Letter dated 15 June 1995 from counsel appointed by Nauru, together with Written Statement of the Government of Nauru

Leüerdate15June 1995hm caurtsel-appointed t-bt-erwimh,
WiitteStaîementftheGovw ofNauni Registrar
International Cour: of Justice
Peace Palace

2517 KJTne Hague
ïhe Netherlanàs

Dear Regi*ar,

Enclosed please ~d two Responses to Submissions of Other States by .

the Republic oi Nauru in the case concerning TheLegai;!ryof the LiseofiVuclear
.vVenpansy StatcsinArrnedConJicf and one .Mernorialin the case conceming
the Legaliiyofihe Useand Threatof UseofNuclear Mienpons.

1understand that the Court has set the date o?O October as the date
for the beglnnig of oral hearings in the two cases. 1would like permission to

use a number of witnesses. In the case concemg The Lega1;ityof the Liseof
Nuc!ear Weapons5y aÇtate !nAmed ConJicf 1wouid like to put on the stand a
Dr. Frank Bamaoy who is a mcleu pi,ysicis: of re?u:e. 1woulà also Lke to
-ut on the stand the Mayors of Hiroshiïna 2nd biagasaki. In the case
concehg the Leplity of thoLisc??Groz: ?i UseoiNuciozr Weripons !would
like tû piace on the stand Ms. Hilda Li?.:, iom.er ~Mkster oi Heaiih of
Vazuatu, Ms. Ligon Zkrilang who has experie~cpd :h.eeffecrsof U. S. nuclear
tests during O~eratior, Bravo or some other womcn kom L-iePaGc who

experienced hose efiects ana Ms. Claudia Peterson who has ex?erienced the
effects ofnuc!ear tsets inLb,eUktecstaies. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE

LEGALITYOFTHE USE OR THREAT OFUSE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONÇ (REQUFOR AN ADVIÇORYOPINION)

MEMORIAL OFTHE GOVERNMOFTHE REPUBOFC

NAURU NAURU

Introduction

Nam is a small island state in the PacificOcean. Nauru believes that

peace and freedom from the threat of waris necessary for the social, cultural

and economicdevelopment ofpeople, both in the Pacificand world wide.

Nauru believes that the threat or use of force is contrary to

international law and the development of positive international relations.
Nauru has no anned forces, and as such threatens no state with the use of

force.

The threat ofnuclear weauons

Nauru believes that there is a continuing threat of use o'fnuclear

weapons which must be addressed by the international community.

Despitethe end of the coldwar thenuclear stateshave yet to relinquish

their policies of first use, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. In

addition, some of the nudear stateshave not signed Protocols1,2 and 3 ofthe
Treaty of Rarotonga under which they would refrain from using or

threatening to use any nudear devices and from testing or stationing any

nuclear devicesin the area defined by the Treaty.

The Pacific was the scene of the only hostile use of nuclear weapons

and the sceneof over 250 nudear explosions fortesting purposes. Thenudear tests have sigruficantly affected the health of Pacificpeople, wiidlife and the

environment, and willcontinue to do so for generations.

The testing ofnudear weapons inthe Pacific from 1946unLi11992has

contaminated numerous islands and large areas of ocean with radiation that

has severely affeaed health and the environment. The U.S.Atomic Energy

Commission has caiied the Marshall Islands "by far one of the most

contaminated areas in the world".1 Mixamages, still bkths, cancers, birth
deformities and other radiogenic diseases have increased by up to 10 times

pre-testing levels in areas dosest to the testing.

A description of some ofthese effectsisgiven by Lijon Eknilang from

the MarshallIslands:

1was seven years old at the time of the Bravotests on
Bikin ir.member that itwas early in the morning
that 1woke up with abright light in my eye1thought
someonewas bumingthe house. Soon afterwe heard
abig loud noise,just like thunder and the earth started
tomove ...Then came the faiiout. It was white and to us
kids we thought it was white soap powder. The kids
were playingin the powder and having fun, but later on
everyone was sick andwe couldn't do anything...My
cousin died ofumour cancer in 1960.In 19721had

another cousin die ofeukaemia. Two of my sistershave
had thyroid surge.. ..

And 1have had sevenmiscamages and stiïi births.
Altogether there are eight otherwomen on the island

'U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 54th Meeting of the Advisory Committee
on Biologyand Medicine, NewYork, 1956.
"Radioactive Heaven and Earth; The health and environmental effects of
nudear weapons testing in, on and above the earth." IPPNW, Apex Press,
N.Y.1991.

Independent Survey of Marshallese Women and reproduction, unpublished
field report. Statement byGlenn Alcalay before the Presidential Advisory
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, March 15,1995. nothing. Other chiidrenarebom who willnever
recognisethi wsorld or their own parents. ïhey just lie
therewith crooked armsandlegsand never speak.
Already we have seven such chüdren ....

The leakage ofradiation from nudear testing sites and waste dumps,

the contùiued human ingesting of radiation released into the environment

and the radiation already ingested by Pacific peoples threatens them with

radiation induced diseases and death for generations to coIneaddition, the

coral reefs damaged by nudear tesüng has caused considerable ciguatera

poisoning and WU continue to threaten such poisoning.

There isalso a very real threat that nudear testing may resume in the

Pacüic.

Theneed for aCourt opinion

Nauru shares the view which it believes to be generally accepted
among nations that the threat or use of nudear weapons is illegal. Nauru is

concemed however that some nations, induding some of the dedarednudear

states,do notshare this view.

Nauru places considerable importance on the role of international law

and the role ofthe International Court ofJustice in governing the practice of

states and in the development of peace and security among states. In this

light,Nauru accepts the compulsoxyjurisdiction of the I.C.Jfor contentious
cases, and has utilised the contentious case procedurein seeking peacehl

resolution ofoneofits conflictswith a neighbouring state.

"PacificWomen Speak, GreenLine,Oxford 1987,pp.15-17. Nauru believes that an opinion from the Court wodd danfy the legal

situation and would be of assistance to smaii statesin their efforts to protect

themselves from the threat or use of nudear weapons. It believes that an

advisory opinion from the Court wouid also be an important step towards a

universaiiy accepted and legally binding prohibition on the threat or use of

nudear weapons, and wouid be an important steptowards the elhination of

nudear weapons.

Nauru does not beiieve that any pronouncement by the Court wiii

harm the ongoing negotiations on nudear disarmament. On the contrary,

Nauru beiieves that a Court pronouncement confirming the iiiegality of the

threat or use of nudear weapons wiii be a stimulant to the conclusion of

current negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a fissile

material cut off, and will also be a stimulus to the commencement of

negotiations on a convention prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons.

ïïu opinion is supported by the fact that the question was introduced

in and adopted by the first Committee of the United Nations General

Assembly. ïhis committee is responsible for recomrnendmg to the Conference

on Disarmamentmeasures which should benegotiated. The First Committee

wouid not have requested such An advisory opinion if it believed that such a

request would harm the negotiations on disarmament measures which the

Committee has initiated in the Conferenceon Disarmament.

Nauru alsobelieves that an opinionfrom the Cou? would assist in the

implementation of Article VI of the Non Proliferation Treaty, according to

which parties to the NPT pledged themselves " ..o pursue negotiations in

good faith on effetive measures relating to cessation of thenudear arms race -

at an early date and to nudear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and

complete disarmament under stnct and effectiveinternational control."

The heat or use ofnudear weauons is iiiegaf

On 20 September 1994, Nauru submitted to the Court that it believes

that the use of nudear weapons inarmed conflict is iiiegal. This wasin

response to the questionasked by the World Health Organisation on whether

the use of nudearweapons by aState in war or other armed code would be

a breach of its obligations under intemational law.

Nauru would like the Court to consider this submission in connection
with the present case as support for OUI belief that any use of nuclear

weapons is a violation of international law. In addition, Nauru supports the

submissions made in that case by Azerbaijan, Colombia, Costa Rica,

Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, India,Iran K,azakhstan, Lithuania,

Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Rwanda,

Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Uganda, Ukraine,

which argue that the use of nudear weapons is a violation of international
law.

In adddition Nauru wishes to respectfully submit to the Court the

following statement to support ou belief that the threat or use of nudear

weapons is iiiegal. Questions presented ....................................................1....
..................
Background .........................................................
..1...............................

Summary ........................................................
.....2...............................

1. Inkoduction .......................................................
.......................

I. The Law ofPeace and Security(]u asd Bellum ).............................
A .United Nations Charter .................................3...................

B .United Nations Resolutions and Dedarations ...................

C .CollectiveSecuri treaties..........................................

D .TheNuremberg PrinBples ............................................
E.Opinwlur L.r..........................................1........
.........

F.Threats of Aggression ..................................14..................

Iü . SpecificLaw Regardhg the Threat ofuseof Nudear Weapons .......6

A .Treaties................................................17......
...............
B.Çecuri t yuncil Resolutions............................1.............

C . Unitrd Nations General Assembly, Conference on

Disarmament and Disarmament Commission .............................1.............

D The Non-Derogable Right to Lie .........................2..........

IV . The Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons is Prohibited in any
Circumstances ....................................................
..............................

A. The Correlation Between Threat and Use of Force: Threat is

use ....................................................
.............................................

B. The Conditional Threat of force is Prohibited in any
Circumstances ....................................................
....23.......................

C. A Retaliatory Threat to Use M~clear Weapons is Illegal in

Any Circumstances ....................................................
....................... 1. TheTïueat of Fust Use ............ . ...... ... . ... .... 24

2. The Thmat of Second use ........ ......... . ... .... ... 25

3. ImplicitThreatsof Use . ... ... ... .... ... .. . . .... ... 26

4. Deterrence ... . ... .; .... .. ........ ........ . ... . . .29

V. Theïïiegalityof the Thmt to Commit an DiegaiAct .. . .. ...... . ..... 31
A. InternationalLegal Instruments ...... .... .. .... . ..... ..... .. 31

B. GeneralPrinciplesofLawRecognized by CmlizedNations ..... .. . 32

Conclusion ....................................................... 37

Appendix A Geneiai Assembly ResolutionWhichConclude thathe Use ofNuclearWeapons
isa Crime AgainstH&ty

Appendix B GeneraiAssemblyResolutions StatingtheEbhation of NuclearWeaponsasa
Goal

Appendix C NuclearThreatsinHiiory;Excerpts from "To Win a NuclearWar" ,nd "Nuclear
Targetingof theThirdWorld" QuestionResented

isthe threatouseofnuclearweapomin any circumstancepermittedunderinternational
law?

Background

On 14May 1993,theWorld HealthAssemblyadoptedResolutionWHA 46.40,requesting
the IntemationalCourt of Justice to anadvisoryopinionon the followingquestion:

In view of thealthand environmentaleffects,wouldthuse of nuclear
weapons bya Statein waror otherarmedconflictbe a breachof its obligations
under internationallaw includingtWHO Constitution?

Followingreceipt othisrequesfrom theDirector-Genexai WHO, the Courtseta term
ofJune20, 1994,subsequentlyextendedto September20. 1994forthe submissionofstatements
by membergovemments. Thut yivecountriessubminedstatements,thernajonty arguingfor an
affirmativenswer to the question presented.A nurnber of states challenged the question's
admissibility,arguingthWHO lackedthe competenceto submitit. Somestates arguedforthe
proposition that,ile humanitarianlaw applies to nuclear weapons as it doesaiiother
weapons,the legalivel nonof their usemustbe detemiinedby the specificfacts of eachcase.
A few states resewed their positionon the merits,should the Court decideto give an opinion.

Inaccordancewiththe Coun'sRules,al1submissionswere transmittedtd states whichmade
submissions.The Courthasset a term of June 20, 1995for states to commenton eachothefs
submissions.

On Decernber 15, 1994.the Generai Assemblyof the United Nations, by Resolution
49/75/K,requested theCour to giveanadvisory opinion onthe followingquestion:

1sthe threat or use of nuclear weapons inany circumstancepemiitted under
internationaliaw?

The Cowt hasset a term of June 20, 1995,for the submissionof statementsrelativeto
the question posed by the Geneml Assembly,and September 20, 1995, as the timeline for
responsesto these statements.

It is expectedthat the Courtwill eventuallyconsolidatethe two questions,but it hasnot
yet doneso. 'Es Statementendom the argumentsalreadybeforethe Courtsupportingthethesisthat
anyuse ofnuclear weaponsisillegaiunderinternationaliaw. Focusongthe questionof threat,
this Statementwiii arguethat the threusefof nuclearweaponsisillegaibecausethe iaw of

peace andsecurity,as it has evolvedsince the adoptionof the United NationsChter, treats
"threat orse"as a single, indivisibleconcand becaus ieisa generaiprincipleof law that
the illegalityof a micularly seriousoffenseentails asweiithe illegalityof the threatto commit
such an offense.

The 'possessionof nuclear weaponsbysonie sratesbut not others, and the homendous
nature of these weaponshas createdan unprecedenteddispanty of powerbetwee nese two
groups of StatesSo long as the nuclear "haves" do not take doustheir solemn obligation

under ArticleVI of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreatyto move in goofaithand withal1
deliberatespeedtowardthe completeeliminationof nuclear weapons,this disparitywillcontinue
to exisand willin andof itself,constitutea threatto thesumivalof the "havenots"and of the
"haves" as weii.

Thisthreatisfurther enhancedby the announcedintentionof the nuclear weaponstates
to reserve to themselvesthe right to use nuclear weapore.sponsto a perceivedor acruai
threat of an attack or, moregenerally,in defense of their national interest or Incarity.

speech at 1'EcoleMilitaire on November3, 1959, General Charles de Gaulle said, ".is
evidentlynecessary that we be able to provide ouselves in the comingyem with a force that
can act on our account, withwhatis custornarilycalleda 'force defrappe,'able to be deployed
anywhere at any tirne.It gws without saying that the basis forthis force will be a nuclear
armament-whether wemakeitor buyit-which mustbelongto us. And,sinceeventuallyFrance
can be destroyedfrom any pointin the world,our forcemust be designedto act anywhereon
earth"'

Nor isthis threat diminishedby the position of thenuclear weaponstates thatthe only
purpose of their nucleararsenisto deterthe use of forceby others.Indeed,the veryconcept
of deterrences rneaninglesswithout a credible willingnessto use; hence "detemence"equals
"threato use."

1Quotedin M. Bundy, DANGER AND SURVNAL:CHOICEA SBOUT THE BOMB INTHE FIRST
Fm YEARS 480 (1988). Thus,the questionposed by the General Assembly goes beyond the juin bel1q0uery

of the World Health Assembly and ventures foith into tarea ofjus ad beiium.But the
doctrine ofjus ad bellum a,selaborated since the enactment of Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter,leaves no room for the Iegality of the threatof force under internationallaw.
Article2(4)categorically prohibits the threat or use of force by one state against another. The
onlyexception tothis prohibition is Article 51, which preserves"the inherent right of individual
or collectiveselfdefense if anarmedattackoccurs againsta Memberofthe UnitedNations."But
nothing in Article 51 sanctions a standing th-ea threatin futuro- by one state against
another,narned orunnamed .t sanctionsonly thuseof retaliatory force oncearmed attack

occurs. Its application is limited to the very bnef tirnespan following an attack; it cannot,
therefore, sanction the threat of the useof force as a hypotheticalmatter inherent in the rnilitary
doctrine of this or that state.

Furthemiore, thuse offorce iseifdefenseissubjectto thruie ofjus inbeiiH oence,
ifuseof nuclear weapons is prohibitedunder the rubnjusfinbeii the threat tusenuclear
weaponscarinever be sanctionedunder the mbnc ofjus ad beiium.

II. The Law of Peace and Security(Jus ad Bellum)

A11States must avoid the threat or use of force in their relations with one another.

A. United NationsCharter

The United Nations Charter specifically prohibits the thusetof force. Underthe
U.N. Charter, ArticlZ(4):

Al1Membersshallrefrain in their internationalrelations fromthe threat or

use of force against the territorialintegrity oralindependenceoany state,
or in any other rnanner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'

The prohibition on the threat or use of forceer Article 2(4) has the status of jus

U.N. Charteran.2, para.4. cogenr,a peremptory nile of internatiola~? Moreover, thisprohibition extends to non-
member States.'

The United Nations Mer permitsthe threat ouse of force only in individualor
collectiveselfdefense. includingSecurityCouncüenforcememeasures. Under Article 51:

Nothinginthe presentChartersballimpairtheinherentnght of individual
or wllective seifdefence ianmed attackoccursagainsta Member of the
United Nations,untilthe Security Councilhas taken measrires necesary to
maintaininternationalpeaceand securit?...

The Charter'srohibitionon tthreatoruseof forcewiththelimitedexceptionofself-
defenserefleasachange inthe developmentof internationlaw. HistoricallJusad Belh,

or thelaw of "justwar",recognizedthe right of a state to resort to "just"reasons.In
1919,the Covenantof theLeague of NationsfurtherlimiteaState'snght to"resorto waf.'

'Accordingtothe InternationalLawCommission,"thegrramajorityofinternationallawyers
todayunhesitatinglyholdsthat [Article2(4)] together withotherprovisionsof th'Charter.
authontativelydeclares the modem nistomary law regardingthe threat or useof forILC"
Yearbook, 1966,vol. 2, p.247. The internationaCour tf Justice affmedthisposition in
Militaw and Paramilitan, Activities in and Aoainst Nicaragva micarama v. United States).

Merits, 1986ICI Rep. 1498-101 (Judgmentof June 27). in addition,the Restatementfïhirdl
of ForeionRelationsLaw includes"the principlesof the UnitedNationsChaner prohibitingthe
use of force" amongperemptorynom. § 102comment k

U.N. Charterart. ,para. 6 provides:

The Organizationshallensurethatstates which are not Members of the
United Nationsaa in accordancewiththese Principsosfar as maybe necessary

for the maintenanceof internationalpeace and secuity.

Seealso Josef MrazekProhibitionof the Use andThreatofForce: SeFDefenceandSelf-Help
in IntermriomlLaw, 1989 CANADIA YN.B.OFML L. 81, 85.

U.N. Charter art .1. The Security Councii,acting within the interests of colleaive
security,has theauthority to detemiine "the existenceof any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace,or act ofggression",U.N. Wer, art3.9. The SecurityCounciiis further authorid

to detemine andemployenforcement measmes underArticle41 (notinvolvingtheuseofamed
force)and Article42 (actioninvolvingthe use of armedforce).
6
League of Nations Covenantart.12,para. 1states:

The Membersof theLeagueagreethatif there should&se betweenthem
any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, wiii submit the matter either to In 1928,the GenemiTreaty for the Renunciationof War(Kellogg-BriandPact,alsolaaswn
thePariPseacePactof27 August 1928)prohibitedaggresswar"as an insuurnentof national

policy"and "for thesolution of internationalcon~ovenies".~

The languageof the Charterprohibitsthe "thruseoof force" rather than "reson to
wai', as the Covenantof the League of Nationsdid. change in terminologyreflects the
recognitionthata Stateightresortto the threator use of forcewhichdoes not nse to the level
of war or resort to armedconflictwithoutan opendeclmtion of wa..'

The Leagueof Nations Covenantdid, nevertheless,recognize the danger of tineats

internationalrelatioThe Covenantdeclared"anywar or threat war" a matter of concem
to the entire League and grounds for the League to take action to "safeguard the peaceof
natio~."~

The principlesbehind the Kellogg-BriandPact and the League of Nations Covenant
providedafoundationfor the United NationsCharter." Theumauxprepararoires thatpreceded
the adoptionof the Chartertherindicate ageneralundemandingthat a state of peace"could

not be regarded merely as maintenanceof the status quo but that it should imco- active
operationbetween Member Statin ordertoprornotethepurposesofthe Organization"" Thus,
Article2(3), whichrequires States tosettledisputespeacefully,complementsthe prohibitionon
the threat or use of forceMoreover, theCharter'spreamble calls on States "to practice

arbitrationorjudicial settlementor to inquiryby the Council,and they agree in
nocaseto resortto war'untilthreemonthsaftertheawardby thearbitratorsor the
judicialecisionor the report by the Council.

'46 Stat. 234T.S N.o. 796,2 Bevans732,99 L.N.T.S.57

N. Bentwichand A:Martin,A COMMENTAR ONm~ CHARTE RFTHE UmD NATIONS
13 (1950).

League of NationsCovenantart.1,para. 1.

'J. Keegan, AHISTOR YFWAWARE 383 (1993);G. Herczegh, ïïze Prohibitionof the
Threatand UseofForce inContemporaryInrernorio~lLaw,inQmo~s OF ~RNATIONAL
LAW70 (1964).

" Herczegh,Id at 78.

l2U.N. Charter,art. 2, p3,aprovides:

Al1Memben shallsettletheirinternationaldisputesby peacefulminns

such a manner that international pceand security, and justice, are not
endangered. toleranceand live togethpeace with oneauotheas goodneighbous". These affiitive
obligationsto cooperatepeacefullywouldcbeainconsistentwitha legalregimethattolerates
threatbelween States.

TheOpeningStatementby Mr. HansCorel l,der-SemetaryGeneralfoLegalAnairs

at the United Nationduringthe Congresson PublicInternationLaw in March, 1995,
reaffiied the principlesthat law should govem the relationsbetweenStatesand thatdisputes
shouide resolvedpeacefully:

[L]etthisCongres alsobe a resomding ap@ to those who uitimately
make the decisionsthaffecour destiny. To thew ourmessage shouldbe:

-Yoursis the responsibilitytoenthrintrnationallaw is appliedand
thatlegal adviissought beforimportandecisionsaremade in foreignpoiicy

matters. ..

-And,ifdisputesoccur, yourstheresponsibilityto refrain frusethe
of force and to make sure thatthesedisarresolvedby peacefulmeans."

The preparatorywork of the United Stinanticipationof the creationof the United
Nationsreflets a concern withthreatsof force. A Memorandumcontaining"basicideaswhich
mightbe embodiedina constitutioanfinternationalorganizationfor themaintenanceofpeace

and secuity" listai afmthamongthe functionsandpurposesofthe organization"toprevent
the use of force or of threats to use force"." As the first of the principa,PISligationsof a
member state.the Memorandumlisted "Torefrainfromuseof forceor threatto us...orce.

The proposalswhich emergedfrom theDumbartoOaks Conference,in preparationfor
the United Nationsonference in San Francisco, formedthe basis of the U.N. WAt.
Dumbarton Oaks,the United Statesproposalswere acceptedas thebasis for discussionand the

structurethey establishedwas generallyaccepted.16TheDumbOaksndraft of the principle

l3H. Corell,OpeningStatement,UnitNation songresonPublic InternationalLaw,New
York, 13-17 March,1995.
14
Memorandum forthe President, Dec. 29, 1943, in U.S. Deparunent of State, Posrwar
ForeignPolicyPreparan'o, 939-1945,Publication3580(February195),Appendix33376-
%1(reproducedin R. Russel,HISTOR YFWE UNITED NATIONCSHAR% App. F(1958)).

lSId.

l6E. LUiXd,A WTORY OF THEUNITED NATIONS Vol. 127(1982).Sef&O L. G00dnCh
& E.Hambro, CHARTE OF THE Uhm~ NATIONS C:OMMENTA RND DOCUMENT 6S(2nded.
1949). whichbecarneArticle 2(4)read:

Al1 members of the Organbtion shallrefrain in their international
relations fiom the threat oruse of force in any manner inconsistentwith the
pwpose of the Organization."

Australia'samendment added the prohibition onthreatsor use of force "against the

territorial integrityoriticalindependenceof any memberor State.""

B. UnitedNationsResolntionsandDedarations

NumerousUnited Nationsresolutionsanddeclarationshave confïmed theprinciplethat

Statesshall refrain from the threat or use of fintheir internationalrelations.

TheDeclarationon PrinciplesofInternationalLawConcerningFriendlyRelationsandCo-
operationArnong States in Accordancewith the Charterof the United NationsI9reiterates the
languageof Article2(4) and adds:

Such a threat or use of force constitutesa violationof internationallaw and the Charter
of the UnitedNationsand shailnever be employedas a means of settlinginternational
issues.20

The Declarationon the Inadrnissibilityof Interventionin the DomesticAffairs of States
and the Protection of Their Independence andSovereigntyzlstates:"No state has the right to
intervene . .. in the interna1or external affairs ofany other state. Consequently, armed

interventionand ail other foms of interferenceor attemptedthreat. ..are condemned."The
Declarationnotes that interventionis not admissible"for anyason whatever."

The 1987 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principieof
Refrainingfiom the Threat or Use of Force inInternationalRelationsaffïirmstheprinciple of
Article 2(4) and of the Declarationon Principles of InternationaLaw Concerning Friendly

Relations, andadds:

l7Doc. 1 (English)G/1. UNCIODocuments,Vol. DI, p. 3.

Doc. 2 (English)G/14 (l), May 5, 1945. UNCIODocuments,Vol. ni, p. 543.

l9G.A. Res. 2625 (XXXV 1970).

z0Id, para.1.

21G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) (1965). Theprincipleof refrainingfromthe threatoruse of forcin internationalrelations
isuniversal in charader and is binding, regardlas of each State's politicai,
economic,social or culturaisystemor relationsof alliance.=

ThisDecldon provides furtherthat "Stateha? the dutyto a- from armed intervention
andaU other fom of interferenceor attemptedhts against the personalityof the State or
againstits political, economicand culturai elements."" in addition, neither acquisition nor
occupationof territoryresultingfromthe threatouse of forcewiU be recognizedas legal? and
atreaty procuredby the threatoruse of forceisvoid.=

The FinaiDocumentofthe Fmt SpecialSessionoftheUnitedNationsGened Assembly

onDisarmamentstatedthat"[Statemembers] stressthespecialimportanceofrefrainllg from the
threator use of forceagainsttheovereignty,temtorial integrityor politicalindependenceof any
State,or againstpeoples undercolonialor foreign domination...""

AdditionalDeclarations.which reaffum theprincipleofrefrainingfrom the threatoruse
of force include: Essentials of Peace. Deciamion on the Strengtheningof international
Sec~rity,~Declaration on the Inadmissibiity of Interventionand interferencin the Intemal
Affairsof States,.and Declarationon the Revention and Removalof Diutes and Situations

G.A. Res.42/22 (XLïi), para.2.

Id para. 10.

26FÙst Special Sessionof the General Assemblyon Disarmament1978, Final Document,
pan. 26.

G.A. Res. 290 (TV). Paragraph3 dis upon everynation"To refrainfrom any threatsor
acts,direct or indirect,edatirnpairingthe freedom,independence or integritof anyState ...."

zaG.A. Res. 2734 (XXV). Paraagaph5 providesthat theGeneralAssembly:

Solemnlyreaffï that every Statehasthe dutyto refrainfromthe shreat
or use of force againstthe temtorial integrityand politicalindependenceof any
other State. .. and that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participatinacts of civil stRfe or terrorist acts in
another State.

29G.A. Res. 361103. Paragraph2 providesthat: 'Theprinciple of non-interventiand non-
interferencein the internaiandexternal affairs of Statescomprehendsthe following rightsand WhichMay ThreatenInternationalPeace and Securityandon the Roleof the UnitedNations in
This Field?"

C. CollectiveSecurityTreaties

A nurnberof collectivese-ty treaties wnfinn thesymbolicnatureof threatand use of

force. TheNonh AtlanticTreaty (theNATOTreaty)" requires StateParties"to refrainin their
international relationsfrom the threat or use of.force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposesof the UnitedNations." Similarly,the now-lapsed Treaty of Friendship;Chopenition
and Mutual Assistance (the WarsawPacty2requiresConuacting Parties"to refrain in their
international relationsfrom the threatorse of force".

The Fi Actofthe Conferenceon Security and Co-operation inEurope3' reqW States
participatingto refrainfrom the threat or use of force,repeatingthe language of the Charter.
Moreover,"[nlo considerationrnay be invokedto serveto warrantresort to the threator use of
force in contraventionof this principle"and "[nlo suchthreator use of force wilbeemployed
as a means of settlingdisputes,or questionslikelyto giveriseto disputes... ."

TheAmericanTreatyonPacificSettlement"requiresthecontractingpartiesto "...refrain

duties... [including,underU(a)Jthedutyof Statestorefrain intheir internationalrelationshm
the threatoruse of forcein any formwhatsoever ... to disruptthe political, socialor econornic
order of other States..."

G.A. Res. 43/51,Prearnble:

Reaffïg the Declaxafionon RinciplesofInternationalLaw Concerning
FriendlyRelations and &-operation AmongStatesinAccordancewith theCharter

of the United Nations . . .and the Declmtion on the Enhancement of the
Effectivenessof the Principleof Refrainingfromthe Threat or Use of Force in
InternationalRelations,
Recalling that it is the duty of States to refrain in their international
relations frommilitary,political,economicor anyotherform of coercionagainst
the political independenceor territorial integntyof any Sta.. ..

''63 Stat. 2241,T.IA.S. No. 1964,4 Bevans.828, 34V.A.T.S.243 (1949)art.1.

''219 U.N.T.S. 3 (1955)art. 1.

3314I.L.M. 1292(1975),also knowsas "the~elsinki~inalAct", Section II,Refraininghm
the Threator Use of Force.

" Also hown as the "Treatyof Bogota",30 U.N.T.S.55 (1948),chapter one, artL from the threat or use of force, or hm any othermeans of coercion for thesettiementof

their wntroversies..."

ThqConvention on theRightsandDuties of Statd5 holdthat"Nostateha. therightto
intervenein the intemal or exteraffai ofanother."

inaddition,the Charterof the Organizationof AmencStates36rovides:

No Stateorgroup ofStatehas therightointemene,directlorindirecty,
for any reason whatevein the intemai oextemal affai orany otherStates.
The foregoingprincipleprohiiits notonly armedforcebutalso any otherformof
interference attemptedthreaagainst thpemnality of the State or againstits
politicai,econornicand culturaielements.

D. TheNuremberg Principles

The General Assembly unanimously afîkned "the principles of international law
recognizedby the Charterof the Nmmberg Tribunaiandthejudgmentof the Tribunal."n The
principle"havesinceben universallyconsideredto constituanauthoritativestatementof the
des of customary internationallaw."" The Nuremberg offenses"co~~espondlargely to the

obligationsimposed'bycenain rules ofjus ~o~ens".~~

The principles'ascodifiedby the InternationalLawCommi~sion~efuiecrimesagainst
peace as:

i. Planning,preparation,initiationor wagingof a warof aggressionor a

35Also known as the "Treatyof Montevideo", 49Stat.3097,T.S.No. 881,Bevans145, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 (1933)rt ..

362 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361, 119U.N.T.S. 3 (19ait.15.

" G.A. Re..950, 188U.N. Dm. Al64lAdd.l (1946).

38F. Boyle,TheRelevanceof InternotionaLaw rorhe"Paradox"of NuclearDeterrence,80

Nw. U.L. Rev. 1407, 1416 (1986) (citing 1.BrownliNTERNATIONAL LAW AND THEUSE OF
FORCE BY STATES 154-213(1963)).

''Repon oftheInternationalLaw Commission,28thSession,31U.N. GAORSupp.(NO.10)
at 246, (19762 Y.B.Intl L.Comm'n W. 2) at 104.

40Repon of theInremrional Law Commission,2d Session, 5U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12)
11,U.N. Dm. Ai1316(1950).2 Y.B .ntlL.Comrn'n374,U.N.Dm. A/Cn.4/SERA/1950/Add.l war in violationof internationaltreaties,agreementsorarsurances

ii. Participationin a comrnonplan or conspiracyfor the accomplishrnent
of any of theacts mentionedunder (i).

A crime againstpeais"a culpableviolationof jus ad belkun"."

Planningandpreparing for aggressionisclearlyproscribeInaddition,whilenot
so appiied by the Nuremberg tribunals,the Nurembergprinciples supportthe proscriptionof
planningand preparationfor wcrimeasnd crimes againsthumanitA warinvolvingsuch
crimes wouldbea "warin violationof international treaties,agreements orassurances". Also.

the Charterof the InternationalMilitaryTrand ControlCouncil LawNo. 10"'provided
for individualresponsibilityforpartiina "pian"to commialthree Nuremberg offenses
(crimesagainspeace ,ar crimesandcrimes againsthumanity). Similarly, the Statuteof the
Internationalibunalfor the Prosecution of ~ersons Responsiblefor Serious Violationsof
InternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedin the Territoryof the Former Yugosiaviaprovides

for individual responsibilityforthe planningand porexecution of any crimereferred
to inthe Stat~te.~

The diusaon regarding crimesagainst peace tums on the conanddefhtion of
aggression. SectionFinfa examinesthreatsof aggression.

E. OpinioJuris

TheUnite Ndations Charterandthetreatiesandresolutionscited abovedonotdistinguish
between the legal statusof the thuseforceand that of the use of force itself. Bothare
equallyrohibited.bdeed,"[ilf the promise is to resort to force in conditions in which no
justificationfor the useof forceexists,the threat itself is iliegal."4s

41iiMcCoubreyand N. White,INTERNATIONL AALWAND AR~D CONR.ICr 334(1992).

42AR. 6, 5U.S.Stat. 546 (1945).

43Art.I(2), 3 OfficiaiGazette ControlCouncilfor Germany50 (1946), (ine2L.nted
Friedman,THE LAW OFWAR908 (1972)) Law No. 10 governedthe 12 subsequentmals of
majorwar criminals.

44Art 7(1),Annex to RepoRof the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Pa~agraph2 of Security
~ouncil Resolution808(1993), S125704,2 May 1993.

45Brownlie,INTERNATION LALWAND THE USEOF FORCEBY STATES (1963),p. 364(citing

L. Oppenheirn,INTERNATION LALW:ATREATISE V,ol. TI,Ed. (Ed.H. Lauterpacht,1952);
U.K. MANUA LF MILITARL YAW,part iii (1958),para. 11). The significance of the phibitioon threatsof force becornes apparent when one
considers the implications for previously accepted legai nOppenheim'sdiscussion of
threatsof forcein relationto the obligationto ultimat ueforeresortingtwar suggests
that the prohibition on the threat of force overrides previously accepted andcodified legal
standards

Inso faas the Charterof theUnited Nationsprohibitsnot onlyacts of force but
alsothreats.of force, the questarisesas to the operationasbetween the
Membersof 'theUnitedNations,of the provisionsofthe Hague Conventionin the
matterof ultimatumand, to someextent, of dalaration of war.isfunlawful
for Membersof theUnitedNationsto threatenanotherState withuse of force,
how canthey properlybe in a position to complywiththe obligationto issue an
ultimatumprior to resorting to war? The correct answer is probably asat
between Members of the United Nations these provisions of the Hague
Convention, althoughnotirectlyconflictingwith the Charter,are substantiaiiy

ob~olete.~

The prohibitionof thethreatofforce applieseven wherethe thisnot carried,out. As
ProfessorOscarSchachternotes,

The preponderanceofmilitarystrengtinsomestatesand theirpolitid reiations
with potentialtargetstatesmayjustifïablyltoaninferenceofa threat of force
againstthe politicalindependenceof the target s...e[and]the applicabiiity
of article2(4) in principle canhardly be deniedP7

However,eventhoughrelativemilitarystrengthanpoliticarelatiocan createsituations
of threat,cluriously[Article2(4hasnot beeninvokedmuch as an expiicitprohibition ofsuch
irnpliedthreat~."~ Accordingto Schachter,this rnaybe due tothe "diificultyof demonstxatixig
coerciveintent"or to the widespread,though not unlimited,tolerancefor dispaiitiesof p~wer.'~

L. Oppenheitn, ERNA NATION LALW: A TREATIS VEol. ïi, 297(7ed.,H.Lauterpacht,
ed. 1952).

" O. SchachterTheRightof Statesto UseArmedForce,82 MI~. L. REV. 1620,1625
(1984).

" Id.

49Id Schachternotes funher that:

A blatantand directthreat of force,used to compelanother statetoyieldtemtory
or make substantialpolitid concessions(notrequiredby law), wouldhave to be
seen as illegal under art2(4) ithe words "threatof force" are to have any
meaning. An alternativeexplanationfor the undeniseof the prohibitionon threain Article2(4)is
the difficulty of invoking it effectively.nce the authorityto do so lies with the Security
Council,the failureof the non-permanent mernbersto exercisethatauthoritydoes not somuch
indicatetheir toleranceof impliedor actualthreatsby thepermanentmembers - whoarealsothe
declarednuclear weaponStates -but rather theirrecognitionof power disparitiesand the veto
power ofthe permanent members.'.

intemational legalscholarsdiffersomewhat intheiranalysesof whatconstitutesa threat
of forceand whatthe roleof threatsin international lawis. Amrding to Ian Brownlie,a threat
"consistsin an expressor impliedpromise by a govemment of aresortto force conditionalon
non-acceptanceof certaindemandsof that g~vemment."~RomanaSadurskaregards athreatin
the internationalrena as "a message,explicitor implicit,formulatedby a decisionmakerand
directedto the target audience, indicatingthat force wiii used if a mle or dernandis not

compliedwith."" Both experts suggestthat use of forceis conditionalon the target'sresporse
to the tlueat and that the threat might be "implicit" or "implied".as well as "explicit" or
"express".

in the Co# Channel Casdz the InternationalCourtofJusticeconcluded thatthe'passage
of Britishwarshipsthroughthe North Corfh Straitdid not violateAlbaniansovereignty. Inthat

case,Albaniahad earlierfued on Britishships,and the British"'missiowasdesigned to affm
a right which had been unjustly denied,"" Le.,the right of passage. ThCour tlso held that
Albania'sobligation to notify international shipping ofthe rniningof her waters sternmedfrom
"certaingeneralandwell-recognizedprinciples,namely: elementaryconsiderationsofhumanity,
evenmoreexactingin peace thanin war, and everystate'sobligationnot to allow howingly its
territoryto beused for acts contraryto the rights of other state~."~A concurring opinionby
JudgeAlvarez drew "specialattention" to"actscontrary tointernationallaw, which are related
to the presentdispute: intervention,pressure or threat offorce, dernomation offorce, witha

view tointimidation, violutionofsovereignfy,and misuseofright. .. .""

Browniie,supra note 45, at 364.

5'R. Sadunka, ïïzreas of Force,82 AM.J. ML L. 239,242 (1988). Sadurskaarguesthat

threats "may not be detrimentai, indeed may even be beneficial, to the preservation of
internationalorder"butadmitsthat"thisisa precan'ousgarne"andthat"anenvironmentin which
threatsof force are regularly usedis likelyto be very unstable."Id., at 239-240,247,250, n. 54.

s2UnitedKingdom v. Albania, 1949 ICI Rep.4 (Ments), (Judgmentof April 9).

Id.at 22.

" Id. 39 (IndividualOpinionby Judge Alvarez)at 46 (emphasisin the original). in theFisheriesJuri.uiictionCase,a dissenringopinionby JudgePa& Nervonotes
the foIlowingregardingthreats:.

A big power can useforce andpressure against small nationin many

ways, even by the very fact of diplomaticallyinsisringin having its view
recogniid and accepted. The Royal Navy did not need touse armed force, its
mere presenceon the seasinsidethe fishery limitsof the coastalState could be
enoughpressure. Itisweiiknown by professon. jurisand diplomatsacquainted
withinternationalrelations andforeignpolicies,thatcer"Notesadeliveredby
thegovernmentof astrongpowerto thegovernmentofa snal nlations,mayhave
the same purposeand the same effectas the uor threatof force.n

A threat of force alone does not constitute an "act of aggression" unthe U.N.
"Defrnitionof Aggression"~esolution.~Infact,theDefinitionsuggeststhatnoal1usesofforce
constituteacts of aggression,noting in the Pzeamblethat "aggresisothe most senousid
dangerousform of theillegaluse of force."59

The InternationalLaw Commissionincorporatedthe GeneraiAssemblfs definitionof

aggressioninthe DraftCodeof CrimesAgainsrPeaceandSecurityof Mankir~d.~ Significantly,
the Dr& Code includesa separatearticle for tcrime of the Threat of ~ggression:~'

1. An individualwho as leader or organizercommitsor orders the commission
of athreatof aggressioshd. on convictionthereof,be sentence.. ..

UnitedKingdomv. Iceland. 1973 ICI Rep. 3 (Judgmentof February2).

Id at 47.
58
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXJX 1974). Article 1 of the Defuiitionstates that:

Aggression istheuse ofarned forceby a Stateagainstthe sovereignty,temtorial
integrity or political independence of another Statin any other manner
inconsistentwiththe Charterof the UnitedNation.. .

s9Id.

Drufi CO& of Crimes Againsr rhe Peace and Security ofManAid Repon of the
Commissionto the GeneralAssembly on the work ofin forry-thirdsession, 19Y.B. htî L.
Comrn'nvol. II,pan two,m. 15,U.N. Doc. A/CN/4/SER.A/1991IAdd.l(part2).

Id.âit16. 2. Threatof aggressionconsistsofdeclarations,communications,demonstsations
of forceor any othermasures whichwouldgive goodreaçon to the Govemment
of a State to believethat aggressionis beingseriouslycontemplatedagainst that
State.

The Internationalaw Commission Reporton the ïhaftCode to the GeneralAssembly
notesthat in thecontextofthis article,"theword'threat'denactsundertaken with aviewto
makinga State believethatforce willbe used against itcertaindemands are not met by that
State."'"A threatAght take the form of declarations("expressionsmade publicin writingor

oraily"),communications("messagessent bytheauthoritiesofone Govemment tothe authorities
of another Governrnent,byno matterwhat meansof transmission")anddemonsaationsof force
(eg.,"concentrationsoftroopsnearthe f~ontier").~Moreover,the Commissionemphasizedthat
the threatof aggession doesnot justify a threatenedStateresortingto force in selfdefence."

The Commission was carefulto Iinkthe actsof an individuai who commits a 'crime
against peace andsecuritywith the State. Only individuals"vested with the authority of the
State"have the potential tocommithisoffense." However,the Stateisnot exempted £rom its.

respoi~sibiliforthe crime. Thus, althoughthe DraftCodeplaces the liability directly on the
individual", also providesthat:

Rosecution of anindividualfora crime againstthpeac end securityofrnankind
doesnot relieve a Stateof anyresponsibilityunderinternationallaw for anact or
omission attributableto it.67

The Commissionalsonoted the importanceof defining a crime of threat of aggression,

particularly since powerful States have the potential to achieve improper objectives without
committingan actualact ofaggression." Indeed,the SixthCornmitteeof the GeneralAssembly,
in its reviewof theCommissionReport,notedtiiat"therehadbeenrnanycases of Statesthathad

1989 Y.B ntl L. Comm'n,vol. 2,part2,U.N . oc.A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/AcId .lar2),
p.68.

64Id.

" 1989 Y.B. intlL. Comm'n,vol. 1, U.N. Dcc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989, p.296.

66Article 3, Responsibilityand punishrnent.

''Article5.

" 1989 Y.B. Intl L. Cornrn'nvol. 1, supra note 60, at 294, para. 11 (statementof Mr.
Beesley). lost their independencethroughthreatsaui-"69 The remrd went on to note:
. .
Contemprary internationallaw prohibitednot only tuse of force, balsothe
threatof theuse of force, anthusits inclusiin the code would reaffirmthe
position of the internatiwmmunity in thatrega~d.~

The DraftCodeof CrimesAgainstthe Peaceand Secwity of Mankindrefleas the recent
developmentof the conceptofcrimesagainst peace.

Iü. SpecificLaw RegardingtheThreat of Use ofNudearWeapons

The Charter of theUnited Nationswas adoptein San Francisco on Jun26. 1945,six
weeksbefore the fmt use of the atom bomonAugust 6, 1945." Had thistimesequence been
reversed,theChartermight weUhave contained a specificprohibition on the threaukndof
nuclearweapbnsand other weapns of massdestruction "The facthowever,thatthe existence
of atomicweaponsmeansanunprecedentedsourco f dangerfor mankind, andtint it.maybe
one of the gravest fom of the threat of force. was immediately rem@ by the United
Nations,which then triedto solve thispr~blern."~ The concem of the wmmmmunity with
this new,startlingdevelopmentwasevidenced by thefactthatthfus esolutionadoptedbythe

UnitedNations dealtwiththesubjectof atomicenergyandcalled,inteorliu"fortheeiimination
from national amaments of atomic weaponsand of ail other majorweapns adaptabletmass
destruction. . .""

69U.N. GAOR Sith Cornmittee (31st rntg.) at 15, U.N. Doc. ~/~.6/44/~~.31 (1989)

(statementofMI. Gondra).

71
Herczegh,supra note 10, at 88.

Id Former United States Secretaryof State John Foster Ddeah stressed tha! if the
drafters of the Charterhad known of the role nuclear weaponswere to play, they would have
adoptedmore "emphaticand reaiistic"provisions todealwith disannament and regulatU.S.
Cornhiunon and U.N.Charter: An Appraisal, Addressby the Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles before the Arnerican Bar Association at Boston on Aug. 26, 1953,Dept. of State
Publication5194.

" G.A. Res. 0101, Establishmentof a CommissionDeal with the ProblemRaised by the
Discoveryof AtomicEnergy,adoptedunanirnously, para.5(c) (1946). The preambleof theTreatyon theNon-Proiiferationof NuclearWeapons" callsfor "the
cessationof the manufactureof nuclear weapons,the liquidationof ail theirexisting stockpiles,
and theeliminationfromnationalarsenalsof nuclear weapons andtheir meansof delivery...."
Specifically,the Treaty prohibitsthe manufactureor a'cquisitionof nuclear weapons by non-
nuclearweapon States,'.'and it requires nuclearweaponStatesto "pursuenegotiationsin good

faitlion effectivemasures relatingto cessationof thenucl& anns raceanteariy date andto
nucleardi~armarnent."'~The threat ouse of nuclear weaponsis inconsistentwith the general
purposeand goal of the treaas well as thespecificrequirementsof Stateparties.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treatyprohibits the manufacture,acquisition,
possessionor controlof nuclearweapons." The Treatyfor the Rohibition of Nuclear Weap

in LatiAnmerica prohibitsthe testing,usemanufacture, productionor acquisition of nuclear
weapons, directly or indirectly, by parties to the treaty or within the region defmed.by the
treaty."

The patternin internationallaw regardingweapomofmass destructionisto prohibitnot
onlytheusebut ais he manufactureand acquisitionof these weapom. Thetreatiesdiscussed

above seek to eiimuiateboththe use and the threatto use nuclear weaponinno instancedo
they prohibit use buttoleratepossession. Sirnilarly,treaties regardingother weapons of mass
destmction, namely biologicalweapon~.~a~nd chernicalweaponss0,link threat and use. The

721 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S.No. 6839, 729U.N.T.S. 161,7 I.L.M 81.1 (1968).

7.Id art.II.

76Id art.VI.

n Alsohown as the Treatyof Rarotonga,24 LL.M. 1440,(1985),art.3.

" Alsohown asthe Treatyof Tlatelolco,22 U.S.T.762, T.I.A.S. No7137, 6I.L. M.1
(1967),an. 1.

79
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,and Stockpiling of
Bactenological (Biological) andToxin Weapons andon Their Destruction, U.N. Res. 2826
WI 1972).26U.S.T.583,T.I.A.S. No. 8062,11I.L.M.309(1972). Article1provides:"Each
State Partyto this Conventionundertakes never in any circurnstancesto deveIop, produce,
stockpileor othenvise acquireor retain" biological weapons.

80Conventionon the Prohibitionof the Development, Production,Stockpilingand Use of
ChernicalWeaponsandon Their Destruction,openedfor signatureinParis on 13January 1993.

A UnitedNations Treary Seriesregistrationnumberwill be assignedonce if enten into force.
Article1.1 provides: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakesnever under any illegalit~ of the threatusethese weapons isunderscored by provisions callingfor their
desauctioaa'

B. Seauity Cound Resolutions

Resolution 984 (April 11,1995) gives non-nuclearStatesassurancesfrom the nuciear
States that nuclearweaponswiiinot be threatenedor used againstthem. Al1of the deciared
nuclear Statessupportedthismolution.

Resolution255ofthe hxrity Chuncil providesthaaggressionor thethreatof.aggression
withnuclear weaponsagainsta non-nuclear weapon Statewouidrequirethe SecUrityCouncilto
act immediately." - -

Resolutions984 and 255thereforeimplicitlyrecognizetheiliegalityof the thandtuse
ofnuclear weaponsagainsta non-nuclearweaponstate. A legalactwouid not requireassurpnces
against use norrequireSecurityCouncilresponse."

C. United ~a&ns General Awmbly, Conference on Disannament and . .
Diient Commission

As discuss aeove,the framersoftheCharter couldnotbe awareofthe threatof nuclear
weapons,but the tint United Nationsresolutionaddressedelhination of these ~eapons.~

ciraunstances (aTO develop,produce,othenviseacquire,stockpileor retain chemicalweapons
.. .(b) To use chemicalweapons. .. .,

" AiticlII oftheBiologicalWeaponsConventionandArticleL2of the ChernicalWeapons
Convention.

" S.C. Res. 255(1968). Therelevanttext rads as foliows:

The SecurityCouncil... [r]ecognizesthat aggressionwithnuclearweaponsofthe
threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear weaponState would creata
situatioin which the SecurityCouncil,and above aliits nuclear-weaponState
permanent members, would have to act immediatelyin accordance with theu

obligationsunderthe UnitedNations Chaner.

" Supranote 5.
LU
See supra notes 71-73andaccompanyingtext. Anotherearlyresolution oftheGeneraiAssembl? reaffirmstheprohibition on thethreat

or use of force and. in this context, c& on the Dûamiamen1Commission.to develop
comprehensiveplans providingfor the "eliminationand prohibitionofal1major weapons .. .
adaptableto mass destru~tion"~and, specifidly, the "effectiveinternationalcontrol of atomic
energyto ensure the prohibition of atomicweapom . . . .""

The issue of assurancesfor non-nuclearweaponStatesagainst theuse orthreat of use of
nuclear weapons has receivedovenvheimingsuppoafromtheinternational community. The

GeneralAssembly haspassed numerousresolutions affirminthe urgencyof reaching an eariy
agreement oneffective internationalarrangementsto assurenon-nuclearweaponStates against
the useor threat of use of nuclearweapons."ignirlcantly,nostate hasopposedthe conclusion
of theseassurances. Mostrecently,forexample,168Statesvotedin'favorof thisresolutionand
only three countriesabstained(Franc th, UnitedKingdom,and the UnitedStates). Even the
three States generallyconsideredto have secret nuclear weaponsanenals (india, Israel and
Pakistan)voted in favor of theseassurances.

The conclusion of effective internationalrrangementsto assure non-nuclear-weapons
States againstthe use or threat ofuseofnuclearweaponshasken a key agendaitemof the U.NI
Conferenceon Disarmament, and the AdHoc Cornmittee estabiisheto review this itemhas
consistently been re-established at the start of eachannual session. Most recently, the
Cornmittee'sreport. adoptedby the Conferenceon Dient, noted as follows:

All delegationsreiteratethattheyattachparticularimportancetothe questionof
internationalarrangementsto assurenon-nuclear-weaponStates againsttheuse or
threat of use of nuclear weaponsand expressed theirreadiness to engagein a
searchfor a mutuallyacceptablesolution of the issue."

Additionally,the report of the Conference"stressedthenecessity to recognizethe right

" G.A. Res. 704 (Wï) (1953).

Id para. 2(a).

Id para. 2(c).

E.g.G.A. Res. 49/73 (1994),G.A.Res. 48/73 (1993),G.A.Res. 47/50(1992),G.A. Res.
46/32 (19911,G.A. Res. 45/54 (1990),G.A. Res. 441111(1989),G.A. Res.43/69 (1988), G.A.
Res. 42/32(1987).G.A.Res.41/52(1986).G.A. Res.40186(1985),G.A. Res. 39/58,G.A. Res.
38/68 (1983) et al.Al1of theseresolutionsbw the name"Conclusionofeffectiveinternational

arrangementsto assure non-nuclear-weaponStates against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons."

Reportof the Conferenceon Disarmarnent,49 U.N. GAORSupp. (NO. 27) (AgendaItem
33) at 130-131,U.N. Doc. A149127 (1994). of non-nuclear-weaponStates not be attacked nor threatened withese weap~ns.~ It is
significantthat, in refemngthisright. the.Report called for its recognitionthanits
creation

Thecompleteeliminationof nuclearweapom basbeen a constantandrecurrhg objective

of theisamament Commission and the Conferenceon Dient9'

In addition, the General Assemblhas passed over 100 resolutionstatingnuclear
disamment or theeiiminationof nuclearweapons as agoal.n Thus,the majorityof statesdo
not acceptthe necessityargumentfor deterrence. A growingnumberof stateshave specifically
prohibited nuclear weapons in their temtory and have established, or are in the process of
establishing,nuclearweaponfre zones.

D. TheNon-Derogable Right toLife

The UnitedNationsHumanRights Cornmittee,whichsupervisesthe implementationof
the InternationalCovenanton Civiland PolitRi@l PCCPR], has determinedthantuclear
weaponsthreatenthe nonderogable right to life:

[Tlhe designing, testing, manufacture, possession and deployment of nuclear
weaponsareamongthegreatesthts to the rightto lifewhichconffontmankind
today. This threaiscimpounded by the danger that the ad use of nuclear
weaponsrnay be broughtabout, not only in the evenwar, but even through
hurnaonrmechanicalerrororfailure. Furthemore, the veryexistenceandgravity
of this threatgeneratesa climateof suspicion and fear between Stateis which
in itself antagonisticto the promotionof universalrespectfor and observanceof
hurna nightsand fundamentalfreedoms in accordance withthe Charter of the

" Eg. Report of the DisarmamentCommission,49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 42) (Agenda
Item4)at4, U.N. Doc.A/49/42;Reportof the DisarmamentCommission,48 U.N.GAORSupp.
(No. 42) (Agenda Item4) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/48/42; Reportof the Conferenceon Dient,
supra note41, (AgendaItem2) at 1;Reportof the Conferenceon Disannament,48 U.N.GAOR
Supp. (No. 27) (Agenda Item 2) at 1,U.N. Doc. A/48/27; Report of the Conference on

Disarmament,47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.27) (AgendaItem 2) at2, U.N. Doc. A/47/27.
92
See AppendixB.

'999 U.N.T. 17.1,6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).Entered intoforceon March23. 1976. Article 6,
para. 1reads: "Everyhumanking hasthe inherent right toliThis righshallbe protected
by law. No one shallbe arbitraiilydepnved of his life." United Nationsand the InternationalCovenantsHuman Right~.~

Inotherwords,nuclearweapons boththreatentheright to life andcontributeto thespirit
ofrnistni astong States which wmpounds the likelihooof threatsbeiigcanied out In
addition,the thretousenuclear weaponsconflicts with the cornmitmentto providechildren
with the protectionof miety and the StateBand to protectfamilies."

The right toliisconfumed asweli inthe Euopean Conventionfor the Protectionof

H-Rights and FundamentalFreedoms" [ECHR],andthe AmericanConventionon Human
Rightsg8[ACHR]. Underthe ICCPR, the ECHR, and the ACHR,a derogationclausemaybe
invokedin exceptionalsituationsthat threatenthe life of the nation. However,the rightto life
is oneof the fournonderogable rightswhich constitutetheeducibleare'* ofhumanrights.
A nonderogable nght is one which cannot besuspendedby the Stateevin times of public
emergency.

Moreover, accordingto Judge Schwebel of the internatioCourt of Justicmatters
affectinginternatiohuman rightsobligationscannberegardedasexclusivelwithindomestic
jurisdictionof a particularState:

Once a state hasundertaken obligations toward another state, or toward the
intemationalcornmunityina specifiedsphereof humanrights,it rnayno longer
maintain,vis-a-visthe otherstate or the internationalcornmunity,that rnatten in

that sphere are exclusively or essentially within its domesticjunsdiction and

Report of theHuman Rights CornmitteeGened Comment 14(23)on Article 6 of the
Covenant,2 November1984: U.N. GAOR (40thSession)Supp. (No.40)AnnexVI,'162, U.N.

Doc. A/40/40.

~6ICCPR, art.24.

" ICCPR, art .3.

" 213 U.N.T.S.221,E.T.S. 5 (1950),art. 2.

''O.A.S. Official Records OEAJSER.K/XVi/1.1 Dm. 65, Rev. 1, Corr.1, 9 ILM 101
(19701,65 AJ.1.L. 679 (1971ari.4.

99J. Oraa, HUMANRIGKT SNSTATES OF EMERGENC ININTERNATION AALW96 (1992).
The other nonderogable nghts are: the nght tbe free from torture and otherinhumanor

degradingtreatmentor punishment(ICCPR,art.7;ECHR, art.3; ACHR,art.5),the nght to be
freefromslaveryor servitude (ICCPRart8; ECHR, art4,ACHR,art. 6),and theprincipleof
non-retroactivi, f penallaws (ICCPR,art. 15,ECHRan. 7, ACHR, art9). outside the range of internationalconcernl"

Thus the manufactureandpossessionof nuclearweapons,whichviolate theright to üfe.
cannotbe defended.by nuclear weaponStates eithas essentialfor defense in times of public

emergencyor as mattersof domesticjunsdiction.

IV. TheThreatof Use of NuclearWeapons is Prohibitedin AnyCircumstance

A. TheCorrelation Between Threatand Use of Force: Threat-1sUse

For purposesof thefollowinganalysis,it wbeiusefuito examinebrieflythe meanings

of theterms "threat"and "force",bothgenericandwithinthe contextof the leginstruments
relevanttothisdi&ussion

The ammon meaningof "force" is"strength,energy, powef'. The normal meAg of
"these of force",withinthecontextofArtic2(4)of the Charteristheapplicationofphysical
forceof a military natureby one memberstate against anotasin the invasionof Kuwaitby
Iraq.

Upon closerexamination.however,it becamesapparentthat moreisinvolvedherethan
a ûansborder launch of tanks, troops missil ert.2(4) forbids not only the use of force
againstthetemtoriai integrityof a state,alsoagainstitspolitical independence,or any
othermanner inconsistentwiththe purposesof theUnited NationsIfArt.2(4) hadbeenaimed
only at cross-border military action, it would not have been necessary to add this further
language.

What kùid of force,then, other thanmilitary foineaction, cabeused by one state
agairtstthe political independenceof another,without affecting its temtorial integrity? Non-
military force, tbe sure,as for instance the erection of tariff barriers or other economic
measures, but also the open or veiled promise of the use of force, including amed force, if
certaindernands are not met.This interpretationis conswithnthe def~tions of "forcas
"powerto influence, affector controi","persuasivepower, power to con~ince."~~'

"Threat", on the otherhand, is defmas"a declarationof an intentionor determination
to infiictunishment, injury, death, or loss on somein retaiiationfor, or conditionally
upon, some action or course; an indication of probable evil, loss or violence to c...;

lmS. Schwebel,Human Rightrinthe WorldCoun,24 VAND J.TRANSNAT L.945 (1991).

'ORandom HouseDictionaq of the EnglishLanguage,Third Unabndged mition.

22 Even more relevant, for presentpurposaisthe defmitionof "threain BlacKsLaw
Dictionq: "In criminallaw..anymenaceof suchanatureas tounsenlethemindofthepenon
on whom itoperates,and to takeawayfromhis acts that free andvoluntaryactionwhichalone
constitutesconsent."

'
The United NationsSecretaryGeneral,inconsideringwhat constitutesa threatuïq
force,notedthat"[tlheperson whounersthe threatmay'notintendtcany it out,andthe threat
is then only a fom of intimidationand 'bla~kmail'."'~

As one philosophehas noted:
:.:

Nuclearweapons are &mg used todayand can beexpectedto beused in
the future. Notthat they are beingdetona... plut thaisnot a requirement
of theirbeiig used. man usesa gunwhenhesticksit inyourribs anddemands
your money. He does not nd to fue the gun And a country uses nuclear
weapons when it makes it known that it rnay launch therunies cenain
conditions are met, as the United States did against the Sovietsin the Cuban

Missile Cnsis, against Chinaduringthe KoreWar,andagainst NorthViefnam
duringthe VietnamWar. Andthevery threat ofretaliationthat is at theheartof
nuclear deterrencis a use of nuclear weapons, even if is not the actual
expiodingof them.IM

Thus, the conceptsof "threat"an"use"in Articl2(4)merge into each otherin most
circumstances:The threatof use is itselfa kind of use.

B. Tbe Conditional Threatof Force isProhibitedinAny Cucumstance

As has ben shown inSectionII,supra, the prohibitionon the threat of forcefor the
purpose of affectinganother state'spoliticalindependence,or rnanner inconsinent with

the purposesof the UnitedNation-,whatwe may cal1a conditionalthre-trunslikea mantra
through the entire pon-World WarIIlaw of peace and security. Whether stated in temis of
threat,attemptedthreat,planningorpreparation,coercion,interferencein the intemalorextemal

lmId, emphasisadded.

'*SecretaryGeneralof the United Nations,Repoonthe QuesrionofDefiningAggression,

U.N. Doc. A12211 at 51 (Oct. 3,1952) para. 368. (Reprinted in Henkin, Pugh et al.,
M TER NATION LAL: CASES AND MATERIAL 894-896 (Thiïd ed.,993).

lMRL. Holmes, ON WAR AND MORAL^ 8 (1989). affairsof states"ai otherfomisof interference"lm,it is cleaaiùlthreatsof thikindare
unequivdly outlawedbythe UnitedNationsCharter,many0th- internationalinstrumentsand,
indeed,the customarylaw ofpeaceand security.

This king so, and considerinthatnuclear weaponsrepresentthe greate cotceivable
instrumentof threat availableto anynation,the conditionalthreusenuclear weapons isa
fortiori, a grossviolationof the lawof peace and security.

C. ARetaliatoryThreat to UseNuclearWeapomisIllegalin AnyCircumstance

Whatofthreat in the retaliatorysense,i.e. "if you do suchand suchto me,1will do such
and suchto you"?Surelyno pemn, nor any state,canbedeprivedof the rightto threaharm
as a meansof self-defense.But thisnght is notunümited.Thereis no righttothreatento commit
a crime or otheriiiegai acHence, if,as has been arguedelsewhe~e,'~the use of nu,clear
weapons isillegainany circumstance,i.e. evenby wayof selfdefense or reprisal,the threatto
use nuclear weaponsmustaisabe illegalin any circ~mstance.~~~

Although this general propositiois dkpsitive of the question of the legaiity of
retaliatorythreats of nuclearweapons,itmay usefulto examinesomewhatmore closely the
fomis which suchthreats may take.

1. TheThreatof Fi Use

A threat offmt use wuld include a threatened preemptive nucleastrik aeainst a

perceived nuclearor conventional attack or a threatened nuclearresponse to an ad
conventionalattack Moreover,a threat of fmt use could be direaed against developments
faliingshoa of the perceptionof an irnrnediateattack: The essence of the current doctrine of
"counterprolifemtion"is that the nuclearweapon states resexveto themselvesthe right to use
nuclear weaponsto discourage"roguestates"from developing-not necesshly using-weapons
of massdesuuction, whether nuclear,chernical,biological or other. Of the declared nuclear

1m
See supraSections II.Band II.C.

'~6P. Weiss, B. Weston, R. Falk, S. Mendlovitz, Drap Mernorialin Support of the
Applicationby the WorldHealthOrganirntion for an Advisory Opinionby the InterMii0~1
Court of Justice on theLegality of the Use of Nuclear WeaponrUnderImermzional Law,
Inclding the W.H.O.Constirution, TRANSNA-~ L .& CONTEMP P.ROBS7 .21,753-757 (1994).
See ako Statementssubmittedby Malaysia,Mexico, Nauru, Solomon Islands,and Sweden in
supportof the requestby the WorldHealthOrganizationforan advisoryopinion onthe legality
of use of nuclear weaponsin armedconflict.

10Brownlie,supra note 45; Oppenheim,supranote 46. powers,only Chinahas an officino-first-uspolicy.'" The nuclear weaponStates,specifically
the United Statesand the UnitedKingdom.have repeatedlyused threats ofmt use of nuciear
weaponsagainst both nuclearandnon-nuclearweapon States.'"

-A threat of fmtuse of nuclear weaponsis a direct violation of jus bellum. The
prohibitionon thethreatof force under the UnitedNations Qiarter"o covers threatsboth

conventionaland nuclear weapons The threat of fim use is inherently a threat againstthe
political independenceand temtorial integTityof anotherState. This is true not only whenthe
threatis imminentand airnedat exactingspecificchanges also,becauseof the uniquenature
of the weapons,when it is a longstandingposturenot direaiinkedto specific demands.Any
Statein actualorpotentialconfiictwith a nuclear Statethathasa fm-use policy, recognizesthat
the nuclear State has the weaponsand the will to use these weapons should it bedeemed

necessaryby the nuclear State.This inevitablyinfluencesthe decisionmakingof that State.

Theunique natureof nuclearweapons,as weaponsof massdestruction,makes thethreat
of theù usea tool of unequalledintimidation, undemiinuigthe political independenceof the
threatenedState.

Anynuclearthreator useandespeciallyfirsuseanditsthreatisconnaryto thepurposes
of the United ~ations, which include the maintenanceof internationalpeace and securityand
preventionof "threatto thepeace"and suppressionof "breachesof thepeace"(Al(1) and the
achievementof cooperationin promotingand respecthg humanrights (Art. l(3)).

Furthemore, the threatof fmt use of nuclearweaponscannever satisfythe principleof
proportionality,oneof thefoundationstonesof thelawsof war,sincethemagnitudeof theevent

to which apreemptiveresponseisbeiig madeis necessarilya matter of speculation.

2. The Threat of Second Use

Theseconduseof nuclearweapons,andthereforethethreatof suchuse,are not permitted
under the law of reprisalReprisais"must confom in ailwes to the laws of humanityand

morality.""' "Civilianpopulatio..shouldnot bethe objectof reprisa...."""Attacksagainst

'ONUCLEAW R EAPONS A: COMPREHENS SIVUEDYAppendix1,U.N.SalesNo. E.91.M.10
(1990).

'OSee AppendixC.

"OSee supra notes 2-5 and accompanyingtext.

"'An. 86, Manual Publishedby the Instituteof Internationaliaw (OxfordManual), 1880.
Schindlerand Toman, The iaws of Armed Conflict,p.48 (hereafterSchindler). the civiiian populatorciviiians by way oreprisaareprohibited."'* "Reprisamaybe
jufied, but they tomustbe in accordancewith customarylaw.""'

Itiscommon ground that the laws of war apply equallyaiiweapons and tactics,
includingthosused inself-defense?" Thuse of genocide,torture or terroristattacks by one
stateagainst anotherdoesjustiftheuse of genocide,tome or temrist attacks in response.

Henceself-defensecannotjus&iQthe threatof use of nuclearweainselfdefense.

3. ImplicitThreatsofUse

Threatsneed nobe expresslycommunicatedto be effective."' Whilisme that the
bullyon the blockthreatensthesafethispeacefulneighborsbyhis verypresenceandhispast
behavior, iis alsotnie that not every disparityof power between peMns or economic or
politicalunilsconstitutesa îhreat aaionable at law. Nevmostsysternsof law recognize

thatmere size can and frequentlydoes lead to abusesof power.

Par. 7, GA Res. 2675 (XXV), 1970, Basic Principlesfor the Protectio'~ivilii
PopulationsinAmed Confiicts,adopted by 109 votes to none. with 18 Statesabstaining or
absent.

"'Art. 51(6), Rotocol 1Additionalto the Geneva Conventions, 1. he Protocalso
prohibits reprisais against civilianobjects (An. 52[1]), cuihiralobjects and places of worship

(Art.S3[c]),objectsindispensableto thesurvivalofthecivilianpopulation(Art.54[4]),thenatud
environment(Art.55[2])and woricsand installationscontainingdangerousforces,namelydams,
dykesand nuclear generatingstations (Art.56[4]).

'"N. Singh& E. McWhinney,NUCLEAW REAFQN SND CON-~IPORARL YAW167 (26ed.,
1989).

115"Whatevermay be the cause of war thahas broken out, andwhetheror no the cause
may be a dled jus cause, thesamedes of internationallaware vaasto what must not
be done, may be done, and mustbe doneby the belligerentsthemselvesin making war against
eachother."U.S ..WilhelmListet al. mostapCase),11Trialof WarGiminals 1247(1950).

?he quoted statement was made by international lawyer L. Oppenheimand adopted by the
tribunal.

IL' For example, Fanands ,he Regionai Use of Force, in THE USE OF FORCE
INTERNATION AELLATION 70,84-85 (F. Northedge,ed., 1974)notes:

The bestexarnpleof.."concealedthreat"wasthefmt Sputnikof October1957;
thi sreatscientificachievementwouldhave beennothingmore if the implication
that for the fmt time the USSR could destroy Americancities had not been
evident. ïhe fieldof cornpetitionlaw,forinstanisrepletewithexamplesof statutesandtreaties
intendedto compensatefor inequalitiessizeand power in themarket place in orderto create
that "ievel playing field" whichaloneguaranteethe functioningof the free rnarket. Many
countries and regional groupingshave laws forbidding the abuse of a dominant po~iti0n.l'~
However,as the EuropeanCourtof Justiceobserved:

The concept of abuse i.an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an
undertahg in a dominantposition whichis suchasto influence thesuucnire of
a market where,asa resultofthe verypresenceof theunciertakinin question,
the degree of competitiisweakenedand which,throughrecouse to rnethods
different from those which condition normalcornpeti..o.has the effect of
hindering the maintenance of the degree of cornpetitionstill exisinnthe

market."'

Substitute"countrypossessingnuclearweapons"for"undextakinin a dominantposition"
andyou have a descriptionof thedistortionof "normal"internationalrelationsresultingfromthe
"verypresence" ofsuch weapons.

Sirnilarly,the rationale of antitlaws providing for state control of mergeand
acquisitionisto preventmeresizfromdistoningnormalmarketrelations,which isanotherway
of saying that mere sizeposes a threatto their operation. Corntriesand regional arrangements
having such laws includethe European Union,Austria, Belgium,Brazil, Colombia,the Czech
Republic,Finland,Fmce, Gemany, Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Nonvay,Poland, Portugal,Russia,
Spain,Sweden,the UnitedKingdom,Australia,India,Israel,Japan,Kenya,Korea,NewZealand,
SouthAfrica, Taiwan, Canada, thUnitedStates,and ~enezuela."~

The possession of nuclear weapons, i.e., weapons capable of wreaking complete
destructionon an enemy,representsa unique case of power disparity. By its very existence, a
nucleararsenal in the hands of one State constitutesa threat of the greatest magnitude tothe
safety,indeed the survival,of everyother state.Iz0

"7E.g..Art.86, Treaty of Rome (EEC),Art. 22,Gennan CornpetitionLaw.
118
Hoffmann-LaRoche v.Commission, 1979E.C.R. 461,par.6 (emphasisadded).

B.E. Hawk, Um STATES COMMO N ARKE TND IN~ERNATION AK ITIRUST 1,031,
n.1, (2ded.,1994 supplement).

12Herczegh,supra note 10,observes:

In our days the major form of the threat of forceis concomitantwith the
armament race, the manufactureof thermonuclearand other weapons of mass
destructionand withthe tests conductedwith them. It may beargued.in rebuttai, chatthe actual poIicyof the nuclear weapis toates
maintaintheù arsenals for the sole purpose of insuringtheir own security, ie., for deterrence.
But nationarenot farnous for observingtheirsolemn promiseswhen they perceive their vital
interesttbeatrisk Ifthey were, theworldwouldnothaveseennurnerouscross-borderwarsl"

break out since theenactment ofU.N. Charter.

Whatis kuown incurrentpoiitiscienp cerlancas"vitalintereor"nationalinterest"
or "nationahty" used to be referreto as "reasonsofstate"and was then,as now,
undentood to takeprionty over law or morality. Onemightsay. in a varüuiton Pascal'swell-
known aphorism,"the stahas itreasonswhichreasonknowsnothing of."

A recent example of thi sttitude is the statement Cien.Vladimir Semyonov.

commanderof Russiangroundforces,that theviolationofthe ConventArmed ForcesTreaty
in Europe1" by the deployment of a newssianarmyinChechnya isjeed because"the
interestsof Russia'ssecurity and inmusticome abovethe provisionssinthis txaty."lp
An exlier example is the statement by Jeane KirkpatU.S.,Ambasador to the United
Nations,hatthe Charter "is not a suicide pact."12

The point heisnot'to chastisethisor that nationfor placingits perceivedvital interest
above the commandsof the law, since al1nationsare guiltyof this offense,but to submitthat,
in assessingthethreposedby overwheimingpower,onemust lookat whatnationsdo,notwhat

they say.

Starting fromLord Acton'sfamous aphorismthat "powertends to compt and absolute

As early as 1939, before serious work had startedanywhere on developinga nuclear
weaponsplant, LordChenvell, WinstonChurchill'sadvisoron scieissaidto have heldthe
view that "fwlhoevepossessedsuch a plant would be able to dictate tem to the rest of the

world." Bundy,supra note 1,at 27.
121
See generallBORDER AND TERF~ORIA DLISPLTE (S.J. Day,ed. ,nd ed., 1987).
ExamplesincludeIran-ï[email protected]),Iraq-Kuwait(pp.244-24,rgentins-UniteKingdom
(Failùands)(pp.391-92), Ecuador-Peru (pp. 424-425). See aLso Comment, International
Intervention: ïhe UnitedStoles'InvasioPanama,31 HARVW .L LJ. 633(1990);R. Beck,
Inrernan'omlLw and the DecisiofoInvadeGrenada: A TenYear Renospecrive,33 VA.J.
!.WL L. 765 (1993).

'"Treaty on ConventionalArmedForces in Europe,30 I.L.M.1 (1990)

New York Times, April 27, 1995,p. A6.

J.Kirkpahickne ïimb of Internutio~Z Lav,addressbefore the AmericanSocietyof

InternationalLaw,New York,NY April 12, 1984. (ReprintedinLEG~ACY AND FORCE v,ol.
II(1988) pp. 241-25at 251.) power cormpts absoiutelyu,Nom Cousins,adjunct professorof MedicaHumanities at the
UniversityofCalifornia.givesthe followinsummary of "the tendenciesthat emergefrom the
pages ofhistorians":

-Thetendency of powerto drive intelligenceunderground;

-Thetendencyof powerto become a theology,admittingno gods before it;

-Thetendencyof powerto distortanddamagethetraditionsand institutitwas
designed to protect;

-The tendency of power tore& a languageof itsown, making other forms of

communicationinwherent and irrelevant;

-The tendencyof power tospawnimitators,leadingto volatilecompetition;

-The tendencyof power toset the stagefor its own use.'=

It is not dificuit to see hal1of these "tendencies" apply to the enormok power
flowingfromthe possessionof nuclear weapons,nor howthispoweris bound tobe used asan
instrumentof nationalpolicy by those whopossess it.

4. Deterrence

Deterrence cuts across the three categories of threat discussed above. Beituis
generallyclaimedtobetheprincipal purposeof nuclearweapons,it meritsspecialconsideration.

Accordiig to the U.S. Joint Chiefsofaff:

"Dlhe fundamentalpurposeof USnuclear forcesis to deterthuseof weapons ofIII&

desmiction,particularlynuclear weapons, andto seasa hedgeagainstthe emergence
of anovenvhelmingconventionalthreat."lz6

Note the use of the adjective "fundamentai"rather than "sole", suggestingU.S.t
nuclear forcesrnay havepurposesother than deterrence. TheJoint Chiefs go on to say that:

Deterrenceis foundedin real force capabilitiesandthe nationaldeterminationto

'=N. Cousins,THE PATHOLOG OFPOWER 23 (1987).

lZJoint Chiefs of Staff, DOCIRINEOR JOINTNUCLEA R PERATIONS Joint Pub 3-12. 29
April 1993, p1-1. usethose forces if necessaryxn

andthatdeterrenceis:

a defense postuthatrnakespossible waroutcornessouncertain and dangerous,
ascalculatebiy potentialenemies,as to remove al1incentive forùiitiating anack
under any cir~urnstance..~'

TheJoint Chiefsof Staffstate fuaher that:

U.S. forces'and command and conml systems [mw]be viewed by enemy
leadershipas capable of infiiduig such damage upon their militaryforces and
means of support, or upon their counasto deny them the militaryoption.lZ9

Thus, the doctrine of deterrence implareadiness andwillingness(1)touse nuclear
weapons, (2)to inflict great darnage on the enemy(3)nif necessary, to intlict such damage
on theenemy'scountry, not simply his military forces and meansof support.

Nor should deterrencbe seen asapurely defensive domine. Asone analysthasnoted:

The developmentof modem nuclear weaponsand the systems needed to deliver

them cannot be explained if one insiis on defuiing deterrenan essentially
defensive and reactive form. Instead, the modem concept of deterrenchas
evolved into somethingmuch closerto the traditional understandimgof the role of
military force in the pursuit of national objectives. Deterrence is nas seen
"flexible" or "extended, and a "second-strikecounterforce"capabiiity is defended
as part ofa deterrent on the grounds that a credible (i.e.,non-suicida11response
mus beavailable if deterrence fails."'

Another makes the followingcomment:

mhe theory of nuclear deterrence, farfrom being one of the great
advances of our tir... issolittle understood in its conceptual foundationsand
so thoroughly confusedin its implementationas to bepracticallyufromsthe
standpoint of the rational,not to mention moral, guidanceof policy. It may, in

lZId (emphasis supplied).

"OA. km, Dererrenceand ItrContradicnorisinTOWAR DUUEAR DISARMAMEN ATND
GLOBAL SEC^ 219 (B.Weston, ed., 1984). fact, ultimatelyprove diiu~.~'

A recent United States Congressionalmdy on the proliferationof weapons of mass
destructiondismsed the "wtentially confiictingobjectives"of nuclearnon-prolifemtionandthe

nuclearpowers'relianceon nucleardeterrence.'" The mdy admitsthat:

One way to reduce the appealof nucleaweaponsis to deemphasizethe
role thatplaininternationalrelations.But to do sowoumean that the nuclear
powen must rely on them less, weakening the credibilityand utility of U.S.
nuclear detementthreats.. ."133

V. The Iiiegaliîy of the ThretoCommit an Iiiegai Act

Support for the principlethat the threacommit aniiiegal act is also iiican'be
foundin internationallegalinstrumentsandopinjwisIYas weliasthegeneralprincipl&of law
recogd by civihed nations.

A. InternationaLegai Instruments

We have alreadyseen that ueaties regardiig weapom of mass destruction prohibit
possession and manufacture of these weapons in addition to their use.13' Similady, the
Nuremberg Rinciples defmeas Crimes AgainstPeace the "planning"and "preparation"of war
in additiontothe "initiation"or "waging"of ~ar.'~~

13Holrnes,supra note 104,at 259.

13'U.S. Congres, Office of TechnologyAssessrnerit,Prol~erationof Weapons of Mas
Destruction: Assesring thRi&, OTA-ISC-559(Washington,DC: U.S. GovemmentPrinting
Office,August 1993)pp. 25-29.

lYSupra notes4546 andaccompanyingtext.

13*Supra Sectionïü.A.

lM Supra SectionD.D. Additional examples include Rotocol 1 of the Geneva Conventionln. which lists, in
Article 75, paxagaph 2, a nurnber of prohibitedacts,namely, murder. tomire, wrporal
punishment, mutilation, outrages upon personai dignity, taking of hostages, collective
punishments.and "rhreas to commit any oftheforegoing acs" (emphasisadded).

In addition,theConventiononthePreventionand Funishmentofthe Crimeof Genocide'"
renders punishable notonly gen~cide,"~but also conspiracyto commit gen~ide,'~ direct and
public incitement to commit genocideF1 attempt to commit genocide,'" and wmplicity in
gen~cide,"~ali of whichmight be perceivedby the targeasthe threat ofgenocide.

B. Generaihinciples ofLaw Recognizedby CiviüzedNations

Giventhe paucityof discussionsin thelegalliteraturewn&g the meaningof"threat"
in Article 2(4) of the mer, it maybe usefulto considerthe treamient of "thrintordinary
civiland criminallaw.

The principleocxumnhn .. g threat, eitinritselfor for thepurpose of achievingsome

udawful end,is well establied inthe legalsystemsofmanycountries,as willbeshownby the
following examples:

Articl21 1, PenaiCode:

Anybody who, in order to spread general fear or to produce a not or

disorder,makesany sign, voices any alarm,threatens the commission of any
crime of common danger, or uses any other physical means which would
normallyproduceany suchresult,shallbe punishedbyjailing from one monthto

13'Rotocol Additionalto the GenevaConventionsof 12 August 1949,and Relatingto the
ProtectionofVictims of InternationalArmedConfiicts(RotocolI),16 I.L.M 1391(1977).

13'78 U.N.T. S77 (1948).

'39Id, artïiI(a).

''OId.,an.m(b)

141id, artrn(c).

142Id, artrn(d).

14'Id, artm.(e). three years..

Article 147of the CriminalCodeprovides for a penalty of imprisonmentof onesix
months, or a fine, for "threatening anyone through words, writing or gesture, or any other

symbolicmeans of causingany unjustorseriousham~"

Article 494 (16)of thePenal Code penalizeanyone who threatensa violent actof
physicalforce as a fom of intimidationto cause fearamongthe generaipublic.

Article296penalizesanyonewhothreatensanotherwitha hm that consututesacriminal
offense.regardless of whether hami occurs.

France:

Article 305of the PenCode renderspunishablebyimpknment fYom two tofiveyears
and by a fme of 50,000to 450,000 franc asy person,who by anonymousor signed writing,
picture,symbol or emblem, threatenstheassassinatipoisoning or any other attemptagainst

the life of a person whiis~unishableby a death sentence,hard labor for life or deportation
whenever the threat is acwmpanied by an order to depositan arnountof money incash at a
designated place,or to fulfillanyother requirement.

Article 306 of the Pend Code providesfor impnsonrnentof no lethan one nor more
thanthree years and a fine of 50,000to 450,000francs,whenthe threat is not accompaniedby
any order or condition.

Germany:

Section 126,Penal Code:

Anybody who endangers the public peace by threatening to commit
felonies entaiiiig cornrnondanger,shbepunisliedby imprisonmentfora term

not to exceed one year.

Section 503, Penal Code:

Whoever threatensanother with any injury to his person, reputation or
propeny, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is
interested, withintent to causealarmto that person,or to causethat personto do any act whichhe is not legallyboundto do, or to omit to do any act whichthat
person is legally entitled to das the means of avoiding the execution ofsuch
threat, comrnitscrimi~I intimidation.

Itaiy:

Article 421.Penal Code:

Whoever threatens to commit crimes .against public safetyor acts of
devzstationorpillage, in a manner which arousespublic fear, shaiibe.punished
by irnpnsonmentfor up to one year.

Article 612,Penal Code:

Whoeverthreatens another withany wrongfui ham shallbepunished, on
complaintof the victim,by a fine of up to 20,000lire.

Korea:

Article 283,Penal Codepenalizesa person whointimidatesanother.

Article284penalizes"apersonwho commits a crimeunder. .. the precediig Anicle by
the threatof collectiveforce or whilcarrying a dangerousweapon".

Nigeria:

Section 252. Penal Code:

A person who ... attemptsor threatensto apply force of any kindto the
person of anotherwithout hisconsent . .. is saidto assault that person.

Philippines:

Art.282, Penal Me, defnes as "Actspunishable as grave threats":

1. By threateninganotherwith the Miction upon his person, honor or propertyor that

of hisfamily of any wrongamountingto a crime and demandingmoneyor ùnposing any other
condition.. . .

3. By threateninganotherwith the infiictionuponhis penon, honor or propertyor that
of his farnily of any wrongarnountingto a crime whichis not subject to a condition. Spain:

Article 263,'Penal Codepenalizeanyone who threatens to commit certain terrorist acts
withthe intent of disniptingsecurityof the State or of altering the public order, even though
the threat is not dependenton the fulfiilmentof sorne condition.

Article 493, Penal Code,nalizesanyonewho threatensanother withharm to his pemn
or honor or that hisfamily or tharrnthe propeay of either withan injury that consritutesa
criminaiffense.

Title XI,Section 309,penalizes"[wlhoever wmpels any person to do,ornot COdo, or
to sufferany ab by putting hirnin fear of injury to life, body, liberty or reputation or property
of him or of another perso...."

Uganda:

Section 76, Penai Code,penalizeanyone who "with intent to intimidate or annoy any
peson ... threatens to injure, assault, shkil any person, or tbum, break or injure any
propert."

United Statesof America:

The distinction between assault and battery, in the crime of "assault andlieinery".
the factthat tthreatof unlawfulforce sufficesto coiistitutethe crimeof assault, while battery
requiresphysical contact.'"

Robbery is frequently definas the commissionof theft bmeans of the use.or threat
of physical force or intimidation,whetherpropeny is actually taken from the vnet."'or

"Threatening" or "Menacing"is defmed as a scparate crinesome criminalcodes.'*

'@U.S . odel Penal Code5 211.1(l)(c), OfficDmftand Revised Cornrnents1982. The
code prohibitan attempt "by physicalmenaceto put another in fear of imminent serious bodfiy
injury."

14Model Penai Code 5 222.1

" Examples include: N.Y. Penal Law99 120.13,120.14,and 120.15 (Menacinginthefirst,
second, and third degrees, respectively);N.Y. Penal LaFj240.20 (Disorderly Conduct by

Threatening Behavior); Cal. Penal Codeg 519 meats); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5 2903.21
(AggravatedMenacing), s2903.211 (Menacingby Stalking),5 2903.22 (Menacing). Extortionand blackmaii are nody definedas "theextraction ofmoneyor othervalue
bymeans of anunlawful threat".'"

'Tenoristic threat" statutare enteringthe vocabularyof criminasltatutes.'"

Section77,Penal Code, penalizesa personwho "threatens.anotherwithany injurytohis
personor property. .. ."

'"Model Penal Code §212.5; N.Y.Penal Law § 155.05(e)(Larcenyby Extortion,defined

as obtaining property byinstillingin another a "fear that,if property isnot delivered,the
actor. . will causephysicalinjury . . or cause damage toproperty.)

'"See. e.g.ModelPenalCode, 5 211.3. "A person isgdty of a felonyof the thirddegree
if he threatensto commit any crimeof violencewith purpose to terrorizanother... ." Conclusion

The 1995 Review and Extension Conferenceof the Parties to UieTreaty on theNon-

Proiiferationof NuclearWeaponshas endedwithtworesults signifiantfor the considerationof
the questionbefore the Court:

The nuclear arsenals of both declared and undeclarednuclear weapon states
remain intact, at a levelvariouslyestimatedat 41,0045,00 warheads."'

There is no unarnbiguous,biiding cornmitmentby the declarednuclear weapon
states, much less the undeclaredones, to thc ultimateabolition of al1nuclear
weapons,evenin the distantfuture.

Thus,the subjectivethreatofuseofnuclear weaponsremainsasan objectivethreattothe
survivalofal1or part of the world'spresentpopulationandof generationsto cornthithreat

wereregarded as an epidemicof potentidy incalculable proportions,like polio in bdayse
and AiDS iii the present, the medicaland scientificrcsourcesof humanitywould be mobilized
to combat it. The only weaponsavailableto comba: the potential of a nuclear epidemicare
comrnonsense,and the mle of law.

In light of the argumentspresentedhere and iii other StateNedtswith the Cowtin

support of boththe WorldHealth Organizationand GeneralAssemblyAdvisory Opinion cases.
tlusCow is respectfullyrequestedto advisethat the tiueat and use of nuclw weaponsis not
permitteduiider internationallaw in any circurnstance.

ldThe Centerfor DefenseInformation,Nuclea Wr eaponFUCLS 1995. Ifthe Treaty onthe
Reductionand Limitationof StrategicOffensiveAms II(START Ii is fullycamed out, the
estirnatednumber of warheadsin the year2003 would be 20,000to 22,000.