Letter dated 20 June 1995 from the Ambassador of India, together with Written Comments of the Government of India

Letter dated 20 June 1995 from the Ambassador of India, together

with Written Comments of the Government of India MOST URGENT

NO: Ei~G/POL/443/2/95 June 20, 1995

As you are aware, the UN General Assembly Resolution
No. 49/75 K requested the International Court of Justice for
an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons.
2. 1am enclosing with this letter a 7-pages submission
by India relating to this subject.

3. Furthermore, 1 also enclose herewith a counter-
mernorialon the WHO resolution relating to the request for
the legality of nuclear weapons.national Court of Justice on

4. 1 understand that the last date for the submission of
these documents is 20th June 1995 and accordingly these are
Seing sent to Your Excellency on a most urgent basis.

hignest consideration.cellency,the assurancesof my

@ i i "---

( I.P. Khosl)

R.E. Mr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina
Registrar.
InternationalCourt of Justice
Peace Palace
2517 KJ THE HAGUE 1. Cao WüO request sn opinion from ICJ ?

(a) KU0 ho0 prsvioualy exercised this right

In aaoordanoe vith Article 96(2) of the Charter ci the
United Nations, Article 76 of its Constitution anci Article
1D(ii: cf iûs agreeaent with the United Nations, the UHO nray
requeist an Adviaory Opinion from the Court on anY legal
question within the scops of its activities. The WHOhas
previously enercised this riaht in 1980 when it resuested an
Advisory hinion on certain questions relating to the
transfer of a ragional WHO office. The present master
similarly lles within the scope of ita activities and the
activifies op.nlon would assist it in the future ccnduct of Its

(b) Reqcest 1s vithin the soope of VBO bctivities

The opinlon requested by WXO clearly relies to a uue~tion
arising althln the scope of ics activities. It is a "leral
quastioii' concerning ~ntcri~atiocal leaal aspects of the
use of nuclear veapons uhich would, no matter hou
csutiously employed, affect human health alid tlis envirenmect
in an :rretrltvable uay. Any politicel chcracter uhich the
question might al63 have Could not and need not. pravenr zhe
Court from giving an opinlon. The WHO raques: invita3 the
Court to contribute throuah the cxercisc of ita nùvisory
role to the effective runcticning of the DN systarn and the
aciivities of one of its Speclallsed agencies. The opinion
reauested is of real importance for the UHO in the conduct !
of its actlvltie~ relatlng to the effects of the uoa of
environnent.terialThe World Healttons Assembly has doclaredh athat the
primary objective of prevention of the health hazards posed by
nuclear ueapons requires clarity about thcir ststue in j
international lau since "over the last 48 vaara rnarired
dlfference of opinlon have men expreaacd by member
States about the laafulneas of the use of nucloar weapons".
(NHA Resolution 46.40 02 14 Hay, 1983). Any edvisory
oplnioii rendered uould clarifv the International lago3 content
in uhich the WHO conducts its actlvltles. The WHO'S objective 1s "the attainment by al1 peoples
or the nianest possloie lsvel ut ~ie;alLl~"(AI Ll-1, I) . Tc *ho*
end the Organisation has a numbrr of specified
functions set out la Artlcle 2 of its Constitution.
~t i3 in the a~~lication of tbese functions that the
WXO has undertaken its activitles for many years on the
health and environmental consecuences of tne use of nuclear
energy and ~ateriala, includina weapons.

The WHO'S lesal mandate to Dromote and .protect human
health characterised by a preventive avproach is dlrectly
threetenad by rieks posad by tlie use of nuclear energy for
civil and rnilitary purposas. In its ~ractice. the WHOhas
long sddressed questions related to. the conszaüences of
anvironment. of nucAnrr argumentone thatn the subjectalthof the humarie
health and enviro~mantal affects of tlie use of nuclear
weapons fell outside the BOOpe of Wi!O'a activit.ie3 Uouid
bc coritrary to the evolution of its practice. It is a
subjcct that no other spacialisad aflenoy has the comDeteiice or
the expertisa to addrcso.

Since 1081, the WHA has adopted s nwber of
ln?ortant resolutioas addrassing the effacts of nuvlear
weapons on hlunan haalth and the environment. The WHA haa been
asslszed in this by a stries of expert specialised roports.
Its Resolutions HHA 34.30, WHA36.28 end WHA40.24 on the
effeczs of nuclear var, snch adopted by lerae rnajorltiea,
recalled that it nad becn ejtablisbed aiid reoogalscd that no
human heeltli servlce ln the wwrld had a capaclty to respond.
adequately to the consequence-i for hummi health resiiltlne
frsm the use of evcn a singlr nuclear weapon. It was also
environment thatwoüldne bampsrelt for aeneration~althzo corne.d the

(c) ICJ opininlon aoulci asslst UBO in future conduct of
activities

These alarming flndlngs have led the WHO an.d in
~articular the NU to co~ialder the proper dlraction of its
a~tlvities relatiag to the effects of nuclear weapons ûn human
health and the environment. In this cnntext, It has becomc
evident that it uas necessary for the Organisation to
ideiitify the lead basis on which nuclear ueapons might bc
ustd undçr internatlonal lau in order to allow it to assess
Its 3wii activitles in the most efficient maii~aer posslble.
The Advisory Opinion which trie Court 1s called upon to
give ad which it ahould give on the question relatlng to
the legalitpof the use of nuclear weapons would allow the
WHO to ensure tbst its activities were properly carrled out
in a manner that took full account of the priorlty needs of iunctiona set out in Article- 2 of itr Constitution.
It 13 in the application of these functions that tbe
WHO has undertaken its activities for many mars on the
health and environmental conacquencea of the use of nuolear
energy and materials, including weapona.

TL WIIO'a icsal nipndmto te pi.omctr -nd rrot.ri-.ih~irnrn
health characterisad by a prtventive approach id directly
threatened by risks posed by the use of nuclear energy for
civil and military purpose$. In its practice, the WHO has
long addressed questions rclated to the cousesuenoes of
the use Of nuclcar weapons on huaan health and the
environment. Any argument that the subjtct of the human
weapons anfellenvoutsldetalthe escopes off WHO'S activities nuwould
be contram to the evolutlon of its practice. It is a
svbject tEat no other speclalised ascncy has the ~ompatenct or
the expertise to address.

Since 1981, the NHA has edopzed a numbor of
important resolutions addrcasing the effects of nuclcar
weapons on numan health and the envlronment. The WHA has been
assiste6 in this by a series of expert specialised reports.
Its Res6lutions WHA 34.38, WHA 36.28 and WHA 40.24 on the
effects of nuclear var, each adopted by large majoritles,
recalled that it had been estabiished and recognlsed that no
adequatelyth tosethece consequencesorld ror a humanity nealth tresultlng
from the use of even a single nuclear weapon. It was also
recal:ed that the impact on human heafth and the
enviroiment would he fçlt for generations tu corne.

[cl ICJ opininion aould assist WHO ln future conduct of
actlvi tics

These alarming findings have led the WHO and ln
particular the WHA to conzlder the proper direction of its
activities relating to the effects of nuclear weapbns on human
health and the environment. In this context, it has becoiae
rvident that it vas necessary :or the Organisation to
used under thinternationalasfa law in order nucta allowneapits tomigassasst
its ovn activities in.the most efficient manlier possible.

The Advlsorv Opinion which the Court 1s called upon to
aivr and which lt should ulve on the question rçlating to
the legality of the use of nuclear weapons would allow the
WKO to ansure that Its activities vere properly ccrried out
in a rnanner that took full account of the priority needs of
the international communlty consistent with applicable norms
of International law. 1
II. Should the ICJ glve an opinion ?
i
.l prcc-ciing discussic!? that the HE5 1
reqursr. an Advisorjr ùpinior. from the Court. i
not obliged in cozformity vltn P.rri2le CF of its '
or recder the advice cn the ?ues=ion 1
in t.he Essterr: Csrella case;1923: tlie
reiiised ;O give an Advi-crs Opicicc i
I
(a) Respon hility of ICJ tc give an oninion
=+
oasa co~cernioa Intergretation cf Peace
Vo;irt amphasisca t.ha:- ,-iven the

question. The oair.ic.~reouostec
and wo~:lJ ::ot Se.
Acrordii,gly ::Y

It ishiiiid sarnsai,le eforsllthepplcandscto ûf itrprasactlvities.
i:: thi: f tlc thatthe k'99 s:io?~l2 he cc:y eniishte~iea and
ir.for.ae,? ofche 1egslit.r cf the use -f :iüc?es. weawzis.
t
(b) ICJ ha? never refused exceDt in the Eastern Carelia case

! 1923!. the Court had saif
of an Advisory Opinior.
States wherc one hsd not
refuaad to participate
atzkr of the 9rgr.nisation

ajrtitted that in tkc pr+acnt case the does not mean that a contentious dispute exists between
the parties. In giving an opinion on the losality of the usa
of nuelaar waapons ln vicw of thcir effatt on human health
and the environment, the Court could contributa to the
disputeionwithin a thatrovmaaning of Articlewoul36 ofnothe Statutes of
the Court.

The Court has frequentlr arnphasissd that as the
"principal judicial organ", it should rcmain fsithful to its
character and that an Advlsory Opinion requested must relate
to a legal questlon [Certain Expenses of the GN, 1962).
Hcïever, the fact that the questlon has polltical lmpllcations
1s not ln ltself an obstacle to the giving of an Advisory
Oplnlon and where tEe Court has been asked to characterise a
particular form of behavlour Wltli respect to the
Pl'OViSlOnS Of treaty and customary law, the Cours 1s
performing a tasis which 1s essenclally legal.
In the present case, the question asked of the Court
relates to the compstibility of the use of nuclear veapona
with tho proviaiono of intornotionol lou inoluding
the Constitution of WHO. In ssking the Court to characterise
the behaviour in the context of established
principles of international lau. the WHO is inviting the
Court to carry out a task clearly related to its judicial
functions .

The choices made and the actions to be taken hy WHO
nuclear depeueaponsdireislylegal3 Ior illepal.e uheTherefore,he usitof 1s
irportant that the Court should exercisr its judicial
function and render the advlce on the question ralsed.
Even if this has considerable political irnplicatlons
a clarification of the legal aspects involved would in
concrete terms enlighten the WHO in the formulatioii of its own
activi ties.

For the above reasons. i+ is submitted that the Court
snould give an opinion on the questions submitted. onu E~S. be use? ii; an
is governed by

law and particuiarl~ the lau re1atin.E ts

hings, provides for the mrthods and means ,of I
regulsies the cimica sf ueapoiis vhicli
uyed; the obLigstion to dletinguisn betvee:] 1

i

inevitable uu~ecessary s~fieri116; the

:rd state3 ; the proi~lbit.i~> ngainor zal2:lng
t.ern scvere 5arnagl r.c. ~hz env1ro~:ment.:

z1.i ueli est.atlished Ziniiing their soiirccs

~rclar~tio~ IV.

It has bee?i sugaested thaz in rhe nuciear agr the narmal
rüles of irternational lau have ieen suspri>aed or perhaps set

onflict applies tc al1 formr
ld azd new, and 1s not ueepcn ~pecific. ACY severdl ruies of intetna:icr.a? ?aï exp:essly

United Nation3 Gtneral As~emblr ha5

It ha3 csndemned the

a Large
~eflec~ing 1 cilstomary international lau applicable to the
national comnunizy. They are an exprersion and
of a ore-existing positive lav which endorses
9rohibition emb~died in :he lau of arme^
co~?fl:ct.. I
- l ru~~!nent.s t.hnt. ih- CA V~*.Y?V,V*.~-~ -..*
:onirë%ct$; , as they declare chat the rise of niiclear
wcaxns 35 lllegal b~t 9130 demand th? coiic1~:sio1~ of the
treaty 2r0! lbiting tlic use cf nuclehr veapu::s, a not.
reflet:. th correct Intrrprrtatior, cf thcsr rules. Ksiiy
tzeaty riii 5 codlfy prt-existln6 cusrùma:? riil?s. ;ne
reaZflr.nsti 12 of t1:tze rule:. in a treatsr dies fi:: imrls t.lieir
prlcr !ior ,x-ist,c!ic -3 blnZins ~Kipaf?o;:.*. The United
?Isti?r.s' d lire fc üdcpt osch à cocve!;;içn cxists because the
-rea treat.~ .aculd codify isthe exlstinfbiteprotibitinc.-niric macncr !
i

rsuments th3t tlic dse of r.uclear w-apons i,~
lsv ustially op~hb3ilt four
sources. !

fi? Ar:.icl and p?iaonede weapvns; Remlotions
l
of 1925 whicb pr~hibitsthe use not only
and cthcr gases but also of 'analogous
or devices ;

SJtc) cf the Hague Regulatlons whichprohlbits
calc~;l,sted to cause iinnecessary suffering; and

(iv) cantrs1 ye to burnaiiitY othose Pevzspoilsg wl!Ichich"iisedlesslu
aggrav r.ethe sufferings 0,' ùissbizd me!: or re~ider their
deatn inavltabie" . -8-
The ravages causcd by Norld Uar If vhich resulted 111
large civilia~i casualties 1.0. 24 milllon out Of a total of
6B million left the world stunned. The need for rriteration
of the axisting provisions and codlfylng the prlnclples fur
the proIection of war vrctlms vas strongly felt.

The 1945 Hurembera Charter adopted by the allies
reaffirmed inter alla that "vanton destruction of cities
mllltaryor vnecesslty- or vasevasaationvar crime juandfieddeclved by
"lnhumane acts comltted against aily civiiiar. ~0~~18tiori" tn
be a crime agalnst humanity.

The most complete codification of humanitarien lai is
conrained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1945 under uhich
rhe Convention No. IV relates to the Protection of
Givilian Persons ln Times of War.

A number of other legal instruments have been adopted
by various bodies which reinforce the notion of moderateness
in armed co~iflicts. Tho Internatio!isl Conmittee of the
Red Cross has adopted variousrules aiid recomrnendatiûiis fer
the llrnitation of the dangers fsced by civillans durinu the
time of var vhich prohibit ura~ons and mcans of uarfarc
which are ir~discrimlnste in their effect aiid cause ii~it~ecesssrv
sufferlngs.
Similnrly, receiitlv the Ststute of the
International Tribuilal for the Proaecution cf Persoiis
R=spolisible for Serious Violation of Iutàriietionn~
Bumanitarian Law Committed in the Trrrlrorv of th* Former
Yugo~l~~la since 1991 ernpouers the International Tribunal to
prosecute persans violating the lavs of nar by vis.
em~luyin6 ~oisonous urapons . sauslng unnacessary
sufferln~. attacks on undrfendsd tom18 and weaton
destruction' of citirs or touns not justified by military
necessity.

Id) Fhe Law of War Pmhibita tbs UJC of Uuclear
iieapons by reason of their qualitative end quaatiGtin
effecta
The qualitative and quantitative effacts of nuclear
weapons characterised br the initial nuclcar radiation
and nuclear fa11 out and consequenoes of thoao affect brings
nuclear weapons wi thin the soope of rules prohibi ting the
use of poisonous and chernical weepons which violate the
principles of international law prohibitlng the use of
ueapons whlch

- ore ohesioal;
- are poisonous; - rsndsr death tnevi table;
- cause unnecessarv sufiering;
-. have indiscriminate effecta;
- violite the grinciples of proportionality and
humanity and neutralltr; and
- damage the environment

It 16 prohibited to use veapons thst fsil tr,
discrimina ta botveen mllltary and clvilian ~ersoiinel .
Arsiclc 24 . 1923 Draft Rules for Aerial Warfare; Article
, 1, 8th Hague Convention of 1907; Article XXV , The
Regulations ou Land Warfare annexed to the 1907 Hague
Ccnvenzions).

The capacity of today's nuîlcar weapvns whloh have
the ylelds of several megaton~ 1.c. several hundrad ti,mas
that of the Hiroshima and Nosasaki aan kiil millions
srnalleoplby today's bombstandards ebutodcd stlllr Hitliouaands vof
lniiocent cltlzens were burnt, blasttd and crushad to .daath
at the moment of explosion. The numbar of deatha
attribiitable to this single bomb 1s 200,OY)Ei. It la self
evidant that effsct of the use such nuclear wcspons cannot
ensure distinction between combatants and non-cornbdtants.
Even nuclear weapons wlth very lou ylelds arc capable
of .harmiï.i non-combatants ; vlrtuslly iiievluably whether
intended or not.

(ii) The Rinclple of Proportionalîty

It is prohibited tc eofect reprisals uliicli are
disproportionate to thelr aiitecedeiit provocatiuns or to
legiiirnate military objectives, or 3lsrespectful of
persons, institutions and resources.otherw1se protected by
the laws of var.

The use of nuclear weapoiis would inavitnbility vlolate
tlir principle of proportionality. The raprisals have to
ccnform to principles of humanitarian lsu. The clvllian
Article:on33 ofca1949 Geneva Convention the No.bjeIV Relativeriaaltn the
Protectloi~ of Clvilians Person3 in Timc of War prohiblts
re~rlsals a~ainst ~rotected Persoiis and property . Thus
civilfan ob3ect.s. cultural obJects and places of worsbip
cannot br made the object of the reprisals. Attacks by wap
of reprlsals are prohibited against natural environmnt,uorks or Installations contalnlng dangerous forces
namely dam . cllites and nuclear electrical generating
stations. Objects lcdispensable for the survival of clvilian
nnniil at.1 nns ~irrh as fnodntuff. agriosltorol nroaa l
llvestock. drinking water installations tuid supplies I
and irrigation work also cannot be made che object of
reprisais . !

violateThe aache and everyr oneeaof the uiahove mentionedqueiltrules.fecthe
ensuing devastation being out of al1 proportion to
the provocatioe received and the objective sought to be
achieved .

(iil) The Rinciple of liecessity

It 1s prohibited to Lise weapons wliose effect 1s greater
thali that reguired to achieve a legitlmate militarv
objective. Xilitary necessity caiinot override ~rin~lples of
humani ty ,
nilf tary ~iecessi tv meaiis that onlu that
destruction necessaru. relevant and ~roportfonste to the
prompt achleveieent of lauful rnilitary nbJectivea is
legal. Hot on?^ must such destruction be necessary and
relevant ta the attainment cf military ob>ect5ves. birt it must
also be ~roportio~iatelv and rsasonatly related tt the
military importance of the abject af attack.

?liiitsry nrcrssity can never justify uea of
cause5itErrater vespciestructionther of weacivllianhich populationed alid I
property than that required tu achieve a legitlmate
milltary obJective. Though military object durlng var 1s tu l
weaken the military foroes of the enemy the uas of weapons
of mass deatri~ctiun ageinet the clviiiai> pvpulation
may vaaksn the enenles vil1 to fight but not enemieo military
forces (1868 Deolaration of 6t. Petersburg).

Although deroget,ions from certain principlcs 1s pcrmittcd
inderthe Customaryonal lawsotoofls war oruundcrcepOenava Conventionsd
of 1949. Article -1 of the 1948 Ocnava Conventloils cnJoiiis
the parties to respect their provisions under "al1
circumstances". Zommon Article 3 provldes that petsons not
taking part in hoatilitie~ ohall in "al1 circumstances"
be treated humanely and protectcd from violence %O lira arid
paraon.
Nuclear weapoz>s canot be ustd in self dcfencc. The -11-
of rnflltciry nectasity permit3 c statr t? apply
degrae and kind of regulsted force no? oth2rÏlJt
b- the laws of var. The nSdclear wcapons cause
traction whlch iar exceed the measüre 3f
rlity and the objrct of Qes?ruc?lol: neces3sry *!id
;O r;he attaiiiment of mllltary chjectives.

!iv)ïhe

.3 ?rohibltea to use weapofis that. cagzi.
or aggravated surfering.

This princi?le aas firzr eni:nciatec in , the
Ceclara ti , of St.. Petersb~rg wkich S9rix.de the use of
certain r apons "which üse1e:slu azuravzte t!w
sulfering Tbereaf ter the 1899 Eauue Daclaratio~i
Cancernin Expanding ~ul~ets tcd the 1925 Gas Protocol
exprtssed the sme sentiment. Hore rrcentlr +na
~.mue?i tio on zhe Proliibition of Miiitary or Ansr Other
Hostile U. Of Etivirsnrnental Nodificaticn Tecliniqaas 1876 and
:.iie Caiivi cion 11 prohitir.ionr cr resr.r<.itions nn itae af
certaix : :iveii;imal weapone vlii.:;? ni,. be dsamed t.c be
excessi ;re ii~Jariouri or te have i:i.?iacrln:~?et.e cffnc.7.s 1@EG
!133e sae concludac? tc give -2fzc~ :i. the tttabli~!icd
CGS~CN i ? a: priiieiplcz of t i law in tkis
regnrc.

gh the nuc3ear ïripars h+ve bceii ireated by sonit
6er.ezis. tne~ are nciie ihc Ierj .W~.,SPOIIJ' anl:
regsrde< as exemp; !rom the genersl
of the Law of GJI relating to use of veapons. rha
.egal provisions uhlch bave tlie effect of
the use of uespoi~s ?hicl: :susr. 'unnecrs5ary
ar,a mea?is of attack whici: are icdlscriminate 1:)
Id obviously appl:~ ttc r.rciecr weapoiis as well
of conventions1 ügpe .

The ! fects of nuclesr wrapolis 01: nuasn bsings hcs beeii
vell doci
ented by virtue of teutimon~ of survivors of
theseHirthal the burn and blajt bomeffectsit.of ncclears oburs~cns fsnd
their 1 uediate and IOIIY-terrc consrquences includiiig
genetlc c' .ssquences. el? place them iii the category of
ceapom tl t cause unnecessary and aggravated devastation
and suffe Lpa theroby violatinn the laus of humaility and the
ilictates 1 public conscience.

(v) The 1

fcrbidden to .-isewcapolis thst vio1nt.t .theiiautral
a of ncn-?srtic:pating Çt.otes. The rad oactive iiilcÿ: of nuclear explcsior. can have
trsesbordor effects, damagicg the citizccs 'and
prcpercy of neutral Srate. it hss been oe31 Joc:~nented
and aisa 55 wii bi Chernobyl eïperlence that the
rsdioactivi' ir, the fail os: can hsr-e cffccta over a
larpr area. huz as nüclasr weapcn? are unahle LC.
discriminet bttueen cosbatants anC nor-comb-sants so
also thai' e ünsble ta discriminate Setueen the ccïtral
statu3 and iie beiligerent sthtes.

1; irI f'orbldde~ t.o use xeapo:iz rhat. cau3c
uidespread, Iciig-trrm an^ severe damage to the
environaent

envircnmect a3 a vltei Zs~:.or
ncv emplieeiusbg tthe ury?nt. needrsî.3nsPreVtlit
atmosphara hy inrrrslis. carb~:~:J~?cxlfie,
the 6tst.ruation of the czv!lr layer.
ir.dlvisibie in terma 3f ou?iersili~ and istht;
of mnnkid, =h$refore ir canilo:. be
by any ui:a sovarcign ~tatr.

well as conventlcral :au of war
CJUS? use of wlong-term snd andsnsacverewaraamagn tt?t the
ni1 abjects essential t.0 the au~vival 3f
or 3n works and iii:tr~1atlons that
are ~lso Dherefore ar~hibit~sd.

Çevtr ot.htr treatiej an.! Inszrcnant.~ lay doui:
-.xter.sivr rcies for thr preservarlo~i of enviruiiment..
usrfsre hs bre:: bcld t,o br fnkereirtl~ bt?struct.ive of
raapactab1 1.ternationalî::t.lsw Stprovidilig thprote~t1011requford the
ecvironmc.? in timoi of armed ccnfllct. , the 1976 Convention
on the Pro ibitioil of Militsry or sny other Kosrlle Use
of Environ ienta: Modification Tccb.iques; 1972 Stockholm
Dcclaretio of the Vnited Nations Conference on the Iinlimali
Ehvlronmen ; 1680 United Nations Ge~iersl Asscmbly
Resolution on Bfst.orics1 Rrsponsibility of Ststes for the
pGeneration 1; Draft NsCode oforCrimesPresaa'aillstanPl~iîCeutuaiid
Sccurlty tif Kankind; 1892 Sscuritç Counc.il Sesclution 687
cciicrrl:iiig the ~cr~uration of Fesce and SecurltY Iraq and
Xuaai t; 1992 Rio dcc:eracion on Knv:ronnett and
Developmeri:. , 1982 United Nations Ynnve:~tlon o:i Law of the
5t3, 1985 Ylonns Conventicn 011Fzot.ection of the Ozone
Laver ; .992 F:'smework Convention nn Ciirnste Change; -13-
1892 Convention on Biological Divcrsity.

It 1s prohiblted to use asphyxiating. poisonous or
other gases and al1 ana:ogous, liqulds, material:,. or
substances .

The radioactive fa11 out of a nuclear explosion is a
breathed of inlsoor eaten,t itn accumulates ln theough body and whenn,
the nccumlated dose rises above a certaln 1evel;- lt

boiie marronn 'rand otber sipartss', of tlieisebcdy. thaIt ssrtaclead tto
propressive cnaemia, loss of hair, skiii sores, lncreased
suscsptibil:ty to infection and ln worst casas - ùesth.

Tlie prohibition to use poison or pcisonous weapons
dates back from the laws of Usnu to Grotius the Lieber Code
and tne 1899 Hague Deslaration (IV,2)Concerning
Asphyxlating Gases; Article 23(a) of the 19D7 Bague
i.egu?stions; Article of the 1922 Treaty Relat.lng t.o the Use
of Submarines and Noxioris Gases in Warfare and the 1925 Geneva
Bas Protocol .

The ~r~hibition under the Geneva Protocoi 1s
unequivocal. It prohiblts not onls' poisonou$ and other
Pases but al20 the use of al1 analoeai!~ llquids, 1
materiais, or drvicrs. Thcrafore lt is not difflcult to
vaapons ththerrbynclrendering thattheir ause illeusi. to the nuciear

(el Uae of Nuclear Yeapan is a 'Grave Breach'

Al? Che four Geiieva Conventions make provision for !
pend1 sanotioiia vhioh enjoii: the partles ta enact the I
ntcesaary legisletion to punish persona who commit brerches I
undcr these instruments. These instruments dei lne 1
'omit.- brrnoh*.' srhirih i s on imnnrt.nnt. rnnt.r-ihi8t.inn t.nv.rdm
the definition of 'war orlrnes' in international lso. This
dafinition 1s more or lesa the same in al1 Conventions wlth
Protwol 1 elucldatlng it ln greatrr detail. Sliice iaost of
tiie Stat.ee are parties to the Genevs Conventions. ur may rely
on the definition undar Artlclr 50 of Convention 1
whioh statas as folloas:

folloïingreaîpots, ...if shacommittedthose againstvindpersons of orhe
property proteoted by the Ce~vention: ullful -14-

killine, torture or lnhuman treatment. includine
biological experirnents. Wilfully causinx meet
sufiering or serious injury to body or htalth. and
exte~slve aestruction and appropriation of property,
noL Justlfied by rnllitary necesslt? and carriad out
unlawiuily and uantonly. The indircrim:nat.e nature of
nUClear weapons 1s known to el1 Staterr, their use
With che knowledge that the^ would kfll protcîtad
persons would amount to wilful killings with in the
the agaravationConveof human suffering.ar veaTherefura kanyn faxch
use would amount to 'wilfull~ causing. Brest suffering,
serious injurp ta body or health' , which is
characterised as a grave breach by each of the
Convefitions. Further 'extensive destruction of propcrty'
not jüstified by military necessity- and carried out
unlaufully and uantanly. are grave breaches. The use of
nuclear ueapons causes exteneive deatriiction in Che
affected area and contamination- thereby infringing th1s
rule directly and constituting 'grave breach' as deflned
in the Conventions.

if) Rohibitioa of attacks aeainst oivilian population
Under international laï it i~ olear beyond doubt Chat
the use of nuciear vénpons against civilians, uhatever
the nature of size and deszruclive povar of 'he weapon. vil1
bc reridere* iilaasl bu virtuc of the apl;lication oL
the custornary +uls nbioh atatcs that belllgerent must
alïays distinnuish betueen combatant~ and nonccmbats2its aiid
limit. their actsok only to the former. This 1s an old and
wcll estsblished rula vhich has achlevea universel
acceDtancc. The firat multilateral instrument to statt
it vas the St. Petersburg Dccleratlon of 1860, which
declares that "the only lesitirnate obJect uhich States should
enùeavour to accomplish during uar 1s tu ueakeliing the
militarv foroea of the anetcy".
This obligation Ls repested and furtber
elaborated in diffcrcnt forms ln mens instruments,
includirig:

- Article 26 of the Resulation annexe6 to the 19@7
Hague Convantion IV Respecting the Law- aiid Customs
of War on Land, and Artlcle 1 OZ the 1907 Hague
Convention 1 Concerning 3ombardment by Naval Forces
in Times of War, to the extent that these provisions
prohibit sttacks on undefende5 areas and undefendsd
buildings; - the resolutlon of 30 -September, 1828, whereby the

Assrmbly of the Leadue of Nations forbade the clvillan
population from beins consldercd a military objective;
- the 1940 Ceneva Conventlons prohibitin6 attacks on
mflltary eetablishicents and health transports (Article
lg et.seq. cf Convention 1; Article 22
et.aeq. of Convention 11; Articles 14, 15.
la, 21, 22 of Convention IV);

- ON Genersl Azsembly. resolutions 2444 (XXIIII of 19
Deceubsr, 1968 and 2675 (XXV) of 9 December, 1870;

Thua the use or a nuclear wcapon against civilisn tsrgets
or of n wenpon havina incidental effects cn civilians
in anv circumstances is rsndered lllegal by virtue of the
moat elamentary rules af the international lav of armd
conflict .
Mnreover. the use of a nuclear vespoil sgainst a
clvillsn tardet vould constitute a crime ausilist Iiumanity as
definel by Article 6 (C) Of the statute of the Nurembera
Trlbunsl and Article ? of the 1948 Genocidr Cui~vantion. The
UN General Asscrnbly has characterisad ss "crime asninst
hornanlty and civilîz3tlon" anv use by a 5tat.t of a
ncclsnr or t.hrrmo-nuclear vcapons irres~sotivs of whetllcr
thcy are even used against civilians.

The use of a nuclcsr vra!xtn aasinst a milltary taraet
vili alsv be illenal. Tnis arises from thc followil~g
considarationa:

1. Evtn t.hr use of a llmlzed ~uclear wcapun with reduced
range ofenitss effects:h inavitsble for those wlthln the

1:. the use of a limitad nuclear ueapon ultll reducbd
poïsr could lead to total naclcar wsr;

111. the &se of naclear weapon with cchanced power increases
the effects idantifled obove und its inblscrlminate
effects uhich cannot be limitcd to aiiy "permitted"
rnilitary objeutivee.

tg) The use or threat of nuclear rcapons nOt Justiflecl by
international law undar any cireumstances.
The pro3-nrnts of the use of nuclsar wespses justify
tneir use on the grounda of

i. self defence ii. repriaals
1ii.neoeaa:ty
iv. deterrenca

Ci) Gtlf-defince does not lustlfy use of nuclear wespons

firl? difenoo la ur bwu~kL1~11 LU Wic yrClliLOlT~lC11Ilgalnst
the uee of -force when a State is subject. t0 an armed
attack. The legallty of var does not release the
participants from the application of the rules regulatine the
conduct of areied coiifllcts. An aggressor violatlnu the Jav
of the Charter ha3 to Cornply with limitations on the vesvons
ustd. Similar restralnt. has to 5e exercised by thosa
fightine in self berence. The applicatio:> of rulas of leu
oi arned ccnflicts docs not depend on tlie legality of the
defended causesi boch aggressor or vic2irn. are eouallv
theJscfifth tPresE~bularws paragraphar of Protocollple 1. reOnlyted thoren
wcspons nûï be uscd in self deSeilce uliosa aae le
otherwise permitted under interiiat.ioiia1 lsv. Raoourse
to nucltar xcapons prohlbited bu various rulas of laws
of var, cannot be justlfied accordine tu tlie right of
3nherent self defence under the UN Charter.

Clil Repriselsdo not Justlfy use of nuclear weapdns

- Reprlsals against non-combatants and non-militsrv tarseta

Reprlsals egnlns:. coi:-corebatsnta ucn-mllitary targeta
are prohibitad. It 1s forbidden to rasort te rcprisals
atzairst mdicsl installations, transporta:iona and unlts;
tlie 11iJured ; iafirrn: civilisn po~ulationr, and property
aiid various categorirs of civilioli sopulatlons
subjecr. to ~rotection.
- Reprlssls sgainst combstaxts and military targeta

- rnilitarye taraetstionis notrspswoificall~ aeainaprovidedmbatfors ln any
legs1 Instrumtlit but prohibition of the use of nuclear
ueapons auainst then in certain bocause iF violatas
the otlier princi~les of lawa of armed confli-t. llke csusing
of Wecessarv srifferiiig rcndcri na death i~ievl table.

The International Law Commission in its Draft
Articles of the Reapotlsibility of States stresses under
Article 30 on countar-measureo that:
"evenvhere the ir.ternationally wrongful act in question uoïl justify a reaî$ion invelvicg the ï:c cf
fors ;.,.] action taken in ttis sdizc ccrt~inlj. canzzmt
incl de, for lnzcsnce, e breoch of obilSatloL5
:,f 1 i!IterTiati$r1slhumanl5arlrn laK. 5;i~l2 Step coïl?
~eve be .lrgl'lrnate- and suci? c.o:;Cüiir COillG rem:l::
wroc fui".
F

ractice. the very nature of nuclear veapofis YOU?C!
y violate proh1bitio:is foi ïhicli re~zissls
- e.e. .ne prohibition on
po2ulations or tbeir pro~erty. This is
mÿst nacessarily be illegôl.

iiiij ~ecCssitp dws n~t justify the use of nuclear neapons

The Law of arnsd clic drüz ri=t rs;ao,gnias th=
i..,?le of nacasaity exoept ii; tkose c.ircum:=ai;ct:
çhrirs it ic expreszily provided for. Tt:? ;:?5rr.1:e.tlciiaL.zr-
Comr,irsioii ha3 $t.atrd that t.!.it 1 dors. na:
e~shcrise o Yüatc 7.3 igliorr tkç ; îf
hunan::cz an lsu a:
:I fii;i~ DC ai5;:ri . : :iii ii!.i CI mlllr.cn

Prce.3Slr.j or 11ecerslt.y 0: xar 1i.oru?r t: ev.ade the di:ty t.o
coz~ly i oh lige si or.^ rlesigiied; grtci~ely, t.c,
pr evii!it. the :iecescities cf wzr. I'rtx: casski:,-s~?ff+ri::g
whick it Ias derized tc proscribe cnce and T-r 311".

of Nuclzar rieopon3 iiircsponae tiiitt4nck t.y 3

ner;t,rb1 d~iintrles. Piuzlea:. deterrrncc haa ore:) consldered
1 to be abhorrent to human aentrment slnce it implies that a
state if requirtd .to defend lts own existence vil1 act wlth
pitiless disregard for the cotisequeilces to its own and
adverssry's people.

Acother question which arises in relatl~n to the theory
of deterrence 1s whether the keeping of peace or the
prevention of var 1s to be made dependent on the threat of
horrlrlc lndiscriminate aestruction which justifies the
stochpiling of zuch weapons at an enormoÿs expense. in the
ho~e that they vil1 merely act as a deterrent but vil1 not
lniact be used. However those uho do nct have such weapons
wclild 811 the time be racing to build them elid those who
already have nuclear ueapona would continue to develop evec
more destructive weapons to maintain the su~eriority
necessary for deterrencr and this would keep humanity in the
perpezual fear of total destruction. A better and saner usv to
secure everlasting peace would be to ensure that anly are such
weapons never used but. also not made. The security ùf al1
natioils wotiid best te safeguarded Sv a nvclear weapon frae
doubt. Ithateacdlsarmar.eiit urcusttebe niventivpriorityre andn hea tuo
take urecedence over deterrencr.

(8) hgalit~ of production. manufaoture, stookplling etc of
nuclear weamns.

xt has bean araird by some S~8tts in thclr
mernorials zhat only the quaation of the leaality of the use
of nuclear weapons :a before the Cni~rt fcr
c31isideratf on in iziviua ite edvisory opinioi:.

iïc*&*~~. tke üuaa t~oi\ YL I~S-IILY or US* or nuclear
weapons cannot te distitifuished or separatel from the legality
of its manufacture. produc=ion eto.
Since the production and manufacture of nucltar uaapons
can onls be with the objective of their use, it must follow
that if the use of such veapone itaelf iz illesal undcr
internatianal lau. then their production and manufacture
cannot under any circum~atanoes be considarsd as
~ernitted. Besides. the manufacture end stockpiling of nuclear
weapons woüld constitute a8 a thregt of their cventual use.

In this conneotion, refcrence may bc made to the
Conventions on Biological Weapons and 011 Chemlcal Weapons
which recukn1s:ng the nted to excludo completely the
~osslb:litv of the une OF sucb wcopona, prohiblt States
acquire or dretain, theduca,prbhibltedkpileweapona. otheThese Conventions clearly recognise and provide that the only
effective vay ta prevent under any circumatanaes the use of
a prohibited veepon is to enaure that no Statc
undertakes the produotion or manufaoture or retnins such
weapoas . Accordingly, where States art in pusacaaion of
chernical or biological ueapous they art required ta
disrnsntle or deetroy them smder an clabsrate procedure
specifiad therein with built-in safepuards of
international inspection. The nted for these Ccnventivns vas
felt because a nwber of States had made
dealaratione/reservati~na to tne 1925 Ocneva .Protoccl to the
affect that they could usa, the prohibited gaJes, Poisons
etc in oaae they wcre sïbjcctad to an attsck bs such
seepans.

The Chamical Weapons Conveniica and the
Biologisal Weapons Convention by prohlbitii~g the
pfodriction, manufacture ecc., of such ueapons under any
circumstances preclude thelr use even by way of
rctaiiation In cases vhrre they liave been used hy ont
parw to a Conflict.

Thus the use of nuclear weapons which 1s
otlierwise. contrary to intemational law could only be
ef!<tcrlvely preveiited by tliniinating complrtely t.heir
prodÿct?cn. manufacture and by ensurina t.he dlsmantllng of
existing nuclcar ueapons.

The prcduction of weapons uhick have the capazity t.o
deitroy al1 mankind catnot in any ccanner be co~isidered t.n be
.iusti,Pieb or pcrmit',ec under 1nternat.ional law.