Letterdated19J1995hm theAmbas&r ofthRussi anleration,
togetwithWntteStatem ofnheGovm ofthe
RussiFederatm Tothe Registrar
of thehtemational Court of Justice
Mr.E.Vaiencia-Ospina
PeacePalace
The Nage
TheHague. 19June 1995
DearMr.Valencia-Ospina
Pleasefind enclosed"UiRITEiY STATEMENT.WB COMMENTSOFTHE
RUSSIANFEDERATIONObiTHE ISSUEOF THELEG.4LITY OF THE THREAT
ORUSEOFhZTCLE.4RWEAPONS".
Enclosure:as abovementioned.20 pages
L.Skotnikov,
.%rnbassadrftheRussianFederation WRlT7EN STATEMENT AND COMMENTS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATIO NNTHE ISSUE
OF THE LEGAWn OF THE THREAT OR USE
OFNUCLEAR WEAPONS
Moscow.16 June'1995
1. The Wodd Health Organization,by its resolutWHA 46/40
dated14May 1993,requestethe lnternationCoun ofJustice to givean
advisoryopinion on the followingquestion: "In ofethe health and
environmentaleffects,wouldthe useof nuclearwcabya Stateinwaror l
i
other armed conflictbe a breach of its obligarionsundrr iriIûw,ational
includingthWHO Constitution?" I
2.The RussianFederation.beinaUN member, iips orrctaparty
to the Statute theInternationalCouof Justiceunderthe provisiof
Articl93, paragraph1ofthe UN Charteraridwjrrespondinglyis entitlcd
to appear beforee Coun.
3. Having receivean appropriate notificationabout the WHO'S
requesand alsoaboutthe readinessofzhc Courtto accept,withinthe time-
limifixedbyifwrittenstatementofthe Stateswhichare entitledto appear
beforethe Court with respectthequestiori,thc KussianFederatiin
-ccordancewithArticl66,paragraph2of theStatutof theInternational
-ourt has presentedan appropriatewritterl statement to the C7urt on
une,1994. 4.Taking into accountthe above,as wellas the fact that thc sirnilar
statements have been prescnted to the Coun by other states the Russian
Federation, in accordancewithArticle66,paragraph 4of the Statuteof the
international Court and following thedccision of the Prcsident of the
Court of 20 June, 1994,hereby presents comments on the other relcvant
writtenstatementspertainingto the issue.
5.The General Assembly,by its rtsolution 49/75K dated December
15, 1994, decided to requestthe International Coun togive an advisory
opinion on the followinquestion:"1sthe threat or useof nuclearweapons
in any circumstancespermitkd under internationallaw?"
6.The Russian Federation,proceedingfrorn what was sct forth in
paragraph 2aboveand having receivedan appropriate notification abothe
UN General Assemblyrequest,in accordancewithArticle66, paragraph 2
of the Statuteof the International Courtin accordancewiththe decision
of theCoun dated February1,1995, herebypresentsa writtcnstaternenton
the question, formulatedythe UN GeneralAssembly.
7. It is the opinion of the Russian Fcderation that questions
formulatedbythe WHO and theUN GeneralAsseniblyare cssentiallyvcry
sirnilarandin this connectionit thinksit possiblcand expedientto dwellon
both of them in a single document which is beingenclosed. 1
A study of written statementsof othcr States even n1oG firmly
strengthenedour opinionespressed in the Sratementof June7,1994:the
Coun shouldnot givean advisoryopiniononthc WHOsrequesl.
1.In accordancewithArticle 96,paragraph1 of theUN Charter the
General Assernblyor the Secunty Councilmayrequest rhc international
CourtofJusticeto givean advisoropinion"onanylegalquestion".
ln accordance with paragraph 7 of the same Article, speciaIized
agencieswhichrnayat anytime beso authorized bythe General Assembly
may alsorequestadvisoryopinionsof the Court"onlegalquestions arising
withinthe scopeoftheir activities".
As applied toWHO, thisgeneral rule relatinto al1 specialized
agenciesis specifiin Article X, paragrap2 of the Agreement between
the UN andthe WHO of 1948and in Articl76of ihe WHOConslitution.
Accordingto ArticlcX, paragraph2 of lhe Agreement of 1948 the
UN General Assembly entitles the WHO tcimake request to the
InternationaCourtofJusriccto givean advisoryopinionon legal questions
arisingin thesphereofthecornpetenceof theOrganizationand othersthan
those concerning relationsbetween the WfIO and the UN or others
specializedagencies.
Under Articl76of the WHO Constitution.Orgrinizatimag request
the Court to give an advisoryopinion on any lcgalquestionarising within
the scopeoftheOrganization'competencc.
Consequently, as distinct from the Geileral Assembly and the
Security Council,theWIIO being a specializedagency,rnay request the
Coun trgivean advisoryopinion not onany lcgalqiicstiobut only on a
legalquestionarisinwithin thscopeofttie Organizationcornpetence. The WHO'S competcnceis definedfirstof al1in ks ConstitutioItis
quite apparent that this document does not contain a provision,which
would confirm ezgrressiserbithat theWHO is cornpetent to consider the
matter of legalitofuscby aState notonly of nuclearweaponsbut of any
kid ofweaponsat al1 in anarmed conflid.
The attempts to refer to an "implicd" or "inherent" WHO'S
competencehaveno prospectseither. Thisisprovedbythe 45- yearpractice
of thcWHO, whichuntil the WH. resolution46/40 of 14.05.9has never
appealedtothe subjectof legaliof theuse ofnuclearweapons.
Accordjngly,there is alsono evidencethat tWHO'S practiccor its
resolutions have somehowldevelopedthe WHO'SConstitution,so as to
endow it with such a competence.In this respcct, an analysisof Wr.iû's
activities,conîainedin Chapter 1of the wriitenstaternent prescntcd to the
Courtby the UK Government inconnectionwitlltheWHO'S request,seems
to be stronglyconvincing.
It is well-knownthat while interpreting a treaty any sirbsequent
practice of its application which establishcs the agreementbetween the
parties regardinginterprctatiof the treaty (Article31. paragraph 3.b of
Vienna Conkentionof the Law of International Treaties. 1969) shall be
taken into account.This rule is also applicableto the treatiessetting up
internationalorganizations.
For us it'sclear thWI-iA resolutio46/41)of 14.05.93which was
adopted with 73 votes "for"40 - "against"and 10 "abstaining",does no1
establishsuchan agreement.
Thus.sofar asthe question of legalityofthc uscof nuclearweapons
does not fa1withintliecompetenceofWHOandcannotemerge withinthis
competenceunder Article 96,paragraph 2 ofthe UN Charter, Article76of
WHO'SConstitution and Article X, paragrap2 of the Agreementbetween betweenthe UN and the WHO, the Organizationhadno righito requestthe
Court to give an advisoryopinion on such a question. So, the WHO
Assembly'sresolution and the question contained in it arethe WHO's
actionsultrvires.
2. In accordancewith Article65. paragraph 1 of thc Statute of the
International Court,the Courtmaygivean advisoryopinionon any legal
question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in
accordancewiththe Charterofthe United Nationsto makesucha requcst".
The verb "may", used in thiswording, in our opinion. bas two
meanings.
Firs~the Courtmaygive opinionsexclusivelyuponthe requestofthe
bodyauthorizedto make sucha request byihe UNChaneror inaccordance
withit.
Takinginto accountwhat wassaid abovein parrigraph 1, it'sdifficult
to considerthe WHO asthe organizationauthorizcdby theUN Chaner or
in accordance with it to make such a request in this particular case.
Conespondingly, inOurview inthis case the Court hardlyatal1rnay,Le.
hardlyha the righttogive anadvisoryopinionuponsuchWHO'srequest.
However, naturally, the Coun itself solves the question of its
cornpetence.And in this connection we would like once again 10 draw
attentionto the secondrneaningoftheword "rnay".
As it wasmentionedin our statement dated Junc 7,1994 and in the
statcmenlsof someother States,the Court may, but is not obligedtogivc
advisoryopinionsi.e.it haadiscretecompetcnce inthisrespect.
In this contextWC would like to note thosc consequcnces for
international law iii general and for thc law of international
organizations in particular, which will arise as 4 I
1
a result of the realizationby the Courtof its right to giveadvisoryopinion
upon WHO'S request,whateverthis opinionrnightbe.
- . i
WewouldIiketo emphasizethat weare puttingasidcpoliticalaspects .! ,
: i
and are talking aboutpurely legalcbnsequenceswhichshall be of primary ' !
; i
importance for the InternationalCourt whilesolvingthe questionwhether
'i
to giveor not to giveanadvisoryopinion. i
'1
In this sense it is important that in this case takine a decision to ! ',
i
exerciseits right andto givean advisoryopinion,the Court,in a waywould
establish a precedent of encouraginginternational organization activities !
!
ultravire s , uld lend to such illegalacts legal consequenceswhich they l
werecaiied upon to achieve-(we stress onceagain: irrespectiveof whatthis ' !
advisclry opinionmightbel. I
I
In Ourview,such an action by the Court wouid be harmful for the i
1:
development of international lawin general and the lawof international !
i
organizationsin particular. 1.
1 :
..':
Despite the differencesin the wording,questions put beforethc Court .
by the WHO and UN General Assemblyare vcrysimilar.In our opinion, . m
i: .
the queslion,containedin GeneralAssemblyresolution 49/75K dated 15 . .
.:.
December 1994 is.formulated in a more gencral manner and somehow ..!
i !
coversthe questionput beforethe Courtbythe WHO. That'swhy,and also 1 :
i. .
withdue regardto considerationsset forth in Section 1 abovc,in this Section ! :
l
we intend to concentraternainlyon the UN GcricralAssemblyquestion: :
"Are the threat or use of nuclear weaponsin any circumstanceperrnitted i
underinternationallaw?" .i
1i 1
1. The vcrywording of the L'NGeneral Asseniblyquestiongivesrise
!.
to questions.
1
i I First of allin virtue of the principle of sovereignty.we treat as
generallyadmined the presurnption that the statmay accomplishany acts,
which are not prohibitedunder international faw.Basically.international
law isa system of limitations,rather than permissionsIn this connection,
the question, whetherinternationallawperrnitsthc useof nuclearweapons
or not is not likelyto be correct.If we ask the questian of this kinwi
should ask whether internationallawprohibitsthe useof nuclearweapons.
Anyway, the essence of the question is in the question whethcr
internationallawcontainsthe banof the use ofnuclearweapons or not.
At the sarne tirne,.an extremely broad wordingof the question
formulatedbythe GeneralAssembly,aswellasby WIIO, strikesonc'seye.
1
It seems that thc initiatorsof both rcquestsdidn't want to draw a
distinctionbenveenthe useof nuclearweapons by theaggressorand the use.
of suchweaponsin self-defence, forinstancein the retaliation fortheuse of
nuclearor someothet massdestructionweapons,aswellas a distinctionin
connection withthe consequencesofthe use of nuclearwcapons.
Meanwhile, in Ouropinion,thesedistinctions arcverysignificant.
2.In ourview,internationallawcontains no generalprohibitionofuse
of nuclearweaponsper se.
A study of main sourcesof international law -international treaties
and international customs - provesour opiiiion. Wc don'l consider here
general principlesof law, brcause we believe that they are reflected in
internationaltreatiesor customs.
1)International trcatie- general.as well asspccial -don't contain
rulesstipulatinga completebanonnuclear weaponsper se.
A study of international treaties. espcciallythose dedicateto the
problems of nuclearweaponsleadsus to thefollowirigconclusions. 6
-
Fit of all,thosetreatiesadmit the cxisle*ce. of nuclearweaponsand
the possession ofnuclear weapons by sorne statcsAt the samr time these
treaties envisagedifferentlimitationswith respectto nuclear weapons. iii
particular:
-their proliferation (Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, 196811/;
-their testing (Treaty on Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Spaceand Under Water, 1963; Treaty betweenthe
USSR andthe USA on the Limitationof UndergroundNuclearWeapons
Tests1974);
-their deployment in certainterritories(Treatyon the Prohibition of
the Eniplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of hfass
Destaciion on the Sea-Bedand the Ocean Floorand thc SubsoilThereof,
1971; Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Wcaponsin Latin America
(TreatyofTlatelolco),1967;SouthPacificNuclearFree ZoneTrcaty(Treaty
of Raratonga),198.5);
-certain types of nuclear arms, down to the eliinination of certain !
types thereof, even if the word "nuclear" is not mentioned in the text. 1
.,
(InterimAgreementbetweenthe USSRand the USAon CertainMeasurcs .l
with respectto the Limitationof StrategicOffensiveArrns, 1972;Trealy
!
betweenthe USSRand the USA on the Limitationof Strategic Offcnsivc
-Arms, 1979,whichthough ithas not entered .inIoforce so far, has been
observeclîor severalyears; Treatybetweenthe USSK and the USAon the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic OffensiveArms. 1991, to which,
Russia,Belorussia,Kazakhstan,Ukraine and the USA havebecomeparties
..
after they have signed the 1992 Protocol to the Treaty: Treaty between
1/ The RussianFederation is coiltinuing to exercisethe rights and
responsibilitiesofthe formerUSSRunder the internationaltreaties.Russia and the USA on Further Reduction and Limitationof Strategic
-
OffensiveArms, 1993,whichhas no1yet entered inio fi~rc; reatybetween
the USSR and the USA on the Eliminationof Their Intermediate-range
and Shorter-rangeMissiles1987).
Thus, treaties, devoted exclusivelyto nuclear weaponsprovide for
significantnumberofrestrictionsinthisregard,butthereinospecialtrcaty
which would put ageneralban onthe useof nuclcarweapons assuch.
We think that there are no real prerequisitesfor concludingsuch a
treatyat prcsentasyet.Nonecessaryand sufficicntconditionsexist.That is
whythe appealsof the General Assembly(CieneralAssemblyresolutions .
45/59 A of 1990and 461370of 1991)to the Conferenceon Disarmament
proposingto beginon a priority basis talks aimcd at the conclusionof a
convention prohibitingthe employment of nuclear weapons in any
circumstances,have not been implemented. The very fact that thcrc arc
projectsof such a conventionin General Assrrnhlyresolutionsprovesthat
presentlynotrearyprovisioninthisregard exists.
Furthermore.itisapparent that while concludingnumerousspccial
treaties in this sphere,Stateshavebasedtheir positionson the assumption
that internationallawdoesno1prohibitthe employment ofnuclearweapons
as such.That iswhy treaties wcresignedwith an ainieither to lessenthc
possibilityof its employment(for example, USSR-USA Trcaty on the
Preventionof NuclearWarof 1973;analogoiistreaties berweenthe USSR
and the UK (1978) t,e USSR and France (1976); the USSK-USA
Agreementfor theCreationof NuclearRiskRcductioriCrnters (1987)or to
pledge thenon-employmentof such weapons against specificcountriesin
specificrcgionsor specificcircurnstances(USSR, thc USA,the UK and
France haveal1signedAdditional Protocol IIof the TlateiolkoTrcaty,in
accordancewitharticle3 whereof theypledgcnotto use andnot to threatento use nuclearweaponsagainstthe State-partictothe Tla~elolkTrea~y;the
USSR and China havealso signed a similar Prolocol to the Karatonga
Treaty).
There doesnot exist a provisioncontaininpa generalprohibilion of
the employmentof nuclearweaponsas such also in international treatics,
whichare notspeciallydevotedtothesubjed ofnuclearweapons.
Iriswellknownthat the UNCharter (Articl2,paragraph 4) obliges
the Organizationmembers to refrainin theirinternational relationfrom
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any otherrnanner inconsistentwith the
purposesof the United Nations.
inthissense,asthe threat or useof force ingeneral.the threat or usc
of nuclear weaponsby a sLateisprohibited, as are the threat or use of any
other kind ofweapons.
At the same time the Charter does not impair in any sense the
inherent right of individualor collectiveself-defenif an armeciattack
occursagainsta Member ofthe UnitedNations (Article51). Accordinglyin
this sensethe Charteradmitsthe useof nuclearor other weapons perse by
a state.
We do not considerthe provisionsof a nimber (ithe UN General
Assembly resolutions,which stipulate that the use ofuclcar weaponsas
such is a violationof thUN Charter (UN GA Res.1653 (XVI).UN GA
Res.33/71/B, UNGA Res.35/152D, UN GA Rcs36/923and some others),
asan authenticand bindinginterpretationofthc UN Charter.SuchGeneral
Assemblyresolutionsand declarations,regardlcssof howLheywereadoptcd,
are not binding and do not crcate by tlirmselves obligations for UN
members. Any other, oppositeviewof the rolc of such General Assembly
resolutionshasno basisinthe UN Charter. A number of international treaties, not spccificallydevoted to the
problem ofnuclcarweapons,containcertain restrictionsin rhisrcgard (the
Treaiy on PrinciplesGoverningthe Activitics ofStatesin the Exploration
and Use of OuterSpace.Includingthe Moonandothcr CelestialBodiesof
1967;the AntarcticTreatyof 1959). Nevenheless,therc does not exist any
general prohibitionon the useofnuclear weaponsin anpsuchtreaty.
Sornetimes, 10 substantiate the point of view accordingto which
international law prohibits the use of nuclear wcapons,the referencc is
made to inlemational hurnan righrstreaties and, in panicuiar. to the
ConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentofthe CrimcofGenocideof
1948.
We presume,howcver,that itclearlyfoliowsfromthe Convcntionthat
it is not the mere use of nuclear or any other type of wcapons that
constitutesgenocide but respectivact "commiticd with intenttu dcstroy,in
whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious group,as such"
(Article II of the Convention).Therefore, to qualify certain actions as
genocide and as a violation of international law, one should take into
accounttheir airnand intentbutnot the weapons,meansusedto implemenl
thoseactions.
Neither do we find correct the arguments that the use of nuclear
weapons is not admissibleunder international law,because itviolates the
human rightto lifelaid down, inparticular,in the Univcrsal~eclaration of
Human Rightsof 1948 (Articl3) and the IntcrnationâlCovenanton Civil
and PoliticalRightsof 1966(Article6).
The existenceof the rightto life does not rneanthaifisnot possible
to deprive a person of his life through Icgitimaieuse of force. This is
confirmeci, for instance, in Article 2, paragraph 7 of thc European
Convention on the protection of Hunian Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, which reads: "Deprivation of lire shall not bc regarded as
inflictedin conlraventjonofthis aniclc whenilresults from the use of force
which ..is absolutely necessar..in defencc of any person from unlawful
violence..."inthis sensethe use ofnuclear weaponsin self-defencedoes not
constitutea violatioof the rightto life.
Besides, those putting forward arguments that the use of nuclear
weapons is not admissible under international law, also appeal to
international treatiescodifyingles applicable to armed conilicts.
Restrictionssetbythe rules applicable to armed conflictsin respoft
means and methods ofwarfarealsoextend to nuclear weapons.However. we
are convinced that there is no general prohibition on the use of nuclear
weapons as such in treaties codifyingthose rules.
The most rccent rules applicableto an arnicd contlict are contained in
Additional Protocols of 1977 to the Geiirva Conventions of 1949.
Restrictions on the rnethods and rneans of warfare are contained, in
particularin partsIIIand IVof the Additional Protocol 1.However, asFrits
Kalshoven reasonablyobscrves,"the Diplornatic Conference"which adopted
the Protocols, "wasvirtually unanimous in its view that it had not been
convokeclto bringthe prohlerns connectedwith thc existence and possible
use of nuclear weaponsto a solutionv1/. The drafting history of Proto1ol
shows that "any new rules and principles, embodied in the Protocol, were
notwrinen witha view tothe potential useof niiclear weaponsn2/.This is
1987,p.82.rits Kalshoven.Constraintson the Wagingof War, ICRC. Geneve.
21 lbid, p.104.In the introductiontq the draft Protocols thelCRC
had stated that: "Problemsrelating to atomic, bacteriologicaland chernical
eovernmenü, suandcin of internationadraft Additional Protocols theICR~
aoes not intend to Sec: Comrnentary on the
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1.2
~ijbott Publ..Geneva,1987,p590.Chr-Swinarski.Rr.Zimmcrrnann, Martinis refleaed in the Protocolsthemselvesin whichthcre is neilhrr referenceto
nuclearweapons nornientioningof any othcr specifictype of weapons, as
well as in the declarations madeby a number of countries (the USSK.
France,the USA,Spain,the United Kingdom.thc Nctherlands, Belgium,
the FRG and Italy)during the Conference, signingor ratificationof the
Protocol.
As is known,the 1949Geneva Conventionscontain no regulations
concerningnuclearweapons.
Thus. the principal humanitarian law instruments adopkd in the
nuclearagedonotprescibe anygeneralban on the use ofnuclcarwcapons.
Itisprobablyinthis contextthat the advocates ofillegalityof thuse
of nuclear weapons substantiate their position by referring to earlier
instruments - the Hague Conventions of 1899-1907 and even the
Declaration tothe Effectof Prohibitingthe Use of Certain Projectilein
Wartime(St.Petersburg Declaration)of 1868.
in particular,theystate thatunder thc DcclarationLhconlylcgilimatc
objectwhich Statesshouldendeavorto accomplishduringwaris to weaken
the mili~aryforcesof the.enerny;for thispurpose itissuficient to disable
the greatest possiblenumbcrof men. this objcctwouldbc cxcccdcd by the
employmentof armswhichuselessly by aggravatcLhe sufferingof disabled
mcn, or render their deathinevitable;the einploynientof sucharnlswould
thereforebe contrarytothe laws ofhumanity.
Along with that. a reference is made lo ihe "Martensclause" - a
blanket formulacontajnedin the Preamblesto the ConventioriRespeding
the Lawsand Customsof War on Land of 1899 and to the Convention
Concerningthe Laws and Customsof War on 1;indof 1907 ("Until ijmore
conlplete code of the laws ofwar has been issued,the ...Parties deem it
expedientto declarethat, in casesnot inciudedin the Regulations adoptedbythem, the inhabitantsand the belligerentsremain undcr the
and the rule of theprinciplesofthe iawof nations,as theyrcsult from the
usages establishedamongcivilizedpeoples.from thc laws ofhumanity and
the didates of the publicconscience"), awellas toArticle22 ("theright of
beiiigerentsto adoptmeans ofinjuringthe enemy inot unlimited"),Article
23b)("it isforbidden..to employarms,projectiles,or material calculatedto
causeunnecessarysuffering"),Article 25 ("iis forbidden toattackor bomb
in anywaywhatsoeverunprotectedcities,towns,housesor premiscs")ofthe
Regulationsannexedto the Convention of1907.
As farasthe regulationsareconcerned, thc ruleslaiddowninArticles
22 and 2.5 contain restrictions which referto the use of any types of
weapons,includingnuclearones.However,these articlesdo not prohibitthe
useof anyparticulartypeofweapons.
As to the attempts 10 jumifythe illigimacyof the use of nuclear
weapons by references that they wuse "unnecessary sufferings while
injuring,uselessiyaggravatethe sufferings ofdisüblcdmen, or rcridertheir
death inevitablen,hey are alsohardly reasonable.The report ofthe ICKC
expertsentitled "Weaponsthat May CauseUnnecessa- Sufferingor Have
Indiscriminate Effects" stated: "What suffering must bc deemed
"unnecessary" isnot easyto define.Clearlythe authorsof the ban ondum-
dumbulletsl/ feltthai the hitofa ordinary riflebullc\vasenoughto pu!a
man out of action and that inflictioof a more severewourldby a bulle1
which flattened would be to cause "unnecessary suffering" ... The
\
circumstancethat a more severe wound is likely Io put a soldier outof
action for a longer periodwas evidently no( considered ajustificationfor
perrnittingthe use of bulletsachievingsuchresults.The conceptsdiscussed
i
1/The authors of the Ha ue DeclarationConcernin the Prohibition
1899.ing Buiietswhich Oipan ot Flatten Easily inthe kurnan Bodyof
i mm 8% - 241irai
must be taken to mver al1 weaponsthat do not offer greater military
advantagesthan other availableweaponswhilecriusing greatersufftzrg.In
addition the concept of "unnecessarysuffering"would seem to cal1for
weighingthe militaryadvantagesof anygivcnweaponagainsthumanitarian
considerationsQl.
These reasonable comment5 of the ICRC expcrts confirm IWO
considerations.Firsthe principleof no1causing"unnecessarysuffering" is
not in itself a generalbaon the use of nuclearweaponsas such. Second,
attemptsto applyblanket norms formulated in the second half of the
19thcentury - beginningofthe 20thcenturyto newtypesofweaponsdo not
seemto be convincing.
As to nuclear weaponsthe "Martensclause" is not workingat allA
"more completecode ofthe laws ofwar" mentioncdthere as a temporap
limit was "issued"in 1949-1977in the form of GerievaConventionsand
Protocols thereto, and today the "Martens clause" may forrnally be
consideredinapplicable.
But itisnot all. ProtocolIof 1977 reproduces,with slight changes
(Art35), the above-mentionedprovisions of the Articles of the 1907
Convention, but they, being treaty norms.are not applied to nuclear
weapons(see pp.lO,1above).
The viewthat the said blanket formulas arenot considercd bythe
international communiryas awholeas ageneral banon the use ofspecific
types of weapons,includingnuclear weapons as such,issupportedby the
fact that internationallawdidchoosethe optionofspecialbanof particular
types of weapons and their use. That ishow thc 1935Protocol on the
Prohibitionofthe Use in War of SuffocatingPoisonous and other Similar
2/ ICRC: Weaponsthat may Cause Unnecessas'Sufferin or have
IndiscnrninateEffects.Reporton thework of experts.Geneva,19A. 11.13 Gases and Bactcriological Means;the 1980Conventionon Prohibitions or
Restrictions on theUse of Certain ConventionalWeapons.which May Br
Deemed to Be ExcessivelyInjurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effeas,
together with Protocolsthereto: the1972Conventionon the Prohibition of
the Development, Production andStockpiling.of Baczeriological-(Biological)
and Toxic Weapons andon their Destruction; 1993 Convention on the
Prohibition of Development, Production,Stockpilingand Use of Chemical
Weaponsandon their Destruction appeared.
It isprobablethatinsornetime a treaty will appear on the ban of the
useof nuclearweaponsand of nuclearweaponsthemselves.Buttodaysuch
a treatydoesnot exist.
2) Constrajntson the use ofnuclear weaponsarc providedno1 by a >
. .
treaty law, but by customarygeneral international law. However,we are
.. .
quite sure that there is no customaryrule of international law,prohihiting
. ..
the use ofnuclearweapons ingeneral. . .
To respondin substanceto the request of thc General Assernblythe 1 I
Court in accordancewith Article 38, paraaaph l(b) of its Statute. shall i
: t
apply "internationalcustom.as evidcnceof a general practice accepted as , !
, .
law". As it was stated above, it is not a permissivcrule, but the rule
I !
prohibitingthcuseofnuclearweaponsper se. I !
Our sludy showsthatthere isno generalpractireacccptedas law,that j
providesforsucha prohibition. i
,
For the purpose of this statement we do not intend to distinguish
!
betweenthe evidences of existenceor, which ismoreaccurate,of absenceof
l
relevantpractice and opiniojuris. i
As it is shown above, the treaty prectice, the treaty iorm of ,
coordination the willsof States demonstrates not only the absenceof a
general prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons per se, but also the
i presence of presumption that in principleuse of nuclear weaponsis
admissible. Thisis tcstifiedby the treaty acts bywhichStates voluntarily
refuse to use nuclear weapons incertain circumstances oragree to adopt
measuresto reducethe risk of a nuclear war(Protocoisio the Treatiesof
ïiatelolko and Raratonga,agreementsbetwcciinuclcarPowers, sceabove,
pp.7,8).
There are also other international agreementsof non-treaty nature
which contain similar provisionsabout the voluntrefusa1of nuclear
statestouse nuclear weapons(Memoranda on the securityguarantces in
connection with Belorussia',Republic of Kazakhstan'and Ukraine's
adhesiontothe NPT, signeby thosestatesrcspectivandRussia,UK and
USA inDecember 1994).
The unilateralwillof states,their unilateralactsdo not stheorl
general practice and/oopini jois on the matter under consideration
either, quiteon the contrary,whatthey doprovc,isthe lackof suchpracticc
and oyinijtrisandthe presenceof majorcontradictionsinviews.
While some states claimthat any usofnuclearwcaponswould be
contrary to international law,others officiallyprotheidodrine of
nuclear containment andstickto it in practicc.thus cxpresslyemphasizing
the admissibiliof the use of nuclear weapons.Atthe srimetime the
nuclearstatesmadcunilateralstatements(see:UNDocumentsS/1995/261.
S/1995/26 S/,1995/26 S/1995/26 S/1995/26 in5)hich,whilegranting
to non-nuclear state-parto theNPT the securityguaranteesagainstan
aggressionwiththe useof nuclearweapons,\loluntgavcup their rightto
usenuclearweapons in certaincircumstances.
The reportsthemselves,submittedtotheCourtand thus containing
theofficia1point of view,testifythat no uniformopinionexistsanlong the
stateson thisquestion. It isnoteworthythat the lack'of a general prohibitionof thc use of
nuclear weaponsas such ininternational lawis not signalledby nuclear
statesalone (see,for instance.the reports suhmitthegovernmentsof
Germany andthe Netherlands).
Some nuclearstateshave,at different Limcs,made statementsof thc
non-use of nuclear weaponsfirst (the formUSSK, China) which aiso
signifiesthat, in their opinion, thofunuclear weaponshas not been
bannedin principle.
The advocatesofthe existenceof such a ininternationallawrefer
to a number of General Assembly resolutio(1653(XVI 19,1;33/71B,
1978;34/83B, 1979;35/125D 1, 80;6/921,19814;5/59B 19904;6/37D,
1991) w,here it is stated that use of nuclear weapons wouldbe a
violatioofthe UN Charter and acrime againsthumanity.
As it has been alreadymentioned aboveisee pa8),such General
Assemblyresolutions donot createbyhernselvesanyobligations forstates
which are UN Members.They are not,in our opinion,an expression of
opin juk oftheworldcornmunityeither.IIisnot evenaquestion ofthe
votingresults on those resoiutions(not one of them wasadopted either by
consensus,orbyacclamation.orbya vastmiijoritofUN Memhers).Many
statesvote for these resolutions,or abstain from voting,not votingagainst,
having in mind that, accorditotheChancr, they dono1createnew law
and do not sign% the recognitionof any rules as such, but are only of
recomrnendatov nature.
This doesnot mean that these resoliitions do not rthecopinio
juruofsome stateswitha different pooftview.Nevertheless,theydo not
representa formof coordinationofwillsof al1UN Membersin relation to
acceptanceoftheseprovisions asinternationallaw. - 17
The same thing can be said about the question of in what capacity
these GA resoiutinnsfor- the other element of a customaryprovision -
univenal pradice.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the acts of intcrnational
organizationseven in their contentsgive prvof to the fact that different
opinionsexiston the questionat hand.Thus,in the resolutionofthe WHA
46/40 itis noted that "overthe last48yearsmarked differencesof opinion
have beenexpressedby MemberStates aboutthe lawfulnessol'the use of
nuclearweapons".The UN Security Council resolutio984of 11April 1995
(S/Res./984(1995)is alsoexemplaryin this sense,betause. acmrdingto it,
the body chargedwith the main responsibility for the maintenance of
internationalpeaceandsecurity"takesnotewithappreciation"ofthe above-
mentioned statements of nuclear States on the assurances to the non-
nuclear Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (while thesc
statemenlstestify10a definitcapprorichof their autliorsto the legalityof
nuclear weapons use). Furthermore, it is statcd in this SecuriîyCouncil
Resolutionthat, according tothe relevant provisions of the UN Charter,
"any aggrcssion with the use of nuclear weapons would cndaneer
internationalpeaceand sccurity"Thus, itis cleafromwhat isstatcd iithe
Security Council Resolutiothat not justanyuse of nuclearweaponsper se
wouldconstitutea violationof the UN Charr?r but an aggressionwith the
useofnuclearweapons.
In Ouropinion,thc factsstated here proveconclusivelythatpresently
there isno universal practicnora universalopiniojurison the unlawfuiness
of nuclearwfeaponsu 'se.And ifso no customaryinternationallawprovision
existswhichwouldenvisagea general ban onthe use of nuclearweapons
perse. 3.Naturaliy.al1thathas been said abovedocs nurmean th-tthe use
of nuclear weaponsis not limitedatall. Evcnif ihc use of nuclearweapons
isin principlejustifiab-in individual orcollcniveself-defenc-that use
shaU be made within the framework of limitations imposed by
humanilarian lawwithrespecttorneansandrnethodsof conductingmilitary
activities.lt is importantnote thatwithrespectto nuclearweaponsthosc
limitationsarelimitationsundercustomaryrather than treatylaw.
The issueof legalitofthe useof nuclear weapons shalbe dealt with
on a case-by-casebasisfrom a viewpointof the correspondenccof such use
to criteriofself-defenceandtheabove limiraiions.
AsHans Blixsaid,'itiscenaintycorrecitosay thatthe legalityof the
useof rnostweaponsdependsupon the rnanner inwhichtheyare employed.
A rifle may be lawfulb aimed atthe enemy or it may be employed
indiscriminatelyagainst civiliandsoldiersalike.Bombsmaybe aimed at
specificmilitarytargetsor thrownat random.Thc indiscriminateuse of the
weapon wilbe prohibited,no[the weaponass~ch"~/. WC should addihat il
is aduly qualifieduse rather thathe use ofweaponsas such at largethat
uiiUbe regardedasiilegal.
Dimensionsanof HumanitarianndLaw.etPubl.byfUNESCO.. InManinis Nijhoff
Publ,1988, 0.143-145.
Letter dated 19 June 1995 from the Ambassador of the Russian Federation, together with Written Statement of the Government of the Russian Federation