INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
MARITIME DELIMITATION
IN THE AREA BETWEEN
GREENLAND AND JAN MAYEN
(DENMARKINORWAY)
COUNTER-MEMORIAL
SUBMITTEDBY
THE GOVERNMENTOF
THE KINGDOM OF
NORWAY
VOLUME 1
11 MAY 1990PDC .Printing Data Center a.s
Oslo 1990 SUMMARY TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ..............................................................
PART 1: THE FACTS .............................................................
7
A: Jan Mayen and the North Atlantic Region ....................
Chapter 1: General Overview .............................7..........
Chapter II: Jan Mayen ...............................................
Chapter II........................................................................
Region 33
B: The Parties' Approach to Maritime Jurisdiction and
Delimitation ...............................................53...................
Chapter IV: Continental Shelf Jurisdiction and
Delimitation ............................................3.............
Chapter V: Zones of Fisheries Jurisdiction ..............61..
Chapter VI: The Present Dispute ........................71........
PART II: THE LAW ............................................7.............
A: Treaty Obligations of the Parties Inter Se ................81...
Chapter 1: Delimitation of the Continental Shelf .......81
Chapter II: Delimitation of Fisheries Zones ...........91..
B: The Conduct of the Parties . Recognition and
Acquiescence ............................................................
Introduction .The Role of Recognition and
Acquiescence ...........................................3.............
Chapter III: The Consistent Conduct of the Parties ...95
Chapter IV: The Legal Effects of the Conduct of the
Parties .................................................13...........
C: General International Law ..............................121............
Chapter V: Introduction: The Applicable Principles ...121
Chapter VI: The Significance of Islands in Maritime
Delimination .........................................1..............
Chapter VII: The Elements of an Equitable Solution 139
Chapter VIII: Conclusions on the Equitable Solution 185
D: Summary of Principal Conclusions . Procedural Issues ..195
PART III: SUBMISSIONS ..................................199..............
Appendices ................................................3.............
List of Tables ............................................43.............
List of Maps and Figures ...............................45........
List of Annexes. cf V.lume II .....................................
Maps ....................................................265.................. TABLEOF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................
PART 1: THE FACTS .............................................................
A: Jan Mayen and the North Atlantic Region ..................
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL OVERVIEW .................7....
1. Historical Perspectives ..............................7.........
2. The Territories of the Region .......................0......
3. Living Resources ...................................13.............
4. Geology and Geomorphology .....................18.......
5. Oceanography and Glaciology ....................20.......
6. Human Environment ..............................2.......
7. Security Policy Aspects ............................21...........
CHAPTER II: JAN MAYEN ..........................23...........
1 The General History of Jan Mayen ..............23.....
2 The Administration of Jan Mayen ................28.....
3. The Geology of Jan Mayen and of the Region
between Jan Mayen and Greenland ..............29.....
CHAPTER III: NORWAY'S INTEREST IN THE
JAN MAYEN REGION ................................33.............
1. Historical Background ..............................3........
2. The Development of Whaling. Sealing and
Fishing in the Jan Mayen Region .................35.....
(a) Whaling .......................................35................
(b) Sealing .......................................................
(c) Fishing .......................................4..............
3. Cooperation on Capelin Management .............44..
4. Other Activities in the Jan Mayen Region ........49.
5. Conclusion ..........................................50.............
B: The Parties' Approach to Maritime Jurisdiction and
Delimitation ..........................................................
CHAPTER IV: CONTINENTAL SHELF
JURISDICTION AND DELIMITATION ..............53...
1. Norway ...........................................................
(a) Norwegian Continental Shelf Legislation .......3
(b) Norwegian Delimitation Practice ..............54...
2 Denmark ..........................................................
(a) Danish Continental Shelf Legislation .............56
(b) Danish Delimitation Practice ..................58..... CHAPTER V: ZONES OF FISHERIES
JURISDICTION ........................................6.............
1. Norway ............................................6...............
(a) Traditional Zones of Fisheries Jurisdiction ....61
(b) Extension to 200 Nautical Miles ................2..
2. Denmark ..........................................6..............
(a) Traditional Zones of Fisheries Jurisdiction ....66
(b) Extension to 200 Nautical Miles ..............67....
CHAPTER VI: THE PRESENT DISPUTE ...........71...
1. The General Background .........................7.........
2. Forma1Negotiations 1980-1983 ...................7.3...
3. Further Contacts 1983-1988 ......................7.3.......
4. Remarks on the Danish Memorial ................7.4..
PARTII: THE LAW ..........................................7................
INTRODUCTION .........................................7...............
A: Treaty Obligations of the Parties Inter Se ...............81....
CHAPTER 1: DELIMITATION OF THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF ...............................81.......
1. The Background ................................................
2. The Treaty Obligations .............................1........
(a) The 1965Agreement between Norway and
Denmark .....................................................
(b) The 1958Convention on the Continental
Shelf............................................................
3. The United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 1982 .............................................
CHAPTER II: DELIMITATION OF FISHERIES
ZONES .....................................................
.............
B: The Conduct of the Parties . Recognition and
Acquiescence .............................................................
INTRODUCTION . THE ROLE OF
RECOGNITION AND ACQUIESCENCE .............93..
CHAPTER III: THE CONSISTENT CONDUCT
OF THE PARTIES ................................................
1. The Sequence of Consistent Conduct .............95...
. The Danish Royal Decree of 7 June 1963
concerning the Continental Shelf ..............95...
. The Norwegian Royal Decree of 31 May
1963relating to the Exploration for and
Exploitation of Submarine Natural
Resources .................................................... . The Boundary Agreement between Norway
and Denmark of 1965 ...........................97........
. The Fishing Territory of Denmark Act of 17
December 1976 ...................................8........
. The Economic Zone of Norway Act of 17
December 1976 ..................................99...........
. The Positions of the Parties during
Negotiations at UNCLOS III ...................9...
. Danish-Norwegian Delimitation Agreement
concerning the Faroes ...........................0.....
. The Danish Executive Order of 14May
1980 .............................................10............
. The Norwegian Royal Decree of 23 May
. Diplomatic Exchanges in the Period................10...........
1979-1980 ........................................0.........
. Ministerial Statements in the Norwegian
Parliament on 6 June 1980 ....................10.7...
. The Forma1Negotiations, 1980-1983 .........108.
2. Practice concerning Delimitation of Fisheries
Zones .................................................8.......
3. Conclusions on the Evidence ......................111.......
CHAPTER IV: THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES .......................1..3....
1. The Overall Picture .................................3.....
2. Express Recognition and Adoption of the
Median Line Boundary ...........................1..4......
3. Tacit Recognition of the Median Line Boundary
resulting from Danish Conduct ...................1..6...
4. In the Circumstances the Median Line 1s
Opposable to Denmark ...........................1..7.....
5. In the Circumstances the Danish Claim to a
"200-Mile Outer Limit" Boundary between
Greenland and Jan Mayen 1sNot Opposable to
Norway .............................................1..9..........
6 .Estoppel .............................................1..........
C: General International Law ........................................121
CHAPTER V: INTRODUCTION: THE
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES ..............................1....
1 .The Purpose ..........................................2..........
2 .The Importance of Title .................................1..1
3 .The Principle of Equal Division ....................24...
4 .Abating the Effects of Incidental Special
Features within the Appropriate Legal and
Geographical Framework ............................... 126 5. The Concept of the "Relevant Area" .............30..
6. The Relevance of State Practice ..................131......
CHAPTER VI: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
ISLANDS IN MARITIME DELIMITATION ........133.
1 The Status of Jan Mayen .........................133.........
2 .Misunderstandings as to ...........................................
the Danish Memorial 134
(a) Islands as a Separate Legal Category............134
(b) The Significance of the Geographical and
Legal Framework ............................134...........
(c) The Interpretation of the Case Law ..........136..
(d) State Practice ..................................13........
CHAPTER VII: THE ELEMENTS OF AN
EQUITABLE SOLUTION .............................13........
1.The Geographical and Legal Framework ............139
(a) The Kingdom of Norway ......................3.9...
(b) The Geographical Context ..........................39
(c) The Significance of Arctic Lands and
Coasts ........................................142.................
2 .The Configuration of Coasts .....................14.2....
(a) The Principle ..................................142..............
(b) The Geographical Context of Jan Mayen ....143
(c) The Legal Consequences ........................4....
3 .The Absence of Incidental Special Features
Justifying Abatement ................................5.......
(a) The Danish Thesis ............................1..5......
(b) The Concept of Incidental Special Features ..146
(c) The Principle of Equal Division ..............1.47..
(d) The Relevant Area ...............................8......
(e) Lengths of Coasts .............................1.........
(0 Equity Does Not Involve Completely
Refashioning Nature: The Jurisprudence .....150
4. The Conduct of the Parties .......................1..4....
(a) The Principle ..................................1...........
(b) The Position of.................................................
(c) The Evidence 155
National Legislation ...............................5....1
Agreements Between Norway and Denmark .157
Agreements Concluded by Denmark with
Third States ...................................1...........
The Danish Position on Delimitation
between Greenland and Iceland ..............1.58.
Agreements Concluded by Norway with
Third States ...................................1..9.......
Diplomatic Correspondence ..................1.60... (d) Conclusion ....................................161...............
5. Security Considerations and the Coastal State's
Protective Interest...................................2.......
6. The Substantial Interest of Norway in the Jan
Mayen Maritime Region ..........................164.........
(a) Introduction ...................................164..............
(b) Norway's Interest in the Maritime Region ...164
(c) The Elements Forming Norway's Interests ...165
Long-established Exploitation Patterns .......165
Fisheries.......................................166................
The Navigational and Protection Interests ....168
Resource Potential ............................169...........
Marine Research and Development ..........1.9
(d) Conclusion ....................................170...............
7. The Relevance of Geology and Geomorphology .170
(a) The Principle ..................................170..............
(b) The Facts ......................................71..........
(c) Conclusion ...................................172...............
8. The Relevance of Area and Population ...........73.
(a) Area ..........................................173..................
(b) Population ....................................174...............
(c) Conclusion ..................................175..............
9. The Practice of Other States in Similar
Geographical Situations ..........................176..........
(a) The Principle ..................................176..............
(b) Normal Standards of Equity in Comparable
Cases ..........................................176..................
(c) The Practice Contradicts the Danish Claims .181
(d) Conclusion ....................................183...............
CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSIONS ON THE
EQUITABLE SOLUTION .............................185...........
1. The Elements of an Equitable Solution under
General International Law .......................185.........
(a) The Delimitation Should Reflect the
Substance of Entitlement .....................185........
(b) Between Opposite Coasts the Presumption 1s
that the Median Line 1sthe Appropriate
Means of Achieving an Equitable Result .......6
(c) The General Geographical Context Has the
Consequence that Jan Mayen Be Accorded
Full Effect as a Geographically Independent
Feature ........................................186.................
(d) There 1sNo Geographical Feature Causing
Disproportionate Effects and Justifying
Abatement ............................................... (e) The Principle of Non-Encroachment.. .........187
(f) Norway Has a Substantial Interest in the
Maritime Areas around Jan Mayen ...........1.88
(g) The Factors of Area and Population Provide
No Support for the Danish Claim ................1 .89
(h) The Median Line Solution Reflects the
Normal Standards of Equity as Evidenced
by State Practice in Comparable
Geographical Situations ........................189.
2. Other Delimitations in the Same Region .........1.89
3. The Test of Proportionality as a Check on the
Equitable Character of the Delimitation ........... 89
4. The Conduct of the Parties ................................. 2
5. Conclusion ...........................................193
D: Summary of Principal Conclusions. Procedural Issues. 195
1. The Norwegian Interests ...........................1..5...
2. The Nature of the Danish Claims .................1..5
3. General Conclusions.. ................................196..
4. Procedural Issues.. ..................................197
5. Reservation concerning Danish Baselines.. .......198
6. The Interests of Third States .......................1..8..
7. Reservation as to the Assertions of Fact .........198.
PARTIII: SUBMISSIONS .....................................199
APPENDICES
Appedix 1: A Note on the Administration of
Jan Mayen ..................................203..
Appendix 2: The Activities of the Norwegian
Meteorological Institute on Jan Mayen ...209
Appendix 3: Norwegian Sealing in the West Ice and
the Denmark Strait .........................213.....
Appendix 4: Norwegian Participation in Marine
Research in the Regions around East
GreenlandIJan Mayen, West Greenland
and Newfoundland/Labrador 1950-1989.225
Appendix 5: Exploitation of Living Resources in the
Jan Mayen - Greenland Area: Tables.. ....231LIST OF TABLES ...............................243.....................
245
LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES ..............................
LIST OF ANNEXES, cf. Volume II
By Annex Number .......................247...........
In Chronological Order .................257...........
MAPS
Map 1 Human Settlement and Norwegian
Hunting and Fishing Grounds
Map II Ice Coverage
Map III Bathymetric Chart
Map IV Fishing Zones in the Area INTRODUCTION
1. This Counter-Memorial is being filed pursuant to the
Order made by the President of the Court on 14 October 1988
fixing 15 May 1990 as the time-limit for the filing of the
Counter-Memorial of the Kingdom of Norway.
2. The present proceedings commenced with the filing on
16August 1988 by the Government of Denmark of a unilateral
Application inaccordance withArticle 36,paragraph 2,and Article
40 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, cf. Article
38 of the Rules of Court.
3. In its Memorial of 31July 1989,submitted pursuant to
the above-mentioned Order of 14October 1988,the Government
of Denmark defined the subject-matter of the dispute in its request
to the Court in the following terms:
"To adjudge and declare that Greenland is entitled to a full
200-mile fishing zone and continental shelf vis-à-vis the
island of Jan Mayen; and consequently
To draw a single line of delimitation of the fishing zone and
continental shelf area of Greenland in the waters between
Greenlandand Jan Mayen at a distance of 200nautical miles
measured from Greenland's baseline." (emphasis added).
4. It should be noted at the outset that the Danish
Application was made unilaterally, without any attempt to reach
agreement as to the submission of the dispute to the Court, and
without any notification of its intention tonitiate Court proceed-
ings. This is extraordinary for several reasons. First, the Parties
had for a long time discussed the possibility of solving of their
disagreement by judicial settlement. As late as 21 June 1988,
following the Danish expression of a preference for arbitration,
the Norwegian side had suggested a combination of settlement of
the legalissues in dispute by arbitration, followed by negotiations
to implement the arbitral decision and to settle other matters
relating to the area between Jan Mayen and Greenland which
might be outstanding. Without any definite response to this
suggestion, a unilateral Application was made to the Court.
5. Secondly, the issues of maritime delimitation are nor-
mally presented to the Court on the basis of a carefully negotiatedspecial agreement. Indeed, in the sphere of general international
law, it is recognized that the primary instrument for effecting any
maritime delimitation and, at the same time, the principal means
of settlement of any dispute relating thereto, is the agreement of
the parties (as in Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982).
6. The Applicant presents as its primary claims its enti-
tlements to a full 200 mile fishing zone and a full 200 mile
continental shelf area vis-à-visJan Mayen. It is the position of the
Norwegian Government that these claims are without any basis in
international law and must be rejected.
7. As to the continentalshelf, the claim totally disregards
the bilateral Agreement of 8 December 1965between the parties,
applicable by its own wording to al1parts of the continental shelf
of the two States, that the boundary between them shall be the
median line. Further, even if the Parties had not been bound by
that Agreement, both States are Parties to and bound by the 1958
Continental ShelfConvention, asit must be applied in the light of
the relationship between the two Parties and of their consistent
conduct. There is no foundation in the 1958Convention, nor in
general international law as expressed in that Convention and as
subsequently developed, for the Danish Claim to disregard the
existenceof Jan Mayen in the delimitation of the continental shelf
between the two States.
8. In regard to zones ofjïsheries jurisdiction, the issues
have arisen more recently. Denmark enacted enabling legislation
in 1976 to extend fisheries zones up to 200 nautical miles from
base lines, but in respect of Greenland decided initially not to
implement the extension north of 67" N on the east coast, and
north of 75"N on the west coast. Norway likewise enacted
legislation concerning the economic zone in 1976.That legislation
applied toJan Mayen, but was only implemented in relation to the
waters off Jan Mayen in May 1980, and then not beyond the
median line in relation to Greenland. Denmark extended its 200
milezone northwards in May 1980,but decreed that "for the time
being", fisheries jurisdiction would not be exercised beyond the
median line in relation to Jan Mayen. A confrontation was
created only when Denmark in 1981repealed this restraint on the
exercise of its fisheries zones jurisdiction. By its 1981 Order,
Denmark exceededthe powers granted under the Danish enabling
Act, which specifically defines the Danish fisheries zone as not
extending beyond the median line in relation to other States. 9. The Danish claim for entitlement to a full 200 mile
fishery zone vis-à-visJan Mayen is without foundation. Although
there is no specific agreement between the Parties in respect of
delimitation of fisheries (or economic) zones (except the 1979
median line delimitation between the Danish Faroes and the
Norwegian mainland), Denmark by its consistent conduct must
be seen as having recognized, and acquiesced in, delimitation
between the two States on the basis of equidistance. On the basis
of general international law, the entitlements accruing to Norway
on account of Jan Mayen must be respected.
10. The Danish claims appear to be inspired by conces-
sions granted by Norway to Iceland, as the outcome of negotia-
tions conducted on a political basis, at the stage when well-
established Danish attitudes started to change. Accom-
modation within a political framework between two States is not
a declaration with regard to the state of the law. There is no claim
to most-favoured-nation treatment with regard to maritime de-
limitations negotiated between States.
11. The request by Denmark that the Court shall "draw a
singleline of delimitation of the fishing zone and continental shelf
area "between Greenland and Jan Mayen" is presented as a
secondary or derivative claim inconsequenceof Denmark's alleged
entitlement to a continental shelf and a fishing zone.
12. Norway does not dispute that boundaries of the con-
tinental shelf and of the fisheries (or economic) zones may wellbe
identical in practice. On the contrary, there has been extensive
practice to the effect that the delimitation of fisheriesor economic
zones follows the continental shelf boundary already in place.
Recent maritime delimitation agreements have stated this speci-
fically.In other cases, fisheries jurisdiction has in fact been
exercised within the confines of existing continental shelf bound-
aries. It does not, however, follow from this practice that the
subsequent establishment of a fisheries zone should lead to a
completely new exercisein delimitation. In the case of the waters
between Jan Mayen and Greenland, it would seem natural that
the boundary between the fisherieszones should coincide with the
continental shelf boundary already in place.
13. To the extent that the Danish claim for a single
maritime boundary is a claim to a delimitation of a different
nature, as compared with other delimitations,Norway is bound to
point out that no agreement exists between the two Parties, eitheron a procedural level or with regard to the substance of such a
claim. Without the agreement of the Parties, such a claim would
not be admissible.
14. The Danish Memorial deals with the interests of third
States at pages 10-11, in paragraphs 25 - 29. Norway shares the
view that Iceland is the only third State whose jurisdictional
interests could be affected by the decision of the Court in these
proceedings. It also shares the viewsuggestedin paragraph 29that
the interests of Iceland should be left unaffected. However, by
requesting the Court to extend its consideration as far southwards
asto a line BCD, terminating to the west at the intersection of the
median linebetween Jan Mayen and Greenland and the parallel of
69" 51'N, Denmark in effect requests the Court to determine its
entitlements to an area which by Agreements between Norway
and Iceland of 28May 1980and 22October 1981(Annexes 70and
72) has been afforded to Iceland, and in effect seeks an implied
recognition of the Danish point of viewas to the baselines to be
taken into account in a delimitation between Iceland and Green-
land (cf. the Danish Memorial, footnote 2 to paragraph 29).
15. However, the present proceedings should not extend to
possible disputes involving other parties than Norway and Den-
mark. The Court is therefore respectfully requested to confine its
consideration to an area which to the south is bounded by the
outer limit of the economic zone of Iceland (as defined by the
latter), to the point where this limit intersects the median line
between Jan Mayen and Greenland at 70" 12'04" N.
16. The lines of argument which will beput forward in the
present Counter-Memorial are independent of one another, but
not mutually exclusive. They are to some extent interwoven, in
that the existence of a treaty relationship and the history of the
conduct of the Parties are interlinked, and- severallyand together
-have an impact on the assessment of the elements of an equitable
solution. They are interrelated in that the operation of therules of
general international law will be seen to confirm and reinforce the
conclusions which flow from the other lines of argument.
17. Therefore, each line of argument is presented as being
in the alternative, without prejudice to Norway's position in
relation to any of the other lines of argument. PART1
THE FACTS A: JAN MAYEN
AND THE NORTHATLANTICREGION
CHAPTER 1:
GENERALOVERVIEW
18. The seas between Norway, the Faroe Islands, Iceland
and Greenland, along with the Barents Sea to the east, have a
certain unity. Theregion formsthe link between the Arctic Ocean
to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to theuth. Byvirtue of the
ice coverage in the mainArctic Ocean, and the channels leading
north from the area, the obvious link is to the Atlantic. In terms
of transport and economic relationships, this maritimeegion can
be said to form a continuation of the Atlantic Ocean. In terms of
the economic interests of the coastal populations, however, the
region has a distinctive character. In informa1usage, references to
the region often use the adjective "Atlantic".
19. The region is characterized by a great deal of interac-
tion between the coastal communities and the different seareas.
Norway has long played a major role in that interrelationship.
20. Human habitation in Norway was encouraged by the
existence of the Gulf Stream, which carries comparatively warm
sea water from the Caribbean to the Norwegian and Barents Seas.
The Gulf Stream has given the seaboard area of Scandinavia a
reasonably temperate climate. The water temperature helps to
establish an environment for rich fisheries.
21. Norwegian dependence on the sea is amply demon-
strated by the persistent pattern of settlement in most of the
country: apart from the agriculturalregions in the central areas
around Oslo and in Traindelag, settlement has been almost
exclusivelyalong the coast (see Map 1at the end of this volume).
22. In the early Middle Ages, population pressures caused
the general Scandinavian outward movement associated with
Viking expeditions, launched for both trade and more warlike
purposes. For Norway, this period also provided a pattern of
more durable overseas settlement, showing that for seafaring
peoples the ocean is not necessarily a separating factor. 23. It may be assumed that Norsemen settled in the
Shetlands and the Orkneys in late Merovingian times. At the end
of the ninth century, Norse settlement was extended to the Faroes
and to Iceland. This settlement was superimposed on earlier Irish
settlement, but the Norse elements rapidly became dominant in
these islands (in contrast to developments in the western Scottish
islands and further south).
24. Norse society was established in the North Atlantic
territories with a basic economy which did not differ in any
essential way from that of western Norway. The settlers brought
with them their forms of government, their laws and their social
customs.
25. In the southern islands, political relations with the
mainland were retained in various degrees of feudal dependence.
In Iceland, a unique aristocratic-popular republic was formed, for
the most part quite independent of the Norwegian Crown until
1262.
26. Settlement in Iceland from the Norwegian mainland
lasted from around 870until around 930.From then on, there was
a separate Icelandic community with its own identity. It was from
this community that Eirik the Red set sail westwards in 982, and
discovered new land which he named Greenland.
27. In the following years, Eirik founded a settlement
along the unpopulated southwestern shore of Greenland. The
settlers found deserted dwellings, boats and tools from earlier
Inuit settlers who had left this part of Greenland for unknown
reasons.
28. The Norse settlement in Greenland was to exist for
close to 500 years. Although the settlement could at most have
comprised 16parishes, as wellas two monasteries, Greenland had
its own place in the organization of the Church, and its own
bishop (first appointed in 1125).
29. The Kings of Norway gradually increased their influ-
ence over the Atlantic settlements. In 1261,a compact was made
between Greenland and the Crown: In return for the King's
protection, Greenlanders would pay taxes. After an extended
period of strife among the leading families in Iceland, the domin-
ion of the Crown was recognized in 1262.Henceforth, the King of
Norway maintained his officers in both territories to keep the
peace, dispense justice and collect taxes. 30. In the middle of the thirteenth century, the King of
Norway reigned throughout the Northern Seas. Administratively,
al1 the island territories formed part of the Kingdom and,
ecclesiastically, they were part of the Archbishopric of Nidaros
(now Trondheim).
31. To the east, the King's domain extended along the
coast of the Kola peninsula. Taxes were paid by the Sami people
(in earlier terminology: the "Lapps"), who were also tributary to
the Muscovite Tsars. Finns and Russians did not venture far into
the Norwegian Sea, althoughthe Russians carried on hunting and
fishing in the White Sea and Barents Sea, and sent expeditions to
Spitsbergen.
32. The power and the vitality of the Norwegian Crown
declined as a function of several developments - not least the
ravages of the Black Death in the middle of the fourteenth
century. The native Norwegian aristocracy did not generate
enough wealth or military force to keep up the strength of the
institutions of the Realm. The Norwegian Crown was hereditary;
this led to persona1unions with Denmark and Sweden,at one time
giving rise to a trilateral union.
33. Political decline in Norway was accompanied by eco-
nomic recession. This led to a decrease in trade with the Atlantic
territories. In particular, the shipping links between thenland
and Greenland were severed, and it is not known with certainty
when the Norse community ceased to exist. Archaeological finds
suggest a gradua1 decline in population, which may have been
related to aolder climate. It appears that first, the northernmost
settlements were givenup, and that the southernmost settlements
became extinct before the year 1500. The areas which had been
settled by the Norsemen were repopulated by Eskimos who
migrated southwards along the west coast.
34. In 1536,Norway and Denmark were joined in a real
union, the terms of which were to Norway's disadvantage, and
which resulted in a subordinate position for Norway. Along with
the Norwegian mainland, the King of Denmark took possession
of the Norwegian provinces in the Atlantic. They continued,
however, to be regarded as an appendage of the Norwegian
Crown.
35. Under the Treaty of Kiel of 14January 1814,the union
between Norway and Denmark was dissolved, as mainlandNorway was ceded to Sweden by the King of Denmark. The
Danish Crown was able to retain the Norwegian provinces: the
Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland.
36. Norway adopted a liberal constitution based on con-
stitutional monarchy on 17May 1814.This could not prevent the
conclusion of a union with Sweden. In November 1814, after a
short war, Norway had to accept terms whereby important parts
of the new Constitution were retained, but the entire executive
power was vested in the King of Sweden. It was only upon the
dissolution of this union in 1905that Norway again resumed full
control over its foreign policy. In thisense, it was only in the
twentieth century that Norway emerged as a truly independent
State.
37. The territories which border on this maritime region
are Norway, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Norway
and Iceland are independent States. Greenland and the Faroe
Islands form part of the Kingdom of Denmark.
Norway
38. Norway is a North Atlantic State with a mainland
coastline of approximately 1,500 kilometres (approximately 800
nautical miles) facing the Norwegian Sea (between the 62nd
parallel and the North Cape), with sovereignty over the archipel-
ago of Svalbard (Spitsbergen) with a western coastline of approx-
imately 500 kilometres (approximately 270 nautical miles), and
with sovereignty over the island of Jan Mayen with a coastline of
approximately 60 kilometres facing the Norwegian Sea and of
approximately 60 kilometres facing the Greenland Sea. A line
from the North Cape over Bear Island to Spitsbergen's South
Cape marks the limit between the Norwegian Sea and the Barents
Sea, and has a length of approximately 650 kilometres (approxi-
mately 350 nautical miles). A line from the South Cape over Jan
Mayen to Fontur (Iceland) marks the limit between the Norwe-
gian Sea and the Greenland Sea, and has a length of approxi-
mately 1,600kilometres (approximately 865 nautical miles).
39. Norway has a population of 4.2 million. Despite
increasing industrialization during the last century, Norway's
economy continues to depend heavily on marine resources. Shelf-derived oil and gas exports in 1985 amounted to NOK 85,000
million, equivalent to approximately USD 13,000million1 (47.7
per cent. of totalxport value). Fisheries also remain an important
element of Norway's external economy,providing an export value
of NOK 7,000 million, corresponding to USD 1,100million (9.5
per cent. of export value excluding oil, gas, ships and offshore
platforms).
In the fabric of Norwegian society, the main impact of
40.
the fishing industry lies in its general contribution to the mainte-
nance of population settlement and viable regional economies in
almost al1coastal districts where fisheries constitute the predom-
inant livelihood. With almost 30,000 full-time or part-time fish-
ermen operating 9,000 decked boats, the fishing industry consti-
tutes the main element in the economy of most coastal
communities in northwestern and northern Norway.
41. The traditional dependence on and utilization of the
surrounding seas led to wide-ranging activities by Norwegian
whalers, sealers, trappers, fishermen, scientists and explorers
throughout this northernmost part of the North Atlantic and the
adjoining seas. In particular, the pattern of Norwegian fishing
activities eventually covered the whole region. None of the other
fishing industries which today are active in the region are as long-
established or as geographically diversified as the Norwegian
operations. These varied efforts by Norwegians of many profes-
sions also formed the basis for the extension of Norway's political
interest by the inclusion of the new territories of Svalbard and Jan
Mayen, by the Treaty of 1920 and the proclamation of 1929
respectively.
FaroeIslands
42. The archipelago of the Faroe Islands, which is situated
where the Norwegian Sea abutson the Atlantic Ocean, has a total
coastline of approximately 350 kilometres (approximately 190
nautical miles).
43. The Faroe Islands economy is also concentrated on the
fishing industry.Since the mid-twenties, the Faroese fishing fleet
has relied increasingly upon distant water fisheries. In the 1950s
and 1960s, the Faroese were major participants in the cod
'Throughout the Counter-Mernorial figures in Norwegian kroner ("NOK) have been
converted into US Dollars ("USD") on the hasis of the rate of exchange on 2 May 1990,
when USD 1equalled NOK 6.53.fisheries off the West Greenland coast. After the establishment of
the Greenland 200 mile fisheries limit, the Faroese long-distance
fishing fleet has turned its attention to the Northeast Atlantic.
Negotiated access rights have been obtained in Greenland, Ice-
landic, Norwegian and Soviet waters.
Greenland
44. Greenland has an eastern coastline of approximately
2,100 kilometres (approximately 1,135 nautical miles), between
Cape Farvel in the south and Nordostrundingen in the north.
45. Fishing as a major industry, producing for export, is a
relatively new enterprise in Greenland. The activities of the
modern Greenland fishing fleet have been almost exclusively
confined to Greenland west coast waters. Greenland's interest in
east coast fishing is of very recent date. Vessels from West
Greenland have to a limited extent participated in the cod and
shrimp fisheries off the southeast coast. Available resources off
the east coast have, after the establishment of the 200 mile fishing
zone, been allocated mainly for the licensing of non-Greenland
vessels. Before 1976, Greenland catches off the east coast gener-
ally stayed below 1,000 tons per year (data from the Interna-
tional Council for the Exploration of the Sea ("ICES")). After
1976, catches of fish (excluding shrimp) by Greenland registry
vessels have only twice (1979 and 1985)exceeded 2,000 tons (see
Table 5.2in Appendix 5).According to available information, out
of a total of 310 registered modern fishing vessels of more than 5
gross register tons, only five had their home port in East
Greenland (namely Tasiilaq /Angmagssalik). Previously, one such
vesse1 was registered with its home port at Ittoqqortoormiit /
Scoresbysund, but is no longer registeredz.
46. The reasons for the absence of modern fishing opera-
tions based in East Greenland may perhaps be sought in the
unfavourable natural conditions: the capacity of inshore east
coast waters for biomass production, the occurrence of pack ice
and consequent restrictions on navigation and the utilization of
harbours, the capability of the local communities to generate the
required capital base for modern fishing activities, and the
remoteness of east coast waters from the home ports of the
modern Greenland fishing fleet. There seems to be no disagree-
2)Minister's Bureau, Copenhagen,at p. 372: Table 41, The GreenlandFishing Fleet,ime
1987und 1989;compared with previous editions. See excerpts at Annex 82.ment as to the paucity of the fish resources in East Greenland
inshore waters, cf. the Danish Memorial p. 14,paragraph 41.
Iceland
47. Iceland is the second independent State in this distinct
maritime environment, with a relevant coastline to the north of
approximately 850kilometres (approximately 460 nautical miles).
48. Iceland likewise has an important interest in this
maritime region. The relative weight of fisheries in Iceland's
economy is great, and support and promotion of the fishing
industry has always figured importantly in the conduct of Ice-
land's international relations. Iceland has rich fishing grounds in
the waters close to its coasts, and Icelandic fishermen have
concentrated their operations to Icelandic waters. Only sporadi-
callyhave they fishedin distant waters. Iceland's resourceinterests
are prominent with respect to the western part of the region.
Denmark
49. Denmark is present in the North Atlantic area only by
virtue of Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
50. Continental Denmark does not fa11within this geo-
graphical region. The distances between continental Denmark and
the Atlantic provinces are considerable (Copenhagen-Torshavn,
(Faroe Islands): approximately 1,300 kilometres (approximately
700 nautical miles; sailing distance 750 nautical miles),
Copenhagen-NuukIGodthaab (Greenland) approximately 3,500
kilometres (approximately 1,900 nautical miles; sailing distance
2,200 nautical miles).
51. For an understanding of the implications for fishing of
the general geography of the region, it is essential to be aware of
the relative distances.
52. The distance between Jan Mayen and Icelandic fishing
ports is approximately 350 to 380 nautical miles, between Jan
Mayen and Troms0 (continental Norway) 572 nautical miles,
between Jan Mayen and Alesund (continental Norway) 636nautical miles The sailing distance from NuukIGodthaab (Green-
land) to Jan Mayen is 1,500nautical miles, and from Cape Farvel
(the southernmost point in Greenland) 1,114 nautical miles The
distances from Ittoqqortoormiit/Scoresbysund (Greenland) to
Cape Farvel and to NuukIGodthaab are 859 and 1,245nautical
miles respectively (see Sketch Map at p. 16).
53. It is a dominant feature of the resource situation in the
waters around Greenland that the most important and most
exploited fish stocks are concentrated along the west coast. The
table below shows average annual cod catches for this area from
1952to 1978.
Tablel3
Average Annual Catches of Cod (in 1,000tons) in the
West Greenland Area, 1952-1978.
Period Norway Greenland Denmark Others
1952-59 34.0 19.8 - 212.2
Complete figures for total catches from 1958to 1986are given in
Appendix 5, Table 5.8. The main fishing grounds for cod and
shrimp off the Greenland coasts are shown in the Sketch Map at
page 17.
54. Off the east coast of Greenland, stocks of shrimp and
halibut are found within the fisherieszonesouth of 68"N. Most of
the cod catches are taken south of 65" N. Fishing for redfish,
which previously was the main activity, takes place both within
the Greenland zone and beyond it, mainly south of 63"N. Fishing
for cod and shrimp in this area (within 200miles, or to the west of
the GreenlandIIceland median line) is of comparatively recent
date.
55. In the northern part of this area, north of 65" N,
Norwegian operations were dominant in the fishery for shrimp
and halibut. In the more northerly areas off the East Greenland
coast, north of 68"N, the natural conditions are such that, apart
from local stocks in fjords and other inshore waters, there are no
demersal species (i.e., white or bottom fish), but only pelagic
species (moving close to the surface), such as herring, capelin,
whales and seals.
Source: ICNAF Statistical Bulletin. For further details see Appendix 5, Table 5.9. 56. Apart from Soviet sealing (the regulation of which was
coordinated with Norwegian management under a special agree-
ment in 1957,see Annex 42),Norwegian sealing, hunting, whaling
and fishing were virtually the only activities in thisrea.
57. The fishing activity pattern in the area is shown in the
following tables:
Table î4
Total Catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in
the Northeast Greenland Area North of 68"N, 1978-1986
Year Nor- Green- Den- Ice- Others
WaY land mark land
1978 165.4 - - 154.5 0.7
45, Table5.4.ulletinStatistiquedes Pêches Meso.r furtherdetailsseeAppendix
15Distances in the North AtlanticMain Fishing Grounds around Greenland
MAINFISHINOOROUNDS
AROUNDQREENLAND
(Codand shrimps)
Çhrimp Rshinggmunds
Medianline(arnputsd)
-.----
Dmish clsim
Outa llmkof200 n.m.zwie
--- hn~~~ted boundarylice Table 35
Total Catch Activities in the Northeast Greenland Area and
in the Jan Mayen Area North of 68"N, 1978-1986.
Year Norway Denmark Ice- Faroes USSR
land
Seal Minke Cape- Shrimp Cape- Shrimp Cape- Cape- Shrimp Seal
Whale lin lin lin lin
1978 30.5 - 154.1 0.1 - - 154.6 0.8 - 5.0
- - - - -
1979 33.0 126.0 1.1 114.6 6.7
1980 19.6 13 118.6 3.2 - - 108.5 20.6 - 5.0
1981 23.5 1 91.4 2.6 17.2 0.6 44.1 13.3 - 4.0
- - - - - - -
1982 23.2 2.0 4.4
1983 3.4 23 - 1.8 - - - - 0.3 4.8
1984 2.6 90 104.6 3.7 - 0.4 - 3.4 - -
1985 0.9 55 188.7 4.3 - 0.3 173.6 - - 1.8
-
1986 2.9 54 149.7 4.0 5.4 0.4 148.4 65.5 6.6
58. In the 1950sand 1960s,fishing fleets of East European
States operated in the waters south and east of Jan Mayen, fishing
mainly for herring. As an element of an Agreement of 16 April
1962between Norway and the Soviet Union on reciprocal fishing
arrangements, Norway obtained certain fishing opportunities
within 12 nautical miles from the Soviet Coast, contingent upon
continued access for Soviet fishingvesselsto carry out loading and
unloading operations in waters outside the 4 nautical mile limit of
the territorial sea of Jan Mayen. That arrangement is an indica-
tion of the practical need of Soviet vesselsat that time (seeAnnex
43).
59. Subsequently, East European fishermen developed du-
ring the 1970s a blue whiting fishery of very significant propor-
tions in the North Atlantic. It is assumed that most of these
catches were taken to the east of Jan Mayen. In fisheries
management discussions between Norway and the Soviet Union,
an interest in blue whiting fishing within the Jan Mayen fishery
zone was also evinced. In a letter dated 15 June 1981 Norway
agreed to open up for such a fishery (see Annex 13).
60. The geological origins of the region lie in the separa-
tion of the original landmass into distinct continents. As the
5)Al1catches in 1,000except minke whale. Source: For capelin: ICES Bulletin Statistique
des PêchesMaritimes. For further details see Appendix 5, Table 5.5.continents started to drift apart about 57 million years ago,
Greenland separated from the European continent. It is this
continental drift which has shaped the maritime area of the
region. It is the operation of the same processes which has
contributed to the creation of the volcanic island territories of
Iceland and Jan Mayen.
61. Greenland has an extensive and relatively shallow
continental shelf along its east coast. There has recently been an
increase in commercial interest in exploring that part of the
Greenland continental shelf.
62. Jan Mayen isa landmass which is situated on a ridge of
continental crust which has separated from the Greenland land-
mass and now forms a mid-ocean micro-continent.
63. Thehydrocarbon potential of the shelf areas of the Jan
Mayen ridge continental shelf has been recognized, and has been
the object of systematic investigations. The evaluation of the
hydrocarbon potential of this area has not been finally deter-
mined.
64. Iceland has a separate geological history, but the
volcanic eruptions which have built up the island are linked to the
same process of continental drift.
65. The Faroe Islands are of volcanic origin. The subma-
rine areas around the islands are of continental origin, left behind
in the process of continental drift.
66. Along the west coast of mainland Norway, the conti-
nental shelf in some areas continues to the outer edge of the
continental margin considerably beyond 200 miles from land. To
the North, the landmass of mainland Norway has a natural
prolongation northwards, across the Barents Sea and beyond
Svalbard (Spitsbergen), of considerable extent.
67. The existence of ridges and rift zones, and the subma-
rine eruptive and volcanic activity which takes place along these
rift zones, also create an environment which may provide for the
occurrence of deposits of polymetallic sulphides. The ocean
depths at which these submarine eruptive activities take place are
comparable to those obtaining in the waters off the west coast of
North America, where the prospects of the exploitation of such
deposits are actively being considered. 68. The physical properties of the oceanic water in the
western North Atlantic are particularly well suited to provide
optimum conditions for marine living resources. The overall
interaction of bottom topography, variations in temperature,
ocean chemical composition and ocean current systems al1work
together to create an environment which has been able to sustain
some of the richest and most valuable fisheries in the world along
the coasts of the region. Marine mammals including whales, seals
and polar bears have occurred in varying numbers at different
periods. Al1 these resources have been harvested, by the local
population or by outsiders.
69. The role of this maritime region is also felt far beyond
the coastal rim, due to the important influences on the climate of
the northern hemisphere of the interchanges between the ice
masses of the Arctic Ocean and the temperate waters of the
Atlantic Ocean which take place in the region.
70. There is a tremendous outwelling of icefrom the Arctic
Ocean, in particular through the channel between Greenland and
Svalbard. Strong currents annually carry around 5,000 cubic
kilometres of ice along the eastcoast of Greenland. This is "pack
ice" which provides a layer of varying density and extent, rather
than isolated, individual ice bergs. The ice cover depends on the
season, the sea state, temperatures in the atmosphere and the
water, wind conditions, and other climatic factors. The ice
coverage has important immediate consequences for al1 surface
maritime transport along the east coast of Greenland. It is also a
limiting factor on the utilization of both living resources and
seabed resources in that area. Anything but the lightest incidence
of ice prohibits fishing with purse seine gear. Heavier ice cover
permits only speciallyreinforced vesselsto sail safely.Ice coverage
for the months of heaviest and lightest coverage is illustrated in
Map II at end of this volume.
71. The climatic conditions are vastly different within the
region, strongly influenced by oceanic current systems such as the
Gulf Stream and the East Greenland Current. Thus Iceland enjoys
a considerably warmer climate than any part of Greenland, even
though Greenland extends further south than Iceland. Wind is
also an important factor in determining human survivability in
cold weather: the wind-chi11effect is as important as the absolute
temperature. 72. Flora and fauna are variables of climate, although
generally extreme adaptation has taken place to withstand the
effects of cold. The marine environment has proved capable of
supporting life more generously than has the land.
73. Historically,human settlement in the region was de-
pendent on the presence of resources to a degree which could
sustain life.In more recent history, human settlement may also be
based on outside support. The incidence of human habitation in
the region therefore varies, from the comparatively densely pop-
ulated Faroe Islands (32 inhabitants per square kilometre), to
Norway (13 inhabitants per square kilometre) and Jan Mayen
(0.06inhabitant per square kilometre) to Greenland (0.025 inhab-
itant per square kilometre). Arctic territories are generally
sparsely populated, but settlements relying on outside support
may provide greater population densities than is the case for
traditional communities. The major increases in the population of
Greenland after the Second World War have taken place only as
a result of outside material and financial support becoming
available.
74. Al1 the States in the region are linked to the same
political and military Alliance. However, they pursue somewhat
differing policies in relation to military matters.
75. Denmark maintains a separate military command for
Greenland, including naval units and aircraft. Greenland is host
to two air bases which include foreign forces. The Faroe Islands
have no foreign bases; the number of permanently stationed
Danish defence units is modest.
76. Iceland maintains a Coast Guard, but no combatant
military force, and is host to a foreign air base.
77. Norway maintains land, naval and air forces (which in
relation to the country's resources must be regarded asconsider-
able), but does not act as host to foreign military bases. One
element of Norwegian defence operations in this region is the
organization of a Home Guard unit in Jan Mayen, composed of
local personnel, which trains regularly. Amainland Army mobi-
lization unit is deployed for manoeuvres in Jan Mayen on the
same regular rotation pattern as other reserve units. CHAPTERII
JAN MAYEN
78. The island of Jan Mayen has as its southernmost point
Sorkapp ("the South Cape") at 70" 49'6 N, 9" 00'0 W, and
stretches northeastwards to Nordkapp ("the North Cape") at 71"
09'7N, 7"58'3W. The length of the island is 53.6 kilometres; the
breadth varies between 2.5 and 16kilometres. The total areas 380
square kilometres (148 square miles). For cornparison, the total
area of the Republic ofMalta is 316square kilometres (123square
miles). Its shapean be compared to a club: the head is formed by
the volcanic mountain Beerenberg (2,277 metres above sea level)
in the northeastern part, the handle is the southwestern part,
varying in elevation from 20 metres to peaks of between 700 and
800metres. Beerenberg'supper part is covered by a glacier which
extends several arms down to sea level. Beerenberg is an active
volcan0 and the latest eruption was in 1970.A map of the island
is found in the pocket of the back cover of this volume. A sketch
map of the island is reproduced on page 22.
79. The mean temperature for the coldest month (March)
is -5.8"C (21.6" F), for the warmest month (August) + 5.1°C
(41.2"F). The flora comprises around 60 varieties of plants, a
similar number of mosses and around 150 lichens. There is a
permanent terrestrial fauna of blue and white polar fox. Polar
bears visit the island regularly.number of seal species occur in
the waters around Jan Mayen, and there are permanent stocks of
ringed seals and bearded seals. There is a varied and abundant
avifauna.
80. There appears to be uncertainty as to the first discov-
ery of Jan Mayen. Icelandic annals record for the year 1194the
discovery of new land to the north. Previously, this discovery was
held to relate to the Svalbard (Spitsbergen) archipelago. It now
believed to be equally likely that the discovery of 1194 in fact
related to Jan Mayen.
81. Its rediscovery is linked to the quest by Britons and
Dutchmen in the early seventeenth century for an alternative
navigation route to the East Indies, north of the Eurasian or
American continents, and to the exploitation of the whale stocks
which were discovered in the process. Its presentname is derived
from observations by Jan Jacobszoon May in 1614. 82. In the first half of the seventeenth century, Jan Mayen
attracted the interest of whalers. British, Dutch, Norwegian and
Danish whalers developed a land-based hunt for whales, espe-
cially the bowhead. After a comparatively short span of time the
bowhead whale stocks, which migrated along the coast of Jan
Mayen, had been decimated. The whaling station on Jan Mayen
was no longer utilized by the whalers after around 1650.
83. The resumption in the nineteenth century of human
activity in the Jan Mayen region is linked to two simultaneous
developments: the general awakening of scientific interest in the
Arctic regions, and the expansion of Norwegian economic interest
in northern waters.
84. The first detailed map of the island was drawn by
William Scoresby Jr. around 1820. Jan Mayen was thereafter
intermittently visited by scientific expeditions, including the-
wegian Northern Oceans Expedition in 1877.The first sustained
scientific effort occurred during the First International Arctic
Research Year, when an Austrian expedition wintered in Jan
Mayen in 1882183.
85. Norwegian sealingcommenced in Jan Mayen waters in
1846. This activity attracted a number of vessels from several
regions on the Norwegian mainland.
86. In 1906,Norwegian trappers for the first time wintered
on Jan Mayen. Hunting (mainly for Arctic fox) was good, and in
subsequent years other trappers found transport on sealers and
occasional sailings. Some of these expeditions proved disastrous.
Others were successful, and Jan Mayen became clearly and
permanently established as a field of operations for Norwegian
hunters.
87. Similar activities were carried out in East Greenland,
where Norwegians erected huts in otherwise uninhabited and
unutilized areas. At thisjuncture, there was a difference of opinion
with regard to whether Denmark had established its sovereignty
over East Greenland. Norway and Denmark nonetheless con-
cluded a Convention of 9 July 1924, providingefor equal access
and working conditions for Norwegian and Danish hunters, and
the possibility for both Parties to set up wireless, meteorological
and scientific stations in East Greenland (Annex 39). This Con-
vention was concluded without prejudice to the views of either
Party with regard to the question of sovereignty. The dispute on
the sovereignty issue was decided by the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice in 1933 (Judgment, 1933, P.C.I.J., Series
AIB,No. 51, p. 22). The arrangements for access to East Green-
land subsisted undisturbed by the dispute, and were renewed with
minor modifications in 1947for a further period of 20 years (see
Annex 40). They were succeeded by an Agreement of 20 April
1967relating to fishing off East Greenland, and assuring national
treatment for Norwegian fishermen (see Annex 50). Although
providing for a conditional possibility for termination after five
years, this Treaty was maintained in force for the entirety of the
ten-year period foreseen. Thus, until 1977, Norway's particular
interests in hunting and fishing in this area were recognized in a
forma1 treaty relationship between Norway and Denmark. That
relationship remained stable throughout half a century, with-
standing a grave political and legal dispute, and changes in social
and economic conditions.
88. Several hunting expeditions on Jan Mayen during the
First World War gave rise to the formulation of claims to property
rights in the island. Such claims were common in those Arctic
territories over which no State had established sovereignty. Prop-
erty claims regarding Jan Mayen were registered with the Norwe-
gian authorities.
89. In 1921, the Norwegian Meteorological Institutel es-
tablished a permanent reporting station on Jan Mayen. In 1922,
the Institute claimed rights ts ownership over parts of the island.
In 1926this claim was extended to cover the entire island. Public
interest in Jan Mayen increased with its utilization for weather
reporting, and suggestions were made for the annexation of the
island by Norway. The practical protection of both public and
private Norwegian interests would be improved by the establish-
ment of governmental authority and an orderly administration on
the island. The nation was again taking charge of its own destiny,
and would be able to obtain for its people the secure dominion
over those far-flung areas which Norwegians utilized to supple-
ment the limited opportunities for farming and other land-based
activities on themainland and the coastal islands.
90. The Norwegian Government ascertained that there
would be no opposition to Norway's annexation of the island.
Thereupon, by Royal Decree of 8 May 1929,Norwegian sover-
eignty over Jan Mayen was proclaimed (see Annex 17).
1The ~grwe~ian Meteorological Institute had been established in 1866as an institution
under the University of Oslo. The Institute was turned into a separate public service
entity in 1909. 91. Since the Norwegian annexation, the meteorological
station has been maintained on a permanent basis. The Norwe-
gian Polar Research Institute carried out a complete mapping of
the island, and has conducted a broad scientific survey of the
island.
92. After the German occupation of Norway in 1940,the
staff of the meteorological station was evacuated to the United
Kingdom by a Norwegian naval vessel, and the radio transmitter
rendered inoperative. Later, an attempt by German forces to
establish their own meterological post on Jan Mayen was
thwarted. That attempt led to the dispatch in March 1941 of a
small Norwegian garrison to Jan Mayen from their main base in
the United Kingdom. From then on, and for the duration of the
war, the garrison was maintained. Norwegian and United States
military personnel provided indispensable meteorological and
radio-locating services without interruption.
93. The meteorological installations were extended and
modernized after the Second World War. The station has contin-
ued to serve as an important source of data for both Norwegian
and international meteorological services,even after data derived
from weather observation vessels and satellite recordings have
become available. Appendix 2 contains a Note on the activities of
the meteorological station, giving further details.
94. In 1959,the meteorological station wasjoined by a new
facility offering long-range radio navigation (the "LORAN A"
and "LORAN C") services. Originally reserved for military use,
these navigation services are now open to al1ships and aircraft.
From 1970to 1985,a facility for Consol radio navigation service
was in operation.
95. Al1these facilities are at present maintained with an
aggregate staff of 25 persons. The radio navigation services are
operated by the Norwegian Defence Communications and Data
ServicesAdministration ("NODECA"). Modern housing is pro-
vided. A coastal radio service is available, and is widely used by
fishermen in the area. This service makes it possible to maintain
ship-to-shorecommunications with individual telephone subscrib-
ers in mainland Norway. In addition to the safety factor and the
technical and emergency services provided, the coastal radio
stationprovides considerable social services for fishermen. Since
1962, the island has had a landing field which is capable of
handling large transport aircraft. There is a regular service by
military aircraft (C-130Hercules), which permits personnel trans-fers and light cargo deliveries. Civilian aircraft provide mail
services. The landing field provides an additional possibility for
search and rescue operations, and for giving emergency evacua-
tion and medical assistance.
96. Bulk supplies are brought in by ship.2 Permanent
harbour works have been proposed, but despite strong support
from fishermen, it has not been possible to give financial priority
to the construction of a permanent, all-weather port.
97. The administration of Jan Mayen was provided for in
an Act of 27 February 1930 (see Annex 18, including also the
relevant Billthereon). The principal feature of this legislation was
the integration of the island into the Kingdom of Norway, not as
a colony or dependency but as an inalienable part of the Realm.
This had important constitutional implications. Section 1 of the
Norwegian Constitution of 17 May 1814 provides that the
Kingdom is "free, independent, indivisible and inalienable", and
the incorporation of Jan Mayen into the Realm has been held to
imply that the territory henceforth may not be separated, ceded or
otherwise transferred.
98. At the same time, Norwegian exploration and whaling
activitiesin the Antarctic led to the annexation of the territories of
Bouvet-0ya ("Bouvet Island") and Peter 1's0y ("Peter 1Island").
However, the legislation regarding Norway's possessions in this
region, also adopted on 27 February 1930, clearly distinguishes
their constitutional and administrative character by specifying
that these territories shall have the status of "biland" (that is to
Say,"dependencies", literally "adjunct lands").
99. The Jan Mayen Act of 1930 provides for an admini-
stration which is simple and addressed to the needs of a sparsely
settled Arctic region. Norwegian private law and criminal law
applies, as well as the laws of judicial procedure. The right to al1
lands which are not transferred to private parties is vested in the
State, and prescriptive acquisition of real rights to property is
l)The statement at para. 207 of the Danish Memorial that "Transportation to and from
out in Hvalrossbukta (Walrus Bay) regardless of whether one elects to cal1this bay "arried
natural harbour" or not (Danish Memorial, p. 55, para. 206).precluded. Inversely, rights retained by the State in property
transferred to a private party cannot be superseded by prescriptive
use.
100. The Sysselmann (Governor) of Svalbard nominally
holds the chief administrative responsibility, while the Chief of
Police at Bod0 exercises civilexecutive authority with regard to
Jan Mayen. Local authority for police and public order purposes
isdeputed to the Officer-in-Charge of the NODECA, who is at the
same time responsible for al1administrative and logistic tasks for
the island as a whole. The City Court at Bod0 is the competent
judicial forum. Jan Mayen has a post office.
101. Appendix 1 reproduces a more detailed Note on the
administration of Jan Mayen.
102. Since the mid-sixties the southwestern part of the
Norwegian-Iceland-North Greenland Sea has attracted the inter-
est of the international geo-scientific community (see Map III at
the end of this volume for the bathymetric situation in the area).
Extensive bathymetric and geophysical measurements have been
carried out to unravel the details of the unique geological history
of the area. Special emphasis has been put on mapping the Jan
Mayen ridge.
103. The Jan Mayen ridge is characterized as a submerged
micro-continent, predating in origin the nascence of the islands of
Jan Mayen and Iceland. Both those islands are described as being
composed of relatively young rocks of volcanic origin. The ridge,
however, is a long sliver of continental crust - a micro-continent
- once a part of the Laurasian supercontinent. During the Tertiary
Geological Era it was split off the Norwegian and Greenland
continental margins through a two-phased process of seafloor-
spreading: About 57million years ago the ridge, still connected to
Greenland was split off from the Norwegian Coast,while the final
split from Greenland took place about 26 million years ago.
104. Notwithstanding the difference in geology between the
volcanic landmasses of Jan Mayen and the continental ridge upon
which the island rests, morphologically the northern part of theJan Mayen ridge is a southward extension of the Jan Mayen shelf,
and does not constitute an extension from the Icelandic shelf.
Between Jan Mayen and Greenland there is a mid-oceanic rift -
the Kolbeinsey Ridge - created by a process typical of such rifts.
The Kolbeinsey Ridge follows a northeasterly direction, approx-
imately midway between Jan Mayen and Greenland.
105. A schematicillustration of the results of the geological
process which separated the Jan Mayen micro-continent from
Greenland is set out below:
Profile of Continental and Oceanic Formations
JAN
KOLBEINSEY RIDGE
Schematic only
WEST EAST
106. Two bathymetric profiles are shown on page 30,
illustrating the geomorphology of the shelf areas between Jan
Mayen and Greenland. The Greenland shelf shows a classical
continental shelf,a gradua1slope, and a rise.TheJan Mayen shelf
comprises areas of lesser depths towards the west, where the
elevations of the Kolbeinsey Ridge are clearly noticeable in the
central area between the two islands. The more southerly profile
provides a parallel picture of the topography of the shelf areas.
107. Investigation of the hydrocarbon potential of the Jan
Mayen continental margin has so far concentrated on the Jan
Mayen ridge. The reason is that the micro-continent is assumed to
offer the greatest hydrocarbon potential of the area. There is at
present no sufficientlydetailed geological material to warrant any
prognostication on the hydrocarbon potential of the western part
of the Jan Mayen continental shelf.
108. There appears to be an increasing commercial interest
in exploring the continental shelf along the east coast of Green-
land, to the west and north of Jan Mayen. Bathymetric Profiles of the Area between Jan Mayen
and Greenland
PROFILE 1
waler Crienland Kolbiinrey Jan Mayen
drpthlm, conlinontal shdf Ridg.
0
1000 -- -
2000--~- - - ~
3000 . - -
4000 - 1000
PROFILE 2
*ale, Gre.nland Kolbeinsey Jan Mayen
depm continental snell Ridge ~idge
II
--IODi,
2000 ~ - ~-- --,il""
JO00 -- . ~ ~ ~ --,10011
1000 - L40011
IUW O 10'1 109. As has been noted, the Kolbeinsey Axis projects
northeastwards on the central portion of the continental shelf
between Jan Mayen and Greenland, while the Jan Mayen Frac-
ture Zone projects southeastwards to connect the Kolbeinsey
Ridge and the Mohn's Ridge north of Jan Mayen. Both the rift
zone and the fracture zone are of a nature which is capable of
providing deposits of polymetallic sulphides. Investigations which
have been undertaken so far appear to indicate that there is
hydrothermal activity in the relevant area, which would sustain
the possibility that polymetallic sulphide concentrations could be
found. CHAPTERIII
NORWAY'S INTERESTIN THE JAN MAYENREGION
110. Norway's traditions as a coastal State with varied
interests in the Northwestern Atlantic go back more than a
thousand years. Those traditions were not unbroken. But the
history of the early period of Norwegian settlement in the island
territories servedintea rlia to inspire public support for the
notable Arctic exploration voyages undertaken by Norwegian
expeditions around the turn of the century, and for continuing
Norwegian efforts in Arctic scientific research.
111. Commercial sealing and whaling in this region dates
back to the Middle Ages. The Basques were the pioneers in
off-shore whaling, with the Dutch and the English taking over
later. Norwegian whaling expeditions commenced in the late
eighteenth century, and expanded in the following decades. The
Napoleonic wars brought famine to Norway, and the authorities
adopted a series of measures to encourage sealing and whaling as
a part of the economy of coastal communities. In the towns of
Troms0 and Hammerfest in North Norway, a specializedindustry
grew up, based on broad experience from Arctic operations. By
the early1830s,these two towns had an Arctic fleet of around 90
vessels,employing around 900 seamen.
112. Increases in population, scarcity of continental land-
based resources, and an enhanced ability to finance sea-going
craft led to a steadily intensifying search for distant-watere-
source potential by Norwegian hunters and fishermen. From the
latter half of the nineteenth century, Norwegian fishing, sealing
and whaling activitiesin the North Atlantic expanded. Norwegian
vesselstook up a bottlenose whalefisheryin 1882.This small scale
whaling turned into aseparate activity. Fishing vesselswere fitted
with small calibre harpoon guns, and spread their operations to
follow the migratory pattern of the smaller whales (bottlenose and
minke) within the whole of the North Atlantic.
113. The whalers in the seventeenth century startedArctic
sealing (and walrus hunting) as a side activity, from their shore-
based whaling stations along the coasts of the North Atlantic.
Norwegian sealing as an independent, regular activity started in
the nineteenth century. The field ofoperations extended from EastGreenland in the west to Franz Joseph Land, Novaya Zemlya,
and the White Sea and its approaches in the east. There were two
main areas: Vesterisen ("the West IceV)3,which is the name used
for the iceedge and the breeding lairs thereon stretching from Jan
Mayen northeastwards until it reaches the warm Atlantic surface
current which passes to the west of Bj~rn~ya (Bear Island) and
Spitsbergen, and 0stisen ("the East Ice"), which was the name
used for the fields in the eastern Barents Sea. In addition,
Norwegian sealers operated in the Denmark Strait, between
Iceland and East Greenland, off Newfoundland, and in the Davis
Strait, between Greenland and Canada.
114. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Norwegian
hunters from time to time operated off the east coast of Green-
land. In 1845,the first specially fitted sealing vessel(of more that
400 tons) sailed for the West Ice. After this first expedition by a
large sealing vessel, Norwegian sealing has continued virtually
every year (except during the Second World War) in the West Ice.
115. The seal hunt increased towards the close of the
nineteenth century. It peaked in 1870,when 32 vessels (steam as
wellas sail) brought home a total of 120,000pelts. By the turn of
the century, the large sealers were refitted as whalers for Arctic
whaling. Smaller vessels (of 50 to 70 tons) with crews of 12to 14
men took over in the sealing trade in the North Atlantic. This
pattern of operationshas continued without great changes (except
forthe adoption of diesel enginesfor propulsion) until the present.
116. Sealing was a hazardous activity: 115vesselswere lost
between 1925 and 1939, and 28 vessels from 1945 till 1970.
Earnings were correspondingly rewarding: participation in a
sealing expedition for two or three months would bring a crew
member more that half of his total yearly income.
117. Details of Norwegian sealing activities in the West Ice
and the Denmark Strait are given in Appendix 3.
118. In the 1920s,Norwegian vessels started long-line fish-
ing off Greenland. The Norwegian fishery for Greenland shark
became an important operation. This fishery was an additional
activity for vesselshunting hooded seals in the Denmark Strait in
the summer season. Norwegian long-liners also engaged in the cod
fishery along the coast of West Greenland from the early 1920s.
This fishery increased gradually after the Second World War.
3)To be distinguishedfrom theDanish termto describethe ice masses inthe Davis Strait
and BaffinBay west of Greenland, seeDanishl,p. 41.Norwegian cod catches (which formed the bulk of the Norwegian
catches in the area) rose to more than 40,000 tons in the early
1960s.A supply and welfare facility was established for Norwe-
gian fishermen at Færingehavn (West Greenland) in 1950. For a
long time, it was supported by Norwegian public funds. The
welfare station was closed down in 1983. Norwegian fishing for
cod off West Greenland ceased by the end of the 1970s (see
Appendix 5,Table 5.8 for a tabulation of cod fisheriesin the West
Greenland area).
119. The seabed topography in the area between Jan Mayen
and Greenland varies greatly, with depths ranging from 100
metres to 1,700 metres. Two major currents - the Greenland
Current and the Atlantic Current - converge in the region.
Together, these factors create a unique oceanographic environ-
ment, with exceptional conditions for the fauna in the area. A
great proportion of the water masses that are carried with the
Greenland Current has its origin in the Arctic Ocean, is very cold,
and has low salinity. This light Arctic water flows in the upper
water layers, above the warmer water mass coming from the
Norwegian Atlantic Current. The meeting of warm and cold water
masses creates a very beneficial environment for krill and other
plankton, which occur in great volume. Plankton is an important
food for the commercially exploitable species in the area. The
relatively steep slopes of the submarine seamounts in the area do
not provide fishing banks. These conditions are not beneficial for
demersal fish (such as cod and haddock). The marine fauna in the
region therefore consists ofpelagic species, i.e., those species that
swim freely in the water column and near the surface, such as
whales, seals,capelin, herring and blue whiting. Certainstationary
species, such as shellfish and local shrimp stocks, are found in
locations close to the coast of Jan Mayen.
(a) Whaling
120. The waters in the vicinity of Jan Mayen have tradition-
ally been important for Norwegian whaling. Norwegian small
type whaling near Jan Mayen started with a bottlenose fishery in
1882.This fishery increased towards the end of the century, and
continued at a decreased level until its cessation in 1972. Norwegian MinkeWhale Catches
off Jan Mayen 1984-1987
74'N
73
72
71
70'N
l ~ ~ ~ l l l l l l l l l l l l l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Q'N
24-w n 20 ie 16 14 12 10 8 6 4'W
Figures indicate thetotal numberof whalescaught in each location,
1984-1987.
Source:NorwegianDirectorateof Fisheries 121. The minke whale stock which is present in the waters
off Jan Mayen, Iceland and East Greenland is defined as a
separate stock - the Central North Atlantic Stock - by the
International Whaling Commission.This stock has in recent years
been harvested by Norwegian whalers. This fishery was taken up
in the early 1960sby Norwegian vessels, in the waters south and
west of Jan Mayen, along the Icelandic coast, and off the East
Greenland coast. Aggregate catches in this area up to 1973were
close to 3,500 whales. After the International Whaling Commis-
sion adopted specificcatch quotas for minke whale stocks in 1976,
Norwegian whalers were allowed an initial annual take of 120
whales (out of an annual quota of 320 whales). This take was
somewhat reduced after 1984.
122. Norwegian commercial small type whaling was tempo-
rarily suspended in 1987, in connection with the conduct of a
major national research programme for al1whale stocks exploited
by Norway, and the consideration by the International Whaling
Commission of a so-called "comprehensive assessment" following
itsdecision to observe a moratorium on commercial whaling (the
comprehensive assessment is to be completed by 1990).
123. Details on Norwegian minke whale catches in this area
are given in Appendix 5, Table 5.12. The sketch map at page 36
shows the location of catches for a recent representative period.
(b) Sealing
124. Two species, hooded seals and harp seals, form the
main resource base for Norwegian sealing in the waters off Jan
Mayen. These seal species are pelagic, that is to say, the stocks
migrate over long distances in search of food. During certain
periods of each year, the sealsconcentrate in great numbers on the
drifting pack ice. Both hooded seals and harp seals have their
breeding lairs in the West Ice inareas north of 68"N during April
and May. The hunt takes place during this season. The location
varies from year to year, depending on where the ice edge is, and
on ice conditions in general (see Appendix 3 for sketch maps
showing seal concentrations for the years 1974-1986).In June and
July,herds of hooded sealsgather further south, along the iceedge
in the Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland. 125. Norwegian sealers have been operating in the West Ice
and the Denmark Strait since the middle of the last century.
Norwegian vesselscarried on a summer seal hunt in the Denmark
Strait until this hunt was curtailed in 1961.After 1930,this hunt
was combined with a long-line fishery for Greenland shark in the
fjords of Greenland, south of 68"N, pursuant to the 1924
Convention (Annex 39). After 1945, statistical returns for this
hunt were given separately, showing that between 10 and 20
sealers took part in the hunt each year. Catches varied between
15,000and 20,000 hooded seals per year.
126. Traditionally, the West Ice hunt has been of greater
importance than the hooded seal hunt in the Denmark Strait. The
West Icehunt is stillcarried on.The levelof the hunt peaked in the
1950s, when 40 to 50 vessels took part each year. The hunt
employed between 500and 900men. In 1950,the catch in the West
Ice reached 100,000,and 138,000the following year. Since 1969,
participation in the hunt has gone down to less than 20 vessels,
with catches between 20,000 and 30,000. Since 1982, catches of
hooded seals and harp seals in the West Ice have been limited. A
fuller account of Norwegian sealing in the West Ice and the
Denmark Strait is given in Appendix 3.
127. The following table summarizes the number of Norwe-
gian sealingvesselstaking part in this hunt in the years 185&1989,
and their catches: Table 4
Average Annual Norwegian4Participation and Catches in West
Ice Sealing, 1850-1989.
Period AverageNo. TotalNo.
of Vessels of seals
1850-55 5.3 19,780
1856-59 No figures available
1860-69 17.1 56,129
1870-74 26.0 87,749
1875-81 No figuresavailable
1882-89 19.0 72,386
1890-99 17.6 65,604
1900-09 15.3 29,614
1910-19 34.5 51,922
1920-29 27.2 57,894
1930-40 37.0 58,960
1946-49 31.8 71,395
1950-59 42.9 77,792
1960-69 34.3 55,231
1970-79 15.3 35,562
1980-89 4.3 11,274
128. The WestIce seal hunt has a duration of maximum two
months each season. It has often been possible for a vesse1to
combine this hunt with the hunt for harp seals in the Barents Sea
and with fishing for the rest of the year. West Ice catches have
yielded comparatively higher revenues than other catches in
relation to the numbers taken. This is because the greater part of
the more valuable Blueback hooded seal has been caught here.
129. Only Norwegians took part in sealing in the West Ice
upto 1955.But by the mid 1950s,seal stocks in the White Sea and
the Barents Seas were in decline, and Soviet sealers turned to
sealing in international waters in the West Ice.
130. Norwegian scientists pointed to the risk of over-
exploitation when catch efforts in the West Iceincreased. Norway
proposed scientific collaboration, and negotiations on conserva-
tion measures were initiated between Norway and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. As a result, the parties on22 Novem-
ber 1957signed an Agreement on management and protection of
seal stocks in the North Atlantic east of Cape Farvel (see Annex
42). The Agreement covered harp seals and hooded seals, but an
4,Source: Based upon Thor Iversen'stabulations and data from the Norwegian Director-
ate of Fisheries. For further details see Appendix 3, Table 3.1.extension to other stocks was provided for. Annual meetings
under the Agreement dealt with regulatory measures and catch
quotas. Sealing is now discussed bilaterally by the joint Commis-
sion established within the framework of general fisheries coop-
eration between Norway and the Soviet Union.
131. The relative catches of Norway and the Soviet Union
are shown in the table below:
Table 55
Average Annual Soviet and Norwegian Catches of Seal in the
West Ice 1958-1989.
Norwegian Catches Soviet Catches
Period Catches Period Catches
1960-69 55,831 1958-66 7,946
(c) Fishing
Herring
132. Historically, herring fishing in theegion of Jan Mayen
and Iceland has been an important fishery for Norway. Prior to
1970,the mature herring stock migrated between this area and the
coast of mainland Norway. During the summer months, the
herring fed along the polar ice front between Jan Mayen and
Iceland. By October, the herring tended to concentrate in an area
east of Iceland before migrating to the Norwegian mainland coast
to spawn. After spawning, the fish migrated back to the feeding
grounds off Iceland and Jan Mayen.
133. An indeterminate, but not insignificant part of the
catches of Atlanto-Scandic herring is assumed to have been taken
in waters south and east of Jan Mayen. After the reduction of this
stock in the 1960s,the very meagre available schools of herring
have remained in the eastern part of the North Atlantic. Should
this stockagain reach the volume it hashad before, the traditional
feeding grounds of a large stock would presumably be utilized
5Appendix 3, Table 3.4. the ICES October 1989 Meeting. For further details seeagain. This would provide catch opportunities for herring in the
waters east of Jan Mayen, and in the area between Jan Mayen and
Iceland.
134. The share of the Norwegian herring catches taken off
Jan Mayen varied greatly from year to year. In 1964,some 16,000
tons were taken in this area, accounting for 17per cent. of total
herring catches. Most of the catch off Jan Mayen was probably
taken more than 200 nautical miles from the Greenland coast.
Overall Norwegian herring catches from 1930 to 1969, and the
proportion taken off Jan Mayen, are shown in Appendix 5, Table
5.10.
BlueWhiting
135. The blue whiting in the Norwegian Sea belongs to the
stock that spawns west of the British Isles and migrates into the
Norwegian Sea to feed. At the end of the 1970sand in the early
1980s,the blue whiting was distributed throughout large parts of
the northern seas, extending far to the north and the northwest.
Until 1981, blue whiting was fished east of Jan Mayen, and
considerable quantities were taken (around 120,000tons in 1981
in the vicinity of Jan Mayen alone). In some years, blue whiting
also occurred west of Jan Mayen. At present, blue whiting does
not migrate north of 65-66"N.
Shrimp
136. The shrimp fishery began off Greenland (West and
Southeast Greenland) in the early 1970s,and off Jan Mayen some
years later. Most of the shrimp concentrations are found due
south of Jan Mayen, within 50 nautical miles from the coastline.
From the very beginning, fishing for shrimp off Jan Mayen has
been combined with the shrimp fishery around Greenland and,
later on, also with fishing operations off Svalbard.
137. In the 1970s, the Norwegian catch volume off Jan
Mayen increased from 100tons in 1975to more than 800 tons in
1979.The catch volume was reduced to around 200 tons in 1982
and 1983,and has since fluctuated between 1,200and 2,000 tons.
During the past fewyears, the shrimp fishery has been carried out
on an almost year-round basis.
138. In recent years, between 20 and 25 Norwegian vessels
have participated in the shrimp fishery off West Greenland andEast Greenland between 65"N and 67"N. In the main, the same
vesselsalso operate off Jan Mayen. Some 300 men are employed
in this fleet. Statisticalterial is presented in Appendix 5,Table
5.11.
IcelandScallop
139. Iceland scallop was an unexploited resource in the Jan
Mayen zone prior to 1985.In that year Norwegian vessels began
dredging operations in the zone. By 1986,the harvest had reached
around 9,100tons of Iceland scallop round weight, at a first-hand
value of just under NOK 60 million.
140. Catches in 1987showed a clear decline, and the areas
off Jan Mayen were temporarily closed to al1 Iceland scallop
fishery. Most of the Iceland scallop banks are located south of Jan
Mayen, within 20 nautical miles of the island. The vessels taking
part in this fishery had been specifically built or fitted for shell
dredging. As of 1 January 1990,a trial fishery on a limited scale
has been allowed in areas in the Jan Mayen zone which have not
previously been harvested.
Capelin
141. The most important stock forcurrent -and most likely
also future - large-scale fisheries in the waters between Jan
Mayen, Iceland and Greenland is capelin. The capelin fishery off
Iceland began in 1964, with the introduction of the purse seine.
Up to 1977,this stock was fished exclusivelyby Icelanders during
the winter season. Fishing for the stock during the summer season
in the area north of Iceland was developed by a Norwegian fleet
of purse seine vesselsduring the summer of 1978.
142. Capelin (mallotus villotus) is a small fish, distantly
related to salmon. The oceanic capelin occurs in schools of great
concentration and volume, as a pelagic, highly migratory species.
Capelin is also found in local stocks, independent of the oceanic
stocks. The capelin in the fjords of East Greenland consists of
such stationary stocks. A small proportion of commercial capelin
catches goes for direct consumption as human food, mainly in the
luxury market (including roe). The bulk of the catches isprocessed
for oil and meal.
143. Although the pattern of movement of the oceanic
capelin stock is assumed to be unstable, it is known that at certainstages of its development cycle, it moves from the Icelandic Zone
noythwards. For a period each year, it occurs in fishable concen-
trations in the waters between Jan Mayen and Greenland, and
between Jan Mayen and Iceland. These occurrences Vary in
volume and location from year to year, depending upon availabil-
ity of feed plankton, which again is conditional on water temper-
ature, currents and other factors which influence the volume of
basic nutrients at the low range of the marine food chain.
144. A table of recorded annual catches, covering both
winter and summer operations, for the Jan Mayen, Iceland and
East Greenland area, is given below.
Table66
Total Annual Catch of Capelin (in 1,000tons) in the Jan Mayen,
Iceland, East Greenland Area, 1964-1988.
Year Winter season Summer/autumn season
Iceland Faroes Nor- Iceland Nor- Faroes EEC Total
way way
1964 8.6 - - - - - - 8.6
1965 49.7 - - - - - - 49.7
- - - - - -
1966 124.5 124.5
1967 97.2 - - - - - - 97.2
1968 78.1 - - - - - - 78.1
1969 170.6 - - - - - - 170.6
- - - - - -
1970 190.8 190.8
1971 182.9 - - - - - - 182.9
1972 276.5 - - - - - - 276.5
1973 440.9 - - - - - - 440.9
- - - - - -
1974 461.9 461.9
1975 457.6 - - 3.1 - - - 460.7
1976 338.7 - - 114.4 - - - 453.1
- - - -
1977 549.2 25.0 259.7 833.9
1978 468.4 38.4 - 497.5 154.1 - - 1,158.4
1979 521.7 17.5 - 441.9 126.0 2.5 - 1,109.6
1980 392.0 - - 367.2 118.6 24.4 14.3 916.5
- -
1981 156.0 484.6 91.4 16.2 20.8 769.0
1982 13.0 - - - - - - 13.0
1983 - - - 133.3 - - - 133.3
1984 439.6 - - 425.2 104.6 10.2 8.5 988.1
- -
1985 348.5 644.8 188.7 81.4 1,263.4
1986 342.0 - 49.9 552.3 149.7 64.4 5.3 1,163.6
1987 500.6 - 59.9 16.0 82.0 66.3 - 1,019.5
1988 600.6 - 57.3 25.0 11.5 47.0 - 741.4
6)Source:ACFM Report to the NEAFC May Meeting 1989. For further details see
Appendix5, Table 5.6.
43 145. The figures accompanying paragraphs 182and 183of
the Danish Memorial give a misleading view of the recorded
migratory pattern of this capelin stock. The catches taken by
Norwegian fishermen show a more easterly occurrence of the
stock in most years than is shown in the very schematic figure in
the Danish Memorial (Catch locations for the years 1980-1989are
shown in sketch maps at pp. 45-46).
146. In addition to the uncertainties provided by the pecu-
liarities of capelin biology, fishing operations in the waters
between Jan Mayen and Greenland may be hampered by the
presence of seaice.This obstacle increasescloser to the Greenland
coast.
147. Because capelin is a migratory species, a unified ap-
proach to management and fishing operations is highly desirable.
In certain years, the distribution of the stock would theoretically
allow both Norway and Iceland (with large, well-equipped and
flexiblepurse seine fleets) to harvest a major part of the total
allowable catch within their own (undisputed) zones, provided a
sufficient number of vessels were in the area when the capelin
stock moved into it. Although these possibilities for separate
management exist within each national zone, a joint approach to
management and catch patterns would better servethe interests of
al1parties. Separate management policies always carry with them
risks of over-fishing. Moreover, if Norwegian catches and Green-
land licensed catches were to be concentrated at the times when
the capelin stock moves through the respective national zones,
that would not provide an optimal harvest in relation to the
potential of the stock: in these phases of migration, the capelin is
lean, and a larger number of individual fish would have to be
taken in order to provide a given quantity of meal or oil. Both
scientists and fisheries administrators from Norway, Iceland and
Greenland were fully aware of these fundamental factors which
influence management of the capelin stock.
148. The basis for scientific advice on management is
provided by data collected during research cruises undertaken
primarily by marine research institutions in Norway and Iceland,
and by studies linked to the actual fishery activity (see Appendix
4, Table 4.2 for a further account). These data are discussed
bilaterally and trilaterally by the competent agencies of thePattern of Location of Norwegian Capelin Catches in
the Jan Mayen Area
mediumcatches concantratedcatches
catches
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheriesparties. As is the practice in the management of North Atlantic
fisheries, scientific evaluations, management strategies and alter-
native catch volumes in relation to alternative options for stock
development have been discussed within the Advisory Committee
on Fisheries Management of the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea ("ICESm)7.That provides a basis on which
the level of a Total Allowable Catch ("TAC") for the stock as a
whole must be determined, and the allotments for fishermen of
each party (or their third-country flag licensees).
149. In 1980, Norway and Iceland set a pattern for man-
agement of the capelin stock which gave both parties a strong
inducement to adopt advice from the Advisory Committee for
Fishery Management. The distribution as between these two
parties had already been established in the governing fisheries
agreement of 28 May 1980 (see Annex 70), on the basis of
available scientific advice. This pattern did not provide an allot-
ment for Greenland, since no Greenland catch had occurred
previously. Nevertheless, in this situation, Greenland authorities
subsequently chose to issue licences to other fishermen (mainly
Faroese), thereby automatically authorizing an element of over-
fishing in relation to the recommended TAC.
150. In 1982,Norway took the initiative for talks between
Iceland, Norway and the European Communities (which were at
the time the competent authority for Greenland fisheriesmanage-
ment) on the regulation of the capelin fishery. This initiative was
prompted by concern over the risk of over-fishing, after Norwe-
gian and Icelandic scientific investigations had shown that the
capelin stocks were at an alarmingly low level. The ensuing
negotiations led to an agreement of 18August 1982setting a total
ban on capelin fishing for the winter season 1982183.This ban was
later extended to cover the following season.
151. This marked the inception of the tripartite negotiations
between Norway, Iceland and Greenland (until 1984represented
by the European Communities) on management of the capelin
stock occurring in the zones of the three parties, and on the
distribution of catch allotments. The negotiations were extremely
7)The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea wasestablished in 1902.It is an
12September 1964.The Councilmotes and coordinates marine scientificresearch, in
particular with regard to marine living resources, primarly in the North Atlantic. It
com~rises 18 Member States which are coastal States in the North Atlantic and in the
al ti,nd offers a focal point both for scientific investigation and for management-
related consideration and advice.
47complex, and turned out to be uncommonly lengthy before the
parties arrived at the temporary Agreement of 12June 1989(see
Annex 79).
152. The main elements of the Agreement are directed
towards sensible conservation policies, flexible opportunities for
catch irrespective of zonal boundaries, and allocation of catches
as between the parties. That distribution is fixed for the three-year
duration of the agreement at 78 per cent. of total catches to
Iceland, and 11per cent. each to Norway and Greenland.
153. The flexible fishing arrangements of the tripartite
Agreement reflect the specific management requirements for
capelin as a highly migratory stock. The geographical distribution
of the stock willVaryfrom year to year, and al1parties are served
by an arrangement which provides access for fishing in the whole
area of migration, irrespective of zonal boundaries. This mutual
fishing access provides for a more flexible, and thus a more
efficient and more profitable fishery .The Agreement takes into
account Greenland's special situation: its allotment of the TAC is
exploited through the sale of fishing licences to third countries,
sinceGreenland does not have a fleet ofpurse seiners which could
participate in the capelin fishery. Foreign vessels licensed by
Greenland are treated on a basis of equality with vessels from
Greenland, Iceland and Norway, and are inter alia allowed to fish
in the Icelandic and Norwegian zones. The Agreement also
authorizes the landing of catches in ports of the other parties. This
provision is particularly advantageous for Greenland-licensed
vessels, since there are no processing plants for capelin in Green-
land, and the distances to the vessels'home ports are great.
154. The Danish Memorial, in paragraphs 90 and 91,
appears to suggest that the settlement of the delimitation issue
would have an influence on the management questions which were
addressed in the tripartite negotiations. That is a misconception.
Both Norway and Iceland dispose of fishing fleets which could
easily fish more than their share of the TAC within their own
(undisputed) zones. The exact location of the boundary line is
therefore not a decisivefactor in determining national allotments.
It is far too simple to assume that entitlement to a national share
of the total allowable catch of migratory fish stocks is related
exclusively - or even predominantly - to the area of the national
maritime zone. Biology and fishing operations are far too
complex to lend themselves to mechanical adjustment, depending
on where the maritime boundary runs, when migrating stocks are
unrestrained by these boundaries. The States through the zones ofwhich the stocks move must agree on, or at least coordinate their
management policies, regardless of the manner in which a mari-
time boundary separates those zones.
155. Whereas delimitation may not necessarily be decisive
for resource management, it is clear that the existence of clear,
agreed boundaries would generally facilitate enforcement of con-
servation and other regulatory measures, as well as the general
policing offishing operations by the competent public authorities.
In the capelin fishery, however, the main concern is to ensure that
permitted catch quantities (per vessel, by area or otherwise) are
not exceeded. The important concern is to ensure that the catches
are correctly reported. This control element is in the main taken
care of where catches are landed. The same applies to minimum
fish size requirements, which is the other specific regulation of
importance in this fishery. Operations in the purse seine fishery
are thus conducted in a manner which does not normally cal1for
any particular policing effort. Therefore, in the context of the
capelin fishing currently carried out in the waters between Jan
Mayen and Greenland, the absence of agreement on delimitation
does not place any practical restriction on any surveillance or
enforcement activities which would be material for a coastal
State's abilityto safeguard its interests and discharge its manage-
ment responsibilities with regard to the resources of its fishing
zone.
156. The capelin fishery off Jan Mayen has taken on greater
economic significance both for the purse seine fleet and for the
shore-based processing industry, especially since the capelin fish-
ery in the Barents Sea has been stopped since the winter of 1986.
In 1987,for example, the fishery represented a value of approxi-
mately NOK 52million, or approximately USD 8 million. For the
most part, the entire Norwegian purse seine fleet has been able to
participate in the capelin fishery off Jan Mayen. This means that
the number of vessels participating has decreased in accordance
with the general reduction in the purse seine fleet, i.e., from 156
vesselsin 1978to less than 100 vesselstoday.
157. In the area between Jan Mayen and Greenland, the
natural conditions for the occurrence of deposits of polymetallic
sulphides are present (see p. 31, para. 109). 158. Investigation of these aspects of the ocean geology of
the region are at an initial stage. If the presence of such deposits
isconfirmed, it is clearly of significant interest for Norway, which
has a traditional metal-processing industry based on hydro-
electric power. Thus, Norway possesses both the technology and
a non-polluting source of energy for the processing of the metals
which may be extractable from this marine base material.
159. Norway likewise has an interest in and the industrial
and technological background for the exploration of the hydro-
carbon resource potential in this area. Joint investigations have
been undertaken with the competent Icelandic agencies in regard
to the continental shelf along the Jan Mayen ridge, whereas the
potential for hydrocarbon deposits in the shelf to the west of Jan
Mayen has not yet been investigated. At the same time, there are
indications of commercial interest in prospecting activities on the
East Greenland Shelf.
160. In the period 1950 to 1989 marine research has been
carried out in the East Greenland-Jan Mayen area by a Norwe-
gian state agency, the Directorate of Fisheries, Institute of Marine
Research. A significant proportion of the research is devoted to
the charting and sampling of fish stocks related to the Jan Mayen
area. The work was concerned, at different times, with herring,
capelin, blue whiting and shrimp stocks. Further details of the
research, both on fish stocks and the marine environment in
general, are setforth in Appendix 4.
161. Norway is dependent on its maritime environment.
That environment has a great capacity for generating living
resources. These resources will, with prudent and rational man-
agement, provide a sustainable base for a reasonable harvest. The
seabed has a potential for providing both well-known and novel
forms of exhaustible hydrocarbon and minera1resources. At the
same time, unsound management, over-exploitation and pollution
may create risks that resources are depleted, that the quality of the
marine environment may be diminished or destroyed, and that
fewer benefits may be reaped. If those risks can be avoided or
minimized, Norway's dependence on the marine environment will
endure.
162. Norway is a coastal State with three different land
territories in the North Atlantic region. In relation to each ofthem, Norwegians carry out a variety of maritime pursuits. In this
respect, the value of the interests linked to Jan Mayen is greater
than what appears from the catch statistics alone. The services
made possible by the various facilities on Jan Mayen make a
positive contribution to the exploitation of marine livingresources
far beyond the island and its fishery zone: navigation aids, radio
communications, weather forecasting. The scientific data which
are collected in or around Jan Mayen likewisehavea value for the
assessment and management of resources in the maritime areas off
the mainland and Svalbard. For marine living resources in
particular, the broadest possible scope for scientific observation
and enquiry is essential for forming the "best available" picture of
al1 the biological parameters which influence the growth and
volume of stocks, their location and movement, the interaction
between stocks and species, and the occurrence of these stocks in
fishable or huntable concentrations.
163. Norway's direct interest with regard to activities con-
ducted in the waters off Jan Mayen has changed over time. Yet
there is a remarkable consistency in the nature of that interest.
The motivating force has been that of coastal communities
seeking their livelihood where it can be found, regardless of
adverse conditions. The specific type of activity has varied, but
not the purpose of the activity: to provide a living for those
Norwegian coastal communities whichhave found a resource base
on Jan Mayen, and in the surrounding waters.
164. With the great changes in the economic and social
conditions which have taken place in Norway in the recent past, it
remains a policy objective for successiveNorwegian Governments
tosustain a pattern of population settlement which does not leave
Norway's long coastline unpopulated. That means in turn sus-
taining and supporting al1maritime industries.
165. Whaling is the oldest activity. It has been maintained
under changingmarketing conditions and changing approaches to
management. Sealing is the second oldest industry, and the one
which, in the long run, has provided the greatest returns.
166. At present, both these industries are labouring under
adverse public attitudes in many countries far from the North
Atlantic.
167. This has led to the temporary suspension of Norwegian
commercial whaling, and a reduction in seal catches. Many have
seen a link between the curtailment of the harvesting of whalesand seals, and the huge invasions of seals which have taken place
along the Norwegian mainland coast. This has led to a serious
diminution of fish stocks, and to large-scale destruction of fishing
gear. The ecological balance may have been disrupted.
168. A National Marine Mammals Research Programme is
now under way to provide a sound scientificbasis for determining
the sizeand condition of the minke whale stocksin which Norway
has an interest, and of theseal stocks in northern waters. Norway
is determined to seek broader recognition of the need to manage
and harvest whales and seals in order to make possible the
scientific management of fish stocks on an overall, ecological
foundation. That will require a great deal of scientific effort, and
the refinement of management procedures, as well as a more
sophisticated understanding by the international community at
large. On this basis, Norway confidently expects that whaling and
sealing willagain become activities which are regarded as useful
and constructive, contributing to the economy of Norwegian
coastal communities, and playing a part in multispecies manage-
ment practices covering both whales, seals and fish.
169. Against this background, the area around Jan Mayen
willretain a primary importance also in the future. At present, the
main interest is concentrated on the fishery of capelin and shrimp,
and to a more limited extent, on scallop and on seal. The different
activities in the area account for up to 8.6 per cent. of total
Norwegian catches, and 3.5 per cent. of the total first-hand value
of Norwegian fish production (figures for 1986). Again, the
activities in the Jan Mayen area have greater significancethan the
tonnage of catches, and the values they bring directly. The
opportunity for employment for the purse seine fleetis of decisive
importance.
170. Norway has a general interest in retaining the ability to
monitor the environmental developments in the widest possible
area around Jan Mayen, and to maintain a high levelof prepared-
ness against threatening pollution, or other influences of change.
171. The seabed resources should not be neglected, even if
prospecting will have to be carried much further before any
precise indication of possible deposits, and of their exploitability,
can be obtained. B: THE PARTIES'APPROACHTO MARITIME
JURISDICTIONAND DELIMITATION
CHAPTERIV
CONTINENTALSHELF JURISDICTION AND
DELIMITATION
(a) Norwegian Coniinental Shelf Legislation
172. By Royal Decree of 31 May 1963,Norway proclaimed
that the seabed and subsoil in the submarine areas abutting on its
Coastwere subject to the sovereign rights of Norway with respect
to the exploitation and exploration of natural deposits, to such
extent as the depth of the sea permits the utilization of such
deposits, irrespective of any maritime limits otherwise applicable,
but not beyond the median line in relation to other States (see
-
173. Act No. 12of 21 June 1963relating to the exploration
for and exnloitation of submarine natural resources restated the
descriptionof the area of application. The Act further stated that
the right to submarine natural resources isvested in the State. The
Act went on to authorize the KingRto establish regulations for
off-shore resource operations. The rights of navigation and fishing
would remain unaffected (see Annex 22).
174. The geographical scope of application of the Act
legallydefined the Norwegian continental shelf. In positive terms,
the Act - following the Royal Decree - established Nonvay's
governmental and administrative authority in respect of shelf
rights up to themedian line in relation to other States, and vested
the right to resource deposits in the Crown. On the otherhand, the
exerciseof powers and authority under the Act was limited by the
median line. Norwegian regulations were not applicable beyond
the median line.
175. The scope of the Act did not exclude Norwegian
jurisdiction in areas on the Norwegian side of an agreed shelf
%)Constitutionally.thistem impliesthatformaldecisionsunderiheauihorityprovidedby
theAct musi beadoptediCounciofStateundertheDresidencyof the King.and
countersignedby responsibleMinisiers.In political lems, the implicationis that the
Cabinetakesthe decision.boundary, where administrative adjustments in relation to the
true median line had resulted in the drawing of the boundary on
the far side of this mathematical line. But it was recognizea that
legal problem existed with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction
over installations beyond the median line (or adjusted boundary)
in connection with the operation of unitized deposits which
straddled a continental shelf boundary. It was considered desir-
able specifically to expand the scope of jurisdiction in respect of
these instances. This was effected by an amendment made by Act
No. 21 of 25 March 1977,extending the original Act to comprise
activities inreas outside the Norwegian part of the continental
shelf, where this would follow from specific agreement with
another State or from international law. This extension ofris-
thetNonvegian continental shelf as such9 (Amendment incorpo-on of
rated in text at Annex 22).
177. The 1963Act continues to govern resources otherthan
hydrocarbon resources (Annex 23).
(b) Norwegian Delimitation Praciice
~~Nanvayaepliëd-thePrïnciple~ %Co>-
tion in its delimitupractice from &
very first stage. This practice cornmencep with the Proclamabon
oMm9mwas confirmed by thë~Tf'21 June 1963.
T___F; <.--i :__ - -
179. Norway concluded an Agreement with the United
Kingdomon the delimitation of thecontinental shelf on 10March
1965 (see Annex 44). That agreement applies the median line
-
?)Oneeiïect of the amendment wasto provideauthority îor the exerciseof Nowegian
jurisdiction with respectto pipelines licensed by Norway and traversingshelf areas
appertainingto third States. and evento on-shore faciloîsuchl the terminais
pipelines,on the basisof agreementswith Statesconcerned. principle. The mathematical median line has been simplified for
aaminiSffative convenience, with minor adjustments. The bound-
ary has thecharacter of a partial Iine,to be prolonged northwards
from the initial terminal point of 61"44' 12" N., 1"33'36" E.
180. The Nonvegian-British continental shelf boundary was
completed by an Additional Protocol dated 22 December 1978,
prolonging the boundary up to the Norwegian-British-Danish
tripoint (as between the Shetland Islands, the Faroe Islands and
the Norwegian mainland) (see Annex 67). The new stretch of
demarcated boundary is likewise a median line. With improve-
ments in navigation and positioning techniques, the new segment
of the boundary isdrawn from the terminal point of the boundary
line already demarcated, 61" 44' 12,OO"N., 1" 33' 36,OO"E.,
directly westwards over a distance of around 173metres, to a new
position described as 61'44' 12,00nN., 1"33' 13,44" E. From this
point, the boundary continues northwards to the Danish-British-
Norwegian tripoint, as a true, mathematical median line, without
adjustments for administrative convenience.
181. Norway and the United Kingdom have further entered
into three separate agreements for the unitized development of
etroleum deposits which extend7?Ei~th~des,oa--
kounda signed on 10 May 1976 f&e-&igg,Fid),,on,16,
p-1979~~dagain -. -,- on 160.cto_ho,19.79,
(the Murchison Field).
t
182. Norway and Denmarkconcluded a general Agreement
on the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two
countnes on 8 December 1965 (see Annex 46). The Agreement
establishes that the boundary between those parts of the conti-
nental shelf over which Norway and Denmark respectively exer-
cise sovereign rights shall be the median line. The specific
delineation of that line is declared tq)be in application of that
principle, andfollows the true median line, adjusted for admini-
strative convenience. The Agreement has been amended twice, to
establish new CO-ordinatevalues for the turning points, and to
establish thetripoint with Sweden.
183. The agreement has been supplemented once, by the
Agreement of 15 June 1979 relating to the delimitation of the
continental shelf and the fishing zone and economic zone respec-
tively in the area between Nonvay and the Faroe Islands (see
Annex 69). 184. On 24 July 1968 Norway and Sweden concluded an
Agreement concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf
(see Annex 52). The agreement provides for a median line
boundary, adjusted for administrative convenience.
185. An Agreement betweenNorway and Icelandconcluded
on 22 October 1981 provides for a continental shelfboundary for
the area between Jan Mayen and Iceland (see Annex 72). The
boundary is drawn in a manner to take account of the Agreement
signed on 28 May 1980,concerning fishery and continental shelf
questions (see Annex 70), and the report of the Conciliation
Commission established under that agreement.
186. Forma1negotiations betweenNorway and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the delimitation of the
continental shelfareas appertaining to each of them in the Barents
Seaand the Arctic Ocean commencedin 1974.Those negotiations
havenot yet been concluded. Norway has consi~tentlyargued that
in te~orinternationai;law,2he~edia~Eïié3EZd'-f~
qitable boundary, and that the ge?&mphicalsituati%pmcd
nvial-iEh%d influence the delimitation.
_LI-----
(a) DanishContinentalShelfLegislation
187. Denmark was among the early States to sign the 1958
Continental Shelf Convention, and deposited its instrument of
ratification on 12June 1963.
188. Almost concurrently, Denmark issued a Royal Decree
of 7 June 1963concerning the exerciseof Danish powers over the
continental shelf (Annex 29).
189. The Decree proclaims that "Danish sovereignty shall
be exercised, in so far as the exploration and exploitation of
natural resources are concerned, over thatportion of the continen-
tal shelf which, according to the Convention ...belongs to the
Kingdomof Denmark,cf. article2"(Article 1,emphasis supplied).
Article 2, paragraph 1sets out the shelfdefinition of the Conven-
tion in identical terms. Article 2, paragraph 2 paraphrases and
compressesthe provisions of Article 6, paragraphs 1and 2 of the
Convention. The language of the Decree distinguishes between
States, the coasts of which ''a-site the coasts of th
Kingdom of Denmark" and those coasts which are "adjacent to Denmark", while providing in both instances that the boundary
"shall be determined in accordance with Article 6 of the Conven-
tion, that is to Say, in the absence of special agreement, the
boundary isthe median line,..."(emphasis supplied).
190. The Decree addresses delimitation in relation to oppo-
site and adjacent coasts on the same basis. The terminology
employed reflects the fact thatonly the continental part of the
Kingdom, that isto SayDenmark proper, has neighbouring States
with adjacent coasts.
191. The Decree states without qualification that the.
bpndary "is" the median Iine. inere 1sno reterence to special
d circumstances. 3
192. Article 3 of the Decree states that activities for the
exploration and exploitation of shelf resources are conditional
upon the issuance of concessions pursuant to previous legislation.
In respect of Greenland a separate statutory instrument applies. It
isthus made quite explicit that the Decree of 7 June 1963relates
to the whole of theKingdom, including Greenland.
193. More detailed provisions governing continental shelf
activities were set out in Act No. 259 of 9 June 1971concerning
the continental shelf (Annex 30). This legislation chiefly makes
clear that the natural resources of the continental shelf are vested
in the Danish State, and sets out in a more detailed manner the
conditions for the granting of concessions, provides for jurisdic-
tion with respect to installations and safety zones (including the
application of law relating specificallyto Greenland in respect of
"the Greenland part of the continental shelf'), and givesenabling
powers for competent ministers to issuedetailed regulations.h
regulations have been issued for Greenland in respect of prospect-
ing. The Act also contains provisions relating to the revocation of
concessions, and penal clauses.
194. The Act has subsequently been amended by enact-
ments of 1972(No. 278) and 1977(No. 654). A consolidated text
is given in Promulgation Order No. 182 of 1 May 1979(Annex
37). No further amendments have been made to the 1963Decree.
195. The 1963 Decree remains the governing instrument
defining the continental shelf of the Kingdom of Denmark. The
Decree must still be held to define the claim to continental shelf
jurisdiction of thengdom of Denmark as against third States, in
terms of international law. (b) Danish DelimitationPractice
196. As mentioned in paragraph 187 above, Denmark
signed the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf and depos-
ited its instrument of ratification in 1963.
197. The first Danish continental shelf Agreement was
concluded with the Federal Republic of Germany on 9 June 1965
(Annex 45). The Agreement provided for a delimitation of the
continental shelf in the area close to the North Sea coasts of the
their agreement that the boundary for the continental shelfstating
adjacent to thecoasts of the parties in the Sea opposite each
other,shall be determined according to the median line.
198. On 8 December 1965. Denmark and Norwav con-
cluded an Agreement establishing the median line as the iine of
delimitation betweenreas of confinéntals-ëlves appertaining to
the two parties respectively (Annex 46).
199. On 3 March 1966, Denmark concluded an Agreement
with the UnitedKingdom, establishing a median line boundary
between the continental shelves appertaining to the two parties
(Annex 47).
200. On 31 March 1966, Denmark and the Netherlands
concluded an Agreement establishing the median line as the
boundary between those areas of their continental shelf which
were closer to their coasts than to the coast of any other State
(Annex 48).
201. Subsequent to the judgment of the International Court
of Justice in the North Sea Continental Sheif Cases (I.C.J. Reports
1969,p. 3),a further agreement between Denmark and the Federal
Republic of Germany was concluded on 28 January 1971(Annex
53).That agreement completed the delimitation of thecontinental
shelfareas appertaining to each of thetwo parties, taking account
ofthe judgment which was rendered at the request ofboth parties.
1971betweenurDenmark and the United Kingdom, amending the
former agreement, and retaining the medianline,(f.(f~~a&wter
eiimitation with the Federal
Y---
203. On 17 December 1973, an Agreement was concluded
between Denmark and Canada, establishing a median line bound-
L------, -ary for the continental shelf between Greenland and Canada
(knner55)rThirAgreemenrtZ accSuintioergerrce~ove~-
the sovereignty over a small island, and reserves the drawing of
the boundary line in the Lincoln Sea.
204. On 9 November 1984, Denmark and Sweden con-
cluded an Agreement for the delimitation of the continental
shelvesappertaining to the two parties inhe relevant maritime
areas, that is to say, the Skagerrak, the Kattegat north of the
Sound, in the Sound,and in the Baltic Sea (seeAnnex 74). In the
Sound, the continental shelf delimitation was determined to
coincide with the line of demarcation established by the Declara-
tion of 30 January 1932between the two parties relating to the
boundary situation in the Sound. In both the Skagerrak and the
Kattegat area and in thealtic Sea, the continental shelf bound-
ary is demarcated as a true, mathematical median line, taking full
account of the several islands, the influence of which on the
delimitation had been the subject of considerable disputeng
the preceding negotiations.
205. On 14 September 1988 Denmark and the German
Democratic Republic concluded an Agreement on the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf and the fishery zones, in the main
following the median line, but providing for a deviation allocating
the AdlerGrund fishing bank to the German Democratic Repub-
lic (Annex 77). CHAPTERV
ZONES OF FlSHERIES JURlSDICTlON
1. NORWAY
(a) Tradiiional Zones ofFisheriesJurisdiciion
206. Norway is a fishing nation, and questions relating to
fisheries limits have historically played an important part in
Norway's international relations.
207. The point of departure in recent times has been the
definition of the general maritime boundary (corresponding to the
modern term territorial sea) in 1812 (see Annex 16). The 1812
Decree fixed a limit of four nautical milesfrom what todayould
be termed baseline points (precisely one marine league of 7,420
metres, applied now as four nautical miles (7,408 metres)). The
1812Decree continues to define Norway's territorial sea.
208. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Norway
started to develop a system of straight baselines for the four mile
territorial sea. In 1906,an Act specifically prohibited fishing by
foreign nationals within theorwegianfisheries limit, and set out
a punishment for contravention.
209. The implementation of Norway's fisheries limit policy
and in particular the use of the system of straight baselines, ledto
a dispute between Norway and the United Kingdom. That dispute
was adjudged by the Court in the 1951 Fisheries Case, (I.C.J.
Reports 1951, p. 116).
210. After the First and Second United Nations Confer-
ences on the Law of the Sea, Norway proceeded in 1961 to
establisha 12mile fisherieslimit, in keeping with the terms of the
compromise proposal which had narrowly failed to be adopted in
1960.
211. By the Act of 24 March 1961 relating to Norway's
fishery limit (seeAnnex 19),the limit was extended to 12nautical
miles. This enabling Act applied to mainland Norway and Jan
Mayen, and allowed for the gradua1 implementation of the
extended zone, and the possibility for distinguishing between
various parts of the coast. The 12 mile zone was established for
part of themainland coast (Le.,Westof Lindesnes). Implementa-tion took place in two stages, first to six miles, then to 12.
Arrangements were made for transitional fishing rights between
six and 12miles.
212. The extension of the fisheries limit to 12nautical miles
did not in Norway's caseraise the general issue of delimitation in
respect of opposite States. The relevant legislation does not
specifically address the delimitation aspect.
213. In relation to adjacent States,the issuedidarise. In one
instance, thelateral delimitation had, in the main, been dealt with
in an existing agreement (seethe Agreement between Norway and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 15 February 1957,
relating to the maritime boundary between the two States in the
Varangerfjord, Annex 41). The agreed boundary is drawn from
the terminal point of the land boundary, in a straight line to the
intersection of the outer limits of the territorial seas of the two
Parties, and applies an equidistanceconsideration (the mid-point
between the promontories of Kibergnes and Cape Nemetsky) to
establish a line beyond which neither Party would extend its
jurisdiction.
214. Maritime delimitation in relation to Sweden had been
determined by an Arbitration Award in 1909in the Grisbadarna
Case (Reports ojIniernationa1Arbitral Awards, Vol. XI, p. 147).
The Award was based on the principle of the perpendicular on the
general direction of the coastline (that is to say, a notional
equidistance line), somewhat attenuated by the Ttibunai's find-
ings with regard to the Grisbadarna lobster grounds. The new
delimitation for the extended fisheries zone took the existing
boundary, and the Tribunal's Award, as its point of departure (see
Agreement concerning the delimitation of the Nonvegian and
Swedish fishing areas in the northeast Skagerrak, with a Decla-
ration, Annex 49).
(b) Extension IO 200 NauticalMiles
215. After the implementation of fisheries limits of 12
nautical miles in most of the North Atlantic area, it becarne clear
that there remained a need for extended coastal State jurisdiction
with regard to the living resources of thesea. For Norway it was
an important foreign policy objective to achieve this goal without
serious disruptions in other fields which affect international
relations. 216. After the first substantive session of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS III"),the
Nonvegian Government outlined its approach to achieving this
goal in a "Declaration on principles fora fisheries limits policy",
issued 26 September 1974 (see Annex 1). That approach com-
prised steps to avoid conflict between trawlers and other fisher-
men in areas beyond the 12mile limit; preparations for an interim
extension of that limit to 50 nautical miles; asell as continued
work at UNCLOS III for the 200 mile Economic Zone. This
policy would be implemented, within the framework of interna-
tional law, after contact and negotiation with other States con-
cerned.
217. In pursuance of that policy, negotiations were entered
into with a number of States, and arrangements were concluded
on 30 January 1975 with France, the Feéeral Republic of Ger-
many and the United Kingdom respectively, relating to trawler-
free zones outside, and adjoining the Nonvegian 12mile fisheries
limit in certain specifiedreas. Similar arrangements were subse-
quently concluded with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the German Democratic Republic and Poland. Three trawler-free
zones were established by Royal Decree of 31 January 1975.
218. The results of the deliberations at UNCLOS IIIduring
1975,the progress of the substantive negotiation on the regime of
the 200mile ExclusiveEconomic Zone, andthe planning by other
States for implementing extended coastal State resource jurisdic-
tion, led the Norwegian Government to determine that it would be
unnecessarily complicated to establish a transitional fisheries
regime based on a 50 mile limit. Instead, preparations for
implementing the 200 mile exclusive economic zone concept
would be undertaken immediately.
219. Negotiations with a number of States ensued, compris-
ing those States in relation to which Norway had mutual fishing
and management interests, States whose fishermen had a long-
established practice of fishing in waters off Norway's coasts, and
neighbouring States.
220. These negotiations eventually led to agreement on a
number of conventional arrangements with regard to manage-
ment cooperation and fishing access.
221. An Act relating to Nonvay's economic zone was
approved on 17 December 1976and entered into force immedi-ately (seeAnnex 24, setting out the text as originally adopted, and
consolidated versions of clauses subsequently amended).
222. The Act establishes an Economic Zone in maritime
areas off the entire Kingdom, Le., including Svalbard and Jan
Mayen. The King is, however, authorized to determine the timing
for theestablishment of the Zone and the areas for which the Zone
was to be implemented (Section 1, first uaragraph). The extent of
223. The Act expressly States that there shall be no change
with respect to the Norwegian territorial sea (Section 1, third
paragraph), and that the high seas rights of navigation and
overflight, or to lay submarine cables and pipelines shall be
unaffected (Section 2, first paragraph). The Act specifies that it
does not in any way alter the existing Norwegian rules in force
regarding the continental shelf (Section 2, second paragraph),
thereby leaving the seabed and subsoil subject to the legal
provisions which were in effectpreviously.
224. The Act lays down a general prohibition of fishing for
those who are not Norwegian nationals or assimilated thereto
(Section 3).At the same time, the Act authorizes the King tomake
exceptions to the prohibition, and by regulation provide for
foreign fishing (Section 3, second paragraph and Sections 4 and
5).
225. Also on 17December 1976,a Royal Decree (seeAnnex
25) was promulgated to establish the Economic Zone off the
mainland Coastwith effect from 1January 1977.The Decree sets
out the limits of the zone in conformity with the enabling Act. It
went on to state that, where the Economic Zone is adjacent to an
area of jurisdiction of another State, the limit shall be drawn
"according to agreement" (Section 1). In this manner, the Gov-
ernment is authorized to implement the intentions of the enabling
Act, so as to demarcate the boundary line, in keeping with the
system which had been established.
226. Negotiations concerning delimitation have taken place
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the absence of
agreement on delimitation between the relevant zones of the two
States, the parties on1January 1978entered into an Agreement
on a temporary practical arrangement for fishing in an adjacent
area in the Barents Sea (Annex 62). The provisional character ofthe Agreement was underlined by the fact that it only applied until
30 June 1978, and had no provision for automatic renewal.
However, these arrangements have subsequently been renewedfor
periods of one year.
227. Detailed regulations in respect of foreign fishing in the
mainland economic zone have been established. General Norwe-
gian fisheries law, as wellas administrative, procedural and penal
legislation relevant to fishing activities and the enforcement of
fishenes legislation, have been made applicable to fishingactivities
in the Zone.
228. A Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard was
estahlished by Royal Decree of 3 June 1977, under the powers
granted in the Act of 17 December 1976 relating to Norway's
economic zone (see Annex 26). The zone has the extent specified
in theAct and is defined as being situated north of the outer limit
of the mainland economic zone (Section 1, second and third
paragraphs). Section 1, fourth paragraph, relates to delimitation
as against adjacent States in terms identical to the mainland
Decree. The Decree provides authority for the Ministry of Fish-
eries to issue conservation regulations for the zone (Section 3),
and sets out certain substantive rules with regard to catch
reporting (Section 4). The Decree states a duty to assist inspectors
(Section 5), and contains a penal clause (Section 6).
229. In recognition of the difference in conservation needs
with regard to the waters around Svalbard, it was not considered
necessary to establish priority for Norwegian vessels,nor to apply
a licensing requirement, nor to establish fishing quotas especially
for foreign fishing.
230. The possibility of differing viewsconcerning a point of
interpretation in respect of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 9 February
1920was also present, as it had been claimed that provisions of
the Treaty in favour of ships and nationals of al1Parties should be
extended to cover the continental shelf (althoughthe provisions of
the Treaty relate these provisions to the territorial sea). The
applicable regulatory measures for the Fisheries Protection Zone
are at present designed to cover specificconservation needs and to
ensure the proper and orderly conduct of fishing operations,
without curtailing foreign fishing. The regulations are under
continual review in the light of Norway's management responsi-
bilities and changing conditions and needs. 231. It was this difference in applicable regulations which
made it necessary to distinguish the Fisheries Protection Zone
geographically. There was no question of "delimiting" the zone
around Bjarnaya (Bear Island), asimplied inparagraph 316 ofthe
Danish Memorial, or that the mainland economic zone should
have been "fully respected".Indeed, there can he no delimitation
per se as between areas under the jurisdiction of the same
Sovereign. An administrative distinction was made between two
areas with respect to which different rules apply, and nothing
more. This administrative distinction was established along the
outer limit of the mainland economiczone exclusivelyfor consid-
erations of practicality and effectiveness.
2. DENMARK
(a) TraditionalZones of FisheriesJurisdiction
The traditional four mile limitof the 1812 Decree(see
232.
Annex 16) was also the point of departure for Denmark's policy
with regard to fisheriesimits.
233. However, in becoming a party to the 1882North Sea
Convention, Denmark acceptedthe three milelimit for fisheries in
the North Sea (i.e., for the continental Danish coastline from
Hanstholm to the German frontier).
234. In connection with an Agreement between Denmark
and the United Kingdom in 1901,the three mile limit wasalso
adopted for the Faroe Islands and Iceland.
235. In 1959,a 12mile fisheries limit wasestablished around
the Faroe Islands. Historical rights were recognized within the
outer six mile belt of this zone. (In 1964, accessfor traditional
fishing within the 12mile fisheries limitfor the Faroe Islands was
restricted at theame time as baselines werereduced in number
and lengthened.) In 1963,the same fisherieslimit of 12mileswas
established for Greenland, with recognition of historical fishing
rights in theuter six mile belt for a period of 10years.
236. Denmark became a party to the new 1964North Sea
FisheriesConvention. On that basis,Denmark applied the 12mile
fisheries limit inthe North Sea, the Skagerrak and the Kattegat
from 1965, while maintaining, for the time being, a limit of 3
nautical miles inthe Beltegion and in the Baltic. Act No. 195of
26 May 1965on salt water fisheriesstated in Section 1,paragraph3, that in respect of opposite coasts, the fisheries limit could not
extend beyond the equidistance line between the low water lines,
except where provided by special agreement with the foreign State
concerned.
(b) Extension to 200 Nautical Miles
237. Act No. 597on the fishing territory of tw' dom of
Denmark (Annex 31)was adopted on 17Decembe 1973he Act
is in the main an enabling Act. One importaoirSubstantive
provision concerns delimitation as against other States, in the
following terms:
"[l.] (2) Failing anyagreement to the contrary, the delimi:
tation of the fishingterritory relative to foreign States whose-
toasts are situated at a distance of-lshan- 400sal
mposite the coasts of the KingdomfDenmark or-
adjacentto.Denmark, besahaillwhich at every-point is
equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines at the
#oasts of the two States (thediedianliw'
238. The terminology employed is entirely parallel to and
consistent with the language of the Decree of 7 June 1963relating
to the continental shelf (Annex29). Reference to the 1958Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf is omitted. It is noted that
the need for delimitation arises in cases where opposite coasts are
less than 400 nautical miles apart. Again, the text is clear in its
application to the Kingdom as a whole, and distinguishes between
adjacent situations, which occur only in respect of continental
Denmark, and opposite situations, which present themselves in
relation to al1 three parts of the Realm. The statement on the
actual course of delimitation in the Act of 1976differs slightly in
the choice and order of terms from that of the 1963instrument,
but with no variation in meaning. The proviso in respect of
alternative agreed boundaries is couched in identical terms in the
original text:"..in the absence of special agreement ..."IApart
from this proviso, the text relating to delimitation is unequivocal
and unqualified.
239. An Executive Order of 22 December 1976, issued
pursuant to this Act, established the fishing territory of Denmark
19This may nok adequatclyreflectedin the translation pAnnexI to the1
Danish Mernorial("Failingany agreementto th..." ).ary in the North Sea with effect from 1January 1977(Annex 33). The
coincides with agreed continental shelf boundaries.ird States in fact
240. Order No. 629 of the same date, also issued pursuant
to the Act, established the fishing territory of Greenland, along
both coasts, but not Curthernorth than 75' N on the Westcoast
states as against Canada a boundary corresponding to the agreed
continental shelf boundary. Section 1,paragraph 4vides for a
median line delimitation as against Iceland. The Order further
specifiesbaseline points for determination of thelimit of the
zone.
241. A further Order of 22 December 1977 extended the
North Sea fisherieszone in the Skagerrak and the Kattegat, again
stating a boundary as against Norway corresponding to the
continental shelf boundary. In respect of Sweden, where no
continental shelfboundary had as yet beenagreed, ajoint fisheries
jurisdiction was established, pending agreement on a final-
itation (Annex 35). The joint arrangement was formalized in an
exchange of Notes dated 29 December 1977.
242. On 1 February 1978,an Order established Denmark's
fisheries zone in the Belt, the Sound and the Baltic (Annex 36).
The Order states expressly that the outer limit as against the
Federal Republic ofGermany, the German Democratic Republic,
Poland and Sweden, is to be determined by agreement, and that,
pending such agreement, the zone limit is the median line (except
Sound, where existing arrangements would continue to
a
d" 243. By Order No. 176 of 14 May 1980, the Greenland
fisheries zone was extended northwards along both coasts, with
effect from 1 June 1980 (Annex 38). The limit of the zone as
against Canada is stated to be in accordance with the agreed
continental shelfline and, to the north, the line (Section 1,
relation to Iceland, in terms apparently corresponding tosen
employed in the 1976 Order. As against Norway, Section 1,
paragraph 4, provides for a median line in relation to Svalbard
(Spitsbergen), whereas, in relation to Jan Mayen, it is stated that
" ..jurisdiction of fisheries shall not, until further notice, be
exercised beyond..."the median line. 244. By an Order of 31 August 1981, the last-mentioned
Order was amended in this regard, sothat Section 1,paragraph 4,
second sentence would read:
"Where the island of Jan Mayen liesopposite Greenland,the
breadth of the fishing territory is 200 nautical miles, rnea-
sured from the baselines mentioned in Section 2."
It is noted that this language departs from the terminology
employed by Denrnark in al1the above-mentioned contexts, and is
in conflict with the enabling Act No. 597 of 17 December 1976
Section 1, paragraph 2, with reference to which the Order was
issued. CHAPTER VI
THE PRESENT DISPUTE
245. Nonvay and Denmark participated in the practice
which developed in al1parts of the North Atlantic by enacting
legislation in 1976 which provided for the exercise of fisheries
jurisdiction within a distance of 200 nautical miles from appro-
priate baselines. The implementation of this extended jurisdiction
differed with regard to geographical scope and timing.
246. The Danish Executive Order of 22 December 1976
limited the extension of the Greenland fishingzone along both the
Westand the east coasts.
247. Nonvay implemented its economic zone first for the
mainland, on 1 January 1977, then for Svalbard. There was
initially no pressing need to establish an exclusiveeconomic zone,
or a fisheries zone for the waters around Jan Mayen.
248. The development oi a considerable capelin Iishcry off
Jan Mayen in the late summrr of 1978made it clear that therc wüs
a need to make provision for the regulation of fishing activities
also in this area. In view of the obvious community of interests
between Norway and Iceland in the management of this capelin
stock,the Norwegian Government stated itsintention to establish
a fisheriesjurisdiction zone off Jan Mayen in due course, on the
basis of cooperation with Iceland (see Annex 7).
249. Contacts were initiated between Norway and Iceland.
The Government of Denmark made its interest in the matter
known to Norway. As is shown by the Nonvegian ministerial
letter of 4 July 1979, replying to a Danish letter of the preceding
day, Nonvay reacted to those comments by stating that it was
aware that, in the negotiations with Iceland, decisions should not
be taken which would prejudice Danish interests, including the
delimitation in relation to Greenland (see Annex 6).
250. Negotiations proceeded between Norway and Iceland
on al1 matters relating to the management and appropriate
regulation of fisheries, including the establishment andelimita-
tion of jurisdictional zones. The result of these negotiations was
recorded in an Agreement, signed on 28 May 1980,concerning
fishery and continental shelf questions (see Annex 70). In dealing with delimitation, the Agreement took a
251.
somewhat indirect approach by referring in the preamble to the
fact that Iceland'sestablishmentof an economiczone had already
been carried out (in a manner which would extend its outer limit
to 200 nautical miles in the waters between Iceland and Jan
Mayen) while noting that the establishment of a fishery zone
around Jan Mayen would follow.At the same time, the Agree-
ment, in its preamble, noted the recognition by the international
community of Iceland's economic dependence on fisheries. A
decisionwasmade toappoint a Conciliation Commissionto assist
the Partiesin dealingwiththe delimitationof thecontinental shelf.
252. The Agreement illustratesthe influence of politicaland
pragmatic considerations. Those influenceshad a bearing on the
pressing need to provide an appropriate framework for the
regulation of the capelin fishery.They also embraced the general
political relationship between the Parties, and the particularly
closecommunity of their interests.
253. After the conclusionof the substantive negotiationson
this Agreement,Nonvay issued a Royal Decree on23 May 1980,
establishinga fisheryzone around Jan MayenwithëfEfTrOm29
May 1980 (seeAnnex 27). The Decree expressedspecificrecognk
t&oLththe_acceptedextent -neries zone (Sect.o.-2).
In relation to Greenland, the Decree restated the delimitation
nom of Act No. 91of 17December 1976relatingto the economic
zone of Norway (see Annex 24, Section 1, second paragraph in
finec,f. Section 2 ofthe Decree). The Decree further stated that
"w-the fisheryzone adioins-the zone off East Greenland,-the,
delimitation iine shaii be drawn by agreement" (Section 3of the
Fécree).
254. Theextensionof the Greenland fisheryzonein the area
north of 67' N along the east Coast followed on I June 1980,
pursuant to an Executive Order dated 14 May 1980 (seeAnnex
38).TheOrder specifiedthat in relation to Jan Mayen,jurisdiction
should not, until further notice, be exercisedbeyond the equidi-
stant line.
255. In Notes exchanged in June 1980, the two Govern-
ments stated their respective reservations and positions with
regard to the delimitation of the two zones (Annex 10and 12). 256. The conduct of negotiations relating to the delimita-
tion question is dealt with in paragraphs 53-72 of the Danish
Mernorial. That account provides the dates of some of the
meetings and conversations which were held, and indicates some
of the subject matter of the negotiations and talks, but it is not
very complete.
257. The negotiations may be separated into several distinct
phases. The first phase consisted of a series of meetings of
formally appointed delegations. Each Party provided a detailed
presentation of its legal position. In the several meetings from
December 1980 until January 1983, these positions were supple-
mented and argued.
258. It is noteworthy that, throughout these negotiations,
both Parties maintained that the 1958 Convention continued to
govern their relationships in respect of the continental shelf, and
formed the natural point of departure also in respect of the
negotiation of a boundary relating to the fisheries zones.
259. At the close of thefourth round of formal negotiations,
it was agreed that both aides would refer back to eonsideration at
a political level.
260. This first phase also comprised a procedural modus
vivendi, under which it was agreed that certain activities by
inspection vessels would not be held to prejudice the positions of
the Parties.
261. A second phase involved informal talks between oflï-
cials ofthe two sides. On the Nonvegian side, it was feltdesirable
to explore whether a broader approach to the delimitation issue
might prove more fruitful than a strictly legal approach. On this
basis, questions relating to the mutual accessof fishermen ofboth
Parties to the zones of the other Party, and other aspects of a
collaborative approach to resource management and exploitation
would be taken into account. ByJune 1985,the attempt to extend
the field of discussion had failed to produce results.
262. After a period of contacts at the level of Ministers, a
subsequent phase consisting of meetings of officiais of the twoForeign Ministries took place in 1987and 1988. In this phase,
efforts were made to develop an appropriate procedure for
judicial settlement of the delimitation issue. Both sides presented
suggestions in writing concerning possible procedures. The Nor-
wegian suggestion sought to combine strictly judicial findings on
questions of law with a procedure for resuming negotiations
between the Parties. The thrust of the Norwegian suggestion was
that an Arbitral Tribunal would be asked to decide those legal
issues which the Parties agreed to submit to it. Thereafter the
Parties would have an opportunity to revert to negotiations in
order to determine the actual delimitation on the basis of those
decisions and at the same time deal with related matters.
263. In the Danish Application of 16 August 1988, it is
allegedthat: "lt wasmade clear by the Danish representatives that
the possibility ofarhitration should be clarified by theend of June
1988." At the meeting which took place in Copenhagen on 21
June 1988, the Norwegian side presented its suggestions in
writing. Those proposais did not immediately find favour with the
Danish negotiators. They were not, however, rejected out of hand
by the Danish side. It was the impression on the Norwegian side,
at the close of the meeting, that the Danish side would revert to
the matter after further consultation with their Government. It
was the understanding of the Norwegian delegation that contacts
betweenthe Parties with a viewto exploring furtherthe possibility
of agreement on the procedures forjudicial settlement were still in
progress at the time when the unilateral Danish Application was
made to the Court.
264. The Danish side made no approach to seek the collab-
oration of Norway in presenting ajoint request to the Court in the
form of a SpecialAgreement, as is the usual procedure in matters
relating to maritime delimitation.
265. Throughout the period of negotiations, the Norwegian
side had heen conscious of the long-range interest in maintaining
a friendly and constructive basis for the relationship between
Norwegian authorities and the Greenland Home Rule authorities.
266. Two elements in the account of the negotiating history
in the Danish Memorial require comment: 267. (a) In paragraphs 54-57, circumstancesrelating to the
issuance by Norwegian Coast Guard officersof warning notices Io
Masters of Danish vesselsfishing to the east of the median line in
the waters between Jan Mayen and Greenland are characterized
as "T-dent". It should be noted that at this time, in late
August 1981. the pertinent Danish Order expressly stated that
Uenmaik for the time being would not exercre jurisdiction
Tbeyond the median IiKNorwayhad not relinquished or sus-
/pended any part of its jÜÏisdiction according to the Norwegian
Decree. Nonvay acted completely within its rights under interna-
tional law in instructing Norwegian Coast Guard officers to issue
warnings to unauthonzed vessels fishing within the limits of the
Norwegian fishenes zone.
268. The only actual element of escalation was the dispatch
of a Danish inspection vesse1to the area, in particular when this
was accompanied by a decision to repeal therestraint clause in the
Executive Order No. 176 of 14 May 1980, which had served to
prevent the underlying difference of views from becoming a
dispute.
269. It is noteworthy that the modus vivendisubsequently
worked out did not rule out the further issuance of such warning
notices. It isificult to see how this sequence of events could be
termed an "incident", with the connotations attaching to that
concept in current diplomatic usage.
(h) Inparagraph 60of the Danish Memorial, reference
270.
is made to an alleged "mutual understanding" between the two
Parties with regard to theconduct of surveillance operations upon
the resumption of fishing activities after two years in which no
capelin catches had been taken. It is correct that there had been
contacts between the Parties in this regard.
271. An informal paper, resembling the text exhibited at
Annex 13to the Danish Memorial, was produced by the Danish
side in the course of these contacts, but was rejected by the
Nonvegian side. No "mutual understanding" was arrived at. On
the contrary, it was clearly stated by the Nonvegian side that no
"understanding", formal or informal, would be acceptable. 272. A proper description of the outcome of the contacts
referred to would be that each of the Parties, independently and
autonomously, and without offering or accepting any undertak-
ings, would instruct its relevant naval, Coast guard or other units
to carry out surveillance operations in the area in a manner
compatible with the common desire of both parties to avoid any
action with regard to thedisputed area which might be prejudicial
to the ongoing delimitation negotiations. PARTII
THELAW INTRODUCTION
273. The relevant considerations of law fall into three
separate but mutually compatible categones as follows:
(a) the treaty obligations of the partiesterse;
(b) the pnnciples of recognition and acquiescence depending
upon the conduct of the parties, together with the pertinent
elements of opposability and estoppel; and
(c) general international Lawin the fom of the equitable princi-
ples applicable in order to achieve an equitable solution.
274. The Norwegian position is that these three categories
constitute independent bases of the legal validity of theedian
line boundary in respect of continental shelf rights and also the
delimitation of adjoining fishery zones.
275. Whilst the Court is at liberty to approach the submis-
sions of the parties as it seesfit, in the circumstances of the present
case there are considerations both of law and of judicial conven-
ience which militate in favour of treating the legal arguments in a
certain order of priority.
276. The independent validity of three legal bases of the
strictmedian line notwithstanding, the particular bistory of the
relations of the parties in this caselves a certain determinism.
The question of delimitation cannot be approached denovo: there
is a series of transactions between the parties relating precisely to
delimitation of maritime boundaries. Moreover, the recent le*
sources consistently give emphasis to the importance and priorlty
3 the agreement ot the parties.
-
277. Consequently, there is a specific legal order bearing
upon delimitation which antedates these proceedings and which as
a matter of legal logic and good policy qualifies for a certain
priority in the process of decision.
278. In any event there is no incongruity in this case
between suecial and eeneral international law. The conduct of the PARTII
THE LAW INTRODUCTION
273. The relevant considerations of law fa11into three
separate but mutually compatible categories as follows:
(a) the treaty obligations of the parties inter se;
(b) the principles of recognition and acquiescence depending
upon the conduct of the parties, together with the pertinent
elements of opposability and estoppel; and
(c) general international law in the form of the equitable princi-
ples applicable in order to achieve an equitable solution.
274. The Norwegian position is that these three categories
constitute independent bases of the legal validity of the median
line boundary in respect of continental shelf rights and also the
delimitation of adjoining fishery zones.
275. Whilst the Court is at liberty to approach the submis-
sions of the parties asit seesfit,in the circumstances of the present
case there are considerations both of law and of judicial conven-
ience which militate in favour of treating the legal arguments in a
certain order of priority.
276. The independent validity of three legal bases of the
strictmedian line notwithstanding, the particular history of the
relations of the parties in this casevolves a certain determinism.
The question of delimitation cannot be approached denovo: there
is aseries of transactions between the parties relating precisely to
delimitation of maritime boundaries. Moreover, the recent legal
sources consistently giveemphasis to the importance and priority
of the agreement of the parties.
277. Consequently, there is a specific legal order bearing
upon delimitation which antedates these proceedings and which as
a matter of legal logic and good policy qualifies for a certain
priority in the process of decision.
278. In any event there is no incongruity in this case
between special and general international law. The conduct of the
parties is a primary guide to what is equitable. The median line is
the legallyvalid boundary as recognized by the express agreement
of the parties, the conduct of the parties in general, and the
application of the modus operandi of equitable principles which
form part of general international law. A:TREATYOBLIGATIONS
OF THE PARTIESINTER SE
CHAPTER 1
DELIMITATIONOF THE CONTINENTALSHELF
279. The relationship between the Parties involves a consid-
erable number of transactions, in the form of treaty obligations
and practice relating to treaties, and other transactions which
constitute acts of express recognition or implied recognition of a
median line boundary between the continental shelves of Green-
land and Jan Mayen. In this Chapter, the treaty obligations of the
Parties in relation to delimitation of their continental shelves as
between themselves will be explored.
2. THETREATY OBLIGATIONS
(a) The 1965 Agreement between Norwayand Denmark
280. The primary basis of the median line boundary appli-
cable in the continental shelfreas between Greenland and Jan
Mayen is to be found in the bilateral Agreement relating to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf signed in Oslo on 8cem-
ber 1965(Annex 46).
281. Article 1 of the Agreement provides as follows:
"The boundary between those parts of the continental shelf
over which Norway and Denmark respectively exercise
sovereignrights shall be theedian line which at everypoint
is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each Contracting
Party is measured."
282. This provision contains a dispositive statement:"...
shall be the median lin..."and it is general in scope, unqualified
and without reservation. There is no geographical restriction
linked to it. It makes no reference to any exceptional oroma-
lous situationsfor which any other solution could be considered.
At the time, the Parties had every inducement to assess their
respectivegeographical situations, and to evaluate whether any ofthem presented such special circumstances as might affect the
detailed demarcation of their continental shelf boundaries. The
conclusion of the Agreement clearly indicates that both Parties
found that this was not the case.
283. The natural meaning of the unambiguous language of
Article 1of the treaty must be to establish definitivelythe basis for
al1 boundaries which would eventually fa11to be demarcated
between the two Kingdoms. Article 2, which is concerned with
demarcation, relates exclusively to the shelves of the two main-
lands.
284. That meaning corresponds to the structure of the 1965
Agreement: First, it sets out the governing principle in Article 1,
then, in a separate article, the detailed application of the principle
is set out, to thextent a concrete delineation of the trajectory of
the median line is required at the time.
285. The same process was again applied in 1979 in the
drawing of the boundary between the appurtenant parts of the
continental shelf (and the respective jurisdictional zones) of the
Parties between the Norwegian mainland and the Faroe Islands
(Annex 69).
286. The 1979Agreement is explicitin dealing with both the
delimitation of the shelf and of the zones. The delimitation of the
zones appears as a separate, and almost incidental matter ("De-
siring at the same time to establish the boundary between the
fishery zone near the Faroe Islands and the Norwegian economic
zone ..." (third preambular paragraph)). This dual character of
the demarcation task made it natural to draft a completely new
instrument, rather than to supplement the 1965Agreement by a
Protocol.
287. The main purpose of the 1979 Agreement was the
delimitation of the continental shelf. This is apparent both from
the structure of the Agreement, and from its contents. The text
keeps open the further extension of the continental shelfboundary
as the need may arise for further delineation:
"...for the time being,they will not establish the boundary
further north than to the point which lies 200nautical miles
from the nearest points of the baselines ..."(second pream-
bular paragraph, emphasis supplied).
288. The structure of the Agreement of 1979follows that of
the 1965Agreement: The statement of principle in Article 1, thedetails of the demarcation in Article 2: "In the application of the
median line principle referred to ...".The Agreement confirmed
that both Parties remained committed to the median line principle
of the 1965Agreement.
289. It must be a further corollary that the Parties are
bound to demarcate or delineateany such boundary on that same
basis, as and when the need for a more precise definition of the
boundary might arise.
290. When the occasion arose to demarcate the continental
shelf boundary (and other zona1boundaries) between Greenland
and Jan Mayen in 1980,Norway was fullyprepared to enter into
negotiations with Denmark with a view to reaching agreement as
to the details of the demarcation. In a manner of which the legal
logic escaped the Norwegian side, the Danish claims deviated
completely fromthe principle stated in the 1965Agreement as well
as from the consistent Danish conduct in the matter of delimita-
tion of itscontinental shelfvis-à-visitsneighbouringStates. As has
been described in Chapter VI of Part 1above, even attempts from
the Norwegian side to settle the matter amicably by taking into
account a broader range of factors, or to seek a combination of
judicialdecision and practical negotiation, were in vain.
291. It is the contention of the Norwegian Government that
in respect of the continental shelf between Greenland and Jan
Mayen, Denmark is bound by its obligations under the 1965
Agreement to apply the median line as the boundary, and to enter
into negotiations for the precise demarcation of that boundary,
based on the agreed principle. As Jan Mayen is a part of the
Kingdom of Norway, and Greenland is a part of the Kingdom of
Denmark, Article 1 of the Agreement by its own wording, in the
plain and natural meaning of the words used, established the
median line as the boundary. What is left is the precise demarca-
tion, with the possibility of simplification for administrative
convenience.
292. It is to be noted that the bilateral 1965Agreement fully
conforms with the general pattern of the conduct of the Parties
relating to continental shelf delimitation. This adds to theroba-
tivevalue of the Agreement in identifying the viewsof both Parties
with regard to the legalprinciples underlying any continental shelf
delimitation, in general and in theirmutual relations. (b) The 1958 Conventionon the ContinentalShelj
293. Denmark signed and ratified the 1958Geneva Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf at an early stage. For reasons
unrelated to the questions of delimitation of the continental shelf,
Norway deferred its forma1 adherence to the Convention until
1971.However, it was Norway's viewfrom the outset that Article
6 of the Convention expressed general international law in this
matter, and it consistently applied those principles in its relation-
ship with other States. Thus, the principles of Article 6 of the
Convention formed a basis for the Norwegian proclamation and
legislation in 1963concerning the Norwegian continental shelf, as
well as for the bilateral Agreement with Denmark in 1965. The
same applies to the other continental shelf delimitation agree-
ments entered into by Norway prior to its forma1accession to the
1958Convention in 1971.
294. The provisions of the 1958 Convention, including its
Article 6,entered into force, and became bindingtreaty obligations
as between Denmark and Norway, on 9 September 1971.Neither
of the Parties has made any reservation to the 1958Convention,
or made any other statement purporting to exclude or modify the
legal effect of any provision of the Convention. On the contrary,
Norway, on depositing its instrument of accession, recorded its
objection to reservations taken by France with respect to Articles
5 and 6 of the Convention."
295. Article6 employs the well-known equidistance/special
circumstances formula in the following terms:
"(1) Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite
each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertain-
ing to such States shall be determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the
boundary is the median line, every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest point of the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured.
(2) Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the
territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the
IlThe Norwegian objection reads as follows: "In depositing their instrument of accession
acceptable the reservation made by the Government of the French Republic to Articled
5, paragraph 1,and to Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2." continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the
boundary shall be determined by application of the principle
of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is
measured."
296. For Norway and Denmark, being also bound by the
bilateral Agreement of 1965, the general references to "special
circumstances" in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention must be
understood to be subordinate to the provisions of the 1965
Agreement. That Agreement adopts without reservation "the
median line" asthe basis of delimitation. In the circumstances and
giventhe notoriety of the formulation in Article 6, the omission of
reference to "special circumstances" in the instrument of 1965
must have been deliberate. Indeed, given the context of other
delimitation matters with which each of the Parties was con-
cerned, the omission may be regarded as declaratory of the
interpretation by the Parties of the 1958 Convention, in its
application to their geographical situations: no relevant special
circumstances were present.
297. The practice of the Parties, including their respective
legislation with respect to continental shelf delimitation, unequiv-
ocally supports the principle of the median line subject only to
modification on the basis of agreement. The relevant materials are
set forth in paragraphs 172-186 of the present pleading, and
commented further upon in Chapters III and IV of this Part.
298. The primacy of the median line formula contained in
Article 1 of the 1965 Agreement is also confirmed by two well-
recognized principles of treaty interpretation. In the first place,
given the overall pattern of themutual relations of the Parties, to
contend that the formulation of the Agreement of 1965 is
subordinate to the "special circumstances" qualification would be
contrary to the obligation to perform treaties in good faith, an
obligation which also operates in the sphere of the interpretation
of treaties, as LordMcNair pointed out in his authoritative work
(The Law of Treaties, 1961,p. 465).
299. Secondly,there is the basic legalmaxim that "a specific
provision prevails over a general provision", described by the
Court as "a well-recognized principle of interpretation" in the
ArnbatielosCase(I.C.J. Reports 1952,pp. 87-88).The operation ofthis principle must be especiallycompelling when the more specific
provision reflectsthe overall practice of the Parties more faithfully
than does the general provision.
300. In the light of this practice and the conduct of the
Parties overall in relation to continental shelf delimitation, the
provisions of Article 6 of the 1958Convention are to be applied in
the light of the provisions of Articleof the 1965Agreement, and
thus the two treaty obligations operate conjointly. Any contrary
contention that "another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances" must be excluded on the basis of the undertakings
in the 1965 bilateral Agreement. The content and scope of that
Agreement was in no way restricted or diminished by Norway's
accession to the 1958 Convention in 1971. None of the Parties
have claimed the presence of special circumstances in their
geographical situations (until new tones from Danish representa-
tives surprised the Norwegian Foreign Minister in 1979).None of
the Parties had made any reference to special circumstances in
their pertinent legislation (and the Danish Royal Decree of 7 June
1963 relating to the continental shelf was promulgated after the
decision had been made to ratify the 1958Convention).
301. It is thecontention of the Norwegian Government that
in respect of the continental shelf between Greenland and Jan
Mayen, territories whose coasts are opposite each other, Denmark
is bound by its obligations under the 1958 Convention on the
Continental Shelf not to exercisejurisdiction with regard to any
part of the continental shelf beyond the median line, which under
the terms of the Convention constitutes the boundary.
302. Both Parties are signatories to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982,but neither Party has
so far ratified it.
303. The coming into force of the new Convention will
maintain the effect of the 1965bilateral Agreement, and confirm
the application as between the parties of the provisions of Article
6 of the Convention of 1958.
304. This follows directly from the provisions of the Con-
vention itself, and the manner in which it deals with delimitationof the continental shelf and other maritime zones. The effect and
operation of the 1982Convention will lead to the same results as
the application of the bilateral treaty, or of the 1958Convention,
respectively. That result will be that a delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf and other maritime zones as between the Parties,
should follow the median line. That result will also within the
prevailing geographical situation satisfy the objective of achieving
an equitable solution, as set out in Article 83, paragraph 1 of the
1982Convention.
305. Under the specific terms of Article 83, paragraph 4 of
the 1982Convention, it is clear that the 1965Agreement, is "an
agreement in force between the States concerned". Article 83,
paragraph 4 then provides that: "questions relating to the delim-
itation of the continental shelf shall be determined in accordance
with the provisions of that agreement." Thus, the continued
validity and applicability of the existing bilateral treatyrelation-
ship between the Parties is explicitly confirmed by the 1982
Convention.
306. The prevalence of the 1965 Agreement is, moreover,
reinforced by a series of cogent indicators:
307. (a) Neither Party has denied the full force and effect of
the Agreement, as a consequence of the adoption of the 1982
Convention, or of other developments in the law of the sea.
308. (b) In their delimitation practice, the Partie- with the
notable exception of the Danish claims raised in the present case
- have overall confirmed their continuing acceptance of the
principle laid down in Article 1 of the 1965Agreement.
309. (c) The Parties have by their conduct confirmed that
the median line principle would not be and has not been modified
by the new Law of the Sea Convention.
310. Article 83, paragraph 1 of the 1982Convention States
the primacy of agreement as the means of effecting the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf. The provisions of Article 1 of the
1965Agreement are therefore in fullconformity with the policy of
the new Convention.
311. The effect of the 1982 Convention is further that the
existing delimitation provisions of the 1958 Convention shall
continue to govern the relationship between the parties thereto. 312. Specifically,the new Convention contains a reference,
or a renvoi to the 1958 Convention, for those States which are
party thereto. Article 83, paragraph 1 of the 1982 Convention
does not contain any substantive rule on delimitation, but pre-
scribes delimitation by agreement "on the basis of international
law, as referred to in Article 38 of theatute of the International
Court of Justice, inorder to achieve an equitable solution". As an
earlier general international convention establishing a rule ex-
pressly recognized by the States in question, the 1958Convention
on the Continental Shelfwould clearly remain applicable by virtue
of the text of Article 83 of the 1982Convention itself, as between
Norway and Denmark.
313. It has also been the stated view ofboth Parties that the
1958 Convention continues in force, undisturbed by the 1982
Convention. As far as Denmark is concerned, that is made clear
by the statement of a prominent negotiator for Denmark at
UNCLOS III, writing in Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook1983on
the new Convention and Denmark's law of the sea policies (see
Annex 81). Similar public statements have been made by Norwe-
gian representatives.
314. Further and generally, Article 311, paragraph 1 of the
1982Convention states that its provisions shall "prevai..over"
the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1958.This implies
that the provisions of the 1958Conventions are to remain in effect
in the relationship between those States which are party to both
the new Convention and one or more of the older Conventions.
Only in the case of conflictbetween the two sets of rules will the
provisions of the new Convention have priority. Paragraph 2 of
Article 311states this explicitlywith regard to "other Agreements
compatible with the Convention". This is, of course, entirely
corresponding to the operation of the normal test of treaty law:
where a subsequent treaty provision deals with the same subject
matter as an older treaty, the test for the relationship between the
two treaties is the test of compatibility. In the submission of the
Norwegian Government, in relation to the test of compatibility,
the principal criterion is the intention of the Parties interested in
the issue of compatibility.
315. The Parties have relied on the 1958Convention in the
negotiations which they have conducted between themselves, and
in their relations with third States.Thus, the Preamble of the
Agreement between Denmark and Sweden of 9 November 1984
on the delimitation of the continental shelf and fishing zonesexpressly invokes the 1958 Convention: the Parties "Have in
accordancewiththe Geneva Convention ...agreed to the fol-
lowing....."(emphasis supplied, see Annex 74).
316. The conduct of the Parties is a major aspect of the
history of the present proceedings. The continuing relevance of
Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958, as inter-
preted and applied in the light of the bilateral Agreement of 1965
and the general pattern of the relations ofDenmark and Norway
inter se, provides the complement to the elements of recognition
and acquiescence to be reviewed in the Part which follows. Al1
these elements are underpinned by the principles of consistency
and good faith and constitute a well-established pattern of
bilateral relations with reference to continental shelf delimitation. CHAPTERII
DELIMITATIONOF FISHERIESZONES
317. The question of the delimitation of fisheries zones was
first addressed by the Parties in their enactments of 17December
1976. It was further expressly dealt with by Norway and Den-
mark, in treaty form, in respect of the boundary between the
Faroe Islands and the Norwegian mainland.
318. The Agreement of 15June 1979 (referred to at pages
82-83, paragraphs 285-289 above, text at Annex 69) covers both
the delimitation of the continental shelf, and the delimitation
between the fisheries zone ofDenmark and the economic zone of
Norway. As noted in the foregoing, the course of the zona1
boundary was decided by the statement that it "shall follow" the
demarcation established for the continental shelf.
319. This solution conforms to the general practice, taken
almost for granted, of applying existing continental shelf bound-
aries in respect of the new jurisdictional zones.
320. This practice was followed by Norway and Denmark
in respect of their respectivezones in the North Sea.Theboundary
line established by the 1965Agreement has in fact been the line of
demarcation in relation to al1aspects of the exercise of fisheries
jurisdiction in extended zones of the Parties. This has been
effected without formality, by virtue of the application by each
Party of the continental shelfboundary for those new needs which
had to be taken care of when fisheriesjurisdiction was extended.
The accessrights which are granted to foreign fishermen require a
geographical definition: that is provided by the median line
between Norway and Denmark, as demarcated by the 1965
Agreement. Similarly, enforcement activities by the inspection
vesselsof each Party are restricted by themedian line. Whenever
questions of resource management in the North Sea are discussed,
between the Parties or in multilateral bodies, it is taken for
granted that the continental shelf boundary marks the extent of
jurisdictionalareas, that is to Say,the areas in which each State in
the end determines the practicalities of fishing.
321. This practice represents a recognition of existing con-
tinental shelfboundaries as being applicable as wellto the exercise
of fisheriesjurisdiction and to execution of management respon-
sibilities. It is further a demonstration that the States which have
contributed to this practice have regarded the use of existingcontinental shelf boundaries for new purposes several years later
as being the equitable and acceptable solution, under general
international law.
322. In this way, the 1965Agreement has been applied, as a
matter of course, to a new situation arising more than ten years
after that Agreement formally defined the median line, with
administrative adjustments, for its original purpose. That is a
manner of utilizing a treaty for a new purpose in a manner which
is entirely loyal both to the underlying original purposes of the
treaty, and to the rules and principles of international law which
formed the basis for the substantive contents of that treaty. B:THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES.
RECOGNITIONAND ACQUIESCENCE
INTRODUCTION.
THE ROLE OF RECOGNITIONAND ACQUIESCENCE
323. The role of recognition and acquiescence in general
international law is well-recognized. These principles, together
with the related concept of estoppel, are grounded in "the
fundamental principles of good faith and equity" (see the Judg-
ment of the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case, I.C.J. Reports
1984, p. 305, para. 130).
324. These principles, involving basic elements of consis-
tency and good faith, are of major relevance in the present
proceedings, and this not leastbecause Denmark has seen fit to
depart from the established pattern of bilateral relations and
agreements by commencing litigation on the basis of a unilateral
application.
325. Prior to the appearance of signs of wavering in the
Danish attitude in the nineteen-eighties, the conjoint conduct of
the Parties had long recognized the applicability of adian line
delimitation in their mutual relations. This recognition took
several distinct forms: specific treaty obligations, other forms of
express recognition, and a general pattern of conduct constituting
tacit recognition of, or acquiescence in,adian linedelimitation.
These different forms of recognition interact in such a way as to
produce a reciprocal process ofacceptance and confirmation, and
the pattern of conduct overallinvolves a period of more than 20
years.
326. The conduct of the parties is also invoked in Chapter
VI1 of this Part of the Counter-Memorial (pp. 154-161, paras.
528-560) as an aspect of thevarious relevant circumstances to be
taken into account in confirming that the median line constitutes
an equitable solution in the context of the principles of general
international law relating to the delimitation ofas of continen-
tal shelf and fisheries zones. CHAPTERIII
THE CONSISTENT CONDUCTOF THE PARTIES
327. The sequence of consistent conduct begins with the
appearance of legislation concerning the continental shelf in
Denmark and Norway in 1963.This legislation was complemen-
tary in language and in function. The adoption of the median line
as the boundary for continental shelf delimitation is subsequently
confirmed by the conclusion of the bilateral Agreement on 8
December 1965(seeparas. 280-292 above). The sequence is then
maintained by Danish legislation concerning fisheries in 1976
which coincides with the Norwegian Act relating to the Economic
Zone. By this further instance of coincident and complementary
legislation, the two States adopted the median line as the bound-
ary also for fishery purposes and, in doing so, provided further
evidence of a consistent adherence to the median line by the two
Governments in their relations inter se.
The DanishRoyal Decree of7 June 1963 Concerningthe
ContinentalShelf
328. Denmark was amongthe early States to ratify the 1958
Continental Shelf Convention. After Parliamentary approval for
the ratification of the Convention had been obtained, Denmark
issued on 7 June 1963a Royal Decree concerning the exercise of
Danish sovereignty over the continental shelf (Annex 29).
329. The Decree proclaims that "Danish sovereignty12shall
be exercised, in so far as the exploration and exploitation of
natural resources are concerned, over thatportion of the continen-
tal shelf which, according to the Convention ...belongs to the
Kingdom of Denmark, cf. Article 2" (Article 1,emphasis supplied).
Article 2, paragraph 1, sets out the shelf definition of the
Convention in identical terms. Article 2, paragraph 2 paraphrases
and compresses the provisions of Article 6, paragraphs 1and 2 of
the Convention. The language of the Decree distinguishes between
States, the coasts of which "are opposite coasts of the Kingdom of
1The translation reproduced at Annex 29 corresponds to the text contained in UN
"h~jhedsret", may be held to have a meaning which is closer to "sovereign rights" than
to "sovereignty".Denmark" and those coasts which are "adjacent to Denmark,
while providing in both instances that the boundary "shall be
determined in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention, that is
to say, in the absence of special Agreement, the boundary is the
median line, ...(Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Decree, emphasis
supplied).
330. The Decree is explicit in addressing delimitation in
relation to opposite and adjacent coasts on the same basis. The
terminology makes it clear that this aspect has been studied in
detail: only the continental part of the Kingdom, that is to Say
Denmark itself, has neighbouring States with adjacent coasts.
There is an invocation of the Convention y.. inaccordance with
Article 6...."). The language of the Decree, however, omits any
reference to special circumstances, and states without reservation
that the boundary "is" the median line, choosing the more
categorical alternative where the Convention distinguishes as
between adjacent and opposite States. The inference must be that
in the course of the Danish legislative process, the geographical
situation of the Kingdom had been examined, and no special
circumstances had been found which would cal1for delimitation
on any other basis than the median line.
331. Article 3 of the Decree concerns the regulation of the
exploration and exploitation of shelf resources. In respect of
Greenland, a separate statutory instrument applies. It is thus
made quite explicit that the Decree of 7 June 1963relates to the
whole of the Kingdom, including Greenland.
332. More detailed provisions governing continental shelf
activitieswere setout in Act No. 259of 9 June 1971relating to the
continental shelf (Annex 30). This legislation sets out in a more
detailed manner the conditions for the granting of concessions,
provides for jurisdiction with respect to installations and safety
zones (including the application of law relating specifically to
Greenland in respect of "the Greenland part of the continental
shelf')and enables competent ministers to issue detailed regula-
tions. Such regulations have been issued for Greenland in respect
of prospecting. The Act also contains provisions relating to the
revocation of concessions, and penal clauses. This Act has subse-
quently been amended by enactments of 1972and 1977(seeAnnex
37).
333. The 1963 Decree thus remains the governing instru-
ment defining the continental shelf of theingdom of Denmark.
The language of Article 1 of the Decree, as read with theprovisions of Article 2, paragraph 2, appears to imply that, in the
absence of special agreement, Denmark does not claim to exercise
sovereign rights with respect to the continental shelf, nor to
exercise the concomitant jurisdiction, beyond the median line in
relation to any foreign State, unless the boundary thus established
is modified subsequently by express agreement.
The NorwegianRoyal Decree of31 May 1963relatingto the
Exploitationof andExplorationfor SubmarineNaturalResources
334. The Danish legislation was enacted more or less in
parallel with similar legislation in Norway. The Norwegian Royal
Decree of 31May 1963(Annex 21) proclaimed sovereign rights as
regards exploitation and exploration of natural resources of the
seabed and subsoil in the submarine areas outside the Coast,as far
as the depth of the superjacent waters admits of exploitation of
natural resources, but not beyond the median line in relation to
other States.
335. The Decree was followed by Act No. 12 of 21 June
1963 (Annex 22) relating to exploitation of and exploration for
submarine natural resources, which restates the definition in the
Decree in, and again specifies"but not beyond the median line in
relation to other States". As in the case of the Danish instruments,
the reference to the median line appears in a context in which
international law is clearly being applied.
336. Thus the invocation of "the median line" is normative
and definitive; and the legislationnvolves both the application of
the pertinent legal rules and the establishment of a boundary.
Moreover, in the constitutional and legislativepractice of Norway
the provisions would apply to al1parts of the Kingdom of Norway
(excludingthereby territories located in the southern hemisphere).
The BoundaryAgreement between Norway andDenmarkof 1965
337. A detailed analysis of the bilateral continental shelf
boundary Agreement of 1965 (Annex 46) has been given in
Chapter 1of this Part. For present purposes it is invoked in order
to underline the elements of consistency and continuity in the
relations between Norway and Denmark. The Agreement must
also be seen as an expression by the Parties of their view that the
application of the median line also would follow under general
international law, for delimitation of the continental shelf. The
Agreement was expresslymade applicable to both Kingdoms, Le.,in the practice of both Parties covering al1territories: For Den-
mark the Faroe Islands and Greenland, for Norway Jan Mayen
and Svalbard.
338. It isto be emphasized that the provisions of Article 1of
the Agreement appear in an instrument concluded subsequently to
the legislation enacted by the two States respectively. Conse-
quently, those provisions would necessarily be compatible with
the delimitation already effected by the legislation, and, in fact,
they conform precisely. A consequential and faithful demarcation
of the boundary in the North Sea, applying the median line
principle set out in Article 1, was effected in the separate
provisions of Article 2.
339. Further practical demarcation in accordance with the
1965 Agreement was carried out by means of the technical
agreement concerninga tripoint with Sweden: seethe Exchange of
Notes of 24 April 1968(Annex 51).
TheFishing Territory of enmarkActof 17 December1976
340. The FishingTerritory of Denmark Act of 17December
1976 (Annex 31) empowered the Prime Minister to extend "the
fishing territory of theingdom of Denmark" to a breadth of 200
nautical miles. (Sectionl(1)). Section 1 (2) provided as follows:
"Failing any agreement to the contrary, the delimitation of
the fishing territory relative to foreign States whose coasts
are situated at a distance of less than 400 nautical miles
opposite the coasts of theingdom of Denmark or adjacent
to Denmark, shall be a line which at every point is equidis-
tant from the nearest points on the baselines at the coasts of
the two States (themedian line)."
341 The Act was applicable to the Kingdom of Denmark in
its entirety, that is specificallyincluding Greenland.
342. The legislation was implemented in respect of the
Faroes by Decree No. 598 of 21 December 1976(Annex 32) and
in respect of Greenland by Executive Order No. 629 of 22
December 1976(Annex 34). Both these instruments implemented
the delimitation provisions of the parent legislation. Thus the
measure concerning Greenland recognized the median line as the
boundary of the fishing territory in relation to Iceland (Art. l(4)).
However, the Order only applied to areas as far as 67"N on the
east coast (Article l(1)). The Economic Zoneof Norway Actof 17 December1976
343. On the same day as the enactment of the Danishparent
Act, Norway adopted Act No. 91relating to the economic zone of
Norway (Annex 24), of which Section 1 provided as follows:
"An economic zone shall be established in the seas adjacent
to the Coast of the Kingdom of Norway. The King shall
determine the date of the establishment of the economic
zone and the waters to which it shall apply.
The outer limit of the economic zone shall be drawn at a
distance of 200 nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 1,852
metres) from the baselines applicable at any given time, but
not beyond the median line in relation to other States.
The establishment of the economic zone shall not entai1
changes in the provisions regarding the territorial sea of
Norway."
344. This legislation applied to "theingdom of Norway",
a phrase which is always employed to cover al1 Norwegian
territories forming part of the Kingdom, including Jan Mayen.
Moreover, Section 1is specificin its application of thedian line
as a definitive boundary, and indeed, as part of the definition of
the Zone.
The Positions of the Parties DuringNegotiationsat UNCLOS III
345. The attitudes demonstrated by Denmark and Norway
in the course of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea show the firm and consistent adherence of both
Governments to the median line. They supported it as a rule of
existing international law, and it was their preferred choice for
incorporation as a substantive provision in the new Convention,
as the law to be applied when that instrument would enter into
force. In particular, the positionsaken in the context of "Nego-
tiating Group 7," established during the Seventh Session of the
Conference in 1978, are of interest. It may be recalled that the
brief of Negotiating Group 7 was the "Delimitation of maritime
boundaries between adjacent and opposite States and settlement
of disputes thereon" (A/Conf. 62/62, 13April 1978,page 3).
346. During the work of Negotiating Group 7, both Nor-
way and Denmark expressed their continued adherence to the
principle of the median line at several junctures. The recordedexpression of this view is document NG7/2, dated 20 April 1978,
and entitled: "Informa1 Suggestions Relating to Paragraphs 1, 2
and 3 of Articles 74 and 83, ICNT" (see Annex 2).
347. In this document Denmark joined with Norway and
eighteen other States in proposing the adoption of the following
text:
"1. The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone/
Continental Shelf between adjacent or opposite States shall
be effected by agreement employing, as a general principle,
the median or equidistance line, taking into account any
special circumstances where this is justified.
2. If no agreement can be reached, within a period of .......
from the time when one of the interested parties asks for the
opening of negotiations on delimitation, the States con-
cerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in part ...
(settlement of disputes) or any other third party procedure
entailing a binding decision which is applicable to them.
3. Pending agreement or settlement in conformity with
Paragraphs 1 and 2, the parties in the dispute shall refrain
from exercising jurisdiction beyond the median or equidi-
stance line unless they agree on alternative interim measures
of mutual restraint."
348. The text of this proposa1 speaks for itself to a consid-
erable extent. However, the Government of Norway would re-
spectfully emphasize two aspects of this formulation which are of
particular relevance. First, the formulations are a faithful reflec-
tion, so far as Denmark and Norway are concerned, of the
previous commitments on the issue of delimitation. Secondly, the
proposa1 underlines the legislative and executive practice of both
Parties of treating the median line as a boundary in place
representing a legal status quo.
349. Shortly after the tabling of the proposal, the Danish
delegation made a statement (on 29 April 1978) in Negotiating
Group 7 (Annex 3) which (so far as material) was as follows:
"As to the legalconcept of delimitation it willat this stage of
Ourdebate be wellknown that my delegation cannot support
the present wording of Articles 74 and 8313where the
13exclusiveeconomicne/continentalshelf between adjoppositeStates shallbeationof the
effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principlese,mploying, where delimitation is based on the criterion of equity.
We have great doubts as to the wisdom of a wording of the
delimitation articles which not only deviate substantially
from the 1958Convention but also from the basis of a very
great number of bilateral agreements negotiated during the
last decades.
This is not to Say that the delimitation of the EEZ or the
continental shelf should not be equitable - of course it
should. But in the view of my delegation the principle of
median line taking due account of special circumstances
would lead to equitable solutions. In other words, the
principle of equity is the result which should be reached, but
it cannot be the principle criterion for reaching agreement on
delimitation of marine boundaries, because it does not in
itselfcontain any objective guidance for a solution of these
problems.
In an intermediate period where no final agreement between
the involved countries has been reached, it would of course
not, as it is now stipulated in the ICNT, be satisfactory to
referthese countries to establish a provisional arrangement
on the basis of the delimitation provision in paragraph 1,on
which there in the existing situation obviously is no agree-
ment.
In this often very difficult period it will inrder to avoid a
very complicated situation be necessary for al1 parties in-
volved to exerciserestraint, and the legal concept governing
the situation should be as clear as possible. That is why my
delegation together with severalother countries cosponsored
a proposa1 which stipulates that pending a final agreement
the parties should refrain from establishing jurisdiction
beyond the median line. Such a rule, would be in conformity
with present international law."
350. Inanother statement in Negotiating Group 7,delivered
on 8 September 1978 (Annex 4), the Danish delegation empha-
sizedthe quality of the median line as "an objectivecriterion" and
stressed that it had "been used in a great number of bilateral
agreements during the last decade".
351. The full text of the statement is as follows:
"As Our discussions in this negotiating group have clearly
indicated, there exists a close connection between the basic
substantive norms for delimitation, interim measures and
circumstances." (Taken from the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Documentelevant
A/CONF.62/WP.10of 15July 1977). dispute settlements. Without diminishing the importance of
this link,1would, however, like to stress that my delegation
attaches the greatest importance to the formulation of a
clear and objective guideline for states in their search for an
agreement on delimitation questions.
Such an objective criterion is contained in the median-line
principle as it has found expression in the Geneva Conven-
tion and has been used in a great number of bilateral
agreements during the last decade. We also find this objec-
tive criterion in the compromise formula contained in doc-
ument NG7/2.
It has, of course, been said before but 1think it is important
to reiterate that inurviewthe median-line principle, taking
due account of special circumstances, would lead to equita-
ble results. The fact that delimitation negotiations should
lead to an equitable solution could be one of the elements in
a compromise formula,as you yourself, Mr. Chairman, have
mentioned in your informa1 suggestions contained in docu-
ment NG7/9.
To substitute the substantive principle of median-line delim-
itation with a principle of equity as the criterion for delim-
itation would in the view of my delegation lead to uncer-
tainty because the concept of equity does not in itselfcontain
any objective guideline for the solution of the problems.
It will from what 1 have said be clear that my delegation
maintains the view that the present formula of the ICNT
Articles 74/83 is not acceptable. It will furthermore be clear
that as my delegation is of the opinion that the provisions
should giveobjective guidelines for states involved in delim-
itation questions, we could not either foresee a solution on
the basis of a curtailed provision limiting the delimitation
rule only to the concept of agreement between states."
352. The commitment of the Government of Denmark to
these Statements is confirmed by their inclusion in the officia1
reports on Danish participation in UNCLOS III. The significance
of such careful expressions of position by the Danish delegation is
considerable. The median line is affirmed as the principle appli-
cable both in relation to the continental shelfand in relation to the
resources of the water column. In recognizing the relevance of the
median line in both these contexts, Denmark was, of course,
following a principle consistent with its own legislation. 353. Both the delegations of Denmark and Norway main-
tained their sponsorship of the proposa1 in document NG712, as
this document was reissued with additional sponsors on 25and 28
March 1980.
Danish-NorwegianDelimitation Agreementconcerningthe Faroes
354. The significance of this Agreement signed on 15June
1979(Annex 69)has been explained in paragraphs 285-289 above.
However, the conclusion of the Agreement, with its recognition of
a median line boundary (Article l), is relevant for present
purposes. First, itrovides a further case of the recognition of an
unmodified median line in the relations interse of Denmark and
Norway. Secondly, the context includes both the delimitation of
continental shelfareas (Articles 1to 3) and the delimitation of the
boundary affecting fisheries (Article 4).
TheDanishExecutiveOrderof 14May 1980
355. Of particular relevance is the next item in the chrono-
logical sequence of legislation. On 14 May 1980 Denmark pro-
duced an Executive Order (No. 176) on the Fishing Territory in
the Waters surrounding Greenland (Annex 38). It declared the
extension of the fisheries zone to 200 nautical miles from the base
lines, to areas not covered by the Order (No. 629)of 22December
1976.This new measure was issued with reference to Act No. 597
of 17 December 1976.
356. Section 1,paragraph 1of the Executive Order provides
a definition of the fisheries zone north of 75"N on the west coast
and 67" N on the east coast, in terms corresponding to the
definition of theouter limit of the zone, as set out in the Act and
in the Order of 22 December 1976,establishing the zone for the
south coast of Greenland. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 specify the
delimitation of the zone in relation to Canada, Iceland and
Svalbard, in terms of an agreed continental shelf boundary (for
Canada), or the median line for Canada (north of the agreed
boundary), Iceland and Svalbard. In relation to Jan Mayen,
Section 1, paragraph 4 states:
"Where the island of Jan Mayen lies opposite Greenland at
a distance of less than 400 nautical miles, jurisdiction of
fisheries shall not, until further notice, be exercised beyond the line which everywhere is equidistant from the nearest
points of the baselines of the coasts concerned (median
line)."
357. The language of Section 1, paragraph 1, when read
with the proviso in paragraph 4 referring to Jan Mayen, seeks to
establish an outer limit for the Greenland fisherieszone along the
coast facing Jan Mayen at a distance of 200 nautical miles from
the baselines.
358. It is recalled that Section 1,paragraph 2 of Act No. 597
states:
"(2) Failing any agreement to the contrary14, the delimita-
tion of the fishing territory relative to foreign States whose
coasts are situated at a distance of less than 400 nautical
miles opposite the coasts of the Kingdom of Denmark or
adjacent to Denmark, shall be a line which at every point is
equidistant from the nearest points on the baseline at the
coasts of the two States (the median line)." (Annex 31)
359. It will be seen that the pretensions of Order No. 176
not only disregard the clear provisions of the enabling Act on the
delimitation of fisheries zones, but also seek to establish the zone
beyond the scope of the authority granted under the Act.
360. At the same time, it was stated that "jurisdiction of
fisheries shall not, until further notice, be exercised beyond the
line which everywhere is equidistant ... (median line)". In the
present context it is ofinterest to note that even as an attempt was
made to extend the Greenland zone beyond the definition of the
"Fishing Territory of the Kingdom of Denmark", the Order
recognized that it would be inappropriate to carry this attempt to
the point of implementation. The expression of restraint is
general, and covers al1coastal State competences subsumed under
the establishment of a fisheries zone ("jurisdiction of fisheries ...
shall not ...be exercised"), and is not restricted to any single
cornpetence, such as enforcement. Implementation of zona1juris-
diction and authority beyond the median line in relation to Jan
Mayen (or to any other territory of a foreign State) would be in
contravention of those rules of general international law which
both Denmark and Norway had espoused, and the legally estab-
lished status quo. By limiting the exercise of jurisdiction, even
'4Or rather: "...in the absence of special agreement...", see text accompanying footnote 6
above (p. 63).
104while expressing an ambition to extend it also in practice at some
future time, the provision, retaining theedian line asthe defacto
boundary for the fisheries zone, maintains legal continuity and
regularity, and observes the established tradition in the Danish-
Norwegian relationship.
The NorwegianRoyal Decree of23 May 1980
361. Bya Royal Decree of 23May 1980(Annex 27)Norway
established a fishery zone in the seareas around Jan Mayen with
effect from 29 May 1980(Section 1). In relation to Greenland it
was confirmed that the zone would be delimited by the median
line (Section 2). The precise demarcation of the boundary was left
to agreement (Section 3).
DiplornaticExchangesin thePeriod 1979-1980
362. The Danish Memorial refers to certain diplomatic
contacts and exchanges in the period from July 1979 until June
1980.In the opinion of the Norwegian Government the somewhat
tentative expression of misgivings on the part of the Danish
Government in its letter dated 3 July 1979 (Annex 5) could not
involve any denial of the long-standing pattern of mutual recog-
nition of the median line boundary. The response of the Norwe-
gian Foreign Minister, Mr. Frydenlund, on 4 July 1979(Annex 6)
was to give an assurance that Danish interests would not be
prejudiced by the negotiations between Norway and Iceland.
363. In face of thisexchange in 1979the Norwegian Gov-
ernment is moved to observe that it is more than a little ironical
that, having reserved its position as regards the Icelandicnegoti-
ations,the Government of Denmark should, in effect, seek to rely
upon the result of those negotiations.
364. The Danish Memorial (p. 15, para. 47) refers also to
the minutes of the Danish Foreign Minister's talks with the
Norwegian Foreign Minister in Reykjavik on 30 August 1979
(Annex 8). (The minutes were not agreed minutes but Norway
does not seek to challenge their accuracy.) For present purposes
the key point is that the Norwegian Foreign Minister is reported
in terms which provide ample confirmation of the Norwegian
position. The minutes read:
"Mr. Frydenlund said that the experts in the Legal Affairs
Division of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry did not think that the negotiations between Norway and Iceland would
give rise to any delimitation problems in relation to Green-
land since it was assumed that in the case of Greenland the
median line principle would be applied."
365. When, according to the Danish minutes, the Danish
Foreign Minister "emphatically" went on to explain the Danish
position in terms dramatically different from what had previously
been a clear and consistent policy, the Norwegian Minister's
spontaneous response must have been very clear: "apparently this
viewpoint took the Norwegian Foreign Minister by surprise".
366. In any event the Norwegian position on the legal
validity of a median line boundary in respect of al1continental
shelf areas and al1 fishing zones involving delimitation with
neighbouring States and in respect of al1parts of the Norwegian
realm was fully maintained. Thus in response to the Danish
Executive Order of 14 May 1980 (Annex 38), the Norwegian
Government stated its position in the following Note dated 4 June
1980,which reads in translation (see Annex 10):
"The Royal Norwegian Embassy, acting upon instructions
from its Government and referring to Executive Order of 14
May 1980 on a fishing zone in Greenland waters effective
from 1June 1980,has the honour to submit the Norwegian
Government's observations as follows:
The Norwegian Government reserves its position with re-
gard to the extension of the fishing zone to 200nautical miles
also in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen in spite
of the fact that the distance between the two coasts in that
areaislessthan 400nautical miles.In the opinion of Norway
the general principles of international law imply that a State
cannot extend its fishing zone beyond the median line in
relation to a foreign State except upon agreement with that
State.
The Norwegian Government notes, however, that Denmark,
for the time being, willnot exercisejurisdiction over fisheries
beyond the median line between Greenland and Jan Mayen.
As will be known, Norway has, effectivefrom 29 May 1980,
established a fishing zone of 200 nautical miles off Jan
Mayen but not beyond the median line in relation to
Greenland. The regulations to be laid down with regard to
the fishing zone will, however, be enforced within the entire
zone. The Norwegian Government hopes that the governments of
the two countries will be able as soon as possible to reach
agreement by negotiation on the final dividing line between
their zones in the area."
367. In response to this statement of the Norwegian posi-
tion, Denmark produced a Note Verbale dated 9 June 1980
(Annex 12).The terms of the Note cal1for three observations. In
the first place this appears to be the first time the Danish
Government was disposed formally to state a departure from the
median line principle. Secondly, the Danish Note makes no
mention of a "200-mile outer limit" principle of delimitation in
the areas between Greenland and Jan Mayen. Thirdly, it is
argued that, in the Danish view, "Jan Mayen, in terms of
international law, falls within the concept of 'special circum-
stances'", however, no geographical feature can be a special
circumstance unto itself.
Ministerial Statementsin theNorwegian Parliamenton 6 June 1980
368. On 6 June 1980the Norwegian Parliament debated the
Recommendation from the Enlarged Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution relating to consent to entry
into an agreement between Norway and Iceland concerning
fisheries and continental shelf questions (thedebate, in English
translation, is reproduced in Annex 11).(In Annex 9, Recommen-
dation No. 318 (1979-80) from the Enlarged Committee on
Foreign Affairs on the 1980 Agreement with Iceland is repro-
duced. Further, Recommendation No. 194 (1981-82) from the
same Committee on the 1981 Agreement with Iceland and the
Records of the parliamentary debate thereon are included in
Annexes 14 and 15.)
369. In the course of this debate the responsible Minister
affirmed that the Norwegian position was that the extraordinary
considerations which motivated the making of substantial conces-
sions to Iceland in thematter of delimitation had no application
to any other States in relation to which questions of delimitation
might arise.Thus the Foreign Minister, Mr. Frydenlund, affirmed
the validity of themedian line boundary between Greenland and
Jan Mayen (see Annex 11, p. 51).
370. In concluding his speech the Foreign Minister summa-
rized the position in terms which leave no room for commentary: "Much of the criticism of the agreement with Iceland stems
from the fear that it may have unfortunate effects, not least
on the delimitation of the zone off Greenland, but also on
delimitation in the Barents Sea. In this connection 1 would
refer to the Committee's Recommendation, which empha-
sizesthat the special reasons for departing from the median
line when determining the delimitation between the Norwe-
gian and Icelandic zones do not exist in certain other cases.
That is also the Government's view. The relations with
Iceland in this context are a circumstance which does not
arise in connection with the delimitation with Greenland or
in the Barents Sea, as has been heavily underlined by the
Chairman of the Committee and other speakers in this
debate, and as the Government also believes."
The Forma1Negotiations, 198û-1983
371. Forma1 negotiations between Denmark and Norway
on the delimitation of maritime areas between Jan Mayen and
Greenland took place in December 1980, May 1981, December
198 1, and January 1983.An account of these negotiations is set
forth in Part 1of the present pleading. For present purposes, only
certain ramifications of these talks need to be reviewed.
372. The ramifications are two-fold. First, the Norwegian
delegation maintained its position on the issues of legal principle
involved, and underlined the obligation to respect the median line
boundary which resulted from the relations of the parties intesre
over a long period. Secondly, the Danish Government, whilst
claiming that the 1958Convention remained the point of depar-
ture, for the first time began to assert that Denmark should
receive,as a matter of legalentitlement, what Norway had granted
to Iceland as a political concession unrelated to legal principle.
373. The 1965 bilateral Agreement deals specifically with
delimitation of the continental shelf. The 1958Convention on the
Continental Shelf does not, in its wording, purport to address the
issue of the delimitation of other maritime areas falling under the
jurisdiction of coastal States. These instruments- and in any case
the legal principles to which they give expression -may neverthe-
less have a bearing on the issue of delimitation, as between the
present Parties, of other zones of jurisdiction. 374. The establishment of extended zones of coastal State
maritime resource jurisdiction in the waters of the North Atlantic
and its abuttingseastook place at a time when the principle of the
Exclusive Economic Zone had been accepted at UNCLOS III.
375. The establishment of these zones occurred, not pursu-
ant to a set of agreed rules, but as acts of State practice, inspired
by and taking due account of the results achieved in the informa1
Conference negotiations, and given some documentary record in
the evolving texts used as a negotiating tool at the Conference.
This process of creating new customary law was thus in some
respects supported by texts which were published and familiar to
the international community.
376. At this stage, the issues relating to delimitation of the
continental shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone were still
under discussion. There was a broad measure of agreement on
certain aspects. It was common ground that agreement between
the Parties would always be the primary factor in establishing
boundaries. Equally, it was taken as a giventhat the conclusion of
the new Convention on the Law of the Sea should not disturb or
otherwise affect existing maritime boundaries. There was likewise
consensus that provisions relating to the norms of delimitation
should be drafted in corresponding terms in respect of the
continental shelf and of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Disagree-
ment subsisted only with regard to which rules or principles were
to apply to future negotiations on delimitation, or to the estab-
lishment of boundaries by other means than negotiation, and with
regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes in regard to delimi-
tation. On this outstanding issue, looking to future resolution of
unfinished or "new" delimitation situations, there was a division
within the Conference, and some degree of controversy (in which
Norway and Denmark held identical positions).
377. As coastal States proceeded in this general area to
establish exclusive economic zones or corresponding extended
zones of fisheries jurisdiction, the need arose to make provision
for the delimitation of these zones as against adjacent States as
well as against opposite States whose coasts were less than 400
nautical miles away. In most cases, they based their national
policy with regard to the delimitation of the new zones on the
established pattern of their continental shelfdelimitation practice.
States took advantage of the fact that the continental shelf
boundary represented a boundary in place. These boundaries
already determined the extent and area of application of public
and private rights in one broad area of national importance.Although that element of the Exclusive Economic Zone which
deals specificallywith the exploitation of marine living resources
has characteristics and ramifications which are distinct fromthose
which are specifically related to the continental shelf, it was
nevertheless felt that the overall benefits of applying a boundary
in place to new zones ofjurisdiction were decisive(and in keeping
with the understanding at the Conference that the substantive
norms for the delimitation of the new zone should correspond to
the norms for the continental shelf). In many instances, the
decision to apply existing continental shelf boundaries was made
clear in national legislation.
378. That is the case for both Denmark and Norway. The
legislativeinstruments which for both Parties provide the basis for
the extension of governmental authority in a maritime belt beyond
the old 12mile fisheries zones make it abundantly clear that this
authority would follow the pattern established for the continental
shelf, and not extend beyond the median line (see Section 1,
second paragraph of the Norwegian Act of 17December 1976at
Annex 24, and Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Danish Act of the
same date at Annex 31). Danish practice took this approach to
delimitation one step further, in that the various instruments
establishing the extended fisheries zone in different locations
would specifythe limit as against the (actual or potential) zones of
jurisdiction of other States in terms corresponding to those
continental shelfboundaries which had already been agreed. Only
where such boundaries had not been agreed was a reference made
to the enabling Act and its median line norm of delimitation,
without specificcoordinates.
379. Norway, on its part, did not make the same specific
statement on the delimitation of each particular segment of its
economic or fisheries zones. Existing agreed continental shelf
boundaries in respect of the economic zone were simply applied.
380. This practice coincided with the attitude of most other
coastal States in the region. The Norwegian Government is not
informed of any instancein which a coastal State in thisregion has
sought to apply its fisheries (or corresponding) jurisdiction be-
yond the agreed boundaries established for the continental shelf.
Indeed, it is believed that this has not been the case in any other
region, except where this may be specificallyagreed, either in the
context of supplementing, or modifying, the previously obtaining
continental shelf delimitation arrangements, or by negotiating a
new agreement, superseding older instruments. 381. To that extent, the existing treaty norms which estab-
lish legal obligations for the Parties with respect to the delimita-
tion of the continental shelf will also have relevance for the
delimitation of maritime resource jurisdiction zones regardless of
the description or qualification.
382. The legal consequences of this evidential sequence will
be presented in Chapter IV.The essenceof the matter is that from
1958 until at least 1981 the two Governments of Denmark and
Norway pursued a consistent policy on delimitation in their
relations interse. This policy was based on explicit considerations
of legal principle and on treaty obligations, and related first to
continental shelf areas and, subsequently, to fishery zones.
383. This policy was manifested in a long series of legal
transactions and appears as a joint position of Denmark and
Norway at UNCLOS III, inter alia in the proceedings of Negoti-
ating Group 7. It is Denmark which eventually sought to disrupt
the well-established pattern of bilateral legal relations based on
the principle of a median line boundary.
384. The change of attitude was such as to surprise Den-
mark's partner and to do so in two ways. First, the change was
unexpected and, secondly, the basis of the change was a bizarre
notion approximating to a claim to "most favoured nation"
treatment in the context of delimitation. The result was for
Denmark to invoke the "principle" that the "200 mile outer limit"
was a principle of delimitation. CHAPTERIV
THELEGALEFFECTSOF THECONDUCT
OF THEPARTIES
385. The evidence reviewed in the previous chapter forms a
coherent body of transactions and confirmatory material, and
also constitutes a readily understood progression ofunderstand-
ings. Consequently, to a great extent the evidence may be seen to
produce a series of legal effects which are both cumulative and
may also operate in the alternative.
386. A pervasive quality of the evidence is that the docu-
ments are in every case concerned directly with the legal question
of delimitation assuch. Thus the legislation is expresslyrelated to
the impact of delimitation on third States. The relevant instances
of treaty-making and reciprocal legislation al1take place at the
highest levels of government and legal policy-making. This is no
less true of the highlyignificant statements presented to Negoti-
ating Group 7 on behalf of Denmark.
387. The adherence to the median line as a boundary on the
part of the Danish Government went far beyond its recognition as
a principle of international law. The Danish position was that the
median line represented an actual boundary in place and thus
constituted a status quo in relation to the exercise ofjurisdiction.
388. This aspect of the median line as perceived by Den-
mark and Norway is stressed in the proposa1 placed before
Negotiating Group 7 on 20 April 1978 (above, p. 100,para. 347).
Paragraph 3 of the draft provision (on delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf) states that
'"ending agreement or settlement in conformity with Paragraphs
1 and 2, the parties in the dispute shall refrain from exercising
jurisdiction beyond the median or equidistance line unless they
agree on alternative interim measures of mutual restraint". This
approach is completely consistent with the provisions of the
Danish Royal Decree of 1963.
389. The evidence available produces the following cumu-
lative or alternative legal effects:
(a) The Danish Government has by its various public actsexpressly recognized and adopted a median line boundary in its
relations with Norway both in the context of continental shelf
delimitation and in the context of fisheries zone delimitation.
(b) The general pattern of conduct on the part of the Danish
Government constitutes acquiescence in, or tacit recognition of, a
median line boundary in its relations with Norway.
(c) The consistent pattern of Danish conduct, together with
knowledge of the long-standing position of the Norwegian Gov-
ernment in the matter of maritime delimitation, prevents Den-
mark from challenging the existence and validity of the median
line boundary between Greenland and Jan Mayen, which bound-
ary is consequently opposable to Denmark.
(d) The consistent pattern of Danish conduct, together with
knowledge of the long-standing position of the Norwegian Gov-
ernment in the matter of maritime delimitation, prevents Den-
mark from asserting the existenceand validity of a delimitation in
the form of the outer limit of a 200-mile fishery zone and
continental shelf area vis-à-vis the island of Jan Mayen: in other
words, the claim presented in the Danish Memorial is not
opposable to Norway.
390. The conduct of the Danish Government includes sev-
eral separate episodes each involving express recognition and
acceptance of a median line boundary applicable in the relations
of the parties. The Danish Royal Decree of7 June 1963,the terms
of whichhave been set out above in paragraph 189,constitutes an
express declaration of the legal position ofenmark with respect
to continental shelfdelimitation. The preamble and the provisions
of Articles 1 and 2 of the Decree make direct reference to the
Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the Decree
(Article2, paragraph 2) expressly incorporates the provisions of
Article 6 of the Convention.
391. This express acceptance of the median line boundary
was confirmed by the provisions of Article 1 of the boundary
agreement concluded between Norway and Denmark on 8 De-
cember 1965(Annex 46). These provisions have a marked declar-
atory effect (see paras. 282-283 above) and against the back-
ground of the Danish legislation constitute a general recognition
of themedian line in the context of continental shelf delimitation. 392. The third episode of express recognition and accep-
tance of the median line boundary consists of the Fishing
Territory of the Kingdom of Denmark Act of 17December 1976
(Annex 31). As with the previous episodes, the enactment is
directly related to matters of international law and to delimitation
with other States.Thus Section l(2) is consciously declaratory and
dispositive in form (see paras. 237-238). The Act of 1976 consti-
tutes express adoption of a median line boundary for the purposes
of delimitation of fishing zones.
393. The obligatory character of such express declarations
can be rested either on the principle of good faith or on the
principle of consent in general international law.
394. The sources of international law are replete with
references to the role of acts of recognition of the validity of a
legal status quo, and such references occur particularly in the
context of the recognition of boundaries. Indeed, in the literature
it is acknowledged that acts of recognition may constitute roots of
title: see,forxample, Whiteman, Digest ofInternational Law,Vol.
2 (Department of State Publication 7553, released December
1963),pp. 1082-4;Fitzmaurice, British YearBook of International
Law, Vol. 32 (1955-56), pp. 58-62; Suy, Les Actes Juridiques
Unilatérauxen Droit International Public, Paris, 1962,pp. 189-214;
Rousseau, Droit International Public, 1, Paris 1970,p. 426 (para-
graph 344).
395. Recognition may take the form of express declarations
on the part of a State: see the Judgment of the Court in the
Arbitral Award Case, I.C.J. Reports, 1960, p. 192 at p. 213 (see
below, para. 399). Or it may take the form of a pattern of
international acts (see the Advisory Opinion of the Court con-
cerning the Western Sahara, I.C.J. Reports, 1975, p. 12 at pp.
49-56, for acceptance of the principle).
396. In this context the Court has recognized the signifi-
cance of legislation concerning the establishment of territorial
rights or some form of delimitation. Thus in the FisheriesCase,the
Court acknowledged the importance of Norwegian delimitation
Decrees in generating rights and in creating a status quo oppos-
able to other States in the absence of protest: see the Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports, 1951,pp. 138-9.
397. Similarly, in the Minquiersand Ecrehos Case the Court
gave importance to British legislation in respect of the Ecrehos: "This legislative Act was a clear manifestation of British
sovereignty over the Ecrehos at a time when a dispute asto
such sovereignty had not yet arisen." (I.C.J. Reports, 1953,
p.66.)
398. By the same logic a State which is confronted by the
legislation of another State concerningdelimitation can treat such
legislation as recognition of a legal status quo which can be
appropriately invoked to protect its legal rights.
399. The Court has also applied the principle of recognition
by conduct in relation to problems of boundary delimitation.
Thus in the Judgment in the Arbitral AwardCasethe Court stated:
"In the judgment of the Court, Nicaragua, by express
declaration and by conduct, recognised the Award as valid
and it is no longer open to Nicaragua to go back upon that
recognition and to challenge the validity of the Award."
(ibid.)
400. In the TempleCase one of the distinct elements in the
reasoning of the Court was the subsequent conduct of the Parties
in relation to the line indicated on the Annex1Map. This conduct
constituted ajoint or coincident recognition of the alignment. As
the Court stated the matter: "Both Parties, by their conduct,
recognized the line and thereby in effect agreed to regard it as
being the frontier line" (I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 6 at pp. 32-33).
401. Similar results will flow from the use of the concept of
acquiescence, which the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case
described as "equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by uni-
lateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent ..."
(I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 246 at p. 305, para. 130).
402. In the respectful submission of the Government of
Norway, the consistent pattern of Danishconduct,the evidenceof
which is set forth in the foregoing Chapter, constitutes a tacit
recognition of, or acquiescence in, the median line boundary
between Greenland and Jan Mayen, first in respect of continental
shelf rights and, subsequently, in respect of fisheries. 403. Distinct from the categories of express recognition and
acquiescence, there is the discrete issue of opposability. The
literature of the law has not provided much intellectual elabora-
tion of this concept but it has nevertheless found favour with
tribunals. The idea behind opposability is that of good faith. The
operation of opposability depends upon the existence of a status
quo known to the claimant which the claimant appears to accept
by avoiding protest or other inconsistent conduct.
404. The essence ofthe matter is a levelof tacit or apparent
recognition by conduct which leads to the status quo thus
recognized becoming opposable to the claimant or proponent
State. The principle was applied by the Court in the Anglo-
Norwegian FisheriesCase thus:
"The United Kingdom Government has argued that the
Norwegian system of delimitation was not known to it and
that the system therefore lacked the notoriety essential to
provide the basis of an historical title enforceable against it.
The Court is unable to accept this view.As a coastal State on
the North Sea, greatly interested in the fisheries in this area,
as a maritime Power traditionally concerned with the law of
the sea and concerned particularly to defend the freedom of
the seas, the UnitedKingdom couldnot have been ignorantof
the Decree of 1869 whichhad at onceprovoked a requestfor
explanations by the French Government.Nor, knowing of it,
could it have been under any misapprehensions as to the
significance of its terms, which clearly described it as con-
stituting the application of a system. The same observation
applies a fortiori to the Decree of 1889 relating to the
delimitation of Romsdal and Nordmnre which must have
appeared to the United Kingdom as a reiterated manifesta-
tion of the Norwegian practice.
...................
The Court notes that in respect of a situation which could
only be strengthened with the passage of time, the United
Kingdom Government refrained from formulating reserva-
tions.
The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the
international community, Great Britain's position in the
North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her
prolonged abstention would in any case warrant Norway's enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom."
(I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 138-9;emphasis supplied).
405. Essentially similar elements appear in the Judgments in
the Arbitral Award Case, and in the TempleCase (Merits). In the
Arbitral Award Case the Court stated emphatically that "it is no
longer open to Nicaragua to go back upon that recognition"
(para. 399above), and in the TempleCasethe Court observed that
"it is not now open to Thailand ..to deny that she was ever a
consenting party to [the settlement]." (I.C.J. Reports 1962,p. 32).
406. The evidence of this type of relation is particularly
strong in the present case. No doubt the time sequence is shorter
than in the earlier cases but this is more than compensated for by
the diplomatic and geographical intimacy which characterized the
relations of the two States. Of particular relevance are the
background of specific treaty relations and the existence of
parallel legislation on delimitation, legislation which was declar-
atory in terms and which has remained in force during the
material period.
407. In the period between 1963and 1979Denmark never
indicated any departure from its stable attitude in relation to the
legalbasis for delimitation of its continental shelf,nor did it at any
time challenge the clearly stated Norwegian position, which was
known to apply to the entire Kingdom, including Jan Mayen.
408. The evidence available - from a Danish source -
establishes the precise elements of inconsistency and surprise
caused by the sudden change in the Danish attitude. According to
the Danish source the Norwegian Foreign Minister (in August
1979)wasassuming "that in the case of Greenland the median line
principle would be applied" (paras. 364-5).When this viewpoint
was questioned, the Danish minutes record that "apparently this
viewpoint took the Norwegian Foreign Minister by surprise."
(ibid.).
409. Consequently, it is the Government of Denmark which
sought to challenge the legal status quo and to do so at ajuncture
when it was no longer open to that Government to go back upon
the long-existing recognition of a median line boundary in its
relations with Norway. The reasoning which applies to the first proposition
410.
relating to opposability set out in No. 4 above is equally applica-
ble to this proposition. claim, or any other claim going beyond
the median line, which disregards the fundamental issue in a legal
approach to delimitation of overlapping areas ofjurisdiction, can
be given credence in any set of political or geographical circum-
stances. But in any event, the claim that delimitation should be
effected by the line representing the maximum limit of Denmark's
entitlement to exercisejurisdiction cannot be opposable to Nor-
way, in viewof Denmark's previous conduct and the relationships
established between the Parties.
411. The evidence reviewed above in the context of oppos-
ability also provides a firm basis for the application of the
principle of estoppel. In particular, up to 1979, the Norwegian
Government had everyreason to believe,on the foundation of the
pattern of Danish legislation, international practice and recorded
attitudes, that relations withenmark in the context of maritime
delimitation were stable.Denmark was consistent in applying the
median lineboth in relation to the continental shelfand in relation
to other maritime zones of jurisdiction. Norway had at no time
before 1979 the occasion to suppose that Denmark would not
maintain its long-established legal views,and was fullyjustified in
continuing to rely on the stability of Denmark's legal position. C: GENERALINTERNATIONALLAW
CHAPTERV
INTRODUCTION:THEAPPLICABLEPRINCIPLES
412. There is no intention of recapitulating the general
statements of the ensemble of principles governing maritime
delimitation in contemporary international law. The purpose of
the present chapter is toocus upon certain aspects of the relevant
principles which are inadequately portrayed in the Danish plead-
ing or which are altogether neglected in that pleading.
413. The general issue of the significance of islands in
maritime delimitation will be the subject of Chapter VI of this
Part.
414. In the sources of the law it is stated again and again
that the equitable criteria governing delimitation are primarily
derived fromthe geography of coasts. Moreover, the possession of
coasts is the basis of entitlement to appurtenantareas of seabed.
This may be stated in the context of entitlement to areas of
continental shelf, as in the Judgment of the Court in theTunisia-
Libya Continental Shelf Case:
"73. It should first be recalled that exclusive rights over
submarine areas belong to the coastal State. The geographic
correlation between coast and submerged areas off the coast
is the basis of the coastal State's legal title. As the Court
explained in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the
continental shelf is a legal concept in which the principle is
applied that the land dominates the seaZ.C.J.Reports 1969,
p. 51,para. 96). In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Casethe
Court emphasized that
'its solely by virtue of the coastal State's sovereignty over
the land that rights of exploration and exploitation in the
continental shelfcan attach to it, ipso jure, under interna-
tional law. In short, continental shelf rights are legally both an emanation from and an automatic adjunct of the territo-
rial sovereignty of the coastal State.'(I.C.J. Reports 1978,p.
36, para. 86).
As has been explained in connection with the concept of
natural prolongation, the coast of the territory of the State is
the decisivefactor for title to submarineareas adjacent to it.
Adjacency of the sea-bed to the territory of the coastal State
has been the paramount criterion for determining the legal
status of the submerged areas, as distinct from their delim-
itation, without regard to the various elements which have
become significant for the extension of these areas in the
process of the legal evolution of the rules of international
law." (1.C.J. Reports 1982,p. 61).
415. The same proposition may be stated in the context of a
Judgment which applies the 200 mile distance principle with the
consequent exclusion of reference to geophysical features when
the distance between the coasts of the Parties is less than 400
nautical miles: Libya-Malta ContinentalShelf Case,I.C.J. Reports
1985, p. 35, para. 39. Or it may be stated in context where the
parties have requested the delimitation of a single maritime
boundary: Award of the Court of Arbitration, Guinea-Guinea
(Bissau) Maritime Delimitation Case, International Law Reports
(Ed. E. Lauterpacht), Vol. 77, pp. 676-7, paras. 91-98.
416. This reference to coastal geography as a starting point
should not be taken to be a statement of the obvious. Together
with the injunction that equity does not involve a "total refashion-
ing of geography", the implication is that the process of delimi-
tation should not involve a substantial departure from the poli-
tical results of the possession of sovereignty in respect of the land
territory. To do otherwise would be to place rights of sovereignty
in respect of the land territory itself in question.
417. In thisconnection it is usefulto recall some of the more
fundamental elements of the Judgment in the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf Cases. In the first place the Court rejected the German
argument in favour of a system of apportionment (of the just and
equitable share). The principal reasons which the Court gave for
rejecting thisthesis were as follows:
"More important is the fact that the doctrine of the just and
equitable share appears to be wholly at variance with what
the Court entertains no doubt is the most fundamental of al1
the rules of law relating to the continental shelf,enshrined in
Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, though quite independent of it,- namely that the rights of the coastal State
in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a
natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the
sea existipsofacto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty
over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and
exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an
inherent right. Inorder to exerciseit, no special legalprocess
has to be gone through, nor have any special legal acts to be
performed.. ." (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 22, para. 19).
418. In the following paragraph the Judgment then draws
the conclusion:
"Ttfollows that even in such a situation as that of the North
Sea, the notion of apportioning an as yet undelimited area,
considered as a whole (which underlies the doctrine of the
just and equitable share), isquite foreign to, and inconsistent
with, the basic concept of continental shelf entitlement,
according to which the process of delimitation is essentially
one of drawing a boundary line between areas which already
appertain to one or other of the States affected. The
delimitation itself must indeed be equitably effected, but it
cannot have as its object the awarding of an equitable share,
or indeed of a share, as such, at all,- for the fundamental
concept involved does not admit of there being anything
undivided to share out. Evidently any dispute about bound-
aries must involve that there is a disputed marginal or fringe
area, to which both parties are laying claim, so that any
delimitation of it which does not leaveit wholly to one of the
parties will in practice divide it between them in certain
shares, or operate as if such a division had been made."
(ibid., para. 20)
419. These passages point to two necessary conditions of
the process of delimitation. The first is that the process should not
result in a divorce between the basis of title and the result of a
delimitation. The second condition is that the process of adjust-
ment in accordance with equitable principles can only be on a
limited scale since "evidently any dispute about boundaries must
involve that there is a disputed marginal or fringe area ..."
420. This view was strongly endorsed by the Court of
Arbitration in the Anglo-French ContinentalShelf Case,Reports ofInternational Arbitral Awards, XVIII, p. 3 at pp. 48-9 (para. 78);
pp. 114-15 (para. 245) and the approach underlies the entire
jurisprudence.
421. The most recent decision of the Court gives appropri-
ate emphasis to the link between the question of title to maritime
areas and the choice of the criteria of delimitation.
"The Court has little doubt which criterion and method it
must employ at the outset in order to achieve a provisional
position in the present dispute. The criterion is linked with
the law relating to a State'slegaltitle to the continental shelf.
As the Court has found above, the law applicable to the
present dispute, that is, to claims relating to continental
shelves located less than 200 miles from the coasts of the
States in question, is based not on geological or geomor-
phological criteria, but on a criterion of distance from the
Coast or, to use the traditional term, on the principle of
adjacency as measured by distance. It therefore seemslogical
to the Court that the choice of the criterion and the method
which it is to employ in the first place to arrive at a
provisional result should be made in a manner consistent
with the concepts underlying the attribution of legal title."
(Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case, I.C.J. Reports 1985,
pp. 46-47, para. 61).
422. In the same context the Court gave expression to the
principle of equal division of the disputed area as particularly
appropriate for equitable delimitation between opposite coasts. In
the words of the Court:
"The consequence of the evolution of continental shelf law
can be noted with regard to both verification of title and
delimitation as between rival claims. On the basis of the law
now applicable (and hence of the distance criterion), the
validity of the titles of Libya andMalta to the sea-bed areas
claimed by those States is clear enough. Questions arise only
in the assessment of the impact of distanceconsiderations on
the actual delimiting. In this assessment, account must be
taken of the fact that, according to the "fundamental norm"
of the law of delimitation, an equitable result must be
achieved on the basis of the application of equitable princi- plesto the relevant circumstances. It is therefore necessary to
examine the equities of the distance criterion and of the
results to which its application may lead. The Court has
itself noted that the equitable nature of the equidistance
method is particularly pronounced in cases where delimita-
tion has to be effected between States with opposite coasts.
In the cases concerning the North Sea ContinentalShelf it
said that:
'The continental shelf area off, and dividing, opposite
States [consists of] prolongations [which] meet and
overlap, and can therefore only be delimited by means of
amedian line; and, ignoring the presence of islets, rocks
and minor coastal projections, the disproportionally
distorting effect of which can be eliminated by other
means, such a line must effect an equal division of the
particular area involved.' (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36,
para. 57.)
In the next paragraph it emphasized the appropriateness of
a median line for delimitation between opposite coasts (ibid.,
p. 37, para. 58). But it is in fact a delimitation exclusively
between opposite coasts that the Court is, for the first time,
asked to deal with. It isclear that, in these circumstances, the
tracing of a median line between those coasts, by way of a
provisional step in a process to be continued by other
operations, is the most judicious manner of proceeding with
a view to the eventual achievement of an equitable result."
(I.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 47, para. 62).
423. The same basic approach has been adopted in decisions
concerning single maritime boundaries. Thus the decision of the
Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case introduced the principle of
equal division in the particular context of a search forriteria best
suited for "multi-purpose delimitation". The relevant passages are
as follows:
"194. In reality, a delimitation by a single line, such as that
which has to be carried out in the present case, i.e., a
delimitation which has to apply at one and the same time to
the continental shelf and to the superjacent water column
can only be carried out by the application of a criterion, or
combination of criteria, which does not give preferential
treatment to one of these two objects to the detriment of the
other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable
to the division of either of them. In that regard, moreover, it can be foreseen that with the gradua1 adoption by the
majority of maritime States of an exclusive economic zone
and, consequently, an increasingly general demandfor single
delimitation, so as to avoid as far as possible the disadvan-
tages inherent in a plurality of separate delimitations, pref-
erence will henceforth inevitably be given to criteria that,
because of their more neutral character, are best suited for
use in a multi-purpose delimitation.
195. To return to the immediate concerns of the Chamber, it
is, accordingly, towards an application to the present case of
criteria more especially derived from geography that it feels
bound to turn. What is here understood by geography is of
course mainly the geography of coasts, which has primarily
a physical aspect, to which may be added, in the second
place, a political aspect. Within this framework, it is inevi-
table that the Chamber's basic choice should favour a
criterion long held to be as equitable as it is simple, namely
that in principle, while having regard to the special circum-
stances of the case, one should aim at an equal division of
areas where the maritime projections of the coasts of the
States between which delimitation is to be effected converge
and overlap." (I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 327)
424. There is no need to elaborate on this summation of the
role which the principle of equal division should play in achieving
an equitable solution of a delimitation.
425. The establishment of the modus operandi of delimita-
tion by the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
involved three critical elements:
(a) The rejection of geometrical methods of delimitation unless
the particular method was justified by the geographical circum-
stances.
(b) Such methods were objectionable in principle when they
resulted in cutting off the coastal State from seabed areas
naturally appurtenant to it: see the Judgment in the North Sea
Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969,pp. 17-18, para 8; the Judgment in the
Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case, Ibid., 1982, pp. 62-3, para.
76 infine; the Judgment of the Chamber in the Gulfof Maine Case,ibid., 1984, pp. 298-9, para. 110; pp. 312-13, para. 157; p. 328,
para. 196; p. 335, para. 219; the Award of the Tribunal in the
Guinea-Guinea(Bissau) Maritime Delimitation Case, International
Law Reports, Vol. 77, p. 681, para. 103.
(c) The abatement of the disproportionate effects of "incidental
special features" (such as the presence of islets, rocks and minor
coastal projections): see the Judgment in the North Sea Cases,
I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 36,para. 57;pp. 49-50,para. 91;the Award
of the Tribunal in the Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case,
Reports of InternationalArbitral Awards,XVIII, pp. 116-17,paras.
249-51.
426. These three elements are al1different aspects of a single
theme: the rejection of the thesis that equidistance is a legal
principle and the affirmation that geometrical methods of delim-
itation may be productive of inequity. However, the modus
operandi of equitable delimitation could not be operational with-
out the addition of further elements. The discarding of geometri-
cal methods necessitated calling in aid certain other elements
without which the process of delimitation would degenerate into
an unpredictable exercise.
427. Consequently, the Court in the North Sea Cases em-
phasized that the attainment of equity was "not a question of
totally refashioning geography whatever the facts of the situation"
(I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 49-50, para. 91). The same motivation
attaches to the principle that the areas of continental shelf
ascribed to one State must not encroach upon what is the natural
prolongation of the territory of another State: seetheJudgment in
the North Sea Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 31, para. 43; pp.
36-37,paras. 57-59;pp. 46-47, para. 85; and the Judgment in the
Libya-Malta Continental SheIf Case, ibid., 1985,pp. 39-40, para.
46.
428. These principles involve an affirmation that the actual
geography - and therefore the political geography - still counts.
The classical exposition appears in paragraph 91 of the Judgment
in the North Sea Cases:
"Equity does not necessarilyimply equality. There can never
be any question of completely refashioning nature, and
equity does not require that a State without accessto the sea
should be allotted an area of continental shelf, any more
than there could be a question of rendering the situation of
a State with an extensive coastline similar to that of a State with a restricted coastline. Equality is to be reckoned within
the same plane, and it is not such natural inequalities as
these that equity could remedy. But in the present case there
are three States whose North Sea coastlines are in fact
comparable in length and which, therefore, have been given
broadly equal treatment by nature except that the configu-
ration of one of the coastlines would, if the equidistance
method is used, deny to one of these States treatment equal
or comparable to that given the other two. Here indeed is a
case where, in a theoretical situation of equality within the
same order, an inequity is created. What is unacceptable in
this instance is that a State should enjoy continental shelf
rights considerably different from those of its neighbours
merely because in the one case the coastline is roughly
convex in form and in the other it is markedly concave,
although those coastlines are comparable in length. It is
therefore not a question of totally refashioning geography
whatever the facts of the situation but, given a geographical
situation of quasi-equality as between a number of States, of
abating the effects of an incidental special feature from
which an unjustifiable difference of treatment could result."
(I.C.J. Reports 1969,pp. 49-50).
429. This passage brings into play the final element of the
modus operandi of delimitation: the assessment of the overall
geographical (and therefore legal) framework. In the passage just
quoted the key reference is to "a geographical situation of
quasi-equality as between a number of States". Thus the tribunal
will assess the situation with a view to abating thedisproportion-
ate effects of incidental features within a certain geographical and
legal framework: see the Award of the Tribunal in the Anglo-
French Continental Shelf Case, Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, XVIII, pp. 58-9, para. 103; pp. 87-8, paras. 181-2; pp.
89-90, para. 187.
430. The Court, in its Judgment in the Libya-Malta Conti-
nental Shelf Case, referred to "the wider geographical context"
and, in particular, "the position of the islands in asemi-enclosed
sea" (I.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 42, para. 53; and see further ibid.,p.
50, para. 69; and pp. 51-2, paras. 72-3).
431. It may be noted that in the jurisprudence of interna-
tional tribunals the process of delimitation has, nearly always,
involved three stages:
(a) The characterization of the geographical setting and, if nec-essary, the identification of separate "regions" for the purposes of
delimitation.
(b) The carrying out of a provisional, or first stage or generally
equitable, delimitation in the context of the overall geographical
characteristics of the area.
(c) The refinement of this prima facie or generally equitable
delimitation in order to avoid giving disproportionate effect to
"incidental special features" such as "islets, rocks and minor
coastal projections": see the Judgment of the Court in the North
Sea Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36, para. 57; the Judgment of
the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case, ibid., 1984,pp. 327-31,
paras. 195-206;and the Judgment of the Court in the Libya-Malta
Continental ShelfCase, ibid., 1985,pp. 46-47,paras 60-5;pp. 52-3,
para. 73.
432. This process of adjustment or correction can only take
place if the overall geographical and legal framework can be said
to justify such adjustment on equitable grounds and without
doing violence to the major features of the geographical context.
As the Court stated in the North Sea Cases:
"There can never be any question of completely refashioning
nature ....Equality is to be reckoned within the same plane,
and it is not such natural inequalities as these that equity
could remedy." (I.C.J. Reports 1969,pp. 49-50, para. 91 .)
433. In certain geographical situations equality cannot be
"reckoned within the same plane" except on the basis that the
only relationship which counts is that of oppositeness between the
relevant coasts. Moreover, it is wellestablished that in the case of
opposite coasts the normally equitable solution is the drawing of
a median line: see the Judgment in the North Sea Cases, I.C.J.
Reports 1969, pp. 36-7, paras. 57-8; p. 52, para. 99; p. 53, para.
101C;the Award of the Tribunal in the Anglo-FrenchContinental
Shelf Case, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, XVIII, pp.
52-3,para. 87;p. 56,para. 95;pp. 58-9,para. 103;p. 88,para. 182;
pp. 111-12,para. 239;the Judgment of the Chamber in the Gulfof
Maine Case, I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 300-1, para. 115; p. 331,
para. 206; the Judgment of the Court in the Libya-Malta Conti-
nental Shelf Case, ibid., 1985, p. 47,paras. 62-3.
434. This exposition of key elements in the legal regime of
delimitation should be complemented by a principle affirmed by
the Court in the TempleCase (Merits): "In general, when two countries establish a frontier between
them, one of the primary objects is to achieve stability and
finality." (I.C.J. Reports 1962,p.34).
435. Essentially the same principle was applied by the
Permanent Court in its Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of
the Treaty of Lausanne, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 12 (1925), pp.
19-20.
436. It is safe to assume that this principle applies with
equal cogency to both land and maritime territories. The factor of
stability of maritime boundaries is of major relevance for present
purposes, given the eccentric character of the claim formulated in
the Danish Memorial. For, if the proposa1 contained in the
Memorial were to be givenany levelof legitimacy, this would cast
doubt on the validity of numerous actual or pending delimita-
tions, the articulation of whichdepends upon givingproper credit
to island dependencies, many of which are relatively unpopulated
or may be said to be "isolated" from other parts of the territory
of the State concerned.
437. The Danish Memorial (paras. 30-35) prescribes "the
relevant area" and states that: "the area relevant to the delimita-
tion dispute submitted to the Court is here determined solely on
principles of geometry, cf. Map II". Apart from this description,
theconcept of the relevant area receiveslittle orno attention in the
Memorial and no attempt is made to provide a legaljustification
for the geometrical exerciseillustrated in MapII (cf.paras. 371-2).
438. The Government of Norway considers it necessary to
offer only a very few general observations on questions of
principle. In the first place the judicial use of the concepts of
relevant coasts and relevant areas is in practice confined to the
application of the test of proportionality ex post facto to the
delimitation already arrived at on the basis of equitable principles.
Secondly, the construction of a relevant area is legally relevant
only in so far as this points up and reflects the actual geographical
configurations and coastal relationships.
439. In this connection it is well accepted that the methods
of delimitation are always subordinated to the equitable solution
which is to be achieved: see the Judgment in the Libya-MaltaContinentalShelf CaseI.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 38, para. 45. What
is true of methods of delimitation - the equitable principles as
applied in practice - is true afortiori also of ancillary devicessuch
as "relevant areas", construction lines, and the like.
440. In the opinion of the Government of Norway the
practice of States provides evidence of the norms of equity as
applied in similar geographical situations: seethe Judgment of the
Court in the Libya-Malta ContinentalShelf Case, I.C.J. Reports
1985,p. 38, para. 44; p. 45, para. 58. The relevant practice will be
presented at pages 176-183,paragraphs 618-658 below.
441. In particular situations, the prior practice of the parties
to a dispute, both inter se and generally, may indicate that the
conduct of the parties forms a relevant circumstance for the
purpose of reaching an equitable solution: see further paragraphs
528-560. CHAPTERVI
THE SIGNIFICANCE OFISLANDS IN
MARITIME DELIMITATION
442. In presenting this examination of some of the more
salient questions of law, the Government of Norway has preferred
to proceed by way of an exposition of its own case in a positive
framework rather than to refute every statement in the Danish
Memorial. However, the exposition of the law concerning the
"Status of Islands in Maritime Delimitations" (Danish Memorial,
Part II, Chapter 1,section 2, pp. 81-95)calls for a response.
443. A fundamental correction is to point out that the
present case concerns the delimitation of maritime areas in
relation to twoisland territories, each located at some distance
from the administrative centres of the two Parties, not between
one continental territory and an island.
444. The Danish Memorial accepts that Jan Mayen is an
island (althoughit is sometimes rather deprecatinglycharacterized
as "an oceanic volcanic island" (para.03), as "a desolate island"
(para. 206), and as "an isolated island" (para. 318)).However, in
one passage ofthe Memorial (para. 272),a somewhat incongruous
statement appears to reserve its position on the general question
of the status of Jan Mayen as an island under international law.
445. This makes it necessary, as a matter of form, to affirm
that Jan Mayen is an area of land territory to which Norway has
unquestioned title and, further, that, even if the Convention on
the Law of the Sea were applicable as between the parties as a
treaty in force, the provisions of Article 121,paragraph 3, would
not be applicable to Jan Mayen. Nor is there any rule of general
international law under which an island of Jan Mayen's size and
other characteristics would be put in any diminished or inferior
status in respect of the legal entitlements or competencesexerci-
sable in relation thereto. (a) Islands as a Separate Legal Category
446. The relevant section of the Danish Memorial contains
a series of substantial misunderstandings as to the role of islands
in delimitation al1of which stem from the erroneous premiss that
"islands" form a discrete legal category.
447. The absence of provisions establishing a distinctive set
of rules as to the role of islands in the context of delimitation in
the Conventions of 1958and 1982is no accident. Both Conven-
tions have, on the contrary, expressly stated that the same rules
shall apply to islands and to mainlands. The judicial expositions
of the equitable principles governing delimitation have consis-
tently emphasized the importance of the geographical features of
the area taken as a wholeand as a framework within which the
process of delimitation must take place. The various decisions,
commencing with the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,do not
classify geographical features into separate categories such as
"islands", "peninsulas", "long coasts", "short coasts", and so on.
448. The emphasishas always been on the overall geograph-
ical relationships in the particular case. The significance of an
island or a peninsula must depend on its location in relation to
other geographical features and also in relation to the political
geography of the region. A simple example of this may be taken
from the Anglo-FrenchContinentalShelf Case.In the Decision of
30 June 1977the Court of Arbitration adopted the "half-effect"
method of abatement in respect of the ScillyIsles. The reasoning
behind this determination did not depend on the question-begging
proposition that the Scillieswereislands but on the consideration
of the issue "whether the geographical situation of the ScillyIsles
in relation to the FrenchCoasthas a distorting effectand is a cause
of inequity as between the United Kingdom and the French
Republic": Reports of International ArbitralAwards, XVIII, pp.
116-17,para. 250. In effect the Court treated the ScillyIsles as an
extension of the mainland of the United Kingdom: ibid., pp.
113-14,paras. 243-44;p. 117,para. 251.
(b) The Signijicanceof the Geographical andLegal Framework
449. The relevant case law indicates the habit of interna-
tional tribunals to establish, in so far as the circumstances allow,
a geographical and legal framework within which the assessmentsof equity and disproportionate effects may be carried out. In the
North Sea Casesthe framework was the semi-enclosedsea and the
presence of three States with coastlines of comparable length. In
the Anglo-French Case the framework was the English Channel
and the opposite coasts of the two parties "in a relation of
approximate equality": Decision of 30 June 1977, Reports of
International ArbitralAwards, XVIII, pp. 87-8, para. 181;and see
also pp. 58-9, para. 103.
450. In the Libya-Malta Case the Court had regard to "the
general geographical context" as a relevant circumstance. The
relevant passage of the Judgment is as follows:
"In the present case, the Court has also to look beyond the
area concerned in the case, and consider the general geo-
graphical context in which the delimitation will have to be
effected. The Court observes that delimitation, although it
relates only to the continental shelf appertaining to two
States, is also a delimitation between a portion of the
southern littoral and a portion of the northern littoral of the
Central Mediterranean. If account is taken of that setting,
theMaltese islands appear as a minor feature of the northern
seaboard of the region in question, located substantially to
the south of the general direction of that seaboard, and
themselvescomprising a very limited coastal segment. From
the viewpoint of the general geography of the region, this
southward location of the Coast of the Maltese islands
constitutes a geographical feature which should be taken
into account as a pertinent circumstance; its influence on the
delimitation line must be weighed in order to arrive at an
equitable result."(I.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 50, para. 69).
"the general geographical context in which the islands ofed Malta
appear as a relatively small feature in a semi-enclosed sea":ibid.,
p. 52, para. 73 (and see also, p. 42, para. 53).
452. In each case the issues of equity are determined within
the geographical framework or context and in accordance with the
equitable principles governing delimitation. The precisegeograph-
ical features can only be given appropriate significance within
these normative systems. Consequently, a major group of islands
like the Channel Islands may be given (for practical purposes) no
effect (Anglo-French Case, Reports of International Arbitral
Awards, XVIII, pp. 74-96,paras. 145-203)and a very small island
like Seal Island may be given half-effect (Judgment of theChamber in the Gulfof Maine Case,I.C.J. Reports 1984,pp. 336-7,
para. 222, referring to the transverse displacement of the "cor-
rected median line").
453. It follows that the exposition in the Danish Memorial
concerning the significance of islands is based upon a misunder-
standing of the treatment of islands in the process of equitable
delimitation.
(c) The Interpretation of the Case Law
454. The Danish Memorial (pp. 82-90) deploys passages
from the Decision of 30 June 1977 in the case concerning the
Anglo-FrenchContinental Shelf, the decision of a Chamber in the
Gulf of Maine Case, and the decisions of the Court in the
Tunisia-Libyaand Libya-Malta Casesto support a contention that
"in deciding where the boundary line in relation to an
extensivemainland should be drawn in order to achieve an
equitable solution, only limited or no effectcould be givento
a small, uninhabited island." (Memorial, p. 90, para. 288).
455. The precise relevance of the case law will be indicated
in the following Chapter. For present purposes it willbe sufficient
to point out that the Danish conclusion is deeply flawed and lacks
any foundation either in law or in fact.
456. Moreover, the exposition offered in support of the
conclusion offends law and fact in the following respects:
(i) The exposition is based upon the erroneous belief that
"islands" form a discrete geographical and legal category in the
law ofmaritime delimitation.
(ii) Consequently in drawing parallels with previous decisions the
Danish Memorial underestimates the significance of the geo-
graphical and legal framework within which delimitation takes
place.
(iii) The geographical comparisons offered are inept. To compare
the large island of Jan Mayen (54 kilometres in length) with the
Channel Islands is unhelpful, more especiallywhen the geograph-
ical and legal framework is completely different.
(iv) The Danish Memorial ignores major aspects of the Award in
the Anglo-French Case and of other decisions concerning delimi-
tation. These decisions relate essentially to the political and legalsignificanceof geography. In this context the relationships of Jan
Mayen within the North Atlantic system are in complete contrast
with the relationships of the Channel Islands and the other island
examples invoked in the Memorial.
(d) State Practice
457. The Danish Memorial (pp. 91-95,paras. 289-92),after
a markedly brief account of examples of State practice, presents
the conclusion that "State practice does not support the Norwe-
gian claim that, according to international law, Jan Mayen is
entitled to amedian line vis-à-visGreenland" (p. 94, para. 290).
458. The Respondent State will express its own position on
the relevance of the State practice in paragraphs 618-658.At this
stage it is necessary to draw the attention of the Court to the
oddities of the "examples" recounted by Denmark. Examples (5)
and (6) are cases in which islands were accorded full effect, as
stated in the Danish Memorial (p. 93).
459. The case of Bj~rn~ya(Bear Island) (Example (7),p. 94)
is not in point at all. As has been pointed out (pp. 65-6, paras.
230-231), the separation between the Fisheries Protection Zone
around Svalbard and the Norwegian mainland Economic Zone is
not a jurisdictional boundary. An administrative distinction has
been made between two areas to which different rules apply. No
delimitation in international law has been effected; indeed, none
could be effected between areas under the jurisdiction of the same
State.
460. For reasons set forth in the present Part of the
Counter-Memorial (paras. 649-655),the remaining four examples
(Danish Memorial, pp. 92-3)giveno support for the Danish claim
in the present proceedings. CHAPTERVI1
THE ELEMENTS OF AN EQUITABLESOLUTION
461. In this and the following Chapter of this Part, the
elements of the equitable solution will be presented, in order of
priority; the geographical and legal framework will be considered
first.
(a) The Kingdom of Norway
462. The Kingdom of Norway appeared in its present
constitutional form as a consequence of the dissolution of a union
with Denmark in 1814, this being followed by a union with
Sweden,dissolvedin 1905.The Norwegian lands had by then been
diminished compared with earlier periods of Norway's history. In
the nineteenth century and the first decades of this century,
Norway developed its traditional interests in the Arctic by way of
traditional maritime industries and pioneering exploration and
surveying activities.
463. The territories of the Kingdom of Norway presently
include the following lands:
- The Norwegian mainland;
- The archipelago of Svalbard (Spitsbergen), Norwegian sover-
eignty recognized in 1920by the Treaty of Spitsbergen;
- Jan Mayen, Norwegian sovereignty recognized in 1929.
464. The legitimate purpose underlying the acquisition of
these territories in this century was essentially custodial and
defensive. Custodial in the sense that modern conditions have
always called for some form of organization and regulation of
human activity which - as a rule - only States have been able to
supply and uphold. Defensive,in the sensethat if Norway did not
establish itself as the territorial sovereign, with duties andspon-
sibilities in addition to rights and privileges, other States could
have put forward their pretensions, at the expense of established
Norwegian interests.
(b) The GeographicalContexl
465. The sea areas between Greenland to the west, Scotlandto the southeast, and the Norwegian mainland and other territo-
ries to the east cal1 for careful characterization. (The Court is
respectfully referred to Maps 1and IV at the end of this volume
for the purpose of this demonstration.) These areas do not
constitute asemi-enclosed sea or any approximation thereto.
466. The Danish Memorial states that "The general geo-
graphical context of the disputed area may be broadly described
as the oceanic expanse constituted by the Greenland Sea and the
Norwegian Sea" (p. 7, para. 8) (emphasis supplied). The longitu-
dinal frame adopted by the makers of Maps 1and IV attached to
the Danish Memorial is misleading, as it tends to leave the
impression that the eastern aspect of the oceanic expanse is
occluded by coastal sectors, which it is not. The sector of the
coasts of East Greenland to the north of Cape Brewster is in fact
on the same latitude as the coasts of Novaya Zemlya, 1,200miles
to the east, and, further north, as are the coasts of Svalbard
(Spitsbergen) some 300 miles across the Fram Strait.
467. The mainland coasts of Norway lie for the most part
south of the latitudes occupied by the coast of Greenland north of
Cape Brewster, and the shortest distance between Greenland and
Norway is approximately 740 nautical miles. The coasts of
mainland Norway lie at a marked tangent to the coasts of
Greenland, at an average distance of more than 1,200 nautical
miles, and in their more southern aspects do not face towards
Greenland at al1 but towards the Shetlands, the Faroes, and
Iceland.
468. The principal characteristic of the sea areas in this
region is that they include three seas: the Norwegian Sea, the
Greenland Sea and the Barents Sea. Moreover, these seas are
linked with the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, not by truly narrow
seas but by expanses of sea which are straits of great breadth: the
Fram Strait (300 nautical miles) and the Denmark Strait (250
nautical miles). To thesouth the links with the Atlantic Ocean to
the east of Iceland are not even called straits. Theareas form a
unity but only in the loose sense that they are an oceanic region
forming a portal between the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. The
absence of a toponymy expressly recognizing the oceanic charac-
ter of the region is of no significance given the geographical
realities. 469. The maritime context isextensive,and characterized by
its openness. The region extends into other sea areas by broad
connecting expanses of water; it does not close off any other area
of sea.
470. Against this background, the essays in the Danish
Memorial at drawing parallels with situations in which the
geography is distinctly introverted and relates to well-defined
regions and sub-regions, must be regarded as implausible. To
compare (for example) the relationships within sectors of the
English Channel, involving coasts between 70 and 80 milesapart,
with the situation in theexpanses between Greenland to the west
and the Barents Sea to the east, lacks any geographical or political
realism (cf. the Memorial, pp. 95-6, para. 295).
471. There is a major feature of the geographical context
which remains to be drawn into the picture. To thenortheast, east,
and southeast of Jan Mayen there is an extensive sector of high
seas lying beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of any State. Its
existenceisdepicted on Map IV attached to the Danish Memorial,
but the text gives no attention to it.
472. This high seas sector, which forms a significant aspect
of the geographical context, points up the significance of Jan
Mayen as a part of the Norwegian realm having an entirely
independent entitlement to its appurtenant maritime areas. The
situationstands in marked contrast to that of the Channel Islands
in the Anglo-French Case, which the Tribunal described as being
"not only 'on the wrong side'of the mid-Channel median line but
wholly detached geographically from the United Kingdom":
Reports of InternationalArbitral Awards,XVIII, p. 94,para. 199in
fie.
473. In the present case, there is no channel, no geograph-
ically introverted situation like that formed by the English
Channel, and no geographical symmetry (opposite States having
almost equal coastlines) (see the Anglo-French Case, ibid.). Even
more significantly, in the present case therecan be no question of
location on the "wrong side" of a median line because there is no
median line between Greenland and the mainland of Norway: the
existenceof a sector of high seasintervenes. The legalconsequence
is that the coasts of continental Norway and Greenland have no
relation of adjacency for purposes of delimitation, and that
"oppositeness" is without relevance. (c) The Signijïcanceof Arctic Lands andCoasts
474. The Danish Memorial, in its descriptions of Jan
Mayen, characterizes the island as "desolate" (p. 55, para. 206),
"uninhabited" (p. 90, para. 288), having "no population in the
proper sense of the word" (p. 97, para. 302), "having no settled
population at all" (p. 110, para.351), and so forth. The signifi-
cance of Jan Mayen for Norway, and the significance of its
appurtenant maritime areas and seabed for Norway, willbe given
proper definition in due course.
475. The climatic conditions inevitably make al1aspects of
modern life in Arctic regions difficult and the creation of an
infrastructure is necessarily expensive. The population of the
polar regions is sparse and many settlements and technical
facilitiesare in somesense semi-permanent.To describe territories
in these latitudes as "desolate" is to state the obvious.
476. For present purposes, itis necessary to emphasize that
the perspective adopted in the Danish Memorial is entirely
inappropriate to the conditions of Arctic lands and coasts. In
these regions the characteristics attributed to Jan Mayen (which
the Government of Norway will evaluate in due course) are
common features of territories inthese latitudes. Much of the east
Coastof Greenland is infested by perennial iceflowsand lacks any
population (paras. 44-46). It is strange indeed that the Applicant
State should seek to attach importance to what are normal
features of coasts inthese latitudes.
477. In this type of environment coasts, and a fortiori
ice-freeislands, are more significant, areafor area, than otherland
areas. Moreover, coasts and the coasts of islands, are the basis of
entitlement to maritime areas and such entitlement cannot prop-
erly depend upon the accidents of current use or settlement. In
these areas the strategic and economic significance of territory is
a matter of potentiality, and may Varyfromone period to another.
2. THE CONFIGURATIO OF COASTS
(a) The Principle
478. In the Dispositif of the Judgment in the North Sea
Cases, one of the "factors to be taken into account" was stated to
be "the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well
as the presence of any special or unusual features"I.C.J. Reports1969, pp. 53-4, para. lOlD(1)). Moreover in the Judgment of the
Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Caseemphasis was placed on the
application of criteria "more especially derived from geography"
(I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 327, para. 195),and the Chamber made it
clear that it was seekingcriteria which were "best suited for use in
a multi-purpose delimitation" (ibid., para. 194).
479. The significanceof geography in the achievement of an
equitable solution is evident. There is, however, always a need to
recall the logical connections of the discrete principles or factors
referred to in particular quotations from judgments. These prin-
ciples or factors are not non-legal or pre-legal but form part of a
set of legalprincipleswhich themselvesare instruments of the legal
process of delimitation.
480. In this context the general geographical and legal
context is predominant, and thus the relevance of geography is
seen to be functional and contextual and not to be abstract.
(b) The GeographicalContext of Jan Mayen
481. The Danish Memorial refers to the "general geograph-
ical context" as "the oceanic expanse constituted by the Green-
land Sea and the Norwegian Sea" (p. 7, para. 8), and there is
emphasis on its "isolation from the rest of Norway" (p. 95, para.
295). Jan Mayen lies within a stretch of sea so extensive as to
encompass three named seas: the Greenland Sea, the Norwegian
Sea, and,to the northeast, the Barents Sea. The distances between
Greenland and the coasts of Norway Varybetween 750 and 1,750
nautical miles. Jan Mayen itself is 250 nautical miles from the
nearest Greenland coast, 550 nautical miles from the nearest
Norwegian coast, and 300nautical miles from Iceland (seeSketch
Map at p. xx).
482. The fact is that Jan Mayen is not particularly "iso-
lated" from mainland Norway (flights take about two hours) and,
in this gratuitously pejorative mode, it would be possible to
describe many parts of northern Greenland as "isolated" fromthe
administrative capital and the main economiccentresin southwest
Greenland.
483. The key factor for purposes of maritime delimitation is
that the region is extrovert and the vast sea areas link up with
other expanses in the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans. The region is
characterized by openness and there are few, if any, features ofocclusion. In this context, the invention of a parallelogram by the
Danish Memorial (p. 7, paras. 9-10) is more than a little fanciful.
Moreover, the description of this constructionisinadequate. Thus
the eastern aspect of the oceanic expanse is not "bordered by the
Arctic Ocean and Barents Sea" in any real sense. The reality is
that each maritime expanse merges into the other. There is no
geographical "border". To the north Svalbard (Spitsbergen) is the
only land feature within the sea areas extending between the
northeast coasts of Greenland and the northern aspect of Novaya
Zemlya (a distance of some 1,200nautical miles).To the south the
expanses between southeast Greenland and the coasts of Norway
are punctuated by Iceland and the Faroes, but there is no evidence
of any element of geographical occlusion.
484. Jan Mayen thus occupies a position of geographical
and geological independence. It forms part of no region or
sub-region. Standing by itself on the Jan Mayen ridge, it forms a
separate but integral part of the Kingdom of Norway.
(c) The Legal Consequences
485. The Government of Norway has indicated the signifi-
cance of proceeding with a process of delimitation within an
appropriate geographical and legal context. As the Court pointed
out in the North Sea Cases, "equality is to be reckoned within the
same plane" and the states in dispute must have been given
"broadly equal treatment by nature" (I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 50,
para. 91). The geographical situation of Jan Mayen discloses no
such system of quasi-equality.
486. Moreover, the coasts of Greenland and mainland
Norway cannot provide a legal framework within which delimi-
tation can be carried out and equitable "adjustments" effected.
The coasts do not bear a legal relation to each other: theyn only
be said to be "opposite" in a descriptive and non-normative sense.
487. The reason for this is, quite simply, that the areas
between Greenland and mainland Norway do not constitute a
unit consisting ofareas primafacie appurtenant to one or other of
the Parties and which are to be divided between them. This
condition, which is absent in the present case, is an absolute
prerequisite for an application of equitable principles on the basis
that the relevant coasts arehose of Greenland and the Norwegian
mainland rather than Greenland and Jan Mayen. 488. In the legal sense the coasts of Greenland and main-
land Norway cannot be "opposite" or in any other sense con-
jointly relevant to an equitable delimitation. The respectiveclaims
of the Parties do not converge and there is no overlapping of the
areas appertaining to them: cf. the Judgment in the North Sea
Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 49, para. 89; p. 52, para. 99; p. 53,
para. 101 (C), (1)and (2);and the Decision of 30June 1977of the
Tribunal in the Anglo-FrenchCase, Reports of International Arbi-
tral Awards, XVIII, pp. 87-8, paras. 181-3.
489. The absence of any basis for the interaction of the
coasts of Greenland and mainland Norway is substantially the
result of the combined operation of the distance principle and the
normal basis of entitlement. The 200 mile zone based on the
Norwegian mainland does not link up with the areas appurtenant
to Jan Mayen and therefore there is no overlapping or conver-
gence ofclaims as between the coasts of Greenland and the coasts
of mainland Norway. Apart from the great distances involved,
there is the existence of a major sector of highseas to the north,
east, and southeast of Jan Mayen.
490. The consequence of these factors is that Jan Mayen is
not in any sensean "incidental" or "special" feature in relation to
the process of delimitation inthese proceedings. The only conver-
gence ofentitiements is that which occurs betweenJan Mayen and
Greenland, and in that context Jan Mayen isin legalterms a major
actor.
(a) The Danish Thesis
491. The core of the Danish case consists of two arguments:
(a) That, as between the coasts of mainland Norway and Green-
land, Jan Mayen is a source of inequitybecause Jan Mayen is "on
the wrong side" of a median line between Norway and Greenland
and is detached from the Norwegian mainland (Memorial, pp.
95-6, para. 295).
(b) That, apart from the application of the test of proportionality
to a delimitation achieved by other means, a difference in the
length of the relevant coasts constituted a relevant factor (Memo-
rial, pp. 103-10,paras. 320-45). 492. These arguments will be analyzed in this Chapter. The
issue of proportionality will be considered subsequently.
(b) The Concept of Incidental Special Features
493. The first of the Danish arguments is based essentially
on the viewexpressed in the Judgment in the North Sea Continen-
tal Shelf Cases:
"It is therefore not a question of totally refashioning geog-
raphy whatever the facts of the situation but, given a
geographical situation of quasi-equality as between a num-
ber of States, of abating the effects of an incidental special
feature from which an unjustifiable difference of treatment
could result." (I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 50, para. 91).
494. In the geographical circumstances of this case, this
argument is misconceived. In the first place the operation of
abating the effects of "incidental special features" can only be
used asan instrument of equity within the appropriate geograph-
ical, and therefore legal, framework. As the Respondent Statehas
demonstrated, the coasts of Greenland and mainland Norway do
not constitute such a framework: and, in this connection, it must
be stated that the reference to "a median line" (between Green-
land and mainland Norway) in the Memorial which relates to
areas which arenot appurtenant to either Party, but are high seas,
has no basis in legal reasoning. As used in the Memorial, the
phrase "a median line" lacks legal content.
495. The process of abatement and the avoidance of sources
of distortion cannot take place in the abstract. Moreover, the
sources of distortion envisaged are features which are both very
small in scale and, within the appropriate framework, placed in
such a way as to cause an influential displacement of the line
which is the best candidate for an equitable solution within the
overall geographical framework.
496. The relevant passages in thejurisprudence are unequiv-
ocal in their indication that an "incidental special feature" is a
solecism within the general geographical context. Thus the Judg-
ment in the North Sea Cases refers to "islets, rocks and minor
coastal projections" (Z.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 36, para. 57); the
Judgment of the Chamber in the Gulfof Maine Case quotes this
phrase (ibid., 1984,p. 329, para. 201);and the passage in which it
appears is quoted in the Judgment of the Court in the Libya-Malta
Case (ibid., 1985,p. 47, para. 62). 497. In the present case the legal framework is constituted
by the juxtaposition of a large island,54kilometres in length, and
the nearest coasts of Greenland, 250 nautical miles distant. Jan
Mayen exists in a position of geographical isolation. It is geo-
graphically independent of Greenland as well as of mainland
Norway.
(c) The Principleof Equal Division
498. The jurisprudence has consistently given expression to
the principle of equal division. The classical statement appears in
the Judgment in the North Sea Cases:
"The continental shelf off, and dividing, opposite states, can
be claimed by each of them to be a natural prolongation of
its territory.hese prolongations meet and overlap, and can
therefore only be delimited by means of a median line; and,
ignoring the presence of islets, rocks and minor coastal
projections...such a line must effect an equal division of the
particular area involved." (I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 36,para.
57).
499. The principle of equal division reflects the basic con-
ception of entitlement expressedwith great clarity in a key passage
from the same Judgment:
"96. The doctrine of the continental shelf is a recent in-
stance of encroachment on maritime expanses which, during
the greater part of history, appertained to no-one. The
contiguous zone and the continental shelf are in this respect
concepts of the same kind. In both instances the principle is
applied that the land dominates the sea; it is consequently
necessary to examine closely the geographical configuration
of the coast-lines of the countries whose continental shelves
are to be delimited. This is one of the reasons why the Court
does not consider that markedly pronounced configurations
can be ignored; for, since the land is the legal source of the
power which a State may exerciseover territorial extensions
to seaward, it must first be clearly established what features
do in fact constitute such extensions. Above al1is this the
case when what is involved is no longer areas of sea, such as
thecontiguous zone, but stretches of submerged land; for the
legal régime ofthe continental shelf is that of a soi1and a
subsoil, two words evocative of the land and not of the sea."
(I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 51,para. 96). 500. The process of abatement in order to achieve an
equitable solution can only qualify the principle of equal division
when the feature causing distortion is (a) located within the
relevant geographical context created by the coasts of the Parties,
and (b) the potential distortion affectseas which involve overlap
or convergence of the appurtenant maritime areas.
This element of convergence in the case of opposite
501.
coasts is prominent in the jurisprudence: see the Judgment in the
North Sea Cases,quoted above, paragraph 499; the Award of the
Tribunal in the Anglo-FrenchCase, Reports of International Arbi-
tralAwards,XVIII, p. 9l, para. 19l; the Judgment of the Chamber
in the Gulfof Maine Case,I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 327,para. 195;
and the Judgment of the Court in the Libya-Malta Case, I.C.J.
Reports 1985, p. 47, para. 62.
502. In the circumstances of the present case the conver-
gence or overlap can only be between the coastal frontages of Jan
Mayen and Greenland. Jan Mayen is not an "incidental" feature
but a principal element of the legal framework. The coasts of
mainland Norway are as irrelevant for present purposes as the
coasts of Norwegian territory in the Antarctic. The process of
delimitation must relate to the actual geography; as the Tribunal
in the Anglo-FrenchCase said:
"The Court considers that the method of delimitation which
it adopts for the Atlantic region must be one that has
relation to the coasts of the Parties actually abutting on the
continental shelf of that region." (Reports of International
Arbitral Awards, XVIII, p. 115,para. 248).
(d) The Relevant Area
503. The Danish Memorial (pp. 11-12, paras. 30-35) pro-
poses an "area relevant to the delimitation dispute" (para. 30),
which is depicted on Map II of the Memorial.
504. The construction of the "relevant area" is stated to be
derived from the "disputed area", which consists in principle of
the area formed by the Danish claim of 200 miles7distance from
the pertinent basepoints and baselines and the Norwegian posi-
tion of a median line boundary.
505. The Government of Norway considers the geometrical
construction offered in the Memorial to be wholly irrelevant toany delimitation in accordance with legal principles. The area
defined bears no relation either to the geography of the region or
to legalprinciple. The construction derivesfrom the dimensions of
a disputed area whichis the casual product of the overlap between
the median line and a spurious line (the outer limit of the Danish
200mileclaim) which bears no relation to equitable principles and
thus can have no status even as a factor influencing a presumptive
or provisional equitable delimitation.
506. The artificiality of the relevant area is increased further
by the fact that, as the Danish Memorial says, it is "determined
solely on principles of geometry" (p. 11, para. 30). The conse-
quence is that the construction described as the "relevant area"
fails to reflect the geographical relations of the coasts of Jan
Mayen and Greenland.
(e) Lengths of Coasts
507. The Danish Memorial (p. 75, para. 254) quotes a
passage from the Judgment of the Court in the Libya-Malta Case
as follows:
"...If the coasts of Malta and the coast of Libya from Ras
Ajdir to Ras Zarruq are compared,it is evident that there is
a considerable disparity between their lengths, to a degree
which, in the view of the Court, constitutes a relevant
circumstance which should be reflected in the drawing of the
delimitation line..."(I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 50, para. 68).
508. In its consideration of "the relevant factors in the
present case" the Memorial offers the assertion that the compa-
rability of coastal lengths is not merely a test of the equitable
character of a delimitation already effected but is a factor to be
taken into account in any event (p. 103,para. 322;and seealso pp.
106-7,paras. 334-5).
509. The issue of proportionality as such will be examined
in Chapter VI11below. For present purposes it willsufficeto make
two general points. First, the Court in the Libya-Malta Case was
very insistent that proportionality should not be used so as to
become an exclusive mode of delimitation. In the words of the
Judgment:
" ..to use the ratio of coastal lengths as of itself determina-
tive of the seaward reach and area of continental shelf proper to each Party, is to go far beyond the use of
proportionality as a test of equity, and as a corrective of the
unjustifiable difference of treatment resulting from some
method of drawing the boundary line. If such a use of
proportionality were right, it is difficult indeed to see what
room would be left for any other consideration; for it would
be at once the principle of entitlement to continental shelf
rights and also the method of putting that principle into
operation. Its weakness as a basis of argument, however, is
that the use of proportionality as a method in its own right
is wanting of support in the practice of States, in the public
expression of their views at (in particular) the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, or in the
jurisprudence. It is not possible for the Court to endorse a
proposa1 at once so far-reaching and so novel." (Z.C.J.
Reports 1985, p. 45, para. 58).
510. The second point isno lessimportant. The Court in the
Libya-Malta Case was applying a variety of factors and the
disparity in the lengths of the relevant coasts was only one of the
relevant circumstances taken into account: seethe Judgment, ibid.,
p. 50,paras. 68-9;pp. 51-3,paras. 71-3.Moreover, the scale of the
resulting "adjustment" of the equidistance line in theLibya-Malta
Case is significant: the "adjustment" was of 18 miles within a
distance between the relevant coasts of 183 miles, a factor of
approximately ten per cent.
(f) Equity Does Not ZnvolveCompletely Refashioning Nature:
The Jurisprudence
511. Under the heading, "Status of Islands in Maritime
Delimitations" (p. 81), the Danish Memorial presents an account
of the case law (pp. 82-90) which, it is claimed, is based on
considerations which "support Denmark's view that, in deciding
where the boundary line in relation to an extensive mainland
should be drawn in order to achieve an equitable solution, only
limited or no effectcould be givento a small, uninhabited island".
(p. 90, para. 288).
512. This proposition is deeply and multifariously flawed.
The first flaw consists in its irrelevance: the jurisprudence sur-
veyedprovides no support for the form of delimitation claimed by
Denmark, which involves an "outer limit of 200 miles zone"
principle not found in any judicial examination of equitable
principles or factors or in any other legal source. 513. The second flaw also concerns its irrelevance, but in
another sense. The relevant judicial decisions involve a certain
modus operandi based upon the creation of a geographical and
legal framework within which the process of delimitation takes
place and, in the case of opposite coasts, within which the
principle of equal division is applied. According to this modus
operandiincidental features are assessed within such a framework
and the prima facie equitable delimitation is then subject to a
process of "correction" (Gulfof Maine Case, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
pp. 334-5,para. 218) or of "adjustment" (Libya-Malta Case, ibid.,
1985,p. 48, para. 65 infine; p. 50,para. 68;pp. 51-3,paras. 71-3).
514. This procedure involves relatively mild forms of cor-
rection of provisional lines of delimitation and bears no similarity
whatsoever to the type of delimitation now advanced by Den-
mark.
The jurisprudence not only insists on the limited scale
515.
of the process of correction but also constantly invokes the
principle that equity does not involve completely refashioning
nature. This principle was invoked by the Court of Arbitration in
the Anglo-FrenchContinental Shelf Case in fivedifferent passages:
Reports of InternationalArbitral Awards, XVIII, p. 58, para. 101;
pp. 92-3, para. 195;pp. 113-14,para. 244; pp. 114-15,para. 245;
pp. 115-16,paras. 248-9. The Danish claim not only disregards
this principle but oversteps the criteria of equity so far as to
trespass deeply into the basic entitlement of Jan Mayen (as land
territory) to appurtenant maritime areas.
516. The Danish Memorial places particular stress upon the
Decision of the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Case
concerning the Channel Islands region (see the Memorial, pp.
82-5, paras. 278-81; pp. 95-6, para. 295). The assertion is made
that: "The geographical situation is to a largetent parallel to the
situation described in the Channel Islands Case, ..."(ibid., para.
295).
517. This assertion does violence to logic. In the following
sentence the Memorial States that "Jan Mayen is on the wrong
side of a median line between Greenland and the Norwegian
mainland ..."As Norway has already pointed out, this bemusing
observation is a legal absurdity. There is nosuch median line and
such a delimitation is impossible not least because there is a large
area of high seas between Jan Mayen and the Norwegian main-
land. 518. The complete inappropriateness of the parallel claimed
by Denmark stems from a failure to appreciate the significanceof
identifying the appropriate geographical and legal framework. In
the case of the English Channel, this consisted of the coasts of the
two mainlands opposite each other "in a relation of approximate
equality": Anglo-FrenchCase, decision of 30June 1977,Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, XVIII, pp. 87-8, para. 181. More-
over, as the context makes clear, the entire region between the
opposite coasts was appurtenant to the one or the other of the
Parties.
519. It was in this legal context that the Court ofArbitra-
tion adverted to the location of the Channel Islands "not only "on
the wrong side" of the mid-Channel median line but wholly
detached geographically from the United Kingdom": Reports of
International Arbitral Awards, XVIII, p. 94, para. 199. The
geographical detachment of the Channel Islands thus had legal
significancebut this was to be measured within the relevant legal
framework.
520. The Norwegian Government considers that the Deci-
sion of the Court in the Anglo-French Case concerning the
Channel Islands is of considerable relevancein this present dispute
when its essence is properly appreciated. Given the relative
closeness of the mainland coasts of the United Kingdom and
France, and the presence of the Channel Islands "practically
within the arms of a gulf on the French coast" (ibid.,p. 88, para.
183),the location of the British islands close to the French coast
(distances of 6.6 and 8 nautical miles from the nearest points on
the French cozsts) was anomalous, and a potentially serious
source of inequity (ibid., p. 94, para. 199).
521. The logicalimplication emerging fromthe keypassages
in the Anglo-French Case is that, mutatis mutandis, Jan Mayen's
location is not productive of inequity and, accordingly, any
modification of its normal entitlement would instead produce
inequity. Jan Mayen is an isolated and geographically indepen-
dent feature 250 miles from Greenland and 550 miles from the
mainland of Norway. In the thinking of the tribunal in the
Anglo-FrenchCase,the Channel Islands were, successively,part of
the English Channel, as an area to be divided, and part of the
Golfe breton-normand, as a sub-region also to be divided.
Consequently, the "detachment" of Jan Mayen in the legal
context of equitable delimitation is a legal basis for a full
entitlement. 522. There is another aspect of the Decision in the Anglo-
FrenchCasewhich militates in favour of a full entitlement for Jan
Mayen. The Court gave considerable weight to "the predominant
interest of the French Republic in the southern areas of the
English Channel": Reports of International Arbitral AwardsXVIII,
p. 90, para. 188.As willbe explained subsequently, Norway has a
substantial interest in the maritime areas appurtenant to Jan
Mayen. Moreover, it is relevant that the Court in the Anglo-
FrenchCaseallowed the maritime interest of the major riparian in
the immediate area to outweigh the social economic and political
significance of the Channel Islands as land territory.
523. The form in which the Danish Memorial invokes the
case law is consistently flawed by false geographical parallels, by
a mistaken focus on the category of "islands" as such instead of
the overall geographical situation in each case, and by a failure to
discern that none of the decisions involves a delimitation similar
to the type espoused by the Applicant State.
524. The Danish view of the Anglo-French Casehas been
examined at length and it will suffice to take two other examples
of the approach to the case law to be found in the Memorial. The
Memorial refers to the Gulfof Maine Case,in which the Chamber
gave half-effect to Seal Island: I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 336-7,
para. 222. The Memorial states that "the fact remains that an
island which is inhabited al1the year round and which occupies a
strategic position was given only half-effect" (p. 89). But the
passage quoted by the Memorial makes it clear that it was the
location that was significant and not the population.
525. In any case, Seal Island is a good example of an
"incidental special feature" (two-and-a-half miles long) which is
considered within a major geographical framework. The correct
conclusion would seem to be that, if half-effect is given tosuch a
feature closeto the coast, it would be strange not to givefull effect
to a major feature standing in isolation 250 miles off shore.
526. The second example consists of the Memorial's invo-
cation of the Judgment in the Libya-Malta Case. The Memorial
(pp. 89-90,para. 287)makes two points. First, the Court is quoted
(Z.C.J.Reports 1985,p. 42, para. 53) to the effect that it was the
wider geographical context which was significant and, secondly,
there is the relation of Malta to "the general geography of the
region" (ibid., p. 50, para. 69). Once again, the passages quotedplace emphasis on the overall geographical relationships involved
and the close relation ofalta to "the northern seaboard of the
region in question" (ibid.).
527. The Memorial then draws a conclusion bearing a very
uncertain relation to the quoted passages. The Memorial states
that the Court "accorded limited effect to Malta" (which is a
major exaggeration) and did so "in spite of the fact that Malta is
an island State with a considerable population and economic life".
Of course, the quoted passagesSaynothing about population and
economic life, but the Danish Memorial has in its conclusion
completely missed the point. The approach of the Court was
related to the geographical framework and its consequences for an
equitable solution. As in the case of the Channel Islands, the
population and economic life of the territory concerned were of
little or no significance when it came to the equities of coastal
relationships.
4. THE CONDUC OT THE PARTIES
(a) The Principle
528. It is well established that the conduct of the Parties to
a dispute may constitute a relevant circumstance to beaken into
account in achieving an equitable solution: see, forxample, the
Judgment of the Court in the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf
Case, I.C.J. Reports 1982,pp. 83-4, paras. 117-18.Such conduct
may involve the conduct of the Parties inter se or it may take the
form of the evidence of a general attitude toward the principles of
delimitation, the evidenceof which includes agreements concluded
with third States.
(b) The Position of Norway
529. The position of Norway in these proceedings is that,
until the dispute began to crystallize, the Danish Government had
consistently adopted the formula according to which delimitation,
apart from the agreement of the Parties, was based on the
principle of equidistance (or theedian line).
530. The Government of Norway considers that the con-
duct of Denmark is a relevant circumstance to be taken account of
in reaching an equitable solution and, further, that the conduct of
Denmark is also relevant as part of the evidence that, until thebeginning of the present dispute, the consistent attitude of both
Parties had been based on the adoption of a median line bound-
ary.
531. Norway also considers that the conduct of Denmark
has other ramifications. The issues of recognition, acquiescence
and estoppel have been examined in Chapters III and IV of this
Part of the Counter-Memorial.
(c) The Evidence
National Legislation
532, From 1963until the outset of the present dispute, the
Parties have recognized in their national legislation that, in the
absence of agreement, the boundary of the continental shelf in
relation to other states abutting on the same shelf is the median
line. This solution is provided for in the Danish Royal Decree of
7 June 1963 concerning the exercise of sovereignty over the
continental shelf (Annex 29, Art. 2(2)).
533. The corresponding Norwegian legislation (Act No. 12
of 21 June 1963)(Annex 22), though in more general terms, was
not incompatible with the Danish Royal Decree and Norway did
not make any objection to the terms of the Danish legislation.
534. When Denmark adopted extended fisheries zone legis-
lation in 1976,the median line solution was expresslyadopted: see
the Fishing Territory of the Kingdom of Denmark Act (Act No.
597of 17December 1976)(Annex 31), Section l(2). The contem-
poraneous Norwegian Act No. 91of 17December 1976relating to
the economic zone of Norway (Annex 24) provided as follows:
"The outer limit of the economic zone shall be drawn at a
distance of 200nautical miles..from the baselines applicable
at any giventime, but not beyond the median line in relation
to other States." (Section 1).
535. Of particular relevance is the Danish Executive Order
of 14 May 1980 concerning the "fishing territory in the waters
surrounding Greenland" (Annex 38). This was adopted pursuant
to Act No. 597of 1976.Its provisions may for present purposes be
summarized as follows:
(i) Between Canada and Greenland north of latitude 75"N, the
boundary lineis based upon two seriesof geodesiclines.This is a negotiated alignment and is not a true median line.
However, the line leaves approximately equal areas to each
State (see the Agreement between Canada and Denmark
signed on 17 December 1973Section l(2)).
(ii) In the Lincoln Sea the boundary line is stated to be adian
line (Section l(2)).
(iii) 67"N is stated to be a median line (Section l(3)).th of
(iv) BetweenSvalbard and Greenland the boundary lineis stated
to be amedian line (Section l(4)).
(v) In respect of the position betweenJan Mayen and Greenland
the Executive Order provides as follows:
"Where the Island of Jan Mayen lies opposite Greenland at
a distance of less than 400 nautical miles, jurisdiction of
fisheries shall not, until further notice, be exercised beyond
the line which everywhere is equidistant from the nearest
points of the baselines of the coasts concerned (median
line)" (Section l(4)).
536. This provision is of considerable significance. Even in
regard to Jan Mayen, where the ambition was to extend Danish
jurisdiction beyond the median line, the median line was still in
fact respected: The interim regime was based on it.
537. The Norwegian Decree of 23 May 1980 (Annex 27)
provides (in pertinent part) as follows:
"1. Pursuant to Act No. 91 of 17December 1976relating to
the economic zone of Norway, a fishery zone shall be
established in the sea areas around Jan Mayen with effect
from 29 May 1980.
2. The outer limit of the fishery zone shall be drawn at a
distance of 200 nautical miles (one nautical mile = 1,852
metres) from the baselines determined for Jan Mayen,
although not beyond the median line in relation to Green-
land nor beyond the line constituting the outer limit of the
economic zone of Iceland, as this limit is today laid down in
the Icelandic Act of 1 June 1979No. 41.
3. Where the fishery zone adjoins the zone off East Green-
land, the delimitation line shall be drawn by agreement." 538. This legislation confirms the adherence of Norway to
the median line in relation to Greenland and in other respects
reflects the contents of the Agreement with Iceland which was
shortly to be concluded, and was in fact signed on 28 May 1980.
The background to this Agreement has been examined in Part 1,
paragraphs 248-253.
AgreementsBetweenNorwayandDenmark
539. There are three bilateral agreements. The first is the
Agreement relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
signed in Oslo on 8 December 1965(Annex 46). The provisions of
Article 1 are as follows:
"The boundary between those parts of the continental shelf
over which Norway and Denmark respectively exercise
sovereignrights shall be theedian line which at everypoint
is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial Sea of each Contracting
Party is measured."
540. A technical agreement concerning a tripoint with Swe-
den was concluded by an Exchange of Notes of 24 April 1968
(Annex 51). This Agreement involved the application of Article 3
of the previous instrument.
541. The third agreement was signed on 15 June 1979and
concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf in the waters
between the Faroes and Norway and the line of demarcation
between the fisheries zone off the Faroes and the Norwegian eco-
nomic zone (Annex 69). Article 1 of the Agreement provides as
follows:
"The boundary between that part of the continental shelfin
the area between the Faroe Islands and Norway over which
the Kingdom of Denmark and the Kingdom of Norway
respectively, exercise sovereignty shall, in so far as the
exploration and exploitation of natural resources is con-
cerned, be the median line, which is defined as the line
equidistant at each of its points from the nearest points on
the baselines from which the width of the Contracting
Parties' territorial sea is measured."
542. Thus by 14 May 1980 (see paras. 535-6 above) the
Government of Denmark had committed itself to the application
of a median line in respect of four distinct sectors of maritime
delimitation involving Norway, as follows:(1) Between the mainlands;
(2) Faroes-mainland Norway;
(3) Greenland-Svalbard;
(4) Greenland-Jan Mayen (interim position).
Agreements Concluded by DenmarkwithThirdStates
543. The Government of Denmark has adopted a continen-
tal shelf delimitation expressly based upon equidistance in the
following five agreements with third States:
(1) Protocol to the Agreement with the Federal Republic of
Germany, signed on 9 June 1965(Annex 45);
(2) Agreement with the United Kingdom, signed on 3 March
1966(Annex 47);
(3) Agreement with the United Kingdom, signed on 25November
1971(Annex 54);
(4) Agreement with Canada, signed on 17December 1973(Annex
55);
(5) Agreement with Sweden, signed on 9 November 1984(Annex
74).
544. Denmark has concluded two other delimitation agree-
ments which are not based upon equidistance as such, but involve
practical departures from it of fairly limited scale. The relevant
agreements are as follows:
(1) Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, signed on
9 June 1965(Annex 45);
(2) Agreement with the German Democratic Republic, signed on
14 September 1988(Annex 77).
545. In all,taking the Agreements concluded by Denmark
with Norway and those with third States, Denmark has expressly
adopted amedian linesolution in respect of continental shelfareas
in seven agreements involving five different treaty partners.
The Danish Positionon Delimitationbetween GreenlanandIceland
546. To this picture must be added the significant evidence
that Denmark's position concerning delimitation between Green-land and Iceland is based on the median line. The Danish
Memorial recognizes that this delimitation consists of an equidi-
stance line.
547. It is stated that "the proposed southern border of the
disputed area is placed to the north of both the equidistance line
between Iceland and Greenland and the Icelandic 200-mile limit
vis-à-vis Jan Mayen, leaving the interests of Iceland unaffected"
(Memorial, p. 11,para. 29; emphasis supplied).
548. The significance of the recognition of the median line
vis-à-vis Iceland is to be appreciated against the background of
the Danish Executive Order of 14 May 1980 (para. 535 above).
The provisions of that Order (Section 1(3))expresslyadopted the
median line as "the boundary line of the fishing territory in
relation to Iceland". This provision is dispositive: in other words
it constitutes the boundary. Whilst there is a proviso - "in the
absence of a special agreement to the contrary" - this is merely a
condition subsequent and thus forms a contingency which does
not reduce the dispositive nature of the instrument.
AgreementsConcludedby Norway with ThirdStates
549. The Government of Norway has adopted a continental
shelf delimitation expressly based upon equidistance in the fol-
lowing three agreements with third States:
(1) Agreement with the United Kingdom, signed on 10 March
1965(Annex 44).
(2) Agreement with Sweden, signed on 24 July 1968(Annex 52).
(3) Agreement with the United Kingdom (Protocol Supplemen-
tary to the 1965 Agreement), signed on 22 December 1978
(Annex 67).
550. Further, an Agreement with the USSR relating to the
maritime boundary in the Varangerfjord, was signed on 15
February 1957(Annex 41). This Agreement is in part based on an
equidistance principle, and would cover also delimitation of the
continental shelf within the Varangerfjord.
551. In addition Norway has concluded an agreement with
Iceland on the continental shelf in the area between Iceland and
Jan Mayen, signed on 22 October 1981 (Annex 72). As a
consequence of this Agreement Norway accepted that the delim-
itation betweenJan Mayen and Iceland should be drawn along the
outer limit of the Icelandic economic zone. 552. Moreover, in the Royal Decree of 23May 1980(Annex
27)Norway had already provided that the fisheryzone established
round Jan Mayen did not extend beyond the outer limit of the
Icelandic economic zone. This position was also reflected in the
provisions of the Agreement between Norway and Iceland con-
cerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions signed on 28
May 1980(Annex 70).
553. The background to these arrangements with Iceland
has been elaborated upon in Part 1, paragraphs 248-253. The
essential element is theecision by Norway to make concessions
on political grounds.
DiplomaticCorrespondence
554. The diplomatic correspondence confirms the view that
until the beginning of the present dispute, Denmark had main-
tained its adherence to the median line as the equitable solution in
the case of opposite coasts. The first informa1 expressions of
doubts concerning the application of a median line as between
Greenland and Jan Mayen occurred during 1979(Annex 5; letter
dated 3 July 1979).
555. Danish minutes dated 31 August 1979 (Annex 8)
makes it clear that at that stage no definitive objection had been
made. In the words of the Minute:
"It could not be taken for granted that the delimitation
between Jan Mayen and Greenland could also be deter-
mined by application of the median line principle."
556. The provisions of the Danish Executive Decree of 14
May 1980(Annex 38), in so far as they concern Jan Mayen (see
paras. 535-6 above), indicated that in respect of fisheries the
median line was accepted as a provisional delimitation. That this
was the understanding of the Norwegian Government is clear
from the terms of the Norwegian Note dated 4 June 1980(Annex
10).In this Note Norway took the opportunity to state that "the
general principles of international law imply that a State cannot
extend its fishing zone beyond the median line in relation to a
foreign State except upon agreement with that State".
557. In its reply dated9 June 1980(Annex 12),the Danish
Government argued that "Jan Mayen, in terms of international
law, falls within the concept of 'special circumstances"', and
reserved its position. (d) Conclusion
558. This very clearly marked pattern of evidence justifies
the conclusion that until 1980the conjoint opinion of the parties
was to the effect that as between opposite coasts the equitable
solution would be in principle based upon equidistance. The
general attitude of the Parties, both in their dealings with each
other and in their transactions with third States, was characterized
by a particular approach to the achievement of equity.
559. The Danish thesis is that the conduct of Norway which
is relevant consistsexclusively of the Agreements with Iceland in
the years 1980 and 1982 and the line defining the separation
between the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard and the
Norwegian mainland economic zone (Memorial, pp. 101-2,paras.
314-19). These items add up to very little. The arrangements with
Iceland were exceptional and were the product of generous
political concessions by Norway (see above, para. 538). The
references to Bear Island are not, as has been demonstrated (para.
459), germane to the issue, as the administrative distinction in this
case does not constitute a delimitation.
560. At one point the Danish Memorial (p. 118, paras.
367-8) invokes "the element of predictability" as a significant
aspect of the concept of equity. In this respect the Memorial
adopts a curious inversion of reality. The Norwegian agreements
with Iceland - essentially a single transaction- are presented as
the norm, rather than the many items relating to an equidistance
solution. Moreover, the concession made in favour of Iceland
produced a boundary which reflects no norm of equitable delim-
itation, whereas (for example) the Danish agreements with the
United Kingdom and Norway in relation to the Faroes, like the
vast majority of the agreements concluded by Denmark and
Norway, adopt a method of delimitation which is well-recognized
in the law and familiar in diplomacy. The political bargain struck
between Norway and Iceland was exceptional and it is the median
lineas between opposite coasts whichisin accord with the element
of predictability. In the Libya-Malta Continental Shelf Case, the Court
561.
adverted to security considerations, in the context of the conten-
tion by Malta that such considerations would confirm the equi-
distance method of delimitation, which gives each party a com-
parable lateral control from its coasts. In the words of the
Judgment:
"Malta contends that the 'equitable consideration' of secu-
rity and defence interests confirms the equidistance method
of delimitation, which giveseach party a comparable lateral
control from its coasts. Security considerations are of course
not unrelated to the legal concept of the continental shelf.
They were referred to when this concept first emerged,
particularly in the Truman Proclamation. However, in the
present case neither Party has raised the question whether
the law at present attributes to the coastal State particular
competences in the military field over its continental shelf,
including competence over the placing of military devices.In
any event, the delimitation which will result from the
application of the present Judgment is, as willbe seenbelow,
not so near to thecoast of either Party asto make questions
of security a particular consideration in the present case."
(I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 42, para. 51).
562. Strategic interests, and security interests in theechni-
cal sense of bearing directly upon military dispositions, are not
materially influenced by the manner in which a continental shelf
or fisherieszone delimitation is effected.l1high seasrights which
are disassociated from the exploration and exploitation of re-
sources, or from the other competences which are recognized as
falling to the coastal State within extended zones of jurisdiction,
are maintained fully in the water column superjacent to the
continental shelf, or within such zones. The exercise of high seas
rights which are relevant in a security or defence context remains
subject to that equitable and mutual balancing of interests
between States which obtains with respect to the high seas beyond
zones of maritime jurisdiction. In thissense, strategic and military
considerations are therefore in general not to be taken into
account as relevant circumstances in regard to delimitation. 563. However, this does not mean that a more general
concept of security - encompassing al1elements of coastal State
protective interest in general - is devoid of importance in relation
to the delimitation of maritime areas of jurisdiction.
564. The Truman Proclamation referred specifically, in its
preamble, to the fact that "the effectivenessof measures to utilize
or conserve these resources [of the subsoil and sea-bed of the
continental shelfl would be contingent upon cooperation and
protection from the shore", and that "self-protection compels the
coastal nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores
which are of the nature necessary for utilization of these re-
sources". The protective interest, as stated, is related directly to
the resource interest connected with the continental shelf, and to
the safeguarding of those other interests which might be affected
by the exploitation of those resources, e.g., the need to avoid
pollution of shorelines and beaches.
565. The interest of each coastal State in safeguarding these
protective concerns is equal in quality and in intensity. The land,
interna1 waters and the territorial sea constitute the prime object
of protection. The physical possibility of conducting and control-
ling resource exploitation in a manner which safeguards these
interests, and of taking other protective measures effectively and
timely, are clearly related to the distance from land-based control
or support bases to the area of activity. In this sense, the
protective interest of a coastal State must constitute a factor which
would legitimately be a relevant circumstance influencing the
course of delimitation. The drawing of a boundary closer to one
State than to another would imply an inequitable displacement of
the possibility of the former State to protect interests which
require protection. In this connection, it should be borne in mind
that in particular the exploitation of seabed resources always
entails an element of risk. The extravagant claim of Denmark
would create a situation in which Denmark would take decisions
directly affecting such risk elements with respect to areas located
very close to the shores of Jan Mayen, and much more comfort-
ably - four times more - removed from the coast of Greenland.
566. In the light of the considerations of the coastal State's
protective interest, the creation of such an imbalance in the
relative security position of the two Parties would clearly be
inequitable, and lack any basis in the existing law of maritime
delimitation. The Court itself must have reasoned in the same way
in the Libya-Malta ContinentalShelf Case when it found that "the delimitation which will result from the application of
the present Judgment is ...not so near to the coast of either
Party as to make questions of security a particular consid-
eration ..."(I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 42, para. 51).
(a) Introduction
567. It may be recalled that in itsDecision of 30 June 1977
the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-French Caseadverted to the
respective "navigational, defence and security interests" of the
Parties in the region. Having done so, the Court stated that such
considerations "tend to evidence the predominant interest of the
French Republic in the Southern areas of the English Channel, a
predominance which is also strongly indicated by its position as a
riparian State along the whole of the Channel's south coast":
Reports of International ArbitralAwards,XVIII, p. 90,para. 188in
fine.
568. The consequence of the conclusion reached by the
Court of Arbitration was the enclaving of the Channel Islands in
favour of France. It was thus the sector of French coast on the
southern side of the English Channel which determined the nature
and strength of the interestsn the maritimeareasconcerned.In the
present proceedings there is no geographical complication com-
parable to the presence of the Channel Islands within a gulf of the
French coast, and the relevant elements consist of the long island
of Jan Mayen, the sea areas associated with it, and the long-
established and substantial interest of Norway in those areas.
569. In this context two factorsare operative. First, there is
a symbiotic relationship between the land territory and the
interests of the coastal State in the maritime areas. Secondly,
within this relationship, the interestsin the maritimereas have an
importance as great as that of the interests associated with the
land territory itself.
(b) Norway's Interest in the Maritime Region
570. Norway's interest in the maritime areas appurtenant to
Jan Mayen contains the following major elements:
(1) Long-established exploitation patterns in respect of sealing
and whaling;(2) Fisheries;
(3) Navigational and protection interests;
(4) Resource potential; and
(5) Marine research and development.
571. These factors are in each case pertinent either to the
institution of the continental shelf, or to the resource interest in
the water column, or to both. Consequently, they clearly qualify
as relevant circumstances for the purpose of applying equitable
principles to the issue of delimitation. Each factor is directly
related to the type of legal interest represented by the shelf or
fisheries zones as legal institutions: seethe Judgment of the Court
in the Libya-Malta Case, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 40, para. 48).
(c) TheElements FormingNorway'sInterest
(1) Long-establishedExploitation Patterns
572. The waters between Jan Mayen and Greenland have
long been the scene of Norwegian whaling, sealing and fishing.
The various fisheries will be described below. In historical per-
spective the fisheries form a part, but an important part, of a
long-established pattern of exploitation of the natural resources of
the waters around Jan Mayen.
The Importance ofWhalingto Norway
573. Since the 1880ssmall-type whaling has been an indus-
try in its own right. This kind of whaling involvesthe equipping of
fishing boats with small harpoon guns. From the 1960s,a minke
whale fishery was conducted along the Coast of East Greenland
and in the areas west and south of Jan Mayen.
574. Commercial whaling is for the time being suspended in
view of a complex set of circumstance unrelated to the present
proceedings. Whale stocks interact with other species - those
which are harvested and those which form an indispensable part
of the various marine food chains. The proper and rational
management of whales, both for the intrinsic value of the harvest,
and as a means of conducting ecological, multispecies manage-
ment programmes, remains essential for coastal nations in this
region. 575. The history and development of whaling activities in
the Jan Mayen area are more fully described in Part 1,paragraphs
120-123.
The Importanceof Sealing to Norway
576. In the modern era regular sealing activities began in the
Jan Mayen area (the West Ice) in 1846.After peaking in 1874the
level of the industry has varied, but sealing activities have always
persisted and have remained significant until the present day.
From 1970to 1979the annual yield from Norwegian sealing in the
West Ice averaged some 35,000 animals at a first-hand value of
approximately NOK 21 million (equivalent to USD 3.2 million)
(see Appendix 3, Table 3.2).
577. The sealing industry is concentrated in two areas in
Norway: the Sunnmure region and the Troms0 region. In both
these regions sealing has by tradition been an important occupa-
tion and source of income during a part of the year when it is
difficult to make a living by other means.
578. The history and development of sealing activities in the
Jan Mayen area are described more fully in Appendix 3.
(2) Fisheries
The Importance ofFisheriesto Norway
579. Norway has had a persistent interest in the fisheries of
the seas around Jan Mayen. The comparatively small area around
Jan Mayen has a substantial significance in the total Norwegian
fisheriesin the Barents Sea, the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea.
This has involved different stocks in different periods, according
to the incidence of particular stocks and the changes in distribu-
tion. The different fishing activities in the Jan Mayen area account
for more than 8 per cent. of the total quantity of Norwegian
catches. The capelin fisheries in the Jan Mayen area are very
important for the employment of the purse seinefleet. The shrimp
fisheries off Jan Mayen and Greenland are integrated in the
operational pattern of other Norwegian shrimp fisheries. The
activities in the Jan Mayen area have a greater significance than
the indirect value. They contribute to the fragile economy of
Norwegian coastal communities, which are particularly dependent
on the utilization of marine living resources for maintaining
employment opportunities. 580. In Part 1, paragraphs 119-146,an account is given of
the significanceof the fisheriesin the Jan Mayen region: Herring,
blue whiting, shrimp, Iceland scallop, and capelin.
The FisheriesInterestas Picturedin the Danish Memorial
581. The Danish Memorial (p. 43, paras. 164-5;pp. 46-51,
paras. 173-89)places emphasis on the importance of fisheries for
Greenland. It also states (p. 50, para. 185): "In the late 1970s
Norwegian and Danish vesselscommenced fishing capelin in the
waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen". It is to be noted that
neither in this passage nor elsewhere is it suggested by Denmark
that fishing boats from Greenlandfish now, or have ever fished, in
the areas near Jan Mayen.
582. The rather general statements on catches of capelin to
be found in the Danish Memorial (see p. 51, para. 186) do not
focus on the fishing areas between the opposite coasts of Jan
Mayen and Greenland.
583. The significant point is that, of the total Danish fishing
effort in the North Atlantic, only a very small fraction relates to
waters in the sea areas presently in dispute. The figures provided
in the Memorial do not attempt to deal with this issue. A general
estimate based on data available to the Norwegian Government is
that less than 3 per cent. of the total quantity of fish landed by
Denmark (including the Faroe Islands and Greenland) is taken in
the area between Jan Mayen and Greenland, amounting to
approximately 0.8 per cent. of the total first-hand value of Danish
catches. In comparison, the equivalent estimate of the importance
of the area north of 68"N for Norway shows a share of up to 8.6
per cent. of the quantity, and 3.5 per cent. of the first-hand value
of total Norwegian catches landed (estimates based on data for
1986).
same context, it appears from the data available
584. In the
that income derived from the licensing of capelin fishing off the
East Greenland Coastnorth of 68"N constitutes less than one per
cent. of the value of fisheries in the whole Greenland zone. The
Danish Memorial offers no evidence of the dependence of Green-
land fisheries on the area in dispute. In fact Greenland fishing
takes place in many areas west and southeast of Greenland, but
not in the disputed area. The key passages of the Danish
Memorial do not provide much illumination in this respect (pp.
46-51,paras. 173-89). 585. The evidence available indicates that no boats cur-
rently fish out of Ittoqqortoormiit (Scoresbysund), and a total of
five vessels wereregistered at Tasiilap,much further south in the
Denmark Strait: seethe figures for 1988inthe 1989edition of the
Yearbookfor Greenland, Table 41 (p. 372). Purchases of fishery
products from the trading district of Ittoqqortoormiit in 1985
were non-existent: see the tables in the same Yearbook,pp. 374,
378.
(3) The NavigationalandProtection Interests
The existence of major communications and rescue
586.
facilities on Jan Mayen provides the means of protecting and
assisting fishing vessels and others who may in the future be
engaged in exploitation of the region's natural resources. It may
be recalled that security considerations, in the form of the ability
to provide "cooperation and protection from the shore" in the
context of resource utilization, were a key feature of the Truman
Proclamation.
587. Jan Mayen plays host to a station which forms part of
the LORAN C radio positioning system. The station is run by the
Norwegian Defence Communication and Data ServicesAdminis-
tration ("NODECA"), in cooperation with an agreement with the
US Coast Guard, as are other comparable stations in this
world-wide network. The station forms part of the Norwegian Sea
chain of stations.
588. The system, established originally for military pur-
poses, has increasingly significant civil application. Navigation
signals are available to otherusers, including commercial vessels,
fisheriesvesselsand so forth. The trend is to maintain and develop
the LORAN C system to satisfy the increased demand from
civilian and commercial interests. The various Norwegian fishing
fleetsoperating in the waters round Jan Mayen depend for certain
vital services upon the facilities associated with the Island. For
example, the summer capelin fishinginvolvesmore than 100boats
employing more than 1,000 men. In addition, shrimp fishing
continues in the area the whole year round.
589. In consequence, Jan Mayen is of great importance to
the safety of thefishing fleet, and sick and injured personnel are
evacuated by means of the Island Airport, this process involving
five or six ambulance flights each year. 590. In this respect, the interest of Norway in the island is
directly connected with the exploitation of the resources of the
maritime areas appurtenant to the island. This factor also oper-
ates in respect of the future exploitation of any minera1resources
based upon the continental shelf areas to which Norway is
entitled.
(4) ResourcePotential
591. In the Dispositif ofthe Judgment in the North Sea
Cases,the "factors to be taken into account" include "(2) so far as
known or readily ascertainable, the ...natural resources, of the
continental shelf areas involved;....(I.C.J. Reports 1969,pp. 53-4,
para. 101(D)). This principle was referred to by the Court in the
Libya-Malta Case, indicating that such resource deposits "might
well constitute relevant circumstances which it would be reason-
able to take into account in a delimitation." (ibid., 1985,p. 41,
para.50). It would be a practical extension of that line of reasoning
to take into account substantial indications of resource potential
as well.
592. The possibility is present that there may be deposits of
polymetallic sulphides on the seabed in the area between Jan
Mayen and Greenland. The natural conditions are there, but
closer investigation of the seabed in the area has begun only
recently.
593. The continental shelf along the Jan Mayen ridge has
been the object of initial investigations. No such investigations
have as yet covered the shelf areas to the west of Jan Mayen, and
the material is therefore lacking for even a preliminary assessment
of the hydrocarbon potential of this part of the Jan Mayen
continental shelf. It is to be noted that there appears to be an
increasing commercial interest in prospecting in the northeast part
of the Greenland continental shelf. Any hydrocarbon develop-
ment on the continental shelf ofJan Mayen would obviously be of
the greatest interest to Norway, which already has an offshore
petroleum industry of appreciable dimensions.
(5) Marine ResearchandDevelopment
594. Norway can take some pride in its scientific research
efforts on Jan Mayen and in the region around the island over an
extended period of time. Those efforts have formed part of a
broad pattern of scientificinvestigations which have been directedtowards al1 the oceanic and Arctic terrestrial regions within
Norway's scopeof interest. Norway's broad range of concerns -
maritime, industrial and environmental - indicate that the scien-
tific study of natural and physical condition on and around Jan
Mayen will remain of high importance.
(d) Conclusion
595. In the Anglo-French Case the Court of Arbitration
referred to "the predominant interest" of the French Republic as
a riparian State (see above, paras. 567-8). In the present case the
Government of Norway does not claim a "predominant interest"
in the waters between Greenland andJan Mayen. To do so would
be to emulate the monopolistic claim of Denmark in these
proceedings to most of the maritime jurisdiction and natural
resources in the disputedarea.
596. The purpose of the demonstration of the existence of a
substantialinterest in the maritime areas adjacent to and to the
west of Jan Mayen is to establish the matrix of relevant circum-
stances which militate in favour of the median line boundary as a
moderate application of equity in these proceedings. In other
words, taking these relevant circumstances into account, and
having regard to the practical interaction of the factors invoked in
this Chapter, the median line boundary is clearly seen to be the
legitimate expression of equity both in relation to delimitation of
continental shelfareas and in relation to its delimitation of fishery
zones.
7. THERELEVANC OF GEOLOG AYND GEOMORPHOLOGY
(a) The Principle
597. The Danish Memorial (p. 76, para. 256) states that
"where a delimitation dispute relates to an area, the extent of
which is lessthan 200nautical milesfromthe coast of either Party,
geological considerations wouldseem tu be irrelevant" (emphasis
supplied). The propositionis based upon the pertinent paragraph
in the Judgment of the Court in the Libya-Malta Case (Z.C.J.
Reports1985, p. 35,para. 39),which is in fact much more definite
than the wording of the proposition as formulated by the Danish
Government ("would seemto be irrelevant").
598. The reader of the Memorial readily detects a certain
frustration in the passageust quoted, which appears in Part IIdealing with "The Law". This comes as no surprise when the
relevant factual passages, offered in Part 1 (pp. 37-40, paras.
153-8),are recalled.
599. The extent of the areas of maritime jurisdiction of the
Parties may not be more relevant to the issue of delimitation than
the extent of the land area. But it may be noted that, as far as can
be estimated, the area of Greenland's fisheries zone, within 200
nautical miles from baselines or within median lines as against
opposite coasts, is slightly over 2,000,000square kilometres. As it
can be said that Greenland is a large island, it is also manifest that
Greenland disposes of an extensive maritime area (see Map IV at
the end of this Volume). For the Kingdom of Denmark as a whole,
another 300,000 square kilometres must be added (estimated on
the same basis, and excluding claims to continental shelf areas
beyond 200 nautical miles or median lines).
(b) The Facts
600. The geology and geomorphology of the area between
Jan Mayen and Greenland have been described earlier in the
present Counter-Memorial (paras. 120-9),and this material forms
the background for a brief assessment ofthe passages contained in
the Danish Memorial.
601. These passages are, in form at least, descriptive, but in
the result they produce highly tendentious evaluations of the
geology of the relevant area. In the first place, the Memorial
makes a wholly artificial and unjustified characterization of the
shelf margin in the area west of Jan Mayen. In the words of the
Memorial:
"As for the shelf margin to the west of the Ridge and south
of 70"N., this is within 50 nautical miles of the axis of the
Ridge, Le.,more than 200nautical miles from the east coast
of Greenland." (p. 40, para. 158).
602. The evidence does not justify this interpretation of the
data, which involves an arbitrary approach to the evidence and
has an obvious motive in seeking to provide support for the
eccentric "principle" - the 200 mile outer limit - on which the
Danish claim rests in the present case.
603. Neither the geology of the region nor the bathymetry
support the detection of the location of a "continental margin"more than 200 nautical miles from the coast of Greenland. The
best available data shows a series of tablelands, south of the Jan
Mayen fracture zone, extending westwards from the Jan Mayen
micro-continent: see GEBCO sheet No. 5.04, 5th ed. April 1978
(reprinted March 1984); and sheet entitled "Bathymetry of the
Norwegian-Greenland and Western Barents Seas", US Naval
Research Laboratory, Acoustics Division, Environmental Sci-
ences Group (Washington, 1977).
604. The bathymetry contradicts the Danish Memorial. The
Jan Mayen continental shelf is not cut off to the south, as
suggested; it continues up to the distinctive elevation of the
Kolbeinsey Ridge. The Ridge defines the most marked axis of
declivity in thearea.
(c) Conclusion
605. The evidence of the bathymetry also contradicts the
assertion of the Danish Government that "there exists no com-
mon shelf between East Greenland and Jan Mayen" (Memorial,
p. 40, para. 158). The existence of a degree of variation in the
topography of the seabed does not place the relevant seabed areas
outside a legalclassification as shelfareas. This conclusion follows
from the opinion of the Court expressed in its Judgment in the
Libya-Malta Case :
"The Court however considers that sincethe development of
the law enables a State to claim that the continental shelf
appertaining to itextends up to as far as 200 miles from its
coast, whatever the geological characteristics of the corre-
sponding sea-bed and subsoil, there is no reason to ascribe
any role to geological or geophysical factors within that
distance either in verifying the legal title of the States
concerned or in proceeding to a delimitation as between
their claims. This is especiallyclear where verification of the
validity of title is concerned,nce, at least in so far as those
areas are situated at a distance of under 200 miles from the
coasts in question, titleepends solely on the distance from
the coasts of the claimant States of any areas of sea-bed
claimed by way of continental shelf, and the geological or
geomorphological characteristics of those areas are com-
pletely immaterial." (IC. J.Reports 1985, p. 35, para. 39). (a) Area
606. The Danish Memorial invokes the differences in area
of Jan Mayen and Greenland in two contexts: first.,as an aspect of
"the geographical factor" (p. 96, para. 296;p. 97, para.301);and,
secondly, as an aspect of "the proportionality factor" (p. 110,
para. 350; p. 111, para. 355). These assertions are flatly contra-
dicted both by the basic principles of entitlement to continental
shelf and by the jurisprudence.
607. In its Judgment in the Libya-Malta Case the Court
spelled out the requirement that, to qualify as a "relevant
circumstance", a consideration must be of the type that is
"pertinent to the institution of the continental shelf as it has
developed within the law": I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 40, para. 48.
Consequently, the Court rejected a Libyan argument that land-
mass provided a legal basis for entitlement. In the words of the
Court:
"Landmass has never been regarded as a basis of entitlement
to continental shelf rights, andsuch a proposition finds no
support in the practice of States, in the jurisprudence, in
doctrine, or indeed in the work of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea. It would radically change
the part played by the relationship between coast and
continental shelf. The capacity to engender continental shelf
rightsderives not from the landmass, but from sovereignty
over the landmass; and it is by means of the maritime front
of this landmass, in other words by its coastal opening, that
this territorial sovereignty brings its continental shelf rights
into effect.What distinguishes a coastal State with continen-
tal shelf rights from a landlocked State which has none, is
certainly not the landmass, which both possess, but the
existence of a maritime front in one State and its absence in
the other. The juridical link between the State's territorial
sovereignty and its rights to certain adjacent maritime
expanses is established by means of its coast. The concept of
adjacency measured by distance is based entirely on that of
the coastline, and not on that of the landmass." (I.C.J.
Reports 1985, p. 41, para. 49).
608. This emphatic viewwas to be confirmed by the Award
of the Court of Arbitration in the Guinea-Guinea(Bissau) Mari-
time Delimitation Case. The relevant passage is as follows: "As for proportionality with relation to the land mass of
each State, the Tribunal considers that this does not consti-
tute a relevant factor in this case. The rights which a State
may claim to have over the sea are not related to the extent
of the territory behind its coasts, but to the coasts themselves
and to the manner in which they border this territory. A
State with a fairly small land area may well be justified in
claiming a much more extensive maritime territory than a
larger country. Everything depends on their respective ma-
ritime façades and their formations." (International Law
Reports, Vol. 77, p. 688, para. 119).
609. This reasoning applies with equal cogency both to
continental shelf entitlement and to entitlement to rights over an
exclusiveeconomic zone (or a fishery zone).
610. The extent of the areas of maritime jurisdiction of the
Parties may not be more relevant to the issue of delimitation than
the extent of the land area. But it may be noted that, as far as can
be estimated, the area of Greenland's fishery zone, within 200
nautical miles from baselines or within median lines as against
opposite coasts, is slightly over 2,000,000square kilometres. As it
can be said that Greenland is a large island, it is also manifest that
Greenland disposes of an extensive maritime area. For the King-
dom of Denmark as a whole, another 300,000 square kilometres
must be added (estimated on the same basis, and excluding claims
to continental shelf areas beyond 200 nautical miles or median
lines).
(b) Population
611. In the same vein the Danish Memorial invokes the
question of population, as in the following passage:
"Greenland has approximately 55,000 inhabitants, six per
cent. of them living on the east coast. Greenland has been
inhabited for several thousand years. Jan Mayen has no
settled population at al1and has never had any." (Danish
Memorial, p. 110,para. 351; emphasis in the original).
612. As a matter of law, the comparative population figures
are as irrelevant as the argument based on relative landmass.
Population isnot a factor related to the shelfor other entitlements
of the coastal State, any more than it is an element in title to the
land territory itself. 613. In this connection the Danish Memorial (p. 98, para.
303)invokes the decision of 30June 1977in the Anglo-FrenchCase
(the passages relied on byDenmark are set out at pp. 82-4,paras.
278-9). In fact the passages quoted refer to population simply as
an aspect of the general description of the importance of the
Channel Islands.
614. The striking fact is that the Court of Arbitration gave
very little, if any, entitlement to the Channel Islands inspite of
what it had said about "the size and importance of the Channel
Islands" (Reports of International Arbitral Awards p. 89, para.
187).The Court also made it clear that it was the location of the
Channel Islands within the overall geographical and legal frame-
work which was "the primary element in the present problem":
ibid. pp. 89-90, para. 187;p. 93, para. 196;p. 94, para. 199.The
brutal fact is that "the sizeand importance", and the population,
of the Channel Islands did not count for very much.
615. In any case the factual data provided by the Danish
Memorial are unconvincing. A very small proportion of the
population of Greenland liveswithin the Arctic Circle, at the same
latitudes as Jan Mayen. Moreover, the comparison of the popu-
lation figuresis less impressive when the densities are considered.
The figure for Jan Mayen (population of 25) works out at one
person per 15 square kilometres compared with the figure for
Greenland of one person per 40 square kilometres.
616. This comparison is even less impressive when it is
recalled that only 6 per cent. of the population of Greenland lives
in East Greenland (according to the Danish Memorial, p. 36,
para. 148).From the Danish Statistical Yearbookit appears that
the total population of East Greenland on 1 January 1989 was
3,425, of whom 564 lived in the municipality of Scoresbysund
(Statistical Yearbook,Vol. 93 (1989), Copenhagen, 1989,p. 418).
(c) Conclusion
617. It is generally recognized that considerations of land-
mass and population do not qualify as relevant circumstances for
the purpose of applyingequitable principles in order to achieve an
equitable solution. Such considerations do not bear upon the
entitlement of the coastal State which derives from its coastline,
and not from the landmass or the demographic conditions of the
landmass. 9. THEPRACTIC OF OTHER STATE IN SIMILAR
GEOGRAPHIC SATUATIONS
(a) The Principle
618. In response to the proposition (from one of the Parties)
that the practice of Statesprovides "significant and reliable
evidence of normal standards of equity", the Court in itsg-
ment in the Libya-Malta Case observed: "The Court for its part
has no doubt about the importance of State practice in this
matter": I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 38, para. 44. Accordingly, the
Norwegian Government will identify a substantial sample of
geographical situations which are comparable to the relationship
between Greenland and Jan Mayen and which have been the
subject of international agreement.
(b) Normal Standards of Equity in Comparable Cases
619. For reasons of convenience, theamples of the prac-
tice of States willbe presented in chronological order, on the basis
of the date of signature of the instruments.
(1) The United Kingdom-Norway(Phase 1) (1965)
620. TheGovernments of Norway and the United Kingdom
signed an agreement delimiting the continental shelf boundary
between the two States on 10March 1965(Annex 44).Article 1of
the Agreement provides that the dividing line "shall be based, with
certainminor divergencies for administrative convenience, on a
line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of
the baselines from which the territorial sea of each country is
measured".
621. Thus the principle of equidistance was employed for
the entire alignment of 359nautical miles. Full effect was givento
the Shetland Islands. The final threeectors of the boundary,
totalling 150 nautical miles, used four basepoints on the eastern
side of the Shetland group. The distance between the relevant
coasts in these three northernmost sectors ranges from approxi-
mately 164to 196nautical miles.
622. The length of the Shetland Islands is approximately
113 kilometres and the greatest breadth is 58 kilometres The total
area is 1,427square kilometres. (2) Japan-Republicof Korea
623. Japan and Republic of Korea signeda continental shelf
boundary Agreement on 30 January 1974 (Annex 56). The
boundary thus established givesfull effect to the Japanese islands
of Tsushima, situated about 27 nautical miles from the nearest
Japanese island of Kyushu.
624. The Tsushima islands are approximately 70 kilometres
in length and 16 kilometres in width. According to the US
Department of State publication Limits in theSeas: "The majority
of the turning points are very close to being equidistant from one
point on each country's baseline" (Limitsin theSeas,No. 75,p. 6).
(3) India-Indonesia(Phase 1) (1974)
625. India and Indonesia signed a continental shelf Agree-
ment on 8 August 1974 (Annex 57). The Agreement established
three straight lineectors as the boundary between Great Nicobar
(India) and Sumatra, a total distance of 47.9 nautical miles. The
alignment represents a modified median line and the consequence
is that theIndian island of Great Nicobar is given full effect.
626. The relevant basepoints are between approximately 80
and 100nautical miles apart. Great Nicobar is 54kilometres long
from north to south.
(4) Panama-Columbia(1976)
627. On 20 November 1976,Panama and Colombia signed
an agreement delimiting maritime boundaries in the Caribbean
Sea and the Pacific Ocean (Annex 58).Article 1of the Agreement
expressly adopts the principle of equidistance.
628. Whilst the median line in the Caribbean is constructed
as a step-like configuration for the sake of convenience, the
principle of equidistance has been applied throughout with only
minor deviations. The result is that the very small islands and cays
on which Colombian entitlement is based have been given full
effect. The island cays involved include Roncador Cay, Cayos del
Este Sudeste and Cayos de Albuquerque. (5) India- TheMaldives (1976)
629. The Governments of the Republic of India and the
Republic of the Maldives signed a maritime boundary Agreement
on 28December 1976(Annex 59).According to Limits in the Seas,
"the boundary closely approximates an equidistance line" (p.7).
630. The delimitation has two principal features. In the first
place, as between the mainland of India and the Maldive Islands.
In general the Maldives are given full effect. However, the
east-west trending segment of the delimitation involves allowing
the modest and isolated Indian island of Minicoy full effect as
against the northernmost atoll of the Maldives. Minicoy is located
110 nautical miles from the nearest of the Laccadive Islands
(which are Indian) and 210 nautical miles from the Indian
mainland. Overall, the arrangements provide no evidence of
discrimination against offshore islands. The Maldives are some
230 nautical miles from the coast of India.
(6)India-Indonesia(Phase 2)(1977)
631. The delimitation of 1974between Great Nicobar and
Sumatra (see No. (3), paras. 625-6 above) was confirmed and
extended by an Agreement signed on 14January 1977(Annex 60).
This arrangement extended the boundary of 1974between the two
countries in the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean in areas not
covered by the previous Agreement.
(7) CostaRica-Colombia (1977)
632. Colombia and Costa Rica signed an Agreement relat-
ing to their maritime boundary on 17March 1977.The Agreement
has not yet been ratified (Annex 61). Although the Agreement
does not adhere to any particular principle of delimitation, the
actual boundary established gives more or less full effect to the
small islands and cays in the Caribbean which form the basis of
Colombian entitlement. The alignment is related predominantly
to the Cayos de Albuquerque so far as Colombian-claimed
territory is concerned.
(8) UnitedStates- Venezuela(1978)
633. Venezuela and the United States signed a maritime
boundary Agreement on 28 March 1978 (Annex 63). The align-
ment consists of a series of geodetic lines, 298.7 nautical miles inlength. Whilst the provisions of the Agreement make no express
reference to equidistance, the resulting line of division evidently
gives full effect to the fringe of small islands off the coast of the
Venezuelan mainland (including the Netherlands Antilles) and, in
the eastern sectors, it produces a median line between the United
States possession of St. Croix and Isla Aves of Venezuela.
634. The treatment of Isla Avesis particularly striking. This
feature is lesshan half a hectare in area and has a height of only
3 metres. In Storm conditions the island is swept by waves and,
consequently, the research station, which is the only habitation, is
on an offshore platform constructed close to the beach and
connected with it by a walkway. The island is 300 nautical miles
from the Venezuelan mainland.
(9) The Netherlands -Venezuela(1978)
635. Venezuela and the Netherlands signed a maritime
boundary Agreement on 31 March 1978 (Annex 64). The align-
ment is not expressly based on any particular principle of
delimitation and consists of a series of geodetic lines. SectoB of
the boundary liesbetween the Leeward Islands of the Netherlands
Antilles (Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao) and the coast of Venezuela.In
the result the delimitation gives full effect to offshore islands.
(10) UnitedStates - Mexico (1978)
636. The United States and Mexico signed a maritime
boundary Agreement on 4 May 1978.The Agreement has not yet
been ratified (Annex 65). The Agreement does not refer to any
particular method of delimitation and establishes a series of
geodetic lines. In doing so full effect is given to three very small
insular features some distance off the coast of Yucatan: Arenas
Cay, Isla Desterrada, and Arrecife Alacran.
(11) India- Thailand(1978)
637. India and Thailand signed a continental shelf bound-
ary Agreement on 22 June 1978 (Annex 66). The resulting
delimitation accords almost full effect to the Nicobar Islands, the
qualification arising from the fact that certain small islands
offshore Thailand appear to have been employed as basepoints. (12) The UnitedKingdom -Norway(Phase 2) (1978)
638. On 22 December 1978Norway and the United King-
dom signed a Protocol Supplementary to the Continental Shelf
Boundary Agreement of 10 March 1965(Annex 67). This agree-
ment continues the boundary further north, thus confirming the
full weight accorded to the Shetland Islands. The preamble to the
Protocol reiterates the provisions of Article 1of the Agreement of
10March 1965,which adopted the method of delimitation on the
basis of equidistance.
(13) DominicanRepublic - Venezuela(1979)
639. The Dominican Republic and Venezuela signed a
maritime boundary Agreement on 3 March 1979(Annex 68).
640. The alignment described in the Agreement is an equi-
distant line between the Dominican Republic and the Netherlands
Antilles islands of Aruba, Curacao and Bonaire, which are,
respectively, 15 nautical miles, 35 nautical miles and 48 nautical
miles from the Venezuelan mainland. The lengths of these three
islands are, respectively, 30 kilometres, 60 kilometres, and 35
kilometres. The Agreement, like the United States-Venezuela
Agreement of 1978(see No.8, paras. 633-4 above), givesfull effect
to the islands of the Netherlands Antilles.
(14) Denmark - Norway(1979)
641. On 15 June 1979 Norway and Denmark signed an
Agreement demarcating the continental shelf boundary between
the Faroes and Norway, and applying it for other jurisdictional
zones (Annex 69, see further [XX]above). This delimitation gave
fulleffectto the Faroe Islands.These islands are 308nautical miles
from the mainland of Norway. They stretch 60 miles from north
tosouth.
(15) Venezuela- France(1980)
642. Venezuela and France signed a maritime boundary
Agreement on 17July 1980(Annex 71).
643. The delimitation is between Isla Aves, a very small
feature belonging to Venezuela (see No. 8, paras. 633-4 above),
and the French possessions of Guadeloupe and Martinique
respectively. It is based on two sectors of the same meridian(Article 1).Whilst Isla Aves is not in the result given full effect in
al1 respects, the delimitation treats the small Venezuelan island
and the very large French islands on a basis of parity.
(16) France- Australia(1982)
644. The Governments of France and Australia signed a
maritime boundary Agreement on 4 January 1982(Annex 73).
645. Article 2 of this Agreement establishes a boundary
between the French possessions of the Kerguelen Islands, on the
one hand, and the Australian Heard and McDonald Islands, on
the other.These possessions are approximately 200nautical miles
apart. The Kerguelens have an area of about 7,000 square
kilometres and the Australian islands about 378 square kilome-
tres. The equidistance line delimitation agreed upon gives equal
effect to the relatively small Australian islands.
(17) India- Myanmar (Burma( )1986)
646. India and Myanmar (formerly Burma) signed a mari-
time boundary agreement on 23 December 1986(Annex 75).
647. The Agreement establishes a maritime boundary be-
tween the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, dependencies of India,
and the coasts of Myanmar. The Andaman Islands lie about 540
nautical miles from the mainland of India, and the Nicobar
Islands (lying some 80 nautical miles further south) are even
farther from India. The two chains of islands lie approximately
300 nautical miles west of the Burmese Coast.
648. The delimitation established clearly accords fullweight
to the Andaman and Nicobar groups in relation to Myanmar in
spite of the remoteness of the mainland of India. In essence the
Andaman Islands are treated as mainland for the purpose of
creating an equidistance line. Within this context the very small
Indian islands of Narcondam and Barren Island, lying 70 and 44
nautical miles respectivelyeast of the main Andaman chain, have
been given half effect.
(c) The Practice Contradicts the Danish Claims
649. The practice provides no support for the type of claim
formulated by Denmark in its Memorial. The evidencecontradictsthe existenceof any equitable standard based upon an "outer limit
of the 200-mile zone" principle. But not only does it negate the
existence of such a formula as such as a modus operandi, it also
shows that isolated islands and groups of islands are normally
given full effect.
650. In this context the Danish Memorial (pp. 117-18,
paras. 365-66) alleges that State practice supports the Danish
method of delimitation, but then only refers to the arrangements
between Norway and Iceland which, as has been indicated earlier,
depended upon concessions based upon special considerations of
a political character. Elsewherein the Memorial (pp. 91-94,paras.
289-90), seven other items of practice are invoked by the Appli-
cant State. For various reasons none of these items of practice
support the Danish claims in these proceedings.
651. There is only one item which involves the outcome
contended for by Denmark and that is the delimitation between
Norway and Iceland. This delimitation is quite exceptional by any
standard of comparison and stands entirely by itself. The case of
Bjarrnarya(Bear Island, p. 94) is irrelevant because it does not
involve a delimitation in international law. It is a matter of an
administrative distinction between two areas to which different
rules apply (see paras. 230-1).
652. Cases (5) and (6) offered by the Danish Memorial
(Faroe Islands-Norway and Denmark-Sweden) involve the giving
of full effectto islands in relation to a mainland, as the Memorial
recognizes (pp. 93-4).
653. The residue of the practice invoked by Denmark
consists of three delimitations in the Baltic Sea. Two of these
delimitations involve alignments affected by the Swedishisland of
Gotland (delimitations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics and Poland) (Annexes 76 and 78), and the third involves an
alignment affected by the Danish island of Bornholm (delimita-
tion with the German Democratic Republic) (Annex 77).
654. The geographical relationships of the riparian States
within the Baltic are so very different from those of States
bordering the oceanic expanses to the east of Greenland that it is
difficult to see any marked element of comparability which could
be said to give relevance, however limited, to these Baltic delim-
itations.
655. However, there is one aspect of these cases which is of
interest for present purposes. In each delimitation the offshoreisland is treated to a very considerableextent as ij'itweremainland.
This is particularly true of Bornholm, since the deviation of the
alignment from the median line is limited in extent. According to
this analysis,these examples of State practice militate in favour of
giving full effect to an island like Jan Mayen, more especially
because the "treatment as mainland" factor must be even more
influential in the case of an isolated island 250nautical miles from
the other mainland coast.
(d) Conclusion
656. In the submission of the Government of Norway, the
substantial sample of State practice set forth above provides
cogent evidence that in comparable geographical situations, in-
volving essentially similar coastal relationships, the normal stan-
dard of equity involves giving full effectto major offshore islands.
Moreover in the practice even minor features are given full effect
when they are geographically isolated and consequentlyare treated
essentially as mainland.
657. The relevant practice extends from 1965 to 1986 and
therefore cannot be said to reflect a view ofthe law which is other
than contemporary. Moreover, the practice encompasses both
shelf delimitations and other maritime delimitations. The pattern
also includes delimitations within a variety of regions: the Carib-
bean (6), the Gulf of Mexico (l), Asia (6), and Europe (3). Three
of the delimitations involve one or both of the Parties to these
proceedings.
658. The Danish Memorial (p. 118, para. 367) states that
"The concept of equity contains . . .an element of predictability"
and earlier in this Part of the present Counter-Memorial (paras.
434-6) the factor of the stability of boundaries is affirmed. Given
the extravagant nature of the Danish claim and the actual pattern
of the State practice, it is clear that it is the solution proposed by
Denmark which is bound to promote unpredictability and confu-
sion in the relations of States if it were to be given legitimacy. CHAPTERVI11
CONCLUSIONSON THE EQUITABLESOLUTION
659. It has been shown above that there exists a treaty
relationship between the Parties in respect of the delimitation of
the parts of the continental shelf appertaining to each of them
(Chapters 1and II of this Part). It has further been shown that the
conduct of the Parties by a process of express recognition, tacit
recognition or acquiescencehas led to the establishment of a legal
status quo in respect of maritime delimitation, and that this
conduct has, moreover, created a situation in which the principles
of opposability and estoppel affect the delimitation issues(Chap-
ters III and VI of this Part). It is the contention of the Govern-
ment of Norway that, on the basis of these considerations, the
median line is a boundary in place, and one which follows from
those specificelements of law referred to above. The median line,
asthe boundary for the continental shelfand for the fishery zones,
is at thesame time an equitablesolution under the test of general
international law.
660. That willbe shown in the following conclusions on the
application of those elements which are operative under general
international law to indicate the equitable solution.hese conclu-
sions are presented without prejudice to any of the two foregoing
sets of argument and conclusions.
(a) The Delimitation ShouldReJlect the Substance of
Entitlement
661. In the light of the considerations advanced earlier in
this Part, the elements in the equitable solution appropriate to the
circumstances of this casecan now be articulated. There can be no
doubt that the primary element is that the delimitation should
reflect the substance of entitlement.A delimitation which departs
from the geographical realities willfail to give fullfaith and credit
to the maritime entitlement of the State concerned and, especially
in the case of islands, will also derogate from the title to the land
territory itself,ince the first flows from the second.
662. The Danish claims are characterized by extremism, and
so much so that at one point in the Memorial (pp. 119-20,para.372) a line is proposed which goes beyond the 200-milelimit. The
nature of the claims (in either version) must involve a serious
reduction of the entitlement of Jan Mayen as a territory subject to
Norwegian sovereignty. Suchexaggerated and monopolistic claims
are not simply "inequitable" but in legal terms invalid.
(b) Between Opposite Coasts the Presumption Is that the Median
Line Is the Appropriate Means of Achieving an Equitable Result
663. Both in the context of continental shelf delimitation
and the delimitation of adjacent fisheries zones, the presumption
is that themedian line is the appropriate means of achieving an
equitable result as between states with opposite coasts. The
jurisprudence points to the double-sided nature of this principle.
In the first place, the method is a logical consequence of the
geography of coasts as a major relevant circumstance and,
secondly, the criterion of equal division is both equitable and
convenient, because it is uncomplicated. As the Chamber stated in
the Gulf of Maine Case, the equal division of areas where the
maritime projections of the States concerned converge is "a
criterion long held to be as equitable as it is simple" (I.C.J.
Reports 1984,p. 327,para. 195).
(c) The General GeographicalContext Has the Consequencethat
Jan Mayen Be Accorded FullEffect as a Geographically
Independent Feature
664. The general geographical context within which the
relation of Greenland and Jan Mayen is to be assessed consists of
the oceanic expanse between Greenland and Novaya Zemlya and
north of the Arctic Circle. This geographical context is character-
ized by openness. The sea areas are extrovert and form extensive
portals to other oceanic expanses.
665. The context thus lacks any of the characteristics of a
semi-enclosed sea. Jan Mayen stands in isolation 250 nautical
miles east of Greenland. It is geographically independent and
cannot be said to be associated with any other coasts. Jan Mayen
is juxtaposed to Greenland and Greenland is juxtaposed to Jan
Mayen. There is no legal or geographical basis for discrimination
between their respective coasts. Each coast has equal generative
value.
666. This general datum produces two corollaries. First, the
only relevant coasts arethose of Greenland and Jan Mayen. Thereisno legalrelationship between thecoasts of Norway itself and the
coasts of Greenland. In particular, there is no convergence
between the entitlements of Norway and Greenland, and to the
east, north and southeast of Jan Mayen there is a large area of
high seas. Secondly, the lengths of the respective coasts can have
no relevance within the geographical context described above,
which involves thejuxtaposition of two entities at a considerable
distance from each other and not forming part of any introverted
geographical framework.
(d) There Is No Effects and Justifying Abatementroportionate
667. In the circumstances of the present case there is no
geographical feature which could be said to be an "incidental
special feature" causing disproportionate effects. The question of
classification of what is "incidental" is to be determined in
relation to the geographical and legal context. Abatement can
only be legallyjustified when there is a system of "equality on the
same plane" in relation to which a particular feature constitutes a
solecism. No such system can be reasonably identified in the
present case.
668. The errors in the reasoning of the Danish Memorial are
clearly indicated by the eccentric claims to which the reasoning
gives birth. The delimitation proposed is a prime example of a
breach of the principle of non-encroachment and produces a
result which, instead of enhancing equity, brings about a major
departure from the realities of the geographical situation.
(e) The Principle of Non-Encroachrrzent
669. The delimitation proposed by Denmark is a prime
example of a breach of the principle of non-encroachment. The
Court adverted to that principle in the Libya-Malta Case (I.C.J.
Reports 1985, p. 39, para. 46), in the context of listing equitable
principles. The Court first mentioned the principle that there is to
be "no question of refashioning geography, or compensating for
the inequalities of nature". Itthen stated:
"the related principle ofnon-encroachment by one party on
the natural prolongation of the other, which is no more than
the negative expression of the positive rule that the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights over the continental shelf offits
coasts to the full extent authorized by international law in
the relevant circumstances" (loc. cit.).
670. The Danish claims would result in a delimitation which
inthose preciseterms would in factcreate an encroachment on the
area of continental shelf which in the relevant circumstances is
appurtenant to Norway. That would be an encroachment which
would not only be a major departure from the realities of the
geographical situation, but one which would exceed the limits
established by Danish legislation in its definition of Denmark's
continental shelf.
(f) Norway Has a Substantial Interest in the Maritime Areas
aroundJan Mayen
671. One of the circumstances of major relevance is the
existence of a substantial Norwegian interest both in the Green-
land and Norwegian Seas as a whole and in the maritime areas
appurtenant to Jan Mayen. This substantial interest consists of a
number of interacting elements, involving the specific interests
themselves and the nature of the disposition of Norwegian
territory in theregion as a whole.
672. A significant element in this complex of interests is the
existence and location of Jan Mayen and its maritime entitle-
ments, which represent a considerable Norwegian asset. It should
be no part of a procedure of "equitable delimitation" to assist in
the Danish attempt substantially to reduce the status and entitle-
ments of Jan Mayen.
673. The interests of Norway in the areas around Jan
Mayen, and in the island as such in respect of the appurtenant
maritime areas, have been identified in Chapters III of Part 1and
in paragraphs 567-596 above. Those interests tend to form a
natural grouping, since the communications and rescue facilities
based on Jan Mayen are of obvious importance for the exploita-
tion of natural resources in the water column and sea bed, and the
protection of those engaged in such activities.
674. In the Danish Memorial there are several passages
devoted to the significance of fisheries, but the statements made
and the data supplied do not focus very much upon the maritime
areas between Greenland and Jan Mayen. In any event no legaljustification is offered for a claim which would result in a virtual
monopoly of al1natural resources, both present and future, of the
relevant maritime areas.
(g) The Factorsof Area and PopulationProvide No
Supportfor the Danish Claim
675. As a matter of legal principle, considerations as to
relative landmass and comparative populations are irrelevant to
the procedure of equitable delimitation. Moreover, in the condi-
tions prevailing within the Arctic Circle, the tendency in the
Memorial to make play with adjectives such as "desolate" and
"uninhabited" is utterly misplaced. In this type of environment
ice-free islands in favourable locations are more significant, area
for area, than other types of territory.
(h) The Median Line Solution Rejlects the Normal Standards of
Equity as Evidencedby State Practice in Comparable
GeographicalSituations
676. The relevant State practice has been reviewed in para-
graphs 618-658 above. The practice shows that isolated islands
and groups of islands are normally given full effect.
677. It is generally accepted that a factor to be taken into
account in reaching an equitable result is "the effects, actual or
prospective, of any other continental shelf delimitations between
adjacent States in the same region": seethe Judgment in the North
Sea Cases, I.C.J. Reports 1969, pp. 54-55, para. 101 (D(3)).
678. In the present case it is evident that the geographical
scope of the decision must be limited in order to avoid impinging
upon the rights of Iceland.
679. The Court has affirmed the role of proportionality as
"a test of the equitableness of the result of a delimitation", which
is to be applied "once the Court has indicated the method ofdelimitation which results from the applicable principles and rules
of international law": see the Judgment of the Court in the
Libya-Malta case, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 46, para. 59.
680. Thus proportionality (in the form of a factor based on
the ratio of the lengths of the respective coasts) is not an
independent principle of delimitation, but a test of the equitable-
ness of a result arrived at by other means: ibid., pp. 43-46, paras.
55-58. In the Libya-Malta Case the Court was very explicit in its
refusa1to recognize coastal length as "a principle of entitlement ...
and ...method of putting that principle into operation": ibid., p.
45, para. 58.
681. In the context of the delimitation of a single maritime
boundary, the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case adopted the
same position on the key questions of principle. In the words of
the Judgment:-
"...the Chamber remains aware of the fact that to take into
account the extent of the respective coasts of the Parties
concerned does not in itself constitute either a criterion
serving as a direct basis for a delimitation, or a method that
can be used to implement such delimitation. The Chamber
recognizes that this concept is put forward mainly as a
means of checking whether a provisional delimitation estab-
lished initially on the basis of other criteria, and by the use
of a method which has nothing to do with that concept, can
or cannot be considered satisfactory in relation to certain
geographical features of the specific case, and whether it is
reasonable or otherwise to correct it accordingly. The Cham-
ber's views on this subject may be summed up by observing
that a maritime delimitation can certainly not be established
by a direct division of the area in dispute proportional to the
respectivelengths of the coasts belonging to the parties in the
relevant area...."(I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 323, para. 185).
682. In the context of the present proceedings, the test of
proportionality is in principle to be applied to the median line
boundary. At the outset it may be noted that it is not the practice
for international tribunals to resort to the use of mathematical
ratios of the lengths of coasts. Moreover, in its Judgment in the
Libya-Malta Case the Court pointed to the practical difficulties
which may stand in the way of resorting to a cornparison of such
mathematical ratios, and, in particular, the difficulties in identi-
fying the relevant coasts and the relevant area: I.C.J. Reports
1985,p. 53,para. 74.The Court therefore foundit appropriate "tomake a broad assessment of the equitableness of the result,
without seeking to define the equities in arithmetical termsibid.,
pp. 54-55, para. 75.
683. In the circumstances of the present dispute, propor-
tionality rather than disproportionality results from the adoption
of a median line. The median line alone can reflect the casual
juxtaposition of the two opposite coasts, 250nautical miles apart.
The median line alone can reflect the substantial interest of
Norway in the maritime areas which form part of its entitlement
by virtue of its sovereignty over the large, isolated island of Jan
Mayen.
684. The use of a comparison of coastal lengths in the
present case would result in an arbitraryefusa1to givefullweight
to the relevant circumstances which form part of the process of
evolving an equitable solution. The importance of security con-
siderations, of whaling, sealing and fisheries, of the resource
potential of the seabed areas, and of the conduct of the parties,
cannot be subject to the irrational veto which must necessarily
result if disparities in the lengths of coasts wereto be givena major
role in the process of delimitation.
685. In the case of an isolated island like Jan Mayen, to
reduce the normal entitlements to maritime areas (based on
equidistance) by givingdispositive significanceto the fact that 250
miles to the west there is a large landmass, the two entities not
CO-existingwithin any coherent framework, would be contrary to
common sense, and constitute a threat to legal stability.
686. In the present case the selection of relevant coasts and
the construction of a relevant area wouldinvolve an unacceptably
arbitrary procedure. The geographical relationships involved are
simple and not susceptible to manipulation.
687. The claim presented in the Danish Memorial is of
considerable interest because it provides a graphic example of the
results of using "proportionality" whilst ignoring the constraints
formulated in the jurisprudence. Following an unconvincing
account of the legal principles relating to proportionality (pp.
102-9,paras. 320-40), the Memorial applies "the proportionality
factor" essentially as an independent basis of delimitation. 688. The key passages in the Memorial (see, in particular,
pp. 109-11, paras. 342-56; pp. 118-21, paras. 368-77) involve a
series of substantial breaches of the principles of equitable delim-
itation which may be formulated as follows:
(a) "The factor of proportionality" is employed as an indepen-
dent basis of delimitation: this is particularly evident in the
passages dealing with the method of delimitation (seepp. 119-21,
paras. 371-77).
(b) The other factors alleged to be relevant to an equitable
solution are treated as confirmatory of the "proportionality"
argument rather than the factor of proportionality being used as
a test of the delimitation arrived at in accordance with the
equitable principles. This aspect of the reasoning is evident in two
distinct sections of the Memorial (see pp. 1 10-11, paras. 346-55;
and pp. 119-21,paras. 372-73).
(c) "The factor of proportionality" is employed in an attempt to
legitimate an alignment based on a "200 mile outer limit criterion"
which forms no part of the corpus of methods of equitable
delimitation, which is prima facie inequitable (involving a radical
departure from the principle of equal division), and which inevi-
tably involves a radical departure also from the principle of
non-encroachment.
689. The delimitation of the areas in dispute by means of a
median line is also justified by the consistent conduct of the
Parties prior to the period when the dispute crystallized. The
conduct of the Parties is important in several ways. Their mutual
treaty relationship is one element of conduct. The actions of the
Parties, and their exchanges in respect of delimitation matters,
have contributed to the process under which recognition, accep-
tance, acquiescence etc. have produced legal effects.
690. For the application of the elements of general interna-
tional law, the conduct of the Parties has three forms of relevance.
In the first place, it is a relevant circumstance which is allied with
other circumstances or factors in establishing the equitable char-
acter of the median line both as a method of delimitation and as
an equitable solution.
691. Secondly, the conduct of the Parties provides an
autonomous criterion of equity, since the criterion involves ex-press acceptance of the equitable nature of the median line in the
relations of the Parties in the context of maritime delimitation.
Moreover, the conduct of the Parties also constitutes an entirely
separate legal basis, that of acquiescence (or recognition), for the
validity of delimitation of the maritimeareas between Jan Mayen
and Greenland in accordance with equidistance. (The issue of
acquiescence or recognition has been examined in Chapters III
and IV of this Part of the Counter-Memorial).
692. Thirdly, the conduct of the Parties confirms the ineq-
uitable and eccentric character of the method of delimitation
proposed in the Danish Memorial. The "200 mile outer limit
criterion" proposed by Denmark is eccentric in terms of general
principle and also in terms of Denmark's own conduct. The claims
appear entirely without foundation and werenot foreshadowed by
the conduct of Denmark prior to the development of the present
dispute.
693. The opportunism of Denmark's claim is highlighted by
its explicit acceptance of the principle of equidistance in relation
to the Faroe Islands in 1979in a geographical context of opposite
coasts (seeparas. 183and 285-9).This arrangement was consistent
with the general pattern of conduct of Norway and Denmark both
interse and with respect to third States. And yet, according to the
Memorial, the key item of practice is the Norwegian delimitation
with Iceland. Thus the one instance of departurefrom the pattern
is picked out by Denmark as the one which has normative
significance.
694. The Government of Norway submits that the equitable
solution in the present case can only be effected by means of a
median line.
695. In concluding its presentation of the elements of an
equitable solution, the Government of Norway would respectfully
draw the attention of the Court to a prominent difference between
the delimitations contended for. The delimitations which will be
the subject of Norway's submissions reflect legal principle. In
contrast, the Danish claims are eccentric, appear to be invented to
serve tactical needs, are fundamentally opposed to normal
principles of entitlement to maritime areas, are a departure from
the usual practice of the Parties in the context of maritimedelimitation, and, in terms of access to natural resources, are
monopolistic since the area of convergence would be entirely
appropriated by the Applicant State. D: SUMMARY OF PRINCIPALCONCLUSIONS.
PROCEDURALISSUES
696. Norway's interests in the maritime areas around Jan
Mayen are represented by the entitlement in respect of the
appurtenant continental shelf, and by the 200 mile fisheries zone
established by the Royal Decree of 23 May 1980.Norway has the
right to establish an exclusive economic zone in the area. These
entitlements exist by virtue of general international law.
697. When the dispute crystallized, it was associated with
the capelin fishery. That is an important matter. However, the
Danish claims set the question of delimitation at large, and a
complex of significant interests has been raised.
698. This complex of interests includes the long-established
patterns for the harvesting of other living resources, a protective
element and an interest in the resource potential of the seabed.
The interests of Norway in the region are not confined to the
question of fisheries, but comprise al1those interests which are
linked to Norway's sovereignty over Jan Mayen.
699. The Danish claims in this case are unacceptable. In the
first place the Court is asked "to adjudge and declare that
Greenland is entitled to a full 200 mile fishery zone and continen-
tal shelfvis-à-visthe island of Jan Mayen..."In form,the primary
issues are issues of entitlement, while the real issue is that of
delimitation. The dispute flows from the existence of overlapping
areas of appurtenant maritime entitlements.
700. Secondly, the delimitation contended for by Denmark
- in effect, the outer limit of the Danish continental shelf and
fishing zone of 200 miles - has no basis in international law. It
would appropriate the entire zone of convergence for the Appli-
cant State. These claims apparently stem from the Danish reaction
to the Norwegian concessions granted to Iceland (Danish Memo-
rial p. 15,para. 47).The Danish claims seekto rely on an outcome
of negotiations between Norway and Iceland which belongs
exclusively within the political domain. The Memorial cites astatement by the Danish Minister that "Greenland must not be
treated less favourably than Iceland in relation to Jan Mayen"
(loc. cit.). This statement has no legal basis.
701. The foregoing considerations of fact and law lead to
the following principal conclusions in relation to the question of
delimitation:
(1)In respect of the continental shelf there is a median line
boundary in place. The precise articulation of the alignment
remains to be agreed. This continental shelf boundary is based
upon
- the treaty obligations of the parties inter se; and/or
-the express recognition and adoption of the boundary by
Denmark; and/or
-the tacit recognition of, or acquiescence in, the boundary by
Denmark; and/or
-the opposability of the boundary to Denmark; and/or
- the operation of estoppel; and/or
- the operation of the pertinent equitable principles and relevant
circumstances forming part of general international law.
(2)In respect of the delimitation of adjoining fisheries zones
between Greenland and Jan Mayen, the median line constitutes
the boundary in accordance with international law. The precise
articulation of the alignment remains to be agreed. The median
line in respect of fisheriesjurisdiction is based upon
-the express recognition and adoption of the boundary by
Denmark; and/or
-the tacit recognition of, or acquiescence in, the boundary by
Denmark; and/or
-the opposability of the boundary to Denmark; and/or
- the operation of estoppel; and/or
-the operation of the pertinent equitable principles and relevant
circumstances forming part of international law.
(3)The conduct of the Parties forms a prominent part of the
considerations of fact and law. The bilateral Agreement of 1965on delimitation of the continental shelf remains in force. The
continuing relevance of Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Con-
vention of 1958, as applied in the light of the continental shelf
Agreement of 1965 and of the general pattern of the relations
between the Parties, provides a powerful complement to the
elements of recognition, acquiescence, estoppel and opposability.
(4) Al1these elements are reflections of the fundamental principle
of good faith in international relations. As the record shows, it
was the Government of Denmark which challenged a well-
established status quo based upon the long-existing recognition of
the median line as the basis of delimitation.
702. The Applicant State requests the Court "consequently
to draw a single line of delimitation of the fishing zone and
continental shelf area of Greenland at a distance of 200 nautical
milesmeasured from Greenland's baseline" (Danish Mernorial, p.
125,para. 379).
703. To the extent that the claim for a single line is a claim
for a delimitation of a different nature as compared with other
delimitations, Norway is bound to point out that no agreement
exists between the two Parties, either on a procedural levelor with
regard to the substance of such a claim. Without the agreement of
the Parties, such a claim would not be admissible.
704. Further, the Norwegian Government submits that in
these proceedings the judicial function is limited in one particular
respect. In the opinion of the Norwegian Government there are
substantive considerations both of lawand ofjudicial convenience
in favour of the view that the Court should confine itself to a
recognition of the legality of theedian line boundaries requested
in the submissions which follow below, and not proceed to the
precise articulation ofthose boundaries. In the circumstances the
Norwegian Government respectfully submits that the adjudica-
tion should result in a judgment which is declaratory as to the
bases of delimitation, and which leavesthe precise articulation (or
demarcation) of the alignment to negotiation between the Parties. 705. The Government of Norway formally reserves its
position in relation to the reformulation of Greenland basepoints
and baselines referred to in the Danish Memorial (p. 9, in the
footnote to para. 22).
706. The Government of Norway states that its requests to
the Court (as formulated in the submissions which follow) are
without prejudice to the determination of any tripoint.
707. Any assertions of fact or inferences therefrom con-
tained in the Danish Memorial which are not the subject of
express contradiction or qualification in the present Counter-
Memorial arenot by that fact alone to be taken as accepted by the
Government of Norway. PART III
SUBMISSIONSHaving regard to the considerations set forth in this Counter-
Memorial and, in particular, the evidence relating to the relations
of the Parties at thematerial times,
May it please the Court to adjudgeand declare that:
(1) The median line constitutes the boundary for the purpose of
delimitation of the relevantareas of the continental shelf between
Norway and Denmark in the region between Jan Mayen and
Greenland;
(2) The median line constitutes the boundary for the purpose of
delimitation of the relevant areas of the fisheries zones between
Norway and Denmark in the region between Jan Mayen and
Greenland;
The Danish claims are without foundation and invalid, and
that the Submissions contained in the Danish Memorial are
rejected.
Oslo, 11 May 1990
Bjmn Haug Per Tresselt
(signed) (signed)
Agents of the Government of theKingdom of Norway APPENDIX 1
A NOTE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JAN MAYEN
The island of Jan Mayen was placed under Norwegian sovereignty
by the Royal Decree of 8 May 1930:"The Island of Jan Mayen is
hereby placed under Norwegian sovereignty." At that time the
State took over Jan Mayen from the Norwegian Meteorological
Institute, which had established property rights to the island in
1926.
Section 1of Act No. 2 of 27 February 1930(Annex 18)relating to
Jan Mayen reads as follows: "The island of Jan Mayen is part of
the Kingdom of Norway."
From the point of view of domestic law, Jan Mayen is in a special
position in relation tomainland Norway, in that Section 2 of the
Act lays down specific provisions concerning the application of
Norwegian legislation on the island. Norwegian civiland criminal
law and legislation relating to the administration of justice apply
automatically, whereas the extent to which other legislation shall
apply is to be "prescribed by the King". This means that statutes
and regulations pertaining to public law - which are not criminal
law or procedural rules - do not apply on Jan Mayen unless it is
specificallylaid down that they shall do so.
The main reason for this is a practical one. Much of the legislation
applicable on the mainland is unsuitable for Jan Mayen because
of geographical, ecological and social differences. Nor is there any
particular need for detailed administrative legislation on the
island. Another factor is Jan Mayen's administrative status. Jan
Mayen is part of Norway, but it is not a separate county,
municipality or electoral district.Thus it would be difficult to
apply administrative legislation designed for themainland insofar
as such legislation delegates authority to local bodies.
The administrative and legal arrangements for Jan Mayen are
similar tothose set out in the Act relating to dependencies and theAct relating to Svalbard. It is, however, important to point out
that the legal status of Jan Mayen differs from that of Svalbard
and the dependencies. Jan Mayen is part of the Realm in terms of
Article 1 of the Constitution, which means that it does not have
the status of a dependency. The essential difference between
Svalbard and Jan Mayen is that Norwegian sovereignty over
Svalbard has its origin in the Spitsbergen Treaty.
There is also a difference between Jan Mayen and Svalbard as
regards the need for legislation. Therefore, a number of statutes
have been made applicable to Svalbard, but not to Jan Mayen.
Examples are the Public Administration Act (cf. Section 4, third
paragraph), the Freedom of Information Act (cf. Section 1,
second paragraph), and the Act relating to the protection of
animals (cf. Section 33).
Separate regulations for Jan Mayen have been laid down when
there has been a specific need forthem. This applies particularly
to regulations relating to fishing and hunting, which were tradi-
tionally the only economic activities on the island. Hunting and
trapping on Jan Mayen weremade subject to the permission of the
Ministry of Trade by the Royal Decree of 6 June 1930, issued
pursuant to the Act relating to Jan Mayen. The Ministry pre-
scribed quotas. The Arctic fox was completely protected from
1930to 1935.
On 30June 1955a Royal Decree (No. 3471)was issuedconcerning
the entry into force of legislation relating to a Norwegian fishery
zone off Jan Mayen. At that time, a provisional fishery limit of 4
nautical miles beyond the baselines at Jan Mayen was prescribed.
Norway established an economic zone of 200 nautical miles by
Act No. 91 of 17 December 1976 (Annex 25). According to
Section 1 of the Act, the zone applies to theseas adjacent to the
"Kingdom of Norway". Thus the zone also comprises the sea
areas off Jan Mayen, as was explicitly stated in the travaux
préparatoires.Pursuant to the Act relating to an economic zone, a
200-mile fishery zone was established around Jan Mayen by the
Royal Decree of 23 May 1980(Annex 28).
Due both to difficult logistic conditions and to the military
activity on the island, it was considered desirable to regulate theadmission of foreign nationals to Jan Mayen. Pursuant to the Act
relating to Jan Mayen, separate aliens regulations were laid down
for Jan Mayen by Royal Decree No. 1 of 1 June 1962. As the
former Aliens Act was not made applicable to Jan Mayen, the
regulations include separate provisions concerning passport re-
quirements, etc. However, there are substantive differences as well
in that the aliens regulations for Jan Mayen arefar more stringent
than those that apply to the mainland. For example, nationals of
the other Nordic countries are required to obtain special permis-
sion to visit the island. As the new Immigration Act has been
made applicable to Jan Mayen, some of the provisions of the
regulations are now superfluous. The specialprovisions laid down
pursuant to the Act relating to Jan Mayen will,however, continue
to apply, which means that the rules regarding the admission of
foreign nationals are still more stringent as regards Jan Mayen
than as regards mainland Norway.
It is important to note that, basically, Norwegian legislation
applies to Jan Mayen. Norwegian civil law and criminal law and
the Norwegian legislation relating to the administration ofjustice
apply automatically to Jan Mayen. New legislation and statutory
amendments in these fields will also apply automatically to Jan
Mayen. It is only in respect of "other statutes", cf. Section 2,
second paragraph, of the Act relating to Jan Mayen, that it shall
be prescribed whether a given Act shall apply to Jan Mayen. This
applies in other words to legislation pertaining to public law other
than penal and procedural law, i.e. what is known as administra-
tive law.
The question whether or not an Act applies to Jan Mayen may be
complex because it is not always easy to determine whether an Act
or parts of an Act are civilor public law. To avoid uncertainty on
this point, it has become usual in recent years to authorize the
King to provide by regulations the extent to which statutes shall
apply to Jan Mayen and Svalbard. In 1986the Ministry of Justice
published a collection of statutes, regulations and provisions
relating to Jan Mayen.Regulations relating to the administration of Jan Mayen werelaid
down on 21 November 1980.
The Governorof Svalbard
The Governor of Svalbard will serve as Governor of Jan Mayen
"until further notice". The duties as chief of police, notary public
and assistant judge have been excepted, and fewof the Governor's
other functions on Svalbard are pertinent to Jan Mayen. The
Governor of Svalbard administers certain rules and regulations
which apply to both Svalbard and Jan Mayen, such as alcohol
regulations no. 2 of24June 1974,regulations no. 8792relating to
the preservation of cultural values, and conservation regulations.
This arrangement is not very practical, however, because of the
distance between Svalbard and Jan Mayen and the state of
communications between them.
Police Authority
For police purposes, Jan Mayen cornes under the chief ofpolicein
Bod0. Although the officer-in-charge of the NODECA' station
on Jan Mayen has police authority (cf. Instructions No. 3341of 1
June 1962),the island comes directly under the chief of police in
Bod0 for police purposes. The exercise of police authority on Jan
Mayen is particularly concerned with aliens control. Foreign
nationals wishing to go ashore on Jan Mayen are required to
obtain special permission. Such permission is granted by the
officer-in-charge of the NODECA station, the chief of police in
Bod~ or the Ministry of Justice, depending on the duration of the
stay. Fishing vessels,pleasure craft and cruise shipscal1regularly
at Jan Mayen. Exact figures concerning the frequency of these
visits may be obtained from the chief of police in Bod0. The
officer-in-charge of the NODECA station submits quarterly
reports on police activities and other matters of interest to the
police.
Judicial Authority
Although Jan Mayen is a separate jurisdiction, the proceedings
that corne under the District/City Court have been assigned to the
Office of the Recorder in Bod~. The High Court for Nordland
serves as High Court for Jan Mayen. Offences committed on Jan
1)Norwegian Defence Communications and Data Service Administration.Mayen which have been tried by the courts include a violation of
Section 22, first paragraph, of the Road Traffic Act (drunken
driving), and criminal negligence in connection with a fatal
accident. The latteris reported in Norsk Rettstidende for 1989,p.
715.
PreviousAdministrative Arrangement
The administrative regulations of 1980 replaced corresponding
regulations of 11 July 1930. According to the previous arrange-
ment, the police authority was vested in the chief of police in
Tromsra, and the competent judicial authority was the Office of
the Recorder in Tromsra and the Troms judicial district. APPENDIX 2
THE ACTIVITIES OFTHE NORWEGIAN
METEOROLOGICALINSTITUTEON JAN MAYEN
The work done by Norwegian meteorologists during and after the
First World War constituted an international pioneer effort, and
the so-called Bergen Schoolis considered the founder of modern
meteorology. Regional weather forecasting bureaus for West and
North Norway were established during this period, and their
primary responsibility was to give storm and gale warnings.
At an early stage it became clear that weather observations from
the area between Iceland and Svalbard would be of particular
importance. Technological advances made it possible to commu-
nicate by telegraph over greater distances. Therefore, around the
time of the First World War, persistent efforts were made to
establish a meteorological station on Jan Mayen. Among other
things, attempts were made to find a multilateral European
cooperative approach to setting up an internationalmeteorolog-
ical station on Jan Mayen.
Jan Mayen remained a no-man's-land until 1921, when the
Norwegian Hagebart Ekerold occupied land on the island as a
private individual. Conversations with meteorologists in Norway
had convinced him that Jan Mayen would be extremely useful for
weather forecasting and storm warnings in Norway. Apart from
hisinterest in hunting, his primary motive for occupying a tract of
the island was to establish a telegraphic meteorological station
there. By agreement with the Norwegian authorities, on 16
January 1922 Ekerold claimed parts of Jan Mayen on behalf of
the Norwegian Meteorological Institute ("NMI"). An officia1
Norwegian meteorological station was established in 1922,nclud-
ing a radio station.
In the spring of 1926,theentire island of Jan Mayen was claimed
as property for the Norwegian Meteorological Institute, with the
approval of Norwegian authorities. By Royal Decree of 8 May
1929,the island was placedunder Norwegian sovereignty.With the exception of a six-month period during the war, the
Norwegian meteorological station on Jan Mayen has been in
continuous operation since it was established. The NMI, with a
staff of ten people, wasalone on Jan Mayen until 1959-60,when
the Norwegian Defence Communications Administration (now
the Norwegian Defence Communications and Data Service Ad-
ministration, "NODECA") established itself on the island. In
addition to its meteorological activities and attendant radio
communication, the station has also served as a coastal radio
station. This function became increasingly important, particularly
for telegraphic exchanges with the Norwegian Arctic Ocean
fishing fleet and for broadcasting weather forecasts during the
fishing and hunting season.
The coastal radio serviceexpanded until it achieved forma1status,
with a twenty-four-hour service. The NMI felt, therefore, that
officia1 telecommunications to and from Jan Mayen were no
longer its responsibility.hus, as from 21 November 1984, the
NMI was released from the responsibility for operating the
coastal radio station on Jan Mayen, which was then taken over by
NODECA.
The meteorological station is located at Helenesanden, three
kilometresfrom the NODECA station. It has a staff of five,whose
meteorological duties consist inmaking radiosonde observations
twicea day (at 00 and 1200hours UTC), and surfaceobservations
(SYNOP) every third hour (at 00, 0300, 0600hours UTC etc.).
The radiosonde observations are made by releasing balloons
carrying a radiosonde into the atmosphere to an altitude of
approx. 25-30,000 metres. These observations provide informa-
tion about wind, temperature and humidity at a series of pressure
levels in the atmosphere. The balloons are filled with hydrogen,
which is produced at the station. A complete radiosonde takes
about two hours.
The meteorologicalsurfaceobservationsconsistin recording wind
force and direction, visibility, weather conditions, clouds (type,
amount, height), atmospheric pressure, pressure tendency (i.e.
changes in atmospheric pressure), temperature, humidity, precip-
itation and sea temperature. Al1the observations are immediately
coded and sent by telex to the NMI.To facilitate aircraft landing on Jan Mayen, half-hourly or hourly
surface observations (METARs) are also made, speciallydesigned
to meet air operational requirements.
The NMI also owns a reference station, which is partly run by the
NODECA station on Jan Mayen. This is used for satellite orbit
measurements and determination of the position of free-floating
automatic weather stations in the Norwegian Sea, which commu-
nicate via US polar orbit satellites. The reference station has been
in operation for five years.
The great importance of the station on Jan Mayen lies in the
island's location, far from other meteorological observation sta-
tions on Iceland, Greenland and Svalbard. This is an area for
which there is very little data, and no regular sea or air traffic.
Therefore, there are few means of obtaining meteorological
observations from this sea area. As cyclones often form in the
area, the meteorological observations from Jan Mayen, especially
the atmospheric observations, are essential for charting theatmo-
sphere and making weather forecasts for Norway and the sea
areas for which Norway has forecasting responsibility.
Jan Mayen is one of the NMI's basic stations, i.e. stations selected
for their meteorologically strategic location, high degree ofregu-
larity, and high quality of observation. As a basic station,it ispart
of the international meteorological telecommunications network.
The station's identification number is 01001.Both the radiosonde
observations and the surface observations from Jan Mayen are
used in the regional and global weather analyses and prognoses
prepared at the regional meteorological centres (inter alia in
England, West Germany and France) and the three World
Meteorological Centres in Washington, Moscow and Melbourne.
Prognoses from these centres are transmitted to the various
national meteorological institutes. This cooperation is part of the
work of the World Meteorological Organization, which is one of
the specialized agencies of the United Nations.
The meteorological observations from Jan Mayen are not only
essential to the daily weather observations and the preparation of
weather forecasts for several days at a time; the station is also
extremely important as regards climate research. As the Arctic
regions will be playing a major role in research into and identifi-
cation of prospective climatic changes, the long series of observa-
tions made from Jan Mayen since the beginning of the 1920sare
of great importance in this context.Due to their isolated position, far from any sources of pollution
that might affect the measurements, Jan Mayen and the other
Arctic stations will also be of great significance for charting
environmental and climatic changes. APPENDIX 3
NORWEGIAN SEALING IN THEWESTICEAND THE
DENMARKSTRAIT
Norwegian sealinghas been going on in the WestIce eversincethe
middle of the last century. The main speciestaken have been the
hooded seal (Cystophora cristata) and the harp seal (Phoca
groenlandica), which assemble on the drift ice off Jan Mayen for
whelping and mating in the month of March. Sealing is carried
out along the edge of the ice and inside the drift-ice area from
approx. 68"N to 74"N and east of 20°W'in March, April and the
beginning of May.
Since sealing vessels were not required to keep a catch log until
1989, there is no exact information as to where the sealing
operations werecarried out in thevarious years. However, a series
of sketches included at the end of this Appendix, based on
observations of seal concentrations made each season since 1973,
gives some indication of where the sealing operations took place.
These maps show that the seal concentrations Varyaccording to
the extent of the drift ice, and that in certain years, part or al1of
the sealing operations have been carried out west of themedian
line between Jan Mayen and Greenland (on the basis of informa1
arrangements between the competent authorities).
Although the sealing operations in the East Ice were the main
focus of interest in the 1920s,hunting operations began to shift
towards the West Ice in the mid-1930s, due to difficult ice
conditions and poor catches in the White Sea. From the mid-
1950ssealing operations became concentrated even farther to the
west towards the hunting grounds off Newfoundland.
Participation,CatchesandFirst-hand Value
The following table, which is based on Table 3.3 at the end of this
')The Agreement of 22 November 1957 between Norway and the USSR (Annex 41)
ernploys a slightly different definition. This has been applied for the purposes of that
Agreement, but does not alter the historical scope and extent of Norwegian sealing
activities.Appendix, shows the average annual catch during various periods
from 1850to 1989.
Table3.1
Average Annual Norwegian Participation and Catches in
West Ice Sealing, 1850-1989.
Period No. of expeditions' Total catches
1850-55 5.3 19,780
1856-59 No figures available
1860-69 17.1 56,129
1870-74 26.0 87,749
1875-81 No figures available
1882-89 19.0 72,386
1890-99 17.6 65,604
1900-09 15.3 29,614
1910-19 34.5 51,922
1920-29 27.2 57,894
193040 37.0 58,960
194649 31.8 71,395
1950-59 42.9 77,792
1960-69 34.3 55,831
1970-79 15.3 35,562
1980-893 4.3 11,274
The table shows that both participation and catches were at a
peak in the 1870s and the 1950s. The West Ice was the most
important hunting ground right after the Second World War,
which was when the sealing fleet was being built up. The average
annual catch increased from just under 60,000animals during the
period prior to the War, to some 71,000 animals during the
four-year period 1946-49, and to nearly 78,000 animals in the
period 1950-59. During the three subsequent ten-year periods, the
average catch declined.
Taking the entire period as a whole, the best sealing seasons were
in 1873, 1883, 1893, 1950 and 1951, when the total catches
exceeded 100,000animals.
The first-hand value of the seal catch is the total revenues from
skins and blubber. Compared with other hunting grounds, the
catches in the West Ice provided a higher yield inrelation to catch
l)The number of expeditions shown in the table cannot be automatically equated with the
number of participating vessels, as some of the vessels made two trips to the hunting
grounds, particularly in recent years. This was extremely rare previously, however, and
applies only to a very few vessels.
Preliminary figuresvolume. This was due to the fact that the greater part of the
Norwegian catch of hooded seals (blueback) was taken in the
West Ice, and the skins of this species have generally been more
valuable than those of the harp seal.The following table showsthe
nominal average annual first-hand value, both in total and per
vessel, during various periods. The value has also been calculated
in 1989kroner in order to illustrate the extent and significancein
terms of the current value of the krone. The conversion has been
done using the consumer price index.
Table3.2
Average Annual First-hand Valueand First-hand Valueper Vesse1
of Norwegian Seal Catches in the West Ice, 1930-1988.
(Al1prices in 1,000.)
Nominal prices 1989kroner USD6
First-hand First-hand First-hand
First-hand value First hand value First-hand value
Period value per vessel value per vessel value per vessel
193WO 921 23,1 17,499 439 2,680 67
194549 4,804 151,l 53,980 1,697 8,283 260
1950-59 6,429 149,9 51,671 1,193 7,913 183
196M9 8,975 261,7 48,097
1,402 7,366 215
197&79 7,035 459,8 21,496 1,405 3,292 215
198&88 1,702 395,8 2,331 542 357 83
Measured in 1989kroner, the total catch value reached a peak in
the 1950s and 1960s. The value per vessel was greatest in the
1960s,and it remained high in the 1970s.
A sealing expedition to the West Ice generally lasts one to two
months. This means that the vessels must be engaged in other
activities for the rest of the year. Sealing operations are usually
combined with fishing for winter herring with purse seines or gill
nets, and vesselsare occasionally sent on expeditions to the polar
regions. According to a study conducted in 1975, the vessels
participating in sealing operations received an average of 46 per
cent of their gross income from sealing.
There is reason to presume that the relative income from sealing
was high in al1the periods, not least because of the great risk of
shipwreck involved in sealing. For example, a total of 115 vessels
were shipwrecked from 1925to 1939,and 28 from 1946to 1970.
4,The catch value has been calculated on the basis of the years 193551940.
6,Converted at a rate of NOK 6.53 to 1 USD. The crew
One characteristic of seal hunting is that it is based in areas in
which there are longstanding sealing traditions. The reason for
this is that sealing is so unique as regards working conditions,
technique and experience that the sealers generally come from
families that have worked in the ice for generations. Until the
1890smost expeditions were sent from ports along the Oslo Fjord.
Sincethen the crew and vesselshave come for the most part from
a few places in Sunnm~re and from Troms.
The number of sealers participating in the West Ice each year,
calculated on the basis of the average crew per vessel, fluctuated
between 500and 900 during the years preceding the Second World
War. The figure was somewhat lower in the years immediately
following 1945,after which it increased to the pre-war levelin the
early 1950s.The number of sealers engaged in the West Icebegan
to decrease gradually in 1960,and has varied between 10and 40
men in the last few years.
Most of the crew on board the sealing vesselswere fishermen, but
a number of farmers and people of other occupations took
advantage of the opportunity to supplement their incomes. Stud-
ies made in the 1970s on the basis of tax statements, and
information from the shipowners show that, on the average, the
sealers derived approx. 50 per cent of their annual income from
sealing. These studies also show that, on an annual basis, the
income from sealing accounted for a greater share of the total
income of the crew than of the vessels, because of the cost of
repairing damage done to the hull by ice. Thus, sealing was of
considerable economic significance for the communities in which
the sealers had their homes.
Up to 1961, Norwegian vessels were also involved in sealing
operations in the Denmark Strait, Le., along the edge of the ice
between Greenland and Iceland south of the West Ice area. These
sealing operations were combined with long-line fishing for
Greenland shark. Table 3.5 at the end of this Appendix shows the
catches in the Denmark Strait since 1945. There are no catch
statistics available for this area prior to 1945. Table3.3
Norwegian Participation and Catches in the West Ice
1847to 1989.
Sealing from
No. of Total No. Catch
Year value NOK~
vessels6 of animals
-
1847 3 -
1848 1 - -
- -
1849 1 - -
1850 1
1851 1 5,500 -
3 12,600 -
1852 -
1853 5 22,000 -
1854 9 28,600
1855 13 30,200 -
- - -
1856 -
1857 - -
1858 - - -
- - -
1859 -
1860 21 67,813
186 1 20 35,159 -
16 46,454 -
1862 -
1863 19 46,091 -
1864 16 48,087
1865 16 60,482 -
-
1866 16 47,682 -
1867 15 83,223
1868 15 63,757 -
62,540 -
1869 15 -
1870 18 85,765
1871 19 82,194 -
26 59,451 -
1872 -
1873 32 120,771 -
1874 35 90,565
1875 - - -
- - -
1876 - -
1877 -
1878 - - -
- - -
1879 - - -
1880 -
1881 - -
1882 15 78,973 -
6)AS from 1955,number of expeditions.
7)Nominal pricesYear No. of Total No. Catch
vessels6 of animals value NOK~
1883 14 106,000 -
88,190 -
1884 16 -
1885 18 58,028
1886 19 42,723 -
1887 24 52,452 -
1888 23 81,424 -
1889 23 71,300 -
-
1890 25 49,743 -
1891 26 66,752
1892 23 98,786 -
1893 18 104,647 -
1894 14 80,645 -
46,393 -
1895 17 -
1896 18 79,649 -
1897 13 58,583
1898 13 38,620 -
1899 9 32,226 -
1900 9 47,000 -
O 14,500 -
1901 1 -
1902 8 47,000 -
1903 12 41,500
1904 1O 32,000 -
1905 14 19,170 -
1906 17 16,551 -
17,979 -
1907 20 -
1908 20 30,695
1909 24 29,750 -
1910 27 42,687 -
1911 28,900 -
1912 26 38,300 -
-
1913 27 20,000 -
1914 3 1 64,000
1915 33 56,000 -
1916 - - -
1917 63 87,000 -
1918 - - -
78,493 -
1919 -
1920 56 71,424 -
1921 14 17,750
1922 23 50,000 -
1923 - 7 1,362 -
1924 - 67,245 -
- 66,343 -
1925 - -
1926 82,929 No. of Total No. Catch
Year vessels6 of animals value NOK~
- - -
1927
1928 17 35,371 -
1929 26 58,627 -
1930 37 52,841 -
1931 19 35,534 -
1932 33 69,108 -
1933 39 60,599 -
1934 37 70,893 -
1935 3 1 57,703 792,000
1936 38 77,898 1,047,000
1,445,000
1937 54 83,321
1938 44 54,281 733,000
1939 34 36,688 613,000
1940 29 49,705 896,000
1946 16 27,772 1,385,000
1947 28 73,747 5,846,000
1948 39 93,074 6,082,000
1949 42 90,989 5,902,000
1950 38 100,943 6,181.000
1951 49 138,042 12,279,000
1952 53 82,792 4,335,000
1953 35 57,607 3,367,000
1954 41 95,120 7,432,000
1955 44 60,244 4,765,000
1956 43 56,677 5,120,000
1957 37 37,840 3,780,000
1958 42 90,664 9,533,000
1959 45 57,937 7,493,000
1960 44 62,942 8,582,000
1961 40 92,529 10,717,000
1962 42 74,575 8,403,000
1963 43 37,286 7,542,000
1964 36 34,937 10,716,000
1965 38 63,174 13,054,000
1966 32 66,034 12,115,000
1967 25 62,901 9,875,000
1968 23 35,313 3,862,000
1969 20 28,623 4,976,000
1970 19 55,806 10,777,000
1971 18 41,391 8,527,000
1972 20 35,398 6,392,000
1973 16 38,310 7,542,000
1974 16 41,099 9,062,000
1975 15 30,780 7,390,000 No. of Total No. Catch
Year vessels6 of animals valueNOK~
19,128 2,975,000
1976 15
1977 13 30,221 5,512,000
1978 11 30,525 5,675,000
1979 1 32,963 6,499,000
1980 9 19,624 4,256,000
1981 7 23,521 4,750,000
1982 6 23,155 4,212,000
1983 2 3,404 326,000
1984 2 2,560 316,000
1985 1 895 62,000
1986 2 2,912 315,000
1987~
5 19,238 1,643,000
1988~ 6 12,897 1,1-8,000
19898 3 4,533
Source:Figures after 1926:The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.
Table3.4
Average Annual Soviet and Norwegian Catches of Seal
in the West Ice 1958-1989
Source: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES): Advisory
Committee on Fishery Management (ACFM) Report to the October 1989
Meeting.
Preliminary figures. Table3.5.
Norwegian Seal Catches in the Denmark Strait, 1945-1960
No. of. Total No. Catch
Year vessels9 of animals value NOK''
1945 9 3,275 123,560
1946 12 18,366 819,700
1947 20 16,361 1,565,300
1948 19 17,457 976,000
1949 20 1,903 55,000
1950 13 17,748 672,000
1951 25 45,934 2,896,000
1952 13 16,915 736,000
1953 18 2,907 146,000
1954 12 18,292 1,022,000
1955 11 10,231 590,000
1956 14 12,846 797,000
1957 12 21,425 1,404,000
1958 12 15,196 637,000
1959 7 6,481 480,000
1960 8 7,934 640,000
Source:The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.
'See footnote 2, p. 214.
'ONominal pricesSeal Occurrences in the Jan Mayen Area
0-w
Source: Norwegian Marine Research Institute SealOccurrences in the JanMayenArea
1981 1982
1983 1984
SW23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5'w
".;::::;:::;;::h75'~ 2SW23 21 10 17 $5 13 11 9 7 ;S:'W 7J.N
.74
..73
.72
.71
b 1 fl
'{
..70 : 1 .70
~w23 21 19 17 1s 13 'ii'9' '7 :5.wrWN 25W23 21 19 17 ~b '13 'ii'9 'i . 5wk
1985 1986
2S'W23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 S'w
@aa 0-
Source:Norwegian Marine ResearchInstitute APPENDIX 4
NORWEGIAN PARTICIPATION IN MARINE RESEARCH
IN THE REGIONSAROUND EAST GREENLANDIJAN
MAYEN,WESTGREENLANDAND
NEWFOUNDLAND/LABRADOR,1950-1989
Table 4.1 is a survey of fieldstudies in connection with Norwegian
research in the above-mentioned regions, conducted by theirec-
torate of Fisheries, Institute of Marine Research. The University
of Bergen has also conducted sporadic environmental investiga-
tions in the northwestern part of the Norwegian Sea (Jan
Mayen-East Greenland).
The East Greenland-Jan Mayen region comprises the entire East
Greenland area from Kap Farvel northward through the Den-
mark Strait to approx. 76"N, and includes the Jan Mayen area.
Studiescarried out along the edge of the icenorth 76"N are also
included, but very little of the activity was carried out in this
region.
West Greenland comprises the entire region north of Kap Farvel
off the coast of West Greenland. The northern edge is in the
vicinityof Disco. The studiesconducted in the Davis Strait-Baffin
Bay (halibut) have been included.
Newfoundland-Labrador comprises the region from the Gulf of
St. Lawrence around Newfoundland, the Newfoundland Banks
and the sea area to the northwest along the north coast of Canada
(the Davis Strait).
The research isdivided into two main categories: The environment
- fish- shrimp, and marine mammals.
The Environment- Fish- Shrimp
These fishery studies involved the charting and sampling of fish
and shrimp stocks. On several of the expeditions, fish were also
tagged. The state of the marine environment was also observed atthe same time. In those cases where research vessels (RV) were
used, extensive series of observations were made of temperature
and salinity and, in some years, of a number of other variables as
well, such as oxygen and nutritive salts. When chartered vessels
(CV) were used, only temperature findings were noted. Observers
(O) on board commercial vessels took samples of the catches to
determine their composition as regards species, size and age.
In the 1950s and 1960s, these studies were based on Norway's
extensivefishery interests, particularly in the West Greenland area
as regards cod, and in the Jan Mayen area as regards herring. In
the 1960sand 1970s,a number of expeditions were also made to
the Newfoundland region, to find fishing grounds for Norwegian
fishermen. The increased activity off East Greenland-Jan Mayen
in the 1980s was partly a result of the "Jan Mayen Capelin" (a
more detailed account of the Norwegian research cruises on the
capelin is given in Table 4.2) and partly in order to chart the
distribution of blue whiting and shrimp stocks.
MarineMammals
The research connected with East Greenland-Jan Mayen prima-
rily involved studies of the harp seal and the hooded seal in the
Greenland Sea and the Denmark Strait.The auxiliary vesse1in the
Greenland Sea which was employed approx. two months a year
during the period 1953-1981has been included. The seal research
involved taking samples to determine composition as to age and
sexual maturity, as well as other biological observations. The
incidence of parasites was also charted for a number of years. The
studies were conducted from auxiliary vessels (CV) and by
observers (O) on board fishing boats. Comparable material was
collected off Newfoundland by observers on board fishing boats.
During the 1970s,studies were made of the minke whale off West
Greenland, and during the last five years (1985-89),much of the
activity off East Greenland-Jan Mayen was also devoted to whale
research. This accounted for part of the significant increase in
whale research noted during this five-year period.
The data have been taken from annual reports and annual cruise
plans from the Institute of Marine Research, and the figures on
which Table 4.1 is based are from each individual expedition. In
cases where the expedition covered significantly largerareas thanthose of relevance for the present matter, e.g. the summer
expeditions in the Norwegian Sea to find herring in the 1950s,the
proportion of the activity that took place in the relevantion is
specified.
The approximate cost per day in Norwegian crowns (NOK) was
as follows:
Research vesse1(RV) USD 9,180 per day
Chartered vessel (CV) USD 4,590 per day
Observer (O) USD 310per day
The figures for the vesselsincludeal1costs, including the cost of
observers. The figure for observers also includes1expenses. For
example, the following costs were incurred during the five-year
period 1985-89in the East Greenland-Jan Mayen area:
RV: 9,180 x 193 = USD 1,771,740'
CV: 4,590 x (120 + 115) = USD 1,078,650
0: 310x(156+195) =USD 108,810
USD 2,959,200
Or approximately USD 590,000 per year.
'Converteat a raof USD1= NOK 6.53
227 Table 4.1
Norwegian Marine Research in the Northwest Atlantic
from 1950to 1989.
(Cruises and field studies)
(Number of days over 5 year periods)
Jan Mayen/East-Greenland West-Greenland Newfoundland/Labrador
Period
Env./fish/ Marine Env./fish/ Marine Env./fish/ Marine
shrimp mammals shrimp mammals shrimp mammals
RV CV O CV O RV CV O CV O RV CV O CV O
1950-54 114 - - 120 151 - 292 - - - - - - - 137
1955-59 47 - - 300 50 66 331 - - - - - - - -
1960-64 185 28 - 300 325 230 - - - - 50 67 - - 81
1965-69 73 - - - -
300 271 233 - - 52 48 - - 231
1970-74 51 12 - 300 270 53 43 - - 305 92 - - - 240
1975-79 91 - 162 300 282 - - 144 - 29 - - - - 136
198&84 219 21 122 120 250 - - 113 - - - - - - 35
1985-89 193 120 156 - - - - - - - - - -
115 195
Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. Table 4.2
Norwegian Research Cruises in connection with the Capelin Stock
in the Area Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland,
1979-1989
1979
Vessel: "G.O. Sars"
Period: 16July - 12August
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greeniand
Vessel: "Michael Sars"
Period: 25 September - 5 October
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland
1980
Vessel: "G.O. Sars"
Period: 11November - 22 November
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland
1981
Vessel: "G.O. Sars"
Period: 14October - 23 October
Area: Jan Mayen - Greenland
1982
Vessel: "Michael Sars"
Period: 8 August - 13 August
Area: Jan Mayen fishery zone
1983
Vessel: "G.O. Sars"
Period: 7 August - 14August
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland
Vessel: "G.O. Sars"
Period: 5 October - 22 October
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland (in cooper-
ation with Icelandic vessels).
1985
Vessel: "Eldjarn"
Period: 29 July - 18August
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland (in cooper-
ation with Icelandic vessels).1986
Vessel: "Eldjarn"
Period: 29 July - 19 August
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland
1987
Vessel: "G.O. Sars"
Period: 28 July - 13August
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland
1988
Vessel: "G.O. Sars"
Period: 23 July - 21 August
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland
1989
Vessel: "G.O. Sars"
Period: 25 July - 8 August
Area: Jan Mayen - Iceland - Greenland
Source:The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. APPENDIX5
EXPLOITATIONOF LIVINGRESSOURCESIN THE
JAN MAYEN-GREENLANDAREA:TABLES
For ease of reference, statistical tables relating to the exploitation
of living resources in the Jan Mayen-Greenland area have been
assembled in this Appendix. The tables covervarious whaling,
sealing andfishing operations, and attempt to provide a measure
of detail which would be cumbersome to present in the body of
these pleadings. Some of the tables which have been included in
the text of thisounter-Memorial are reproduced here, accom-
panied by explanatory material which, for simplicity of presenta-
tion, has not been appended to the tables in the text. Table 5.1
Total Catches' of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the East and
West Greenland Areas, 1932-1957
2
Year Norway Greenland Denmark3 Others4 Total5
- 51.1
1932 0.6 10.7 - 39.8
1933 0.5 10.0 28.3 38.8
1934 0.9 7.3 3.0 75.3 86.5
1935 0.8 6.6 - 70.5 77.9
1936 2.6 6.2 0.2 84.9 93.9
1937 2.3 6.4 O.1 94.8 103.6
1938 5.6 4.6 O.1 97.8 108.1
1939 11.7 6.2 - 25.3 43.2
- - - 12.3
1945 12.3 -
1946 O.1 13.2 O.1 13.4
1947 1.9 15.0 - 12.1 29.0
1948 0.6 15.8 2.0 9.2 27.6
1949 10.9 14.0 3.8 14.8 43.5
1950 16.7 17.3 5.3 2.9 42.2
1951 36.2 18.7 5.4 49.1 109.4
1952 24.0 19.8 - 150.6 194.4
1953 36.5 23.3 - 285.5 345.3
-
1954 48.6 22.4 - 290.6 361.6
1955 48.6 25.8 407.3 481.7
1956 44.7 i 26.3 - 324.7 395.7
1957 22.7 1 31.0 - 304.2 357.9
Source: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Bulletin
Statistique des PêchesMaritimes.
'In this period, the catches consisted mainly of cod taken off the coast of WestGreenland.
=)From 1958on there are separate statistics for East and West Greenland, see Tables 5.2
and 5.7.
3,Excluding Greenland and the Faroes.
4,Including France, GermanyIFRG, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and the Faroes.
5,Total catches of the countries included in this table. Table 5.2
Total catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the East Greenland Area,
1958-19866
Year Norway Greenland6 Denmark7 Otherss Total9
1958 1.9 0.9 - 35.5 38.3
1959 - - - 51.4 51.4
1960 - 1.7 - 63.8 65.5
-
1961 43.8 1.2 46.1 91.1
1962 - 0.9 - 51.6 52.5
1963 - 0.9 - 56.5 57.4
1964 - 1.1 - 80.4 81.5
1965 - 0.9 - 51.6 52.5
- -
1966 0.9 78.9 79.8
1967 - 0.8 - 56.9 57.7
1968 - 0.6 - 39.7 40.3
1969 - 0.6 - 49.5 51.1
1970 - - 37.6 38.1
- 0.5 -
1971 0.6 50.8 51.4
1972 - 0.2 - 39.1 39.3
1973 - 0.2 - 31.1 31.3
1974 - - - 46.0 46.0
1975 2.3 0.2 - 32.4 34.9
-
1976 0.4 0.5 172.7 173.6
1977 0.9 1.8 - 23.4 26.1
1978 165.4 1.4 - 204.1 370.9
1979 77.8 2.8 - 156.8 237.4
1980 74.6 1.8 12.6 181.8 270.8
1981 0.5 1.O 17.2 138.2 156.9
1982 - 0.9 O.1 59.2 60.2
1983 - 0.5 - 42.2 42.7
1984 28.3 1.1 7.8 30.1 67.3
1985 189.1 5-8 16.2 98.5 309.6
1986 86.9 5.9 243.6 336.4
Source: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). Bulletin
Statistique des PêchesMaritimes.
6From 1977only catches within the Greenland fisheries zone are included. Redfish that
is mainly taken outside the Greenland zone is thus not included in the table. Figures of
the redfish catches are presented in Table
'Excluding Greenland and the Faroes.
RIncluding France, the FRG, Iceland, the Faroes, Portugal, Spain, Kingdom,ed
the GDR, Poland and the Soviet Union.
yTotal catches of the countries included in this table Table5.3
Catches of Redfish (in 1,000tons) in the East Greenland Area, 'O
1977-1986
Year Norway Greenland DenmarkL' Others"
1977 O.1 - - 14.2
- - -
1978 19.3
1979 - - - 15.9
- - -
1980 30.2
1981 - - - 36.4
1982 - - O.1 37.7
- - -
1983 29.1
1984 O.1 O.1 - 14.3
- -
1985 5.5 11.4
1986 - 9.5 - 14.3
Source: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Bulletin
Statistique des Pêches Maritimes.
Table5.4
Total Catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the Northeast Greenland
Area North of 68"N13,1978-1986
Years Norway ~reenland'~ DenmarkLs Iceland OthersL6
- -
1978 165.4 154.5 0.7
1979 77.8 - - 114.6 -
1980 74.6 - - 108.5 20.6
1981 0.5 - 17.2 44.1 13.4
- - - - 0.5
1982 - - - - -
1983
1984 27.4 - - - 3.8
1985 189.1 - - 173.6 5.8
1986 86.9 - 5.9 148.5 85.5
Source: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Bulletin
Statistique des PêchesMaritimes.
Io)The redfish stock is mainly to be found outside the Greenland fisherieszone southeast
of Greenland.
Il)Excluding Greenland and the Faroes
12)Includes the FRG, the Faroes, Iceland, the United Kingdom, the USSR, Poland, the
GDR and France.
13)From 1978on the ICES statistics have been divided into an area north of 68'N (area
XIVa) and an area south of this latitude (XIVb).
14)Figures do not include catches taken by the indigenous population.
'5)Excluding Greenland and the Faroes.
16)lncluding the GDR, the FRG, the USSR, Poland and the UK. Table5.5
Total Catch" Activities in the Northeast Greenland Area
and in the Jan Mayen Area North of 6S0N,1978-1986.
Ice-
Year Norway Denmark Faroes USSR
land
Seal Minke Cape- Cape- Shrimp Shrimp Seal
Whale lin Shrim P lin 5::- 5-
1978 30.5 - 154.1 0.1 - - 154.6 0.8 - 5.0
- - - - -
1979 33.0 126.0 1.1 114.6 6.7
1980 19.6 13 118.6 3.2 - - 108.5 20.6 - 5.0
1981 23.5 1 91.4 2.6 17.2 0.6 44.1 13.3 - 4.0
1982 23.2 - - 2.0 - - - - - 4.4
- - - - -
1983 3.4 23 1.8 0.3 4.8
1984 2.6 90 104.6 3.7 - 0.4 - 3.4 - -
1985 0.9 55 188.7 4.3 - 0.3 173.6 - - 1.8
1986 2.9 54 149.7 4.0 5.4 0.4 148.4 65.5 - 6.6
Sources:
Capelin: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Bulletin
Statistique des PêchesMaritimes.
Sealing: The Report of the Advisory Committee on Fishery Management
(ACFM) to the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES) Meeting October 1989.
Whale: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.
Shrimp: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), Bulletin
Statistique des PêchesMaritimes.
17)All catches in 1,000exceptminke whale.
235 Table 5.6
Total Annual Catch of Capelin (in 1,000tons) in the
Jan Mayen - Iceland - East Greenland Area, 1964-1988's
Winter season19 Summer/autumn season
Year ICe- Nor- Ice- Nor-
Faroes Fa- EEC Total
land way land way roes
1964 8.6 - - - - - - 8.6
- - - - - -
1965 49.7 49.7
1966 124.5 - - - - - - 124.5
1967 97.2 - - - - - - 97.2
1968 78.1 - - - - - -
- - - - - - 78.1
1969 170.6 170.6
1970 190.8 - - - - - - 190.8
1971 182.9 - - - - - - 182.9
1972 276.5 - - - - - -
- - 276.5
1973 440.9 - - - - 440.9
1974 461.9 - - - - - - 461.9
1975 457.6 - - 3.1 - - - 460.7
- - - - -
1976 338.7 114.4 453.1
1977 549.2 25.0 - 259.7 - - - 833.9
1978 468.4 38.4 - 497.5 154.1 - - 1.158.4
- -
1979 521.7 17.5 441.9 126.0 2.5 1.109.6
1980 392.0 - - 367.2 118.6 24.4 14.3 916.5
1981 156.0 - - 484.6 91.4 16.2 20.8 769.0
1982 13.0 - - - - - - 13.0
- - - - - -
1983 133.3 133.3
1984 439.6 - - 425.2 104.6 10.2 8.5 988.1
1985 348.5 - - 644.8 188.7 - 81.4 - 1.263.4
1986 342.0 - 49.9
- 552.3 149.7 64.4 5.3 1.163.6
1987 500.6 59.9 16.0 82.0 66.3 - 1.019.5
1988 600.6 - 57.3 25.0 11.5 47.0 - 741.4
Source: The Report of the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management
(ACFM) to the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) May
Meeting 1989.
'9 1987and 1988figures for the summer and autumn season only includecatches until24
October.
Iy)All catches in the Icelandic zone. Table 5.7
Total Catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the West Greenland Area,
1958-1986
Year Norway Greenland DenmarkZO Others2' ~otal*~
1958 36.4 31.6 - 275.9 343.9
1959 27.4 32.9 - 199.7
- 260.0
1960 32.2 32.5 230.0 294.7
1961 - 38.1 - 326.2 364.3
1962 32.1 39.0 - 438.9 510.0
1963 32.2 29.1 - 349.1 410.4
1964 35.0 33.4 - 318.5 386.9
1965 32.2 39.7 - 313.7 385.6
-
1966 38.9 43.4 309.6 391.9
1967 53.4 43.7 - 355.2 452.3
1968 39.8 33.1 - 304.3 377.2
1969 18.7 38.0 0.4 168.2 225.3
1970 6.5 37.3 - 96.2 140.0
1971 7.8 36.9 -
- 101.1 145.8
1972 33.1 41.1 62.6 136.8
1973 19.0 41.3 - 42.7 103.0
1974 9.9 50.9 - 47.7 108.5
1975 12.4 47.7 1.5 80.6 142.2
1976 14.9 44.1 2.7 68.1 129.8
1977 9.4 58.0 5.8 75.1 148.3
1978 9,3 66.8 3.4 48.8 128.3
1979 4.6 80.2 1.3 77.6 163.7
1980 3.0 101.1 0.8 19.7 124.6
1981 1.O 106.3 0.9 8.4 116.6
1982 - 103.5 - 19.6 123.1
-
1983 0.4 97.3 - 22.6 120.3
1984 O.1 83.2 14.9 98.2
1985 O.1 85.1 0.1 4.5 89.8
1986 O. 1 86,s 0,1 O.1 86.8
Sources:
From 1958-1964: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).
Bulletin Statistique des PêchesMaritimes (area XV).
From 1965-1978: International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisher-
ies (ICNAF). Statistical Bulletin (Area la-f)
From 1979-1986: Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). Statisti-
cal Bulletin (Area NAFOI).
20)Excluding Greenland and the Faroes.
2')lncluding the Faroes, France, the FRG, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, Japan, the USSR, the
United Kingdom, Poland and the GDR.
Z2)Total catches of the countries included in the table. Table 5.8
Catches of Cod (in 1,000tons) in the West Greenland Area,
1952-1978
Year Norway Greenland DenmarkZ3 Other~~~ Totalz5
1952 22.7 16.7 - 212.8 252.2
1953 31.5 22.6 - 151.3 205.4
1954 49.3 -26 - 202.6 302.0
-
1955 44.2 19.8 235.8 299.8
1956 41.O 21.0 - 259.1 321.1
1957 19.9 24.6 - 201.4 245.9
1958 36.4 25.8 - 255.6 317.8
1959 26.6 27.5 - 179.0 233.1
-
1960 31.7 27.0 181.9 240.6
1961 43.4 33.9 - 268.0 345.3
1962 31.9 35.3 - 382.7 449.9
1963 32.0 23.1 - 349.7 404.8
34.5 22.0 - 276.6 333.1
1964 -
1965 32.0 24.3 289.9 346.2
1966 38.7 29.0 - 288.3 356.0
1967 53.1 27.5 - 338.6 419.2
1968 39.2 20.7 - 291.5 351.4
- 161.8 203.4
1969 18.0 23.6 -
1970 6.2 20.0 83.8 110.0
1971 6.2 19.4 - 92.1 117.7
1972 31.5 23.4 - 54.3 109.2
1973 15.5 17.7 - 29.3 62.5
-
1974 3.5 19.9 23.6 47.0
1975 3.1 19.3 - 25.0 47.4
1976 2.8 16.2 - 13.6 32.6
1977 1.6 24.2 - 12.7 38.5
1978 - 37.4 - 1.O 38.4
Source: International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
(ICNAF), Statistical Bulletin.
23)Excluding Greenland and the Faroes.
24)Including the Faroes, France, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the FRG
and the USSR.
25)Total cod catches of the countries included in the table.
26)Figures not available. The Faroes and Greenland had a total catch of 50,100 tons Table5.9
Average Annual Catches of Cod (in 1,000 tons) in the West
Greenland Area, 1952-1978
Period Norway Greenland ~enrnark~~ ~ther~~
1952-59 34.0 19.8~~ - 212.2
1960-69 35.5 26.6 - 282.8
-
1970-78 7.8 21.9 37.3
Source: InternationalCommission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
(ICNAF), Statistical Bulletin.
Table5.10
Norwegian Average Annual Catches of Herring (in 1000tons),
1930-1969
Period Total No. of Share of
Catch Vessels Catch off Jan ~a~en~'
- -
1930-34 21.O00 -
1935-39 21.O00 184
1945-49 18.000 193 -
1950-54 20.000 206 -
1955-59 37.000 217 2.500
1960-64 105.000 216 4.100
1965-69 33.000 78 3.400
Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.
27)Excluding Greenland and the Faroes.
28)Including the Faroes, France, Iceland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, the FRG
and the USSR.
29)Separate figures for Greenland in 1954not available.
30)Until 1955 the catches in the area off Jan Mayen were not accounted for separately. Table5.11
Norwegian ShrimpCatches in tons offJan Mayen and Greenland,
1971-1989
Jan East West
Year Mayen Greenland Greenland
1971 - - 148
1972 - - 1,386
1973 - - 3,000
1974 - - 5,917
1975 1O0 - 8,678
1976 350 -
11,658
1977 109 -4 7,505
1978 70 7,966
1979 864 267 4,571
1980 593 2,558 2,555
1981 615 2,016 1,056
1982 147 1,899 827
1983 260 1,563 482
1984 1,575 2,135 322
1985 2,248 2,024 459
1986 2,030
1,993 442
1987 1,635 2,021 435
1988 1,093 2,048 439
1989 500 2,000 450
Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. Table5.12
Norwegian Minke Whale Catches in the Central North Atlantic
Area (Jan Mayen, Iceland and the Denmark Strait), 1939-1987
Year Total Catches No. of Vessels
1939 1 1
1940 - -
1946 -
1947 12 2
1948 66 6
1949 78 7
1950 - -
1951 - -
1952 2 1
1953 - -
1954 - -
1955 20 6
1956 5 3
1957 1O 4
1958 2 2
1959 32 4
1960 40 7
1961 139 11
1962 245 25
1963 168 19
1964 272 20
1965 349
1966 26
250 14
1967 416 16
1968 725 22
1969 210 13
1970 288 20
1971 134 12
1972 236 10
1973 269 13
1974 162 12
1975 239 13
1976 8- 5
1977 1
1978 131 9
1979 120 1O
1980 120 8
1981 45 1
1982 108 7
1983 104 9
1984 104 4
1985 85 5
1986 54 3
1987 50 4
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.
241 LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Average Catches of Cod (in 1,000tons) in
the West Greenland Area, 1952-1978 .............
Table 2: Total Catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the
Northeast Greenland Area, 1978-1986 ............
Table 3: Total Catch Activities in the Northeast
Greenland Area and in the Jan Mayen Area
North of 68"N, 1978-1986 ...............................
Table 4: Average Annual Norwegian Participation
and Catches in West Ice Sealing, 1850-1989 ...
Table 5: Average Annual Soviet and Norwegian
Catches of Seal in the West Ice, 1958-1989 .....
Table 6: Total Annual Catch of Capelin (in 1,000
tons) in the Jan Mayen, Iceland, East
Greenland Area, 1964-1988 .............................
Table 3.1: Average Annual Norwegian Participation
and Catches in West Ice Sealing, 1850-1989 ..
Table 3.2: Average Annual First-hand Value and
First-hand Value per Vesse1of Norwegian
Seal Catches in the West Ice, 1930-1989 ........
Table 3.3: Norwegian Participation and Catches in the
West Ice Sealing, 1847-1989 ...........................
Table 3.4: Average Annual Soviet and Norwegian
Catches of Seal in the West Ice, 1958-1989 ...
Table 3.5: Norwegian Seal Catches in the Denmark
Strait, 1945-1960 ............................................
Table 4.1: Norwegian Marine Research in the
Northwest Atlantic, 1950-1989 ......................
Table 4.2: Norwegian Research Cruises in connection
with the Capelin Stock in the Area Jan
Mayen - Iceland - Greenland, 1979-1989 .....
Table 5.1: Total Catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the
East and West Greenland Areas, 1932-1957 ..Table 5.2: Total Catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the
East Greenland Area, 1958-1986 ...................
Table 5.3: Catches of Redfish (in 1,000tons) in the
East Greenland Area, 1977-1986 ................
Table 5.4: Total Catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the
Northeast Greenland Area North of 68"N,
1978-1986 ...............................................
Table 5.5: Total Catch Activities in the Northeast
Greenland Area and in the Jan Mayen Area
North of 68"N, 1978-1986 .........................
Table 5.6: Total Annual Catch of Capelin (in 1,000
tons) in the Jan Mayen - Iceland - East
Greenland Area, 1964-1988 .......................
Table 5.7: Total Catches of Fish (in 1,000tons) in the
West Greenland Area, 1958-1986 ...................
Table 5.8: Catches of Cod (in 1,000tons) in the West
Greenland Area, 1952-1978 .......................
Table 5.9: Average Annual Catches of Cod (in 1,000
tons) in the West Greenland Area, 1952-1978
Table 5.10: Norwegian Average Annual Catches of
Herring (in 1,000tons), 1930-1969 ..............
Table 5.11: Norwegian Shrimp Catches in tons off Jan
Mayen and Greenland, 1971 -1989 ..............
Table 5.12: Norwegian Minke Whale Catches in the
Iceland and thetlantDenmark Strait), 1939-1987 .. MAPS AND FIGURES IN VOLUME 1
Map 1 Human Settlement and Norwegian Hunting
and Fishing Grounds
Map II Ice Coverage
Map III Bathymetric Chart
Map IV Fishing Zones in the Area
Map of Jan Mayen in Scale 1 100.000
Distances in the North Atlantic ...............................16.......
Main Fishing Grounds Around Greenland ................... 17
Sketch Map of Jan Mayen .................................................
Profile of the Continental and Oceanic Formations ...........29
Bathymeric Profiles of the Area between Jan Mayen and
Greenland ...................................................3...
...........
Norwegian Minke Whale Catches off Jan Mayen 1984-1987 . 36
Pattern of Location of Norwegian Capelin Catches in
the Jan Mayen Area ..........................................5...........
Seal Occurrences in the Jan Mayen Area ......................22..... INDEX OF ANNEXES
VOLUME II
1. OfficialDocuments
Page
Annex 1: Declaration from the Norwegian
Government on Principles for a Fisheries
Limits Policy, 26 September 1974 ...................
Annex 2: Informa1 Suggestions in Negotiating Group
7, dated 20 April 1978,concerning
Amendments to Paragraphs 1,2 and 3 of
Articles 74 and 83 ICNT .......................23........
Annex 3: Danish Statement in Negotiating Group 7,
dated 29 April 1978 .............................4..........
Annex 4: Danish Statement in Negotiating Group 7,
delivered on 8 September 1978 ..................26....
Annex 5: Letter of 3 July 1979from the Danish
Foreign Minister to the Norwegian Foreign
Minister ........................................7.............
Annex 6: Letter of 4 July 1979from the Norwegian
Foreign Minister to the Danish Foreign
Minister ........................................8.............
Annex 7: Press Release of 6 July 1979concerning the
Norwegian Government's Intention to
Establish a Fisheries Jurisdiction Zone
around Jan Mayen ............................29...........
Annex 8: Danish Minutes of a Conversation on 30
August 1979between the Danish Foreign
Minister and the Norwegian Foreign
Minister inReykjavik, dated 31 August 1979. 30
Annex 9: Recommendation No. 318 (1979-80)to the
Storting from the Enlarged Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, dated
30 May 1980 ..................................3.2..............
Annex 10: Note of 4 June 1980from the Royal
Norwegian Embassy in Copenhagen to the
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ............37..Annex 11: Records of the Parliamentary Debate on 6
June 1980on Recommendation No. 318
(1979-80)to the Storting .................................
Annex 12: Note of 9 June 1980from the Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal
Norwegian Embassy in Copenhagen ...............
Annex 13: Norwegian letter of 15June 1981relating to
Soviet Fishing for Blue Whiting in the Zone
around Jan Mayen ..........................................
Annex 14: Recommendation No. 194 (1981-82)to the
Storting from the Standing Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, dated
27 April 1982 ...................................................
Annex 15: Records of the Parliamentary Debate on 19
May 1982on Recommendation No. 194
(1981-82)to the Storting, dated 19 May
1982 .................................................................
2. NorwegianLegislation
Annex 16: Government Decree (Cancelli-Promemoria)
of 25 February 1812relating to the Limits in
the Sea of the Territory of Norway ................
Annex 17: Royal Decree No. 3426 of 8 May 1929
Proclaiming Norwegian Sovereignty over Jan
Mayen.. ............................................................
Annex 18: Act No. 2 of 27 February 1930relating to
Jan Mayen and the Relevant Bill thereon ......
Annex 19: Act of 24 March 1961relating to the Fishery
Limit of Norway .............................................
Annex 20: Crown Prince Regent's Decreeof 24 March
1961implementing the Act of 24 March 1961
relating to the Fishery Limit of Norway ........
Annex 21: Royal Decree of 31 May 1963relating to the
Sovereign Rights of Norway over the Seabed
and Subsoil outside the Norwegian Coast ......Annex 22: Act No. 12of 21 June 1963relating to
Exploration for and Exploitation of
Submarine Natural Resources as
subsequently amended by Act No. 11of 25
March 1977 .....................................................
Annex 23: Act No. 12of 21 June 1963relating to
Scientific Research and Exploration for and
Exploitation of Resources other than
Petroleum Resources as most recently
amended by Act No. 11 of 22 March 1985 ....
Annex 24: Act No. 91 of 17 December 1976relating to
the Economic Zone of Norway as
subsequently amended by Act No. 40 of 3
June 1983and Act No. 11 of 22 March 1985.
Annex 25: Royal Decree of 17December 1976relating
to the Establishment of the Economic Zone
of Norway .......................................................
Annex 26: Royal Decree of 3 June 1977relating to a
Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard.. ..
Annex 27: Royal Decree No. 4 of 23 May 1980relating
to the Establishment of a Fisheries Zone
around Jan Mayen ..........................................
Annex 28: Act No. 11of 22 March 1985pertaining to
Petroleum Activities (excerpt).........................
3. DanishLegislation
Annex 29: Royal Decree No. 259 of 7 June 1963
concerning the Exercise of Danish
Sovereignty over the Continental Shelf ...........
Annex 30: Act No. 259 of 9 June 1971concerning the
Continental Shelf as subsequently amended
by Act No. 278 of 7 June 1972 .......................
Annex 31: Act No. 597 of 17December 1976on the
Fishing Territory of theKingdom of
Denmark.. ........................................................
Annex 32: Decree No. 598 of 21 December 1976on the
Fishing Territory of the Faroe Islands............
Annex 33: Executive Order No. 628 of 22 December
1976on the Fishing Territory of Denmark .....Annex 34: Executive Order No. 629 of 22 December
1976on the Fishing Territory of Greenland ...
Annex 35: Executive Order No. 639 of 22 December
1977on the Fishing Territory of Denmark .....
Annex 36: Executive Order No. 43 of 1 February 1978
on the Fishing Territory of Denmark. ............
Annex 37: Promulgation Order No. 182of 1 May 1979
including Amendment in Act No. 654 of 21
December 1977of Act No. 259 of 9 June
1971concerning the Continental Shelf of
Denmark.. ........................................................
Annex 38: Executive Order No. 176of 14May 1980on
the Fishing Territory in the Waters
surrounding Greenland ...................................
4. International Agreements
Annex 39: Convention of 9 July 1924between Denmark
and Norway concerning East Greenland and
Exchange of Notes relating hereto ..................
Annex 40: Exchange of Notes of 9 July 1947between
Denmark and Norway constituting a
Supplementary Agreement to the Agreement
of 9 July 1924concerning East Greenland .....
Annex 41: Agreement of 15 February 1957between
Norway and the USSR concerning the Sea
Frontier in theVaranger Fjord with
Additional Protocol of 29 November 1957 .....
Annex 42: Agreement of 22 November 1957between
Norway and the USSR on Measures for
Regulating the Catch and Conserving Stocks
of Seals in the Northeastern Part of the
Atlantic............................................................
Annex 43: Agreement of 16April 1962between Norway
and the USSR on Fishing with attached
Protocol of the Same Date and attached
Letter of 22 February 1962 .............................Annex 44: Agreement of 10 March 1965between the
United Kingdom and Norway on the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries with
Supplementary Protocol of 22 December
1978 .................................................................
Annex 45: Agreement of 9 June 1965between Denmark
and the FRG concerning the Delimitation, in
the Coastal Regions, of the Continental Shelf
of the North Sea with Protocol of the Same
Date .................................................................
Annex 46: Agreement of 8 December 1965between
Denmark and Norway relating to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.............
Annex 47: Agreement of 3 March 1966between the
United Kingdom and Denmark relating to
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries .............................
Annex 48: Agreement of 31 March 1966between the
Netherlands and Denmark concerning the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under
the North Sea ..................................................
Annex 49: Agreement of 5 April 1967concerning the
Delimitation of Norway's and Sweden's
Fishery Areas in the Northeastern Part of
the Skagerrak and Declaration hereto ............
Annex 50: Agreement of 20 April 1967between
Denmark and Norway concerning the East
Greenland Fisheries, with Additional
Protocol of theSame Date ..............................
Annex 51: Exchange of Notes of 24 April 1968between
Denmark and Norway amending the
Agreement of 8 December 1965concerning
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.......
Annex 52: Agreement of 24 July 1968between Norway
and Sweden concerning the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf.......................................
Annex 53: Treaty of 28 January 1971between Denmark
and the FRG concerning the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf under the North Sea ....Annex 54: Agreement of 25 November 1971between
Denmark and the United Kingdom relating
to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries .............................
Annex 55: Agreement of 17 December 1973between
Denmark and Canada relating to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between Greenland and Canada .....................
Annex 56: Agreement of 30 January 1974between
Japan and Korea concerning the
Establishment of a Boundary in the
Northern Part of the Continental Shelf ..........
Annex 57: Agreement of 8 August 1974between India
and Indonesia relating to the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf Boundary between the
Two Countries .................................................
Annex 58: Treaty of 20November 1976between
Panama and Colombia on the Delimitation
of Marine and Submarine Areas and Related
Matters ............................................................
Annex 59: Agreement of 28 December 1976between
India and Maldives on the Maritime
Boundary in the Arabian Sea and Related
Matters ............................................................
Annex 60: Agreement of 14January 1977between India
and Indonesia on the Extension of the 1974
Continental Shelf Boundary between the
Two Countries in the Andaman Sea and the
Indian Ocean ...................................................
Annex 61: Treaty of 17March 1977between Colombia
and Costa Rica on the Delimitation of
Marine and Submarine Areas and Maritime
Cooperation .....................................................
Annex 62: Agreement of 11January 1978between
Norway and the Soviet Union on a
Temporary Practical Arrangement for
Fishing in an Adjacent Area in the Barents
Sea ...................................................................Annex 63: Agreement of 28 March 1978between the
United States of America and Venezuela
relating to the Maritime Boundary between
the Two Countries ...........................................
Annex 64: Treaty of 31 March 1978between Venezuela
and the Netherlands relating to the
Boundary Delimitation between the Two
Countries .........................................................
Annex 65: Agreement of 4 May 1978between the
United States of America and Mexico
relating to the Maritime Boundaries between
the Two Countries ...........................................
Annex 66: Agreement of 22 June 1978between
Thailand and India on the Delimitation of
the Seabed Boundary between the Two
Countries .........................................................
Annex 67: Protocol of 22 December 1978
Supplementary to the Agreement of 10
March 1965between the United Kingdom
and Norway relating to the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf.......................................
Annex 68: Treaty of 3 March 1979between Venezuela
and the Dominican Republic on the
Delimitation of Marine and Submarine
Areas between the Two Countries ..................
Annex 69: Agreement of 15June 1979between
Denmark and Norway concerning the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the
Area between the Faroes and Norway and
concerning the Boundary between the
Fishery Zone around the Faroes and the
Norwegian Economic Zone .............................
Annex 70: Agreement of 28 May 1980between Norway
and Iceland on Fishery and Continental
Shelf Questions ................................................
Annex 71: Treaty of 17July 1980between France and
Venezuela relating to the Maritime
Delimitation between the Two Countries .......Annex 72: Agreement of 22 October 198 1 between
Iceland and Norway relating to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between Iceland and Jan Mayen .....................
Annex 73: Agreement of 4 January 1982between
Australia and France on the Marine
Delimitation between the Two Countries .......
Annex 74: Agreement of 9 November 1984between
Sweden and Denmark on the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf and Fishing Zones
between the Two Countries .............................
Annex 75: Agreement of 23 December 1986between
India and Myanmar (Burma) on the
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between the Two Countries .............................
Annex 76: Agreement of 18April 1988between Sweden
and the USSR on the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf and of the Swedish Fishing
Zone and of the Soviet Economic Zone in
the Baltic Sea...................................................
Annex 77: Treaty of 14 September 1988between
Denmark and the GDR on Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf and the Fishing Zones
between the Two Countries .............................
Annex 78: Agreement of 10 February 1989between
Sweden and Poland on the Delimitation of
the Fishing Zones and Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries .............................
Annex 79: Agreement of 12June 1989between
GreenlandIDenmark, Iceland and Norway
on the Capelin Stock in the Waters between
Greenland, Iceland and Jan Mayen ................
5. Miscellaneous
Annex 80: Law No. 41 of 1June 1979concerning the
Territorial Sea, the Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf of Iceland ...........................Annex 81: Excerpt from an Article by Mr. Peter
Brückner in Dansk UdenrigspolitiskArbog
1983 (Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook
1983) .................................. . . . . .307.. .
Tables of the Greenland Fishing Fleet in
Annex 82:
1981and 1988Distributed according to
Municipality .......................................8......... INDEX OF ANNEXES
IN CHRONOLOGICALORDER
VOLUMEII
Page:
25 Feb 1812 Government Decree (Cancelli-Promemoria)
Annex 16: of 25 February 1812relating to the Limits
in the Sea of the Territory of Norway..........2
9 Jul 1924 Convention of 9 July 1924between
Annex 39: Denmark and Norway concerning East
Greenland and Exchange of Notes relating
hereto........................................38................
8 May 1929 Royal Decree No. 3426 of 8 May 1929
Annex 17: Proclaiming Norwegian Sovereignty over
Jan Mayen ....................................3.............
27 Feb 1930 Act No. 2 of 27 February 1930relating to
94
Annex 18: Jan Mayen and the Relevant Bill thereon ....
9 Jul 1947 Exchange of Notes of 9 July 1947between
Annex 40: Denmark and Norway constituting a
Supplementary Agreement to the
Agreement of 9 July 1924concerning East
Greenland....................................14............
15Feb 1957 Agreement of 15February 1957between
Annex 41 : Norway and the USSR concerning the Sea
Frontier in theVaranger Fjord with
Additional Protocol of 29 November 1957 . 143
22 Nov 1957 Agreement of 22 November 1957between
Annex 42: Norway and the USSR on Measures for
Regulating the Catch and Conserving
Stocks of Seals in the Northeastern Part of
the Atlantic..................................5.1............
24 Mar 1961 Act of 24 March 1961relating to the
Annex 19: Fishery Limit of Norway ....................96.......
24 Mar 1961 Crown Prince Regent's Decreeof 24 March
Annex 20: 1961implementing the Act of 24 March
1961relating to the Fishery Limit of
Norway .....................................9.7..............16Apr 1962 Agreement of 16April 1962between
Annex 43: Norway and the USSR on Fishing with
attached Protocol of the Same Date and
attached Letter of 22 February 1962 ...........
31 May 1963 Royal Decree of 31 May 1963relating to
Annex 21 : the Sovereign Rights of Norway over the
Seabed and Subsoil outside the Norwegian
Coast ............................................................
7 Jun 1963 Royal Decree No. 259 of 7 June 1963
Annex 29: concerning the Exercise of Danish
Sovereignty over the Continental Shelf .......
21 Jun 1963 Act No. 12of 21 June 1963relating to
Annex 22: Exploration for and Exploitation of
Submarine Natural Resources as
subsequently amended by Act No. 11of 25
March 1977 ..................................................
21 Jun 1963 Act No. 12of 21 June 1963relating to
Annex 23: Scientific Research and Exploration for and
Exploitation of Resources other than
Petroleum Resources as most recently
amended by Act No. 11 of 22 March 1985 .
10Mar 1965 Agreement of 10March 1965between the
Annex 44: United Kingdom and Norway on the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries with
Supplementary Protocol of 22 December
1978 ..............................................................
9 Jun 1965 Agreement of 9 June 1965between
Annex 45: Denmark and the FRG concerning the
Delimitation, in the Coastal Regions, of the
the Continental Shelf of the North Sea with
Protocol of the Same Date ..........................
8 Dec 1965 Agreement of 8 December 1965between
Annex 46: Denmark and Norway relating to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf .........
3 Mar 1966 Agreement of 3 March 1966between the
Annex 47: United Kingdom and Denmark relating to
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries .........................31 Mar 1966 Agreement of 31 March 1966between the
Annex 48: Netherlands and Denmark concerning the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under
the North Sea ...............................................
5 Apr 1967 Agreement of 5 April 1967concerning the
Annex 49: Delimitation of Norway's and Sweden's
Fishery Areas in the Northeastern Part of
the Skagerrak and Declaration hereto .........
20 Apr 1967 Agreement of 20 April 1967between
Annex 50: Denmark and Norway concerning the East
Greenland Fisheries, with Additional
Protocol of the Same Date ..........................
24 Apr 1968 Exchange of Notes of 24 April 1968
Annex 51: between Denmark and Norway amending
the Agreement of 8 December 1965
concerning the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf .........................................
24 Jul 1968 Agreement of 24 July 1968between Sweden
Annex 52: and Norway concerning the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf ...................................
28 Jan 1971 Treaty of 28 January 1971between
Annex 53: Denmark and the FRG concerning the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under
the North Sea ...............................................
9 Jun 1971 Act No. 259 of 9 June 1971concerning the
Annex 30: Continental Shelf as subsequently amended
by Act No. 278 of 7 June 1972 ....................
25 Nov 1971 Agreement of 25 November 1971between
Annex 54: Denmark and the United Kingdom relating
to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries .........................
17 Dec 1973 Agreement of 17December 1973between
Annex 55: Denmark and Canada relating to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between Greenland and Canada ..................
30 Jan 1974 Agreement of 30 January 1974between
Japan and Korea concerning the
Annex 56:
Establishment of a Boundary in the
Northern Part of the Continental Shelf .......8 Aug 1974 Agreement of 8 August 1974between India
Annex 57: and Indonesia relating to the Delimitation
of the Continental Shelf Boundary between
the Two Countries .......................................
26 Sep 1974 Declaration from the Norwegian
Annex 1: Government on Principles for a Fisheries
Limits Policy, 26 September 1974 ................
Treaty of 20 November 1976between
20 Nov 1976
Annex 58: Panama and Colombia on the Delimitation
of Marine and Submarine Areas and
Related Matters ...........................................
17Dec 1976 Act No. 91 of 17December 1976relating to
Annex 24: the Economic Zone of Norway as
subsequently amended by Act No. 40 of 3
June 1983and Act No. 11 of 22 March
1985 ..............................................................
17Dec 1976 Royal Decree of 17 December 1976relating
Annex 25: to the Establishment of the Economic Zone
of Norway ....................................................
17Dec 1976 Act No. 597 of 17 December 1976on the
Annex 31: Fishing Territory of theKingdom of
Denmark ......................................................
21 Dec 1976 Decree No. 598 of 21 December 1976on
Annex 32: the Fishing Territory of the Faroe Islands..
22 Dec 1976 Executive Order No. 628 of 22 December
Annex 33: 1976on the Fishing Territory of Denmark .
22 Dec 1976 Executive Order No. 629 of 22 December
Annex 34: 1976on the Fishing Territory of Greenland
28 Dec 1976 Agreement of 28 December 1976between
Annex 59: India and Maldives on the Maritime
Boundary in the Arabian Sea and Related
Matters .........................................................
14Jan 1977 Agreement of 14January 1977between
Annex 60: India and Indonesia on the Extension of
the 1974Continental Shelf Boundary
between the Two Countries in the
Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean ...........17 Mar 1977 Treaty of 17 March 1977between
Annex 61 : Colombia and Costa Rica on the
Delimitation of Marine and Submarine
Areas and Maritime Cooperation ................
3 Jun 1977 Royal Decree of 3 June 1977relating to a
Annex 26: Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard
22 Dec 1977 Executive Order No. 639 of 22 December
Annex 35: 1977on the Fishing Territory of Denmark .
11Jan 1978 Agreement of 11January 1978between
Annex 62: Norway and the Soviet Union on a
Temporary Practical Arrangement for
Fishing in an Adjacent Area in the Barents
Sea ...............................................................
1 Feb 1978 Executive Order No. 43 of 1 February 1978
Annex 36: on the Fishing Territory of Denmark ..........
28 Mar 1978 Agreement of 28 March 1978between the
Annex 63: United States of America and Venezuela
relating to the Maritime Boundary between
the Two Countries .........................................
31 Mar 1978 Treaty of 31 March 1978between
Annex 64: Venezuela and the Netherlands relating to
the Boundary Delimitation between the
Two Countries ...........................................
20 Apr 1978 Informa1 Suggestions in Negotiating Group
Annex 2: 7, dated 20 April 1978,concerning
Amendments to Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of
Articles 74 and 83 ICNT .............................
29 Apr 1978 Danish Statement in Negotiating Group 7,
Annex 3: dated 29 April 1978 .......................................
4 May 1978 Agreement of 4 May 1978between the
Annex 65: United States of America and Mexico
relating to the Maritime Boundaries
between the Two Countries ........................
22 Jun 1978 Agreement of 22 June 1978between
Annex 66: Thailand and India on the Delimitation of
the Seabed Boundary between the Two
Countries ......................................................
8 Sep 1978 Danish Statement in Negotiating Group 7,
Annex 4: delivered on 8 September 1978 ....................22 Dec 1978 Protocol of 22 December 1978
Annex 67: Supplementary to the Agreement of 10
March 1965between the United Kingdom
and Norway relating to the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf ...................................
3 Mar 1979 Treaty of 3 March 1979between Venezuela
Annex 68: and the Dominican Republic on the
Delimitation of Marine and Submarine
Areas between the Two Countries ...............
1 May 1979 Promulgation Order No. 182of 1 May
Annex 37: 1979including Amendment in Act No. 654
of 21 December 1977of Act No. 259 of 9
June 1971 concerning the Continental Shelf
of Denmark ..................................................
1Jun 1979 Law No. 41 of 1 June 1979concerning the
Annex 80: Territorial Sea, the Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf of Iceland ........................
15 Jun 1979 Agreement of 15June 1979between
Annex 69: Denmark and Norway concerning the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the
Area between the Faroes and Norway and
concerning the Boundary between the
Fishery Zone around the Faroes and the
Norwegian Econonic Zone ..........................
3 Jul 1979 Letter of 3 July 1979from the Danish
Annex 5: Foreign Minister to the Norwegian Foreign
Minister ........................................................
4 Jul 1979 Letter of 4 July 1979from the Norwegian
Annex 6: Foreign Minister to the Danish Foreign
Minister ........................................................
6 Jul 1979 Press Release of 6 July 1979concerning the
Annex 7: Norwegian Government's Intention to
Establish a Fisheries Jurisdiction Zone
around Jan Mayen ........................................
30 Aug 1979 Danish Minutes of a Conversation on 30
Annex 8: August 1979between the Danish Foreign
Minister and the Norwegian Foreign
Minister in Reykjavik, dated 31 August
1979 ..............................................................14May 1980 Executive Order No. 176of 14May 1980
Annex 38: on the Fishing Territory in the Waters
surrounding Greenland ......................133.......
23 May 1980 Royal Decree No. 4 of 23 May 1980
Annex 27: relating to the Establishment of a Fisheries
Zone around Jan Mayen ..............................
28 May 1980 Agreement of 28 May 1980between
Annex 70: Norway and Iceland on Fishery and
Continental Shelf Questions .........................
30 May 1980 Recommendation No. 318 (1979-80)to the
Annex 9: Storting from the Enlarged Standing
Committee on Foreign Affairs, dated 30
May 1980 .....................................................
4 Jun 1980 Note of 4 June 1980from the Royal
Annex 10: Norwegian Embassy in Copenhagen to the
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs .............
6 Jun 1980 Records of the Parliamentary Debate on 6
Annex 11 : June 1980on Recommendation No. 318
(1979-80)to the Storting ..............................
9 Jun 1980 Note of 9 June 1980from the Danish
Annex 12: Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Royal
Norwegian Embassy in Copenhagen ...........
17Jul 1980 Treaty of 17July 1980between France and
Annex 71 : Venezuela relating to the Maritime
Delimitation between the Two Countries ....
Norwegian letter of 15June 1981relating
15Jun 1981
Annex 13: to Soviet Fishing for Blue Whiting in the
Zone around Jan Mayen ..............................
22 Oct 1981 Agreement of 22 October 1981 between
Annex 72: Iceland and Norway relating to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
between Iceland and Jan Mayen ..................
4 Jan 1982 Agreement of 4 January 1982between
Annex 73: Australia and France on the Marine
Delimitation between the Two Countries ....
27 Apr 1982 Recommendation No. 194 (1981-82)to the
Storting from the Standing Committee on
Annex 14:
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, dated
27 April 1982 ...............................................19May 1982 Records of the Parliamentary Debate on 19
Annex 15: May 1982on Recommendation No. 194
(1981-82)to the Storting, dated 19 May
1982 ...............................................................
1983 Excerpt from an Article by Mr. Peter
Annex 81 : Brückner in Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Arbog
1983 (Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook
1983) .............................................................
9 Nov 1984 Agreement of 9 November 1984between
Annex 74: Sweden and Denmark on the Delimitation
of the Continental Shelf and Fishing Zones
between the Two Countries .........................
22 Mar 1985 Act No. 11 of 22 March 1985pertaining to
Annex 28: Petroleum Activities (excerpt)......................
23 Dec 1986 Agreement of 23 December 1986between
Annex 75: India and Myanmar (Burma) on the
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between the Two Countries .........................
18Apr 1988 Agreement of 18April 1988between
Atinex 76: Sweden and the USSR on the Delimitation
of the Continental Shelf and of the Swedish
Fishing Zone and of the Soviet Economic
Zone in the Baltic Sea ..................................
14 Sep 1988 Treaty of 14 September 1988between
Annex 77: Denmark and the GDR on Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf and the Fishing
Zones between the Two Countries ..............
1989 Tables of the Greenland Fishing Fleet in
Annex 82: 198 1 and 1988Distributed according to
Municipality ..................................................
10 Feb 1989 Agreement of 10 February 1989between
Annex 78: Sweden and Poland on the Delimitation of
the Fishing Zones and Continental Shelf
between the Two Countries .........................
12Jun 1989 Agreement of 12June 1989between
Annex 79: GreenlandIDenmark, Iceland and Norway
on the Capelin Stock in the Waters between
Greenland, Iceland and Jan Mayen ..............
Counter-Memorial of the Government of the Kingdom of Norway