letterfrom HungariPrimeMinistcL Adamcc,4 Octobcr1989;HM,
Annexes, vo l, annex 27: Draft Treatyattacheclto Note8Verbale fthe
HungariaM ninisirof Foreign Affairto theEmbasçy of the Czechoslovak
SociaIiRepublic,0November1989; HM, Annexes ,ol4, annex30,Art3.
12' A/CN.4/447,p 11,3March1993 ,iteinSM, para7.40.
128
Report oftheInternational LCommissionon the Workof ils46thSession,
2May-22 July1994{UNDocA149 1O)atp 309(cmphasisadded).context of Drafi Articles which embody principles of mutual co-
operation (Article 81, notificationto the other concerned watercourse
States of planned rneasureswith possibleadverse affects (Articles12-
161,exchange ofinformation (Article1I),consultationsand negotiations
with a view toensuring an equitableand reasonable utilization of the
watercourse(Articles5, 141,and, generally,respect forthe environment,
incIuding gro~ndwater.'~9 The design and operation of unilateral
VariantCsatisftesnoneoftheserequirernent~,~30
SECTION D:Tm JLLEGALOPERATIONOF VARIANTC
6.119. Even on theassumption- which isveryfar frombeingthe case-
thatVariant C was IawfuIin its inceptiontheway in which it has been
operatedfromthat timeuntilthe present is cIearlyunlawful.
6.120. The factual elements associated with this operation have been
summarised earlierin this Co~nter-Mernorial,~3buildingin turn on the
presentationinthe HungarianMem0rial.1~~ Inessence,VariantC suffers
from the same inadeqrracies as the OriginaI Project, in terms of its
generaItechnic calception,and ofdeficientscientificassessrnentf the
risksand hazardscreated by its operation. Buin addition, the Iackof a
balancedand equitable operation, the absolute priori9 given to energy
production over al1competinguses and especiallyover the volume of
water.supplied to the Danube andto the Hungarianside-am systernin
the Szigetkiiz,bring VariantC and its operation intoconflict with basic
principIesofinternationalIaw.
6.121. Slovakia is unabIe to demonstrate that the way in which
VariantC was pIanned was differentfromthe conceptionof the Original
Project,so faras the upstreamsector is concerned.But in its execution
Variant C is even more dangerousthan the Original Project due to its
hastyimplernentation.It is moredamagingin its implementation because
of the manifest failureof Slovakiato utilise the Danube waters "in an
*
r29
SeeRobertRosenstockSpeciaIRapporteur,econdReporton The Lawof the
Non-NavigationaUses of InternationWatercourses,LTN Doc AlCN.41462
(21 Apri1994)'
130 Seeabove,paragraphs.07-3.086.124. In particular, one decision, although not basedon an environ-
mental impactassessment,gavethe Slovak Govemment guidance aSto
the basicrequirementsfortheprotectionof the environment in relationto
the operationof VariantC. On 25 June 1991, the SlovakEnvironmenta1
Commission(whosefunctions were subsequentlyassumed by theSlovak
Minishy for Environment)issued a binding"Statement" underSection
14of the SIovak Water Act. According to this staternent,19 conditions
had to be complied with as a IegaI prereqrrisitefor the operation of
VariantC. These conditions are reproduced in the Hungarian
Memorial.137But, as revealedby the 1993 World Wildlife Fund
Report138 as wejl as ina DraftCommuniqué prepared bythe Slovak
Ministry forthe Environment,the rnajorify of these requirementswere
not met, therebycreatingmajor threatsta the drinkingwatersupplyof
the populationof theBratislava region.139 The DraftCommuniqu éf the
t37 SeeHM, para5.135and HM, Annexes ,ol4, anne168.
138 See1993WWF Report,p 7, HM,Annexes,vol5 (partIannex 20, atp. 847.
139 The drafl Communiqukissuedby the SlovakMinistryof EnvironmentreveaIsthe
foIlowinmatters:
(1)The implementationof VariantC and the operation of the GabEikovo
hydraeIectricpImtwere reaIisein vioIation of the SIovaWater Act,
13811973;the investorCompanyacted unlawfullin establishingandusing
certainstnictureand utilising twaterwithout havingbeen granted the
appropriatelicences.Accordingto thedraRCommuniqué":the severenatureof
the contractor'sillegalcgnductisespemanifesinhisconsciouvsiolations
oftheIawsprovidingfor constructionactivities".
(2) The operationoftheGabEIkovolantsubstantiallydisregardedthe" 19criteria"
earlier acceptbya consensusofrelevantexperts andlocal authoritieç;of
particutroncernherewere conditionsfor the protectionof sub-surface waters,
havinginmind Lhat-
"the kitni: Osrrovregionasa rich reservoirof potabIewatcr (17.8
rn'lseeffectively)provides the drinkingwater suppIy to Western
Slovakia(includingBratislavIthasbecome clearthatthcre ino
alternativesupply,shouldthepresent\veIIsceascto function."
FuIfilmentothesecriterwas mandatoryand shouldhave beenensuredbefore
thcdiversion.
(3) In additi"no studyhas been preparedhithertoon the complex impact of
[VariantCIonsubsoil waters."
(4) Since VarimlC was brought into opemtion, "[tlhe situation has been
aggravatedby thfactthat preliminaryresultssuppontfearof expertsthat
the subsoilwaterreservoirsofthezOstrov regiowillbedestroyed".
(5) Furthemore:Ministryfor the Environmentwasrejected by the SlovakGovernment at
its session of 4 December 1992. But fhis did not have the effect of
making'the operation of VariantC IawfuIeven under Slovak Iaw.140
Eventually,ratherthan the operationof VariantC beingmade to conform
with the Iegatrequirernents,therequirementswere amended to conform
with the operationof Variant Cl4' Thus SIovakenvironmentallaw was
madeto adjusttu the factof the Project,and to design parameterswhich
precluded cornpliance w ith any reasonabte standard of water
management. 142
6.125. As to theassessrnent of the geologicalor seisniicrjsksassociated
with the construction of VariantC, it appears that no detaiIed risk
analysis had been carriedout with regard to the OriginalProjectas Iate
as 1989. Nor- on the informationso faravaiIabIe- .was oneestablished
with regardto VariantCthereafter.
6.126. Thus there remainreal doubts as to whether the structuresat
Cunovo meet safety requirements adapted to seismic and Iiquidation
risks. For example,accordingta the studies attached to this Counter-
Mernorial,"[tlheallowanceforfreeboard (iypically2 metres)is probably
adequateto coverseisrnicallyinducedwaves,but maynotbesufficient to
deal with subsidenceof the dyke foundations underextremeearthquake
Ioading.The bulkfil1forming th6dykes is potentiaIIyeasilyeroded,and
"[tlhe prcsentmanipulation of the riverpreventsthe regularflooding
of the flood-pIareas. ,
..
Because of the non-fulfilment of environmental conditithe
conneciiciofthebrancheswiththDanube and with eacoiher have
been destroyed, resulting in a change in the hydroIogical Iifc of rhe
flood plainshnrbbery."
Communiquéof the SIovakMinistryof Environmentto khe4 December 1992
Sessionofthe SlovaGovemment; HC-M, Annexes,vol3,annex57.
I4O As pointedout by the WWF Rcponof Deccmber 1993,p 7;HM, Annexes,vol 5,
annex20.The faclsetoutby iheWWFare no1denied inProfessoMucha' repIy
ofApriI 1994,althougheassensIhat"it cfearthat rheeffortof the govemment
istooptimizthewholesystem asrnuchas possibeirhthe spcciaIemphaîto the
floodplain areaIMucha, "GabEikovo- WWF. The prosand cons"(Bratislava,
April1994)p82;HC-M,Anncxcs,vol 4 (parl)annex2.
I4I For lhidecision(mken on 29April 1994)sce Resolulion(andReport) of the
Governmentof the SlovakRepubliCancerni DigputedIssueOFthe GabEikovo-
NagyrnaroBs arragSystemand the GovernmenPrroposalin ConnectionWiththe
FutureCourseofAction7July 1994;WC-M ,nnexes,vol3,anne 7x2.
14* The PHARE projccl concemsonlyone aspect,aithoughanimportanone,of Ihe
overaIIproblemseeabove,paragrap2.123.overtopping would be very likely to develop into a major breachin a
shortspace oftime."143
5.127. But it is even not sure ththestructures designed for VariantC
complywith moreeIernentary~afetyrequirements, even under ordinary
conditionsof use.A document issuedby the SlovakUnionof Natureand
LandscapeProtectorsrevealsthat:
"- the marinerofconstruction has been çlipshod and, to some
extent, unplannedor undertakenwithoutdueregardto the plans.
- Thereare moreindicationsand signs (e.g. flawand cracks in
the damwaIIand canal,the haItin the prefillofgthecanalwith
waterinAugust 1991 )whichindicatetheproject doesnot cornply
withtherequiredspecificationsconcerningstructuralstabiliQ.
- The studies dealing with the dimension design of the earth
dam of the GabEikovoProject concIudedthat there are earth
dams sections which wouId not be able ta withstand an
earthquake ofthe presently-forecastintensity.
- Independentengineers and safetyspecialistsasweIIas people
forrner Iorking on the project, have repeatedIy expressed
misgivings in this respect, and consider an immediate
examination and verification of the entire installatto bean
absolutenec es si^."^^^
6.128. The dangers inherent in the projechave been even considerably
increased by the hastyway in which the dammingof the Danube was
carried out in October 1992, as already described in the Hrrngarian
Mern~rial.'~s According to press reports, about 2000 people were
working in the area day and night, in three shifts, with 500 trucks
deliveringstonesand gravelfortheclosure of the river.146
6.129. A few weeksIater, a practicai demonstration was given of the
inappropriate design of the structuresinvolved in the operation of
VariantC. The "unexpected" flood inNovember1992showed a serious
risk to thestructurehm major flo~ds.]~~2-3 million cubic rnetresof
sand and gravelerodedfrom the stretchninning 500 rnetres downstream
143 Se, ScientijirEvaluation,HC-M2,chap6.4.3.
144 See HM, AnnexesvoI5,(partIIannex17atp.628.
145 SeeHM, par3.182.
146 See HM, vo2,photos1-8.
147 SeeHM, voI2photos9-IO.from the Cunovo dam, a consequence of the unfinishedsiate of the
constniction.
6.130. The Slova by-passweirat Cunovo isalsoun~atisfactory.~~It
only permiisdischargeat less than halfof whahad been cIaimed to be
its~apacity. A'sa~consequence,VariantC PhaseI cm onIycope with
a floodof less than10,000cubicmetrespersecond ifevery partof the
system operatesperfectly.150But there have been many weeks since
October 1992 wheneither the Cunovo by-pasw seir or one of the
GabEikov sohiplac cousldnotbeoperatedeven inan emergency.
6.131. Theincapacity ofthe Slovak authoritietoprovide themainbed
of theDanubewitha minimum waterdischargeinaccordance withthe
recommendation fora TernporaryWaterManagementRegirnemadeby
the expertsappointedbythe EC Commissionisanotherexample of the
technicaldeficiencies whichaffectVariantC.lsl It hasbeen saidthat
thisparticularproblercould beresolvedwithin a few months,'52which
suggeststhatthefailuretodo so reflectsa deliberatedecisiononthepart
of therelevantSIovak authorities.Whateverthe reasonmaybe, thefact
isthatthestructurecannot provideforadischargewhich is theminimum
IevelacceptabIeaccordingto independenetxperts.
6.132. It has been recalIeeulierin thi s hapterthat,by its unilateral
and damagingdiversionof the Danube,Stovakiacornmitted a clear
violation of the customarynile of equitable use of international
watercourses and of the obligationnot to cause appreciabIeharm to
another watercourseState.153
5.133. But'independentlyof thatissue,Slovakiahas infact carriedout
andoperatedVariant C in compIete disregardof the requirementf due
14* SeeHM, parS.116.
'49 This iconfirmein the EC Reporof1 Dccember1993: WorkingGroupof
MonitoringandWaterManagementExperfortheGabEikovoSysterofLocks,
Reporon TemporarWaterManagement RegimeHM, Annexes,vol5(par!II),
annex19p757.SeeaIsoHM,para5.116.
50 Scienific Evalilalion,HC2,chap2.4.4.A 10,0m'ls floiregardeasa
IO0yeaflood-Le.onewhichhastobeexpecieditermof noryaplanninfoa
structof thiskinSeeabove,pmgraphs3IO, .85.
IS1
SeeHM,para s.14-3.223;above,pmgraphs3.107-3.108.
l52 "Itisno! thSlovaki gonernment'sobjecttopreparethe riverbed for daily
use.Iipossibtocarryouthesworksinafewmonlhs."1Mucha,"GabElkovo
WWF. Theprosand cons" (BratisI, priI19946pI;WC-M,Annexes,vat4
(pa11 nnex2.
l53 See abovepmgraphs6.29-6.33.6.137. Evenifonepreferstoanalysethesituationwithinthe framework of
liabiIiQ for conductnot prohibited by internationallaw, it would remain
the casethatSlovakia would be IiabIefor damagecaused to HungaryT . he
InternationalLaw Commission has considered this topicat Iength in its
work reIating to the International Liabilityfor Injurious Consequences
Arisingout of Acts notProhibitedby International Law.l58 Inthe course
of its long-standingconsideration of thisissue, it has moved from the
consideratipnofan eveniuaI primaryobligationof reparation, characteristic
of a liabiliq for harmfulbut licit activities,towards the codificationof
preventiverneasures to betaken,especiaIly inthe case ofactivitiesIikeIyto
damagetheterritory and environmentofthirdstates.Is9
6.138. The convergence of therulesthus identfiedwith thosegoverning
the Law of the Non-navigable Uses of International Watercourses is
striking. The-basic principl peoposed by Professor J Barboza in his
NintliReport includethe obligatioiito CO-operatteh,e prohibition against
the harmfuI use of a territory, the necessityto assess the impact of a
plannedhazardousactiviiyonthe environment, and adequatenotification
to theconcernedthird statesofthe activity in question.'60Itisclear that
CzechosIovakiaand subsequently Slovakia did not comply with these
rules.
15* For thecurrentstale ofthe prseeReportoftheIniernotionol Law Commission
onthe Workofiis 44thSessio2 May-22July 1994(UN DOE AJ49110 a)pp 367-
383.
Is9 See in panicular S Magmiv,"Transbonndary Ham: The InternationaLaw
Commission's Studyof 'InternationalLiability"',809AJIL305; C Caubet,
"Ledroitinternationalquetc d'uni: rcsponsabilitclesdommagesrésultant
d'activitésqu'il n'inpas"(1983)29AnnuaireFrançaisde Droirlnlernafional
pp 93; J Brrrboza, "La responsabiIi!S 'causàIela Commission da Droit
International(I988) 34 Annuaire Français de Doit hierna~ionai 513;
SMcCaffrcy,"International Liabilityand InternationaIWaterTherWorkof
the lnternational LCommission Relating to International PollutioDBin
Magraw(ed),InfernaiionalLaiand Pollution (University of Pennsylvania Press,
PhiIadeIphia, 1991)esppp 101-103R PisilIMaeschi, "Due Diligence"e
responsabiliià iniernazideglisiai(Milano, Giuffrk1989)esp pp I28-I89;
Carlos Jmenez Piernas,La Conducia Arriesgada y la Responsabilidad
lnlernucionaldel &lado (Universidad de Alicante, 1esppp 281-294; PM
Dupuy, "Le rble de I'Etat dansl'indemnisation des dommages catastrophiques
internationaux"Lo réparafiodesdommagescaiastrophiques (Biblirithèqde
la FacuIttdcdroitde I'UniversittCatholiquede LoXIX,Bruylant,BruxeIIes,
1990)pp 219-248;JBarboza,NinthReporton International LiabforInjurious
Consequence srising Out oActsNot Prohibited by International Law, UN Doc
MCN.41450 5April1993.7.05. The present case is ana fortior oine,for many reasons. For
example, Slovakia's use of VariantCentaiIsusingwater to the equitable
use of which Hungary has an entitlement? and there are also issues of
serious damage resuItingto Wungary.3But the distinction between
interim protection and repudiation by condUct nonetheless applies.
Indeed Slovakia implicitly recognises this by consistently calling
Variant C a "provisional","ternporary"and "aItemativesolution,and by
its repeateassertionthatVariantCis re~ersible.~
7.06. Itevendoesso in relationto itsargumentbasedon thedoctrineof
approxirnateapplicati~n.~That doctrineis, as has been seen, a novelîy,
even an invention- and thereis nothingthat could be calIeda corpusof
rulesassociatedwithit.6It isan ideawrenchedoutof itçoriginalcontext
of the internationalsupervisionof the regimeofmandatesandappliedto
a bilateraljoint investmenttreatYet Slovakiaexpresslyrecognises that
it can only be appliedas a tempormy doctrine, thatit does notjustifi
conductof a permanent charactercreatinganew situationnot inanyway
envisagedbythe treaty.7
7.07. Now there are many reasons why Slovakia's conduct in
constructing,impIementingand operatingVariantC carinot be justified
underthe so-caIIeddoctrineof approximateapplication.In the first place,
the doctrinesirnpldoes notexistas a matterof law,inrelatioto ordinary
bilateratreatiessuchas the 1977Trea~.~ Asa matterof fact,VariantCis
quitedifferentfrom the OriginaIProject:itis not evenapproximatelythe
same? Moreover,thedocbine wouldnotserve tojustify thway inwhich
VariantC has been implementedin a manner whichcauses substantial
harm to theenvironmentand toHungaryas aCO-riparian.10
7.08. But if,for the sake of argument, one sets aside these
considerations the Court isconfronted with a situationwhich isby no
meanstemporary.Whateverthe position with those aspectsofVariant C
Seeaboveparagraphs.20-6.1.
Seeespabove,Chapter3 fageneralccountofthese.
Seee.g.SM,paras5.63-5.67.
SeeSM,paras7.28-7.29.
Seeabovepmagmphs 6.82-6.104,
SeeSM, para 71.
Seeabovepmgraphs6.94-6.102.
Seeaboveparagraph3.02-3.07.
Seeabove,paragrap3.15-3.85,6.133. which were hastily implemented, contrary to undertakingsgiven by '
CzechosIovakiaa ,ndmaintainedinforce,contrary ta the wmmitments in
the LondonAgreement,in October 1992 - the position with the so-called
"Variant C (Phase 2)" is that it is a permanent structure,wholly
controlld by Slovakia,progressivelyand expensivetymodified so as to
'
maximise power production. That thisis the case has been shown in
Chapter3 of thisCounter-Mernorial.'I
7.09. Its legalconsequenceis as foliows. VariantC has to be justified
now as a structure which, despiteprotestations,is intendedto have a
permanent character.There is a clear discrepancy between the Slovak
IegaIargument, under which VariantC is a mere temporary device, an
expedient whiIe Hungary cornes to its senses, and the intent of its
designers and operators, underwhich it is a "permanent soIution". The
Slovak Memorialdoes not even purport to justi@ VariantC as a
permanent structure. Setting aside al1 other arguments, if the Court
accepts that VariantC (Phase2) is notintended to be rnerelytemporary
or provisionalthen that structure isunIawfui- notonly in its operation,
but unIawfulper se,ontheassumptionsoftheSIovakMemorial itseiJ
SECTIONB: THE PRINCIPLETHAT DAMAGE MAYNOT BE
AWARDEDFORUNLAWFULCONDUCT
7.10. The SlovakMernorialstates as a generalprinciple that "a State
maynot benefit from its own wr~ngdoing".~~ This is no doubtthe case,
althoughthe applicationofthat generalprincipleof Iawin a givencase is
arnatterforthe Courtto determine -as weIl,of course,as to whichof the
twopartiestothe presentcase haç beenguiIty of wrongdoingand inwhat
respects.
7.I1. Buta corollaryof that principle in the presentcase is as foIlows.
IftheCourt holdsthat VariantC isunlawful,then the risks and burdens
of theoperationof VariantC naturallyfaIIonthe State responsiblefor it,
that ito Say, on Slovakia.A State which engages in unlawfulconduct
must be takento haveassumedthe risksand burdensof that conduct.
\
7.12. Againtheprecise implicationsof ihisprinciplefor the presentcase
need not be determinedat this stage.It is sufficientto note that ratherthan
accepting Hungary'soffer of judicial settlementof the dispute, which
wouId have covered al1aspects of the rnatter, Czechoslovakiachose, to
, I Seeabove,paragraph3s15-3.122.implement,and SIovaki taadoptand continue, a system of de facto
controland exploitationof thewaters ofthe Danubewhich was unIawful
both inits inceptionandin itsexecutionItmustbe takento have accepted
the risksandburdens ofitsconduct.
SECTION C: REMEDIES IN RELATION TO THE
EXPLOITATION OF SHAREDNATURALRESOURCES
7.13. The Danuberiverbasin,togetherwiththe aquiferand the ground-
water which form asinglehydraulicsystem,constitutea naturalresource
sharedby the differentstates throughwhose territory it flows. This fact
impliescertain rightsandcertainduties foreach and everyCO-basinstate,
al1 deriving from the "community of interests"at the cote of such
sit~ations.~~
7.14. This is riotosay thateach one of the concernedstates maynot
considerthe portionofthe internationalriverIocatedonitsterritoryas part
of its nationalnaturairesources.Yetthe specificityof such resources,as
recognisedby the internationalcommuniiyon the basis of the general
practiceinspired,inleraliu,by UNGeneralAssemblyResolution1803on
Permanent Sovereign oveyrNaturat Res~urces,~~lies precisely in one
feature:the right that states exerciover these resourcesisat the same
time "inalienable" and "pemanent".15This imposesIimits both on the
way statesmay use their resourcesand on the way other states shouId
behave inrespectto ihem,as wellas on the extentof rightthat aMythird
partiescan acquireoverthesenaturalre~ources.'~ .
7.15. The principleof permanentsovereigntyover natural resources,
which hasclaims tobeing considered a nom ofjus cugens,has a number
of specific corollarieforthepresent case.In particular,in the reniedial
context itmeans that no state can be presumed to have alienated
sovereigntyor control over itsnatural resources. By the same token no
I4
Sce GAResolution1803(XVIII)adopiedbyavoteof87 in favou2againsrand
12 abstentions.See funh1Brownlic,"Legal StaFs of Natural Resourins
InternationalLai979H)162 Recueidescortrpp249-317.
I5
Theterm"inalienabIe"tobefoundin thePreambte-GA Resolution1803;the
term"permanent"is initstitleandi1.The Frenctexthas"inaliénable".
I6 Para ofUN ReçoIution1803readasfollows:
"The righofpeoplesandnationstopermanen tovereignovcrtheir
natunI wealth aresourcemust beexercised'itheinterestof their
national developmentand of the well-beingof thcoftheState
concerned."state can be presumedto have acquired such sovereigniyor control,
whether by treaty or contract or otherwise. A state cannot "sell" the
elements of its natrrraI heritage, which are factors of its national
development vitalto the well-being of its population. This would be a
violationof the rights of the peoplethemselves.l7A fortiori,no treatyor
otherarrangementshouIdbe interpretedas involvinganysuch alienation.
7.16. It followsthat the Hungarian Governmentcould not impose on
the Hungarian peoplea situation involvingthe alienationof its natural
resources.Nor should the Court by an order effectivelydeprive a people
of its natural resources on a permanent basis, especiaIIy if in the
meantirnetheyare subjectedtomajorrisksof harm.
SECTIOND:THE"QUANTIFICATION" OF LOSSES
7.17. Ina briefsectionat theend of itsMemorial,Slovakiaassertsthat
it has suffered losseswhich are set out "by wayof ill~stration".~~Both
generaIIy, and in relation to particularheads of damage,the Slovak
Memorialgives nobasis for its calcuIations,rnerelystatingthat ata Iater
stage it will"iterniseandexplaineach headofdamage, justifying the
amountcIaimed".lgUnderthesecircumstances,and havingregard tothe
fact thatthe issuesof compensation and damagecannot be resoIvedprior
to a resolution of the disputed substantive IegaIissues in the case, no
detailedresponse to theSlovakclaims is necessary.Hungaryreservesits
position in relationto eachof the claims,and will in due course quanti@
andjustiS, itsown clairnin reIationtodamagecausedbyVariant C.
7.18 In thecircumstances itis surprisingthat Slovakiaclaims what it
describesas "theconstructioncosts to Czechoslovakia"of VariantC in
the years 1991 -1992,although not- it \vould seem- in relation to the
years 1989-1990.20 Quite apartfrom the diffrculîy of clairningdamage
l7
in a reIatedcontthiçinspirecg.,thepositiontakenbythearbitra1tribunal in
theAminoil Case(982) 21ILM975. Therribunaltheredecidethateven in the
caseofan earliercontractual cornmitmentIimitingthe rightof a sovertognstate
nationaliseforeignprivateassby the"stabilisatiof its naiionaIlegislation,
thisdidnot involveanabrogatioof ils sovereiover itnaturalresources.See
ibidalpara95;and seealsoG Burdeau,"Droitinlemationalt contratd'EtLa,
sentenceAminoil Koweïtdu 24 mars1982"[1982] Annuairefrançais dedroit
internation454.
l8 SM, para9.33and secSM,paras9.34-9.47forthe "illustrations".
SM, para9.37, note 2wms rhaHungary will alshaveto pay for Phas2 of
VariantC, which, asdemonsiratcdabove, isintendedby Siovak -iadespite for wrongfuIconductwhichcausedseriousharm to the otherparty,there
is thefurtherdifficultthatVariantC issaidby Slovakiato havebeen an
"approxirnata epplicationof the 1977 Treaîy,yetthere isno explanation
astowhy thecost-sharing farmuIa of theTreatyisnot to beappIiedto it.
. Itmay be that theSlova Mkernorialintendssom,eparts of the Treaty to
beappIiedmoreapproximately thanothers.
7.19 The Slovak Memorial also ignoresa numberof factors in its
calculations.Twoexamples onIyneed be given.
7.20 Slovakiahas appropriate the fruitsof 15 years of Hungarian
work now locatedonSIovakterritory. Hungarh yadcompletedmuchof
the requiredworkon Slovakterritory,witha few exceptions,including,
inlerdia:
, The Dunakiliti-Hruiovhead-waterinstallationson the right bank,
in CzechosIovskterritory, includingthe connectingdykeand the
Dunakilitiweir;
The taiI-racecanalof theby-passcanal,inCzechoslovak territory;
*
Operationalequipment of the GabEikovoSystem of Locks in
CzechosIovak territory;
* The flood controlworks of theNagymaros head-water instalIations
intheLowerTpeldistrictinCzechoslovakterritory.
7.21 Al1 of thiswork isnow usedby Slovakiain implementationof
Variant C. Only asrnaIlamauntof work remained to bedonebyHungary
on Czechoslovakterritory2 ICzechoslovakiaiiself gave a budgetary
calculationas to thecostofcarryingoutHungary'sunfinishedwork- an
terminologi praension- as a "permanenttmcture":seabove ,aragraphs
3.115-3.122.Sinalbenefitof thexpenditurinvolved ilt albeaccounted
for(astatcannotberequire10 payforan invesmentwithoutbeinggivethe
advantagesfanyprofitsarisfromtheinvesirnenh,eimplicationîhicIairn
ithatPhase2ofVariantCoperatea!a105s.
*' IllusNo 31intheSIovakMernoriails inaccuringary had providernosof
theoperationlquipmentof rGNBS inCzechosIovakterritno!"O"(itemb-
7)OtheritemsareaIsoierrorforexampIe,Hungaryhabegun improvernentosf
thebed of rhDanube on Hungarianterritory(item band had comrnenced
productioofworksan thNagymarosgstern oflocks(itemO)which hadbeen
calculatbytheAustrialenderto comprise36%ofwork,not"0"ascontended
inthSIova Mkernorial.amount of US $14 million (415 million CSK2*).This maybe compared
with the total amounts Slovakia daims to have spent on the Project (in
which it include'variantC), narnely13.8 billioCSK as of 1989,2 or
'
24.3billion CSKas of 1992.24
7.22 The SlovakMernorialdoes not account for the valuereceivedby
Slovakiain usingthe substantiainvestrnentHs trngaryhas carried onon
Czechoslovakterritory.
7.23 Anotherinstanceof theapproachofthe SlovakMernorial relatesto
the issue of "Iosses to the Czechoslovak navigation a~thorities".~~
Slovakiaclaims 178million CSK (equivalent to US$ 5.4 rnilIi~n~~)for
theselosses.Theseincludea nurnber of items.To takeanexample justone
of these,Itema) relatesto"Costs frornlimitingship tonnage"(79 million
CSK, ¢qua1ta US$ 2.4miIlion).Evengrantedthe underlyingassumptions
of the clairn?? it wouldrequireproofof actual lossesin relatitagoods
carried under the CzechosIovakflag, or of losses to Czechoslovakia in
relationto goods carriedunderotherflags,as aresultofthe non-existence
of theby-pass canalin the year 1s990-1992.Onlythe d~flerenceberneen
the actualnavigationthattook pIacein thoseyearsand the navigationthat
would have occurred had the by-passcanal existed,and only the actual
Iosses incurredas aresuItof thatdifference,could be takenintoaccount.
Slovakiarnakesno attempt to proveany such difference,or any such
Iosses.As dernonstratedinChapter 3,Czechoslovak trafic onthe Danube
fell from7.82milliontons in 1986to 5.78miIIiontons in1990 and to 1.98
million tons in 1992,and has hardly risen sin~e.~~At the same tirne
Czechoslovak dead-yeight capaciîy actually grew frorn 300,000 tons
(1986) ta 339,000 (1991), leading to a precipitous fa11in the actual
percentage of capaciiyusedin thatperiod.Giventhe existenceof sharp
cornpetitionin shippingonthe Danubedueto unusedcapacity,and thefact
22
ThisamountappearinKeponNo 239,preparcbytheSlovakGovemmenton 15
Januar1992 for theSIovA NatioAssemblyabouttheconslmctionprogressof
thGNBSby J Carnogursky.
23
Tocalculatethesum,thc 1cxchangcmieof $1=29.5CSK was used.
24 SM,paras2.01,5.01.
25 SM,p366.
25
ThiscaIcuIatioassumesthe SIovakMernorial's 19exchange mte of$US
1e32.68SK;SM, para9.37not28.
27 Thcseappearto bc that theby-pa~scacouldand shouldhaveexisteduring
thoseyears,anwouldhaveworkedalsomcIeveloeficiency (unspecifieSM,
para9.36).
Sm abovepmagraph3.88.that(exceptfor the actualperiodof the diversion,and in coniradistinction
with the period since) the Danube was never cIosedto shipping in the
period 1990-October1992,there is no proof that the existenceof the by-
pass canalwouldhave made any differenceat al].. 4
7.24 These sections of the Slovak mernori41offer no principIed
approach tothe issueof losses,even "by wayof illustration". It ismore
useful at thistage of the proceedingsto turn to the real remedial issues
at stake,which date tothe veryexistence of VariantC and the ideaof
the resurrectionof the Original Project.
SECTIONE:THEREALREMEDIALCONTEXT
7.25. Inthe presentcase, as in anyinternationallitigationdealingwith
the protectionof the environment, thefollowingobservation, inspired by
cornmonsense as well as by positive international law,applies.The first
criterion for an equitable and appropriate rernedyin this kind of dispute
is thatit cannot result in substantial injurythe national environments
of thetwo 'litigatingcountries,or ansignificantrisk of such injury. The
function of arernedyis to repair, not to harm. The function of a court is
to dojustice betweetn he parties,not to requirefuturegenerations to run
unacceptabIeenvironmental risks.
7.26. In other words,one reasonwhy the Cou~t~cannoa tcceptthe main
submissions of Slovaki iarespect of reparation is that the continued -
operation of VariantC - let alonethecompletion oftheOriginal Project -
would provoke irreparabledamage and create major risks to the
environment of the region, including to the ground-water and the
drinking wafer supply, as atreadyshown in chapte; V of the Hungarian
Mernorial and furtherdeveloped in thisCounter-MernoriaI.
7.27. This observation is consistenwith current trends ininternational
practice withregardto environmentalprotection, the main orientation of
which isto reconciIeeconomicdevelopmentandthe environmerit.
7.28. This is in particular reflected in the Rio Declaration on
Environmentand Development,adopted in June '992 by more tlian170
delegations taking part in the "Earth Sumrnit". It istrue rhat this
document is not to be takenas a "hardlaw" instrument.Nevertheless, it
reflects the emerging consensus of members of the international
cornmunity with regard to the basic principtesto be promoted, both
individuaIlyandcoIlectiveIy.
7.29. According to PrincipIe 4 of the Rio ~eclaration, "h order to
achievesustainabledevelopment,environmentalprotectionshall constitute I
268
tries"in transition" IikeHungaryand SIovaki exercises.a very speciaI I
careintheprotectionof the environment.Whengrantingcredit,the Bank I
conditions the attribution on the acceptance ofa cornmitment bythe
beneficiary state to realise sustainab ptoejects, respectingthe human
environment, both at thenational and at the international Ieve1.37The
,
samehas becorne true for the WorId Bank which in the past had been
stronglycriticisedforplacinginsufficientemphasison the protection of
the environmentinthe financingof proje~ts.~~
37 Sec European Bank for Reconstruction and Developrnent, Environmenfol
Procedures (London,1992).The EBRD is pIedged in its Agrecrncntto place
environmentalmanagementat the forefronilsoperationsto promotesustainabIe l
economic developmentin central and eastern Europe. lt has adopted spccific I
proceduresto implementihis approach;these guidestaffon how to exercise
environmenraldue diligen10ensurethatcmh projectisenvironmentallysound, l
just as duc diIigenceis requensurethat projectsare financially,ecanomicaIly
andlegallysound.
Environmentalproceduresneed tbc followedthroughoutthe life of evBank
project. Durinprojecideniificaiion,Project Sponarcsrcquested to provide
reIevantinfoma!ionconcerningthe project,includingenvironmentalinformation,
in accordancciviththe "Guide toPresentProposais"establishedby the Bank.
The "screcningcategory" of the project indicwhat form of environmental
analysis iviIIneed to be undertaken.This categorisationiscarried oua when
projcctisinthe expIoratstageEnvironmena1invesiigarionsarcthencarriedoui
by the ProjectSponsorio gcneralethe cnvironmentalinformationrequiredby the
Bankaficrscreening.nvironmentalnssessrnensndenvironrncntalauditsarcthe
main types environmentalinvestigationsto becmicd outon projectswhhave
potenlia1environmentalimpIications.
The Bank' environmentalstaff carriesout a reviceveryproject before it is i
submitiedto the OperationsCommittecfor FinReview.Environmentalchanges l
ivhich are identificdas necessaryduring project prepaand cnvironmenial
review wiII be incorporntedinloan agreerneniascovenants. Environmental
supervisionis then undenakenwhiIa Ioan is being supervisedby Bank, to 1
ensurethat the Project Sponsorcarryout the cnvironml esures specificdin
iheAgreementand takesappropriate actioncasesof non-cornpliance.Finaa!y, I
project compIetion an cnvironmenial evaluati'iviI1be conducted by ihe
EnvironmcntaIStaffattherequesttheTearnLeader.
38
1bid.Fromthe earIy19705,environmentaconcerns'havebeenan explicitpartof
World Bank activities.TheBawas thefirstmultinationaldevelopment agetoy
screcn projocisfor cnvironmentaIconsequenand io adopt guidcIinesfor the
evaluationof future Iending operaiions. Thcse guidelines have been regularly
updatedto bring environmentalissues into themainstram of its Iendingactivities,
culminating in 1987 with the introductionof the Operational Directive on
Environmenta1Assessrnen(OD 4.00, AnnexA; modifiedin 1991byOD 4.01)a
cornprehensivencw poticy rnandatingdetailed environmentalassessrnentfor a11
projectslhamay have significantimpactson the environmen[.Bankstaff review
environmental assessrnent findings and negotiate environmentat conditions
(incIudingmitigationplans)wtheBorrower;ihesearethen in'corporaintothe
loandocuments.The Bank's proceduresaresubjectto annual reviewand have
17.34. Generally speaking, since the collapse of the s-ocia~istsystem in
EasternEuropein 1989-1990,there is a general mavernent ta repair the
major negative impactson the environmentof the region caused by the
socialist approach to econornic development through heavy
industrialisation.
7.35. As forstates actingjointly or individuaIly,the re-evaluation of
the sustainable balance to be struckbetween economic growthand the
protection of the environment has led in several cases to the
abandonment of majordampr~jects.~'
7.36. In sharp contrast with the current evolutionof environmental
awareness, the Original Barrage System cornes from another age, in
which anyconsideration for the protection of the environment was
systematicalIy underestimated and subordinated to a namw vision of
developmentcharacterisedbyan effort to maximiseheavy industry.
7.37. The primary Slovakcontention in this case arnountsto a request
ta the Court to return ta this ancienrégimein violationof the law, both
as itwas and as ithas furtherevolved. Faced with suc11a demand,the
Court, theprincipaljudicial organof the UnitedNations, is bound itself
to apply a precautionaryapproach. ,
7.38. Slovakia wants to stop the clock in 1977, ignoring the
fundamental economic, social, political and scientific changes which
have happenes ince S.eenagainstany current criteria used to assess the
impact on the environment of a major project, the Original Barrage
System is a dinosaur. Slovakia cannot reasonably expect the Court to
resurrect it.
proven Io be realisticworkable and instrumentalin helping to imprqvc
devcIopmentplannin gndenvironmentamlanagement.
39
See ScientfiEvaltlaiioIIC-M, vol2,chap 2.5.1describinihemceIIation of
thebarrageatNcuburgiueicirn Gcrmanywhichhad besnagreed toin 1975 in a
ircaiybetwccnFrancand Gemany.Mer doing a seriesolests on tpossibilitics
of scdimentaddition!Oreplaccerodedbed rnaterial,orh countricssignedan
amendmcntstipulatingthat scdimentadditioiuould be carriedou1insteadof
bmge constructioatNeuburgweier.LISTSOFANNEXES VOLUME 2:SCIENTIFICEVALUATION
Page
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 2 RIVERMORPHOLOGYANDRIVERHYDRAULICS
Surnmary
TheNatural System
HistoricalDevelopment
Impactsof theOriginalProject
ImpactsofVariantC
~valuationof ~emedia1Meaçtrres
AlternativeManagemenSttrategies
Conclusions .
CHAPTER 3 SURFACEANDGROtTNDWATER
Surnrnary
3.1 Intraduction
3.2 Surnmary of SurfacWaterHydrology
3.3 SurfaceWaterQuality
- 3.4 Groundwater
3.5 Groundwater QrraIiy
3.5 Bank-FilteredWaterSupplies
CHAPTER 4 FLORAANDFAUNA
4.1 Historical Development
. 4.2 The~atuiaISystem
4.3 EcoIogyof FIoodpIains
4.4 Impactsof the OriginProject
4.5 Impactsof Variant C
4.6 EvaluatioOf Rernedial eastires
SOILS,AGRICULTURE,FORESTRY,FISHERY
CHAPTER5
5.1 Soiis
5.2 Agriculture
5.3 Forestry
5.4 Firhery Page
CHAPTER5 SEISMOLOGYANDGEOLOGY
Siimrnary
6.1 Introduction
6.2 GeologicalandTectonicBackground
6.3 EarthqnakeEngineering
6.4 EarthqrrakDeesign
CHAPTER 7 ENVIRONMENTALIMPACTASSESSMENT (EN)
7.1 TheConceptofEIA
7.2 TheEvolutionof EIA
7.3 SrrstainabIe~evelophent andEIA
7.4 TrendsofIrrtematiol ecision-Makkgn Dams
7.5 LackofEIA onthe GNBProject
7.6 Conclusions
CONTRIBUTORS VOLUME3: LEGALANNEXES
CORRESPONDENB CETWEET NHE PARTIES AND THE ICJ Page
Annex1. Letterfrorn Janos Martonyi, Agent f6rthe Goveriiment of the 1
Republic of Wungary beforethe IrrternationCarrrfofJusticeto
Mr- Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Registrar of the International
Court of Justice, 2 Ma1994
Annex2, Letter from Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Registrar of the 2
InternationalCourt of Justiceto PeterTomka,Agent of the Slovak
RepubricbeforetheIntemationaICourtof Justice, IOMay 1994
An~rex 3. Letter frorrr Jean-Jacques Arnaldez, Deputy Registrar of the 3
InternationalCourtof JusticetPeterTomka,Agent of the Slovak
Republicbeforethe InternationalCourtofJustice,16May 1994
Annex 4. Leiier from Eduardo Valencia-Ospi~la, Registrar of the 4
InternationaCourt of Justiceta Jinos Mar-tonyi,Agent ofthe
ReprrbIicofHungary beforethe Interriational Couof Justice, 8
June 1994
Annex5. Letter from Gyfirgy Szenisi, Co-Agent of the Republic of IO
Hungary before the International Court of Justiceto Eduardo
Valericia-Ospina,Regisirarof the InremationaCourt of Justice,
23 Juiie 1994
Annex6. Letîer from Gyorgy Szénbi, Co-Agent of the Republic of 17
I-Iungarybefore theInternationCorirof JusticetoPeterTomka,
Agent of the SlovakRepublic More rfieInternariona1Court of
Justice23 Jr~ne1994
Annex 7. Letter from Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Registrar of the 22
InternationalCourt of Justice to DénesTomaj, Co-Agent ofthe
RepubIicof Hungarybefore theInternationaICourtof Justice,28
Jnne 1994
Annex 8. Letter from Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Registrar of the 24
International Court of Justice to Denes Tomaj, Co-Agent of t'e
Republic ofHungary beforethe InternationaCourt of Justice5
JuIy1494
Lerter from Eduardo VaIencia-Ospina, Registrar of the 30
InteriiationalCourtof Justice to GyorgySzenasi,Co-Agentof the
Republicof Hungarybefore theInternationalCourtof Justice, 13
July 1994 VOLUME3: LEGAL ANNEFS
CORRESPONDENCEBETWEEN THEPARTIE AND THE ]Cd Page
Annex IO. Letter frorn Eduardo Valencia-Uspina, Registrar of the 33
I~rternationalCouofJustice to Dénes~a'maj,Co-Agent of the
Republicof Hungarybeforethe InternationalCourt of Justice, 18
July 1994
Annex I1. Leîîerhm Peter Tornka,Agent ofthe ~(pvakRepubiic befon
the InternationalCourt of JutoGy&= Szénisi,Co-Agentof
tlre~e~u6Iicof HungarybeforetheIntemafiunalCourt of Justic-
3August 1994
i
Annex 12. Letter from Gyürgy Szénisi, ~s-~~ent] ofthe Republic of
Hungarybeforethe Infarnatic~Coiinoflhstice to PaterTornka,
Agent of the Slovak Reprrblic before the jnternational Corrrt of
Justice,August 1994
Annex13. Letter from Gyorgy Szénasi, Co-Agent,of the Republic of
Hungary before the InternationCouri yf Justice tu Eduardo
. Valencia-Ospina,Regiswarof the IntemationaICourtof Justice,9
Augnst 1994
Annex 14. Letterfrom Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, State Secretary for Foreign
Affairsof the Republicof Hungaryto ~ddardoValencia-Ospina,
Registrarofthe InternationalCoiirt of ~uAuguot91994
I
Annex 15. Lerter from Jean-Jacqrres Amaldez, ~e~uv-~e~isfrar of the
internationaCourtof Justice to Janos Martonyi,Agenof the
RepublicofHungary, 9August 1994
Annex 15. Letter from Gyorgy Szénisi, Co-Agent;of rhe Reptibiic of 48
Hungarybsfore the IritemationalCourtof JustoPeterTorrrka,
Agent of the SIovakRepubIicbefore the!~nternatioCourtof
Justice, August 1994
1
Annex 17 Letter from Gyfirg.SdnSsi, ~o-~~end of the Republic of , 51
Hungary before the Internatio~iaICourt bf Justice to Eduarda
Valencia-Ospina, Registrarof the InternafionaICourt.of Justice,
11August1994
Annex18. Letter fram Jean-Jacques Arnaldez,~d~uty-~e~istraof the 55
International Couri Justicto Gy6rgyi~zknhsi,Agent of the
RepnbIicofHungarybefore theInternationaICourt of Just15e,
Augnst 1994 1
I VOLUME 3:LEGALANNEXES
CORRESPONDEN CETWEET NHEPARTIEA SNDTHEICJ Page
Annex 19. Lettefrom HWAThirlway,ActingRegistmr ofthe International 56
Courtof lustik toGy- Szénirsi, gent of the Republic of
HungarybeforetheInternationCour tfJustice25 Augr~st994
Annex 20. Leifer from HWAThirIway,ActingRegistrarof the International
Court of JustictoGy6rgy Sténisi, Agent of the RepubIicof
HungarybeforetlieInternationalCourtofJustice,25August1994
Annex 21. Lertwkum Gyorgy Szénasi , gent of the Republic of Hungaq
beforetheInternationCourtof Justito PelerTomka,Agentof
the SIovakRepubIicbefure the 1nternationaICourt of Justice, 6
September1994
Letter frornGy6rgySzénisi,Agent of the RepubIof Hungary
before the InternationalCourt of Justice to Eduarda Valencia-
Ospina, Registrarof the International Court of Justice5
September1994
Annex23. Letterhm GyGrgySgnisi, Agent ofthe Republicof Hungary
before the InterrratiunalCourt of Justice to Eduardo Valencia-
Ospina, Registrar of the International Court of Justic6,
Scpterber 1994
Annex24. Letter from Gy6rgy Szénaç, gent of the Republof Hungary
before the InternationalCouofJusticeto Eduardo Valencia-
Ospina, Registrar to the International Courof Justice, 6
September1994
Letter from Eduardo Valencia-Ospina, Registrar of the
Annex 25.
InternationCwrt ofJustice to Gyürgy SzénisiAgent ofthe
RepnbIic of Hungary befure the internationalCouJustice8
September 1'994
Annex 22. Letter hrn Gyorgy Szénasi,Agentofthe Republicof Hungary
before the International Court~eter Tornka,Agent of the
SIovak RepubIic before the InternatioCourt of Justice, 23
September 1994
Annex 27. LetterfromGy6rgy Szenasi,Agentof the Republicof Hungary
before the IniemationaI CourtJustice10 Eduardo Vaiencia-
Ospina, Regisirarof the InternationaI Court of Justice, 23
September 994 VOLUME 3: LEGALANNE~S
CORRESPONDENB CEETWEE NHE PAR~ES ANDTHEICJ Page
I
Annex28. Letter from Eduardo ~alençia-ospina! Registrar of the 76
InternationaI Court of Justice to Gyürgy Szénisi,Agent of the
Republicuf Hungarybeforethe ~nternationhCourtof Justice,27
September1994
I
An~iex29. Letter from Eduardo %alencia-ospina, Rcgistrar of the 78
~nternationaiCourt of JustictoGyür-gySzé~iisi,Agent of the
Republiçof Hungarybeforethe ~nternationkiCourtof Justice, 27
Septernber 1994
Annex30. Lenerfm~Gy~rgySzén~si,Agentofthe~~e~ubiiçof 84ungaiy
before theInterriationCourt of Justice$O EduardoVaIencia-
Ospina, Registrar of tlie InternationaI Court of Justice, 29
September 1994
A~irrex31. Letter from Eduardo ~a~encia-ospinal Registrar of the 85
International Court of JustitoGy6rgy %&nasi,Agent of the
Republic of Hungarybefore the liiteniatioi!alCourt of Justice, 3
October 1994
I
Arinex 32. Letter from Jean-Jacques ArnaIdez, ~ebuq-~e~istrar of the 86
InternationaCourt of Justice to Gy6rgyFasi, Agent of tlie
RepubIicof Hungarybefore the InternationaICourof Justice, 13
Octuber 1994
I
Annex 33. Letter frornGyctrgySzénSsi,Agent of thelRepublic of Hungary 87
before the International Court Justice foEduardo Valen~ia-
Ospina, Regisirarof the IntemationaI Couri of Justice, 17
Octuber 1994 !
I 1
Annex 34. Lefîer frum Peter Tumka, Agent of the ~lbvakRepubIia before 88
the InternationCourt of Justito GyorgySzénhsiA , gentofthe VOLUME3: LEGALANNEXES
DIPLOMAT CC RRESPONDENCE , INUTEOSF
INTERGOIIERNMENTAL MEETMG S,BLICSTATEMENTS AND
INTERNALDOCUMENTS Page
Before 1989
Annex35. Protocolon theNegotiation of theGovernrneritPlenipotentiaries
oftheHungarian RepubIicand the CzechosIovakRepubIic HeId
i~iBudapest on 15-17June 1977 on the Subject of the
Preparatiofor thImplemaitationotheGabzikovo-Nagymaros
Hydroelectric Power Plant-Excerpts andAtîached Rcpurt, 17
June 1977
Annex36. Presidencyof theHungarianAcademyof Science,PositionPaper
Conceming the Scientifically Debated Questions of the
GabCikovo-NagymaroB sarrage System, 20 Decernber 1983
[ThisdocumentrepIaceHM Annexes,Vol 5,Annex 21
Annex 37. Lerter fro~82seMarjai, HrrngarianDeputyPrime Ministeto
Jan, Sze~rtagothai,Chaimanof the HringarianAcademy of
Sciences,19March 1984
Annex3 8. Protocol On the Negotiations of the Government
PIenipotentiarisf the HungarianPeople's Republicand the
CzechoslovakSocialist Republic Concerning the Cu-operation
on the Constrrrctionof the GNBS HeId in Bratislo~i 13-
14Julie I985,1lune 1985
Annex 39. HungarianAeademy of Sciences, Opinion,28 Jun'1985[This
documentreplacesHMAnnexes,Vol 5,Annex31
Annex40. Memorandum On the Negotiationof CornradesStrougaland
16zsef~arjaiHeldOn 19August1985,19August1985
Annex4 1. GovernrnentalResolriti(323811985)On The Curre~iTaçks of
rhe Construction the GabCikovo-NagymarosBarrageSystem,
23August 1985
Annex 42. GovernrnenblDecree111987(ITI.I5),15March1987 VOL= 3: LEGALANNEXES
DIPLOMAT[C CORRESPONDENCE M,INUTEOSF
INTERGOVERNMENT MELETING S,BLICSTATEMEN ANSD
INTERNA I,OCUMENTS Page
An-ex50. Memoranda on the Meetingsof the CornmittEvaluatingthe 166
VariationSolutionof thCzechoslovaPartof thGabEikovo-
Nagymaros Barrage SysternHYDROCONSULT, Bratislava,
September-Novernbe1990
Annex 51. Parliamentary esoluti2611991(IV.23),15April 1991 [This
documentreplacesHMAnnexes,Vol 4,Annex 1541
Annex52. ParliamentarResolutio121992 (IV.41,24 March1992 [This
documentreplacesHMAnnexes,Vol4, Annex 1561
Annex 53.GovernrnentResoIution190119927,May1992[Thisdocument
replacesHMAnnexes,Vol4, Annex1571
Annex54. Hand-writtenNote of F Madl, Minister without Portfolio,
Regardi theProposeclViennaMeeting,16May 1992
Annex55. Nole Verbale From the Ministryof Foreign Affairs of the
Republic ofHungarytothe Embassyof thCzech and Slovak
FederalRepublic,10June 1992 [This documentreplacesKM
Annexes,Vol4,Annex 861
Annex56. LetterFromJanStrasky,CzechoslovaPrimeMinistertoJbzsef
Antall, HungarianPrime Ministe23 September1992 [This
documentreplacesHMAnnexes,Vol 4, Anne961
Annex57. Communiqué of theSlovakMinistry of Environmeto the4
December 1992Sessionof the SlovakGovernme4tDecember
1992 VOLUME 3:LEGALANNEXES
DIPLOMATC IORRESPONDENC ME, UTEOSF
INTERGOVERNMENTA LEETMGS PUBLI SCTATEMEN ATSD
INZRNAL DOCUMENTS Page
Annex58. LetterfromPabloBenavidesE, CDirectorfoExterna lconomic
Relations, to Janos Martonyi, HungarianState Secretaryfor
ForeignAffairs, 19 JuIy 1993[This documentreplaces HM
Annexes,Vol4, Annex 1221
1994
Annex59. ResoIutionof theNationalAssembIyOntheNecessaryMeasures
Due totheUnilateralDiversionof the Danube,29 Ma1994
Annex60. Note Verbalefrorn the Ministryof Foreign'~oftheSlovak
Republicta the Embassyof the RepubIic of Hungary,8 ApriI
1994
Annex6 1. LetterfromJhnos Martonyi,HungariaStateSecretaryof State,
- to Pablo Benavides,Directorate-Generlf External PoIitical
ReIationof the CEC,14ApriI1994
Annex 62. Note Verbulefrornthe Ministryof Foreign~ffatheRepubliç
ofHungary totheEmbassyoftheSlovak Republi14April1994
Annex63 Note Verbalefromthe MinistrofForeignAffairofthe SIovak
Repubiic to the Embassy of the Republic of Hungary,
27 April1994
Annex 64. Letterfrom, J Hauser,Slovak Representatito the Danube
Commission, to M H Strasser,irec ci General of the
Secretaria,8April1994
Annex65. Note Verbalefromthe MinistryoForei gffairsof theRepublic
of HungarytotheEmbassyofthe SlovakRepubIi4May1994
Annex66. Nole Verbalefromthe Ministryof ForeignAffaiofthe SIovak
ReptrbIitothe EmbassyoftheRepubfiofHungary8, May1994
Annex67. Note VerbalefromtheMinistryofForeignAffairoftheRepublic
ofHungary totheEmbassyof theSlovakRepublic,16May1994 VOLUME 3:LEGALANNEXES
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENC E ,Nu'I-ES '
INTERGOVERNMENTAL MEETINGS,PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND
INTEPNAD LOCUMENTS Page
Anrrex58. Note Verbalefromthe Ministryof ForeigrrAffofrhe SIovak 224
Republicta the Embassyof the Republicof Hungary,25 May
1994
Arrnexb9. Mofe Verholefronithe Ministry of Foreign Affairof the 225
RepubIic ofHrrngaryto the Embassyof the SIavakRepubIic,
27 May 1994
Annex70. Nofe Verbalefrom theMinistryof ForeignAffairofthe SIovak 228
Republic tothe Embassyof the Republic of Hrrngary,8Jrrne
1994
Annex 71. Conventionon Co-operationfor the ProtectionandSustainable232
Use oftheDanubeRiver(DanubeRiver ProtectionConvention),
July1994
Annex 72. Resolution (and Reporîof the Governrnent of the SIovak 284
RepubIic Concerning Disprifed Issues of the GabEikovo-
Nagymaros BarrageSystem and the GovernmentProposalin
ConnectionWiththeFutureCourseof Action,7July1994
Arinex73. Mernorialon the ExpertTaIksHeIdin Bratislavaon5 Augrrst 297
I994,24Augrrst 1994
Annex74. Letter from C Martin, Director Generaof the WWF, to D 298
Kocinger, Slovak Government Commissioner for GNBS,
3 October1994 -
Annex 75. WWF Press RereaseReaffiming the Organisation'sConcern 300
Aboutthe GabEikovoDam,4 October 1994 VOLUME3: LEGAL ANNEXES
MISCELLANEOUS
Page
Annex 76. TheEcunomisf,(EuropeanEdilion),8 December1984 301
I
Annex77. ReutersLibvaryReport,1 March1988 302
l
Annex 78. CzechosiovaSW33, 1September1988 1 303
l
Annex79 BRC, Surnmary of World Bruadcas~s,rElWOO95 AI],21 304
September1989
Annex80. BBC, Strrnrnarof Worid ~raadcastk, BEN0093 AI, ,,305
7 September1989 II
I
Annex8 1. BBC, Summav of WarldBroadcast~,~4099 Ail,!9 Ocfober 306
1989
l
Annex 82. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts,~E~WOIOO Ail, 25 307
Oclober 1989
Annex 83. BBC, Surnmaryof World Broadcasts, 'EEIWO 105 Ail, 30 308
November 1989
Annex 84. BBC,Sumrnary ofWoridBroadcasts,EEWOI09 Ail, Janrrary 309
1990
Annex 85. BBC,Summary ofWorldBroadcasts,~~10809C1Il, 6 Ju1990 310
Annex86. PowerEurope,27 Septernber1990 1 311
I
Annex87. BBC, Srirnmarof WorIdBroadcasts, EElf1989B/6Febrtiary 312
' 1991
!
Annex88. BBC, Surnmary of World ~roadcasis,EE10999 A215, 313
18Febmary 1991
Annex89. BBC, Sumrnary of World Broadcart~$i1037 A212,4 April 315
1991 VOLUME 3: LEGALANNEXES
MISCELLANEOUS Page
Annex 91..BBC, Summaryof WorldBroadcasts,EE11146815, 1 August 317
1991
Annex92. GabEikovo: the Case Agains, East Europenn Observer, 318
September-Ocfober1992
Annex 93. East-West Centre, "Slovakia.The GabEikovoWater Works", 325
Januaty1993
Annex 94. Internationaltomic EnergyAgency, Document PR 9417, 10 349
May 1994
351
Annex 95. BBC,Strmmaiyof WorIdBraadcasfs,EElO476A211,7 Jury 1989
Annex 96. BBC, Summary of Worid Broadcasts, EEll527 1, 352
2 November1992 VOLUME 4:SCIENTIFXC &PORTS
PART 1 t Page
Annex 1. Becfitel Envirumental, Inc., ~nvir~nmenhlEvaluation of the 3
GabCikovo(Bos)/ NagyrnarosRiver Barrage Syste~n,February,
1990 I
Annex 2. 1. Mucha, Gabfikovo-WWF,Pros and Cons, Bratislava,~~ril 204
1994
Annex3. J. Losing, Excerpts from The ~ab~iko?a-~a~~maror Project 339
Impacts On Nature And On The ~alanc!eOf Nature, Essen,
Nove~nber 1986
Anrrex4. WorId WildIife Fnnd, Excerpts frum ~os<tioi akenby WWF 349
(WorId WiIdIfieFrrnd)with Regard to théGabEikovo Barrage
Project,RastatAugust 1989
Annex5. M. BaEik and J. Kali:, SiltingProblem Arising With The 355
Realisation Of The GabEikovoWate~cheme ,ratislava,October
1991
Annex6. K. Kern,ImpactsOf Th¢~ab~ikovo/Nagy~arosProjectOn River 373
MorphoIogy,Fluvial HydraulicsAndHabitats,KarIsruhe,FRG,
August 31,1994 1
' Annex7. K. Kern, Non-Structural SolutionsTo ~&erbed Degradation-
419
ExperiencesFramThe Upper Rhine And The AustrianDanube,
l Karlsruhe ,RG, September9, 1994 I
Aiineu8. 1.Lauay, Traditional SolutioTGThe ~ahi~ationalProbIarnnIn 436
The SzigetkozSkefch Of The Danube,~ud&est,August4, 1994
I
Annex9. 1. Laczay, FIood Protection and the GabCikovo-Nagymarcis 445
Project, Budapest,5thOctobe1994
i VOLUME 4: SCENTIFIC REPORTS
PART 2 Page
Annex 10. A. Berczik,ImpactAssessrnentStudyOn The GabEikovo- 473
NagymarosWaterPowerSystem,SurfaceWaters,Vacrhtbt- Cod,
November, 1989
Annex II. 1. Mucha, DanrrbianLowIand - GrotrrWaRr Mode1(Annex 2 493
frornPHARE),Bratislava,Augnst1993
Annex 12. JC Refsgaard, An Integrated Eco And Hydrodynamic Mode1For 512
Prediction Of Wetland Regime In The Danubian Lowland Under
Alternative Operation StrategiesFor The GabEikovoHydropower
Plant, London,Jun1994
Anriex 13. L.Somlylidy,WaterquaIity issuesconcerningthe GNBS:Models 528
andapplicability, Budape1988
Annex 14. Kalkowski, What is the Impact of Special Weirs on the 656
GroundwaterLevels? Proven for the area of the Barrage Rhinau,
Freiburg,July 1986
Annex 15. W. Krarrse, G. Hugin, EcologicaI Effects of the Management 567
System of Connected Side Brarrcheç (Dernonstrafed by the
Exampleof the Regdation of SidBranches of thRiver Rhine),
Stuttgar1937
Annex 16. J. Loesing, The ~unctionin~Of Floodplain Ecosystems. Review 671
Of The Upper Rhine Floodplains Ecosystems, Karlsruhe,
September 16,1994
Annex 17. F. Mdsziroç, T. Simon, L. Ronkay, A. Vida, A. BiIdi, The 724
CharacrerisarionOAnd The Threat To TerrestriAnd PartiaIIy
Aquatic Habitats,The Impact Of GNBS And WithinThat, Of
Variant "CiBudapest,September1994
Annex18. F.MeszAros,T. Simon, L. Ronkay, A. Baldi andA. Vida, The 746
Description of the EcologicaValues ofdie Szigetkoz Inland
DeIta,Budapest,Octuber1494
Annex 19. T. Simon, M. Szabh, R. Draskovits, 1. Hahn & A. Gergely, 758
EcaIagicaIAnd PhytosocioIogicI hangesInThe Willow Woods
Of Szigetkoz,NW Hungary,ln ThePast 60 Years,Budapest, 1993
Annex 20. SummaryReport.Damageand Risksto Agricultural Productivity
767
in theSzigetkozduto thediversionof he Danube,1994 VOLUME 4:SCIENTIFIC 1
Page
Annex21. 2. 'Balla, Deep Simcture and Seis ic Hazard of fhe 783
GabEikovolNagyrnarosegion,Budapest , itember, 1994
Annex 22. 1. Bandar, Effect of Local Geologic: Conditions on the 834
AccelerationsExpecteintheArea,bu da^ it1992
Annex23. Hens,TheGabCikovo- NagymarosProjec inEvaluationOf The 845
Hungarian GabEikovo - Nagymaros ivironmental Impact
Studies,Brussel*Marc1994 VOLUME 5:COWUR PLATES
Plate 1.1 Environmental Impact Area of the GabEikovo-Nsgyrnaro Bsarrage
SystemOriginalPlan.Scale 1:300,000
Plate 13 Environmental 1hpact Area of the GabEikovo-NagymaroB çarrage
SystemVariantC. Scale 1:300,000
PIate2.1 Changes of the Danube Riverbed, WaterIeveI and Dredging Depth
betweenRajkaandGonyii
Plate 2.2 Dyke Systemsinthe Szigetkoz
.PIate3.1 The Effect of the ImpIernentationof Variant C: Changes in the
. ManfhlyAverageFlow-rate,1991 -1994. ScaIe 1:75,000
Plate3.2 ThicknessoftheNear-surfaceAquifer. Scale1 :300,000
Plate3.3 Thickness oftheMainAquifer. Scale1:300,000
Plate3.4 Tfiicknessof the Fine-grainedFIoodpIainSedirnentwScal1:175,000
PIate3.5 Average Regionai Grolrndwater LeveI Measured in 1990. ScaIe
1:300,000
Plate 3.6 AverageGroundwater DepthMeasuredin 1990.Scale 1 :175,000
PIate3.7 AverageGroundwaterDepth andFI uctuatioriMeasuredbetween 1955
and 1960.ScaIe 1:175,000
Plate3.8 Bank-frltereWellsinthe~onyü-~agymarosReach. Scale 1:300,000
Plate3.9 Bank-filteredWellFieldsDownstreamofNagymaros.Scale 1 :175,000
Plate3.10 Grotrndwatertevel Simulations(OriginalProject,200m3/sDischarge).
Scale1:175,000
Plate3.11 PredicteCIianges inGroundwater Level duetu theImpletnentatiorof
the OriginalProject (with 200 m3/s and 50 m3/s Discharge in the
Danube).Scale 1:175,000
Ptate3.12Condition of Sub-irrigation othe Covering Lay& (Simrrlationbefore
and afier theImplernenrationof theOriginalProject).Sc1:175,000
Plate3.13 ilifferences in Groindwater Levels before and after the
ImplementationofVariant C. Scale:175,000
Plate3.14 Groundwater Levels Measuredin August 1993 (Average Situation).
Scak 1:175,000PIate3.15Reductive and OxitIativeRecharge ~oneb before alid after Damtning
(Estimates of the NaturaIStatearrd fliImplernentation of the
OriginaIProject). ScaI1:175,000
Plate 3.16 PredictedChangesinGroundwatérLevel(lueto the Irnplernentationof
the Original ProjectUncertainty due tc!Inîreased Clogging. Scale
1:I75,000
I
Plate 4.1 Important Areas for FIora, Fauna and the Szigetkoz Biofogical
MonitoringSystem. ScaIe 1:175,000 I
I
Plate 4.2 Impactof VariantC onFloodplainWater ~odies.Scale 1:175,000
l
Plate 4.3 Ichthyological Categories oWater ~~sthrnsin the Szigetkoz. Scale
1:175,060
l
Plate 5.1 Soi1Classificationofflie Szigetkoz.ScaI:175,000
l
Plate 5.2 Species Composition of Commercial (a) kndRecreational(3) Fishery
on theUpperStretchof theHungarian~dubI between 1968and 1993
Plate 53 (a) Proportionof Commercial and ~eclional Fishery on the Upper
Stretch of the Hungariari Danube between 1976 and 1993 (3).
QuanfItativeChangesof Commercial aridR l ecreational Caiches ithe
Szigetk oeween 1988and 1993 1
Plate 5.4 Ichthyologicai Funçtional Units of the dight ~lood~lainAdjacent;o
1832-1838riverkm before (a) and after (3) the Irnplementation of
Varimr C (1992and 1994)
PIafe 6.1 Depth of the Pre-TertiarBasement i
I 1 291
1
SUBMISSIONS
On the basis of the evidenca nd IegaI argument presented in tfie
Mernorialand rhisCounter-Me~noriaI ,lieRepriblicof Hrrngary
Regrresrsrhe C~urr to a4udge anddeclare
Firsr, that the Republic of Hungary was entitled to suspend and
çubseqrrent1yabandon the works orithe NagyrnarosProject and onthe
part of the Gabeikovo Project for which tfie Treaty attributed
responsibi1itytuthe Republicof Hungary;
Second, that the Czechand SlovakFederal Republicwas not entitled to
proceedtothe "provisional solution"(darnmingup of the Danubeat river
kilometre 185I .7on Czechoslovakterritoryand reçulting consequences
onwater and navigation course);
Third, that by its Declaration of 19 May 1992, Hungary validly
terminated the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of ûre
GabEikovo-NagymarosBarrageSysternof 16Septernber 1977;
RegrtestsrheCourf fondjudg aend declarcftlr~her
tlratthe legal consequencesof thesefindingsandof the evidence and the
argumentspresenred to theCourtare asfollows:
that the Treaty of IG Septernber 1977has never been in force
(I)
betweentheRepublicof Hungaryandthe SlovakRepublic;
(2) that the SIovakRepublic bears responsibilily to the Republic of
Hungary formaintaining in operation the "provisional solution"
referredto above;
(3) that the Slovak Republic is internationally responsiblefor the
damageand loss suffered by the Republic of Hungary and by its
nationalsas a resultofthe "provisionalsu1rriton";
(4) that the SIovakRepubIic içunder an obligationto makerepararion
in respectof such damage aridIoçs,the aniortnrof such reparation,
if itcannot be agreed bythe Parties withinsix rnonthsof the date
ofthe Judgementof theCourt, tu be deterrnined bythe Court;(5) thattheSlovakRepuhlicinundertheiol1o~ingobligations:
(a) to return the waters of the Danube to theircourse dong the
internationalfronfier betweenthe of Wungaryand the
SlovakRepublic, that is to say thé navigablechanne1as
definedby applicabletreaties;
to restoretheDanubeto thesituationitwkç inpriorto theputting
(b)
intoeffectof theprovisionalolution;andI
(o) to provide appropriateguara&s againAtthe repetition of the
damageand loss sufferedby the ~e~ublibof Hungaryand by its
AgentforrheGovernmenioftheRepubJic of~zi&my~
1
16November 1994 0
AkadérniaNyomda, Budapesr,
Printedin Hungary
Counter-Memorial of the Republic of Hungary