Courinternationalede Justice
EnregistrauGreffele :
InternationalCourt of Justi3e0 .A =
FiledintheRegistryon : 7
6 Shvat 5764
29 January 2004
Sir,
In accordance with the Court'sOrder of 19 December 2003, and Article 66, paragraph 2,
of Statute of the Court, 1 have the honour to transmit to you the enclosed Written
Statement ofthe Government ofthe State of Israel.
The statement sets out detailed objections to the jurisdiction of the Court in thister
and the propriety of the Court responding to the request. As an element relevant to the
Court's discretionunder Article 65(1) of the Statute, the statement also details the on-
going terrorist threat faced by Israel from Palestinian terrorism directed at Israeli
civilians.
As final arrangements are being made to transmit this document to you - and as these
words are being written - news has just broken of yet another terrorist atrocity on a
public bus in Jerusalemonly a few kilometers fromthis office. In these first few minutes,
the news is that ten people have beenkilled and a further 45 injured. It seems likely that
the numbers of dead and injured will increase in the next hours as the news becomes
clearer. The television imagesof the scene are deeply distressing.
Israel has been the target ofhese kinds of murderous attacks from Palestinian elements,
unhindered by those exercising executive responsibility, for the past 40 months of
violence and beyond. Israeli civilians are literally being slaughteredon buses as they
go about their daily lives, in their homes, in restaurants andelsewher- by those who
operate from under the protective umbrella of "Palestine". Nothing is being done by
those in positions of responsibility in "Palestine" to bring these attacks to an end. On the
contrary, there is compelling evidence offficial Palestinian engagement with those who
perpetrate these attacks.
Mr. PhilippeCouvreur
Registrar
InternationalCourt of Justice
Peace Palace
The Hague, The NetherlandsIt is inconceivableto the Government of Israel that a court of law, seized of a request for
an opinion on Israel's actionsin constructingthe fence - a non-violent measure designed
to prevent preciselythe kind of attack that we are atthis very moment witnessing - could
think it proper to enter into the question in isolation from consideration of the carnage
that is being visited on Israeli civilians by its principal interlocutor before the Court in
these proceedings. Yet the resolution of the loth Emergency Special Session of the
General Assembly requestingthe advisory opinion is absolutely silent on the matter. It is
a travesty, and reflects the gravest prejudice and imbalance within the requesting organ.
Israel trusts and expects that the Court will look beyond the request to the wider issues
relevant to this matter. There are compelling reasons why the Court should refuse to
become engaged in this matter.
1 would be grateful if you would bring this letter expressly to the attention of the
Members of the Court and treat it as an integral part of Israel's statement for purposes of
transmission to other interestedparties.
Please be assured, Sir, of my highest considerations.
Alan Baker
Ambassador
Deputy DirectorGeneral and LegalAdviser International Court of Justice
Request for an Advisory Opinion frornthe lothEmergency Special Session
of the United Nations General Assembly on "the legal consequences arising
from the construction of the wall being built by Israel"
WrittenStatement of the Governmentof Israel
onJurisdiction and Propriety
30 January 2004 Israel's right todefend its citizens from attack. Yet it is the PLO, through Fatah, the Al-Aqsa
Martyrs' Brigadesand its wider authorityin the West Bank andGaza, that is behind manyof the
most murderous attacks directedat Israeli civilians. In the most recent of these, on 14 January
2004, a young woman fromGaza, pleading illnessand a prosthetic limb,managed to evade Israeli
security to detonate her bomb to cause maximum casualties. Four lsraelis were killed in that
blast. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, closely associated with Yasser Arafat'sFatah party, was
involved in the attack.
0.4 These acts of terrorism violate al1 established rules of customary and conventional
international law. Yet responsibility for and the legal consequences of these attacks are not part
of the request for an opinion from the Court. Those most responsible for the attacks are
effectively given freerein in the proceedings. Thereis a travesty of imbalance in the exercise in
which the Court is now engaged.
0.5 Israel's written statement addresses the jurisdiction of the Court and the propriety of
any response by it on the substance of the request. It does not address the legality ofthe fence,
legal consequences that flow from it or other matters pertaining to the question of substance
presented to the Court. Israel considersthat the Court does not havejurisdiction to entertainthe
request and that, evenwere itto havejurisdiction, it should not respond tothe requested opinion.
0.6 The request for an opinion is ultra virehe competence of the 1ot hmergency Special
Session of the General Assembly by reference to the very rules by which the session was
convened. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Emergency Special Session is only
competent to act in circumstancesin which the SecurityCouncil has failed to do so on the matter
in question. Yet the Security Council did act, adopting, by unanimous vote, resolution 1515
(2003) endorsing the Quartet CO-sponsoredRoadmap just 19 days before the request for an
advisory opinion was made. Moreover,any opinion from the Court on the substance of the
request will without doubt upset the balance of the Roadmap and make any meaningful
resumption of negotiationsmore difficultto achieve.
0.7 The Court has a discretion whether to give the requested opinion. In the past, it has
emphasised that it would refrain from giving an opinion when to do so would be incompatible
with itsjudicial functions. This isjust such a case. "Palestine" does not come to the Court with
clean hands. The process is tainted. It is an abuse of the advisory opinion procedure. Thequestion is unbalanced. The Security Council has acted to different effect. And any responseon
the substance of the request would undoubtedly cut across the Roadmap initiative. In Israel's
submission, the Court should decline to give a response onthe requested opinion. TABLE OFCONTENTS
Page
PART ONE: PRELIMINARYMATTERS .............................................
CHAPTER1 :INTRODUCTION ............................................................
...........
CHAPTER2: ISSUES OF FAIRNESSANDNATURAL JUSTICE ..................
A. The Title Given to the Case ..........................................................
B . The FixingofTime-Limits ...........................................................
C . The Participation of"Palestine"inthe Proceedings ..............................
D . The Application of Article17(2)of the Statute ....................................
E . The Secretary-General's Report and the Secretariat's Dossier ..................
CHAPTER3: ESSENTIAL CONTEXTUALMATERIAL ..............................
A . The Relevanceof Context ............................................................
B . The Israeli-PalestinianConflict and Attemptsto Finda Settlement ............
(i) InitiativesWithinthe United Nations ......................................
(ii) The Madrid Process ..........................................................
(iii) Exchangeof Letters Between the Prime Ministerof Israel and the
Chairmanofthe PLO.9 - 10September 1993 ...........................
(iv) Declarationof Principleson Interim Self-Government Arrangements.
13September 1993 ...........................................................
(v) Israel- PL0 Agreementsand Undertakings. 1994 - 1999 .............
The Mitchell CommitteeReport ............................................
(vi)
(vii) The RoadmapandRelated Developments .................................
(a) Background Issuesandthe Involvementof the United
Nations SecurityCouncil ..........................................
(b) The Roadmap and SecurityCouncil Resolution1515(2003) ..
(c) SubsequentDevelopmentsin the 10"Emergency Special
Session ................................................................
C . Borders.Jerusalemand SettlementsUnderthe Israeli-PL0 Agreements
and theRoadmap ........................................................................ D . The PalestinianTerrorist ThreattoIsrael .........................................
(i) The Perpetratorsof Terror ................................................
The Methodsand Meansof Terror and its Victims ...................
(ii)
(iii) The Threat of"Mega-Terror" Attacks ..................................
(iv) The Responsibilityof "Palestine" for Palestinian Terrorism .........
PARTTWO: OBJECTIONSTOJURISDICTION ....................................
CHAPTER 4: THE REQUEST IS ULTRA VIRES THE COMPETENCEOF THE 1 oTH
EMERGENCY SPECIALSESSIONANDIORTHE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ........
A . Introduction .....................................................
..................
B. Background .......................................................
................
(i) The Convening of the 1O"Emergency Special Sessionof the
General Assembly .............................................................
(ii) The Uniting forPeaceResolution ...........................................
C. The Exerciseby the SecurityCouncil of its Primary Responsibilityin Respect
of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Subsequentto the Convening of the loth
Emergency Special Session ............................................................
D. The Advisory Opinion Request is Ultra Viresthe Competence of the 10"
Emergency SpecialSessionandlorthe General Assembly ........................
(i) The Advisory OpinionRequestis Ultra Viresthe Competence of the
Emergency Special SessionUnder the Uniting for PeaceResolution ...
(ii) The Advisory OpinionRequest WouldHave Been Ultra Viresthe
Competenceof the General Assembly Convenedin Regular Session ...
CHAPTER 5: THE REQUESTDOESNOT RAISEA LEGAL QUESTIONWITHIN
THE SCOPEOF ARTICLE 96(1)OFTHE CHARTERAND ARTICLE 65(1) OF
THE STATUTE ......................................................
.................
A . The Requirement that theRequest ShouldRaise a Legal Question ..............
B . The Question is Uncertain and Incapable of Response Within itsTerms .......
The Underlying Assumptionof Illegality ..................................
(i)
(ii) LegalConsequences for Whom? ............................................
C . Conclusions .......................................................
................ PART THREE: PROPRIETY AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION ........
CHAPTER 6: PRTNCIPLESRELEVANTTO THE QUESTIONOFPROPRIETY
AND THE EXERCISEBYTHE COURTOF ITS DISCRETIONUNDER
ARTICLE65(1) OFTHESTATUTE ....... ............. ...... ................... ... ........
A. The Court's Discretionto Declineto Answerthe Question ... ........... ........
(i) The Requirementthat the Court RemainFaithfulto its Judicial
Character ........... ............ .... ..... ............. .........,........ ........
(a) TheLimitationon Giving an AdvisoryOpinionWhereThere
is a LegalDispute .... ............. ......... .............. ...........
(b) The Limitationon Givingan AdvisoryOpinionWhereThere
is InsuGcient Evidence Before the Courtto Enableit to Make
Findingsof Fact ....... ............. ........... ............. ..........
(ii) Other "Circumstancesof the Case" that MayLeadthe Courtto
Decline toAnswer the Request ............. ............ ........... .........
Judicial Proprietyand the Circumstancesof this Case .... .. ...... ......
(iii)
CHAPTER 7: THE REQUESTCONCERNS A CONTENTIOUSMATTERIN
RESPECTOF WHICH ISRAELHAS NOT GIVEN CONSENTTO THE
JURISDICTIONOFTHE COURT .... .... .... .... ...... ........... ...... ................. ..
A. The ApplicableLegalPrinciples .... ......... ............. ........... .... ......... ...
B. The Pending Dispute .. ............... ...... ............. .............. .......... .......,
C. The Absenceof Consent ...... .......... .............. ................ ,.... .......... ...
D. Conclusions ........................................................................
.......
CHAPTER8: THE QUESTIONREQUIRESTHE COURTTO SPECULATE
ABOUT ESSENTIALFACTSAND MAKE ASSUMPTIONSABOUT
ARGUMENTSOF LAW .. ......... ........... ......... ............ ....,....... .... ... ..........
A. A Responseto the QuestionWould Require the Courtto SpeculateAbout
Essentialand HighlyComplex Facts Which AreNot Before lt ...... ......... .....
B. A Responseto the Question WouldRequire the Courtto Make Assumptions
AboutArguments of Law WhichAreNot BeforeIt .... ................ ....... ......
C. Conclusions ........................................................................
........CHAPTER 9:OTHER COMPELLING REASONSWHYTHE COURT.IN THE
EXERCISEOF ITS DISCRETION.SHOULDDECLTNETO ANSWERTHE
QUESTION ...................................................................113..
..............
A . Equity Requiresthat the Court Declineto Give an Opin....................113.
B . An Opinion WouldCut Across the Schemeofthe Roadmap ......................
CHAPTER 10: SUMMARYANDCONCLUSIONS ................................119....
LISTOF ANNEXES ...........................................................123..........
... PARTONE
PRELIMINARY MATTERS CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 On 8 December 2003, the loth Emergency Special Session of the United Nations
General Assernbly adopted resolutionA/RES/ES-10114by which it requested the International
Court ofJustice "to urgentlyrender an advisoryopinion". The questionreferred to the Court was
as follows:
"What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall
being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, includingin and around East Jerusalem,as described in the report of
the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international
law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions?"
1.2 This written statement of the Government of Israel("Israel") addresses only questions
of jurisdiction and propriety affecting the Court's treatmentof the advisory opinion request.
Israel does not deal, and does not intend to deal, with the substantive question put to the Court
which, in Israel's submission,the Courtdoes not havejurisdiction to examine. Moreover,and in
any event, the Court should exercise its undoubted discretion to declineto give an advisory
opinion on a matter thattakes it deeply into the politicalarena.
1.3 In the following Chapters, Israel develops a number of objections of law going to
jurisdiction and propriety. A more detailed schemeof this statement is given below. A number
of common threads run through these objections. First,the advisory opinion request is at odds
with the approach adopted by the United Nations Security Council for addressing the on-going
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The United Nations is a co-sponsor, as a memberof the Quartet with
the EuropeanUnion, the Russian Federation andthe United Statesof America, of the "Roadmap"
(the short title of the proposa1entitledA Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent TwoState
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conjlict). The Roadmap was expressly endorsed by the
Security Council in resolution 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003, less than three weeks before
the adoption by the 10' Emergency Special Session of the advisory opinion request. The
Roadmap has been accepted by both sides. It represents a concerted effort by the international
community, endorsed by the Security Council, to get back to meaningful negotiations. The
objective of the Roadmapis a two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first step
in that directio- by the express terms of the Roadmap - is an end to violence and terrorism. 1.4 It is difficult, indeed impossible,to seehow any response by the Court on the substance
of the request can fail to cut across the scheme of the Roadmap. Elements pertinent tothis
appreciation are addressed throughout this statement, most directly in Chapters 3, 4 and 9. The
Roadmap sets out anagreed sequence of conduct and negotiations. The acknowledgedfirst step
is that Palestinian terrorismand incitementagainstIsraelmust end. Israelaffirms its commitment
to the two-State visionof an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian State livingin peace and
security alongside Israel. It has been agreedthat negotiations on borders, Settlements,the status
of Jerusalem and other "permanent status" issues will follow in Phase III of the Roadmap once
the basic building blocks of peace are in place. The referenceby the Court to such matters - even
incidentally- would be problematicand unhelpfùl.
1.5 The Roadmap was the product of careful discussion between the CO-sponsorsand the
two sides. It represents the best efforts of the international community to restart a dialogue
between Israelis and Palestinians. An opinion of the Court on the substance of the question now
before it would exacerbate ratherthan ease relations betweenthetwo sides.
1.6 Second, Israel considers that, as a matter of law, the advisory opinion request is ultra
vires the competence of the 10" Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly. The
Emergency Special Session was convened in April 1997 on the basis of the Uniting for Peace
Resolution. Under this Resolution, the General Assemblyis competent to act where "the Security
Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". There is, however, no
failure bythe Security Councilto act. On the contrary. The Council has acted;just nineteendays
before the adoptionof the advisory opinion request. Theactions of the Security Councilmay not
sit comfortably with the objectives of the CO-sponsorsof the advisory opinion request. Butthe
Council has not failed to exercise its responsibility in this case. It is not for the Emergency
Special Sessionof the General Assemblyto set down a path which would without question cut
across the SecurityCouncil initiative.
1.7 Third,there is a wider factual contextof considerable importance which informsIsrael's
objections. The advisory opinion request ignores half of the reality of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. It is striking that, in the twenty preambular paragraphs of the resolution that precedethe
advisory opinion request, no reference is made to the on-going Palestinian terrorism that is directed against Israel and its citizens. These attacks, through suicide bombings and other
indiscriminate attacks againstIsraeli civilians,have left 916Israelisdead inthe past 40 monthsof
violence and manyothers injured andscarred. The PalestinianAuthorityand Palestine Liberation
Organisation ("PLO") have done nothing to assert control over the groups perpetrating these
attacks. Indeed, some ofthese groups act pursuantto the directionand control of the Palestinian
political establishment. These acts, by reference to established principles of attribution and
responsibility, engage the responsibilityof "Palestine", the principal motivator and CO-sponsoo rf
the request to the Court. By reason of this, the advisoryopinion request is a travesty, challenging
Israel's right to defend itselfagainst on-going attacksbut sayingnot a word about the perpetrators
of the terrorist violence.
1.8 Israel has said time and again that the fence is intended solely as a temporary, non-
violent, defensive measure to guard against suicideand other attacks against lsrael and Israelis.
The fence does not, and is not intended, to prejudice the outcome of political negotiationson
borders, Jerusalem, Settlements or any other issue. Israel expects, in due course, when the
terrorist threat has ceased, that the fence will be moved to reflect any agreement between thetwo
sides. Israel is fully committed to doing so. It has moved such fences before - on its borders
with Egypt, Jordanand Lebanon inthe context of peace agreementsor other arrangements.
1.9 These and other issues are developed in detail in this statement. To the extent that
issues of a factual nature are addressed, theyare directed solely at questions of jurisdiction and
propriety. This statementdoesnot address issuesof detail relevantto the fence - routing, military
necessity, fabric of life concerns and other elements. These are not matters which are properly
before the Court or on whichthe Court should give an opinion.
1.10 This statement proceedsas follows. Chapter 2 addresses issues of fairness and natural
justice in relation to the advisory opinion request and the Court'sOrder of 19 December 2003.
Chapter 3 then sets out some essential contextualmaterial relevant to the Court's consideration
of Israel's submissionsonjurisdiction and propriety. This includes in particularmaterial on the
search for peace inthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict, includingthe scheme of the Roadmap, and the
nature and extent of the terrorist threat against Israel and Israelis fiom Palestinian suicide bomb
and other attacks. Israel submits that the fact that these are attacks for which "Palestine" bears
responsibilityis a matter that the Court should take fully into accountin any exercise of discretion
bythe Courtin accordancewith Article 65(1) of the Statute. 1.11 Chapters 4 to 9 then developIsrael's objectionsonjurisdiction and the propriety of any
response on the substanceof therequest underthe followingheadings:
the request is ultra virethe competence of the 10" Emergency Special Sessionandlor
the General Assembly(Chapter4);
the request does not raise a legal question within the scope of Article 96(1) of the
Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute - it is uncertain and incapable of response
within its terms(Chapter 5);
the considerationsrelevantto the question of propriety and the exercise by the Court of
its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute exclude the examination of the request
(Chapter 6);
the request concerns a contentious matter in respect of which Israel has not given
consent to thejurisdiction ofthe Court (Chapter 7);
a response to the questionwould require the Courtto speculate about essential factsand
make assumptions about argumentsof law which it cannot properly make in the context
of advisory proceedings(Chapter 8); and
other compelling reasonswhy the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, should decline
to examine the question(Chapter 9).
1.12 These Chapters are followed by a short summary of argument and statement of
conclusions(Chapter IO),and a list of annexes.
1.13 Before turning to these issues, it is appropriate in an introductory statementof this kind
to sketch a broad picture for the attentionof the Court. Israel, more than any other country in the
world, faces today a distinct, declared and ongoing threat of terrorism aimed at al1levels of its
society. It is an existential threat by the declared intention of its authors. It goes to the heart of
Israeli society. Israelis live dailywith fabric of life constraints ranging from persona1searches in
public places to the daily expectation of the next suicide attack at the local community hall or 1.17 Fabric of life concems exercise Israel greatly. Questions of necessity and routing are
constantly addressed by Israel. The Israeli SupremeCourt, Sittingas the High Court of Justice
("High Court"),has been seised of a series of petitions concerning various aspects of the fence.
Israel, being a Societybased onthe rule of law, abidesscrupulouslyby the decisions ofits courts.
There is also a broader dimension tothe requestnow before the Court whichis germane
1.18
to questions of jurisdiction and propriety. Following the request,if the Court responds on the
merits, where does it stop? Armed with an advisory opinionon this request, will "Palestine" and
others proceed to reconvene the ongoing 10" Emergency Special Session for purposes of
requesting yet further opinions? 1sthe Middle East disputeto come for resolution piecemealto
the Court by way of expedited requests for advisory opinions at six monthly intervals? And what
about other conflicts - the security fence currently under construction by India along the Line of
Control in Kashmir, or Russia's involvementin Georgia or Chechnya,or China's in Tibet? There
are significantrisksdownthe path which the presentrequesturges uponthe Court. CHAPTER2
ISSUES OFFAIRNESSANDNATURALJUSTICE
2.1 The present Chapter sets out a number of aspects of the treatment that the Court has
already given the requestwhichraise serious questionsaboutthe faimess of the Court's approach
and its compliance with the requirements of natural justice. It also addresses questions
concerning the Secretary-General's Report attached to the requestand the Secretariat's Dossier
submittedto the Court in this case.
2.2 Resolution AIRESIES-10114was communicated to the President of the Court by the
Secretary-General by letter on the day of its adoption, ie, 8 December 2003. On 11 December
2003, Israel, through its Ambassadorin The Hague, wroteto the Registrar of the Court. A copy
of that letter is annexed to this statement.' The letter reserved Israel's position in respectof the
proceedings but raised a number of issues for early considerationby the Court. It noted Israel's
position that the Court should not entertain the advisory opinion request for reasons of
jurisdiction and admissibility. It also noted that sufficienttime would have to be allowed forthe
preparation and exchange of written statements, and comments thereon by others. Given the
senousness of the issues raised by the request, Israel observed that the written phase of the
proceedings couldnot be "adequately,or fairly, achieved in the space of weeks but would haveto
allow at leasta number of months".
2.3 In the circumstances, mindful of the potentially prejudicial effect of impending
proceedings on attempts to restart the process of political negotiation, Israel proposed that the
Court should bifurcatethe proceedingsto allow an early responseto the question of whether the
advisory opinion request shouldbe entertained by the Court. Israel also drew attention to Article
17(2)of the Statute and Article 34 of the Rules of Court which address circumstancesin which
Members of the Court who have had some connection with a matter under consideration should
recuse themselvesfromthe proceedings.
2.4 Israel's requestwas disregarded. On 19 December 2003, the Court issued an Order in
respect ofthese proceedings. Four aspectsof the Order may be noted. First, the Court named the
'Letter fiom H.E.Eitan Margalit, AmbassadorofIsrael, The Hague, to H.E. Philippe Couvreur, Registrar,
Internationalourtof Justice11December 2003. (Annex 1) caseLegal Consequences of the Constructionof a Wall in the OccupiedPalestinianTerritory. In
doing so, it adopted the language of the question, although with some variation. Second, the
Court fixed an exceptionally short time period of six weeks for the filing of written statements
and fixed 23 February 2004 as the date for the openingof the hearing. Third, the Court,"taking
into account the fact that the GeneralAssembly has granted Palestinea special statusof observer
and that the latter is CO-sponsorof the draft resolutionrequesting the advisoryopinion", permitted
"Palestine" to submit a written statement in the proceedings and to participate in the hearing.
Fourth, the decision of the Court was taken by the full Court after the deliberation ofal1of its
Members.
2.5 In response to the Court'sOrder, Israel sent a letter to the Registrar of the Court on 31
December 2003. A copy of the letter is annexedto this tat te men Itthat letter, and specifically
in the light of the Court's Order, Israel again reserved its position. The object of the letter was to
place on record Israel's disquiet with the four elements of the Order noted in the preceding
paragraph. These concerns are as follows.
A. The Title Givento the Case
2.6 The question asks the Court to address the legal consequences arising from the
construction of the "wall" by Israel. In his report prepared pursuant to General Assembly
resolution ES-10113to which the requesting resolution makes reference,the Secretary-General
refers to Israel's decision to "build a system of fences, walls, ditches and barriers in the West
Bank ('the Barrier')". A footnote to this sentence notesthat "Palestinians often cal1this system
the Separation Wall and Israelis use the term Security Fence. For the purposes of the present
report,the more generalterm 'theBarrier' is ~sed."~
2.7 The use of the term "wall" in the resolution requesting an opinion is neither
happenstance nor oversight. It reflects a calculated media campaign to raise pejorative
connotations in the mind of the Court of great concrete constructions of separation such as the
Berlin Wall, intendedto stop people escaping from tyranny. The reality, however, is different.
Alonga 180kilometre routeof the fence so far constructed, 8.8 kilometres, or lessthan 5 percent,
Letter fi-omH.E. Eitan Margalit, Ambassador of Israel, The Hague, to H.E. Philippe Couvreur, Registrar,
International Courtof Justice, 3cember 2003. (Annex 2)
Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10113, NES-
10/248,24 November 2003, at paragraph 2. (Dossier No.52) is made up of a concretebarrier,generallyin areas where Palestinian population centresabut ont0
1sraeL4This barrier, mostlycomprising a system of wirefences, with access and crossing points,
has as its intention achieving security for Israel while trying asbest as possible to facilitate
access. Neither objectiveis assured, as recent suicide attacks inIsraelhave sadly attested.
2.8 Given the intentionally pejorative useof the term "wall", andthe ready availability of
the neutral term "barrier" used in the Secretary-General's report, Israel in its letter of 31
December 2003 objected to the Court's adoption of the term"wall" inthe formulation of the
name of the case. In this statement, lsrael will use the term "fence" to describe the barrier in
general terms and theterms "fence" or "wall" as appropriateto the context to describe particular
elements ofthe banier.
2.9 An additional element of terminologyraises similar concerns. The question put to the
Court refers to the "Occupied Palestinian Territory". The underlying assumption appearsto be
that the so-called "Green Line" or Armistice Demarcation Line ("ADL") is the presumptive and
immutable border of a putative Palestinian State. This, however, is to prejudge the outcomeof a
settlement between the partiesin a manner that has never before been accepted - by the UN, by
the parties themselves, orby the sponsorsof the ~oadma~.~The sponsorsof the request seek the
imprimatur of the Court merelyby havingthe Court acceptthe validity of the question itself. It is
not the formula of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It is not the formula of the 1993
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed by Israel and the
PLO, which defers discussions on borders to the permanent status negotiations.6 Perhaps most
important of al1for present purposes, it is not the formula of the Roadmap, co-sponsoredby the
United ~ations,~and endorsedby the Security Council in resolution 15 15 (2003),*which likewise
envisages negotiationsonborders as part of Phase III of the plan. For the Court nowto adopt, by
design or default,languageof the kind used in the advisory request, is inconsistent with carefully
crafted formulations aimed at facilitating the search for peace over more than 3 % decades of
conflict. It would also be to elevate a highly contentious and politicised resolution of a General
Assembly Emergency Special Session over a UN co-sponsored, SecurityCouncil endorsed, plan
- --- - - -
See the Reportof the Secretary-General,at paragraph 11. (Dossier No.52)
This is addressedfurtherin Chapter 3 below.
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993,at Article V.3.
(Dossier No.65)
A Performance-Based Roadmapto a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,
S/2003/529,7 May 2003. (Dossier No.70)
SIRES11 515of 19November2003, at operative paragraph 1. (Dossier No.36) for the resolution of a dispute that continues toengagethe SecurityCouncil in the exercise of its
primary responsibilityunder Article24 of the Charter.
B. The Fixingof Time-Limits
2.10 The Court has fixedtime-limits that areso short as significantlyto affect the ability of
Israel to put its case. Time-limits of comparable brevityto those in this case are the exception
rather than the rule, even in priority advisory opinion requests. For example, in the advisory
proceedings in DzfferenceRelating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on HumanRights, the Court fixedan 8 %week period forthe filing of first round
written statement and a further 30 days after that for second round written comments on the
written statemenk9 ~he subsequent procedurewas reservedfor further decision, once theextent
of the written statements was known.
2.11 In other priority cases, such as the Namibia advisory proceedings, time-iimits were
significantly longer than those fixed in this case.'' Yet, if the Court proceeds with the present
case, it will be entering into matters that are considerably more complexthan most, if not all,
advisory proceedings to come before the Court. The underlying issues go to Israel's essential
security and defence interests. Moreover, in the letter sent to the Court before the Court's
procedural deliberations, Israel explicitly noted that, given the seriousness of the issues raised by
the question, sufficient time would have to be allowed for the preparation of initial written
statements.
2.12 The peremptory constraints of time under which the Court has required written
statementsto be prepared gives rise to very serious concerns aboutthe faimess of the procedures
in this matter. Even if Israel had considered it appropriate to address the issues of substance, the
procedure adoptedby the Court would not have allowed itproperly to do so. The same point may
also be madeas regards:
Difference Relating to Immunity From Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
HumanRights,Order of1OAugust 1998,I.C.J. Reports 1998, p.423.
'OLegal Consequencesfor States of the ContinuedPresence ofSouth Africa in Namibia (South WestAfrica)
NotwithstandingSecurity Council Resolution 276 (1970), Orders of 5 and 28 August 1970, I.C.J. Reports,
1970, pp.359and 362. (a) the exclusion of a written reply phase andthe fixing of a date for the opening of the
hearing without regard to the number or volumeof written statements to be submitted
by others;
(b) the facility left open to Member States, "Palestine" and international organisations to
present oral statements and comments at the hearing regardless of whether or not they
have submitted written statements. This procedure would leave Israel no or only
limited opportunity to addresssuch oral statements and comments with no prior notice
at all.
2.13 The Court in this case has been asked, at the insistence of many in the General
Assembly who would denyIsrael's very right to exist, for an opinionon Israeli policies that go
directly to Israe17smost fundamentalsecurity needs. For the Court to set a timetable forthe
proceedings to unfold with such expedition raises serious questions as to the fairness of the
process.
C. The Participationof "Palestine"in the Proceedings
2.14 The presence of "Palestine" before the Court signals clearly the contentious nature of
the proceedings. Israel is nevertheless constrained to observe that the Court's decision inviting
"Palestine" to participate has no basis in the Charter, the Statute or the Rules of Court. On the
contrary, Article 35(1) of the Statuteprovidesthat the Court shall be opento "states parties tothe
present Statute". The remainder of the Article addressesthe conditions under which the Court
shall be open to other States - conditions which do not operate in the present circumstances.
Article 66 of the Statute, addressing advisory proceedings directly, refersto "States entitled to
appear before the Court"and internationalorganisations.
2.15 Whatevermay be the statusof "Palestine", it is neither a State entitledto appear before
the Court, nor an international organisation. Furthermore, it is quite clear from the General
Assembly resolutions, which, in the language of the Court's Order, have "granted Palestine a
special status as observer", that they can in no way form the foundation for the direct
participation of"Palestine" in the proceedings. Quite to the contrary: By resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974,the GeneralAssembly invited "the
(a>
Palestine Liberation Organisation to participate in the sessionsand work of the General
Assembly in the capacity of observer"."
(b) Resolution 431160 A of 9 December 1988 addressed certain administrative details
regarding PL0 participation as observerinthe work ofthe General~ssembl~.'~
(c) By resolution 431177 of 15 December 1988, the General Assembly decided that "the
designation 'Palestine' shouldbe used in place of the designation 'Palestine Liberation
Organization'inthe UnitedNations system, withoutprejudiceto the observer status and
functions of the Palestine Liberation Organizationwithin the United Nations system, in
conformitywith relevant United Nations resolutionsand practice".'3
Finally, by resolution 521250of 7 July 1998,the General Assembly decided "to confer
(dl
upon Palestine, in its capacity as observer, and as contained inthe Annex to the present
resolution, additional rights and privileges".'4 An examination of the Annex to the
resolution, however, discloses no extension of rights and privileges to Palestine as
regards the International Court of Justice, which in any event would not be within the
competenceof the General Assemblyto confer.
2.16 Israel does not seek to deny to the Palestinian people a voice of their own. It is
concerned, however, that in a matter as delicate as the Israeli - Palestinian conflict,the Court, en
passant and without discussion in a procedural Order, considered it appropriate to take a decision
that accords"Palestine" a status that has been highly contentious amongstUN Members for many
years. The Court's Order on this aspect reinforces Israel's wider concerns aboutthe fairness of
the process in which the Court is engaged, and the Order itself is already being viewed as an
additionalsubstantivefactorin the political debate about Palestinian statehood.
" AIRES13237 (XXIX), 22 November 1974,at operative paragraph 1(emphasis added). (Annex 3)
l2A/RES/43/160A, 9 December 1988. (Annex 4)
14A/RES/43/177,15December 1988,at operative paragraph 3. (Annex 5)
A/RES/52/250,7 July 1998,at operative paragraph 1. (Annex 6) D. The Application of Article 17(2) of the Statute
2.17 In its letter of 11 December 2003, Israel drew attention to Article 17(2) of the Court's
Statute and Article 34 of the Rules of Court concerningthe participation in the decisionsof the
Court in this case by Members of the Court who have a prior involvement in the underlying
dispute. The Court'sOrder of 19 December 2003was nonetheless made by decision of the full
Court after deliberationofal1of itsMembers.
2.18 Israel, with reluctance, has felt obliged to pursue the matter further as regards the
participation in the proceedings of one Member of the Court whose previous involvement
manifestly raises questions of the application of Article 17(2) of the Statute. By its letter of 31
December 2003,Israel observed that it was inappropriate fora Memberof the Court to participate
in the decisions of the Court in this case in circumstances in which he had previously played a
leading role in the very Emergency Special Session from which the advisory opinion request has
emerged, and had also acted in an officia1 capacity as an advocate for a cause that was in
contention in the proceedings. Israel went on thereafter to write to the President of the Court
confidentiallyon this matter, pursuant to Article 34(2) of the Rules, challenging Judge Elaraby's
participation in the proceedings.
2.19 There is littlereasonedjurisprudence of the Court on the applicationof Article 17of the
Statute and Article 34 of the Rules. In the past, in cases like Namibia, the Court showed a
reluctance to acknowledge thatthe previous involvement of a Member of the Court in a political
role on the matterthat was subsequently referredto the Court was a reason requiring that Member
to step down. Morerecently, however,in a number of cases, Membersof the Court haveproprio
motu, pursuant to Article 24(1) of the Statute, chosen to step down where there has been some
previous involvement withthe matters in contention.
2.20 Absent authoritative guidance on this matter from the Court, Israel submits that the
appropriate test is to be found in the practice and jurisprudence of other courts and tribunals,
includingmunicipalcourts, faced with similar issues. A review of this practice andjurisprudence
shows a remarkableconsistencyof approach.
2.21 For example, afier examining both international and national decisions on the matter,
the general principles of law in this area were addressed by the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the case of Prosecutor v. Anto
Furundzija in the followingterms:
"189. ... the Appeals Chamber finds that there is a general rule that a Judge
should not only be subjectively free from bias, but also that there should be
nothing in the surrounding circumstanceswhich objectively gives rise to an
appearance of bias. On this basis, the Appeals Charnber considers that the
following principles should direct it in interpreting and applying the
impartiality requirement ofthe Statute:
A. A Judge is not impartialif it is shownthat actual bias exists.
B. There is an unacceptableappearance ofbias if
i) a Judge is a partyto the case, or has a financial or propnetary interest in the
outcome of a case, or if the Judge's decision will lead to the promotion of a
cause in which he or she is involved, together with one of the parties. Under
these circumstances, a Judge's disqualification from the caseis automatic; or
ii) the circumstanceswould lead a reasonable observer, properlyinfonned, to
a reasonably apprehended bias."15
2.22 This principle is echoed ina wide rangeof other municipaland internationalcases.16
2.23 Judge Elaraby, in both his previous professional capacity andin his private statements,
has been actively engaged in oppositionto Israel on matters which go directly to aspects of the
question now before the Court. Israel contends that Judge Elaraby's involvement in the case
raises an unacceptable appearance of bias and,with respect, that the Judge should therefore not
take part in any aspect of the present proceedings.
E. The Secretary-General's Report and the Secretariat's Dossier
2.24 Israel is also compelled to note its concerns with both the Secretary-General's Report
attached to the advisory opinion request transmitted tothe Court and the Secretariat's Dossier
prepared pursuant to Article 65(2) of the Statute. As regards the Secretary-General's Report,
l5 Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, IT-95-1711-T,Judgrnent of 21 July 2000, at paragraph 189. See also
paragraphs 164 - 215.
l6See, for example,In re Pinochet (House of Lords), Judgmentof 15 January 1999, [2000] 1AC 119;In re
Murchison et al. (US SC), 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Liteky v. United States (US SC), 510 U.S. 540 (1994);
Miglin v. Miglin (SC of Canada), 2003 SCC 24; Webb v. R (High Court of Australia), 122 A.L.R. 41
(1994). The growing body of international jurisprudence in this area is surveyed in Brown, C., "The
Evolution and Applicationof Rules Concerning Independenceof the 'International Judiciary"',in The Law
and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2 (2003) -396. Israel notes that Annex 1of this Report,described as "Summary legal position of the Government
of Israel", is both materially inaccurate and failed to take account of information expressly
provided to the Secretary-General'senvoy in the region. It does not reflect Israel's position.
Moreover, the language of the Annex, by comparison to Annex II representing the Palestinian
position, raises questionsof balance whichare prejudicial to Israel'sposition.
2.25 In the main body of the Report, Israel considers that the passing acknowledgement,
immediately qualified, of Israel'sright to protectits citizens,17fails to accord suficient weight to
the now accepted appreciationthat stands at the core of Security Council resolution 1373(2001)
and other related resolutions in the response against terrorism. That resolution reaffirmed that
terrorist attacks of the kind faced by Israel "constitute a threat to intemational peace and
security". It reafirmed "the inherent rightof individual and collective self-defence" in such
circumstances. It reaffirmed"the need to combat by al1means, in accordancewith the Charterof
the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts". The
Report is entirely one-sidedin itstreatmentof these issues.
2.26 The Report is also fundamentally misleading on the question of the Roadmap. It
condemns Israel's positionbut fails to reflect the Roadmap's principal requirement,that "the
Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence". These are its
opening words. The Report's "Observations" are simply not credible in the face of such glaring
omissions.
2.27 As to the Secretariat's Dossier,Israel addressed a letter to the Secretary-Generaldated
26 January 2004on the subject. It is set out here in full in its operative parts:
"Israel must register its dismay and concem at the dossier submitted by the
Secretariatto the International Court of Justice, in the request for an advisory
opinion on Israel's security fence. The dossier is rife with what we hope are
oversights, and cannot,in any way, besaid to present a balanced pictureof the
relevant United Nations documentssalient in this case.
The context in which the security fence was constructed - Israel's exercise of
its legitimate right of self-defence in accordance with principles of
international law and the UN Charter - has been entirely overlooked. Indeed,
those resolutions which speak not only of a right, but rather of an obligation,
" Secretary-General'sReport, at paragrap30. (Dossier No.52) to fight terrorism have not been includedin the dossier. Themost relevant of
these are undoubtedlySecurityCouncil Resolutions 1269and 1373.
At the same time, various documents have been included whoserelevance is
questionable, at the least. For example, the inclusion of General Assembly
Resolution 194, as well as the Rome Statue of the ICC, could only be
considered 'relevant' in the context of a broad political campaign against
Israel. At times, the lackof balance inthe dossierborderson the absurd. 1am
at a loss to understandthe justification for the inclusionof reports written by
the SpecialRapporteur ofthe CHR to the territories,while no mention is made
of detailed responses by Israel, themselves circulated as documentsof the
UnitedNations.
1must protestthese shortcomings in the strongest of terms. Boththe inclusion
of irrelevant materials, as well as the exclusion of salient documents, may
have effect upon the work of the Court. 1 would therefore ask that these
oversightsbe urgentlycorre~ted."'~
2.28 Israel does not consider that the involvementof the Secretariatin this matter to date has
been in the best traditions of fairness and impartiality. It adds to the concerns about due process
and naturaljustice in the conductof these proceedings.
''Letter dated 26January 2004 frorn Arnbassador Arye Mekel, Charge d'affaires a.i. of lsrael to the United
Nations inNew York, addressed to the Secretary-General. (Annex 7) CHAPTER 3
ESSENTIAL CONTEXTUALMATERIAL
A. The Relevanceof Context
A limited factual presentation is necessary to enable the Court to undertake a
3.1
meaningful assessment of Israel's objections to jurisdiction and the propriety or otherwise of a
response on the substance of the question. This concernsin particular the on-going attempts to
find a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including at thelevel of the United Nations,
and the realities of the Palestinian terrorist threat against Israel and Israelis. These issues go
directlyto such preliminaryquestionsas the vireosf the advisory opinion request,the contentious
nature of the matter brought before the Court by way of the request, the factual and legal issues
not beforethe Court but which would be essential to any proper assessmentof the substance of
the request,and the exercise by the Courtof its discretionunder Article65(1) of the Statute. Key
elementsofthis factualcontext are addressedin the following sections ofthis Chapter.
B. The Israeli-PalestinianConflictand Attempts to Finda Settlement
(9 Initiatives within the UnitedNations
3.2 The resolution requestingan advisory opinion locatesthe request squarelyin the context
of the wider Arab-Israeli / Israeli-Palestinian dispute. Reference is made, for example, to
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) which were respectively adopted
following the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars. These resolutions, which have formed the
cornerstoneof the search for peace in the Middle East subsequently,and have been accepted by
both sides,cal1for a negotiated settlementof the conflict in which each side has the "right to live
in peace withinsecure and recognised boundariesfree from threats or acts of force".19Reference
is also made to Security Council resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002 which, in its
preambularparagraphs, afirms "a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live
side by sidewith secureand recognisedborders". That resolution goes on, in operative paragraph
1, to demand an "immediate cessation of al1 acts of violence, including al1 acts of terror,
provocation,incitementand destru~tion".~~Resolution 1397 (2002)is particularly importantas it
19
SIRES1242(1967),22 November 1967,atoperativeparagraph1(ii). (DossierNo.24)
SIRES11397(2002), 12March 2002. (DossierNo.35) sets the agenda for the Quartet initiative which resultedin the Roadmap, itself endorsedby the
Security Council in resolution 1515(2003).
(ii) TheMadridProcess
3.3 A concerted initiative to find a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East conflict
was launched in October 1991at the Madrid ConferenceCO-sponsoredby the United States and
the then Soviet Union. The purpose of the Conference was to establish a fi-ameworkfor the
resumption of negotiations in the Middle East that had seen relatively little movement since the
Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. The form of the
arrangements agreed upon in Madrid was to encourageseparate rounds of bilateral negotiations
between Israel and itsneighbours. The Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of 26 October 1994 was the
outcomeof the Israel-Jordantrackof the Madrid negotiations.
3.4 In the immediate aftermath of the Madrid Conference, negotiations between Israeland
the Palestinians took the form of negotiations between Israel and a joint Palestinian-Jordanian
Committee. These talks were subsequently overtaken by direct, secret talks held in Nonvay
between Israel and representatives of the PLO. These negotiations led in turn to a series of
agreements between Israeland the PL0 as the recognised representativeofthe Palestinian people.
These agreements are commonly referred toasthe Oslo Accords.
(iii) Exchange ofLetters Between the Prime Minister of Israel
and the Chairman of the PLO, 9 - 10September 1993
3.5 An important preliminary step to the Israel-PL0 agreements was the Exchange of
Letters between Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, and Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of
Israel, on - 10September 1993. The letter from ChairmanArafat, in material part, bears setting
out at length:
"The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of
the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, 1 would like to confirm the
following PL0 commitments:
The PL0 recognises the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and
security. The PL0 acceptsUnitedNations SecurityCouncil Resolutions242 and338.
The PL0 commits itself to the Middle East peaceprocess, and to a peaceful
resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that al1
outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through
negotiations.
The PL0 considersthat the signingof the Declarationof Principles constitutes
a historieevent, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from
violence and al1other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly,
the PL0 renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and
will assume responsibility over al1 PL0 elements and personnel in order
to assure their compliance, preventviolations and discipline violator~."~'
3.6 The salient points for presentpurposesare the renunciationby the PL0 of terrorism and
others acts of violence, its commitment to assume responsibility over al1 PL0 elements and
personnel in order to ensure their compliance, prevent violationsand discipline violators,and its
commitment to resolve al1 outstanding issues regarding permanent status issues through
negotiation. These commitments were and remain fundamental to any dialogue between Israel
and the Palestinian leadership. They are commitments that have been systematically and
consistentlyhonouredonly in the breach by the PL0 and Palestinian authorities.
(iv) DeclarationofPrinciples onInterim Self-GovernmentArrangements,
13September1993
3.7 The Exchange of Letters was followed some days later by the Declaration of Principles
on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("DOP") which was signed at the White House in
Washingtonon 13 September 1993by the two sides and witnessed by the United States and the
Russian Federation as the co-sponsors of the Madrid Process. The DOP provided for the
establishmentof a Palestinian InterimSelf-GovernmentAuthority in the WestBank and the Gaza
Strip leadingto a permanent settlementbased onSecurity Council resolutions 242(1967) and 338
(1973).
3.8 Pursuantto Article V of the DOP, "permanent status negotiations" wereto commence
as soon as possible. By Article V(2) of the DOP,the permanent status negotiations were to
- --
21Letter dated9September 1993fiom Yasser Arafat, Chairman, The Palestine Liberation Organisation,to
Yitzhak Rabin, PrimeMinister of Israel (emphasis added). (Annex 8) "cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees,Settlements,security
arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and
other issuesof commonintere~t."~'
(v) Israel- PL0 Agreements and Undertakings,1994 - 1999
3.9 Following the DOP, in the period May 1994to September 1999, lsrael and the PL0
entered into a series of agreementsand undertakingsdesigned to facilitateand ultimately achieve
a permanent status agreement. Key elements of these texts have a bearing on the issues of
jurisdiction and proprietythat the Court is now requiredto consider.
3.10 The principal agreements of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiationsin this period were the
following:
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, 4 May 1994. This was a provisional
(a)
agreement for "an accelerated and scheduled withdrawalof Israeli military forces from
the Gaza Stripand fromthe Jericho Area" in accordancewith a detailed arrangement set
out in Annex1of the ~greernent.~~Article IX and Annex 1of the Agreement addressed
issues relevantto security;
(b) Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, 29 August 1994;~~
(CI Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, 27 August 1995;25
(d) Interim Agreement on the WestBank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995("Interim
~greement").~~ This Agreement superseded the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of 4 May
1994and the earlier agreements onthe transfer of powers. Pending the conclusionof a
permanent status agreement, the Interim Agreement is the principal agreement
governing relations between the two sides. The Interim Agreement addresses various
22 Declarationof Principleson InterimSelf-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993. (Dossier
No.65)
23Agreementonthe GazaStripand theJerichoArea, 4 May 1994, at ArticleII.
Iiitp \\\ln iiifCO\ il'iiiialaspqllr ltlOOq?O
24AgreementonPreparatory Transfeo rfPowersandResponsibilities, 29 August 1994.
liilp \t\\\b~iif201 11ln!d 20 :1\1>''\11100~190
25Protoc01on FurtherTransferofPowersandResponsibilities, 27 August 1995.
lit117\j\i\i1111~1 11III~~QO a\p'>h4lttlOOr~10
26Interim Agreemeno tnthe WestBankandthe GazaStrip, 28 September 1995. (Dossier No.68) matters ranging from the redeployment of Israeli forces, the transfer of powers to
detailed commitmentsby the PL0 on matters of security, incitement to violence and
related issues;
(el Protocol Concerningthe RedeploymentinHebron, 17 January 1997.27
3.11 As al1those involved in the process areacutelyaware, a commitmentby the PL0 or any
other partyacting for the Palestiniansto take effectivemeasuresof control to forestall violence is,
always has been, and will continue to be, a sine qua non for any permanent status agreement
betweenIsrael and the Palestinians.
3.12 In the face of on-going violence - including horrific suicide attacks on buses in Tel
Aviv and Jerusalem-the United Statesattempted to bring the twosides together at various points
in the process to maintainthe momentumof the negotiations. These meetings led to a number of
additionalundertakingsand documentsof the two sides, including:
Notefor the Record, 15 January 1 997.28 In the light of continuing terrorist attacks,the
(a)
Palestiniansideexpresslyreaflfirmedits previously unfulfilled commitmentsto:
"2. Fightingterror and preventing violence
(a) Strengthening security cooperation
(b) Preventing incitementand hostile propaganda ...
(c) Combat systematically and effectively terrorist organisations
and infrastructure
(d) Apprehension, prosecutionand punishment of terrorists
(e) ...
(0 Confiscation of illegalfirearms."
(b) WyeRiverMemorandum,23 October 1998.29 This was focused on addressing inter alia
continuing Israeli concems regarding the unfulfilled Palestinian security commitments
in the earlier agreements. By this Memorandum, the Palestinian side undertook to
"make known its policyof zero tolerance for terror and violence" and to take effective
measures "to ensure the systematic and effective combat of terrorist organisations and
their infrastru~ture".~~
27ProtocolConcerning the Redeploymen it Hebron, 17January 1997.
htlp \LM\\ 111180\ 11'1ntdCO <l\17''AiH00qIO
28Notefor theRecord, 15January 1997. htii,\\\t \\nil,~201 IImia CO ,i\i>\il 4HOOc!iiiO
29TheWyeRiver Memorandum 2, October 1998. (Dossier No.69)
30TheWyeRiverMemorandum ,3 October 1998, at Section II.A.1. (Dossier No.69) (CI Sharrn El-Sheikh Mernorandum, 4 September 1999.31 ln the face of continuing
concerns about the failure of the Palestinianside to abide by its security commitments,
the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandumwitnessedthe Palestinianside undertaking yet again
"to implement its responsibilities for security, security cooperation and other issues
emanating fromthe prior agreement^".^^
3.13 Notwithstanding the continuing violenceand the reluctance of the Palestinian Authority
to act decisively to stop suchattacks, the two sides enteredinto extensive and seriousnegotiations
in an attempt to address core issues of the conflict and achieve a permanent status agreement.
The efforts culminated in talks held at Camp David in July 2000. Israel went equipped with a
genuine desire for a final status agreement, even at the cost of painful concessions. The
Palestinian side, however, went with a different attitude. Once it became apparent that the
negotiating process was unlikelyto see the realisation of al1of the Palestinian political goals,the
talks stalled. Violence followed, eruptingat the end of September 2000. Amidst the violence,
attempts were nonetheless made to recover the initiative towards peace in late 2000 and early
2001. These attempts failed. Subsequent attempts tofind a path back to the peace process were
taken by the international community,led bythe United States. These included the establishment
of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, chaired byformer US Senator George Mitchell.
This reported on 30 April 2001 .33 Various attempts were made thereafterto achieve a ceasefire,
notablyby the Tenet Cease-Fire Planon 10June 2001 brokered by CIA Director George ene et.^^
3.14 Before turning to address these developments, key elements of the Israeli-PL0
agreementsof 1993 - 1999merit recollection.
m, a cessation of terrorism by the PL0 and, through them, by associated Palestinian
groups, was the cornerstone of the agreements and a sine qua non for Israel's
participationtherein.
31
SharmEl-SheikhMemorandum,4 September 1999. littt, \z\\iiil'go\ ilriltco L~s'\If \I IOlo?O
32SharmEl-SheikhMemorandum,4 September 1999, at paragraph 8(b).
33Report ofthe Sharm Al-Sheikh Fact-FindingCommittee, 30 April2001.
Iltir,\+\+\!lllf'!Lo\IIlllf-CO '~~11''LI4HOl/iO
34Tenet Cease-Fire Plan, 10June 2001. iittp \\ i4 iiilfZL)~ fl~i1~1CO 'iq)'1Ir 11I(lhl~A) Second, by the express agreement ofboth sides, questionsconcerningborders, Jerusalem
and settlements, amongst othermatters, wereto be settled onlythrough the frameworkof
the permanent status negotiations.
Third, the two sides expressly committed themselves to resolvingal1outstanding issues
between them by negotiation. This is the approach consistently adopted in the Israel-
PL0 agreements and inthe Roadmap.
Fourth, one of the key reasons for the breakdown of the arrangements agreedupon by the
two sides in this period was the failure by the Palestinian side to abide by its
commitments to take effective steps to prevent and counter terrorist violence by
Palestinian groups against Israel and Israelis. This was the bargain. The Palestinian
leadership, however, now uses violence as a strategic tool in the peace process. It is
culpably in breach of itscommitmentsunderthe earlier agreements.
(vi ) heMitchell CommitteeReport
3.15 On 17 October 2000, following three weeks of escalating violence, US President
Clinton, speaking on behalf of the participants at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit - Israel, the
Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, the United Nations, and the European
Union - announced the establishment of "a committee of fact-finding on the events of the past
several weeks and how to prevent their re~urrence".~~ As subsequently established, the
Committee was chaired by former US Senator George J. Mitchell. Other Members of the
Committee were Suleyman Demirel, formerly President of the Republic of Turkey, Thorbjoern
Jagland, Foreign Minister of Nonvay, Warren B. Rudman, former United States Senator, and
Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy.
3.16 Following detailed written submissions by both sides, the Committee reported on 30
April 2001. The first item in its recommendations was that the violencemust end. Under the
headingof rebuildingconfidence,the Committee recommended:
35Statementby USPresident Clinton, Sharm El-Sheikh Summit, 17 October 2000
Irrli?\+\\\\<ilcctiiI,i\\\\c,i\ ,ilii?ide,i1iiitlDIhlrii "The PA [PalestinianAuthority]shouldmake clearthrough concrete action to
Palestiniansand Israelisalikethat terrorism is reprehensibleand unacceptable,
and that the PA will make a 100 percenteffort to prevent terrorist operations
and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to
apprehend and incarcerateterrorists operatingwithinthe PA'Sjuri~diction."~~
3.17 Both sides accepted the Mitchell CommitteeReport. Israel has seen no movement at al1
by the Palestinian side to adopt the recommendationjust noted on terrorist violence. On the
contrary, the terrorist attacks against Israel and Israeli civilians intensified dramatically in the
period since the Mitchell Committee reported. It is the failureby the Palestinianside to take - or
even to attempt to take - any meaningful measures to stop such attacks that has led Israel to
search for effective means to protect its citizens. The fence now in issue is a temporary, non-
violent means of doing so. Whatever the claims of its detractors, it has been effective in
achieving this end. Whateverthe claimsof its detractors,it is not intended to, and does not, either
prejudge or prejudice the outcomeof permanent status negotiationson such matters as borders,
Jerusalem and Settlements.
(vii) TheRoadmap andRelated Developments
(a) Background Issues and the Involvernentof the UnitedNations Security Council
3.18 In the face of escalating violence followingthe report of the Mitchell Committee and
the Tenet Cease-Fire Plan, the SecurityCouncil became actively involvedin the attempts to find a
path back to negotiations. By resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, the Security Council
afirmed "a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within
secureand recognised border^" .^he resolution went on towelcome and encourage:
"the diplomatic efforts of the special envoys from the United States of
America,the Russian Federation, the European Unionand the United Nations
Special Coordinator and others, to bring about a comprehensive, just and
lastingpeace in the Middle~ast".~~
3.19 In operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, the Security Council demanded an
"immediate cessationof al1acts of violence, including al1acts of terror, provocation, incitement
--
36Reportofthe SharmAI-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee,30 April2001.
lllL[l\\\4\~.111CO\ 11111f20 2\j?''q/\t{()[/ï()
37SIRES11 397 (2002), 12 March 2002,at the second preambularparagraph. (Dossier No.35)
38SIRES11397(2002), 12 March 2002,at the sixth preambular paragraph. (Dossier No.35) and destruction". By operative paragraph 2 of the resolution,theCouncilcalled upon "the Israeli
and Palestinian sides and their leadersto cooperate in the implementationof the Tenet work plan
and the Mitchell report recommendations with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political
settlement".
3.20 Resolution 1397 (2002) was followed 18 days later by resolution 1402 (2002) of 30
March 2002 which cameat the end of a month of the most murderousPalestinian terrorist attacks
against Israeli civilians. By operative paragraph 2 of the resolution, the Security Councilagain
reiterated "its demand inresolution 1397(2002) of 12 March 2002 foran immediate cessationof
al1acts of violence, including al1acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction". By
operative paragraph3 of the resolution,the SecurityCouncil expressedits "support forthe efforts
of the Secretary-Generaland the special envoysto the Middle East to assist the parties to halt the
violence and to resume the peace process". By operative paragraph 4, the Security Council
decidedto remain seised ofthe matter.
3.21 Resolution 1402 (2002) was followed a few days later by resolution 1403(2002) of 4
April 2002 by which the Security Council demanded the implementationof resolution 1402
(2002) without delayand welcomed "the mission of theU.S. Secretaryof State to the region, as
well as efforts by others, in particular the special envoys from the United States, the Russian
Federation and the EuropeanUnion, and the United Nations Special Coordinator". The Council
remained seisedofthe matter.
3.22 There followed,on 10April 2002, a Statementby the President of the Security Council
in which the Council supported a Joint Statement issuedin Madrid on the same date by the UN
Secretary-General, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Secretary of
State of the United States,the Minister for Foreign Affairsof Spain and the High Representative
for European Union Common Foreign and Security ~olic~.~~ The Joint Statement, which is
annexedto the SecurityCouncil Presidential Statement,said interalia as follows:
"We call on Chairman Arafat, as the recognised, elected leader of the
Palestinianpeople, to undertake immediately the maximum possible effort to
stop terror attacks against innocent Israelis. We call upon the Palestinian
Authority to act decisively and take al1possible steps within its capacity to
dismantle terrorist infrastructure, including terroristfinancing, and to stop
39S/PRST/2002/9,10Apnl2002. (Annex 9) incitement to violence. We cal1upon ChairmanArafat to use the full weight
of his political authority to persuade the Palestinian people that any and al1
terrorist attacks against Israelis shouldend immediately,and to authorise his
representatives to resume immediatelysecurity coordinationwith Israel.
Terrorism, includingsuicidebombs, is illegal and immoral,has inflicted grave
harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and must be
condemned as called forin UNSCR 1373.
We cal1 on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to reach agreement on
ceasefire proposals put fonvard by General Zinni without further delay. We
commend the effortsof GeneralZinnito date to achieve this objective.
The Quartet stands ready to assist the parties in implementing their
agreements, in particular the Tenet security workplan and the Mitchell
recommendations, includingthrough a third party mechanism, as agreed to by
the parties."40
3.23 On 24 June 2002, US President George W. Bush set out US policy in favour of a two-
State solutionto the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 16July 2002, the Quartet- the UN, Russian
Federation, European Union and United States - issued ajoint statement supporting thisvision of
a two-State solution. In operative part, this statementreads:
"The Quartet deeply deplores today's tragic killing of Israeli civilians and
reiterates its strong and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism, including
suicide bombing, whichis morally repugnant and has caused greatharm to the
legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a better future. Terrorists
must not be allowed to kill the hope of an entire region, and a united
international community, for genuine peaceand security for both Palestinians
and Israelis. The Quartet expresses once again its profound regret at the loss
of innocent Israeli and Palestinian lives, and extends its sympathy to al1who
have suffered loss. The Quartet members express their increasing concem
about the mounting humanitarian crisis in Palestinian areas and their
determination to addressurgent Palestinian needs.
Consistent with President Bush's June 24 statement, the UN, EU and Russia
express their strong support forthe goal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian
settlement which, with intensive effort on security and reform by all, could be
reached within three years from now. The UN, EU and Russia welcome
President Bush's commitment toachieve U.S. leadership toward that goal.
The Quartet remains committed to implementing the vision of two States,
Israel andindependent, viable and democratic Palestine, living side by side in
peace andsecurity, as affirmed by Security Council resolution 1397."~'
40Joint Statementof the Quartet, 10 April2002, annexed to S/PRST/2002/9, 10April2002. (Annex 9)
41Joint Statementof the Quartet, 16July 2002. (Annex 10) 3.24 This Joint Statementby the Quartet was followed, on 18July 2002, by a Statement by
the President of the SecurityCouncil indicating theCouncil'ssupport for the Quartet q ta te ment.^'
On 24 September 2002, the Security Council adopted resolution 1435(2002). By operative
paragraph 1of this resolution,the Council reiterated"its demandforthe completecessation ofal1
acts of violence, including al1 acts of terror, provocation, incitement and destruction". By
operative paragraph 4, the Council called upon "the PalestinianAuthoriiy to meet its expressed
commitment to ensure that those responsible for terrorist acts arebrought to justice by it". By
operative paragraph 5, the Security Council expressed "its full support for the efforts of the
Quartet". The Councilremainedseised of the matter.
3.25 On 20 December 2002,the Quartet issued a Joint Statementinteralia as follows:
"Reaffirming their previous statements, the Quartet members reviewed
developments since their last meeting, on September 17, 2002. They
condemned the brutal terror attacks carried out by Palestinian extremist
organisations since the last meeting, which aimto diminish the prospects for
peace, and only harmlegitimate Palestinian aspirations for statehood.
Specifically, the Quartet calls for an immediate, comprehensive, ceasefire.
AI1Palestinian individualsand groups must end al1acts of terror against
Israelis,in any location."43
3.26 This statementwas followedby another on 20 February2003 in which the Quartet inter
alia "expressed veryserious concern at the continuing acts of violence and terror planned and
directed against~sraelis".~~
(3) TheRoadmapand Securi~,Council Resolution 1515 (2003)
The Roadmapwas presented to the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority
3.27
on 30 April 2003. Bya letter dated 7 May 2003 from the UN Secretary-Generalto the President
of the SecurityCouncil,the Secretary-Generaltransmitted the Roadmap to the Security~ouncil.~~
42S/PRST/2002/20,18July 2002. (Annex 11)
43Joint Statementof the Quartet,20 December 2002(emphasis added). (Annex 12)
44Joint Statementof the Quartet,20 February 2003. (Annex 13)
45S/2003/529,7 May2003. (Dossier No.70) 3.28 As its name indicates, the Roadmap is a performance-based initiative aimed at a
permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its objective is a final and
comprehensive settlementof the Israeli-Palestinianconflictwithina three-year time frame.
3.29 The gateway to the resolution of the conflicton the basis of the Roadmap is an end to
violence and terrorism. This is made clear in the opening paragraphs of the Roadmap in the
followingterms:
"A two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflictwill only be achieved
through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a
leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a
practising democracybased ontoleranceand liberty ..."46
The Roadmap proceeds fiom this opening statement of principle to lay down three
3.30
phases towards the achievementof its objective. Phase 1is headed"Ending Terror and Violence,
Normalising Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions". Phase II is headed
"Transition". PhaseIII is headed "Permanent Status Agreement and End of Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict". The opening sentenceof Phase 1reads as follows:
"ln Phase 1,the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation
of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be
accompaniedby supportive measures undertakenby Israel."
3.31 Under the heading "Security" in Phase 1,the openingpoint reads as follows:
"Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and
undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain
individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis
anywhere."
3.32 Also under this heading is the requirement that "Arab States cut off public and private
funding and al1 other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and
terror".
3.33 Phase II, "Transition", isfocused "on the option of creating an independent Palestinian
state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty". The "primary goals" of Phase II
46Dossier No.70. include "continued comprehensive security performanceand effective security cooperation".
Includedamongst the elements ofthis Phaseis the
"[c]reation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders
through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the
international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior
agreements to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, including further
action on settlementsin conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state
with provisional borders."
Phase III of the Roadmap is focused on achieving a Permanent Status Agreement. It
3.34
envisages"a process with the active, sustained,and operational supportof the Quartet, leading to
a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees,
settlements".
3.35 Four elementsof the Roadmap warrant emphasis:
-7irst the immediate demand is for an end to Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel
and Israelis, wherever they are. This would be matched by an end to Israel's military
action in responseto such attacks.
Second, the Roadmap envisagesa phased process with progress being dependent on the
effective realisationof the objectives of each phase. Thus, progress from Phase 1,which
is focused on security and onan end to terror, to Phase II, which willaddress the creation
of an independent Palestinian state with provisionalborders, is dependent on effective
and comprehensive security performanceand cooperation.
Third, the resolutionof key issues - including borders, Jerusalem and settlements - is the
keyelement of PhaseII1of the Roadmap.
Fourth,the Quartet CO-sponsorsof the Roadmap anticipate a negotiating process between
the two sides with the "active, sustained, and operational supportof the Quartet".
3.36 Followingthe presentation of the Roadmap, and continued violence on the ground, the
Quartet met again in June 2003. Their Joint Statement of 22 June 2003 reads inter alia as
follows: "The Quartet members deplore and condemn the brutal terror attacks against
Israeli citizens carried out byHamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-
Aqsa Martyrs' Brigadesince the roadmap's presentation. TheQuartet calls
for an immediate, comprehensiveendto al1violence and welcomesefforts by
the Government of Egypt and others to achieve such an immediate and
comprehensive halt to armed action by Palestinian groups. All Palestinian
individuals and groups must end terror against Israelis, anywhere. The
Quartet calls on the Palestinian authorities to take al1possible steps to halt
immediately the activitiesof individuals and groups planning and conducting
attacks on ~sraelis."~~
3.37 Again, on 26 September 2003, the Quartet issued a further statement reading inter alia
as follows:
"[The Quartet members] condemn the vicious terror attacks of August and
September carried out by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs'
Brigade. They again affirm that such actions are morally indefensibleand do
not serve the interestsof the Palestinian people. They cal1on Palestinians to
take immediate, decisive steps against individuals and groups conductingand
planning violent attacks. Such steps should be accompanied by Israeli
supportive measures, including resumptionof full security cooperation. They
further cal1on al1states to end harbouring and support, including fund-raising
and financial assistance, of any groups and individuals that use terror and
violence to advancetheir goals.
The Quartet members affirrn that the Palestinian Authority security services
must be consolidated under the clear control of an empowered Prime Minister
and Interior Minister and must be the sole armed authority in the West Bank
and Gaza. Noting that the first Palestinian Prime Minister has resigned his
post, they urge that the new Palestinian Prime Minister form a cabinet as soon
as possible, and ask that cabinetto re-commit itself to the pledges made in the
roadmap and at ~qaba.~' The Palestinian Authoritymust ensurethat a 'rebuilt
and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained,
targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting al1those engaged in
terror and dismantlingof terrorist capabilitiesand infrastructure'.
The Quartet members recognise Israel's legitimateright to self-defence in the
face of terrorist attacks against its citizens. In this context and in the context
of international humanitarian law, they cal1on the Government of lsrael to
exert maximum efforts to avoid civiliancasua~ties."~~
47Joint Statementof the Quartet,22 June 2003. (Annex 14)
48The statements of the two sides at the Aqaba Middle East Peace Summit of 4 June 2003 are set out
below.
49Joint Statementof the Quartet,26 September2003. (Annex 15) 3.38 The Roadmap, and progresstowards it, have been thesubject of detaileddiscussionsby
the Security Council in private session. On 19November 2003, followingprivate deliberations,
the Security Council convened in open session to vote on a drafi resolution CO-sponsoredby
Bulgaria, Chile, China, France,Germany, Guinea, Mexico, the RussianFederation, Spain andthe
United Kingdom. The drafiresolution was adoptedby the unanimous voteof al1the Membersof
the Council, becoming resolution 1515 (2003). The resolution is short and merits recitation in
full:
"The Security Council,
Recalling al1 its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 242
(1967), 338 (1973), 1397(2002) and the Madrid principles,
Expressing its grave concern at the continuation of the tragic and violent
events inthe Middle East,
Reiterating the demand for an immediate cessation of al1 acts of violence,
including al1actsof terrorism, provocation, incitementand destruction,
Reaflrming its vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live
sideby side withinsecureand recognised borders,
Emphasising the need to achieve a comprehensive,just and lasting peace in
the Middle East, includingthe Israeli-Syrian andthe Israeli-Lebanesetracks,
Welcomingand encouragingthe diplomatic efforts of the internationalQuartet
and others,
1. Endorses the Quartet Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent
Two-State Solutiontothe Israeli-Palestinian Conflict(Sl20031529);
2. Calls on the parties to fùlfil their obligations under the Roadmap in
cooperation with the Quartet and to achieve the vision of two States living
sideby side in peace andsecurity;
3. Decides to remain seizedof the matter."
(c) SubsequentDevelopments in the 1 OlhEmergencySpecial Session
3.39 Nineteen days after the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council endorsing
the Roadmap, the loth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, first convened in
April 1997underthe Uniting forPeace Resolution to address an entirelyseparatematter, adopted
resolution A/RES/ES-10114requesting an advisory opinion fiom the Court. The resolution,although adopted by the requisitevoting majority,failedto commandthe supportof a majorityof
membersof the UnitedNations, receiving 90votes in favour of the resolution, with 8 against and
74 abstentions. It is significant that the members of the Quartet - the United Nations apart -
includingal1the members of the EuropeanUnion,eithervoted againstthe resolution or abstained.
3.40 The Court will no doubt examine closely the record of the meeting at which the
advisory opinion request was adopted. It is nonetheless worth extracting four statements - two
prior to the vote and two explanations of vote- in illustrationof at least a significant segment of
sentiment in the room. The statements are those of Uganda and the United States, the United
Kingdomand Singapore. They are setout in full.
Uganda (abstaining on the vote)
"Our delegation has noted the Secretary-General's report, contained in
document ALES-101248.Uganda remains a firm supporter of the Palestinian
cause and Ourproposed course of action should be seen in that light. We are
looking for ways of bringingboth sides backto the negotiating table.
Uganda supports a two-nation policy, whereby the State of Israel and the
Palestinian State exist side by side in peace, each State with internationally-
recognised and secure borders. It is within this context that conflict in the
Middle East should be addressed, and as a way fonvard, the on-going
Quartet-led road map for peace initiative should continue to be
supported. On 19 November 2003 the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1515 (2003) supporting the roadmap. This mechanism should
be givena chance.
The international community, especially the United Nations, shouldbe part of
the solutionand not be seen as a part of the problem in the search for peace in
the Middle East. Adopting resolutions to condemn one side would only
harden attitudes, a fact to which the statements by the main protagonists this
morning have eminently borne testimony. The United Nations should
endeavourto bring the two sides, the Palestinians and the Israelis, together to
the negotiating tableto arrive at an amicable solution.
Resolutions should not be perceived as solutions per se or solutions in
themselves, but as viable means to a solution. Without minimising the
importance of resolutions as a way of garnering international pressure for a
particular cause, Uganda believes thatif adopting resolutions has not produced
the desired results to date, an alternative mechanism shouldbe found. The
solution lies in negotiated settlement by both sides. That is why, in Our
opinion, referringthe matter to the International Court of Justice would
not serve the cause of peace. We should avoid politicizing theCourt, as
this would undermine its impartiality and credibility. Furthermore,
going to the International Court of Justice would amount to forum shopping when there is already a mechanism through the Quartet-led
road map to addressthe issue.
Uganda will continue to support al1 international efforts aimed at bringing
about a just and equitable resolution to the conflictand we believe that this
General Assembly, the most representative and most universal of al1 such
assemblies, can play a vital role in bringing the partiesback to the negotiating
table. We cal1upon al1nationsto supportthat process."50
United States of America (votingagainst the resolution)
"This emergency special sessionwhich hasbeen ongoingsince 1997 does not
contribute to the shared goal of implementing the road map. The path to
peace is the Quartet performance-based road map to a permanent two-State
solution to the Israeli-Palestinianconflict. The road map, endorsedin Security
Council resolution 15 15 (2003), very clearly outlines the obligations and
responsibilities of the partiesto achieve President Bush'svision of two-States,
Palestine and Israel, livingside by side in peace and security.
The international community has long recognised that resolution of the
conflict must be through negotiated settlement, as called for in Security
Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). That was spelled out
clearly to the parties in the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace
Conference in 1991. Involving the International Court of Justice in this
conflict is inconsistent with that approach and could actually delay a two-
State solution and negatively impact road map implementation.
Furthermore, referral of this issue to the International Court of Justice
risks politicising the Court. It will not advance the Court's ability to
contribute to global security, nor will it advance the prospects of peace.
The United States policy on Israeli construction of the fence is clear and
consistent. We oppose activities by either party that prejudge final status
negotiations. PresidentBush said on 19November 2003, 'Israel should freeze
settlement construction, dismantle unauthorised outposts and the daily
humiliation of the Palestinian peopleand not prejudice final negotiations with
the placementsof walls and fences'.
But this meeting today and this draft resolution undermine rather than
encourage direct negotiations betweenthe parties to resolve their differences.
This is the wrong way and the wrong time to proceed on this issue.
Furthermore, the drafi resolution itself is one-sided and completely
unbalanced. The text itself is clearly not designed to promote a process
towards peace. It doesn't even mention the word 'terrorism'. We will vote
50Statement byMr Wagaba, Representativeof Uganda to the United Nations to1oheEmergency Special
Session,8 December2003. AIES-IOlPV.23,8 December 2003, at p.18 (emphasis added). (Dossier No.42) opinion would have no binding effect on the parties to this dispute or on
the General Assembly.
The purpose of seeking the advisory opinion of the ICJ must be to assist or
facilitate the work of the General Assembly. In operative paragraph 1 of
resolution ES-10/13, the General Assembly has itself already made the
determination that the constructionof the wall by Israel is 'in departureof the
Armistice Line of 1949 and is in contradiction to relevant provisions of
internationallaw'.
That assessmentmust necessarily have beenmade based on considerationsof
the obligations incumbent on Israel. The ICJ's advisory opinion does not
formally bind either partysince it ismade pursuant to the advisoryjurisdiction
of the Court. Nor does it enable the General Assembly to take any action
more binding than what it has already done in resolution ES-10113. On the
contrary, posing the question might create the impression that the General
Assembly is not very sure about the correctness of its early determination on
the legality of Israel's actions in resolution ES-10/13. For the above reasons,
we have abstained fiom the voteon this draft res~lution."~~
3.41 Israel acknowledges,as will be plainfrom the record of the proceedingsas well as fiom
other statements made in the SecurityCouncil, by the Quartet and elsewhere, that the fence now
in issue has raised particular concerns. These concerns are most often made in ignorance of the
facts and of the relevant applicableprinciples of law. The facts relevantto a meaningfulappraisal
of the issues are not now before the Court. Questionsof routing and fabric of life consequences
as a result of the fence exercise Israel greatly. It will not have escaped the attention of observers
of Israel and readersof the Israeli press that decisions have been taken in recent months to Vary
the route of the fence, and make other material changes, in the light of fabric of life concerns
where this can be done consistently with the dictates of security. Many phases of construction,
including some which have attracted particular comment, have yet to be started or authorised.
Israel islookingagain at these issues. The High Court is currently seisedof a number of petitions
concerning the fence. Israel is a Societybased above al1on the rule of law and will carefully
comply with the decisionsof itsj~diciar~.~~
3.42 The question now in issue, however, is whether it is appropriate for the Court to
respond, and whether it is within itsjurisdiction to do so, to a request for an advisory opinionby
the 10" Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly which cuts across and would risk
53Statement by Mr Tan, Representative of Singapore to the United Nations to the 10" Emergency Special
Session,8 December 2003. AIES-10lPV.23, 8 December 2003, at pp.22 - 23 (emphasis added). (Dossier
No.42)
54See further onthis the statement by Prime Minister Sharon at paragraph 3.79 below. destabilising an initiative expressly endorsed by the Security Council. Israelcontends that the
Court lacksjurisdiction in this case and that, even were itcompetentto do so,it shouldnot, in the
exercise of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute, respond to the substance of the
question referred to it.
3.43 Al1of these resolutions, agreementsand statements point to the fundamental agreement
of the two sides, the Quartet, the Security Council and the international communitythat the
appropriate mechanism for resolving disputes between the two sides is negotiation within the
context of the Roadmap. Unilateral initiatives thatdivert from this process, and seek to isolate
one issue for attentionin an alternativemechanism, are in direct contradiction to this fundamental
principle and risk unravelling the fiamework by which a comprehensive settlement may be
reached.
C. Borders, Jerusalem and Settlements
Under the Israeli-PL0 Agreements and the Roadmap
3.44 The question referredto the Court calls for an examinationby the Court of the route of
the fence. It implies that the baseline that the Court should use for this purpose is the 1949
Armistice Demarcation Line. The question is whether this is an acceptable approach, particularly
in the light of the scheme of the Roadmap. Israel does not here enter into the substance of the
debate on these issues. A number of observations are, however, necessaryby way of essential
backgroundto Israel's submissionsonjurisdiction and propriety.
3.45 The so-called "Green Line" is the term commonly used to describe the Armistice
Demarcation Line ("ADL") described in the General Armistice Agreement signed by Israel and
Jordan on 3 April 1949. The languageof the "Green Line" has enteredthe popular lexicon of lay
commentators on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the presumptive and immutable border
between Israeland a putative Palestinian state. This assessment is, however, problematic as a
matter of substanceand has no basis in law. The point goes to one of the significant risks of this
advisory opinionrequest,namely,that the Court will paint with a broad brush on the landscape of
the Israeli-Palestinianconflictin a way that will complicate initiatives to achievea lasting peace
settlementbetweenthe two sides. 3.46 On 16November 1948,the Security Counciladoptedresolution62 (1948). In operative
paragraph 1 of the resolution,the Security Council decidedthat, "in order to eliminate the threat
to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition fromthe present truce to a permanent
peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in al1sectors of Palestine". TheCouncil, in
operative paragraph 2 of the resolution,went on tocal1upon the parties involved in the conflict,
as a provisional measureunder Article 40 of the Charter,to seek agreementon the delineationof
an armistice demarcationline beyond whichthe armed forces of the respective parties wouldnot
55
move during the transitionperiodto permanentpeace .
3.47 On 3 April 1949, Israel and Jordan signed a General Armistice Agreement. The
preambular paragraphs of the Agreement reference resolution 62 (1948) and Article 40 of the
Article II of the Armistice Agreement provides that no provision of the Agreement
shall in any way prejudicethe rights, claims and positionsof either party in the ultimatepeaceful
settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of the Agreement having being dictated
exclusively by military cons ide ration^ .rticle VI(9) provides expressly that the ADL is
"without prejudice to future territorial settlementor boundary lines or to claims of either Party
relating thereto." The ADL, which was marked onthe map in green, was known as the "Green
Line".
3.48 The ADL was never authoritatively demarcated. Moreover,in the period following the
General Armistice Agreement, and in accordance with its terms, a considerable number of
adjustments were madeto the route of the line as describedin the Agreement. They were made
by commanders on both sides, acting jointly, pursuant to Article IX and XII of the Agreement.
The adjustments were marked on large scale maps of the parties which were signed and
subsequentlyusually broughtbefore the Mixed Armistice Commission for approval.
3.49 An additional issue which the question posed to the Court might engage relatesto the
status of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This is a subject, the resolution of which the
two sides have expressly agreed to leave to the permanent status negotiations. Thisis the scheme
of the Roadmap. The question iswhether Israel has a right to take measures to protectthe lives of
the residentsofthese settlementsin the face of on-going attacks by Palestinian terrorists.
55S/RES/62, 16 November1948,atoperativeparagraph2. (Annex 16)
56Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - Israel: General Armistice Agreement, April1949. (Annex 17)
57GeneralArmisticeAgreement, at ArticlII. 3.50 It is often said by Israel's detractors,justi@ing Palestinian suicideand other attacks in
particular against residents of the Israeli settlementsin the WestBank and the Gaza Strip thatthe
settlements are illegal and that the attacks are therefore legitimate and somehow morally
acceptable. The same reasoningleads also to similar commentsin respect of attacks to the east of
the so-calledGreen Line or in parts of Jerusalem that the particular commentatorwould aggregate
to "Palestine".
3.51 As the extracts from the Quartet and other statements given above indicate, it is
acknowledged by many close to the detail of this conflict that Palestinian terrorism against Israel
and Israelis is illegal wherever it occurs. This includes terrorism directed at the Israeli
settlements and the residents thereof in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,to others east ofthe Green
Line, in Jerusalem or elsewhere. Even the harshest of Israel's critics have been constrained to
acknowledge that such attacks are a violation of the noms of international humanitarianlaw and
general internationallaw andcannot bejustified.
3.52 As already observed, the issueof settlements is to be addressed in the permanent status
negotiations. This is the scheme of the Roadmap. It would be enormously problematic forthe
Court to enter into this complex issue in the context of the present request for an advisory
opinion. Moreover,thereis a significantrisk that any decision of the Court on this issue could be
construed as legitimising such attacks with the consequence thata renewed wave of such attacks
might occur. The Court should be more thanjust ordinarily cautious about proceedingdown this
road. Any opinion on these issues would almost inevitably destabilise still further relations
between thetwo sides andprejudicethe Roadmap initiative.
D. The PalestinianTerrorist Threat to Israel
3.53 The request for an opinion does not ask about the legal consequences of unlawful
terrorist attacksupon the inherentrightto life of Israeli citizens so often carried outby Palestinian
terrorists with the support, active or passive, of the authorities of "Palestine". It should have
done. Israel has a compelling case and it would not hesitate, in other circumstances,to make it.
Neither doesthe question ask for an opinion on the consequences of the violation of the laws and
customs of war and of wider customary principles of international human rights law by
Palestinian terrorists and the Palestinian Authority. Heretoo Israel's case is compelling. As is addressed in Chapter 8, an appreciation of these issues would be essential to any meaningful
assessment by the Court of the question before it. The request for an opinion is not balanced.
The procedure adoptedby the Court is notconduciveto a consideredexamination of the issues.
Israel does not accept that the Court hasjurisdiction to examinethese issues, or that it would be
proper forthe Courtto doso inthe context of itsadvisory procedure.
3.54 Some factual material on the nature and scale of the Palestinian terrorist threatto Israel
will assist the Court properly to exercise its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute and
decide whether or notto answerthe questionreferredto it. The followingparagraphs accordingly
set out some basic details on these issues for purposesof Israel's submissionsonjurisdiction and
propriety only.
(i) ThePerpetratorsof Terror
3.55 There are four principal Palestinian terrorist organisations that are responsible for the
vast majorityof the attacks againstIsrael and Israelis. These are:
(a) Al-Aqsa Martyrs7Brigades - this is also sometimes referredto as the "Tanzim" and is
part of the Fatah organisation. It includes amongst its ranks members of the various
security forces of the Palestinian Authority;
Popular Front for the Liberationof Palestine ("PFLP") - one of the original factions of
(b)
the PLO;
(CI Hamas - an Arabic acronym for Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya, the Islamic
ResistanceMovement; and
(dl PalestineIslamic Jihad.
3.56 Between them, these organisations have been responsible for about 20,000 separate
incidents againstIsrael and Israelissince the start of the current violence in October 2000. As has
already been noted, these attacks have lef? 916 Israelis dead and over 5,000 injured, many
critically. 3.57 The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigadesemerged out of the recent violence. They are based
mainly in West Bank cities and towns and are an integralpart of Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction of
the PLO. They draw considerable support from the 80,000 strong security forces of the
Palestinian Authority. Given theirpower base in Fatah,the Brigades are closely linkedto Yasser
Arafat personally. Giving an interview to USA Today in March 2002, one of the Brigades'
leaders, Maslama Thabet, said "[wle receive Ourinstructions from Fatah. Our commander is
Yasir Arafat himse~f'.~~Palestinian Authority officials have acknowledged that many of the
Brigades' members arepaid from Palestinian Authority funds in their capacities as members of
the PA'Svarious securityforces.
3.58 The Brigades have been responsible for - indeed, have claimed responsibility for - a
large number of attacks against Israelis including some of the most murderous suicide bomb
attacks. They provided assistanceto Hamas in the most recent suicide bomb attackon 14January
2004 in which four Israelis were killed at the Erez crossing-point between Israel and the Gaza
Strip. Amongst other attacks forwhichthey are responsible are:
the 5 January 2003 double suicide bombingnear the old central bus stationin Tel Aviv
which killed 23 people and lefi around 120 others injured (the bomber having come
from Nablus),
the 19June 2002 suicidebomb attack at the French Hill intersection in Jerusalemwhich
killed 7 people and left 50 injured at a crowded bus stop (the bomber havingcome from
Nablus),
the 12 April 2002 suicide bomb attack in a Jerusalem open-air market which killed 6
people and injured 104(the bomber having come fromBeit Fajar), and
the 2 March 2002 suicide bomb attack in central Jerusalem which killed 11people and
injured 50 at a Barmitzvah celebration (the bomber havingcome from Dehaishe).
3.59 The PFLP was founded in 1967 by George Habash. It was an original, founding
member of the PLO. It is opposed to any negotiation with Israeland Israel's continued existence
58USAToday,March 14,2002, atp.A.06. (Annex 18)
42 in any form. It receives logisticalsupport fiom, and safe haven in, Syria. It was responsible for
the 17October 2001 assassination ofIsraeliTourism Minister RechavamZe'evi. Amongstother
recent attacks for which it is responsiblewas the 25 December 2003 suicide bomb attack outside
Tel Avivwhich killed4 people and injured24 others.
3.60 Hamas was establishedin 1987. It is an Islamist movement whichis an offshootof the
Muslim Brotherhood. It is opposedto al1negotiationswith Israel and seeks Israe17sdestruction.
Its military wing - Izz al-Din al-Qassam - is responsible for the principal suicide attacks within
Israel. Amongst the attacks forwhich Hamas is responsible are:
• the 9 September 2003 suicide bomb attack at a café in the German Colony
neighbourhood of Jerusalem which killed 7 people and injured over 50 (the bomber
having comefrom Rantis),
• the 19 August 2003 suicide bomb attack on a bus in Jerusalem which killed 23 people
and injured over 130(thebomberhaving comefiom Hebron),
• the 11 June 2003 suicide bomb attack on another bus in Jerusalem which killed 17
people and injuredover 100(the bomber havingcome fromHebron),
• the 5 March 2003 suicide bomb attack on a bus in Haifa which killed 17 people and
injured 53 (the bomberhaving come from Hebron),
a the 21 November 2002 suicide bomb attack on a bus carrying schoolchildren in
Jerusalem which left 11 people dead and around 50 injured (the bomber having come
fromEl-Khader),
• the 31 July 2002 bombing of the cafeteria onthe campus of the Hebrew University of
Jerusalemwhich killed9 people and injured 85(the bomber having comefrom Silwan),
• the 7 May 2002 suicide bombingof a gaming club in Rishon Lezion, south of Tel Aviv,
whichkilled 15 peopleand injured 55, the 31 March 2002 suicide bomb attackon the Matza restaurant in Haifa which killed
15people and injured40 (the bomberhaving comefromJenin),and
the 27 March 2002 suicide bombing of the Park Hotel in Netanya which killed 30
people, most in their 70s and SOS,and injured 145 (the bomber having come from
Tulkarem).
3.61 Palestine Islamic Jihad was establishedin 1981. It receives support,sponsorship and
safe haven from Syria, Lebanon and Iran (amongst the co-sponsors of the advisory opinion
request). It is an Islamist movementwhich has as its goal the destruction of Israel.Although
smaller than Hamas, it is more radical in its ideology. Amongst the attacks for which it is
responsible are:
the 4 October 2003 suicide bomb attack in Maxim'srestaurant in Haifa which killed 21
people, including 4 children, and injured60 (thebomberhavingcome from Jenin),
the 5 January 2003 double suicide bombattack at the old central bus stationin Tel Aviv
(carried out jointly with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Bridges)which killed 23 people and
injured 120(the bomberhaving come fromNablus),
the 21 October 2002 bombing of a bus en route from the north of Israel to Tel Aviv
which left 14 people dead and injured around 50 others (the bomber having come from
Jenin),
the 5 June 2002 suicide bomb attack on a bus travelling from Tel Aviv to Tiberias
whichkilled 17peopleand injured38 (the bomber havingcome from Jenin),and
the 20 March 2002 suicide bombingof yet another bus en route from Tel Aviv which
killed7 people and injuredaround 30 others (the bomber having come fromJenin).
(ii) TheMethods andMeans of Terrorand its Victims
3.62 Terrorist attacks come in many forms. Over the past 40 months of violence, lsraelis
have been killed in attacks that range from stabbings to shootings at vehicles from roadside ambushes to drive-by shootings and suicide and other bombings. Proportionately, suicide
bombings represent a small minority of the attacks but account for the majority of Israeli dead
and injured. They alsopose a veryparticular difficultyfor defence,law enforcement and security
forces, as the normal concern of a combatant or other attacker to avoid injury to him or herself
cannot be relied upon to prevent an attack. On the contrary, it is often precisely as attemptsare
madeto apprehendan attackerthatthey detonate the bombthey are carrying killingthose who are
attempting to apprehendthem. Since the start of the present violence, about 70%of al1suicide
attacks have taken place to the west of the so-calledGreen Line. These account for lessthan 10%
of overall attacks in this area. Yet they account for around 80% of Israeli deaths from such
attacks in this area. The next largest category of attacks by numbers of victims is shootings,
including shootingat travelling vehiclesfromroadside ambushes.
3.63 Less widely known, but nonetheless critical, area different formof attack, referredto in
the press as "mega-terror" attacks, akin to that in New York on 11 September 2001. Fortunately
for Israel, most attemptsof this kind have been foiled but the threat remains real and the risk of
devastation considerable. Detailsof key incidentsof this kind are given in section (iii) below.
3.64 For purposes of the exercise by the Court of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the
Statute, it is important that the Court should appreciate the sheerscale of the temorist onslaught
that Israel has faced andcontinues to face. The opening requirementof the Roadmap is that "the
Palestinians immediately undertakean unconditional cessation of violence". The failure of the
Palestinian leadership to take adequate steps to this end is a matter of wide public record. Two
illustrative periods of terror attacksmay be givenby way of example of scale and effects - first,
March 2002, the bloodiest month of Israeli fatalities, the scale of which led directly both to the
military Operation Defensive Shield and to thedecision to begin construction of the fence as a
non-forcible barrier to the on-going attacks; and, second, the attacksin the past 12month period
fromJanuary 2003 culminatinginthe filing of this statement.
3.65 There were 37 separate terronst attacks resulting in Israeli fatalities in the 31 days of
March 2002. These attacks killed 135 and injured 721 others, many critically. Of the dead, 12
were children; 28 were in their 70s and 80s. The ovenvhelming majority of those killed and
injured were civilians. A11were specifically targeted. These were not random acts. Amongst
these atrocities inthis period werethe following: 2 March 2002 - 11 people were killedand over 50 injured when a suicide bomber
detonated his bomb next to a group of women and infants waiting to attend a
Barmitzvah celebrationin Jerusalem. The bombercame from Dehaishe. The Al-Aqsa
Martyrs' Brigadesof Yasser Arafat'sFatahmovement claimedresponsibility;
9 March 2002 - 9 month old Avia Malka of South Africa was killed and around 50
others were injured whentwo Palestinians opened fire with automatic weapons and
threw hand grenades in the tourist hotel area of the coastal city of Netanya. Yasser
Arafat's AI-AqsaMartyrs' Brigades claimedresponsibility;
9 March 2002 - 11 people were killed and 54 injured in a suicide bomb attack in a
crowded café in Jerusalem at 10.30 pm on a Saturday night. Hamas claimed
responsibility;
27 March 2002 - 30 people were killed and 145 injured in the suicide bomb attack of
the Park Hotel in Netanya during the Passover holiday dinner. The bomber came from
Tulkarem. Hamas claimed responsibility;
31 March 2002 - 15people were killed and over 40 injured in the suicide bombing of
the Matza restaurant in Haifa. Two families suffered multiple fatalities. The bomber
came from Jenin. Hamas claimed responsibility.
3.66 In the 12 months from January 2003 to the filing of this statement, 218 people have
been killed in terrorist attacksand around 850 people have been injured. These numbers are still
unacceptablyhigh but, by comparison with those of March 2002, they have fallen significantly.
This drop in the number of Israeli casualties does not reflect a reduction in the number of
attempted attacksa~ainst lsraelis by Palestinian terrorists. The number of attempted attacks has
remained broadlythe same at around 50 a week. The reduction in casualties reflects the growing
number of attacks that are thwarted by the lsraeli Defence Forces("IDF"). The fence has been a
significantfactorinthis respect.
3.67 Amongstthe terrorist atrocities committedin the past 12months arethe following: 5 January 2003 - 23 people killed, including8 foreignnationals, and around120injured
in the double suicide bombingat the old central busstation in Tel Aviv. The bombers
came from Nablus. Yasser Arafat's AI-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and Islamic Jihad
jointly claimedresponsibility for the attack;
5 March 2003 - 17people were killedand 53 injuredin a suicide bomb attack ona bus
in Haifa en route to Haifa University. Nine of the 17killed were under the age of 18.
The bomber camefrom Hebron. Hamas claimedresponsibilityforthe attack;
30 April 2003 - 3 people were killed and around 60 injured in a suicide bomb attack at
a Tel Aviv beachfront bar. Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement andHamas both claimed
responsibility. The attackwas carried outby two British Muslimmembers ofHamas;
11June 2003 - 17people were killed and over 100injured in a suicide bomb attack on
a bus in central Jerusalem. The bomber came from Hebron. Hamas claimed
responsibility;
19 August 2003 - 23 people were killed and over 130 injured in another suicide bomb
attack on a bus in central Jerusalem. The bomber came from Hebron. Hamas claimed
responsibility;
4 October 2003 - 21 people were killedand 60 wounded in a suicide bomb attack by a
female terrorist from Jenin in Maxim's restaurant in Haifa. Islamic Jihad claimed
responsibility;
18November 2003 - 2 soldiers were killed on a road outside Jerusalem whena member
of Yasser Arafat's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades opened fire with a semi-automatic
assaultrifle concealed in a prayer rug.
3.68 Statistics like these may seem remote to Members of the Court - mere numbers on a
lsrael is a small country. The casualties that it
page. They are not remote to Israeli society.
continues to sufferreach into every home. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintains an
In Memoriam website with every name and photograph and persona1sketch of those who have been killed in terrorist attacksin the past 40monthsof violence.59~ecalling briefly the identities
of some of those who wereonce living is a salutary exercise. It gives pause for thought against
the backdrop of some of the rhetoric that comestoo often fromthe mouths of Israel's detractors.
A few brief lines on some of Israel's typical casualties drawn from five "incidents" merit
recitation.
3.69 On 1 June 2001, a Friday evening, a suicide bomber from Kalkilya attacked a
discothèqueat the Tel Aviv Dolphinarium. That evening, girls were allowedin free of charge.
Many were teenagers. Twenty-one peopledied that night whenthe bomb exploded. Most were
young girls. Most were under 18years of age. One of the victims was Anya Kazachkov. She
was a newcomer from Russia,as were many of the others who died that night. Shewas 16. Her
drawings decorate thewalls of her school. Sheis buried in the Yarkon cemetery in Tel Aviv.
3.70 On 27 March 2002, on Passover evening, 250 guestshadjust sat down to a meal in the
Park Hotel in Netanya. A suicide bomber, later identifiedas a member of Hamas from Tulkarem
just 10 kilometres away, entered the room and detonated his bomb. Thirty were killed and a
further 140 injured, many critically. Most of the dead were elderly. One was Marianne Myriam
Lehmann Zaoui, aged 77. Shewas a Holocaust survivor from Germany. After the SecondWorld
War she taught English in high schools in France where she lived for most of her life. She was
celebrating the Passover dinner in the Park Hotel with her husband and daughter and 2
grandchildren. Her husband and 9 year old grandson were injured in the blast. Marianne was
killed.
3.71 Revital Ohayon was 34 years old. She was a mother of two small sons, Matan, 5, and
Noam, 4. They lived in a kibbutz close to the coastal town of Hadera near to the Green Line.
Revital was a school teacher. Shewas divorced and livedalone with her sons. On the night of 10
November 2002 she had puther small sons to bed and was talking on the telephone with her ex-
husband Avi, with whom she maintained good relations. She heard shots outside as a terrorist
from Yasser Arafat's Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades entered the kibbutz. She dropped the phone and
ran to her sons. They were killed,al1three, holding each other in the corner of the room. Avi
Ohayon heard the shots overthe phonebefore the line was cut off. Revital and Matan and Noam
are buried in the Tsur Shalom Cemetery in Kiryat Bialik. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
claimed responsibilityfor the attack. The terrorist escaped.
59llttjl\il$,\llllCO\ Illll'CO <1\1)~'/1IOll\\O 3.72 Noam Leibowitzwas 7 years old. She lived withher familyin a village closeto Haifa.
On the night of 17 June 2003, the Leibowitz family was returning to Haifa from a trip to
Jerusalem. It was 11.30pm at nightwhen a terroristfrom Kalkilya,400 meters fromthe highway
on the other side of the Green Line, opened firewith a semi-automatic weapon atthe vehicle in
which the family were travelling. Noam was killed. Her three yearold sister was seriously
wounded. Their brother and grandfather werealso injured inthe attack. At her funeral,Noam
was described as "a small girl with a large soul". She is buried in the Moshav Nir Etzion
cemetery.
3.73 On 4 October 2003, 8 members of the Almog family, grandparents, parentsand
grandchildren, went forlunchto Maxim'srestaurant in Haifa. In the course of the meal, a young
Palestinian woman from Jenin, a 29-year old lawyer named Henadi Jaradat, enteredthe
restaurant. She positioned herselfclose to the family and set off her bomb. Ze'ev Almog,his
wife Ruth, their son Moshe andtwo grandsons, Tomer and Assaf, were killed in the blast. Their
daughter Galit, daughter-in-lawOrly, and two other grandchildren werewounded. Islamic Jihad
claimed responsibilityfor the attack.
3.74 There are many stories likethose just recounted. Too many. One of the constant
features of the terrorist attacks directed against Israelisover the past 40 months is that they have
invariably been directed at civilians, specifically and by intent. The civilians have been
especially vulnerable- children,the elderly, in discothèquesor community halls or hotel dining
rooms. This is the nature of the threat that Israelcontinues to face. This is the reason for the
fence, a temporary andnon-violentmeasure to counter a murderous threat directed at the softest
of targets.
(iii The Threat of "Mega-Terror"Aîtacks
3.75 As noted above, there is a real and ever present threat to Israel from mega-terrorists
attacks - attacks on a scale that would dwarf the acts of the individual suicide bomber or man
with a gun. As aresult of good intelligence and alert security, attempts of this kind have so far
been successfully thwarted. The risk, however, remains very great. A number of such incidents
are inthe publicdomain,including: in late April 2002, lsraeli security forcesapprehendea Palestinian terrorist cell, based
in Kalkilya, which had beenplanning to detonatea 1,000kilogramcar bomb atthe base
of the Azrielitwin skyscrapersin Tel Aviv;
on 23 May 2002, a bomb was detonated by remote control inside the Pi Glilot gas and
oil depot on the northern outskirts of Tel Aviv. The resulting fire was quickly
extinguished but the risk, and no doubt the intended result, was of a chain reaction of
explosions across the depot which, had it occurred, could have killed thousands of
people inthe vicinity;and
in January 2003, Israeli police intercepted a bomber who was en route to bomb the
Teddy Kollek sports stadiumin Jerusalem,then packed withpeople.
(iv) TheResponsibility of "Palestine"for Palestinian Terrorism
3.76 The question to the Court does not ask about "Palestine's" responsibility forthese acts
of terrorism. It ought to have done. The evidence of attribution, of commissionand omission, is
great. In a different forum with a different procedureon a question that sought fairly to address
the realityof the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,Israel wouldhave no hesitation in presenting its case.
This is notthat forumor that procedureor that question.
3.77 Three points may nonetheless be made. First, it is accepted by al1that the cessation of
Palestinian terrorism is the threshold issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Once this is
addressed,al1else will follow. Yasser Arafat committedthe PLO, in the Exchange of Letters of
September 1993, to the renunciation of terrorism and the taking of al1possible stepsto ensure that
this is combated.
3.78 The Mitchell Committee Report, the Tenet Cease-Fire Plan, the Roadmap, the Joint
Statements of the Quartet and resolutions of the Security Council al1 place a cessation of
Palestinian terrorismat the top of the agenda. Every time an attack takes place, the world sends
its condolences. Israel has a file full of them. It is little solace in the face of the continuing
onslaught. It is only the Government of Israel that can protect its own citizens. It has a
responsibilityto do so. 3.79 Israel is acutelyaware, and regrets, the suffering of innocent Palestinians on the other
side of this conflict. It is concernedto alleviate fabricof life constraintsthat resultfromthe fence
or from anyother action taken by Israel in the protectionof its citizens. On the scales, however,
weighing heavily when it comesto addressthese issues,are the livesof its citizens.
3.80 A recent statement by Prime Minister Sharon, of 18 January 2004, reflects this
dilemma:
"The operative experience that has accumulated over thepast few months in
which the fence was being built was both goodand bad. It was excellent at
preventing terrorbut was not satisfactoryin al1matters relating to the damage
to Palestinians' quality of life. 1 am personally monitoring the problems
arising from the operation of the fence and am familiar with the cornplaints
about it; it is possible that additional thoughtis neededto allowthe possibility
of changing the route, in order to reduce the numberof mishaps in operating
the fence withoutharming sec~rit~."~~
3.81 Second, there is no doubt that the terrorist actions are violationsof the laws andcustoms
of war, including some that amount to grave breaches, and other principles of customary
internationallaw. Theyare in breach of the principleof distinction, which requires differentiation
between civilians and combatants. They are in breach of the rule against perfidy and the
injunction prohibiting the use of booby traps. Theyamount to crimes against hurnanity,contrary
to principles enshrined first in the Nuremburg Charter. They violate the most fundamental
precepts of the international law safeguarding human rights, includingthe most basic of rights,
that of the inherent rightto life. They are also in violation of the central principles of the Charter
of the UnitedNations.
3.82 Third, the Palestinian leadershipknows its responsibilities. Time and again it expresses
itself to be committed to ending the violence. Little, if anything, by way of effective measures
have everbeen undertaken towards this end. The repeated calls by the Quartet, in the statements
set out above, for action to be taken by the Palestinian leadership towards this end attests to the
frustration ofthose in the international community whoare closest to these issues at the failure to
act on thismatter.
60StatementbyPrime Minister Sharon, 18January 2004. (Annex 19)
513.83 Speaking at the Aqaba Summit on 4 June 2003 in the presence of King Abdullah II of
Jordan and US President GeorgeW. Bush,the then Palestinian Prime Minister,MahmoudAbbas,
said as follows:
"As we al1realise,this isan importantmoment. A new opportunity for peace
exists, an opportunitybased upon President Bush's vision and the Quartet's
road map, which we have accepted withoutanyreservations.
Our goal is two States,lsrael and Palestine, living side-by-side, in peace and
security. The process is one of direct negotiations to end the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict,and to resolveal1the permanent status issues,and endthe
occupation that began in 1967, under which the Palestinians have sufferedso
much.
At the same time, we do not ignore the suffering of the Jews throughout
history. It is time to bring this sufferingto an end.
Just as lsrael must meet its responsibilities,we, the Palestinians, will fulfil Our
obligations forthis endeavourto succeed. Weare ready to do our part.
Let me be very clear:There will be no military solutionto this conflict, sowe
repeat Our renunciation, a renunciation of terror against Israelis
wherever they may be. Such methods are inconsistent with Our religious
and moral traditions and are dangerous obstacles to the achievement of
an independent, sovereign state we seek These methods also conflict with
the kinds of state we wish to build, based on human rights and the rule of
law.
We will exert al1 of Our efforts, using al1 Our resources to end the
militarization of the intifada, and we will succeed. The armed intifada
must end, and we must use and resort to peaceful means in Our quest to
end the occupation and the suffering of Palestinians and Israelis. And to
establish the Palestinian state, we emphasise our determination to implement
Our pledges which we have made for Our people and the international
community. And that isa rule of law, single political authority, weaponsonly
in the hands of those who are in charge with upholding the law and order, and
political diversitywithinthe framework of democracy.
Our goal is clear and we will implement it firmly and without
compromise: a complete end to violence and terrorism. And we will be
full partners in the international war against occupation and terrorism. And
we will cal1 upon Ourpartners in this war to prevent financial and military
assistance to those who oppose this position. We do this as part of Our
commitment to the interest of the Palestinian people, and the members of the
large family of humanity.
We will also act vigorously against incitement and violence and hatred,
whatever their form or forum may be. We will take measures to ensure that
there is no incitementfiom Palestinian institutions. We must also reactivate and invigorate the U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli Anti-lncitement Committee. We
will continue to work to establish the rule of law and to consolidate
govemment authorityin accountable Palestinian institutions. We seekto build
the kind of democratic state that will be a qualitative addition to the
internationalcommunity.
AI1 the PA security forces will be part of these efforts, and will work
together toward the achievement of these goals. Our national future is at
stake, andno onewill be allowedtojeopardise it."61
3.84 The killing began againthe very next day. Sincethese words were spoken, 127Israelis
have been killed - in suicide bomb attacks, in roadside shootings,in stabbings. Yasser Arafat's
Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigadeshaveclaimed responsibility fora many of these attacks.
3.85 Responding to Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas at the Aqaba Summit, Israeli Prime
Minister Sharonsaid as follows:
"As the Pnme Minister of Israel, the land which is the cradle of the Jewish
people, my paramountresponsibility is the security of the people of Israeland
of the State of Israel. There can be no compromise with terror and Israel,
together with al1free nations, will continue to fight terrorism until its final
defeat.
Ultimately, permanent security requires peace and permanent security can
only be obtainedthrough security, and there is nowhope of a new opportunity
forpeace betweenIsraelisand Palestinians.
Israel, like others, has lent its strong support for President Bush's vision,
expressed on June 24, 2002, of two States - Israel and a Palestinian state -
living side by side in peace and security. The Government and people of
Israel welcome the opportunity to renew direct negotiations accordingto the
steps of the roadmap as adopted by the Israeli government to achieve this
vision.
Itis in Israel's interests notto govern the Palestiniansbut for the Palestinians
to governthemselves in their own state. A democratic Palestinian state fully
at peace with Israel will promote the long-term security and well-being of
Israelas a Jewish state.
Therecan be no peace,however, without the abandonmentand elimination of
terronsm, violence,and incitement. We will work alongside the Palestinians
and otherstates to fight terrorism, violence and incitementof al1kinds. As al1
parties perform their obligations, we will seek to restore normal Palestinian
life, improvethe humanitarian situation, rebuild trust, and promote progress
- --
61StatementbyPalestinian PrimeMinster Abbas, Aqaba Summit,4 June 2003 (emphasis added). (Annex
20) towards the President's vision. We will act in a manner that respects the
dignity as well as the humanrights ofal1people.
We can also reassure Our Palestinian partners that we understand the
importance of territorial contiguity in the West Bank for a viable Palestinian
state. Israeli policyinthe territoriesthat are subjectto direct negotiationswith
the Palestinians will reflect this fact.
We accept the principle that no unilateral actions by any party can prejudge
the outcome of our negotiations.
In regard to the unauthorised outposts, 1 want to reiterate that Israel is a
Society governed by the rule of law. Thus, we will immediately begin to
remove unauthorised outposts.
Israel seeks peace with al1its Arab neighbours. Israel is prepared to negotiate
in good faith wherever there are partners. As normal relationsare established,
1 am confident that they will find in Israel a neighbour and a people
committed to a comprehensive peace and prosperity for al1the peoples of the
region."62
3.86 This is the prism through which Israel'sobjectionstojurisdiction and to the proprietyof
a response by the Court on the substance of the question ought to be seen. The Court has
discretion, under Article65(1) of its Statute, to decide whether to respond to the request for an
opinion. Israel urges the Court to exercise its discretion and declineto respond to the substance
of the request. It is dangerous for the Roadmap. It cuts across the endorsed initiative of the
SecurityCouncil. It is dangerous for the integrity of the Court. Legal arguments in support of
this contention are developedin detail in the following Chapters of this statement.
62Statementby IsraeliPrime MinsterSharon, Aqaba Summit, 4 June2003. (Annex 21)
54 PARTTWO
OBJECTIONS TO JURISDICTION CHAPTER 4
THEREQUEST IS ULTRA VIRESTHE COMPETENCEOFTHE lothEMERGENCY
SPECIAL SESSIONANDIORTHEGENERALASSEMBLY
A. Introduction
4.1 Israel contends that the present request for an advisory opinion is ultra vires the
competence of the 1othEmergency Special Session of the General Assembly. The Emergency
Special Sessionwas convened in April 1997pursuantto GeneralAssembly resolution 377 A (V)
of 3 November 1950 entitled "United for Peace" ("Uniting for Peace ~esolution").~~ This
provides, in operative part, that the General Assembly may consider a matter with a view to
making appropriate recommendations"if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of
the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security". In this case, however, there was no failure by the Security
Council to act. On the contrary,the Council unanimously adopted resolution1515 (2003)just 19
days before the lothEmergency Special Session adopted the resolution requesting an advisory
opinion. Resolution 1515 (2003) endorsed a carefully planned diplomatic initiative - the
Roadmap - designedto find a path backto negotiations. The request for an advisory opinion isat
odds with the Roadmap. It is ultra vires the competence of tothEmergency Special Session.
4.2 This should bean end of the matter. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was the basison
which the Emergency Special Session was convenedand continued to act. It sets the terms of its
competence. Aviolationof its essential conditions is a sufficientbasis for impugning the vires of
the EmergencySpecial Sessionas regards its request foran advisory opinion.
4.3 For completeness, however, Israel observes that, given the active engagementof the
Security Council with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the advisory opinion request would also
have been ultra vires the competence of the General Assembly even when convened in regular
session. Israel does not question the General Assembly's secondary responsibility and
competence for the maintenance of international peace and security. Its responsibility and
competence in this field are, however, subsidiary to that of the Security Council. Under the
schemeof the Charter,in circumstancesin which the Security Council has acted in exercise of its
primary responsibility,the General Assembly has a dutyto exercise restraint. The principle of
63ARES1377 (V), 3 November 1950,"UnitingforPeace". (Annex 22) speciality referred to by the Court in respect of international organisations in general in its
advisory opinion on the Legality of the Use by States of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict
applies equally to the competence and balance of responsibility of organs of the United Nations.
These and related issues are addressed in more detail in the sections of this Chapter that follow
below.
B. Background
(9 The Conveningof the 1 dh Emergency Special Sessionof the GeneralAssembiy
4.4 On 7 March 1997, the Security Council convened to consider a draft resolution
addressing Israeli~ettlements.~~The draft did not achieve the requisite majority in consequence
of the negative vote of the United States. Speakingafter the vote, Mr Al-Kidwa, the Palestinian
Observer, stated interalia as follows:
"... the Council has been unable to assume its responsibilities for the
maintenance of international peace and security orto adopt the draft resolution
because one permanent member exercised its right of veto. ...
Accordingly, despite Ourdeep appreciation for the efforts of all, in view of the
Counci17sfailure to fulfil its obligations, we will request the members of the
United Nations to agree an emergency meeting of the General Assembly, to be
held in response to these developments in order to take appropriate action."65
4.5 Two weeks later, a fürther draft resolution was brought to the Council on the same topic
of ~ettlements.~~It too failed to achieve the requisite majority in consequence of the negative
vote of the United States. Speakingafter the vote, Mr Al-Kidwa, the Palestinian Observer, stated
as follows:
"... the Security Council has, for the second time, failed to carry out its
responsibilities and duties for the maintenance of international peace and
security, in accordance with the Charter ofthe United ~ations."~~
4.6 In a letter dated 31 March 1997 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent
Representativeof Qatar to the United Nations requested "that an emergency special session of the
64Sl1997/199,7 March 1997.
65Statementby MrAl-Kidwa, SlPV.3747,7 March 1997,at p.6.
SI19971241,21March 1997.
67Statementby MrAl-Kidwa, SlPV.3756,21 March 1997,at p.8. General Assembly be convenedpursuant to resolution 377 A (V), entitled 'Uniting for Peace'".
In relevant part, this letterstated as follows:
"The Group of Statesmembers of theLeagueof Arab Stateshas discussed the
dangerous situation resultingrom the illegal Israeli actions in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, in particular the commencement of
the construction of the Jabal AbuGhneim settlementto theouth of occupied
East Jerusalem, and other measures regarding Jerusalemand the building of
settlements.
The Arab States have considered the failure of the Security Council to
exercise its role in maintaining international peace and security owing to the
use of the veto by a permanent member of the Council on two successive
occasions in lessthan two weeks.
Given their belief that the illegal Israeli measures in question represent a
threat to international peace and security as undermining the Middle East
peace process and are in violation of international law and the relevant
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, and in the light of
Israel's persistence in these measuresand of the failure of the Security
Council to exercise its primary responsibility under the charter of the
United Nations, the States members of the League of Arab States have
decided that it isecessary to convene an emergency special session of the
General Assembly,pursuant to its resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950,
entitled 'Uniting for Peace', toconsider 'Illegal Israeli actions in occupied
East Jerusalemand the rest of the Occupied Palestinianrritory'.
Accordingly, and in my capacity as Permanent Representativeof the State of
Qatar to the UnitedNations,1request that an emergency special session ofthe
General Assembly be convened pursuant to resolution 377 A (V), entitled
'Unitingfor Peace', in orderto consider this importantmatter."68
4.7 Pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly as revisedby
the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the text of this letter was transmitUNd Member Statesby
the UN Secretary-Generalon 1April 1997. In a note dated 22 April 1997,the Secretary-General
informedMember Statesthat themajority of Members had concurred in Qatar's request and that,
accordingly,the tenth emergency special sessionwould convene on 24 April 1997.~~
4.8 Opening the first meeting of theothEmergency Special Sessionon 24 April 1997,the
Presidentof the Session stated as follows:
AIES-10/1, A22ril1997(emphasis added).
69AiEs-10/1, ~22nl 1997. "This emergency special session of the General Assembly reflects the
conviction of the membershipthat there exists an increasingly grave situation
involving peace and security. In the past two months, the Security Council
twice held extensive discussions, and the General Assembly once, on the
illegal Israeli actions in occupied EastJerusalem and the rest of the occupied
Palestinian territories. For the second time, the issue hasbeen placed before
the General Assembly. The discussions in the Security Councilhave proved
to be inconclusive, since it has been unable to take action because of lack
of unanimity of its permanent Members.
The convening of this session, which is being held in accordance with the
provisions of General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950,
entitled 'Uniting for Peace',at the request of a Member State and with the
concurrence of a large majority of Members, demonstrates clearly their
gravest concernand awareness of the implicationsof the present sit~ation."'~
4.9 Opening the debate,Mr Al-Kidwa setthe agenda in the followingterms:
"Yes, uniting for peace. Uniting against the violationof international lawand
United Nations resolutions. Unitingto confi-ont thearrogance of power and
the mentality of occupation. Uniting to oppose the misuse of the veto and
attempts to neutralise the Security Council. Uniting in order to rescue the
Middle East peace process. Yes, uniting for a just solution to the question of
Palestine and the establishmentof a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in
the region."7'
4.10 Following the debate, the Emergency Special Session adopted resolutionAIRESIES-
1012of 25 April 1997. By operative paragraph 13 of the resolution, the Emergency Special
Session decided to adjoum temporarily '70 resume its meetings upon request from Member
ta tes". 'he Emergency Special Sessionhas been reconvened, has been temporarily suspended,
and has been reconvened again on 11 separate occasions in the 6 '/zyear period since April
1997.73Its debates and resolutions overthis period have ranged very far from the question of the
70 Statement by Ambassador Razali Ismail of Malaysia, AIES-IOlPV.1, 24 April 1997, at p.2 (emphasis
added).
7'Statementby Mr Al-Kidwa,AIES-IOlPV.1,24 April 1997,atp.3.
72ARESIES- 1012,25 April 1997. (Dossier No.3)
73The Emergency Special Session("ESS') was reconvened on 15 July 1997 following a request of 7 July
1997 by the Permanent Representativeof Egypt, and Chairman of the Arab Group, Ambassador Elaraby;
AIES-10/8,7 July 1997. The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuantto operative paragraph 13
of ARESIES-1013, 15 July 1997(Dossier No.4). The ESS was again reconvened on 13November 1997
(AIES-10117,24 October 1997). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to operative
paragraph 9 of AIRESIES-1014,13November 1997 (Dossier No.5). The ESS was again reconvened on 17
March 1998 (AIES-10121,11 March 1998). The Session was again temporarily suspended pursuant to
operative paragraph 8of AIRESIES-1015,17March 1998 (Dossier No.6). The ESS was again reconvened
on 5 February 1999 (AIES-10131,26 January 1999). The Session was again temporarily suspended
pursuant to operative paragraph 10 of AIRESIES-1016,9 February 1999 (Dossier No.7). The ESS was Israeli "settlement activities in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area", the drafi resolutions on which were
vetoed in the Security Council by the United States, this being relied upon as the basis for the
convening of the Emergency Special Session pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
(ii) TheUniting for PeaceResolution
4.11 The Uniting for Peace Resolution was adopted by the 302"~ plenary meeting of the
General Assembly on 3 November 1950. lnsofar as is material for present purposes, it provides:
"The GeneralAssembly
Recognising that the first stated Purposes of the United Nations are:
'To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
forthe suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace', and
'To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace',
ReafJirmingthat it remains the primary duty of al1 Members of the United
Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement ofsuch
a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI
of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievementof the United Nations
in this regard on a number of previous occasions,
Findingthat international tension exists on a dangerous scale,
againreconvenedon 18October2000(AIES-]0136,13October2000). The Sessionwas againtemporarily
suspendedpursuantto operativeparagraph 12of AIRESIES-1017, 20October2000 (Dossier No.8).The
ESS was again reconvened on 20 December 2001 (AIES-101130,18 December 2001). Two resolutions
were adopted at this reconvened Session, AIRESIES-1018,20 December 2001 (Dossier No.!)) and
AIRESIES-1019, 20December 2001 (Dossier No.10). The Session was again temporarily suspended
pursuantto operative paragraph3 of the latter resolution. The ESSwas againreconvened on 7 May 2002
(AIES-101170,3 May 2002). The Session was again temporanly suspended pursuant to operative
paragraph 10 of AIRESIES-101107 , May 2002 (Dossier No.11). The ESS was again reconvened on 5
August 2002 (AIES-1011 87, 1 August 2002). The Session was again temporarilysuspended pursuant to
operative paragraph8 of AIRESIES-1 O111, 10 September 2002 (Dossier No.12). The ESS was again
reconvenedon 19September2003 (AIES-101237, 17 September2003). The Sessionwas againtemporarily
suspended pursuantto operative paragraph 4 of AIRESIES-10112, 25September 2003 (Dossier No.13).
The ESS wasagain reconvened on 20 October2003 (AIES-101242,15 October 2003). The Session was
again temporanly suspended pursuant to operative paragraph 4 of AIRESIES-10113,27 October 2003
(Dossier No.14). Most recently, theESS was again reconvened on 8 December 2003 (AIES-101249,2
December2003). Recalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled 'Essentials of peace',which States
that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is
primarily responsible for the continuance ofinternationaltension, and desiring
to contribute furtherto the objectivesofthat resolution,
Reaflrming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its
primary responsibility for the maintenanceof international peaceand security,
and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise
restraint inthe use of the veto,
Reaflrming that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces
provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council,and
desiring to ensure that, pendingthe conclusion of such agreements, the United
Nations has at its disposa1 means for maintaining international peace and
security,
Conscious that failure of the Security Councilto discharge its responsibilities
on behalf of al1the Member States, particularlythose responsibilities referred
to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their
obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to
maintain internationalpeaceand security,
Recognising in particular that such failure does not deprive the General
Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilitieser the Charter in
regard tothe maintenanceof international peaceand security,
Recognising that discharge by the General Assembly of its responsibilities in
these respects calls for possibilitiesof observation which would ascertainthe
facts and expose aggressors;for the existence of armed forces which could be
used collectively; and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the
General Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collective action
which, to be effective, should beprompt,
1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity
of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and securityin any case where
there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately
with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for
collective measures,including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of
aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore
international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General
Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hoursof
the request therefore. Such emergency special session shall be called if
requestedby the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a
majorityof the Membersofthe United Nations; 2. Adopts for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set
forth in the annexto thepresentresolution;
3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commission ... which could observe
and report on the situation in any area where there exists internationaltension
the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of
the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General
Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session,
may utilise the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the
functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question.
Decisions to utilise the Commissionshall be made on the affirmative vote of
two-thirds of the members presentand voting. The SecurityCouncil may also
utilise the Commissionin accordancewith itsauthority underthe Charter.
4.12 Pursuant to operative paragraph 2 of and the Annex to the Resolution, various
amendmentswere madeto the Rulesof Procedure of the General Assembly.
4.13 A number of salient features of the resolution warrant emphasis. First, the Uniting for
Peace Resolution recognises that the Security Council has primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. This is expressly stated, for example, in the
seventh preambular paragraph of the resolution. Second,the resolution affirms the General
Assembly's subsidiary responsibility forthe maintenance of international peace and security.
This is stated, for example, in the tenth preambular paragraph of the resolution. Third, the
resolution expressly afirms a hierarchical relationship between the Security Council and the
General Assembly in respect of their overlapping cornpetence and responsibility in this area.
Thus, for example, the ninth preambular paragraph contemplates circumstances in which the
Security Council fails to discharge its responsibilities. The point is affirmed in operative
paragraph 1of the resolution asregardsthe circumstances in which the General Assemblywill be
competentto consider a matter. It is reinforced in operative paragraph 3 of the resolution which
provides that the General Assembly may utilise the Peace Observation Commission - a body
establishedby the General Assembly - in respect of a matter only in circumstances in which "the
Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the
matter in question".
74A/RES/377(V), 3 November 1950,emphasis added. (Annex 22) 4.14 Fourth, and most significantly, the resolution lays down a condition precedent to any
consideration of a matter by the General Assembly under the framework of the resolution. By
operative paragraph 1 of the resolution, the General Assembly shall consider a matter
immediately "if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members,
fails to exercise its pnmary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
in any case". The question in any case in which there may be a request for the General Assembly
to convene to consider a matter, or for an Emergency Special Sessionto act in respect of a matter,
is whether the Security Council, in consequence of the lack of unanimity of the permanent
members, has failed to exercise itsrimary responsibility in the case.
4.15 Fifth, the resolution also lays down various procedural rules relevant to the convening
of the General Assembly pursuant to the resolution to consider a matter. Operative paragraph 2,
together with the annex to the resolution, amends the General Assembly's Rules of Procedure as
regards the convening of meetings of the Assembly pursuant to the terms of the resolution. Of
some importance, operative paragraph 1 provides that the Assembly may meet in emergency
special session to consider a matter pursuant to the terms of the resolution in circumstances in
which the General Assembly is not in ordinary session.
4.16 The Uniting for Peace Resolution is part of the fabric of the United Nations. It aMirms
the competence of the General Assembly under the Charter in circumstances in which the
Security Council is unable to act. At the same time, however, it draws the limits on this
competence in circumstances in which the Council is able to and has acted. It is a resolution of
the General Assembly itself. It reflects the balance of responsibilities and competence between
the principal executive organ and the principal deliberative organ of the United Nations. The
strictures of its terms cannot beightly discounted or wished away by the creative intent of some
of the Members ofthe United Nations to achieve some private political purpose.
C. The Exerciseby the Securiîy Council of its Primary Responsibility
in Respect of the Israeli-PalestinianConflict Subsequentto the Convening
of theloth Emergency Special Session
4.17 As noted in Chapter 3, the Security Council has been actively engaged in attempts to
find a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the past 40 months of violence.
Resolution 1322 (2000) of 7 October 2000, adopted some days after the violence first erupted, reaffirmed the Council's view "that a just and lasting solution to the Arab and Israeli conflict
must be based on itsresolutions 242 (1967) of22 November 1967and 338 (1973) of 22 October
1973,through an active negotiatingprocess."75 Resolution 1397(2002) of 12March 2002again
recalled resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and, for the first time explicitly, affirmed "a
vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and
recognised borders". Israel has endorsed this vision, as the statement, quotedin Chapter 3, by
Prime Minister Sharon at the Aqaba Summit on 4 June 2003 attests. This resolution of the
Security Council has become the central pivot of recent attempts to find a path back to
negotiations.
4.18 In March-April 2002, the Security Council was again actively engaged, adopting
resolutions 1402 (2002), 1403 (2002) and 1405 (2002), as well as issuing a Statement by the
President ofthe Security Council supporting the initiativeof the Quartet that was later to become
the Roadmap. A further PresidentialStatementsupporting theQuartet initiative was issued on 18
July 2002 and resolution 1435 (2002) adopted on 24 September 2002. Following its fonnal
presentation to the two sides, the Roadmap was transmitted to the Security Council under cover
of a letterfromthe UN Secretary-Generalof 7 May 2003.
4.19 In early October 2003, a number of elements of the Israeli-Palestinian and wider Arab-
Israeli conflict came again before the Security Council. On Saturday, 4 October 2003, a
Palestinian suicide bomberfrom Jenin, acting in the name of Islamic Jihad, killed 19 people and
injured a further 60, some critically,in Maxim's restaurantin Haifa. This was the attack, noted in
Chapter 3, which killed 5 members of the Almog family. Islamic Jihad receives active support
from Syria. Israel accordingly took action against terrorist facilitiesin Syria in response to the
attack. No one was killed or injured in the Israeli action.
4.20 In response to Israel's action, 17 States from the Arab League proposed a drafi
resolution to the Security Council on 5 October 2003 condemnatory of Israel's c~nduct.~~No
reference was made inthe drafi resolution to Syria's active support for the terroristgroupthat the
preceding day had killed so many. The Council, on the eve of Yom Kippur, met to consider the
75SIRES11322(2000),7 October 2000, at the third preambular paragraph (emphasis added).
76Sl20031340,5 October 2003. drafi resolution the same day.77 Absent support for the draft resolution, it was not pressed to a
vote.
4.21 It is worth noting extracts from some of the statements made by Members of the
Security Council in the course of the debate. Taken together, they point to a widely held view
amongst Members of the Council that the Roadmapis the only option for finding a resolution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Mr Wang Guangya(China)
"China is gravely concerned about the latest developments in the Middle East
situation. We strongly condemn the suicide bombingof 4 October, which
resulted in many innocent civilian casualties. We oppose any measures that
may threaten the peace process between Israel and Palestine. We strongly
urge both sides to cease acts of violence and any other acts that may
exacerbate tensions. We hope that theywill return to the proper trackof
settling disputes through negotiation as soonas possible."78
Sir Emyr Jones Parry(UnitedKingdom)
"Let me be clear that Israel's actiontoday is unacceptable and represents an
escalation. Israel shouldnot allow itsjustified anger at continuing terrorism to
lead to actions that undermineboth the peace process and, we believe, Israel's
own interests. But we have to recognise that terroristsare continuing to
attack Israel and thatthey are being permittedto do so. There is a heavy
responsibility on al1those who are in a position to act against terrorism to do
so. That has been affirmedby the Security Council many times, and perhaps
most clearly in resolution 1373(2001).
Allowing impunityto those committedto using terror as a political instrument
serves only to undermine peace andprevent progress in the Middle East peace
process. The United Kingdom believes that lasting security can only be
assured by a successful peaceprocess, as was stressed at the conclusion ofthe
Quartet meetingheld in NewYork on 25 September. We believe that al1sides
should exercise restraint andnow reinforce their efforts to implement theroad
map. In the next day, the Security Council should doal1that it can to help
bring that about. We will al1have to reflect carefully on the best message
we can now send in order that we reinforce the prospects of the road
map, and do so at a precarious momentin the Middle ~ast."~~
77SlPV.4836, 5 October2003. (Annex 23)
78SlPV.4836, 5 October2003, at p.9 (emphasisadded). (Annex 23)
79SIPV.4836,S October2003, at p.9(emphasis added). (Annex 23)
66 Mr Gatilov (RussianFederation)
"The ongoing escalation of violence in the Middle East requires more
energetic action on the part of the international communityin order to prevent
an even more dangerous aggravation of the situation. It is important now to
press the parties to the conflict to halt the confrontation as soon as possible
and to restore the politicalprocess,the final goal of which is a comprehensive
settlement in the region. To that end, what we need above al1is to unblock
the way fomard on the road map, to which there is no alternative in
finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Palestinians and
Israelis alike must resume their dialogue and begin to carry out their
obligations under the r~adma~."'~
Mr Pleuger (Germany)
"We are very concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East.
We feel that we have to break the vicious cycle of violence and counter-
violence. De-escalation, we feel, is possible only by a return to
implementing the road map as proposed by the Quartet. There is no
alternative to the road map for finding a resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and for creating peace and stability in the Middle
~ast.""
Mr De La Sablière (France)
"1stress once again that the situation inthe Middle East is mostalarming. In
such difficult circumstances,we appeal to al1parties - particularlythe Israelis,
Palestinians and Syrians - to allow reason to prevail over the threat of
escalation. There can be no lasting security without peace. Peacecan prevail
only through negotiation, not by the force of arms. It is essential that the
opportunity for a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement be sought in
accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. The road map,
which contains Syrian and Lebanese tracks, must be given a ~hance."'~
Mr Tafrov (Bulgaria)
"Bulgaria categorically condemns the terrorist act carried out yesterday in
Haifa, as we always do on such occasions. It is important for al1those who
make such acts possible to do their utmostto end them by ceasing al1material
and moral support to them. The murder of an innocent child is particularly
repugnant.
Bulgaria believes that Israel's anned action against the Syrian Arab Republic
is not in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations or with
international law. Like other delegations, we consider it to have been an
unacceptableact. The only resolution of the Middle East crisis - which has
of late grown more serious - lies in the implementation of the road map
S/PV.4836,5 October 2003, at pp.9 - 10(emphasis added). (Annex 23)
''S/PV.4836,5 October 2003,at p.10(emphasis added). (Annex 23)
82S/PV.4836,5 October 2003, at pp.lO - 11(emphasis added). (Annex 23) devised by the Quartet, as the Quartet itself noted in its statement
following its most recent meeting in New ~ork."'~
Mr Mufioz (Chile)
"The international community views with alarm these developments and
their impact on the peace process and the road map on which the Quartet
is seeking to make progress for the benefit of the majority,who, webelieve,
seek peace and coexistence among Israel, Palestine, Syria and al1 other
neighbours in theregi~n."~~
Mr Gaspar Martins (Angola)
"We needto see a real commitmentby the parties to the conflict to put a stop
to the logic of violence. Violence is not stopped with violence. We reiterate
Our appeal to the States in the region to create a climate conducive to
progress in the implementation of the road map, which, alone, will bring
a stopto the building of walls, or to acts that took place over the weekend
in Haifa and Damascus. My delegation unequivocally condemnssuch acts.
A clear commitment to peace and moderation in the Middle East is long
overd~e."~~
Mr Belinga-Eboutou (Cameroon)
"We urgently appealto the international negotiators,in particularthe Quartet,
immediately to take actions aimed at the containment of the situation and to
accelerate thetaking of bold steps, which the Secretary-Generalreferredto on
26 September. Such bold steps, in keeping with the roadmap, should deal
simultaneously with the fundamental needs of the two parties, namely,
security for Israel and an end to occupation for ~alestine."~~
4.22 On 9 October 2003,refusing to heed the cal1of Members of the Security Counciljust 5
days earlier for moderation in an attempt to get back to the Roadmap, the Permanent
Representative of Syria, as Chairman of the Arab Group, wrote to the President of the Security
~ouncil.~' The letter referred to "the decision by Israel to proceed with the construction of its
expansionist conquest wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory". Annexed to the letter was a
draft resolution for considerationby the Council which, in operative paragraph 1, would have had
the Council decide that the "wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories departing from the
armistice line of 1949 is illegal under relevant provisions of international law". This draft
resolution was subsequently supersededby a fùrther draft resolution proposed by Syria, Guinea,
--
83S/PV.4836,5 October 2003,at p.11 (emphasis added).(Annex23)
84SPV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.l (emphasis added).(Annex23)
85S/PV.4836,5 October 2003, at p.12 (emphasis added)(Annex23)
86SlPV.4836, 5 October 2003, at p.13(emphasis added)(Annex 23)
" S/2003/973,9 October 2003. (DossierNo.73) Malaysia and Pakistan of 14 October 2003 which, withsome additional preambular paragraphs,
repeated operativeparagraph 1of the earlier draftreso~ution.~~
4.23 The Security Council met to debate the issues on 14 October 2003.~~A vote on the
proposed draft resolution was defeated by the negative vote of the United States. Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Germany and the United Kingdom abstained from supporting the draft resolution.
Extracts of a number of the statements madeinthe courseofthe debate warrant citation:
Sir Emyr JonesParry(United Kingdom - abstaining)
"The United Kingdom is gravely concerned about the prospects for peacein
the Middle East. It is vital that both sides realise exactly how much is now at
stake. The United Kingdom is committed to the Quartet's road map as
the best way ahead to implement the vision ofthe two States, living side
by side in peace and security. It is essential that thetwo sides implement
the obligations containedin the roadmap.
That is why the United Kingdom believes that the international community
has a direct stake in the peace process. A continuing, strong international
commitment to the road map-based process is imperative. A strong and
determined Quartet can play a vital role, closely following road map
implementationthrough reports of monitors and making an extra effort where
it detectsproblemsor deficiencies.
But, ultimately, Israel's security can only be achieved through a just and
lasting settlement negotiatedbetweenthe two parties. A Palestinian Statewill
not be created by acts of terrorism. The road map offers the region the best
opportunity for peace. In that context, we look to both the Israelis and the
Palestiniansto move forward in implementing their obligationsunder the first
phase."90
Mr Tafrov(Bulgaria -abstaining)
"Bulgaria is convinced that the road map alone is the answer to the
problemsof the Middle East. Both parties must do their utmost to overcome
their differences, to resume their contacts and to continue joint efforts to
create two States living within internationally recognised boundaries, as
providedfor by Security Council resolutions.
''Sl20031980,14October 2003. (Dossier No.84)
90SlPV.4841, 14October 2003(Dossier No.44) and SiPV.4842, 14October 2003 (Dossier No.45).
SlPV.4841, 14October 2003,at pp.13 - 14(emphasis added). (Dossier No.44) Bulgaria believes that it is necessary for the entire international
communiiy, and in particular the members of the Quartet, to convince
both parties to implement the road map. At that point, there would no
longer be any reason to build the wall, and prospects for a peaceful
resolution would in~rease."~'
Mr Lavrov (RussianFederation - in favour)
"We believe that ifthe roadmap is not madebinding in nature, it may remain
on paper and the region will ultimately be swept up in a wave of violence.
This is why, during the meeting of the Quartet in New York this September,
the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, Igor Ivanov, put forward an
initiative for the adoption of a special Security Council resolution that
would approve the road map. This proposa1not only remains valid, it is
becoming ever moreurgent."92
Mr Pleuger (Germany - abstaining)
"The members of the Quartet continue to back the road map for peace as
accepted by both sides at the Aqaba Summit, held on 4 June 2003. We cal1
upon both the Israeli and Palestinian Governments to continue to
implement the road map in good faith, because we feel there is no
alternativetothe road map as the way to peace."93
4.24 It is important to notewhat the draft resolution did propose. It did not propose that
the SecurityCouncil requestan advisory opinion fromthe Court on the question of thelegality of
the fence,its legal consequences or anythingelse.
4.25 Immediately following the vote in the Security Council, Syria, acting as Chair of the
Arab Group, requested a reconvening of the 10' Emergency Special Session of the General
~ssembl~.~~The Emergency Special Sessionwas reconvened on 20 October 2003. The meeting
had before it two draft resolutions, the first requesting an advisory opinion from the Court, the
second purporting to declarethe illegalityof the fence. In the light of discussions, it was evident
that there was strong opposition to an advisory opinion request. The draft resolution on the
subject was not, therefore, pressed to a vote. On 27 October 2003, the Emergency Special
Session adopted resolution ES-10113.~~Operative paragraph 1 of the resolution demanded that
"Israel stop and reverse the construction of the wall" and declared it to be in "contradiction to
91SlPV.4841, 14October 2003, at pp.14 - 15(emphasis added). (Dossier No.44)
92SlPV.4841, 14October 2003, at p.15(emphasis added). (Dossier No.44)
93SlPV.4841, 14October 2003, at p.19(emphasis added). (Dossier No.44)
94AIES-101242,15October 2003. (Dossier No.74)
95A/RES/ES-I0113,27 October 2003. (Dossier No.14) relevant provisions of international law". Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution called upon
both parties to "fulfil their obligationsunder relevant provisionsof the roadmap".
4.26 On 30 October 2003, three days after this vote, in keeping with the earlier initiative of
the Russian Foreign Minister referredto in the Security Council debate on 14 October 2003,
Russia proposed a draft resolutionin the SecurityCouncil on theRoadmap. The text of this draft,
which was the subject of extended private deliberations amongst Members of the Security
Council, was adopted unanimouslyby the Security Council on 19November 2003 as resolution
1515 (2003).~~ On the same day, the Security Council held another meeting also to consider
issues relatingto the Israeli-Palestinian~onflict.~'
4.27 Nineteen days after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1515 (2003), the 10~
Emergency Special Session adopted the resolution currently in issue requesting an advisory
opinion. Extracts fi-oma number of the statements made during the debate on this resolution
were set out in Chapter 3. It is evident fi-omthe statements that there was a widely held view
amongst Council Members that, in the words of Representative of Germany in the Security
Council, "[tlhere is no alternative to the road map for finding a resolution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflictand for creatingpeace andstability in the Middle~ast."~'
D. The Advisory OpinionRequest is Ultra Vire the Cornpetenceof the
lothEmergency Special Sessionandlor the General Assembly
4.28 As will beclear from the preceding, the Security Councilhas been intimatelytaken up
with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict overthe past two years (and more)in an attempt to bring the
two sides back to negotiations. This involvement has rangedfrom the affirmation of the visionof
a two-State solution to the conflict in resolution 1397(2002), to active support for the Quartet
initiative throughout the preparatory processof the Roadmap, to the unanimous endorsement of
the Roadmap in resolution 1515 (2003). The principal protagonists of the Roadmap within the
Security Council, as well as others, have repeatedly emphasised the importanceof the Roadmap
and expressly sought to discourage, as destabilisingto attempts to bring the two sides together,
96S/PV.4862,19 November 2003. (Annex 24)
97S/PV.4861,19 November 2003. (Annex 24)
9%See paragraph4.21 above. precisely the kinds of initiatives that were brought to thelothEmergency Special Session in its
October and December 2003 meetings.
4.29 As will be evidentfrom the discussionin Chapter3, virtuallyany response by the Court
on the substance of the request for an opinion would cut across and risk destabilising the
Roadmap. This issue is addressed furtherin Chapter 9. The questionat this point is different. It
is whether, given the active engagement by the Security Council with the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and its unanimous endorsement ofa particular initiativejust 19 days before the advisory
opinion request, it was open to the 1O"Emergency SpecialSession, acting under the Uniting for
Peace Resolution,to set in train a process differentto that beingpursued bythe Secunty Council.
Israel contendsthat it was not open to the Emergency Special Session to proceed in this manner.
Moreover, the General Assembly convened in regular session would have been similarly
precluded from so acting.
(i) TheAdvisory Opinion Requestis UltraVires the Competenceof the
Emergency Special Session Underthe Unitingfor Peace Resolution
4.30 As already noted, the lothEmergency Special Session was convened in April 1997
following the US veto in the Security Council of two draft resolutions concerning "settlement
activities in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area" in Jerusalem. It has been a rolling session ever since,
ranging farfromthe subjectmatter of the original issueit was convened to address.
4.31 By reference to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, there are a number of highly
problematical questions relevant to the conduct of the 10" Emergency Special Session. For
example, is the rolling character of the Emergency Special Session - having been convened and
reconvened on 12 separate occasions since April 1997 - consistent with the Uniting for Peace
Resolution and the revised Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly adopted pursuant
thereto? Israelcontends that it is not. The Uniting for Peace Resolution contemplates the
convening of emergency special sessions in accordance with a specific procedure to address a
specific issue of immediate concem. The Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly were
revised to meet this objective. Rolling emergency special sessions which are reconvened at a
time and on a subject that is detached from the original sessionare at odds with the very intent of
the Unitingfor PeaceResolutionand the Assembly's Rules of Procedure. 4.32 This practice, indeed, has been thesubject of long-standing concern andcriticism by a
number of Members of the United Nations over many years. For example, addressing the
resumption of the 7thEmergency Special Sessionin 1982 some 21 months after its temporary
adjournment, US Ambassador JeaneKirkpatrick, in a letter addressed to the President of the
GeneralAssembly, statedas follows:
"It seems plain thatthe purpose of this 'temporary'adjournmentwas to allow
for a resumption in the same time fiame if events warranted. Wedo not
believe that Members contemplated thatthe sessioncould be maintainedin its
state of adjournment indefinitelywith the possibility of being 'resumed' on
request. Indeed, two regular sessions, two emergency sessions and one
special session of the General Assemblyhave been heldsince that time. What
is now proposed is that, at the request of a group of Members, and
notwithstanding the passage of a substantial period of time, an emergency
special session should be reconvened withoutregard to the views of the
majority of the membership of the United Nations or to developments that
may have taken place. This dubious procedure of a 'resumption' has the
effect of undermining the provisionsof the rules of procedure of the General
Assembly for the convening of an emergencyspecial session. In the opinion
of the United States, itis not possible some 21 months after adjournments to
'resume' the old session. We cannot understand how the word 'temporary'
can be stretchedto cover a gap of this d~ration."~~
4.33 This view was supported atthe time by others, including1srae1.'~~ The point remains
unresolved today. For example, while not explicitly challenging its rolling character, US
Ambassador John Negroponte nevertheless expressedthe doubts of the United States about the
reconveningof the 10" Emergency Special Sessionin May 2002in the followingterms:
"The United States is fully committed to a settlement of the conflict in the
Middle East. ...
We believe that the best way forward is to advance the comprehensive
strategy thatthe 'quartet'reaffirmedat its meeting lastweek. ...
The Security Councilmet 32 times on the Middle East last month, sidelining
al1othermatters. Frankly, weare puzzled by the Palestinian decisionto resort
to a resumption of the emergency special session at this time of Secunty
Councilactivism and new diplomaticinitiative.""'
99AIES-7116, 19 April 1982.
'O0See, for exarnplAIES-711 8, 22 April 1982.
'O'AIES-1OlPV.16,7 May 2002, at p.12. 4.34 An additional problematical aspect of the 10"' Emergency Special Session is the
convening of its meeting on the advisory opinion request at the same time as the General
Assembly was meeting in regular session. Indeed, the propriety of holdingan emergency special
session simultaneously with a regular session was expressly rejected by the President of the
General Assembly at the time of the 1" Emergency Special Session in 1956 in the following
terms:
"Holding simultaneous sessions would be contrary to the provisions for
convening emergency special sessions, which are held solely because the
General Assembly is not in regular session at the time. The drafters of the
rules relating to emergency meetings had not intended such meetings to be
held when the Assembly was in regular session and thus fully capable of
dealing withthe itemsbefore it."'02
4.35 The propriety of this view was formally confirmed by resolution 1003(ES-1)of the lst
Emergency Special Sessionon 10November 1956 which transferred the items on the agenda of
the Emergency Special Session to the provisional agenda of the 1lth regular session of the
General Assembly for considerationin that forum.Io3The express terms of operative paragraph 1
of the Uniting for PeaceResolutionalso confirm the correctness ofthis approach.Io4
4.36 The prohibition on convening an emergency special session while the General
Assembly is in regular session was also emphasised in a Memorandum prepared by the Office of
Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat on25 August 1967. Supportingthe statement,
quoted above, of the Presidentof the General Assembly at the time of the 1" Emergency Special
Session,the Memorandumconcluded:
"...there would seem to be considerable merit in the argument advanced by
the President of the first emergency special session ... that holding
simultaneous sessionswould be contrary to the purpose of emergency special
sessions, as a device for speedily convening the Assembly when it is not
alreadyin session."'05
102UN GAOR, 1"Emergency Special Session,572"dPlenary Meeting, at paragraph 28.
103Resolution 1003(ES-1),10November 1956.
'O4Operative paragraph 1 Statesinter alia: "If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in
emergency special session.."
'O5UnitedNations Juridical Yearbook, 1967, p.321,at p. 324. The same point is made in Simma (ed.), The
UnitedNations Charter:A Commentaty (2001), at pp.387 - 389. 4.37 There are other questions,too, which go to the essential proprietyof the conductof the
10" Emergency Special Session. It is not Israel's intention, however, in the context of these
proceedings, to engage in detailed debates on every aspect of the procedural conduct of the
Emergency Special Session. What is of more fundamental concem as regards these proceedings
is the evident disregardby the 10" Emergency Special Session of the conditionprecedent in the
Uniting for PeaceResolutionto any consideration ofa matter by the General Assembly.
4.38 Operative paragraph 1 of the Uniting for Peace Resolution provides that the General
Assembly
"Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails th exercise its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there
appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,
the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures
...,7106
4.39 This is the declared basis on which the lothEmergency Special Sessionwas convened
and is said to have been acting. The fundamental question is thus whether, in this case, the
Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, has indeed failed to
exercise its primary responsibilityfor the maintenanceof international peace and security. It goes
without saying that, while, in the first instance, this will be a matter for the appreciation of the
General Assembly itself, the question engages the interpretation ofa central pillar of Charter
architecture designedto clarifi and elaborate on the competence of and division of responsibility
between two of the Organisation's principal organs. It is thus a matter which comes properly
within the purview of the Court in proceedingssuch as this.
4.40 One observation needs immediatelyto be made. The SecurityCouncil was never seised
of a draft resolution proposing that the Council itselfshould request an advisory opinionfiom the
Court on the matters now in contention. It may be that the CO-sponsorsof the resolution in the
Emergency Special Session calculated that such a draft would not have attracted sufficient
support in the Councilto have had any chance of adoption. The point atthis stage is simple. It is
that there has been no lackof unanimity of the permanent members or failure by the Council to
'O6Emphasisadded. act on the matter which the CO-sponsorsof the advisory opinion request brought before the
Emergency Special Session. The matter was simplv never brou~htbeforethe SecuritvCouncil.
4.41 The relevance of the point is cogently made by a number of commentators. Thus, for
example, Wolfrumhas observed:
"... there is an indispensable precondition forany action taken by the General
Assembly that the Security Council has discussed the topic first, because only
this can have resultedin a lack of unanimitybetweenits mernber~."'~~
4.42 Similarly, Reicherhas commented:
"... the Security Council must have dealt with the issue before the General
Assembly may take any action whatsoever. It cannot be said that the Council
has failed to exercise its primary peacekeepingfünction by virtue of a lack of
unanimity among permanent members unless the matter has at the very least
been discussedin the Council. In fact, one maygo fùrther and suggest that for
the pre-condition in Part A to be fulfilled, the deliberations in the Council
must be brought to a vote. How else can a lack of unanimity be
estab~ished?"'~~
4.43 The CO-sponsorsof the advisory opinion request will no doubt point to the lack of
unanimity of the permanent members on 14 October 2003 when the Council failed to adopt a
draft resolution proposing the illegalityof the fence. This, of course, is accurate but it leaves out
of account a critical factor. Under the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the competence of the
General Assembly is engaged not simply by a lack of unanimity of the permanent members, but
by a lack of unanimity which results in the Security Council's failureto exercise its primary
responsibilityforthe maintenanceof international peace andsecurity.
4.44 It is evident from the extracts from the statements of the Members of the Security
Council, quoted above, on both sides of the issue in their 14October 2003 meeting on the fence
that, notwithstanding their differencesof view on the question then before them, it was common
ground that the only way forward on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was through negotiations
between thetwosides underthe fiamework of the Roadmap.
--
'O'Rudiger Wolfrum (ed.), UnitedNations: Law, Policies andPractice (1995), Volume 2, at p.1343.
'OsHany Reicher, "The Uniting for Peace Resolution on the Thirtieth Anniversary of its Passage" (1981)
20 ColumbiaJournal of TransnationalLaw, at p.40. 4.45 Significantly, this appreciation translated almost immediately into a Russian led
initiative for the Security Council to endorse the Roadmap. This was a matter of active
deliberation by the Security Council in late October and November 2003, culminating in the
unanimous adoption of resolution 1 515(2003)on 19November 2003, beforethe 12threconvened
session of the loth Emergency Special Session was even requested. There was no lack of
unanimity of the permanent membersof the Security Council here. There was no failureby the
Council to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of internationalpeace and
security. On the contrary, in this case the Charterwas workingjust as it was conceived to work.
The Security Council, after full and considered deliberation over an extended period of time,
endorsed a course of action on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There was no basis under the
Uniting for Peace Resolution for the 10' Emergency Special Session to proceedon an initiative
of its own. The advisory opinion request was thus ultra vires the competence of the 10Ih
Emergency Special Sessionunderthe Uniting for Peace Resolution.
(ii) TheAdvisory OpinionRequest WouidHave BeenUltra Viresthe Competence
of the GeneralAssembly Convened inReguiar Session
4.46 That the advisory opinion request by the loth Emergency Special Session was ultra
vires the Uniting for Peace Resolution should be an end of the matter. For completeness,
however, lest Israel's interlocutors suggestthat this is purely a forma1objection, two further
observations are required. First, Israel's objections concerningthe vires of the 10IhEmergency
Special Session cannot be lightly dismissed as formal. The Emergency Special Session,
conducting itselfin a highly dubious and questionable fashion, purported to actunder the Uniting
for Peace Resolution. The resolution is part of the essential fabric of the Charter, addressingthe
competence of and balance of responsibility between the Security Council and the General
Assembly on mattersgoing to the maintenance of international peaceand security. A violationof
its essential precepts and preconditions for action cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
properly characterised asformal.
4.47 More fundamentally, Israel contends that, given the active engagement of the Security
Council with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would not have been open to the General
Assembly in regularsession to adoptthe advisory opinion request. 4.48 Kelsen, writing in his seminal 1950 work The Law ofthe UnitedNations, observed as
follows about the competence ofthe General Assembly andSecurityCouncil to request advisory
opinions under Article 96(1) of the Charter:
"The competence of requesting advisory opinions as establishedby Article 96,
paragraph 2, in contradistinctionto that establishedby Article 96, paragraph 1,
is restricted in so far as the organs authorised by the General Assembly are
permitted to request advisory opinionsonly on legalquestions 'arising within
the scope of their activities'. No such restriction is imposed upon the
analogous competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council in
paragraph 1 of Article 96. Nevertheless, these organs, too, are competentto
request advisory opinions on legal questions only if such questions arise
within the scope of their activities,that is to Say,withintheirjurisdiction. The
determination of any organ'sjurisdiction implies the nom not to act beyond
the scope of its activity as determined by the legal instrument instituting the
organ. It is not very likely that it was so intended to enlarge, by Article 96,
paragraph 1, the scope of the activity of the General Assembly and the
Security Council determined by other Articles of the Charter. Hence the
words 'arising within the scopeof their activities' in paragraph2 of Article 96
are redundant."'09
4.49 Judge Schwebel appeared to find this analysis persuasive,"0 although Judge Higgins
observes that an advisory opinion requestentails no substantive enlargement of the scope of the
activity ofthe requesting organ.I1l As a general observation, this latter assessmentmay indeed be
correct. The question in the present case, however,is whether, giventhe scheme of the Charter
and the competence of and balance of responsibility between the Security Council and the
General Assembly thereunder, it would beopen to the General Assemblyto request an advisory
opinion of the Court on a matter which overlaps with action taken by the Security Council in the
context of its exerciseof its primary responsibilityunder the Charter and which would have the
effect of hindering thework of the Council.
4.50 Israel does not question that the General Assembly is also concerned with international
peace andsecurity under the scheme of the Charter. The point is so well established - including
by the jurisprudence of the Court in the Expenses case112- as not even to warrant comment.
109
Hans Kelsen, TheLaw of the UnitedNations, 1950,at p.546.
"O Schwebel, S.M., "Authorising the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Request Advisory
Opinionsof the InternationalCourt of Justice", (1984) 78 AJIL 869, at 8-4875.
IIIHiggins, R., "A comment on the health of Advisory Opinions", in Lowe and Fitzmaurice (eds.), Ffi
years of the InternationalCourt ofJustice, 1996, p.567, at p.577.
Il2Certain fipenses of the United Nations (Article17,paragraph 2, of the Charter),Advisory Opinion of
20July 1962: I.C.JReports 1962,p.151,at p.163. Israel contends, however, that, when the Security Council is acting in exercise of its primary
responsibility, the General Assembly is under a duty to exercise restraint. Indeed, this very
appreciation isthe central pivotof the Uniting for Peace Resolutionitself.
4.51 It is well known that Article 24(1) of the Charter gives the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of internationalpeace and security. It is also well known that
it isthe Security Council,and the SecurityCouncil alone,which iscompetentto take action under
Chapter VI1 of the Charter. In addition, the Security Council is also virtually exclusively
competentto act under Chapter VI of the Charter in respect of the pacific settlement of disputes.
Thus, while Article 35 of the Charter establishesa limited competence to bring certain matters to
the attention of the General Assembly, Article 35(3) provides expressly that any proceedings of
the General Assembly on such matters are subjectto the constraints of Articles 11and 12 of the
Charter, the latter of which restricts the competence of the General Assembly in circumstances
where the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions
assignedto it under the Charter.
4.52 More significantly, Articles 33, 34, 36, 37 and 38 of Chapter VI accord special
responsibilities in respect ofthe pacific settlementof disputO& to the Security Council. Thus,
under Article 33, it is the Security Council that is competent to cal1upon parties to a dispute to
settle the dispute by peaceful means. Under Article 34, it is the Security Council that may
investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction. Under Article
36(1), it is the Security Council that may recommend appropriate methods of adjustment.
Significantly, under Article 36(3), it is the Security Council that is enjoined to "take into
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the
International Court of Justice". It follows, by implication, that any request for an advisory
opinion on such matters falls presumptively within the competence of the Security Council, not
the General Assembly, especially when the Security Council has acted in exercise of its primary
responsibility under the Charter. This, indeed, was the approach adoptedin the Namibia case, in
which it wasthe Security Council that requested an opinionfiom the Court.
4.53 Under Article 37, it is again the Security Council that is competent to recommend terms
for the settlementof a dispute. The Security Council is again competent under Article 38. 4.54 The upshot of this is that, while the General Assembly is undoubtedly concernedwith
the maintenance of international peace andsecurity, its competence in respect of the pacific
settlement of disputes is secondary,based on its general powers under Chapter IV of the Charter
rather than on any specialpowers derived from Chapter VI of the Charter. Specialpowers to act
in this area are accorded exclusivelyto the Security Council. The Uniting for Peace Resolution
accurately reflects this balance of competence and responsibility between the Security Council
and the General Assembly.
4.55 Other provisions of the Charter, too, afirm the competence and responsibility of the
Security Council to act in respect of international peace and security to the evident exclusionof
the General Assembly. Thus, for example, Articles 52 to 54 of the Charter, concerned with
regional arrangements, accord a role to the Security Council alone in respect of such matters.
Similarly, under Article 99 of the Charter, the Secretary-General may bring matters which he
considers may threaten the maintenanceof international peace and securityto the attention of the
Security Council. TheGeneralAssembly is not referredto in these provisions.
4.56 There has undoubtedly beensome evolution in the practice of the United Nations on
such matters overthe pastalmost 60 years of its existence. Itis evident from this that the General
Assembly is able to undertakea more active involvementin issues concerning international peace
and security than the bare bones of the Charter might suggest. The scheme of the Charter,
however, remains. It is the Security Council that has primary responsibility in the field of peace
and securityand the role of the General Assembly is subordinateto that.
4.57 The competence of,and balance of responsibilities between,the General Assembly and
the Security Council underthe Charter cannot be lightly side-stepped. The issues in question are
bigger than the case now before the Court. They go to the constitutional arrangements of the
United Nations itselfjust at a point at which the Organisation is strugglingto find its voice in the
face of wider challenges to its ability to act. The scheme of the Charter is by no means perfect.
The balance between the Security Council and the General Assembly under the Charter cannot,
however, be ignored.
4.58 In the light of the foregoing, Israel contends that, given the active engagement of the
Security Council with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in exercise of its primary responsibility,
including under Chapter VI of the Charter, it would have been ultra virethe competence of theGeneral Assembly even in regular session to request the advisory opinion now before the Court
by resolution of thlothEmergency Special Session. CHAPTER 5
THE REQUESTDOESNOT RAISEA LEGAL QUESTION
WITHIN THESCOPEOF ARTICLE96(1) OFTHE CHARTER
AND ARTICLE65(1) OF THE STATUTE
A. The RequirementThat the Request ShouldRaisea Legal Question
5.1 It is well-established that, in order for the Court to be able to exercise its advisory
opinionjurisdiction, a requestmust have been referredto the Court on a "legal question". This
follows from Article 96(1) of the Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute, the interpretation of
which hasbeen addressedin many of the advisory opinionsgivenby the Court to date.'I3
5.2 The question referred to the Courtin this case is not a "legal question" within the scope
of Article 96(1) of the Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statute. Israel's objection, so far as
jurisdiction is concerned, is not that the question is "political", although it will be abundantly
clear fromthe discussionin Chapter 3 that the request is highly political and partisan in character
and goes to one aspects of a widerpolitical dispute. Rather, it isthat the question referredto the
Court isuncertain in its terms with the result that it is not amenableto a responsebythe Court.
5.3 For a question to constitute a legal question for the purposes of Article 96(1) of the
Charter and Article 65(1) of the Statuteit must be reasonably specific. This follows in part fi-om
the language of Article 65(2) of the Statute, which expressly requires "an exact statement of the
question upon which an opinion is required", and in part fiom basic principles. The Court has
also been guided by the imperative of reaching conclusions whichare legally certain.'14 The
requirement that decisions be made by reference to and within the confines of legal certainty
amounts to a general principle that fallsto be applied as a matter of international law.lI5 The
113
See, for example, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Articl17,paragraph 2, of the Charter),
Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, p.151, at p.155: "Therefore, in accordance with
Article 65 of its Statute, the Court can give an advisory opinion onlyon a legal question. If a questionis
not a legal one,the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must decline to givethe opinionrequested."
Il4See, for example, Legali~ of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996, p.226, at para.95; UnitedStates Diplomatic and Consular Stafl in Tehran (UnitedStates of America
v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p.29, para.58. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spav.
Canada),Separate OpinionofJudge Oda, LC.J. Reports 1998, at para.9.
Il5Dailler and Pellet, Droit International Pu(6"ced.), p.349. See also Sir Hersch Lauterpachtrefemng
to the "paramount postulate of security and stability" in the context of the administration of justice.
Lauterpacht,H., The Function of Law (1933), p.253. The principle of legal certainty is also an important issue of legal certainty is not to be confused with the issue that has arisen in previous advisory
opinions as to whether a question is unduly abstract, ie, where the meaning of the question is
certain but where it is said that it fails to relate to a specific factual ~ituation."~ The issue here is
that it is not possible to decipher with reasonable certainty the legal meaning of the question.
This is addressed further below.
5.4 In addition, while Israel accepts that it is part of the Court's judicial function to seek to
interpret the question put to it, in doing so the Court must not exceed its own cornpetence. As the
Permanent Court stated:
"The Court would exceed its own competency should it essay to consider
controversial cases, actual or hypothetical, on which its opinion is not asked,
and to intimate what, in itsjudgment, the decision upon them should be."Il7
5.5 The Court's task is to answer the question as put to it, not to seek to refonnulate the
question."8 In the absence of a reasonably certain legal question for it to answer, the Court
cannot establish itsjurisdiction by augmenting the question before it.'I9
concept in European Community law: seee.g. Portelange v. Marchant, Case 10/69 [1969]E.C.R., p.309, at
p. 316.
116See, for example, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996, p.226, atpara.]5.
Il7Competenceof the InternationalLabour Organization to regulate, incidentally,thepersonal work of the
Employer (1926),P.C.I.J. SeriesB, No. 13,p. 24.
Il8See, for example, Difference relating to immunityfrom legal process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p.62, at para.37; also, Competence
of the GeneralAssembly,Advisory Opinion,ICJ Reports 1950,p.4 at p.7.
Il9 Given that the Court's jurisdictionis limitedto answering the question putto it, and is in part defined by
that question, the position is analogous to where a dispute resolution provision and in particular an
arbitration agreement fails for uncertainty because it is not possible to ascertain how the parties wished
their disputesto be resolved. See e.g. Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial
Arbitration (31ded.), pp.172-173, on "Uncertainty", addressing the issue of so-called "pathological
arbitration clauses". Another useful analogy is the Court's approach to the interpretation of treaty
provisions at the jurisdictional phase e.g. in Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v.
United States of America), 1996, I.C.J. Reports, p.803, at p.810, para.16. The Court interpreted each
provision relied on by the claimantso asto establish whether the facts alleged were capableof leading to a
breach. The question whetherthe parties had consented to the Court's jurisdiction could notbe answered
on the basis merelyof an "arguable" interpretation of the treaty. Greater certaintywas required to establish
the Court's jurisdiction. B. The Question is Uncertain and Incapableof Response Within ItsTerms
(i) The UnderlyingAssumption ofIllegaliîy
5.6 The question referred to the Court has three elements. It asks:
what are the legal consequences arising fi-om
a given factual situation, ie, the construction of the wall being built by Israel, the
occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, as described in the report of the Secretary-General,
considering the rules and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949,and relevant SecurityCouncil and General Assembly resolutions.
5.7 The question goes to "legal consequences", not to underlying issues of legality.
Although the question put to the Court appears to assume that the construction of the fence is
unlawful, there has in fact been no legally binding assessment or determination ofthe illegality of
the fence.I2OThis leaves two possibilities:
(a) that the Court is being asked (i) to find that the construction of the fence is unlawful,
and then (ii) to give its opinion on the legal consequences of that illegality,
(b) that the Court is being asked (i) to assume that the construction of the fence is unlawful,
and then (ii) to give its opinion on the legal consequences of that assumed illegality.
5.8 The first of these possibilities is unworkable. The second is unworkable and would also
lead the Courtto give an opinion that was devoid of object or purpose.
5.9 So far as the first possibility is concerned, the question as to whether the construction of
the fence is unlawful is a complex question of mixed fact and law. This is discussed further in
Chapter 8. It is also a question of acute political sensitivity, as has been shown in Chapter 3, not
I2OCf. General Assembly resolution AIRESIES-1011 3 of 27 October 2003, operative para1. (Dossier
No.14) least given the SecurityCouncil endorsed initiativeto bring the twosides back to negotiations. It
may be supposed that if the General Assembly had wanted the Court's opinion on this highly
complex and sensitive question,it would expresslyhave soughtsuch an opinion. In an analogous
situation,the Permanent Court found:
"The Council, if it had wishedalso to obtain the Court's opinionon this point
...would not have failed explicitlyto Sayso. Inthese circumstances the Court
does not considerthat it has cognisance of this question." 12'
5.10 It is submitted that the Court should similarly declineto reformulate and respondto a
question going to the issue of whether or not construction of the fence is unlawful. Further, the
issue of legality is one that is inherently ill-suited for determination by way of an advisory
opinion. This is because of the complex underlying questions of fact that would have to be
resolved, which would of necessity involve considerationby the Court of abundant documentary,
witness and expert witness evidence. As developed fürther in Chapter 8, the factual enquiry
necessary to address the question of legality is one that cannot properly be shoehornedinto the
scopeof the current advisory opinion request.
5.11 As to the second possibility,if the Court were to proceed on the basis of an assumption
of illegality, the resulting opinion could have no practical value. As followsfrom the Western
Sahara case, the function of the Court is to give an opinion once it has come to the conclusion
that the question put is relevant and has a practical and contemporary effect, and is not devoid of
object or purpose.'22These requirements cannotbe considered satisfied if the question is simply
askingthe Court to give its opinionon the basis of an assumption, ie,the assumed illegality ofthe
construction of the fence. The resulting opinion could not assist the General Assembly in the
121
Exchange of Greek and TurkishPopulations (1925), P.C.I.J. Series B,No.10, at p.17.
''' WesternSahara,Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975,p.12, at p.37, para.73. See also at p.20, para.20
and p.27, para.39. See also Northern Cameroons, I.C.J. Reports 1963, p.15, at p.33: "If the Court wereto
proceed and were to hold that the Applicant's contentionswere al1sound on the merits, it would still be
impossible for the Court to render ajudgment capable of effective application ...".This was obviously in
the context of a contentious matter, but in the samejudgment the Court stressed that al1the considerations
of judicial propriety applied equally to the exercise of the advisory jurisdiction. Ibid., pp.30-31. Cf.
Legali~, of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.226, at
para.16. It is arguablethat the Court'sjurisprudence pulls in different directions on the appropriateness of
considering the object and purpose of an advisory opinion request. However, the question in truth goes to
immediacy of application. An opinion going to a general question of international law, as in the Nuclear
Weapons case, has an immediate application regardless of whether or not there is a specific situation to
which it may be applied. An opinion going to the legal consequences of a specific act, where that act may
or may not be unlawful, can have no imrnediate application. proper exercise of its fi~nctions.'It would also be a source of wider confusion. Further, any
legal consequences would depend on the precise nature of the illegality. 1sthe Court then to
proceed on the basis of an extended series of differing assumptions, giving its assessmentof the
legal consequences in eachcase?
5.12 Thus, what is being asked of the Court is quite uncertain. It is uncertain which of the
two options referred to above the Court is intendedto adopt. It is uncertain, in terms of option
(a), what the precise scope of the enquiry would be, and, in terms of option (b), preciselywhat
assumptions could or shouldbe made.
5.13 The position was quite different in the Namibiacase, where the Court was being asked
to give its opinion on the legal consequences for Statesin circumstances in which the illegalityof
the continued presence of SouthAfrica in Namibia had already been definitively established by
Security Council resolution276 (1970). Thus, the starting point forthe Court's consideration of
the legalconsequences for Statesin that case was precisely the fact thatthere had beena "binding
determination made by a competent organ of the United Nations to the effect that a situation is
i1lega1".'~~
(iiL)egal Consequencesfor Whom?
The use of the formula "legal consequences" leads immediately to a further area of
5.14
uncertainty. The question fails to speci@ whether the Court is being asked to address legal
consequences for:
the General Assembly or some other organof the United Nations,
Member Statesof the UnitedNations,
Israel,
some combinationof the above, or some different entity.
124WesternSahara,Advisoty Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12, atp.20,para.39.
Legal Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstandingecuriiy Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisoty OpiniLnC.J. Reports 1971,
p.16,atp.54,para117,andpp.54-56, paras.118-126. 5.15 Legal consequences do not exist in the abstract. They must have a defined object. In
the absence of a defined object, there is an absence of legal certainty. The qualification of
"consequences" by the adjective "legal" in no sense alters this. Moreover, the gap cannot be
filled by reference to the record of the meeting at which the advisory opinion request was
adopted. There is a notable lack of explanationon the record as to who was intended to be the
beneficiary of any opinion of the Court - or, indeed, as to how the General Assembly would be
assisted inthe performanceof its functionsby the givingof an opinion.
5.16 The uncertaintyin this respect is relevant for two reasons. First, the Court must know
the scope of the exercise on which it is being asked to embark. It cannot be for the Court to
double-guess the General Assembly. Second,and no less importantly, States or other interested
parties must also know the scope of the exercise on which the Court is being asked to embark.
Failing this, they are not in a position to consider how to respond. In this respect, it may again be
noted that, in the Namibia case, the Courtwas asked to give its opinion on the legal consequences
for States ofthe continued presence ofSouthAfrica inNamibia notwithstanding Security Council
resolution 276 (1970). The Court was not left to fil1in the blanks, and the Court did not go
beyond the specific taskset by the question before it.
C. Conclusions
5-17 The failings outlined above render the question put to the Court uncertain. It follows
from this that the question cannotbe a legal question as required by Article 65(1) of the Statute.
As the Court has fiequently affirmed, where the question referred for an opinion is not a legal
question, the Courthas no discretion inthe matter. It must declineto give the opinion requested. PART THREE
PROPRIETY AND THE EXERCISE OFDISCRETION CHAPTER6
PRINCIPLESRELEVANTTO THE QUESTIONOF PROPRIETY
AND THE EXERCISE BY THE COURTOF ITSDISCRETION
UNDERARTICLE 65(1) OFTHE STATUTE
A. The Court's Discretionto Decline to Answer the Question
6.1 The Court has a discretionto decline to respond to a request for an advisory opinion.
Israel submits that the requestnow beforethe Court is one to which it should not respond. Article
65(1) of the Statute is cast in permissive terms. It provides that the Court "mav give an advisory
opinion" (emphasis added). The Court has on numerous occasions affirmed that this leaves it
with "a large amount of discretion" to examine"whetherthe circumstancesof the case are of such
a character as should lead it to answerthe ~e~uest".'*~For example, in the WesternSahara case,
the Courtaddressed the matter in the followingterms:
"Article 65, paragraph 1, of the Statute, which establishes the power of the
Court to give an advisory opinion, is permissive and, under it, that power is
discretionary in character. In exercising this discretion, the International
Court of Justice, likethe Permanent Court of International Justice,has always
been guided by the principle that, as a judicial body, it is bound to remain
faithful to the requirements of its judicial character even in giving advisory
opinions. If the question isa legal one which the Court is undoubtedly
competent to answer, it may nonetheless decline to do so. As the Court has
said in previous Opinions, the permissive characterof Article 65, paragra1,
gives it the power to examine whether the circumstances of the case are of
such a character as shouldlead it to declineto answer therequest."'26
6.2 Similarly, in its Opinion in the Certain Expenses case, the Court, recalling the Opinion
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Status of Eastern Carelia Advisory
Opinion, observedas follows:
"The power of the Court to give an advisory opinion is derived fiom Article
65 of the Statute. The power granted is of a discretionary character. In
exercising its discretion, the InternationalCourt of Justice, like the Permanent
Court of International Justice, has always been guidedby the principle which
the Permanent Court stated in the case concerning the Status of Eastern
Carelia on 23 July 1923: 'The Court, beinga Court of Justice, cannot, even in
Iz5lnterpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinio30oMarch 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.65, at
pp.71-72.
Iz6WesternSahara,Advisory Opinion, I.J.Reports 175, p.12,at paragrap23. advisory opinions,depart from the essential rules governing their activityas a
Court' (PCIJ,Series B, No.5, p.29). Therefore, in accordance with Article 65
of its Statute,the Court can give an advisory opinion onlyon a legal question.
If a question is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it
must decline to givethe opinion requested. But, evenif the question isa legal
one, which the Court is undoubtedly competentto answer, it may nonetheless
declineto do ~0."'~~
6.3 The Court has nonethelessalso made clear both that a reply to a request for an advisory
opinion, in principle, should not be refused andthat only "compelling reasons" should lead it to
refuse to givea requested advisoryopinion.'28
6.4 The recent jurisprudence of the Court shows that the Courtis particularly mindful to
ensure that questions ofjurisdiction and propriety are properly addressed before any questionof
merits is considered. So, for example, in the case of the General Assembly's requestfor an
advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Court first
resolved questions of jurisdiction and propriety before turning to consider the merits of the
question referred for anopinion.'29An examination of the Court'sjurisprudence, and that of the
Permanent Court before it, indicate a number of elements that are germane to the question of
what would constitute "compelling reasons" that should lead the Court to refuse to give a
requested opinion.
(i) TheRequirement that the CourtRemain Faithful to its Judicial Character
6.5 In the Northern Cameroons case, the Court, referring to the exercise of a judicial
function, equally applicable to advisory opinions and contested cases, observed that "[tlhat
function is circumscribedby inherent limitations whichare none the less imperativebecause they
may be dificult to catalogue, and may not frequently present themselves asa conclusive bar to
adjudication in a concrete case."'30 This awareness of the "inherent limitations" evident in the
"judicial function" has received a particular focus in the exercise of the Court's advisory
jurisdiction, in which the Court has placed great emphasis on the dominant requirement that it
Iz7Certain Expenses of the UnitedNations (Article 17,paragraph 2, of the Charter),Advisoty Opinion of
2128uly 1962:ICJ Reports 1962, p.151 atp.]55.
See CertainExpenses of the UnitedNations (Article 17,paragraph 2, of the Charter),Advisoty Opinion
of 20 July 1962:ICJ Reports 1962, p.151atp.155.
129 Legaliw of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.226, at
paragraphs10et seq and 14et seq respectively.
I3O Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminaty Objections,
Judgment of 2 December 1963,1.C.J. Reports 1963,p.1 5,atp.30. remain faithfulto its judicial character. This imperativedraws on the Opinion of the Permanent
Court in the Eastern Carelia case. Given its pertinence tothe matter now before the Court, the
principal conclusions of the Permanent Courtwarrant setting out in detail. Concluding that it
would notgive an Opinionon the questionreferredto it, the PermanentCourt stated as follows:
"It follows from the above that the opinion which the Court has been
requestedto give bears onan actual disputebetweenFinlandand Russia. .. It
is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent,
be compelled to submitits disputes with other States eitherto mediation or to
arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement. ... Such consent,
however, has never been given by Russia. On the contrary, Russia has, on
several occasions, clearly declared that it accepts no intervention by the
League of Nations in the dispute with Finland. The refùsals which Russia has
already opposed to the steps suggested by the Council have been renewed
uponthe receipt by it of the notificationof the request for an advisory opinion.
The Court therefore findsit impossibleto give its opinion on a dispute of this
kind.
It appears to the Court that there are other cogent reasonswhich render it very
inexpedient that the Court should attempt to deal with the present question.
The question whether Finland and Russia contracted on the terms of the
Declaration as tothe nature of the autonomy of Eastern Careliais really one of
fact. To answer it would involvethe duty of ascertainingwhat evidence might
throw light upon the contentions which have been put forward on this subject
by Finland and Russia respectively, and of securing the attendance of such
witnesses as might be necessary. The Court would, of course, be at a very
great disadvantage in such an enquiry, owingto the fact that Russia refusesto
take part in it. It appears now to be very doubtful whether there would be
availableto the Court materials sufficient to enable it to arrive at any judicial
conclusion upon the question of fact: What did the parties agree to? The
Court does not Say that there is an absolute rule that the request for an
advisory opinion may not involve some enquiry as to facts, but, under
ordinarycircumstances, it is certainly expedient that the facts upon which the
opinionof the Court is desired should not be in controversy, and it should not
be leftto the Court itselfto ascertain what they are.
The Court is aware of the fact that it is not requested to decide a dispute, but
to givean advisory opinion. This circumstance, however, does not essentially
modi@the above considerations. The question put to the Court is not one of
abstract law, but concerns directly the main point of controversy between
Finlandand Russia, and can only be decided by an investigation into the facts
underlying the case. Answering the question would be substantially
equivalent to deciding the dispute between the parties. TheCourt, being a
Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the
essentialrules guiding their activityas a ~ourt."'~'
131Status of EasternCarelia,Advisory Opinion (1923),P.C.I.J., Series B, No.atpp.27-29.
93 6.6 The Permanent Court was concerned by two factors of particular relevance in these
proceedings: (a) the absence of consent to the adjudication of a legal dispute,and (b) the
necessary bar against making determinationson underlying facts wherethe Court does not have
sufficient evidence beforeit.
(a) The Limitation on Giving an Advisory Opinion Where There is a Legal Dispute
6.7 The opinion in the Eastern Carelia case was in part predicated on the fact that Russia
was not a member of the League of Nations. It follows that it could not be said that Russia had
consented generallyto the Permanent Court's exerciseof the advisoryjuri~dicti0n.l~~However,
the jurisprudence of the International Court has focussed not on the jurisdictional elementof the
Permanent Court'sfinding, but rather on the issue of whether the consideration of a question that
related to a pending disputebetween Stateswas consistent withjudicial propriety.'33This has led
the Court to consider with care the issue of whether a given question put to it relates to an
existing dispute between States.
6.8 Thus, in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties case, the Court considered the nature of
the question before it, which concerned the applicability to certain disputes of the settlement
procedures institutedby the Peace Treaties, and found that this "in no way touches the merits of
those disputes".'34It followed that the Eastern Carelia case could be distinguished. It could not
be said that the question "related to the main point of a dispute actually pending betweentwo
States, so that answering the questionwould be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute
between the parties."'35 The Court found that "the legal position of the parties to these disputes
cannot be in any way compromised by the answers that the Court may give to the Questions put
- -
'32 Cf. Legal Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Securiiy Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1.C.J. Reports 1971,
p.16, at p.23, para.31; also Western Sahara, Advisoty Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12, at pp.23-24,
para.30.
'33See for example Simma (ed.), The Charter of the UnitedNations (2"ded.), Vol. II, p. 1185: "A decision
to entertain a request would be inappropriate if a legaldispute relating to States which have not recognized
the jurisdiction of the ICJ on the basis of Art. 36 of the Statute, were brought before the Court, in the
absence of the States concerned, by a request for advisory proceedings." See also at p. 1187: "The ICJhas
recognized, on the other hand, that the lackof consent of an interested State may render the giving of an
Advisory Opinion incompatible with itsjudicial character."
134Interpretationof Peace Treaties,Advisoty Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports1950,p.65, at p.72.
13' Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.65, at
pp.71-72. See, Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the Jnternational Court, 1920-1996, Vol.II, noting that
the views of the present Court as expounded in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties Advisory Opinion "are
today the guiding statement". to itn136
. In other words,the Court formulateda basic principle - that it should decline to answer
a question where this "would be substantially equivalent to deciding the dispute between the
parties" - and sought toestablishwhetherthat principle was applicableon the facts before it.
6.9 Similarly,in the Namibia case the Court addressed itselfto the question of whether the
request related to a legal dispute actually pending between two States (andlor between South
Africa and the UnitedNations), but found thatit did not.13'A fùrtherimportant factorin terms of
consent was SouthAfrica's appearancebefore the Court forpurposesof settingout itscase on the
merits of the question putto the ~0urt.l~~
6.10 In the Western Sahara case, the Court expressly addressed the continuing relevanceof
the Eastern Carelia case (building on the earlier consideration of this same question in the
Interpretation of Peace Treaties case), and concluded that: "the consent of an interested State
continues to be relevant,not for the Court's competence, but for the appreciation ofthe propriety
of givingan It continued:
"In certain circumstances,therefore,the lack of consent of an interested State
may render the giving of an advisory opinion incompatiblewith the Court's
judicial character. An instance of this would be when the circumstances
disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of circumventing the
principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to
judicial settlementwithout itsconsent."'40
6.11 The principle that the Court must remain "faithful to the requirements of its judicial
character", highlighted in the Western Sahara case, goes to the proposition that the Court must
not permit the advisory mechanism to become an abuse of process by which the scheme of the
Statuteon consensualjurisdiction iscir~urnvented.'~~It is not simplya question of whether there
is an actual dispute between States that might othenvise come before the Court through its
136Ibid.
137 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Securiv Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C. J. Reports 1971,
p.16, at p.24, para.32. It found: "It is not the purpose of the request to obtain the assistanceof the Court in
the exercise of the Security Council's functions relating to the pacific settlement of a dispute pending
before it betweentwo or more States. The request is put fonvard by a UnitedNations organ with reference
to its own decisions andit seeks legal advice from the Court on the consequences and implicationsof these
decisions."
13*Ibid, pp.23-24, para.31.
'39WesternSahara, Advisory Opinion,1.C.J.Reports 1975, p.12,at p.25, para.32.
140Ibid, p.25, para.33.
14'Seealso the IMCOAdvisory Opinion,,I.C.J. Reports 1960,p.50, at p.153. contentious procedure. It is whether engagement with the question by the Court would in effect
involvethe Court in anadjudication of issues - whether binding or not - in a manner that would
evade the constraints of the Statute. The Court examinedthe situation before it in the Western
Sahara case and found that the legal controversy before it had not arisen in bilateral relations
betweentwo tat tes.' ^t^also placed emphasis on the fact that,in the proceedings in the General
Assembly, Spain had not opposed the reference of the question as such to the Court's advisory
juri~diction.'~~
(b) TheLimitation on Giving an Advisory Opinion Where There is Insuficient Evidence Before
the Courtto Enable it to Make Findings ofFact
6.12 Notwithstanding the discretionthat the Court enjoys in terms of the application of the
rules applicable in contentious cases (pursuant to Article 68 of the Statute), the advisory
jurisdiction does not readily allow for a procedure well-suited to the determination of complex
issues of fa~t.'~~This has not been a major problem so far as the Court's exercise of its advisory
jurisdiction is concerned - prior to the present proceedings - as the Court has not been faced with
the problem of establishingcomplex facts on which there has beendi~a~reement.'~~
6.13 In the Eastern Carelia case, the Permanent Court was faced with the dificulty of
determining facts and found that, in the absence of a concerned Party, it could not do so without
departing fromthe essentialniles guiding its activityas a Court. The weight and proprietyof this
principle has been consistently affirmed in the jurisprudence of the International Thus,
14'Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, LC.J. Reports 1975, p.12, at p.25, para.34. Cf. the instant case,
where lsrael did of course vote against resolutionA/RES/ES-10114. The dicta in the WesternSahara case
were consideredand applied in Applicability of Article VI,Section22, of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 177 at p. 191, para. 38.
Again the Court considered whether the effect of the advisory opinion was to submit an existing dispute to
judicial settlementwithoutone State's consent. It found that this was notthe case.
144 WesternSahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12 at p.24, para.30.
See, for example, Rosenne, The Law and Practice qfthe International Court, 1920-1996 (3'ded.), Vol.
II, p. 992: "..unlessthere is agreement on the facts as the point of departure for the determination of the
law applicable to those facts, non-contentious and non-adversarial procedures are not likely to be
appropriate machineries for the establishmentof facts."
145Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-1996 (31~ed.), Vol. II, p.993: "Both
Courts have regularlymade relatively simplefindings of fact, established onthe basis of the documentation
submitted to the Court. Those instances are not conclusive, since the Court has not in the course of
rendering an advisory opinion been faced with the problem of establishing facts on which there was
disagreement."
'46See with respect to the Permanent Court's decision in the Eastern Carelia case, Bin Cheng, General
Principles of Law (1953), p.298: "The decision of the Court not to give its opinion demonstrates the for example, in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties advisory opinion, the Court affirmed that
amongst the imperative inherent limitations of the judicial function in respect of advisory
proceedings was the principle that the Court cannotgive an opinion on questions which raise "a
question of fact which [cannot]be elucidatedwithouthearingboth parties".'47
6.14 This limitation was not problematic at the practical levelin the Interpretation of Peace
Treaties case because the Court was looking simply at the application of a dispute settlement
mechanism, not at the underlying dispute. The issue was also raised by Spain in the Western
Sahara case. The Court definedthe questionas follows:
"whether the Court has before it sufficient informationand evidence to enable
it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon any disputed questionsof fact the
determination of which is necessary for it to give an opinion in conditions
compatible with itsjudicial chara~ter."'~~
6.15 In the event, the Court found that it had the necessary information and evidence. It
found that it had received fiom Mauritania, Morocco and Spain "very extensive documentary
evidence of the facts which they considered relevant to the Court's examinationof the questions
posed in the request" and that each of those States, as well as Algeria and Zaire, had presented
their views on these facts and on the observationsof the ~thers.'~~In the present case, the Court
has received no evidence from Israel bearing on the substantive question, and evidence received
fiom others, including the United Nations Secretariat, cannot be regarded as authoritative or
reliable.
(ii) Other "Circumstancesof the thatMay Lead the Court
to Decline toAnswer the Request
6.16 The two elements, outlined above, going to the judicial character of the Court are
directly relevant to the present case and have featured extensively in the jurisprudence of the
-- - - - --
fundamental natureof the principle audiatur et alter~pars. Exceptions should not be allowed Savewhere a
party, which is under an obligationto present itself and has been afforded the opportunity to do so, fails to
comply with such obligation without valid reason and neglects to exercise the nght and privilege of being
heard." That, of course, is not the situation in the present case. Israel is under no obligation to present its
case in the currentproceedings.
'47Interpretationof Peace Treaties,Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.65, at p.72.
149WesternSahara,Advisory Opinion,1.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12, at pp. 28-29, para.46.
WesternSahara,Advisoty Opinion, 1.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12, at p.29, para.47.
150WesternSahara,Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12, at para.23. Court. They are not the only factors, however, which are relevant to the exercise of the Court's
discretion. The requirement that the Court remain faithful to its judicial character suggests
additional "compelling reasons" that require consideration in this case, notably, that the Court
should not allow its advisory procedure to be used by the General Assembly to obtain an opinion,
the mere fact of which would undermine a delicate process of political negotiation nurtured
endorsed by the Security Council in exercise of its primary responsibilities under the Charter.
(iii) JudicialProprieîy in the Circwnstances of this Case
6.17 The following chapters in this Part address a number of specific elements of propriety
and the exercise by the Court of its discretion in this case.hese are:
(a) the propriety of an opinion of the Court since the request concerns a contentious matter
in respect of which Israel has not given consent to the jurisdiction of the Court
(Chapter 7);
(b) the propriety of an opinion of the Court since that the question requires the Court to
speculate about essential facts and make assumptions about arguments of law (Chapter
8);
(CI other compelling reasons in the circumstances of this case why the Court, in the
exercise of its discretion, should decline to give an Opinion (Chapter 9). CHAPTER7
THE REQUEST CONCERNSA CONTENTIOUSMATTERIN RESPECT OFWHICH
ISRAEL HAS NOT GIVEN CONSENT TOTHEJURISDICTIONOF THE COURT
A. The ApplicableLegal Principles
7.1 The present chapter develops Israel's submission that the Court shouldnot exercise its
jurisdiction in the present case because the request concems a contentious matter in respect of
which Israel has not given its consentto the exercise ofjurisdiction by the Court. The applicable
legal principles have already been outlined in Chapter 6. Absence of consent is an important
factor to be taken into account when the Court considers whetherto exercise its discretion. The
following issues of principlecan be derived fromthe analysis containedin Chapter6:
does the question in the advisory opinion request relate to the main pointof a dispute
(a)
actually pending so that answering the question would be substantially equivalent to
deciding the disputebetweenthe parties?'51
(b) do the circumstances disclose that to give a reply would have the effect of
circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be
submittedtojudicial settlementwithout itsconsent?15'
In order to be able to addressthese issues, the Court must consider (i) the nature of the
7.2
Israeli-Palestinian dispute,and whether the effect of the advisory opinion request is to bring the
substanceof that dispute or an elementof that dispute before the Court (SectioB below), and (ii)
whether Israel has consentedto the settlement ofthe dispute by the Court (SectionC below).
B. The Pending Dispute
7.3 The issue now before the Court is an integral part of the wider lsraeli-Palestinian
dispute conceming questions of terrorism, security, borders, Settlements, Jerusalemand other
related matters. Elements of that dispute, and in particular steps taken by the international
15'lnterpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of 30 March 1950, I.C.J. Reports 1p.65,at
pp.71-72.
Is2WesternSahara, Advisory Opinion,I.C.J. Reports 19p.12,atp.25,para.33. community, includingthe SecurityCouncil,to achieve itsresolution,have already been identified
in Chapter 3. That the advisory opinion request brings before the Court a "dispute" between
Israel and "Palestine" can most easily be seen from a review of the documents sent by the
Secretary-General to the President of the Court on 8 December 2003, principally General
Assembly resolution A/RES/ES-10114and the report of the Secretary-Generalof 24 November
2003 (A/ES-101248).
7.4 First, resolution ARESIES-] 0114 firmly places the advisory opinion request in the
context of the ongoing Israeli-Palestiniandispute.'53This is evident from:
(a> the Agenda item, which is described as "Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East
Jerusalem andthe rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory";
the reference back to previous United Nations resolutionsconceming actions of Israel
(b)
such as settlementof its citizens interritory to the eastof the so-called "Green line";
(c> the characterisationof Israel as "the Occupying Power";
(4 the reference to the construction of the "wall" in departure from the so-called "Green
line";
the affirmationof "the necessity ofending the conflict" betweenIsrael and "Palestine".
(e>
7.5 Second, and even more telling, the Secretary-General's reportcontains two annexes.
Annex 1is entitled "Summary legal position of the Government of Israel". Annex II is entitled
"Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization". The existence of a dispute
between Israel and "Palestine"could not be illustrated more clearly.
7.6 Third, the "Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation Organization" which
forms Annex IIto the Secretary-General's reportis apparently based ona legal opinion provided
by the PL0 for the purposes of the report. The "Summary legal position of the Palestine
LiberationOrganization":
'53NOpoint is taken here as to the bias and inaccuracy in the description of and approach to the dispute
manifested in resolution AIRESIES-1O14. makesreferenceto certainrightsof Israel;
makesreferenceto certain violationsby Israel of Palestinian rights;
makesreference to thecriminal liabilityof Israel;
claims that the "construction of the Barrier is an attempt to annex the territory [in the
West Bank] contrary to international law" and that the "de facto annexation of land
interferes with the territorial sovereignty and consequently with the right of the
Palestiniansto self-determination".
7.7 Two points immediatelyfollow. First,the language clearly predicates the existenceof a
dispute. Second,the dispute is unambiguouslya key part of the wider Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
If it were necessary, further confirmation of this last factoris provided by the language of the
preamble to General Assembly resolution AIRESIES-10113,pursuant to which the Secretary-
General'sreportof 24 November 2003 wasprepared.154
7.8 The existence of the pending dispute behind the advisory opinion request cannotbe
doubted. This is not a case, such as Namibiaw ,here the Court could find that it was concerned
with mere differences of views on legal issues which have existed in practically every advisory
opinion.155The dispute between Israeland "Palestine" is thefonset origo of the advisory opinion
request. This is also evident from a review of the record of the meeting at which the resolution
requesting the advisory opinionwas adopted. It is not merely that there is no hint in that record
(or in the resolution itself) of how an advisory opinion might assistthe General Assembly in the
exercise of its function~.'~~On the contrary. The record abounds with statements goingto the
position of "Palestine", and of Israel, and the intent on the part of the CO-sponsorsof the
resolution to "send a powerful message to Israel"that "justice be done".15'
7.9 The issue then is whether responding to the question put to the Court would be
substantially equivalentto deciding that dispute. This issue can be answered very simply. If the
154 See the ninth preambular paragraph, referring, for example, to "the need to end the occupation that
began in 1967".
155
Legal Consequencesfor States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Securily Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisoiy Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971,
p.16, at p.24, para.34.
156Cf. WesternSahara Advisoiy Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, at pp.26 - 27,para.39. The point was made
expressly by the Representative from Singapore (see paragraph 3.40 above).
157
See, for example, the statement by the Representative of Malaysia on behalf of the Non-Aligned
Movement (AIES-]OlPV.23,8 December 2003). (Dossier No.42) Court interprets the question as requiring it to pronounce on the legality of Israel's constructionof
the fence, this would be substantiallyequivalent to deciding the pending dispute as to the legality
of the fence. In fact, it would notjust be a question of substantial equivalence. The Court would
be making findings regarding the legality of the fence. The fact that it would be doing so in the
exercise of its advisory capacity makes no difference. At the same time, the Court could not
avoid deciding significant elements of the broader ongoing dispute between Israel and
"Palestine". If the Court were merely to assume the illegality of the construction of the fence, the
impact would be the same. Even if the Court were to construe the question as narrowly as
possible, it wouldstill inevitably have to address a dispute between the two sides in breach of the
requirement of consent in contentious proceedings.
7.10 This leaves the fùrther issue of whether the reply to the question would have the effect
of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to
judicial settlement without its consent, i.e. regardless of the fact that Israel has not consented to
the Court dealing with any aspect of its dispute with "Palestine".
C. The Absence of Consent
7.11 As is its undoubted right, Israel has not consented to the Court's jurisdiction in respect
of its dispute with "Palestine", or anyelement thereof, or with any other associated party. That
Israel has so chosen is evident from:
(a> the absence of any optional clause declaration;
(b) reservations made by Israel to compromissory clauses in multilateral treaties;
the different mechanisms of dispute settlement that have been accepted by Israel,
(c)
including in particular the dispute settlement arrangements in the Israel - PL0
agreements.
Each of these is briefly considered below.
7.12 So far as concerns the absence of any optional clause declaration, on 19 November
1985,lsrael informedthe Secretary-General that it was withdrawing the declaration of acceptance of the compulsoryjurisdiction of theCourtthat it had depositedon 17October 1956and modified
on 28 February 1984.Is8 In response, the Legal Counselof the United Nations informed Israel
that the Secretary-Generalhad receivedthe letter on 21 November 1985and that the notification
would take effect from that date. Evenhad Israel not withdrawn its declaration in 1985, the
dispute with "Palestine", including the disputeput to the Court in the advisory opinion request,
would not have been coveredby Israel's optional clause declaration. This contained reservations
inter alia as follows:
"This Declarationdoes not apply to:
...
(c) any dispute betweenthe State of Israeland anyother State whether ornot a
member of the United Nations which does not recognize Israel or which
refuses to establish orto maintainnormal diplomatic relationswith Israel and
the absence or breach of normal relations precedes the dispute and exists
independently ofthat dispute;
(d) disputes arising outof events occurring between 15 May 1948 and 20 July
1949;
(e) without prejudice to the operation of sub-paragraph (d) above, disputes
arising out of, or having referenceto, any hostilities, war, stateof war, breach
of the peace, breach of armistice agreement or belligerent or military
occupation (whether such war shall have been declared or not, and whether
any state of belligerency shall have been recognized or not) in which the
Governrnentof Israel are or have been ormay be involved at anytime. .."'59
7.13 So far as concerns multilateral treatiesto which Israel is a Party,Israel has not accepted
the compulsoryjurisdiction of the Court in any multilateral treaty since 1975.I6OAlthough, since
that date, Israel has become partyto a number of treaties that include the possibility of dispute
settlement by the Court, such settlement is optional only. In other cases, Israel has attached
reservationsthat expressly withhold consentto dispute settlementby the Court.
7.14 So far as concerns different mechanismsof dispute settlement that have been accepted
by Israel, it is stressed that none of the treaties and agreements concludedby Israel as part of the
Is8 See40 ICJ Yearbook(1985-1986), p.60.
Is9See 39 ICJ Yearbook(1984-1985), p.79.
'60lsrael has, in its nearly 56 years of existence, been party to only two bilateral treaties submitting to
dispute resolution by the Court. Ofthese, only the 1951 Treaiy of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
with the United States remains in force. peace process contain references to dispute resolution by the ~ourt.'~'In the context of the
consideration of this aspectofjudicial propriety,it is importantto bear in mind that no agreement
with the PLO, and no unilateraldeclarationby either Israelor the PL0 providesfor a compulsory
settlement ofthe dispute whetherby the Courtor otherwise. Thus:
(a) The letter from Chairman Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin of 9 September 1993
provides:
"...The PL0 commits itself to the Middle East peace process,and to a
peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares
that al1outstanding issues relatingto permanent status will be resolved
through negotiations."
(b) ArticleXV of the Declaration of Principlesof 13September 1993provides:
"1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this
Declaration of Principles or any subsequent agreements pertainingto
the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint
Liaison Committeeto be established pursuantto ArticleX above.
2.Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by
a mechanism of conciliationto be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relatingto the
interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this
end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an
Arbitration Committee."
Article XVII of the Gaza-Jericho Agreementof 4 May 1994 (superseded by the Interim
(CI
Agreementof 28 September 1995)provides:
"Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be
referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism
established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the
Declaration of Principles shall apply to any such difference whichis not
settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation
mechanism, namely:
161
Article VI1of the Treaiy of Peace between Israel and Egypt provides that disputes will be resolved by
negotiations, conciliationor submitted to arbitration. Articlethe Treaty of Peace between Israel and
theHashemite Kingdom of Jordan also provides that disputes will be resolved by negotiations, conciliation
or submitted to arbitration. 1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this
Agreement or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the
interim period shall be settled by negotiations through the
Liaison Committee.
2. Disputeswhich cannotbe settledby negotiations may be settled
by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the
Parties.
3. The Parties may agree to submitto arbitration disputes relating
to the interim period, which cannot be settled through
conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties,
the Partieswill establishan ArbitrationCommittee."
Article XXI of the Interim Agreementof 28 September 1995provides:
(d)
"Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be
referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism
established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the
DOP shall applyto any such difference which is not settled throughthe
appropriate coordinationand cooperation mechanism, namely:
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretationof this
Agreement or any related agreements pertainingto the interim
period shall be settledthrough the Liaison Committee.
2. Disputes which cannot be settledby negotiations may be settled
by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the
Parties.
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating
to the interim period, which cannot be settled through
conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties,
the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee."
7.15 The position could not be clearer. Israel and the PL0 have repeatedly agreedthat their
disputes should be settled by negotiation, with the possibility of an agreement that disputes be
solved by arbitration. It is notjust that Israel hasnot consentedto the Court resolving its disputes
with "Palestine", or any part of that dispute. It is that other mechanisms of dispute settlement
more appropriateto the circumstances have been expressly preferred.
D. Conclusions
7.16 It follows from the above that in the instant case, if the Court has jurisdiction, which
Israel submits it has not, the Court should exercise its discretion by refusing to respond to the advisory opinion request. This is an exceptional case. Answering the question would be
equivalent to the Court to deciding a significant element in the dispute between Israel and
"Palestine", and this is precisely what the CO-sponsorsof resolution A/RES/ES-10113 appear to
have been seeking.16* Answering the request would have the effect of circumventing the
principle that a State is not obliged to allow its disputes to be submitted to judicial settlement
without its consent. These factors apply a fortior wihere a State has, in respect of a particular
dispute, acted expressly to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court in favour of other forms of
settlement.
7.17 To this must be added the further consideration, namely, that "Palestine" is not a State.
It has no standing before the Court. The Court's advisory jurisdiction cannot be employed to
circumvent the scheme of the Statute in circumstances in which the Court would not in any
circumstance be open to the would-be litigant most directly involved in the recourse to the
advisory procedure.
162
See, for example, the statement of the Palestinian Representative, Mr Al-Kidwa, in the debate in the
Emergency Special Sessionon 8 December 2003. AIES-lOlPV.23, 8 December 2003. (Dossier No.42) CHAPTER 8
THE QUESTIONREQUIRESTHE COURTTO SPECULATE ABOUT ESSENTIAL
FACTSAND MAKE ASSUMPTIONSABOUT ARGUMENTSOF LAW
8.1 In this Chapter, lsrael will develop its contention that the question requires theCourt to
speculate about essential facts and make assumptions about argumentsof law. The applicable
legal principles have alreadybeen outlined in Chapter 6, fi-omwhich the following questions can
be derived:
(a> does the advisory opinion requestraise questions of fact which could not be elucidated
without hearingtheparties?'63
doesthe Court have before it suficient informationand evidenceto enable it to arrive at
(b)
ajudicial conclusion upon any disputed questionsof fact the determination of which is
necessary for it to give an opinionin a mannercompatiblewith itsjudicial ~haracter?'~~
A. A Response to the QuestionWould Requirethe Courtto Speculate About
Essential andHighly Complex Facts Which Are Not BeforeIt
8.2 If the Court were seised of the issue of whether the constructionof the fence were
lawfùl or not and, if not, what the legal consequences of such illegality might be for certain
specified parties, it would inevitably have to address and resolve a series of complex factual
issues.
8.3 The extent of the factual issues would, in a contentious case, appearfi-omthe pleadings
of the parties. In the absence of such pleadings, and in circumstances where Israeldoes not know
what issues "Palestine" is goingto put before the Court,the likely ambit of the factual issues can
most conveniently be derived fi-om the allegations contained in Annex II to the Secretary-
General's report of 24 November 2003, "Summary legal position of the Palestine Liberation
Organization". On the basis of this document, it would befor the Courtto consider:
'6lnterpretation qfPeace Treaties,Advisory Opinion of 30March 1950,I.C.J. Reports 1950, p.65, at p.72.
164WesternSahara,Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p.12, at pp.28-29, para.46.
107 factual issues goingto the rnilitary necessity of the fence;
(a>
(b) factual issues going to the proportionality of the construction of the fence, including
factual issues going to the question of whether the requirements of proportionality can
more likely be met by different means including different routing ofthe fence.
8.4 Any assessrnent of the military necessity of the fence would necessarily have to entail,
including in respect of parts of the fence where the routing has not been finally determined:
(a> an assessment of the security threat faced by Israel, which would in turn require an
assessment of the nature and scale of terrorist attacks, the continuing nature of the
threat, and the likely nature and scale of future attacks;
an assessment of the effectiveness of the fence to address the security threat relative to
(b)
other available rneans;
(CI an assessrnent of the motives behind the construction of the fence;
(d) an assessment of the routing of the fence, including an assessrnent of whether the
routing was justified by military necessity so far as concerns individual sections of the
fence;
(el an assessrnent of the specific nature and extent of the construction, including an
assessrnent of whether these aspects were justified by military necessity so far as
concerns individual sections of the fence, to cover, for exarnple, the issue of whether
there was a justification on grounds of military necessity for those short sections of
wall;
(f) an assessrnent of the specific nature of the threat to the Israeli population at different
sections of the fence;
in the light of the claim that the requirements of proportionality can better be met by
(g>
different routing of the fence, an assessment of the relative threat arising as a result of such different routingand of whether the requirements ofmilitary necessity couldthus
be satisfied.
8.5 In order to beginto answersuch questions, anytribunal seised with the determinationof
such contested facts would require extensive documentary,witness andexpert evidence from
the parties invo~ved.'~' It would be entirely inappropriate for the Court to rely simply on
"evidence" supplied by "Palestine". Evidence must be tested. And the Court would have to be
willingto embark on a time-consumingdeterminationof facts.
8.6 The Court would also have to consider and rule upon countervailing factors reliedupon
by "Palestine" with respect to the contention that the construction of the fence is not
proportionate. On the basis of the contentions made in the "Summary legal position of the
Palestine LiberationOrganization",the Court would haveto assess:
(a> the extent and nature of the claimed "Extensive destructionof Palestinian homes and
other property";
(b) the extentand nature of the claimed "Infringementsof freedom of movement";
(c> the extentand natureof the claimed "Infringementson the rights to education, work,an
adequate standardof livingand health care";
(d) the extentand nature of the claimed "arbitrary interferenceof home";
(el the extent and nature of the claimed "facilitation of the entry of Israeli citizens into the
Closed Area while restricting Palestinian accessto and residence inthe Closed Area";
the extentto which similar factors also affect non-Palestinians.
(0
8.7 The Courtcannotpossiblymake any such factual determinations. Evenif the case were
a contentious one, the operational constraints under which the Court works do not permit
thorough scrutinyof highly detailed or complex issues of fact. Indeed, it may be asked whether
165 Of course, strictly there are no partiesin advisory opinion proceedings. This highlightsthe
inappropriatnatureofsuchproceedingsfortheresolutionofdisputes involving complexsetsoffacts. the Court has ever decided facts of such a complexand highly politicised character, and that are
so centralto a conflict of this nature. These factorsweighal1the moreheavily where the Courtis
exercising its advisoryjurisdiction, thepoint having already beenmade that non-contentious and
non-adversarial proceduresare not likely to be appropriate machineries forthe establishment of
fa~ts.'~~This is al1the more so in a case where "Palestine" hasasserted the criminal liability of
Israel.
8.8 In the event, the Court has allowed a mere six weeks for the presentation of written
statements. The Court could not possiblyhave the necessarymaterial before it and will be in no
position to make any findings of fact at all. For one thing, Israel contests the jurisdiction of the
Court and is not putting fonvard a case on the substance. Further,in the light of recent decisions
regardingchanges to the routing of the fence in certain sensitiveareas, and other developments, it
is highly unlikely that even the basic factual material available to the Court from Palestinian and
other non-Israeli sources will be accurate. The Court cannot replace the proper judicial
determination of facts by assumptions or speculation. This is not a case like Interpretation of
Peace Treaties, where the Court is in no sense looking at the underlying dispute; or the Narnibia
case, wherea binding finding of illegalityhad already been made. This is not a case like Western
Sahara, where the main protagonists had al1submitted extensive documentas. evidence of the
facts which they considered relevant to the Court's examinationof the questions posed in the
request, and had submittedtheir observations on that evidence.
8.9 It follows that the Court will not have before it suficient information and evidence to
enable it to arrive at a judicial conclusion upon disputed questions of fact the determination of
which is necessary for it to give an opinion compatible with itsjudicial character.
B. A Response to the Question WouldRequire the Court to Make Assumptions About
Arguments of Law Which Are Not Before It
8.10 In the absence of participation by Israel on the substance of the request, a response to
the questionwould also require the Courtto make assumptions about argumentsof law which are
not beforeit. This issue has alreadybeen touched upon in Chapter 5 above so far as assuming the
illegalityof the construction of the fence is concerned. The further point here is that, in order to
make the findings that "Palestine" apparently seeks in the "Summary legal position of the
'66Seethe passage from theEasternCarelia case set out in Chapter 6 above.
110 Palestine Liberation Organization",the Courtwould haveto not merelymake the series of factual
determinations referred to above, but it would also have to apply the relevant legal principles to
those facts. To do so, theCourt would haveto make assumptions argumentsof 1awwhich are not
before it including asto:
(a> the component elements of such legal concepts as military necessity and
proportionality;
(b) the interpretationand applicationof the broad series of other instruments that mightbe
relied upon by "Palestine";
(c> questions concerningallegationsof annexation;
other issues arisingin the context of an enquiryasto legal consequences.
(d)
8.11 These legal issues are varied and complex - as cannot be surprising given that they
form part of a dispute that is manydecadesold.
C. Conclusions
8.12 This is an exceptional case. The issues arising in respect of the construction of the
fence - whether confined to the question of legal consequences or whether expanded to include
the underlying question of legality - do not lend themselves to hasty determination in a
procedurally questionable manner. This is not simplya consequence of the Court's Order of 19
December 2003. It is inherent in the advisory opinion procedure. To make findings on a
complex legal and factual dispute, in the absence of one of the two most directly concerned
parties, would constitute a departure from the essential rules guiding the Court's juridical
a~tivity.'~~
'67Status of Eastern Carelia,Ahisory Opinion (1923), P.C.I.J., SeriB,No.5, atpp.27-29.
111 CHAPTER9
OTHER COMPELLINGREASONSWHYTHE COURT,
IN THEEXERCISEOF ITS DISCRETION,SHOULD
DECLINETO ANSWERTHE QUESTION
9.1 The preceding Chapters of this Part have addressed established reasonsof law which go
to the exercise by the Court of its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute to decline to
answer the request for an advisory opinion. These draw on the principles in the Eastern Curelia
case, largely affirmed as of continued relevance in the jurisprudence of the present Court. The
circumstances of the present case,however, raise for the Court's considerationother "compelling
reasons" which should lead the Court to decline to give the opinion requested.In Chapters 4 and
5 of this statement, Israel advanced two objections ofjurisdiction which, in its contention, operate
to preclude the Court - as a matter of law - from giving an opinion in this case. In the
alternative, in the event that the Court takes the view that these elements do not preclude its
consideration of the matter, lsrael contends that the circumstances of the request and the
competence of and balance of responsibility between the General Assembly and the Security
Council are also relevant to the exercise by the Court of its discretion to decline to answer the
opinion requested. Likewise, Israel contends that the inherent uncertainty of the question also
goes to issues of discretion and propriety.
9.2 There are two additional aspects relevant to propriety that require further brief
comment. They have already been addressed at some length at various points throughout this
statement and only require brief concluding remarks.
A. Equity Requires thatthe Court Declineto Give an Opinion
9.3 Equitable principles of good faith and "clean hands" are widely acknowledged in the
Court's jurisprudence, as also are their corollaries of bad faith and abuse of rights.I6' Citing the
See, for example, Factory at Chorzow, P.C.I.J., 1927 Series A, No.9, at p.31; Free Zones Case, P.C.I.J.,
1932 Series A/B No.46, at p.167; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., 1933Series A/B No.53, as
per Judge Anzilloti, at p.95; Diversion of Waterfrom the Meuse, P.C.I.J., 1937 Series A/B, No.70, as per
Judge Anzilloti, at p.50, and Judge Hudson, at p.77; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staf in
Tehran,Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980,p.3, as per Judge Morozov, at pp.53-55, and Judge Tarazi, at pp.62-
63; Military and Paramilitary Aclivities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.United States
America), Merits,Judgment, 1.C.J.Reports 1986, p.14, as per Judge Schwebel, at paragraphs 240 and 268-
272. equitable maximthat "a court of equityrefuses relief to a plaintiff whose conduct in regard to the
subject-matter of the litigation has been improper",Judge Hudson, in his Separate Opinion in
Diversion of Waterfrorn the Meuse, observed:
"The general principle is one of which the international tribunal should make
a very sparing application. ... Yet, in a proper case, and with scrupulous
regard for the limitations which are necessary, a tribunal bound by
international law ought not to shrink from applying a principle of such
obvious fairne~s."'~~
9.4 Although this is a request for an advisory opinion, itis dificult to conceive of a case to
which Judge Hudson's injunction to the Courtto act is more appropriatelysuited. As the material
in Chapter 3 attests, "Palestine" is responsible for the terrorism which the fence is aimed at
addressing. Thiscannot beignored. It cannot be opento a party to seek a remedy from a court in
circumstances in which it has committed the wrong that has brought about the very situation
which is under examination. This follows from the principlenullus commodum capere de sua
injura proprio - no one can be allowed to reap advantage fiom his own wrong - a principle
which is just as pertinent in advisory proceedings which seekto raise for assessment questions
which are essentially contentious. The realityof this case is that "Palestine" will be seeking from
the Court certain findingsof law. Yet it is the very suicide and other attacks against Israel and
This is
Israelis for which it isresponsible that have led to the situation of which it complains.
quite obviously a material factor, amounting to a "compelling reason", which the Court must
weigh in the balance whenexercising its discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute.
B. An Opinion Would Cut Across theSchemeof the Roadmap
9.5 The implications of an opinion of the Court on the substance of the request for the
scheme of the Roadmap have already been addressedin detail in earlier Chapters. There are two
reasons why anadvisory opinion on the substance would be at odds with the Roadmap. The first
is that the Roadmap commits the two sides to negotiations within an agreed framework.
Acceding to the request for an advisory opinion whichraises one aspect of a conflict that the two
sides have agreedto address by other means would signal to "Palestine" that it is acceptable for it
to pursue its objectivesoutside of the fiamework agreed. In practical terms, this is likely to act as
'69Diversionof WaterfrorntheMeuse, P.C.I.J., 1937SeriesA/B, No.70, as per Judge Hudson, at p.77.
114 a factor detracting fiom the Roadmap modalitiesand, even more ominously as a green light for
additionalterror activities.
9.6 The second and more important reason why an opinion on the substance would
undermine the Roadmap is that almostany conceivable answer on the substance of the question
would go directly to issues that the two sides have deferred for later discussion. The Roadmap
advances a comprehensive approach to resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict comprised of
a number of phases. The scheme of these phases is not happenstance but a recognition of the
foundationthat needsto be establishedif there is to be any hope of success. It followsthat, under
the Roadmap, progress towards a permanent status agreement in Phase III of the initiative is
dependent on the effective performanceby the two sides of the commitmentsunder Phases 1and
II. Critical amongst these is the requirement that the Palestinianside take effective measures to
bring the terrorism to an end. This cannot be sidestepped by way of a procedure which seeks to
engage the Court on issues that fall to be determined through negotiations in due course once
"Palestine" has fulfilledits ownthreshold commitments.
9.7 The dispute over the fence is only one aspect of the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The fence is a response by Israel to the failure by the Palestinians to fulfil their commitmentsto
bring an end to the terror. One element of the dispute cannot properlybe addressed in the
absence of the other. And neither can be properly addressed by the Court, especially in the
context of its advisoryjurisdiction, without runninga considerable risk that such balance as the
Roadmap attempts to achieve, and to advance in due course through negotiations by the two
sides,will be immediatelyupset.
9.8 It does not require a particularlycreative imaginationto consider what an opinion of the
Court might conceivably address - assuming arguendo that it would not simply endorse Israel's
right to construct the fence and al1of its conduct in relation thereto. As one undertakes such an
exercise, as the Court will no doubt do, it becomes immediately apparent thatany opinion on the
substance of the question wouldcut across the Roadmap. The point has been made in Chapter 3
by reference simply to some of the issues surrounding the Armistice Demarcation Line andthe
question of settlements. To these can be added others, such as the status of Jerusalem. Virtually
anything that the Court might say would risk undermining the proposed scheme of the
negotiations aswell as their substance. 9.9 The most evident difficulty concerns the question of legality. The point was made in
Chapter 5 that this is not even explicitly part of the question. Yet some assessment of legality
might be expected to be a prerequisite to anything that the Court might choose to Say on the
subject of legal consequences. There are, however, significant pitfallsin every direction of this
question. Resolution ES-]0113, which purports to determine illegality, cannot properly berelied
upon as an authoritative determination of legality. It is not binding. The assessment of illegality
was not arrived at afier any consideration of substantive issues of law. The resolution does not
state what provisions of law the fence is supposed to be in contradiction of. An opinion of the
Court based on this assessmentof legality would not be credible and would be likely to embroil
the Court, the two sides and the UnitedNations more generallyin a longer-term disputeas to the
weight of the Court's opinion.
9.10 Other avenues to which the Court might turn to in order to assess legality would be
equally problematic. Other resolutionsof the Security Council and General Assembly do not
address the legality of the fenceand are subjectto their own significant limitations of assessment.
These resolutions, even ofthe SecurityCouncil, are not akin to resolution 276 (1970), in issue in
the Namibia case, which, under the scheme of the Charter, was dispositiveof a matter essentially
interna1to the United Nations itself. A much more considered reviewof legality would properly
be required.
9.11 Assuming, however, simple reliance onsuch resolutions, the Court would still be faced
with the need to extrapolate from these resolutions to address the legality of the fence. And it
does not follow that a resolution on the legality of some or other question can of itself form an
adequate and proper basis for an assessment of the legalityof the fence. Even assuming that the
Court, in its advisory hnction and absent relevant factsand arguments on the matter from Israel,
could properly undertake a considered assessment of legality, the outcome would be an opinion
which would undoubtedly trespass into the essential domain of the Roadmap on questions of
borders, Jerusalem and settlements. Whatever the Court might Say on these topics would be
thrust into the balance of the intended negotiations with every chance of destabilising that
process. Issues that the Quartet has proposed should be addressed in Phase IIIof the Roadmap
would be catapulted up front with the opinion of the Court, given in ignorance of the wider
political dynamic, underminingthe negotiations. 9.12 Other approaches do not suggest simpler solutions. "Legal consequences" do not
subsist in a vacuum. An opinion addressing legal consequences for Israel, for "Palestine", for
other States, for the United Nations, which had no anchor in the reality of the events on the
ground and a considered assessmentof the balanceof rights,would becounterproductive.
9.13 Against this background,the statementof the United States, as the principal architect of
the Roadmap, in the debate in the Emergency Special Session at whichthe advisory opinion
request was adopted, bears recollection. The full statementis set out in Chapter 3. The salient
element isas follows:
"The international community has long recognised that resolution of the
conflict must be through negotiated settlement, as called for in Security
Council resolutions242 (1967) and 338 (1973). That was spelled out clearly
to the parties in the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Conference in
1991. Involving the International Court of Justice in this conflict is
inconsistent with that approach and could actually delay a two-State solution
and negatively impactroad map implementation. Furthermore,referral of this
issue to the International Court of Justice risks politicising the Court. It will
not advance the Court's ability to contribute toglobal security, nor will it
advancethe prospectsof peace."
9.14 As will have been evident from the other extracts of statements set out in Chapters 3
and 4 above,the United Stateswas not alone inthis assessment.
9.15 An advisory opinion, conducted on an accelerated procedure, which cuts across a
concerted diplomatic initiative, endorsedby the Security Council, to bring the two sides back to
negotiations, cannotbut harm attempts to achievea resolution ofthe conflict. Israel submits that,
by any standard, this amounts to a "compelling reason" why the Court, in the exercise of its
discretion under Article 65(1) of the Statute, should decline to respond on the merits of the
requestedopinion. CHAPTER 10
SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
10.1 As required by the Court's Practice DirectionNo.11,this Chapter contains a short
summary of Israel's reasoning as set forth in the preceding Chapters. It also contains
brief conclusions.
10.2 Israel's contentions are twofold. First, the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
advisoryopinion request containedin resolutionA/RES/ES-10114. Second,if the Courtfinds that
it hasjurisdiction, as a matter ofjudicial propriety it should decline to answer the request. There
is, however, a common theme that mns through both of these contentions, namely, that the
advisory opinion request would see the Court trespass into the complex Israeli-Palestinian
conflict notwithstanding that the Security Council unanimously endorsed the Roadmapin
resolution 1515(2003),just nineteendays before the advisory opinion request.
10.3 The Court lacksjurisdiction for two reasons. First, the requestfor an advisory opinion
is ultrviresthe competenceof the 1othEmergency Special Session ofthe General Assemblyand
would also have been ultra viresthe competence of the General Assembly convenedin regular
session (see Chapter 4). The 10" Emergency Special Session was convened pursuant to the
Uniting for Peace Resolution of 3 November 1950,which provides in relevant part that "if the
Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenanceof international peace and security in any case where
there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collectivemeasures". In the instant case, there has been no
failure by the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility forthe maintenance of
international peace and security. On the contrary, just nineteen days before the passing of
resolution ARESIES-10114, the Security Council exercised its primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security in endorsing the Roadmap. In any event, under
the scheme of the Charter, the General Assembly's responsibility and competence for the
maintenance of internationalpeace and security is subsidiary to that of the SecurityCouncil. In
circumstances such as the instant case, where the Security Council has acted in exercise of its
primaryresponsibility, the General Assemblyhas a dutyto exercise restraint. 10.4 Second, in order for the Court to be able to exercise its advisoryjurisdiction, a request
must have beenreferred to the Courton a "legal question"(see Chapter5). The question referred
to the Court in this caseis not a "legal question" within the scope of Article96(1) of the Charter
and Article 65(1) of the Statutebecause it is not sufficiently certain. Thisis so for two reasons.
First, it is unclear whether the Court is being asked to find that the construction of the fence is
unlawfül, or merely to assume illegality. Second, although the concept of"legal consequences"
does not exist in the abstract, the questiondoes not state for whom the "legal consequences" are
to be specified.
10.5 Were the Court to conclude that it does have jurisdiction, there are significant reasons
why it should decline to answer the request as a matter of judicial propriety. The relevant
principles of law are set out in Chapter 6. The reasons why the Court should decline to respond
to the requested opinion are as follows. First,the advisory opinion request relatesto key aspects
of the ongoing dispute between Israel and "Palestine" and would be substantially equivalent to
deciding that dispute (see Chapter 7). In circumstances where Israel has expressly acted to
exclude the Court'sjurisdiction in respect of that dispute, answering the request would have the
effect of circumventing the principle that a State is not obliged to allow its dispute to be
submittedtojudicial settlement without its consent.
Second,answeringthe question would require the Courtto speculate about essential and
10.6
complex facts which arenot before it, and alsoto make assumptionsabout arguments of law (see
Chapter 8). The Court is not in a position to make the factual determinations necessaryto a
response to the advisory opinion request,and the Court cannot replace the judicial determination
of facts by assumptions orby speculation. Nor can the Court make assumptions as to what legal
arguments would be raised by Israel had it made submissions on the substance of the question
raised inthe advisoryopinionrequest.
10.7 Third, there are other compelling reasons why the Court should decline to exercise its
advisory jurisdiction in this case (see Chapter 9). These go both to the general fairness of the
proceedings and to judicial propriety. The Court should take full account of the fact that the
prime motivatorand CO-sponsorof the advisory opinion request,"Palestine", bears responsibility
for the very attacks that the fence has been designed to prevent. In addition, any response to the
advisory opinionrequestwould cut across the Security Council endorsed Roadmap initiative.10.8 In view of the considerations set out in this statement, Israel submits that the Court
should find that it has no jurisdiction to consider the advisory opinion request. In the alternative,
Israel submits that there are compelling reasons why the Court should exercise its discretion to
decline to answer the requested opinion. LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex No. Document
1. Letter from H.E. Eitan Margalit, Ambassador of Israel, The Hague, to H.E.
Philippe Couvreur, Registrar, International Court of Justice, 11 December
2003
2. Letter froin H.E. Eitan Margalit, Ambassador of Israel, The Hague, to H.E.
Philippe Couvreur, Registrar, International Court of Justice, 31 December
2003
3. AIRES13237(XXIX),22 November 1974
4. AIRES1431160A, 9 December 1988
5. A/RES/43/177, 15December 1988
6. AlRESl521250,7 July 1998
7. Letter dated 26 January 2004 from Ambassador Arye Mekel, Chargé
d'affaires a.i. of Israel to the United Nations in New York, addressed to the
Secretary-General
Letter dated 9 September 1993 from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, The Palestine
Liberation Organisation, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Ministerof lsrael
Joint Statement of the Quartet, 16July 2002
S/PRST/2002/20, 18July 2002
Joint Statement of theuartet, 20 December 2002
Joint Statement of theuartet, 20 February 2002
Joint Statement of theuartet, 22 June 2003
Joint Statement of the Quartet, 26 September 2003
SlRESl62, 16Noveinber 1948
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - Israel: General Armistice Agreement, 3April
1949
USAToday, March 14,2002, p.A.06
Statemeiitby Prime Minister Sharon, 18Jaiiuary 2004Statementby Palestinian Prime Minster Abbas, Aqaba Summit,4 June 2003
Statementby IsraeliPrime Minster Sharon, Aqaba Summit,4 June 2003
A/RES/377 (V), 3November 1950,"Uniting forPeace"
SPV.4836,5 October 2003
SPV.4862, 19November 2003 Cour internationalede Justice
Enregistréau Greffele:
----------
InternationalCourt ofJustice.
Filed inthe Registryo:
International Court of Justice
Request foran Advisory Opinion from the 10" Emergency Special Session
of the UnitedNations GeneralAssemblyon "the legal consequences arising
from the construction of the wall being builtby Israel"
WrittenStatement of the Government of Israel
onJurisdiction and Proprieiy
Annexes
30 January 2004 LIST OF ANNEXES
Annex No. Document
1. Letter from H.E.Eitan Margalit, Ambassadorof lsrael, The Hague, to H.E.
Philippe Couvreur, Registrar, International Court of Justice, 11December
2003
2. Letter from H.E.Eitan Margalit, Ambassadorof Israel, The Hague,to H.E.
Philippe Couvreur, Registrar, International Court of Justice, 31December
2003
AIRES13237(XXIX), 22 November 1974
A/RES/43/160 A. 9 December 1988
A/RES/43/177, 15December 1988
A/RES/52/250, 7 July 1998
Letter dated 26 January 2004 from Ambassador Arye Mekel, Charge
d'affaires a.i. of Israel to the United Nations in New York, addressed to
the Secretary-General
Letter dated 9 September 1993 from Yasser Arafat, Chairman, The
Palestine Liberation Organisation, to Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of
Israel
Joint Statementof the Quartet, 16July 2002
S/PRST/2002/20, 18July 2002
Joint Statementofthe Quartet, 20 December 2002
Joint Statementof theQuartet, 20 February 2002
Joint Statementof theQuartet, 22 June 2003
Joint Statementof theQuartet, 26 September 2003
SlRESl62, 16November 1948
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan - Israel: General Armistice Agreement, 3
April 1949
USAToday,March 14,2002, p.A.06
Statementby Prime Minister Sharon, 18January 2004
Statement by Palestinian Prime Minster Abbas, Aqaba Summit, 4 June
200321. Staternentby Israeli Prime Minster Sharon,Aqaba Summit, 4 June 2003
22. AIRES1377(V), 3 November 1950,"Unitingfor Peace"
23. SlPV.4836, 5 October 2003
24. SlPV.4862, 19November 2003Annex 1 THE AMGASSADOR OF ISRAEL
THE HAGUE
H.E. Philippc Couvreur
Registrar
Interr~aiionalCoun of Sus;ics
PeacePalace
2517 I<JThe Hasue
TheNetherlands
The Hzjue, J1eceinbe1 -7,2003
Sir,
1referto the adoptionby :he SpecialSession of the United Kations GeneralAsseinbly
ofResolution PLIES- O]Ad 16of 8 December 2003 requestinj theInternztional Coun of
Justice to render.an advisory opinion on " the legal consequences asisinz from the
construcrionofthewall beinz built by Isracl".
!
Therequest raisescontentiousmatters which bear di~.ectly on the security of the Staie I
of Israel and its population from terrorist atracks. The Government of lsrael is l
accordin_oly cnnsiderir.8ifs position on ~hisrequest and whetlier it should rake any
pan in the proceedinsr of the un. Without prejudicr to any further position that
Israclmay in due coursetake on the matter, Tsrael'view is tharthe Couit should not
entertainthe request forrcasorisof discretion,jurisdictiand admissibiliry.
lsrzel nores thzt any consjdered assessrnent of the substance of the q~iestionwould
haveto allow sufficientrime for the prcparation and exchange of wrirten statements,
?ad comrxe::ts:!x:ecn byo:hc;s. withirithe terns of Aiticle 66ofthe Courr'r.Y/atrrtc.
Gi~rn the seriousness of the issse raised by rhe qzestion, notwithsiznding rhc
expediticln1-equesreby t!leGenczrzl Asseinbly, Tsraeldoes not think that tliis can be
adequately,or fairly,achievedin thespace of weeksbui rvoui'd have to allowat leasta
nurnba of mon;hs for the preparationof initial writtstateriienrs.
In this coniext,lsrzel is concerned b)~rhc negzti1.refièctcf ?endin2proceedii~~son
any ac~ivitiesairned at fxi!itôiingnegoti~tioi~sbe:~beenthe parties as eiivisagedby
the "RoadXiap".THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL
THE HAGUE
Ir.thcse circlicst~nces, lsrzel irlthe cou^tc considrr oi?urcatjcgrhe procccdin~s
IO allowaneai-lyresponse to the questionof whetliertherquest should be enteitained
hy the Ccilrr\Yhile sur'ijcierl:newcc!d stiil ncctobe e!!csl:eCto Ststvs'tprepue
wrirtenstaremei~rsoriquesrionsofjurisdjction and adinissibilitin the event tiiat rhe
Cvurt wcre to decio'r thar it Uoeskve jurisdlctioito, :rd should, enterLainthe
request, itivould then be ?ossiDie 70 move on to ihe substance of tiie matfer
uneiicumberedbypreliin ir!arissues.
Givcr. Israel'sdirectcozcem wit!rhis natter, it resvrvesal1 its ri@s uader the
Charter,tneSrlrruzeandthe Ruiesoftne Court iiiçludingitsrjght10choose a Judge ad
hoc inaccordance ~ith &ic!v 3 1oftkr C:oiii?',)'r~rbile2Anicles 35 and i02(3) ci
the j21rlesrfrijeC'ozrrr.Israel aisodiaws attenrioito Article i7(2) of the Coun's
,Tti~n~aendArticle 34 of irsKulcs.
Plezlsebe assureà, Sir,of niyhighesi considerations.
5. /yVG[
Eitan Kai 0-alit
Ambzssrc'.oo rflsrzel
TheHa;iieAnnex 231-DEC-2003 11:1@ FROM Israeli Embassy
TKE AMBRSSADOR OF ISRAEL
THE HAGUE
31.PhilippeCouvreur
Registrar
International ourotfJustjce
PcliccPalace
2517 iU The Hague
TheNetherlands
The Hague, 31 December 2003
Sir,
ihave the honour toreferto my lettetoyou of 11 Dewmber2003 and tothe Court's
Order of 19 December2003 in the matterof the requestfornn advisory opinionin
resolutionNRESIES-10I14of8 December 2003 conveycd totheCourt under coverof a
lettehm the Secretary-GeneroltheUnired Nationsalsoof 8hcember 2003.
The Govemmentof lsrael wishes toplaceon recorditsvcryconsiderabledisquietwith
keyeleinentsoftheCourt' Osrder.Thç Ordermns countertothccstablishedpracticeof
theCourt in respectof advimryproceedings and,in a materiallespect, is inconsisteni
with the expri?s ternisothe Statuteand Rulesof Court. Ttis tmubling that,on a
ccn;piexmarrer ofsuch hporrancebearîngairccriy on the securitanddeknce of thc
Statrof Israeand of the righttlife oitcitizensthe Courthas decidedto procecd in
thimaiiner.
CsraeIotesthattheCourthastitledthecaseLeml ConsuquericesofrireComartcCion ofa
Wall in theOccupied Pule~tinianTerrixory.in doing so, theCourthas adopted tlie
lmguageof thequestion,alrhoughwith some variation. lsraelnoteshowever, thatin
pamgraph 2 oftheRcportannexed to theSecretiuy-Gcn iererlf'sDecember2003.
theSecretary-Genera~ ffemd ro "a systemof fences,walls,ditchesandbnrriersin hc
West Bank ('theBamcr')". A footnote to this sentencStates"PalestiniansoRencaIl
thissystem ttiSeparationWall andIsraeliusethe termSecurityFençe. For thepurpose
of rhcpresentreport,thmore generalterm'the Ramieri'sused."
Given theüçuîe sençitivities abtc.rminologinthis matterandthc factthatthebarrier
is ovelwhelmingly 3wire fenceratherthan aconcretewall,Tswelis conccrncdthat the
Court'sfailure twflect thissuesbeforeifinaneutralway inthevery nainegiven tothe
case may be tüken tù suggestthatthe Courthas alreadyforrned aview of the barrier
which issupp0rtiv&of thePalestiniposition.
In operativeparagraph1 of ifs Order,thCourt fixcda 6 weekperiod for the filing of
writtenstatements. The Order makes no provision tbr a second round of written
comrnents. The Court alsofued the dateforthe openmg of thehearings3 weeks afier31-DEC-213133 11:11 FROM Israeli Ernbassy TO %09?2253@3367 F.03
TCLE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL
THE HAGUE
receiptof the written statementwithout regard to thenuinber,site or content of riie
wrjttenstatemcntsto be subrnjtredThc basis forthe Court'dsecision ithe requestthat
theadvisoryopinian bc rendered"urgent l".
Inits most reccntadvisory opinion, the Courtwas faced with a rcquest "on a priority
basis". Itthere fixed an 8 % week period for thc exchange of first round written
staternents andafurther30 daysthereafterfortlisubmissionof writtencomments oiithe
written çfatements.A hearingdate was sctafler thecloseof tlie writtenphasconcethe
extent of the written statementswas knotvn. Tirne-lir in itherpnority advisory
opinions have variedaccording tothecompbxity of thparticulnrcase.
The prcscnt case is consideram blore cornplex than most, if not all, advisory
proceedingsthathavecorne beforethe Court. it goes to Israel's essentisecurityand
dttènce interests. Thcseaspectsmight have beed expected todictate longerpenods for
the filing ofwritten statements,nn opporhinity for written comment. on the writkn
statementsand an adquateopportunity to considerthe writtenstatements and comments
before the openingof the hearings. On cach element, however, the Court basfixecla
procedureInthis case thatishardlyconducivcto a consideredexamination ofthe matter.
Varticularlyinthe lightof my letter tyou of Il December 2003, in which thesevexy
issueswere mised by Isnel in a manner intended tabeof assistance to the Court, the
arrangeinentslaiddown bythe Court give rise toveryseriousconcerns aboutthe fnimess
of theprocedure.
By operativepsrngnphs2 and4 of its Order,the Court pmvidesthat "Palestine" may
submit a writkn siatemcnt on the questionand may take partin the hearings. ln this
regard,Israelrecallsdierems of Articles35 and66 ofthe Statute. Whatever the stati~a
of "Palestinc", itÏs neitbern "State entitledto appear before the Court" nor an
inrcrnational organisatiwithinthescope of trierelevaiitprovisions of the StatuO.n
thecontrary,pursuanttoA/RES/43/177of 15 hccmber 1988 it is simplythecase tl~at
"the designation'Palestine' should be used in place of the designntion 'Palestine
LiberationOrganization 'ntheUnitedNations system,without prejudice tothe observer
statusand functionsofthe PalestincLibcrationOrganization wifiin theUnited Nations
system". White the Cotin should be ina position toreceiveinformation relevantto its
task, lsraecansee no basis in the Charterthe Statute, the Rules of Court or relevant
UnitedNations resolutions forthearrangements iirespectof '‘Palestinenow laid down
in the Court'sOrder. It is not appropriathata matterthat hasbeen highly contentious
amongst UN Membersfor many years is now dealt with en passunt and wiulout
discussion innprocedural Oderof the Court.
In my letterof 11 Decctnber2003, Israelreferred to Article17(2) of the Statuteand
Article34 of the Rules ofCourt. Inthis regard,israelnotes rharthe 19 December2003
OrderoftheCourt was madc by thefullBench ofthe Court aftedeliberadon by al1of its
Memlxrs.
Israelisconstraind ioobserve thata Member of theCoun whohasplayed a leadingrole
in recentyearsin the veryEmergencySpecialSessionfiom which theadvisory opinion31-DEC-20~33 11:11 FROM Israeli Embassy TO %El97225383367 P.04
THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL
THE HAGUE
requesthastiow emergedshould be participatinindecisionsinthiscriseThis appears
tobe sliarplat itds withthe approachdopted by a nurnber of otheMembcrsof the
Courtinrecentyearsin othw cases.
ResolutionAIRESIES- 1 11requestingthe advisoryopinlolocntestherequestsquxely
inthe contexi ofthe wider Arab-Isrn 1eIraeIi-Palestinimdispute.The essentially
eontentiousnature of the pruceedingsis alsrecognisedby the Court' snvitat toon
Palesti tneparticipatin thecase. It isinappropriatfora Memberof tlie Courtto
participatindecisionin a caseinwhichhchas prwious~y played anactive,officiaand
publicroleas an advocatefora cause thatis in contentionin thcase. Israelwiifbe
writingtothePresjdenotftheCour teparatelonthismatterpursuant IOArticle34(2)of
theRulesofCourt.
In thelightofthe Court'sOrder,lsmelisconsidctingitsposition.Itmaintainsthevicw
that theCoirrtshould notentertaintherequesrfor reasonsof lack of jurisdictiand
inadmissibility,reasons whicharboundup with thetrulyconteatiouschancter of the
casc inwhicliconsentby lsraetotheCourt'sexerciseofjurisdictioovcr ihas notbeen
given. Forthe uvoidance ofdoubt,nothing in th&lcttcrorthaiof 11 Dccember 2003,
caninany way betaken risan acceptanct:y israeoftheCourt's jurisdictioin rcspect
of thismatteroroftheproprietyof aresponsconthe meritsoftherequest.Inde&,Israel
doesnotconsidertl~iittheprocedurafmework Iniddown in the Orderis conduciveto a
fairconsiderationof therneiits othecase. Isnel rcscrves all oitsrightsunder the
Charter,Statutand Rulesof Court.
Pleasebeassured,Sir,ofmy highcstconsiderations.
EitanMargatjr
Ambrissadoroflsrael
TheHaguc AiRES/3237(XXIX) of 22 November 1974
UNITED
NATIONS
GeneralAssembly
A/RES/3237 (XXIX)
22 November 1974
3237 (XXIX) .Observer status for the Palestine Liberation
Organization
The General Assembly,
Having considered the question of Palestine,
Taking into consideration the universality of the United Nations
prescribed in the Charter,
Recalling its resolution 3102 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973,
Taking into account Economic and Social Council resolutions 1835
(LVI) of 14 May 1974 and 1840 (LVI) of 15 May 1974,
.Noting that the.Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in.Armed
Conflicts, the World Population Conference and the World Food
Conference have in effect invited the Palestine Liberation
Organization to participate in their respective deliberations,
Noting also that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to
participate in its deliberations as an observer,
1. Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in
the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity
of observer;
2. Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in
the sessions and the work of al1 international conferences convened
under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of
observer;
3. Considers that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled
to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of al1
international conferences convened under the auspices of other
organs of the United Nations;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for
the implementation of the present resolution.Annex 4 A/RES/43/16of 9 December 1988 Page 1of 3
UNITED
NATIONS
General Assembly
A/RES/43/160
9 December 1988
43/160. Observer statu~ of national liberation movements
recognized by the Organization of African Unity
and/or by the League of Arab States
The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions 35/167 of 15 December 1980, 37/104 of 16
December 1982, 39/76 of 13 December 1984 and 41/71 of 3 December
1986,
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General,l/
Recalling its resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, by which
it granted observer status to the Palestine Liberation
Organization,
~ecaliing further its resolution 31/152 of 20 December 1976, by
which it granted observer status to the South West Africa People's
Organization,
Desirous of enhancing the effective role played by these national
liberation movements,
Bearing in mind the necessity of facilitating the work of these
organizations,
1. Decides that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the South
West Africa People's Organization are entitled to have their
communications relating to the sessions and work of the General
Assembly issued and circulated directly, and without intermediary,
as official documents of the Assembly;
2. Decides also that the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
South West Africa People's Organization are entitled to have their
communications relating to the sessions and work of al1
international conferences convened under the auspices of the
General Assembly of the United Nations issued and circulated
directly, and without intermediary, as official documents of these
conferences; Page 2 of 3
3. Authorizes the Secretariat to issue and circulate as official
documents of the United Nations, under the appropriate symbol of
other organs or conferences of the United Nations, communications
submitted directly, without intermediary, by the Palestine
Liberation Organization and the South West Africa People's
Organization, on matters relative to the work of these organs and
conferences;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for
the implementation of the present resolution.
*Only resolution 43/160 A deals with matters related to the
question of Palestine.
-/ A/43/528 and Add.1 and 2.
RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 43/160 A: 117-2-31
In ---v-our:Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti,
Dominican ~epublic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania,
Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United
Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen,
Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.
Against: Israel, United States.
Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Costa
Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Dominica, El Salvador, Finland,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Honduras, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Samoa, Spain, Sweden, UnitedA/RES/43/160 of 4December 1988 Page 3 of 3
Kingdom.
Absent: Bangladesh*, Chile, Comoros, Haiti, Jamaica, Mozambique,
St. Kitts and Nevis, Zimbabwe*.
*Later advised the Çecretariat that it had intended to vote in
favour.Annex 5 AIRES14377 of 15December 1988 Page 1of 2
UNITED
NATIONS
GeneralAssembly
A/RES/43/177
15 December 1988
43/177. Question of Palestine
The General Assembly,
Having considered the item entitled "Question of Palestine",
Recalling its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, in which,
inter alia, it called for the establishment of an Arab State and a
Jewish State in Palestine,
Mindful of the special responsibility of the United Nations to
achieve a just solution to the question of Palestine, .
Aware of the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the
Palestine National Council in line with General Assembly resolution
181 (II) and in exercise of the inalienable rights of the
Palestinian people,
Affirming the urgent need to achieve a just and comprehensive
settlement in the Middle East which, inter alia, provides for
peaceful coexistence for al1 States in the region,
Recalling its resolution 3237 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974 on the
observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization and
subsequent relevant resolutions,
1. Acknowledges the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the
Palestine National Council on 15 November 1988;
2. Affirms the need to enable the Palestinian people to exercise
their sovereignty over their territory occupied since 1967;
3. Decides that, effective as of 15 December 1988, the designation
"Palestine" should be used in place of the designation "Palestine
Liberation Organization" in the United Nations system, without
prejudice to the observer status and functions of the Palestine
Liberation Organization within the United Nations system, in
conformity with relevant United Nations resolutions and practice;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary action to
implement the present resolution. Page 2 of 2
RECORDED VOTE ON RESOLUTION 43/177: 104-2-36
In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria,Angola, Argentina,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussia,
Cape Verde, Chad, China, Colombia, Comoros, Cuba, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti,
Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon,Gambia, German
Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea,Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait,Lao
People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar,
Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine,
USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu,
Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against: Israel, United States.
Abstentio-ns:Antigua and Barbuda, Australia,.Austria, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belgium, Bhutan, Canada, CentralAfrican Republic, Costa
Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia,
Luxembourg, Malawi, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, ri ni dndadobago, United Kingdom,
Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire.
Absent: Belize, Cameroon, Chile, Congo, Dominica, Dominican .
Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica,
Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Solomon Islands.
IRAN ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE VOTE.Annex 6 AIRES1521250of 7 July 1998
UNITED
NATIONS
GeneralAssembly GENERAL
A/RES/52/250
7 July 1998
Fifty-second session
Agenda item 36
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THEGENERAL ASSEMBLY
lithout reerence to a Main Cornmittee(A/52/L.53/Rev.2and Addl)]
521250.Participation of Palestine in twork of the United Nations
TheGeneralAssernbly,
Recallingits resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947,in which, inieralia, it recommended the
partitionof Palestineinto a Jewish State andan Arab State, with Jerusalemas a corpusluin,
Recalling alsoitsresolution 3237 (XXIX)of 22 November 1974,by which it grantedobserver status
to the PalestineLiberation Organization,
Recallingfurther its resolution160 A of 9 December 1988,adopted under the item entitled
"Observer statusof national liberation movements recognizedby the Organizationof African Unity
and/orby the League of Arab States",in which it decided that the Palestine LiberationOrganization
was entitled to have its communications issued and circulatedascia1documents ofthe United
Nations,
Recalling itsresolution3/177 of 15December 1988,in which it acknowledged theproclamation of
the Stateof Palestineby the Palestine NationalCouncil on 15 November88 and decided that the
designation "Palestine" shouldbe used in place of the designation "Palestine Liberation
Organization"inthe United Nations system,
Recalling alsoitsresolutions 49112 A of 9 November 1994 and 49/12B of 24 May 1995,through
which, interalia, arrangements for the specialcommemorative meeting of the General Assembly on
the occasionof the fiftieth anniversary of the UnitedNations, in addition to applyingto al1Member
and observer States, were also applied to Palestine,in its capacity as observer, including in the
organizing processof the listof speakers for the commemorative meeting,
Recallingfurther that Palestineenjoys full membership in the Group of Asian States andthe
Economic and Social Commissionfor Western Asia,
Aware that Palestines a full memberof the League of Arab States,the Movementof Non-Aligned
Countries,the Organizationof the Islamic Conference, andthe Group of 77 and China,
Aware also that general deinocratic Palestinianelections were h20dJanuary 1996 and that the A/RES/52/250 of 7 July 1998
Palestinian Authority was establishedon part of the occupied Palestinian territory.
Desirous of contributing to the achievement of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, thus
attaining a just and comprehensivepeace in the Middle East,
1.Decides to confer upon Palestine, inits capacity as observer, and as contained in the annex to the
presentresolution, additional rights and privileges of participation in the sessions and work of the
GeneralAssembly and the international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly or
other organs of the United Nations, as well as in United Nations conferences;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to infonn the General Assembly, within the current session, about
the implementation of the modalities annexed to the present resolution.
89thylenary meeting
7JuIy 1998
ANNEX
The additional rights and privileges of participation of Palestine shall be effected through the
following modalities, without prejudice to the existing rights and privileges:
1.The right to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly.
2. Without prejudice to the priority of Member States, Palestine shall have the right of inscription on
the list of speakersunder agenda items other than Palestinian and Middle East issues at any plenary
meeting of the General Assembly, after the last Member State inscribed on the list of that meeting.
3. The right of reply.
4. Theright to raise points of order related to the proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues,
provided that the right toraise such a point of order shall not include the right to challenge the
decision of the presiding officer.
5. The right to CO-sponsordraft resolutions and decisions on Palestinian and Middle East issues.
Such draft resolutions anddecisions shall be put to a vote only upon request from a Member State.
6. The right to make interventions, with a precursory explanation or the recall of relevant General
Assembly resolutions being made onlyonce by the President of the General Assembly at the start of
each session of the Assembly.
7. Seating for Palestine shallbe arranged immediately after non-member States and before the other
observers; and with the allocation of six seats in the General Assembly Hall.
8. Palestine shall not have the right to vote or to put forward candidates. PERhZeWiYTMISSIONOF ISRAEL 18-71
TO THEUNITED NATIONS
AMBASSADOR ARYEMEKEL
DEPUrY PERMANENT REPRESEhTATNE
26 January2004
ExcelIency,
Israel mustregister its dismay and concern at the dossier subrnitted by the Secretanat to the
International Court of Justice, in the request for an advisory opinion on Israel's security fence.
The dossier is rife with what we hope are oversights, and cannot, in any way, be said to presenta
balanced picture of the relevant United Nations documents inthis case.
The context in which the secunty fence wasconstructed - Israel's eofits legitimate right
to self-defense in accordance with principles of international law and the -hasbeener
entirelyoverlooked. Indeed, thUNe resolutions which speak not only nght,but rather of
an obligation, to fight tenorism have not been included in the dossier. The most relevant ofthese
areundoubtedly Security Council Resolutions 1269and 1373.
At the same time, various documents have been included whose relevance is questatthele,
least.For example, the inclusion of General Assembly Resolutioas1weli as the Rome
Statuteof thICC, could onlybe considered "relevant" in the context of a broad political
campaign against Israel. At times, the lack of inthe dossier borders on the absuani7
at a loss to understand thejustification for the inclusion of reports written by the Special
Rapporteur of the CHRto the temtories, whileno mention is made of detailed responses by
Israel, thernselves circulated as documents of the United Nations.
1mustprotest these shortcornings in the strongest of terthe.inclusion of inelevant
materials, aswell as the excluofsalient documentsmay have effect upon .thework ofthe
Court.1woul4 therefore asîhatthese oversightsbe urgently corrected.
Please accept,.Excellency, the assurances of my highest considerations.
me ~ekel, Arnbassador
Charged'affaires a.i
H.E.Mr. Kofi Annan
Secretary-General
The UnitedNations
New York,NY
800 SECOAD AVENUE, hTW YORK, hl 10017 + TEL.(2 12)499-55 IO t FAX: (212)499-5515Annex 8 September 9, 1993
Mr. Prime Minister,
The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history
of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the
following PL0 commitments: l
The PL0 recognizes the right of the State of lsrael to exist in peace and
security.
The PL0 accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions242 and 338.
The PL0 commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful 1
resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that al1
outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through
negotiations.
The.PL0 considers that thesigningof the Declaration of Principlesconstitutes
a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from
violence and al1other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly,
the PL0 renounces the use of terr'orismand other acts of violence and will
assume responsibi~it~overal1PL0 elements andpersonnel inorder to assure
their compliance. prevent viol-lions and discipline violators.
In view of the.promise of-a new era and the signingof the Declaration of
.
Principles and. based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338, the PL0 affirms that those articles of the
Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of
the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are
now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PL0 undertakes to
submit to the Palestinian National Couricil for formal approval the necessary
changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.
The Palesti
Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister of lsraelAnnex 9 United Nations
SecurityCouncil Distr.: General
10 April 2002
Original: English
Statement by the President of the Security Council
At the 4511th meeting of the Security Council, held on 10 April 2002, in
connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in the
Middle East, including the Palestinian question", the President of the Security
Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:
"The Security Council supports the Joint StatementS/2002/369) issued
in Madrid on 10 April 2002 by the Secretary-General, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, Secretary of State of the United States,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain and High Representative for European
Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is annexed to this
statement, as transmitted the Council by the Secretary-General. The Security
Council calls upon the Government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and al1
States in the region to cooperate with the efforts to achievgoals set out in
the Joint Statement and insists on the immediate implementatiof resolutions
1402(2002) and 1403 (2002)."
02-32528 (E) 100402
"0232528 *Annex
Joint Statement
The Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation lgor Ivanov, Secretary of State of the United
States Colin Powell, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain Josep Pique and High
Representative for European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier
Solana met in Madrid today. We reviewed the escalating confrontation in the Middle
East and agreed to coordinate our actions to resolve the current crisis.
We express our grave concern about the present situation, including the
mounting humanitarian crisis and the growing risk to regional security. We reiterate
our shared condemnation of violence and terrorism, express our deep distress at the
loss of innocent Palestinian and lsraeli life, and extend our deepest sympathy to the
families of those killed and wounded. Believing that there has been too much
suffering and too much bloodshed, we cal1 on the leaders of Israel and the
Palestinian Authority to act in the interests of their own people, the region, and the
international community and to immediately halt this senseless confrontation.
In this regard, we express our grave concern about the most recent attacks
from Lebanon across the UN-determined Blue Line. The Quartet calls on al1parties
to respect the Blue Line, haltal1 attacks, and show the utmost restraint. The conflict
should not be allowed to spread and threaten regional security and stability.
The UN, EU and Russia express their strong support for Secretary of State
Powell's mission, and urge lsrael and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate fully
with his mission and with their continuing efforts to restore calm and resume a
political process.
We reiterate that there is no military solution to the conflict and1on the parties
to move towards a political resolution of their disputes based on UNSCR 242 and 338,
and the principle of land for peac- which formed the basis for the Madrid Conference
of 1991. We reaffirm our support for the objective expressed by President Bush and
spelled out in UNSCR 1397, of two States, lsrael and Palestine, living side-by-side
within secure and recognized borders. We warmly welcome Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah's peace initiative, as endorsed in Beirut by the Arab League, as a significant
contribution towards a comprehensivepeace, including Syria and Lebanon.
To enable progress towards our shared goals, we reaffirm that UNSCR 1402
must be fully implemented immediately, as called for in UNSCR 1403. We cal1 on
Israel to halt immediately its military operations. We cal1 for an immediate,
meaningful ceasefire and an immediate lsraeli withdrawal from Palestinian cities,
including Ramallah, specifically including Chairman Arafat's headquarters. We cal1
on Israel to fully comply with international humanitarian principles and to allow full
and unimpeded access to humanitarian organizations and services. We cal1 on Israel
to refrain from the excessive use of force and undertake al1possible efforts to ensure
the protection of civilians.
We cal1 on Chairman Arafat, as the recognized, elected leader of the
Palestinian people, to undertake immediately the maximum possible effort to stop
terror attacks against innocent Israelis. We cal1 on the Palestinian Authority to act
decisively and take al1 possible steps within its capacity to dismantle terrorist
infrastructure, including terrorist financing, and to stop incitement to violence. We cal1 on Chairman Arafat to use the full weight of his political authority to persuade
the Palestinian people that any and al1 terrorist attacks against lsraelis should end
immediately, and to authorize his representatives to resume immediately security
coordination with Israel.
Terrorism, including suicide bombs, is illegal and immoral, has inflicted grave
harm to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and must be condemned
as called for in UNSCR 1373.
We cal1on Israel and the Palestinian Authority to reach agreement on ceasefire
proposais put forward by General Zinni without further delay. We commend the
efforts of General Zinni to date to achieve this objective.
The Quartet stands ready to assist the parties in implementing their
agreements, in particular the Tenet security workplan and the Mitchell
recommendations, including through a third-party mechanism, as agreed to by the
parties.
We affirm that the Tenet and Mitchell plans must be fully implemented,
including an end to al1 settlement activity. We affirm that there must be immediate,
parallel and accelerated movement towards near-term and tangible political
progress, and that there must be a defined series of steps leading to permanent
peace - involving recognition, normalization and security between the sides, an
end to Israeli occupation, and an end to the conflict. This will allow lsrael to enjoy
enduring peace and security and the Palestinian people to realize their hopes and
aspirations in security and dignity.
In support of these objectives, we cal1 on the international community,
particularly the Arab States, to preserve, strengthen and assist the Palestinian
Authority, including through efforts to rebuild its infrastructure, security and
governance capacity. We cal1 also on the donor community and the international
financial institutions to renew their commitment to provide urgent humanitarian
assistance to the Palestinian people, and to assist in economic and institutional
reconstruction. We pay tribute to the courageous efforts of the humanitarian
agencies.
We agreed on the need to keep the situation in the Middle East under review by
the Quartet at the principal's level through regular consultations. Our Special
Envoys will continue their efforts on the ground to assist the parties in reaching an
end to confrontation and a resumption of political negotiations.
Madrid - 1 0 April2002Middle East Quartet Stalement of July 16:2002 Page 1of 2
Middle East Quartet Statement of July 16, 2002
NewYork City
July 16, 2002
Afîer meeting at theWaldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City,the Quartet issuedthe followingStaternent:
UnitedNationsSecretary-GeneralKofi Annan, Russian ForeignMinister lgor Ivanov, U.S. Secretaryof
State Colin Powell, Danish ForeignMinister Per Stig Moeller, High Representativefor European Cornrnon
Foreign and Security PolicyJavier Solana and European Cornrnissionerfor External Affairs Chris Patten
met in New York today. The Quartet rnernbersreviewedthe situation in the MiddleEast and agreed to
continue close consultations,as expressed in the Madrid Declaration,to which the Quartet rernains fully
cornrnitted,to prornote ajust, cornprehensive, and lasting settlernent of the MiddleEastconflict. The
Quartet expresses its supportfor the convening of a further internationalMinisterialmeetingat an
appropriate tirne.
The Quartet deeply deplores today's tragic killing of lsraeli civilians and reiteratesits strongand
unequivocal condernnation of terrorisrn, includingsuicide bornbing,whichis rnorally repugnant and has
caused great harrn to the legitirnate aspirations of the Palestinianpeople for a better future. Terrorists rnust
not be allowed to kill the hope of an entire region, and a united international cornrnunity,for genuine peace
and security for both Palestinians and Israelis.Theuartet expresses once again its profoundregret at the
loss of innocent lsraeliand Palestinian lives, and extends its syrnpathy to al1those who have suffered loss.
The Quartet rnernbersexpressed their increasing concern aboutthe rnountinghurnanitarian crisis in
Palestinian areas and their deterrnination to address urgent Palestinian needs.
Consistent with President Bush'sJune 24 staternent,the UN, EU and Russia expresstheir strong support
for the goalof achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlernent which, with intensiveeffort on securityand
reforrnbyall, could be reachedwithin three years frorn now. The UN, EU and Russia welcorne President
Bush's cornrnitrnentto active U.S. leadershiptowardthat goal. The Quartet rernains cornmittedto
irnplernentingthe visionoftwo states, lsrael and an independent,viable and dernocratic Palestine,living
side by side in peace and security, as affirrned by UN Security Council Resolution 1397.The Quartet
rnernbers,intheir individualcapacityandjointly, pledge al1possibleeffortsto realize the goals of reforrn,
security and peace and reaffirrnthat progress in the political, security, econornic, hurnanitarian,and
institution-buildingfields rnustproceed together, hand-in-hand.The Quartet reiteratesits welcorne of the
initiativeof SaudiArabia, endorsedby the Arab League Beirut Surnrnit, as a significantcontribution
towards a cornprehensivepeace.
To assist progresstoward these shared goals, the Quartet agreed on the importanceof a coordinated
international carnpaignto support Palestinianefforts at politicaland econornic reforrn. The Quartet
welcornes and encourages the strong Palestinian interest in fundarnental reforrn, includingthe Palestinian
100-Day ReforrnPrograrn. It also welcornes the willingness of regional states and the international
cornrnunityto assist the Palestiniansto buildinstitutions of good governrnent, and to create a new
governing frarnework ofworking dernocracy, in preparation -for statehood. For these objectives to be
realized,it is essential that well-prepared, free, open and dernocraticelectionstake place. The new
internationalTask Forceon Reform, which is cornprised of representativesof the U.S., EU, UN Secretary
General, Russia,Japan, Norway, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,andwhich works
under the auspices of the Quartet, will striveto develop and irnplement a cornprehensiveaction plan for
reforrn.The inaugural meeting of this Task Force in LondonJuly 10 discussed a detailedplan including
specific Palestiniancornrnitments.It will rneetagain in August to review actions in areas includingcivil
society, financial accountability, local governrnent,the market economy, elections, and.judicial and
administrative reforrn.
lmplernentationof an action plan,with appropriate benchmarksfor progress on reforrn measures, should
lead to the establishmentof a democraticPalestinianstate characterized by the rule of law, separationof
powers, and a vibrant free market econorny thatcan best serve the interests of its people.The QuartetMiddle East Quartet Statement of July 16. 2002 Page 2 of 2
also commits itself to continuing to assist the parties in efforts to renew dialogue,and welcornes in this
regard the recent high-levelministerial meetings between lsraelis and Palestinianson the issues of
security, econornics and reforrn.
The Quartet agreedon the critical need to build new and efficient Palestinian security capabilities on sound
basesof unified cornrnand,and transparency and accountability with regardto resourcesand conduct.
Restructuring security institutionsto servethese goals should leadto irnprovernent in Palestiniansecurity
performance,which is essential to progress on other aspects of institutionaltransformationand realization
of a Palestinianstate cornmittedto cornbating terror.
Inthis context,the Quartet notes Israel'svital stake in the successof Palestinian reforrn. The Quartet calls
upon lsrael to take concrete steps to support the ernergence of a viable Palestinianstate. Recognizing
Israel's legitirnate security concerns, these steps include irnrnediaterneasures to ease the interna1
closures in certain areas and, as security irnprovesthrough reciprocal steps,withdrawal of lsraeliforces to
their pre-Septernber 28, 2000 positions. Moreover, frozen tax revenues should be released. In this
connection, a more transparent and accountable rnechanisrnis being put into place. In addition,consistent
with the Mitchell Cornrnittee's recornrnendations,lsrael should stopal1new settlernentactivity. lsrael rnust
also ensure full, safe and unfettered access for international and hurnanitarianpersonnel.
The Quartet reaffirrnsthat there rnust be a negotiated permanent settlernentbased on UN Security Council
resolutions 242 and 338. There can be no military solution to the conflict; lsraelis and Palestinians rnust
addressthe core issuesthat divide thern, through sustained negotiations, if there is to be real and lasting
peace and security. The lsraelioccupationthat began in 1967 rnustend, and lsrael rnust have secure and
recognized borders. The Quartet further reaffirrns its cornrnitrnentto the goal of a cornprehensive regional
peace between lsrael and Lebanon, and lsrael and Syria, based upon Resolutions242 and 338, the
Madrid terms of reference,and the principleof landfor peace.
The Quartet looks forwardto upcorning consultations with the Foreign Ministersof Jordan, Egypt,Saudi
Arabia, and other regional partners, and deterrninesto continueregularconsultationon the situationin the
Middle East at the principals' level.The Quartet envoys will continue their work on the groundto support
the work of the principals,to assist the Task Forceon Reforrn,andto aid the partiesin resurning a political
dialoguein order to reach a solution to the core political questions.
Releasedon July 16,2002Annex 11 UnitedNations SIPRST,~OO~/~O
SecurityCouncil Distr.: General
18 July 2002
Original: English
Statement by the President of the Security Council
At the 4578th meeting of the Securiheld on 18 July 2002, in
connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in the
Middle East, including the Palestinian question", the President of the Security
Council made the following staternent on behalf of the Council:
"The Security Council supports the Joint St'Quartet', the
annexed to this statement, which was issued in New York on 16 July 2002 by
Federation, the Secretary of State of the United States, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs ofmark, the High Representative for the European Union Common
Foreign and Security Policy and the European Commissioner for External
Affairs. The Security Council appreciates also the involvement in discussions
with the 'Quartet' of senior representatives of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
"The Security Councalls upon the Governmof Israel, the
to achieve the goals set out in the Joint Statement and stresses the importance
of, and the need to achieve, a cornprandnsive, justce in the
Middle East, based on al1 its relevant resolutions incIuding its resolutions 242
(1967) of 22 November 1967,338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 and 1397 (2002)
of 12 March 2002, the Madrid terms of reference and the principle of land for
peace."
02-48542(E180702
Il11111111111111111111111111SIPRST/2002/20
Annex
"QUARTET"JOINT S'I.-4TE!PIE3T
Following is the textof ajoint statement issiib',ilie"Quartei" (United Nations,
Russian Federation, the UnitedStates aiidthe EuropèanUnion) following Ll-ieir eeting
in New York.
UnitedNations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov,
U.S.Secretary of State Colin L.Powell, Danish ForeignMinister Per StigMoeller, High
Representative forEuropeanCommon Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and
EuropeanCommissioner forExtemal Affairs Chris Patten met inNew York today. The
Quartetmembers reviewed the situation in the Middle East and agreed to continueclose
consultations,as expressed in the Madnd Declaration, to which the Quartet remains fully
cornmitted,to promote ajust, comprehensive, and lasting aettlementof the Middle East
conflict. The Quartet expresses its support for the convening of a further international
Ministerialmeeting at an appropriate time.
TheQuartetdeeply deplores today's tragickillingof Israelicivilians and reiterates'its
strongand unequivocal condemnationof terrorism, includingsuicide bombing, which is
morallyrepugnant and has causedgeat harm tothe legitimateaspirations of the
Palestinianpeople for a better future. Terrorists must not be allowed to killthe hope of
an entire region, and a united international community, forgenuine peace and secunty for
both Palestiniansand Israelis. The Qiiartet expresses once again its profound regret at the
lossof innocent Israeli and Palestinianlives, and extends its sympathy to al1those who
have sufferedloss. The Quartet members expressed their increasing concem about the
mountinghumanitariancrisis in Palestinian areas and their determination to address
urgent Palestinianneeds.
Consistent with PresidentBush's Ju~ie24 statement. theUN, EUand Russia expresstheir
strong support for thegoal of achieving a final Israeli-Palestiniansettlement which, with
intensive efforton security and ref6:-by all. could be rcached within three years from
now. The UN, EUand Russia welcoi~icPresideritBush's commitment to active U.S.
leadership toward thatgoal. The Qiiartet remains corninittedto implementingthe vision
of two States,Israeland anindependcnt, viable anddemocratic Palestine, living side by
side in peace and security, as affirmcd UN Security Council Resolution 1397. The
Quartetnienibers.in tlieir individual capacity andjointly. pledge al1possible efforts to realize the goals of reform, security and peace andreaffirm thatprogress in the political,
security, economic, humanitanan, and iilstitution-btiildingfields must proceed together,
hand-in-hand. The Quartet reiterates iis welcome of the initiative of Saudi Arabia,
endorsed bythe Arab League Beiriit Summit, as a significant contribution towards a
comprehensive peace.
To assist progress toward these shared goals, the Qii,i-retagreed on the importance of a
coordinated international carnpaign to support Palestinianefforts at political and
economic reform. The Quartet welcomes and encouragesthe strong Palestinian interest
in fundamental reform, including the Palestinian 100-DayReform Program. It also
welcomes the willingness of regional Statesand the international community to assistthe
Palestiniansto build institutions of good government. and tocreate a new governing
fiamework of working democraqy, in preparation forstatehood. For these objectives to
be realized, it is essential thatwkll-prepared, fiee, open anddemocratic elections take
place. Thenew international Task Force on Reform, which is comprised of
representatives of the U.S.,EU, UN Secretary General, Russia, Japan, Norway, the World
Bankandthe International Monetary Fund, and whichworks under the auspices of the
Quartet,will strive to develop and implement a comprehensive action plan for reform.
The inaugural meeting of this Task Force in LondonJuly 10discussed a detailed plan
including'specificPalestinian commitrnents. It will meet again in August to review
actionsin areas including civil society, financialaccountability, local government, the
marketeconomy, elections, andjudicial and administrativereform.
-
Implementationof an action plan, with appropriatebenchmarks for progress on reform
measures, shouldleadto the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state characterized
by the ruleof law, separation of powers, and a vibrant fiee market economy that can best
serve theinterestsof its people. The Quartet also commits itself to continuing to assist
the parties in effortsto renew dialogue, and welcomesin this regard the recent high-level
ministerial meetingsbetween Israelis and Palestinianson the issues of security,
economics and reform.
The Quartet agreed on the critical need to build new and efficient Palestinian security
capabilitieson sound bases of unified command, and transparency and accountability
withregard toresources and conduct. Restructuringsecurity institutions to serve these
goals shouldlead to improvement in Palestinian secunty performance, which is essential
to progresson other aspects of institutional transformation andrealization of a Palestinian
statecommitted to cornbating terror.
Inthis context, theQuartet notes Israel's vital stakein the success of Palestinian reform.
The Quartetcalls upon Israelto take concrete steps to support the emergence of a viable
Palestinianstate. Recognizing Israel's legitimate security concems, these steps include
immediatemeasures toease the intemal closures in certain areas and, as security
improves through reciprocal steps, withdrawal of Israeli forces to their pre-September 28,
2000 positions. Moreover, fiozen tax revenues shouldbe released. Inthis connection, a more transparent and accountablemechanism is being put into place. In addition,
consistent with the MitchellCommittee's recommendations, Israel should stop al1new
settlement activity. Israelmust alsoensure full, safc and unfettered access for
international and humanitarian personnel.
The Quartet reaffinns that there must be a negotiatetl permanent settle~nentbased on UN
SecurityCouncil resolutions 242 and 338. There ean be no military solution to thc
conflict; Israelis and Palestinians must address the coi-eissues that divide them, through
sustained negotiations, if thereis to be real and lasting peace and secunty. The Israeli
occupation that began in 1967must end, and Israel must have secure and recognized
borders. The Quartet further reaffirms its commitmentto the goal of a comprehensive
regional peace between Israel andLebanon, and Israel andSyria, based upon Resolutions
242 and 338, the Madrid terms of reference, and the pnncipie of land for peace.
The Quartet looks fonvard to upsoming consultations wiih the Foreign Ministers of
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other regional partners, and determines to continue
regular consultation on the situation in the Middle East at the principals' level. The
Quartet envoys will continue their work on the ground to supportthe work of the
principals, to assis; the Task Forceon Reform, and to aid the parties in resuming a
political dialogue in order to reach a solution to the core political questions.Annex 12 Quariet meeting (b7as1îingtc~iDi..C..20 Decembel LUOLj -Quarretstateme~îr -kc! pres ...rage ior :
European Union 20 December 2002
Statement of the Middle East Quartet, Washington DC, 20 December 2002
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. Danish
Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller. High Representative for EuropeanComnlon Foreign and Security
Policy Javier Solana, and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten met today in
Washington with President Bush and Secretaryof State Powell. In his meeting, President Bush
expressed strongsupport for the efforts of the Quartet and his firm comn~itmentto the Quartet's
roadmap, which would realize his vision of two states - Israel and Palestine - living side-by-side in
peace and security.
Reaffirming their previous statements, the Quartet members reviewed developments since their last
meeting. on September 17,2002. They condemned the brutal terror attacks carried out by Palestinian
extremist organizations since the last meeting, which aim to diminishthe prospects for peace, and
only harm legitimate Palestinian aspirations for statehood. The Quartet deplores the killing of
innocent Palestinian civilians and UN employees in IDF security operations, and calls on the
Government of Israel to review its rules of engagement and disciplinary procedures to avoid such
civilian casualties.
The Quartet took stock of the results ofthe ongoing consultations with the parties on the elements of
a three-phase performance-based and goal-drivenroadmap to realize the vision expressed in
President Bush'sJune 24 speech of two States - Israel and an independent, viable, sovereign, and
democratic Palestine - living side-by-side in peace and security. The Quartet commended the
constructive spirit that characterized itsdiscussions withal1parties. The Quartet, based upon a
common understanding on the content and goals of this process, made substantial progress toward
finalizinga roadmap for presentation to the parties in the near future. The Quartet agreed to further
intensive work to develop a credible and effective monitoring mechanism. In the meantime, the
Quartet calls on the parties to carry out as rapidly as possible their responsibilities to restore calm,
pursue reforms, and improve the humanitarian situation -steps that will lead to a political process
culminating in Palestinian statehood.
Specifically, theQuartet calls for an immediate, cornprehensive cease-fire. Al1Palestinian
individuals and groups must end al1acts of terror against Israelis, in any location. In this regard, the
Quartet welcomes the initiative of Egypt to work with Palestinians to achieve this end. Such a cease-
fire should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by the government of Israel. As calm
is established, Israeli forces should withdraw fromPalestinian areas and the pre-Intifada status quo
on the ground should be restored. The Quartet calls on the Palestinian leadership to work with the
US and others to restructure and reformthe Palestinian security services.
Recognizing the importanceof well-prepared Palestinian elections to the process of building strong,
democratic, institutions in preparation for statehood, theQuartet supports the accelerated work ofthe
Constitutional Committee to drafta Palestinian constitution. The Quartet notes the progress made in
the reform process under difficult circumstances and calls for increased efforts by the Palestinian
Authority to move forward in a comprehensive and sustained manner?in cooperation with the Task
Force on Palestinian Reform,on institutional reforms. In this context, the Quartet welcomes the
initiative of the UnitedKingdom and Prime Minister Blair to convene a meeting early next year to
encourage and accelerate the reform process.
The Quartet expresses concern atthe deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the West Bank. It
calls for increased effortsby the Government of Israel to ease the humanitarian situation in the West
Bank and Gaza. Italso calls on Israel and the Palestinians to implement fully the recommendations
of the Bertini report. TheQuartet welcomes the recent transfer by Israel of VAT and other revenues
due to the Palestinian Authority andcalls on Israel to continue these monthly transfers including Quar~etn?eetiiîg(Mlashingion. D.C. .0 Deceniber 2002) -Quartei sraiemen1 - i-.pie 1-agtL oi 2
arrears. The Quartet i-eiteratesthe importance of inmediate Israeli measures. consistent with
legitimate security concerns. to improve the lives of Palestinians, including allowing the resun~ption
of normal economic activity facilitatingthe inovement of goods. people. and essential services and
lifting curfew and closures. TheQuartet calls on Israel to avoid actions that undermine trust and
create further hardship for innocent Palestinian civilians, includingolition of houses and civil
infrastructure.
The Quartet welcomes efforts to re-organize and update donor coordination mechanisms in order to
simplifi and strengthen an already unified international effort soas to revive and support peace
efforts.
The Quartet reiterates the critical importance of sustaining hope on the part of Israelis and
Palestinians for the vision articulated by President Bush, andsupported by theuartet in its previous
statements and ongoing engagement with the parties and inthe region, of a future in which both
peoples can live - in their own States- in genuine peace and security. Consistent with this goal the
lsraeli occupation that began in1967 will be ended though a settlement negotiated between the
parties and based on resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeliwithdrawal tosecure and recognized
borders. For this goal to be achieved, violence and terror must come to an end. Israeli settlement
activity must stop, consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell report.
The Quartet will continue to encourage al1parties in the region to seek ajust. lasting and
comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict basedonthe foundations of the Madrid
Conference, the principle of land for peace,NSCRs 242,338 and 1397,agreements previously
reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah endorsed by the Beirut
Arab League Summit - for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security. in the
context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to
promote a comprehensive peace on al1tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli
tracks.
The Quartet looks fonvard to continuing consultations on achievingthe above goals, and a further
meeting of theQuartet principals in the near future to adopt the roadmap and present it to the parties.
Meeting in the Middle EastQuartet in Washington DC, December 20, 2002
At the meeting the Minister forForeign Affairs, Mr. Per StigMoeller, deliberated on the below main
points of view:
General
Thank you for convening this meeting. EU is fully committed to the work of the Quartet. Only if we
pool Ourefforts can we hope to influence the situation.
Also key to ensure continued close coordination with moderate Arab States. Equally important that
we maintain close cooperationwith the two parties. We therefore have to consider how best to
communicate the results of our discussions today.
Road map
As the EU heads of state and government underscored at last weeks European Council [in
declaration on Middle East]we firmly remain of the view that the Quartet should have adopted and
published the RoadMap today. rage 2 oi 2
Quariet nîeetlng (\?'asiliiiglonl2.c.. LUUecember 2UVL i- VLiarretslatemenz -t i prc
Iaccept of course that there is no agreement to do this. But it is a pity. It is key to i-ilaintain
monientum. keep a political perspective in the process and safeguard the credibility of the Quartet.
Much good-will has been invested in 'selling'the Road Map concept to the parties and regional
stakeholder. Theynow expect the Quartet to deliver.
True - the Road Map could become hostage in the Israeli election campaign and this could
complicate the subsequent implementation.
On the other hand, 1do think the Israeli electorate has a right to know what the international
community expects from Israel. Further, even Sharon himself has publicly stated that President
Bush'svision is a realistic and attainable plan.
Given the circurnstances, 1find it important that we do three things:
Firstly, we have to send a clear and unambiguous message that the Road Map will be adopted and
made public before the end of February.
Secondly, we need - if at al1possible today - to finalize the text of the Road Map so it is ready for
adoption.
Thirdly, we need to speed up the work of devising a credible monitoring mechanism for the
implementation of the Road Map.
Turning to the content a major outstanding issue in the text is the linkage of the settlement freeze to a
cessation of hostilities. Thisinkage poses quite frankly a problem for us. We are very concemed
about the continuing expansion of settlements, which is a real threat to the realisation of the Two-
State solution and to the implementation of the Road Map. What we should be calling for is therefore
rather an unconditional settlement freeze. The settlements are illegal according to international law
and a freeze should not be made contingent on a ceasefire. Quite to the contrary the settlements have
themselves developed into major flashpoints for violent confrontation. A settlement freeze would
provide decisive incentive to cessation of terror and violence.
Perspectives in thecoming months
Time is of essence. We are working within a narrow window of opportunity. If it comes to a military
confrontation in Iraq we are likely to see a further polarization, particularly among the radical forces
on both sides that are trying to undermine the peace process.
Very important that we provide encouragement to the moderate forces and regimes in the region.
The Road Map can become a central rallying point for gaining such support.
A new Sharon government will - irrespective of whether Labour joins in the coalition or not -be
dependent on the growing part of the Israeli public who is ready for a settlement that allows for both
peace and security. It is therefore key to keep up the pressure on Sharon to go ahead with the Road
Map.
In a similar way the EU is making a major effort through Ourpolicies to engage Turkey and Iran
constructively on the side of the West.
Monitoring
A credible monitoring mechanism will be essential to the implementation of the Road Map. yuarier meeting (\i/asn~ngron. u.L.. LU ueceninei- .iuvi -)~~iünt'~sLaLeriierit-ci:pre ... r~gc 4 :
1he inechanism must be preseiîted together u.ith the Road h4apto the parties and they nîust agree to
it.
Mieshould draw on existing structures and personnel in providing information on iinplernentation.
The information should via workiilg group structure be fed to the Quartet Envoys Group who should
assess it and transfornî it into politically meaningful input to the Quartet Principals.
Key that the Quariet Envoy Group clearly pinpoints who is responsible in case of non-coinpliance
and that the Quartet is ready to act on the information.
Palestinian reform process
The EU is pleased with the work in the Quartet Task Force on Palestinian Reform and will continue
to be actively engaged in its efforts to assist the refonn process.
With the postponement of Palestinian elections there will be sufficient time for more thorough
preparations for free and fair elections and for the Palestinians themselves to engage in an open
debate on their future political leadership. The road map process can help to strengthen the interna1
debate on the need for a further devolution of executive power.
A significant number of important reform measuresare directly or indirectly affected by Israeli
actions such as closures and curfews. To facilitate the reform progress Israel shouldgrant long-
duration travel permits to al1key Palestinian officials involved in the reform process. The Israelis
made a commitment to do that at the last meeting of the Working Group on Palestinian Reform in
Jordan. A list of such key Palestinian officials has been worked out and provided to Israel.
With the aim of consolidating the work on reform we should consider having an AHLC-meeting
shortly .afterthe Israeli elections.
Security
We are encouraged by the Cairo-talks between Fatah and Hamas, which will be resumed in the near
future with the aim of reaching anagreement on a stop to attacks on Israeli civilians as well as to
attacks inside Israel. The Security Advisor of the EU'SSpecial Middle East Envoy, Mr. Alistair
Crooke,has been closely involved infacilitating these talks, which have the potential to change the
developments on the ground in a positive direction. The aim should of course be to have Islamic
Jihad included in an agreement.
In this connection,the EU will continue to impress on Syria and Iran the need to stop their financial
and logistical supportto terrorist organisations.
Very important that securitytrainers and observers are deployed on the ground quickly to follow up
if an agreement falls into place.
British Middle East Conference
Welcome the British initiative on Palestinian Reform. Could help keep up the momentum while we
are awaiting a new Israeli Government and provide much needed encouragement to the reform
forces on the Palestinian side.
Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller'spress statement after the meeting in the Middle East Quartet in Washington DC, 20 December. 2002
Miehave finalized the Road Map at our meeting.
Very inîportant that President Bush has given his unreserved support to the Quartet and the Road
Map principles.
Nobody should be in any doubt that the international comnîunityis fully committed to see the Road
Map and the vision of two states livingside by side in peace and security implemented.
We have aclear agreement. The final adoption and presentation to the parties should take place early
in the new year.
Ha\~eimpressed onthe parties the need for them to start implementation of their commitments
immediately so we do not loose more time.
The coming weeks will be used for working out an effective and credible monitoring mechanism of
the Quartet for the implementation of the Road Map.
No doubt in my mind that the Road Map which builds onthe initial Danish EU Presidency draft - in
spite of the delays incurred - is the only way forward and willremain the central frame of reference
for solving the conflict in the years to come.Annex 13 UN News Service 20 February 2003
Quartet Envoys Statement
London, February 20,2003
Representatives of the Middle East Quartet -- the United States, the Russian Federation,
the European Union, and the United Nations -- met at the Envoys level in London February
19 to review the current situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and prospects for giving
new impetus to peace efforts. They expressed very serious concern at the continuing acts
of violence and terror planned and directed against Israelis, and at lsraeli military
operations over the pastseveral days in the West Bank and Gaza which led to Palestinian
civilian fatalities. The Envoys discussed the next steps toward the adoption and
implementation of the Quartet'sRoad Map, as it is the means for progress toward the vision
described by President Bush on June 24, 2002: two democratic states living side by side in
peace. They reaffirmed that the Road Map should be formally adopted and presented to the
parties as soon as possible.
The Quartet envoys reaffirmed the cal1of the Quartet principals in Washington on
December 20 for an immediate, comprehensive cease-fire. Al1Palestinian individuals and
groups must end al1acts of terror against Israelis, in any location.
The Envoys reiterated their cal1for the Palestinians to build credible institutionsto prepare
for statehood and welcomed the Palestinians' decision to appoint a Prime Minister as a
significant step. The Envoys underscored the importance of appointing a credible and fully
empowered Prime Minister. They urgedthe immediate convening of the relevant legislative
and executive Palestinian bodiesto exercise their authority inthis regard, and called on the
Governmentof lsrael to facilitatethese meetings. The Quartet also encouragedthe
Palestinians to continue the process of preparing a constitution that would form the basis
fora strong parliamentary democracy.
Noting Israel's important role in facilitating the Palestinian reform process,they recognized
the positive effect of the resumption of monthly revenue transfers and return of outstanding
arrears. Likewise,the Quartet Envoys emphasized Israei's obligation, consistentwith
legitimatesecurity concerns, to do more to ease the dire humanitarian and socio-economic
situation in the West Bank and Gaza, includingfacilitating freedom of movement and
access, alleviating the daily burdens of lifeer occupation, and respecting the dignity of
Palestiniancivilians. They welcomed the opportunity for direct discussions between the
donor community and lsraelis and Palestinians to address this critical issue. Mideas1 situariori/Road h~lap/C;.uarrc.!'c:ead Sea n-iee:ii?(.loi-da:?-Qual-;et staiernei11... Page ; of 2
European Union 24 June 2003
Quartet
Russian Federation
United States of America
Secretary-General
Quartet Statement (Jordan)
11~ummaryl 2l,2003: Staternent by the Quartet, Dead Sea (Jo-June 22, 2003
Representatives of the Quartet -United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister lgor
Ivanov, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, High
Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and European
Commissioner for ExternalAffairs Chris Patten - met today at the Dead Sea in Jordan.
The Quartet members reviewed developments since their last meeting in Washington, on December 20,
2002. They welcome the appointment of Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas and the strong start he and his
government have made in difficult circumstances, and the acceptance by Israeli and Palestinian authorities of
the roadmap presented to the parties on April 30, 2003, leading to realization of the goal expressed by
President Bush and shared by the Quartet members, of two states - lsrael and Palestine-living side by side
in peace and security, in 2005. They strongly endorse the results of the Red Sea Summit meetings, and
pledge to support actively Prime Minister Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon in carrying out the commitments
made at these meetings.
They welcome the very positive message and personal commitment of President Bush, and his decision to
place a mission on the ground charged with helping the parties to move toward peace, through establishment
of a credible and effective structure led by the United States, in close cooperation with the Quartet, to
coordinate, monitor, and promote implementation of the parties' commitments and responsibilities, as laid.out
in the roadmap. The Quartet fully shares President Bush's expectation that both parties will meet their
obligations in full, and welcomes the initial steps taken by the parties toward this goal.
The Quartet members deplore and'condemn the brutal terror attacks against Israeli citizens carried out by
Hamas, PalestinianIslamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade since the roadmap's presentation. The
Quartet calls for an immediate, comprehensive end to al1violence and welcomes efforts by the Government of
Egypt and others to achievesuch an immediate and comprehensive halt to armed action by Palestinian
groups. All Palestinianindividuals and groups.must end acts of terror against al1Israelis, anywhere. The
Quartet calls on the Palestinian authorities to take al1possible steps to halt immediately the activities of
individuals and groups planning and conducting attacks on Israelis. TheQuartet supports immediate
Palestinian action to restructure and consolidate under Prime Minister Abbas al1security services, and calls
on al1states to assist in such efforts.
. .
The Quartet welcomes the discussions between lsrael and Palestinian authorities over transfer of security
responsibility in Gaza and Bethlehem. They cal1on both sides to reach agreement as.soon as possible on
workable arrangements and timetables for implementation.
The Quartet calls on al1states in the region and around the world to end immediately any form of support,
including fund-raising and financial assistance, to groups and individuals that use terror and violenc. to
diminish the chances for peace, and calls for an end tol1forms of incitement to violence and hatred.
The Quartet expresses its deep concern over lsraeli military actions that result in the killing of innocent
Palestinian and other civilians. Such actions do not enhance security and undermine trust and prospects for
cooperation. While the Quartet recognizes Israel's right to self-defense in the face of terrorist attacks against
its citizens, it calls on the Government of Israel to respect international humanitarian law and to exert
maximum efforts to avoid such civilian casualties.
The Quartet also calls on the Government of lsrael to make al1possible efforts to support Palestinian
authorities and ease the plight of the Palestinian people through immediate actions. Theuartet strongly
urges Israel to facilitate movement of people and goods, as well as access by international humanitarian
organizations. These steps must be taken as rapidly and comprehensively as possible to improve the
humanitarian situation and normalize the daiiy life of the Palestinian people.
The Quartet recalls its positionthat settlement activity must stop. In this context, it welcomes the undertaking MidèasrsituaiionIRoad R4aydQuai-tel's Dead Sea meetii~giJnrdan) - Quarrer statt-ine~i~ Page 2 oi':
made by Prime Minister Sharon at Aqaba, and first steps taken by Israel on the ground, to remove
unauthorized outposts.
The Quartet members reviewed progress made on Palestinian institutional reform, endorsed the result of the
meetings of the Task Force and Ad Hoc Liaison Committee Meetings held earlier in the year, and reaffirmed
their support for al1efforts to fulfill the reforrn goals set forth in the first phase of the roa-including
adoption of a Palestinian Constitution and preparations for free, open and fair Palestinian elections as soon as
possible.
The Quartet reaffirms its commitment to a just, cornprehensive, and lasting settlement to the Arab- Israeli
conflict, including progress toward peace between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.
Such a peace would be based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace,
UNSCRs 242, 338, 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown
PrinceAbdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit -calling for acceptance of Israel asa
neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement.
The Quartet looks forward to continuing to work together in close consultation on these issues with the
parties.
Ref: CL03-230EN
EU source: CouncilAnnex 15 United Nations si2003195 1
SecurityCouncil Distr.: General
7 October 2003
Original: English
Letter dated 6 October 2003 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council
1 have the honour to transmit to you the text of the Quartet statement that was
issued following the meeting of the Quartet principals- representing the United
States of America, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United
Nations - at United Nations Headquarterson 26 September 2003 (see annex).
1should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the
attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
03-54561(E) 081003
-*Annex
Quartet statement
New York, 26 Septernber 2003
Representatives of the Quartet - United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, Russian Foreign Minister lgor Ivanov, ltalian Foreign Minister Franco
Frattini, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell, High Representative for
European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and European
Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten - met today in New York.
The Quartet members view with great concern the situation in Israel, the West
Bank and Gaza, which has stalled implementation of the road map. The Quartet
reminds both parties of the need to take into account long-term consequences of
their actions, and the obligation for both parties to make rapid progress towards full
implementation of the road map for peace. They reaffirm their commitment to
President Bush's vision - shared by Russia, the European Union and the United
Nations - of two States, lsrael and Palestine, living side by side in peace and
security; and cal1 on both Israelis and Palestinians to fulfil their obligations and
responsibilitiesunder the road map and the commitments both sides made to
President Bush at the Red Sea summitmeeting in Aqaba.
The Quartet members remind al1 sides that they have obligations and
responsibilities to each other that must be performed. Each party must do more to
immediately and simultaneously addressthe core concerns of the other, as described
in the road map. The Quartet members reaffirm their commitment to the road map
and to resumed progress by the parties towards its rapid implementation.
They condemn the vicious terror attacks of August and September carried out
by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. They again affirm that
such actions are morally indefensible and do not serve the interests of the
Palestinian people. They cal1 on Palestinians to take immediate, decisive steps
against individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks. Such steps
should be accompanied by Israeli supportive measures, including resumption of full
security cooperation. They further cal1 on al1 States to end the harbouring and
support, including fund-raising and financial assistance, of any groups and
individuals that use terror and violenceto advance their goals.
The Quartet members affirm that the Palestinian Authority security services
must be consolidated under the clear control of an empowered Prime Minister and
lnterior Minister and must be the sole armed authority in the West Bank and Gaza.
Noting that the first Palestinian Prime Minister has resigned his post, they urge that
the new Palestinian Prime Minister form a cabinet as soon as possible, and ask that
Cabinet to recommit itself to the pledges made in the road map and at Aqaba. The
Palestinian Authority must ensure that a "rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority
security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at
confronting al1 those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities
and infrastructure".
The Quartet members recognize lsrael's legitimate right to self-defence in the
face of terrorist attacks against its citizens.In this context and in the context of
international humanitarian law, they cal1 on the Government of lsrael to exertmaximum efforts to avoid civilian casualties. The Government of lsrael must "take
no action undermining trust, including deportations, confiscation andlor demolition
of Palestinian homes and property, destruction of Palestinian institutions and
infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet Work Plan". The Quartet
members cal1 on the Government of Israel to take immediate steps to ease the
humanitarian and economic plight of the Palestinian people, including through
easing the movement of people and goods and ensuring access to international
humanitarian organizations. The Quartet members reaffirm that, in accordance with
the road map, settlement activity must stop, and note with great concern the actual
and proposed route of Israel's West Bank fence, particularly as it results in the
confiscation of Palestinian land, cuts off the movement of people and goods and
undermines Palestinians' trust in the road map process, as it appears to prejudge
final borders of a future Palestinian State.
The Quartet calls upon the international and regional community to continue to
provide well-coordinated assistance to the Palestinian Authority for the
implementation of reforms and institution-building and to consider steps that could
be taken with respect to the socio-economic development of the region. The Quartet
members will continue to follow closely the implementation by the parties of their
obligations. The Quartet members will coordinate their efforts through regular
meetings of Quartet representatives, as well as through discussion among the
Quartet principals. The principals will next meet prior to the end of the year.
The Quartet members look forward to continuing to work closely together, as
well as in association with regional parties, to help achieve progress, both between
lsraelis and Palestinians and towards the goal of a just, comprehensive and lasting
peace in the Middle East.Annex 16 UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
:il/F.ZLiL (1948)
S/1080
16 November 1948
62 (1948).Resolution of 16Novernber 1948
[SI0801
TheSecuris Council,
Reaffirmingits previous resolutions concerning the establishment and implementation of the truce in
Palestine, and recalling particularly its resolutionX) 01'15 .Ili1C)-l: hich determined that
the situation in Palestine constitutesa threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the
Charter of the United Nations,
Takingnote that the General Assembly iscontinuing its consideration of the future government of
Palestine in response to the request of the Security Council in its resolution 44 (1948) of
1948,
Withoutprejudice to the actions of the Acting Mediator regarding the implementation of Security
Council resolution 61 (1948) of 4 November 1948,
1.Decides that, in order to eliminate thethreat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition
from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine. an armistice shall be established inors
of Palestine;
2. CaIlsupon the parties directly involvedin the conflict in Palestine, as a further provisional
measure under Articl40 of the Charter, to seek agreement forthwith. by negotiations conducted
either directly or through theActing Mediator, with a view to the immediate establishment of the
armistice, including:
(a) The delineation of permanent armistice demarcationnes beyond which the armed forces of the
respective parties shall not move;
(b) Such withdrawal and reduction of their armed forces will ensure the maintenance of the armistice
during the transition to permanent peace in Palestine.
Adopied ut the 381st meeting1/
11The drafi resolution was voted on in parts. No vote was taken on the text as a whole.Annex 17 SI1302IRev.1of3 April 1949 Page1of 8
UNITED
NATIONS
Security Council
S/1302/Rev.l
3 April 1949
DOCUMENTSl1302lREV.l 11
Cablegram dated 3April 1949from the UnitedNations Acting Mediator to theSecretary-
General transmitting the textof the General Armistice Agreementbetween the Hashemite
Jordan Kingdom and Israel.
[Originaltext: English]
Rhodes, 3April 1949
For the Presidentof the Securiîy Council
1have the honourto inform youthat an armisticeagreementbetweenthe HasherniteJordan
Kingdom and Israelhas been signedthis eveni3April 1949,at Rhodes. The text of the agreement
follows.
RalphJ. BUNCHE
Acting hfediator
HASHEMITEJORDAN KINGDOM -ISRAEL:
GENERAL ARMISTICEAGREEMENT
Rhodes,3 April 1949
Preamhle
The Partiesto the presentAgreement,
Responding to theSecurity Councilresolution of 16November 1948,2/calling uponthem, as a
further provisional measureunderArticle40 of the Charter of the United Nationsand in orderto
facilitate thetransitionfromthe presenttruce to permanent peacein Palestine,to negotiate an
armistice;
Having decidedto enter intonegotiationsunder UnitedNations chairrnanshipconceming the
implementation ofthe Security Councilresolution of 16November 1948;and having appointed
representatives empoweredto negotiate andconclude an Armistice Agreement;
The undersigned representativesof their respective Governrnents, havingexchanged their full
powers foundto be ingood and properform,have agreed uponthellowingprovisions: Page 2 of 8
Article 1
With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine and in recognition of the
importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the future military operations of the
Parties, thefollowing principles, which shall be fully observed by both Parties during the armistice,
are hereby affirmed:
1.The injunction of the Security Council against resortto military force in the settlement of the
Palestine question shall henceforth be scrupulously respected by both Parties;
2.No aggressive action by the armed forces - land, sea, or air - of either Party shallbe undertaken,
planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other; it being understood that
the use of the term planned in this context has no bearing on normal staff planning as generally
practised in military organizations;
3.The right of each Party to its security and freedom froin fear of attack by the armed forces of the
other shall be fully respected;
4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties is accepted as an
indispensable steptoward the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine.
Article II
With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 16November
1948,the followingprinciples and purposes are affirmed:
1.The principle that no military or political advantage shouldbe gained under the tmce ordered by
the Security Councilis recognized;
2.It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way prejudice the rights,
claims and positions of eitheï Party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine
question,the provisions of this Agreement being dictated exclusively by military considerations.
Article III
1.In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security Council of16
November 1948,a general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties - land. sea and air -
is hereby established.
2. No element of the land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-
regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of
the other Party, or against civilians in territoryer the control of that Party; or shall advance
beyond or pass overfor any purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Lines set forth in
articlesV and VI of this Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party.
3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by one of the Parties
to this Agreement against the other Party.
Article IV
1.The lines described in articlesV and VI of this Agreement shall be designated as the Armistice
Demarcation Linesand are delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the resolution of the
Security Council of 16November 1948.
2.The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Lines is to delineate the lines beyond which the
armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move.
3.Rules and regulationsof the arined forces of the Parties. whicli prohibit civilians fronî crossing the SI!302/Re\s.l of 3 Apl-il 1949 Page 3 of'8
fightinglines or entering the area between the lines. shall remain in effect afier the signing of this
Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articleV and VI.
ArticleV
1.The Armistice Demarcation Lines for al1sectors other than the sector now held by Iraqi forces
shall be as delineated on the maps1 in annex1 to this Agreement, and shall be defined as follows:
(a) In the sectoKh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574)to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the
30 November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area, the Armistice Demarcation Lines
shall follow the truce lines as certified by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;
(b) In theJerusalem sector, thermistice Demarcation Lines shall correspond to the lines defined in
the 30November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area;
(c) In theHebron-Dead Sea sector, the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be as delineated onmap 1
and marked B in annex 1to this Agreement;
(d) In the sector from a point on the Dead Sea (MR 1925-0958)to the southemmost tip of Palestine,
the Armistice Demarcation Line shall be determined by existing military positions as surveyed in
March 1949 by United Nations observers, and shall run from north to south as delineated on map 1in
annex 1to this Agreement.
Article VI
1.It is agreed that the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom shall replace the forces of Iraq in the
sector now held by the latter forces,the intention ofthe Government of Iraq in this regard having
been communicated to the Acting Mediator in the message of 20 March from the Foreign Minister of
Iraqauthorizing the delegation of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom to negotiate for the Iraqi forces
and stating thathose forces would be withdrawn.
2. The Armistice Demarcation Line for the sector now held by Iraqi forces shall be as delineated on
map 1in Annex 1to this Agreement and marked A.
3. The Armistice Demarcation Line provided for in paragraph 2 of this article shall be established in
stages as follows,pending which the existing militaryines may be maintained:
(a) In thearea west of the road from Baqa to Jaljulia, and thence to the east of Kafr Qasim: within
five weeks ofthe date on which this Armistice Agreement is signed;
(b) In the area of Wadi Ara north of the line from Baqa to Zubeiba: within seven weeks of the date
on whichthis Armistice Agreement is signed;
(c) In al1other areas of the Iraqi sector:within fifteen weeks of the date on which this Armistice
Agreement is signed.
4. The Armistice Demarcation Line in the Hebron-Dead Sea sector, referred to in paragraph (c) of
articleV of this Agreement and marked B on map 1 in annex 1,which involves substantial deviation
from the existing militaryines in favour of the forces of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdomis
designated to offset the modifications ofthe existing military lines in the Iraqi sector set forth in
paragraph 3 of this article.
5.In compensation for the road acquired between Tulkarem and Qalqiliya, the Government of Israel
agreesto pay to the Governnlent of the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom the cost of constructing twenty
kilometres of first-class new road.
6. Wherever villagesmay be affected by the establishment of the Armistice Demarcation I<ine SI1302IRev.1of 3 April 1949 Page 4 of 8
provided for in paragraph 2 of this article. the inhabitantsof such villages shail be entitled to
maintain, and shall be protectedin. their full rights of residence. property andreedon~.In the event
any of the inhabitants shoulddecide to leave their villages, they shall be entitled to take withthem
their livestock andother movable property, and toreceive without delay fullcompensation for the
land which they have left. It shall be prohibited forsraeli forces to enter or to be stationed in such
villages, in which locally recruited Arab police sliallbe organized and stationed for interna1security
purposes.
7.The Hashemite Jordan Kingdom accepts responsibility for al1Iraqi forces in Palestine.
8. Theprovisions of this article shall not be interpreted as prejudicing, in any sense, an ultimate
political settlement between the Parties to this Agreement.
9. The Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in articles V and VI of this Agreement are agreed upon
by the Parties without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundarylines or to claims of
either Party relating thereto.
10.Except where otherwise provided, the Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be established,
including such withdrawal of forces as may be necessary for this purpose, within ten days from the
date on which this Agreement is signed.
11. TheArmistice Demarcation Lines defined in this article and in article V shall be subject to such
rectification as may be agreed uponby the Parties to this Agreement, and al1such rectifications shall
have the same force and effect as if they had been incorporated in full in this General Armistice
Agreement.
ArticleVI1
1. The military forces of the Parties to this Agreement shall be limited to defensive forces only in the
areas extending ten kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, except where
geographical considerations make this impractical, as at the southemmost tip of Palestine and the
coastal strip. Defensive forces permissible in each sector shall be as defined in annex II to this
Agreement. In the sector now held by Iraqi forces, calculations on the reduction of forces shall
include the number of Iraqi forces in this sector.
2.Reduction of forces to defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be
completed withinten days of the establishment ofthe Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in this
Agreement. In the same way the removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either
Party, and the transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party, shall
be completed within the same period.
3. The strength of the forces which may be maintained by the Parties on each side ofthe Armistice
Demarcation Lines shall be subject to periodical review with a view toward further reduction of such
forces by mutual agreement of the Parties.
ArticleVI11
1.A SpecialCommittee, composed of two representatives of each Party designated by the respective
Governrnents, shall be established for the purpose of formulating agreed plans and arrangements
designed to enlarge the scope of this Agreement and to effect improvements in its application.
2. The SpecialCommittee shall be organized immediately following the coming into effect of this
Agreement and shall direct its attention to the formulation of agreed plans and arrangements for such
matters as either Party may submit to it, which, in any case, shall include the following, on which
agreement in principle already exists: free movement of traffic on vital roads. including the
Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads, resumption of the norinal functioning of the cultural and
humanitarian institutions on MountScopus and free access thereto: free access to the Holy Places S/i 302i'Rev.1 of 3 April 1949 Page 5 of 8
and cultural institutions and use of the cemetery on the Mount of Olives; resurnption of operation of
the Latrun pumping station;provision of electricity for the Old City:and resumption of operation of
the railroad to Jerusalem.
3. The Special Committee shall have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to
it. Agreed plans and arrangements forinulated by it may provide for the exercise of supervisory
functions by the Mixed Armistice Commission established in article XI.
Article IX
Agreements reached between the Parties subsequent to the signing of this Armistice Agreement
relating tosuch matters as further reduction of forces as contemplated in paragraph 3 of article VII,
future adjustments of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, and plans and arrangements fonnulated by
the Special Committee established in article VIII, shall have thesame force and effect as the
provisions of this Agreement and shall be equally binding upon the Parties.
Article X
An exchange of prisoners of war having been effected by special arrangement between the Parties
prior to the signing of this Agreement, no further arrangements on this matter are required except
that the Mixed Armistice Commission shall undertake to re-examine whether there may be any
prisoners of war belonging to either Party which were not included in the previous exchange. In the
event that prisoners of war shall be found to exist, the Mixed Armistice Commission shall arrange
for an earlyexchange of such prisoners. The Parties to this Agreement undertake to afford full co-
operation to the Mixed Armistice Commission in its discharge of this responsibility.
Article XI
1.The execution ofthe provisions of this Agreement, with the exception of such matters as fa11
within the exclusive competence of the SpecialCommittee established in article VIII, shall be
supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party to
this Agreement shall designatetwo, and whose Chairman shall be the United Nations Chief of Staff
of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer from the observerpersonnel of that
organization designated by him following consultation with both Partiesto this Agreement.
2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at Jerusalem and shall hold its
meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for the effective conduct of its
work.
3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the United Nations
Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later than one week following the signing
of this Agreement.
4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be basedon the
principle of unanimity. Inthe absence of unanimity, decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of
the members of the Comnîissionpresent and voting.
5. The Mixed Armistice Conlmission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. Meetings shall be
held only after due noticeto the members by the Chairman. The quorum for its meetings shall be a
majority of its members.
6. The Commission shall beempowered to employ observers, who may be fronl anîong the military
organizations of the Partiesor from the military personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision
Organization, or from both. in such numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its
functions. In theevent UnitedNations observers should be so employed. they shallremain under the
comnîand of the UnitedNations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. Assignments
of a general or special naturegiven to United Nations observers attached to the Mixed Armistice
Commission shall be sub-jectto approval by the United Nations Chief of Staffor his designated SI1 303/Tie1/. 013 April 1949 Page 6 of.8
representativeon the Con~mission,whichever is serving as Chairinan
7. Clainlsor complaints presented by eitller Parh relating to the application of this Agreement shall
be referred immediately to the Mixed Arnlistice Comn~issionthrough its Chairman. The
Commission shall take such action on al1such claims or complaints by means of its observation and
investigationmachinery as it may deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually
satisfactory settlement.
8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, other than the
preamble and articles 1 and II, is at issue, the Commission's interpretation shall prevail. The
Commission, in its discretion and as the need arises, may from time to time recommend to the
Parties modifications in the provisions of this Agreement.
9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its activities as
frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report shall be presented to the
Secretary-Generalof the United Nations for transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the
United Nations.
10.Members of the Commission and its observers shall be accorded such freedom of movement and
access in the area covered by this Agreement as the Commission may determine to be necessary,
provided that when such decisions of the Commission are reached by a nlajority vote United Nations
observers only shall be employed.
11.The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations observers, shall be
appor60ned in equal shares between the two Parties to this Agreement.
Article XII
1.The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force immediately upon
being signed.
2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the resolution of the
Security Councilof 16 November 1948 calling for the establishment of an armistice in order to
eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truceto
permanent peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peaceful settlement between the Parties is
achieved, except as provided in paraagraph 3 of this article.
3. The Partiesto this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or any ofits
provisions, or may suspend its application, other than articles 1and III, at any time. In the absence of
mutual agreement andafier this Agreement has been in effect for one year from the date of its
signing, either of the Parties may cal1upon the Secretary-General ofthe United Nations to convoke a
conference of representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing. revising,or suspending
any of the provisions of this Agreement other than articles 1and III. Participation in such conference
shall be obligatory upon the Parties.
4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this article does not result in an agreed solution of
a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the Security Council of the United
Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of
Security Council action towardthe end of achieving peace in Palestine.
5. This Agreement is signedin quintuplicate 4/, of which one copy shall be retained by each Party.
two copies communicatedto the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the
Security Counciland tothe United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine. and one copy to
the United Nations ActingMediator on Palestine. S/l302/Re\r.1of 3 April1949 Page 7 of 8
DONEat Rhodes, Island ofRhodes. Greece.onthe thirdof April onetl-iousandnine hundredand
forty-ninein the presence of the UnitedNationsActing Mediatoron Palestineand the United
NationsChief of Staff of the Truce SupervisionOrganization.
For and on behalf ofthe For and on behalf ofthe
Government ofthe Hashemite Governmentof Israel
JordanKingdom
(Signed) (Signed)
ColonelAhmed Sudki EL-NNDI Reuven SHILOAH
Lieutenant-colonel Mohamed MAAYTE Lieutenant-ColonelMoshe DAYAN
Annex 1
41\l)S 1)l1IV1 Il l\(i ,4R4llS 1lc'l lA1 jl<(.1Il03 1IYI \
[Thesemaps followannex II, and are explainedin the [endlnote[3]by the SecretariattoarticlV of
the Agreement.]
Annex II
DEFINITIONOF DEFENSIVEFORCES
1.Forthe purposes of this Agreementdefensiveforces shallbe definedas follows:
1.Landforces
(a) A standardbattalionto consist ofnot morethan 800 officers and otherranks, andto be composed
of not morethan:
(i) Four rifle companieswith ordinary infantry equipment;rifles.LMG's,SMG's,
lightmortars, anti-tankrifles and PIAT.
The light mortarsshallnot be heavierhan 2 inch.
The followingnumberof weapons per battalion shallnot be exceeded:48 LMG's,
16mortars 2 inch, 8PIAT's;
(ii) One supportcompanywith not more than six MMG's,six mortarsand not
heavierthan 3 inch,four anti-tank guns not heavier than six-pounders;
(iii)One headquarterscompany;
(b) The artilleryand anti-aircraft artilleryto be allotted to the defensive forces shallconsist of the
following typeof weapons: fieldgunsnot heavier than twenty-five pounders, theanti-air-craftguns
not heavierthan fortyinillimetres.
2.The followingareexcluded from thetern~"defensive forces" (a) Armour. such as tanks of al1types. armoured cars. Bren gun carriers. half-tracks. armoured
vehicles or load carriers, or any other armoured vehicles;
(b) Al1support arms and units other than those specified in paragraphs 1(a) iand ii, and 1 (b) above;
(c) Service units to be agreed upon.
3. Air forces
In the areas where defensive forces only are permitted airfields, airstrips, landing fields and other
installations,and military aircraft shall be employed for defensive and normal supply purposes only.
II.The defensive forces which may be maintained by each Party in the areas extending ten
kilometres from each side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines, as provided in paragraph 1of article
VI, shall be asfollows for the sectors described in article V, paragraph 1:
1. Sector Kh Deir Arab (MR 1510-1574)to the northern terminus of the lines defined in the 30
November 1948 Cease-Fire Agreement for the Jerusalem area: one battalion each.
2. Jerusalem sector: two battalions each.
3.Hebron-Dead Sea sector: one battalion each.
4. Sector Engeddi to Eylat: three battalions each. In addition, each side will be allowed one squadron
of light armoured cars tonsisting of not more than 13light armoured cars or half tracks. The
weapons permissible on these vehicles will be determined by the Mixed Armistice Commission.
5. Sectornow held by Iraqi forces: five battalions each, and one squadron of armoured cars each.
No tes
11This document includes mimeographed documents SI1302, SI1302lAdd.1, S/1302/Corr.1and also
annexes 1and II of the Agreement.
21See OfJicialRecords of theSecuriv Council, Third Year, No. 126 (381st meeting), page 53.
31Note by the Secretariat. The photo-offsets of the two officially signed maps comprising annex 1
will be found at the end of this fascicule. For purposes of reproduction, it has been necessary to
present the map of Palestine (map 1) as a north sheet (part 1)and a south sheet (part 2). Map 2 is a
survey map of Jerusalem which should beconsulted in connexion with sub-paragraph (b) of article
V. The line referred to in sub-paragraph (d) of article V begins on part 1 of map 1 (blue line south of
the Jerusalem area) andcontinues south on part 2. For al1other geographical references in articles V
and VI, map 1,part 1 should be consulted. The truce lines referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of article
V are the red and green lines on the latter map.
41Al1of the signed copieswere in English, the English text being the only authentic one
MAPS DELINEATING ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES
il~'!< ,,, , t~l,~t ~IIJ~II'T /\ ,Jeru.~ulenzL, utrun Copyright 2002 Gannett Company, Inc.
USA TODAY
March 14,2002, Thursday, FINAL EDITION
SECTION:NEWS; Pg. 6A
LENGTH: 1293words
HEADLINE:Terrorist says orders come from Arafat
BYLINE:Matthew Kalman
DATELINE:TULKARM, West Bank
BODY:
TULKARM, West Bank --A leader of the largest Palestinian terrorist group
spearheading suicide bombings and other attacks against Israel sayshe is following
the orders of Palestinian leader YasserArafat.
"Our group isan integralpart of Fatah," says Maslama Thabet, 33, a leader of the Al-
Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Fatah, headed by Arafat, is the largest group in the Palestinian
Authority, thegovernment of the autonomous Palestinian territories.
Thabet spokefromthe Tulkarm refugee camp, where he was holed up with about 300
of his heavilyarmed followers as hundreds of Israelioldiers swept through the tom.
Over the pasttwo weeks, Israel has launched massive incursions into Palestinian
toms andrefugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza in search of terrorists.
"Thetruth is, we are Fatah itself, but we don'toperate under the name of Fatah," he
said in a recent interview. "We are the arrnedwing of the organization. We receive
Ourinstructionsfrom Fatah. Our commander is YasserArafat himself."
SpokesmenforArafat give differing responses when asked about his ties to Thabet
and the brigade.Nabil Abu Rudeineh, Arafat's chief spokesman, sayshe has never
heard of Thabet. "Thepresident has nothing to do with these things, he has nothing to
Sayaboutthis issue," Rudeineh says.
But MohammedOdwan, Arafat's foreign media spokesman, confirms thatthe brigade
is "loyalto PresidentArafat."
"Theyare workingfor the interests of the Palestinian people," Odwan says. "They are
fighting becausethey think these kind of operations -- and 1agre--will push fonvard
their independence andtheir dream of freedom." Israeli securityofficialsconcedeArafat isnot involvedin directingthe on-the-ground
operations of militant groups,but they Sayhis regular calls for holywar against
Israel's occupation havebeentaken up as a directivebythe extremists.
In a televised address Saturday,as Palestinianterrorists launched suicide attacksin
Netanya and Jerusalem, Arafaturged Palestiniansto "sacrificethemselves as martyrs
injihad (holy war) for Palestine."
"When Arafat standsin frontofa crowd and calls for millionsof martyrs to march on
Jerusalem and holy war againstIsrael,he is giving a clear directive to his followers,"
says Reserve Col. EranLeman, former head of research for Israeli Military
Intelligence andnow the Jerusalemdirectorof the American Jewish Committees.
"Marwan Barghouti (secretary-generalofFatah in the West Bank) and the local
leaders below himtake that directiveand transform it into actions.. .. Arafatdoes not
personally approve individualoperations,but he provides the money for Barghouti's
terrorism."
Barghouti, who often is on the guest list at dinners with Arafat inthe Palestinian
leader's compound in Ramallah,confirmedlast week that one of his lieutenantswho
was killed in an Israeli assassination was a memberof the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.
The link betweenthe brigade and Arafat signals a turning point in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.It meansthe Palestinian leadership hasopenly allied itself with a
terrorist group.Palestinianofficialsopenly Saydealing in death, not diplomacy,is the
only viable way to achievetheir end: an independent Palestinian state.
Asthe Palestinians have rarnpedup their attackson Israeli targets, Israel has escalated
its response. The result hasbeensome of the worst violencethe region has seen in
decades. Morethan 200 peoplehave died --163Palestinians and 59 Israelis --since
the beginning of March.Morethan 1,500people have been killed in thepast 18
months, morethan 1,000of themPalestinians.Israel's incursionsinto Palestinian
territory reached a new level this week: 20,000troops were deployed, andthey
searchedhouse-to-houseforterrorists and weapons. It has beenthe biggest Israeli
military operationsince its invasion of Lebanonin 1982.
The emergence of a radicalyoungbranch of Arafat'sFatah faction comes as no
surprise to MahmoudMuhareb, a Palestinianprofessor of political scienceat Al-Quds
Universityin Jerusalem. "Theyare under siege, under blockade and almost at the edge
of starvation,"he says. "When youdehumanizethe life of human beings, they endup
feeling theirlifeis not worthy.Five years ago, you might find one suicidebomberin
an entire city. Today, it is different. There aremany, because they feel there is no
meaning to theirlives." Palestinian Authority officiaiSaymost members of the brigade receive salariesfrom
the authority. For example,the leader of the brigade in Nablus, Nasser Awes,is a
salaried officer in the PalestinianNational Security Force, which isone of 14armed
police and security servicesthat reportto Arafat.
In the past two weeks, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has claimed responsibilityfor
attacksthat include:
*A suicide bombing March2 in Jerusalem that killed 10Israelisand injured 44.
*A sniperambush on a WestBank checkpoint March3that killed 10Israelis and
wounded four.
*The shooting attack on a seasidehotel late Saturday in Netanya, north of Tel Aviv,
that killed two Israelis and injureddozens.
* An ambush in northem Israel onTuesday in which gunmenwearing Israeli army
uniforms killed six Israelis beforeoldiers shot two of the attackers dead.
Israeli police say theythwarted a string of other planned attacks bythe group in recent
weeks.
The brigade, unknown until a year ago, has become the largestarmed Palestinian
group operating inthe West Bank, Gaza and Israel. Unlike twoother major
Palestinian militant groups, theIslamic fundamentalist Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the
brigade is secular. The groupgrew out of the Fatah youth movement known as the
Tanzim. Under the 1993Oslo peaceaccordsthat stated only Palestinian security
services may bear arrns, Tanzim isan illegal militia of about 10,000 armed young
men headed by Barghouti.
As the terrorist wingof Arafat'sFatah faction, the brigade has the supportof the
largest political and military faction in the Palestinian Authority.Hussein A-Sheikh, a
Fatahpolitical leaderin the WestBank, seems insulted when asked whetherthe
brigade isunder Arafat's control."Of course, there is control," he snaps"What do
you think? That we are just a bunch of gangs?"
The Israeli army says Fatah, fueled by the brigade'slethal activities, has surpassed
Hamas in Israeli fatalities.Hamas killed 100Israelis in 2001 and Fatah killed 45, the
army says, but sincethe start of 2002, Fatah has killed 57 Israelis while Hamas haskilled27. The brigade also introduced alethaltwistto its attacks:female suicide
bombers.A woman killed anelderlyman and wounded 50 peoplein a suicide attack
Jan. 27 in Jerusalem. Anotherwomanblew herselfup at a WestBank army
checkpoint Feb. 27,injuringtwo soldiers.
Thabet,who commandsthe brigadein Tulkarm, attainednotoriety a year ago when,
with his friend Raed Karmi, he kidnappedand executedtwo Israelirestaurateurs who
had stoppedin Tulkarmfor lunch.Karmi, founderof the brigade in Tulkarm, died in
an explosionin Januaryin a suspectedIsraeli assassination.Palestinian security forces
arrestedThabet last year. He wasreleased, asweredozens of other suspected
terrorists.
"Ourstruggleis againstthe Israeli occupation,"Thabetsaid. "We are prepared to fight
to the lastfighter against (Israeli Prime Minister Ariel) Sharonand his war machine. .
..Israel must pay aheavy price forthe atrocitiesand massacres which they are
perpetratingon a dailybasis againstthe Palestinianpeople."
* Bush rebukes Israel, 1A
GRAPHIC: PHOTO,BIW, Elizabeth Dalziel, AP; PHOTO,B/W, Abdellah Senna,
Agence France-Presse; GRAPHIC,BIW,USA TODAY (MAP);GRAPHIC, BIW,
Robert W.Ahrens, USA TODAY, Source: The Associated Press(BAR GRAPH);
Attackin Jerusalem: Aman woundedin a suicide bombing at a crowded cafeis
evacuated Saturday night. <>Brigade member: A Palestinian militant displayshis belt
of explosives Fridayin Bethlehem.
LOAD-DATE:March 14,2002 Jerusalem, January 18,2004
PM Sharon and senior ministers hold discussion ahead of ICJ
deliberations
(Communicated by the Prime Minister'sMediaAdviser)
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, ForeignMinisterSilvan Shalom, DefenseMinister Shaul
Mofaz,Justice Minister Joseph Lapidand Minister Meir Sheetrit met this afternoon
(Sunday),January 18, 2004, with the steeringcommittee and the legaltask force
that have been appointed to prepare for the InternationalCourt of Justice in the
Hague'sdiscussion of the terrorism preventionfence.
Acting Attorney General EdnaArbel, Prime Minister Bureau Director DovWeisglass,
ForeignMinistry Director-General Yoav Biran, Prime Minister Sharon's and Defense
Minister Mofaz's military secretaries, ForeignMinistry Legal Adviser Alan Baker, Dr.
Meir Rosen, the Director of InternationalLaw in the IDF Judge Advocate General's
office and other senior Foreign, Defense and Justice Ministry officiais also attended
the meeting.
The goal of the discussion was to presentthe ministers with a summary of the
expected courses of action in the diplomatic, military, informational and legal
spheres.
At the beginning of the meeting, Prime Minister Sharon said: "We are not discussing
a change in the route of the fence, and there will be no change as a result of
Palestinianor UNdemands, including those from the Court. A re-discussion of the
fence's routewill take place only as a result of internal lsraeli deliberations.The
operative experience that has accumulatedover the last few months in which the
fence was being constructed was both good and bad. It was excellent at preventing
terror but was not satisfactory in al1matters relating to the damage to Palestinians'
quality of life.am personallymonitoringthe problems arising from the operation of
the fence and am familiar with the complaints about it; it is possible that additional
thought is needed to allow for the possibility of changing the route, in order to reduce
the number of mishaps in operatingthe fence without harming security.
Other considerations,even if for domestic lsraeli reasons, are a difficult
determinationthat I received in any case from Acting Attorney-General Arbel and
which indicates legal difficulties in defending the State's position beforethe High
Court of Justice on certain points related to the route of the fence. This is an internal
legal position that must be considered with due seriousness and this Iwill do."
Foreign Ministry Director-GeneralBiran reported on the diplomatic situation and the
preparations for internationaldiplomaticefforts.
Defense MinisterShaul Mofaz's Military Secretary, Brig.-Gen. Michael Herzog,
reported on the security and intelligencesituations.Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Baker gave an update on contacts with international
legal experts on the issue.
Foreign Ministry Deputy Director-General for Information and Media Gideon Meir
reported on the media and information campaign ahead of, during and after the
Hague discussion.
It was agreed that at this stage, the task force would prepare a range of professional
positions on the basis of the fence's existing route; if lsrael - for humanitarian and
domestic reasons - decides to change the route, the task force will, of course, adapt
the professional opinions in accordance with the changes.Annex 20 Statcment oi'PA Prime h4ii1jstei-Mahmoud Abbarit kcjabSuniinit (Jorda4.June 2 Page 1 of1
lsrael 4 June 2003
Jordan
Palestinian Authority
United States of America
STATEMENT BY PRIME MlNlSTER MAHMOUD ABBAS
OF THE PALESTlNlAN AUTHORITY AFTER THE
AQABA SUMMIT MEETING, Jordan, 4 June 2003
Iwould like to thank King Abdullah for hosting Our meeting here today. Iwould like
also to thank President Mubarak and KingAbdullah, King Hamad, and Crown Prince
Abdallah who met in Egypt yesterday. I thank them for their statements supporting
Our efforts.Ialso would like to thank the lsraeli Prime Minister Sharon for joining us
here in Jordan. And many thanks, especially, to President Bush, who took the
longest journey for peace of al1of us.
As we al1realize, this is an important moment. A new opportunity for peace exists, an
opportunity based upon President Bush's vision and the Quartet's road map, which
we have accepted without any reservations.
Our goal is two states, lsrael and Palestine, living side-by-side, in peace and
security. The process is the one of direct negotiations to end the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and to resolve al1the permanentstatus issues, and end the occupation that
began in 1967, under which Palestinians have suffered so much.
At the same time, we do not ignore the suffering of the Jews throughout history. It is
time to bring al1this suffering to an end.
Just as lsrael must meet its responsibilities, we, the Palestinians, will fulfill Our
obligations for this endeavor to succeed. We are ready to do Our part.
Let me be very clear: There will be no military solution to this conflict, so we repeat
Our renunciation, a renunciation of terror against the lsraelis wherever they might be.
Such methods are inconsistentwith Our religious and moral traditions and are
dangerous obstacles to the achievement of an independent, sovereign state we seek.
These methods also conflict with the kinds of state we wish to build, based on
human rights and the rule of law.
We will exert al1of Our efforts, using al1Our resources to end the militarization of the
intifada, and we will succeed. The armed intifada must end, and we must use and
resort to peaceful means in Our quest to end the occupation and the suffering of
Palestinians and Israelis. And to establish the Palestinian state, we emphasize Our
determination to implement Our pledges which we have made for Our people and the
international community. And that is a rule of law, single political authority, weapons
only in the hands of those who are in charge with upholding the law and order, and
political diversity within theframework of democracy.
Our goal is clear and we will implement it firmly and without compromise: a complete
end to violence and terrorism. And we will be full partners in the international war
against occupation and terrorism. And we will cal1 upon Our partners in this war to
prevent financial and military assistance to those who oppose this position. We do
this as a part ofOur commitment to the interest of the Palestinian people, and as
members of the large family of humanity. Starèmci~toPA Pi-inieMiilisies Mahmoud Abbas a?Aqaba Sun~~nit(JoI-dan.4 Jun2.. J'agc 2 cf 2
We will also act vigorously against incitement and violence and hatred,whatever
their form or forum may be. We will take measures to ensure that there is no
incitement --from Palestinian institutions. We must also reactivate and invigorate the
U.S.-Palestinian-lsraeli Anti-lncitement Committee. We will continue Our work to
establish the rule of law and to consolidate government authority in accountable
Palestinian institutions.We seek to build the kind of democratic state that will be a
qualitative addition to the international community.
All the PA security forces will be part of these efforts, and will work together toward
the achievement of these goals. Our national future is at stake, and no one will be
allowed to jeopardize it.
We are committed to these steps because they are in Our national interest. In order
to succeed, there must be a clear improvement in the lives of Palestinians.
Palestinians must live in dignity. Palestinians must be able to move, go to their jobs
and schools, visit their families, and conduct a normal life. Palestinians must not be
afraid for their lives,roperty, or livelihood.
We welcome and stress the need for the assistance of the international community
and, in particular, the Arab states, to help us. And we also welcome and stress the
need for a U.S.-led monitoring mechanism.
Together, we can achieve the goal of an independent Palestinian state, sovereign,
viable, in the framework of good neighbors with al1states in the region, including
Israel. Thank you very much.Annex21 Staternent of israeli PI-iineR4iiîisterArieI Sharori at Aqaba Sumniii (Jordan. 4 .lune 20... Page icl J
lsrael 4 June 2003
Jordan
Palestinian Authority
United States of America
Statement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of lsrael
after the Aqaba Summit meeting, Jordan, 4 June 2003
I would like to thank His Majesty King Abdullah for arranging this meeting, and express Israel's
appreciation to PresidentBush for coming here to be with Prime Minister Abbas and me. Thank you.
As the Prime Minister of Israel, the land which isthe cradle of the Jewish people, my paramount
responsibility is the security of the people of Israeland of the State of Israel. There can be no
compromise with terror and Israel,together with al1free nations, will continue fighting terrorism until
its final defeat.
Ultimately,permanentsecurity requires peace and permanent peace can only be obtained through
security, and there is now hope of a new opportunity for peace between lsraelis and Palestinians.
Israel, like others, has lent its strong supportfor President Bush's vision, expressed on June 24,2002,
of two states -lsrael and a Palestinian state - living side by side in peace and security. The
Governmentand people of Israel welcome the opportunity to renew direct negotiations according to
the steps of the roadmap as adopted by the lsraeli government to achieve this vision.
Itis in Israel's interest not to governthe Palestinians butfor the Palestinians to govern themselves in
their own state. A democraticPalestinianstate fully at peace with Israel will promote the long-term
security and well-being of Israel as a Jewish state.
There can be no peace, however, without the abandonment and eiimination of terrorism, violence, and
incitement. We will work alongsidethe Palestinians and other states tofight terrorism, violence and
incitement of al1kinds. As al1parties perform their obligations, we will seek to restore normal
Palestinian life, improvethe humanitariansituation, rebuild trust, and promote progress toward the
President'svision. We will act in a manner that respects the dignity as well as the human rights of al1
people.
We can also reassure Our Palestinianpartners that we understandthe importance of territorial
contiguity in the West Bank, for a viable, Palestinianstate. Israeli policy in the territories that are
subject to direct negotiations with the Palestinians will reflectthis fact.
We accept the principle that no unilateral actions by any party can prejudge the outcome of Our
negotiations.
In regard to the unauthorizedoutposts, Iwant to reiterate that Israel is a society governed by the rule
of law. Thus, we will immediately begin to remove unauthorized outposts.
lsrael seeks peace with al1its Arab neighbors. Israel is prepared to negotiate in good faith wherever
there are partners. As normalrelations are established, I am confident that they will find in Israela
neighbor and a people committed to comprehensive peace and prosperity for al1the peoples of the
region.
Thank you all.Annex 22 10 General Assembl y-Fif tli Session
.. -- --
3. Requests the Economic and Social Council, in Roafiir~iti>:ythe importance of the exercise by the
consultatioii with the specialized agencies, to develop Securit- Cotiiicil ui its primary responsibility for the
plans for relief and rehabilitation on the terniination of maintcii;iiicc.oi iriterii;~tioiial pcnce and security, and
hostilities and to report to the General hssenibly witliin the diity ~i tlit. ~)crninneritriieriil)ers to scek i~naniniity
three weekss" ol the adoption of the present resoliition and to cixcrcisc restrniiit iii tlie useof the veto,
by the General Assembly ; liri?fliririiii!/ tliat thc initi;ltiviii riegotiatiiig the
4. Also rrcovznlrnds tlie Ecoiiomic aiid Social Coiin- agrcenirrits tor ariiied forces providecl for in Article
cil to expedite the study of long-terrn measures to 43 of thc C1i;irter I)eloiigs to tlie Seciirity Council, and
promote the econoniic devclopnient and social progrcss desiriiig to eiisiirc tliat. periding the conclusion of such
of Korea, and nieanwhile to draw the attention of the agrrcnients. th(. United Nations tias at its disposa1
authorities which decide requests for technical assistance nieans for iiiairitaiiiing iiiternational peace and security,
to the urgent and special necessity of affording. such Conscio~rsthat failiire of the Security Council to dis-
assistance to Korea ; charge its rcs~~orisibilitieson belialf of al1 the Member
5. Expresses its appreciation of the services ren- States. pnrticiilarlq- those responsibilities referred to in
dered by the niembers of the Cnited Nations Commis- the two prcrcdiiig paragraphs, cloesiiot relieve Member
sion on Korea in the performance of their inlportant States of tlieir 01)ligations or the United Nations of its
and difficult task;
responsil)ilit>~ iinder the Charter to inaintain inter-
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide tlie national peacc and security,
United Nations Cominission for the Unification and Rccognizi~ig in partictilar that siich failure does. not
Rehabilitation of Korea with adequate staff and facili- deprive the General Assenibly of its rights or relieve it
ties, including technical advisers as reqiiired: and of its respoiisil>iiitics iinder the Charter in regard to
authorizes tlie Secretary-General to pay the expenses the inairitenance of iriterriational peace and security,
and PCY dieln of a representative and alternate from
each of the States incmbers of the Cominission. liccog~zizirrgthat discliarge by the General Assernbly
Z9lflz plenary meeting. of its respoi:sibilities in these respects calls for possi-
7 Ortober 1950. bilities of ol)servation which would asccrtain the facts
and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed
forces wliicli could be iiscd collectively ; aiid for thr
377 (V). Uniting for peace possibility of tiniel) recoiniiieiidation I)y the General
A Asscnihly to Mernbers of the United Nations for collec-
tive action which, to be effective, should be prompt,
The General Asse7fibly,
Recognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the
United Nations are:
1. lirsoh~cs that if the Seciirity Council, hecaiise of
"To maintain international peace and security, and lnck oi uii;iiiiiiiity of tlir periiiaiieiit nienibers, fails to
to that end: to take effective collective measures for esercisc its priiiinry resl)onsiliility for tlie niairitcriance
the prevention and removal of threats to the pence,
and for the supl>ression of acts of aggression or otlier of ii~teriiatioiial pence aiid security in ~iiiycase where
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful tlicrc al)pe:irs to be a tlireat to the pcace, breacli of the
means, and in conforiiiity with the principles of jiis- pcace, cir nct oi aggressioii, the Geiicral Assenil~ly shall
tice and internatioiial law. adjitstment or settlenicnt consider the 111;ittcriniiiie(liatc1ywith a view to iiialiirig
of international dispiites or situations which niight appropriate recoiiiiiiendations to hieinl)crs for collcc-
lead to a breach of the peace", and tive rilrasiircb, iiicliidirfg iii the case of n brench of the
perice or zict of aggressioii the use of arnicd forcc when
"To develop frieiidly relations aniong nations based iiecessary, to inaiiitaiii or restore iiiteriiatioiinl peace
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self- ai:d seciiritx. If iic)iiisession at the tiiiic, tlic Gciitlral
determination of peoples, and to take other approlm- Assc~iil)lyiii:iy iiicct in einergeiicy special session withiii
ate measures to strerigthen universal ~~eace", t\\~ciity-foiir Iiours of ille rerliiest thcrefor. Siich criier-
Reafirming that it remains the prin~ary duty of al1 g'ncy spccial scssioii sliall be called ii rccluestcd by the
Members of the United Nations, when iiivolved in an Scciirity Coiincil on tlic vote of any sevcii nieiiil)crs. or
international dispute, to seek settlement ot sucli a tlis- l)j.a iiiajority of the Meriil)ers of tlie 1:iiited Nations;
pute by peaceful means through the procedures laid
down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the 2. rldup!~ for this ~>iirl)osethe aineritlments to its
1-iilcui proccdure set foi-th iiithe annes to tlie present
successful achievenieiits of the United Nations iri this iv~c~lutior;i
regard on a nurnber of previous occasions,
Finding that internatioiial tension esists oii a darigcr-
ous scale.
Recalling its resolution 290 (1V) erititled "13sscri- .i. l<stnh/ir/rrs a Pe:ice 0l)servation Commission
tials of peace", wliicli states tlirit disregard of the Priri- \\.hich. ior tlie calciitlnr years 1951 and 1952, sliall be
coriil~osedof ioiirtc.cii hlenil~ers, iiarne:yChina, Colom-
ciples of the Charter of the United Natioris is priinarily l~i;tCzcclioslo~-skia, France. Iiiclia, Ir;iq, lsrael, New
responsible for the contiriuance of international te~isioii, %c:ilaritl. 1'aliist;iii. Sweden. tlie tinion of Soviet Social-
and desiring to contrihute turtlicr to the ol)jecti\res of ist I~c~~ublics.tlic LJnitctl Kiiigclom of Great Britain
that rcsolution. ;iiid Ilortherii Ireland. the United States of Aiiierica
8.See resolution 410(V) , page 31 iii:tl llrugiiay, and which could observe and report on Hr~oliitions adopted on rep )orte of the Firet Cummitire 11
-- -- ---
the situation in any area where therc exists iriter- Great 1irit:iiii and Sortlierii Ireland, the United States
national tension the continuaiice of wliich is likely to of Aiilci-icn. \'ciicziic.I;iaii<l'I'iigoslavia, aiid directs the
enclniiger the rnainteiiance of iiiteriiatioiial peace and L'oniiiiiitcc..in c.oi~siiit;itiuii\vitIl tlie Sccrrtary-General
;incl\villi siicli 'rlciiil>erSt;ites as tlie Cornrnittre finds
security. Upon the iiivitatioi~ or witli tlic corisent of apl)rol>riiit<~t.o '.;tiid!.an<lni:ilic a report to the Seciirity
the State into whose territory the Coniiilission would
go, the Geiieral Asseiiil)ly. or tlic Iriteriii~ Coiiiiiiittce C'oiiiicil ;il1, tlit. ;encra1 I\ssetnbly, not later than
whcn the Assenilily is riot iii sessiriri. iiiny ritilizc tlic 1 Sel)teiiil,<.r1951, on nietliods, including those in section
Coiiiiiiission if tlie Scciirity Coiiiicil is not çsïrcisi~ig C of tlit.jmsw~t rcsoliitioii. wliich tiiiglit 11euscd to
tlie iunctioiis assigiied to it I>ythe Cliarter with resllect niaiiitaiii ;iiitstren~tlicii interii;itional pcace and sr-
to tlie niatter in cluestioii Decisions to utilize ttic Loiii- cilrit!.iri:ic<-ordaricçwitli the Purpose:: and Principles
mission shall be made on the affirmntive vote of two- of the CI1i;ii-tcr,takiiig accourit oi collertive self-defence
thirds of the rnembers present and voting. The Security and regioii:il ;irrangeii-ierits (:\rticles 51 and 52 of the
Corincil tiiay also utilize the Cori1niissiori in ;rccord:ince Chartcri ;
with its authority under tlie Charter; 13. Ii'i~t-o>:i~iic.titisal1 ,\lcii~ber St:itvs that they co-
4. Dccidcs that the Coininission shall have auihority oper;it(. \viili tlic Cniiiiiiittïc ancl assist it in tlic per-
in its discretion to appoint siib-coniniissions and to f~rriiaiii~oc its fuiictions :
utilize the services of observers to assist it in the per-
forniance of its functions; 13. Iicrl~c+si.~the Secretary-General to fiirnish the
daff nritl faciliiies riecessary for the effective accom-
5. Reco~nmends to al1 governmerits and authorities plisliinrritof the piirpoaes set forth irisections C and
that they CO-operate witli the Commission and assist it 1) of th( JI;(.fsiire.soliitiii;i
in the performance of its functions ;
ti.Rcqucsts the Secretary-Geiicral to provide the
necessary staff and iacilities, utilizing. ~vliere directed
hy tlie Comn~ission, the United Nations 1':iiielof Field 14. I: jrrlly ronsriot(s that, in adoptirig tlie proposals
Ol~servers envisaged in Crcneral Asïcnihly rc\oliitioii set forili ;iliovc. entliiring peace will not 11cseriired
297 B (IV) ; solel- 11' collective srciirity arratiç;c5nients against
I)i-~:icli<o.i iritcriiatioiinl pcace ari<l acts of ag~rcssion,
I~iitiIi;!:i gc.iiiiiiieand lastinç peace dcpentis also upon
tlie ;)i)hc.r;i~iceof al1 the Principles niitl Purposes es-
7. Iwv'tcs each Aleinber of the United Nations to
survey its resources in order to deterniine the nature iri1)liilic~iii the Charter of the United Nations, upon
and scope of the assistance it niay be in a position to the iiiiIilt.iiicntation of the resoliitiotis of the Security
render in supliort of any reconimendations of the Coiiiicil. tlie Geiiei-al Assenibly and otlier principal
Seciirity Corincil or of the General Assenif>ly for the orgnris: [lie United Nations intericled to acliicve the
restoration of interriatiorial peace and security : iii:iiritci::iitcc. of ir:tern:itional peace ar,d security, and
c.sl)ccinll! 111)onrespect for and ol~servaiice of hiiinaii
8. Rcco~iiwii~ndsto the States Mciiil)ers of tlie IJiiited rights ;iiicl fiindainenta1 ireedoiiis for nll and on the
îiatioris that each Meml)cr iiiaiiitüin witliiri its national r:a!~li~lii?ic.iit and 11iainte:iaiice of conditions of eco-
armed forces elernents SV trained. orgaiiized and ecluip- noiiiic ;iiitlsocial well-king in al1 coiintries; and
ped that ihey could proin1)tly I>e made avnilahle, in accorcliiigl~
accordance with its coiistitutioiial proccsscs. for service
as a Unitcd Nations unit or uiiits, ulmri reconimenda- 15. I'r.,q~-sIllciii1)cr States to respect iiilly. and to
iritciisii~. jiliiit ~ictioii. iii co-operation witli tlie United
tion by the Security Coui?cil or the Creiicral ;\ssciiilily. S:itioiis, to tlcvrlop aiid stinirilate iiliiversal respect for
witlioiit pi-ejiitlice to the liseof such clciiieiit. iiieser-
cise of the right of individual or collective srlf-deience arid o?;ser\:uice of hiiii~aii rights and fiiiidamental frec-
recognized in Article 51 of the Charter; doiiih. ;iiitl to iiitcnsify individual and collectivr efforts
to achicsvr con<:itioils of ecoiioniic stnbility and social
0. III:~!~,t.l:ie h~leiiil~ersof tlie Uiiitrd Nations to progres.. l>articiilarly tliroiigh tlie develoyiriciit of
ii?fo?in thc (lollective Measures Coiiiniittee provicled iiii(lcr-cli.\.riol>etIcoiiiitrics and areas.
for in paragrapli 11 as sooii as possil)lc ot the incasures
takcn iii iiiipleiiientatioii of the preceding paragraph ;
ANNEX
10. Retlucsts the Secretary-General to appoint, with
the al)proval of the Cornmittee provided for in para- I'lie riilc,, 1 ~irocedure of the General Assembly are
;:ral)h II. a panel of inilitary experts who coiilcl 11c amendctl ii~..le following rcspects
iiiatle avail;~!ile,on request, to Meniber States wisliing 1. I lic pi-esent test of rule 8 sliall become paragraph
tu ci:)taiii technical advice regardirig the organization. (a) of that rule. ancl a new paragrapli (b) shall be added
trriii;ing, a!id ~(luipnient for pronil~t service as lnited to re;itln. Collowq :
Nz:ic;r!s iiiiits oi tlie eleinents referrecl to in para-
graph S; "l<iiierpency spccial scisioiis I~iirsuant tri rcsolution
371 ;2 (V) sliall he coiivcrictl witliiii twcnty-forir hoiirs
of tlic rcceipt by the Sccretary-General of a request
for 5iicli ;i session frotii the Seciirity Counril. on the
Il. Estnblislie-.s ;i Collective Measiircs Coininittee vote <!fariy seyen memhers thereof, or of a request frorn
consisting of fourtçen Menibers, riaiiiely: Australia, a iii;ijoi-ity of tliî Menibers of the United Nations ex-
Belgiiim, Brazil, Burtna, Cariada, Egypt, France, prc-seil I>y votc in the Interirn Coiiimittee or othcrwise,
or of t11i.concurrence of a majority of Mcmbers as
Mexico, Philippines, Turkey. the Ciiited Kiiigclom of prciviilcciin riile9." 12 General Assembly-Fifth Session
- -
2. The present text of rule 9 shall becorne paragraph The above dispositions shoiild in no manner prevent
(a)of that rule ancl a new paragraph (b) sliall be addcd the General .4sseinlily from fulfilling its functions under
to read as follows: resoliition 377 A (V).
"This rtile shall apply also to a request by any Mem- 30Znd i>lcnary meeting,
ber for an clnergency special session pursuant to resolu- 3 Nove17zber 1950.
tion 377 A (V). In sucli a casc the Sccretary-Gcneral
shall conimuiiic:itc witli othcr hleiiibers I,y the most
expcditioii5 lncans of communication available."
3. Rule 10 is arneiided by adding at the end thereof
the following: The General Assembly,
Rccognizing tliat the prirnary fiinction of the United
". . .In tlic case of an emergcncy special session con-
vcncd pursuaiit to i-ule 8 (b), tlie Secretary-General Nations Organization is to niaiiltain and promote peace,
shall notify the bleniliers of the Uiiitrd Nations at least security and justice aiiiong al1 nations,
twelve hours in advnnce of the opening of the session." Xrrogni,-i~zg the responsil)ility of al1 Mernber States
4. Riile 16 is amcnded by adding al the end thereof to proniote tlie caiise of international peace in accord-
the following :
arice with their obliga-ions as provided in the Charter,
". . .The provisional a~eiida of an eniergcncy special Rccognizing that tlie Charter charges the Seciirity
session '>lia11be comiiiuiiicated to the Members of the Council with the priiiiary responsibility for maiiitain-
Unitet, Na:ions simultaneously witll tlie comniuii~catioi, ing international peace and seciirity,
suninionins the session."
5.Rule 19 is aiiieiide(l by adclinfi at the end tliereof Rcafisgitinq the iinportance of unanimity anlong the
the following: permanent nieiii1)ers of tlie Seciirity Cocincil on al1
problems whicli are liltely to threaten world peace,
". . .Duriii:: an emergcncy spccinl sc.;sion ac1dition:il
itenis concernirig the nintters dealt \vit11 iii resolution Rrcnlling General Assembly resoliition 190 (III)
377 A (V) may hc ntl~lrdto tlic agentla by a two-tliirrls entitled "Appeal to tlie Great Powers to renelv tlieir
niaioritp of tlic Meiiibers i~rcscnt aiid voting." eflorts to coinpose their differences and establisli a
6. Tlierc is added a iiew rule to pi-cccde rule 65 to read lastitig peace",
a5 follows:
Rrroiiliiirirds to the permanent meinbers of the
"Notwit1ist;iiidin~ tlie provisions of any otl~er rule Security Coiiricil tliat :
and unless the General hsseni1)ly decides otherwise,
the Assc:iibly, iiicase of an ciiicrgency special sessioii, (a) They nieet ancl discuss, collectively or otherwise,
slinll conveiie in plen:iry scssion oiily and proceed di- and, if necessary, witli other States concerne<l, a11
rectly to consider tlic item ~iroposetl for coti;ideration probleiiis wliicli are likely to threaten international
in thc reqiicst for tlic lioltiing of tlic session, witiiout peace aiicl Iiaiiil~cr the activities of tlic United Nntioris,
prcviouz rcfcrciiec tn tlic Gcnernl Coiiimittee or to any \vit11 a view to tlieir resolving fiiiidanieiital rliffcrcilces
other Ccniiiiittee: the Prcsitlciit and Vice-Presirlents and reaching agreement in acccrdance with the spirit
for iucli cmcrgcncy specinl sescions shall I>e. reiliec- and letter of tlie Charter;
tively, thc.Chairnian of tliosr drlcgations from whicb
werc elected the Prcsitlciit and Vice-Presidents of the (II) Tliey advise the General Assenibly and, when
prcvious sessioii." it is not in session, [lie hleinbers of tlie United Nations,
as soon as appropriate, of tlie results of tlicir con-
sultatioiis.
302tzd plenary nrcctinq,
3 Novc~iiBer 19.50.
For the purpose of maintaining international peace
and seciirity, in accordance with the Charter of tlie 378 (V). Duties of States in the eveni of the
United Nations, and, in pnrticular, with Ctiapters V, outbreak of Iiostilities
VI and VI1 of tlie Charter,
The Gerzcrnl Asscntbly
Recona~rrends to the Sec~irity Council :
Rrafirnziiig tlie I'rinciples eiii1)odied in the Charter,
That it slioiild talie the neccssary steps to ensiire wliicli rcrluirç tlint tlie force of arms slinll not I>e re-
that the action provi<led for iindcr tlie C1i:irter is talicii sortcrtl to esccpt in the coniniori iriterest, aiid slinll riot
with respect to tlireats to the l~eace. I>rcachcs of tlie be irsed ag:iiiist the territoriaintegrity or political inde-
peace or acts of aggression and witli respect to tlie pçn[lence of aily State,
peacefiil scttlcnient of disptites or sitriations likely to ni,.siririq to create a fiirther obstacle to the oiitl>rcak
endari~er the niainter~arice of international peace aiid oI war, e\wi after hostilities have started, and to facili-
security ; t:ite the ces:;ation of [lie Iiostilities 11ytlie action of tlie
That it diould devise measiires for the earlicst al>- ~);ir~irs tliciii~clves. tliiis contribiitinto the peacciul
plication of Articles 43, 45. 4G and 47 of tlic Chnrter ~.ettlciiieiit of clispiites,
of the Unitecl Nations regarding the placiiig of arnicd
forces at the disposal of tlie S<rciiritu Cocriicil 1,y tlie
States Mcnll)crs of tlie United Nations and tlie effec- (a) Tliat if a State becomes engaged in armed con-
tive functioriing of the hlilitary Staff Comniittce ; flict with anotlier State or States, it take al1 stepsAnnex 23 United Nations
SecurityCouncil Provisional
Fifty-eighth year
4836th meeting
Sunday, 5 October 2003, 4.45p.m.
New York
President: Mr. Negroponte ...................................... (United States of America)
Mr. Gaspar Martins
Members: Angola ..........................................
Bulgaria ......................................... Mr. Tafrov
Cameroon ........................................ Mr. Belinga-Eboutou
Chile ........................................... Mr. Mufioz
China ........................................... Mr. Wang Guangya
France .......................................... Mr. De La Sablière
Germany ........................................ Mr. Pleuger
Guinea .......................................... Mr. Sow
Mexico .......................................... Mr. Aguilar Zinser
Pakistan ......................................... Mr. Akram
Russian Federation ................................. Mr. Gatilov
Spain ........................................... Mr. Arias
Syrian Arab Republic ............................... Mr. Mekdad
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ..... Sir Emyr Jones Parry
Agenda
Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Representativeof the Syrian Arab
Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council
(S/2003/939)
Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/943)
This record contains thetext of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of
speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council.ctions should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated inpy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the
delegation concerned to the ChiefVerbatim Reporting Service, room C-l54A.
03-54194(E)
- The meeting was called to order at 4.45 p.m "On behalf of the members of the League of
Arab States, 1 have the honour to request that the
Expression of thanks to the retiring President Security Council extend an invitation to His
Excellency Mr. Yahya Mahmassani, Permanent
The President: As this is the first meeting of the Observer of the League of Arab States to the
Security Council for the month of October, 1 should United Nations, to address the Council under rule
like to take the opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of 39 of its provisional rules of procedure in the
the Council, to His Excellency Sir Emyr Jones Parry, course of the Council's consideration of the item
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to entitled 'Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the
the United Nations, for his service as President of the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab
Security Council for the month of September 2003. 1 Republic to the United Nations addressed to the
am sure 1 speak for al1 members of the Council in President of the Security Council'."
expressing deep appreciation to Sir Emyr Jones Parry
for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted That letter will be published as a document of the
the Council's business last month. Security Council under the symbol S/2003/941.
If I hear no objection, 1 shall take it that the
Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 to
Adoption of the agenda Mr. Yahya Mahmassani.
The agenda was adopted. Therebeing no objection, it is so decided.
The Security Council will now continue its
Letter dated 5 October2003 from the Permanent consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Council is meeting in response to the request contained
United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council (Sl20031939) in a letter dated 5 October from the Permanent
Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic addressed
to the President of the Security Council.
Letter dated 5 October 2003 from the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations 1 now give the floor to the representative of the
addressed to the President of the Security Council Syrian Arab Republic.
(S/2003/943) Mr. Mekdad (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in
The President: 1 should like to inform the Arabic): Allow me at the outset to express to you, Sir,
Council that I have received a letter from the our thanks for immediately convening this meeting at
representative of Israel in which he requests to be the request of the Syrian Arab Republic, Lebanon and
invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Group of Arab States.
the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual
As this is the first open meeting of the month, we
practice, 1propose, with the consent of the Council, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency
invite that representative to participate in the
discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance and wish you every success in your stewardship.
with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 We also thank Ambassador Sir Emyr Jones Parry,
of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, and
the members of his delegation for their leadership of
There being no objection, itis so decided. the Council last month.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Gillerman
Allow me to begin by reading out the text of the
(Israel) took a seat at the Council table. letter addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
-
The President: 1 should also like to inform the the Syrian Arab Republic to the Secretary-General of
Council that 1 have received a letter dated 5 October the United Nations and the President of the Security
2003 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Council. The letter has not yet been officially
Arab Republic to the United Nations, which reads as translated. Following my reading of the letter, 1 shall
follows: make my official statement on the item on the agenda. "1 wish to advise you that the lsraeli air 1shall now make my statement on the item on the
force, on the morning of Sunday, 5 October, Council's agenda. Permit me, Mr. President, to thank
violated the Lebanese and Syrian airspaces and
you for convening this emergency meeting of the
committed an act of aggression by launching Security Council, in response to the request of the
guided missiles inside the territory of the Syrian Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, to discuss
Arab Republic. The target was a civilian site in the flagrant Israeli military aggression within the
the village of Ein Saheb, north-west of the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, targeting a
capital, Damascus. That act of aggression caused civilian site in the village of Ein Saheb north-west of
physical damage. Damascus and causing physical damage.
"The Government of the Syrian Arab Let me also express our satisfaction at the
Republic informs the Council of this flagrant statement issued by Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
violation of Lebanese and Syrian air space and of strongly deploring this act of aggression and
this aggression against the territory of the Syrian expressing concern at the potential escalation of an
Arab Republic in open defiance of the United already tense and difficult situation in theeg-on.
Nations Charter and the norrns of international
This unwarranted aggression - in flagrant
law, and constituting a serious new escalation; it violation of the Charter of the United Nations, of
requests an immediate meeting of the Security
Council to consider this Israeli aggression against international law and of the 1974 Disengagement
Agreement between Syria and Israel - is a clear
Syrian territory and to consider the measures that manifestation of an Israeli policy based on aggression
the Council must take to deter the Government of and lack of respect for agreements. This Israeli
Israel from pursuing its provocative policy of
aggression against Syria. aggression targeting a Syrian village is a true and
precise embodiment of Israeli terrorism, while Israel
"By its persistent aggression against the falsely claims to be fighting terrorism and standing
Palestinians and by deliberately provoking the against it. Moreover, this terrorist act of aggression
broadening of the scope of that aggression to provides further proof that the massacres committed by
include Syria and Lebanon, the present lsrael on the pretext of fighting so-called terrorism
Government of Israel is underscoring that it is a reflect a big lie and an irrational, foolish claim, al1used
Government of war, not a Government of peace. in an attempt to justify the policy of colonialism and
settlement-building in violation of al1 the principles of
"Syria is not incapable of establishing a peace and security on which the United Nations was
balance of resistance and deterrence that would
force Israel to reconsider its calculations. Syria founded, and running counter to the peace process that
has exercised maximum self-restraint, because it began at Madrid in 1991.
realizes that on many fronts lsrael is provoking The act of aggression that Israel committed
pretexts to export its current domestic crisis to the against Syria this morning is part of a strategic policy
rest of the region, which would thus be exposed adopted by the Israeli Government in order to escalate
to further escalation and volatility. tension in the Middle East, at a time when the
"Syria, which is at present a member of the international community is pursuing efforts towards a
comprehensive, just peace in the Middle East that
Security Council, believes that the Council is the would ensure peace and stability for al1 the peoples of
most appropriate forum to address, condemn and
halt this dangerous development, with a view to the region.
-
preventing a repetition of such acts; this It has become abundantly clear to the entire world
development poses a threat to international peace that it is beyond belief that Syria - which has
and security and exposesthe already deteriorating respected and complied with the mission of the United
situation in the region to dire consequences that Nations Disengagement Observer Force since 1974, as
could spiral out of control." al1 the sponsors of the peace process and other world
leaders can attest - or the powerless Palestinians -
That letter was signed by the Minister for Foreign who lack weapons and who are languishing under
Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Israeli occupation and harsh oppression - could take any action posing a threat to anyone, especially as it is Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which seek to
common knowledge that the Palestinian people lack an achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle
army and a military arsenal anything like those East, are contested, misinterpreted and distorted by
possessed by Israel. Israel.
For us, the question that comes immediately to On this basis, it is only logical that ail Member
mind is how Israel can persuade the entire world that it States, with the exception of Israel - which has
is a victim at a time when it forcibly occupies the become a symbol of defiance of the United Nations and
territory of others, lays siege to them, demolishes their its resolutions - should debate international legality
homes, uproots their crops and murders their children and the implementation of Security Council
rather than joining them at the negotiating table to resolutions. The current Government of Israel, through
ensure the implementation of the legitimate rights of its continued aggression against the Palestinians and its
al1 sides, in conformity with the Charter of the United
broadening of the scope of that aggression to include
Nations and the norms of international law. Syria and Lebanon, confirms de facto that it is a
Government of war and not a Government of peace.
This flagrant lsraeli aggression is no isolated
incident. In fact, it was preceded by another Israeli 1 wish to stress and reiterate here in the Security
violation, committed - without justification or Council the contents of the letter addressed by the
provocation - on 2 January 2003 in the demilitarized Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syria to this Council, in
zone, which resulted in the death of a Syrian soldier. which he emphasized that Syria is not incapable of
The UNDOF report on this incident, following an establishing a balance of resistance and deterrence that
extensive investigation, found that there was no would force Israel to revise its calculations. Syria has
justification for the crime and that Syria had exercised exercised maximum self-restraint because it recognizes
maximum restraint, which averted an escalation of the that Israel is creating opportune pretexts with a view to
situation at that point. exporting its current domestic crisis to the entire
region, thus exposing it to further escalation and
It is strange that Israel should continue to violate
international agreements and to flout the Charter of the volatility.
United Nations, to the point where Arabs and many Syria has come to the very heart of the house of
other people around the world have come to believe legality, right here in the Security Council - which
that Israel sees itself as above international law and as represents the hopes and aspirations of millions of
acting beyond the jurisdiction of the resolutions Syrians and Arabs and the concerns of many millions
adopted by the Security Council. more throughout the world who uphold the principles
It is very strange indeed that the lsraeli of international law - in order to condemn this act of
aggression, which has no justification whatsoever, and
Government, after several decades of occupation, to demonstrate once again to the entire world and from
bloodshed and the flouting of international law, does
not recognize that the path to peace lies in Israel's this forum our adherence to the United Nations system
implementation of relevant Security Council and its resolutions. In this regard, Syria has officially
submitted the text of a draft resolution that responds to
resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. AI1 those the challenges before us, in accordance with the
resolutions remain unimplemented and unrespected by
Israel. principles of the United Nations Charter. 1would stress
that the draft resolution on the table reflects the
Nonetheless, it is important to place on record positions usually adopted by the Security Council in
that Israel's past performance with regard to its respect the face of similar acts of aggression and threats.
for international law and the resolutions of the United We are fully confident that al1 members of the
Nations is not in the least honourable. lsrael has defied
the United Nations and its resolutions from 1948 to Council will respond forthwith and stand up to this
today. General Assembly resolution 181 (11) on the lsraeli challenge in the context of their ongoing efforts
to address any threat to international peace and
Palestinian State has been dead letter since its security. Will the Council meet this new challenge? We
adoption. Resolution 194 (111) on the return of
Palestinian refugees has not been impiemented except are very hopeful that it will.
-
insofar as Israel has challenged and denied it. The President: 1 give the floor to the 18 Israelis; the bombing of a commuter bus on 21
representative of Israel. October 2002, which killed 14 Israelis; the attack on a
shopping maIl in the lsraeli town of Afula on 19 May
Mr. Gillerman (Israel): First, let me congratulate
you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the 2003, in which three civilians were killed and over 70
wounded; and the attack on 30 March 2003, in which a
Security Council. Let me also express to you my regret suicide bomber detonated his explosives at a café in
that your first meeting should be of this nature and take
place on this day. Netanya, wounding 58 civilians.
The encouragement, safe harbour, training
1wish also to express to Sir Emyr Jones Parry my
great appreciation for his able and fair stewardship of facilities, funding and logistical support offered by
Syria to a variety of notorious terrorist organizations is
the SecurityCouncil last month. a matter of public knowledge. Among the many
This meeting of the Security Council is being terrorists group that operate and benefit from the
convened within hours of Yom Kippur, the Day of auspices of the Syrian dictatorship are Islamic Jihad,
Atonement, which is the holiest day of the Jewish Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Popular Front for the
calendar. 1 deeply regret that the Council could not Liberation of Palestine. It is well known that the
meet after this most important religious day so as to Secretary General of Islamic Jihad, Ramadan Abdallah
allow Israel to participate fully in the debate. 1 will, Shallah, is one of several terrorist leaders who operate
unfortunately, have to leave this meeting after 1 make freely in Damascus and receive immunity and support
my statement in order to observethis holy day. from the Assad regime.
Yesterday, a Palestinian suicide bomber entered a Allow me to briefly detail, for the benefit of
crowded beachfront restaurant in the port city of Haifa, Council, the extent of support that Syria, as well as the
murdering 19 innocent civilians and wounding at least regime in Iran, afford to terrorist organizations such as
60 others. The restaurant - a symbol of Arab-lsraeli Islamic Jihad, which are engaged in the deliberate
coexistence, as is the city of Haifa - was frequented massacre of innocent civilians.
by Jewish and Arab citizens of lsrael alike, and among Safe harbour and training facilities are provided
the victims were four Israeli Arabs, three children and throughout Syria for terrorist organizations such as
a little baby girl. Five victims were members of the
same family and three were members of another family. lslamic Jihad, Hamas and Hizbollah, both in separate
facilities and in Syrian army bases. The Ein Saheb
Whole families were wiped out by that horrendous act, base, which was targeted in Israel's measured defensive
taking place on the Jewish sabbath on a quiet, peaceful
beachfront in the city of Haifa. operation today, is just one of those facilities sponsored
by Syria and Iran. Recruits at camps such as Ein Saheb
Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization that come from Islamic Jihad, Hamas and other terrorist
operates freely from Palestinian Authority territory and groups. They are taught how to assemble bombs,
has headquarters in Damascus, Syria, proudly claimed conduct kidnapping, prepare suicide belts, gather
responsibility for this massacre. Islamic Jihad is an intelligence and establish terrorist cells. Some have
organization committed to the destruction of lsrael also received aviation instruction. Recruits training at
through holy war and which engages in the deliberate those camps are slated to return to Palestinian
and widespread murder of innocents to that end. It Authority territory and other areas to set up cells and
opposes moderate Arab Governments and actively conduct terrorist operations.
supports terrorist attacks against Western targets. There
could not be a more obvious example of a terrorist Syria has itself facilitated and directed acts of
terrorism by coordination and briefings via phone and
organization. Internet and by calling activists to Damascus for
The massacre in Haifa is the latest of over 40 consultations and briefings. Three such operatives -
terrorist atrocities committed by Islamic Jihad in the Tarek Az Aldin, Ali Saffuri and Taabat Mardawi -
past few years. Among the attacks perpetrated by that have been identified under investigation as specifically
organization were the massacre of 21 teenagers at a designated liaisons for relaying instructions between
discotheque in Tel Aviv on 2 June 2001; the bombing officials in Damascus and terrorist cells in the West
of 5 June 2002 at the Meggido Junction, which killed Bank and Gaza. Mr. Mardawi himself has admitted involvement in many attacks, including a bus bombing of conferences in which senior terrorist operatives from
in Haifa in May 2001, a suicide attack at a restaurant in Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other organizations meet.
Kiryat Motzkin in August of that year and an attack on
Syria has facilitated the transfer of arms to
a bus near Nazareth in March 2002. Palestinian terrorist organizations such as Islamic Jihad
Another example comes from an intelligence by allowing the transfer of sophisticated weapons from
report provided by the Head of the Palestinian Iran to Hizbollah through Syrian territory. Hizbollah,
Preventative Security Apparatus on 31 October 2001, itself a vicious terrorist organization, hthen sought to
which asserts that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbollah smuggle those arms to Palestinian terrorist groups, as
were meeting in Damascus "in order to increase their was evidenced in the Karine A arms shipment and
joint acitivity ...with the aid of Iranian money". similar incidents.
Instructions are also given to halt terrorist activity
when it suits Syrian or Iranian interests to avoid the These are just a few examples of the extent and
nature of the involvement of the Syrian regime in the
spotlight, such as following the terrorist attacks of 11 deliberate murder of innocent civilians. Each and every
September in the United States. It is very strange that
Syria decided to be in the spotlight today and actually one of these acts constitutes a grave violation of
international law and Security Council resolutions, as
put itself in the dock on this very day, after these well as a threat to international peace and security.
actions. There are few better exhibits of State sponsorship of
Iran, through the use of the Syrian and Palestinian terrorism than the one provided by the Syrian regime.
banking systems, sustains a systematic money transfer
system, and large sums of money have been transferred Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), adopted
to Islamic Jihad as well as other terrorists organizations under Chapter VI1 of the Charter - which in act of the
highest hypocrisy Syria itself voted for - makes
through Damascus for the planning and perpetration of absolutely clear that States must prevent acts of
attacks. Mr. Shallah himself, the Secretary-General of
Islamic Jihad, is known to have transferred funds in the terrorism and refrain from any form of fïnancing,
hundreds of thousands of dollars from Damascus to the support, safe harbour for or toleration of terrorist
groups. Syrian complicity in and responsibility for
individual accounts of Islamic Jihad operatives such as suicide bombings are as blatant as they are repugnant.
Bassani ak-Saadi, who is responsible for Islamic Jihad
fïnancing in Jenin. The membership of this arch-sponsor of terrorism in
the Council is an unbearable contradiction and an
Syria uses its State-run media and official embarrassment to the United Nations. For Syria to ask
institutions to glorify and encourage suicide bombings for a Council debate is comparable only to the Taliban
against civilians in restaurants, schools, commuter calling for such a debate. It would be laughable, if it
buses and shopping malls. To mention but a few was not so sad.
examples, Radio Damascus - far from being a free
And yet, members of the Council and the United
radio - in a broadcast on 9 May 2002 lauded "the Nations can hardly be surprised at this shameless act of
wonderful and special suicide attacks which were hypocrisy by the Syrian regime. This is the same
executed by some of the sons of the Palestinian
nation". In another State-run announcement on 1 regime that speaks so often of occupation while it
brutally occupies the neighbouring territory of
January 2002, Damascus Radio declared "The entire Lebanon. It is the same regime that speaks of
world knows that Syria, its political leadership and its international law and human rights while it subjugates
Arab people ..have turned Syrian Arab soi1 into a
training camp, a safe haven and an arms depot for the itspeople under a repressive and primitive dictatorship,
violating countless international obligations. It is the
Palestinian revolutionaries." And on 13 May 2002, same regime that supported the Saddam Hussain
President Bashar Assad himself announced in reference regime in Iraq in violation of Security Council
to so-called acts of resistance "If 1was not President of
Syria 1 wouldn't hesitate to participate in them." This resolutions and that to this day facilitates the
infiltration of terrorists to attack civilian and military
was not said by Osama bin Laden or by Saddam targets in lraqi territory. And it is this same despotic
Hussain, but by a President of a State that is a member
of this Council. Syria has also played host to a number regime that speaks so freely of double standards at the
United Nations. Syria would do well to take a hard look at the mirror and count itself fortunate that it has For the sake of peace and the reputation of the Council,
not yet, for unfortunate reasons, been the subject of let there be no such double standard today.
concerted international action as part of the global
campaign against terrorism - not yet. In the face of the rejectionism, aggression and
terrorist sponsorship of the Syrian regime, together
The Syrian delegate speaks a great deal about so- with Iran and the Palestinian Authority, what would the
called resistance. Perhaps he can tell us precisely, international community have us do? Like any State
without his familiar diplomatic word games and faced with such a critical and prolonged threat, lsrael
misrepresentations, how exactly the murder of children must exercise its inherent right and obligation to
and babies in a restaurant is an act of legitimate defend its citizens. What can we tell the Arab and
resistance. Or perhaps he could tell us how the Syrians lsraeli mothers of children murdered in this weekend's
themselves have dealt with resistance, such as in the attack in Haifa? Should we Say, "We could have
case of Hama, in which some 10,000 Syrian civilians prevented the death of your son or daughter. We could
were murdered by the Syrian armed forces. have stopped a terrorist from walking into your town,
your school, your home, your bedroom - but our
Israel's measured defensive response to the
horrific suicide bombings against a terrorist training hands were tied"? lsrael remains committed to a
peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict and is
facility in Syria is a clear act of self-defence in ready to make painful compromises to that end. But no
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. Those peace can come while terrorism prospers. No
actions come after lsrael has exercised tremendous
restraint despite countless acts of terrorism that have negotiations can bring progress, while our citizens die
on the streets.
claimed hundreds of innocent lives, for which Syria
bears direct and criminal responsibility. It comes after Today, on the very eve of the Day of Atonement
Israel and the international community as a whole have and the thirtieth anniversary of the Egyptian-Syrian
repeatedly called on Syria to end its support of aggression that initiated the Yom Kippur War, we cal1
terrorism and finally comply with international law. on members of the Council to come to the aid of the
And it is designed to prevent further armed attacks victims of terrorism, not of its sponsors. Syriaeserves
against Israeli civilians in which Syria is complicit, no support for its complicity in murder, and the
with a view to encouraging Syria to resolve its dispute Council would commit an unforgivable act of moral
through bilateral negotiations in accordance with blindness were it to act otherwise. The time has come
Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 for the Council, which adopted resolution 1373 (2002),
(1973), as it is legally required to do. This is not a and which has been at the forefront of the global
hypothetical question. Many States members of the counter-terrorism campaign, to hold to account a brutal
Organization and of the Council have been faced with dictatorship that is world-renowned for adopting
terrorism of far less intensity and have responded with terrorism as its primary tool. The world is watching.
far less restraint and far less concern for human life. And today, more than on any other day, God is
And yet the Security Council has not seen fit to watching too.
scrutinize their conduct. Indeed, on certain occasions The President: 1should like to inform the Council
the Council has specifically endorsed such defensive that 1 have received letters from the representatives of
measures.
Algeria, Bahrain, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, the Islamic
If there is a double standard in this Organization, Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, the Libyan
it is that while some States are afforded the right to Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
protect their citizens, Israel too often is sent the Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates
message that its citizens are not worthy of protection. and Yemen in which they request to be invited to
If there is a double standard, it is that some States are participate in the discussion of the item on the
able to support terrorism with impunity, while those Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual
defending against it are called to account. If there is a practice, 1propose, with the consent of the Council, to
double standard, it is Syria sitting at the Council table invite those representatives to participate in the
and raising one hand to vote against terror and the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance
other to perpetrate and initiate terror around the world. with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37
of the Council's provisional rules of procedure. There being no objection, it is so decided. Parry, Permanent Representative of the United
Kingdom, for a successful presidency last month.
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Baali
(Algeria), Mr. Almansoor (Bahrain), Mr. The Security Council has been established to
Rodriguez Parrilla (Cuba), Mr. Olhaye defend a world order based on the principles and
(Djibouti), Mr. Abou1 Gheit (Egypt), Mr. Zarif purposes of the Charter. Our Charter prescribes strict
(Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Al-Hussein rules for the use of force by Member States, and this is
(Jordan), Mr. Al-Otaibi (Kuwait), Mr. Kronfol envisaged in two circumstances only. The first is in
(Lebanon), Mr. El-Treki (Libyan Arab exercise of the right of self-defence against a direct act
Jamahiriya), Mr. Bennouna (Morocco), Mr. Al- of aggression or use of force; the second is the
Sameen (Oman), Mr. Al-Nasser (Qatar), Mr. collective use of forceunder Article 42 of the Charter,
Shobokshi (Saudi Arabia), Mr. Hashi (Somalia), with the explicit authorization of the Security Council.
Mr. Erwa (Sudan), Mr. Hachami (Tunisia), Mr.
Al-Shamsi (United Arab Emirates) and Mr. The attack perpetrated by Israel against the
territory of the Syrian Arab Republic on 5 October did
Alsaidi (Yemen) took the seats reserved for them not meet these strict requirements set out in the Charter
ut the side of the Council Chamber. with regard to the use of force. This was an arbitrary
The President: 1 should also like to inform the attack, and in legal and political terms it is clearly a
Council that 1 have received a letter dated 5 October violation of the Charter. It is also a violation of the
2003 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the several resolutions that the Security Council has
United Nations, which will be issued as document adopted on the issue of the Middle East - resolutions
S/2003/942, and which reads as follows: 242 (1967), and 338 (1973), 350 (1974), 1397 (2002)
and others.
"1 have the honour to request that, in
accordance with its previous practice, the We welcome the fact that the Government of
Security Council invite the Permanent Observer Syria, instead of retaliating against this wanton attack
of Palestine to the United Nations to participate on its territory, has chosen to approach the Security
in the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council for redress. The Security Council must
Council to be held today, 5 October 2003, commend Syria's self-restraint and condemn the Israeli
regarding the letter dated 5 October 2003 from attack against Syria's territory.
the Syrian Arab Republic addressed to the
A few weeks ago, the Secretary-General warned
President of the Security Council." Member States about the danger of the misuse of the
1 propose, with the consent of the Council, to "Tmword - namely, terrorism - for actions by States
invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to designed to suppress peoples and to achieve their own
participate in the current debate, in accordance with the partisan objectives. We believe that the response of
rules of procedure andprevious practice in this regard. Israel in this case is one such example of the
exploitation ofthe campaign against terrorism for other
There being no objection, it is so decided.
purposes. The problems that lsrael faces are problems
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Al-Kidwa that arise from its illegal occupation of Palestinian and
(Palestine), took the seat reserved for him at the other Arab territories. The answer to individual acts of
side of the Council Chamber. terrorism is not State terrorism, nor is it wanton attacks
Mr. Akram (Pakistan): As this is the first formal against other countries, in violation of international law
and the Charter of the United Nations. State power
meeting of the Security Council for this month, may 1 must distinguish between acts of terrorism and the
take this opportunity to extend to you, Sir, the warm legitimate struggle of peoples under foreign occupation
felicitations of the delegation of Pakistan on your
assumution of the uresidency of the Council for the for self-determination and liberation.
current month. We will extend our full cooperation to Pakistan has officially condemned Israel's attack
you to ensure the success of your presidency. against Syrian territory as a violation of international
law. We urge the Council to speedily adopt a decision
1 would also like to express my delegation's to condemn that military aggression and to uphold the
congratulations and admiration to Sir Emyr Jonessovereignty and territorial integrityof the Syrian Arab Sir Emyr Jones Parry (United Kingdom of
Republic. Great Britain and Northern Ireland): 1would like to use
this occasion to offer you every best wish for your
Mr. Arias (Spain) (spoke in Spanish): Today's
meeting is taking place due to certain events of grave presidency, Mr. President, as well as to affirm the
concern to us. The situation in the Middle East during United Kingdom's commitment to offer you every
support.
recent weeks has obligated us to cal1 for prudence and
restraint. Any act that will unleash a spiral of violence This is the first meeting since the Haifa bombing,
must be rejected. In that context, we would like firmly so 1 must begin by condemning strongly the actions
to condemn yesterday's attack in Haifa, which we that took place yesterday, and to express our
believe was completely odious and reprehensible, condolencesto the families of those killed and maimed.
regardless of the date on which it was committed. 1note that Islamic Jihad has claimed responsibility for
However, that cannot cause us to overlook or minimize that action.
the extreme gravity of the attack perpetrated against
Let me be clear that Israel's action today is
Syria today. That attack is clearly a patent violation of unacceptable and represents an escalation. Israel
international law. Accordingly, it is something we
believe to be worthy of condemnation. 1 should also should not allow its justified anger at continuing
like to appeal for moderation to be exercised in the terrorism to lead to actions that undermine both the
peace process and, we believe, Israel's own interests.
Middle East. The parties should also understand that But we have to recognize that terrorists are continuing
reprisals only lead to a dire aggravation of the
situation. to attack Israel and that they are being permitted to do
so. There is a heavy responsibility on al1 those who are
Mr. Wang Guangya (China) (spoke in Chinese): in a position to act against terrorism to do so. That has
First of all, please allow me to congratulate you, Mr. been affirmed by the Security Council many times, and
President, on your assumption of the presidency of the perhaps most clearly in resolution 1373(2001).
Security Council for the month of October. China will Allowing impunity to those committed to using
fully cooperate with you in order to carry out the
Council's work this month. 1 would also like to thank terror as a political instrument serves only to
undermine peace and to prevent progress in the Middle
Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the Permanent Representative of East peace process. The United Kingdom believes that
the United Kingdom, for successfully presiding over lasting security can only be assured by a successful
the work of the Council during September.
peace process, as was stressed at the conclusion of the
China is gravely concerned about the latest Quartet meeting held here in New York on 25
developments in the Middle East situation. We strongly September. We believe that al1 sides should exercise
condemn the suicide bombing of 4 October, which restraint and now reinforce their efforts to implement
resulted in many innocent civilian casualties. We the road map. In the next day, the Security Council
oppose any measures that may threaten the peace should do al1it can to help bring that about. We will al1
process between Israel and Palestine. We strongly urge have to reflect carefully on the best message we can
both sides to cease acts of violence and any other acts now send in order that we reinforce the prospects of the
that may exacerbate tensions. We hope that they will road map, and do so at a precarious moment in the
return to the proper track of settling disputes through Middle East.
negotiation as soon as possible.
Mr. Gatilov (Russian Federation) (spoke in
We also condemn Israel's air attack against Syria. Russian): Since this is our first statement in the
Israel's action is a violation of the norms of Council this month, we should like to join other
international law. We are deeply concerned about the delegations in wishing you success, Sir, in your
negative effect of that action on the situation in the presidency of the Council.
Middle East. We cal1 on al1 parties to exercise
maximum restraint in order to avoid any actions that We also thank the Ambassador Jones Parry of the
United Kingdom for his very skilful conduct of the
may lead to further aggravating tensions in the overall Council's work in September.
situation in the Middle East. The course of events in the Middle East is of and that killed 19 people and injured many more. Our
growing concern and alarm. Following the large-scale condolences go to the bereaved families of the victims.
terrorist act in Haifa, the lsraeli air force, for the firstThese acts of terrorism have to be stopped and whoever
time in many years, sent missile strikes against Syrian can exercise influence to that effect should do so.
territory near Damascus, targeting what Israel claimed
to be a training camp for the extremist organization We are very concerned about the deteriorating
situation in the Middle East. We feel that we have to
lslamic Jihad. It left open the possibility of other break the vicious circle of violence and counter-
attacks against terrorists wherever they may be. violence. De-escalation, we feel, is possible only by a
It is very clear that such acts lead to increased return to implementing the road map as proposed by
confrontation in the Middle East, are fraught with peril theQuartet. There is no alternative to the road map for
for other countries and could trigger even more finding a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
dramatic consequences, both for the very tense and for creating peace and stability in the Middle East.
situation in theregion and for international security as Mr. De La Sablière (France) (spoke in French):
a whole. Russia urges al1parties to the conflict to show
maximum restraint and to act in a balanced and Since this is the first time I am taking the floor this
month, like my colleagues who have spoken before me
responsible way so as to avert any further escalation in 1 should like to wish you great success, Sir, in your
the spiral of violence and to prevent regional duties.
destabilization, the tragic results of which would be
difficult to foresee. 1also thank Ambassador Jones Parry for the way
The ongoing escalation of violence in the Middle in which he conducted our work last month.
East requires more energetic action on the part of the We are deeply concemed by the deterioration of
international community in order to prevent an even the situation and the serious danger of rising tension.
more dangerous aggravation of the situation. It is We condemn violence from wherever it may come. It is
important now to press the parties to the conflict to halt unacceptable and politically ineffective, kills innocent
the confrontation as soon as possible and to restore the
people, obscures the political horizon and can only
political process, the final goal of which is a aggravate the crisis.
comprehensive settlement in the region. To that end,
what we need above al1 is to unblock the way forward The Israeli operation today that targeted a site
near Damascus is a grim business and an unacceptable
on the road map, to which there is no alternative in violation of international law and the rules of
finding a solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. The sovereignty. In a Middle East situation that has already
Palestinians and Israelis alike must resume their
dialogue and begin to carry out their obligations under been made precarious by such crises, it is the
responsibility of all, particularly of States in the region,
the road map. to refrain from increasing stability and tension. Any act
Mr. Pleuger (Germany): Like other delegations, of terrorism is unjustifiable and should be condemned.
mine would like to welcome you, Sir, in the presidency Having said that, the fight against terrorism to which
of the Security Council and to assure you of its support France is firmly committed must be undertaken in the
this month. context of respect for international law. That is
1 would also like to thank Ambassador Jones essential.
Parry for the very effective and elegant way in which 1stress once again that the situation in the Middle
he did his job as President of the Council lastmonth. East is most alarming. In such difficult circumstances,
we appeal to al1 parties - particularly the Israelis,
As the German Chancellor said after a meeting Palestinians and Syrians - to allow reason to prevail
with President Mubarak, the action against Syria is not
acceptable. The German Government feels that a over the threat of escalation. There can be no lasting
violation of the sovereignty of a neighbouring State security without peace. Peace can prevail only through
negotiation, not by the force of arms. It is essential that
does not facilitate peace and stability in the region and the opportunity for a comprehensive, just and lasting
that such action makes the Middle East conflict even
more complicated. We, like other delegations, also settlement be sought in accordance with the relevant
Security Council resolutions. The road map, which
condemn the suicide bombing that occurred in Haifa contains Syrian and Lebanese tracks, must be given a denounce and condemn al1 acts of terrorism, whatever
chance. their origin. We reject any attempt to justify such acts.
Mr. Tafrov (Bulgaria) (spoke in French): 1 should Suicide attacks followed by the destruction of
like to extend my delegation's congratulations to you, civilian homes, air strikes and further acts of terror
Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the constitute a vicious circle of violence that must stop.
Security Council and to assure you of our full We appeal to both Syria and Israel to be prudent. We
cooperation. cal1 on them to exercise al1 due restraint in order to
avoid the taking of even graver decisions that would
1 should also like to thank Ambassador Jones
Parry for his skilful presidency last month. escalate the violence.
Bulgaria categorically condemns the terrorist act The international community views with alarm
carried out yesterday in Haifa, as we always do on such these developments and their impact on the peace
process and the road map on which the Quartet is
occasions. It is important for al1those who make such seeking to make progress for the benefit of the
acts possible to do their utmost to end them by ceasing
al1 material and moral support to them. The murder of majority, who, we believe, seek peace and coexistence
an innocent child is particularly repugnant. among Israel, Palestine, Syria and al1 other neighbours
in the region.
Bulgaria believes that Israel's armed action
Mr. Aguilar Zinser (Mexico) (spoke in Spanish):
against the Syrian Arab Republic is not in accordance Like the Permanent Representative of Chile, 1 am
with the Charter of the United Nations or with sorry, Sir, that this should be the first Security Council
international law. Like other delegations, we consider it
to have been an unacceptable act. The only resolution meeting for the month of October, at which we express
our pleasure at seeing you assume the Council
of the Middle East crisis - which has of late grown presidency. Yet we express to you our confidence and
more serious - lies in the implementation of the road
map devised by the Quartet, as the Quartet itself noted support. Further, our thanks go to Ambassador Emyr
in its statement following its most recent meeting in Jones Parry of the United Kingdom. He had just joined
the Council, but he conducted Our work most
New York. effectively, wisely and prudently.
Mr. Muiïoz (Chile) (spoke in Spanish): We might Let me begin by conveying my country's
have preferred a different meeting of the Security
Council to congratulate you, Ambassador Negroponte, condolences to the families of those who lost their lives
on your assumption of the presidency, to offer you our in the suicide bombing that took place yesterday in a
seaside restaurant in Haifa. Nothing can justify such an
best wishes and to assure you of our cooperation, as attack against innocent civilians. It was yet another
well as to thank Ambassador Jones Parry for his
excellent work during the month of September. expression of extremism that contributed nothing to
furtherin- the Palestinian cause. And yet a-ain the
Events in the Middle East in recent hours prompt Council is obliged to condemn such acts and appeal to
Chile to make the following statement. First of all, we the Palestinian Authority genuinely to work to combat
condemn the Israeli air force bombing on Syrian and prevent such attacks.
territory, which is an outrage against international law The reprisals taken by Israel in consequence of
and the principles and purposes of the United Nations
Charter. Such conduct is unacceptable and dangerous, that attack are equally reprehensible. Israel gains
nothing by such reprisals; they only contribute to the
because it can widen the conflict and pose additional spiral of violence of which Israel and its citizens are
threats to international peace and security in the Middle
East. the victims. The Israeli attack on Syrian territory was a
clear violation of the United Nations Charter; it was a
Similarly,Chile firmly and harshly condemns the grave act that endangers international peace and
repugnant terrorist attack in Haifa, which killed 19 security.
A -
innocent people and injured some 50 others. Such In that connection, my delegation notes with
violence against civilians can never be justified. Chile
has condemned in the past and will continue to optimism Syria's decision not to respond militarily to
the aggression. It is our expectation that, as this matter particularly, terrorism as a means of political and and security in the region- prospects that are already
diplomatic negotiation or of pressure to advance very weak. Cameroon has always condemned al1 acts
political views. We condemn terrorism in al1its forms, of terrorism. We believe that there can be no
including in the form of State terrorism. In that respect,justification for such acts and that no cause can
we have condemned the terrorist attacks committed on legitimize them. Similarly, Cameroon, which is
the eve of Yom Kippur in Haifa, which struck innocent resolutely committed to combating that scourge, is
lsraeli citizens. convinced that Our common struggle must be
Such blind violence can only damage the noble undertaken with full respect for fundamental human
rights and international law.
Palestinian cause, which my country has always
supported. The Israeli armed reprisa1 is a Faced with this dangerous escalation, we cal1 on
disproportionate reaction stemming from a political al1of the parties to demonstrate a great deal of restraint
will to destroy the peace efforts in the region of the at this extremely diffïcult and delicate time. We cal1 on
international Islamic community. We firmly condemn them to refrain from any initiative that might
this military attack, and we express Our concern at the exacerbate the situation. We cal1 on them to respect
attempt to illegally expand the zone of conflict and their commitments - contained both in the road map
destabilize the entire Middle East. and in earlier agreements. Finally, we cal1 on them to
My country commends the measured and very put an end to the cycle of violence in the Middle East
so as to facilitate a resumption of dialogue.
responsible reaction of the Syrian Government. In
promoting the path to dialogue and appealing to the We urgently appeal to the international
conscience of Security Council members, Syria is negotiators, in particular the Quartet, immediately to
setting an encouraging and laudable example. take actions aimed at the containment of the situation
We believe yet again that we must cal1 on the and to accelerate the taking of bold steps, which the
Secretary-General referred to on 26 September. Such
Israeli Government to show more self-restraint and bold steps, in keeping with the road map, should deal
moderation and comply with the relevant Security simultaneously with the fundamental needs of the two
Council resolutions. In that context, my delegation
fully supports the draft resolution submitted by Syria. parties, namely, security for Israel and an end to
occupation for Palestine.
That draft is moderate. and could be a ~ositive and
beneficial signal to the peoples of the Middle East and It goes without saying that if such measures are
the world. not taken we will run the risk, as the Secretary-General
warned us, of having to pay a heavy price. Recent
Mr. Belinga-Eboutou (Cameroon) (spoke in
French): First of all, 1 would like to congratulate you, events make clear the urgent need for what Cameroon
Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the terms comprehensive disarmament in the Middle
East- a disarmament policy aimed in particular at
Council during October and to assure you of my cultural disarmament, which would eradicate war
delegation's full cooperation. I would also like to
express our appreciation to the permanent psychosis and the violence in people's hearts and show
the various parties that their survival depends, not on
representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador the results of war, but on the outcome of negotiations.
Emyr Jones Parry, for his innovative presidency last
month. We have just received a copy of a draft
resolution. Immediately after the end of this public
We learned with consternation of the outbreak of
violence that has recurred in the Middle East over the meeting we will transmit it to Our capital and await
instructions.
past two days, which has been marked by the attack in
Haifa and the raids into Syrian territory. The President: 1 shall now make a statement in
my capacity as representative of the United States.
All of these acts are serious violations of the
terms of the Quartet's road map, of the ceasefire We cal1 on al1 sides to avoid heightening the
agreement of 1974 between Israel and Syria and of tension in the Middle East and to think carefully about
the consequences of their actions. We were notified this
international law. Such acts are dangerous because they
jeopardize the prospects for a speedy return to peace morning of the Israeli action in Syria last night, afterthe event. This morning, at 9 a.m., President Bush The Council of the Arab League held an
called lsraeli Prime Minister Sharon and conveyed our emergency meeting today at the level of permanent
condolences for the victims of Saturday's terrorist representative to consider the consequences of the
attack at a restaurant in Haifa, which claimed the lives repugnant lsraeli attack against Syrian territory. The
of 19 Israelis, including three children and five Israeli League considers that this attack constitutes an
Arabs, and wounded dozens more. The United States escalation that threatens international peace and
and the Government of Israel agreed that it is important security, as well as representing a deterioration in the
to avoid actions that could lead to a further heightening situation such that it could spin out of control and
of tension in the Middle East. involve the entire region in a cycle of violence. It calls
The United States believes that Syria is on the upon the United Nations to discharge its
responsibilities to preserve international peace and
wrong side of the war on terrorism. We have been clear security and to consider this question under Chapter
of the need for Syria to cease harbouring terrorist
groups. Specific directions for terrorist acts continue to VI1of the Charter.
be issued from terrorist groups based in Syria. During The Council of the Arab League denounces this
his visit to Damascus this year, Secretary of State Colin attack and considers that it is yet another flagrant
Powell told the Government of Syria that this was violation of the United Nations Charter and of the
unacceptable and intolerable. 1 myself made this point principles of international law. Israel is fully
to Syrian Foreign Minister Al-Shara' in June 2002 in responsible for al1 consequences that may result from
this Chamber. such aggression.
We believe that it is in Syria's interest and in the The Council reaffirms its support for and
broader interests of Middle East peace for Syria to stop solidarity with the Syrian Arab Republic and any
harbouring and supporting the groups that perpetrate measures that it may adopt in self-defence against such
terrorist acts such as the one that occurred in Haifa aggression. The Council calls upon the Security
yesterday. Council to prevent lsrael from continuing such
1 now resume my functions as President of the provocative acts. We cal1 for the cessation of State
terrorism and lsraeli measures against the Palestinian
Council. people, Syrian and Lebanon in order to ensure that the
As a measure to optimize the use of our time and entire region does not become inflamed and experience
in order to allow delegations to take the floor as even greater insecurity.
quickly as possible, 1 will not individually invite
speakers to take a seat at the Council or invite them to This attack reaffirms the aggressive nature of
Israel and the fact that the Israeli Government rejects
resume their seats at the side of the Council Chamber. any peace initiative. lsraeli aggression against Syria is
When a speaker is taking the floor, the Conference part and parce1 of Israeli policy to continue the
Officer will seat the next speaker on the list at the
table. occupation of the Syrian Golan and the other occupied
Arab territories. It confirms that Israel is not devotedto
1 thank representatives for their understanding a just and lasting peace throughout the Middle East. It
is lsraeli politics and its policy in continuing
and cooperation.
1now give the floor to the Permanent Observer of settlements and annexation of Arab territories.
the League of Arab States to the United Nations. This attack acerbates the situation. It will have a
serious fallout that will make any peaceful settlement
Mr. Mahmassani (spoke in Arabic): 1would like of the conflict impossible. 1 cal1 on the Security
at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your Council to discharge its duty and see what can be done
assumption of the presidency of the Security Council
for this month. 1am convinced that you will guide the now, because Israel works beyond the range of legality
as enshrined in al1 international resolutions. The
work of the Council with wisdom and skill. 1 would Security Council's double standards are enabling lsrael
also like to thank your predecessor, Sir Emyr Jones to continue to act outside international law, as if it
Parry, for his work at the helm of the Council last
month. enjoys total impunity. The Security Council has adopted 37 resolutions that Israel has not implemented. Syrian Arab Republic. On the same date, at noon,
lsrael has not implemented any of those resolutions. eight other Israeli military planes violated the
airspace in southern and northern Lebanon.
At the very heart of the Arab-lsraeli conflict we
find Israel's occupation of Arab territories. lsrael is "lt is to be noted that despite the repeated
trying to distract people from this truth. Israel is positions of the Secretary-General, and
presenting its acts as if they are a way to eliminate notwithstanding the announcements and warnings
terrorism. That is naïve. lsraeli occupation of Arab by his representative in Lebanon, the Israeli
territories is at the very heart of this problem. It will violations continue without any grounds or
remain unsolved until lsrael abides by international justifications.
legality and leaves those occupied Arab territories. "The most recent of those violations is the
Measures and punishments exacted by Israel against use of Lebanese airspace in order to commit an
the Palestinian people do not bring peace to the region;
they lead to violence and continuing deterioration of act of aggression against a sister neighbouring
State. That action consititutes a serious escalation
the situation. That situation can be solved only by of the situation and a new development in the
sitting around the negotiating table, and Israel must method of Israeli attacks.
implement the Security Council resolutions, the 2002
proposal from Beirut and the principle of land for "On this basis Lebanon requests that the
peace. Security Council meet immediately to examine
The President: 1now cal1on the Ambassador of these acts of aggression and to take proper
measures to deter Israel. Those violations,
Lebanon. especially the most recent, constitute blatant
Mr. Kronfol (Lebanon)(spoke in Arabic): Allow aggression against the Blue Line, which is
me first, Mr. President, to express to you my hope that sponsored by the United Nations in southern
your presidency of the Council this month will be Lebanon. They also endanger stability along that
successful in achieving peace and security in the whole line and represent Israel's intention to export its
world, especially in our region. Let me thank your current dilemmas in the occupied territories to
predecessor, the Permanent Representative of the other places.
United Kingdom, for his skilful presidency.
"As it draws the attention of this Council to
At the beginning 1 wish to state that my this grave situation, Lebanon is fully confident in
Government today addressed a letter to the President of the measures the Council will take to condemn
the Security Council and to the Secretary-General of Israel and to deter it from similar acts of
the United Nations in which it requested the convening aggression that would lead to dire consequences
of an immediate meeting of the Security Council to that would destabilize the current situation along
consider the violation by lsraeli military planes of the the Blue Line as well as seriously endanger peace
Lebanese airspace in order to strike a site inside the and stability in the region."
territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. Our That letter, dated 5 October 2003 from Beirut, is
understanding now is that the Secretariat is in the
process of translating that letter from Arabic so that it from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and
may be circulated to al1 members of the Council. 1 Minister for Expatriate Lebanese, Mr. Michael Smaha.
request that that fact be reflected in the official records Lebanon requested a meeting of the Security
of this meeting. Council due to Israel's excessive violations of
Lebanon's air space and of the Blue Line arrangements
1will now read the text of that letter: sponsored by the United Nations in southern Lebanon.
"His Excellency, the President of the Security Those actions led to an act aggression against a
Council, Ambassador John Negroponte: Member State of the United Nations and current
member of the Security Council, in addition to being
"We would like to advise you, Sir, that in an act of aggression against a sisterly State with whom
the morning of Sunday, 5 October 2003, lsraeli
military planes violated the airspace of Lebanon my country has the closest of relations.
in order to strike a site inside the territory of the The Charter of the United Nations and the norms Lebanon and Syria, it has missed the mark. These
of international law, which al1of us must respect, warn actions by Israel will further fuel the cycle of violence
against any act of aggression by any Member State in which that country will itself become trapped.
against another irrespective of the reason. They also Lebanon hopes that the international community
hold that a State should first resort to the Security will lay bare the true nature of these lsraeli practices,
Council to argue its case.
bring them to an end and strongly condemn them, just
The Government of Israel has no right to exploit as it should condemn those who order them and
the international campaign against terrorism as a implement them. Lebanon also hopes and expects that
the Security Council will condemn Israel's aggression
stalking horse to implement its policy against the
people whose lands it occupies. Mixing up the Haifa against another peaceful Syrian village, just as it
bombing with an action against Syria or linking it with condemned the lsraeli air force's attacks against many
the State terrorism practised by Israel is a peaceful villages and towns in Lebanon.
contravention of the norms of international law. No Given the current practices of the Israeli
crime can be justified by the commission of an even Government, which can only be described as reckless,
more serious crime.
and given its blind violence, the Security Council
Israel has al1 along rejected al1 forms of should not compromise al1 its peace efforts. More than
international advice. It has also completely disregarded ever before, the Council has a clear responsibility
the advice and warnings of the Secretary-General and today to rein in Israel's wholly illegitimate acts of
of his Representative in southern Lebanon. The danger aggression.
of these violations and the disregard for the United The President: 1 now give the floor to the
Nations remarks constitute flagrant acts of aggression
against peace and stability along the Blue Line, which representative of Algeria.
is a strategic line that representsthe strategic position Mr. Baali (Algeria) (spoke in French): I would
of Lebanon, Syria and the Arab Group to reach a just, first like to thank you, Mr. President, for having agreed
comprehensive and lasting peace in the region, as so promptly to the request of the Arab Group to hold
reflected in the Arab peace initiative adopted at the this open meeting to consider an event of extreme
Beirut Arab summit. gravity that has imperiled international peace and
Lebanon requests the Security Council to fully security just a few days after many world leaders came
to the United Nations to reaffirm their adherence to
meet its responsibilities and take the proper measures international law, the principles and objectives of the
to condemn Israel and deter it from committing acts of
aggression, violations and the constant threats that have Charter of the United Nations and the system of
become a daily routine against Lebanon. Israel is doing collective security embodied by the Security Council. 1
should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate
al1 those things without any real grounds or reasons, you, Mr. President, on your assumption of your duties
except to mislead lsraeli public opinion by fleeing to
the front and exporting its domestic crisis outside lsrael as President of the Council for the month of October. 1
and to give world public opinion the false impression also wish to congratulate the representative of the
United Kingdom for his outstanding performance as
that it is a victim of aggression. President of the Council last month.
The letters that my Govemment has repeatedly An exceptionally grave lsraeli act of aggression
addressed in the past to the Secretariat and to the has taken place today against a sovereign State and
Security Council constitute clear proof of the fact that
Israel's intentions are aggressive and not defensive. member of the Organization, the Syrian Arab Republic.
This is a prime example of a violation of the Charter of
Israel's violations of the relevant resolutions of the the United Nations, international law, the relevant
United Nations and of international agreements are the resolutions of the Security Council and the
cause of pain, anguish, misery, evil and turbulence
throughout the Middle East. The tactics pursued by disengagement agreement that has linked two countries
since 1974. This act of aggression is particularly
Israel to justify its presence in neighbouring countries serious given that it is taking place in an atmosphere of
are known to all. But if the Government of Israel wants
to send a message of terrorism and intimidation to extreme tension that is affecting a region made fragile The convening of this important meeting at this with the people of Syria, who remain committed
time to examine the situation in the Middle East is a to international legality. Egypt calls upon the
clear manifestation of the Security Council's international community to oppose this new act of
recognition of the grave developments that have taken aggression and to ensure that the situation in the
place in the our region that will endanger the peace Middle East does not deteriorate.
process and will lead to bloodshed.
"We condemn al1 acts of aggression
The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of perpetrated against civilians, including the attack
Jordan strongly condemns the aerial attack by lsrael carried out yesterday in Haifa."
this morning against the Syrian Arab Republic.
Israel's continuedprovocative and aggressive acts
International law in this regard is very clear. No against the Arab States of the region should cause the
party can act outside of the jurisdiction of Article 2, international community to use its powers in order to
paragraph 4 of the Charter, which prohibits the use of bring about lasting peace. The entire world understands
force except in two cases. The first case is if the use of that Israel must withdraw from al1 territories occupied
force is used under Article 51 of the Charter, which since 1967 and that an independent Palestinian State
reflects the principle of self-defence. However, the must be established, living side by side with Israel in
exercise of that right on the part of any State is peace and security. Such a settlement - on which
conditioned on a prior armed attack against it. The negotiations must resume immediately - would be
second case is if the Security Council authorizes the consistent with the principles of international law and
use of force under Chapter VI1 of the Charter. common sense, and would be in the interest of al1
Neither case applies in this matter. The peoples. Any delay in reaching such a settlement will
cause further civilian victims on both sides and will be
Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan calls a loss of precious time for people who seek prosperity
upon Israel to cease forthwith using force and any and development.
forms of violence, comply with international law and
respect the sovereignty of al1States of the region. Today, the international community has an
opportunity to reassert its engagement and to condemn
The President: l cal1 on the representative of
the adventurists, who will bring only suffering to the
E~YP~. peoples of the region. A firmposition must be taken
Mr. Aboul-Gheit (Egypt) (spoke in Arabic): The today for the sake of the tomorrow we wish to build
Security Council is meeting following the attack, together. Stern measures must be adopted today to
which means that the Council must now carry out its avert further years of suffering. A strong consensus
responsibilities, strongly condemn that act of will open the way for hope, and will convince the
aggression and take steps to ensure that it does not adventurists that they are harbouring illusions that only
perpetuate aggression. They will have to renounce the
recur.
1should like to read out a statement issued today desire to hold on to the territory of others. Peace must
reign.
in Cairo by our Minister for Foreign Affairs. That
statement reads as follows. Today the Israeli representative told the Council
that on this day 30 years ago Egypt and Syria attacked
"The international community is Israel. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of lsrael made
endeavouring to achieve a just and peaceful
settlement in the Middle East in the context of a similar statement today; he spoke of unprovoked
Egyptian-Syrian aggression. 1 cannot fail to recall that
peace and security for al1 peoples. At present, the Egyptian-Syrian military action across the Suez
Israel continues to escalate the situation and has Canal was legitimate and had the clear-cut goal of
even attacked Syrian territory. This inflames
tension and could broaden the sphere of violence regaining Egyptian territory in the Sinai at a time when
Israel was insisting on retaining the Sinai. Egypt's
and counter-violence. action was in full conformity with the United Nations
"The Arab Republic of Egypt condemns this Charter and with the right of self-defence. It took place
new act of aggression, which is part and parcel of within Egyptian territory and on Egyptian territory.
Israel'susual policies. It expresses its solidarity The President: 1 now give the floor to the norms of international law. In the course of this action
representative of Tunisia. against Syria, Israel also violated Lebanese air
space - which constitutes aggression against yet
Mr. Hachani (Tunisia) (spoke in Arabic): 1 another Arab country.
cong-atulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the
presidency for the month of October. My appreciation Today's action may be added to the long list of
goes to Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry for the way in acts of Israeli military aggression against many Arab
which he guided the work of the Council last month. countries, and confirms Israel's determination to use
My delegation thanks you, Mr. President, for having aggression and force and to violate international law.
responded so quickly to the request to convene this We vigorously deplore and condemn this most recent
meeting to discuss recent events in the Middle East. Israeli aggression against Syria and cal1 upon the
Tunisia learned with grave concern of Israel's act Security Council to join in vigorously condemning it.
We cal1 upon the Council to demand that Israel cease
of aggression against fraternal Syria. We condemn that such acts of aggression and such violations of
act of aggression and stand in solidarity with Syria. We
believe it threatens a serious escalation and violates international law, as set out in the Arab draft resolution
international law. It poses a threat to regional security that has been placed before the Council.
and constitutes a violation of resolution-338 (1973). it The Israeli aggression threatens to extend the
is a flagrant violation of Syria's sovereignty and cycle of confrontation to the entire Middle East, adding
territorial integrity. Furthemore, Tunisia vigorously to the great dangers that we already face in that region.
deplores the violation of Lebanese air space in the We speak today as the victims of systematized Israeli
commission of this aggression against Syria. aggression and of the bloody Israeli campaign against
us of the past three years, including repeated war
Tunisia believes that this unjustified act of crimes. We are victims of settler colonization,
aggression will further complicate the situation in the expansionist policies and the denial of our national
region and will bring further escalation, violence and
destabilization. Here, Tunisia appeals to the Israeli right to an independent Palestinian State with its
capital in East Jerusalem.
Government to halt such acts of provocation so as to
prevent the region from being caught up in a cycle of Despite long years of colonization, we take the
violence. We cal1 on the international community to position of responsibility in standing against al1 illegal
shoulder its responsibilities and to take urgent and acts undertaken from our occupied territories against
forceful measures to prevent the escalation of the civilians in Israel. On that basis, the Palestinian
situation. leadership condemned the suicide bombing that took
place yesterday in the city of Haifa and called for the
My delegation cannot fail to welcome the full and immediate cessation of such acts.
responsible position taken by the Government of Syria,
rejecting the logic of violince in the face of 1s;aeli On the other side, Israel must admit that such acts
escalation. The Council should take this into account. are the consequences of colonization and of its policies
The President: 1 now give the floor to the and actions, and not vice-versa. Israel must also stop
linking its dirty acts to the international community's
Permanent Observer of Palestine. struggle against terrorism. lsrael must also cease its
Mr. Al-Kidwa (Palestine) (spoke in Arabic): 1 illegal campaigns, including its building of a wall
wish at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your around our country; its threatening the life of the
assumption of the presidency of the Security Council Palestinian leader, elected by the Palestinian people;
for this month, and to convey our appreciation to your and its intimidation of Arab countries, including
predecessor, Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry. sisterl y Syria.
As members of the Council know, lsraeli The President: 1 now cal1 on the representative
warplanes attacked a site north of Damascus, the of Kuwait.
capital of sisterly Syria. There is no doubt whatsoever Mr. Al-Otaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): Allow
that this marks new lsraeli aggression against the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria. It is a me at the outset to congratulate you, Sir, on your
assumption of the presidency of the Council for this
violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the month. 1 wish you every success in conducting our peace and security. The Council must condemn this
deliberations. escalation and cal1 on Israel to refrain from such acts,
which threaten regional and international security and
1 would be remiss if 1 failed to thank your will further exacerbate an already explosive situation in
predecessor, the Permanent Representative of the
United Kingdom, for his leadership of the Council last the Middle East.
month. The President: 1 cal1 on the representative of
We appreciate your swift response to the request Saudi Arabia.
of the Arab Group to convene this meeting. Such Mr. Shobokshi (Saudi Arabia) (spoke in Arabic):
celerity is based in the Council's belief that Israel's act1join with those who have congratulated you, Sir, on
of aggression today against a State member of the your assumption of the presidency of the Council for
Security Council represents a grave threat to this month. We are optimistic that your wisdom and
international peace and security. Kuwait condemns experience will help you in conducting the Council's
Israel's violation of Lebanon's and Syria's airspaces business as we al1would wish.
and its attack against Syrian territory by targeting a
civilian site in the village of Ein Saheb. The statement 1 also extend appreciation and thanks to your
predecessor, the Ambassador of the United Kingdom,
issued by our Prime Minister stressed our for guiding the Council's work last month.
condemnation of that act of aggression, which violates
the principles of international law and the fundamental Once again, lsrael has affirmed its disregard for
principles of the United Nations. international law and norms. Once again, it has
We welcome the statement made by Secretary- affirmed that it does not care about any agreement,
convention or international legality. The lsraeli air
General Kofi Annan on this grave escalation and we force has committed an unprovoked aggression against
share his concern that the deterioration of the situation a civilian site in Syria that posed no threat or danger to
in the region could presage further threats to regional
peace and security. Such provocative and unwarranted anybody. Israel's violation of Lebanese and Syrian
airspaces and its aggression against Syrian territory is a
acts of aggression by Israel fall within the context of itsblatant contravention of international law and norms,
ongoing efforts to undermine the peace process by confirming the aggressive, terrorist nature of the Israeli
setting up obstacles to the implementation of the road
map of the Quartet. Such acts also prove the fact that Government.
the Israeli Government is not serious about achieving a The lsraeli Government is resorting to every
permanent peace in the Middle East and will bring pretext to export its interna1 crises, terrorizing and
further violence to theregion. intimidating the countries of the region and pursuing
its continued aggression against the Palestinians and
Israel's acts of aggression, by they in the
occupied Palestinian territories or in neighbouring repressive practices in the occupied territories. The
Arab States, will not achieve its desired sense of Israeli Government is trying to confuse everybody,
wrecking havoc on the region and raising tensions in a
security. lsrael should stop shirking its responsibilities very volatile situation.
and international commitments. We cal1 on Israel to
commit itself to the obligations it has already assumed, We agree with the statement made by the
including those under Security Council resolutions 242 Secretary-General in which he denounced the Israeli
(1967) and 338 (1973), as well as to the principle of aggression and warned against escalation in a region
land for peace. lsrael should also implement the road that is already extremely tense and against a rising
map, with al1its obligations, and withdraw from al1the danger that may be difficult to contain. We need to
territories it occupied in 1967. implement the road map through the Quartet's
Kuwait stands in full solidarity with the Syrian insistence on the implementation of al1 its provisions
with due impartiality.
Arab Republic in defying the act of aggression
committed today. Kuwait supports the measures to be The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia denounces Israel's
taken in defence of the territorial integritof Syria and aggression against sisterly Syria. This aggression is a
calls on the Security Council to assume its provocation that may undermine the peace process in
responsibilities in the maintenance of international the area. It threatens international and regional security and represents a dangerous deterioration of the The veto of the United States - repeated 37
situation in the region. times - has thus far prevented Security Council
Saudi Arabia, while affirming its solidarity with resolutions from being implemented, has prevented
Chapter VI of the Charter from being invoked, has
the position of Syria - which has showed great prevented appropriate actions from being taken to
restraint in the face of this aggression calls upon the ensure Israel's withdrawal from al1 the occupied
Security Council to shoulder its responsibilities for the
maintenance of international peace and security by territories, and has prevented peace from being restored
in the Middle East.
condemning the lsraeli aggression and by putting an
end to this organized State terrorism, to the inhumane Cuba confirms its full support for the cause of the
practices of the Israeli occupation against the Arab peoples against Israeli occupation and aggression,
Palestinian people and to its aggression against Syria and we express our deeply felt solidarity with their
and Lebanon. In order to maintain peace and security resistance. A just and lasting peace cannot be achieved
in theregion, it must not repeat its act of aggression. in the Middle East unless there is an end to Israeli
occupation, unless the Palestinian people can exercise
The President: 1 now cal1 on the representative
of Cuba. their legitimate right to establish an independent State
with its capital in East Jerusalem, until there is a return
Mr. Rodriguez Parrilla (Cuba) (spoke in of al1 the occupied territories, until lsrael withdraws
Spanish): 1 wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your from the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and Syrian Golan
assumption of the presidency and to express my back to the line held on 4 June 1967. There will not be
gratitude for the presidency of Ambassador Jones peace until the Israeli provocations in southern
Parry. Lebanon cease, until the rights of the Palestinian
The delegation of Cuba strongly condemns the refugees are guaranteed and until the illegal lsraeli
military attack launched by Israel on 5 October against settlements are eliminated, in conformity with Security
Council resolutions.
the Syrian Arab Republic in flagrant violation of the
Charter of the United Nations, international law and Mr. Zarif (Islamic Republic of Iran): 1 should
the very resolutions of the Security Council. An act of like to join previous speakers in expressing our
aggression has been committed, in the light of which felicitations to you, Sir, on having assumed the
the Council must exercise its functions under the presidency of the Security Council and to congratulate
mandate of the Charter. your predecessor, Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, on
the excellent way he conducted the work of the Council
The Security Council has the duty to prevent a
dangerous escalation in the Middle East conflict. last month. I also wish to thank you for having
convened this urgent Council meeting.
Approximately 3,600 people - nearly 2,800 of them
innocent Palestinian civilians - have died since The Israeli violation of Lebanese territory and
September 2000. A wall is being built to segregate the airspace and the raid against civilian centres in Syria,
Palestinian people. There are repeated violations of causing destruction and casualties, is a further random
airspace and attacks against southern Lebanon. The act in the course of the incessant Israeli aggression
provocations and slanderous statements against Syria against Arab countries and the Palestinian people. It
are increasing. clearly represents Israeli persistence in the pursuit of a
While we reiterate our condemnation of suicide policy of State terrorism, which must be vigorously
bombings against Israeli civilians - who continue to condemned. No justification or pretext can be accepted
for such a policy of reckless recourse to armed
be innocent victims of the spiral of violence caused by aggression, which represents a clear violation of the
their Government's policy - Cuba rejects the use of
such individual actions to attempt to justify State Charter of the United Nations and the most basic
principles of international law.
terrorism against Syria and Lebanon and atrocities
perpetrated by an army that possesses the most modern This aggression represents a serious escalation at
and lethal means for indiscriminately killing targeted a time when tension is running high in the region. The
persons as well as numerous other victims. raid further deteriorates the situation and threatens to
broaden the scope of violence. It is in line with the policy of escalation that the Israeli regime has pursued Mr. Almansoor (Bahrain) (spoke in Arabic): At
al1 along with a view to holding on to the Palestinian the outset, 1 should like to sincerely congratulate you,
and Arab lands it has continued to occupy for decades. Sir, on assuming the presidency of the Security Council
That is nothing but playing with fire in a region already for this month. 1 should also like to thank your
scarred by decades of aggression and occupation by predecessor, the Permanent Representative of the
Israel. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Ambassador Jones Parry, for his success in conducting
My delegation rejects the baseless fabrication
against my country presented in the Council today. But the work of the Council last month. We thank you for
promptly convening this emergency Security Council
itis evident that no amount of slander, deception and meeting to examine the dangerous situation that has
smear campaigns by Israel can cloud the obvious: that arisen in the region.
the Sharon regime has engaged in a systematic
campaign of provocation and escalation, from The Security Council is holding this emergency
desecration of holy places to targeted murder of meeting in the shadow of the dangerous developments
Palestinian leaders, in order to obliterate any prospect threatening the peace and security in the Middle East
for peace. and stemming from the current Israel's Governments
policy of war, with unforeseeable consequences. The
However, this new adventure is al1 the more
ominous, because it clearly indicates the fact that lsraeli attack against sisterly Syria is a dangerous
escalation of violence that threatens international and
Israel, in its manoeuvring to continue its policy of regional security. It is a violation of the United Nations
occupation through escalation and provocation, is Charter and international law and is in defiance of al1
running out of options. It is attacking Arab countries in
the belief that that will enable it to get out of the the agreements, conventions and principles of
international law. Israel's actions today offer a textbook
impasse it has created for itself. This new course of example of the foregoing. As if it were not enough to
action, if unchecked, will drag the entire region into a
downward spiral of violence, as it is designed to do. conduct a policy of violence against the defenceless
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has Palestinian people, the lsraeli Government, through its
policy of provocation, went on to launch an attach
already condemned this act of aggression - which is attack against a Member State and current non-
an integral part of the provocative and aggressive
Israeli policy - and expressed its full solidarity with permanent member of the Security Council.
the Government and the people of Syria and the My country condemns the Israeli raid against the
Government and the people of Lebanon. Syrian Arab Republic and its violation of Lebanese and
Syrian airspace. My country deplores this blatant
We cal1 on the international community, aggression and the gross violation of international
represented by this body, to impose restraints on the legality and the laws on the sovereignty of States. We
Israeli regime, whose actions are a threat to peace and
stability in the Middle East. It is unfortunate that the denounce any action conducive to war.
Security Council, bearing primary responsibility for the The current lsraeli Government is called on to
maintenance of international peace and security, has desist from its current policy, which has dragged the
thus far been prevented from shouldering its region into a cycle of violence and tension. It must
responsibility with regard to the crisis in the Middle exercise reason and wisdom rather than engage the
East. There is no doubt that the impunity that Israel language of war and aggression against others. It must
enjoys emboldens it to perpetrate its policy of respect the principles of international law, including
aggression and occupation. Thus we urge the Council respect for the sovereignty of States in the region.
to take decisive action this time on this new, alarming Here, 1 would like to pay tribute to the policy of
aggression. This is especially necessary in the light of restraint adopted by the Syrian Arab Republic in the
further threats by lsrael to launch more attacks on
Syria. face of aggression. Syria believes that international
forums are the best recourse and far preferable to a
The President: 1 now cal1 on the representative language of war that victimizes people.
of Bahrain. Finally, the Kingdom of Bahrain calls on the
Security Council to apply the Charter against aggressor countries. We cal1 on the international community to encourage such aggression, it must end. 1 believe that
take every measure to pressure Israel to stop the the Council, which is responsible for the maintenance
practices that are undermining al1 peace efforts and of international peace and security, must put an end to
threatening stability andsecurity in the region. such aggression.
The President: 1 give the floor to the We express our support for and solidarity with
representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. sisterly Syria. We stand with Syria and Lebanon to
confront such aggression. No peace and no end to
Mr. El-Treki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (spoke in terrorism can be achieved so long as people continue to
Arabic): 1 would also like to express to you, Sir, our
congratulations on your assumption of the presidency live under occupation and State terrorism is exercised
notjust for self-defence but for the sake of occupation
of the Security Council for this month. We wish you and aggression.
every success in your work. We would like to extend
our thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, the We hope that the Council will rise to its
representative of the United Kingdom, for the efforts responsibilities, at least for once. It must Say that
he made last month to make the work of the Council a aggression must be stopped and condemned. The
success. Charter must be applied to Israelis, as it is to other
people. Only than can we end aggression and
We meet today not for the first time - and it will occupation. We are certain that the Council is capable
not be the last - to discuss Israeli aggression against a
State member of the Security Council. Israel's of doing so, if it can muster the will and a sense of
responsibility towards the members.
ag--essive nature and years-long exercise of State
terrorism have continued unabated without any The President: 1 now give the floor to the
decision taken to address the problem. Because of representative of Yemen.
Security Council inaction, aggression and political
Mr. Alsaidi (Yemen) (spoke in Arabic): Allow
assassinations have continued, as has occupation of me to begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your
land. Syrian land too is still occupied because of lsraeli
aggression. assumption of the presidency of the Security Council
for the month of October. We are confident that vour
1 am not saying that this is a violation of the well-known wisdom will help the Council reach the
Charter of the United Nations, for Israel has never objective for which this meeting has been convened.
respected the Charter or any Security Council Allow me also to express our sincere thanks to Sir
resolutions. Perhaps we might now have an opportunity Emyr Jones Parry, the Permanent Representative of the
to stop such aggression and an aggressor that has been United Kingdom, for the wise manner in which he
exercising State terrorism, which, owing to the lack of conduced the deliberations of the Security Council last
constraints and measures to stop Israel from carrying month.
out terrorist acts, has promoted the spread of
international terrorism. Syria is a victim today. Israeli forces committed an unprecedented act of
Palestine is another victim. No one knows who will be aggression this morning in an attempt to drag Arab
States into military confrontation and to mask the
the next victim. heinous crimes perpetrated by the Israeli Government
1 would like to mention in particular the friends against Palestinians, in the hopes that such an action
of Israel. We must speak frankly with Israel. We should would draw the region into further conflict. This is an
not believe Israel. We should tell the Israelis that act of aggression whose like we have not seen against
continued aggression, assassinations and occupation the Syrian Arab Republic in 30 years. lsrael has failed
will not result in the achievement of a sense of security to suppress the Palestinian intifada, so it has tirelessly
for Israel. The entire question of security for Israel, the endeavoured to export its interna1 crisis to
only guarantee of security for Israel, lies in its abiding neighbouring States. What is truly regrettable,
by international resolutions, recognizing the rights of however, is that Israel has not yet understood that a just
the Palestinian people, withdrawing from occupied and comprehensive solution, the establishment of a
Arab territories and putting an end to the State Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital and
terrorism that it exercises. Security cannot be achieved Israeli withdrawal from occupied Syrian and Lebanese
through aggression. Despite the conditions that territory constitute the solution that will prevent any further bloodshed and war in the region. Israel's act of between Syrian and lsraeli forces. It also affirms
aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic is a Israel's desire to export its interna1 crisis by waging
challenge to international law and to internationally wider war in the guise of combating terrorism.
binding resolutions calling on Israel to withdraw from
My country has joined the list of sponsors of the
the occupied Arab territories. The Republic of Yemen draft resolution that has been submitted to the Council.
therefore condemns that act of aggression. Yemen also
expresses its solidarity with its brothers in the Syrian We are confident that, given the very delicate
circumstances, the Council will be able to assume its
Arab Republic and in the Lebanese Republic. full responsibility under the Charter of the United
We cal1 upon the international community, and Nations.
primarily upon the Security Council and the United The President: 1 now give the floor to the
Nations, to condemn this senseless act of aggression. representative of the Sudan.
We also cal1upon them to adopt resolution to deter any
further premeditated escalation by Israel. In our view, Mr. Erwa (Sudan) (spoke in Arabic): At the
such escalation would pose an ominous threat to peace outset, Sir, 1 would like to congratulate you, on your
and stability in the region. assumption of the presidency of the Security Council
for thismonth. We are fully confident of your ability
The President: 1 now give the floor to the and wisdom. We would also like to thank Sir Emyr
representative of Qatar.
Jones Parry, the Permanent Representative of the
Mr. Al-Nasser (Qatar) (spoke in Arabic): At the United Kingdom, for the wise way in which he
outset, 1 would like to convey our congratulations to conducted the work of the Council last month.
you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the
We have returned to the Security Council for the
Security Council for the month of October. We are second time in less than a month because of Israel's
confident that your wisdom will guide the Council to repeated violations of international law. God only
the attainment of al1our expectations. 1would also like
to thank your predecessor, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, the knows how long and how often we will have to
continue to come to the Council.
Permanent Representative of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, for his efforts during the month of My delegation has followed with great concern
September. We further wish to thank the members of Israel's violation of Syrian and Lebanese air space and
the Council for their speedy response to the request its acts of aggression against the territory of both
made by the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to hold countries that targeted a civilian site north-west of
an emergency meeting of the Security Council to Syria's capital, Damascus, and that caused material
consider the dangerous escalation of aggression damage. My delegation considers that act of aggression
perpetrated by lsraeli forces against sites in the Syrian to be a dangerous escalation that could threaten
Arab Republic and lsraeli violation of Lebanese air international peace and security and make an already
space. bad situation vulnerable to incalculable and
uncontrollable repercussions. At the same time, my
The Foreign Ministry of Qatar issued a statement delegation also condemns Israel's aggression against
this morning in which it condemned the raid launched
by lsraeli forces against sites in Syria. We consider Lebanese and Syrian territories, which we consider yet
one more in a long series of lsraeli violations of
those actions a grave threat to peace and security in the international norms and law and instances of Israeli
Middle East that could drag the region back to war and contempt for international legitimacy.
tension. My country reaffirms that it stands by the
sisterly Syrian Arab Republic. We cal1 on the My delegation reaffirms its support for, and
international community to bring pressure to bear on solidarity with, the Syrian Arab Republic. We also
Israel to cease its aggression and commit itself to reaffirm its right to self-defence and torespond to this
implement internationally binding resolutions calling act of aggression.
on it to withdraw from al1occupied Arab territory.
My delegation further asks the Security Council
Israel's aggression against Syria is in clear to shoulder its responsibility and to intervene
defiance of al1 international rules and laws. It is also a immediately to prevent lsrael from continuing its
clear violation of the Disengagement Agreement provocative acts of aggression against Syria, against the Palestinian people and against neighbouring Arab with regard to Israel ever since the State of lsrael was
countries. My delegation reaffirms that is necessary to established.
abide by the provisions of the United Nations charter
That representative chose to ignore the main
and by international law. reason behind the catastrophes and disasters which our
The blatant aggression committed this morning is region faces. He chose to ignore the blood-letting - by
not an isolated event. It was preceded by another such that 1 mean israel's insistence on occupying Arab
act on 8 January in the demilitarized zone between territories, its daily acts of aggression against the
Syria and Israel. Now Israel has once again returned to Palestinian civilians and its acts of aggression against
its previous behaviour by committing another act this Arab States, the last of which we have witnessed this
morning. The Security Council is called upon to take morning. The Israeli continued occupation is the reason
the necessary measures to ensure that Israel does not for the presence of hundreds of thousands, if not say
continue its terrorist acts, and that it returns to its millions of Palestinians in Syria and in other Arab
senses and understands that its security lies in lands. It isalso needless to recall that the presence of
withdrawing from the land it occupies and putting an those refugees was supposed to be temporary until the
end to its acts of aggression against the Palestinian circumstancesallowed them to go back to their country
people and its attacks against neighbouring Arab from which they were expelled by Israel and whereby
countries. they were replaced by illegitimate settlers and
illegitimate settlements, things that this Council has
Mr. Mekdad (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in rejected more than once.
Arabic): I regret having to take the floor again.
However, this afternoon the Council heard unfounded The Palestinian field leadership is in the
lies, through which the Israeli representative tried to Palestinian territories. Its just logical to say that for
divert our attention from the reason for which the tactical and geographic reasons the Palestinians who
Council met: the Israeli violation of the air space of reside in Syria cannot plan for operations that take
Syria and Lebanon and the acts of aggression place on Palestinian territories. Therefore, accusing
Syria with what the Israeli representative chose to term
committed against the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of a State member of the Security Council and as giving refuge to terrorist organizations is only a
of the United Nations. 1s there an insolence that can desperate attempt to get out of the dead-end that Israel
exceed what we have already witnessed? This Israeli fïnds itself in and, as 1 Say, an attempt by Israel to
style of prevarication is not new to us. We know about export its interna1 crises beyond its borders.
Israel's unfounded lies, and we know about Israeli Nothing hurts international action against
attempts to distort facts and realities. That is the
pattern we have come to expect from Israel, from 1948 terrorism more than Israeli acts of aggression and the
killing of Palestinians under the pretext of combating
to this very moment. terrorism. Israel chooses to ignore the fact that it -
1 will not respond to the unfounded lies and only it - was the first to introduce the concept of
perpetrated and promoted by the representative of the terrorism into our region through crimes committed by
Israeli war Government, because the statements that the Stern and the Haganah: gangs that were in fact the
were included in his statement simply deserve to be nucleus of the Israeli army. Some of their members are
thrown into the Council's wastepaper basket. The logic still wanted in Great Britain to this very day because of
promoted by the Israeli representative is the logic and the acts of terror they committed. They became Prime
the reasoning of a gang, not that of a responsible Party. Ministers and other high officiais in lsrael. Do
What is even more arrogant in what we have heard members remember the assassination by those gangs of
today is that he came here to preach to us about Israel's Count Bernadotte, the international mediator; do
history of respecting international legitimacy, despite members remember the carnage and the massacres of
the fact that each and every of us here knows very well Deir Yassin and Qana; do members remember the
that that history is not exactly honourable. We would massacres of Sabra and Shatila; do members
have greatly preferred to have him tell us the reasons remember the role of General Sharon, the current
for the Israeli failure to implement the scores - or Israeli Prime Minister in those massacres? We marked
even more than scores - of resolutions adopted by the the anniversary of these massacres just a few days ago.
United Nations, including by the Security Council, In combating terrorism, Syria stands side by side 1s that truly respect for human rights? Do States
with al1 the other countries of the world. We frankly members of the Council believe in Israel's unique way
believe that this is what we should really do, that this is of showing respect for human rights? I say to Israel
the correct course of action. Has not Syria cooperated that the members of the Council would not accept such
with al1 with al1 the other countries of the world, notions.
including the United States in combating terrorism?
Has not Syria saved lives, as recognized by United In conclusion, 1 would like to thank those who
condemned the Israeli act of aggression against my
States Administration officiais? Were we in fact on the country. In doing so they expressed their support for
wrong side when we cooperated in that field? We do
not believe that this is the case. The responsibility of the Charter and for international legitimacy. That is the
one permanent member in the Security Council and a right course of action to take in the interests of the
maintenance of international peace and security.
CO-sponsorof the peace process makes it incumbent on
that party to adopt balanced positions that do not The President: There are no further speakers
encourage acts of aggression and that do not accept any inscribed on my list.
such acts, but that would deter the commission of such
In accordance with the understanding reached in
acts. the Council's prior consultations, 1now invite Council
1would like to refer briefly to the comments that members to continue our discussion of the subject in
the representative of Israel made about democracy and informal consultations.
respect for human rights, among other issues. The
Israeli record with regard to democratic practices is The meeting rose ut 7.55 p.m.
very well known to al1 of us. Israel demonstrates its
respect for the rights of the Palestinian people at
checkpoints, in the building of the fence and in the
demolition of the houses of civilians while their
inhabitants are still inside. Such actions provide
evidence of the lsraeli attitude to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments of
international humanitarian law, which we are al1
seeking to respect.Annex 24 United Nations sl~v.4862
SecurityCouncil Provisional
Fifty-eighth year
4862.4 meeting
Wednesday, 19November 2003, 12.20 p.m.
New York
President: Mr. Gaspar Martins ................................ (Angola)
Members: Bulgaria ........................................ Mr. Raytchev
Cameroon ....................................... Mr. Tidjani
Chile ........................................... Mr. Muîioz
China .......................................... Mr. Wang Guangya
France .......................................... Mr. De La Sablière
Gennany ........................................ Mr. Pleuger
Guinea ......................................... Mr. Sow
Mexico ......................................... Mr. Pujalte
Pakistan ........................................ Mr. Akram
Russian Federation ................................ Mr. Lavrov
Spain ........................................... Ms. Menéndez
Syrian Arab Republic .............................. Mr. Mekdad
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern lreland ..... Sir Emyr Jones Pany
United States of America ........................... Mr. Negroponte
Agenda
The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of
speechesdelivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in Recordscial
oftheSecuriqCoztnciC l.rrections should be submitted to the original languageTheyly.
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and senthe signature of a member of the
delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting ServicC-154A.
03-62146(E)
*0362746* The meeting was called to order at 12.20p.m. There being no objection, it is so decided.
Adoption of the agenda At the invitation of the President, Mu. Al-Kidwa
(Palestine) took a seat at the Council table.
The agenda was adopted.
The President: 1 should like to inform Council
members that Bulgaria, China, Germany, Guinea,
The situation in the Middle East, including the Mexico, Spain and the United Kingdom have also
Palestinian question
joined as sponsors to the draft resolution contained in
The President: 1 should like to inform the document ~/2003/1100.
Council that 1 have received a letter from the
representative of Israel, in which he requests to be Accordingly, members of the Council have before
them document SI200311100, submitted by Bulgaria,
invited to participate in the discussion of the item on Chile, China, France, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, the
the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual
practice, 1propose, with the consent of the Council, to Russian Federation, Spain and the United Kingdom of
invite that representative to participate in the Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance 1 welcome the presence of the distinguished
with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 Secretary-General at this meeting today.
of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.
It is my understanding that the Security Council
There being no objection, it is so decided. is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution
before it. If 1 hear no objection, 1 shall now put the
At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mekel
(Israel) took a seat at the Council table. draft resolution to the vote.
There being no objection, it is so decided.
The President: 1 should like to inform the
Council that I have received a letter dated 19 A vote was taken by show of hands.
November 2003 from the Permanent Observer of Infavour:
Palestine to the United Nations, which will be issued as Angola, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chile, China,
document SI200311102, and which reads as follows:
France, Germany, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan,
"1 have the honour to request that, in Russian Federation, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic,
accordance with its previous practice, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Security Council invite the Permanent Observer Ireland, United Statesof America
of Palestine to the United Nations to participate The President: The draft resolution received 15
in the meeting of the Security Council to be held
toda~, Wednesda~, 19 November 2003, regarding votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted
the situation in the Middle East, including the unaniinous~y as resolution 15 15 (2003).
-
Palestinian question." The Security Council has thus concluded the
present stage of its consideration of the item on its
1 propose, with the consent of the Council, to agenda.
invite the Permanent Observer of Palestine to
participate in the meeting in accordance with the rules The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.
of procedure and the previous practice in this regard.
Letter dated 29 January 2004 from the Deputy Director General and Legal Advisor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Written Statement of the Government of Israel