3. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS PRESENTED BY
THE COVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
RRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN REGARD TO THE
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION LODGED BY THE IMPERIAL
GOVEIINhfENT OF IRAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I Page
Introductory ............... 321
The Order of 5th July, 1951 ......... 321
The proceedings in the Sccurity Council ..... 323
The sole question which the Court has to consider is
whether it has jurisdiction to deal with tlie merits of
the case ..... ..........
Articlez (7)of the charter lias no bearing on tlie
question which the Court has to consider ...
The case falis witliin Article 36 of the Statute of the
Court unless the declaration of either Persia orthe
United Kingdom is so worded as to exclude it .
The relationship created by declarations under the
Optional Clause .............
The reservations in the l'ersiaii acceptance of the
Optional Clause .............
The limitation to disputcs arising out of treaties or
conventions .............
Thin the Treaties of 1857and 1903na.... clauses
The international engagement of 1933 ...
The exception of "domestic jurisdiction" ....
The case of the Tunis and hlorocco Nationality
Decrees .............
TheElectricityConipanycase ......
The Peace Treaties case ........
The views of writ~rs .........
Alternative submissioii of the United Kingdorn
Government that, if the Court decides not to
reject the Preliininary Objection, it should
join the question of jurisdiction to the merits
Comments of the United Kingdom Government on
certain miscellaneous points raised by the Iranian
GoThe Eastern Carelia casear...bservati...... . ,
The alleged abuse of tlie right of dipiornatic protec-
tion. ...............
The "local remedies" rule .........
Article22 of the Concession Convention .... OBSERVATIONS AND SUEMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III52) 321
Pnrogvoph Page
The Iranian clairuthat uroceedinesbeforethe Court
should be suspendedA ... y ...... 53 367
The uuruorted withdrawal ofthe I'ersiandeclaration
of i9$o .............. 54 366
Conclusionsof the Government of the United Kingdom 55-j6 369
List of Annexes .............. 371
Anneses ................ 372
[XOTE-AS stated in footnote I on page 67 of the Mernorial
and in the note at the beçinning of Annex 3 thereto, the
United Kingdom Government endcavours as far as possible
throughout the pleadings in this case to use the words "Persia"
and "Persian" when dealing with the pre-1935 period and the
words "Iran" and "Iranian" when dcaling with the post-1935
period.]
Introductory
I. These Observations and Suhmissioiis arc presented to the
Court in pursuance of an Order made by the President of the Court
dated 11th February 1952. (I.C. J. Reports 1952. page 13.) In
submitting them the Government of the United Kingdom maintains
al1 the contentions and submissions which it has presented in its
Memorial and in the Annexes thcreto, to which these Observations
and Submissions are supplementary.
2. The document filed with the Court by the Iranian Govern-
ment on 4th February 1952 is entitled "Observations préliminaires
- Refns du Gouvernement inzpérialde reconnaitre la compétence
de la Conr - Agaire de l'ex-Anglo-Iranian Oil Co". It is treated
by the President of the Court in the above-named Order as a
Preliminary Objection falling within Article 62 of the Rules of
Court, and the Government of the United Iiiiigdom proposes to
treat it as a Preliminary Objection to the jiirisdictiun of the Court
to deal with the merits of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Contpany case
and to reply to it accordingly. The Prcliminary Observations bf
the Iranian Government appear to cvince some confusion as to
the question which is now before the Court. It will be convenient,
therefore, hefore turniiig to the main purpose of these Observations
and Submissions, to clcar up this confusion and to dispose of
certain irrelevant matters introduced hy the Iranian Government.
The Orderof 5th July 1951
3. The Iranian Government has devoted some paragraphs
(paragraphs 3-5) of its Preliminary Observations to commenting,
in terms which are scarcely consistent with the respect dut: to
the International Court of Justice, on the Order of the Court OBSER\rATIOSS ASD SUBJIISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
322
made on 5th July 1951 indicating Interim Measures of Protection
(I.C. J. Reports 1951, page Sg), and has alleged, iftter alia, that
the Court had no competence to make that Order. These comments
and allegations are quite irrelevant at the present stage of the
proceedings. The question of the Court's competence to make the
Order indicating Interim Measures of Protection is a different
question from that of the Court's jurisdiction to determine the
dispute ori the merits, and the former question is not now before
the Court. The Court cannot now be asked to reconsider whether
or not it came to a correct decision in making its Order of 5th July.
The Iranian Government did indeed, before that Order was made,
contest thc competence of the Court. It addressed to the Court
a commuiiication, \\,hich is referred to in the Order of 5th July,
andthe Court in its Order dealt specifically with the two objections
which the Iranian Government had raised in that communicatioii.
The Iranian Government has failed to appreciate correctly the
principle upon urhich the Court proceeded in consideririg itself
competent to make that Order *.The United Kingdom Government
infers froni the Order thatthe Court did not, asthe Iranian Govem-
ment alleges in paragraph 3 of its Preliminary Observations,
proceed on the basis that its competence to dcal with the merits
of the dispute was merely "éventuellement possible". Of the two
objections which Iran had put forward, one (iiamely thatthe dispute
was merely one betweeii the Irauian Government and the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company) was totally rejected by the Court, as being
founded on a misconception, andthe other (that relative to domestic
jurisdiction) was stated by the Court to be an objectioii which.
having regard to the grounds on which the United Kingdom
Government based its claim, could not be accepted a priori, that
is to Say it \vas an objection which could not in principle be estab-
lished on n summary consideratioii. The Government of the United
Kingdom does not consider it necessary to comment further on
the gratuitoiis and discourteoiis remarks made in this connection
by the Iranian Government
1Thc Iranian Covernmcnt quotes from the book of the former Judge Manley
O. Hudson, hut it does not quote from the latest edition of that wark, which is
in the.earlier edition. authar erpressedvieivs sornewhat difierent from those
xOn pages289 and zgoof its Preliminary Obscraatiothe Iraiiian Government
indulges iadigression into what çeem to be mere technicalities of French municipal
law, into which the Government of the United Kingdom does not propose to follow
it. These technicalitdosnot appear tobe germane. even by way of analogy, to
the question of the Court's competence to indicate Interim Rleasarquestion
which itself is quite irrelevto the matter now before the Court. It will be
sufficient to suy that thnt competence derives solely fromqrrof the Statute
of the Court and Article 61 of the Rules of Court. and thCourt. in making
the Order of 5th July, acted strictly within the powers conferred on it by those
Articles., OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52) 323
The proceedings in the Security Council
4. Following upon the Order of 5th July 1951 and the further
events described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 2A of the Rlemorial. the
United Kingdom Government felt obliged to bring to the notice
of the Security Council the fact that the Iranian Government had
refused to comply with the Order indicating Interim hleasures of
Protection (which, in accordance with Article 41 (2) of the Statute
of the Court, had been notified to the Security Council), but on
the contrary was persisting in the course of action which had led
the United Kingdom to apply to the Court for Interim Measures
of Protection. Accordingly, on 29th September 1951, the United
Kingdom submitted to the Security Council the draft resolution
which is printed as Annex I hereto; snbsequently thc United
Kingdom submitted in succession two revised draft resolutions
which are printed as Annexes 2 and 3 hereto. An extended debate
took place in mhich representatives both of the United Kingdom
and of Iran took part l. The United Kingdom representative did
not, of course, put before the Security Council the grounds on
which the Government of the United Kingdom, though not in
gcneral disputing the right of a State to nationalize enterprises
situated in its territory, contends that, in its actions towards the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Iran had contravened interriatii~nal
law, grounds nhich are set out in the United Kingdom Memr>rial
and are summarized in paragraph 7 thereof. Nor, of course, did
the United Kingdom representative place before the Security
Council the grounds on which the United Kingdom alleges that
the Court has jurisdiction to decide the present case upoti the
merits, grounds which are set out in Annex z to the Memorial.
Ncither of these was relevant to the matter which the United
Kingdom was bringing to the attention of the Security Council,
namely the failure of Iran to comply with the Court's Order indicat-
ing Interim Measures of Protection. On 19th October, on the
proposa1 of the French representative (S/PV. 565, page 6), the
Council resolved to adjourn consideration of the latest United
Kingdom draft resolution until after the Court had decided the
question of its (the Court's) competence to deal with the Afrglo-
Iranian Oil Company case on the merits ;the words used hy the
French representative were : "until the International Court of
Justice shall have tuled upon its own competence in the matter".
The sole. question which the Court has to consider is whether
it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case
5. It is, in the submission of the United Kingdom Government,
important to remember that the two questions :
The verbatim repoofthis dehate is containeS/PV. 559-S]P\565.324 OBSERVATIONS AND SUB>lISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
(i) has the Security Council jurisdiction to entertain the draft
resolutions submitted by the United Kingdom. or (in
general) to consider or take any action in relation to the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case ? and
(ii) has the International Court of Justice jurisdiction to decide
tlie Anglo-Iraniar~ Oil Company case on the merits ?
are quite distinct and do not fa11to be determincd by the same
criteria. This point was expressed very clearly in the Security
Council by Mr. Tsiangl. The first question (jurisdictiori of the
Security Council) depends in the Jirstplace on whether the dispute
falls within the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter or whether
the Security Council has jurisdiction under Article 41 (2) of the
Glurt's Statute or Article 94 (2) of the Charter, and in the second
place whether, if so, the Security Council is deprived of jurisdiction
by Article z (7) of the Charter. That question (namely the question
of the jurisdiction of the Security Council) is one which the Court
has not to decide in these proceedings. Indeed, it is a question
which could not arise for the Court except upon a request for an
advisory opinion uiider Article 96 of the Charter. The Government
of the United Kingdom does not therefore propose to address any
argument to the Court upon this first question. The second question
(the jurisdiction of the Court) depends on Article 36 of the Court's
Statnte, and in particular upon paragraph z of that Article and
upon the tems of the acceptance of the Optional Clause by the
United Kingdom and by Iran.
6. It will appear from paragraphs 9-14 of these Observations
and Subniissions that, in the submission of the Government of
the United Kingdom, Article 2 (7) of the Charter is not relevant
to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court at ail, and that
consequently the Court, in deciding the question iiow before it.
will not have to consider the meaniiig or effect of that paragraph.
It is none the less true that the decision of the Court on the question
of its owii jurisdiction will, as it appears that certain members
of the Security Council bclieved2, assist the Security Council in
detennining the question of its (the Couiicil's) jurisdiction. This
is so for two reasons:
(i) Both Persia and the United Kingdom, in their declarations
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, made
' Mr. Tsiang said:"Hoi\.evcr, 1 should like to cal1 the attention of the Coucil
to this fac:The competence of the Security Council and the cornpetence of the
International Court of Justiare not identical. Should the Courtdecide that it
was not competent to render judgrnent on this question, that ivould not automatic-
ally mean that the Sccurity Cowaslalso not cornpetent to deal with this question.
On the other hand, should the Court decide tha%vascampetent to render judg-
ment on this question, that also would not automatically rnean that the Security
Co'nSeewthe speeches of the representativesof Francc and India (S/P\'. 565.
page 6 and page 36). OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 II1 52) 325
reservations relating to "domestic jurisdiction". In
deciding the question of its jurisdiction, the Court wili
have to interpret and apply the words used in these
reservations, which read as follows :
(By Persia)
"
questions qui, d'après le droit international, rclbvc-
raient exclusi.i~ementde la juridiction de la Perse".
(By the United Kingdom)
"questionswhich by international law fall exclusively
within the jurisdiction of tlic United Kingdom".
In the French text of Article z (7) of the Charter tliere
occur the words "contpétence natioibale", and in the
English text the words "domestic jurisdiction". For
reasons explained in the United Kingdom Memorial', tliere
can be no doubt that the expressions "jz~ridiction" and
"compétence nationale"in Frcrich and "jurisdiction" and
"domestic jurisdiction" in English bèar the same meaning.
The difference (if any) betwccn the effect of the words
quoted above from the respective dcclarations on the one
hand and that of the words "matters which are essentially
within the domcstic jurisdiction of aiiy State" ("des
afaires qzti,relèvent essentiellemeittde la compétencenritio-
nale d'un Etat") in Article 2 (7) of the Charter on the
other hand, lies in the diffcrence (if any) between the
effect of the qualifyiiig adverbs "exclusively" ("exclzuive-
ment") and "cssentially" ("esse>ztiellemeizt" ).In elucitating
the meaning of. the word "jurisdiction" ("jz~ridictioii.")
in its application to the prcsent case the Court will,
thereforc, inevitably assist the Sccurity Coiincilin applying
to the same case the words "domestic jurisdiction"
("compétenca?zutionale") in Article 2 (7) of the Charter.
It is believed that this is what the Indian rcpresentative
on the Security Council mearit (S/PV. j6j, page 36).
(ii) The second reason why the Court's decision on its own
competcnce will assist the Security Council was indicated
by the representative of Ecuador (S/PV. j6j, page nr),
' See Annex 2,paragraph 18,fwtnotes 2 and 3 (Rlemorial, p156).and Anna 2,
paragraph 26 (A) (Rlcmorial, p162).
Article2O(7) is nnt relevant to the question of the jurindicof the Court, that
the Court will not have to pronounce upon the mcaning of the word "essentially"
("essenfielle>nelit") in that Artorupon tho question whetlier. and so in what
respect,it differ~ from that of the word "cxclusivcly"("~xclusiuernent") in the
declarations.The United Kingdom Governmcnt will however argue in the alter-
native. in Annex 4 of thesc Ohservationrand Submissions, tliat the presencase
is not essenfially within the domestic jurisdictiof Iran any more than it is
exc2usiuely withilierjurisdiction.326 OB~ERVATIOS~ AND SUB~~ISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
where he said that, ifthe Court held itself competent, the
judgment of the Court would either be complied with
by the losing party, in which event the matter would not
trouble the Security Council again, or, if it were not
complied with, the other party could bring the case under
Article 94 (2) of the Charter. He indicated that the object
of Ecuador was to "reinforce the authoiity of the Inter-
national Court of Justice" and he therefore considered it ,
essential that the legal issue, the question of domestic
jurisdiction, should be decided by the Court.
7. The Iranian Government in its Preliminary Observations has
contended that the decision to which the Court will come on the
question of its competence cannot even be considered as an advisory
opinion and, consequently, is not binding on anyone (page 3,
paragraph I, ad fipr.)and further that the prcsent discussion con-
cerning the jurisdiction of the Court is designed solelyto enlighten
the Security Couiicil and can have "aucun caractère d'ordre
judiciaire" (page 4, paragraph 2). The decision of the Court will,
as has bccn cxplained in the preceding paragraph, incidentally
assist the Security Coiincil in deciding thc question of its own
competcnce, but that this will not be its sole effect is clcar from
Article 36, paragraph 6,of the Statute of thc Court, which provides
as follows :
"In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has juris-
diction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court."
The decision of the Court as to jurisdiction is, of course, binding
on the parties to the dispute, by virtue of Article 94 of the Charter,
in just the same way as any other decision of the Court. Such a
decision lias nothing in common with a consiiltative or advisory
opinion, nor indeed has such an opinion becn requested. It is
somewhat. paradoxical that the Iranian Government should suggest
that the dccision can have "aucun caracthrc d'ordre judiciaire"
when it is at pains, in paragraph 5 of its Preliniinary Obscrvations.
to stress that thc Court is an "organe judiciaire, exclusivemeiit
judiciaire".
8. Turriing then to the sole question which the Court has now
to consider, it is the contention of the Government of thc United
Kingdom that the jurisdiction of the Court depends on its Statute,
and in particular on Article 36 thereof, together with the declara-
tions, made under the Optional Clause by Persia and the United
Kingdom. Paragraph 2 of Article 36 (Optional Clause) provides
as follo\vs:
"2. Thc States parties to the present Statute may at any time
declare that they recognize as compulsory i@so facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52) 327
same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in al1legal disputes
conceming :
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law ;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would con-
stitute a breach of an intemational obligation ;
(d) thenature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation."
This paragraph expressly sets out, under the letters (a) to (d), the
four categories of matters in respect of which States may accept
the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. It clearly follows that,
where States have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court, the Court has jurisdiction to determine legal disputes
concerning any one or more of those categories of matters, except
.. in so far as any reservations or qualifications in the declarations
of the disputants debar the Court from doing so.
Article z (7) of the Charterhas no bearing on the question which the
Cozirt has to consider
9. The Iranian Government, on the other hand, contends that
Article 2 (7) of the Charter in some way cuts down the power given
to States by Article 36 of the Statute to accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court. An exarnination of the actual words of
Article z (7). however, makes it quite clear that it is totally inap-
plicable to the International Court of Justice. The introductory
words of the paragra~h a~e as follows :-
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene ...."
In the first place, the paragraph refers only to intervention by the
United Nations. The International Court of Justice is not the
United Nations ; it is (as Articles7 and 92 of the Charter state) a
principal organ, and the principal judicial organ, of the United
Xations. Rloreover, the later words in Article z (7) are clearly
inapplicable tothe Court :the words "bzrtthis principle shall notpre-
judice the application of enforcementn~easuresunder ChapterVII"
indicate that the paragraph is directed to the limitation of
the action of the United Nations as such, including the Security
Council acting on their behalf (Article 24 (1)).The function of the
Court is a specialized one and its duties are peculiar to it ; tliey
bear no resemblance to those functions and duties which the
United Nations Organization has as such under the Charter. The
special status of the Court is made clear by the fact that it, alone
of the organs of the United Nations, has a Statute to define and
regulate its functions, which is separate from (though an integral
part of) the Charter ; Article 92 of the Charter provides that the
Court shall function in accordance with the Statute; Article I
of the Statute provides that "the International Court of Justice,328 OBSERV.4TIOSS ASD SUBhllSSIOSS OF U.K. .(24111 52)
established by the Charter of the United Nations as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, shall be constituted and shall
function in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute".
There is riot a word in the Charter or the Statute to suggest that
the powers and functions expressly conferred on the Court by the
Statute (in accordance with which the Articles quoted above
provide tliat it is to function)are to be limited by general provisions
in the Charter. It is inconceivable that, if it had been intended that
Article z (7) of the Charter should limit the jurisdiction expressly
conferred on the Court by the Statute, express words to this effect
u,ould not have been used either in the Statute or in Article 92
of the Charter. Reference may pcrhaps be made to two principles,
of which the first, though expressed here in the particular form
known to Anglo-saxon law, none the less represents (equally with
the second) a mle of construction of universal application coming
within Article 38 (1) (c) of the Court's Statute. The first is that a
grantor \vil1not without express and unambiguous words be deemed
to have intended to derogate from his grant ; the second is that
enshrined in the maxim generalia specialibtbs non derogant. The
Court should not, in the submission of the Government of the
United Kingdom, give ail application to general words in the
Charter which contradict special provisions contained in the Statute
and derogate by implication from the specific powers granted
expressly and unambiguously by the Statute.
IO. Secondly, Article z (7) is merely a negative provision, whicli
deprives the United Nations of a pourer which, apart from Article z
(7). the Charter might he said to have conferred on it :the words
are :"Nothing containcd in the present Charter shall authorize ...."
In fact tliere is nothing which the Charter authorizes the Interna-
tional Court of Justice do so, Save perhaps that Article 96 by
implication authorizes the Court to give advisory opinions, though
in tmth it is Article6j of the Statute which expressly so authorizes
the Court and Article 96 of the Charter merely authorizes the
General Assembly, Security Council and other organs of the United
Nations and specialized agencies (if so authorizcd by the General
Assembly) to request advisory opinions. -4 fortiori, Article z (7)
does not purport to limit the acceptance by the Court of a juris-
diction which States may confer upon it. and which is derived not
from the Charter but from the voluntary acts of States under
Article 36 of the Court's Statute. For Article 36 is a facultative
or enabling article, which empowers States to refer to the Court
in advance either al1 disputes conceming the matters mentioned
in the Article, or certain of such disputes ;it is the declarations
which confer jurisdiction on the Court ; Article 36 of the Statute
merely authorizes States to make such declarations and lays down
the matters in respect of which they may be made.
II. Thirdly, Article z (7) relates solely to intemention by the
United Nations. The word "intervention" is quite inappropriate OBSERVATIONS AND SUSMISSION SF U.K. (24 IIIj2) 329
to describe the exercise by the Court of its functions. There has
indeed been some discussion as to the meaning of the word inter-
vention :and as to whether or not "discussion" or the "passing
of a recommendation" constitute intervention within the meaning
of this paragraph. Whatever niap be the tme meaning of the word,
it is certain that the exercise by the Court of its functions under
the Statute cannot be "intervention". It merely delivers decisions
and judgments and advisory opinions on the application of States
or at the request of international organs, in those cases where it
finds that it has jurisdiction to do so (see Articles 36 (6) and 53 (2)
of the Statute).
12. The arguments thus derived from an examination of Article z
(7) itself are confirmed when one looks to Article 36 of the Statute
of the Court. That Article, by paragraph 1, provides that the juris-
diction of the Court comprises al1cases which the parties refer to
itand al1matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations1 or in treaties and conventions in force, and makes it
plain that the Court shall have jurisdiction over al1 cases wliich
the parties refer to it and in al1 cases provided by treaties and
conventions in force. States, Nembers of the United Nations, are
not bound to accept the jurisdiction of the Court in any case at
al1but are free to accept it either ad hoc or by treaty or convention
or by declaration under the Optional Clause to the extent that they
may freely decide to do so. They may subject their declarations
to reservations and make them operative only for a limited period
of time. But if the Iranian contention were right and Article 2 (7)
applied to the jurisdiction of the Court, the result would be that
States would not be free to refer certain categories of inter-State
disputes to the Court even if they wished to do so. It would mean,
as in fact Iran contends that it means, that, where there has been
a pre-existing treaty or convention or acceptance of the Optional
Clause freely entered into, conferring jurisdiction on the Court,
this jurisdiction might be cut down by the provisions of Article z
(7). However, paragraph 5 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court
provides expressly that : "Declarations made under Article 36 of
the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
-hich are stiil in force shall be deemed, as'betupeen the parties
So far, nobody ha? discovercd what effect these words "cil1 matters specially
provided for in the Charter of the United Xations"have, and it is thought that
they were drafted on the açsumption (in the end not realized) that thCharter
itself rvould provide for the compulsory jurisdiction of the Coiirt in cases.n
At any rate, acontention by the Governrnent of the United Kingdom in the Grçt
Cartu Channelcase (PreliminarO ybjectiot tht these words might have somc
meaning by reference to Articl25 of the Charter,when the Security Council had
recommended that the parties should refea dispute to tlic Court, did not Gnd
favour in the separate opinion of a large nurnber of Judges of the CUurt (çee joint
separate opinion of Judges Basdevant, Alvarez, Winiarski,ZoriCiE, De Visscher,
Badawi I'asha and Krylov to the Judgment of25th March, ig48, I.C. J. RePorts
rgq8, p. jr) and this particularcontention \vas not dealt with in the majority
decision.
25330 OBSERVATIOXS ASD SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III52)
to the Present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory juris-
diction of the International Court of Justice for the period which
they stiii have to run and in accordance with their terms." Surely,
if there existed any possibility of the scope of the declarations
already made under Article 36 being limited by the terms of the
Charter, this would have been the appropriate place for giving
expression toany such limitation.
13. Thc remarkable contention that Article z (7) of the Charter
applies to the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases is siipported
by very little argument in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Iranian
Government's Preliminary Observations. The contention is presum-
ably put forward because the Iranian Government, whcther as a
result of confusion or othenvise, is desirous of obtaining from the
Court in these proceedings an opinion as to the jurisdiction not
of the Coiirt but of the Security Council and, moreover, an opinion
which "ne présente pour personne aucun caractère obligatoire"
(see paragraph I of the Iranian Preliminary Observations and also
paragrapli 7 of these Observations and Submissions). The conten-
tion, however, reveals a complete failure to appreciate the reason
why Article z (7) is incliided in the Charter. States, when they
become Itembers of the United Nations, are obliged to accept the
\\-hole of the Charter and al1 the jurisdictioii mhich the Charter
"authorizes" the United Nations to exercise ;thcy cannot accept
just so much of the jurisdiction as they individually may clioose.
Article 2 (7) is, therefore, a necessary protection for Nembers
against excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Unitcd Nations.
(ArticleIj (8)of the Covenant of the League was a similar provision
and inserted for a similar reason.) Article z (7) has, however, no
possiblc place as a qualification of the Court's Statute. By virtue
of Articlc 36 of the Statute, States can become parties tothe Court's
Statute on the footing that they accept the Court's jurisdiction
to the cttent that thcy frcely choose and no more. When States
have frecly coilsented, by instruments entcred into before the
Charter came into force, to accept the jurisdiction of the Court
(or of the Court's predecessor, the Permanent Court of International
Jiistice) in a given class of case becanse they were willing that that
class of case affecting them should be judicially decided at The
Hague, there is no conceivable reason for holding that Article z (7)
of the Charter limits the jurisdiction conferrcd on the Court by
those instruments.
14. There isa further reason why Article z (7).which is a perfectly
appropriate provision limiting United Nations action, is inap-
propriate as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the Court. If a State
is not contravening any of its obligations under international law,
then before the Court it will be successful in the procecdings. A
State thtirefore, which is acting within its domestic jurisdiction.
has always, under the general rules of international law, a valid defence before the Court on the inerits if its action is challenged'.
On the other hand, before the General Assembly or the Security
Couiicil, the position is entirely different. But for -4rticle 2 (7).
it might be argued that, by reason of other provisions of the Charter,
there is nothirig to prevent either of these organs from discussing
the actions of a State which is not contravening any of its inter-
national obligations, and recommeiiding (or in certain cases cven
deciding) that it should follow a course of conduct which din:cts
it to do something which it is not legally obliged to do, or refrain
from doins something which it is legally entitled to do. Article 2
(7) is theGfo;e a necessary protcctien $or States against undue
interference with their sovereientv bv- 2e Uniaed Nations. but for
this further reason is quite iinnecessary in the case of the'lourt 2.
The case fnlls within Article 36 of the Statute of tlie Cozirt zciiless
the Declarationof eitherPersia or the United Kingdom is so rnorded
as to exclzrde it
15. For the reasons given in paragraphs 9-14 ,he jurisdiction
of the Court in the present case is governed, not by Article z (7)
of the Charter of the United Natioris, but by Article 36 of the
Statute of the Court and the dcclarations made under paragraph 2
of that Article by Persia and (by'virtiie of the requirement of
1 For the meaning of "domestic jurisdiction", secparagraph 38 below.
Since the United Kingdom Govcrnment contends that Article 2 (7) of the Charter
doeç not apply to the jurisdiction of the Court, when the Court is requestcd to
deliver judgments in contentioiis proceedings where its junsdiction is founded on
the consent of the parties either ad hoc or on thc basis of engagements of a morc
general character previously entered into, it is unnecessarforthe United Kingdoin's
case to consider whether or not Article z (7) of the Charter has any applicatiaii to
the Court when the Court is requested to givc an advisory opinion by one of the
other organsof the United Xations. There are certain'grounds. however. on wliich
the tivo cases can be distinguished :in the firçt place, an advisory opinion is re-
quested by an organ of the United Sations in order to assist that oigan in deciding
what. if any, action ("intervention") it shall take and the organs of the United
Nations requesting the opinion are tliemselves undoubtedly subject to Article 2
(7). Secondly, while it is the case that the Courthas no jurisdictionto decidc a
dispute betwren two States unless its jurisdiction has been accepted voluntarily,
it may be asked by the Security Council or the General Aççembly ta givean advisory
opinion with regard to a dispute bctwecn two States in regard to which those
States have not accepted the jurisdiction of thc Court at ali. In thc case of th0
Inferpretation of Peoce Treiities witii Bulgaria, Hungavy and Romania (I.C. J.
Reports 1950, page 65).the point of the applicability of Articl2 (7) of the Charter
to the Court, whep asked to give un advisory opinion, was raised, and thc Coiirt.
having decided that the case was not oneof domestic jurisdiction anyway. con-
tendcd itself mith remarking :"These considcrations alsosufficeto dispose of the
objection based on the principle of domestic jurisdiction and directed spccifically
against the competence of the Court. namely. that the Court. asan argan of the
United Nations, is bound to observe the provisions of the Charter, including Article
2, paragraph 7" (page 71).The Court therefore did not express any opinion in that
case one way or the other on the question whether Article2 (7)was binding on it
when it was asked for an advi~ry opinion.332 OBSERVATIONS ATD SUBJIISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 II1 52)
reciprocity) by the United Kingdom. The question of the Court's
jurisdictiori becomes therefore the question ivhether the issues
which await decision on the merits faIl within the provisions of
that Article and those declaiations.
In the present case the Governmeiit of the United Kingdom
contends and the lranian Goveriiment denics :
(i) that Iran has committed breaches of treaties ;
(ii) that there are rules ofinternational lawregulating the circurn-
stances in which and thc manner in which a Statc can,
bythe method ofnationalization or othenvise, legitimately
cancel concessio~is held by foreigners and expropriate
the property of foreigners, and that the Iranian Govern-
ment has acted toivards thc Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
iii contravention of these rules ;
(iii) that the Iranian Governmeiit has acted towards the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company in a manncr ivhich constitutes a
breach of international obli-ations. both customarv and
conventional ;
(iv) that, since there has bccn such a breach of international
obligations as aforesaid. Iran is obligcd to make reuaration
to tKeGovernment of the United do do mor such'breach,
and that the question of the nature and extent of such
reparation must be detcrmined by the Court or by some
impartial body nominated by the Court ; and tliat the
provisions for coinpensation contained in the Iranian Act
of 1st May 1951 in no way satisfy the requirements of
international law.
On al1 tliesc points there is a.legal dispute between the United
Kingdom aiid Iran, and xll these points fall within the categories
set out in Article 36. The case is therefore one which falls within
Article 36, and, unless the declaration of either Persia or the United
Kingdom is so worded as to excludc it, the jurisdiction of the Court
is plain. In view of the fact that the Persian declaration is expressed
to be made "conformément à l'article 36, paragraphe 2,du Statut
de la Cour:', it can scarcely be denied that, subject to any limita-
tions or reservations contained in the declaration, the compulsory
jurisdictionthus accepted hy Pcrsia extends to aü those categories
of matters specified in Article 36, paragraph 2. The next task is to
consider the two declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the
Permanent Court of International Justice (which are continued as
acceptanccs of the junsdiction of the International Court of Justice
by Articlc 36, paragraph 5,of the Statute),and which are set out
in Annex 2 to the Memorial, paragraphs 2 and 4 (Volume II,
page 14') and, in particular, the limitations and reservations
contained in them.
-
' See yy.146-147. OBSERVATIONS AND SUB3flSSIOKS OF U.K. (24 III 52) 333
The relationship created by declarations under the Optional Clause
16. It may be convenient, however, to deal first with a general
point raised by the Iranian Government, namcly, the relationship
created by declarations under the Optional Clause. The Iraiiian
Government (paragraph 17 of its Preliminary Observations) has
put forbvard the proposition that the obligations created by such
reciprocal declarations as those of the United Kingdom and lran
are in no sense contractual. The Iranian Government asserts that
such acceptances are engagements by the States making them
towards the Court, and that the existence of parallel engagements
creates symmetric and similar obligations. It is not clear how the
practical effect of this theory differs (if at all) from that of the
theory which the Iranian Government is attacking, since it is not
disputed that, where one State has made such a declarationtowards
the Court, another State which has made a similar declaration
can rely on the declaration made by the first. The United Kingclom
Government does not therefore propose to spend much time on a
theoretical issue nhich it believes to have no practical significaiice.
It affects at most only one of the Iinited Kingdom arguments
relating to the interpretation of the Iranian declaration, namely,
that in paragraph 36 of Annex z. The United Kingdom Government,
however, feels bound to observe that the theory riow put forward
by Iran is not that generally heldl and accords singularly il1with
the words in fact used in the Persian declaration as well as in those
of the United Kingdom and other States. It is to be noted that
the Persian Government accepted the jurisdiction of the Permanent
Court of International Justice "de plein droit et sans convenlion
spéciale,vis-à-vis de tout aut~e Etat accéptantIn mêmeobligation,
c'est-à-dire souscondition de réciprocité",andthe United Kingdom
declaration contained similar terms. The words in italics make
it clear that Persia was placing herself under an obligation towards
other States, and intended by her declaration to place herself,
in relation to any dispute falling within the terms of the declaration
which might arise in the future, in the same position as if there
were a "convention spéciale" specifically concluded in relation to
the particular dispute. Moreover, in addition to the authorities
quoted in paragraph 36 of Annex 2 to the Memorial, it is pertinent
to refer once again to the judgments in the case cifthc Electricity
Company of Sofia and Bz6lgaria(Series A/B, No. 77). Judge Erich
under the Optional Clause is said to be based upon the theoretical views of French
writers regardingcontrats d'adhésion oude guichet under French municiplaw.
Even in this field the theory of no contract is not appatho general oneSee
Planiol, Traitédlémentairede droit civil, 2nd Edition,2,5l54;and Josserand
in Recueil des Budes sur les sources de denil'honneur de F. Gény, Volume2,
pp. 336.338.and in Recueil d'dtudenl'honneur CE. Lambert, Volume 3. pp143,
145-146.334 OBSERVATIOSS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
(at p. 140) referred to the mutual obligation(obligationrLcijhroqne)
of Belgium and Bulgaria to submit their dispute to the Permanent
Court of International Justice based upon their declarations
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Judge tlnzilotti
said (at p. 87) :
"As a result of these declarations,an agreement came into exist-
ence between the two States accepting the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court, in conformitywith Article36of the Statute and subject
to the limitations and conditions resultin from the declarations,
more especially from that of the Belgian 8overnment. This agree-
ment, hereinafter referred to as the Declarations, came into force
on AIarch ~oth, 1926, the date of the Belgian ratification. The
Bulgarian Declaration is made without limitation of time, but the
Belgian Declaration beiiig made for a period of fifteen years as
from the date of ratification, the duration of the Declarations is
untilhlarch 10th. 1941".
and at page 89 he referred to "the text of the Dcclarations, which,
together with Article 36 of the Statute, detcminc the content of
the Agreement concluded between the two Governments". Finally
the Court itself (at p. 81) gives March ~oth, 1926-the date of the
ratification of the Belgian Declaration, the Bulgarian Declaration
having already been ratified in 1921-as "the date of the establish-
ment of the juridical bond (lien juridique)between the two States
under Article 36 of the Court's Statute".
The reservations in the Persian acceptance of the Optional Clause
The limitation to disfiutes arising out of treaties or co?rve?ztions
17. To turn now to the reservations or exclusions made in the
acceptance of the Optional Clause by Pcrsia, thcrc are in fact two
\\,hich have been raised as relevant to the present case. Thc first
is that Pcrsia's declaration limits the jurisdiction of the Court to
disputes arising out of treaties and conventions, aiid tliere is a
diffcrcnce between the parties as to whether the jurisdiction is
simply limited to treaties and conventions or whether it is coiifined
to treaties and conventions concluded after a certain date. The
second limitation, \vhich relates to "domestic jurisdiction". has
already been referred to in paragraph 6 above and is further dealt
with in pnragraphs 3j-48 below. The United Kingdom Government
now proceeds to deal with the Iranian observations rclating to the
first limitation.
These observations are contained in paragraphs 18-20 of the
Iranian Preliminary Observations and are made in reply to para-
graphs 28-40 of Annex 2 to the iilemorial. The Iranian Government
has distorted the United Kingdom Government's arguments on
this point and appears to suppose that in its argument the United OBSERVATIOSS ASD SUB>IISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 III 52) 335
Xingdom has altogcther ignored thislimitation l.In fact, the United
Kingdom Government has given full effect to this limitatiori to
disputes with reference to treaties and conventions. Indeed a grcat
part of Anncx z to the Mcmorial is devoted to showing that the
present dispute is a dispute with reference to situations or facts
relating dircctly or indirectly to treaties or conventions acccpted
by Persia :sec especialiy paragraph 7 (c) and paragraphs 9-I~A
and 40 of that Annex, and paragraphs 6-6B of the Rlemorial. As
stated in paragraph 34 of Aiinex 2 to the Rlemorial, the proper
deduction from the tems of thc Persiaii declaration, and that
which is in accordance with the ordinary rules of interpretatioii,
is that by adding to the common form the words :
"(lcs ~IiiiCrcnds lu sujcr 11' iitu;itions oidi:f;iih .iyirit(lirccrenient
,111iiiilircctcmrnt tr.iitciI'...~~lii:itioiiilcî trnitis oii ci~n\.ciirions
acceptéspar la Perse",
but in every other respect adhering exactly to the i9sissima vevba
of the common fomi declarations, the Persian Government intended
to adhere to the common form and to give the same meaning to
the standard form of words as they bear in other declarations \vliich
employ them, stcbjecto?dyto the esceptional limitation of the class
of differenccs, to which the declaration was to apply, imposed by
the additional words quoted abovc, that is the limitation to disputes
arising out of conventional obligationse.
18. The United Kingdom i+tterfiretation gives, as no otlterinter-
firetation gives, i1~11 efect ta mery w07din the Persian declaration.
The interpretation which the Iranian Government is now putting
forward does not give effect to evcry word in the declaration. In
fact, it makes three lines of the dcclaration completcly superfluous.
The Government of the United Kingdom has pointed out in para-
grapli 35 of Annex 2 that, if the iiiterpretation now put fornpard
by the Iranian Government were correct, the Persian declaration
would contain words which are completely otiose, namely the
words "qui s'élèveraientaprèsla ratification de la présente déclara-
tion", sincc no dispute arising out of a treaty ratified after the
ratification of the declaration could arise before the ratification
of the declaration. In fact, if the iiiterpretation now put forward
by thc Iranian Government were correct, still further words would
be otiosc, namely the \vords "situations ou faits ayant directemcnt
1 The lranian references to the United Kingdom arguments are confusing here.
Preçumably at the bottom of page 296 of the Iranian I'reliminary Observations the
referenceintended is to paragraph 34 of Annexz to the Mernorial, and not to para-
graph 34 of the DlernarialIn any case the reference to page 42 cannat be right :
the reference intended iç preçurnably to page 28 of Volume II (pp. 166-167 of
this volume).
[,\page 42Rewasfblank.he original Vol. 1 ended at page 37, and in Vol. II
1 This limitation ofcourse excludes disputes as to the application of the rules
ofgeneral international law.savewhere (asin the present case) there exisascon-
ventional obligation to observe those rules. OBSERVATIOSS AND SUBMISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 II1 52) 337
(i) to the fact that,Save for the addition of words limiting the
acceptance to disputes arising out of treaties and conven-
tions, the declaration is in identical terms nith the "com-
mon form" declarations (see paragraphs 31-34 of Annex 2
tq the Mcmorial, and paragraph 17 of these Observations
and Submissions) ;
(ii) to the fact that, if the Iranian interpretation were Correct,
many words of the declaration would be entirely
superfluous, whereas the interpretation suggested by the
United Kingdom gives a meaning to every word (para-
graph 35 of Annex 2 to the Memorial, and paragraph 18
of these Observations -and Submissions) ;
(iii) tothe reasons given for limitationsrationetemporis expressed
in the case of the Plzospl~atesin iMorocco(Prelzininary
Objections), Series A/B, No. 74, at p. 24 (paragraph 35A
of Annex 2 to the Memorial) ;
(iv) to the consensual nature of declarations under the Optional
Clause (paragraph 36 of Annex 2 to the Memorial).
zo. In paragraph 19 of its Preliminary Observations, the Iranian
Government attempts to counter the argument contained in para-
graph 35A of Annex 2 to the Memorial, namely that the interpre-
tation put forward by the United Kingdom Government is in
accordance with the tme raison d'être of the limitation ratione
temporis, in the following manner: it alleges that the Persian
Government had a reason for limiting its acceptance to disputes
relating to treaties and conventions accepted by Persia after
19th September 1932, namely that in October 1928' Persia had
abrogated her treaties with other States which wcre based on the
régimeof capitulations and therefore wished to exclude from the
jurisdiction of the Court disputes relativc to treaties in force before
1928. The United Kingdom Government does not wish to be takeii
to admit the admissibility of this argument ; but even if the argu-
ment be admissible, the conclusion which the Iranian Government
seeks to derive from it clearly does not follow for at least three
reasons :
(a) The interpretation which the United Kingdom Government
alleges to be the correct one is equally consistent with the
desire of the Persian Government to exclude disputes
arising out of treaties relating to capitulations. For, on
the United Kingdom interpretation, the Persian declara-
tion is limited fi) to disputes arising after 19th September
1932, and (ii) rclating to situations or facts posterior to
19th September 1932. Both these limitations are qiiite
In factas appears from Annex1 to theIranian Reliminary Observations.
the treatiwere abrogated in Ma1927,but theabrogationwasnot to takeeffect
until Xay1928.338 OB~ERV:\TIOSS AXD su~~r~ss~oss OF U.K. (24 III 52)
sufficient to exclude disputes with regard to situations or
facts relatiug to the régime of capitulations arising out
of the treaties on which that régimewas based. There was
therefore no neccssity arising out of the denunciation by
Persia of capitulations to limit the acceptancc of compiil-
sory jurisdiction to treaties or conventions ratified after
'19th September 1932.
(6) It cannot be said that the denunciation of capitulations
made it iiecessary to limit the acceptance to treaties
concluded aftcr 19th September 1932, when the result of
the denunciation itself was ipso facto to render the capitu-
lations conventions and treaties dead letters. Why should
they be excluded from the acceptance when they had
ceaçed to exist ? This indeed would have been pushine -
at an open door.
(c) There is conclusive evidencc to show that during the period
IQ~Q,IQ>-. nothine was further from the inind of the Persian
~bvernmeiit than to limit its acceptance of international
jurisdiction to treaties or conventions ratified after
19th September 1932 or any other date. With impressive
uniformity, Pcrsia during thosc yearsassumed the initiative
iii using laiiguage in treaties with other States which is
quite inconsistent with any suchintention (seeparagraphzr
below).
21. In the Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration concluded at
Tehran betwcen Persia and Belgium on 23rd May 1929 (ratifications
exchanged 24th November 1930, Leagtie of Nations Treaty Series,
Reg. o. 2568, Vol. 110, p. 372). there occurs the provision
(Article V) that
I.t,iiitats contrnct;iiits con\.ieiiiic.ntde soumctticI'arbitr?ge
tous Ic3(liffcrcndsqui iurgirai~.~t ntrceux ?Ipropos(Io1';ipplic;ition
uu ~IcI'iritcii)rt!t:itiunclesstr~>ul:iiletorrsIz1r.ritzt cu~r;nliorrs
corr:/rrori rjcorrcltrry, coi;i1~riile I~ri~cnttraite,iliin'.lurnient
pu ttiz rCglcsi I':~nii;~bllnns uii ilclairlrsonnablepu lesprucr:dés
ailpomatiques ordinaires. Cette disposition s'appliquera également,
le cas échéant, à la question préalable de savoir si le différend
se rapporte à l'interprétation ou à l'application desdits traités et
conventions. La décision dutribunal arbitral obligera les parties."
To the samc or similar effect are Article III of the Treaty of
Friendship and Arbitration concluded at Tehran between Persia
and the Netherlancls on 12th Narch 1930 .(ratificationsexchanged
17th December 1930, Leagz~eof hrations Treaty Series, Reg. No.
2599, Vol. III, p. 390) ; Article IV of the Treaty of Friendship
concluded at Tchran betaeen Persia and Germany on 17th February
1929 (ratifications exchanged 11th December 1930, Lengtce of
Nations Treaty Sevies, Reg. No. 2576, Vol. III, p. 29) ; Article V
of the Treaty concluded at Tehran between Persia and France on OBSERVATIOSS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 II152) 339
10th May 1929 (ratifications exchaiiged 5th July 1934, Leagireof
Nations Treaty Series, Reg. No. 3465. Vol. 150, p. 329) ;Article IV
of the Treaty of Friendship concluded at Tehran between Persia
and Sweden on 27th May 1929 (ratifications exchanged 26th May
1930, League of Nations Treaty Series, Reg. No. 2420, Vol. 105,
p. 279);Article VI of theTreaty of Friendship concluded at Moscow
between Persia and Lithuania on 13th January 1930 (ratifications
exchanged zznd June 1932, League of Nations Treaty Series, Reg.
No. 3013, Vol. 131, p. 221) ;Article III of the Treaty of Friendship.
Commerce and Xavigation concluded at Paris between Persia and
Norway on 8th May 1930 (ratifications exchanged 4th Octoher
1932, Leagne of Nations Treaty Series, Reg. No. 3089, Vol. 134,
p. 155) ;Article IV of the Treaty concluded at Moscow between
Persia and Estonia on 3rd October 1931 (ratifications exchanged
zrst February 1933, League of Nations ïreafy Series, Reg. No.
3155, Vol. 137. p. 183) ; Article IV of the Treaty of Friendship
coiicluded at Moscowbetween Persia and Finland on 12th Decem-
ber 1931 (ratifications exchanged zrst February 1933, British and
Foreign State Papers, Vol. 134, p. 769) ; ilrticle XVI of the Treaty
of Friendship, Establishment and Commerce concluded at Tehran
between Persia and Denmark on 20th February 1934 (ratifications
exchanged 6th alarch 1935. Leagzreof NaationsTreaty Series, Reg.
No. 3640, Vol. Ij8, p. 299) ;Article IV ofthe Treaty of Friendship
and Arbitration concluded at Berne between Persia and Switzerland
on 25th April 1934 (ratifications exchanged 1st June 1935, League
of Nations Treaty Series, Reg. No. 3666, Vol. 159. p. 239).
It does not appear frorn the provisions of these treaties that at
or around 2nd October 1930 (the date of the declaration) the
Persian Government had in mind the corisiderations which are riow
alleged by the Iranian Government to have irnpclled it at that date.
Rloreover, the fact that the Persian Governrnent took the initiative
in using such language in these arbitration treaties shows that it
had present to its mind the question of which treaties should be
covered by the arbitration provisions. The Court is here confronted
with a long series of arhitration treaties which provide with unusual
emphasis and clarity that the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal
shall ernbrace disputes arising out ofal1the treaties and conventions,
past, prese~it and future, to which Persia is a party. It is almost
inconceivable that the intention of the Persian Governrnent, when
it accepted the.0ptional Clause, should not have beeri the same.
The treaties and conventions relied upon by the United Kingdom
22. For the reasons given in paragraphs 17 to 21 above, the
. United Kingdom Government submits that the word "postérieurs"
in the Persian acceptance of the Optional Clause governs the words
"situations ou faits" and the Court has jurisdiction over disputes
arising after 19th September 1932, concerning situations and facts340 OBSERVATIOHS ASD SUBhIISSlONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
suhsequent to ~gth September 1932, and relating directly or indi-
rectly to treaties or conventions concludcd by Iran at aiiy time.
Before turiiing to the second Persian rcscrvation, namely tlomestic
jurisdiction, it will be convenient if the United Kingdom Govern-
ment no\\, replies to the Preliminary Observations of the Iranian
Governmciit on the subject of thc treaties and conventions upon
which the Government of the United Kingdom relies. As is shown
in paragrnph g of Annex 2 to the Memorial, these fall into three
groups, namely :
(1) Certain treaties between Persia and third States upon the
provisions of which the United Kingdom is entitled to
rr:ly hy virtue of most-favoured-nation clauses in the
Treaties of 1857 and 1903 hetween the United Kingdom
and Persia.
(2) An exchange of notes between the United Kingdom and
Persia dated 10th May 1928, and
(3) The international engagement betwcen Persia and the United
Kingdom to observe the terms of the Concession Conven-
tion of 1933.
The Government of the United Kingdom would remark at this
point that, although it is confident that in paragraphs 17-21 ahove
it has demonstrated that the interpretation of the Persian declara-
tion which it puts forward is the correct and proper interpretation
and the one which the Court should adopt, none the less, there
are, in fact, among the treaties and converitions relied upoii certain
treaties and conventions \\,hich came into force after 19th Septem-
ber 1932, and accordingly the United Kingdom Government
contends that, eveii if the interpretation now put fonvard by the
Iranian Government were correct, these treaties and conventions
still bring the prcsent case within the terms of the declaration. They
are the following :
(i) the treaties with Denmark, Switzerland and Turkey upon
which the United Kingdom is entitled to rely by reason
of the most-favoured-nation clause. The Iranian Govern-
nient does not comment on this point, and it is unnecessary
therefore to do more than to rcfer to paragraph 39 of
Annex 2to the Memorialwhere these treaties are discussed ;
(ii) the international engagement betwecn Persia and the United
Kingdom to observe the terms of the Concession Conven-
tion of 1g33.
The efect of themost-favoured-nationclausesin the Treaties of 1857
and 1903
23. The Government of the United Kingdom proposes to deal
now with the comments contained in paragraph 20 of the Iranian OBSERVATIOSS AND SUBMlSSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52) 341
Government's Preliminary Observations with reference to most-
favoured-nation clauses :
(a) The remark of the Iranian Government in paragraph 20
of its Preliminary Observations that the most-favoured-
nation clauses relied on by the United Kingdom are irrele-
vant to the question of the jurisdiction of the Court, is
difficult to understand. The Persian declaratiou is (as the
Government of thc United Kingdoin recognizes) limited
to disputes arising out of trcaties and conventions, and
the two treaties bctween the United Kingdom and Persia
containing most-favoured-nation clauses are, of course,
among the treaties and conventions relied on by the
Government of the United Kingdom as bririging the dispute
within the terms of the Persian declaration, together with
treaties with other States binding Iran to treat their
nationals in accordance with the principles of gene-al
international law.
(b) The fnrther observation in the same paragraph that "on voit
mal comment elle pourrait invoquer cette dernière pour
faire échecan droit commun internationalqui régit l'indem-
nisation due à la suite de mesures de nationalisation"
seems to relate to the question of merits and not to the
question of jurisdiction. As paragraphs gto12ofAnnexz to
the Memorial show, the United Kingdom relieson the most-
lavuuied-nation clauses in two treaties between the United
Kingdom and Persia as entitling the United Kingdom to
claim in respect of the treatment of British nationals in
Iran any treaty rights which are in force between Iran
and third Statcs, and, iii reliance on these clauses, invokes
a large number of treaties with third States bywhich Iran
has undertaken by treaty to treat the nationals of those
States in accordance with general international lam. The
United Kingdom Government does indeed contend that
the actions of Iran towards the Anglo-Iranian OilCompany,
a British national, are in conflict with general international
law for the reasoiis set forth in the Memorial, and
summarized in paragraph 7 thereof. Iran may dispute
thc validity of these grounds, but that is a question which
arises on the merits andhas nothing to do with jurisdiction.
The internntional ensagement of 1933
24. The United Kingdom Government wiil now proceed to reply
to the comments which the Iranian Government makes in para-
graphs 21 to 24 of its Preliminary Observations ahcut the inter-
national engagement between Persia and the United Kingdom to
observe the terms of the Concession Convention of 1933. Before
doing so the United Kingdom Government wishes again to make342 OBSERVATIOSS ASD SUBYISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
it clear that the contention of the United Kingdom based on this
engagement is not (as tlie Iranian Government alleges on p. 308 of
its Preliminary Observations) "la base essentielle de ses préten-
tions" ;on tlie contrary, as stated in paragraph 6 of the Memorial,
neither in the matter of jurisdiction nor in the mattcr of the merits
is it an indispensable part of the United Kingdom case, though it
is a contciitioii in the soundness of \'hich the United Kingdom
Government has every confidence.
zj. The United Kingdom Government maintains that the
Concession Convention of 1933 had a hybrid character :
1) It was an agreement between the Persian Government and
the Anglo-Persian Oil Company ;
2) It \rras a Persian la\\,'; and
3) It embodied the terms of the settlement of an international
dispute between the United Kingdom and Persia which
both Governments were bound by an obligation of a treaty
character to observe and accept in the future.
The United Kingdom argnments on this issue are contained in
paragraphs 6-6C of the Memorial, which are concerned with
establishing the existence of the international conventioiial engage-
ment, and in paragraphs 9, I~A, 21, 28. 38 (b) and 40 of Annex z
to the Rfemorial, where the arguments relating to jurisdiction
resulting from this international conventional engagement are
presented. In paragraphs 21-24 of its Preliminary Observations the
Iranian Government contests these arguments of the United King-
dom Government, principally (a) in regard to the existence of the
conventional obligation under international law, which of course
is a question which goes to the merits as well as jurisdiction, but
also (b) with regard to jurisdiction, where Iran contends (contrary
to the argument in paragraph 40 of Annex z to the Memorial) that
the terms of its acceptance of the Optional Clause do not cover
this conventional obligation even if it is held to exist.
26. The Government of the United Kingdom will here reply to
these Iranian arguments, though not necessarily in the same order
as they are presented in the Iranian Preliminary Observations.
The observations submitted here, however, are supplementary to
those made in the Rlemorialitself, and in Annex z to that Memorial.
' In afwtnate to paragraph 6of the Mernorial. the United Kingdom cited the
case of theInlerPrelolion of lhe StolutMemel Terrilor? (Series A/B. Xo49)
solcly for the ncgative proposition that the fact that an instrument is. for interna1
purposes. a municipal law does not prevent it from also having the character of a
treaty and irnposing an international obligation. Thewassenot relied upon.
as the Iranian Governrnent appears to suppose. as authority for the positive
proposition that the Coiicession Convention of 1933 does crnbady the terms of an
international agreement butnerely to forestall an ill-founded objection to this
proposition. No analogy bctween the facts of the tcaseswas drawn. Perhaps
no authority\vasneeded for the well-known negative proposition, sincï in many
cauntries treatiareembodied in municipal laws or decrees. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBhlISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III52) 343
It will be convenient to take first those Iranian observations which
relate to(a) (i.e. the existence of the obligation) and, before doing
so, to summarize briefly the contentions of the United Kingtlom
Government as set forth in paragraphs 6-6C of the Memorial. The
United Kingdom Government contends
(1) that the 1933 Concession Convention was accepted by the
Governments of the United Kingdom and Persia as
embodying the terms of a settlement of an international
dispute arising out of the purported cancellation of the
D'Arcy Concession which the United Kingdom had
brought before the Council of the League of Nations :
(II) that the negotiations which led to it were conducted under
the supervision of the Rapporteur of the Council of the
League of Nations (M.BeneS), and that, on the condu-
sion of these negotiations, the Concession Convention
was embodied in the report of M. BeneS to the Council,
and this report was accepted by the Governments of
the United Kingdom and Persia and the dispute removed
from the agenda of the Council of the League of Nations
when the Concession Convention had been ratified by
the Persian Parliament and entered into force. (These
contentions (1) and (II) are contentions of fact) ;
(III) that (a) it isa principle of international law that, when
there has been an international dispnte between two
governments mhich is settled on certain terms, there
arisesunder international law an international obligation
binding the two governments to observe the terms of
the settlement, and this obligation has the character of
a treaty stipulation (paragraph 6 (a) of the Memorial),
and (b) therefore, having regard to (1) and (II) above,
an international obligation ofthischaracter arose between
the United Kingdom and Persia with regard to the 1933
Concession Convention ;
(IV) (a) that there is another mle of international la\!, that a
resolution ofthe Councilofthe League ofNationsaccepted
by the contesting parties creates an international obliga-
tion on the contesting parties to observe the resolution,
and (b) the removal of the dispute from the agenda of
the Council in the circumstances indicated iii (II) above
was the equivalent of a resolution of the Council accepted
by both contesting parties that the dispute shoiild be
settled by the putting into force and observance of the
Concession Convention of 1933, and that this implied
resolution created an international obligation on the
United Kingdom and Persia to observe it.
27. In paragraph zr of its Preliminary Observations the Iranian
Govemment puts forward as an argument against the existence OBSERVATIOKS ASD SUB>llSSIOSS OF U.K. (24 III52)
344
of the obligation having the character of a treaty stipulation for
which the United Kingdom Government contends (see III (b) of
paragraph 26 above) the objection that, if it existed, it was an
obligation which bound Iran only and not the United Kingdom.
The objection is ill-founded becanse there arose from thc settlement
of the internationaldispute obligations binding both Governments ;
both were obliged to continue to respect the settlemeiit made;
neither could make claims or take action inconsistent with it. In
the same parigraph the lranian Government observes that it is
elementary law that international engagements can come into
existence otherwise than through treaties in solemn form. The
United Kingdom Government agrees that it is elementary law and
therefore it was perhaps snperfluous to have cited a portion of the
Eastern Greenland case (Series A/B, No. 53) in support of such an
elementary proposition. As the United Kingdom Government only
cited the case for this sole purpose, it is unnecessary to comment
on the Iranian observatioiis on this case in paragraph 24.
28. The United Kingdom Government cited in paragraph 6 (a)
of its Memorial the case of the Free Zones of UfiperSavoy and the
District of Gex(Series A, No. 24) and the case of Accessto Gernaan
Minority Schoolsin UfiperSilesia (SeriesA/B, No. 40) as authorities
for the legal principle mentioned in III (a) of paragraph 26 above
that, when an international dispute is settled,there arises ai inter-
national obligation of a treaty character binding both governments
to observe the tems of the scttlement. In paragraph 22 of its
Preliminary Observations the Iranian Government observes that
in both these cases the dispute between the parties was a dispute
arising out of a treaty and seems to contend that the principle is
applicable only to settlement of disputes arising out of treaties.
But thcrc is no reason why the principle should apply to this class
of dispute and not to other international disputes relating to the
application of the principles of general international law, and,
indeed, it is clear that the Court in both affairs was applying a
priiiciple of general application to particular disputes arising out
of treaties. The Iranian Government in its observations on the
Free Zones case clearly misinterprets the ground of the decision.
The fundamental point of that decision upon which the United
Kingdom Government relies is that the Rlanifesto of the Royal
Sardinian Court of Accounts was not (as the Iranian Government
suggests) simply "la mesure d'application interne du traité de
Turin du 16 mars 1816", or "l'acte d'application in foro dornestico
d'une obligation internationale préexistante, le traité de Turin".
On the contrary, as the quotation from the judgment in pai-agraph 6
of the Rlemorial clearly shows, there was an intcrnational dispute
between Sardinia and the Canton of Valais ; the King of Sardinia,
in order to settle the dispute, assented to and agreed to accept the
claim put forward by the Canton, though not admitting that it
was well-founded in law ;by this assent and agreement the inter- OBSERVATIONS AND SUBhlISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52) 345
national dispute was terminatcd; the Manifesta cmbodied and
interpreted that agreementand asserrtand "laid down in a maiiner
binding upoii the Icingdom of Sardinia, what the law was to be
between the Parties" as a result, not of the Treaty of Turin, but
of that same agreement and assent, which (in the words of the
Court) "confers on the creation of the zone of Saint-Gingolph the
cltaracterof a treatystipzdatio...."TheTrcaty of Turin is mentioned
only because it vas as to the interpretation of that trcaty that the
international dispute arose ;but the fact is quite irrelcvant to the
principle enunciated by the Court, or to its application to the
present casc.
In the pfescnt case there was an international dispute betureen
the United Kingdom and Persia, and, in order to settle the dispute,
both States assented to and agreed to accept the new Concession
Convention negotiated between the Company and the Persian
Government. By this assent and agreement the international dispute
was terminatcd. Thus the Concession Convention, ratified .by the
Persian Parliament and assented to by His Imperia1 Majesty the
Shah, embodied the terms of settlernent between the two Govern-
ments, terms which thenceforth both Governménts bccame obliged
to each other to respect. (The Concession Convention also, thongh
this is not material to the present argument, applied in foro domes-
tico the international obli-ation im~osed on Persia bv the assent
and agreement.)
29. The United Kingdom Government also cited in paragraph (6)
/b) of its hfemorial the cases of Access to GermanMinoritv Schools
U$per Silesia (Series A/B, No. 40) again, and ~ailw& Trafic
between Litltz~aniaand Poland (Series A/B, No. 42) in support of
the legal proposition set ont in IV (a) of paragraph 26 above-that
a resolution of the Council of the League of Nations accepted by
the contesting parties creates an international obligation on the
contesting parties to observe the resolution. The lranian Govcrn-
ment in paragraph 22 of its Preliminary Observations observes
that in both thcse cases the dispute between the opposing States
arose out of treaties. But again therc is nothing in the pronourice-
ments of the Permanent Court of International Justice in either
case to suggcst that a resolution effccting a compromise in an
international dispute arising out of an alleged brcach of a treaty
has this effect, but that a resolution cffecting a compromise in an
international dispute arising ont of an alleged breach of gcneral
international law would not have this effect, and it is difficult to
see that there can be any rational basis for this distinction. In the
German Minority Schools case there was an intcrnational dispute
between Poland and Germany which was settled or compromised
byan agreedresolution without the disputehaving been investigated
or determined upon the merits by the Council. The arrangement
embodied in the resolution, in the words of the Court quoted in
paragraph 6 (a) of the 1\1emorial,\vas valid or binding for both
26346 OBSERVATIONS AXD SUB%IISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
countries either as a compromise between them adopted by the
Council or by virtue oi this participation in the vote of the Council.
So,in the present case, the terms on which the internationaldispute
between the United Kingdom and Persia was settled or com-
promised in 1933, namely the terms of the Concession Convention
of that year, are valid and binding for both countries.
The Iranian Govemment suggests that that case can be distin-
guished from the present case on the ground that the international
dispute which was settled in the earlier case was "néde l'application
d'un traité". One can only suppose (though it is an absnrd assertion)
that the Iranian Governrnent intends to assert that a dispute
between two States is not an international dispute unless it arises
from the application of a treaty, and that a dispute between two
States arising out of the application of rules of customary inter-
national law is not an international dispute. The fact that the
dispute between Poland and Germany, which was settled on the
terms of the Council's resolution, related to the Convention of
15th May 1922 is quite irrelevant to the principles enunciated by
the Court or their application to the present case. It is to be noted
that the resolution of the Council introduced a régime (whichwas
binding on both countries, as stated above) entirely different from,
and inconsistent with, that imposed by the Convention.
30. Turning to the facts of the present case, the Iranian Govern-
ment, at the bottom of page 103 and in the first half of page 104
of its Preliminary Observations, makes certain observations which
bear particularly on 1 and 11 of the United Kingdom contentions
set out in paragraph 26 above. The Iranian Government submits :
(i) that there were two quite separate and distinct disputes in
1933, one between the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and
the Persian Government and the other between the
Govemment of the United Kingdom and the Persian
Govemment ;
(ii) the first of these disputes was dealt with and settled at
Tehran by the signature of the Concession Convention of
1933 and the second was dealt with at Geneva by the
Council of the League ;
(iii) that at no moment did the Council of the League involve
itself in the solution of the first dispute and that this is
show by two letters of M. Bene4 which are Appendices
Xos. 14 and 15 to Annex 3 to the United Kingdom
Alemorial ;
(iv) that in these circumstances there could be no question of a
pseudo-novation in the nature of the dispute and that
international practice offers no precedents for such a
transformation of the nature of the dispute ;
(v) that there was never any resolution of the Council of the
League ; OBSERVATIONS AND SURhlISSlOSS OF U.K. (24 III 52) 347
(vi) that the Council of the League simply dropped the second
dispute from its agenda when the Concession Convention
was concluded at Tehran.
31. The Iranian Government, in making these submissions, in
particular that set out as (iv) paragraph 30 above, appears to be
accusing the United Kingdom of misunderstanding ivhat occurs
when a State in the exercise of the right of diplomatic protection
takes up the case of an injury to one of its nationals. Such cases
always begin with conduct or action on the part of a foreign govern-
ment towards a national of the State taking up the case, the legiti-
macy of which the national disputes. There is thus always in the
first place a dispute between the national and the foreign govern-
ment. The next stage is that, the national having no means of
redress, or having exhausted without success the available means
of redress, in the municipal law of the foreign State, the national's
own government, believing that its national has been treated in a
manner which is a breach of international law or treaty, takes up
the case and in so doing is (in the words used by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the case of the Mavromnzatis
Palestine Concessions, Series A, No. z, page 12) "in reality asserting
its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law". There is then a dispute
between the two States, arising out of the same facts as the dispute
between the national and the foreign State, but with different
parties. What happens in such cases was described by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in the Mavro,nmatis case (loc.
cit.) as follows :
"In the case of the hfavrommatis concessionsit is true that the
dispute was at first between a private person and a State-i.e.
between 1fi.Mavrommatis and Great Britain. Subsequently the
upon a new phase t;it entered the domain of international law, and
became a dispute between two States."
So in the case coiicerning the pairnent O/ various Serbian Loans
issued in France (Series A, No. 20). the Court said at page 18 :
"As from this point, therefore (Le.the intervention of the French
ence of opinion which, though fundamentally identicals a (auffond
identique) with the controversy already esisting between the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Government and its creditors, is distinct
therefrom : for it is between the Governments of the Serb-Croat-
SloveneKingdom and that of the French Republic,the latter acting
in the exercise of its right to protect its nationals."
Since the second dispute (that between the two.States) arises out
of the same facts as the first and is (in the words of the Court)
fundamentally identical with it, it generally happens that, if the
disputes are settled, the same terms of settlement will settle both348 OBSERVt\TIOSS :\ND SUBMISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 III j2)
disputes. The scttlement may be negotiated either between the
two Governmeiits or (with the consent of the plaintiff govcrnmcnt)
between the injured national and the defendant goveriiment.,
(A settlemcnt negotiated between the national and the defendant
government does not ipso fnctoscttle or bring to an end the dispute
betwen the governments or debar the plaintiff government from
continuing to press for an indemnity ; the inter-governmental
dispute is settled only if the plaintiff government agrees to the
settlement of the inter-governmental dispute on the basis of the
terms agrccd between the national and the defendant gover~iment)~.
By whichever method the settlcmeiit isarrived at, in the contention
of the United Kingdom Government. therc arises, upon the settlc-
ment of tlic dispute between the two governments, an international
obligation of a trcaty charactcr between the goveriiments to
continue to accept and observe the terms on which the inter-govern-
mental dispute is settled, whether those terms were negotiated
between the governmentsor between the national and the defendant
government. Therc is never any such "pseudo-novation" as the
Iranian Government wrongly alleges the United Kingdom Govern-
ment to have suggested (see (iv) of paragraph 30 above). The
United Kingdom Government has never contended, and does not
need to contend, that any such pseudo-novation took place in the
present case.
32. In the presciit case the mcthod adopted for the settlement
both of the inter-governmental dispute between the United King-
dom and Persia and the dispute between the Persian Government
andthe Anglo-Persian OilCompany \vasthat of negotiation between
the Persian Government and the Company. These negotiations
were begu~iin Geneva and Paris and, with the consent of M. BeneS,
the Rapporteur, were continued and completed in Tehran. (The
Persian submission set out as (ii)in paragraph 30 abovc is thercfore
not quite accuratc.) This form of ncgotiation resulted from the
"provisional agreement" betmcen the Pcrsian andthe Unitcd King-
dom Governments which \vas reported to the Council of the Lcague
by M. Bene9 (Annex 3 to the RZcmorial,paragraph 28), and from
the resolution of the Council (106.cit. paragraph 29). The relevant
portion of M. BeneS'sreport is as follo\\~s :
(i) "The two parties agree to suspend al1 proceedings before
the Couiicil until the session of RIay 1933, with the option
of prolonging, if necessary, this time-limit by mutual agrce-
ment."
1 Wlien the settleinent is negotiated between thetwo governments, it is commonly
stipulatedaspart of the settlement that the national shall renounceal1 further
daim :sirnilarly. if the settlement ia negotiated between the injured n;~tionaland
the defendant State, there iç commoanyexchangeof communications between
the ho governrnenq recording that the dispute between them is settled on the
termssonegotiated. OBSERVATIONS AND SUB>IISSIONS OF U.K. (24 11152) 349
(ii) "The two parties (i.e. the two Governments) agrec that the
Company should immediately enter into negotiations with
the Persian Government ...."
(iii" ....If the negotiations for the new concession reniain
without result, the question will come back before the
Council, before which each party remains free to resume the
defence of its case."
The dispute between the Persiaii Government and the Company
was settled when, as a result of the negotiations, the course of wliich
is described in paragraphs 31 and 32 of Annex 3 to the Memorial,
the 1933 Concession Convention was signed at Tehran and ratified
by the Persian Parliament. The dispute between the two Govern-
ments \vas settled on 12th October 1933, when BI.13enc5made a
report to the Council, to which the new Concession Convention was
annexed, in which he stated that he had been informed by the
Persian Government of the ratification of the new Concession and
that, in the circumstances, the Council might takc it that the
dispute between the two Governments was now finally settled;
the representatives of the two Governments announced their entire
approval of his report. In these circumstances there arose an
obligation upon both Governments towards each other to continue
to respect the terms of the settlement, as alleged in III of para-
graph 26 above. The United Kingdom Governmcnt further submits
in the alternative (IV in the same paragraph) that the Council's
action in taking note of M.BeneS'srcport and removing the dispute
from the agenda in these circuinstances was the equivalent of a
resolution of the Council accepted.by both parties that the dispute
between them should be settled by the putting into force and
observance of the Concession Convention of 1933, and that this
implied resolution created an international obligation between the
United Kiiigdom and Persia to observe that Convention.
33. It will appear from the description given above of the course
of events that the Iranian Government's submission set out as (iii)
in paragraph 30 above is not correct. The negotiations betweeii the
Persian Government and the Company were the condition upoir
which the Council agreed to suspend consideration of the inter-
govemmental dispute, and the furthcr course of the proceedings
before the Council in relation to the inter-governmental dispute
was dependent on the success or failure of those negotiations. The
two letters written by AI. Bene5 (Appendices Nos. 14 and 15 to
Annex 3 to the Memorial) make it clear that, since tliese negotia-
tions were being conducted in accordance with a resolution of the
Council, he, as its Rapporteur, was hound to interest himseif in
them and that both he and the Secretariat of the League had a
continuing function in relation to the negotiations. It further
appears that the Iranian contention set out as (vi) in paragraph 30
above is incorrect.It is clearfrom the provisional agreement referred350 OBSERVATIONS AND SUB>lISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III52)
to above (paragraph 28 of Annex 3 to the Memorial) that the
United Kingdom Government \vas insisting that, if the negotiations
failed, the inter-governmental dispute must come back before the
Council for decision on the merits, and would not agree to its
removal from the agenda unless the negotiations were successful.
In fact the inter-governmental dispute was not removed from the
agenda until both parties had formally stated in October 1933
that they acccpted the Concession Convention as a settlement of
the dispute between them.
34. It is now necessary to deal shortly with the Iranian conten-
tion referred to as (b)in paragraph 25 ahovel that the international
obligation created by this settlement (or alternatively by the
implied resolution of the Council) does not fa11within the terms of
the Persian acceptancc of the Optional Clause, by reason of the
fact that (so Iran alleges) it cannot bc described as a "traité ou
convention". The United Kingdom Governmcnt has already put
forward its argument on this point in paragraph 40 of Annex z to
the Memorial. In paragraph zr of its Preliminary Observations the
Iranian Government relies on the argument of restrictive interpre-
tation which has been dealt \\rith already in paragraph 37 of Annex 2
to the klemorial. In the footnote on page 297 of its Preliminary
Observations, the Iranian Government argues that, if Iran had
meant by hcr declaration to include every sort of coltventional
obligation, she would have accepted letter (c) of Article 36 (z) of
the Court's Statute and not merely letter (a). The answer is, of
course, that the letter (c) covers breaches of international obliga-
tions which are not conventional at all, as well as breaches of
conventional obligations.
The exception of "domestic jurisdiction"
35. The second limitation in the Pcrsian acceptancc of the
Optional Clause which has to be considered in this case is that of
"domestic jurisdiction". The relevant words of the limitations on
this point made by Persia and the United Kingdom are:
(By Persia) "les différendsrelatifs à des questions qui, d'après
le droit international, relèveraient exclusivement de
la juridiction de la Perse".
"disputes with regard to questions which by inter-
(By, the national law faIl exclusively within the jurisdiction
United
Kingdom) of the United Kingdom".
In paragraph 13 of its Preliminary Observations the Iranian Govem-
ment appears to be arguing that, although the limitation made by
The Iranian contention ismade in siib-paragr3pand 4of paragraph21 of
its Preliminary Observations and inootnote at the bottom of pa297. This
footnote, however, appearç to bc misplaced and probably relates to p21.graph OBSERVATIONS AND SUB&IISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III52) 351
Persia was in the words quoted above and although Article 36 (5)
of the Statute of the Court provides that :
"Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice and which are still in force
shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute.
to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice for the period which they still have to
run and in accordatzce with their terms",
none the less the Persian dcclaration must he rcgarded as in some
way modified by some supposed change since 1932 in international
law. If, as perhaps paragraph 7 of its Preliminary Observations
suggests, the Iranian Government is referring to a change in the
rules of general international law, a change which widens the
sphere of domestic jurisdiction (or in other words the sphere of the
discretionary power of a State) so that in some respect that spliere
is wider to-day than it was in 1932, it is for Iran to convince the
Court that that change has taken place. The United Kingdom deuies
that any such change in the general rules of international law has
taken place. The Iranian Government in its Preliminary Observa-
tions hG not demonstrated that any change in the general rules
of international law, which are relied upon by the United Kingdom
in its blemorial and which are summarized in paragraph 7 thereof,
has taken place. If the Court will look at the legal contentions in
the United Kingdom hlemorial, it will see that these contentions
are in no way affected by the fact that, since 1932, the nationaliza-
tion of industry has been practised on a large scale in a large number
of countries, which is al1 that Iran cites as authority in favour of
the alleged change in the law, since in its Memorial the United
Kingdom admitted that, in general and subject to conditions which
are set forth in the Memorial, States may nationalize industry
in their territories. Nothing in the Iranian Preliminary Observations
in support of an aileged change of international law in any way
touches on the United Kingdom contention, hased on the existence
in the Concession Convention of 1933 of an article, the terms of
which in effect contain an express obligation on Iran not to natio-
nalize the enterprise of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, or indeed
on any other contentions on the merits which the United Kingdom
Government makes 1.
36. It is, however, thought that the main argument of the
Iranian Government is that based on Article z (7) of the Charter.
Article 2 (7) of the Charter is, of course, not a rnle of general intcr-
national lalv but an important provision in the constitution of the
United Nations, preserving intact (except where Chapter VI1 is
involved) the discretionary power of a State in accordance with
1 In anyevent the Iranian argumenin regard to nationaliraarenarguments
going to the merits of tcaseand arcnot relevant to the question of jurisdiction
except to the extentindicated in paragr43 below. OBSERVATIONS AND SUBIIISSIOKS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
352
the rules of general international law which define that discretion.
If the Iranian Government argument is that declarations under
the Optional Clause must now be read as subject to Article 2 (7)
of the Charter, this is merely another and less plausible version of
the argument (that Article z (7)affects the jurisdiction of the Court)
which the United Kiiigdom has dealt with in paragraphs 9 to 14
of these Observations and Submissions. It is difficnlt to understand
how it can be argned that Article z (7) of the Charter modifies the
terms of an acceptance of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the
Court. It is true that the provisions of the Charter override al1
treaty obligations between Members which arc inconsistent with
the terms of the Charter (Article 103). But there is no conflict
betwçcn a provision in the Charter, which provides that the United
Nations is not to intervene in a certain class of inatters, and a
reservation to a declaration under the Optional Clause, which
excepts from the jurisdiction given to the Court by the declaration,
a smaller class of matters than that designatcd by Article 2 (7) of
the Charter as the limitation on the action of the United Nations.
(The United Kingdom Government does not admit that the class
of matters covered by the words "exclnsively within the domestic
jurisdiction" of a State is smaller than that covered by the words
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of a State, but
assumes for the purposes of this argument that the Iranian Govern-
ment contends that it is smaller.)
37. It appears sufficiently clearly from paragraphs 9 to 14 above
and from the commentsjust made that, jnst as the express terms of
Article 36 of the Statute are not limited by Article 2 (7) of the
Chart,er, so the express terms of the Persian declaration are not
affected by that Article. The words which the Court has to consider
are thosc of the Persian and United Kingdom declarations, and
it is to those words that these observations \vil1be directcd l.The
Iranian Government's contentions on this point (rvhich are
contained in paragraphs 7-12, 15 and 16 of its Preliminary Obser-
vations) are, directed rather to the \\,ords "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction" which occur in Article z (7) of the Charter.
For the reasons already given %, it is submitted that Article 2 (7)
of the Charter is not relevant to the question before the Court ;
but, if the Court should decide that it has some relevance, the
--
' It has heen pointed out in paragra6hahove that. iso farai.in dealing with
this point the Court elucidateî thc meaning of the expressions "jurisdict(of"
thc United Kingdom) and "juridiction" (dlnPerse), it will incidentdiy offer some
assistance to the Secutity Council, which may have to doniits own jurisdiction
diction" (conrpéte>zcenationale) appcar. The United Kingdom Government suh-ris-
mittcd in paragraph18 of Annex 2 to the Memorial that the ivords ''jurisdictioxi"
("juridiction"and "domestic juriçdictio("compdtence nationale"have the sanie
meaning :what is said in the succeeding paragraasto "jurisdiction" (jurididior)
applies equally to "domestic jurisdiction" (compétencenaiioriale).
"çee paragraphs9-14 above. OBSERVATIOXS APiD SUBhIISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 111 52) 353
United Kiiigdom Government would contend that, even on that
hypothesis, the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits
of the present case would not be affected. The United Kingdom
Government has, therefore, included, as Annex 4 to these Obser-
vations and Submissions, an outliiie of its arguments on this point,
in case they should become relevant.
38. The arguments here submitted by the United Kingdom
Government are supplementary to those contained in paragraphs
18-26 of Annex 2 to the Rlemorial. It may be as well at the outset to
summarize the submissions which the United Kingdom Government
there put forrvard on the subject of "domestic jurisdiction" :
(a) An act is not within the "jurisdiction" ("domestic jurisdic-
tion", "jzcridiction". "conzpétence nationale") of a State if it relates
to a matter as to which the discretionary power of the State is
limited, at the time when the act is done1, by rules of international
law or treaty obligations, and, in performing the act, the State
infringes any of those rules or obligations.
(b) The question whether a mattcr is one as to which the discre-
tionary power of the State is limited by rules of international law
or treaty obligations, can never be a question within the jwisdic-
tion ("domestic jurisdiction", "ja~ridiction","compétencenationale")
of the State, but must be determined objectively.
(c) The question whether the State, when performing the
act, did or did not infringe any rule of international law or any
treaty obligation, cannot be a question within the "jurisdiction"
("domestic jurisdiction", "jtirisdiction". "compétencenationale")
of the State, but must be dctermined objectively.
The case O/ the Tunis and Aforocco Nationality Decrees
39. The main authority, on which the United Kingdom Govern-
ment relied in Annex 2 to the hIemoria1in support of these propo-
sitions, was the case of the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees
(Serics B, No. 4). Despite the comments made by the Irariian
' It has oftcn bcen obscrired by iirritcrç. somc of wharc <lniotedin paragrvph
42 below. that the question of domestic jurisdictiois a relative one in thesense
that it depends on the çtate of interiiationlaiv at the time in question and the
treaty obligations mhich may be in force at that time. Also, the I'ermanent Court
of International Justiceitself, in the case of the Tuniand Morocco Nationnlify
Decrccr (Series B.No.4). said :"The question whether a certain matter is or is
not solely ivithin the jurisdictioof a State is an esscntiallyrelative question;
it depends upon the developmcnt of internationalrelations. Thus. in the prçsent
state ofinfernoiiono lui,questions of nationalityare,in the opinion of the Court.
in principle within thireserved domain" (p.24).An act which. done in the year
1880,might have been aithin thc domestic jurisdictioof the State,may not be
50 in 1930, because, in the interval, either the rules of internationalaw have
developed or the State in question haç entered into trcaty obligations which were
not in farce in 1880.Thereis noritlç of internationlaw whicli traces once and for
aU the limits ofa State's domestic jurisdictionsince those limits depend on the
developmcnt of internationallaw and of treaty obligations.Government in paragraph 15 of its Preliminary Observations, the
Government of the United Kingdom still contends that that case
is still acceptcd as the leadiiig judicial pronouncement on domestic
jurisdiction, and that (for the reasons given in paragraph 18 of
Annex 2 to the Nemorial) the principles laid down in that case
apply exactly to the declarations in thêpresent case. The comments
of the lranian Govemment on that case (like its comments on other
cases cited by the United Kingdom ~ovemment) appear to be
based on a misunderstanding of the reasons for which the United
Kingdom Government cited the case. The fact that Article ïj (8)
of the Covenant is no longer itforce in no way detracts from the
value of the case as an aiithority for the interpretation of words
(in the Persian and 'LTnitedKingdom declarations) identical with,
or synonymous with, those used in Article ~j (8).The fact that the
TzcrzisapzdMorocco Nationality Decrees case related to the nation-
ality legislation of two protected States does not detract from
the universal applicability of the general principles laid down by
the Court in the Opinion ;no two cases are exactly alike in their
facts, and the United Kingdom Government does not suggest that
there is any similarity betmeen the facts of the Tunis and Morocco
Natiorzality Becrees case aiid the present case ; but the principles
enunciated in the Opinion are general principles of international
lam, and are applicable whenever an international court has to
determine (in whatever circumstances) a question as to domestic
jurisdiction. In fact (in the first sub-paragraph of paragraph 15
of its Observations) the Iranian Govemment admits (as of course,
in the light of the Opinion, it has no option but to do) the validity
of the principle laid down in the case and on which the United
Kingdom relies. Its only comment-"nous verrons seulement que
dans l'affaire de l'ex--4.1. O. C. ces engagements n'existent pas2'-
totally ignores the engagements set out in paragraphs 9-I~A of
Annex 2 to the Memorial on which the United Kingdom Govern-
ment relies. Rforeover, the principle applies equally to obligations
of general international la\\,.The Iranian Govemment indeed quotes,
with approval, a part of the Court's Opinion to the effect that the
"mere fact that a State brings a dispute before the League of
Nations does not suffice to give the dispute an international
character calculated to escept it from the application of para-
graph 8 of Article 15" and that "the mere fact that one of the
parties appeals to engageincnts of an international character in
order to contest the exclusivejurisdiction of the other is not enough
to render paragraph 8 inapplicable". The Govcrnment of the
United Kingdom (as Annex 2 to its Memonal shows) fiilly approves
this passage, ivhich must of course be read in conjunction with the
immediately succeeding passage, lvhich is of equal importance :
"But when once it appears that the legal grounds (litres) relied
on arc such as to justify the provisionalconclusionthat they are
of juridical importance for the dispute submitted to the Council, OBSERVATIOSS AND SUB~IISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III52) 355
and that the question whether it is competent for one State to take
certain measures is subordinated to the foundation of an opinion
with regard to the validity and construction of theselegalgroiinds
(titres)the provisions contained in paragraph 8of Article15 cease
to apply and the matter, ceasingto be one solely withinthe domestic
jurisdiction of a State, enters the domain governed by international
law."
The question for the Court now is whether the legal grounds (tifres)
relied on by the United Kingdom Gorernment are, or are iiot, of
juridical importance for the dispute suhmitted to the Court.
The Electvicity Co~nfianycase
40. The next case relied on by the United Kiiigclom Governnient
was that of the Electricity Conzfianyof Sofia and Bz~lgaria (Series
A/B, No. 77). In paragraph 23 of Annex z to the Memorial, the
United Kingdom Government quoted two passages from pages
77-78 and 83 of the Court's judgment in that case, to the effect :
(a) that, by alleging that Bulgaria had committed violations of her
international obligations, Belgium had raised a point of an inter-
national character ; and (b) that the question of the existence or
non-existence of the alleged international obligations amou~ited
"not only to encroaching on the merits, but to coming to a decision
in regard to one of the fundamental factors in the case", and could
not therefore be regarded as preliminary in character. The Iranian
Government does not attempt to deny the correctness of these
statements of principle; instead, it attempts to argue (in
paragraph 16 of its Preliminary Observations) that they are not
applicable to the present case because of some supposed distinction
(which the United Kingdom Government does not understand, and
for ushich no authority whatever is quoted) between "nationalisa-
tion" and "expropriation en vue de l'établissement d'un service
public". Even if such adistinction existed (which the United King-
dom Government does ~iot admit), it would not in the least affect
the universal applicability, in cases where domestic jurisdiction
is in issue, of the general principles laid down in the Electriciiy
Conifiany case by the Pcrmanent Court of International Justice.
The Peace Treaties case
41. In addition to these two pronouncements by the Permanent
Court of International Justice, which are in themselves desicive,
and the applicability of which the Iranian Preliminary Observations
have not succeeded in placing in any doubt, a more recent authority,
which may be advanced in support of the subniissions in para-
graph 38 above, is to found in the case of the Interfivetationof
Peace Trenties with Bz~lgaria,Hungary and Roumania (I.C. J.
Refiorts 1950, page 65). where the Court said (at pages 70-71) :356 OBSERVATIO~ ;ND SUB)IISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 III j2)
"It [Le. the Request for an Advisory Opinion] is directed solely
regarding the applicability of the procedure for the settleiiietitof
disputes by the Commissions provided for in the express terms of
Article 36 of the Treaty with Uulgaria, Article 40 of the Treaty
with Hungary and Article 38 of the Treaty with Roumania. The
intzrpretation of the teruts of a treaty for this purpose cqicld not be
consideredas a questioit essentially within the domestic lurisdiction
of a State. It is a qriestion of iriternational law, which, by ivery
mture, lies witltin the compstenceof the Court."
And again at page 74 : "Whether there ezists an i~rternatioiial
dispute is a matter for obiectiuedetermination. Themere denial of
the existenceof a dispute doesnot proueils non-existence."
Similarly; in the present case, the questions whether the riiles of
international law and the conventional obligations allegcd by the
United Kingdom exist or not, and whether the facts alleged by
the United Icingdom (if tme) constitute violations of them, are
"questions of international law which, by their very nature, lie
within the competence of the Court", and are "matters for objective
determination".
The views of writers
42. Support for thc submissions of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment is to be found in the works of writers as well as in judicial
decisions. Thus, Al. Politis, after enumerating some of the matters
which, accordiiig to a resolution before the United States Senate
in 1920, were undoobtedly within the domain of domestic jurisdic-
tion, said that
"
parmi les questions énuméréesi,l en est qui sûrement échappent,
au moins en partie, à la compétence exclusive du pays intéressé,
car elles ont fait l'objet de traités qui leur donnent un incontestable
caractère international. Il ne suffit pas eu effet pour qu'une affaire
soit traitée comme domestique qu'elle n'ait pas étérégléepar le
droit international général.11 faut encore qu'elle soit restée en
dehors des prévisions du droit conventionnel." (Recueil des Cours
de l'Acudémiede Droit intenrational, 6 (1925) (i),pp. 49-50.)
Referring to the case of the Tunis and ~MoroccoNationality Decrees
(SeriesB, No. 4), II. Politis said,
"C'est un point important qu'il convient de retenir. On peut,
avec la Cour, le formuler ainsi :les matières non régléespar le
droit international peuvent cesser d'êtrecomprises dans le domaine
réservéd'un pays, si celui-ci a consenti à restreindre à cet égard
sa liberté par des engagements envers autrui." (Loc. cil., p. 50.)
M. Politis went on to say that :
"Il est une autre règlequi doit êtresuivie dans la détermination
du contenu du domaine réçervéS . i, dans l'appréciationdu caractère
domestique d'une question, il y a doute. il doit profiter plutôt au OBSERVATIONS AND SUBhllSSIONS OF U.1<. (24 III 52) 357
droit international qu'à la compétence exclusivede l'État intéressé,
car, dans Ic droit international moderne, le domaine de la liberté
limitée l'emporte sur le domaine réservé." (Ibid.)
Similarly Professor Basdevant in Recneil des Coursde L'Académie
de Droit inter+zntionaL 58 (1936) (iv). page 603 at pages 606-607,
wrote :
"Enfin, la compétence d'un État peut être envisagée comme
exclusive face au droit international. On entend alors dire que la
comoétence de cet Etat est exclusive ciuand aucune rèrrlede droit
intç;ii:itioiin11; iléterminc coiiiiiierit icdiJit'itrle\.r:;cuerc?r s:i
ciitn. 1;icorn~~c:teiicr~scluii\~ç;il~l,;ir.il~ri cornnie C1:iiit
ceIl*:CIIIl'Lt3t excrcc <li5cr6tionnsircment. S'ilesist~. au cuiitr.iire.
des &les de droit international positif déterminant dans quel se&
la compétence doit êtreexercée, la compétencedevient une compé-
tence fiée; elle n'est plus exclusive face au droit international.
Spus cet aspect, le domaine de la compétence exclusive se rétrécit
singulièreinent. Il ne suffit pas de considérer l'objet de cette
comoétence : une affaire d'ordre interne ou de caractère domestiaue
échhpe à la compétence exclusive dès qu'elle a fait l'objet d';ne
règlededroitinternational toucharit l'exercice decette compétence."
Again, at pages 610-611, Professor Basdevant wrotc :
"En effet. dès ou'une rèele-de droit international existe DOW
dl't<:rriiinerCoiiini6ntI;icoiiip&tencc d'titi I1:tat ser:l eercic,' cet
cxrrcice coinpoitc, :IIriiuiiisimplicitemciit, iiitcrl~rïtaliet nppli-
catiun <lecerte rCuli..1"oc*oucinent. cette inrerurL:t;itetau..licatioti
ne peut relever ;lu seul Etat dont la comp&ence,est réglementée.
La position que prend celui-ci touchant cette ,interprétatiori et
application, et qu'il est compétent pour prendre,jl la prend sous sa
responsabilité politique et juridique envers les Etats qui ont titre
à demander l'exacte application de ladite règle et à critiquer, le
cas échéant, l'interprétation qpi eu a ,été donnéeet l'application
qui en a étéfaite. Face à ces Etats, 1'Etat dont la compétenceest
liée ne peut plus revendiquer celle-ci comme exclusive sous cet
aspect et dans cette mesure."
Alternative submission of the United Kingdom Government that,
if the Court decides not to reject the Preliminary Ob?ection, it
should join thequestion of jzirisdiction to the merits
43. In paragraphs 35-42 above the United Kingdom ~overnment
has put fornrard reasons whv the Courtshouldhold that the present
casé does not fall \\rithin the reservation of domestic juriidiction
inthe Persian dcclaration and should reiect the Preliminarv Obiec-
tion lodged by the Iranian ~ovcrnment. If, ho\vever, the ~iurt
should not be disposed to dismiss the Preliminary Objection, then,
in the submission of the United Kingdom Governmcnt, it must
ioin the auestioii of iurisdictioii to the merits. Wherc a State has
included ih its dcclaration under Article 36 of the Statute an express
reservation of domestic jurisdiction, it is indeed open to it to put OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
358
forward "domestic jurisdiction" not only as a defence on the
merits-as a defeiice on the merits it is always available-but also
as a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction. -4s a general rule,
however, a preliminary objection based on domestic jurisdiction,
though it may be rejected, cannot be upheld without going into
the merits of the case. As explained in Annex 2 to the Mernorial,
and in particular in paragraphs 18 to 26thereof, and in paragraph 38
above, a State which has committed a breach of an international
obligation (whether one arising from general international law or
treaty) cannot have been acting within its domestic jurisdiction.
The question whether the actions of a State do or do not constitute
a breach of an international obligation can therefore nevcr be a
question failing within the exception of domestic jurisdiction ;for
the question on the merits (i.e. the question whether the State
has committed a breach of an international obligation) is the sanie
as the question whether or not the State was acting within its
doniestic jurisdiction ;and, therefore, the decision on the question
of jurisdiction arising on the domestic jurisdiction reservation
depends on the decision on the merits. Where the dispute relates
to the existence or non-existence of a breach of an international
obligation, it is only possible to decide in favour of a preliminary
objection based on the domestic jurisdiction reservation, before
examining the merits, ifit is filain on a szrmmary view that the
allegedinternational obligation does not exist or that the facts alleged
by the apfilicant State, iftrue, donot constitute a breach(paragraph zz
of Annex z to the Memorial). Where it is not possible to hold this
on a summary vie\\,, the Conrt must either dismiss the preliminary
objection or join it to the merits.
44. In the case of the Electricity Company of Sofia and Batlgaria
(SeriesA/B, Xo. 77). the Conrt adopted the latter course l, ~vhereas
in the case of the Tunis and ~MoroccoNationality Decrees(Series B,
No. 4) it felt able, without going into the merits of the case, to
advise the Council of the League of Nations to reject the plea of
domestic jurisdiction.
45. The arguments advanced in paragraph 43 above are
supported by the views of prominent writers. Thus, M. Georges
1 The Court also adopted this coursin the case concerning The Adminirlrntion
of the Prirrccvon Piers (Scries A/B, 52).where it said (at p15) "\\'hereas the
daim thus made raises a question regarding the Court's jurisdiction, and as this
question is cannected with another, namely. whether,on the basis of Article 72.
pnragraph 3, of thc Genova Convention. a Statc,in its capacityas a Mcmber of
thc Council. may daim that an indemnity he awarded to a national of the respondent
State. who isa member of a minority :and as the latter yuertion-whicthe Court
feels called upon to raise proprio motu-concarns the merits, the Crmrnol poss
upon the question of jurirdicfion i'ntcaschhos bccn nrgucd upotr the mer...."
"The Courte ..joins the preliminary objection raised by the Polish Gavernment to forin
the merits of the sui...in order to pass upon the objection and, if the latter is
overruled. upon the merits, by means of a single judgment." OBSERVATIONS AND SUBhlISSIOSS OF U.K. (24 III 52) 359
Scelle, in Recueil des Cours de I'Académiede Droit international,
46 (1933) (iv), page 331, at pages 417-418 wrote :
"Il en résulte que, pour juger de la validité des situations juri-
diques résultant de l'utilisation d'une compétence discrétionnaire
(soi-disant compétence exclusive), il est nécessairede juger l'affaire
au tond, ou, comme dit la jurispmdence anglo-saxonne, con its
merits n.Par conséquent, la question de domaine réservéou de
compétence exclusive ne peut jamais faire l'objet d'uneexception
d'incompétence opposée ain limiizelitin '.Ni le Conseilde la Société
des Nations, ni un tribunal international ne peuvent jamais savoir
i première vue si l'on est dans un domaine de compétence exclu-
sive, pour cette bonne raison que ces domaines n'existent pas
comme tels, qu'il n'y a que des catégories de rapports internatio-
naux où la compétencc.est particuliérement discrétionnaire et que,
pour savoir dans quelles limites elle l'est, et si les gouvernants
assignésdevant le Conseil ou devant la Cour ont ou non dépassé
ces limites, il n'y a pas d'autre moyen que d'examiner l'affaire
au fond."
46. In the present case, it is clear beyond argument that no
Court could decide on a summary view whether or not the inter-
national obligations relied on by the United Kingdom exist, or
whether or not the facts alleged by the United Kingdom, if tiue,
constitute a breach of thcm. Indeed, when the Court in its Order
dated 5th July 19j1 said :
"Whereai the cornplaint made in the Application is one of
alleged violation of internationallaw by the breach of the agree-
ment for a concession of April 29th. 1933.and by a denial of justice
which, according to the Government of the United Kingdom, would
follow from the refusal of the Irauian Government to accept arbi-
tration in accordance with that ameement. and whereas it cannot
be acceytcd u prori thnt a cl3in1-b;,sed on siiçhn corn1)laint fdls
cornl~l~~telyiitsirle the scol>eof int~~rn:.tion:,ljurijdist(I.C.1.
Reports1951, p.89, at pp.92-93,)
no other conclusion from its words is possible than that the
preliminary objection as to domestic jurisdiction must (if not
rejected) be joined to the merits.
47. This conclusion becomes irresistible when one reads the
Preliminary Observations of the Iranian Govemment. There are
several pages of those Observations which contain nothing but
argument on the merits. This is indeed scarcely appropriate in an
objection relative to the jurisdiction, but the mere fact that the
Iranian Government has thought it necessary in such a pleading
to indulge in this extended argument on the merits indicates that
it is far from self-evident that the United Kingdom's contentions
on the merits are wrong. To put the matter at its lowest, there is
room for controversy. In fact, of course, the matter can be put
' Professor Scelle here putç the point even mare categorically than the United
Kingdom Government.360 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III52)
much higher : in paragraphs 7 ta 47 of its Memorial, the United
Kingdom Government addressed to the Court a series of closely
reasoned argumcnts, supported by citations from judgments of
international tribunals and writers of,rcpute ;to these argi~ments
the Iranian Government in paragraphs 6-12 of its Preliminary
Observations presented in most cases mere contradictions, unsup-
ported for the most part by any relevant authority, and in maiiy
cases lacking even argument in support of its contentions ; in
addition, the Iranian Government fails to deal in terms with most
of the arguments of the United Kingdom Govemment, or cven
to refer to the authorities cited by the United Kingdom Government.
The Iranian Government can scarcely ask the Court to hold, on
the strength of the cursory treatment which it has accorded to
the matters iii issne, that the United Kingdom contentions on the
merits can be rejected on a sz~rtt+tcavo yiew, without the proper
consideration which the ordinary procedure on the merits is designed
to afford. To paraphrase what the Court said in the Peirce Treaties
case (I.C. J. RePorts 1950, page 74) : "The mere denial of the
existence of an international obligation does not prove its non-
existence." The Iranian arguments have, however, served to show
that the matters in issue between the two Governments are not
susceptible of decision on a summary view. A glance at the Memorial
and at the Iranian Preliminary Observations indicates clearly
that there are here a number of difficult and important cliicstions
at issue. One of these, namely the issue as to the legitimacy in
internatioiial law of the cancellation of a concession by legislative
action in uiolatiorcof an exfiressrenzinciationoftheright toterminate
the concessionzinilaterally evetzby legislative action, involves a legal
question which, so far as the United Kingdom Goveriiment is
aware, has never arisen before and which certainly cannot be
determincd witliout a full consideration on the merits. Further, a
reading of paragraphs 26-34~ of the Memorial together with the
references to compensation in paragraphs 7, II and 12 of the
Iranian Preliminary Observations reveals that there is a complicated
issne not only of law but of fact, depending 011figures and possibly
even requiring an enquiry or an expert opinion under Article 50
of the Statutc of the Court, which even the Iranian Government
hasadmitted "pourrait donner licu à litige" (page287 ofthe Iranian
Preliminary Observations) and which could certainly not be
determined on a summary view on a preliminary objection.
48. Instances conld be multiplied, but the United Kingdom
Government considers that it would be improper at this stage to
enter into arguments on points which go solely ta the merits : it is
sufficient for the present purpose to show that there are issues
raised on the merits of the case which cannot be decided on a
summary view. The United Kingdom Government wishes, however,
to reserve its position entirely, andto make it clear that it accepts
none 01the arguments put fonvard on the merits in the Preliminary OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
361
Observations of the Iranian Government, and is confident that it
will have little difficulty in rebutting them whcn the proper time
arrives. The United Kingdom Government cannot, however, refrain
from commenting at this stage on the strange allegation made hy
the Iranian Government in paragraph 7 of, and Annex VI to, its
Preliminary Observations, namely that the United Kingdom
Government has recognized irrevocably and for al1 purposes the
nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Conipany's concession ;
this is an allegation with which the United Kingdom Govemment
has not prcviously had an opportunity to deal ; it ha therefore
thought it right to present the true facts to the Court, and to mnke
certain comments: these are to be found in Annex 5 to these
Obscrvations and Submissions.
Comments of the United Kingdom Goverriment on certain
miscellaneous points raised by the Iranian Government in its
Preliminary Observations
The Eastern Carelia case
49. It remains to dispose of certain snbsidiary arguments put
forward by the Iranian Government which do not fa11within any
of the headings undcr which these Observations and Submissioiis
are arranged. The first of these is the one precedent which the
Iranian Govemment has seen fit to cite in support of its case,
namely the case of the Status of Eastern Carelia (Series B, No. 5).
(Sec paragraph 26 of the Iranian Preliminary Observations.) In
that case a dispute had arisen between Einland and Russia (ushich
at that date was not a member of the League of Nations) as to
whether certain provisions, contained in the Treaty of Dorpat
between the two countries and in a declaration annexed thereto.
imposed an international ohligation upon Russia. Eiriland aslced
the League of Nations to take the matter up and the Council of
the League caused an enquiry to be made of Russia whether she
would consent to submit the question in issue to the examination
of the Council on the basis of Article 17 of the Covenant. Russia
refuscd to agree to this course, and the Councilthereupon requested
the Permanent Court of International Justice to give an advisory
opinion upon the question at issue between Finland and Russia.
The Iranian Government has made the remarkable suggestion that
the position of Iran in the present case is comparable tothe position
of Russia in the Easter~~Carelia case. It is hnrd to imagine two
cases which are less properly comparable. The Iranian Governmcnt
has ignored the fundameiital differences which rcnder the Eastern
Carelia case quite useless as an authority in the presept case.
In the earlier case, not only had Russia not signed a declaration
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court,
but she was not a member of the League of Nations or a party to
2i OBSERVATIONS AND SUBXISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
362
the Court's Statute at ail. Moreover, as stated above, when asked
to submit her dispute with Finland to the Coiincil of the League
in conformity with Article 17 of the Covenant (the only means
by which a non-member State could ùecome justiciable by an
organ of the Leaguc of Nations) she declined the request. It was
in relation ta that state of facts tliat the Court said (page 27) that
"it is well established in international la\\,that no State can. without
its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States
eitlier to inediation or arbitration or to any other kind of pacific
settlement", and it was in those circumstances that the Court in
that case declined jurisdiction. Iran, on the other hand, is a Member
of the United Nations, and as such has accepted the principles and
obligations contained in the Charter and, in particular, in Article I
(1), Article 33(1) and Article 36 (3) thereof, and has accepteci with
the Charter the Court's Statute. Unlike Russia in the earlier case,
Iran ha, by its acceptance of the Charter, undertaken "to submit
its disputes nrith other States either to mediation or to arbitration
or some other kind of pacific settlement". (This form of acceptance
of jurisdiction is referred to by the Court in the passage of Its
judgme~it in the Eastern Carelia case which immediately follows
that quoted above wheii it says : "Such consent can be given once
and for al1in the form of an obligation freely undertaken, but it
can, on the contrary, also be given in a special case apart from any
existing obligation. The first alternative applies to the Alembers
of the League who, haviiig accepted the Covenant, are under the
obligation resulting from the provisions of this pact dealing with
the pacific settlement of international disputes.") hloreover, Iran
has given lier consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice by her declaration under Article 36 (2)of the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, that is, she has
committed herself in advance to a particular peaceful means, namely
judicial settlement (règle?netzjtz~diciaire)by the International Court
of Justice for the solution of legal disputes falling within the terms
of her declaration, and it is that acceptance of jurisdiction which
is now invoked by the United Kingdom. The sole question now
before the Court is whethcr the present case falls within the Persian
declaration. If the Court answers this question in the affirmative,
it is absiird to suggest tliat Iran is being "compelled without her
consent to submit a dispute with another State either to mediation
or to arbitration or to any other kind of pacific settlement".
Even if the Eastern Carelia case were at al1comparable to the
present case, it must no\\. be read subject to a more recent pronoun-
cement of the present Court. In the case of the Interpietution of
Peuce Treaties with Bzilgaria, Hz~ngary and Roumania (First
Phase), I.C. J. Reports 1950. page 65, the International Court of
Justice gave an advisory opinion at the request of the General
Assembly upon the .interpretation of those treaties. Bulgaria,
Hungary and Roumania nere not members of the United Nations.nor had they accepted the Court's Statute; rnoreover, they contested
the jurisdiction of thc Court to give an advisory opinion. None the
less the Court felt able in that case to give the advisory opinion
which had been reqiiestcd of it.
The alleged abaiseof the right of difilomatic protection
50. In paragraph 25 of the Iranian Government's Preliminary
Observations, the remarkable proposition is put fonvard that,
although a State rnay "en utilisant la procédure diplomatique,
faire surgir à son gréun litige de caractère international" between
itself and another State, none the less "cc qui est impossible
juridiquement c'est detransformer celitige cn une affaire judiciaire
relevant de la compétence obligatoire de la Cour". The passage
in which this curious allegation occurs appears to suggest that the
United Kingdom Government has done something improper in
bringing before the Court under the Optional Clause the case of
an injury done to orie of its nationals. The Iranian Governnient
has evcn delved into history and made reference to a case in which,
in the carly years ofthe century, the French Government found it
necessary, in order to obtain redress for an injury committed to
French nationals by the Governrnent of Turkey, to invade and
occupy for a period part of the island of hlitylene, an island lying
within the Turkish dominions. The United Kingdom Governnient
can sec no reason for the introduction of this ancient incident other
than that the Iranian Government wishes to suggest that in sonie
way the United Kingdom Government has acted in a comparable
manner. In fact, the differencebetween the courses adopted by the
United Kingdom Governmcnt in this case and the French Govern-
ment in that case dernonstrates in a most significant manner the
development, during the 50 years which have intervened, of
international organs and of means for settling international displites
without recourse to the use.of force. What greater contrast can
there be between the course which the French Government, lacking
any other means of obtaining redress, \vas forced to adopt in 1901,
and the recourse urhich the United Kingdom Government has had
in the present case to judicial settlement under Article 36 of the
Court's Statute ? It is perhaps pertinent to remark that this
peaceful procedure is one which is available to the smallest as
well as to the greatest of nations, and is a procedure by which the
United Kingdom itself has been brought before the Court on more
than one occasion by small nations. It is sufficicnt to refer to the
well-known case of the Mavrotnmatis Concessionsand to the case
at present pending before the Court in the rnatter of Ambatidos
(Greece v. United Kingdom).
What is almost more remarkable than the proposition put fonvard
by the Iranian Government in paragraph 25 of its Preliminary
Observationsis the fact that it citeas authority for it the 11lavrom-364 OBSERVATIONS. AND SUBMISSIOSS OP U.K. (24 III52)
matis case. It is impossible to understand how the Iranian
Government can suppose that that case supports its contention.
In that case the Greek Government alleged that the dispute
between itself and the Government of the United Kingdom
concerning the Mavromnbatis Concessions fell within the terms of
Article 26 of the Palestine Mandate (the instrument by which
the United Kingdom Government as Rlandatory had accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Coiirt of International
Justice over disputes relating to the interpretation or the applica-
tion of the provisions of the Mandate), and the United Icingdom
was contesting the jurisdiction of the Court (as Iran is now) and
was alleging that the dispute d'idnot faIl within the terms of that
Article. The decision of the Court was that, as to certain of the
concessions, the dispute did fa11within the terms of the Mandate
and that the Court thcrcforc had a compulsory jurisdictioii over
the dispute. In that case the dispute \vas certainly "un litige de
caractère iiiternatioiial", which the Greek Government had caused
to arise "cn utilisant la procédure diplomatique" on behalf of
M. Rla\~roniniatis, and the Court's decision clearly shows that an
international dispute arising out of the exercise by a State of the
right of cliplomatic protection on hehalf of its subject can fa11
u~ithinthe compulsory jurisdiction of the Coiirt.
The Iranian Government also relies on the case concerning the
Payment ofvarious Serbian Lourzsissz~edin France (Series A, No. 20)
and on the caseconcerning Paynzent in Goldof the Brazilian Federal
I,oans isszied in France (Series A, Xo. 21).In each of these cases
there was a compronzis (special agreement), and the sole question
of jiirisdiction which arose was whether, on the tme constriiction
of the compromis, there was a dispute falling within the jurisdiction
of the Court iinder tirticl34 of the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, wliich provided that only States or
hfembers of the League of Nations could be parties in cases before
the Court. The Court decided that there was such a dispute even
though the comfironzis (pcrhaps by an error in drafting) defiiied
the disagreement brought before the Court as one between the
Serbian Government and the French bondholders. In the present
case, there is no comparable question and no issue arises under
Article34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
What is before the Court is not the dispute between the Aiiglo-
Iranian Oil Company and the Iranian Goverument (for which the
proper forum is the arbitral tribunal provided for in Article 22 of
the Concession Convention), but the dispute between the United
Kingdom and Iranian Governments. The cases of the Serbian and
Brazilian loans are therefore of no assistance as precedents. The '"local remedies" rule
jI. The next snbsidiary argument of the Iranian Government
is that in paragraph 12 of its Preliminary Observations to the effect
that "l'accusation de déni de justice ne pourrait donc intervenir
conformément au droit international généralqu'après épuisement
préalable des instances internesz'. With this expression of general
principle no one could disagrce, but the implication that in the
present case the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should have had
recourse to the Iranian municipal courts, so far from beirig a
legitimate application of the principle, is quite obviously untenable.
The United Kingdom Government has indicated in paragraphs 7
(7) and 47 of the Rlemorial, and paragraph 17 of Annex 2 thereto,
the several reasons which conclusively contradict any such impli-
cation: briefly summarized, they are that the requirement of
international law that municipal remedies should first be exhausted
does not apply in a case where there are no local remedies to exhaust ;
that, in the present case, the action of which the Unitcd Kingdom
Government complains consists of lranian legislalion, and that no
redress for an injury inflicted by Iranian legislation can be obtained
in the Iranian municipal courts; that the Convention of 1933
provided for arbitration and that, on any view, therefore, the
Company was not obliged or even permitted to have recourse to
the Iranian municipal courts ; and that the Iranian Government
rejected the arbitral procedure so provided, and so denied to the
Company the remedy to which it was entitled. Before leaving the
point, however, it is necessary to draw attention to the disingeniious
manner in which the Iranian Government have dragged from its
context and quoted in support of their argument the following
passage from the exchange of notes of 10th Rlay 1928 :"A l'exclu-
sion de toutc autre juridiction, seuls les cours et tribunaux relevant
du ministère de la Justice seront compétents dans le cas où une
des parties est de nationalité britannique." When one reads this
passage in its context (see Appendix No. 2 to Annex z to the
Memorial, pages 176-17g), it will be seen that, so far from
excluding the jurisdiction of international or arbitral tribunals in
favour of Iranian municipal courts generally, on the contrary the
purpose of the passage was ta indicate that the jurisdiction of the
Iranian municipal courts \vas to be limited, in cases in which one
party was a British national, by removing such cases from the
jurisdiction of al1Iranian courts other than "les cours et tribunaux
relevant du ministère de la Justice".
Article 22 of the Concession Cotzvention
52. In paragraih 27 of the Iranian Governrnent's Preliminary
Observations, there is a very far-fetched argument which is hardly
consistent with the contention just dealt with. The argument366 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III 52)
appears to be this :that,by providing in the ConcessionConvention
for arbitration, the parties must have intended to excludc the
jurisdiction of the Court and the Court therefore has no jurisdiction
to decide the present case. Thisargument rests on a misconception:
Article 22 of the Concession Convention relates to disputes between
the Company and the Iranian Government, and has no application
to a dispute between the United Kingdom and Iranian Govern-
ments. The InternationalCourt of Justice could not in any event
have jurisdiction over a dispute betareen the Company and the
Iranian Government (see Article 34 of thestatute of the Court,
and the SerbiaL noans case referred to in paragraph jo above).
Apart from this, however, the argument is a singular attempt on
the part of the Iranian. Government both to eat their cake and
have it ;for they are here seeking to rely on an arbitration clause
\\,hich they theniselves have repeatedly declared to be nul1 and
void, and which they have in relation to the present dispute
expressly refused to observe*. The Court \vil1recall that, bv letter
dated 8th May ~gjr, the -4nglo-Iranian Oil Company, relying on
Articles 22 and 26 of the 1933 Concession Convention, requested
arbitration and notified the Iranian Government that it had
appointed the Riglit Honourable Lord Radcliffe, G.B.E., as its
arbitrator and that hc had consented to act ;and that on 20th May
1gj1, the Iranian Government, in a letter to the representative
of the Company, stated that the nationalization of the oil industry
was not subject to arbitration, and that the Iranian Government
had no other duty except the enforcement of the articles of the
Oil Xationalization Act and that it did not agree whatsoever with
the contents of the letter of the "former oil company". regarding
reference to arbitration. (Seeparagraphs j and 6 of, and Annexes D
and E to, the Application Instituting Proceedings dated 26th May
1951.) Further, in order that it might not be said that they had
failed in any respect to have recoursc to the arbitral proccdure
provided for in the Convention, the Company (despite the catego-
rical rejection of arbitration by the Iranian Government in its
letter of 20th May rggr), by letter dated 25th May 1951 (a copy
of which is annexed hereto as Annex 6 (1)),requested the President
of the Court, in accordance with Article 22 of the Concession
Convention of 1933, to appoint an Arbitrator. By letter dated
28th May IgjI (a copy of which is annexed hereto as Annex 6 (z)),
the President of the Court replied that, as the Company's request
AS stated I>ythe Court in the case concerningFacloryatChorrdw (Claim
forIndentnily), jurisdidioSeries A, Ng.(at p31) "It is. moreover, a principle
generally accepted in the jurisprudence of international arbitration. uswell as by
municipal courts, thaone party cannot avail himself of the fact that the other
haç nat fulfilled someobligation or bas norecourseto some means of redress.
obligation in questiorçfrom having recourse to the tribunal which would haveilling the
been open to him." OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OF U.K. (24 III52) 367
had certain points in common with the United Kingdom Applica-
tion, he was unable for the present to deal with it. It is hardly
credible that, afterits total rejection of arbitration, and its repudia-
tion of the articles of the Concession Convention which provide
for it, the Iranian Government shonld now suggest that those
articles constitutea bar to the jurisdiction of the Court. The Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co'mpany,and the Government of the United Kingdom
in these proceedings, have consistently maintained that the
Company was entitled to have the questions in issue settled by the
arbitral procedure laid down by the Concession Convention, and
are complaining of the Iranian Government's refusal to go to
arbitration as a denial of justice. It is a novel answer to an accusa-
tion of denial of justice to Say that the jurisdiction of the
International Court to hear the accusation at the suit of a govern-
ment is ousted by the exclusive jurisdiction of that very tribunal
to which access to the national has been wrongfully and unjustly
denied. Its absurdity is so patent that the United Kingdom Govern-
ment does not consider it necessary to devote any furtber argument
to it, Save to remark that the allegation that the rôle accepted by
the President and Vice-President of the Permanent Court of
International Justice has not been transferred to the President
and Vice-President of the International Court of Justice (an alle-
gation which the United Kingdom Government does not accept)
would secm, if true, to weaken rather than to support the Iranian
argument. Moreover, it is hard to see how the conferring of these
powers on the President and Vice-President in the Concession
Convention can have any effect, limiting or othenvise, on the juris-
diction of the Court.
The Iranian clairn that firoceedings before the Court should be
suspended
53. The next argument to be dealt with is that contained in
paragraph 2 of the Iranian Goverument's Preliminary Observations.
In that paragraph the Iranian Government relies on the reservation
in the Persiaii declaration tothe effect that "toutefois, le Gouveriie-
ment impérialde Perse se réservele droit de demander la suspension
de la procédure devant la Cour pour tout différend soumis au
Conseil de la Société des Nations". It is not easy to understand
exactly the effectofthis Iranian argument since, clespiteits refererice
to this reservation and its allegation that the Government of the
United Kingdom has "submitted the dispute" to the Security
Council and that consequently the procedure before the Court is
suspended, the Iranian Government none the less appears to desire
and to request that the Court shall proceed to consitler the question
before it, namely the question of its jurisdiction to decide the
present case on the merits. It may therefore be that this is an
academic point on which no time need be expended, but since the OBSERVATIOSS AND SUBMISSIO~S OF U.K. (24 III52) 369
Iranian Government to the fact that, on 10th July 1951, in a
telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the
Iranian Government purported to withdraw the Persian declarntion
of 1930. It is not thought that any lengthy comment is neccssary,
since the lranian Government does no more than mention this
fact and do not go on to allege that this deprives the Court of
jurisdiction in the present case. The reason why the Iranian Govern-
ment does not do this presumably is that such an argument is,
upon the face ofit, quite untenable and further is effectivdisposed
of by the dictum of Judge Hudson in the case of the Electricity
ComPany of Sofia and Bulgnria (Series .4/B ,o. 77). quoted in
footnote I on page 148 of Annex zto the Memorial. The attitudc of
the Iranian Government in this case, towards the submission of
disputes to the Court is in sad contrast with the attitude of the
Iranian Delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations
in 1947, when that Delegation put forward the resolution set forth
in Annex 7 to these Observations and Submissions.
Conclusions of the Government of the United Kingdom
55. Having disposed in paragraphs 49-54 above of certain
siibsidiary arguments raised in the Iranian Preliminary Observa-
tions, the United Kingdom Government refers to the arguments
and precedents contained in the main body of these Observations,
and submits in conclusion :
(a) that the prcsent dispute is covered by the terrilof Article 36
of the Statute of the Court and the declarations made by
Persia and the United Kingdom under the Optional Clause,
being a dispute arising in 1951 in relation to situations
and facts occurring in that year and relating to the applica-
tion of treaties or conventions accepted by Persia
(paragraphs 8, 15 and 22 above) ;
(6) that the objections to the jurisdiction of the Court raised hy
the Iranian Governnient in its Preliminary Observations
have been shown in these Observations to be groundless,
ir~particular:
(i) that the present dispiite does not fa11within the excep-
tion of domestic jurisdiction made in the Peisian
declaration (paragraphs 35-48 above) ;
(ii) that neither Article 36 of the Statute of the Court nor
the Persian declaration made under the Optional
Clause are in any way limited in scope by Article 2
(7) of the Charter of the United Nations (para-
graphs 9-14 and 36-37 above);370 OBSERVATIONS AND SUBMISSIONS OP U.K. (24 III 52)
(iii) that, even if Article2 (7) of the Charter is in any way
relevant to the question of the jurisdiction of the
Court in the present case, the present dispute is not
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of Iran
(Annex 4 of these Observations) ;
(iv) that the present Iranian interpretation of the Persian
declaration of 1930 under the Optional Clause has
been shown to be incorrect (paragraphs 17-21above) ;
(v) that, even if it were correct, the present dispute would
still fall within the jurisdiction of the Court for the
reasons given in paragraph 22 above ;and
(vi) that the Iranian Government's arguments concerning
the treaties and conventions relied on by the United
Kingdom are unfounded (paragraphs 23-34 above) ;
and
(c! that, for ail these reasons, the Court has jurisdiction to
detenuine the present case on the merits.
56. The Government of the United Kingdom accordingly prays
the Court :
(1) to declare that it has jurisdiction oralternatively,to join the
question of jurisdiction to the merits ; and
(2)to ordcr the Iranian Government to plead on the merits and
to fix the time-limits for the further written proceedings.
(Signed) W. E. BECKETT,
Agent for the Govemment of the
United Kingdom.
24th Rfarch 1952. ANNEXES
LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex Title Page
I Draft Resolution submitted by the United Kingdom Delega-
tion to the Security Council on 29th September 1951
(S/z358) ................. 372
z Revised Draft Resolution submitted by the United Kingdom
Delegation to the Security Council on 12th October 1951
(S/z358/Rev. 1) ............... 374
Second Revised Draft Resolution submitted by the United
3 Kingdom Delegation to the Security Council on 17th
October ~gjr (S/qj8/Rev. z) .......... 375
4 Submission of the Unitcd Kingdom Government that, even
ifthe Court holds Article z (7)of the Charter of the United
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"a of Iran 375
5 Comments of the United Kingdom Government on the argu-
ments contained in Annex VI of the Iranian Preliminary
Observations relating to the recognition by the United
Kingdom Government of "the principle of the nationali-
zation of the oil industry in Iran" ........ 379
Appendix No. I.-Note, dated 12th Deccmber 1951,
from the Prime Ministerof Iran to the British Embassy
in Tehran ............. , 383
Appendix No. 2.-Note, dated zznd December 1951,
from the British Embassy in Tehran to the Prime
hlinister of Iran ............. 383
Appendzx No. 3.-Xote, dated 12th January 1952.from
the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British
Embassy in Tehran ........... . 384
Appendix No. 4.-Note, dated 19th hfarch 1952, from
the British Embassy in Tehran to the Imperia1
Government of Iran ............ 384
6 (1)Letter, dated zjth May 1951, from Sir William Fraser,
Chairman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited,
to His Excelleiicy Judge Jules Basdevant, President of
the International Court of Justice ........ 387
(2)Letter, dated 28th May 1951, from His Excellency Judge
Jules Basdevant, President of the International Court of
Justice, to Sir William Fraser, Chairman of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company, Limited ......... 39'
(3) Letter, dated 1st August 1951, from Sir William Fraser,
Chairman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited,
to His Excellency Judge Jules Basdevant, President of
the International Court of Justice ........ 39*372 AKNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS (NO. 1)
(4) Letter, dated 7th August 1951, from the Registry of the
International Court of Justice, to Sir William Fraser,
Chairman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited 393
7 Proposal submitted by the Delegation of Iran to the Siuth
Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations
on 8th October 1947 (A/C.6/164) . . . . . . . . . 393
DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOAI
DELEGATION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON 29th SEPTEMBER rgjr (S12358)
Whereas the International Court of Justice acting under Article 41,
paragraph 2,of its Statute notified the Security Councilof the provisional
measures (the text of which is annexed hereto) indicated by the Court
on 5th July 1951, at the request of the Government of the United
Kingdom in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case ; and
[Vhereas the United Kingdom's request to the Court for the indication
of provisional measures \vas based on the contention tliat the actions
of the Iranian authorities threatened to bring the wholc process of oil
production and refining to a standstill in the circumstances calculated
to cause irreparable damage to the oilproducing and refinery installations
and seriously to endanger life and property and cause distress to the
areas concerned and the findings of the Court constituted an implicit
recognition of the accuracy of this contention ; and
Whereas the United Kingdorn Government at oncepublicy proclaimed
their full acceptance of the Court's findings and so informed the Govern-
ment of Iran, but the Government of Iran rejected these findings and
have persisted in the course of action (including interference inthe
Company's opcrations) which led the United Kingdom Government to
apply to the Court for interim measures ; and
Whereas the Government of Iran have now ordered the expulsion of
ail the remaining staff of the Company in Iran and this action is clearly
contrary to the provisional measures indicated by the Court :
The Securitv Council.
Cunccrncd nt the <lnnçcri iiilicrent in titis sitii;ition anri at the threat
to pc:u:i. .ind sccurily t1i:rt may tlicrcby be iiivolvcd :
1. 2:illj iipontlicGu\,irnni~iit of 1r:iitu ~ct in nll résr,cctiict,iiC,rrn-
ity\vitItlic ~)ruvisionnlnic.iciiri:jiiidicathy th,.Ci,iirt and in {~irticular
to 1)çrrnit tlic ci>ntiiiu~<Irchideric;it Abadail ~f tlic st;ifi :iffcztecl by
theiecent expulsion orders or the equivalent of such staff ;
z. Requests the Government of Iran to inform the Security Council
of the steps taken by it to carry out the present resolution. ANNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS (NO. 1) 373
ANNEX TO DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED KIKGDOM
DELECATION ON 29th SEPTEMRER 1951
Provisional Meast~resindicnted by the International Court of Jtrstice on
5th Jtdy 1951
The Court
Indicates, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted on
May 26th. 1951. by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northem Ireland against the Imperia1 Government of
Iran, the following provisional measures which will apply on the basis
of reciprocal observance :
I. That the Iranian Government and the United Kingdom Govern-
ment should each ensure that no action is taken whicti might prejudice
the rights of the other Party in respect of the carrying out of anycision
on the merits which the Court may subsequently render ;
z.That the Iranian Government andthe United Kingdom Govemnient
should each ensure that no action of any kind is taken which might
aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court ;
3. That the Iranian Government andthe United Kingdom Governient
should each ensure tliat iiomeasure of any kind should be taken designed
to hinder the carrying on of the industrial and commercial operations
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, as they were carried on
prior to May 1st. 1951 ;
4. That the Company's operations .in Iran should continue uiider
the direction of its management as it was constituted prior to May ~st,
1951,subject to such modifications as may be brought about by agree-
ment with the Board of Supervision referred to in paragraph 5 ;
4.That. in order to ensure the full effect of the orecedi<.,~rovisions.
\\&ch in any c:lsr.retaiii tlirir o\vri;iutliunty. thzre ;hould be titablislie<i
by :igreciiierit I~et\r.cciitlic Irnniaii (;o\.criinient and tlic Cnited Kiiiplom
Go\.crnnient a Uoard to bc knosvii;is rhc Uoard of Suoer\.i.;ioiicomoi~scd
of two Members appointed by each of the said ~oveinments and a'fifth
Member, who should be a national of a third State and should be chosen
by agreement between these Governments, or, in default of such agree-
ment, and upou the joint request of the Parties, by the President of
the Court.
The Board will have the duty of ensuring that the Company's opera-
tions are carried on in accordance with the provisions above set forth.
It will, inte7 alia, have the duty of auditing the revenue and expenses
and of ensuring that al1 revenue in excess of the sums required to be
paid in the course of the normal carrying on of the operations and the
other normal expenses incurred by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
Limited, are paid into accounts at banks to be selected by the Board
on the undertakingof such banks not to dispose of such funds except
in accordance with the decisions of the Court or the agreement of the
Parties.374 AKPEXES TO U.K. OBSER\'ATIOXS (NO.2)
Annex z
REVISEI) DKAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED
KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON
12th OCTOBER 1951 (S/z358/Rev. 1)
IVhereas a dispute has arisen between the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of Iran regarding the oil installations
in Iran, the continuauce of which dispute is likely to threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security, and
Whereas the efforts ta compose the differences between the United
Kingdom Government and the Government of Iran regarding the instal-
lations have not succeeded, and
Whereas the Government of the United Kingdom requested the
International Court of Justice for an indication of provisional measures,
and
Whereas the International Court of Justice, acting under Article 41,
paragraph 2, of its Statute, notified the Security Councilof the provisional
measures indicated by the Court on 5th July 1951, pending its final
decision as to whether it had jurisdiction in the proceedings instituted
on 26th May 1951 by the United Kingdom Government against the
Government of Iran, and
Whereas the United Kingdom Government accepted the indication
of the provisional measures and thc Government of Iran declined to
accept such provisional measures ;
The Security Council,
Concerned at the dangers inherent in the dispute regarding the oil
installations in Iran and the threat to international peace and security
which may thereby be involved ;
Noting the action taken by the International Court of Justice on
5th July 1951, unàer Article 41, paragraph 2, of its Statute ;
Conscious of the importance, in the interest of maintaining inter-
national peace and security. of upholding the authority of the Inter-
national Court of Justice ;
Calls for:
I.The rcsumption of negotiations at the earliest practicable moment
in order to make further efforts to resolve the differences between the
Parties in accordance with the principles of the provisional measures
indicated by the International Court of Justice, unless mutually
agreeable arrangements are made consistent with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations Charter ;
2. The avoidance of any action which would have the effect of further
aggravating the situation or prejudicing the rights, claims or positions
of the Parties concerned. ANPIEXES TO U.K. OBSER\'ATIOPIS (SOS.3-4) 375
Annez 3
SECOND REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE
UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
ON 17th OCTOBER 1951 (S/z358/Rev. 2)
Whereas a dispute has arisen between the Government of the United
Kingdom and the Government of Iran regarding the oil installations
in Iran, the continuance of which dispute is likely to threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security, and
Whereas the efforts to compose the differences between the United
Kingdom Government and the Government of Iran regarding the
installations have not succeeded, and
Whereas the Government of the United Kingdom requested the
International Court of Justice for an indication of provisional measures,
and
Whereas the International Court of Justice, acting under Article 41,
paragraph 2, ofits Statute, notified the Security Councilof the provisional
measures indicated by the Court on 5th July 1951, pending its final
decision as to whether it had jnrisdiction in the proceedings instituted
on 26th May 1951 by the United Kingdom Governinent against the
Govemment of Iran, and
Whereas the United Kingdom Government accepted the indicat'ion
of the provisional measures and the Govemment of Iran declined to
accept such provisional measures ;
The Security Council,
Concerned at the dangers inherent in the dispute regarding the oil
installations in Iran and the threat to international peace and seciirity
which may thereby be involved ;
Calls for:
I. The resumption of negotiations at the earliest practicable mornent
in order to make further efforts to resolve the differcncesbetween the
Parties in accordance with the pnrposes and principles of the United
Nations Charter ;
z. The avoidance of any action which would have the effect of further
aggravating the situation or prejudicing the positions of the Parties
concerned.
-
Annex 4
SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNI\IENT
THAT. EVEN IF THE COURT HOLDS ARTICLE 2 (7) OF THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS RELEVANT TO THE
CASE, THE CASE IS NOT A MATTER "ESSENTIALLY WITllIN
THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION" OF IRAN
I. The ar uments in this Annex are submitted upon the hypothesis
(which the Eovernment of the United Kingdom contends to be com-376 ANNEXES TO U.K. OBSER\'ATIONS (NO. 4)
pletely erroneous for the re:isons given in paragraphs gto 14of these
Observations and Submissions) that Article z (7) of the Charter is in
some way relevant to the jurisdiction of the Court. The arguments here
are supplementary to those in paragraph 26~ofAnnex 2 tothe Memoyial.
As the United Kingdom Government understands the Iranian contention,
if Article z (7) of the Charter were relevant to the jurisdiction of the
Court, the position would be as if eitherthere was in the Statiite of the
Court a provision to the effect that the Court shall not exercise juris-
diction in any case where the dispute submitted to the Court relates
to a matter which is essentially within the jurisdiction of a State, or
as if the Persian and United Kingdom declarations accepting the
Optional Clause contained exceptions, not worded as they are in fact
worded, but using the expressions of Article z (7)of the Charter "essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran" (or "essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of the United Kingdom" as the case may be).
2. The United Kingdom Government submits that it is at any rate
clear that it is for the Court to determine whether a dispute,does,or
does not relate to a matter essentially within the domestic juri~diction
of Iran and that it is not for Iran to decide unilaterally what matters
are aiid are not essentially within her jurisdiction. The provisions of
Article 2 (7)of the Charter have been invoked in matters brought before
the UnitedNations in a number ofcases, namely the Indonesian Question ',
the complaint of India regarding the Treatment of Indians in South
Africa ', the question of the Franco Government in Sfiain a and the
case relating to The Observance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Roumanra
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms '. In not a single one of
these cases did the General Assembly or the Security Council of the
United Nations take tlie view that the Member invoking Art!cle z (7)
liad the right to decidc whether the matter came within Article z (7)
or not, so that itsdecision had to be accepted by the United Nations.
3. The second point which becomes clear from a glance at these cases
before the General Assembly or the Security Council when Article z (7)
has been so far invoked is that in none of them did the plea of "essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction" succeed as a preliminary objection.
In none of them was a plea based on Article z (7) accepted as a reason
for removing the matter from the agenda before there had been any
discussion on the merits to see whether the plea was well founded or not.
In this respect the plea based on Article z (7) of the Charter has been
dealt with by the United Nations in the same manner as pleas relating
to domestic jurisdiction Iiave been dealt with by the Permanent Court
of International Justice or by the present Court. Either the plea has
been rejected as a preliminary objection or it has, so to speak, been
treatedas linked with the merits and discussed together with the merits ".
1 Oficial Records of the Security Council, FYeor,Fivst Series.
"ee, for example. Oficial Records of the General Asrembly, Joint First and
Sixth Cornmittee:Sum~nary Records ofMeetings. Navember 1946.and the Oficial
Records ofthe Genernl Arrenrbly of its first and subsequent sessions.
Journal of the Securily Council. Fivst Yenr, and Journal of the Gerzeral
Assembly, No. 75.
4 Oficiol Records of the Genernl Assembly of its third and fourth sessions.
6 It is not intended to asçert that "domestic jurisdiction" can never be upheld
as a preliminary objection before the United Nations. It may be upheld if. having
regard to theomplaint brought before the United Nations, it ironea summary
view, that no breach of an international obligation can possibly be involved.375 ANNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS (No. 4)
this Annex to discuss or consider the minutes of the Sati Francisco
Conference relating to Article 2 (7) of the Charter at all. It considers
that this is a case where, under the Court's Advisory Opinions on
Conditions of Adinission of a State to Membership in the United Nations
(I.C. J. Reports 1948, p. 57, at p. 63) and on the Coiizpetenceof the
General Assembly for the. Admission of a State to the United Nations
(I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 4, at p. 8). no recourse should be had to the
preparatory work in order to ascertain the meauing of Article 2 (7).
If, on the other hand, the Court considers that it needs some assistance
in interpreting Article2 (7)of the Charter, the United Kingdom Govern-
ment submits that it shoulrl rather seek such assistance in theactual .
conduct of the United Nations in applying the Charter, since this conduct
is of much greater value in ascertaining the meaning of Article 2 (7)
than the minutes of the San Francisco Conference.
6. The Court, on the hypothesis on which this Annex is written, has
to interpret the yords "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
(Iran)". The expression "domestic jurisdiction" is a legal term of art
which \vas interpreted by the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the case of the Tunis and hilorocco Nationality Decrees (Series B.
No. 4) and also considered by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the case of the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria
(Series A/B, No. 77). It does iiot appear that the fact that the Court
in the Tunis case had to apply the expression "solely within the domestic
jurisdiction" had auy effect on the Opinion or that the Opinion would
not have been exactly the same -if there had merely been the words
"within the domestic jurisdiction". That is also the view of writers of
great reputation, for instance Professor Georges Scelle, =.ho writes:
"Le qualificatif d'exclusive joint au mot compétence ne signifie absolu-
ment rien. Une compétence est toujours et nécessairement exclusive,
si l'on se place du point de vue de son exercice, car elle ne peut être
exercée que par son titulaire, si réglementée soit-elle ....A l'inverse,
si toute compétence est exclusive en ce qui concerne son exercice,
aucune ne l'est en ce qui concerne son attribution." (Recueil des Cours
de Z'Acadéinie de Droit interirational. 46 (1933) (iv). p. 415.)
7. \Vhen once the proper meaning of the expression "domestic
jurisdiction" is ascertained, and it is submitted that the correct meaning
is given in paragraph 38 of the United Kingdom Government's Obser-
vations and Submissions, it would appear that the adverb "essentially",
like the abverb "solely" in Article xj (8)of the Covenant of the League,
makes no material difference to the sense at all. A matter is either
within the domestic jurisdiction of Iran or it is not. As Professor Scelle
says, "Le droit international, comme toute discipline juridique, nous
the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, it is "esselitially" within her domesticin
jurisdiction. If it is not uithin the domestic jurisdiction of Iran, it
cannot be "essentially" \\lthin her domestic jurisdiction.
In any case, the adverb "essentially" cannot be held to give to Arti-
cle 2 (7)of the Charter such a vague meaning that what is intended to
be a clause protecting Members of the United Nations from excessive
interference with their independence is reduced to a formula of which
the application can only bc arbitrarydependent upon purely political
considerations and persona1 views. If Article 2 (7) were such a formula,
it would fail entirely in its main object. Article2 (7) must express some ANSEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS (h'o. 5) 379
definite principle, some criterion which can be applied to all'conceivable
cases and which makcs it possible to decide whether these cases [Io or
do not fa11within the proper sphere of United Natioiis action.
8. It is clear from the practice of the United Nations that the word
"essentially" has not been regarded as "greatly en1arging"-as Iran
would have it (seeparagraph 13of the Iranian Prelimiiiary Observations)
-the sphere reserved to the domestic jurisdictioii of a State, still less
as justifying the view put fonvard-though with iio great confidence-
by the Iraniari Govemment (also in paragraph 13) that the question
whether a matter is within the domestic jurisdiction of a State depends
upon its importance for that State as determined by that State'. If
anything, the practice of the United Nations to date, irithe cases referred
to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of this Annex. suggests tliat the United Nat'ions
have-rightly or wrongly-regarded Article 2 (7) of the Charter as a
provision of narrower application than Article 15 (8) of the Covenant.
The Iranian attempt, therefore, to argue that, because of the inclusion
of the word "essentially" in Article 2 (7). the whole "portée" of the
domestic jurisdiction exception has become enlarged, seems to be
entirely withoiit foundation.
o. The Un-t~ ~ ~nedom Govemment submits. therefore. that it is
clch tli:i;iStatc is no; iictiiig esscntinlly \\.itliin its clomesticilirisdiction
if it coniniits ;i brcacli of tre;ity or coii\~crition,:tnd tlintthe pra-lice
of rlic Unitcd Sliti.jiis in the cnses rcfirrrd tu ;~bo\.c.and tlic oi~ii~ion
of the Court in the case of the Interpetalion of ~&ce ~reati& mith
Bulgaria, Hungary and Houmania (I.C. J. Refiorts1950, p. 65), strongly
supports this view. In the case now before the Court, because of the
terms of the Persian acceptance of the Optioiial Clause, the United
Kingdom Government contends that the Court has jurisdiction on the
footing that the Iranian action in regard to the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, Limited, is a breach of treaty and convention.
Finally, the United Kingdom Government repeats Iiere what it has
said in paragraphs 5-14 of these Observations and Submissions, that
it does not consider that the Court in this case ha+:been called upon to
interpret Article 2 (7) of the Charter at all, thougli the opinion which
the Court may give on the meaning of the expression "domestic jiiris-
diction" in the Persian acceptance of thc Optional Clause and its
application to the facts of the present case may assist the Çecurity
Council if and when the Security Council has to decide upon its own
jurisdiction.
A~~nes j
COMMENTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT ON
~- ~ - - - - - .- ~ ~ ~ -- -~
RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED KINGDOM G0VERNME:NT
OF "THE PRINCIPLE OF THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE
OIL INDUSTRY IN IRAN"
I. In Annex VI to its Preliminary Observations, the Iranian Govern-
ment contends that the Govemment of the United Kingdom, by
' For a discussion of United Nations practice in this respect,'see paragraph z
of this Annex.38.0 ASSEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIOXS (xo. 5)
paragraph 3 of a note of 3rd August 19j1 addressed by Mr. G. H.
hfiddleton, its Chargéd'Affairesat Tetiran, to the Iraniaii Goverriment.
(a) accepted, in a manner wliicli cornmitted it irrevocably aiid for al1
purposes, the nationalizatioii of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's
Concession, so that it is not possible for the Government of the United
Kiiigdom to contest this nationalization in the future, arid (b) that,
in so doing, the Government of the United Kingdom committed itself
to the aoolication not merelv of the Iranian law of zotli hlarcli ro;~.
in which tliis nationalization was tobe*ëffected.
z. The Government of the United Kingdom maintains that both
these propositions are entirely ill-founded and that the position was
simply as folloas. The Government of the United Kingdom was, in
Aligust 1951, ready to endeavour to settle the dispute out of court by
agreeriient. It had declared itself ready to endeavour to make such a
settlement from the beginning of the dispute, and in fact it still remains
ready to endeavour to do so. It accepted the mediation of hlr. Harriman,
who endeavoured to find a basis, upon which negotiations between the
two Governments for the purposes of arriving at a settlement out of
court could take place, and part of the basis of negotiations was the
acceptance by the Uiiited Kingdom, !or the purpose O!lhesenegotiations,
of "the principle of the natiorialization of the oil industry in Iran".
3. The Government of the United Kingdom accepted as the basis
for tbese negotiations this principle, and the Iranian law of 20th AIarcli
1951 in which this principle is enshrined, but it did not accept even for
this purposc the Iranian Act of 1st May ~gjr, and indeed the Harriman
formula, aith its express reference to the law of 20th March, and its
omission of any reference to the Act of 1st May, would seem to make
this abundantly clear. The Harriman formula, which is quotedin French
in the second paragraph of the Iranian Annex VI, was given iri English
in Appendis No. z to Annex I B of the Memorial at page 137.and the
Governmeiit of the United Kingdom submits that the account given
in paragraphs 2 and z (A) of the Rlemorial is correct in fact and in law.
4. It is true, as stated in the first paragraph of the Iranian Annex VI,
that MI. H:lrriman's rOlewas that of a mediator who was endeavouring
to find a formula which could be used as the basis of negotiations for
the settlement of the dispute by agreement. It is also true that the
Iranian Government was not ivilling to enter into negotiations on the
basis of ariy formula, which did not make it clear that the principle of
nationaliz:ition was the basis on which the negotiations should be
conducted. But it is quite untrue to suggest that the Government of
the United Kingdoin accepted this principle for any other purpose
except as the basis for these negotiations. It is also quite uiitrue to
suggest that the Govemnient of the United Kingdom, when it accepted
this principle merely as the basis for negotiations in which an endeavour
to settle the dispute out of court would be made, committed itself to
the nationalization of the eiiterprise of the ringIo-Iranian Oil Company
as sometliing which it admitted and accepted as lawful, except when
forming part of an agreed settlement, so that the Government of the
United Kingdom was committed to this even if (as in fact turned out
to be the case) the negotiations were iinsuccessful.. ANNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIOSS (Xi. 5) 381
5. The correctness of the contention in the preceding paragrapli is
indeed evident from the note of 3rd August 1951 from thc British
Chargéd'Affaires, which is quoted on pages 314 and 31j of the Iranian
Preliminary Observations. Tlie secoiid paragraph of this note reads that
"His Alajesty's Government are desirous of availing themselves of this
formula (Le. the Harriman formula) and are prepared to negotiate in
accordance with it", and then follows paragraph 3, which says : "His
Alajesty's Govemment recognize on their own behalf and on that of
the Company the principle of the nationalization of the oil industry in
Iran", thus complying with point (2) in the Harriman formula, which
reads tliat, "before sending representatives to Tehran, the British
Government should make a forma1 statement of its consent to the
principle of the nationalization of the oil industry on behalf of the
former Company".
6. Paragrapli z of Mr. hIidclleton's note, and its reference ta the
Harriman formula, shows clearly that this principle was recognizetl for
the purposes of the negotiations, so that negotiations could be held on
the basis of the Harriman formula. It is common. when efforts are macle
to scttle a dispute, both in the case of international disputes (and in
the case of disputes arising under municipal law betwecn private persons)
for the parties ta the dispute, either through a mediator or betwecn
themselves, first of all, before negotiations for settlement are helcl, to
try and agree to certain principles which shall be accepted for the basis
of these negotiations. In such cases il is always understood that the
principles agreed for the purposes of the negotiations (as indeed also
detailed proposals for settlement put fonvard by one party or the other
during the negotiations, and indeed tentative agreements during the
negotiations) are al1 without prejuclice to thc position of the parties,
if the negotiations do not lead to a final agreement. Indeed, if this
principle were not accepted, it would be seldom, if ever, that disputes
could be settled by agreement at all. Nothing is more reprehensible
from the point of view of the friendly settlement of disputes between
nations-a matter which is of general international interest-thaii that
a party to a dispute should, after an effort to effect a friendly settlement
has failed, endeavour to use the principles accepted for the purposes of
negotiations (or proposals put forward in negotiations for the purposes
of settlemcnt) as prejudicing the legal position of the other party. The
Government of the United Kingclom can only express great regret that
the Iranian Government has in the present case endeavoured to abuse
~~-~H-~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ '.
7.Equally extraordinary, in the submission of the United Kingdom
Govemment, is the apparent Iranian contention which appears nt the
In this connection,seethe case concerning The Fa'ndoryal Cborrdiu (Claim for
Indeniniiy) (Jurisdiclion)SeriesA, 90. g,where the Court sGd (at p. ~g):"Before
procceding tosetoutthe reasons forwliich it must overrule thc preliminary objei;tion
taken by I'oland to itç jurisdiction to deal with these siibinissions. the Court woiild
observe that.for the purposes of this statementof reasonsas alsofor the purposes
of its future judgment on the merits, it cannot take accoiint of declarations,
admissions or proposals which the I'artieç may have made in the course of direct
negotiations which have taken place between them, declarations which, moreciver.
have been made without prejudice. in the event of the points under discussion
forming the subject of judicial proceedings. For the negotiatiiiinquestion have
nat, as acknowledged by the representatives before the Courtof the Parties tliem-
selves, ledto an agreement betwcen them."382 ANNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS (NO. 5)
bottom of page 316 and on page 317 of the Iranian Preliminary Obser-
vations, that the Government ofthe United Kingdom committed itself
to accept the Iranian Act of 1st hlay 1951, even for the purposes of these
negotiations. That this Act was not involved by the Harriman formulais
indicated with almost crystal clearness by paragraph 3of that formula,
which says : "By tHe principle of nationalization of the oil industry is
meant the proposal whichwas approved by the specialoilcommittee ofthe
hlajlis and confirmed by the law of 20th March rggr", which paragraph 3
thcn proceeds to quotc. Now, if the principle of nationalization was
understood to include the Iranian Act of 1st May, it is impossible to
suppose that the law of 20th March would have been mentioned expressly
and that no reference should be made to the Act of 1st May. If there
ever was a case where the principle of interpretation expressio unius
est exclzrsioalleriusapplied, this seems to be one.
8. Point 4 of the Harriman formula reads :"The Iranian Govemment
is prepared to negotiate on the manner in which the law will be carried
out so far as affects Rritish interests." Can there be any doubt that the
words "the law"in tliis paragraph referred ta the law of March only
(i.e. the law just referred ta in the preceding paragraph 3) ? Moreover,
by its own terms the Iranian Act of 1st May describes itself as "concern-
ing the procedure for the enforcement of the law concerning the nation-
alization of the oil industry" (Article 1).It is an act which, according
to its own terms, settles the manner in which the Lawof 20th Harch
shall be carried out. Yet, under point 4 of the Harriman formula, the
manner in which the law of 20th hlarch is to be carricd out (in so far
as itffectcd British interests) was to be the very snbject of the negotia-
interpret the Harriman formula as making the Act of 1st May also onee to
of the agreed bases of the negotiations.
9. The fact that hlr. Stokes at the beginning of the negotiations in
Tehran put fonvard proposals which accepted the principle of nationali-
zation but which were inconsisteiit with the Iranian Act of 1st Alay,
shows that the Government of the United Kingdom never had any
doubt as to what the Harrirnan formula meant on tliis point, and it
is submitted that tlie Iranian Government by its action, when the
negotiations started, in maintaining that the Act of 1st May must also
be-accepted as an agreed bais of the negotiations and rejecting any
proposals which did not comply with that Act, was departiiig from the
formula with which it Iiad agreed and on the faith of which alone the
Government of the United Kingdom had sent the Stokes Mission to
Tehran.
IO. The Iranian Government did, in a note of ~ztli January 1952
to the British Embassy in Tehran, which it published, put forward the
contention now made by Iran before the Court that the Government of
the United Kingdom had, as a result of entering into the negotiations
on the basis of the Harriman formula, committed itself for al1purposes
aiid for al1 time to the principle of the nationalization of the Iranian
oil industry. In an answer dated 19th Alarch 1952by the British Embassy
in Tehran to this note, the Government of the United Kingdom has
refuted this contention. Copies of these two notes, as well as copies of
two earlier notes, which preceded the notes liere referred to, are given
as Appendices Nos. 1-4 to this Annex. ANNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS (NO. 5)
383
Appendin No. I to Annen j
NOTE, DATED 12th DECEMRER 1951, FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN
TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN TEHRAK
[Translation]
For the enforcement of Article 7 of the law setting forth the method
for the execution of the law concerning the nationalization of the oil
industry throughout the country, dated 10th Urdihihisht 1330 (1st
hfay 1951). stating that al1customers of the products of the wells taken
over from the ex-Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could purchase in future
any quantity of oil which they used to purchase annually from the
Company between 1st January 1948 and 20th March 1951, at a fair
international price and that for the surplus quantity they should have
priority, other terms and conditions being equal, the Temporary Board
of Directors of the National Iranian Oil Company, on instructions from
the Oil blixed Commission and the Council of Ministers, brought the
matter to the notice of the former customers of Iranian oil through
the representatives of the Imperial Government abroad on 10th Tir 1330
(2nd July 19j1). Whereas, until the expiry of the prescribed date, iione
of them made any offer or proposals, and although in such circumstances
they are not entitled to such a right in accordance with the law, uever-
theless, in order to sliow furtlier good will, the Imperial Government
thought it necessary to hring the matter once more to the notice of
His Majesty's Embassy, so tliat they might inform their Government
that in the absence of an application for the purchase of oil fromvate
individuals or companies of (British) nationality witliin ten days from
the receipt of this note, the Imperial Government will be free to sel1
oil to any customer offering to buy. In this case, the priority given to
the former customers on the basis of equal terms and conditions will
no longer obtain.
With sincere sentiments,
(Signed) DR. ~IOHAMMAM DUSADDIQ,
Prime hfinister.
Appendix No. z to Annez j
NOTE, DATED zznd DECEMBER 1951, FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN
TEHRAN TO THE PRIME MlNISTER OF IRAN
1 have the honour to acknowledge Your Excellency's note of 12th
Decemher regarding Article 7 of the 9-point law for the implementation
of the nationalization of theoil industry in Iran, the contents of wliich
have been communicated to my Government.
1 am instructecl to refer to tliis Embassv's note No. 60 of 27th &hv.
in which His Majesty's Amhassador informed the 1mperial'~iniste;
for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government had felt themselves
obliaed Co institute ~roceedinei aiainst the Imoerial Government in
the Ïnternational ~oirt of ~u&ice-at The ~a~ué. As was pointed out
in thisEmhassy's note No. 82of 30th June, it is the viewof His hlajesty's
Govemment that until this casë hai been heard the matter mÜst -be .4XXEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIOSS (XO. 5)
384
regarded as being ab indice. 111the absence therefore of an agreement
with the Imperial Government about the operation of thc oil industry
in Iran, His Majesty's Government cannot agree to the purchase of
Iranian oil by British nationals arid do not recognize the Imperial
Government's legal right to dispose of the oil.
1 avail myself, etc.
(Signed) G. H. MIDDLETON.
Appendix No. 3 to Annex 5
NOTE, DATED 12th JANUARY 1952, FROM THE IRANIAN MINISTER FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS IO THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN TEHRAN
[Trafzslation]
In reply to letter dated 30th Azar 1330 (~2nd December ~gjr),
addressed to His Excellency Dr. Jlusaddiq, the Prime Minister, by
Mr. Middleton, Chargé d'Affairesof His Majesty's Embassy, 1 have to
state under instructions froni Prime Rfinister that,
Firstly, as has already been pointed out on repeated occasions, the
Imperial Government has no issue with His Majesty's Government over
the nationalization of the oil industry, and that the nationalizatioii of
the said industry tliroughout the country is an interna1 matter relating
solely to national sovereignty. The Imperial Iranian Government have
consistently announced the incoinpetence of the International Court of
Justice to intervene in any way in tliis matter and therefore the question
is not one to be regarded as being szrbjtidic?.
Secondly, whereas His Akijesty'sGovernment have in a letter No. IOO
from the Embassy, dated 11th Murdad (3rd August 1951). officially
recognized on their own behalf and on behalf of the former Oil Company
the nationalization of the oil industry throughout Iran, including al1
exploration, extraction and exploitation, the Imperial Government
note witli great surprise the latter partof the letter of 30th Azar 1330
(zznd Decernber, 1951),stating that "His Majesty's Government cannot
agree to the purchase of Iranian oil by British nationals and do not
recognize the Imperial Government's legal right to dispose of the oil",
and add that the Im~erial Government considers itself leealS. e,titled
ancl ;iutliorize<l totHkc iiny steps in CC~~IICCIIU~with thc country's
narurnl resoiirccs aiiil tltr n:itiorr;dil iiidiiitri<.s.
1 avail niyself, etc.
(Signed) BAQIR KAZEMI.
Appeizdix No. 4 to Annex j
SOIE, D.ATED 19th MARCH 1952, FR011 THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN TEHRAN
TO THE IhlPERIAL GOVERNAIEST OF IRAN
M. le Ministre.
1 have the honour, under instructions from Her Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to refer to Your Excellency's AXNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS (No. 5) 385
note No. 6362 of 18th January 19jz (~1st Dai 1330)~and to address
you as follows.
Her Majesty's Government observe that in tlicir note of 12th January
1952, the Imperial Government repeat earlier arguments to the effect
that the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran is an interna1 matter
solely connected with the sovereignty of Iran, that it is of no concern
to Her hlajesty's Government in the United Kingdom and that, despite
the reference of the matter to the International Court of Justice by
Her hlajesty's Govemment in the United Kingdom, the Court has no
competence to adjudicate upon it. Her Xlajesty's Government in the
United Kingdom have, however, on many occasions made clear to the
Imperial Government that, in taking up the case of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company when the Company was divested of its concessioii in a
manner contrary to the principles of international law and contr,ny
to the treatv obli"ations undertaken bv Iran towards the United Kina-
doin. ller \injccry's tio\fernmcnt wcre nut iiitcrfcring in :rmatter s-leïy
cùiiricctc(l\vit1tlic so\.creifnty uf Ir;rii but \i.erc proceecliniiivirrue
of tlic richt. \\.hicdl States c1:tiin.tu :iccord rlii~lomaticurutr:ction to
their naGo&ls when their national's are treated 'in a marher contrary
to the principles of international law. On 26th hlay xgjr, Her hlajesty's .
the International Court of Justice, and on 10th October 1951 filed are
Memorial with the Court setting out the reasons why thcy maintained
that the enforcement of the Iranian Oil Nationalization Act of the
1st May 1951is not a matter within the exclusivc domcstic jurisdictii~nof
Iran but is an international matter on which the Court is competent
to adjudicate. The Imperial Govcrnment may contend that the Court
is not competent to adjudicate upon the merits of this question. The
Imperial Government cannot deny, however, that the Court is competent
to decide the question of its own competence in the matter, as this is
expressly provided for in Article 36 (6) of the Statute of the Court,
which is an annex of the Charter of the United Nations. Her Majesty's
Government wish therefore to place firmly on record that they cannot
accept the contention of the Imperial Government, made in their note
of 12th January 1952, that tliis question is not one to be regarded as
under judicial consideration. In the view of Her Majesty's Government,
it follows from Article 36 of the Court's Statute that, uutil the Court
has given its decision, the whole matter must iiecessarily he regarded
as szrb jz~dice.
The Imperial Government in their recent note also state that they
view with great surprise that in their note of zznd December 1951 Her
hlajesty's Government espresscd their inability to agree to the purchase
that the Imperial Government had anyand alslegal right to sel1the said oil,
having regard to the fact that, in a note dated 3rd August 19j1, Her
Majesty's Government officially recognized on their own behalf and on
behalf of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company the nationalization of the oil
industry throughout Iran. Thc Imperial Government willrecall, however,
that this recognition by Her Majesty's Government of the principle of
the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran was made for the purposes
of negotiation only. This is made quite clear in thc first two paragraphs
of the note of 3rd August 1951, which read as follows :386 ASSEXI:~ TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS (NO. 5)
"1 have the honour to inform Your Excellency, on instructions
from my Govemment, that they have received through MI. Harri-
man the Imperial Gmernments' formula for negotiations between
the Imperial Government and His Majesty's Government on behalf
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and for discussion on matter:
of mutual interest to the two Govemments.
His Alajesty's Government are desirous of availing themselves
of this formula and are prepared to negotiatein accordancewith it,
but it will be appreciated by the Imperial Government that
negolialions which His Majesty's Government for their part will
enter into with the utmost goodwill cannot be conducted in a
satisfactory manner unless the present atmosphere is relieved. On
the assurance that the Imperial Government recognize this .fact
and will enter into discussions in the same spirit, a mission headed
by a Cabinet hlinister will immediately set out."
Neither in their note of 3rd August 1gj1 nor on any other occasion
have Her Majesty's Government ever recognized that the oil industry
in Iran has been lawfully nationalized or that the enforcement of the
Iranian Oil Nationalization Act of 1st May 1951 represented a lawful
exercise of Iranian sovereignty. As the Imperial Govemment well know,
Her hIajesty's Government have always chauenged, and continue to
proceedings in which the Imperial Government are now taking part-tice-
the validity in international law of the unilateral abrogation by Iran of
the Ig33 agreement negotiated hetween the two countries uiider the
auspices of the League of Nations. ln their note of 3rd August rgj~,
Her hlajesty's Government did no more than place on record their
readiness to negotiate with the Imperial Govemment on the basis that
the oil industry, operated in Iran by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
should be nationalized in a manner acceptable to them and to the
Company. As the Imperial Government are aware, the acceptance of
a certain formula as a basis for negotiations in no way constitutes a
binding acceptance of the provisions of that formula regardless of the
outcome of the negotiations. In iiiterpreting the note of 3rd August 1951
as an acceptance by Her hlajesty's Government of the fait. accompli
brought about in Iran by the unlawful enforcement of the Iranian Oil
Nationalization Act of 1st May 1951, the Imperial Govemment have
therefore completely misrepresented the position.
Her Majesty's Government remaiii ready to settle the dispute by
negotiation, and for the purpose of further negotiations to accept the
same formula as a basis of discussion, but must emphasize that they
accept it as a basis for negotiation only which does not prejudice the
rights of either side if the negotiations are not successful.
1 avail myself, etc.
(Signed) G. H. ~~IDDLETON. dominion, un protectorat,retaune colonie, un pays de mandat ouà un
autre administré ou occupépar un des deux pays précités oucomme
étant ou ayant étéau service d'un de ces pays.
(D) Si l'une des parties ne désignepas son arbitre ou n'en notifie
pas la désignation à la partie adverse dans les soixante jours après
avoir reçu iiotification de la demande d'arbitrage, l'autre partie
aura le droit de demander au Président de la Cour permanente de
Justice internationale (ou au Vice-Président dans le cas prévu à
la finale de l'alinéafB)I de nommer un se111 arbitre.à choisir narmi
des personnes qualifié&comme ilest mentionné ci-dessus, et'dans
ce cas le différendsera tranché par ce seul arbitre.
IEI La ~rocédure de l'arbitkee sera celle oui sera suivie au
monknt dé l'arbitrage, par la ~&r de Justice inter-
nationale. Le lieu et le temps de l'arbitraae seront déterminés,
selon le cas, par le tiers aibitre ou par I'irbitre unique visé à
l'alinéa (D).
(F) La sentence se basera sur les principes juridiques contenus
dans l'article 18 des Statuts de la Cour ~ermanente de lustic"
internationale.-la sentence sera sans :~~>~él.
(G) Les frais d'arbitra.e seront su..ortés de la facon déterminée
par la sentence."
On ~jth March 1951 and 20th March 1951. the Iranian Majlis and the
Iranian Senate respectively approved a Single Article enunciating the
principle of the nationalization .of the oil industry in Iran, and this
SingleArticle subsequently received the Imperial assent on 1st May 1951.
On 26th April 1951, tlie Majlis Oil Committee prepared a draft bill
"for carrying out oil nationalization", and tliis Bill was passed by the
Majlis on 28th April 1951. and, after being passed by the Senate on
30th April 1951, received the Imperial assent on 1st May 1951.
This Act provides for the establishment of a "mixed Board composed
of five Senators and five Deputies, elected by each of the two Houses,
and of the Minister of Finance or his deputy" (Article 1).It also obliges
the Imperial Government of Iran "to dispossess at once the former
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company under the supervision of the mixed board"
(Article 2). The Act further States that "Whereas with effect from
29th Isfand 1329 (20th hlarch 1951)~when nationalizatiori of the oil
industry mas sanctioned also by the Çenate, the entire revenue derived
from oil and its products is indisputably dile to the Iranian nation, the
Govemment is bound to investigate, with tlie supervision of the Alixed
Committee, the account of the Company. Also the Alixed Committee
must supervise carefuily matters conceming exploitation, as from the
date of the execution of this law and until the appointment of the
Managing Board."
On 28th April 1951, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, pro-
tested to the Imperial Government of Iran witliout effect.
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, considers that the Act
of 1st May 1951 amounted to an attempt by the Iranian Government
unilaterally to annul or alter the terms of the Convention contrary to
the express terms of Articles 21 and 26 thereof, and accordingly, on
8th May 1951, the Company sent a notice (a copy of which is Annex B
hereto) to the Iranian Govemment pursuant to Article 22 of the ASXEXES TO U.K. OBSERYATIOSS (SO. 6) 389
Convention requesting arbitration, appointing an arbitrator and re-
qucsting the Iranian Governmcnt to appoiiit its arbitrator.
On 20th May 1951. the Company received a communication (a copy
of which is Annex Chereto) from the Iranian Minister of Finance acting
on behalf of the Prime Minister, in which the Company's request to
have the.dispute referred to arbitration was rcjected and in which the
Iranian Government asserted that the matter was one with whicli no
international authority was competent to deal.
In view of the categorical rejection of the Company's request for
arbitration contained in this communication, the Company considers
that it is entitled to proceed in accordance with Article22 (D)not~vith-
standing that the period of sixty days therein meiitioned has not yct
elapsed.
1 have thercfore the lionour to request Your Escellency to nominate
a sole arbitrator in accordance with Article 22 (D) for the purposes sct
out in the Company's request for arbitration (Annes B), and in view
of the gravity of the situation respectfully to ask that the nomination
be made at I'our Excellency's earliest convenience.
1 avail myself of this opportunity, etc.
(Signed) IV. FRASER,
Chairman,
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited.
ANNEX B 10 SIR WILLlAbl FRASER'S LETTER OF 25th MAY 1951
No. 2.22/29619.
His Excellency The Prime tlinister
Tehran, 8th May 1951.
Your Excellency,
1 am instructed by Sir \\'illiam Fraser, Chairman of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company Limitcd, to submit to you the followingnotification
on his behalf :
"Your Escellency,
The measures recently introduced in respect of the oil industry
in Iran clearly have the object of either briiiging the Concession
held by the Anglo-Iraiiian Oil Company, Limited, to an end, or
annulling it before the date provided therein for its termination,
by a unilateral act of the Imperia1 Iranian Government in breach
of Articles 26 and 21 of the Concession Agreement or unilaterally
alterine the terms therein contained in breach of Articles zr and I
of thar Agreement.
Therefore, 1, on behalf of the Company and in accordance ivith
the rights reserved to it by Articles 22 and 26 of the Concession
Agreement, beg to notify the Government that the Company
requests arbitration for the purpose of dctermining whether, in
so attempting to annul, or tenninate, the Concession or to alter3g0 AXXEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIONS o. 6)
the ConcessionAgreement, the Government has acted in accordance
with the tenns of the Concession Agreement and for the purpose
of establishing the responsibility for and determining the conse-
quences of the breach above referred to.
1further beg to statethat the Company has appointed the Right
Honourable Lord Radcliffe, G.B.E., as its arbitrator and that he
lias given his consent to act.
Fiiially, the Company, in view of the gravity of the situation
brought about by the ineasures above referred to, expresses the
hope that the Government will appoint itsarbitrator at the Govern-
ments' earliest convenience."
1 shall be glad if Your Excellency will kindly acknowledge receipt
of the ahove notification from Sir IVilliam Fraser.
\Wh the assurance of our highest esteem,
For Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Limited,
(Signed) N. R. SEDDON.
Copy to Ilis Excellency the Minister of Finance.
No. 9582. of 20th May 1951.
From Ministry of Finance to Mr. Seddon, "Kepresentative of the former
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co~npaiiy"
His Excellency the Prime Alinister has instructed me to convey the
following reply to your letter No. zz/zg61g dated 8th Alay 1951adressed
to him :
In accordance with the Acts of 15th and 20th hlarch 1951 and 30th
April 1951.copies of which are enclosed herewith, the petroleum industry
throughout Iran has been nationalized, and the Imperia1 Government
is required to undertake itself the exploration for and production.
refining and exploitation of petroleum resources.
Itperhaps needs iio exp1:ination that :
I:irstl!., tlic nation~lizntiorifiiidusiries derivcs frum the right of
suvereignty ui nations. and otticr goverririieiits. timong thrm tlie I3ritijli
<;o\errirneiit:iii<tlie 3lexican Govcrnmcnt. Iiaie iri vario~is instances
availed themselves of this same right ;
Secondly, private agreements, even supposing their validity is estab-
lished, cannot hinder the exercise of this right which is founded on
the indisputable principles of international law ;
Thirdly, the fact of nationalization of the petroleum industry which
derives from the exercise of the right of sovereignty of the Iranian
nation is not referable to arbitration, and no international authority
has the competence to deal with this matter. ANNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIOXS (xi.6) 391
In view of these premises, the Iranian Governmerit has no duty in
the existing circumstances otherthan implementing the articles of the
above-mentioned Acts and does not agree in any way with the contents
of the letter of the former Oil Company on the subject of reference of
the matter to arbitration.
You are meanwhile notified that, in accordance with Articlesz and
3of the Act of April1951, the Iranian Government isprepared to exainine
the just claims of the former Oil Company.
In conclusion, the formeril Company is hereby invited to noniinate
immediately its representatives with a view to making arrangements
concerning the matter and carrying out the above-rnentioned law, so
that the day, hour and place of their attendance sliould be notified.
(Signed) ~\~oH.~&~MEDALI VARASTEH,
Rlinister of Finance.
Annex 6 (2)
LETTER, DATED 28th MAY 1951, FROM HIS EXCELLENCY
JUDGE JULES BASDEVANT, PRESIDENT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, TO SIR WILLIAM
FRASER, CHAIRhlAN OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY,
LIhfITED
13691/12255
28th May 1951.
Sir,
1 have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 25th
May 1951, in which, in reference to Articl22 of the Concession Agree-
ment entered into on 29th April 1933 between the Imperial Iranian
Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, you have
requested me to proceed to the nomination of a sole arbitrator to decide
on the dispute existing between that Government and the said Company.
1 should bring to your notice that, a few hours after your letter usas
placed in my hands, the Registrar of the Court duly received from the
Government of the United Kingdoin of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland a preliminary petition to the International Court of Justice .
praying, in effect, that the Court should declare and pronounce that
the Imperial Government of Iran isunder a duty to submit to arbitration,
under the provisions of Article 22 of the Concession Agreement, the
dispute existing between that Government and the Company.
\Vithout prejudice to any action that the Court may take regarding
the petition siibmitted by the Government of the United Kingdom
and regarding any objections that the Imperial Government of Iran
might raise against it, 1 should draw your attention to thefact that
each of these requests has certain points in common and that, conse-
quently, 1 am unable to deal at present with that which you have
submitted to me. 1 must, therefore, confine myself to a formal acknowledgement of
your request without entering into a furtlier examination tliereof.
1 beg you, etc.
Tlie President of the Court,
(Signedj JULES BASDEVANT.
Sir \Villiain Fraser,
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited,
Britannic House,
Finsbury Circus, E.C. 2.
Attizex6 (3)
LETTER, DATED 1st AUGUST 1951, FROM SIR WILLIAM
FRASER, CHAIRMAN OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY,
LIhlITED, TO HIS EXCELLEXCY JUDGE JULES BASDEVANT,
PRESIDENT OF THE INTERXATIOSAL COURT OF JUSTICE
His Excellency Judge Jules Basdevant,
The President,
International Court of Justice,
Peace Palace, Tlie Hague.
1st August 1951.
Your Excellency,
1 have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's letter of 28th May
1951.The Company has noted that as, in the opinion of Your Excelleiicy,
the application of the Government of the United Kingdom and the
request of the Company have certain points in common, Your Excel-
lency is at present unahle to deal with the request submitted by the
Company.
Your Excellency willhavenoted that the period of sixtydays provided
for in Article22 (D) of the Concession Agreement has now elapsed.
The Company attaches importance to stating that it is fully confident
that, if and when siicli action is deemed appropriate, Your Excelleticy
will be prepared to undertake the function envisaged in Article zz of
the.Concession Agreement and accepted by the Court in its communi-
nication to the Government of the United Kingdom of zrst October
'933.
1 avail myself of this opportunity, etc.
(Signed) \\'.FRASER,
Chairman,
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited. ASNEXES TO U.K. OBSERVATIOSS (SO.7) 393
Anner 6 (4)
LETTER, DATED 7th AUGUST 1951, FROM THE REGISTRY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TO SIR
WILLIAM FRASER, CHAIRMAN OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN
OIL COMPANY, LIMITED
14287. 7th August 1951.
Sir,
1have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 1st Auyst
igji, addressed tothe President of the Court, which has been forwarded
to him for his attention.
1 have the honour, etc.
(Signed) S. AQUARONE,
Acting Registrar.
Sir William Fraser,
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited,
Britannic House,
Finsbury Circus, London, E.C. z.
Annsx 7
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED Bi' THE DELEGATION OF IRAN 1'0
THE SIXTH COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS ON 8th OCTOBER 1947 (AIC. 61164)
[Translated /rom the French]
SIXTHCOMMITTEE
Need /or greater alby the Uded Nations alid zts OrgansO/ the
International Court O/ Justice
I'roposal submitted by the Delegation of Iran
The Iranian Delegation has the honour to submit to the Sixth Com-
mittee the following draft resolution, in connection with the item of
the agenda on the need for greater use for the United Nationsand its
organs of the International Court of Justice :
Considers that differences of an international character aralupays
liable to lead to a mpture of peace and securit;
Considers that the solutions to be found to the differeuces of an
international charactershould be in conformity with the principles
of justice and law ;
Considers that such solutions could be insured by recourse to the
International Court of Justice;
Considers that the Nembers of the United Nations have not yet
availed themselves of the services of the International Court of Justice
as could have been expected ;
29394 ASNEXES TO U.K. OBSER\rATIONS (SO. 7)
Considersthat thereare yet States who have not deposited declarations
in accordance with Article 36 of the Statute of the Court ;
The General Assembly recommelzds :
I. to the hfember States who have not yet deposited the declarations
provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 36 rf the Statute of the Court,
to do so as soon as possible ;
2. to the Member States to submit their 'differences of a juridical
character to the International Court of Justice ;
3. to the Security Council to refer to the International Court of
Justice not only disputes of a legal character but also legal aspects that
certain differences and sitiiations could preseiit.
Observations and Submissions presented by the Government of the United Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland in regard to the Preliminary Objection lodged by the Imperial Government of Iran