Memorial of the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark

INTERNATIONALCOURT OF JUSTICE

MARITIME DELIMITATION
IN THE AREA BETWEEN
GREENLAND AND JAN MAYEN

(DENMARK/NORWAY)

MEMORIAL

SUBMITTEDBY
THE GOVERNMENTOF

THE KINGDOMOF DENMARK

VOLUME1

JULY 1989 VOLUME l ,

TABLEOF CONTENTS

Page
INTRODUCTION ................................. 3

PART 1. THE FACTS .......................... ...

CHAPTER 1. SUBJECT MATTER AND HIS-
TORY OFTHE DISPUTE . .......
Section 1. The General Geographical Context,
the Disputed Area and the Relevant
Area ...........................
A. TheGeneral Geographical Context .....
B. The Disputed Area ...................
C. The Relevant Area ........ ... .... ...

Section 2. History ofthe Dispute ....... .....

CHAPTER II. GREENLAND ..... ............
Section 1. History and Constitutional Status ..
A. History ............................
B. Constitutional Status ...... ...... .....
Section 2. Population ..................

Section 3. Geography, Geology and Climate ..
A. Geography .........................
B. Geology ............................
C. Climate ............................
Section 4. Economic Structure and Exploita-

A. General Remarksesour.......................
B. The Greenland Fishenes Sector ........

C. Living Resourcesdi.......n...d....... ...

CHAPTER III. JAN MAYEN.. .................

Section 1. History and Status ...............
Section 2. Geography . .... . .... ..... ....
Section 3. Geology ................... .....

Section 4. Utilization ..............PART II. THELAW ..........................

CHAPTER 1. THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES
APPLICABLE TO MARITIME
DELIMITATIONS ..............
Section 1. General Principles and Rules ......
A. Convention on the Continental Shelf of
29April 1958 ........................
B. Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982. .....................
C. CaseLaw ...........................
D. State Practice .......................

Section 2. Status of Islands in Maritime De-
limitations......................
A. CaseLaw ...........................
B. State Practice .......................
Section 3. The Relevant Factors in the Present
Case ...........................
.............
B. The Populationl Facand Socio-Economic
Factors .............................
............
D. The Proportionality Factor ............

CHAPTER II. THE TYPE AND METHOD OF
DELIMITATION APPROPRIATE
IN THE LlGHT OF THE CON-
CRETE CIRCUMSTANCES .....
Section1. The Reasons for the Request for a
Single Line of Maritime Delimita-
tion............................

Section 2. The Method of Delimitation Appro-
priate in the Light of the Concrete
Circumstances ..................

PART III. SUBMISSIONS.. .......................

MAPS ............................................ Map 1. Map Showing the North East Atlantic Region
Map II. Map Showingthe Disputed and Relevant Areas

in theirGeographical Context
Map III. Map Showing Greenland and Surrounding Wa-
ters
Map IV. Map Showing Maritime Zones in the North
East Atlantic Region

LIST OF ANNEXES, cf. Volume II

Annex 1. Act No. 597of 17December 1976on the Fishing Terri-
tory ofthe Kingdom of Denmark
Annex 2.
Act No. 91 of 17December 1976relating to the Econ-
omic Zone of Norway
Annex 3. Letter of 3July 1979from the Danish Foreign Minister
tothe Norwegian Foreign Minister
Annex 4. Letter of4 July 1979from the Norwegian Foreign Min-
ister to the Danish Foreign Minister
Annex 5. Summary (P.M.) concerning the Danish Foreign Minis-

ter's talk with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, in
Reykjavik 30-31 August 1979
Annex 6. Executive Order No. 176of 14May 1980011the Fishing
Territory in the Waters surroundingGreenland
Annex 7. Royal Decree of 23 May 1980on the Fishery Zone in
the Sea Areas roundJan Mayen
Annex 8. Decree of the Crown Prince Regent, dated 30 June

1955,on the Outer Limit of the Norwegian Fishing Ter-
ritory aroundJan Mayen
Annex 9. Note Verbale of4 June 1980from the Royal Norwegian
Embassy to the Danish Ministryof Foreign Afiirs
Annex 10. Note Verbale of9 June 1980from the Danish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs tothe Royal Norwegian Embassy
Annex I1. Executive Order No. 437 of3I August 1981on the Fish-

ing Territory in the Waters surroundingGreenland
Annex 12. Norwegian Warning of 31 August 1981 to Master of
Danish Fishing Vessel
Annex 13. lnterim Arrangement between Danmark and Norway
regarding Monitoring of Fishing for Capelin in the Wa-
ters between Greenland and Jan Mayen

Annex 14. Regulations of 15 July 1975 concerning the Fishery
Limits off lceland
Annex 15. Law No. 41 of I June 1979concerning the Territorial
Sea, the Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (of
Iceland)Annex 16. Agreement of 28 May 1980between Nonuay and Ice-
land concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Ques-
tions

Annex 17. Agreement of 12June 1989between Greenland/Den-
mark, Iceland and Nonuay on the Capelin Stock in the
Watersbetween Greenland, Iceland andJan Mayen
Annex 18. The Greenland Home Rule Act No. 557 of 29 Novem-
ber 1978
Annex 19. Suwey of Matters Transferred to Greenland Home
Rule and Dates ofTransfer
Annex 20. Treaty of 13 March 1984 amending, with regard to
Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European
Communities
Annex 2 1. Agreement on Fisheries of 13March 1984between the
European EconomicCommunity,on the one hand, and
the Government of Denmark and the local Government
ofGreenland, on the other
Annex 22. Commercial Fisheries Act of the Landsting. No. II of
21 November 1984
Annex 23. The Greenland Home Rule Executive Order No. 27of 1

December 1987on Fishing Quotas for 1988
Annex 24. The Role of Capelin in the Traditional Greenland So-
ciety
Annex 25. Total Annual and Seasonal Catches of Capelin in the
lceland -Greenland/ Jan Mayen Area since 1964
Annex 26. The Administration of Mineral Resources in Green-
land
Annex 27. Act No. 585 of 29 November 1978on Mineral Resour-
ces, etc. in Greenland, as amended by Act No. 844 of21
December 1988 (Promulgation No. 88 of 8 Febmary
1989)
Annex 28. Agreement of 22 October 1981between Norway and
lceland on the Continental Shelf in the Area between
lceland andJan Mayen
Annex 29. Agreement between Sweden and the USSR of 18April
1988on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and
of the Swedish Fishing Zone and the Soviet Economic
Zone in the BalticSea

Annex 30. Treaty between Denmark and theGerman Democratic
Republic of 14September 1988on Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf and the Fishing Zones
Annex 3 1. Agreementbetween Sweden and Poland of IOFebmary
1989on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and the
Fishing ZonesAnnex 32. Agreement between Denmark and Norway of 15June
1979 concerning the Delimitation of the Continental

Shelf in the Area between the Faroe Islands and Nor-
way and concerning the Boundary between the Fishery
Zone near the Faroe Islands and the Norwegian Econ-
omic Zone
Annex 33. Agreementbetween Denmark and Sweden of9 Novem-
ber 1984on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf
and Fishing Zones
Annex 34. Declaration between the Danish and Swedish Govern-
ments concerning the Boundaries of the Sound, signed
atStockholm,30 January, 1932
Annex 35. Royal Decreeof 3June 1977relating to the Fishery Pro-
tection Zonearound Svalbard
Annex 36. Maritime Boundary Agreement between Chile and
Pem byjoint Declaration on the Maritime Zone, signed

on 18August 1952
Annex 37. Maritime Boundary Agreement between Pem and
Ecuador by joint Declaration on the Maritime Zone,
signed on 18August 1952
Annex 38. Maritime Boundary Agreement between Umguay and
Brazil,signed on 21July 1972
Annex 39. Maritime Boundary Agreementbetween Argentina and
Umguay (Treaty ofthe Rio de la Plata and its Maritime
Boundary, 1973),signed on 19November 1973
Annex 40. Maritime Boundary Agreement between Colombia and
Ecuador, signed on 23August 1975
Annex 41. Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United
States of America and Cuba, signed on 16 December
1977
Annex 42. Maritime Boundary Agreement between Venezuela

and the United States of America, signed on 28 March
1978
Annex 43. Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United
States of America and Mexico (Caribbean Sea and Pa-
cificOcean),signed on 4 May 1978
Annex 44. Agreement between France and Tonga concerning the
Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones, signed
on II January 1980
Annex 45. Agreement between France and Mauritius on the De-
limitation of the Economic Zones between Reunion Is-
land and Mauritius,signed on 2April 1980
Annex 46. Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United
States of America and the Cook Islands, signed on11
June 1980Annex 47. Maritime Boundary Agreement between Venezuela
and France,signed on 17July 1980
Annex 48. Maritime Boundary Agreement between Burma and
Thailand, signed on 25July 1980
Annex 49. Treaty between New Zealand and the United States of
America on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Tokelau and the United States of America,
signed on 2December 1980
Annex 50. Maritime Boundary Agreement between St. Lucia and
France,signed on 4March 1981
Annex 5 1. Maritime Boundary Agreement between France and

Australia (Coral Seaand Indian Ocean),signed on 4Ja-
nuary 1982
Annex 52. Agreement between France and Fiji of 19January 1983
relating to the Delimitation oftheir EconomicZones
Annex 53. Agreement between Burma and India of 23 December
1986on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in
the Andaman Sea,in the CocoChannel and in the Bay
ofBengal
Annex 54. Agreement on Maritime Delimitation between France
and Dominica, signed on 7September 1987
Annex 55. Agreement between the Solomon Islands and Australia
establishing certain Seaand Seabed Boundaries, signed
on 13September 1988 INTRODUCTION

1. On 16August 1988the Government of Denmark filed an
Application with the International Court of Justice instituting pro-
ceedings concerning a dispute which had arisen between Denmark
and Norwayover the delimitation ofthe fishingzones and continen-
tal shelf areas between Greenland and Jan Mayen.

2. The point at issue is what effect should be given in a de-
limitation dispute to the island of Jan Mayen in relation to Green-
land. Denmark claims a line equal to a 200-mile zone, Norway
claims a median line. As the distance between Greenland and Jan
Mayen is only about 250 nautical miles the respective claims result
in an overlapping area. The size of the overlapping area is some
66,400 square kilometres.

3. Eight years of negotiation had preceded the filing of the
Application. As a negotiated settlement did not materialize, the
Government of Denmark decided to submit the dispute to the Court
for decision in accordance with the declarations made by Denmark

and Norway under Article 36(2)of the Statute of the Court.

4. In so doing the Government of Denmark has been
stronglyinfluenced by theimportance for Greenland ofestablishing
a clear jurisdictional line enablingtheGreenland authorities to plan
the future exploitation of the resources in the area in support of the
Greenland community.

5. In its Application the Government of Denmark has
asked the Court:

"to decide, in accordance with international law, where a
single line ofdelimitation shall be drawn between Denmark's
and Norway's fishing zones and continental shelf areas in the
waters between Greenland andJan Mayen".

6. It is the opinion of Denmark that a single line of delimi-
tation provides the best legal foundation for achieving stability and
finality in the area.

7. The present Memonal is submitted in pursuance of the
Court's Order dated 14 October 1988. CHAPTER 1.

SUBJECT MA'ITER AND HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE

Section 1.The General Geographical Context, the Disputed Areaand
the RelevantArea

8. The general geographical context of the disputed area
may be broadly described as the oceanic expanse constituted by the
Greenland Sea and the Norwegian Sea.

9. Map 1,annexed to this volume, depicts the region as a
large body of water shaped as a parallelogram bounded to the West
by the northern segment of the east coast of Greenland and to the
east by the Westcoast of Norway. No continuous land boundaries
exist to the north and to the south of the region. To the north the
region is bordered by the Arctic Ocean and Barents Sea, andto the
south by the North Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea.

10. The north-south extension of the parallelogram sea area
is approximately 1,000nautical miles, whereas the east-west exten-
sion is approximately 800nautical miles. The greater part of the re-
gion lies to the north of therctic Circle (66'33.N latitude).

II. The general geographical context of the disputed area
may be presented in greater detail by a description of the land
masses of the region.

12. The Norwegian Svalbard (Spitzbergen) Archipelago is
situated at the northeastern edge of the region. Svalbard (about
63,000square kilometres) is separated from the east coast of Green-
land by Fram Strait,approximately 250nautical miles wide, leading

to the Arctic Ocean. The western coast of Svalbard stretches for
about 370kilometres in an approximate NNW-SSE direction.
Tothe SE of Svalbard, the passage between the southernmost point
of Svalbard and Norway, approximately 350 nautical miles wide,
marks the boundary between the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea.
Straddling theboundary about 130nautical milessouth of Svalbard
lies the Norwegian Bear Island (about 180square kilometres).

13. Approximately 215 nautical miles to the south-east of
Bear Island lies themainland of Norway (about 324,000square ki-lometres) with a population of about 4.2 million. The Westcoast of

Norway stretches for approximately 1,100 kilometres in a regular
NNE-SSW direction.

14. The Faroe Islands, a self-governing region within the
Danish Realm with a population of about 47,000, are situated to the
Westof southern Nonvay at the southern edge of the region on the

boundary between the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic
Ocean. The Faroe Islands (some 1,400 square kilometres) are
ofiented in a N-S direction extending over a distance of some 110
kilometres.

15. About 240 nautical miles to the NW of the western tip of
the Faroe Islands lies the island State of Iceland (about 103,000

square kilometres) marking the boundary between the Greenland
Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. Iceland has a population of some
247,000. The northern coast of lceland stretches for more than 450
kilometres in a generally E-W direction.
Approximately 55 nautical miles to the north of the central segment
of the northern coast of Iceland, the tiny rock of Kolbeinsey is

found. Kolbeinsey has an expanse of a few hundred square metres
and a maximum altitude of 6 metres.

16. The northwestern part of lceland is separated from the
east coast of Greenland by the Denmark Strait, about 150nautical
miles wide, linking the Greenland Sea to the North Atlantic Ocean.

The segment of the east coast of Greenland facing the Denmark
Strait runs south-west from Cape Brewster for a distance of about
850 kilometres before turning to a SSW direction around Ammas-
salik towards Cape Farewell. North of Cape Brewster the coastline
follows a roughly NNE direction until it turns north-west at Nord-
ostrundingen, some 1,300kilometres to the north.

17. The Norwegian island of Jan Mayen (about 380 square
kilometres), is situated in the Greenland Sea approximately 300
nautical miles to the NE of Iceland, 510 nautical miles to the north
of the Faroe Islands, 550 nautical miles to the Westof Nonvay, 250
nautical miles to the east of Greenland, and 500 nautical miles to the

SW of Svalbard.
The Westcoast of Jan Mayen runs in a NE-SW direction, opposite
and almost parallel to the northern segment of the east coast of
Greenland. 18. Map II, annexed to this volume, depicts in greater detail
the disputed area and its immediate geographical surroundings, Le.,
Jan Mayen, the relevant segment ofthe east coast of Greenland and
Iceland.

19. The present dispute exists in the context of a relatively

simple geography. The relevant segment of the east coast of Green-
land runs, deeply incised by a number of major fiords, from Cape
Alf Trolle to Cape Brewster in a roughly SSW direction facing the

almost parallel and nearly linear north-west coast ofJan Mayen. To
the south of Cape Brewster, the east coast of Greenland veers to a
south-west direction and faces across the Denmark Strait to Iceland.
Between Cape Alf Trolle and Cape Brewster the coast stretches for

approximately 650kilometres. The ice-free land massbetween these
two points is the most extensive in al1of Greenland,at some places
reaching a width of more than 300 kilometres. The area is a marked
highland with a great number of peaks, some of which are almost

3,000 metres high. A multitude of fiords, among them some of the
largest and deepest in the world, terminate in iceberg-producing gla-
ciers originating from the ice cap. Numerous large and small islands,
isles, islets, and rocks are strewn in front ofthe East Greenland land

mass.

20. Jan Mayen is an elongated island tapering towards the
south with a maximum length of about 54 kilometres and a maxi-
mum width of 16kilometres. The coasts of Jan Mayen are straight
and virtually without indentations.

Iceland is a roughly rectangular island State with a maxi-
21.
mum east-west length of approximately 500 kilometres and a maxi-
mum north-south width of approximately 350 kilometres. Topo-
graphically, the north coast of Iceland is very similar to that of East

Greenland,the mountainous coast being deeply indented by fiords.
The altitude of the coastal region varies from flat sand banks to ba-
saitformationsof a maximum height ofapproximately 1,200metres.

22. The straight baselines of the east coast of Greenland are
shown on Map II.')

7 Jkhe-zone waspromuIgared&~rheDonishGovernmenrin 1976and 1980.whereasaorrhe
rerrirorinlseo baselinewaspromulgoredin 1965. The bareline,/i>rrhefishery zone
esrablishedhyE~ecuriveOrdeNo. 176($14 May 1980onrheFishingTerriloryin rhe
WarerssurroundingGreenlandisempl~,~rd/brrhepurposerqf rhir Memoriul(Anner
6).Thebasepoinrslirred in the Order servelwirh minor corrorrhasis/or rhe
compulalion/,frhe Danish 200-milefirhe~. limir and rhe equidixranceline herween
CreenlnndandJan Ma~en. Theaccuroq ,?/'rle.ri.'rmgoprand chorrs/romw,hich 23. The disputed area created by the overlapping claims of

the Parties has a roughly triangular shape, awidth at its maximum of
about 75 nautical miles and a total expanse of about 66,400square
kilometres.
The area in dispute is represented by the figure ABCD shown on

Map II. AB is the relevant segment of the 200-mile fishery limit
claimed by Denmark off East Greenland. AD is the relevant part of
the equidistance line claimed by Norway to be the limit of the Nor-

wegian fishery zone off Jan Mayen vis-à-vis Greenland. The south-
ern border of the disputed area is represented by the broken line
BCD.

24. The dispute submitted to the Court is confined to the de-
limitation ofthe fishery zones and continental shelf areas appertain-
ing to Greenland/~enmark and Norway.

25. The proximity ofthe StateofIceland to thedisputedarea
makes itnecessary, however, to ensure thatthe decision ofthe Court

does not affect Iceland's rights. No other State has claims in the vi-
cinity of the disputed area.

26. In an Agreement dated 28 May 1980Norway recognized

Iceland's right to a 200-mile economic zone vis-à-vis Jan Mayen,
and in an additional Agreement dated 22 October 1981 the two
countries agreed that the continental shelf boundary between Jan

Mayen and lceland was to coincide with theboundary ofthe Icelan-
dic economic zone, cf. paragraphs 75 and 78.

27. No maritime delimitation agreement concerning the wa-

ters between Iceland and Greenland has been concluded between
lceland and Denmark.
Iceland has claimeda 200-mileeconomic zone providing that where

the distance between Iceland and Greenland is less than 400 nauti-
cal miles,the equidistance lineforms the outer limit ofthe economic
zone. The outer limit of the continental shelf has been defined by
Iceland as 200 nautical miles or the outer edge of the continental

margin subject to the equidistance line vis-à-visGreenland, cf.para-
graphs 73 and 74.
Denmark has claimed a 200-mile fishery zone off Greenland, with

the basepoinrshavebeenselecreddoesno1meerrodaySstandardsand in order ro
rr,mr,<pocrrhlrrni,ccura<O$gpodpr~i.,jJrrigruph~rrrç<innitir>zrpediriunniII
hr corrred<,urin Ju-Auyurr /Li9 lhrpriniriri, oimoirhe rerunna>ssdn<*u,il/hr ln
znwre rhar rhe data on whiclirhz bu5zbneriarem u/rhr releront port iijrlir totr
(;nmlttnd<i>u~riba>eJir inronformir) wirhgio,gri>phirrr<i/,rrhz>iondardsci/
prerrnr ~.<irrog>grAr).u re~ulrO/rherecunnoi<raniiringleItrr ol<orrr<hriw
oornr,i~iieninOornoo J<irunUT *rll<i> in >i>rzmWGS 84. "il1hesuhntitrtrihrthe proviso that where the distance between Greenland and Iceland
is less than 400 nautical miles the equidistance line serves as the
outer limit of the fishery zone, cf. paragraph 49.

lceland and Denmark are thus in agreement that the principle of
equidistance willform thebasis ofa futuredelimitation of the waters
between Greenland and Iceland.

28. Iceland's claim for a 200-mile economic zone with re-
spect for the equidistance line vis-à-vis Greenland is identified as
the solethird State claim of relevanceto thedispute submitted to the
Court.

29. In order to leave Iceland's 200-mileeconomic zone unaf-
fected the disputed area is limited towards the south. Therefore, the
Court is requested to limit its decision in geographical scope to the
delimitation ofthe Parties' fishing zones and continental shelf areas
in the waters north of the broken line BCD.

The line BCD is drawn from the intersection of the 200-mile limit of
the Greenland fishery zone and the 69O36.N parallel of latitude
(point B),via apoint with the coordinates 6g049'N, 14"00'W(point
C), to the intersection of the equidistance line between Greenland

and Jan Mayen and the 69"Sl'N parallel of latitude (point D).
Thus, theproposed southernborder ofthedisputed area is placed to
the north of both the equidistance line between Iceland and Green-
land and the Icelandic 200-mile limit vis-à-vis Jan Mayen, leaving

the interests of Iceland unaffected2).

30. The area relevant to the delimitation dispute submitted
to the Court is here determined solely on pnnciples of geometry, cf.

Map II.

31. The disputed area, represented by the triangularly
shaped figure ABCD, cf. paragraph 23, serves as a basis for the
determination of the relevant area.

>) Inevirably. whoreverdelimirorion line maj evenruollybedrarn b? rhe Couri. rheline
w-il1becul shorr rorhesourtheerclusive economiczone oJlceland. rheerocijunc-
rion-poinr robenegoriaredberreen D~nmark/GreenlandNorw,q and leeland. Dur-
ing rhew negoriariooproblem ma,' orire with regard ru rhesmall lcerockof
Ko1beinse.vreferred ro in paragraph 15. In 1975 lceland empl<?i.edKolheansqv as
harepoinrJur rhee.rr;renrionof rheJshery zone ro 200 naurical miler. Themorr recenr
promulgation ofrhe lcelandic baseliner ir conrained in Law No. 4June11979 .
concerningrhe Terrirorial Seo.rhe EconoZone and rheConrinenral Shel/(Anner
15).Denmark doesnor occeprihe legirimo-. under inrernarionol low oJrhe lrelandic
geoggraphical rea wpirhinwhichrhedelimirorion berweenGreenland JancMayengrhe
ir tobeefeeredrhe irrue oJKolbeinseyhosbeendirregarded. 32. G and H are basepoints (baseline control points) on the
baseline off East Greenland. BasepointGgeometricallycontrols the

southern extremities of the disputed area, points B and D, whereas
basepoint H controls the northern extremity of the disputed area,
point A.Consequently, G and Hconstitute the terminal points ofthe
relevant segmentof the East Greenland baseline. The geodesic GH
represents the relevant coastal front of Greenland vis-à-vis Jan
Mayen. The coastal front stretches for approximately 532 kilome-
tres. The length of the relevant East Greenland baseline isabout 551

kilometres.

33. Points F and E are basepoints on the western baseline of
Jan Mayen. F and E geometrically control points D and A of the
disputed area, respectively').
Thus, F and E are terminal points of the relevant segment of theJan
Mayen baseline vis-à-vis Greenland. The geodesic FE representing

the coastal front of Jan Mayen measures some 54 kilometres. The
length ofthe relevant western baseline ofJan Mayen, FE, isapproxi-
mately 58 kilometres4).

34. Thus, the area relevant to the present delimitation may,
based on principles of geometry, be determined as the oceanic ex-
panse delimited by the polygon: A-E-the NW baseline of Jan

Mayen-F-B-C-D-G-the relevant baseline of East Greenland-H-A.

35. The above definition of the relevant area has the advan-
tage that the computation of al1points on the 200-mile fishery limit
and the equidistance line, constituting the limiting lines of the dis-
puted area, are confined geometrically to the inside of the above

polygon5). It thus appears that the geometrical approach to the
determination of the relevant area offers a precise and objectively
defined basis for the Court's delimitation.

Section 2. History of the Dispute

36. In 1976the Danish Parliament adopted Act No. 597 of 17
December 1976on the Fishing Territory of the Kingdom of Den-
mark. The Act empowered the Danish Prime Minister to effect an

') ThebaselinesaroundJan Moyenarepromulgaredin Decreeo/rhe CrownPriRe-
genr.dared30 June1955(Anne8).
') TheboselineofJan Moyenisnorshownon Map Ildue rorhescoleofrhemap.
') Sofa, al1compuiarionshave beendone in a purelyformol way. sinceno common
land.Allrrraighr lineIOberegordedosgeodesics.ishedbetheParriesand Ice-extension of the Danish fishery zone up to 200 nautical miles. The
Act entered into force on I January 1977(Annex 1).

37. The Bill was tabled in the Danish Parliament on 9 No-
vember 1976.Prior to the tabling of the Bill, a number of countries
bordering on Danish, Greenland and Faroese waters had either ex-
tendedtheir fishery zones to 200 nautical miles or announced that
they would introduce legislation to that effect. In 1975Iceland ex-
tended its fishery zoneto 200nautical miles, cf.paragraph 73.In Au-
gust 1976 Canada had announced that a 200-mile fishery zone
would be established as of 1January 1977.The Norwegian Govern-
ment had stated that it deemed an extension of the Norwegian fish-
ery zone necessary prior to the end of 1976and had on 3 September
1976 tabled in the Norwegian Parliament a bill on the establishment

of an economic zone. The United States of America had also
adopted an extension of the fishery zones to 200 nautical miles. The
extension of the United States fishery zones became effective as of
I March 1977.

38. Thisdevelopment of State practice madeit necessary for
Denmark to act. Following the establishment of 200-mile fishery
zones by the United States of America, Canada, lceland and Nor-
way, the waters around Greenland and the Faroe Islands and the
North Sea would be the only open fishing grounds of importance
left in the North AtlanticOcean. The situation could rapidlybecome
critical to the fish stock ifthe international fishing fleetthat had now
been barred from fishing off the coasts of other countnes could
freely commence fishing in Danish, Greenland and Faroese waters.
Such a scenario would be especially harmful to Greenland and the
Faroe Islands as thepopulations ofthose tenitories are cnicially de-
pendent onthe fishing industry. Consequently, in July 1976and Au-
gust 1976respectively, the Provincial Council of Greenland and the

Home Rule Authority of the Faroe Islands requested the Danish
Government to effect an early extension of the fishery limits to 200
nautical miles. To avert such serious consequences to Danish,
Greenland, and Faroese fishing interests as the extension ofthe fish-
ery limits by the neighbouring countries might have caused, it was
imperative to empower the Government of Denmark to extend the
Danish fishery zone.

39. In 1976the Nonvegian Parliament passed Act No. 91 of
17 December 1976 relating to the Economic Zone of Nonvay
(Annex 2).The Actempowered theGovernment ofNonvay to estab-
lish economic zones. Pursuant to this Act, the Government of Nor-
way established by Royal Decree of 17December 1976a 200-mile
economiczone for mainland Norway effective as of 8January 1977. 40. By Order of 22 December 1976 the Greenland fishery
zone was extended from 12nautical miles to 200 nautical miles. The
extension was effective from 1 January 1977. Off the Westcoast of
Greenland the extension only applied up to 75"N and off the east
coast of Greenland the extension only applied up to 67"N latitude.

41. The reasons for not extending the 200-mile fishery zone
off the east coast north of 67"N were that such an extension might
cause certain dificulties in relation to the delimitation of the fishery
zone in the areas vis-&vis lceland and Jan Mayen, and also the
relative paucity of fish stocks in those waters.

In September 1978 the Norwegian Minister of Foreign
42.
Affairs announced that the newly discovered prospects of capelin
fishing in the waters around Jan Mayen had led the Government of
Norway to consider the establishment of an economic zone around
Jan Mayen.

43. In March 1979the Government of Denmark learned that
the Govemment of Norway and the Icelandic Government had ini-
tiated talks conceming maritime delimitation of the area between
lceland and Jan Mayen.

44. At the Session of the Nordic Ministers for Foreign Af-
fairs held in Copenhagen on 29 -30 March 1979the Danish Minis-

ter for Foreign Affairs advised his Norwegian colleague that an
equidistance line delimiting the waters between Greenland and Jan
Mayen would not be acceptable to Denmark.

45. In June 1979 the Government of Denmark learned
through the news media that the Norwegian Minister for Foreign

Affairs had visited Iceland to discuss fishing in the waters between
Jan Mayen and Iceland and the delimitation of those waters. In a
letter of 3 July 1979 the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs in-
formed his Norwegian colleague that the Government of Denmark
expected that no decisions would be made during the Norwegian -
lcelandic talks that might prejudice Danish interests, including the

maritime delimitation off East Greenland north of67"N (Annex 3).
In his reply of4 July 1979the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs
gave an assurancethat the Norwegian side would make certain that
during the negotiations with lceland no decisions prejudicing Dan-
ish interests would be made (Annex 4).

46. At the end of August 1979the Government of Denmark
advised the Norwegian and lcelandic Governments that Denmark
was considering an extension of the fishery zone off East Greenlandnorth of 67"N. The fact that large-scale fishing had taken place in
the waters between Greenland, Iceland and Jan Mayen and that a
considerable part of this fishing had taken place in an area within
200 nautical miles off East Greenland had led to such consider-
ations.

47. During the Session of the Nordic Ministers for Foreign
Affairs held in Reykjavik on 30 - 31 August 1979,the issue of the
maritimedelimitation of the areas between Greenland, Iceland, and
Jan Mayen was discussed between the Danish Minister andthe Nor-
wegian Minister. The Nonvegian Minister informed his Danish col-
league that the experts in the Legal Affairs Division of the Nor-
wegian Foreign Ministry did not think that the negotiationsbetween

Norway and lceland would give rise to any delimitation problems in
relation to Greenland since it wasassumedthat in the case of Green-
land the median line principle should be applied.The Danish Min-
ister emphatically refuted this erroneous conception. The Danish
Minister stated that Greenland must not be treated less favourably
than Iceland in relation toJan Mayen or, to put it in another way,
Norway should not expect to be compensated in a future delimita-
tion with Greenland ifitgranted concessions to Iceland. TheDanish
Minister also stated that even if a median line between Jan Mayen
and Iceland became the end result, it could not be taken for granted
that the delimitation between Jan Mayen and Greenland could also
be determined by application of the median line principle (Annex
5).

48. At the Session of the Nordic Ministers for Foreign Af-
fairsin Helsinki on 27-28 March 1980,the Danish Minister advised
his Norwegian colleague that in May or June 1980Denmark would
extend the fishery zone off East Greenland north of 67"N to 200

nautical miles. In order to avoid difficulties Denmark would not for
the time being exercise jurisdiction beyond the median line in the
area between Greenland and Jan Mayen.

49. ByExecutive Order No. 176of 14May 1980and effective
from IJune 1980,Denmark extended Greenland's fishing territory
north of 67"N from 12nautical milesto 200nautical miles. Article 1,
paragraph 4, ofthe Order provided that until further notice the fish-
eryjurisdiction would not be exercised beyond the median line be-
tween Greenland and Jan Mayen (Annex 6). The Order was issued
pursuant to Act No. 597 of 17December 1976on the Fishing Terri-
tory of Denmark (Annex 1).

50. Subsequent to Denmark's extension ofGreenland's fish-
ery zone, Norway established by Royal Decree of 23 May 1980andenective from 29 May 1980, a 200-mile fishery zone around Jan
Mayen (Annex 7).Article 2 of the Royal Decree provided that in re-
lation to Greenland, the fishery zone should not extend beyond the
median line. Vis-à-vis Iceland, however, the 200-mile fishery zone
claimed by Iceland was recognized in Article 2 providing that the
fishery zone around Jan Mayen would not extend beyond the line
constituting the outer limit laid down in the Icelandic Law No. 41 of
1June 1979,cf. paragraph 74.

51. In a Note Verbale addressed to the Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs by the Norwegian Embassy in Copenhagen, the
Government of Nonvay on 4June 1980reserved its position regard-
ing the Danish 200-mile fishery zone in the area between Greenland
and Jan Mayen. The Government of Nonvay held the view that ac-
cording to customary international law, a country may not, in the
absence of an agreement, extend its fishery zone beyond the median
line in relation to another country. In addition, the Government of
Nonvaystated that Norwaywould exercisejurisdiction in the entire
area of the Nonvegian fishery zone (Annex 9).

52. A response to the Norwegian Note was given by Note
Verbale dated 9 June 1980from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs to the Norwegian Embassy in Copenhagen. The Note stated

that in theopinion of the Government of Denmark, Jan Mayen con-
stituted a special circumstance under international law. Therefore,
the fishery zone around Jan Mayen could have no impact onthe ex-
tent of Greenland's fishery zone. Consequently, the Government of
Denmark reserved its position with regard to the Government of
Norway's decision to establish a fishery zone around Jan Mayen
covering waters within the Greenland 200-mile fishing limit. The
Note stated that under international law Greenland's entire
200-mile fishery zone remained under Danish jurisdiction. The
Government of Denmark maintained that the decision not to exer-
cise jurisdiction beyond the median line between Greenland and
Jan Mayen until further notice was made at a time when no ex-
tended fishery zone around Jan Mayen had been established, and
that a new situation had arisen with the Government of Norway's
decision to enforce the fishery regulations in the entire zone claimed

by Norway. The Government of Denmark reserved the right to re-
view its decision not to exercise sovereignty in the part of Green-
land's fishery zone lying beyond the median line (Annex 10).

53. Following the exchange of notes, the two Governments
initiated talks on the maritimedelimitation between Greenland and
Jan Mayen. The first meeting was held in Oslo on 3 -4 December
1980,cf. paragraph 61. 54. At the end of August 1981the Norwegian Government
announced that a Norwegian coastguard ship was sailing towards
the disputed area with instructions to boarDanish fishing vessels
and hand over written warnings ordering the vessels to stop fishing
and leave the Norwegian fishery zone. This led the Government of

Denmark to decide that hencefonh it would also exercise jurisdic-
tion in the disputed area. A Danish inspection ship was sent to the
area. By Executive Order, No. 437 of 31 August 1981,issued by the
Government of Denmark, the temporary restraint in the exercise of
Danish jurisdiction in the disputed area was rescinded (Annex II).

55. On 3 1August 1981,the Norwegian coastguard boarded
two Danish fishing vessels, one of them from the Faroe Islands,
which were fishing for capelin in the disputed area. The vessels were
inspected and written warnings served on the captains (Annex 12).

56.
In order to avoid a further escalation of the conflict, the
Danish Minister for Foreign Anàirs on 31 August 1981advised the
Government of Norway, through the Danish Ambassador to Nor-
way, that the Government of Denmark was prepared to have the dis-
pute settled by international arbitration.

57. The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Nor-
wegian Minister of Foreign Affairs met on I September 1981 in
Copenhagen to discuss the critical situation that had developed. The
Norwegian Minister was sympathetic to the Danish proposal to
have the dispute settled by international arbitratand stated that
he would reflect upon the idea. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs

agreed that before arbitration proceedings were initiated the two
Governments would seek an amicable solutionto the problem ofde-
limitation through bilateral talks.

INTERIA MRRANGEMENR TEGARDINM GONITORING

OF FISHING FOR CAPELIN

58. Following the meeting on 1September 1981between the
Danish and the Norwegian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, a delega-
tion of Danish civil servants met in Oslo on 7 September 1981with
their Norwegian colleagues in order to work out a provisional solu-
tion to the problems raised by the delimitation dispute. The Parties

agreed to preserve status quo in the area in order to avoid an escala-
tion of the situation. Inspection shifrom both countries should
show restraint. The Norwegian coastguard would.still serve writtenwarnings on Danish, including Faroese, fishing vessels, but would

not board the vessels for inspection purposes. The Parties agreed
that this understanding would not prejudice the Parties' position
during future talkson delimitation.The Parties, furthermore, agreed
that the establishment ofthe total allowable catch (TAC) for capelin
fishing andthe allocation of quotas for capelin fishingwould have to
be placed on the agenda of the future talks among al1 Parties con-

cemed.

59. In 1982 and 1983 fishing of capelin was brought to a
complete stop in the area in order to ensure conservation of the fish
stock, cf. paragraph 83.

60. In the summer of 1984 a mutual understanding was
reached between the Parties to the effect that in the disputed area
each Party would enforce its regulations only upon its own vessels
and upon vessels from third States that had not been granted a
licence by theother Party. Both Partieswould refrain from enforcing

these regulations on the other Party's vesselsand on third State ves-
sels holding lawful licences. Licences granted by both Parties to
third State vessels should also apply in the disputed area (Annex 13).
This arrangement concerning regulation of the capelin fishing has
been applied each year since 1984.

TALKS ON THE DELIMITATD IOINPUTE

61. As mentioned in paragraph 53 the first meeting between
the Parties concerning the maritime delimitation in the waters be-
tween Greenland and Jan Mayen was held in Oslo on 3-4December
1980. During nearly a decade the Parties held a series of meetings

and had a number of informal contacts in order to try to solve the
dispute. However, al1attempts to reach an agreed settlement have
been fruitless.

62. At the meeting on 3-4 December 1980 the Parties gave
accounts of their views and the legal rationale underlying these

views. The legal aspects ofthe talks centred on the delimitation rule
contained in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelfseen in the context of later developments in State prac-
tice, in the case law of the International Court ofJustice and arbitral
tribunals as well as in the field of the on-going codification efforts
concerning the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The meeting pro-

duced no rapprochement between the Danish claim for a distance
criterion of 200 nautical miles and the Norwegian claim for a me-
dian line. 63. The next meeting was held on 25 May 1981 in Copen-
hagen. The Parties reiterated their views put forward at the Decem-
ber 1980meeting and agreed to resume the talks at a later date. At
the following meeting in Copenhagen on 15December 1981the only
items on the agenda were the arrangements for future talks and a
modus vivendi for 1982.

64. The next meeting was held in Oslo on 27 January 1983.
The Parties concluded that a continuation of the talks would be fu-
tile, and that the matter had to be submitted to the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs.

65. At a meeting on 10June 1983in Paris the Danish Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs advised the Norwegian Minister of Foreign
Affairs that Denmark was still willing to have the dispute on the de-
limitation submitted to international arbitration.

66. Renewed talks between representatives of the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs took place in Copenhagen on 19 August 1983.

67. On 6 January 1984Norwegian and Danish civil servants
met again in Oslo. Neither this meeting nor subsequent meetings in
Copenhagen on 4 June 1984and 6 June 1985and in Oslo on 29Jan-
uary 1986brought the Parties closer to a settlement of the dispute.

68. During the autumn of 1986Denmark urged for fixing the
date of a meeting with a view to making a last attempt for a full and
substantive exchange of al1viewpoints involved in the settlement of
the dispute. On 15January 1987a preliminary meeting was held in
Copenhagen. At this meeting the Parties went over al1the aspects
involved in the delimitation of the continental shelf and the fishery

zones in the area. They agreed upon the agenda of a meeting sche-
duled for 23 - 24 April 1987.

69. At this meeting, which was also held in Copenhagen,the
Parties exchanged their views on the delimitation of the fishery

zones and the continental shelf areas. They did not reach any solu-
tion but agreed to pursue the matter further at a meeting in Copen-
hagen on 29June 1987,but also that meeting remained inconclusive.
The Parties realized that the possibilities of reaching a negotiated
settlement between the civil servants had now been exhausted.

70. The matter was therefore once again referred to discus-
sion between the two countries' Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Talks
between the two Ministers were, however, also fruitless. 71. On 7 - 8April 1988negotiators ofboth countries opened
talks in Copenhagen on the'possibilities of settling the delimitation
dispute by arbitration. The talks on a possible settlement by arbitra-
tion were resumed at meetings on 20 May 1988inOsloand 21June
1988in Copenhagen. These talks did not lead to any result and no
further meetings were scheduled.

72. Against this background and with a view to obtaining,
eventually, a final settlement ofthe disputethe Danish Government
decided to institute proceedings before the International Court of
Justice.

ICELAND' MSARITIMDEELIMITATIO ANSD

THENORWEGIAN-ICELAN AGIREEMEN CTONCERNINF ISHERYAND
CONTINENTA SLELF QUESTIONS

73. ByRegulations of 15July 19751celand extended its fish-
ery zone to 200 nautical miles (Annex 14). Where the distance to
Greenland and to the Faroe Islands is less than 400 nautical miles
the fishery limits were established as equidistance lines. Towards
Jan Mayen, where the distance is less than 400 miles, a full 200-mile
zone was claimed by Iceland, but until further notice jurisdiction
was not to be exercised in the area outside the equidistance line.
The Government of Denmark disputed, as it still does today, some
of the points determining the drawing of baselines in the Icelandic
Regulations. In a Note delivered on 23 October 1975by the Danish

Embassy in Reykjavik to the lcelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Government of Denmark, therefore, resewed its position with
respect to equidistance lines drawn on the basis of those baseline
points.
The Norwegian reaction toIceland's extension of its fishing limits
was one of strong protest. In a Note, d5tSeptember 1975,the
Government of Norway informed the lcelandic Government of its
view that the equidistance principle should apply not only towards
the Faroe Islands and Greenland but also towards Jan Mayen.

74. By Law No. 41 of 1June 1979concerning the Territorial
Sea, the Economic Zone andthe Continental Shelf (Annex IS), Ice-
land established a 200-mile economic zone. The Act contained no
provision corresponding to the provision in the Regulations of 15
July 1975concerning non-enforcement of jurisdiction beyond theequidistance line towards Jan Mayen. Towards the Faroe Islands
and Greenland the economic zone was delimited by the equidis-

tance line.

75. The Norwegian - Icelandic dispute on fishing rights in
the waters between Jan Mayen and lceland was settled by an Agree-
ment of 28 May 1980 concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf

Questions. The Agreement entered into force on 13 June 1980
(Annex 16).

76. In the preamble to the Agreement the Norwegian Gov-
ernment and the lcelandic Government recognize inter alia that the

economy of lceland is overwhelmingly dependent on fisheries, cf.
Article 71of the draft convention before the Conference on the Law
of the Sea. The preamble of the Agreement further evidences the
Nonvegian Government's acceptance of an lcelandic 200-mile
economiczone in the area between lceland and Jan Mayen.

77. The'Agreement provides forjoint management by Nor-
way and lceland of the fish stocks in the waters around Jan Mayen,
inter alia by establishing a joint fisheries commission. The Agree-
ment also regulates the fishing for capelin in the area, establishing

procedures for the annual fixing oftotal allowable catch (TAC) and
allotment of quotas to the two countries. For more details on the
capelin aspect of the Agreement, cf. paragraph 80.

78. The Agreement does not lay down a continental shelf

boundary in thearea between Iceland and Jan Mayen, but provides
for the establishment of a Conciliation Commission empowered to
submit recommendations to the Governments of Norway and Ice-
land regarding the dividing line for the shelf area between Iceland

and Jan Mayen6).

O) ie Conciliarion Commirsiu%,as esrohlirhed o6 Augusr 1980.In ils report de-
livered in May 1981ro rhe Governmenrsof Ireland and Norw3ir recornmendeIO
rhe rwo Governmenrsrhar rhedividing Iine berweenrrw8counrries'recrions ofrhe
rhedividing linefor rheeconomiczones. TheCr>mmi.~snlro recornmendedrhoeo-
operarion should heerrahlirhed herweenrlie rwocounrrie,s,fi>rrerroreh and erploira-
rion ofperroleurn depo.rirrin a rpecifir area heinren IcJon Mqrnd onhorh
sider ojrhe dividing line. rheJoinr VenrureArca. Therepurl ofthe Conciliation Corn-
mirsionfirmed the borir ojrhe Agreemenrbernaen Norw,oynnd Iceland on rhe Con-
rinenral Sheljin rhe Area berweenlceland aJan Mqen. concluded herw,eenrhe
Norw,egianand lrelandic Governmenron 22Ocruber1981lAnne.x 28). 79. The fishing of capelin in the area around Jan Mayen
which started in 1978has accentuated the importance of drawing a
final delimitation line also between Greenland andJan Mayen.

80. In the Agreement of 28 May 1980 concerning Fishery
and Continental Shelf Questions Norway and Iceland established a
procedure for the biannual establishment of the total allowable
catch (TAC) of capelin in the maritime areas between lceland and

Jan Mayen. The two countries agreed to distribute the capelin stock
between themselves in theratio of 15:85.The agreement did not pro-
vide for capelin fishing by vessels from Member States of the Euro-
pean Economic Community(EEC).

81. In 1982marine biological reports on a serious decline in
the capelin stock led to trilateral talks between the EEC, Iceland,
and Norway in Brussels. At that time Greenland was still a member
of the EEC, cf. paragraphs 139 - 144.

82. The trilateral talks were complicated by the Agreement
between Norway and lceland on the distribution between them of
the capelin stock in the ratio of 15:85.

83. On 18 August 1982, the EEC, Iceland, and Norway
agreed for purposes ofconservation to bring the fishing of capelin to
a complete stop for the period I July 1982to 30June 1983.The Par-
ties further agreed to form a working group with the objective of es-
tablishing the terms forjoint management of the capelin stock and a
permanent ratio for the allocation of capelin quotas.
Byagreement between the EEC, Iceland and Nonvay the complete
ban on capelin fishing was extended to the fishing season from I
July 1983to 30 June 1984.

84. In early 1984 the capelin stock had multiplied and
marine biologists advised the Parties that capelin fishing could be
resumed. Pursuant to the trilateral Agreement of 18August 1982the

EEC, Iceland and Nonvay met on 8 -9 May 1984in Bergen, Nor-
way, to discuss a permanent ratio for sharingthe capelin stock and
the fixing ofajoint trilateral TAC for the fishing season 1984 - 1985.
However, the Parties to the capelin talks were unable to agree on
either issue.

85. Following the Bergen talks Norway and Iceland held a
meeting pursuant to the Agreement of 28 May 1980.The two coun-
tries agreed on an lcelandic - Norwegian capelin TAC for the fish- ing season from 1June 1984 - 30 June 1985in the well known ratio
of 85:15.Asin the earlier Icelandic-Norwegian agreements the EEC
was not allotted a capelin quota. Thus the EEC was left with no
choice but to establish unilaterally an EEC capelin quota for the
fishing season 1984 - 1985.

86. At the Session of the Nordic Ministers for Foreign Af-

fairs on 4-5 September 1984,the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs
advised his Norwegian and lcelandic colleagues that Danish par-
ticipation in the talks and in the possible conclusion of agreements
on the catching of capelin was contingent on the non-prejudicial ef-
fect of this participation on the maritime delimitation between
Greenland and Jan Mayen. The three Ministers of Foreign Affairs
agreed to initiate talks between Greenland/Denmark, Iceland, and
Nonvay on the allocation of capelin quotas for the fishing season
1984 - 1985as soon as possible.
It was then known that Greenland would withdraw from the Euro-
pean Communities in early 1985, cf. paragraph 144. Following
Greenland's withdrawal from the European Communities, Green-
land/Denmark became a direct party to the talks with lceland and

Nonvay on the fishing of capelin.

87. Greenland, lceland and Nonvay met for capelin talks on
15-17 April and 26-28June 1985.The Parties agreed on a tentative
TAC for the fishing season from 1August 1984to 31 July 1985.The
Parties however, were unable to agree on a ratio for sharing the
capelin TAC.
A report on the biological key for quota sharing of capelin in the
Icelandic-Greenland-Jan Mayen area submitted in the summer of
1985by ajoint working group ofthe EEC, Iceland, and Norway did
not bring the Parties together on the size of the quotas appertaining
to the three Parties. At the closure of the talks in June 1985the Par-
tiespresented their final claims for capelin quotas: lceland claiming

80 percent. of the TAC, Norway 13percent., and Greenland II per
cent.

88. At a meeting on capelin quotas held in Copenhagen on
16 - 17April 1986,Greenland suggested an arrangement according
to which Greenland and Norway should jointly share more than 35
per cent. of the TAC. The Parties did not come to terms on perma-
nent ratios for sharing the capelin stock but they were able to agree
on ajoint capelin TAC for the period from IAugust 1986to 30 No-
vember 1986. 89. In 1987no trilateral meetingswere held on the allocation
of capelin quotas, but talks were resumed in Reykjavik on 14May
1988.The Parties did not come to terms at these talks either.

90. Five months after Denmark had initiated proceedings
before the International Court of Justice in the present case, re-
presentatives of Greenland, lceland and Jan Mayen on 20 January
1989 agreed on a draft agreement on joint management of the
capelin stock. The Agreement between Greenland/Denmark, Ice-
land and Norway on the Capelin Stock in the Waters between
Greenland, lceland and Jan Mayen was signed by the Parties in
Copenhagen on 12June 1989.The Agreement provides for sharing
the capelin TAC between Iceland, Norway and Greenland in the

ratio of 78:11:11.The Agreement also provides for a procedure for
the biannual establishment of the capelin TAC and for mutual fish-
ing and landing rights inside the other Parties' zones. The Agree-
ment is valid for the fishing seasons from 1July 1989until30 April
1992(Annex 17).
During the negotiations leading to the Agreement, Iceland and Nor-
way suggested that the Agreement should be valid for a longer
period of time. This was not acceptable to Greenland. One of the
explicitly stated reasons was the Greenland wish to be able to nego-
tiate a new agreement on the basis of the Court's decision in the
present case.

91. The Agreement does not affect the need for a delimita-
tion. When discussions on its renewal begin, Greenland will be in
exactly the same position as in the previous discussions ifno delimi-
tation has been effected. For, lacking a clear delimitation line,
Greenland is unable to argue for an allocation of the catch which
matches the size of the maritime area to which Greenland is entitled

by law.
Furthermore, there are practical difficulties which only a delimita-
tion will remove. The interim arrangement regarding monitoring of
fishing for capelin (Annex 13)is unsatisfactory to the extent that it
allows dual jurisdiction in the disputed area and precludes Green-
land from monitoring or controlling vessels licensed by Norway to
operate in a substantial area within Greenland's 200-mile zone.
Afinal delimitation would also enhance Greenland's possibilities of
enacting proper conservation and management measures concern-
ing the fish stock in the area. CHAPTER II.

GREENLAND

Section 1.History and Constitutional Status

A. HISTORY

IMMIGRATION

92. The history of the Greenland people is characterized by
seven waves of immigration, followed by a colonial period of some
immigration.

93. Greenland and the main place names mentioned in this
Chapter are shown on Map III, annexed to this volume.

94. The first immigration known to archaeologists took
place about 2500 B.C. when a group of palaeo-Eskimo hunters set
out from the easternmost part of North Canada across the narrow

straitsto thenorthernmostpart and later the eastcoastof Greenland
(Independence 1culture).

95. In the second wave, which also started from Canada,
presumably immediatelyafter the firstone, the immigrants were also
palaeo-Eskimo hunters. Contrary to the first immigrants they spread
south along the Westcoast (Saqqaq culture).

96. About 1000B.C. a third group arrived from North Can-
ada. Like the first immigrants they moved northeastward and then
southward round the coast (Independence II culture).

97. Shortly thereafter yet anothergroup of people, presum-
ably of the same ethnic origin, entered Greenland by the same ap-
proaches but they went south across Melville Bayand downthe west
coast (Dorset culture).

98. About AD 900, still by the same routes from present-day
Canada, camethe vanguard ofthe people who were to take posses-
sion of Greenland in both east and West(Thule culture). They later
named themselves Kalaallitand became the ancestors of the people
inhabiting modern Greenland. In Greenlandic the country is called
Kalaallit Nunaat.

99. In 985 a group of people from Iceland settled in the
south-west part of Greenland. In order to attract more settlers fromIceland, these Norse peasants of Viking culture named the country
'Greenland'. Thus, the south-west part of Greenland was a part of
the European-Nordic cultural region throughout the Middle Ages.
The Norsemen in Greenland had become extinct at the end of the
15thcentury.

100. The last immigration from Canada took place during the
period about 1700 - 1900.The immigrants were polar Eskimos who
now inhabit the Thule district.

101. In 1721 the King of Denmark sent an expedition to
Greenland to re-establish connection with the Norsemen there, not
knowing that they had become extinct. Unable to accomplish the
task assigned to it, the expedition assumed Lutheran missionary
work among the Eskimos in West Greenland and established a
trading post in the district. This marked the advent of a colonial

period which lasted until 1953.

102. North-East Greenland, Le.,thearea between what today
is known as Peary Land and Scoresbysund, and which includes the
area between the 70" and 76"N latitudes relevant to the present dis-

pute, has been inhabited forseveral thousand years, presumably the
longest continuous period of habitation in Greenland. Here remains
of the lndependence 1culture have been found, e.g. in Peary Land
dated to approximately 2500 B.C.
Remains of large settlements belonging to later cultures have now
been found on Ile de France, around Dove Bay, and as far south as
at Cape South in Scoresby Sound Fiord. The total number of former
settlements that have been found in North-East Greenland is close
to three hundred, leaving no doubt that the population of this area
was at times relatively large.

103. North-East Greenland has thus been populated and its
natural resources exploited over a time span of some 4500 years.

104. In the centuries following 1721,Denmark established al-
together 16 settlement districts in Greenland. This process was
peaceful and without any armed conflict between Denmark and the
aboriginalpopulation. Denmark did not exercise authority over the
administration of wildlife resources (marine mammals, fish and
birds), which since ancient times had been managed by the huntersthemselves by way of prescriptive rights which various settlements
and families had gained with respect to specific hunting and fishing
areas.

105. Culturally,asalient feature ofthe period wasthe effort to
create a written language which could turn the West Greenland dia-
lect of the principal Eskimo language into a usable tool in modem

Greenland. Analphabetism was practically eliminated in the 19th
century.

106. An important event took place when the Permanent
Court of International Justice on 5pfil 1933passed judgment in
the case concerningthe Legal Siatusof Eastern Greenland(P.C.I.J.
1933 Series A/B, No. 53).Thedisputearose out ofthe actionof Nor-
way in proclaiming on IOJuly 1931the occupation ofa zone of Eas-
tern Greenland betweenlatitudes 71°30'and 75"40'N. Denmark re-
sponded by instituting proceedings with the Court asking it to de-
clare the Nonvegian proclamation invalid on the ground that the
area to which it referred was subject to Danish sovereignty, which
extended to the whole of Greenland. TheCourt held that there was

suficient evidence to establish Denmark's title to the whole of the
country. The area which Nonvay had claimed was therefore not
terra nulliuscapable of being acquired by her occupation.
The maritime area which is now in dispute lies off theastof that
part of Eastern Greenland which was the subject of the Court's ml-
ing in 1933.

107. During the Second World War connections with Den-
mark, which was occupied by German troops, were temporarily cut
off.

108. In 1946the Danish Government listed Greenland as a
non-self-governing territory with the United Nationsnder Article

73 of the Charter of the United Nations, thereby formally acknowl-
edging ~reenland's colonial status. In the period of 1946- 1953
Denmark submitted annual reports to the United Nationsonthead-
ministration of Greenland pursuant to Article 73 e of the Charter.

GREENLAND'S STATUS PRIOR TO THE ENACTMEN OTF THEREVISED
DANISH CONSTITUTIO IN1953

109. Greenland was a Danish colony upto the enactment of a
revised Danish Constitution in 1953.The constitutional separation
of powers did not apply to Greenland prior to 1953,and Greenlandstitutionally, Greenland in effect enjoyed no higher or lower degree
of self-government than other parts of Denmark, except for the
Faroe Islands which gained Home Rule in 1948.

115. By Resolution 849,the General Assembly of the United
Nations in 1954approved the constitutional integration of Green-
land intothe Danish Realm and deleted Greenland from the list of
non-self-governing temtories.

116. Segments oftheGreenland population werenot satisfied
withthe way colonialism came to an end in Greenland. Denouncing
integration into the Danish Realm they advocated increased auto-
nomy with self-government for Greenland.

Aspirations for increased autonomy in Greenland ranging from the
introduction of a Home Rule system similar to the Faroese to full
political and economic self-determination through secession from
the Danish Realm were voiced with growing intensity in the 1960s
and 1970s.
Important political issuessuch asthe Greenland demand for an ex-
tension of the fishery zone, Greenland's association with the Euro-
pean Communities, and granting of concessions for exploitation of
the natural resources of Greenland spurred a political mobilization
of the Greenland population in the 1970s.Coupled with a growing
Greenland consciousness this political mobilization underscored
the Greenland desire for wider participation in decision-making
processes.
In the mid-1970sGreenland witnessed the birth of the first political
movements from which the present political parties have developed,
clearly distinguishable by their views on Greenland's association
with the Danish Realm as well as their political colour.

117. In 1972, the Provincial Council recommended to the
Danish Governmentthat the issue of granting the Provincial Coun-
cilincreased influence upon andjoint responsibility forthe develop-
ment of Greenland be studied.

118. A Commission on Home Rule in Greenland composed
of Greenland and Danish politicians was established by the Danish
Government. On the basis ofthe recommendations and proposals of
this Commission, the Folketing passed the Greenland Home Rule
Act No. 557of 29 November 1978(Annex 18). 119. Bya referendum held in Greenland on 17January 1979 a

large majority of the population of Greenlandapprovedthe coming
into forceofthe Act; 70 percent. of the votes cast favoured the intro-
duction of Home Rule in Greenland which became effective as of
1 May 1979.

120. Greenland Home Rule is an extensive type of self-gov-
ernment. By the Greenland Home Rule Act the Danish Parliament,
the Folketing, has delegated legislative and executive powers to the

Home Rule Authority, consisting of the popularly elected legislative
Greenland Assembly, the Landsting, and the executive branch, the
Landsstyre, elected by the Landsting.Presently, the Landstinghas 27
members and the Landsstyre has 5 members.
The powers transferred by statute are in principle identical to the
powers exercised by the central authorities of the Realm in other

parts of Denmark. Consequently, the Folketingand the Danish Gov-
ernment refrain from enacting legislation and exercising administra-
tive powers in the fieldswhere these powers have been transferred to
the Home Rule authorities.

121. The Home Rule Act provides that the Home Rule
Authority may request that a number of fields specified in a Sche-
dule annexed to the Act be transferredto Home Rule, cf.Section 4of
the Act. The list of functionally defined, transferable fields con-
tained in the Schedule is not exhaustive; however, transfer of legis-
lative and executive powers in fields other than those listed in the

Schedule is subject to prior agreement between the Home Rule
Authority and the central authorities of the Realm, cf. Section 7 of
the Home Rule Act.

122. During the ten years that have elapsed since the estab-
lishment of Home Rule in 1979,the Home Rule Authority has al-
most exhausted the list in the Schedule and thus assumed authority
in most aspects of life in Greenland. Out ofthe 17fields listed in the
Schedule, the more important ones in which transfer has taken place
include inter a1ia:The organisation of the Home Rule system; taxa-

tion; regulation of trade, including fisheries and hunting: educa-
tion; supply of commodities; transport and communications; social
security; labour affairs; housing; environmental protection and
conservation of nature.
The health service is the one field of major importance in the Sche-
dule that has yet to be transferred to Home Rule. The survey inannually in the Danish Budget. The 1989block grant to the Green-
land Home Rule Authority amounts to well over DKK 1,500mil-
lion, equivalent to approximately USD 194million').

127. The Home Rule Act has not altered Greenland's con-
stitutional status as a part of the Danish Realm.

128. The constitutional principle of the national unity of the
Realm, derived from Section 1of the Danish Constitution and ex-
pressed in Section 1of the Home Rule Act, sets certain limits to the
scope of Greenland Home Rule: sovereignty continues to rest with
the centralauthorities ofthe Realm; Greenland remainsa part ofthe
Danish Realm; only fields appertaining exclusively to Greenland
may be transferred to Home Rule;the delegation of powers cannot
be unlimited and must be precisely defined by statute; certain fields,
the so-called affairs of State, may not be transferred to Home Rule.
These exclusive affairs of Stateinclude inter aliaexternal relations,

defence policy, financial and monetary policy, the administration of
justice.

129. However, with respect to non-transferable and non-
transferred fields, the Home Rule Authority has an important advi-
sory function to the central authorities ofthe Realm. Proposed legis-
lation exclusively addressing Greenland affairs must be submitted
to the Home Rule Authority for comments prior to the introduction
ofthe bill in the Danish Folketing,cf.Section 12(1)ofthe Home Rule
Act. Where proposed legislation is "of particular importance to
Greenland" the Home Rule Authority must be consulted before it is

put into effectin Greenland, cf. Section 12(3)ofthe Home Rule Act.

130. With theintroduction of Home Rulean intensive process
of "Greenlandization" commenced. The autonomy of Greenland
was symbolized by the bringing into existence of an official Green-
land flagand coat of arms. The Home Rule Authority hasmade and
ismaking great efforts to preserve the Greenland culture and heri-
tage. The language is of vital importance and Section 9 of the Home
Rule Act proclaims Greenlandic to be the principal language in

7 niroughourtheMemorioljgures in DanishKronerhbeenconverredinroUSDol-
lors onthebosis ofrhe rale ojexchangeon 1June 1989when100 US Dollars(USD)
equelledDonishKroner(DKK) 772.25.

32Greenland. In 1983 the university-level Inuit Institute was estab-

lished in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland, where linguists are
modernizing Greenlandic in order to meet the needs created by the
development of Greenland.

131. The new Greenland consciousness has also found inter-
national forms of expression. Greenland representatives have often
assumed a leading role in the cultural and political Fourth World

conferences on issues relating to ethnic minorities. One example is
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, a pan-Eskimo non-govemmen-
ta1organization that acquired NGO status under the auspices of the
United Nations in 1983.

132. In 1985Greenland was admitted to the Nordic Council

as a member of the Danish delegation. The Nordic Council is a par-
liamentary and govemmental organ of co-operation among Den-
mark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.

133. The power to conduct Foreign policy is a constitutional

prerogative of the Danish Government, and no part of this preroga-
tive may be transferred to Greenland Home Rule, cf. Section 1Iof
the Home Rule Act.
However, the Home Rule Act has created co-operative procedures
sewing to accommodate the interests of Greenland and to alleviate
potential conflict of interests between Greenland and Denmark in
matters of foreign policy by granting the Home Rule Authority a

number of important functions of an advisory, representative and
executive nature.

134. Extensive legislative and executive powers, territorially
as well as functionallydefined,have been transferred to Home Rule.
Consequently, the co-operation of the Home Rule Authority will
often be necessary to fulfil Denmark's international obligations. Ac-

cordingly, the Home Rule Act provides that the Danish Government
must consult the Home Rule Authority before entering into treaties
that particularly affect Greenland interests, cf. Section 13 of the
Home Rule Act. This consultative procedure applies whether or not
the treaty concernsa transferred field.

135. International treaties concluded by the Danish Govern-
ment and customary international law bind the Home Rule Author-
ity to the same extent as they do the Government of Denmark. In
order to ensure that Denmark and Greenland comply with their in-ternational obligations, the Danish Government may direct the
Home Rule Authority to takethe necessary steps to fulfil such obli-
gations, cf. Section 10of the Home Rule Act.

136. Legislative and administrative orders of the Home Rule
Authority, e.g., concerning regulation of fisheries, may affect third
State interests and the position of the Danish Government vis-à-vis
other countries. Under the Act the Home Rule Authority is, there-
fore, under obligation to consult the central authorities of the Realm
before introducing measures that might prejudice Denmark's inter-
ests, cf. Section 1l(2) of the Home Rule Act.

137. The Home Rule Authority may send representatives to

Danish diplomatic missions in order to safeguard important com-
mercial interests of Greenland, cf. Section 16(1)of the Home Rule
Act.

138. Although, in principle, treaty-making powers are vested
exclusively in the Danish Government,the central authorities of the
Realm may, upon request, authorize the Home Rule Authority to
conduct, with the assistance of the Foreign Service, international
negotiations on purely Greenland affairs, cf. Section 16(3)of the
Act. The Home Rule Authority has notablyavailed itself ofthe right
to conduct bilateral negotiations in connection with the conclusion
of fishery agreements.

139. Denmark's membership of the European Communities
(EC) was effected by accession to the Treatiesestablishingthe Euro-
pean Communities. Denmark's membership includedGreenland as
a part of the Danish Realm.

140. In the referendum held in October 1972on Denmark's
proposed membership of the EC approximately 70 per cent. of the
votes cast in Greenland opposed Denmark's accession.

141. Greenland's capacity under international treaty law to
unilaterally withdraw from the EConce Home Rule had been estab-
lished was a matter of concern and debate during the preparations
for Home Rule. Since the treaty-making power under Home Rule
would remain with the Danish Government, Greenland's with-
drawal from the EC would be contingent upon the CO-operationof
the central authorities of the Realm.
Prior to the introduction of Home Rule the Danish Prime Ministerdeclared thatthe Danish Governmentdidnot wish to force uponthe
Greenland Home Rule Authority any particular association with the
EC.

142. The introduction of Home Rule inGreenland in 1979did
not persealter Greenland's position within the EC. The legal actsof
the EC continued to apply to Greenland and the special arrange-
ments made with respect to Greenland's fishery rights remained
valid. Similarly, Home Rule did not change the division of legisla-
tive and representative powers between the EC and the central
authorities of the Realm.

143. In a referendum held in Greenland in 1982,a majority of
the electorate opted for Greenland's withdrawal from the EC. The
Danish Government subsequently reafirmed its commitment to
support Greenland's decision to withdraw.

144. The negotiations on Greenland's withdrawal from the
EC and the subsequent agreements between the EEC and
Denmark/Greenland commenced in 1982.On the basis of a Treaty

amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities (Annex 20), concluded on 13 March 1984
by the Member States, Greenland's withdrawal from the EC became
effective from IFebruary 1985.

145. Upon withdrawal Greenland was accorded Overseas
Countries and Territories(OCT) status under Part four ofthe Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community. The OCT status
of Greenland is reflected in the Protocol on the Special Arrange-

ment for Greenland linked to the 13 March 1984Treaty on Green-
land's withdrawal from the EC. Greenland produce falling under
the common market scheme for fisheries produce may be imported
to the EEC exempt from duty and quantitative restrictions. This fa-
voured status is,however, explicitly contingent upon the conclusion
of an agreement between the EEC and Denmark/Gieenland grant-
ing EC Member States satisfactory access to the fishery zones of
Greenland.
In accordance with the Protocol, a ten year Agreement on Fisheries
was concluded on 13 March 1984 between the EEC, on the one
hand, and the Government of Denmark and the Home Rule Author-
ity of Greenland, on the other (Annex 21). Recognizing in its pre-
amblethe vital importance ofthe fishing industry to the economy of
Greenland,the Agreement lays down the principles for EEC fishing
in the fishery zones of Greenland, cf. paragraph 177. Section 2. Population

146. As of 1January 1989the population of Greenland num-

bered 55,1718).
Four fifths of the people inhabiting Greenland are Inuit (Eskimos).
The lastfifth represents predominantly Danes, most of whom stay in
Greenland for a comparatively short period carrying out work for
which there is a shortage of qualified personnel in Greenland.

147. At the start of the 20th century the population of Green-
land numbered about 12,000.This figure doubled during the first
half ofthe century. Since 1950the populationhasdoubled in only 20
years. Especially in the 1960sthe growth rate was remarkably high.
In the period from 1950to 1970,the Greenland society had to adapt

itself to an annual population growth of 3.5 per cent. To meet this
challengesubstantial investments were required, especially in order
to provide increased occupational opportunities. In 1988the rate of
population growthwas 1.2percent., but it is not expected to remain
at this reduced level. Forecasts in March 1989suggest a rise in popu-
lation to 61,000in the year 2000.Due tothis development theGreen-
land Home Rule Authority will still have to provide training and
jobs for the increasing population within the working age group.

148. Eighty per cent. of the Greenland population live in the
western part of Greenland,extending from Disko Bayin the north to

Cape Farewell in the south. This isbecause the waters offthis stretch
of Coastare heated by the North Atlantic Current and are thus prac-
tically ice-free al1year round.
The remaining part oftheGreenland population livesin the hunting
regions of North-West Greenland (approximately 14per cent.) and
East Greenland (approximately 6 percent.).
In East Greenlandthe population growth in the Ammassalik district
at the start of this century generated a demand for renewed utiliza-
tion of hunting regions which had previously been abandoned. This
led tothe foundation ofthe Scoresbysundsettlement in 1925by hun-

ters moving in from the Ammassalik district.
As of 1 January 1989,3,425persons lived in East Greenland, 2,861in
the municipality of Tasiilaq (Ammassalik) and 564 in the munici-
pality of lttoqqortoormiit (Scoresbysund).

7 ber ofindependeniSraies.e.8.. Nouni (8.042 in 1983). Tuvalu(8.229 in 1985).SI.
Chrisrophernd Nevis(47.000in 19871,Kiribati(66.250in 1987)and theSeychelles
(67,090in 1987).Someo/rheseSraresare memberso/ihe UniiedNaiions.Source:
Sraiesmon'sYear-Book.1988.

36 Section 3. Geography, Geology and Climate

A. GEOCRAPHY

149. Greenland covers an area of approximately 2,200,000
square kilometres of which about 1,858,000square kilometres are
covered by an ice cap. The remaining 342,000square kilometres are
ice-free land.

150.
Greenland's northernmost point (excluding two tiny is-
lands) is Cape Morris Jesup, which is situated at latitude 83"39'N,
only 380 nautical miles from the North Pole. The southern tip, Cape
Farewell, lies at 59"46'N, which is about the latitude of Oslo and
Stockholm. Greenland thus extends from north to south over about
24 degrees of latitude, a distance of 2,670 kilometres.

151. Greenland's westernmost point is the westernmost of the
Carey Islands, situated at 73"15'W.The easternmost point is Nord-
ostrundingen, 1I021'W. At its widest, Greenland measures more
than 1,300kilometres from east to West.

152. The coastline of Greenland is estimated to be about
40,000 kilometres !on& when one takes into account the shorelines

of the hundreds of fiords, among them the Scoresby Sound Fiord
complex, the world's largest network of fiords. Behind the rugged
Coast,which in many places is fringed by innumerable rocks and is-
lands,there is a belt of ice-free land which is at its widest, about 300
kilometres, in the area Westand north-west of Scoresbysund in East
Greenland, while in West Greenland north of Sisimiut (Holsteins-
borg) it reaches a width of 180kilometres. Most of the coastal area of

Greenland is mountainous; the highest point in Greenland is the
3,733 mettes high summit of Mount Gunnbjorn, which lies between
Ammassalik and Scoresbysund.

153. Greenland was once part of a vast megacontinent known
as Laurasia, which included most of North America, Greenland, Eu-

rope north of the Alps, and Asia north of the Himalaya. The break-
up of this megacontinent, which ultimately led to the formation of
the North Atlantic Ocean, the Norwegian Sea, the Greenland Sea,
the Labrador Sea, Davis Strait and Baffin Bay,began about 250 mil-
lion years (m.y.) ago, and Greenland finally became a separate con-
tinental entity about 55 m.y. ago. 154. The rocks making up Greenland range in age from some
of the oldest continental crustal rocks known tothe recent deposits
by glaciers and melt water rivers. The major part of Greenland be-
longs to a Precambrian shield or craton (a geologically old and
stablearea) built up of more than 2500 m.y. old crystalline rocks. To
the north this craton is flanked by a belt of folded sedimentary rocks

about 600-400 m.y. old, while the ice-free area of East Greenland
stretching from Scoresbysund to Nordostrundingen is built up of an
array of rocks from more than 2000 m.y. to about 475 m.y. old, al1of
which were folded and altered during a period of mountain building
that ended about 450 m.y. ago. These folded rocks are overlain by

thick sequences of sedimentary rocks laid down in the interval 390 -
75 m.y. ago. South of Scoresbysund extrusive basalt lavas about 55
m.y. in age cover al1the older rocks.

155. The final event in the geological history of East Green-
land was the development of the Inland Ice sheet, a consequence of

the majorclimaticdeterioration that set in about 2.5 m.y. ago. At the
height ofthe last major glaciation the extent of the ice cap was much
greater than today, and parts of the continental shelf were covered
by ice.

156. The East Greenland shelf is a distinct offshore morpho-
logical feature throughoutthe relevant area, as may be seen from the
figure on the opposite page.

157. The shelf break is approximately 55 nautical miles from
the coast at 72N and approximately 100 nautical miles from the
coast at 76N. As an estimate it can be said that the edge of the con-
tinental margin lies less than 200 nautical miles from the coast
within the relevant area.

158. Jan Mayen is a volcanic island situated at the northern
end of a submarine feature known as the Jan Mayen Ridge, cf. the

figure on the opposite page. Water depths increase southwards
along the Ridge from Jan Mayen and reach 1,000metres at a point
about 150nautical miles south ofthe southwestern tip ofthe island.
While one does not commonly talk of a continental shelf, with a
shelf break and margin, in connection with small volcanic islands,Simplified bathymetric map of the Greenland-Jan Mayen area. Depths in metres

39one may in the case ofJan Mayen and theJan Mayen Ridge arbitra-
rily define a shelf with a shelfbreak atthe 1,000metre isobath. How-
ever, it should be noted that in the maritime area WestofJan Mayen
and north of approximately 70"N, the sea floor topography is rough,
and terms like continental rise, slope and shelfbreak are not applic-
able in this area. As for the shelf margin to the Westof the Ridge and
south of 70°N, this is within 50 nautical miles of the axis of the

Ridge, i.e. more than 200nautical miles from the east CoastofGreen-
land.
It is generally accepted in the scientific community that the Jan
Mayen Ridge was split offthe east side of Greenland when the axis
of seafloorspreading in the southern pari of the Norwegian-Green-
land Sea shifted from a position in the Norwegian Sea to ifs present

position along the submarine Kolbeinsey Ridge. This split-off
started about 30 m.y. ago, and the ocean between Jan Mayen and
East Greenland is floored by oceanic cmst formed during the last
approximately 25 m.y., cf. paragraph 203.
As is evident from the foregoing, there exists no common shelf be-
tween East Greenland and Jan Mayen.

159. The whole of Greenland has an arctic climate but owing
to the island's vast expanse there are great variations in humidity
and temperature. The ice cap makes the climate arctic even in South
Greenland where the annual mean temperature is around or below

freezing point. Even in the warmest month the mean temperature
does not rise above 10°C (50°F) which corresponds to the tempera-
ture of the timber line. Consequently there are no forests, but in the
southernmost parts there are birch shrubs with scattered patches of
Greenland rowan, and willow scrubsare seen upto 72N. With a few
exceptions, growth of cultivated plants is not profitable. Grain, for

example, cannot ripen. Another characteristic feature of an arctic
climate isthat the subsoil is frost-bound at a certaindepth. Theshort
summer leaves time for only the upper layers to thaw. This phe-
nomenon, known as permafrost, gives rise to high costs of building
and construction because instability of the upper layers of soi1en-
hances the need for foundation.

160. One of the most important mechanisms regulating the
climate and its variations is the exchange of heat between sea and
atmosphere.
The permanent oceancurrent in Fram Strait which separates North-
East Greenland from Svalbard is of vital importance for the entire
energy balance in East Greenland regions. From the Arctic OceanSEAICE

Normal distriof sea ice

JANUARY FEBRUARY MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE

JULY AUGUST SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBER DECEMBER

Greatdwiationsfrom normal dmayoccurion
17 Elar West
ice
Source:laat unaat Gsreenlandthe ice-cold East Greenland Current runs south alongthe east coast
of Greenland until it eventually meets the warm lrminger Current,
which is a branch of the North Atlantic Current, and bends to the
West,south of lceland towards South-EastGreenland. The two cur-
rents take the same course, the East Greenland Current as a cold
surfacecurrent (the water is less salty and therefore lighter), and the
lrminger Current as a warm undercurrent (the water is saltier and
therefore heavier). lnfluenced by the rotation of the Earth the cur-
rents bend to the Westround Cape Farewell and continue north-
wards along West Greenland while gradually mingling. Both sea
and airtemperaturesare therefore higher in West Greenland than in

East Greenland, and variations in the force ofthe two currents cause
variations in temperature.
The southward flow ofthe cold East Greenland Current carries with
it enormous quantities of ice, about 6 million tons per minute. The
figure on the previous page shows the mean month-by-month dis-
tribution of compact ice and polar ice around the coasts of Green-
land.
The figure illustrates how the waters offthe northern segment ofthe
east coast of Greenland are permanently covered by compact ice.
Scoresbysund is practically unnavigable throughout the year and
the important East Greenland settlement of Ammassalik is navi-
gable only from July through October.
Compact ice and polar ice make coastal fishing ofFthe east coast of
Greenland north of Cape Brewster practically impossible for al1 12
months ofan averageyear. The icepack extends so Farseawardsthat
it coversthe disputed area for most of the year, allowing commercial
fishing within the disputed area only in late summer and early
autumn (July - September).

Section 4. EconomicStructure and Exploitation of Resources

161. Geography, demography and climate are factors of im-
portance to the economy of any developing area. In Greenland, the
influence of these factors upon the economy has been of particular
weight.
162. When looking atthe Greenland economy it must be kept
in mind that one of the most striking features in the history of the
people of Greenland is the struggle for survival in this arctic region
where a vast land area ofapproximately 2,200,000square kilometres
with a surrounding sea of about 2,000,000 square kilometres can
hardly sustain a population of about 55,000people. Every possible
resource must be relied upon, and every kind of resource exploita-TABLE II Greenlandk TradeBalance.Selected years between1970
and 1988. Valuesinmillionsof USD (currentprices).
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988

Exports ......... 13 66 135 239 272 307 341
Imports ........ 51 96 239 407 382 466 443
Tradedeficit .... 38 30 104 168 110 159 102

Source: The Prime MinisrerS Deparrmenr: Greenland Yearbook 1988.Copenhogen

Although thetrade deficit has increased considerably since 1970in
absolute figures - with a downward trend since 1985, however - it
should be noted that the growth rate of exports has by farexceeded

that of imports; in 1970the export value amounted to a mere fourth
of the import value, whereas that figure had risen to approximately
three fourths in 1988.

167. Since the export earnings of Greenland are not yet ca-
pable of sustaining the economy, Greenland has, to a very large ex-

tent, to rely on unrequited transfers from Denmark to finance im-
ports and public expenditurelO). In 1987, Danish unrequited trans-
fers totalled approximately USD 343 million, a figure almost identi-
cal with the 1988value of the entire exports of Greenland, cf. Table
II above.

168. Table III below provides a general view of the economy
of the public sector in Greenland in the year of 1987,listing the ag-
gregate income and expenses of the Home Rule Authority, the in-
come and expenses'of the municipal sector in Greenland, and the
Greenland-related expenses of the central authorities of the Realm.

'7 Unrequired rrons/err include direci paymenrs ro Greenland brancher of the Central
Aurhoriries o/rhe Realm. block10the Home Rule Aurhoriry. nndsubridies ro
"or rronsferred Io Home Rule, whereor theblockgranrsjinonce rheoperorionr o/theî
Home RuleAurhoriry in rrans/erredjields. ~Jporag-a126.TheHome Rule
Aurhority enjoyscompletefieedom in allocaring theblockgmnrs rospect~cpurpses.
Wirh the gradurrons/ero Home Rule. rhe Danish Srore's direcr poymenrr have
decreasedwhileblockgranrs haveincreased. TABLE 1111987incomeand expenditure oftheHomeRuleAuthority.
1987 incomeand expenditure of the municipalsector in Greenland,
and the 1987Greenland-relatedexpenditureofthe centralauthorities
of the Realm. Valuesinmillions of USD (currentprices).
1987
A. TheHome Rule Authority
1. Totalincome ....................... 370

lncome tax and duties ............ 105
Blockgrants .................... 174
Otherincome ................... 91
2. Totaloperating and capital expenditure . 435
3. Deficit ............................. 65
B. The municipalsector in Greenland
1. Total income ....................... 215
Municipal taxes ................. 114
Blockgrants and directpayments .'. 91
Other income ................... 1O
2. Totaloperating and capital expenditure .
3. .Surplus ............................

C. The centralauthoritiesofrhe Realm
1. Total Greenland-related expenditure
(unrequited transfers) ................
Block grants to the Home Rule
Authority and the municipal sector . 186
Operating and capital expenditure
in fields not transfemed to Home
Rule ........................... 157
Source: Reporton the Economic Developmenreenlandin 1988.submitredbythe
AdvisoryCommitteon the Economyof Greenland,the Rime Minister'sDe-
partment.Copenhagen.

169. In addition to Danish disbursements the Home Rule
Authority has secured the necessary funding for its operations
through raising Danish-currency loans in mortgage banks in Den-
mark. In 1988,the Lnndsstyre,obtained foreign-currency loans in
commercial banks abroad in the amount of USD 150million.

170. Finally, the overall size of the economy of Greenland
may be illustrated by Table IV below depicting Greenland's Gross
Domestic Product, Gross National Product, and Gross National In-
come.TABLEI V GrossNationalIncomeofGreenland.Selectedyears 1984.
1986,1987. Currenrprices inmillionsof USD.
1984 1986 1987
1. Gross Domestic Product ..... 530 618 70 1
2. Indirecttaxes .............. 32 43 58
3. Subsidies .................. 53 14 14
4. Gross National Product in
market prices (+ 2-3) ....... 509 647 745
5. Wages, dividends, and inter-
eststo abroad (net).......... 37 52 52

6. Gross National Income in
market prices (4-5).......... 472 595 693
7. Unrequited transfers from
abroad .................... 340 340 372
8. Gross National Income, dis-
os able(6+ 7). ............. 812 935 1,065
Source:Q-Data. Nuuk.StatistiskeMeddelelserond91989:3

The relatively high Gross National lncome figure belies the actual

scarcity of financial resources in Greenland. Greenland's economy
is still very much in a stage of development with unusually large
capital-intensive investment requirements. The majority of these
public and commercial investments, e.g. in housing, educational
and health systems, supply of goods, public fisheries industry and
fishing vessels, etc., are undertaken by the public sectorthat plays a
predominant role in the economy of Greenland.

171. The cost level for investments in construction and engi-
neering projects is considerably elevated in Greenland due to the
complete dependence on imported materials, high transportation
costs, and difîïcult climatic and environmental conditions.

172. Similarly, the maintenance of a satisfactory level of pub-
licservices requires additional expenditure in Greenland,ecause a
fairly small population lives scatteredover extremely longstretches
of coast in small villages and towns accessible only by ship or heli-
copter.

173. During the 20th century Greenland fishing activities
have developed from small-scale fishing from kayaks and other
primitive boatsinto an industrytilizing modernequipment, includ-
ing large sea-going trawlers and other highly specialized vessels.Major investments have been made not only in order to build up an
efficient fishing fleet but also to construct new, and improve exist-
ing, on-shore facilities such as fish-processing plants.

174. Todaythe Greenland fisheries sector employs about one
fourth of the labour force and accounts for approximately 80 per
cent. of the total export earnings, cf. paragraph 165.Merely to Say
that Greenland is dependent on the natural resources of the sea is
not sufficiently emphatic. The fact is that the development of the
fisheries sector is decisive for the development of thentire Green-
land economy.

175. The fundamental prerequisite for the development of
any fisheries sector is the existence of exploitable fish stoFortu-

nately, many lucrative fishing grounds are to be found in the seas
surroundingGreenland.This fact has attracted many foreign fishing
vessels for decades. In order to preserve the fish stock an annual
total allowable catch (TAC) is established for each of the economi-
cally interesting species on the basis of marine biological advice.

176. Effective from 1 Febmary 1985legislative competence in
fishery matters was transferred to the Greenland Home Rule
Authority. The Home Rule allowed for such transfer ofcompetence
as early as 1979,but this competence was exercised by the EEC and .
could not be transferred to Greenland for independent exerciseuntil
after Greenland's withdrawal from the EC.

177. Simultaneously with the Treaty on Greenland's with-
drawal from the EC, a ten-year Agreement on Fisheries was con-
cluded between Denmark/Greenland and the EEC (Annex 21).The
Agreement, dated 13March 1984,envisages the conclusion of sup-
plementary protocols. A Protocol of the same date regulates fishing
by EEC vesselsin Greenland waters, including what speciesmay be

fished, what catch possibilities are allotted to the EEC, and whafi-
nancial compensation Greenland should receive from the EEC for
fishing rights granted to the EEC. Under the five-year Protocol, ex-
piring on 31 December 1989,Greenland has received annual pay-
ments from the EEC in the amount of USD 27.5 million.
In recognition of Greenland's economic dependence on fisheries
the above-mentioned Agreement on Fisheries and supplementary
protocols guarantee Greenland minimum quotas if biological cir-
cumstancesfora givenfishing yearrequire TACSto be fixedbelow a
certain level. Insuch cases the EEC quotas will be fixed at a level
below the quantities fixed in the Protocol, without this reduction af-
fecting the level ofGreenland's annual remuneration, cf.Anicle 7of
the Agreement on Fisheries. 178. The Commercial Fisheries Act of the Landsring,No. II
of 21 November 1984(Annex 22)empowers the Landsstyreto estab-

lish annual TACs and quotas based upon marine biological advice.
The TACs and the quotas for 1988are contained in the Greenland
Home Rule Executive Order No. 27of 1December 1987(Annex 23).
The Order reflects that the most valuable species (cod, shrimps and
Greenland halibut) in the waters off West Greenland are largely
resewed for Greenland fishermen. In East Greenland waters, non-
Greenland fishing vessels (including those of the European Com-
munities) have been granted larger quotas, but primarily for species
that Greenland itself has not yet been able to exploit to any major

extent.

179. Greenland's share of total catches in Greenland waters
has shown an upward trend in recent years with the 1987Greenland
catch accounting for 85percent. ofthe total againstonly 62percent.
in 1984.
The increasing capacity of the Greenland fishing fleet is illustrated
in Table Vbelow listing the total tonnage of the Greenland fishing
vessels.

0
TABLE V Total tonnageof registeredfishing vesselsin Greenlandof
20 GRTor more.
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Tonnage.. ... ......... 24.457 28.787 32.817 33,465 39.970

Source: 7heDonishYenrbookon Fisheri1984- 1988.

THEFISHING FOR CAPELIN

180. At present capelin is the only fish that is being commer-
cially exploited in the disputed area. As the economic potential of
the capelin fishing is substantial, the issue of the exploitation of the
capelin stock has played an important role during the negotiations
between Denmark and Norway concerning the maritime delimita-
tion in the present case, cf. Part 1,Sectio2.

181. Capelin is a species which is used primarily for produc-
tion of fishmeal and fish oil. However, the population of the small
communities on the east Coastof Greenland has a long tradition of
using capelin for human as well as animal consumption, cf. Annex
24 on the role of capelin in the traditional Greenland society.

182. Capelin is a migratory fish with a life span of-34 years.
The relevant capelin stock is found within the economic zone of Ice-
land and the fishery zones of Greenland and Jan Mayen, includingthe disputed area. The migratory pattern of the capelin varies greatly
with the climatic conditions but may in very general terms be de-

scribed as follows:
The three-year-old capelin spawn off the south Coast of lceland in
the months of March and April"). The young capelin remain pri-
marily in lcelandic waters, the one-year-olds spending the months

of May through August inside the Greenland fishery zone. In sum-
mer and autumnsome of the two and three-year-old capelin expand
their migratory range to include the waters between Greenland and
Jan Mayen. These fish return to lcelandic waters in October where

they stay until March when the majority spawn at the age of three
years and die.
The migratory routes of two and three-year-old maturing capelin
during the year is shown in the figure below.

BJAN MAIEN

") Capelin olsospawnin rhejiords ofEasr Greenland.especiallyin rhe Ammassalik
regionl"Ammassalik"meanscapelinplacein Greenlandic).burir remoinsuncerrain
Io wharexrenrrhio connecrionbernsrhesrock.~.

49 183. Capelin is considered to be commercially fishable at the
age of 31 - 39 months. It is estimated that during the period from
July to September over half the fishable stock is outside the Icelan-
dic economic zone, part of this adult stock migrating to thedisputed

area between Greenland andJan Mayen, cf. the figure below show-
ing the typical geographical distribution of juvenile and adult
capelin during feeding season.

Horizontal shading: adults Vertical shading: juveniles

68.

66'

64.

184. Even though ice conditions prevent coastal fishing off
East Greenland practically throughout the year and in the disputed
area for a good part of the year, cf. paragraph 160,there is accessto

the disputed area during the months of July through September,
making it one of the most important fishing grounds for summer
capelin.

185. From the early 1960sthrough the mid-1970s capelin was
fished commercially only off the coasts of Iceland, and purely by
lcelandic fishermen. In the late 1970s Norwegian and Danish ves-
sels commenced fishing capelin in the waters between Greenland

and Jan Mayen. 186. Total annual and seasonal catches of capelin in the Ice-

land - Greenland /Jan Mayen area are shown in Annex 25. In 1987
the total catch ofcapelin amounted to about I million tonnes.

187. Catches ofcapelin in Greenland fishingterritory off East
Greenland from 1981up to and including 1987,as reported to the
Danish authorities, are listed in the table below which shows the
combined Greenland, Faroese and EEC catches.

TABLEVICombinedGreenland.Faroese and EECcarches ofcapelin
in tonnes.
1981 82. 83. 84 85 86 87

Total ....... 23,473 O O 14,177 81,242 69,690 66,342
* Corcherno1allowedhecauseofrhebiologiealsrarurofrhesrock.

The Danish authorities are not in possession of reports on Nor-
wegian or lcelandic capelin catches within the disputed area.

188. At present, exploitation of the fishing resources in

Greenland waters is the only way in which Greenland in the fore-
seeable future can achieve a higher degree of economic indepen-
dence. The Home Rule authorities aim at building up fishing and
production capacities which will be adequate to meet that goal.
Throughout the years the fisheries sector as a whole has suffered
substantial losses and been dependent on considerable public sub-
sidies. To reverse this trend the Home Rule authorities have focused
on modernizing the production machinery, on gearing investment to
availability of resources and,taught by history, on not relying solely

on one species which has proved to be vulnerable to climatic
changes.

189. The preliminary goals set for exploitation by Greenland
alone of the resources within Greenland's fishing zone have been
realized to a great extent. A further development of fisheries in
Greenland waters requires continued technological development

and exploitation of al1potential resources in the form of either fish-
ing from own vessels or selling fishing rights under agreements with
other countries.

190. Exploration for and exploitation of the non-living re-
sources of Greenland have been carried out since the middle of the

19thcentury.Many varieties of ore and minerals have been extracted at various

locations in Greenland during the years, e.g., lead, zinc, coal and
cryolite. However, the majority of the mining activities have now
ceased, and today only one mine is in operation, namely the "Black
Angel" lead and zinc mine in the municipality of Uummannaq. This
mine hasbeen almost exhausted, however, andthe "Black Angel" is
expected to close down in 1990.

191. Several attempts have been made to find new deposits of
exploitable non-living resources in Greenland. Thus, exploratory

activities are camed out for hard minerals as well as for hydrocar-
bons.

192. At present, on-shore exploration for hydrocarbons is
being carned out in Jameson Land in East Greenland in an area of
10,000square kilometres. Seismic surveys were initiated in Jameson
Land in 1985.
With a viewto providinga basis fordecision-makingconcerning fu-
ture oil exploration activities in paris ofGreenlandother than Jame-

son Land, itis planned during the next sixyears to carry out a recon-
naissance survey of off-shore oil potential. This project covers col-
lection, processing, interpretation, and sale of about 13,500line ki-
lometres of new seismic data collected on shelf areas off the West
and east coasts of Greenland, 8,500 kilometres off North-East
Greenland and 5,000kilometres off West Greenland.

It isstill too early to tell whether exploration activities in Greenland
will result in the discovery of deposits of exploitable non-living re-
sources which inthe future may contribute to the development ofthe
Greenland economy.

193. The exploration activities in Greenland are carried out
partly by the public sector and partly by private enterprises on the
basis of licences and concessions. The concessions were formerly
granted solely by Danish authorities, but following the introduction

of a new scheme for the administration of mineral resources in
Greenland in 1979,granting of concessions and licences and al1
other substantial decisions regarding mineral resources in Green-
land are contingent on agreement between the Danish Minister for
Energy and the Greenland Landsstyre12)

'*inrludingthene6oagrremrnr on dt>rrihurtofpuhlii. rebenuebelnern Greenlund
anJ Denmark. </: Ihe AdniinnrrrurianoJ~AiinHe~<~urrrir Greml<ind1Anne.r
26 unilArr No Shi ui2GNoirmher 19790" Miner"/Hrcriuri.err.inGrernlund.
or omrnd~dh~ACINo. 844 0/21DecemberIMS(Annex 27, CHAPTERIII

JAN MAYEN

Section 1. History and Status

194. It is generally believed that Jan Mayen was first dis-
covered in 1607by the Englishman Henry Hudson. The island was
rediscovered in 1614by the Dutchman Jan Jacobszoon May, after
whom the island is named. Legally, Jan Mayen was terra nullius
until it was annexed by Norway in 1929.

195. From approximately 161 1until approximately 1640the
waters round the island were much frequented by interalia British,
Danish and Dutch whalers. After whaling had come to an end the
island was left deserted for more than 200 years.
From the end of the 19th century Jan Mayen was visited by several

scientific expeditions, including Danish and Norwegian. Nor-
wegian hunters wintered onthe island during a short period around
1900,hunting blue fox and white fox.
After the year 1916a nuniber ofcases occurred of private Nonvegian
citizens notifying the Norwegian Government oftheir occupation of
certain partsof ian Mayen, apparently with a view to starting some
kind of economic exploitation of the island.

196. Nonvegian meteorological .activities on Jari Mayen
started in 1921when the first meteorological station on Jan Mayen
was est'ablished by the Norwegian Meteorological Institute, a pri-
vately owned but government-supported organization. In thiS con-

nection the lnstitute effected a private occupation of certain partsof
Jan Mayen in 1922,followed in 1926by a likewise private occupa-
tion of the whole island.

197. In the same year a Danish scientific expedition visited

Jan Mayen with a viewto investigating the possibility of establishing
a Danish seismic station on the island, considering its obviously fa-
vourable geographical position as far as seismic obse~ations are
concerned. However, the expedition arrived at the conclusion that
establishment of a seismic stationon Jan Mayen could not be recom-
mended due to the structure (porous) of the underground and the
general level of seisms on the island.

198. Bya Norwegian Royal Decree of8 May 1929Jan Mayen
was annexed by Norway. Denmark and other countries were noti-
fied of the annexation. Denmark did not object to the annexation. 199. According to the Norwegian Act No. 2 of 27 February
1930Jan Mayen is constitutionally a part of the Kingdom of Nor-
way.

Section2. Geography

200. Jan Mayen is situatedatabout 7IN, 830'Win isolation in
the Greenland Sea, cf. Map 1, approximately 550 nautical miles
from the Nonvegian mainland, approximately 250 nautical miles to

the east of Greenland and approximately 300 nautical miles to the
north-east of Iceland. The area of the island is about 380 square ki-
lometres. lt is about 54 kilometres long in NE-SWdirection and has
a maximum width of approximately 16 kilometres. The highest
point on the island is the summit of the volcanic cone Beerenberg,
2,277 metres high, which is situated in the northeastem part of the

island. The southern part ofthe island rises to over 700 metres above
sea level, while the central part is relatively low-lying and only 2.5
kilometres wide. The upper part of Beerenberg is covered by a per-
manent ice cap.Thisfeedsa number of glacier tongues, fiveof which
reach the sea.

201. The average temperature is below OC (32F). Winds of

gale force and long periods of fog occur frequently.

202. The plant life is scanty, consisting mostly of mosses and
lichens. The bird fauna is abundant, but of quadrupeds only foxes
are found.

Section3. Geology

203. Jan Mayen is an oceanic volcanic island less than a mil-
lion years old. It is probably underlain by oceanic cmst, but mor-

phologically it lies al the northern end of the submarine Jan Mayen
Ridge which is believed, though it has not yet been proved, to have a
core of continental crust. The Jan Mayen Ridge is separated from
East Greenland by an area of oceanic crust formed by spreading
along the Kolbeinsey Ridge during the last 25 million years.

204. Jan Mayen is built up entirely of volcanic rocks, mainly

basalts but also trachytes. Most of the volcanic rocks occur as sub-
aerial lava flows. The island has been volcanically active throughout
historical time. Comparison of the newest topographic map with re-
liable older maps going back to 1650indicates that the coastline has
been modified by lava flows on a number of occasions since that
date. The most recent eruption occurred in 1970 on the north-east 21 September1990

MEMORIAL

SUBMITTED BY

THE GOVERNMENT OF

THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK

VOLUME1
.
JULY 1989
- - -a-- ...2 -
-

Corriaendm
submittedbv the Government oD fenmark

Page 24, paragraph90, line 3: for "JanMayen" read"Norway"

Page 115, inthe referenceto the Maritime Boundary Agreement
betweenVenezuelaand theUnited States oA fmerica,for "24 March 1978"
read "28 March1978".slope of Beerenberg, and more eruptions can be expected in the fu-

ture.

205. As to the oceanic area between Jan Mayen and Green-
land reference is made to paragraph 158.

Section 4. Utilization

206. Jan Mayen is a desolate island without natural resources
of any significance. In the past, mining activities (lignite) as well as
hunting activities (blue and white fox) have been attempted and

abandoned. There are no harbours (natural or artificial) on the is-
land and various projects for construction of a port to form a base
for fishing and hunting have al1been relinquished.

207. Today, Jan Mayen functions as a base for a
meteorological station, a LORAN C (Long Range Navigation Sys-
tem) station and a coastal radio station. About 25 persons (mainly

technicians and meteorologists) are temporarily stationed on the is-
land to perform the functionsrequired for operatingthe above-men-
tioned stations. These persons, who are normally stationed on the
island for a term of twelve months, form the only "population" of
Jan Mayen. Transportation to and from the island is possible only
by air.
Thus, the island of Jan Mayen has no significance as a base for the

lucrative Nonvegian fishing which takes place in the waters around
the island. CHAPTER 1

THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES APPLICABLE TO
MARlTlME DELIMITATIONS

Section 1.General Principles and Rules

208. The description in Part1establishes the factualbasis for
considering the essentialquestion whcther an island with the special
characteristics of Jan Mayen should be entitled to a maritime zone
which impinges upon Greenland's right to a 200-mile continental
shelf area and fishery zone.

209. In order to address this issue it might be useful first, as

done in this Section, to givea brief description of the general princi-
ples and niles governing maritime delimitations. Section 2 deals
with the more specificquestion of the legal status ofislands, includ-
ing Jan Mayen, in maritime delimitations. Finally, Section 3 dis-
cusses the relevant factors which in the view of the Government of
Denmark should be taken into account in the present case.

A. CONVENTIO ON THE CONTINENTA SLELFOF 29 APRIL1958

210. The Convention on the Continental Shelf of 29 April
1958was ratified by Denmark on 31 May 1963and acceded to by
Norway on 9September 1971.Itremains in force as between the two
States.

21 1. According to Article 6.1 the delimitation of continental
shelf areas between States whose coasts are adjacent toor opposite
each other shall be determined by agreement between them. This
agreement should seek to embody an equitable result, as was af-
firmed by the International Court ofJustice in the Libya/Malra case
concerningthe ContinentalShelf;1985:

"The normative character of equitable principles applied as a
part of general international law is important because these
principles govern not only delimitation by adjudication or ar-
bitration, but also, and indeed primarily, the duty of the Par-
ties to seek first a delimitation by agreement, which is also to
seek an equitable result...(I.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 39, para.
46). 212. With reference to situations where no agreement has
been reached between the Parties, Article 6.1sets out a nile of equi-
distance, a nile which, however, is not of an obligatory character,
not even as a starting point for a delimitation. This follows from the
wording of Article 6.1, "....unless another boundary isjustified by
specialcircumstances .....,T.hat wording isinterpreted as having in
view the achievement of equitable solutions taking into consider-
ation the relevant special circumstances of each particular case of
delimitation.

213. This interpretation has formed the basis of the Court's
approach in al1its decisions concerning continental shelf delimita-
tions.

214. Reference is made to the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases, 1969,in which the Court said:

"In the records of the International Law Commission, which
had the matter under consideration from 1950to 1956,there is
no indication at al1that any of its members supposed that it
was incumbent on the Commission toadopt a mle of equidis-
tance because this gave expression to, and translated into li-
near terms, a principle of proximity inherent in the basic con-
cept of the continental shelf, causing every part of the shelf to
appertain to the nearest coastal State andto no other, and be-
cause such a mle must therefore be mandatory as a matter of
customary international law. Such an idea does not seem ever
to have been propounded ...".(I.C.J. Reports 1969.p. 33,para.
49).

215. In itsdecision in the case concerning the Delimitationof

the ContinentalShelfbetween the UnitedKingdom and France.1977,
(United Nations Reports of International ArbitralAwards, Volume
XVIII, Part 1)the Court of Arbitration said (para. 70):

"...ln short, the rôle of the "special circumstances" condition
in Article 6 is to ensure an equitable delimitation; and the
combined "equidistance-special circumstances nile", in effect,
gives particular expression to a general norm that, failing
agreement, the boundary between States abuttingonthe same
continental shelf is to be determined on equitable principles....
Consequently, even under Article 6 the question whether the
use of the equidistance principle or some other method is ap-
propriate for achieving an equitable delimitation is very much
a matter of appreciation in the light of the geographical and
other circumstances. In other words. even under Article 6 it is the geographical and other circumstances of any given case
which indicate and justify the use of the equidistance method
asthe means of achieving an equitable solution rather than the
inherent quality of the method as a legal norm of delimita-
tion."

216. Reference can also be made to the Judgment ofthe Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Tunisia/Libya case concerning the
Continental SheK 1982:

"Before considering the methods of delimitation discussed by
the Parties in argument, the Court thinks it appropriate to
make some observations on the equidistance method. The
Court held in the North Sea ContinentalShelfcases, which also
concerned adjacent States, thatthe equidistance method of de-

limitation of the continental shelf is not prescribed by a man-
datory rule of customary law (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 46, para.
83; p. 53,para. 101).On the other hand it emphasized the me-
rits of this mle in cases in which its application leads to an
equitable solution. Thesubsequent practice of States, as isap-
parent from treaties on continental shelf boundaries, shows
that the equidistance method has been employed in a number
of cases. But it also shows that States may deviate from an
equidistance line, and have made use of other critena for the
delimitation,whenever they found this a better wayto arrive at
an agreement. One solution may be a combination of an equi-
distance line in some parts ofthe area with a line ofsome other
kind in other parts, as dictated by the relevant circumstances.
Examples of this kind are provided by the 1977arbitration on
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between France and
the United Kingdom, and by the Convention between France
and Spain on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves of
the two States in the Bay of Biscay of 29January 1974.Treaty

practice, as wellas the bistory of Article 83ofthe draftconven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, leads to the conclusion that equi-
distance may be applied if it leads toan equitable solution; if
not, other methods should be employed." (I.C.J. Reports 1982,
pp. 78 -79, para. 109).
"Nor does the Court consider that it is in the present case re-
quired, as a first step, to examine the effects of a delimitation
by application of the equidistance method, and to reject that
method in favour of some other only if it considers the results
of an equidistance line to be inequitable. A finding by the
Court in favour of a delimitation by an equidistance line could
only be based on considerations derived from an evaluation
and balancing up of al1relevant circumstances, since equidis- tance is not, in the view of the Court, either a mandatory legal
principle, or a method having some privileged status in rela-
tion to other methods. It is to be noted that in the present case
Tunisia, having previously argued in favour of a delimitation
by theequidistancemethod for at least some of the areain dis-
pute, contended in its Memonal that the result of using that
method would be inequitable to Tunisia; and that Libya has
made a formal submission to the effect that in the present case
the equidistance method would result in an inequitable delimi-
tation. The Court must take this firmly expressed view of the
Parties intoaccount. If however the Court were to amve atthe

conclusion, after having evaluated al1relevant circumstances,
that an equidistance linewould bnng about an equitable solu-
tion of the dispute,there would be nothing to prevent it from
so finding even though the Parties have discarded the equidis-
tance method. But if that evaluation leads the Court to an
equitable delimitation on a different basis, thereis no need for
it to give any further consideration to equidistance." (I.C.J.
Reports 1982,p. 79, para. 110).

217. Reference is furthermore made to the Judgment of the
Chamber constituted by the Court in the CaseconcerningDelimira-
tion oftheMaritimeBoundaryintheGulfofMaineArea, 1984.where
the Chamber reached the following conclusion concerning the ap-
plication of the method of equidistance:

"The Chamber therefore wishes to conclude this review of the
rules of international law on the question to which the dispute
between Canadaand the United States relates by attempting a

more complete and, in its opinion, more precise reformulation
of the "fundamental norm" already mentioned. For this pur-
pose itwill, interalia,draw also upon the definition ofthe "ac-
tual rules of law ..which govern the delimitation of adjacent
continental shelves -that is to say, rules binding upon States
for al1delimitations" which was given by the Court in its 1969
Judgment in the NorthSen ContinentalShelfcases (I.C.J. Re-
ports 1969,pp. 46-47,para. 85).Whatgeneral international law
prescribes in every maritime delimitation between neighbour-
ing States could therefore be defined as follows:

(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts may he effected unilaterally by one of those
States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected by
means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in
good faith and with the genuine intention of achievinga posi-
tive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a
third party possessing the necessary competence.
(2) In either case, delimitation isto be effected by the applica-
tion of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods
capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic configura-
tion of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable
result."(I.C.J. Reports 1984,pp. 299 - 300, para. 112).

Finally, in the Libya/Malta case, 1985,the Court said:

"...the Court could hardly ignore the fact that the equidistance
method has never been regarded, even in a delimitation be-
tween opposite coasts, as one applied without modification
whatever the circumstances. Already in the 1958Convention
on the Continental Shelf, which imposes upon the States par-

ties to it an obligation oftreaty-law, failing agreement,to have
recourse to equidistance forthe delimitation ofthe continental
shelfareas, Article6contains the proviso thatthat method isto
be used "unless another boundary line is justified by special
circumstances."." (I.C.J. Reports 1985.p. 48, para. 65).

218. This analysis of the equidistance/special circumstances
rule in Article 6 of the 1958Convention on the Continental Shelf
leads to the result that the mle must be seen as an expression of
equity. One cannot, however, claim that Article 6 expresses a mle of
customary international law governing al1 maritime delimitations
today, such as for instance delimitation of fishery zones.
This point of view has found its clear expression in the Gulfof
Maine case. 1984, where the Chamber constituted by the Court
stated:

"The Chamber must therefore conclude in this respect that the
provisions of Article 6 of the 1958Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf,although inforcebetween the Parties, do not en-

tail either for them or for the Chamber any legal obligation to
apply them to the single maritime delimitation which is the
subject of the present case." (I.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 303,para.
125).

219. In the present case concerning a single line of delimita-
tion both for a fishery zone and a continental shelfarea, itisthe con-
tention of the Government of Denmark that the applicable princi-
ples and rules are those having found expression in the 1982United
Nations Convention onthe Law ofthe Sea.This point of viewisfur-
ther supported by the fact that both Parties to the present dispute
have based their attitudes on the general development of interna-tional law as expressed in that Convention, cf. paragraphs 223 and

315.

220. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
1982,has been signed, but not ratified, by Denmark and Nonvay.
The Convention has not yet entered into force.

221. A number of the mles adopted in the Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 1982,must be regarded as innovations within the

sphere of international law. Other niles of the Convention must be
considered as a codification based on customary international law
being developed before or during UNCLOS III; this applies inter
aliato the provisions relating to the extent of the territorial sea (Ar-
ticle 3), the contiguous zone (Article 33), the exclusive economic
zone (Article 57)andthe continental shelf (Article 76.1and Article
77).

222. The Conference drafts had a generating effect, in the
sense that the provisions which had achieved a consensus at the
Conference became the nucleus for a subsequent and parallel prac-
tice of States, which in turn crystallized in the form of recognized
legal niles. Thisoccurred, forinstance, withthe institution ofthe ex-
clusive economiczone and the fishery zone.

223. An example is provided by the Act on Nonvay's Econ-
omic Zone No. 91 of 17 December 1976(Annex 2) which entered
into force on IJanuary 1977and forms the legal basis of the Nor-
wegian Royal Decree of 23 May 1980concerning the establishment
of a fisheryzone of 200nautical miles around Jan Mayen (Annex 7).
The Act is based inter alia on the assumption that the rules con-
tained at that time in thedraft texts of the Convention onthe Law of
the Seaconcerning an exclusive economic zone did as early as 1976

express the general practice of States. This assumption also formed
the basis of the Danish Act No. 597 of 17 December 1976on the
Fishing Territory of theKingdom of Denmark (Annex 1).

224. As of 1 June 1989at least 74 countries have established
exclusive economic zones and at least 18countries have established
exclusive fishery zones of 200nautical miles').

225. This development in contemporary international law is

')ondrheLowofrheSea).onreceifrom rhe UniredNario(Ojii ereOcennAfiirs

64reflected in the Court's Judgment in the Tunisia/Libya case which
Statesthat the exclusive economic zone "may be regarded aspart of
modern international law" (I.C.J. Reports 1982.p. 74, para. 100).
In the Libya/Malta casethe Court expressed itself in the follow-
ing way:

"...It is in the Court's view incontestable that..the institution
ofthe exclusive economic zone, with its rule on entitlement by
reason of distance, is shown by the practice of States to have
become a pari ofcustomary law ..."(I.C.J.Reports 1985,p. 33,
para. 34).

This conclusion corresponds well with the obiter dictum in the
Court's first leadingjudgment on maritime delimitation, the North
Sea ContinentalShelfcases, 1969.where it is said that a rule of cus-
tomary international law may be created "without the passage of
any considerable period of time" (I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 42, para.
73). The law-making process within this field of international law
has indeed progressed at a considerable speed since the 1969Judg-
ment and especially since the FisheriesJurisdictioncase (I.C.J. Re-
ports 1974).

226. As far asthe question of delimitationof maritime areas is
concerned, reference is made to Articles 74 and 83 of the Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea. Both Article 74relating to the delimita-
tion of the exclusive economic zone and Article 83 relating to the
delimitation of the continental shelf provide that, failing agreement,
the delimitation shall be effected "on the basis of international law,

as referred to in Article 38ofthe Statute ofthe International Court of
Justice in order to achieve an equitable solution." The formulation
of the two Articles is identical:

Article 74
"1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between

States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
in order to achieve an equitable solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period
of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures
provided for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the
States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-opera-
tion, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrange-
ments ofa practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agree-
ment. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the

final delimitation.
4.Where there is an agreement in force between the States con-
cerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive
economic zone shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of that agreement."

Article 83
"1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement

on the basis of international law, as referred to in Articl38 of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to
achieve an equitable solution.
2.If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period
of time, the States concerned shall resort to the procedures
provided for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the

States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-opera-
tion, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrange-
ments of apractical natureand, during thistransitional period,
not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agree-
ment. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the
final delimitation.
4.Where there is an agreement in force between the States con-

cerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the continen-
tal shelf shall be determined in accordance with the provisions
of that agreement."

Articles 74and 83 ofthe Convention onthe Law of the Sea are the
result of a compromise between the viewpoints of groups of States

whose attitude to the question of delimitation during UNCLOS III
differed in principle. One group, including Denmark and Norway,
advocated the maintenance of an equidistance/special circumstan-
ces rule similar to that of Article 6.1. of the Convention of 29 Apfil
1958 on the Continental Shelf, or in any case a delimitation rule
which expressly mentioned the equidistance principle, while an-
other group wanted the provisions on delimitation to be worded

without any reference toan equidistance/special circumstances rule
and with "equitable principles" as sole criterion of delimitation.

227. The first drafts of the provisions which were later
adopted as Article 74 and Article 83, were formulated as Article 61
(ihe~exclusiveeconomic zone) and Article 70(the continental shelf)
of the so-called Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) during theThird Session ofthe Conference in 1975.The drafts reflected clearly
the attempts to bridge the twodifferent schools of thought.The texts
were as follows:

Article61

"The delimitation of the exclusive economiczone (Article 70:
the continental shelf) between adjacent or opposite States
shall be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable
principles, employing, where appropriate, the median or
equidistance line, and taking account of al1the relevant cir-
cumstances." (UNCLOS 111,OfficialRecords.Vol. IV,pp. 162
- 163).

228. The same texts were included in the Revised Single
Negotiating Text (RSNT)in 1976and later in the Informal Compos-
ite Negotiating Text (ICNT) in 1977.

229. Continued efforts to reach a consensus regarding the
provisions on delimitation led to a new text in 1980, included in
ICNT/Revision 2and later again in ICNT/Revision 3.This text was
as follows:

"The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone (the con-

tinental shelf) between States with opposite or adjacentcoasts
shall be effected by agreement in conformity with interna-
tional law. Such an agreement shall be in accordance with
equitable principles, employing the median or equidistance
line, where appropriate, and taking account of al1circumstan-
ces prevailing in the areas concerned." (UNCLOS III, Official
Records.Vol. XIII, pp. 77 -78).

230. Neither that text nor anyother referring to equidistance
was able to achieve consensus atthe Conference. Asiswellknown, a
solution was not reached until a very late date when a draft was pro-
posed the text of which was adopted as Articles 74 and 83 of the
present Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.In that text the ref-
erencesto "equitable principles" as well as to "the median or equi-
distance line" and "al1 circumstances prevailing in the area con-
cerned" were deleted and replaced by "...in order to achieve an
equitable solution".

231. Both Denmark and Norway accepted the final text of the
Convention as a whole including the rules on delimitation in Article
74 and Article 83. Denmark's position was based upon the assump-
tion that the said texts of Article 74and Article 83 would form a sa-tisfactory legal basis which would make it possible to reach equit-
able solutions in maritime delimitations in al1geographical parts of
the world.

232. Articles 74 and 83 may be regarded as an expression of
contemporary international law and thus forming the main legal
basis for deciding the present dispute, cf. the decision of the Cham-

ber in the GufofMaine case, 1984,where the Chamher commented
on the niles on delimitation in the Convention onthe Law ofthe Sea
in the following way:

"...In the Chamber's opinion, these provisions, even if in some

respects they bear the mark of the compromise surrounding
their adoption, may nevertheless be regarded as consonant at
present with general international law on the question." (I.C.J.
Reports 1984,p. 294, para. 94).

233. This analysis of the legal statusof Articles 74 and 83 car-
ries particular weight in the present dispute where both Parties have
availed themselves of their right to establish 200-mile fishery zones
or economic zones, stating as the legal basis of that right the general

development in international law as that development manifested
itself during UNCLOS 111,and later in the Convention on the Law
of the Sea itself. In so doing Denmark and Norway have also under-
taken the obligation to respect in their relationship the provisions on

delimitation in Article 74 of the Convention, which take specific ac-
count of the development of the concept of the exclusive economic
zone.

234. In the case of Norway the establishment of an economic

zone took place with reference interaliato the current development
at UNCLOS III, cf. the tabling in the Norwegian Parliament of the
Bill on the Economic Zone of Norway on 3 September 1976l).

235. A survey of international judicial practice concerning
maritime delimitations since theadoption and entry into force of the

5 In rhesuhmi<vii,nro rhr Nornegion Parliamrn<q'rhonBrhr tcunomi'Lvnr oj
Nurhai <.n3Szprrnihrr IY76i1 no*inirruliu </orrd

"BaredonrhisSrarepracriceandin rhelighrof ihesupporiwhichiheprinciple
of200-mile economiczoneshasgained/rom a vasrmajoriryofrhe world'sno-
lionsduringrheLaw of rheSeo Conjerenee.onemay- in theviewof rheGov-
ernmenr-derermineihai rhenrcessnrypolirl osisandfoundorionof inter-
(ExcerprofOr.prp. No. 4097677)4)i fsuchzones."

68 1958Convention on the Continental Shelf reveals the following es-
sential elements to be taken into account in deciding maritime de-
limitation disputes:

Any delimitation must be in accordance with equitable princi-
ples; equitable principles are subordinate to the result to be

achieved, and it is the equitableness of the result or solution which
must predominate; the equity ofthe result is to be determined in the
light of al1the relevant factors of the particular case. The relevant
factors include interalia the geographical configuration of the rele-
vant coasts and their relationship to the maritime area abutting on
those coasts. In this respect the geography of the coasts is a question

of fact, so thatthere can be no question ofrefashioninggeography to
justify a result perceived to be equitable; real differences in coastal
length areimportant, for equity does not require equal treatment for
coasts that are not equal;thegeography of the coasts may also indi-
catethe appropriate method of delimitation. Further factors are: the
geological and geomorphological characteristics of the sea-bed

area; theconduct of the Parties;delimitations,actual or prospective,
with third States in the region; the proportionality factor. The
method of delimitation appropriate in a given case is that dictated
by al1the relevant circumstances, especially those of geography, and
equidistance has no special status or priority as a method.

236. In the opinion of the Govemment of Denmark judicial
practice has not excluded the possibility of accepting other relevant
factors such as population or socio-economic factors.

237. The essential elements derived from international judi-

cial practice will be described in the following paragraphs.

Anydelimitation must be in accordance with equitable principles

238. With reference to the history of Article 6 of the Geneva
Convention of 1958 the Court said in the North Sea Continental
Sheifcases, 1969:

"...it is clear that at no time was the notion of equidistance as
an inherent necessity of continental shelf doctrine entertained.
Quite a different outlook was indeed manifested from the start
in current legal thinking. It was, and it really remained to the
end, governed by two beliefs; - namely, first, that noonesingle

method of delimitation was likely to prove satisfactory in al1
circumstances, and that delimitation should, therefore, be car-
ried out by agreement (or by reference to arbitration); and se- condly, that it should be effected on equitable principles. It
was in pursuance of the first of these beliefs that in the draft
that emerged as Article 6 ofthe Geneva Convention,the Com-
mission gave priority to delimitation by agreement, - and in
pursuance of the second that it introducedthe exception in fa-
vourof "special circumstances ...".(I.C.J.Reports 1969,pp. 35
- 36, para. 55).

Furthermore it was said:

"...Nevertheless, when mention is made of a court dispensing
justice ordeclaring the law, what is meant is that the decision
finds its objective justification in considerations lying not out-
side but within the niles, and inthis field it isprecisely a rule of
law that calls for the application of equitable principles."
(I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 48, para. 88).

In the operative part of the Judgment the Court stated that

"delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles, and taking account of al1the rele-
vant circumstances, ...".(I.C.J. Reports 1969,p. 53, para. 101
(C)(1)).

239. Reference isalso made to the decision ofthe Court ofAr-
bitration in the case concerning the Delimitation of theContinental
Shelfbetweenthe UnitedKingdomand France,1977,where the Court
of Arbitration said interalia:

"70 ...In other words, even under Article 6 it isthe geograph-
ical and other circumstances of any given case which indicate
and justify the use of the equidistance method as the means of
achieving an equitable solution rather than the inherent
quality of the method as a legal norm of delimitation."
"97. In short, this Court considers that the appropriateness of
the equidistance method or any other method for the purpose
of effectingan equitable delimitation isafunction or reflection

of the geographical and other relevant circumstances of each
particular case. The choice of the method or methods of de-
limitation in any given case, whether under the 1958Conven-
tion or customary law, has therefore to be determined in the
light of those circumstances and of the fundamental norm that
the delimitation must be in accordance with equitable princi-
ples..."
"195. ..Under customary law, the method adopted for delimi-
ting the boundary must, while applying the principle of natu- ral prolongation ofterritory, also ensure that the resulting de-
limitation of the boundary accords with equitable principles.
In other words, the question is whether the Channel Islands
should be given the full benefit of the application of the prin-
ciple of natural prolongation in the areas to their north and
northwest or whether their situation close to the mainland of

France requires, on equitable grounds, some modification of
the application of the principle in those areas...".

240. In its decision in the Tunisia/Libya case, 1982,the Court
considered "that it isbound to decide the case on the basis of equit-
able principles ..."(I.C.J. Reports 1982,p. 59,para. 70). In the opera-
tive part of the Court's decision of that case it was stated conse-
quently that

"...A. The principles and rules of international law applicable
for the delimitation, ..are as follows:
(1) the delimitation is to be effected in accordance with equi-
table principles, and taking account of al1relevant circumstan-
ces;..."(I.C.J. Reports 1982,p. 92, para. 133).

241. The Chamber constituted by the International Court of
Justice in the Gulfof Maine case, 1984,pronounced itself in the fol-
lowing way:

"ïhe Chamber therefore wishes to conclude this review ofthe
mles of international law on the question to which thedispute
between Canadaand the United States relates by attempting a
more complete and, in its opinion, more precise reformulation
of the "fundamental norm" already mentioned. For this pur-
pose it will, interalia, drawalso upon the definition of the "ac-
tual mles of law ..which govern the delimitation of adjacent
continental shelves - that is to say, rules binding upon States
for al1delimitations" which was given by the Court in its 1969
Judgment in the North Sea Conrinenral Shelfcases (I.C.J. Re-
ports 1969,pp. 46 - 47, para. 85). What general international

law prescribes in every maritime delimitation between neigh-
bouring States could therefore be defined as follows:
(1) No maritime delimitation between States with opposite
or adjacent coasts may be effected unilaterally by one of those
States. Such delimitation must be sought and effected by
means of an agreement, following negotiations conducted in
good faith and with the genuine intention of achieving a posi-
tive result. Where, however, such agreement cannot be
achieved, delimitation should be effected by recourse to a
third party possessing the necessary competence. (2) In either case, delimitation is to be effected by the appli-

cation of equitable criteria and by the use of practical methods
capable of ensuring, with regard to the geographic configura-
tion of the area and other relevant circumstances, an equitable
result." (I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 299 - 300, para. 112).

242. In the Libya/Malta case, 1985, the Court stated:

"Judicial decisions are at one - and the Parties themselves

agree (paragraph 29 above) - in holding that delimitation of a
continental shelf boundary must be effected by the application
of equitable principles in al1 the relevant circumstances in
order to achieve an equitable result ...".(I.C.J.Reports 1985, p.
38. para. 45).

and concluded with this statement interalia:

"...(1) the delimitation is to be effected in accordance with
equitable principles and taking account of al1relevant circum-
stances, so as to arrive at an equitable result;..."(I.C.J.Reports
1985, p. 57, para. 79A (1)).

Equitable principles aresubordinatte othe resulttobeachieved,andit
is the equitableoessof the resultor solutionwhichmustpredorninate

243. This was stressed by the International Court ofJustice in
the Tunisia/Libya case, 1982(1.C.J.Reports 1982. p. 59, para. 70) as

well as in the Court's decision in the Libya/Malta case, 1985(I.C.J.
Reports 1985. p. 38, para. 45), when it was stated that

"It is however the goal - the equitable result - and not the
means used to achieve it, that must be the primary element in
this duality of characterization."

The equityof the resultis to bedeterrninedin the light of al1the

relevantfactorsof the particularcase

244. In the caseconcerning the Delimitationofthe Continental
Shelfbetween the UnitedKingdomand France.1977, the Court of Ar-
bitration said, in paragraph 70:

"...In short, the rôle of the "special circumstances" condition
in Article 6 is to ensure an equitable delimitation; and the
combined "equidistance-special circumstances nile", in effect,

gives particular expression to a general nom that, failingcount in the course of the negotiations resulting from the Court's

Judgment (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 54, para. 101 D (1)).

249. The Court of Arbitration in the case concerning the De-
limitation of the ContinentalShelfbetween the United Kingdom and
France, 1977, stated that"...the validity of the equidistance method,
or of any othermethod,as a means of achieving an equitable delimi-
tation of the continental shelf, is always relative to the particular
geographical situation." (para. 84). This viewpoint was further

stressed in paragraph 97 of the Court's decision quoted above, cf.
paragraph 239.

250. The International Court ofJustice in its Judgment in the
Tunisia/Libya case, 1982, stated interalia:

"... The geographical correlation between coast and sub-
merged areas off the coast is the basis of the coastal State's

legal title..."(I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61, para. 73).

The geography ofthe coasts isa question offact, sothat there can beno
question of refashiooiog geography to justify a result perceivedto be
equitable

25 1. This was first stated in the North Sea ContinentalShelf
cases, 1969.as follows:

"Equity does not necessanly imply equality. There can never
be any question of completely refashioning nature, and equity
does not require that a State without access to the sea should
be allotted an area of continental shelf, any more than there
could be a question of rendering the situation of a State with
an extensive coastlinesimilar to that of a State with a restncted
coastline. Equality is to be reckoned within the same plane,
and it is not such natural inequalities as these that equity could
remedy..." (I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 49, para. 91).

252. In the case between the United Kingdom and France.
1977, the Court of Arbitration expressed itself in the following way:

"... Just as it is not the function of equity in the delimitation of
the continental shelf completely to refashion geography, so it
is also not the function of equity to create a situation of com-
plete equity where nature and geography have established an

inequity. Equity does not, therefore, cal1 for coasts, the rela-
tion ofwhich to thecontinental shelf is not equal, to be treated The geological or geomorphological characteristics of the sea-hed
area

256. It istme that in the past the Court has recognized the rel-
evance of geophysical characteristics of the area of delimitation if
they assist in identifying a line of separation between the continental
shelves of the Parties, as it was recalled in the reasoning of the Court

in the Libya/Malta case, 1985,(I.C.J.Reports 1985, p. 35, para. 40).
But where a delimitation dispute relates to an area, the extent of
which is less than 200 nautical miles from the coast of either Party,
geological considerations would seem to be irrelevant as stated by
the Court in the same case:

"The Court however considers that since the development of
the law enables a State to claim that the continental shelf ap-
pertaining to it extends up to as far as 200 miles from its coast,
whatever the geological characteristics of the corresponding
sea-bed and subsoil, there is no reason to ascribe any role to

geological or geophysical factors within that distance either in
verifying the legal title of the States concerned or in proceed-
ing to a delimitation as between their claims. This is especially
clear where verification of the validity of title is concerned
since, at least in so far as those areas are situated at a distance
of under 200 miles from the coasts in question, title depends

solely on the distance from the coasts of the claimant States of
any areas of sea-bed claimed by way of continental shelf, and
the geological or geomorphological characteristics of those
areas are completely immaterial ..."(I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 35,
para. 39).

The conduct of the Parties

257. The conduct of the Parties is an element which has often
been examined thoroughly by the Court and by Arbitral Tribunals
when - in the absence of e.g., treaty obligations - arguments con-
cerning the concepts of acquiescence and estoppel have had to be
commented upon. Suffice ithere to mention the Gulfof Mainecase,

1984(I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 61 - 70, para. 126 - 154).

258. Such an examination of conduct may in some cases pro-
vide evidence of the fact that a binding legal obligation has evolved
from theconduct of the Parties. Even in cases where no legal obliga-

tion exists, Courts will examine the degree of consistency shown in a
Party's conduct towards different neighbouring States, for, unless
justified by external factors which are manifestly different, a dif-ference in treatment of its neighbours by a Party suggests a lack of
consistency in that Party's interpretation of the law.

Delimitations, actual or prospective,with third States in the region

259. This element was emphasized by the Court in the opera-
tive part of the decision of the North Seo ConrinenralShelfcases,
1969(I.C.J.Reports 1969,p. 54,para. 101(D(3))) and in the Tunisia/
Libya case(I.C.J. Reports 1982.p. 93, para. 133 B(5)). In the mar-
itime delimitation between Guineaand Guinea-Bissau,1985.the Ar-
bitral Tribunal also emphasized this element by stating in its award:

"93. ...A delimitation designed to obtain an equitable result
cannot ignore the other delimitations already made or still to
be made in the region ...".(Translation from International
Legal Materials,Volume XXV, No. 2, March 1986)').

The proportionaliîy factor

260. In its decision in the Libya/Malta case, 1985.the Court

pronounced itself in the following way refernng in paragraph 55to
its Judgment in the North Sea ContinenralShelfcases. 1969, and
stressing in paragraph 56:

"It isclear that what the Court intended was a means ofidenti-
fying and then correcting the kind of distortion - dispropor-
tion - that could anse from the use of a method inapt to take
adequate account of some kinds ofcoastal configuration ...In

factthe proportionality "factor" arisesfrom the equitable prin-
ciple that nature must be respected; ..."(I.C.J.Reports 1985.p.
44, para. 56).

The Court went on to Sayinteralia:

"...Consideration of the comparability or otherwise of the

coastal lengths is a part of the process of detennining an equi-
table boundary on the basisof an initial median line; the test of
a reasonable degree of proportionality, on the other hand, is
one which can be applied to check the equitableness of any
line, whatever the method used to arrive at that line." (I.C.J.
Reports 1985,p. 49, para. 66).
-
')Original rexr: Unedélimitarionvisonà obtenirun résulrnréquiroblenepeut ig-
norerlesoutresdélimirotiodejaeffecruésua effectuerdansla rég.."

77 In the Libya/Malta casethe Court referred to the close link which
exists between the delimitation of maritime areas and the legal basis
of title tohese areas. The Court said:

"..the legal basis ofthat which is to be delimited, and of entit-
lement to it, cannot be other than pertinent to that delimita-
tion." (I.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 30, para. 27).

261. Asalsostated bythe Court inthe Tunisia/Libya case,it is
the Coastwhich "is the decisive factor for title to submarine areas
adjacent to it." (I.C.J. Reports 1982,p. 61, para. 73).

262. The Court thus recognized that a State generates con-
tinental shelfrights by wayof itscoastal front, asis shown bythe fact
that those rights cannot be engendered in the case of land-locked
States. Now, the coastalfrontgenerates a certain maritime area, be-
cause of its length, amongother factors. It follows that proportion-
ality is an essential factor in a delimitation operation.

Themethodofdelimitation appropriate ina givencaseisthat dictated
by al1the relevant circumstances, especiallythose of geography;
equidistance has no special status or priorityof application as a
method

263. Reference is here made to the North Sea Continenfal
Shelfcases, 1969.where the Court in its conclusion stated:

"(A) the use of the equidistance method of delimitation not
being obligatory as between Parties; and
(B)there being no other single method ofdelimitation the use
of which is in al1circumstances obligatory;
(C) the principles and rules of international law applicable to
the delimitation as between Parties of the areas of the con-

tinental shelfin theNorth Seawhich appertain to each ofthem
beyond the partial boundary determined by the agreements of
1December 1964and 9June 1965,respectively, are as follows:

(1)delimitationis to be effected by agreement in accord-
ance with equitable principles and taking account of al1
the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as
much as possible to each Party al1those parts of thecon-
tinental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its
land territory into and under the sea, without encroach- ment on the natural prolongation of.the land territory of
the other;
(2)if, inthe application of the preceding sub-paragraph,
the delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap,
these are to be divided between them in agreed propor-
tions or, failing agreement, equally, unless they decide
on a régimeofjoint jurisdiction, use, or exploitation for
the zones of overlap or any part of them;

(D) in the course of the negotiations, the factors to be taken
into account are to include:

(1)the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties,

as well as the presence of any special or unusual fea-
tures;
(2)so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical
and geological structure, and natural resources, of the
continental shelf areas involved;
(3)the element ofa reasonable degreeofproportionality,
which a delimitation carried out in accordance with
equitable principlesought to bring about between the ex-
tent of the continental shelf areas appertaining to the
coastal State and the length of its Coastmeasured in the
general direction of the coastline, account being taken
for this purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of
any other continental shelf delimitation between adja-
cent States in the same region." (I.C.J. Reports 1969,pp.
53 - 54,para. 101).

264. The ideas embodied in the Court's decision of the North
Sea ContinentalSheljcases, 1969,werefurtherdeveloped byjudicial
practice during the subsequent years.

265. In its Judgment in the Tunisia/Libya case, 1982, the
Court referred to its Judgment of 1969,while stressing that:

"...Treaty practice, as well as the history of Article 83of the
draft convention ofthe Lawofthe Sea, leads to the conclusion
that equidistance may be applied if it leads to an equitable
solution; if not, other methods should be employed." (I.C.J.
Reports 1982,p. 79, para. 109).

266. In the Culjof Maine case, the Chamber of the Court
stated that equidistance is nota nile of lawbut "is in reality: a practi-
cal method that can be applied for the purposes of delimitation."
(1.C.J.Reports 1984,p. 297,para. 106). 267. In the Libya/Malta case, 1985,the Court expressed itself

in the following terms:

"The Court is unable to accept that, even as a preliminary and
provisional step towardsthe drawingof a delimitation line, the
equidistance method is one which mustbe used, ..."(I.C.J.Re-

ports 1985,p. 37, para. 43).

268. The Arbitral Tribunal entmsted with delimiting the mar-
itime boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, 1985, pro-
nounced itself as follows:

"102. ...The Tribunal itself considers that the equidistance
method isjust one among many and thatthere isno obligation
to use it or give it priority, even though it is recognized as hav-
ing a certain intrinsic value because of its scientific character

and the relative ease with which it can be applied.The method
of delimitation to be used can have no other purpose than to
divide maritime areas intotemtories appertaining to different
States, while doing everything possible to apply objective fac-
tors offering the possibility of arriving at an equitable result.
Such an approach excludes any recourse to a method chosen

beforehand. On the contrary, itrequires objective legal reason-
ing and the method to be used can come only as a result of
this." (Translation from InrernarionalLegalMaterials.Volume
XXV, No. 2, March 1986)').

269. In the analysisof Statepractice as evidenced by treaties,
one isfaced with the dificulty thatthe specificreasons for the actual
delimitations in the agreements are generally not known. Only the
result is clear; be itthedrawing of a median line, a line following the

200-mile limit or an arbitrary line based typically on political or
economic factors; be it different lines covering the continental shelf
areas and the fishery zones respectively or, as recent State practice
shows, a single line covering both maritime zones.

'J Original iexr"..Le Tribunal esrimepour so port que Iëquidisrance n'est qu'une
mérhode commeles autres er qu'elle n'ex1ni obligaroire niprioriraire. mémes'il doit
lui êlrereconnu une cerrolne qualiréinrrinsenraison de son caractère sclenri-
Jique er de la facilité relative avec laquelle ellepeur êrreappliquée.Lo mérhodede
ririmes en rernroires relevonr d'Erars dt~érenrs,en s'airachanr à appliquer desfac-
reursobjecrifspouvantpermerrre unrasbuooriquirable.Unerelledémnrche
exclu1roui recoursa unemérhodechoisieopriori. Elle exigeau conunaraisonne-
menrjuridique objecri/er Io mérhodeà utiliser nepeur qu'en êrrel..."(para.
102). 270. The present dispute concerns a delimitation vis-à-visan
island. State practice concerning such delimitations will be ac-
counted for in the following Section dealing with the status of is-

lands in maritime delimitations.

Section 2.Status of Islandsin Maritime Delimitations

271. In Article IOofthe Convention ontheTemtorial Seaand
the Contiguous Zone, 1958,as well as in Article 121of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, an island is
defined as a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide.

272. Withthe exceptionof rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic lifeof their own,international law makes no
distinction between continental and insular territories with respect
totheirentitlement to continental shelf and economiczone rights off
their coasts, cf. the Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 121,
paragraphs 2 and 3. As Faras the continental shelf is concerned the
equating of islands to land territory was already established by the
1958Convention on the Continental Shelf, cf. Article 1.The Gov-
ernment of Denmark does not at present enter into the question of
what is the status and what are the rights of Jan Mayen under inter-
national law.

273. Entitlement, however, must be distinguished from de-
limitation. The above-mentioned provisions deal exclusively with
the entitlement of islands to maritime zones, whereas no specific
provisions regulate delimitation questions involving islands. Ref-
erence therefore has to be made to the provisions which in general
lay downthe principles to be applied when the question ofdelimita-
tion arises, Le.,Articl6 of the 1958Convention and, in particular,
Articles 74 and 83 of the 1982Convention.

THE DELIMITATION ASPECT

274. With regard to Article 6 of the Convention of 29 April
1958onthe Continental Shelf,notably concerning the interpretation
ofthe term "special circumstances", it appears fromthe travaux pré-
paratoiresthat what the International LawCommission particularly
had in mind in phrasing that term was special geographical factors,
e.g. the influence of small islands on the delimitation of the con-tinental shelf between two States situated opposite (or adjacent) to
each other. In the comments on Article 72 of the ILC draft (corre-
sponding to what later became Article 6 of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf) it is stated:

"...provision must be made for departures" (i.e., from the
equidistance line) "necessitated by anyexceptional configura-
tion ofthe Coast,as wellas by the presenceofislands or ofnav-
igable channels. This case may arise fairly often, so that the

mle adopted is fairly elastic". (Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 1956,II, p. 300).

275. During the negotiations at Geneva in March-April 1958
prior to the adoption of interaliathe Convention on theContinental
Shelf it was likewise clearly statedthat amongthe geographical fac-
tors it was notably the problem ofthe relative weight of small islands
in connection with delimitation which had given rise to the incor-
poration in Article 6 of the term "special circumstances", cf. inter
alia Official Records, Vol. VI, Doc. A/CONF. 13/42, pp. 93-95. In
the course of its deliberations on this question the Conference also
discussed the desirability of referring specifically to islands in the
text. This idea was abandoned, however, because a more elastic
wording ad modum the one proposed by the ILC was found to be
preferable.

276. The strengthening of the concept of "equity" which took
place during UNCLOS III in the various drafts of the Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 1982,atthe expense ofthe equidistance prin-
ciple was to a considerable degree based on the discussions of the
legal status of islands.

277. The presence of islands has played an important rôle in
international judicial practice. Different types of islands have been
involved in the cases decided upon by the International Court of
Justice as well as by courts of arbitration covering a range of islands
of different size and location, and different status with regard to
population, economic life and political independence.

278. In the decision by the Court of Arbitration in the case
concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the
United Kingdomand France,1977,the issue with regard to theChan-
nel Islandswas described in the following way in paragraphs 184,

187and 195respectively: "184. ...Possessing a considerable population and a substan-
tial agricultural and commercialeconomy, they are clearly ter-
ritorial and political units which have their ownseparate exist-
ence, and which are of a certain importance in their own right
separately from the United Kingdom ..According to this in-
formation they undoubtedly enjoy a very largemeasure of po-
litical, legislative, administrative and economic autonomy; so
much so that the United Kingdom asks the Court to regard
them as, in effect, distinct island States for the purpose of
determining the continental shelf appurtenant to them."
"187.The legal framework within which the Court mustdecide
the course of the boundary (or boundaries) in the Channel Is-
lands region is, therefore, that of two opposite States one of
which possesses island territories closeto thecoast ofthe other
State. To state this conclusion is not, however, to deny al1rel-
evance to the size and importance of the Channel Islands
which, on the contrary, may properly be taken into account in
balancing the equities in this region....."
"195. ...In other words, the question is whether the Channel

Islands should be given the full benefit of the application of
the principle of natural prolongation inthe areas to their nonh
and northwest or whether their situation close to the mainland
of France requires, on equitable grounds, some modification
of the application of the principle in those areas..."

279. After having thus identified the factual and legal frame-
work for ifs decision concerning the Channel Islands region the
Court of Arbitration went on to evaluate the concrete situation
(paragraphs 196 - 199):

"196. .. he presence of these British islands close to the
French coast, ifthey are given full effectin delimiting the con-
tinental shelf,willmanifestly result ina substantial diminution
of the area of continental shelf which would otherwise accrue
to the French Republic. This fact by itselfappears to the Court
to be,primafacie, a circumstance creative of inequity and call-
ing for a method of delimitation that in some measure re-
dresses the inequity. lfthis conclusionistested byapplying the
equidistance-special circumstances rule of Article6, instead of
the rules of customary law, it appears to the Court that the
presence oftheChannel Islands closeto the French coast must
be considered, primafacie, as constituting a "special circum-
stance" justifying a delimitation other than the median line
proposed by the United Kingdom."
"197. ... he United Kingdom, moreover, maintains that the
specific features of the Channel Islands region militate posi- tively in favour of the delimitation it proposes. It invokes the
particular character of the Channel Islands as not rocks or is-

lets but populous islands of a certain political and economic
importance; it emphasizes the close ties between the islands
and the United Kingdom and the latter's responsibility for
their defence and security;..."
"198. The Court accepts the equitable considerations invoked
by the United Kingdom as canying a certain weight; and, in its
view, they invalidate the proposal of the French Republic re-
stricting the Channel Islands to a six-mile enclave around the

islands, consisting of a three-mile zone of continental shelf
added to their territorial sea. They do not, however, appearto
the Court sufiïcient to justify the disproportion or remove the
imbalance in the delimitation of the continental shelf as be-
tween the United Kingdom and the French Republic which
adoption of the United Kingdom's proposal would involve.
The Court therefore concludes that the specific features of the

Channel Islands region cal1for an intermediate solution that
effects a more appropriate and a more equitable balance be-
tween the respective claims and interests of the Parties."
"199. ...The case is quite different from that of small islands on
the right side of or close to the median line, and it is also quite
different from the case where numerous islands stretch out one
after another long distances from the mainland ...The Chan-

nel Islands are not only "on the wrong side" of the mid-Chan-
ne1median line but wholly detached geographically from the
United Kingdom."

280. The Court of Arbitration concluded by drawing a me-
dian line between the opposite mainlands and a boundary for the
Channel Islands extending to 12nautical miles from the baselines,
therebycreating an enclave within the French continental shelf area.

Thus their geographical location,as isolated islands, "on the wrong
side of the median line", interalia led the Court to qualify them as
"special circumstances" and to consider them as being creative of
inequity.

281. This decision is particularly significant when one con-
siders the character of the Channel Islands: They have a total land
area of 195square kilometres, a population of 130,000,a substantial

independent economic life and a high degree of autonomy. These
aspects were certainly taken intoconsideration by theCourt of Arbi-
tration as is seen inter aliafrom paragraphs 184, 187, 197and 198
quoted above. But these factors only sufiïced to invalidate the pro-
posai of France restricting theChannel Islands to a six-mile enclave,
not to justify an adoption of the United Kingdom's proposal for amedian line calculated from these islands. As the Court of Arbitra-

lion stated in paragraph 199,the Channel Islands were not only "on
the wrong side" of the mid-Channel median line but were wholly
detached geographically from the United Kingdom. In a geographi-
cal situation of that nature the important character of the islands,
although taken into consideration, obviously was not regarded as
justifying an extension of the shelf attaching to the islands to the
north, so as to reduce the shelf area appertaining to the French

mainland.

282. Theother part of the decision of the Court of Arbitration
concerned the Atlantic Region. This geographical context is not
equally parallel to that ofthe present case, but a number of consider-
ations in the decision concerning the status of islands are fully valid
also to the present delimitation. Reference is made in particular to
the following excerpts from paragraphs 243 -245 and 251of the de-

cision:

"243. The essential point, therefore, isto determine whether, in
the aciual geographical circumstances of the Atlantic region,
the prolongation of the Scilly Isles somedistance further west-
wards than the island of Ushant renders "unjust" or "inequi-
table" an equidistance boundary delimited from the baselines
of the French and United Kingdom coasts ....he question is

whether, in the light of al1the pertinent geographical circum-
stances, that fact amounts to an inequitable distortion of the
equidistance line producing disproportionate effects on the
areas of shelf accruing to the two States."
"244. ..1tmay also be urged that the very fact ofthe projection
of the United Kingdom land mass further intothe Atlantic re-
gion has the natural consequences of rendering greater areas

of continental shelf appurtenant to it. Nevertheless, when ac-
count is taken of the fact that in other respects the two States
abut on the same continental shelf with coasts not markedly
different in extent and broadly similar in their relation to that
shelf, a question arises as to whether giving full effect to the
Scilly Isles in delimiting an equidistance boundary out to the
1,000-metre isobath may not distort the boundary and have
disproportionate effects as between the two States ...".

"245. The Court thus recognizes that the position of the Scilly
Isles west-south-west of the Cornish peninsula constitutes a
"special circumstance" justifying a boundary other than the
strict median line..."
"251. A numher of examples are to be found in State practice
of delimitations in which only partial effect has been given to
offshoreislands situated outside the territorial sea of the main- land. The method adopted has varied in response to the vary-
ing geographical and other circumstances of the particular
cases;but in one instance, at least, the method employed was
to give half, instead of full, effect to the offshore island in de-
limiting the equidistance line ...The distance that the Scilly
Islesextend the coastline of the mainland of the United King-
dom westwards ont0 the Atlantic continental shelf is slightly
more than twice the distance that Ushant extends westwards
the coastline of the French mainland. The Court, without at-
tributing any specialforce as a criterion to this ratio of the dif-
ference in the distances of the Scillies and Ushant from their
respective mainlands, finds in it an indication ofthe suitability
ofthe half-effect method as a means of amving at an equitable
delimitation in the present case. The function ofequity, as pre-
viously stated, isnot to produce absolute equality oftreatment,
but an appropriate abatement of the inequitable effects of the
distorting geographical feature. In the particular circumstan-

ces of the present case the half-effect method will serve to
achieve such an abatement of the inequity ..."
As clearly emerges from these statements, due attention was paid
to the distorting effect ofthe ScillyIsles in the concretegeographical
context and, consequently, the half-effect method was applied in
order to abate the inequitable effects of the distorting geographical
feature.

283. In relation to Norway's claim for a median line to Jan
Mayen it is noteworthy that the Scilly lsles are situated relatively
close to the English mainland (21 to 31 nautical miles) and have a
population of approximately 2,500.

284. The Judgment of the Court in the case concerning the
Delimitation of theContinental Shelf between Tunisia and Libya,

1982,treated the question of islands in paragraph 79:
"...the presence of the island of Jerba and of the Kerkennah
Islands and the surrounding low-tide elevations is a circum-
stance which clearly calls for consideration. ...the Court can-
not accept the exclusion in principle of the island ofJerba and
the Kerkennah Islands from consideration. The practical
method for the delimitation to be expounded hy the Court
hereafter is in fact such that, in the part of the area to be de-
limited in which the island of Jerba would be relevant, there
are other considerations which prevail over the effect of its

presence; the existence and position ofthe Kerkennah Islands
and surrounding low-tide elevations, on the other hand, are
matenal." (I.C.J. Reports 1982,pp. 63 - 64, para. 79). For purposes of choosing the practical method of delimitation in
the case, the Court divided thearea to be delimited into two sectors.
With the following reasoning the Court disregarded the island of
Jerba, which might have been relevant for the delimitation of the
area closer to the coast at Ras Ajdir:

"...It should also not be lost sight ofthat, as explained above,
the Court is at this stage confining its attention to the delimita-
tion of the sea-bed area which is closer to the coast at Ras
Ajdir, so that in assessing the direction of the coastline it ise-
gitimate to disregard for the present coastal configurations
found at more than a comparatively short distance from that
point, forexample the island ofJerba." (I.C.J. Reports 1982.p.

85, para. 120).

In delimiting the areas farther off-shore, the Court regarded the
Kerkennah Islands as a relevant circumstance to be taken into ac-
count:

"ln the view of the Court, the relevant circumstances of the
area which would not be attributed sufficient weight if the 26"
line were prolonged seaward much beyond the 34" parallel of
latitude are, first, the general change in the direction of the
Tunisian coast already mentioned; and secondly, the exist-
ence and position ofthe Kerkennah Islands ...(I.C.J. Reports
1982,p. 88, para. 127).
"..To the east ofthis line, however, liethe Kerkennah Islands,
surrounded by islets and low-tide elevations, and constituting
by their size and position a circumstance relevant for the de-
limitation, and to wbich the Court must therefore attribute
some effect.The area of the islands issome 180square kilome-
tres; they lie some II miles east of the town of Sfax,separated
from the mainland by an area in which the water reaches a

depth of more than four metres only in certain channels and
trenches ...However, the Court considers that to cause the de-
limitation line to veer even as far as to 62", to run parallel to
the island coastline, would, in the circumstances of the case,
amount to giving excessive weight to the Kerkennahs." (I.C.J.
Reports 1982.p. 88,para. 128).
"The Court would recall however that a number of examples
are to be found in Statepractice ofdelimitations in which only
partial effect bas been given to islands situated close to the
coast; the method adopted has varied in response to the vary-
ing geographical and other circumstances of the particular
case. One possible technique forthis purpose, in the context of
a geometrical method of delimitation, is that of the "half-ef- fect" or "half-angle". Briefly, the technique involves drawing

two delimitation lines, one giving to the island the full effect
attributed to it by the delimitation method in use, andtheother
disregarding the island totally, as though it did not exist. The
delimitation line actually adopted is then drawn between the
first two lines, either in such a way as to divide equally thearea
between them ,or as bisector of the angle which they make
with each other, or possibly by treating theisland as displaced
toward the mainland by half its actual distance therefrom.

Taking into account the position of the Kerkennah Islands,
and the low-tide elevations around them, the Court considers
that it should go so far as to attribute to the Islands a "half-ef-
fect" ofa similar kind ...(I.C.J. Reports 1982. p. 89, para. 129).

285. In relation to the present delimitation with Norway, it is

noteworthy that the 1982 Judgment, for purposes of clarifying the
practical methods of delimitation, totally disregards the island of
Jerba, almost twice the size of Jan Mayen and with a considerable
permanent population, and that the Kerkennah Islands, populated
as well, are given only "half-effect".

286. In the case concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime

Boundaryinthe Gulfof Maine Area. 1984, the Chamber constituted
by the International Court ofJustice was requested to determine the
course of a single boundary for the continental shelf areas and the
fisheries zones of Canada and the United States in the Gulf of
Maine. Asfar as the actual drawing ofthe line of delimitation is con-
cerned the Chamber pointed out:

"...the potential disadvantages inherent in any method which
takes tiny islands, uninhabited rocks or low-tide elevations,
sometimes lying at a considerabledistance from terra firma, as
basepoint for the drawing of a line intended to effect an equal
division of a given area. If any of these geographical features
possess somedegree of importance,there is nothing to prevent
their subsequently being assigned whatever limited corrective

effect may equitably be ascribed to them, but that is an al-
together different operation from making a series of such
minor features the very basis for the determination ofthe divi-
ding line, or from transforming them into a succession of base-
points for the geometrical construction of the entire line. It is
very doubtful whether a line so constmcted could, in many
concrete situations, constitute a line genuinely giving effect to
the criterion of equal division of the area in question, espe- cially when it is not only a terrestrial area beneath the sea
which has to be divided but also a maritime expanse in the
proper sense of the term, since in the latter case the result may
be even more debatable." (I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 329, para.
201).

Consequently, when drawing the line of delimitation, the Cham-
ber had to decide to what exlent the Canadian Seal Island and cer-
tain islets in its vicinity should influence the calculation:

"..The Chamber considers that Seal Island (together with its
smaller neighbour, Mud Island), by reason both of its dimen-
sion and, more particularly, of its geographical position, can-

not be disregarded for the present purpose. According to the
information available to the Chamber it is some two-and-
a-half miles long, rises to a height of some 50 feet above sea
level,and is inhabited al1year round. It is still more pertinent
to observe that as a result of its situation off Cape Sable,only
some nine miles inside the closing line of the Gulf, the island
occupies a commanding position in the entryto the Gulf.The
Chamber howeverconsiders that itwould be excessiveto treat
the coastline of Nova Scotia as transferred south-west-wards
by the whole of the distance between Seal Island and that
Coast,and thereforethinks itappropriate to givethe island half
effect,...(I.C.J. Reports 1984, pp. 336-337,para. 222).

However,the Chamber observed in this connection:

"...Since it is only a question of adjusting the proportion by
reference to which the corrected median line is to be located,
the result ofthe effectto be givento the islandisa smalltrans-
verse displacement of that line, not an angular displacement;

and its practical impact therefore is limited." (I.C.J. Reports
1984, p. 337,para. 222).

Even though, as the Chamber observed, the practical impact of
giving Seal Island only half-effect islimited,the factremains that an
island which is inhabited al1 year round and which occupies a
strategic position was given only half-effect.

287. In the Libya/Malta case, 1985, the issue was the delimi-
tation ofthe continental shelf areas between amainland, on the one
hand, and an island State, on the other. That particular aspect was
commented on by the Court in the followingway:

"In the view of the Court, it is not a question of an "island State" having some sort of special status in relation to con-
tinental shelfrights; indeed Malta insists that it does not claim
such status. It issimplythat Malta being independent,the rela-
tionship of itscoasts with the coastsof its neighbours is differ-
ent fromwhat itwould be ifitwerea part ofthe territory ofone
of them. In other words, it might well he that the sea boun-
daries in this region would be different if the islands of Malta
did not constitute an independent State, but formed a pari of
the territory ofone ofthesurrounding countries.Thisaspect of
the matter is related not solely to the circumstances of Malta
beinga group ofislands, andan independent State, but also to
the position of the islands in the wider geographical context,
parficularly their position in a semi-enclosed sea." (I.C.J.Re-
ports 1985.p. 42, para. 53).

The Court commented in the following way on the importance for
the delimitation of the geneml geography of the region:

"..the Maltese islands appear as a minor featureof the north-
em seaboard of the region in question, located substantially to
the south of the general direction of that seaboard, and them-
selves comprising a very limited coastal segment. From the
viewpoint of the general geography of the region, this south-
ward location ofthe coasts of the Maltese islands constitutesa
geographical feature which should be taken into account as a
pertinent circumstance; its influence on the delimitation line
must be weighed in order to arrive at an equitable result."
(I.C.J.Reports 1985,p. 50,para. 69).

The Court'sJudgment in the case accorded limited effectto Malta
in spite of the fact that Malta is an island State with a considerable
population and economic life(I.C.J. Reports 1985.pp. 56 -57,para.

79).

288. International judicial practice in the aforementioned
cases is based on the same considerations as those which in Den-
mark's view should form the basis of determining the maritime de-
limitation in the waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen. They
support Denmark's view that, in deciding where the boundary line
in relation to an extensive mainland should be drawn in order to
achieve an equitable solution, only limited or no effect could be
given to a small, uninhabited island. 289. In State practice there is evidence of a trend similar to
that seen in international judicial practice:

(1) The example closest tothe present dispute is provided by the
single line of maritime delimitation drawn between Iceland
and Jan Mayen where the distance between the respective
baselines isalso lessthan 400nautical miles. Theboundary line
respects Iceland's 200-mile economic zone covering both the
fishery zone and the continental shelf area. Jan Mayen has not
been allowed to reduce Iceland's 200-milezone. The most rele-

vant factor inthis respect -besides the actual establishment of
a single line of delimitation using the distance criterion of 200
miles - is Nonvay's recognition of Iceland's 200-mileeconomic
zone. The Agreement dated 28 May 1980(Annex 16) does not
in its operative provisions indicate that the two Parties have
come to an agreement about fixing the delimitation line at a
distance of 200nautical miles from Iceland's Coast.The opera-
tive part of the Agreement deals with practical questions con-
ceming the cooperation between the two Parties in fishing mat-
ters (Article 1),including the establishment of a joint fishery
commission (Article 2); it also establishes a conciliation com-
mission of three persons with the task of recommending a line
of delimitation with regard to the continental shelf area be-
tween Iceland andJan Mayen (Article 9). It is only in the pre-
amble tothe Agreement that reference is made to the 200-mile
distance criterion. Not, however, as something which the two
Parties haveagreed upon, but as a unilateral Nonvegian recog-
nition of Iceland's right to an economic zone of 200 nautical

miles (preambular paragraph 5),taking account of develop-
ments at the UNCLOS III (preambular paragraph 8) and re-
cognizing at the same time Iceland's strong economic depend-
ence on fisheries and the relevance ofdrawing a line of delimi-
tation with regard to both fisheries andto the continental shelf
area (preambular paragraphs 4 and 6). In its "Report and Re-
commendations to the Government of Iceland and Norway of
the Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf Area
between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Washington D.C. 1981"(In-
ternationalLegal Materials,Volume XX, No. 4, July 1981),the
Conciliation Commission recommended that the delimitation
line for the continental shelf should coincide with the 200-mile
economic zone proclaimed by Iceland. The recommendation
was accepted by the two Governments cf. paragraph 78 and
Annex 28. In other words, the Agreement is based on the premise that
Iceland has the right to a 200-mile economic zone in accord-
ance with contemporaryinternational law, and thatthe area of
Jan Mayen's entitlement may not encroach into this zone. This
is exactly the same solution which Denmark considers to be
reasonable and just for the delimitation of the area between
Greenland andJan Mayen. The logical conclusion from a com-
parison with this precedent, which can hardly be more rele-
vant, is that Greenland is also entitled to a full 200-milefishery
zone and continental shelfarea.
At this point it isofparticular interest to note that during the
debate inthe Nonvegian Parliament on 6June 1980concerning
parliamentary approval of the Agreement of 28 May 1980with
Iceland, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee inter
aliastated:

"From a Nonvegian point of view it is not difficult to see
that Nonvay has made considerable concessions to Ice-
land ..Another Nonvegian concession is that we today
accept as an established fact that the Icelandic fishery
zone has full extent, also into the Jan Mayen area. This

means a corresponding reduction of the Nonvegian zone
..The main reason for the Committee's approval of the
Agreement is evident;no agreement would have resulted
in an overt conflict between Iceland and Nonvay. Nor-
waywould have had to unilaterally establish itsownzone
around Jan Mayen. Iceland would not have respected
that zone. Neither would any other country have re-
spected it..."(Srorringstidende1979/1980.page 3612).

It thus seems obvious that doubts existed also on the Nor-
wegian side about the legitimacy of establishing a fishery zone
around Jan Mayen giving full effectto that island in relation to
other States.

(2) By an Agreement of 18 April 1988between Sweden and the
USSR on the delimitation of the continental shelf and of the
Swedish fishing zone and the Soviet economic zone in the Bal-
tic Sea itwas decided to delimit the maritime areas between the
Swedish island of Gothland and the USSR by dividing a dis-
putedarea, situated between a median line and a boundary line
of 12 nautical miles off Gothland, in a manner by which
Sweden was accorded about 75 percent. and the USSR about
25percent. of the area. Bythis delimitation theisland of Goth-
land was thus given a reduced effect in relation to the USSR,
despite the fact that Gothland is an island of considerable size, witha high population density, and (unlike Jan Mayen) is situ-
ated closer to the mainland of Swedenthan to that ofthe USSR
(Annex 29).

(3) In a Treaty of 14 September 1988between Denmark and the
German Democratic Republic on delimitation of the continen-
tal shelf and the fishing zones in theBaltic Sea the boundary
line fixed between the Danish island of Bornholm, on the one
hand, and theGerman Democratic Republic onthe other, devi-
ates from the median line in favourof the German Democratic
Republic and at the cost of Bornholm, notwithstanding that
Bornholm is an island of a fairly considerable size and with a
relatively high population density(Annex 30).

(4) By an Agreement of 10 Febmary 1989 between Poland and
Sweden on delimitation ofthe continental shelf and the fishery
zones between Poland and Sweden it was decided to delimit
the maritime areas between Poland and Sweden by dividing a
disputed area, situated between a median line and a boundary
line of 12nautical miles off Gothland, in a manner by which
Swedenwas accorded about 75 percent. and Poland about 25
per cent. of the area. Also by this delimitation the island of
Gothland wasthus given reduced weight in relation to Poland,
regardless ofthe factthat Gothland isan island of considerable
size and with a high population density and much closer to
Sweden than to Poland (Annex 31).

(5) State practice also provides examples of islands having been
accorded full effect in connection with delimitation in relation
to amainland.
Such a case is the Agreement of 15June 1979between Den-
mark and Norway concerning the delimitation ofthe continen-
tal shelfin the area between the Faroe Islands and Norway and

concerning the boundary between the fishery zone near the
Faroe Islands and the Norwegian economic zone. By that
Agreement a median line was established, this being the natu-
ral and equitable solution in that specific case where the seg-
ment of the relevant coastal front of the Faroe Islands and the
segment of the relevant Norwegian coastal front are of roughly
the same length (Annex 32).

(6) Another case isthe Agreement of9 November 1984concerning
delimitation of the continental shelf and the fishing zonesbe-
tween Denmark and Sweden. By that Agreement the Parties reached accord on a delimitation by which al1the Danish is-
landsconcerned (Læso, Anholt, Hessel0, and Bornholm) were

given full effect.It should be added, however, that the three
first mentioned islands were not looked at in isolation but as
part ofa larger archipelagic formation. Recognizing that in the
absence of special circumstances offering grounds for any
other solution (the distances in the area are rather limited) the
Parties agreed that this approach to the matter of delimitation
represented the best means of attaining an equitable and just
solution(Annex 33)3.

(7) Asa particular casemention should be made of the Nonvegian
Bear Island, the southernmostisland in the Svalbard Archipe-
lago6).Bear Island issituated less than 400nautical miles north
ofthe Norwegian mainland.
On 3 June 1977Norway, by a Royal Decree, established a
200-mile fishery protection zone around Svalbard, including
Bear Island (Annex 35). However, it was decided in the Decree
thatthe protection zone should be limited, when necessary (i.e.,

south of Bear Island), by the 200-mile economic zone of the
Norwegian mainland. Thus, Bear Island was givenno effect in
the delimitation vis-à-visthe Norwegian mainland.

290. Denmark is of the opinion that although the examples
mentioned clearly demonstrate that each case concerning delimita-
tion of maritime areas between an island and a mainland has itsown
special circumstances of relevance for achieving an equitable solu-

tion, State practice does not support the Norwegian claim that, ac-
cording to international law,Jan Mayen is entitled to a median line
vis-&visGreenland.

291. In both international judicial practice and State practice
recognition ofthe diversity offactual situations has led to widelydif-
fering solutions. There are cases in which an island has been ac-

corded full effect in relation to an opposite-lying mainland; and
thereare cases in which an islandopposite to a mainland has hadto
renounce a greater or lesser part of the maritime zones to which it
would othenvisehave been entitled under the rules of international
law because a different result would have been inequitable. But

') ne rexrofrhe Declararionof30 January1932berweenDenmorkondSwedencon-
November1984.isorrachedasAnnex34. Fmm rherexiofrhor DeeloralionNwillbef9
seenrharrheislandof Yenwasdisregardedin connecrionwifhtheesrablishrfno
theboundarylininrheSound.
ConcerningrhespeciallegolrégimeprovidedfortheSvalbard(Spirzbergen)Archipe-
logoreferenceismaderothe TreaonSpitrbegenof9 February1920,cJ Leogueof
Narions.TrearySeries.VolumeII. No.41.there are no cases in which a small island, devoid of a permanent
population, has been regarded as entitled to a median linevis-à-visa
mainland territory as Greenland. On the contrary there are cases
where such islands have had no effect on the 200-mile zone of an
opposite-lying mainland, cf. Jan Mayen/lceland and Bear Island/
Norway.

292. Since the adoption of the 1958Convention on the Con-
tinental Shelf it has been acknowledged in judicial practice and
State practice that inter alithe size, barrenness and remoteness of
an island are relevant factors in a delimitation situation.Such fac-
tors were covered by the concept of "special circumstances" in that
Convention. In contemporary international law they are relevant
circumstances to be taken into account in order to achieve an equi-
table solution. Thus, the influence of such factors is nothing new,
and the result will often be identical nomatter whether reference is
made to oneor theother ofthe delimitation critena described above.
The only difference is that the principle of equity is conceived as
having been further strengthened.

293. In the light ofthe present and foregoing Sections thele
applicable to the delimitation between Greenland andJan Mayen is
the one which is appropnate to bnng about an equitable result. In
order to substantiate that nile the following Section will describe
those factors which theGovemment of Denmark believes must have
a particular bearing on the result.

Section3. The Relevant Factors inthe Present Case

294. As shown in Part 1 of this Memonal, a number of factors
of a geographical, demographic, economic, geological, political/
constitutional and cultural nature can be identified as characteristic
of Greenland and ofJan Mayen. In this Section those factors willbe
highlighted which, in the Danish view, seem to be of particular im-
portance for achieving an equitable solution with regard to the de-
limitation of the maritime areas in question.

295. Jan Mayen is situated in isolation from the rest of Nor-
way, cf. Map II. The distance between Jan Mayen and the Nor-wegian mainland is about 550 nautical miles, while the distance be-
tween Jan Mayen and Greenland is only about 250 nautical miles.
The distance between Jan Mayen and Norway is thus more than

twice the distance between Greenland and Jan Mayen. The geo-
graphical situation is to a large extent parallel to the situation de-
scribed in the Channel Islandscase,cf.paragraph 280.Jan Mayen is
situated "on the wrong side" of a median line between Greenland
and the Norwegian mainland and it is indeed geographically de-

tached from it. A diminution of Greenland's maritimezone because
of the presence of Jan Mayen seems difïicult to reconcile with the
reasoning referred to in that case.

296. The area of Jan Mayen is approximately 380 square ki-

lometres, while the area of Greenland is approximately 2,200,000
square kilometres. Of this area about 342,000square kilometres are
icefree coastland. Greenland is thus about 5,800 times larger than
Jan Mayen. The icefree area is about 900 times larger than Jan
Mayen and exceeds the total area of the Kingdom of Norway which

is approximately 325,000square kilometres (excludingSvalbard) by
about 17,000square kilometres.

297. The length of the western coastal front of Jan Mayen is

about 54kilometres. The length ofthe eastem relevant coastal front
of Greenland is about 532kilometres, Le.,a ratioof 9.8to I in favour
of Greenland, cf. paragraphs 30-35.

298. The total fishery zone ofJan Mayen, Le., around the
whole of the island, would be about 320,400square kilometres if it
were fixed in relation to Greenland according to the median line
principle. If a full zone of00 nautical miles were accorded Green-
land, Jan Mayen's total fishery zone would still be about 254,000
square kilometres. This is farmore than thecorresponding areas of a

number of European States with coastlines much longer than Jan
Mayen's7).

299. Thetotalfshery zoneofGreenlandis very roughly about

2,000,000 square kilometres. Accordingly the proportion of land

7 Forcompo"sonthefollowing exnmplesjromihe norrhernporrof Europecanbemen-
iioned:
Belgium: ZOO-milejishinzone 2.7ûûsquarekm
. . --. ..uhlir
Nerherlondr 2110-mtlejirhing:one 84.700squarekm
Swede-n 200-rntlefi~hingzone ISS.3ûûrquarekm

ïhejigures havebeenprovidedbytheOflcefor OceanAffairsondLnw ofrheSea
ofrhe UniredNarionsandareno1bosedoninformarion/rom rheSrareseoncerned.area to fishery zone is 2,000,000to 2,200,000,i.e.,just under 1square
kilometre zone per square kilometre land.

300. For Jan Mayen the ratio would be 320,400 to 380 if the
median line were applied in relation to Greenland, Le., about 843
square kilometres zone per square kilometre land. With full respect
of a 200-mile zone to Greenland the ratio for Jan Mayen will be
254,000to 380 Le.,about 668 square kilometres zone per square ki-
lometre land.

301. These figures show unequivocally that giving full effect
to Jan Mayen (Le., a median line delimitation) would entail an en-
tirely unreasonable and inequitable distortion of the division of the
maritime area between Greenland and Jan Mayen, purely as a mat-
ter of geography. In this context it should be borne in mind that the
ice conditions along the Coastof Greenland, cf. paragraphs 160and
184,to a considerabledegree limit the area to which there is free

cess. The disputed area represents the most important fishing
ground, within the relevant area, to which there is access during the
summertime (July - September).

B. THE POPULATIO AND SOCIO-ECONOM FCCTORS

302. Jan Mayen has no population in the proper sense of the
word. It does not have and cannot sustain an economic life of its
own. According to availableinformation about 25persons staytem-
porarily on Jan Mayen. This group of persons consists of meteoro-
logists, engineers and other technicians manning the island's me-
teorological station, the LORAN Cstation and the coastal radio sta-
tion, but there are no fishermen or other settled population. Jan
Mayen has no harbour. The Norwegian fishing in the area does not
serve to sustain economic life on Jan Mayen. Norwegian fishing
must therefore be regarded as irrelevant in so far as delimitation of

the maritime area between Jan Mayen and Greenland isconcerned.
Norwegian fishing vessels in the Jan Mayen area operate from the
remote Norwegian mainland. Large scale Norwegian fishing was
not commenced in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen until
1978.The Norwegian fishing cannot be regarded as traditional fish-
ingaccording to international law in the sense given to that concept,
e.g., in the Fisheries case. 1951,(ICJ Reports 1951.p. 116)between
Norway and the United Kingdom or in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
case. 1974.(ICJ Reports 1974.p. 3) between Iceland and the United
Kingdom. 303. The total population of Greenland is about 55,000.
About six per cent. of the people live in East Greenland. Inconnec-
tion with the consideration of the population factor reference is
made to paragraph 278 concerning the rôle of this and other socio-
economic factors in the case between the United Kingdom and
France, 1977.

304. As shown in paragraphs 173-189, fishing and fisheries-
related industries are the mainstay of Greenland's economy today.
Substantial investments are required to build up a modern fishing
fleet, fish-processing industries, plants etc. in Greenland. The ob-
vious prerequisite of such large-scale investments is permanent and

indisputable access to exploitable fish resources.Thus, the future of
theGreenland fishing industry willbe affected by the outcome ofthe
present delimitation.

305. It isgenerally recognized that heavy dependence on fish-
eries may be a relevant factor under international law as far as tem-
tories like Greenland are concerned. Attention isdrawn to the Reso-
lution which was adopted on 26 April 1958in connection with the
Convention of 29April1958 on Fishing and Conservation ofthe Liv-
ing Resources of the High Seas (Ofticial Records, Vol. II, Doc.
A/CONF. 13/38, p. 144).by 67 votes (including Norway) to none,
with 10abstentions. The Resolution was designed to safeguard the
interests of countries or temtories heavily dependent on fisheries in
waters bordering on their territorial seas. At the introduction of the
Resolution it was underlined that the first preambular paragraph
referred in particular to Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland,
cf. the afore-mentioned document, p. 45. The paragraph concemed

is worded as follows: "Having considered the situation of countries
or territories whose people are overwhelmingly dependent upon
coastal fisheries for their livelihood or economic development".
This understanding was also clearly expressed during the Second
Conference on the Law of the Sea at which the United Kingdom in
its intervention made the following observation on this point:

"The United Kingdom was not unsympathetic towards the
special situation of the few countries which were overwhelm-
ingly dependent upon fisheries for their livelihood. In 1958,
three countries had been generally recognized as being in that
category - Iceland, The Faroes, and Greenland." (OfticialRec-
ords, Doc. A/CONF. 19/8, p. 128).

306. In the Fisheries case. 1951, between Norway and the
United Kingdom concerning the drawing of straight baselines the
Court expressly referred to the fact that "...the inhabitants of the coastal zone derive their livelihood
essentially from fishing." (I.C.J. Reports 1951,p. 128).

The Court furthermore pointed out in the same case that

"...there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the scope
of which extends beyond purely geographical factors: that of
certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and
importance of which are clearly evidenced by long usage."
(I.C.J. Reports 1951,p. 133).

The distance criterion of 200 miles for the exclusive economic
zone is based on the same rationale asthe drawing of straight base-

lines, namely that of securing the vital economic needs of the popu-
lation of the coastal States.

307. The Court's decision in the FisheriesJurisdictioncase.
1974, between Iceland and the United Kingdom isalso of interest in
this connection, even though that case did not concern a delimita-
tion ofmaritimezones between the two States involved, but the law-
fulness of a unilateral extension by Iceland of its fisheries jurisdic-
tion to 50 miles. In its decision the Court stressed "the special de-
pendence of its [the Icelandic] people upon fisheries in the seas
around its[lceland's) coasts fortheir livelihood and economicdevel-
opment", as one of the factorsto be taken into account in the nego-
tiations that the Court decided should be held bythe Government of
lceland and the Government of the United Kingdom, pursuant to
their mutual obligation to seek an equitable solution of their dif-
ferences (I.C.J. Reports 1974.p. 34, para. 79(4)(a)).Thus, economic
dependence is regarded by the Court as relevant to achieving an
equitable solution.

308. Reference isfurthermore made to the Judgmentof30 No-

vember 1982 of the Court ofJustice of the EuropeanCornmuniries
(Case 287/81, European Court Reports 1982,pp. 4053 - 4087)con-
cerning the lawfulness of a management and conservation measure
adopted by Denmark on limitationofcatchesfor the fishingzone off
Greenland. In that case the Court of Justice of the EEC based its
decision interalia on the fact that "the measure was justified by ob-
jective considerations relating to the protection of the needs of the
coastal population concerned ...".

309. Denmark does not believe that, in arguing consider-
ations of this kind before the Court, itis pursuing an approach in-
consistent with the Court's ownjurisprudence. In the Libya/Malta
case, 1985,the Court stated: "...The Court does not however consider that a delimitation
should be influenced by the relative economic position of the

two States in question, in such a way that the area ofcontinen-
ta1 shelf regarded as appertaining to the less rich of the two
States would be somewhat increased in order to compensate
for its inferiority in economic resources. Such considerations
are totally unrelated to the underlying intention of the applic-
able rules of international law. It is clear that neither the niles
determining the validity of legal entitlement to the continental
shelf, nor those concerning delimitation between neighbour-

ing countries, leave room for any considerations of economic
development of the States in question. While the concept of
the exclusive economic zone has, from the outset, included
certain special provisions for the benefit of developing States,
those provisions have not related to the extent of such areas
nor to their delimitation between neighbouring States, but
merely to the exploitation of their resources. The natural re-
sources of the continental shelf under delimitation "so far as

known or readily ascertainable" might well constitute relevant
circumstances which it would be reasonable to take into ac-
count in a delimitation, as the Court stated in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases (I.C.J.Reports 1969, p. 54, para. 101
(D)(2)). Those resources are the essential objective envisaged
by States when they put forward claims to sea-bed areas con-

taining them. In the present case, however, the Court has not
been furnished by the Parties with any indications on this
point." (I.C.J.Reports 1985. p. 41, para. 50).

310. TheGovernment of Denmark understands this dictum by
the Court to indicate that it is not reasonable or equitable in mar-
itime delimitation casesto make a point of comparingthe GNP's of
the disputing Parties. A country which is poor today may be rich to-

morrow.

311. The dictum in theLibya/Malta case does not, however,
seem to apply to the present case, where a known resource, namely
the capelin resource, exists in the disputed area. With regard to that
kind of resource which with conservation can last indefinitely, and
which by definition is a relevant economic factor in the livelihood of
a given population, in particular one like Greenland's which is over-

whelmingly dependent on the fishing resources, the economic argu-
ment seems to be a valid one.

312. It also seems evident that in State practice dealing with
negotiated settlements of maritime boundaries covering both the
continental shelf and the fishing zone theeconomic aspects involved play a decisive rôle in the search for mutually acceptable solutions
based on equity.

313. Another factor related to that of the population aspect
deserves to be mentioned. As pointed out in Part 1,Chapter II, Sec-
tion Ion History, the people of Greenland feel closely attached to
their land and the surrounding sea which for approximately 4,500

years, and against heavy odds, have sustainedthe life of the people.
Even the ice-belt has been and is still used as a traditional hunting
area, treated as if it were the mainland itself. This feeling of attach-
ment is of course not particular to the population of Greenland. All
peoples of the world feel attached to the surroundings in which they
grew up. But this point has to be stressed within the context of the

present case. Like the opiniojurisin the establishment of customary
law, this factor - which may be named the cultural factor - repre-
sents asubjectiveelement of major influence in the following sense:
It would be difficult if not impossible for theGreenlanders to under-
stand why the sea area off the coast of East Greenland which lies
within the 200-mile boundary established by the international com-
munity as belonging to a coastal State should be curtailed in de-

ference to the interests of the people of a foreign, highly developed
industrial State living more than 1,500kilometres from their shores.
Their reaction would be the same as the reaction of the Icelandic
people, who could not accept any limitation in their 200-mile econ-
omic zone vis-à-vis Jan Mayen.

314. This factor is relevant as evidence of the attitude of the
Parties to the present delimitation case. In particular national legis-
lation and treaties with a third State provide such evidence -as do
also, of course,the eight years of negotiation preceeding Denmark's
Application to the Court.

315. As far as the national legislation of Denmark and Nor-
way is concerned it has already been mentioned in paragraph 223
that both the Danish Act of 17 December 1976 which formed the
basis of the Order of 14 May 1980on the extension of Greenland's
fishery zone north of 67"N from 12 to 200 nautical miles, and the
Norwegian Act of 17December 1976which formed the basis of the

Norwegian Royal Decree of 23 May 1980 establishing a 200-mile
fishery zone around Jan Mayen. were based on the assumption that
the rules contained at that time in the draft texts of the Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 1982,concerning an exclusive economic zone
did as early asthat date (1976)express the general practiceof States.It has also been mentioned in paragraph 233 that in the opinion of
Denmark, a Stateestablishing 200-milefisheryzones by reference to
this development in international law, has implicitly by its conduct
undertaken the obligation to respect, in its relationship with other
States, the provisions relating to delimitation of such zones.

316. Furthermore, reference is made to the Norwegian Royal
Decree of 3June 1977 dealing with Regulations on the Fishery Pro-
tection Zone around Svalbard (Annex 35).Bythat Decree, in delim-
iting Svalbard's 200-mile fishery protection zone around Beur Is-

land. which is the only part of Svalbard lying within 400 nautical
miles of the Norwegian mainland, the 200-mile economic zone off
the Norwegian mainland has been fully respected.

317. Regarding treaty practice reference has already been
made to the Agreements between Iceland and Norway of 28 May
1980concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions, and of 22
October 198 1concemingthe Continental Shelf in the Area between
Iceland andJan Mayen. These agreementsindicate a pattern of con-
duct by Norway which must be considered of relevance in the pres-
ent case.

318. In the case ofGreenland there exists no othersituation in
which a delimitation has been effected or will have to be effected in
the future between Greenland and an isolated island like Jan
Mayen. Consequently no pattern of conduct in this respect can be
pointed at as far asGreenland/Denmark is concerned.

319. In conclusion it would be natural to include among the
relevant factors in the present case the conduct of Norway, espe-
ciallytheunilateral Norwegian delimitation ofthe boundary around
Bear Island and Norway's bilateral agreements with lceland over
the same island which is the subject of the present dispute.

By a parity of reasoning Norway, having recognized that Jan
Mayen or, by analogy, Bear Island is not entitled to a maritimezone
such as to diminish the 200-milezone ofa populated, neighbouring
territory, cannot deny that same principle of law in its relations with
neighbouring Greenland.

320. It is now well established in international law that pro-
portionality plays an important role in the process of achieving an
equitable delimitation. This is demonstrated in particular by thejurisprudence which over the past 20 years has gradually developed
and identified the concept and the rôle of proportionality.

321. In the North Sea ContinentalSheljcases, 1969. this was
expressed in the following way by the Court, which also included
the element of proportionality among the factors to be taken into
account in the course of the negotiations of the Parties:

"A final factor to be taken account of is the element of a rea-
sonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation ef-
fected according to equitable principles ought to bring about
between the extent of the continental shelf apperîaining to the
Statesconcerned and the lengths of their respective coastlines,
- ..."(I.C.J. Reports 1969, p.52 para. 98).

This pronouncement signifies that, for the purpose of achieving
an equitable result, it is necessary to aim at a rough correspondence
between theratio of the lengths of the Parties' coasts and theratio of
the respective maritime areas attributed to each of them.

322. The Court, in 1969,described proportionality not as a
mere test but as a factor that had to be taken into account even be-
fore the selection of the appropriate delimitation method.

323. The Court of Arbitration in the case concerning the De-
limirationofthe ContinentalSheljbetween the UnitedKingdom and
France,1977, interpreted the Court's pronouncement in the North
Seo Continental Sheljcases narrowly when it assumed that it was
only "the particular geographical situation of three adjoining States,
situated on aconcave coast" which gaverelevance to the criterion of
proportionality, cf. paragraph 99ofthe Arbitral Award. For that rea-

son the Court of Arbitration described the rôle of the proportion-
ality factorinteralia in the following manner (para. 100):

"...The concept of "proportionality" merely expresses the
criterion or factor by which it may be determined whether such
a distortion results in an inequitable delimitation of the con-
tinental shelf as between the coastal States concerned. The fac-
tor of proportionality may appear in the form of the ratio be-

tween the areas of continental shelf to the lengths of the re-
spectivecoastlines, as in the NorthSea ContinentalSheljcases.
But it may also appear, and more usually does, as a factor for
determining the reasonable or unreasonable -the equitable or
inequitable - effects of particular geographical features or con-
figurations upon the course of an equidistance-line bound-
ary." 324. On the otherhand,the Court of Arbitration didcompare
the lengths of the mainland coasts ofthe Parties and found that they
were ofcomparable length. This wasthe explicit ground upon which
the Court based its adoption of a median line, asthe basic boundary
throughout the English Channel. It was only in the areas of the
Channel Islands and the South-Western Approaches that this basic
equality and symmetry were replaced by the exceptional configura-
tions of the Channel Islands and the Scilly Isles. To accommodate
these exceptional configurations the Court drew a 12-mileenclave
to the north of the Channel Islands and assigned only half-effect to
the Isles of Scilly(paragraphs 181, 195,199,202,234,244). Thus, the

proportionality factor in that case, unquestionably influenced the
decision, cf. inter alia paragraph 181 ("...and the general result is
that the coastlines of their mainlands face each other across the
Channel in a relation of approximate equality.") and paragraph 244
("Nevertheless, when account is taken of the fact that in other re-
spects the two States abut on the same continental shelf with coasts
not markedly different in extent and broadly similar in their relation
to that shelf,...").

325. The factor of proportionality was also taken into con-
sideration and elaborated upon in the three most recent delimitation
Judgments of the International Court of Justice.

326. In the Tunisia/Libya case. 1982,the International Court
of Justice carefully calculated and studied the ratios of lengths ofthe
relevant coasts of the two States concerned to the sea-bed areas ap-
pertaining to each State following the method indicated by the
Court. TheCourt expressly mentioned among the relevant circum-
stancesto be taken intoaccount in order to achieve an equitable de-

limitation:

"(5) the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality,
which a delimitation camed out in accordance with equitable
principles ought to bring about between the extent of the con-
tinental shelf areas appertaining to the coastal state and the
length ofthe relevant part of its Coast,measured in the general
direction ofthe coastlines, ..."(I.C.J.Reports 1982.p. 93, para.
133 B).

327. This decision shows that the Court considered propor-
tionality to be a general factor, applicable to different geographical
situations, and not confined to a certain coastal configuration. The
subsequent Judgments in the Gulfof Maine case, 1984,and Libya/
Malta case, 1985, applied proportionality to completely different
geographical situations. 328. In the case concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundaryinthe GulfofMaineArea, 1984, the difference between the
lengths of the coasts in question corresponded to a ratio of 1.32to 1
in favour ofthe United States, adifference which the Chamber ofthe
International Court ofJustice (I.C.J.Reports 1984, p. 322,para. 184)
described as "particularly notable" in comparison with several other

cases where the respective lengths of the coasts had been taken into
consideration. In paragraph 196the Chamber went on to state that
"a fair measure of weight should be given to a by no means neg-
ligible difference within the delimitation area between the lengths of
the respective coastlines of the countries concerned".

329. The specific function of the proportionality factor was

described in paragraph 218:

"..it is in the Chamber's view impossibleto disregard the cir-
cumstance, which is of undeniable importance in the present
case, thatthere is a difference in length between the respective
coastlines of the two neighbouring States which border on the
delimitation area. Not to recognize this fact would be a denial
of the obvious. The Chamber therefore reaffirms the necessity

of applying to the median line as initially drawn a correction
which, though limited, will pay due heed to the actual situ-
ation. In Section VI, paragraph 157,the Chamber has recog-
nized in principle the equitable character of the cricerion
whereby appropriate consequences may be deduced from any
inequalities in the lengths of the two States' respective coast-
lines abutting on the delimitation area. As the Chamber has
expressly emphasized, it in no way intends to make an autono-
mous criterion or method of delimitation out of the concept of
"proportionality", even if it be limited to the aspect of lengths
of coastline...."(I.C.J. Reports1984, p. 334, paragraph 218).

Because ofthe difference in coastal lengths the Chamber moved the
median line in the second sector closer to the Canadian coast,
thereby cmcially affecting the delimitation in the second and third
sector.

330. In the Libya/Malta case. 1985, the difference in length of
the respective coasts was approximately 8to I in favour of Libya, a
disparitycharacterized in theJoint Separate Opinion as "completely
"unusual" and unique in delimitation processes" and "surely a par-
ticularly relevant factor in this case." (I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 85,
para. 25). 331. A most important aspect ofthis case is that the Court re-
jected Malta's contention that the concept of proportionality could
not be applied to a delimitation between opposite coasts, one of
which wasa small island and theother an extensive mainland (I.C.J.
Reports 1985,p. 53, para. 74).

332. The Court acknowledged that "proportionality is cer-
tainly intimately related both to the governing principle of equity,
and tothe importance ofcoasts in thegeneration ofcontinental shelf
nghts" and that "accordingly, the place of proportionality in this

case calls for the most careful consideration" (I.C.J. Reports 1985.
p.43, para. 55).

333. The Court, however, stated that "to usethe ratio of coast-
al lengths as of itself determinative of the seaward reach and area of
continental shelf proper to each Party, isto gofarbeyond the use of
proportionality as a test of equity, and as a corrective of the unjusti-
fiable difference of treatment resulting from some method of draw-
ing the boundary line." (I.C.J. Reports 1985,pp. 45 - 46, para. 58).
But the Court, on theother hand, added that this did not "mean that
the "significant difference in lengths of the respective coastlines" is
not an element which may be taken intoaccountat a certain stage in
the delimitation process."

334. In the latterconnectionthe Court made a distinction be-
tween the two aspects of the application of the proportionality con-
cept:the relevance ofcoastal lengths as apertinent factor in thecon-
struction of thedelimitation line and the use of the ratio of coastal
lengths as a subsequent test ofthe equitableness of the delimitation.

TheCourtstated:

"...there remains, however, the very marked difference in the
lengths of the relevant coasts of the Parties ..The Court has
alreadyexaminedthe role of proportionality in a delimitation
process, and has also referred to the operation, employed in
the Tunisia/Libya case,of assessingthe ratios between lengths
ofcoasts and areas of continental shelf attributed on the basis
of those coasts. It has been emphasized that this latter oper-
ation isto be employed solelyas a verification ofthe equitable-
ness ofthe result amved at by other means. It is,however, one
thingto employ proportionality calculations to checka result;
it isanotherthing to take note, inthe course ofthe delimitation
process, of the existence of a very marked difference in coastal
lengths, and to attnbute the appropriate significance to that
coastal relationship, without seeking to define it in quantita-
tive terms which are only suited to the expost assessment of relationships of Coastto area. The two operations are neither
mutually exclusive, nor so closely identified with each other
that the one would necessarily render the other supereroga-
tory. Consideration of the comparability or othenvise of the
coastal lengths is a part of the process ofdetermining an equi-
table boundary on the basis ofan initial median line;the test of
a reasonable degree of proporcionality, on the other hand, is
one which can be applied to check the equitableness of any
line, whatever the method used to arrive at that line." (I.C.J.
Reports 1985,pp. 48 - 49, para. 66).

335. In the context of the present case before the Court, it
seemsparticularly important, incomparison withearlierJudgments,
to note some clanfying remarks in this and the following part of the

Judgment. First, it is made clear that the lengths of the respective
coasts, their "comparability or othenvise", as stated by the Court,
are taken into consideration in thedetermination of theappropriate
method to produce a delimitation line and not only during the sub-
sequent test of proportionality intended to verify the equity of the
delimitation. Second, the question of a marked difference between
the coastal lengths (ortheir comparability at all) is dealt with at the
firstof these two stages as one ofthe relevant circumstances, as is
confirmed by this statement of the Court in paragraph 67:

"...The question asto which coasts ofthe two Statesconcemed
should be taken into account is clearly one which has eventu-
ally to be answered with some degree of precision in the con-
text of the test of proportionality as a verification of the equity
of the result.uch a test would be meaningless in theabsence
of a precise definition of the "relevant coasts" andthe "rele-
vant area", ofthe kind which the Court carried out in the Tuni-
sia/Libya case. Where a marked dispanty requires to be taken
into account asa relevant circumstance, however,this rigorous
definition is not essential and indeed not appropriate. If the

disparity in question only emerges after scmpulous definition
and comparison of coasts, it is exhypothesiunlikely to be of
such extent as to carry weight as a relevant circumstance."
(I.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 49, para. 67).

336. Without going into the details of the proportionality test
undertaken bytheCourt inparagraphs 74and 75theGovemment of
Denmark wishes finally to recall section B of the Judgment (para-
graph 79) which enumerates the circumstances and factors to be
taken into account in achieving an equitable delimitation in the
case. Two ofthe three circumstances and factors involvethe lengths
of the coasts, namely "the disparity in the lengths of the relevantcoasts of the Parties and the distance between them" and "the need
toavoid inthe delimitation any excessivedisproportion between the
extent ofthecontinental shelf areas appertaining to thecoastalState
and the length of the relevant part of its coast, measured in the
general direction of the coastlines". Consequently, the delimitation
line was drawn by transposing a provisional median line consider-
ably northwards. The solution was not basically dissimilar to the
transposition of the median line in the GulfofMaine case, 1984.

337. In the Libya/Malta case. 1985,there was a circumstance
which prevented the Court from adopting a more complete applica-
tion of the proportionality factor, namely the proximity of Malta to
the Italiancoast. The Judgment wasbased onthe hypothesis that, if
Malta did not exist, the delimitation line between Sicily and Libya

would be a median line.TheCourt regarded this hypothetical line as
the extremelimit for a northward transposition of the boundary, in
order to recognize some effect to the existence of Malta.
Suchageographical situation does not existin the present case since
Norway is 550nautical miles away from Jan Mayen, so that, in the
present case, there is scope for a further application of the cnterion
of proportionality.

338. Thus jurispmdence has made it clear that the propor-
tionality in the lengths of coastsisa highly relevant factor in the de-
limitation process. First as a relevant circumstance or factor to be
taken into consideration together with other criteria in order to
adopta method appropriate for an equitable delimitation line. Sec-
ond, as a determining factor in the subsequent proportionality test
which is aimed at testing the equity of the delimitation line arrived
at. At the latter stage the difference of coastal lengths is usuallyx-
pressed as an arithmetical ratio whereas the former procedure is
based on a more general consideration of the comparability of the
toasts.

To-datethe factorofproportionality has mostly been ap-
339.
plied in cases concerning the delimitation of continental shelf areas.
This simply reflects the fact that these are the majority of the cases
that have been submitted for judicial decision. In the two cases,
however, which also involved delimitation of maritime zones other
than the continental shelfthe proportionality factor was, as a matter
of fact also taken into consideration: namely in the Gulfof Maine
case, 1984.which concerned a single boundary line dividing both
the continental shelf andfisherieszone, and inthe case between Gui-
nea and Guinea-Bissau, 1985, where the Arbitral Tribunal deter-
mined a single boundary line for the territonal waters, the exclusive
economic zones and the continental shelves. 340. According to the jurisprudence, the proportionality fac-
tor is a purely geographical concept based on the length ofthe rele-
vant coasts of the Parties. It is the coastal front which is the basis of
the legal entitlement to maritime areas and it is fromthat coastal
front that al1maritime zones of national jurisdiction extend into or
under the sea. Consequently, the equitable considerations which are
the basis of the proportionality factor are valid for ail maritime
zones.

341. Against this background the proportionality factor must
be regarded as equally relevant and valid in the present case as when
dealing solely with the continental shelf.
It is also contended that, where a single line of delimitation for the
whole maritime zone isbeingestablished, there may in certain cases

be good reasons for including other eleimentsin the proportionality
factorbesides the basic elements of coastallengths and of ratios be-
tween these lengths and the maritime areas attributed. The Govern-
ment of Denmark will return to this question after having applied
the basic elements to the present case.

342. The relevant area of delimitation between Greenland
and Jan Mayen is shown onMap II. The disparity between the two
relevant coastal lengths is obvious. There is a more marked dif-
ference between them than in any ofthe previous cases:Greenland's
coastal front, Le., the rectilinear connection between the baseline
control points G and H, has a length of approximately 532kilome-
tres whereas Jan Mayen's coastal front, Le., largely the facade to-
wards West,is about 54 kilometres long. Thus, the ratio of coastal
lengths is 9.8 to I in favour of Greenland.

343. Even without taking into account the other relevant cir-
cumstances a disparity of this nature should lead to a delimitation
line which respects Greenland's right to a maritimezone of 200nau-
tical miles in accordance with contemporary international law. This

would attribute a maritime area ofapproximately 215,700square ki-
lometres to Greenland, leaving about 31,400 square kilometres to
Jan Mayen, or a ratio of 6.87to I in favour of Greenland. In viewof
the ratio of the coastal lengths, a distribution of the maritime areas
according to a ratio of 6.87to I clearly complies with thesubsequent
proportionality test from the point of view of protection of Nor-
wegian interests.

344. If, on the otherhand,the delimitation line were to follow
the median line claimed by Nonvay, Greenland's area share would
be approximately 149,300square kilometres andJan Mayen'sshare
about 97,800square kilometres, in other words a ratio ofonly 1.53toI in favour of Greenland. This result would seem to be clearly dis-
proportionate and therefore not in accordance with the factor of
proportionality, let alone the other relevant factors. It would disre-
gardthe difference in the lengthsof coasts as afactorto be taken into
account.

345. As indicated above, the disparity between the coastal
lengths appears to be so significant that these are hardly com-
parable. The extraordinary character of the delimitation situation
becomes even clearer if one goes on to compare also other factual
elements concerning Greenland and Jan Mayen.

346. Until now, jurispmdence has concentrated on coastal
lengths when dealing with the proportionality factor.

347. In the great majority of cases this is undoubtedly both
natural and fair. However, the Govemment of Denmark is of the
opinion that in extraordinary situations, with very marked differen-
cesbetween the territorial units in many other respects, the principle
ofequitywould seem to demand that other differences also be taken
into consideration.

348. It may be a matter for discussion whether the compari-
son of additional elements should be considered part of the applica-
tion of the proportionality factor. In cases like the present there are
good reasons for this to be done, but on the other hand Denmark
attaches minor importance to this predominantly theoretical ques-

tion as long asother significant featuresbesides the differentcoastal
lengths are actually given due consideration and weight.

349. These features have already been mentioned and are
consequently only briefly repeated below with a view to evaluating
them as an aspect of proportionality.

350. The territoryof Greenland is approximately 2,200,000
square kilometres, while the area ofJan Mayen is380square kilome-
tres, Le.,a ratio of about 5,800to 1.If only the ice-free area of Green-
land is counted the ratio is about 900 to 1.

351. Greenlandhas approximately 55,000 inhabitants, six per
cent. of them living on the east Coast.Greenland has been inhabited
for several thousand years. Jan Mayen has no settled population at
al1and has never had any. 352. Greenland has an economicIifeofitsownwhich ismainly
dependent on fisheries. No economic activities take place on or
from Jan Mayen.

353. In accordance withits Home Rulestatus withinthe Dan-
ish RealmGreenland has a Governmentand Administration, which
iscompetent in most intemal matters.Jan Mayen has no political or
social life.

354. Even respecting in fullGreenland's 200-milezone, the
extent of the total maritime zone around Jan Mayen willbe excep-
tional, taking intoaccount Jan Mayen's size,characterand location
and the maritime areas lyingto the east ofthe island and comparing
it with the maritime zones of many other States as well as with the
relative sizeof Greenland's maritimezones.

355. In the view of the Government of Denmark a compre-
hensive consideration of the proportionality factor would not be
complete without the inclusion of the above-mentioned additional
elements. Together with the difference in coastal lengthsthese ele-
ments serve to emphasize the fundamentally different character of
Greenland and Jan Mayen and the reason why the proportionality
factor speaks clearly in favour of attnbuting a 200-mile maritime
zone to Greenland.

356. Finally, a delimitation as claimed by Denmark is, ac-
cording to the subsequentor second-phase use of the test of propor-
tionality, entirely equitable and far from havingany disproportion-
ate effect in relation to Jan Mayen. On the contrary, as indicated
above, Jan Mayen's claim to the whole maritime area under con-
sideration would still seem excessivelylarge. CHAPTER II

THE TYPE AND METHOD OF DELIMITATION
APPROPRIATE IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONCRETE CIR-
CUMSTANCES

Section 1.The Reasons for the Request for a Single Line of Maritime
Delimitation

357. The Government of Denmark has asked the Court to de-
cide where a single line af delimitation should be drawn between
Denmark's and Nonvay's fishing zones and continental shelf areas
in the waters between Greenland and Jan Mayen. This request is

hased on the premise that the delimitation question should be set-
tled in accordance with the concept ofan exclusive economic zone
which undoubtedly forms part of contemporary international law.

358. Thus, Denmark envisages a single lineof delimitation al-
though two different maritime zones are involved. The rules of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,and of customary interna-
tional law concerning the exclusive economic zone clearly points to-
wards such a solution when the distance between the relevant coasts

is less than 400 nautical miles. In those situations it would seem
highly questionable if the solution of delimitation questions should
involve the establishment of two separate and different boundaries,
one for the shelf and onefor the superjacent waters, in the same mar-
itime area. Such a solution would result in the creation of areas of
overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions, usually leading to both

practical and political problems between the countries involved. In
contrast, a single line is conducive to establishing finality and sta-
bility in the area.

359. The aim is thus to achieve a single line applicable to al1
aspects of resources and ofjurisdiction in the maritime zones under
consideration. In other words, a delimitation dividing the exclusive
rights to the whole of the natural resources of the zon-sliving and
non-living on the seabed, under its subsoil or in the superjacent wa-

ters.

360. The development in international judicialandSrareprac-
riceshows acleartendencytowards the establishment ofa single line
of delimitation between the maritime zones of States with opposite
or adjacent coasts. 361. In the Libya/Mal!a case, 1985. (which concerned only
the continental shelf areas of the Parties) the Court expressed itself
in the following way:

"...As the 1982Convention demonstrates, the two institutions
- continental shelf and exclusive economiczone - are linked
together in modern law. ..."(I.C.J. Reports 1985,p. 33, para.

33), and
"lt is in the Court's view incontestable that, apart from those
provisions, the institution of the exclusive economic zone,
with its mle on entitlement by reason of distance, is shown by
the practice of States to have become a part ofcustomary law;
...Although the institutions ofthecontinental shelf andthe ex-
clusive economic zone are different and distinct, the rights
which the exclusive economiczone entails over the sea-bed of
the zone are defined by reference to the régime laiddown for
the continental shelf. Although there can be a continental shelf
where there is no exclusive economic zone, there cannot be an
exclusive economic zone without a correspondingcontinental
shelf. It follows that, for juridical and practical reasons, the
distance criterion must now apply to the continental shelf as
well as to the exclusive economic zone; and this quite apart
from the provision as to distance in paragraph 1 of Article 76.
This is not to suggest that the idea of natural prolongation is
now superseded by that ofdistance. What it does mean is that
where the continental margin does not extend as far as 200
miles fromthe shore,natural prolongation, which in spite of its
physical origins has throughout its history become more and
more a complex and juridical concept, is in part defined by
distance from the shore, irrespective of the physical nature of
the intervening sea-bed and subsoil. The concepts of natural
prolongation and distance are therefore not opposed but com-

plementary; and both remain essential elements in the juridi-
cal concept ofthe continental shelf.Asthe Court has ohserved,
the legal basis of that which isto be delimited cannot be other
than pertinent to the delimitation (paragraph 27, supra), ..."
(I.C.J. Reports 1985.p. 33, para. 34).

362. Reference shouldalso be made to the GulfofMaine case,
1984. inwhich the Chamber pursuant tothe wish ofthe Parties to the
dispute established a single line of delimitation between the dis-
puted maritime areas. Rightly, the Chamber took note of "an in-
creasingly general demand for single delimitation, so as to avoid as

far as possible the disadvantages inherent in a plurality of separate
delimitations, ..."(I.C.J. Reports 1984,p. 327, para. 194). 363. A single line of delimitation was also, pursuant to the
Parties' request, established by the Court of Arbitration in the case
of delimitation between Guineaand Guinea-Bissau,1985.

364. The practice of States shows numerous examples of
agreements establishing a single line delimitation for the maritime
zones of the Contracting Parties. References made interalia to the

following agreements:

Maritime Boundary Agreement between Chile and Peru by
joint Declaration on the Maritime Zone, signed on 18August
1952(Annex 36).

Maritime Boundary Agreement between Peru and Ecuador by
joint Declaration on the Maritime Zone, signed on 18August
1952(Annex 37).

Maritime Boundary Agreement between Uruguay and Brazil,
signed on 21 July 1972(Annex 38).

Maritime Boundary Agreement between Argentins and Uru-
guay, signed on 19November 1973(Annex 39).

Maritime Boundary Agreement between Colombia and Ecua-

dor, signed on 23 August 1975(Annex 40).

Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United States of
America and Cuba, signed on 16December 1977(Annex 41).

Maritime Boundary Agreement between Venezuela and the
United States of America, signed on 24 March 1978(Annex
42).

Maritime Boundary Agreement between the United States of
America and Mexico (Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean),
signed on 4 May 1978(Annex 43).

Agreement between Denmark and Norway of 15 June 1979
concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the

Area between the Faroe Islands and Norway and concerning
the Boundary between the Fishery Zone near the Faroe Is-
lands and the Norwegian Economic Zone (Annex 32).

Agreement between France and Tonga of II January 1980
concerning the Delimitation ofthe Exclusive Economic Zones
(Annex 44).Agreement between France and Mauritius of 2 April 1980on

the Delimitation of the Economic Zones between Reunion Is-
land and Mauritius (Annex 45).

Agreement between the United States of America and the
Cook Islands of Il June 1980concerning the Delimitation of
the Exclusive Economic Zones (Annex 46).

Agreement between France and Venezuela of 17 July 1980
concerning the Delimitation of the Exclusive EconomicZones
(Annex 47).

Agreement between Burma and Thailand of 25 July 1980con-
cerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas and of the
Continental shelf. In the event that Thailand establishes itsex-
clusive economic zone the line established by the agreement

shall alsoconstitute theboundary between the exclusive econ-
omic zones of Thailand and Burma (Annex 48).

Treaty between New Zealand and the United States of
America of 2 December 1980on the Delimitation of the Exclu-

sive EconomicZones ofTokelau and the United States(Annex
49).

MaritimeBoundary Agreement between St.Lucia and France,
signed on 4 March 1981(Annex 50).

Agreements between lceland and Nonvay of 28 May 1980
concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions, and of
22 October 1981on the Continental Shelf in the Area between
Iceland and Jan Mayen (Annex 16and 28 respectively).

Agreement between Australia and France of 4 January 1982
concerning the Delimitation of the French Economic Zone
andthe Australian Fishing Zone and of the Continental Shelf
(Coral Sea and Indian Ocean) (Annex 51).

Agreement between France and Fiji of 19January 1983con-
cerning the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones
(Annex 52).

Agreement between Denmark and Sweden of 9 November
1984onthe Delimitation ofthe Continental Shelf and Fishing
Zones (Annex 33). Agreement between Burma and lndia of 23 December 1986on
the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Andaman
Sea,in theCocoChannel and in the Bayof Bengal (Annex 53).

Agreement on Maritime Delimitation between Dominica and
France of 7 September 1987(Annex 54).

Agreement between Sweden and the USSR of 18April1988 on
the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and of the Swedish

Fishing Zoneandthe Soviet EconomicZone in the Baltic Sea
(Annex 29).

Agreement between Australia and the Solomon Islands of 13
September 1988establishing certain Sea and Seabed Bound-
aries (Annex 55).

Treaty between Denmark and the German Democratic Re-
public of 14September 1988on Delimitation of the Continen-
tal Shelf and the Fishing Zones (Annex 30).

Agreement between Poland and Sweden of 10 February 1989
on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf and the Fishing
Zones (Annex 31).

Section2.TheMethod ofDelimitation Appropriate inthe Lightof the

Concrete Circumstances
365. The present case is unique injudicialpracticein the sense

that it concerns the delimitation of maritime zones between, on the
one hand, an extensive territory whose population is dependent for
its suwival on the natural resources of the surrounding sea and, on
the other, an island, small in the geographical context and without
any population ofits own,situated far from the mainland bywhich it
was annexed fairly recently. One looks in vain for similar cases in
the practice of international courts. However, in State practice
examples are to be found similar to the case before the Court.

366. The most clear-cut example of this is provided by the
Agreements between lceland and Norway concerning exploitation
of the economic resources in the sea area between Iceland and Jan
Mayen (Annex 16and 28)in which Agreements Norway recognized
that Jan Mayen could not be accorded a right to maritime zones at
the cost of Iceland's right to a full 200-milezone. This example from
State practice would seem to carry particular weight in the present
dispute in thesense that it becomes an essential element in establish-ing a reasonable basis for solving the remaining delimitation prob-
lem inthe North Atlantic area which iscaused bythe presence ofthe
uninhabited island of Jan Mayen. If the principle is reasonable for
Norway in the one case, it should be so also in the other.

367. The concept of equity contains, besides the elements of
proportionality, finality and stability also an element of predicta-
bility. Thislastelement is in particular something which an interna-
tional tribunal must be concerned with because it is interpreting and
developing the law in each particular decision. The International
Court of Justice has indeed expressed a view on this point in the

Libya/Malta casewhere it stated:

"Thus the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not ab-
stract justice but justice according to the mle of law; which is
to Saythat its applicationshould display consistency and a de-
gree of predictability; even though it looks with particularity
to the peculiar circumstances of an instant case, it also looks
beyond it to principles of more general application. This is
precisely why the courts have, from the beginning, elaborated
equitable principles as being, at the same time, means to an
equitable result in a particular case, yet also having a more
general validity and hence expressible in general terms; ..."
(I.C.J.Reports 1985,p. 39, para. 45).

368. This element of predictability assumes a particular im-
portance in a situation where the delimitation issue has been the
subject of an interstate settlement not only in the same region but
concerning the very same island which is also causing the present

dispute, cf. the dictum in the Tunisia/Libya case to the effect that
considering "the element of a reasonable degreeofproportionality"
accountshould also be taken "of any other continental shelf delimi-
tation between States in the same region" (I.C.J.Reports 1982, p. 93,
para. 133 B (5)).

369. Against this background the Government of Denmark
submits that the method of delimitation appropriate in the light of
the concrete circumstances will have to be something very different
from a median line even as a provisional step in the process ofdraw-
ing a single maritime line indicating the sea-area appertaining to
Greenland. Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental
Shelf indicates very clearly that in the absence ofagreement two ap-
proaches are at the disposal ofthe States concerned:the median line
or any other boundary line justified by special circumstances. The
relevant provisions of the 1982Convention, i.e. Articles 74 and 83,
do not indicate any particular method of delimitation be it a medianline, a distance criterion or any other method; the emphasis is on the

equitable solution to be achieved leaving it to the States themselves,
orindeedtothe Court, to endow this goal with specific content. The
Court has done exactly that in the Libya/Malta-case where in the
light of the concrete circumstances in that case an adjusted median
line was used as a method leading to an equitable solution. In so
doing the Court, however, stressed that

"...The fact that the Court has found that, in the circumstances
ofthe present case, thedrawing of a median line constitutes an
appropriate first step in the delimitation process, should not
be understood as implying that an equidistance line will be an
appropriate beginning in al1cases, or even in al1cases of de-
limitation between opposite States. ..."(I.C.J. Reports 1985. p.

56, para. 77).

This is in line with the reasoningofthe Court in the Tunisia/Libya
case where it was stressed that theequidistance method "...isnot, in
the view of the Court, either a mandatory legal principle, or a
method having some privileged status in relation to other methods."
(I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 79, para. 110).

370. The Government of Denmark further submits that in the
particular circumstances of the present case, where the character of
the opposite geographical entities in al1relevant aspects is indeed
extremely different, a delimitation method leading to an equitable
solution cannot even as a provisional step take as its starting point a
median line as claimed by Norway. Or, to use the line of reasoning

of the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-Frenchcase: the island of
Jan Mayen is prima facie creative of inequity. Another method of
delimitation must therefore be adopted.

371. Taking as a basis the principle of proportionality "it is
certainly essential to define in advance al1the areas to be delimited
and coastlines to be measured" (diss.op.Oda, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p.

133,para. 15).In this case the relevant area and relevant coasts are
clearly and easily defined. This geographical situation facilitates the
proportionality calculation between the relevant coasts andthe area
attributed to each Party. In these circumstances the equitable con-
siderations would seem to require that the line of delimitation
should allocate areas which correspond, within a reasonable degree,

to the ratio of the lengths of the coasts.

372. Thus, a natural starting point would be to look at thegeo-
graphicalcontext governing the relevant area, and treating the area
simply asthe area abutting on the relevant coasts, irrespective ofthedistances involved. Such a method using the ratio of the relevant
coastal length of Greenland and Jan Mayen respectively Le.,a ratio

of almost 10to 1in favour of Greenland would then result in a geo-
graphical proportionality line, AIB, beyond the 200-mile limit to-
wards Jan Mayen as shown on the figure below. 373. The other relevant factors such as population. constitu-
tionalstatus and economicstructure -al1these factors operating in
favour ofGreenland only -further justify the linAIB shownon the
figure.

374. The geographical proportionality line, though equitable
in its result as between Greenland andJan Mayen seen in isolation,
cannot, however, be upheld because it is incompatible with the
existing legal régimegoverning the right of States to claim certain
areas of the sea bordering their coasts.

375. Thus, any maritime zone off the east coast of Greenland
would in the concrete circumstances not be allowed to extend be-
yond 200nautical miles.

376. The delimitation issue in the present case does therefore
give rise to a particular dilemma. An equitable solution would indi-
catea lineevenbeyond the 200-milelimit.Theexistinglawofthe sea
régime, however, restrictsGreenland's claim to the 200-mile line
which thereby becomes both a minimumline and a maximumline.

377. In sum, the method which cornesclosest to securing an
equitablesolution giventheparticular factual and legal circumstan-
ces of the present case consistsof applying the distance critenon of
200nautical miles,soasto recognisethe entitlement ofGreenland to
a full 200-milezone.

378. On Map IV,annexed to this volume,the lineclaimed by
Denmark applying a distance criterion of 200 nautical miles
measured from the baseline along the relevant pan of the coast of
East Greenland is indicated (in red). For comparison the relevant
maritimezones in the North East Atlantic Regionare also indicated

(in black). PARTIII

SUBMISSIONS 379. In view of the facts and arguments presented in Parts 1
and IIof this Memorial,

May itplease the Court:

To adjudge and declare that Greenland is entitled to a full
200-mile fishery zone and continental shelf area vis-à-visthe island

ofJan Mayen; and consequently

Todraw a single line of delimitation of the fishing zone and
continental shelf area of Greenland in the waters between Green-
land and Jan Mayen at a distance of 200 nautical miles measured
from Greenland's baseline.

Copenhagen, 31July 1989.

(SignediTYGE LEHMANN

Agent of the Government
of the Kingdom of DenmarkMAPS MAP II

DISPUTEDAND RELEVANT
AREASINTHElR
GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

Mercator Projection

Scale 1:7000000

List of Coordinates:

A:74'2V5N 4'56'4W
6: 69036'0N 1~07'2 k

C: 69'49'0N 14°0W0 W
D: 690 51'0 N 15O07'3 W

E: 71'09'7N 7'57'5W
F: 7V4Y8N 9003'5W
G: 7V32'0N 21°29'4 W

1 H: 75'08'3N 17O13'4W

----
200-nautical mile line
offEart Greenland.
l
---- Median line betwsen
Greenland and Jan
Mayen. The limiting lins
BCDtoward~the south.

.......... .im t ng "compdlatio#i'
1ne$ AE.F6. DGan0Ah.
Coosla fronts Gan0 FE.

Strsight barelines of Eart
Greenland.

ZOO-nauticalmile lines
off Greenland, leeland
andJan Mayen
respectively.