INTERNATIONAL COURT OFJUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING MARITIME DELIMITATION
AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS
BETWEEN
QATAR AND BAHRAIN
(QATARv.BAHRAIN)
MEMORLAL
THE STATE OF BAHRAIN
(Merits)
VOLUME 1
30 September 1996 CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Section 1.1 Outline ofthe Mernorial ........................................1............
Section 1.2 Sumrnarygeographicaldescription ofthe region .................2.........
Section 1.3 Thecore ofBahrain'sposition ...................................3.'............
A . Theterritorial questions........................................3................
B . Themaritimedelimitation ......................................4..................
Section 1.4 Summaryof Bahrain'sterritorial claims ...................................
A . Evolution ofthe Statesof Bahrain and Qatar .....................4.......
B . Bahrain'sclaims ...............................................8......
.......
TheZubarahregion ......................................8..........
(1)
(II) TheHawarIslands ......................................13.............
Section 1.5 Expandedgeographicaldescription ............................1.5...............
A . Bahrain .......................................................
..............
3 . Qatar ..................S.............*...................2.....
THEUESTIONS
PART 1 .
CHAPTER2
BAHRAIN'S SOVEREIGNTY OVERTHE ZUBARAHREGION
Section 2.1 Thegeographicalextent of the Zubarahregion claimed
by Bahrainis based on the tribal territoryinhabited by
theNaimtribe. who recognised theauthority of the
Ruler ofBahrain ..............................................7.......
....
A.
TheNaimtribe and its relationship with Bahrain ...............2.....
B . Thetribal dirahof the Al-Jabrsection ofthe
Naim tribe....................................................3...
............Section2.2 The Rulersof Bahrainexercised authority throughout
the entireQatar peninsuladuring the period 1762-1872 ..........42..
Section2.3 The Al-Thanifmily emerged from beinglocaltax
collectorsto being chiefs ofDohaTownunder the
authority ofBahrainin 1867 ..................................................
Section 2.4 Britain'sinfluenceinthe regionwasbasedon protecting
trade andkeepingthe maritimepeace...............................6........
Section 2.5 The OteomanEmpireexpandedinto the south-eastofthe
Qatar peninsuIathroughthe Al-Thanichiefsof Doha
Town in 1871 ..................................................3.........
.......
Section2.6 The OttomanEmpire'sauthorityin the Qatarpeninsulanever
expandedbeyondDoha Townand its environs ..................69........
Section2.7 The Ottoman Empireandthe Al-Thaniwererebuffedin six
attemptsto exerciseauthorityoverthe ZubarahRegion
(1874, 1878,1888, 1891, 1895 and 1903) .......................74...........
Section 2.8 The Ottoman Empire'sinfluencein the region declined
fiom 1905andthe OttomanEmpirefinallywithdrew
fromthe Provinceof Qatarin 1915................................83............
Section2.9 Bahrain continuedto exercise authorityoverthe Zubarah
regionduringthe Ottoman periodof 1871-1915 .................6....
Section2.10 The chiefof DohaTownand Britain signedthe 1916
Treatyandthe Stateof Qatar slowlyemergedthereder .........94.
Section2.11 Bahraincontinuedto exerciseauthorityover the Zubarah
regionduring the periodof 1916-1937 ..........................97........
Section2.12 BritishandUnited Statesoil companiesbeganto compete
for oil concessionsin Bahrainand Qatarduringtheperiod
1933-1936 ...................................................10......
..........
Section 2.13 Qatarlaunchedan med attackon theZubarahregion
in 1937 .......................................................0.
...............
Section2.14 The disputeoverthe Zubarah regionhasbeen continuous
since 1937 ....................................................2.......
.......... CHAPTER 3
BAHRAJN'SSOVEREIGNTYOVERTHEHAWARISLANDS
Section 3.1 Geographicaldescriptionofthe HawarIslands ...................1....
Section 3.2 Summaryofthe basis of Bahrain'stitleto the Hawar
Islands156
Section3.3 Bahrain'ssovereigntyoverthe HawarIslandshasbeen
resjudicata sincethe British adjudicationof 1938-1939 ...........60
Introduction.... ...................................,....................160
Theprobative implications of Qatar'sclaimsin the adjudication165
(i) TheRuIerof Qatarmadehis claimwithoutknowing
either the locationor eventheidentityof the
HawarIslands .............................. . . ... . .,165
TheRulerof Qatar'sobviousfinancialand economic
(ii)
motivesunderminedthe credibilityof his claim ...........169
(iii) TheRulerof Qatar's clairn wasalsomade to alleviate
domesticproblems.. ........................... ...............172
Theadjudicationwas formal,legitimateand
comprehensive.. ........................................... ......... 173
Janaa nndHaddJanai nslands were included within
the arnbitofthe Britishadjudication ..................................1...
Section3.4 The Stateof Qatar was createdat a greatdistancehm the
HawarIslands and its RulingFamilyhadnever exercised
authoritythere ............................. . ...... . . . . .. . .. 182
Section3.5 TheRuIerofBahrain's authority overthe Hawar Islands
duringthe centuryprecedingBritain'srecognitionof Qatar
in the 1916Treatyis welIdocurnented .............................185
Section3.6 Evidenceof Bahrain'sauthorityoverthe Hawar Islands
since 1916is overwhelming.. ....................................... 195
Fishing ...............................................................9.
.........
Animalhusbandry ...................................................201
Gypsumquanying ......................................................2...
Pagc III E. Additional evidenceofthe permanent natureof the settlement.. 205
F. Otheractsof administrationor examplesof the
authorityof Bahrain ...............................................209
G. The exerciseof courtjurisdiction and other legal
procedures .................................... ......................214
Surveysofthe HawarIslands..............................................2 17
H.
Constructionby the Governmentof Bahrain onthe
1. '
Hawar Islands. ......................................................2 17
Section3.7 Bahrainhascontinuedto exercise authority in the Hawar
Islandsfrorn 1939until today ..................................,,,21.8.........
Section 3.8 Qatar's resuscitation ofits claim to the Hawar Islandsafter
a hiatusof 19yearswasa tacticto counterBaivain's
persistencein seeking the restorationof its rights to the
Zubarah region ...............................................................
CHAPTER 4
APPLICABLE LAW
Section4.1 Title is dependentuponpossession ................................2......
Section4.2 Unlawfulpossessioncannotcreatetitle save in the caseof
prescription .........................................................2..6....
.......
Section4.3 Possession overridesproximity .....,.............................2..9...
Possessionthroughthe exerciseof effectivepersona1
Section4.4
jurisdiction in areasof low habitability ...........................2.3...
Section4.5 Resjudicata. .........................................................234
Section 4.4 Proposals madeinnegotiationsfor thesettlementofa dispute
cannotbe invokedby one party againstthe other in subsequent
legal proceedings ....................................................36............ CHAPTER5
APPLICATIONOFTHELAW TO THEFACTS
Section5.1 Qatarhasneveracquiredlawfultitle to Zubarahwhich
thereforeremainsunder Bahraini sovereignty ...................3....
Section5.2 Qatar isunableto challengeBahrain'swell-established
sovereigntyoverthe HawarIslands ............................................
PART II . THEMARITIMEDELIMITATION
CHAPTER 6
BAHRAIN'SMARITIME BOUNDARY
Section6.1 Thesouthemsector ...........................................2..............
A . Characteristics................................................2.8.......
....
(i) Bahrain'shistoricalexerciseof sovereigntyandpolitical
control overthe areasbetweenits mainisland and the
Qatarpeninsula .........................................2............
(ii) Contemporarysocio-economiclinksbetween
Bahrain'smain islandandthe maritimefeatures
betweenit andthe Qatar peninsula ......................258...........
(iii) The uniquecharacterof the area to be delimited.........26.2
B . Themaritimeboundaryinthe southemsector .................26.....
(i) Determiningthe pointsthat generatethe medianline ....266
Theresultantmedian linerequiresneither adjustment
(ii)
nor shifing in orderto arriveatan equitableresult ......2.71
Section6.2 Thenorthem sector ..........................................2.............
A . Characteristics...............................................2........
....
B, Bahrain'spearlingbanks ....................................2............
(i) Thenatureofthe Ruler of Bahraintsrights .................5.
(ii) Theexerciseofjurisdiction and control overthe
peatlingbanksby Bahrain .................................6......
(iii) Thelocationof Bahraintspearlingbanks ................2..... Themaritimeboundaryinthe northern sector .......................
C.
Section6.3 Bahrain'salternativeclaim .......................................285................
A . Archipelagicbaselines................................................8.........2
(i) Bahrainis anarchipelagicState ...........................289..........
(ii) The islandscomprisingBahrainare an archipelago .......289
(iii) TheBahrainarchipelagois anintrinsicgeographical
entity ......................................................
...........2
(iv) The Bahrainarchipelagois an intrinsiceconomic
entity ..................................................9...
...........2
(v) TheBahrain archipelagois an intrinsicpolitical entity ....293
(vi) Historicalevidence ofthe existenceofthe Bahtain
archipelagoas an intrinsicgeographical,economic
andpoliticalentity .........................................294.................
(vii) Theratio of theareaof waterto the area of landfalls
between 1 :1and 9: 1........................................295................
(viii) Thebaselinesdo not departto any appreciableextent
fiom the generalconfigurationofthe archipelago .........95
(ix) No baseline exceeds 100 miles ............................2........
(x) Thebaselinesdonot cut offthe territorialsea of
Qatar fromthe High Seasor the ExclusiveEconomic
Zone ......................................................
.................
(xi) Any legitimateandtraditionalrights ofpassage
exercisedby Qatar betweenthe coasts of Qatarsouth
ofBahrain'sarchipelagicwaters andthe Gulf will
continue .......................................................
........2
B . Normalbaselines .................................................29...............
.
C . Thealternativemaritimeboundary ..............................298............
(i) The southemsector.....................................................2
(ii) Thenorthem sector...............................................0.......3 APPENDICES
1. List of PeopleReferredto in Memorial
(withreferences to paragraphsin which they arementioned) .........303..
2. Ruling Farnilies.......................................................09
...........
(i) Rulers ofBahrain ................................................9.........
.
(ii) Chiefs of Doha1Rulers of Qatar ................................................
3. BritishPoliticalResidentsandAgents inThe Arabian Gulf ............11.
(il PoliticalResidents.Bushire. 1822-1960 .........................11.....
(ii) PoliticalAgents.Bahrain. 1900-1960 .........................................
(iii) PoliticalAgents/OfficersQatar. 1949-1960 .....................1.....
4. AdmimsirativeStructures ..............................................15.........
(i) OttomanEmpire .................................................15........
.
British Empire administrationin BahraidQatar Peninsula
(ii)
until IndependenceofIndia. 1947 ...............................16.....
(iii) British Empireadministrationin BahradQatar Peninsula
afier Independenceof India. 1947 ..............................3........
5 . Chronology oftheBritish 1938-1939 Adjudication ..................3.8...
6. List ofHistoricalMaps intheMernorial ..............................32.......
7 . List ofDocumentaryAnnexes(includingillustrativemaps)...............322 CHAPTER1
INTRODUCTION
This Memorial of the Govemment of the State of Bahrain (hereinafter
"Bahrain") is filedpursuant to the Order of the Court of 1 February
1996.
SECTION1.1 Outline of the Memorial
1. The introductow Chapter 1begins with a summarygeographical
descriptionof the region involved in the dispute. This is foIlowed by a
concise statement of Bahrain's position. Chapter1 concludes with an
overaIl description of Bahrain's territorial clairn, as well as a fùller
expositionofthe geographyof the Parties.
2. Part One then examines the major aspects of the territorial
dispute between the Parties, narnely sovereignty over the region of
Zubarah and overthe Hawar Islands.This case depends largely uponits
facts and to a much lesser degree upon differences regarding the
applicable law. Forthat reason thefactual substanceof Bahrain'scase is
presented first.
3. The history of the political evolutionof the two Parties is a key
to this case.In particular,it is important to understandthat the extension
of the power of the State of Qatar (hereinafter "Qatar")over what has
corneto be knownas the Qatarpeninsula is recent, and thatit was both
gradua1 and incomplete. Since the modern State of Bahrain had itsgenesisin Zubarah, this history is setout initially in Chapter 2 relating to
Zubarah, but muchof it also applies ta the Hawar Islands as wiIlbe seen
in Chapter 3. The Mernorial will seek taavoid unnecessary repetition of
this history, but in so far as it occurs, Bahrain asks the Court's
indulgence.
4. The subsequent discussion of law in Chapters 4 and 5 is,in the
circumstances and at this stage ofthe case, relatively brief.
5. Par iwo setsout Bahrain'scase on themaritime boundary.
SECTION 1.2 Summary GeooraphicalDescription of theRegion
6. Map 1 of Volume 7 shows the Gulf of Arabia, from its north-
western end, atthe mouth of the Shatt al Arab,to its easternend north of
Oman.Bahrain and Qatar are located approximately in the centre of the
southem coast of the Gulf.
7. Map 2 of Volume 7 shows the features thatbear directly on the
present case. On the south-eastern side is the Qatar peninsula. On the
north-western side is the main island of Bahrain.The Hawar Islands are
located to the south-east of the main island of Bahrain, off the middle
section of the western coast of the Qatar peninsula. On the west side of
the Qatar peninsula is the Zubarah region, extending £romUmm EI Ma
in the south to Al Arish in the north, and show in greater detail on Map
5 in Volume 7. North of the Qatar peninsula and north-east of the main
isiand of Bahrain is the area of the Bahrainpearling banks, as show on
Map 9 in Volume 7.
8. The mainland to the west and south ofthe main island of Bahrain
andto the south of the Qatar peninsuia forms part of Saudi Arabia. The
mainland onthe northern shore of the Gulfof Arabia is Iran.Bahrain will show that it has continuously exercised more than the
contextually appropriatelevel of occupation and administrationrequired
by international law in the Hawar Islands, while Qatar has exercised
none. Indeed, in the critical period, the record shows that Qatwas
ignorantof the Islands' location.
B. The maritime delimitation
12. Bahrain proposes a maritime delimitation achieved by the
construction of a median line upon the baselines of the territories
appertainingto the two States.
SECTION 1.4 1
A. Evolutionofthe States of Bahrain andOatar
13. Prior to 1971, both Bahrain and Qatar were British Protected
States; that is, Britain responsible for their international protection
and for the conduct of their foreign affairs. That reiationship was
brought toan endby ExchangesofNotes concludedbetweenBritain and
Bahrain on 15 August 1971, and between Britain and Qatar on 3
September 1971.The two States accordingly assumed full international
responsibility for the conduct of their foreign affairs, and became
Members of the United Nations and Parties to the Statute of the
InternationalCourtof Justice on21September 1971.
14. Bahrain however had emerged as a political entity at a much
earlierperiod thanQatar.
15. Because of its water supply from natural springs Bahrain has
been populated for at least 5,000 years. The Qatar peninsula, on the
other hand, is arid; with the exception of Zubarah (lasting onayfewdecades),there is Iittleevidenceof any population there untilthe 1800s,
and even then its few, small and isolated settlements were largeiy
populatedby fishennen andpearldiverson a seasond basis.
16. Through its ruling family, the Al-Khalifa, the political entity of
Bahrain in the 18thCenturyinitially established authorityand control in
what ishown geographicallyas the "Qatar"peninsula. Thatname was
not then used to referto the peninsula as a whole. Thus, for exarnple,a
1838 French map drawn up by a Colonel Lapie, reproduced opposite,
recognised Bahraini dominance over the peninsula by the simple word
"Bahrein"written in capitd letters across the entire territory of what is
today Qatar. The Al-Khalifa rule was subsequently extended overthe
entire Bahrain archipelago.This archipelago comprisesthe main island
of Bahrain, its many immediately fiinging islands, the Hawar Islands
(which appearon ColonelLapie'smapas the "IslesOuardens",a French
adaptation of the then-used English narne "Warden's Islands") and
certain small islands, isIets and low-tide elevations in the Gulf of
Bahrain.
17. In addition, al1 the waters lying within the archipelago and,
particularly, between the main island of Bahrain to the Westand the
Zubarah Coastand the Hawar Islands to the east were andare so closely
linked with the land domain of Bahrain as to have been subject tothe
sameauthorityandcontrol.
18. Reference to the "Qatar" peninsula is, it rnust be emphasised,
only to a geographical feature.The fact that this peninsula has in the
most recent times corne to be equated with the territory of the late
emerging politicalentityof Qatardoes not by itself establish the title or
sovereignty of Qatar over the whale of that peninsula. In relation to
Zubarah, Qatar simply cannot demonstrateany lawful dominion at anytirne;as for the Hawar Islands, theyhave always and in al1ways been
foreign territoryin relationto the Stateof Qatar.
19. The Al-Khalifa familycamefrom Kuwaitto Zubarah in the early
18thCentury and fimly establishedtheir authoritythereuntil they were
forcibly expelled in 1937. During the 19th Century, that authority
extended also throughout the Qatar peninsula, especially its north
western part,and over the tribes living there. In 1783, the Ai-Khalifa
expelledthe Persians from the main island of Bahrain and took control.
They moved their central seat of govemment there fkom Zubarah in
1796.'They developedtheir authority and contxolthere, as well as in the
HawarIslands, whilecontinuingto rule the muchdiminished population
of the Zubarahregion.
20. In al1this activity, the Al-Khalifa fmily, or "Bahrain" as one
may thereafter properly call the deveioping political entity, met no
opposition from any authority whatsoeverin the Qatar peninsula. There
was no indigenouspolitical entity in that peninsula. No entity claiming
to callitself "Qatar"emergeduntil late in the 19thCentury. Even then its
geographical authoritywas limitedto Doha, the srnall settlementon the
eastern Coastof the peninsula. The State of Bahrain existed and was
recognised as a sovereign entity in the early 19th Century. In 1820,
Britain andBahrain concluded a Treaty by which Bahrain became a
party to the Treaty of Peace betweenBritain and the Sheikhs of Ras al-
~haimah.~The Sheikhs of Ras al-Khaimah had been crushed by three
naval expeditions before they signed this Treaty of Peace, the airn of
1 A. Montigny-KozlowskaE , volution d'unerouve bkdouin dans un wavs
producteurde pétroleles Al Naim de Oatar,(Pari1985 PhD thesis), 53,
Ann.229,Vol. 4, p. 983.
2
Aitchison, Treaties. Eneapements and Sanads relating to India and
Neighbourin~Gountries,(1933)Vol. XI,p.233, Ann. 1,Vol.2,p.2.which was the prevention of piracy in the Gulf. According to one
commentator, Bahrain was made a party to this treaty notbecause the
Al-Khalifapractised piracy,but because Bahrain was a marketplace for
plundered good~.~ This was followedby fürther treaties betweenBritain
and Bahrain in 1856 and 1861.During this time, the authority of the
Rulers of Bahtain was acknowledged and exercised thoughout the
islands of Bahrain, including the Hawar Islands, and in the Qatar
peninsula. Bahrain continued to exercise authority over the Qatar
peninsula's tiny population of scattered tribes until 1871, when the
Ottoman Empiretook controlof the area around DohaTown (referredto
as the "kaza"or provinceof "Qatar").
21. It wasin thisperiod(specifically1878)that a CaptainIzzet of the
Ottoman Amy prepared a primitive but highly instructive map of the
region,reproducedafterpage 6,whichonthe one hand showsthe Hawar
Islandsas a part of Bahrainandon the otherhandclearly locates "Qatar"
as aplace inthe far south-eastcornerofthe peninsula.
22. After 1871, the Al-Thani chiefs of Doha attempted to use the
Ottomans, to whom they were subservient, to help them expand their
influence over the peninsula beyond what the Ottomans called the
provinceof "Qatar".Theauthority of the Rulers ofBahrainrecededfrom
Doha, but remainedintact intea lia in the Zubarahregion. Attempts by
the Ottomansand the Al-Thani to establish authority in Zubarah were
consistentlyresisted.
23. The Ottoman Empirewithdrew fromthe province of "Qatar" in
1915. In 1916, Britain and the Al-Thani chief of Doha entered into a
3 Fuad 1.Ouri, Tribeand StateinBahrain,(19801p.27, Ann.227,Vol.4,
p. 967.treaty whereby Britain recognised Abdullah Al-Thani as the "Shaikhof
Qatar". However, as wilI be seen in paragraph 28 and discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 2, the1916 Treaty did not define the area of
"Qatar" or indicate that it was Iarger than that of the previous Ottoman
province of "Qatar". The authority of the Al-Thani did not extend much
beyond Doha and certainly not as far as the western shores of the Qatar
peninsula.No political entity called "Qatar" existed even in theory that
could be assurnedto be in control of the entire Qatarpeninsula.
24. Some time after 1916, the Rulers of Qatar began expanding their
control northwards from Doha dong the east coast of the Qatar
peninsula, to include scattered settlernents fouthere.Ttwas not until
the 1930sthat this expansion reached the Zubarah region. In 1938,the
Ruler of Qatar, eager to expand his new oil fields, made an express
claim to the Hawar Islands.
B. Bahrain'sClaims
(i) The ZubarahRegion
25. The Zubarah region includes the now abandoned town of
Zubarah and its defined outlying areas (see paragraphs 89 to 103 and
map 5 of Volume 7). It has been an integral part of the territories
dependent on the Al-Khalifa family since they settled in the area in the
1760s. After the Al-Khalifa moved their capital from Zubarah to the
main island of Bahrain in 1796,theZubarah region remained under their
authority and control. TheNaim tribe inhabited the Zubarah region fiomthe end of the 18th Century at the invitation of the Rulers of ~ahrain.~
The Nain1 recognised the authority of the Rulers of Bahrain and
regularlymigrated betweenthe main island of Bahrainand ~ubarah.~
26. The situation remained unchanged until 1871. In that year, the
Ottoman Empire attained some measure of control overthe south-east
part of the QatarpeninsuIaby establishinga garrisonin Doha. In the last
quarter of the 19th Century and the early 20th Century, six attempts
were made by the Ottoman Empireand the Al-Thani chiefs of Doha to
expand their authority to include the Zubarah region. Each of these
attempts wasrejectedby Bahrain and by Britain.
27. In 1905, the British Political Agent, Captain F.B. Prideaux,
undertook a detailed study of the Qatarpeninsula and its tribes for
Lorimer's -of. He wote:
"My predecessor,Mr. Gaskin,has of lateyears tried to showthat
al1 the towns of the Peninsula are politically subordinate to
Sheikh Jasim [Al-Thanil,but 1 do not think his arguments are
convincing,and1am told that the peopleof KhuwerHassan, Abu
Dthuluf, Ruwes, Fuwerat, Dthakhira, Dthaayan, Surnesrna and
Khor Shaqiq [in the north of the peninsula] have never paid
revenue to the Sheikhs of Bida andwill [scoff at] the idea of
4
Lorimer's the standard referencework for the
early history of the Gulc notes that the Al Naim had been invited to the
peninsula from Oman by the Al-Utub (the tribe of the ruling Al-Khalifa
family). J.G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf Oman and Central
ArabiaVol. II(1908) p.1306, Ann.74, Vol.3, p. 397.
5 Lorimer'sGazetteerofthe PersianGulf notes:
"The nomadic Na'imoutside Oman are betieved tonumberabout
2,000 souls. In winter they live in Qatar, chiefly in the
neighbourhood ofZubarah; inthehot weather most ofthem remove
toBahrainand form campsinthe northernpari ofthe main isla...O
Ibid., p. 1305,Ann.74, Vol.3,p. 396. As Klaus Ferdinand confimis: "the
special relationshipbetween thAI Naim and the Bahraini Sheikhs'family,
the Al-Khalifah,goes backtothevery coiningofthe Al Naimto Qatarand to
their CO-residencearound Zubarah", in Bedouins of Oatar (1993), p. 41,
Ann.232, Vol.4, p.1013. being their subjects. Business relations many of their pearl
merchants have certainly had with the Thani family but nothing
more ... .
Negotiations for a treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Britain in
1913included a proposa1for anentity called "Qatar" assumed to have
control over the entire Qatar peninsula, but the First World War
intervenedand the treatywasneverratified.7
28. In 1916,Britain concludedatreaty directly withthe Al-Thani.76
* This was the first acknowledgementof independentpolitical statuson
the part of theAl-Thani chiefsof Doha. The Treatyrefemedto Abdullah
Al-Thani's"territories and port of Qatar", but contains no definition of
thoseterritories.This documentcannot, therefore,support any clairn that
the chier sterritories necessarily includedthe Zubarah region. The 1916
Treaty does not acknowledge the existence of a State of Qatar
territorially coextensive with the Qatar peninsula. Nor cm such a
territorialextent be assumed. lndeed two facts serve to contradict any
such assumption. The first is that the effective control of the Zubarah
region continuedto be exercisedby the Rulers of Bairirainafterthe 1916
Treaty, as it was before.The secondis containedin an easily overlooked
aspect of the Treaty. In the prearnbularparagraph,the Sheikh of Qatar
achowledged that he was bound by unilateral persona1undertakings
6 Letter, Capt Prideaux, British Political Agent, to Sir Percy Cox, British
Political Resident,attachedto the latter'sdespatchto the Govt. of16ndia,
July 1905,Ann.71, Vol.3, p. 357. Prideaux uses the phrase "the peo...
will scoutthe idea ofbeing theirsubjects".The word "smeans"to reject
withscornorridicute" (ConciseOxfordDictionary).
7
Unratified Conventionbetween United Kingdomand Turkey regarding the
PerçianGulfand adjacentterritories,29Ju1913,Ann.81, Vol.3, p.431.
8
Treatybetweenthe BritishGovt. andthe Shaikhof Qata-3November 1916,
Aitchison,op. cit., p.258,Ann. 84,Vol.3513.signed by his grandfather in 1~68.~ Among these undertakings was a
promise (in paragraph 5th of the 186s document) to maintain towards
the Chief of Bahrain "al1 the relations which heretofore subsisted
between me and the Sheikh of Bahrain." The "relations" in question
included a cornmitment to pay an annual levy to the Ruler of Bahrain
evidencedby an undertakingsignedby the chiefsof Doha as welIas six
Chiefs fiom other parts of ~atar.'' The fact that this 1868 obligation
subsisted and was recognised in 1916means that the Ruler of Bahrain
was recognised as still retaining dominionand authority in parts of the
Qatar peninsula. It follows that the area of rule of the Chief of Qatar
couldnot in 1916 have been regardedas coterminouswith the peninsula
as a whole.
29. As a matterof fact,for20 years followingthe BritishTreatywith
Abdullah Al-Thanithe authority ofthe State of Qatar did not extend to
the western part of the Qatar peninsula. As before,the Zubarah region
remained under Bahrain' s authority and control. Qatar's occasional
efforts to subvert the Naim tribe living there from their allegiance to
Bahrainfailed.
30. In 1936,Qatar becarneactively interestedin the Zubarah region.
This was coincident withexploration for oil in Qatari territory. In that
year, the governent of Qatar attempted to imposea tax on the Naim
tribe inhabiting the Zubarah region. The Al-Jabr branch of the Naim
tribe, ever loyalto the Ruler of Bahrain, rejectedthis attemptto impose
9 Agreementof the Chief ofEl-Kutr (Gutter-enza.aoinot to commit any
Breachofthe MaritimePeace,12 September1868,Aitchison,op.cit.,. 183
to184,Ann.12,Vol.2, pp.157to 158. Thisdocument isfurthediscussedin
paragraphs127to 129.
Agreementof the Chiefsof Oatar. 13 September1868, Aitchison,op. cit.,
p. 193,Ann.13,Vol.2,p. 159.the tax and appealed to the Ruler of Bakrain as their sovereign.
Negotiations commenced in May 1937between the State of Bahrain and
the State of Qatar, often involving Britain as mediator, on the status of
the Zubarahregion.
31. These negotiations were interrupted in July 1937, when Qatar
mounted an med expedition against the Zubarah region and expelled
the Bahraini subjects who then irhabited it. This act of aggression was
inconsistent with then prevailing principles relating to the renunciation
of the use of force enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations
and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Bahrain protested against the attack and
has never since waived, or waveredin, its claim to the Zubarahregion.
32. The events of 1937 were a violation of international law,
incapable of terminating existing rights or generatinginconsistentrights.
33. In 1944," the Parties agreedthat the status of the Zubarahregion
would "remain, without altering anything which did not exist before."
Theunderstanding failed because each Party interpreted it to support its
own view ofthe issueof sovereignty.
34. The State of Bahrain's clairn to the Zubarah region has never
been adjudicated. Bahrain has over theyearsput several proposais to the
State of Qatar in anattempt to promote a peaceful dialogue about the
status ofZubarah.Negotiations have been unsuccessful. Bahrainis fully
entitled, under international lawto plenary sovereignty over Zubarah.
" Agreementbetweenthe Ruler of Bahrainand the Ruler of Qatar, A167,
Vol.4,p. 752.(ii) TheHawar Islands
35. Though close to the shores of the Qatar peninsula, the Hawar
Islands are partof the Bahrain archipeIago.They are only afew minutes
away fromthe main island ofBahrain by helicopter, less than an hour by
motor boat. By sail boat thejouniey is no more than three or four hours.
Socially, culturally, economically and politically, the islands constitute
an appendage of the main island of Bahrain. The comprehensive links
between the Hawar Islands and the other islands of the Bahrain
archipelagoare well docurnented.
36. In about 1800,members ofthe Dowasirtribe sought and obtained
permission fiom the Qadi of Zubarah, an official of the Al-Khalifa
farnily,to settle on the islands. They thus acknowledgedtheir allegiance
to the Rulers of Bahrain.Occupation of the Islands by Bahraini subjects
has ever sincebeenopen and continuous.No rival presence has appeared
there atany time.
37. Bahrain'sjurisdiction and control over the Hawar Islands thus
cornmenced twocenturiesago. The economic activities of the islanders-
gypsumextraction, fishing and pearl diving - were al1dependent on the
markets in the main island of Bahrain. In contrast, there is no
documentation of any contact between the inhabitants of the Hawar
Islands and the Settlementsof the east coast of the Qatar peninsula. The
latter are more than 150 kilometres sailing distance around the
peninsula, or an a~duous80 kilometres landjoumey across desert sand
androck .
38. With the development of the oil industry in Bahrain starting in
the early 1930s,life on the main island became more attractive than life
on the Hawar Islands.As a result, the Hawar Islands lost much of theirpopulation. The traditional way of life declined. Nevertheless, therare
still people alive who remernberlife on the Hawar Islands half a century
ago. These Hawar Islanders - principally from the Dowasir tribe, many
of them distinguished and influential members of Bahraini society - now
live onthe other islands of Bahrain.
39. The Ruler of Qatar first made a forma1claim to the Hawar
Islands in May 1938. Over the next year, the British Governent
adjudicated the dispute over the Hawar Islands. Britain sought the views
of both Parties. It concluded that there was ovenvhelming evidence in
support of the sovereignty of Bahrain over the Hawar Islands and none
to support the claim put forward by Qatar. Indeed, apart fiom Qatar's
bald - and legally irrelevant-assertionthat the Hawar Islands belonged
to it because of their proximity to the coast of the Qatar peninsula, Qatar
produced no evidence to support its case. No Al-Thani, Ottoman, or
Qatari authonty has ever been exercised over the Hawar Islands. No Al-
Thani, Ottoman or Qatari adherents have ever iived in the Hawar Islands
or, before the opening of the DuMianoil field in 1939, on the coast of
the Qatar peninsula opposite these islands. No governent action other
thanthat of Bahrain has evertaken place onthe Hawar Islands.
40. The British adjudication is resjudicuta and the confirmation of
Bahrain's title to the Hawar Islands is Iegally binding on the Parties.
Indeed, it was once again so viewed by Britain in 1947when it stated its
views as to the maritime delimitation betweenthe Parties.
41. Bahrain does not, however, rely exclusively upon the 1939
British adjudication. Bahrain'stitle ultimately rests upon the fact of its
continuous, uninterrupted andexclusiveexercise ofjurisdiction over the
Hawar Islands fiom the beginning of the 19th Century to the present
day, especially in cornparisonwith theabsence of Qatari activitiesthere.Bahraini laws operate in the Hawar Islands; Bahraini justice is
administered in relation to disputes arising there; Bahrain has always
regulatedfishing andmining activities(gypsurnand oïl); Bahrainipolice
are present there, as are Bahraini forces; Bahrain provides public
services,suchasthe water supply; theresidentscany Bahrainipassports,
are included in the Bahraincensus and are eligible tvote in Bahraini
elections. By reference to the criteria of sovereignty operative at al1
relevant times, there is no doubt that the Hawar Islands belong to
Bahrain.
SECTION1.5 Expanded GeographicaIDescription
A. Bahrain
42. The State of Bahrain is cornprised of an archipelago which
includes morethan 50 islands,low-tideelevationsand shoals situatedin
the Gulf of Bahrain off the Arabian peninsula, and the territory on the
north-west coast of the Qatar peninsula referred to as the Zubarah
region.
43. The land area ofthe archipelagois approximately 701 km2. The
main island of Bahrain, sometimes calledAwal Island, has an area of
591km2.Todayit is connectedby causewaystomost of the immediately
neighbouring islands, such as Muharraq, Sitra,Umm Al Na'san and
Nabih Saleh.A causeway hasalso been built fiom the main islandto the
coast of Saudi Arabia. The other principal islands of the Bahrain
archipelago are inthe Hawar Islands group, located about 11 nautical
miles to the south-eastof the main island of Bahrain about half-wayup
the western coast ofthe Qatarpeninsula.TheHawar Islands havea land
areaof nearly51 km2.44. Between the south-west of the main island of Bahrain and the
Arabian peninsula, there is a relatively deep and featureless stretch of
sea. These waters have traditionally acted as a barrier between Bahrain
and the Arabian peninsula. In contrast to this natural fiontier to its West,
to the east and south-east of the main island of Bahrain lie the calm and
shallow waters which extendto the western coast ofthe Qatar peninsula.
These eastem reaches of the Gulf of Bahrain rarely exceed ten metres in
depth, with great expanses less than two metres deep. Sheltered in the
west by the main island of Bahrain and in the east by the western coast
of the Qatar peninsula andabundant in pearl-oysters and fish, the eastern
reaches of the Gulf of Bahrain have for many centuries effectively been
a Bahraini lake.
45. The seas within the Bahrain archipelago contain a nurnber of
relatively small islands, including notably Jazirat Ajirah, Al Mu'tarid,
Jazirat Mashtan, Jabbari, Umm Jalidand Qit'at ~aradah." They also
contain the low-tide elevations of Fasht Bu Thur, Qita'a el Erge, Qit'at
ash Shajarah and Fasht ad Dibal. Each of the latter two low-tide
elevations is several miles in extent. Fasht al'Azm, a large reef which
constitutesan integral part of Sitrah Island and is exposed at low tide,I3
extends for over ten miles in an east-south-easterly direction towards
Qit'at:ash Shajarah.
46. The mainland component of Bahrain, the Zubarah region, is
located on the north-western coast of the Qatar peninsula, facing the
main island of Bahrain. The region is composed of the tribal "dirah" -
the lands inhabited andused for grazing livestock - ofthe Al-Jabrbranch
I2
Thestatuçof Qit'aJaradahis discussedmore fullyatparagraphs580 to 598
and622 to624.
l3
ThestatusofFasht alrAm isdiscussedmorefullyatparagraphs620to 626.of the Naim tribe, which has consistently recognised the authority of the
Ruler of Bahrain. The members of this branch of the Naim tribe
defended the Zubarah region against Qatar'sarmed attack in July 1937.
The extent of the Zubarah region is shown on Map 5 in Volume 7. It
stretches from Al Arish, about 10 kilometres north of the town of
Zubarahon the coast, to Umm El Ma, about 20 kilometres south of the
town of Zubarah. Inland from the coast of the Gulf of Bahrain, the
region stretches to Al Na'man,Masarehah and Al Thagab (see further
paragraphs 89to 103).
47. Until 1937,the main population centres of Bahrain completely
encircIedthe eastem reaches of the Gulf of Bahrain: the main island of
Bahrainin the west, the Hawar Islands in the south-east and, in the past,
Zubarah in the north-east. The ensemble constituted a protected
maritime enclave. The waters of the Gulf of Bahrain have for centuries
been dominated politically and economicaily by the AI-Oalifa farnily
and their subjects. This historical reality is a kto understanding the
territorial as well as the maritimeissues in this case.
48. Although subterranean aquifers enable substantial irrigation on
both the main island and Muharraq, the life of the people of Bahrain
was, and remains, inexticably Iinked with the sea. In theera before the
development of oiI, the pearling industry was the major source of
wealth. The main pearling banks were to the north and north-east of the
archipelago.Income from pearling provided not only most of the wealth
of the country but was also the major source of government revenue. In
the 1930s, however, cultured pearls were developed in Japanand threw
the Bahrainipearling industry into a depression fromwhich it has yet to
recover. Howevsr, as Iate as the 1960s the industry still continued.
Feasibility studies are under way in order to determinhow to revive it. "Whenwetravelledfiom Zellaq tathe HawarIslands,we used to
sail to Ra's al Barr on the southern tip of the main island of
Bahrainandthen towardsthe eastuntilwe reachedHalatNoon, a
very srna11island. After HalatNoon we sailed on to Al Mu'tarid.
Then we sailed east until we arrivedfi-orna northerly directionat
the two Rabad islands which are to the north of the main Hawar
Island. We wouldpass to the west of the RabadIslands and enter
the main Hawar Islandfrom a bay in the nnorth.We would put a
stick in the sea-bed to tie the dhows in the bay of the North
Village because we didn't useanchors."'4(This traditional route
isshownon Map 3 in Volume 7.)
53. SimiIarly, the Naim and others would migrate between north-
west Qatar and the main is1and of Bahrain. One hundred years ago
Zubarah was several days' journey cross-country from Doha Town,
while it was "only four hours' sail from Bahrain in fair weather."I5
Moreover, it was a long established practice ofthe Al-Khalifa ruling
family, following seasonaI rains,to çend their flocks fiom Bahxainto
graze on the western side of the Qatarpeninsula. This practice was a
regularfeatureof thepastoraleconomy of Bzthrainin the pre-oil era.16
54. The population of Bahrain was estimated in 1995 as
approximately 580,000 of whom approximately 370,000 (64%) were
Bahraini citizens. Bahrain is one of the world's five most densely
populated corntries, and by far the most densely populated in the Gulf.
ThepopuIationis expandingrapidly.
l4 See statement of Ibrahim bin Salrnan Al Ghattarn, para. 3, Ann.316(a),
Vol.2,p. 1400.
l5
Prkcisof newsreceivedfrom BahrainAgentin August 1873,Ann. 18,Vol. 2,
p. 172,.
l6 See correspondencebetween Maj. Daly, British Political Agent, and Lt. Col.
Knox, the British Political Resident17October 1923, Ann. 88, Vol. 3,
p.525. The Sheikh ofBahrain's 'grazing rightsin the Qatar peninsula were
recognisedina 14 July 191 report of the British Standing Cornmitteeof the
Imperia1Defence."Itappears inexpedientomake anyconcessionsto Turkey
in regard to the El Katr Peninsula, sincethe Sheikh of Bahrain has grazing
and otherrightsthe..."Ann. 77,Vol. 3p.41 1.55. Although Bahrain was the first Arab Gulf State to produce oil
afterthe first discovery there in 1932, there have been no significant
discoveriessince. From a peak of 70,000 barrels/dayin 1970,Bahrain's
oil production declined by 5% per year until it stabilised at around
40,000 barrelsjday in the mid-1980s. (The output in 1995 was 39,000
barreldday .)
56. Bahrain'stotal oil reservesin 1995were estimatedat 210million
barrels, 18 times less than the oil reserves of Qatar. Unlike Qatar,
Bahrain is nota memberof OPEC.
57. Bahrainhas nothing to compare to Qatar'svas1liquefied natural
gas (LNG)projects (seeparagraph71).
B. Qatar
58. The Qatar peninsula is a large, desolate body of land that
stretchesinto the Gulfof Arabiaat the Gulfs mid-point on its southem
side.About 160kilometreslongand up to70kilometreswide, the Qatar
peninsula is low lying and formed of limestone rock. It has a surface
area of approximately 11,400km2 and a maximum elevation of 40m
above sea level with extremelyhigh temperatures and humidity. It is a
desert territory, relentlessly barren. The virtual absence of natural
vegetation has effectively excluded any permanent human presence in
the interior.17
59. The State of Qatar comprisesthe territory of the Qatar peninsula,
with the exception of theZubarahregion which is part of the territoryof
the Stateof Bahrain.
l7 R.S.Zahlan, TheCreationofOata, (1979)pp.13 to 15,Ann.226, Vol. 4,
pp.947to948.60. The small populations living on the Qatar peninsula during the
19th Century centred on Doha,lg on the south-east coast of the Qatar
peninsula,and Bahrain'sZubarahregion,onthenorth-westcoast.Today,
Zubarah is abandoned and an estirnated 80%of Qatar'spopulation live
in l30ha.I~The country's secondmost importanttown is Wakrah, which
is in reality a southern extension of the Doha agglomeration, and the
third is the industrial centre of Umm Said 30kilometresto the south of
Doha. Estimates of the population of Qatar in the 1950s placed the
number between 20,000 and 25,000. According to the Economist
IntelligenceUnit Country Profile for Qatar,theindigenouspopulationof
Qatar at the end of 1995 was "believed to be around 155,000;" the
overall population includes nearly three timas as many foreigners.
Qatar's total populationhas a particularly high proportionof immigrant
workers; 38% of the people living in the countxycorne from Iiidia or
Pakistana~one.~'
61. Excluding expatriates in both cases, the relative population
densities of Bahrain and Qatar are drarnatically differen521 Bahrainis
perkm2,14Qatarisper km2.
62. Small settlements - little more than encampmentsof fishermen -
were recorded on the east coast of the Qatar peninsula during the early
19th Century. As these settlements developed into permanent villages,
notably Doha, they remainedquite isolated from the Gulf of Bahrain on
the far side of the peninsula. The inhabitants of the east coast, in and
18
Dohawasknown duringmuchof the 1800asAl Bidda.
l9
EconomistIntelligenceUnitCountry ProforOatar 1996-97,33.
*O Ibid.around Doha itself, were primarily concerned with the exploitation of
the pearling banks inthe waters due east of Doha.
63. In addition to the settled population on the Qatar peninsula, there
were nomadic and semi-nomadictribes. It is not possible to make a clear
distinction between the settled and the nomadic populations. The
important Naimtribe -subjects of the Ruler of Bahraîn- would migrate
by sea between the Zubarahregion onthe north-west corner of the Qatar
peninsula and the Bahrain archipelago. Other tribes migrated overland
between the mainland of Arabia and the Qatar peninsula, recognising
and being aware of no fiontier between peninsula and mainland. Many
of them admitted no superior authority within the peninsula, as the Al-
Thani SheiMisrepeatedly acknowledged (see paragraphs 133, 146 and
158 to 159).From early in the 20th Century until 1937 and later, they
were more likely to recognise the authority of Ibn Saud than that of
Sheikh Abdullah bin Jasim Al-Thani.These tribes paid the tax of zakat
to Ibn Saud and acknowledged his authority. The inhabitants of the
northem villages paid taxes out of their incorne from pearling directlyto
marauding tribes in order to be left in peace. There was no central
authority in the Qatarpeninsula able to deal with the tribesmeon behalf
of al1 the inhabitants of the peninsula until after the Al-Thani had
extendedtheir authoritythrough many other parts of the peninsula in the
second half of the 1930s;but the Al-Thani did not, even then, establish a
permanentpresence in Zubarah.
64. Until well into the 20th Century, the ecology of the Arabian
peninsula inhibited the emergence of States or rulers whose territory
could be defmed by reference to specific boundaries. Tribes moved
through the arid and semi-arid areas in cycles detemined by the
sustainability of life and not by abstract borders. Given the reality oftransient populations, political authority in the area was exercised over
people and evidenced by the allegiance of tribal groupings. The territory
occupied by tribes owing aüegiance to a mler was thereby under the
authority ofthat mler - for as long as that occupation and that allegiance
would last. Sovereignty over territory did not arise fiom a meaningless
assertionof lordship overthe desert. Nowhere was this more tme than in
the case of the arid and scarcely populated Qatar peninsula. It is
therefore possible to identify the territory over which the Rulers of
"Qatar" exercised authority only on the basis of tribal allegiance. The
population of the peninsula owing allegiance to the Al-Thani was
originally very small and centred on Doha and its environs. Only later,
asthe Al-Thani authoritygradually expanded, did that of the Sheikhs of
Bahrain within the QatarpeninsuIa recede.
65. Doha is of course on the eastem side of the Qatar peninsula,
separated fiom the Gulf of Bahrain by 80kilornetres of barren desert
wasteland. Originally, "Burr Kutr", "Gatr", "Katr" or perhaps most
commonly "Guttur", was the name given to the eastern Coast of the
peninsula that is now known in its entirety as the Qatar peninsula.
Indeed, some contemporaneous sources used "Qatar"to refer simplyto
Doha; see, e.g. the Ottoman rnap reproduced after page 6. Until
relativelyrecently, there was no need to refer to the Qatar peninsula as a
whole because it comprised neither a single geo-political nor a single
geo-economic unit. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the
southern area of the Qatar peninsula around Doha as a "kaza" (district)
until 1915,referred to it as "Qatarand considered it a unit distinctfrom
the other two sub-districts {nahiye)onthe peninsula,which it referred to
as "Zubarah"and "Odaid".66. Until 1937, the Zubarah region was inhabited by Bahraini
subjects: the Naim tribe.21There is nothing to indicate that the peoples
of the north-east andnorth-west of the Qatar peninsula owed any forrnof
allegiance to the Al-Thani Sheikhs.
67. Oldresidents of the Hawar Islands who are still living in Bahrain
recall that they occasionally ventured to the coast of the Qatar peninsula
opposite Bawar half a century ago, notably to search for desert truffles -
a popular recreational activity. They al1Saythat there were no signs of
human habitation in that harsh land. As one former Hawar Islander,
Harnoud bin Muhanna al Dosari, recalled:
"..if we were fishing near the Westcoast of the Qatar peninsula
we would go to Zekrit. Therewas a spring there where we could
getfresh water. Wenever met anyone or saw any signs of human
life when we went to Zekrit. Along al1the shore opposite the
Hawar Islands you would not meet another person except the
occasional itinerantbedouin. Even when we occasionally went to
the place called Dukhan,on the coast of the Qatar peninsula
south of the Hawar Islands,to look for desert truffles, we rarely
met any~ne."~~
68. The situation is no different today. There is little sign of life
except Dukhan, a recent oil town of prefabricated buildings where
people have gone to work, not to live. There is still no road up the
western ~oast.~'Onlya negligible proportion of the population of Qatar
Iivesonthewest coast.
21 Since the 1937 armed attack by Qatar on ZubaratheZubarah region has
beenvirtuallyuninhabited.
22 See statement of Hamoud bin Muhanna al Dosari, para. 16, Ann.313(a),
Vol. 6, p. 1366.Seealso statementsof Ibrahim bin Salman AlGhattam,para.
10, ~nn. 316(a), Vol.6, p. 1402, Nasr bin Makki al Dosari, para. 10,
Ann.314(a), Vol.6, p. 1379, and Salman bin Isa al Dosari, para. 4,
Ann. 315(a)VoI.6,p. 1392.
L5
SeeOxfordMap ofQatar,Vol.7, Map 16.69. Oil was discovered in Qatar in 1939. Production has in recent
years averaged above 400,000 barrelslday (422,000 in 19951,more than
ten times the production of Bahrain. Taking a constant valueUSf $20
per barsel for purposes of cornparison, this represents an annual per
capita value of US $18,830 for the native Qatari population. The
corresponding figure forahrainis US $769.
70. Qataralso has threemajor liquefiednatural gas (LNG)projects in
its vast North Fieldthe world's largesthown single deposit of non-
associatednatural gas. The first (Qatargas) will reportedly supply 4 m
tonslyear of LNGto Japanbeginning in 1997.The second (Rasgas) will
supply 2.4 m tonshear Io Korea beginning in 2001, with a Mer
production capacity of 7.5m tonslyear. The third project is led by the
well-known United StatesCompanyEnron; itcontemplates production
of more than 5 m tons/year to commence in 1999, intended to suppIy
customersin Israel,Jordan, andIndia.
71. If these projects materialise as planned, Qatar'sLNG output will
easily exceedthat of Algeria,one of the world'sleading on-streamLNG
producers. Algeria generally exports about: 15 m tondyear, which
translate into export earningsonthe magnitudeof US $2.5to 2.8 billion.
For the Qatari population, these projects thus hold the promise of
additionalannual revenues of well over $20,000per capita. Byway of
cornparison,Bahrain'ssole gas liquefaction plant is expected to produce
0.38million tonsin 1996. PART1
THE TERRITORIALOUESTIONS CHAPTER 2
BAHRAIN'SSOVEREIGNTYOVERTHE ZUBARAHFUCGION
72. The principal elements of Bahrain'stitleto the Zubarah region
are:
a) evidence of the exercise of authority and control by or on
behalf of the Ruler of Bahrain over the people inhabiting the
Zubarahregion andthus over the region itself;
'hi
ICj b) recognition by the inhabitants of the Zubarah region of the
:ar authority of the Ruler ofBahrain over themselves and over the
ab
id( area in which theylived; and
iir
nt
c) absence of anycompeting exerciseof authority by Qatar in the
d
iaj Zubarah region until its amied attack and forcible expulsion of
1b:
Bahrainisof the region in 1937.
SECTION 2.1 The geographical extent of the Zubarah re~ion
1
inhabited bv the Naim tribe, who recognised the
authority of theRuler of Bahrain
A. The Naim tribe and its relationshipwith Bahrain
73. Before turning to the substance of Bahrain'sclaim to sovereignty
icis over the Zubarahregion, it will be helpfiil to describe the geographical
sidi
171 extent of the area over which Bahrain assertsits sovereignty.
74. Identification of the area of the Zubarah regiand the question
of title to it is closely linked to the character of tribal aliegiances in the~ahrain." In describing the event, the senior British officia! stationed in
the Gulfof ~rabia~'observed:
"Zobarah is held by the Naim Tribe who are allies and in some
degree dependants of the Bahrain Chief.The sovereignty over al1
this Coast is undefined, but the ChXefsof Bahrain have always
looked on Zobarah as a feudal dependency of Bahrain. Sheikh
Esau [the Ruler of Bahrain; usually spelled "Isa"] accordingly
allowed the body of the Naim Tribe who had corne to his
assistance to return to the relief of their comrades at Zobarah.
Sheikh Ahmedthe Chiefs brother accompaniedthese Naim allies
to Zobarahbut did not
80. The allegiance owed by the Nairn tribe to the Ruler of Bahrain
was centra1to the security of the main island of Bahrain, sincethe Ruler
could depend on them to defend Zubarah. If Zubarahwere to fall, they
could rapidly remove to the poorly defended main island and increase
the forcesthere. The PoliticalResident also recognised this:
"Shaikh Esau necessarily relies much on the Naeem tribe of
Zubara who came to his aid in his late dangers, and if he were to
be deprived of their support, his means of defence would be
greatly~eakened."~~
It was for this reason that the Ruler of Bahrain had sent reinforcements
to Zubarah in responseto the 1874attack andrepairedthe fortthereafter.
'' J.A.SaIdana'sPrécisof Katar Affairs (Simla,19041, p.4,Ann. 70, Vol. 2,
p. 292.
30 For a description of Britain'ç political and diplornatic involvement and
administrativestructure in the Gulf of Arabia, see Secti2.4 starting at
para136. See also App.4(11) for an organigramme of the British
administrativeand diplornaticerarchyinthe Gulf ofArabiapriorto1947.
31
Letter fiom British Political Resident to the Secretaryto the Govt. of India
ForeignDepartment12 September1874,Ann.21,Vol.2, p. 180.
32
Letter frornLt. Col. Ross, BritishPoiitical RestoeSecrdaryto Govt. of
India, 10November1874,Ann.24, Vol.2, p. 184.8 1. In February 1875,the Naim senttheir cattleto the main island of
Bahrain for protection. The cattle weretransported in boats provided by
the Ruler of ~ahrain.~~
82. During 1876and 1877,the Ruler of Bahrain:
distributed provisions and cattleto 100 members of the
a)
Naim tribe in orderto assist them to returnto the Zubarahregion
fromthe main island of ~ahrain;~~
b) subsidised the income of the Naim tribe and permitted
them to frequent other parts of Bahrain, treating them as his
subjects;
used 100 of the Nairn tribesmen as regdar soldiers in the
c)
Bahrain ami^; ^^d
d) sent "a strong partyof armedmen" to Zubarah "supplied
with arms [and]provisions".36
83. In a report on Qatar dated September 1893, the Ottoman
authorities admitted that the inhabitants of the Zubarah region owed
allegiance to the Ruler of Bahrain. In describing the tribes of the
province of Qatar and its vicinity, the Ottoman authorities recognised
that:
33 Trmslated purport of a lehmer News Agent Bahrain, toLt. Col. Ross,
British Political Resident,9 February 1875,Ann.28, Vol.2,p195.4to
34 Letter from Capt. Prideaux, British Political Resident, to toctheary
Govt.of India,7 October1876,Ann.34,Vol.2, p.203.
35
Letter fiom Maj.Grant, British Political Resident, to Ruler of Bahrain,
17September1877,Ann.35, Vol.2, p. 205. "The third [tribe] is the Naim. Although this tribe goes about on
the Katar coast, that is between the town of Katar and Zubara,
because they go to Bahreyn in the date season and because
Bahreyn sheikhIsa presents them with some dates and coffee and
other things every year, this tribe is really to be counted among
the tribesof~ahre~n."~~
84. In January 1906,a Persian boat had been obliged to seek shelter
fioma stom at Abu Dhuluf,just north of theruined town of Zubarah. It
was attacked by the local inhabitants. Because this was considered as
constituting an act of piracy, the British Political Agent, Captain
Prideaux, investigated the matter. Prideaux visited Abu Dhuluf and
requested an interview with the local chief. The chief refùsed the
interview and declared himself to be a "subject of the Shaikh of
Bahrain". Captain Prideaux then wrote to him and requested that he
appear in Bahrain to explain the acts of piracy. He compIied and
appeared in Bahrain on 1 March 1906:~ thus evidencing his allegiance
to the Ruler of Bahrain.
85. The Naim tribe consisted of several branches. The next most
important branch was called the ~l-~amzan.~~The tribal dirah of the
Al-Rarnzanwas situated far to the south of Zubarah, along the coast of
the Qatar peninsula to the south of UmmEl Ma and inland as far as Al
~a'i~ah.~'But'the branch which traditionally led the Naim tribe was
called the ~l-~abr.~~
The tribal dirah of the Al-Jabr branch of the Naim
was situated in and around the ruined town of Zubarah (see paragraphs
37 OttomanreportonKatar,September1893,Ann.52(a),Vol.2,p. 255
LorimerVol. 1,op.cit., p.833,Ann. 83,Vol.3,p.486.
39 Ferdinand,op. cilp.44, Ann.232, Vol.4,p. I013a.
40
See map prepared by Montigny-Kozlowska, op. cit.Aan.229, Vol.4,
p. 983a.
41
Ferdinand,op.cii., 44,Ann. 232, Vol. p. 1013a.89 to 103). By 1937, the Al-Rarnzanbranch of the Naim tribe had
switched its allegianceto the Al-Thani Rulers of Qatar as a resuIt of an
interna1 tribal dispute. According to a report of the British Political
Agent of 3 May 1937:
"Sometime ago â man called Ramazan of the Ramazin
sub-section of the Na'im tribe divorced bis wife. The woman
remarried into the Al Jabor section of the Na'imtribe. As a result
of this there was friction between Ramazan and Shaikh Rashid
bin Mohammad, the aI1egedleader of the Na'im. As a result of
this friction the Ramazin sub-sectionleft the Na'im and joined
the Shaikhof ~atar."~~(Emphasisadded.)
The Al-Jabr branch of the Naim tribe maintained its allegiance to the
Ruler of Bahrain.
86. The Ruler of Qatar sought to becorne active in the Zubarah
region in early 1937,intending to impose his authority on the region.
Concerned at that development,the Rüler of Bahrain and the headmanof
theNaim tribe, Rashid Al Jabr, kept inclose communication. Like al1of
the Al-Jabr Naim, the headman was a Bahraini subject. Likemany ofthe
Naim he had been born on the main island of Bahrain. As a leader of a
tribe dependent on Bahrain, he was entitled to an allowance from the
Bahraini Civil ~ist.~~At the time of the Zubarah conflict in 1937,the
Naim headman tumed to his sovereignboth to warn him of the threat to
his interestsand to seek protection in deterring the Qatariaggression. He
42
Report entitled "Zubarah Incident" by Capt.Hickinbotharn, the British
Political Agent, on the Zubarah incident, 3 May 1937, Ann. 126, Vol. 3,
p.653.
43
Telegam from British Political Agent to Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political
Resident,23April1937,Ann. 119,Vol3,p.642.warned in his Iettertothe Rulerof Bahrain that:
"Bin Thany has displayed his enmity towards you and what is
more ishis ideato take Zubara and otherplaces...".44
87. Thereupon, Bahraini soldiers, arrns4$ and food46for the Naim
were sent to Zubarah by the Ruler of Bahrain. The Bahraini flag was
planted conspicuously on the beach by the old fort in Zubarah. Repairs
to the fort were commenced by ~ahrain.~~In a letter to the British
Political Agent, Charles Beigrave, Adviser to the Government of
Bahrain,explained:
"TheNaim and their relations, who are clairned by the Bahrain
Govemment and themselves claim tu be Bahrain subjects, have
always in the past received financial subsidies and food from the
Ruler of Bahrain.Duringthe recent disturbances in Qatar ...they
had difficulty in obtaining food supplies, some of them were
given rice and dates, and others, in Bahrain, were given money
with which theypurchased food fortheir families and relations in
Zubarah.
Arms and arnmunitionwere issued by the Bahrain Government
to al1the villages onthe south coast of Bahrain [for fear of]...an
attack from the mainland. Certain inhabitants of these villages
andislandswhoserelations and in somecases wives and children
were with the Naim tribe at Zubara crossed over to Zubara and
joined the Naimandwere present at the swender when armsand
44 Letter frorn Rashid bin MohomedAl Jabor, headmanof Naim, to Ruler of
Bahrain,3 Safar 1356(15April1937),Ann. 116,Vol.3, p. 636.
45 Letterfrom Rulerof Qatarto Capt.Hiçkinbotham,British PoliticalAgent11
July 1937,Ann. 149,Vol. 4, p. 714.See also statement of Mohammed bin
MohammedbinTheyabAl Naimi,para 14,Ann.233(a),Vol.4,p. 1017.
46
Letter from Charles BelgraveAdviser to the Govt. of Bahrain, toCapt
~ickinbotham, British PoliticaIAgent, August 1937, Ann. 158, Vol.4,
p.729.
47 Telegram fromBritish Political Agent,to Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political
Resident,26 Apri1937,Ann. 122,Vol. 3, p. 646. munition were handed over as part of the tenns of
surrender"48
88. In the aftermathof Qatar'sarmedattack on the Zubarahregion in
1937,the Ruler ofQatar forcedthe tribesmen eitherto switchallegiance
to him or to leave the Qatar peninsula. The rnajority fled to Bahrain,
including the headrnan (for an analysis of Qatar's 1937 attack, see
Section2.13 startingat paragraph253).
B. Thetribal divahof theAI-Jabrsection ofthe Naimtribe
89. The geographical extent of the Zubarah region claimed by
Bahrain is that area over which Bahrain continuously and openly
exercised authorityby virtue of the aIlegianceof the Al-Jabr branch of
the Naim tribe. Their tribal dirah constitutes the area over which
Bahrain had sovereigntitle at the time of Qatar's1937amed attack and
to whichBahrrtinstillassertstitle. Itis shownon Map 5 in Volume7.
90. The tribaldira hf the Al-Jabr sectionof the Naim tribe in 1937
may be determined by: (a) interviews with members of the Al-Jabr
branch of theNaim tribe who lived in Zubarahprior to the 1937attack
and who are still dive, and(b)conternporaneousdocuments describing
the limits ofthe tribal area.
91. An elderlymemberof the Al-Jabr branchof the Naim tribe bom
in 1920 and now living in Bahrain recently recalled the area within
whichhistribe moved,dependingonthe season:
"When 1was young, 1would spendthe winter with my farnily
towardsthe northof the Qatarpeninsula, and move Mer south
inthe summer.We lived mainlyin the areabetween Hulwanand
48
Letter hm CharleBelgrave, Adviser to tGovt.of Bahrain, to Capt.
Hickinbotharn,British Political Agent, 19 August 19158,Vol. 4,
pp.729to 730. Lisha (about four kilometres from the shoreline of the Gulf of
Bahrain) and Masaicha [Masarehahlbut wandered up as far north
as the ruined city of Zubarah, Al Arish and Al ïhagab. At other
times in the year we wouldreach places further south such as AI
Na'man,Al Judaydah, Al Maharaqa and UmmGabrain (Umm a1
Ghubbur). We would set up a camp wherever we could find
waternearby. Thiswas our homeland. "49
92. Another former Zubarah resident, Salehbin Muhammed Ali bin
Al Nairni,recalled in 1996:
"The Zubarah region included Al Na'rnan,Lisha, Hulwan, Ain
Muhamrned, Zubarah and Al Faraihah. There were about 3000
Al Naim who lived there, about 2000 of whom werebedouin and
about 1000 of whom were hadar(settled).My fmily was hadar.
The Zubarah region was part of the Ruler of Bahrain'sterritory
and peoplewere free to corneand go between the main island of
Bahrainand Zubarah."s*
93. In additionto the testimony of living witnesses who aremembers
of the Al-JabrNaim, manydocuments of the earlier period indicate the
extent of their tribaltemitory.In his 1909Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf,
Lorimer referredto Zubarah as a "ruined and deserted town". He noted
that its sitewas still frequented "theNaim of Bahrain and Qatar"and
that it was surroundedby dependent forts "within a radius of 7 miles"
fiom the main town including "Faraihah,Haiwan [Hulwan], Lisha, 'Ain
Muhammed,QalfatMurair [themainZubarahfort], Rakaiyat, Umm-ash-
Shuwail [Umm AlShuwyyl]and Thagab."sl
49 Statement of Mohammed bin Mohammed bin Theyab Al Naimi, para. 2,
Ann.233ja),Vol.4, p. 1014.
50
Staternentof Saleh bin Muhamrned Ali binAl Naimi, para. 3234(a),
Vol.4, p.1025.
51
LorimerVol.II, op. cit., p. 1952,Ann.74, Vol. 3,p. 398. Three decades later, a telegram from theBritish Political Agent
94.
to his superior described Zubarahas an "areamarked by certain known
wells and towers":
"1cannotSay ..to whatextentjurisdictionis actuallyexercisedat
Zubarah but 1rather think that the Shaikh [of Bahraid sends
orders if occasion arises to people who live there. Shaikh'Isa
certainlyusedto do so.
2. Two sons of late Shaikh Khalid, some of Qatam fmily of
Rifa [main island of Bahrain] and bin' Ali of Hidd [island of
Muhanaq] live thereand have fishtrapsand boats and sometimes
take animalsthere.No Qatarcustomsare leviednor are passports
required."52
95. Two months later, on 3 May 1937,as the tension in the region
increased, the Political Agent prepared a briefing note for the British
Political Resident on thesituationandthe physicallocationof Zubarah:
"The town of Zubarah consists of a number of ruined houses on
the sea coast surroundedby the remains of a mud wall which at
one time was guarded by towers, and an enclosed corridor runs
inland for about a mile to the remains of a large fort ... which
contained a mosque and dwelling quarters. The whole of this is
completely ruinedandthere isno signof recentoccupation.
East and southeast from Zubarah thereare situated the wells of
Halwan, Masaichah [Masarehah] and Lashi [Lisha]. There is
good grazinginthe neighbourhoodandthewellsnumber five.
TheNa'iminformedme that Zubarahwas bound on the north by
Faraihahand onthe southby Rubaijah [Rubayqan].They seemto
includethe wells mentionedabove, ieHalwan [Hulwd etcetera,
as partof Zubarah. This is not improbable as there are ruined
housesnearthesewells. ...
For the purposesof thisnote the Zubarah area may be takento be
an enclave running fiom the coast south of and including
Rubeijah, inland to include the wells at Halwan [Hulwan],
Masaichah [Masarehah]and Lashi [Lisha]returning to the coast
atand including Faraihah village. The mined town of Zubarah
52 TelegramfrornLt.Col.Loch, BritishPoliAgent,to Li.Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident,30March 1937,Ann.113,Volp.633. and the ruined fort of Umm Rear [Murair] will be seen to be
included within thisarea."53
96. Thagab, rnentioned by Lorimer as one of the dependent forts,
does not appear withinthe area described by the Political Agent, yet it
clearly formed part of the tribal area as one of the Naim guardposts
where they gathered on the day of the historic Qatari assault of 1937.54
ImmediateIy afier the battle of Zubarah, the Ruler of Bahrain informed
the Political.Agent thathe extent ofZubaxahincluded:
Al Thagab
Fureiha [AlFaraihah]
• Ain Muhammed
• Ummal Sheweei [UmmAI Shuwyyl]
Al Zubarah
• QalaUmmRear [Murair]
• Al Rabaija [AlRubayqan]
Halwan [Hulwan]
Lisha
Masuchhi [Masarehahl
53 Report entitled "Zubarah Incident" and a memorandum entitled "Possible
basis of a Compromise"by Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent,
3 May 1937, Ann. 126, Vol.3, pp.654 and 665. UmmRear was another
namegivento Murair,the AI-Khalifafort inthetown ofZubarah.
54
See staternent of Mohmrned bin Mohammed Al Nairni, para. 12,
Ann.233(a),Vol.4, p. 1016.97. In the context of the 1944 settlement negotiations between
Balirain and Qatar (see paragraph304), it was proposed that the
historical clairns of the Al-Khalifsito the forat the wells of Umm EJ
Ma, Al Naman, Al Lisha, Halwan [Hulwan],Umm Sika [Masarehah],
and Al Furiha [Faraibah], over which the Naim had roamed at their
invitation,be recognised.56
98. In November 1946, the Ruler of Bahrain described his ancestral
territories and the extent of Bahrainiland to the BritishPolitical Agent,
Lieutenant Galloway,as:
"theport of Zubara territory,the housesin Zubara andthe Lisha,
and Halwan [Hulwd and Um Saicha [Masarehah] and Um-
Alma [Umm El Ma]and the rnosquesand the graveyards and his
freedomandthat of his people on the seaCoastfiom Al Arish to
Um Alma [Umm El Ma] and in the desert of the land without
interference"57
99. In March 1948,the Ruler explainedthe background to his rights
over these territoriesto the BritishPolitical Agent:
"Firstlythereis Zubarah,which was a city built by our ancestors
and which contains the tombs of our ancestors including six
ShaiWisof the ruling farnilywho axe buriedin the cemeterynear
the Fort...On the shore thereare fish traps which beIong to our
subjects which were used by our people untilthe time of the
quarrel...
Secondly,there are the houses at Omrair [Al Murair Fort -very
close to theruins of the town of Zubarah]also the fish traps at
55 SeeLettefrom Capt.Hickinbotham,BritishPoliticalAgetoLt. COI.
Fowle,BritishPoliticalResid4nJuly 1937,Ann.141,Vol. 4, 701.
Capt.Hickinbotharn's1944proposalforthe setîlementof the Zubarahdispute,
Februar 1y44,Ann. 166,Vol.4, p.751sent under cover of a ItoRuler
oEQatar,8February 1944,Ann.165,Vol.4, p. 749.
57
Note by Lt. Col. Galloway on his meeting with RuJer of Bahrain on 2
November1946, Ann. 182(a),Vol4, p790. that place. Itwas herethat our uncle, SheikhKhalid and his sons
were living until recently. Here toois the house of 'AlMatawa'
and his familywho are our subjectsandnow living in Bahrain.
At Lishar there are houses and welIs which belong to us and
whichwe built. ..
Fourthly, there are the fish traps at Om al Ma [Umm El Ma],
Rabaijah [Rubayqan] and Farachls [Faraihahl which belong to
our subjectsand which have passed in inheritancefrom fatherto
son.
Fifthly,we own the wells at Zeraat and at Lisha and Helwan
[Hulwan],which we dug and used for cultivatingthe land.
Al1these placesareknownto the Arabsof Bahain and Qatarand
we do not think that anyone can deny that [they] were in our
possession beforethe dispute. Mernbers of our family lived at
these placesand Arabs belonging to us worked their fish traps as
they did in the days when the Khalifas lived at Zubarah. Never
until the dispute, diwe suffer any interferencehm the Shaikh
of Qatar and we and our people passed freely between Bahrain
andZubarah unhinderedandunmolested. "58
100. In December 1946,the Ruler of Bahrain asserted to Britain that
UmmEl Ma was "one of the ports belongingto our StateZubarah" and
complained aboutQatari activitythere." Further cornplaintswere made
by the Ruler of Bahrain in October 1947 that the Ruler of Qatar had
visited Zubarah and was intending to cultivate at the oases of Hulwan
andLisha "whereourhouses areand which areour propertyW.60
58
Letter from Rulerof Bahrainto C.J. Pelly, BritishPoliticalAgent, 2 March
1948,Ann. 186,Vol. 4, p.798.
59
Reportentitled "NoteonDevelopmentsinthe Zubarah case", BritishPolitical
Resident'sOffic1948,Ann. 185,Vol.4,p.795.
Ibid.101. In June 1948, MT. Ballantyne adviser to the Bahraini oil
concessionaire BAPCO located the southern boundary of the Zubarah
areaat "Ommal Mai"(Umm ElMa).61
102. These conternporaneous documents and the recollections of the
former inhabitants of Zubarah now resideiit in Bahrain establish the
following wells and places (none of which are inhabited today) to be
subject to the sovereignty of the Ruler of Bahrain as part of the tribal
dirah of theAl-Jabrsection of the Naimtribe:
AlArish
Rakay iat
• Al Faraihah
Al Thagab
• AinMuhamrned
• Masarehah
Zubarah
Ummal Shuwyyl
Al Rubayqan
Umm al Ghubbur
6i See letterEromMr. Ballantyne(AdvisetoBAPCO), to Charles Belgrave,
Advisertothe Govt.of Bahrain,2 Juxle1948,Ann. 188,Vol.802.p. a Al Maharaqa
Al Judaydah
a Al Na'man
a Umm El Ma
103. Thetribal dirah of the AI-Jabrbranchof the Naim tribe is shown
in red on Map 5 in Volume 7. The line that links the wells, oases and
place-names dong the edge of the dirah of the Al-Jabr section of the
Naim tribe constitutes the boundary between the Zubarah region, to
which Bahrain is entitled, and the State of Qatar. This is the region
which QatarseizedfromBahrain by armedforcein 1937.
SECTION 2.2 The Rulers of Bahrain exercised authoritv
throuehout the entire Oatar aeninsula dur in^ the
period 1762-1872
104. The authority of the Rulers of Bahrain over Zubarah may be
viewedas an aspectof the widerauthoritywhichthey exercisedoverthe
Qatarpeninsula for morethan a century.
105. Along with other families of the Al-Utub tribe, the Al-Khalifa
farnily established Kuwaitat the beginning of the 18th ~entury.~~The
Al-Utub settlement in Kuwait prospered; indeed the modem State of
Kuwait is ruled by the Al-Sabahfamily ofthe Al-Utub tribe.Much of its
early prosperity was derived from the commercial efforts of the Al-
Khalifa family, who were responsible for trade and commerce in
62
A usehl surnrnary of the early histois provided in Lienhardt "The
Authorityof Shaykhsin the Gulf', in ArabianStudiesVol. II(1975),
Ann. 225,Vol.4, p.937.Kuwait. The Al-Khalifa's principal commercial activity at that time
involved the pearling indu~tr~.~~
106. Seeking to develop its pear1ingactivities, the Al-Khalifa family
decided to reside closerto the centre of the pearling industxy,which was
located in the Gulf of Bahrain. In 1762, therefore,the Al-Khaiifa family
left Kuwait and moved to the north-western region of the Qatar
peninsula. With the assistance of the Naim tribe, they were quickly able
to paci% the local bedouin tribe of AI M~sallam.6~The Al-Khalifa
established the fortified town of Zubarah on the north-west coast of the
Qatar peninsula.65
107. Zubarah quickly emerged as the principal settlement on the
virtually unpopulated Qatar coast. It was advantageously located beside
the pearl-grounds of Bahrain andat the mid-point of the Gulf of Arabia.
Thatenabled the Al-Khalifato profit from the lucrative pearl and Indian
trades. The importance of Zubarahand the Al-Khalifa rapidly increased
as "agreat part of the pearl and Indian trade ...centered at ~obara".~~It
was through Zubarah that the Al-Khalifa acquired their power and
~ealth.~~Under the governance of the Al-Khalifa, the Zubarah region
prosperedandthe cityanditsenvirons grewquickly
63
Francis Warden, HiçtoricalSketch of the Uttoobee Tribe of Arabs11716to
1853 (fi-orfiA
New Series,(1856)pp.362 to 363, reproduced in Records of Bahrain,Vol. 1,
pp. 20 to 21),Ann.5, Vol2, pp.14ato 15.
64 Lorimer Vol. II,op. citp. 1306,Ann. 74, Vol.3, p397 and,Khuri,op. cit.,
pp.24 to 25, Ann.227, Vol.4, pp. 964 to 965. The Naim later assisted the
Al-Ualifa in their occupationof Bahrain in 1783,Lorimer Vol.1 ,op. cit.,
pp.839 to840,Ann.83,Vol. 3, pp.492 to493.
65 Khuri,op. cit., at pp.23 to25, Ann.227, Vol.4, pp.9to 965.
66 Warden, op.cit.p. 363,Ann. 5,VoI.2, p. 15.
67 Ibid.108. Zubarah's prosperity, however,made it an attractive target for
raids andpiracy. In response tothese threats,and in orderto consolidate
the Al-Khalifatsrising influencein the region, Sheikh MohammedBen
Khalifa,SheikhofZubarah, builtthe MurairFort in Zubarahin 1768.
109. Despitethis safeguard,Zubarah was, over the next two decades,
the subjectof relentless attacksfrom the Persian and Arab littorals. Two
attacks were launched against Zubarah by Nasr bin Madhkur, who
governed the main island of Bahrain as a dependency of the Persian
Empire.68 The Al-Khalifa recognised that they needed to control the
islands of Bahrainas well as Zubarah in order securelyto dorninatethe
Gulf of Bahrain and its lucrative pearling industry. Consequently, in
1783,having enlisted the assistance of their cousins the Al-Utub tribe
fromKuwaitas well as scatteredtribes fromthe Qatar peninsula,the Al-
Khalifa attackedand defeatedthe Persian grnison on the main island of
Bahrain.69
110. Following the victory over the Persians, the Al-Khalifa quickly
consolidated their control over al1of the islands of Bahrain. The leader
of the Al-Khalifa,SheikhAhmad bin MohammedAl-Khalifa(knownas
Ahmadthe Conqueror), appointeda representative to govemthe islands
of Bahrain and retumed to the Al-Khalifa capital of Zubarah. The
expulsionof Persia fromthe islands of Bahrainhad removed oneof the
principal threats to the Al-Khalifa'scontrol of the area. The AI-Khalifa
controlled the islands of Bahrain,the Zubarah region, and, through the
allegianceof local tribes, the remainderofthe Qatar peninsula.Thus the
68
Khuri,op.cd.,pp.23to 24, Ann.227, Vol4,pp.963 to964
69
LorimerVol. 1op.cit p.788 ,Ann.83, Vol. 3, 441.Al-Khalifa were able to rule over the Gulf of Bahrain and its lucrative
pearl industry.
111. From 1783-1794, the Al-Khalifa Sheikhs of Zubarah continued
building defences in the town of Zubarah. The town was reinforced by
the construction of a channel from the sea to the entrance of the fort (a
clear depression marking its route cm still be seen). Fortifications and
towers along the sideç of the channel were built to protect vessels on
their way to the fort. At the sarnetime, a mosque and several freshwater
wells to support cultivationwereconstructed. Wallswere built to protect
road access to the fort from the city gate. Thirty-five houses for the
servants ofthe Al-Khalifarulers were located alongsidethe fort.70
112. Sheikh Ahmadthe Conqueror andhis successors divided their
time equally between their two principal possessions, preferring to
reside in the islands of Bahrainduring surnrnersand in Zubarah during
winters.'l Towards the end of the 18thCentury, the Al-KhaIifa Sheikhs
decided to establish their court permanently on the main island of
Bahrain and then Muharraq Island. They appointed a governor to de
the province of Zubarah under their direction.'* There were several
reasons for this administrative shift. The islands of Bahrain were easiex
to defend than Zubarah which was vulnerable to landward attacks by
wandering bedouin tribes and also by the Sultanateof Muscat, located at
the mouth of the Gulf of Arabia. Furthemore, the abundance of fresh
70 Partsof the rnosqueand the fort were still standingas late as the eariy 1920s
whenthe Al-Khalifawouldgo to Zubarah to hawk. See Interview of Sheikh
Jasim bin Abdullah AI Khalifa by Dr. Ali Aba Hussein, Directof the
HistoricalDocumentationentre,Bahrain, conductedon 14 December 1980,
Ann.228, Vol.4, p. 976.
7'
Khuri,op.cit., p. 25,A227, Vol.4, p965.water, vegetation and agriculture coupled with a significant population
base madethe islands more habitable than the Qatar peninsula.
113. After the relocation of the Al-Khalifa court.and the centre of its
commercial activities away from the town of Zubarah,the population of
Zubarah declined. The town'sdaysas a major pearling andtrading centre
were over. It was overrun in 1809 by bedouin from the Arabian
peninsula and again in 1811 by the Sultan of Muscat in the course of
regional ~arfare.~~After this, the town of Zubarah was largely
abandoned, notwithstanding the RuIer of Bahrain's attempt to
reconstruct the town of Zubarah in the 1840s.
114. Although the tom became deserted,the region around it did not.
The Naim owed allegiance to the Al-Khalifa Rulers of Bahrain, and
recognised their authority. They continued to inhabit the region and to
recognise the authority of the Rulers of Bahrain (see paragraphs 77 to
SS).
115. Despite the decline of the town of Zubarah and the scattering of
its population, the Zubarah region maintained its strategic importance. It
was the onIy harbour and settled area along the coast of the Gulf of
Bahrain. As such, it was a potential base from which enemies of the Al-
Khalifa could attack the islands of Bahrain or raid the pearl-grounds.
Attacks on Zubarah usually camefrom the south of the Qatar peninsula.
In consequence, the Rulers of Bahrain maintained their authority
throughout the entire Qatar peninsula in order to safeguard the security
of the Zubarah region.
13 LorimerVol. 1op.cit.,pp.790to79 1,Ann.83,Vol. 3, pp443 io444.116. By 1829,Britain had determinedand acceptedthat the Rulers of
Bahrain held authority in the Qatar peninsula.74Indeed, in his Arabian
Coast Survey (rneticulouslyconductedin 1821-1 ~29~'),Captain George
Bmcks of Britain'sIndianNavy recorded that, dong the entire coast of
the Qatar peninsula from the village that was later to becorne Doha on
the one side up to the northern tip (Ra's Rakan)and on to the Hawar
Islands on the other, "the authority of the sheikh of Bahrain is
acknowledged"by al1the tribeslivingtk~ere.~"
117. The Rulers of Bahrain encountered little resistance to their
authority. In the 1X20s,Captain Bmcks estimatedthe population of the
main island of Bahrainto be some "sixty thousand In contrast,
he noted only a few inhabited places along the coast of the Qatar
peninsula.78The largest settlement observed by Captain Bmcks on the
Qatarpeninsula was "Al-BidderTown", (later to become Doha), which
contained "about four hundred Arabs, ...in the pearl season ...
augmented to about twelve h~~ndred".~E ~ven there, Captain Bmcks
74
Capt. George Bnicks of the British Indian Navy, Memoir Descriptive of the
Navipation of the Gulf of Persia with brief notices of the manners. custorns,
religion. commerce and resources ofthepeople inhabitine its shores and
idands. 821-1829 (fiom Selectionsfiom the Records of the Bombav Govt.,
No. XXIV.New Series, (1856),reproduced in Records of Bahrain pp. 104to
121),Ann. 7,Vol. 2, pp.92to 109. In Zubarahi,n the1820s, Capt.Bnicks
found a settlement of bedouin who acknowledged that they were "subject to
Bahrain."Ibidp,.112,Ann. 7, Vol.2, p. 100.
75
"Myinformationhas been obtained in the followingmander: I have proposed
to the chiefs certainquestions relativeto the tribes,and their localities, of the
revenues, trade&c, whic1 have noted, withtheir replies.1Thave done to
severalother personsatdifferentperiods,andthentaken suchof the substance
as appearedto agreethe bestIbid, p105,Ann.7,Vol. 2, p. 93.
76
Bmcks, op, ci?pp. IO7to 114,Ann. 7,Vol.2, pp. 95to 102.
77
Ibid p.116,Ann. 7,Vol.2, p.104.
79 Ibid,p. 109, Ann7,Vol.2, p. 97.confirmed that the inhabitants were, afier his usual careful enquiries,
"subjectto ~ahrain".*~
118. During the 1820s, Britain signed treaties for the suppression of
piracy with al1of the Arab sheikhdoms along the coast of the Gulf of
Arabia.No suchrreatywas signedbetween Britainand any entity having
authority over the Qatar peninsula other than the Sheikh of Bahrain. This
reflected the understanding shared by both parties tht the Ruler of
Bahrain heId authority over the inhabitants of that peninsula. These
treaties included the Agreement not to Permit the Sale in Bahain of
Property Procured by Plunder and Piracy, dated 5Febniary 1820, and
the GeneralTreaty for CessationofPlunder and Piracy by Land and Sea,
dated 23 February 1820.''
119. The Rulers of Bahrain exercised their authority over the
inhabitants of the Qatar peninsula in confomity with traditional local
custom. Even as close an observerof the history of the Gulfof Arabia as
Lorimernoted, when describing the situation in the Qatar peninsula in
the 1820s, that the authority of the Rulers of Bahrain in the Qatar
peninsula was not questioned and the Rulers were able to enforce their
authority on those who xesistedit.82
Bnicks, op. cip. 109, Ann. 7Vol. 2, p. 97. Doha Town was,atthattime "a
mostmiserableplace: nota bladeof grass norany kind of vegetationnearit"
as observed by Lieutenant Grubb of Britain's Indian Navy in 1822, in
Lt.Kemball'sMernorandaon the Resources.1.ocalitieand Relationsof the
Tribes inhabitinp.the Arabian shores of the Persian Gulf, reproduced in
Recordsof QatarVol. 1,p. 99,Ann.6, Vol.2, p. 90.
8' Airchison, op.cit.,p. 233, Ann. 1, Vol.2, p. 2, and Ann. 2, Vol.2, p. 4
respectively.
82
LorimerVol.1,op. citp.794,Ann. 83,Vol.3, p. 447.120. The Qatar peninsula was frequently used as both rehge and
power base for rnembersof the Al-Khalifa Rulers of Bahrain during the
turbulent period from 1799 to 1851. Despite dynastic and other
stmggles, the Rulers of Baliraincontinuedto exercise authority overthe
entirety of the Qatar peninsula fi-omtheir base in the Zubarah region.
This is borne out by a review of some of the historical events of the
period:
(a) In 1800,the Imamof Muskat attackedthe main islandof
Bahrain, and Sheikhs Abdullah and Salman, the joint mlers of
Bahrain following the death of their father Ahmad the
Conqueror, known as the "Uttoobee Sheikhs", proceeded to
Zubarah with theixfolIowers.The followingyear, they retookthe
mainisland of~ahrain.'~
(b) On the death of Sheikh Salman,his son, Sheikh Khalifa,
assurned joint power with Sheikh Abdullah. When Sheikh
Khalifa died, Sheikh Abdullah mled alone for a few years. In
1837, alarrned by unruliness on the main island of Bahrain, he
"preparedfor his removalto Khor ~assan~~[onthe westCoastof
the Qatar peninsula north of Zubarahj by despatching to that
place two of his wives, with their families, together with the
fumiture ofthe houses, evento the verydoo~s."~~
(c) Shortly after the death of Sheikh Khalifa, his son
Mohammed began to challengethe authority of Sheikh Abdullah
83 Warden,op.cif., Ann. Vol. 2, p. 18.
84 A localitywhose populationhabeen estimated in the 1820sat "aboutone
hundred"by Capt.Brucks, (modem day Khuwayr), Bmcks op. cit.p.112,
Ann. 7, Vol2, p100.
85
Warden,op.cit., 44,Ann.5,Vol. 2, p.38. as Ruler of Bahrain. Anxious for the return of his loyal subjects
who had fled to Abu Dhabi during an Omani raid on the main
island of Bahrain in 1799, SheikhAbdullah in 1838encouraged
his subjectsto settleinhis dominions "onthe coast of ~ut-tur."~~
(d) In 1841, the dissident Sheikh. Mohammed began to
establish pockets of opposition to the Ruler of Bahrain on "the
GU~~U ~ ~ ~ t . ~ ~ ~ ~
(e) In 1842,Sheikh Abdullah conducted reprisals against the
dissident Sheikh Mohammed and then "with a view to
concentrating and strengthening his resources on the Guttur
Coast, planned and commenced the rebuilding of ~obara.""
In 1843, Sheikh Mohammed seizedZubarah from Sheikh
(f)
Abdullah and launched a successful offensive on the main island
of Bahrain from Fuwairat, a small settlement on the northem
coast of the Qatar penhsula, and thus took power on the main
island of ~ahrain.~~
(g) Later in1843,the British authoritieswelcomed the arriva1
of an ally of Sheikh Mohammed, by then Ruler of Bahrain,in
Doha Town because "it took Dohah out of the hands of a
86 Letter from Lt. Hennell, British Political Resident, to 1.P. Willoughby,
Secretary of the Govt. of Bombay, 11December 1838, Ann. 3, Vol. 2, p. 9
andconfirmedat Warden,op. cit.pp.44to45, Ann.5, Vol.2, pp. 3to39.
*'
Warden,op. cit.p.49,Ann. 5,Vol.2, p.43.
sg
Ibid p,. 53Ann.5, Vol. 2p.47.
''
Lorimer, opcit.p. 799,Ann. 83,Vol. 3,p. 452. headman of the Sudan tribe who was more addicted to piracy
than to regularwar.""
In 1851,there was an apparentdefectionof "thetowns on
(h)
the GutturCoast"fiom the Ruler of Bahrain tothe WahhabiEmir
on the ArabianCoast.SheikhMohammed,then Ruler of Bahrain,
sent his brother to makepeace with the Emir's envoy.The two
Rulers reached an agreement which enabled the defectors once
more to become vassals of the Rulers of Bahrain providedthat
they paid a tribute "forthe return of al1[theRuler of Bahrain's]
forts". In a report by Commodore JP Porter of Britain'sIndian
Navy :
"al1the [Doha]peoplecame toAlIyben Khuleefa [AliAl-
Khalifa] to ask pardon and he pardoned them al1except
SheikhFulda],the Sheikhof Wukra ..Afterthis Ally ben
Khuleefa wanted to bring al1 the Guttur people to
Bahrein, but they saidexcuse us for 2 rnonths while we
go to fish for peads after which we will go whereveryou
like"9'
i As described above (see paragraph 7.9, the Naim tribe
hadbeen living in the Zubarahregion since the Iate 18thCentury
at the invitation ofthe Rulersof ~ahrain.~~
121. Theseevents demonstratethe link betweenthe Al-Khalifafarnily
and their ressortissants onthe Qatar peninsula. The territorial extent of
the authorityheld by the Al-Khalifa over the inhabited section of the
90 Lorimer, opcitp. 799,Ann.83,Vol. 3, p. 452.
91 Letter from Commodore Porteto Lt. Col. Hennell,British PoliticalResident,
31Juiy 1851,Ann.4, Vol. 2, 13.
92
Lorimer Vol.2, opcitpp. 1305to 1306,Ann. 74,Vol. 3, p396 10397.Qatar Peninsuia encompassed both the Zubarah region and the region
aroundDoha Town as well asall the territory in between.
122. The LPersian Gulf Pilot (1864), an officialrecord of the geography
and political configurationof the Gulf of Arabia compiled by the British
Navy, documented the authority of the Rulers of Bahrain over the Al-
ThaniandDoha, noting the limited Al-Thani role:
"The [Al-Thani] Sheikh of [Doha], who is under Bahrein, has
some authority overthe chiefs of [~oha]."~~(Emphasis added.)
123. Events in the region were tumultuousduring this period and the
authority of the Rulers of Bahrain over the scattered tribes of the
peninsula did not go unchallenged. Indeed, there was considerable
rivalry between the Wahhabis of the Arabian peninsula and the
Bahrainis. In 1862, a letter from a British officia1stationed in the Gulf of
Arabia to the Ruler of the Wahhabis requested that the Wahhabis desist
fiom:
"sowing dissension arnongst the tribes subject to Bahrain on the.
Gutter coast ...the quiet of the Chiefs and people of Bahrein
being thus constantly disturbed ...[Bahrain will declare war on
you in order to stop your interference] and independent as we
recognise the Chief of Bahrein to be 1 shall I fear be unable to
restrain him fiom the exercise of his lenitirnate rinhts and
prerogatives ..Nay it will be my dutyto respect and even uphold
thoserightsand prerorcatives (Emphasis addcd.)
In this Ietter, Britain once again confirmed its assessment that the Ruler
of Bahrain had authority over the Qatar peninsula and tliat the people
livingthere were the "people of Bahrain"
93
Capt. C.G. Constable and Lt.A.W. Stiffe, The Persian Gulf Pi(1864),
p.105,Ann. 11,Vol. 2, p135.
94
ett thm Capt.Jones,British Political ResidtoRuler of Wahabeeç,8
Febniary1862,Ann. 9,Vol. 2,p.114.124. The Rulers of Bahrain exercised theix authority on the Qatar
peninsula in a variety of ways. In 1863,asa result of complaints against
the lawlessness of the inhabitants of the south-east coast of the Qatar
peninsula, the Ruler of Bahrain appointed his cousin Muhamrned bin
Ahmad to act as his governor.In 1863,a British dispatch noted that the
Ruler of Bahrain had exercised his authority in order to prevent the east:
coast ofthe Qatar peninsulafiom being used as a pirate haven:
"jT)he Sheikh of Bahrein has, without any urging fmm me,
caused the evacuationof a place named Wukra onhis main coast,
where ...disreputable characters, usedto collect and injure Trade,
or disturb the peace. The Sheikh has brought the Chief of Wukra
to Bahrein in cust~d~."~~ (Emphasisadded.)
The dispatch is furtherevidence from a disinterested third partythat the
BahrainRuler'stenitory included the Qatarpeninsula, the eastem part of
whichwas consideredhis "maincoast".
125. At some time in the mid-1860s - it is not possible to determine
precisely when-the Ruler of Bahrain entered into an agreementwith the
Rulerof the Wahhabitribe in order to protect his subjects in the Qatar
peninsula fiom Wahhabi raids. The tems ofthe agreement werethat the
Ruler of Bahrain would pay to the Ruier of the Wahhabis a yearly sum
of money and in retur ne Wahhabis would not molest the inhabitants
ofthe Qatarpeninsu1a.96 Thisarrangement endedthe Wahhabi attacks?'
126. The RuIers of Bahrain imposed taxes and religious tithes on the
inhabitants of the Qatar peninsula as a matter of course. In 1866, the
local tribal chiefsofthe area knownas the "Gutturcoast" (Doha and its
95
Letter frornLt. Col. Pelly, British Political toH. Anderson,Chief
Secretaryofthe Goa. ofBombay,13April1863,Ann.10,Vol. 2, p. 116.
96
LorimerVol. 1,opcit.p.800,Ann. 83,Vol.3, p.453.
97 Ibidenvirons), dissatisfied at the level of taxation imposed by the Ruler of
Bahrain, rebelled against Bahrain. The Ruler of Bahrainwas incensed at
this disloyalty. In order to punish this insubordination, the Ruler of
Bahrain (in coordination with the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi as his ally)
largely destroyed Doha and Wakrah in 1867.'' When the incident
threatened to escalate fbrther,Britain, which was concerned to maintain
the maritime peace of the regfon, intervened. In 1868, Britain sent its
Political Resident, Colonel Pelly,to the city ofWakrahon the east Coast
of the Qatar peninsula in order to meet with the local tribal chiefs in the
area around Doha ~own.~~
127. Colonel Pelly heard the grievances of the rebel Sheikhs and then
compelled them to return to the Bahraini fold. He made them formally
express their recognition of the authority of the Ruler of Bahrain by
agreeing to return tothe practice of paying taxes andtribute to the Ruler
of Bahrain. Colonel Pellyimposedthese unilateral personal undertakings
on the local chiefs in two documents, dated 12 and 13 September
1868.100 In the 12 September 1868 unilateral undertaking, entitled
Agreement of the Chief of El-Kutr (Gutter) engagingnot to commitanv
breach of the maritime peace. 1868, MuhammedAl-Thani, whose
descendents became the Rulers of Qatar, bound himself to "maintain
towards Sheikh Ali bin Khalifeh, Chief of Bahrain, al1 the relations
98 LorimerVol. 1,cipcitpp.800to 801, Ann. 83,Vol.3,pp. 453 to454.
Ibid ..801,Ann. 83,Vol.3,p.454.
'0
'O0
Thetenns imposedby Britainhave occasionallybeen referred to erroneouçly
in the pastas constituting a treaty. This is not possible, however, because
while Britain regarded Bahrain as independent at that time (see para 123) it
regarded the Qatar peninsula and its inhabitants as part of Bahrain
(seepara 124).whichheretoforesubsistedbetweenme andthe Sheikh of Bahrain" .IO'In
thereiated unilateralundertakingdated 13September 1868,the principal
local chiefs, including Mohammedbin Thani, undertook that the taxes
and tribute payableby them to Bahrainwould be collected from al1the
local chiefson behalf of the Rulerof Bahrain by Mohammedbin Thani
andpaidto the Rulerof Bahrainthrough the British Gûvemment:
"We, the undersigned Chiefs, al1 residing in the province of
Qatar, do hereby solemnly agree and bind ourselves to pay to
Sheikh Ali bin KhaIifa,Chiefof Bahrein, the sums of money per
annumheretoforepaid by us to the Chiefsof Bahrein,as follows:
this total sum to be paid byus to Muhammadbin Thani of Doha
and by him ta the Resident for delivery to the agent of the Chief
of Bahrein,at Bushire:
1,700Kranson accountof theMahanda tribe,
1,50K 0rans on account of the AI Bu Aainen and Nayim
tribes,
500Krans on account of the Semsemiehtribe (Le.the Al
Bu Kuwara,who live atSumesma),
500 Kranson accountof theKeleb tribe,
1,500Kranson accountofthe Sudantribe,
2.500 Krans on account of Muhammad bin Thani (Chief
ofthe Maadhid)andthe Musallarntribe,
800Kransan accountof the Amameratribe.
9,000Kranstotal
And we, the said Chiefs, understandingthat the Bahrein Chief
clairnsfiom us a totalof 15,000Kransper mm in lieu of 9,000
as above set forth, we do hereby further agree to pay any extra
sums not aggregating a total larger than 15,000, which the
Residentafterjudicial investigationmay decree.
Article 5, Apreementof tChiefof El-Kutrenrraginpnot to commit any
Breach of the MaritiPeace.1868, inAitchison, ocit.p.183,Ann. 12,
Vol.2,p. 157. Written on the 25 Jamadi-ul-Awal 1285133th September
1868." 'O2(Emphasisadded.)
128. Following the meeting with the rebe1 chiefs, Colonel Pelly
addressed a letter to al1of the rebel chiefs of Qatar, confirming to them
the nature of the terms imposed on them and warning them of the
consequencesof any future breach of the maritime peace. 'O3The tax and
tribute terms placed Muhamrned Al-Thani on a stature equal to the six
other local tribal chiefssubject to the Ruler of Bahrain'sauthority.
129. The 12 September 1868 document was similar to the
undertakings signed by the Sheikh of Bahrain on 6 September 1868and
by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi on 16 September 1868.'~~ Al1three were
imposed by Britain (through Colone1Pelly) in response to the breaches
of the maritime peace described above. These unilateral undertakings
were of a personal character. They were not treaties between Britain and
sovereign political entities.This is evident by contrasting the documents
rnanifestingthe 1868unilateral undertakings with various Britishtreaties
with Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. British practice in relation to Bahrain and
Abu Dhabi both before and after the 1868incident shows that from the
rnid-19th Century onward Britain concluded treaties with them
following recognised international formaIities. Thus, the 31 May 1861
Friendly Convention entered into between Sheikh Mohamed bin
'O2 Aitchison,op.ci!p..193,Ann. 13,Vol.2,p. 160.
'O3
LorimerVol. 1,op.cit.p.802,Ann.83,Vol. 3,p.455.
'O4 AgreemententeredintobyAlibin Khuleefa.Sheikhof Rahrain - 1868
6 September1868,Aitchisonop. cit.pp.236 to237Ann.3 17,Vol. 6,
pp. 1415to 1416. Agreementof theAboo DhebbeeChiefeneaeins notto
mit anvbreachoftheMaritimePeace. 186816September1868,
Aitchison,op. cit., 254to 255,Ann. 14,Vol. 2,p.161.successors. and Caritain Felix Jones. Her Majesty's Indian Na-,
Political Resident of Her Britannic Maiesty in the Gulf of Persia on the
part of the British Government was signed by Bahrain and Britain as
Parties; approved by the British Governor-General-in-Councilon 9
October 1861; and ratified by the Government of Bombay on 25
February 1~62.'~~ Suchfomalities were also observed by Britain in the
Anglo-Bahraini Treatv of 22 December 1880,~~"d in the Exclusive
Agreement of the Shaikhof Bahrein with the British Government of 13
March 1892,'07.So, too, the Exclusive Agreement of the Chief of Abu
Dhabi with the British Governmentof 6 March 1892was signed by the
Parties and ratified by theViceroy and Governor-Generalof 1ndia.lo8In
marked contrast, no such formalities were observed in relation to any of
the 1868 unilateral~ndertakin~s.'~~
130. The formalisationofthe taxes payableby the dependenttribes of
the Qatar peninsula to the Ruler of Bahrain in ths manner confirmed
him as the sovexeignauthority on the peninsuIa. This included the Al-
Thani chiefof Doha who, althoughhe had been informallyidentified as
a spokesman and tax collecter for the local tribes, had expressly
'O5
Friendly Convention enteredinto between Sheikh Mohamed in Khulee.Fa,
independent ruler of Bahrain. on the part of himself and successors. and
C C
Britannic Maies- in the Gulf of Persia on the part of the BritishGovt., 31
May 1861,Aitchison,op.ciL,pp.234to236, Ana. 8,Vol.2, pp. I1to113.
'O6
0 , 2 2 Chiefecem1er80,Aitchison,op,
cit.p.237forratification procedure,Ann.37, Volp.215.
107 F.xclusiveAgreement of the Shaikh of Bahrein with the BritGoa., 13
March 1892,Aitchison,op. cilp. 238, Ann318,Vol. 6,p.1418.
'O8
ExcIusiveAgreement of the Chief of Abu Dhabi with the British Govt., 6
March 1892,Aitchison,op.cil.,p.256,Ann.50,Vol.2, pp.247 to 248.
'O9 Theacceptanceof theunilateralundertakingçby Mohamedbin Thani andthe
Rulerof AbuDhabiwerernerelywitnessedby Col.Pellyand Capt. R. Brown
ofthe BritishNavy.acknowledged the continuing authority of the Rulers of Bahrain and
their righttodaim taxes fiom him.
SECTION 2.3 The Al-Thanifamilv erner~edfrom bein~ local tax
collectors to being chiefs of Doha Town under the
authoritvof Bahrainin 1867
131. It is not entirely clear how the Al-Thani fmily became
prominent in Doha Town. Lorimer's 1909 Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf,
in describingthe history ofthe Qatarpeninsula, noted:
"Notiiing is known of the manner in which the Al-Thanihad
attained by 1868to predominant influence in Qatar; they were
Maadhid and therefore of the Al bin-Ali, the tribe of Isa-bin-
~arif."''O
132. The Al bin Ali tribe had originally been important foIlowers of
the Al-Khalifa farnily in their 18th Century defeat of the Persians and
conquest of the islands of Bahrain. They remained loyal subjects ofthe
Rulers of Bahrain for many years after that. One of the Rulers of
Bahrain, Sheikh Abdullah, married a woman from the Al bin Ali tribe
and had three sons by her. Someof the Al bin Ali tnbe fell out with the
Rulers of Bahrain during a dynastic ~truggle."~ At some point
thereafier,the Al-Thanifamilybeganto exerciseinfluencein Doha as its
principal pearl merchants and tax collectors. In 1864,the PersianGulf
Pilo dtscribed the Al-Thani chief as having some authority over the
chiefs in the toms of Doha, Little Doha and Al Bida (settlements
"O
LorirneVol. 1op.cifp.802,Ann.83, Vol. 3, p.455.
11'
Lienhardt,opcit.pp.66to 67, Ann.225, Vol.4, p. 941 referringto Shaykh
Muhammedbin Khalifah al-Nabhani,Al-TuBatal-Nabhanivah fi Ya'ralh
wrah al-Arabivah,(1914).located within a one-mile stretch of the coast~ine).]~~ By 1868,the Al-
Thanifamilywererecognisedas chiefsof Doha.' ''
133. While Mohammed bin Thani had been identified ashaving some
standing over the other local chiefs, the geographic extent of that
standing was limited. An interna1report of the Ottoman Empire dated 8
June 1871described the roleofthe AI-Thaniinthe followingterms:
"[Mohammedbin Thani]residing in [Doha]has no rule over the
other villages. The leadershipof eachvillage has been left to the
local sheikhs. As for [Mohammed bin Thani], in respect of the
dependentvillages, he holds the position of tax collector and his
duty consists of collecting the annual taxes and the taxes from
pearlfishingfromthe pe~ple.""~
In a letterto theBritish Political Resident,Mohammed bin Thani'sson
Jasirn, who had succeeded his father as the chief of Doha Town,
describedthe geographiclimitations of his father's influenceas Chief in
1868, as well as hisownin 1881 :
"...1have no power over [theKatar coast]. You are aware of the
treaty made in the time of my father [1868]between us and the
British Govt. narnely that we were only to be responsible for
[DohaTown]andAl Wakra.
TheAl KatarCoast is verylargeandextensiveand 1have notthe
power to forbid anyone fiom landing or ernbarking and unless
you give strict orders to al1the people of Al Katar ..to migrate
andsettle in my country and be subject to me."'15 (Emphasis
added.)
Capt.ConstableandLt. Stiffe,ocit.atp.105,Ann.11,Vol.2, p.135.
'13
Lorimer,op.citp. 801,Ann.83, Vol.3, p.454.
Extract fkom Ottoman OfficiaGazette "TakvirniVekayi",8 June 1871,
Ann. 16(a)Vol. 2,p167.
115
Letter from Sheikh Jasim bin Thanj toLt. Col. Ross, British Political
Resident,9 March1881,Ann.38,Vol.2, p. 216.134. There is thus no historical basis for the assertion that by 1868
Mohammed Al-Thani was a chief independent of the Ruler of Bahrain,
or that there existed even a nucleus of an independent State of Qatar.' 16
Any possible pretensions to that effect were dispelled by Mohammed
bin Thmi himself. When confronted with troubles fiom other local
Qatari tribes in 1870,he turned to the Ruler of Bahrain for a~sistance."~
In doing so, Mohammed bin Thani expressly confirmed his
subordinationto the Ruler of Bahrain in the following correspondence:
"1 am your [the Ruler of Bahrain's] subject and want you to
inform [Britain]ofthe troubles we undergo i.18
In this rnanner,the chief of Doha acknowledged the Ruler of Bahrain to
be his sovereignas of 1870.
135. Takingal1of these factors into account, one must conclude that,
as of 1871, when the Ottoman Empire took control of Doha and its
environs (see paragraphs 140 to 142),the Rulers of Bahrain exercised
authority over the Qatar peninsula as a whole (and a fortiori of the
Zubarah region). The Al-Thani Chiefs controlled only Doha Townand
its environs.
SECTION2.4 Britain's influence in the reyion was based on
protectinp trade andkeepin~the maritimepeace
136. Britain became involved in the political affairs of the Arabian
peninsula andthe Gulf of Arabia from the 1820sprincipally due to its
Il6
Capt. Constable andLt.Stiffe, op. cit. had concluded that Mohammed bin
Thani was a local chief "who is underBahrein", p. 105, Ann11,Vol.2,
p.135..
Translatedpurportof a lettefrom Mahommed bin Thani,Chief of Doha
Town, toRulerof Bahrain,10Mmch 1870, Ann. 15,Vol.2,p. 164.commercial interestin protectingmaritime trade routes to India. Britain
did not interfere forrnally in the interna1affairs of the States in the
region, but insisted that they refiain from piracy or maritime warfare.
Britain concluded anti-piracy treaties in the 1820s with the regional
Statesandrulers,including Bahrain.Thetreaties wereaimed at ensuring
the safepassageofthe Britishships of the EastIndia Company.In return
for ensuring their maritime peace, Britain agreed to protectthe States
fromattack.
137. In order to exert influence over thecourse of events in the Gulf
of Arabia, Britain establishedaregional administrativecentre at Bushire
onthe Persian coastwhereBritain's interestsin the Gulf of Arabia were
supervised by an official with the title of "Political Resident". Other
subordinate off~cials,withthe title of "PoliticalAgent",functionedunder
the authorityoftheBritish Political Residentin Bushire.British PoIitical
Agents were stationedthroughoutthe Gulfof Arabia,includingBahrain.
The entire British administrative apparatus in the Gulf of Arabia
reported to the British Govenunent through the British Indian
Government,andafterIndia'sindependencedirectlyto ond don."'
138. The issue of control over the Qatar peninsula had never been a
significant concern for Britain until the Ottoman Empire expandedits
control into Doha in 1871. Before then, Britain had supported the
authority of the Rulers of Bahrain in the peninsula {see Section 2.2
starting at paragraph 104 and Section 2.3 starting at paragraph 131).
Following the Ottoma n xpansion, Britain'sassessment of the issue of
SeeApp. 4(II)for an organigramme of the British administrative structure in
the region. Prtorlndian independence in 1947,the British Govt. of India
was responsiblefor colonial administration ofIndia and Britain's possessions
and protectoratesinthe MiddleEXtwas mswerable to the British Govt. in
London.No substantivestinctionis madein thisMernorialbetweenthe two.control over the Qatar peninsula was informed by its larger strategic
interests in relation to the generd expansion of the Ottoman Empire in
the Arabian region. Initially,Britainwas cornplacentabout the Ottoman
advance into Doha expecting the Ottomans to cooperatein maintaining
orderin theGulfof ~rabia."'
139. AlthoughBritain did not wantto antagonisethe Ottoman Empire
overwhat it considered to be the relatively unimportantquestion of who
exercised authority overthe northernedge ofthe barrenQatarpeninsula,
Britain was firm in its conviction that it would not tolerate Ottoman
expansion north of the region of Doha (which was referred to by the
Ottomans as the "k-cazao "r province of Qatar). There was, however,no
point in rnakingthe question of authority over the northern part of the
Qatar peninsula an issue until the need arose. In 1871, the British
Political Resident, Lieutenant-ColonelPelly, obtained the agreementof
the British Governent to defer the question of csntrol over the Qatar
peninsula.121He argued that it seerned probable at that point that the
Ottoman Empire would soon withdraw from the southem Arabian
peninsulain anyevent.His reluctanceto pressthe issuewas reitcratedin
1873when he advised that Britain should defer questions of territorial
sovereigntyin the Qatar peninsulafor as long as possible. His reasoning
wasthat the time toconfiont the issue wouldbe if orwhenthe Ottoman
Empire evidenced any definite interest in expandingbeyond Doha and
its environs,lZ2
120 Saldanao, pcit.p. 1,Ann.70, Vol.2,p.289.
12' Letterfrom Lt. Col. Ross,British PoliticalResideSecretaryto the Govt.
of India,4 September 1873,Ann20,Vol.2,p. 175.
Iz2
Letter from Col. PellytoSecretaryto Govt. of India, 27 October 1873,
Ann.22,Vol. 2, p. 182.SECTION 2.5 The Ottoman Empire ex~anded into the south-east
gf the Qatar peninsula throuyh the Al-Thani chiefs
of DohaTownin 1871
140. The expansion of the activities of the Ottoman Empire into the
southof the Qatarpeninsda is an importantepisodein the history of the
region.
141. The Ottomans moved into the Arabian peninsula Eromthe north
during the latter half of the 19th Century. Shortly after the chief of
Doha'savowal of fealty to the Ruler of Bahrainin 1870(see paragraph
134 above), the mies of the Ottoman Empire reached the base of the
Qatar peninsula. The Al-Thani saw in thisdevelopment anopportunity
to break freehm Bahrain'sauthority.The chief of Doha, Mohammed
bin Thani, was understandablyreluctant to riskpunishment for a second
rebellion againstBahrain'sauthority in the Qatarpeninsula. However,at
the urging of his arnbitiousson Jasim, Mohammed binThani accepted
the umbrella of protection that might be afforded by the Ottoman
~rn~ire.'~~
142. Thus it was that in 1871,one year afier he had appealed to the
Ruler of 13ahrainfor help, the chief of Doha repudiatedthe authority of
the Ruler of Bahrain and invitedthe OttomanEmpire to take control of
his territory. The agreement between the Ottoman Empire and
Mohammed bin Thani provided for the Ottoman Empire to establish a
garnisonin Doha Town and to fly the Ottoman flag there. In return, the
chief of Doha was appointed the Ottoman assistant govemor -
Kaimmakawz - ofthe cityandwas givenOttomanprotection.
123 LorimerVol. op.citp. 803, Ann.8Vol.3, p456.143. As things transpired,the submissionof the chief of Doha to the
authority of the Ottoman Empireweakened ratherthan strengthenedhis
political position.He was subject toOttoman administrativeprocedures
and was given no authority to control the conduct of the Ottoman
soldiers and officiais. For example, in reply to a cornplaint from the
Chiefof Dubai overrobberiesof Dubai shipsin the Ottoman colony,the
British Political Resident observedthat "the robberies were apparently
committedby disorderly Turkishsoldiersover whom theArab Chiefsof
Gutturthemseiveshaveno c~ntrol."'~~ The localchiefswere subservient
to the OttomanEmpirein everyrespect.
144. In referring to the situation prevailing in Doha in September
1875, the British Political Resident's Second Assistant, Lieutenant
Fraser,madethe followingobservation:
"Mahornedbin Thani [the chiefof Doha], though now averse to,
and desirous of fieeing himself fiom the thraldom of Turkish
control,is afraidf exhibiting outward symptomsof disaffection,
which would probably result in his removal to Constantinople
anddetentionthere foran indefinite period.
Jasim Agha, the Turkish officer, is consulted in al1 matters
connected with the Chiefs policy and administrationand nothing
cm be done withouthis concurrence.Suchcuriailment of power
is extremely irksome to Mahomed bin Thani, and also to his
ambitiousson,Jasim ..TheTurkishffagis flown of course.tt125
145.
Even the limited authority the Ottomans assigned the chief of
Doha werenot, in fact,exercised.In 1887,the Ottoman Councilof State
- Departmentof Interna1Affairs noted:
"SheikhJasim has for a long time functioned onIy in name as
provincial governor in the Qatar District between Oman and
Bahrain. He stays in Qatar two or three months ayear ..nd he
Iz4 Saldana,opcitAnn.70,Vol.2, p.291.
IZS Ibid A.,n.70,Vol.2, 299. spends the rest of his time with the tribes in the desert... lt is
essential that you ... immediately relieve Sheikh Jasim of his
official authority and appoint in his place a different
governor." L26
As will be recalled, the Ottoman Empire used the tem "Qatar" (and
similar spellings)to referto Doha and its immediate environs.
146. The status of the chief of Doha had deteriorated by 1888. He
Iived in fear of the Ottomansand was concemed that their erosion of his
power and their onerous occupation might combine to drive away the
locai inhabitants. The Political Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross,
observedthat:
"he does not know what the Turks may do to him and the
inhabitants of El Katar; the latter are Bedouins and own no date
plantationsor other landed property, that might compel them to
patiently beâr any oppression; and possibly they may leave the
place andgo elsewhere,as it is intimated."Iz7
147. The Ottomans and the Al-Thani shared a mutml interest in
expanding the range of their authority beyond Doha and its environs.
But they werejointly and severdly unsuccessfhl in realising that interest
(see Section 2.6 starting at paragraph 156 and Section 2.7 starting at
paragraph 167). Relations between the Ottomans and the Al-nani
deteriorated and the chief of Doha began to seek other ways to ensure
his independence and perhaps expand his jurisdiction. In 1893, Jasim
Al-Thani,whohad succeededhis father as Chief, began courtingBritain
in an attempt to escape fiom his relationship with the Ottoman
126 Report,18 January 1887, from Ottoman Councilof State-Department of
Interna1Affairs conceming refoms in the province of Ann. 39,Vol.2,
p.217.
'27
Letterhm the British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Ross, British Political
Resident,27 June 1888,Ann43,Vol. 2, p.234.~rn~ire,'~~ even though that rnight havemcant risking that Britain would
continue to support the Ruler of Bahrain's sovereignty over the entire
Qatar peninsula, possibly includingDoha.
148. In 1893,in a meeting held with the British Political Resident in
Wakrah, the chief of Doha offered to return to paying tribute to the
Rulersof Bahrain. Itwas reported bythe PoliticalResident that:
"Shaikh Jasirn at once acknowledged the rights of Bahrain and
expressedhis willingness to pay tribute asbef~re."'*~
The British Political Resident also reported that the Chief would like
British protection:
"When Shaikh Jasim had finished what he had to say about past
events, 1asked him what his views were as to the future.He said
that he wished for British protection, and a place of safety to
which he might retire."I3'
149. In 1898,the chief of Doha took a leadingpart in an attack against
the Ottoman garrison in ~oha.'~' As punishment, the Ottomans
confiscatedthe Chiefs property.
150. Relations between the Ottomans and the Al-Thani continued to
deteriorate andthe Al-Thani continued to cultivate contacts with Britain.
In November 1898, Ahrned Al-Thani, a brother of the chief of Doha
made it clear in an interview with a British naval officer, Lieutenant
Robinson, that it was their wish to tum out the Ottomans "and they
l2hSee letter fromLt. Col. Talbot, British Politicaf Resident, to Secretary to
Govt. of India7 May 1893,referring to his meetingwith Chief of Doha at
Wakrah, Ann. 51,Vol.2,pp. 249to 253.
'29 Ibid, Ann.51,Vol.2, p.251.
I3O See letter from Lt. Col. Talbot, British Political Resident, to Secretary to
Govt. of India7 May 1893, referrinta his meetingwith Chief of Doha at
Wakrah,Ann. 51,Vol. 2,p. 250.
Saldana,op.cit.p.45, Ann.70,Vol. 2,p.333.would be pleased to enter into the same treaties with the British
Gaveniment as havetheTrucialChief~".'~~
15 1. By 1900,Ottomaninterestin the Qatarpeninsulawas decreasing.
Britain began reconsideringits policy towardsthe chief of Doha and the
Qatar peninsula. British ofiïcials commented on the desirability of
obtaining a better hald on Qatar and of coming to some permanent
arrangement wlth SheikhsJasim and ~hrned.'~~
152. In 1902, the Al-Thani renewed their offer to switch allegiances
fiom the Ottomans and corneunder British protection. They expressly
acknowledged that the Ruler of Bahrain had a significant and
authoritative presence on the Qatar peninsula. The Assistant British
Political Resident, J.C.Gaskin, reported in July 1902 that the chief of
Dohahad promised that:
''if[the chief of Doha] were taken under the protection of His
Majesty'sGovernment, he would reside at any place in Katar
approved by the Government and further that he would hold
himself responsibleto keep the seasround Katarfree frompirates
and would CO-operatewith His Majesty's Government and the
Chiefof Bahreinin any matterswhichmight concernthem onthe
mainland." 134
153. By 1902, some British officials had begun occasionally to refer
to the chief of Doha as the "Chief of Qatar". Nonetheless, Britain
rernaineduncertainof the precise statusthat could properlybe attributed
to the Al-Thani. In 1902, the British PoIitical Resident, Colonel
Kernball, requested authority fiom the British Secretary of State for
Indiato makeenquiriesabout theprecisestatusand extentofjurisdiction
'32 Saldana,op. ci.,46,Ann.70,Vol. 2,p.334.
'33
Ibidp.48,Ann. 70,Vol.2, p.335.
'34
Saldana,op. cit., p.49,A70,Vol. 2, p.337.of the chief of Doha. In July 1902,the Governrnentof India observed
that:
"shouldit prove that the Sheih is establishedas Chief of Katar,
we would propose to authorise ColonelKemball to conclude
with him an Agreement similar to thase which have been
executedwith the TrucialChiefsof theArab ~oast."'~~
154. However, despite Britain's interest in developing relations with
the Al-Thani, the investigationsof British officiaisin the regionrevealed
that their authority was still not extensive. Indeed it was, in fact,
diminishing. The Assistant British Political Resident, J-C. Gaskin,
observedin 1903that:
"theinfluenceofthe Thanifamily was likelyto decreasein Katar
because most of the Arabs being pearl divers, who had grawn
rich by the bounty of Sheikh Jasim, would soon be less
dependent uponhis bounty." 13'
155. The precarious position of the chief of Doha and his farnily in
terms of their limitedauthorityin the Qatar peninsula,even atthat time,
was underscored by the British Political Resident, ColonelKemball. He
concluded that an agreement between Britain and the chief of Doha
would enablethe latter to consolidatehis standing with the local tribes
becausehe could therebyoffer them protection against the Ott~rnans.'~'
Ul.timately,Britain decidednot to enter into such an agreement for fear
of creating an Anglo-Ottoman cri si^.'^'
13' Suldana,op.citp. 50, Ann.70,Vol. 2, p. 338.
136 lbid, p. 55,Ann.70,Vol.2, p. 343.
'37
Ibid,p. 56,Ann.70, Vol.2, p. 344.
13*
Ibidpp.52 to 53, Ann.70, Vol. 2, pp.34to341, citing a report frthe
BritishAmbassadorto Turkey, Sir N. O'Conor,to the SecreofiStatefor
Indiaof 14March1903.SECTION2.6 The Ottoman Empire's authority in the Oatar
peninsula never exuanded beyond Doha Town.and
its environs
156. At this point it may be helpful to consider in greater detail the
geographicalextent of theOttoman and Al-Thaniauthority on the Qatar
peninsula.
157. At the time that the Ottoman Empire sentits garrison toDoha in
1871, the local Chiefs authority was Iimited to the town and its
environs. Britain'sevaluationwas that the Al-Thani family only had the
power to grant a limited "foothold" on the Qatar peninsula. A secret
report to the British Secretary of State for India dated 22 May 1879,
ernphasisedthat:
"...whateverfoothold [the Ottoman Empire] may have acquired
in El Katr was obtained ..by the invitationof the local chiefs of
(~oha)."'~~
158. This evaluation cm be confirmed by reference to a similar
evaluation by the Ottoman Empire. In a report dated 8 June 1871,the
Ottomansconfirmedthe limited extent of the area controlledby the Al-
Thani :
"the leader residing in (Doha) has no rule over the other
villages."l40
159. In IBl, even after nine years under the controlof the Ottoman
Empire, the chief of Dohaacknowledgedin a letter dated 9 Mach 1881
to the British Political Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, that his
139
Govt.of 1ndiaForeignDept.MemorandumNo. 127, 22 May 1879Ann. 36,
Vol.2, p21 O.
14'
Extractfrom Ottoman OfficialGazette"TakvimiVekayi", 8 June 1871,
Ann. 16,VoI.2,p. 167.authorityonthe Qatar peninsulawas lirnitedto DohaTown andWakrah.
In it, the chief of Doha describedthe geographic limitations of his own
authorityin the followingmanner:
"You mite to me that 1should keep guard over the wholeof the
Katar Coastbut 1haveno power of it. Youare awaseofthe treaty
made in the time of my father [1868] between [the Al-Thani
farnily] and the British Govt. namely that we were only to be
responsiblefor [DohaJand Al Wakra.
TheAl KatarCoastis very large and extensiveand I have not the
power to forbid anyone fiom landing or embarking unless you
give strict orderstoal1the people of AI Katar ..to migrate and
settle in my country and be subjectto me. 1should then be able
to prevent disturbances on the Katar Coast. 1 have before
revortedyouthis stateof the case and that 1am powerless.I even
fear for myselfandmy property."(Empliasisadded.)14'
160. As was described above, Britain'sprimaryinterest in the area
since 1820, when it had organisedthe anti-piracytreaty system with the
sheikhdomsdong the southernshoresof the Gulf of Arabia, had been to
securethe traderoutes toIndia(see paragraph 136). It became apparent
to Britain that the Ottoman Ernpi~e was unableeffectively to control
even the part of the Qatar peninsulathat it occupied. The local chiefs
around Doha shelteredunder Ottomanprotection, but theOttomanshad
not assumed govemental responsibilities in order to control the
activities of the local chiefs. In a letter dated 19 December 1874,
Lieutenant-ColonelRoss,the Political Resident,observed:
"Thechief causeof embarrassmentas regardsthe maintenance of
peace and neutralityby sea between Bahreinand Katar lies in the
present uncertaintyas to the question with whom responsibility
rests. The various mainland Sheikhs may shelter themselves
under Turkish protectionwhilst the latter powerhas not formally
assumed Government duties. Were the responsibilities more
14' Letterfrom SheikhJasimbin Tani,Chiefof Doha Town,tott. Col.Ross,
BritishPolitical Resident9, Mar1,Ann. 38, Vol.2, p.216. decidedly fixed the constant inconvenient anxiety about Bahrein
would di~appear."'~~
161. By December 1887, Britain had concluded that it would not
recognise Ottoman sovereignty over the "sea Coastof ~atar",'~~i.e. over
the settled parts of the peninsula, as there were no inland settlernents.
Britain had decided that the Ottomanswere unable to control the tribes
in the areas in which they exercised authority, or to maintain security
over the adjacent waters. By December 1887, the British Political
Resident, Lieutenant-colonel Ross observed:
"after his further experience and observation of the mode of
procedure and policy of the Turkish authorities on the Arabian
side of the Gulf, it seemed hopeless to expect a state of security
to result from Turkish exclusive control, even where they were
firmly established."'44
162. In the modern era, the term "Qatar"refers to thepeninsulaof that
name and the State that occupies most of the territory on the peninsula.
The Ottoman Empire, however, used the term kaza (or province) of
"Katar" to refer only to Doha and its en~ir0ns.l~~The Ottoman Empire
considered the province of Qatar to be distinct from the Zubarah and
Odaid regions. An exarnpleof this is a report of the Ottoman assistant to
the governor of Qatar that distinguished between "Zubarahand Udaid
and "thetom ofKatar itself '.14"
142 Saldana,op.cit., 3,Ann. 70,Vol. 2,p. 295
143 Ib- p.32'Ann.70,Vol.2: p.320.
144 Ibid.
'45
OttomanReport, 1891-92, referring to "Town of Katar"and its "dependent
villages",Ann.49, Vol.2, p245. See mapof the Velayat oBasraprepared
by Capt. Izzetof the Imperia1 Amy of the Ottoman Empire (1878),
reproducedfollowingpage6.
146 Letrerdated7Novernber1891fromthe Ministryof the AssistantKairnmakarn
of Qatar,Ann.48, Vol.2, p.243.163. Arnapofthe OttomanEmpire,drawnup in 1878, described three
political entities on the Qatar peninsula: Qatar, Zubarah and dai id.'^^
An Ottoman report of 1891-1892notes the existence of the kaza of
"Katar" and its "dependent villages".148Not only did the Ottoman
Empire distinguishbetweenthe three parts ofthe Qatarpeninsula,it also
recognised that it did not exercise authority in Zubarah. A letter of 7
November 1891fromtheMinistry ofthe AssistantKaimmukumof Qatar
notes:
"If a govemment is now established in Udaid and Zubarah then
the Kazaof Qatarwill be ableto benefit from the pearl fishing in
this area.14'
Thus, the appointment of Jasim Al-Thani as the Kaimmakam(or
govemor) of "Qatar" by the Ottoman Empire referred only to his
appointment as Ottoman governorof Doha Town and its environs.As
late as 1909,the OttomanEmpireand Brirainwere both operatingunder
the sameunderstandingthat the Ottoman provinceof Qatar was distinct
from Zubarahand Odaid.In a report concerningOttomanjurisdiction in
the Qatar peninsuia dated 27 January 1909, the Ottoman Foreign
Minister confirmed:
"The BritishGovernmenthas alwaysrepeatedher rightto protect
the shoresofZubarahand dai id..."."^
'47 Seemapof the Velayalof Basra prepared by Capt.Izzetof the IAmyria1
oftheOttoman Empire(1878),reproducedfollowingpage6.
14' Ottoman Report, 1891-92, referringto "Townof Katar"and its "dependent
villages",Ann.49, Vol.2, p. 245.
14'
Letter fromthe Ministry of the Assistant Kaimrof Qatar7November
1891,Ann.48, VoI.2, p. 243.
''O
Reportof Ottoman Foreign Minister, 27 January 1909, Ann.75, Vol. 3,
p. 402,14 By 1893 the chief of Doha wanted to be rid of the Ottoman
Empire and also leave Doha because he could not control its
inhabitants.I5l He negotiatedwith Britain for protection in the eventthat
he expelled the Ottoman garrison from Doha and then left to settle
elsewhere. The British Political Resident expressly excluded Zubarah
and Odaid as possible places fox his resettlement. When the British
PoliticaI Resident raised the issue of Bahrainfsclaims to "Katr"" :(the
chief of Doha Town) at once acknowledged the rights of Bahrein, and
expressedhis willingnessto pay tribute as bef~re."'~~
165. Interna1 Ottoman documents from 1900 confirm that the
Ottomans believed that Britain was not content only with influence over
the principal islands in the Gulf of Bahrain but had "widened its claim
and tried to include Zubara and Ujayd [Odaid] territories under its
infl~ence".'~~As Bntain could only claim influence over Al-Khalifa
lands, the attitude reflected a recognition of the Ruler of Bahrain's
sovereign rights over that territory. This recognition of Britain's
influence (and accordingly Al-Khalifa sovereignty) over the Zubarah
region was practically demonstrated by the placing of five British ffags
on the shores of Zubarah in 1902,an event reported by the Commander
of the 6th Ottoman arrny and passed on to the Grand Vizib ry the
Minister of the 111terior.I~ritain's positiowas confirmed to the new
governor of Odaid when he called at Bushire on the Persian Coastand
15'
Letterfrom Lt.Col. Talbot, BritishPolitical Resident,to Secretary to the
Govtof India,7 May1893,para.7,Ann.51, Vol. 2,p. 249.
15' Ibid, Ann.51, Vo2,p.251
153 Ottoman "Reporton Bahrein"from Council Chamber,22 April 1900,
Ann.64,Vol.2, p.273.
Is4
Memorandum fromOttomanChiefClerk'sOffice,30 March 1902,Ann.65,
Vol. 2, p.277, anda letter from Miniofethe Interiorto GrandVizi,
April1902,Ann.66,Vol.2, p.279.met with the assistant to the British consul (the Political Agent) at
Bahrain. The assistantconfinned that Zubarah was attached to Bahrain,
that Bahrain was under British protectionand that no Ottoman official
would be allowed to go there.''' Diplornaticefforts in Londonin April
1903resulted in an agreementby the Ottoman Empire that a governing
officia1would notbe sentto 2~barah.l~~
166. The modem usage of the word "Qatar"to refer to the State of
Qatar,andto encompassthe peninsulaas a geographicunit, did not gain
currency untilafterthe 191 6 Anglo-Qatari Treaty discussed in Section
2.10 (startingat paragraph215).Thus, the fact that the Ottomanrecords
might:occasionally referto the province oQatardoes not meanthat they
or anyone elçe conceived that their authority, evenlessso that:of the
chiefsof DohaTown,extendedthroughoutthe Qatarpeninsula anymore
than the modern use of the word "America"to refer tothe United States
of America means that the speaker thinks that the United States of
Americaexercisejurisdiction throughoutthe American continent.
SECTION2.7 The Ottoman Empire and the Al-Thani were
rebuffed in six attempts to exercise authority over
the ZubarahRegion (1874 ,878. 1888. 1891, 1895
and 19031
167. The fact that neitherthe Ottoman Empirenor the chiefs of Doha
ever extendedtheir authoritybeyondthe area around Doha - particularly
not to the Zubarah region - is evidenced by their no less than six
lS5 Letterfrorn Mudir (Governorj of Odaid Grand Vizir1 April 1903,
Ann.68,Vol. 2,p. 282.
156 Letter fiorn Oüornan Ministry of the Interiorto the Province of Basra,
30November 1911,Ann. 79,Vol.3, p. 416.attempts at expansion from 1874 to 1903.In the face of Britain'sand
Bahrain'sopposition, each attempt ended in failure. Ttis to these failed
attemptsthat the analysisnowtums.
18. The Ottoman Empire was in anexpansivephase when it sent its
garrison to Doha in 1871. It was eager to expand its influence and
authority in the region and simdtaneousIy to diminish that of Britain.
The chief of Doha himself had designs on the territory of the Ruler of
Bahrain, particularly his dependenciesin the Qatar peninsula,including
the Zubarah region. This coincidence of interests resulted in the
concerted attempts of the Ottomans and the Al-Thani to expand the
geographicalscope oftheir authoritynorth of Doha and its environs and
intoZubarah.The firstattemptby the OttomanEmpire and the Al-Thani
to expandnorthwardintoZubarah occurredin 1874. Itbroughtthem into
both indirectand direct conflict with Bahrain and Britain.
169. In the surnmerof 1873,an Ottoman detachmentaccompaniedan
Ottoman offlcer named Hossein Effendi to Zubarah in order to try to
persuade the BahrainiNaim tribe to corne under Ottoman After
this failed,in early 1874,the OttomanEmpirebegan supporting indirect
attacks by bedouin tribes against Bahrain's island and mainland
territories.lsgAt the sarne tirne, the Ottoman Empire encouraged the
chief of Doha to attack Zubarahdirectly. The latter cornplied,enlisting
200 mercenaries of the Beni Hajir tribe, a bedouin tribe from the
mainlandof Arabia,to assist himin carryingout the atta~k.'~~
15'
IbrahiA mli Abdel,BritishPolicv rowards Bahrein and Qatar 1871-1914
(PhDthesis)p. 111Ann. 230, Vol.4,p.985.
lS8 Saldana,op.cit.p.4, Ann.70, Vol. p.292.
'59 Ibid,atp.11,Ann. 70,Vol.2, p.299.170. The attack was a fadure. The British Political Resident,
Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, telegraphed on 12 September 1874,16'
following theBeniHajir attackon the Zubarahfort:
lt(T)hesrnallsurnmer garnison of Zubarahheld out gallantlyuntil
relieved by their fellow tribesmen, who suddenly retumed in
strengthfi-omBahrainand the pearl banks and inflicteda severe
defeatuponthe assailant~.'''~'
171. The Ottoman Empire complainedto Britain about Bahrain's
a~tivities.'~Britain rejectedthe Ottomancornplaintout of hand on the
ground that Zubarah hadnever been an Ottomanpossession but rather
that it had:
"been hitherto consideredby the Sheikhs of Bahrein, past and
present, as a dependancyof [Bahrain], and used as a summer
residence."'"
172. The next attempton Zubarah came in 1878.In that year, Sheikh
Jasimbin Thani,now chief of Doha,launchedan attack againstZubarah
in conjunctionwithNasir bin Mobarik,a renegademember of Bahrain's
ding Al-Khalifafa~nil~.'~~ ~he town of Zubarah was destroyedin the
attack. No attempt to settle the Zubarah region was made by the
Ottoman Empireorthe chiefof Dohauntil 1888.As the British Political
Residentcommentedin 1888 :
"TheTurkshave nothitherto assertedor exercised any authority
orjurisdictionoverZobarahand the othervillages onthat part of
the Katarpromontory ...16'
'"
Saldanq op. cit.,p.4,Ann. 70,Vol. 2,p. 292.
Lorimer Vol.1,op.ci!,p. 906, Ann. 83, Vol.3, p.494.
Ib2 Saldana, opcil,p. 6,Ann.70, Vol.2,p.294.
16' Saldana, op. cii., p. 6,Ann.70, Vol. 2, p. 294.
lti4 Lorimer Vol. 1,ap.cit..,08,Ann.83,Vol.3,p.496.
165
Saldana, op. ci..34,Ann.70,p. 322, Vol. 2.This supports the conclusion that neither the Ottoman Empire nor the
Al-Thani exercised authority in the Zubarahregion after the 1878attack.
173. In 1888 the Rder of Bahrain and Britain discovered that the
Ottoman Empire was planning to rebuild the town of Zubarah and settle
it with people from tribes that were under Ottoman control. The
Ottoman Empire'sintentionwas to occupy it and reinstateitas a leading
centre of trade in the area and therefore divert vade (and accornpanying
customs duties) from Bahrain, through which most trade in the region
passed. As the VaIiof Basra, an Ottoman official, noted in a letter dated
12April 1888:
"If Zubarah is reinstated to its former position of importance and
customs duty is taken fkomthe goods taken on land there, this
wilI secure an income for the Treasury and at the sarne time the
areawill be stimulati166rom there to the town [Kasaba]of Qatar
al1along the Coast...
174. The report goes on to suggest that the chief of Doha intended to
rebuild the city. The Ruler of Bahrain and Britain reacted with alarm to
the proposal. The Ruler reiterated to Britain his claim to dominion over
the Zubarah region, which he had never released despite his agreement
not to be involved in affairs on the mai111and.l~W ~ hen advised of the
plan, the British Political Resident, Colonel Ross, telegrammed the
Government oflndia:
"In view to opposing further extension Turkish jurisdiction,
safety of Bahrain, and security of seas, 1consider important that
166 Letterhm Vali of Basra to Head Clerk of Padiçhah, 12 April 1888,
Ann.42(a),Vol.2, p. 21.
16'
Letterfrom Col. Ross, British Political ResidtotSecretaryof Govt.of
India,17March1888,Ann. 41, Vol.2, p228. any settlement at Zobarah should be forbidden and prevented by
us
In a letter to the Secretary to the Goverment of India, Foreign
Departmentof 17March 1888,the Resident added:
"The Turks have not hitherto assented or exercised my authority
orjurisdiction over Zobarah and the other villages onthat part of
the Katr promontory, and the policy of the Government of India
has been adverse to allowing them to extend their authority in
that ~istrict"16'
Britain was opposed to the rebuilding of Zubarah, recognising, inter
dia, the Ruler of Bahrain'stitle to sovereigntyoverthe region.17'
175. In October 1889,the Ottoman Governor of Nejd proposed to the
Ottoman Goveniment that it establishsub-governorships at Zubarah and
0daid.171 By November 1889, the Ottoman Empire had formally
decided on the establishment of officiais in Subarah.and Odaid and had
even assigned salarie^. T"^e Ottomans realised the benefits that would
result fiom thecontrol of the pearIfisheries:
"Ifa govenunent is now established in Udaid and Zubarah then
the Kaza of Qatarwill be able to benefit from the pearlfishing in
this a~ea.""~
16' Telegrarn from Lt. Col. Ross, British Political Resident, to Foreign Dept.,
Govt.oflndia, 12March 1888,Ann.40, Vol.2, p. 227.
'69 Letter from Col. Ross,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryto the Govt. of
India,ForeignDepartment,17March 1888,Ann.41, Vol. 2, p. 228.
I7O
Letterfiom Col.Ross, British Political Residentto Secretary of Govt. of
India, 17March 1888,Ann.41, Vol.2, 228.
17' Reportfrom Governor ofSwk of Nejd to Minister of Interior including
recommendationsfor reforms in Nejd, 9 October 188Ann. 44(a), Vol2,
p.236.
'72 Ottoman Cabinet Minutes,27 November 1889,Ann.45(a), Vol. 2, pp.238 to
239.
'73
Letterbrn the Officeof Assistant Governorof Qatar, 7 November1891,
Ann.48(a),Vol.2, p. 243.176. The Ruler of Bahrainobjected to this proposal, concerned again
that his rights in Zubarah would be violated. He wrote to the British
PoliticalResident, Lieutenant-ColonelRoss,that:
"Now officers ofthe Turkish Govemment intended for Zobara
and Odeyd have arrived and proceeded to Katr, and from what 1
have ascertained, they are hopefùl that Sheikh Jasim bin Thani
will rebuild Zobara,and appoint one of themto be a Mudir of the
ii174
place....
177. The Ottoman Empire abandoned its proposal because the
inhabitants of Zubarah refüsed to submit to its authority. As the
Ottomansthemselves laternoted:
"In the year 1890-91, [Zubarah] refùsed occupation by the
Ottomans and when it was learned fram the note sent to the
Ottoman Ambassador in London on 30April 1903 that
administrativeofficials were to be appointed for Zubara, Ujeyd
[Odaid]and Vekre [Wakrah]t,hey were told of agreements from
the Porte, oral.and written assurances, that a governing official
would not be sent." 17'
Once again, Britain upheldBahrain'ssovereignrights andobjected to the
Ottoman Empire. The sub-governorshipproposal was abandoned.
178. In April and May of 1895, the Ottoman Empire md Jasim Al-
Thani, the chief of Doha, jointly encouraged Al bin Ali tribesmen who
had settled on the main island of Bahrain to leave it and settle at
~ubarah'~~under the Ottoman flag. Sheikh Jasim also threatened the
Naim tribespeople who lived in Zubarahwith a view to their changing
174 Letter fiom Ruler of Bahrain to Col. Ross, British Political Resident,
11February 1891,Ann.46/47,Vol. 2, p.242.
175 Leiter from Ottoman Minishy of the Interior to Basra Province concerning
Zubarah,30 November 1911,Ann.79(a)Vol. 3,p. 416.
17'
Letters fiom Col.Wilson, British Political Resident,to Chiefoftooha and
Chiefof Ali-bin-Ali,22April 1895,Ann.54, Vol.2, p.260 and Ann. 55,Vol.
2, p. 261respectively. See alsoSaldana,op.cit.,Ann 70,Vol.2, p. 330.allegiance from Bahrain to him.'77Sheikh Jasim and local Ottoman
officialssailedwith afiotillaof dhowsto the town of Zubarah, occupied
italong with theAl bin Ali tribeandraised the Ottomanflag.
179. These activities came to the attention of the Ruler of Bahrain.
Promptedby his protests, and citingas its motivation theRuler'stitle to
the Zubarah region, Britain dispatcheda warship to Zubarah in arder to
displacethe Ottomansand the forcesof Sheikh Jasim Al-Thani. Captain
J.H. Pelly, the British commander, orderedthe Al bin Alitribe to leave
Zubarah. When they failed to do so, several Al bin Ali boats wcre
~eized'~a ~ndBritain sent adiplomaticprotest tothe OttomanErn~ire."~
180. On 6 September 1895, in the face ofthe stand-off,Captain Pelly
conveyed a messageto SheikhJasirn,who was still in Zubarah, advising
him to surrender and leave Zubarah. When no reply was forthcoming,
Captain Pelly opened fire on the Al-Thani fleet with his warship. The
warship destroyed 44 dho~s.'*~Ovemight, the Ottoman officials left
Zubarahwiththeir flagand SheikhJasim surrendered.18'
181. Zubarah was entirely vacated by the Al bin Ali tribe, Sheikh
Jasim and the Ottomansby 20 September 1895,in accordancewiththeir
terms of their surrender set out in a letter of 7 September 1895 fiom
177 Letter from Lt. FraseActing Assistant Residento Lt. Col. Ross, British
PoliticalResident,8arch 1895,Ann. 53, Vol.2, p. 256.
17'
Letter from Capt. Pelly, Commander and Senior Naval Officer, to Col.
Wilson,BritishPolitical Resident,9 July 1895,A58,Vol. 2,p. 264.
179 Merno. fiom Col. Wilson, British Political Resid5nJuly 1895, Ann.57,
Vol.2, p. 263.
''O Letter from Col. Wilson, British Political Resident,to Seto Govt. of
India, 13September1895,Ann.62,Vol. 2, p. 268.
Is1
LetterfromCapt.Pelty,Commanderand SeniorNaval Oficer to Col.Wilson,
BritisholiticalResiden7,September1895,Ann. 60,Vol. 2, p. 266.Captain Pelly to Sheikh ~asirn."~Zubarah was once again left to the
Naimtribe andthe Ruler of Bahrain.
182. The Zubarah incident in 1895caused a greatdeaI of friction in
Anglo-Ottoman relations. The Ottomans demanded that the various
boundarieson the shoresof the Gulfbe clarified.It is interestingthat in
1897the Ottomansclearlyunderstoodthat Britain's intervention was not
solely to protect themain island of Bahrain. Significantly, anOttoman
reporton the Zubarahaffair datedMay 1897notes:
"Britain claims that Zubarah is under the control of Bahrain
which it claims is under British protection, and Britain insists
that the Ottoman state has no rights of sovereignty over itUutg3
{Emphasisadded.)
In 1903,the OttomanEmpire once again attempted to establish a
183.
colonial administrative unit in the Zubarah region. The Ottomans
appointed a mudir, or sub-governor for the Zubarah region. However,
Bahrain immediately protested to Britain. Britain was well aware of
Batirain'sposition in relation to the Zubarah region. Indeed, the British
Political Resident,ColonelKemball, observedatthetime that:
"the occupation of Zobara [by the Ottoman Empire] would be
viewed with the greatest concern by the Chief of Bahrein, who
considersthe placeto be an appanageof his, andwhose rights we
arebound ta maintain...".l(~m~hasisadded.)
184. Following Bahrain'sprotest, Britain vigorously and successfully
opposed the intended Ottoman expansion. The reason for this
lg2 Letter fiom Capt.Pelly,Commander and SeniorNaval Officer,to Chief of
Doha,7 September1.895A,nn.61,Vol. 2, 267.
18' 3ttoman Report on the Zubarahaffair3 May 1897,Ann. 63(a),Vol.2,
p.269.
'84
Letter hm Lt. Col. Kemball, British Political Reçtoeûovt. of India,
23March 1903,Ann. 67, Vol. 2,p. 281.opposition, as cited by the Viceroy of India himself, was "(Britain's)
relations with I3ahrein".ls5This suggests that Britain supported,at least
publicly, Bahrain'sassertion of its rights over the Zubarah region and
agreed with the Bahraini view that Ottoman occupation of Zubarah
wouIdbe a threatto Bahrain'ssafety.
185. This is confirmedby records fi-ornthe Ottoman Empire archives
which indicate that Britain warned the individual who had been
appointed by the Ottoman Empire as mudir (sub-governor) of Zubarah
that:
"Zubarahwas attachedto Bahrain, that BahrainwasunderBritish
protectionandthat no [Ottoman]officia1would be allowedto go
there..."lS6
186. After diplornatic complaints, the Ottoman Empire agreed to
withdrawthe appointmentof a rnudirat Zubarahand also fromthe town
of Wakrah .7
187, These six attempts by the Ottoman Empire and the Al-Thanito
extend their authority into the Zubarah region demonstrate three facts
that are importantto the presentcase.First, neitherthe Ottomansnor the
Al-Thani in fact ever succeeded in establishing their authosity in the
Zubarah region throughout this period. Second,the Ruler of Bahrain
consistently maintained his claim to the Zubarah region during this
period. Third, Britain continued publicly to support the Ruler of
Bahrain's claimto the Zubarahregion.
Iss Saldana,op,cit.p.51, Ann.70,Vol.2, p. 339.
ls6 Letter hm Mudir of Udaid to Grand Vizi1rApril1903,Ann.68(a),Vol. 2,
p.2x2.
18'
Letter fiom Sir N. O'Conor {British arnbassador to Constantinople)to
Marquessof Lansdowne (ForeignSecretary - British Govt.), 13June 1903,
Ann.69,Vol.2, p. 284.SECTION 2.8 The Ottoman Ern~ire's influence in the reeion
declined from 1905 and the Ottoman Em~ire
finally withdrew from the Province of Oatar in
1915
188. The ejection of the Ottoman Empire and the Al-Thani from
Zubarah in 1895 and their continued inability to extend their authority
over the entirety of the Qatar peninsula lefi matters in the Qatar
peninsuIa in a state that was satisfactory neither to Britain nor to the
Ottoman Empire.
189. As lateas 1907, Ottoman records suggest that they had no real
control on the peninsula and that Jasim Al-Thani had no power beyond
Doha Town. In a report dated 24 December 1907,the Govemor of the
Ottoman province (Sanjak)ofAkkawrote:
"In Qatarwhere the Ottoman coast ends, despite the presence of
a majorJcommander with soldiers, the seauort town of Qatar is
under the independent control of a Sheikh cdled Jasim Al
ha ni."" Emphasis added.)
190. In December 1908, Britain formally confirmed to the Ottoman
Empire that it did not recognise Ottoman sovereigntyover the peninsula
and wouId not accept any interference t.he~-e.'~ T~his was the case a
forfiow rith Zubarah. The Ottoman Foreign Minister noted in a report
concerning Ottomanjurisdiction in Qatar dated 27January 1909:
"The British Govemment has always repeated her right toprotect
ri190
the shores of Zubarahand Udaid ...
ls8 Reportby Governorof Sanjakof Akk24 Decernber1907,Ann. 72(a)Vol.
3,p. 364.
lS9 Telegram sent by Muharram Pasha, Vali of Basra, 5 Decernber 1908,
Ann.73(a),Vol.3, p. 368.
''O
ReportoftheOttoma ForeignMinister,27 January190Ann.75(a),Vol. 3,
p.402.191. Although the Ottomans designated Zubarah as a nahiye (or
sub-district), the Ottoman Empire's own records show as late as 1909
thatthe Ottomans had:
"neverhad officia1administration representingthe state nor have
they undergone anydeveloprnent orimprovement."lgl
The Ottoman Empire attempted to constmct a government building,'92
but like al1the other Ottoman plans for Zubarah,it came to nothing.
192. Due to greater strategic concerns, the Ottoman Empire began
contemplating a withdrawal from the Qatar peninsula. In March 191 1,
Britain and the Ottoman Empire began to negotiate a comprehensive
agreement for their strategic relations. Those negotiations included
within their ambit discussions about the political future of the Qatar
peninsula. In a draft memorandurn addressed to the Ottoman Empire on
the subject of a comprehensive agreement for their strategic relations,
dated July 1911,Britain reaffirmed its position thatthe Ottoman Empire
must renounce "El Katr, where the Sheikh of Bahrein has imuortant
rights."'93 (Emphasis added.) At the time Britain and the Ottoman
empire were negotiating over the future of the Gulf Region (see
paragraph 194),the Ruler of Bahrainreopened with Britain the question
of his rightto levytribute fiom "Qatar" in accordancewith the terms of
the 1868 document imposed on the local sheikhs of Doha Town and its
environs and signed by the chief of Doha (see paragraph 127). There is
no record of Britain'sultimate view of the matter, but the record shows
Reportfrom theProvince of Basrato Ministof the Interior, 25 September
1909,Ann.76(a),Vol. 3, 409.
lg3
Draftrnernorandurnta TurkishAmbassador, July 1911, Ann. 78, Vol. 3,
p.415.that the initial response of the British Political Resident, Sir Percy Cox,
was supportive. In his note to the British Govemment about the issue of
Bahrain's right to tax "El-Katr", Cox characterised the question to be
whether:
"the extinction by the Turks of the Bahrein right to tribute as
arranged by us [in 18681 ..was an act of aggression fromwhich
[Britainwas] boundto protect the ~heikh."'~~
193. That Cox would have raised this question confirms that, shortly
befare the conclusionof the Anglo-Ottomannegotiations, Britain did not
consider the issue of Bahrain's authority over Qatar to be settled.
Moreover, as already indicatedabove (seeparagraphs162, 163and 166),
Cox'snote is further evidence that the term "Qatar" or "Qatr"was used
during this period to refer to the area around Doha Town (the Ottoman
province of El-Katr).
194. If it is accepted that the Ruler of Bahrain, Cox andthe British
Govemment were using that term "Qatr" in thatsarne ordinary sense -
and there is no indication thatheywere using it in any contrary sense-
then it is clear that what was at issue in the relevant part of the Anglo-
Ottoman negotiations was the future of the Ottoman province of "Qatr",
in otherwords Dohaandits environs.
SECTION2.9 B e
Z Z f
1871-1915
195. The various events described above in relation to the attempts of
the Ottoman Empire to expand the Ottomanprovince of "El-Katr" (i.e.
lg4 Note entitled"Shaikhof Bahrain'sdaim to tributefiom Qatar", by Sir Percy
Cox,BritishPoliticalResident,Ann.80,Vol.3424.Doha Town and its immediate environs) cleasly involved some
limitation of the Ruler of Bahrain'sauthority over the southern part of
the Qatar peninsula. However,nothing disturbed the Ruler of Bah.rainls
authority over the Zubarah region. Zubarah was close to the main
Bahraini population centres in Muharraq Island and the main island of
Bahrain. It was, conversely,far from the Ottomansand the Al-Thani in
Doha Town. The Naim tribe who inhabited the Zubarah region
maintained its allegianceto and recognised theauthority of the Ruler of
Bahrain (see Section 2.1 starting at paragraph73). The traditional
economic and sociallinks betweenthe Zubarahregion andthe islandsof
Bahrainweremaintained.
196. The Rulers of Bahrainopposed each of the six failed attempts of
the Ottomans and the Al-Thani to extend their authority over Zubarah
region (see Section 2.7 starting at paragraph 167).Britain very clearly,
and occasionallyforcibly,maintaineda consistentposition of refusingto
concede that the Ottomans had authority over the whole of the Qatar
peninsula. Although acknowledging that the Ottoman Empire had
estabrished"aninfluence"in the Qatar peninsulaby virtue of its garrison
stationed in Doha, Britain was of the opinion that the issue of
sovereignty over the entire Qatar peninsula had not been thereby
decided. Writing to the British Governent on 4 September 1873, the
British Acting Political Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, noted the
historical authorityof the Rulers of Bahrain over thepeninsula and the
limited extentof the Ottomanintrusion.Heobservedthat "[tlhe question
ofthe sovereignty overGuttergenerally,has neveryet been decided." 19*
lP5
LetterfiomLt. ColRoss,ActingBritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryto the
Govt. of India, 4 September 1873, Ann.20, Vol. 2, p174 to 176 and
Saldanaop. ciatp.3,Ann70, Vol. 2,p.290.197. Britain's policy in the region during this period was to avoid
antagonising the Ottoman Empire over Arab issues, out of concern for
its own larger geo-politicd interests. At the same time, Britain was
unable to deny Bahrain's authority over the Zubarahregion. Britain had
concluded that its greater strategic interests required that the Ruler of
Bahrain be persuaded to desist from his involvement in the political
affairs of the Qatar peninsula. It must be emphasised that this attitude
reflected Britain's conclusion as to the most advantageous course of
action to achieve Britain's strategicinterests. It did not reflect any view
as to the Ruler of Bahrain's legal title or actuaI authority over the
Zubarahregion. Britain'sconclusiononthat latter score is reflected in its
subsequent acceptance, as well as defence of, Bahrain's continued
authority in the Zubarah region. In short, although for its own interests
Britain did not wantBahrain to be involved in Zubarah, it could not
identify anyconsideration of law against it.Nor could Britain's interests
in the Gulf of Arabia afford it to allow Bahrain to become weakened by
Ottoman attacks. So long as Britain was unable to persuade the Ruler to
adopt another approach,Britainwas obliged to lend it assistance.
198. Britain consistently tried to persuade the Ruler of Bahrain to
abstain from engaging in affairs on the Qatar peninsula.Ig6The Rulerof
Bahrain however remained resolved to protect the interests of his
subjects in the Zubarah region. Following the unsuccessful attack on
Zubarah in 1874, Sheikh Isa, the Ruler of Bahrain, requested assistance
from the British PoliticalResident to prevent another attack on Zubarah.
The tems of his request showed that the Ruler of Bahrain was
196
Letter froLt. Col.Ross,BritishPoliticalResidentoSecretary oGovt. of
India, 10November 1874,Ann.24, Vol. 2, p. 184.continuing to assert:his authorityover Zubarah and thaz:he continued to
view theNaim tribewholivedthere to behis subjects:
"Sheikh [Isa]in dwelling on the danger to his Govemment from
the propinquity of Nasir bin Mobarik [a defector from Bahrain
who had allied himself with the chief of Doha], expressed his
desire that 1 should take steps to prevent the Katar Chief
harbouring him or assisting him in any operations against
Zobarah by land or sea ...The Chief of Bahrein being
apprehensive of an attack on his allies, and as he considers,
subjects who hold the fort of Zobarah, asked whether he would
be allowed to reinforce the garnisonof that place, which he
considereda dependencyof ahr rein."'^^
199. In private consultations, the Political Resident sought to
discourage the Ruler of Bahrainfrom asserting his rights. Ultimately,
however,Britainagreed withthe Ruler ofBahrainthat he was entitledto
dispatch troop reinforcementsto Zubarah in defence of his rights. The
Political Residentreported:
"That as regards succouring Zobarah1would not interfere with
the despail198f reinforcements as a purely defensive
rneasure....
200. The Political Residentwas told by the Governmentof India that
Britain would not assist the Ruler of Bahrain if he continued to be
involvedin affairs onthe Qatarpeninsula.199 Still,fearingfurther attacks
on his dependenciesin the Qatarpeninsula afterthe initial attack by the
Beni Hajir in 1874, the RuIer of Bahrain senthis brother, Khdid, along
with the Chief of the Naimtribe, to Khor Hassan north of Zubarah on
the Qatar peninsulain October 1874,to convincethe Chabisatribe who
were living there to join the Naim tribe in Zubarahfor their own
lg7
Saldana, opcit., p. 5, AnnVol.2, p293.
Ig8 Ibid.
199 Letter from OfficiatingUnder SecretatoGovt.of Indiato Lt. Col. Ross,
BritisholiticalResident, 10Decembe1874,Ann. 25,Vol.2, p.186.protection.200In the course of the same month, the RuIer of Bahrain
appointed a new governor for Zubarah. He also hired and sent stone
rnasonsto Zubarahto make repairs to the fort at his e~~ense.~''
201. In a letter to the British Political Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel
Ross, dated 17 December 1874, the Ruler of Bahrain emphasised that
"Zobarah ...belongs to us and is one of our dependencies."202 In a letter
to the British Political Resident dated 18 Decernber 1874, the British
Political Resident's Second Assistant, LieutenantFraser, noted a similar
assertion by Sheikh Isa and concluded: "In this [Le. his rights over
Zubarah] he is right and it is difficult to seewhy or how we cm prevent
him sustaining s~verei~nty."~~~
202. The Ruler of Bahrain repeatedly tried to press his point home to
Britain. On4 Mach 1875,the Ruler offered not to interfere in theaffairs
of the mainland wit the exception of:
"our city Zobarahfor that is our property and has been. It and its
inhabitants are dependent on us and we are al1dependent on the
BritishGovernment. We feel certain that the British Governmen.t
would neverwish us to abandon our possessions and allow the
enernyto seizethernaM204
200
Letter fkomNews Agent,Bahrainto Lt. Col Ross, BritishPoliticalResident,
28 October1874,Ann. 23,Vol.2,p. 183.
201
Letter fromRuler of BahraintoLt. Col. Ross, British Political Resident,
4 March1875,Ann.29,Vol.2, p. 196.
'O2 Letter fiom Ruleof Bahrain, to Lt. Col. Ross, British Political Resident,
17December1874,Ann.26, Vol.2, p. 190.
'O3 Letter from Lt. Fraser, Officiating Second Assistant Resident, to Lt. Col.
Ross,British PoliticalResident,cember1874,Ann.27, Vol.2, p. 191.
204
Letter from Ruler of BahraitoLt. Col. Ross, British Political Resident,
4March 1875,Ann.29,Vol.2, p. 196.203. On 7 March 1875, he again wrote to the British Political
Resident,this time pointing out that ever sincethe conquestof the main
islandof Bahrain,the:
"Al-Khalifa remainedmastersof the Islandas wellas of Zobarah.
From that day ta this Zobarah has been in our possession and no
one has ever ventured to dispute our rights. All the Arab tribes
are awareof this fact."'05
204. Britain continued to discourage the Ruler of Bahrain fiom
involvinghimself in affairson the Qatar peninsula.In May 1875,Britain
informed the Ruler that if he did not accept Britain's advice on the
matter, "the consequences will be upon himself, and ... the British
Government will hold themselves free to take such rneasures with
respect to him as they may think neces~ar~."~~"nJune 1875,the Ruler
of Bahrain succumbed to Britaints pressure. He agreed not to involve
himself in activities in the Qatar peninsula, but expressly reserved his
rights in relationto Zubarahwith the following staternentto the British
Political Resident dated 14June 1875:
"Thereason of our not interferinginthe affairs of Zobarahat this
time is simpIyobedienceto the ordersof (Britain), not that our
rights have becomeinvalidor e~tinct."'~'
205. In a letter dated 22 June 1875,the Ruler'sbrother reiterated the
Rderts position to the British Political Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel
Ross:
'O5 Letter fiom Kuler of Bahrain to Lt. Col. Ross, British Political Resident,
7March1875,Ann.30,Vol.2,p. 197.
206
Seelettersfrom Secretaryto the Govt.of lndiato Lt. Col.Ross, 10May1875,
Ann.31, Vol. 2, p. 198 and letter from Lt. Col.Ross, British Political
Residentt, Ruler ofBahrain, 1May 1875,Ann.32, Vol.2, p. 199.
207
Saldana,op.cit.p.7, Ann.70, Vol.2, p. 295anlettefrornRulerof Bahrain
to Lt. Col. Ross, British Political Resident, 14 June 1875, AVol.32,
p.201. "Shaikh Isa trusts that his abstaining from interference with
Zobarah will not be considered as (involving) loss of right to it,
forit is Ourpossession andthe possession of our forefathersfrom
oldertimes, and we beg that our claim will be held in recollection
11208
by [Britain]....
206. In August 1875,the Beni Hajir tribe attacked Zubarah.The Ruler
despatched "fivearmed vessels of his own to pursue the off en der^".^"^
This was, of course, inconsistent with Britain'sattempts to dissuade him
fi-ominvolvement in the Qatar peninsula. Britain threatened that if the
Ruler were to maintain his course of conduct "he cannot remain a friend
of the British ~overnment".~'~Britain's interpretation of Bahrain's
maritime peace obligations clearly restricted Bahrain's use of force to
defending the main island of Bahrain, thereby curtailing its ability io
protect Zubarah. Nevertheless, as described in Section 2.1 (starting at
paragraph 73), the Ruler of Bahrain remained actively involved in the
affairs of the Naim tribe in the Zubarah region even afier 1875.
Moreover, the Ruler continued to defend Zubarah using his army,
"suppliedwith arms and provisions". For this,the Ruler was admonished
by the officiating British PoliticalResident, MajorCharles~rant.~''
207. In 1878,the chief of Doha attackedZubarah (seeparagraph 172).
TheNaim settlement was destroyed and those Naimtribesmen who had
been left homeless took refuge on the main island of ~ahrain.''' The
208 Letter fiam Sheikh Ahmed bin Ali Al Khalifato Lt. Col. Ross, British
PoliticalResident,22June1875A,nn. 33a,Vol. 2,p. 202a.
209
Saldana,op.cit.p. 8,Ann.70, Vol.2,p.296.
210 Ibid
Letter from Maj. Grant, British Political Residento Ruler of Bahrain,
17September 1877, Ann.35, Vol. 2,p. 205 and Saldana, op.crt.,p.9,
Ann. 70, Vol. 2,p.296.
'12 LorimerVol.II,op. cit.p. 908,Ann. 83,Vol.3,p.496.Ruler of Bahrain felt unable to resist Britain'swaming not to becorne
involved.This causedhim considerableanguish.AsLorimer observedin
the Persian Gulf Gazetteer:
"The Shaikh of Bahrain, who considered himself in honour
bound to assist the Nafimof Zubarah,chafed angrily against the
policy of inaction imposedonhimby the BritishG~vernment."~'~
208. Lorimer'sGazetteer reportedthat, followingthe 1878 attack, the
Ruier of Qatar objectedto reportsthat the Ruler of Bahrain was planning
to settle his subjects,the Naim, atFuwairat, close to the ruined town of
~ubarah.~'~The Ruler of Bahrain remained in close contact with the
Naim and was reported to have gone to considerable effort to maintain
theirallegiance."
209. Despite their hstrated ambition to control the Zubarahregion,
both the chiefs of Doha and the Ottomans clearly and candidly
acknowledgedthe interests of Bahrain in the Qatar peninsula. In 1893,
whenthe BritishPolitical Residentraisedthe topic of Bahrain'srights in
the Qatarpeninsulato Jasimbin Thani, he reportedthat:
"Sheikh Jasim at once acknûwledgedthe rights of Bahrain, and
expressedhis willingnessto pay tribute as bef~re."~'~
210. Furthemore, Lorimer'sGazetteerrecordsthat, in 1893:
"...[TheAl-Thani chiefofDoha] addressed letters to the Political
Resident and the Chief of Bahrein appealing for British
protection and that of the Chief of Bahrein, and applying for
permission to reside in the northen part of Katar within the
latter'surisdiction. ThePolitical Resident proposedto reply that
LorimerVol. II,opcitp. 908,Ann.83,Vol.3, p.496.
214 Ibid ,.910,Ann. 83,Vol. 3p.498.
'15 Ibid ..911,Ann. 83,VoI.3, p499.
'16
Lettehm tt. Col.Talbot,BritishPoliticalResitonSecretaryof Gavtof
India,7 May1893,Ann. 51,Vol.2,p.251. ...[theAI-Thani chicf of Doha] was debarred by previous orders
of Govenunent from settling either at Zobarah or Odeid, which
places the Sheikh had evidently in view in which to sett~e."~'~
(Emphasis added.)
2 11. In 1895, the Ruler of Bahrain once again fomally affirmed to
Britain Bahrain's rights to Zubarah. The British Resident's Second
Assistant responded that:
"(The Ruler of Bahrain) must understand from the explicit
instructions of Government that the consequence of his
interference in the affairs of the mainland beyond his insular
possessions [andt] he exercise of rights of sovereignty there that
might lead to complications ... would be the withdrawal of the
promises of protection held outto him {Emphasisadded.)
212. In 1895,during one of the latest Ottoman/Al-Thani atteinpts on
Zubarah (see paragraphs 178-182), the British Political Resident,
Colonel Wilson,recorded his concems:
"There cm no longer be anydoubtthat the intrigue, having for its
object the establishment of a position which the Bahrein Chief
regards - and as 1 concur, with justice - a grave menace to his
security and an unjust encroachment on his ancestral territories,
is actively fostered by the local Turkish a~thority."~(Emphasis
added.)
213. In a letter dated 23 Jury 1895,the British Resident wrote to the
Ottoman forcethat had attacked and occupiedZubarah:
"Hearing that you are detaining nine boats belonging to the
Shaikh of Bahrein, who is on friendly terms with the British
Govemment, and Zobarahbeing one of the towns belonginp to
him ...1demand that you will inform me by what authority you
are detaining these Bahrein boats ... No Turkish authonty is
217
Saldana,op.cit., p.39,Ann.Vol.2, p. 327.
218 LettekornLt. Fraser,Actin2ndAssistant esident,to Lt. Col.Ross,British
PoliticalResident,8Marc1895Ann.53, Vol. 2, p.257.
'19 Letter from Col. Wilson,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryto the Govt.
of India,24 Ma1895,Ann. 56,Vol.2, p.262. recognised by the British Govemment at ~obarah."'~~ (Emphasis
added.)
214. The history of Bahrain'sauthorityover the Zubarahregion from
this date until 1916 has already been desçribed with some detail in
Section 2.7 (starting at paragraph 167) and Section 2.8 (starting at
paragraph 188) and will notberepeated here.
SECTION2.10 The chief of Doha Town and Britain signed the
1916 Treaty and the State of Oatar slowly
emetyed thereafter
215. The Ottoman Empire's presence in the Qatar peninsula faded
during the 1914-1918war. In August 1915,the Political Agent, Major
Keyes, met with the chief of Doha, SheikhAbdullah bin JasimAl-Thani,
to discuss its surrender and requested the Sheikh to present surrender
terms to the Ottoman ~ornrnander.2'~The presence of a British ship
caused the remaining Ottoman soldiers to flee during the night of
f9August 1915 and the Fort was formally handed over to the chief of
~oha.~~~
216. Britain was the only Great Power now active in the region. It
decided torecognise the Al-Thani chief of Dohaas the ruler of an entity
called "Qatar" and, on 3November 1916, entered into a treaty of
protection with the chief ofDoha own in reIationto his territ~ries.~~~
220
Letter from Capt.Pelly, Commander and Senior Naval OffitoMahornêd
EffendiatZubarah,23 July 1895,Ann. 59,Vol. 2, p.265.
22'
Letter fiomMaj.Keyes, BritishPolitical AgtoLt. Col. PerCox, British
PoliticalResident,August 1915,Ann. 82,Vol.3, p. 436.
222 Ibid, Ann.82, Vol3,p.437.
223 Treatybetween BritisGovt. and theShaikh of Qatar-3 Novernber 1916,
Aitchisonop. cifp. 258,Ann. 84, Vol. 3, p. 513. The 191 6 Treaty did not contain any geographical definitionof
21 7.
the territoryof Qatar.There was nothinginthe text of th191 6 Treatyto
lead to the conclusion that it contemplatedan entity called Qatar that
was larges than the Ottoman administrative unit of Qatar, which the
Ottomansthemselveshad consideredto be a territorial unit distinct fiom
the regionsof Zubarah and Odaid.Certainlythere is no indicationin the
text that the entire Qatar peninsula was to be part of the Al-Thani
territories. At the end of the Ottomanperiod there was no Ottoman or
Al-Thani authority in Zubarah. The Ruler of Bahrain continued to
exercise authority over the Zubarah region and the Naim inhabitants
continued torecognisethe authority of theRuler of Bahrain.
2 18. The 1916Treatywas writtenin the firstperson, fromthe point of
view of the Al-Thani chief of Doha, now s.tyled"the Rder of Qatar". It
onlyrefers to "Qatar","myterritoriesand port of Qatar", "myFrontiers",
"myterritory"and "theterritoriesof Qatar".Clearly,the referenceto the
"portof Qatar"in the 1916 Treaty must be a referenceto Doha, which
was referred to by the Ottoman Empire as "El-Katr".This referenceto
the "port of Qatar"in the text, distinguishedby the Ruler of Qatar from
his "territories",adsto the conclusionthat the 1916 Treaty was using
the samenomenclatureas theOttomansto referto Doha and its environs
as "Qatar".This wouIdbe consistent with the analysissupra (see paras.
194-196)relatingto the lirnitedmeaning of the term "Qatar"as used by
Britainandthe OttomanEmpire.
219. Such a conclusion is supported by the fact that the text of the
opening paragraph of the 1916 Treaty incorporates the obligations
arising fiom the terms imposed by Britain upon the chief of Doha in
1868within the 1916Treaty: "Whereas my grandfather,the late ShaikhMohammed bin Thani,
signed an agreement on the 12thSeptember 1868 engaging not to
commit any breach of the Maritime Peace, and whereas these
obligations to the British Govemment have developed on me his
successor in ~atar."'~~
220. The nature of the tems imposed by the 1868 document have
been reviewed in paragraphs 127 to 129. They were understood by
Britain and the Al-Thani toapply to territory over which the chiefs of
Doha had authority. The limited geographical scope of the Al-Thani
territones in1868 and subsequently was described in paragraphs 133 to
235. The reiteration ofthe 1868undertaking in thepreamble to the 1916
Treaty means that the politicd entity of Qatar did not encompass the
entire peninsula and most obviouslynot the Zubarahregion.
221. The transformation of the former Ottoman province of "Qatar"
from an administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire to an entity
under Britain'sprotection in 1916excited little comment in Bahrain.The
Al-Thani had, by 1916, exercised authority in the area around Doha
Town under the Ottoman Empire. The forma1 recognition of that
authority by Britain changed nothing in relation to the Zubarah region
and so did not effect Bahrain'sinterest inZubarah.
222. On the contrary, the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire fiom the
Qatar peninsula eliminated the reason for Britain's anxiety regarding
Bahrain'sexercise of authority over Zubarah. In anticipationof just such
an eventuality, Bahrain had been pressing since 1913 for the revival of
the 1868 tems imposed on the ~l-Thani.~*~ Cox, the British Political
'"
Treatv'betwe BrntishGovt. and Ruler of Oatar- 3 November 1916,
Aitchisonop. citp. 258, Ann.84,Vol.3, p. 513.
225
Noteby SirPercy Cox,BritishPoliticalResident entitled"Shaikhof Bahrain's
claimto tributefioQatar"17May 1913,Ann. 80,Vol.3, p424.Resident,had noted the'Rulerof Bahrain's insistenceon inclusionof the
1868unliateral undertakingin the terms of any future Anglo-Al-Thani
agreement:
"As the Sheikhis certain to raise the question when we corneto
make an agreementwith Qatr, it would be as well to examineit
now. Iwill accordingly ask Colonel Knoxto obtain a copy of
ColonelPelly'sagreementof 1868,as the whole matter tums on
the question whether the extinction by the Turks of the Bahrain
right to tributas arranged by us was an act of aggression from
whichwe were boundto protect theShaikh."226
223. In any event, the 1916 Treaty was, vis-à-vis Bahrain, res inter
nliosacta, and could not therefore affect its sovereign rights.Nothing in
the relationshipofprotectionbetween BritainandBahrainauthorised the
formerto disposeof any part of the territoryofthe latter.
SECTION2.11 Bahrain continued to exercise authority over
the Zubarah reyion during the period of 1916-
1937
224. At the close of the First World War, in 1919, the Ruler of
Bahrain dispatchedthe CrownPrince of Bahrainto London.The object
of his mission was to infom the British government of the Ruler's
intentionto build aport inZubarahandre-developthe region.227
225. Oneof Bahrain's interestsin deveiopinga port in Zubarahwasto
prevent cornpetitionto Bahrain's commerciam l aritime dominanceof the
region from Ibn Saud's proposed port on the Coast of the Arabian
226 Note by SirPercyCox,British PoliticalResidententitledof Bahrain's
daim totributefromQatar", 17Ma1913,Ann.80,Vol.3, p.424.
227
Memorandurn fiom XndiOfficeto theGovt. of Indi16 September 1919,
Ann.83,Vol.3,p. 517.peninsula.228Followingthe dissolution ofthe Ottoman Empire, Britain's
irnrnediate strategic concern in the region was to contain Ibn Saud's
expanding domain without provoking its Ruler. Britain opposed the
proposai because it concluded that Bahrain'sproposed port facilities in
Zubarah would be perceived by Ibn Saud as extremely
~onfrontational.~~ ~nce again Bahrain'sIegal title and historic interest
in Zubarah were subordinated to Britain's greater strategic concerns.
Bahtain had to discontinuethe proposal.
226. The majority of the Naim were, during this period, pastoral
bedouin. Theremaindertraditionallysupplementedtheir livelihood from
the sea. In the 1920sand 1930s,the populationof Zubarah decreased as
many Naim migrated ta the main island of Bahrain. This was due, in
part, tothe technological improvementof fishing andpearling boatsthat
enabled the Naim to operate in the Gulf of Bahrain and the Bahrain
pearlingbanks without operating from Zubarah, and to the general
declinein the localpearl industryas a result ofthe GreatDepressionand
the development of Japanese cultured pearls. In addition, health and
educationservicesbegan to be provided by the State of Bahrain on the
main island of Bahrain. Electricity and varied food staples - al1to be
found on the main island of Bahrain -made life there more attractive
than lifein Zubarah.
227. The discoveryof oil in 1932 on the main islandof Bahrain -the
first commercialoil field in the Arabian Gulf - createdjobs with good
wages. Illegal immigrationbecarne a problem for Bahrain. However,
228 MemorandurnfromMaj.Dickson,BritishPoliticalAgent,ta Lt. Col.Prescott
Trevor,BritishDeputy PoliticalResident, 17 January1920,Ann.87, Val. 3,
p.524.
229 MernorandumfromMaj.Dickson,BritishPoliticalAgent, to Lt. Col. Prescott
Trevor,BritishDeputyResident,6 December19Ann. 86, Vol.3, p.519.Bahraini subjects, including those from the Zubmah region and the
Hawar Islands, could move fieelyto the main island as they had always
been able to do.
228. The Ruler of Bahrain continued to exercise his authority in the
Zubarahregion. His authonty continued to beacknowiedgedby its Naim
inhabitants. CharlesBelgrave,the Adviser to the Government of Bahrain
who had been appointedin 1925,recorded in 1948that:
"some of the Khalifah lived pemanently at or around Zubara
coming over 10 Bakrainfor visits and about a year before 1came
[1924]one Shaikh Ibrahim bin Khalid Al-Khalifah was banished
to Zubarah by order of Shaikh Hamed ..He lived there till in
about 1926he was permitted to return to Bahrain ...[As]fa as 1
can ascertain, fiom 1914 till 1937there was no interference with
Bahrain people living inthe Zubarah area."230
The continued presence in the Zubarah region of inhabitants who owed
dlegiance to Bahrain during the 1920s and 1930s demonstrated
Bahrain'scontinuingauthority in theZubarahregion.
229. In the light of these facts, it is evident that as of 1937 Bahain
stillretained sovereigntitIeto Zubarah.
230. The Ruler of Qatar did not exercise authority over Zubarah
during the period 1916-1937. Zubarah was far to the north and Westof
his power-base in the south of the peninsula. Even in Doha Town, the
sovereigntyof the Rulerof Qatarwas oftena fiction. As the 1923British
AdministrationReport of the Bahrain Political Agency noted:
"In his own territories, the [Ruler of Qatar] is now powerless.
Any attempt to enforce his nile is fnistrated by malcontents
appealing to the Sultan of Najd [Ibn Saud], whose power the
[Ruler] fears.Cases have occurred ofpersons being arrested by
230 Letter fromCharles Belgrave, Adviserto the Govt.of Bahrain, to Ruler of
Bahrain'sEnglishsulicitor,H. Ballantyne,9 October 1948,AnnVol. 4,
pp.834to835. armed followers sent by the Sultan, not rnerely within Qatar
territory, but actually in the Town of Doha, where the Ruler
re~ides."~~~
231. In 1927, the British PoliticalAgent reported on the subject of
landing grounds for aircrafi in the Qatar peninsuIa and arrangements
with the Rulerof Qatar:
"1 think independentmangements with local tribes would have
to be made for protection at Zubara and Shaqiq, as Abdulla [the
Ruler of Qatar] is represented to me more as a pearl merchant
than a ~haikh."~'~
232. Ibn Saud had been expanding his territories in the Arabian
peninsula during the 1920s and 1930s.It was clear that at the 1922 oil
conferenceat Uquayr, Ibn Saud consideredal1of Qatar as part of Hasa
(theArabianeast coast). The PoiiticalResident, Cox, remindedhim that
Qatarwas outsidehis jurisdiction. However,in 1930, the Rulerof Qatar
admitted to the Political Agent that he was paying Ibn Saud a secret
subsidy of a "lakhof rupees a year", effectivelyplacing Qatar under the
contra1of Ibn ~aud.~~K ~ing Saud finally recognised a State of Qatar in
1935. Nevertheless he exercised authority in the south of the Qatar
peninsula wellintothe 1930s.'~~
233. As has been described. Zubarah was far fiom the base of the
Ruler of Qatar in Doha. There was little there to interest him other than
231 1923 British Administration Report of theBahrain Political Agency
(CKDaly)Ann.89, Vol.3, p. 528.
232 Note by Maj. Barrett, British PokiticalAgent, 17 January 1927, Ann.93,
Vol. 3, p. 551.
233
See letter fromCapt.Prior, BritishPoiiticalAgent,to Lt. Col.Biscoe, British
PoliticalResident,ugust1930,Ann. 97, Vol. 3, p. 563 and letterfrom Lt.
Col. Biscoeto Foreign Secretary,Goof.India,18August 1930, Ann.98,
Vol. 3, 567.
234
Zahlanop. cit.,pp. 82to 84,Ann.226,Vol. 4, pp. 951ato 951c.the Naim tribe and their potential as a source of tribute. A.F.
Williamson, a geologist working for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
who had reconnoitred the Qatar peninsula in 1933, reported that the
towns and villages in the north of the Qatarpeninsula remainedoutside
the authority of the Ruler of ~atar.~~~Soon after granting an oil
concessionover his territoriesin 1935, the Ruler of Qatar sawthe great
attraction of expanding the territory under his authority in order to
maximise hispotential revenuefromhydrocarbon deposits.
SECTION2.12 British and United States oil coraa~aniesbefan
to compete for oil concessions in Bahrain and
Oatar durin? the period1933-1936
234. The advent of oil concessions in the Gulf of Arabia region
coincided with the decline of Britain's commercial interests there.
Britain had dominated the Gulf of Arabia politically andeconomically
for over 100 years.236However, soon after the discovery of oii in the
region - in Bahrain in 1932 - United States oil companies becarne
dominantin competingfor oil concessionsand exploration rights. From
the early 1930s, Britain struggled to give its own oil companies a
cornpetitiveadvantage over United States oil companies by exploiting
Britain's historical political influence in the region. The struggle
influenced events inthe Zubarahregion and underlayQatar'sinvasionof
Zubarah in 1937 jsee Section 2.13, starting at paragraph 253, and in
particular,paragraphs282to 290).
2'5 A.F. Williamson'sreport entitled "Notes on Qatar14 January 1934,
Ann.101,Vol.3, p576.
236
Takingtheconclusionofthe first generalanti-treatof 1820asthefirst
date.235. On 14May 1914,the Rulerof Bahrainagreed notto gant anyoil
concession for his territory without the prior approval of the British
~overnment.~~~ In 1925, a British syndicate, Eastern & General, was
granted a concession to drill for oil in Bahrain. The ternis of the
concession authorised Eastern & General, inter alia, to explore and
search "throughoutthe whole of the territories under [the Ruler of
Bahrain'scontrol] f.38
236. Eastern & Generalcouldnot raisethe capitalnecessaryfor sucha
project and decided to assign its concession. In November of 1927,it
signed an option agreement withGulf Oil of Pennsylvania to assignthe
entire concession. Thatoption was itself subsequently assigned on 21
December1928to the StandardOil Company of California C SOC AL).^^^
The assignmentswere dependent onthe approvalof Britain. But Britain
was increasingly concerned about "the intrusion of Arnerican oil
interests into Bahrain", as noted in a telegrarn dated 15 August 1929
fiom the BritishSecretaryofStatefor ~ndia.~~'
237. After lengthy negotiations, Britain agreed that the concession
could be assigned to a Canadian subsidiarycreated by SOCAL to hold
and operate the concession: the Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited
(BAPCO). The assignment was executed in lune 1930.~~' Contrary to
237 Reported in letter frorn Lt. Col. Haworth, British Political Resident, to
SecretaryoStateforColonies,2 April 1928,Ann. 94, Vol. 552..
238
BahrainOil Concession,1925,Ann. 90,Vol. 3529.
239
For these early developments, see Angela Clarke, Bahrain Oil and
Development0929-1989) (1991),Chapter3,Ann. 231, Vol. 4, p. 987.
240 Telegramhm Secretaryof State for india to Viceroy (Foreign and Political
Department)and Lt. Coi.CharlesBarrat,BritishPolitical ResidAugust5
1929,Ann.95,Vol. 3,p.554.
241
Indenture behveenRulerof Bahrainand Easter& General, 12 June 1930,
Ann.96,Vol. 3,p. 556.Britain'soriginal aspirationBAPCO was indirectly100% United States
owned.
238. In 1932, BAPCO struck oil in commercially exploitable
quantities in the centre of the main island of Bahrain. Following this
success,it appliedto extendits prospectinglicenceon severaloccasions.
A mining lease was signed between the Ruler of Bahrain and BAPCO
on 29 Decernber 1934. By virtue of that lease and the original 1925
concession, BAPCO was permitted to select a Mer site in Bahrain's
territory in which to ~~erate.~~B~APCO selected a site on the main
island of Bahrain,as detailedonrnaps appendedto thelease.
239. The remainder of Bahrain's territory, referred to as the
"unûllottedarea",was left to benegotiated between theRuler of Bahrain
and prospective concessionaires.It was understoodby these prospective
concessionaires thatthe Zubarah region could be included in Bahrain's
oil concessions. In a 1936 letter, the local representative of BAPCO
wrote to the company'slegal counsel: "The Khalifa familyat one time
lived in Zubara and still have sorne daim to that town and its
11243
environs...
240. With the prospect of oil, the eyes of the Ruler of Qatar became
intently fixed on Zubarah. Britain was involved with the Qatari oil
concessions by virtue of Article 5 of the 1916Treaty between Britain
and Jasim AIThani,underwhichthe Ruler of Qatarwasprecluded from
granting any oil monopolies or concessions "to anyone whatsoever ...
without the consent of the High British Governrnent." For its part,
242
LeasebetweenRuler ofBahrainand BAPCO,29 Decernber1934,Ann.102,
Vol.3,p.580.
243
LetterfromK.SkinnertoN. Ballantyne,5 Decernber1936,Ann. 108,Vol. 3,
p.627.Britain wanted British companies to get as many concessions in the
regionas possible.Having lost theBahrainconcessionto a 100%United
States-owned company, Britain was determined to ensure that
concessions for the remainder of the unallocated territory in the region
be awarded to British commercial interests. Britain was concerned that
Bahrain's sovereignty over the Zubarah region could rnean that the
United States-controlledBAPCO rather than a British company would
ownresourcesthere.
241. Britain recognised the strength of Bahrain'sinterest in Zubarah.
The British PoliticalAgent noted ina memorandumdated 13June 1933,
at the beginningof discussions withoil companies aboutoil concessions
onthe Qatarpeninsula:
"Inthis connection 1mentionedthat it would be advisablein any
matter of boundariesto avoid reference so far as possible to the
western coast of Qatar as there were certain places on it which
were claimed by Bahrain. 1said that visits of geologists to that
areahad been commentedon locally asbeing beyond the powers
of [theRulerof Oatar]...".244(Emphasisadded.)
Severaldays later,the PoliticalAgentmet a representativeof the British
Anglo-Persian Oil ~om~an~~~o ~n,e of the prospective concessionaires,
who was due to meet with the Ruler of Qatar. The Political Agent
advisedhim:
"to keep clear of the Western coastof Qatar, so far as might be.
He [Sampson]askedme about the Bahrainclaims, but 1 said that
1couldtell him little except that they were consideredIocallvto
be live claims, andthat 1thoughtthat, unless theyfoundthat they
244 Mernorandum by Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, 13 June 1933,
Ann.99, Vol. 3p.570.
245 Laterto be calledthe Anglo-IraOil Company;now known asthe Britiçh
PetroleumCompany. definitely required to operate there, it wouIdbe best, at any rate
at this stage.tletsleepingdons lie.1124 (6rn~hasisadded.).
242. Using its political influence, Britain entered into an agreement
with the Rulerof Qatar for the sole purpose of ensuringthat the Qatar oil
concession be granted to Anglo-Persian. In return, Britain offered
protection to Qatar (a fairly valueless benefit to Qatar in the Iight of
Britain'songoing obligations to Qatar under the 1916Treaty).Theterms
of the arrangementwereverysimple:
"Protectionwillbe affordedyou on the condition ..that you give
theOil Concession about which the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
havebeen negotiating,to that ~orn~an~."~~~
243. Once the concession had been awarded to Anglo-Persian on
17May 1935,2B ~ritain entered into an agreement with the company
whichensuredthat any assigneeof the concessionwould:
"be and remain a British company registered in GreatBritain and
having its principal place of business in Great Britain, and its
Chairman shall at al1times be a British ~ubject."~~~
244. Article2 of the Agreement ensured that subsidiary companies
were subject to the same requlrements and Article 3 required that "the
employees ofthe Company inQatarshall at al1times be British subjects
or subjectsof the Sheikh".
246
Mernorandumfrom Lt. Col.Loch, British PoliticalAgent,to Lt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliricalResident,25 June 1Ann. 100,Vol.3, pp.572to 573.
247 Letter from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to Ruler of Qatar,
11May1935A ,nn.103,Vol. 3,p.612.
248 QatarOilConcession,17May 1935,Ann. 104,Vol. 3,p.615.
249
Political Agreement between BritishGovt. and the AngIo-Persian Oil
Company,5 June 1935,Ann. 106,Vol.3, p.622.245. The Qatar concession was subsequently assigned in September
1935, with the consent of the British Go~ernment,~~~ to Petroleum
Development (Qatar) Limited,a holding Companyowned by Petroleum
Concessions Limited ("PCL"), a consortium in which British interests
246. Thus, while the oil concession in Bahain was held by United
States interests, the oil concession in Qatar was awarded to British
interests.In order to extend further the British economic interest in
Qatar, Britain had reached an understanding with the Ruler of Qatar
abouthisterritoriesthatpurported to transfer therebyBahrainterritory to
Qatar and consequently to British oil companies. Britain wanted to
assure the integrity of the Qatar peninsula was not threatened. As a
Foreign Office officia1in London said to a PCL representative on 25
June 1937:
"..His Majesty'sGovement, who had strong views about the
integrity of the Qatar peninsula, would not be at ail likely to
recognise anyclaimsby the Sheikhof Bahrein overthis area."252
247. Article2 ofthe 1935Qatar concessionpermitted operation:
"inanypart of the Stateof Qatar as is defined below...The State
of Qatar means the whole area over which the Shaikh mIes and
which is marked on the north of the line drawn on the map
attachedto this ~~reernent."~~(~Emphasisadded.)
''O
Letter from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political RestoeRuIerof Qatar,
21 September1936,Ann.107,Vol.3,p. 625.
251
Seee.g.referenceto PCL lettefrom J.S. Black, Chief Local Representative
of BAPCO, toHugh Weightman,British Political Agent, 8 June 1938,
Ann. 161,Vol.4,p.739.
252 ForeignOfficeMinute,25 June 1937,Ann.133,Vol. 3p.688.
253
Qatar Oil Concession,17May 1935,Ann.104,Vol. 3,p.616.248. The map that was attached to the Agreement contained a line at
the base of the Qatar peninsula, to the north of which was depicted the
Qatar peninsula and the Bahrain Islands (including the Hawar
~slands).~~~
249. In 1937, PCL, the British concessionaire in Qatar, was
negotiating with the RuIer of Bahrain for a concession over Bahrain's
"unalloted area". PCL took the view that its Qatar concession included
the Zubarahregion, but itwas concerned about how Bahrain's viewof its
sovereignty over the Zubarahregion might affect both PCL'schances of
obtaining the unallotted area and PCL'sability to develop the Zubarah
region underthe Qatar concession.
250. In August 1937,PCL sent a letterto the India Office stating:
"Information now reaches us fromBahrain to the effect that the
Shaikh would in al1 probability be willing to give us al1 the
unallottedterritory ..provided that a clause be inserted in the
concession agreement that 'noeffort would be made to develop
the oilresources of theZubaraha~-ea'."~~'
251. PCL believed that its interests would be best served by leaving
aside the Zubarah question for the moment in order to increûse its
chances ofbeing awardedthe concessionfor Bahrain's "unallotted area".
To this end, PCL even suggested to Britain that perhaps the issue of
sovereignty over the Zubarah region could be avoided entirely if
negotiations were to emphasisethat the concession being sought by PCL
related onlyto the unallotted "portion of Bahrain Island and al1the other
Islandsunder the Sovereigntyof the Shaikh of ~ahrain."~~~
254 Mapatcompanying the1935QatarOiIConcession,Ann. 105,Vol.3,p.621.
255 LetterfromS . Longrigg,PCLto Mr. Walton, India Office, 16August 1937,
Ann. 157,Vol. 4,p727.
25bbid, Ann. 157,Vol.4, p.728.252. The British Govemment now found it convenient to temporise.
In a Iettedated September 1937writing to the British PoliticalResident
in September 1937;~~the British Political Agent noted:
"From an examination of Article 2 of the Qatar Oil Concession I
am inclined to theview that His Majesty'sGovernment are in no
way committed, for the state of Qatar is defined as being 'the
whole area over which the Shaikhmles and which is marked on
the north of the line drawn on the niap aftached to this
Agreement.' If the Shaikh of Rahrain eventually succeeds in
min? his claim to the area known as Zubarah then @so ,facto
the Shaikh of Oatar cannot be said to ruIe over that area and,
therefore. that area cannot be considered as part of the state of
Qatar." (Emphasisadded.)
SECTION 2.13 Oatar launched an armed attack on the
253. TheRuler of Qatar'sinterest in increased oil revenues combined
with Brih's interest in ensuring that the British oil company PCL,
which had the Qatar concession, had the largest possible territorial
concessionpossible soon led to conflict between Bahrainand Qatar over
the status of the Zubarahregion.
254. Ta the oil companiesoperating inthe region,to Britain andto the
Parties, iwas clear that, at the end of 1936,the Ruler of Qatar had not
yet established his authority in the Zubarahregion. Sincethe Ottoman-
inspired attackonZubarah in 1895,the Al-Thani,first as chiefs of Doha
Town and then as Rulersof Qatar, had made no furthet attempt to settle
~ubarah.~'~They had already failed to do so three times by use of force
257
Letter fromCapt.Hickinbotham,British PoliticalAgent, tCol.Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident,22 September1937,A160,p. 735,Vol. 4.
258
See e.g. Mernorandumby HughWeightrnan,BritishPoliticalAgent,28 April
1937Ann. 123,Vol.3, p647.and twice by proposed peaceful administration and sett~ement.~'~The
Ruler of Qatar had problems enough in his own territories without
concerning himself withZubarah.This attitude changed, however, when
the Ruler of Qatar consideredthe potentid foroil. Britain perceived that
Bahrain's interest in the region would make it a ripe area for conflict.
The British Political Agent in an official note dated March 1937warned
that:
"[Zubarah]is going to be the subject rnatter of a tensible feeling
between the [Ruler of Bahrain] and [the Ruler of Qatar] ..owing
to thedevelopmentof petroleum."260
255. Like his predecessor in 1895, the Ruler of Qatar began to
conspire with some local tribesmen to impose his authority on the
region. In a hasty atternpt to create some sort of presence in the Zubarah
region, the Ruler of Qatar embarked on plans for the construction of a
port and a pier there. In addition,the British Political Agent noted that
the Ruler of Qatar was attemptingto imposehis authority on the Al-Jabr
branch of the Naim tribe and the Zubarah region by establishing a
customs officia1in Zubarah and demanding tax for the "juss boats" that
brought provisions from the main island of Bahrain to the Bahraini
Naim inhabitants of ~ubarah.~~B ' y Mach 1937,the Rulerof Qatarhad
259
Thereisno evidencethat the Al-Thani participateddirectly in the short-lived
attemptbytheOttomanEmpireto extend its administrattoZubarah.
260
Note of Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, 13 March 1937, Ann. 109,
Vol.3,p. 629.
261 Telegram from Capt. Wickinbotham,British Political Agent, tLt. Col.
Fowle, British Political Resident, 23 April 1937,Ann. 119, Vol.642.p.
For anaccountof the role of thes''jusboats" see statementof Saleh bin
MuhammedAli bin Ali Al Nairni, para.7, Ann.234(a), VoI.4, p. 1026and
statementof Mohammed bin Mohammedbin Theyab Al Naimi, para.6,
Ann.233(a),Vol.4, p. 1015.begun to settie the Zubarah region with his own s~bjects.~~~ As the
BritishPolitical Agent observed,the Ruler ofQatar had engaged inthese
acts expressly "inorder to ensure the claim ofownership of the land."263
256. When these plans became known to them, the Al-Jabr Naim
tribesmen were provoked into open confrontation with Qatar. They
rejected the idea of submiaing to the authority of the Ruler of Qatar.
Their headman refused to pay the tax on the ground that they were in
Bahrain and subjects of the Ruler of Bahrain.The leader of the Al-Jabr
Naim, Rashid bin MohammedAl Jabr, sensing trouble from the Qataris,
went to see the RuIer of Bahrain in the main island of ~ahrain.~~~ He
obtained assistance in the form of food and arrn~.~~B ~y 30 April 1937,
about 1000members of the Al-Jabr branch of the Naim tribe had massed
at the old town of Zubarah, anxious to defend themselves against the
anticipated aggression from the Ruler of Qatar as reprisa1 for their
refusal to subrnit to his authority or pay his taxes.266At the same time,
three members of the Ruler of Bahrain's personal guard went to
~ubarah.~~~
262 Note of Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, 13 March 1937, Ann. 109,
Vol.3, p.629.
264 See statement of Salehbin Muhammed Ali bin Ali Al Naimi, para. 10,
Ann.234(a), Vol. 4, p. 1027 and statement of Mohammed bin Theyab Al
Naimi,para.10,Ann. 233(a),Vol. 4, pp. 1015to 1016.
265
Leaer from Ruler ofQatar to Capt. Hickinbotham, BritishPolitical Agent,
11July 1937, Ann. 149, Vol.4, p. 714. See also statementof Saleh bin
MuhammedAli bin Ali Al Naimi, para IO,Ann.233(a),Vol. 4,p. 1016, and
statement of Mohammed bin Mohammed bin Theyab Al Naimi, para 10,
Ann.234(a),Vol. 4,p.1027.
266 Telegram from Capt. Hickinbotharn, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col.
Fowle, BritisholiticalResiden30 April 1937,Ann. 124,Vol.3,p.649.
267
Note entitled"ZubarahIncident", by Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political
Agent,3 May 1937,Ann. 126, Vol.3,p. 654.257. At the sarne time as this confrontation was developing in the
Zubarah region, the Ruler of Qatar had been trying toentice members of
the Naim tribe away fiom their loyalty to the Ruler of Bahrain. He had
been partly successful. A lesser branch of the Naim tribe - the Al-
Ramazan - had switched allegiance sorne time before to the Ruler of
Qatar as a result of an intemal tribal dispute (see paragraph 85).
However, the principal branch - the Al-Jabr, who occupied the Zubarah
region - remained loyal to Bahrain (see paragraphs 85-88).One former
AI-Jabr Naim resident of the Zubarah region, Saleh bin Muhammed Ali
bin AlNaimi, now resident in the main island of Bahrain, recalled:
"there had been a lot of trouble with the Al-Thani Sheikh of
Qatar who wanted to tax the Al Jabr Naim, for example by
charging customs duties on the dhows which brought food fiom
the main island of Bahrain and setting up a guard post in Our
tribal territory. Another section of the Al Naim tribe, the Al
Ramzan,had switchedallegiance to the Al-ThaniSheikhandhad
been appointed to collect taxes fiom the Al Jabr section of the
tribe.
This caused a great deal of bad feeling within the Al Naim tribe
and ourleader Rashid bin Mohammed Al Jabr argued with the Al
Ramzansection and refused to payanytaxes. He made it clear to
the Al-Thanis that the Al Jabr Al Naim were subjects of the
Ruler of Bahrain and that we would have nothing to do with the
Al-Thani. We were afraid that the Al-Thani would demand
allegianceby force and many ofthe AlNaimtribe gathered at the
ruined town of Zubarah from the outlying towns and villages in
fearof an atta~k."~~~
258. The British Political Agent, Captain Hickinbotham, learned that
the Ruler of Qatar had visited the villages of the northern coast of the
Qatarpeninsula, as well as the Zubarahregion, in March of 1937,inthe
268
Secstatement of Saleh bin Muhammed Ali bin Al Naimi, paras.to 9,
Ann.234(a),Vol.4,pp.1026to 1027.Seealso statementof Mohammedbin
Mohammedbin TheyabAlNaimi,para. 10,Ann. 203(a)Vol.4,p. 1015.wakeofthe recent defectionof the Al-Ramazanbranch of theNaim tribe
from Bahrainito Qatari autl~orit~.~~~
259. In response to the actionstaken by theAl-Jabr Naim, the Ruler of
Qatar wrote to the headman of the Al-Jabr branch of the Naim tribe in
April 1937 demanding his loyalty and obedience on pain of
punishrnent.270 The headman of the Al Jabr Naim cornplained to the
Ruler of Bahrain about Qatari tax collectors and customs official in
Zubarahand claimed assistance fromhim.27'
260. The Ruler of Bahrain noted with concern the sudden visits of the
Qataris and their followersto the Zubarahregion in the spring of 1937
and immediately cornmunicated its concems to the British Political
~~ent.~~~ Bahrain expected that, while Britain might continue to
discourage it fiom becoming involved in events on the Qatar peninsula,
Britain would also continue to protect and maintain Bahrain'sauthority
over Zubarah in the face of Qatariexpansionism.
26 1 The British Political Agent, Lieutenant-Colonel Loch, originally
responded to Bahrain'sprotests and requests forassistance in Zubarah on
the basis of his mistaken understanding that the question of sovereignty
over the Zubarah region had been decided in 1920, when Britain had
refused to allow the construction of a port there by Bahtain (see
paragraphs 224-225). With this in mind, he referred to Britain's
269
Note entitled "Zubarah Incident", by Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political
Agent,3 May 1937,Ann. 126,Vol.3,p. 653.
270 LetterfromRuler of Qatarto Rashidbin Mohomed Al Jabor, headmanof the
Naim,April 1937,Ann.125,Voi. 3, pp. 650to 61.
271 Note entitled "Zubarah Incident", by Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political
Agent,3 May 1937,Ann. 126,Vol. 3, pp.653to 654.
272 See e.g.translationof letter from Ruler of BatoaLt. Col. Loch, British
PoliticalAgent,14March 1937,Ann.110,Vol.3, p.630."decision regarding Zubarah", in a note dated 16 March 1937.~~T ~he
British Political Resident, Sir Trenchard Fowle,was reluctant to support
Bahrain's claim to the Zubarah region. Without substantiating his
sentiment, he asserted: "Personally 1 am of opinion that Zubara
definitely belongs to ~atar..."~~F~owle appeared finally to have decided
that the opportunity had corne both to rid Britain of the long-standing
problem of Bahrain's involvement in the Qatar peninsula and to assist
the Ruler of Qatar in consolidating his tenuous authority, thereby
assisting Petroleum Concessions Limited, the oil concessionaire in
Qatar. At no time did the British Governrnent or British officiais ever
evaluate the quality of the claim of Ruler of Qatar. Nor did they ever
comware the two States'bases of title to the Zubarah region or evaluate
them in light of theprevailing internationallaw standards.
262. One week later, the British Political Agent, Lieutenant-Colonel
Loch, completed his review of the records and realised that there had
been no decision. He noted in a memorandum of 12April 1937that he
had informed the British Political Resident, Sir Trenchard Fowle, of his
findings:
"1told theResident that I h
Zubarah as Shaikh Isa's orders certainly used to be obeyed and
the place is inhabited largely by persons from Hidd and ffom
Rifa bath towns in the main Bahrain Island group] and no Qatar
customs are taken. 1explained that the Zubaraharea was a large
semi-circular enclave with towers around it ...1 finaIly begged
the Resident not to suggest any course to Government until he
273
Mernorandum of Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, 16 March 1937,
Ann. 111,Vol.3,p.631.
'14
Telegram firomLt. Col. Fowle, British Political RetoLt. Col. Loch,
British PoliticalAgent, 25 March 1937, Ann. 112, Vol. 3, p. Upon
further reflection, he expresseda very different view in May 1937; see
paragaph272. had had an opportunity of finding out the Shaikh'sattitude in the
rna~er..."~~(Emphasisadded.)
263. Despite the limitations that had been placed by Britain on the
exercise by the Ruler of Bahrain of his authority in the Zubarah region,
it was well established. In a telegram dated 30 March 1937,the British
Political Agent confirmedthat:
a) in addition to the Naim, other important Safiraini families
lived in the Zubarahregion;
b) those families made their living fiom fishing (with boats
and fish traps);
the Ruler of Bahrain sends orders if occasion arises to
c)
people who live there'(the Telegram refers to the practice of the
previous Ruler of Bahrain, who died in 1932,in that regard by
statingthat he 'certainlyused to doso');and
d) no Qatari customs taxes were levied in the Zubarah
region.276
264. Britain was clearly concerned that if it continued to recognise
Bahrain'ssovereignty over Zubarah, as it:had in the past, then PCL
would fîndthe Zubarahregion to beoutside its oil concession granted by
the Ruler of Qatar. At one point when British officiaiswere discussing
the issue of Bahrain's sovereignty over Zubarah,the British Political
Agent suggested that, as a condition of any agreement with the Rulerof
Bahrain about his sovereignty over Zubarah, Britain should insist that
Bahrain give PCLthe oil concessionforthe Zubarahregion.277
27s
Noteof BritishPoliticalAgent, 12ApriI193Ann. 114,Vol. 3, p. 634.
276
Telegram fromLt. Col.Loch, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident,30Marc1937,Ann.113,Vol. 3,p. 633.
277 Noteof BritishPoliticalAgen12 ApriI 1937Ann. 114,Vol.3, p.634.265. Frornthe beginningof the renewedinterestof the Rder of Qatar
in the Zubarah region in early 1937, the Ruler of Bahrain asserted his
authority over the Zubarah regi~n.~'~As the activity of the Ruler of
Qatar in the Zubarahregion increased during the spring of 1937, so did
the communicationsbetween the Ruler of Bahrain and the headman of
the Al-Jabr branchof the Naimtribe. Rashid Al Jabor warned in a letter
to the Rulerof Bahrain:
"Bin Thany has displayed his enrnity towards you and what is
moreis his ideato takeZubaraandotherplaces..."279
266. The Ruler of Bahrainsent soldiers,arms and food to theNaim in
Zubarah as he had done before (see paragraphs198-206)in times of
difficulty.One old Naim tribesman now living on the main island of
Bahrain recalled:
"Our leader, Rashid bin Mohammed Al Jabr, had gone to the
Ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Harnad bin Isa and his son Sheikh
Salman,seeking weaponsin fearof anattack from Ibn Thani.He
had sought the weapons fiom the Ruler of Bahrain because they
were our Rulers, and because the Naim were fighting on behaIf
ofthe AlKhalifa.TheRuler of Bahrainsent five shot and eieven
shotgunsto help
267. In the course of April 1937, the Bahrain flag was planted
conspicuouslyon the beachby the old fort in Zubarahand repairs to the
fortwerecommencedby ~ahrain.~'~
278 Letterfrom Ruler of Bahrain to British Political Agent, 14 April 1937,
Ann. 115Vol. 3, p. 635.
279 Lettefrom Rashidbin MohamedAl Jabor,headmanof the Naim, toRuIerof
Bahrain14April 1937,Ann. 116,Vol.3,p.636.
280
See statementof Mohammedbin Mohammedbin Theyab Al Nairni, para.10,
Ann.233(a), Vol.4, p. 1016. See also statementof Salehbin MuharnrnedAli
bin AINaimi,para. 10,Ann. 234(a), Vol. 4, p. 1027.
'"
Telegramfrom Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent,to Lt. Col. Trenchard
Fowte,British PoliticalResident, 26 April 1937, Ann. 122, Vol. 3, p. 646.
SeealsoMemorandumentitled"ZubarahIncident" ftom Capt.Hickinbotham,268. On 22 April 1937, the Acting Superintendent of the Bahrain
Land Department sent supplies to Zubarah, including Bahrain
Govemment Bags. He also confirmed that land in Zubarah was to be
registered in the Bahrain Land ~e~istry,~" ssomething that had
hithertofore not been done because of the pastoral and maritime nature
ofthe society there.A request for suchregistration wasre~eived."~
269. In May 1937,Britain proffered its good offices to the parties in
an attempt to resolve the deadlock over Zubarah. The British Political
Agent, Capt. Hickinbotham, obtained an assurance fiom the Ruler of
Qatarthat he had no intentions of attacking the Nairnpending a decision
onthe status of Zubarah to be madeby the BritishPolitical ~esident.*'~
270. Several inconclusive meetings took place in Bahrain, under the
auspices of the British Political Agent, between representatives of the
Rulersof Bahrain and Qatar. In the course of these negotiations, Captain
Hickinbotham proposed a compromise: Qatar wouId not tax the Nairn
inhabitants of Zubarah, would notcoIlect customs duties in the Zubarah
region and would not requireany travel documentsbetweenZubarahand
the rest of Bahrain.The Ruler of Qatar, furthemore, would recognise
the right ofthe Ruler of Bahrainto Zubarah ashis property. In exchange,
British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident,
3 May 1937,Ann. 126,Vol.3, p. 656.
282 Letter from Acting Superintendent of Land Department, 22 April 1937,
Ann. 117,Vol.3,p. 637.
283 See request for registration of property in the Zubarahregion in Bahraini
Land RegistrationDirectoratereceived on 23 April 1Ann. 118,Vol. 3,
p. 638.
284
Mernorandumentitled "Zubarah Incident" from Capt. Hickinbotham,British
Political Agento Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, 3 May 1937,
Ann. 126,Vol.3,p.656.the Rulerof Bahrainhad to give any oiIrightsin Zubarah to the Rulerof
~atar.~~~
271. The compromise proposal did not ded with the issue of
sovereignty directly, describing the rights of both Rulers in ternis of
persona1property. Nonetheless, other than oil revenues being accorded
to the Ruler of Qatar, the Ruler of Qatar was expressly prohibitedfiom
exercising authority (in the form of taxation, immigration, import
control) in Zubarah. In substance, the proposal was that the Ruler of
Bahrain would continue to exercise his authority over the Zubarah
region to the excIusionof the Ruler of Qatar,provided that the British
oil concessionaire could prospect foroiI there and the Ruler of Qatar
could collectanyoil revenues.2g6 Events shortlyovertookthis proposal.
272. Once the negûtiations between the representatives of the two
Rulers had started, it became rapidly evident to Britain that the better
Iegal claim lay with Bahrain.Ena memorandumto the British Secretary
of State for India dated 5 May 1937, the British Political Resident
communicatedBahrain'scaseto the Secretaryof Stateforlndia, noting:
"(1) that for many years pastthe Naim tribe of Bahrainorigin,
and members of whom live in Bahrain are practically the sole
inhabitantsof Zubarah
and the Naim at ~ubafah pay no taxes, includingcustoms
(2)
to the Shaikh of Qatar. Nor does the Shaikh of Qatar insist on
travelpapersforBahrain subjectsvisitingZubarah
(3) that the Naim tribe obey the orders of the Shaikh of
Bahrain,in support of which statement the BahrainGovenunent
*'' Memorandum entitled "Possible basis for compromise" by Capt.
Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political
Resident,3May 1937,Ann.126,Vol.3,p. 661.
286 Mernorandum entitled "Possible basiç for compromise" by Capt.
Hickinbotham,British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political
Resident,May 1937,Ann.126,Vol.3, pp.661to665. quote that many years ago the tribe obeyed the orders of
Shaikh'Isa,then Ruler of Bahrain, not tooccupy the Zubarah fort,
which they wished to do. Further, that the Naim tribe generally
obey the orders of the Ruler of Bahrain.
The Bahrain Goverment, however, admit that they do not
adrninisterortake taxes at ~ubarah."~*'
273. The strength of Bahrain'sclaim and the corresponding weakness
of Qatar'sclaim to Zubarah was becoming awkwardfor Britain, which
still wanted to ensure that PCL would be able to realise the benefits of
the Zubarahregion undexthe Qatar oil concession. Sir Trenchard Fowle
acknowledgedthe difficulty of the situation:
"1 had hoped that ...the thorny question of the ownership of
Zubarah would remain quiescent, and that His Majesty's
Governent would be able to avoid giving a definite award
either in favour of the Ruler ofBahrain orthe Ruler of ~atar."~~~
274. Negotiations ensued between the representatives of the Rulers of
Bahrain and Qatar during May and June of 1937. Various proposals
were made by both sides in the course of negotiations, including one in
which Bahrain agreed temporarily to withdraw its claim to Zubarah,
subject to the ongoing performance of certain conditions, including
maintaining the Zubarah region as it had been before the dispute arase
which included maintaining a moratorium ontaxes on the ~airn.~~~ In a
287
Mernorandum from Lt. Col. Fowle, BritishPolitical Resident,to Secretaryof
State for India, 5 Ma1937,Ann. 127,Vol. 3, pp.666 to 667. Point4 is of
timited significanceduta the fact that the Govt. of Bahraindid not collect
taxes in many of its territoatethe time. Govt. administration of bedouin
peoples has always been recognised as IimitedWestern Sahara Advisory
Opinion. Judpment. I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12,Dubai/Sharjah arbitration,
91 ILR 543.
28s Mernorandumfrom Lt.Col. Fowle, British PoliticalResident,to Secretaryof
StateforIndia, 5 May1937,Ann. 127,Vol. 3,pp. 667to 668.
289
Telegramfrom Lt.Col. Fowle, British Political Residentt,o Secretaryof State
forIndia,23 June 1937,Ann.132, Vol. 3p. 685.direct communication to the Ruler of Qatar about that proposal, the
Ruler of Bahrain said:
"As long as the above conditions are carried out without
alterations 1(the Shaikh of Bahrain) agree to withdraw rnyclairn
to Zubarah and the Naim but should there happen anything
contrary to the conditionsmy claim returns asb~fore".~~~
275. In contrastto Bahrain'sconduct duringthe course ofthe May and
June meetings, the representatives of Qatar refused to engage in any
substantive negotiation in the usual sense of the word. They had
apparently been instructed that the purpose of the negotiation was to
have Bahrain agree with the Ruler of Qatar's demands. The British
Political Resident, who wanted the Ruler of Qatar to succeed in
obtaining control ofthe Zubarah region, noted on 23June 1937:
"Attitudeof Qatarrepresen.tativeshas been most chauvinistic and
offensive. The Bahrain Government have been rnost patient and
have in my opinion now gone along way to meet the Shaikh of
~atar."291
276. When the negotiations did not immediately produce the result
that the Ruler of Qatar desired, he wote to the British Political Agent
describing his claim to ~ubarah.~~H ~e cited the text of the 1916Treaty
with Bntain and the 1935Qatar Oil Concession, insisting, oblivious to
their lar~~ua~e?~~ that they included the Zubarah region within the
territories ofthe Rulerof Qatar.
290
Telegramhm Lt.Col. Fowlc,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryof State
forIndia,23 June 1937,Ann.132,Vol. 3p.685.
291
Telegramfrom Lt.Col.Fowle,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryof State
for India,23 June 1937,Ann.132,Vol.3, p.685.
292 Lettefrom Rulerof Qatarto Lt. Col.Fowle,BritishPoliticalResident,9 June
1937,Ann. 129,Vol.3, pp.676to678.
293
Regarding the 1916 Treaty, see Section 2.10, startiat paragraph215;
regardingthe OilConcession, seeparagrap375 to376.277. In the meantirne, the Al-Jabr branch of the Naim tribe, recalling
previous attacks by theAl-Thani on the Naimcommunity, had continued
their defensive preparations in anticipation of a Qatari attack. The Al-
Jabr confirmed their allegiance to the Ruler of Bahrain in witten
communications sent by the Chief of the Naim tribe to the Ruler of
~ahrain.*" Food, amis and ammunition continued to be supplied by the
Ruler of Bahrain to the Al-Jabr Naim in Zubarah, as was confirmed by
both theRuler of Qatarandthe Adviser to theBahrain ~overnment.~~~
278. Qatari defectors fiom Doha and the south of the Qatarpeninsula
joined the Al-Jabr Naim rds. This underscored the fact that, even in
the south of the peninsula, the Ruler of Qatar'sauthority was threatened.
The British Political Agent, Captain Hickinbotham, noted on 29 May
1937:
"Mygeneral impression is that the Shaikh of Qatar's position is
being daily weakened by defections not only of outside notables
but fiom his own family. He will very shortly not be in a
sufficiently strong~p~sition to make any terms whatsoever and
indeed nimours are circulating that he goes daily in fear of his
life."296
294
Letter fiorn Chief of Naim tribeto the Ruler of Bahrain,24 April 1937,
Ann.120, Vol.3, p. 644,and letter from Chiefof Naim tribeto the Ruler of
Bahrain dated25 April 1937,Ann. 121, Vol. 3, p. 645. See also letter fiom
Charles Belgrave, Advisor to Govt. of Bahrain, to Capt. Hickinbotharn,
BritishPoliticalAgent20 June 1937,Ann. 130(a),Vol. 3,pp. 679 t680.
295
Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Capt. Hickinbotham, BritishPolitical Agent,
11July 1937, Ann. 149, Vol. 4, p. 714. Letter from Charles Belgrave,
Advisorto Govt.of Bahrain, to Capt. Hickinbotham,BritishPoliticalAgent,
19August 1937,Ann. 158,Vol. 4, p.729. See also Statement ofSalehbin
Muhammed Ali bin Al Naimi, para.10, Ann.234(a), Vol. 4, p. 1027 and
Statementof Mohammed bin Mohammed bin Theyab Al Naimi, para 10,
Ann. 233(a) Vol.4,p. 1015.
296 Noteby Capt.Hickinbotharn.British PoliticalAgent,29 May 1937,Ann. 128,
Vol.3, p. 674.279. The Ruler of Qatar began hiring mercenaries to attack
~ubarah.~~~ The fears of theAl-Jabr branch of the Naim tribe about yet a
fourth armed attack on their community by the Al-Thani in less than 70
years seemedjustified. As the messenger of the Ruler of Bahrain noted
on 22 June 1937:
"Qatar, as 1 saw it, was in a dîsturbed state and every one was
preparing for ~ar."~~'
280. Despite the evident risk of an outbreak of hostilities Britain
resolved not to intervene in ~ubarah:~~ thereby no longer protecting
Bâhrain'srights in Zubarahfrom aggression.
281. The second round of negotiations between Bahrain and Qatar
over the Zubarahregion took place in late June in Qatar. The Ruler of
Bahrain sent his sons tonegotiate with the Ruler of Qatat at the village
of Ghariyeh, situated at the very north of Qatar'seast Coast,about 40
kilometiresby boat from the Zubarah port. These negotiations made
some progress but the talks were temporarily suspended when the
representatives of the Ruler of Bahrain informed the representatives of
the Ruler of Qatarthat they needed to return to Muharraq Island in order
to obtain instructions frorntheirRuler. Before leaving, however, the two
Bahrainirepresentatives to the Ghariyeh meeting fomally reminded the
Qatari representativesof Bahrain'sclairnto ~ubarah.~~~
297
ReportofAbdullahbin Hasan,Messengerof Rulerof Bahrain, 22June1937,
Ann.131,Vol.3, p. 683.
299 Telegramhm Lt.COI.Fowle,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryof State
for India,23 Ju1937,Ann. 132A,Vol. 3, p.686.
300
Letterfrom Representativesof the Ruler of Bahrato Representativeof
Rulerof Qatar,June 193Ann. 134,Vol. 3,p.690.282. Bahraini fears of a Qatari surprise attack proved well-founded.
On 1 July 1937, whenthe representatives of the Ruler of Bahrain were
returning from the suspended negotiations to the main island of Bahrain
by boat, they followed the usual route to the main island of Bahrain,
southwards along the coast of peninsula before crossing the Gulf of
Bahrain fi-omZubarah. Just as they were turning fiom the coast of the
Zubarah region, they witnessed a band of med bedouin mercenaries
attacking the Naim in the old town of Zubarah. It transpired that the
representatives of the Ruler of Qatar at the negotiationsin Ghariyehhad
been secretly joined by a large force of anned bedouin mercenaries.
Following the suspension of the negotiations, the representativesof the
Ruler of Qatar andthe mercenarieshad travelleddownthe western coast
of the Qatar peniasula to attackthe Zubarahregion. The Governent of
Bahrain's Adviser, Charles Belgrave, who had accompanied Bahrain's
negotiating party,recorded the attack on the Naim in the old town of
Zubarah in his autobiographyinthe following words:
"Some unusual activity had been sighted on the coast [fiom the
boat]. Motor lorries, loaded with men, were moving in the
direction of Zabara and bodies of menwere deploying. Then, as
we watched, the fighting started. The Naimtribesmen who lived
atZabara were being attacked by Shaikh Abdulla bin Jasim's
~edouin ...".30'
283. Belgrave wrote that Bahrain's negotiating party was "close
enough to see ourpeople being attacked," butwas unable to get to shore.
He later estimated the Qatari rnercenary force to have nurnbered five to
seventhousandmen, assisted by threelorries and six cars.302Eyewitness
accounts fiom Naim tribespeople living in other parts of the Zubarah
301
CharlesBelgrave,Persona1Colurnn(1960),p. 156,Ann.217, Vo4,p. 911.
302
See note of an interviewithCharles Belgave, Adviser to the Govt. of
Babrain, by Capt. Hickinbotham'sBritish Political Agent, 1 July 1937,
Ann.136,Vol. 4,p.694.region showthat the attack had been planned in advance, as other similar
surprise attacks by Qatari mercenaries occurred against Naim villageat
the same time. One Naim tribesman now living in Bahrain recently
recalled the details ofthe invasion ofhis tribe'sterritory:
"On 1July 1937, early in the afternoon, 1 saw a large body of
tribesmen, some Qatari, some bedouin fmm the Manasir and
Beni Hajir tribes, approachingOur dirah (tribal area) near Lisha.
Some were on foot and some were in lorries. There were maybe
three or fourthousand men in totaland most of themhad guns. It
was clear that they were intending to attack us. One of our
tribesmen shouted the battle cry. We went to join the other
members of our tribe who had assembled to defend our tribal
areaagainst the attack.
A fiont Iineof ourtribe went ahead on camels and horses andthe
rest of us followed on foot. They reached the site of the battle
before us. Meanwhile, the women and children took down the
tents to move away fiom the area of fighting. 1heard a lot of
gdre but bythe time 1arrivedon foot,the Qataris had retreated
to the east. Wefound the injured andbrought them backto Lisha
fortreatment.
That day three of our tribe died in the fighting, Majd binNasr,
Isa bin AhmedAl Sayedand Ahmedbin Mohammed, the brother
of Rashid bin Mohammed. Majd bin Nasr was at first seriously
injured but subsequently died of his wounds at the Arnerican
Hospital onthe main island of ~ahrain."~'~
284. Another member of the Naim tribe, also living in Bahrain,
Mohammed bin Mohammed Al Naimi recently related the events which
caused them to abandon Zubarah and return to the main island of
Bahrain:
"Onthe day ofthe battleat Zubarah,1remernberthat al1ofthe Al
Jabr Naim had gathered in fear at Lisha and at Hilwan. 1heard
the battle cry sometime between the two prayers at noon and
dusk. Those of the men who had camels or horses went on
reconnaissance, and a few of them went north to our men who
were at a guardpost at Al Thagab. Whenthey reached there, Ibn
303 Seeçtaternentof Salehbin MuharnmedAli Al;Al- Naimi,paras1.1t.o 13,
234(a),Vol4,p.1027. Thani was already there with his army. Ibn Thani had lorries
which transferred his men to behind our lines. They heard
shooting andcries. Iwas with the peopleapproaching Al Thagab
and we heard the shotsbut whenwe reachedthemit was already
too late. Therewere deathson both sides and 1helped to pick up
the injuredand the deadfrom our side. Later 1came back to help
those men whosecamelshad been slaughtered.
In the battle, people were killed and injured. Majd bin Nasr was
injured and he later died at a hospitd on the main island of
Bahrain. 1also remember that Ahmed bin Mohammed and Isa
bin AhmedAl Sayeddiedinthe fighting."304
285. On 1 July 1937,as soon ashe had learned of the surprise Qatari
attack, the Ruler of Bahrain made a forma1 request to Britain for
assistancein defendinghisterritoryfromexternal attack:
"We have to inform you that al1 our efforts to arrive at a
compromise with the Ruler of Qattar regarding the matter of
Zubara andthe Naimhave been without success.Our brotherand
Our son returned last night and inforrned us that [the Ruler of
Qatar]refusedto agreeto anytenns excepthis own.
[TheRuler of Qatar]withhis my is near the edgeofthe Zubara
area and there is now a state owar. The Arabs of [the Ruler of
Qatar] daily attackthe places where ou subjects the Naim are
living and also their watering places. [The Ruler of Qatar] is
taking every opportunity to provoke the Naim but, until now,
they have done nothing but defend themselves. [The Ruler of
Qatar] ha looted somevillages where some of our subjects live
andhas seizedtheirpropertyandtheir flocks and camels.
Wewish to preventa warand the sheddingof blood. We request
the British Govemment to restrain [the Ruier of Qatar] from
making war against ou subjects who live within our boundaries
at ~ubarah."~'~
286. Britain refused to provide such assistance. On 2 July 1937,the
BritishPoliticalResident,SirTrenchardFowle,wroteto the India Office
304
See staternentMohammed bin Mohammedbin Theyab AlNairni,paras12
to 13,Ann.233(a),Vol4,p.1016.
305 Letter fiorn the Ruler of Bab10iCapt. Hickinbotham, British Political
Agent,1 July 1937,Ann.135,Vol. 4, p. 691.in London that negotiations between Bahrainand Qatar that had been
ongoingfortwo rnonthshad brokendownandthat hostilitieshad broken
out. He concludedthat:
"Inthese circumstancesthereis no coI306now open to us except
to let hostilitiestaketheir cours....
The focus of the PoliticalResident'sinterestwas revealed as he wenton
"[The PCL] Oil Company ...will not resume operations until
autumn and before that dispute between Shaikh of Qatar and
Naim shouldhavebeen sett~ed."~~'
287. By2 July 1937,the Qatarimercenarycorpshadtaken the village
of Furaiwah, five kilometresnorth of the ruined town of Zubarah, from
which refugees had been sent to Bahrain. Fighting continued al1during
the day.308On 2 July 1937, the British Political Agent telegraphed the
followingupdateon the hostilitiesto the Political Resident:
"2. Adviserhasjust received reliableinformationthat Shaikh
of Qatar attacked Zubarah area early morning 1st July and
fightingstillproceeding.
3. About 100Naim and adherents reportedkilled including
numberof persona1foilowersof Shaikh of Baluain whonormally
livein Zubarah.
4. Refugeesarereportedto be landing on coast of Bahrain.
'O6 Telegram from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resideto,India Office,
2 July 1937,Ann.138, Vol.4,p. 696.
308
Letter from Charles Belgrave, Adviser to thGow. of Bahrain, to Capt.
Hickinbotham,BritishPoliticalAgent, 2 JuIy 1937,Ann. 139,Vol. 4, p. 698. 6. 1 have asked Adviser to send out police patrol to look
afier any refugeeslandi~~~."~'~
288. In tnith, it is impossible to know exactly how many casuaIties
were sufferedthroughout the Zubarahregion.
289. By 5 July 1937,the Ruler of Qatar had entered into discussions
with the AI-Jabrbranch of theNaim tribe with the hope of swaying their
traditional allegiance fiom the Al-Khalifa of Bahrain to himself. He
informed them thal:they were free to quit the Zubarah region and Qatar
or to rernain and abide by the rules of the State of ~atar?" swearing
allegiance to him and abandoningthe Al-Khalifa. ANaim eyewitness to
the events in the Zubarahregiondescribed it as follows:
"Our leader, Rashid bin Mohammed, sent his brother Khalid to
the Al-Thani camp. When they finished talking, Rashid bin
Mohammed explained to the tribe that we had two choices. The
first choice was to stay in our homes in Zubarah but if we did
that we would have to swear our allegiance to the Al-Thani
chiefs and corne under their rule. The second choice, if we did
not want to switch ourallegiance from the Ruler of Bahrain, was
to leave Zubarahor facefürther attack~."~ '
290. On 13 July 1937, at the palace of the Ruler of Bahrain in
Muharraq, Rashid binMohammed,the Chief ofthe Nalm tribe, who hâd
escaped to the main island of Bahrain, described the afiennath of the
attack on Zubarah insimilarwords:
309
Telegram from Capt, Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col.
Trenchard Fowle, British Political Res2dJuly 1937,Ann. 137, Vol. 4,
p. 695.
310
Telegram hm Capt. Hickinbotham, BritishPolitical Agent,to SeniorNaval
Officer, PersianGulf Division,5 JuIy1937,Ann.142,Vol.4, p. 703.
311
See statement of Saleh bin Muharnmed Ali bin Ali Al-Naimi, para. 14,
Ann.234(a), VoI. 4, p. 1027. See also statement of Mohammed bin
MohammedbinTheyabAlNaimi,para. 15,Ann.233(a), Vol. 4,p. 1017. "One of the [Ruler of Bahrain'smen] wrote asking [the Ruler of
Qatar] to refrain fram shedding the bIood of the Muslims and
also ffom dernanding anything from them. [The Ruler of Qatar]
then sent a letter with his brother saying that he wanted to see
me. 1 interviewed him because our foodstuff had exhausted and
the way was cut as [the Rulex of Qatar] stood between us and
Bahrain. When 1 went to him in the camp [the Ruler of Qatar]
told me that he would not give us secmity unless we have
surrendered our ms. We surrendered ou anns as we were
forced by hunger to do so and because we did not do anything as
ordered by the [British] Political Agent. Then they themselves
wrote a document and took my seal and sealed it. It ran as
follows:
That as long as 1am residing in Qatar 1 should not do
anything against [theRuler of Qatar] and shouIdnot fight
with him and if 1want to leave Qatar and go to anyother
place he will not prevent me and rny followers and al1
connectedto me suchas property etc., to do ~0."~~~
Some Al-Jabr Naim chose to switch their allegiance to the Ruler of
Qatar. Butthe majority of the Al-Jabr Naim, including the Chief of the
Al-Jabr Naim, Rashid bin Muhammed, chose to rernain loyal to the
Ruler of Bahrain. Some 1200 to 1300 persons fled to the islands of
Bahrain, principally to the main island of Bahrain. An Al-Jabr Naim
who is still aliand living in Bahrainhas recentlyrecollected:
"1cannotrecall how many of us rnoved, but it took about seventy
dhows or more to move us. The dhows were full and even then
someof us stayed on and came later with cattle and belongings. 1
remember the sons of Mohammed bin Saud, Ali bin Hassan al
Majid and his farnily, Abdullah Al Jabr and his farnily and Salah
bin Mohammed bin Khanfax al1 coming to the main isIand of
Bahrainwithme andmyfamily.
312
Staternent made by Sheikh Raçhid bin Muhamrned, Chief of Naim tribe,
13July 1937,Ann.150,Vol.4, pp. 716 to 717. See also telegramfrom Lt.
Col.Fowle,BritishPolitical Resident,to Secretaryof State for india,24 July
1937,Ann.154,Vol.4, p724. We landed at Bahrainat the town of Askar,and some of us went
north. In the summer we would go to the area of present:day Isa
~own."~'~
Some yeass later the British Political Agent, Edward Wakefield,
observed afterthese events:
"the tribesmen who came over to Bahrain in 1937 must have
regarded themselves as subjects of the Shaikh of Bahrain or they
would have rcmained in Qatar and subrnitted to the authority of
the Shaikhof ~atar."~'~
291. Many of thoseNaimwho lived in the Zubarah region and fled to
the islands of Bahrainare alive and in Bahrain. Their descendants living
in Bahrainnumber inthe thousands. .
292. Bahrain lost no time in protesting Qatar'sattack on the Zubarah
region. In a letter dated 6 July 1937,one day after the surrender of the
Naim in Zubarah, the Ruler of Bahrain protested to Britain that "(the
Ruler ofQatar) has occupiedour
293.
Simultaneously, on 6 July 1937, the Ruler of Bahrain imposed
sanctionson Qatar. The sanctionsincluded:
(a) a decree that no subjects of the RuIer of Qatar were to
enter Bahrain (other than those with messages for the British
Political Agent);
313 SeestaternentofMohammedbin Mohammedbin Theyab Al Naimi,paras. 16
to 17, Ann.233(a), Vol. 4, p. 1017. See also statement of Saleh bin Ali
MuhammedAlibinAlNaimi,para. 15,Ann.234(a),VoI.4,p. 1027.
3'4 Letter frorn EdwardWakefield, British PoliticaAgent, to Lt. Col Prior,
BritishPoliticalResident,11Januar1948,Ann. 184, Vol.4, p. 794.
315
Letter hm Ruler of Bahrainto Capt.Hickinbotham,British Political Agent,
6 July 1937,Ann. 144,Vol.4,p.707. (b) a decree withdrawing the preferential transit dues on
goodsentering Bahrainwith a final destination in ~atar,~'~and
(c) a decree prohibiting any exports (as opposed to re-
exports)fromBahrainto ~atar.~'~
294. At the request of the Ruler of Bahrain, the Ruler of Qatar was
informed of Bahrain'smeasures by the British Political ~~ent.~''The
Ruler of Qatar respondedby complaining against the imposition of the
Bahraini sanctions.319Bahrain's sanctions continued in force until the
outbreak of the Second World War, when the embargo was suspended
by the Rulerof Bahrain "forthe cornmongood"?20Despitethat, Bahrain
continuedto protest the occupationof the Zubarahregion by Qatar and
to seekits returnto the authorityof the Rulerof Bahrain.
SECTION2.14 The dispute over the Zubarah repion has been
continuous since1937
295. Since 1937 unti1now, Bahrainhasunsuccessfullysoughtto have
its rights to the Zubarah region restored. Despite considerable efforts,
Bahrain has not obtained a reasoned exarnination of the merits of the
3'6 Letterfiom Rulerof BahraintoCapt.Hickinbotharn,BritishPoliticalAgent,
6 July 1937,Ann. 143(a),Vo4, p.704.
3'7
Memorandum from Charles Belgrave, Adviser to theGovt. of Bahrain,to
Edward Wakefield,British Political Age11,June 1942, Ann.164, Vol.4,
p. 748.
318 In relation to rneasures(a) and (bsee letter from Capt. Hickinbotharn,
British Political Agent, to Ruler of Q14aJuly 1937, Ann. 151, Vol4,
p.718.
319
LetterfiornRuler of Qatar to O. KirkpatricCaroe, British PoIiticalResident,
17July 1937,Ann. 153,Vol. 4, p.722.
320 RepresentatiisonZubarahto ForeignOffice,4 August1949,Ann. 193,Vol.
4, p. 836.Zubarah issue. The history of these unsuccessful attempts to reverse the
effect of Qatar'suse of armed force in 1937involve Bahrain, Qatar and
Britain. There are at least seven important conclusions to be drawn fiom
thishistory:
1. It demonstratesthe absence of any legal determination in favour
of Qatar or against Bahrain by Britain or any other entity. Britain
avoided making a decision. For geopolitical reasons, Britain
preferred to avoid compromising the integrity of the Qatar
peninsula, but Britain couldthink of no principled reason to deny
Bahrain'srightsto the Zubarah region.
2. It shows that Britain attempted to avoid antagonising either
Bahrain or Qatar over the Zubarah issue. As a result, Britain's
attitude was deliberatelyvague.
3. The historical record isrepfete with exarnplesof British officiais
contradictingeach other in favour of either Bahrainor Qatar, in
the light of mornentary expediency and in the absence of a
definitive adjudicationof the competingclairns.
4. Qatar's statement of the alleged bases of its claim to title to
Zubarah rnakes it possible to evaluate them. Qatar evidently
could not make a principledclaim based on its med expulsion
of Bahrain subjects from the region. Thus it based its claim to
Zubarah on two grounds: its 1916 Treaty with Britain and its
1935oil concession withAnglo-PersianlPCL. Neither document
can supportthe daim that it gives Qatar any basis for sovereignty
over the Zubarah region (see Section 2.10, starting at
paragraph 315 and paragraphs 375to 376,respectively).5. It demonstratesthat Bahrainnever abandonedits sovereign claim
to the Zubarah region. On occasion, British officials expressed
contraryviews to the effectthat the Rulers of Bahrain were only
claiming some kind of privale property rights to Zubarah.
However, on other occasions, otherBritish officials expressed
views to the effect that the Rulers of Bahrain were claiming
sovereign rights. When the full record of Bahrain's
representations are considered, it becomes evident that the
expressionsby the Rulers of Bahrain inrelation to "theirrights"
in Zubarah cannot be taken to mean a disavowal of sovereign
title. This is confirmed when considered in light of well-known
historicalconceptsof sovereigntyinthe GulfofArabia.
6. It showsthat any concessionsthat Bahrain indicated that itwas
prepared to make in relation to the Zubarah issue were part of a
package of negotiating proposals. At no time did Qatar ever
conclusively accept those proposals and the negotiations were
never successfullyclased.
7. It reveals that the Rulers of Sahrain and Qatar did not share the
sameunderstandingof the variouswriaen and unwrittenworking
agreementsthat werebrokered by Britain in itattempt to bring
the disputetoan end.
The salient elements of the historical record relating to Bahrain's
attemptsto have itsrights toZubarahrecognisedarethe following.
296. On 6 July 1937,only one day after the surrender of the Naim in
Zubarah,the,Adviserto the Governmentof Bahrainwrote to the British
PoliticaAgent: "1have the honour to infom you that [theRiiler of Bahrain]has
asked meto ascertainfiom you whenhis claimto the Zubaraarea
will receive consideration and by whom the matter will be
e~amined."~~'
The Adviser'sletter ernphasisedthe importance ofthe issue to the Ruler
of Bahrain:
"If necessary [the Ruler of Bahrain]is also prepared to send a
representativeto Europeto act on hisbehalf."322
297. Britain tried to avoid addressing the issue.The British Political
Resident wasinstructedby the British Governrnenton 7 July 1937not to
mention "ownership"of Zubarahto the Ruler of Bahrain,but merely ta
suggest that Britain'spoIicy towards Zubarah was the sarne as it had
been in 1875(in other words onlythat Bahrain shouldnot interfere in
the affairs of the n~ainland).~~O ~n 9 July 1937, the British Political
Resident suggestedto the British Secretaryof Statefor Indiathat Britain
should allow the Ruler of Bahrain to present its case for sovereignty
over Zubarah to the British ~overnrnent.~~~ However, a British Indian
Office memorandum dated 14 Juiy 1937 shows that Britain was
concernedthatthis wouldhave had adverse geopolitical consequences:
"1have pointed outon another paper that if we allow the Sheikh
of Bahrainto establishclaims on the mainland of Qatar we shall
greatly weaken our case for maintaining the integrity of the
PeninsulaagainstIbn Saud. 1think therefore we shall have to be
32'
Letter from Charles Belgrave, Advistothe Govt. of Bahrain, to British
Political.Agent,6 July 1937,Ann. 145,V4,p. 708.
323 Telegram from Govt. of Indito Secretary of State for lndia and Lt. Col.
Fowle,BritishPoiiticalResident,6 July 1Ann. 146,Vol. 4, p.709.
324
TelegramfromLt.Col. Fowlç,British Political Residentto Secretaryof State
forIndia and Govt. of lndia External Affairs Department, 9 July 1937,
Ann. 147,Vol.4, p710. çareful not to do or Say anything implying that we might
recognisethe Sheikhof Bahrain's~lairns."~~~
Xnseeking to support this posture, British officials failed to analyse the
longand detailed history linking the Bahraini ruling family to the region.
Rather, they adopted the unsubstantiated opinionof the British Political
~esident~~~ that Qatar had sovereigntyover Zubarah.
298. British officials began to revise their interpretation of the
instructions given to the Ruler of Bahrain in 1875that he should avoid
entanglernents on the Qatar peninsda. They had followed a policy of
discouraging Bahrain's involvement in the Qatar peninsula (see eg
paragraphs 198 to 206). Now they were being reinterpreted as a
recognition ofthe Sheikh of Qatar'srightsoverthe whole peninsula.327
299. In response to the repeated entreaties of Bahrain, the British
Political Agent, Captain Hickinbotharn, undertook an independent
investigationinto the Zubarahquestion. On 30July 1937,Hickinbotharn
referred the Political Resident to a passage in Lorimer'sGazetteer of the
Persian Gulf (dating from 1909)in which ownership of Zubarah was
said to be "underdiscussion" in 1905.~~ 'hat evidence clearly refuted
any allegation that the Zubarah issue had been resolved in 1875.
Lorimer's observationwas more inkeeping with the evidence at the time
and clearly contradicts the interpretation which the Politicai Resident
325 IndiaOfficernemorandum,14July1937,Ann. 152 ,ol. 4p.719.
326
Telegramfrom Lt. Col.Fowle, BritishPoliticalResidtoSecretaryof State
for Indi4,July 1937,Ann.140,Vol.4, p.699.
327
DraftTelegramundercoverof letter, 1July1937,Ann. 148,Vol.4,p.712.
328 Letterfrom Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col.
Trenchard, Fowle, BritishPoliticalResident, 301937,Ann. 155, Vol. 4,
p. 725.wished to draw from the 1875 communications between Britain and
Bahrain. Nonetheless, on 12 August 1937, he dismissed the evidence
saying: "there is nothing new in it which affects His Majesty's
Governmenttsdecisionasto the ownershipof ~ubarah."~~~
300. Hickinbotharn was referred to the 1875 correspondence between
Britain and Bahrain as the basis for the Political Resident's assertion.
Hickinbotham replied, insistingthat:
"in [the 18751correspondence ...there is no decision made by
His Majesty's Government with regard to the ownership of
Zubarah''
and maintained that:
"the [British Government] were at that time anxious to avoid
complications on the mainlandand at the sarne time the^were
not disaosed to give a definite decision regardingthe ownership
of Zubarah. The sarne situation avpears to have arisen this
uear."330(Emphasisadded.)
301. A Mer letter from the Political Agent tthePolitical Resident
on 22 September 1937confirmed that the Qatar oil concession did not
bind Britain to acknowledge the Zubarahregion as part of the State of
Qatar. Referring to Article 2 of the concession, the Political Agent
noted:
"Frornanexamination of Article2 of the QatarOil Concession I
am inclinedto the view that His Majesty'sGovemment are in no
way committed, for the state of Qatar is defined as being 'the
whole area over which the Shaikh rules and which is markedon
the north of the line drawn on the map attached to this
Agreement.' If the Shaikh of Bduain eventually succeeds in
329
Lettefrom Lt. Col. TrenchardFowle, British Political RestoeCapt.
Hickinbotham, British PoliticaI Agent, 12 August 1937, Ann. 156, Vol. 4,
p.726.
330 Lettehm Capt.Hickinbotham,BritishPolitical Agent, to Capt. Galloway,
Secretaryto BritishPoliticalResident, 16 September 1937,Ann. 159,Vol. 4,
p. 732. proving his claim to the area known as Zubarah then ipso facto
the Shaikh of Qatar cannot be said to rule over that area and,
therefore, that area cannot be considered as part of the state of
~atar."~~'
302. Despite thesearguments,no action was taken by Britain. Bahrain
did not receive a hearingand no official decisiontaken. onthe stateusof
Zubarah.
303. 1x11939, Qatar built a fort in Zubarah. Bahrain immediately
protestedto Britain that the fort wason Bahrain'sterritory:
"[Wle regard this action as illegal because Zubara is our tom
andcontains OUT cemeteriesandrn~s~ues."~~~
304. In 1943, Major Hickinbotham (as he now had become) offered
his servicesto the Partiesin a personalcapacityas a mediator in orderto
resolve the Afier several unsuccessful attempts,
Hickinbothamproposeda textproviding:
"The Ruler of Bahrain and the Ruler of Qatar both agree to
resume friendly relations (between them) to that which was
existing before, and the Ruler of Qatar undertakesthat Zubarah
will rernain,without altering anythingwhich did not existbefore
as a respect and esteem of the Alkhalifah,and also the Ruler of
Bahrain on his side undertakes not to do anythingwhich hms
the interests of the Ruler of Qatar. " This agreement does not
331 Letter from Capt. Hickinbotham, British PoliticalAgent, to Lt. Col. Fowle,
British PoliticalResident,22 September1937,Ann. 160,Vol.4, p. 735.
332
Letter fromRuler of Bahraito Hugh Weightman, British PoliticaAgent,
which refers to his "persona1suggestions" (emphasis added),26 April 1939,
Ann. 162,Vol.4, p.743.
333 See e.g. Letter hmMaj.Hickinbotham, British Political Agent,to Ruler of
Qatar, 8February 1944, Ann. 165, Vol. 4, pp.749 to 750. The nature of
Maj. Hickinbotham's participationin the mediaticinwas later misunderstood
by Britain. SubsequentBritish officiais in the Gulf of Arabia felt obliged to
supervise-inanofficialcapacit-the irnplementationof an agreementwhich
had beenmediatedby Maj.Hickinbothamin a persona1capacity. Britainwas
therebyunwittinglydrawnback into a disputewhich ithad hoptorid itself
offollowingthe 1937Qatariattack. affectthe agreementof the Oil Company that works in Qatar,as
itsrights shallbe protected."334(Punctuationas in original.)
The Ruler of Qatar signed this text on 17 June 1944~~~ over the
objectionsof his sonto the effect that:
"hisfatherhadsoldthe countryto the Al ~halifah."~~~
The Rulerof Balxainsubsequently signedthe documentas and
lifted the embargo on Qatar, which had been in effect since the 1937
attack.
305. The weakness of the 1944 Agreement lay in its use of the
concept of thestatus quo ante.The two Parties'basic goals of achieving
recognitionof their sovereigntyover the Zubarah regionmeant thateach
interpreted the agreement ta confonn with their respective goals.338 The
understanding of Balxainwas t'riait established thestatus quo prior to
the 1937Qatari armed atta~k.~~ T~he understanding of Qatar was that it
entrenchedthe 1944 status
334 Copy of Agreementsignedby Ruler of Qatarand Rulerof Bahrainon 17 June
and23June 1944,respectively,Ann.167(a),Vol.4, pp. 75to753.
335 Ibid,Ann. 167(a),Vol.4, p. 752.
336
Note by British PoliricalAgeofa meetingwith Rulerof Qatar on 18 June
1944,Ann.168,Vol. 4, p. 757.
337 Agreementsigned by Ruler of Qatarand Ruler of Bahrain on 17 June and
23June 1944,respectivelyAnn. 167a,Vol.4, pp.752to 753.
33s Letterfiom Lt. Col.Galloway,BritishPoliticalAgent,to Lt. Col.Hay,British
PoliticalResident11June 1946,Ann.180,Vol. 4,pp. 785to787.
339
Lettersfrom Ruler of BahraintMaj. HickinbothamB, ritishPoliticalAgent,
14 September 1944and 3Ocmber 1944, ,Ann. 170, Vol. 4,p. 761 and
Ann. 171(a)Vol.4, p. 763respectively.
340 Letterfiorn Ruler of Qatarto Ruler of Bahrain, 30 January 1945, Ann. 175,
Vol.4,p. 778.306. In letters dated 14 September and 3 October 1944,the Ruler of
Bahrain compIainedto Major Hickinbotham, as Political Agent, that the
Qatari fort in Zubarah infringed his sovereignty, that it had not been
pulled down and that there were Qatariguards the~-e.~~I
307. Hickinbotham immediately wote to the Political Resident, his
Ietter confirming that there had as yet been no official decision by
Britain regarding the status of ~ubarah.~~T ~hree weeks later, he made a
written suggestion to the Ruler of Bahrain that the latter take up the
question ofthe removal of the Qatari guards atZubarah directly with the
Ruler of ~atar.~~~After further negotiations, the Ruler of Qatar
eventually removed the guards from the fort.344ïhose negotiations only
served to highlight the different understandings that Bahrain and Qatar
had of the 1944 Agreement and their conflicting goals in relation to
sovereignty over Zubarah. The Ruler of Bahrain'sletter to the Ruler of
Qatar, dated 24 January 1945, is particularly instructive of the view
taken by Bahrain:
"As you are aware, in the past there did not exist for you a
building or a garrison in my country ~ubarah (Emphasis
added).
34'
LetterçfrornRuler ofBahrain1.Maj. Hickhbotham, BritishPolitical Agent,
14 September 1944 and 3 October 1944, Ann. 170, Vol. 4, p. 761 and
Ann. 171(a),Vol.4, p. 763respectively.
342 Letter from Maj. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Prior,
BritisholiticalResident,4 October 194Ann. 172(a),Vol.4, p. 766.
343 Letter from Maj. Hickinbotham, BritishPoliticalAgeto,Ruler of Bahrain,
1November 1944,Ann. 173(a),Vol.4, p. 775.
344
Letter fkomRuler of Qatar to Maj. Hickinbotham, British PoliticalAgent,
1February 1945,Ann. 176,Vol.4, p. 779, Letterfrom BritishPoIiticaIAgent
to Lt. Col. Prior, British Political Resident,11April 1945,Ann. 179, Vol. 4,
p. 783.
345 Letter fromRuler of BahraintoRuler of Qatar, 24 January 1945, Ann. 174,
Vol.4, p. 777.The response fiom the Ruler of Qatar, dated 30 January 1945,was:
"[We] have been surprised to see Your Highness using for
Zubarah the words 'Yourcountry'.Zubarah,as everybody knows,
is an inseparable part of Qatar.It is my country and not yours as
you rnentioned. "34"
308. The Ruler of Bahrain referred this to the British Political Agent
in a letter dated 3 February 1945:
"[The Ruler of Qatarj mentions ...that Zobarah is his country. It
is strange for [hirn] to mention this while he is aware of the
existenceof Ourhouses, forts, rnosquesand graves of our people
and that it had been in our possession till the trouble started eight
yearsago when he occupied it and built on it ...AI1the people of
the GulfknowthatZobarah is one of the Al-Khalifahfp sroperties
in the pastand
Hickinbotham again suggested that the Ruler of Bahrain negotiate
directly with the Ruler of Qatar about Zubarah and indicated that the
British Political Resident had never supported the Ruler of Bahrain's
claims to ~ubarah.~~~
309. A new British Political Resident, Sir Rupert Hay (who took
office in May 1946), wrote asfollowsin June 1946:
"According to [Hickinbotham] ...the agreement of 1944restores
the status quo ante 1936.1have been endeavouring to ascertain
fromthe Residencyrecords what this sratus quowas ..
346 Lettehm Ruler of Qatar to Ruler of Bahr30nJanuary1945,Ann. 175,
Vol. 4, p.788.
347
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Maj.Hickinboth,ritish PoliticalAgent,
3February 1945,Ann.177,Vol.4, p.780.
348
LetterfiorMaj. Hickinbotham,British Politi. gent,to Ruler of Bahrain,
6March 1945, Ann.178(a),Vol.4, p.781. ...1am of opinion that in no circumstances could we recognise
[theRuler of Bahrain's]sovereignty over ~ubarah."~~~ (Emphasis
added.)
Nevertheless, Hay went on to query:
"1sthe sovereignty of [the Ruler of Qatar] over Zubara officially
recognised? Even if it is it is still incumbent upon us to enswe
that [the Ruler of Qatar]recognises anyrights of usage, pasturage
etc. which the Shaikh of Bahrain or tribesmen who are his
subjectsrnaypossess there."350
310. In 1946, the Ruler of Qatar tried to settle loyal followers in
Zubarah. In a letter to the Political Agent (now Lt. Col. Galloway), the
Ruler of Bahrain angrily protested that the Qatari settlement had
occurred "without our c~nsent".~" In October 1947, the Ruler of
Bahrain complained to Britain that the Ruler of Qatar had visited the
Zubarah region without inforrning him.352The Ruler of Bahrain at the
sarnetime also complained that the Ruler of Qatar wasabout to cultivate
two places within the Zubarah region "where our houses are and which
are OUT Pr~pertylf.353In January 1948, the Ruler of Bahrain again
protested at the cultivation by the Ruler of Qatar in the Zubarah region,
citing it asa violation of the statu3quo clauseofthe 1944~~reernen?~~.
349 Letter from Lt. Col. Hay, British PoliticalReçidtotLt. Col.Galloway,
BritishPoliticalAgent,15June 1946,Ann. 181,Vol.4, p. 788.
350 Ibid,Ann. 181,Vol.4,p. 788.
351
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to British Political Agen5,March 1947,
Ann. 183,Vol. 4,p.793.
352
Reportentitled "Note on developmentsinthe Zubarahcase"to Secretary of
Statefor India,1948,Ann. 185,Vol4. p.795.
353 Ibid.
354 Ibid,Ann. 185,Vol.4, p. 796.311. On 17 February 1948, yet another Political Agent, C.J. Pelly,
asked the Ruler of Bahrainto defineprecisely what propertiesthe Ruler
claimed in Zubarah.Theproperties claimed by the Rulerwere described
in a letter and included the old Murair fort, the mosque, the wells and
varioushouses. Thelettercontinued:
"3...Never untilthe dispute,did we sufferanyinterferencefrom
the Shaikhof Qatarand we andour people passedfieely between
Bahrain andZubara unhindered and unmolested. Never, before
the dispute, were our privileges questioned and ou authoritv at
vu.barawas s' When we wished persons
to appear beforeus in Bahrainwe summonedthem from Zubara
and the people who lived inZubara were subjectto our rule.We
and our people rnoved between Bahrain and Zubara with
completeEreedornand each year we sent our cattle to Zubara for
grazing.Never was there any question of taxes or Customs or
permission to go and corne, the reason being that fiom over a
hundredyears the Khalifahhavebeen establishedboth in Zubara
and in Bahrain.Weon our part did nothing againstthe Shaikhof
Qatar or his
3 12. In the spring of 1948,the Ruler of Bahrain instructeMr. H.K.
Ballantyne, a London solicitor, to approachthe British Government on
his behalf with a view to obtaining further considerationof Bahrain's
claim to the Zubarah region.356BaIlantyne proposed io the British
Foreign Officethatthe RulerofBahraincontinueto enjoy sovexeigntyin
Zubarah as he had before 1937 but that he cede the region's minera1
rights to the Ruler of ~atar.~~~Notwithstanding its prima facie
consistency withthe 1944agreement brokeredby Major Hickinbotharn,
355
Letter from Ruler of Bahrainto C.J.Pelly, British Polit2MachAgent,
1948,Ann.186,Vol.4, pp.79to799.
356 LetterfromBallantyntoPyman(ForeignOfice),2June 1948,Ann. 187(a),
Vol.4, pp. 80to803.
357 LetterfromBallantytoCharlesBelgrave,Adviserto the Govt. of Bahrain,
2 June 1948,Ann. 188,Vol.4, pp.to803.Bahrain's direct approach to the British Governrnent in London was
dismissed without c~nsideration.'~~
313. On 24 June 1948the Ruler of Bahrain complained directly, by
letter, to the British Governent Minister responsible for the
protectorates in the Gulf, the then Foreign Secretary,Ernest Bevin, of
the "evasive and non-committal replies" received fiom the British
of fi ci al^Th^eR^uler protested to the Minister that "outproperties at
Zubarah have passed out of our direct control and supervision since
many years, in spite of our consistent endeavours The Ruler
offered:
"(a) To define, as is shown on the map herewith, the area of
Zubarah. To hold this land and what is on it in fi-eeuse by my
family,my adherentsandmy subjects.
To hold the land so defined as inprivate ownership for
(b)
ever.
(c) To surrenderto the Shaikh of Qataror otherwiserenounce
al1oilrights inthe Zubaraarea;inthis connectionI wouldliketo
point outthat1 haveneverat anytime claimedsuchrights there.
(d) Subject to my seeing the oil concession Agreement
between the Shaikh of Qatar and the Petroleum Concessions
Limited to respect the provisionsofthat Agreementso that al1its
benefits,entirelygo tothe Shaikhof Qatar.
(e) To obtain the surrender by the Bahrain Petroleurn
Companyof any claimsthey have or may have in Zubaraunder
the concessionwhichthey hold fromme inmy territories.
To continue,as nowand as before,to [giveto] Petroleum
(1)
Concessions Limited freedom to conduct its business in my
country and tobuywaterfiom here and carry itto Qatar....
358
Letter fiomBallanttoPyrnan(Foreign Office2June1948,Ann. I87(a),
Vol. p. 800.
359
Lettehm RulerofBahrain to Ernest Bevin,BriSecretarof Statfor
ForeignAffairs,24 Ju1948Ann. 189,Vol. p.XIO.
360
Ibid,Am.189,Vol. 4pp.811. In retm forthis fair offer 1require to obtain the rights of
(g)
my farnily,my adherents and niy subjects al Zubara including
freedom and security for their lives and property similar to the
conditions which they enjoyed at Zubara prior to the dispute in
1936.1'~~'
314. In substance,the Ruler of Bahtain was yet again proposing that
he have sovereignty over the Zubarah region but that he cede the oil
rightsto the Rulerof Qatar.On 14July 1948,a detailedbackground note
on Bahrain'sclaim to the Zubarah region was prepared by the British
Political Agent, C.J. Pelly. Pelly'snote deait with the points raised by
the RulerofBahrainin his letterandrecognisedthe inherently sovereign
aspect of the Ruler of Bahrain's ~lairn.~~I ~nterna1 documents of the
British Government of this period relating to the Zubarah issue show
that the difficulty of distinguishing private law rights from rights of
sovereignty in the context of a sovereign's persona1 rule was also
re~o~nised.~~~
315. A letter fiom the British Foreign Office to the British Political
Resident dated 3 September 1949, surnmarising the provisional
conclusionsthathadbeenarrivedatby theForeign Officeby September
1949,admittedthat:
"The [puler ofBahrain] ..hasundoubtedly someprivateor tribal
rights in Zubarah which local customwould admit thoughthese
maybe contraryto modern ideasof territorial ~overeignt~,''~~~
361 Letterfrom Ruler of Bahrain to Ernest Bevin, British Secof Statefor
ForeignAffairs,24 June1948,Ann.189,Vol. 4,pp. 812to813.
362
Letter from Lt. Col. Hay, British PoliticalResident, to ErnestBevin, M.P.,
14 July 1948,nn. 190,Vol.4, p. 81.
363 See ForeignOffice DiscussionPaperand draft letterattach, 1 July 1948,
Ann. 191,Vol.4, p.825.
364 Letter fiom Foreign Office to Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident,
3 September1949,Ann. 194,Vol. 4,p. 838.This point was devcloped fùrther by the Foreign Office in a
memorandurnto thePolitical Resident dated 12October 1949:
"1 agree that the private or tribal rights are vague and that we
should not yet commit ourselves to the Sheikh of Bahrein about
their existence.Nevertheless, somevague rights which rnight be
likened to the rights which Bedouin, completely unfami'liar with
the notions of territorial sovereignty and artificially drawn
frontiers, claim in moving across desert frontiers, seem ta have
existed,and we should try to ascertain as clearly as we can just
what they amounted to and how far it is reasonable to try and
securetheir recognitionby the Sheikhof ~atar."~~~
316. In 1950,with the assistance of mediation by the Political Agent,
C.J. PeIly,the Ruler of Bahrain and the Rder of Qatar reached anoral
agreement on the statusof Zubarah, which the Political Agent described
to theBritishForeign Offlcein the followingterms:
ll(T)heRuler of Qatarhas agreed that the [Rulerof Bahrain] may
send his followers and tribesmen to Zubarah for grazing without
any passport or customs fonnalities and also to leave the fort
vacant provided in retum the [Ruler of Bahrain] will allow goods
for Qatar the same privileges inrespect to the payrnent of transit
duties as goods for Saudi Arabia.[The Ruler of Bahrain] has
accepted this and is making arrangements to send fiom 150 to
200 of his people to Zubarah with the necessary rations to
support the~n."~~~
Several families from Bahrain went to Zubarah in March of 1950
without incident.367By the end of June 1950, some 120 Naim tribe
rnenlbers hadreturned to Zubarah withtheir farni~ies.~~M ~ohammed bin
365
Letter from Foreign Office to Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident,
12October1949,Ann.195,Vol.4,p. 840.
366 ett tfrom Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident, to Foreign Office,
7 February1950,Ann. 196,Vol.4, p. 841.
367 Letters frorn C.J. Pelly, British PolAgent, to Sir Rupert Hay, British
political Resident, 20 Marc1950, Ann. 197, Vol.4,p. 842 and 23April
1950,Ann. 198,Vol. 4,p.844.
368
LetterfromCharlesBelgrave,Adviserto the Govt. oBahsain ,o R. Andrew,
BritishPoliticalAgent,2June 1950,Ann. 199,VoI.4, p.852.Mohammed Al Naimi, one of the Al-Jabr Naim resident in Bahrain who
returned to the Zubarahregion recently recalled:
"Sorneyears later,in about 1950,we went back to Zubarahat the
request of Sheikh Salman, the Ruler of Bahrain. The Al Jabr
leader,Khalid bin Mohammed Al Jabr said we could not go
without sending someone first to Ibn Thani to notify him. Sheikh
Salman's reaction to this was to ask us whether we were his
subiectsor KhaIid'ssubjects. We answered him that we were his
subjects, whereuponhetold us to go without noti@ingIbn Thani
andwe did. "j6'
317. The 1950 Agreement proved to be as illusory as the 1944
Agreement. On 15April 1952,the Ruler of Bahrain protested to Britain
that the fort at Zubarah was being stocked with food by Qatar and that
"followers of the Shaikhof Qatar are constantly going in and out of the
fort by day and by night'1.37O0n 29 April 1952,a British official visited
Zubarah with a view to ascertaining the truth of the allegations.
Although he found no evidence of new supplies, he nonetheless asked
the Ruler of Qatarto empty the fort.37'
318. In 1953, Qatar re-established a guard post at the fort in Zubarah.
That drew a protest iiomthe Ruler of Bahrain on 18 March 1953 .372The
Political Resident, Hay, wrote a strongly worded note to the British
3" See staternent of Mohammed bin Mohammed Al Naimi, para. 18,
Ann.233(a),Vol.4, p. 1017.
370
Lettefrom CharlesBelgraveAdviserto the Govt.of Bahrato,W.S. Laver,
BritishPoliticaiAgent, 15April 1952,Ann.200, p. 853,Vol.4.
371 LetterfromW.S.Laver,BritishPoliticalAgent,to CharlesBelgrave,Adviser
tothe Govt.ofBahrain, 19May 1952,Ann.201,Vol.4,p. 854.
372 Letterfrom RuIerof Bahrain to Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident,
18March 1953,Ann.202, Vol.4, p855.Political Agent nowin place in Doha, demandingthat the Qatari guard
bewithdra~n.~'~
319. On 16 June 1953, while in London for the coronationof Queen
Elizabeth, the Ruler of Bahrain had an audience with the British
Minister of State for the Foreign The Ruler presented his
daim to the Zubarahregion, avoidingtheuseof the word "sovereignty",
which was known to antagoniseBritain. The Foreign Offlce interpreted
this to the effectthathe Ruler:
"agreed ...that he was not claiming sovereignty over this area,
and that for instance,if oil were foundin it, that would belongto
the Shaikhof Qatarandnotto hi~n."~''
320. In November 1953, the Ruler of Bahrain explained his claim to
the Zubarah region in more detail in a meeting with a British official,
who aftewards noted:
"[The Ruler of Bahrain] now appears to be clairning ... the
recognitionof his jurisdiction in [theZubarah] area over anyone
he claims as his follower.Secondly,complete freedomfor al1his
followersta reside, pasturetheir fiocksor Gshor exercise any of
their traditional avocations in the area, or to visit it for the
purpose of recreation or enjoyment of their property there with
the right to takein, without any control by Qatar Authorities, al1
suchgoodsasthey need fortheir ownconsumptionand use."376
321. Yet another British Political Agent, J. Little, subsequently
confirrned a conversation he had had with the Ruler of Bahrain in
373 Telegramhm Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident, to EwartBiggs,
BritishPoliticalAgent,Doha,I7 April1953,Ann.203,Vol.4,856.
374 Minutesof meetingbetween Ruleof Bahrainand British MinisterState,
16June1953A,nn.204(a),Vol.4,p.857.
375
IbidAnn. 204(a), Vo4,p. 858.
376
CopyMinuteby Mr. J,Wall,BritishOfficiating PoliticalAgent, 5 Novcrnber
1953,Ann. 205, Vol.p.864.January 1954:
"Your Highness claims jurisdiction over al1 your followers ...
while they are in Zubarah or the area surrounding it. You
expressly said ..that you did not claim 'sovereignty over the
-and', thatyou madeno claimto any oil that there rnightbe inthe
ground of Zubarah andits surroundingarea and that your claims
on Zubarah do not affect in any way any agreement made
between the Ruler of Qatar and the Qatar Petroleum
~om~an~ "377 (Emphasisadded.)
That reported statementmust be understood in the context of the Ruler
of Bahrain's proposal to exercise authority over his people in the
Zubarahregion,butto Ieavetheoil rightsto the Rulerof ~atar.~~'
322. On 29 April 1954,the British Foreign Office suggested to the
British Political Residentthat the problem could be resolved by finally
infonning the Ruler of Bahrain that Britain considered the Ruler of
Qatar to have full sovereignty over the Zubarah region.379On 1 May
1954, the British Political Resident, Bernard Burrows,met with the
Ruler of Bahrain:
"In the presentproposedarrangementto [theRuler of Bahrain] 1
emphasisedthat HerMajesty'sGovernent had never recognised
any claim by Bahrain to territorial sovereignty over Zubarah.
[The Ruler of Bahrain] had himself admitted an important
attribute of territorial sovereigntyby Qatar, when he had agreed
that anyoil found in Zubarahwould belong to Qatar.In previous
agreements which had beenmade under our auspices it had been
possibleto leavethe questionof sovereigntyin suspense.But the
daims apparently sincemade by Bahrain, that Zubarahwas part
of Babrain ...had made it impossible any longer to prevent the
Ruler of Qatar from assertinghis own claim to, if necessary, the
377
Letter frorn Mr. J. Little, British Political Agent, to Ruler of Bahrain,
17January1954,Ann.206,Vol. 4, p. 867.
378
As described above, traditional Arab conceptions of sovereignttorelate
soverei'gntyway of allegianceover people who occupied land,not over the
landitself(seeparagraphs529to1).
379 Memorandum from Foreign Officeto B. Burrows, British Political Reçident,
29April 1954,Ann.207, Vol.4, p. 874. sovereignty, provided he did so in such a way as not to interfere
with Bahrain's freedom of access. Both parties had rights of
different kinds..The greater part of the argument turned on the
distinction between territorial sovereignty. the ownership of
private propertv and 'soverei~ntv'over perçons i.e. what we
should cal1interfering with iurisdiction. [TheRuler of Bahrain]
stated his claim under thsee headings of jurisdiction over his
folIowers, freedom of movement, and the right to enjoy private
property. He feIt deeply that he would not enjoy any of these
rights if Qatar police were present at Zubarah. His position
appeared in fact to be that, while not explicitly claiming that
Zubarah is a part of Bahrain, he could not enjoy his rights there
unless he had what virtually arnounted to territorial sovereignty.
He also claimed that the 1944agreement in fact gave him, to al1
intents and purposes, territorial sovereignty and that the Ruler of
Qatar would not, in 1950,have agreed toleave the fort empty if it
had really been hi^."^ "Emphasisadded.)
323. Burrows informed the British Foreign Office that he would send
letters to the two Parties regarding the latest proposa1by Britain.He
commented :
"On reflection 1 do not propose to put in writing a statement
about territorial sovereignty... as 1 feel this would only give
Bahrain something more to argue about, and if sent to Qatar,
would only cause further difficulty about accepting the proposed
limitationson the exerciseof his s~verei~nt~."~~'
324. In a Iettersentto both Parties dated 5May1954, Burrows me:
"1am now able to state to Your Highness the views of Her
Majesty's Government on the matters relating to the Zubarah
question which I recentIydiscussedwith you.They are
1 Tribesmen owing allegiance to Your Highness
[Sheikh Salman, the Ruler of Bahrain] who habitually
visit Qatar foi grazingand similarpurposes shall continue
to be freeto do so.
380
Telegram from Burrows,British PoliticalResident, toOfice,g2 May
1954,Ann. 208(a)Vol.4 pp876 to877.
38'
IbidA,nn.208(a),Vol. 4, p. 878. (2) The Al-Khalifahshall continue to be free to visit
Zubarah for purposes of recreation and hunting in
accordancewith habitua1practice.
(3) The Qatar authorities will not interfere in any way
with the people carrying out the normal visits at (1) and
(2)above.
(4) The Qatar police will not maintain a permanent
post at Zubarah but will be fiee to enter the fort there in
the courseof visits by mobile patrols hm time rotime.
(5) As it appears that there may be conflicting claims
to individual private property in Zubarah such claims rnay
be settled by reference to local law and custom and for
this purpose may be heard before an impartial Qadi fi-om
another part of the Persian Gulf. Any such claims shall in
the first instance be stated to the representatives of Her
Majesty'sGovernment who will arrange, in consultation
with al1 concerned, for them to be heard in the above
manner. "382
Neither Party acceptedthe terms of the
325. In the course of a meeting with the British Political Agent,
Charles Gault, on 7 May 1957, the Ruler of Bahrain was reporied to
have confirrned that he did not claim sovereignty orjurisdiction in the
Zubarah region.384~e reportedly narrowed his claims to (1) ownership
of the buildings in Zubarah (but not the soi1on which they stood); (2)
freedom of access and grazing rights; and (3) disputes to be resolved (a)
by tribal custom; and, if this failed to produce anagreement, (b) by the
Qatar Shariacourts. Thisproposa1brought no response fiom Qatar.
382 LetterfrornB. Burrows,BritishPoliticalResident,to Rulerof Bahrain,5 May
1954,Ann.209,Vol. 4,pp. 884to 885.
383
Lerter frorn Charles Gault, British Political Agent, to Burrows, British
PoliticalResident, 18Marc1957,Ann.210, Vol. 4,p. 887.
384
Noteof CharlesGaulr,BritishPoliticalAgent,7 May 1957,Ann.211,Vol.4,
p.889.326. In a note dated 13June 1957,the British Foreign Office criticised
Bahrain'sclaim to Zubarah because itrested essentially on tribal rights
and traditional concepts of ~overei~nty.~'~ According to the interna1
Foreign Office discussion, such rights had no place in the modern
western notions of absolute territorial sovereignty that Britain had been
trying to impose in the Middle East. The Foreign Officewas determined
to accomplish"the conversion oftribal Arab "states", whence rights may
be intermixed with those ofneighbouring "states"or confederations, into
states ofa western type ...1386
327. On 10 August 1957,the British Political Resident informed the
Ruler of Bahrain that Britain considered that he had no rights, sovereign
or othenvise, over Zubarah, andthat if any rights were tobe concededto
himit was a matter only betweenhim andthe Ruler of ~atar.~'~
328. A confidential British Foreign Office Minute dated 1 June 1960,
describedhow, from 1957,theRulerof Bahrain had continued to referto
the Zubarahdisputeand press his claimand suggestedthat Britain might
consider approachingthe Ruler of Qataron the Zubarah issue ~t~ain.~"
329. In the context of the negotiations between Bahrstin and Qatar
concerningthe delimitation of their boundary along the northern seabed,
a confidential British Foreign Office memorandum dated 3 1 October
1960,fromthe British Political Resident,M.C.G.Man,noted:
385 Seee.g. Foreign OfficeMinutby C. Gault,British Political Agent, entitled
"ZubarahDispute",13June 1957,Ann.212, Vol.4,p.891.
386 Ibid.
387 Letter from B. Burrows,the BritishPolitical ResitonRuler of Bahrain,
10August 1957,Ann. 213, Vol.4, pp.896to 898.
388
Foreign Office Minutes by M.C.G. Man, British Political Resi1eJune
1960,Ann. 214,Vol.4, pp. 90and 904. "It seems to me that these two problerns of the seabed and
Zubarah are inextricably linked and that we can only hope to
make progress on the former if we can give (the Ruler of
Bahrain) somesatisfaction onthe
330. A letter dated 15November 1960, fkornthe Political Residentin
Bahrainto his colleaguein Doha,recorded:
"1 will not burden you ...with a detailed account ofwhat [the
Ruler of Bahrain]said to me on November 12 because we have
heard it al1before. Butthe following pointsaresignificant: -
(i) [The Ruler of Bahrain] still insists that sovereignty
ver Zubarahis hi^."^ ^Emphasisadded.)
331. On 8 February 1961,the Ruler of Bahrain drafteda letter setting
out the historyofthe matter andthe precise nature of Bahrain'sclaim to
Zubarah. The wording of the claim avoided the use of the word
"sovereignty",but is in substance consistent withBahrain'sposition on
the statusof the Zubarah region:
"[a) Full proprietary rights in al1 immovable property
including buildings, masques, graveyardsand water-wells, built
or setup by [theAI-blifa farnily]in Zabara.
Free right of access to and movernent in Zabara for our
(b)
followers including al1of our subjects in Bahrain, without any
fonnaiitiessuch as passports,customs duties or other restrictions
imposedby the RuIerofQatar.
Autharity and jurisdiction over our followers whilst in
(c)
Zabara; that is to Say,that our followers would obeyour orders
and regulations (as the subjects of Qatar would obey those of
their own Ruler) and would conform to our iaws and in case of
disputeamong themselveswould bejusticiable in our Courts (as
389
Letter from M.C.G. Man, British Political Resident, to Foreign Office,
31October1960,Ann.215, Vol.4,p.905.
390 LetterfromM.C.G. Man, British Political Resident, to J.C. Moberly, British
PoliticAgent,Doha, 15November1960,Ann. 216,Vol.4, p908. the subjects of Qatar would be justiciable in the Court of their
own ~uler)."~~'
332. In his response to the new Bahrain initiative, Mr. Beaumont of
the British Foreign Officeachowledged that the issue was not about an
examination of legal rightsbut about practicalpolitics:
"Whateverthe leeal position, it would not be practical poIiticsfor
us to admit to the Qataris, perhaps by saying nothing, that we
considered Bahrain had a claim to sovereignty (as opposed to
certain feudal or otherrights) ~ubarah. (E~mp~hasis added.)
The Ruler of Bahrain continued to refer to cornplaints about Qatari
activity in ~ubarah.~~~
333. In 1961, a letter from E.P. Wiltshire, the British Political Agent,
to the Ruler of Bahrain made it clearthat Britain understood the
sovereign natureof Bahrain'sclaim:
"Her Majesty'sGovernment do not recognise that any ...clain~to
sovereignty ...has been established ...onIy a direct approach by
YourHighnessto the Ruler of Qataroffers my hope of achieving
a solutionto the problem of ~ubarah."~~~
334. On 2 May 1961,the Foreign Officefinally admitted that Elritain's
decision to continue its policy of reivsing to recognise Bahrain's
sovereigntyoverthe Zubarahregionwaswithout a legalbasis:
391
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Sir George Middleton, British Political
Resident,8February191,Ann. 218, Vo4, pp.918 ro919.
392
Foreign Office ArabianDepartmentMinutes, 21 Febru1961, Ann.219,
Vol.4, p. 922.
393 See e.g. LetterEromRuler of Bahrain to British Political Agent, Bahrain,
9 May 196I, Ann. 221, Vol.4, p. 927 and letter from British Political
Resident,to R.A.C. Beaumont, Foreign Office, 18May 1961, Ann.222,
Vol.4, p. 928.
394
Letterfrom E.P. Wiltshire, British Political Agenr, to Ruler of Bahrain,
29 July1961,Ann.223, Vol.4, pp.9to 934. "[British advice] to the then the Ruler of Bahrain that he should
dissever himself fiom the affairsof the mainland does not really
show that we either acceptedor rejected his claims to sovereignty
on the mainland. Our advice was given on general political
grounds. "395
335. In 1966, at a UNESCO conference, Bahrain distributed to the
delegates of other Mernber States a booklet on Bahrain. The booklet
showed the Zubarah region to be a part of the State of Bahrain. The
delegation fromQatar at the same conference published a memorandum
and distributed itto the conference expressly protesting the inclusion of
Zubarah as part of the State of Bahrain in the booklet. The Qatari
memorandum assertedthat:
"Regarding the application of this description [that it is an
integral partof Qatar]to Zubara Area, such description has never
been, at anytime whatever, subject to any dispute or contest. It is
therefore obvious that the said statement [by Bahrain] in respect
of that area calls for overwhelming~onder."~'~
336. In the interests of regional stability, international peace and
security and the general promotion of brotherly relations between the
Parties, Bahrain has refiained fiom confrontational assertion of its
sovereignty to the Zubarah region since 1966, while continuing to
reserve its rights and make theUK and Qatar aware of them. Bahrain has
dso entered into various negotiations from 1966to the present time with
Qatar where the issue has been raised and Qatar can never have been
under any illusion that Bahrain had abandoned its claim to sovereignty
over the Zubarahregion.
395
Minute by F. BurrowsofForeign Office Arabian Department,2 May 1961,
Ann.220, Vol.4, p. 926.
396 MernorandumfromQatar Delegationto XIV sessionof the UNESCOGeneral
Conference,1October 1966,Ann.224, Vol.4,p.935. CHAPTER 3
BAHRAIN'SSOVEREIGNTYOVERTHEHAWARISLANDS
SECTION3.1 Geo~raphical description oftheHawarIslands
337. TheHawarIslandsconsistof aclusterof somefifteen islandsand
islets lyinatthe closest point abo11 nautical miles south-eastof the
main island of Bahrainand extending for a Mer eight miles various
directions. Thzart show in detail in Map 4 in Volume 7. It ia fact
that these islands and islets Iie closerto the western coast of the Qatar
peninsula than to Bahraibut itis equallytnie that the westcoastof
Qatar (with the exception of the otom at Dukhan) is essentially an
unpopulated,roadless stretchof desert."'
338. TheHawarsincludethe followingisland~~~~:
JaziratAjirah 00.03km2
RabadAlGharbiyah 00.66km2
RabadAsh Sharqiyah 01.43 km2
JuzayratRabad Al Gharbiyah <00.01 km2
JuzayratRabadAsh Sharqiyah <00.01km2
JuzayratUmmAlchen 00.02km2
JaziratHawar 38.51km2
JuzurAlhajiyat 00.06km2
Suwad ash Shamaliyah 02.72km2
UmmJini 00.06kmz
397 SeeOxfordMap ofQatar,Vol.7, Map16. There aresmall stretchesof road
nearDukhanandAl Ruwais.
398 "Jazirat"means"island"in Arabic.Theplural is "Juzur". Umm~aswarah~~~
Juzural Wukur
Suwadal Janubiyah
Juzur Bu Saada
QassarRabad
Janan
HaddJanan
QassaseerBusadad
339. Each listed island satisfies the definition of an island given in
Article 121(1)of the 1982Law of the Sea Convention,namely that it is
"...a naturallyfonned area of land,surroundedby water,which is above
water athightide."
340. The Hawar Islands also include the following low-tide
elevations,listed approximatelyin order fromnorth to south:
Qit'atUmmAlbugarr
Qit'atAl E'ddah
Qassar Al-Ali
341. The 1938-1939adjudication by the Govement of Britain of
Qatar's claim to the Hawar Islands (Section3.3, starting at
paragraph 354) resulted in a succinct and meaningful physical
description of the Hawar Islandsby a third party.It is contained in the
followingpassage froma note prepared in theBritish IndiaOffice:
399
UmmHaswarah isalsoreferretoas "Mahagwarah"inthe letterfromChalres
Belgrave, Adviserto tGovt.of Bahrain, to the British Political Agent of
28April 1936Ann. 246, Vol. 5, p. 1071,and as Al MahzourthenIist of
islands in the group submitted by the Adviser to the Govt. of Bahrain in a
letter to the British Political Agent of 29th May 1938, Ann.261, Vol.5,
p.1110. "...the Sheikh of Qatar adduces nothing positive in his own
favour except the geographical contiguity of the islands to his
undoubted territory. Even the geographical claim looks more
plausible on the map than in terms of travelling distances. The
fact that the islands are separated by only five miles (more than
three) of shallow water from the mainland is perhaps of less
importance than that they are se~arated by 50 miles of desert
from the centre of the Qatar Sheikhdoln at Doha: whereas in so
maritime an area as the South Coastof the Persian Gulf the 20
0
island would be more ofa linkthan a division. The persistence of
the SheiM7o . f Bahrein'sinterest in Zubara is an instance of the
importance ofthis factor..."400(Emphasis added.)
342. The implications of this analysis for the present case are
considerable. As seen in Chapter2, the original authority of Bahrain
over areas of the Qatar peninsula other than Zubarah receded only
gradually, against the slowly spreading authority of the Al-Thani family
on the mainland. The authority of the latter, as reflected in acts of
administration or even inthe presence ofpopulations accepting Al-Thani
control, has never extended inte alia to the Hawar Islands. As.a result,
the original authority of the Rulersof Bahrain was never displaced; on
the contrary,it has constantlybeen reinforced.
343. At the present tirne, Jazirat Hawaris the on1yisland of the group
which is regularly inhabited - exclusively by Bahraini subjects. The
other islands in the group are regularly used by Bahraini dshennen for
drying nets or for refuge during storms. Bahraini fish traps are scattered
throughout the Hawar Islands. The Islands are an increasingly popular
recreationalde~tination.~~'
400
Minuteby C.E.M. Hemingway,lndia Office (Political Department), 12May
1939,Ann. 163,Vol.4, pp.74to 746.
401
Seee.g.advertisemenofGulfTourismCompany,25 June 1996, inAl Ayam
newspaper,Ann. 312,Vol6,pp. 1359to 1362.SECTION 3.2 Summary of the basis of Bahrain's title tothe
Hawar Islands
344. Bahrain'stitleto the Hawar Islands is a matter of resjudicata by
virtue of the British Govemment's adjudication of 1938-1939. Hence,
the merits may not be reopened and consideredde novo. Alternatively, if
a de novo examination were undertaken, Bahrain's valid title is
established by referenceto threeseriesof considerations:
(i) evidence of the exercise of sovereign authority in the
Hawar Islandsby or on behalf of the Ruler of Bahrain;
(ii) recognitionof the titIeof Bahrainby the inhabitants of the
islands; and
(iii) the absence of any competing exercise of authority by
Qatar.
345. The historical genesis of Bahrain'stitle to the Hawar Islands is
Bahrain'soriginal dominance and authority over al1the territories in the
Gulf of Bahrain and the Qatar peninsula, described in Chapter 2.
Bahrain's sovereignty is supported by the continuous peaceful presence
of a population subjectto Balirain. Bahrain's authority an the islands is
confirmed by acts of administration. These facts were confirmed by the
British Government in the 1938-1939adjudication and are now, asthey
were then, fully demonstrable.
346. The Hawar Islands were occupied by a branch of the Dowasir
tribe around 1800, afterthey had sought and been granted permission to
occupy the islands by an official of the Ruler of Bahrain in Zubarah (see
paragraphs 413 to 414) .In 1845, the same Dowasir were also grmted
permission by the Ruler of Bahrain to settle on the main island ofBahrain. They established the towns of Zellaq and Budaiya jsee
paragraph 417). They thus owed their allegiance andtheir right to reside
in the islands of Bahrain to the Ruler of Bahrain (see paragraphs 426 to
431).
347. The Hawar Islands were not, however, anexclusiveIy Dowasir
preserve. At least one prominent non-Dowasir Bahraini family, the
A1 Ghattam, resided on Hawar. The fins of their home in the North
Village of Jazirat Hawar may still ~een.~"
348. The traditional occupations of the inhabitants were fishing,
pearling and gypsumextraction. What they did not consume was taken
to the main island of Bahrain and to Muharraq Island for sale in the
markets.
349. From the beginning of the 20th Century, with the increasing
development of Bahrain's infrastructure and administration, the
Govemment of Bahrain's activities increasedon the Hawar Islands as
elsewhere. Years before Qatar made its first claim to the Bawar Islands
in 1938, the Government of Bahrain was administering and regulating
the mining of gypsum on the islands, had a regular police force on the
islands, and was supervising the health of the inhabitants of the islands.
After Qatar's med attack on Zubarah in 1937, Bahrain increased its
military presence on the Hawar Islands and constmcted a police fort
there. At thetirneof Qatar's firstclaim to the islands, Bahrain'sactivities
on the Hawar Islands were so extensive that it would be impossible to
deny that its occupationwas effective,andQatarhasnever once done so.
402
Seee.g.statemenof Ibrahim bin Salmanbin AhmedAl Ghattampara.25,
Ann.316(a)Vol.6,p. 1406.350. Over time, as part of a global phenornenon of urbanisation, the
Hawar Islands have lost much of their population. Many facets of the
traditional way of life died out as the oil industry and modem
opportunities onthe main islandof Bahrainproved more attractive.
351. The destiny of the Dowasir who lived in the Hawar Islands and
other parts of Bahrain is inextricably connected with the past and the
present of Bahrain.In the towns of Budaiya and Zellaq it is possible to
see many stores and businesses with signs showing that they belong to
people with the near-universal Dowasixfamily name: "AlDosari" (Le.
the singular of "Dowasir" in Arabic). One need only consult the
telephone directory to see many pages of "Al Dosari" listings.403 Many
former Hawar Islanders are still living. They have testified about their
Iives on the Hawar Islands, have identified and named their former
neighbours there, and have pointed to the remains of their homes and
their fish traps. Hundreds of young Bahrainis cm tell of their family
traditions,rooted in life on the Hawar~slands.~*~
403
1996-97 Bahrain Telephone Directory, pp. 77 to 80, Ann. 311, Vol. 6,
pp. 1354to 1358.
404
The Dowasir werenot a marginal group of outsiders in Bahrain'ssociety.
Some Bahrainifiguresof historicalproportions havebeen Dowasir, withtheir
roots inhe HawarIslands.For exarnple,the father of Abdullah binJabr, who
became Secretary tothe Emir in the 1930s, lived for part of every year on
Jazirat Hawarand owneda fish trapnear to the southernvillofethe island.
AbdullahbinJabr'spalace (which isdecorated with elegantfriezes made from
Hawar gypsum) may still be seen in Zellaq on the west Coastof the main
island of Bahrain. The remains of his father'ssh trap near the southern
village of Jazirat Hawar may stillbeeen undenvater. Abdullah bin Jabr's
grandson, Sheikh Mohammed bin Mubarak, is Bahrain's current Foreign
Minister. Another importantBahraini Dowasir was Yusuf bin Rahmah al
Dosari. Athis death in October 1995,he had been the head of the Bahrain
Amiri Courtfor more than 30 years.Yusuf bin Rahmahwas one of the most
respectedmenin modernBahrain.He livedas a childon Jazirat Hawar, where
the vestigesof his father'shouse may still be seen in the southern village.
Someof his childhoodfriends arestiIlalive, and remember him clearly from
Hawardays. See statement ofHamoudbin Muhannaal Dosari, paras. 11 and
12,Ann. 313(a),Vol. 6, p. 1365,and statemeof Nasr bin Makkial Dosari,
paras. 1and25, Ann.314(a),Vol.6, pp. 1379and 1385.352. Qatar's clairn to the Hawar Islands was adjudicated by the
Governent of Britain in 1938-1939 at the request of Qatar. The
adjudication took account of an abundance of evidence of Bahrain's
occupation and administrationof the Hawar Islands,from as far back as
the previouscentury. In starkcontrast,anddespitethe factthat Qatarhad
initiated the proçeedings,it was explicitly recorded in the course of the
.. ,
adjudicationthat Qatar was unable to produce any shred of evidence to
support its assertion that the Islands had always been a part of Qatar.
Britain thus concludedin July 1939that Bahrain had sovereignty over
theHawarIslands.
353. Qatar resuscitatedits claim tothe Islandsinthe 1960sin whatthe
then Ruler of Qatar admitted was retaliation for Bahrain'sinsistence on
its claim to sovereignty overZubarah.But despitecommunicationswith
Bahrain on the subject of the HawarIslands over the pastthree decades,
and despite mediation under the auspices of Saudi Arabia starting in
1978,Qatarhas neverprofferedany concreteevidence ofspecificactsof
administration in the Hawar Islands. If Qatar had possessed such
evidence,one may assumethat itwould have taken one of the numerous
opporhmitiesavailableto it duringthe past 57 yearsto present it. Qatar's
claim to the HawarIslands is nothing more than an attempt to fashion a
counter-weight to Bahrain's well-documented historical rights in the
Zubarahregion.SECTION3.3 Bahrain's sovereignl over the Hawar Islands has
been resjudicata since the British adjudication of
1938-1939
A. Introduction
354. Qatar's claim to the Hawar Islands was adjudicated by the
Government of Britain in 1938-1939 at the request of Qatar. The
adjudication lasted more than a year and involved adversarial
submissions by the Parties. The competing contentions and evidence
were analysed in detail by the British Political Agent for Bahrain and
Qatar. His ~eport~'~was considered and approved by the British
Political Resident for the Gulf, prior to the further consideration and
decision of Bis Majesty'sGovemment and the yet Wher assent thereto
by the British Governmentof India.
355. The Political Agent was the official charged with conductingthe
on-site assessrnent for the British Governrnent, although of course the
ultimate decision was not for him to take. He invited Qatar to submit
what he caIled a "forma1claim" and then invited Bahrain to submit a
"counter-claim," to which Qatar could reply by way of "rejoinder . i406
Either Party could have produced as elaborate pleadings as they wished.
The Parties chose to express their legal arguments in the form of letters
to the Political Agent. The expressions used by the Political Agent to
refer to these communications, adopted in this Mernorial, including the
405
Reportof HughWeightman,BritishPoliticalAgent, in the formof a letterto
Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident,22 April 1939 Ann.285, Vol.
p. 1165,(hereafter"Weightman Report").
406 WeightmanReport,22 April 1939,Ann. 281, Vol5, p. 165. See also letter
fromCapt.Howes,OfficiatingPoliticalAgent to ActingAdviser Govt.of
Bahrain,14August 1938, Ann. 270, Vol.5, p. 1125. See also Leaer from
Hu& Weightman,British PoliticAgent, to Ruler of Qatar, 20 May 1938,
Ann. 258, Vol5,p. 1098.word "Rejoinder" to describe the replyto Bahrain'sCounter-daim which
the Ruler of Qatar successfully insisted on submitting, confinn the
explicitadjudicativenatureof the proceedings.
356. The stages ofthe adjudicationwereas follows:
27 May 1938 Qatar'sclaim407
30May 1938 The British Political Agent meets the Ruler
of Qatarto discuss his claim4'"
14August 1938 Qatar'sClaimis forwardedto ~ahrain~~~
8November 1938 The PoliticaI Agent reminds Bahrain to
submitits~ounter-claim410
22 Decernber1938 Bahrain'sCounter-claim411
5 January1939 Bahrain's Counter-clah is fonvarded to
qatar412
30March 1939 Qatar's~ejoinder~'~
407 QatarClaim(inthe formoftwo lettersfromRulerof Qatarto BritishPolitical
Agent),10May 1938,Ann.256, Vol.5, p. 1094and 27 May 1938,Ann.260,
Vol.5,p. 1102.
408
Letter fiorn Hugh Weightman, BritishPolitical Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident,3June1938,Ann.262, Vol.5, p. 1112.
409 Letter fiom Capt. Howes, Acting British Political Agent, to the Acting
AdvisortoGovt. ofBahrain,14August 1938,Ann.270,Vol. 5,p. 1125.
4'0 Letter from HughWeightman, British Political Agentto Charles Belgrave,
AdvisertotheGovt.ofBahrain,8November1938,Ann.272, Vol.5, p. 1127.
411
BahrainCounter-Clairn(in the form of a lefromAdviserto the Govt.of
Bahrain to BritishPoIitical Agent), 22 December 1938, Ann.274, Vol. 5,
p. 1129.
4'2 Letter fiom Hugh Weightman,BritishPoliticalAgent, to Rulerof Qatar, 5
Janumy1939,Ann.276,Vol. 5,p. 1141. 22 April 1939 The Political Agent cornmunicates the
record of the proceedings and his analysis to
the Political ~esident~'~
29 April 1939 ThePolitical Resident fonvards the Political
Agent's record and analysis to the British
Government in ond don^
13June 1939 The BritishGovernmentdecides in favour of
Bahrain's daim to sovereignty over the
Hawar Islands, subject to the assent of the
British Governmentof 1ndia416
1July 1939 The British Goverment of India "concurs"
in the decision of his Majesty's
~overnrnent.""
11July 1939 Britainfs decision is communicated to
Bahrain and ~atar~"
357. Analysis of the 193 8-1939 adjudication yields the following
significant conclusions:
413 QatarRejoinder(inthe fom ofa letter fromRulerof Qatar toBritishPolitical
Agent),30 March1939,Ann.278, Vol. 5, p. 1144.
414 WeightmanReport,22 April 1939,Ann. 281,Vol. 5, p1165.
415
Letterfiom Lt.Col.Fowle,BritishPoliticalReçident,to Secretaryof Statefor
India 29April 1939,Ann.282,Vol. 5, p1173.
416
Letterfrom ForeignOffice (London) toIndiaOffice (London), 13June 1939,
Ann.284(a),Vol.5, p. 1176.
417 Letter from DepuS Secretav to the Govt. of Indiato the British Political
Agent, LtCol.Fowle, 1July 1939,Ann.286, Vol.5,p. 1181.
418
Letters from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Polirical.Resident, to Ruter of Bahrain
and Ruler of Qatar, 11luly 1939,Ann.287, Vol. 5, p. 1182 andAnn.288,
Vol.5,p. Il 83respectively.(i) Qatar never made a formal claim to the Hawar Islands until May
1938,i.e. in the aftennath of Qatar'ssuccessful attack in Zubarah
and soon after Bahrain had begun discussionswith oil companies
about expanding the profitable Bahrain oil industry to the Hawar
Islands;
fii) Qatar requested the adjudication and both Qatar and Bahrain
participated willingly;
(iii) the adjudication adhered to fündamental procedural
requirements;
(iv) the basis and substance of Qatar'sclaimwas revealed as nothing
more than geographicalproximity;
(vj certain of Qatar's surprisinglyerroneous affirmations about the
physical characteristics of the Hawar Islands showed thar the
Ruler of Qatar did not understand which islands he was in fact
purporting to claim;
(vi) the result of the adjudication- that Bahrain had sovereignty over
the Hawar Islands - was formally cornrnunicated to the two
RuIers by the British Political Resident, Sir TrenchardFowle, as
a decision of "HisMajesty'sGovernrnent";
(vii) the carefully documented adjudication gives no support to {and
by negative inference contradicts) Qatar's contentions that its
1916 Treaty with Britain and its 1935 Oil Concession with the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company recognised the Hawar Islands as
part of Qatar;(viii) the record of the adjudication comprises aweaIth of evidenceof
continuous occupationof the HawarIslandsby Bahraini subjects
andof Bahrainiactsof administration;
(ix) the record reveals no evidence of Qatari subjects ever having
dwelt onthe Hawar Islands,or of Qatariacts of administration;
(x) the adjudication did not exclude Janan from the Hawar Islands, .. ,
andrecognisedBahrain'ssovereigntyover them all;
(xi) Qatar's contention that the 1938-1939 adjudication was unfair
and substantially wrong, and quickly recognised as such by
British officials,"lgis flatly contradicted by the record, which
shows inter alia that the British Government's BaliraidQatar
maritime delimitationin 1947was in part explicitly based on the
1938-1939adjudication.
358. There is ample evidence that knowledgeable map makers are
aware of the status of the Hawar Islands. Thus Map H-6C published in
1972by the BritishDirectorof MilitarySurveyshowsthe BahrainIQatar
border clearlyrunningbetween the HawarIslands and the Coastof Qatar
(reproduced in relevant detail opposite). As for the United States
National GeographicSociety, even its February 1991 map covering the
entire Middle East shows the Hawarsin pinkl, ike the rest of Bahrain,
while Qatar is green (reproducedin relevantdetailon followingpage).
419 StatofQatarMernorial{QuestionsofJurisdictionand Adrnisçibility),p.24.B. The Probative Implications of Oatar's Claims in the
Adjudication
(i) The Ruler of Qatar made his daim without knowing either
the locationor eventhe identityof theHawar Islands
359. Qatar's Rejoinder to Bahrain's Counter-claim in the 1938-1939
adjudication showed that the Ruler of Qatar was quite ignorant of the
Hawar Islands, and probably confked them with another group of
islands.
360. The tone of Qatar's Rejoinder was set in a comment that
Bahrain's Counter-claim was a "boId denial of the firmly set fa~ts."~~"
This statement however is more accurately applied to Qatar's assertion
that the HawarIslands "are islands whose extent is from4 to 5 square
miles approximately at hightide."421 In other words,the Ruier of Qatar
was thinking of islands whose size was between one fifth and one
quarter of that of the Hawar Islands, which comprise 20 square miles
(approxirnately51km2;seeparagraph 33 8).
361. Thiswas either due to ignorance or tothe possibility that Sheikh
Abdullah was claiming a different set of islands. Either hypothesis is
consistent with the further statementin Qatar'sRejoinder that:
420
QatarRejoinder(inthe fom of lettehm Ruler of Qatar to British Political
Agent), 30 March 1939,Ann.279, Vol5, p.1148. See also the statementof
the RulerofQatarthat "the Hawar Islands belongedto the QaStatefrom
the very daywhenGodcreatedthem..." Lettefrom Ruler of Qatar to Lt. Col.
Fowle,British Political ResidenAugust 1939, Ann.289, Vol. 5, p. 1184.
Languagelikethisrecalls SirGeraFitzmaurice'comment thatthe real basis
of claims foundedon proximityis "sentimental, economicor political, as the
case may be, but not legal."Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,The Law and Procedure
of the InrernationaICoofJustice, (1986) Vol. 1,p. 312 infootnote2.
421
Qatar Rejoinder(in the forrnof letter from Ruler ofQatarto British Political
Agent),30March 1939,Ann. 279, Vol. 5, 1148. "The HawarIslands are considered, from a geographical point of
view, asa part which completes Qatar fiom the North. Any one
who has the least primary knowledge of geography will agree
with thi~."~~~
The Hawar Islands cannot accurately be described as compieting the
Qatar peninsula or the Stateof Qatar from the north. They are located to
the west of the Qatar peninsula, at approximatelyits mid-point.
362. There isa group of islands, however, including Ra'sRdsan Island
and Umm Tays Island, located near the northem tip of the Qatar
peninsula off Al Ruwais {for example, see maps 2 and 6, Volume7).
They seemto fit the Ruler'snotion of "completing" Qatar fromthe north
and are much smalIer than the Hawar Islands. Since Sheikh Abdullah
appeared so certain of the location and size of the Islands that he was
cIaiming, the inference is that he had fixed upon the wrong islands as a
result of insufficiently clear advice - probably given by Petroleum
Concessions Limited (seeparagraphs 374 to 376) - as to the objective of
his claim.
363. Consistent with its confident reference to "any one who has the
least primary knowledge of geography", Qatar'sRejoinder alleged tliat
the physical description of the Hawar Islands given in Bahrain's
Counter-claim were "concoctions" and a "bold denial of the firmly set
fa~ts."~~~ This invites a cornparison of the two Parties' competing
descriptions ofthe Hawar Islands.
364. The alleged "concoctions" towhich Qatar referredwere Bahrain's
assertionsthat the Hawar Islands contained:
422
QatarRejoinder(in the fom of letter fion1Ruler of Qatarto BritishPolitical
Agent),30March 1939,Ann.279, Vol.5, p1153.
423 IbidAnn.279, Vol. 5p.1148. "..inhabited villages, established since a Iong time, with firmly
built stone houses, pemanently inhabited, for more than a
century, by the subjects of the Ruler of Bahrain and the subjects
of his ancestors withtheir wives,families, herds andb~ats."~~~
In contrast, Qatar considered that the Islands:
"...arebarren,without water and unfit as pasturage for herds, and
was in the past completely without inhabited buildings and by no
any way can be called villages or anything that approaches the .. ,
meaning of this word, and generally unfrequented except by
fishermenwho corne fiom timeto time..."425
365. Perhaps again the Ruler of Qatar was thinking of some other
islands to the north, but if he was thinking of thetrue Hawar Islands his
description was quite wrong. The British Political Agent visited the
Hawar Islands and faund them to be inhabited and hl1 of evidônce of
more than a century'scontinuous occupation. Indeed, Hawar Islanders
are still alive who were born and grew up on the Hawar Islands in the
reign of Sheikh Isa, i.e. before 1932.The PoIiticaIAgent'sobservations,
as well as a wealth of additional evidencereviewed in Sections 3.5 and
3.6,ovenvhelmingly contradict SheikhAbdullah'sassertions.
366. In another rhetorical passage, the Ruler of Qatar stated in his
Rejoinder that
"We extend an opportunity to the Bahrain Government to cite
any instances of any action which they took in the past in Hawar
Islands and which we did not challenge."426
424 QatarRejoinder(inthe form of letterfromRulerof Qatar to BritishPolitical
Agent),30 March 1939,Ann. 279,Vol.5,p. 1148.
425 Ibid,atAnn.279,Vol. 5,pp.1148to 1149.
426
QatarRejoinder(in theformof aletterfromRuIerof Qatato BritishPolitical
. Agent),30 Mach 1939,Ann.279, Vol.5,p. 1151.367. There is however no evidence of such "challenges" by Qatar in
relation to the HawarIslands prior to Sheikh Abdullah'sClaim.
368. The factthat the Ruler of Qatar had not the least idea as to what
the Hawar Islands were or where they were located should occasion no
surprise. The likelihood of anyonefrom Doha having routinely visited
the Hawar Islands, or even the west coast ofthe Qatar peninsula, before
1938 is rern~te.~~~ Until the mid-1930s there was no route across the
peninsula.428 The situation had not changed significantly by 1939,
although oil activities had Ied trithe construction of a "track" to the oil
field at Petroleum Concessions Limited's newly established camps at
Dukhan,on the Qatar peninsula south of the Hawar Islands. The word
"track" (not a real road) iç used in a British military report of 1939.429
The report goes on to note that the Qatari oil camps nevertheless relied
for al1their supplies and water on shi~ments made by sea and not the
roughfiftymiletrack acraç she peninsula.430 The trackdid not providea
practical alternative to the sea route and was thus avoided. When Sir
Rupert Hay, the British Political Resident, decided to break with general
427
First, suca journey would be pointless. A visitor fiorn Doha would have
found a sandy, windswept island populated by a small, closely knit
communityof simplepeople.They hadno rnoney.There were nosightsto be
seen, no entertainmentto be enjoyed.As for the wider environment,the arid
sketches ofthe Qatarmainlandto the eastofthe isIandswe-ethen, asnow-
one ofthe mostdesolate placeson earth. TheHawarIslanderswerejealous of
theirfishing grounds and gypsum quarries, and did not want strangers to
approach their women. Secondly,ucha voyage wouldhave beenarduous.To
go tothe Hawar Islands from Doha would have been a very long voyageby
the searoute,withal1the problemofwindandcurrentassociatedwithsailing
around a largepeninsula.Indeed,the WawarIslandsare in al1importaways
closerto Bahrain than to Qatar. What matters is the proximity of people to
each other,not that ofone sandnkto thenext.
428 Seethe map accornpanyingthe 1935QatarOil ConcessionbetweenRulerof
Qatar andAPOC,Ann. 105,Vol.3, p. 621.
429 British MifitaryReport entitled "Appreciationof the situation regarding the
Defence ofthe QatarPeninsula",January 1939,Ann.275, Vol5, p. 1138.
430
Ibid Ann.275, p. 1138.practise and travel by car fiom the PCL camp to the Ruler of Qatar's
residence outsideDohain 194 1,he reportedthat:
"the road lay across stony and uninhabited desert and the going
was fairlyrough;not a livingthing was seenfi-omsome 50miles
...itwas strangeto travel aboutthese wild parts at al1times of the
night without my kind of armed escort.~'~~'
In fact, in 1922 aBritishPolitical Agent, Major Clive Daly,had written
of his resolve to return from Doha to Manama by crossing the Qatar
peninsula overland, rather than the standard sea route around it. His
motive is revealing: "NoBritish Official appears to have yet made this
trip andit wouldbeinte~estin~."~~~
369. In this context,one cm easily believe the following commentin
Bahrain'sCounter-claimof 22 December 1938:
"It would appear that until about a year ago Shaikh Abdullah
ignored the existenceof these islands andthat he is now moved
to make a daim to them believing that they perhapscontain
,il"433
(ii) TheRulerof Qatar's obvious financial and economic motives
underrninedthe credibilityof his claim
370. Prior to 1938,Qatar showed little interest in the Hawar Islands.
In February 1938,having been infomed that Bahrain had entered into
negotiations with two oil companies for the possible grant of minera]
rights in the Hawar Islands (see paragraph 374), the Ruler of Qatar
431 Letter from Lt. Col. Ray, British PoliticalResident,to Secretaryto the Govt.
of India,19November 1941,Ann.296, Vol.5,pp.1205to 1207.
432 Letter frorn Maj.Daly,British Political Agent, to British PoliticalResident,
30 January 1922,Ann.241, Vol5,p.1064.
433 Bahrain Counter-clairn(in the form aflettefrom Charles Belgrave, the
Adviserto the Govt.of Bahrain,to HuphWeightrnan,BritishPoliticalAgent),
22 December1938,Ana. 274,Vol.5, pp. 1130to113 1.complained orally to the British Political Agent about Bahrain'sexercise
of authority over the Hawar ~slands.~~m ~ile the motivation for conduct
or inactivity is not usually relevant to the assessrnent of its legal effect,
the explanation of a change of conduct may confirm the significance of
inactivity before the time of the change and the corresponding lack of
significanceof the conduct followingit. Suchis the casehere.
371. The Ruler of Qatar'sclaim to the Hawar Islands was stirnulated
by greed for oil.
372. After the discovery and production of oil in Bahrain and the
Arabian peninsula, Qatar desperately sought producing oil fields of its
~wn."~~ In the 1930s,Qatar experiencedwidespread poverty, hunger and
di~ease.~~B ~oth Bahrain'sand Qatar's traditional sourceof income, the
pearling industry, had declined rapidly in the ewly 1930sbecause of the
invention of culturedpearls. Unlike Bahrain, Qatar did not have any oil
revenues to offsetthe economic stagnation. Qatar was particularly eager
to stemthe flow of emigration from Qatar to Bahrain which, during the
latter half of th1930s, was much wealthier than ~atar.~~'
373. In 1936,two years before Qatar made its first claim to the Hawar
Islands, British officiaishad identified the Hawar lslands as potentially
significant sourcesof oil production:
434 Letter fromHu& Weightman, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident,15May 1938,Ann.257, Vol. 5,1096.
435
Althoughail was firçt diçcoveredin 1939,the Second World Warprevented
commercialexploitation until1946.
436
Report of Wugh Weightman, British Political Agent, 5 December 1939,
Ann.292,Vol.5,p. 1190. "[ThemainHawar Island]is a low,desolatelooking placenear to
the mainland of Qatar, but it is possible that it may have
considerablevalue nowthat oil has been found in Bahrain and is
hopedforin ~atar."~~~
374. Both Bahrain Petroleum Company("BAPCO") and Petroleum
Concessions Limited("PCL") - the oil companies operating in Bahrain
and Qatar respectively - consideredthat the Hawar Islands potentially
had significantoil depositsand fought bitterly with each other to obtain
r. UltimateIyBAPCOprevailed.
375. By virtue of an oil concession agreement signedin 1935by the
Ruler of Qatar, Petroleum Concessions Lirnited -a consortiumin which
British interests were dominant - had acquired rights over "the whole
area overwhich theShaikhmles and which is markedon the north of the
line drawn on the map attached to this ~~reernent".~~' There are two
equal and distinct elementsin that formula. The first is that the rights
related to territoryuled by the Sheikh. The second is that the rights
related onlyto suchterritoryas alsolies to the nortof theline drawn on
the map. Thus, the agreement did not purport to include territory that
was notmled by the Sheikhof Qatar,regardlessofwhere it waslocated.
376. Since the Hawar Islands are depicted to the north of the line
drawn on themapin question,it becarneconvenient tobothPCL andthe
Ruler of Qatar (asthe recipientof potential royalties) to ignore the first
element ofthe Concessionand insteadfocusexclusively on the map.On
that basis, PCL and the Ruler of Qatar argued that the agreement
acknowledged the Hawar Islands as belonging to Qatar. In a letter to
438 Letter from Lt. Col. Loch, BritishPolitictoALt. Col. Fowle, British
PoliticalResident,6 1936,Ann.247, Vol.5, p. 1074.
439 Agreementbetweenthe Ruler of Qatar and the AngIo-PersianOil Company
(predecessorofPCL), 17May 1935,Ann104,Vol. 3, p.616.PCL,~~*a British Government official imrnediately pointed out the
fallacy ofthe argument. He noted that in fact al1of Bahrain was to the
north of the line drawn on the map and explained that the purpose of the
linehad beento definethe southernboundary of the conce~sion.~~'
(iii) The Ruler of Qatar's daim was also made to alleviate
domestic problems
377. The Ruler of Qatar's claim to the Hawar Islands is related to
Qatar's armed attack on the Zubarah region in 1937, which aggravated
Qatar's economic difficulties. Although Qatar had succeeded in
occupying Zubarahmilitarily, the economic consequences of the armed
attack were crippling Qatar's weak economy because Bahrain had
imposed economic sanctions against Qatar (see paragraphs 293 to 294).
Almost al1imports and exports to and from Qatar during that period
flowed through Bahrain'sprincipalport in Manama(seeparagraph 225).
Coupled with the introduction of cuItured pearls fi-om Japan, the
Bahraini embargo was disastrous for Qatar. The claim to the Hawar
Islands was a bargaining counter against Bahrainiscornplaints about the
previous year's med attack on Zubarah and against the resulting
Bahraini embargo.
378. The British Political Agent'sAnnual.Report on Qatar for 1939
referred to dissatisfaction of the Qatar population caused by "poverty
due to the pearl slurnp and lack of employment."442The Report noted
that tribesmen on the Qatar peninsula were considering emigration to
440 LettefrornJ.C.Walton,India Office, London, to Mr. SkPCL,s14 May
1936,Ann.248,Vol.5, p.1076.
441 Ibid.
442
Report by Hugh Weightman, British PoliticAgent,5 Decernber 1939,
Ann.292, Vol5,p.1190.Bahrain or Saudi Arabia as a result of the Ruler of Qatar's refusa1ta
agreeto sharethe benefitsof any oil production:
"ShaikhNassir bin Jasim [oneof the Ruler'sbrothers]took upon .
himself to speak plainly to the Ruler and wam him that his
niggardliness in money matters and handling of empIoyment in
the oil Co.was losinghimthe supportof the tribesmen he needed
to controI Qatar and his prospective oil field, and helping his
Bahrainenemiesto undenninehis a~thorit~."~~~
379. Qatar's populationwere easily persuaded to leave, given the
abjectpovertythroughoutQatar, coupledwith:
"The Ruler'sand his son Hamed'sgreed wkich makes them not
only retain al1the oil money444but also control for their own
benefit employment in the oil Co. Neither can see that Arab
standards of life are chsuigingand the rising generation with its
contact with the outside world can no longer be deceived and
repressed."445
380. By engaging Bahrain in a dispute about sovereignty over the
Hawar Islands, the Ruler of Qatar was hoping to alleviate his internal
problems. Then as now, Qatar had IittIe to lose in advancing such a
claim,and muchto gain.
C. Theadjudicationwas formal. lepitirnatandcomprehensive
3 81. Afterthe Rulerof Qatarcomplained tothe British PoliticalAgent
in Febmary 1938about Bahrain'sexercise of authority over the Hawar
443 ibid.
444
Oil revenuesiQatar in this period were Iirnited to explorationfees ("up-
front"payments).
445
Report by Hugh Weightman, British Political Agent, 5 Deceni1939,
Ann.292, Vol.5,p.1190.Islands,the British Political Residentsuggestedthat Qatarmightpresent
a forma1claimforthe HawarIslands to the British Government.446
382. On 10May 1938, the Ruler of Qatar, SheikhAbdulla, stated his
firstwrittenClaimto the Hawar Islandsinthe followingterms:
"Hawar is, by its natural position, a part of Qatar, and it is not
hidden to anyone who is acquainted with geographical and
naturalcondition and has seen the natural position of Hawar that
it is, beyond doubt, a part of Qatar though it is a small Island
separated by a shallow channel of water. But by its present
positionit isattachedto Qatar,formedby it and belongs toit."447
383. The British Political Agent immediately remarked of Qatar's
case:
"it remains to be seen whether the Shaikh of Qatar can in fact
produce any evidence in support of his claim other than a mere
referenceto geographical location,whichpresumablywill not by
itself serve to contest theBahrain claim supported as it is, by
physicaloccupation."448
384. Britain's evaluation of the dispute then took on the principal
attributes of a forma1adjudication. In a letter dated 20 May 1938, the
British PoliticalAgent informedthe Ruler of Qatarthat Bribin would:
"givethe fullestconsideration toanyformal clairnput fonvard by
you [the Rulerof Qatar]to the HawarIslands,provided thatyour
claim is supported by a full and complete statement of the
evidence on which you rely in asserting that you, as [Ruler of
Qatd, possesssovereigntyovertl~ern."~~~
446 See interna1note of Sir TrenchardFowle, BritishPolitical Resi5eApril
1938, Ann.254, Vol. 5,p. 1090. The proposed approachwas discussed
betweenthe lndia Officand the Foreign Offic- see letter, 13 April 1938,
Ann. 255, Vol. 5, p.1092.
447
QatarClaim(inthe formoftwolettersfrom Rulerof Qatarto BritishPolitical
Agent, 10Mayand 27 May 19381,10May1938,Ann. 256, Vol.5,p. 1094.
Letter fiom Hugh Weightman, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident,15May f938Ann. 257,Vol.5,p. 1097.
449
Letter from HughWeightman, British PoliticalAgento Ruler of Qatar, 20
May 1938,Ann.258, Vol.5, p. 1099.385. At the outset, the British Political Agent established the
adjudicatory nature ofthe investigation.Inthe Political.Agent'swords:
"LI explainedto the Ruler of Qatarthat] 1could offer himno hope
that His Majesty's Government wouid disturb the sfaritusquo
while his claim wasunder consideration; it was cornmonpractice
that when a person laid claim to property in the actual physical
occupation of a second party, that party was Iefi in possession
until the new claimant had established his right before a
tribunal,."45(Emphasis added.)
386. Qatar'sClairndescribedthe basis ofthe Ruler'sclaim as follows:
"Sn my capacity as Ruler of Qatar territory including coasts,
islands, promontories and everything belonging to it, I have the
right of ownershipoverthese i~lands."~~'
387. On 3 June 1938,the British Political Agent noted theprima facze
weakness, ifnot inexistence,of Qatar'sClaim:
"In regard to the substanceof the Shaikhof Qatar's claim,it will
be observedthat it consists of (1) a bare assertion of sovereignty
and (2) the affirmation that the Hawar Islands are part of the
geographicalunit of ~atar."~~~
388. After receiving the Claim,the Political Agent met directly with
the Ruler of Qatar in Doha and "discussed the matter at considerable
length with Sheikh Abdullah [theRuler of Qatar], his sons Hamad and
Ali and his Secretary Salehal ana."^' ^ven after that meeting, he
noted that:
"No evidence is offered of formal occupation by Qatar, no
mention is made of collection of taxes, of sale of fishing rights,
450
Letter from Hugh Weightman, British Political AgtotLt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident,3 June Ann.,262,Vol.5,p. 113.
451
QatarCIaim(inthe formof twolettersfiom RuIerQatarto British Political
Agent,10Mayand27 May 1938),27 May 1938,Ann.260,Vol. 5,p.1104.
452 Letter from Hugh Weighhian, British Political Agent, to Sir Trenchard
Fowle, BritishPoliticalResident,3 JuneAnn.8262, Vol5,p. 1114.
453 IbidA,nn.262, Vol. 5, p12.1 of the exercise ofjudicial authority, or indeed of the performance
ofanyfunction which might denote sovereignrights."454
389. Yet in this conversation with the Ruler of Qatar, the British
Political Agent had ensuredthatthe Qatariposition was stated as fully as
the Ruler possible could:
"1 enquired repeatedly whether this letter [the 27 May 1938
Claim], read with his previous letter of the 110 May 19381,set
out his daim in al1the detail which he wished to place before His
Majesty's Government or whether he had any other evidence,
documentary or othenvise, which he would wish to submit. He
replied that he had set out al1that he wished to say in these two
letters, that he had no other evidenceto offer (and saw no need
for it) and that he relied on the justice of Wis Majesty's
Go~ernment."~~( ~Emphasis added.)
390. The Ruler of Qatar asked to be allowed to be informed of
Bahrain'sevidence of its sovereignty over the Hawar Islands in order to
fiame Qatar'scasemore effecti~el~.~~~ ~his was a strangerequest fiom a
State insisting that it alone had sovereigntyover the tenitory in question,
but was clearly prompted by Sheikh Abdullah's ignoranceregarding the
Islands. He made the request in writing on 15 June 1938, in the
followlng ternis:
"Perhaps, if1 hear the statement which they consider it to be the
ground on which they base their aggxession, 1may be able to
rebut it and frustrate it andproduce something which may prove
my ~lairn."~~'
454 Letter from Hugh Weightman, British Political Agent, to Sir Trenchard
Fowle,BritishPoliticalReside3June 1938,Ann. 262,Vol. 5,p. 1114.
455 IbidAnn. 262,Vol. 5pp. 1112to1113.
456
Letter from Ruler oQatar to Hugh Weightman, British Political Agent,
15 June1938,Ann. 263,Vol.5,p. 1115to 1116.391. British officials were at first reluctant to give Qatar such an
advantage not intended tobe availableto Bahrain. The British Political
Agent describedhis interview withthe Ruler of Qatar in the following
terms:
"[The Ruler of Qatar] demanded the right to see the Bahrain
Government'scounter-claim,'inorderto enablehim to rebut it'.1
replied that 1 was unable to give hirn an assurance that His
Majesty'sGovernmentwouldagreeto suchprocedure,andthat in
my own opinion it was impossible to conternplatea procedure
enabling each party in turn to rehearse the arguments, counter-
arguments,rebuttal,counter-rebuttaland so on of the other, since
this would render a decision impossible in his life-time or in
392. LocalBritish officialsthus refusedQatar'srequest on the ground
that the Ruler of Qatar had alreadyhad an opportunity to state his case
and had confirmedthat there was no other evidence on whichhe would
seek to rely.459That decisionwas overruledby the British Government
in London,which consideredthat:
"while recognising that Sheikhof Qatar rnay be able to add
nothing of substance tothe statementshe has alreadymade ...on
the whole it would be preferable to give him an opportunity to
comment on the Bahreinrepiy. "460
393. Bahrain was fonvarded a copy of Qatar's Claim on 14 August
1938.~~' On 8 November 1938,the British PoliticaI Agent sent a letter
458
Letter from Hugh Weightman, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle,
British PoliticalResident,3June 1938,Ann.262, Vop. 1113.
4'9 Seee.g. letterfrom Lt. Col.Fowle,BritishPolitical Resident,to the Secretary
of State to Govt.of lndia and copiedto HughWeightman,British Political
Agent,27 June 1938,Ann.264,Vol. 5p. 1117.
460 Letter from Secretaryof State for lndia to Lt. Col. TrenchardFowle, British
PoliticResident,21July 1938,Ann.269, Vol. 5, p124.
46'
Letter fromCapt. Howes, Acting British Political Agetothe Govt. of
Bahrain, 14August 1938,Ann.270,Vol.5,p.1125.urging Bahrain to hand in its Counter-claim as soon as possible.462
Bahrain sent its Counter-claim to the British Political Agent on 22
Decernber 1938~~a ~ndit wasfonvarded tu Qataron 5January 1939.~~~
394. The content of Bahrain's Counter-claim of 1939 was Mly
consistent with Bahrain'spositiontoday.
395. Qatar was then allowed almost three months in which to
composeits Rejoinder. (It had ofcoursebeen in a position to refine its
argument for the preceding six months.) Qatar initially complained of
the three-rnonththe-limit imposed by ri tain,^b^^t it did noraise the
matter when it submitted the Rejoinder on 30 March 1939. On the
contrary,the Ruler of Qatardeclared in his Rejoinder that:
"...1 have explained my comments and remarks to Your
Excellency as fully as is required bv the circumstances of this
....466(Emphasisadded.)
396. Qatar'sRejoinder included fifteen pages of comments on
Bahrain's~ounter-daim.467Theassertion of Qatar'sclaim to sovereignty
over the HawarIslandswas consistent in itsreliance on pure geography:
"(W)e ask the Bahrain Govement whether the Hawar Islands,
fiom a geographical point of view, comprise a part of Bahrain
462 Letter frorn Hugh Weightman,British Political Agent,to CharIesBelgrave,
Adviserto the Govt.of Bahrain,8 November1938,Ann.272, Vol.5, p. 1127.
463
BahrainCounter-daim (in the fonn of a letter from Adtothe Govt. of
Bahrain to British Political Agent), 22 December 1938,Ann.274, Vol.5,
p.1129.
464 Letter from Hugh Weightman,British Political AgtotRuIer of Qatar, 5
January 1939,Ann,276,Vol.5,p.1141.
465 SeeletterfromRulerof QatatoHughWeightman,BritishPoliticalAgent, 19
March 1939,Ann.277, Vol.5,p. 1143.
466
QatarRejoinder(inthe fom of a letterfromRuler of Qatarto British Political
Agent),30March 1939,Ann.279, Vol.5,p. 1160.
467
IbidA,nn.279,Vol.5,p.1146. cornpletingitfromthe southor a part of Qatarcompletingit from
the north? ... The Hawar Islands are considered, fiom a
geographicalpoint of view,as aparw thich completesQatarfrom
the North. Any one who has the least primary knowledge of
geographywill agree withthi~."~~~
Qatar's confusion regarding the location of the Hawar Islands
demonstratedby this assertionhas been discussed in paragraphs 361 to
362.
397. Qatar'sRejoinder implicitly acknowledgedthat Sheikh Abdullah
had never been to the Hawar Islands but asserted vaguely that: "the
[precedingRuIerof Qatarj has visited it many times and many others of
the people of Qatar had visited No evidence was adduced in
support of this contention. The Rejoinder also made reference to
affidavit testimony of witnesses making the unsupported assertion that
the WawarIslands constituted apart of northern ~atar.~~'
398. TheRuler of Qatar's only claim tohave exercised authorityaver
the Hawar Islandswasby referenceto a farnilyof the Dowasirtribe who
lived at Zellaq, in Bahrain, but "[who] used to frequent Hawar for
fishing purposes".47'This family were allegedly "attacked at [Hawar]
andthey put a complaintbeforemy late father ShaikhQasimwhoheard
their complaintanddecided againstthose whohave attackedthem onthe
ground that the attack took place in his own territ01-f"'~~S ~heikh
Abdullah claimed that there were reliable witnesses to this event who
468
IbtdAnn.279,Vol.5,pp.1 152to 1153.
449
Ibid Ann.279,Vol. 5,p.1154.
470 Ibid, Ann.279, Vo5,pp. 1161toI162.
471 QatarRejoinder(in theformof a letterfromRulerof QtoBritishPolitical
Agent),30March 1939,Ann.279, Vol.5, p. 1157.
472 Ibid.would "give their evidence about the same." No evidence was (or has
sincebeen) produced insupportof this assertion.
399. The most notable feature - then and now - about Qatar'sclairnto
the Hawar Islands is the total absence of anyevidence of any Qatari act
ofadministration there.
400. A full Report dated 22 April 1939, including a record of the
proceedings and an analysis of the evidence, was prepared by the
PoIitical Agent before the decision was handed do~n.~'~His analysis
was assisted bytwo visitsto the Hawar ~slands.~~~
401. The British Political Residentfor the Gulf, Sir Trenchard Fowle,
then fonvardedthe Political Agent's Reportto the British Goverment in
London,commendingit as "a veryclear statement ofthe case 1.75
In London, the Government'sinterna1analysis concluded that,
402.
despite al1the timethat hadpassed sinceQatar'sClaimandthe extensive
exchangeof correspondence:
"The Sheikh of Qatar has been able to produce no evidence
whatsoever in support of his claim. He relies solely on an
assertionof sovereigntyandon geographicalpro~imity."476
403. On 13 June, the British Governent decided in favour of
Bahrain'sclaim to sovereignty overthe Hawar Islands, conditional on
473
WeightmanReport,22 April 1939,at Ann.281, VoI5,p. 1165,
474 See marginalof notes of HughWeightmanB, ritish PoliticalAgent indicating
histwo visits, on QatarRejoinder(in the formlettefrom Rulerof Qatar
to BritishPolitiAgent),30 March 1939,Ann.279,Vol. 5,p. 1152.
475 LetterfromLt.Col.Fowle,BritishPolitical Resident,to Secretaryof Statefor
India,29April 1939Ann. 282, Vol.5,p. 1173.
476
IndiaOffice minute,7June 1939,Ann.283, Vol5,p. 1175.the agreement of the British Governent of ~ndia.~~~ The latter
communicated its agreement on 1 JU~~.~B ~~itain's decision was then
cornmunicatedto the RulerofBahrain andthe Ruler of Qatar on 11 July
by the British Political Resident, Sir Trenchard Fowle, in the following
terms:
"...1 am directed by His Majesty's Governent to inform you
that, after careful considerationof the evidence adduced by Your
Highness and the Shaikh of Qatar, they have decided that these
islands belong to the State of Bahrain and not ta the State of
~atar-''~~~
D. Janan and Hadd Janan islands were included within the
ambitof theBritishadjudication
404. Theremay be a questionas to whether Britain'sdecision included
Janan. The name Jananrefers to two islands, situated between one and
two nautical miles off the southern coastofJazirat Hawar,which merge
into a single island at low tide. Thetwo islands have a combined surface
area of just over 0.1 kmZ and are called Janan and Hadd Janan.
Genexally, however, they are referred to together simply as "Janan."
Sirice the low-water line is relevant for determining the breadth of
Bahrain'sterritorial sea, the islands of Janan and Hadd Janan effectively
constitute only oneisland formaritimedelimitation purposes.
405. There is no reason to exclude Janan ftom the Hawar Islands.
Janan was used by Hawar residents and other Bahraini fishermen.
According to the testimony of one HawarIslander:
477 Lettehm ForeignOffice(London)to IndOffice(London),13June 1939,
Ann.284(a)Vol.5,p. 1176.
478 Letter fiom Deputy Secretroythe Govt. of India to the British Political
Agent,LtCol Fowle,1July 1939.Ann. 286Vol. 5, p1181.
479
LettersfromLt. CoFowIe to RulerofBahrain11July1939Ann.287, Vol.
5,p.1182andRulerof Qatar,11July1939,Ann.288, Vol5,p. 1183. "Apartfrom the main Hawar Island, there were many fish traps
on the other islands. Just north of the island of Janan,there were
many reefs which weredangerous for fishing dhows. A pipe was
therefore built there by the Bahrain Government to lead the
dhows away from the reefs. I remember that a fisherman from
Muharraq once accidentally hit the pipe and broke hisdhow. He
was compensated by the Bahrain Government, by Sheikh
~a1rna1-1."~~~
Another formerresident States:
"Many of the Hawar Islanders also had fish traps on the other
[Hawar]islands. They wouIdsail there to check the traps and put
up makeshift shades. Janan Island and Hadd Janan were
particularlyrich in fish and many Hawar Islandershad fish traps
there, including rny father and Muhanna bin Hazeem from the
South~il~a~e."~~'
SECTION3.4 The Stateof Oatar was created at a vreat distance
from the Hawar Islands and its Rulin? Farnilvhad
never exercised author- there
406. In the unlikely event that the Court were not to consider
Bahrain'ssovereignty over the Hawar Islands to be resjudicata, Bahrain
considers that it cm easily demonstrate that ithas a better claim than
Qatar does.
407. Chapter 2 of this Memorial dealing with Zubarahhas described
at length the distinct historical evolutions of the States of Bahrain and
Qatar. When considering the status of the Hawar Islands over the last
200 years, it isneceçsaryto recall that until almost the last quarterofthe
19th Century virtually the whole of the Qatar peninsula was subject to
4s0 See staternent of Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Harnadal Dosari, para. 26,
Ann.313(a),Vol.6, pp. 1368to 1369.
481
See statement of Salman bin Isa bAhmad bin Saad al Dosari, para. 7,
Ann.3 15(a)Vol. 6p.1393. See also statementsof Ibrahim bin Salmanbin
Ahmed Al Ghattam,para.21, Ann. 316(a),Vol.6, p. 1405, and Nasr bin
Makkibin AlialDosari,para. 16,Ann.314(a),Vol. 6, pp. 1382to 1383.the authority of the Rulers of Bahrain (see Section2.2 starting at
paragraph 104). Thisauthority wasonly affected toa limited degree by
the presence of the Ottomanauthorities.As to the islandsin the Gulf of
Bahrain,theynevercamemder Ottomanmie.
408. The main island of Bahrain, the Zubarah region and the Hawar
Islands fomed a triangle of populated territory under Bahraini
sovereignty, interconnectedby easy passagesover the shallow watersof
the Gulf of Bahrain. The peoples of Bahrain moved unhindered within
this triangle. TheotherpopuIationcentreof the region- Doha Town and
its environs - was on the other side of the Qatar peninsula. The
populations in the main island of Bahrain, the Zubarah region and the
Hawar Islandswere focused on the Gulf of Bahmin.The population of
Doha Town and its environsmade their living on the waters to the
of the Qatar peninsula, where their primary concern was their ofien
difficult relationship with Abu Dhabi wllich competed for fishing and
pearlbanksthere.
409. As will be recalled in Section3.5, Bahrain'ssovereigntyover tbe
Hawar Islands was already established in the first quarter of the 19th
Century. At that time, there was no State of Qatar, nor even any
settlements on the western Coastof the Qatar peninsula opposite the
HawarIslands(seeparagraphs 107 and 117).Not until the establishment
of the oil tom of Dukhan in 1949 was there any significant regular
human habitation ofthe western part of the Qatar peninsulaoutside the
Zubarah region. No tribe on the Qatar peninsula made, or could have
made, a claim to the Islands. Nor didthe Al-Thanichiefs of Doha Town
makeany suchclaim.
410. Bahrain'sauthority over the Qatar peninsula receded gradually
towards the north and Westduring the period of the Ottoman Empire'spartial occupation of the Qatar peninsula (see Sections2.5 to 2.10
starting at paragraph 140). Even so, the occasional authority exercised
by the Ottomans or the Al-Thani in the Qatar peninsula had no impact
on the Hawar Islands. Indeed, there is compelling evidence that the
Ottoman Empirerecognised thatthe Hawar Islands belonged to Bahrain,
most demonstrably he Ottoman Amy surveyof 1878reproduced an the
following pages. In 1909, the Ottoman Empire attempted to annex
Zakhnuniyah Island, an island in the Gulf of Bahrain offthe coast of the
Arabian peninsula that was regularly occupiedby the Bahraini branch of
the Dowasir tribe andwas part of Bahrain (see paragraphs 426-431).
Britain prevented the annexation. The British Political Agent, Captain
F.B. Prideaux, noted that ZakhnuniyahIsland was similar to the Hawar
Islands, in terms of Bahraini sovereignty, andthat Britain had to prevent
the annexation because, othenvise, the Ottomans"will then naturdly be
encouraged to go on to ~awa.....''.~~S~ubsequently, a secret declaration
annexed to the unratified treaty of 1913 between Britain and Turkey
refened to an agreement between the Parties for the Ottoman
Government to pay compensation to the Shaikh of Bahrain for his
renunciation to his rights to ~akhnuni~aht ;his"acknowledgement of
Bahrain's rights in Zakhnuniyahserves also as an acknowledgernent of
Bahrain's rightsin the HawarIslands, which of course were not ceded.
411. The status of the Hawar Islands as part of Bahrain remained
unquestioned until Qatar's claimin 1938.No matter what point of time
one chooses to compare the nature of the authority of Bahrain and of
482 Letter from Capt. Prideaux, British Political Agent, to Maj.Cox, British
PoliticalResident, 20 March1909,Ann.235, Vol.5, p. 1038.
483
Resolutions approved at the meetinof the Ottoman Cabinet Council,
19April 1913,Ann.240A, Vol.5, p. 1063aand Secret Declaration annexed
to Conventiobetweenthe UnitedKingdomand Turkey regardingthe Persian
Gulfandadjacentterritories,29 July 1913,Ann.240B, Vol.1063e.Qatar over the territory of the Qatar peninsula, the Al-Thanifamily or
the State of Qatar was never in a position to sustain a claim that it
controlledinanywaythepeopleorthe territoriesof the HawarIslands.
SECTION3.5 The Ruler of Bahrain's authority over theHawar
Islands durin? the century precedino Britain's
recoynition of Oatar in the 1916 Treaty is well
documented
412. The exerciseby Bahrain of authorityover, and in relation to, the
Hawar Islandsduringthe yearseven before19 16 is wellevidenced.
413. In 1783,the Al-Khalifa -then based in Zubarah - defeated the
Persiangarrisononthe main islandof Bahrainand established dominion
overthe islandsof the Gulfof Bahrain (see paragraphs109to 112). The
authority of the Ruler of Bahrain over the Hawar Islands in particular
was recognised by the inhabitants of the region. Following the Al-
Khalifavictory,a branchof the Dowasirtribe requestedpermission from
the Al-Khalifa to settle in the Hawar Islands andwere granted that
permission by the highest-rankingreligious and legal officia1of the Al-
Khalifafamily,the Qadiof~ubarah.~'~
414. TheDowasirsettledpeacefuIlyin the HawarIslandsaround 1800
under the authority of the Ruler of Bahrain. Like most of the island
inhabitants of Bahrain at that time, they lived by fishing and pearling
fromthe waters oftheshallowGulf of Bahrain.
"'
III 1909, correspondencefrom the British Political Agent to the Political
Residentsubstantiatedthe existenceof this grant and indthatat that
time, evidence thewrittendecisionof the Qadi was still preservedby the
Dowasir. Letter from Capt. Prideaux British Political Agent, to Maj.Cox,
British PoliticalResi4eApril 1909,Ann.236, Vol. 5,p. 1039. This Ietter
isalsoreferredto in the WeightmanReport,22 April 1939,Ann.281, Vol. 5,
p.1168.415. Bahrain'sauthority over the Hawar Islands was confinned in
oficial British records published in the 1820s. A British Indian Navy
officer, Captain George Bmcks, conducted a comprehensive official
survey of the Arabian Gulf between 1821to 18~9.~''In relation to the
Hawar Islands, referred to at that time by Europeans as "Warden's
~slands",@B ~rucksobserved:
"Warden'sIslands is a group of eight or nine islands and rocks
extendingfrom lat. 25-46-25N, long. 50-55Etc~ lat25-33N,long
50-53-20E.The principalis calledAl Howahk,and is about four
miles long. It has two fishing villages on it, and belones to
ah rein." ^E^^ phasisadded.)
416. The thoroughness of Captain Brucks'approach is shom by the
followingextracthom his introduction:
"...Wh&1have done is to try and place the situation, numbers
and manners of the people I have visited, and who are little if at
dl known, in as clear a point of view as my information and
abilitieswouldpermit.
My information has been obtained in the following rnanner: 1
have proposed to the chiefs certain questions relative to the
tribes,and their localiries, of the revenues, trade, &c which 1
have noted, with their replies. This 1have done to sseveralother
persons at different periods,andthentaken such of the substance
i488
as appearedto agree the best ....
417. The political relationship between the Hawar Dowasir and the
Ruler of Bahrainwas aErmed and reinforced in 1845when they were
485
Capt.Bruckç,op.cit.,Ann.7, Vo2,p.92.
486 The islands appeatohave been narned by the ArabianCoast Survey after
FrancisWarden,the First Secretaryto the Govt. of India in the earlyyears of
the nineteenth centuand theauthorof Historical Sketch of the Uttoobee
TribeofArabs (716 to18171.
488 Ibidatp. 105Ann. 7,Vol.2,p. 93.invited by the Ruler of Bahrainto settle onthe main island of ~ahrain?'~
wfiile atthe same time continuing their life on the Hawar Islands. The
Hawar Dowasir accepted the invitation and established two towns -
Budaiya and Zellaq - located on the west Coastof the main island of
~ahrain.~"
418. With the Dowasir's new settlements on the main isiand of
Bahrain, the inter-island exchanges naturally increased. There was
regular traffic between the main island of Bahrain, MuharraqIsland and
the Hawar Islands. Dowasir economic activity centred on gypsum
extraction from Jazirat Hawar, and fishing and pearl diving from the
shallow waters of the Gulf of Bahrain. Dowasir dhows made the easy
crossing to the main island of Bahrain - 11nautical miles away - taking
fish and gypsum fkom the Hawar Islands to the nearby markets in
Manama and Muharraq and returning with goods and supplies,
particularly fresh water. Thepattern of commercialactivity ofthe Hawar
Islanders thus established was to continue until the discovery of oil in
theregion.
419. Many of the Dowasir who lived on the main island of Bahrain
spent five months of the year there during the pearling season and the
remainder of the year on the Hawar Islands. Although the presence of
some Hawar Islanders was seasonal, the settlement was nevertheless
permanent (see paragraphs 458 to 465). The ruins of old mosques and
the six cemeteries on the Hawar Islands, one a children's cemetery,
dernonstrate the stability of the community there (see paragraphs 463 to
464).
489
LorimerVol. Ilop. cip.,391,Ann.74, Vol.3, p. 378.
490
Ibid. These communitiesare still thrivitoday.It is possibltolocate
thousandsof descendantsoftheseoriginalDowasir still livingin Bahrain.420. There was no contact between the Hawar Islanders and the
inhabited locations on the eastern side of the Qatar peninsula. The
settlements around what eventually became Doha - 150 kilometres'
sailing around the peninsula, or80 kilometres across a hostile desert -
had much less to offer than the markets in Manama and Muharraq,
which were major trading centresfor the Gulf of Arabia. There is no
evidence that the Hawar people made any effort to cultivate contacts
with the faside of the peninsula. In any event, the few hundred people
in Doha and Wakrah were not potential suppliersor customers for the
Hawar Islanders. Rather, theywere potential cornpetitorsin fishing and
pearling.
421. In 1871, the Ottoman Empireannexed Doha and its environs.
This changed the political configuration of the Qatar peninsula and
undemined the position of the Ruler of Bahrain as the sovereignpower
in the east ofthe peninsula (see paragraphs 156to 158 and Section2.9,
starting atparagraph 195). However, at no time in the course of the
Ottoman petiod did the Ottomans or the AI-Thani chiefs of Doha ever
interest themselves in the Hawar Islands or seek to exercise authority
over the Bahraini subjectsthere. The patterns ofintercoursebetween the
populations of the main island of Bahrain and the Hawar Islands
continued uninterrupted.
422. Lorimer'sGazetteerreferred to Jazirat Hawar and the Dowasir
occupationofit as follows:
"[Jazirat Hawar is about] 10 miles long, north and south, and
roughlyparalleito the Qatar Coast.Thereare nowells but there is
a cistern to hold rainwater built by the Dawasir of ZeIlaa in
Bahrain who bave houses at two places on the island and use them in winteras shooting boxes.Fishennen also frequentHawar
....49(Emphasisadded.)
423. Lorimer'sGazetteerincludedthe Hawar Islandsunderthe section
entitled "Placesand features of the Coast - West side of Qatar". Qatar
has sought to rely on this geographicalnotation as somehow reflecting
an understanding of sovereignty over the Hawar ~slands.~~~ Such
reliance is unjustifed. Bahrain does not dispute the fact that the Hawar
Islands are features that are located near the "West side of Qatar," but
that factdoesnot create sovereignty.
424. On 4 April 1909,the British Political Agentwrote a letter to his
superior, in whichhe describeda recent trip he had taken to Hawar. On
the island, CaptainPrideauxhad observed "two similarwinter villages"
and in onelocality:
"a collection of 40 large huts under the authority of a cousin of
the tribal principal Shaikh. This individual is ...related by
rnarriageto ShaikhIsabin Ali [theRuler of ~cthrain]."~~~
In the sarne letter, Prideaux also referred to the original grant to the
Dowasir by the Kazi [Qadi]of Zubarahwhom he correctly describedas
"anofficialof the ~l-~halifah"~~~ (seeparagraph413).
425. The authority and sovereigntyof the Ruler of Bahrain overthe
Hawar Islands was recognised by the Ottoman Empire. During the
Ottoman Empire's occupation of the southern part of the Qatar
49' Lorimer,Vol.IIop. cit,,p. 1513,Ann.74, Vol. 3,p. 399.
492 State of Qatar Reply (Questions of Jurisdiction and Adrnissibility)
28 September1992paragraph2.09 at.p. 9.
493
Letter from Capt. Prideaux, British PoliticalAgent, to Cox, British
Politicalsident,4 April 1909,Ann.236, Vol.4, p1041 to 1042.
494
Ibid,Ann.236, Vol.4,p. 1042.peninsula, neither the Ottomans nor the Al-Thani chiefs of Doha were
involved in any way with the Hawar IsIands. Indeed, an Ottoman
political survey map drafted by Captain Izzet of the Imperia1Army of
the Ottoman Empire in 1878, shows the Hawar Islands to be part of
Bahrain (see map afterpage 6).
426. Bahrain's sovereignty over the Hawar Islands was implicitly
confimed in 1909 by bath Britain and the Ottoman Empire in
comection with the Zakhnuniyah incident referred to above (see
paragraph 410). Zakhnuniyah Island was regularly occupied on a
seasonal basis by members of the Bahraini ~owasir.4'~ The British
Political Agent observed that they used it as a fishing base.496The
Dowasir, "Bahrainsubjects, were living in two or three temporaryhuts
at the southern extremity of the island and were engaged in fïshing for
sharks, swordfish etc ..."?97He also observed a dilapidated fort on the
west side of the island built, according to the Ruler of Bahrain, by his
father, Sheikh Ali. In 1909, troops of the Ottoman Empire landed on
Zakhnuniyah and declared that it had been annexed by the Ottoman
Empire. A report dated 20 March 1909, f?omthe British Political Agent
to the Political Resident notes: "...Mudir fiom Ojairhad recently been
over [toZakhnuniyah]andhad fixed aflagstaffon the ruined 'fort' on the
island claiming it as Turkish teri-it~r~."~~W~hen the Ruler of Bahrain
was informed by the Dowasir of this Ottoman interference, he
495 Letterfiom Capt. Prideaux, British Political Agent, to Cax, British
PoliticalResiden4 Apri1909,Ann. 236,Vol.4, p. 1041.
496 Ibid.
497 Ibid.
498
Letter from Capt.Prideaux, BritiPoliticalAgent, to Maj. Cox, British
PoliticalResident,20 March 1909,Ann.235, Vol.4, p. 1034.protested.499Britainalsoprotested tothe OttomanEmpire,relyingon the
Ruler of Bahrain's sovereignty over Zakhnuniyah by virtue of the
islandsfregularseasonaluse by the Dowasirof ~ahrain.'~~
427. Bahrainand Britain were concernedthat, if the Ottoman attempt
to annex ZakhnuniyahIsland was successhl, then the Ottomans might
be ternptedto make asirnilarclaimto the Hawar~slands.~~T 'his concern ., ,
flowed from the substantial similarities between the character of the
Ruler of Bahrain's authority over the Hawar Islands and over
SakhnuniyahIsland.As CaptainPrideaux observedinhis report:
"The facts are that Dowasir of Budaiya and Zellaq on the north
west coast of Bahrain are in the habit of every winter partially
migratingto Zakhnuniyahand Hawar Islands for fishing (sharks
as wellas ediblefish)andhawking ....
The Mudir [anofficial of the Ottoman Empire] the other day,
told the Dowasir whom he found [on Zakhnuniyah] that they
should recognise thernselves as Turkish subjects and he only
asked them to haul up and lower the [Ottoman] flag each day.
Theyrepliedthat they could onlv followtheir ownheadmanwho
resided in Bahrainand resolutelydeclinedto have anythingto do
withthe [Ottoman]flag...
1 stronnlydeprecatelettine the Turks keeu Zakhnuniyahas they
wiIl then nahirally be encouraeed to go on to Hawar ....02
(Emphasisadded.)
428. The Ottoman troops were soon withdrawn. The British
AdministrationReport forBahrain for 1909records:
499 Letter from Capt. Prideaux, British Political Agent, to Cox, British
Politicalreside4tApril 1909,Ann. 236, Vol.4, 1042.
500 Administration Report for Bahrain for the year 1909, Ann.237, Vol. 4,
p. 1044.
501 Letter ftom Capt Prideaux, British Political Agento Maj.Cox, British
PoliticalResiden20 March 1909,Ann.235, Vol. 4, pp. 1037to 1038.
'O2
Ibid,Ann.235, Vol. 4, pp. 1037to 1038. "Representationas regards thesoldiersandthe f lgwere made to
the Porte andthe troopswerewithdra~n."'~~
429. In 1911,the British Administrative Reportsfor the Persian Gulf
states:
"Accordingto al1reports received,no Turkish garrison has been
stationed on the island duringthe year. The Dosoris Il)owasit]
there at the end of the year were on occasions hoisting Shaikh
Isa's flag [the flag of Bahrain]..othenuise no flag was being
flo~n."~O~
430. Subsequently,by a secret declaration annexed to the unratified
1913 Treaty between Britain and Turkey, the British Govemment took
note of the decision of the Ottoman Government to pay £1000 to the
Shaikh of Bahrainby way of compensationfor the renunciationby him
of al1claim to the Island of ~akhnuni~ah.~~I f Captain Prideauxwas
right in believingthat legally Zakhnuniyahand the HawarIslands were
in a similar position, this acknowledgement by Turkey of Bahrain's
rights in Zakhnuniyah Island (no less a fact becauste he declaration
never entered into force) also serves as an acknowledgement of
Bahrain'srights overthe HawarIslands.
43 1. A number of conclusionsmay be drawn from the Zakhnuniyah
incident. First, the Bahrain Dowasir, who also include the Hawar
Islanders, clearly recognised the authority of the Ruler of Bahrain.
Second, they reported foreign interference to the Ruler of Bahrain.
'O3 AdmjniStratiOn Ann. 237, Vol.4,
p. 1044.
'O4 Administration Re~ort for BahminPolitical Agency for the ye1911,
Ann.240, Vol.4, p. 1054.
'O5 See Resoiutionsapprovedat the meetingof the OMomanCabinetCouncil,
19April 1913,Ann. 240A, Vol.5, p. 1063a and Secret Declarationannexed
to convention betweenthe UnitedKingdomand Turkeyregardthe Persian
Gulfand adjacentterritories,29July1913,Ann.240B,V15,p. 1063e.Third, the Ruler of Bahrain protested against foreign interventionthere.
Fourth, Britain acknowIedgedthe allegiance of the Bahrain Dowasir to
the Ruler of Bahrain. Fifih, Britain acknowledged that that relationship
supported Bahrain's territorial sovereignty in relation to Zakhnuniyah
and the HawasIslands. Sixth,the Ottoman Empire had made no attempt
ta extend theirchallengeto the Ruler of Bahrain'sauthority inthe Hawar
Islands.
432, ln 1873, the Ruler of Bahrain was staying on the Hawar Islands
when some passing Ottoman soldiers were shipwrecked there.jo6The
Ruler caused the soldiers to be transferred to the mainisland of Bahrain
and frornthere onwardto their intendeddestinati~n.~'~
433. Even before the First World War, Bahrain rnanifested its
authority over the Hawar Islandsthrough the decisions of its courts. The
cases related to land rights and fishing traps in the Islands.
434. One of these cases was decidedin 1909by the Qadi of the Sharia
Court inBahrain.
"Be itknown that Ahmadbin ShahinDosari and Bati bin Salman
and Jabr bin Muhanna and Hamad bin Saeed have appeared
before me and disputed the ownership of land and sea properties
in Hawar. Ahmad bin Shahin claimed these b be his property
inherited from fathers and forefathers; Jabr and Bati claimed
them tobe their properties andthat they held document..."508
506 BahrainCounter-clairn{inthe form of a letter EromAdviserto the Govt. of
Bahrain to British Political Agent), 22 December 1938, Ann.2Vol.5,
p. 1134. See also Weightman Repart,22 April 1939, Ann.281, Vol.5,
p. 1171.
'O7
Bahrain Counter-clairn(in the form of a letter from Adviser to the Govt. of
Bahrain to British Political Agent), 22 December 1938, Ann.274, 5,l.
p. 1134.
508 Judgement made by Sharaf bin Ahmad,the Qadi of the Sharia Court,
1327Hejrah(1909 )nn.238, Vol.5, p. 1049.In 1938 and 1939,the Ruler of Qatar alleged that the fishermen who
used the Hawar Islands were itinerant and rnerely used the islands as a
temporary base.'" The evidence, however, is ovenvhelmingly to the
contrary. There istestimony of Bahraini who lived in the HawarIslands
to the effect that the Bahrain Dowasir settlements were permanent."8
Thexeis physical evidence of permanent dwellings and other buildings
on the islands (see paragraphs 458 to 465). There is documentation
relating to acts of administration by Bahrain in relation to the settled
population (see paragraphs 446 to 447, 455 to 457 and 466 to 467). In
answer to Qatar's descriptionof the inhabitants of the HawarIslands as
itinerantfisherman,Bahrain'sCounter-claim stated:
"[Tlhe fishermen who are referred to [by Qatar] are some of the
inhabitants of Hawar who live in the islands and who go fishing
fi-omtheir home [on the Hawar Islands] bringing back their fish
to Hawar or sometimes sending it to Manamafor
Hugh Weighîman noted at the tirne, those affidavits simply make the
unsupportedstatement that "Hawar Islandisa part of northem (sic) Qatar and
was never subjectto Bahrain".They were signed on behalf ofal1deponents
"in one handwriting, unsupportedby thumb impressions or seals of the
alleged signatories.Nor is any descriptionof the alleged signatories given,of
their placeof residenceor ofthe reason fortheirhavingecialknowledgeof
the Hawar Islands.There is no suggestion that they are residents, whether
temporary orpermanent ofHawar ...- see WeightmanReport,22 April 1939,
Ann.288, Vol. 5, p.1166.
517
QatarClaim(in the formoftwo lettersfrom Rulerof Qatarto British Political
Agent, 10 May and 27 May 1938),10 May 1938, Ann.256, Vol. 5, p. 1094
and 27 May 1938,Ann.260, Vol. 5, p. 1103. QatarRejoinder(inthe form of
a letter from the Ruler of Qatarto British Political Agent), 30 M1939,
Ann.279, Vol.5,pp. 1148to 1149.
See staternentsof Hamoudbin Muhanna bin Hamad al Dosari, Ann. 313(a),
Vol. 5, p. 1363, Nasr bin Makki bin Ali al Dosari, Ann.314(a), Vol.6,
p. 1379, Ibrahim bin Salman bin Ahmed al Ghattam,Ann.316(a),Vol.6,
p.1400,and SalmanIsa bin Ahmad bin Saad al Dosari,Ann.315(a), Vol.6,
p. 1392.
Bahrain Counter-clairn(in theform of a letter from Adviserto the Govt. of
Bahrain to British Political Agent), 22 December 193g, Ann.274, Vol.6,
p. 1130.441. When the British Political Agent, Hugh Weightman, visited the
Hawar Islands in April 1939, it was not during the fishing season.
Nevertheless, he noted the presence of what he referred to as
"fishermen"- the permanentinhabitantsofthe Hawar ~slands.~~~
442. The testimony of former inhabitants of the Hawar Islands, now
living elsewhere in Babain, is uniform in its description of the fishing
activitiesaspart of theregular pattern of life of the Islanders: they would
tend their fish traps and use their nets in the shallow waters of the Gulf
of ~ahrain.'~' A Dowasir man who grew up on Hawar in the 1920s
recently recalled the central role of fishing in the Hawar Island
community :
"1earned my livelihood fiom the sea. During the winter we
would fish using fish trapsandnets. If the weather wasgood, fish
traders would corne from Muharraq and the main island of
Bahrain to buy the fresh fish. The traders wodd buy it straight
off the pier, fil1 up their boats and take it back to sell in
Muharraq. They would often bring provisions which we could
no1get inHawarsuchas lemons,coffee andrice which wewould
trade forour fish. If the weather was bad, everyone -the men, the
women, the servants, the children - would clean the fish and
when it had dried we would store it in straw sacks that had been
used previously for dates. Everyone used to help each other.
Then we would take it and sell it in Muharraq for one or two
mpees."522
520 Weightman Report2,2 April1939,Ann.281, Vol.5,p.1170.
521 See statementçof Hamoudbin Muhannabin Hamad al Dosari,Ann.313(a),
Vol. 6, p. 1366, Nasr bin Makki bin Ali al Dosari, Ann.314(a), Vol. 6,
p. 1382,andIbrahimbin Salman bin Ahmed alGhattam, Ann.316(a) , ol.6,
p. 1405 and SaimanIsa bin Ahmad bin Saad al DosariAnn.315(aj, Vol. 6,
p. 1393.
522 See statementof Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Hamad al Dosari, para. 18,
Ann. 313(a),Vol. 6, p1366. See alsoStatemen ofIbrahim bin Salmanbin
Ahmed AlGhattam, paras.12and 21, Ann.3l6(a), Vol. pp. 1403to1405.446. The Govemmentof Bahrainregulatedthe pearling industryin the
Hawar Islands in the same way as it did in other parts of Bahrain. The
Government of Bahraindistributeddiving books to the pearl divers and
log books to the pearl boat captains of the Hawar Islands and regulated
them throughout the pearling sea~on.~~O ~ne former Hawar Islander
recentlyrecalled:
"Everydiverhad a logbookandthe logbooks were issuedby the
Bahrain Government.The log book kept a record of the diver's
narne, credits, debits and possessions. When the time came for
diving, we submitted our log books and afier we retumed they
checked outhow much we owed or were owed. If there were no
debts, thediver was givena release and was fiee to stay with the
Captainor to goto workforsomebodyelse."531
Another former resident of the Hawar Islands, currently living in the
main island of Bahrain, recalled the formalities required by the
Government of Bahrainin relationto the pearlingboats in the following
terms:
"The boats used by the Hawar Islanders were registered in
Bahrain. The registration books were called 'passes'.They were
issued by Saad bin Samra, a Bahrain Government official, who
would charge 100rupeeper dhow.No dhowcould leave Bahrain
forthepearlingbankswithouta pa~s."53~
447. The British Political Agentconfinned in 1939 that the pearling
boats moored on the islands were registered by the Government of
530 Bahrain Counter-clairn(in theofoaletterfromCharles Belgrave,Adviser
to theGovt. of Bahrain to Hugh Weightman,British Political Agent),
22 December1938,Ann.274,Vol. 5,p.1133.
53'
See çtaternent of Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Hamad al Dosari, para. 21,
Ann.313(a),Vol.6, p. 1367.
532 See staternenof lbrahim bin Salrnan bin AhrneAl Ghattarn,para.23,
Ann. 316(a),Vol.6, pp. 14051406.
533 WeightmanReport,22April1939,Ann.281, Vol. 5,pp. 1169to1170.C. Animalhusbandry
448. The Hawar Islanders grazed their flocks on Jazirat ~awarj~~and
kept a wide variety of animals. Oneof them recounted:
"We also kept cattle, sheep, goats, cows anddonkeys. The cattle
wandered the island without any shepherds. They would eat the
vegetation and corne back to the village by themselves. There
was good pasture in the winter,better than in the main island of
Bahrain." 535
449. Thisvariety enabledthe Ham Islanders to be self-sufficient in a
number of important stapies, such as meat,cheese and milk.536Animais
were generally cared for by the women while the men were responsible
forthe fishtra~s.53~
450. In 1939, the British PoliticalAgent noted:
"After good rain the island provides better pasturage than
Bahrain itself and even this year, when the rain was very late,
there are still to-daybetween 50 and 100animals in ~awar."'~~
451. In order to maximisethe pasture area in some parts of Jmirat
Hawar,the Hawarlslanders built dams,539thereby creating basins that
534 See statement of Harnoud bin Muhanna bin Harnad al Dosari, para. 17,
Ann.3 13(a)Vol.6,p. 1366.
535
See statement of Ibrahim bjn Salrnan bin Ahmed Al Ghattarn, para.13,
Ann. 313(a),Vol.6,p. 1403.
536 See statement of Wasrbin Makki bin Ali al Dosari, para. 12, Ann. 314(a),
Vol.6,p. 1382.
537
Ibid,para.18, Ann314(a),Vol. 6,p. 1383.
53g Weightman Repon, 22 April 1939, Ann.281, Vol.5, p. 1169. The Bahrain
Counter-clairninthe formof a Ietterfrom Adviserto theGovt. of Bahrainto
BritisholiticalAgent),22 December1938, alsornakesa generalreferenceto
the presenceof "cattle,sheep and dwkeys" on the HawarIslands, Ann.274,
Vol.5, p. 1130.
539
See Report of Dr. Paolo Costa on the Archaeological Investigation on the
HawarIslands, 17 January 1995("CostaReport"),Ann.310, Vol.6, p. 1338,
1340,1342improved the grass yield of certaingrazing grounds.540Dr. Paolo Costa,
Professor of Oriental Archaeology at the University of Bologna,
undertook several field studiesin the HawarIslands in 1994-1995.In his
report dated 17 January 1995, Dr. Costa suggested that the improved
yield fromthis practise wouIdhave enabled the high-growing grass to be
hand cut and storedas dry fodder for the mimals-541
452. In 1939, the British Poiitical Agent recorded that the Hawar
Islanders occasionally sent their livestock across to the main island of
Bahrain during water shortagesonthe Hawar~slands.~~~
453. Anirnals are still grazed on Jazirat Hawar today as part of
Bahrain's cornmitment to reintroduce native Arabian wildlife into its
territories.543
454. The Hawar Islands possess large quantities of high-quality
gypsum, which is used in construction.544 Gypsum extraction
traditionally provided the Hawar Islanders with one of their sources of
liveIihood.54jHawar gypsum was quarried throughout the 19thand 20th
Centuries and used as building material for construction on both the
540 See Report of Dr. Paolo Costa on the Archaeologiinvestigatioon the
HawarIslands, 17January 1995("CostaReport"),Ann.310,Vol.6, p. 1342.
541 Ibid.
542 WeightmanReport,Ann.281, Vol.5,p. 1169.
543 See starernent of Harnoubin Muhanna bin Hamad al Dosari, para. 28,
Ann.3I3(a), Vol.6, p. 1369.
544
SeeCostaReport,atpp. 16to 17,Ann.310, vol. 6, pp. 1to1350.
545
Ibid para. 22. See alço staternoftIbrahim binSalrnan bin AhmedAI
Ghattam,para.14,Ann.316(a),Vol. 6, p. 1403 and Statementof Salmanbin
Isa bin Ahmad bin Saad al Dosari,para. 8, Ann.315(a), Vol.6, pp. 1393 to
1394.Hawar Islands themselves and on the main island of Bahrain and
Muharraq 1s1and.~~ ~r. Costa'sreport concludedthat there were three
gypsum extraction sitesonthemain island.He observed:
"Of the three, the two smaller quarries of about 2 hectares are
located close to areas where there are buildings which required
plastering: the gypsum was therefore quarried mainly for local
use: the third quany, on the contrary,is very large in size (over
10 hectares)and lies far fiom local Settlements.It seems clear
that the exploitation of this quarry does not depend upon local
demand and that the gypsum was extracted to be used
elsewhere. "547
455. Gypsum quarrying in the Hawar Islands increased during the
period between 1916 and 1939. So did the Govenunent of Babain's
regulation of the ind~str~?~'at the request of the inhabitants of the
Hawar Apparently, the islanders felt that the incxeased
quarryingwas too close to their villages and was disturbing their
families. Former residentsof the Hawar Islands recall the disputes and
the intervention of the Gsvemment of Bahrain at their request. One
formerHawarIsland residentrecentlyrecalledtheproblem:
"1 remember that the older Dowasir complained that there was
too muchgypsumcuttingnearthe homesandthewomen."550
The Islanders werealso concernedthat the quarryingwouId deplete the
gypsum resourcetoo quickly.After severaldisputes,the Governrnentof
546 SeeCostaReport,ap. 17,Ann.310,Vol.6,pp. 1348to1349.
547 Ibidatpp.16to 17Ann.3 10,Vol.6,p. 1348to 1349.
548
See staternent of Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Hamad al Dosari, para. 23,
Ann.313(a),Vol.6, p. 1368.Bahrain imposed the requirement that gypsum quarxyingon the Hawar
Islandscould be carried outonlyunder the authority of alicence.551
456. The licensing scheme was regulated by officials of the
Govemment of Bahrai~1.5O 5ne former Hawar Islander now residing in
the main island of Bahrain recalled:
"...the BahrainGovernmentregulated the cutting by requiringthe
cuttersto carry pemits. The permits were issued by the Bahrain
Chief of Police, SheikhKhalifa bin Mohammed. He used to stay
on the main Halvar Island in the police fort and meet the
Dowasir. He issued the permits after there had been several
quarrels. Only people who had a permitwere allowed to cut the
gypsum.
457. Officials of the Govemment of Bahrain documented the
regulation of the gypsum industry on the Hawar Islands. The Annual
Reportof the Government of Bahrain for the year 1356 Hajirah (March
1937 to February 19381,before any claim was raised by Qatar to the
HawarIslands, noted that gypsum554 was brought fiom Jazirat Hawar to
the main island of Bahrain and MuharraqIsland for construction there
by boats which used to wwork as ferries before the construction of the
Manama-Muharraqcauseway :
"smdl sailing boats [basedon the main island of Bahrainand on
MuharraqIsland] ...bxingbuildingstonefromthe reefs out at sea
and [gypsurn]from~awar."''~
551 WeightmanReport,22 April1939,Ann.281,Vol.5, p. 1169.
552
See statementof Nasrbin MakkibinAli al Dosari,1.9"Wewouldcheck
that the gypsumcutterwho used to come fiom the main island of Bahrain
had a valid permit issued by the Govt. of Bahrain."314(a),Vol.6,
pp. 138to1384.
553 See statement of Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Hamadal Dosari, para. 23,
Ann.313(a),Vol. 6, p. 1368.
554 Alsoreferredto as"juçs"
jS5 5
m, Ann.253, Vol.5,p. 1086.ln his note on the Hawar lslands of 29 May 1938,the Adviser to the
Governmentof Bahrainreferredto the rich sourceof gypsurn,good sand
and a particular type of pebble on the Hawar ~slands.~~~ ~he
Government of Bahrain'slicensing system for the Hawar Islands was
also recorded in a 1939 report from the British Political Agent to the
Political~esident.~'~The Government of Bahrain'sAdviserrecorded on
severaloccasions the existenceof the licensing~~stern.~~'
E. Additional evidence of the eermanent nature of the
settlement
458. A letter from Petroleum Concessions Limited, the Qatar oil
concession holder, recorded in February 1938 that there were "300
Bahrainis" in the Hawar ~slands.~~T ~he same letter also noted that
Babrain Police were stationed there.560Bahrain'sCounter-daim in the
course of the British adjudicationlater that year describedthe Bahraini
settlementin theHawar Islandsashaving:
"a long estabIished settled community of Arabs living in
permanent stonehouses with their wives and families and their
cattle, sheep and donkeys...The villages of Hawar consist of
stone houses, permanent buildings not palm huts, built by
Bahrain subjects. There are also inthe various islands ancient
stone cisterns constructed by the ancestors of the present
inhabitantswho were permitted to buildthem by the Shaikhs of
Bahraitinin the past. The inhabitants of Hawar reside there
556 Note by CharlesBelgrave,Adviserto Gom.of Bahrain, entitled "TheHawar
Islands",29 May 1938. Ann.261Vol.5,p. 1106.
557
WeightmanReport,22 April 1939,Ann.281, Vol. 5, p.69.
558
Note by Charles Belgrave, Advisetothe Govt. of Bahrain, entitled "The
Hawar Islands",29 May 1938,Ann.261, Vol. 5, p. 1109.
559 LetterfromE.V.Packer,Managerof PCL,to CharlesBelgrave,Adviçerthe
Govt.of Bahrain, 19February1938,An252, Vol.5,p. 1080. permanently keeping their goods and chattels in their houses and
their boats, when notin use, on the shoreofthe i~lands."~~~
459. In April 1939, the British Political Agent visited the Hawar
Islands ona fact-finding mission and found:
"two villages in the main Hawar Island. These are quite small
villages, occupiedby about 35 and20 families re~~ectivel~."~~~
He observedthat the familiesinhabitingtheHawar Islands lived:
"...in houses of the type known as 'kubara',i.e. buih of mfaced
stone and held together with mud and roofed with date palm.
These are definitely more permanent constructions than
fishermen's'barasties'(palm huts) and some at least of them are
occupied throwhout the (Emphasis added.j
As one formerresident recalled,the houses "were sirnpiybuilt out of the
local gypsumro~k."56~
460. In his fact-finding mission in April 1939, the British Political
Agent observed stone cisterns used for storing water by the Hawar
Islanders andalso:
"two quite considerable cemeteries in the island ...[indicating
that] the main island of Hawar has been inhabited for
generations."565 (Emphasisadded.)
He continued:
561
BahrainCounter-daim (inthe fom of a lefrom CharlesBelgrave,Adviser
to the Govt. of Bahrain, to Hugh Weightman, British Political Agent),
22December 1938,Ann.274, VoI.5,pp. 1129to 1134.
562 WeightmanReport,22 April 1939,Ann. 281, Vol.5,p. 1168.
563 IbidA,nn.281, Vol. 5,pp. 1168t169.
s64 See statement of Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Hamad al Dosari, para. 7,
Ann.313(a), Vol. p.1364.
WeightmanReport,22 April1939,Ann. 281,Vol. 5, 1168. "1 am not able to statedefinitely that these Dawasir have for the
past 150years occupiedHawarat al1seasons of the year, though
those now in residence there claimthat this is so. On theother
hand the cemeteries,the water cisterns, theruins of the old fort
which 1havemyself seenandthe type of house in use al1provide
evidence of consistent occupationfor at least the greater part of
the yea~-."'~~
461. Thereport alsodealswith the problemsof water shortageson the
HawarIslands andthemeasuresadoptedby the inhabitants:
"Hawar suffers from the absence of a permanent water supply,
sincethe cistems ...are only fil1 after heavy rain and are subject
to Ioss both fiom evaporationand from Ieakage. There was, for
instance,heavyrain in Hawara month ago, fillingthe cisternsto
the brim, butthe localpeople informedme that this water would
be exhaustedwithin threemonths. Watertherefore, during much
of the year, has to be brought across fiom Bahrain and this
naturally restricts the nurnber of persons remaining there
it567
permanently ....
462. Recent archaeoiogicalresearch has uncoveredthe existence of a
total of six cemeterieson the main idar~d.~~A ~ former Hawar Islander
recalled the burial of his uncle in the North Village on the main Hawar
Island,followinghis deathat sea:
"1 remember many people who died and were buried in the
cemetery in the North Village. 1 recall once, when 1 was very
young, we were sailingf?omBahrain tothe mainHawarIslandat
night. One of my uncles, Mohammed bin Rashid, had not been
well and was taken very sick. He died in the dhow before we
couIdreach land. We thought about taking his body back to the
main Bahrain Island, but decided to continue on to the Hawar
Islands as hebelonged equallyto the main islandof Bahrain and
Hawar. WereachedHawar in the middle ofthe morning and we
then prepared and buried him in the North Village cemetery
/ ' - --
i/p ..12%i u'
568
SeeCosta Report, 17January 1995, Ann310,Vol. 6, p. 1337 (referringto
three cemeteries in the Northem Area) and the sketch mat p. 1332
(indicatingthreecemeteriesinthe Southernatnos.18,22 and26). where my granàmother (who was the sister of Ahmed bin
Shaheen, the elder of Hawar) and her sister, Lulwa, had
previously been buried. Our neighbours in the North Village,
Hassan bin Thamer, Ali Bum Jaid and the late Saba are also
buried there."569
463. The existence of the children'sgraveyard in the southem half of
the main island, containing the graves of about forty infants, provides
compelling and poignant evidence of the existence of stable and
permanentfamily units on the HawarIslands.Itinerant fishemen would
not have travelled with their families and would not have buried their
deadfarfkomtheir permanenthomeon an uninhabited island frequented
by them only for shelterduringfishingexpeditions.
464. The permanence of the occupation was also reflected by the
existence of mosqueson JaziratHawar.The mosquestill standingin the
North Village is of comparativelyrecent construction.It was built by the
Bahrain Govemment in 1939.'~'It repiaced an older mosque that had
been constructedfromgypsum,whichhadco~la~sed.~~~
465. Dr.Costa'sreportconcluded,on this point:
"...cannot refrain from expressing the belief that what results
(fromthe data we have collectedduring fieId work) is definitely
the picture of settled people and not wandering fishermen or
occasionalvisitors."57*
569
See staternent of Ibrahim bin Salman bin Ahrneal Ghattarn, para. 7,
Ann. 316(a), Vol.6, p. 1401.moud bin Muhanna al Dosari also recalIs
people buriedin the South ViIlagecemete-ysee his statement, para. 13,
Ann.313(a),Vol.6,p.1365.
570 ExpenditureSummaryforthe Govt. OFBahrainfor 1358H (1939), Ann. 293,
Vol.5,p. 1200.
571 See statement of Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Hamad al Dosari, para. 9,
Ann. 313(a)Vol.6, p. 1364.F. Other acts of administration or examples of the authority of
Bahrain
466. The Govemment of Bahrain's Adviser, Charles Belgrave,
recorded in 1938that the previous Ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Jsa, who
died in 1932, used to make annual visits to the Hawar ~slands.~''
Belgrave also confirmedthe routine administrative functions exercised
by t!~eGovement of Bahrain in respect of the Hawar Islands and the
activitieofthe inhabitants:
"Theirboats are registeredin Bahrain and sail under the Bahrain
flag, when they travel they travel under Bahrainpassports, their
boats areregisteredinBahrainandthey payboat registrationfees
and diving licenses ..Those of them who are divers hoid diving
bookswhich are issuedby the Bahrain ~uvemment."~~~
467. The Govemment of Bahrain regulated immigration into the
Hawar Islands. Evidence of this is the Govemment'sstrict control of
access by Qataris and other "foreigners" into the islands folloming
Qatar's 1937 med attack on Zubarah (see Section 2.13 starting at
paragraph253).ThiswasbeforeQatar hadmade anyclaim to the Hawar
Islands. On 10 November 1937,the Goverment of Bahxaininstructed
its Head Natur (Police Officer) stationed on the Hawar Islands as
follows:
"Onno account are any people, European or Arab, fiom Qattar
Coastto be allowedon anyofthe HawarIslands. You are warned
that there are people working opposite Hawar on shore and
573 Note by CharlesBelgrave, Adviser to the Govt. of Bahrain entitled "The
HawarIslands",29 May 1938,Ann.261, Vol5,p. 1107.
s74
BahrainCounter-clah (inthe formof a letterfromChartesBelgrAdviser
to the Govt. of Bahrain, to Hugh Weightman British PoliticAgent),
22 December1938,Ann.274,Vol. 5,pp. 1132to 1133.paragraphs 370 et seq.).Both Parties participated in the adjudicationand
were given as much opportunity to make submissions and adduce
evidence as they asked for. Upon receipt of Bahrain'sCounter-claim, the
Ruler of Qatar insisted he be given the right to reply. The British
Political Resident had throught this inappropriate, but was overruled by
the British Secretary of State for ~ndia.~'~ Qatar was thus allowed to
lodge a Rejoinder, following which the Ruler of Qatar expressed his
satisfaction inthese terms:
",..1 have explained rny cûmments and remarks to Your
Excellency as fully as is required by the circumstances of this
case,...1654
548. A full Report, including a record of the proceedings and an
analysisof the evidence, was prepared by the Political Agent before the
decision was handed d0wr-1.~~ H~is analysis was infomed by two site
visits to the Hawar ~slands.~~ T~he fact that the comprehensive Report
was prepared before the decision is significant;the Report cmot be
1suggest that in reply to the present communicationfrom
Shaikh Abdullahbin Qasim1should write and informhim
that thoughthe BahrainGovernment possessa prima facie
claim to the Hawar group of islands which is supported by
their formal occupation of them for some time past,His
Majesiy's Govemment would be prepared to give
considerationo a formal claim by him provided suca
claim were supportedby a full and complete statementof
the evidence on which he relied in asserting Qatar
sovereigntyover this group of islands."(Emphasis added.)
(Ann.257, Vol. 5,p. 1096.)
653 Leüer fiom the Secretaryof Statefor India, to BritishPoliticalResident,of 21
July 1938,Ann.269,Vol. 5, p. 1124.
654
QatarRejoinder(in the formof a letter fiomRuler of Qatarto British Political
Agent),30 Mach 1939,Ann. 279, Vof.5,p. 1160.
655
WeightmanReport,Ann.281,Vol. 5,pp. 1165 to 1172.
656 See marginal notes indicating hitwo visits, Hu& Weightman, British
Political Agenton Qatar Rejoinder(in theof a letter fiom Ruler of Qatar
to BritishliticalAgent),30March 1939,Ann. 279,Vol.5,p.1152.criticised as apost facto attempt to rnarshal evidence and principles to
justify an arbitrarydecision.
549. The British PoliticalResidentfor the Gulf, Sir TrenchardFowle,
then fonvardedthe Political Agent'sReport to the BritishGovemment in
tt657
London,comrnendingit as "avery clearstaternentofthe case .
550. In London, the Governmentts interna1analysis (7 June 1939)
concluded that,despiteal1 thetimeand exchangeof correspondence:
"The Sheikh of Qatar has been able to produce no evidence
whatsoever in support of his claiin. He relies solely on an
assertionof sovereigntyandon geographicalproximity."658
On 13 June 1939,the British Governmentdecided in favour of
551.
Bhain's claim to sovereignty overthe Hawar Islands, conditional on
the agreement of the Govemment of ~ndia.~~T ~he lattercommunicated
its agreementwith the decisionof the British Governmentby letter of 1
July 1939.~~'Britain's decision was comunicated to the Ruler of
Bahrain and the Ruler of Qatar on 11July 1939by the British Political
Resident, Lt.Col.Fowle,inthe followingterms:
"...1 am directed by His Majesty'sGovernment to inform you
that, &er careful considerationof the evidence adducedby [the
Ruler of Bahrainand the Rulerof Qatar], they have decided that
657
LetterfromLt.Col.Fowle,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryof Statefor
India,29 April1939,Ann.282,Vol. 5,p. 1173.
658
IndiaOfficeMinute,7 May1939,Ann.283, Vol. 5,p. 1175.
'j9 Letter from C. BaxterForeignOffice to Secretary of State, India Ofice,
13June 1939,Ann.284(a),Vol. 5, pl176.
Letter fromDeputySecretaryto theGovt. of Indito Et. Col.Fowle,British
PoliticalResident,1July1939.Ann.286, Vol. 5,p. 1181. these islands belong to the State of Bahrain and not to the State
of ~atar."~~'
552. Qatar expressed itsdisappointmentin letters addressedto British
officiais dated 4 August 1939,~~~ 18 November 193g6" 3d 7 June
1940.~~~ Even afier the adjudication was complete, however, Qatar
soughtto adduceno furtherargument or evidencein supportof its claim;
it merelyquestionedthe meritsofthe British decision:
"1sit acceptableto YourHonourto say thatthe islands which are
csnsidered the completing part of the Qatar State on the north
side,belong to theBahrain State and not ta the State of Qatar ...
that they do not belongto Bahrain according to theirnaturaland
geographicalposition;"665
553. Bahrain considers that the British adjudication of the Hawar
Islands dispute is authoritativeand binding on the Parties to the present
dispute. Qatarmaynotreject it merelybecause it is dissatisfiedwith the
result.As the InternationalCourtof Justice stated in the ArbitralAward
madebvthe Kingof Spainon23 Decernber1906case:
"Theappraisalof the probativevalue of documentsand evidence
appertainedto the discretionarypower of the arbitratorand is not
opento question.""'
66'
LetiersfromLt.Col.Fowte,BritishPoliticalResident,to Ruler ofBahrain and
Rulerof Qatar, 11July 1939Ann.287, Vol. 5p. 1182 andAnn.288, Vol. 5,
p. 1183.
662 Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Lt.Col. Fowle, British Political Resident,
4 August 1939Ann. 289, Vol.5,pp. 1184to 1186.
663
Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Lt.Col. Prior, British Political Resident,
18November 1939Ann.291,Vol. 5,pp. II88 to 1189.
664 Letter from RuIer of Qatar to Hugh Weightman, British Political Agent,
7 June 1940,Ann.294,Vol. 5,pp. 1202to 1203.
665
Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Lt.Col. Prior, British Political Resident,
4 August 1939,Ann. 289,Vol.5,p. 1184.
666 Arbitral Award made bv the Kin? of Spain on 23 December 1906 and
Judement I.C.J.eports 1960.pp.215 to 216.554. In view of this threshold obstacle to the re-opening by Qatar of
the question of title to the Hawar Islands, it should not be necessary to
review the manner in which Bahrain has satisfied the requirements of
international law in the establishment and maintenance of its title to the
Hawar Islands. However,it may be desirable that, in the alternative, this
aspect ofthe matter shouldbe dealt with.
If the application of the general principle of resjudicata should,
555.
contrary to the contentions of Bahrain, be thought insufficient, it may
properly be supplemented by reference to the commitments assumed by
the Ruler of Bahrain in 1861 andthe Chief of El-Kutr in 1868to accept
the decision of Britain in disputes in which they rnight be engaged with
their neighbours.
556. Bahrain has exercised jurisdiction and control over the Hawar
Islands since the end of the 18th Century, even before the members of
the Dowasir tribe asked the Qadi of Zubarah, an officia1appointed by
the Sheikh of Bahrain, for permission to settle in the Hawar Islands.
Thereafter, the Rulers of Bahrain manifested their authority over the
Islands in a variety of ways: by legislation and regulation on various
matters including quanying of gypsum and fishing; by stationingpolice
and armed forces there; by providing public services, such as water; by
exercising the judicial function in relation to matters arising in the
Hawar Islands; by affordingprotection to rnembersof the Dowasir tribe;
by giving themthe opportunityto reside and work in Bahrain when they
removedthemselves seasonallyfromthe HawarIslands.
557. The positive conduct of Bahrainin relation to the Hawar Islands,
stretching over nearly two centuries, must be contrasted with the total
inactivity of Qatarthere over the same period of time. This inactivity is
entireIyunderstandable. The barrier of the desert between Doha and theWest coast of the peninsula was, and remains, much greater than the
narrow maritime separation of the Hawar Islandsfrom the Bahrainmain
islaiid.The desertwas a virtuallyinsurnountable obstacle;the water was
a natural comecting factor. Qatar'scomplete inactivity in the Hawar
Islands stands as an insuperable element to the establishment of its
claim.
558. The factthatthe Hawar Islands lie closer to the coast of the Qatar
peninsula than they do to the coast of the main island of Bahrain cannot
improve a case that does not exist.As stated earlier, mere proximity is
not, by itselfa basis for title to territory when the proximate islands are
subjectto the lawfuland long-timeauthority of another State. PART11
THEMARITIMEDELIMTTATION BAHRGIN'SMARITIME BOUNDARY
559. Between Dawhat Salwa to the south, and a line from Fasht ad
Dibal to Ra'sRakan (on the northern point of Qatar) to the north, the
respective coasts of Bahrain and Qatar are nowhere fmher than 24
nautical miles apart,so that throughout this sector (hereinafterreferred
to as the "southern sector") the Court's task is in fact to delimit the
parties' respective territorial seas. (It will be remembered that Qatar
claimed a territorial sea of 12 miles in 1992, while Bahxain made a
similar claim in 1993.)To the north of the line from Fashad Dibal to
Ra's Rakan (hereinafter referred to as the "northern sector"), the
maritime boundary will primarily divide the continental shelf and the
exclusiveeconomiczone.667
560. The maritime boundary which the Court is asked to deIimit is,
therefore, a territorial seaboundaryin the southern sectorand in a smali
part of the northern sector,aadboundary dividingthe continentalshelf
and exclusiveeconomiczonein most of the northern sector.
561. Qatar requests that the Court decide "in accordance with
international law." Bahrainagrees.The Court is thus askedby the two
parties todecidein law,andnot ex aequo etbono.
562. It is clear from the history of negotiations preceding the
adjudicative phase of this controversy-on which the Court has been
informed in the jurisdictional phase- that both parties have aiways
agreed that the territorial and maritime areas in issuebelong to one or
667 Seepara65 1,andMap6 inVolume7.the other of the parties,viz. Bahrain or Qatar, and to no other State.
Neither is thereas betweenthe parties, a possibilitythat any of the land
or maritimeareas claimed maybe a res nultius.In this regard, reference
may be made to the Minquiers and Ecrehos judgment, in which the
Court characterisedits function as "to decide in general to which Party
sovereigntyovereach groupas a whole belongs ....68
563. Neither Bahrainnor Qatar is a party to any of the four Geneva
Conventions of 1958.~~B ~ahrain has signed and ratified the United
Nations Conventionon the Law of the Sea of 1982; Qatar has signed,
but not ratified, the 1982 Convention. As a result, none of these
conventionsis in force as betweentheparties. The maritimedelimitation
in the present case thereforefallsto be effected inaccordance with the
principlesand nilesof customary internationallaw.The applicable legal
principlesand rules are contemporary legalprinciples and rules, as they
are expressed in State practice, in the decisions of the Court and of
international arbitral tribunals, and in provisions of international
conventions which reflect the state of customary international law.
Foremost among the latter are certain provisions of the 1982
Convention.
SECTION6.1 Thesouthern sector
564. The southem sector,as defined in paragraph559 above, extends
from DawhatSalwi in the southto the line fiom Fasht ad Dibal to Ra's
Rakan (atthenorthernextremityof Qatar) in thenorth.
668 Minquiersand Ecrehos.Judgrnent.1.C.J.Repo1951,p.53.
669 Thesearethe Conventionon theTerritorialSeaandthe Contigaous Zone, the
Conventiononthe Hieh Seasthe Conventionon FishinganConservationof
t h e & Sea~igh,the Conventionon the ContinentaI
Mf.565. Ashas alreadybeen indicated,the singlemaritime boundaryis in
thissectoraterritorialseaboundary.
566. The geographical relationship betweenthe respective coasts of
Bahrain and Qatar is notidentical overthe entire southem sector.To the
south of the southenunost point of the coast of the Zubarah region over
which Bahrain claims sovereignty (hereinafter referred to as the
"Zubarah coast"), and to the north of the northernmost point of the
Zubarahcoast (thesepoints areshownas points X and Y respectivelon
Map 6 in Volume 71,the Court's task is tocany out a delimitation
between opposite coasts which are practically parallel, whether one
considersthe coast of Qatarvis-à-visthat of main Bahrain island,or
- as will be demonstratedto be appropria-vis-à-visthatofthe insular
andotherlegally relevantmaritimefeatureswhich appertainto Bahrain.
At pointsX and Y, on the other hand, thCourt'staskis to carry out a
lateral delimitation between the peninsular coasts of the two States,
which areadjacentat thosepoints.
567. The most important aspect of the delimitation in the southern
sector is the presence, between the eastern coast of the main Bahrain
islandand the western coast of Qatarofa large number of insular and
otherlegallyrelevantmaritimefeatures,from Jananin the southto Fasht
ad Dibal in the north. These insular and other legdly relevant maritime
featuresare all, without exception,subjectto the sovereigntyof Bahrain.(i) Bahrain's historical exercise of sovereignty and political
controloverthe areas between its mainislandandthe Qatar
peninsula
568. Bahrain has consistently exercised sovereignty overal1 of the
maritime features situated in the Gulf of Bahrain, from the Hawar
Islandsin the southto Fashtad Dibal in the north. WhenQatar became a
distinctpolitical entity and later a distinct State, its territory comprised
only those parts of the continental peninsula over which the Doha
Sheikhs actually exercised authority. The areas of sea, and the insular
and other legally relevantformations,situatedbetweenthe peninsula and
the main island of Bahrain, rogether with those peninsular areas that
wereBahraini,continuedto be part ofthe political entityof Bahrain.
569. This perception was reflected in the words of a letter from the
Rulerof Bahrainto the BritishPolitical Agenton 31December1947:
"Wewould liketo bring to your attentionthat since the time that
our ancestors occupiedBahrain frorn theirpIaceat Subarah up to
the present, the sea betweenour east coast and Qatar Westcoast
was (under ou own hands) and sovereigntyand also al1islands
and shoals and sea bed exposed at low tide. Our subjects have
undisputed fishingrights. Al1these waters shouldbe within our
b~undary."~'~(Emphasis added.)
570. In the same letter, the Ruler of Bahrain noted that during the
earlier negotiations between the Government of Bahrain, BAPCO and
Petroleum ConcessionsLtd., the Governmentaf Bahrain had submitted
maps describingits petroleumconcessions as extendingffom the Hawar
Islands to about 10 miles north-east of Fasht ad Dibal. The Ruler
confirmed thatthe British PoliticalAgent had not suggestedor implied
670 Letterhm Ruler of Bahrain to CJ Pelly, British PolitAgent,
31December 1947.Ann.345,Vol. 6p. 1486.at any stage thatany part of this sea area or any maritime featwe in it
might notbe subjecrto Bahrain'ssovereignty.
571. Nor does it appearthat at anytime duringthis period the Sheikh
of Qatar formulated objectionsor reservations aboutBahrain'splans to
grant petroleum concessions throughout this area. Such objections or
reservationswould have beenextremely surprising,since it was only in
1937that he establishedauthorityover various parts of the west Coastof
the Qatarpeninsula. (See Chapter2 starting atparagraph72.)
572. The attitude of Petroleurn Concessions Ltd ("PCL") is quite
instructivein this connection. Already holding a Concession granted in
1935 for the exploitation of petroleum in the territory of Oatar, PCL
applied in 1938to the Rulerof Bahrain for a concessionin his territory.
Of particularinterestis Article1of the draftConcession,whichinciudes
in the concession area "al1 islands,reefs, shoals and submerged land
belongingto the Sheikh" .671
573. PCLacknowledgedBahrain'stitleto those maritimefeatures.For
example,in 1940PCLaskedthe Rulerof Bahrainforpermission to light
and use a channelacrossthe Bahrain watersfrom Sitrah(in Bahrain)to
Zekrit(onthe Qatarpeninsula,southof ~awar).~"
574. Again in 1949the RuIerof Bahrainwroteto thePoIiticalAgent:
671 Lettefrom Symon,IndiaOffice,toLt.Col.Fowle,BritishPoliticalResident,
28 April1938,enclosingPCLdraflBahrainleaseandthreecharts,Ann.337,
Vol.6,p. 1459.
672 MernorandurfnromBritishPoliticai AgentoCharles Belgrave,Adviserto
Goa. ofBahrain2, I March1940,withenclosures,Ann.339, Vol. 6,1467
to1469. "The ownership ofthe seabetween Bahrain and Qataris claimed
by us. We have never heard that the Shaikh of Qatar madeany
claimto this ~ea."~'~
575. Bahrain's acts of sovereignty in relation to these maritime
featureshave taken severalforms.In the firstplace, Bahrainimonuments
or markershave been erectedon all of these maritime featuressince the
1930s. Many of the maritime features also possess survey markers and
navigational beacons, likewise placedby Bahrain or under its authority.
Qatar has never objected to any of this activity on Bahrainfpart. Nor
have anysuch acts of sovereigntyever been perfomed byQataror on its
behalf.
576. Bahrain has also performed activities of a more sustained and
visible nature in relation to several maritime features. For exarnple,
Bahrainhas conductedsurveysand granted oil concessionswith respect
to Fasht al'h to BAPCO, which has pursuant thereto drilled and
constructed jetties and platforms. Similarly, Bahrain has conducted
surveys and granted oil concessions aver Qit'at Jaradah and Fasht ad
DibaI.
577. As a result of its geographicalsituation,Fasht ad Dibal has also
assumed considerable importancein relation to fishing and navigation.
This has givenrise toMer examplesof sovereignactivity by Bahrain,
which has installedan artesian well for the use of its fishermen and
granted licencesin respectofpermanent fishtraps.
578. Bahrain has for a long period regularly canied out salvage
operations for vessels which have been stranded or wrecked at or near
673 Letterhm Ruler of Bahrainto BritishPoliticalAgent, 23 May 1949,
Ann.346,Vol.6,p. 1488.Fasht ad Dibal. For exarnple, on 10January 1920the S.S. Palamcotta
ran ashore on Fasht ad Dibal; she was got ofon 14January 1920with
the heIpof theS.S. and Warina, and her cargo "was discharged
into lighters sent from ~ahrain.""~ Navigational difficulties in relation
to Fasht ad Dibal were regarded as Balirain's concern, not only in
emergencies but on an ongoing basis. As the Bahrain Political Diary
States:
"The incident again proves, (what ships masters are continually
asking for) that the Bahrain approaches are in urgent need of
betterlighting
579. A similar incident occurred between 14 and 17 March 1927,
when the I.G.T.S.PatrickStewartwas strandedon Fashtad Dibal. Mr de
Grenier,Directorof Customs inBahrain,"despatcheddhows andcoolies
from Bahrein for lighteninghe ship as asked for."67% de Grenier was
also interestedin findinga long-termsolutionto the problem of lighting
the Port ofBahrain,and clearly consideredFashtad Dibalas an integral
part of this problem and of its solution. In a Ietterto the Adviser dated
10 May 1928 on the subject of "Port Lighting", Mr de Grenier
suggested:
"A stone beacon having recently been erected on the Fesht al
Djebal,if a permanentlight were affixeduponthis beacon,with a
range of at least twentyrniles [sic], there would be no need to
remove the present outer buoy light, as suggested ....[Tlhe
purpûse of a light on the Fesht al Djebal is to wammariners of
674
BahrainPoliticalDiary for monthending31 January1920, p. 10,Ann.324,
Vol.6,p. 1438.
676
Letter from Director, PersiGulf Section, Indo-European Telegraph
Department,to BritishPoliticalAgent,25 March 1927, Ann.327, Vol. 6,
p.1443. the situationoftheFesht,andto assistthem in avoidingthe Fesht
and findthe OuterBuoy ~i~ht."~~~
580. The question of sovereignty over Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'at
Jatadah was consideredby British officiaisbatween 1937and 1947and
not only resulted in interna1discussions but also led to enquiriesbeing
made of the respective Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar. The terms of the
relevant correspondence reveal that whiIe Bahrain asserted its
sovereignty over Fasht ad DibaI and Qit'at Jaradah (among other
maritime features) at every opportunity(consistentwith its long history
of acts of sovereignty and administration over the relevant maritime
features), Qatar claimed sovereignty over Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah only when specificallyinvited to do SU, and based its claim on
the unconvincing arguments of geographical proximity and the needto
compensate Qatar for what Qatar perceived asthe unjust 1939 British
decisionto attributesovereigntyoverthe HawarIslandsto Bahrain.
581. Thus on 14August 1937Belgxavewroteto the Political Agent:
"In addition to the largeislands formingthe Bahrainarchipelago,
which arewell known,the followingislandsbelongto Bahrain:
FishtDibal (a reef)
QattahJarada (an isiand)
Fisht alJarirn (a reef)
KhorFisht (anisland)
Al Benat (an islandj
The Howar archipelago, consisting of nine islands near
the Qaterc~ast.""~
582. A list prepared by the Land Department down to 1939 shows
pillars as having been erected by the Govemmentof Bahrain intea rliu
677 Letter from Directof Customs,to CharlesBelgrave,Adviçerto Govt. of
Bahrain,10May 1928,Ann.328,Vol. 6,p.1444.
678 Memorandurnfrorn CharlesBelgrave, AdvisertGovt.of Bahrainto British
PoliticalAgent14August 1937,Ann.334, Vol.6,p.1455.onAl Mu'tarid,Mashtan,Noon,Tighaylib, Al Hul, Qit'atJaradah, Fasht
ad Dibal,andFasht a~'Azm.~'~
583. On 18 June 1946Belgravewrote againto the Political Agent:
"In the year 1936the Bahrain Governmentbuilt beacons on the
Fasht-AI-Debal.One of the beacons was built on the rock at the
north end of the Fasht which is above water. His late Highness
ShaikhHamad and the present Rule1have alwaysregardedthis
Fasht as being owned by Bahrain. The anchorage there is used
exclusively by Bahrain boatmenand fisfiermenand the Fasht is
one of those which areconsideredto belongto ~ahrain."~*~
584. In July 1946the PoliticalAgentwroteto the respectiveRulers of
Bahrainand Qatar to ask whethereach Rufer considered Fashtad Dibai
and Qit'atJaradah to constitute part of his territory.In the event of an
aflïrmative answer,the Rulerswere asked to statethegrounds on which
sovereignty waç ~lairned.~"The Ruler of Bahrain based his cIairn to
sovereigntyboth on Bahrain'shistorical enjoyment of sovereignty over
the entire Qatar peninsula and the islands and other maritime features
lying between the Qatar peninsular and Bahrain, and on recent acts of
sovereigntyby Bahrain in relation to the maritime features, The clairn
referredto the constnictionof artesianwells on Fashtad Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradahand annexed a list of cairns which had been erected by Bahrain
duringthe 1930s.~'~
b79
List preparedby LandDepartment,Govt. of Bahrain,of pillars erected
1938-1939,Ann.336,Vol.6,p. 1457.
LetterfromCharlesBelgrave,Adviserto the Govt.of Bahrain,to British
PoliticalAgent,18June1946,Ann 340.Vol. 6, p1470.
See,forexample,letterfrorBritishPoliticalAgentoRulerof Qatar9 July
1946,Ann.341, Vol. 6,p1471.
682 LetterfromCharlesBelgrave,Adviserto Govtof Bahrain,oPoliticalAgent,
10July1946,Ann. 342,Vol.6,pp.1473 and1474.585. The claim asserted by the Ruler of Qatar to Fasht ad Dibal and
Qit'at Jaradah is not based on any ground other than the legally
unmeritorious arguments of geographical proximity and the urge to
compensate perceived past injustice. It demonstrates ignorance and
confusionas to the extentof Balvain'ssovereigntyin general:
"...Perhaps Your Excellency knows that the name with which
Bhain is known atpresent is not its original name, but Bahrain
is a general narne for the western Arab tenitories borderingthe
western coasts of the Gulf, this (Bahrain) is only (A'wal)and
(Atwal) is an island in Bahrain, and it is understood that this
island has no dependencies contrary to Qatar which is a large
temitory and has dependencies, coasts, and islands. If we look
into the questionfiom the point view of equality, Qatar isto be
entnisted with Deebil and Jaradah Fashts which are situated
betweenQatar andBahrain,andthey arenearerto Qatar.You see
that Qatar has been treated unjustly in her clear right in the
question of Hawar islands which 1am still tenacious to claim
their ownership,then how about the~thers!"~'~
586. A detailed report fiom the Political Residentto the India Office
dated 18 Januaq 1947 unequivocally supports the conclusion that
Bahrainhad successfullyestablished its sovereigntyover Fashtad Dibal
and Qit'atJaradah:
"...On both shoals there isacairn andan artesian well bored by
the Bahrain Petroleum Company on behalf of the Bahrain
Govemment through a contractor. Dibal consists of a coral reef
which is completelysubmergedat high water except for the cairn
builtby the BahrainGovernrnent,the baseof which is submerged
and a small square of wall built to protect the head of the well
whichis darnagedand out of action. Thereis no rock abovehigh
water level as stated by Mr. Belgrave vide paragraph 26 of the
Political Agent'sletter. Jaradah isa sand-bank and when the
Political Agent visited at a neap high tide, heound an area of
about thirty yards by ten yards above the water level. This was
dry and bore the tracks of birds and appeared not to have been
recently submerged. The Political Agent reports that he has
always seen some land exposed whenever he has passed the
683
Lettefrom Rulerof Qatarto BritishPoliticalAgent, 18July 1946,Ann.343,
Vol.6,p.1476. shoal.The base of the cairn and the artesianwell which is sealed
areboth belowhigh water Ievel.
7.
With regard to the ownership of these two places 1
reluctantlyagree with the PoliticalAgent that if it is possible for
any body to establish a claim over shoals of the kind described,
they must be regarded as belongingto Bahrain. They have been
treated by the Bahrain Governmentas their propertyand beacons
havebeen erectedand weIIsboredwithoutanykind of protestby
the Shaikhof Qatar. Infact, as thePoliticalAgentpoints out,the
Shaikh of Qatar is a late arriva1 on the scene. He only
consolidatedhis position on themainland as recentlyas 1937and
has not taken steps to establish his position over neighbouring
islands and shoals ...My view is therefore that the two shoals
should be assigned to Bahrain which has done al1 it can to
establish its sovereignty overthe pIaces in the now outmoded
style of empire-building without any kind of protest from
Qatar.,.I.84
587. Apartfiom activities relating to and indicating sovereignty over
specificmaritime features, beginning in 1938(when BAPCO sought an
extension of the area of its oiI Concessions from Bahrain) the entire
maritime area between Bahrain'smain island and Qatar was surveyed
and many maritime features were marked in one fom or another for
purposesofnavigationalsafety and mapping.In 1950,BAPCOinformed
the Ruler of Bahrain that it had surveyed up to the low-water mark off
the Qatar Coast.BAPCO'sactivities were authorised by Bahrain, and
were carried out openly and must have been known to Qatar. Yet no
record of protest is known to exist. Indeed, in 1940, PCL, the oiI
cornpany operating under Qatar's authority, sought permission from
Bahrain to place navigational markers on, for example, Tighaylib,
MashtanandJanan.
68\etter from British Political ResitonH.M.'sSecretaryof Statefor India,
18January1947,Ann. 344,VoI.6,pp. 1480and 1481.588. Bahrain'scontrol over the entire maritime area between its main
island and Qatar is consistent with, and complementaryto, its control
over pearling bankssituatednorthof the Fasht ad Dibal-Ra'sRakan Iine.
Notwithstanding that many of Bahrain's pearling banks are
geographicallycloser to Qatarthan to the main island of Bahrain, these
pearling banks have appertainedto Bahrain fiorn time immemorial and
Bahrainhas consistentlyexercisedjurisdiction and control overthem. In
relativelyrecenttimes,Bahrainhas regulatedthe seasonfor pearldiving,
imposed taxes on pearl diving boats, determined disputes between
captains and divers, and provided medical services through a hospital
boat (see paragraphs644 and 645).
589. Bahraindoes not contestQatar'sright to a territorisea and does
not claim theentire areaof seaas faras the coast of Qatar.The object of
the present case is to delimit the sea areas between the two States in
accordancewiththe principles and rules of intentionallaw applicablein
our tirnes. Bahrain's objective in citing the evidence above is to
emphasisethat al1ofthe maritimefeatures lyingbetweenthe main island
of Bahrain and the peninsula of Qatar are subject to Bahrain's
sovereignty, and that the maritime delimitation should be effected
accordingly.
590. The only maritime features that Qatar has specifically put in
issue in this case by clairning "sovereign rights" over them are "Dibal
and Qit'atJaradah shoals".
591. By reference ta the considerations of law set out in Chapter 4
above, there is no basis on which such a claim can be sustained. At no
time, with the exception of the 1986 incident described in
paragraphs488 and 489, has Qatar ever exercised any form of
jurisdiction or authority over these features. When in 1947 Qatar wasinvitedby Britainto statthe basisof its claimto these featuresit relied
only on the concept of proximity and the need to be compensated for
what it saw as a past injustice suffered by it in relation to the Hawar
Islands. The latterisclearly irrelevant as a legal argumentAs to the
argumentof proximity it cannotbe supportedwhenthe feature is almost
as close to Bahrain as it is to Qatand, moreover, as indicated,Qatar
ha never performedany actsof sovereigntyin relationto it. By contrast,
as shown above, Bahrain fias conducted surveys and granted oil
concessions covering the features; has granted licences in respect of
permanent fish traps; carried out salvage operations; and placed swey
markers and navigationalbeaconson thern.
592.
The 1986 episode in which Qatar armed forces landed on Fasht
adDibal and forcedthebulldozinginto the sea of the constructionwhich
Bahrain had begunthere cannotsupport Qatar's claim;nor can Bahrain's
agreement to terminate the construction work there be seen as in any
way amounting to acquiescence by Bahrain in Qatar's claim or
renunciation by Bahrain of its own claim. Bahrain'srestraint must be
viewed within the bework of the Mediation Processthen (and still)
underway and as a contribution to that process intended to promote
peacefulrelationsbetween theParties.
(ii) Contemporary socio-economic links between Bahrain'smain
island and the maritime features between it and the Qatar
peninsula
593. Bahrain has in Chapter 3 demonstrated the close social and
economicinterrelationshipwhichbas alwaysexistedbetweenthe Hawar
Islands andthemainBahrainisland.594. To this daythe fisheriesaroundthe HawarIslandsremainvital to
Bahrain. In 1993, some 75 boats and 198 fishennen operated in the
watersoffthe Ifawar Islands, exercisingtraditionaltechniques offishing
involving nets, lines and portable fish traps. The boats come from
fishingvillageson the main Bahrainisland and the islandsof Shah and
Al Muharraq.No fishing boatsfiom Qatarwork the fisheriesaroundthe
Hawar Islands.
595. But the Hawar fisherydoes not exist in isolation. The entireaea
between Bahrain's main island and the Qatar coast is an area of
traditional Bahrain fishing. The fishing grounds located in this area
provide the livelihood fo2,208 fishermen, or 83%of the total number
of people engaged in the fishing industry. In 1993, these grounds
produced 3,802 tonnes of fish, about half of the entire catch by the
traditional sector of Bahmin'sfishing industry, andsome 37% of the
overall fish consurnption in Bahrain. The most important fishing
grounds, othar than the Hawar fishery referred to above, are the areas
surroundingFasht al'h, Qit'atJaradah and Fasht ad Dibal. Again, no
fishingboats fiom Qatar workthese areas.
596. The Fashtal'Am areais alsoa major shrimping ground, yielding
between 500 and 1200 tonnes per annum. It is also a rich breeding
ground for other species. In 1993, 398 vessels worked the area,
employing 1,239 men. The system of barrier nets and traps used for
shrimping is controlled by licences granted by Bahrain'sDirectorate of
Fisheries.
597. The areas around Qit'atJaradah and Fasht ad Dibal are worked
by 160 boats employing 507 men to produce an annual catch of 400
tonnes.598. A significantpolitical linkwith Bahrain,which continues to the
present day, is Bahrain's consistent practice ofmaintaining coast guard
patrols throughout the area occupied by the insular and other legally
relevant maritime featwes inquestion.
599. Map 7 inVolume 7 shows, in red,the normalpatrol limits ofthe
Bahrain coast guard. It may be seen that there is no direct relationship
between these patrol limits and the main navigation routes (indicatedin
black and blue). It follows that Bahrain's coast guard patrols are a
continuingand unchallengedmanifestation ofgeneralsovereigntyrather
than of specific concem for navigationalsafety. Bahrain also maintains
buoys and beacons in the maritime areasin question, which likewise
represent a continuing and unchallenged manifestation of gsneral
sovereignty.
600. Bahrain submitsthat the evidenceit has marshalledwith respect
to its contemporary as well as historical manifestation of sovereignty
over the maritime areas amply sustains its title. Indeed, the evidence
rnaywell exceedthe internationallegal evidentiary requirementin these
matters. The Court will recall the discussion in Section4.1, starting at
paragraph 506 to the effect that the international law requirement of a
continuous and peaceful display of State functions varies in content
according to the nature of the territory in question. For example, the
degreeof State activityrequiredis smâller in the case of an uninhabited
islandthan in that of a populatedand economicallyexploited island.
601. Accordingto MaxHuber'sawardin the IslandofPalmas case: "As regards groups of islands, it is possible that a group may
under certain conditions be regarded as in law a unit and that the
fate of theprincipalpart may involve the re~t."~"
Thus, in the case of Minauiersand Ecrehos,the Court did not consider it
necessary to make a pronouncement about each islet and rock
individually but decided the issue of sovereignty over each group of
islands as awhole and wascontent.686
602. Finally, fewer and less significant acts of sovereignty over an
island or group of islands willbe required of one party to a dispute if the
other party cannot establish any act ofjmisdiction than if there are two
cornpetingseriesof actsof jurisdictior~.~~~
603. These principles must be kept in rnindwhen assessing the acts of
sovereignty carried out by Bahrain over the features in question. In the
present case many of the islands and other maritime features to which
international law assigns relevance in maritimeboundary delimitation do
not lend themselves to human habitation, and insofar as they lend
themselves to a certain fom of human activit~, it is onlv from Bahrain
and by the inhabitants of Bahrain that such activity has ever been
performed.
604. Qatar, as has been shown, has no title or demonstrations of
peaceful and continucius contra1 that can match those of Bahrain. In
diplornatic exchanges, Qatar has referred ta contiguity or proximity as
the foundation of its claim. The answer to that daim is that the title of
685 U.N.Reportsof InternationalArbitAwards ,ol. II,p. 1at p.855.
686 Minquiersand EcrehoçJud~rnent.I.C.J.Report1953,p.53.
687
Cf,deVisscher,Leseffectivitésen droitinternational pub(1967)p. 106,
Fitrmaurice,p.cit.p.304et seq.contiguity, understood as a basis of territorial sovereignty, has no
foundation in international law. In the absence of a cogent contrary
claim, contiguity rnay in certain circumstances create a presumption of
title, but this is a mere presurnption which is always displaced by
evidence of anactual adverse display of sovereignty by a competing
State.
605. Furthemore, the argument related to contiguity loses al1
relevance where the maritime features in question are also situated
within the territorial sea breadth of another State's coast (or more
generally within the territorial sea breadth of a basepoint or baseline
used lawfully by the other State for defining its territorial sea), as is true
for nearly al1ofthemaritime featuresinissue inthe present case.
(iii) The unique characterof the area to be delimited
606. To describethe present deiimitation as adelimitation betweenthe
coasts of two mainlands between which insular and other legally
relevant maritime features are scatteredwould be seriously to distort the
political and geogaphical relationship between the two countries. The
reality is quite different. While Qatar is without any doubt a continental
mainland State, Bahrain is an ensemble consisting of the main Bahrain
island, the islands immediately adjacent to it (Sitrah and Al Muharraq),
the Hawar Islands and al1the other insular and other legally relevant
maritime features, together with the continental Zubarah region. Bahrain
is not a mainland with some off-lying islands, islets and rocks; it is an
insular and archipelagicensemble,together withthe continental territory
of Zubarah,
607. A paralle1may be drawn with Judge Bedjaoui's description, in
his opinion in the Case conceming the determination of the maritimeSeneaal, [a Case con ce min^ the arbitral award of 31 July 19891of the
relationshipbetween the continentalandinsular parts of Guinea-Bissau:
"Dans la présente affaire, il s'avèremanifeste que le facteur
géographiquele plus caractéristique estla présence d'un large
boucIier d'îles en Guinée-Bissau.Celle-ci s'est définiecomme
semi-insulaire, ou même commeamphibie, en raison de la
remarquable intimitéexistant entre la terre et Ia mer dans ce
pays.... Ces îles ... sont en fait déterminantes ... pour
l'appréciation dela nature du littoral de la Guinée-Bissauet de la
configuration générale deses cdtes. La Guinée-Bissaune serait
pas cequ'elleest sans les Bijagos....[Ill convient de tenir compte
de ce trait essentiel de la façade maritime de la Guinée-Bissau
constituée par la présencede ces îles et par leurlien étroitavec le
continent...".
"In the present case, rnanifestly the most characteristic
geographical factor is the presence of a large bulwark of islands
in Guinea-Bissau. That country has described itself as semi-
insular, or even as amphibious, because of the striking intirnacy
existing between the land and the sea in Guinea-Bissau ....These
islands ...are in fact a decisive factor..for assessing the nature
of the coastline of Guinea-Bissau and the general configuration
of itscoasts. Guinea-Bissau would not be what it is without the
Bijagos....[DJueregard must be had for this essential feature of
the coastal fiont of Guinea-Bissau constituted by the presence of
these islands andtheir close connectionwiththe continent
The present case is even more striking: the situation is not one of a
continental territory with off-lying islands, but one of a group of
territories which are al1 islands, with the exception of Zubarah. The
expressions "bulwarkof islands" and "arnphibious" are even more
appropriate in the present case than in that in which Judge Bedjaoui
employed them.
UN ~iportç of InternationalArbitral Awards Vol. XX, p. 204, para. 134; 83
ILR 109. The English translation was prepared by the Regisby of the
International Court of Justice on the basis of the authoritatitext.ench
Judge Bedjaoui'sopinion addressedthe question of the maritime boundary
which,intheview ofthe Court,didnot requirean answer.608. It would, therefore,be wholly inappropriateto draw a "mainland-
to-mainland" median line and then to distribute the insular and other
legally relevantfeatures according to whether they were situated othe
Bahraini or the Qatari sideof the line (Le. according to whether they
were geographically closer to the main Bahrain island or to the Qatar
peninsula). The appropriate delimitation is a delimitation between the
coasts of the Bahraini ensemble, on one hand, and Qatar, on the other
hand.
B. The maritime boundary inthe southern sector
609. As seen above, the delimitation to the south of the line from
Fasht ad DibaI toRa'sR&an is governed by the principles and mles of
customary international law which, as is generally accepted, are those
expressed in Article 15of the 1982Convention. The maritime boundary
between Babrain and Qatar in this sector, therefore, should be, in
accordance withthe customaryrule expressed in Article 15,
"...the rnedian line every point of which is equidistant fiom the
nearest point on the baselines fiom which the breadth of the
territorial seas of eachof the two Statesismeasured."
Article 15goeson to providethat
"The above provision does not apply, however, where it is
necessary, by reason of historic title or other special
circumstances,to delimitthe tenitorial seas of the two States in a
way which isat variance therewith."
610. Except for the reference to historic title, this mle, which was
taken, word for word, £romArticle 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, is identical to the
"equidistance-speciaIcircurnstances"mle set out in Article 6 ofth1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, in relation to which the
Courtrecently declaredthat "itmust be difficu1.to find anymaterial difference - at any rate in
regard to delimitation between opposite coasts - between the
effect of Article 6 andthe effect of the custornaryrule which also
requiresadelimitation based on equitable principles. "689
611. There exists, therefore, an identity between, first, the
equidistance-specialcircumstancesnile governingthe delimitation of the
territorial sea under Article 12of the 1958Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Article 15 of the 1982 Convention; second, the equidistance-
special circumstancesmle governing the delimitation of the continental
shelf under Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf;
and, third, the custornary rule of delimitation according to equitable
principles governing al1 delimitations not governed by one of these
conventions. The same mle, therefore, applies in substance to al1
maritime delimitations, whether of the territorial sea, the continental
shelf, the exclusive economic zone, or "all-purpose"6gQ delimitations,
and whether governed by international conventions or by customary
international law. In relation to delimitationsother than of the territorial
sea (i.e., continental shelf, exclusive economic zone, or single maritime
boundary delimitations), the Court has stated that this rule applies "at
any rate between opposite coasts", but this does not imply that the nile
does apply as between adjacent coasts. In the case of a territorial sea
delimitation,in any event,the customary rule expressed in Article 15 of
the 1982Convention doesnot distinguish between opposite and adjacent
coasts; Article 15 in fact provides explicitly that the "equidistance-
special circunistances"mle applies "whether the coasts of tvlroStates are
e Delimitationin the Area between Greenland and Jan Maven,
JudgmentI..C.3.Report1493,p. 58,para.46.
690 Ibid,p.62,para.56.opposite or adjacent to each other", that is to Say in al1 possible
geographicalsituations.
612. In the Maritime Delimitationin theArea between Greenland and
Jan Mayen case, the Court explained the modus operandi of the
"equidistance-specialcircurnstances"rule in continentalshelf, exclusive
economic zone and single maritime boundary delimitations between
opposite coasts. To give effectto Article 15, the same modus operandi
shouldbe appliedto territorialseadelimitations.
613. It followsthat,to delimitthe southem sectorin the present case,
"... it is appropriate tobegin by taking provisionally the median
line between the territorial sea baselines, and then enquiring
whether 'specialcircumstances'requireanotherboundaryline." 69
614. As seen above, the rule expressed in Article 15 expressly
requires, "whether the coastsof two States are opposite or adjacentto
each other", that the starting point be "the median line every point of
which is equidistantfrom the nearest point on the baselines from which
the breadthof the territorialseas of each of the two States is measured."
In a second phase, it is appropriateto enquirewhether "it is necessary,
by reason of historic titleor other special circumstances,"to adjust or
displacethe medianline in orderto arriveat an equitableresuIt.
(i) Determiningthepointsthat generate themedianline
615. In relation to the delimitation of the continental shelf between
opposite coasts, the Court has characterised the initial phase as the
691
Maritime Delirnjtation the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen,
Judpment.I.C.J.Report1993,pp. 59to60,para.49.drawing of "the median line between the territorial sea baseline~."~~~
This applies a fortiorito the delimitation of the territorial sea itself.
Once the baselines of the two countries' coasts are defined, the
determination of the median line becomes a relatively straightforward
technicalmatter.
616. As regards these parts of the coast of the Qatar peninsula that
appertainto Qatar, the appropriatebaseline, according tothe customary
mle expxessedin Article 5 of the 1982 Convention, is "the low-water
line along the coast as marked on large-scalecharts officiallyrecognised
bythe coastal State."
617. The same rule applies to the coasts of the ensembIeconstituting
Bahrain.
618. Onthe coastline of the Zubarah region, therefore, the low-water
lineis the appropriatebaseline.
619. Under the customary principle expressed in Article 121 of the
1982 Convention, each of the islands constituting the State of Bahrain
generatesits ownterritorialsea.Paragraph 1ofArticle 121provides:
"An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by
water, whichis abovewaterathigh tide."
Paragraph 3 of Article 121,which relatesto "rockswhich cannotsustain
human habitation or econornic life of their own", applies only to the
continental shelfand the excIusiveeconomic zone, not to the territorial
692 6,
Jud9.ment. p.60,para.49.sea.693It foilowsthat al1of the maritime features which are "abovewater
at high tide" are to be taken into account in defining Bahain's temtorial
sea.In addition to the main Bahrain island and the islands of Sitrah and
Al Muharraq, these maritime features include the Hawar Islands, Rabad
a1 Gharbiyah, Rabad ash Sharqiyah, Jazirat Ajirah,AI Mu'tarid,Jazirat
Mashtan, Jabbari,UmmJalid and Qit'atJaradah.
620. The appropriate baseline for Sitrah Island is also its low-water
line, which is constituted by the low-water line around Fasht d'Am,
which foms an integral part of Sitrah Island. The only discontinuity
between Sitrah Islandand Fasht d'Am is a narrow artificial channel, 3
rnetres deep, which was dredged in 1982in order to facilitate navigation
between the Mina SuIman harbour and the east coast of the main
Bahrainisland. Bahmin submits that, by analogywith Article 60 (8) of
the 1982Convention (which provides that artificial islands, installations
and structures shall not affect the delimitation of maritime boundaries),
the existence of this artificial channel should not affect the definition of
"the low-waterline alongthe coast" forthe purposes of Article 5.
62 1. In respect of the HawarIslands,the baseline consists of the low-
water lines of Janan, Suwad al Janubiyah, Suwad ash Sharnaliyah and
Jazirat Ajirah. Thearea of sea to the Westof the Hawar Islands, between
these islands and the main Bahrain island, is comprised of interna1
waters of Bahrain.
622. The status of Qit'at Jaradah merits special attention. Although
there is some evidence that Qit'atJaradah was for some periods prior to
1947 a low-tide elevation rather than an island, its size and height
693
Indeed, even with respect to delimitatirhe continental shelf and the
exclusiveeconomiczone, it is doubtful whetherthis limitation fofs part
customaryinternationalIaw.increased as a result of natural accretion during the 1950s and
subsequently.Thereisno doubtthatby 1986it had becomean island.
623. On 26 April 1986,Qatarperpetrated an armed invasion of Fasht
ad Dibalandother actsof med aggression.Inthe course of subsequent
negotiations underthe auspicesof SaudiArabia, when Qatari bulldozers
removed that part of Qit'atJaradah which was exposed at high tide,
Bahrain emphasised that this was without prejudice to its rights of
sovereignty over Qit'atJaradah or the geographical status of this
maritime feature. Bahrain also stated at this time to Saudi Arabia that
Qit'atJaradahwould almostcertainIyrevert to being an island by means
of naturalaccretionoverthe course of time.
624. It is Bahrain's positionthat Qit'atJaradah shouldbe treated as an
island for the purposes of determining the single maritime boundary.
First, Qit'aJaradah has undeniablybeen an island in the past and would
still beo todayif it hadnot been forQatar'sarmed interventionin 1986.
It would be offensive to any notion of law or equity to allow Qatar to
benefit from this intentionally unlahl act. As Qatar's intervention
occurred afier the dispute between Bahrain and Qatar had arisen, and
with the manifest intention of changing the facts to the prejudice of
Bahrain's rights, the Court should in accord with international law
determine the maritimeboundary as if Qatar's interventionhad never
taken place. In addition, Qit'at Jaradah is today in the process of
revertingto its formerisland statusby means of an inexorable processof
natural accretion.
625. Article 13ofthe 1982Conventionprovides:
"Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a
distancenot exceeding thebreadth of the .territorialsea fiom the
mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be usedasthe baseline formeasuringthe breadthofthe territorial
sea."
Article 13 definesa low-tide elevation as "a naturally formed area of
landwhich is surroundedby and abovewater at low tide but submerged
athigh tide."
626. Several low-tide elevations fulfil the condition stipulated by
Article 13, and their low-waterlines are therefore availableto Bahrain
foruse as baselines. Thisis the casein respectof:
Fasht Bu Thw whichis closerthan 12nautical rniIesto the mainBahrain island
and several other islands (Al Mu'tarid, Mashtan,Jazirat Wawar,
Rabadal Gharbiyah,Rabadash Sharqiyah, and Ajirah);
Qita'ael Erge which is closerthan 12ilauticalmilesto the mainBahrain island
andseverd other isiands (Al Mu'tarid,Mashtan, Jazirat Hawar,
Rabad al Gharbiyah,Rabad ash Sharqiyah,Ajirah, Umm Jalid)
andto Zubarah;
Fasht al'h which (shouldthe Court.decline to recogniseit to be anintegral
part of SitrahIsland) is in any case closerthan 12nautical miles
to the mainBahrain island,to Sitrahand to Umm Jalid;
Qit'atash Shajarah whichis closerthan 12 nauticalmilesto UmmJalid;and
(A1Khujayjirah)
Fashtad Dibal which is closer than 12 nautical miles to Fasht allAm (Le., to
Sirrah)andto Qit'atJaradah.
627. Afterthe baselines of Bahrain and Qatarhave thus been defined,
the line "everypoint of which is equidistant from the nearest point on
the baselinesfromwhichthe breadthof the territorialseas of each of thetwo States is measured" can be precisely determined by the two States'
technical experts. This line, which in fact consists of two separate lin-s
one running southwards fiom the southem limit of the Zubarah coast
(Point X), the other ming northwards from the northern limit of this
coast (Point Y) - is shown for illustrative purposes, with the basepoints
fiom which it is determined,onMap8in Volume 7.
628. It should be noted that the southernmost point of the maritime
boundary cannot be defined precisely atthis time. South of Janan, the
boundaryruns towards the sea area appertainingto Saudi Arabia. Point 1
of the BahraidSaudi Arabia maritime boundary defined by the
agreement dated 22 February 1958between SaudiArabia and ~ahrain~'~
is irrelevant in this respect; it was never intended to be a
BahraidQatariSaudi Arabia tripoint, as both its definition and its
geographical location clearly show. The question of this tripoint will
require future negotiation arnong Bahrain,Qatar and Saudi Arabia. For
this reason, the median line on Maps 3 and 4 teminates south of Janan
in an arrow indicating a directional bearing, rather than in a precise
point.
The resultant median Iine requires neither adjustrnent nor
(ii)
shiftingin order taarriveat an equitableresult
629. According to the principle laid down by the Court in relation to
the delimitation of the continental shelf, of the exclusiveeconomiczone
or of a single maritime boundary between opposite coasts, which is
equally applicable to territorial sea delimitations, the median line
between the respective States' baselinesis "aprovisional line that may
694 J. Charneyand L.Alexander(Eds.)InternarionalMaritime Boundaries
(19331,op.citVol.II,p.1489.be adjusted or shifted in orderto ensurean equitable res~lt."~~t follows
that it is necessary "to examine every particular factor of the case which
might support an adjustment or shifiing of the median line provisionally
drawn", as "[tlhe aim in each and every situation must be toachieve an
'equitableres~lt'."~~~
630. Where the delimitation is between opposite coasts (i.e., in the
present case, tothe south of the pointX and to the north of the point Y),
the median line enjoys a presumption of equity, and produces, in most
geographical circumstances, an equitableresult. In relation to continental
sheIf, exclusive economic zone and single maritime boundary
delimitations, thisview has been clearlyupheld by the Court:
"...in the case of opposite coasts ...the tendency of customary
law ... has been to postulate the median line as leading prima
facie to anequitablere~ult."~'~
"Prima facie, a median line between opposite coasts results in
general in an equitabie solution, particularly if the coasts in
questionare nearlyparallel. "698
"The application of that method [Le.the equidistance method] to
delimitations between opposite coasts produces, in most
geographicalcircumstances,anequitableres~lt."~~~
Thepresumption of equity in favour ofthe median line appliesaforriori
in relation to territorial seadelimitations, because, as the Court has held,
"owing to the very close proximity of such waters to the coasts
695 Maritime Delimitation itheArea betweeriGreenlan and Jan Mayen,
Judyrnent.I.C.J. 1993,p.60,para. 50.
696 lbid, p.62,para54.
699'
Maritime Dalimitationin the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen,
Jud~ment.I.C.J1993,p.67,para65.concerned", "the distorting effects" of equidistance lines "under certain
conditions" are "cornparatively small within the limits of territorial
waters."700Hence only truly exceptional circumstmces would justify
deviating, in these delimitations, from the median line between opposite
coasts.
631. In the present case, no exceptional circumstances - historical or
of any other nature -justifi modifying the median line in the southern
sector, either as between opposite or as between adjacent coasts. In
particular, there is no "disparity or disproportion between the coastal
lengths" such as was taken into account by the Court in the Jan Mayen
case.70'The two States'coastlines have similar characteristics, and to a
significant extent are virtually parallel.
632. To conclude,the singlemaritime boundary between the maritime
territories ofBa.hrainand Qatar in the southern sector (i.e., south of the
line from Fasht ad Dibal and Ra'sRakan)should be the equidistant line
between the baselines of Qatarandthose of Bahrain.
SECTION6.2 The northernsector
633. The northern sector, asdefined above, lies to the north of the line
from Fasht ad Dibal to Ra's Rakan (at the northern extremityof Qatar).
A. Characteristics
634. To the north of the line from Fasht ad Dibal and Ra'sRakan, as
Bahrain has already shown, the geographical situation and the legal
700 North Sea Continental Shelf case, Jud~menT.C.J Reports 1969,p. 18,
para.8,andp. 37,para59.
70' M ri e Delimitation in th
Judoment., QQ.65 etseq.paras.61etseq.nature of the delimitationtobe effected differ from those of the southern
sector.
635. First, the delimitation in this sector is a delimitation between
adjacent,rather than opposite,coasts.
636. Second, except for that partof the northern sectorwhich is closer
than 12 nautical miles to the coasts of Fasht ad Dibal and the Qatar
peninsula, the boundary to be defined is a single maritime boundary
between the continental shelves and exclusive economic zones of
Bahrainand Qatar (seeparagraph 650).
637. Third, the delimitation must be effected in the context of the
existingagreements between Iran and Bahrain (signed on 17June 1971)
andbetween Iran and Qatar(signed on 20 September 1969).'02
638. Finally, although the northern sector does not, unlike the
southem sector, contain nurnerous insular and other legally relevant
maritime features, it contains a signifiant number of pearling banks
which have appertainedto Bahrain sincetime inmernorial, andof which
an all-purpose delimitation must take account. Bahrain'shistoric rights
over these banks are relevant to the determination of the maritime
boundary in accordance with equitable grinciples and cannot be ignored
in carryingout the delimitation.
B. Bahrain'spearliny banks
639. The pearling banks appertaining to Bahrain in this sector
constitute one of the oldest, and richest, pearl fisheries in the world. In
1915,Lorimerwas able to referto peari fishingas "thepremier industry"
'O2 InternationalMaritime Boundaries,cit.Vol. IIpp.1481 and 1511.See
para. 65tnfa.of the Persian ~ulf,~'~and the Bahrain banks were pre-eminent. As
Lorimer states:
"The largesr and most productive of ail the banks are situated on
the Arabian side of the Gulf and are fished annually, the richest
being those to the north and east of Bahrain ...'O4
640. Lorimer provides statistics to show that in 1905-6, the value of
pearls exported from Bahrain was Rs. 1,26,03,000, nearly twice the
value of pearl exports fromthe whole of the Trucial States,and ten times
the value ofpearl exports from ~uwait.~'~InBahrain,in 1907,sorne 917
boats and 17,633 men were engaged in the fisl~er~.~'B ~ut the Bahrain
pearling fleet had been even larger. Streeter, in a work published in
1886, refers to 3,500 boats fiom ~ahrain.~'~WhiIst the number of
vessels declined from the mid-nineteenth Century, the pearling fieet
remainedactive at least until 1954, and long after Bahmin'scontinental.
shelf rights hadvested.
i The natureofthe Ruler of Bahrain'srights
641. Prior to the evolution of the contemporary continental shelf
doctrine, the general view was that the adjacent sovereign could, upon
proof of long-established "occupation" of the beds or banks, assert
ownership of the seabedand exclusiveright to the "fï-u~tus".~~~
'O3 LorimerVol. 1op. cit2220,Ann.83, Vol.3, p. 502.
7"
Ibid. p. 2221, Ann.83,Vol.3, p. 503.
705
Ibid, p. 225Ann. 83Vol.3,p. 508.
706 fbidp. 2258, Ann.83, Vol.p. 509.
?O7 E.W. Streeter, Pearls and Pearline Life, (Lon1886), pp.213 ta 221,
Ann.320,Vol.6, p. 1425.
'O8
Sir CecilHurst,"Whoseisthe Bedof thSea?"in Collected Papers,p. 58 and
B.Y.B.T.L. (1923-24), pp.34 to 43. Foreign Office Minutes including642. There is little doubt thatBahrainhas occupiedthe pearling banks
in this sense. The powers asserted by Bahrain over the pearling banks,
which are discussed in more detail in paragraphs 643 to 645., included a
power to tax and to legislate,which in turn assume both property in the
pearls and sovereignty over the Banks. It is clear that the British
Governrnentrecognised Bahrain'srights, for in 1905 the Law Officers of
the Crown so ad~ised,~'~and in 19 11 the British Government advised
the Ruler not to grant any concessions over the pearling banks to
foreignerswithout prior consultation with the British ~overnrnent.'~~
(ii) The exercise of jurisdiction and control over the pearling
banksby Bahrain
643. Under the traditional, customary law of the Gulf, neighbouring
tribes apparently had the ieightto fish for pearls, if their own Ruler was
on terms of amity with the Ruler whose banksthey were, but strangers
or foreigners were excluded unless granted concessir~ns.~'~ In practice,
few non-Bahraini boats fished Bahrain's pearling bank~,~'*and
vessels, irrespective of nationality or place of registration, were subject
to the jurisdiction of Baluain whilst on the Banks. Traditionally the
comments by 1.M.Sinclair, 13 October 1955,Ann.351, Vol. 6, pp. 1517to
1520.
709
Reportby the LawOfficers, Finlay and Carson, 11 Februa1905, Ann.321,
Vol.6,pp. 1431,1432.
'1° See letter from Lt. Col, Cox, British Political Resident, to British Political
Agent, 11July 1911, Ann. 322, Vol. 6, pp. 1434 and 1435. See also letter
from H.R.Ballantyne to Chartes Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain,
14 November 1949,Ann. 347, Vol.6, pp. 1490to1498.
71'
SeeExtractsfromLorimer Vol. II,op.cd, pp. 2241to 2242, Ann.83, Vol. 3,
pp. 506to507.
712 Testimonyof Jabor MusaIlam,Pearl Merchant, 26 October 1950, Ann. 349,
Vol. 6,p.1503, and of Dr. A.S. Bhandarkar, Medical Officer, Bahrain 17
October 1950,Ann. 348,Vol. 6,p. 1500.Ruler's jurisdiction was customary. Local, special tribunals called
"Diving Courts" (Salifat-al-Ghaws) enforced the rules and settled
disputes,principally about debts betweendivers andboat-~wners.~'~ The
Ruler of Bahrain levieda taxon vesselsfishing for pearls fromthe early
19th Century, justified by the need to maintain armed vessels on the
pearlingbanksta protectthe vesselsfishingthere.7'4
644. Subsequently,specificlegislation was enacted. In1924new laws
were enacted, providing quite comprehensive laws for the pearling
industry, and jurisdiction over disputes was transfmed from the old
diving courts to the ordinary courts. The year 1924 saw another clear
exampleof an assertion of sovereigntyby the Ruler of Bahrain overthe
banks. In order to punish some members of the Dawasir tribe,
traditionally loyal to the Rulerof Bahrain, who had quarrelled with the
Ruler and left Bahrain to settlein Saudi Arabia, the Ruler ordainedthat
various measures should be taken against those Dawasir, including
banning them from diving on the Balxain pearling banks. The British
warship "Cyclamen"was used to put tl-iisorder into effe~t.~'~ Later the
Governmentof Bahrainissued a Proclamationrequiring al1boat-owners
and individual divers to maintain a book of acc~unts.~'~The
7'3 Lorimer,op.cil.pp.2233to 2234, Ann. 83,Vol. 3, pp. 50505.
'14
Xbid,p.2241, Ann,83,Vol. 3, P506.
715
Sec Memorandurnfrom British Political Agent,to British Political Resident,
24 May 1924,Ann.325,Vol.6, pp. 1439to 1441,also Telegramçexchanged
between H.M.S. Cyclamen and British Political Resident 19120June 1924,
Ann.326, vol.6,p. 1442.
'16
Crovt.of Bahrain Proclamation,20.10 AH 1349 (1930). This followed an
earlierNotice of 8February 1926.It may be notthat thQatar Rejoinderin
the course of the 1938-39Britishadjudication (inthe ofa letter from the
Ruler of Qatar to British Political Agent30 March 1939, para. IO)
cornmented on Bahrain's claim to Hawar, adrnitted that any Qatari boats
diving on the Bahrain banks wûuld cany diving books issued by Bahrain,
Ann. 329, Vol.6,p. 1445.Govemrnent of Bahrain issued formal Notices fixing the dates for the
pearling season,setting fees for divingboats and enforcingsuchNotices
by confiscationof boatsm717
645. It must be added that Babrain's control was not simply
legislative, butlso administrative and judicial. In view of the health
risks attached to diving, it was the practice for Bahrain to provide
medical services onthe PearlingBanks.Regulartrips to the Banks were
made by a Governmentof Bahrainhospital boat,carrying a Government
physician and a licensing inspecter, and rendering assistance to al1
vessels. Dr. Bhandarker, who was employed by the Govemment of
Bahrain as a physician fromMay 1925until October 1950,testifiedin a
statement dated 12 October 1950 that the Government of Bahrain
hospital boats made regular trips to al1 of theprincipal pearl fishing
banks used by pearling fleets from ~ahrain.~'~ As Dr. Bhandarker
testified:
"Amongthe pearlingbanks we visited regularly were Shiggatah,
Shitaiyah (Shithyya),Miyyaneh, Bu Hagul, Bu Ja'al,Ai Ashira,
Bu Amanah, Abu Lathama, Bu Suwar, Mashbak,Al Asira and
Khababan.Normally we left Manama and went slightly east of
northto the Shitaiyahbanks, which areperhaps the largestof the
pearlingbanks.We coveredanareaas far east as Bu Suwatnorth
and west through Abu Latharna, Bu Arnanah, Al Asira and
Khababan. For shelter we some times went to Fasht al Dibal,
Fasht Jarim, Khor Fasht and sometimes to Ras Tua and
Dahrein.Wetook waterfromspringsat Khor~asht."~'~
Dr. Bhandarker stated that over 90% of the vessels operating in the
relevant pearling banks wereBahraini. He made a pointof visitingal1of
717 For anexampleseeGovt.ofBahrainNotice,15ApriI1939,Ann.338,Vol.6,
p. 1466.
71\~stimony of Dr. A.S. Bhandarkar, edicalOfficer,12 October 1950,
Ann.348,Vol.6, pp.1499to 1501.
719
Ibid Ann.348, Vol6, p. 1499.the Bahraini pearling vessels, but would also provide medical assistance
to other pearling vesselsfrequested. His testimony continues:
"Al1Bahrain pearling vesseis were required to be licensed. The
Bahrain Government inspector who accompanied me checkedthe
licenses of dl of the vessels visited and his clerk recorded the
names of the nakhudas and the numbers of divers on each
vessel....
...The pearlers frequently told me that before my time nakhudas
were practicdly despots aboard their vessels and would starve
men who did not strictly obey their instructions. This situation
did not exist during my time, however, because the Bahrain
Government was then active and any man could cornplainto the
Government and secure redress for wrongs dune to him while he
was on a pearling expedition. If a man should die aboard a
pearling vessel his body is brought toBahrain, the Government
notified and a medical examination made before the body is
buried.No bodies areburied at ~ea."'~~
646. Bahrain's claim to sovereignty is also supported by the
staternentsof contemporarywitnesseswhoarestillliving today, many of
whom participated in the pearl diving industry and had first-hand
knowledge of Bahrain'sadministrationboth of thepearl banks and of the
smaller islands and low-tide elevations situated between Bahrain and
Qatar.Nasr bin Makki bin Ali al Dosari, for example, states that he and
his fellow Hawar Islanders "used to dive at Bu1Thama, Bu Amarna,Al
Mashubach, Shtayya, Hoora, and Bal Kharab. These pearling banks
were al1in the territory of Bahrain.There was also a water wel1in Dibal
which belonged to ~ahrain."~~'Later, states the witness, "we continued
to corne back ... to tend the fish traps of Al Mu'tarid, Hanan, Umm
Beitkha, and Al Bateen near ~awad."'~~Hamoud bin Muhanna bin
720
Testirnony of Dr. A.S. Bhandarkar, MedicalOfficer, 12 October 1950,
Ann.348, Vol.6,pp.1500 and1501.
72' Statemenrof Naçrbin Makkibin Ali al Dosari, 16September1996, para. 22,
Ann.3 14a,Vol.6, p1384.Hamad al Dosari statesthat "AlDibal is apearling site and alsoa shelter
for Bahraini dhowswhen it is windy. The Goverrunentof Bahrain dug a
well there for the Bahraini dho~s."~~~ Salman bin Isa bin Ahmad bin
Saad al Dosari states that "When we returned to Zellaq in the summer
for the pearling season,the Dowasirwould dive off the Bahrainpearling
banks such as Bu1Thama, Shtayya, Al Mayna and Dibal. Dibal also
provided ashelter when it was windy. Al1of these pearling banks were
part of Bahrain - althoughthey were open to everyonethey were always
refened to as the 'Bahrain pearling banks. ttg724Mohammed bin
Mohammedbin TheyabAINaimi, who lived in the Zubarahregion from
his birth in approximately 1920 until Qatar's invasion of 1937, states
"We used to dive in Al Dibal, Shtayya, Al Mayana, Bu Amama, Bu1
Thama and other nearby places.Al1of thesepearling banks belonged ta
Bahrain. The Al Diba1pearling banks used to be called Hair Al Utub
afterthe Al-Khalifa who are ofthe Al-Utubt~-ibe."'~~
(iii) The location of Bahrain'spearlingbanks
647. Bah.rainlsprincipal pearlingbanks are shown in red on Map 9 in
Volume 7. Theyare:
Fasht Naywah (AlArnari)
Abu Al Kharb
Hayr AbuAl Ja'al
723
Translation of staterofnHamoud bin Muhanna bin Hamad al Dosari,
7 September1996,para.27, Ann.13aVol.6, p.1369.
724 Translation of staternentof Salman bin Isa bin Ahmad bialSDosari,
16September1996,para. 11,Ann.315,Vol. 6, 1395.
725 Translation of staternent of Mohammed bin Mohammed bin Theyab Al
Naimi,6 September1996,para.9, Ann.233aVol4, p1015. Bin Zayaan
Bu Sawr
Naywah Al Rumayhi
Naywah Al Ma'awdah
Naywah Abdul Qadr
UmmAl Arshan
KhraisAl Thayr
UmmAl Qars
Naywah Walid Ramadhan
648. TheBanks coincidewith areasof relatively shallowwater,notso
much because pearls did notoccur at greater depths but more because
traditional diving techniques only permitted harvesting in shailow
waters.
C. The maritime boundaryin the northern secfor
649. As has been explained above, the delimitation ithe northern
sector is primarily a delimitation of a single maritime boundary between
Bahrain's and Qatar's continental shelves and exclusive economic
zones,726and is governed bythe mles of customary international law.
650. The Court has held, particularly in Jan Mayen case, that the
same prînciples and rules apply in substance to continental shelf
delimitations, exclusive economic zone delimitations and "all-purpose
726 See,however,para.651,infra.boundary" delimitations, whether an international agreement or
customary international law is app~icable.72A 7s the Court emphasised on
several occasions in its judgment in that case,728the fundamental
principle is that of the search for an equitable result. Although the
delirnitation in the northern sector is one between adjacent rather than
opposite coastç, it is also appropriate to take an equidistance line as a
starting point, andthereafterto ascertain whether it is necessary to adjust
or shiftthe equidistanceline so as to take into account al1of the relevant
circumstances and to reach an equitable result. In the same decision,the
Court observedthat "thereis inevitably a tendency towards assimilation"
between the "special circumstances" referred to in Article 6 of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf (and, for that matter, in
Article 15 of the 1982 Convention), and the "relevant circumstances"
which customary international law requires to be taken into account in
al1maritime delirnitati~ns.~~'
651. Thesouthemost point ofthe maritime boundary in the northern
sector is the point equidistant from Fasht ad Dibal and the Qatar Coast.
This point, marked O on Map 10 in Volume 7, is naturaliy also the
northernmost point of the median iine in the southern sector. From this
point northwards, the provisional boundary which should be initially
taken into consideration is the equidistance line between the closest
points on the coasts of Bahrain and Qatar respectively. It is immediately
apparent, however,that this provisional boundary requires adjustmentby
727 Maritime Delimitaiton in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen,
Judgment.I.C.J.Reports1993,p. 58,para.46, and p. 62,para. 56.
728
See, in particular,MaritimeDelimitaiton in the Area between Greenlandand
Jan Mayen. Jud~ment. T.C.J.Reports 1993, p. 59, para.4p.62, para. 54;
p. 69, para.70.
'*'
Maritime Delimitaitonin the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen,
Judement. I.C.J.Reports1993,p. 62,par55.reason of two circumstances pertaining to the areas of the continental
shclf and exclusive economiczone. The first such circurnstanceis the
existence of Bahrain'shistoric rights to the pearling banks. The second
special circumstanceis the existence of the Bahrain/Iran and IrdQatar
Agreements of 17 June 1971 and 20 September 1969 respectively.
Neither of these agreements purports to detennine a single
BahraidIradQatar tripoint; the point of termination of the maritime
boundaryin eachof these ag~eementsis determinedonly by referenceto
an azimuth. Moreover, the agreements purport only to effect a
continental shelf delimitation, and expressly provide that they do not
"affectthe status ofthe superjacent waters."Nevertheless,the provisions
of these agreements are obviously relevant to the delimitation of the
maritime boundary inthe northern~ector.~~'
652. Bahrain's proposedsingle maritime boundary is shown, together
with the location of the pearling banks, on Map 10. The maritime
boundary consistsof a seriesof straightIinesjoining the points 0, Q, R,
S, T, U, and terminating at the point Z. Point O, as explained above, is
equidistant fiom Fasht ad Dibal and the Qatar coast. Point Q is afso
equidistant from Fashtad Dibal and the Qatar coast and is exactly 12
nautical miles fiom each of thern. The part of the single maritime
boundary corresponding to the line OQ is therefore a territorial sea
boundary.
730
In its Judgment itheContinentalShelF(TunisiaILibvanArabJamahiriyal
CaseJudgment. I.C,J, Repor1982, pp64, 65, para. 81, the Court cited "the
existenceand interestsof other Statesin the area,andthe existingor potential
delimitations between each of the Parties and such States" as relevant
circumstancesto be taken into account by the Court. The Court is also
referredoP. Weil,ne Lawof Maritime Delimitatio- Refiections,(1989),
p. 254 etseq.653. Northwards of point Q, the circurnstancesreferred to above cal1
for two modifications of the equidistance line. The first modification,
which is in Bahrain'sfavour, is justified by the existence of Bahrain's
rights in respect ofthe maritimeareas wherethe Bahrainipearling banks
are located. Bahrain requests that the single maritime boundary be
delimited fiom point Q through points R, S, Tand U. The three latter
points are situatedtthe easternlimits of the three eastemmostpearling
banks appertaining to Bahrain. This is the minimum deviation to the
equidistanceIinenecessaryto ensurethat Bahrain'shistoric rights tothe
pearlingbanksarepreserved.
654. As may be seen from an exarnination of Map 10, a boundary
drawn directly from pointQ to point S would cut acrossthe 12-nautical
mile territorial sea to which Qatar is entitled. PRinis situated onan
extension of the line OQ, in the southernmost possible position
consistentwith preservingthe integrityof Qatar'sterritorial sea. As Map
10shows,the lineRS istangentialto Qatar'sterritorialseaboundary.
655. The second modification, whichis in Qatar'sfavour, is proposed
in order to accommodate the provisions of the BahraidIran and
IrdQatar Agreements.Although(i) each ofthese agreementsis binding
only as between its parties, and consequentlyneither Bahrainnor Qatar
enjoys any rights as against the other on the basis of its own or the
other'sagreement with Iran, and (ii) any adjustmentof Qatar'smaritime
areas south of the Iran-Qatar boundary line would in no way prejudice
Iran, Bahrain nevertheless proposes that the Court, to the extent
reasonably possible, effectthe maritime delimibtion so as to arrive at a
northern termination point consistent withthe provisions of both
agreements with Iran. The point 2, which Bahrain suggests as the
appropriate northem temination point of the Bahrain/Qatar singlemaritime boundary, is Point 2 of the IraniQatar Agreement. Thispoint is
situated tothe west of the point where a BahraidQatar equidistance line
would intersect the boundary with Iran. The delimitation of the maritime
boundary ffom point U to point Z thus represents the minimum
westward deviation in Qatar'sfavour necessary to take into account the
provisions ofthe existing agreementswith Iran.
656. The maritimeboundary proposed by Bahrain in both the southern
and the northem sectors is shown for illustrative purposes on Map 11in
Volume 7.
SECTION6.3 Bahrain's alternative claim
657. There are variousways of characterisingBahrain, including:
(1) as a continental and multiple island State, if the Zubarah
region isdeemedto appertain to Bahrain;
as an archipelago, in theinternational Iegal denotation of
(2)
this term,if the Zubarahregion is not deemedto appertain
to Bahrain but the insular and other legally relevant
features of Bahrain are deemed to fulfilthe relevant
requirementsof the 1982Convention;
(3) as a multiple isiand State, if the Zubarah region is not
deemed to appertain to Bahrain and Bahrain is not
recognised as an ar~hi~ela~o.~~"
731
Even in the event thatthe Zubarahregion waç deemed to appertain to
Bahrain,as it tnustinthe view of Bahrain,the conceptof anarchipelagicState
might still be applied to characterisStateof Bahrain. Since the result
wouldnot substantiallydifferfromthe maritimeline propointhe previous
section,his alternatisnot examinedhere ingreatedetail.658. Each of these factual characterisations necessarily irnports
differentlegai features,such as baselines, and differentunified boundary
lines.
659. It is Bahrain's position that the Zubarah region appertains to
Bahrain and this position is argued fully elsewhere inthis Mernorial.But
Bahrain appreciates that the disposition by the Court of some distinct
items in issue,e.g. title to the Zubarah region, or the archipelagicstatus
of Bahrain, will put some rnatters into issue while rendering others
moot. Bahrain considers it appropriate to inform the Court of its views
ofthe law and boundaries under each of the possible characterisations.
660. A decision that Bahrain is not entitled to sovereignty over any
part of the Zubarah region would not affect the status of the maritime
features situated between the main Bahrain island and the Qatar
peninsula, which would remain under Bahraini sovereignty and whose
low-water lines would therefore continue to be available to Bahrain as
baseIines.Bahrain wiIlhereafterjusti@ its right to archipelagicbaselines
on the basis of these and other maritime features and requests that the
Court dclimit the maritime boundary using the equidistance-special
circumstances method with the archipelagic baselines claimed by
Bahrain. If, however,the Court were to take the view that Bahrain is not
entitled to archipelagic baselines, then a substantially sirnilar maritime
boundary would result from the use of the equidistance-special
circumstances method with, on the Bahraini side,the low-water lines of
the sarne maritime features as normal baselines, together with a small
number of additional features which would not othenvise have been
relevant. While Bahrain asserts its right to archipelagic baselines,
therefore, Bahrain's alternativelaimis in fact forthe maritime boundary
resulting from the application of the equidistance-çpecial circumstancesrnethod to whichever of Bahrain's archipelagic or normal baselines the
Court sees fit to accept.
A. Archipelapicbaselines
661. The description of Bahrain as an archipelago - using that term in
a geographical sense - is long-established and well-documentecl. It was
Lorimer's term in his Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, published in 1908.~~'
It was the term used in British governmental and other offi~ial~~~ and
unoffi~ial~~~ publications. The precise extent of the archipelago
necessarily depended upon a determination of the extent of the domain
over which the Rulerof Bahrain claimed, and asserted, sovereignty. But,
by 1937,in response to a British governmental inquiry on precisely this
point, the Government of Bahrain replied that thearchipelago comprised
Fasht Dibal, Qittat Jaradah, Fasht al Jarim, Khor Fasht, AI Benat, and
"the Hawar archipelago consisting of nine islands near the Qatar
~oast".~~~This clairn was re-iterated in 1947 when the Ruler of Bahrain,
writing to the Political Agent on 3 1 December 1947, stated that the seas
lying between our Eastern coast and the Western coast of the Qatar
732 torirner Vol.II,opcit.pp. 234to 235, Ann. 74,Vol.3, pp.373 and374.
733 See, for example, "Gazetteer of Arabia", published by the Govt. of India, at
p.329, IndiaOffice Records, Ann.323, Vol. 6, p. 1436; Military Report on
the Arabian Shoresof the PersianGulf, Kuwait, Bahrein, Hasa,Qatar, Trucial
Oman, Oman, 1933,p. 32,Ann. 330,Vol.6, p. 1447.
734 See, for example, Charles Belgrave, "Pearl Diving in Bahrain" Journal of
Roval Central Asia Society?Vol.XXI, July 1934, p.450, Ann. 331,Vol. 6,
p. 1449, Sir Rupert Hay, "The Persian Gulf States and their Boundary
Problems",in-TheGeogra~hicalJoumai, Vol.CXX Part4, Dec. 1954,p. 437,
Ann. 350,Vol.6, p. 1510
735
Mernorandurn from Charles Belgrave,Adviser to the Govt. of Bahrain, to
British PoliticalAgent, 14August 1937,Ann.334, Vol. 6, 1455. This was
in replytoa request initiated by Admiralty through the India Office; see
letterfromE.A. Seal, Military Branch Admiralto,Clauson, lndia Office,29
April 1937, Ann. 332, Vol. 6, pp. 1451to 1453, followedby the Political
agent'srequestfor information,5July 1937Ann.333,Vol. 6,p. 1454.peninsulahave been "(under our ownhands) and sovereignty and also al1
islands and shoals and seabed exposedat low ti~le".~~~
662. The translation of this claim, resting on both geography and
established dominion and control, into actual archipelagic base-lines
necessarily had to await the stage at which a clear international
consensus emerged over the whole concept of the archipelagic State.But
in the context of the negotiations during the Third Law of the Sea
Conference, Bahrain's claim was clearly expressed as early as 1974,
without objection from ~atar.~~~ Bahrain has never doubted its
entitlement to the status of an archipelagic State, with archipelagic
baselines, and it hasmade thispositionclearthroughout this dispute.
663. The archipelagicbaselines to which Bahrainis now entitled as an
archipelagic State, under conternporaryinternational law, are an element
of crucial importance in this case. They are illustrated on Map 12 in
Volume 7.
664. Since the Third Law of the Sea Conference was able to reach
agreement on a PartIV (ArchipelagicStates) incircumstanceswhich can
be said to reflect a general consensus, the provisions of Part IV can
properly be said to reflect the current, generally accepted rules of
international law on the matter. Accordingly, it is by reference to these
niles, in particular the rules contained in Articles 46 and 47, that the
legitimacy of Bahrain'sclaim must be tested.
736 Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to CI Pelly, British Political Agent,
31Decernber1947, Ann.345, Vol.6,pp. 1480to 1487.
737 Statement of M. Al-Nimer, Representativeof Bahrain,Third Law ofSeae
Conference, 37th Mtg., 11 Ju1974 (OfficialRecords, Vo1,1974, p. 174
para.30),Ann.352,Vol. 6,p. 1530. Bahrain is an archipelagic State
(i)
665. Article 46(a) providesthat:
"'ArchipelagicState'means a State constituted wholly by one or
more archipeIagosand may include other islands."
666. It is evident that Bahrain meets this criterion since, assurning the
occurrence of the contingency on which this part of the Mernorial is
based, the Court will have determined that Bahrain is composed wholly
of islands.
(ii) The islandscamprisingBahrain arean archipelago
667. Article 46(b)provides that:
"'Archipelago'means a group of islands, including parts of
islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which
are so closely interrelated that such isIands, waters and other
natural features fonn an intrinsic geographical, economic and
political entity, or which historically have been regarded as
such."
668. It is apparentfiom the provision that the group of islands, waters
and natural featuresmust be shownto constitute anentity on the basis of
observable fact a (and this is an alternative rather than a cumulative
requirement) must histoncally have been regarded as such. Bahrain
submits that both alternativecriteria are in factfulfilled inowns case.
The historical data already rnarshalled demonstrate that Bahrain was, in
fact and with amplejustification, historically regardedas an archipelago;
the geographical and social data demonstrate the inextricable
relationship betweenthe islands inte srand the sea.
(iii) TheBahrainarchipelagois an.intrinsic geographicalentity
669. The maritime features enclosed within Bahrain's archipelagic
baselines consist of the main Bahrain island, the immediately adjacentislands of Sitrah and Al Muharraq, approximately 50 other islands
(includingthe HawarIslands) and 22 low-tide elevations.The total land
area exposed atmean high water springs is approximately 701kmz;the
total land area exposed at lowest astronomical tide is approximately
1,020 km2.The total area (land and sea combined) enclosed within the
archipelagicbaselinesreferredto above is approximately4,500km2. The
ratio of sea to Iand is thus approximately 5.3:l or 3.4lt mean high
water springsandlowest astronomicaltiderespectively.
670. The archipelagic baselinesjoin the ten outermost islands and
drying reefs of the Bahrain archipelago.These islands and drying reefs
are Fasht al Jarim, Fasht ad Dibal, three of the islands of the Hawar
group, the Al Hu1 reef atthe southerntip of the main Bahrain island,a
permanently dry rock to the south-west of the main Bahrain island,Al
Baynahas Saghirah,adrying reefto the north of Al Baynahas Saghirah,
and KhawrFasht.
671. The distancebetween the two maritime features constituting the
Bahrain archipelagowhich are the furthest apart, Fasht al Jarim (to the
north of the main Bahrain island) and Janan (in the Hawar group),
measured fromthe northemost point of the formerto the southemost
point of the latter, is just under 60 nautical miles. This maximum
geographical separationis not large by the standards of either the 1982
Convention,whichauthorisesindividualbaselines of upto 125nautical
miles in length,or Statepractice,whichoffersthe examplesof Indonesia
(with a maximumgeographicd separation of 2,161 nautical miles) and
the Philippines (with a maximum geographical separation of 1,034
nautical miles).
672. The maritime features whose geographical unity with the
remainder of the Bahrain archipelago are of most direct concem to amaritime boundary delimitationwith Qatar are the islandsof the Hawar
group, and Fasht ad Dibal. Rayad al. Gharbihyah, the northemmost
island of the Hawar group, is situated only 11 nautical rniIes fiom the
southern tip ofBahrain'smain island at Ra's alBarr T.he intervening
waters contain several other islands (Halat Noon, Qasar Noon, Jazirat
Mashtan,and Al Mu'tarid)distributedeveniybetweenthe main Bahrain
island and the Hawar group. The intervening waters are moreover very
shallow; the depthrarely exceeds 9 metres and is mostly less than 6
metres.Largeareasare so shallowas to be quite unnavigable.Proximity
and shallowness of depth, along with the intense patterns of social
exchangedescribedabove, reinforcethe geographica1unity which exists
betweentheHawar groupand the remainderof the Bahrain archipelago.
673. In additionto the geographicalunity ofthe maritimefeatures,the
baselines connecting them arewell within the internationalnom. Once
again, a cornparison with State practice supports Bahrain's position:
Indonesia maintains archipelagic baselines around the Anambas, an
island group between 180 and 235 nautical miles northwest of Borneo
and only 90 nautical miles east of Malaysia, and around Palmas
(Miangas)Island,245 nauticd miles north of the main island of Celebes
and only 45 nautical miles from the south coast of the Philippines. For
theix part, the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines encompass the
islands ofY'Ami,situated 154nautical miles hm the island of Luzon
and only 78 nautical miles from the mainland of Taiwan, and Sibutu,
situated 193 nautical miles from the island of Mindanao and only19
nautical miles fiom Indonesian Bomeo. Components of archipelagos
may be close to other states, without minimising their archipelagic
status,asthe aboveexarnplesdemonstrate.674. The low-tide elevation Fasht ad Dibal sirnilarly forms partof the
intrinsic geographical entity constituted by the Bahrain archipelago.
Fastit ad Dibal is situated only 14 nautical miles from the island of
Muharraq; it is only 10 nautical miles from the low-water line around
Fasht allAzmand Qit'atAl Khujayjirah, which, as Bahrain has shown
above, should be considered aspart of the island of Sitrah; and it is only
2.5nautical miles fiom Qit'atJaradah.
675. To sumarise, the entire area between the main Bahrainisland,
the Hawar Islands and Fasht ad Dibal is filled with various maritime
features,including, inadditionto those alreadymentioned,the islands of
(Jazirat) Ajirah, Jabbari, Tighaylib and Umm Jalid, and the low-tide
elevations of FashtBuThoor and Qita'ael Erge. The combined effect of
al1these maritime features is to keep commercial shipping to the east of
the line from theHawar Islands to Fasht ad Dibal;the waters to the West
of this line are used only by srnaIl,shallow-draft Bahraini vesselswhich
are engaged mainly in fishing. The islands and other maritime features
making up the Bahrain archipelago, therefore, clearly constitute an
intrinsic geographical entity.
(iv) TheBahrainarchipelagoisan intrinsiceconomic entity
676. Bahrâin has demonstrated that the Hawar Islands are and
historically have been entirely economically dependent on and
economically integrated with Bahrain (sec paragraphs 418 to 419 and
paragraph438 et seq). Balvain has also demonstrated the economic
significance of the fishing activities carried on in the area enclosed by
Bahrain'sarchipelagic baselines to the inhabitants of the main Balnrain
island, SitrahandAl Muharraq(seeparagraphs 595to 597).677. Takinginto accountthe large-scaleBahraini fisheriesthroughout
the area enclosed by Bahrain's archipelagic baselines,the extensive oil
exploration conducted over this area since 1938 under Bahrain's
authority, and Bahrain's continuous activities in surveying, charting,
buoying and marking the area, it is clear that the Bahrain archipelago
constitutesanintrinsiceconomicentity.
(v) The Bahrain archipelago isan intrinsicpoliticalentity
678. Bakrain'sclaims to sovereigntyoverthe HawarIslands, and over
Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, have been discussed above (see
Chapter 3 in relatioto the Hawar Islands and paragraphs569 to 592 in
relationto Fasht adDibaland Qit'atJaradah).
679. Bahrain has already referred to its consistent practice of
maintaining coast guard patrols throughout the area occupied by the
insukir and other legally relevant maritime features between themain
island of Bahrain and the Qatar peninsula (see paragraphs598 to 599).
Map 7 in Volume 7 shows, in red, the normal patrol limits of the
Bahrain coast guard.As Bahrain has pointed out, there is no direct
relationship between these patrol limits and the main navigation routes
(indicated in black and blue). On the other hand, the area patrolled by
the Bahrain coast guard encompasses al1of the area enclosed within
Bahrain's archipelagicbaselines. It follows that Bahrain's coastguard
patrols are a manifestationf general sovereigntyrather than of specific
concern for navigational safety, and a demonstration of the intrinsic
politicaiunityof the Bahrainarchipelago.(vi) Historical evidence of the existence of the Bahrain
archipelago as an intrinsic geographical, economic and
political entity
680. lt is important to emphasise that, providedthere is historical
evidence of such links between Bahrain's main island and the outlying
islands or features of the ar~hi~ela~o,~~ t~ere does not need ta be
historical evidence that the entire group was considered to be an
archipelago.The reason for this is abvious enough. As has been show,
the regime of the archipelagic State,as a legal regirne,achieved forma1
recognition in the 1982 Convention. Prior to the Third Conference on
the Law of the Sea, the concept was, as an international legal concept,
controversialand the geographical extentof a legal archipelagowas not
defined. It could not be expected, therefore, that in 1939 the British
Govenunent would recognise that the Hawargroup of islands fonned
part of the Bahrainarchipelago.Forin 1939such a concepthad not been
established. Thus what has to be established is that there are such
geographical, economicor political links, or that suchlink have been
historically recognised:but the legal clairnto archipelagicstatus can be
quite newandin Bahrain'scase couldnothavebeenreasonably expected
prior to the 1982 Convention. Theformal promulgationof such a claim
has been delayed even further because of Bahrain'scornmitmentunder
the principles of mediation of 1982-83 "not to change the current
situation in respect of the disputed issue". But,facto, Bahrain & an
archipelago and, de jure, it has an existing legal entitlement to
promulgatesuchbaselinesas it is entitledto by law.
738 That thereis such evidenceis clear. See Lorimer Vocit.pp.234 to
235,Ann. 74, Vol.3,pp.37to 374. The ratio of the area of water to the area of land falls
(vii)
between 1 :1 and 9:1
681. As noted above, the ratio is in fact 5.3:1 or 3.4:1 at mean high
watersprings and lowestastronomicaltide respectively.
(viii) The baselines da not depart to any appreciable extent from
the generalconfiguration ofthe archipelago
682. The criterionof what is, or is not, an "appreciableextent.",within
the meaning of Article 47(3) can only be determined by reference to
Statepractice. The distances fromBahrain'smain islandare very modest
by any standard of State practice: they are 18 nautical miles (Pasht al
Jarim), 14 nautical miles (Fashtad Dibal) and 11 nautical miles (the
Hawar Islands). State practiceaccepts distancesof 100 - 200 nautical
miles.
683. Itmight, of course,be saidthat distancealone is not decisive,and
that the significanceof any departure is a question of scale. But if one
bears in mind the sizeof the main island, in relation to the location of
the outlying parts of the archipelago, and their distance fiom the main
island,it cm be seenthat there is no significantdeparture.This is al1the
more evidentwhen one considers thesize and configuration ofthe main
island by reference to its own offshore reefs and low-tide elevations.
For, even by reference to the normal rules governing baselines and
without contemplating the outlying parts of the archipelago, Bahrain's
main island must be deemed to iinclude an extensive area of fringing
reefs, and manylow-tide elevations.It is thereforenot simply the shape
and size of the area of dry land which counts. The main island of
Bahrain has to be regardedasthat area which wouldbe embraced within
normal baselines, evenif no questionof archipelagicstatusarose.(ix) No baseline exceeds 100miles
684. The maximum length is in fact 38 nautical miles from Dibal to
Hawar.
(x) The baselines do not cut off the territorial sea of Qatar from
the High Seas or the Exclusive Economic Zone
685. In relation tothe area of Qatari territorialseato the south-westof
the Qatar peninsula, access from thistenito~ialsea to Qatar'sexclusive
economic zone and the high seas is possible via the band of Qatari
territorial sea situated between the Hawar Islands and the Qatar
peninsula.
686. In addition,ascm be seenfrom anymap, Qataras awhole is left
with open access to the high seas by virtue of its extensive east-facing
coastline,alongwhichvirtuaIlyits entirepopulationlives.
(xi) Any legitimate and traditional rights of passage exercisedby
Qatar between the coasts of Qatar south of Bahrain's
archipelagicwaters and the Gulfwill continue
687. Bahrain acceptsthe obligations statedin Articles 5and 52 ofthe
1982 Convention. Thus, Bahrain accepts the obligation to enter into a
bilateral agreementwith Qatarto preserve within Bahrain'sarchipelagic
waters any "traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities"
which Qatar may show to have existed within certain areas of these
archipelagicwaters.Moreover,a right of innocentpassage is accordedto
Qatar by virtue of Article 52, in accordance with the tems of
paragraph 1of that~rticle.~~'
739 Historicaltherehasnever beeanysignificantmaritimetrafic betweenthe
QatarCoasttothe southof the HawarIslandsand the high seas of the GulfB. Normal baseline~
688. Bahrain considers it appropriate, as has been explained in
paragraphs 657 to 660 above, to inform the Court of the maritime
boundarywhichwould, in Bahrain'sview, result fiom a decisionto treat
the coastlines of Bahrain's insular and otherlegalIy relevant maritime
features, excluding the Zubarah region, as normal baselines. Bahrain
would respectfùlly remind the Court,however, that this treatrnent does
not correspond toBahrain'sview of its own geographicalstatus.Bahrain
continues to maintain both its claim to sovereignty over the Zubarah
regionand its position that, shouldthe Zubarahregion be deemednot to
appertain to Bahrain, the insular and other Iegally relevantfeatures of
Bahrain constitute an archipelago within the meaning of the 1982
Convention.
689. Bahrain'snormal baselines, in the event that the Court does not,
withinthe context of Bahrain'salternativeclaim, accept Bahrain's claim
to archipelagic baselines, are exactly the baselines which Bahrain
claimed in the context of its principal claim, with the exception of the
Zubarah c~astline.~~~ Among these baselines, the low-water line
surrounding Qit'at ash Shajarah, owing to its geographical situation,
assumes greaterrelevancein connectionwith Bahrain'salternative claim
thanit possessesin connectionwithBahrain'sprincipalclaim.
itself (witheexceptionof the old routefrom Sitrahto Zekrit). The oil.fields
inQatarat Jebel Dukhanpipe the oil acrossthepeninsulUmmo Saidon the
east coasofQatar.Qatar'sfishinisalso locaton theeastcoast.
740
For a discussionof thesebasepoints,see Section6.1, statparagraph564
and Section6.2, startingat paragraph633.C. Thealternative maritime boundary
(i) The southernsector
690. As in the case of Bahrain's main claim, the single maritime
boundary which Bahrain requests the Court to delimit in this sector is in
fact aterritorial.sea boundary.The geographicalrelationship betweenthe
respective coasts of Bahrain and Qatar, however, differs fiom the
correspondingrelationship in the case of Bahrain'sprincipal claim. As a
result of the removal of the Zubarah Coastfrom Bahrain's baseline, the
delimitation under this contingency would be between opposite coasts
over the entirety of the southern sector.
691. The appropriate rnethod of delimitation in the context of
Bahrain's alternativeclaimis, Bahrain submits, the sameas for Bahrain's
main claim: the Court should take as a starting point "the median line
every point of which is equidistant fiom the nearest point on the
baselines fromwhich the breadth ofthe territorial seas of each of the two
States is measured." Subsequently, the Court should enquire whether "it
is necessary, by reason of historic title or other special circumstances,"
to adjust or displace the median line in order to arrive at an equitable
result.
692. As alreadystated,therefore, the appropriate baselines for Bahrain
are the archipelagicbaselines illustrated on Map 12in VoIurne7. Should
the Court:not accept Bahrain'sclaim to archipelagic baselines, however,
the appropriatebaselines for Bahrainare the normal baselines referred to
in paragraphs 688 and 689. Afier the baselines of Bahrain and Qatar
have thus been defined, the Iine "every point of which is equidistant
fi-omthe nearest point on the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial seas of each of thtwo States is measured" can be preciselydetemined by the two States' technical experts. Map 13 in Volume 7
shows, for illustrative purposes, Bahrain's archipelagic baselines in
purple, and the equidistance line between Bahrain's archipelagic
baselines and Qatar's baselinesin red. Map 14 in Volume 7 shows the
equidistance line between Bahrain's normal baselines and Qatar's
baselines as a blue dotted line. Map 15 in Volume 7 shows the two
equidistance lines in the southern sector: the equidistance line using
Bahrain's archipelagic baselines is shown as a red solid line, and the
equidistance line using Bahrain's normal baselinesis shown as a blue
dotted line.
693. As in the case of Bahrain's principal claim, the southernmost
point of the maritime boundary cannot be definedprecisely at this time.
For this reason, the median lines on Maps 13, 14and 15terminate south
of Janan in an arrow indicating a directional bearing, rather than in a
precisepoint.
694. After the median line has been determined, the Court has to
consider whether any particular aspect of the delimitation requires the
adjustment or shifting of the median line in order to arrive at an
equitable resultAs Bahrainhas pointed out (see paragraphs 690to 694),
where the delimitation is between opposite coasts (as is the entire
delimitation in the context of Bahrain's alternative claim), the median
line enjoys a presurnption of equity; and in the circumstances of the
present case no adjustment or shifting is called for. The median line
deterrnined by the Court should, throughout this sector, be regarded as
definitive.(ii) The northern sector
695. The single maritime boundary requested by Bahrain in the
northern sector, in the contextof Bahrain'salternative claim,is identical
to the single maritime boundary requested by Bahrain in the northern
sector in the context of Bahrain'sprincipal claim (see paragraphs649 to
655). This boundary is shown on Map 10 in Volume 7 for illustrative
purposes. 301
SUBMTSSIONS
In view ofthe factsand argumentssetforthin this Mernorial;
May ir please the Court, rejecting dl contraryclaims and subrnissions,
to adjudgeand declarethat:
2. Bahrain is sovereign over the Hawar IsIands, including
Jananand HaddJanan.
3. In view of Bahrain'ssovereignty overal1the insular and
other feahres, including Fasht ad Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah, comprising the Bahraini archipelago, the
maritime boundary between Bahrain and Qatar is as
describedin ParTwo of this Mernorial.
Bahrainreservesthe righttosupplementor modi& the preceding
submissions.
(Sig&)
JawadSaIim Al Arayed
Ministerof StateandAgent ofthe Stateof Bahrain APPENDICES
1. LISTOF PEOPLEREFERRE DO INMEMORIA (with reference
to paragraphsnwhichthey are mentioned)
1 Bahrain
(II) Qatar
3. BFUTIS POLITICA LESIDENTAND AGENT INTHE GULFOF
ARABIA
(1) Political Residents,Bushire 1822-1960
(II) Political Agents, Bahrain1900-1960
(III) PoliticalAgentslOfficersQatar1949-1960
(1) Ottoman Empire
British Empireadministrationin BahraidQatar
(11)
Peninsulauntilindependenceof India, 1947
(III)BritishEmpire administrationin BahrainiQatar
Peninsula after indepenofIndia, 1947
5. CHRONOLO GYTHEBNTISH 1938-1939ADJUDICATION
6. LISOF HISTORIC AAPSINTHE MEMOTUAL1. LIST OF PEOPLE REFERRE TDO INMEMORIAL
(withreferences toparagraphsin which theyare mentioned)
Ahmad, Sharafbin. (paragraphs434,435)
Qadi(seniorreligiousjudge) of ShariaCourt in Muhmaq.
Andrew, R.M. (paragraph316)
BritishPoliticalAgent,Bahrai(1950-1952).
Ballantyne, H.K.(paragraphs101,228,239,3 12,642)
London Solicitorto BAPCOandto the Ruler ofBhain. Wasappointed
asthe Ruler's London legalrepresentatin May 1949.
Beaumont, Richard. Cparagraph332, 501,502)
BritishForeignOffice Official,London(early 1960s).
Belgrave, Sir Charles Dalrymple(paragraphs 87, 101, 228, 277, 282,
283, 287, 293, 296, 312, 316, 317, 393, 439, 457, 458, 459, 466, 472,
473,479,481,483, 573,579, 581, 583,584,586,642,661)
Adviserto the Governent ofBahrain(frorn 1927to 1957).
Bhandarker,Dr(paragraphs643,645)
MedicalOfficer,Bahrainhospitalboats.
Bevin,Emest (paragraphs313,314)
BritishSecretaryof Statefor ForeignAffairs(1945-1951).
Black, S.Siparagraph245)
BAPCOChiefLocalRepresentative,Bahrain(1938-1939).
Brown, R.M. (paragraphs129,492)
BAPCO ChiefLocalRepresentative,Bahrain(late 1940s).
Bmcks, CaptainGeorge(paragraphs116,117,120,415,416)
Captainin Britain'sIndianNavy.Responsiblefor the first ArabianCoast
Survey (1821-1829)which included the Hawar Islands (then known as
Warden'sIslands).
Burrows, SirBernard(paragraphs322,323,324,327,334)
SeniorForeign OfficeCivil Servant (1949-). Political Resident,Bahrain
(1953-1958).
Caroe, SirOlaf (paragraphs252,294)
Government of India Official (up to 1936). Acting British Political
Resident,Bushire(Aug.-Nov.1937).
Carson,E. (paragraph642)
LawOfficer to theCrown (1905).Clauson, M.J. (paragraph661)
India OfficeCivilServant, London (mid 1930s).
Cox, Sir Percy (paragraphs27, 192, 193, 215, 222,232, 410, 413, 424,
426,427,436,642)
British Political Resident, Bushire(1904-1914).
Daly, Major Clive(paragraphs53,368)
British Political Agent, Bahrainan.1921-Sept.1926).
Dickson, Major Harold(paragraph225)
British Politicalent, Bahrain(Nov.1919-Nov.1920).
Dosari, Salmanbin Isaal Cparagraphs67,405,443,454,482)
Formerinhabitant of HawarIslands.
Dosari, Nasr bin MakkiAli al (paragraphs67, 351, 405, 440,442, 444,
449,456,471,487, 646)
Former inhabitantof HawarIslands.
Dosari, Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Harnad al Dosari (paragraphs 67,
351,444,485,646)
FormerinhabitantofHawarislands
Fowle, Sir Trenchard (paragraphs86, 87, 94, 96, 229, 241, 242, 245,
255, 256, 261, 262, 263, 269, 270, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 280, 286,
287, 290, 297, 299, 301, 354, 356, 357, 373, 381, 383, 385, 387, 389,
391,392,401,403,473,549,551,552,572)
British PoliticalResident,Bushire(1936to 1940).
Galloway, Lieutenant-Colonel Arnold (paragraphs 89, 98, 300, 305,
309,310)
BritishPoliticalAgent,Bahrain(1945-1947).
Gaskin, J.C.baragraphs 27, 152,154)
Political Assistant of the Bushire Residency, based in Bahrain
(1900-1914). Mr.Gaskinwas the firstBritish official to be permanently
basedin Bahrain.
Gault,CharlesA.(paragraphs324, 325,326)
PoliticalAgent,Bahrain (1954-1959).
Ghattam,Ibrahim bin Salman Ali (paragraphs 52, 67, 347, 405, 440,
442,445,448,454,462,472,475)
Formerinhabitantof HawarIslands.
Grant,MajorCharles (paragraphs77,82,206)
AssistantPolitical Resident,Bahrain(1873).Hasen, Abdullabin
British'NewsAgent'Dohah(1937).
Haworth,Lt. Col.L.B.(paragraph235)
British Political Resident,Bushire(Jan. 1927-Nov.1928).
Hay, Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert (paragraphs305, 309, 314, 315, 216,
318,368, 661)
British Political Resident,Bahrain (1946-1953).
Hickinbotham, Major T. (paragraphs85, 87, 95,96, 97, 252, 255, 256,
258, 259, 269, 270, 277, 278, 281, 285, 287, 289, 292, 293, 294, 299,
300,301,304,305,306,307,308,309,312,472)
British PoliticalAgent,Bahrain(1937-1944).
Holmes, MajorFrank
Oil Concession entrepreneurin the MiddleEast hm early 1920s.Acted
for Easternand General Syndicateand later for Petroleurn Concessions
Limited as negotiatorforBahrain Additional Area, 1938.
Izzet, (paragraphs21, 162,163,425)
Captainin the Imperia1OttomanArmy(Circa 1878).
Jabur,Nasserbin
Tribal Leader ofNaim atZubarah (1930s).
Kemball, Colonel(paragraphs117, 132, 153, 155,183)
BritishPoliticalResident,Bushire (1898-1904).
Keyes, CaptainTerenceH.K.lparagraph2 15)
British PoliticalAgent,Bahrain(1914-1916).
Al-Khalifa family,Ruling family of Bahrain. See Appendix 20) for a
listof the Rulorsof Bahrain.
Knox,S.G.(paragraphs53,222,436)
British Political Resident, Bushire (Mar. 1914-Nov. 1914). Jan.
1915-Apr.1915(on specialduty).Apr. 1923-0ct. 1923(Acting).
Laver, W.S. (paragraphs316,317)
PoliticalAgent, Bahrain(1952-1953).
Little,J. (paragraphs321,493,642)
PoliticalAgent, Bahrain(1953-1954).
Loch, Lieutenant-ColonelGordon (paragraphs 94, 241,254, 255, 260,
261,262,267,373,479)
PoliticalAgent,Bahrain(1932-1932).Longrigg, S.H.(paragraph75)
Anglo-PersianOil Company/PCLRepresentativefrom 1930s.
Lorimer,J.G. (paragraphs25,27, 58, 75, 84,93,96, 100, 119,120, 125,
126, 128, 131, 132, 141, 170,207, 208, 210, 299, 417, 422, 423, 437,
639,640,643,661,680)
India Civil Service, early 1900s. British Political Resident, Bushire
(Dec. 1913-Feb.1914).
Man,Morgan (paragraphs328, 329,330, 501)
British Political Resident,Bahrain(1959-961).
Mana, Salehal. (paragraph388)
Secretaryto the Rulerof Qatar(1930s).
Middleton, Sir George(paragraph 331)
BritishPoliticalResident,Bahrain(1958-1961).
Moberly, John C.(paragraph330)
BritishPoliticalAgent,Doha(1958-1961).
Mohammed,Khalifabin (paragraphs456,472)
Head ofBahrainpolice(1940s).
Musallam, Jabor,
Pearl Merchant.
Naimi, Mohammed bin MohammedAl. (paragraphs96, 257, 266, 277,
284,289,290,3 16)
Former inhabitant ofZubarah.
Naimi, Saleh bin MuharnmedAli Al - (paragraphs92, 256, 257, 266,
277,283,289,290)-
Former inhabitantof Zubarah.
Packer, E. (paragraphs439,458,469)
Manager and Senior Local Representative of Petroleum Concessions
Limited(1935-1947).
Pelly, Lieutenant ColonelLewis(paragraphs 124to 129, 139,222)
BritishPolitical Resident, Bushire1867-9).
Pelly, C.J.(paragraphs99,3 11,3 14,316,569)
British Political Agent,Bahrain(1947-1950). The architect of the 1950
"verbalagreement"overZubarah.
Pelly,J.H. Captain(paragraphs179 - 181,225)
CommanderandSeniorNaval Off~cer,Gulf(1890s)Prideaux, F.B. Captain(paragraphs27, 82, 84, 410, 413, 424, 426, 427,
43O)
British PoliticalAgent,Bahrain (1904-1909)and later PoliticaiResident
(1924-1927).
Prior, SirGeoffiey(paragraphs232,290,307, 552)
British PoliticalAgent, Bahrain1929-1932).British Political Resident,
Bushire (1941-1945).
Ross, Lieutenant-ColonelEdward C. (paragraphs80, 81, 133, 139, 146,
159, 160, 161, 170, 174, 176, 178, 196,198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204,
205,211)
BritishPoliticalResident,Bushire (1872-1891).
Saud,AbdulAzizIbnbaragraphs 63,225,230,232,297)
FirstRuler ofthe modernKingdomof SaudiArabia.
Skinner, E.A. (paragraph239)
BAPCOChiefLocalRepresentative(1930s).
Skliros,J. karagraph 376)
PCLLondonExecutive(1936onward).
Smith,Captain
2nd AssistanttoPoliticalResident(1869).
Starling,F.C.
PetroleumDepartment,Whitehall(1933).
Steineke,Max(paragraph492)
Aramcogeologist,
Talbot,Lieutenant-ColonelAdelbertC. Cparagraphs147,163,209)
BritishPoliticalResident,Bushire(1891-1893).
Tomlinson, B.L.
AssistantBritishPoliticalAgent,Bahrain(1937).
Tripp, J. Peter
BritishPoliticalgent, Bahrain(1965).
Trevor, Lt. Col.A.P.(paragraph225)
British Political Resident, Bushirev. 1919-Oct.1920)and fomerly
British PoliticalAgent,BahrainWov 1912-May1914).
Wakefield, E.B.(paragraphs290,293)
British PoliticalAgent,Bahrain(Jan. 1942-0ct. 1943).
Wall (paragraph320)
ActingBritishPolitical Agent,Bahrain(1954).Walton, J.C. (paragraphs250,376)
India Office,Civil Servant(1936-1.
Weightman, Sir Hugh (paragraphs245, 254, 303, 354, 356, 372, 378,
379, 383, 384, 385, 387, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 395, 400, 413, 432,
440, 441, 444, 445, 447, 452, 455, 457, 459,460, 468, 469, 472, 474,
477,481,547,548,552)
BritishPoIiticalAgent (1937-1940).
Williamson,Haji Abdullah(paragraph233)
Anglo-PersianRepresentativein Persian Gulf.
Wilson, Lt.Col.F.A.(paragraph78)
BritishPoliticalResident,Bushire (Oct. 1920-Apr.1924).
Wilson,Col.F.S. (paragraphs179, 180,212)
BritishPolitical Resident, Bushire(Jan. 1894-Jun.1897).
Wiltshire,Edward P. (paragraph333)
BritishPoliticalAgent, Bahrain(1959-1961).(1) RULER SF BAHRAIN
H.H.SheikhAhmed Al-FatihAl Khalifa
H.H.SheikhAbdullah bin AhmedAl ~halifa'
H.H. SheikhSalmanbin AhmedAl Khalifa
H.H. SheikhKhaIifabin Sdman Al Khalifa
H.H. SheikhMohammedbin KhalifaAl Khalifa
H.H. SheikhAli bin KhalifaAl-Khalifa
H.H. SheikhMohammedbin AbdullahAl Khlifa
H.H. SheikhIsa binAli Al-Khalifa
W.H. SheikhHamadbin AliAl-Khalifa
H.H. SheikhSalmanbin Hamad Al-Khalifa
H.H. SheikhIsabin SaimanAl-Khalifa
1
SheikhsAbdullahand Salmanruled jofromytheir father'sdeath in 1796.
When Sheikh Salrnandied, his son, Sheikh Khalifasucceededas joint mler.
On SheikhKhalifa'sdeath in 1834,SheikhAbdullahcontruleassole
mleruntil 1843.{II) CHIEF S FDOHA /RULER OSF QATAR
SheikhMohammedbin Thani(Chiefof BiddaDoha) -1876~
Sheikh Jasimbin MohammedAl Thani(Chiefof Doha) 1876-1913
SheikhAbdullahbin lasim AIThani (Chiefof DohaJRulerof ~atar~ ) 1913-1948
SheikhAli binAbdullahAlThani 1948-1960
SheikhAhmedbin AIiAl-Thani 1960-1972
SheikhKhalifabin Harnad Al-Thani 1972-1995
SheikhHamad bin KhalifaAl-Thani 1995-
2 Sheikh Mohammedbin Thaniremainedthe nominal Chiefof Dohauntil 1876
when he retired fiom public life. He died in 1878. His son, Sheikh Jasirn,
became dfactoChief of Doha following the establishment of the Ottoman
garrison inDoha1871and formallysucceededin 1876.
3
ln 1916, Britain signed a treaty wichthe Chief of Doha, caIling him the
"ShedcofQatar". (See Section2.IOstatpara. 215)3. BRITISH POLITICA RESIDENT SND AGENTS INTHE ARABIAN
GULF
Cpt.John MacLeod Dec. 1822-Sept18234
Cpt.Henry Hardy Oct. 1823-Dec.1823
Col.Ephraim GerrishStannus Dec. 1823-Jan.1827
Cpt.David Wilson Jan.1827-Mar1831
Dr.John MacNeil Dec. 1830-Dec. 1831
Lt, SamuelHennell Mar. 1831-Jan. 1832(ilc)
DavidAnderson Blane Jan. 1832-June1834
Lt. SamuelHennell June 1834-c.July 1835(acting)
SurgeonThomas Mackenzie c. July 1835-
Major James Morison Oct. 1835-0ct. 1837
SurgeonThomasMackenzie Oct. 1837-Apr.1838(iic)
Lt. Samuel Hennell [May] 1838-Mar. 1852
Col.HenryDundas Robertson Jan. 1842-Apr.1843(officiating)
Lt.Arnold BurrowesKemball Apr. 1843-Dec. 1843(offg)
Cpt. Arnold BurrowesKemball Mar. 1852-July1855
Mar. 1852-July 1855
Cpt.James FelixJones Oct. 1855-Apr. 1962(offgto July 1856)
Cpt. Herbert Frederick Disbrowe Apr. 1862-Nov.1862(offg)
Lt.-Col.LewisPelly NOV.1862-Ott. 1872
(actingto Mar. 1863;offtoApr. 1864)
Lt.-Col.EdwardCharles Ross Oct. 1872-Mar. 1891(actinguntil 1877)
Et.-Col.WilliamFrancis Prideaux May 1876-1877 (acting)
Lt.-Col. SamuelBarrettMiles 1885-0ct. 1886(acting)
Lt.-Col.Adelbert Cecil Talbot 1891-May1893(offgto Sept 1 891)
Cpt. StuartHill Godfrey May 1893-June 1893(i/c)
Maj.James Bayes Sadler June 1893-July 1893 (acting)
JamesAdair Crawford July 1893-Dec.1893(i/c)
Maj .JamesHayes Sadler Dec. 1893-Jan.1894 (acting)
Col.Frederick AlexanderWiIson Jan.1894-June 1897
Lt.-Col.MalcolmJohn Meade June 1897-Apr.1900(offgto Mar. 1898)
Lt.-Col.CharlesArnold Kemball Apr. 1900-Apr. 1904(acting)
Maj .PercyZachariahCox Apr. 1904-Dec.1913(offgto Oct. 1905);
substantive,tempto May 1909)
Maj.Arthur PrescottTrevor Aug. 1909-Mar.1910(i/c)
John Gordon Lorimer Dec. 1913-Feb. 1914
Cpt.Richard LockingtonBirdwood Feb. 1914-Mar. 1914(i/c)
4 Appointmentnot takenupandsubsequentlycancelled.Maj. Stuart:GeorgeKnox Mar. 1914-Nov. 1914(i/c)
Maj.PercyZachariahCox Nov. 1914-0ct. 1920'
Maj. StuartGeorgeKnox Jan. 1915-Apr.1915
(officer on speciaduty)
Maj .ArthurPrescottTrevor Apr. 1915-Nov. 1917 (DepiityPR)
John HugoHepburnBill Dec. 1917-Sept1919(DeputyPR)
Maj.Cecil HamiltonGabriel Sept 1919-Nov. 1919(DeputyPR)
Lt.-Col.Arthur Prescott Trevor Nov. 1919-0ct. 1920(Deputy PR)
Lt.-Col. SirArnold TalbotWilson Oct. 1920-Nov.1920(offg)
Lt.-Col.Arthur PrescottTrevor Nov. 1920-Apr. 1924
Lt.-Col. Stuart GeorgeKnox Apr. 1923-0ct. 1923(acting)
Lt.-Col.Francis BevillePrideaux Apr. 1924-Jan. 1927
Lt.-Col.ChariesGilbertCrosthwaite June 1925-Oct.1925(acting)
Lt.-Col. SirLionelBerkeleyHaworth Jan. 1927-NOV1 .928
Sir Frederick WilliamJohnston Nov. 1928-Apr.1929
Lt.-Col.Cyril CharlesJohnsonBarrett Apr.1929-Nov.1929
Lt.-Col.HughVincentBiscoe Nov. 1929-Juiy1932
Lt.-Col.TrenchardCravenFowle May 1931-0ct. 1931(acting)
Lt.-Col.TrenchardCravenFowle July 1932-Aug.1939
(actingto Sept 1932)
Lt.-Col.PercyGordonLoch Apr. 1933-May 1933
July 1933-Oct.1933
July1934-Oct.1934
July 1935-Oct.1935
July 1936-Oct.1936(acting)
Olaf KirkpatrickCaroe Aug. 1937-Nov.1937(acting)
Hugh Weightman Aug. 1938-Sept1938(acting)
Lt.-Col. CharlesGeoffieyPrior Sept 1939-May 1946
Lt.-Col.WilliamRupertHay Oct. 1941-Sept 1942(offg)
LI.-Col.Arnold CrawshawGalioway May 1945-Nov.1945
Lt.-Col.WilliamRupertHay May 1946-1953
5
Cox was titularuntiOctober1920althoughabsentin Baghdad. His duties
wereperformed in his absence by an "OfonSpecial Duty"whose title
was laterchanged to "Deputy PR. On Cox's appointmenas Chargé
d'Affaires athran in Mach 1918, A.T. Wilson took oveasabsentee
Residentin Baghdaduntil October 1920.John Calcott Gaskin Feb. 1900-0ct. 1904
(PoliticalAssistanti/c)
Cpt. Francis Beville Prideaux Qct. 1904-May1909
Cpt. CharlesFraserMackenzie May 1909-Nov.1920
Ma.. StuartGeorge Knox Nov. 1910-Apr.1911
Cpt.David LockhartRobertsonLorimer Apr. 1911-Nov.1912
Maj .ArthurPrescottTrevor Nov. 1912-May 1914
Cpt.TerenceHumphreyKeyes May 1914-Mar. 1916
Maj. Hugh Stewart Mar. 1916-May 1916
J.M.Da Costa May 1916-June1916
(Head Clerkin charge)
Cpt.TrenchardCraven Fowle July 1916-Nov.1916(acting)
Cpt. PercyGordonLoch Nov. 1916-Feb.1918
GeorgeAlexanderMungavin Mar. 1918-Dec. 1918
Cpt.NormanNapierEvelynBray Dec. 1918-June1919
Saiyid SiddiqHasan June 1919-Nov.191 9
(IndianAssistantilc)
Maj.HaroldRichardPatrick Dickson NOV.1919-Nov. 1920
Saiyid SiddiqHasan Nov. 1920-Jan.1921[ilc)
MajorCliveKirkpatrickDaly Jan. 1921-Sept1926
Cpt.GeorgeLeslieMallam May 1925-Nov. 1925 (acting)
Maj.Cyril CharlesJohnsonBarrett Sept 1926-Apr.1929
Cpt. Reginald GeorgeEvelinAlban Apr. 1927-Nov.1927
Cpt. CharlesGeoffreyPrior Apr. 1929-Nov.1932
Lt.-Col.Percy Gordon Loch Nov. 1932-Apr.1937
KahnBahadurAbdulHaiyal-Hashimi Apr. 1933-May1933[offg)
Cpt. Everard HuddlestonGastrell JU~Y1933-Nov.1933(offg)
MeredithWorth July 1934-Oct.1934[offg)
Cpt. GeorgeAshrneadCole Mar. 1935-Oct.1935joffg)
Cpt.Tom Hickinbotham Apr.1937-Oct.1937
Hugh Weightman Oct. 1837-0ct. 1940
Cpt.John Baron Howes Aug. 193%Sept1 :938 (acting)
Maj .Reginald GeorgeEvelinAlban Oct. 1940-Jan.1942
EdwardBirkbeckWakefield Jan. 1942-0ct. 1943
Cpt. MichaelGreyDixon Aug. 1943-0ct. 1943 (acting)
Maj .Tom Hickinbotham Oct.1943-Mar.1945
CorneliusJames Pelly Mar. 1945-0ct. 1945
Lt.-Col.Arnold CrawshawGalloway Oct. 1945-Mar.1947
Cpt.Hugh DunstanRance July 1946-Nov. 1946(acting)
CorneliusJames Pelly Mar. 1947-1951
Cpt.Hu& DunstanRance July 1947-Aug.1947
GordonNoel Jackson Aug. 1947-Nov,1947
Lt.-Col.Arnold CrawshawGalloway June 1947-Qct.1947 (offg)BernardA.B.Burrows July1953-NO 1V.58
George H.Middleton NOV. 1958-1961
CharlesAlexanderGault Dec. 1954
EdwardParrWiltshire May 1959
ArthurJohn Wilton Aug. 1949
WilliamBannettJohnston April 1953
Derek CharlesCarden Mar. 1955
John SpenserDuncan Jan. 1958
John CampbellMoberly July1959 OttomanEmpire -Sultan
GrandVizierate -GrandVizier
Vilayet(region) -Beylerbyi(RegionalGovernor)
SanjaklSancak(province) -Sancakbeyi {ProvinciaGlovernor)
KitalKaza(district- Kadi(Magistrate)/KaimMakam(AssistantGovernor)
NahiyelNahilze(Sub-district)-NaiplMudir(11) BRITISH EMPIRE ADMINISTRATION IN BAHRAIN/QATAR
PEN~NSUL UNTILINDEPENDEN CEINDIA1,947
ForeignOffice(London)
L
lndia Office(London)
Governmentof lndia (Bombay)
PoliticalResident(PersianGulf)
PoliticalAgent (Bahrain)(111) BRITISH EMPIRE ADMINISTRATION XN BAHRAINIQATAR
PENINSUL AFTERINDEPENDENCE OF INDIA, 1947
Foreignand
Communwealth Office
(London)
SecretarofState for
CommonwealthAffairs (London)
PoliticalResident(PersianGulf)
PoliticalAgent (Bahr-iPoliticalAgent (Qatar)(from 1949)5. CHRONQLCJ OGFY HE BRITIS H938-1939ADJUDICATION
The Political Agent, the official charged with conducting the on-site
assessrnent for the British Government, invited Qatar and Babrain to
submit what he called "claim" and "counter-claim," respectively. Either
Party could have chosen to produce as elaborate pleadings as they
wisl-ied.The Parties choseto expresstheir legal arguments inthe formof
letters to the Political AgentThe expressions used by the Politicd
Agent to refer to these communications, adopted in this Memorial,
including the word "rejoinder" to describe the reply to Bahrain's
Counter-claim which the Ruler of Qatar successfulty insisted on
submitting, confirm theexplicit adjudicativenatureofthe proceedings,
27 May 1938 Qatar'sclairn6
30May 1938 The British Political Agent meets theer of Qatar
to discuss his clairn7
14August 1938 Qatar'sClaimis forwarded to~ahrain'
8November 1938 The Political Agent reminds Bahrain to submit its
~ounter-claim9
22 December 1938 Bahrain'scornter-claim"
6 QatarCIaim(inthefonnof two lettersfrom Rulerof Qatarto BritishPolitical
Agent,10 Mayand 27 May 1938), 10 May 1938,Ann. 256, Vol. 5, p. IO94
and27 May 1938,Ann.260, Vol. 5,p.1102.
7
Letterhm Hugh Weightrnan,British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResideJune1938,Ann.262,Vol.5,p. 112.
8
Letter from Capt. Howes, Acting British Political Agent, to the Acting
Adviserto Govt. of Bahrain,14August1Ann.270,Vol. 5,p. 1125.
9 Letter fiorn Hugh Weightman,British PoliticalAgent, to tto theiser
Govt. of Bahrain, British Political Resident, 8 November 1938, Ann.272,
Vol.5, p. 1127.5 January 1939 Bahrain'sCounter-claimis fonvardedto ~atar"
30 March 1939 Qatar's~ejoinder'~
22 April 1939 The PoliticaIAgent cornmicates the record of the
proceedings and his analysis to the Politicai
~esident'~
29April 1939 The Political Resident forwards the Political
Agent's record and analysis to the British
Governmentin g on don'^
13 June 1939 The British Govemment decides in favour of
Bahrain's claim to sovereignty over the Hawar
Islands, subject to the assent of the British
Governmentof 1ndia15
1 July 1939 The British Govenunent of Zndia"concurs" in the
decisionof HisMajesty's~ovemment'~
l0
BahrainCounter-daim (inthe formofa letterfromCharlesBelgrave,Adviser
to the Govt. of Bahrain to Hugh Weighîman, British Political Agent),
22 December1938, Ann. 274, Vol. 5,p1129.
II Letter frorn Hugh Weightman, British PoliticalAgent,to Ruler of Qatar, 5
January 1939,Ann.276, Vol.5,p.1141.
l2
Qatar Rejoinder (in the form of a lemer kom Rulerof Qatar to Hugh
Weightman, British Political Agent), 30 March 1939, Ann.278, Vol. 5,
p. 1144.
l3 Weightman Report, Ann.281, Vol. 5,p. 1165.
l4 LetterfrornLt. Col.Fowle,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryof State for
India,29 April1939,Ann.282,Vol.5, p. 1173.
l5
LetterfromForeignOffice (London) toIndiaOffice(London),13June 1939,
Ann.284(a),Vol. 5, p. 1176
l6 Letterhm Deputy Secretaryto the Govt.of lndia to Lt. Coi. Fowle, British
Political Agent,Lt. ColFowl1,July1939,Ann.286,Vol. 5,p. 1181.11 July 1939 Britain'sdecision is communicated tu Bahrain and
~atar'~
l7
Lerterfiom Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political ResitonRuler of Bahrain
and Rulerof Qatar, 11July 1939 Ann. 287, Vol. 5, p. 18and Ann. 288,
Vol. 5p.1183. 6. LISTOFHISTORIC ALAPSINTHE MEMORIAL
1. 1838 Extract from French map entitled Carte de la Turquie
d'asie. de la PedeeI'Af~hanistet de L'Arabie by
Colone1Lapie.
2. 1878 Extract fromOttomanmap entitled The Velavat:of Basra
by Captain Izzet of the Imperia1Armyof the Ottoman
Empire.
3. 1972 Extract from British map entitled H-6C. BahIrano
Qatar. Saudi Arabia'United Arab Emirates published by
the Directorof MilitarySurvey,Ministryof Defence.
4. 1991 Extract from National Geographic map entitled Middle
m.The Annexes tothe Stateof Bahrain'sMernorialare listed from 1to 352
seriatum. Thepages of the Annexesgofrom 1to 1530 seriatum.
ANNEXES1 TO 70
(ZUBARAHAND HISTORICALDOCUMENTS)
Annex PageNo.
No. Description
1. Preliminary Treaty between Britainand the Sheikhs of Bahrain, 1-2
5February 1820
(Aitchison's Treaties, Vol.XI,p. 233).
2. General Treaty with the Arab Tribes of the Persian Gulf, 3-8
23 February 1820(Aitchison's TreatieVol. XI,pp. 245-249).
3. Letter from Lt. Col. Hennell, British Political Resident, to 9-12
I.P.Willoughby, Secretary of the Govt. of Bombay,
11December 1838(Recordsof ~atar*Vol. 1,pp. 270-273).
4. Letter from Commodore Porter to Lt. Col. HennelI, British 13
Political Resident, 31July 1851(RecordofQatar,Vol. 7,p. 633).
5.
Extracts fiom FrancisWarden "Historical sketch of the Uttoobee14-77
Tribe of Arabs (1716-1853)" (Selections fiom Records of the
Bombay Go\%.,No XXIV, New Series, 1856, reproduced in
Recordsof ~ahrain*,Vol 1,pp. 19-83).
6. Extracts fiom Et. Kemball "Memoranda on the Resources, 78-91
Localities, and Relations of the Tribes Inhabiting the Arabian
Shores of the Persian Gulf' (Selections fi-orn Records of the
Bombay Govt., No XXIV, New Series, 1856, reproduced in
RecordsofQatar, Vol 1, pp. 87-100).
*
The 'Recordsof Bahrain'and 'Records of Qatar' consarchiv ald
documentarymaterialdrawnfrom British archives within the IndiaOffice
Recordsand the Public RecordsOfandpublishebyArchiveEditionin
1993and 1991respectively.Captain G. Brucks "MernoirDescriptive of the Navigation of the
Gulf of Persia, 1821-29" (Selection from Records of theBombay
Govt., NoXXIV, New Series 1856, reproduced in Records of
Bahrain,Vol 1,pp. 105-121).
Tem~s of Friendly Convention between Ruler of Bahrain and
British Govt.,31May 1861
(Aitchison's Treaties,Vol.XIpp. 234-236).
Letter from Capt. Jones, British Political Resident, to
RuIerof Wahabees,8 February 1862.
Letter fiom Lt. Col. Pelly, British Political Resident, to
HAnderson,ChiefSecretaryof Govt. of Bombay, 13April 1863.
Capt. Constable and Lt. Stiffe "The Persian Gulf Pilot"
(Admiralty HydrographieOffice, 1864,reproduced in Records of
Qatar,Vol.2 pp. 7-45).
Agreement of Chief of El-Kutr (Gutter) engaging not to commit
any breach of the maritime peace, 12September 1868,
(Aitchison's Treaties,Vol.I,pp. 183-184).
Agreement between Chiefs residing in the province of Qatar and
ChiefofBahrain,13September1868
(Aitchison's Treaties,Vol.,p. 193).
Agreement of the Aboo Dhebbee Chiefengaging not to commit
anybreach of the Maritime Peace, 16 September 1868(Aitchison's
Treaties,Vol XI,pp. 254-255)
Letter from Mohammed Bin Thani, Chief of Doha to Ruler of
Bahrain, 10 March 1870(IORW15/2/29).
(a) Translation of extract from Officia1 Ottoman Gazette
"TakvimiVekayi", 8 June 1871.
(b) ExtractÇorn OfficialOttoman Gazette
"TakvimiVekayi"8 June 1871(OttomanArchives)
Precis of conversation between Maj. Grant, British Political
Resident, and Ruler of Bahrain, 16August1873
(Recordsof Qatar,Vol 2; p. 519).
Precis of news received from Bahrain Agent in August 1873
(IORPf770).
Translated purport of Ruler of Bahrain's Statement,
2 September1873(Recordsof Qatar,Vol 2, p523).LetterfromLt. Col. Ross,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryta
Govt.of Tndia,4 September 1873
Recordsof Qatar,Vol. 2,p.517).
LetterfromLt. Col. Ross,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryto
Govt.of India, 12September1874(L/P&S/9/25).
Letter from Col. Pelly to Secretary to Govt. of India,
27 October1873(Recordsof Qatar,Vol2,p. 522).
Letter from News Agent to Lt. Col. Ross, British Political
Resident,28 October1874.
LetterfromLt. Col.Ross,BritishPoliticalResident,to Secretaryto
Govt.ofIndia, 10 November 1874
(Records of Qatar,Vol 2,pp. 556-557).
(a) LetterfromOfficiatingUnderSecretarytoGovt.of India,to
Lt.ColRoss,British Political Resident,10December1874.
(b) Transcript of letter fiom Officiating Under Secretary to
Govt. of India, to British PoliticaI Resident,
10 December1874.
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Lt. Col. Ross, British Political
Resident,1 7 December1874.
Letter from Lt. Fraser, Officiating2nd Assistant Resident, to Lt.
Col.Ross,BritishPolitical Resident,18December 1874.
Translatedpurport of a letter fiom News Agent toLt. Col. Ross,
BritishPolitical Resident,February 1875 (IOR Pl775).
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Lt. Col. Ross, British Political
Resident,4 March 1875.
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Lt. Col.Ross, British Political
Resident,7 Mach 1875.
Letterfrom Secretarytothe Govt. of India to Lt. Col. Ross, British
Political Resident,10May 1875.
Letter fiom Col. Ross, British Political Resident, to Ruler of
Bahrain,31May 1875.
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Lt. Col.Ross, British Political
Resident, 14June 1875.
Letter from Sheikh Ahmed bin Ali Al Khalifah to Lt. Col. Ross,
BritishPolitical Resident,2 June 1875(IORPl776).Letter from Capt. Prideaux, British PoliticalResident,to Secretary
to Govt.of India,7 October1876.
Letter from Maj. Grant, British Political Resident, to Ruler of
Bahrain, 17 September1877(IOR Pl1036).
Govt. of India Foreign Dept.MemorandumNo. 127,22May 1879
(RecordsofQatar,Vol.3, pp. 31-38).
Agreement signed by the Chief of Bahrain, 22December 1880
(Aitchison'sTreaties,Vol.XI, p.237).
Letter from Sheikh Jasim bin Thani, Chief of Doha Town, tu Lt.
Col.Ross, BritishPoliticalResident,9March 1881.
Modern translation of a report from Council of State
(a) Departmentof InternaiAffairs, 18January 1887.
{b) Report from Ottoman Council of State Department of
Interna1Affairs, 18January 1887(OttomanArchives).
Telegramfiom Lt. Col. Ross,BritishPoliticalResident,to Foreign
Dept.,Govt.of India, 12March 1888(IORPl3276).
Correspondencebetween Col.Ross, British Political Resident,and
Secretaryto Govt. ofIndia, 17March1888(IORP/3276).
(a) Modern translation ofOttoman Arabic letter from the Vali
ofBasratoHead Clerkof the Padishah,12April 1888.
(b) Ottoman Arabicletterfromthe Vali of Basrato Head Clerk
ofthe Padishah, 12April 1888(OttomanArchives).
Letter from British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Ross,
BritishPolitical Resident,7June 1888(IORP/3276).
(a) Modem translation of Ottoman Arabic report from
Governor of of Nejd to Minister of Interior, including
recommendationsfor refoms inNejd, 9 October1889.
(b) Ottoman Arabic report from Governor of of Nejd to
Minister of Interior,includingrecommendationsfor reforms
inNejd, 9 October1889(OttomanArchives).
(a) Modern translation of Ottoman Arabic Cabinet Minutes,
27 November1889.
(b) Ottoman Arabic Cabinet Minutes, 27November 1889
(OttomanArchives).Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Cal. Ross, British Political
Resident,1 1February 1891.
(a) Modern translationof Report fiom the Office of Assistant
to the Govemor ofKatar, 7Novernber 1891.
Report from the Office Assistantto the Governorof Katar,
(b
7 November 189 1(OttomanArchives).
(a) Modem translation of Ottoman Report from the office of
the ChiefSecretary,YildizPalace 1891-2.
(b) Ottoman Report from the office of the Chief Secretary,
YildizPalace 1891-2(OttomanArchives).
Exclusive Agreement of the Chief of Abu Dhabi with the British
Government, 6March 1892 (Aitchison's Treaties, Vol XI,
pp.256-7).
Letter fiom Lt. Col. Talbot, British PoliticalResidtotSecretary
to Govt.ofIndia, 7May 1893(IORIP&S/7/70).
(a) Modem translation of Ottoman Report on Katar,
Septernber1893.
(b) Ottoman Report on Katar, September 1893
(OttomanArchives).
Letter from Lt. Fraser, Acting 2nd Assistant Resident to Lt.
Col.Ross, British Politicalsident,8 March 1895.
Letter fiom Col. Wilson to Chief of Doha, 22 April 1895
(Recordsof Qatar,Vol3,p. 583).
Letter from Col. Wilson to Chief of Ali bin Ali,22 April 1895,
(Records of Qatar,Vol 3,p.584).
LetterfiomCol. Wilson, British Political ResidenttoSecretary to
Govt of India,24 May 1895(TORRI1 5/1/314).
Memo fiom Col. Wilson, British Political Resident, 5 July 1895
(IOR W15/1/314).
Copyof the letter from Capt. Pelly,Commanderand SeniorNaval
Officer, to Col. Wilson, British Political Resident9 July 1895
(IORR/15/1/314).
Letter hm Capt. Pelly, Commanderand SeniorNaval Officer, to
MahamedEffendi atZubarah,23 July 1895
(IORRI1 5/1/314).Letter from Capt. Pelly, Commanderand Senior Naval Officer, to 266
Col. Wilson, British Political Resident, 7 September 1895
(IORR/15/1/314).
Letter from Capt. Pelly,Commanderand Senior Naval Officer,to 267
Chief ofDoha, 7 September1895
(Recordsof Qatar,Vol. 3,p. 619).
Letter fiom Col. Wilson,British Political Resident,to Secretor268
Govt.ofIndia, 13September 1895(IORRI15/1/314).
(a) Modern translationof Ottoman Arabic Reporton Zubarah 269
Affair,3 May 1897.
Ottoman Arabic Report on Zubarah Affair, 3 May 1897 270-272
(b)
(OttomanArchives).
(a) Translationf Ottoman "Report on Bahrein" fiom Council 273-274
Chamber,22 April 1900.
(b) Ottoman "Report on Bahrein" from Council Chamber, 275-276
22April 1900(OttomanArchives)
(a) Modern translation of mernorandurn from Ottoman Chief 277
Clerk'sOffice30 March1902.
{b) Memorandum hm Ottoman Chief Clerk's Ofice, 278
30March 1902(Ottoman Archives)
(a) Modem translation of Ietter hm Ottoman Minister of 279
Interiorto GrandVezir,6 April 1902.
(b) Letter from Ottoman Miriister of InteriorGrand Vezix, 280
6 April 1902(OttomanArchives).
Letterfiom Lt.Col. Kemball,British Political Resident,to Govt.of 281
India,23 March1903(FOL/P&S/l9).
Modern translationf OttomanArabicletter fiom Mudur of 282
(a)
Udaidto GrandVezir, 1April 1903.
(b) Ottoman Arabic letter from Mudur of Udaid to Grand 283
Vezir,1April 1903(OttomanArchives).
Letterfrom SirN O'Conorto theMarquess of Landsdowne,British 284
ForeignSecretary,13June 1903( IORL/P + Si19).
Extracts from JA Saldana's "Precis of Katar Affairs" 285-354
(Simla 1904,pp. 1-66). ANNEXES71 TO 134
(ZUBARAHANDHISTORICALDOCUMENTS)
Annex Description Page No.
No.
71. Letter fiom Capt. Prideaux to Maj. Cox, Officiating British 355-363
Political Resident, 16 July 1905, attached to a despatch from
Maj.Coxto Sec.to Govt.ofIndia(IORR/15/2/26).
72. (a) Modem translation of Ottoman Arabic report by Governor 364
of Akka,24 December 1907.
(b) OttomanArabicreportby Governorof Akka, 365-367
4 December1907(OttomanArchives).
73. (a) Modem translation of Ottoman Arabic telegram sent by 368-369
MuharramPasha,Vali of Basra, 5December1908.
(b) OttomanArabic telegrarn sentby MuharramPasha, Valiof 370
Basra,5Decernber1908(OttomanArchives).
74. Extracts from Lorimer "Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Oman, and 371-400
Central Arabia", VolII (19081,(pp.233-236, 249-25 1,389-404,
1301-1306,1952,1512-1513,1516).
75. (a) Modern translation of original Ottoman Arabic report 401-403
expressing the opinion of the Foreign Minister that the
places situated on the Nejd Coast belong to Ottoman
Lands,27 January 1909.
(b) Ottoman Arabic - report expressing the opinion of the 404-408
ForeignMinister thatthe placessituated otheNejd Coast
belong to OttomanLands, 27January 1909
Ottoman Archives).
76. (a) Modemtranslation of OttomanArabic reportfiom Province 409
of Basrato Ministryof Interior,25 September1909.
(b) Ottoman Arabic -report from Province of Basra to the 410
Ministry of Interio25 September1909
(OttomanArchives).
77. Report of the Standing Sub-Cornittee of the Cornmittee of 411-412
Imperia1Defence, 14July 1911.Drafi memorandurn to Turkish Arnbassador, JuIy 1911 413-4 15
(FO371112341.
(a) Translation of letter from Ottoman Ministryof the Interior 416
to Basra ProvinceconcemingZubarah, 30Novernber 191 1.
(b) Ottoman Arabic letter f?om Ottoman Ministry of the 417-423
Interior to Basra Province conceming Zubarah,
30November 1911(OttomanArchives).
Note by Sir Percy Cox, BritishPoliticalResident, entitled "Shaikh 424
of Bahrain'sclaimto tributefi-omQatar"(IORR/15/2/30).
Convention between United Kingdom and Turkey regarding the 425-435
Persian Gulfandadjacentterilitories,29 July 1913.
Letter fiom Maj. Keyes, British Political Agent,to Lt. Col. Percy 436-438
Cox, British Political Resident, 23 August 191 5
(IOR W15/2130).
Extracts from Lorimer "Gazetteerof the Persian Gulf, Oman,and 439-511
Central Arabia" Vol 1 (9 15), @p.787-840, 906-913, 2220-2221,
2233-2234,2241-2242,2253,2258,2288-2289).
Treaty between the British Govt. and Ruler of Qatar, 5 12-5t6
3 November 1916(Aitchison'sTreaties,Vol.XI, pp.258-261).
Memorandum from India Office to Govt. of India, 517
16September 1919(L/P&S110/850).
Memo from Maj.Dickson, British Pokitical Agent, to British 518-521
DeputyPoliticalResident,6December 1919(IORL/P&S/10/850).
Memo ftom Maj.Dickson, British Political Agent, to British 522-524
DeputyPoliticalResident, 17January 1920
(IORL/P+S/10/850).
Letter Maj.Daly, British Political Agent,to Lt Col Knox, British 525-526
PoliticalResident, 17October 1923(R/15/1/338).
C.K.Daly'sAdministrationReport of the BahrainPolitical Agency 527-528
forthe year 1923(IORFU1 5/1/71314).
BahrainOilConcession 1925(RI15111649). 529-547
Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Mr Lees and Haji Williamson, 548
10March1926.
Letterfrom Lt,Col. Prideaux,British PoliticalResident, to Foreign 549
Secretaryofthe Govt.of India, 10 July 1926(IOR Rf15111626).Note by Maj. Barrett, British Political Agent, 1January 1927
(FU15121119).
Letter from British Political Resident in the Persian Gtofthe
Secretaryof Stateforthe Colonies, London, April1928.
Telegram fiom Secretary of State for India to Viceroy,
15August 1929.
Indenture between Ruler of Bahrain and E&G, by which the
Bahrain Concession was assigned to BAPCO, 12 June 1930
(IORFUI 5/1/650).
Letter from Capt.Prior, British Political Agent, to Lt.Col. Biscoe,
BritishPoliticalResident,2 Augus1930 (FO37111 4483).
Letterfrom Lt. Col. Biscoe, British Political Resident, to Foreign
Secretaryto Gavt.ofIndia, 18August 1930(FO 371/14483).
Memorandum by Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent,
13June 1933(IOR R/15/2/10123).
Mernorandun from Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, ta
Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, 25 June 1933
(RI15111626).
A.F.Williamson's report entitled "Notes on Qatar",
14January1934(pp. 131-135).
Lease between Ruler of Bahrain and BAPCO,
29 December 1934(IOR RI1 5111661).
Letter fiom Lt. Col. Fowle, British Politicai Resident,to Rofer
Qatar, 11May1935.
Qataroilconcession, 17May 1935@ORR/15/1/633).
Map accompanyingQatarOil Agreement 1935 (IORFU1 5/1/631).
Political Agreement between His MajestyfsGovt. and the Anglo
PersianOilCompany,5 June 1935(IORFU15111633).
Letter from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, toRuler of
Qatar,21 September1936.
Letter from K Skinner, BAPCO, to H Ballantyne, BAPCO
5December1936.
Note of Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, 13 March 1937
(IORR15/2/202).Translationof letterfromRuler ofBahrainto Lt. Col.Loch, British
PoliticalAgent, 14March 1937(IORRI15I21202).
Memorandum of Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent,
16March 1937(IORRi15/2/202).
Telegram from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident to
Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, 25 March 1937
(IORRI15/2/2021.
Telegram from Lt. Col. Loch, British Political AgenttoLt, Col.
Fowle, British Political Resident, 30March 1937
(IORRI15121202).
Note of BritishPoliticalAgent12 April 1937(IORR/15/2/202).
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to British Political Agent,
14April 1937(IORW15/2/202).
Letter from Rashid bin MohomedAI Jabor, headman ofthe Naim,
to Ruler of Bahrain, 3 Safar 1356, (15 April 1937)
(IORRI15/2/202).
Translation of letter fiom Acting Superintendent of Land
Department,Bahrain,22 April 1937.
Request for registrationof property in Zubarah region in Bahraini
Land Registration Directorate,23 April 1937.
Telegrarn from British Political Agent to Lt. Col. Fowle, British
Politicalesident, 23 April 1937(RI1512/202).
Letter from Chief of Naim tribe to Ruler of Bahrain,
12Safar 1356(24April 1937).
Letter fiom Chief of Naim tribe to Ruler of Bahrain,
13Safar1356(25April 1937).
TelegramfromBritishPoliticalAgent,to British PoliticalResident,
26 April 1937(IORR/15/2/202).
Memorandum by Weightman, British Political Agent,
28April 1937(IORW15/2/202).
Telegramfrom Capt. Hickinbotham,British Political Agent, to Lt.
Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, 30April 1937
(IORR115/1/309).
Letter fiom Rder of Qatar to Rashid bin Mohomed Al Jabor,
April 1937(IORRf15/2/202).Letter from Capt. Hickinbotham, British PoliticaI Agent
(IOR W15/1/309), to Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident,
enclosing report entitled"ZubarahIncident" (IORW15111309) and
memorandum entitled "Possible Basis for Compromise"
(IORR/15/2/202), 3May 1937.
Memorandum from Lt. Col. FowIe, British Political Resident, to
Secretaryof StateforIndia,5 May 1937(IORR/1512/202).
Noteby Capt. Hickinbotharn,29 May 1937(IORR/l5/1/369).
Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Lt. Col. Trenchard Fowle, British
Political Resident,9June 1937(IORW15111369).
(a) Letter fiom C. Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, to
Capt.Hickinbotharn,BritishPoliticalAgent,20 June 1937.
(b) Transcript of letter from C. Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of
Bahrain, tn Capt. Hickinbotharn, British Political Agent,
20 June 1937.
Report by Abdullah bin Hasan, Messenger of Rulerof Bahrain,
22 June 1937(IORR/15/2/203).
Telegram from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to
Secretaq of Statefor India,23June 1937 (IOR W15/1/370).
Telegram from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to
Secretaryof Statefor India,23 June 1937(IORW15/2/203).
ForeignOfficeMinutes entitled "Easternand SouthernFrontiers of
Arabia",25 June 1937(FO371130777XCl132657).
Letterfiom Representativesof Ruler of Bahrainto Representatives
ofRulerof Qatar,June 1937(R/15/1/370). ANNEXES 135 TO 234
(ZUBARAHAND HISTOIUCALDOCUMENTS)
Annex Description Page Na.
No.
135.
Letter fiom Ruler of Bahrain to Capt. Hickinbotharn, British 691 -692
Political Agent,1July 1937(TORlU1.5121203).
136. Note by Capt. Hickinbotham,British Political Agent, ofinterview 693-694
with C. Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, 1July 1937
(IORR/15/2/203).
137. Telegram fiom Capt. Hickinbotham,British Political Agent,to Lt. 695
Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, 2 July 1937
(IOR RI15/1/370).
138. Telegram from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to India 696-697
Office, London,2 July 1937(IOR RI15/2/203).
139. Letter fiom C.Belgrave, to Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political 698
Agent,2 July 1937(IORR/15/1/370).
140. Telegram fi-ornLt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident to 699-700
Secretaryof Statefor India,4 July 1937(IORW15/1/370).
141. Letter fromCapt.Hickinbotharn,BritishPoliticalAgent,to Lt.Col. 701-702
Fowle, British Political Resident,ly 1937(IORR/15/1/370).
142. Telegram from Capt.Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, to 703
Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, 5 July 1937
(IOR RI1512/203).
143. (a) LetterfromRuIerof Bahrainto Capt.Hickinbotham,British 704-705
Political Agent, July 1937.
(b) Transcript of letter fiorn Riiler of Bahrain to Capt. 706
T. Hickinbotham, BritishPoIiticalAgent, 6July 1937.
144. Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Câpt. Hickinbotham, British 707
PoliticalAgent,6 July 1937(RI15121203).
145. Letter from C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt.of Bahrain, to British 708
PoliticalAgent,6 July 1937 (IORRi15121203).TelegrarnfrornGovt.ofIndia to Secretaryof Statefor India and Lt. 709
Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, 6July1937
(IORRI15/1/370).
Telegram from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to 710
Secretary of State for India and Govt. of India External Affairs
Department, 9 July 1937(IOR RI15121203).
Dr& Telegram under cover of Ietter fiom India Office to 711-713
T.V.Brenan,IOJuly 1937(FO371/20783XC/132657).
LetterfromRuler of Qatarto Capt.Hickinbotham, British Political 714-715
Agent, 11 July 1937(IOR RI1 5/2/203).
Statement by Shaikh Rashid bin Muharnmed, 13 July 1937 716-717
(10RRI15/1/370)
Letter frorn Capt. Hickinbotham,British Political Agent, to Ruler 718
of Qatar,14July 1937(IORRI15/2/203).
India OfficeMemorandum, 14 July 1937(FO371120783). 719-721
Letter from Rulerof Qatar, to O.KirkpatricCaroe,British Political 722-723
Resident,17July 1937(IORR/15/21203).
Telegram from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to 724
Secretaryof StateforIndia, 24 July 1937(IORRI15/2/204).
Letter from Capt.Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, to 725
Lt.Col.Fowle, British Political Resident, 30July1937
(IORRI15/2/204).
Letter fiom Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to 726
Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, 12August 1937
(TORR/15/2/204).
Letter from S.H.Longrigg, PCL, to Wafton, India Office, 727-728
16August 1937.
Letter from C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, to 729-730
Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, 19August 1937
(IOR RI15121204).
Letter fiom Capt. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, to 73 1-732
Capt.Galloway, Secretary to British Political Resident,
16September1937(IORR/15/2/204).
Letter from Capt.Hickinbotham, British Political Agent, to 733-738
Lt. Col.Fowle, British Political Resident, 22 September 1937
(IORW15/2/437).Letter from J.S. Black,BAPCO, toH. Weightman,British Political
Agent, 8June 1938.
Letter from Rulerof Bahrain to Hugh Weightman,British Political
Agent, 26 April 1939.
India Office (PoliticalDepartment)minute byC.E.M. Hemingway
12 May 1939(IORL/P&S/12/3895).
Memorandum frorn Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, to
Edward Wakefield, British Political Agent, 11 June 1942
(IORR/15/2/204).
Letter from Capt. Hickinbotham,British Political Agent, to Ruler
of Qatar,8Febnrary1944(IORRI15/2/2051.
Capt. Hickinbotham'sproposa1for the settlement of the Zubarah
dispute,February I944 (IORRI15/2/205).
(a) Agreement signed by Ruler of Qatar and Ruier of Bahrain
on 17June and 23June 1944 respectively
(IORRl15/2/205).
(b) Transcript of Agreement signedby Rulerof QatarandRuler
of Bahrain, 17$uneand23 June 1944.
Note of British Political Agent's meetingwith Ruler of Qatar,
18June 1944(IOM 15/2/205).
Letter frorn Maj. Hickinbotham, British Politicai Agent, to
Lt. Col.Prior, British Political Resident, 24June 1944
(IORR/15/2/205).
Letter fiom Ruler of Bahrain to Major Hickinbotham, British
PoliticalAgent, 14September1944.
(a) Translation of letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Major
Hickinbotham,BritishPoliticalAgent,3 October 1944.
(b) Transcript ofa translation of letter from Ruler of Bahrainto
Major Hickinbotham, British Political Agent,
3 October 1944.
(a) Letter from Maj. Hickinbotham, British PoliticalAgent to
Lt. Col.Prior, British Political Resident,4 October 1944.
(b) Transcriptletter fiom Maj. Hickinbotham, British Political
Agentto Lt. Col. Prior,British Political Resident,4 October
1944.(a) Letter fiom Maj. Hickinbotham, British Political Agent,to
Rulerof Bahraia, 1November 1944.
(b) Transcript of letter from Maj. Hickinbotham, British
PoliticalAgent,to Ruler ofBahrain, 1November1944.
Letter fiom Ruler of Bahrainto Ruler of Qatar, 24 January1945
(IORRi15/2/205).
Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Ruler of Bahrain,30 January 1945
(IORFU1 5/2/205).
Letter from Ruler of Qatarto Maj.Hickinbotham, British Political
Agent, 1February1945(IORR/15/2/205).
Letter fiom Ruler of Bahrain to Maj. Hickinbotharn, British
PoliticalAgent,3 February 1945 (IORR/15/2/205).
(a) Letter from Maj. Hickinbotham,British Political Agent, to
Rulerof Bahrain,6 March 1945.
(b) Transcript of letter from Maj. Hickinbotharn, British
PoliticalAgent,to RulerofBahrain,6 Mach 1945.
Letter from C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, to
Lt. Col.Prior, British Political Resident, 11 April 1945
[IORRI15/2/205).
Letter fiom Lt. Col. Galloway, British PoliticalAgento Lt. Col.
Hay,BritishPolitical Resident,11June 1946(IORRI15/2/605).
Letter fiom Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident, to Lt. Col.
Galloway,British Political Agent15June 1946(IORR/15/1/371).
Note by Lt. Col. Galloway on his meeting with Ruler of
(a)
Bahrainon 2 November 1946(IORRI1 5/2/605).
(b) Transcriptof note by Lt. Col.Gallowayon his meeting with
Ruler of Bahrainon 2November 1946.
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to British Political Agent,
5March 1947(IORRi15/2/6051.
Letter from Edward Wakefield, British PoliticalAgent, to Lt. Col.
Prior,British Political Resident, 11January 1948.
Reportentitled"Noteon Developmentsinthe ZubarahCase", 1948
(FO 371/68324).Letter fiom Ruler of Bahrain to C.J. Pelly,British Political Agent,
2 March 1948(FO 371/68324).
(a) LetterfromH.Ballantyne, BAPCO, toL. Pymanof Foreign
Office,2 June 1948.
(b) Transcript of letter frorn H.Ballantyne, BAPCO, to
L. Pymanof ForeignOfice, 2June 1948.
Letter ftom H. Bdlantyne, BAPCO, to C.Belgrave, Adviser to
Govt. of Bahrain,2 June1948.
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to, Ernest Bevin, British Foreign
Secretary,24 June1948 (FO37116832496694).
Letter from Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident, to
ErnestBevin,MP, 14July 1948(FO 371/68324)
Foreign Office discussionpaper and draft letter attached thereto,
21 July 1948(FO 371168324).
Letter from C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahain, to
H. Ballantyne,BAPCO,9 October 1948.
Representationson Zubarahto ForeignOffice,4 August 1949.
Letter from Foreign Office to Lt. Col. Hay, British Political
Resident,3 September 1949(FO371/7497196754).
Letter from Foreign Office to Lt. Col.Hay, British Political
Resident, 12October1949(FO37117497196754).
Letter fiom Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident to Foreign
Office,7February1950(PO37118209196754).
Letter fiom C.J.Pelly, British Political Agent to Sir Rupert Hay,
British Political Resident,20March 1950(FO 371/56091).
Letter from C.J.Pelly, British PoliticalAgent to Sir Rupert Hay,
British PoliticalResident,23 April 1950(FO 371182691).
Letter from C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, to
R. Andrew,British PoliticalAgent,26 June 1950.
Letter £romC.Belgrave,Adviserto Govt.of Bahrain, to W. Laver,
British PoliticalAgent, 15April 1952.
Letter from W.S.Laver, British Political Agent, to C. Belgrave,
Adviserto Govt.of Babrain,19May 1952(FO 10 16 547).Letter from Rujer of Bahrain to Lt. Col. Hay, British Political
Resident, 18March 1953(FO 1016/266XC 148248).
Telegram fiom Lt. Col. Hay, British Political Resident,to Ewart
Biggs, British Political Agent, Doha, 17 April 1953,
(FO 1016t266XC 13549).
Minutes of meeting between Ruler of Bahrain and British
(a)
Minister of State,June 1953(FO371ACXL 273 96333).
(b) Transcriptof minutes of meeting betweenRuler of Baluain
and BritishMinisterof State 16June 1953.
Copy minutes by J. Wall, British Officiating Political Agent,
5November 1953(FO 1016/266 XL 148248).
Letter fiom J. Little, British Political Agent, to Rulerof Bahrain,
17January1954.
Letter hm Foreign Office to B. Burrows, British Political
Resident,29 April 1954(FO 371110781296853).
(a) Telegram fiom B. Burrows, British Political Resident, to
ForeignOffice,2 May 1954(FO37It107812 96853).
(b) Transcript of letter from B. Burrows, British Political
Resident,to Foreign Office, May 1954.
Letter fiom B. Burrows, British Political Resident, to Ruler of
Bahrain,5 May 1954.
Note by C.Gault, British Political Agent,tB. Burrows, British
PoliticalResident18 March 1957(FO 1016/586XC 14078).
Note by C.Gault, British Political Agent, 7 May 1957
(FO1016/586XC 14078).
Foreign Office minutes by C.Gault, British Political Agent,
entitled"ZubarahDispute", 13Sune1957
(FO371426435 XC 156317).
Letter fiom B. Burrows, British Political Resident, to Ruler of
Bahrain,10August 1957.
Foreign Off~ceminutes by M. Man, British Politicai Resident,
entitled"Zubarah" 1,June 1960.
Letter from British Political Agent to Foreign Office,
31 October1960.Letter from M.C.G. Man, British PoIitical Resident, to 908-909
J.C. MoberIy,British PoliticalAgent, 15November 1960.
Extracts fromC.Belgrave"Persona1Column"
London, 1960,p. 156).
Letter fiom Ruler of Bahrain to Sir George Middleton, British 912-921
Political Resident,8February 1961.
Foreign Office Arabian DepartmentMinutes by M.Man, British 922-924
Political Resident, entitled "Zubara", to R. Beaumont, Foreign
Office,21 February1961(FO371t15672126335).
Minute by F Burrows, Foreign Office Atabian Department, 925-926
2 May 1961(FO 371/15672126335).
Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to British Political Agent, 927
9 May 1961(FO 371/156721 26335).
Letter from British Political ResidetoR. Beaumont of Foreign 928-930
Office, 18May 1961(FO 371/15672126335).
Letter from E.Wiltshire, British Political Agent to Ruler of 931-934
3 ahrain,29July 1961.
Memorandum from Qatar delegation to XIV session of the 935-936
UNESCOGeneral Conference,31October 1966.
Peter Lienhardt, "The Authority ofShaykhsin the GulfAn Essay 937-945
in Nineteenth-CenturyHistory" in Arabian Studies, VoII (1975)
editedby SerjeantandBidwell,pp. 61-75.
R.S. Zahian"The Creationof Qatar" (London, 1979,pp. 13-15 80- 946-95Id
85).
Extract from Fuad 1.Khuri "Tnbe and State in Bahrain" 952-975
(Chicago, 1980,pp. 13-34,44).
Interview of Shaikh Jasim Bin Abdullah Bin Khalifa Bin 976-980
Muhammad Bin Ibrahim Aal Khalifa conducted by Dr Ali Aba
Hussein, 14December1980.
Anie Montigny-Kozlowska "Evolutiond'un groupe bedouin dans 981-983a
un pays producteur de petrole: les Al-Na'im de Qatar"
(Paris, 1985,pp.52-53).
Extracts from the thesis presented by IbrahimAli Abdel entit1ed 984-985
"British Policy towards Bahrein and Qatar 1871-1914"
(Lancaster,1988,p. 111). Angela Clarke "Bahrain Oil and Development 1429-1989" 986-101 1
(1991,pp. 62-87).
Extract from Klaus Ferdinand "Bedouins of Qatar" 1012-1013d
(London, 1993,pp. 41,44-47).
Translationof statementof Mohammedbin Mohammedbin 2014-1018
(a)
TheyabAl Naimi, 6 September1996.
(b) Statement of Mohammed bin Mohammedbin Theyab Al 1019-1024
Naimi, 6 September1996.
Translation of statementf Saleh bin MuharnmedAli bin 1025-1028
(a)
AlialNaimi, 14Septernber 1996.
(b) Statement of Salehbin Muhammed Ali bin Ali al Naimi, 1029-1033
14September1996.
ANNEXES 235 TO 304
(HAWARISLANDS)
Annex Description PageNo.
No.
Letter fiom Capt.Prideaux, British Political Agent, to 1034-1038
Maj.Cox, British Political Resident, 20March 1909
(Recordsof Bahrain,Vol.3, pp. 383-387).
Letter fiom Capt. Prideaux, BritishPolitical Agent, to British 1039-1043
Political Resident,4April1909(IORR/15/2/547).
AdministrationReportfor the BahrainPoliticalAgency forthe 1044-1048
year 1909 (The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, 1986,
Vol.VI, pp.69-73).
Judgement madeby Qadi of Shara Court, Bahrain in the year 1049
1327Hejrah(1909)(RecordsofBahrain,Vol. 5,p.244).
Judgementmade by Qadi of Shara Court, Bahrain in the year 1049a
1328Hejrah(1910) (IORR/15/2/547).
(a) Translation of Ietterfiom Ruler of Bahrain to 1050
Maj. Cox,British PoliticalAgent, 15January 1911.
(b) Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to Maj. Cox, 1051
BritishPolitical Agent, 15January 1911.Administration Report for Bahrain Political Agency for the
year 1911, (The Persian Gulf Administration Reports, 1986,
Vol. VI,pp. 98-99).
(a) Translation of resolutions approvedat the meeting of
the Ottoman Cabinet Council on 19April 1913
(OttomanArchives).
(b) Resolutions approved at the meeting of the Ottoman
Cabinet Councilon 19April 1913(OttomanArchives).
Secret Declatation annexed to Convention between United
Kingdom and Twkey regarding the Persian Gulf and adjacent
territories,29July 193.
Letter fiom Maj. Daly, British Political Agent, to
British Political Resident,30January 1922.
Particularsof caseno.26411351, 1932(IORRi15/2/5471.
Bahraincourt recordforcaseno.26411351, 1932.
(a) Transcript of translation of Bahrain Court Record for
case 611351(1932).
(b) Translation of Bahrain Corn Record for case 611351
(1932).
(c) BahrainCourt Record forcase 61135 1(1932).
Letter from Police Directorate to the Bahrain Corn,
14April 1936.
Letter from C. Belgrave, Adviser to the Govt. of Bahrain,to
Lt. Col. Loch, British Political Agent, 28 April 1936
(IORR/15/1/688).
Letter from Lt. Col.Loch, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col.
Fowle, British Political Resident, 6 May 1936
(IOR R/15111688].
Letter from J.C. Walton,India Office, to J. Skliros of PCL,
14May 1936(IORR/1511/688).
Letter from C. Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, to
HeadNatur, 10November 1937.
Letter fromC. Belgrave,Adviser to Govt. of Brthrain,to E.V
Packer, PCL,31January 1938.Police Orders by C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain,
1February 1938.
Letter from E.V. Packer, Manager of PCL, to C.Belgrave,
Adviser to Bahrain Govt., 19 February 1938
(IORR/15/2/204).
AnnualReport of Govt.of Bahrain,
(March 1937-February1938,pp. 10-11, 16-17).
Note by Lt. Col.Fowle,5 April 1938(FO 371121822).
Letterhm T.V.Brenan,Foreign Office,to J.P.Gibson,India
Office,13April 1938(FO 37 1/2182297609).
QatarClaim in the form of two letters from Ruler of Qatar to
BritishPolitical Agent, 10May and 27 May 1938,(letter from
Ruler of Qatar to H. Weightrnan, British Political Agent,
10May 1938(IORR/15/1/690)).
Letter from H. Weightman, British Political Agent, to
Li. Col. Fowle British Political Resident, 15May 1938
(Records of Qatar, Vol.6pp. 19-22).
Letter fromH.Weightman,British Political Agent, to Ruler of
Qatar,20 May 1938(IORR/15/1/690).
Police Orders fromC.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain,
24 May 1938.
QatarClaim in the forrn of two letters fromRuler of Qatar to
British PoliticalAgent, 10May and 27 May 1938(letter from
Ruler of Qatar,to H. Weightman, British Political Agent, 27
May 1938)(IORL/P+S/l2/3895).
Note by C. Belgrave, Adviser toGovt. of Bahrain, entitled
"TheHawarIslands",29 May 1938(IORRI15121547).
Letter fiom H. Weightrnan,British Political Agent to Col.
Fowle, British Political Resident, 3June 1938
(IORW15/2/547).
Letterfiom Ruler of Qatar,to H. Weightman, British Political
Agent, 15June 1938(TORRi15111690).
Letter from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to the
Secretary of State to the Govt. of India and copied to
H. Weightman, British Political Agent, 27 June 1938
(IOR R/1512/547).Letter from Ruler of Qatar to H. Weightinan,
BritishPoliticalAgent, 8July 1938.
Letterfrom Ruler of Qatar to H. Weightman,British Political
Agent, 12 July 1938(IORR/15/211858).
Letter from Acting Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain to
H.Weightman, British Political Agent, 17July 1938
(IORR/15/2/1858).
Letter from H. Weightman, British PoliticalAgent to Ruler of
Qatar, 19July 1938(IORRfI5/2/1858).
Letterfromthe Secretaryof Statefor India,to British Political
Resident,21 July 1938(IORR/15/1/691).
Letter from Capt. Howes, British Political Agent, to Acting
Adviser to Govt.ofBahrain, 14August 1938.
Letter Çom PCL to H. Weightman, British Political Agent,
27 September1938(IOWR/15/2/547).
L'etter from H. Weightman, British Political Agent, to
C. Belgrave,Adviser to Govt. ofBhain, 8Novernber 1938.
Letter fi-om H. Weightman, British Political Agent to
Galloway, British Political Resident, 15December 1938
(IORRI15/2/547).
Bahrain Counter-Clairn in the form of a letter from
C.Belgrave, Adviser to the Govt. of Bahrain to
H. Weightman, British Political Agent, 22 December 1938
(IORR/15/2/547).
British Military Report entitled "Appreciation of the situation
regardingthe Defenceof QatarPeninsular",January 1939.
Letterfrom H.Weightman,British Political Agent, to Ruler of
Qatar, 5January 1939(IORRI15/2/5471.
Letter fiom Ruler of Qatar to H.Weightman,
British PoliticalAgent, 19March 1939.
Translation of letter from Ruler of Qatar to H.Weightman,
British PoliticalAgent,30March 1939
(Recordsof Bahrain,Vol. 5,pp. 279-280),
Qatar Rejoinder(inthe form of a letter fromthe Ruler of Qatar
to the British Political Agent) 30March1939
(Recordsof Bahrain,Vol.5,pp. 281-295).Letter fiom C.Belgrave, Adviser to Goa. of Bahrain, to
H. Weightman,British PoliticalAgent,20 April 1939.
Report of H. Weightrnan, (in the fom of a letter from
B. Weightman, British Political Agent, to Lt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident)22 April 1939
(Recordsof Bahrain,Vol. 5,pp. 252-259).
Letter from Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, to
Secretaryof StateforIndia,29 April 1939
(Recordsof Bahrain, Vol.5,p. 300).
IndiaOfficeMinute, 7June 1939(F0/371/23185).
Letter fi-omC.Baxter, Foreign Office, to Secretary of
(a)
State,India Office, 13June 1939(IORR/15/2/547).
(b) Transcript of letter froC. Baxter, Foreign Office to
SecretaryofState,India Office, 13June 1939.
Letter from PCL to Under Secretary of State for India,
30 June 1939(TORR/15/2/547).
Letter from Deputy Secretary to Govt. of India to
Lt. Col. Fowle, British Political Resident, 1July 1939.
(Recordsof PoliticalDepartment,India Office).
Letkr fiom Lt. Col. Fowle, British PoliticalResident to Ruler
ofBahrain,11July 1939.
Letter fromLt. Col. FowIe,British Political Resident to Ruler
of Qatar, 11July 1939.
Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Lt. Col. Fowle,
BritishPoliticalResident,4 August 1939
(Recordsof Bahrain,Vol. 5,pp. 302-304).
Letterfiom J. Black, BAPCOto C.Belgrave,Adviserto Govt.
of Bahrain,8October 1939.
Letter from Ruler of Qatar to Lt. Col. Prior, British Political
Resident, 18Novernber1939(IORK/15/2/547).
Report entitled "Qatar"by H. Weightman, 5 December 1939
@p.432-433,435,438-441) (IORRI1 5/2/142).
Expenditure Summary for the Govt. of Bahrain for
1358H(1939)(RecordsofBahrain,Vol. 5).294. Letter from Ruler of Qatar H. Weightman, BritishPoIitical 1202-1203
Agent,7 June 1940(TORR/15/2/547).
295. Letter fi-oM. Fripp,BAPCQRepresentative,to C. Belgrave, 1204
Adviser to Govt. ofBahrain, 10August 1941.
296. Letter fi-om Lt. Col. Hay to Secretary to Govt. of India,1205-1207
19November 1941 (Reco~dsof Qatar,Vol.6,pp. 559-561).
297. Letter from British Political Agent, to Ruler of Qatar, 1208-1210
23December 1947(IORFU1 5/2/430).
298. Letterfrom R.M. Brown,BAPCO Chief LocalRepresentative, 1211
to Adviserto Govt.of Bahrain, 13July 1949.
299. Letter fiom M. Man, British Political Resident, to 1212-1213
R. Beaumont, Foreign Office, 21 February 1961
(FO371/156721 26335).
300/3OI. Qatar Diary No. 2 of 1961 -for the period 1214-1221
February2-March1,1961 (FO37111569749536).
302. Letter from W.Schmidt, BAPCO, to Secretary to 1222-1224
Govt.ofBahrain,28October 1961.
3031304. Letter from Ruler of Bahrain to W. Schmidt of BAPCO, 1225-1249
2 November 1961.
ANNEXES305 TO352
(HAWARISLANDS,APPLICABLELAW AND
MARITIME DELIMITATION)
Annex Description PageNo.
No.
305/306. Letterfi-omK.Khalifa,Headof Financeof Govt.of Bahrain to 1250-1282
E.Wiltshire,BritishPoliticalAgent, 5June 1966.
307. R-S.ZahIan"The Makingof the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, 1283-1285
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman"
(London, 1989,pp. 140-141).
308/309. J. Crystal "Oil and Politics in the Gulf:Rulers and Merchants
1286-1328
inKuwaitand Qatar"(1990) (p.166).Archaeological Report on the Hawar Islands, by Professor
Paolo Costa, Universityof Bologna, 17anuary 1995.
Extract from Bahrain Telephone Directory 1996-97
@p. 77-80).
Advertisementof Gulf TourisrnCompany, 25 June 1996.
(a) Trandation of Statementof Hamoud bin Muhanna bin
Hamadal Dosari,7 September1996.
(b) Statement of Hamoud bin Muhanna bin Hamad
al Dosari,7 September 1996.
Translationof Statement ofNasr bin Makkibin Ali al
(a)
Dosari, 16Sepember 1996.
(b) Statement of Nasr bin Makki bin Ali al Dosari
16 September1996.
(a) Translation of Statementof Salman bin Isa bin Ahmad
bin SaadalDosari, 15September1996.
(b) Statement of Salman bin Isa bin Ahmad bin Saad
alDosari, 15Septernber1996.
(a) Translation of Ibrahim bin Salrnan bin Ahrned Al
Ghattam, 15September 1996.
(b) Statement of Ibrahim bin Salman bin Ahrned Al
Ghattam,15September 1996.
Agreement entered into by Ali bin Khuleefa, Sheikh of
Bahrain,6 September1868
(Aitchison'sTreaties,Vol. XI,pp. 236-237).
ExclusiveAgreementof the Shaikhof Bahrainwiththe British
Government,13 March 1892
(Aitchison'sTreaties,Vol.XI,p.238).
M.J. Mustill and S.C.Boyd "The Law and Practice of
CommercialArbitrationin England"(1989,p. 15).
E.W. Streeter"PearlsandPearlingLife"
(London,1886,pp. 213-221)
Report by the Law Officers, Finlay and Carson,
11February 1905(F0371/91288).Letter from Lt. Col. Cox, British PoliticalResident, to British
PoliticalAgent, 11July 1911(IOR/R/l5/2/14).
Govt. of India "Gazetteer of Arabia" India Office Records
@. 329)(IOR/LIMIL/17/16/2/i).
Bahrain Political Diary for month ending 31 January 1920
(L/P&S/11/170).
Memorandumfrom British Political Agent to British Political
Resident, 24May 1924.
TeIegramsexchanged between H.M.S. Cyclamen and British
Political Resident,19/20une 1924.
Letter from Director, Persian Gulf Section, Indo-European
Telegraph Department to BritishPoliticai Agent, 25 March
1927(R/15/2/1371).
Letter fiom Director of Customs to C. Belgrave, Adviser to
Govt.of Bahrain, 10May 1928(RI15/2/125).
GovernrnentofBahrain Proclamation dated
20.10AH 1349(1930).
Military Report on the Arabian Shores of the Persian Gulf,
Kuwait, Bahrain,Hasa, Qatar, TrucialOman and Oman, 1933
(L/NIL/I7/15/141).
C.Belgrave "Pearl Diving in Bahrain" Journal of Royal
CentralAsia Society,Vol. XXI,July 1934.
Letter fromE.A. Seal,MilitaryBranch Admiralty,to Clauson,
India Office,29 April 1937(IOR/Rf15/2/546).
Memorandum from British Political Agent, to C. Belgrave,
Adviserto Govt.of Bahrain,5July 1937(IORW15/2/546).
Memorandum fromC. Belgrave, Adviser to Govt.of Bahrain,
to BritishPoliticalAgent, 14August 1937(IOR/Rl15/2/546).
Memorandum fromC. Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain,
to British PoliticalAgent, 14August1937(IOR R/15/2/546).
List preparedby LandDepartment, Govt. of Bahrainof pillars
erected 1938-1939.
Letter from Symon, India Office, to Lt. Col. Fowle, British
Political Resident,28 April 1938,enclosingPCL draft Bahrain
leaseand two charts(IORR/15/1/689).Governmentof Bahrain Notice, 15April 1939.
Memorandurn from British Political Agent to C.Belgrave,
Adviserto Govt. of Bahrain,21 March 1940,with enclosures
(IORRi15/2/41 8).
Letter fiom C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, to
BritishPoliticalAgent, 18June 1946.
Letter fiom the British Political Agent, to Ruler of Qatar,
9 July 1946(IOR W15/2/430).
Letter from C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt. of Bahrain, to
BritishPolitical Agent10 JuIy 1946(IORRI 5/2/430).
Letter ffom Ruler of Qatar to British Political Agent,
18July 1946(IORRI15/2/430).
Letter from British Political Resident toH.M.'sSecretary of
StateforIndia, 18January 1947(IORL/P&S/12/3006/6).
Translationof letterfiom Ruler of Bahrain to Pelly, British
Political Agent, December 1947.
Letter from the Ruler of Bahrain to British Political Agent,
23 May 1949.
Letter from H.R. Ballantyneto C.Belgrave, Adviser to Govt.
of Bahrain, 14November 1949.
Testirnony of Dr. A.S. Bhmdarkar, Medical Officer,
12October 1950.
TestimonyofJabor Musallarn,Pearl Merchant,
26 October 1950.
Sir Rupert Hay "The Persian Gulf States and their Boundary
Problems" The Geographical Journal, Vol. CXX Part 4,
December1954(pp. 433-445).
Foreign Office Minutesincludingcomments by I.M. Sinclair,
13October 1955(F0371191288).
Statementof M. Al-Nimer, Representative of Bahrain, Third
Law of the Sea Conference, 37th Mtg., 1'1 July 1974
(OfficialRecords,Vol. 1,1974,p. 174para 30). -VOLUME 7-
LIST OFILLUSTRATIVEMAPS
MapNo. Description
Politicalap ofthe Gulf ofArabia
Bahrainand Qatar
Traditionalroutefrom the mainislandof Bahrainto theHawarIslands
TheHawar Island- locations
TheZubarahregion(withplacenames)
Bahrainiand Qatariterritories
Normal patrolIimitsonthe Bahraincoastguardand shippingroutes
Southernsector: equidistance linewith basepoints
Bahrain'spearlingbanks
Northernsector: equidistancelinewithbasepoints
Proposed maritimeboundary
Archipelagic baselines
Medianline (southemsector)using archipeia baselines
Medianline [southern sector)using normalbaselines
Medianlines(southern sector)using ârchipelagicandnormalbaselines
OxfordMap ofQaîar CERTIFICATION
1, the undersigned, Jawad Salim Al Arayed, Agent of the State of
Bahrain, hereby certitjr ththe copies of the documents attached as
documentary Annexes of the Memorial subrnitted by the State of
Bahrain in Volumes 2 to 6 are accurate copies of the documents
they purport to reproduce and that where a translation ofsuch a
document is attached that translation an accurace translationof the
document
This dayofSeptember1996
Jawad Salim Al Arayed
Minister of State and Agent of the Sate of Bahrain
Memorial of the Government of the State of Bahrain