Written Statements (The Netherlands, Poland, Pakistan, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, France, Finland, Yugoslavia)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

PLEADINGS,ORALARGUMENTS,DOCUMENTS

LEGALCONSEQUENÇES FORSTATESOF THE

CONTlNUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN
NAMIBIA(SOUTHWEST AFRICA)

NOTWTTHSTANDINGSECWRlTY COUNClL
RESOLUTlON 276(1970)

VOLUME 1
Request for Advisory Opinion, Documents, Written Statements

COUR INTERNATIONALDEJUSTICE

MÉMOIRES, PLAIDOIRIESET DOCUMENTS

CONSEQUENC JERIDIQUESPOUR LES ÉTATSDE
LA PR~SENCECONTlNUE DE L'AFRFQUEDU SUD

EN NAM1BIE(SUD-OUEST AFRICAIN)
NONOBSTANT LA RÉSOLUTION 276 (1970)
DU CONSEIL DE SECURITE

VOLUME 1

Requttpour avconsultadocumentsexposkcrits CONTENTS IX

Page
. . c) 1969(jusqu'ila vingt-quatritme sessionl'kssemblte
gknkraleinclusivement).............. 38
3. Autres résolutionspertinendes1'AssemblCegénérale . . 38

C. Documentation du Conseilkconomique et societ delaCom-
mission des droits de l'homm.............. 34
1. Documents de la Commission des droitdeI'hoinme ... 39
2 et3. Documents et résoIutionsdu Conseil économiqueet
social ....................... 40
CONTENT OSF THEDOSSIER ................... 42

Writtenstatements. Exposésécrits
WRITTEN STATEME NFTTHE SECRETARY.GEN LERFATHE UNITED
NATIONS .......................... 75

1. Introduction......................
The question before the Cou...............
The meaning and scope of the question..........
The issuestobe examined ................

II. International obligations concerning Nam........
Obligations derived frorn the mandates sy........
Obligations derived frorn the CharttheoUnited Nations. .
Other sources of legal obliga..............
The special respansibiliofethe United Nations towards the
people and Territory of Nanlibi............
The role of the General Assembl.............
The right of the people of Namibia to self-deterniination and
independence .....................
III. The continuepresenceof South Africa in Namibia.....
The basis Forthe South African presen..........

The role of the Securfty Coun..............
The illegal occupatio..................
The responsibility ofSouAfricn .............
IV.The legal consequences for Stat.............
The territoriauthority .................
Diplornatic. consular and other relat..........
International treaties and agreemen...........
"Dealings" and commercial. investment and tourist activ.ties
Correlative obligatio..................
V. Conclusion .......................

Annex A. Resolutions adopteby the General Assembly with spe-
cificreference to Namibia (South West Afric........
Anncx B. Acts of the South African Parliament purpotoapply
to Namibia. and enacted. or purportedly extendeto Namibia
after October 1966 ....................
REVIEW OFTHE PROCEEDIN OCSTHE ÇENERAL ASSEMBL YND OF THE
SECUK~TC YOUNCI RELATINC TO THETERMINATI OFNTHE MANDATE
FOR Nn~rsra AND SUBSEQUEA NTTION (SUBMITTE TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OFJUSTIC EN BEHAL FF THESECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS )..................X NAMlBlA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)

Page
Tntroduction ....................... 123

1. Proceedingsof the General Assemblywhichled to the adop-
tion of resolution 2145 (XXI) ............. 124
Consideration of the question of South West Africa as a
mütter of priority ................. 124
Documents before the General Assemblyin connection with
the item...................... 124
(1) Report ofthespecialcorninittee andreport of thesub-
cornmittee on South West Africa ......... 124
(2) Dsaft resolutions and amendments ........ 125

(a) Draft resolution A/C.483 and Add. 1-3 and
arnendmenis which were adopted ....... 125
(b) A sub-amendment to the amendments containe...
document AIL.488. which was not adopted ... 129
. . (c) A draFt resolution which was not adopted 130
Adoption of General Assernblyresolution 2145 (XXI) and
. detailsof the voting ................ 130
. Summary of viewsexpressedin the debate ....... 131
(1) Statemento made in introducing draft resolution
AlL.483 and Add . 1-3 .............. 131
(2) Statement made in introducing amendments proposed
in document A1L.488 .............. 131
(3) Statemenrs made in the course of discussion .... 131

(a) Sponsors of draft resolution AIL.483and Add .
1.3 .................... 131
(b) tion AlL.483 and Addd .n1-3 but whichafvotedoin-
..~ favour of the draft resolution ........ 133

(i) Eastern European States ......... 133
(ii) Western European and other States .... 135
(1) Western.European States ....... 135
(2) Other States ............ 137
(iii) Asian and AfricanStates ........ 140
(iv) Latin AmericanStates ......... 141
(cl Delegations which abstained in the vote .... 143

(i) France ................ 143
(ii) United Kingdom ............ 144
(dj Dclegations which voted against the drafr reso-
lution AlL.483 and Add. 1-3 and the amend-
ments in document AIL.488 ......... 145
(i) Portugal ............... 145
(ii)South Africa.............. 145

General observations on resolution 2145 (XXI) ..... 146
II.Proceedingsof the Ad Hoc Cornmitteefor South West kffica
estabrished bj, resolutio2145 @XI) of the General Assern-
bly ......................... 147 CONTENTS iY1'

Page
.Proposais submitted.to theAd Hoc Cornmittee . . . . . 147
.(O) Proposa] by Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and the
.United Arab Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
. .(b) Proposal by Chile and Mexico . , . . . . . . . . 148
.(cj Proposai by Canada, Italy and the United States . . 148
Transmission OF the three proposalsto the General Assem-
bly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
The propositions underlying ail-three proposals . . . . . 148
Differencesof view on praciical action . . . . . . . . . 149
Subjects on which unaniniity of viewexisted in the Ad Hoc
Cornmittee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
, Proceedingsof thefifthspecialsessionof the General Assem-
.blywhich led to the adoption of resolution 2248(S-Vjof 19
May 1967. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Documents before the General Assemblyin connection with
theitem report of the Ad Hoc Cornmittee for SouthWest
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Draft resolutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
Draft resolution AIL.516IRev. 1 . . . . . . . . . . 150
Draft resolution AlL.517 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Adoption of resolution 2248 (5-V) . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Szatementsinthe generaldebaieand explmations ofvote. . 151
Sraiements by CO-sponsors of draft resolution AIC.5161
Rev. t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Statements by delegations which voted in favourof but
did not CO-sponsordraft resolution AIL.516IRev. I . . 153
'Statetnentsby permanent membersafthe Security Council
abstaining in the vote upon draft resolution AIL.5161
Rev. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 154
Statements by Western European and other States (other
than permanent members of the Security Council) ab-
stainingin thevote.upon draft remlution A/L.516/Rev.
1 ....................... 154
Stingminthe vote upon draft resolution A./L516/Rev. I. . 156
Statements by members of the Eastern European group
abstaining in the vote upon draft resoIution A/L.S16/
Rev. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
Statement opposing the adoption ofdraft resolution AIL.
5161Rev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 157
Statements by delegations absent durlng the vote upon
draft-resolution AIL.SI6IRev. 1 . . . . . . . . . . 157
General observations on General Assenibly resolution 2248
(S-v> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . 157
, Survej~of General Assembly resolutions relatingto Namibia
adopted subsequent ta GeneraI Assembly resolutions 2145
(XXI} and 2248 (S-V) , . .. . . .;. . . . . . . . . . 158
Resolutions 2324 (XXri) and 2325 (XXII) of 16 December
1967 . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)
Page
Resolution 2324 (XXII) ............... 158
Resolution 2325(XXII) ............... 158

Resolution 2372 (XXIl) of 12June 1968 ........ 158
Resolution 2403 {XXILl)of 16 December 1968...... 159
Resolution 2498{XXIV) of 31 October 1969 ....... 159
ResoIution 2678[XXV)of 9 December 1970....... 150
V .Praceedings leading fo Security Council resolution 245
(1968) ....................... 160
Request for a meeting of the Security Counci...... 160
Meeting ofthe Security Council ............ 161
Documents before the Securjiy Council in çonnection with
the question considere............... 161
Adoption of Security Cowncil resolution 245 (1968.... 161
Sumrnaryof viewsexpressed inthe debate........ 161
General observations on Security Council resolution 245
(1968) ...................... 163
VI .Proceedings leading to Secürity Council resolution 246
(1968) ...................... 164
Request for a meeting of the Security Counci...... 164
Meetings of the SBcurityCouncil ............ 164
Documents befor e.the Security Council......... 164

(b) Draft resolutioSI8429pand amendments... ..... 164
184
Adoption of Seruriiy Council resolution 246 (196.... 166
Provision in resolution 246(1968) referrito General As-
sernblyresolution 2145 (XXT) ............ 166
Summary of vicwsexpressed in the debat........ 166
Statesrnot members of the Security Council....... 170
General observations on Security Council resolution 246
(1968) ...................... 171

VI1 .Proceedings leading to Security Council resolution 264
(1969) ...................... 171
Request for a meeting ofthe Security Council...... 171
Meetings of the Security Council............ 171
Documents before the Security Council ......... 172
Communications .................. 172
Draft iesolution.................. 172
Adoption of Security Council resolution 264(1969).... 173
Summary of views expressed in the deba........ 173
General observations on Security Corincil resolution 264
(1969) ...................... 177

VIII. Proceedings leading ro Security Council resolution 269
(1969) ...................... 177
Request for ameeting of the Security Council ...... E77
Meetings of the Security Counci............ 178
Documents before the Securiry Council......... 178 Page
. Les responsabilitéssptciales des ,Nations UniAs l'égarddu
peuple et du territoire de la Nami........... 217
Le rblede I'Assembliegknérale .............. 218
Le droit du peuple de Namibia I'autodetermination et il'indé-
pendance ....................... 220

III. La prksencecontinue de l'Afriquedu Sud en Namibie.... 225
A quel titrel'Afrique duSud est présen.......... 225
. Le r8le du Conseil de sécuri............... 237
L'occupation illéga................... 234
La responsabilitde l'Afriquedu Sud ........... 235
IV .Conséquencesjuridiques pour les Etats .......... 237

Autoritéterritariale................... 237
Relations diplomatiques, cansulaires et au........ 238
Traitks et accords internationau............. 239
CRelations))et activitésrelatives au commercaux investisse-
ments etau tourisme .................. 241
Obligations correspondantes ............... 242
V . Conclusion....................... 245
'
Annexe A: Résolutionsadoptées par l'Assembléegknéraleconcer-
nant expressernentla Namibie (Sud-Ouestafricai....... 247
Annexe B: Lois adoptéespar le Parlement sud-africain ecensées
s'appliquer Ala Namibiequi ont ktépromulguéesen Nainibie ou
dont l'application aurait étéétendaela Nainibie après octobre
.1966 ........................... 252

ETUDE DES DEBAT DE L'ASSEMBLÉ CE~NÉRALE ETDU CONSEI LE SECU-
RITRELATIFSÀ LA CESSATIONDU MANDAT SUR LA NAMIB ITMESURES
PRISESX LA SUITE DE CEDEBAT SDOCUMENT SOUMIS A LACOUR INTER-
NATIONALE DE JUSTIC EU NOM DU SECR~TAT AIRN~RA DE L'ORGA-
NISATION DESNATIONU SNIES) ................. 260
Intfoduction ........................ 260

. 1. Débats qui ont conduit i l'adoption de la résolution2145
(XXI) de l'AssembléegénCrale.............. 261
Examende la question du Sud-Ouest africaien prioritk . . 261
Documents dont l'Assembléegénéraleétait saisieAl'occasion
de l'examen delaquestion .............. 261
1) Rapport du Comitéspécialet rapport du Sous-Comitédu
Sud-Ouest africai.................. 261
2) Projets de resolutions et amendement......... 262

a) Projet de résolutionAIL.483 et Ad.1 à 3 et amende-
ments quiont étéadoptés ............. 262
h) Sous-amendement aux amendements contenus dans le
document AIL.448,qui n'a pas étéadopté ...... 267
c,JProjet de rtsolution qui n'a pastté ado...... 267
Adoption de la résolution2145 (XXI) de I'Assernbltegénérale
et analyse du vote.................. 267
Résumédes vuesexpriméeslors du débat ......... 268

1) Dkclarations faiteà l'occasionde la prksentation du
projetde résolutioAIL.483 et Add .1 A3 ...... 268 CONTENTS XV
Page

2) Déclarations faites lors de la présentation des amende-
ments proposésdans le doçunient AIL.488 ...... 268
3) Déclarationsfaites au coursde la discussion ..... 259
a) Par lesauteurs du projet de résolutionAjC.483et Ad.
1à 3 ..................... 269
b) Par des délégations quine figuraient pas au nombre
des auteurs du projet de résofutionAIL.483 et Add .
1 3 mais qui ont votéen sa faveur ....... 271
i)Eiats de l'Europe de l'Est .......... 271
fi) Etats de L'Europede l'Ouest et autres Etais. 273
1) Etats de l'Europede l'Oum ........ 273
...............
2) Autres Etats 275
iii} Eiats d'Asie ed'Afrique ........... 278
iv) Etats d'Amériquelatine ........... 279
rJ Par des dklégationsqui s'étaientabstenues lors du
vote ..................... 281
i) France................... 281
ii) Royaume-Uni ............... 282

d) Par des délégationsui avaient votécontre leprojet de
résolutionAjL.483 et Add .1 à 3et les amendements
figurant dans le documentAIL.488 ........ 284
i) Portugal.................. 284
ii) Afrique du Sud ............... 284
Observations généralesconcernant la résolution2145 (XXL) . 284

II.Débatsdu Comitéspècialpour le Sud-Ouest africain cré6 en
application de la sesalution 214(XXI) de l'Assemblée gèné-
rale ......................... 285
Propositions presentéesau Comitéspécial ......... 286
a) Proposition présentéepar I'Ethiopie.le Nigéria.la Rtpu-
blique arabe unie et le Sénegal........... 286
b) Proposition présenttepar le Chili et le Mexique.... 286
c) Proposition prksentée par le Canada. les Etats-Unis
d'Amérique etI'Italie ............... 287
Comm~inicationdes trois propositions à l'Assembléegénérale 287
Conclusions sur lesquellesreposaientlestrois proposition. . 287
Divergences de vues quant aux mesures pratiques ..... 287
Questions ayant fait l'unanimitéau sein du Comitéspécial. . 288

111. Débats de l'Assembléegénérale (cinquième sessioe nxtraordi-
naire) qui ont aboutia l'adoptionde liartsolution 2248 (S-V)
du 19mai 1967 .................... 288
Documents dont 1'Assernblee giniraleÇtaftsaisiea l'occasion
de l'examen dela question .............. 289
Rapport du Comitéspécialpour le Sud-Ouest africain . . 289
Projetsde rksolution ................. 289
Projet de résolutionAIL.51GIRev 1 .......... 289
Projet de rksolution AIL.517. ............ 289XVI NAMIBIA (SOUTPIWEST AFRICA)

Page
Adoption de la rtsolutiori22448(CS-V). . . . . . . . . . . 290
Déclarationsfaites au cours de la discussion gtnéraleerexpli-
cations de vote. . . . . . , . . . . . , . . . . . . . 240
Déclarationsfaites par des délégations iîgiiranau nombre
des auteurs du projet de résoIutionA/L.516/Rev. I . . . 290
Déclarationsfaites par des délégationqs uiont votéenfaveur
du projet de réso4utionAlL.5 1GIRev.1 mais qui ne figu-
raient pas au nombre de ses auteurs . . . . . . . . . 292
Déclarations faitespar les membres permanents du Conseil
de stcurite qui se sont abstenus lors duvore sur le projet
de résolutionAIL.516lRev. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Dkclarations faites par des Etats de l'Europe de l'Ouest et
par d'autres Etats(autres que les membres permanents du
Conseil de sécurité)qui se sont abstenus lors du vote sur
Ieprojet de rksolution A/L.S16/Rev. 1 . . . . . . . . 294
Déclarations faites par des membres du Croupe afro-asia-
résolutionAIL.5161Rev.enu1 .o. .du. . .. su. .e.pr. . . . 295
Déclarations faitespar les Etats de l'Europe de l'Est quise
sont abstenus lors du votc sur le projet de rksolution
A/L.Sl6jRev. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Otclaratian Faitepar unedéltgationopposéeAl'adoption du
projet de rtsolution AlL.516IRev. 1 . . . . . . . . . 296
Dtclarations faites par des dtlégationsabsentes lors du vote
sur le projet de résolutioAIL.5161Re 1v... . . . . . 296
Observations générales concernant la résolution2248 (S-V) de
l'Assembléegénérale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
IV. Etude des rksolutions adoptées par l'Assembléegknérqale au
sujet dela Namibie postérieurement aux résolutions2145(XXT)
et2248 (S-V) de l'Assembléegénérale, . . . . . . . . . . 297
Résolutions2324(XXII)et2325(XX 16dI)cdembre1967 . 297

Résolution2325 (XXII) .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . . 297

Rtsolution 2372(XX11)du 12juin 1968. . . . . . . . . . 298
Résolution2498 (XXIV) du 3 11octobre 196968. .. .. .. . . .. 299
Résolution2678 (XXV) du 9 décembre1970 . . . . . . . . 299

V. D6bats qui ont abouti à I'adoption de la résolution245(1968)
du Conseil de sécurité . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Demande de réuniondu Conseil de sécurité . . . . . . . . 300
Réuniondu Conseil de sécurité . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Documents dontleConseiIde stcurité étaitsaisipour l'examen
de la question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Adoption de la résolution245 (1968) du Conseil de séciaité. 301
Observations généraleseconcernant la rksolution 245 (1958) du1
Conseil de sécuritt . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 303

VI. Débats quiont abouti l'adoption de la résolution246 (1968)
du Conseil de sécurité . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 COmENTS XVII
Page

Demande de réunion du Conseil de sécurité ........ 303
Documents dont le Conseilcudetsécuritéétait sais...... 304

a) Lettres et rapports ................ 304
b) Projet de résolution SI8429et amendements ..... 304
Adoption de la résolution 246 (1968) du Conseilde sécurité . 306
Dispositions de la résolution 246 (1968) se référanta la résolu-
tion 2145 (XXI) de l'Assembléegénérale ........ 306
Résumédesvues exprimées au cours de Ia discussion .... 306
Ems membres du Conseil de sécurité.......... 307
Erats non membres du Conseil de skcurité ........ 310
Observations générales coricernant la résolution 246 (1968) du
Conseil de sécurité .................. 311

VIT. Débats qui ont abouti a l'adoption de la résolution 264(1469)
du Conseil de stcuritt .................
Demande de rkunion du Conseil de sécurité ........
Réunions du Conseil de sécurité .............
Documents dont le Conseil de sécuritéétait saisi......
Lettres .......................
Projet de résolution .................

Adoption de la résolution 264 (1969) du Conseil de stcurité .
Rksumtdes vues exprirnkes au cours de la discussion ....
Observations généralesconcernant la résolution 264 (1969) du
Conseil de sécurité ..................
VI11. Débats quiont abouti a l'adoptionde la résolution 269 (1969)
du Conseil de sécurité .................
Demande de réunion du Conseil de sécurité ........
Réunions du Conseil de sécurité .............
Documents dont le Conseil de sécuritkétait saisi......
Lettres et rapporis ..................
Projet dc rksol~ition .................

Adoption de la résolution 269 (1969) du Conseil de sécurité .
Résumédes vues expriméesau cours de.la discussion ....
Observations généralesconcernant la résolution 269 (1969) du
Conscil de sécurité ..................
IX. Débats qui ont abouti l'adoption de la résolution76 (1970)
du Conseil de sécuriit .................
Demande dc rkunion du Conseil de stcurité ........
Rkunions du Conseil de sécurité .............
Documents dont le Conseil desécuritéétait saisi ......
Lettres et rapports .................. 324
Projet de résolution ................. 325

Adoption de la résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil destcurité . 326
Résumé desvues expriméesau cours de la discussion .... 326
Observations généralesconcernant la résolution 276 (1470) du
Conseil de sécurité .................. 331XVIII NAMIBIA (SOUTH WESTAFRICA)

Page
X .Débatsqui ont abouta l'adoption de la résolution283 (1970)
du Conseildesécuritk ................. 332

Demande deréuniondu Conseil de skcuri........ 332
Réuniondu Conseil de sécurit............. 332
Documents dant le Conseil de sécurittesais...... 332
Rapport du Sous-Comitk ad ho............ 332
Projets de rCs~luti................. 332

i) Projet de résoluSI9891............ 332
ii) Projde résolutionSI989............ 333
Adoption dela résolution283 (1970) du Conseil de séc.r333
Resunnedes vues exprimaes acoursde ldiscussion.... 333
Observations généralsoncernantIarésolution283(1970)du
Conseilde sécurit.................. 337
XI .Debats qui ont abouti hl'adoptdenla résoIution284(1370)
du Conseil de sécurité 338
..................
Débats auseindu Sous-Coniitad lzo........... 338
Débats du Conseil de sécuratsa1550'séarice ...... 341
XII. Résuméde l'étudedes débats.............. 344

Annexe concernant les efdeti'abstention volontaire des membres
.permanents du Conseidesécurité.............. 346
WRI~ENSTATEMEN OF THE GOVERNME NT THE KINGDOM OF THE

NETHERLAND ......................... 350
WR~TTEN STATEMEN OFTTHE GOVERNMEN OFTHE POL~SH PEOPLE'RSE-
PUBLIC ............................ 354

WR~EN STATEMEN OF THEGOVERNMENT OF PAKISTA ........ 355

WRITTEN STATEMEW OF THE GOVERNMEN OTTHE'HUNGARIAP NEOPLE'S
REPUBLI .......................... 359

LETTE RROMTHE AMBASSAD OFRHE CZECHOSLO VACIAL~S.....LIC
TO THEPRESIDEN QF THEINTERNATION CALURT OFJUSTICE 361

F~R~TTE STATEMEN OF THEGOVERNME OFTFINEAND ........

1. lntroductory rernark..................
I. The legal consequences for SoAfrica..........
II1. The legconsequencefor orher Mernbersofthe United Nations
than South Afric....................
1V. The Iegalconsequences for States not rnernbers of the United
Nations ........................

Chapter 1. Introductio...................
Chapter T.The interpretatiand modification of treaties.
A .Introductor.......................
B. Interpretation of treat................ CONTENTS . XIX

Page
I. The aim or purposeof the interpretative process .....
II. The principlesto be applied in ascertaining the cornmon
inteni of the parties.................
(a) Actuality and ordinary meaning ..........
(b) Contemporaneiiy ................
(c) Implication of agreement .............
(CI) Effectiveness(utrcs magis valea:qaumpereat) ...
(c) The universal appIicability of the above principles. .
Ç . Subsequent conduct ..................
......................
II Subsequent conduct as an aid to interpretation.....
III . Subsequent conduct as a means of modifying treaties . .
IV. Practice within the United Nations ..........

Chapier TT.1The forma1 validity of the relevant Security Council
resolutions ........................
A. Introductory ......................
B . The origin and arnbiof the powers oftheSecurityCouncil . .
C. The composition of the SecurityCouncil .........
D. The voting procedure of the Securfty Council .......
1. General ......................
II.The requirement OFthe concurring votes of the Permanent
Mtrnbers of the Council ...............
1II.The effect of the practice of the Council upon Article 27.
paragraph 3 .....................
1V. Compulsory abstention in terms of the proviso to Article
27. paragraph 3 ...................
E . The non-procedural nature of Security Council resolution 284
(1970)..........................
F . The failureof the Security Council to invite South Africa to
participatein itsdiscussions ...............
G . Conclusion ......................

Chapter 1V. The discretion of the Court .. ; : ......*.. 425
A. Introductory ...................... 425
B . The politicaI background to the question and the involvement
of the Couri ...................... 426
1. General ...................... 426
II.The reception of the Court's 1966 Judgment ...... 427
III.The involvetnent of the Court as constituted at present . 433
IV. The involvernent of individual Membersof the Court . . 437
V .The applicable Iegalpsinciples ............ 439
VI . Concluding remarks ................ 441
Ç. The dispute between South Africaand other States ..... 442
T. General ...................... 442
TT. The existence of a dispute.............. 443

D .The factual issues involved ............... 447
E. Conclusion ...................... 450 Page
II.Substitution of supervisory organs by virtue of some
objective principle of international law......
TIT. The express terms of the Mandate ..........
IV .Winstrumenti.................... read into the mandate
Y. Judicial pronouncements ..............
VI. Judgc Jessup's disseniing opinion in 196.......
VTT. Conclusion ....................
C .The possibility of revocation of the Mandate........

II.GRevocation bywirtueof..aprinciple of international la.
Il1.The express termsof the Mandate ..........
IV. Revocation by virtue of an implied term .......
V. Conclusion ....................
Annex A. Article 22 of theCovenant of the Leagueof Nations ...
Annex B .andate for GermanSouth West Africa .......
Chapter VITI .The transitional years 1945-1946and thereafter..

A . Tntroductory......................
C Dissolution of the Leagued ofNations ...........
D . The period 196-1949 ..................
E . The effect of the evenis during the transitional ye....
1. General .....................
TI. Thc United Nations Charter ............
III. United Nations resolutions of January-February 1946
pertaining to assumption of certain Lcague functions and
establishmentof the trusteeship systeni.......
TV. League of Nations resolutions during last session of its
Assembly, 8 to 18 April 1946 ............
V. Negotiations subsequeni todissolution of the Leagri. .
Y1. Practiceof States .................
F. Conclusion ......................
Annex A . Participationby Members of the United Nations in
debates in that Organization during the years 1947. 1948and 1949
concerningtheaQuestionofSouth West Africa" ........
First Par.........................
Second Part .......................
Chapter IX . The earlier Opinions and Judgrnentsconcerning super-
visionofSouth West Africa .................
A. Tntroductory ......................
B . Analysis of. and comment on. the 1950Advisory Opinion . .
C. Dissent from the 1950 Advisory Opinion concerning super-
vision.........................
1 Minority opinions .................
TI. Opinionsof writers ................
D. Advisory Opinions of 1955and 1956 ...........
E. The 1962Judgrnent and Opinions ............
1. General .................... Page
II. Separate opinion of Judge Eustamante ........ 695
TI1.Dissenting opinion of JudgesSir PercySpendecand Sir
Cerald Fitzniaurice ................ 696
IV. Dissenting opinion of Judgevan Wyk ........ 698
V. The Judgment of the Court ............. 698
VI. Separate opinion of Judge Sessup .......... 703
VI1 . Sepasate opinion of Sudge Sir Louis Mbanefo ..... 704
VIII. Dissenting opinionsof President Winiarski.JudgesBasde-
vant and Morelli and Declaralionof Judge SpiropouEos . 705
.F . The '1966Judgmentand separate opinions ......... 706
1. General ..................... 706
11. The Sudgrnen tf the Court ............. 705

(a) The Court's analysis of the mandates in the context
of the Leapue system ..............
. (b) The Court's view asto the events in the transitional
period 1945-1946 ...............
(c) of 'fillingin the gaps"'..............e ina process
(d) Conclusion tobe drawn from the Court's approach .

111. Separateopinion of Judge van Wyk .........
IV. Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Wellington Koo . .
VI. Dissenting opinion of JudgeJessupa............
VI1. Dissenting opinion of JudgePadilla-Nervo ......
VI11. Dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Louis Mbanefo ....

G . Conclusion ......................
Chapter X. The validity and legal effectoGeneral Assemblyreso-
lulion 2145 (XXI) .....................
A . Introductory ......................
B. The origin andmbit of the powersof the General Assernbly. .
C. The powers of the General Assernbly in relation to the present
.. .que$tion. .... , , , . , , . +! i ........
D. The nature and legal effect of &neral Assernbly resoluiion
2145 (XXI) ......................
E . Conclusion ......................
Chapter...I. The factualissu. a . .......4......
A . Intraductory ...... : ...............
B. The political background to the adoption of resolution 2145
wl) .........................
C . The attacks on South Africa'sadministration of theTerritory .
1. General .....................
II. Thc quality and sources of the çriticisragainst South
Africa'çpolicles ..................
II. Reactions to expbsitions of the tfue fact.......

(a) The visit of Mi.Caipio and Dr .Martinez de Alva to
South WestAfrifa ', .............. CONTENTS XXllI

Page
{b) Furiherreaction toevidenc proving the absence of
militarizarion................ 740
(c) The Sorirh WestAfricacases........... 742

E .Subsequent eventse...................ution2145 (XXI) . . 751
F .The latesi progress.................. 756

I'.General .................... 756
II. Population and history............ 756
1l.Government and administration .......... 761
IV. Summaryreview of general economic developrnent . 764
V:Banking.....................s.......... 768
YI1. Agriculture.................. 770
VI11. Veterinary services........ ' ..... 775
IX. Fishing .................... 775
X. Construction .................. 776
. XI Commerce ................... 778
XII. Manufacturing ................. 778
XII1. Railway, road transport, harbour and air serv. .s 779
XIY . Oficial transport............... 783
XV . Raads ..................... 783
XVI . Postal and telecommunications services..... 785
XVII . Economic advancement of the indigenous peoples of
South West Afric................ 788
XVlIi Waterresources ................. 792
XIX Power ..................... 797
XX . Educaiion ................... 799
XXI . Health services................ 806
XXTI. Scientifi....................esearch services . . 808
XXII1. Summary 809
G .Conclusion ...................... 809
lntroductionto pholographic presentation........... 811
Annex A..South Wesr Aji-icSurveyIYO ............ 812
Annex B. Communication dated 26 September 1967from the Minis-
terof Foreign Affairsof the Republic of South Africa (U.A[oc
6897, Annex II, Enclosure 2)................ 812
Annex C. South West Africa: SouthAfrica R'sply to the Secretary-
GeneraIof the United Nations (Securiiy ÇounciI resolution 269 of
1969)........................... 812
Table ofcasescited ..................... 813
List of tlie relevant documentation............ 815
.........
WRI~TEN STATEME NFTTHE GOVERNME OFTINDIA 830
Introductory ........................ 830
T. Scopeofthe question ................. 830
TT Issues bforc the Court................ 837
JT TLegal consequencesforStates.............. 838
1V .Conclusion ...................... 842XXlV NAMlRlA {SOUTH WEST AFRICA)
'Page

WRITTEN STATEME NT THE GOVERNME ONT THE UNITEDSTATES OF
AMERKA ........................... 842
lntroductory ........................ 843

TheQuestion ....................... 843
Issues presented...................... 843
jurisdiction of the Cour.................. 843
Part T.Statenlent of fac................... 845
South Africa's administration of South West Africa under the
League of Nations Mandate ................ 845
The 1950Advisory Opinion ................. 846
The 1955 AdvisoryOpinion ................. 847
The 1956Advisory Opinion ................. 848
The cont~ntious cases ................... 848
General AssernbEyresolution 2145&XI) and subsequent General
Assernblyand Security Council resolutions......... 849

Part I. Stateinentoflaw ................... 852
Chapter f. The United Nations validly terminated South Africa's
Mandate overthe Territory of Namibia .......... 852
Section 1. Scopeof the question.............. 852
Section TI.The Mandate as a treaty in force........ 854
Section TT.1There is a legal obligation to observtreaties in
good faith ...................... 855
Section IV. A material breach of a treaty entitlesthe other party
to suspend its operation in wholorin part........ 856
Section Y. The League of Nations had the right to terminate
rightsndera mandate in the evcnt oa materia! breach of its
obligations bythe Mandatory Fower ........... 857
Section VI. The United Nations succeeded to the right to ter-
minate South Africa's mandate in the event of a material
breach ........................ 860
Section VFI.Sbuth Africa has been in material breach of its
inandate obligations.................. 863

A . By refusing to submit reports, transmit petitions, and
otherwise recognizethe authoritythe United Nations .. 863
B. By systernatic rejection of the recommendationOF the
General Assenlbly and the Security Counci...... 864
C. By application ofapartheidin Namibia ........ 864
1.Freedorn of movernent .............. 856
2 Freedom of residence and right to own land.... 867
3. Freedom of employment ............. 867
4. Right to participate in governme......... 868
5. The rightto family lif.............. 868
6. The right to education.............. 869

Section VI1T.The United Nations had theright to terminaie
Soiith Africa'sauthority under the Mandate becauof South
Africa's material breaches of its mandate obligations, and
such terminatiowas a reasonable exerciseof United Nations
supervisory authority................. 871
Section 1X. The United Nations has the legal capacity to as-
sume the functionof the Mandatory Power ........ 872 CONTENTS XXV

Page
Chapter 11.South Africa hy virtue of itç conrinupresence in

Namibia notwithstanding SecurityCouncil resolution 276(1970)
isoccupyingNamibiaille~allandis obligateto rransferadminis-
tration oNamibia to the United Nations ......... 874
Section 1. South Africa isin illegaloccupation of Nami. . 874
SecrionII. South Africa should have transferrod the admini-
straiion of Namibia to the United Nation........ 876

Chapter 111. From South Africa's cantinued presence in Namibia
flow certain legal consequecnes for South Africa and other
States ......................... 878
Section 1.South Africa has certain dutics conçerning Namibia
under international law................. 878
A. The duty iinder the Mandate to promote thewell-beingand

developmeniof theinhabitants isimpressedupon theTerri-
tory and survives terinination of South Africa's rights
under the Mandate................. 878
B. South Africa lus the duty to act in conformity with
Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter concerning
non-self-governingterritori............. 880
C. South Africa has thc duty to act in conforrnity with
Chapter IX and other provisions of the United Nations
Charter. ..................... 881
D. South Africa has the duty under general international
lawto adhere to certain standaintheadministration of
Namibia as occupied territory............ 881
E. The preceding duties are unaffected by the Factthai South
Africa is occupying Namibia illegal......... 882
Section II.Stateshave certain duties under international law
with respectto Namibia among which are:

A. To respect the direcr responsibility of the Nations
for Namibia .................... 882
B. To apply certailegalrules with respect to treaffect-
ing Namibia .................... 884
Part IIT .onclusions .................... 888

LETTR Eu SECRÉTAIRED'ETA TUPPLÉANT AUX AFFAIRESÉTRANG~RES DE LA
REPUBLIQU SOCIALISTE FEDERATI VEE YOWCOSLAV A~ELA COUR WKI'I"1'EN SI'ATEMENT OF I'Hb GOVERNMEN'I'

OF THE KlNGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS

1.On 29 July 1970 the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a
resolution requesting the Tnternational Court of Justice to give an adviwry
opinion on the following question:

"What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presencc
af South Africa in Narnibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution
276 (l940)?"

By Order of 5 August 1970the President of the International Court of Justice
fixed 23 September 1970as the time-limit within which written statements rnay
lx submitted in accordance with Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the
Court.
2. The question submitted to the Court raises many legal issues of grMt
complexity. The Netherlands Government is not in a position to submit for
the consideration of the Court, within the time-limit fixed by the President, a

comprehensive view on al1those issues.The present statement, therefore, must
lirnit itsel.'to the presentation of a few general observations which inno way
pretend tu givean exhaustive opinion on the legal questions involved.
3. In r8:spectof the fact of "the continued presence of South Africa in
Narnibia*! itwould seem useful, as a point of departure, to distinguish bet~ven
three lem. relationships, viz: (a) the legalrelationship between South Africa and
the UniterlYations (asregards the territury originally called South-West Africa;
fi) the kgal relationships between South Africa and other individual Stata,
and {cl ttielegal relationship between the Government of South Africa and tlie
poples QI-Narnibia.
4. Withrcspect to the leyal rclationship hetweei-iSnutl-iAfrica and the Uniled

Nntinns a; regards Ille territnry, the Neiherlatids Govemrncnl is irlruIlügrre-
inenr ivii iht: Icgal upiniuns expressrd by th^ Cu~irt in its Advisury Opiiiinn
iN 11 Jrily 1950 (Iirttriiofionnl Srnttqf Solith-Wesf Africo, Advisary Opirriu~r.
I.C,J. H~parrs IY5IIp. 128)to the effectthat: "Ttie teriris ol ihis Mandatc,3s
well as ihrpruvisiuns uf Article 22uï lhc Cuvcniint and thc prii-iciplcscrnbndied
chrrcin, show tliat the creatiun of this new iiiternationai institution di(Jiror
irlvo!vfdfipcr.$.sionq/'lvrritoor !ruir,$/>ls.overeixrrryio the Unioii of Suuih
Africa. The UriiiirGuvcrnnient waç in cxcrcisc atr itirrrtintioJirtictionof
adn.iinislraliun un bchalfnT ths Lcagiic, with the object nf pronioting the well-
bçing and developinetit of the inhabitants" (ibi dl.p. 132; italics added)and
that ''...the General Assembly of the United Nations is legally qualified to

exercise lhe srrpervisorfunctions previously exercised by the League of Nations
ivith regard to the administration of the Territory .. ." (ibid. at p. 137; italics
added).
Furthemore, the Netherlands Government is of the opinion that the inter-
nacional rkgime, established under the League of Nations and continued under
the United Nations, is based upon the right of self-determination of peoples,
and that the functions of the United Nations organization as such under ihis
régirne indude the power to put an end to a mandate on the ground of non-
cornpliance by the mandatory power with the essential obligations ensuing
frorn the mandate agreement, inparticular the obligation to alIow and promote WRITTEN STATEMENTOF THE NETHERLANDS 351

the exercise of the right of self-determination by the peoples of the territory
concerned. Consequently the Netherlands Governrnent was among the Il4
States which voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of
27 October 1966, by which the General Assernbly decided "that the Mandate
conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the
Govemment of the Union of South Africa is ...terminated".
It followed from the above that the territory now called Namibia has never
lost the internarionastatus it acquired at the end of the First World War, when
the former sovereign, Gerrriany, renounced afl its rights and titles in respect of
the territory, and thentern.itional régime referredto in Article 22of the League
of Nations Covenant was established. The object andpurpose of this internatio-

nal rhgime is still essentiaylthe same, though the funcrions under this régime,
originally entrusted to the League of Nations, have legally devolved on the
United Nations, and thefr!ncrions originally entrusted to the Union of South
Africa havelegally corne to anend.
The primary legal consequence of this situation, as regards the legalrelation-
ship between South Africa and the United Nations is, obviously. that South
Africa, which was originally entrusted with certain powers in relation to the
territory, isnow under the legal duty to end its defacto exerciseof those powers
(its "presence" in Namibiii) and to allow the United Nations and its agents
effectively to fulfilwithin and with respect tothat territory the functions neces-
sary to achieve the object and purpose of the international régime(the "pre-
sence" of the United Nations in Namibia).
It would seem that, frorn the legal point of view, the relationship between
South Africa and the United Nations under the international régimerelating
to the territory, can not simply be equated with the relationship, under the
general rules of internationallaw, between two sovereign States in reiation to a
particular territory, in respect of which each claims to be entitled to exercise

sovereign rights. The "functional" approach underlying theestablishment of an
international régimefor thi: territory with the object and purpose of promoting
the eventual exercise of the right of self-determination of the peoples of the
territory, does not admit ihe analogous application of rules of international
law based on a quite different approach. Accordingly (and apart from other
Iegal objections) from a stiictly legal poinof view it woutd seern erroneous to
consider the continued prcsence of South Africa in Namibia as constituting
vis-à-vis the United Nations a "threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity" of a foreign Stat~:,or as constituting "occupation" of the territory of
a foreign State.ne ver the le:;^t,he obvious non-compliance by South Africa with
its legal duty towards the United Nations effectively to transfer to the latter
the exercise of its powers under the Mandate, constitutes a serious violation of
the international régimein:;tituted for the area. In conformity with thefunction-
al approach underlying this international régimeit is in the first instance for
decision of the competent organs of the United Na~ions,which conseqiiences
shall be attached by the Lrnited Nations to this violation. This is a matter of
political judgment to be exercised within the legal framework of the powers

given to the Organization by its Charter, and in the light of the object and
purpose of the international régimeestablished for the territory concerned.
5. The question,submitted to the Court, refers to ". ..the continued presence
of South Africa in Namith, notrvithstanding Securify Coirrrcilresolurion 276
(1 970)".
This formulation could iieemto imply that, fromthe legalpoi~t of view,that
resolution as such is relevimt for the determination of the legal consequences
referred to in the question. It shouldbe noted, however, that the operative part352 NAMIBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRICA)

of that rcsolution is couched in exhortatory rather than mandatory terms. It
would secrn, therefore, that the resolution does not purport to impose any legal
dutyon any State nor to legallyaffect any right of any State.
6. Passing now to the second group of relationships, referred to above(under
3), viz., the legal relationships between South Africa and other individual States,
it would seem that the fact of "continued presence" of SouthAfricain Namibia
also entails some legal consequences for these relationships.
In itselr, the circumstance that South Africa no longer has any legal title to
administer the territory does not release it from its obligations and respon-
sibilities under international law towards other States in respect of the exercise
of its powers in relation to this territory, so long as it de factocontinues to
administer the territory as before.

On the other hand, the absence of a legal title of South Africa to administer
the territory releases the other States from any obligations fhey might have
towards South Africa (either under the general rules of international law, or
under international agreements entered into with South Africa before the
termination of the Mandate) in respect of the recognition or support of South
Africa's administration of the territory.
Here again, however, the paramount importance of the international régime
forthe territory should be taken into account. In particular, the non-recognition
of South Africa's de facto administration of the territory should not result in
depriving the peoples of Narnibia froin any advantage derived from interna-
tional CO-operation, so long and in so far as the United Nations is not yet
in a position effectively to ensure equivalent advantages. Adniittedly, in the cir-
cumstanc'usof the case, this exception may belargely of a theoretical character.
7. With regard to the third relationship, mentioned under 3 above, Le., the
legal refationship between the Government of South Africa and the peoples of
Namibia, it should be noted that the rules of present-day general international

law impose on the government of every State the legal duty to respect and
promote i.heexercise of the right of self-determination of peoples in so far as
this is within its effectivepower. Obviously thecircumstance that the mandateof
South Afi'ica has been legally terrninated and that, accordingly, the Govern-
ment of South Africa has no longer any legal title to adrninister the
territory, does not release that Government from its legal duty to allow and
promote the exercise, by the peoples of Namibia, of their right of self-deter-
mination. This nowadays is a universal duty, irrespective of the existence of an
international régime with regard to a particular territory or any obligation
entered into through a treaty; it applies to the peoples of any territory, whether
that territory ide iureor only defacto administered by a given govemment.
As rega.rds the legal consequencesof non-cornpliancewith this duty it would
seem that the international practice of States has not as yet developed into a
pattern which could be considered as the expression of universal acceptance of
a set of rules of law.ïndeed the attitudes of individual States with respect to

such non-cornpliance by another State are divergent according to the peoples,
the territory and the government involved in a particular situation. Those
attitudes range from attempts to persuade the government in default to comply
with its diity, through action taken against such government, to direct support
of the peoples concerned in their resistance against that government .A legal
duty of ail States individrlallyto adopt any of those attitudes does not appear to
be part of present-day customary international law.
On the other hand, collective action may be taken by the United Nations
under its responsibility to promote universal respect for, and observance of,
human rigihtsand fundamentalfredorns for all, without distinction as to race, WRlTTEN STATEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS 353

sex,language or religion (Ait 55 under (c), United Nations Charter). Further-
more, non-cornpliance by a government with its duty to respect and promote
the exercise of the right 01'self-determination of peoples under its effective
power may in fact contribute to the creation of a situation which, under the
provisions of the United Fations Charter, empowers the United Nations to
take decisions which the Members of the United Nations are obliged to cany
out.
8. In conclusion the Nctherlands Government would like to stress the
partici;!ar character of the question submitted to theCourt. This question refers

to the legal consequences for States of the continuedpresence of South Africa
in Namibia.
It,does notrefer to thepolicy pursued by South Africa withinand with respect
to Namibia, nor does it refi:rto the policy best suited eventualty to arrive at a
situation in which the peoples of Namibia can freely determine their poIitical
status and freelypursue their economic, socialand cuituraldevelopment. While
there is no doubt that South Africa's.policy is contrary to its legal duties and
that, consequently,States hhvea legalright to react to suchconduct individually
and collectivelythrough the United Nations, their legaiobligationto do so and
the meairsthey may apply are still subject to the general rules of international
law, inparticular to the provisions ofthe United Nations Charter.

28August 1970. WRLTTENSTASEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The United Nations has been dealing with the problem of Namibia for more
than 20 y:ars. In the course of detailed considerations, which took place in
differentorgans of the Organizatiori, al1theelements of theproblemofNamibia,
including the legal status of the Territory and its population, had been clearly
defined. The decisions of the United Nations concerning Namibia have been
based on firmlyestablished political and Iegalprinciples.

Of fundamental importance is the resolution of the General Assembly 1514
(XV) of 14 Decernber 1960, Le., the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This Declaration is applicable to
non-self-governing territories, trusteeship territories and al1 other territories
which have not yet attained independence. The General Assembly, a few days
after the adoption of the Declaration, recognized that Namibia (Territory of
South West Africa) had an inalienableright to independence andto the exercise
of itsfullnational sovereignty (resolution 1568(XV) of 18December 1960).
On 27 October 1966 the General Assembly adopted a resolution in which
it recognizedthat the administration of the mandated territory by South Africa
had been conducted in a manner contrary to the Mandate, the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (resolution
2145 (XX;l)). As a consequence, the General Assembly decided to terminate
the Mandate of South Africa over the Mandated Territory of South West
Africa. Henceforth, the Territory of South West Africa (now Namibia) came
under the direct responsibilityof the United Nations.
Since that time the presence of South Africa in Namibia has become illegal.
This has lieen also confirmed in several resolutions by the Security Council,
interalia,in the resolution 276 (1970)of 30January 1970.
The Government of the Polish People's Republic fully recognizes and sup-
ports the above-rnentioned decjsions of the General Assernblyand the Security

Council as being infull accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
isof the opinion thatthe following legalconsequencesarisetherefrom:
(1) reaffirrnation of the right of the people of Namibia to freedorn and inde-
pendericeand of the legitimacyof their national liberation struggle,
(2) restatement of the illegality of the presence of the South African adminis-
tration in Namibia,
(3) imperative rule for an immediate withdrawal of South Africa's authorities
from Namibia.

The staiidpoint of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on the
question cif Namibia was expressed, inte ria, in a statement made by the
representative of Poland in the Security Council on 30 January 1970. The
Govemment of the Polish People's Republic fully maintains that standpoint
as corresponding to the tegalsituation. WRITTEN STATElvlENTOF THE GOVERNMENT OF
PAKISTAN

Pakistan submits the following written statement in relation to the question
referred for advisory opinioii:
1. Narnibia (formerly South West Africa) was a German colony. The Allied
and Associated Powers at Versailles in 1918were concerned with thedisposition
of the former German overst:as territories, whose people were regarded at that
time as being unable to stand by themselves. Since the Allies had publicly
announced opposition to territorial annexation, as a legitimate end of victory,
it was considered that some fi~rmof international administration of the conquer-

ed lands should be established under the aegis of the League of Nations. The
mandates system, as ultimately given expression to in Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, represented a victory for the opponents of the prin-
ciple of annexation. Namibia was classified as a "C"group Mandate,that is to
Say, one which was regardecl as appropriate to be administered as an integral
portion of the mandatory'!; territory, and it was allotted to His Britannic
Majesty for and on behalf of South Africa. Under Article 2 of the Mandate,
South Africa was required to promote to the utmost the material and moral
well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants and under Article6, agreed
to submit reports annually to the League Council. Thus, South Africa, by ac-
cepting the Mandate, became the effective authority in Namibia and assumed
the duty to transform the legacy of poverty into the condition of well-being and
social progress.

2. South Africa, accordingly, submitted anhual reports to the Council of the
League of Nations, beginning with a report for 1919. A separate body, the
Permanent Mandates Comniission, was entrusted by the League Council with
responsibility for reviewing the reports, along with those of other Mandatory
Powers, and advising the C'ouncil as to the course of administration in the
mandated territories. Although South Africa was not at first hostile towards the
Permanent Mandates Commission, nevertheless she from the outset viewed
the Mandate as tantamount ro annexation. During the period between 1920and
1939, the Permanent Mandates Commission felt obliged on more than one
occasion to cal1 South Afrita to task with respect to its attitude towards the
legal status of the territory.
3. When the League of Nations ceased to exist, the United Nations estab-

lished an internationaltruste1:shipsystem under Article 75 of the Charter of the
United Nations. which, interalia, applied to territories held under mandate.
4. The United Nations, iiiaccordance with Article 75of the Charter,estab-
lished a trusteeship for dependentterritories, and invited the former Manda-
tory Powers to enter into tritsteeship arrangements in respect of the mandated
territories. On 14 Decernber 1946,the General Assembly passed the resolution
recommending that mandatrfd territories of South Africa be pIaced under inter-
national trusteeship agreement and invited the Government of South Africa to
propose for the consideratioil of the General Assembly a trusteeship agreement
for the aforesaid territory. (General Assembly resolution No.. 65- (1) of 14
Decembèr 1946.)South Afric:a refused to heed this resolution and did not place '
her territory under trusteeship. She proposed, instead, that the Mandate over
Namibia should terminate and the territory be incorporated intoSouth Africa.

Although the proposal was rejected by the General Assernbly, South Africa,356 NAMlBIA (SOUTH WEST AFRIGA)
continuing to ignore the trusteeship proposal, declared in 1947that it would
continue i:oadminister Namibia in the spirit of the 1920 Mandate and would

be prepared to submit an annual report to the United Nations as it had done
to the League of Nations. Exceptin 1947,South Africa has never submitted any
reports thereafter to the Secretary-General.
5. During the period from 1946 to 1949,the policy of the Governrnent of
South Africa, in respect of the Mandate, underwent a marked change. In the
beginning, South Africa conceded the existence of the Mandate and her obli-
gations thereunder, including that of rendering reports to the United Nations.
By the enciof the period, South Africa referred to the Mandate as "the previous
Mandate sinceexpired", insistingthat the administration of the territory was a
matter solely of interna1concern, and refused to render reports to the United
Nations. 13ythe end of 1949,it was obvious that South Africa's conceptof her
legal oblilgationsunder the Mandate was diarnetrically opposed to that of the

United Nations Members. Accordingly, the General Assembly sought the
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice relating to the above
attitude of South Africa. The Court rendered three Advisory Opinions: the
basic Opinion isthat of 11 July 1950,and the other twoivere delivered on
7 June 1955and 1 June 1956.Each of those Advisory Opinions was accepted by
the General Assembly by appropriate resolution. In the Advisory Opinion of
11 July 1!)50,the International Court of Justice held that Namibia was a ter-
ritory untler the international mandate and the territory had an international
status. The Court rejected South Africa's contention that the Mandate had
lapsed wi1.hthe discontinuance of the League. The Court confirrnedthe powers
of the General Assembly to exercise supewisory functions and to receive the
annual reports. The Court was further of the opinion that South Africa, with
the consent of the United Nations, could modify the international status of the

mandated territory but could no1 unilaterally modify the international status
of the territory. The Court was however of the opinion that South Africa was
not bounil to place the territory under the United Nations trusteeship system.
South Africa denounced the Opinion of the International Court of Justice.
The General Assembly made effortsto obtain implementation of the Opinion
by means of negotiation and appeal, but to no avail. Two more references
were made in 1955 and 1956 to find out as to whether the United Nations
wouldbe *rompetentto receive reports and whether "the Committee on South
West Africa" established by the General Assenibly could hear petitions and
petitioners. In both cases again the International Court of Justice supported
the view-point of the United Nations as against South Africa, with the result
that it was clearly established that the international obligations continued.

Notwiths1:andingthis, the attitude of South Africacontinued to becantankerous
and conti~macious. Eventually, on 4 November 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia
filed concurrent Applications in the International Court of Justice, having
regard to Article 80 of the United Nations Charter, asserting, among others,
contraventions of the Mandate by South Africa. The two States sought a
judgment of the Court to require South Africa to cease the alleged violations
and to carry out its obligations under the Mandate. In November 1961South
Africa filt:dpreliminary objections contesting the jurisdiction of the Court to
hear the clisputebrought by the said two States. The Court, in its Judgment of
21 Decemiber 1962, dismissed the objections raised by South Africa and con-
cluded, bi eight votes to seven, that Article 7 of the Mandate was a treaty or
convention still in force within the meaning of Articl37 of the Statute of the
Court and that the dispute was one which was envisaged in the said Article 7

and whiclicould not be settled by negotiations. Ttheld that it had jurisdiction WRlTTEN STATEMENT OF PAKISTAN 357

to adjudicate upon the merits of the dispute. However, after almost six years
of contentious proceedings, the Court, by the then-President's casting vote,
concluded that the above iltates could not be considered to have established
any "legal interest" apperti~iningto them in the subject-matter of the present
claims, and that, accordingly, the Court must decline to give effect to them.
Ttis respectfully submitted that having regard to Articles 59, 60 and 61 of the
Statute and the well-recogriizeddoctrines of international law, the Judgment

of 1962was resjrrdicata and being final was binding on the Parties in respect of
the particular cause and could not be revised in 1966 without there being cir-
cumstances or conditions ahich required revision.
6. The Afro-Asian countiies in 1966,therefore, took the matter to the Gen-
eral Assernbly of the Unit.rd Nations which on 27 October 1966resolved to
terminate the South African right to administer the territory (General Assembly
resolution 2145 (XXI)). In the resolution the Assembly declared that South
Africa had failed to fulfil itj obligation in respect of the administration of the
mandated territory and to eiisurethemoral and material well-beingand security
of the indigenousinhabitants of Namibia, and in fact had disavowed the Man-
date. As a result of these findings, it decided that "the Mandate conferred upon

His Britannic Majesty to bt:exercised on his behalf by the Government of the
Union of South Africa isthtrefore terminated, that South Africa hasno right to
administer the territory and henceforth South West Africa comes under the
direct responsibility of the United Nations". To implement this resolution, the
General Assemblyestablishcd an Ad Hoc Comrnittee for Namibia, consisting of
14 States, to recommend the practical means by which Namibia should be
administered so as to enabl- thepeople of the territory to exercise the right of
self-determination and to achieve independence. On 19May 1967the Assembly
resolved to establish an Il-member council to take over the administration of
Namibia from South Afric;..
7. In March 1969the Set:urityCouncil met to consider the Namibian ques-

tion and for the first timeexplicitlyrecognized the General Assembly'sdecision
to terminate the Mandate (resolution 264 (1969) of 20 March 1969). In the
resolution the Council called upon South Africa "to immediately withdraw its
administration from the territory", and decided to meet again in the event of
South Africa'sfaiiure to coniply, in order "to determine upon necessarysteps or
measures". South Africa rejected the above resolution of the Security Council.
On 12August 1969 the Council reaffirmed its March resolution and declared
that South Africa's defiance "constitutes an aggressive encroachment on the
authority of the United Nations, a violation of the territorial integrity and a
denial of the political sovereignty of the people of Namibia" (resolution 269
(1969)). Ttcalled for South Africa'swithdrawal from the territory by 4 October

1969and again warned that further measures would be decided upon should
South Africa refuse to coinply. Upon South Africa's refusa1 to withdraw
from Narnibia, the Genera1.4ssemblyadopted three resolutions and condemned
the South African Governinent for its persistent refusal to withdraw its ad-
ministration (General Asseinblyresolutions 2498 (XXIV) of 31 October 1969,
2517 (XXIV) of J Decernter 1969, and 2518 (XXIV) of 1 December 1969).
The Security Council by its resolution 276 (1970), interdia, recognized the
decisions of the General As:;emblyto terminate the Mandate and by resolution
284 (1970) decided to subrnit the question aforesaid to the International Court
of Justice.
8. South Africa's persistent refusal to withdraw its administration from

Namibia would canstitute "a threat to the peace" in terms of Article 39 of
Chapter VI1 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council's WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The Embassy of the Hurigarian People's Republic presents its compliments
to the InternationalCourt of Justice and with reference to the latter's Orders of
5 and 28 August 1970 (1.C.J. Reports 1970, pp. 359 and 362), as well as to
Article 66, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, upon instructions of its
Government, has the honour to make the following statement:

The continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, in defiance of the will of
the international community, gravely violates international law.
Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966of the General Assembly of the
United Nations reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to
self-determination, freedorr, and independence in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, Geiieral Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of December
1960 and earlier Assembly resolutions concerning the mandated territory of
South West Africa. The General Assembly by the same resolution 2145 (XXI)
terminated the Mandate and pronounced that the Republic of South Africa has
no other right to administer. this territory. Hence the legal basis of the presence
of the Republic of South Africa in Namibia has ceased to exist.

The Security Council by its resolution 276 (1970)of 30January 1970reaffirm-
ed General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) and declared that the continued
presence of the South African authorities in Namibia is illegal. The Security
Council decfared also that consequently al1 acts taken by the Government of
South Africa on behalf of or concerning Namibia after the termination of the
Mandate are illegal and in1,alid.
Member States of the United Nations are expected to respect and accept this
resolution of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter, and they are
obliged to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
order to make the termination of the Mandate effective.
The Republic of South Africa, whose rights based upon the Mandate have
been terminated, is under the clear obligation to discontinue its illegaI presence
in Namibia and withdraw its administration therefrom. .
The obligation of the Republic of South Africa towithdrawfrom theTerritory
of Namibia is essentially of the same character as those obligations under con-

temporary international law, which are listed in the Judgment of the Inter-
national Court of Justice ~f 5 February 1970. The Judgment of the Court
mentions obligations deriviilg from the outlawing of actsofaggression, and of
genocide, as also from the principles andrules concerning the basic rights
of the human person, incliiding protection from slavery and racial discrimi-
nation. (I.C.J.Reports 1970, p.32, para. 34.)TheCourt held that in viewof the
importance of the rights related to these obligations, al1States can be held to
have a legal interest in tht:ir protection and the obligationsin question are
obligations erga omnes (ibic!.,para. 33).
The continued presence of the Republic of South Africa in Namibia notwith-
standing the termination of the Mandate, establishes its responsibility vis-à-vis
al1States. Ttsobligation to s~ithdraw is an obligatierga omnes. The interests
of the international commuiiity as a whole are violated by the illegal presence of
South Africa in Namibia and from this fact States can draw the appropriate
conclusions individually anclcollectively. States are especially entitled to appealto the Security Council and request that it should adopt decisions of a rnanda-
tory chawrcter on various ways of bringing political, economic and rnilitary
pressure to bear on the Republic of South Africa. States can propose-as has
been done by the USSR-that the Security Council should adopt a decision to
the effect that the governmenls of countries whose nationals and companies
are engagcd in industrial, financial and trade activities with the Republic of
South Africa, should take the necessary legislative, administrative and other
steps to prohibit these activities until such time as the Republic of South Africa
complies with the resolutions on Namibia (S/9863).
States hlembers of the United Nations can consider whether the conduct of
the Republic of South Africa does not amount to a persistent violation of the
principlei of the Charter.of the United Nations.
, States are naturally bound not to recognize any acts of the Government of
South Africa madeon behalf of or concerningNamibia after the termination of
the Mandate, in accordance wittithe above-mentioned resolution of the Security
Council.
In thisconnection, referenceismade tothestatement of Mr. Karoly Csatorday,
representative of the Hungarian People's Republic, then President of the
Security C:ouncil,which he made on 20 March 1969. Among other things, he

pointed out the following:
"The Government of South Africa up to this very day occupies and
illegally administers Namibia . .. The most elementary rights of self-
.. déterminationof this African people are thus suppressed. Those who resist
the ccilonial'ruleof the Pretoria Governrnent are treated as criminals by the
oppressive colonial.régime. . . .
It ia most regrettable state of affairs that the peoples of Namibia, ...

have to wage their fight for self-determination, for their most elementary
" human rights, not only against their direct oppressors, but also against the
mighi: of powerfui monopolies which have allied themselves with their
rnasters. The substantial financial and rnilitary assistance provided to
South Africa, for instance, against the clearly expressedwishof the United
. Nations as reRected in resolutions of the General Assembly by some
major Powers shows convincingly the tragic line-up of forces.
But to present a true picture of these forces we must add that the people
of Nirmibiadoes not have to fight alone against such ovenvhelming forces.
The peoples of many continents and many countries support them in their
just cause. The socialist countries have always been in the forefront of
those which have offered meaningful support to the peoples fighting for
their national independence. The Hungarian People's Republic is duty
bound to offer its support to the people of Namibia . . .threatened by the
inhurnan apartheid policies, . . we have believed for a long time that the
Security Council rnusttakc effective measuresagainst South Africa should
it continue its defiance of the United Nations and world conscience."
IS/PIr.1465,pp. 63-67).

The Erribassyof the Hungarian People's Republic availsitself of this oppor-
tunity to renewto the International Court ofJustice theassurances of its highest
considerai.ion.
16 November 1970.

.. .
. - LETTERFROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAJC SOClALIST REPUBLIC 70 THE

PRESIDENTOF THE INTERNATIONALCOURTOFJUSTICE

16 Novernber 1970.

Mr. President,
Referring to the leofethe International Court of Justice Nos. 50143and
50224dated 5and 28 Augu!;t19701have thehonour to inform you about the
position ofthe Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic concerning

thecontinued occupation of Namibia by South Africa.
The Czechoslovak Socialist Repubfic insists in the futfillingof al1resolutions
of the United Nations acct:pted in that case, especially in the unconditional
withdrawal of al1military a.ndpolice units and administration of South Africa
frorn the territory of Namibia and in the abolition of al1acts of discrimination
againsthe people of Namibia.
Accept, etc.,

(Signed) Viclav MAL+. EXE~OSÉÉCR~T DU GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS

A l'occasion du vote par l'Assemblée générae let le Conseil de sécuritéde
résolutionsrelatives au Territoire du Sud-Ouest africain,auquel I'ONUa donné
en 1966lenom de Namibie, lesreprésentants françaisont plusieurs foismarqué
que leur gouvernement faisait des réservessur le fondement de ces textes au
regard du droit international. En conséquence,ils se sont abstenus sur les
textesen question.
Le Gouvernement français considère maintenant comme opportun de déve-
lopper les raisons qui sont a la base de ses réserveset de ses abstentions. Aussi
présente-t-illes remarques suivantes, qui ne porteront que sur quelques-uns
desaspect:;du problèmeposé Ala Cour.

* * *
A titre liminaire, le Gouvernement français entend souligner que, au-delà de
la formulation de la question adresséeà la Cour, le débatn'est pas de savoir

si I'Afriqiie du Sud s'est rendue coupable d'infractions aux obligations du
Mandat acceptépar elte pour le Sud-ouest africain,àicelles qu'ellea assumées
en devenant Membre des Nations Unies, ou si encore l'Afrique du Sud a agi
contrairement aux normes énoncéesdansla Déclaration universelle des droits
de l'homme. Pour le Gouvernement français, il ne fait pas de doute que le
Gouvernement de l'Afrique du Sud a très réellementet systématiquement
contrevenu à ces règleset a ces obligations. C'est là un point que les représen-
tants français au sein de divers organes des Nations Unies ont fréquemment
souligné etqui doitêtreprécis2inouveau de manière catégorique.
Mais il s'agit de déterminersi I'ONU, en sanctionnant ces infractions par le
retrait du Mandat et en prenant d'autres mesures qui peuvent êtreconsidérées
comme di:s conséquencesde cette décisionde retrait, ne fait qu'exercer des
compétencesattribuéespar la Charteet, dans l'affirmativel,esquelles.
Lescorrimentairesci-après neporteront donc pas sur lefait, tenu pour acquis,
que t'Afrique du Sud a faillà des normes internationales et contrevenà des
obligations conventionnellement acceptéespar elle, mais sur l'étendue de la
compétencede I'ONUa l'égard de lasanction decesmanquements.

* * *

La question poséepar leConseil de sécuritéà la Cour vise les conséquences
pour les Etats Membres de la non-application par l'Afrique du Sud d'une
résolutiondu Conseil de sécurité. ienque, de l'avisdu Gouvernement français,
il soit fort souhaitableque la Cour ne conçoive pas sa tâche d'une maniéretrop
étroitemeiitlimitée,et notamment ne se dispense pas d'examiner les liens entre
la résolution enquestion et d'autres résolutionsvotéespar l'Assembléegénérale,
en particulier la résolution 2145 (XXI), la Cour doit en tout cas répondrA
cettequesrion précise.
Au sujet de celle-ci, on observera que le fait même qu'ellesoit poséeparaît
impliquer de la part des Etats qui ont votéen faveur de ce texte, qu'ilexiste, au
sujet des obligations que comporterait la résolution no276 pour les Etats
Membres,,un doute sérieuxou une divergenced'opinionsquant à son caractère
de idécision1).
En effet, si cette résolution régt ar voie de ((décisio)u sens technique du mot la situation juridique du Sud-Ouest africain et la conduite des Etats
l'égardde ce territoireet dt:l'Afrique du Sud, à la façon dont la résolution232
(1966) a ordonné aux Eta?s un certain nombre de conduites a l'égardde la
Rhodésiedu Sud, les ob1ig:itionsdes Membres des Nations Unies seraient très
claires: ces Etats Membres auraient le devoir d'appliquer ladite décision, a
moins qu'ils ne soutiennerit que celle-ci n'a pas étéprise conformément à la
Charte. Or les conditions dans lesquelles la question a étéposéepar le Conseil

de sécuritéàla Cour, aussi bien que le libellémême de cettequestion, indiquent
que telle n'est pas I'hypotl-ièseet que le Conseil de sécuritédemande à être
éclairésur une situation qui n'est pas celle qui se produirait cas où il y aurait
non-application d'une adécision) du Conseil se présentant comme telle. II faut
donc en conclure que le Conseil n'affirme pas catégoriquement avoir jusqu'à
présentstatué par voie de clécisionquant à la conduite qui doit êtrecelle des
Etats 5iI'égarddumaintien de l'Afrique du Suddans le territoire contesté.
Que le Conseil n'ait pas eu jusqu'à présentl'intention de prendre une telle
décision à I'égardde la conduite des Etats Membres se déduitdu libellé même
des résolutions correspondantes aussi bien que des débats qui ont conduit a
leur adoption.

S'agissant de la terminologie utilisée par ce dernier, on observera que cet
organe n'a pas employé, ?Our définir les conduites qu'il attend des Etats
Membres, les expressions .:aractéristiques d'une décision,d'un ordre donné
par lui, semblables aux expressions qu'il a utiliséesdans le cas des sanctions1i
l'égardde la Rhodésiedu Siid.
Dans sa résolution no 27tile Conseil n'emploie le mot (décide))qu'à I'égard
de mesures de procédure le concernant lui-même.S'adressant aux Etats, il ne
[(décide))pas mais utilise le langage de la recommandation (pour les Etats
Membres autresque l'Afrique du Sud) ou de la déclaration(en ce qui concerne
cedernier pays). Or le Con:;eils'estservi,ily a peu de temps, du langagede la
décision.Quand ila voulu déciderdes sanctions a I'égardde la Rhodésie, il a

prescrit aux Etats leurs conduites dans des termes sans équivoque. C'est ainsi
qu'il a ((requisles Etats Membres d'avoir à prendre certaines mesures (alors
qu'il sebornaità idemander instamment Iaux Etats non membres de se confor-
mer à une attitude détermiriée),De plus il a tenu à spécifierque la non-appli-
cation par les Etats Membres des mesures requises constituerait de Ieur part une
infraction aux obligationstelies qu'ilsles ont assumées enacceptant l'article 25.
Du reste, les termes utiliséspar la résoluti276 à I'égarddes EtatsMembres,
tout en se situant a l'intérieur de la gamme des expressions normalement
employéesdans les recomm;indations, ne sont même pas particulièrementéner-
giques si on les compare a d'autres expressions visant, par exemple, le cessez-
le-feu au Moyen-Orient qui, bien que n'étant paslui non plus « décidé)) , fait

cependant l'objet de mentioiis plus pressantes.
Les indications fournies par le langage mêmede la résolution votéesont
corroborées à l'évidencepar les procès-verbaux des débatsqui ont permis son
adoption etdesconsultations entre délégationsqui ont précédé cevote.
On peut donc conclure dc:la terminologie employéeet du débatdont la réso-
lution est la conclusion que le Conseil n'a pas cherchéa imposer aux Etats par.
voie de décisioncertaines conduites à I'égarddu Gouvernement sud-africain
à raison du comportement de ce gouvernement dans leterritoire que 1'Assem-
bléegénéralea rebaptisé iNamibie)). II n'a donc pas voulu, du moins jusqu'à
présent, que les Etats Membres, sous peine d'êtreen contravention avec la
Charte, soient juridiquement contraints de tirer certaines conséquences du

comportement de l'Afrique du Sud, puisqu'il lesa seulement invités à lestirer. Toutefois il s'agit là du contenu de la résolution relatifaux conduites des
Etats Menibres autres que l'Afrique du Sud. Mais il faut également évaluer la
portee desmenfionsque cetexte comporte àl'égarddel'Afriquedu Sud.
Deux mentions doivent alorsêtreexaminées:I'unese référant à la résolution

264et,13autreàla résolution269.
a) La ribolution 264, tout d'abord, est ((réaffirmée)p)ar la résolution 276.
Par Ia le C'onseilréaffirmesa (reconnaissance de ce que l'Assemblée générale
a privél'Afrique du Sud de son Mandat. Le Conseil n'a donc pas revendiqué
le droit de prononcer une telle dkhéance, mais il se borne àprendre acte de ce
que celle-ci a été prononcée par l'Assembléegénérale etAen tirer des consé-
quences.
En effet-et (l'appui de $ refus du Conseil de se prononcer lui-mêmesur
le retrait du Mandat on ne voit rien dans la Charte qui autorise le ConseiI
de sécurité & déciderde la dévoiution d'un territoire, qu'il soif ou non sous
mandat.
Certes, aux termes des dispositions relatives au règlement pacifique des
différends,le Conseil de sécuritépeut faire toutes recommandations, y compris
cellesqui porteraient sur les aspectsterritoriaux d'un règlement. Maisil ne peut
s'agir que de propositions qu'il depend des parties de reprendre ou non a leur

compte. II n'a, certes, étéaffirmépar personne que le Conseil pouvait, par
exemple, dans le cas du conflit palestinien, décider » de l'attribution de terri-
toires d'une maniérejuridiquementobligatoire p,ourlesEtats. . .
Mêmedans le cas des tutelles soumisesau contrdle du Conseil, la Charte ne
donne pas 2i cetorgane le droit théoriquede mettre fin a une tutelfe stratégique,
alors mêmeque dans la pratique cedroit ne pourrait s'exercerqu'avec l'accord
du pays intéressé.
bJ La si:conde mention intéressantles rapports entre l'Afrique du Sud et le
territoire contestéest constituéepar le rappel de la résolution269 par Ia résolu-
tion 276.Quelleen estla portée?
On notera tout d'abord que si la résoluiion276, dans un-deses considérants,
irappelle))la 269, elle ne la réaffirme pas,au contraire de ce qu'elle fait pour la
264.Celariest sans doute pas fortuit.
Quant Srla résolution 269 ainsi rappelée,il,kst vrai qu'elle adécide 1)non
seulement iipropos de la procédure(par. 6 du dispositif) mais aussi'surle fond.

Eneffet, leparagraphe 3du dispositif
;décide que l'occupation continue du .Territoire de la Namibie par les
autorités sud-africaines constitue' une atteinte agressive à l'autorité de
-l'organisation des'Nations Unies, une'violation de l'intégritéterritoriale
et une négationde la souverainetépolitique du peuple dela Namibie i). '

On peut donc se demander si O; se trouve en présenced'une décisionque le
Conseilaurait voulu prendre surla basedel'article39delaCharte.
Pour en juger, on peut observer que le Conseil s'est abstenu d'utiliser la
terminologie de l'article 39. C'est ainsi qu'ilne mentionne pas une (agressionn
mais une (atteinte agressive1)De plus celle-cis'entendnon pas a l'égardd'un
Etat mais iiel'ONU. Il parait clair que la Charte n'apas envisagécette catégorie
d'agressions, non plus que le comité qui s'efforce actuellement de définirce
concept. Bien entendu les expressions relatives A la violation de l'intégrité
territoriale eta la négationde la souverainetépolitique du peuple de Namibie

sont -enco:re,plus loin de la terminologie de l'article 39. En revanche, elles
évoquentl'article 2, paragraphe 4, à cela près qu'ellessubstituent la notion de
peuple àcelled'Etat.
Or le Conseil a utilisé entoute clart6 la krminologie de I'article 3à propos de sa résolution déjà citéesur fa Rhodésie du Sud. En effet; après avoir pris
soin de préciser qu'il agissaitconformément al'article.39 (efil'articl41), ila
iconstatéiiqu'ilexistaitune menace à la paix.
On peut donc en conclure que le Conseil dans sa résolution no276 ne paraît
pas avoir, même à propos de ce point particulier, effectuéune constatation au

sens de I'articte39de laCharte.

LeConseil n'adonc ni (d-tcidé11desconduites des Etats sur la,basedesarticles
41 ou 42 ni même (décidé)d)'effectuer,sur la base de l'article39,'la constatation
préalable qui estjuridiquement nécessaire.
Toutefois, il afait plus que d'esquisser un schéma selonIequel le ~onséil; A
partir de la décisionde rt:trait du Mandat prise par l'Assembléegénérale,
constaterait'que cette décision n'est pas exécuté eet que la Puissane5 adminis-
trante demeure dans un territoire qui est pour elle,désormais étranger.Ce
maintien 'seraitalors assimiléà une agression et le Conseil deviendrait compé-
tent pour déciderdesanctioiiscontre l'agresseur: ,, ,. .,
De surcroît, on pourrait avancer que, les compétences dedeux organes

excluant leur contrôle réciproque, leConseil de sécuritén'a pas a juger de'la
légitimité dela décisionprise par l'Assemblée générale, mais seulemen àten
tirer les conséquences.Ce raisonnement pourrait être tenu non seulement à
propos du sort d'un territciire sous mandat mais a propos de toute décision
que l'Assemblée générale :;'arrogerait le droit de prendre dans le domaine
territorial omême en deboysdecelui-ci.
II est bien clair qu'une telle construction, nettement esquisséeà propos de la
présente affaire,comme 1èmanifestent les textes votéset les débatsqui les ont
entoures, impose d'examiner non seulement i'action du Conseil de sécurité
mais celle, 'antérieure,de .l'Assembléegénéraledont le Conseil de sécurité
deviendrait 'une sorte 'de (bras séculier)).Ainsi la situation juridique dans
laquelle la résolution276met lesEtats Membres ne peutêtreévaluée que si l'on
se réfère en mêmte emps aux résolutionsde l'Assemblée généraq leui lui ont

servi de base, et particulièiement celle'qui, en 1966, a entendu mettre fin au
Mandat de l'Afriquedu Sudsur le Sud-Ouest africain.La Cour nepeut apprécier
la situation juridique des Etats ii propos de la résolutino276 du Conseil sans
se prononcer sur le point d,:savoir si'la résolution2145 &XI) de I'Assemblée
généralequi en est lefondenient a étépriseconformémentaux dispositionsde la
Charte. Seule une discussioiisimultanéede la valeur de la résolutiondu Conseil
et de celle de l'Assembléegiinéraleci-dessusmentionnée permettrait à la Cour,
pour répondre filaquestion concrétequi luiaétkadressée,destatuerd'abord skr
le problèmeplus vaste et plrrs grave qui sepose'à l'ensembtedes Etats a propos
du territoire en question et de I'action conjuguéede I'Assemblée généraeltedu
Conseil Ason sujet.
.-
*'* *
Convaincu que la solution du problémeposé implique un jugementsur le

bien-fondéde la résolution2145 (XXI) de l'Assembléegénéralel,e Gouverne-
ment français note que cette:résolution, pour mettre finau Mandat de I'Afrique
'duSud, prend motif de ce que ce pays s'estmis en infraction avec les principes
du Mandat, les principes d- la Charteet la Déclaration universelle des droits
'de l'homme(par. 5 du préanibuledela résolution).De plus, la résolution 1514
(XV) est iqvoquéedans le gréambule(par. premier) et dans le dispositif (par.
premier)commejustifiant également!eretrait du Mandat. -
Mettant a part le cas de'la.résolutioi1.514(XV) e'Gouvernement françaisrappelle ci:qui a été dit plushauàsavoir qu'ilconsidèreque le Gouvernement
sud-africain s'est mis en contradiction de façon systématiqueavec les normes
de la déclaration des droits de"l'homme, les principes de la Charte, les obli-
gations du Mandat. Mais la question est pour lui de déterminersi la sanction
de ces manquements prouvés peutbien êtrecelle que l'Assemblée généralae
choisie, a savoir le retrait du Mandat. Pour cela, il convient de reprendre les
différents motifsinvoquéspar l'Assembléegénéraleetrappelésci-dessus.
a) Le manquement aux normes inscrites dans la Déclarationuniverselle des
droits de l'homme ne peut de toute évidence déclencheurne telle sanction. Le
texte de ct:tte déclaration ne lie pas par lui-mêmeIesEtats, il n'a pas un carac-
tère convi:ntionneI et, du reste, les textes conventionnels qui, en le prenant
pour fonclement, ont établides obligations et des mécanismesde sanctions à

l'égarddes Etats n'ont pasétéjusqu'a donner à l'Assemblée généraleet,de loin
lepouvoir dont elleprétend faireusagedans l'affairedu Sud-Ouest africain.
b) La question de la compétence qu'aurait 1'Assemblée généralepour pro-
noncer la déchéancedu Mandat en cas de non-respect des termes de ce mandat
mériteévidemmentplus de développement.
A cet égard on rappellera que la Cour, par son avis de 1950 acceptépar
l'Assemblée générale a, admis non seulement que subsistait le Mandat de
l'Afrique du Sud sur le Sud-Ouest africain, mais encore que Ies pouvoirs de
contrôle t:t de surveillance exercésantérieurement par le Conseil de la SdN
étaient recueillis par l'Assemblée générale. Eo nutre, la Cour a posé deux
principes relatifs à ce contrôleàecette surveillance: ledegrédesurveillancii
exercer piir l'Assemblée généran lee saurait dépasser celuiqui a étéappliqué
sous le rkgime des mandats et, d'autre part, cette surveillance devrait être
conforme.,autant que possible,àlaprocéduresuivieen la matièrepar le Conseil
de la SdN.
De plus, depuis lors, et notamment par son avis de 1955, la Cour s'est

préoccupkede résoudre différentsproblèmes relatifs à l'application des deux
principes poséspar elle en 1950,qu'ellea interprétésmais sur lesquels ellen'est
pas revenue.
C'est ainsique lesjuges de laCour se sont demandési lefait que les décisions
au sein dc:l'Assembléegénérale étaientprises pour les questions importanteà
la majorité desdeux tiers alors que les questions relativàla survei1,lancedu
Mandataire étaientsoumises à la règlede l'unanimitéau sein du Conseil de la
SdN pouvait êtreconsidéré commeun accroissement de la surveillance qui
eût étéint:ompatible avec la règle poséepar l'avisde 1950. Il est caractéristique
que les débats de fa Cour ont porté sur le point de savoir sià l'inférieurdes
fonctionsde surveillancetelle ou telle procédureou mesure de contrôle corres-
pondait à une aggravation de cette surveillance qui, comme telle, eût étécon-
traire aux principes de l'avisde 1950. 11n'était pasquestion qu'ilpût être ajouté
a ces fonctions de surveillance et de contrble si cela signifiaitattribution d'un
pouvoir que n'avait pas eule Conseil de la SdN. Lors même, en1956, que la

Cour a interprétéson avis de 1950 comme signifiant que l'ONU recueillait les
pouvoirs non pas seulement effectivement utiliséspar le Conseil de la SdN mais
aussi bien ceux qu'iln'avait pas mis enŒuvrebien qu'ils lui fussent théorique-
ment conlërés,elle n'apas un instant admis que lespouvoirs des Nations Unies
(et singuliérementde l'Assembléegénérale) à propos du Mandat puissent être
radicalement plus étendusque ceux du Conseil de la SdN. Or il est bien clair
que c'estcependant à cette conclusion que l'onarrive sil'on admet que I'Assem-
bléegénérale a ledroitde priver un mandatairede son mandat.
If est ci:rtain en effet que le Pacte n'avait pas donnéau Conseil de la SdN
compétencepour mettrefin A un mandat, Ilnlest.paspossiblenonplus d'admettre qu'il aurait pu s'agird'une rompétence implicitecar il eût fallu, pour qu'elle ait
un effet pratique, qu'une dérogation fht expressément prévueà la règle de
l'unanimitéqui prévalaitaii sein du Conseil comme de l'Assemblée. S'agissant
de cette règle,si des doute:;ont pu parfois étreexpriméssur le point de savoir
sila voixde l'Afriquedu Sud aurait dû êtrecomptéedans cette unanimité, même
ceux qui exprimaient ces doutes ne contestaient pas que l'unanimité nefût
exigéede tous autres Etats Membres du Conseil. On ne peut donc admettre que
le pouvoir de mettre finà un mandat est un pouvoir du Conseil de la SdN
recueilli par l'Assembléegtinérale.La Cour, par exemple dans son avis fonda-
mental de 1950,sielle n'a pas eu a prendre expressémentposition sur l'existence

d'une telle compétencede retrait du mandat, parce que personne ne proposait
de la reconnaître ni au Conseil de la SdN nàl'Assemblée générad les Nations
Unies, l'a cependant implicitement mais clairement exclue en nementionnant
que despouvoirs de surveillanceet decontrôle.
Le fait que la Cour ait considéréque la sévérité mêm de cette surveillance
ne devait pas êtresubstantiellement aggravée exclutque cette haute juridiction
ait pu consentir àcequ'on :ajoute aussi substantiellement qu'on leferait en do-
tant I'Assembléegénérad leu pouvoir de prononcer la déchéancedu mandataire,
Sur la base de ces prises de position de la Cour (que ne contredisent pas sur
ce point celles des juges ayant exprimé une opinion dissidente) comme de sa
constatation du caractère conventionnel du mandat, il ne parait pas possible
de conclure que l'Assembléegénérale esc tompétente pour prononcer la fin du
Mandat.

c) La résolution2145 CYXI) invoque enfin pour mettre fin au Mandat les
manquements de l'Afriquedu Sud a l'égard desprincipesde la Charte.
Mais lecasde méprissystématiquede la part d'un Etat a I'égarddes principes
de la Charte est forme1lemr:ntcouvert par une disposition spécifiquede celle-ci.
Il s'agit, comme I'on sait, (LeI'article 6. Or ce texte prévoitque, si un Membre
de l'organisation enfreint de manièrepersistante les principes énoncésdans la
Charte, il peut êtreexclii de l'organisation par l'Assemblée générals eur
recommandation du Conseil de sécuritéI.I est doncbien clair quece texte, s'il
permet éventuellementune procédurevisant àl'exclusionde l'Afrique du Sud,
ne peut pas êtreutilisépour priver ce pays de son mandat sur le Sud-Ouest
africain.
D'une maniére plus générale o,n ne peut trouver dans l'énoncdes fonctions
de l'Assemblée générale, tel qu'il figudraens l'arti10, aucune mention d'une

compétence permettant à cet organe de adécider))de l'appartenance de tel
territoireàtel ou tel Etat, (lutransfert de responsabilitésterritoriales d'un pays
Membre à un autre, mais jeulement, à propos de toutes questions ou affaires
rentrant dans lecadrede la Charte, un simplepouvoir de recommandation.
Si I'on observe que I'A!isembléegénéraIea cependant voté une résolution
((mettant fin))au Mandat, qu'elle a trouvésuffisant pour cela de s'appuyer sur
des textes qui ne lui donnairnt pas cette compétence, qu'ellea invoquéen même
temps des textes conventioiinels (la Charte, le Mandat) et desrésolutionsvotées
par elle (la Déclaration di:s droits de l'homme, 1arésolution 1514(XV)), on
peut en conclure que 1'Assi:mblég eénérales'est conduite comme si elle se con-
sidérait commeinvestie d'en pouvoir législatifiil'échelon universell'habilitant
à la foisAformuler des noi.mesjuridiques obligatoires pour tous, mêmesi elles
ajoutent a la Charte ou modifient celle-ci, eà assortir ces règlesd'un pouvoir
de sanction.

Cela revient a refuser le principe fondamental selon lequel les restrictiàns
la souveraineté desEtats ne se présument pasmais doivent êtreconsenties par
eux. II va de soi qu'une telle construction n'est pasacceptable et que lefait qu'elle
se manifeste, dans le cas en question, Apropos d'un gouvernement dont la
politique :raciste est justement critiquéen'est pas un motif suffisant pour se
dispenser tlela dénoncer.
Le Gouvernement français ne peut que répétera cet égardce qu'il écrivait
A la Cour en date du 15 février1962 1ipropos de l'avisconsultatif sur Certaines
dépensesdoo Nsations Unies:

uLesEtats Membres desNations Uniesont souscrit, qu'ilsoientmembres
originaires ou non, aux engagements de la Charte mais rien de plus. La
Chari:eest un traité parlequel les Etats n'ont aliénéleur compétenceque
dans la stricte mesure où ilsy ont consenti. Depuis le débutdu fonction-
nement des Nations Unies, il n'a pu se créerde règlescoutumières ou de
pratiques contraires a la Charte que si ces règles coutumières ou ces

pratiques ont étconstantes et non controversées, )1
Comme il va de soi qu'enmatiérede retrait d'un mandat on nepeut parler de
pratique constante, et que la résolution2145{XXI)a étécontestée,notamment

par 1aFrance l,on se trouve dans le cas d'une décisionde l'Assembléegénérale
prise ultra vires.

Le fait que l'Assembléegénérales,ans êtrecompistentepour déciderdu retrait
du Mandat de l'Afrique du Sud, ait cependant votéavec une trèslarge majorité
la rksolution 2145(XXI) comporte deux sortes de conséquencesquant à l'effet
de cette résolutionsur laconduite desEtats Membres.

1. Toul. d'abord, cette résolution est dépourvuede force obligatoire pour
I'ensembli:des Etats Membres. Ceux-cine sont pasjuridiquement contraintsde
l'appliquer souspeine de manquer àleurs obligations en tant que Membres des
Nations Unies.

a) On notera que la Charte, qui mentionne explicitement l'obligation d'appli-
.quer 11:sdécisionssiricto sensu du Conseil de sécuritén, e dit rien de tel de
celles de 1'AssembIée générale. Cela s'explique aisément ls'ion considère
que celle-cidoit agiiil'égarddes Etats Membres par voie de recommanda-
tion el:non de décision. Mais mêms ei on admettait qu'elle puisseprendre

des décisionsii,celles-ci ne sauraient êtreobligatoires, par analogie avec
ceIlesdu Conseil, que si ellesetaienten conformitéavec la Charte. Lorsque,
comme dans le cas présent,cette conformité n'existe pas, la décision,de
toute na ni èren,e pourraitêtreobligatoire.
6)Xi va de soi que cette conclusion, même soi n sauhaitait la nuancer ence qui
concerne les pays.qui ont vote pour la décisionde l'Assembléegénérale,
+ demeurerait tout A fait valable pour ceux qui n'ont pas acceptéde voter en
. 'faveur du texte en question. Pour ceux-là, en tout état de cause, il est bien
évidentque la décision nepeut leur êtreopposable.
.
cJ Mais même en cequi concerne ceux qui ont votéen faveur de la résolution
en qut:stion, on notera que certains Etats ont soutenu qu'un telvote, tout
en exprimant un accord des volontés desEtats en question, ne signifiaitpas
- , : * , i * . '
La positionde la France à l'égarddeda resolution 2145 (XXI) a faitl'objetde
déclarationsde M. R. Seydoux(doc.AlPV.1439, p. 17B19et doc. A/PV.1454, p.31.
Depuis lors, leréservesfrançaises'ontétérappelées maintes fois,notamment par
M. Bérarddevant'leConseil desécurité(docS .JPV.1464 ,. 46 a 52) etM. Chayet
devantle inëme organe (doc. SIPV. 1495,p. 21 123), etc. IXPOSÉ BCW TE LA FRANCE .369

que lecontenu de cet accord étaitreconnu en tant que norme de droit inter-
national ni qu'avait donc disparu le droit d'appréciationindividuelle des
Etats. 8 ,

2. Toutefois l'absence de force obligatoire ne signifie nullement l'absence
de toute force. Une résolution commecelle qui est en question peut avoir non
seulement une valeur politique certaine maisencore des effetsjuridiques sub-
stantiels bien qu'indirects.

L'importance du soutie~ique la résolution a obtenu justifie clairement sa
valeur politique; une expression aussi générale doit tout naturellement requ6rir
detous lesEtats l'examenle:plusattentif.
En y procédant, les Etais pourront êtresensibles au fait que la résolution
cherche a combler une insuffisance,apparue au regard de l'évolutionhistorique
du dispositif institutionnel en cequi concerne un mandataire en.infraction avec
lesobligations de son mandat. Sans doute a-t-elle 1etort, de l'avisdu Gouver-
nement français, de chercher a remédier cette insuffisanceen dotant l'ksem-
bléegénéralede pouvoirs qui ne lui ont pas étécodés. Mais, enfin, bien que

d'une manièrejuridiquemeiit mal fondée,eHes'efforcede traduire un'sentiment
légitime, h savoir le souhait de voir sanctionner un mandataire systémati-
que,mentdéfaillant.Or, dariscet étatd'insuffisancede l'organisation internatio-
nale, les Etats individuels demeurent libres, dans l'exercicedeleyr souveraineté,
d'apprécierles conséquenccisde la conduite de l'Afrique du Sud sur le,plan de
leursrelations aveccetEtat. .--.
En tirant ces conséqueno:s,ilsdoivent tout naturellement attacher un grand
prix a l'opinion de lYAssemtilégeénéraleN , 'étantpas contraintsde s'ysoumettre
ils sont en revanche tenus d'y prêterattention. Bien entendu, ce faisant, ils
tiendront compte d'autres 5lémentstels que I'effectivitéde1'exercice.descom-

pétencespar l'Afrique du Sud, le souci de ne pas priver.en fait les populations
du territoire en question dl: la possibilitéde participer 2ila vie internationale.
Une fois cesdifférentsfacteurs évaluési,lspeuvent, et doivent, sous Ieurrespon-
sabilité, tirer leurs propres conclusions quant A leur position A l'egard de la
présencede l'Afriquedu Sui dans leterritoire contesté.
Selon le poids relatif qu'ils auront attribué aux diverses'considér~tions"en
cause, cette conclusion peut êtreconfoqe ou non au contenu de la resolution
des Nations Unies. Dans uii cas comme dans l'autre, il s'agira de l'exercicepar
chaque Etat de son droit de juger la situation en question.et de sanctionner

éventuellementcequi lui paraîtrait un manquement au droit international.. b WRITTEN STATEMENTOF THE GOVERNMENT OF

FINLAND

1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

1.Although the.question on which an Advisory Opinion from the Court has
been requcsted is worded briefly,its scope israther extensive. Having taken the
initiative leading to this request, the Governrnent of Finland therefore deems it
appropria1.eto explain in greater detail the essenceof the question on which the
Court is requested to pronounce itself:The observations made by the represen-
tatives of Finland and a number of other countries in the Security Council and

the adhoc sub-cornmittee established in pursuance of Security Council resolu-
tion 276 (cf. especially the sub-cornmittee report S/9863), give considerable,
although ~ierhapsnot conclusive guidance in this respect. The opinion of the
Court is rcquested on the legal consequences for States arising frorn the situa-
tion resulting frorn South Africa's continued presenceinthe Territory of Narni-
bia in spite of the fact that already severalyears ago the Territory byan almost
unanimous decisionof the United Nations General Assembly was placed under
the adrnin:istrationand direct responsibility of the Organization. The Assembly
took this decision because it was convinced that South Africa had conducted
itself in a inanner which was contrary to the Mandate entrusted to it, contrary
to the Charter of the United Nations and contrary to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. Significantly,South Africa'spresence there has continued in
spite of thmfact that the General Assembly and the SecurityCouncil on several
occasions, after the decision to revoke the Mandate had been taken, have re-
quested it!;authorities to withdraw froni the Territory.
2. In the opinion of the Government of Finland the Court's Opinion should

make it clear that South Africa lost its Mandate over South WestAfrica pre-
cisely becauseit acted contrary to its aforementioned international obligations,
thereby vioIating the legal status of the Territory. The decision taken by the
United Notions General Assembly to revoke the Mandate and assume direct
responsibility for the Territory has been described as final andirrevocable by
the overwl~elrningmajority of United Nations member States. It was precisely
because of'the nature and character of the administration of the Territory that
South Africa-in the view of the United Nations-violated the international
status of the Territory, which resulted in the revocation of the Mandate.
3. In way of introduction, the Finnish Government wishes to make some
brief remarks on the question of the transfer of administrationof the Territory.
In its Ad\*isoryOpinion of 11 July 1950, on the InternationalLegal Starus of
South West Afiica,the Court consideredthat the Union ofSouth Africa wasnot
under an obligation to place the Mandated Territory of South West Africa

under the .trusteeshipsystemof the United Nations. However, no less than 6 of
the 14 Members who participated in the decision were of a different opinion.
Some of tliem felt that the Union of South Africa at any rate had an obligation
to enter into negotiations on converting the Territory into a trust territory. Ptis
furthermore worth recalliog that at that particular time the question of whether
the Union of South Africa had violated its obligations under the Mandate was
not at issue. What was at issue, was whether of not the Territory should be
converted into a trust territory on the basis or Article (1)(a) of the Charter
of the United Nations. On the other hand the Court considered unanimously WRI~TEN STATEMENT OF FINLAND 371
in its Opinion of 1950that the Union of South Africa had no right to change the

international legal status of the Territory without the consent of the United
Nations. A sizeable majority (12-2) was furthemore of the opinion that the
Union of South Africa w2.sbound by the international obligations contained
both in Articie 22of the Covenant of the League of Nations and intheMandate
and in addition obligated to forward the petitions of the population of the
Territory as well as its olvn annual reports on the Territory to the United
Nations, which now had trbperform the obligations (formerly entrusted to the
League of Nations) pertaining to the supervision ofthe Territory. The authority
of the United Nations ovt:r the South West Africa Mandated Territory was
placed beyondany doubt iri two subsequent Opinions rendered by the Court on
7 June 1955, and 1 June 1956.
It is finallyworth noting that the Court initsJudgment on 21December 1962,
on .thecase brought before it by Ethiopia and Liberia, rejected the preliminary
objections made by South Africa and established that Article 7 concerning,
interah, modification of the South West African Mandate Agreement was
still.in forcin its finalJudgment on the case on 18July 1966the Court did not
pronounce itselfon the que:itionwhether South Africa hadviolatedthe Mandate

orYotherinternational oblir:ations but dismissed the case on grounds of lack of
locusstandiNeither didthe:Court at the timt expressviewsdifferentfromthose
contained in its previous Gpinions on South West Africa.
4. The situation has changed since the afore-mentioned judgment by the
Court. The General Assembly of the United Nations, in dealing with the ques-
tion at its twenty-first regular session, established in its resolution(XXI)
that South Africa had adniinistered the Territory in violation of the Mandate
and certain other ,international obligations thereby also violating the interna-
tional legal status of the l'erritory. The Assembly consequently declared that
South Africa. on these grounds had forfeited its rights under-the Mandate.
Later the Security Council confirmed the decision of the General Assembly,
declared South Africa's presence in the Territory illegal and requested its
authorities to leave the~~~~~~~~y.
Withthe exception of So~thAfrica almost theentire United Nations member-
ship shares the opinion th2.tSouth Africa has violated its international obliga-
tions under the Mandate. France, which-onmany occasionshas abstained from
voting in the United Naticenson matters concerning the Territory, declared at
the Security Council meeting on 29 July 1970,that "there can be no doubt that

the mandatory Power (Soiith Africa) disregarded its obligations and that the
measures which itis planriing to adopt, or has adopted,.are in contradiction
with the commitmentsemanating from Article 22of theCovenant of the League
of Nations" (S/PV.1550, p. 87). Differences of opinion have, in fact, been
expressed only with regard to whether such violations shouldcause the ioss of
the rights under the Mandlte. Neither the Covenant of the League of Nations
nor'the South West Africaii Mandate Agreement contain any provisions on this
matter. Article 22,paragraph 1,of the Covenant states, however, that ". . . the
well-king and development of such peoples [in the mandated. territories] form
a sacred trust of civilizati...". Paragraph 2 of the same Article states that
the State entrusted with this function acts on behalf of the League of Nations.
These provisions in themselves show that no mandates-not even the ones
belonging to category "C", as did the Mandate over South West Africa-were
intended to be permanent. [naddition the mandatories had a number of impor-
tant obligations, which weIesupervisedby the League of Nations. Although the
category "CM Mandates, eccording to Article 22, paragraph 6, of the League
Covenant, "... can be be:;tadrninistered under the laws of the Mandatory asintegral portions of its territory.. .",thiscould not beinterpreted to impiy that
the mandatory was not obliged to respect the special international legal status
of the territory in question. In legal doctrine various viewshave been advanced
as to whoin the sovereignty of such a territory belonged. The most prevalent
opinion wiis that the sovereignty either befonged to the League of Nations or
was for thi: time being latent.
- S. It seems natural, as is obviously the case of South Africa, that if the

mandatory continuouslyviolatesits obligations,theorganization that supervises
the administration may declare the mandate forfeited. South Africa has not
fulfilled thmrsacred trust of civilization which wasits duty under the Mandate.
Instead of providing for the welfare of thepopulation of South West Africa and
developing:its people, it has, on the contrary, violated the human rights of the
pop~ilatiori,which are under the special protection of the United Nations. It is
indisputable, moreover, that South Africa continuously has neglectedits duty
to submit reports and this alone givessufficientgrounds to terminate the Man-
date. Authoritative support for the legitimacyof theaction taken by theGeneral
Assembly and the SecurityCouncil isalso given by a iate Meniber of the Court.

Thus Trairéde Droit internationalpublic 1:2 (Paris 1925)by Bonfils-Fauchifle,
which thoroughly examines questions concerningmandates, Stateson page 887 :
"un mandat international est susceptible d'être révoqué lorsqule e mandataire
se rend collipabled'un 'manquement gravea ses obligations, et c'est Ie conseil,
qui ... prendra à cet égardune décision".In his work Legai Efecrs ofUnifed
Nations Rt:solutions(New -York and London 1969) Castafieda deals (p. 128)
With.the South West African question. He refers to general principles of law,
according -towhich treaty relations implythat if either party does not carry out
its 'obligations, the other party may consider the treaty terminated. Conse-

quently, the General Assembly had the right to cancel the South West African
Mandate. 'rhis principle is also upheld by Article 60 of the Convention an the
Law of Tieaties, adopted in Vienna on 22 May 1969.:One.Member of the
Court (Alvarez), in his dissenting opinion in the case concerning the Inierna-
tional Statlrs ofSoulh West Africa i,rer alin,expressed the viewthat in case the
mandatory did not fulfil the obligations arising from the mandate, the United
Nations General Assembly could by virtue of Article IOaofthe Charter, make
admonitioiis to the mandatory and, if necessary, revoke the rnandate.(I.C.J.
Reports 19.50,p. 182, para. 8).
6. The revocation of the.Mandate has changed the situation and special

legal consequences hive arisen for States..The Govemment of Finland believes
that these legal consequences should be defined, and that the International
Court of Justice is the most comptent and authoritative international Iegal
organ to give an advisory opinion in the matter. Having participated in the
decision by the United Nations Security Council to request the International
Court of .Justice for such an advisory opinion, the Finnish Government,
therefore, considers it appropriate to give its viewson the legal character of the
question of Namibia.
7. The Fecurity Council resolution containing the request for an advisory

opinion refers to the legal consequencesfor States, i.e., al1States. The legal and
factual position of States differs, however, withregard to this question. There-
fore, the legal obligations of Sout Ahfrica,of the other Members ofthe United
Nations and of the Statesnot rnembersof the Organization are dealt with under
separate headings. $- 4
. . .* . . . ~ .r
. - .1.
7- WRITTEN STATEMENT OF FINLAND 373
Il. THE LEGAL (:ONSEQUENCES FOR SOIJTHAFRICA

8. In the preceding section, the question of the transfer of the administration
of the South West African Mandated Territory has been examined. It is main-
tained that byacting in a nianner contrary to its obligations under the Mandate
South Africa has lostitsrights under the Mandate. General Assemblyresolution
2145(XXI) of 27October 1966contains a dedaration to this effect.The Security
Council later concurred ircthis opinion, in resolution 264 (1970), in which it
calls upon South Africa to withdrawits administration from South West Africa.
In theAdvisory Opinion of 1950to the General Assemblyof the United Nations,
the International Court of Justice stated by a majority of its Members that the
supervisory duties over thi: South West African Mandated Territory had been
transferred to the United Nations after the dissolution of the League, but that
the international status of the Territory in other respects remained unchanged.

Sinc ehe United Nations had succeeded the League, the supervisory duties of
the United Nations include, interdia,the right to terminate the Mandateand to
place the territory in question under its own administration if the Mandatory
has violated its obligation:. under the Mandate. This has indisputably been the
case with South West Africa. In this connection it must be emphasized-in
addition to what has been stated in the preceding section-that the possibility
to dismiss a mandatory ar-drevoke a mandate is a necessarypart of the super-
vision, since otherwise the necessarysanctions would belacking.In casethere is
no such possibility, the p~ovisionsin the Covenant of the League of Nations
and in the mandate agreement itself, dealingwith the protection of the.interests
and development of the T1:rritoryand its population, lose their significanc..
9. Since the demand to relinquish the administration of Namibia kas been
made on the basis of the dxision taken by the General Assembly to revoke the

Mandate,-South Africa should conform with that dernand and withdraw its
administration from the Territory. The South African Government has, how-
ever, defied this demand, contrary to its obligations under the Charter. Conse-
quently-as isstated in operative paragraph 2 of Security Council.resolutipn
276(1970)-the continued presenceof the South African authorities in Namibia
must be considered illegal and al1measures which the South African Govern-
ment has taken on behalf of, or concerningNamibia after the termination,of the
Mandate, equally illegal andvoid. Such measures rnay bearupon the Territory
itself or natural and juridical persons in the Territory. In this case nationality
does not have conclusivesignificance.Adrnittedly there are acts which cannot
be retroactively annulled. 13utif in such casesdamagehas ensued, theobligation
of compensation arises as ;iresult of South Africa'sinternational responsibility
in the matter.

III. THE LEGAL COjVSEQUENCESFOR OTHER MEMBERS OF
THE UNITEDNATIONS THAN SOUTH.AFRICA . ..

10. ln dealing with,the legal consequences foi other Mernbersof the United
Nations than South Afric;r the Govemment of Finland considers it necessary
to deal with the SecurityCouncil resolution 276and resolution 283 (1970)since
certain parts of the latter r:solution are closely connected with operative para-
graph 5 of resolution 276 (1970) and clarifythe special measures arisingfrom
that paragraph.
11. Operative paragraplis 2and 5are the signifiant paragraphs of resolution
276 (1970). The illegality and voidance of the measures taken by South Africa
in Namibia are established in paragraph 2,and member States have to take thjsinto account. Paragraph 5 which is a corollary to paragraph 2 seeks to imple-
ment that paragraph. States, particularly those which have economic and other

interests in Namibia, are called upon to refrain from any dealings with the
Government of South Africa.
12. In eiideavouring to definethe exact implications of operative paragraphs
5 and 2 they should be read together. As a consequence of these paragraphs
States shoiild adopt an attitude of non-recognition with respectto South African'
claims to authority on Namibia. In matters concerning this Territory, member
States shoilld deal only with LheUnited Nations. Member States are not to
participate in any activities of South Africa in Namibia or concerning that
Territory, or to give any support to such activities. They have to endeavour
to isolate IrTamibiafrom foreign contacts.
The situation in the case of Namibia is somewhat similar to that which exists
between States which have not recognized each other, but the duty to refrain
from any contact isstillmore comprehensive.It seemsthat thecourtsof member
States sho~ildnot accord legalvalidity to decisionsor measures by South Africa
concetning Namibia. A differentquestion iswhether member Statesalso should

prohibit and prevent their nationals and other pcrsons, includingjuridical per-
sons, from having dealings with the authorities now in power in Namibia and
insist that ihese should refrain from any activity in Namibia. This depends pri-
marily on what the Security Council will decide. The Council has already
defined thi:in the resolution 283 (1970) which will be analysed below. Prior to
this it is, however, necessaryto refer to operative paragraph 7 of resolution 276
(1970),in vvhich,inter olia, the Statesare requested to givethe ad hocsub-com-
mittee, estr~blishedin operative paragraph 6 of that resolution, information and
other assistance that sub-committee may require in the performance of its task.
13. The provisions of Security Council resolution 283(1970)concerning acts
against South Africa are to be understood primarily as recommendations.
Operative lparagraphs 1-3, which deal with the diplomatic, consular and other
relations uith South Africa in regard to Namibia form a whole. AI1these acts
are in conformity with the principles expressedin operative paragraphs 2 and 5
of resolution 276 (1970).
14. In operative paragraph 1of resolution 283 (1970)States are requested to
refrain, in itddition to diplomatic and consular relations, also from other kiods

of relation:jwhich woirld,directly or indirectly, imply the recognition of the
authority cifSouth Africa over Namibia. Such other relations are understood
to comprise, e.g., the dispatching of special missions or political agents to
Namibia. A11 official relations with this Territory are thus tbe severed. Ttis
also logical that those member States which have dipIomatic or consular rela-
tions with !:outh Africa, declare officiallyto the South African Government that
they do not recognize its authority over Namibia and that they will recall the
diplomatic, consular or other representatives they rnay have in that Territory,
as is deterrnined in operative paragraphs 2 and 3.
15. Operative paragraphs 4-6 deal with the termination of commercial and
financial re:lationswith Narnibia. Here it is primarily a question of acts by the
States theniselves, some of which willaffect their nationals as welas firms and
enterprises of their nationality. States are entitled to regulate these matters at
will. In the subsequent (7.)paragraph States are called upon to discourage their
nationals or firms .not under direct governmental control frorn investing or
obtaining r:oncessions in Namibia. States shall withhofd protection of such

investment against possible claims of a future dejure govemment of Namibia.
There are of course no Fundamental or legal obstacles to such measures and
according to international law a State rnayat willdeclinediplomatic protection WRI'lTEN STATEMENT OF FINLAND 375
of ils nationals, includingj~ridical persons. This is a right belonging to the State
and not to those who coulil be protected.

16. In operative paragraph 8States are invited to study al1bilateraltreaties be-
tween themselves and South Africa and to review the treaties in as far as they
contain provisions which iipply to Narnibia. The purpose is presumably to
avoid applying them to Namibia. Since it is assumed that Namibia does no
longer corne under South rifrican jurisdiction, the logical consequence is that
the treaties concluded by South Africa with foreign countries have ceased to be
in force in Namibia. Such an attitude is in conformity with both the Security
Council resolution 276 (1970) and with the main principle of the territorial
application of treaties exprrssed in Article 29 of the 1969Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties. Iri addition reference can be made to the generally
applied principle of movable treaty boundaries, according to which the terri-
torial application of treatim changes correspondjngly if the boundaries of the
State are moved.
17. In operative paragraph II States are called on to discourage the prorno-
tion of tourism and emigration CoNamibia, which they can do, as far as their
own nationals are concerned.

18. Finally, according to operative paragraph 13 the States are requested to
report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on measures they have
taken in order to give effect to the provisions mentioned above.
19. Tt appears from the above that al1the most important acts for the imple-
mentation of operative paragraphs 2 and 5 of resolution 276 (1970) are con-
tained in resolution 283 (1970). This is particularly the case in regard to the
relations of the States theniselves. The stipulations concerning individuals are
of a secondary nature. Only the question of their economic and financial activi-
ties has been touched upcm to a greater extent. During the debates in the
Security Council and the adhocsub-committee a proposa1 was made according
to which foreign firms active in Namibia should pay taxes to the UnitedNations
Namibia Council and not to the South African authorities. This suggestion,
however, would have been difficult to put into practice. Operative paragraph 5
of resolution 276 (1970) is worded rather broadty and thus gives the Security
Council a possibility to propose, within the scope of the paragraph, such addi-
tional steps which may be deemed necessary.

IV. THE LEGAL CON!iEQUENCES FOR STATES NOT MEMBERS

OF THE UNITED NATIONS

20. Resolutions 276 and 283 (1970) of the Security Council are also directed
to States not members of tl-ieUnited Nations. Their effectiveness depends upon
whether and to what extent al1States take part in the efforts to isolate Namibia.
Some States not members of the United Nations have replied to the enquiry
made in the spring of 1970 by the adhoc sub-cornmittee of the Security Council
concerning their relations with Namibia, but this does not mean that these
States would be ready or would consider themselves bound to carry out the
measuresstipulated by the :3ecurityCouncil. TheCharter of the United Nations
presupposes, cg., in Articic:2, paragraph 6,that also States not members of the
Organization should act according to the principles ernbodied in the Charter.
The most important of thest: principles is the maintenance of international peace
and security. It is, however, doubtful whether it can be considered that the per-
tinent provisions of the Charter, although dealing with States in general or
expressly with States not mernbers of the Organization (asin Art.2, para. 6),are

binding. In jurisprudence rhe view has been put forward that even an almostuniversallyaccepted treaty as the Charter, is binding only on the contracting
parties, Le.,the mernber States.This viewhasfoundsupport in Articles 34-37of
the Vienria Convention, on the Law of Treaties dealing with third States.
Similar ~T~ligationsa,s those based on treaty, rnay, of course, arise for third
States froin the general principles of international law, Le.,customary Iaw. This
has been taken into consideration in the Vienna Convention (Art. 38). It can
therefore be stated with good reason that the prohibition of the use of force in
the relaticins between States already isa part of general international law. The

maintenance of peace and security, rnentioned inArticle 2, paragraph 6, of the
Charter oFthe United Nations may, however, comprise many other things,e.g.,
active rnexsuresfor the maintenance ofpeace, the performance of which in no
casecan tieimposed upon States outside of the Organization.
21. Despite what has been said above, States not members of the United
Nations, :;hould not entirely ignore the almost unanimous decisions as wellas
the statenients pronounced and the measures indicated therein. According.to
the view of the Organization, the South African administration in Namibia is
illegal and belongs for the time being to the Organization until the Territory
becornesindependent and is itself in a position to take over the responsibilities.
SinceSouth Africa still has the defacto power, a conflicthas ensued. The States
not members of the United Nations are certainly not bound to recognize the
forma1 trimsfer of the territorial sovereignty to the Organization but on the
other hand they have the right to do so and in that case their stand on the
Narnibian question puts them to some extent in the same position as the Mem-
bers of the Organization.
22. Finally it should be mentioned that should States not members of the
Organization, both those that have, and those that have not recognized the
.transfer of the administration of Namibia to the Organization, continue their
activities in Namibia in spite of the resolutions edopted by the Organization,
they do sciat their own risk. If also the defacto administration of the Territory
should betransferred to the Organization, the newauthorities arenot compelled
to approve such rights and privileges which have been accorded during the
South Afiican ilfegal administration to these States and to their nationals.
. - LETTRE DU SECRETAIRE D'ÉTAT SIJPPLI~ANTAIJX
AFFAIRES ETRANGERESDE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

SOCIALISTE FÉDÉRATIVE. DE YOUGOSLAVlE
..:A iL.4COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

Le 18 novembre 1970.

Me réfkrant la lettre de la Cour internationale de Justice nodu05août

1970, dans Laquelleest poséela questiones conséquencesjuridiques pour les
Etats dela présencecontinue de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie, nonobstant la
résolution276 (1970) du Conseil de sécuritéj,'ai l'l~odevous informer que
le Gouvernernent de la République socialiste fédérativede Yougoslavie con-
u&re que le Mandat de l'Afrique du Sud en Namibie a juridiquement pris fin
en wrtu dis risolutions de l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies et du Con-
seil de ecurité.sibien que son administration en Namibie est aujourd'hui
illégale.
Le Gouvernement sud-africain continue a refuser opiniâtrement d'accepter
les dicisioril;, dglements et recommandations di: l'ONU, ne reconnait pas le
Conseil des Nations Unies pour la Namibie, ne se retire pas du Territoirlade
Namibie, mais étend à ce territoire et y renforce sa politique d'apartheid. Cette
pditique du Gouvernement de la République sud-africaine ne menace pas
seulement la paix et la sécuritésur le continent africain, mais la paix dans le
monde et reprkente un obstacle sérieuxa la coopération entre les Etats. Elle
porta aussig~.ae~t~eilattteiitI'eflicacitkde I'Orgaiiisatiun dcs Nt~.liunsUnies.
Cel~ayrtsmce de laRtp~ibliq~ltsud-africaine rev.31tous Ics rispccts d'accu-
patian cuntraircs aux principcs fondÿmcntaux dIüCharte des Natiotis Uiiies.
Pouies raisons,le ~:;ouvernciiieiilaeRSF de Yougoslavie ticnt ü suiiligncr

une no~ivcll~i'uisqu'il suiilicnt loulss 1cs rricyusoinpris celles d'ordrc
j~iridiquczymt pour objcctif de mcttrc fiI'uccupatius de la Naniihie par In
KCpuhliquesud-africaine, ainsi que toutlesniesures qui iibutiliraidtirile
~rtcilleurdtlai possibAInliberltct Al'indtpeadance du peuple dc Namibic cl
cellasprkvues par les articles 41, 42 et 43 da In Chartdes Nnlions Clnies.
lx I.;outvrneiiietit de la R&pprihlocia1i.st.et'tdtralivc dc Yuuguslrsls
donc i.1'xiqu'ilcxisieçn plus d~sçuns~c~~içncçpsrkvlispar la Cliartcilcas
d'inobwrvatinn des dkcisioiis des 'Nations Ui~ies,une co~s&yiienceji~ridique
certaine que 1'Afi.iquedSud iiesaliraen aucuii cas, npar rapporti l'ONU
nipar rapport aux Etats tiers, se prévaldurparagraphe 7 de l'article 2 de la
Charte des Nations Unies relatifàl'ingérencedans les affaires intérieurs ence
qui concerne ses procédéssur le Territoirà l'égarddu peuple de la Namibie.
Veuillezagtéeretc.
(Signé) Dr. Anton VRATUSA.