IN THENAME OF GOD
THE MERCIFUL, THEBENEVOLENT INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASECONCERNINGMARITIMEDELIMITATION
AND TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS
BETWEEN
QATARAND BAHRAIN
(QATAVBAHRAIN)
MEMORIAL
SUBMITTBY
THESTASEOF QATAR
VOLUME 1
30 SEPTEMBER 1996 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
&
PART 1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................
........1...............
CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUNDTO THE PKESENT PROCEEDlNGS ..........1....
Section 1 . The Case submittcd to the Courf............................................................1
Section2 . 'i'hcViolationsby Bahrain ofthe starus quo Coniinitmciils....................
Section 3 . Outline o1'Qatsir1Ms ernorial..................................................................
PARTTI THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORLCALBACKGROUND 'Ml
THE DISPUTE .......................................................
........................
CHAPTERII DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERAL AREA OP THE
DISPUTE ..................................................
.....13..............
Section 1. Iiltroduction....................................................
......3............
Section2 . GeneralSetting:The Geographyoflhe ArabidPersiai Gulf ..................13
Section 3. Qatar.Bahraiil aiidthe HasaCoast ......................................14....................
A . Qatar ........................................................
......................
B . Bahrain ...................................................
....................
C. TlieI-IasaCoast .....................................................6.................
CHAYTERIII HISTORICAL BACKGROUND...............................................
Scction 1. Introduction .....................................................
....17............
Section 2. Trade in the Gulf. and Presence of ForeigiiPowersprior to 1868 .........7.
A . TheBritish .............. .........................................18..................
R . The Ottomans............................................... 20
Section 3. The History of Qatar and Balirain~ipto 1868............................2..........
A . Events in Qatar.........................................................................
B . Events in Bahraiii................................................
........................
C . Events leüdingto the Agreements OS 1868.....................................2YAKT II1 THE HAWARISLANDSAND OTHERTERRTTOMALQlJESTIONS ...49
CWAPTERIV THE GEOGKAPHY OFTHEHAWAK iSLANDS .............4....
Section 1.Location and Composition ..........................................49......................
Section 2. Geologyand Gcomorphology .......................................51..........................
CHAPTERV THE TERIUTORTAL INTEGRITY OF QATAR AND
QATAR'S SOVEREIGNTY OVEK THE HAWAR
ISLANDS .................................................
..53..................
Section 1. I~itroduction...............................................
.....53................
Section 2. Recognition ofTerritory............................................56
.........................
A . Ceneral ...................................................
...6................
B . SpecificInstances demonstratingRecognition.....................58...........
1. The Tuskish presence. thcir survey tnaps. and Uritislî and
.. .......................................................................
regional recognition 58
2. Bahraini Recognition of Qatar'sSovereignty ovcr theHawx
Islands.................................................
..73..................
Scction 3. Thc Subscq~ient Change in Bührain's Position and its Elf'cirto
sccurc Supportfor its Claim........................................7...................
A. The Discovcry of Oil and Ral-iraiil'sInitial Efforts to secure
Supportfor its Claim...........................................75.
.........................
B . Bahrain'slflegal Occripalioof Hdwar Island ....................77.............
C . Bahrain'scontinued FailuretciseçureRegionalSupport ...........78......
Section4 . Qatar's 'TerritorialIntegrity and its Security.....................84.................
Section 5. Conclusion .................................................
.....86.................
CHAPTEKVI THE DEFECTTVE NATURE OF THE BRITISH
DECISION OP 1939 ..........................................87.....
.......................
Section . Background to the 1939Decision ...................................87........................
A . Naturc of British RelationwithQatar ai~clBal~rai.......................
B . EveiitsJeadingupto thc1939 Decision.............................0..........9 1. The discovcryof oil and its iinpüct................................................
2. Beaconing of islcts in the Hawür Group ...........................03.....
Section 2. The Defectsinthe Procedure Sollowedby tlieBritish Govcrnnient ......104
A. Descriptionof the Procedure ........................................104.................
I TheBelgravc plan and the Dowüsjr ..............................IO6............
2. Further evidenccof Bahraini aciivities...........................110..........
3. Belgrave's relationswith Weightmaïi ..........................................113
4. Openingofthe formal procedure .................................115...........
5. Thc influenceof the oil negotiationsonthe formal proçedure....120
6. Developments following the close of thc for117ap Iroçedure
and the questiuriof bias...........................................2.........
7 .The Decisionof 11 July 1939.........................................4........1
8 .TheReactions of Prior and Alban ................................125.............
B. FormaiDefects ..................................................
.130.................
1 Absence ofconsentand othcrproceduraldeliciençies ...........130..
2. Unfairnessof the proccdurc ......................................133................
3 .Bias ..........................................................
..137............
4 .Absenceof reasons ..............................................141.....................
Section 3 . Tbe Defeçtsiiithe Basis ofthc 1939Dccision ...........................142..........
4 . Evidence presented tothc British Authorities .......................142........
1.By Bahrain ......................................................142...............
a) The first forma1claimby Bahrain ..............................42.........1
b) Bal-irain'"preliminarystatemcnt" of 29 May 1938 ...........1.44 c) Bahrain's"coiuiter-claim"of 3 Jailuary 1939 ..........................150
d) Belgrüve'sletter to Weightman of 20 Apri11939 ...................159
2. By Qatar ..........................................................
...0.........
a) The Ruler of Qatar's forma1lcttcr to Wcight111üio if 27
May 1938.........................................................60..............
b) The Ruler of Qatar'scornmcnts on tlie Ba12i.air"counteï-
claim".......................................................
................
B . Evidence not madeAvailablcto the BrilislîAiitliorities ..................
C . Erroneous Assumptions and Signilicant Oinissioiis...................5.
1. Were the Hawar islands opento occupation by Bahrain in the
mid-1930s? .......................................................66....
...
..................168.....
2. Compositionandlocationof the Hawarislands
3. Were the alleged acts of sovcreigiity in or iilrelation to the
I-Iawasislands. engaged in by Bahrain il1 Illeinid-1930s or
earlier. sufficient to confer title. onthe assuinptioii tliat the
islandswere open to occupationat the time? ......................7..
a) Beaconing ofthe islands and islets of [lHawai- group........171
b) The occupation of the Hawar islaiids by subjects of
Bahrain.......................................................
1...............
c) 'l'hc.allcgcd exercise or jurisdicticiil by the coults of
Bahrain ......................................................
173...............
4. 'T'itto the smallerislands of the Hawar group ...................74.....
Section 4 . The Non-Opposability to Qatar of the 1939Decision ....................17...
A. Protests by Qatar ....................................................1........
......
R. Recognition by the British Goverment that tlic Hacvarislüilds
weredisputed .....................................................
179...............
Seçtion 5 . Conclusion ....................................................
........180........... CHAPTERVI1 JANANISLAND .................*..............................183................
Section 1 . TlieGeography ......................................................
183..............
Section2 Janan andQatar'sl'crritorialI~itegrity .................................183................
Seçtion 3 Bahrain'sClaimis Unfoundcd .........................................184....................
CHAPTERVI11 THEQUESTIONOF ZURAUH ...............................189..............
Sectioiî 1. Presentationof Zubarah ................................................189..
..................
Sectioii2 . Bahrain has no Sovcrcignty overSubardl .............................190..............
......................................................
.................
A. Introduction 190
B . The FactualBackground ...........................................191.....................
1 TheEarlyHistoryof Zubarah ..................................191.................
. .................................................
......................
2 1867- 1937 192
3 The Eventsof 1937 ............................................198.......................
4. 1937to the Present .............................................203.......................
. ........................................................
......................
Section3 Conclusion 207
PART IV MANTIME DELIMITATION .............................................209.......................
CHAPTERIX CENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE RELEVANT
MARITIME AREA .............................................209........................
.................................................
......................
Introduction 209
Section 1. The Relevant MaritimeArea for Delimitation .........................209............
Section2 . Thc MainCcographicaiFeaturesinthe Relevant MlaritiiîîeArea...........211
...................213........
Section3 . FactorsIrrelevant tothe Delimitationto be Gffectcd
CHAPTERX THE 1947 BRITISH DECISION CONCERNTNC:TI-IE
DELIMITATION................. .. .... ..........................215............
Section 1. The General Legal Context: the State of Iiitcrnntioiial Law on the
Continental Shelf and its Delimitaticinat the 'Iimc of the Brilisli
Decisioii..................................................
..........215.............Section 2 . TlieCircumstancesin which the 1947British Uecisioiiwas made .......1 X
A. The Role of the Oil Companies ........................................8............2
B. Events leading to the 23 December 1947Decision ..........................220
C . The Equitable Principlesrcfewedto inthc Trun-iaiiProclanîalion...221
1. Exclusive consideration ofthe two main coasls ..................22....
2. SelectionOC fixedturning poiiits..................................2..3.........
3. A simpli fied line.................................:................ 23...2
Section 3. Reactions of the Parties . Tlie Differcnt Altitudes of Rahrain and
Qatar .....................................................
.............224............
A . Qatar'sAttitude .....................................................2................
B. Evolution of Bahrain'sAttitudes ....................................226...............
1 .First phase. 1947-1960:Claim to sovercignly over al1 the sea
betweenBahrainand the Qatarpeninsula ........................226.........
2. Second phase. since 1960: contincntal shelf claim based on
the Gaieva Conventiontogetllerwith special circumstances...... 230
C. Evolution ofthe British Government'sPositioii............................33
Section4 . The Dibal and Qit'atJaradah Shoals .....................................235................
A Introduction ........................................................235..............
B . Nature of thesc Features: Islandsor Shoals? A Question of Fact
.......................................................
...................
and Law 237
1. Hydrographical characteristics ..................................................237
2 .Legal contrnversiesabout the deltnitiotl of an island ............238...
a) Definitionsof "islands" and ciP"low-tidc clevatioils" iiithe
Gencva and Montego Bay Coilventions ......................238...
b) Hcsitatioiisof the British Governmcnt about the concepts
of islandsand of low-tide elevations.............................39......2 C. Rules of Attribution of Sovereign Rights over 1.)w-Tide
Elevationç ......................................................
.240.............
1.The lawof the sea is thapplicablelaw ........................240...........
2 .Practicc inthe Gulf in Ihiregard .................................42............
Section 5 . Conclusion.......................................................
......4..........
CHAPTERXI THE SINGLEMAlUTIME ROIJNDARYAND 'THE 1947
LINE ....................................................
.......247..........
Introduction ....................................................
247................
Section 1 . The Extensionof the Territorial Sea by Qatar andBahraiil.................48
A. 'The1992Qatari Decree andBahrain'sKcactin1..i.....................48....2
B. The 1993 BahrainiDecree-Law ...................................2..9
C . The Consequence of the Extension 01'the Territorial Sea in the
PreseiitCase ................................................
....249................
Section 2 . The 1947Line in the New Situation createdby ihe Extensioll of thc
Territorial Seas......................................................
250..............
A. Sovereign Rights over the Sea-Bed as deliiililed il1 1947 and
their Overlap withthe ExtensionOSScivereignly ...................251.......
B . What is the Effect of thc Request for Ille nrawing of a Single
Maritime Boundaryin thcsc Circumstniices? ......................252..........
Section 3. The 1947 Line as an Important Factor for the Delirnitatioii of thc
MaritimeBoundary ..................................................
253...................
A . Qatar'sSovercignty over the Hawar Islaildand its Gffccton the
Portionofthe 19471.ineEilclavingtkoseIslands ..................254.......
B . Kights of a T11irdState at the Eiltraice of thc Uawhal Sülwail
andthcir Impacton the SoutheriiSegment ofthc 1947 Line.........25G
C. The 1947Linc as a Special Circunistancefor the Uclimitation of
the Tei~itorialSeas ................................................258
.....................
D . The 1947 Line as a Relevaiit Cirçuinstance for thc Single
Maritilne Boundary bcyond the Outer Liinit of thc 'Territorial
Seas ~iptu BLV .................................................
261...................
Section 4. lrrelevanceof anArchipelagiçClaitnby Uahrain .......................262......... Section 5. Conclusion ..........................................................................4
CHAPTERXII THE SlNGLE MARITIME BOUNDARY IN THE
NQRTHERNSECTOR ...................... ..........,. ..,.........265
Introduction ................................... . . . . . . . 265
Section 1. 'l'hcSpecificNature of the Northern Scctor......................................... ...6
B. A Delimitation concerning Maritime Areas lyiiig beyoiid the
Outer I,imit of the Parties''i'erritorial Waters...............................66.
C. Irrelevance of thc Usual Distiiictionbetween 1;rontal and Lateral
Delimitation. ......................... . ...... . . . . . ,. .... 269
Section 2. The Law Applicable to the Maritime Delimitalion in the Northern
Sector ..........................................................
...................71...
A. The Delitnitation must be made iil Conformity with the
"Fundamental Norm" according to wllich tlie Coursc of Ille
Dividing Line mustbe drawn by applyiiig Equitablc Principles
and taking into account al1Relevant Circumstanccs iii order to
achicvc an EquitableResult....................................................271
B. The Existence of Common Principlcs Applicable to the
Delimitation oS Maritime Areas lying outside thc Territorial
Waters of the Parties, whatever the Legal Regiine of such Areas
may bc ................................,,.. ... ,,..,...,..,...,... ... ..,....272
C. Equity does not necessarily imply Equality .............................374....
Section3. The RelevantCircumstancesin theNorthcrn Scctor ...................... 375
A. Tlie RelevantGeographicalCircumstaiices.. .............................762
1. 'l'hcgeological and geomorphologicd unity of the arca of
seabedto bc dclimitcd .............................,... ..... ... 276
2. The regularity of the geogrüphicalconfiguration ofthe coasts
oSthe Parties ............................................................278
3. The disparity or disproportion betwccn the lengths of the
relevantcoasts (fthe Parties.. .........................................279
B. Takinginto Colisiderationthe Existing Delimitation Agreements ..283 Volume 5............................................................
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Volume 6 ..........................................................................
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Volume 7............................................................
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Volume 8 ............................................................
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Voliimc 9 ...........................................................
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Volumc 1 O .............................................................
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Volume 11 .......................................................
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Volume 12 ..........................................................
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Volume 13 .............................................................
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LIST OFAPPENDICES .............................................................
........375..................
Volume 14 ..........................................................
...................375................
Volume 15 ............................................................
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Volume 16 ...............................................................................375..........
Volumc 17 ..............................................................
...............375....................... CASECONCERNINGMARITIMEDELIMITATlON
ANDTERRITORIALQUESTIONS
BETWEENQATAR AND BAHRAIN(QATAR V. RAHRAIN)
MEMORIALOF THE STATEOF QATAR
PART 1
INTRODUCTION
This Mernorial is filed in accordance witii the Order Courtdated 1Fehruary
1996which extended until 30 September 1996the time-limforthe filing of Memoriaby
the State of Qatar ("Qatar")andthe Stateof Bahrain ("Bahrain").
CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUNDTO THE PRESENTPROCEEULNGS
1.1 For a long tir-eseveral decad-sQatar has been seekingjustice inFaceof what it
regards as the illegal occupation by Bahrain of part of the territory of Qatar. The solution of
this long-standing dispute with Bahrain is of vital importance for the two States and thcir
people as well as for the restoration of peand the deveiopmcntof triendly relations
between them. Qatar has always refained from the threat or use of fii~any manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the CharteUnitedeNations, anhas always soughto
settle this dispute in accordance with AS(3)of the Charter, and therefore "by peaceful
rneansin such a manner that internationalpeace and security,andarenot endangered".
Section1.The Case submittedto the Court
1.2 A solution to the dispute was eventually sought, with the agreement Arnirsof
Bahrain and Qatar, in the context of a mediation, sometirnes10as "good officesby
the King of Saudi ArabiThatmediationbegan in 1976and has lastcd two decades. A setof "Principles for the Framework for Reaching a Settlementl'(hereincifterrefcrred to as the
"Framework")was approved during a tripartite meetingin May 1983'.
1.3 For thc next few years, there was no progress towards the scttlemeiitof the dispute. The
King of Saudi Arabia then sent to the Amirs of Qatar and I3ahrainletters in identical terms
dated 19December 1987, in which he put forward new proposals for setlleinent of the dispute
by the International Court of Justice. Those proposals were acceptcd hy lelters from the Iwo
Arnirs, dated respectively 21 and 26 Deccmber 1987. These cxcl~anges of lctters are
hereinafter referred to as the "1987 Agreement". In addition, 011 21 Decembcr 1987 an
announccrnentwas issuedby Saudi Arabia, the terms of which llad been approvcd by the two
parties2.
1.4 During the work of the Tripartite Committee cstablislied by the 1987 Agreement, and
following an initiative by Saudi Arabia, on 26 October 1988 the IIeir Apparent of Bahrain,
when on avisit to Qatar, transmitted to the IJeir Apparent of Qatar a text (subsequently known
as the "Bahraini formula") which readsas follows:
"Question
The Parties request the Court to decide any matter of territorial right or otlier title or
interest which may be a matter of difference between them; and to draw a single
maritime boundary between their respective maritime areas of seabed, subsoil and
superjacentwaters3."
Thework ofthe Tripartite Commiitee cameto an end in Deceinber 1988.
1.5 On the occasion of the annual meeting of the Co-operation Council of ArabStates of the
Gulfat Doha in December 1990,Qatarlet it bc knownthat it was readyto accept the Bahraini
formula. On the sidelines of that meeting, the Foreign Ministers of Bahraiil, Qatar and Saudi
Arabia signed on 25 December 1990 Minutes placing on record the fàct that Qatar had
acceptedthe Bahraini formula andthat the dispute could be referredto the Court if it was not
1 -
Annex 11.10to the Mernorialof Qatar in the phaseof the proceedingsrelatingto Questions of
Jurisdictioand Admissibility,Vol. III, p.49. When the need arforsQatartu reteto sucliproçecdings,the
referencesused wilbe, forexample,Q.M.J.A.orB.C.J.A., asappropriate.
2Annexes 11.15and 11.16,Q.M.J.A.Vol. IIIpp. 101and 107,andAnnex 1.4,l3.C.J., Vol. 1p. 23.
3Annex11.29,Q.M.J.A.,Val. III.p.191.resolved through the good offices of King Fahd by May 19914.Those Minutes are hereinafter
referred to as the "Doha Agreement". Both Parties thus accepted tliat the Court, once seised,
should decide:
"..'my matter of territorial right or other title or intcrest wl-iich111bc c matter of
difference between [the Parties]'; and should 'draw a single ~naritime boundary
between their respective maritimeareas of seabed, s~ibsoiland superjacentwatersf5".
The formula thus adopted determined the limitsof the dispute witli wliiclithe Court would be
asked to deal. It was devised to circumscribe that dispute wliile leaving open the possibility
foreach of the Partiesto present its own claimsto the Court, withiil illframework thus fixed.
1.6 The continuation of the good officesof King Fahd as envisaged in the Doha Agreement
did not lead to the desired outcome within thetime-limit fixed in that Agreement, and on 8
July 1991 Qatar instituted proceedings before the Court against Bahrain by filit~g an
Application:
"... 'inrespect of certain existing disputes between them relatiiig to sovereignty over
the Hawar islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit'atJaradah, and the
delimitation ofthe maritime areasof thetwo tat tes'^."
1.7 Qatar's requestsascontained in that Application were as follows:
"'Reservingits rightto supplernentor amend its rccluests,the State of Qatar requests
the Court:
1. To adjudge and declarein accordance withinternatioiiallaw
(A) that the Stateof Qatar has sovereignty over theIIawar islands;and,
(B) thatthe State of Qatar has sovereign rightsoverDibal and Qit'atJaradah
shoals;
and
II. With due regard tothe line dividing the sea-bed of thc two States as described
in LheBritish decision of 23 December 1947, to draw in accordance with
international law a single maritime boundary betwccn the maritime arcas of
5nnex 11.32,Q.M.J.A.,Vol. III,p205.
Maritime Delimilaliuand TerritorialQuestions between Qatar and Uuhruin, Jurisdiction and
Rdmissibility, Judgment, I.C.J.Rep1994,p. 123para.32.
lbid,pp. 119-120,para.20. sea-bed, siibsoilandsuperjacentwatersappertairiingrespeçtively to the State of
Qatar and the State ofI3ahraini7."
1.8 The President of the Court, having consulted the Parties, and talting into account the
agreement reached between tlîem concerning proccd~ire,decided by an Order of 11 Octobcr
1991 that the written plcadings should firstbe addressed to the questioiîs of thejurisdiction of
the Courtto entertainthe disputeandof the adrnissibilityof the Application.
1.9 In its Judgment of 1July 2994,the Court:
"...decided to aflord the Parties the opportunily to ensure the submission LO the Court
of the entire dispute as it is comprehendedwithiii the 1990 Miiiutes and the Bahraini
formula, to which they have bothagreed. Such submission of the entirc dispute could
be effected by a joint act by both Parties ...or by separatc acts.Whichever of thcse
rnethods is chosen, the rcsult should be that the Court has befare it 'anymatter of
territorial right or other title or interest which may be a matter of difference between'
the Parties, and a request that it 'draw a single maritime boundary between thcir
respective maritimeareasof seabed,subsoil andsuperjacentwaters"".
The Cout-tthen fixed 30 November 1994 as the time-limit withiil which the Parties were,
jointly or separately, totake actionto submit to the Court the wl.iole of thedisi~u~e9.
1.10 On 30 November 1994,Qatar filedin the Registry a documei-ilentitled "Act to comply
with paragraphs 3)and 4) of operativeparagraph 41 of the Judgnient of tlieCourt dated 1 July
1994". Ttreferred to "the absence of an agreement betweenthe Parties to act jointly" and
declared that it was thercby suhmitting to the Court "the whole cifthe disp~itebetween Qatar
and Bahrain, as circumscribed by the tcxt ...referred ta in the 1990 Doha Minutes as the
'Bahraini formula"'.It continuedthus:
7 IDid.,p. 124,para. 35.
8
9 Ibid.p. 125,para.38.
On 1 July 1994,H.E. SheikhMohammedbin Mubarak Al-KlialifatliForeign Ministerof the State
of Bahrain, issued the following declaratiori:"The State of Balirain appreciates today'dccision of the
IntematiotialCourt of Justice wliicliconfirtheright oftheState of Baliriito siibrnto the Court iis claiin
over Zubarali, aswellasitsclaims regardingothcrrights wliicarethe subjc~lofdispute betwccn theStatesof
Bahrain aiidQatar".This statementwas sent to the Courunder acoveringletterfromthc Agent andCounsel of
the StateofBahraindated 11July 1994. "The matters which would be referred to the Court were exhaustively defined in the
Tripartite Committee (see paragraph 18 of the Court'sJudginent of 1 July 1994). The
subject matters of the dispute were described in identical terms in Bal~raiii'swritten
pleadings and in a draft special agreement proposedby Rahrain or1 20 Jut~e 1992(sce
Bahrain'sRejoinder, Annex1.3,p. 113).
The following subjects fall within the jurisdiction of the Court by virtue of tlie rights
and obligations created by the internatioiial agreements of Deccmber 1987 and
25December 1990 and are, by virtueof Qatar'sApplicatioiidcited5 3uly 1991 and the
present Act, submitted to the Court:
1. The Hawar Islands,including the island ofJanan;
2. Fasht al Dibal and Qit'atJaradah;
3. Thearçhipelagicbaselines;
4. Zubarah;
5. The areas for fishing forpearls and forf'ishingfor swimming fisliand any other
matters connectedwith maritime boundaries.
It is understood by Qatar that Bahrain defines its claim conceriiingZubarah as a daim
of sovereignty.
Furtherto its Application Qatarrequests the Court to adjudge and dcclare tliat Bahrain
has no sovereignty orother territorial riglit over the islanof Janan or over Zubarah,
and that any claim by Bahrainconcerning achipefagic baselines and areas for fishing
for pearls and swimming fish would be irrelevant for the purposc of maritime
delimitation in the present case."
1.11 Inits Judgment of 15February 1995 the Court held that:
"48. The dispute is thus described in the very ierins used by Balirain at the sixth
meeting of the Tripartite Committee held on 6 and 7 Deceinber 1988. Nor does it
differ from the dispute described in the draft joint acts proposcd by Bahrain on
22 October and 12November 1994,and subsequentlywitlidrawnby it, except in so far
as these latter related to snvereignly over the Hawar islands and .rovereignty over
Zubarah. It is clear, however, that claims of sovereignty ovcr the Hawar islands and
over Zubarah may be presented by cither of the Parties, from the nioment that the
matter of the Hawar islands and that of Zubarah arc referred to the Court. As a
consequence, it appears that the form of words used by Qalar accurately describedthc
subject of the dispute. In the circurnstances, the Court, wliile regrctting that no
agreement could be reached between the Parties as to how it should be presented,
concludes that itis now seisedof the whole of the dispute, and that the Application of
Qataris admi~sible'~."
IOL CJ. Reporr1995,p.25, para48.1.12 Qatar welcomed the Judgmentof the court", which found "tliat it hasjurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the dispute submitted to it betweeii tlie State of Qatar muidthe State of
Bahrain" aiid "that the Applicationof the State of Qataras formulated on 30 November 1994
is admissible". Since then, Qatar has beeii cooperating with the Court in tlie conduct of thc
prcsent proceedings. Qataris confident that the forthconiing Judgment of the Court, to the
Statute of which the two States as members ofthe Unitcd Nalions are ipso fuctc:parties, will
put an end to the dispute betweenthe two Statesin accordance withiiiternationallaw, and that
the decision of tlie Court will be complied witliin accordance witli the obligations of the
Parties under the 1987 Agreement and the Charter ofthe IJniled Nations. During the present
proceedings, Qatar is remaining at the disposa1of the Mediator to study anyproposa1it might
make withinthe framework of the Doha Agreement which, as the Court decided in opcrative
paragraph 41(1) of its Judgment of f July 1994, is an "international agreeinent ...creating
rights and obligationsfor the Parties".
1.13 On 28 April 1995,having ascertained the views of Qatar and having givcn Bahrain an
opportunity of stating its views,the Court issued anOrderfixing 29 February 1996as the time
limit for the simultaneous filing of the written pleadings iriaccordance with paragraph 39 of
the Judgment of 1 July 1994 and paragraph 49 of the Judgmcnt of 15 February 1995. On
1February 1996, at the request of Bahrain the Co~irtexteilded this time limit until 30
September 1996.
1.14 It is now for each Party to present its claims to the Court. As the Court stated in its
Judgment dated 15February 1995"...it falls to Qatar to present itssubn~issioiisto the Court,
as it falls to Bahrain to present its own12".
1.15 As the Court is aware, Qatar's claims and initial submissions are tu be found il1 ils
Application dated 5July 1991 and in its "Act to çoiilply with paragraphs 3) and 4) of
operative paragraph 41 of the Judgment of the Court dated 1 July 1994" filcd witli the
Registry on 30 November 1994.In its Judgment of 15February 1995 the Court found "ihat
" Sec,forexample,Annexes1.3and 1.6,Vol.2, p9 and25.
" I.C.JReports1995,p.25,para.49.tlie Application ofthe State of Qataras formulated on 30 Novernber 1994 is admis~ible'~".As
of today, Qatar remains incompletely informed of any of the claiins and submissions of
Bahrain either under the five subject matters of the dispute which are submitted to the Court
or under the request that the Court drawa single maritime boundary betweeil tlicir respective
maritime areas of sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters. In Iliis Mernorial Qatar will
therefore present itscase with respect to those subject mattcrs, witl~outprejudice howcvcr to
the position that it may take once it has been informed of the claiins and submissions of
Bahrain.
Section2. TheViolations bv Bahrain of the stntus acroCommitrnents
1.16 Qatar recaIls that, as a result of meetings during 1975 and 1976 between the King of
Saudi Arabia, the Amir of Qatar and the Amirof Bahrain, it was agrecd that the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia would undertake mediation between Qatar and Bahrain to resolve thc
outstanding disputes. In 1978, in the course of the Mediation, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia
proposed the ~ramework'~. As indicated above, the Framework was approved on 22 May
1983". The Second Principleprovided for the maintenance of the strrfusquo and declared that
any act to change the stulusquo would have no legaleffect. The Third Prinçiple incorporated
undertakings by the Parties to refrain from engaging in propaganda aclivities against cach
other or from doing anything to sully the cordial atmosphere neccssary to làcilitate fruitful
negotiations.
1.17 The Second and Third Principles ofthe Framework werc reiteratedand elnbodied in the
1987Agreement which, to use tlie words ofthe Court itself, is an "iiiternationalagrcernent ...
creating rights and obligatioiisfor the ~arties'~".
1.18 The second pointof that Agreement readsas follows:
13Zbid.,p. 26, para.50(2).
14Annex 11.1,Q.M.J.A.,Vol. III,p.For a full account thecvcntsrelatinto theFramework, see,
Q.M.J.A.,Vol. 1,pp. 35-40, paras.3.09-3.20.
1.AnnexII.lQ,Q.M.J.A.,Vol.III,p.49.
16
I.CJ.Reports1994,p. 126,para.41(1). "Secondly:Until a final settlement for the disputed matters is reached in accordance
with the preceding Articie, the two sisterly States of Qatarand Bal~raiiishall abide by
the principles of the framcwork fora settlemcnt on whidi they agrced on 10/8/1403 H
- correspondingto 22/5/1983- and bythe following in partiçular:
(a) Eacli party shall undertake frorn to-datc to refrain fri-oinany action lhüt would
strengthen its legal position, weaken the legal position of the oiher party, or
change the status quo with regard tothe disputedmatters. Ariy such action shall
be regardednul1and voidand shall have no legül effect inthis respect.
'Theparties undertake to refrain from tu-date from any media activities against
(b)
each other whether in connection with this dispute or anyolher inatters and
until such time as the desired settlement isreüclied.
(c) 'Theparties undestaketo refrain from aiiy action that would impede the course
of the negotiations or distutb the brotherly atmosphere necessary for the
achievement of theirobjectives17."
1.19 In the course of the procecdings addressed to thc questions of the jurisdiction of the
Court to entertainthe dispute and of the admissibility of the Application, Qatarcomïnuilicated
a cestain ilunber of notes verbales with respect to various incidents relating to the Hawas
islands, the shoals of Dibal and Qit'atJaradahand the watcrs situated on the eastcrn side of the
line indicaled in the British decision of 23 December 1947, which were in brcach ol'tlie
Second and Third Principles of the Framework andthe second point of the 1987 Agreeineiit
relating to the maintenancc of the status quo. Qatar attaches to Ibis Mernorialcopies of tliose
notes verbales, updated by the addition of more recent cxchanges of notes verbales between
the two States and/orthe Co-operationCouncil of Arab States of the ~ulf'~.
1.20 With respect to the Hawar islands, Qatarhas also prepared a written reportaccurnpanied
by photographs on Bahrain's actions and activitiesin those islands since thc beginning of thc
~ediation". It has also prepmed photographs of mosaics of slidestakcn of the Hawar islands
from 1958 on2'. These documents give evidence of the construction of rnililary md civilian
17Sec, Annexes 11.15and II.16,Q.M.J.A.,Vol. III, pp. 101and 107and Annex 1.4,B.C.J.A.,Vol. II,
p. 23.
18See, Appeiidix 1,Vol. 14.For the sake of coiivenience,a bricf sumiiiary of the con[ieach nole
verbaleha19been insertedat the beginningof Appendix 1.
See, Appendix 2, Vol. 15,p. 1,and the video tape entitlcd"Bahrain Actions aiid Activities in 1-Iawar
Islands Since the Beginning of the Mediation". Twcntycopies of thevideo arc being tiled witli thc Registry
pursuant to Article 50, piragra2,or theRulesof Court.
20 See,Appendix 7, Vol. 16.A mosaic isthe composite pliotographtliat icieated when anurnher ot
aerial photographs arejoined together sothatbroader geographic al-eas canbe studied frum a single image.installations and the introduction of military wcapons into Hawar by Bahrain, and also show
that Bahrain has bcen intensifying such activities, in particular fiom the date of seisin of the
Court by Qatar on 8 July 1991. This has become more flagrant since the first Judgrnent of the
Court on 1 JuIy 1994. Indeed, in a note verbale,which it forwarded to thc Registrar of the
Court under cover of a letter of 8 January 1996,Bahrain acktîciwledgesthat it liasca-ried out
such activities2'.
1.21 In addition, it is apparent that Bahrain is continuing to undertake military activities on
Hawar. For example, on 24 May 1996,the Heir Apparent and Commander-in-Cllief of the
Derence Force of the State of Bahrain went to tlie main Hawar island tu visit the public
security and defensive forces stationed there. Moreover, Bahrain lias undertalcen othes
activities in anendeavour to consolidate its position, but:these are cleüsly no more than an
artificial attempt to give thc impression that there arc civilian activities on Hawar. For
example, Bahrain has put up bungalows and a hotel for tourism on the maiiiHawarisland, and
has taken fürther steps to encourage tourism on the islands. Tnparticular, in July 1996, a
Bahraini tourist company began advertising tourist trips to lhe islands. Pinally, Bahrain is
taking legislative and administrative actionsin relation to the disputed shoals and maritime
areas.
1.22 This situation is viewed very seriously by the Qatari authorities, wl-ioseconcern was
expressed by the Agent of the State of Qatar at the meeting withthe President of the Court on
27 April 1995. He indicated that under the 1987Agreement, by the terms of which Bahrain
and Qatar have undertaken legd obligations (as decidedby the Court in its Judgment of 1July
1994), tlie two Partieshad agreed to refrain from hostile actions.He drew the attention of the
President of tlie Courtto the necessity for Qatar and Bahrain to refrain1Lomadversc acts and
breaches of the status quo:
Mosaicsare createdusing either controlledor uncontrolledaçsembly techniques.Controlled inosaicsare created
from a sophisticateassembly processwhich accounts for, and corrects,muchthe distortion inherent in aerial
photographs, making theln a reliablebase source of informationfor topographie inappin;. Uricoiitrolled
mosaics, on the other hand, are çreated from a more simplisticasseinbly process anbeused fors~udying
laad use and naturaI resources.The mosajcspresented inAppendi7are al1uncoiitrolledinosaics; assuch, they
may beused tostudy featuresontheground, buttheywould iiot be suitabfurinakinç precise distanceaerial
ineasurements.
21Sec,Appendix ],Vol. 14p.393. f'..Qatar considers that both Governmcnts should refrain froin any act likely io
impede the gathering of evidence material to the present case and that in regard to the
administration of the dispiited islands, shoals and maritime area, thc sit~iationwhich
prevailed previously should notbe modified. 111addition: hoth Partics sl~ouldrefrain
from any adverseacts and anyii~fiingementsof the sfufils gr~r?'."
1.23 To conclude, the Bahraini activities that Qatar l-iabroiiglitto the attention of the Court
are flagrant and material breaches of the agrced .skltus quo, and iiiparticular of the 1987
Agreement, whichhas now been conllrmed by the Cou1-tas bcing ail international agreement
creating rights and obligations for the Partics. Moreover, it is clear that under the Sccond
Principle of the Frarnework agreedin 1983 (as again set out in paragraph (a) of the sccoild
point of the 1987Agreement), any actioninfringing the starus quo is nul1 and void and cari
have no legal effe~t~~.
Section 3. Outlineof Qatar's Memorial
1.24 This Memorial is divided into four Parts. Followingthis Introductory Part 1, Part II
addresses "The Geographicai and HistoricaI Background to the Dispute", Chapter II
cotltaining a geographicaI description of the general area of the dispute, and Chapter III
setting out the historical backgroundfromthe 17thcenturyunlil today.
1.25 Part III then addresses "Tlie Hawar Islands and Other Territorial Questions". Wiih
regard to the Hawarislands, their geographyis considered inChapter IV, while the territorial
integrity of Qatar and Qatar's sovereignty overtlie Hawar islands is discussed in Chapter V.
Chapter VI thcn explains the defective nature ofthe British decision of 11 July 1939 that the
1-Iawarislands belonged to Bahrain. Finally, in Chaplers VI1and VIII, Qatar addresses the
questions of Janan island andZubarahrespective1 y.
22
Agent of Qatar'sletter to the Registrar, 28Ap1995,p. 3.Sec.also, thstatement,niade upon the
occasion of the deliveryof the Judgment ofthe Couon i5February 1995,by the HcirApparentand Defence
Minister of the State of Qatar, now the Amir, 1-. heikh Hainadbin Khalifa Al-TlianHe stated that: "The
Siateof Bahrain lias,notwithstanding, coiitinued to breach this cornmitment [niain(cthccstatus qzruby
constructing installations and effecchangesin placesand positions in dispute suchas the islands OFHawar"
(Annex 1.3,Vol. 2, p9).
23 Sm, in this respecLegal Stalus of theSouth-EasternTerritory of Greenluna Order of3 August
1932, P.C.I.J., SeriesA/B,No48,p.287.1.26 Part:IV deals with the issueof maritime delimitatiotlbefore the Court. Chapter TXgives
a general presentation of the relevant maritime arca for the purposcs oL'this dclimiiation.
Chapter X then considers the 1947 British decision, wliile Cliaptcr XI addrcsses the
relationship between the line drawn by the British in1947 aiid the single maritime boundary
which the Court is being askedto draw. Finally, ChapterXII considers thedrawing of asiiigle
maritime boundary by the Court in the area to the ilortl~of a izoticinaline joining the
northernmost points ofthc respectiveland tcrritories of Qatar anBalirain.
1.27 This Memorial endswith Qatar'sSubmissions.
1.28 Attached to this Memorial there are 8Appendices in 4 volumes, including rMap Atlas,
and 12 volumes of Annexes. A list of these Appendices, Annexes and Maps may be found at
tlie end of this Volume. ln general, the Annexes are organised according to the Part of thc
Memorid in which they are referredto. In other words Aiinexcs to PartII of thc Meinorial are
numbered Annex 11.1,11.2,etc. 1-Iowever,certain important texts which are referred to
throughout the Menlorial are only included once - ainong thc Annexes to Part TI of the
Memorial. A list of certain documentswhichare being deposited separately with the Registry
pursuant to Article 50,paragraph 2, of the Rulesof Court is contained in theAgcnt of Qatar's
letter to the Registrar dated 30 September 1996.
1.29 For the sake of convenience, a list of the main abbreviations used Sromtime totime in
Qatar'sMemorial and its annexes is set forthbelow.
RQ : Ruler of Qatar
RB : Ruler of Bahrain
PRPG : Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, sometimcs refei-reto simply as
the Political Resident
PAB : Political Agent,Balirain
PAQ : Political Agent, Qatar
ABG : Adviser to the Bahrain Govcrnment
1O : India Office
FO : Forcign Office 10R : lndia OfficeRecords
BAPCO : BahrainPelroleum Company
PCL : Petroleum CoilcessionsLimited
EGS : Eastern and Generd SyndicateLtd.
APOC : Anglo-PersianOil Company
Where reference ismade in this Meinorial to Archives of the State ofQatar, the docuinents
are frotn the Archives ofihe DiwanAmiri of the Statcof Qatar. PART II
THE GEOGRAPHICAL ANDHISTOFUCALBACKGROUNDTO THE DISPUTE
CHAPTERII
DESCRIPTION OF THEGENERALAREA OF THE DISPUTE
Section 1.Introduction
2.1 Two geographical areaswill be distinguished and hrietly described below. The first is the
broad one ofthe Arahidersian Gulf which geographically,liistoricüllyand politically forms
a natural configuration with its own particular characteristics wliich are relevant to this
dispute. This generalsetting is shown on Map No. 1, facing this page and is discussed in
Section 2 below.
2.2 Within this larger area, a secondmay be idcntifiedwhich is shown on Mup No. 2, Sacing
the following page. This covers an area between the Hasa Coastin thc west and the sea to the
east of the peninsula of Qatar. It thus includes the whole of andaBahrain and the waters
surrounding Bahrain. It is within this second area that most of the events which fom the
background to this dispute occurred.
Section 2. General Settin~:The Geographv ofthe ArahianIPersianGulf
2.3 As cm be seen from Map No. 1 facing this page, Qataand Bahrain are situated on the
southern side of the ArabianIPersianGulf almost rnidway between ils mouth at the Strait of
Hormuz and its termination at the Shatt al Arab. Confined by the IaiidrofsPersia (now the
Islamic Repubiic of Iran)to the north, and the Arabian peninsula to the south, and narrowing
at the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf is a semi-enclosed sea. It has an area of approximately
240,000 square kilometres; its length is approximatcly 984 kilometrcs and its breadth varies
from a maximum of336 kilometresto a minimum of 56 kilomctres in the Strait of Hormuz.
2.4 The ArabidPersian Gulf is forined by a shallow depression, constitutian unbroken
continental shelf underlyingthe whole of the Gulf. This depressionproduccs dcpths averaging
only 40 metres in the Gu11as awhole with a inaximuin depth of 170 metres near the Strait ofIiormuz. 1-Iowever,the basin formed by the depressionis markedly asyimetric with the dope
of the southern and south-westernsidesof the Gulf, adjoiningthe Arabianpeninsula, being Iàr
geiitIerthan that of the northcrn lranian coast. Thus, the watcrs are deeper iiear this northeril
coast and easier for navigation, while an the southern sidc the waters are generally very
shallow'.
2.5 These characteristics of the two sides of thc Gulf are inirrored in the respective
shorelines. Thc northern side of the Gulf is mountainous, with the inoiixitainsfallii~gsha-piy
to the shoreline. The southern coast by contrast is, as described in the PersiavzGulf'PiEot,"a
desert of white sand". With the exception of the northwest side of thc Oman peninsula, this
coastline is described by the same source as "exceedingly low; fromit, for nearly its whole
length, reefs and shoals extend as much as from 30 to 50miles in places2".The southern coast
of the Gulf starts at the tip of the Oman peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz and foIIows the
coastline south-west and then west untii it meets the Qatar peninsula. Afier going round the
Qatar peninsula, it turns in a steep north-westerly directionfollowing thc coastlines of Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait and Iraqto where it meets the border of the Islainic Kcpiiblicof Iran atthe
Shattal Arab. This lattespart of the coastline is often referredto as the Hasa coast orthe Qatif
coast. Bahrainis situated in the gulfthat lies between the Qatarpeninsula andthis coastline.
2.6 There are nurnerous islands, shoalsand reefs inthe Gulf, the largest islandsbeiiig Jazirat-
ye Qeshrn on the north sideof the Straitof Homuz andthe island of Bahrainitself.
Section3. Qatar, Bahrain andthe Hasa Coast
2.7 The area to be discussed in this section is shown on Mq? Nu 2, facing this page. This
area is at the centre of the dispute. It includes the seabed, subsuil and supcrjacent waters
between Qatar and Bahrain, as well as the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Sasadah, the Hawar
islands, the island of Janan, and Zubarah on the pcninsula. The British drew a line of
delimitation of the sea-bcd on 23 December 1947 at a time when both Bahrain and Qat=
asserted claims to a three-mile territorial sea limit3. Both States have since extcnded tlieir
'See,AiiiiexII.1,Vol.3p.13.
Ibid.
3See, paras. 3.76 et seq.,andpa11.13clseq.below.territorial seas t12 miles. Thus, iilthe area where tliiecoasts of Qatar and Ralxain face eacli
otlier,the waters are nowterritorial sea. MapNo. 2, facing thepreceding page,reproduccs the
lines of the existing seabed delimitation agreements between Bahrain andSaudi Arabia,
Bahrain and Iran, and Qatar and Iran. Qatar hasalso concluded a delimitatioii agreement with
Saudi Arabia in the Dawhat S'alwah4.The detailed description of the geographical
characteristics of these specific features will be takeup in detail inParts III and IV of this
Memorial.
2.8 The peiiinsula of Qatarjuts northward into the Arabian/Persian Gulf from the bay called
Dawhat Salwah on the Westand, on the east, from south of Khor al-Udaid. The peninsula is
about 180 kilometres long north to south and a niaximum of 85 kilometres wide and,
excluding islands, covers an area of approximately 14,000square kilometres. Its main ports
are Doha, the capital, and Umm Said,onthe east side of the peninsula.The Hawar islands and
Janan island are located on the western side of the Qatar peninsula. There isa major oil field
to the south of Ras Dukban oust below the Hawar islands)on the west coast. Zubarah'sruins
are to be found on the north-western coast.Thc surface oftliepeniiisula consisls ofanarch of
limestone, in the sand-filled pockets ofwhich are seams of water which support good grazing
in the winter and spring. The land of Qatar has numerous hills on thc western side. Towards
the east the surfaceof the couiitry becomes a less rugged liinestonc plain sloping gently into
the ArabiadPersian Gulf#
B. Bahrain
2.9 Bahrain is situated at a midway point along the ArabiadYcrsian Gulf and as a result
gaincd much of its importance as a trading centre, its geographical separatitionfrom tlie
mainland making it relatively secureand independentof the mainland'spi-oblems.
2.1 O According to the latestversion of thePcrsian GuEJ'Pilott,he State of Balirainconsistsof
the island of Bahrain itself "togetherwitli a number of small islands and islets lying close to
4Thisdelimitation agreement is not sonMup No. 2. Seeparas. 11.28scq., below.its shores5".The name Bahrain haç been used variously to refei-to thc main island 01Bahrain
itself Cpreviouslyknown as "Awal"),or to the groupof three principal islailds which form thc
inhabited part of the State of Bahrain.The othertwo inhabited isiands lie tothe north-east and
east of the main Bahrain island, the larger beingAl Muharraq, and the other Sitrah. Lorimcr,
writing at the beginning of this century, described the group of islands that formed thc
sheikhdom of Bahrainas follows:
"...taken al1together these form acompactgroup alinost in the middle of the gulf whieh
divides the promontory of Qatarfiornthe coastof ~atif"."
2.11 The main island of Bahrain is about 43 kilomctres iii length from north to snutli,with a
breadth of about 12.8kilometres for most of its length. For Qatar, Bahrai11 covers anarea of
approximately 652.8 squarekilometres.
C.TheHasaCoast
2.12 TheHasa coast is the third natural feature of the area.Tl~erelevant part of this coast for
the purposes of this disputeruns from Ras Tannurah in the northto thc end of Dawhat Sdwah
(at the Saudi Arabian tom of Salwah), in a general north-west/so~ith-eastdirection and is
sliownon MapNo. 2, facingpage 14.
5Annex 11.1Vol.3, p.37.
Annex 11.3,Vol.3,p. 88 (emphasisadded).This citationtaken frciJ.G.Lorimcr,Gazetlecr ofthe
Pgrsian GuK OmunundCentral Arabin, 1908 and 1915,reprintcd by ArchiveEditions1986, Vol.II, p. 234.
Lorimerwas an employee oftlie IndianCivil Service,whose career culrninatediiiposiof PoliticResident
in the PersianGiilffrom Deccmber 1913untilhis death in February 1914,and his Ciazetwasrcompiled as a
British govemmental project. CHAPTEK111
HISTORTCAL BACKGKOUNT)
Section1.Introduction
3.1 The purpose of this Chapter is to o~ltlinethe history of Qatar and Bahrain.11will lirst
deal, in Section 2, with the general background Iiistury of the presence of forcignpowers in
the Gulf, and will then turn, in Sections 3 and 4, to the history of Qatar ailci Bahrain
individually. Finally, Sections 5 aiîd6 will describe the events which arc mare pxticularly
related to the subject matter of the dispute in the present procccdings, togetl~erwith the
Parties' attempts to resolve the dispute. Facingthis page is Mup No. 3 sliowing the general
setting,indicating the variousplaces mentionedin this Chaptcr.
Section2. Tradeinthe Gulf,and Presenceof Foreign Powers prior to 1868
3.2 From early times there existed a considerable sea tradc bctwccnthe Gu1Sand Africa and
India. Before tlie arrivaof the Europeansin the area, navigation wastrnditioilally inthe hands
of the Arabs, on both the Arabian and Persian sides of the Gulf. 'l'hcfirst Europeansto arrive,
at the end of the 15th century, were the Portugucsc who wcre attracted tcithe Gulf because it
lay along one of the trading routes with India. Thcir commercial ii~terestslay in controlling
the waters of the Gulf and thus assuring the safe flow of trade. Tliey establishcd forts at
Hormuz and Bahrain and had a virtual monopoly of trade iiithe Gulf tliroughout thc 16th
centiiry.This monopoly was first challcngedby the Dutch, whoarrived towardsthe end of the
16th century, establishing a series of trading posts oil the Persian coast. IIowcvcr, the real
challenge cüine somewhat later fkuinthe British, in the forin of the East India Coinpaiiy,
which was anxious to consolidatea presence inthe Gulfbecausc of its commercial interestsin
~ndia'.Britain subsequently associated withPersia and succccdcd iiicxpelliiig the Portuguese
from IIormuz in 1622.Rivalry with the Dutch followed, andin 1766 the last Dutçh trading
post, on Kharg Island, was ahandoned.Tliereafter,the British acquired almost a monopoly of
the foreign commerce of the Gulf ports,and were left as the only foreign powcr in Ille ma
~intilthe arrival ofthe Ottomans somedecades later.
I
For further informataboui thEast TndiCompany, see,Appendis 3, Vol.15p. 95 A. TheBritish
3.3 By the end of the 18th century, in addition to its commercial interests, therc were other
rcasons for Britain's increased involvementin the Gulf, including the growing presence of
Indian traders who were subject to British protection. More significantly, the growing British
prcsence in India made the Gulf an area of great strategic i~nportanccfor successive British
governmenls. Maritime trade had considerably increascd,as kad piracics, with the resultthat
the southern coast of the Gulf came to be known as the "Pirate Coast". It was the
intensification of acts of piracy in the first part of t19th century, directly affccting British
2
commercia1interests, which ledto the firstmajor changeinthe British i-olein the area .
3.4 In 1797,two British vessels were attackedin the Gulf by Arabtribes led by the Qawasim,
whose headquarters were in Ras Al-Khaimah. In 1803-1804 and 1805, similar attacks
occurred, including the seizureby pirates of the British crew and passengers of a native vesse1
and, on another occasion, of two merchant vessels owned by the British Resident at Bushire.
Since these affairs were too serious to be ignored, the British sent an expcdition against the
Qawasim in 1805,followingwhich there wasa temporary cessatioilof acts ofpiracy.
3.5 In 1808,however, piratical attacks againstBritish and Indian vessels begaii once again,
and on two occasions the crews of such vessels were massacredby the pirates. By this time
the Qawasim reportedly possessed 63 large vessels and a huge fleet of small ones, and about
19,000 men afloat. This strength even led their sheikh to suggest that the Bombay
Govemment should pay him protection money, in return for wliich he would guarantee the
safety of British commerce in the Gulf. Sincc the British coiild not allow this situation to
continue, they despatched a secoiid expedition against tle Qalvasiin iii 1x09-18 10. While
many of'their vessels were destroyed,the piratical tribes made no forma1adinissinn of de'feat
or written engagement for future good conduct, aiid in 1812 tliere wcre already signs of a
revival of piracy. In 18 13 the Qawasim attacked and robbed several Rritish and imtive
commerciai vessels, and other vessels remainedconfined to port in India, iiotventuring to sail
on account of the increasing dangerat sea. Similar offcnces occurredin 18 14 and increased
For further detarelatintothe contentsof paras. 3.3-see, Lorilncr, ocil., Anil11.5,Vol. 3,
pp. 163-168 and 175-181.greatly in 1815-1816, when on many occasions the pirates riot only robbed ships, but also
killed their crews. These depredations continued until18 19.
3.6 In that year, a substantial force of combined British naval ütid East India Company
vessels was led against the Qawasim. The British took control of Rus al Kliaimah, and "the
other ports of the Pirate Coast were visited, anda çlean swccp was made of their military
dcfences and their larger war vessels3".Similar measures were taken against the two Bahraini
Sheikhs. Thereafter, individual agreements were signed by the British wit1.1tlie Sheikhs
including an undertaking to enter into a General Treaty of Peace inthe fl1ture4.Tlie Gcneral
Treaty was drawn up on 8January 1820, and on various dates the Sheikhs of the Pirate Coast,
including the two Bahraini Sheikhs,severaIlybecame parties thereto5.
3.7 By this Treaty the Arab signatoriesundertook on behaif ofthcmselves and their subjects
to abstain for the future from plunder and piracy, as distinguished from "cicknowledgedwar",
and various arrangements were prescribed forensuring strict observance by them oftheir new
obligations, arnong these being the adoption by the tribes of a common distinctive flag, and
the institution of a systemof ships'papers forpurposes of identification.
3.8 In order to enforce the Treaty of 1820,the British stationcd more permanentnaval forces
in the Gulf, and subsequent acts ofpiracy, includingseveral believed lohave been perpetrated
by tribes of Qatar and Bahrain, were dealt with directly by thcse forces. 1-Iowever,piracy as
well as numerous acts of aggression by one Arab tribeagainst:another continued, resulting in
severe disruption to both Britishand Arab trade, Therefore,in 1835, on British suggestion, a
maritime truce was established whichwas to be observed by the leüding sheilchsof the Pirate
Coast for the period from21 May to 21 Novernber of that year." Decause of the benefits to
trade this agreement brought, it was renewed on a yearly basis, until a Treaty of Maritime
Peace in Perpetuity was signed on 24 August 1853~.In 1836, the British liad also irnposed a
3Lorimer,op.cit., Annex11.5Vol. 3, p. !SI.
Ibid. See, alsAnnex 11.7,Vol.4, p. 171.
5Annex 11.14,Vol.5, p. 9.
6See,Lorimer, op.cit., Aili11.5Vol. 3, pp. 182-183.
See, ibid., pp. 188-189.Tlreatywassigned by theChiefsof Umin Al-Qaiwain,Ajinan,Dubai,Abu
Dhabi and Ras Al-Khaimah, whoseterritoriethereaftebecameknown as the"truciasheikhdoms".dejucto restrictive line between the Persian coast and the Arab coast, heyond w11içl.tihe Arab
tribes were not allowedto conduct any hostile operations.
3.9 While the aimof these trcaties and of the restrictive line was to protect trade by ensuring
maritime peace and eliminating piracy, the British were inevitably drawil into resolviiig local
disputes. This rhey did, for exanple, by irnposing fines and assisiiiig in the recovery of
plundered properly, andat times by supporting one sheikh ratherthan anotl-ier.
3.10 It is worthnoting, however, that Britishascendancy in the Gulffrom 1820onwards and,
in particular, over the affairs of the Arab chiefs, was mainly a de .fucfo position and not a
position held as of right. In effect, the moves to estabiish peacc at sea refcrred to above, as
well as others between 1838and 1847 concerning the slavc trade, permitted the British to
intervene to secure the execution of treaty obligations. But they did not establish any
supremacy of Great Britain overthe Arab chiefswith regard to their other interna1or external
affairs. Nor did Great Britainclaim suzeraintyover theni on trealy grounds. This situation was
not generally modified until 1892, when most Arab sheikhdoins coticluded the so-called
"Exdusive Agreements" with Great Britain, a general policy of protection having been
adopted at thattimeR.
B. The Ottomans
3.11 Unlike British involvement, which was essentially maritime and directed against
interferences with trade, Ottoman involvementin the regioti was inore concerned witli the
land, and was a reaction againstthe rise of Wahhabipower9. %y 1795the Wahhabishad taken
control of Ccntral Arabia and reached the Hasa coast, and were prepciring for furthcr
expansion "towardsKuwait, Bd~rain,Qatar and Oman" 'O.In 1802tlie I-iolycity ol.Mecca fell
8See,paras.3.50-3.51,below.
Y The tenns "Wahhabi" and"Wahliabism" coine from thenarne of a religioiisscholar, Muhammad Ibn
Abdul Wahhab (1703-1792), who in 1741launched an appeal for a drastic iefofthe religious,politicand
social lifeotheArabs, preachinginessence areturnto thefaitas knownin the days of the Prophet.He came
into contact with Muhammed ibn Saud, who adoptedhis preachings. Indeed, the terin "Wahhabi" thereatter
began to beassociatedwithSaudipowerandgave great impetusto tlieriscofthis powerby providinga sense of
Arab unitycornbined withtliedesire for reformation.The rofWalihabi powcr isdealtwithin mlircdetail by
Lorimer, op.cil.(Annex 11.5,Vol. 3pp. 354-355) andJ.A.Saldanhainthe Pevsiun GzrlfCmetteer (Annex11.9,
Vol.4, p 256-259).
p iee, Lorimer,up.cit.,nnex 17.5,Vol.3, p354.to the Wahhabis, and hm at least 1803until 18 11both Bakrain and Qatar were subject to the
influence of Abdurrahman bin Saud, the Wahhabi mir". Tlie extent of this power was an
embarrassrnentto the Ottoman Sultan,who claimed to be the litularoverlord of the Hijaz and
the leading Muslim sovereign with the right to control the Holy Places. He thercfore invited
the Viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad Ali (who was subjcct to the Otloinan Sultan), to send a
military expedition to obtain control over the Wahhabis on his behalf. This first expedition
took place between 1811 and 1815,and resulted in the occupation of the Hi.jaz,Nejd and
Hasa. After departure of the Egyptiantroops by 1824,the authority of the Ottoman Sultan was
not repudiated, and a nominaltribute continuedto be paid to him by the Walihabi mir".
3.12 Soon after the death in 1865of Faisalbin Turki,the WahhabiAmir, a conflict broke out
between his sons Abdullah and Saud. The Ottoman Turks supported Abdullah and appointed
hirn as Kaimakam (or Deputy Governor) of Nejd on their behalf, obtaining from Iiim an
admission of their suzerainty ovcr Central ArabiaI3. When Saud subseq~ientlysought to
overthrow his brother Abdullah, the Sublime Porte intervened by sending a military
expedition to Hasa and the Nejd in 1871 to restore peace aiid orderL4.'This Ottoman
involvement in the area confirrnedthe division between control of the sea by the British and
of the land by the Ottomans.
3.13 Already, in 1867the Ottomans hadbegun to make surveys of the arca and to produce
maps on the basis of these sur~e~s'~.The British were aware of the existence of these maps,
as witnessed by the stamps they bear. They show Bahrain and Qatar as scparate entities, the
Ottomans being concernedto demonstratethat the mainland, including Qatar, fell within their
sphere of influencelb.
3.14 Indeed, as will be further discussed below, in 1871,with the agreement of the Sheikhs
of Qatar, the Qatar peninsulacameformally undcrthe control of the Ottoman Empire with the
raising of the Ottoman flagat various localities and, in early 1872,the arriva1of an Ottoman
l'The leader of theWahhabwas variouslyknown as thAmiror asthe Imam.
'*See, Lorimer,opci!Annex 11.5Vol. 3, pp. 172-175.
13Ibid .,356.
14Ihid .,.356-357.
15
16See, MapNo. 4facingtheprecedingpageandAnnexes 11.21-11.V,ol.5, pp51-70.
See, also,paras.5.et seqbelow.garrison17.Ottoman control in Qatar was to last until 1915.In genmal, tlie British did nothing
to hinder this controI, once they had obtained the necessary assurances fromthe Porte that it
would not interfere in any way inthe affairs of' Bahrain or the Arab Trucial sheikhdoms ilor
disturb the peace at sea, which would have hadsevereadverse cffcctson British tradc18.
3.15 Against this background, it is now appropriate to turn to the history of Qatar and
Bahrain thcmselves.
Section3. The History ofOatar andBahrain up to 1868
A. Eventsin Qatar
3.16 As tlie Court will appreciate, written evidence of events in the region of Qatar and
Bahrain is understandably scarceforthis earlyperiod, given the difficult desert conditions and
the largely nomadic lifethat was led by the tribes. Nevertheless,therc is evidence to show that
a town existed at Zubarah on the northwestern coast of the Qatar peninsula in early Islamic
times, and there are aIso references to Qatari products dating from those times". Further
evidence shows that at least by the beginning of the 17th century Zubarah was already a
fortified town, with its own Sheikhand administration2'.
3.17 In 1715 members of the Al-Utub tribe from Central Arabia established tliemselves
outside the walls of Zubarah for abouttwo years, afterwhich lheywent to Kuwait. During this
time three sections emerged in the tribe: the Bin Kl-ialifah,from whom the present ruling
family in Bahrain claims descent, and the Bin Sabah and AI-~alahrna~'.In 1766 the Bin
Khalifah and Al-Jalahma sections left Kuwait for Bahrain, which had heen occupicd by the
Persians since 1753,and thcnceto the Qatar peninsula, where ii~1768 they built a fort,known
as AI-Murair,at some distanccoutside the outer wall ofZubarah 22.
17See,paras. 3.43-3.44,below.
18Sec,para. 3.45, below.
1'Annexes 11.68,11.71-11.7and11.76,Vol. 5,pp. 333385-396 and405.
20
21See, paras. 8.7-8.8,below,andAnnexesII.12and 11.13,Vol5, pp.1and 5.
These three sectionsremain in existence today, under the namesAl-Khalifah,Al-Sabah and Al-
Jalahma. O~ilythe Al-Khalifahsectionispresent in Bahrain nowhereas members of al1thrce sections live in
Qatar.Members of theAl-Khalifahsection LivinginQatar are citizeithe Slalof Qatar.
22See, Mohamed Khalifa Al-Nabhani,AI-TuhfahAl-Nahhaniyn,fi TurikhAl-Juzira AGAral~iya,Beirut
and Bahrain, 1986,p. 83 (Annex 11.69,Vol. 5, pp.340-342).Al-Nabhani is an officiahistorian oc Balirain.3.18 The growth of Zubwah was greatly stimulated by the Persian occupation of Basrah
between 1776 and 1779, during which time a number of Basrah mercliants together with
fugitives from Kuwait resided there temporarily, and thc pearl trade and gcneral trade with
eastern Arabia centred there. In these circumstances, thc "reductioii" of Zubarah became an
object of importance to the Persian ~overnment~~.Several attacks were thcrefore made upon
the place by the Sheikh of Bushire who was also Persian governor of Bahrain, supported by
Persian boats together with tribesfrom the Pirate Coast. l'hcse atten~ptscommenced in 1777,
but were unsuccessful 24.It was after failure of these attempts that ~nembcrs the Al-Utub,
together with tribes from various parts of Qatar, retaliated and finally took control of Bahrain
in 1783~',whereupon the Al-Utub transferred their headquarters to 13ahrain2!Ah these
events, and following a struggle for power in Bahrain,the Al-Jalahmasection of the Al-Utub
were evicted from the islandby the Bin Khalifah section27.
3.19 Since Britainwas chiefly concerned aboutits trade, mentions of Qatar inBritish sources
during the following period, up until 1820,refer mainly to the activities of Rahmah bill Jabir
of the dissenting Al-Jalahmasection ofthe Al-Utub tribe. He was regarded by the British as a
notorious pirate, but his hostility was in fact directed against the Bin Khalifài~section of his
tribe as aresult of their eviction of his ownsection from Bahrain. Rahmali bin Jabir managed
to achieve a substantial degee of control in the peninsulaat some periods, in conjunction with
the wahhabisZ8, and in 1809 the Wahhabis with his help took control of the whole
peninçula29.The following year, thcy extendedtheir control to Rahrain, but in 1811 tl~eywere
Consequently, Qatar expressesa formal reservationwitlirespect toany parts of his account which rnaysupport
Bahrain's positiointhe presentcase.
23See,Lorimer, op.cit., Annex11.5,Vol.3, pp. 194-195.
24Ibid., p. 195.
25Ihid .,. 246-247. The Qatari tribes involved included the Al-Musallam, Al-Bin Ali, Sudan (from
Doha), A26BuAinain, Kibisah, Sulutah(fiom Doha), Manana'ahSadah,Al-Bu Kuwarah,and Al-Naim.
27lbid.p. 195.
28Ibid.,p. 247.
Ibid pp. 196etseq.
29Ibid., p. 197.forced to withdraw from Bahrain and fiom the peninsula by the Iman of usc cal In'.the
course of these eventsthe town of Zubarah was burnt3'.
3.20 After 1820 and the signature of the General Treaty of ~eace~~t,he British cnntinued to
be principally concemed with Qatar as a source of occasional acls of piracy. Although Qatar
had noi been a party to the Treaty, the British appeared to think hat its terms nevertheless
applied to the peninsula. Howcver, on a visit to Al-Bida in 1823, the Political Resident
observed that "the people scemed toknow very littlc of the conditions of the treaty aiid[their
boats] had neither flagnor registe?31'.
3.21 During the first half of the 19thcentury both Qatar and Bahrain were marlcedby intcr-
and intra-tribal conflictas well as by a struggle for their controlby outsidepciwers.
3.22 In Qatar, the 1850'ssaw the rise of Mohamed bin Thmi bin Ali bin Jassim Al-Bin-
Tainim, who increasingly asserted his authority over the tribcs of the peilinsula and uplield
tlieir independence. In 1854, he described himself as Chicf of the people of Qatar, and by
1858 had entered into an agreement of friendship and cooperation on behaIf of Qatar with
Faisal bin Turki, the Wahhabi Amir, thus asserting his control ovcrthe country and people of
~atar~~.
B. EventsinBahrain
3.23 During the 17thand 18th centuries Bahraiil was occupied for rnost of the time by the
Persians, who were finally cxpelled in 1783by sections of the Al-Utub tribe and tribes from
10See, ibid.p. 198and Annex 11.75,Vol. 5p.401; Muscatcorresponds topi-esent-dayOman, which
should not be confusedwith whatwaskiiownas Tmciai Oman, correspondiiig tothe prcsent-dayUtiited Arab
Emirates31
32See, Lorimer, opcil.Annex 11.5Vol. 3, pp. 19and 250 and Annex 11.75, ol. 5p.401.
Sec,paras.3.6 et seqabove.
33Annex 11.15,Vol. 5, p.21. The town of Al-Bida othc eastern Coastof Qatar furrns part of what is
now callcd Doha, thecapitalof Qatar. The namc "Doha" began to be uscd around the middle of the 19th
century.
34Sec, Annexes 11.17and11.18 ,ol.5,pp.33-40.~atar'~.As noted above, the Bin Khalifah section finaily achieved ascendancy in Bahsain and
evicted the Al-Jalahma ~ection'~.
3.24 The Arab occupation of Bahrain in 1783was followed by a conf~~sed period until 1820,
with struggles for control over the isIandby Muscat, the Wahhahis and Persia. During this
time the Bin Khalifah from time to time acknowledged their submission to one or other of
37
these powers .
3.25 In the years following 1820, the year in which the General Treaty of Peace had been
signed by Britain with the Sheikhs of Bahrain, a series of fiu-therthreats were posed by
Muscat against Bahrain. Al1of these were ultimately unsucccssful, the British intervening
each time in an atternpt to preserve peace in the regiod8. The 1830s saw renewed thseüts to
Bahrain fiom the Hasa coast, first by the Wahhabisand thcn by the Egyptian forces who were
engaged in another expedition in the Arabian peninsula in support of the 0ttomans3'. Despite
assurances by Britain that it would protect Bahrain, the Bin Kl-ialifah nevertheless
acknowledged Egyptian supremacy in 1839 and paid tribute to the Egyptians, themselves
vassals of the Porte, inthat year40.
3.26 The period from 1840 to 1860 was marked in Bahrain primarily by a coiiflict between
Sheikh Abdullah bin Khalifah and his great-nephew, Sheikh Mohamed bin Khalifah, who
were CO-ruiersat the time. In 1842, Sheikh Mohamed was expelled from Bahrain and took
rehge in the Murair fort outside the old walls of Zubarah. Mohamed'spresencc at Murair did
not last long because in April 1843, helped by a contingent of Qataris, hc retook Muharraq
and ousted ~bdullah~', who was in turn expelled from Bahrain and praceeded to seek
alliances with both the Wahhabis andthe Persians in an effortto regain control of the isla~~d~~.
35
36See,Lorimer,op. cit.,Annex11.5Vol. 3, pp. 246-247.See,also, pa3-18, above.
37See,para.3.18, aboveSee,also,Lorimer,op.cil.Annex 11.5,Vol3,pp. 195and 247
38See,ibid.,pp.248-255.
See,ibid.,pp.255-263.
" See, ibid.,pp.263-266.
40See,ibid.,pp.268-273.
4ISm, ibid.pp. 206 and276-277.
42Ser, ibid.,pp.279-286.In 1848, Sheikh Mohamed requested fiom the British a new agreement affording him
protection, in an efforttosecurehis control.This requcst was however ultin~atelyrejected".
3.27 While they had refused Sheikh Mohamed's request for protection, the British
iievertheless rejected various claims of other parties to Rallraiii, adoptiiig an incrcasingly
protective attitude towards the island. Thus, in May 1853, wl-ienthere was reiiewed tension
between the Wahhabi Amir - then nominally subject to IlleOttoinan Porte - and Sheiktl
Mohamed, the British were ready to offer every obstacle to an attaclc ~ipoiithc island of
~ahradl. However, as will be seen below, the Britisli took rio stcp to uppose the Ottoman
forces when they moved into~atarj.
3.28 The struggle for control over Bahrain cameto a head in 1859.when Eurtherpreparations
for a descent on the island were made by the Wahhabi governor of the littoral. While the
British Political Resident had made it clear that he was determined to prescrve the
independence of Bahrain,the situation was complicated by the WalihabiAmir'sassertion that
he had authority over Bahrain as a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan and by thc fact tlat towards
the end of 1859Sheikh Mohamedof Brihrainhad made simultaneo~isapplications to both the
Persians andthe Ottomansfor protection46.
3.29 In 1861,inresponseto furtler Wahhabi threats,SheikhMohamedbegan to blockade the
Hasa coast and to harass the pearl fishers of Qatif and Dammam. The British interveiied with
naval forces and the Sheikh was forced tosubmit, being upbraided by tlie Political Resident,
who had arrived in Bahrain "to preserve the maritime tranquillityiiow opcnly endangered by
the defiant attitude [the Sheikh has] ass~rned~~".Thereafter, on 31 May 1861, Sheikh
Mohamed, togelber with other sheikhs of Bahrain, was required to entcr into an agreement
proposed by the Political Residcnt, thepurpose of which wasstated in the preamble to be "tlie
advancementof trade and the security ofal1cIassesof people navigating or residing upon the
coasts" of the Gulf. In exchange for an undertakingto abstain from "al1maritime aggressions
43See, ibid.,289.
44See,ibid.p. 294.
45See,para3.45b ,elow.
46See,Lorimer,op. cil., Annex 1Vol. 3,pp294-295.
47Ibid.,p. 296 aAnnex II.19,Vol. 5p.41.of every description", Slieikh Mohamed, recognised as "indcpcndent ruler of Bahrein", was
granted Britisliprotection against similaraggression from otlierchicfs or tribes inthe GUIP.
C.Events le ad into the Agreements of 1868
3.30 In 1867,an increase of the tensions between Mohamcd bin Thani in Qatar and the Bin
Khalifah in Bahrain occurrcd as a result of the seizure and depnrtatinii to Balirain of a Qatari
bedouin by Sheikh Ahmed bin Mohained bin Khalifah, the representative of the Sheikli of'
Bahrain at Wakrah.This causedthe lieadmenof Al-Bida and Wakrah to deinand the bedouin's
release and, on their request being refused, they took measures to expel Sheikh Ahmed froin
Wakrah. However, their action was forestalled by his removing himself to Klior Hassan. A
seeming reconciliation then took place, the Sheikh of Balvain releasing the bedouin and the
headmen of Qatar apologisingto the Sheikhfor their behaviour. Sheikh Jassim bin Mohamed,
the son of Mohamed bin Thani, was then invited to Bahrain for the purpose of making a
permanent arrangement for the administration of the peiiinsuia. As soon as he arrived,
however, he was imprisoned4'.
3.31 Immediately thereafter, Sheikh Mohamed bin Khalifah of Bahrain, in coordination with
Shcikh Zayed bin Khalifih Al-Bin-Yasof Abu Dhabi, launched an attaclcon Qatar, directed at
Wakrah and ~l-~ida~'. Al-Bida was totalry destroyed, and the victirns of tliis outrage
appealed for redress to the Wahhabi Arnir, who maintained a daim to authority over Qatar,
but whose demandfor reparatian was rejectedby the Sheikh of ~ahrain" .
3.32 At around the sametime, an encounter also occurred alAl-Hamroor, bctween the Al-
Naim tribe and the Bin Khalifah led by Sheikh Ahrnedbin Mohamed bin Khalifah. This was
provoked by Sheikh Ahmed'sapparent intentionto impose a tax upon the inlîabitmts of Qatar,
whicli had led to a general movement of hostility throuçhout thc populatioii. In the battle of
48Annex11.20,Vol. 5,p. 45.
49See,Lorimer, op.cilAlinex 11.5Vol.3,pp. 299-300.
50
Ibid., p.30and Annex 11.69Vol.5, pp.363-365.
5'Se~,Lorimer, op.cit.,Annex11.5Vol.3, p300.Al-Hamroor, Sheikh Ahmed was killed almost irnmediatcly, and the Al-Naim defeated the
Bin Khalifah forcess2.
3.33 In retaliation for the Bahraini attack on Wakrah aiid Al-Bida, inJune 1868the Qataris,
led by Mohamed bin Thani, sailed towards Bahrain with an armcd force. They wcre attacked
at Dmsah, however, by the Bin Khalifah of Bahrain, led by Sheikh Mohained bin KhaIifah,
and the engagement resultedin heavy casualtiesamongthe ~ataris'~.
3.34 Since this aflair had quickly corne tobe regardedthrougho~itthe Gulf as a testofBritish
preparedness to maintain the peace at sea, the British resolved to intewcne in the conflict,
viewing Sheikh Mohamed bin Khalifah's attack on Qataras a violation of the agreement
signed by hirn with thern in1~61~~ S.heikh Mohamed, who wasreportcdly "well awarc that a
reckoning was at hand", fled to Qatar upon the arrival at Bahrain of Colonel Pelly, the
Political Resident, withthree naval vesselss5.
3.35 As a result of the intervention by Colonel Pelly, on 6 Septeinber 1868 Sheikh Ali bin
Khalifah, who had been left as Ruler of Bahrain der the flight of SlieikhMohained, executed
anagreement in settlernentof the iff fai r^e^A.greementprnvides as follows:
"We, the undersigned, Ali bin Khalifeh aiid the inhabitants and subjectsof Bahrein in
general, do hereby declare that Mahomed bin Kl-ialifehhaving rcpeatedly committed
acts of piracy and other irregularities at sea, and liaving ~iow,after llis recent piratical
act, fled from Bahrein, has forfeitedal1clair tnhis title as principal Shaikh and Cliief
of Bahrein, and at thepreseritmoment therebeiilgno othcr Shaikh, 1,Ali binKhalifeh,
received the Resident's letter addressed to Mahomcd bin Khalifeh, and have
understood the demandstherein made, and 1 hereby agrce and acceptthe conditions as
f0llows:-
1st.-To make over to-morrow moming 19th Jemadi-ool-ml 1285 (7th September
1Sus) o the high in rank, Captain Brown, Commandiiig1-IerMajcsty'sships prescrit,
al1the wrirbuglas and biitcelsbelonging toMahomedbiiiKhalifeh and myself.
2nd.-Ta pay the Residentthc sum of one iri kfhdollarsiithe manncr specifiedbelow:
25,000 dollars cash, payable on the spot on the 7thSepteinber 1868.
52
53ec, Annex11.74,Vol. p.397.
54See,Annex11.69,Vol.5,pp. 369-371andLorimer,op.cit.Annex 11.5,ol.3,p.301.
55See,Annex11.67,Vol. 5p.329.
See,Lorimer,op.cil.Annex 11.5,Vol3, p. 302.
Ibid. 75,000 dollars by three annual instalinents of 25,000 dollars, cach instalinent being
payablc on the 7th Septe~nberof eachsuccessiveycar ui~tilthe total sum ispaid up.
3rd.-To consider Mahomed bin Khalifeh as perrnaneiltly excluded from al1
participation in the affairs of Bahrein and as having no claiinto that territory, and in
case of his returning to Bahrein1 promise to seize and malcehi111 over to the Resident.
But if 1do not act up to the stipulations now agrecd 1 rnay be considered a pirate, as
Mahomed binKhalifeh himself.
4th.-In view of preserving the peace at sea, and precluding the occurrence of further
disturbance, and in order ta keep theResidcnt informed of what happens, 1promise to
appoint an agent onmy part at 13ushires7."
3.36 Afier securing this Agreement from Ali bin Khalifah, Colonel Pelly entercd into direct
contact with Moharned bin Thani, writing him a letter datcd 11 Septeinber 1868 wliich calls
upon him to "continue ... the peaceful relations forrnerly subsisting bctween Bahrcin and
Guttar" and invites him to settlethe problems imrnediatelyÇR.This led, on 12 September 1868,
to the conclusion of an Agreementwith MohamedbillThani, as follows:
"1,Mahomed bin Sanee, of Guttur, do hereby solemnly bind inyself in thc presence of
the Lord, to carry into effect the underrnentionedterins agreed upon betwcen me and
Lieutenant-Colonel Pelly, HerBritannicMajesty'sPoliticalKcsident,Persian GulC -
1st. -1promise to return toDawkaand reside peüceablyin that port.
2nd. -1 promise that on no pretence whatsoever will 1 at any time put to sea with
hostile intention, and in the event of disputes or misunderstanding arising, will
invariably refer to the Resident
3rd. - 1 promise on no account to aid Mahomed bin Khalifeh, or in any way connect
myself with him.
4th. - If Mahomed bin Khalifeh fa11into rny hands, 1promise to liand him over to the
Resident.
5th.- 1promise to maintain towards Shaikh Ali bin Khalifeh, Chicf of Bahrein, al1the
relations which heretofore subsisted betweenme and the Shaikh of Bahrein, andin the
event of a difference of opinion arising as to any question, whcther mûney payment or
othermatter, the sme is to be referredto the ~esident"."
3.37 On 13 September 1868, Colonel Pelly made an address to the trihes of Qatar, wxning
them that if anyone were found "in any way breaking the peacc at sea, he will betreated in the
same manner as Shaikh Mahomedbin Khalifeh,of Bahrein, has bcen". The address continued
57Annex11.26,Vol. 5, p.75.
58Annex 11.27Vol. 5, p. 79.
59Annex11.28,Vol. 5, p. 83."TheBritish Resident, in the most friendly but solemn inaimer, warns al1 of you that the
English Government are determincdto preservethe pcace at sea in the Pcrsian GUI~G'".
3.38 In the Agreements of 1868, the position of Sheikh Mohamed bin Thüni as Chief of
Qatar was acknowledged, and the two Agreements treated the Chiefof Balirain and the Cllief
of Qatar on an equal footing. The Agreements also confirin British recognition that tlie
authority of the Sheikh of Bahrain did ilot extend to the territof Qatar. since crichSheikll
accepted obligation to hand over Mohamed binKhalifah,who was sdidto have fled from
Bahrainto Qatar, if he was foundon his territory.
3.39 In the Sourthcondition of his Agreement, Sheikh Ali bin Khalifah,who was already
bound to abstain from maritime aggressionby the agreement of 1861, was remindcd of Iiis
obligation to respect the maritime peacemd, in that connection, tolcccpthe Political Resideiit
informed. For his part, Sheikh Mohamed bin Thani proinised tlot to put tcisea with hostile
intention and to refer to the Residentin the event of disputes or misunderstandings arising.
Thus, the sea was to act as a buffer between Bahrainand Qatar, and thc Resideiltwas to be
kepi infoimed so that he could intervene if required to prevent any hostile action arising
across the sea by oneparty againsttheother.
Section 4.Events from 1868to 1930
A. BritishIntervention inBahrain followingthe 1868 Agreements
3.40 Somefour months after signature of the 1868Agreements, in January 1869,and despite
the terms of the third article of Ille Agreement signedwith Sheikh Ali bin Khülifah, Sheikh
Mohamed bin Khalifah was allowedby thc British to return to Bahrain. This was at the
request of Sheikh Ali, who believed he could keep better control over hirn if he was in
Bahrain ratlier than elsewherc. However,he soon began to iiitrigue,and SheikIiAli deported
him to Kuwait. By September 1869 Sheikh Mohamed had moved to Qatif, and from there
GO
Annex 11.29Vol.5,p. 87.attacked Bahrain. 111an engagement betweenthe forces of Mohanied and Ali, Ali was killed
and his forces weredefeated6'.
3.41 When Colonel Pelly learnt of the violation of the inaritimc peace by Mohamed bin
Khalifah and his allies, he proposed, inter alia, a blockade of Bahrain until the leaders of the
disturbance, including Mohamed bin Khalifah, were surrendered. IIe also proposed the
recognition of Issa, the son of Ali bin Khalifah,as Chief of Balirain. The Ciover~lmeno tf lndia
authorised Pelly to proceed with the blockade and stated that lis recommcndation as to Issa
seemed reasonable and that he could act on it after the blockade, if circ~imstancesseemed
fa~ourable~~.
3.42 In November 1869,Pelly blockaded Bahrain, the garrison surreildered, and Mohamed
bin Khalifah was taken prisoner. Subsequently, the British invited Issa to assume the
governrnent of the country. Following this British intervention, protests were made by Persia
and the Porte, who both continued to rnaintain clairns over ~ahrain". Howevcr, the British
opposed such claims and, as will be shown below, were to increase theirinvolvcment in and
protection of Bahrain in the following years, supporting thc rule of Sheikh Issa and his
64
successors .
B.Forma1Arriva1 of theOttomans in Qatar: 1871-1873
3.43 As noted above, while the British had become the dominant powcr in maritimc matters
in the Gulf bythis time, the Ottomanshad established theircontrol over large parts ofthe land
on the Arabian side of the Gulf, and in 1867 had already perhrmed various siïrveys of the
area illustrating their view of the territorial Iimits of both Qatar and I3ahrainG5I.n July 1871,
shortly after an Ottoman expedition to Nejd, Sheikh Abdullah bin Sabah, who had been
appointed Kaimakani of Kuwait by the Ottomans, sailed to Qatar to ~neetSheikh Mohamed
61See,Saldanha,op. cit.Annex 11.7Vol. 4, pp.39-40.
62
63See,ibid.,pp.40-45.
64See,ibid, pp.45-46.
65Ibid.,and seeparas.3.46et seq.bclow.
Sec,para3.13, abovc, andAnnexes 11.21-11.24, ol. pp.5 1-70.bin Thani and his son Jassim, and to offer them the protection of ihe Ottoman Eiiipire,
handing overto them four Ottomanflagsb6.
3.44 Thereafter, in January 1872a detachment of Ottomanregular lroops arrived lo iilstall a
garrison in Al-Bida. These were in turn replaced in 1873 by genu'armes67H . owever, thc
immediate effect of these events was not particularly sigaificant as far as tlie political
organisation of Qatar was concerned.Lorimer cornmentsas follows:
"Except in the internd affairs of Qatar, especially the administration ofthc chiel'town
and its immediate environs, little or no change was praduced by the presence of a
Turkish post at Dohah; tribal relations geilerally continiied on the samc footing as
formerly, and the Al Thani Shaikhs of Dohah werc still the principal factor in
poiiti~s68.fl
3.45 The main concem of the British, when they had learnt of the Ottoman cxpedition to
Ne.jd,seems to have beentu establish that the Ottomans would assert no claii~isover Bahrain.
In response to a request for clarification madeto the OttomanGoveri~nieiitthrough the British
Arnbassador in Constantinople shortly before Sheikh Abdullah bin Sabah's visitto Qatar on
behalf ofthe Ottomans, it wasreported on 12May 1871that:
"The Ottoman Porte explicitly denies al1 intention of extending supreinacy over
Bahrein, Maskat, or the independent tribes of Southern Arabia, andconteinplates no
attack against them69."
A further Ottoman assurance was given that the officer commanding tlieexpedition had
instructions "on no accountto turn his eyes on ahr rein" "u.bsequeiitly,having been asked
by the British whether the Ottoman intervention atDoha had bcen aulliorisedby thc Ottoman
Government, the Vali of Baghdad "claimedthat Qatar was not covered by a previous Turkish
assurance thatthere çhouldbe no intcrfcrencewitli ~ahrain~"'.
66
Sec,Lorimer, op.cit.Annex 11.5,Vol.3, p.209.
67See,ibid., pp.209etseq.
68Ihid., p. 210.
''Saldanha,op. cit., Annex 11.Vol. 4,p. 48.
70Ihid.,p.49.
71Lorimer, op. çitAnnex 11.5Vol.3, p.210. C. 1874-1892:British Attitudes to Qatar andBahrain
3.46 British policy towards Balirain during this period continued to bc directed at isolating
Bahrain fiom the problems of the mainland and protecting it from clain~sof other powers. To
this end, the British entered into an Exclusive Agreement with the Sheikh of Bahrain in
1880~ ~ .is was the only agreement of its kind at the time, andwm testimony to the unique
commcrcial and strategic position Bahrain held for tlie British, especially in view of the
growing interest of foreign powers in the ~ulf~'. By this agreement, the Sheikh of 13ahrain
undertook, interalia, to abstain from negotiating or entering into treaties my sort or from
establishing diplomatic or consular relations with any other govei-ilmeiitwithout British
consent.
3.47 British relations with Qatar following the arriva1of thc Ottomans were marked by a
desire to continue to enforce the maritime peace against acts of piracy slemining from Qatari
ports and to protect the local Indian traders from Sheikh Jassim'scontinuous harassment. At
the same time the British recognised that the Ottomans had dejuçto control of the peninsula,
and they were prepared to achowledge this control.
3.48 In 1881,the Goverrimentof India sought clarificationfrom the British Governrnentas to
how it should treat the Ottoman presence in Qatar. The orders of the British Government,
issued eariy in 1882, were to the effect that the Sheikh, "thoughhe liad açcepted the position
of an Ottoman dependent on land,shouldbe encouraged to maiiltainclose and direct relations
with the of'ficersof the Government of India and ta defer to them, as he appeared iiiclined to
do, in ailmatters affectingthe peace of the seas". Decision in particularcases in eveilt of the
Sheikh putting to sea with hostile intentions was left to tlie Governmcnt of Tndia, "upon
general considerations of expediency", and "ncedless q~iestionswith Turkisli authorities" and
"unnecessary encroachrnent upon the jurisdiction of thc Sultan" wlierever itwas cffectually
established onthe Coastto the north of Udeidwere to bc avc~ided~~.
72Annex 11.36,Vol5, p117.
73
74Se@,Lorimer, opcit., Aiinex Vol.3,pp.328 etseq.
Sm, ibid.,p.217.3.49 Consequently, when the British became aware of various alteinpts by the Ottomans to
strengthen their position on the peninsula, they did not interfere. For example, whcn in July
1889the British Ambassador at Constantinople receivcda pro-rnemoria Sromthc Ottoman
Foreign Office to the effect that the troops in Qatar were lo be reiriforcedfroni the Raglidad
Army Corps, he raised with the British Governrnentthe question of Oltoiiian rights over the
Qatar coast, biit he was only instructed to remind the Ottoman Gvvernmenl tbat "Her
Majesty'sGovernment could notview witliindifference any attcmpt oiithe part of tlieTurkish
authorities at intcrferenceor aggressioiiin 0man7'".
3.50 At this time, the British were also becoming very concerned about theinterest of other
powers in the region. It was these concerns,arnongothers, which led to thc sigiiingin 1892of
Exclusive Protection Agreements between Britain andthe rcspective clliefsof the sheikhdorns
of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah,Dubai, Ajinan,Ummal Qaiwainand Ras alKhaimah.
3.51 At the sme time, and in confirmation and by way of extension of the Exclusive
Agreement signed in 1880 and the previous treaty of 31May 1861,the British also signed on
13 March1892 a further exclusive protectioil agreement with the then Ruler of Bahrain,
Slieikh Issa bin Ali. That Agreementprovided, notabIy, tliat he bound himself and his heirs
and successors not to enter intoany agreement or correspondencewilh üny Power other than
the British Government; notto consent to the residence in Bahrain of the agent of any other
Government without the assent of theBritish Government; and not 10 cede, sell, mortgage or
otherwise give for occupation anypart of histerritory Saveto the British ~overi-irnent'~.
3.52 No such agreement was signedat the time with Qatar, since Qatar was at the time under
the authority of the Ottomans. Indeed,in 1891, Sheikh Jassim bin Mohamed bin 'I'hanihad
sought from the British a treaty "onthe same terms as Trucial Chiefs". However, the British
rejected this approach on Ille grounds that the "Sultan would ncitagrec to the proposa1 and
nothing wnuld be gaitledbymakingit77".
75Saldanha,op.cit.Annex 11.8Vol.4, pp.221-222.In thicontext,"Oman" rekrs to whatwas known
as "TruciaOman", whichliasnowbecome theUnitedArab Elnirates.
76Annex 11.37,Vol. 5p.121,
77See, Saldanhaop.cit.Anncx 11.8Vol.4, pp.225-226.D. 1892-1916: Endofthe Ottoman Presence in Qatar and increased BritishInvolvement
in Bahrain
1. Events inQatar
3.53 Although Sheikh Jassiin had been appointed Kairnakamby thc Ottomans in 1876, his
relations with them were not always good. In 189 1 he had tendcrcd liis resignation, but this
was not accepted, and he was instead told "to work with zeal and to discllarge the duties he
had performed bef~re~~"H . owever, in 1893he came to blows with Ottoman troops when tlie
Vali of Basrah led an army against him to punish hiin for various acts of insubordination. A
battle took place at Wajbah, some distance to the west of Doha. After heavy Iosses on both
sides, agreement was reached on an armisticeand settlement whcreby Sl-ieikhJassiin resigned
his position asKaimakam and left administrative mattersinthe hands OShis brother ~limed".
3.54 In March 1895,the Al-bin-Ali, a tribe which had been living in Baliraimi silice the time
of the Arab conquest of the island, fell into dispute with thc Riiler of Bahsain and returned to
Qatar to settieclose to Zubarahwith the support of SheikhJassim bin ha ni^ T he Ruler of
Bahrain cornplained to the Political Resident about the threatto Bahrain tl.ihe alcged was
caused by this settlement8', and the Political Resident warncd Sheilch Jassim thal Great
Britain could not accept it8'.The Ottomansthen sent soldiers into the regind3 and tlit:British,
concerned to assure the security of Bahrain having regard tn the Exclusive Protection
Agreements of 1880and 1892andthe Treaty of 1868,selita warsl-iip.Forty-four boats which
had apparently been assembled by the Ottomans and Sheikh Jassim to attack Bdrain were
destroyed by the British, afier which Sheikh Jassim surrendered and accepted the British
conditions, including rernoval of the ~l-bin-~ii'~. OHomanprotests followed, but tlie British
78See,ibid.pp.223-224.
79
80See, Lorimerop. cilAnnex 11.5,Vol.3, pp.229-230.
Ses,Annex11.39,Vol. 5,p. 129.
82Ibid.
See, Annex 11.38Vol.5,p. 125.
83Annex11.40,Vol.5, p.133.
84Annex 11.42,Vol. 5, p. 1See, alsoLorimer, op.cit.AniiexH.5, Vol.3, pp.330-333and Annex
11.69,Vol.5,pp.375-378.replied that the ineasures taken were necessary for the defence of Bahrain, which was under
their protection85.
2. The1913Anglo-Ottoman Convention
3.55 One of the raisons d'êtrefor this Convention was tliat, in the years preceding its
negotiation, tensions had corneto a head between the British and Ottoinan Govcrnments over
the Ottoman presence on the Hasa coast and in the Qatar peninsula. As tensions built up it
became apparent that it was essential to defilie and agree upon the extent of British and
Ottoman control over theregion.
3.56 Negotiations for the Convention began in 1911 and ended witli signature on 29 July
1913. Ratification was twice postponed, however, and due to the outbreak of war the
Convention was never ratified. Nevcrtheless, it is by 110means devoid of lcgal value. 'l'he
provisions relating to Qatar midBahrainare important. The provisions relating to Qatar read
as f~llows~~:
"II.Al-Qatar
ART. 11.The Ottomansancak ofNajd, the northern linlit of wliiçh is indicated by the
demarcation line defined in Article 7 of this convention, ends in the south at the gulf
facing the island of al-Zakhnuniyah, which belongs to the said scrncuk. A line
beginning at the extreme end of that gulf will go directlysouth up to the Euh'-al-Khali
and will separate the Najd from the peninsula of al-Qatar. 'Theliinits of the Najd are
indicated by a blue lineon themap annexe td the present convention(annex Va). The
Ottoman Imperia1Government having renouncedal1its claims to the peninsula of al-
Qatar, it is understood by the two Governmentstliat the peninsula wiIl be governed as
in the past by the shaykhJasim-bin-Sami and liis successors. The Governmentof His
Britannic Majesty declares that it will noî allow the interrerence of the shaykh oc
Bahrayn in the interna1affairs of al-Qatar, his endangeringthe autonomy of that area
or his annexing it.
ART, 12. The inhabitants of Bahrayn will be allowed to visil the island of ai-
Zakhnuniyah for fishing purposes andto residethere in full frecdom during the winter
as in the past, without the application ofanynew tax."
See, Saldanha,op. cit., An11.7Vol. 4, p106 andLoiimer,op.cit.Annex 11.5,Vol3, p. 333.
Sce,also,para. 8.24,below.
'Thefultext of tConventioncanbe foundinAnnex 11.44,Vol. 5, p. 151.The provision relating to the territoryof Bahrsiinnoted:
"ART. 13.The OttomanImperia1Governmentrenounces al1ils çlaims to the islands of
Balirayn, including the two islets Lubaynat al-Aliya and 1,ubaynat al-Safliya, and
recognizes the independencc of the country. For its part, the Government of His
Britannic Majesty dcclarcs that it has no iiitentioilof mexing the islands of Rahrayn
to its territories."
3.57 This Convention thus once again recognised the autonoiny of thc Qatar peniilsula under
Bin Thani iule, as in the past. While it did not definethe territorial limits of Qatar and Bahrain
with any precision, the way it dealt with islands such as the Libainat islands, situated
approximately half way between Bahrain and the 1-Iasacoast, and Zakhnuniyah island,
situated just off the Hasa coast, is important for this dispute, considering lhat the 1-Iawar
islands, situatedjust off the Qatar coast, arenot mentioned. If they lîad been considered as
appertaining to Bahrstin,their location so close to Qatar would surely have requircd express
confirmation of this fact, but the Convention is consistent wit1the vüriousinaps produced by
the Ottomans during the 19th century, many of which were seen by the British authorities ai
the time, and which show the Hawar islands and other features relevant to this dispute as
appertaining to Qatar.
3.58 Since the 1913 Convention had not been ratified at the outbreak of the War in 1914,it
never came formally into force. However,it appears that Article 1I of tliat Convcntion was
regarded as binding, since the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 9 Marc111914, which was ratified in
London on 3 June 1914", refers to that Article 1 1, whereby the territory of Qatar was
separated fromthe Ottoman sanjak ofNejd.
3.59 A further complication arose as a result of the conquest ofIIasa in 1913by Ibn Saud, at
that time Ruler of Nejd. He claimed to regard Qataras partof his ancestral domains; but at the
end of 1913 he was persuaded that non-interlèrence with Qatar was a condition of
maintenance of friendly relations withthe British Goverilment. Iiideed, in a treaty concluded
with the British Government on 26 Dcccmber 19 15, he uildertook to refrain from aggression
on, or interference with, "theterritories o..the Sheikhsof Katr and the 01nan coast, who are
87Annex 11.45,Vol5, p. 16Sm, also, Annex11.48,VoI.5, 187.under the protection of the British Governrnent, and wlio have trealy relations with the said
Government, and the liinitsof their territoriesshall be hereaftcr delerrninedps".
3.60 In spite of the signature of the 1913Conventionexpressing recogniticinof thc autoilomy
of Qatar and renouncing al1 tlieir claims thereto, the Ottomans continiied to maintain a
garrison at Doha, the rcmnants of which departed as a coiisequence ofthe arriva1of a Rritisli
warship and a landing at Doha effectedwithoutopposition on 20 August 19 15.
3. The 1916Agreement
3.61 As a result of the above events, negotiations wcre carried out directly bctween the
British and Sheikh Abdullah bin Jassim bin Mohamed Al-Thani, thc successor of Slleikll
Jassim, concesning an exclusive agreement in the same form as tliosc which had been agreed
with otherArab Sheikhs in 1892.Afterthe final depart~lreof the Ottomans, thesc ilegotiations
led to signature of a Treaty by Sheikh Abdullah and the Political Resident on 3 November
1916,and its ratification on 23 March 191 sg9 . his Treaty recngnised thc contiiiuity of Al-
Thani rule in Qatar from 1868 to 1916 and set out various obligations for the Shcikh. In
particular,he undertook not to "have reIations nor correspond witli,iior rcceive the agent of,
any other Power without the consent of the High British Governinent", nor to "ccde to any
other Power or its subjects, lad either on lease, sale, Lransfer,gift, or in any other way
wl~atsoever" nor to grant my concessions, witho~it tlie salne consent of the British
Governrnent.In retum, the British Governmentundertookto accordto the Slieikli,his subjects
and vessels the same treatment as it conferredon "the friendly Shaikhs,their subjects and their
vessels", to give protection against aggressionby sea and to Iryta exact reparation for injuries
suffered at sea, and to grant good offices should the Sheikh or his subjccts "be assailed by
land within the territories of Qatar".
88Anncx 11.46Vol.5,p. 175.Secalso, Annex11.10Vol. 4, p.274.
8')
Annex 11-47, ol. 5,181. Section 5.1917-1947: TheSituation prior to the BritishDecisinnsof 1939 and 1947
3.62 Thisperiod is close to the beginningof the disputeitself. As a result itwill inevitably be
dealt with in more detail in the Parts which iollow. To avoid repetitioil,thcrefore, oiilya brief
surnmary ofthe main events will be given here.
A. The Discovew of Oiland itsImpact on the Economies of Oatar and Rahrain
1.The economies of Qatar and Bahrain prior to thc discovery of uil
3.63 Despite the geographical proximity of Qatar and Bahrain, Bahrain's economy had
always been by far the more prosperous of the two until the 1950s, when the balance was
redressed by the development of ûil in Qatar. This was due to a combination of more fertile
land, supporting a diversified system of agriculture, andtlie long-standing iiltercst of various
foreign powers in developing Bahrain as the trading and strategic centre of the Gulf. In
particular, the British saw Bahrain as a centre which could be developed for their own
commercial and political interests andto counter ather foreign influence".
3.64 As mentioned above, like other Arabsof the Gulf States, bnth Qataris and Bahraillis
were involved in the fishing and pearl fishing industries. Fishing was an important activity,
affording a livelihood to a proportioiiof the population and being an important sourcc of food.
In addition, a certain amount of dried fish was exported. There was no regulation of fishing
activities or fishing areas, and the use of fish traps did not involvc any proprietary rights over
their location. At that time the person who cauglit Iiving resourccs in the sea became tlieir
owner .
3-65 Only pearl fishing, on banks to be found alnilg the coast bctween Kuwait and Oman,
was however a real sourceof income forthe Arab tribes. It was an importantthough seasoiial
activity in Qatar and Bahrain, which was governed oiilyby custom and local traditions. As
noted in 1840: "The right of (pearl) fishing is common to al1the liul?'". Pearl fishing rights
9IQ.M.J.A.,Annex 1.56p.342. See, aisAppendix34, Vol.15,p.111..43,Vol5, p. 145.were thus a collective right or property of al1the tribes of the Gulf. This was an exclusive
right, to the exclusion of third parties,and a concurrent rightof al1suçhtribes.
3.66 Qatar and Bahrain suffereda serious decline in their pearling industriesduring the early
part of the 20th century, being hit by the effects of the introduction of artiliçialand cultured
pearls, and by the recession of the 1930s. The development of oildcalt a death blow to the
once important activity of pearling as well as to the other traditional ccoi~ornicactivities.
From lhat time on, oilbecame the predo~ninantindustry in both States.
2. Thediscoveryand developmentof oil
3.67 The development of the oil economy occurredmucll more quiclclyin Bahrain than in
~atar~~.In 1923 the representative of the Eastern and General Syndiçatc Lirnited ("EGS")
prepared a draft agreement to be concluded withBahraiil for a pctroleuin concession, and the
Ruler of Bahrain granted a concession to EGSon 2 Deceinber 1925, which was subsequently
transferred to BAPCO. Oil was first struck on 1June 1932,and ii~1934 oil storage facilities
and a pipeline were constructed, with the first oil shipment being made in the samc year.
Construction of a refinery began in 1935 andwas cornpletedin 1937.Oii fiom other parts of
the Gulf, especially SaudiArabia, was brought tothe rcfinery, and during the Second World
War a plant was constructed for the productionof aviation spirit.In 1946 a large port iàcility,
exclusiveiy coiiilectedwith oil production and delivery, was coinpleted ofi'Sitra Island. The
influx of wealth from oil, and foreign influences in the form of oilmcn and othcrs, had a
considerable influence on the political development and signiiicance of Bahrain, as did the
importance of tliese oil suppliesand the refineryil:the context o l'theBritish war effort.
3.68 Oil development bcgan considerably later iti Qatar. Tliere, thc Grst concession
agrccrnent was not concluded until 1935. 111 1938 the coilcession-holder, Pctroleum
ConcessionsLimited ("PCL"),estabIished its camp at Dukhan on the wcstern side of Qatar
and started drilling. It struck oil iiithe following year. It drilled two more wclls with
promising results and was aboutto drill a fourth when it was orderedby thc Britishauthorities
io close down its operations for the duration of tlie war and plug the wells it 1:adalready
92
For further details concerningthe developmentosee,paras. 6.1eiscy., belon'.drilled. It was not until 1946that the Companyresumed its operations, and not until December
1949 that the first shipment of oil took place from Qatar - a whule 15 years alter the
corresponding event in Bahrain. From the date of the 1947 Brilisli decision, Qatar granted
offshore concessions in thc area oî the enclave around thc Hawar islailds, and also up to the
line laid down bythe 1947dccision and to the north of thatlir~e~~.
B. Other Events in Bahrain
3.69 By the 1930s, Bahrain was recognised by the British Governinent as a protccted State
(but not a British Protectorate) enjoying special treaty relations withthe British Govemment.
The internal administration of the State was formally conducted in the late 1920sby Sheikh
Hamad bin Issa Al-JShalifah,the acting Ruler of Bahrainsince the deposition of his father by
the British Government in 1923,following seriouscornplaintsof mismle and oppression. But,
in practice, and at least until 1928, internal power in Bahrain was exercised by the British
Political ~~eiit'~.In 1926,a British Financial Adviser, Mr. Charles Dalrymple Bclgrave, was
appointed by the Bahraini authorities on the advice of the British to assist Sheikh Hamad iii
the task of internal administrationg5. He rapidly acquiredpronounced influence and power, not
only in Bahrain, but also in the Gulf more generally. Belgrave's position is described as
follows:
"From Isa'sdeposition until 1928 the Political Agent was thevirtual ruler of Bahrain.
Hamad was indolent andtook little interest in State affairs and from 1928 until his
death in 1942 Mr. C. (now Sir Charles) DalryrnpleBelgravc, who had been appointed
93See, Annex 11.57,VoI. 5, p. 227. It may be noted that in the sector located in tlie north, during the
presence of the British, Qatar refrained from granting concessions or autharizing drilling Westof a line frorn
longitude 51°20'N and latitude 27"E10Ras Rakan. From 1971, Qatar granted concessions and authorized
drilling to the Westof that line, in accordance with anextension of tlie line of the segment North Sitrah Light
BuoyiBahrain LightVessel of the 1947 decision upto its intersectwith the seabed deliinitation agreement
between Iran and Qatar.See, Annex II.GG,ol5, p. 325.
91Sec, Annex 11.11,Vol.4, p. 291.
95Belgrave'seducation atOxfordUniversity was interruptby World War 1.IIe became a "temporary
officer",receiving his commission through the Officer Training CoHcs.scrvedin the Sudan in1915-1916,
and subsequently in Palestine andEgypt.Towards the end of thewar he was secoridedthe Frontier Districts
Administration Camel Corps, where he spentseveral years ithe Western Desert of Egypt. His dulies at that
time included a certain amount of courtand politicalwork. F1923 to 19251icwas an administrative officer
in the Colonial Service in Tanganyika where he aiso had experience ofcourt work. Durinçiirncwith the
Colonial Service,he passedtwo of its law examinations. In Marc1926 Belgravetook upthe appointment of
FinancialAdviser to the Ruler of Balirain, althoughby 19he had achieved rnuch wider powcrs. He retired
from Bahrainin 1957and diedin 1970. Financial Adviser in 1926, sofar as internal administr;itiowas conceriied,was to al1
intents and purposesthe ruIerof the state9?."
3.70 As will be scen, Belgrave's power was exerciseddiiring the 1930s no1 only in rclatioilto
nlatters affecting the internal administrationof Bahrain,bu1alsu in matters at'fectingBahraiil's
relations with neighbouring sheikhdoms, including Qatar.In pai-ticular,lie played a leading
and, it inust be said, discreditable partin the unsavoiiry imanceuvressurrounding Balîrain's
wrongful acquisition ofthe Hawari~lands~~.
3.71 In addition to these administrative changes, in the 1920s Bahraiil became more alid
more the commercial centre of the GuIf,and by the 1930shad becorne of vital interest to thc
British as a key point on the air route to India and beyond, without which a civil aviation
service could not be maintained. With the construction of an airport for thc Royal Air Force,
and with the creation of a new naval base in Bahrain in 1935, Balirain alsu became the
strategiccentre for Britain's positionin the GUI?'.
3.72 Another factor which operated to strengthen the ties of Britain to Bahraiil was the
Persian threat. As early as 1922, there were signs tliat Persia would sliortly revive its long-
standing claim to sovereignty over Bahrain; and indeed iil1927the Persian daim was brought
before the League of Nations, in the context of a Persian protcst agüinst thc Saudi/British
Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927(concludedwith Ibn Saud) in which Bahrainis described as
having "specialtreaty relations" with theBritish Governrnent.This Persian protest provoked a
stroag reply frornthe British Government repudiatingthe Persian ~lairn~~.
C. Other Events in Qatar
3.73 During this same period, Qatar remainedunder the control OC the Al-Thani ijinily, with
whom the British Government maintained much more distant relations than it did with thc
Rulers of Bahrain. This may be attributable to tlie consideration tliat the British had
maintained a Political Agent in Bahrain since 1904whercas, no duubt in part beçause of the
'"bid.
9See, inparticular,Chap.VI, Sec2 and 3below.
9fl
99es,Annex 11.1,Vol.4,pp.296-297.
See,Annex 11.10,Vol. pp.266-271.Turkish presence in Qatar from 1871to 1915,they had no such direct representation inQatar.
Indeed, no Political Agent in Qatarwas appointed by the Britisli ~lntil1949;prior to 1949, it
was the Political Agent in Bahrain who was responsible for reporliiig cinconditions in Qatar.
Thus, during the 1930s, British knowledge of the geography of Qatar and of its Rulers and
other leading farnilies was inevitably limited; and this was to lead to somc mistaken
impressions on the part of Britishofficiais.
3.74 As mentioned above, the British aeronautical authorities, both civil and military, liad
strong reasons for supporting the interests of the Ruler of Bahrain. By way of contrast, the
Ruler of Qatar inthe 1930swas reluctant to afford aeronautical facilities in response to British
100
requests . However, on 11 May 1935, at a tirne when the Ruler oc Qatar wu, isundcrthe
pressure of a serious dispute with Ibn Saud over the lirnits of Qatar's southcrn border,ille
British wrote to the Ruler of Qatar concerning the protection wliicli they wcre prepared to
extend to him on land1o'.It was pointed out at that tirne that, in order to cnable the British to
implement their guarantee of protection,it was necessary that the Royal Air Force should be
accorded certain facilities, andthereafter theRuler raised no objectionto the construction of a
landing go~d102. It was also a condition for this extended British protection that an oil
concession was granted by the Ruler of Qatar to the British Company Aiiglo-Persian Oil
Company ("APOC")on 17 May 1935,to be transfcrrcd to Petroleum Development (Qatar)
Ltd. in October of the next year.
D. TheIssue of theHawar Islands andOatar's Protest
3.75 On 28 April 1936a formal clairn to the Hawar islands was subinilted by Belgrave, the
Ruler of Bahrain'sBritish adviser, in a letter to the Political Agent in ~ahrain''! The events
following Bahrain's formal claim and the procedure adopted thereafter by thc British are
discussed in detail below in Chaptcr VI. The British decision that the 1-Iawarislands belonged
to Bahrain was eventually communicatcd to the two Rulers by letters of 11 July 1939. The
IO0See,Annex II11,Vof. 4,p.310.
IO1ihid.,p. 1.
102
103Ibid ..31O.
Tlie historyof Bahrain'sclaitothe I-lawaislands andtheprocedure adopted bythe British arc
dealtwith ingreater detail inChap.VI,below.Ruler o1'Qatarimmedialely protcsted this decision, but,in spile of serious doubts about the
correctness of the decision by certain British officiais, this and subscquent protests were
rejectcd or ignored bythe British.
E. Events leading up to the British Decisinn uf 1947
3.76 Although the necessity for sorne kind of maritiine ciclimitation l~ad been recognised iii
1940,the Second World Warand the resulting suspension ofoil coiiipanyaclivities put an end
to further discussions of the territorialissues between Bahrainand Qatar foi-severalyears.
3.77 Immediately after the war a change took place in British administrative arrangeinents in
the area. In 1946,the Political Residency was transferred fromR~ishisein Persia to Bahraiil,
confirming Bahrain's position at the centre of British intcrests in the CiulC In 1947, Her
Majesty'sGovemment took over responsibilityfor Gulf affairs Crointlie Ciovernmentof India,
and the Political Resident now became answerable to the Cominonwealth Relations Officc
until 1April 1948, when full controlwas transferredto the Foreign 0fficelo4.
3.78 The end of World War II, the Truman Proclamation and the resumptinn of oil coinpany
activitiesgave a newurgency to the maritime delimitation issue.IIIMay 1946, BAPCO asked
for permission to driIl in certain areas, some of wliichthe Britisliconsidcred ~ilighteventually
be found to belong to Qatar. The British Government decided thüt this pcrmission could iiot
be granted until therehad beena division ofthe sea-bed between Bahrainand ~atar"~.
3.79 At the sarne time, the British authorities resumed the review of the status of Fasht ad
Dibal and Qit'atJaradah wliichhad startedbefore the war. The review ccincerncdnot only the
status of tliese features but alsowhether Balirainor Qatar asserted any iights ovcr them and, if
so, tlienature of such rights. Itwas consideredby the British thatany delimitation would have
to t&e accountof these features, and alsoofthe 1939 decision ovcrthe 1-Iawarislai~ds'~~.
104
105Sec,Appendix3, Vol. 15,p.95.
Sec,Annex 11.1,Vol. 4, p. 293.Thehistory of the sca-bed divisdealtwith ingreater detail in
Chap.X,below.
1UGSee,paras.10.44etseq.helow.3.80 The subsequent British decision was comm~inicated to the two Rulers by Ictters of 23
December 1947issuedby the British Political Agent inBal~rüiil. The letters statcd, inlsr crlia,
kat the operations of the oil companics in the territories of Qatar and Baliraiii illude a
delimitation necessary, thatthe British Governrnent considered the line "dividcs in accordance
with equitable principles"the sea-bedbetween Qatar and Bahrain, and tliathis was ü inediaa
line based gcnerally on thc configuration of the çoastline of the Balirain mai11island and the
peoinsula of ~aiar"~.
3.81 The decisioiispeçifiedtwo exceptions.Thc first purported lo recognjse tllatBahrain lzad
"sovereign rights" in "the areas of the Dibal and Jaradeh shoals" lying east of the line on the
Qatar side. It was Mler stated that "After a full examitiatioi~ 01'the position undcr
international law", the British Governrneiit was of the opinion that "tlîese shoals sliould not bc
considered to be islands havitlg territorialwaters". The sccond exception was the drawing of
the line with the intention of giviiig effect to the British dccision of II July 1939 that thc
IIawar islmds belongedto Baliraii~.
IV7
Annexes 11.52and 11.53,Vol. 5, pp. 205 and 209; seclparas. 10.13 ci seq.below. Qatar hes, for
illustrative purposes oiily, prepared a rnap (Map Na. 12, facing page 215) showing t1947 linc based011the
icxt of the British decision. The map showing the 1947 line attaçhedto Qatar's Applicatiori, aiid of which a
further enlarged copy wes given to the Court tipon the request of the Regisiwas 1101the rnap attachedtu tlie
letter sent by the British to the RofQatar in 1947. In thisregard, sincethe filiiiitsApplication, Qatar lias
found a copy of a letter dated 10 April 1961 from Ihc Political Agency in Doha to tlie British Kesidcncy
reportirig a request from Qatar for a copy of the 1947 letter aiid a copy of the inap wwaschenclosed, since
this, along with many othcr of Qatar'sofficial ducuments, was believed to have beeii srosec,Anncx 111.286,
Vol. 8,p. 421 and paras. 6.197-6.198, below. However, as of today, Qatar is nutlin possession of this map.
The 1947 line starts in the soufrom point "Mo,defined as "180" true18.03 NaciticalMiles froin the
'l'riangulationStationNo. 102atKas al Barr" and ends in Ihcnorthatthe "Rahrain Light Vessel", the posilion of
wliich was assigned in 1947at "046 114"true 28.05Nautical Milesfrom the Polilical Agcnt's tlagstaff Latitiide
26"14'.1N, Longitude 50°35'.2E (approximately), as the positioiis of floating inarks are subject 10 frequeilt
alteration". This northern point is hereinafter refcrtodas "BLV", iiorder to avoid confusioii wjth anothcr
Bahraiii Liglit Float, which is today located at the followitig coordina26"33'N, 5I003'E (sce Alinex 11.1,
Vol. 3, p.39), i.e.itis moored 23 milesNNW of Ras Rakan Light and "28miles northeastward of thc noiihern
extremity of Jazirat al Muharraq(see,Annex 11.2,Vol. 3,p. 60). Section 6. Protests overthe 1939and 1947 British Decisions, and Neerotiations
A. Protests
3.82 As noted above, the Rulcr of Qatar had immediately protcsted the 1939 decisioii. Hc
requested rcconsideration andfurther enquiries into the facts, wliilereserviilghis rigllts to tlic
Hawar islands. This protest was followed by renewed protests, inlerdia on 18 Nuvember
1939 and 7June 1940 and, after the War,on 13July 1946 and21 February 1948 'O8.
3.83 The British decision of 1947was protested by both Qatar and ~ahraiii"? Thc Ruler of
Qatar accepted the line drawn bythe British but could not acceptthc two exceptionsmade for
tlie IIawar islands and for the shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradal?. Tke Ruler of'Bahrain
contendedthat the liileshould runfurker to the east, andasserted slllegedrights to al1tlie seas,
shoals and reefs betweeil Bahrain and Qatar. Specifically, he protcsted thefact tl~atthe two
shoals had been treated as "enclaves"on the Qatar side of the line. He also protcsted against
the fact that Janan island was attributedto Qatar in the 1947decision, althoughhc regarded it
as part of the Hawar group andthetefore asbelonging toBahrain.
3.84 There were further protcstsinto the early 1950sfrom both Kulers and also Iloin the oil
companies themselves. Although there is a good deal of evidcnce, from interna1 British
correspondence of the period, that the British a~ithoritiesmight have becn prepared to
reconsider certain elements of the 1947 decision (iiicluding questioiis over the real
geographical nature and legal status of the shoals of Dibal and Qit'atJaradah and over the
identity of the Hawar islands), the British repeatedly confirmedin responsc to protests that
tlieyregarded the decision as final.
10Annexes 11.49-115and 11.54,Vol. pp. 191-204and233.
109
See,Chap,X,Sect.3, below.3.85 Nevertheless, the British encouragedQatar and Bahrain to malte sea-bed proclamations
in 1949, on the basis of texts that the British had themselves prcpared'i! Two featurcs of
these proclamations are of note. First, they stress that the sca-bed boundaries should bc
delimited on the basis of equitable principles, and second they contain express reservations
regarding sovereignty over islandsand for "fishing and traditional pearling rights".
B. Negotiations
3.86 It was not until the 1960s that anyprogress was made on the disputes over the IIawar
islands, Dibal and Qit'atJaradah and the 1947 line. At this timc both Qatar and Bahrain wcrc
still under British protection. In a Memorandum of 1961 the C;over11111en of Bahrain
requested the British to make a modification of the 1947 line, allegiiig that Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah were islands with territorial waters and belonged to Rahrai~i,aiid that the fact that
Bdu-ainis fished for pearls in the area to the east of the 1947 line was a special circurnstance
within the ineaning of Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, justifying modilication of
the line"'. The extent of the proposed modification was shown on a map attachrd to tlie
Mernorandum. It will be noted that it paçsed to the east oS Dibül and Qit'at Jaradah and
extended in a way not defined in the Memorandum into the maritilne area to the north of the
Qatar peninsula. This Memorandum was not made known to tlie Govemment of Qatar until
Septeniber 1964"~.
3.87 A detailed description of the varivus steps taken after that date with a view to resolving
the dispute between the two States rnay be found at paragraphs 3.02 to 3.65 of Qatar's
Mernorial in the phase of this case relating to Questions of .Jurisdiclionand Admissibility.
Briefly summarised, there were first attempts, under the auspices of the British Govcrnment,
to settle the matter through arbitration, biit these altempts failed. Foilowing the final
withdrawal of British troops from the Gulf in 1971, it wüs agreed as a result of meetings in
110
Il!Copies othese proclamationareincludedinAnnexes 11.55and 11.56Vol. 5pp.219 and223
II2Annex 11.59Vol. 5,p. 237.
See,para. 10.3footnote61, below.1975 and 1976that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabiawould undertakcmcdiation betwecn the twci
States. During the following years,the King of Saudi Arabia directcd his efforts, at differeiit
times, at securing a settlement of the substance of the disputes,at ssuhinittirigthc matter to
adjudication, and at preventing or resolving incidentscreatiilgtension betweeiithe two States.
It was in thc context of this mediation that the Parties entered intu tlie agreements of
December 1987 and 25 December 1990 whereby they undcrtook, inkr dia, to subinit tu the
Court the whole of the dispute betwcenthem. PART 111
THE EIAWARISLANDS AND OTHER TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS
CHAPTERIV
THE GEOCRAPHYOFTEIEHAWAK ISLANIIS
Section1. Locationand Composition
4.1 For the purpose of tliis presentation thc Hawx islands are delined as the collection of
islands and islets situated within the enclave describedby the Rritisl-iun 23 Decernbcr1947'.
Thcsc islands are situated in a compactcluster along the central portion of Qatar'swest coast,
just north of the parallel 25'301N,andjusl east of the ineridian 50°40'G.
4.2 IJpon first cxamination of Maps Nos. 2 and 5, Sacingpages 14 and 50, one is struclc
immcdiately by the shape of this island group,which fits iieatly witliin tliigeneral shape of
the Qatari coast2. The group'sdistinguishing characteristic is the prcsence 01.a rather long,
narrow island shaped a little like a crescent, positioncd so tliat its southeatiprstarts from,
and its northeastcrn tip returns to, the mainland of Qatar. This is tlie main 1-Iawarisland,
whose name was used in the 1939 decision to describe the group of islaiidsof whicli it forms
part.It can be seen that the islandof Hawar is a direct continuation of Qatar's westerncoast
which, starting fiom the suuthern reaches of Dawhat Salwah, proceeds north to Hawar, lheii
bends slightly to the nol-th-northeastuntil it reaches Ras Rakan,wlicrcit turns çl~arplyto the
cast. Qatar'swestern coast in the vicinity of thc Hawar islands is vcry ragged, resemnbliiiga
jigsaw puzzlc with a fcw missing pieccs. The Hawar islands appear to he the missing pieces
that would be needed to complctc the eurveoSQalar'sweslei-IIcoast between Ras Uwaynat
and Ras Ilmm Hish. Whcn fittcd together, these pieces reliect the conti~iuousgeographical
structiireofQatar. In fact, the Hawar islands arephysicallyailiiitegrapart of tlie landmass of
Qatar.
1
2The liiieas so desçrihcd isshownon iMa12,facingp. 15.
The expressions "the Hawar islands" an"the Hawür group" areused intercliaiigeably in this
Memurial.4.3 Several recent surveys3 indicate that appproximately 31 islands and islets are situated
within theperimeter ofthe enclavedescribedin the 1947British decision.
4.4 The area of the isIands at higli tide is extremely varied, ianging from less than 1square
kilometre for several of the islets found just south and southeast of Suwad al Janubiyah to
27square kilumetres for the main island of Hawar. Hawar is by far the largest island in the
group. Its total length from north to south is 21.3kilometres and its niaximun~width is
5.3kilometres. Hawar island also foms the western perimeter of the island group. A video
film documentingthe recent construction on Hawar island and the geographic situation of the
island group relative to bothQatarand Bahrain was prepared inSeptcn~ber1995~.
4.5 As illustrated on Map No. 5 facing this page, the distance between thc main island of
Hawar andthe nearest coastal point on Bahrain'smain island is 21.85kilometres;the distance
between the island in the Hawar group thatis closest to Bahrain [Rabad al Gharbiyah) and the
nearest point on the Bahraini coast is 18.75kilometres. In other words, the Hawar islands arc
separated from Bahrain by a sizeable expanse of open water. In general, the waters between
the Hawar islands and the mainland of Qatar are extremely shallow even at high tide. At low
tide the distance betweenthe tip of the spit ofHawar islaiidand the nearest point on the Qatari
coast is only 250 metres. Approximately half of the islands of the Hawar group lie either
wholly or partially within 3 nautical miles of Qatar'smainland coast. The 3-mile limit from
Qatar's high tide coast depicted on Mup No. 5 shows that Suwad as11Shamaliyah, Suwad al
Janubiyah, the Wakurs and the Bu Sadads are al1wholly within this area; Umm Haswarah is
just touchcd by the line and the entire southern half of Hawar lies within 3 nautical miles. In
the northern part of Hawar, Rabadal Gharbiyah,Rabad ash Sharqiyah,Ajira and several other
srndl islets to the north of IIawar liejust beyondthe 3-mile Iimit; wliile in thc south, Janan is
3
A satellite photo (Landsattliematicmapper image, prepared by Barringcr,Golden,Colorado); "Qatar",
1:100,000,Doha.Editionof 1982(Sheet 1540);"TheStateof Bahrain",1:50,000,1986,Sheet 3, Cdn2. A copy
of each of these documentsisbeing depositedwitli the Registry of ttie Court in accordance with A50,cle
paragraph 2 ofthe Rulesof Court.
4See, Appendix 2,Vol. 15,p. 1,and the video "BahrainActions and Activities in Hawar Islands Since
the Beginning of the Mediation". Tweiitycopies of the video have been depwithethe Registry pursuant to
Article50 of the Rulesof CourSee,also,Appendix7, Vol. 16,which containstnosaics of the Hawarislands.practicallybisected bythe line5.An examination of Map No. 5 clearly illustrates the compact
nature of the Hawar group.
Section 2. Geolom and Geomorphology
4.6 Geologically, it is likely that the bedrock ofthe Hawar islands is the same age and typc as
that of the adjacent Qatar peninsu1a6.The folding dong the Dukhai structure created a single
landscape fion1which the present bedrock surfaces of both the peninsula and tlie islands were
eroded by the sea, by wind and possibly by rivers. This laiidscape was Iowerthan, and cluite
separate from the initial folded landscape of Bahrain, which was developed along different
structures. Thereafter the sea level rose and floodedthe fringes of the landscape of the Qatar
Peninsula to create a series of islands, including 1-Iawar.This rise of sea levei probably
occurred about 5,000 - 8,000 years ago. Since then, sea level has fallen slightly exposing
coastal sediments around some of the islands and shoals. This has also created an area
between the Hawar islands and the peninsula which is subject to coastal deposition. In terms
of coasial processes, this area is part of the western Qatar coastal system. Today, this zone of
small islands, shoals and shallow waters is protected againstthe "sliamal"winds and the wave
erosion that accompanies them by the shield provided by Hawar island and its "spit". This
sheltered zone between the Hawar islands and the Qatar mainland appears to be cl~aracterized
by sediment accumulation, and the intervening areas of water are becoming narrower and
shallower. If the sea tevel remains the same, it is probable tl~atthe islands will grow, join
together and Iink up with the peninsula - in other words, for the Hawar islands to be
physically reunited with the mainland. This phenornenon has already occurred at a number of
locations along the western Coastof the Arabian Gulf. The reuniting is only likely to he fully
achieved, however, over cenhiriesandonly affectsthe area described7.
5
Xtin- be noted that Janan was not included withinpcriineteof the enclave dcscribed in tlie 1947
British decision.
6 See,the Geological Map ofQatar, 1:200,000, 1970. Acopy ofthis map is heing depositewith the
Registry of the Court in accordaticewith Ar50,lparagraph 2 of the Rulof Court.
7See, A.I.M. Alsheeb, 1988,CoastalGeumorphofogy oftheQulur Peninsula, Ph.D,Thesis, University
College of Swansea, University of WaleA.A.A. Babikir, 1986,"Thevegetation of natural depressions in Qatar
in relatiota climate and soil",Arid Environments, IO,(3), pp.165-73; C.Cavelier, 1975, "Le Tertiaire du
Qatar en affleurement", LexiquetratLgraphique Internutiunpp. 3, 10,63, 89-120; Dcpartmeiit of Petroleum
Affairs, Qatar, 1988lnterpretation of Subayueous Structures wilh St~uctlo'al OvsDirector of Petroleum
Affairs, Qatar, 1970, Geological Map of Qatar, 1:200,000; J.C. Doornkamp et al., 1980, Gcology,
tieornnrpholo~ and Pedalogy ofBahrcrin,Ceobooks, Norwich;J.J.H.C. Houbolt, 1957,Surfuce ~ediments oj
the Persian Gulfnour the Qatar PeninsufPh.D.thesis, University of Utrecht;Kassler,1973,"The structural4.7 Hawar island and its associated islands are part of the major evolving coastal system of
the western Qatarpeninsula. The Hawar islands are therefore ü flanking offshore island group
that, in terms of coastal dynamics, ispart of Qatar.Furthermore,tliis coastal system is enlirely
separate from that of Bhain. Indeed it is a long way from Bahrain and separated by
relatively deep waters or a channel. The occurrence of fine muddy sands and rnuds iii these
deep waters separating Bahrain andQatar suggests tliat there are prcihablyno transfers of
sediment between the Qatar coastal systemand the Bahrain island coastalsystem, and that the
two systerns are dynamicalIy separate. The occurrence of soine shoals and reefs, trending
NNE/SSW, in the expanse of sea between Balmin and Qatar reinforccs this view, because
they were probably createdby strong tidalcurrents running in the deep watersor channel.
and geomorphic evolution of the Persian Gulf', in I3.H.Purser (eThePersian Gulf;Springer-Vertag, Berlin,
pp. 11-32;R.W. Powers etal. ,966,"Geology ofthe Arabian Peninsula: sedilnentary gcology of Saudi Arabia",
US. GeologicalSurveyPrvfessional Papev,560-D; E.A. Shinn, 1973,"Carbunate coastalaccretinn aiiarea of
longshore transport,E Qatar, Persian Gulf', in B.H. Purse(ed.),The Persiun Gulf;Spriiiger-Verlag, Berlin,
pp. 180-98; J.C.M. Taylor and L.V. Illing, 1969, "Holocene intertidal calciuin carbonate ccmentatQatar,
Persian Gulf', Sedirnentology, 12, pp69-107; J.W. Tleel, 1973,"Surface geology nf the Dammam Dome,
Easteni Province, Saudi Arabia"Am. Ass. Pet. Geal.Bull.57, pp.558-76. Sce, also, Annex 111.301,Vol8, p.
507. CHAPTERV
THE TERRITORIALINTEGRITYOF QATAR AND QATAR'SSOVEREIGNTY
OVERTHEHAWAR ISLANDS
Section1. Introduction
5.1 In this Chapter, it will be shown that the territorial integrity of Qatar, together with dl
islands immediately adjoining the mainland, was recognized and confirmcd, fromüt least the
middle of the nineteenth century by the British in the course of their efforts to maintain
maritime peace in the Gulf area; and that it was further confirnied by specific Ottoman
surveys carried out in the second haofthe 19thcentury, surveyswhich were also acquiesced
in or formally accepted by the British. It will be shown tliat the IIawar islands, and Zubarah,
were similarly always accepted as bsing part of Qatar by countries in the rcgion. The Ruler of
Bahrain is himself on record in 1907as having accepted Qatar's sovereignty over theHawas
islands. The extent of Qatar's territory, including the IIawas islands, was confimed in
numerous maps covering a period of some seventy-fve yeass, in a description recorded in
1908by Lorimer, in the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913, in a British Admiralty survey of
1915, read with the British-Qatar Treaty of 191 6,and otherwise in British Governrnent
records until at least 1933.This long-standing state of affairs was only brought into question
with regard to the Hawar islands by the British, giving entirely unjustificd credence to a
Bahraini claim to the Hawar islands from 1936, after oil becmne a significant feature in the
Gulf area; and thereafter makingthe decision of July 1939that the Hawar islands belonged to
Bahrain - a decision which was alrnost immediately seriously attacked as wrong by a senior
British officid and eventually acknowledged by the British Government itself as being an
appropriate subject of dispute to be arbitrated.
5.2 As shown in Chapter III,from early in the nineteenth century. Bahrain became an
important mainstay of British policy in the Gulf, the mainobjective of which was to maintain
the maritime peace in orderto facilitate sea trade withansafesea-routeto India. Beginning
with the General Treaty of Peace of1820 concluded witl~the Slieikhsof the Pirate Coast and
with Bahrain with a view to eliminating piracy, the British entered into a numbcr of treaties
mentioned hereafter to ensure such maritime peace. Thc importaliceof the Bahrain islands inparticular to the British was stressed a few years later ina letter of6 12cbruary 1851from the
Foreign Officeto the Governmentof India stating:
"... it would be injurious to British interests that the Islands of Balrein sliould be
placed under tlie sovereignty, the protection or the directing intluence of any foreign
Power; andthat tliereis a danger ...that Islandsinight fa11under the control of Francc,
of Turkey, or of persia1."
5.3 When violations of maritime peace originatingin Bahrain continued to occur, the British
Resident in the Persian Gulf wrote to Sheikh Mohamed bin Khalifah of Bahrain on 18 May
1861, reaffirming his determination sternly to repress ciny hostile atittempts on the
neiglibouringtribes, made by Bahrainor inthe name ofBaluain.Hc went on to say:
"...you are now engaged in aggressions on the coast nu your neighbours, the
Wahabees ...Hence my arriva1here to preserve the maritime lrünquillity now openly
endangered by the defiant attitudeyou have assurned2."
5.4 This letter was followed by the signing of the "Friendly Convention" betweenthe Ruler
of Bahrain and the British Political Resident on 3 1 May 1861. Ry Article 2 of this
Convention, the Ruler undertook to "abstainfrnm ail maritime ugg~cssions of every
description, from the prosecution of war,piracy, and slavery by sea, so long as 1 receive thc
support of the British Government inthe maintenance of the security of iny own possessions
against sirnilaraggressionsdirected againstthem by the Chiefs and tribes of this ~ulf~".
5.5 However, rivalries among the ruling family of Bahrain on the one hand, and between
thern and otherlocal Sheikhs of the Gulf, on the other, continued during this period4.Friction
between Bahrain and Qatar had become endemic in the first half of the nineteenth century as
Qatar was frequently used as a base for dissident members of tlie Bi11Khalifah fmily to
pursue their quanels with the niling section in Bahrain. Tliiscffeclively ceased hy the middle
of the century, when the whole of Qatar was generally under the leadership of Sheikh
1Annex 111.4Vol.6, p. 13.
2Annex 111.5, ol6, p.27.
3Annex 111.6, ol. 6, p1;emphasisadded.
4See,Annex 111.297, ol.8, p.487andLorimer,op. citAiinex 11.5,Vol. pp. 294ctseq.Moharned bin ha ni 'h.e later Bahraini attacks in the battles of 1867and 1868described in
Chapter 111"ere regardedbythe British as aggressioncontrary to the Agreement of 1861and
they therefore decided to punish the Ruler, denounced him as a "pirate" and replaccd him by
his brother Sheikh ~li'.
5.6 As described above, these cvents led to two British agreements in 1868 - one witli the
Chief of Bahrain and another with the Chief of Qatar. The principal object of these
agreements again was the maintenanceof maritimepeace andeach agreement iiicorporatcd an
undertaking by each Ruler to preserve peace at sea. As a result of tliese agreements, the sea
was to act asa buffer between Bahrain and Qatar, which werc thus considered as distinct and
separate entities. As the object of these agreements was to achieve peace at sea they cIearly
also recognised the territorial integrityof the peninsula of Qatar and its iminediately adjoining
isIands. It could not have bcen and was not within the contemplation of any of the parties that
Bahrain had or could have any rights over any part of the peninsula or its adjoiniilg islands,
imxcludingthe Hawar islands, located mostly within Qatar's territcirial waters and alinost
eighteen nautical miles away from Bahrain.A contrary view would deprive the Agreements of
1868of any meaning or purpose.
5.7 As already described in Chapter III,early in the 19th century, the Ottoman Sultan had
begun to take effective stepsto displacethe Wahhabi controIover the Muslim holy places and
other areas in the Arabian peninsul$. After the death of Faisal Bin Turki in 1865, his
successor acknowledged to the British that he was ruling under the eflèctive control of the
Ottoman Goverment. Although the British attitude was ambivalent about Ottoman rights in
Qatar, they did not want to intervene so long as the Ottomans retnained within the territorial
limits of Qatar and did not interfere with the British or Ilieir influence and authority in
Bahrain. Indeed, the British sought and were able to obtain Sromthe Ottomans in May 1871
an assurance that the Ottoman Porte had no intention of extending suprernacy over Balvain,
Muscat, or the independent tribes of Southern ~rabia~. The Ottoinrins reassurcd the British
5See,Annexes11.17 andII.18,Vol. 5,pp. 3and 37.
6SEC,paras.3.30etseq., above.
7See,Annex 111.297, ol8, p.487 andLorimer,op.cit.AnnexIT.5,Vol. 3,pp. 207-209.
II
9Ses, paras.3.1etseq,, above.
See,Saldanha,op. citAnnex 11.7Vol.4, pp.48-49.again soon thereafter that on no accounl did they waiitto turn their "eyes on ah rein "". a
result, the British did nothing to hinder the Ottoman expansionlo iiiclude the peninsula of
Qatar, its immediately adjoining islandsandwaters.
5.8 During the latter part of the 19th century, Rahrain fram tinle to tiine advanced vague
pretensions to varioils islands {including Zakhnuniyah and the Hawar islands) whcre
fishermen from differeiit countriesinthe region (Oman, Hasa, Qatar, A~LL Dhabi,Bahrain, and
the Persian Coast) utldertook seasonal fishing cictivities". Its pretcnsioils also extended to
Zubarah on the mainlandof the Qatar peninsula and even the shoals nTDibal (Maxnzoor)and
Qit'at Jaradah -pretensions which were either not accepted or firmly re,jcctedboth by the
British and the Ottomans aswell as other countries in the region. In particiilar, the RuIer of
Abu Dhabi (in spite of the fact he had fought many battles with Qatar over their own border
differences) repeatedlyconfirmedthat the Hawar islands, Janan,tlie shoals of Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah, and Zubarah belonged to Qatar.
Section2. Reco~nition nf Territory
A. General
5.9 Qatar submits that recognition by third countries of the extent of tcrritory controlled by a
State or other entity is highly significant in establishing tilleto that territory.Even more
significant is recognition by the other party to the territorial dispute which can also form the
basis of an estoppel.
5.10 As pointed out by Shaw, the priiicipIcof effective conlrol of a terrilory to demonstrate
title:
"...comprises a seriesof elements, andclearly the more such elements are satisfied thc
stronger and more certainwill the title be. But tliis principle, which relies upon acts
performed or assiniilated by a State authority, rnust bc seen in conjunction with the
important principle of recognition.
IOSec,ibid.,p49.
1I
Sce,Annexes 111.15,11.2and 111.2V,ol.6,pp.75, 325 and 129and Annex 111.128,ol.7,p. 141. With regard to this principle, one must distinguisli betwccn international recognition
and bilateral recognition. In the former case, one is concerned with the acceptance by
the international community as a whole of a particular situation as a valid one despite
any ambiguousor illegalorigin, while inthe latter case one or inore Statesrecognizc a
particular situation and may therefore be estopped from deiiying thc validity of the
samein the future; that is, the situation is opposable to suc11States but not necessarily
to others. The two may shade into one another, b~~itit is believed that a fundarnental
distinction lies between the two.Bilateral recognition is important as regards evidence
of effective control and should therefore be treated as an clen~eiit within 111at
principle12."
That the probative nature of recognition is well recognised was also nated by Professor R.Y.
Jennings who wrote:
"...it is, of course, obvious that al1forms of acknowledgement of a legal or factual
position rnay be of great probative or evidentiary value eveii when not thernselves an
elernent in the substantive law of title. Recognition -and also ücquicscei~ce -is likely,
therefore, for that reason alone,to have a prominent place in territorial questions13."
5.1 1 Internationaljurisprudence generally confirms the probative character of recognition, in
particular in rnatters of territorial title. In the Delagoa Baycase (1875), the Arbitral Tribunal
cited, in support of its decision in favour of the territorial title çlaimed by Portugal, the
recognitionof this title by HollandandAustria on the basisthat:
"Attendu que, les actes par lesquels le Portugal a appuyé sesprktenticinsn'ont soulevé
aucune réclamationde la part du Gouvernement des Provinces Unies; qu'en 1782,ces
prétentions ont ététacitement acceptées par l'Autriche, à la suite d'explications
diplomatiques échangéee sntrecette Puissance etle ~ortugal'!."
5.12 Similarly, in the Rann of Kutch case (1968), the majority decision of the Arbitration
Tribunal relied on British declarations recognising that the territory in dispute between India
and Pakistan belonged to Kutch, the Stateof which Indiawas the successor:
12Annex 111.310,Vol. 8, pp. 566-567See,also, Annex 111.307,Vol. 8, 550 rcprodiicing an extract
from Oppenheirn'sInternationalLaw,stressingthe importance of recognition in relationto consolidatitlcof
over a periodof time, and stating, "Oneof most importantofthe new factors ithcattitude towarda given
situationfthe internationalcommunity,partlyby the processof recognition...".
14Annex 111.304,Vol. 8,p. 51.
Annex 111.290,Vol. 8,p.454. "The statements made on the British side that the Rann was Kutch territory carry
greater weight ...the attitudewas most clearly cxpressed in thc Bombay Gazetteers for
the years 1905and 1914in which it was stated that the total arca of'9,000squaremiles
of the Rannbelonged to utc ch'"''
5.13 Again, in the Dubai/Sharjuhcase (198l), the Tribunaltook note o('thefact that:
"...the British authoxities ... always recognised the territory of the Rani Qitati as
forming part of ~harjal~'""
and tliereforeconcluded frornthis thatthis territory did ilidcedbeluilgto Sharjah.
5.14 In the presant case, apartfrom the recognition accordedby other couiltries in the region,
the recognition by tlieBritish of Qatar's sovereignty over the Hawar islands until oil became a
îactor inthe Gulf area can similarlybe regarded as significantevidence oi'thissovereignty.
B. S~ecificInstances demonstrating Recognition
1. The Turkish presence,their survey maps, andBritish and regional recognition
5.15 In the 1860s, the Turkish authorities were anxious to extend Ottoman influence in thc
Gulf area by bringing certain territoriesunder Ottoman coiitrol. These territories included
Qatar, with which at the time the British had no treaty relations. Ottoman Marine
Comrnanderstliereforcunderlook surveys of the territoryof Qatar and itsüdjoining islands. A
survey map of the borders of Qatar (including Zubarah, the Hawar islands and the Dibal and
Jaradah shoals) was coinpleted by an Ottoman Exploratory Marine Captain in September
1867". Another Ottoman survey map, completed in Novcmber 1867,shows tlic distances in
leagues between themainlandand the shoals of Dibal and .laradalii8.A third Ottoman survey
map of 1867similarly shows thc bou~idariesof Qatar and ~al~raiii", and a further rnap, of
15
IhAnnex 111.294,Vol8,p.472.
17Annex 111.295V,ol8, p481.
18Annex 111.8, ol. 6,41.
Aiinex 111.10, ol. 6, p. 5see,also,Q.M.J.A., Annex 1.11, Vol. II, 49, wliere the date was
erroneously translated as "November 1884".On the copyofthesame mapfiled withthe present Mernorial,
Qatar has correctcdthis materialerror.
19Annex 111.7, ol.6, p. 37.October 1867,shows the boundaries of 13ahrain20M . any of these survey maps were shown to
and apparently iipprovedby British officiaisat diffcrent times.
5.16 A later survey report of 5 October 1870made by the Vice Commander of the Sultanic
Marine Fleet to the ProvinciaI Governor of the Province of Basra states, inter alicr,that:
"Hawarisland ...is liiikedto the land of ~ritar~'".A second report states, inter illiatliat "Tl~e
borders oîBahrain ..endbeforeHawar islundby fdzreemarine Eeciguesa ,nd he41rethe city of
Zuhuruhby ten marine leagues",and thatthe Ruler of Bahrain "... docs not possess uny island
or lands inland of eatcruZ2".
5.17 The Ottoman authorities had already collected material with regard to the ownersliip,
nature and activity of even Siemain Hawarisland. Ina report dated 15April 187 1 an Ottoman
NavalCaptain stated:
"The huts that we have seen in Hawar belong to fishermen iium the country of Al-
Hassa,the country of Qatar,the country of Ornai and some from Rahrain.
There is no structure, and there is no water. The fisherrnen say that it is an islaild
which belongs to the landof ~atar~~."
5.18 A fùrther report, dated 22 May 1871,by an OttomanMarine Vice-Commanderstated:
"..we met, in the sea of Qatar, two groups of Hassawi fishermcn coming from Hawar
island. They confirn-ithat the island is empty of EngIish military personnel; and that
the island is open to al1fishermen. The two groups confirm that thel-eare in Hawar
huts similar to the huts at the marshes at Shat Al-Arab. Thcre isno water; there are no
houses; there is no fort. In the summer it is empty of inhabitants; empty of people.
There are some people who hunt birds in the wintcr. Wateris brought only froiilthe
land of Qatar, from the spring of Al-Dawakhil. There are no animals i.e.donkeys,
mules or goats.
20
21Annex111.9,Vol.6,p.45.
22Annex111.14,Vol.6, p.69.
21Aiinex111.19,Vol.6, p.93emphasisadded.
AnnexiII.15,Vol.6, p. 75. We assure you tliatwe wiIl visit it intwo daystime. We iieedyour prayers24."
5.19 By 1871,tlie Qatar peninsula, withits adjoining islands including the Hawar islands as
shown in the Ottoinan survcy maps had corne under the control of thc Oltoinan Empire, as
had the Nejd andthe Hasa coasl. In 1872,having already persuodedShcikllJassim bin Thani,
the son of the then Chief of Qatar, to agreeto their prescncein Qatar,the Ottomans inslalled a
small garrison in Doha. They aIsopresented SheikhJassim bin Thani with a stcarn launch to
enable hirnto control the coasts and waterswithin hisjurisdiction2'.
5.20 Apartfrom exploring the extent of the territories of Qatar and Bahrain thi-oughthe
surveys mentioned above,the Ottomansalso made specific inquiries IYom Qatar's neighbours,
in particular from the Rulers of Abu Dhabi. There wasconsiderable correspondence in this
connection between the Ottomans and Sheikh Zayed bin Khalifah, whciwas the Ruler of Abu
Dhabi from 1860 to 1909(which covers most of the period of the Ottoman presence in the
Gulf area). Kelly writes that after the eclipse of the Wahhabi power in Eastern Arabia
followed bythe occupation of Hasaby the Turksin 1871,the politics ofthe area:
"...south of Hasa, came to be dominated ...by the figurc of Zaid ibn Khalifah ..thc
ruler of Abu Dhabi. Zaid, who had succeeded to the chieftainsliipon the deposition of
his cousin, Sa'id ibn Tahnun, in 1855,had become the most powerful of the Trucial
Shaikhs by the early eighteen-seventies ..By the last decade of the ccntury Zaid ibn
Khalifah had extended his authority over the greater pari OSthe hinterland of Trucial
Oman,and even into the Dhahirah province of Oman,where his influence exceeded
tliat of the Al Bu Sa'id Sultan, who consequently entrusted himwith the carc of his
interests there.Indeed, the only serious challenge that Zaid had to contend with in
these years came from the Al Thani Shaikh of Qatar, who cndeavoured, in the
eighteen-seventiesandeighteen-eighties, ...to take possession of Kl-iauial-LJdaid2"'"
5.21 On a number of occasions, the Ottoman authorities iiiquired fromSheikh Zayed about
the extent of Qatar's territories and about Bahrain's carribitiontowards such territories. In his
responses to such inquiries, Sheikh Zayed's descriptions of Qatar's territories were always
consistent with the Ottoman survey maps of 1867 ontvürds. Furthermore, he constüntly
26
25AnnexIII.16,Vol.6, p81.
26Sec,Q.M.J.A.,Annex 1.13Vol.II, p.59.
Annex111.305V, ol. 8,535.warned the Ottomans of Bahraini intentions to rnake claims on Qatari territory and in a letter
of 4 June 1870 advised:
"Do not allow Bahrain to snatchwhat it can andto dwnp what it cannot2'."
5.22 It was against this background that the Ottoman Vali of Hasa in a communication
addressed to the Ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Issa, in October 1871 steriily warncd against any
Bahraini pretensions to Qatar territoryand stated:
"According to what lias been provedto us, Zubarah and its surrounding area and the
islandsof Qatar oppositeyour country are uElclearly and nbsoluteiy ~heproperw of
Q~ltur.This is a ~varningto you and you must be aware that we have the demarcation
of your borders aid that the British Ambassadorto Constantinople has seen it28."
5.23 Sheikh Zayed bin Khalifahof Abu Dhabi, in another letter to the Ottoman Vali of Hasa
on 17November 1871in the context of any Al-Khalifah interests in the terrilories of Qatar,
stated:
"As for Qatar, we know it well, and the fighting whicli has bcen going on between
Khalifah's and its [Qatar's] peopleiswell known. It is a big country aiidif you intend
to take it, do not forget to take its sand diving spots. They are commendable and
rich, If dates are in Al-Qateef, money is in Qatar [an old proverb - if Al-Qateef is
known for dates, Qataris known forwealth].
It has a spring of fresh water in its north-west sea which they cal1 Al-Marnzoor.
Below, there is Jaradahwhich belongsto the sea of Qatar. To its east lies Zubarah and
below Zubarah you find the islands of Hawar opposite to the mountain on it [the
mainland i.eBrooq].
1have already been asked by people who came before you about Hüwar. 1told them
al11knew about it. Al-Hassa has not got a nail on this island [tlley own nothing] nor
has Bahrain any hand over it. You cm go to it from the shore OSQatar on foot. We
were informed a long time ago that there werc h~itsand a rain-water pool which
belonged to some people of Faris [Persians]. Therewcre also Sbiiies from Qatecf who
came there as fishermenat thc time of Al-Btain [severewintcr].
Do not worry. It belongs neither toBin Khalifah nor to anyonc from Illepeople of Al-
Hassa. It belongs to ~atar~?."
27~nnex III.13,Vol6,p.65.
29Annex 111.1Vol.6, p.85;emphasisadded.
AnnexIII.18,Vol.6, p. 89.In fact, Sheikh Zayed binKhalifah, inthe same letter,went on to make a proposal of his own
to the Ottomanswhenhe stated:
"If you want a refuge from which to monitor the English, Hawaris the place. Your
reputation and your understanding withBin Thmi woiild make Bin 'Thanigivc it 10
you. We arein disagreementwith Bin Thani,olherwiscwe wuuld havehelped you30."
5.24 Soon afferthe Ottoman prcsencein Qatarhad been establishedand upoil a complaintby
Slieikh Jassimbin Tl-ianiagainst Bahrain's conduct in relation tothe terriiories of Qatar, the
Ottoman Vali of Hasa inMarch 1872respondedto SheikhJassiinby stating:
"We have received your letter and we do not accept Bin KhaIiPah'sconduct in Bida
and Wakrah. On the basis of orders from our Vali,the Vali of Raglidad, and orders
from the Sublime Porte, may his shadow last forever [may hc live forevcr], we have
carried out a survey of your country, Al-Qatar,incliidingits sca, land and islaiids.The
swey was cmied out by Mohammed Quli Abdu, a Sultanic Marine Commander,
who is an exploratorymarine captain. He has done a lotof surveys in the Ottoman
Sultanic world. These surveys have been approved by the Sublin-iePorte and by the
ambassadorof GreatBritain to Constantinople.
On eachmap there isa small signature, a decoratedLatin Letter. He signed and agrees
to tha?'."
5.25 Shortly after that, the Ottoman Vali of Hasa obtained further information concerning
Hawar from SheikhZayedbin Khalifahof Abu Dhabi w110 wrotc in l~isletter dated 7 October
1872:
"Regardiiig Hawar, you are free to Say whatever you think about it. No-one
understands morethan you do and no-oneknows as muc1-a is you do, but wc want you
to understand that Hawar hm been Ipart] of Qatar sinçe the time of our fathers and
grandfathers, and no-one l-iasany right to it. This is wliatwe arc sufby virtue of al1
we have known and al1whom we haven-iei-itioned...Wehave people who [would] tell
you about Hawar and that ilis a fishcrmen'srefuge belongingto Qatar, and its Sl-ieikh
is BinThani not Bin~halifah~~."
'OIOid,
31Annex 111.20,ol.6,p.99.
32
Annex 111.21, ol.6, 103.5.26 By contrast, British knowledge about Qatar (in which it had shown no interest)
including ils territory, its tribes and its activities was extreinely meagre. This is demonslrated
by the contents of a letter fromthe Political Residentin tlie Persian G~i l;Col.E.C. Ross dated
4 September 1873to the Secretüryto the Governinentof India wllere lieStates:
"4. The position of the Turks on that coast, howcver, Iiad perhaps better be again
brought to notice, in referenceto their proceedingsnow reported.
5. The accompanying slight sketch of that part of the Coast may serve to illustrate my
report. Thered marks denoteplaces where there areTurkish troops quartered.
6. It will be observed tlat there is an extensive cape or praimoiitorycalled by the
general narne of Guttur, or properly, Katr. The greater part of this tractis desert land,
but a few Bedouin tribes find pasture for theirflocks. On the coast are fishing villages,
such as Zobarah, Khor Hassan, el Biddah &c. - the most considerable beingBiddah.
The whde coast is calIedthe GutturCoast and the population is fluciuating.
7. The question of the sovereignty over Guttur, gelieraily,has never yet been decided.
It has, perhaps, been a debatable land, between Oman on the one side and Wahabee
Power on the other. At one time the Chief of Aboothabce is said to have exercised
authority in Guttur. Later the Uthoobees having settled there aiid at Bahrain, became
paramount. These in time had to pay religious tithe to thc Wahabee Ameer - w110
established a Govemor ofhis own at Biddah.
8. Since the Turkish occupation ofEl Hassa, the wholc line of Coast as far as Odeyed
had fallen under Turkish influence, and the chiefs in [questioii?]have been forced to
accept the Turkish flag. Biddah has been actually occupied, and a body of Turkish
troops is now quartercdthere.
9. In October 1871 Government of Bombay requested ColonelPelly to report on the
question of sovereignty overGuttur, but Colonel PeIlyasked permission to defcr this,
as there was a probability ofthe Turkswithdrawing from Najd.
10. Such is, briefly, the present positionof affairs at Guttur, andIlieredoes not appear
at present to be cause of cornplaint against the proceedings of the Turkish
authoritie~~.~"
33Annex IIT.24,Vol.6, p. 117.Sm, also B.C.J.A.,Aiinex111.4,Vol.111,. 15.Tliearchaic spellings in
the original text correspotothe following present-day spellings: Gutturor K=tQatar;el Biddah or Biddali
= Bida,nowknown as Daha;Waliabee = Wahhabi;Aboothabee = Abu Dhabi; Uthoabees = Al-Utub; Odeyed =
Udeid.5.27 In 1873,an Ottoman detachmentwas reportedto be airiving in ~ubarah~~ and the Chief
of Bahrain wished to offer help to the Naim who he claimed owcd allegiance to liim3'.The
British advised him not to involve himself oii thc maiilland"%o as 10 avoid complications
with the ~ttonians'~,and warned him of dire consequences if hc ignored this advice3'. While
the British accepted th3t the Ottomans exercised de facto coi~trolover the Qatar peninsula,
they never formally recognized Ottoman sovereignty over the penins~lla39.Indeed, they
insisted on maintaining dircct relations with the Ruler oî Qatar and the rights lhey had
acquiredby treaty -
"...in order to preserve the peace of the seas or to obtain redress for outrages on
British subjects orpersons entitledto Britishprotectioi?O."
5.28 But the British did not want to intervene so long as the Ottomans remained within
Qatar's territorial limits, as understood and recognized hy the British, and thus did not
threaten maritime peace or British interests in Bahrain and otlier Sheikhdoms with whom
Britain had treaty relationships. However,being suspicious of Ottoman intentions, the British
concluded an Exclusive Agreement with Bahrain in December 1880, n~ainlyto prevent any
arrangement being reached betwccn the Ottomans and the Shcilth of ahr raid A'.further
agreement was concluded on 13 March 1892by wl~ichthe Sheikli of Bahrain agreed not to
"enter into any agreement or correspondence with any Power other than the British
Government", not to permit the agent of any other Govcrnment to residc in Bahrain without
the consent of the British Govermnent,and also ilot to "cede, sell,inortgageor othcnvise give
for occupation" any part of his territory, Saveto the British ~overiirnent~~.It is important to
note tliat the British, having accepted Qatar (as shown in the Ottoman survey maps) as being
part of the aea of Ottoman influence,made no attempt to enter into anysuch agrcement with
the Ruler of Qatar at this time.
34See,Saldanliaop. cit.A,nnex11.7,Vol4, p.53.
35Sce, B.C.J.A.,Vol.3, Annexes111.2and111.3.
36
See,Saldanha,op. cit.Annex11.7,Vol.4, p.53.
38Sec, ihidp. 54.
39See,Lorimer, op.cit.,Annex11.5Vol.3, p.223,
Ses,paras.3.47 etseq.,above.
11Saldanha,op. citAiinex 11.8Vol. 4,p.214.
41See,Annex 111.35,ol.6,p. 165.
42Annex111.41,Vol.6, p. 189.5.29 At about the same time as Col. Ross was addressiiig his above cominuilication of
September 1873 to the Secretary to the Governrnent of Iildia displaying vague ovcrall
knowledge about Qatar, the Ottomans were suweying and increasing iheir control over
territories which included Hawar. With regardto Hawar island, by a corninunication dated
27November 1873,the OttomanVali of Hasa writing to the Vali of Baghdad stated:
"As for your queries regarding Hawar Island, which belongs 10 Qatar, no-one inliabits
the island except sailors from the countries of the Pcrsiaii Coast and the Onlani land,
people of Qatar and Shiites of Bahrain. In all, there are tliirtyof them and tliere are no
houses or permanenthomes43."
Two days later, the Ottoman Naval Captain Mohammed Quli Abdu on 29 November 1873
reported to his Marine Vice-Commanderas follows:
"Sir, we have been to the intended place. We raised the fIag of the sublime Sultan,
may his shadow [life and authority] last on earth, on Rawar island without any
objection. The Engiish wereawareof this and were present, but did notapproach us.
Regarding the matter of urgency that we have received from you, we went and
measured the sea fromthe Coastof Qatar. Down beIowthe island appears a strip in the
sea which canbe walked on for three quarters of anhour with water at knee level. We
found on it [Hawar] iishermen from Oman and from Al-Hassa and we found one
person from Qatar repairing aship. Thereis no one frotn Bahrain and no Cnglish. This
iswhat we wantedto inform you. Thereis no fear of thc inliabitants[forthcy are] very
weak, We have also seen the maps of Hawar and Qatar on the Sultanic ship. We
recornmend modificationof the shapeof Hawar inthe file of Qatar. We shall send you
maps ofthe island later, God~illiilg~~."
5.30 On 10 December 1873, about ten days later, Capt. Mohammed Quli Abdu did in fact
finalise a sluvey map of Hawar (Mup No. 6 faciilg the prcceding page) which clearly
illustrates that Hawar belongstu Qatar.
43
44nnex 111.2, ol. 6, 125.
Annex 111.2, ol.6, p129.5.3 1 It is significant that in a British memorandum of March 1874 coiicerning the claims of
Persia and the Ottomans to Bahain, the extent of Bahraini territory was described as
consisting only of the followiiig:
"The Bahrein Islands are a srnallgroup of islands, three in riwnbcr, on the south-west
side of the Persian Gulf, in the centre of Bahrein Bay, the priiicipal of which is
Bahrein (or Aval),lying about ten miles off the Coast of ~rabia'."
Thisdescription of Bahrain self-evidentlycould notiiicludethe Hawarislands.
5.32 It would appearthat there were recurring changes inthe Ottoman oflicials (Valis) posted
in the Gulf area and a new official would often seek information fiom Sheikli Zayed bin
Khalifah of Abu Dhabi. In response to one such inquiry in a coiilmunication dated
23 December 1874to the Vali of Hasa, SheikhZayed bin Khalilàh wrotc:
"..with referenceto what we have been discussingwitll you concesningAl-Mamzoor
and Jaradah, you know what the Al-Hala is. Al-Hala [a piece of land usually
submerged by the sea ai high tide] is a piece of uninhabited land as you were told by
the one who came to you from Bahrain. You see, these [Halas] belong to Qatar and
they are Qatari territories and Bahrain has no hand over them [rights]. You sec the
English know nothing about them except through what they hear. As for Al-Zubarah
we have already told you that it belongs to Qatar and the Al-KIialifahinhabited it but
did not stay Iong.As for Hawar Icannot say more than what we liavc already said to
your predecessors; it belongs to Qatar. If we were entitlcd to it, thcn Bin Khalifah
would be rightly eiititledtn itIfit is to bejudged by its population, there are more of
our people and more peo le fiom the Persian Coast who are ruled by Al-Qawasim
[thanthere are Balirainis]!.!,
5.33 In another such communicationthree years later of 22 July 1877to a ilewVali of Hasa,
SheikhZayed bin Khalifahwrote:
"As for Hawar, wc have said to your prcdecessor what we know: ttiat itbelongs to
Qatar. Because we are neither afraid of anybody nor in awe of anyune. Yes, we took
Bin Khalifah's side in hostility to Jassim.Wc did not thinlctllatmatters would develop
in this way. Undoubtedly, dialogue betwcen Bin Khalifdl and Jassim would
15
46nncx 111.28V,ol. 6, 137.
Annex 111.1,Vol.6,p. 149. extinguish the fire - but to take Hawar by deception is neither good for them nor for
us47.1'
5.34 It is also relevant to note that, from time to time, Sheikli Zayed bin Khalifah was
resisting claims on his own territory in Udeid by Sheikh Jassim bia Thani of Qatar.
Differences over these territorial claims became extremely severe bctwcen 1881 md 1889,
when they fought a number of battles.
5.35 Thus, although Sheikli Zayed bin Khalifah had serions differences with Sheikh Jassim
of Qatar, in respect of their own territorial borders and cngaged in numerous battles against
Qatar (at times with the support of Bahrain),he continued to reaffirm liis strongly hcld view
as to the extent of the territories of Qatar, consistently asserting that Hüwar constit~itedan
integral part of Qatar and that Bahrain had no valid claims to those islands or indeed to
Zubarah. He continued to maintain these opinions up to thc time of Ilis death in1909and, as
shown below,his successors reiteratedthe sarneviewfromtimc to time.
5.36 It is important to note that the Ottoman authorities had continued to mange for more
detailed surveys of the borders of Qatar and even Hawar to be carried out from time to time.
Such survey maps were also presentcd to other governrneiits and authorities (including the
British), as shown by the stamps which they bear. Survey maps in respcct of Qatar of the
years 1874 and 1S91198are Annexes 111.29and 111.46" and the survey mal, in respect of
Hawarof 7July 1890is Annex 111.37~l~ t.is particularly significant to note that the territories
of Qatar and Bahrain shown in the Ottoman maps from 1867 to 1889 are also substantially
similar to those shown in a number of other maps of the period published in the West in the
years fol~owin~~~.
5.37 There is other evidence from theturn of the century wlzichdernonstratesthat the Hawar
islands (and Zubarah) were reçognisedasbelonging to Qatar.
48Annex111.34V, ol. 6, p. 161.
49Annexes 111.2and111.46,Vol. 6, pp. 141and209.
Annex111.37V, ol.6, p173.
50See,para. 5.4b,elow.5.38 A geographical dictionaryof the Gulf region, compiled by Lorinier in 1908, also clearly
listed the Hawar islands under Qatar as one of the places and fcatures on its Westcoast and
provided a detailed description of Hawarand adjoining islands:
"About 10miles long, northand south, and roughly parallel to the Qatar coast. Therc
arc no wells, but therc is a cistertohold rain-waterbuilt by the Dawasir of Zallaq in
Bahrain, who have houses at two places on the islüiid and use thein in winter as
shootingboxes. Fishermenalso frequent Hawar.'Theisluid is ad-joined on the north by
Jazirat Rubadh and on the south by Jazirat Janan, wliileJabalat Ajirah and Jazirat
Suwad lie in the channelbehveenit and themainland''."
Onthe other hand, Lorimer described Bahrainas follows:
"The prescnt Shaikhdomof Bahrain consists of the archipclago formeciby the Bahrain,
Muharraq, Umm Na'asan, Sitrah and Nabi Sali11islands and by a n~unberof lesser
islets and rocks which are enurnerated in the articles upon the islands: taken al1
together these form a compact group almostin the middle of the gulf whicli divides
the promontory of Qatar frornthe coastof ~atif5~."
5.39 After a visit to the isIand of Zakhnuniya and the Hawar islands in March 1909,Major
F.B. Prideaux, the Political Agentin Bahrain, reportingto the Political Residcnt, appeared to
be concerned about the fact that the Ottoman officiaismight seek to extend their authority
more securely in the district generally.He noted in hisletter of 20 Mach 1909:
"Thefacts are that Dowasir of Budaiyaand Zellaq on the north-west coast of Bahrain
are in the habit of every winter partiallymigrating 10 Zhuniya and Hawar Islands
for fishing (sharksas well as edible fish) and hawking. A Dosiri is said to have built
the Zakhnuniya fort many decades ago, and ShaikhAli bin Khalifa (Esa's father)
rebuiltthe fort duriiigthe reign of his brother Muhammad wl-iom we dcposed. Since
then, the Dowasir have once again repaired the .fort,but now it is inruin and only the
fourunroofed bastions arestandingu,"
5.40 The Political Agent hoped the Ruler of Bahrain would lay claim to Zakhnuniya and
Hawar Islands so as to be able to try and challengeOttoman üuthorityover tliese islands. He
therefore stated in his lettero20 March 1909:
51
52Loriiner,op.cit., An11.4Vol.3, pp.120-121.
53Lorimer, opcitAiinex11.3Vol. 3, p. 88.
Annex 111.1,Vol. 6, p.233. "If Shaikh Esa is willing to claim sovercignty over Züklinuniya Ourposition will be
fairly plain sailing ...but if ShaikiiEsadoesn't want or dare assert his sovereignty over
Hawar we sliallbe in rather a quandary. However, 1liope next week to be able to give
a satisfactoryreport abouthiçattitudes4."
As it happened, the Ruler of Balîraindid in fact lay claim to Zakhnutliyüby his lettcr of 30
March 1909addressed to the Politiccil~~erit~~ but obviously refrained fsoin daring to do so in
respect OF Hawar.
5.41 The successors ofSheikhZayed bin KhaIifahcontinued tomaiiltain tiieposition that the
Hawar islands (and Zubarah) belonged to Qatar. In fact Sheikh Talmoon bin Zayed, the
immediate successor of Shaikh Zayed, in a communication dated May 1909 addressed to
SlieikhIssa, the Ruler of Bahrain, advised him:
"...We do not question what you say except froin worrying abo~ltyou. You see, O
brothep;you must tell thefruth tousandfoyourse~~A Inan is boundby his own word,
as are his children afterhim.
As for Zubarah,by Allah, no brother, you must notget into hostiIity with Bin Thani;
these lands, as you and we know, do not belong to you. They belong to Qatar. As
regards the dividing up [of these lands] you have told us about, you see it is not fair to
divide up already-recognised countries;this is the firsl thing 1wmt to say. Second: yes
we know Hawar well due to whatour predecessors, who have been to it, have told us.
Some of our friends had giventhe messenger oï Jassim Biii Tharii a slavc by the name
of Naseeb as a levy. Those who had nothing tu give, gave either a fishing net or fisli.
We are certain of this. Third: Father, rnay God have inercy on him, gave his
fingerprint to the snldiers is as sa to testify that 1-Iawaris one of thc lands of Qatar
and that Al-Zubarahis the same.. .Leave Zubarah andIIawar to thcir owner Bin Thani.
There are no gains fromconflict"."
It is important to notice that in ihis communication, the ncw Ruler of Abu Dhabi not only
reiterated his country's recognition of Qatar's ownership of Zubara1.i and Hawar but also
stated that hehad been told that a levy (in the form of a slavc, a fishingnet or fish) had been
54
55Ibid.
56Annex111.52,Vol.6,p.241.
The referenceclearlis to variouscommunications addressedby Shcikh Zayed to the Turkish
autliorities.
57Annex 111.54, ol.6p. 251;cmphasisadded.given to the messenger of the Ruler of Qatar, apparently by itinerant fishcrrnen who were
visiting the islands. This confirms other cantemporary evidencc of tlie payment of levies to
the Ruler of Qatarby itinerant fishermanvisiting ~awar~~.
5.42 As shown earlier, in viewof certaintensions that had dcveloped between the British aiid
Ottoman Governrnents, negotiations between them led to the signing of the Anglo-Ottoman
Convention of 1913.By Article 11 of the Convention, the Otloinan Goveriliilent "renounced
al1their claims with regard to the El-Katr peninsula", and the two Govcrninents agreed that it
"shall be governed, as heretofore by Sheikh Jassim-bin-Sani and his successors". Consistent
with their stand of nearly fifty years (reaffirmed on numeruus occasiuns), the British
Governrnent declared "that they will not permit the Sheikh of Bahrain to interfere in the
internd affairs of El-Katr,to infringethe autonomyof the country, osto annex it591'.
5.43 The 1913 Convention did not specifically define the territorial limits of Qatar and
Bahrain. However, as explained above, the inference must be that the Hawar islands were
considered to be part of ~atar~'.
5.44 Thereafier, a survey by the British Admiralty War Staff (Intelligence Division) carried
out in 1915included Hawar(and Janan) in the description ofthe territory of ~atar~'.
5.45 Althoughthe Ottomansrecognizedthe autonomyof Qatarby the 1913 Convention, they
continued to maintain a garrison at Doha which did not leave until the arriva1of a British
warship on 20Auguçt 1915". To formalise tl~eirposition, the British signed the 1916 Treaty
with the Sheikh of Qatar containing the various mutual obligations dcscribed aboveb3.The
58
See, paras. 6.178 et seq., below. See, also, paras. 6etseq., below, describing other actions of
exercise of Qatari sovereigntyover the Hawar islands incliiding controlling accesta the island for fishing
(Annexes 111.48,11.49and 111.50V,ol.6, pp.221, 225 and 2291,expellingthose retusing to pay levies,granting
recognition to ownership of fishing traps (Annex 111.40,Vol. 6, p. 185), pursuing and arranging ai-restsof
criminals (Annex 111.39,Vol. 6, p.181),Qatari officiaisraising banncr on the island (Annex 111.36,Vol. 6,
p. 169) and visits by the Sheikh'srepresentative or by the Sheikh himselto the islaiid(Annexes 111.36and
111.71,Vol. 6pp. 169and 375).
59Sec, paras. 3.55et sey.,above.See, alsothe Map which was Annex V tothc Convention and which
isbeing deposited withLheRegistry,pursuant toArticle 50, paragraph2 othe Rules of Court.
60
See, para. 3.57, abovc
62See, Annex lII.296,Vol. 8, p483.
See, Annex 111.61, ol.6, p. 291.
63See,para. 3.61,above.opening recital of the Trealy refers to the Agreemcnt of 1868 tvherehy the Ruler of Qatar
undertook "no1lo commit any brench of the Maritimc Ycacc" and the Rulei. confirms that
"these obligations to the British Govemnent have developcd Isic: '?devolved] on ine his
successor in Qatar". Tlie British, in turn, undertook to protcct the Sheilthdom against
aggressions by seah4.A clear implication of this provision mustnecessarily be that the land
territory of Qatar (includiligthe Hawarislands) was tobe protected againsl üiiiiaggression by
sea by üiiyoneincluding Balirain(in the same way as it was not to be violated under the 1868
Agreement).
5.46 A German map publislied by Freytag and Berndt in 1914,and another by Geographia
Ltd. London, publislied in 1919 (Mups Nos. 7 and 8, both prcccding this page). sliow the
Qatar peninsula andthe IIawar islands in one colour andBahraiil in another. Consistent with
thcsc maps are those of Bahrain alonc: one to be fouiid in the proceedings of thc Koyal
CicographicSocicty, 1890 ~tlas~" and another being Tivener's inüp of 1898frotii thc records
ofthc samc ~ocict~~~.
5.47 As at thc timc of signing thc Anglo-Ottoman Conveiition of 1913, tio nccd was felt
wheii signing IlleBritish-Qatar Trealyof 1916to define Qatar territory or to refer specificülly
to IIawar or Janan islaiids as Ille British and Qatar were clear about thc fact tlîat the 1-Iawar
islands were part of Qatar.
5.48 11is importanl to note that the British Governmentin fact co~itinuedto rcgard tlie Hawar
islaildsas part of Qatar almost until the so-called "provisional" decisioii of 1936 to the effect
that the islandsprirna facie bclongedto 13ahrainh7T .his is apparentfiorn tliefollowing:
64
65Annex 111.63V, ol6,p. 301.
66Aniiex 111.38,Vol.6,p. 177.
Annex 111.45,Vol. 6,p. 205,Tee,alsotlieinaps of tlie Persian GulTp~ibliin tli1891, 1905and
1914 editions of Sticlcr's Hand Atlas, Bartholomcw'sLibrReference Atlas of 1890, the EnglishItnperial
Atlas of 1891 and Philips Iiiternational Atlas of 1931, al1of wshow tlie Qatapeiiinsula andthc Hawar
islaiidsin one colouaiidBahrain in another. Copies of these mapshave bccn dcpusiicwith theRegistry in
accordance withAriiclc 50paragraph2 of theRules ol'court.
67See, para. 6.38, below. In a report of the British India Office of 1928entitled "Status of Certain Groups of
ji)
Islands in the Persian Gulf', the Bahrnin archipelago is defincd as consisting only of
"the islands of Bahrain, Muharraq, Umm Nü'assan, Sitrah, and Nabi Salih, and a
number of lesser islets and rocks forming part of the same compact geographical
68 17
group .
(ii) Again on 3 May 1933, Ldithwaite, of the India Office, referring io the territorics ol'
Bahrain, gave an almost identical description and stated tàat tlie dominions of the
Ruler of Bahrain may be regardcd as consistii~gof "the Islaildof Bahrein, and of the
adjoining islands of Muharraq,UmmNa'assan, SitraharidNdbi Salih ...in considering
anygrant of a concessionin respectof his 'dominions'or alir ira in'^^."
(iii) In connection widithe concession for the unallotted area, when the Secretary of State
for India requested a "markedmap showing area recognized as Bahrain ~slands~~"t,he
acting Political Resident's response of 4 August 1933 and the accompanying map
showedthat Bahrain'sterritory did not include the Hawar islands7'.
(iv) As shown hereafte~~~d,so in 1933and in the sarnccoiitcxt. whm the Ruler of Balirain
had suggested to the Political Agent that the Balirain islands should not be listed by
nme because of an alleged ninety-year old agreement that tlie islands offQatar were
dependencies of ~ahrain~" the Political Resident was content to recommend
acceptance of the suggestion "as Hawar Islaild is cleaily not orie of the Bahrain
gro~p74".The India Office agreed that the area under the Ruler of Bahrain's
68
Q.M.J.A., Annex 1.18,Vol. 11,p. 99. Seealso, Q.M.J.A., Vol1,p. 17.Kckreiice is alsoinvited to
para.5.31,above, reproducingthe descriptionof Bahraini territoryaBritishmenioraridurnof nearly 50 years
earlie(in 1874),confining suchterritortothree islandsand topara.5.38 reproducing Lorinier's descriptionof
Bahrain in 1908as consisting of the same islands as iiientioncd in the 1928report rcproducedhere. None of
these descriptionsiiicludedihe Hawar islands.
69See,Annex 111.84V,ol.6, p431.
70
71Annex 111.89,Vol.6, p,453.
72Annex 111.90, ol6, p. 457.Sec,also,para. 6.22, below.
See,para. 6.20,below.
77Annex 111.87Vol. 6, p445.
74Annex111.88,Vol.6, p.449. sovereignty for tbis purpose did not inchde Hawar, which was ~iotunder his control
and belonged geographicallyto ~atar~~.
(v) Otlier evidence reviewed in detail in Chapter VI bcIow demonstrates that the British
Government consistently denied, even as late in the day as 1933, that the Hawar
islands belonged to ~ahrain'~ and that indeed t11e1935 Conccssion Agreement
between the RuIer of Qatar and APOC covered the IIawar islands as part of the
territory of ~atar~~.In fact, it was not until 1936 tlmt the Britisli Government
suddenly, and without apparently being conscious tllat it had previously denied any
validity to Bahrain'sdesigns upon Hawar, took its "provisional decision" iizfavour of
the Bahraini claim to Hawar.
2.Bahraini Recognition of Qatar'sSovereigntv over the Hawar lslands
5.49 There was good rcason for Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi tciadvise the
Bahraini Ruler Sheikh Issa in his letter of May 1909quoted above "to tell the tnith to us and
to yo~rself~~".AS will be seen from a letter of 7 Jiily 1907addresscd to SheilchSaeed Al-
MutawwaAl-Binhajer, wlio was SheikhJassim's representative on the westernside of Qatar,
Sheikh Issa himself pleaded for citizens of Bahrain to be permitted to visit Hawar,promising
to meet "your demands" andundertakingresponsibility forthc behaviour of Bahrainis visiting
Hawar. Sheikh Issa wrote:
"Sheikh, we are ready to meet your demands. Bu1 we want nothing but your
permission for our people to anchor atHawar. We, by God, ask for nothing but your
satisfaction and forgiveness.Our people have pestcredus in their demands to write to
you and to send you a letter. Weare responsible for any tiiisbehaviour that may occur
by our people onyour island and in yoztr ~o~ntr~'~."
75Anncx 111.91, ol6,p.461.
7See, paras.6.18 et seq., below.
7See, para.6.26,beiow.
7See,para.5.41 above.
79
Annex 111.49, ot6,p.225;cmphasisadded.Earlier in the same year,on 15February 1907,SheikliIssa also elidorsed and sealed a request
frorn one of the Balirainifishemen to visit ~awar".
5.50 Bahrain's Ruler therefore acknowledgedQatar's sovereignty over thc Hawar islaridsand
secured advantages by way of access and fishing riglits for "his people". Having thus
recognised the original titIe of Qatar to the Hawarislands, it was llardly opeil to Bülirain to
challenge this title.
5.51 Another important event that demonstrates Bahrain's assurnpiioil and thercfore its
recognition that the Hawar islands belonged to Qatar occurred in the early days of the
development of prospects of discovery of oil. As described in Chapler II1 above, on 2
December 1925, the Ruler of Bahrain granted a concession to the Eastern and General
Syndicate Limited ("EGS") to explore the whole of the Ruler's territories for oil. This
concession was subsequently transferred to the Bahrain Petroleum Company ("BAPCO"). A
review of the negotiations leadingup to the 1925Agreement shows tliat in 1923 when Major
Holmes, then representing EGS,drew upthe draHof the Concession Agreement, Article 1of
the draft referred to the territory of the concession as being that portion of the laiid known as
"THEBAHRAINISLANDS ..more particularly shown and delineated on the Map attached
to this Agreement, and MARKEDin RED colouration thereon... "". It is to be noted that on
this map, the Bahrain islandsare colouredred while the Hawar islands are çoloured white like
~atar~~.
5.52 Later oil coilcessionnegotiations confirm that, inthe lüte 1920sand early 1930s,neither
Bahrain's concessionairc under the 1925 concession (EGS) nor its succcssor (BAPCO)
considered the Hawar islands to be part of the territories of Bahrain. There is clear cvidence,
whicli is reviewed in detail in ChapterVI below, that when Major Frank IIolmes (representing
EGS) applied in 1928 for permission to negotiate for a concession over the sa-called
"unallottedu area (i.e.,the area of Bahrain and its territorial waters rernaining after
EGS/BAPCOhad chosen the 100,000acres of Bahrain territoiy for the inining lease to which
80Annex111.48 ,ol.6, p221.See,also, para.6.18below.
a1See,Annex 111.66,ol.6,p.327.
82Ibid, p.345.it was entitled under the 1925 concession), he didnot regard the IIawar islands as falling
within the "unallotted" area. As will be seen, Major Holmes had calculated that thc
"unalIotted"area arnountedto 97,920 acres, anarea altogethestoo srnallto includc the Hawar
Islands, Fasht Dibal or Qit'ai ~aradah~~N . either the Ruler of Balirain nor the Political Agent
demurred from these calculationsat the time.
5.53 Another instance of Bahraini recognition of Qatar's owncrshipof the Hawar islai~dsis
thc cxpress admission in a letter of 21Septernber1926from the Ruler of Bahrain to the Ruler
of Dubai wherein he statest11at"wehave reached an understanding with the Cnglishhcre lin
Bahrain]:that they will give us the islandof Hawarwhich bclongsto Bin ha ni^ '''.similar
effect is the admission inthe letter of 20 JuIy f938from Belgraveto the Representativcof the
British State in Sharjah infoming him that Bahrain, "by the approval of the British State, is
going to take the Islandof Hawar which belongs to patar8'". And again, in a letter of 15
Febniary 1939 to a subordinate of theBritish Political Residentin the Trucial States,Belgsave
statesthat: "evenifHawar beIongsto Qatarwedon'tdisagrce with this, it is in the interests ol'
the British Statethat it should belongto ~afirain'~".
5.54 These documents represent firm evidence that, over a loiig pesiod, Balirain expressly
recognised or assumed that Qatar had sovereignty over the IIawar islands. ln such
circurnstances, Bahain has no valid basis for having changed its position or for questioning
Qatar's sovereigntyover tlieHawar isiands.
Section 3. The Subseauent Chance in Bahrain's Position andits Efforts to secure
Supuortforits Claim
A. The Discoverv of 0i1 and Bahrain's Initial Efforts to secure Supportfor its Claim
5.55 As described earlier,the British had considered Bahrain,ever siilcethe beginning of the
nineteenth century, as the centre of their activityin the ArabiaidPersian Gulf; by 1904,it was
83,I't.e,par6.16erscq.below.
85Annex111.69V, ol. p. 365;einphasis added.
86Annex 111.17,Vol.7,p. 339;emphasisadded.
Sm.A,nnexIII.180,Vol.7, p.405;empliasisadded.considered important enough by them to appoint a Political Agent for Bahrain. Tlie
importance ofBahrain was further increased in the 1920swhen there carnethe promise of oil.
Soon after Bahrain granted the first prospeciing licence for oil in December 1925 to EGS,
Belgrave, in collusion with the Ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Han-iad,began to plan the eventuai
mouilting ofa forma1daim to the Hawar islands inthe expcctalioiitliat oil would be fouiid in
these islands. At about that tiine and for the same reason, eveil Ibn Saud began to makc an
"ancient claim" to Qatar and to include the peninsula in the tract of country for which he was
prepared to negotiate an oil conces~ion~~.However. the British quickly and effectively
restrained Ibn Saud from piirsuing any such claim. But, as will be seen, in the years to corne,
the British were prepared to Iend encouragement to a Bahraini claim8'.Tlie Bahraini Ruler
also sought, though unsuccessfully, the support of other rulers in the area. Hc had sought
support for his claims to Hawar from successive Rulers of Abu Dhabi but instead of securing
any such support was continually advised not only thatthere was nojustification for any such
claims but evento avoid making them.
5.56 In the light of the fact that up until 1933the British had always Vakenthe view that the
Hawar islands belonged to Qatar andthat a similar view had beentalien by the rulers of other
sheikhdoms in the Gulf, Belgrave set about implementingpIans in an effort to show that the
main Hawar island belonged to Bahrain. As described in detail in Cliapter VI, Belgrave set
about fabricating evidence forthis purpose. On 28 April 1936, Relgravc formally wrote to the
British PoliticalAgent inBahrain that:
"Inconnection with the presentnegotiations for an oil conccssion over the territory of
Balxaiti which is not includedin the 1925 oil concession, [Shcikh Hainad of Bahrain]
has instructed me .tostate to you that the Hawar group of islanclslying between the
southern extremity of Bahrain island and the coast of Qatar is indisputably part of the
State of ~ahrain'~."
There is evidence to show that the British Political Agentin Bahrain was at tteastpartly aware
of, if not actively initiatingor supporting,Belgrave's plans, presumably to show his superiors
gains in increasing the area of British influence.It is interestiilgtonote that in his letter to the
87See,Aiinex 11.1,Vol.4,pp.307-308
88See,paras.6.35efsrq.,below.
89Sec:AnnexIII.103,Vol. 7,p.15.Political Resident dated 6May 1936,fonvarding Belgrave's above letter of 28 April 1936,the
Political Agent supported Bahrain's claim and alsosuggcstedthat:
"... it might in certain circumstances suit us politically to Iiave as large ail arca as
possible included under ~ahrain"."
5.57 In other words, efforts wereto be madeto add to the territory of Bahraiil. This "plot",
which began to be implemented from around 1930,and evidence which s~rbsequei~tly becanle
available about the false basis of Bahrain's claimsto the Hawar islands is dealt with in dctail
in the next Chapter.
B. Bahrain's Illegal Occu~ation of Hawar lsland
5.58 However, in regardto Bahrain'sclaims of exerciseor recognition of its sovereignty, it is
most important to consider that when Bahrain began seriouslyto press its claiinto the Hawar
islands in the 1930s, it did so through a clandestine occupationby moving a garrison to tlie
islands. This occupation taok place at around the time when Rührainmade a written clairn to
the Hawar islands in Belgrave's lettet of 28 April 1936 to the Political Agent in ahr rai il"'.
The Ruler of Qatar took the view that tllis action clearly ainounicd to aggression within
ArticleX of the 1916Treaty, andcomplainedto the British on 1OMay 1938 in view oE
"thetreaties which exist betweenme and H.B.M.'sGoverninentupon whic1.i 1rely ..."
requesting:
"prompt action and to prevent the aggressors who vcntured to take tliese actions
without my knowledge. 1ain quite confident thatyou will, in order to kcep the peace
and tranquillity, do what is necessaryin the rnatte?2."
90Sm,Annex 111.106V,ol.7,p.27.
9'See. Belgrave'sletterdated 22 December1938 coiifirming"a militargarrisorwas only postedlhcre
recently"and alsoreferringto the buildiof "fortifications"on tlie islands(AnIII174,Vol. 7,p. 371).Sec,
also, the PoliticalAgent Alban'snote o1941 to the Political Resident, Piwherc l~edraws attention to tlie
"'buildi92'of afort there" and "garrisoningitwpolice(Aniiex 111.228, ol.8,p, 123).
See, Annex111.150V , ol.7,p.253. ItappearstheRuler of Qatar mayin additionhave beeriiiivoking
the more recent assuranceof prolection against aggression granto hirn by tliPolitical Resident's letter of
11 May 1935 subjectto his grantingthe oil concessiontoAPOC.See,Annex III98, Vol. 6, p501In liis subsequent letter of protest of 27 May 1938, the Ruler of Qatar again çharacterised
Bahrain's actionas "anaggressive actg3".
5.59 Bahrain's aggression andhostile ocçupation is cIcarIyunsupportablc iii~~ternationallaw
and would have no basis in law.As statedin Opperiheim:
"The principle ex iniuria ius non orifur is well est.dblishcd in internationallaw, and
according to it acts whichare contraryto internationa1law cn1111o btccorne a source of
legal rights fora ~ron~doer~~."
In support of this proposition, the learned authors point out that"Tlie ICJ has repeatedly held
that a unilateral act which is not in acçordance with law cannot confer upon a State a legaI
right95".
C. Bahrain'scontinued Failure to secure Regional Support
5.60 It appexs that duringthis period Belgrave was also seeking support for Bahrain's claim
to the Hawar islands by writing to the various rulers in the region. In response to one
approach, Sheikh Shakhboot bin Sultan, the then Ruler of Abu Dhabi, in a letter of 27 July
1930informed Belgrave:
"Regarding your queries conceming whether the Hawar islands belong to Qatar, to
Qatar and Bahrain,or to Bahrain only, we inforrn you that tlie IIawar are uninhabited
islands which belong to Qatar, aswe have been told by people wliom we trust, and we
believe what tlheySay. Bahrain has no right to them [theislaiids]ncither in the past nor
inthe future.
They [the Hawar Islands], as reported by people who have been thei-eare [madeup of]
seven or eight pieces [islands] the largest of w1iicl.iiHawar surrouiideclby smaller
[islands]. Tliey say that its name Hawar is like I-IawarAl-Naqa [baby camel], the
camel being the country of Qatar.
93Sm, Annex 111.157, ol7,p.285.
94Annex111.307,Vol. 8pp.545-5415 nd footnote4 thereto and casestherecited.
95Ibid.,tootnote4. Why do you ask about it? 1 hope there is no dispute about it, for we are ready to
testif$"."
5.61 Thus Sheikh Shakhboot bin Sultan fiom the time he became thc Kuler of Abu Dhabi in
1927(until 1966)continued, as did hispredecessors,to reaffirm Qatar's ownership of Hawar.
In a fùrtherietter of 22August 1934to the Ruler of Bahrain himself, I-iewas strongly critical
of Bahrain's designs to take the Hawarislands from Qatar. He wrote:
"You know, as well aswe do and those who are present with us, that those islmds
belong to Qatar. It is one of Oatar's islands. So, dear [sir], if one took al1one wants,
we would take part of Persia, part of the Levant and part of Egypt. We hope tliat the
Adviser will not compel you to take Ourcountry as well. Wlat yyouhave done will not
escape the notice of those who will corneafter you and, my dear [sir], injustice is a
terrible thing. What you have done is too much. You have never wanted a
reconciliation with Bin Thani.
Our son in Qatarhas told us that poorBin Thani is trappedby tliose whoin you andwe
know. If,my dear [sir], they are not Ioyal to their country how can they be loyal to
you? The one who does hm to his country would not mind doiiig liarm to other
countries as well. We know that al1those with Bin Thani - Darwish, Al-Hitmi and &
Jabor - keep the oldman in the d~irk~~.''
5.62 In view of his frustratioilupon failingto securethe support of the Sheikhof Abu Dhabi,
Belgrave even wrote to one of Sheikh Shakhboot's representatives(in the eastern province of
Abu Dhabi) to enlist his support in persuading Sheikh Sh&hboot that it wouid be in his
interest to cooperate with Bahrain. By a letter of 15 March 1936, he wrote to Al-Sheikh
Ahmed bin HilalAl-Dhahiri:
"We inform you that Sheikh Abdullah Bin Jassim, Sheikh of Qatar, has asked his
adviser to define the borders [of the lands] which bclong to him and to Sheikh
Shakhboot, in which he knows there isoil. Sheikh Shakhboot did no1liste11to what we
had told him and did not listen to the advice. We would like y011to bring to his
attention that Bahrain seeks what is good forhim. This is to keep the Sl-ieikhof Qatar
preoccupied with more than one issue, coming from al1directions. With tliis letter you
get 200 rupees, three sacks of rice, three of sugar and 25 sacks, made opalm leaves,
96
Annex 111.76, ol6, p397.
y7Annex 111.95, ol.6,p489.Underlinedas intheoriginal. full of Qa9se,t dates from the Sheikhs [of Bahrain]for your people. WCare awaiting
your repIy .
5.63 This attempt to put indirect pressure on Sheikh Shakliboot to support Balirain also
failed. Indeed, Sheikh Shakhboot wasbecoming annoyed at the persistent attcmpts by Balirain
to enlist his support in its designs against Qatar. In a strongly-worded letter to Bclgrüve of
May 1937, Sheikh Shakhboot states:
"We have received your 1-espectedletteat the most blessed hotir.WC11avenoted what
you said. Yes, we talked about the subject of Ourpeople living in IIawar. This caiinot
be denied by my sane person wha knows the sea of our country and the region. Ihave
got thenames of each and every one of those who inliabitcd il.I thinlcyou know that
the Al-Dawasir, who allege that they are its owncrs, have no right to it. They are, as
we andyou know, followersof BinSaudand they live iiZallaq in Balirain.
If you give them Hawar, we will ask for compensation from you for uur people herc.
This means that you haveno right to ask us not to interfere. We comrnunicatewith our
brother Sheikhsof Qatarin the eyes ofAllal1and Hiscreatures [opcnly].
We see and understand everything and keep sitent but without making aly concession.
Weinfom you that we do not wantyou to take our side inthe matter of Al-Udeid as it
is the home of ow people, the Al-Manaseer. As for Dass and Delma, let whoever is
entitled to them speakup.
We are not disagreeingwith Bin Thani. Let bygones be bygones. It was the custoin of
Ourancestorsto invadeand their descendantsshould not be harn~ed by tl~eideeds.
We demand that you keep out of our country's affàirs, whether your intentioi~sare
good or evil. We know how to protect them withnut you. We will not accept your
communicating with us unless it is only for greeting. Iyou need something let your
man here, Bin Rizoogi, infom us. He is assigned thetask of taking this lettcr to you.
May Allah'speace andblessingbeupon Muslimsonly; onc and alf9."
This communication is particularly important in demonstrating that Sheikli Shakhboot also
rejected Bahrain's support in its territorial differences with Qatar relating to Al-Udeid in
exchange forAbu Dhabi supportto Bahrain on its ciaiin to Hawar islarids.
9Annex 111.101,ol.7,p.5.
9Annex 111.128,ol.7,p.141.5.64 Another important communication which demonstrates Bahrain's failure to secure
support from rulers in the region for its claim to the Hawar islands iü letter o13 December
1937fromSheikh Shakhbootof Abu Dliabito SheikhSaecd bin Maktoom of Dubai where he
States:
"Well,you see the treachery oftaking Hawar. Hawar is an absolutc right of Bin Thani;
we expect this treachery from Al-IUialifahand the Englisli. It an absolute injustice.
We fear they will turn against us and thatwe will bc takenof[guard. The point in your
message is fùlly understood and will always be kcpt in niind. We liope nothing will
upset us as the case with Bin Thani did. 1-lismessenger came to us and we spoke witlri
hirn and informed him [of what is going on]. He who is in a weak position has go1 lo
inake promises to the one who is in a stronger position. I helieve the meaning of illis
does not escape your notice.You sec, his [BinThani] weclknessis caused by thrisswho
are besida end around hirn an,d we cannot speak for fear of the messcnger who isa
bastard. He is the source of ourplight, the one-eyed iman and nobody clse. May Allah
10011
help us treat hirnin the way he deserves .
5.65 CIoserto the time of the July 1939decision,Belgrave made further andfirmer efforts to
secure the support of the regional rulers. In a letter dated 20 July 1938 addressed to JShan
Bahador Issa Abdul Lateef Al-Sarkal, representative of the British government in Sharjah,
Belgrave wrote:
"After inquiring aboutyow health and your children's health,we order you to inforln
the Sheikhsaroundyou, in eachof Sharjah, Dubai and Abu Dhabi, of the following:
First, to inform them, Bahrain,by the approvalof thc British Slate, is going to take the
Island ofI3awarwhich belongs toQatar.
Second,weare goingto give thema copy of the signed docun~eiltconcerningthe issue
when it is disclosed aftert is signedby the Governmcnt.
Third, we do not want anybody to interferein the issuc or to lake Qatar's sidc until the
entire issue is reveaied andwe do not want anybody tosupport what Qatar says.
Fourth, the rnatter of taking Hawar from Qatar is ovcr, and if'anybody from any of
these cited countries gives witness, the ruler willbe rcspoilsible for it, and nobody
else, since the people of thcse countries havehuts in Hawar and they have been sold
since oldeii times to the people of Rahrain. Pleasc inforrn the Sheikhs of al1these
O0
AnnexIII.141,Vol. 7,p203;emphasisadded. matters. Give them Ourregards and relay io them the Goveriment's satisfaction with
themlO'."
5.66 In another letter of 15 February 1939addressed to Abdul Razag Rizoogi, a subordinatc
of the Political Resident in the Trucial States,Belgrave stated:
"...The issue of Hawar does not conceru the Rulers of the Trucial Coast, therefore it is
better for them to changethe subject. Butwe inform yuu that even ÏfHawnr helongs to
Qi~turand we don'tdislrgreewith this,it is in the interests of the British State that it
should belong to Bahraiil. This is what the honousable officiais who preceded us
decided. We carry out what we have been asked to do, espccially because to us the
interests of Bahrainare superiorto the interestsof Qatar and itsSheikhs.
Ttis in the month of July a royal decree will be issued to unnex Hawar of &tu- to
Brchrain.We inforrnyou tliatwe haveprepared everytliingthat will guarantee the right
of Bahrain to it, inciuding reports and help [other neçessary things]. We ask you to
give the rulers of the countriesour regards and the regards of Sheikh Hamad Biii Issa
Al-Khalifah who expectsthem to standwith him aiid docs not forget the stands taken
by the Sheikhs of Qatar with regard to their countries in their [Qatasis'] repeated
attacks andthe attacks on their relativesin Oman 10.Il
5.67 In fact, in a letter of 2 Dacember 1939, fi-am Abdul-Aziz bin Abdul-Rahman Al-Faisal
of Saudi Arabia addressedto Sheikh Shakhboot on the subject of Bahrain's Lakingof Hawu,
he had stated:
"As for the Qatari Sheikh'sarguments. Allah knows that we are on his sidc, but we are
still waiting forhis reply toBahrain's claims. If Bahrain acts in thisway it is [because]
Bahrain is coerced and not endowed withfree will. O mare,join tlie horses [i.e. when
in Rome, do as the Romans do]. Iwas angry with Mohammed Bin FIazeemand with
Ahmed Bin Rashid's sons regarding the document whiçh theyhad sent to the English.
For they are my subjects in Al-Khubar and Al-Dammain. They hdve made me a
promise not to harm anybady and not to interfcre in the inatters going on in Bahrain, if
they want to be safe10.tt
It is significant to note that Mohammed bin I-Iazeernand Alimed bill Rashid's sons were
signatories to a document forwarded by Belgrave in January 1939to the British which was
intended to establish that these persons beloilged to the Dawasir tribe, lived in Hawar and
iaAnnexIII.167,Vol.7, p.339.
102
103nnexIII. 180,Vol. 7, 405; emphasisadded.
Annex 111.216,Vol.8, p73.owed allegiance to Bahrain. Repudiations of signaturesto this documcnt by a number of other
signatories arereferred to in deta11in ChapterVI, belowlo4.
5.68 It is also relevant to refer to yet another communication to the Ruler oSAbu Dhabi,
Sheikh Shakhboot bin Sultanon 4 October 1940,addressed by his representative in Bahrain,
where he states:
"Youhave been aware of the situation betweenQatar andBahraiil, since you heard of
tlie taking of Hawar from Qatar, and [the fact that] the Adviscrhas paved the way for
Bahrain into the Island [Hawar]by scttling theAl-Dowcrsirtherc, thc reason for wliiçh
was not understoodby people atthe time.
We have been aware ofthe taking of Hawar since the issue or Al-Zaklmooniyyah; and
since the Ai-Dowasir's departure to Al-Zallaq and the visit of Qatar's Adviser with
Nassir Bin Atiyyah after Al-Zubarah [battle]. But what keeps us worried is the news
regarding the issue of the maritime boundaries betweenQatar and Bahrain: that many
islands will be taken by Bahrain in the same process. The ïeür is that we niay suffer
the same 105.II
5.69 Finally, in a letter of 13December 1940addressed LoSheikli Shakl~boot,Sheikh Saeed
bin Maktoom of Dubai confirmedthat:
"With reference to your question about whatwe think of your reply to the Sheikh of
Qatar, we would like to inform you that we suggest you send a word to tlie Sheikh
there that you, dong with Bin Maktoom, hold the samc vicws, aiid that mexation
(- is sismethingthat Allah and his creation would nol approve of.
We see that (06 71sue of Hawar,ad-Dibal and Jaradah is a plot the British are rnaking
to divide us ,
He further went on to Say:
"We have known of Sheikli Bin Thanifsarguments suid 1suggest Iliat he submit his
coinplaiiits to King Bi11Saud since the E~~glisla ire his frielids.1 also suggest tliat he
write to the Sultan Master of Oman since there has been an issuc between them. We
see that Bahrain has no rights whatsoever. Tliisis wliat we said in our leiter to Sheikh
Hamad Bin Issa. May you live long for your sincerebrother'07."
10,Tee,paras6.58 clseq., below.
105
IO6nnex111.223V , ol8, p. 103;emphasisadded.
Annex111.224,Vol.8, p.107.
] Ib id. Section 4. Qatar's TcrritoririlJnteeritv and itsSecuritv
5.70 As shown in Cliapter IV, nlost of the main IIawar islaridas wcll as nlaiiy of'tlie other
islandç in the group fa11within three nautical milesof thc coüstof ~atar]~'.It will also be sccil
from Map No.14,facing page250, that afterQatar'sexteilsion of its territorial sea in 1992up
to 12 nautical miles, the entire grorip of the 1-Iawarislands falls witliiii Qatar's territorial
waters.
5.71 It is weIl known tl-iattlie territorial seahad almost univcrsally corne to he regardcd ever
since tlie 17thcentury as so essential tothe security oT the coastal Stale tliat it was acceptcd as
part of itsterritory and subject to its coinplete sovereignjurisdicticinand contrnl. This aspecl
isof particular importance in relation to the security of Qatar invicw OC the close proximity 01'
the Hawar islands to the mainland, andgiven Bahrain's actions on the islands. A description is
given in Appendix 2 of the fortifications constructed by Bahrain on Hawar in receiit ycars as
well as its placing military anns and cquipmenttherc, posing a direct danger to the security of
the territory of Qatar. Iisparticularly importantto draw attentionto the füctthat tliis thrcato
Qatar's security is posedlo its south-weslregionwhere ils principal oil lields are located.
5.72 It seems pertinent to rcferhere to the very old and weil known Anrw casc of 1805,
dealing with the status of certain alluvial islandsfoimed off the çoastof tlie Mississippi River
and emphasising that the security ofa coastal State was a paramount colisideration. In that
case, itwas stated:
"Considcr what the coliseqiience would be iT lmds of tliis description were not
considered as appendant to the inainland, and as cornpriscd withiil the bounds al'
territory. Ifthey do i~otbeIong to the United States of Amcrica, any othcr power migl~t
occupy them; they n~iglitbe e~iibailked aiidfortifïed. What a thoril would this be in the
side of America! ltis pliysically possible at least tllal they mighlbe so occupied by
European nations, andthen the cornmaiid ofthe river would be no longer in America
but in such settlements.The possibility of such a consequeiiceis cnougliito expose the
fallacy OSany arguments that are addressed to shew, thal these içlands are not to be
considered as pa-tof the territory of America. Whcther they are con~pusedof eartli or
108
See, para4.5,above andMap No.5, facing page50. solid rock, will not Varythe right of dominion, for the rigl~tof dominion does not
1091,
depend upon thetexture of thesoi1 .
In an Indian appeal to tlie Privy Council of Great Britain, Lord Shaw cited with approval the
above-mentionedjudgment of Lord StowellintheAnnacase, and sti-essed:
"The confusion that might be produced by leaving islands, etnergent within Illethree-
mile limit, to be seized by the first corneris clear bcyond controversy. He migIit be a
foreign citizen: he would of course hoist the flag of his owiî nation, and tlîal nation
might proceed to fortifythe ernergentlands ..."'."
5.73 It is relevant to note tht the very British officials (E'owle and Weightnîan) who
recommended the decision of 11JuIy 1939 on the Hawar islandswere Ihemselvcsfully aware
of the rule relating to islands falling within territorial waters. Al about the sme time as thc
decision about the Hawar islands was being made, Fowle and Weightman proposed the
application of the rule in determining the ownership of two islands clairned by both Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia. In his letter of 10November 193811', Fowle (the Political Residcntj wrotc
that one of the islands "is within 3 miles of the Umm Na'san islatid i.e. within the territorial
waters of that island which undoubtedly belongsto Bahrain". Accordingly, lieand Wcightman
(thePolitical Agent in Bahrain)tookthe viewthat the islaildbelongcd to Rahrain -a view that
was supported on the same ground by the Foreign Office in its lctter of 20 December 1938'"
and by the India Office in its letter of 4 January 1939'13.
5.74 It is therefore Qatar's submissioii that if the fact that inust of thc Hawar- islands were
located in Qatar's territorial waters had beentaken into account, the British decision would
necessarily havebeen different.
109Annex 111.284V,ol. 8,p447.
LIUAnnex 111.291V,ol. 8, p. 455.
IIIAnnex 111.171, Vol. ,p. 357.
112
113Annex 111.172V,ol. 7,p. 363.
Annex 111.176,Vol. 7, p. 38The letteris eironeously dated 19311thc cvent,wlienthe Saudi
Arabian Government pointed out that Clleisland in questiwas sornewhal more than 4 iniles from Uinm
Na'san,the view was abandoiiedboth by thePoliticalResident and the India OffSec, Annex III.196Vul.7,
p. 507 and Annex 111.205,Vol8,p. 23. Section 5.Conclusion
5.75 The above review of the records establishes that the ii1tegrit.y of the tcrritory of Qatar,
including the islands of Hawar, was clearly accepted and recognised by the British and the
Turks as also by rulers of other countriesin the region,aiid bÿ Bahraiil itsclf. 1fact, until a
short period before the "provisional" British decision of 1936that the Ha~varisiands bclonged
to Bahrain, the British authorities iLondon and in India had consistently rccogilised that the
Hawar islands were part of Qatar. The British decision of 1939 is accordingly iildefensible,
particularly when account is taken of the fact that the Hawar islands la11mostly within ihree
nautical milesof the Qatar mainland Coast. CHAPTERVI
THE DEFECTIVENATUREOFTHE BRITISHDECISIONOP 1939
Section1.Back~round to the 1939Decision
A. Nature of British Relationswith Oatar and Bahrain
6.1 The nature of the relations between the British Govcrnment, on the one hand, and the
Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain, on the olher hand, is relevant to the issue whetlier, in 1939, the
British Governrnenthad the power unilaterally to determinc with binding effect whcther title
to the Hawar group of islands was vested in Qatar or in Bahrain. The liistorical survey in
Chapter III above shows that by 1939, both Qatar and Bahrain, like utlier Gulf sheikhdoms,
were British protected States in special treaty relations with the British Governrnent. The
content of these treaty engagementsis spelt out in the Précis of the Treulissand Engagernrnls
betweenthe British Government and the Chiefi of the Arabian Coast ofthe Pcrsian ~ulj'. In
the case of Qatar, there is, in addition to the treaty of 1916,the new assurance of protection
against attacks on Qatari land territory givenby the Political Resident lo the Ruler of Qatar on
11May 193~~.
6.2 Itis further explained in the Political Resident'slctter of 11May 1935that the protection
from the British Governrnent would be:
"...against serious andunprovoked attacks which may be made on your territory from
outside your frontier."
6.3 The protection "naturally refers to serious incursions, and not tu small raids"; and the
British Government "...naturallyexpect you to take al1reasonablc steps foryourown delènce
and for maintaining order within your own frontier". Theprotection was to be afforded by use
1
Revised up to 29 September 1928, constituting an Appendix to ThePmsian Gulf Ifistorical
Summaries,1907-1953(pp. 165-170).An exccrptfromthis Préciscoveringtreaties wBahrainand Qatar is at
Annex 12.10Vol.4,pp.280-281.
The full text of this additionalassofaprotectiongiven in 1935atAnnex 11.1,Vol. 4, p311.
Itwill be seen from the text oftlie PoliticalResidenthathe British Govcrnmentcoiiditionaltyundertook
to afford thc protection. The condition was that the ciQatar give tlie @ilconcession about whithe
Anglo-Persian Oil Company had been negotiatingto that Company;and it rnay be noted that this condition was
met.of the Royal Air Force, and certain facilities were requested "...in order that ...aircraft should
be able to corne to yow assistance as soon as possible and be abIe to take action swiftly and
effectively when they havearrived".
6.4 A brief surnmary of the engagements undertaken by the Arab rulers in the Gulf towards
the British Government is given at the end of the P'récis3 T.tshould be noted that mariyof the
engagements undertaken by the Arab rulers in the Gulf towards the Rritish Government are
common to al1(or virtually all) these rulers because this is a signiiicant fcature which may
well be decisive in determining whether, and if so to what extent, the British Government had
the power in 1939 unilaterally to decide whether title tu the Hawar group of islands was
vested in Qatar or Bahrain. This is becausethe nwxd of the Courtof Arbitration constit~~ted in
1978 to resolve the dispute between Dubai and Sharjah (both by then forming constituent
parts of the United Arab Emirates) concerning the demarcation of their boundaries touches
upon the nature and extent of the power of theBritish Goverlunent in this context. The award
of the Court of Arbitration in tlie DubaiLTharjuh Border case has been published in the
InternationalLaw~e~orts~I.n its award,the Court of Arbitration reviewed the content of the
undertakings given by the Rulers of Dubai and Sharjah towards the British Government. It
found that they correspondedapproximately to those set out in points 1and 2 of the suinmary
of the ~re'cis'.Frornthis, the Court concluded:
"It is therefore clem that no treaty authorised the British autl~oritiesto delimit
unilaterally the boundaries between the Emirates and that no British administration
ever asserted that it had the right to do so. The Court has tlierefore corne to the
4Annex 11.10Vol. 4,p. 283.
Lauterpacht, E.and Greenwood C., InternalionaLaw Reports,Grotius Publications Ltd., 1993,
Vol.9L,pp. 549-701. Extractsofthis Awardmay befoundatAnnex 111.295V . ol. 8p.475.
5See, Annex 11.10Vol.4, p.283. Points 1and2 ofthe summaryread as follows:
"1. The following are common to the engagements of al1 thc above Arab States to the British
Goventment:-
The undertaking not to cede, seII, mortgage, &c., any of their territory except to the British
Government,or togive anyoil concessionwithoutpennission.
The undertakingto psoliibitthe trafficof armsin theirterritories, and(cxthecase of Koweit)the
undertakingto suppress slavetrade.
2. Tlie followingis coinmontoal[,exceptMuscat:-
The undertakingto have noiiegotiatioiiswith, or receivethe repiesenof,ariyPowerother than the
British Goveminent, exceptwith theconsent of the British Government,and the undertaking not to give any
pearling or sponge fishingconcession withoutpermission." conclusion that the consent of the Rulers concerned was necessary before any such
delimitation could have beenundertaken'.'"
6.5 The Court of Arbitration in the Dubai/SharjahBordercase then proceeded to examine
whether Dubai had ever given its consent to the delimitation of its boundaries by the British
autliorities. It found tliat such consent had been given (on 18 March 1955 aiid on 14 Junc
1956),and that it had not, as Dubai sought to argue, been vitiated by duress, coercion or the
threat of force:
"Having considered al1of the very considerable docun~entatioiipresentcd to it on this
point, the Court:has arrived at the conclusion that the consent given to the British
authorities by the Ruler of Dubai in 1955 permitting ihem Lodelimit his boundaries
with Sharjahwas not givenunderthe threat of force and wasa valid consent7."
6.6 Thus, in the Dubai/Shurjah Border case, the Ruler oCDubai, wlio was challcnging the
validity of the decisions on the boundary taken by the British Political Agent in the Trucial
States (Mr. Peter Tripp)on the basis of reports prepared by the Assistant Political Agent (Mr.
Julian Walker), had, as the Court of Arbitration found, consented iii advance to the
determinationof his boundary with Sharjahby the British authorities.
6.7 Here, there is a substantial and crucial difference betwcenthc procedure followed in the
case of the decisions on theDubai/Sharjah boundaricstaken by the British authorities in 1956
and 1957and the procedure followedin the case of the decisicinof the British authorities in
1939 on the attribution to Bahrain of the Hawar group of islaiids. In the case of the British
decision of 1939 on the Hawar group of islands, no atteinpt had been made by the British
authorities to obtain in advance the consent of the Rulers of Qatar and Bahrain to tlie
determination by the British authoritiesof title to the Hawar Islands; and no consent was in
fact cver givcn by the Ruler of Qatar.
6Annex 111.295V, ol8, p.477. Itmay bc notcdthatat die time of the British deciconcerncd in
that cas7,Dubai aiid Sharjahwerenot part of a federatrheyarcnow.but were independent sheiklidoins.
Ibid., 478.6.8 This is in sharp contrastto the position in the Dubai/SharjahBorder case. Nowhere in the
British archives relating to Qatar andBahrain is there to be found any authorisationsimilar ta
that given by the Ruler of Dubai on 18 March 1955,when he gave a written undertaking on
his own behalf and on behalf of al1his successorsas Rulcrs of Dubaithat they would not:
"...dispute or object to any decision that rnay be decided by the Political Agent
regarding the question of the boundaries between our Emirate üild the Einirate of
Sharjahtowards the coast8."
6.9 Qatar accordingly contends that, in the period immediately preceding the British
Governrnent'sdecision of 11 July 1939,purporting to give the Hawar islands to Bahrain, no
consentwas either sought or given by the Ruler of Qatar to tlie malcingof a determination by
the British Government as to whether Qatar or Bahrain had sovereignty over the Ha~var
islands. As will be dernonstrated in Sections 2 and 3 of this Cliaptcr,the procedure followed
by the British Government in 1939in reaching its decision un whether Qatar or Bahrain had
title to the 1-Iawarislandswas so defective,and the evidence on which theBritish Government
based that decision wasso suspect, that, even if it could be estabiishedthat Qatarhad given its
prior consent to the making of such a decision, the decision itself was vitialed on a number of
grounds, including error, and çannot bepesmittcdto stand.
6.10 In Chapter III, Sections 4 and 5 of this ~emorial~, Qatar has drawn attention to tlie
evolution of relations between the British Government, on the one liand, and the Rulers of
Qatar and Bahrain,on the other hand. These relations developed as a result of thc separate
histories of Qatar and Balirain. It will have been notcd that theBritisli authorities in the Gulf
maintained a much closer relationship with the Rulcrs of Baluaiii tl-ianthey did witl-ithe
Rulers of Qatar, partly in consequence of the fact that the Government of India (responsible
aCited iDubai/ShcrrjahBordercase,ihidp.480.
O
See,alsoChap. V,above.for the exercise of political control in the Gulf until 1947) had inaintained permanent
representatives in Bahrain (known as Political Agents) since 1904. No doubt in part because
of the Turkish presence in Qatar fiom 1871 to 1915,and in part also because of opposition to
the appointment of British representativesin Doha by successive Rulers of Qatar, the British
had no suc11direct representation in Qatar. Indeed, it was not until 1949 lhat the British
Governrnent (who had assumed responsibility fiom the Government of India in 1947/48)
appointed a Political Agent in Qatar. Thus, during the 1920's aiid the 1930's,a crucial period
in the liistory of the Gulf,there was no directBritish official representation in ~atar".
6.11 Other Factorsoperated in the 1920'sand the 1930's to strengtlien the ties of Britain to
Bahrain and to weaken any potential Qatari influence. As has already bcen noted, these
included:
(1) the continuing Persian threat to Bahrain based ~yotl its long-standing claim of
II
sovereignty .
(2) the arriva1of BeIgravein Bahrain in 192612.
(3) the willingness of Bahrain, in response to British rcquests, lo provide aeronautical
faciliiies, bot11civil and military, for ainajor staging-post on the route from Britain to
India and beyond, when contrasted with the reluctance of Qatar to permit the
development ofair links '3.
1.Thediscoveryof oil and its impact
6.12 But it was the discovery of oil in the Gulf during thc 1930s which bad an inilnediate
impact on the traditional local economiesand indeed on the relationsbetween Qatar, Bahrain
1OSee,Appendix3, Vol. 15,p. 95.
1ISee,para.3-72,above.
12See,paras.3.69-3.70, above.
13Sec,paras.3.71and 3.74,abave.and Britain. Attention has already been focussed an certain aspects of'this development,
including the conclusion of the first petroleum concession by the Ruler of Bahrain wit11
Eastern and General Syndicate Ltd. (EGS) in 1925,and thc conclusion of the first petroleu~n
concession betweenthe Ruler of Qatar andthe AngIo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1935.
6.13 There is strong evidence that throughout the negotiations on an additioiîaIarea between
1928and 1933,both the British officiaisandthe oil companies themselves were çlearly of'the
view that the Hawar islands did not belongto Bahrain.
6.14 Under the terms of the Concession Agreement withEGS of 2 December 1925,the Ruler
of Bahrain had granted to the Company (EGS)an exclusive exploration licence for a pcriod
not exceeding two years (with the possibility of extension for afurtherperiod of Iwoyears):
"...throughout the whole of the territoriesunder his [theRuler's]control ...14."
He also undertook to grant it, either during the currency of the exploration licence or upon its
expiry, a prospecting licence over areas to be selected by the Company with the approval of
the Ruler and with the cognizance of the Political Resident. In addition, the Ruler undertook
to grant to the Company, on the expiry of the prospecting licence, a "niining lease over an
aggregate area not exceeding 100,000acres" divided into blockç to be selecled by the
Company.
6.15 Beginning in 1928, negotiations were conducted between EGS, its successor BAPCO
(who in ljct took over in 1930 the EGS interest in the 1925concession), and the RuIer of
Bahrain for a concession over that portion of the Bahrain islands and territorial waters
remaining alter the Companyhad chosen its 100,000acres. This f~~rthe rrea became knowiias
the "additional", "remaining" or, more usually, "unallottcd" area. During thc iiegotiations,
14See,Annex 111.68,ol.6, p353.which were suspended in 1933 at BAPCO's request and resumed only in 1936, it was
necessary for the negotiatorstu identifythe acreageof land and territorial waterswhich would
be comprised in thc unallotted area.
6.16 On 23 April 1928,Major Frank Holmes,the local representative of EGS and later tu be
thc local representative ofBAPCO until 1933,had wriiteii to the Political Agent in Bahraiil
applying, on behalf ofEGS,for permission to negotiatc an oiIcoilcessioncovering:
"..that portion of the Bahrain Islands and its Territorial Waters which isnot includcd
in the BahrainOil Concession~~reernent ...'""
by which 100,000acres of the Bahrain Islands was granted toEGSby thc Kuler of Bahrain on
2 December 1925.The letter of 23 April 1928 continucd:
"The total area of the Bahrain Islands including its Territorial Waters is roughly
198,000acres approximately309 square miles.The area granted under the Bahrain Oil
Concession Agreement is 156square miles. Therefore this requcst isfor permission 10
negotiate for the balance of the totalarea includiilg Territorial Waters which is 153
squaremiles equalling 97,920 square [sic acres."
6.17 Now. it is clcar that the acreage of the "Arca Remaining" applied fur by Major Holmes
in 1928(amounting to 97,920 acres)is altogether too srnallto be capable of being interpreted
as including such areas as tlie Hawar islands, FashtDibal or Qit'atJasadah; and the further
explanation given by Major Holmes in his letter to Ballantyne of 6 September 193316only
serves to corroborate the conclusionthat neither the Hawar islands, norFasht Dibal, nor Qit'at
Jaradah could have been includedin the areacaIculationsmade in 1928.
6.18 Independent calculations were made by the Petroleum Dcpartment (Mincs Department)
in London in 1933 for tliearea of the Bahrain Islands and that part of the territorial waters of
the islands regarded at the time as workable for oil exploitation. In a letter from Starling
(Petroleurn Department) to Laithwaite(IndiaOffice) of 17August 1933, it is stated:
"Annex 111.7V,ol.6,p.389.
lAnnex 111.93,Vo6, p. 475. "We have measured the area of the islands and the territorial watersup to a limi1 of
mile, andthe resulisas foI1ows:-
Island Areaof Land. Shoal Water Area.
Sa. miles= Acres. Sq. miles = Acres.
Bahrein 210.15 134,496) 74.25 47,521
Sitra 3.25 2,080)
Nabbi Salib 0.25 160)
Muharrak 5.25 3,360 8,960
Um Nassan 5.55 3,552 15.70 10,048
Cliff 0.25 160 4.45 2,848
Jadum (Fasht al Yarim) 1.50 960 11.O0 7,040
TOTALS 226.20 144,768 105.40 76,417
It is doubtful whetherJadum Island (Fashtal Yarim)is of any value, as a drilling area,
being remote from land and surrounded by a Iarge area of shoal waterthelatteroften
dry d low water.
The total area of these Islands, plus a belt of water 1mile wide surrounding their Iand
area = 221,185acres,availablefor possible drillingl'."
6.19 These independent calculations are not al1 that far removed from the original
calculations made in 1928 (22 1,185 acres as compared witli the earlier 198,000 acres). The
difference may be attributable in Iarge parttc the method of calculating the acreage of
territorial waters (or shoal water area)to be taken into account. What is beyond question is
that the 1933 calculation did not include the acreage oth3 Hawar islm~ds,Fasht Dibal or
Qit'at Jaradah since none of these geographical features figures in the specific list of the
Bahrain Islands incorporatedin Starlinp'sletterto Laithwaof 17 August 133318.
6.20 There is further evidence that neither Britishofficiaisin London or the Gulf nor the oil
Company representatives concerned considered.in1933,that the Hawar islands were included
in the Bahrain group of isiands. Firstly, the acting Political Resident (Loch) recommended, in
telegram No. 27 to the Secretaryof State for the Colonies (ColonialSecretary) in London of
23 July 1933,that inany newconcessionit would:
17AnnexIII.92,Vol.6p. 469.
IBIbid. "..be prudent to name islands i.e. BahrainIsiand, Muharraq and Sitrah (Umm Nassan
and other islets near main island might be included if questioii is raised), otherwise
controversy may arise over Hawar Island and Bahrain claimto certainplaces on west
coast of Qatar peninsula'g."
Although the Colonial Secretary acceptedthisrecommendation, the Political Agent in Bahrain
was unable to obtain the agreementof the Ruler of Bahrain, who wished the area to be called
"Bahrain Islands" in thencw concession "sothat questionof Hawar Island aiid Qatar will not
be made prominent by their omissionz0".The actingPolitical Residentthougl~tihat the Ruler's
viewon this issue could be accepted:
"1 thi21 that we rnay accept this as Hawar Island is clcarly not one of the Bahrain
group ."
6.21 The India Office were concerned at this time about thc rislcthat EGS and its successor
BAPCO might attempt to claim that they had rights in respcct of Hawar, having regard to the
reference to the Ruler of Bahrain's "territories"in the 1925 concession. But Laithwaite
managed to persuade himself that this risk was negligible:
"The exploration licence granted under the Agreement of 2nd December, 1925(from
the area specified in which the areas under the prospecting licence and inining leasc
must be selected) is, however, in respect of 'thewholc of the territories undert the
Sheikh's 'control'.This seems clearly to exclude areas in Qatar and presurnably also
would exclude Hawar which belongs in any case geographically to Qatar, and is the
westernmost and largest of a groupof islandsjust off the Qatar coast
6.22 There is a final piece of evidenca which goes fartowards confirming the above account
of the understanding of British offîcials in 1933.In responsc to a telegraphic request fiom
London on 2 August 1933, for a marked inap sliowing the arca recngnised as the Bahrain
Islands, the acting Political Residcnt sent a despatch on 4 August cnclosing a rnap published
in 1906by the Swey of Iiidia. Tlicmap enclosedwith this despatch is unlortunately missing
fiomthe British archives,but the despatchitself describes it as showing "..the main island of
Bahrain, the islands of Muharraq, Sitrah andNabi Salih and certain islets". The despatch also
''Annex 111.85, ol.6,p.437.
20Amex 111.86,Vol.6, p441.
21
22Annex 111.88V,ol.6, p.449.
Annex 111.91, ol.6, p461.Statesthat the enclosed map "...does not show the island ofUmm Nassan (and some petty
islets) which lies about two niiles off the wcst Coastof Manama island ..."Findly, paragraph
3 of the despatch summarizesthe position as follows:
"Thewhole of the idands shown on the enclosed map, and also Umin Nassan and the
pctty islands mentioned in the second paragraph of this letter are iilcluded in the
genei-alterrn Bahrain 1s1ands2'."
It hardlyneeds stressing chatthis definitioof tlieterm Bahrain Islaiidspointedly excludes the
Hawarislaiids.
6.23 The negotiations with EGSIBAPCOfor a new concession covering the "unallotted" area
of Bahrain were suspended in the second half of 1933at the rcquest of BAPCO and were not
resurned until 1936 when Petroleum Concessions Ltd. (PCL), by this time Qatar's
concessionaire, joined in the bidding.
6.24 WhiIe these negotiations for a new concession were in progress, there had been
significant developments on the ground, including the discovery of oil in Balxain in 1932,and
the subsequent building of a pipeline and storage facililies in 1934, and of a refinery in
193524.
6.25 Oil development began later in Qatar tlian in Bahrain; and this was tohave a decisive
impact on developments in the area. As already noted, Qatar'sinitial concessio~~aire was the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company ("APQC")~~ A;POCpromptly assigned its iriterestundcr its 1935
concession to PetroIeum Concessions Ltd("PCL") , which in turn passed on ils interest to its
subsidiary, Petroleum Concessions (Qatar) Ltd.These were al1British cnmpaiiies although
ultirnately there were substai~tivenon-British interests in tlieparcnt Company, the lraq
Petroleum Company.
23Annex 111.90,ol.6, p. 457.
2See, para.3.67,above.
25The textof tlie 1935 Concession Agreement between the Ruler of Qatar and APOC is at
Annex 111.99, ol.6,p. 507.6.26 It will be seen that, in Article 1 of the 1935 Concession Agreen~ei~twitli APOC, thc
Riiler of Qatar grants to thc Company various eaumerated rights to cxplore,to prospect, to
drill forand to extract petroleumand other specified substances "throughout the principality
of Qatr". The territorial scope of the 1935 Coiicessioil Agreement is f~irtherdefined in
Article 2 which Statesinteralia:
"The Statc of Qatr rneans the whole area over which the Shailch rules =id which is
marked onthe north of thc linc drawnon themap attaciched to this ~~reeinent*"."
Tlie map attached to the 1935Concession Agreement sliows thatthe IIawar group of islands
is unmistakably comprehended withinthc territory of the Stüteof Qatar as so defit~ed~~.
6.27 This is confirmed by a "Reconnaissanceof Qatar"carried o~lton YMay 1934,by Royal
Air Force aircraft coming under the corninand of Air Headquarters, Britisli Forces in Iraq,
althoiigh opemting hm ahr raid W'hat is of interest in fhesc reconnaissÿii~ereports is that
Hawar island is treated as unquesiionably being Qatar territory. Thus,iiWiiig-Commander
Oxland'scovering report of 30 May 1934,the following scntcnceis included:
"Asregards flyingboatsthe foot of DOHATAS SALWAnear SALWA Wells is quite
suitable for flying boats exceptwhen the 'shamal' (norwind) is blowing, and in those
circumstances flying boats could take rcfi~gein the soutkernmost bay of DJEZIRA
HAWAR~~.."
The report by the flying-boa1squadronm confirms that "the soutliernrnosl buy of HAWAR
ISLANDwould possibly afford good shelterin emergency ..."The RAF was thus in no doubt
atthis time that Hawar island belongedto Qatar.
6.28 As already iioted,oil was first discoveredin the western paofQatar in 1939;but, with
the outbreak of war in that year, the British Govcrnment ordered PCL to closc down tlieir
26Ihid ..511.
27Ibidp..529.
28Fulldetails of this reconnaissancearecoinAnnex 111.9, ol. 6,479.
29
30Ihid ..483.
Appendix Bto thmain repoitibidp.486.6.31 Nevertheless, it was clearly in the intcrest of tlie Ruler of Bahrain iil1936to maximize
the territory over which he could claim sovereign riglits and tliereby grant valuable oil
concessions. It was also in BAPCOs interest to support suc11claiins. APOCIPCL had already
been granted a concession over the wholeof the Ruler or Qatar'sterritories, so tliat BAPCO's
only chance of obtaining rights to prospect in the Hawar islands was if Bahrain wcre
deterrninedto have sovereignty over them. At first sighl, it miglitthercfore seeln that PCL, as
Qatar's concessionaire, would haveail interest in pressing the claim of Qatar to sovereignty
over the Hawarislands; and indeed,it did so.
6.32 Thus, on 30 June 1939, PCL wrote to Pccl (India Office) ~nalcingtlie point that the
original negotiator of the Qatar concessionin 1935, Mr. Mylles, "was and remained under the
impression that Hawar formed part of the Concession ared3". However, once PCLcntered the
bidding for the Bahrain unaiIotted area in cornpetition with BAPCO, it had no interest in
antagonising the Ruleï of Bahrain by opposing his claim tothe Hciwarislands; this would be
virtually certain to drive him into the amis of BAPCO. if, on the other hand, the Hawar
islandswere heIdto appertainto Qatar,PCL was assured of its rights overthem anyway, since
its concession covered the whole of Qatar's territories.PCLtheseforesoon made it clear that it
did not much mind who was awarded sovereignty over Hawar,as long as it got the right to
exploit anyresources found there.
6.33 It is also apparent that, at this tiine, the oil companies were very interested in the
potential resources of the Hawar islands. In reporting on 30 .Tuly1936on thc progress of the
negotiations, Walton (India Office)states thatBelgrave had said Ihüt:
"...they both, the Bahrein PetroleumCompany in particular, appcared to attach great
value tothe oil prospects of the Hawar~slands~~."
6.34 Notwithstanding that there had been hints in 1933 that the Rules cilBahrain might
advance a claim to sovereignty overthe Hawar islands, itwas not until 1936 tliatthe R~ilerput
forward a forma1 claim. The Bahraini claim to the Hawar islands was first advanced in
33
34Annex 111.206,Vol8,p.27.
Annex 111.12,Vol. 7p. 55.Belgrave's letter to the then Political Agent iii Bahrain {Loch)of 28 April 1936~~.It will be
seen that the claim was specifically linkcd to the on-going negotiations for an oil concession
over Bahrain's "unallotled wea". Bahrain, no doubt egged on by RAPCO, who atlached great
importance to the oil prospects of the Hawar islands, was c1carlycovctnus of the enormous
potential forwealth represented by a groupof islands whicli were thought attlie time to be oil-
rich. Some ofthe unsavoury and indeedunlawfulactivities engaged in by Belgrave and others
in the 1930s in sinattcmptto provide support for a Bahraini daim to the Hawar islands are set
out in cietai1be10w~~ . t ihis point in the narrative, it is sufficient to record that,as will be
demonstrated at a later stage, the campaign engaged in by Belgrave and oll-iersin liis pay to
secure recognition of a Bahraini claim to the Hawar islands was already under way in 1930;
and that, as will be seen, it involved inter ciliathe blatant manulücturing of evidence designed
to mislead anythird party.
6.35 The reaction of the Political Agent (Loch) and the Political Resident (FowIe) to this
Bahraini written claim to the Hawarislands is strangc. In Iiis letter to Fowle of 6May 1936,
Loch concedes that he had "neverlanded at Hawar Island", but that he had "flown over it". Hc
describes it as "alow, desolatc looking place near to the mainland of Qatar", but he does not
discount the possibility that it may have considerablevaIue because of the discovcry of oil in
Bahrain. He confesses that hehas not yet beenable to trace certain records relating to Zubarah
andZaknuniyah island in which Hawar might havebecnmeiltioned.He goes on to Say:
"1 do not recollect that Hawar Island was mentioned in thc course of those
proc.eedings,probably not as I do not think that the Turks made any üttempt to raise
their flagon it3'."
He then concludes this cursory and inconclusive siirveyof the position by expressing his view
that:
35
36Annex 111.103,ol. 7, p. 15.
See,paras. 6.51esey.,below.
37Annex 111.106, ol.7,p.27. It should be noted hcre ttlie slateinelit tlie Turks dinotraise
theirflag on Hawar is demonstrably inistakeiiview of the evidcnce presentcd in Chaptei-V about Turkish
naval surveys of Qatar and its offshore islands in the early 187sec,paras.5.15 et seq.,above, and in
particdar Anncx 111.26, ol6, p.129. "...subject to any past correspondence which is not avivailable to me, ... there is real
substance in [theRuler of Bahrain's]claim and ...itmight in certain circumstances suit
uspoIiticallyto have as largean area as possible included under Bahrain."
6.36 The reaction of the Political Resident (Fowlc) is equally casual. 11s an express letter to
the Secretary of State for Tndiaof 25 May 1936, Fowle pursues the red lierring of earlier
correspondence relating to Subarah, but, in favouring the Bahraini çIciim to Hawar, he relies
more on "evidence" dating fiom 1909that "the Islandhas longbeen ocçupied by the Dowasir
tribc of Bahrain", and on Belgrave's assertion thatthe present Ruler of Babrain and his Iàther
had cxcrcised activejurisdiction in Hawar "downto the present day". He thereforc inclines to
the view:
"...tliat Hawar shouldbe regarded as belonging to the Shaikh of Bahrain and that the
burden of disproving his claim lies onthe Shaikhof ~atar~~."
6.37 It will be noted that:
(a) no attempt was made by the Political Agent or the Political Resident lo investigate the
truth of the assertions madeby Belgravein his letter of 28 April 193639;
(b) no attempt was made by either official to inform the Ruler of Qatar that a claim to
Hawar had been advanced on behalf of Bahrain, notwithstandiisg that the Political
Resident himself was preparedto acknowledge Qatar'sinterest by recornmending that
"the burden of disproving [Bahrain'sjclaim" shouldrest on thc Ruler ot'Qatar.
6.38 On the basis of these recommendations of the Political Agent in Bahrain and the
Political Resident, the British Government made a "provisiorsaldecision" in favour of the
Bahraini clairnto the Hawar Islands in July 1936~'.There is nrievidence that the "provisional
decision" itself was ever cornrnunicated to the Rider of Qatar, although it was certainly
communicated througl-iBelgraveto the Ruler of Bahrain, as is çlearly shown by the following
minute:
39Annex 111,107Vol. 7p. 31.
40Annex 111.103Vol. 7p. 15.
Annex 111.109,ol.7,p.41. "Mr. Clausoiiand 1saw Mr. Belgrave oii 10th July,and explained io bim the position
in regard to Hawar, viz.,that on the evidence at ppreseiitberore H.M.G. it appears to
belong to the Sheikh of Bahrein, and that the biudeil of disproving his claitn lies on
any other potential claiinant. It was explained to him tliat it would be impossible to
give a final ruling without knowing whether the Sheikh of Qatr has a claim, and
hearing it if he had one. Mr. Belgrave understood theposition. Be said that the Slieikh
would enter the island in the list of his possessions to be giveii to Petroleum
Concessions ~td.~'."
Qatar'soil concessionaire (PCL) was also informedofthis developinent 011 14July 193642.
6.39 As will have been seen, the "evidence"on which Lhis"provisional decision" was based
was fragmentary and inconclusive.Moreover,exparle statements by Belgravc were given hl1
credence without any attempt being made to test their veracily. Politicalconsiderations were
also clearIy being taken into account. It is difficult to escapc tlie conclusion that this
"provisionaldecision" was taken on the basisof "evidence" whichwas both unconvincing and
highly disputable. Further analysis of the substance of this first forinai claim by Bahrain to
sovereignty over the Hawar islandswill befound in Section3.A.1.of this ~ha~ter"~.
6.40 Reverting to the oil concession negotiations on the "unailolted" area, thc Ruler of
Bahraineventually decidedin 1938in favour of the bid from BAPCO,but the possibility was
left open that PCL might bbcawarded a concession over the Hawar islands". Indeed, the
British Governrnent suggested to thc Ruler in early 1939that he award a concession over the
Hawar islands to PCL if it was decided that Hawar belonged to Bahrain: but the Ruler was
faced with a threat fiom BAPCO that tliey wouIdslow down oil production ifthe wlioIeof the
unallotted area were not concededto them, andhe succurnbed tothis pressure". Accordingly,
a concession was granted to BAPCO by the Ruler of Bahrain on 19 Junc 1940,in the form of
a Deed of Further Modification cxtending theMining Lease and covering "al1lands, islands,
shoals, reefs, waters and submerged lands overwhich the Shaikhnow has dominioii or wtiich
may ..corne under the dominion of the Shaikh or his Successors" during a fifty-five year
41
AnnexIII.111,Vol. 7p.51.
42Annex 111.10,Vol.7,p.47.
43Ses,paras6.146etseq.,below.
44~nnéx 11.1,Vol.4,pp.'294-295.
45Ibid.period from the date of the ~eed~~. By this time the British Governtnenthad of course decided
in favourof the Balirainiclairnto sovereignty overthe Hawar islands.
2.Beaconing of isletsin theHawar Group
6.41 It was followingthis so-cdled "provisiona1decision" in 1936 that Belgravc, on hehalf of
the Ruler of Bahrain, began to take additional steps to bolster Bahrain'sclainito Hawar by the
carrying out of various acts of construction on Hawar island iisell' andon some of the
uninhabited islets forming part of the Hawar group. These acts of construction date from the
period mid-1936 to mid-1938, and they were al1put in hand and superviscd by Belgrave.
They included the construction of a stone fort with ttower,the building of a mosque, and an
attempt to drill an artesian well, all on the main Hawar island. Details of tl~eseactivitics, so
cleasly designed to give a semblance of credence to theBalmini claim to Hawar, arc given in
Section 3.A.1of this chapter4'.
6.42 In addition, much effort was expended by Bahrain during this period (particulcuiy
during the winter months of 1937/38) in erecting beacons, cairns or inüsks on a number of
uninhabited islands, islets, rocks and shoals in the E-Iawargroup. Belgrave himself makes
referenceto this in his private diary entry for 2April 1938,on which date he was inHawar:
"... went in the launch round the other side ainong the islands, which have al1 got
cairns on them now painted red andwhite48."
6.43 Furthermore, in the Governmenf of Bahruin Annunl Report coveriilg the pcriod Mach
1938 to February 1939, a reference is made in the context of tlîe costs relating to the
construction of the fort on 1-Iawarto "the cost of erecting about lwenty stonc beacoils on
various islands in the Bahrain waters49".Finally, in response toan eiiquiry frorn t11ePolitical
Agent in Bahraiii in July 1946, requesting a list of al1 tlie cairns erectcd by the Bahrain
Govcmment in the waters and on the shoals and islands betweeii Qatar and Bahrain, and the
46Tlietexof this Deed of FurtherModificationiAi~nex111.21, Vol8,p.93.
47
48See,paras6.146 etseq.below.
49Annex 111.143, ol. p.213.
AnnexIII.178,Vol.7, p.397.dates of their erection, Belgrave sent him, on 10 July 1946,a list of the cairns "built during
1357[March 1937to February 19381 and 1358 [March 1938to February 1939]"".
6.44 There is no doubt that these beacons or cairns were erccted ky tlie Balirainis on islands,
islets, rocks and shoalsin the Hawar groupof islands on the instructions of Belgrave, with the
clear purpose of strengthening the claim of Bahrain to the Hawar group. Ili the Bahraiil
"preliminary statement" of 29 May 1938 (a copy of which was nat convcyed to the Ruler of
Qatar), reference is made to "stone beacons" surmounted by a pole oii top of wliich is ail oil
drurn painted in the Bahraini colours. Sixteen such beacons are identified". What is carefully
not disclosed is that the beacons had been crected only a few rnoiiths beforebaiid, during the
winter of 1937138.It is highly significant that no mcntion is made of such bcacons in
Belgrave'sletter to Lochof 28 April 193652.
6.45 As wi11subsequently be ~hown~~b ,oth Alban (succcssor to Weightnian as Political
Agent in Balirain) and Prior (successor to Fowle as Political Resideiit)trcated with contempt
the Bahraini claim to sovereignty over the Hawar islands insokr as it was founded on the
erection of beacons or "national marks""".Even more irnportanlly,tlie Court, in its Judgment
in the Minquiers andEcrehos case, attachedno legal significai-iceto the placing of bcacoils as
evidence of the exercise of s~verei~nt~~~.
Section 2. The Defects in the Procedure followed bvthe British Government
A.Descriritionof the Procedure
6.46 Attention has alreüdy been drawii to some of the ço~isiderations wl-iich impelled the
British Governent in 1938139to make a fonnaI decision, as between Bahrain and Qatar, on
the ownership of the Hawar islands. The Political Kesident was askcd for his views on wliat
50
Annex111.243V , ol. p. 195.
51AnnexIII.158,Vol. 7,p.291.
52Aniiex111.103,Vol. 7p.15.
53See,paras,6.101etsaq., below.
54Annexes 111.220and fI1.228,Vol. 8, pp. 89 aiid 123.
55See,paras.6.223etscq.,below.procedure should be followed in determining the q~1estjoio .if sovereignty. In a memorandurn
of 5ApriI 1938,Fowle proposed the following scenario5":
1. The Ruler of Qatar should be informed that, on the evidence at present available, [lie
Hawar islands appeared to belongto Bahrain;
2. He should be given anopportunity of advancing a claim to the islands, but tl~iswas to
be subject to cornpliance within a short lime-liinit (a period of two inonths being
suggested);
3. Any claimspresented afterthis period would notbc considered;
4. The Bahrain Government wouldbe sent a copy ofthe leiter sent to the Ruler of Qatar
and ofthe latter's reply when received,and would be given an opportunity torebut any
claim to the islands advancedby the Ruler of Qatar.
6.47 It was thus contemplated that the burden of dzspravingBahrain'sclaim to the Haww
islands would lie on Qatar; but there was no room in Fowle's scenario for granting to the
Ruler of Qatar any information about the evidence on whicli Bahrain'sdaim was based, or
any opportunityto rebut that evidence.
6.48 Fowle'sprocedural proposals were endorsed without commentby the India Office, in
the letter of7 April 1938,from Gibson(India Office) to Brenan (Foreign Office), and bythe
Foreign Office,inthe letterof 13April 1938,[romBrenaii to ~ibsoii''.
6.49 In consequenceof this agreed procedure, the Ruler of Qatar\vas formallyinvited to state
his case on Hawar by a Ietter dated 20 May 1938from Weightman, thc Political Agent in
I3ahrains8.It will be noted that theRuier is invited to submit to Wcightman his formd clairn
" Annex III.146,Vol. 7,p. 233.
57Annexes 111.147and111.149, ol. 7,pp237 and 249.
'*Annex 111.156,Vol. 7, p. 279. WeightrnanwasPoliticAgeiit111BahrairifioiOctober 1937 until
October 1940, serving as Acting Resident from August 1938uritilSeptemb1938. Upon leaving Eahrain he
wcnt to Delhi, where he became Foreign Secretary io theGavernment of India. By 1949, following his
retirementfrompublic servicc,hwas working fortheSuperiorOil Company.supported by al1the evidencewhich he could produce "at theearliest possible moment"; even
the short time-lirnit of two rnonthssuggestedin the FowIernemorai~dum~h ~as been dropped.
6.50 Tt wilI of course he recalied that the British Guvernmeiit l-iadalreaùy provisionally
decided (in July 1936)in Fivourof the Bahraini claim to Hawar. The gap of nearly two years
before the Ruler of Qatas was invited to prcsent his formal claim to sovereignty over IIawar
allowed the Ruler of Bahrain and Belgraveto reinforce and (appxently) strengthcn a Bahraini
claim to the Hawar group by engaging in activities in and in relation totheislands designed to
demonstrate that tl~eywere under active Bahraini control. As we havc seen in Section 1.B of
this Chapter, these activities includedthe erection of beacons or cairns on various uninhabited
islands or islets in thc Hawar group. During the year 1937,and particularly during the winter
of 1937/38,Belgrave arsanged for the building of a fort, and the construction of a pier anda
mosque on Hawar island. He also set intrain drilling for an artesian well on tlic island. What
may have escaped the British authorities, at least in London, was that Belgrave was following
a carefully prepmed plan whereby Bahrain would eventually be rccognised by the British as
having sovereignty over the Hawar group of islands.
1. The Belgraveplan and the Dowasir
6.51 Preparations for this plan had already begun in the year 1930. Evidençe is available
which establishes that, inthal year, Belgrave was instrumental in theprocuring of "evidence"
designed to mislead anythird party.
6.52 The Courtmay bepuzzled as to why Belgravebegan his preparations for the takeover of
Hawar as early as the year 1930.The reason is relatively simple. Belgrave was far-sighted.
Negotiations had already commenced in 1928 for a new oil concession agreement covering
tlie"unallotted" area of Bahrain. Major Holmes (of EGS and later BAPCO) tnay, as Belgrave
was to daim later in 1936,have had no idea during the eariier negotiations between 1928 and
59Ibid.1933 tliat Bahrain had any conccivable claim to Hawar. Belgravc himselî was quite
unprepared at this time to advance any claim to Hawar on behalf of Bahrain; he wished to
prepare the ground very cürefùlly. So in 1930he began io tüke thefirst steps in tliis direction
by seeking ta build up supposed "evidence" of a permanent presence on thc mai11 Hawar
island of inembers of the Dowasir tribe.
6.53 The nomadic Dowasir tribe wasideal for this purpose. It lias already beei~noted how
members of the Dowasir tribe from Budaiya and Zallaq Iladtraditionally been in the habit of
partially rnigrating to Zakhuniya andthe Hawar islands during the winter months l'orfislling
purPosesbu.This was part of the pattern of theirnomadic life. Tlicir allegiance to the Ruler of
Bahrain was in fact highly doubtful, for this and other rcasons. During the 1920s, the
Dowasirs had had a troubled relatioiishipwith the British authorities andalso with successive
Rulers of Bahrain. The Dowasir, as Sunnis, had traditionally l~eld ü privileged position in
Bahrain;they resided in the north-east of the Island of Rahrciinat Budaiya and many oftliein
were divers on the pearl banks off Qatar and Bahrain.Following the deposition by the British
of the former Ruler of Bahrain (Sheikh Issa)in 1923 on grounds of misgovernmeilt, the
Dowasir, as partisans of thc old régime, created disturbances. A dcspatch frain the then
Political Resident (Col. Prideaux) to the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India of
4 December 1926givesmore details of subsequent developments:
"On the introduction of the reforrns in Bahrain in 1923this tribe gave trouble, and it
was found necessary to punish them by inflicting a fine of Rs. 15,0001-on their
leading Shaikh. The fine was paid, but rathertlian submit to the ncw régime the tribe
left their native town of Budaiya and migrated to the promontory of Dammam on the
coast of Qatif, forfeiting their property in Bahrain and - thcoretically, though
apparently nol in practice - tlîeirdiving rights onthe Bahrain pearlbanksG1."
6.54 Following approval by the Government of India of the line which the PoliticalResident
had taken in his talks with the three DowasirShaikhs in Scptcmbcr 1926, in response tothe
decIaredwish of the tribe toreturnto ~ahrain~~t,he PoliticalAgcnt wrole to Sl-iaikhI-Iamadof
" See, paras. 5.38-5.39, above and especPrideaux'sreportto thePolitical Resident20fMarch
1909, An61x111.51,Vol.6,p.233.
Annex 111.70,ol.6,p.369.
" 2Iid.Bahrain on 20 February 1927,expressing the view of the Governrnentof Iiidia and indecd of
Col.Prideaux;
"..that the Dowasir should notbe allowedto rcturn tcBahrcin, wliercconditions have
much improved since they left, unless they agree to bc bo~~~lb dy the following
conditions:-
1. They must be obedient in every way to the Bahrein Government and must
neither çlairnnor exerciseany independent:status whatcver.
2. Theymustpay the sametaxes as other agriculturistsand traders.
3. They must be submissive to the Courts in Bahrein eslüblishcd by Your
Excellency .
4. Thcymust accept apolice post atBadaya.
5. They must acceptanyheadman appointedby Your Excellency ..
6. The Bahrain tenants and negro diversof tlie Dowasir should have equal rights
of citizenshipwith others of their classin Bailrein."
The Political Agent concludestliis letterby stating:
"1 am sure that Your Excellency ...isconvinced that the relurn of the Dowasir under
any other conditions would be a danger to the safety aiid good Governrnent of the
islands which are rnuch too small to admit of the establishment of any authority
whatever, independentof your ~wn~~."
6.55 Shaikh Hamad was nonetheless anxious that the propcrty confiscated iiom the Dowasir
at the time of their departure from Bahrainshouldbe returncdto tliem, pointing out that it was
a slur on liis honour tliat he should be considered by his neighbours to have confiscated the
property of his subjects and put it in his owil pocket. The new Political Kesident (Col.
Haworth) eventually raised no objection to the return of thecoiifiscatedproperty oii receiving
an assurance from Shaikh Harnad that, if the Dowasir still wished to relurn to Bahrain, they
would be permitted to do so only as ordinary inetnbers of society and witl~no spccial
64
privileges .
63
64Aniiex111.72, ol. 6, p. 379.
Annex 111.73, ol.6, p.383.6.56 The Dowasir began to show signs of returning to Bahraiii in 1928, following upon the
retum to thcm of their confiscatedproperty6s.
6.57 So itwas members of this independent and rebellious tribe,anly perrnitted to rctiirn to
Bahrain a year or Iwo previously under siringent conditions, whichBelgrave uscd in 1930 in
the manusacture of "evidence" ihat the Dowasirs (claimed to be Bahraini subjects) were
permanent inhabitants of Hawar. (Püreiithetically,it may be noted that Col. Haworth, theiiew
Political Resident, carefully distinguished the Bowasir from ordinary Bahrainis by reporting
that "when the Dowasir were expelledand the town forfcitcd WC had attempted 10populate it
with ~ahrainis...66").
6.58 Al1 this is by way of introduction to the following documents which disclose that
Belgrave was responsible for theproduction of false documents from1930onwards about the
alleged Dowasir presencein Hawar, as evidence ofBahrainititle to the islands.
6.59 Tliere is first a confession, wriltenin November 1930,from Ahmed bin Ali Al-Crhatam,
Yousuf bin Ahrned and Trhamabin Ahned Al-Dosari that none of the threc gcntlenien had
ever set foot on Hawar and that ithad belonged to the Ruler of Qatar "for ages". The
confessioii also relates thal Belgrave made them put their fingerprints on a written paper on
the orders ofthe Sheikhof ~ahrain".
6.60 The significance of this confession becomes apparent whcn one studies theevidence
adduced by Belgrave in early 1939to support thc Bahraini claim to the Hawar isl~ids~~.It
may be notcd that the principalpiece of evidencc in the Bahraini "counter-claiin"of 3 January
1939, is apetition supposedly subscribcd to, whether by signature, fingerprints or seals, by a
number of persons (ten of whom arc from thc Dowasir tribe) claimiiig to be permanent
residents of ~awar~'.
''1bid.
67"id.
68Annex 111.77,Vol. 6p.401.
69Ses, paras. 6.1ctseq.,below.
Annex 111.174V, ol. p.371.6.61 In that petition, the petitioners affirm that the Hawarislands belong to Bahrain, that they
are subjects of the Ruler of Bahrain and that Hawar istheir home. Thc worthlessness of this
supposed "piece of evidence" is dcmonstrated by the fact that three of those who are said to
have subscribed to it have testified tu the fact that, some eight or nine years prior to its
productio~iby Belgrave, lhey were forced by him to put thcir tliigesprints on a blank piece of
paper; they also testified in 1930that they had never set foot on Hriwar.
6.62 A hrther document which supplements thc confession made iiiNoven~ber 1930 is a
letter which Yousuf bin Ahmed wrote to the Ruler of Bahrain in wliich hc repeats that he liad
been coerced into providing his fïngerprints for the document, tliat he totally repudiates
whatever may appear in the document andthat he has never set Iooton ~awa-").
2. Furtherevidence ofBahrainiactivities
6.63 Belgrave's subsequent correspondence with intelligence agents whomlie liad obviously
recruited and with the Rulers of otlier Gulf sheikhdoms during thc period till1938 revcals the
pattern of the web he was weaving in order to obtain Hawar for Bahsain. Some examples of
his activities will demonstrate this. They will show theglaring Sap between appearancc and
reality. The appeurance is rcflected in the official documents in the British archives on which
reliance has been placed in constructing the main narrative in this Cliapter. The unpleasant
realilyis reflected in a number of documents dating from tlie mid-1930s which are in the
Qatari archives. Some oftliese documents refer to narned individuals; and Qatar will seek to
disclose the part which thesenamed individualsplayed in the untblding dran-ia.
6.64 The first document is a letter of 18August 1935from Sheikh Hamad, Rulcr ofBahrain,
to Sheikh Shakhboot, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, this letter bcing çounter-signed by ~el~rave'~.In
the letter, Sheikh Hamad is clearly endeavouring, as he had done on previous occasions, to
enlist Sheikh Shakhboot'ssupport in the plot for Bahrain 10 take over Hawar. He does so by
claiming that "the English have promised us that we will lake it from Rin Thani one of these
70
71Annex ill.IO0, Vat.7,1.Sec,also,Annexes lI1.76and111.9V,ol. 6pp.397 and489days". Sheikh Hamad goes on, in a relatively frank way, to promise support to Sheikh
Shakhboot for his claims on the Qatari possessions of Dclma and Halul in returii for the
latter's support for the Bahraini claim to Hawar. Shcikh Shalchboothad alrendy (in 1934)
warned Sheikh EIarnadnot to pursue his claimto Hawar, stating unequivcicallythat the IIawx
islands belongedto ~atar'~.
6.65 Salim bin Nasser Al-Muzairc wasin the 1930sTinamof the illosqueof SheikhAbdullah
bin Jassim, Ruler of Qatar. He also provided intelIigence to Rclhrain.The following lcttcr
addressed to Sheikh Hamad of Bahrain,and dated 12Jüiiuary 1937,confirms this beyond
question . The writer claims to have ".,. secretly met the people in Hawar and they have
agreed to be eyes for you in the country there".Hea1soadvises SlicikhHamad to offer moiiey
for Hawar, stating that he has been informed thatthe Kuler of Qatar is short of inoney. There
are also references in the letter to "Al Balyooz", which was apparently the term used for the
official rank of British Political Agent in the Gulf. The British Political Agent in Bahrain in
1936/37was still Lt.-Col. Loch, who was replacedby Weightmari only in 1937; so it inay be
assurned that the "Al-Balyooz" to which referenceis made in the letter is I,och rather than
Weightman (asthe lettcr is dated early in January 1937, and reference is made in it to the fact
that Al-Balyooz "willbe replaced").How much of the attitudealtribulecito "Al Balyooz" is to
be believed is open to conjecture; Qatar simpiy wishes 11x3Coiirl to be aware of what was
being reported to SheikhHarnad at the time by one ofhis intelligence agents.
6.66 An earlier letter from Salim bin Nasser Al-Muzaire to "Al Balyooz" in Bhain dates
fiom 15January 1935.The writcr confessesthat he had "burntthe liuts of the Qatari people as
you instructed us" and that "no-one knew about our act". The writer also reports tliatthe Ruler
of Qatar is lacking in weaponrybut is awarethat the countryhas
6.67 Eveii more daiiiiiing is the coiifessio~iniade by Belgrave in iiis secret letter tci Abdul
Razag bin Rizoogi of 26 March 1938~'.Abdul Razag bin Rizoogi was in 1938 the British
Residency Agent in the Trucial States (the post being abolished iii 1949).He was of Iranian
72See,para.5.6I,above.
73
74AnnexIII.115,Vol. 7,p.69.
Annex111.97,Vol.6, p.497.
75Annex 111.145,Vol7, p.229origin and had ties of citizenship with both Kuwait and Dubai. He died in 1992 at the great
age of 92. BeIgravelsletter of 26 March 1938states boldly lhat "wchave setup many houses"
in Hawar; and that "we have builta fort" andare in process of "building a mosque". Belgrave
also admits openly that "the people whoare in Hawar neitlier want Rührainnor Al-Khalifah"
and that for them it is betîer to be part of Qatar especiülly since the visitof the son of thc
Ruler of Qatar a moi~tlipreviously. Belgrave also urges his correspondent net to "allow your
Sheikhs to interfere in the issues of QatarandBahraiil".
6.68 Belgrave'sletter to Abdul Razagbin Rizoogi of 26 Marcli 1938 also states tliat "în hve
days I will leave for Hawar to see what they have done there7'".It is notcwortliy that this is
confirmed in the Exlractsf~omBelgrave'sDiarieswhere the entryfc~r 31March 1938states:
"Took under three hours to reach Hawar. The fort showed up from a long distance
siway... .The fortis exactlywhat 1liadplanned and looks inost effective ...77."
6.69 Almost equally darnning is a letter which Belgrave wrote toAbdul Rahman Al-Qusaibi
on 10May 1938". The secipient of this letter actedat this time as the link-inan between the
Bahraini intelligence agents in Qatar. He was also close to the British authorities in Bahrain
and to the Saudis.In this letter, Belgrave admits thai one of Bahrciin'sintelligence agents is
keeping a close eye on the RuIerof Qatar and his people. He alsu assertsthat the interests of
Bahrainhave priority overthose of the people ofQatar. Finally, he reminds his correspondent
of the time when he went "...with the Al-Dawasir to Hawar to reconslruct the buildings so
that theycould live there".
6.70 Here is a cloud of witncsses testiQing to the malpractices ofBelgravc and his associates
in rnanufacturii~gevidencc of Bahraini activities in and iii relation to the Hawar group of
islands during the key period between 1935 and 1938, and in seekiiig to cajoIe thc Rulers of
other sheikhdoms in the Gulf to supportthe Bahraini cause.
76Ibid.
77AniiexIII143,Vol.7,p. 213.
78AnncxIII.151,Vol.7, p. 257. Jan 12: Wenl over to the Agency and had a talk with Wleightman], oil and
other matters.
Jan 16: With Weightmanto Sakhrir,ail the shaikhs present. Oil talk. W leftand
1 and the three shaikhs drove tu Awaii and liad a long talk wit11Davies
in his office about including Hawar.He wüs very upset ...
Jan 18: Weiglttmanback, had a talkto hini abau1oil events sincehc left.
Jan 30: Went over to see Weightmanand discussedthe oil business.
Feb 2: Spentsometime at Agencydiscussitlgoilx'."
6.73 These particular citations from Belgrave'sdiaries iestify to the very close relationship
which he had with Weightmanin 1938and 1939.They must bc read in conjunction with tlie
entries for 18, 20 and 22 April 1939, which are cited at paragraphs 6.88-6.90, below. They
must also be read in conjunction with the following extract from Belgravc's inemoirs,
published in Lebanon in 1972:
"Hugh Weightman left Bahrain for Delhi in August Cl9401and subsequently became
Foreign Secretary to the Governrnent of [British] India. I and lnany uthers miich
regretted his departure.Both lieand ,ater, E.B. Wakefield, whoalso served in Bahrain
and then in Delhi, were very valuable friends at court; they did much to keep Bahrain
on the map and helped us to maintain a supply of food frorn 1ndiag2."
6.74 It may not be altogether irrelevant that, afier his retirement, Weightman re-appeared in
the Gulf as a representative of the (Arnerican-owned) Superior Oil Company. In 1949,
Weightman arrived in Abu Dhabi seeking to interest Sheikh Sl~akhbootin a new oil
concession. The then Political Officer in the Trucial States (Mr. Slobart), in writing to his
supcrior (Mr.Pelly) on 8 April 1949,took averyjaundiced vicw ol'weightman's activities un
behaIf of the oil Companyemploying him, particularly as it seemed that Weightman was
tempting Shcikh Shakhbootto sign the new concession agreement in advance of securing the
consent of HMG:
"1fee! it to be intolerablethat a distinguishedp~iblicservant in 1-etiremcntshuuld have
facilities for visiting an area for which hewas forinerly responsible andtl~ere,trading
upon the fact that he is known and respected, blaiüntly encourage the Ruler to break
faith withE-I.M.G.~~."
8Annex 111.143V,ol.7p.213.
82
83niiex 111.299,Vo8, p.501.
Annex 111.26V,ol8,p.305. 4. Opening of theforma1 procedure
6.75 It is time to revert.to the opening of the formal proccdure followed by the British
Govemment in 1938.Acting upon instructions kkom the Political Resident, Weightman wrote
to the Ruler of Qatar on20 May 193gE4 p,erernptorilyinviting hirn to slale l-iiscase on Hawar
"atthe earliest possiblemoment". The Ruler evidently took this requestliteraily, for he replied
within one week (on 27 May 1938)". It will bc seen that the Ruler reiteratcd his p~oiest
against recent Bahraini activities on Hawar and tolally denied any alleged Baliraini
"occupation"oftlie islands in the past. On 30 May, Weightnianhad a further meeting with the
Ruler of Qatar at which the latter demanded llnathe be permit~icdto see Rahrain's counter-
claim in orderto enable him to rebut:it. In his reportto the Political Residei~iof3 Junc on this
meeting, WeightmanStates:
"1replied that 1 was unablc to give him an assurance that His Majesty'sGovcrnment
would agree to any such procedure, and that in my own opinioii it was impossible to
contemplate a procedure enabling each party in turn to traverse the arguments,
counter-arguments, rebuttal, counter-rebuttal and so on of the other, since this would
render a decision impossible in his life-timeos inminex6."
6.76 Weightman'sletter to the Political Resident of 3 June also forwards "for information" a
"preliminary statement" of the Bahraini case which he had received from Bclgrave on
29 ~ a ~ ~ W. eightmanhad already iiidicatedto Belgrave in a letterwl-iichhe had writteiito the
latter on 20 May enclosinga copy of hisletterto the Ruler of Qatar of thesame date:
"Should it become necessary to requestthe Bahrain Government ta subrnit a counter-
claiin supported by evidence,1will addressyou again in duc c~urse*~."
6.77 So the "preliminary statement" of the Baiiraini case had not been requested by
Weightman. And it is instructive to observe that Weighttnanwas alrcady in possession of the
"preliminary statement"at the time that he was refusing to the Rulcrof Qatar any opportunity
84Annex III.156,ol.7,p. 279.
85A copy intranslation of lettertWeighmianof thaidateisatAiinex111.157, ol.7, p285.
86AiiiieIII.159Vol.7, p.299.
87 A copy of this anonymous "preliminary statcment"(obviouslydraftcd by Belgrave) isat
Annex111.158V , ol.7p.291.
AnnexIII.154, Vol. p. 271.to see the Bahraini case. Weightman apparently saw no contradiction between the response
which 11ehad given to the Ruler of Qatar on 30 May and the decision wllich the British
Government had already taken to allow the Ruler of Bahraiil an opportunity to cciinmenton
the case presented by Qatar.
6.78 Nor indeed did the Political Resident (Fowle) see any such coiitradictio~i.In his letter to
the Sccretary of State for Iridiaof20 June 1938,the Political Resident rccominended that the
Ruler of Qatar's "detailedclaim" to the Hawar islands now be giveil officially to the Balirain
Government with a request that they in turn subrnit a detailed stateinent of tlleir claim to
Hawar. Butthe Political Resident went on torecommend lhatthe request of the Ruler of Qatar
to see the Bahrain Government'scounter-claim shouldbe rejected".
6.79 Mcanwhile, the Ruler of Qatar had written again to Weightmail on 15 Julie1938~'. Tn
this letter, the Ruler hinted that further evidence on the questionof the ownership of Hawar
might be available to him; but this depended in part on his knowing the casc hc had to meet.
Weightman was wholly unsympathetic to this renewed plea by the Riiler of Qatar that he
should be afforded an opportunity to be informed of the grounds on which Bahrain based its
claim; in forwarding the relevant cxtract from this letter to the PoliticalKesident, Weightman
proposed that no notice need be taken of the Ruler'ssuggestiontliat further evidence might be
available, since the Ruler had bcen very clearly instructed (on 20 May 1938) "to produce at
once al1the evidence which he hasgl".The Political Resident agreed. So also did the India
Office. But the Foreign Office, when consulted, took a more balanced view. Mr. (later Sir
Eric) Beckett (at the time Second Legal Adviser, and later Chief LegalAdviser, to the Foreign
Office) was apparently of the viewthat it would be inore regulas to let Qatar see the Bahrain
reply and then let Bahrain see the Qatar cornrnents,on whichthe inattcr could be siibmitted to
the British ~ovcmrneiit~~.The rcasons for the Foreign Offic ereference were more hlly
exprcssed in Baxter'sreply toPeel of 12 July 1938.The Foreign Office did nrit fail to point
out that under the procedurcproposed by Weightmanand approvcd by the Political Resident:
89Annex 111.161,ol.7, p311.
90AnnexIII.160,Vol.7, p. 305.
91
Annex 111.162,ol.7,p.3 15.
'*Sm, thc marginacoinmenton thedraft Ietterfrom Pe[IndiOffice) to BaggalIa(yoreign Office)
of 6July 1938atAnnex 111.164V, o7, p.323. "..unless we deliver a long and reasoned decision,thc Sheikh of Qatar will not ki~ow
what the Sheikh of Bahreinhas advancedin support of his clai~n,tior will hc have any
opportunity of answeringany statements madebythe S1icikl.o if ~dxein"~."
The Foreign Officewent on to argue:
"Normally, as you will of course appreciate, when une is assirming an arbitral rulc
(sk) r? rolc] of this character, one wouldfirst cause each party to state hisown claim,
with the grounds upon whiçh it is based, then coii~rnunicateboth parties'statement of
claim to the othar, appoint a time for answers, and then decidc the iîlatter in the light
of the four documents. Under this procedure, the party who loses the case at least
knows the grounds on which the decisionwas given, andhas no opportunityof feeling
that some erroneous statement, which he wasable to controvert, has been relied upon
in reaching a decision9'."
6.80 Baxter'sletter to Peel, liowever, concludes mildly by simply slatiiig that "we do not,
however, wish to do more than place these considerations bcforc yciii",Ieaving the final
decision to the India Office.
6.81 This highly sensible advice from the Foreign Office, obviously based on Beckett's
advice, came however too latc in the day ta affect materially the way in which the British
decision was eveiitually taken in 1939. Indeed, although officiais in the India Office were
prepared to acccpt the advice given in Baxter'slettcr to Peel oi'12 July 1938, they did so in
terms which make it clear that they were aiready parti prisT .hus, in an interna1manuscript
minute of 14July 1938, Gibson (India Office), in recornmendiiigacceptance of the Foreign
Officeview on the proceduralpoint, openly argued that:
"...since the issue will almostcertainlybe decided in favour of Bahrein,it would be as
well to leave the Sheikh of Qatarwith no feeling of gricvance tl.iliis case had no1
been fully heard" "."
6.82 As a result of these exchanges in London, the Secrelary of State for India instructed the
Political Residcntto communicate the statement of the Babain Government, when received,
93
Annex 111.165,ol.7,p.327.
954bid.
Annex 111.166, ol. 7, p. 333.to the Ruler of Qatar and to allow him a "reasonable period" to coninieiit on itand adduce
further evidence. On 14August 1938,tlie Officiating Political Agent in Balirain tbrmally sent
to Belgrave a copy of the Ruler of Qatar's "detailed claim" and requested that the Bahrain
Govcrnment should now submit a full and detailed stateinent of Llieir"counter-claim" to
Hawar, covering the Ruler of Qatar'sclaim aswell as anyotller point they wished to make9'.
6.83 Three points should be tloted about the treatinent accorded to the respective Rulers in
requesting each of them to statehis respectiveclaim to the Hnwargroup ofislands:
Qatar is treated throughout as the claimait (derncrurdeur i) the face of a provisional
(1)
Britishdecision taken in 1936 to attribute the islands to IJahrain, and in the faceof
Bahraini defacto occupationof the islands;
(2) At the time wlien Qatar was being required to produce its forma1clain~it was being
denied access ta the "evidence" on which Bahrain was relying in support of its claim
to Hawar; by way of contrast, Bahrain not only submitted (iininvited) a "preliminary
statement", but was thcn given a copy of the Ruler of Qatar'sletter of27 May 1938 at
the time when it was asked to submit its "counter-claim";
(3) Qatar was requested to produce its daim "atthe earliesl pussiblc moment" whereas no
time-limit was put on the submission by Bahrain of its "counter-claim"; in the event,
the Qatar claim was presented within one weck oi'Weightman's rcquest, whereas
Bdu-ain's "couilter-daim" was not submitted to Weightman uiltil 3 January 1939,
nearlyfive monthsEromthe date of the request fromthe Officiating Political Agent in
Bahrain.
6.84 Attention has already been drawn to the bias in favnur of tlic Bahraixiclaim toHawar
shown by both Weightman and the Political Resident in the years iminediately preceding the
British decision of 1939. Further evidence of tliis bias is shown in the Politic.alResident's
Ietterto the Secretary or'State forIndia of 3November 1938(written al ütime wheii Bahrain
"AnnexIII.168,Vol. 7, p343.had not yet submitted its "couilter-claim"to Hawar in accordance witli the agrccd pracedure)
in wliichhe makesthe wholly premature{andunwarranted)assunlption tliat a concessionover
Hawar is within the gift of the Ruler of Bahrain in ihe context of tlie compctition between
BAPCO and PCL over the so-called "Bahrainunallottedarea":
"Itwill be seen that the Shaikh [of Bahrain] nowdoes not eveiiwish to give Hawar to
Petroleum ConcessionsLirnited. 1 am not of opinion Iha~we should acceptthisY7."
6.85 At a time wheii the Political Resident was playing a lcey role in the decision-making
process as to whether the Hawar group of islands belonged to Baliraiil or to Qatar, it is well-
nigh unbelievable that he should calmly be assurning that the award of ail oil concession on
Hawar to a particular oil company is a matter for theRuler of Bahrain. Indecd,the Secretary
of State for India was obligedto warn both the Political Resident and Weightman on 1March
1939,in the context of aproposai that a concession overthe wlioleof the "Bahrain unallotted
asea" should be given to BAPCO, that a warning sl~ouldbe given to the Ruler of Bahrain and
also to the company:
"...that the question whether the Hawar Islands are included in thc concessioilal areci
depends on whatever decision is eventually given by His Majesty's Government
regarding the sovereigntyover the islands.. .98."
6.86 It remains to conclude the description of thc procediire hlfciwed by the British
Government in 1938/39 in assessing the strength of the respective clainis of Bahrain and
Qatarto the Hawar groupof islands. Following receipt of theforma1Bahraiiicounter-daim on
3 January 1939,Weightman wrote to the Rrilerof Qatar on 5 Januéiry1939,enclosing a copy
of Bahrain'scounter-claim in English and asking to be informed as soon as possible whether
he wished to put fonvard any further arguments or adduce any further evidencevYA . n Arabic
version of Bahrain's counter-claimwas not however f~~rnisbed to the Ruler (who could not
speak ur understand English) until 10January 1939"~. It will of çourse be recalled that
Belgrave had already submitted an moiiyinous and uninvited "prcliminary stateinent" of
97Annex111.170V , ol. 7,p. 351.
9s
99AnnexIII.183,Vol. 7,p.417.
Annex IfI.177,Vol. 7,p. 393.
'O0See,Weightman's letter to PoliticalResident 5 March 1939,at AcinexIII84, Vol.7, p.421.Bahrain'sclairn to Hawar on 29 May 1938'"'.This "preliminary statemcnt" of 29 May 1938,
had not, however, been transmitted to the Ruler of Qatar al~lioughit was subsequei~tly to be
treated by Weightman as one of the key documents in the caseIo2.
5. The influenceofthe oil negotiationson theformal procedure
6.87 By March 1939, the oil concession negotiations were coming to a head, and pressure
was accordiilgly put on the Ruler of Qatar to respond to the Bahraiil "countei-claim". Having
consulted the Political Resident, Weightman accordingly informed the Ruler of Qatar uii
17March 1939 that he must respond to the Bahraiil "counter-claiin" by 3 1 March 1939;
otherwise it would be assumed that the Ruler did not wish io put foiward any further
arguments bcyond those which he had already ~ubmitted"~. The Ruler imrnedicltelyprotested
against this imposed time-limit, insisting that a reply to the Hawar cnsc needed careful study
and that he had not had "even half of the time taken by the Balmin Goverlimentin preparing
their reply'04".But Weightman refused any concession, insisting in his letter of 22 Masch
1939 that the Ruler of Qatar had had "unlimited time in which to incike [his] original
~lairn'~~"W. eightman had no doubt conveniently forgotten that he had required, in his letter
to the Ruler of Qatar of 20 May 1938,that the latter submit his formal claim to Hawar "at the
earliest possible m~rnenl'~"";and that the Ruler of Qatar had in fact subaiitted his forma1
daim on 27 May 1938'*'.Weightrnan'sletter of 22 March 1939proinpted a bitter response on
24 March 1939 from the Ruler of Qatar.The Ruler çomplained lhüt,altlioughhe had prntested
against Bahraini activities in Hawar in early 1938,he had never been informed of the grounds
on which Bahrain relied "in putting thcir hands on a part of Qatar". 'TheRuler also insisted
that "we were not c~aimants'~~"N . onetheless, the Ruler did providc his comments on the
Bahrain "counter-claim" on 30 March 1939, noting agaiil the shortness of thc time made
available to him fortheir prepiiration.
101Sec, para6.76, above.
102
103See,para.6.93,bclow.
104Annex 111.188V,oi7, p.437.
105Annex 111.189, ol. 7p.441.
Aniiex111.190,Vol7, p.445.
106Annex 111.156, ol.7,p.279.
'O7Annex 111.157, ol. 7, p. 285.
108AniiexIII.191,Vol7, p.449. 6. Developmentsfollowingthecloseof the forma1procedure and the question of bias
6.88 The submission to Weightman, on 30 March 1939,of the Ruler of Qatar's observations
on the Bahraini "counter-clairn"brought to a close the formal prcicedure.It will bc noted that
there was no oral hearing and no opportunityto examine or cross-examine witnesses as to
matters of fact. In addition, and notwithstandingthe closure of the forma1procedure, tl~ereis
unmistakable evidence fromthe Bclgravediaries tliat Weightman had further private coil.tacts
with Belgrave during the period in which Weightman was preparing hisreport 10the Political
Resident analysing the strength of the opposing clairns of Qatar and Bahraiil io Hawar. In
Weightman'sreport to the Political Residentof 22 April 1939,analysing the respective claims
of Qatar and Bahrain to Hawar, to which fuller reference will be madc in Sectioil 3 of this
Chapter, the miter, in speaking of Hawar,refers in passing in paragraph 9 to"rny visit there
last week'09".This matches perfectlywith the entry in Belgrave's diaryfor 18 April 1939,
where there is mention of a hill:
"... from where we could see the fortat 1-Iawarand also HW'sIaunch retwning frorn
there, he went to visittheplace''0."
In this entry and also in the entries for 20 and 22 April, "HW" or "H" clearly refers to
Weightman.
6.89 Three entries from Bclgrave's diary dernonstrate the pernicious influence which
Belgrave cxercised over Weightman at a lime when the latter waspurportcdly engaged in a
quasi-judicial task in which Belgrave had an undoubted intcrcst.'These are theentries for 18,
20 and 22 April 1939. Attention has already been drawnto the entry for 18 April. The cntry
for20 April is equallyrevealing:
"At Agency for some time in morning hearin about 1-1't srip to Hawar. 11s. eerns to
have been satisfactoryfrom Ourpoint of view (17."
109
110nncx 111.195Vol. 7, p. 497.
IIInnexIII.143,Vol. 7, p.213.
Zbid.6.90 Weightman should not of course have discussed with Belgrave (a reprcsei-itativeOSone
of the two parties in dispute) his trip to Wawar,fjr less conveyed the imprcssiuil that the trip
was "satisfactory" froin Bahrain's point of view. But even more darnning, and even more
indicative of the bias which Weightman shawed in favciurof Bahrain and against Qatar over
the issue of Hawar isthe entry for22April fromwhich the following passage istaken:
"At Agency for some time in the morning, discus.red the Hcr~tnuclclin?,suw HW's
lefiervegurding ihewholcthing,Ourcase looks str~n~"~."
6.91 So we find the (British) Political Agent, to whom l-iasbcen confided the task of
assessing objectively the respective strengths and weaknesses of the claims to Hawar
advmced by Bahrain and Qatar, engaging in discussions with a representative of Bahrain
(indeed the Ruler's principal adviser) while drawing up his report and indeed showing tliat
report to Belgrave before it has even been despatched. Thcre can bc no inorc glaring
illustration of bias in favour of the Bahraini claim tHawar during the 1930sthan is provided
by this episode.
6.92 It is no doubt also a consequence of Belgrave's discussion withWeigl-itmanoii 20 April
(of which the Ruler of Qatar was and remained wholly ignorant) that Belgrave, in a letter of
that date to Weightmün, retracted an assertion in Bahrain's"prcliminary stateiilent" that the
permanent fish traps at Hawar were registered in the Land Departmcnt of thc Bahrain
Govenunent, and elaborated on ailotherassertion about the allcged ow~iership of fish trapsby
a resident of ~awar"~. It is clear from paragraph 10 of Weightman'sreport to the Political
Resident of 22 April 1939 that Weightman took this additional "evidence" (not of course
conveyed to the Rulerof Qatar) into account inrcaching his conclusion' IJ.
6.93 Weightman submitted his report to the Political Residenl vn 22 April 1939"~.At thc
outset, he idcntified the documents in this case. Ainoilg thcsc docurncnts was Bahrai~l's
"preliminary statemeiit"of 29 May 1938,a copy of whicl-ihad ncver atany stage been shown
'1Ibid., emphasisadded.
Il3Belgrave'sletter tWeiglitman of 20 April 1939, conveying the additional "evideiice"atis
AniiexIII193,Vol. 7,p.489.
11Annex. 111.19V,ol.7,p.497.
11Iliid.to the Ruler of Qatar. Weightman also look into account the information confirmed in
Belgrave'sletter to him of 20 April 1939'16, despite the fact thatthat informalion was equally
never conveyed to the Ruler of Qatar. In evaluatiiigthe evidcncc put forward by the Rulers,
Weightman also expressly drew on sources which were notput to the Ruter of Qatar, and to
which the Ruler of Qatar otherwise had no access, such as statements i1.L,orimerlsGazcttccr
of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Arabia; Agency archives datingfroin 1909;and on his own
"knowledge" derived fromtwo briefvisits to Hawar in 193 8 and 1939.
6.94 Weightmaii fouiidthat Qatarhad made no real case for sovereigntyover Iiawar. He was
obviously unaware of, or was deliberately ignoring,the substanlial evidence dating from the
period of the Ottomanpresence in Qatar from 1871to 191 5 establishing Qatar's original title
to the Hawargroup of islands'". Although treating as "valueless"the written cvidence of the
witnessesproduced by Qatar (onthe ground inte rliu that the signatureswcrc unsi~pportedby
thumb prints or seals), he seems to have acceptedwitlioutquestion the writtcn evidence of the
witnesses produced by Bahrain, notwithstandingthat, as is now known, Belgrave had, as early
as 1930, arranged for the finger-prints of particular individuals tobe affixcd on a blank piece
of paper, laterto be produced as "evidence"of the alleged long-standing occupation of Hawar
by the Dowasir of zallaql la.
6.95 At this stage, however, it is not necessary to establish definitively that Wcightman was
in error in 1939in recommendiiigthat Hawar should be regarded as belonging to Bahrain, but
it has been shown that Weightman was less than objective in assessing the claims of the
disputing parties. Sufficient evidencehas already been adducedby Qatar in this Mernorial to
prove beyond question that, in the period from 1937to 1939, Weightman exhibiteda marked
bias in fclvourof Bahrain as regards thc respective claims of tlie two sheikhdoms to Hawar.
Reference need only be made to the demandwhich he made of'tlieRuler of Qatar on 20 May
1938,to produce his claim to 1-Iawar"at the carliest possible rnoinent''"" ttohis trcatrneni oi'
the Ruler of Qatar'srepeated requests to be informed of the grounds nriwhich Bahrain relied
116AnnexIII.193,Vol.7,p.489.
117Ses,paras.5.15etseq.above.
1IR
1I'Jee,paras6.51et srq., abovand Annexes 111.77-111.V9,l.6,pp.401-412.
AnnexIII.156,Vol.7,p.279.in support of its ~lairn'~?to his adarnantrefusal to allow the Ruler of Qatar anything like the
sarne ainount of time to prepare his case as was accorded to the Ruler of ~ahrain'~';and,
above alI, to the prefesential treatment given to Belgrave in the key month of April 1939,
when he was preparing his report to the Political Resident onthe respective claims oî Bahrain
and Qatar to the Hawar group of island~'~~.
6.96 Qatar is not suggesting that Weightman'srecommendation that Hawar be ~'iven to
Bahrain is itself proof of bias; the proofof bias resultsfrom the otliesmaterialsto which Qatar
has drawn attention. What Qatar is submitting is that the wliole conduct of the procedure
leading up to the British decision of 1939was unfair and one-sided; and that, indeed, thc
procedure was flawed fromthe outset, since itstarted from tliepremise that the burden was on
Qatar to disprove Bahrain'sclaim to Hawar, a provisional decision (unknown to Qatar) in
favour of the Bahraini claim having already beenreached by the British Govermelit in 1936.
7. The Decision of 11 .luly 1939
6.97 Weightman's reportand conclusions were endorsed by the Political Resident (Fowle)
who suggested that, if the British Goverment concurred in this opinion, hc should be
authorised to convey their decision to the ~ulersl*'. Hemingwdy (India Office) recommended
approvd of the proposed decision in a manuscript minute of 12May 1939Iz4,essentially for
the reasons summarised in paragraph 13 of Weightmanui' report to the Poiitical ~esidentl~'.
Hemingway addedthat the proposed decision in favour of Rahrain:
"...affords, incidentally, an opportunity to mollify ailyrescntment whichhe [the Ruler
of Balirain]may feel at our treatment ofthe Zubara question in 1937."
6.98 Peel, Under-Secretary at the India Office, also agreed urith Weightman's
recommendatioii, as did the Foreign Officeand the Govermnent of Indiü, nonc of the I3ritish
officiaisin London or in Simla beiiigaware of Weightman'sprivatc contacts with Belgravc in
120
12IAnnexes III.159and111L.62,Vol.7,pp.299 and 315.
Annexes III.177,III.184, 111.and111.90, Vol.7, pp393, 421,437 and 445.
122Annexes III.143and III.193,Vol.7, pp.13and 489.
123Annex III.199, Vol7,p.519.
12.Annex 111.203V,ol.8,p.13.
'15Annex 111.195, ol. 7y. 497.the preparation of his report to the Political Resident. Lnshort, the 1939 decision to give
Hawarto Bahmin was based aImostexclusively onWeightman'sreport.
6.99 Letters communicating the British Government'sdecisioii were sent by the Political
Resident to both Rulers on 11July 1939lZ6I.t will be seen tlmtno reasons wcre givei~for the
decision in favour of Balirain.This absence of reasonwas iimnediatelyrcmarked uponby the
Ruler of Qatar who, in his eloquent protest to the Political Resident of 4 August 1939,
remarked tl-iathe had"...triedtofind the causc for what His Müjesty'sGoverrunent I~ave made
the basis oftheir opinion on this
S. The ReactionsofPrior and Alban
6.100 It is of course noteworthy that the strong bias displaycd towards Bahrain by
Weightman (as Political Agent) and, to a lesser extent,by Fowle (as Political Resident)was
not shared by their immediate successors.A new Political Residcnt(Lt.-Col. Prior)took officc
in September 1939, some two months afterthe decision of 11July 1939 had been issued.Prior
had previously served as British Political Agent in Bahrain from April 1929 to Novembcr
1932,and was therefore familiarnot only with the area but also with the subject-matter of the
dispute. That Prior was irnmediatelystruck by the unfairness of the decision isevident from
the following developments. The Ruler of Qatar'sprotest of 4 August 1939 I~adbeen seen by
the departing Political Resident (Fowle) on ils receipt in Bushire. As will heseen from the
attached copy of the manuscript minutes extracted [rom the Residency files, the Ruler of
Qatar'sletter of 4 August 1939was entered on the relevant Residency filc as item number
176 18
.One of Fowle'ssubordinatesrecommendedto him on 29 August that a rcplyshould be
sent to the Ruler of Qatar stating that HMG'sdecision was final and that the question could
not be re-opened; but Fowle obviously hadsome hesitations about this and gave a written
instruction in the followiiigtenns on 30August:
"Putupta Major [sicP]~ior,when 1have handcd overlZ9."
12Annexes 111.208-111.V9ol.8,pp.37-44.
12Aiinex111.21,Vol. 8, p. 49.
128
Annex 111.212, ol. p.53.
12"bid.6.101 On 25 September 1939, Prior approved thedraft of a mcssage iilreply tc)the Ruler of
Qatar informinghim that HMG'searlierdecisionof 1 1July 1939 was liilaand that the matter
could not be re-opened. In doing so, however,hc prjvately expressed liisdeep uneasc about
the way in which the matter hadbeen handledin a manuscript minute of 25 Septernber 1939:
"As regards p.u.c. [piece under consideration] 6, 1 have littlc dnubt that a grave
miscmiage ofjustice has occurred, and I am iiot surprisecithat my predecessor wished
Illecaseto be put up after hehadhanded over. It is too late to do anytl-iingnow and tlie
Shaikh can only [?] be informed that HMG have already passed ['?]final orders and
that the matter cannotbe re-opened 130.1,
6.102 Prior did not imrnediately report hisdoubts to his political supcriois in Londoii, buthe
did so in a preliminary way in his telegram No. 366 of 7 June 1940to the Secrctary of State
for India where, after criticising the notion that territory could bc acyuired in small islets in
the waters of the Gulf by the erection of "national marks" or beacons, he states (in
paragraph 4):
"1 have grave doubts regarding justice of decision in Hawar Islailds case and am
raising question aftermakingfurtherinquiries 131.11
6.103 At this point, Weightman, who was still Political Agentiii Bahraili, entcred the fray,
believing that his honour was beingchallenged. In a letter to the Political Resident of 3 JuIy
1940,he claims that Fowle had been aware of the facl tlid Bahrain liad crecled "national
marks" on al1islets to which they laid claim in the wiilter of 1937/38. More generalIy, and
possibly reflecting his ownuneasy conscience,he voices afear "...thalthe inference mightbe
drawn that there was somequestionof rnyentire i~n~artialit~'~~".
6.104 Priorwas obviouslynot satisfiedwith this explanation.But he decidedto await events.
InOctober 1940,Weightmanwas succeededas Political Agentin Bahrain by Major(later Lt.-
Col.) Alban. On 23 October 1941, Priorsent a telegram to Alban instiuctiilg him to "... have
tabulatcd and shown to mc on arrivai any information youbave bccn able to collect regarding
'" lbid.
131Annex 111.220,ol.8,p.89.
132Annex 111.222, ol. 8,p.99.Bahrain claim to Hawar Island" (this telegram was obviously scnt in advançe of a visit by
Prior to Bahrain). The response to this instruction was a Note cntitlcd "Owiiersl-iipof Hawar"
prepared by Alban, probably between23 and 26 October 1941 133.'Thestatements made in thc
Note strongly challenge,on severalgroulids,the assumptionson whicli the 1939 decision was
apparently made. Thus, the 1939decision assumedthat the Dowasir werepermanent residents
of Hawar and that they owed allegianceto the Ruler of Bahrain. T11isis Lirmly disputcd inthe
1941Note which arguesthat "the Dowasirare rather independcntas can be seen from the way
they deserted their town of I3udaya in Bahraiii for the mainlaizd";that "tl~eyare not truc
inhabitants of Bahrain and arc able to change tlieir allegiance atwill if displeüsed"; and that
"their settlemcnt in any spot does no1therefore mean much morc than the settlement of a
migratory tribe in a neighbouring state". The Note also rcvcals what might well havc been
overlooked by officials in London and elsewhere ignorant ofthe geograpliyof the Gulf that "it
is possible to wade from Hawar to the mainland [of Qatar] at low water and any boundary
cutting off tlie group fromthe mainlandwould be very artiiicial". Finally, it draws atteiltionto
the consideration that the Rulerof Bahrainhad always beeiidiscouraged from busying himself
with affairs in Qatar and cites as an example Zubarah "... where tliere wcrc far more of his
followers and concrete signsof occupationthanat Hawsir".
6.105 What is said in the 1941 Note about the Dowasir is of course confirmed by the
evidence which Qatar has now drawnto the attention ofthe The 1941Notc indeed is
much more objective and fair-mindedthan any documcnt produced by Weightmaii or Fowle;
and, had itscontents been known to senior officials in the India Office and the Foreign Officc
in 1939, it is extremely unlikelythat a decisionin favour of Uahrainwould havebeeiitaken.
6.1 06 Prior did not let matters rest. On 26 October 1941,he wrnie to Peel (Under-Secretary
at the India Office) coiiveyiilg Iiis deep-seated disquiet abo~lttlîe correctness of the 1939
decisi~n'~~H . e charaçterised it as Il...niost unfair to Qatar" anlie stoutlymaintained that the
133Annex 111.228, ol. 8,p123.
134 Annexes 111.1, 111.72-111.71,11.77-111.7V,ol.6, pp. 233, 379-388 and 401-412; and
Annex 111.128, ol. p. 141.
135Annex 111.229, ol8, p. 127.explanations which Fowle had given hiin for his recommendaliui-is"...wcre not ones whiçh
would carry any weight withanyArab". The confliciiilgclaims to the IIawar islands had been
decided "...according 10western ideas, and no allowance [hadl been made for local custom
and sentiment". Revertingto his own previous service inBahrain, Prior says:
"During 3%ycars in Bahrain 1 never heard anytliing to suggest that these islands
belonged 1361,Bahrain, and believed tiiem to beIong to Qatar, a view s~ippcirtedby
Lorirner .
6.107 Prior theil considers, and responds to six arguments advanced by Belgrave. In tl-iis
context, Qatar would draw particular attention to one sentence in paragrüph 4(1) of Prior's
letter, where the writer States:
"Bahrain never had any rules and regulations till it had an Adviscr, aiid he has been
collecting evidence of administrationin Hawar for many yexs past with the objecl of
making this claim, in which he has been very successful. IIad Qatar had a British
Adviser this claim could not havebeenmade 137it
.
6.108 The general thrust of Prior'scomment cal hardly be denied; but itfell well short of the
tmth, since Prior was almost certainly unaware of the true position revealeciin the evidence
now before the Court - namely, that Belgrave was not simply "colleçtiiig cvidençe", he was
"manufacturing" it.Prior concluded his letter to Peel by cxpressing liis conviction that the
1939decision on Hawar was "inequitable", butthat it was not practical politics to reverse it
now. He suggestedthat the question be submittcdto C.K. Daly (who had becn Political Agent
in Babrain from 1921to 1926)for his opinion. A copy of Prior'sletter to Pecl oc 26 October
1941 liad gone to Mr. O.K. (later Sir Olaf) Caroc (Secretary to thc Governmcnt of India in
New Delhi) who took the view, in a letterto Peelof 19 Novembcr 194 1,tliat:
"Where the local expertsdif'ferso markedly as in this case, ilisdifficult to adjudicate,
and the Government of India are of the view that the only safe course is to follow
Prior's own advice ...and decide that it is now outsidc practical politics to reverse the
decision made in 1939and communicatedto both ~ulers"~."
13'I6id.
137Ibid.
'" Annex 111.230 ,ol.8,p. 133.6.109 Caroe'sview was acceptedbythe IndiaOfice, and it is no doubt understandable in the
state of knowledge of the principal actors at the time. In the iight of prescnt knowledge,
however, several of the statementsmade in Caroe'sleiter are higlily questionable. 'l'lius,Caroe
says:
"Thatreport [the Weightman report]is certainly a coi~sidereddocument based on visits
to Hawar main Island itself, and it is reasonable to observe tliat the counter opinion
now given is not related directly to it, but to the clailns put forward by thc Bahrein
Adviscr 13.VI
But this takes no account of what is now known from the Extrctcfsfron?the Belgrave Diurie.5
of 1939 that Weightman was working hand in glove with Belgrave on this issue and had
indeed shown to Belgrave his report to Fowle of 22 April 1939before dcspatching it to the
latterL4! Caroe also asserts that, taking into consideration rnattcrs of Lise,oçcupancy and
exercise of the attributes of sovereignty,"...the weight of the evidence so làr dduced would
appcar to be in favour of Bahrain". But "the evidenceso far adduced" had been produced
almost entirely by Belgrave and had not been subjectedto critical exainination by any British
authority; on the contrary, it had becn accepted withotit question by Weightman. And, of
course, it is now known that the evidence providedby Belgrave on whicli reliance was placed
by Weightman and other British officials in 1939 was highly suspect wherc not wholly
fictitious.
6.110 This concludes the description of the procedure followed by British officials in the
Gulf and also in London in reaching a decision on the respective claims of Bahrain andQatar
to the Hawar group of islands.A f~~llnd detailed descriptionhas been given, sincc it is only
in the light of such a description that a view can be fonned on the procedural fairness and
propriety of the conduct of the enquiry ieading tu the British decision of 11 July 1939.
Accordingly, attentionis now directedto formal deficts in the procedure.
lnIliid.
'"Annex III143Vol.7, p.213. B. Forma1Defects
1.Absence of consentand other procedural cleiïciencies
6.111 The question whcther the Ruler of Qatar gave Iiis coiisent in 1938/39 to the
determination by the British Governrnentof his claim to sovercigniy over the Hawar group of
islaildshas already been touchedupon in Section 1 .A of this ~ha~ter'~'.
6.112 Qatar dcnies that its then Ruler gavehis consent iii1938/39 la tliedctermination by the
British Government of his claim to sovereigntyover tlieHawar group ofislai~ds.In addition,
the Ruler of Qatar most assuredly did notgive any undertaking in 1938139that he wuuld not
dispute or object to any decision that might be taken by the Britisk Govcrnment on the
conflicting claims of Qatar and Bahrain to the Hawar Islands. In this respect, the position is
quite different from that which obtained in the Dubai/Shavah Border case where the two
Rulers, when consenting to the delimitation of their boundaries by tliBritish authorities, did
specifiçally undertake not to dispute or object to any decision by the Political Agent tliat
might be f~rthcoinin~'~~.
6.113 The Court will rccall that, in the Dubai/ShurjlahBorder case, thc Court of Arbitration
rejected the argument put forwmd by Sharjah that the decisions taken by the two British
officids assigned to effect the delimitation of the boundaries between Dubai and Sharjali
(Messrs. Tripp and Walker) must be interpreted as if they were arbitral awards. Dubai raised
four objections to characterisingthe Tripp decisionsas arbitral awards:
(1) there was no arbitrationagreement;
(2) the arbitrator was not independent;
(3) the parties had been unableto presenttheir arguments; and
(4) the awards Iiadnot been reasoned.
14'See,paras6.1 etseq.above.
142Annex 111.295Vol.8,p. 480.6.114 The Court of Arbitration denicd the first of these objections, 011Ille ground that
"...international law does not require here an excessive formalis~li'"". It also rejected the
second objection on the ground that "..the alleged lack of independcnce of Mr. Walker and
Mr. Tripp lias iiot been proven'4"'.But the Court ol'Arbitratioii upheld tlzcthirclüxidfourth
objections and concluded:
"For these two reasons, the lack of opportunity for the Partics to present their
arguments and the absence of reasoning for the decisions, the Court has coine to tlie
conclusion that the Tripp dccisions cannot be said to have constituted arbitral
awards'"? ."
6.115 The 1939British decision on the Hawar islands is ann fortiori casc. Obviously, there
was no arbitration agreement authorising the British Government to act as arbitrator between
Qatar and Bahrain in the matter of the dispute over title to thc Hawar group of islands. 'The
Judgment of the Court of 1July 1994in the jurisdictional phase of the present casc confirn~s
that international law does not require consents to be expressed only in thc form of an
arbitration agreement. Qatardoes however rely on tlie three remaining ob.jcctionsraised by
Dubai in the Dubai/Shayjah Border arbitration, in addition to the absencc of consent. Qatar
hmalready dernonstrated thatin 1938/39, British oficials exerçising authorityin tlie GUITdid
not always act impartially as regards canflicting claiins to areas wherc oil deposits were
thought to be at stake. In the Dubai/Sharjbh Border case, the Court of Arbitration was in a
position to statc not only that the reaching of a settlernent was clearly both in the interests of
thc British authoritiesand of the Rulers themselvesbut alsothat:
"...there is no evidence to suggest that the British authorities wislied to favour one
Emirate more than the ~ther'"~."
6.116 In the face of al1the cvidence which Qatar has now produced about the partiality of
Weightman (and, to a lesser extent, Fowle) for Bahrain in l938/39, it requires little
imagination to justify the conclusionthat the British authorities atthis timc wexe intent on
144id. p,.479.
Ihid.
14Ibid.p. 480.
14Ibid., p. 479.finding any possible justification (however flimsy) for giving the Hawar islands toBabrain.
So the objection that the "asbitrator"in the dispute oves the Hawar islands in the 1930s was
less than fully impartial has been sufficientlyproven in the preseiît case.
6.1 17 The remaining two objections raisedby Dubai in the L)uhui/,S'CiarjahBorder case cm
be invoked equalIy by Qatar in the preseiit case. As LheCourt of'Arbitration said in their
awasdin the Dubui/SharjuhBordercase:
"...tlie Court must emphasisc that it is of the essence of asbitration that thc parties to a
dispute must be able to address their arguments to a tribunal Ilirough Lheirown
representatives and that a dialogue betweeii the parties, each replying to the othcs,
must be establislied 147,I
6.118 The Court wilI be able tojudge for itself the extent to which Lheprocedures adopted by
the British Government in the present case, as described in Scctioii 2.AI4', fall short of the
minimum standards requiredtojustie describing theprocess as one of arbitration.
6.1 19 That neither Qatar nor Bahrain was afforded in 1939 aiy rcason for the decision
purporting to givethe Hawar group of islands toBaliraincannol be disputed. It was indeed the
principal ground on which the Ruler of Qatar relied in protesting strenuously against thc
decision at the time. Sn here again is a reason for distinguishing thc 1939 decision on the
Hawar islands from an arbitral award.
6.120 At most, therefore, and eveii if not invalidatcd on the grounds which Qatar has
invoked, the British decisionof 11 July 1939,pusporting to givethe Hawar islands to Bahrain
arnounted to a non-binding decision which would havc had legal force oiily to the extent that
it was accepted by bot11of tlie parties in dispute (Qatar and Bahrain). It is clear beyond
question that the Ruler of Qatar iinmediately protested agaiiist the British decision of 11July
147
148IIid.
See,paras.6.46etseq.,above.1939'~~.He repeated thisprotest in anotlier letter to the Political Rcsident ol. 18 November
1939"" Not content with this, he addressed anotherletterto the Political Agentin Bahrain on
7June 1940'~~,renewing his protcst against Bahraiiii actions in the IIawar islands and
complaining in particular about secret landings onthe western coast of the mainLandoc Qatar
from boats normally anchored at Hawar, and tlie kidnapping of Qatar citizcns. 'l'heseearly
protests express the Ruler'smazement and indeed incredulity atthe British decision; this is
hardly surprising inview of his knowledgetliatthe vast majority of Gulf rulcrs, and indeed of
the Arab population ofthe Gulf region, were convinçed that the IIawar islands belonged to
Qatar, a conviction of which Prior, for one, wasawarei5*.Tlme protests by thc Euler of Qatar
over the seime ofHawar wererepeated regularly in subsequentycars, wlienever oppoi-tunity
presented itself. So it cannot be argued that the Ruler of Qatar at any lime acquiesced in the
1939British decision or in the take-overof Hawarby Bahrain.
2. Unfairnessof the proccdure
6.121 In the description of the procedures followed by the British Governmcnt in the laie
1930s in Section 2.A of this Chapter, attention has been directed to certainfcatures of those
proçedures which operated to theadvantage of Bahrain and, more tellingly, to the manifest
disadvantage of Qatar in the determination by the British Governmcnt of the contlictiiig
daims of Bahrain and Qatar lo sovereignty over the 1-Iawargroup of islands. Attention has
also been directedto certain instancesof bias in favour of Bahrainand against Qatar displüyed
by British ol%ïcialsin the Gulfduringthe 1930s.
6.122 It is now necessary to consider the legal consequences of these shortcomings in the
procedures followed and tlie bias displayed by the British authorities in thcir capacity as
"dccision-maker". There is a consensus among the leading publicistson internationallaw that
thcre are certain fundamental mles whose observanceis esscntial to sustain the validity of any
149Sec,Annex 111.21,Vol. 8, p.49.
1.50
151Alinex111.213, ol. 8p.59.
152Annex 111.219V, ol8,p. 85.
See,para.6.106,above.decision reached or award given as a result of internationaljudicial or arbiiral process. These
rules l~avebecn described as niles "inherent in the judicial process, or which are generally
recognised by civilised nationsli3". In the subrnission of Qalar, thesc iules are applicable
equally to the exercise of quasi-judicial powers of the kind wI-iicIthe British authorities were
ptuyiortiiigto app1y ta the determination of the conflicting claims of Qatar and Balirain to
sovereignty over the Hawar group of islands. The principal rules in this category (which to
some extent may overIap)are the following:
(1) the ruIe tbat both parties rnusthave a proper and equal opportuiiityto present their case
at al1stages(the audi crltcrampnutem rule);
(2) the rule that noone should bcjudge inhis own cause (nemcJ ~udex in cuusu sua);
(3) the requirement that the proceedings should be free from corruption, hud and bias;
and
(4) the right of the parties to areasoned decision.
6.123 In the following pasagraphs these rules will be looked at more closely and an
assessrnentwi1lbe made of tlie extcnt to which thcre may have been a failurc to observc them
in the clioiceand conduct of the procedurepreceding the 1939dccision.
Audi alteram partem rule
6.124 As the Court wiIlbe well aware, this ruje requires in essence that eachpxty must have
an equal and proper opportunityto present its case at al1stagcs of the proccedings. It thus has
two main elements: (a)the right to a proper opportunity to preseiilone'scase aiid {b)the right
to an equal opportunity to do so.
6.125 The right to a proper opportunity to present one'scase eiitails that each party be given
adequate notice of the case tu be met and an adequate opportunity to comment on it. The
consequencethat attaches to a failure to observe this requirement is thai theproccedings are a
nullity15'.
153
154nncx 111.11,Vol.8,p.569.
See,Annexes 111.306and 111.30Vol.8, pp. 539 an5556.126 From the description ofthe procedures followedby the British authoritiesin the years
leading upto the forma1decision of'11Jury 1939,it is abundnntlyclear that this principle was
not observed. In particular, it was not observed in 1936. The Court will recall that, in that
year, Dahrain submitted for the first tiine a forma1claim to tlie Hawar islands. The British
authoritics did not even inform tlie Ruler of Qatar that Rhrain had madc sucli a claim.
Instead, and again without informing Qatar, thc British Governinent, oii thc advice of its
representatives in the Gulf, made a "provisional decision" in i'avourof the Bahraiil claim to
Hawar. They do iiot even appear to have informed the Ruler of Qatar in 1936 lhat tliey had
made such a "provisional decision". Thcre was noteveli an appearancc ofaflhrdiiig Qatar an
opportuiiity ta present its case bcfore the "provisional decision" was reachedin 1936. There
could hardly be a more flagrant case of a failure to observcthe f~~ndarneatarlule of fairness in
quasi-judicial procedures. As Qatar has already submitted, the procedurcs were thus
fundamentally flawed from the outsetby the action takcn in 1936.
6.127 The second limb of the uudi alteramparternnile is the principle ofthc equaliiy of the
parties. The present Court has emphasized that "The piincipte of equality of the parties
follows from the requirements of good administrationof justice"'".
6.128 By definition, equality of the parties precludes ex parte communications between the
decision-maker and one of the parties.It is accordingly the duty of the decision-maker not to
take evidence privately from one side: not to use information without puttingit to bath sides:
and not to seeone party inthe absence ofthe otlier.
6.129 As has been ~een'~~ t,he procedure followedby the British authorities (andparticularly
by Weightman and, to a lesser extent, Fowle) breached each and cvcry one of'tliese specific
incidents ofthe audi alteram parlem rule. Moving forward from what happeiledin 1936to the
procedures followcdin 1938/34,it will be seen immediatelythat there was a glaring departure
155
./udgmcnts ofthe AdministrativTribunalof the IL0 ~yon Cniiiplaints itfade uguinUnesco,
Advisory15fnion,I.C.J. Reports 1956,p.86.
See, paras6.46et seq.above.from the audi ulteram parlem mle in the initial assumption inadc, nmely, that it was for
Qatar to disprove the Bahrain claim of sovereignty.
6.130 A closer look must be taken at what actually liappened during the formal proccdures
which opcned with Weightman'sletter 10 the Kuler of Qatar of'20 May 193 8, and closed with
the letters of 11 July 1939 from Fowle to both Rulers conveying the decision of the British
Government. It has been noted that therewas an initial and Ilagrantbreacli of the principle of
equality in requiring Qatar to disprovethe Bahrain claim, therebyshifting the burden of proof
in Bahrain's favour.But (and here it is unfortunatelynecessary for Qatarto relèragain io facts
to which it has already drawn attentionin other contexts) the following suiilmary of specific
incidents, whicli testify to the discriminatorytreatmeilt accorded to the Ruler of Qatar during
the course of the formal procedure, in gross breach of the priiiciple oî equality, is hercby
presented forthe convenience ofthe Court:
(1) the Ruler of Qatar is requested, on 20 May 1938,to submit his clainî to Hawar "at the
earliest possible moment1', and in fact responds on 27 May 1938, wl-iereasno time-
limit is put on the submission of Bahrain's"counter-claim"whiçh was i~otin the event
submitted untiI 3 January 1939, some four and a half 1r1011t1lafter it had been
requestcd.
(2) the Ruler of Qatar was never, so far as can be ascertained from British archives,
inforrned of the contentof the (uninvited) "preliminary staternent"of 29 May 1938of
the Bahrain case on Hawar, despite the fact th& Weiglitman expressly idcntified that
document as one of the documents in the case upon whiçli Iie drew wlien evaluating
the evidence in his letter to Fowle of 22 April 1939'".
Nor was the Ruler of Qatar informed of the last-minute cvidence about fish-traps
(3)
submitted by Belgrave to Weightman on 20 April 1939'"~and takeninto account in
paragraph 10of Weightman'sreportto Fowle of 22 April 1939"~.
157
158nnex 111.195, ol7,p.497.
159nnex 111.193, ol7, p. 489.
Annex 111.195, ol.7p.497. The inequality of trcatment as regards time-lirnits (see point(1) übove) was repeated
(4)
when Qatar was made awareof Bahrain's"counter-clairn"'".
(5) As is cvident from Belgrave'sdiary entries for 18,20 and 22 April 19391b',meetings
took place between Belgrave and Wcightman during tlie sensitive period when
Wcightmanwas engagedin preparing his reportto Fowle on the relative strengths and
weaknesses of thc claims to Hawar submittedby Bahrain and Qatar. These meetings
took place without the knowledgeof the Ruler of Qatar. Moreover, it is admitteclby
Belgrave in his diary entry for 22 April that he saw Weiglilmail'sletter regarding the
whole thitlg (possibly evenin draft).
6.131 Indeed, this analysis of the mmer in which the competent British officials in the Gulf
failed to observe eventhe most basictenets of the uudi alterampartcmrule in their treatment
of the dispute about sovereignty over the Hawarislands in the 1930s inevitably leads one to
consider whether there is sufficient proof of bias on the part of individual 13ritishofficials in
the Gulf or elsewhere which wouldor could have had an impact upon the final decision to
give Hawar to Bahrain.
3. Bias
6.132 There are two main elernents underlying the rule which prohibits bias in a dccision-
rnakeron the international plane,narnely:
that no-one may be judge in his own cause (nernojudex in causa suu), which is
(1)
generaily understood to mean that the decision should not be made on the basis of the
decision-maker's self-interest, butwith due regard to the merits oî the respective cases
of the disputingparties;
GO
See,para.6.83,above.
I6AnnexIII.143,Vol. 7,p,213.(2) that the decision-maker must not be prejudiccd for or against either of the parties; nor
must he have prejudged the case, by making up his mincibefore having given the
partiesa proper and equalopportunityto be lieard.
6.133 Again, there is some overlap betweenthese two elernents. Sometimes, indeed, itinay
be a matter of persona1choice whether a particular instai~ceof cnnduct is regarded as falling
under element (1)or element (2).
6.134 We know for example thai several British officials, both in the Gulf and in London,
were quite open in arguing for a decision favourable to Bahrain on Hawar on political and
strategic grounds. Others simply stressed the more general advantagcs to Britain of a decision
on Hawar favourable to Bahrain. It will be recalled, for example, that Lt.-Col. Loch, the then
British Political Agent in Bahrain, whenforwarding tothe Political ResidcntBelgrave'sletter
of 28 April 1936, outlining Bahrain's forma1claim to Hawar, commented iliat "it might in
certain circumstances suit us politically to have as large an area as possible iiicluded under
Bahrain162w . What would or would not suit Britain politically is not, il is submitted, a proper
consideration to be taken into account by an impartial decision-maker. The Political Resident
in the Gulf at the time (Fowle) was even more blatant in seeking to distance any eventual
decision on Hawar from a careful and impartial considerationof the tnerits. In formulating, in
a memorandum of 5 April 1938,his one-sided proposals onthe proçedurc to be followed in
determiniiigthe question of sovereigntyover Hawar,Fowle liad no hesitation in adding:
"From the politicai point of view it will suit quitc well if we give Hawar to
~ahreir~...'~~."
6.135 Finally, 1-Iemingway of the India Office in London, when minuting on the
recommendations made by Weightrnan and Fowle in April 1939 that the Hawar islands be
awarded to Bahrain, thought it appropriate toadd, as an argumentfavouring such a dccision:
162
163nnex 111.106 ,ol.7, p27.
Aniiex 111.146,Vol7,p.233. "...the present dispute affords, incidentally, sinopportunity to mollify any resentment
which he [the Sheikh of Bahrain] may feel at Ourtreatment 01'the Zubara question in
1937'~~."
6.136 Something more needs to be said about the conduct of Weightman in relation to thc
question of bias. Qataris conscious ofthe gravity ofvoiciilga suspicion aboutthe integrity of
the British Political Agent in Bahrain in 1939,particularly after the passage of soine 57years.
But the documents speak for themselves. They strongly suggest anunacceptable degree of
collusion between Belgrave and Weightman. This is particularly evidenced by Belgravc's
diary entries for 18,20 and 22 April 1939~"'. 11 was clearly quitc improper for Weightman,
when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity,to discuss with the official representative of one of
the parties, in the absence of an official representative of the other Party,a visit which he had
made to the islands in dispute. lt was even more improper, and indeeda strikingly flagrant
departue from the attitude of impartiality which Weightman wascülled upon to display, for
him to show Belgrave a copy of his substantive report ta the Political Rcsident before its
despatch on 22 April 1939.
6.137 What is remarkable in this story is that both Prior, the iiew Political Resident in tlie
Gulf appointed to succeed Fowle in September 1939,and Alban, the new Political Agent in
Bahrain appointed to succeed Weightmanin 1940, should have expressed such unease and
disquiet about the correctness ofthe British decision of 1939on the Hawar islands. Tkey did
not particularisetheir unease and disquiet by pointing to specific procedural irrcgularities, but
it is clear that bothof them wereanxiousto havethe decisionre-opened; and the refusal of the
British officials to re-open it in 1941was attributed not so inuclito a firm bclief on the part of
that Fowle and Weiglitmanwere right,but rather lo the political undesirability, if not
impracticability,of reversing thedecisionmade in 1939.
6.138 The secondeleinetitutlderlyingthe mie prohibiting bias in a dccision-maker is that the
decision-maker must not be prejudiced for or against either ofthe parties; iior must he have
prejudged tliecase by making up his mind beforehaving given thc parties aproper and equal
164
165Annex 11T.203, ol. 8p. 13.
166AnnexIII.143,Vol.7, p.213.
Annex111.230V, ol8, p.133.opportunity to be heard. We have already reviewed the evidence which shows that, in the
1930s,there was, among British officialsin the Gulf, a substaiitiaigeneral prejudice in favour
of Bahrain. There remains the separate issue of pre-judgment; and here there is clear and
compelling evidence that British officials centrally involvcd in the decision-inking prucess
over Hawar on several occasions prejudged the outcome of that proccss by acting or
threatening to act on the assurnptionthat the Hawar islands beloiiged to Bahraiil. Here again it
is necessary for Qatar to refer, as examples of pre-judgment, to cvidence whic1-i it has already
reviewed in other contexts. The inost significant example of pre-judgincnt is afforded by the
British "provisional decision" of 1936in favo~irof the Bahraini daim to Hawar.
6.139 Further evidence of pre-judgment is provided by the uvert and strangely candid
tendency of sorne British officials in the Gulf and indeed in London to treat that "provisiond
decision" of 1936in favour ofthe Bahraini daim to Hawaras a final decision. TIius,we see in
the draft letter frorn Peel (India Office)to Baggallay (Foreigil Office) of 6 July 1938'" that
the reason given for not affording the Ruler of Qatar an opportunity to put forward
observations on Bahrain'scounter-clairnis that "..it is pretty clear tha11ehas no evideiice to
bring forward in his own support". Further evidence of prejudgrnent in the India Office in
London is afforded by an interna1minute of Gibson (India Office) of 14 July 1938,in which,
while recommending acceptance of the Foreign Office view that the Ruler of Qatar should be
afforded an opportunity to see and comment on the Bahrain "counter-claim" to Hawar, he
frankly (and quite improperly) comments that "...since the issue will almust certainly be
decided in favour of Bahrein, it would be as well toleave the Sheikh of Qatar with no feeling
of grievance that his case had notbeen fullyheard'hs".
6.140 Thcre is accordingly ample evidence of the bias of certain British officials iiifavour of
Bahrain in the conduct of the quasi-judicial procedures adopted in 1938 to decide upon the
respective daims of Qatar and Bahrain. Some of the bias displayed may have been unwitting
and unintended; but, viewed ob,jectively,it was bias nonetheless.
168mnlle1x11.164Vol.7, p323.
Annex 111.166,ol.7,p. 333. 4. Absence ofreasons
6.141 It rernains to consider the lcgal significailce of the fact that tlie Britislî decision of
11July 1939was unsupported by reasons. It will be recalled tliat the Court of Arbitration in
the Duhai/Sharjah Bordercase upheld the objection raised on this gro~mdby Dubai in regard
to the Tripp decisions, in the followingterms:
"ltis true tliat on occasions in the past arbitral awnrds have beeil given without
reasoning, especially whenrendered byHcads of State. This lioweveris contrary to the
modern concept of arbitration and the 1958 Mode1 Rules oil Arbitral Procedure
iiidicate, in Article 35(c),that a failure to state the reüsons for an award may af'ford
eitherparty a groundto challengethe validity of ailawud 10.,,
6.142 Although the award in the DuhaiLYharjah Border case was rcndered as recently as
1981and, on the point at issue, sceksto determine the validity,as arbitral awards, of decisions
made by representatives of the British Government in 1956 and 1957, Qatar entertains no
doubt that the "modern concept of arbitration" had already emerged by 1939 so as to deprive
the 1939 British decision on Hawar of any claim to the status of an arbitral award if oi-ilyby
reason of thetotal lack of reasoning in thedccision.
6.143 On this point, Qatar would simply add that, as the Court will be wcll aware, the
Judgment of the present Court in the Case concerning the ArbitralAward Made hy the King
of Spain on 23 Decemher 1906, confirms that an arbitral award must be supported by
reasons 17.
6.144 For al1the reasons wl~ickQatar has invoked - namcly, tlie essential uiifairness of the
procedure adopted to determine the respective claims to Hawar of Bahrain and Qatar, the
failure of the British authorities to apply the audi alteramparternrule, the bias in favour of
Bahrain and against Qatar displayed by the British authoritics in the GulT with regard to the
question of Hawar, and the absenceof reasons to motivate the 1939 deçision - Qatar submits
tliat that decision cannot be equated to an arbitral award and that, wl~etheror not it to be so
169
170linex 111.24V,ol. 8, 480.
1.C.J ReportsIY60,p.192,atp.216.treated, it would in any event be invalidated by reason of the scrious procedural delects to
which Qatar has drawn attention. Moreover, Qatar intends to preseilt further proof tliat not
only isthe 1939British decision vitiated by these procedural defccts, but that the substance of
the 1939 British dccision was perverted by reason ol' the faIse aiid disiorted "evidence"
presented tothe British authoritiesby Belgrave (represcntiilgthe Ruler of Bahïain) diiring the
period between 1936and 1939.
Section3. The Defectsin theBasis of the 1939 Decisinn
6.145 Thcre is ample cvidence to establish not only that the British decision of 1939 was
rendered nul1and void by reason of the significant procedural dcfects to which attention has
already been directcd, but also that the decision was based on false and manufactured
evidence presented by Belgrave on behalf of Bahrain. Somc of tliat evideilce Qatar has
alreadypresented17'. Qatar regrets the need to refer in the contexi of tliis Section to evidence
already submitted in other contexts,but will now supplementthat evidenceby other materials.
A. Evidence ~resentedto theBritish Authorities
1.ByBahrain
a) The first formalclaim by Bahrain
6.146 The first formal claim by Bahrain to sovereignty aver the Hawar islands was presented
by Belgrave to the then Political Agent in Bahrain(Lt.-Col. L,och)in a letter dated 28 April
1936'72.
6.147 There are four assertions in this letter on which the Bahraini claim to sovercignty is
presumabl y based:
The Hawar group of islands is defined as including the following named islaiids as
(1)
wcll as "anumber of small islets":
17Ses, Sects1.Aand 2.A ofthisChapter,paras.6.1etseq.and6.46 ctsey.,above.
172Annex 111.103, ol7,p. 15. Noon
Meshtaan
Al-Materrad
Rubadh
Hawar
Ginan
Mahazwarah
So the Hawar group is claimed to comprise sevenislands in addition toa number of
small islets.
It is claimed that "at least four of the larger islands are permanently occupied" by
(2)
subjects of the Ruler ofBahrain "wholive there in stone liouses as wcll as barastis and
who are the ownersof valuable fish-trapsround thecoasts of the islands".
(3) It is also claimed that "the inhabitants of the Hawar islandsand their forefathers are
and always have been the subjects of tlie Shaikh of Bahrain in wIloseterritory they are
living".
(4) It is likewise assertedthat "the people of Hawar are today and always have been under
the jurisdiction of the Shaikhof Bahrain" in that "they appearin the Bahrain Courts in
answer to summonses which are served on them iii Hawar and al1their cases and
disputes are dealt with in tlie Bahrain Courts"; and that "recently" the Bahrain police
had occasion to make several arrests in Hawar and to producc the persons in the
Bahrain Court.
6.148 Al1these are bare assertions presentedwithout any proof or atiy supporting evidence;
and it will be recalled that, as recently as 1933, the India Office iil London had already
considered and expressly rejected the possibilitythat Hawar islai~d, to which the Ruler of
Bahrain maintained what was characterisedthen as ci "vague claim", could be regarded asincluded in the territories covered by the 1925conce~sion'~~ A.nd yet both the Political Agent
in Bahrain (Loch) and the Political Resident (Fowle) cornbiiied to recommcnd in 1936that
"Hawar should be regarded as belonging to tlie Shaikh of Bahraiil and that the burden of
disproving his claim lies an the Shaikhof ~atar'~~".No British official in thc Gulfnor indeecl
in London seems to have consulted the correspondencedating fronl as reccntly as 1933 and
expressing the British Government'sfirm view atthal time that the Hûwarislands belonged to
~atar''~.This may be attributableto the fact that a Cabinet decision of July 1933had rcsnlved
that, beçause of its greater experience, the India Office should Lake ovcr from the Coloiiial
Office as the department responsible for Persian Gulf ~ffairs'~! Thcre is no hint in Lochs
letter to Fowle of 6 May 1936"~,nor in Fowle'slettcrto the Secretary of State for India of 25
May 193617',tliat either official was prepared to ~mdertakean independent investigation to
establish wliether the bare assertions made by Belgrave werc justified. They were simply
accepted unquestioningly, with Fowle adding some argument bascd on Hawar'sproximity to
Zubarah while denyingthe relevance of Hawar'smuch closer proximity to inainland Qatar.
b) Bahrain's "preliminary statement" of29 May 1938
6.149 This "preliminary statement", which Belgrave tralsinittcd to Weightman on 29 May
193817'had not been recluestedby ~ei~htrnan'".
6.150 The "preliminary statement" had aiinexed to it a description of the Hawar islands
which differs materially from the description given by Bclgrave iil 1936 when submitting
Bahrain'sprior formal claim to the Hawar group of islands. The anncx to the "preliminary
statement" includesthe following passage:
"This group of islands consists of one large island approximately 11niilcs long and at
the widest point 2 des in width, with anarea of'about 17 square miles which is
173AnnexIII.BI,Vol. 6, p.461.
174AnnexIII.107,Vol. 7,p.31.
17'Ses, for example, the letters and documents citedparas.6.18-6.22, aboveand reproduced as
Annexes117685-111,86,III.8and111.90-IIL92V,ol.6, pp437-444,449 and 457-474.
177See,Appendix3,Vol. 15,p.95.
17RAnnex 111.106Vol.7, p. 27.
Annex111.107V , ol7,p.31.
179Annex 111.158V,ol. 7, p. 291.
lS0See,paras.6.76-6.77above. known as Hawar island and also a number of isla~~dsand rocky islets which are
adjacent to 1-Iawarisland."
The annex to the "preliminarystatement"contiiiues:
"Oneach of the islandstliere is a stollebeacon about 6 feet high surmounted hy a pole
on the top of which is an oil drum painted red and whitc, thc Bahrain colours. The
bcacons arc numberedas fo1lows:-
South Sawad (Sawad = Black)
Al Wakara (1)(Hawk'sstand)
" (2)
" (3)
Bu Sedad rocks, fourrocks
Bu Saadaisiands, four small islands
Al Mahzoura
NortliSawad
Al Hajiat (thefemüleHajis)
" (two islmds)
Ajaira (the widow)
Rabadh
Al Maotaradh(the intervcncr)."
Al1 these islands and islets can be seen on Map No. 9 fücing tliispage, solne of them undcr
different names, but bearing iiuinbers corresponding to the above nuiilbers?the main Hawar
island beingNo. 1 718'.
LXI
The names which appear on Mup No. 9 are the usuanames lakcn Li-oiitlhesurveys referredato
para. 4.3,footnote3, above. In ordertoreconcile the naines of the islarids giiiBatirain's prcliminary
stateinentivliich Belgravc transrnitoeWeightman on 29 May 1938 with ~hosc given on Map No. 9, tiie
following list has been prepared, indicatingtirst the thei1938istatementfollowedby the namc on Map
Nu. 9: 1.SouthSawadISuwadal Janiibiyah;2-4. Al WakardJuzur alWakur; 5-9. BuSedad or Bu SaadaiJuzur
Bu Sadad; 10. Al Mahzoura/Un.ini Kharurah; II. Nortli SawadiSuwad ash Shamaliyah; 12-13. Al6.15 I A cornparison of this list with theiist included in Belgrave'sletter to Loch of 28 April
1936'" discloses that Bahrain isno longer clairning that Noon, Meshtaan and Al Materrad
(which lie doser to Bahrain than to Qatar) form part of the Hawar grcmp.Nor does it any
longer claim that Janan island forms part of the group. By way of contrast, the second and
third largest islands in the Hawar group -Suwad al Janubiyah and Sriwadash Shamaliyah -
are omitted from the 1936 list but, under the names "South Sawüd" and "Nortli Sawad,
included in the list contained in the annexto the "preliminary staiement" of 29 May 1938. So,
right from the begiming, there was complete confusion on theBahraini side as to thc precise
composition of the Hawar graup. This cm only be attributed to the fact that Bcigrave and
those acting for him were wholly ignorant of the geography of the Hawar group because,
contrary to what Bahrain was asserting, there was no permanent Bahraini or even Dowasir
presence on Hawar in 1935/36. It defies belief that Bahrain should have been unable to
identify by name even the principal islands and islets iil the Hawai. group in 1936 if, as
Belgrave claimed in his letter to Loch of 28 April 1936, "the Hawar group of islands ...is
indisputably part of the State of Bahrain" and "at least four of the larger islands are
perrnanently occupied by [the Riiler of Bahrain's] s~bjects'~'".'fie accuracy of this latter
statement can in anyevent be wholly discounted whenit is recallcd that the 1936list does not
even include the second and thirdImgestislands in the Hawar group.
6.152 Another feature of the revised list in the annexto the "preliminarystatement" is that it
makes reference to the beacons erected on a number of islands, islets and rocks adjacent to
Hawar island. These beacons were of course put up by Bahrain, on the directions and under
the supervision of Belgrave, during the winter of 1937/38, in an obvio~is attempt to bolster
Bahrain's claim to the Hawar islands'". Itcould well he that thc process of beaconing also
served a secondary purpose - to remedy the woeful ignorance of Bahrain about the
colilposition of the Hawargroup. Itisjust worth recallinghere that, in 1941,thc new Political
Agent (Alban) slated, in a note whichhe had preparedfor Prior:
Hajiat'unnamedislets;14.AjairdJaziratAjirah15.RabadhiRabadashSharqiyah;and 16.Al Maotoradh/Rabad
al GliarbiyahThcre may be somedoubtas tothe identificatioftheisletnuinbered8 and Y.
182Annex 111.103, ol. 7, p. 15.
183Ibid.
184
See,paras. 6.4et seqabove. "It is not the custom in these parts to erect 'national marks'oCtlie sort used by the
Bahrain Authorities and then wait forother parties todispute them. In any case to do it
so hurriedly jiïst before the ownership question was raised seerns rather like sharp
practice. The sarne applies to the building of a Sort there and garrisoning it with
poiice'85.u
6.153 Prior himself had earlier expressed himself forciblyon the notion that territory could
be acquired in the Gulf by the erectioiiof beacons:
"It is ridiculous to suppose that territory can be acquired in t11esewaters by the
erection of 'national marks'and itis unfortunatethat the Political Agent didnot report
186 1,
it before .
6.154 There seerns little doubt that this evidenceof the lengths Luwhich Belgrave (tacitly
supported by Weightman) was preparedto go to obtain for Bahrain titleto the Hawar islands
contributed to the grave disquiet which Prior continued to entertain abouttliejustice of the
British decision of 1939.
6.155 Turning to the "preliminarystatement"itself, it inoteworthy tl~at the final sentence of
the first paragraph refers (correctly) to the fact that Hawar means "a young carnel" and then
goes on (falsely) ta statetliat
"...the island is 1ocalIyknown as the offspring of Bahrain island which it resembles
somewhat in shapelg7 .
6.156 It is obvious that Belgrave has distorted completely a metaphor deriving from an
undated report made by the Bahrain agent Salim bin Nasser Al-Muzaire lo the Ruler of
Bahain. 111 this report, thewriter seeks todescribe Hawar in the li>llowiiigtermu:
"O Sheikh, Hawar is an island adjacentto the shore of Qatar. It is an island [which is
connected to the mainland] as a baby came1is tied to itsrnoth~r'~~."
185Anriex111.228V, ol.8,p.123.
1R6Anncx 111.220,Vol. 8, p.89.
187AnnexIII.158,Vol. 7, p.291.
188
Anncx 111.82,Vol.6,p.421.6.157 A mcre glance at the map suffices to show that thc relationship between a baby came1
and its mother is mucli more appropriateto the relationship between Hawar and the mainland
of Qatar than it is to the relationshipbetween Hawarand Bahrain.
6.158 Much is made in paragraph 4 of the "preliminary statement" of the permanent
occupation of the Hawar islailds by subjects of the Ruler of Bahrain since shortly after 1783.
It is flatly asserted:
"The principal families who lived in Hawar are of the Dawasir tribe wliose
18911
headquarters in Bahrain are Zellaq and Budeya .
This assertion is specifically contradicted in a letter which Belgrave hiinself wrote to Abdul
Razag Rizoogi on 20 November 1937:
"The Glorious State has ordered the Rulers of Bahrain to settle the Dawasir in it. We
transported them there in four days with their cattle, donkeys alidwatcr, so that it will
appear, when the report is written, that it is inhabited by the people of Bahrain, who
wrote a documentthat the island is theirs fromfathet.to granclfather;that is al1 190.I
6.159 The fact that it was Belgrave himself who atranged for the traiisportation of members
of the Dowasir txibe to Hawar at the relevant tirne is confirmed by a letter from Ali bin
Khadim AI-Hamily (an agent of Sheikh Shakhboot, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi) to Sheikh
Shakhboot himself, written on4 October 1940.The writer slates ip~ter aliu:
"You have been aware of the situation between Qatar and Balirain, since you heard of
the taking of Hawar from Qatar, and [the fact that] the Adviser has paved the way for
Bahrain intothe Island [Hawar]by settling the Al-Dawasir tliere... 191.I
6.160 ReCereilceis made in pwtgraph 3 of the "preliminarystatement" to the factthat "on the
high ground above the bay there is a stone fort with a tower, which is visible in Bahrain". The
clear implication is that this stone fort had been in existence for a number of years prior to
1938, this being further evidence of permanent occupation. What is carcfully not rcvealed is
R9AnnexIII.158, Vol. 7, p291.
19Annex 111,140V,ol.7, p. 199.
I9Annex111.223,Vol.8,p. 103.that it was Belgrave himself who made arrangementsfor the construction of the stone fort on
Hawar island. Thus, in a letter to Abdul Razag bin Sayed Rizoogi of 27 September 1944,
Belgrave admits, with unconcealed pride:
"But if your messenger cornes tous we will tell him 1have contrived how a fort:was
192II
built on Hawarwhile there wasnofort before that .
This fort:on Hawar appearsto havebeencornpletedin carly 1938193.
6.161 Jn paragraph 5 of the "preliminary statement", itis suggested tliafishing rights off the
shore of I-Iawarwere originally grantedto the people of Hawarby the Sheikh of Bahrain; and
it is stated that "if these documents are available they will be fonvarded". The alleged
documents appear to be another figment of Belgrave'slively imagination, for they werenever
fonvarded.Theunjustified assertionin the "preliminary statement"that Hawarfish-trapswere
registered in the Land Department of the Bahrain Government had to be abr~iptlywithdrawn
on 20April 1939,when it was foundthat they were not so registeredl".
6.162 So there were many assertions in the "preliminary staternent" which were eitherfalse
or unsupported by evidence or distorted. Attentionhas been drawn oniy to those which cm
immediately be shownto be less than fully accurate. Prior, in his letter to Peof 26 October
1941195, takes issue with some of the other "evidence" addressed in this "prelirninary
statement". In particular, he refiites the sigiiificance of Sheikll Issa's allegedaniiual visit to
Hawar by pointing out that Sheikh Issa madeannual visits to Lingeh and Hasa (neither of
which were territories subjectto the sovereignty of the Rulerof Bahrain). Prior also discredits
much of the so-called "evidence" ofthe exercise of Bahrainijurisdictioil in and in relation to
Hawar.
6.163 In short, had the "evidence" adclucedin Bahrain's"prelinlinary statement" of 29 May
1938 been subjected to vigorous scrutiny by Wcightman or Fowle ritthe time, it could not
192
143Annex 111.241, ol. 8,p187.
,Tee,the entry for 31 March 1938 itheextracts from Belgrave'sDiaries,Anncx111.143Vol. 7,
p. 213. 194
Annex 111.193V,ol. 7p. 489.
195Annex 111.229V,ol. 8,p. 127.have been relied upon to support the Bahraini claim to sovereignty. Even the less than fully
rigorousscrutiny carried out by AIbanand Prior in 1940and 1941 revealed some (but not all)
of the flaws in the Bahraini argumentas set out in tlie"preliminary stateinent".
c)Bahrain's"counter-claim"of 3 January 1939
6.164 Bahrain's"counter-claim" to theHawar islands, submittcd by Belgrave to Weightman
on 3 January 1939(although dated 22December 1938),does not add very rnu~h'~~.
6.165 The main piece of evidence presented byBelgrave is a petition subscribed to, whether
by signature,thumb impressions or seals, by a number of persons (ten of whom arc from the
Dowasir - here spelt "Dosari" -tribe) cIaiming to be permanent rcsidents of Hawar. The
reliability of this so-callpiece of "evidence"has been whoIly undermined by the confession
from Ahmed bin Ali Al-Ghatam, Yousuf bin Ahmed and Irhama bin Ahed Al-Dosari,
written in November 1930,that they had been cajoled by Belgrave into putting their finger-
prints onto a blank piece of papes, and that they had never set fouton Hawar, and had nothing
there in the way of property'97.This confession is of course repeated intwo t-ùrtherlelters of
December 1930 from Yousuf bin ~hrned'~'. Itis corroborated by thc letler of 2 December
1939 fromAbdul Aziz bin Abdul-RahmanAl-Faisal of Saudi Arabia to SheilchShakhboot of
Abu Dhabi, in which he expresses his anger atthe signature of the Baliraini petition by
Moharned bin Hazeem among others"'. The effect is wholly to destroy tlie unwarranted claim
that there were permanent residents on Hawar living in stoiie houses inherited by the
petitioners from their fatherand theirpredecessors.
6.166 Qatar also has evidence which demonstrates beyond apcradvei~turethat some of the
signatories of the petition presented by Bahrain liad acquired properlyon I4awarby purchase
from Qatari subjects only a few years before the dispute as to sovereignty over Hawar arose -
and had no doubt done so at the behest of Belgrave. Therc is for example the statement of
196
Annex III.174Vol.7, p. 31.
'"Annex 111.77, ol.6, 401.
lgAnnexes 111.7and 111.7V,ol.6,pp.405and409.
Annex 111.16,Vol.X,p. 73.Saleh bin Hamad Al-Mannai (a Qatari subject) made on 7December 1934200where he claims
to have sold to Abdullah Bu Jabor Al-Dosari, in return for a money payment and a piece of
land in Al-Zallaq, al1the property in Hawar which he had inherited from his fan~ily,and
consistiiig of land with huts on it, and a fish-trap. This is completcd by an instruction froin
Belgrave dated 1935ordering the land to be registered in the name of Abdullah Bu Jabor Al-
Dosari, who is not permitted to sel1it for 30years.
6.167 Then there is the settlen~entof a dispute as to property on IIawar which was recorded
by the Baliraini judge Abdullah Al-Mihza on 11 Mach 1939,in the presence of Beigrave.
This settlement showsthat Ali bin Rashid Al-Dosari (stated to be from AI-Zallaq although,as
someone whose seal is affixedto the Bahraini petition, professedly also havinghis "dwelling-
place" in Hawar) was in the process ofpurchasing some land with rihut on iton Hawar from
Abdul Hussain Al-Shihri, who had previously acquired the property for ten Austrian riyals
from a person in nmthern ~atar~''.Belgrave was present when this scttlcment was recorded.
There is additional evidence, however, that this transactionmay have been conciuded under
duress, in the form of an undated letter which Belgrave wrote to Saleh Shihri in which
Belgrave threatens to take Saleh Shihri's hut onBawar by force if he refuses to sel1it to Ali
bin ~ashid~'~.
6.168 It would seem that some of the signatories ofthe Bahraini petition were now getting
rewards for their false testimony. Oneof the signatoriesof the BaI~rainipetition presented by
Belgrave as"evidence" of the permanent occupation of Hawar is Salman bill Ahrned Al-
Ghatam. In a settlement recordedby a Bahrainijudge (Salmeen bin Rübee) on 18May 1939,
Salman bin Ahrned Al-Ghatam is stated to be "aninhabitant of Al-Zallaq" (and not an
inhabitant of ~awar)~'~.The document records the purchase by Salman bin Ahmed Al-
Ghatam of a hut in Hawar wliicli the owner (Saleh bin Abdullah Al-1-Iasawi)had himself
bought from its original owners "the inhabitants of Qatar", the judge having seen the deed
testifying to this latter transaction. The buyerwas to pay teil Austriail silver riyals cash with a
further sum of forty silverriyalsguaranteedby Belgrave on certain coiiditioiis.
200Annex111.96 ,ol.6, p.493.
201Anncx 111.186, ol. 7, p.429.
202AiinexIII187,Vol.7, p.433.
203
Annex111.202,Vol. 8,p.9.6.169 There is even more evidence of Belgrave's duplicityin the early montl-isof 1939. This
would have been a testing time forhim, as he awaitedthe British decision «ilwhethcr Qataror
Bahrain liad sovercignty over Hawar. The lastthing he wanted, therefore, was evidence from
independentsourcestestifying to close links between Hawar and Qalar. That is why the letter
which Belgrave wrote on 10 May 1939 tci Khm Bahadur Issa Abdul Latcef AI-Sarkal (thc
former Residency Agent in the Trucial States) is of such interest2". It will be seen that
Belgrave is using his influence to persuade his correspondent tu intercedc in such a way as to
prevent two named Sheikhs from testifying in favour of Qatar in relation to huts which the
Sheikhs owned on Hawar. This demonstrates the lengths to which Belgrave was prepared to
go to suppressevidence which might not be favourableto the Bahraini case.
6.170 To complete the picture about properties in Hawar, Qatar would wish to refer to the
letter of 20 May 1938, from "thepolitical agent in Bahrain" to Salch Abdu1IIussain shihri205,
who was later to sel1his land (with a hut on it) in Hawar to Ali hiil Rashid ~l-~osari~'~.
Leaving aside the question of the authorship of this letter, its content is entircly consistent
with what the Court will now know of Belgrave's activities. There is first the wholly false
statement thai "we" (presumably the British) "have purchased Hawar from Qatar who sold
Hawar to the Sheikh of Bahrain a month ago". There is no truth in eithcr limb of this
statement, This is accompanied by a threat that the recipient'shuts will be cither confiscated
or dismantled. Then the recipient of the letter is informed tl-iatit is prohibited for any non-
Bahraini to "inhabit" Hawar which is reserved to "the Dowasir of Bahraii~".The letter also
concedes in terms that "Hawar was previously a property of Qatar" (presumably before its
non-existent"sale" to the Sheikhof Bahrain).
6.171 The pressure being put on Saleh Abdul Hussain Al-Shihri by Bclgrave is further
evidenced by ai undated lctter, probably sent in 1939~''. ln this letter, the recipient is
requcsted tu disavow a document which he was reported to have signed in favour of the
Sheikh of Qatar. One hundred rupees is enclosed with the lettcr, "foryour expenscs".
204Annex 111.201V,ol. 8, S.
205Sce,Annex 111.155V, ol7, p.275.
206Annex III.186,Vol.7,p.429.
2D7Annex 111.14,VoI. 8,p.65.6.172 The Court will now be in a position to assess thc truth of thc statements made in the
Bahrain "counter-claim" about properties in Hawar. 1s thc cvidence which Qatar lias iiow
produced208consistent with the assertions advanced in the Bahrain "counter-clairn"? The
answer is surely in the negative. What the new evidence discloses is that Belgrave arranged
for the transportation to Hawar, togetherwith their cattle, of a small group of mcmbcrs of the
Dowasir tribe whomay have been rewarded for their compliance with Belgrave's instructions
by the making over tu tliein of properties on Hawar bought privatcly from their original
owners in Qatar. In no way can it be said that, in 1939,Hawar was "...a place containing a
long-establislied settled community of Arabs living in permanent stonc hoilses with their
wives and families and their cattle, sheep and donkey~~"~~ T.his is pure fantasy; and it is
remarkable that so Iittle credence was given at the time to the Ruler of Qatar'sfirm denial of
this assertion in his letterto Weightman of 30March 1939~''.
6.173 But this does not exhaust Belgrave'shighly suspect activities. As supposed proof of a
long-standing occupation of properties in Hawarby members of thc Dowasir tribe, Belgrave
produces details of two judgments given in 1909/10 by a Bahrain court and relating to land
and sea properties in Hawar.A transcription of each of these twojudgments is aimexedto the
Bahrain"counter-claim". It will be seenthat thejudgments are statedto have been written and
sealed by the Qadi, "Sharafbin Ahmad"" '.Considerable doubtis cast on the validity of these
twojudgments if one studiesthe content of a letterwritten by Sharq bin Ahmed to Sheikh Issa
bin Abdul Latcef Al-Sarkal (forrnerlyResidencyAgent inShar-jah)on 1 December 1939~'~I.n
this letter, writtcn from Ras-al-Khaimah, the writer complains that he is about to be deported
from Bahrain unjustly after having servedthe Ruler and Belgravc faithfully and "helpedthem
a lot". The nature of the help hc has given is not revealed, but Iîetlireatens 10 reveal the truth.
He goes on to complain that he has not received his monthly payinent fiom the Sheikhs; and
he likewise complains that Belgrave owes him 100 rupees "wliichthey proinised me if 1did
208
In Annexes 771.82and 111.9Vol. 6,pp.421 and 493; Annexes 111.140.111.15111.186and 111.187,
Vol.7, pp. 199,275, 429 and433; andAnnexesIII.201,111.202,111.21and 111.223,ol.8,pp. 5, 9,65 and 103.
209Annex 111.174, ol.7,p. 371.
210Annex 111.192,Vol.7,p. 453.
211The Qadi's firstname was in fact "Sharq" and not "Sharaf', whicis an errorintranscription
resulting from thfact thaithArabic letterscorresponditu"f' and "q" are verysimilar.
"2 Annex 111.215,Vol. 8,p. 69.somejob forthem inmy name". It shouldbe emphasized that Qatar attaches evidentiary value
to this letter only in so far as it may suggestthat the two supposedjudgments of 190911 0 were
fabricated by Sharq bin Ahmed at the behest of Belgrave. The lctter is not proof of
fabrication, but it inevitably implies that Belgrave was indebted to Sharq bin Ahmed, but
wanted him out of the way in case he revealedthetmth about the allcged 1909/1O judgments.
6.174 What we have thereforc in the Bahrain "counter-claim" is ü serics of extravagant
assertions, allegedly supported by evidence which proves, on close inspection, to be highly
suspect, if not demonstrably false. Mere common-sense would, in addition, operatc to cast
sevcre doubt on some of the Bahraini assertions. This is particularly true of the claim that
Hawar had been occupied by subjects of the Ruler of Bahrain for over a ceiitury and that it
contained a long established settled community of Arabs living in permanent stone hnuses, It
is a fact of nature that Hawar could not have been occupied permanently before Bahrain torik
it over in 1936/37. In the 1930s and earlier, there was no reguIar water-supply on Hawar and
people who ventured to live there for short periods had to rely on whatcver water might have
been collected in cisterns on Hawaror was broughtfrom Qatar. WeightmanhimseIf, citing the
reports of local people, admits that, although there had been heavy rai11 iilIIawar a month
before his brief visit inApril 1939, "..this water would be exhaustcd within three months2"".
In fact, thereisindependent evidencethat, in 1938/39,most of the cisterns on Hawar were not
in working order. Thus, in the Governrnent of Bahrain Annual Report for 1938-1939, it is
freely admitted:
"There is no water supply at Hawar except the old cisterns or catchments which were
built many yearsago by the people of Hawar. Most ofthe cisterns are out of repaisand
do not hold water.They are to be ~e~aired~~~."
6.175 Qatar does not dispute that, manyyears before 1939, attempts were made by the
itinerant fishermen who occasionally ventured to stay on I-Iawarfor ü limited period to
construct cisterns or other receptacles to hold water. But clearly their efforts mrerenot such as
to ensrire a permanent water-supply. Even Weightman, in his report to Fowfe of 22 April
213Annex 111.195, ol7,p.497,
214Annex III.178,Vol.7, p.397.1939~'~a ,dmits that during much of the year, water has to be brought across from Bahrain.
Thisin itself is puzzling, sincethere must bea question as to wlierethis "importcd"water was
to be storcd if,as the Government of Bahrain conceded, mostof the cisterns required repair.
Even Weightman, though continuing to insist that "... a few peopledo rernainthere [in I-Iawar]
throughout the year", is obliged to admit ignorance or "whethei Ihis is equally tme of the
past2'611.
6.176 Five independent sources testify to the fact that IIawar was never pcrmanently
occupied, although some people may have stayed on the islandduring the wintcr months:
(1) Various Ottoman documents refer to the fact that the Hawar islands were onry
frequented by fishermen2 17.
(2) Lorimer, in his Gazetteev qf thePersian Gulfdated 1907, states that "the Dawasir of
Zallaq in Bahrain ...have houses attwo places onthe island and use thern in winter as
shooting boxes218".It will be noted that Lorimer malces no mention of "villages" on
Hawar.
(3) The first edition of the Persicrn Gulf Pilot appeared in 1864. Its description of the
Hawargroup of islands is suitablyvague. It refers simplyto:
"...a group of islands, little explored,the largestof which is called Hawar,and is about
10 miles long, and frequentedby fishennen 219.II
(4) In 1909,Prideaux, at that time Political Agent iii Bahrain, paid a visit to Hawar and
reportedthat the Dowasirhavetwo winter villagesthere220.
215Ihid.
'16Annex III.195,Vol.7,p. 497.
217See,forexarnple, Annex 111.15,Vol6, p.75.
218Annex 11.4,Vol. 3,p. 120.
219Annex 111.308 ,ol.8, p.551.
220
Annex 111.53,ol. 6p. 245.(5) In 1916, the Hundboo okfArubia reproduces more or Iess the description given by
Lorirner,but addsthat the islandof Hawar "hasno permanentpopulation22'".
6.177 Thus, it will be seen that only Bahrain asserts that Hawar island I-iasalways been
occupied permanently. Al1other neutral observers deny this, tliougii admilting that it was
frequented by fishermen andmayhave been visited on a fairly regular basis during the winter
months.
6.178 Muc11is made in the Bahrain "counter-claiin"of the considerationthat "no niember of
the Al Thani fürnilyhas everset footon [theHawar islands]" and tkat "norulcr of Qatar ...has
exercised authority over the Hawar Islands or the iilhabitantThese assertionsare faise. The
second of these allegations will be exarninedfirst. Qatar has evidence dating frotheturn of
the twentieth century of the payment of taxes bypersons temporarily living in Hawar, such as
itinerant fishermen who used small huts on Hawar during the winter fishing season. Therc is
for example a letter dating fimm1891fromthree tax-collectorsworking for the Ruler of Qatar
to the Ruler himself. The letter informs the Ruler that "we brought witli us the inoney which
we collected from them in the season and it is 30 Ardi [a kind of currency used at the
tir ne^^ Tw^ ^ "ther documents provide further evidence as to the collection of taxcs on
behalf of the Ruler of Qatar in the 1880s and 1890s from itinerant fisherinen temporarily
livingon Hawarisland. The first is a letterof 29 March 1887to the Rulerof Qatar from Saeed
Al-Mutawwa Al-Binhajer: Sheikhof the westernports of Qatar,in which the writer reports:
"We did not collect any levies in Hawar this timbecause the people of Bahrain did
not corne there [this season].We met 22311eople of Al-Hassa and of Ornan.1agreed
withthem on tenns for the next season .
Thewriter also states:
"1have raisedyour banner,may AlIahhonour you, on the mid-western partof Hawar."
22Annex111.296,Vol. 8,483.
2'Annex 111.39, ol. 6,p. 181.
22Annex 111.36,Vo6, p.169.6.179 The second is another letter of 2 June 1891 to the Ruler of Qatar from the same source
in which the writer reports much greater successin the collection oflevics for the Ruler fiom
fishermen on Hawar island:
"...1 went witli my men to 1-Iawaryesterday to collcct a lump suin and levy from the
Shiites and the people of Bahrain. The good news is that we f'ciuiltheln there and
collected three hundred Asdi [kind of money] fiom them as the Ievy for the last
season. 1 made them vow and set their fingerprints to tliis effect: thdttl~eyshould hand
in the money to us regularlyat the turn of each season 224.I
6.180 There is also evidence that, in the early years of tlie century, Bahraini nationals and
residents were accustomedto seek spccificpermission frointhe Qatari authoritiesto anchor at
Hawar island. Thus, a letter of 15 February 1907 from Muhanna Bin EIazeemAl-Dosari, a
reçident of Al-Zallaq inBahrain, to Sheikh Saeed Al-MutawwaAl-Binllajerstates:
"O Sheikh, we ask your permission for our ship to anchor at your island, Hawar; to
repair Our ships, because your men have not allowed us to anchor [on the island]
without a letter from you 225.iq
6.181 Much more significant in this context is the letter of 7 July 1907from Shcikh Issa bin
Ali Al-Khalifah (Ruler of Bahrain [rom 1869 until relieved of control by the British
autlioritiesin 1923)to Saeed Al-MulawwaAl-Binhajerrequesting permissionfor Bahrainis to
anchor at Hawar md acknowledging his responsibilityfor any misbchaviourby Bahrainis "on
226 11
your island and in your country ,
Hexethen we have a clear and unqualified recognition by the Ruler of Bahrain in thc year
1907 - long berore any Bahraini claim was ventilated - that Havar islaildbelonged to Qatar.
6.182 Finally, but of lesser signifîcance, there is a letter of12 June 1908 €romMohammed
bin Khalifah Al-Khalifah of Muharraq (a member of the ruling hmily in Bahrain) to the
224Aniiex111.40V,ol. 6, p. 185.See,also,para.5.41,above.
225Annex 111.48, ol.6, p.21.
226AnnexIII.49, Vol.6,p.225. See,also,para. 5.49, above.Sheikh of the western ports of Qatar requesting permission for 1rhamal.ibin Rashid Al-Dosari
to anchor at Hawar. Theletterconcludes: "Weare obliged to do whatever you write2*'".
6.183 These letters offer compelling evidence that, in thc years 1907 aiid 1908, Bahrain
unqueslioningly acknowledged that Hawar island belonged to Qatar. Shey are reinforced by
evidence in a ietter dated 16 February 1891 that, from time to time, Qatari officials piwsued
and, where necessary, made arrangements for the arrestof çriminals wl~ohad fled from the
mainland and taken refuge on ~awar~~'.
6.184 The first of the two allegations is also easiIy refuted. Thcre is indirect evidence that,
before 1927, Sheikh Jassim bin Thani of Qatar paid a visit to Hawar. Thus, in a letter from
Sultan bin Zayed to the then Ruler of Bahrain (Issa bin Ali), written in January 1927, it is
stated of Hawar that "according to what Rashid bin Obaid bin Sharara Al-Buflasah says,
Jassim bin Thaniwent there in former dq.7~~~~ T".isiç admittedly l~earsayevidence, but other
eiements in this letter, such as the statement that Hawar "..has no known inhabitants except
for some Shiite fisherrnen from Al-Hassa" confirm the other evidence whiçh Qatar has
submitted in this Memorial and its annexes to demonstrate that Hawar was, at the relevant
times, without any settled population.
6.185 Tliere is also direct evidence that Sheikh Hamad of Qatar paid a visit to Hawar in
February 1938.This was at a time when the Ruler of Qatar (Sheikl-iAbdullah) was already
fiai1and infirm. Indeed, this isvouchcd for by Belgrave himself. In his lettcr to AbdulRazag
Rizoogi of 26 March 1938, Belgrave specificaily admits that "...the Sheikh of Qatar's son
visited them a monlh ago" and that "hepromised themplenty of presents if tl~eydid what was
requiredZ3O".
6.186 There is further direct evidence that Sheikh Hamadof Qatarpaid other visits to Hawar
in early February 1939.For example, we find Belgrave writing again to Abdul RazagSayed
227Anncx 111.50, ol.6,p.229.
228Aiinex111.39Vol. 6,p.18 1.
229Annex 111.71V, ol. p.375.
23OAnnex 111.145Vol.7, p.229.Rizoogi on 10February 1939,stating that the people of Qatar have "no topic exçept the topic
of Hawar since the visit of the Sheikh'ssonthere with his servants2"".
6.187 There is evidence of yet another visit to 1-Iawarby Shcikh Hainad of Qatar which
appears to have taken place in the year 1940. A letter from SheikhHamad to Abdul Razag bin
Rizoogi, written on 19 March 1940, indicates that Sheikh Hainad is going to Hawar; that lie
has "found witnesses to our case"; that Hawaris "oursfrom our htliers and grandfathers"; and
that "we will not keep silent about the seizure of ~awar~~~"Q . atdr would like to draw the
attention of the Court to tlie iiotation on the original Arabic version "Teleg to Bal~rainGo.
BX3 QT 20-8-1940". It may be inferred fromthis that the recipient of this letter, who was at
the time the Residency Agent in the Trucial States, was transinitting a copy of this letter to
Belgrave.
6.188 As a finalcornmentary on the Bahrain"counter-claim", it may be noted that Prior, in
his letter to Peel of 26 October 1941, was wholly dismissive of much of the so-called
"evidence" put fonvard bp ~ahrain~~'.But Qatar does not rely entirely, or even rnainly, on the
reaction of Prior in 1940J41when confronted with wliat he believed to bc a wholly unjust
decision which had been recornrnended by his predecessor. It is rather the evidence of
Belgrave's ruthless and unconscionable activities to procure Hawar for Bahrain which
explains Qatar's unremitting efforts to obtain justice in this matter. Wl~atis now beforc the
Court is evidence of what appears to have been a deep-seated and well-prepared plot by
Belgrave and others, to obtainrecognition ofBahrain'ssovereignty over tlieHawar islands.
d) Belgrave's letter toWeightman of20April 1939
6.189 This is the letter which Belgrave submitted to Weightman on 20 April 1939, severai
weeks after tlie formal procedure had been brought to a close by the submission of the Ruler
of Qatar's observations on the Bahrain "counter-claim" on 30 March 1939~~~A . S already
211Annex III.179,Vol.7, p.1.
232Anncx 111.218,Vol8, p81.
233Aiiiie111.229, ol.8,p. 127.
234
Anncr 111.192Vol. 7p.453.noted, it was never transmitted to the Ruler of ~atar?'~.Given the percmptory refùsal by
Weightman to grant the Ruler of Qatar moretime in which to prepare his observations on tlie
Bahrain "counter-claim", and given theevidence of Weightnîaii'sbias in favour of Bahrain in
1939, it should perhaps not occasion too much surprise that Weightman should so readily
haveaccepted Belgrave'sletterof 20 April as a key document, notwithstanding that it
had been submitted irregularlyandout of tirne.
6.190 The letter itself retracts an assertion made in Bahrain's "preliminary statement" that
fish traps on Hawar were registered in the landregistry of Bahraiil, admittirig tliat there was
stilla dispute over the ownership of the traps which had not yet been dccided by thc Bahrain
courts.
6.191 The only other new element in Belgrave'sletter to Weightinan of 20 April 1939237 is
the transmission of a copy of the judgment in Case No. 264 (of 1936)between aninhabitant
of Muharraq and Mohamed bin Ahmed bin Shahin,stated to bc "of Hawar". It will
immediately be noted that the Iatteris one of those whose thuinb-print is affixed to the totally
discredited petition enclosed with the Bahrain "counter-claim". The Court will also note that
Belgrave admits in this letter of 20 April 1939,that the Bahrain court in 1936 consisted of
Sheikh Sulman bin Hamad and limself. This so-called evidence is therefore worthless; in
particular, the statement that Mohamedbin Almed bin Shahin is "of 1-Iawar"lacks crcdibility
in view ofthe confessions made by three ofthe signatoriesof the petition238.
2.By Qatar
a) The Ruler of Qatar'sformal letterto Weightman of 27 May 1938
6.192 It will be recalled that, byvirtue of Weightrnan'sletter to hini of 20 May 1938~~'t,he
Ruler of Qatar liadbeen invitedto produce his forma1claim on Hawar "at the earliest possible
23See, paras.6.92-6.93 and6.130,above.
236Annex III.193,Vol.7p. 489.
237fhid,
23Sec, paras.6.5etaeq.,aboveand Annexes111.77 and 111.78,Vol.6, p401and 405.
239Annex III.156,Vol.7, p.279.moment"; and tliat the Ruler had taken this invitation literally, sincc he replied within one
week -on 27 May 193~~~'.
6.193 It is clear from the terms of his letter to Weightman of 27 May 1938 tlratthe Rulcr of
Qatar, in the absence of any knowledgeable adviser, had simply not understood that he was
being callcd upon to submit positive evidence of thegrounds upon which he claimcd
sovereignty over the Hawar islands. The termsof his lcttcr of 27 May 1938show that the
Ruler of Qatar drafted it as a follow-up to his lctter to Weiglitinan of IO May 1938,
cornplaining aboutBahraini activities in ~awa?"'. In other words, lis letter of 27 May 1938
protested bitterly about theactions which Babrainhad taken and was still taking in Hawar. He
clearly regardedit as self-evident that theHawargroup wasan integralpart of Qatar:
"Since the date of declaringthe independence ofQatar and recognition of my rulership
over it, this island, as other islands, hasbeen belonging to Qatar 242.11
No doubt fortified by his knowledge that the rulers of neighbouring sheikhdoms (with the
glaring exception of the Ruler of Bahrain)were unanimous in acknowledging his sovereignty
over Hawar, the Ruler of Qatar concentrated more on deilounciilg Bahraini activities on
Hawar than on settingout in detail the grounds upon which his own claimto sovereignty was
based. It must be remembered, however, that the Ruler of Qatar at the time 1101oiily lacked
any foreigii adviser, he also had no çlear idea of the evidence hc might need to support his
own case. Unsurprisingly, therefore, heconfined himself largelyto an aatlempt to discover the
grounds upon which Bahrainreliedto support its claimto Hawar:
"As it is clear that Hawar is considered as an island of Qatar and within its tenitory
and has not been subject to any change which would alter its political position as
required by customary rules, what authority the Bahrain Govexi~rneiih tave to claim it
243 II
and on whatgroundthey arejustified to takc suchacts .
This attempt wasunavailing, at least atthe time.
240Annex 111.157V,ol. 7, p.285.
241Annex 111.150 ,ol. 7p.253.
242Anncx 111.157 ,ol.7, p.285.
2431bid.6.194 It is unfortunate tliat, in writing to Weightman on 27 May 1438, the Ruler of Qatar
made no mention of the visit of his son (Sheikh Hainad) to Hawar in February 1938.
Nevertheless, it is indicative of Belgrave's attitude that he should, when presenting the
Bahrain "counter-claim"on 3 Jmuary 1939,blataiitlyand falsely maintain that "...no member
of tlie Al Thani family has ever set foot on these islands" when lle wcll knew that Sheikh
1-Iamadhad visited Hawar in February 1938. It will inany event be rccalledtliatthis allegaiioii
was firmly refuted in the Ruler of Qatar'scomments of 30 March 1939, wliere it is stated that
the late Sheikh Qasim (Jassimbin Mohamedbin Thani)visiteciHawar many tjmes.
b) The Rulerof Qatar'scommentson the Bahrain "counter-claim"
6.195 The Ruler of Qatar presented l~is comments on the Bahrain "çounter-claim" to
Weightman in his letter of 30 March 1939244a ,fter having protested bitterlyatthe shortness of
tirne made available to him to comment on the evidence presented by ~alrain~~~.This bitter
protest becomes explicable in the light of the content of the following two documents from
Qatar's archives.
6.196 The first is a letter from Sheikh Harnad of Qatar to Abdul Razag hin Rizoogi dated
1 1December 1939. In this letter, Sheikh Hamad states that lie has visited Hawar with his
servants and that he has:
"... a document which shows that no-one has visited them [theislmders], ...except
since the British adopted a definitive policytowardsthe island [Hawarj 24.11
6.197 The precise meaning of this passage in the letter is soniewliat obscure, but Sheikh
Hamad then reveals that this document "hasbeen stolen from under thernattrcss"of his father
and that hc has been informed "that it is in Bahrain", which brealcshis heart. This letter, if it
stood alone, might be somewhat suspect in that it iiiight be thouglit (depending on when the
theft took place) to providc an excuse forthe non-submissionby thc Ruler of Qatarof muchin
244Annex 111.192Vol.7,p.453.
245Annex III191,Vol.7,p.449.
24%nnex 111.217, ol. 8,p. 77.the way of positive evideilceto support his case. But Sheikh Hamad'slelter of 11December
1939does not stand alone.
6.198 It is in fact confirmed in al1ils essential details by an undated letter from Salim bin
Nasser Al-Muzaire to the Ruler of ~ahrain~~'.The content of this letter shows that the writer
is describing, withsome embellishment, thesame incident as is described in Sheikh Hainad of
Qatar'sletterZ4'.In this undated letter, Salim bin Nasser Al-Muzaire describcs the visit which
Sheikh Hamad, accompanied by three of his servants, made to IIawar. According to the
writcr, ShcilchHamad went into Hawar "fromthe side ol'Zekrit and waded through the low
tide"; he paid people Ii-omAl-Qateef to be on his side; and he met "with a group of Al-
Dowasir and a group from Oman" with whom he wrote an agreement and took finger-prints.
The writer states that "the document was taken by Bin Darwish from undcr the Sheikh's
cushion" and "sent ...to you yesterday with Bin Nisif and Bill I-Iitmi".'i'hewriter then
proceeds to give a detailed description of the physical characteristics of thc document, The
reference LuRin Darwisli liaving taken the document is suinewllat surprisingly coiifirmed
fiom British sources. In a letter from Moberly (Political Agent, Doha) to Ford of 10 April
1961 (over twenty years later), the writer reports having been inforrned, in the context of the
discussions about the seabed boundary between Qatar and Bahrain, that "the Qatar
Government archives arevery incomplete and that Abdullah Darwish is suspected of having
made off with many official Governent papers which he cannot iiow be persuaded to hand
ba~k~~'".
6.199 Tliethefi of the evidence about Hawar which the Ruler of Qatar had been collating in
the early monlhs of 1939 clearly ernbittered the Ruler and Sheikh Hamad and Ied them to
suspect the existence of a conspiracyto deprive Qatar of the Hawarislands. It is now apparent
that the thefi was organised by the smdl band of agents in Qatar acting in the interest of
Bahrain.
217
248Annex111.175V, ol. 7, p.385.
249Annex111.217,Vol.8,p. 77.
Annex 111.286,ol.8,p.421.6.200 Qatar has goiie into these details of the theft oa major part of the evidence collected
on Hawar by Sheikh Hamad of Qatar in early 1939 bccause the theft explains (a) why the
Ruler of Qatar was so anxious to securea postponement of the time-limit within which he was
required to provide his comments on the Bahrain "counter-clai~n"and (b)why the evidcnce
which the Ruler of Qatar did eventually subrnit under cover of his Ietter to Weightman cif
30 March 1939was not as compelling as it might otl~erwisehave been. In this context, it will
be recalled that, in his report to Fowlc of 22 April 1939, Wcightinan somewhat
conternptuously dismissed thevalue of the statements put in on 30 March 1939 by the Ruler
of Qatar on the following grounds:
"The value however of these latter documents is greatly diininished by the fact that the
signatures on al1ofthem are in one handwriting, unsupportedby thumb impressions or
seals of the alleged signatories.Noris anydescription of the alleged signatories given,
their place of residence or reason for having special knowledge of the Hawar
~s~ands~~~."
6.201 The criticism is wholly underminedif it is accepted that the evidence on Hawar which
had been at the disposa1of the Ruler of Qatar in the early moiiths of 1939had in fact been
stolen from the Ruler by agents acting on behalfof the Ruler ofBahrain.
B. Evidence not madeAvailable tothe BritishAuthorities
6.202 Throughout thisChapter ofthe Qatar Mernorial,and also lhroughout Chapter V, Qatar
has invoked evidence relatingto the Hawar islands which was not available, or not made
available, tothe British authorities in the GuIf or in London in 1938 or 1939. This evidence,
which is scattered over the Iwo Chapters to which reference has been made, discloses a
distasteful picture of activitiesby Belgrave and othersin the manufacture of documentary and
other evidence to sustain the claim by Bahrain to the Hawar islands. The incentive for
Belgravc and the Ruler of Bahrain was,of course, that thc Hawar islands werethought by the
oil cornpanics at the tiine to have considerable oil-bearing potelitid; had this been so, the
Ruler of Bahrain would have be~ielitedfrom a substantial inçrease in Iiis oil revenues.
Cupidity was no doubt the principal reason motivatingthc the11Ruler of Balirain. Whether
250
Annex 111.195,ol. 7,p497.otlier reasons motivated Belgrave has yet to be revealed; butthc evidence of his misdceds, to
theclear detriment of Qatar, isovenvhelming.
C. ErroneousAssum~tions and Sienificant Omissions
6.203 Qatar has identified four erroneous assumptions on whichthe 1939 Brilish decision
was or at any rate rnay have been based, together with onesignificant omission anlong the
considerations which should have been taken into account. The four erroncous assumptions
were:
1. That the Hawarislands wereopento occupationby Baluaiii in the mid-1930s;
2. That the I-Iawarislands were located fùrther off the rnainland Coastof Qatar than was
the case, and that the composition of the Hawar group was known and generdly
accepted;
3. That,even if the Hawar islandswereopen to occupation by Bahrain in the mid-1930s,
the alleged acts of sovereignty in or in relation to the Hawar islands engaged in by
Bahrain in the mid-1930sor earlier weresufficiei~tto confertitle; and
4. That title tothe smaller islands of the Hawa group neccssarily depended upon the
question of which State had titleto the main I-Iawarisfand (this was not so much an
erroneousas an exaggerated assumption).
In addition, Qatar would draw attention to one significantomission in the arguments relied on
by Bahrain in support of its clairn and by the British as an elerncnt in the decision-making
process, namely,the territorial scope of the concession grantedby Bahrain loEGS (and later
to BAPCO) in 1925. Qatar will now review these erroneous assuinpiions andsignificant
omissions seviatim. 1.Were the Hawarislands opento occupationby Bahrain in the mid-1930s?
6.204 The British decision of 1939 seems to have been based on the erroileous assurnption
that the 1-Iawargroup of islandswas open to occupation by or on behalf of Rahrain in the mid-
1930s.Occupationhas been defined as:
"...the act of appropriation by a state by which it intentionaIly acquires sov251ignty
over suçh territory as iat the time not under the sovereignty of another state .
It is further explained:
"The only territory which can be the object of occupation is that which does not
already belong to any state whether it is uninhabited, or inhabited by persons whose
community is not considered to be a state; for individuals inay live on a territory
without forming themselves into a state proper exercising sovcreignty over such
territory. The territory of any state however is obviously not a possible object of
occupation; and it can only be acquired through cession or, formcrly, by subjugation.
On the other hand, a territory whichonce belonged to a stat252b91 has been afterwards
abandaned, is a possible objectof occupation bymother state .
A fooinote to the last sentencereads:
"It should be emphasised that territory the sovereignty over whichis merely unclear,
or disputed, caimotbe regardedas terranullius."
6.205 The assumption that in (lie mid-1930s the IIawar group of islands were open to
occupation by Bahrsiin,or indeed by any State other tlian Qatar, was an unstated assumption.
A careful study of the British archives revealslittle trace oany detailed rcsearchhaving been
done by the British authorities in the Gulf or in London in the 1930sto deterinine whether
Qatar might have a prior original title to the Hawar islands so as to disable Balirain from
acquiring sovereigiity over them by occupation. In any event, it will be recalled that up until
1933the British Government had fully acceptedthat the Hawar islaiids belonged to Qatar. It
is possible that the transfer of rcsponsibility foPersian Gulf affairs from the Colonial Office
251
252nnex 111.307 ,ol. 8, p. 547.
Ibid .,.548-549.to the India Office in the early 1930smay have contributedto the lack of knowledge among
India Office officials in London of the history and geography of Qatar. including the Hawar
i~lands~~~.
6.206 Tliere is evidence tliat,during the late 1860sand thc 1870s, the BrilisliA~nbassadorin
Constantinople(then the capital city of the OttomanEmpirc) was fully aware tliat the Turkish
authorities regarded the Hawar islands as appertainingto Qatar. Tiirkish inilitary and naval
forces were presentin Qatarfrom 1871 ta 1915 and Turkish naval personnelprepared several
maps during the period from 1867 onwards sllowingthe Hawar islands to bc an integral part
of Qatar. There is also documentary evidencefrom this period and indccd from earlier times,
showing tlmtthe Hawarislandswereacknowledgedto belongto ~atasl'~.
6.207 Furthermore, there is equally evidencefrom the period between 1886 and 1891,of the
collection of levies from itinerant fishermen on Hawar on behalf of the Ruler of Qatar; and
there is also evidence dating from 1907108of a clearrecognition by thethen Ruler of Bahrain
andby othcr Bahraininationalsthat Qatarexercised sovereigiityover the Hawar islands2".
6.208 Quite apartfrom tliis, there is ample evidence, which Qatar has laidbefore the Court,
to demonstrate that most of the Rulers of neighbouring sheikhdoms in the Gulf had been
unequivocallyof the view formanyyears that theHawar islands bclongedto ~atar~~~.
6.209 Prior, in his letter of 26 October 1941,to Peel (India Office) unhesitatingly confirms
that this was the position:
"Thc view of independentArabs is that Hawar bclongs to Qatarand 1 am convinced
257II
the decision is inequitable ... .
253
254See,para. 6.148above.
Sec paras5.15 et seq.above.
255Ses,paras.5.49and6.178 elseq.above.
256See,paras.5.21etsey.,above.
257Annex 111.229,oI.8,p. f27.6.210 This vicw was shed by Alban, the successor to Weightman as Political Agent in
Bahrain. Alban expresses the following view in his note 011 the "Ownership of Hawar"
prepared in October 1941 :
"The feeling amongst impartial Arabsregardingthe ownership 011-IawarIslands isthat
258
they are apartof Qata... .
6.211 So, despite al1tlzepressure whichthe RuIcr of Rahrain and Belgrave put on the Rulers
of neighbouring sheikhdoms to support Baluain in its clash witli Qatar uver the owiiership of
the Hawar istands, none did so ovcrtly and some,such as the successiveRulers of Abu Dhabi,
expressed active disapproval of Bahrain'stakeover.
2. Compositionandlocation of the Hawar islands
6.212 As we have aiready scen, Belgrave himself was thoroughly confused as to the
composition and location ofthe Hawar islaiid~"~.
6.213 Tliroughout thc pcriod in the 1930swhen the respective claiins of Bahruinand Qatar to
the Hawar islands wereunder considerationby the British authurities in tlieGulf, there was no
agreed conclusion as to the coinpositionof the group. Even in itsforma1"counter-claim"of 22
December 1938/3 January 1939,Bahrain is vague and uncertain as to the composition of the
group, describing the IIawar islands as "..consisting of one largc island, two or three small
islands and a number of rocky islets", al1forming, acçording to Balîrain, "...a part of thc
Bahrain archipelago2"".
6.214 The COLU ? ill of course recallthat tfinal deçision ofthe Brilish Governmeiit,which
was conveyed to the Rulers of Ral~rainand Qatar by identical letlei-sfrom the Political
Resident of 11 July 1939,refcrs simply to prcvious correspondcnce "on the subject of thc
owncrship of the Hüwar Islands"aiid then goes on to süy that:
258
25iincx IIi.228, Vol.p. 123.
260ee, paras6.146etseq.ahove.See,also,MapNo. 9 facingp. 145.
Anncx 111.174, ol7, p. 371. "... after careful consideration of the evidence adduced by [thc two Rulers], they [the
British Government] have decided thatthese Islaids belong to the State of Bahrain
261 11
and not to the State of Qatar .
6.215 The Court will note that there is no definition in this decision of what are the islands
and islets which constitute "the Hawar Islands".This is perhaps not al1that renlarkable, given
that the British autlioritiesin the Gulf in 1939 were remarkably ignorant of the geography of
the group. Thus, on 4 July 1939, only one week before the British decision oii thc Hawar
islands was çonveyed to the Rulcrs of Bahrain and Qatar, thc Secretary of State for lndia
requested the Political Resident (Fowle)to make proposals "... (accompanied by a detailed
sketch map) as to the line of division which should be drawn betwcen the territories and
territorial waters of Bahrain and of Qatar in the area affected2"2".This obvinusly occasioned a
certain aniount of panic among British officiaisin the Gulf. Weightmanreported to Fowle on
22 July 1939:
"No maps 263c11rts exist showingthe locationof the Hawar Jslands with any degree of
accuracy .
6.216 Weightman tlienindiçated to Fowlethat he had made an unofficial enquiry of the RAF
unit at II-Iabbaniya(in Iraq) as to whetherthey could make a photographie map of the FIawar
islands and the adjacent coast, and had been informed that photographs could betaken within
six week~~~!In fact, photographs werenot taken until early in 1940because of the outbreak
of war in Europe; and, becausc of the small scale of the photographs, no inap büsed on them
was ever constructed.
6.217 There was also some uncertainty in the 1930s as to the precise localion of the Hawar
islands, and more particularlyas to the distancebetweenthe nearest island of the IHawargroup
andthe mainland of Qatar.The fact thatmany of the islets in the Hawar group lie within three
miles of the main Qatar coast is however implicit in the statement made in paragraph 4 of
Weightinan'sreport of 22April 1939,on the rcspectiveclüiins of Bahrain and Qatar that "...at
2b1Annexes 111.208and 111.209,ol. 8, pp. 37 and41
262AnLiex111.207V, ol. p.33.
263
Annex 111.210V, ol8, p.45.
'" IIid.low springs it is possible ...to wade from the Qatar mainland to a certain point on the main
MawarIsland in about three feet of ~ater~~'"and was later expresçly adrnittcd in paragraph 4
of Weightman's letter to Prior of 3 July 1940'~'. Yet dcspite the statement made in
paragraph 4 of Weightman's report of22 April 1939, we find Hemingway (India Office)
miiiuting on 12 May 1939,that " ...the islands are separated by ..!ivemilcs (more than three)
of shallow water from the mainland ...267".It is almost as if Herni~lgwayhad not fully
absorbed Weightman's report and was relying simply on the description in Lorimer's
Guzetteev of thePersian Gulf(1907) whereHawar is describedas 1ying:
268 19
"Ducwest of the point of Ras Abunik and about 5miles hm it .
6.218 So also, in "A Handbook of Arabia" prepared by the War Staff Intelligence Divisioiiof
the Adn~iraltyin May 1916, Hawar is referredto as follows:
"An island, Jezirah Hawar, lies 5miles W. of Ras Aburuk onthe W.coast, with which
it is roughly parallel; itis about 10miles long, and has no perinanent population, but
the Dawasir of Zdlaqin Bahrein havehouses used as shooling-boxcs in winter, and a
cistern for rain-water.The islets Rubadh and Janan liero N. and S. of Hawar, those of
2691,
Ajirah and Suwad in thecharnel between itandthe mainland .
6.219 The point is of course tliat 1-Iawarisland does lie due west off thc point of Ras Aburuk
and about five miles from it, so that the descriptions in Lorimer and "A Handbook of Arabia"
are not inaccurate in themselves; they areactiveIymideading, however, if they are interpreted
as meaning that the point of Ras Aburukis the nearest point to Hawar islaiidon the mainland
coast of Qatar. The nearest point lies furthcr soutli on the maiiiIünd fiom where, as
Weightman (to his credit) reported on 22 Aprii 1939, it is possible at1ow springs to wade out
to E-Iawairn about three feet of water. None of the ofiicials in London, liowevcr, appearedto
appreciatc the significanceof the fact that rnany of the islands and isletsiiithe Hawar group,
including about half of Hawar island itself, lay within three miles ofthe mainland coast of
Qatar. The misleading descriptionsin Lorimer and in the Admiraltypublication "AHandbook
265
266Annex 111.195V, ol7,p.497.Se, alsoMup Nu. 5Facingpage 50,and para.4.5 ,bove.
267Aniiex111,222V,ol.8,p.99.
Anncx IlI.203, Vol.8, 13.
268Annex11.4, Vol.3,p. 120.
269Annex 111.296V,ol. 8p.483.of Arabia" could have led the unwary to believe that tlie 1-Iawargroup of islands lay wholly
outside what was then the territorial sea of Qatar and indeed much closer to Bahrain than in
fact is the case2".
6.220 It waçnot untir 1947,when the BritishGoverrunentiiotifiedto the Rulers ol'Qatar and
Bahrainthe division of the seabed between their respectiveterritories, that a line was drawn
on a map to illustratethe islands and islets belongiiigto the IIawar group. Janan was excluded
because it lay outside the line within which the Hawar group was situatcd.
6.221 This vagueness as to thc compositionand location of the Hawar group cifislands in the
years between 1936and 1939would in itself be a factor which could lead to Ille invalidation
of the 1939decision onthe groundsof the uncertaintyofthe determinationmade.
3. Were the alleged acts of sovereignty inor in relation to the Hawar islands, engaged in
by Bahrain inthe mid-1930sor earlier, sufficientto confertitle, on the assumption that
the islandswere open to occupation at thc time?
6.222 Weightman and his superiors, both in the Gulf and in London, appear to have
proccedcd on the assumption that the alleged actsof sovereignty carried out by Bahraiil in or
in relation to the Hawar islands in the mid-1930s or earlier were sufficicnt to conkr title on
Bahrain. This was of course on the unstated, but rnistaken, assumption that the Hawar islands
were capable of appropriationby Bahrain in the 1930s.Let us assume, howcver, fortlie sake
of argument, that the Hawar islands were so capable of appropriation. in this hypothetical
situation, would the acts performedby Bahrain in or in relation to the Hawar islandsin the
mid-1930s or earlier havebeen sufficientto confer title?
a) Beaconingof the islands andislets of the Hawar group
6.223 It is known that Belgrave made arrangements for the placcrnent of beacons on a
number of islands and isletsin the Hawar groupduringthe wintcr of 1937/38. The note on the
Hawar islands attached to the Balirain "preliminary statenient" delivered by Belgrave to
270
But notcthat both Weightinan and Fowlwere fullyawareofthe presuinptionthat ail islsituated
within the three-mileIiiiiitof territorial of a Statbelongcd to thaState,iithe light of their expcrience
withthe Lubainah islandssec,para.5.73, above.Weightman on 29 May 1938,and carefully concealed from the Ruler of ~atar*~l,gives, in
paragraph 1, a description of the beacons. Belgrave'sbelief in the efficacy of beaconing as a
mode of acquiring territory was to prove somewliat short-lived. It was forcefully denied by
Prior, who stsited,in his letterto Peelof 26 October 194 1 :
"The method of clairning rcefs by erecting cairns and marks is totally foreign to Arab
seiltirnentand practiceand littleweight shouldbe attachedto it 272.,
6.224 More importantly, however,this Court, in the Minquiers and Ecrehoscase, attached iio
legal signifieance to the placing of beacons as evidence of the exercise of sovercignty. How
this issue arose is explained in the followingpassage from the Judgment:
"The French Government further contends that since 1861 it has assumed the sole
charge of the lighting and buoying of the Minquiers for n-iorethan 75 yeas, without
having encountered any objection from the United Kingdom Government. The buoys
were placed outside the reefs of the group and purported to aid navigation to and froln
French ports and protect shipping against the dangerous reefs of the Minquiers. ln
1888 a French mission, appointed to make a hydrographie sui-veyof the islets, erected
27311
provisional beacons on severalofthern to facilitatethe survey .
The Court thereupon proceeds to disregard these acts as evidence of French sovereigi~tyover
the Minquiers:
"The Court does not find that the facts, invoked by the French Government, are
sufficient lo show that France bas a valid title to the Minquiers. As to the above-
mentioned acts from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in partiçular, including the
buoying outside the reefs of the group, suchacts can hardly be considered as sufficient
evidence of the intention of that Government 10 act as sovcreign over the islets; nor
are those acts of such a character thut ~hey cun 274eiionsidered us i~tvolvinga
maniJkstation ufState auiho~ifyinrespecl ofthe islets .
6.225 It would seem therefore that the beaconing of the islets of the Hawar groiip on
Belgrave's instructionsin 1937/38can be disregarded as a manifcstalian of Bahraini authority
in respect of the Hawar group.
27LAiinex 111.158,Vol7,p.291.
272Annex111.229V , ol.8,p127.
2731.C.J Reporf.1953, p.70.
274Iliidp. 71;emphasis added. b) The occupation of the HawarisIands by subjects of Bahrain
6.226 The claim by Bahrain that the Hawarislands,and particularlythe maiil 1-Iawarisland,
werc "pcrmancntlyoccupied in the 1930sby subjects of Bahrain hasi~owbeeil shown to be a
complete fabrication. The evidence of the alleged "permanent occupation" of IIsiwar by
mcmbcrs of thc Dowasir tribehas been so underminedby the revc~ations~~t~ l-iatit can safely
be ignorcd. It is simply no longer to be believed that the Dowasirhad been in permanent
occupationof Hawar for manyyears.
c) The slleged exerciseofjurisdiction by the courts of Bilhrain
6.227 Much weight is put by Bahrain onthe twojudgments rendered by the Sharia court in
Bahrain in the years 1909 and 1910 to settle disputes coiicerning immovablc property in
Hawar. Reference is made to them in paragraph 11 of the Bahrain "counter-claim", and
translations of the two judgments are attached to tlie "counter-~lairn"~~~A . S already
ii~dicated~~Q ~,atar has serious doubts about the authenticityof bothjudgments when account
is taken of the extraordinaryletter of 1December 1939fiom Sharqbin Ahmed (the Qadi who
wrote bot11judgments of 1909 and 1910) to the former Residcncy Agent in the Trucial
states2'! Whether or not these doubts are justified, the judgments tliemselvesprovide no
evidence that any of the litigants were permanently, or even principally, resident in Hawar;
and it will be recalled that Prior,in his letterto Pcel of 26 October 1941, was ilot prepared to
attach any real weightto these supposed exercisesofjurisdiction by theBahrain courts.
6.228 The other cases cited by Baluain as evidence of thc cxercise of jurisdiçtion by the
Bahrain courts in relation to~natterson Hawar arcequally inconclusive.Tliereis, for example,
Case No. 264/1351 of 1932, which appears to have been a claim by one Bahraini subject
against another Bahraini subject for a debt sccured agaiilst a mortgage. The only connection
with Hawar is that the defendant was supposedly livingin Hawür and did not appear iii
27'Annexes 111.77-111.V,ol. 6, pp.401-412; Annex111.1, ol.7, p199;and Atilie111.223V,ol.8,
p. 103.
276AnilexIII.174,Vol.7, p.371.
277,Teepara.6.173, above.
278
Annex111,215,Vol. 8p.69.response to leHersaddressed to hi~n~'~ .elgrave hirnselfadmits, in his letter to Weighmian of
20 April 1939, that the case concerned property in 13ahrain2'! Belgrave appears to have
thought that the service of process by a Bahrain court on a defendant supposcdlyresident in
Hawar constituted an act evidencing Bahraini sovereignty over Hawar. But this is self-
evidently iiol so. Sumrnonses to appear before a foreign court are regularly served in
practically al1jurisdictions, without it being thoughtthat such a summons constitiites evidence
that the territoryin which it is served forms part of the territory of the State whose court has
issued the summons.
6.229 Even if these two cases rested on the facts as described by Belgrave and Weightman,
they provide no support to the Bahrain claimto sovereignty overHawar. Moreover, Belgrave
adrnits that the Bahrain court which decidedCase No. 264/1351 of 1932 consisted of the
Ruler of Bahrain and himself?", so that the evidence, such as itis, does nnt eveii come tkorn
an independent source.
4.Title to the smaller islands of the Hawar group
6.230 Under sub-section 2 ab~ve~'~Q , atar has already reviewed the evidencedernonstrating
that the British authorities inthe Gulfand in London had no clcar idea in 1938139either of the
composition or of tlie exact locationof the Hawar islands. Their ignorance wasequalled only
by their prcdisposition to give them to Bahrain in view of tlie supposed advantages which
would accrue to Britain from sucha decision.
6.231 It is interesting, if not altogether surprising, that nonneof the evidence submitted to
Weightman in 1938/39by the Ruler of Qatar, on the one hand, and by Bclgrave, on the other
hand, related to islands or islets in the Hawar group othcrthan Hawar island itself, at least if
one ignores the evidence of beacoiiingby Bahrain: and tliis evidence should be ignored in any
*'?ee, noteattacheto Bahrain"cuunter-clair"tAniiex111.174, ol.7, p.371.
Annex 111.183,ol.7,p.489.
281ibid.
282See, para6.212 et seq., above.event because Bahrainls "preliminary statement" in which this evidence is embodied was
never conveyed to ~atar"~.
6.232 Weightinan, in his report to Fowle summing up the strengths and weaknesses of the
respective clairns to the Bawar islands by Qatar and Bahrain, offers, as a thow-away
suggestion (it is the final sentencein hisreport),the followingproposal:
"The small barren and uninhabited islands and rockyislets which form the complete
Hawar group presumably fa11to the authority of the Ruler establishing himself in tlie
Hawar main island, ar$84ularly since marks have beeli erected on al1of them by tlie
Bahrain Govenunent ."
6.233 This isprirnu.faciean attractive propositionfor which there mighl appear to be some
support in intcrnational law. Thus, in the Island of Palmus case, the sole arbitrator, Judge
Huber, in liis award states:
"As regards groups of islands, it is possible that a group may under certain
circurnstancesbe regarded as in law a unit, andthat the fate of the principal part may
285II
involve the rest .
6.234 Of course, for reasons given earlier, one would have to ignore the reference to
beaconing in Weightman's formulation, andit is significant that .ludgeHuher's dictum is less
absolute than Weightman's (note the use ofthe phrases 'litis possible" and "under certain
circumstances"). The fact is that there is no evidence of human activities on islands ofthe
group other than Hawar island.
6.235 Even if, at thc abstract levcl, there is some force in Weiglitinan'sformulation (subject
to the qualifications just made),the Court will not need to be reminded tliat if, as Qatar
submits, Qatar liad an original title tothe Hawar group of islands dütiilgfrom the ninetcenth
century, and that title had not bccn displacedby the 1930s,tke Hciwcir group werenot capable
of being appropriated by Bahrain in the mid-1930s on the basis of what was in any event
283
Sec,paras.6.77etseq.,above.
285nnexIII.195, Vol,7,p.497.
Annex 111.292,Vol. 8, p.459.spurious and manufactured evidence of activities by alleged subjects of Bahrain on the main
Hawar island.
6.236 It would be wrong to conclide this section dealing with "Erroiieous assumptions and
significant omissions" without making reference to the most glaring omission in tlie case
which Balirain was seeking to develop in the mid-1930s for recognition of its sovereignty
over Hawar. That omission is of course tlie inference wliich necessarily has to be drawn from
the failure of Bahrain to place reliance on the oil concession awarded by the Ruler of Bahrain
to the Eastern and General SyndicateLtd. ("EGS")on 2Deceinber 1925.Tl-ieconcession was
to explorethroughout the Ruler of Bahrain's territoriesand to prospcct foroil in selected areas
thereof. It would be thought that if, as Bahrain was subsequently to claiin, successiveRulers
of Bahrain had exercised sovereign authority in and over tlieHawar islands since shortly after
1783 (as is asserted in Ba1irain1s prcliminary statement of 29 May 193&),tl~erewould have
been no doubt that the concession to explore "throughout the Ruler's territory" (but not of
course the concession to prospect) would have been taken as applying to the Hawar islands.
But this is not so. There was no suggestion in 1925 that any part of the 1925 concession
applied to the Hawar islands. The concession to EGSwas assigned to the Bahrain Petroleum
Company (BAPCO),with the agreementof the British authorities, in the late 1920s.
6.237 Section 1.B.i of this ~lia~ter~~g ~ives details of the negotiations over the so-called
"Bahrain uiiallotted area" and provides convincing evidençe that, neither in 1928 (wlien the
negotiatioiis began) nor in 1933 (when they were suspended at the request of BAPCO), did
the British authorities in London accept that the Hawar islmds formed part of the territories
controlled by the Ruler of~alirain~~~.
6.238 One can well understand why Bahrain should have neglccted to base any argument oii
its 1925oil concession and the subsequentnegotiations over the so-called "Bahrain unallotted
area". For Bahrainto concede that the Hawar islands did not in principle fa11within the Ruler
of Bahrain'stcrritories available for exploration imder the 1925concession would be wholly
inconsistent with the argument that the Rulerof Bahraiilhad cxerçised sovcreignty over them
286
287ee,paras.6.12,ctscy.,above.
Sm, alsopara.6.148,abovesincc 1783;andyet to argue in the oppositesense might be todeny the opportunity ta Balnain
of profiting from anew concession if the British authorities were to award the Hawar islands
to Bahrain.
Section 4. The Non-O~~osabilitvto Oattirof thc 1939 Decision
A. Protests by Qatar
6.239 Attention has already been drawn to the eiiergeticprotest lodged by the Rulcr of Qatar
on 4 August 1939 against the British Government's dccisionof 11July 1939 upholding the
claim of Bahrain to the Hawar is~ands~~' I.ts terms are moderate, but firrn.The Ruler asks for
the question to be reconsidered. Althoughthe new PoIiticaI Resident was convinced that an
injustice had been done to Qatar, he feIt reluctantly obligedto accept tl~ait was not practical
politics to reversc the 1939 de~ision~'~A . ccordingly, the Ruler ol'Qatar was infarrned, in
reply to his protest of 4 August 1939, that the matter could not be reopened. This provoked
another letter, of 18 November 1939, from the Ruler of Qatar to the Political Resident
reiterating his protest and affirming his positioninthe followingternis:
"1tlierefore beg to inform Your Honour that I neitl-ierrecognize nor submit that the
Bahrain Government have the leastlawful connectioi~with the Hawar Islands, and that
1view whatever measui-ewhich have been 1atcIytakeii hy the Balirain Government as
a çliallenge and an eiicroachrnent upon my rights against whicll 1 most strongly
protest,and iherefore,as 1have inforrnedyou beforc, I reserve n-iyrights to the Hawar
islaiidswhile not recognising any measure which may bctaken in thein...90.,
6.240 TheRuler of Qatar repeated hisprotest against the British Goveriiineiit's1939decision
oii tlie Hawar islands in a further letter addressedto the Political Agent in Bahrain on 7 June
1940, which complained also of a recent raid on the inaiilland of Qatar launclied from
~awar'". It should bc notcd that the protests of the Ruler of Qatar wcre not confined to
Balirain's defacto occupationof, and prcsenceon, the main Hawar island. As carly as 27 May
288
287Annex 111.21,Vol. 8, 49.
290See,para6.108,above.
211Anncx 111.213,Vol8, p.59.
Annex 111.19,Vol. 8, p. 85.1938,the Ruler of Qatar, in a letter of protest to Weightman against Bahraiii activities in and
in relation to the Hawar group of islands stated inter dia:
"It is a clear fact that the islands of Hawar are stilla depcndeiicy of Qatar as other
similar islüiids.The Bahrain Govemment have only recently occupied themwhich fact
made me move in the matter and subrnitprotests agaiiistit 292.ii
6.241 In paragraph 5 of the same letter, the Ruler of Qatar specifically requcsts the British
Governmcnt "... to note this coinplaint and restrict the Balvain Governinent from unlawful
interfercnce in the rights of others as far as there is no legal ground cinwhich they can base
suchacts". The Court will note the dignityandmoderation of this requzst.
6.242 The Riiler of Qatar'sprotests against the 1939decision of d1eBritish Govcrnment on
Hawar did not abruptly terminate in 1940. His continuing sense of grievancc against the
injustice of this decision manifested itself again in 1946 when, in a letier to the then Political
Agent in Bahrain (Lt.-Col. Galloway) of 13 JuIy 1946,in response to an eenquirywhether he
claimed Fasht Dibal or Qit'atJaradah, he renewed his claim to sovereignty over the Hawar
isIandç and his protest against the 1939British decisiot~~~~ H.c did so yet again in a letter of
21February 1948,to the Political Agent. In this letter, the Rulcr of Qatar did not question the
right of the British Government to make the decision on dclimitation of the seabed between
Bahrain and Qala wwhich it had conveyed to the two parties on 23 Deccmber 1447. But he
went on to say that "14.M.'~ Govemment acted as they wished, and1 I-iadnothing but to
submit, reserving in the meantirne to myself my own rightç2"". The Ruler was however
particularly incensed that thc Hawar islands and Fasht Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah which he
considered to be an integral part of the territories of Qatar had been awarded to Bahrain.
Although the use by the Rulcr of Qatar of the word "subrnit" might, if' that word is taken
alone, suggest that he had corne to accept the 1939 decision, this is clearly not its meaning
when read iii the context of the rest of the letter. The word conveys not the seiise of voluntary
acceptailcebut of incapacity to procure a reversal of whathad been decided.
292Annex 111.57,Vol.7, p.285;emphasisadded.
293Annex111.245 V,ol.8,p.203.
294Annex 111.259, ol.8, p. 277.6.243 lt is arnplyclear fiom these continuousprotests by the Ruler of Qatar against the 1939
decision of the British Government on the Hawar islands that atno time did l-ieacquiesce in
the award of the islands to Bahrain. He was absolutely and resolutely consisteiit in asserting
that the decision was unjust, and he repeatedly asked for its reconsideration. This was no
synthetic outrage: it was a deeplyfelt sense of betrayal.
B. Rccognitiunby the British Governmentthat the Hawar ishnds werc disnuted
6.244 Tl-ie 1947 decision of the British Government on the delimitation of tlie seabed
between Bahrain and Qatar was protested by both Rulers. Tlie Ruler of Qatarwas prepared in
principle to acccpt the line drawn by the British but, as we have seen, could not accept the
exceptions made forthe Hawar islands and the two shoals of Fasht Dibal and Qit'atJaradah.
By way of contrast,the Ruler ofBahrain contended thatthe Lineshould run filrtheto the east
of the line proposed by the British, and generally asserted allcged riglits Loal1the seas, shoals
and reefs between Balirain and Qatar. In particular, he protested against the fact thatthe two
shoals had bcen treated as enclaves on the Qatarside of the line. He also protested against the
fact that Janan island,which liesjust to the south of the main 1-Iawarisland, had been awarded
to Qatar, although he regarded it as part of the Hawargroup and accordingly as appertainiiig
to Bahraiil.
6.245 Tliere were lùrther protests from the two Rulers in the early 1950s and also from the
oil companies tl~ernselves.There is soine evidence in the British archives that Britishofficiais
were prepared to look again at the real geographical nature and legal status of the two shoals
and at thc precise identity of the "Hawar islands"; but no modification was made to either of
the two dccisions of 1939 and 1947,and the British rcpcatedlyconfirmed that these decisions
were final.
6.246 The dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over the Hawar islands and the two shoals of
Fasht Dibal and Qit'atJaradah became rather more quiescent in the 1950s asa result of the
preoccupation of both Rulers with other maritime boundary disputes (in the case of Bahrain,
with Saudi Arabia; and, in the case of Qatar, with Abu Dhabi). Sci il was not until the 1960s
that any fi~rthcrprogress was made on the principal disputes over the Hawar islands, Fasht
Dibal and Qit'atJaradah, and tlie course oftlie 1947line. In 1964.thc Political Agent in Qatartransmitted to the Qatari authorities Bahrain'srequest to the Britis1.iGovernment to make a
modification to the 1947line, based upon the consideration that tlie two shods were islands
with territorial waters and belonged to Bahrain, and that Balirain'shistorical rights to pearl
fisheries in the area to thc eastof the 1947line were a "special çircuinstance"justiSiing, in the
tems of Article 6 of the 1958Geneva Conventiol-ion the Coiitiiieiital Shelt; a departure fiom
that ~ine~'~.
6.247 On being informed of the Bahrain request, Qatar, in a Note to the British C ~overnrnent
of 21 April 1965, refuted the Bahraini allegations and recommended ubitration as a solution
to the disputes between the two States. Qatar also insisted that the dispute over the Hawar
islands, w1iicl.ihad not been mentioned by Bahrain,should be included among the disputes to
be referred to arbitration.
6.248 'I'hcCourt will be aware of subsequentdevetopments from the writtcn pleadings which
Qatar submitted in the earlier phase of the present case devoted to jurisdiction and
adrnissibi~it~~~!Qatar simply wishes to stress at this stage that the ready acceptance by the
British Governrnent in 1965166that the differences between Bahrain and Qatar over the
Hawar islands, the two shoals of Fasht Dibal and Qit'atJaradah, and the course of the 1947
line, were suitable for reference to arbitration constitutcs an acknowledgement that there was
at least a genuine issue as to the validity and correctncss of Ille 1939British decision on the
Hawa islands. In other words, the British Government were at last prcpared to allow that
decision to be reviewed by animpartial internationaltribunal.
Section 5.Conclusion
6.249 Oii 11 July 1939, the Rulers of Qatar aiid Bahrain were informed of the British
decision that thc Hawar islanclsbelongcd to Bahrain. As has been showiiabove, l~ciwevert,hat
decision was defective both procedurallyand on the inerits, and is not opposable to Qatar.
295
296Sec,paras. 10.37esey.,below.
For turthedetails, seQ.M.J.A.,Vol. 1paras. 3.0et seq.6.250 First, the British Governrnenthad no authority to makea bindingdecision of this kind.
As in the Dubui/SharjuhBorder case, no treaty autliorised the Britishto make the decision,
and Qatar did not give its consent to the detemination by the British authorities of whetlier
title to the IIawar islands belonged to itself or Balxain. Indeed, Qatar'scommunications witli
the British on the subject at the time were directed towards endingtlie illegal occupation of
Hawar by Bahrain.
6.251 Furthermore, the procedure followedby the British was so defectivc that the resulting
decision cm only be considered anullity. Qatar was not given a propcr andequal opportunity
to present its case; there were clear instances of bias, both by Brilain generally and by
Weightrnanin particular, in favour of Bahrain; and no reasons weregiven for the decision.
6.252 The substance of the British decisionis equallyflawed. 'Thcdecision was clearly based
on the report prepared by Weightman,wl-iichin turn was bascd on various assertions madc by
Belgrave which were either unsupported bÿ evidence at the tiine csr were supported by
evidence wliichhas now been proven tobe highly suspector demonstrably false. In addition,
evidence wliich could have beenput fonvard by Qatar in support of its case, aiid which Qatar
intended to putforward, was stolenby agents of Bahrain.
6.253 Furthermore, the British seem to have based their deçisioil on several erroneous
assumptions. First, disregardingal1evidence of recognition ofQatar'slitle to the islands since
the 1860s,and the fact that until at least 1933the British authorilieshad consistently taken the
position that thc Hawar islands belongcdto Qatar, they seem tohave assumed that in the mid-
1930s the islands were open to occupation. Second, eveii if, urguendo, tlie islands had been
open to occupation, the alleged acts of sovereignty upoii which Bahrain relied were
insufficient to establish title, were unsupportedby evidence, or were supported by fabricated
evidence. Third, the Britisli appeared to believe, erroneously, that tllicislands iay beyoiid the
3-mile liinit of Qatar'sterritorial sea. Fourth, tliey assumed that title to the smaller islands of
the group - the coniposition of which was not defined, and of which Bclgrave himself was
unsure - should automalically Collowtitle to the main Hawar isl,and.Finally, the British were
guilty of a significant omission in failing to take into consideration thc fact that Bahrain's
1925 oil coiiccssionclearly did notincludcthc Hawar islailds.6.254 The reactions of Prior and Alban,respectively the new Political Resident and Political
Agent in Bahsain wlio took up their posts shortly after the 1939 dccision was issued, are
telling. Both oftlcials expresscd gravedoubts over thejustice of the dccision, Priorexpressing
the opinion that a grave miscarriage of justice had ttakenplace, and bot11voicing serious
doubts as to the validity of Rahrain's case. However, allhough they clexly felt tliat the
decision should be reopened, it was finally allowcd lo stand for reasoils or political
expcdiency .
6.255 Finally, the 1939decision is unopposable to Qatar. It was immediately protested and
lias never been accepted by Qatar, and the British recognised, before they lefi the Gulf, that
the questiail of'the Hawar islands was disputed and could be reopcned. It is Qatar'sposition,
therefore, Ihat the1939 decision cannot be regarded as adversely affecting in any way Qatar's
long-established and well-recognised sovereignty overthe 1-Iawarislands. CHAPTERVI1
JANANISLAND
Section1.The Geography
7.1 Janan is an island approximately 700metres long and 175rnetrcs wide situated off the
southwestern tip of the main Hawar island'.The island is located 2.9 nauticalmiles or 5,360
metres hm the nearest point on Qatar's lowwater line and 17nautical miles fiam the nearest
point of Bahrain (Ras al Barr). Its coordinates are as follows: 25O33'20"and 50°44' Et.is
separated from Bahrain's main island and the coast of Saudi hrabia by tlierelatively deep
water of the Gulf of Salwah which is over 20 metres deep in places, much deeper than the
waters separating Jananand mainland Qatar at Ras Dukhan which do not excecd 1.5metres at
the lowest astronomical tide. It is located 1.6nautical miles or 2,890 metrcs from the main
Hawar island. The coralline area of the island as a whole is aligned (approximately
NNE/SSW)with the generaltrend of Hawarisland and is separatcd from the latter by a very
shallow sea of no morethan approximately2.0rnetres atthe lowest astronomical tide.
7.2 At high tide Janan island appears as a long low reef rising abovc the sea, comprised of
sand and coral. It is "dry at dl tides at its western end,driesout a long way towards the
mainland"'. It has no water supplyiiorany hurnansettlements. A beacon has been constructed
on the island, sumounted bya Qatari flag.
7.3 Janan has no geornorphologicalconnections at al1with Bahrain. On the otlier hand, in a
slightly broader context,Janan canbe seen as acomponent of the offshore topography andthe
nearshore dynamic system associatedwith the Qatarcoast.
Section2. Janan and Qatar's TerritorialInte~ritv
7.4 It is the submission of the State of Qatar that the evidence described in Chapter V, in
particular the Turkish survey maps (coveringthe territorieof Qatar) and their acceptance by
1
2See,Map No. 5facingpage50.
Annex 111.24V,ol. p.219. Thereis Iittleavailable dataon Janan islandothat providby
satelliteimages and the AdmiChart(No.2886).the British, as also references to Janan in tlîe letters of the Rulcrs of Abu Dhabi and the
various maps, clearly establishes that Janan,as much as the wliole group of the Hawar islands,
is a part of Qatar territory. Consistent with al1this evidençe, Lorimer, in his geographical
dictionary of the Gulf, also described Janan (ashe does the Hawarislands) under tlie heading
"West side of ~ûtar"'.
Section 3. Bahrain'sClaim isUnfuunded
7.5 Most of the reasons given in this Mernoriai to show that tlîe Hawar islaiids belong lo
Qatar also apply to Janan. However, in this Section, it will be shown, by considering the
reasons why Janan hasbecome an issue of dispute in the present proceedings, how some of
the important reasons for which the British decided in 1947that Janan belonged to Qatar also
apply to the other islands in the Hawar group.
7.6 At the time when the British Government began its considerdion of proposals to delimit
the maritime boundary (eventually notified in its decision of 23 Dccember 1947), it was
realised that the composition of the group referred to as the Hawar islands had never been
addressed when the decision was made on 11 July 1939 to the cffect that these islands
belonged to Bahrain.The letter containingthis decision simply declares tlîat "onthe subject of
the ownership of the Hawar Islands ...His Majesty's Government ...have decided that these
islands belong to the State of Bahrain and not to the State of Qatar". It is significant to note
thereforethat the British authoritiesat the time were ignorant of the arca whose fatc they were
deciding. In fact, the decision appears to have been made only on the basis of whatever
evidence Bahrain tendered to prove its "occupation" of the main Hawar island without any
reference to the other islandsorislets4.
7.7 While analysing details of the area for the purpose of considering the maritime boundary,
in his letter of 31 December 1946, the Political Agent statcd that each of tlîe islaiids had not
been individually considered at tlie time Hawar was allotted to 13alirain5.IJnspecified islands
had been allotted to Bahrain simply because they were "assuined" to forin a group and so
3Lorimer, op.citAnnex 11.4,Vol3,p, 121.
4ExceptBahrain's claim ohaving placedbeacoilsonsome of theseScle,paras.6.41et seabove.
5
See, Annex 111,249,ol.8, p219.awarded to Bahrain together with the main Hawar island. He furtlier pointed out that the
Bahrain Governmenthad submitted:
"...at least three conflicting statements of the coinposition of the 'groiipl.In August,
1937,it was stated that there were nine islands in tlie Hawar archipelago, iii t938 their
list included 1-Iawarand 16islands or groups of islets, and in 1946the list comprised
Hawar and 17~."
7.8 Even as late as 1946,officiais inthe British Goveiment wcrc still unclear about the
composition and extent of the Hawargroup. Tlius,the Secretaryof State forIndia noticed the
situation in his letter o3 August 1946to the Political Resident whcn he said:
"...the exact extent of the Hawar Islands (i.e. the off-lying Islets and their territorial
waters) never seemsto have been accurately defined7."
EvenLorimer, accordingto the PoliticalAgent:
la...did not know of a 'group',and only mentionsfour in the area individually8."
He further notes:
"It will be seen how vague the conception of the group is, üild aiso how it has
inçreased in sizewith the growingimportanceof the area9."
7.9 At the time of the considerationof delimitation of the maritime boundary, it was the 1938
list, sent with Belgrave's "preliminary statement" of 29 May 1938'O, which carne to be
regarded as the specific list on the basis of which the decision or 1 1July 1939was madc. In
his letter of31December 1946, the Political Agent iioted(inparagrapl~9) tliat:
6 Ibid. See, also, Belgrave's letter of 28 April 1936 wheBahrainçlaiined "theI.Iawargroup of
islands" and named7 specific islands (including "Ginan")"as well as a numbsinallislets" (Annex III.103,
Vol. 7,p.15).
7See Annex 111.246 ,ol. 8,p.207.
8See Annex 111.249 ,ol.8,p.219.
Ibid.
'OSec,paras.6.149 etseq. "The 1938list was submitted in connection with the Hawar xbitratioil, and 1 propose
to take that as their considered clai~n,particulariyas no explanations Iiave ever been
given for changes."
Hewent on to state (inparagraph 14):
"Jananis shown on charts andplans as a piinple of an islaiid, but, in fact, atlow tide it
shows a long low reef rising above the sea. It is dryalal1tides at its western end, and
dries out a long way towards themainland. It has not becn surveyed,but to the layrnan
it appears to be part of the Ras Awainat Ali featrire, and completely separate from
Hawar. The islmd is barren, but is used by Bahraiii fishcrmen, and 1 dare Say by
Qataris on occasions. It has neither water nor habitation, and beyond the erection of a
cairn by the Bahrain Governrnent 1 know of no justification for their claim to
ownership. The erection of a cairn should, in rny opinion, bc given but litlle
consideration since it was not included in the Bahrain Government's 1938list. Further
the eastern half of the island Iies within Qatar territorial waters and south of the deep
water channel which runs close to Janan and not Hawar. For these reasons, 1am of the
opinion that itis not and should not be considered to be a mcmber of thc 'group'and
shouId beawarded to Qatar and included in [sic t]eir side of the dividing line"."
7.10 The Politicai Resident endorsed the above views in a letter of 18 Jaiuary 1947 to the
Secretary of State for 1ndia12.These views were eventually accepted, and hencc in tlie letters
of 23 December 1947it was specifically stated:
"It shouldbe noted that Janan Island is not regarded as being inçluded in the islands of
the Hawar group13."
Bahrain disputesthis conclusion.
7.11 It is reiterated that Janan was iany event one of the islmds clearly fonning part of the
territories of Qatar, and some of the grounds on the basis of which the British made their
decision regarding Janan applied equalIyta the I-Iawarislands as a whole, in particular, that it
was part of the Ras Awainat Ali feature and that a Iarge part of itis located wiiliin thrce
1I
12Ihid.
Annex 111.250,ol. 8, p.233.
l3Annexes 111.25and 111.257, ol8,pp.265 and 269.ilautical miles of the coast of Qatar (as is the main Hawar island) while somc of the other
islands/islets are wholly within three miles of Qatar's mainland coüst. Bahrain's clairn to
Janan (as also to the Hawar islands) is tliereforeunfoundcd. Qatar accordiilgly submits that
Bahrain has no sovcreignty or otherterritorial right over thc island of Janan. CHAPTERVIE1
THEQUESTIONOF ZUBARAH
8.1 Zubarah is one of the subject matters ofthe dispute which fa11within the jurisdiction of
the Court in the present proceedings. Inthe absence of any knowledgc of the Bahraini case on
Zubarah, Qatar has prepared this Chapter of its Memorial 011 the basis of its understanding
that Bahrain defines its claim conceming Zubarahas a clairnof sovereigntyl.
Section 1.Presentatiao ofZubarah
8.2 Zubarah is located on the northwestern coast of Qatar at the CO-ordinatesof latitude
26" North and longitude 51°1 E'ast. As may be seen from Mup No. 10 facing this page,
Zubarah was a fortified town. Themost ancient part of the town was on the coast itsclf with a
surrounding wall and towers along this wall. Another ancient part, builtoutside this first wali,
was also surrounded by a wall along which were guard towers atintervals. The tom covered
an area of approximately 60 hectares. It was about 1500metres long and about 400 metres
wide. On the northeastern sideof the town, houseswere also built outside the second wall.
8.3 In the 18th century, sections ofthe Al-Utiibtribe settled outside the town of Zubarah and
erected a fort calied Murair about 1500 metres from the o~itsidewall. Later, two walls were
buiIt apparently with a viewto connectingthe fort to the tom. However, there is no evidence
that they did actually reach the outside wall of the town or of the fort. The sabkha between
those two walls was uninhabited. A channel 1250metres long also led froln the sea to the
vicinity of the fort, and was used for the transitof small boats. During the period from the
early 17th century to the 18thcentury,Zubarah became oneof the iuain inerchanttowns in the
Gulf. Itsprosperity came mostlyfiom the trade in natural pearls fisliedin tlieGulf, which was
then the main economic activity in the area, and from gei~eraltrüde between Europc and
1ndia2.However, thetown ceasedto exist as a populatedplace in tlie 19thcentury.
'Ses, Qatar's"Actto comply with paragraphs 3)4)nof operatiparagraph 41of the Judgrneiof
the Cour2dated1July 1994".
See,for general accountson tliis subject,Abu Hakirna,HisofEasternArabia, Ainman,1965;
EsmailRa'in,Historyof Iranian NmigaîiuTehran,1971,Vol.11.8.4 Today, Zubarah is an archaeological site, having the legal status of public property
owned by the State of Qatar. The site is protected under Law No. 2 of 1980 relating to
~nti~uities~.
Section 2.Bahrain has rioSovereienty over Zubarah
A. Introduction
8.5 From Bahrain's Counter-Mernorial in thc jurisdiction and admissibility phase of this
Case, it appearsthat Bahrain's claim over Zubarahrests on the factthat certain mcmbers of the
Al-Khalifhh family allegedly resided atZubarah in the 18th century and kelpcd develop the
place into a well-known trading centre4. Bahrain also asserts that the Al-Khalifal~retained
certain ties with Zubarahsubsequent to their departure froin Zubarah in 1783, inparticular
retaining the allegianceof the Naimtribesmen in the area, maintainiiig homes, preserving the
mosques, grazing cattle, and regularly visiting for these purposes and for hunting. Bahsain
recognises that the intensity of these alleged activities "waned with time", but argues that
"there was never any formal abandonment of rights in this area by the Al-Khalifa fmily5".
According to Bahrain, as late as 1937, one Rashid bin Mohamed al Jabor, who Bahrain
alleges was the Chief of the section of the Nairn tribe resident in thearea, confimied to the
Ruler of Bahrainthat the Nairnwere Bahraini sub-jects and that Zubaraliwas under the control
of Bahrain. Finally, Bahrain alleges that Qatar forcibly took control of Zubarah in 1937 and
that thereafter Zubarahbecame an issue in disputebetweeiithe Parties.
8.6 Assurning that these allegations represent the legal and factual basis for Bahrain's claim,
Qatar will show in this Sectioiithat Bahrain's factualallegatioiis are inaccurate on every point
and that, in any event, Bahrain does not have any basis, factual or legal, for a claim to
sovereignty over Zubarah.
3Sm, Annex 171.288,ol.8, p431.
4See,B.C.J.A.paras.2.7-2.1.
5
Ibid .ara.2.8. B. The FactualBack~round
1.The Early History of Zubarah
8.7 There is evidenceto showthat a town existed at Zubarahon the nurthwesternCoastof the
Qatar peninsula frorn early Islamic tirnes6,and that at lcast by Illeheginning of the 17th
century it wasalready a fortifiedtown, with itsown Sheikhand adniii.iislrütion.Thus, when i1.i
April 1612members of the Al-Utub tribe from the centre of the Arabian pe~linsulaattempted
to enter Zubarah, Sheikh Sultan bin AliAl-MuraikhiAl-ZubariAl-Qatari issued an order to
the guard of the gate, according to which he was to prohibit the entry of strangers, in
particular ~l-~tub~. If such strangers entered Zubarah, they had to be removed and put
outside the walls, together with the persons who hadreceived them. Further information may
be derivcd fiom an account written by Hamadbin Nayern bin Sultan Al-Muraikhi Al-Zubari
Al-Qatari in April 1638according to which Zubarah was at the time a prosperous settlement
of 150 bouses with 700 inhabitants, owning boats and livestock8. The saine account also
records that a levy was imposed, and that the inhabitants werc the "Naim, Musallem, Twar,
Hawajer,the Beduins, Lisaud,freemenand slaves".
8.8 These two documents areof great interest in that they show that by the beginning of the
17th century, Zubarah was a settled and prosperous walled towil, and thus that, contrary to
what has been written by western and Bahraini authors, it was not sdtled and developed only
after 1766 by the Al-Utub tribe, but that the Al-Utub were regarded as strangers by the
original Qatari tribes who had settledit.
8.9 In 1766two sections of the Al-Utubtribe - the Bin Khalifhhand Al-Jalahma - lert Kuwait
for Bahrain tlien under Persian occupation, and thence made their way to zubarah9. The locd
sheikhs laid down a condition for their settlcment: ifthey were to trade in Lubaral~,tliey
7Annex111.298,Vol. 8,p. 493.
8AnnexIII.1,Vol. 6, p. 1.
9Annex111.2,Vol. 6, p.5.
See,para.3.17,above.would have to pay the usual taxes. The AI-Utub refused this condition and iii 1768 built the
fortknown as Murair at some distanceoutsidethe outer wall of ~ubarah''.
8.10 It is from this period of their presence in the fortof Murair outside Zubarah that the
Bahraini claim to Zubarah apparcntly stems. However, this prescnce only lasted until 1783,
whensections of the Al-Utub,together with Qataritribes, retaliatedagainst Persian attacks on
Zubara from Bahrain and finallytook control of that island. Following tliese cvents, the Al-
Utub rnoved from Murair to ~ahrain".
8.11 Zubarah was bumt by the ImamofMuscat in 1811 12.
8.12 As described in Chapter III above, following the violent skirn~isl-ies betwee~lBahraini
andQataritribes in 1867-1868the Britishtook actionthrough the Agreements OS 1868to bind
the Chiefs of Bahrain and Qatarto preserve the maritimepeace, withthe sca acting as a buffer
between them. From the time of these agreements, the British were repeatedly preparedto
recognise that Qatar was effectively separatedfrom Bahrain, and that Zubarah was a part of
Qatar.
8.13 The sarnerecognition ofthe separation of Qatar and Bahrain wasconfii-medin the sarne
period both by Turkish authorities in the region and by other regional powers. The niimerous
Turkish surveys, maps and documents preparedfrom 1867 on, and referred 10 in Chapter V,
confirmthat Zubarah wasregardedas partof Qatar.In addition, Sheikh Zayed bin Khalifahof
Abu Dhabi repeatedly confirmed to the Turkish authorities, in response to their enquiries
about the extent of the territory of Qatar, that Zubarah was part of Qatar. In fact, as earlyas
June 1870,i.s., even beforethe Turkish arriva1in Qatar, SheikhZayed wrote and confirmed to
the Turkish Vali of Hasa as follows:
'OAnnex 11.69Vol.5,p.337.
11
12Lorimer,op.cit., Annex 11Vol.3,pp. 194-19and 246-247.
See,para. 3.19,above. "... Zubarah is one of the meadows of Qatar. Wc have those who would vow 10you
that Bin Khalifah'speople came there whenit was already tliickly populated. The
Khalifah people did not urbaniseit and did not setup any buildings there. Pay no heed
to what opportunists Say,it is useless. On the other hand if Qatar owns it, we cannot
deny that. The enmity between us and Bin Thani does not entitIe us todeny his rights
in the seas of his countryand its i~lands'~.'~
8.14 Subsequently,the Turkish Vali of Hasa, in a communicatioii addressed to the Ruler of
Balirain, Sheikh Issa, in October 1871,warned Bahrain against any interference inZubarah,
stating:
"As you know, you have no rights whatsoever to Zubarah, otherwise we shall do
whatever is necessary. Therefore, take your hands off and stop yntir people from
making claims, deceit and looting. Accordingto whüt has been proved to us, Zubarah
and its surrounding area and the islands of Qatar opposite your country areal1clearly
and absolutelythe propertyof ~atar'~."
8.15 The British did not seek to interfere with or prevent the establishment of a Turkish
presence in Qatar fiom 1871onwards, nor did they seek to interfere wlien Turkish or Qatari
authorities sought to exercise control overZubarah. On the otlier hand, thcy were repeatedly
concerned to ensure that Bahrain did not seek to interfere in the nainl landand ta ensure the
respect of the maritimepeace between Qatar andBahrain.
8.16 It was in this period - followingthe arriva1 ofthe Turks in Qatar - that a Bahraini claim
concerning Zubarah was first advanced. Thus, in August 1873,it came to be reported that a
Turkishdetachmentof some 100men had embarkedat Katif for "Zobarah on themainlar~d'~".
The Chief of Bahrain statedto the Britishat this timethat he claimedthe Naim tribe living at
Zubaraliwerehis subjects'! The BritishrejectedBahraiii'sallegationsand pointed out:
"...that though thc matter of sovereignty over Katar had apparently never been
formally decided, still the Turkish authorities in Nejd had established an influence
over the Katar Coastas faras the Odeidboundary"."
14nnex111.13V, ol. 6,p. 65.
15nnexIII.17,Vol. 6,p. 85.
Saldanha, p.cit., Ann11.7Vol.4,p.53.
'"bid,
lIbiJ.8.17 The Political Resident also expressed the view that the "Balirein Chief had not the
power, if he wished, to protect tribes residing in Katar, and Lhat he could ilot expect
Government to interfere where the rights were involved in ~ncertaint~'~".TlîeBahrain Chief
was therefore advised to continue to remain strictly neutral and to "kcep aloof from al1
complicationson the mainland with the Turks, Wahabis, ctc.19".
8.18 In 1874,Nasir bin Mubarak, the head of a rival branch of the family of the Ruler of
Bahrain, went into exile in Qatar, with members of his tribe, the Beni Hajir, and appeared to
be planning to attack Bahrain from the wesi coast of Qatar. The Rulcr of Balirain feared that
Nasir might decide first to attack Zubarah and the members of the Naim tribe living there.
Reporting to the British Government,the Political Resident in the Persian C'Juiwf rote on this
subject:
"The Chief of Bahrein being apprehensive of an attack on l-iisallies, and as he
considers, subjects, who hold the fort of Zobarah,asked whether he would be allowed
to reinforce the garrison of that place, which he considered a dependericyof Bahrein.
Sheikh Esau necessarily relies much on the Naim tribe of Zobarah, who came to his
aid in his late dangers, and if he were to be deprived of their support, his means of
defence wodd be greatly weakened. A refusal on his part to aid the Naim garrison of
Zobarah if attacked by other Arab tribes of Katar would undoubtedly lose the
friendshipof that tribe for Sheikh~sau~~."
8.19 The Political Resident was informed by Government that:
"The Governor-General in Council observes that by the correspondcnce marginally
noted, it was shownthufthe Chie off Bahreinhad nopussessions on ~he mainiandof
Katar, and thafhis rights therewere ofa very unceriainchuracteu ...
His Excellency in Council, therefore, considers thai the Chief of Bahrei...should be
advised to rely for support on the assistanceof the British Govcrnment, which will, if
necessary, be given him either to repel attacks by sea or to frustra atthreatening
movement from themainland.
It should be clearly pointcdout to the Chief that so long as he adheres to his treaty
obligations, the Britishovernent will protect hirn; but if suc11protection is to be
accorded to him, he must not be the aggressor or undertakc measures, which wiIl
IR
Ibid.
19IbidSee,also, ibid.,p. 54.
*OIbid.,p. 61. involve hirn in complications and whicli are considered inadvisable by the British
Government 21.1
8.20 The Political Resident subsequentlywrote to the Ruler ofBahrairiinlornling him of this
~ielv~~T . he British thus refused to recognise that Bahrain had any rights in Zubarah. Clcarly,
this approach was consistent with the 1868 Agreements which rccognisecithe separation of
Bahrain from the Qatar mainland by a maritime buffer zone. In April 1875, the Governmcnt
of India rebuked the Chiefof Bahrain onceagain andnoted with:
"...regret the continued dispositionof the Shaikh to cntangle hiinself in the affairs of
the continent and ordered thathe should be made to ~mderstandtliat, if hc persisted in
a course opposed to their advice and thereby became involveciin complications upon
the mainland, the consequences would be upon himself, and they would hold
themselves free to take such measures with respect to him as they might think
necessary 23."
Again, such British statements were consistent withthe terms of the 1868Agreements whicli
had precisely sought to ensure that there was no resumption of hostilities across the seas
between QatarandBahrain.
8.21 The British confirmed their attitude to Zubarah in 1878, Iollowing piracies and attacks
on other tribes by the inhabitants of Zubarah in which several people were killed. The
Political Resident was directed by the Governrnent of India to demand of the Tuskish
authorities that the inhabitants of Zubarah be punishcd. While tllis wcis a clear recognition by
the British of Turkish authority overthe mainland (including Zubarali), it was in fact Sheikh
Jassim bin Thani- who continued to bethe most influential figurein the peninsula - who took
stepsto controIZubarah.Duringthe ensuing conflict.there was Surtherdestruction of Zubwah
and the Naim (some 500 tribesmen) were besieged in the fort of Murair. ïhey eventually
swrendered andwere rernovedto Doha, "andZubarah as a populated place ccased 10 existZ4".
21Ibid.(empliasisinoriginal).
22Annex 111.30, ol. 6,p. 145.
23
24Lorimer,op. cit., Annex ITVol. 3, p. 223,
Ibid., pp. 224-225.8.22 During this conflict, Sheikh Issa, Ruler OSBahrain, had requested that some action be
takcn by the British in favour of the Naim, but the British refused. Balirain'sconcem appcars
to have been that Zubarah might be used by Sheikh Jassim as a staging-post for attacks on
Bahrain and thus represented a threat to Bahrain'ssecurity. Apparently both the British and
the Sheikh of Bahrain took the view that the best solution to this problcm would be the
permanent occupation of the place by the ~urks.~~This proposa1was not put ii-itoeffect and
Z~ibarahremained in niins. However, Bahrain's support for such a proposai was clearly
inconsistent with any claim of sovereignty.
8.23 While the British entered into forms of exclusive agreements with Balirain in 1880and
1892, given the events of 1873-1875 and 1878, these agreements clearly only applied to
Bahrain,and did not include anypart of the peninsula of Qatar. Indeed,part of the purpose of
these agreements was to protect Bahrain from other influences in the region, such as Persia,
the Turks andthe ahh ha bis^^.
8.24 The British position was again made clear in 1895 when it was feared that Sheikh
Jassim bin Thani intended to invade Bahrain from Zubaral-iwith 'l'urkishsupport and the
support of the Al bin AIi tribe, a tribe hostile to theRuler of Bahrain. 'TheBritish intervened
to destroy the alleged invasion kt that had been gathered, and thus to cnsure the maritime
peace between and sepantion of Qatar and ~ahrain~'.As the British later noted, this action
"shows clearly that at that date the Bahrain Government, far from having any control over
Zubarah, were actually threatened byinvasion hm that place28".
8.25 Throughout this same period, the Turks aiso took the view tliat Zubarah Iormed pm of
Qatar and that Qatar - under the control of Sheikh Jassiin bill Thani - caille within the
Ottoman area of influence. This is made clear in an Annex relating to Qatar tû an Aide
Mémoiredated 15 April 1912 sent by Tewfik Pasha to the British in the context of the
25
26Ibid See,also, Saldanhaop.cil.Annex 11.8,Vol.4,p. 199.
27See,paras.3.50-3.52,above.
See, para. 3.54, above.Sec, alsu, Annex 11.135,Vo7,p. 177, andthe observation othe Political
Resident in his telegram ofJuly 1937to the Secretaryof State for Inclarifying th"...itshouldbe noted
the action taken in 1895by His Majesty'ssloops in destroyinhostiledhows at Ziibarahwas to prevent the
invasionof BahrainfromQatarand in nowaysupportcdthe claimof BahraintoZubarah."
28Annex III.126,Vol. 7,p.125.negotiation of the Anglo-Turkishtreaty concerning the Persian Cr~lll'rea. a treaty eventually
signed on 29 July 1913.~~ It is noted in the Annex to the Aide MCrnoiret'orexarnple that the
Turks had informed the British in 1891that Zubarali came within the Vilayat of Basra11 and
had for many years been governed by Turkish appointed kaimakams aiid mudirs. It is also
notcd that theBritish hadnot protestedwhen informed of thesc facts3'.
8.26 The same Aide-Mémoire alsonotes that the Political Agen1 in Bahrain had reqiiested iii
1911 to be allowed to settle some Bahrainisat the site of Zubaraliin exchangc forpayrnent of
an annual sum of 10,000 mpees, but that this request had been turned dowii by Sheikh
~àsçirn~'A. gain, such a request could only have been made on the assumption that Qatar had
fulland effectivecontrol overZubarah.
8.27 The Anglo-Turkish Treaties of 29 July 1913and of 9 Mac11 1914 discussed in Chapter
III above did not explicitly mention Zubarah. However, Article 1I of the 1913 Treaty
provided that "thepeninsula [ofQatar] ..willbe governed as inthe pst by tlie shaykh Jasiin-
bin-Sami and his successors", and contained a declaration by the British Government that it
would "not allowthe interferenceof the shaykh of Bahrayn in the interna1affairs of al-Qatar,
his endangering the autonomy of that area or his amexing As explained further in
Chapters III and V, it was clear that for both the British and ihe Turks the rcference to the
Qatar peninsula meant the whole peninsula -including Zubarah.
8.28 This position was further confirmed when following the depürture of the Turks, the
British concluded the 1916 Treaty with the Ruler of ~atar~~.Although the extent of Qatari
territory was not explicitly defined in the Trcaty, the British had obviously for many years
pior to 1916 clearly recognised thatZubarahwas part of Qatar.
29Annex 111.56, ol6, p.259.
30Ibid.
32Ibid.
33Sec.paras.3.55atseq.above.
See,para. 3.1,above.8.29 This understanding of the Treaty is confirmed by subsequent events. Thus, whcn in
1919the Ruler of Bahrain made a request to the British to be allowcd tcoccupy Zubarah and
develop a port there, this was rejected by the E3ritish.j4~urtl-iermorc specific confimation of
the application of the 1916Treaty to Zubarah occurred as a result of the negotiations for a
grant of an oil concession over his territory by thc Ruler of Qatar. The 1916 Treaty provided
that the RuIer of Qatar would not grant oil concessions over 11isterritory without British
consent. A concession was finally signed in 1935 which clearly included tlie whole of the
peninsula, including Subarah,as also confirmedby the rnap atlachedto the c~ncession~~.
8.30 Ttmay also be noted here that the discussionsrelating to the granting and then to the
extension of Bahrain's petroleum concession in the 1920sand 1930salso show that Bahrain
didnot consider Zubarah as beingpart of its territoryto be coveredby the concession3'.
3.The Events of 1937
8.31 Despite Bahrain's recognition during the discussions relating to the granting of its oil
concession in the 1920s and 1930sthat it had no claim of sovereigiity over Zubarah, there is
evidencethat at least by 1936Bahrainwas seekingto manufacturea basis for such a daim.
8.32 In the 1930s, Qatar was increasingly concernedto protect the security of its borders and
control imports through the imposition of customs duties. To this end, iii 1937 the Ruler of
Qatar took steps to impose such controls against certain dissenting n~embersof theNaim tribe
who were obstructing such effortsj7.
8.33 This obstruction of the Ruler of Qatar's effortswas being led by one Rashid bin Jabor,
who had influence over one section of the Al-Naim t~-ibe.~I~ t is apparent, however, that
Rashid bin Jabor's actionswerebeing controlled at least in part by Bahrain, andthat Belgrave,
34Annex IIi.64, Vol.6, p. 307.
35Annex 111.99, ol.6, p507.See,also,para6.26,above.
36See, paras. 6.1et seq., abovelndeed,Bahrain was later to acknowlcdge explicitly in 1944 that
Zubarah was coveredby Qatar'soilconcessionSee,paras.8.45-8.46,below
37Annex111.120,Vol.7, p.89.
38~nnexIII.121,Vol. 7p.97.in particular, was using him to seek to obtain (or even manufacture) evidence ofalleged
Bahraini rights over Zubarah. The sirnilaritybetween the activities of Bclgrave in advancing
on behalf of Bahrain a claim over Zubarah at this time with his earlier actions with regard to
Hawar will be apparent.
8.34 From a letter of 5May 1936frornRashid bin Jabor to Belgrave, it seeins that the former
was thoroughly unhappy with the task he had bcen assigned and the way 11ewas treated, for
he wroteto Belgrave:
"OAdviser, things havegone too far.1amnot so mean as tobe sworn at by you al1the
time. I have already sent a messengerto the Sheikhabout Bin Kanoo'sissue with me. 1
have dissociated myself frommy people and abandonedmy acquaintances. My closest
friend has becorne my enemy because of my love for you and my affection for the
Sheikhs to the extent that they resent mentioning my namc in Abdullah Bin Jassim's
Majlis ..1have nothingto dowith your affairs and 1do not want letters fromyou39."
8.35 However, Belgrave appears to have overcome Rashid bin .Tabor'sreluctance with
promises on behalf of BahrainfsRuler of benefits to come and wrote to him on 12February
1937to Say:
"We have come to an agreement with Sheikh HamadBin Tssaregarding your stay in
Zubarah. This is for your own good and to show your allegiance to your sheikh, the
Sheikh of Bahrain. Zubarah,as Sheikh Hamad has said, is yours. You have authority
over Bin Khalifah'sproperties. 1know better whatis gaod t'oryou and for yourpeople
and prior to that cornes the interest of Sheikh Hanlad Bin Issa. You represent us in
Zubarah andils surroundings.
This deed is yours and yourule accordingto the decree ofSheikh Hamad BinIssa, the
Sheikh of ~ahrain~'."
8.36 Pursuant to Belgrave's plan, Yousuf Al-Shirawi of Belgrave's office sent a circular
(undated)through Rashid bin Jaboras follows:
"This is what the Adviser emphasises accordingto tlie news lie has received: whoever
inhabits the lands of Al-Zubarah, Fraiha, Ar-rubayqah, Ain Mohammed, Musaykah
and Al-Mhaimat ...is a citizen of Bin Khalifah, Sheikh of Bahrain. He [each citizen]
39See,AnnexII1.105,Vol. 7, p.23.
40See,AnnexIII.116,Vol. 7p.73. has to fingerprint the paper which is with Sheilth Bin Jabor. Whoever disobeys the
order shall leave [the lands], together with his childi-enandhis property; and whoever
puts his fingerprintwill be given a present and a monthly payment îroin thc Sheiklis of
Bahrain.
This is to be made public andto be irnplementedurgeiitly4'."
8.37 But Rashid bin Jabor obviousIy found the assignrnent very difficult aiid wrote to
Belgrave on 14April 1937stating:
"You see, Adviser, 1do not think we will fingerprint the pcople whoinyou have asked
for, for to speakis simple and to act is impossible. How can 1get you six hiindred men
to fingerprint udess you send some more people from there [Bahrainl to add to those
we have? 1 am, by God, baffled by 42ese orders and 1do not how what to do. We are
urgently awaiting a reply fromyou ."
8.38 However, Belgrave apparently persisted with the effort and wrote again to Rashid bin
Jabor prescribing the fonn in which the affidavitwas to be procured, as follows:
"We, the undersigned, the inhabitants within the borders of Al-Zubarah for more than
one hundred years, statethat we follow the ru1ersof Bahrain, the Al-Khalifah.
We have never been under the authority of any other mler. As for the borders of Al-
Zubarah,they are from Ras Ushayriq, Ar-rubayqah,Umm-Alma, An-na'man,Hulwan,
Lisha, Musaykah, Al-Thaqab, Ras Al-Hiddiyya, and Al-Farailiat to Zubarah. [The
lands within] the aforementioned boundaries have been the property of the rulers of
Bahrain, the Al-Khalifah, frorntime immemoria14'."
And atthe bottom of the form, Belgravenoted:
"P.S. Nothing elseis required.
Have the people fingerprinted without their naines. Evcryoi~e is to fingerprint
above andbelow. We need a lot of fingerprints,even those OC your slaves.
This and geeti~~~ç~~."
41
42See,Annex 111.19,Vol.7,p.85.
43Annex 111.127, ol. p.135.
4416id.8.39 By early 1937, however, the Ruler of Qatar was aware tliat a part of the Naim tribe
under Rashid bin Jabor - who by this time was in the official pay c~the Ruler of Bahrain -
were established in towns north of Zubarah and appeared to be cngaged in srnuggling from
Bahrain into Qatar. Accordingly, in March 1937 the Ruler of Qatar went to Zubarah and
affimed his intention to impose customs duties on al1thc Naim and to stop the smuggling. A
party of the Ruler'smen were obstructed in their efforts to achieve this by Rashid binab or^^.
Following inquiries about these disturbancesfromthe British -who were inforrnedof them by
the Ruler of Bahrain -the Ruler of Qatarrepliedon 23 April 1937pointing outtl~atthese were
purely intcrnal matters, that Rashid bin Jabor was a Qatari sub.jcct,and thütthe Ruler of Qatar
intended to bring an end to these dis turban c Io^we v.r, on 28 April 1937, the British
requested the two Rulers not to aggravate the situation furtlier while they exarnined the
question of ~ubarah~~.
8.40 In a comprehensive review of Bahrain'sclaims in relation to Subarali submitted on 5
May 1937 to the Secretary of State for India, the Political Resident (Fowle) recognised that
juridically a Bahraini daim to Zubarah must failt noting also that the British Governrnent's
endorsement of the Qatar Oïl Concession seemed to commit the Government "to the
recognition of the ownership of Zubarah by the Shaikh of ~atar~~".Nevertheless, the British
took the provisional view that - for political reasons- it would be better if a11amicable
solution eoufdbe reached betweenthe ~u1er.s".
8.41 In this regard, proposals were put forwardby Bahrain and Qatar iiian effort to solve the
problem. The Ruler of Bahrain was prepared to agrec not to press his claim to Zubarah or to
the Naim tribe, provided inte rliu Zubarah \vas not developed in any way by Qatar. Itwas
confirmed, however, that this would notaffect anywork carried out by the oil Companyunder
4See,AnnexIII.125,VoI.7, p113.
4See,Annex 111.120,Vol7,p.89.
4See,Annexes111.123and 111.124,Vol. 7,IO5.and 109.
4See,Annex 111.126,ol.7,p. 125.
4Ibid.Qatar's oil concession5! Further proposals were exchanged, and meetings look place, but no
solution was reached". It is interesting to note that in May 1937, Belgrave suggcsted to the
Political Agent in Bahrain that the "Na'imshould be given the right to decide by plebiscite as
to whiçh ruler they desire to serves2".This proposal was clearly consistent with Belgrave's
scheme to obtain fingerprinted affidavitsof allegiance to the Ruler of Bahrain from members
of the Naim tribe through Rashid bin Jabor. Indeed, in June 1937Belgrave forwarded to the
Political Agent in Bahrain copies of certain fingerprinted affidavits wl~ichused the wording
earlier provided by Belgraveto Rashidbin ab or^^.
8.42 In June 1937, negotiations were broken off. Thc Ruler of Qatar thereafter decided in
July 1937to impose his authority over the dissenting Naim under Kasl-iidbin Jabor by force
and put an end himself to tlie smuggling and other activities occurring. Whcn the Ruler of
Bahrain requested the British to intervene to stop the Ruler of Qatar, the Britisli refusedS4,
Writing on 4 Julyto the Secretaryof State forIndia, the Political Resident noted thatthe Kuler
of Qatar's claim to Zubarah was good and in fact went back to 1875, and that the British
therefore could not intervene on behalf of the Naim alzubarahs5. On 15 July ,the Secretaryof
State for India concurred in this view, even pointing out that the Ruler of Bahrain should not
be given the impression that the British recognised that he had even "aprimafucie claim" tu
~ubarah~~.
8.43 In fact by 5 July the dissenting Naim had surrendered5'.Moreover, in a meeting on
13Julybetween the Political Agent in Bahrain, the Ruler of Bahrain and Rashid bin Jabor,the
latter announced thathe had:
"...entered into an agreement with the Ruler of Qatar and that hc had agreed to obey
the laws of Qatar whilehe resided in ~atar~!."
50See,Annex 111.129 ,ol.7,p. 147.
51See, Annexes111.130-111.133 ,ol. 7pp. 151-171.
52See, Annex 111.131,Vol. 7, p.157.
53
See, B.C.J.A.,Annex 111.16. ee, also,para.8.38, above.
55See, Annex III.134,Vol.7,p. 173.
56Ses, Annex III.135,Vol.7,p. 177.
See, AnnexIII.139,Vol.7, p. 195.
57See,AnnexIII.136, Vol.7, p.181.
58See,AnnexIII.138,Vol. 7, p. 189.When Rashid bin Jabor nevertheless wenton in the samemeeting to protest against the Ruler
of Qatar'sactions, he was informedby the Political Agent that it was not British Government
policy to interfere in the intcrnal affairs of the Slieikhdoinsand that if he had any cornplaints
to make, he should make them to the Ruler of Qatar, but that if he did not want to obey he
could alwaysIeave~ata?~.
4.1937 to the Present
8.44 Following the events of 1937, relationships between Qatarand Bahrain sowed. The
Ruler of Bahrain imposed restrictions on the circulationof persons and goods between Qatar
and Bahrain, with Qatar taking similar actions". Because of Qatar's concerns about the
continuing infiltrationof persons from Bahrain into Qatar,in particular in the area of Zubarah,
Qatar built a srnall guard post there6'.When the Ruler of Bahrain prolested to the British at
this action, the British decidednot evento reply6'.
8.45 Nevertheless, the British were prepared to intervenein the cnsuing years in order to
attempt to reach some arrangement concerningZubarah which would bringabout a restoration
of friendly relations between Qatar and Bahrain. 'fhroughout 1943 and 1944, the British
engaged in extensive efforts to this end63.While the precise nature of what Bahrain wanted
remained unclear and varied in almost every discussion the British held with Bahrain's
representatives, it is significant that neither theBritish tior Qatar ever envisagedany kind of
arrangement that would cal1into question Qatar'ssovereignty over~ubarah'~.The rnost that
was envisaged was some kind of stutus quo agreement whereby Zubarah wou1d not be
developed by Qatar (however,witlioutprejudice to aiiyoil coinpany activities).The Ruler of
Qatar made it crystal clear that he refùsedto concedethat the Ruler of Bahrain possessedüny
property in his country65.
59Ibid.
"Sec, Annexes 171.137,171.144nd 117.160, ol.7pp. 18.5225 aiid305.
61
See, for Qatar'sprotests about such activities,Ann111.160,111.16nd 1118. 1, Vol7,pp.305,
347and 462.
Sec, Annexes 111.197and111.198, ol.7, pp.511and 515 andAnnex 112100,Vol. 8, p1.
63See,in general,Annexes111.231-111.239,ol. 8,pp. 137-182.
64See, for example, Annex 111.234,Vol. p. 153.The Political Agent notesin tliis letter twas it
neverthe British "intentionto acknowledgehis [theRulerofBahrain's]sovereigntyover thc Zubara area".
65Sec,Annex 111.235V, ol. 8, 157.8.46 When the British succeeded in their efforts to briilg about a limitcd arrangement
between the Rulers of Qatar andBahrain in June 1944,the agreement cinlyprovidecithat:
"The Ruler of Bahrain and Ruler of Qatar agree to the restoration of friendly reIations
between them as they were in the past. The Ruler of Qatar undertcakesthat Zubara will
remain without anything being done in it which did not exist in the past. This is from
consideration and reverence to Al Khalifah. The Ruler of Bahraiil, also, or1 his part
undertakes not to do anything that miglit harm the interest of the Ruler of Qatar. This
agreement does not affect the agreement with the Oil Cornpaily operating in Qatar
whose rights are pote~ted~~."
It will be seen that none of the provisions of this agreement an~ountedto the grant of any
rights by the Ruler of Qatar to the Ruler of Bahrain. Al1that the Ruler of Qatar agreed to was
"thatZubarah will remainwithout anything being done in it which did not exist in the past".
Inother words, he was content to leaveZubarah as the archaeological site that it has continued
to be until today. It will be seen tliat the provision in the agreeinent according full protection
to the rights of Qatar'soil concessionaire at Zubarah constitutes a clear acknowledgment by
Bahrain of Qatar'ssovereignty over Zubarah.
8.47 In the following years, Bahrain nevertheless continued to make f~lrthercomplaints about
Zubarah. ln general, these complaints concerned claims of a privale nature at Zubarah -
property rights to certain graves, rights of visit, etc.. Bahrain from tiine to time disclaimed
sovereignty over Zubarah and in ünyevent the British remained Grm in thcir opposition to any
such claim.
8-48 Thus, in a letter of 11 JuIy 1946 fiom the Political Agent in Bahrain to the Political
Resident, Colonel Hay, it was recorded that Qatar'ssovereigilty over Zubarali was officially
recognised by the British in 1937~~.
66Sec,Annex 111.240,ol. 8,p. 183.
fiAnnex 111.244V , ol. 8, 199.It is of interest to rioteanother passage in tlie sainc letter as follows:
"TheShaikhof Bahrain talks large about the gravesof his ancestors,but StiaikhHbilAbdullah was inost
scornful andsaidthat he knew of no more than two, or at tlie inost three, AI Klialifah graves in Zubarah. He
said thattheybelonged to tlie dead and would continue do so and that noone would interfcre with them.
Thereare Ai Thani buried underthe PetroleumConcessionsLirnitedtenniscouratJusair, but that does not give
the livingAl Thani anyright toplaytennis on theP.C.L.court!"8.49 In the same year, the Ruler of Bahrain appearedta reçognise that his daim to Zubarah
was more a matter of prestige than of anything else. In a note of4 September 1946, which the
Political Resident sentto the Political Agent in Bahrain, hereferred to aconversation with the
Ruler of Bahrain and recorded:
"If I understood him rightly he stated that hc did nut claim .sovereignty over Zuhurrcih
but only wanted his grass andwater. When 1remarked thal lhere was no profit for 11im
in Zubarah he replied that it was not a matter of prolil as he knew that lhsre wus
nothing of value inZuburah but one ofpr.estigeM8."
Inanothernote dated 1October 1946by the PoliticalResident, Coloncl Hay, il was recordcd
that the Ruler of Bahrain had been even more explicit, declaring that he did not claim
sovereignty over ~ubarah~~.
8.50 On 25 January 1950,the PoliticalAgentin Bahrain confirmed in a letter to the Ruler of
Qatar that:
"His Highness the Shaikh of Bahrain does not claim sovereigrllyover Zubarahor any
other part of Qatar territory, ilor does he claim rights to ail or any other material
therein70."
8.51 In 1950 and 1954,following extensive discussions, the British sought to bring about
new arrangements between the two Rulers with regard to Zubarah whereby, while Qatar's
sovereignty was preserved, Qatar would agree to allow the KuIer of Balirain to excrcise
certain limited rights at Zubarah (such as rights of visit) while his private propcrty claim
would be submitted to a Qatari court for decision. However, none of these arrangements
proved workable and aspects of them were objectedto by both ~ulers".
hRAnnex 111.247, ol. p.2I 1;emphasesadded.
69Annex 111.248, ol.8, p. 215. Salso,Annexes 111.25and 111.260Vol.8, pp.273 and 283, where
theRulerof Bahraininsiststhat lieonlyclaimsprivaterights ai Zubarah.
70Annex111.266V, ol8,p. 317; ernphasisadded.
71
Sec,Annexes111.266-111.28V2, l. 8, 317-400.8.52 The Ruler of Bahrainthereupon unilaterally requested the British for a final decision as
to their attitude to Zubarah. In a letter dated 13June 1957 from the Political Resident to tlie
British Foreign Secretary,Mr. SelwynLloyd, on this subject, itwas recorded:
"Successive Political Residents and Political Agents have alteinpted to compose this
dispute, but without success, faced as they were by the growing intransigence of the
Qataris on the one hand and by the obstinacy, based on sifeeling of persona1
humiliation, on the part of Sliaikh SaImm. 1should note here that Shaikli Salman's
feelingsabout Zubarah do not appearto be shared by anyone else in Bahrain.
...
It is clear that at no lime have the Government qf Indiiuor II.I~.IC;.in the Unilcd
Kingdomgiven the Rulersof Buhrainany encouragementor suppnrl in their claim tu
exercisesovereigntyoverZubarah,and thepresent Ruhr of Bahrain hm aadmirted lhat
he hasnosuch rightthough he clairnsprivate ownership of the ruins the~-e'~."
8.53 Upon instructions from London, the Political Resident then wrote tu the Ruler of
Bahrain on 10August 195773and rerninded him that "Her Majesty'sGovernment have iiever
supported any clairn by Bahrain to sovereignty in Zubarah" and informed him that the
arrangement for special facilities (for example, for rightsof visit) negatiated in the past with
the Ruler of Qatar could not be continued and that, furthermore, considerations of Qatar's
security required stricter entry arrangements.He concluded:
"lt is therefore necessary that forthe future Bahrainis wishing to enter Qatar should do
so through the normal ports of entry and be in possession of the normal passports or
travel documents.
...
It followsfrom what 1 have said above that the Ruler of Qatar must be frce to do what
is necessary to control the entry of al1people into Qatar, and that no special rights can
be claimed on behalfof anyparticular group of people the^'^."
8.54 When the Ruler of Bahrain sought to revive his cornplaints concerning Zubarah in
1961~~t,he Political Agent in Bahrain responded sirnply by reiteratiiig the views expressed in
the Political Resident's letter of 10 August 1957 - that Bahrain had no sovcreignty or other
72Annex 111.283, ol. p.401; emphasisaddcd.
13Aniiex111.284 ,ol.8,p.409.
74Ibid.
75
Annex 111.285 ,ol.8,p.413.rights at Zubarah. In particular, he noted thatHer Majesty'sGovcrni~~ei~ "..do not recognise
that any such claim to sovereignty, either immediately prior to the Agreement of June 17,
1944,or at the present tirne, has been e~tablished'~",
8.55 No further claim concerning Zubarah was alleged by Balirain until the meetings of the
TripartiteCornmitteein 1988.
Section3. Conclusion
8.56 In the preceding sections, Qatar has dealt with the question of Zubarah only in terrns of
sovereignty, since it understands that once Bahrain states its claim, it will defirie it as one of
sovereignty.
8.57 Qatar has shown that there is however no factual basis for ü claim of sovereignty by
Bahrain. As far as Qatar can ascertain at present, it appears that my such claim would be
based on the alleged residence in and development of Zubarah by the Biii Khalifah section of
the AI-Utub tribe in the 18thcentury,their retention ofties with Zubaah after their departure
in 1783 from Bahrain, and the allegation that Qatar forcibly took control of the town in 1937.
But as Qatar has demonstrated, Zubarahwas already a flourishing town by tliebeginning of
the 17thcentury, long before the Bin Khalifah arrived, and the Rin Khdifah were oiily
resident in anarea outside Zubarah- Murair -for a brief periodof about 20years.
8.58 By thetime of the 1868agreements which formally recognised the scparation between
Qatar and Bahrain and which established the sea as a buffer betweeii the two countries, the
BinKhdifah had beenout ofZubaraliandsettled in Bahrain forover 80 years. Since thattime
Qatar has had full control over Zubarah, and has exercised that control and sovereignty in
many different ways.
76Annex 111.287,ol. 8p. 425.8.59 The fact that Zubarali forrns a part of Qatar was morcover repeatedly and explicitly
confirmed by the Turks and the British from the 1870s. Eveil more significantly, Bahrain
itself has on inany occasions recognised Qatar's sovereigntciverZubaralz, ai-ifrom at least
1961 until 1988 made no mention of my claim that it inight have had to Zubaral~.111
conclusion,therefore,Qatar submitsthatBahrainhas no sovereignty overZubarali. PARTIV
MARITIMEDELIMITATION
CHAPTER IX
GENERAL PRESENTATIONOF THE RELEVANTMAKITlME AREA
Introduction
9.1 The Court is requested to draw a single maritime boundary between thc respective
maritime areas of seabed, subsoil and superjacent waters appertaining respectively to Qatar
and ~ahrain'. Thus,the Courtwill have todraw a singlemaritime boundary which will divide
the respective maritimejurisdictional zones ofthe Partiesrecognizedby international law, i.e.,
(a) their 12-nautical mile territorial seas2, (b) their 24-nautical mile coiitiguous zones3, (c)
their continental shelf, comprising the seabed and subsoil of the s~ibmarineareas that extend
beyond the territorial sea4and (d)their superjacentwaters adjacent to Lheterritorial sea5.Such
boundary is to be drawn with due regard to the line dividingthe seahed of tlie hvo States as
described in the British decision of 23 December 19476.
Section 1.The RelevantMaritimeAreü for Deliniitatioii
9.2 The maritime area within which the Court is requested to draw a single maritime
boundary, in other words, the geographical area directly concerned in this delimitation, is
depicted on MapNo. Il facing this page. As can be seen,the area is located between the east
I MuritirnaDelimitationand TerritoriaQztestions between Qatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction and
AdmissibilityJJudgent, I.C.J. Reporl1994, p. 125, para. 3See, also, Qatar's Application filed with the
Registry on 8 July 1991and Qatar's "Actto comply with paragraphs 3) and 4) of operative paragraph 41 of the
Judginen2 of the Courtdate1July 1994".
See, Annex IV.278, Vol. 12,p. 241andAnnex 1V.281Vol. 12,p.261.Itshould be notedthat neither
ofthe Stateshas issued arnap of the baselinesorthe coordinates ofthe bascpoints.See,also, Chaptcr Xi, below.
1lbid.
4See,Annexes 1V.138and IV.139,Vol. 10,pp. 203 and 207.
Annex IV.269, Vol. 12, p. 169 and Annex IV.276, Vol12, p.223. For Qatar both cxtento the
median line "on which each point 1ssituated at equidistance from the base line from whichthe breadth of the
territorial waters of Qatar and anyother state concernedis measured".This zone of superjacentwaters could also
be considered as covering the exclusiveeconomiczone under 1982Convention un the Lawof rhe Sea, when
one or more Gulf Stateshavedeclaredit.
6See,paras. 3.76 et seq. andpara.3.80, footnote 107,and Annexe115and IV.116,Vol. 10, pp. 71
and 75.coast of Bahrain and the west coast of Qatar. Its southern par1 is constituted by the moutli of
the Dawhat Salwah andthe nortliernpartextends up to the existing delimitalions with Iran.
9.3 The relevant coast of ~ahrain~ has a general rinrtherly dircction witl~outany major
indentation or change in direction. FromRas al Ban; at the southcrninost pointof the island of
Bahrain, which is a low sandy spit, to Ras al Jamal, 4 % miles NNE, the coasl is featureless
and steep-to, then it runs in a northerlydirection to Ras Hayyan,thence to the Sitrahjettyg, to
the soulheastern corner of the A.I.S.C.jetty and finally to the northeastern tip of the island of
~uharra~~. The general direction of the coastal front from Ras al Barr to the northern tip of
Muharraq is 7" northeast.
9.4 The relevant coast of Qatar extendsfiom Ras Uwaynat in the south to the northernmost
point of the coast of ~atar'' located east of the light of Ras Rakan, in a general direction of
30" NNE without any major indentation or change in direction. The coast is lc~w".From Ras
Uwaynat to Ras Rakan a coastal front can be constructed, passing through .Tanan, Almatraz
island(one ofthe Hawar islands),Hawar isiand, and RasUshayriq, closeto zubarahI2.
9.5 The relevant coasts of the two States are oppositeeach other. The coast of Bahrain from
Ras Al Barr to Muharraq is around 26 nautical miles or 48kilometres long and the coast of
Qatar between Ras Uwaynat and Ras Rakan is 48 nautical miles or 89kilometres long. The
ratio between the coastal frontsof Bahrain and Qataris 0.6311or 1A.59.
9.6 The mouth of Dawhat Salwah constitutes the southern part of thc geogrrtphical area
concerned in this delimitation. Dawhat Salwah is a bay, the east coast of which is Qatari and
' The description is taken from thPcrsian GulfPrlot 1982-94,pp. 180 etseq. (Annex 11.1Vol. 3,
pp. 37et8seq.).
Sitrah, an island 4 miles long from north to south, lies close to the northeast side of Bahrain; it is
connected toBahrain by a causewayat itsnorth end, andby a shorneck of reclaimedland, carrying road links,
on itswest side.
9See, BahrainiChart 1501 "Approachesto Mina Sulman"whichshows theA.I.S.C.jetty. Muharraq lies
close off the northeastern extremof Ballrainto which it is connectedbastonecauscway aiida road bridge.
Reefs,which are extensive,friiigeMiiharraqon al1sides.Treefextendingabout 3 iniles south FromMuharraq
termiriates in an area of reclaimed land,wliich is connected toisland bya causeway. Tlie coordinates of
Muharraqare as follows: 50°37'54"Eand26"17'15"N.
IIAtcoordinates5 1O15'02"Eand 2fi009'25"N.
The description itaken tom the PersianGuifPilot 1982-1994, pp. 178 Crscg.(Annex 11.1,Vol. 3,
pp. 35el seq.).
12See,Appendix 6, Vol. 15,p. 143.the west coast aud di T"he tripoint between Qatar, Saudi Arabiaand Rahrain is not yet fixed
between the three States.
9.7 The northern part of the geographical area concemed in tliis delimitation is bordered by
the seabed delimitation agreement between Bahrain and Iranof 17June 197 1 which ends at
the following coordinates: latitude27"0S946"Nand longitude 51'05'54"E("Point 2")14and the
seabed delimitation agreement bctween Qatarand Iran of 20 Septembcr 1969 which ends at
the following coordinates: latitude 27"0'35"E and longitude 51°23'00"N ("Point 2")': Tlie
tripoint between Bahrain andIranand Qatarhasnot been agreed bctweenthe lhree States.
Section 2. The Main GeographicalPeatures in the Relevant Maritime Area
9.8 The maritime area between the coasts of Qatar and Bahrain is characterized by the
existence of shallow waters. As to the maritime area situated to the north of the area where
Qatar's and Bahrain's coasts areopposite, there is geological and geomorphological unity of
the seabed. There is no fundamentaldiscontinuity. Thedepth of the waters, subject to certain
variations, reachesan isobath of an average of 50to 60metres.
9.9 Three and a half miles soutli of Ras al Barr lies Al Hool, a sinall uninhabited islet16.
Meshtan and Mattera are two uninhabited islets lying about 4 !4miles ENEand 5 % miles E,
respectively, of Sabkha ~oon'~. Sabkha Noon and Halat Nooii are low uninhabited islets
lying, respectively, about 2 miles E and SE of Ras al ~arr''. Thalib is a reef, 3 miles NE of
13
There is a delimitationagreement between Qatar and Saudi Arabiadalcd 4 December 1965,tinder
which the start thedelimitationinthe DawhatSalwahis not describedwithcoordinates.Art(1)onlystates
that "DohatSalwa shallbe dividedeqiiallybetweenthe twocountrbysthe inethod of equidistaiicepoints Rom
both shores". There is also a continentalshelf agreementbehveenBahrain andArahia dated 22 Februat-y
1958.Accordingto its Article 1, "Theboundary linon.the basis of the mediaiiIine,batiPoint 1 located
aithemidpoint of the Iineconnectingthe tip of Ras al-Barr at the southernmost eofrBahrain, and Ras
Abu Maharah (B)on the coasofthc Kingdomof Saudi Arabia" (AnnexIV.262,Vol. 12,p. 95)Inthe vicinity
of the two starting points mentioiied above is to be found the end of the liiie of the British decision of
23 December 1947.This ispoint"MW. It is locatedat the following coordinates:latitude25"30100"N,lotigitude
50°33'54"E(AnnexesIV.115and IV.116, Vol. 10,pp. 71 and 75).
14Annex IV.264, Vol. 12,p. 111.
15Annex IV.260, Vol. 12,p. 81.
16Annex 11.1Vol. 3,p.44.
17Ibid.
11Ibid ..43.Yabberi rocki9. Yabberi rock is situated 3 miles NE of Ras Al Jamal neas the centre of an
extensive reePa. Fasht Adham is a reef which driesz'. Fasl~t al Am is a shoal outside the
Sitrah island which extends up to the East side of the line of the British decision of 1947.
Qit'atash Shajarah is a reef, lying about 5 miles WNWof Ras Ushayriq which is covered in
its entirety at hightide22.A navigationalchanne1exists SromBahrain Lightht~loat~ t~the port
of Mina Salman (includingthe port of Sitrah), passingNorth SitrahLiglitBuoy ("NSLB").
9.10 From Ras Rakanto Subarah the coral reef extends from 2 to 3 miles offshore; it is
covered in its entirety at high tide. The two shoals of Dibal and Qit'atJaradah are situated
between Qatar and Bahrain,offthe west coast of Qatar and the east coastof'Bahrain. They are
nearer to the Qatar coastthanto the coastof Bahrain.
9.1 1 Dibal is a shoal located 9.3 nautical miles from the nearest point on the low water line
(and about 11.5nailticalmiles fromthe high water line) of Qatar and 13.7 nautical miles fiom
the nearest point on the low water line (the A.I.S.C.jetty, which is also the nearest point on
the high water line) of ~ahrain~~.It is borderedto the northwcsi and east by water which is 7
to 8metres in depth. The sea between Dibal and Qatar is shallower than that between Dibal
and Bahrain.
9.12 Seven miles south is Qit'atJaradah. It is a shoal located 9.4 nautical miles from the
nearest point on the low water line (and 10.6 nautical miles from the higlî water line) of
Qatar'scoastand 10.8nauticalmiies fromthe nearest point on the low water line (the A.I.S.C.
jetty, which is also thenearest point onthe 11ighwatcr linej of~ahrâin~~.
''Ibid.
Ibid.
21Ibid.,p.55."Fasht"istheArabictermused to describeda shoalSee, Annex11.1,Vol.3, p. 7.
22Ibid.,p. 37.
23See,para.3.80, footnot107,above.
24See,Appendix 5,Vol.15,p. 125.
25
Sm, ibid. Section 3. Factors Irrelevant to the Delimitation to bc Effected
9.13 In its Act of 30November 1994,Qatar requested the Court to adjudge and declare, inter
aliu, that any claim by Bahrain concerning archipelagic baselincs and areas for fishing for
pearls and swimming fish would be irrelevant for the purposc ofmarilinle delimitation in the
present case.
9.14 Qatar would simply note hcre that Bahrain lias not to datc made a claim to archipelagic
baselines in accordance with the rules laid down in the 1982 United Nations Convcntion on
the Law of the Sea. For this and other reasons, discussed more fully at paragraphs 11.43 et
seq., below, Qatar submits that any archipelagic baselines claiin by Bahrain woiild be totaily
irrelevant in the present case.
9.15 Qatar has also dealt more fully below with thc irrelevançe of pearl fishing for the
purpose of maritime delimitation in thepresent case. As will be shown in paragraphs 10.37 et
seq. and in Appendix 4, Bahrain'sassertion that it exercised exclusive rights over the pearl
fisheries off the western Coastof Qatar is contradicted by a wealth of evidcnce according to
which rights in pearl fisheriesinthe Gulfwere the collectiveproperty of al1tribes living in the
Gulf, and that Qatartoo had a role in pearl fisheries. Furthermore,it wibe shown that even if
Bahrain had had such exclusive rights, this would n0.tin law bc a special circumstance to be
taken into account in delimitingthe maritimeareasbetween Qatarand Balirain.
9.16 Finally, fishing for swimming fish was, until the develapment of the oil industry, an
important activity for the overall economy of the coastal çountries of thc Gulf? and was
traditionally exercised by al1 commimities in the Gulf, witli no exclusive rights. Unlike
pearling, thefishingindustry has nnt died out in the Gulf, but has been encouraged as part of
the Gulf States' national diversification plans forhe post-oil eriz.At present, the respective
catches of Qatar and Bahrain are rouglily equivalent. Fishing is thus of equal importance to
the econoinies of both States, and there do not appear to bc any reasom based on f'rshing
activities for modifjing the course of the single maritime boundary line which might
otherwise be determinedby the Courtto produce m equitablercsult. CHAPTER X
THE 1947BRITISHDECISIONCONCERNINC THE DELIMITATION
Section 1.The General Legal Context:the State of InternationalLaw on the Continents11
Shelfandits DelimitationattheTimeof theBritishDecision
10.1 The British decision of 23 December 1947(see, Map No. 12, facing thispage), so far as
it delimited the sea-bed lying between the territory of Qatar and that of Bahrain was adopted
within the context of the emerging new legal continental shelf doctrii-ie,and sought to apply
the principles enunciatedin the TrumanProclamationof 28 September 1945.
10.2 It is customary to regard the Truman Proclamation as tlie first clear assertion that the
continental shelf belongs to the coastal tat te U'nderlining the "special status" of this
instrument, the International Court of Justice stated in the North Sea C:onlinental SheZj
Judgment:
"The Truman Proclamation ... soon came to be regarded as the starting point of the
positive law onthe subject,andthe chief doctrine it enunciated ..came to prevail over
al1others2."
The Truman Proclamation acted as a catalyst in the formation of the legal notion of the
continental shelf asa part of international law, and provided the impetus for a spate of other
similardeclarations concerning claimsto offshorezones. In particular, it was closely followed
by several Latin American claims made successively by Argentina, Mexico, Panama,
Nicaragua, Chile and Peru,to mention only those which arose before tlzedrawing of the 1947
line between Qatar and Bahrain by the British authorities3. As tlieCourt said in its 1969
Judgment, the legal regime of the continental shelf "furnishes an exrunple of a legal theory
derived from a particular source that has secured a general following" and "it was theTruman
Proclamation of 28 September 1945 which was at theorigin ofthe tlleoV4".
IAnnex IV.75 Vol.9, p.363.
2
31.C.J;Reports1969, pp. 32-33, para.47.
Sec,R. Young, "Recent developmentswith respect to continental shelf', A.J.I.L849. The p.
United Kingdom for its part madesimilar claims in respect of on 26Novcmber 1948 (Annex IV.126,
Vol. 10, p119),the Bahamas(AnnexIV.125, Vol. 10,p. 115oi27Novembei 1949and theFalkland lslands
on21 Dec4mber 1950(see,i.C.,J.Pleadings, Fisheries,United Kingdomv. Norway, Vop.598).
NorthSea ContinentaSheE Judgment,1.CJ.Reports1969,p. 53para.100.10.3 One particular but importantpoint, which is of the greatest relevance in the present case,
lies in the circurnstance that, concerning the question of delimiting the U.S. continental shelf
with neighbouring States,the Truman Proclamationstated:
"In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is
shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be dcteriniiied by tlie Unitcd States
andthe State concerned in accordancewith equitableprinciples5."
With regard to the way in which the Truman Proclamation dealt with the question of
delimitation of the continental shelf, the International Court of Justice inevitably recognized
that:
"These two concepts, of delimitation by rnutual agreement and delirnitation in
accordance with equitable principles, have underlain al1the subsequent history of the
subject. They were reflected in various other State proclamations 06 the period, and
after, and in the later work on thesubject6."
10.4 The idea of delimitation in accordance with equitable principles was thus ftom the
outset inherent in the continental shelf doctrine as expresscd in the Truman Proclamation,
This was so, not only becausc the early delimitatioiis of the coi~tinentalshelf evidcnced the
application of no clear rule and no strict method, but mainIy becausc oC tlie idea of the
uniqueness of each boundary deliniitation. According to the observations presented by M.O.
Hudson in the 69th and 79th meetings of the International Law Commission, "Geographical
differences prevented the formulation of a general principle7".It was stated alço at that time
that:
"Each situation is unique, and cm be solved satisfactorily only in the light of its own
facts and the particular intereststhere involvcd8."
5AnnexIV.75,Vol. 9, p.363.
ONorth SeaConlinenta2Sheif;Judgment,1.C.JReports1969, p.33,para.47.
7AnnexIV.322,Vol. 13,p.265.
8R. Young,"Thelnternatianal Law Commissionand theContinental Shelf', .4.J.I.L.,Vol. 46, 1952,
Annex lV.325, Vol. 13,p. 279.This explanation has been surnmarizedas follows:
"From the very inception of the doctrine of the coatiiiental shelf, the argument has
been put forward that geographicalfeaturesvaried so great1ythat it was dil'iicult,if not
impossible, to posit fixed rulcs goveming the establishment of maritiine boundaries
between states9."
10.5 The major forerunner of the Truman Proclamationwas the United Kingdom-Venezuela
Treaty relating to the subrnarineareasof the Gulf of Paria, of26 Fcbruary 1942". This agreed
delimitation in the Gulf of Paria was said to have secured an equitable division betwcen the
two States concerning the submarine areas lying between the then British colony of Trinidad
and the Venezuelan facing coast. Taking into account the fact tliat the respective coasts
involved were opposite to each othcr, the 1942 Treaty establishcd a quasi-median line.
Nevertheless, the median line method was notscrupulouslyfollowed in drawing tlie boundary
under that instrument1 l.
10.6 The practice of Arabian GulfStates laid particularemphasis on equitable principles. For
exmpIe, the Saudi Arabian Royal Pronouncement of 28 May 1949 on the continental shelf
statedthat:
"The boundaries of such areas will be determiiled in accordance with equitable
principles by Our Governmentin agreementswith other States havingjurisdiction and
controi overthe subsoiland sea-bedof adjoiniiigareas12."
9
L.D.M. Nelson, "The roles of equity in the delimitation of maritiine boundaries", A.JI.L., 1990,
Annex IV.309, Vol. 13, p. 191.
IOAnnex IV.72, Vol. 9,p. 349,
IIIn a sector of thedelimitedarea calledthe Serpent'sMouih, locatedat the soutli-easternentrance of
the Gulf of Paria, Venezuela was limited to a three-milesubmarinearea, while I'rinidad'souter liinit of seabed
was at a distanceof sevenmiles, underthe delimitation line drawnin that sector.Among the explanationsgiven
in order tojustify such a departurfrom the strict median line was the following"..itmay be recalled thatin
1942the Island of Patos intliGulf of Paria was ceded by Britain to Vei~ezuela.Therefore, the unusual course
whichthe 1942 boundary line follows may beexplainedonthe ground that Britainobtained something in rcturn
for the cession of Patos" (Anselm Francis, "'Treatybetween the Repliblic of Trinidad and Tobago and the
Republic of Venezuela on the delimitation of the marine and submarine areas", Interncl6iond ./ourizalof
Estuarineand Coastal Law, Vol. 6, 1991,pp. 169-187, atp. 175).The islandof Patos islocated at the northern
entranceof the Gulfof Paria,calledthe Dragon'sMouth.
12AnnexIV.135, Vol. 10,p. 189.The proclamation of Saudi Arabia was irnmediately followed in Junc 1949 by nine other
proclamations issued by theRulers of the coastal countriesofthe Arabian Gulf or, for some of
them, by the United Kingdom acting as protecting power: Bahraiii (5 June), Qatar (8 .lune),
Abu Dhabi (10 June), Kuwait (12 June),Dubai (14 June), Sharjah (16 June), Ras-al-Khairnah
(17 June), Ajrnanand Umm-al-Qaiwain (20 une)'^. AH of these referred to equitable
principles for the delimitation of submarine meas with neighbouring States. For example,
Qatar'sProclamation referredto "boundariesto be determined more precisely as the occasion
arises, on equitableprin~i~les~~".
10.7 Evidencethat deIimitationin accordancewitliequitablepriilciples was perceived as part
of the emerging continental shelf legal regime may be seen in the fact tliat not only had the
concept of equitable principles for the purpose of delimiting thc continental shelf been
adopted by aImost al1national regulations promulgatedby various Gulf States, but also that
this concept "ha alwaysbeenthe unquestionable basis for continentalsl~elfdelimitation in al1
negotiationsconducted by the Gulf tat tes'"'.
Section 2. TheCircumstances inwhichthe 1947BritishDecision was made
10.8 The drivingforcefor a divisionof the seabed between Qatarand Bahrain stemmed from
the desire to exploit oil resources. The role of oil companies will therefore be examined first,
before considering the events leadingto the decisionof 23 Deccmher 1947.
A. The Roleof the Oil Com~anies
10.9 An account of the evolution of the Qatar and Bahrain oil concessions up to 1939 has
already been given above16.The Deed of Further Modification, dated 19 June 1940, extended
BAPCO's Mining Lease to cover the Bahrain unallotted area (al1 'theShaikh'spresent and
future dominion^" ^"e)Companyin fact began its exyloratory work in thc Additional Area
13SeeAnnexesIV.138-IV.146,Vol. 10,pp.203-240.
14See,AnnexIV.139, Vol. 10,p.207.
15S.H. Amin, "Law of the Continental Shelf delimitatiothe Gulf Example", ,Vetherlan&
Internat16nalLawReview,Vol.XXVII, 1980,AnnexIV.292,Vol. 13,p. 66.
See,paras.6.12etseq., above.
" Annex IV.64, Vo9, p.313.in 1939,before the terms of the concession were approvedand the Deed signed in June 1940.
PCL was also anxious to pursue its programme of exploration, and on 26 February 1940,
Wheatley of that Companywrote to Peel of the lndia Officc to enquire whether any decision
had been reached concerning "the line of division between the territories and the territorial
waters of Bahrain and ~atar'~".
10.10 After the Truman Proclamation, the practical significance of claiming riglits to the
resources of the seabed beyond territorial waters iil the relatively shallow waters of the
Arabian Gulf rapidly became apparent, and the question soon becanle perceived as one
involving notjust the attribution of particular reefs and shoals to one Ruler or another, butthe
division of the whole seabed between the two States.By this time BAPCOwas impatient to
resume its exploratory drilling, and for this reason was anxious that the British decision
should not be long delayed.
10.1 1 Qatar'sconcessionaire since 1936had in effect been Petroleum Development (Qatar)
Ltd., a subsidiary of PCL. Its local representative wroteto the Political Agent, Bahirainon 30
September 1944inquiring whether thetime was thought opportuneto raise again the question
of the boundary between the two States and the two concession areas. The issues concerned
not only the composition of the Hawar group of islands and the extent of thcir territorial
waters, but also reefs and islets beyond territorial waters whicli might constitute possible
drilling locations". The Political Agent repliedon 1October 1944that he would prrfer nutto
have had the question raised, but he noted that in any event it was bcing considered in
on don^'.
10.12 In 1946, with the resumption of operations by the two companies, PCL again
expressed anxiety about the question of the division, and raised the rnatter with the Tndia
Office, insisting that the BAPCO concession over the Bahrüin uilallotted area could not
properly oust Qatar's rights or those of its concessionaire2'.This togetl~erwith the roughly
18Annex IV.57,Vol.9,p. 279.
19Annex IV.73, Vol9,p.355.
20
21Annex IV.74,Vol.9,p. 359.
Annex IV.84,Vol. 9p.401.conternporaneous request by BAPCO to reswne struch~ral&iIling in the E-Iawarislandsz2
seems to have set in motion the interna1consultations amongst the British autl~oritics which
culminated in the decision of 23 December 1947.
B. Events leading tothe23 December 1947Decision
10.13 On 3 August 1946the Secretary of State for India instructed the Political Resident in
the Gulf to prepare a dividing line drawn accordingto the following principles:
"Sucha line could be regardedeither as sirnplydemarcating the areas in which H.M.G.
are willing to permit the respective Oil Companies to operate, or as dividing the sea-
bed, including the portion outside territorial waters, between Bahrain and Qatar,and
allotting to eachRuler virtuai sovereignty overhisrespectivc portion without prejudice
to existing navigation rights. In the latter case the application of the principles of
President Truman's Proclamation regarding the Continental Sllelf is involved ...
Whatever the outcorne, the first step must in any case be to obtain the
recommendations of the Political Agent as to the most cquitable dividing line. The
Political Agent should perhaps base his reçominendation prirnarily on the
configuration of the main Bahrein Island, the Hawar Islands and the Qatar peninsula,
with their respective territorial waters,and shouldo faras possible discountthe recent
assertions by the Bahrein Government of claims to reefs and rocks by the erection of
cairns. He should, in fact,attemptto arrive at as simple and equitablea division of the
sea-bed as
10.14 The recommendation of the Political Agent in Bahrain, sent an 31 December 194tiZ4,
was commented on by the Political Resident in the GUIP Th.c rnatter was then the subject of
intensive discussions between the India Office, the Foreign Office and Admiralty, and the
eventual decision was cornmunicatedto the two Rulers by letters dated 23 Decernber 1947.
The Court is respecthlly referred to the full text of the decision which inay be found in
Annexes IV.115and IV. 11626.
22AnnexIV.77, Vol9, p. 373.
24Annex IV.88,Vol. 9, p. 419.
25AnnexIV.92,Vol.9, p. 435.
26AnnexIV.93,Vol. 9, p.440.
AnnexesIV.115 and IV116,Vol.10,pp.71 and75. C. The EquitablePrincinles referred to in the Truman Procliimation
10.15 At the time the British decision was taken, tl-ierewere no helpful precedcnts or
established rules of delimitation, and no specific rule or method of deliinitatioii could yet be
regarded as being alreadypart of the emerging legal doctrineof the conlinental shclf. Existing
State practice concerned the delimitation of territorial waters between States with opposite
coasts, and that practice consisted of using generdly the mcdian hile", This hnd bccn done iil
particular for the establishment of the maritime boundary betweeil Demark and Sweden
under the 1932Danish-SwedishDeclaration concerningthe ~ouild~"and therc were a nurnber
of similar examples for other straits around the world, constituting a consistent general
practice in this field. However, the only precedent dealing with the drawing of a sea-bed
boundary as such was the 1942 Treatyrelating to the Gulf of Paria, which had just established
an equitable division by an adjusted median line, at least for the main portion of thc
boundaryz9.Some assistance could thereforebe derived îrom principles or rnethods applied in
connection with territorial sea boundaries, and it was seen as desirable ihat any new
development should be inharmonywith what had gane before3'.
10.16 When the British Governrnent drew the 1947 liiie, it hcidto sclect a iew objective
criteriain order to apply equitable principles. Indeed,ihese principles. as such, did not provide
a criterion or a method of delimitation which wascapableof being used topiuduce a Iineon a
map. This is still the case today, since the search for equity in conteinporary maritime
delimitations does not always lead inevitably to one single practical bouildary. In order to
27See,the detailed studyof the subjectin G. Gidel,droit internafionpublicch Icmer, Paris, 1981,
Vol. III, pp. 746-759,wherethe author sumrnarizedthe existing legalsituaasfollows:the boundary is to be
established accordingto the median Iine, unless the States concerned otheiwjse agree, or in cases where thc
geographical configurationis such ththemedian linewould produce anextreme disproportioninthe different
uses ofthe seaby both StatesAiinexIV.300, Vol. 13,p. 113).
28Annex IV.263,Vol. 12,p. 105.
29See,para. 10.5,above.
30See,the anonymous and undatedMemorandumonthe PersianGulfsea-bcd, cntitled "Offshore Areas
in the Western PersianGulf',verylikelyproduced by ARAMCOfor the Süudi Goveriimentbcforethe meeting
of the 1958Geneva Conference (FO 371/132510), where it was stated that "anysystematic legal treatment of
this new field must be grounded fimly on the coiiceptofqui@. Fortunately, al1the Gulf States which have
made offshore claims have embodied thisconceptin their assertions,itis already at Iiandfor use. Yet whiIe
equity must be the predominant factor, it must be temperedwith practicality"(5)(Annex IV.218,Vol. Il,
p. 249;emphasis inoriginal).achievean equitable delimitation between Qatar andBahrain as regards their respective rights
over the sea-bed, the British authorities were confronted with thc need to dcfine a practical
methodology, each element of which had to be siibordinated to the broader concept of
equitable principles. They did so through the adoption of the three following criteria: they
decided to take exclusively into consideration the two main coasts; they selected some fixed
turning points;and they drew a sirnpIifiedline.
1. Exclusive considerationof the two main coasts
10.17 The absence of identification of the low-water mark in an area which was largely
unsurveyed, coupled with the presence of several smallisiets, rocks and sand-banks lying in
shallow waters immediately off the coasts of both States,made it difficult to have a precise
knowledge of the detaiIed configuration of the coastlines. These factors were regarded as
constituting in themselves sufficientjustification for taking into account only the high water
line on the main coasts, that is the eastern coast of the main Bahrain island and the western
coast of the Qatar peninsula. This optiori was not an extraordinary une, especially givcn the
specific problems in theGulf area3'.
10.18 In addition, the drawingof a line based on the main configuration of the two coastlines
found a more theoreticaljustification in the continental shelf doctrine itself, since the sea-bed
to be divided was atthe time seen as the logical extensionofthe mainland :
"2. ...(a) The median line should be based on tllemain configuration of the coastlines
since we are dealing here with the logical extension of the continent and minor reefs
and shelveson the sea bed haveno bearing on the mainprii~ciple32."
31The sameproblem aroseagain a fewyears later,duringthe negotiationof the 1968Saudi Arabia-Iran
Delimitation Agreement, where the Parties encountered diffrculties arisiiig out of the absence of sufficient
geographical data to construct the accurate median line uponwliich thcy weie agrAs then explaincdby a
lawyerwliowas indirectlyinvolved in thosenegotiations "Atheoutset no singlmap was found which showed
both sides ofthe Gulf in adequatedetail and whichwassatisfactorytbothsides foriisc iconriectiowith the
agreement", And the same commentator added in a footnote: "Nautical charts of tlie Ciulî, thougli much
improved inrecent years, were foundtolack accurate shorelinedetail in areas not importantfor navigation, and
to liave other shortcomingsfor delimitationpurposes"(R.Young, "Equitable Solutionsfor Offshore Boundaries,
the 1968SaudiArabia-IranAgreement",A.J.I.L.,Vol.64,No. 1,1970,Annex lV.326, Vol. 13,p. 288).
32See, inparticular,Annex IV.97,Vol. 9, 479. 2. Selection of fixed turning points
10.19 The same reasonswhich dictated thedecisioilto take exclusivelyinto consideratioilthe
main coastlines also governed the selection of certain points on thc dividing line itself.
Because of unsurveyed coasts and maritime areas, the British authorities selected identified
points, either by way of triangulütion or by referencc to aids to navigation suçh as buoys and
lights. Another consideration which the BritishGovemment no doubt tuok into account was
the desirability of protecting maritime access toBahrai11lhrough the Sitrah Channel, and this
probably providcd sufficient reason for the choice ofthe North Sitrah Light Buoy and the
Bahrain Light Vesse1 as points of reference for tlie drawing of the dividing line. In this
particular case, the method presented the advantage of eliminating any uncertainty of
demarcation.Undoubtedly, the requirementof certaintywas regardedas ~i~nificant~~.
3. A simplifiedline
10.20 The different parlions of the 1947 line were drawn as straight lines joii~iilgselected
points, a method which has since been used on numerous occasions, both in maritime
delimitation agreements and in decisions by international tribunals in this matter. Such a
method has the virtue of simplicity, a requirement that was exprcssly incorporatedinto the
instructions delivered in 1946by the India Office to the Political Resident in tlie Gulf and the
Political Agent in Bahrain, when they were asked tomake suggestions about the line to bc
drawn. The first continental shelf boundary agreementin the Gulf region, concluded between
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia on 22 February 1958 which was significant sincc it could be
regarded as a leading precedentin this area employedthe "middle line", totranslate the exact
wording of the original Arabic te~t~~B . ut the course ofthat particular dividing lineisjust an
33In the Memorandum "Offshore Arens in the Western PcrsianGulf", referred to in para. 10.15,
footnote 30, above, the following suggestiwas made: "Boundary lines shouldbe assimple and regular as
possible,to facilitatequickascertainmentandpreventdisputes.It is ustohave theiii related to well-defined
points o34landoratseau(Annex IV.218,Val. II, p. 249).
AnnexIV.216,Vol. Il, p. 235."approximation of the median line3'" and has been presented as "a variation of the
equidistance principle361'.
10.21 The 1947line is neither an equidistant:line, nor the strict or tnie inedian line.Itwas not
the strict or true median line, because this was not the intent of the British aiithorities. It was
the aim of the British authorities to decide upon a line of delimitation in accordance with
equitable principles. One of the factorstaken into account (although this is nowhere explicitly
stated) rnay have been the difference in coastal lengths, the Coastof the Qatar peninsula being
much longer than that of the main Bahrainisland.
Section 3. Reactions of the Parties -The Different Attitudes of Bahrain and Qatar
A. Oatar'sAttitude
10.22 Qatar's attitudewith regardto the 1947decisionwas fairly simple. By a telegrarnto the
Commonwealth Relations Officeof 8January 1948,thePolitical Resident reported:
"4. Sheikh of Qatar, whom 1 saw on Jmuary 5th, stated tliat while he could not
vtiluntarily surrenderthe islandsand shoals East of the line which lie rcgarded as Qatar
territory, hewould accept His Majesty's or der^^^."
10.23 Pressed by a letter of 4 February from the Political Agent in Bahrain to "confirm this
a~ce~tance'~",the Ruler of Qatar adopted a much more reserved position. By letter of 21
February 1948to the PoliticalAgent in Bahrain he statedthat :
"..1like to invite Your Excellency's attention to thecorrespondence exchanged some
ten years ago on the subject of Huwar (Island) and the clear representation 1 made
regarding its position in my letter subrnitted to His Excelleiicy the Political Agent,
Bahrain, at the time, in which 1expounded my points of view in regard to this Island
which is a part of Qatar and in which 1expressed my protest against the behaviours of
Bahrain Government.But H.M.'sGovernment acted as they wished, and I liad nothing
but to submit, reservingin the meantime to mysclfmy own rights.
35S.H.Amin, "CustornaryRules of Delimitationof the CoiitiiieShelT.The Gulf States'Practice",
Journalo36MaritimeLaw and Commerce,Vol. Il,No.4, July 1980,Annex IV.291, Vol13, p57.
37Annex 1V.262,Vol. 12,p. 95.
36Annex[V. 119,Vol. 10,p.89.
AnnexIV.120, Vol. 10,p. 93. The map you were kind enough to send me shows clecirlytliat Deebil shoal and Huwar
Islands are within the territory of Qatar. Huwar isdireçtly attached to the coasl of
Qatar with a piece of shalIow water disconnecting, whicll recedes at cbb tide, thus
establishing access for pedestrians ..Yet as 1 have rneiitioned to Your Excellency 1
cannot but exercise patience, being content with wkat your Excellcncy said that this
decision is liable to alteration at any time in case more exact gcographical data are
forthcoming. This strengthensin me the hope that H.M'sCioverninentwill reconsider
the matter once again and award a more correct decisi011hased on geographical
data39.
In a word, the Ruler was content with the line,but not with the exceptions relating to Hawar
and the two shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah. A sinlilas view was takcn by the Iraq
PetroIeum Company in a letter to the Cornmonwealt1.iRelations Office dated 19 March
194g40.
10.24 Assuming or wishing to assume that these replies arnounted to acquiesceilce, tlie
Political Agent in Bahrain thoughtfit to write to the Ruler of Qatx on 30 April 1949tliat His
Majesty'sGovernment noted "with pleasure Your ExceIlency's ready acccptance of their
decision", which was a far-fetched interpretation of the Ruler'scautious obscrvatinns4'.Mr.
Morgan Man, of the Political Residency, Bahrain, was moreperspicacious whcn he wrote in a
letter of 13 January 1962: "1 read it [the Ruler's reply] as a polite rejection of 1-I.M.G1s
a~ard~~''.
10.25 Qatar confirmed its position by supporting the proposa1of arbitration about the sea-
bed, although it made it clear that such proceedings sl-iouidnot be confined to the question of
the sea-bed. On 2 July 1962,the Politicd Agent in Doha warned the Foreign Office tliat any
arbitration proceedings between Bahrain and Qatar could notbe confined to the sea-bed, and
that accordingio Qatari views they shouldinclude the other issues,such as the I-fawarislands,
in the tenns of reference4'.
39AnnexIV.121,Vol. 10,p.97.
40Annex IV.123,Vol. 10,p.107.
41
AnnexIV.131,Vol. 10,p. 169.
43Annex1V.246,Vol. 11,p.415.. B.EvolutionofBahrain'sAttitudes
10.26 In the maritime field Balirain'sclaims and their factual or Iegal basis have fluciuated.
As a matter of fact, Qatar is not aware of Bahrain's presentclaiins, whicl~wiIl be Itnownonly
when Bahrain files its own Meinorial. In the meantime the evolvitlg situation may be
summarized as follows.
1.First phase, 1947-1960:Claimto sovereigntyoveral1the sea betweenBahrain and the
Qatarpeninsula
10.27 Onthe whole, the position taken by Bahrain aftet the 23 Deccmber 1947dccision was
sirnilar to that expressed in various letters written1946 beforethe decision wastaket~~~ T.he
reaction of Bahrain to the letter of 23 Decernber 1947 was immediate and negative. Ttwas
expressed in a letter from the Ruler of Bahrain to the Political Agent in Balirain dated 31
Decernber 1947~~ in the following terms:
"2.We wish to point out that since the time that nur ancestors conquered Bahrainfrom
their town of Zubara until the present day the seas lying between our Eastern coast and
the western coastof the Qatar peninsula have beeil under our coiitrul and we have held
domination over the isIands, shoals and reefs which existin these waters. Our people
own fishing rights, which havenever been disputed, in the waters inside this area,
3. During the lengthy negotiations between our Governrnent and the two oil
companies, Bahrain Petroleum Company and Petroleuin ConcessionsLimited who
were competing for an oil concession in the seas beloiiging to Balmin, in 1938and
1939,many discussions took place and maps and plans were made showing the sea
area which was the subject of the negotiations. These negoliations wcre carried on
through H.B.M.'s Political Agent who was eitlier present during the mcetings or who
was provided with a delailednote about al1matters which were discusscd. The seaarea
which we were then prepared to lease to the companies between the coasts ofBahrain
and Qatar was fiom and including the islai-idof Jinan, the most southcrn island of the
Hawar Group,to a point appi-oxiinately10 miles north east of Faslit al Dibal. It was at
no time suggested by H.B.M.'sPolitical Agent that we had no rights ovcr any partof
the sea area lying between Bahrain and this line. If oui-ownersl~ipof this area was in
doubt why were these negotiations approvedby H.B.M.'sPolitical Agent ?
44See,AnnexesIV.82,1V.86and IV.89,Vol. 9pp. 393411and 423. IntlilettersotOJuly 1946and
22 July1946 (Annexes IV.82and IV.S6),the claimwasdirectedto the islands and shoals, bediscussed
in Section4, para10.44 et ,sbelow.
45
Annex IV.118,Vol.10,p.83. 4. In para 4 of your letter you state that our sovereign rights in Dibal and Jaradah
shods, which are above spring tide low water level, are recogniscd.Tliese two shoaIs
are in fact the terminus of one long continuous slioalwhich begins off Sitra Island and
reaches nihal and Jaradah. There is no deep water cllaiinelcroçsing tl~isshoal and the
highest points of this shoal, at DibaI and Jaradali, caniiot be scparated from thc main
shoal. We contend that al1the sea lying between our coasts ~ipto and including Dibal
and Jaradah should be includcd in the sea over which WC have sovereign rights.
...
6.In conclusion we consider that the delimitation dcscribed in your lettcr should be
readjusted and the dividing line should run from and including Jinan up to the ilorth
east corner of Dibal, including the whoIe length of the shoal which starts at Sitra aiid
which appears abovethe surfaceat Dibaland Jaradah."
10.28 Another letter from the Ruler of Bahrain to the Political Agent in Uahraii~ on 23 May
1949asserted a similarly extravagant claim:
"Theownershipof the sea between Bakrain and Qataris claimed by us. We have never
heard that the Shaikh of Qatar made any claim to this sea. If he has made a daim to it
we ask that we should see bis claim and the evideilce which he may have to prove
it46il
10.29 On 6January 1950the Ruler of Bahrainreferrednot to the sen but tothe seu-bed:
"1should Saythat the sea-bedbetweenBahrain and Qatarhas on no day been under the
sovereignty of the Shaikh of Qatar and that 1 do not acccpt that. Secondly, what
confirrns this is that there exist some possessions belongingto Rahrain subjects the
right in the disposal of which vested in us and in Oursubjects, without thc Ruler of
Qatar or his subjects havingany control over them.
Thirdly, when the Company wanted to install buoys betweenBduain and Zikrit it was
we who granted the permission whichapart fiom the iluinerousreasons and conclusive
proofs, establish our rightinthe sea-bedbetween Bahrainaiid ~atar~'."
46
Annex IV.134, Vol. 10,p. 185.Thesame letterqueried in vestrong termsthe right otheBritish
Governmentto decide boundary disputes betweenBahrainand Qatar.In a fiirthletteof 21 November 1949
the Ruler of Bahrainrepeatedhis clatoownershipof al1theseas between Bahrainand Qatar(Annex IV.15 1,
Vol. 10,p.259).
47AnnexIV.158, Vol. 10,p.295.But in the next two protests Eahrain referred again in general to the seu4'.
10.30 The British authorities consistently and firmly re-jcctedBahraini claims. Thus, the
Political Agent in Bahrain in a letter dated 30 May 1949to the Political Rcsidei~tstated:
"Adaim to 'ownership' ofthehigh seas outside the farthest limit of the claimsmade to
territorial waters by any country inthe world must be something unique4'."
The Ruler's claimwas rejected by letter ofthe Political Agent dated 2 January 1950:
"Iam firther ta remind your Highness that your claim to sovereignty over al1the seas
between Bahrain and Qatarhas not been admittedby His Majesty's~overnment~~."
10.31 Sixteen months later, on 14 May 1951, the Political Ageiit sent a further reply to the
Ruler of Bahrain containing the followingparagraphs:
"3. ... Since then [the Ruler of Bahrain's letter of 23 May 19491,however, Your
Highnesshas issued a proclamation assertingjurisdiction and control over the sea-bed
and sub-soi1beneath the high-seas contiguous to the territorial waters of your State.
The Ruler of Qatar has issued a sirnilar proclamatioil. It is thcrefore inore than ever
necessary that al1the parties concerned should observe the line laid down in 1947 as
the limitofthe sea-bedoverwhich you and the Ruler of Qatar have since asserted your
control in these proclamations. This line was determined in accordance with equitable
principles after careful examinationof YourHighless' daims and of those of the Ruler
of Qatar and is the onlyline recognisedby His Majesty'sGoverment. ...
5. ... His Majesty's Government are not prepared to recognise a claim by Your
Highness touny urea ofthe seus outside theterriioriul waters oflhe S'tateof Bahrain;
nor indeed does the Ruler of Qatar make any claim to the seas outside his territorial
waters. As has been pointed out on many occasions this discussion concerns the sea-
bed beneath the high seas and its division bctween Rührain and Qatar. These two
48See, letter from Belgrave to the PoliticalAgein Bahrain dated 14 February 1950:"1 have the
lionour to inform you that Ais Highnesshas heard that an arbitracourtis sitting at Dnha to consider the
claims oftwo oiI companies to the seas around QatarHisHighnesswishcs the courtto be informed that he
claims theownershipof the seawhich lies between Bahrainanthe Coastof Qatarwhiçh is opposite to Bahrain,
His Highness fearsthatthe court may corne to some decision whicwill affect thsea whiclihe claims.His
Highness deslres me to remind youthat he has at no time agreedto the boundary of his domain heing restricted
by the line which was shown onthe mapwhich was enclosed in your IetteiNo Ci1226 dated 23rd December
1947"(Annex IV. 161,Vol.10,p. 307). Seealso,AnnexIV.171,Vol. 10, p.357.
49Annex IV.136,Vol. 10,p. 193.
Annex 1V.157,Vol.10,p. 291. States asserted the right to exercisejurisdiction and control overtheir respective areas
of the sea-bed inthe proclanlationsreferredto in paragraph 3 of this letter, which were
issued by Your Highness and the Ruler of Qatar at the initiative of His Majesty's
~overnment~'."
20.32 This was to no avail, since on 22 Septernber 1951,the Ruler of Rallrain again wrote to
the Political Agent:
"Ourwaters reach to the Westernshore of Qatar - this bas heen the fact dom the ages
- and that the bed uponwhich those waters rest and the sub-soi1of that bed are within
and form an integral part:of Our domain and We make that statement once again with
al1the conviction of which Weare capable52."
This position was still taken by the Ruler of Bahrain in April 1960 with Wiltshire, Political
Agent in Bahrain, who reportedthe Ruler'sview as Follows:
"Qatar had no sea-bed rights in the west at al1 ..everything in thc sea between Zubara
and Bahrain belongedto the AlKhalifas and shouldbe included inhiç clairn~'~.~l
10.33 The claim that Qatar's sovereignty was limited to the mainland rcveals great ignorance
of Qatar's history, and disregards several facts and cases connecting the làshts with Qatar
since the middle of the previousccnhlry.Many documents show that during the 19th century
Qatar'sjurisdiction and sovereignty were not at al1lirnitedto thc mainlands4.This sovereignty
51Annex IV.193, Vol.10, p.473; einphasis added.
32 Annex IV.197, Vol. 10, p. 497. This claim seemed linkedto the Ruler's pretensionsover Zubarah
(see,for instance, Annex IV.199, Vol.10,p. 507), even if this was denicd by Rahraiii(AiiiiexIV.201, Vol. 11,
P.5).
54Annex IV.227,Vol. II, p.325.
-An Ottoman sketch ofJune 1867 sliowingthe bordcrs of Qatar incliidesDibal and Qit'atJaradali
cfearlyseparatedfrom Bahrain by a dotled line(Annex IV.5,Vol. 9, p14);
- An Ottomansketchof Septetnber 1867 showingthe borders of Qatar includcsDibaland Qit'atJaradah
(Annex IV.6, Vol.9, p.23);
- Conversely, an Ottoman sketch of October 1867sliowing tlie borders of Rahrain does not include
Dibal and Qit'atJaradah (Annex IV.7, Vol.9,p. 27);
- An Ottoman sketchof Novembcr 1867showing the borders of Qatar indicatestliat Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah are theproperty of Qatar. The distance fromthese two faslits to the iiiainland are indicated in leagues
(Annex IV.8, Vol. 9, p. 33);
- A staternentof November 1867 from a Turkish MarineCaptainto the Vali in Hvsainentions that Al
Mainzoor(Dibal) and Qit'atJaradahbelongto Qatar(Annex IV 9, Vol.9,p. 39);
- A statementfrom BarakahBin Era'ar,Valiof Hasa, dated 26 February 1870 describes thsea borders
of Qatar as extending "fromthecoastof Zubarah upto approximately20 marine leagucs"(AnnexIV.Il, Vol. 9,
p.49);
-A statement of the Vice Commanderof the Sultanic Marine Fleet to Hafidh Basha, Governor of the
Province of Basrah, dated5October 1870indicates thesea bordersof Qatar. "fromZubarah fromthe Westinthewas at the time recognised officially by the Turkish and British authnrities. For Bahrain to
displace such a title would have required acquiescence fiom Qatar whicli was never obtained.
In fact, the image of "Bahrain ruIing the waves" was fabricated by Belgrave only in the late
1930s,when he put into practice a systematic policy of maritime iinperialism liidcedto oil
discoverY".
2. Second phase, since 1960:continentalshelf claim based on the Geneva Convention
togetherwith special circumstances
10.34 Around 1960,Bahraingave up ils claim to the sen by advancing a claim limited to the
sea-bedandbased on the median line together with fishing rights as a specid circumstance. A
first sign of this evolution was reflected in the Political Resident'sletter of 19December 1960,
addressed to the Rulerof Bahrain, wherethe followingis noted:
"Your Highness has on a number of occasions told me that because the pearling and
fishing fleets of Bahrain had established her sovereignty over certain areas of the sea
bed, Bahrain also had the right to exploit minerals below the surface of those areas.
The legal experts in the Foreign Office have carehIly considered Yoiu Highness's
assertion but they have corne to the conclusion that the validity of your claim cannot
be re~o~nised~~."
direction of Bahrain is twenty marine leagues". Consideringthese distances, the accnmpanying sketch would
includethe twofashts iftheywere drawn (Annex IV.13,Vol.9, p. 57);
- A leüer dated 17November 1871from Zayed Bin Khalifah, Sheikh of Abu Dhabi and Bin Yass, to
Medhat Basha, Vali of Hasa, specifies that Al-Mammor (Dibal) and Qit'atJaradah belong to the sea of Qatar
(Annex 1V.12,Vol. 9,p. 53);
- Another sketch dated5 and 10 October 1874 witli British and Turkish stamps representsQatar and
includesspecifically Qit'atJaradahand Mamzoor(Dibal)(Annex IV.I4,Vol. 9p. 63);
- A letter from Zayed Bin Khalifah, Sheikhof Abu Dhabi, to BarakBin Era'ar,Vali of Hasa, dated
23 December 1874describes Al-Mamzoor(Dibal) and Qit'atJaradah ashelongiiito Qatar (Aniiex IV.15,Vol.
9,P. 67);
- A sketch of Qatar'sborders made during the reign of Saeed Basha Al-Mousily, Valiof Hasa, dated
May 1898, and stamped by various Turkish and Europeanseals sliows Dihal and Qit'atJaradah as lying within
choseborders (AnnexIV.17,Vol. 9, p. 75);
- A letterfrom the Vice Commander of the Sultanic Marine Fleet, Bash Jawisli, to Hafidh Basha,
Govemor of the Province of Basrah (undated) defines the sea borders of Bahrain as ending tcn marine leagues
before the city ofubarah. The accompanying sketch showsalso the sea borders of Qatar which facc those of
Bahrain; thetwo fashts wouldappearon the Qatariside ifthey were shown(AnIlexIV.10,Vol. 9, p. 43).
55See,paras.6.41erseq.,above.
56Annex IV.231,Vol. Il, p. 343. In acknowledging recciptof this letter the Kulerof Balirain informed
the Political Resident thathe had put thematterin the handsofhis lawyers(Annex IV.232,Vol. 11,p. 349).10.35 This new position of the Ruler of Bahrain was formally conveyed to the British
Governrnent by a lcttcr of 16 August 1961 froln the Ruler to Sir William L~ice, the Political
Resident, to which was attached a Memorandum outlining his casein support of I~isclaim and
suggesting that preliminary discussions be held betweeii his legal adviscrs in 1,ondon and
those of the Foreign office5'. One of the maps illusti-atingBahraiii'sclaim is reproduced as
Map No. 13 facing the following page. Bahrain's claim was rejected outright by a letter from
the Foreign Officc of 5 Junc 1962, while leavi~lgopen the possibility of discussicinsbetween
the Foreign Office and the Ruler's legd adviserçS8,and on 20 Jurie and 2 August 1962
inconclusive meetings were heldal the Foreign Office betwccnthc legal advisers of the Rulcr
of Bal~rainand Mr. Walrnsleyand some Foreign Officelcgal advisersS9.
10.36 A direct challenge tothe Iegalright of the British Governnient lo prolnulgatc the 1947
decision and to make a binding "award" was advancedin a strong üiidweI1-reasonedopinion
obtained by Bahrain from Sir Lionel Heald (a CormerAttorney-General), which washmded
overto the Forcign Office by Bahrain's legaladvisers ot~3 July 1963"'.
10.37 Bahrain'sMemorandum of 196 16'contained severalsiibstantiveclaims:
1. The sea bed should be dividcd according to the equidistance inetbod provided for in
the 1958 Geneva Convention;
57The letter and Memorandum are reproduced as Annex IV.213, Vol. II, p. 353 and Annex IV.254,
Vol. 12, p. 17,respectively. The Memoranduin was accompanied by two anncxcs (Lhetirst, dated 12 October
1950,isan affidavit by Dr. Bhandarker;the second, dated 26 October 1950,is a stateinent by Jahor Musallain, a
pearl merchant of Bahrain). This Memorandum is rcfcrrcdto in a furthes letter fi.onidie Ruler to thc Political
Kesident dated 18February 1962,reproduced asAnnex IV.238, Vol.11, p. 373.The final niaps illustrating thc
claim were officially sent by the Ruler's lawyers under coveraoletter date2 March 1964, corrected by a
further letter of 10 March1964. Thcsc letters and the inaps are reprodiirisAnnexes IV.250 and IV.251,
Voi. 12,pp. 1and 5.
58
Annex IV.245, Vol. 11,p. 411.The reasons were not givcn. Hnwcvci-,a çonfïdentinl ~nemorandum
dated 17May 1962from Walmsley on the BahraidQatar Seabed Boundary gives some clucs:
"4. The claim embodied in the memorandum is extrerncly far-reaching. It is show11in green on the attachcd
chart. The claim as it stands is quite untetiable, being based on the assiirnption ihat ancient rights over pearl
banks confer the right to sovereigntyover the seabed" (Annex IV.242,Vol. I1,p. 391).
59Annex IV.247, Vol. 11,p. 419.
b0
6lAnnex IV.248, Vol.II, p. 425.
ttwas only on 31 August 1964 that Dr. Hassan Kanei, Adviser to tlie Qatari Govcmment, was
haiided a copy of the Ruler of Balirain's 1961 Memorandum togeihcr \vith actipy ofthe two inaps (Annex
IV.254, Vol. 12,p. 17).This is the reason why, until the British archives were open and perbythe Qatari
Government, this documeiit was refeired to by Qatar as the "Septemb1964 rneinorandum" (see, for instance,
Qatar's Applicationdaied5 July 1991,para. 23).2. The Iine so obtained should however be modified to take account of'a special
circumstance: the historicalrights of Bahrainto pearl fishcries;
3. Subsidiarily, Dibal aild Qit'atJaradah are not sliaa!s but islands and should therefore
62
carryterritorial waters .
10.38 The çlaims mentioned under points 1 and 3 are dealt with elsewhcre iii this
~emorial~~.With respect to the pearl fisheries, Bahrain'sposition was basically as follows:
(a) Bahrain had exercised exclusivc rights over the pearl fisherics ofr the wcstern çoast of
Qatar; and (b) these pearl fisherieswere a special circurnstalce justifiii-ig a departure from the
median line accordingto the ContinentalShelfConventionadoptcd in Geneva in 1958".
10.39 With regard to the facts, the claim that Bahrain exercised exclusive historic rights over
the pearl fisheries off the western coast of Qatar is contradicted by a wealth of evidence,
including investigatioiis and statementsmade by the British Governtnent, according to which
rights in pearl fisheries inthe Gulf werethe collective property of al1tribes living in the Gulf.
Furthermore, there are many documents showing that Qatar also had a rolc - even if less
important than that of Bahrain -in the exploitation of pearl fisheries. Finally, in any event, it
is an acknowledged fact that, by 1960, pearling in the Gulf was dcfunct for practical
commercial purposes.
10.40 As a matter of law, by relying on the 1958 Geneva Convei~tioilon the Continental
Shelf, Bahrain appears to have abandonedthe concept of commoiiright to scdenlary fisheries.
According to the Geneva Convention, sedentary fisheries are ailexclusive right of the coasial
State stemming from its sovereign rights to exploit the cantinental shelf. However that may
be, it appears that, in its 1961 claim that pearl fishery rights were a special circumstance
justifying a departure fiom the median line, Bahrain was applying the 1958 Convention
62 In his Memorandum the Rulerof Bahrain contended tbat "both Jaradah and Fasht Aldeeble are
islandsi.e.that Jaradah aa partof FaslitAldeeblarepermanentlyabovewater athigh tide, aiidhave been for
many years universally recognisedas belongingto Bahrain.There is permanent evidenceof this in the weliand
watertap established on each of them by the Bahrain authorities for the use of sailors and fishermen iii their
areas"(Annex IV.254,Vol. 12, p. 17).
63
Dibal and Qit'atJaradah are discussed in Section 4 of this Chaplcr; and the method for drawing a
singlemaritimeboiindaryisaddressedin ChaptersXI andXII,below.
64A detailed reporton this subjecto be found inAppendix4, Vol.15,p. 111,hcreto.wrongly. The Baliraini argument consisted in claiming that since Bahrain was the historical
owner of the oyster beds it should obtain the continental shelf'where they lay. But Bahrain
misunderstood the system. In the 1958 Convention and, for that matter, also in the 1982
Convention, sedentary fisheries - a categoryto which pearI fishing undoubtedly beIongs - are
considered as resources of the continental shelf. Hence the coastalStatc in whom is vested the
continental shelf rights possesses sovereign rights to them with respect to exploratioii and
exploitation, &so iure and to the exclusionof any other Statc. It is thus not surprising that tlie
wcakness of the Bahraini position was repeatedly pointed out to the Ruler of Bahrain and l~is
lawyers by the British authorities.
C. Evolution of theBritishGovernment'sPosition
10.41 In the face of the cornplaints of both Rulers, but particularly of the Ruler of Bahrain,
and coiifronted with requests to revise the 1947line, the British Goveri~ment'sposition was
equivocal for many years, maintaining in some statements ihat the line was final and
admitting in others that it could be revised". However, in spite of tlie doubts expressed
internally, the British Government stuck as long as possible ta the position that it could iiot
revise the decision.
10.42 This having been said, the Foreign Office slowly came roundto the view that the line
could be revised if both Rulers agreed. Among the factors whichled to ihis gradua1shift of
position werethe following:
(a) the uncertain nature of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, in particular the question whether
these two featureswere islands or low-tideelevations";
(b) the course of the line itself, having regard to the perception that thcre miglit be an
inconsistency between the 1947 line (which was not in ilsoi-iginconceived of as a
65For instance, the line was officially confïrmed to the R30eApril 1949 (sccAnnexes IV.131
and IV.133, Vol.10, pp.169 and 179) but a little later in the year (21 Nov1949) itwas decided not to
reconfinn i(see,AnnexIV.152, Vol. 10,p. 263). See, also, Annexes 1V.153and IV.1Vol. IO,pp. 269 and
3 17.In mid-1950there wasa decision not to modifythe lisec,letter froFO to PABdated 29 August 1950
(Annex Iuu173, Vol. 10p. 365),aftewhich therewere many siaternentssliowingadherencto the1947line.
This issuewill be analysed inthe followingsection. strict median line)and the solutionrecornmended in the Boggs-Kennedy Report issued
at the end of 1948 (which envisaged the applicaticineveiywhere in the Gulf of the
median line principle based on an equidistance Iine between thc mainland coasts of
countries facing each other);
(c) the incompleteness of the line in the north, giving risto the ideathat Bal-iraincould be
compensated in the northern part of the seabed boundary for what it regürded as thc
unfairnessof the more southerly part of the 1947Iine;
the unhappiness of bothRulers with the 1947line, combincd with serious legal doubts
(d)
which had been raised asto the validity andbinding character of the 1947de~ision~~.
10.43 This shifl of position coincided with a suggestion ventilated at the beginning of 1962
that the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over the 1947 iinc miglit be referred to an
international arbitration process. The Ruler of Bahrain consented in principle to arbitration in
a letter addressed to Lord Carringjon afier a formalvisit to London on 27 Suly 1964~'.It W~S
only on 31August 1964,that Qatar received a copy of the Ruler of Bahrain'sMemorandum of
1961together with a copy of the two inap~~~I.nreply to this Mernorandum,Qatar addresscd a
Memorandum to the British Govemment on 21 April 1965refuting Bahrain's allegations and
recornmending arbitration as a solution to the dispute between the two slates7'. For Qatar,
however, the dispute over the 1-Iawar islands, not mentioned in the Memorandum of 1961,
must be included among the disputes to be submitted to arbitration; and it was Bahrain's
objection to the inclusion of the Hawar islands among the q~~estionsto be s~ibrnittedto
arbitration which was to leadto the breakdown of the arbitrationproposa1inthe late 1960s.
67,Tee,Annex IV.152 V,ol. 10,p. 263Set, in particular, Annex1V.248,Vol. II, p. 42Sce,also,
Annex I68147,Vol. 10,p. 241.
AnnexIV.252,Vol. 12,p.9.
70Sec,para. 10.37,footnote Gabove.
Annex IV.255, Vol. 12p.51. Section 4. The Dibal and Oit'at Jaradah Shoals
A. Introduction
10.44 Pasagraph4 of the lettersof 23December 1947ran asfollows:
"His Highnessthe Shaikhof Bahrainis recognized ashaving sovercignriglits in
(i) Theareas of the DibalandJaradehshoalswhich are abovethc spriiigtide low-water
level.After a full examination of the position under iriternational law, Ilis Majesty's
Government are of opinion that these shoaIs should not be considered to be islands
having territorial waters7'."
As noted above,this part ofthe decisionwasnot acceptedby eitherofthe two ~u1e1-s~~.
10.45 It is first of al1 necessary to describe the circumstances in which the British
Government adopted this part of the disputed decision of 23 December 1947.Attempts by
Belgrave to assert a claim of Bahraini sovereignty over these tcvo fashtç begm in the late
1930s, in connection with the extension of the oil concession of BAPCO beyond the main
Bahraini islands. The opinion of both Rulers on the subject was officially sought by
Galloway, the Political Agent in Bahrain in June1946.Belgrave repliedby letters of 18June
194673,10 July 1946~~2 ,2 Ju1y 1946" and 20 October 1946'~,a1s0providing a map77.The
Ruler of Qatar replied on 13 July 1946~',and Galloway reported on his enquiries to the
Political Resident on 31 Deceinber 1946~~I.n his lettcr he discussed the conflicting claims
over the shoals and gave his own opinion. His proposal was 10 üllocate soveïeignty over the
two shoals to Bahrain. Hay, the Political Resident, in a letter of 18 January 1947 to the
Secretary of State forIndia "reluctantlyagree[d] with the Political Agent" with regardto the
7'AnnexesIV. 115and IV.116,Vol. 10,pp. 71and75
72
73See,paras. 10.22eseq.,above.
74AniiexIV.79,Vol. 9, p381.
AnnexIV.82,Vol.9, p.393.
7SAnnexIV.86,Vol. 9, p.411.
76Annex IV.89,Vol. 9, p. 423.
77Annex IV.90, Vol. 9, p. 427.
78Annex IV.83,Vol.9, p. 397.
79AnnexIV.92,Vol. 9,p.435.ownership of these two features, "if it is possible for anybody to establish a cIaiin over shoals
of the kind describedS0".
10.46 The British authorities which dealt withthe matter at governmcntal level did not query
the views of the Political Agent and the Political Resideriton the problein of ownership of the
fashts. However, they did not draw the consequences of these findings for the maritime
delimitation, in that they did not considerthat either ofthe shoals carried territorial waters.
10.47 The final interna1 decision appears in a letter dated 10 Novembcr 1947 from thc
Secretary of State for CommonwealthRelations to the Political Resident. The part relating to
the two shoals ran as follows:
"(b)Dibul and Jaradeh shoals. Since the Sheikh of Baivein has takeil steps usirally
regarded as suMicientfor an assertion of sovereignty, it is considcred tliat these shoals
must be allotted to him.It is not considered, however, that they should have territorial
waters and Bahrein sovereignty over thein will thus extend only to the areas which are
above the spring tide low-water Ievel ..H.M.G.do not coiisidcr that there would be
justification for deviating themedian line to include Dibal and Jaradeh on thc Bahrein
side8'."
10.48 With respect to the Dibal and Qit'atJaradah shoaIs, the decisioii of 23 December 1947
involved three issues which have each been disputed: the ownership of the shods; their
character as low-tide elevationsor islands, and their impact on the seabed dividing line. These
points areclosely interrelated.
10.49 As will be seen below, the British Government appears to have allocated sovereignty
over the shoals to Bahrain by a reasoning based on ananalogy bctweeii low-tide elevations
and land territory. Howevcr, unlike islands, whose ownership is acquired by the usual
methods of acquisition of land territory,the acquisition of Iow-tideelevations was in 1947and
still isovemed by application of the law of the sea. Consequently the first question to settle
80Annex IV.93,Vot. 9, p.449.
8tAnnexIV.108 V,ol10,p.35.is the nature of the two shoals: islandsor low tide elevations?It is submitted that they are low-
tide elevations and that accordinglythe lawapplicableto the attribution ofthesc features is the
law of the sea. Therefore the reasoning of the British Ciovernmcntinsofa- as it was based on
the analogy of land territory lacks conviction. The nature of Dibal and Jaradah as islands or
shoalsas a question of fact and law will first be exarninedhercafter. This will be followed by
adiscussionof the rules of attributionof sovereignrightsovcr low-lideelevations.
B. Nature of theseFeatures: Islandsor Shoals? A Question of Fact and Law
10.50 During the period 1947-1960there were differing views among British officials both
onthe facts and on the applicable legalprinciples.
10.51 On the facts, the officials concerned could not make up their minds as to the nature of
these two shoals: were they islands or iow tide elevations? During thc period under rcview,
there were conflicting statements about the physical nature of these two sIioals, in particular
whether or not theywere above water at al1states of thetide.
10.52 In law, the lawyers were equally divided as to tlie definition of ailisland capable of
carryingterritoriai waters; ina nutshell,the official view, forsome time, was that a mere rock
or shoal, which was above water atal1states of the tide, carried territorialwaters only if it was
capable of permanent habitation. Moreover, there were differences of view as to whether an
artificially made island could be deemedto bean island in its own right.
1.Hydrographicalcharacteristics
10.53 The location of Dibal and Qit'atJaradah has been discussed in Chapter IX above. The
hydrographical characteristics of these two features are extremely important to detemine
whether they are islands or low-tide elevations. In Appendix 5" are listed in chronological
order the various sources and authorities which dcscribe these two features, from which the
following conclusions may be drawn:
82Appendix 5,Vol. 15p. 125.10.54 For Dibalthere seem to be no conflicting views on its physical characteristics: from at
least 1825 it has been a coral reef covered by water at high tide and dryirig in patches at low
tide. The only features rising pemanently above water were or arc artificial. There are at
present two light beacons consisting of a metal pedestal on a concrcte base. The photograph
facing this page, taken at the beginning of October 1995, shows the artificial structure at the
north-east of the shoal, which is al1 that appears above the water at high tideR3.Dibal is
therefore clearly a low-tide elevation in its natural forrn. It extcnds approximately 4.7 miles
north to south and 2.7miles east to west.
10.55 For Qit'atJaradah, in spite of some hesitation from 1940 onwards, it appears that it is
partly a coral reef which is not dry at high tide and partly a sand bank which niay not be dry at
al1states of the tide along its southem edge; this latter part variesinsliape aiidelevation with
the wind (which is to be expected). The only features which are perinancntly above water are
artificial. At present there is a light beacon, erected on a masonry base structure on the
southern end of the reef, and a poIe. The photograph facing this page, taken at thc end of July
1996, shows those artificial structures,which are al1that appear above the water at high tideV4.
Qit'atJaradah is a low tide elevation in its natural form.
2. Legalcontroversiesabout the definitionof an island
a)Definitionsof "islands"and of "low-tideelevations" in thc Geneva and MontegoBay
Conventions
10.56 According to Article 10 of the Geneva Convention of 29 April 1958on the Territorial
Seaandthe Contiguous Zone:
"1.An island is a naturally-fomed area of land, surroundcd by water, which is above
water at high tide."
Article 1 1defines asfollows a lûw-tide elevation :
83
See,"PredictionofHighand Low Waters",October 1995and July 1996,Ministryof Coinmunication
andTrans84rt,Annex IV.328,Vol. 13,p.303.
See,AnnexIV.328,Vul. 13,p.303. "1. A low-tideelevation is a naturally-formedarea of land which is surrouiidedby and
above water at low-tidebut submergedat high tide."
These definitions have been confirmed by the 1982UnitedNations Convention on the Law of
the Sea: Article 121, paragraph 1, for islands and Articlc 13, paiagraph 1, for low-tide
elevations. However, things have not always becn so clear. In particulai.,at the time of the
British decision of 1947and for some years later, there were differing views among British
lawyers and decision-makers as to the exact definition of these concepts.
b)Hesitations of the British Government about the concepts of islands and of low-tide
elevations
10.57 During the period under review there were doubts about the Iegal nature and impact of
islands and of low-tide elevations.Arnongthese doubts were tl-iefollowing:
- To be entitled to territorial waters should an island be capable of use and occupation?
A negativeconclusion was eventuallyreached.
- 1san artificial island to be assimilatedto a natural island? Again, t1958 Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea have settledthis point beyoiiddoubt:an artificial island cannot be assimilated to a natural
oiieandtherefore does not carryterritorialwaters.
-
Can a low-tide elevation be converted artificially inan isiand? Here also the reply is
now settled inthe negative.
- Should a feature be permanentlyabove water to quali@ as an island? The reply is yes,
otherwise itis alow-tide elevation.
10.58 These considerations of fact and of law lead to the conclusion that Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah are low-tide elevations, and that the artificial structuresbuilt on thcm have not altered
their character. C. Rulesof Attribution ofSovereign Rightsover Low-TideElevations
1.The law of the sea is theapplicable law
10.59 As already noted, the British Goverment appears to have attributed sovercign rights
over the shoals to Bahrain by a reasoning based on a mistaken analogy betwecn low-tide
elevations and land territory. In the following paragraphs it is subn~ittedthat the rules of
attribution of sovereignrights over low-tideelevations are govcrnedby tlie law of the sea.
10.60 In his letter of18 January 1947,Hay, the Political Residcnt, writing to the Secretaryof
State for India, although acquiescing in the solution proposcd by the Political Agent,
expressedhis doubts:
"Withregard to the ownership of these two places 1reluctantly agree with the Political
Agent that if itispossiblefor anybody to estahlisha daim ovev shauls of the kind
described,they rnustbe regardedasbelonging to 13ahrain8?''
In fact, it wouId have been more appropriate to attribute sovereign rights over low-tide
elevations by reference to criteriaderiving fromthe law of the sea. Some Brilisliofficiaistook
this approach. Thus, Prior, the Political Resident, in his Ietter of 7 June 1940to the Secretary
of State for India, wrote concerning Dibal:it "...belongs to neither and is resorted to by al1
fishermen under stress of ~eather"~~.
10.61 Qatar submits that the proper law concerning appropriation of sovereign rights over
low-tideelevations entirely relies on the law of thesca, and that the rules governing the status
and legal effect of low-tide elevationsvary according to their localioil.
10.62 A low-tide elevationin the territorial sea of a Statebelangs to that State as part of the
bed of its territorial sea. As provided in Article 2 of the 1982Convention on the Law of the
Sea:
85
86Annex 1V.93, Vol9, p. 449; emphasisadded.
Annex IV.63, Vol. p.309. "1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory and interna1
waters ..to an adjacentbelt of sea, described asthe territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty exteiidsto the air space over the territoriasea as well as to ils bed
and subsoil."
When the low-tide elevation is situated in territorial waters,itrnay affect thc breadtl~of these
waters. As provided in Article 13,paragraph 1,ofthe 1982 Convention:
"Where a low-tide elevation is situatedwholly or partly ata distance not exceeding the
breadtli of the territoriasea from the mainland or an islaiid,the Iow-waterline on that
elevationinay be used as the base linefor measuring the breadth of the territorial sea."
10.63 If the Iow-tideelevation is in the high seas it is not capable of appropriation. Article 89
ofthe 1982Convention, of indisputablecustomary character, provides:
"No State mayvalidly purport to subjectanypart of the lliiigh seas toits suvereignty."
As stated in Oppenheim'sIntsrnutional Law:
"Since the high seas are free, no part of it can be the object of acquisition of
sovereignty by occupation nor can mere rocks or banks in the open sea, although
iighthouses rnaybebuilt on them"."
10.64 Most importantly, as part of the seabed,a low-tide elevation may form an integral part
of the continental shelf of the relevant coastaI State. In such a case, as declared by Article 77
ofthe 1982Convention:
"1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the
purpose of expioring it and exploiting its natural resourçes."
By its status as part of the continental shelf, the low-tide elevation is incapable of
appropriationby a third State. Paragraph2 of the sameArticleprovides:
87
AnnexIV.3 10,VoI. 13p. 195. "The rights referred to in paragraph 1are exclusive in the sensethat if the coastal State
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may
undertake these activities withoutthe expressconsent ol'the coastal Stüte."
2. Practice in theGulf in this regard
10.65 Various examples ofthe practice followedin ille Guifare as Sollows:
- Seal, from Admiralty, Military Branch, in a letter to Clauson, India Office, of29 April
2937, impliedly suggested that sovereignty over Fasht al Jarim, FashtDibal and other fashts
of the region (also called rocks or islands) should in general be attributed according to
proximity88.
-
During the negotiations betweeilthe Britisli Government and Saudi Arabia concerning
the maritime boundary between Bahrainand SaudiArabia,Fry,of the Foreign Office, dealing
with the caseof Fasht al Jarimwroteto Sir Rupert Hay on3 April 1951as follows:
"We do not trace any claim to Fasht-al-Jarim ...ever having beeri made by Ibn Saud
and presume therefore that it is acknowledged to belong to Bahraiil; as it will fa11on
the Bahrain side of the sea-bed boundary whichwe intendto propose, we have omitted
it frornour lists!'t
Saudi Arabia proposed that Bainah-as-Saghir island and Fasht-al-Jarim and Rennie shoals
should go to Bahrainand Bainah-al-Kabir and Fasht-bu-Sa'afa shoal to Saudi Arabia:
"Their claims to these places were made on similar grounds to the claims of Bahrain
and especiallÿ on the fact that both the places which they claimcd lie nearer to the
Saudi Arabian coastthan to ~ahrain~'."
88Annex IV.35, Vol.9, p. 161.
89AnnexIV.191, Vol. 10,p. 465.
90 Annex IV.195, Vol. 10, p483. Tlie same position was conveyed in çitnilar lems by the Political
Agent Bahrain to theRuler of Bahrainon 17September 1951(Aiiiiex IV.196, Vol.10,p. 491).Similarly,on 21
January 1952,Prof. C.H.M. Waldockproduced in favour of BAPCO an opinion entitled "TlieNorth Jariin Area
- The Sheikh of Bahrein'sClaim to the Sea-bed and Subsoil"in which he ineiitioiiedthc followiii"21. It is
understood from the Foreign Officeliat in the London negotiationsSaodiArabia admittedBahrein'sclaiiiithe
Jarim Shoal.I am not clear whether this admissiowas inade on thefooting that Bahreinwas acknowledgedto
have previously possessed territorial sovereignty over the Shoalor on thc footing tliat a incdian line would in
any case place the Shoalonthe Bahreinsideof the boundary"(Annex IV.203,Vol. 11,p.27).The BahraidSaudi Arabia agreement of 1958is a good example of the practice followed in
the Gulf, where al1the islands and shoals taken into account during the negotiations were
allocated on the previously mnoted basis that shoals or submergea banks should belong to the
State on whose side of the median Iine dividing the Bal~raiiiiSaudiArabia sea-bed area they
liey'.
10.66 This position was sun~marizedby C.M. Rose of the Foreign Officc iri a minute dated
26Febsuary 2953on the Londoiitalks:
"It was further agreed that der settlement of the ownership of the islands and shoals
under dispute and the subsequent drawing of the dividing line, the remaining islands
and shoals should be regarded as belonging to the party on whose side of the line they
iaY9' ".
10.67 Under these circumstancesit is worth readingagain the letter addrcssedby the Ruler of
Qatar to the Political Agent in Bahrain dated 13 July 1946and the main argument it put
fonvard:
"If we look into the question fiom the point of view 01'equülity, Qatar is to be
entrusted with Deebil and Jaradah Fashts which are siluated betwecn Qatar and
Bahrain, and they are nearerto Qatar. You see that Qatar lias been trcated unjustly in
her clear right in the question of Hawar islands which 1 üm still tenacious to clailn their
ownership, then how aboutthe othersg3."
It will be noted that this opinion of the Ruler of Qatar was shared by several British officials
who expressly or by implication sawthe reasonablenessof the proximity principle wilh regard
to these two shoalilS4.
91
Annex IV.216, Vol. 11,p. 235. Sec, also, Annex IV.162,Vol. 10,p. 31 1:"We are glad to see from
your letter EA 127611of the 27th January,to Sir R. Hay ihat you contemplatetliat, where thcre isno clear cut
title toany islanitwillgotothe State inwhosesea-bedit is situated"S'cealso, AiiiiexIV.192,Vol. 10, p. 469.
"...the Rennieand Bu Sa'afalishoafs,...are not, to the beofmy belief, strictly speaking shoalsat all, in that
they are never exposed at any statof the tide though theyboth have lights or soine sort of marker on thein.
Their ownershipshould, in my opinion,be based on any decision which mayhe reached regardingthe position
of the sea-bed boundary. On the other hand, if thesetwo slioals are taken into accounin the forthcorning
negotiations,we shall also probabiy Iiaveto take into consideratothersimiiar shoals suchasAshira and Bu
Athama."
93Annex IV.205,Vol. 11,p.61.
AiinexIV.83, Vol.9, p.397.
94Sce, PAB to PRPG, 20 August 1937,expectingthat Qatar "might lay claiiii"to FaslitDibal, Jaradah
and the Hawar group (Annex IV.36, Vol. 9,p. 167);Prior, PRPG,ta Secretary of Staie foIndia,7 June 1940:10.68 At the time, Dibal and Qit'atJaradah, being low-tide elevations, located in the area
beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea (and in conformity with the practice in the Gulf),
had to be considered as located on the part of the continental shelf which, according to the
1947decision, had to be attributedto Qatar.Accordingly, Dibal and Qil'at Jasadah also had to
be attributed to Qatar,because they were onthe Qatariside of the line.
10.69 Now that both States have proclaimed a territorial sea of 12 miles, the matter may be
viewed frorn another perspective. As mentioned above, Dibal is 9.3 nautical miles from the
nearest point on Qatar's low water line (and about 11.5 nautical niiles from the high water
line) and 13.6nautical miles from the nearest point 011 the low water line {wl~ichis also the
nearest point on the high water line) of Bahrain. Qit'atJaradah is 9.4 nautical miles froni tlie
nearest point an Qatar's low water Iine (and about 10.6nautical miles froni the high water
line) and 10.8 nauticd miles fiom the nearest point on the low water linc (the A.I.S.C. Jetty,
which is also the nearest point on the high water line) of ~al~rain~'.In both cases the two
shoals are closer to the territory of Qatar.
Section 5. Conclusion
10.70 The British decision of 1947 delimiting the sea-bed between Qatar and Bahrain was
issued in the context of the emerging continental shelf doctrine, which requires that
delimitation be made in accordance with equitable principles, rather than in application of
fixed rules to be applied in every case. In order to make this delimita~iuii,the British
authorities adopted three criteria: exclusive consideration of the two main coasts, selection of
lixed turning points, and a simplified line, for reasons of sirnplicity and certainty. For these
reasoilsthe line determinedby the British isnot the truc median line, which wüs not the intent
"Theonly equitableboundaryforthe two cornpanies[sicshould lie midway between respective shores" (Annex
IV.63, Vol.9,p. 309) and Priorto Peel, I26 October 1941(Anncx IV.70, Vol. 9,p. 339); Harrison, Under-
Secretaryof Statefor Indiato Stock,Ministryof Fuand Power,2 July 1936 :Frointheinap ilooks as though
the spots whereBapco wantto driilnboththeseareasmight more properlyfal l»Qatar" (Anncx IV.80,Vol. 9,
p. 385); Stock,in his reply of 17July 1946concu"..a frontier lineshotildthen be drawiidue north from the
Hawar Islands which wouldleavJe abal and Jaradeh ... in Qatar territory" (AIV.85,Vol. 9, p.405);and
Harrison,lndia Office, toGauft,FO, 13Februar1947:"It looksas thouglithe Bahreinclatosthese slioalswill
have to be upheld in spitofthe factthat they wouldon grounds ofcontiguity mostnaturally falo Qatar."
(Annex IV.94,Vol. 9, p. 459).
YSSm, paras.9.11-9.12,above.of the British authorities; rather, their aim was to decide upo1.ia line in accordance with
equitable principles.
10.71 Although the Ruler of Qatar was content with the line itselî, he protested at the
exceptions whiçh were made for the Hawar islands (for the reasons uulliiled in Chaptcrs V
and VI above), and the shoals of Dibal and Qit'atJaradah. As far as the latter are concerned,
Qatar has demonstrated in fact and in law that they are both low-tide elevations, and that the
artificial structures built on them cannot alter their character. Conscqucntlythey cannot carry
territorial waters. Being,at the Limeof the 1947decision when the breadth of the territorial
sea of both States was only three miles, low-tide elevationslocatcd on the continental shelf
which extends in an unintenupted way fiom Qatar to Bahrain, Dibal and Qit'atJaradah wcre
parts of the sea-bed recognised as appertaining to Qatar and should have been attributed
accordingly.
10.72 As both States have now proclaimed a territorial sea of 12 iniles, the matter may be
considered from another perspective. In this context it may be noted that Qit'atJaradah is
wholly situated in the area where the territorial seas of Qatar and Bahraia overlap, and that
Dibal is situated partly within the territorial sea of Qatar. In both cases the two shoals are
closer to the territory of Qatar.
10.73 In the submissions contained in its Application dated 5 July 1991, Qatar requested the
Court to adjudge and declare that the State of Qatarhas sovereignrights over Dibal and Qit'at
Jaradah shoals. In view of the subsequent extension ofthc territorial waters of both States,
Qatar now requests the Court to adjudge anddeclarethat Dibal and Qil'ai Jaradah are low-tide
elevations which, by their very location, areunder Qatar'ssovereignty. CHAPTERXI
THE SINGLEMARITIMEBOUNDARYAND THE 1947 LINE
Introduction
11.1 In its Application fi1edin the Registry on 8July 1991, the State of Qatar rcquested the
Court:
"With due regard to the line dividing the sea-bed of thtwo States as dcscribed in the
British decision of23 December 1947,to draw in accordance with intcrnatianal law a
single maritime boundary between the maritime areas of sea-bed, subsoil and
superjacent waters appertaining respectively to the State of Qatar and the State of
Bahrain."
11.2 Accordingiy, the task of the Court in this respect is to draw a boundary liiie which will
divide the different maritime zones that the two States are eiititled to claim under present
international law, and which has to be an alt-purpose dividing line. In the drawing of such a
line, itannot be said that the Court is faced with a purely de novo maritime delimitation,
since in a partof the relevant maritimarea a line dividing the seabed between the Parties had
dready beendrawn in 1947by the British authorities'. It follows frorn this consideration that
the Court will have to make anevaluation of what weight shouldbe given to this previous line
in the drawing of the single maritime boundary. In the view of Qatar, it will be convenient to
consider the delimitation in two distinct sectors. The southern sector is the one in which the
main part of the line of the British decisionof 1947 is located.In this secior the coastsof
Qatar and Bahrain are opposite. The northern sector isthe sector starting ilorth of a notional
line joining Ras Rakan and Muharraq up to the lines of the continental slielf delimitation
agreements of the two States with Iran. The BLVpoint mentioned in the British decision of
1947is to be found in the soutlierpart of the northem sector.
11.3 It may be noted that the extension of their respective territorial scby Qatar in 1992
and by Bahrain in 1993,up to twelve nautical miles, has generated a new lcgal situation with
respect to which the weight to be given to the 1947dividiiig linhas to be cvaluated. Within
1See, ChapterX,above.the context of this situation,the 1947line is now certainly an impoi-tantfactor to be taken into
account for the purpose of drawingthe singlemaritime boundary.
11.4 This Chapter will be devoted to these different aspects and, having regard to the new
situation referred to above, it will also demonstrate that any claim by Bahrain concerning
archipelagic baselines would be irrelevant for the purposc of maritime delimitation in the
present case.
Section 1. The Extension of the TerritorialSea by Qatar and Bahrain
11.5 The movement towards the extensionof territorialwaters began in the Gulf wlm Saudi
Arabia and Iraq in 1958and Iran in 1959enacted national legislation establishing a 12-mile
limit2.Kuwait and Oman took steps to that end in 1967 and 1972, respectively3. Since the
decisions taken by Qatarin 1992,and by both Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in 1993,
al1the GulfStatesnow have a 12-mileterritorialse$.
A. The 1992 QatariDecreeand Bahrain's Reaction
11.6 When Amiri DecreeNo. 40 of 1992was issued on 16April 1992, defining the breadth
of the territorial sea and contiguous zone of the State of Qatar, it was made clear that this
decision wasfully in accordancewith theexisting rules of international law5.
11.7 In a protest note dated 14May 1992,the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of
Bahrain raised the point that the Qatari Decree did not makeanyprovision for a maritime
boundary with Bahrain and, arguing that different islands and features lying within the
maritime areasconcerned were part of Bahrain'sterritory, it stressed the impossibility for the
Qatari territorial sea to be extended to 12 nautical miles where the coasts of the two States
faced each other. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar rejected the Bahraini
allegations concerning those islands and features by a note dated 26 May 1992, in which
2See,AnnexesIV.215, IV.217and IV.219,Vol. II, pp.23245and 269.
3See,AnnexesIV.257and 1V.265,Vol. 12,pp.65 and121.
5ee, Annex1V.282,Vol. 12,p. 265.
See,AnnexIV.278,Vol. 12, p.241.emphasis was put on the fact that Qatar had never recognixed the British decisions that had
purportcd to declare that the Hawar islands belong 10 Bahraiil and that it had recently
submitted to the International Court of Justice the question cifsovereignty over those islands
pursuant to the 1987and 1990Agreementswhich had been reached bctwcenthe two states6.
B. The 1993Bahraini Decree-Law
11.8 One year after the Qatari decision extending to 12 nautical miles tlie breadth of its
territorial waters, the State of Bahrain issued on20 April 1993 a Law by Decree with rcspcct
to its territorial sea and contiguous zone, whose object and purpose wcre exactly the same as
those of Qatari DecreeNo. 40 of 1992~. The onIy difference betwecn these two national texts
lay in the fact that the Bahraini decree-law contained no explicit provision dealing with the
right of innocent passage through territorial waters, the navigational rights of foreign vessels
in those waters being simply identified through the broad rcference made to the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea inthe preamble but not in the operative part of the
text.
11.9 The 1993 Bahraini decree-law was undoubtedly issued as a reaction to the 1992 Qatari
decree. In this respect, it is noteworthy that, in its above-mentioncd protest of 14May 1992,
Bahrain had made it perfectly clear that it would extend in due time ils own territorial sea to
12 nautical miles and would claim aiso a contiguous zone up to a filrther 12nautical miles, as
had been doneby ~atar'.
C. The Conseauence of the Extensionof the Territorial Sea in the Present Case
11.10 It isapparent that as a consequence of the extension of their respective territorial seas
by both States, there has been a change in the status of some parts of'the maritime areas in
which the Court is asked todraw a maritime boundary. At the time of the Iiling by Qatar of its
Application in the Registry of the Court, on 8 July 1991,each of the two territorial scas had a
G
For the text of the Bahrainiand Qatari notes ofand 26 May 1992, sec,Annexes IV.279 and
1V.280,V7l. 12,pp.247 and253.
8AnnexIV.281, Vol. 12p.261.
See,AnnexIV.279,Vol. 12,p.247.breadth of3 nautical miles and they did not overlap,thus leaving ailarea of continental shelf
and superjacenthigh seas betweenthe twofacingcoastsof Qatarand Bahrain, Butby the time
of the Court's Judgmentof 15February 1995,that part of the maritime area lying between the
coasts of Qatarand Bahrainwasformedby the overlappingterritorialseasof the two States.
11.11 In the present situation, the twoareasofterritorialwaters ovcrlapin the southernsector
(i.e.,south of the line drawn between RasRakan and AT-Muharraq), as a result of the short
distance between the two opposite coastswhich virtually nowhere exceeds24 nautical miles.
Consequently, in that part of the delimitation area, the request presented to the Court, in
confonnity with the Bahraini formula, "to draw a single maritime boundary between [the]
respectivemaritime areasof sea-bed, subsoiland superjacent waters"of the Partieseffectively
concems the delimitationof their respectiveareas of territorialsea, i.e.maritime zoneswhere
by that very fact, sovereigntyextendsto the watersas well as to the bed and subsoil of the sea
and also to the superjacentair space9.Moreover,it may be seen frornMap No. 14,facing this
page, thatthe shoal ofQit'atJaradahis whollyincludedin the area where theterritorial seasof
Qatar and Bahrainoverlap,andthe shoalof Dibalis situatedpartlywithin the territorialseaof
~atar". In these circumstances,the question arisesofwhat weight shouldnowbe given to the
1947line.
Section 2. The 1947Linein the New Situation createdbv theExtension of theTerritorial
-eas
11.12 Not only do the new 12-mile territorial seas overlap in the maritime area located
between the two opposite coasts of Qatar and Bahrain, but there is also ailoverlap between
someportion of the sea-bedas delirnitedin 1947and the extendedterritorialwaters. The latter
is al1the more important in that it could i~ivolvesome confiict between sovereign rights
pertaining to one State and the sovereigntyof the other State.Thus, the request presentedto
the Courtfor the drawingof a singlemaritimeboundaryhas to beexarninedin the light of that
situation.
YArticle2 ofthe 1982ConventionontheLaw oftheSea.
10See,para.10.72,above. A. Sovereign Rights over thc Sea-Bed as delimited in 1947and their Ovcrlap with the
Extension of Sovcrei~nty
11.13 Tlie British decision of 23 Decernber 1947delimiting tlie sea-bed areas lying between
the territory of Qatar and that of Bahrain was taken within the context of the then emergiiig
continental sheIf legal doctrine and the fict that in thc Gulf tl~reemiles was the generally
recognized breadth of the territorial sea1'.The purpose of the dividirigline so cstablished was
to delimit the respective areas in which the two Sheikhdoms possessed sovereign rights over
the natural resources of the sea-bedand the subsoil thereof. By adopting recently the 12-mile
rule for their territorial seas, the State of Qatar and the Statc of Rahrüin are now entitled to
claim and to exercise full sovereignty over those areas, at least upto whatevcr deliinitation
line betweentheir respective coasts maybe determined.
11.14 Srich a change in the nature and extent of the rights of thc twn coastal States would
have no legal or practical consequences if the 1947 dividing linc were a strict median line.
However, it was not the strict median line between the two main coasts, as has been
previously demonstrated". This was not the intent of the British authorilies. The line resulting
from the 1947 British decision was an adjusted line which was drawn closer to the coast of
Bahrain, the adjustment being made, especially in the area lying directiy between the two
coasts, apparently in view of the difference betweencoastal lengthsI3.Consccluently,there is a
portion of the sea-bed area concemed wherethe State of Qatar would bc cntitlsd to exercise
its sovereign rights pursuant to the 1947 decision, while that portion would fa11under the
sovereignty of the Stateof Bahrirainas part of its new territorial sea, on the supposition thatthe
boundary betweenthe two newterritorial scas would be amedian line.
11.15 Sovereign rights over the sea-bed as delimited in 1947now overlap with the cxtended
sovereignty of both States over tlie same asea as a result of tl~eirrespective 12-mile territorial
seas. According to the legal regime of the continental sl-ielfthe sovercign riglits inhering in
the coastal State are exclusive and do not dcpend on effective or notional occupation or on
II
12See,paras.10.2etsaq.,above.
Sec,paras. 10.13et seq., above.
13See,para.10.21,above.any express they exist "ipso .facto and ah initio' and are regarded as the
expression of "an inherent rightl"', On the other hand, it is indisputable that cvery coastal
State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea, to wliich its savereignty
automatically applies, up to a lirnit not exceeding 12 nautical miles'"in thc absence of an
opposite State within 24 miles of the relevant baseline) and that it has thc exclusive powcr to
act with respect to the delimitation of the outer limit OCits territorial waters: "the act of
delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is coinpctent to
undertake it ..."". The prohiein thus created may havc praciical consequcnccs in view of the
task of the Court in the present case.
B. Whntis theEffectof the Request for theDrawingof a Sinele Maritime Boundary in
theseCircumstances?
11.16 In the southern sector, the maritime boundary will in any case be a single line in the
sense that it will divide the respectiveareas of seabed, subsoiIand superjacentwaters, andwill
be an all-purpose dividing line. In fact, as already noted, it will be the boundary between two
territorial seas.It is quite obvious that different questions ariseiinmediately as fkr as the pre-
existing dividingline drawn in 1947forthe continental shelf is concerncd.
1 1.17 Ifthe boundary line were to be drawn by the Court with due regard to the 1947 line, as
Qatar submits it should be, what would be the impact of the general trend in State practice,
and in particular in the practice of Gulf States, according to wliicl-iboundaries drawn for the
sea-bed quite autornatically bccome maritime boundaries for any purposc, especially when
exclusive econornic zones or fishing zones are establishedlR? Could tlie solution of
transforming a continental shelf delimitation line into a single maritime boundary applying
also to EEZ delimitation be transposed in the prcsent case? In other words, would it bc
possible for the 1947dividing line tu be used partly as the boundary between thetwo arcas of
territorialsea, as has sometimes been the case when part of a preexisting continenta1 shelf
14
Ses, Article 2 of th1958 Geneva Conventionon the ContinentalShcli'and Article77 ofthe 1982
United Nations Convention ontheLawof the Sea.
1sNorih Seu ContinentalShev;J~ddgment ,.CJ. Reporls1969, p.22,para. 19.
LGSee,Article3 ofthe 1982Conventionoiithe Law ofthe Sea.
17FisheuiesJ,udgntentI.C.J. Kepurts 19.51,p. 132.
18See,para. 12.8,below.delimitation line was transformed into a territorial sea bouiidary in corisequence of the
extension of the breadthof their territorialwaters by the Statesconccrnedlg?
11.18 In the submission of Qatar, the role and effectof the 1947 dividing line have to be
appraised in the light of the present rules applicable to maritime deliinitütion betwcen States
as reflected in the now substantial body of case law. Qatar also subinits that, subject to tlie
situation expIained hereunder conceming the southern part of tlie 1947dividing line, tliat line
constitutes an important faciorto be taken into consideration.
Section 3. The 1947Line as an Imnortant Factor for the Delimitation of thc Maritime
Boundary
11.19 Qatar does not contend that the 1947 line is to be automatically regarded as the
boundary line to be delimited between the maritime areas pcrtainiiig to Qatar and those
pertaining to Bahrain. However, the Court, when drawing the single inaritimc boundary,
cannot act as if that line had never existed. As was stated in the submissions conlaiiled in
Qatar's Applicationinstituting the present proceedings,the single maritiine boundary that tlie
Court is requested to draw should be deiimited "with due regard to the linc dividing the sea-
bed of the two States as described in the British decision of 23 Dccember 1947~'".In other
words, the 1947 line, by the very hct that it was drawn as a continental shelf bo~indary
between the two Parties, is a factor or a circumstancc highly relevant for the purpose of the
drawing of a single maritime boundary.
11.20 The reason why Qatar is asking the Court to draw the single maritime boundary "with
due regard to" the 1947line and is not claiming a single maritime boundary drawn "aloiig"
that Iine liesin the factthat the southernpart of the 1947 line(soutli of point L) now has to be
disregarded because of two basic legal considerations, narnely: Qatar's sovercignty overthe
Hawar islands, and a tliird State'srights at the entrance of the Dawl-iatSalwah. In the view of
l9See, for example, the Agreement between Franceand the United I<ingdoron theTerritorial Sea
Boundary in the Straits of Dover, signed on2 November 1988, transformingstatusof theboundary in that
Straits from a continental shelfboundtoa territorial seaboundary,as a resutheoextension othe United
Kingdom'sterritorial seaup to 12na~iticalmiles.J.I. CharneyandL.M.Alexander (efnfernutionaMaritime
Boundari20,MartinusNijhoff Publishers,Dordreclit/Boston/London,1993,Vol. II,pp. 17754.
Application fîled inthe Registryon 8 July 19918,para.41.Qatar, it is necessary first to deal with those consideratioliswliich require the soutliernpart of
the 1947 line to be disregardcd, and then to show how tlie reinaining part of that line is to be
viewed both as a special circurnstaiice for the delimitation of the territorseas, and as a
relevant circumstance forthe single maritimeboundary bcyond the outer fimitof the territorial
seas.
A. Qatar'sSovereigntv over theHawar Islands and its Effect on thePortion of the 1947
LineEnclavinrrthose Islands
11.21 The Britisli decision of23 December 1947 delinlited the sca-bed lying bctweeil Qatar
and Bahrain by a main dividing line starting from a point in the south defincd as point M,
running northward through a point identified as point K, thetice to the Nortli Sitrah Light
Buoy (NSLB), and from there to the Bahrain Light Vesse1(RLV). 1-Iowcver,because of the
previous 1939decision that the Hawar islands belonged to Bahrain, the 1947British decision
provided for an exception concerning the islands of thHawar group and the territorial waters
pertaining thereto. Thus it drew a line comprising iniiially twelvc segments and enclaving the
Hawar islands. According to the letter dated 23 December 1947 hom the British Political
Agent to the Ruler of Qatar,the dividing line inthe region of the Hawar islands wasshown on
a map by a linejoining successively points A, 3,C, D, E, F, G, 131,J, 1and L. Furtherrnore,
the said Ietter added the following indication:
"As this delimitation will, however, leave a narrow tongue of water jformed by the
points M, J, and1) pertaining to Qatar it has been decided to alter tliH,l1,J, toFI,
P, Q,thus exchanging an equal area PI0 for OJQ~'."
The enclave finallydrawn aroundthe Hawarislandswas therefore a liile starting from point L
and joining pointsA, B, C, D, E,F, G, H,P and Q, as shownon Muy Aro 15,fsicingthis page.
11.22 It suffices to recall liere that the Ruler of Qatar protested againsi the British
Goverment's decision of 1939upholding the clairn of Bahraiil to the Hawar islandsz2.Later
on, while declaring he had no alternativebut to accept the line defined ithe 1947 British
21See, Annex1V.115,Vol.10,p71, andMapNa. 15,facingthis page.
22See,paras.6.239etseqabove.decision, he made a reservation concerning in particular the exception reIating to tlie I-Iawar
island~?~.Thus the part of the 1947 line enclaving the Hawar islands was not accepted by
Qatar.
11-23 In the present proceedings, Qatarhas requested the Court to adjudge and deciare that it
has sovereignty over the Hawar islands, and it has fully demonstrated above that its claim is
well-founded both in fact and in ~aw~~T .herefore, it follows that the part of the 1947 linc
enclaving those islands, on the fdse assumption lhat they belongcd to Rah~üin,cannot be
taken into consideration for the purpose of the delimitation of the single niaritirne boundary
that the Court is requested to draw. That part of the line lias to be disregarded on the
assumption that the Hawar islands are recognizedby the Court as pertaining to ~atar~~.
11.24 The part ofthe 1947line which must be disregarded is that portion starLingfrorn point
L and running around the Hawar islands upto point Q~~I.t is notcworthy that point K, which
was defined in the 1947 British letter as one of the "points on the n~üindividing lineu2',
disappeared as a resultof the construction ofthe liiieeiiclavingthe Hawar islands. As a matter
of fact, instead of starting from that point to draw the enclave around tlie Hawar islands, ilie
British Goverment decided to create a new point Iocatednorth of point K and identified as
point L, the latter being considered at that time as an integral part of thc enclaving line. Thc
justification for so doing was to be found in the express iiiteiit of thc British Governrncnt:to
include within the enclave the territorial waters pertaining to the 1-lawar islands and to delimit
them "in accordance with the usual principles of international la^"^ ^T.hus,point L was the
point from which the Hawar islands produced an effect on the drawiiig of the main dividing
line. As such it liad,and stillhas, an important legal significance.
23See,para. 10.23,above.
24See, Part 11,bove.
25 Moreover, thepart ofthe 1947 line enclaving tlie Hawaislands is opeto criticism on teclinical
grounds.
26See,Mup No. 15,facing page254, and para. 11.21,above.
27
Para. 6(b) of tlie letter dated 23 Deccmber 1947 from tlie British Political Ageiit in Bahrain to the
Ruler o28Qatasee,Annex IV. 115,Vol. 10,p. 74.
Para.4(ii) of the letter dated23 Decembcr 1see,Annex IV. 115,Vol. 10,p. 73.11.25 Contrary to the starting point of the enclaving Iine (point L), the ending point of that
line CpointQ) wm not defined in the 1947 British Ictterwhich did not give its position in
terms of bearing and distance from an identified base-point. Point Q was a purely artificial
point generated by the particular cxchange of two small triangular üreas bctween Qatar and
Bahrain settled by the British Govemment, whenthey decided to alter the last segment of the
enclaving line, as previously indicated .Point Qhad nu actualjustification oitsown.
11.26 As the southernmost scgment of the 1947 liiie was a straight linc joining point Q to
point M, that segment must also be disregarded, especially wheii itis uiiderslood that, due to
the location of pointM, the said segment of the line would interferewith the rights of a tliird
State in that area.
B.Rights of a Third Stateatthe Entrance of theDawhat Salwah and their Impact on the
SouthernSegmentof the 1947Line
11.27 According to the 1947 British letter, point M, whicli was the slürting point of the
dividing line drawn by the British Government, was defined as " 180" truc 18.03 NauticaI
Miles from the Triangulation Na. 102 at Ras al I3arr"". Point M was shown on the map
appended to that letter as being plotted at: latitude 25"30'00"N,longitude 50°33'55"E. Itwas
located at the entrance of the Dawhat Salwah, a tongue of sea lying betwcen the peninsula of
Qatar andthe coast of Saudi Arabia.
11.28 It appears from more precise data available today that point M is cIearlysituated within
the maritime zone pertaining to Saudi Arabia and cannot therefore bc regai-dedas a dividing
point between Qatar and Bahrain. This is self-evident when one takcs into consideration the
delimitation agreements that have been concluded since the hawing of the 1947 line, both
between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and between Bahrain and Süudi Arabia, the lincs of which
also begin in or near the entrance ofthe Dawhat Salwah.
29
30ee,para.11.21,above.
Para.6(bof theletterdated2December 1947,see,AnnexIV. 115,Vol.10,p. 74.of the Kingdom of Salidi~rabiü)'". T11ecoordinates of the pointso defiiied are: 25O35'38"N-
50°31'45"B.'Thus,one cm see that point 1 of the Bahraini-Saudi detiri~itatio~idocs not
coincide with point M of the 1947 line, but is located to the iiortli ofit. For reasons of
conveniencc and clarity, point 1 of the delimitation agreement betwccn Rallsaiii and Saudi
Arahia will hereafter be referrcd toas "point ~1"~~.
11.32 In Qatar'sview, in the area of the entrance ofthe Dawhat Salwali, the maritime zone
pertai~iingto Saudi Arabia certainly does not exteildto the north beyund point S1.Moreover,
under thc agreement between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, it seelns also quite ubvious tliat
Bakrainis not entitled to clailnrightsover the maritime arca cxiending to thc cas1of poiiit S1.
Such a situation leaves it open to the Court to deçide on a maritime boundwy between Qatar
and Bahrain starting freinpoint SI3'.
LI .33 It follows from the above considerations that the scgmei.itof the 1947 line betwccn
points M and Q asa whole has to be disregarded. Conscquently,takinç into accouiit what has
previously beensaid concerning the Hawar islanc ciclave, QaVürsubmits tlial, south of point
L as defined in 1947bythéBritish Government,the single inaritime bouridürybetwcen Qat~ir
and Bahrain could bc a straight linejoining point S1 and point L.
11.34 Therefore the part of the 1947 line which constitutes ü relevant factor for the
delimitation of the single maritime boundary with Bahrain is the part of the liiie extending
north of point L, in other words the line starting (rom point L and runilii~gnorthwards to
North Sitrah Light Buoy (NSLB) and to Bahrain T,ightVesse1 (l3LV) (Sec, iMap No 16,
facing this page). Accordiilgly,attention will nowbe directed tothat aspect.
C. The 1947Line as a Special Circumstance for the Delimitationof the Territorial Seils
11.35 The maritime boundary is to be drawn in accordance \vit11international law. As fa as
the delimitation of the territoriaseasbetween Qatar and Bahraiil is conccrned, the applicable
35
36Anncx IV.216,Vol. II, 235.
37See,Mup /Va.12,facinpage 215.
Itshould also be noted that poSI isnearly equidistant frthe coasts othc threecountries
concerned accordinto thchcadland-to-headlandmethod.mle of international lawis embodicd in Article 15of the 1982United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which readsas follows:
"Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to eacli other, iieither of the
two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its
territorial sea beyond the niedian line evcry poinl of wliich is equidistant from the
nearest points on the baselines from whichthe breadlh of the territorial seas of each of
the two States is measured. The above provision does iiot apply, however, where it is
necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances 10 delimit thc
territorial seas ofthe two Statesin a way which is at variancethercwith."
11-36 Qatar signed the Conventioilon 27November 1984but has not yel ratified it. Bahrain,
which signcd the Convention on 10 December 1982, ratificd it 011 30 May 1985. The
Convention is now in force, since 16 November 1994, betwcen States wl-iiclihave ratified or
acceded or succeededto it, but it does not constitute a convention inforce bctweeii Qatar and
Bahrain.Nevertheless, if the mie enuncided in Article 15is not binding on Qatar and Bahrain
as a conventional rule, there can be no doubt that the delimitation rule incorporated in that
article is part of customary international lawand, as such, is applicable tothe prescnt case. As
a niatter of fact,the terms of Article 15 oîthe 1982Convcntion are, with the exceptionof two
minor stylistic changes, exactlythc same as those of Article 12 nf the 1958Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which has long been considered as fom~ingpart of
custornaryinternational law3'.
11-37 Accordingly, in the relatively restricted maritime area lyiiig betwcen the opposite
coasts of Qatar and Bahrain, the boundary of the two territorial seas is to bc cstablished by
application of the equidistance method, atleast as afirst step in the delimitationprocess. Such
a provisional median line has to be drawn by taking exclusively into consideration the two
main opposite coasts, withoutregard to the numerous particular featurcs existii~gin the arca,
because most of those fèaturesdo not qualie as islands generating thcir own maritimc zone.
Those features can be regarded as "unusualfeatures" which are to bc neglected or disregarded
for deliinitation purposes. Such a solution is in accordancc with the general practice as
38Tlie second sentence of Artic12of the 1958Convention was as follows:"The provisionsqj'rhis
paragraph shnllnot appIy, however, where itis necessary by reason oî histciric tior other spccial
circumstancesto delimit the territorialofthe two States inway which is at varianwith this provision"
(ernphasisadded to indicatewhich words werealtered).followed by Gulf States in their delimitation agreen~eiitsalready concluded. Thus, in thc
22 February 1958 agreement betwcen Saudi Arabia and Bahrain andtlle 20 Septeinber 1969
agreement between Iran aiid Qatar, islets and low-tide elevatioiis were not takeii into
coilsideration for the drawing of the median line and more particularly fur the calculation of
the boundary turning points39.And one has also to keep in ~nindtliat with the so-called
"Boggs-Kennedy 1inet'drawn in 1948,the authors did not takc account of any shoal, rock or
isIet, and suggested that the lateral line between Qatar and Rahraiii bc the median line
equidistant frornthe mainland of Qatar andthe Bahrain islands4'.
11.38 Arnong the "special circumstances" referred to in the gencral i-ule govcrning tlie
deliinitation of territorial seas, it maybe wonderedwhetlier the ciifferencebetwccn the iengtli
of the respective coasts of Qatar and Bahrâinfacing the maritime area in this sector might not
be a circumstance rendering it "necessary" to delimit the territorial seas in a way at variance
with strict equidistance. From this point of view,there is no strict cquality betwcen the two
States in terms of coastai geography. There is no doubt that such a consideration, wllich has
played a role in cases relating to the delimitation of continental shelves, rnay also be taken
into account forthe purpose of delimiting two territorialseas, because the refercnce to special
circurnstanceshere is also a clearindication thatthe fin&aim of the delimitationprocess must
be a balanced representation ofthe geographical circumstances. Summarising the main trend
of the international jurisprudence conceming the delimitation of the continental shclf, in a
study devoted to the single maritime boundary, Professor Paul Reuter statcd as foIlows:
"...cettejurisprudence s'efforcede ne pas aggraver par le recours à la géométrie,qui
est l'instrumentinévitabledesdélimitationsmaritimes, les fantaisies et les inéquités de
la nature, mais de leur donner une traduction équilibréeo ;n ne voil plrs o priori cette
tendunce nécessairementlimité aux délimitutions du pluleau continentul; les
39See, the commentaryrelating to those agreementsby the Statc DepartinentGeographerLiniits in
theSeas,40o. 94,p. 7(Annex IV.216,Vol.11,p. 235 andAnnexIV.260,Vol 12, p.81).
Commander R.H. Kennedy, of the HydrographieDepartment of the Britisli Admiralty, and S.W.
Boggs, SpecialAdviser on Geographyof the U.S. Departmentof State, rcçiirnmeiided16 Deceinber1048 tu
their respective governments the basis of a geographical divofithe Persian Gulf. IIItheir proposal, tliey
fimitedthemselves to the technical aspectthc problems of determininç what they believed toabfair and
equitable division of the seabed and subsoil areas of the Gulf on scientificprinçiples, andthey tried to indicatc
what they understoodto be thegeographicalfactors thatshoubctaken into considcratiSse, Annex IV.127,
Vol. 10,p.123. prt.'occupationsamquelles elle répond doivent êt rrésenles lursqu'il sbgiî de lu
&limitation dcn'importequelespacemaritime4' ."
ThereTore,in the drawing of the maritime boundary of the territorial seas of the Parties, there
is no reason not to reflect, to somc extent, tlie geographical situalion by mems of an
adjustment of the median line. And it nzustbe reinembered that the 1947 line was indeed a
sort of adjusted rnedian line.
11 -39 Even if the coastal geography, as such, were not regarded as a special circumstance
authorising the Court, in the present case,to depart from a strict or tnie mcdian line, the Court
nevertheless couId not totally ignore the fact that a previous dividing line had been drawn
concerning the sea-bed areas, and that that line wasbased on gcographical c~nsiderations~~I .n
fact, the 1947line in itself constitiitesa special circumstance insofar as it was drawn in order
to permit each of the two interested StatesactualIyto exercise its inherent right over the sea-
bed. While it cannot be saidtlzatany historic title has derivedfrom that decision, the situation
thus created however does iiot fa11far short of it. This consideratioi~alone sufficiently
dernonstrates the importance of the 1947 line as a circumstancc covered by the "historic title
or other special circumstances" rcfcrence containedin Article 15of tlze1 982 Convention.
D. The 1947 Line as a Relevant Circumstance for the Sin~le Maritime Roundam bevond
the OuterLimit of theTerritorialSeas up Eo BLV
11.40 The 1947dividing line was drawn up to the Bahrain Light Vesse1(BLV)through the
North Sitrah Light Buoy, two points located 28.05 and 15.20nautical miles rcspcctively frorn
the Political Agent's flagstaffi'inI3ahrain3. BLV lies outside the extended territorial seas of
the Parties. When the British authorities selected tl~ose points, they had in inind the
requirements of maritime access to Bahrain through the SitrahChamel, and this was probably
sufficient motivation for the choiceof these aids to navigation as points of ref'erencefor thc
hawing of the dividing line,coupled with the advantageof elilninating any uncertainty in the
4'AnnexIV.315,Vol. 13,p.223.
42The letterof 23 Decembcr 1947 fiom the British PolitiAgeiit in Bahraititlie Kulcr oQatar
explicitly stated: "Thisis a median line based generally cinthe coiitïgutheicoast-linof theBahrain
main islandand the peninsulaof Qata(Annex IV.115,Vol. 10,p. 71).
43See,para. 3.80footnote107,below.demarcation. Althaugh the expression was not used at the time for obvioirs reasons, the
concept of relevant circumstances was unquestionably atthe root of the choice made by the
British authorities.
1 1.41 Beyond the outer line of the territorial scas or tlie two States, the single maritime
boundary that the Court has beenasked to draw will be determined by application of the well-
established international law rule according to which the aim of üny maritime delimitation
process is to reach an equitable solution. And, as underlincd by the International Court in the
case concerning MaritimeDelimitationinthe Area between Greenland ~rnd Jan Moyen, in a
case involving opposite coasts, the application of "an equidistancc-speciül circumstances rulc
produces much the same result as an equitable principles-relcvan tcircumstances rulc ..,
whether in the case of a delimitation ofcontinental slielf, of fishery zone, orof ail all-purpose
single bo~ndar~~~".
11.42 For purposes of the present delimitation, the 1947 line, and particularly its identified
terminal point at BLV, is a circumstancethat is al1the more rclevaiit in that there is no other
objective factor in this part of the delimitation area which could be taken into consideration.
In one way or another, the location of BLVand the façt tliat it pfayed an important role inthe
definition of the 1947line scem to be highly relevant circumstances for the drawing of the
maritime boundary beyond the external limits of the two territorial seas, not only up to BLV
but also beyond that point45.
Section 4. Irrclevance ofan Archipelagic Claimbv Bahrain
11-43 The 1982United Nations Conventionon the Law ofthe Sca has recogniscd for the first
time the concept of "archipelagicStates",to which PartIVof thc Convention (Articles 46-54)
is devoted. It is noteworthy that this riewconventional regime was devised in cirder to permit
States constituted by one or more mid-occanarchipelagoesto draw, under certain conditions,
straight baselinesjoining the outeimost islands and drying rcefs of the archipelago, and to use
those lines, known as "archipelagicbaselines", to ineasurc the breadth of their tel-ritorialsea,
44
45.JzrdgmentI,.C.J.Repor1993,p.62,para.56.
Sce,para.3.80, footnot107,above.contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelC Ttis ais0 noteworthy that,
according ta information available in the Office of Lcgal Affairs of the United Nations
(Division for Ocean Affairs and theLaw of the Sea),Bahraiil is nutlisted among the 15States
which have claimed archipelagicstat~s~~.
11.44 The item "archipelagic baselines",which was raised at the instancc of ahr rai r has^,
been placed onthe list of subjects falling within thejurisdiction of the Court by virtue of the
1987 and 1990 agreements concludedby Qatar and Bahrain. lt was submitted to the Court
through the Act filedin the Registryby Qatar on30Novernbcr 19~4~~.
11.45 However, Bahrainhas never actually produced a claimof archipelagic status, either as
regards its relations with Qatar or with respectto other States. The basic reason for Bahrain's
refraining from any archipelagic claim may well be found in the circuinstance that it could
hardly legally qualifj as an archipelagic State as defined by the 1982 Convention, since it
would have difficulty in proving that it meets the requirements of that Convention, in
particular the ratio of the area of water to the area of land provided for in Article 47,
paragraph 149.
11.46 Moreover, in the absence of any forma1Bahraini claim of arçhipelagic status, there is
not, properly speaking and in the legal sense, any dispute between Qatar and Bahrain
concerning an archipelagicclaim. Even ifthere were a dispute, inthe circumstances adecision
of the Court would be moot and therefore wouldbe incompatiblewith thejudicial function of
the Court. As the Court said in its Judgment of 18November 1953 un the Preliminary
46 The 15 States claiming archipelagic status are the followiiig: Antigua and Barbuda, Cape Verde,
Comoros, Fiji, indonesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands,Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Saint Viiicent and the
Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, 'l'uvalu,VanuatSee,United
Nations,TheLaw of'the Sea, hctice ofStutesut thetime of entry inforce oftheUnited NulinnsConvention
an the Luw of the Seu, New York, 1994, p. 9. The relevant legislation of thosc archipelagic States, with the
exception of the Marshall Islands, has been published in UnitNations, The Luw uf ihcSeu: Pracfice of
ArchipelugicStutcs,New York,1992.
47Balirainhas on several occasions spokenabout arcliipelagicbaselinnamcly during the Tripartite
Committeemeetings,and in itsoral pleadingsbefore the Court. However,Rahiain has neveractually produceda
daim in 48isrespect.
49See,para. 18ofthe Judgmentof 1Jiily1994,I.C.J.report.^1994at p.118.
Art. 47, para.1: "An archipelagic State may draw straight ai-cliil~elagicbaselines joining the
outermost pointsofthe outermostislandsand dryingreefs of tliearcliipelagoprovided that within suclibaselines
are includcd the main islands andan area in whicthe ratio of tharca of the wateto the area of the land,
includitigatolls,is between 1to I and9 to 1".Objection in the Nottebohmcase, "the seising of the Court is one thing, the administration of
justice is another49q1I. the NorthernCamerounscase, the Courtwaçthus obligedto recall:
"There are inherent limitations on the exercise of thejudicial funclion which the Court,
as acourt ofjustice, cannever ignore5'."
In that case, the Court decided that the circumstances rendercd any adjudication devoid of
purpose and, considering itseif as being the guardian of the Courl's judicial integrity, it stated
that:
"The Court must dischargethe duty ...to safeguârdthe-iiidiciallunction" ."
Accordingly, Qatar submits that an archipelagic claim by Bahrain is totally irrelevant in the
present case.
Section 5. Conclusion
11.47 The single maritime boundary that the Court is requested to draw with duc regard to
the 1947line could be a line startiilgfrom point S1, the Grst segment of which being a straight
line between point S1and point L of the 1947 line, the second and third segments following
the 1947 line (from point L to BLV through NSLB) (sec, Ma- No. 16, facing page 258).
Qatar's submission that the single maritime boundary is to bc drawn with due regard to the
1947line applies not only to the southern sector in which the main pxt of that line is located,
but also concerns directly the part of the northern sector wl~ere the 1947 lineextends up to the
point referred to as BLV, as has been demonstrated in the present Chapler. Therefore, in
considering the starting point ofthe last scgment of the single maritimeboundxy, which will
be discussed in the followingChapter, the Court will necessarilyhave to pay due regard to the
1947Iine.
49
50I.C.JReports 1953,p. 122.
51Judgment, I.C.J.Report1963,p. 29.
Ibid ..38. CHAPTERXII
THE SINGLEMARITIME BOUNDARY IN THENOKTHERNSECTOR
Introduction
12.1 In its Application Qatar reqiiestedthe Court:
"With due regard to the line dividing the sea-bedof thetwo States as described in the
Britishdecision of 23December 1947,to draw in accordance with international law a
single maritime boundary between the maritime areas of sea-bed, subsoil and
superjacent waters appertaining respectively to the State of Qatar and the State of
~ahrain'".
In the Mernorial which it submitted to the Court on 10 February 1992 on questions of
jurisdiction and admissibility, Qatar indicated with respect to "the disputc relating to maritime
delimitation" that "Thearea involved in this dispute ... runs from the mouth of the Dawhat
Salwah in the south ...up to the Gulf median line between the lslarnic Republic of Iran on the
one side and Qatarand Bahrain on the othe?".
12.2 Consequently, the dispute relating to maritime delimitation between Qatar and Bahrain
is not limited to the sector covered bythe British decision of 23 December 1947,i.e.,from the
mouth of the Dawhat al Salwah up to the point identified as BLV. lt also concerns thc
maritime areas lying beyond BLV, i.e.essentially in the nosthern sector, up to the Gulf
median line laid down by the delimitation agreements previously concluded by Qatar and
Bahrainwith Iranon 20 September 1969and 17June 1971.
12.3 In the following discussion, Qatar will endeavour to deinonstratc the specificnaturc of
this northern sector; to determine the law applicable tothisaspect of thc dispute; and, in the
light of the relevant circumstances, to identifj the appropriate method of delimitation which
will allow an equitable solutionto be achieved.
I
2Para.41, 11.
Q.M.J.A.,Vol.1p.26, para.2.54Seealso, MapNo. 1,facingp13,and ChapterJX,above. Section 1.The S~ecificNature of the Northern Sector
12.4 The circumstances for the delimitation of the single maritilne boundary inthe maritime
areas situated to the north of BLV are quite different from thosfor themaritime delimitation
in the sector to the south of BLV, which has been discussed above3.The delirnitation in tlie
northern sector has three main characteristics which clearly highliglitsspecific nature: first,
it is a de novo delimitation; second, it has to be performed in an area lyillg beyond the outer
Iimits of the Parties'territorialwaters; and third, it is a delimitation which does not reanyre
categoriaation.
A.A de novo delimitation
12.5 The seabed delirnitation effected by the British decision of 23 Dccember 1947docs not
go beyond BLV. Indeed, the British decision states that the coursc of the dividing line shown
on Mup No. 17 facing this page nuis "ITompoint 'M'to the 'Bahrain Light Vessel"'. The
decision also indicates that "the assigned position" of BLV is "046%" true 28.05 Nautical
Miles fkom the Political Agent's flagstaff Latitude 20°14'1 N, Longitude 50°35'2 E
(approxirnately),as the positionsof floatingmarksare subjectto fiequent alteration"', Beyond
BLV - which thus appears as a turning point in themaritime delimitation between Qatar and
Bahrain and as a tme reference point or anchorpoint - no boundary has ever been establishcd,
either by agreement or otherwise. It is thus clearly a de novo delimitatioii that has to be
performed inthe northern sector5.
B. A DelimitationconcerningMaritimeAreas lvingbevond the Outer Limit ofthe
Parties'TerritorialWaters
12.6 The specific nature of the delimitation of a single maritime boundary in the iiorthern
sector is apparent also fioma second point of view, insofar as, unlike tlie delimitation already
3See,Chap.XI,above.
AnnexesIV.1I5 and IV.116,Vol. 10,pp71 and 75. Secpara. 3.80, footn107 and MapNu. I2,
facing page 214, aboveBLV should not be conrused witli tlie "Babrain Light Floatisat 26O33'N,
51°03'E.Thepresent geographical coordinaofthepoint rcferred to in1947dcçisiolare 5O057'30"and
2fi033'35"N.
See,para. 10.42,above.made as far as BLV, it conccrns in its entirety maritime arcas lying beyond the outer limit of
the Pastics'territorial waters.
12.7 The starling point ofthis delimitation in the northern sectoi-coincides, as has just been
menliuned, with the end point of the dividing lineIaid donil by the 1947 British decision.
This point, BLV, is situated 53.31 km, i.e.,approximately 28.8 nautical ~nilcs, 1TotnRK,
which is tlie northernmost point on the Qatar pcninsula, and 44.40 km, 1.e..approximately
24.0 naulical miles, koin point MQ on the island of Al Muhai-rüq.the relevant point iiî
Rahrain as shown on Mup Ab. 17 facing thc prcvious page? However sumrriary tl~is
geographical localisationinay be, it allows the definition, without the sliglîtest Iicsitation, of
the legal naliireof the maritime areas lying to thc north of BLV. In 1992and 1993 Qatar and
Bahrain, respectively, extended the breadth of their territorialseas to 12 nautical i~iiles, to be
measured froin baselines determined in accordance with the rules of intcriîational law7. In
addition, bcyond thc outcr limits of their territorial watersas shown oii 6.1Lrp o, 14, facing
page 250, the two States have and exercise exclusive sovcrcign righls over their rcspcctive
continental shelves and fishing ïones. It may be noted in this rcgard thal in r-Proclamation by
the Ministry cif Foreign Anjirs dated 2 June 1974, Qatar proclaimed its exclusive and
absolute sovereign rights over the natural and marine resolirces and over the fishcries in the
zones contiguous to the territorial sea off the coasts of the State and its islancisand tl~atit lias
exclusive rights with rcspcct to exploration, prospection, exploitation, enlianccrncnt,fishing
and the installation offacilitics and of safety, controlaiidproteçtion zones for al1the marine
and naturalresourccs situatcdon thc sca-bed,in the subsoilor intlie superjaccntwaters8.
12.8 Sincc BLV is outsidc the territorial waters of tlie Parties, the saine will he true, a
fortiori,of thc cnd point of the dividing line in the noi-thernsector, since thc ciclimitationhas
to bc madc up to a point locatcd at the intersection of the line tliat the Court will determine
and the inedian line in the cei~tralpart ofthe Gulf, as established by thc agreeinenls delimiting
the continental shelf concluded in 1969 and 1971 by Iran with Qatar and Bahrain,
b PointsRK alidMQ arelocated on thehighwatcr liofthecoastsconcerned (secparas. 12.1012.63,
12.66and 12.70, bclow).
7
8See, paras. 11.5eseq., abovand Annexcs lV.278 and IV.281,Vol. 12pp.24 1and 261.
See,para. 9.1footnotc 5, abovand Annex IV.269, Vol. 12p.169.respectivelyY.This conventioilal continental shelf boundary has becn applied by lran to the
colurnn of superjacent waters and, from Iran'spoint of view, lias becorne the boundary of its
exclusive economic zone with the facing Arab States. Thus, accordiiig to Article 19 of the
"Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic RepubIic of Iran in the Persian GuIf and the Oman
Sea" of 1993,"The limits of the Exclusive Economic Zonc and lhe Continental Shelf of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, unless othenvise determined in acçordance with bilateral
agreements, shall be a line every point of which is equidistant fron~ the nearest point on the
baselines of two tat tes' ^h".senew Iranianregulations cannot uiiilaterally tnodify the object
and purpose of the continental shelf delimitation agreements çoncluded wit1.iQatar and
Bahrain. From a formal point of view, the application ("exhausserncnt") of the contii~entai
shelf boundary to the fishing zones, andperhaps to the exclusiveeconomiç zones, once tliese
countries have proclaimed their creation in their national legislation, requires their consent.
Such an application Inay nevertheless be inferred with respect to the fishing zones, givcn the
proclamationsmade by both Iranand ~atar".
9Annexes IV.260and IV.264,Vol. 12,pp. 81 and 111.
10Annex IV.283,Vol. 12,p. 271.
II
Indeed,the Iranian Proclamationof 30 October 1973and the Qatari Proclamation of2 June 1974are
in harmony. First, in its Proclamation of 30 October 1973 "concerning theouter liinit of the exclusive fishing
zone of Iranin the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman", the Iranian Government, "in order to safeguard the
fishingrights and interestsof Iran inthes adjacentto itsCoastandthecoastsof irsislands", declared:
"Theouter limits of the exctusivefishing zone of lran inthe Persian Gulf shallbe the outer Iimitsof the
super~jacent aters of the continentalshelfof Iran.
(a) In areaswhere the continental shelfof IranRasbeen delimitedunder bilateral agreements withother
States,the outer limitsof the exclusive fishing zoneof Iran shall correspondto the outer limitsof the contincntal
sheIfof Iran as specified inthose agreements" (Annex1V.267,Vol. 12,p. 145).
This Iranian proclamationof 1973is consistent with the 1969 Agreement between Qatar and Iran, and
constitutes express recognition by Iran of the application of the seabed liiie to the exclusivefishing zones.
Moreover, it was confirmed duringthe Third United Nations Conferenceon the Law of the Sea. Indeed, during
the Caracas Session,the Iranian dclegation insistedseveral times upon the specific problems of serni-enclosed
seas (seeAnnexes IV.270 and IV.272,Vol. 12,pp. 177and 193)and expressly admitied the existenceof a link
betweenthe 1973Proclamation and the 1969Delimitation Agreement.On 13Aiigltst 1974,Mr. Kazemi stated,
at the 38th meeting of the SecondCominittee:
"As to the managementof resources. the factthat the total area of the semi-cnçlosedseas lay above the
continental shelf of the coastal States justified the working out ofa special régime.In that connexion, the
delimitation of thearious areas of jurisdiction would present problems whichwei-epeculiar to seini-enclosed
seas and which would have to be solved on the basis of the principles of justice, cquityand equidistance. Iran
had already established the limitsof its continentalshe1fin agreement with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain on
the basisof those principles. HisGovernrnent'sProclamationof 30October1973 relativeto thc establishmentof
an exclusivefishery zone had alsobeen based ontlioseprinciples"(see,AtineIV.271,Vol. 12,p. 183).
Second, this boundary for the fïshing zones, correspondingto the "raised" continental shelf boundary,
has inoreover been confirmedby the subsequent conductof both States. In this regarshould be recalledthat
Qatarhas also declared, in itsProclamation madeinDoha on 2June 1974,that:
"Without prejudice to freedomof movement of maritimeand air international navigation,in accordance
with the established principles of international, the State of Qatar to the cxclusion of al1others possesses12.9 In these circumstanccs Qatar submitsthat thc line deliinitiiig the continental shelf, as
established in the agrcements concluded by Qatar and Bahraiil witb Iran in 1969 and 1971,
inay be "raised" to thc supcrjacent colurnn of watcr to constitute as from now the line
delimiting the exclusivc fishing zoi~esof the two tat tes" F urthenilore. tlie object of the
maritime dclimitation between Qatar and Bahrainin the northern scctor will be to draw a
single maritime boundary froin BLV to thc Gulf median line eçtablishcd hy treüty.
C. Irrelevance of the Usual Distinction betweenFrontal and 1,atcral Delimitation
12.10 The part of the boundaryto be drawnbetween thc maritime jurisdictions of Qatar and
Baivain to the north of 13LVis situated throughoutits lcngth in the open sec?.llronl the striçtly
geographical point of vicw, which may be verified by glancit~gat a map, it is apart of the
dclimitation arca lying completeiy outside the arca where Qatar and Bahrain have directly
facing coasts, i.tr.,beyond the iinaginary linc from RK to MQ'~, witl~out however
correspondingto the situationof Iwoadjacent States.
12.11 Thcrcfore, Qatar considers lhat iil the present case it is uniîecessary to makc a legal
characterisation of the geographical situation in the northcrn sector, for two main reasoils.
First, although the delimitation iil tliis area cannot bc categcirizedas rideliiilitation relatiiig to
a situation of "adjacent States",one might bc rcluctant ta put it in tlie catcgory of a frontal
delimitation reIating to a situation of "opposite States",to use a distinction that isfi-equeiitly
huad in the law of inaritime delimitations- even if itis closerto the lattcr catcgory. Insofar as
the northern sector may be rcminiscent of tlie Atlantic sector iii thc Ailglo-French case,
beyond the area whcrc Francc and the lJnited Kingdom werc dircctly oppusile each othcr in
the English Chamcl, it is important not to forget tlie hesitations in [lie arbitral award 01'
riglitof total authoritover~iatitslesources, marincwcalth aiidfishingittlie areaadjacent totlie territorial
watcrs of thc coasts «f the State anislaiids.
Tlie external boilndaries of theareas shallbe deinacated iiaccordancc with bilateraagreements
already in forcand those concluded in thfriture".SeeAnncx IV.269: Vol. 13,p. 169.
12With respectto thecoincidencc bclwcen the coiitiiieshelfboiindary,as established bagrccmeiit.
and the boundary of the tishingzonesin lranian practicsec, Annex IV.284, Vol. 13,p. I and J.1Charney Sr.
L.M. Alexander (eds.),up.ci!.p,p.1506,1514 and 1523.
13MapNo. 17, facing pagc 266.30June 1977as to the characterisationof the Atlantic region1! Mororeover a,nd above al1 - and
this is the second reason why Qatar believes that it is unnecessary to becoine liidebound by
the alternative between "opposite States" and "adiacent States" in charactcrisiilg the northern
sector -the distinction which is frequently madehas no direct legaleffect. Not only does the
law of 1958and 1982lay down rules which are essentially identicd for bolh situations, but
also thejurisprudence does not atlach anyreal importance to this distinction15.
12.12 In these circumstances, it is not necessary to characterise the ilortl-iernsector in terrns
of the distinction between frontal and latcral delimitation. As Profcssoi- Weil has rightly
stressed, "la distinction entre côtes adjacentes et côtes opposéesne saurait être tenue pourunc
circonstance pertinente bénéficiand t'unpoids réel'6".(In the othcr hand, what matters, in an
operation of maritime delimitation, is Lotake into accuuiit the geographical circumstances
whichare peculiar to eaclicase or, to use the words of the Anglo-French award, it is nccessary
to identi@the "real facts",the "naturalfacts" or the "actual geographical conditions"", so true
is it that it is the geographical situation which indicates the applicable method of
delimitation". According to the much cited dictum of the Chamber in the Gulf qf Maine casc,
"thechoice of method to be usedis essentially dependentupon gcograpliy'9".
14
15nnex 1V.287, Vol. 13,pp.25-28.
Thus, in the award of 30 June 1977, it is stated that "... to fix the precisc legalclassificatioii of the
Atlantic regionappearsto this Courttobe of little importance.The rules ofdelimitation prescribed in paragraph
1 and paragraph 2 [of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelfl are the same, aitis the
actual geographical relation of the coasts of the iwo States which detelmithcirapplication"(ibid.,p. 28).
Moreover, when it examined the role of special circurnstaiicesin the impleineiita«f tliriiles contailied in
Article 6 of the Convention, tlie Court was careful to stress that the equilable nature of a deliinitation "cannot
de.pendon whether the case is fegaliyto be considered a delimitation between 'opposior'between 'adjacent'
States"(ibid., p27; emphasisin original).Similarly,in tliecase between Guineand Guiiiea-Bissau,where one
of the parties considered the Stateswere opposite, while the other consideredthey were adjacenthearbitral
tribunal held that "iln'estpas nécessairedes'attardesurcettecirconstance" (Annex IV.288,Vol. 13,p. 37).
lAnnex IV.321,Vol. 13,p. 259.
17
Annex IV.287, Vol. 13,p.27.
l8Ibid.
l9Delinfitalioof theMuritirn Boundary inthe Gulf ofAdaine Arsa,Jrrdgrnen 1.C,J.Repovls 1984,
p. 333, para.216. Section 2. The Law Applicable to the MaritimeDelimitation in the Northern Sector
12.13 The maritime delimitation to be effected by the Court to the north of BLV, will
naturally be based on the sources of international lawas set lorlh iii Artic38 of the Statute.
But given that neither the 1958 Convention on the Continental ~help' nor the 1982
Convention oiithe Law of the Sea is fomally applicable in tlie presencase, the principles of
customary international law relating to maritime delimitation, as ideiltified intealia by the
jurisprudence, willthus be applicable to the delimitation of the continental shclf and lishing
zones in the northem sector. In Qatar's view,three of these principles espccially inust be
applied to these maritime areas. First, the delimitation must be made in conforinity with the
"fundamental nom" according to which the course of the dividing line must be drawn by
applying equitable principles and taking into account al1relevant circumstances in order to
achieve anequitable result; second, the applicable law is cornmon lo the delimitation of
maritime areas lying outsidc tcrritorial waters, whatever the legal regiiiie of such areamüy
bc; and third and finally,equity doesnot necessarily implyequality.
A. The Delimitation mustbe madein Conformih with thc "Fundamental Norm"
accordine towhichthe Courseof the Dividing Line must be drawn bv applying
Equitable Principles and takinpinto account al1Relevant Circumstances inorder to
achievean Equitable Result
12.14 Qatar considers, first, that the delimitatiointhe northern sector must be effected on
the basis of equitable principles,taking into accounal1the relevant circumstances,in order to
achieve an equitable solution. In its Judgment of 1969 in the North Sea C'ontinentulShelf
case, the Court held that the "delimitation is to be effected...in accordance witli equitable
pinciples, and taking account of al1the relevant circ~mstances~~". Similarly, in the most
recent Judgment that it has issued on the subject, in 1993,in the Case concsrning Maritime
Delimitation in theArea between Greenlund and JunMayen,thc Court stated âgain that "That
statement of an 'equitable solution' as the aiin of any delimitation process reflects the
requirements of customary lawas regards the delimitation botli of contineiital shelf and of
20
It tnaybe notedthat neither QatarnorBahisa party to the 1958Convcntion
2'J.C.J.Reporf1969,p. 53,par101,C.1. 22
exclusive economic zones" . Between these two decisions, the chai11of j~uisprudence has
used similar lang~rage,and the Court has clearly taken carc to show that the application of
equitable principles "should displayconsistency and adegree of predictability23".
12.15 Thus, in the Judgment of 1982in the LibyaiTunisia C'onlinenfal Shclf case, the Court
again stated that: "the delimitation is to be effected in accordailce with equitable principlcs,
and taking account of al1relevant circurnstance~~~"a,nd that "Theresiilt of the application of
equitable principles muçt be equitable2'".Sirnilarly, in the Cu,se concerning Delimitation of
the Marifime Roundary inthe Gulfuf MaineArea - ie., in a casewhich, Iiltcthe present casc,
concerned the drawing of a single maritimeboundary - the Judgment of thc Charnber of 1984
defined "what general international law prescribes in every maritime delimitation bctween
neighbouring States" as follows: "delimitation is to be effected by the application of equitable
criteria and by the use of practical methods capableof ensuring, with regard to the geographic
configuration of the area and other relevmt circumstances, an equitable resu~t"~! Finally, in
its Judgment of 1985in the Case concerning the Continental ShcEJ'betwccn Libyü and Malta,
the Court confirmed that "judicial decisions are at one ...in holding that the dcliinitation of a
continental shelf boundary must be effected bythe application of equitable principles in al1
the relevant circumstances in order to achieve an equitable res~it~~"and that thiç is "the
'fundamental nom' ofthe law ofdelimitati~n~~".
B. The Existence ofCornmonPrinciples Applicableto the Delimitation of Maritime
Areas Iyine:outsidc the Territorial Waters of the Parties, whatever the Legal Kegime of
such Areasmavbe
12.16 Qatar submits that Articles 74, paragraph 1, and 83, paragraph 1, of the 1982
Convention on the Law of the Sea are the expression of customary internationalIaw with
22
231.C.J Reports1993,p. 59,para.48;see, alsp.69,para.70.
CbntinentalShe!f(Libyan Arab JcimuhiriydMalta),kdgmenf, I.CJ. Reports 1985, p.39,para. 45;
see, als241C.J. Reports 1993,64,para. 58.
I.C.J.Reports 1982p.92, para.133,A.1.
25lbidp..,59, para. 70.
26I,C.J.Reports1984, pp.299-300,para. 112.
271,C.JReports 1985,p. 38,para.45;see, also, p. 57,pa79, A.I.
28Ibid .,47, para.62. The arbitral jurispnidencc folIows the same linc. Mentionbe made, in
particular, of the 1977Anglo-Frencaward (see,Annex IV.287, Vol. 13,pp. 19-20 and 22)andof the 1985
GuineaGuinea-Bissau award (Annex IV.288,Vol.13,p.37).respect to the delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive econoinic zones29,and that
they also apply to the delimitation of fishing zones. The fact that there is an equivalence
between the conventional lawof 1958,customary internationallaw and 11)e iiew conventional
law was stated as early as the 1977 Anglo-French arbitral award3'. A simiiar idea is to be
found in the Court's Judgment of1993 in the case bctwccn Denii~arkand Norway, which
inade a striking short-cut in order to eilsurethe consistencyof thcjurisprudence on the sub-ject
of maritime delimitations, be it concerning the continental shelf, fislîing zonesor exclusive
economic zones, and onthe basis of the 1958Convention, customaryinlernational law or the
1982 convention3'. The Court concluded its rcasoning as follows: "Thiit statemcnt of an
'equitable solution'as the aim of any delimitation process reflects the requircments or
customary Iawas regards the delimitationboth of continental sheIfand of exclusive economic
zones32".There is thus an equivalence betweenthe regime for delimiting the continental slielf
as laid down in the 1958Convention and customary internationallaw concerning delimitation
of the continental shelf and of the exclusive economic zone, just as there is an equivalence
between the regimes for delimiting fishing zones and for delimiting exclusive economic
zoncs. In fact the application of a "generalnom based on equitable principles" andthe search
for an "equitable solution" arc the common denominalor of the law applicable to the
delimitation of the maritime areas lying outside the territorial waters of the States concerned,
as is the case here in the northernsector. Moreoverit maybe iiotedthat in view of the specific
nature of the Arabian/Persian Gulf and the absence of any exclusive economic zone, the
practice of the Gulf States is to have a single maritime boundary for the seabed and fishing
zones.
29
See, Delirnitcrtiof the Maritime Boundaiy in the Guy ofMarneArca, Jirdgrncnt/.CL Reports
1984, p.294, para.94.
30 See, Annex IV.287,Vol. 13,pp. 21-22, referringto Arliclcs otheRevised Single NegotiatingText
(AnnexIV.273,Vol. 12,p. 199).Subsequently,the contentsof the provisionsof thc Rcvised SingleNepotiating
Text were changed so that agreementcouldbcreached atthe Conferenceas to tliewordingof Articles 7and 83
of the 1312Convention,wliich entered intoforceon 16November 1994.
Maritime Delimitatron inthe Area between Greenland and Jan Mu,ycn, ./udgnlentI.C.J. Reports
1993,p. 59, paras. 46-47, where IhcCourt noted that theparties took same positioii,neitlierof thcm seeing
anyobjectionto "the boundary ofthe dshery zones being determinedby thclaw governingthe boundary of the
exclusiveeconomic zone,which iscustomarylaw"(ibid., para.47).
32 Ibirl.,59, para.48. C. Equity doesnot necessarily imply Equality
12.17 Findly, Qatar would like to recall a well-known principle of customary international
law, which is particularly applicable in the present case.This is the principlc that equity does
not necessarily imply equality. Although the principle of equality of Statcsplays a certain roIe
inthe Lawof maritime delimitation, a dividing line giving unequal areas to the Parties cannot
per se be considered as inequitable. As Judge Mosler remarked: "Tlic nileof equity requires
equal treatment of the Parties. In disputes concerning territorial bouildaries, including
submarine areas, equal treatment daes not neccssarily meai-ithe attribution of equal sl~ares.A
delimitation according to equal areas on either side is in conformity with the rule of equity
only in so far as the relevant criteria and circumstances in theix tvtality in fact indicate this
result3'".The series ofjudgments rcndered on the subject of maritime delimitation has never
put this principie into question. As Professor Weil has stressed, "la jurisprudence est d'une
constance quineconnaît pas d'exception"".
12.18 As early as 1969,the Court made a strong statement in a dictum wllich is often cited:
"Equity does not mcessarily imply equality3'".The Court explained iinrnediately afknvards
that "There can neverbe any question of completely refashioning nature,and eqiiity does not
require that a State without accessto the sea should be allotted an area of continental shelf,
anymore than there could be a question of rendering the situaiion of a Statewith anextensive
coastline similar to that of a Statewith a restricted coastline ...Ttis therefore not a question of
totally refashioning geographywhateverthe factsof thc situation ...j6".
12.19 Similarly, in 1977the Anglo-French Court of Arbitration repcated the same principle:
"The function of equity ..is not to produce absolute equality of treatrneilt ..."".Mention may
also be made once more of the LibyaIMalta ContinentalShelf case, where in 1985 the Court
rejected the Maltesc argument relying onthe principle of the sovereignequality of States:
33
Continentalk'hev (Tunisia/Libyan Arah .lamahiriyuDisscnling Opinioii of ludge Mosler, I.CJ.
Reports 1985,p.119.
34AnnexIV.321?Vol. 13,p.262.
35Norlh Sea Confinenta1ShelLJudgmant, LCL Reports 1969,p. 49,para.91.
16Ibid., pp49-50,para.91.
37AnnexlV.287, Vol. 13,p. 32. "..it is evident that the existence of cqua1 entitlement, ipso jure and ab i~itio,of
coastal Statcs, does not imply an cciuality 01'exteiit of shelf, wliatever the
circumstances of the area; thus refercncc to the length of coasts as a relevant
circumstance cannot be excluded n priori l'hc priiici leof eqiialityof States has
therefore no particularrole toplay inthe applicable law"QP".
In the same case, the Court mentioned, arnongthe equitable principles which areapplicableto
al1marilime delimitations:
"...the principle that thcre is to be no question of refashiuiiing geography, or
compensating for the ineqiialitiesof nature; ..the principle tl-iatültlioughal1States are
equal beforc the law and are entitled to equal treatment, 'equitydoes not necessarily
imply equality' (1C.J Reports 1969,p. 49, para. YI), nor does it scck ta inake equal
what nature hasmade unequal"".
There can be no better systematisation of theequitable principles ol'"xiormativecharacter4'"
which are directly applicableto ihe delimitation ofa single maritime bowidary between Qatar
and Bahrain in the northern sector.
Section3. TheRelevantCircumstances in the Northern Sector
12.20 Having outlined the specific nature of the delimitation in the northcrn sector and
determined the law which is applicable in the present case, Qatar will now identify the
relevant circumstances which should be used in order to effect the delimitation of a single
maritime boundary between Qatar and Bahrain to the nortliof BLV, so that an equitable result
is attained. This means taking into consideration the pai-ticularfacts, or the làciors which are
peculiar to the area under consideration,pemitting the detcrmination of what is equitable.
12.21 The legally relevant circumstances that Qatar wishes to icientifyin order to make the
delimitation in this sector, iii accordance with equitable principles, depend upon the Parties1
title to the maritime areas to be delimited, since tliey are linked both tothc contineiital shelf
and to fishing zones. Itshould be recalled that in its Application of 5 July 1991, Qatar
38I.C.J. Rcpor1985, p43, para. 54.
ibid,, pp.39-40,para.46.
40Ibid.rcquested the Court to draw "a single maritime boundary betwecn tlie maritime areas of sca-
bed, subsoil and superjacent waters" appertaining ta each Party re~~ectivcl~~~T .his means
that, like the Chamber in the GuyrfMuine case, thc Court inust in the presenl case carry out
"a delimitation of two distinct eleinents" - thc continental shelf and tlie tisl~iilgzones - "by
rncans of a single li~~e~~T "h. e Court therefore lias 10 malie a "dual purpose" dclimitation, a
dclimitation with a "twofold ~bject~~" i, a word, a "multi-purpose dclimita~ioil""".And in this
fact thcre is already in the present case, as in the Guy oJ1Vainê case, "a speçial aspcct of the
case which must he taken into consideration even before procccding tri examine the possible
influence of other circumstances on the choice of applicablecriteri$"'.
12.22 Having recalled this point, a consequence of wliich will be the chojce of criteria that,
"because of their more neutral character, are best suited for usc in a multi-purposc
delirnitation4"', Qatar will identify two types of legally relevant circumstances which will
allow an equitable delimitation to be ûchieved in the northern sector. Thcse relevant
circumstances are of two kinds: tliefirst are geographical; the second are linkcd to the existing
delimitations in the area.
A. TheRelevant GeographicalCircumstances
1. The geological and geomorphological unity of thearea of seabed to be delimited
12.23 The first relevant geographical circumstance which must be idenlified iii the northern
sector for the application of equitable principles conceriis the geological and
geornorphological unity of the sea-bed area. It is truc that the coilceptof natural prolongation,
like reference to geophysical considerations, no longer seems trihave the particular place iti
recent jurisprudence that it occupied in the first rulings issued on the subjcct of continental
41
Sec,para.12.1,above.
42Delimitationof theMaririme Boundnry in thCît1JoJ'Malr?Areu, .ludgnzent, 1.CReporls 1984, p.
326, para. 192.The Courtwill howeverbe awrarethat ithepresent case,in çharpcontrast witthesituatiotiin
the Guvnf Mainecase, thefislierieselementisessentialirrelevant.
43Ibid p,.326,para.193.
44lbid., p.327,para.194.
45
46Ihid p.,326,para.193.
lbid, p. 327,para194.shelf delimitation4'.That jurisprudence wasjustified at the tiine "in a rcgime of the title itself
which used to allot those factors a place which now belongs to thc pasl, in so far as sea-bed
areas less than 200rniIesfrornthecoast are concerned4'".
12.24 However, it is not without interest, in effectiiig the maritilne deliinitation in tlie
northern sector, that the sea-bed in that area is characterised by its geological and
geomorphological unity. There is no fundamental discontinuity forrniiig a sort of naturai
boundary to intermpt the extension of Qatar's continental shelf towai-ds tlie north and north-
west, or that of Bahrain's continental shelf towards the east and north-east. Froin the
bathymetric point of view, it is sufficient to glance at the nlarinc charts of the arca, suc11as
British charts No. 2837 or, even bettes, No. 2838, to see that thc sea-bed in thc northern
sector, subject to certain variations, reachesan isobath of an avcrage of 50 to 60 metres. On
the other hand, to the south, it hardly goes beyond the 10-inetrcisobatli.Tlieseobservations fit
in vexywellwith the general descriptionofthe Arabian-PersianGulf by R. Young: "Generally
sliallow, its greatest depth is about 100 metres and itsaverage no more than 40. The dceper
waters arefound mostly inthe lower part ofthe Gulfand along the mountainous Iranian coast,
which contrasts rnarkedlywith the generallylow-lying shore on the Arabian side"".
12.25 This brief and summary mention ofthe first relevant circ~mstance,relating to physical
geography, is sufficient to show that the northern sector is an area without any major
irregularities or significant natural anomalies. Geologically and geornorpl~ologically,the area
to be delimited is simple. This idea is confirmed by the second legally relevant circumstance
that has to be taken into consideration,which isthe regularityof the coastal geography.
47
See, in particular, NorSm Continenfal ShelJ;Judgment, I.C.JReporls 1969, p.51, para.95 and
Contineniül Shelf(Tuni.sia/Lihyan Arab Jamahiriyal, Judgment, LC.J Rcport1982,p. 47, para44 aiidp. 57,
para.66.
48ContinentalSheif (LibyanArab.JarnahiriydMaltir),Judgment, I.C.J. Rcpur1985,p. 36,para.40.
O9See, Annex IV.327, Vol. 13,p. 293. Evensupposingtliattherearc a fewstructural irregularitiesin the
sea-bed in the northernsector, thearc not veiy significanl and can oibeconsidered as "minor structures".
The traditional analyses bGrallainEvans of the geology,geomorphology and sedimcntology of the Gulf (G.
Evans, in R. Fairbridge (ed.), Persian Gulf in the Encyclopedia uf Oceanography, Rcinhold Publishing
Corporation, New York, 1966,pp.689-695) do notbelie this presurnptionof unity and uniforrofthe sea-bed
throughoutthe sectortothe north of BLV,and this analysis is confirmbythe more recent studyby P. Kassler
(The Struchtraf and Geomorphic Evolution of the Persion Gu@ IYuloccne Carbonate Srdimentution and
Diagenesis ina ShulluwEpicontinentalSeo, New York, Springer Verlag, 1973). 2. The regularityof the geographicalconfiguration of thecoasts of the Parties
12.26 As was emphasised by the Court as early as 1969,it is iiecessary "to exainine closely
the geographicalconfigurationof the coastlines of the countries whose contineritd slleives are
to be delirnited5"". Similarly, in 1977 the Anglo-French Arbitral Tribunal held tliat ''the
method of delimitation which itadopts ...must be one that has relation to the coasts of the
Parties actually abutting on the continental shelfs'". Indecd, is it not truc that, as the Court
held in 1982,"Thecoast of eacliof the Parties ...constitutes the starting line from which one
has to set out in order to ascertain how far the submarine areas appcrtaining to each of them
extend in a seaward directions2"?In other words, the basis for a State'slegal title to submarinc
areas and the superjacent column of water off its territory is determinecl"through" its coasts
and founded on the geographical relationbetween thatState'scaastline and the inaritimc areas
concerned. This primacy of the general configuration of the coasts of the States which are
parties to a delimitation process is quite naturaliy explainedby the direct impact of the Parties'
coastlines and of their configuration on the course of the dividing line. As the Chamber noted
in its judgment of 1984in the GulJ'oJ'Maine case, "The delimitation line to be drawn in a
given area will depend uponthe coastal configuration""".
12.27 In the present case, a quick glance at the geographicalconfigurationof the coastlines of
Qatar and Bahrain is sufficientto showthat they have two main characteristiçs. First, they are
notable forhaving no deep indentationsor irregularities, pxonounceddeviations or distortions,
or major anomalies or, in a word, forhaving no "markedlypronounced co~ifigurations",to use
the words of the Court in 1 96954 Second,theçoastlines of Qatar and Bahrain are also notable
for having no pronounced concave or coiivex fcat~uesor, in otlier words, for having no
sharply defined receding coastsor coastal projections.
50
North Sea Continental Shelf./udgrnentI.C.J. Reports1969, p. 51, para.96; sec,also,p. 54,
para.10 51D.I.
52AnnexIV.287,Vol. 13,p.30.
Continental tYhe(TuiiLibun Arub.Jrrmahkiya)J, uu'gmenTf,.J. Repurh1982,p. 61,para.74.
53Delinzztationof fhc MuritirneBoundury in tGicf ofMaine Areu, ./ztdgtnenI,CJ Reports 1984,
p.330, para.205.
54North Seu ContinentalShelf;Judgrnent,LC.J Report1969,p.5 1,para96.22.28 These coastal characteristicsof the Staies which are partics to the present dispute thus
highlight their regularity, in a manner of speaking their "ordinariness", or in fact their
"normality". In these circumstances, it is al1the easier to determine tlîeir general dircction,
which is an objective refiection of the coastal configuration of the Parties. Any cartographer
or geographer who might undertake this exercise wouldnot cncountei-the difficultics which
arme in the LibydTunisia ContinentalSheEfcase as tothe question OS wllether it had to be
considered that the Tunisian coast changed direction, or of cxactly whüt point marked the
change in direction of the coast5'.Nor would they encountcr the dil.ficultiesthat thcy might
have met in thc GulfofMaine case56,
12.29 In these circumstances, there is no need to take into account any irregularity in thc
general direction of the coastlines of Qatar and Bahraiil. It is tiicrcfore possible to apply to
them the words of the Court in its Judgment of 18December 195 1in the Norwegian li'isheries
case, concerning the so called "tracéparallèle''method of deterniining the outcr limit of
territorial waters, which "may beapplied without difficultyto an ordinary coast, which is not
too brokenj7". Indeed, Qatar'sand Balirain'scoastlines are "simple";they are "not too broken"
in any significant way. In other words, for purposes of the maritime delimitation in the
northern sector, there are no relevant circumstanccs linked to the coastal geography of the
Statesparties which might lead to aninequitablercsiilt.
3. Thedisparity or disproportion between the lengths of thc relevant coasts of the
Parties
12.30 The jurisprudence has consistently stressed that the respective coastalfronts of the
States parties to a maritime delimitation operationmust be taken directly into account, since
thcy arethe Yerybasis ofthe coastal States title to the adjacentmaritime areas5'. As the Court
declared in 1982, "the coast of the territory of the State is the decisive I'actorfor title to
subrnarine areas adjacent to it5"'.And again, in 1985, in the LibydMalta Continental Shtrlf.
case, it stated:
55Sec, I.C.J. Rcpor1982,pp.86-87,para.123.
56LC.J,Reports 1984,p.320,para.176.
57Fisheries.ludgmentl.C.-J.Repnrt.~195p. 128,
58See,para.12.31,below.
59Continentuf Shslf(TunisidLibyaArab JarnahiriyuJuclyment,I.CJ. Rcports 1982,p. 6para.73. "It is by means of the maritime front of this landmass, in otlier words by its coastal
opening, that ...territorial sovereignty brings its coi~tiiientaishclf rights into effect.,.
The juridical link between the State's territorial sovereignty and itsrights to certain
adjacent maritime expaises is establislied by mcms of its coast. The concept of
adjacency measured by distance is based entirely on thal of the coast1ine6'."
Consequently, the rights which States rnay claim with respect to thc sea, whether conceining
the continental shelf or fishing zones, are directly related to their coasts and, more precisely,
depend upon their coasts and the way in which theyedge their territory. "Tout dépend de leurs
façadesmaritimes respectives et de la faqondontelles se ".
12.31 In the present case, one of the most significant characteristics of the geographical
relationship between Qatar and Bahrain is precisely the disparity or disproportion between the
respective lengths of their coasts. This self-evident observation, wliich may be made simply
by examining a map, is confirmed when they are measured.In order tcido so, no account will
be taken either of islands and islets or of low-tide elevations, both for purposes of
simplification and in order to conform with the practice that is generally followed in the
Arabian-Persian Gulf in respect of maritime delimitation. Moreover, use will be made of the
method which allows the coastal fronts of the Parties to be scliernatised as accurately as
possible, and two straight coastal fronts to be determined, to which the coasts under
consideration may reasonably be assirnilated.This method of measurement is therefore based
on the concept of general direction of the coasts, to which the internationaljurisprudence has
oftenreferred62.
bu
I.C.J. Reporfs1985, p.41, para.49. In thesame case, three ofthe Court'sjudges dcclared,in their
joint separateopinion, that "Theextentand limitsof [the] shelf are given concrete fbymthe coastal front, and
as a function of itsgeography,which comprisesal1its pliysicalcharacteristics,length included.The sea-board is
a parameter which enables use to be made of the sea; it is a more or lcss important, more or less extensive,
means of acçess to the sea. For that purpose it is exprcssed in units of measurement. Territorial sovereignty
generates continentalshelf rightsby way of thecoastal front (as is proved by thfact that it cannoi engender
them in the caseof landlockedStates). This coastalfront generatesacertain areaof coiitinenlalslielf,becaofe
its Icngt61amongotherthings;tliisseemsa statementof the obvious".1C.J. Reports i9B5,pp. 83-84, para. 21.
62Sec,Annex 1V.288,Vol. 13,p.41.
1C.J. Reports 1969, p.52, para. 98; I.C.J. Reports 1982,p. 86, para. 1CJ.1 Kcports 1984,p. 268,
para. 29;pp. 318-319,paras. 170-171and p. 320, para. 176;SU, also,Annex IV.288. Vol. 13,pp,39 and 40.12.32 On the basis of this rneth~d~~ the eaçtern coast of Bahrain, rneasiired in its gencral
direction and without taking into account the islands and islets or low-lide elevations, is
approximately a straight coastal front from Al Muharraq to Ras al ~arr~~.Its length is
approximately 55.5kilometres or 29.99nauticalmiles. Measured in accordance with the same
parameters, Qatar'swestern coast is also a straight coastalfront, running approximately from
the northemost point of the Qatar peninsula to Ras al~wa~iîat~~I.ts lei-iglis approxirnately
88.2 kilometres or 47.6 nautical miles. Thus, it is possible ta quantify the rnarked disparity
between the relevant lengths of the respective coastal fronts of the Parties to the prescnt
dispute. It results, as precisely as these constructions allow,in a proportioaality ratio of 1.S9
to 1 in favour of Qatar.
12.33 This disparity or disproportion betweenthe respective lcngths ol'the coasts of Qatar
and Bahrain cannot be disregarded in the delimitation bctween the two countrics in the
northern sector,because there is indeed a certain relationshipbetweeiî tlie leiigthof the coasts
and the maritime areas engenderedby those coasts, which mtist be takeii into consideration in
order to arrive at an equitable solution.As the Court recallcd in 1993 in the Denmark/Norway
case:
"The frequent refereaces in the case-law to the idea of proportionality - or
disproportion - confirm the importance of the proposilicin that an equitable
delimitation must, in such circurnstances,take into account the disparity between the
respective coastal lengthsof the relevantarea6'."
There are well-known dicta in the jurisprudence, which is equaily applicable in continental
shelf delimitations and in continental shelf andfishing zone delirnitationç6'.
12.34 Thisjurisprudence has been reaffirmedin the cases concerning delimitation of a single
maritime boundary. TIlus, in 1984 the Charnber in the Gulf o.$'Muine case hcld that "a
u3See,Appendix 6,Vol.15,p. 143.
64Ibid.
65Ibid.
661.C.J Reports 1993,p.67, para.65.
a7S'ceparas.12.6-12.9,above.See, also,I.C.J. Reporls 196p. 54,para.101, D.3; ibid, p. 5para.
98; 1C.J.Reports 1982,pp. 43-44, para.37;I.C.JReports 1985pp.43-45, paras.55-57.See, alsopara. 12.19,
above.substantialdisporportion" in relationto the respective lengthsofthe coasts of the parties in the
relevant area "that resulted frorna delimitation effected on a differentbasis wouId constit~ite a
circumstance calling for an appropriatec~rrection~~.Indeed, in thc Clîarnber'sview, the ratio
between the coastal fronts of the United States (284 nautica1miles) and Canada (206 nautical
miles), which was 1.38to 1 in favour of the United States in the Gulf of Maine, had to be
"reflected in the location of the second segment of the delimitation line6"'. The Chamber
considered that this geographical characteristicjustified the correction thai it made to a
delimitation based onthe equidistance method,and was a "validground for correction", which
was "more pressing" than others7'.In short, therefore,the coursc of tlîe central segrncntof the
dividing line was to correspond "over its entire length" to the coi-rectedinedian line as so
established7'.
12.35 In 1993,in the Caseconcerning Maritime Delimitation in theAreu hetweenGreenlund
and Jan Mayen, the Court noted that the lengths of the coastal fronts were, rcspectively,
according to the methods of calculation that were used, 54.8 or 57.8 lun for Jan Mayen and
504.3 or 524 km for Greenland, and that thus, "the ratio between the Coastof Jan Mayen and
that of Greenland is 1 to 9.2 on the basis of the first calculation, and 1 to 9.1 on the basis of
the second72".Therefore, in the viewof the Court:
"The disparity between the lengths of coasts ... constit~itesa specid circumstance
within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 1, of thc 1958 Convention. Similarly, as
regards the fishery zones, the Court is of the opinion, in view of the great disparity of
the lengths of the coasts, that the application of the median line leads to manifestly
inequitable res~lts'~."
681.C.J;Reports1984.p. 323. para. 185.
69Ibid p.336, para.222. The disproportiontherewas iherefore not as great as that in the present case.
The ratio between the lengths the coastal fronts of Qatar and Bahris, should be recalled, 1.to 1 in
favourof Qatar.See,para.12.32 ,bove.
70
Ibidp..323, para.185.
71Ibid p.,337,para.223. It will also be recthat,ina situationof lateraldeliinitation rclaiing both
to the continental shelf and to the exclusiveeconomiczone, the arbitral aw1985in the case concerning
delimitationof the GuineaiGuinca-Bissauundary also used proportionalasya testobc applied a posterion,
thusallowing itto be verifiedwhethereach Partyhad obtaineda maritimc area inproportionto the lcngth of its
coastline;sec, Annex lV.288, Vol. 1341.
72IC.J. Reports1993,p. 65,para. 1.
73Ibid pp. 68-69p,ara. 68.And the Court concluded that "in the light ofthe disparity ol'coastal leiigths,the median line
should be adjusted or shiftediii sucha way asto effect a dclimitation closer to tlie Coastof Jan
~a~en~~".
12.36 Qatar has certainly not forgotten that every delimitationoperation is specific and is
"inonotypic",to usethe expressionof thc Chamberin the GuEf oJ Maine case7! But it believes
that in order to arrive at an equitable rcsult in the delimitation of the northern scctor, it is
necessary, in view of the jurisprudence analysedabove, Lotake into accoutit thc disparity in
the respective coastal fronts of Qatar and Bahrain, wherethe ratio determincd on the basis of
the sirnplifiing rnethod that has heenused7%s 1.59to 1.This rniist bc so,whaievrr inay have
been the terrninology usedby tlie Courtor arbitraltribunals in the abcive-inentioiiedcases, and
whether proportionality is considered as "a factor to be taken account of77";a a
riteri ri on ^^"";stso";an "aspect of equity8'"; a "iouchstone of equitablencss82"or even, in
the most recent of the Court'sjudgments,a "principles33".
B. TakingintoConsiderationtheExistin~ Delimitation Arrreements
12.37 A relevant circumstance that the jurisprudence has also alwüys taken into account in
delimitation processes is the existence of agreements of this type which havc already been
made in the area in question. In 1969, in the Norfh Sea Continent~E Shelfcascs, the Court had
already recommended that the States parties take into account, in the course of ncgotiaLioi~s,
"the effects, actual or prospective, of any other continental slleif delimitations between
adjacent States in the sarneregions4".Again, in 1982,in the LibydTunisia Continrnlul Shelf
case, the Court expressly listed, arnongst "the relevant circumstances which characterize the
area", "the existence and interests of other States in the area, and the existing or potcntial
74Ibid., p. 69, para.69.
751.C.J.Reports 1984,p.290,para.81.
76Sec,para.12.32,above.
77
78Ibid., pp. 53-54, para101,D; AnnexIV.287, Vol. 13, pp. 22 and 23;I.C.J. Reports 1985, p.44,
para.57; I.C'.Report4vI993, p67, para.66.
79AnnexIV.287,Vol. 13,pp.23 and 30;I.C.J.Reports1982,p.91, paras,130-131.
801.C.J Reports1985, p.53,para.74.
81I.C..JReports1982, p.91,para.131;I.C.J. Reports1985,p.55,para.75.
821.C.J.Reports1982,p.78, para.108.
83I.C..IReports1993,p.68, para.67.
84I.C.J.Reports1969, p.54, para. 10D.3.delimitations betwcen each of the Parties and such tat tes" E".ually clearly, the arbikal
tribunal, in its Decision of 14 Fcbniary 1985 in the case conccrning Delimitalion ofthe
Muritirne Boundury betweenGuineuand Guinea-Bissau,declarcd tlîat:
"Uile délimitationvisant à obtenir un résultat équitable ne peut ignorer les autrcs
délimitationsdéjàeffectukesou àeffectuerdans la région8!'"
Suchjurisprudence is readilyjustifiable sincc,as Professor Wcil Iîasrightly rcriiarkcd:
"Opérationcssentiellernent inter puries, la délimitationjudiciaire ou arhilrale ne pcut
s'effectuercn vase clos, coupéedu monde alentour et isolée des autres dé1imitations
déjà réaliséesn,u encore à faire,dans la régionx7."
12.38 In the prcsent dispute, at least as far as the northern sectoriscoiiccrned, the Court will
not have to take into consideration possiblefuture delimitations 10be carricd o~itin the reginn,
sincc the delimitation it must now malceis the Iastfor thc central-western par1of the Arahian-
Persian Gulf. 011 the other hand, in order to reachan cquitable result,the Court will inevitably
have to take into account the various delimitations already made by coi-iventionalmeans, and
in particular their effect on the soiutioilto be applied to the probfcm of the Qatar/lran/Rahrain
tripoint.
1.The conventional delimitations already effected and to be talreninto consideration
12.39 The Court will neccssarily atlach psimary importance to the agrccinenls çoncluded by
Iran with Qatar on 20 Scptemher 1969'"d with Bahrain on 17 Juiic 1971R9, respcctively,
sinçe these two agreements define the northern boundary OP the area thatthe Court will have
to delimit in the prescnt dispute. However, it must be noted that thcy raise a problem of
intei-pretation,notably in dctermining tlie segment wliere Ihe QatarJlran bciundary and the
BahraidIran boundary meet cach otl-ier.This is bccause point 1 on thc QalariIran boundüry
and point 1 on the Bahrain/Irm boundary were not determined in thc agreements ol' 29
R5I.C.J.Reports 1952p.64,para. 81.reealso,p. 93, para. 135,€3.5.
86Annex lV.288,Vol. 13,p. 38.
87AnnexIV.321, Vol. 13,p.261.
RBSee,AnnexIV.260,Vol. 12,p.83 and MupNo. II, facingpage 209.
a9
Sec,Annex 1V.264, Vol.12,p. 11and Map No. II, facingpag200.Septembcr 1969 and 17 Julie 1971.Nevcrtheless an analysis of Article 1 of thc QatadIran
agreement of 1969 and of Article 1 of the BahraidIran apreeinent of 1971 allows the
conclusion that point 1 in the 1971 BaliraidIran agrccn~eiit,situated at tlie "latitude of
27 degrees, 00 minutes, 35 scconds Norlh and longitudc 51 degrees, 23 miniitcs, 00 seconds
East, and having a gcodctic azimut11of 278 degrccs, 14 mi~iutes. 27 seconds" coincides
exactly with point 2 on the delimitation line drawnin the Qatarilrailagreeriicntof 1969. Tliere
is strict continuitygOa,s a resultOS tlie coincidence of these Iwo points, of t11cdividing line of
thc Iranian continental shelr cipposite the Qatar cotitinental slielf and the Bal~rüiii contincntal
shelf, respectively, and consequently thc whole of the contincntal shelf and, as lias already
91
been s11own ,the siiperjacentfishing zone, are delimited withrcgard to Qatar as wcll as with
regard to Bahrain.
12.40 The Court will have to take into consideration the cxistiiig continental sIiell'
deliinitatioii agreement concluded on 22 February 1958 between SaudiArübiaand ~ahraii~".
It is true that there is no question of taking into accouilt thc whole of' the dividing line
established by the 1958agreement, in order lo delimit the ~iorthcrnsector between Qatar and
Balirain, but oiily of a relevant segmcnt OSthe bciundary, i.e. a segment comprised
approximateiy between a point to the north of point 14on that boundary, deterinincd by Ille
1958 agreement, and the western end point (point 4) of thc 1971 BahraidIran agreement,
which also coincides with the starting point (point I) ,n the agreement of 24 October 1968
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, forwhichthe gcographicalcoordiiiütesaïe latit~de27°10'00"
Nortli and longitude 50°54'00" I3astY3.This is therefore tlie Bahrainllrai~ISaudi Arabia
94
tripoint .
90
Subjectto a discrepancof one second, wliich inigtit be explainadsiiiipleerior in calculation. In
fact point 2 in the BahraidIran agreement of1971 is not situated exactly on tlie linc defïned by that
agreement and by the Qatarllran agreement of 1969.In ordto bc strictly acciirate to a secolatitudand
loilgitude, 27"02'47" North should have been takefor the latitiide point 2 and not 27O02'46",it bcing
undcrstood that the longiiudligure of51'05'54"East must rcmain the saine. In aiiy event, this error has no
practical effecton the maritime deliinitation bctwcenQatar aiidBahrttinorthcrn sector.
91See, paras12.8-12.9,above.
92See, Annex IV.262, Vol. 12,p95 and MapNo. Il,facingpage209.
93See,Annex IV.258, Vol.12,p. 71.
94Sec,para. 12.68,below. 2. The QatarllranA3ahraintripoint
12.41 The problem of the tripoint has already been dealt with in this Mernorial with respect
to the relationship between Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain at tlie southeri1 end of the
delimitation areag5.It was recalled in that context thatjudicial and arbitral bodies are dwriys
extrernely careful to ensure that they do not prejudice the riglits and interests of third States,
both in maritime delimitations" and in land delimitations". In thc norlhern scctor, since thc
QatarlBalirain delimitation is the last to be made, no rights and interests of any tllirclState,
i.e., in fact, Iran, cm be affccted by the future dccisionof the Court in the preseiit case. 'I'hey
will be adequately protected by Article 59 of the Statute of tlîe Court in Iraiî'srelations with
each Party, as the Chamber noted in the Burkina Faso/Mali case, in its Judgmerit of
22December 1980".
12.42 The only effect of the delimitation agreements between Qatarand Iran of 1969 and
Bahrainand Iran of 1971is to clarif!ythat Iranhas no rights over thc continental shelf situated
to the south of the dividing lines established by thcse agreements, and also tliat ncither Qatar
nor Bahrain has rights over the continental shelf situatedto the north of tlie same lines. Thus,
if the principles applied to a land delimitation in the Burkina Faso/Mali Judgrnent are
extended to maritime delirnitati~ns~~i,t appears that the Court could, at least, in the present
dispute, "determine" how far the maritime zones of both Qatar and Ralxaiii extend, The Court
would therefore restrict itseIf in this way to indicating the location uf the ad qurm point, the
end point of this dividing line, i.e. the point where thc single maritime boundary no longer
separates the respective maritime zones of Qatar and Bahrain. It would indiçate nothing less,
but it might also indicate nothing more,in other words nothing which miglitbring Iran's rights
95See, paras.11.27etseq., above.
96
Annex IV.287,Vol. 13, p.18;I.C.J.Reports 1982, p. 90, MapNO. 3;J.C.J.Repipurl1985, p, 26, para.
21, following the Judgment of 1984 concerning Italy's application forpertnisçionio intervene, 1.C.J Reports
1984,p. 27, para. 43.
97Frontier Dispute, Judgmenf,I.C.J. Reports 1986, pp. 577-578, paras. 46-47; fir~itorial Dispute
(LibyanArab JamahiriyaKhad), Judgmenl, i.C..IReports 1994, pp. 33-34, para.63.
98I.C.J. Reports1986, pp. 577-578,paras.46-47.
Y9
On this point,the Chamberconcludedthat it had "a duty to decidettie wholeof tliepeiitum entrusted
to itthat is, to indicathe lineof the frantier betweenthePartiesoverthe entire lengiof tlie dispiited arca. In
sodoing, itwill define the locationof theend-pointof the îrontier in tlieeast,the pointwhere thisfrontierceases
to divide the territories Burkina Faso andMali; but...this willnot amount toa decision by the Chamber that
this is tripointwhich affectsNiger"(1.CJ. Reports1986, pp.579-580,para. 50).and interests into issue. ln the present dispute,the Court has nojurisdiction to determine the
QatarIIradBahrain tripoint without theexpressconsent of Iran.
Section 4. The Appro~riatc Delimitation Method inthc Northern Sectur
12.43 Qatar submits that, in the çircumstances of the preseilt case, thc most appropriate
method of delimitation in the northern sectoris the perpendicularitymcthod. This geometrical
method is very wel1suited to the geographyof the area, since it is based on the coasts of the
Parties themselves, and on the northernmost points of theirrcspcctive territories, which are tlie
only elements that rnay be used as a basis for the dclimitatiun operationwhich the Court has
been requested toperform. Ttis moreoverthe only method tl-idtallows an cquitable solution to
be achieved in the sector concerned, by application of equitable principlcs'OO and by taking
into account the relevant circumstances which are peculiar to the case'0'.Tliis is why Qatar,
af3errecailing the rationale underlyingthis method of delimitation and the circumstanccs in
which it has been used in Statepractice and in international jurisprudence, wilI demonstrate
the application of the perpendicularitymethod in the northern scctor and tl~eilwill procccd to
an a posterio vrirification of the equitable nature ofthe linc thus obtained, by means of
proportionality calculations.
A. TheRationale underlying the Pcr~endicularitvMethod
12.44 The perpendicularity method applied toa maritimc delimitatioii isderived fiom the
sarne rationale as the equidistance method. In fact it is only a variant of that mcthod, as Iras
always been stressed by the doctrinal authorities. As early as the pcriod between the two
world wnrs, GideI, referring to ~ünch'~~,noted that in cases where two snvereigii States are,
in his words, "au contact latéral",the solution consisting of perpendicularityin relation to the
general direction of thc coast was no more than "une modalitc spécialede Ia ligne médiane
entenduc au sens largeLo3".
10See, paras.12.14etseg., above.
10Sec, paras. 12.2d seq., above.
103ie technischenFragen desKüstenmeers,Kiel,1934,p. 156.
Le droit internationalpublic derner,T. III, mer territoriaet lzone contiguë, Paris, Sirey,
1981(AnnexIV,300,Vol. 13,pp. 129-130).12.45 Currentdoctrine shares the same point of view. Thus, inthe opinion of Professor Weil,
this method of delimitation, whether it be by a line perpendicular to the coast or a line
perpendicular to the imaginary closing line of a gulf',is only one of' the "variantes de
l'équidistance'04"T .he sarnelearnedauthor Statesmoreoverthat:
"...une ligne d'équidistanceentre deux points est par définition laperpendiculaire à la
droite unissant ces deux points qui coupe cette droite en son point médian,tant et si
bien qu'une ligne d'équidistance n'est rien d'autre qu'une succession de
perpendiculaires ... Dans le cas d'unecôte a peu près rectiligne ou lorsqu'on est en
présence d'une ligne imaginaire de fermeture d'un gollè, on pcut parler
presqu'indifféremmentd'une ligne perpendicu10sr,,coupant la ligne de fermeture en
son miIieu ou d'uneligned'équidistance .
Similarly, L.Legault and B. Hankeyhave observed:
"Another method of delimitation is the perpendicular, generally a perpendicular to the
general direction of the coast, although perpendiculars to the closing lines of coastal
indentations have also beenused.
1061,
The rationalefor this method is that it constitutesa simplified forrnof equidistance .
12.46 The jurists' point of view is shared by technical experts in hydrography, marine
cartography or the drawing of maritime boundaries. To givejust one examplc, of the liighest
scientific authority, the International Hydrographic Office in Monaco has expressed the view
that:
"In plane geometry a perpendicular to a straight line is also a tine of equidistance
relative to that line. This method of delimitation may therefore be seen as a special
case of equidistance but it will be essential to cornpute the results in geodetic
terrn~'~' .t
104
Annex IV.321, Vol. 13, p. 257. InProfessor Weii'sview, "IIserait Bpeine cxagéréde dire que la
méthode de l'équidistance constitulee développement scientifiquede cdclla perpetidiculaire,plus fmste car
'vraisemblablement la plus anciennequi soit venue b l'esprit'pour délimiterla mer territorinlc entre Etats
liinitrophes" (ibid.,259).Prof. Weil refers in this respect to the observations Chamber in theGuif of
Mainecase (1C.J.Reports 1984, pp.319-320, para.175).
LUAnnexIV.321, Vol. 13,p.263.
''"ethod, Oppositenessand Adjacency,and Proportionalityin Maritime Delimitationin J.I. Chamey
& L.M.Alexander(eds.), op. czt.,InternationalMaritimeDoundaries,Vol1,p.213
10Annex 1V.302, Vol. 13,p. 147. 12.47 This convergence in analysis by jurists and technical experts explains why the
jurisprudence has echoed the links existing between the perpendicularity rnethod and the
equidistance method. Thus, in the Gulfof Mainecase, the Judgment rendered on 12 October
1984 by the Chamber of the Court stressed that thercare methods of delimitation other than
the equidistancemethod -
"...differing from it in varying degree evenwhile promptcd by similar coiisiderations,
which rnay prove equally appropriate or even distinctly prcferable, giveii that thc task
is to delimit not onkya contirtenta1shelf, as provided for in the 1958Convention, but
also the volume of superjacentwaters'08."
Here, the Chamber was referringto the perpendicularity inctliodand also to the method of the
bisector of the angle formed by the coastlines aiid, as we kilow, it applied tl-iesernethods,
together with the corrected equidistance method, to the various segments of tlie maritime
boundary between Canadaandthc United tat tes" In!deed.as the Chamberremarked:
"Nor should one overlook the possibility that, over the whole course of a long
deiimitation line, various, though relat110IIethods may succcssiveIy appear more
appropriateto the different segments .
B. Useofthe PernendicularityMethod in State Practice and in the .Jurisprudence
1. The line perpendicularto the general direction of the coast
12.48 As inay be seen from the foregoing remarks, the perpendicularity rnethodmay be used
in maritime delimitation in two gcographical coiitexts. State practice and international
jurisprudence first used it in cases of lateral delirnitation between two States with adjacent
coasts, as a line perpendicularto the general direction of the coastfl'. Menticin may be made
herc of the agreement of 18March 1958for delimitation of theterritorial sea between Poland
10I.C.J. Report1984, p.329, para.200.
109
110ee,paras. 12.54et seq.below.
III.C.J.Reports 1984,p.329, para.200.
It rnay be recalled that twas one of the four methods submitted to the Committee of Expert
Hydrographersby the InternationalLaw Commissionin 1953,in the hypothcsis of a lateraldelimitation of the
territorialwaters ohvo adjacent States,the others being, respectivequidistancethe exicnsion seawasds of
the land boundary, and the drawing of a line perpeiidicularto coast althc pointwliere the land boundary
reachesthe sea (seealso,I.C.J.Reports1969,p. 34,para. 51and 1C.J.Reports 1994, pp.319-320, para. 175).and the Soviet union112, the maritime delimitation agreement of 21 July 1972 hetween Brazil
and ~ru~ua~"~, and the delimitation agreement of 2 February 1980betwecn Costa Rica and
anm ma "^1,of which used this method at least partialiy. International jurisprudence has
also used this method of a line perpendicuIarto the general direction of thc coast, in one way
or another and for a more or less extensive segment of tlie maritime boiindary in question.
Mention may be made here of the Grisbadarna case"', the Libyalrunisia CantinenrulShelf
case for the segment of the dividing line closest to the coast116,and, l'roma more rnacro-
geographical point of view, the GuineatGuineaBissau case"'.
2. Thc line perpendicular to theclosingline of coastal concavity
12.49 State practice and international jurisprudence have also used the perpendicularity
method in another hypothesis, as a line perpendicularto ail imaginary ljne closing a more or
less pronounced coastal concavity, whether it be a gulf or anestuary. Here the geographical
situation is different from the previous one. It is no longer a question of effecting a strict
lateral delimitation, but a delimitation ofthe maritime areas located in the prolongation, in the
open sea, of a situation where the coastlines of the two Statesconcerned are atleast partially
opposite. Since the maritime delimitationin the northem sector betwecn Qatar andBahrain is
related to such a situation1'" attention should be paid to two partiçlilmly significant
precedents, the Rio de la Plata treaty of 19 November 1973and the Judgment of the Charnber
of 12 October 1984in the Gulf ofMainecase. This is particularly i~nportantin view of the
fact that use of the perpendicularity methodis much more appropriate in the case of a line
perpendicular to the closing line of adeep coastal concavityor of a relativelynarrow maritime
passage, than in the case of a line perpendicular to the general directio1.iof the coast in the
113Lirnitsin theSeas,No.55; J.Charney& L,M.Alexander (eds.), opcil., Vol. II2039-2026.
Annex 1V.274, Vol. 12,p. 201.See, also, J.I. Charne& L.M. Alexaiider(eds.)op. cit.V,ol.1,
pp. 785-114 andthe observationsofL. Legault& B,Hankey, ibid .o,l1,p.2 14.
Lirnits ithe Seas,No. 97;J.I. Charne& L.M.Alexander (eds.)op.cit., Vol.pp. 537-549.
lL5Annex IV.285, Vol. 13,p. 7,and the observationsof G. GidcI,op. cit. (AnnexIV.300, Vol. 13,
pp. 129et seq.).
116I.C.J.Reports 1982,p. 85, para. 120, and the observationsof E. Deca(Annex 1V.296, Vol. 13,
p. 93). 117
Annex IV.288,Vol. 13,p. 33, and the commentariesby E. DavidiiitheAnnuaire@unçuis de droit
international, 1985(Annex IV.295,Vol. 13,p. 83) and in J.I. Char&eyL.M.Alexander(cds.), op.cit., Vol1,
p. 861.
118See,paras.12.59-12.61,below.case of a laterd delimitation, unless the adjacent coasts are practically straight.As Professor
Weil has remarked:
"La méthodede la perpendiculaire est d'une application infiniment plus discutabie
dans le cas d'unecôte qui n'est pas tout à fait rectilignc. car eiIe suppose dors que soit
déterminée d'abord une direction générale de la côte entre dcs points qu'ilbut choisir.
Or c'estlà, on le sait, une opérationémiriemmentaléatoire"?"
One might add to Professor Weil's remarksthat this operation is unnecessary when the sanie
n~ethodis applied in the otherhypothesis, ie. that of a lineperpendicular to the closing line of
a coastal indentation or of a maritime passage.
a) The Rio de la PlataTreaty signedon 19November 1973 between Argcntina and
Uruguay
12.50 The Rio de la Plata Treaty is of particular interest with respect to its provisions
concerning delimitation of the Iateralmaritime b~undar~'~'.Firsl, the constsuction is based on
closure of the Riode la Plata by animaginary straightlinejoining its iùrthest entry points, i.e.
Punta del Este on the Umguayan side and Punta Rasa del Cabo Sali Antonio on the
Argentinian sideI2'. Second, the maritime boundary, which is therefore beyond the closing
line of the Rio de la Plata, towards the open sea, may bc characterised more or less
interchangeably, at least along a large part of its course, as an equidistance Iine or as a line
perpendicular tothe closing lineofthe Rio.
12.51 It is tme that Article 70 ofthe Treatyof 19November 1973providesthat:
"The lateral maritime boundary and that of the continental shclf between the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay and the Argentine Republic are dcfincd by an equidistant line,
deterrnined by the adjacent coasts methods, which bcgins at theinidpoint of ttic
baseline consisting of an imaginary straight line that joins Punta del Este (Uruguay)
and Punta Rasa del CaboSanAntonio (~r~entina)'~~."
119Annex1V.231,Vol. 13,p. 263.
12'Annex1V.268,Vol. 12,p. 149.J.I. Charne& L.M.Alexander(eds.), op.cit., Vol1pp. 757-776.
121This is independent oftlie ques-iwhich was subjectn controversyfor a loiigtime thepast but
which isof hardlyany interest toda-of whether the Rio de la Plata shoube assiinilated a bay orto an
estuary.122
AnnexIV.268,Vol. 12,p. 149.However, although it is called an "equidistance line" in the parties' agreement,thc line
separating the maritime areas lying seawardsof the closing line of the Rio de la Plata, which
concerns both delimitation of the continentai shelf and delimitation of the superjacent waters,
may also be characteriscd as a line perpendicular to the closing linc of the Rio de la Plata.
This is the case at least with respect to the first section of the line, between point 23 whiçh,
according to Article 70, is equidistant from Punta de1Este and Punta Rasa del Cübo San
Antonio on the closing line, and point A, i.e. for a distancc of approxiinately 112.7 nautical
miles 12.
12.52 The State Department's Geographer,in his commentary upan the Rio de la Plata
Treaty, taking into consideration the Iack of precision in the tcxt oi'the agreement concerniilg
determination of the course ofthe dividing line, and iii pilrticuiarthe Sactthat point 23 is not
exactly the median point of the closing line of the Rio de la Plata, drew thc following
conclusions:
"Beyond point 23 the shelf boundary is defined in Article 70 as 'an equidistant line,
determined by the adjacentcoasts methods'. Since specific coordinates of this segment
of the boundary are not cited in the Treaty, the continental shelf boiindary on the
attached chart beyond point 23 consists of provisional lines devcloped by the
Department of State'sGeographeron a U.S.chart.
From point 23 the line continues seaward as the perpei~dicular bisector of the
Argentina-Uruguay closing line of the Rio de la Plata. Point 23 is supposed to be
equidistant from the two States; a .O9nautical mile calculated disçrepancy from
equidistance can probably be attributed to the different charts used. While point 23 is
the intended mid-point of the river closing line, it is not an equidistant point between
the two States. Pta. Brava, south of Montevideo, iscloser to point 23 than any other
Uruguayan or Argentine territory.
The perpendicular bisecting line is the boundary until it reaches point A,
approximately 112.70 ilautical miles seaward of point 23. At this point the
configuration of Argentina'scoast would cause the true equidistant boundary to be
diverted toward Uruguay. Assuming, thatthe phrase in the Trcaty 'determinedby the
adjacent coasts methods ...(Article 70) means that al1possible points on both coasts
are to be considered in drawing the equidistant boundary, thcn the shelf boundary
continues as the line connecting point 23 to points A, B, C, D, E, and F. If, however,
the intention of the Treaty is to continue the shelfbouildary seaward from point 23 as
123See,Map No. 18,facing this page, takcn hinB. CotifortiG. Fraiicalanci, Atlante dei conJini
sottomuriniMilano, Giuffrè1979,p.187. the perpendicular bisector of the river closing line,then tliis idcpicted oiltlie attached
chart risa dashed linc to pojnts where it is200 nautical miles froin Uruguay (UR) and
12411
fiom Argentins (AR) .
12.53 In sum, to repeatthe well chosen words used by Professor Weil in his summary of the
provisions of the Rio de laPlata treaty concerningdeIimitationof the inaritinie front:
"L'accord Argentine/Uruguay... définitla ligne de dcliinitaliciilau largc dRio coiniiie
une ligne d'équidistance; cetteligne aurait aussi bien LI êtredéfiniccomme uiie
If51,
perpendiculaire ala ligneimaginairede fermeturedu Rici .
b) Thc Judgment of 12 Octabcr 1984in the GulfofMnN~c case
12.54 ln the Gulf<$Maine case, the Chamberhcld that:
"The course of the single maritimebouiidarythat divides tlie coiitiiicntalslielf and tlie
exclusive fisheries zoncs of Caiiada and the United Slates of America in the arca
referred to in the Special Agreementconcluded by those two States on 29 March 1979
shall be defined by gcodetic linesconnectingthc points [A, B, C and Dl"
of which it indicated the geographical coordinatc~'~~.This ineant that the dividing line
between Canada and the IJiiiled States consistcd of three segments,of whicli the first two -
segments A-R and B-C - were situatedinside the Guli'of Maine andtlîe tliird - segment C-il -
correspontied tu the delimitation outside the ~ulf"'. Thus thc line oTdelimitation diawn by
the Chamber between points A and B was the bisector of a rcflex angle of about 278" formed
by two Iines perpendicular to the two coüstlines,joining the end point of thc international
bouiidary to Cape Elizabeth (United Slales) and to Capc Sable (Canada), re~~cctively'~~A . s
for the secoiid segment of the maritime bouiidary,linking points B and C. it is a "corrected
rnedian linel*"', the Chamber having taken into accouiit various special circurnstançes
(ciilferencein length between the coasts oftlieIwo States a-joining tliedeliniitation area, and
existence of the Canadiail Seal Islaiid,which was given half effcct by the Cliambcr) in order
to inodiSythe strict applicationofthe cquidisiancemetliod in this scctor.
124
AiinexIV.268,Vol. 12,p. 149.
125Annex IV.321, Vol. 13p.263.
126I.C.JReporls1984, p. 345para. 243.
1?7See,~MupNo. 19,facing this page (J. Reports 1994p. 346).
128I.C.J. 1lieport.s198333,para.213.
I2?bid., p. 33para.223. 12.55 Finally, withrespect to the third segment of the maritime boundary betweenpoints C
and D, which is therefore beyond the imaginary closing li~ieof the Gulf of Maine, the
Chan-iberused the perpendicularity method. It consideredthat for this sector lying uutside the
Gu1f:
"The portion of the liiienow to be determinedwill inevitably,throughout its length, be
situated in the open ocean. From the geographical point of vicw, there is no point of
reference, outside the actual shores of the Gulf, that cm serve as a basis for carrying
out the final operation required.That being so, it appears obvious tliütthe only kind of
practical method which can be considered for this purpose is, once again, a
geometrical method. Within the range of such methods, the most appropriate is that
recommended above al1by its simplicity, nainely in this instance the drawing of a
perperidicularto the closing lineofthe ~ulfl~~.''
12.56 Thus, the dividing line in this third sector, lying outside the Gulf proper, and linking
points C and D, forms a 90"angle with the closing line ofthe Gulf whichjoins Cape Sable to
the island ofNantucket. Butit must be noted that, unlikeat lcast Illeliteralwording of the Rio
de la Plata Treaty as analysed above, this C-D perpendicular does not cut the imaginary
closing line of the Gulf of Maine at its mid-point. It cuts it at a point lying to the east of the
mid-point, since it must not be forgotten thatthe second segment ofthe dividiiig line is not a
strict median line, but a median line corrected in favour of the United States, since the
Chamber took into account various special circumstances, as noted above13'.The proportion
between the lengths of the coastal fronts of the United Statesand Canada in the Gulf of Maine
is 1.38to 1in favour of the United ~tatesl~~B . ut taking into account tlie half effect attributed
by the Chamber to the Canadian Seal Island, the proportion to be applied in order to
determine the position of the corrccted median line in the second sector was "approximately
1.32 to 1 in place of 1.38 to 1'""". As Profcssor Weil has rightly pointed out, this C-D
110Ibid, pp.337-338, para.224; see, alsothecommentariesby E. Decaux (Anncx TV.297,Vol. 13,
p.97); L.H. Legault& D.M. McRae (Annex IV.306, Vol. 13, p. 165); 1Schneider (Annex IV.318, Vol. 13,
p.243); 131,also,Annex 1V.290,Vol. 13,p.53.
132See,para. 12.54above.
LC.J report,^1984pp. 335-336,paras.221-222.
133Ibid., p. 337, para.222;see, also,the Technical Report of P.B. Beazley, ibid, pp.350-351,
paras.14-15.Sec, alsothe observationsof L. M.Alexai~de(AnnexIV.290, Vol. 13,p. 53).perpendicular "équivaut à une ligne d'équidistancecontrôlée par les deux points extrêmesde
la ligne de fermeture et qui auraitfait l'objetd'unetranslation versl'est'341f.
C.Anelication ofthe PerpendicuIarity Mcthodin thePresent Case
1. Justification for use of this methodof maritime delimitation
12.57 Statepractice and internationaljurisprudencethus show thüt wheii certain geographiçül
conditions are fulfilled, the perpendicularity method allows a reasonable and equitable
delimitation of maritime areas lying off a coastal concavity,be it deep or shallow, an estuary
or a gulf. They also show that this method is particularly appropriatc when a single maritime
boundary has to be drawn, as is the case here.The technique is simple. Itis sufficient to draw
the line perpendicular to the imaginary closing line of the indentation cuncerned. As for the
startingpoint ofthe seaward segment ofthe boundasy,it correspondsto apoint situated onthe
closing line of the concavity, which pointmay coincide, but docs not necessarily do so, with
the mid-point of the closing line135I .n fact,this starting point or,if one prcfers, the base of the
boundary of the seaward maritime areas, must be the same as tlie end point of the previous
segment of the dividing line in the maritime areas where the two neighbouring Stateshave
opposite coasts, and therefore before that boundary meets the closing line. In these
circumstances, as was stressed by the Chamber in the Gulf of Mainecase, "the essential
question ...to be resolved" is to determine "the precise point on the closing linc of the Gulf
from which the perpendicular to that line should be drawn ~eawards'~~".The Chanber
explainedits method of work in the followingterrns:
"However, if it is considered necessary to remain guided by geography, al1 the
considerations already set forth in regard to the determination of the final segment of
the line militate in favour of havingthis new choicecoiilcidewith the verypoint where
114AnnexIV.321,Vol. 13,p. 264.
135Two commentatorsupon the Judgrnentof 12October 1984 havc remarked in this respect: "lnthe
Gulfof Mainscase ...in establishing the thirdsegmof lbcboundary,whiclidivides the Atlanticarea seaward
of theGulf of Maine, the Chamber drcw a line perpendicular tothe closing linethe GulC.This method was
used instead of equidistance because the Chamber did not wish the line ithisarea to commence from the
midpointof the closing line, whichwouldhave been the approximateresult ife equidistance methodhad been
einployed. By usuig the perpendicular,in conjunctionwith other methods for the segments intheeGulf, the
Chamberhad more freedornto ad,justthe startingpoint of the outer segment of the boundary", in J.I.&Charney
L.M.Alexander(eds.), op. cilVol.1,p.2 13.
136I.C.J. Report1984, p. 338,para. 226. the corrected median line encountersthe closing line of the Gulf. Indeed the Chamber
has borne constantly in mind the problcm OF determining the final segment of the
delimitation line when applying itself so meticulously to the lask of establishing the
previous segments. It wouldbe unthinkable that, in that part of the delimitation area
which lies outside and over against the Gulf, the dividing line should not follow or
continue the line drawn within the Gulfby reference to the particular charactcristics of
its coasts. If one were to seek for a typical illustratiocifwhat is meant by the adage
'the landdominates the sea',it is here that itwould be f~und'~'."
12.58 The perpendicularity method used in this way to delimit the maritime areas lying
beyond the closing line of a coastal concavity may be applied to similar geographical
situations and also to achieve an equitable result in such situations. Indccd, ilis possible tu
relate to the hypothesis adopted in the Gulfof Maine Judgment or in the Riode la Plata treaty
a geographical configuration which, while notin the strict sense of the word a gulf or an
estuary, is certainly reminiscent of such a configuration. This could for exmple be the case
for the delimitation of areas lying outside a relatively narrow maritime passage between two
States with at leastpartially facing coasts,in which case the perpendicular is drawn from the
imaginary Iinejoining the hrthest points of the land territory of the two States.
12.59 The present case, where two sectors must be geographically distinguished from each
other, falls within this hypothesis13! On the one hand there is the interna1sector where the
coasts of Qatar and Bahrain are directly facing eachother, and on the other hand there is the
sector beyond the facing coasts of the two States, in the open sea. It is quite clear that the
territuries of Qatar and Bahrain do not meet in the south, for exarnplc in tlie area of the
Dawhat Salwahor at the level ofthe Hawar islands.In this respect they are differentfrom tlie
territories of Argentina and Uruguay which meet at the end of the Rio de la Plata; ihey are
also different from the territories of Canadaand the United States wliicliare contiguous at the
end of the Gulf of Maine. Nevertheless,the facing situation of Qatar and Bahrain is strangely
reminiscent of the relationship betweenArgentina and Uruguay, at least in the widest part of
the Rio de la Plata, which is delimited by the segment linliing points 22 and 23 of the
maritirne boundary by the Treaty of 19November 1973'39.The faciilg situation of Qatar and
Bahrain is even more reminiscent ofthe relationship betweenCanada and the United States in
137
138bid., p338,para.226.
See,paras.12.10-12.12above.
"'See,,Wap No. 18,facinpage292.the sector hetweenNova Scotia and Massachusetts, whicliis deliinitcd by segineiitB-C of the
maritime boundary laid down by the Jiidgment of'12 October 1984'"'.Siinilarly, thc f~~rthest
and northernmost points of Qatar and Bahrain on the land, tl-ieSirthest point of the Qatar
peninsula on the onc sidc and Al Muharraq on the othcr, aie even more signilicantly
reminiscent of thc natural points or entry of a deep coastal indentation appcrtaining ta two
different States, such points being, on either side of the Rio de la Plata. Piinta dcl Esle md
Punta Rasa del Cabo San Antonio or, on eitherside of thc Gulf of Maine, C'apcSable and the
island of Nantucket, just as the iinaginary line joining the i-ioi-llieininostoint of the Qatar
peninsula to Al Muliarrarlis reniiniscent of thc straight lines joiniiig respcctively Punta del
Este and Punta Rasa del CaboSan Antoiiioand Cape Sableand the islaildof Naiituçket.
12.60 Uscof the pcrpendicularity inethodilia geographicalsituation such as tlic one between
Qatar ruid Bahrain in the nortlîern sector is easily justiijiiedin view of tlîcse precedents.
lndeed, to determine the course of the outcr dividing iine, txyond the facing situatio~iof thc
two States which are Parties to the prcscnt case, "there is no point of ref'rençe" - to use the
words of the Chamber in thc Gulf ofMaine casem - beyond thc respective coasts of Qatar and
Bahrain whcrc they are opposite eacli otlîer and, in particular, beyond [lie end points of t11e
closing line linking the northernmost point of the Qatar pcninsula tu Al Muharraq. These
coasts and f~~rthesptoinls on the land of Qatar and Bahrain arei~ecessarilypoiritswhicll inust
be relied upon for drawi~igthe course of the maritime bciiiiidarybetween thcse two States in
the northern sector. There can be no other points whicli nlight scrvc as a büsis for the
delimitation.
12.61 In these circurnstances,to quotc oncc again Sromthe Judgnient of 12 Oclober 1984''~,
"it appears obvious that the only kind of practical nielhod which criilbc considered for this
purpose is .,a geometricd ~nethod"and, within tlie range OSmethods of this type, "the inost
appropriate is ...the drawing of a perpendicular totl-ieclusii~gliiie" of tharca where Qatar
and Bahrain are opposite, whicliwould bc tlie imaginaiy line liiikiiigthc northcri~mostpoint
ofthe Qatar peninsula to Al Muharraq.This pcrpendicularity~nethodis rccommended, as \vas
140
141ec,Mup Nu. 19,facingpage293.
I.C.J.Reports1984,p.337,para.224.
'"[bid, pp.337-338,para224.stressed by the Chamber, "abovc al1by ils sin-~~licit~'~~ lt".is alsn recotninendcd iiîsofar as it
ensures anobjective basis forthc course OS the maritime boundaiy betwee~iQatar and Balirain
in the northern sector. In their coinmentdry on the Gulf of iMLiinc case and il-idelimitation
adopted by the Chambcr in the third sectcirbeyond thc iiiîe froin Cape Sablc to [lieislalid of
Nantucket, twoauthors remarkedtliüt:
"..Lheopen sea beyond [thc concavily] sliouldbe delimitcd by a line perpendicular to
the closiiig line of thc concavily. Such a formula provides ail objectivc illeans of
delimitation and can be applied to any deep coastal concüvity. no matter wliere the
land boundary tcrminus is locatedwithin tlie concavity'".II
The same authors concludcd their analysis by stating that "The specific contribulioii of tliis
case may well be the guidance that it provides for the deliinitütio1.iof a deep coastal
c~ncavity'~~".This conclusion covers equally well thc delimitation of inaritimc arerts filhich
extend seawards a relatively narrow maritime passagc between two States witlî facingcoasts,
as is precisely the case in tlie northern sector of the delimitatioil area bctween Qatar and
Bahrain.
2. Technical implementation of the perpendicularity mcthod in the present case
12.62 The single maritime boundary betweenQalai-and Bahrain in thc northern sector must
ncccssarily pass through point BLV. Indeed, this point, which is the end point of thc 1947
line, is,as has been sllown ahove, a circurnstance of the grealest relevance in the n1aiitiine
delimitation between the two tat tes' U^^. to thc turning point of BLV, thc houndiiry
corresponds to the line laid down by the 1947 decision. Therefore, beyond the ürea where
Qatar and Bahrain are directly oppositc cacholher, it is the course ofthc British line thatlinlcs
points N, NSLB and BLV, as shown on Mup No. 20, facing this page, the geographical
coordinates of which are respectivcly, for N, longitude 5Q048'1 3"E and laillude 26°15'021'N;
for NSLB, longitude 5Oo49'48"E and latitude 26"21124"N; and forBLV, longitude 50°57'30"E
and latitude26O33'35"N. Reyond this turning point, in order to liiik BLV to the iliediai line
143
143bid, p. 338, pa224.
Anncx 1V.306, Vol. 13p.165
146bid
See,para.12.5,above.established in the central part of the Gulf by the above-rnentioned dclimitation agreements
concluded between Qatar and Bahrain on the one hand and Iran on the other hand, the
boundary rnust be drawn in accordancc withthe perpendicularityrnethod'". This construction
is based on the following two elements.
12.63 The construction of the perpendicularity methodin the ~iorthernscctor is based first of
al1on the closing line of the area where Qatar and Bahrain havefacing coasts, wliich, as has
been seen above, links on Qatar'sside the northernmost point of the Qatar pe~iinsulaand, on
Bahrain'sside, the nortliemost point of Al ~uharra~'~~. This is the liiie linking points KK
and MQ, shown on Map No. 20 facing the previous page, the geographical coordinates of
which are longitude 51°12'02"Eand latitude 26O09'25"Nfor RK ruid longitudc 50°37'54"E
and latitude 26O17'15"N for MQ.The choiceof point RK as a basis for the closing line on the
Qatari side lias been made out of a desire to be strictly consistcnt with the position that is
always taken in the present Mernorial,that no account should bc taken of islands, islets, rocks
and low-tide elevations in drawing the dividing lineI4'.Qatar could have put forward serious
arguments in favour ofthe island ofRas Rakan,wl-iichwould have beenmore favourable 10 it
insofar as this point would have moved the closing line ofthe area whcrc the coasts of Qatar
and Bahrain are opposite by approximately 2" northwards, and consequently wouId have
moved westwards the perpendicular to that line. As for the çhoice, on the Bahsaini side, of
point MQ on the island of Al Muharraq, it is justified by the same desire for consistency,
insofar as Al Muharraq, unlike RasRakan in relation to Qatar, may be considered as part of
the main Bahrain island and as forming with it one and the saine lerritory'", since it "lies
close off the NE extremity of Al Bahrayn to which it is connected by a stone causeway and a
road bridge1 5'".
12.64 The second element upon which the construction is based is tlie drawing of a
perpendicular to the line previously established,linking the north of thc Qatar peninsula to Al
147See,para. 12.39above.
148Sm, paras. 12.10and 12.59,above.
149
150See,paras. 12.31-12.32,above.
As noted by thePcrsian GulfPilot, "Ra'sRakan (26"l'N, 5Iu13'E)is thNW extremityof a low
sandy islet whicli liabout 1 1/4 milesoffthe N extremityof Al Qatar; the reef between the islet and the
inainland dries(Annex 11.1,Vol. p.35).
j5'Ibid.p.38.Muharraq. This is sirnply a question of drawing a line at right angles to the line from RK to
MQ, passing through BLV and finally reaching the Gulf mediai linc cstablisbed by treaty in
the central part of the Gulf, The starting point of this perpendicular on tlie closing line RK-
MQ of the area where Qatar and Bahrain areopposite corresponds topoint R, which is shown
on Map No. 20, facing page 298, and whose geographical coordinates are longitude
50°52'28"E and latitude 26"14'12"N. As for the end point of this pcrpei~dicular,at its
intcrsection with the Gulf median line, it corresponds to point S on Mup No. 20, the
geographical coordinates of which are longitude 51°05'12"Eand latitude 27"03'04"N.Point S
is located approximately 1270 metres (to be precise, 1271.97 in) 10 the west of point 2B on
MapNo. 21, facing this page, which corresponds to point2152laid down by thc agreement for
delimitation of the continental shelf signed on 17 June 1971 between Bahrain andIran, the
geographical coordinates of whiçh are longitude 51'05'54"E and latitude 27002'46"~'~~. The
proximity between point S, which is the end point of the perpendicular, and point2B of the
1971 agreement is striking, the distance of 1270 rnetres being quite insignificant, given the
degree of accuracy of the construction. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, point S cm be rnoved
to point 2B, and consequently thelast segment of the dividing line, BLV-S, cm be moved to
the BLV-2B segment1''. In a manner of speaking, this operation perfornis itself, by a simple
rounding-up, and the line from BLVto SBremains perfectly in hamony witli the spirit of the
method of perpendicularity, especially sincethe extension of segment 2B-BLVof the dividing
line is practically perpendicular (to the accuracyof 1") to the closiilg line, from point RK to
152See,Map No. 20, hcing page 298.
153Annex IV.264,Vol. 12, p. 111. The latter coordinateis subject, naturally, tu the correction by one
second which must be made to the determinaiionof the latitude of thispoitit(para. 1note90, above). The
exact coordinates of point 2 are therefore longitude5lo05'54"E and latitude27"02'47"N,and not 27"02'46", as
indicated by the1971agreement. It will also be iioted that po2nis particularly rernarltable,since it may be
considered as being, at lcastapproximately, equidistantfrom each of Bahrain,lran and Qatar. First,tliispoint is
Iocated, asthe Department of State's Geographer has noted, "nethe same distance from Bahrainand Qatar"
and is "in fact" an equidistant point, since it is located 51.2 naulical miles froin an islet to the north of Al
Muharraq and 50.7nautical milesfrornthe lranian island of Nakhilu. If tliesame calculation is made following
the rnetl~odwhicli is consistently used in the present Merni.e.without taking into account islands, islets,
rocks or low-tide elevations,and starting from the high water Ievel, it will be seen that point 2 is located 51.85
nautical miles or 96,032 metres fromAf Muharraq and 101,838 tnetreor 55.0 naulical miles froin the Iranian
coast (Ras Jabrin). Second, poi2tis similarly roughly equidistantfrom Bahrain and Qalasinçeit is located
53.81nautical miles or 99,671metres frointhe northemmost poinof the Qatarpeninsula, this calculation bcing
made on the basis ofthe sarne principles as before. It may therefore be consideredihat point 2 is a tripoint at
practically the same distance from Qatar,Iran and Bahrain or, at the very least, that it is inore significant than
any other point on the Gulfrnedian line establishedby agreements between Qatar and lran and Bahrain and
lran in 1969and1971,respectively.
154
Point SB could become, with Iran's agreement, the QatariIranlBahrain tripo(see,para. 12.42
above and para. 12.72, below).point MQ,of the area where Qatar and Bahrainhave opposite coasts. ï'hebase of the BLV-2B
line on RK-MQ corresponds in fact to point T on Mup No. 21, facing the previous page, the
geographical coordinates of which are longitude 50°51'59"Eand latitude 26'14'18"N.And
point T is approximately 800 metres (to be precise, 822.24 metres) to the west of point R,
which corresponds, as has aIreadybeen mentioned, tothe base of theBLV-Sperpendicdar on
RK-MQ. The shifting effect - 800 metres at the starting point of the construction (R-T)and
1300 metres at its end point (S-2B) -is practically negligible attlie scale of the construction.
Qatar concludes in these circumstances thatthe extension of the 1947 line for the segment
BLV-2B is a technically simple line which resultsin a reasonable delirnitation, thc equity of
which is confirmed aposteriori by proportionality calculations.
D. Theaposteriori Verification ofthe Eauitvofthe Result thus obtained in the Northern
Sector
12.65 In the earlier discussion in this Chapter, Qatar has stressed the disparity and
disproportion between the respective lengths of the coastal fronts of the Parties to the present
dispute'15.It has also recalled the use of the principleof proportionality by the jurisprudence
to evaiuate the equity of the result of a maritime dclimitatioii afier implementatian of the
method resulting from equitableprinciples, taking the relevant circumstancesinto account15'.
In the submission of Qatar, it is therefore not a question of making a direct division of the
delimitation area in the northern sector in proportion to the 1engtl1of the Parties'coasts, but
only of using the idea of proportionality as a test of the equity ofthe delimitation once it 11as
been made. Consequently, for Qatar, proportionaIity is, as the Chamber stated in the Gulf'of
Maine case:
"..a means of checking whethera provisional dclimitationestablisl-iedinitially on the
basis of other criteria, and by the use of a method which has notliing to do with that
concept, cm or cannot be considered satisfactory in relation to certain geographical
features of the specificcase'"."
15See,paras. 12.30-12.32,above.
15See,paras. 12.33-12.36,above.
151.C.J. Rcporl1984,p.323,para.185.In the present case, propokionality allows the checking of the equity of the resült of the
delimitation performed in the northern sector on the basis of the perpcndicularity mcthod or,
more precisely, the equity of the single maritime boundary to the north 01'ihe area where the
Parties have directly opposite coasts, linking points N, NSLB, BLV atid213(Map No. 20,
facing page 298). It allows this verification taking into account the ratio betwccn the lengths
of the relevant coastal fronts of the Parties and the size of the ii-iaritimearcas appertaining to
them. But this verification presupposesthat before comparing the ratios, the delimitation area
in the northern sector must be accuratelydefined.
1. The delimitation areain the northern sector
12.66 In the Gulfof Mainecase, the Chamber stated that "theconcept of the delimitationarea
...isa legal concept, albeit one developed against the background of physical and political
geography'58".On this basis, how is the delimitation area in the northern sector to be defined
inthe present case? Its southern limit clearly correspondsto the closing line of the area where
Qatar and Bahrain are directly opposite each other, whicli lias been rcferred to several
tir ne^'^ a^d, which links points RK and MQ, i.e., the northernmost point of the Qatar
peninsula and of the island of Al Muharraq (MupNo. 22facing this page). The northern limit
of the delimitation area is just as obvious: it is the continental shelf boui~darieswhich were
established by the agreements between Qatar and Iran of 1969and between Bahrain and Iran
of 1971 I6O.As for its eastem and western limits, they correspond to the lincs drawn aa right
angle fiom the furthest points of the closing line of the area where Qatar and Bahrain are
opposite, ie.f,rom point FX, at the northermost point of the Qatarpeninsula and from point
MQ on Al Muharraq.
12.67 More precisely, the eastern limit of the area in dispute links point KK and point WQ
(Map No. 20, facing page 298) at the point of intersection of the continental shelf boundary
established by the agreement between Qatar and Iran of 1969. Point WQ, the geographical
coordinates of which are longitude 5lo28'15"E and latitude 26"59'32"N, is located
approximately 8900 metres (to be precisc, 8910.96 nietres) to the east of point 2 of the
15I.C.J.Report1984,p.272, para41.
15See, paras.12.1and 12.63,above.
Annexes IV.260and IV.264, Vol12,pp.81and 111.dividing line fixed by the Qatar/Iran agreement(May, No. 22, facing the previous pagc)'61,the
geographical coordinates of whichare longitude 51°23'00"Eand latitude 27"00'35"~~~~.
12.68 The western limit of the disputed area in the northern scctor has two segments. T11e
first segment links point MQ and point WB on Map No. 22, facing the previous page, at the
intersection of the continental shelf boundary established by the RahraidSaudi Arabia
agreement of 22 February 19581b3t,he geographical coordinatcs of point WB being longitude
50°50110"Eand latitude 27°04'42"~1". The second segment of the western limit corresponds
to the line WB-4B on Map No. 20, facing page 298, and is the northernmost part of the
boundary under the BahraidSaudi Arabia agreement of 24 October 1958, point 4B being
point 4 of the Bahraidran agreement of 1971'6 a nd point 1 of the IrdSaudi Arabia
agreement of 24 October i.e.,theBahrainlIranJSaudiArabia tripoint, the geographical
coordinates of which are longitude 50°54'00"Eand latitnde27°10'00"N'67.
12.69 Tliis definition of the delimitation area in the northern sector is rcadily justifiable. Its
southern and northern limits are self-evident. As for its eastern and wcstern limits, they have
the merit of being logical, given theirstrict symrnetryover the greater part of their course, but
also insofa as the chosen method of delimitation, based on perpcndicularity, is also a
geometrical method. The delimitation area isperfectly suited to the geographical conditions of
the region. In particular, it takes into consideration the dissymetry in the respective positions
of Qatar and Bahrain and in the greater thrust forward or, if one prefers, in the overtaking,in
their projection northwards, of Bahrain and Al Muharraq in relation to the northernmost point
161
Annex IV.260, Vol.12,p. 81.
162In the deljmitation agreements between Iran and Bahrain and Iran and Qatar, scveral numbered
points are identiîïed alongthe line of delimitation.Theseare indicatedon MapNo. 22, facing the previous page,
as points 2, 3 and 4 on the IratiiBahrainlin2 and3 on the IraniQatarlinFor ease of reference in the text
of this Mernoriathese points arefrom time to time referred to, forexample,as 4theIradBal~raiiilineand
24 on th163ranIQatarline.
Annex IV.262,Vol. 12,p. 95;MapNu. 22, îacingthe previouspage.
'64PointWB is locatedon the last segmentof the boundary under the RahrainISaudiArabia agreement
of 1958, 11,455 metres to the north-east of poiS14, the geographical coordinatesof which are longitude
50°46'24"Eand latitude26"59'30nN.
165Annex IV.264, Vol. 12,p. 111.
166Annex1V.258,Vol. 12,p. 71.
167
16%See,para.12.40,above.
The general orientation of the delimitation area towards the north-north-east is not favourable to
Qatar. However, Qatar does not want, under cover of equity, to make an adjustmentto the dividinç line N, 2. Proportionality between the lengths of the coastal fronts and the size of the maritime
areas
12.70 On the basis of the above definition of the delimitation area in tlie northern sector,
which links - as shown on Mup No. 23, facing this page - points RK, N, MQ, WB, 4B, 3B, S,
2B, 2Q, WQ and RK,the overall surface areais approximately 5215.11kn12.Tlie surface area
of the maritime areas lying to the east of the dividing line linking points N, NSLB, BLV and
23, corresponding to the polygon RK, N, NSLB, BLV, 2B, 2Q, WQ,RK attributed lo Qatar,
is approximately 2,978.6km2.As for the surface area of the maritime areas lying to the West
of the sarnedividing line and correspondingto the polygon MQ,N, NST,R, BLV, 2B, 3B, 43,
WB, MQ attributed to Bahrain, it is approximately 2,336.51kmz.Thus, the ratio between the
sizes of the maritime areas on either side of the boundary proposed by Qatar in the northern
sector is 1.68to 1in favow of Qatar.
12.71 It is true that these figures do not coincide exactly with the ratio betweentlie respective
lengthsof the coastal fronts of the Parties which, as has been establishcd above, is 1.59to 1 in
favour of ~atar'". However, the fact remains that the eqiiity test of the dividing line N,
NSLB, BLV, 2B is quite conclusive for the following reasons. First, it should be noted that
the ratio of coastal lengths (1.59) is not very far distant from the ratio of surface areas
corresponding to the dividing line established by Qatar (1.68). The difference is only in the
region of 696,which in itself is very little in the light of the constructions and, in any event,
does not allow the conclusion tiiat the boundary is inequitablc; there is no real disproportion
between the respective values of 1.59 and 1.68.Moreover, if one defines the dividing line on
the basis of the ideal ratio between coasts and surface areas(159) aiid if onc draws it on the
same map ta compare it with the dividing Iine proposed by Qatar, one cannot fail tu see that
NSLB, BLV, 2B that it is proposing in application of tlie perpendicularity niethod, since ihis would be
"refashioning geography" (para. 12.28, above). Itberecalled in thconnectionthatiithe Anglo-French
case, therbitralTribunal heldthat inthc Atlanticregion,the preofthe Scilly lslesthewest-south-west
of Cornwall would cause quite a ~narkeddeviation of the equidistance line, aitstio~ildthcrefobe a
"special circumstance" withithemeaning of Article 6 of the1958 Convention on the Continental Shelc
"justify169a boundary othertlthestrictmedian Iine"(Annex1V.287,Vol.13,p.29).
See,para. 12.32, above,and Appendix6, Vol. 15,p. 143.the balancing point thus obtained, at the intersection of tlie boundary eslablished by the
agreements concluded by the Parties with Iranin the central part of the Gulf, corresponds to
point EQ on Map No. 23, facing the previous page,the geographical coordinates of which are
longitude 51"07'44"Eand latitude 27"02'32"~'~~A . nd point EQ - which, it bears repeatiny,
would be the end point of the dividing line establishedon the basis ofthc cxact ratio between
the respective coastal iengths of the Parties (1.59)- isonly about 3000 mctres (to be precise,
3054nietres) to the east of point 2B, which, again, isabout 1270metrcs froinpoint s'~' This
means that the final segment, beyond BLV, of the single nlaritimc boundary in the northern
sector, as proposed by Qatar - Le., segment BLV-2B- is in a manner of speaking framed on
the one hand by the BLV-S segment, which corresponds to a strict application of the
perpendicularity method, and on the other hand by the BLV-EQ segment, which corresponds
to a strict application of the proportionality method. This means tliat the proportionality test
performed in this way is sufficientto permit the conclusionthat theN, NSLB, BLV, SR Iineis
equitable.
3. Conclusion
12.72 The a posteriori vcrification made on the basis of proportionality calculations allow
Qatar to conclude that the only means of reaching an equitable solution for thedelimitation of
the maritime areas lying beyond the area where the Parties'coasts are oppositc is to draw a
singleline for the contiilentalshelf and fishing zones, linking points N, NSLB, BLV and 2B,
and thus comprising two segments. The first segment, N, NSLB, BLV, is tlie part of the
boundary defined by the 1947 British decision, lying beyond the area where Qatar and
Bahrain are opposite. As for the secondsegment, BLV-2B, itcoi-respondsto the pcrpendicular
fiom BLV on the line RK-MQ, it being understood that thisperpendicular has been slightly
modified so that the end point of the boundary in the northern sectorcan coincide with point
170The ideal dividilinwith regardto the proportionalitycalculashould in thcase correspond
tothe linN, NSLB,BLV,EQ.
17Sec,para.12.64,above.2B. Point 2B, the geographical coordinates of which are loiigitude 5Oo05'54"Eand latitude
27°02'47"~172, is indeed a very significant reference point in the maritime delimitations in the
area, not only becauseit is a turningpoint on the continental shelf bouildary establisl-iedby the
BahraidIran agreement of 197 I,but also because it is the Qatai-/Irail/Bahraintripuint, being
"in fact" equidistantfromthe coasttsof those three c~untries"~.
173ee, para.12.39,footnote90, above.
See, para.12.42 and para.12.64,above. -307 -
PARTV
SUBMISSTONS
In view of the above, the State of Qatar respcctf~~lrequests the Court, rc~jcctinall coiitrary
claims and suhmissioiis:
1. To adjudge and declare in accordance with interiiatioiiallaw:
A.(l) That thc Statcof Qatarhas sovereignty overthe Hawar islands;
(2) That Dibal and Qit'atJaradali shoais are low-tidc clevati»ns which arc undcr
Qatar's sovereigi-i:y
R.(I) Thal the State of Bahrainhas no sovereigntyovei-the isla~idof Janail;
(2) That the State of Bahrain has no sovereigniyuver Zubarah;
(3) That any claim by Balirain concerning arcliipelagic basclinesand nreas for
fishing for pearls and swimming Iish would be irrelevarit for the purpose of
maritime delimitationin the prcsent case;
II. TVdraw a single maritime boundary between thc maritime areas of sea-bed, subsoil
and superjacent waters appertaining rcspcctivelyto il~eStaleor Qatar and thc State of
Bahrain on the basis that the Hawar islands and the island of'Jaiian appcrtainto the
State of Qatar and not to thc State of Bahrain, that bouildary startirigfrom poinl of
the dclimitation agrcemcnt concludedbetween Rahraiii and Iranin 1969 (51"05'54"E
and 27O02'47"N),thcncc proceeding in a southerly direction up to LZLV (5Oo57'30"E
and 26O33'35"N), then following the line of the Britisli decisioi23oDecember 1947
iip to NSLR j50°49'48"E and 26"21t24"N) aiid up to point L (50Q43'00"Eand
25"47'27"N), thence proceediiig to point SI of thc dclimitati«n agreement concluded
by Babrain and Saudi Arabia in 1958 (50°31'45"and 2So35'38"N). Tlie line claimed
by Qatar is illustratedon kfapNo. 24, facing thispage.
(Signcd) Dr. Najeeb ibn MobaininedAl-Nauin~i
Ministcr ofJusticc
Agent and Coiinse1of the Stale of Qatar . 309 .
LISTOF MAPS
MapNo .1. General Setting of the Arabian G~ilf..................................................1
Map No .2. General Area oftlieDispute .............................................................
Map No . 3. Historical Background ........................................................
.....
Map No .4. Ottoinan Map of Qatar and its Borders with Balirain datcci
27 June 1867 ......................................................
..2..............
Map No .5. Proximityof the HawarIslandsto Qatar...................................50.......
Map No .6. OttoinaiiSurveyMap of Hawar datcd10Deceinber 1873 .............64......
MapNo .7. "Agyptcri, Palastina und Arabien", publislied by Frcytag &
Berndt, 1914..............................................................................7
MapNo . 8. "Arabia",published by GeographiaLtd., 1919............................70.........
MripNo . 9. Thc Hawar lslandsandJanan Tsland........................................4.5......1
MapNo .10. Zubarah ......................................................
.....1..9...........
MapNo .11. GeneralPresentation ofthe Maritime Area ...........................209............
MapNo .12. The British Dccisionof 23 Deccmber 1947 ...........................215............
Map No . 13. Map attached to Bahraintsletters datec2 and 10Marc111964.............232
Map No .14. 12Nautical Mile Pro-jectionfrom OppositeCoasts ...................... 2513
Map No .15. The BritishDecisionof 23 December 1947(Details) ....................254....
Map No .16. Thc Single Maritime Bouildary Kequestcd by Qatar in the
SouthcrnSector .......................................................5...............
Map No .17. 'I'he Closing Line of the Arca where Qatar aiîd Bahrairi have
OppositeCoasts .......................................................
.6..............2
Map No .18. The CIontinentalShelfBoundarybctween Uruguay and Argentina
(The Rio de taPlata Treatyof 19Noveniber 1973) ...................292........
Map No .19. The MaritimeBoundary betweenCanadaand the UnitcdSiates
(The Judginentof 12 October 1984inthc G~ilfof MaincCase) .......293
Map No .20. Application of the Slrict Perpendicularity Methodin thc Northern
Seclor..................................................
...................2.
MapNo .21. Applicationof ModifiedPerpendicularityin the Nortliern Scctor .....300
Map No .22. Area ofDelimitationintheNorthern Sector.........................................
302
Map No .23. Test of Proportionalityin the NortliernSector.........................304..........
MapNo .24. The SiiigleMaritimcBoundaryRequeslcdby Qatar..........................306 r&&e
PART 1
1.1 1,ette.rfrom H.E. Dr. Routros Boutros-Ghali to H.E. Sheikli IIainad
Bin Jassem Bin Jabr Al-Thani, Minister SurForeign Allàirs of tlic
State of Qatar, datcd3 August 1994...................................................I
..................
1.2 "ICJ lo hold public sitting", Gulf Timesdated 15February 1995 ...........................
1.3 "Cal1 for cordial settlemeilt"; "Victory for Qatar",Weekly Gulf l8in?es
dated 16-17 Febr~üiry1 995 ....................................................
...................
1.4 "Eyes and Ears", Al-Huycct,Issue No. 1 1686datcd 17 Febriiary 1995
(Translation andArabic version) ...................................................15....................
1.5 "Balirain, Qatar turn to Saudis for mediatioiitl,The ilsian Age cidcltcd
18 Februüi-y1995.......................................................
......................
1.6 "Rahrain welcomes Qatar's position1'; "Focus is ilow on fiilding
settlement through ICJ"; "Saudi offer to resuiile mediation efriirts",
Gulf'Tirnesdatcd 18 February 1995.......................................................
........2
1.7 "Kuwait Co~incilof Ministers/Welcume", Qafar News Agcricy datccl
19February 1995 (Trailslationand Arabiçversio~i) ..................................I.............3
1.8 "Arab League welcornes Saudi rnediation", Cu(f Tinzêsdated
20 February1995 ...................................................
............37................
1.9 "The Emirates Welcorne Qalar/Ballrain Wish lo Settle Thcir Roider
Differences Via Cordial Mems", United Aruh Rrnirates ~~'cM!.gency
dated 21February 1995 (Translation andArabic version) ..........................41............
1.1O "GCC chief wclcomesmediütion",Gulf Times dated 21 1;cbruary1995................54
1.11 "Cal7iiietreviews Saudi statement", Weekly Gulf Tirnes dated 23-
24 Februnry 1995.......................................................
.....................
1.12 "Bahraini statemenls 'causing coi-ifusio~-i' .atar 'slands firnl' on
referring border dispute toICJ", GulfTimes dated 25 Fcbruary 1995.................3....
11 "Statement by Islamic Conference Organisation in .IcddahH,Dail})
Press Report, Diwan Amiri, Qatar, Marc111935 (Translatioii ailcl
Arabic version) .....................................................
.............57...................Letter No. WKHiMKI-1 6/1/8-253 from H.E. Hamad Bin Jassinl Bin
Jabor Al Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Statc of Qatar to
H.E.Dr. Boiitrns Routros Ghali, dated 7 Marc111995('I'railslütioi lricl
Arabic version).......................................................
................61........
"Qatar-Bal~raiildispute: Russia'sofficia1 stance", Kfcekly GuIf ïi'rncs
dated 9-1 0 Marçli 1995........................................................
...............
"(;CC ministerial council hails Qatar initiativc"; "Qatar stance is
unchanged on UN sanctions rcsnlulions"; "GCC Soreigiinlinislers
applaud Qatar'soffer", Gulf Times dated 2i March 1995...............................1.........
"Bahrain total area itlçreascd by 32.5 squarc kilcimetersand Hawar
Island increased by 650 meters according to new slatistics piiblished
by a Bahrain paper", Daily Press Report, Diwan Amiri, QCIILIT 1995
(Translation and Arahic version) ............... ..................................................7
"Slütement by Dr. Hussüin Mohammad Al Bahartla, Balxain's Siate
Minister for Legal Affairs", Gulf NewsAgency dated 30 April 1995
(Translation and Arabic version).........................................................
..............
Statcmcnt of the GCC Secretary-General: "Bilateral effortsregarding
the Qatar Bahraiil Border Disputeare contin~~ed"Q , atarlYc.w.~Agency
datcd 4 June 1995(Translation andArabic vcrsionj ..................... ... ............97...
"Thc Secrelariat Generalof the GCCdenies the repoi-tedstateme~ltby
Al-Qasimi aboutQatar/Bahrain dispute", Al-Shurq dated 7 Julie 1995
(Translation and Arabic version) .................... .......................................101
Extracts from an interview with H.H. The Amir of thc Stale of Qatar,
Al-Watandated 3 Septeinber 1995(Translation and Arabiç version) ................105..
"Regarding the dispute between Qatar and Balîrain", Qatar N~M:s
Agency dated 5 September 1995 (Translation andArübicversion) ..................1..9
"Bahrain Claiins Hawar an indivisible part of its territosies",Rudio
Bahrain and Gulf'Ne~~s Agency daied 5 Scptcmbei.1995(fianslalion
and Arabic version).......................................................
..................
"Bahrain reiterates sovercignly oves&IawarIslands", Gulf'D~iily Netvs
dated 6 September 1995........................................................
...............
Amis's "Interview williMBCtouches ona liost of issues". Gulf Times
and Al-S'hcrr(qArabicversion) dated 11Septeinber 1995 ...........................127.......Extract from thc speech of His Highness Shaikh Harilad Bi11Kbalifa
Al-Thani, Amir of thc State of Qatar at tlie openitlg of the 24111
Ordinary Session of Thc Advisory Council on 14 Novembcr 1995
(Translation and Arabic version) ................... .............. .. .. . . . . 139
"Rahrain shifi prove Qatar's stancc correct", GzilJ'Times dated
23 Juiuary 1996 (Transcription) .........................................................145
Ashu~qAl-Ai.vsaf dated 25 January 1996 (Translatiticii................................149..
"Rahrain urges Qatar to accept Saudi arbitratioi-i un tlle border
dispute", Reuters dated 31 May 1996 ('Trans1atioi.aind Arahic versiori) .............153.
"Direct negotiatioils urged to solve dispute Crown Prince in cal1to
Qatai-", GatlJ'DaiZ yews dated 1stJunc 1996 ............................,..............159
"Qatar rejects Bührain's plea to withdraw case hoin TCJ", PeninsciEu
düted 2 June 1996 ........................................... -.. .........................163
"GciodEfforts of Saudi Arabia to Settle QatartBahrain Dispute1',Al-
Huyar dated 2 .Tuile1996(Traiislation and Arabic vcrsion) ...........................167
"Foreign Millister backs Saudi Arabia's mcdiation", C;ulf'Buily News
dated 3 June 1996 (Transcription) ...................... ..... ..... ............. ...... 173
"Qatar confirms dual approach to border dispute", Daily Gulf' 'limes
dated 30 June 199 6 ...........,........+.................,...,......................,..,..177
"Rahrain nol Ibrllicoiniilg on border prublem - ministcr", Gzdf'Tin?es
dated 13July 1996 ............................................................................18.......
"Emir, Falid hold cordial talks", DcrilyGulf Times datcd 15.Tuly1996............ .......85
"Address of 11.11 T.heI-IeirApparcnt of Bahrmn to the Sei~icirOfficers
of Bahrain Defence Forcet1, Qatar News Agenqy dated 1 5 Suly 1996
(Translation and Arabic version); "Bahraiii vows to delèiid islmds
Qatar also claiinsl', Reuters WorEd Report datcd 15July 1996 .......................189
"Bahrain shuns juslice and tlireatens: Says Qatari Newspaper
Alwattan" dated 16July 1996 .......................................................,,.201
"Cabinct bricfcd", GulfTinzes dated 18 July 1996.......................................205.. LISTOF DOCUMENTARYANNEXES
{Volurne 3)
PART II
11.1 Persian Gulf Pilot, published by 'lhe Hydrographer of tlie Navy,
Twelfth Edition, 1982 as corrccted to 24th Septe~nber 1994 by
Siipplement Nu. 6-1994(Abstracts) ................................................
......................
11.2 Sailing Directions filp. thePersian Gulf; H.O. PLL~ . o. 62, 1:iftli
Gdition 1960, published by the U.S. Navy Hydrcigi-aphic Office,
Washington 1960,p. 217 ..............................................
........57...............
11.3 Lorimcr, J.G., Guzellrer of the Persian GulJ Omun und Cci?tral
Arahia, 7,Volui~~e TT(Geographical & Statistical), Rahraiii Island and
Bahraiil Principalitpp. 212-253, Archive Editioiis,1986...................................
11.4 Lorimer, J.G., Guzetteer of the Persian Cizdf,Oman and C'entrai
Arubiu, 9, Volunle II(Geographical & Stalisticül). Qatar, pp. 1505-
1535,Archive Editions, 1986....................................................
....................
11.5 T,orimer, J.G., Guzecteer of the Pe~siun CizrlJ;Clnzanund Centrul
Auabia,1, Volume 1(Historical),Part 1pp. 15, 17-19,28-29, 45, 122,
138-139, 142-143, 145-147, 178-198, 210-211, 213, 217, 21 9; 220,
234-235,265-267, 787-948 and 966-967; Part Il, pp. 1779-1780,
1830, 1975-1976, 2099-2 103 and 2144-2147, Archive Editions, 1986 .............133... LIST OF DOCUMENlAKY ANNEXES
(Vo1urne4)
PART II
11.6 Saldanha, J.A., The Persicln Gulf Prkcis, Vol. TT, Précis of
Correspondcncc rcgarding the Affairs of thPersiail G~il1801-1853,
Archive Editions, 1986,pp. 148-150and319-320 .................................1...................
11.7 Saldanha, J.A., 7'hePersian Gulf Précis, Vol. TV,Prkcis of Bahrein
Affairs, 1854-1904,ArchiveEditions, 1986.................. ................................9
11.8 Saldanha, .I.A., The Pevsian Gulf Pr.t;ci,, ol. IV, Précis of Kütar
ASSairs,1873-1904,ArchiveEditions, 1986.........................................1..........1
11.9 Saldanha, J.A., The Yersiun Guy Précis,Vol. V, Précis cif Nqjd
Affairs,1804-1904,ArchiveEciitioils,1986, pp. 14..............................253..............
11.10 The Persian Gulf Historical S~~mmuries1907-1953, Hisrovicrrl
Sun~muryof Events in the rlèrritoriesofthe Ottoman Lr)~yil.ePer.sia
und Arubiu u&icfing the British Positio in ~hcPersion Gulj: 1907-
1928, Vol. 1,Archive Editions, 1987,pp. 40, 62: 64-65, 67-72, 95,
105-108and 165-170 ...................................................
.....6..............
II.11 The Persian Guy Historical Summuries J907-1953, Nistoricul
Summary qf Evcnts in thePersian IiulfL'7haikhdumasnd the 5'1~LIMUI~
of hfuscaf and Oman, 1928-1953, Vol. II, Arcliive Editions, 1987,
pp. 1-3,16-17,27, 32-33,47-48, 120-123, 126-134and 267........................85...... LIST OF DOCUMENTARY ANNEXES
(Volunie5)
PARTIl
11.12 Lctter from Sheikl~Sultan bin Ali Al-MtiraikhiAI-Zubari Al-Qatari to
the Guard of the Gale of Zubarahdated April 1612,Archives ol'the
Diwan Amiri ol'the State of Qatar((TranslatiuilaiidArabic versicit.................1........
11.13 Dcclaration by Harnedbin Naycm Bin Sultan Al-Muraikhi Al-Zubari
Al-Qatari dated April 1638,Archives of tlie DiwanAmiri of tlie Statc
of Qatar (TranslationandArabic version)..............................................................5
11.14 No. XIX. TransIationof the General Treatywiththe Arab tribes of the
Persian Gulf, 1820(Trcaties and Engageme~tsreluting luArubiu crnd
~hrPersian Gulf, compilcd by C.U. Aitchison, Vnl. XI, Arcliivc
Editions, 1987, pp.245-249).....................................................
..................
11.15 Report of Lieutenant Macleod, Political Residentin the Pcrsiaii Gulf.
datcd 27 January 1823 (Recouds qf Qatar: PrirnaryDoc~tmenl.v 1820-
1960, Vol. 1, 1820-1853, reprinted by Arçliive Editions, 1991, pp.
595-603) ........................................................
................7.....................
Colonel Wilson, Memorandrun respeçting the Pearl Fislîei-iesiil the
11.16
Persiail Gulf, TheJournal of the Roy~rlGeog-I-nphica Society, 1833, p.
11.17 Letter from Mohammcd Bin Thaiii to Imam Sayed Saeed dated 7
November 1854, Archives of ihe Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar
(TransIationand Arabic version) .................................................33 .....................
11.18 Letter from Mohammed Bin Thani and others to Sheikh Süyed Biii
Khalifah datcd 3 May 1858, Arcliivesof the Diwan Aiiîiriof the Statc
of Qatar (Translation andArabic version) .........................................37......................
11.19 Letter from Fclix Jones, British Resident in thc Persian Gulf, to
Sheikh Mohammcd Bi11Khalihh, Chief of Bahraiil, dated 18 May
1861 (Tadjbakhchc, GR., Lu questiondes îlesDahrciui, I960, p. 304).............41.....
11.20 No. X. Terms of a Fricndly Coi-iveiltioneiitered intbetween Sheikli
Maliomed Bin Khulcefa, IndepeildailtRuler of Bahrain, on the part of
IIirnself and Succcssors, alid Captain Felix Jones, Her Majesty's
Indian Navy, Political Residentof Her Britannic Ma-jesty i1.tliGulf
of Persia on the part of the Britisli Government - 1861 (Treuties and
E~zgagernents relating to Arahiu und the PcrsicrnGrdlf:cornpilecl by
C.U. Aitchison, Vol. XI, Archive Editioils,1987,pp. 234-236) .....................5.......No. II. Treaty betweenthe British Governmentand tlie Rulei- of Nejd,
El Hassa, Qatif, etc., - 1915 (Treulies and En~qagemcuil.r \-eluting tu
Aruhia and the PcïsicrnGulf;compiled by C.U. Aitchisoi~, Vol. XI,
Archive Editioiis, 1987, pp. 2U6-208)................................. ...................175
No. XXXTII.Treaty between the Brilisli Gover~lmentand the Shaikli
of Qatar, - 1916 (Trecrtiesund Engugeazentsrel~~fing to.ilrrrhi~land the
Persiun Guy, ccornpiledby C.1J.Ailchison,Vol. XI, Arcliive Editioils.
1987,pp. 258-261) ........................................................................181
Letter froin Sir J. Simon to Sir P. Loraine (Angora) daleci22 Marc11
1934 (F.O. 371117821) ....................... ........187
Translation of a Ictter from RQ to PAB daiited 18 Novenlber 1939
(I.O.R.Ri15/2/547)...............................................................
....................
'Translation of letter from RQ to PAR dated 7 June 1940 (1.O.R.
R/15/21547) ...................................... ... .. . . ...... . . . . .. 197
Translation of a lettcr from RQ to PAB and Arabic versioil dated 13
July 1946(I.O.R. R/15/2/430) .........................................................................
Lctter from PAB to RQ dated 23 Decernber- 1947 (l.O.R.
L/P&S/12/3806b)......... ...............................................................,.,205
Lctter fi-omPA3 to RB dated 23 December 1947 (F.O. 371168325) ...........,....209
Translation of a letter from RQ to PAB and Arabic vcrsioi~daled 21
February 1948inEnglishandArabic (I.O.R.RI15/2/43 1)..............................132
Governrnent of Balirain ProclamationNo. 3711368dated 5 Junc 1949
(Translation and Arabic version) .........................,............... .... ..,..,,.2 1V
Proclaination of Qatar, datcd 8 J~lne1949 (Tr-ailslationand Arabic
version) ........................................... ...... .... ..... .............. 223
Petroleum Develtymenl (Qcirur) Ltd. v. Xuler of QLIILIY,Award, April
1950,In~ernationul T,UW Reports, 1951,pp. 161 -164. .,..............................227
Letter from PAQ to FOdated 31August 1964 (m 37 1/174526) ......................233
Memorandum of 7961 Sromthe Governmcnt of Bahrain to the British
Government preseiited to Qatar in Septembcr 1964 (F.O. 10 161697) ...............237Note Verbale from lhe Director General and Legat Adviser of tlic
Government of Qatar to the Political Agent of the British Gvvernment
in Doha dated 21 April 1965 enclosing a "Mcn~orandum of thc
Govcrnment of Qatar in rcply to the 1964 Mcmorai-iduinof tlîc
Government of Balirain concerning the undersca boundai-y betwecn
the two States",Archivesof the DiwaiiAiniri of thc State ou Qatar ...............271.....
Nore îrom the Political Agcnt of the British Govcrnmentin DoIia to
the Director General aiid Legal Adviser of tlie Govcriin-ient of Qatar
dated 27 Oclober 1965in English ai~dArabic, Archives al'LheDiwan
Anîiri of the Stateof Qatar.....................................................
..................
Letter from the Dircctor Geiieral and thc Legal Adviser of the
Governrnent of Qatar tothe Political Agent of theBritish Govcri~inent
in Doha dated 8 November 1965 in English and Arabic, Archives of
the Diwan Amiri of Ihe State of Qatar; 1,elierfroin the Political Agent
of the British Govemment in Doha to the Director Gcnei-alüiîdLegal
Adviser of the Governmcnt of Qatar dated 12 December 1965,
Archives ofthe DiwanAmiri of the State of Qatar ................................285..............
Letter from the Director General and Legal Adviser of the
Government of Qatar to the Political Agcntof the British Govcrnineiit
in Doha datcd 30 Saiiuary 1966 cnclosing a draft arbitration
agrccmcnt, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qavar
('TranslationandArahic version)................,....................................9.1............2
Lctter from PAQ to the Director Gencral of the Governinent of Qaiar
datcd 29 March 1966 ......................................................
......0............
Lcttcr from the Director General and Legal Adviser of the
Government of Qatar to the Political Agent of the British Govcrnment
in Doha dated 13 April 1966, Archivcs of tlie Diwan Arniri of the
State of Qatar (Translation andArabicversion)......................................307.......
List of CO-ordinates and map attached to tlie 1373 Wititcrshall
concession.....................................................
...................25........
PublishedWorlrs
Al-Baharna, H.M., The Legul Sfatus qf fhc Arcrhiun Gulf States,
Manchester University Press, U.S.A.: Oceana Publications lnç., 1968,
p. 33.................................................................. 329
Al-IIafidh Abi Abdullah Mohammed Bin Yazid Al-Qazwiili, Sl~ncrn
Ibnlajcr, Part 1,p. 187(Translatioiiand Arabic version) .........................333..........Al-Nabhani, Mohammcd Khalifa, Al-Tuhfuh al-Nubl?crniyu ,fi Tnrikh
Al-.Jaziru AI-Arabiya, Beirut and Bahrain, 1986, pp. 82-83, 87-88,
102-104, 112-114, 115-116 124-127, 144-145 and 147-148
(Translation and Arabic versioiî) ...........................,.................. . ......., 337
Bin Bishr, O., Anwan al-Majd ,fi llirrikh Nqjd, pp. 130-131
(Translatioiland Arabic version) ............ ...................................................9....3
Ibn Al-Athir, Al-Nihuyat jiGhclrih AI-Hadith Wn Al-Allgor,Vol. 4,
p. 80(TranslationandArabic version) .................................. ............... 385
Ibn Saad,Al-Tahuquf Al-Kubra,Vol. 3, p. 28 ('Trai~slatioi and Arabic
version) .................................... ......................,..,...,...........,.........,...389
Jawad Ali, A Chapter in Aruh Histovy bej~re Dlarn, Vol. 7, p. 537
(Translation andArabic version)............................... .............. . . . . . ,393
Moiitigny-Kozlowska,A., Evolutiond'ungroupe de h8siouin dans un
pays producleur depétrole: Les Al-Nuim de Qatar, Thesis, UiiiversitS
Paris V, January 1985,pp.65-66............................... .....................................397
Tadjbakhche,G.R.,La quesiion des îles Bahrein, Paris, PEdone,1960,
pp. 47-48........................................... ... ... ......... .... ................. .....401
Wadhih AI-Samad, Arub Industries und (i'riijbsin the I're-I,rlamic
Periud, p. 77(Translation andArabic version)................. .............. ..... . 405
Dr. Said Ai-Shahabi, Buhrnin 1920-1971, St~rdy of the British
Archives, Dar Z\lkuno«zAl-Adabiahi,Beirut, 1996, p. 29 (Traiislation
and Arabic version). .............................................................................41 1 LlST OF DOCUMENTAKY ANNEXES
(Volume6)
RlJg
PART II1
111.1 T,etterfrom Sheikh SultanbinAli Al-MuraikhiAl-Zubari Al-Valai-ito
the Guard of the Gate of Zubarah dated April 1612, Archives of' the
Diwan Amiri of the Stateof Qatar (Translatioiiand Arabic vcrsinn).........................
111.2 Declaration by Hamed bin Nayern bin Sultan Al-MurailchiAl-Zubari
Al-Qatari dated April 1638,Archives of the Diwan Aimiri oi'Ihe State
of Qatar (Translation andArabiçversion) .........................................5......................
111.3 Bruclts,Caplain G., Mernoirdescriptive of Ihe Nuvigcationof the Gulf
ofPersia, Indiun ~Vuvy,1829(Surveyof the Shores und Islcrndsofthe
Persian Gulf 1820-1829, Vol. 1,Archive Editions, 1990, p. 155)...........................9
111.4 Letter from FO to TO dated 6 Febmary 1851 (FO. 781882)
(Transcription)...............................................
................13..........
111.5 Letter from PRPG to the Cliief of Bahrein dated 18 May 1861 (r.O.
7812443).................................................
..................................2
111.6 No. X. Terms of a Friendly Convention enteredinto between Sheikh
Mahomed Bin Khuleefa, IndependentRuler of Balirain, on the partof
Himself and Successors, and Captaiil Felix Jones, Hcr Majesty's
Indian Navy, Political Kesidentof Her Britannic Majcsty in the Gulf
of Persia, on thc part of the Britis1.iGoveinmen-,1861 (Treuliesund
Engagements relating io Arabiu und the Pevsian Gulf; compiled by
C.U. Aitchison, Vol. XI, Archive Editions, 1987,pp. 234-236) ....................1.........
Ottoman map dated 27 Junc 1867,ArchivesOSthe Diwan Ainiri of the
111.7
State of Qatar (Translation andArabicversion) ..................................37.................
111.8 Ottoman map dated Septcmbcr 1867, Archives of the Diwan Ainiri of
the State of Qatar (Translationand Arabicversicin)..............................41................
111.9 Ottoman map dated October 1867,Archivcsof theDiwan Ainiri ofthe
State of Qatar (Translalioand Arabicversion) ..................................45....................
Ottoman map dated Noveinher 1867,Archivcs of thc Diwan Alniri of
III.10
the Stateof Qatar(Translalionand Arabicversion) ...............................51....III.11 No. XI. Translation of the Agreement entered into by Ali Bin
Khuleefa, Sheikh of Balirain, - 1868 (Treuties and Engugernents
rekuting to Aruhia und the Persian GulJ'compiled by C.1J. Aitchisoi~,
Vol. XI, Archive Editions, 1987,pp. 236-237) .....................................57...................
Na. XXVII. Agreement of the Chief of El-Kutr (Gulfur) engnging 1101
to coininit any Breach of the Maritime Yeace, - 1868 (Trenties rrnd
Engugements rcluting to Arubiu a~ld the Persiirn Gulf; compilcd hy
C.U.Aitchison, Vol.XI, Archive Editions, 1987,p. 255) ...........................6.1..........
III.13 Letter from Zayed bin Khalifih of Abu Dhabi to Barakail RiilEra'ar,
Vali of Hassa dated 4 June 1870,Archives of the Diwan Amiri of thc
Statc of Qatar (Translationand Arabic version) ....................................65...............
Lctter froin Bash Jawish, Vice Corninaider of the Sullünic Marine
Fleet to Hafidli Baslia dated 5 October 1870, Archives of the Diwan
Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translation andArabic vcrsiui~) .......................69...........
Report of Turkish Naval Captai11 dated 15April 1871, Archives of the
Diwan Amiri of the State ofQatar (Translation andArabic version)....................5.
Report of Mahmood Bey, Ottoman SultanicMarine Vice-Commander
to Saeed Gffendi, the Provincial Governor of Rasrah dated 22 May
1871,Archives of the Diwan Amiri of thc State 01'Qatar (lranslation
andArabic version)........................................................
......................
Letter fioin MecllutBasha, Vali of Hassa to Ruler of Bal~rain,Sheikli
Issa bin Ali dated October 187 1,Archives of thc Diwan Anliri of thc
Stdtteof Qatar (Translation andArabic version) ....................................8................
111.81 Letter from Shcikh Zayed Bin Khalifah of Abu Dhabi to Mcdliat
Basha, Vali of Hassa dated 17November 187 1,Archives of tlic Diwan
Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translationand Arabiç version).................................8
III.19 Report by Vice Coinmailderof the Sultanic Marine FleetBas11.lawisli
to Hafidh Basha IlleProvincial Governor of the Province of Basra,
undczted, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qalar
(Translation and Arribicversion) ....................................................93..................
Lctter from Saleh Rasha, Vali of Hassa tn S1ieikhJassim Hiii Thani
dated March 1872, Archives of the Diwan Ainiii of the Statc of Qatar
(Translation and Arabic version) ........................................................................
Letter from SheikhZaycd Bin Khalifah of AbuDl~alii loSaleliBasha,
Turkish Vali of 1-Iassndatcd 7 October 1872, Archives of'the Diwan
Amiri of the Stateof Qatar (TransIalionand Arabic version) ......................10......111.22 Précis of conversation which took placebetween Major Grant, First
Assistant Resident ald Sheikh Esau bin Alli, the Chief'of Balir~ 111on
16 Aug.st. 1873 (I.O.R. L/P&S/9/23) (copy of original and
transcription)......................................................
...........................
111.23 Tralslated purport of Shaikh Esau bin Klialeefa's statcmcnt of
2 Septei. .r 1873 (I.O.R. T.,/P&S/9/23) (copy of origirial aiid
transcription)......................................................
..........................
711.24 1,etter lrom Acting PRPG to Secrctary of State or Goveil~nlentof
Ti~dia dated 4 Seplember 1873 (I.O.K. L/P&S/9/23) (ccipyof ciriginal
. .
and transcription) ...................................................
......................1
Letter forn Baraka11 bin Era'ar, Turkish Vali of Hassa lo Vali 1-Iafidh
Rashri, Vali of Baghdad dated 27 Novcmber 1873, Archives of the
Diwan Ainiri of the State ofQatar (Translation and Arahic version) ......................125
Report from Turkish NavalCaptainMohammed Quli Abdu to Turkish
Marine Vice-Commander Amir Alai (Admiral) Ahined Rasha dated
29November 1873,Archives ofthe Diwan Amiri or the State of Qatar
(Translation and Arabicversion) .......................................................2..
.......
Survey Map of Hawar sent by Captain Mohammed Quli Abdu dated
10December 1873,Archives ofthe Diwan Ainiri of the Stateof Qatar
(Translation and Arabic version) .....................................................33......1
Mernoranduin on the separate claims of Turkey and Pcrsia to
sovereignty over the island of Bahrein dated 25 March 1874 (1.O.R.
L/P&S/139).........................................................
............................
Ottoman map dated 10October 1874,Archives of the Diwai-i Ainiri of
the State of Qatar (Translation andArabic versioiî) ............................................ 141
Lctter from PWG to RBdatcd 12December 1874(1.O.R.R/15/1/370) ...........145..
Letter from SheikhZaycd Bin Kha1ifal.iof Abu Dhabi to Rarakah bin
Era'ar, Vali of Hassa datcd 23 Dcccmber 1874,Arclzives O Ithe Diwan
Amiri of the Staie of Qatar (Translationand Arabicvcrsion) .......................149........
Letter from PRPGto RB dded 22 February 1875 (I.O.K. R/ 1511/370) .............153..
Letter from PRPGto RB dated 31May 1875(I.O.R.W15/1/370) .................157.....
Letter from Sheikh Zayed Bin Khalifahto AhrnedEzzat Al-Omari Al-
Mousily, Vali of Hüssa dated 22 July 1877, Archives of thc Diwan
Amiri of the Statc01 Qatar (Translationand Arabic version) .......................16.1.......No. XII. Translation of Agreement signed by the Chief of Baliraiii,
dated 22nd December 1880(Trentiesand Engagements relcttitzg /O
Arubia and the Persian Gu&;compiled by C.U. Aitchison, Vol. XI,
Archive Editions, 1987,p. 237) .....................................................5
............
Lctter from Saeed Al-Mutawwa Al-Rin Hajerto Ruler of'Qatar, Shcilc
Jassim Bin Mohammed dated 29 March 1887,Archives of tlieDiwan
Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translation andArabic version).........................169......
Surveymap of IIawar dated 7 July 1890,Archives ol'tl-ieDiwanAiniri
of the State of Qatar (Translationand Arabic versioi-i).............................173............
Atlas,Prnceeding.~ oflhe Royal Geogruphicul Socieiy,1890 .....................177.........
Letter from Saeed Al-Mutawa Al-Bin Hajer to Ruler of Qatai-,Sl-ieik
Jassim Bin Mohammed Bin Thani dated 16 February 189 1, Arcliives
of the Diwan Amiri of the Statc of Qatar (Translation and Arabic
vcrsion).....................................................
....................1..1..........
Letter from Sheikh Saeed Al-Mutawwa Al-Bin IIajer to Ruler of
Qatar, Sheik Jassiin dated 2 June 1891, Archives oftlic Diwaii Ainiri
of the State of Qatar(Translation andArcibicversion) ............................185.............
No. XIII. Exclusive Agreement of the Shaikh of Bahrain witli thc
British Govcrnment dated the 13th March 1892 (Trcntics mu'
Engagements relaling lu Arabia and the Persiun Gulf, cotnpilcd hy
C.U. Aitchison,Vol. XI, ArchiveEditions, 1987, p. 338)...........................189.........
No. 84. Nole Verbaleto Sublimc Porte dated 12August 1895 (T.O.R.
R/I5/1/314) .....................................................
...............193...................
Letter from PRPG to Goverilmentof India, Forcign Departinent dated
15September 1895(I.O.R. R/15/1/314)............................................................1
Lctter from Chief of Bahrein to PRPG dated 15 Septeinber 1895
(1.O.R.iU15/1/3 14) ..................................................
.................2...
Tivencr'smap, P~oceedingsoj-theRoyal Geogra~?hicu,lSociety,1898 ............205....
Survey map of Qatar dated May 1898,Archives of the Diwan Amiri
of the State of Qatar (TranslationaiidArabic version) ............................209.............
Letter frornMajor P.Z. Cox, British Resideiicyto Forcign Secrelary il1
Simladated 27 August 1904 (F.O 78J5460) ......................................2.1.........
Letter from Muhanna bin Hazeem Al-Dosari to Sheikh Saeed Al-
Mutawwa Al-Bin-1-Iajerdatcd 15 February 1907, Archives of the
Diwan Amiri of the Stateof Qatar (Translation and Arabic version) ......................221Lctter from Ruler of Bahrain, Sheikh Issa Bin Ali Al-Khalifa to
Sheikh Saeed Al-Mutamva Al-Bin-Hajer, the Sheikli of the Western
Ports of Qatar dated 7 July 1907,Archives of the Diwan Ainii-iof'tlie
Slateof Qatar (Translation and Arabic version)..................................225..............
Letter from Mohammed Rin IUlalifahAl-Khalifah lo SheiItliSaeed Al
Mutawwa Al-Bin-Hajer, the Sheikh of the Western Ports of Qatar
dated 12June 1908,Arcllivesofthe Diwan Ainiri ufthe State of Qatar
('Translationand Arabic version) ................................................2..
..............2
Extract from Lelter Iiom PAB to PRPG d&d 20 March 1909
(trariscriptand copyof original) (1.0.R. iU15/2/25...............................3.........
'Translationof a lelterfiomRB to PAB dated 30Marc11 1909 (ilruhian
Uoundaries,Ruhi-uin-Qatm1937-1954,p. 568).........................................1........2
Leiter from PAB to PRPGdated4 April 1909(I.O.R.Ki15/2/25) ................245.......
Letter from Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Zayed of Abu Dhabi to Sheikli Issa
Bin Ali Al-Khalifah, K~ilcrof Bahrain dated May 1909, Ai-cllivesof
the Diwan Amiri of the Slale of Qatar (Translation and Arabic
version) ...................................................
..................2............
Lcttcr from 10 to FO dated 30 December 1910 (F.O 88.119907
148466) .......................................................
..............25...............
No. 47. Aide-Mémoire communicated by TewfikPasha dated 15April
1912 (Brit isocuments on the Orzgins oy the War1898-1914, G.P.
Gooch and H. Tcmperley (eds.), H.M. Stationery Office, T,ondo~i~
1938,Vol. X, Part II,pp.59-65) ....................................................
.............2
Lctter from PRPG to Governmeiltof India dated 22 June 1913 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/10/396).....................................................
.............6.........
Copy of the original French version of the "Convention relative au
Golfe Persique et aux territoires adjacents" signed OIÎ29 July 1913
(British Archives)and Eilglishtranslation (Kecorull;r?f'<jaluPritnury
Dncumenls 1820-1960, Vol. 4, 1896-1916, Archivc Ediiions, 1991,
pp. 1-4,323-325) ................................................
............2..3.......
Lettcr from PKPGto Al Amir AbduIaziz bin Abdurahman hiil Faisal
as Saud dated 11Septembcr 1913(1.0.R. no. illegible)............................3..........
No. 1.Anglo-TurkisliConvention respecting theBoundaries of Aden -
1914(Treaties and Engagementsrelufing 10 Ai.uOinand the Pcesiun
Gu% compiled by C.U. Aitchison, Vol. XI, Archive Editions, 1987,
pp.42-43 - without anilexes)...................................................
..7..................'felegrain from Vicervy dated 8 September 1915 (1.O.R.
L/P&S/10/386,file 3294) ....................................................
..9................
No. II. Treaty betweenthe British Govcrnmentand thc Ruler of Ncjd,
El Hassa, Qatif etc.,- 1915 (Tvcaties und Engngcnzentsrcinting fo
Arabiu und the Persion Guv; compiled by C.U. Aitcliison, Vol. XI,
ArchiveEditions, 1987,pp. 206-208) ............................................295...............
No. XXXIII.Treaty between theBritish Government and tlic Shailch
of Qalar, - 1916 (Treali ensdEngagementsrelclting IoArnbiu und the
Persian Gulf, compiledby C.U.Aitchison, Vol. XI, Archive Editions,
1987, pp. 258-261)...................................................
..........3.........
Memorandum from PAB to Deputy PRPG dated 6 Deccriiber 1919
andsketch map (1.O.R. lU15/2/204)......................................................
.........3
Report of thc Interdepartmental Cornmittee appointed by the Prime
Minister to make recommendatioiis as to the termiiiation of ilnew
departmentunder the Colonial Of'ficeto deal with mandateciand othcr
territories in the Middle East dated 31 Jaiuary 1921 (I.O.K.
L/P&S/l 1/193) .......................................................
..........................
ProvisionaI,not confirmedBahrein ConcessionDupliçate drawn ~ipin
1923 by Holmes on behalf of EGS, in English and Arabic with
accompanyingmap (I.0.R. RI15/1/6641..................................................3..........3
Lctter from PRPGto Foreign Secretaryof Governinent of India datcd
10October 1925 (I.O.K.R/15/1/362) ............................................347.............
No. 1.Concessioii Agreement between Easternand GeiieralSyiidicate
Limited and thc Ruler of Bahrain daled 2 December 1925(as rcvised
up to 12January 1934) (F. 3O7./109915) .......................................353....................
Letter from Ruler of Bahaimi,Sheikh Hamad Bin lssa Biri Ali Al-
Khalifah to Riiler of Dubai, S11eikhSaeed Biii Maktooin datcd 21
September 1926, Archivesof the Diwan Amiri of the State ofQatai-
(TranslationandArabiç version) ...................................................5.........3
Despatch from PRPG to Foreign Secretary of Govcrnineïit of India
dated4 Decembcr 1926(I.O.R.R/15/2/87)...............................................9.....3
Letter from Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed of Abu Dliabi to Rulei of
Bahrsiin, Shcikh Issa Bin Ali dated January 1927, Ascilivcs of the
DiwanAmiri of the Stateof Qatar (Translation andArübicversion) ..............375.....
Letter from PAB to Sheikh Hainad Bin Issa Al Klialifah dated
20 February 1927(1.0.R.R/15/2/87) .......................................................................
379Deçpatch from PRPGto Foreign Secretaryof Govcrnnîent of Iiidia of
27 March 1927(I.Q.R.RI15/2/87) ...................................................3..
.........
Copy of letter dated 23rd April 1928 from Major F. Holil-ies.for anci
oii belialf of the Eastern and General Syndicate Liinited. to PAR,
.....................................................
..................
Bdwain (I.O.R. W15/1/654) 389
Letter from PAB to EGS dated 3May 1928(I.O.R. Ri15/1/654) ..................393......
Letter from Sheikh Shakliboot,Rulcr of Abu Dhabi to ficlgrave, the
Adviser to the Govemnient of Bahrain dated 27 July 1930. Arcliives
of the Diwan Amiri oS the State of Qatar [Translation and Ai-alic
version)......................................................
......................7.........
Writtcn testimony of Ahmed bin Ali Al-Ghatam, Yousufbin Alirned
and Irhama bin AlimedAl-Dosari dated Noveniber 193U, Archives of
the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translation ,and Arabic
version)......................................................
...................................
Letter I'rornYousuf bin Ahmed to Sheikh Abdullah hiil Jassiln AI-
Thani dated December 1930,Archives ofthe Diwan Amiri ofthe Statc
of Qatar (Translationand Arabicversion) ...........................................5...............
Letter from Yousufbin Alimedto RB datcd December 1930,Archives
of the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translation anci Arabic
vcrsion) .......................................................
....................9................
1,etter from Political Agent in Kuwait to PRPG datcd 29 May 1932
(I.O.R. Ri15/2/645) ........................................................
.....413..............
Letter frorn PABto PRPG datcd 10 July 1932(I.O.R. 1U 15/2/645).................417....
Lelter from SaiimBin Nasscr AI-Muzaireto RB, undatcd, Archives of
the Diwan Amiri of thc State of Qatar (Translation ancl Arabic
versioi.1)......................................................
...................2................
Letter from Salim Bin Nasser Al-Muzaire to Shiekh Issa Bin Al-
Sheikb Ali, undated, Archivcs of the Diwan Ainiri of tlie State of
Qatar (Traiislatioiland Arabic vcrsion) ................................................................
Lcttcr from IO to F.C. Stmling, Pctroleiim Departii-ient, Board of
'Tradcdated 3 May 1933(I.O.R.R/15/1/652) ......................................431.................
Tclcgram frorn PRPG tu Colonial Secretary dated 23 July 1933
(I.O.K. RII5/1/653) ...................................................
..........437............
Tclegrarn from PAB to PRPGdated 29 July 1933 (1.O.R.R/15/1/653) ............441...Despalchfrom PABto PRPG dated 30 July 1933(1.0. R. RI1 5/1/653) .............4.45
'Lelegramfrom PWG to Secretary of State for India dated 3 1 July
1933(I.O.R.R/15/1/653) ................................................................
..9...........
Letter from Secretaryof State forIndiato PRPG dated 2 August 1933
(I.O.R.R/15/1/653) ........................................................................453....
Dcspatch fromOfficiating PRPG to Secrctaryof State for Iildia dated
4 August 1933(Z-- R/15/1/653).........................................................4......
.
Letter from IO to Petrolcum Department, Board of Tradc dated 9
August 1933(I.O.R.R/15/1/653) ........................................................461
Letter from Petrolcum Department, Board of Tradc to IO datcd
17August 1933 (I.O.R.R/15/654) .............,..................................................4
Copy of lctter dated 6th September 1933 from the Cl-iiefLocal
Representative of BAPCO ta H.R. Ballantyne, Esq. (I.O.R.
RI15/1/654) ......................................................................,,........475.
Letter from PRPG to Air Headquarters,British Forcesin Iraq daled 5
June 1934enclosing documentationrelatingto RAF reconnaissanceof
Qatar (I.O.R.R/15/1/629) ................................. .............................479
Letter from Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhboot Bin Sultan to
Rulcr of Bahrain, SheikhHamad Bin Issa Ali Bin Al-Kl-iaiifahdatcd
22 August 1934, Archives of the Diwan Ainiri of the State of Qatar
(TranslationandArabic version) .............................. ..... . . . . . 489
Statement of Qatari subjcct, Saleh bin IIamad Al-Mailni conccriling
sale of property in Hawar to AbdullahBu Jabor AI-Dosari datcd 7
December; instructiongiven by Relgravedatcd 1935, Archives of the
Diwan Amiriof the Stateof Qatar (Translation and Arabic version) ....................493
Letter frorn Salim bin Nasser Al-Muzaireto "Al Ralyooz" in Bahrain
dated 15January 1935, Archives of tlie Diwan Ainiri of tlie Statc of
Qatar (Translationand Arabic version) .......................... . . . ........ . 497
Letter fromPWG to RQdatcd 17 May 1935(1.0.R. RI1 511iG32) ...................501
Qatar Oil Concession betwecn ShaikhAbduIlah bin Qasiiil al ?'hani,
the Ruler of Qatar and Anglo-Persian Oil Co. Ltd. (APOC) datcd
17 May 1935(T.O.R.W15/11632) ...............................................................
... LIST OF DOCUMENTAKYANNEXES
(VolLlmc7)
PARTIII
111.100 Letter from Sheikli Hamd bin Issa bin Ali al-Khülifah, Kulcr of'
Bahrain, to Sheikh Shakhboot bin Sultan, Ruler of Abu Dliabi datecl
18 August 1935, Archivesof the Diwan Amiri of the Statc of Qatar
('Translationand Arabicversion) .......................................................
.............
111.101 Lctter from Belgrave to the Represcntative of the Eastern Proviiice OC
Abu Dhabi, Al-SheikhAhrnedBin Hilal Al-Dliahiri dated 15 Mard-i
1936, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar ('l'ranslatic~n
and Arabiç version).....................................................
......................
111.102 Dr& letter from IO to FO dated 17 April 1936 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/12/3 862) ...................................................
...............9..................
111.103 Letter from Relgrave to PAB datcd 28 April 1936 (1.0.R.
L/P&S/I2/3895) ....................................................
..............5..........
111.104 CetterfromPCL to IOdated29 April 1936(I.O.R.R/i5/1/688) ....................19........
111.105 Letter from Rashidbin Mohammcdbin Jabor to Belgrave datcd 5 May
1936,Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the Stüteof Qatar ('l'ranslaticin
and Arabic version).....................................................
.........2..........
111.106 Lct-tcrfrom PAB to PRPG daled 6 May 1936(I.O.K.R/15/1/688) .................27........
111.107 Express letter from PRPGtu Secretaryof State for Lndiadated 25 May
1936 (1.O.R.L/P&S/12/3895).......................................................
.1..............
III.108 Telegram from Secretary of State for lndia to Governmcnt of India
dated 29 June 1936;Dccypher of Telegrain dated 1 July 1936 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/12/3895)......................................................
........................
III.1O9 Departmental Minutesdated 8July 1436(I.O.R.L/P&S/12/3 895j...................41......
111.110 Letter fram 10 toPCL dated 14July 1936(I.O.R.L/P&S/12/3895) ........................
111.111 Minute dated 14 July 1936 by IO (I.O.R.L/P&S/12/3895) ...........................1.........5
111.112 Lcttcr from 10 to Pctrolcum Department, Board of Tradc datcd 30
July 1936(1.O.K.W15/1/688) .....................................................55................111.1 13 Record of meeting of 10 on 1Oçtober 1936 datcd 5 Oclober 1936
(I.O.R.W15/11688)...................................................................
..............9........
III.114 Letter from BAPCO to Belgrave of 5October 1936 (with rnnrgiiial
commentsby Belgravc) (I.O.R. R/l5/1/688) .........................................................6
111. 1 5 Letter from Salim bin Nasser al-Muzaire to SheikhHaniadbill Issa bin
Ali Al-Khalifah dated 12 January 1937,Archivcs of the Diwan Ainiri
of the State of Qatar (Translation and Arabicvcrsion) ...................................6.9.......
III.116 Letter from Belgrave to Rashid bin Mohammed bin Jabor dated 12
February 1937, Archives of the Diwan Arniri of Ille State of Qatar
(Translationand Arabicversion) ............................... .. ,. ... ... . .......73
Letter from Yousuf Al-Shirawi to "our îrieiids iii Qatar tl-irt~ugli
Rashid bin Mohammedbin Jabor Al-Naim", undated,Archives of Ille
Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translationand Arabicversion) ..................77....
III.118 Letterfrom RB to PAB dated 14April 1937(I.O.R. Ri15121202)...... .................8.1
111.119 Letter liom Rashid biii Mohammed bin Jaborto Belgrave datcd 14
April 1937, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of tlie State of Qatar
(Translationand Arabic version) ............................. ..,..... .................. ...85
III.120 Translation of letter dated 23 April 1937 froin Shaikh AbduIlal1bill
Qasim al Thani, C.I.E., RuIerol'Qatar,to Lieut-Coloncl Loch, C.I.E.,
PAB (I.O.R. W15121202. )................................................ . ....... .........89
Lctter from PAB to PRPGdated23 April 1937(I.O.R.RI1SI11369) ..................9..
Lcttcr from Belgrave to Rashid bin Mohammed bin Jabor, ~mdated,
Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar ('l'ranslatioiiand
Arabicversion) .....................................................................,,........1O1
Letter [romPABto RQ dated28 April 1937 (I.O.R. RI15/2/202) ....................105
Letter froin PABto RI3dated 28 April 1937 (I.O.R. RI15121202)..........................09
Report aiid recoinineiidation on the Zubarah incident fronl PAB to
PRPG dated 3 May 1937(I.O.R.RI15/2/202).................. .............................113
III.126 Letterfrom PRPGto IOdated 5 May 1937 (I.O.R. R/1 5/11369] ......................125
III.127 Lettes from Belgrave to Rashid bin Molian~inedbill Jabor, i~lcluding
affidavit, undated, Archives ofthc Diwan Arniriof the State of Qatar
(Translation and Arabic version) ............. .................,..,.,,...,..,.............13 5111.128 Letter from Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Slieikh Shakhboot Bi11Sultan ta
Bclgrave dated 10 May 1937, Archives ofthe Diwan Arniri of the
State of Qatar(Translationand Arabicversion) ....................................41..............
711.219 Telegrain from PAB to PRPG dated20 May 1937 (I.O.R.FU1 5121202) ............147..
111.130 Letter fromRQ toPRPG dated24May 1937 (1.O.R. R/15/2/202).........................
I51
III.131 Memorüiidum fiom Assistant PAB dated 29 May 1937 (1.O.R.
R/I 5121202) ........................................................
...............................
711.132 Meinoranda from Assistant PAB datcd 10 Julie 1937 (1.0.R.
W15/1/369) .......................................................
...............6.............
III.133 Lctter from Belgraveto PAB dated 22Julie 1937(I.O.K.Ri 15/2/202) .............167...
III134 Letter fromPABto PRPG dated 1JuIy 1937(I.O.R. RI15/1/3703 ..................173.....
111.135 1,elterfrom PRPG to Sccretaryof State for India dated 4 July 1937
(I.O.R. Rl15/1/370)......................................................
...................
111.136Letter from Commanderof IIMS Deptford toPRPG dated 5 July 1937
(1.O.R.R/15/1/370)........................................................
..........1.......
T71.137Letter from RBto PAB datcd 6 July 1937(nR. R/15/1/37r)).......................85...1
111.138 MemorandumfromPABdated 13July 1937(1,O.R. K/I 5111370)..................189.....
III.139 Decypl~erof Telegramfrom Governcnentof India to YRPG dated 16
July 1937 enclosing Secrctary of Slate'stelegram no. 1903 dated 15
July 1937(I.O.R.R/15/1/370)........................................................
................
111.140 Letter from Belgrave to Abdul Rrizag Rizoogi, llcputy Political
Resident in the Trucial States dated 20 November 1937, Archives of
tlie Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translatiai~ and Arabic
versioil).......................................................
...................9...............
111.141 Letter from ShcilchShakhboot, Ruler ofAbu Dhabi, to Sheikh Saeed
bin Maktoom, Riiler of Dubai dated 13Deccmber 1937. Archives of
the Diwan An~iri of tlie St'tte of Qatar ('Transldioil and Arabic
version) ......................................................
.....................3..............
III.142 Governmcnt of Bahrain,AnnzdalXeporf filr Yeur 333'6(March 1937-
February 1938),pp. 16-1 7....................................................
......7..............
111.143 Qatar'sreport on BclgraveDiary for entrics dated February 1938-May
1938;January 1939- May 1939........................................................
..........2III.144 Letter rromBelgrave to PAB dated 9March 1938(I.O.R.W15i21204) .............225
111.145 Letter li-omBelgravc to Abdul Razag Kizoogi, Political Kcsident in
the Trucial Statesdated 26 March 1938,Archives of the LliwailAniiri
of the State of Qatar ('ITanslatioiiaiidArabic vcrsioi-i) ...................................29..2
111.146 Mernorandum from PRPG to IO dated 5 April 1938 (1.O.R.
R/15/1/689) .................................................................
.......................
111.147 Letter from 10 to FO dated 7 April 1938(I.O.R. L/P&S/12/3895)......... ............237
111.148 Record of 'an Inforn-ial Meeting hcld at IO on 12April 1938, tv discirss
the activities of PCL oii the Arab Coast of the Yersian Giilf (I.O.K.
RI1 5111689)................................................................,,,,,..............241
III.149 Letter from FOto IOdatcd 13 April 1938(I.O.R. L/P&S/12/3895)..... ..............249
111.150 Translation of a letter dated 10 May 1938 from Sheikh Abdullah bir-i
Qasim al Thani to PAB(I.O.R. R/15/2/547)................................................2. 3......
111.15 1 Letter from Belgrave to Abdiil Ralimml Al-Qusaibi datiled IO May
1938, Archives of the DiwanAmiri of the State of Qaiar (Tralislation
and Arabicversion) ...................................................................,,...257
171.152 Express letter from PAB to PRPG dated 15 May 1938 (I.O.K.
R/15/2/547) ........................................... ... ...... ....... ,.. .......,. .,.,261
III.153 Telegrarn from PRPG to PAB dated 14 May 1938 (I.O.R.K/15/2/547).... ..........267
III.154 Lettcr from PAB to Relgrave dated 20 May 1938(I.O.R. W1512i547). ..............27 1
111.155 Letter allcgedly from PAR to Saleh Abdul Hussain Shihri datcd 20
May 1938, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar
(Translation and Arabic version) ....... ...................................................275..
III.f56 Lettcr from PARto RQdated 20 May 1938(J.O.R.Ri15/2/5471 ............ .......279
111.157 Translation of letter dated 27 May 1938 from RQ to PAR (T.O.R.
RI15121547) .............................. .... . . . . .. .. . . ,.... .. .285
111.158 Memurandum dated 29 May 193 8 by Relgrave (I.O.K. Ri1 5121547) ..................291
III.159 Letter lkomPABto PRPG datcd 3 June 1938(I.O.K.iU15/21547) ...................2..9
111.160 Translation of letter dated 15 June 1938 froin RQ to PAR (I.O.R.
RI1 5/2/547) ................................................................................305111.161 Express Lctter from PRPG to Secrctary of' State for India dated 20
June 1938(I.O.R. R/15/2/547)...............................................................311
111.162 Express Letter from PAB to PWG dated 21 June 1938 (1.O.R.
w 15/2/547) ................................................. . . . ,. . . ,. . . 3 15
111.163 Express Letter from PWG to Secretary of State for India düted 27
June 1938 (I.O.R. Rl15/21547) ..........................................................
..1..........
111.6 14 Draft Icttcr from IO to FOdated 6 July 1938(withinasginal coininent}
(I.O.R. LIP8rS11213895( )Transcription). .............. .................................323
111.165 Letter fromFOto IO dated 12July 1938(I.O.R.no. illegible) .......................327
111.166 Abstracts of Minute dated 14 July 1938 by Gibsoii of IO (1.O.R.
L/P&S/l2/3 895) (Transcription) .........................................................333
111.167 Letter from Belgrave to the Representative of the British Stale in
Sharjah, Khan Rahador Issa Abdul LateeTAl-Sarkal dated 20 Suly
1938,Archives of the DiwanAmiri of the State of Qatas (Tianslatioii
and Arabic version)....................................................,.......................339
111.168 Letter from Officiating PAB to Acting Adviscr to the Balirain
Governmentdated 14August 1938(I.O.R.Rfl5/2/547) ..............................3.43......
111.164 Translationof a letter dated 23 October 1938from RQ lo PAB (W.
RI15/2/2041(Translation and Arabic version) ..................................,........347
111.170 Express Letter from PRPG 10 Secretary of Statc for Indiü dated 3
November 1938(I.O.K.L/P&S/12/3895) ....,...........................................35 1
III.171 Letter from PRPG to Secretary of State forlndia dated 10 Novernbcr
1938 (Arahian Rounduries, Saudi Arabia-Bahrain, 1938-1957,
Vol. 10,pp. 7-9)..................................................................
............3.............
111.172 Letter froin FO to IO dated 20 Deccmber 1938 (Arcrbirru Bioundarie.~,
Vol. 10, pp. 11-12) ...................................................................
........................
111.173 Written coilfèssion of subjects of the RB daled 1938 (I.O.R.
Ri 15121547( )TranslationaiidArabic version)............. ................................367
111. 14 Letter from Belgrave to PAB dated 22 Decelnber 1938 ci~closing
affidavitsandjudgments (I.O.R.K/15/2/547) .....................................,.....371
111.175 Letter froln Salim bin Nasser Al-Muzaire to Slieikh IIamid Bill Issa
Rin Ali, undated, Archives of thc Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar
(Translationand Arabic version) ..............................,.,..,,................... 385111.176 Letter from IO to FO dated 4 January 1938 (should read 1939)
(Arabian Ruundaries, Saudi Arabia-Bahrain, 293 8-1957, Vol. 10,
pp. 13-14).................................................................
.....................3.............
III.177 Letter from PABto RQ dated 5January 1939(I.O.R.FUI5121347) .,.................393
111.178 Government of Bihain, Annzrul Report ,for Yeur 1.357(Marc111938-
February 1939),pp. 10,57 ..................................................................397.....
111.179 Lctter froin Belgravc to Abdul Razag Rizoogi dated 10 February
1939,Archives of the Diwaii Amiri of the Stateof Qatai.(Trailslaticiii
and Arabic version)............ ........................................................,........401
117.180 Letter from Belgrave to Abdul Razag Rizoogi dated 15 February
1939,Archives of the DiwanAmiriof the State of Qatar ('l'ranslation
and Arabic version) ...,....................................................................,..405
III.181 Translation of a letter dated 20 February 1939 fron~ RQ to PAR
(I.O.R.Ri15121204) ..........................................................................,409
111.182 Letterfrom ActingSaudiMinisterfor Foreign AfEairsto lIis Majcsty's
Ministcr, Jedda dated 26 February 1939 (Arahiun Bnunduries, Vol.
10,p. 15) .......................................................................................413
III.183 Express T,etterfrom Secrctaryof State for lndia to PRPG, PAR and
Governmentof Iiidiadated 1 March 1939(I.O.R.R/15/11692)...... ...................417
III.1 84 Letter from PABto PRPG dated 5 March 1939(I.O,R. Ki1 51 1!692) .................421
111.185 Extract from Politicai Agent'sD.O. lctter No. C!146 dated 5 March
1939 (1.Q.R.R/15/2/547) ..............................................................,...,.425
117.186 Judgment of Bahraini Judge Abdullah Al-Mihzasigncd by Relgravc
on 11March 1939, Archives ofthe Diwan Amiri of thc State of Qatar
(Translation and Arabicversion) ................................ . . . .......,. . ,. ,429
111.187 Letter from Belgraveto Saleh Shihri, uiidatcd, Archivesof tlic Uiwaii
Ainiri ofthe Stateof Qatar (Translationand Arabic version) ..................,.......433
111.188 Letter from PAB to RQ dated 17 March 1939 (1.O.R.lUI5/2/547)
(TranslationandArabic version) ................................. ... ................437.
111.1 89 Letter from RQto PA6 dated 19 March 1939 (I.O.R. RI1 5121547) ..................441...
III. 190 1,etterfroin PABto RQ dated 22 March 1939(I.O.R. R/15/2/547).......................4 .45
III.19 1 Trünslatioiiof a letter and lettcr in Arübic fromRQ to PAB datcd 24
Marc11 1939 (7.O.R.RI15/2/547) ...........................................................449111.192 Translation of a ietter dated 30 Marc11 1939 froni KQ tu PAR
enclosing translation of testimonials of evidence and translationof'
comments on the stalemeiltof the Bahrain Governinent in tliccase of
Hawar Islands submittedby RQ(I.O.R. R/15/2/547) ..............................53.............
III193 Letterfrom Belgraveto PABdated 20 April 1939(I.O.K.K/15/2/547) ...........489...
111.94 1,etter from Belgrave to Sheikh Almed bia IIilal al-lll~ahiin Abu
Dhabi dated 21 April 1939, Archives of the Diwan Amiri 01'the State
oi'Qatar .....................................................
................4.............
111.135 Letter from PABto PRPGdated22 April 1939 (1.O.R. R/15/2/547) ..............497.....
111.196 Lettcr from PRPG to PAB dated 22 April 1939 (Arabinn Bouud~~rië.~.
SaudiArabia-Bahrain,1938-1957,Vol. 1O,pp. 17-18) ...........................................
111.197 Letter from RB to PAB dated 26 April 1939 iii Eng1isl.i and Arabic
(1.O.R.RI15/2/2041 ......................................................
.....................
111.198 Memorandum from PAB to PRPG dated 29 April 1939 (I.O.K.
R115/2/204)....................................................
............................
111.199 Express Letter from PRPG to Secretary of St,?tcfor India dated 29
.......................................................
................
April 1939 (1.O.R.R/15/2/547) 519 LIST OF DOCUMENTARY ANNEXES
(Volumc 8)
Page
PART 111
111.200 Letler from PRPGto PABdated 10May 1939(I.O.R. R/15/2/204)..........................1 .
I11.201 T,etterfrom Belgrave to Khan Balladur Issa Abdul Laleef AI-Sarkal,
former Resideiicy Agent in the Trucial States datcd 10 May 1939,
Archives of the Diwan Amiri of'the State of Qatar (Translation and
Arabic version)......................................................
.............................
111.202 Judgment recording settienlent of disputc betm-eenSdeh bin Abdullal~
al-Hasawi and Salman bin Ahmed Al-Ghatitam,recordcd by Judge
Salmeen bin Rabee on 18May 1939,Archives of the Diwan Arniri of
the State of Qatar (Translation andArabic version) ...................................................
111.203 Manuscript Minutes datcd 12, 15 and 18 May 1939 by Heiiliilgway,
Gibson and Peel (I.O.K.L/P&S/I213895)(Transcriptioii)....................................1
111.204 Interna1IO Mcmorandum dated 22 May 1939 (1.O.R.T,/P&S/12/3895)
(Transcription) ....................................................
.............19...................
111.205 Lcttcr from IO io FOdated 15June 1939(Arahiun Roundnries, Saudi
Arabia-Bahrain, 1938-1957,Archive Editions, Vol.10, pp. 27-28)..........................
111.206 Letter from PCJ, to Under Secretary of State Ior Iiidia dated 30 June
1939(I.O.R. R/15/2/547) .......................................................
2...............
111.207 Express letter from Secretary of Statc for India to PRPG datcd 4 Jiily
1939(I.O.R. R/15/2/547).......................................................
...3............
111.208 Txtter from PRPG to RB datcd 1f July 1939 (I.O.R. K/15/2/547)
(Trai-islatioiiand Arabic version)...................................................7...
.........
111.209 Letter from PRPG to RQ datcd 11 .My 1939 (I.O.R. K/15/2/547)
(Translation andArabic version) .................................................
......................
111.210 Express letter froin PAB to PRPG dated 22 July 1939 (I.O.R.
R/15/2/547) ...................................................
..................45...................
111.211 Letter from RQ to PRPG datcd 4 August 1939(I.O.R.RI15/2/5471 .....................
111.212 Manuscript minutes by Political Resideixy (August-Septembcr 1939)
(I.O.R.R/1511/693)(Transcription) ................................................53...
..................Translation of letrer fram RQ to PAB dated 18 November 1939 and
copy of original enclosing translation of a letterfiom RQ to PRPG
dated 18Novembcr 1939 (I.O.R.RI15/2/547) .....................................59....................
Lctter Sroin RB and Belgrave to Saleh Abdul-Husseiii Al-SIîiIiri.
undated, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the Stale of Qatar
(Translatioiiand Arabic version) .................................................65................
Letter from Sharq bin Ahmed to Sheikh Issa bin Abdul Latccf Al-
Sarkal dated 1 December 1939, Archivesof the Diwan Aiiiiri ofIlle
Stateof Qatar (Translationand Arabiç version) ....................................9.................
Letter from Abdul-Aziz bin Abdul-Rahman Al-Faisalof Saudi Arabia
to Shcilth Shakhboot datcd 2 December 1939,Archivcs of tlieDiwan
Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translationand Arabicversion) .......................73...........
Letter from Hamad bin Abdullah Al-Thruii to Abdul Razag bin
Rizoogi dated 1 1 December 1939,Archivesof thc Diwan Amiri of the
State of Qatar (Translation andArabic version) ...................................77.............
Letter from 1-Iarnadbin Abdullah ALrThani to Abdul Razag bin
Rizoogi dated 19 March 1940, Archives oi'the Diwan Aiîiiri of thc
State oFQatar (Translationand Arabic version) ..................................................8
Translatioil of letter dated 7 June 1940 from RQ to PAB (I.O.R.
W15/2/547) .....................................................
................................
Telegramfrom PRPG to Secretaryof State for Tndia datcd 7 june 1940
(I.O.R. R/15/2/547) ...................................................
.........89................
Deed of Further Modilication dated June 19 1940 made belween thc
Bahrein Petrolcum Company and the Ruler of Balirein wlîereby tlie
Mining Lease is cxtendedto cover al1"the Shaikh'sprcscilt and future
Doininions" known as the "Additional Area" (F 371/10991 5)...................93........
Express Letter fioin PAB to PRPG dated 3 July 1940 (I.O.R.
R/15/2/547) ....................................................
...............99....................
Lctter from AIi bin Khadim Al-Hümily,Rcprcsentalive in Baliraiil OS
Abu Dl-iabito Ruler of Abu Dhabi, SheikhShakhboot bin Siiltai-idated
4 October 1940, Archivcs of the Diwan Amiri of'Ille State ofQatai
(Translation and Arabic vcrsian) ................................................
.3.....................
Letter iloin Sheikh Saeedbin Maktuoin of Dubai to Sheikh Sliakhhoot
of Abu Dhabi dated 13Deccrnber 1940, Archivcs of'the Diwan Ainiri
ofthc State of Qatar (TranslationandArabic version) .............................0........111.225 'Translationof letter from RQ to PAB datcd Il Aiigust 194 1and copy
of Arabiç original (I.O.K.RI15/2/2041..............................................................
111.226 Letter dated 17 August 1941 from Acting PAB lo PAB (1.0.R.
RI15121204)...........................................................
................1............
111.227 Telegrarn from PKPG to PAB datcd 23 October 1941 (I.O.R.
R/15/2/547) .........................................................
..............................
111.228 Note on "Owncrship of Hawar" by PAB [probübly betwccn 23 and 26
October 19411(1.O.R.R/15/1/693) ...................................................2.3.................
111.229 Letter from PRPG Lo IOdated 26 October 1941(I.O.R.RI1512/547) ...............127...
111.230 Letter from Seçretaryto the Government of India in New Delhi to 10
dated 19November 1941(I.O.R.W15121547) .................. ........................133
111.213 Memorandum "Dispute vver Zubarah between Balirain and Qatar"
from PAB dated 25 May 1952 (sic) [should be 19421 (I.O.R.
W15/2/204) ..........................................................
..............................
111.232 Note on an interview with RB by PRPG on 9 December 1943(I.O.R,
RI15121205) .........................................................
...............14..............
111.233 Tetler hin Government of lndia Lo PRPG dated 8 Januüry 1944
(I.O.R. R/15/2/205) ......................................................
...................
111.234 Letter from PABto PRt>Gdated 15January 1944 (1.0.R. RI15/2/205) .............153..
111.235 Translation of letter from RQ to PAB dated 24 Fcbruary 1944 and
copy of Arabic original (1.O.R. RI1 51205) ...........................................157.................
111.236 Letter froin British Agcncy. Sharjah to PAD dated 22 May 1944
(I.O.R. R/15/205) ..................................................................................1
111.237 Lettcr fiom Belgrave lo PABdated4 dune 1944 (I.O.R.Ri15/2/205) ................h7...1
111.238 Translation 01' letter dated 8 Junc 1944 froin RB to I'AB (I.0.R.
Ki15/2/206) ............................................................................71........
111.239 Mcmorandum of PAB"Qatar" dated 18 June 1944(I.O.K.Ri15121205) ...........175..
111.240 Agreement of 24 June 1944 signcd by RQ and RB(I.O.K. RI15111205 ............183..
111.241 Letter from Belgrave 10 Abdul Razag Rizciugi dated 27 Scpternher
1944. Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar ('Traiislation
and Arabic version)..........................................................
....................111.242 Letter from Abdul Rahman Al-Qusaibi to Saqr bin Sultan al-Qasiini
dated 25 June 1945. Archives ciftliDiwan Amiri ni'the State ofQahr
(Translation and Arabic version..............................................1...
................
111.243 Letter from Belgrave toPAB dated 10July 1946(IL R/15/2/430)..............95..1
111.244 Letter from PAB to PRPG dated 11July 1946(T.O.R.RI15121605 ...............199......
111.245 Translation of letter dated 13 July 1946 froin RQ to PAB (I.O.R.
RI15121430) ...............................................
.................03.......
111.246 Letter from Secretasy of StatforIndia toPRPG dated 3August 1946
(I.O.R.L/P&S/12/3806b)....................................................
.2.................
111.247 Letter cnclosing note froin PWG to PAB dated 4 Septembcr 1946
(I.O.R.R/1/2/605)................................................
...........1...........
111.248 Nole from PRPG dated1 October 1946(I.O.R.RI15131605 ........................5.........21
111.249 Letter from PAB to PRPG dated 31 Deccrnber 1946 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/12/3806b) ...................................................
........1.............
111.250 Lctter fiomPRPG to the Secretaryof State for Indiü date18 January
1947(1.O.R.L/P&SI12/3806b)....................................................3................
111.351 Lctter from YABto RQ dated 13February 1947 (1.OR.RI15121605) ............243.....
III.252 Translationof letter date23 February 1947 SrornRQ to PAU(I.O.R.
W 15/605>...................................................
..............................
111.253Translation of letter dated28 March 1947 from RQ to PAB (T.O.R.
W15/605> .....................................................
............251.........................
111.254 Letter froiPAB to PKPG dated 6 April 1947 (I.O.K.KI15121605 ..............2..5..
111.255 Express Lettcr from Secretary of Statefor Cominonwcalth Relations
toPRPC;dated 10November 1947 (F. O71/6 1442.128080) ...............................259
IIT.256 Letter Sron1 PAB to RQ dated 23 Deceinber 1947 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/I213806b) ...................................................
.......265..................
TTT.2571. etterfiom PAB to RB dated 23 Dccember 1947 (m 371168325) .............269......
111.258 Note from PRPG dated 18February 1948 (1.O.R.FU151 1372)..............................273
111.259 Translation of letter dated21 February 1948 from RQ tv PAB and
copy of Arabic original (I.O.RR/1512/431) ..................................................111.260 Lctter frornRB to FOdated 24 June 1948in English andArahic (F.O.
371168325] ..................................................
............2.............
111.261 Letterfrom PRPG to FO dated 14 Juiy 1948(T.O.R.RI15/2/372) ..........................795
111.262 Letter fromFO to PRPGdated6August 1948 (1.O.R.RI15/2/372)................01...3
111.263 Lcttcr from Stobart. Political Officer. Trucial CoastPAB daled 8
April 1949 (I.O.R.R/15/2/889)................................................
.....................3
171.264 1.elter froin PABto PWG dated 19October 1949 (E'. (01./62)..................09...3
111.265 Telegramfrom FO to Tripoli dated22 Octobcr 1949 (F. O71124946) .................313
111.266 Lettcr from PAR loRQ dated 25January 1950 ~IEnglish atidAi-abic
(m 1016/154).............................................
.............3............
111.267 I.etielrom PAQto PABdated 5 March 1950 (-.0.101M1 54).................323..........
111.268 Letter fromPABto PAQ dated20 March 1950 (m 1016/154)................327.........
111.268 Letter from PAB to PRPG dated 23 April1950 (Arabiun Raundarics.
Bahrain.Qatar. 1937.1954.ArchiveEditions. p.64)............................331................
111.270 Letter from PAQ to PAI3 dated 4 March 1953(Avabiun Roun~lclrics.
Bahrain.Qatar. 1937-1954. pp.643-650...........................................................3
111.271 Letter from PAB ta PRPG dated 25 March 1953. (Arabinn
iloundaries.Bahrain.Qalar. 1937-1954.pp .665-666...........................345................
111.272 Lcttcr fromPRPC;to PAB dated 23 April1953 (u 1016i154)................349........
111.273 Telegram fromPRPG toFOdated 25 April 1954 (F. O71/109812) ............3..3.
111.274 Telegrml from PRPG toFO dated2May 1954 (F.O.37111098 12) .............357.......
111.275 Memorandum "Zubarah"dated4 May 1954 (F.O.371/109X 12) ................363.........
111.276 Letter from PWG to KB dated 5 May 1954 in D~iglisliand Arabic
(F.O. 3711109812) ..................................................
.....3...............
111.277 Letterfrom PRPG to FO datcd 8 May 1954 (m 3711109812)
(Transcription).................................................
.........................
111.278 Letter fiom PRPG to PAQ dated 12 May 1954 eilclosingMinute
"Zubaral~"by PAS dated 8 May 1954 (ArubiunBuundaries. Bahrain-
Qatar. 1937.1954.pp.753-755) ..................................................
...............111.279 Translation ofa letter datc14 May 1954from RQ to PRPG and copy
of Arabic original(F.O.10161384) ...........................................383.......................
111.280 Letter from PAB toPWG dated 17June 1954 (F.O. 1OI6/314) .................389........
717.281 Translation of Draft Agreement bctween RB and RQ concerning the
properties belongingto RB and the fmily OC AI Khalifali inZubxd~
consisting of hauses andother immovable property (r;. 10 16/314).............393.....
111.282 Letter from PAB toPRPGdated 18October 1954 (m 10161332) ..............397......
111.284 Letter fromPRPGto RE3dated 10 August 1957 (F.O 3714 26935) ..............409.....
111.285 Lettcr from RB to PRPGdated 8 February 1961 (F.O.37 1156721) ..............413.....
111.286 Letter fromPAQ to PRPGdated 1 0 April 1961 (u 1016/697).................4. 1....
111.287 Letter from PAB to KB dated 29 July 1961 iiiEi-iglishand Arabic
(F. O71/156721) ...................................................
.......2............
111.288 Qatari Law No. 2 of 1980on Antiquities, pubrished inThe Protcc!ion
of'Movable Cultural Yroperiy, Collection qfLegi.slutiveTcxts,Qatar,
UNESCO, 1985 .....................................................
........1...............
Cases
111.289 The "Anna", 1805, 5 C. Robinson, p. 373 [The English Reports,Vol.
CLXV, 1923,p. 8 15)........................................................447.........................
111.290 Delagua Buy (Great Britain/Portugal), 24 July 1875, (Moore, J.B.,
Histary und Digest of the International Arbifrafions fo which the
UnitedStates hasbeeiln Yarly, Vol. IV, 1898pp. 4984-4985) ...................51...
111,291 Secretary of State ji?rZndiu in Council v. ChelikcrniRurrzRno and
othcrs, 39Madras Luw Rq~orts617, Indian Appeals, Vol.XLII, p. 199
(TheLaw Reports,Indian Appeals, Vol.XLlII, 19 5-1916) ......................5.....
111.292 Island of PcrlrnnsCuse {Netherlands/U.S.A.j,Awurd clj'JApril 1928,
United Nalions Reports of International Arhiiral A~~ards, Vol. II>
pp. 831and 855 ..................................................
...............................
111.293 Naomi Russel, in her own right and as Adminisfrulrixand Gt.arciian
(U.S.A.)v, United iMe,vicanSlufes, Decision No. 5, 24 April 1931,
United Nations Reports of lnternutic~naArbitral Award~, 1'E.IV, pp.
805, 806 and 884....................................................
.......63.............111.294 Case concerning the Indo-Pakistan Western Boundcriy (Rann of
Kutch) between India und Pakisian, Award of IY Fehrzi~~ry 1968.
United Nations Reports of Internalional Arbitral Ai.i:nrd.~,L'al WI1.
p. 1,pp.564-566and 568...................................................... ................69....4
III.295 Dubai/'arjah Border, Aivard uJ' 19 October 1981, 9I In/er-natiu~ol
Law Reports, 1993,p. 549,pp. 567,571,576-577and 641 .........................475.
Puhlished Works
111.296 A Collection of First PVorldWarMililury Hundhooks ~f Arnhia 19 13-
1917,Vol. IV, A Handbook of Arahilc,Vcil.1:Geneial, 1916, Archive
Editions, 1488, p.326............................................................
.............
111.297 Al-Ballarna, H.M., The Legal Slulus oj'the Arabian Gz.iffL7tules,
Manchester University Press, U.S.A.:Oceana Publicatioix Ii.ic.1968,
pp. 33, 36 and 249 ............................................................
.......4..7............
111.298 Al-Nabhani,Mohamed Khalifa,Al-Tuhfah al-ÏVul?hanzyc/jT iarikh Al-
Jazira AI-Arabiya, Beirut and Bahrain, 1986,pp. 87-88 (Trarislation
and Arabicversion) .....................................................................493.
111.299 Belgrave,C., PersonalColumn, 1972,Librairic di1Liban, p. 121 ..................499
111.300 The Buraimi Memorials, 1955,Vol. 1,ArchiveEditions, 1987, pp. 26-
27 ..........................................................
.............................. 3....5
111.301 Doornkamp, J.C., et al., Geology, Gsornorpholngyund Pedolo,~ of
Bahraiva,"GeomorphologicalMap of the Hawür Islaiids". Geobooks,
Norwich, 1980.............................................................
................07...5
111.302 E~cyclopaediaUritannica,Articles un "Indian Subcolitiilent,I-Iistory
of the" and "British Empire and Commoi~wealth", pp. 302-306, 398-
399and 409-410 ......................................................
.............................
111.303 Hay, Sir R., The Persian Guy States, Tlie Middlc East Instilule,
WashiilgtonD.C., 1954, pp. 12, 13 and 20 ............................................523
111.304 Jenniiigs, R.Y., The Acquisition uf l'erritory in lnlerncrfional T.aw,
Manchester, 1963, yp. 38-39and74-75 ................................................29.
717.305 Kelly, J.B., Euslern Arubian Frontieus, Faber and Pabcr, Lonclan,
p. 91 ......................................................................................3..............
111.306 Merrills, J.G., international Dispute S'eltlrrnenl, 2nd ed., Grotius,
Cambridge, 1991, p. 99............................................... ........... . 539111.307 Opprnheim !YInternational LLIWS ,ir Robcrt Jeniîitîgs andSir Arthur
Watts (eds.) 9th ed., Vol.I,Longinan, Harlow, 1992, Vol, 1. pp. 183-
184,686-688 and 715........................................................
......4..........
111.308 Persian Gulf Pilot, 1864 (Records of Qatur, Primary Dncuinents
1820- 1960, Vol. 2, Archive Editions, 1941, pp. 29 and 30) .........................51.......5
111.309 Reisman,M.,Nullity and Kevision, YaleUniversity Press, New IIaven
andLondon, 1971,pp.488-489and 494-497.............................................555..........
111.310 Shaw, M., Title to Territory in Afvica: Iniernafional Lcgal l.s.n~e.r,
1986,pp. 20,22-23 and 87.....................................................
...563............
111.311 Simpson, J.L. and Fax, H., fnlernutional Al'biirudion Z,LIIIQM~
Praclice, Steven & SonsLimited,Loiidon,1959,pp. 252-255.............................9
111.312 Tadjbakliçhe,G.R.,La question des îlesBahrein, Paris, Pédcine,1960.
pp. 47-48 ......................................................
..................5..............
111.313 Tuson, P.,The Records of the British Residcncy und Agcncics in the
Persian Gdl; India Office Records, London, 1973,pp. 3,4, 5, 7, 44-
45, 47, 107-108and "Residents md Agents in thc Persian Gulf, 1763-
1947" ......................................................
...................5.9................. LISTOF DOCUMENTARY ANNEXES
(Volume9)
PART TV
IV.1 Reyrcsentation of Debil Shoal and Qit'atJaradah in "Trigonornctrical
Planof the Island and Harbour of Bahrain on lhe Arabian sidc of GiilC
of Persia" by Lieut.s G.B. Brucks and W.E. Rogers, Hon. East Ti~dia
Marine Service, 1825 .......................................................
......................
IV.2 East India Company's SailingDirectioiis,5th ed., 1841, pp. 424-1137......................
IV.3 1,eiterfiom Secretaryto Governmentof Bombay to Loinmander Felix
Jones, Resident in the Pcrsian Gulf dated 8 July 1857 (1.0.R.
R/15/1/172)(Transcription).....................................................
..................
Letter from Colonel A.B. Kemball, Resident in 'l'url<ishArabia datcd
IV.4
15 June 1863 [Saldanha, J.A., The Persiun Gulf Pricis, Précis of
Bahrein Affairs, 2854-1904, Vol. IV, Chaptcr XLTV, Archivc
Editions, 1986,p. 110)....................................................
.......1...........
IV.5 Ottoman rnap of Qatar and its borders with Bahraiil dated 27 Junc
1867, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the Statc of Qalar (Translation
and Arabic version) .......................................................
.......................
1V.G Ottoman inap dated September 1867,Archives of the Diwan Amiri ol'
the State of Qatar (Translationand Arabic version) ................................2............
IV.7 Ottoman map showiiig borders of' Bahrain datcd October 1867,
Archives of thc Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar {Translalicinand
Arabic version) ...................................................
................................
IV.8 Ottoman rnap datedNovenlber 1867,Archivcs ofthe DiwaiiAmiri of
thc State ofQatar (TratislationruidArabicvcrsion) ...............................3.3..............
IV.9 Letter from Mohainined Quli Abdu to thc Vali in Hüssa datecl
Novcmber 1867, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of tlie Stale of Qatar
(Translation and Arabic version) ..................................................3.9................
IV.10 Report and map from Bash Jawish,Viçe-Coinmandcr of the S~iltaiiic
Marine Fleet to Hafidh Basha, govenlor of Basrah, Archives of tlie
Diwan Amiri ofthe State of Qatar (Translationand Arabic version)......................4
IV.11 L,etterfroin Barakah Bin Era'ar,Kulcr 01-Hassa, and iiicornplcternap
or the borders of Qatar dated 26 Fcbruary 1870, Archivcs of the
Diwan Amiri of thc Stateof Qatar (Translation andArabiç version) ................49......IV.12 Lctter from Zayed BinKhalifah to Medhat Basliüdüted 17Nnvember
1871,Ar~hivesof the Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translation
and Arabic version)......................................................
.....................
IV.13 Letter from Bash Jawish, Vice-Coinmander of the Sultaiiic Marine
Fleet to Hat'idhBasha, thc governor of the province of Basrah clated 5
October 1870, Archives of the Diwan Amiri of the Statc of Qatar
('Translationand Arabic version) ....................................................
..7................5
Ottoinan inap datcd 10October 1874,Archives of the Uiwa1.iAnliri of
the State of Qatar (Translationand Arabic version) ...................................3............6
Letter from Zayed Bin Khalifah to Rarakah Bin Era'ar, Vüli of Hassa
dated 23 December 1874,Archives ofthe Diwan Amiri of the State of
Qatar (Translationand Arabicversion) .......... ....................................7.............
The Persiulz Gulf' Pilo 1870-1932, 3rd ed., 1890, Archive Lditions,
1989,p. 130........................................................
............................
Ottoman map of the borders of Qatar, islands and seas dated May
1898, Archives ofthe Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar (Translatioii
and Arabicversion) .......................................................
.......................
Representation of Dibal and Qit'atJaradah in "Persian Gulf - Ralli-ein
to Ras Rakkin" surveyed under the direction of Corninander T.H.
Heming, R.N., in charge ofthe Marine Survey of India. 1O01-1302 .................
Letter from Governrnent ofIndia toSecretary of State for India dated
10March 1904(I.O.R.R/15/2/3) ....................................................5....
......
Letter from IOto FO dated 30 June 1904and annex; Opinion of HMG
LawOfficersdatcd 1I February 1905 (1.0.R.R/15/2/3)......................................9
Report by David Hood supplementary to that of a Cornmittee of
Enquiry on the Lightiiig and Buoyage of the Persian (iull'dated 1909
(I.O.R. L/P&S/10/168).........................................................
.......7.......
Sketch of Fasht ad Dibal dated 1909 (Appendix of Kcport by David
1-Iood)(I.O.R. LIP&SIl OIl681.......................................................0...................
Translation of a lctter from RB to PAB dated 30 March 1909 (1.0.R.
RI15/2/25)(Transcription) .......................................................
..7.............
1,etter from FO to Board of Trade dated 4 May 1910 and eiiclosures
(1.O.R.R/15/2/3).........................................................
...........1...........Lettcr from FO to IO dated 13 May 1938(I.O.R. RI151116 16) ........................209
Lettcr frorn PRPG to Secretary to the Govcrnment of Iiidia daled 16
May 1938 (I.O.R.R/1511/616).....................................................................
3.....
Letter from PRPGto IO dated 1I Octoher 1938 (m 37 1/2183) ....................2.19
Lctter from IO to Admiralty dated 26 Octnber 1938 (I.O.R.
K/15/1/616) ..............................................................
...................3............
Exprcss Letler from PWG to Secretary of State Ior India dalecl
10November 1938(I.O.R.W15121548) .................................................229
Lctter fromIO to FOdated 30 November 1938 (F.O. 37112183) .......................35..2
Minutes by (illegible) and Beckett datcd 7 Deceniber 1938 ("
371/2183) (Transcription) ..................................................................239
Letter from FO to IO dated 20 Decernber 1938 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/12/3907)............................................................................ .,.,245
Notice of Regulationentitled "Bahrein PearlFisherics Regulation" by
PKPG,undated (I.O.R.R/15/1/616) ....................................................2.5........
Letter from FO to Sir K. Bullard dated 16 Januai-y 1939 (1.O.R.
R/15/2/548) .................................................................................255
Enclosure to Sir R. Rullard'sdespatchNo. 40 of 2 Marc11 1939 (-0_
371123 184) ...................................................................,...,.,........259
BAPCO Additioiiül Area Progress Report No 4 dated 26 Septenibcr
1939(I.O.R. R/1512/439)...................................................................
.............
BAPCO AdditionalAreaProgress Report No 5 dated 22 January 1940
(I.O.R. R/15/2/439).................................................................
......................
Letter from Belgrave to PAB dated 27 January 1940 (I.O.K.
W15/2/439)...................................................................
.................2..............
Lctter froin PCL to IO dated 26 February 1940 (I.O.K.
L/P&S/12/3895)................................................................
........................
Draft Express lelter from Secrctaryof State to PWG dated 12 March
1940(I.O.R. Ri1 5/2/5471................................................................
............. Letter from Belgrave to Abdul Razag Sayed Rizoogi dated 19 Marc11
1940, Archives of tlie Diwan Amiri of the State of Qatar (Ti-aiislatiori
and Arabic version)......................................................
.................
Express Letter frorn PAB to PRPG dated 26 Marc111940 (I.O.K.
R/15/2/547) ......................................................
.............................
BAPCO Additional Area Progress Report No 6 dated 21 April 1940
(I.O.R.R/1512/439).......................................................
..................
Letter fiom IO to Admiralty dated 6 J~ine1940(A.D.M. 116/41 66)...............305.....
'Telcgr,un from PRPGto Secretaryof State L'oIrndia drited7 June 1940
(I.O.K.Ri15121547)......................................................
.........3.......
Dced of Furlher Modification datcd June 19, 1940 madc bctween the
Bahrcin Pelroleurn Colnpany and the Ruler of Bahrain wherehy the
MiningLease is extended to coveral1"the Shaikh'sprcscnt aiîdSuture
Dominions" kiiow~ias the "AdditionalArea" (F.O. 3711 1U9915) .................3..2...
TV.65 Letter from PABto PRPGdated 20 July 1940(I.O.R. RI15/2/5471 ...............319......
IV.66 Letter from Belgrave to Abdul Razag Mahmood Rizoogi datcd
11Septembcr 1940,Archives ofthe DiwanAmiri of'the State of Qatar
(Translation and Arabiçversion) .................................................3..3.
..........
Letter from Saleh bin Sulaiman Al-Mala to Sheikh Shalibboot bill
Sultan, Ruler of Abu Dhabi dated 23 April 1941, Archives of the
Diwan Amiriof the Statc of Qatar (Translation andArabic vei-sion)...............327....
Letter from Belgrave to PAB dated 18August 1941 (I.O.K,
RJ15121439) ........................................................
..............................
Letter fromPWG to 10 dated 18October 1941 (1.O.R.R/1 5/2/439)...............335...
Letter from YKYG to 10 dated 26 October 1941 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/12/3895) ...................................................
.............339.............
Telegram from Sccretary cif State for Indiri to PRPG dated
12Decernber 1941(I.U.R.RI15/2/439)..................................................345..............
No, 4829 - Treaty betwecn Ilis Majesty in respect of the IJnited
Kingdom and the President of the United States of Vcnezuela relatiag
to the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria. Signcd al Caracas.
February 26th, 1942 (League of Nufions Trenty Series, Vol. 205.
pp. 122, 124and 126)........................................................
..................Letter from Pelroleuin Development (Qatar) Limitcd to PAR dated
30 September 1944(I.O.R.W15121864. )..........................................................3
Letter froin PABto Petroleum Development (Qatar)Limited dated 1
October 1944(I.O.R.R/15/2/864) .................................................59.....
....
Proclamation No 2667. Policy of the llnited Stales with rcspcctto the
nahiral resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental sllelf
dated28 Septeinber 1945 .....................................................
..6...............
Letter from BAPCO to PAB and accompanying maps dated 13 May
1946(T.O.R.RI15/2/430)......................................................
.................
Copy ol' letter dated 13 May 1946 from thc Chief Local
Representative.BAPCOto PAB (F.O. 371152254) ...............................373...............
Express Letter from PAB to PRPG dated 23 May 1946 (m
371152254) .......................................................
.............377......................
Letter from Belgraveto PAB dated 18Junc 1946(1.O.R.R/15/2/43 0)................1..38
Letter from IO to Ministry of Fueland Power dated 2 July 1946 (F.O.
371152254) ........................................................
..............5.................
Letter from Packerto PCL dated3 July 1946 (]F.O.371152254) ....................89.....
Letterfrom Belgraveto PAB dated 10 July 1946(T.O.R.W15/2/430) ............393...
Translation of letter dated 13 July 1946 from RQ to PAU (I.O.R.
W15/2/430) .......................................................
.............97.............
Letter froin Starling IIouse to 10 daled 16 July 1946 (1.O.R.
L/P&S/12/3806b)......................................................
.....................
Letter froin Ministry of Fuel and Power to IO dated 17 July 1946
(I.O.R.L/P&S/1213806b) ......................................................
4.5..............
Letter from Belgraveto PAB datcd22 .u1y 1946 (I.O.R. RI15/2/4301 ............411....
Memorandum dated 25 July 1946 by Under Secretary of Statc for
Jndia (1.O.R.LIP&S112/3806b. ).................................................
....................4
Letter from Secretaryof Statefor lndia to PRPG dated 3 August 1946
(1.O.R.LIP&Si1213 806b) ........................................ 419
Lelter froin Belgrave to PAB dated 20 October 1946 (I.O.R.
RI15121430) ......................................................
..............2.........IV.90 "Belgrave"SketchMap dated 20 October 1946 (F.C)371/21823)...................27..4
IV.91 Lettcr fiom PRPG to PAB dated 2 Dcccmher 1946 (I.O.R.
W15/2/430)..................................................
.................1.......4
IV.92 Lelter froin PAB to PRPG dated 31 Deceinber 1946 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/I213806b) ..................................................
.....................
IV.93 Letter from PWG to Secretary of State for Indiadatcd 18 January
1947(I.O.R.L/Y&S/12/3806b) .............................................
..........................
IV.94 Letter frolnIOto FO daled 13February 1947 (F.O. 371/6144 1).................459........
TV.95 Minute datcd 12March 1947by Beckett (F.O.371/61441) and Miiiutc
..........................
dated 29 March 1947 by Evans (F.O.371161441)(Transcriptioii) 465
IV.96 Minutes of meeting lield at Forcign Offiçon 31 March 1947 (m
371/61441) ..................................................
.............................
IV.97 Letter froin Adniiraltyto IO dated 19May 1947 (F.0.371161441) ................79.....
1V.98 Minute dated 30 May 1947by Pyman (F.O. 371/G1441) .........................83............
IV.99 Letter from 10 toFO dated 6June 1947 (F. O71/61441).......................487...........
IV 100 Minutes dated 30 June 1947 by Pymaii and 22 July 1947 by Evans
(m 371/61441) ..................................................
..................... LIST OFDOCUMENTARYANNEXES
(Volume 10)
&
PART IV
IV.101 Letterf'romFO to IO dated28July 1947(1.O.K.L/P&S/1213806b) ......................
IV.102 Letter from BAPCOto PAI3datcd 3 August 1 947 (1.O.R.RI15/2/430) ...................
IV.103 Letter from PAB to BAPCO dated 12 August 1947 (I.O.K.
RJ15/2/430) ..............................................
...............................
TV.104 Letter from Commonwealth Relatioiis Office to Foreign Officc dated
28 A~igust1947 a 371161442) ..................................................
..............
TV.105 Minute dated 24 Septeinber 1947 by Eva~is (I:. 37. /61442)
(Transcription) ...............................................
......................2.
IV.106 Letter from FO to Cominonwealth Relations Office datcd 6 Octoher
1947 (I.O.R.L/P&S/12/3906b) ................................................2...
.............
IV.107 Mernorandun addressed to Under Secretary of Statefor India dateci7
Novernber 1947(I.O.R. L/P&S/l2/3 806b) .....................................................
1V.108 Express Letter from Secretary of State for Coilîmonwealth Relations
to PKPGdated 10Novembcr 1947 (F(- 371/61 442)
.............................35................
1V.109 Lcttcr from Eastern Departmcnt, Foreign Office 10 British Embassy,
Washington datcd21Novcmber 1947 (F.O.371161442). ..................................
IV.110 Abstract of Minutes dated 26 Noveinber 1947by G.G. Arthur, Legal
Adviserto FO (m 371161442)(Transcription)..................................47...................
IV.111 'I'clegram from PRPG to Cornmonwcalth RelationsOflice dated 29
November 1947(I.O.R.L/P&S/12/3806b) .......................................51...................
IV.112 Letter from Ministry of Fuel andPower to F0 dated 5 Dcccinber 1947
(F.O.371/161442) ....................................................
.......................
IV.113 Telegram liom Commonwealth Relations Office to PAB datcd 11
December 1947 371161442) ..............................................
.........................
IV.114 Aide-MCmoire fiom British Ernbassy in Wnshiilgton datcd 12
December 1947 (F.O. 371161442) ...........................................
..5.6.......................IV.115 Letter from PAB to RQ dated 23 Dccember 1947 (I.O.R.
L/P&S/12!3806b) ................................................ .......... ..... 71
IV.116 Letter from PAB to RB dated 23 Deccmber 1947 (m 37 1/68325) ...................75...
IV.117 Letter from PAB to PRPG dated 28 Decernbcr 1947 (I.O.K.
w 15/2/888) ........................................................................,.....79
IV.118 Translaliun of letter dated 31 December 1947 froin RB to PA13 and
copy of original (1.O.R.Ri15/2/431) ...................................................83
IV.119 TeIegrani from PKPG to Commonwealth Relations Office düted 3
January 1948 (F.O. 371!68325)..........................................................
.39..........
IV.120 Lettcr from PAB to RQ dated 4 Februasy 1948in English and Arabic
(I.O.R. R/1512!43 1)......................................................................93,.
IV.121 Translation of letter dated 21 February 1948froin KQ to PAR (I.O.K.
R/15/2/431)(Translation and Arabic version) ..........................................97
IV.122 Letter from PRPG to Secrctaryoc State for Commonwealth Relations
dated 21 February 1948 (F.O 371168325).......................................................1
IV.123 Letter from Iraq Petroleum Company Ltd.,London to Comnionwealtl~
Relations Office dated 19 March 1948 (F.O . 71168325) ............................107
IV.124 Letter from Admirally to FOdated 5 October 1948(A.D.M. 1/21519) ................1
IV.125 Alteration of Boundaries, The Bahamas Order in Clouncil, 1948,
No. 2574 made on 26th November, 1948(The Stalulo~y Rulcs and
Orders and Statutor Inys~rurnentsRevised to Decemher 31, 1.948,
Vol. III, His Majcsty'sStationeryOffice, London, 1950, pp. 27-28) .................115
IV.126 The Jamaica (Alteralion of Boundaries) Order in Council, 1948,
No. 2575 made on 26th November, 1948 (The Statuto ry les und
Clrders und ,Ytututvry Instruments Reviived 10 DecemBer 31, 1948,
Vol. XI, His Majesty'sStationeryOffice, Londcin: 195 1, pp. 1 11-1 12)...............19
lV.127 Boggs-Kennedy "Joint report regardiiig an urderly and cquiiable
longitudinal line and lateral jurisdictional lines iii tlie Persian Ciuli",
issucd on 16 Deceinber 1948(F.O. 371/45000) ......................................123
IV.128 Abstract from the Admiiiistration Report of the Rahraiil Agcncy
including the Tnicial Coast and Qatar for the year 1948 (f;.C)'
371/2498).............................................................
...................1.............
IV.129 Minutes datcd 4 and 6 Mürçh 1949by Guttcridge and Rogers (m
371/68344)(Transcriptioii) ..........................................................,.159IV.130 1,etterfrom PAB to BAPCOdated 30 April 1949(F,O. 101 6113) ...................165....
IV.131 Letter from PAB to RQ dated 30 April 1949 in Eiiglisli anci Arabic
(F 1016!13) ..................,........................................................1..9.............
IV.132 Draft of letter froin PABto RBdated 30April 1949 (F 0.71168344) .............. 173
IV.133 Letter from PAB to RB daled 30 April 1949in Eiiglisli and Arabic
(I.O.R.RI15/2/431)..........................................................................179
IV. 134 Letter from KB to PAR dated 23 May 1949 iilEng1isl.iand Arabic
(I.O.R.R/15/2/431 orF.O. 1016!13)....................................................................
IV.135 Royal Pronouncement concerning the policy of the Kingdom of Saiidi
Arabia with respect to lhe subsoil and sea bed of arcas in the Persian
Gulf contiguous to the coasts of the Kingdom of Saiidi Arabia, 28
May 1949. Trailslationfrom Arabic lext published in "Uinm El Qurri"
(Mccca), Supplenient No. 1263, 29 May 1949; Americun Journal of'
Internationcrl Law,Vol. 43 (1949), Suppleinent, p. 22..................................
IV.136 Letter from PAB to PWG datcd 30 May 1949 (I;. 1016/13) ......................193
IV.137 Minutesdated 1June 1949by Evans aiidBeckett (m 370/74997) ..................197
IV.138 Government of Bahrain ProclamationNo. 37/1368,5 Jui-ie1949 (m
371/91321)(Translation and Arabic version)..... ......................................203
IV.139 Proclamation or QaFar, 8 June 1949(Translatioiiaiid Arabicvei-sioil) ...............207
IV.140 (i) Abu Dhabi, Proclamation with respect tothe seabcd ancitliesubsoil
of the high seas of the PersianGulf, 10Julie 1949 ....................................211
IV.141 (ii)Ajman, Proclamation with respect to the scabed andthe subsoil of
the high seas of the Pcrsian GulS,20 June 1949 .......................................215
IV.142 (iv) Dubai, Proclamation witl~respect to thc scabed aiid the subsoil of
the liigliseas of the Persian GulC, 14June 1949 .....................................,.2 19
TV.143 (v) Kuwait, Proclamation with respectto the seabcd aiid the subsoil of
thc high seas of the Persian Gulf, 12 June 1949....... ....................................223
IV.144 (vii) Kas al Khaimah, Proclamation with respect to the scabcd and the
subsoil of thc high seas of the PersianGulf, 17June 1949 ......................................227
IV.145 (viii) Sharjah, Proclamationwith respect to the seabed alid the subsoil
of the high seasofthe PersianGulf, 1 G June 1949 ....................................231IV.146 (ix)Umm al Qaiwan.Proclamationwith respect to the seahed and tlîe
subsoil ofthehigh seasofthe Persian Gulf.20 June 1949 ...........................7......2
TV.147 Minutes by Evans. Beckett and others dated 23 Jui~e-14July 1949
(F.O. 371/74998)(Trünscription)............. ....................................4.............2
IV.148 Letter from FO lo Admiralty dated21 July 1949 (F.O. 371174997) ..............247......
IV.149 Lettcr fiomAdmiraltyto FO dateci7 October 1949 (m 371145000) ............2.51.
IV 150 Letter fromPWG to FO dated 19November 1949 (m 3 71175009) ............255.....
IV 151 Letter from RB 10 PA3 dated 21Noveinber 1949 (F 1O 16/13)................259.......
IV.152 Record of a meeting hcld at the Foreign Officeon 21Novcmber 1949
(F.O. 371175001) .....................................................
.......2.............
IV.153 Record of discussion between M . Wright and membcrs 01'tl-iStatc
Department. 22 Noveinber 1949 (m 371/74976)....................................9........2
IV.154 Note Verbalefrom British Embassy. Jedda to SaudiArabian Ministry
of Foreign Affairson 8Deccmber 1949 (F.O.371/7500 1).......................2...7......
IV.155 Letter from Admiralty to FO dated 19 Decemher 1949 (F.O.
371175002) ......................................................
.............8...............
1V.156 Letterfrom Adrniraltyto FO datedJanuary 1950 (F.O.371182089)................287...
IV.157 Letter from PAB to RB dated 2 January 1950 inEnglish and Arabic
(I.O.R.R/15/2/891) .....................................................
.....2..............
IV 158 Translation of letter dated 6 January 19.50SrornRB to PAR (I.O.R.
R/15/2/891)....................................................
..............2.............
IV .159 Mernorandun from PRPG to FO dated 13January 1950 (m
371182036) ......................................................
...........2....................
TV.160 Letterfrom !?Oto PKPG dated 27 January 1950 (F.O 371182089) ...............303
TV.161 Letter from Belgrave to PAB dated 14 Februüry 1950 (I.O.R.
R/15/2/891)....................................................
.................7........
IV .162 Letter from British Embassy. Jedda. to FO dated 21 February 1950
(F.O. 371182089).....................................................
........3.............
IV .163 Letterfrom PRPG to FO dated7 March 1950 (m 37 1/82089).....................17...3IV.164 Minute dated 21 March 1950 by Jones (F 0.71/82083)
(Transcription).............................................
.......................3..
TV 165 1.etter fi-omFOto Admiraltydated 30 March 1950 371182083)....................
IV.166 Letter from British Residei~cyto FO datcd 16 May 1950 (m
371182090)...............................................
.............................3
IV.167 Minutes ofMeeting held at Foreign Officedated 23May 1950 (F.O.
371182090)...............................................................
.3.......................
IV 168 LcttcrfrornPAB to FO dated23 lune 1950 a 371182036) ..................341..........
TV.169 Lelter [romFOto PABdatcd 5 July 1950 (F.O.371/82090) ....................345...........
IV 170 Abstract of Minute dated 11 JuIy 1950 by Evaiis (F.O. 371/8209 1);
Minutedated 1.1July 1950by Beckett (F 0.71182091 .......................349............
.
IV 171 Letter fro~nBelgraveto PABdated 24 July 1950(I.O.K.K/1 5/2/891)...........3.57....
IV 172 Copyof' Aide Mémoirefrom HMG to Sa~idi Arabia Govcrnmenl dated
17 Augusl 1950 (F.O.371182037)...............................................
...................3
IV.173 Letter from FO 10 PAB dated 29 August 1950 (' 371/82090)
(Transcription)..............................................
.......................3.
IV 174 Letter from FO to Admiralty dated30August 1950 (F.O.371/8209 1)...........371.....
IV 175 Letter from FO to PABdatcd 30 August 1950 (F. 3O71/82092)................375........
IV.176 Interna!BAPCO Reportdatcd 10 Seplember 1950(I.O.K.W15121433 )................379
IV 177 Letter from PABto FOdated 11 September 1950 (m 371/82092).............385......
IV 178 Letterfrom Admiraltyto FOdated 19October 1450 (F. O71/82092) ..........389....
IV.179 Letter fro~nFO to Central Mining and IizveslinentCompany datcd 8
Noveinber 1950 (P. 371.182086)...........................................393...........................
IV.180 Letter fi-01F1Oto BAPCO datcd 8 November 1950 (F.O.371/82086) ..........397.....
IV.1 SI Letier l'rom Adinirrilty to FO dated 29 Noveluber 1950 (u
371182036) ..............................................
...........................4
IV .182 Lctterfrorn FU toPRPC;dated 20 December 1950 (F.O 371182086) .............0..
IV.183 Minutc datcd 2 January 1951 by Cranston (u 371/82086)
(Transcription..................................................
........4............1V 184 Report by CommandingOfficer. H.M.S. Owcn. dated 8 Janiiary 1951
(F.O. 371/91320)................................................
............9..........
IV 185 Map entitled Structuralvicw of.FcishtAd Dibal & Jaradah S11oüdlated
8 January 1951 (F.O. 371191320].............................................423
.......................
IV.186 Letter frorn PoliticaResideilt.Baixain toFO dated IO büiiuary195 1
(F.O. 371191320).................................................
......................
IV 187 Note fiom Admiralty 10FO datcd 24 Jmuary 19.51(F. 371.191320)............431.....
TV.188 Minutc dated 12 February 1951 by Evans (F.O 371191320)
(Transcription)...................................................
.........35...............
IV.189 Record of Meeting held al Foreign Office on 27 Fcbruary 1351 (m
371/91320) ..................................................
.............4.1.............
TV.190 Letter from Belgrave to PAB daled 21 March 1951 with enclosures
(F.O. 1016171)....................................................
..........................
IV 191 Lctter froin FO tuPWG dated 3 April 195 1 (F 371/82037) ..................465.........
IV.192 Lctter froin PRPGta FO dated 12May 195 1(F.0. 371191284) .................469.........
IV.193 Lcttcr from PAB to RB dated 14 May 1951 in Englisli arid Arübic
(u 1016/46).....................................................
.......473.......................
lV.194 Minute dated 21 May 1951 by Lranslon ( 371191284)
(Transcription)................................................
.......................
IV.295 Letter from FO 10PABdated28 August 1951 (F.O 1016/71) ..................483..........
IV 196 Lcttcr froni PAB to RB dated 17 September 1951 in Ciiglish aiid
Arabic (F. O016171)..................................................
...4.1...............
IV.197 Letter buin RB to PAB dated 22 Septcmber 1951in Englisliand
Arabic (F.O. 1016/78)................................................
.....4.................
IV.198 Letter from PAB to RB dated 18 Nuvember 195 1 in Eiiglishand
Arabic (F.O. 1016/71j................................................
.....5.1...............
IV .199 Letter from FO to PRPG ddted23 November 1951 (f;. o016/46)..............507....... LIST OF DOCUMENTARY ANNEXES
{Voluine 11)
&
PART IV
lV.200 Letter [rom RB to PAB dated 8 December 1951 in Englisli and Arabic
(F 1016171)....................................................
...............1............
IV.20 1 Letter frcim PRPG to FO dated 13 Decembcr 1951 (F.O 1016/46) ......................5
IV.202 Chart by 1-IM Surveying ships "Owen and Dalrymple", 1950aiid 1951...............9.
IV.203 TheNorth Jarim Area - The Sheikh of Bahrain's Claim to thc Sea-bed
and Subsoil, Opinion dated 21 January 1952 by WaIdock (-o
371J98411) ........................................................
.............3....................
IV.204 Letter from FO to Shell Petroleum Company Limited ciated 2
Septcmber 1952 (F 3371198433 )................................................
....................
lV.205 Minute dated 26 February 1953 by Rose (m 37 1/104319) ........................1..
TV.206 The Sea-bed Boundary bctween Rahrain and Saudi Arabia, Opinion
dated 16 February 1954by Waldock (m 3711109844) .............................7..........6
IV.207 Minute "Fasht bu Sa'ala" dated 17 February 1954 by Ewart-Biggs
(F.O. 371/109844) ...............................................................149
IV.208 Mcmorandum of Baluain's Equitable Clüiin to the Sea-bed of tlie
North Jariin Area and Legal Titlc to the Raina Islands, Opinion dated
17 September 1954 by Waldock (F.O. 371/109845) ..............................153
IV.209 Minutes dated 15 November 1955 by T.R.D. Bclgrave, (F.O.
371/114722) (Traiiscriptian.....................................................1.9.
IV.210 Letter CroinPolitical Resident, Bahrain to Eastern Departmei~t, dated
20 Marc111956 (F.O.371/120652).................................................207....
IV.211 Minute dated 21 April 1956 by Ewart-Biggs and mi~iutc dated 24
April 1956by Grundoil (F.O. 371/120652) (Transcription) ......................211..
IV.212 Lettcr from FO to Political Residency Persian Gulf datcd 14 May
1956 (F.O. 3711120652) ..................................................
.......9.............
IV.213 Letter from YRPGto FO dated 15Octobcr 1957 (F. O7. /126849) .........,......3
IV.214 Letter fromPWG toFO dated 8 Novembcr 1957 (F 371 /126849) ..............27...1V.215 30. Saudi Arabia (b) DecreeNo. 33Defining the TerritoriaIWaters of
the Kingdom of 16 February 1958 (repealing DecreeNo. 61415131 71
of 28 May 1949)Supplementto Lnws and Kegulutiorzs on the Heglme
ufthe High S'eus and LawsConcerning lhclNalionality qf Ship.~,Vols.
1 and II, United Nations,Ncw York, 1959(ST/LEti/SER.R/8, pp. 29-
30) .......................................... ...................................231......
IV.216 Rahrain-Saudi Arabia Coi~tinentalShelf Bounclai-y of 26 Fcbruary
1958, Iuternational Boundary Stualy,Serie s, 1,inaif.iin tlzei5'CIS,
Continental Shelf BoundaryRalwain-SaudiArabia, No. 12, March 10,
1970,Departmentof Statc, USA ......................................................235.........
1V.217 22. Traq, Republican Ordinance No 435 of 15 Noveinber 1958,
Nutional Legislation and Treaties Relating to the TerrifurinlSen, the
Contiguous Zone, the ContinentalSheZtthe High Seus and tn bïshing
and Con.servatior? cf'lhe LivinX gesourcesr,J'lheSeo, Unitcd Natioiis,
Ncw York, 1970(ST/LEG/SGR.B/lS,p. 89) ..........................................5............
IV.218 Memorandum on offshorc areas in the Western Persian Gulf datcd
1958 (F 371/132510)........................................................
...............
IV.219 9. Iran. Act of 12April 1959 Ame~idingthe Actof 153uly 1934on the
Territorial Waters and the Contiguous Zone of Iran, Nutionul
Legislation and Treutie.~Relating to the LUWoJ' the Sen, United
Nations,New York, 1974(ST/LEG/SER.B/lG,p. 10) ..............................269
IV.220 Report compiled by Commanderof H.M.S.Loch Fada dated 14April
1959 (F.O. 371/140194)........................................................
.......73.2....
IV.221 Minutes dated 27 May 1959-14 July 1959 by Ms. Gulteridge (F.O.
37111 40194)(Transcription) .........................................................277
IV.222 Letterfrom PRPG to I;O dated20 August 1959 (1;. 3711 1401 94) ................297
IV.223 Letter from Hydrographie Departmelit, Admiralty to FO dated 35
August 1959 371/140194).........................................................0.
........3
IV.224 Minutes datcd 22 Scptember 1959 - 2 October 1959 Iiy Gutteridge
(F. 37 1/140194)('Transcriptiu~l ).................................................305
IV.225 Letter fromFO toPKPGdated 7October 1959 (F.O. 371/ 140194) .................315
IV.226 Note from Walmslcy, FO to Ford, Bahrain dated 25 Marc111960
(ArabianBou~daries,Vol.30, 1960, pp. 748-7491 ...............,,.............. .321
IV.227 Minutes "Bahrain Sea-bcd Claims" by Wiltshiredated 13 April 1960
(Arabian Bou~zduricsV , ol. 30, 1960,pp. 759-760) .................................325.............IV.228 Letter from F0 to Political Residency Ycrsiaii Gulf dated 17 May
1960(AuabianBounduries,Vol. 30, pp. 754-756) .....................................29..........
IV.229 Extract from Minute dated 21 Jtily 1960 hy Gutteridgc (rlr~lbic~n
Uoundarie.~, 1960, p. 779) ...................................................,,,,,....335
IV.230 Lettcr from FO to PRPG dated 3 August 1960 (AunOinn flotinduries,
Vol. 30, 1960,p. 780) ....................................................................... 339
1V.231 Letter [rom PRPG to FO datcd 17 December 1960 c~iclosiiigdraft
letler l'romPRPG to RB (,4rahian Ruundaries, Vol. 30, 1960, pp. 63-
TV.232 Letter from RB to PRPG dated 23 January 1961 in Lnglislî and Arabic
(' 11061697)......................... .... .... ..................,..,.... .....,,...349
IV.233 Letter from RBto PRPG dated 16 August 1961 (m 10 161697). ........... .......353
IV.234 Lcttcr from PAQ to PRPG dated 30 Deceluber 1961 ('
3711162824) ..........................................................................37...............
IV.235 Letter from PRPG to Political Agency, Bahraiil dated 13Sanuary 1962
(F 371/162824).........................................................
..............1......
IV.236 Letter from Given, FO, to Political Residency Pcrsian Gulf dated
24 January 1962 (F.O. 371/162824) ...................................... .........365
IV.237 Lctter from FOio PRPG dated 24 January 1962 (F.0. 37 11162824) ................369
IV.238 Letter from RB to PRPG dated 18 Fcbruary 1962 (F. O71/162824) ..............373
IV.239 Memoranduin "The 1947 Award: Qatar-Bahrain Seübed Doundary"
dated 2 March 1962by Walmsley,FO (F.O. 3711162824) ..........................377
IV.240 Minute "Ephemerül" dated 26 April 1962 hy Vüllat {FJJ
371/162624); Minute dated 9 May 1962by Sinclair (F.C) 371 1162824)...... .......381
IV.24 1 Memorandum "1947 B&ain/Qatar Seabcd Award" dated 17 May
1962by Walmsley {F. O 711162824) ...............................................387
IV.242 Memorandum "Ral~raidQatar Seabed Boundary" by Wülmsley dated
17May 1962 (m 3711162824).........................................................
.1.........3
TV.243 Mernorandum dated 21 May 1962 by Crawford (m 3711162824)
(Transcription) ............................. . . . . . . ,. .. . ....... 399
IV.244 Minute dated 22 June 1962 by Sinclair (m 371/162824) ...........................405IV.245 Letter fiom FOto Trower. StiIland Keeling dated 5 Junc 1962 (m
371/162824) ..........................................................
..............4.11
IV.246 Letter from PAQ to Brown. Political Rcsidency Pessian Giilf datcd
2July 1962(ArabianBoundarie.~p .. 567 ..........................................4...............
IV.247 Record of Conversation about tlieBahrainiQatar seabcdon Augi~st 2:
1962dated 3 August 1962 (F.O 371/162824) ......................................4..9..........
IV.248 Opinion of Sir Lionel Hcald dated 4 July 1963 transmit~ed to FO
(ArabinnBnundurias. 1963. Vol . 1.pp .484-496) ..................................4..5..........
IV.249 Letter from Trower. StiIl and Keelingto );O daled 15 Novernber 1963
(ArahianBaundaries.1963.Vol . 1.pp .20-521)......................................4..1...... LIST OF DOCUMENTARY ANNEXES
(Volume 12)
PaRe
PARTIV
IV.250 Letter frornTrowcr, Stilland Keelingto FO dated2 Mürcli 1964 ...................1..........
IV.251 Letter from Trower, Still and Keelingto F0 datcdIOMascl-i1964 ..................5.......
1V.252 Letter fromRB toFO dated 27July 1964 (F.C 37./174526) .......................9.............
IV.253 Letter fromPAQto FQdated 31 August 1964 (F.O.3711174526)......................3..1
IV.254 Mcmorandum of 1961from the Government of Bahrain tothe British
Government presentedto Qatar in September 1964 (F.O. 10141697)................17.....
1V.255 Noie Verbale and Memorandum from State of Qatar iil reply to the
1964 Memorandum of the Governrnent of Bahrain cor-icerriingthe
undersea boundarybctweenthe two Statesdatcd 2 1April 1965...................51
IV.256 Letter from Lyne,CommanderMarineCraft, dated 29 December 1965 ...........61......
IV.257 27. Kuwait, Decree of 17 December 1967 regarding the delimitation
of the breadth of the territorial sea of the State oc KuwaiNatinnul
Legislution and Treuliss Relating to the TerrilnriaJ Sca, the
ContiguousZone, ~heContinentalSheK theIligh Sem und foFishing
and Conservation of the LivingResourcesof the Seu,United Nations,
New York, 1970 (STlLEG/SER.B/15, p.96) ....................................................6
IV.258 Iran-Saudi Arabia: Agreement Concerning Sovereigi-rlyover Al-
'Arabiyah and Farsi Islands aiid Delimitation of Roundary Linc
Separating Submarine Areas between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and Iran, signed at Teheran, October 24, 1968, eniered iiito forcc,
January 29, 1969, InlernationaELegal Materials, Vol. VIII. No. 3,
May 1969,pp. 493-496 .................................................
.....7................
IV.259 Contiriental Shelf Boundary, Abu Dhabi-Qatar, Inler~~cilionul
Boundury,S'ludyS,eriesA, Limifs in thS'eus,No. 18,U.S. Departinent
of State, Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Iiltelligciice and
Research, 20Mar& 1969 ......................................................77 ..................
IV.260 Agreement delimiting the continental shelf concluded by Qatar wilh
Iran signed20 September 1969,Internationul Boundury ,Sludy, ,!Serie.s
A,Lirnils in thS'eus,No. 25, U.S.Departmcnt of State, Officcof the
Geographer,Burcauof Intelligenceand Rescarch, 9 July 1990......................1......IV.261 Continental Shelf Boundary: Trinidad and Tobago-Vcnezuelü, signcd
26 February 1942, Internalional Boundary Study, Series A, Limitis n
the Seus, No. 11,U.S. Departinentof State, Office of the Geographcr,
Bureau of Intelligenceand Research,6 March 1970 ................................89...............
IV.262 Coiitinental Shclf Boundary: Bahrain-Saudi Arahia. sigiied 22
February 1958, Infernational Boundury Study, Series A, Linlits in ~he
Sem, No 12, U.S. Departmcnt of State, Officc of the Geographer,
Bureau of Intelligence andResearçh, 10March 1970 .................................5..........9
IV.263 Territorial Sea Boundary: Denmark-Swedcn, Declaration coilceriliilg
the boundaries in the Sound, January 30, 1932, inte~nrifioncll
Boundary Study, Limits in the ,Seas,No26, U.S. Departmcrit of State,
Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intclligei~ceand Rcscarch, 1G
July 1970....................................................
...................1..........
IV.264 Agreement delimiting the continental shelf conçluded by Iran with
Bahrain, 17June 1971,InternutionnlBoundury Sfudy, Scries 4, I,irnirs
in ~hc.Scas, No 58, U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Geographer,Bureau of Intelligence and Research,Septcmbei. 1974 ...............1.11...
IV.265 21. Oman, Decree of 17 July 1972 Concerniilg the 'l'crritorialSea,
Continental Shelf and Exclusive Fishing Zones of the Suliailate of
Oman, National Legislution and Treaties Relating to the I,uw qf'the
Sea, United Nations,New York,1974(STILEG/SER.BI16, pp. 23-24) ...........1.21
IV.266 Trcaty of the La Plata River and its Maritime Limits, Moatevidco, II)
November 1973, International Legal mute rial.^,Vol. XIII, No. 2,
March 1974, pp.251-267.......................................................
................
IV.267 7. Iran .roclamation of 30 October 1973concerning the outcr lin-iof
the exclusive fishing zone of Iran in the Persian Gulf andthe Sea of
Oman, United Nations Legislative Séries , utional Legislulion and
Treaties Relating lo ~heLaw of the Seu, United Nations, New York,
1976(STILEGISER.BI18,1995,p.334)............................................................1
IV.268 Continental Shelf Boundary:Argentina-Uruguay signed 19 Novembcr
1973,Internationul Boundary Study, Seriries A, Limits in ~heSeas, No
64, U.S. Department of Statc, Office of the Geographer, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research,24 October 1975 ......................................1.............
lV.269 Proclamation of the Minislry of Foreign An'iirs ofthe Stnte of Qatar,
2 J~ine1974,Archives.of the State of Qatar.........................................9...............
IV.270 Statement of Mr. Parsi, 6111meeting of the Second Committce, 17 July
1974, United Nations C,70njirenceon the LUWof the Seu, Official
Documents,Vol. II, p. 128,paras. 15-16 ............................................7........Statement of Mr.Kazemi,38th meeting ofthe Second Coininittcc, 13
August 1974, IJnited Nurions Conferencc on the I.ow of t!lc,Yeu,
Oflici D olcuments,Vol. II,pp. 273-279 ..........................................8.................
Stalernent of Mr. Parsi, 43rd meeting of the Sccond Coinmittee, 23
August 1974, United Narions Cnnfirence on the 1,uw oj'the S'LLI,
0)fcia Dlocuments,Vol. II,pp.293-296 ........................................................1
Revised Single Ncgotiating Text, 6 May 1976, 3rd United ~\rcrtinn.r.
Conference on the Law of the Ses, Official Di~curnent.~ .ol. V, 4th
Session,NewYork, 15March-7 May1976,pp. 164-1 65 .........................199...........
Maritimc Boundary: Brüzil-Uruguay agreed on July 21, 1972.
International Roundury Study, Series A, Lirnifs in the S~C[SN , o73.
U.S. Departinent of State, Ofice of the Geographcr, Bcireüu of
Intelligenceand Research, 30 September 1976......................................0.3.........2
Coiltinental Boundaries: The Persiail Gulf, Series A, Lir~2ilin the
S~LIS,No 94, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Geograplier,
Bureauof Inteliigenccand Research, I1Septembcr 198 I..........................11.........
LawNo. 4 for the year 1983 on Exploitationand Protection ofLiving
MarineRcsourcesin Qatar, Archivesof the Statc ofQatar(Trailslation
and Arabicversion).......................................................
....................
Qatar Statcrnent on Extending Territorial Waters to 12naulicül miles
dated 16April 1992,Archives of the Stateof Qatar.....................................5......2
Decree No. 40 of 1992 defining the breadth of thc territoriasea aild
contiguous zoneof the State of Qatar, Archives of the State of Qatar
('Translationand Arabicversion) ................................................
..1.....................
Note of Ministry of Foreign Affairsof the State ol'Rührain dated 14
May 1992 (Bahrain'stranslation)....................................................4.................2
Note ofMiiiistryof Foreign Affairs ofthe Staleor Qatar dated 26 May
1992 (TranslationaiidArabicversion) .............................................3..................
TT.T,egalInformation Relevant toUnited Nalioi-isConvention on the
Law of the Sea, No. 1 Bahrain, Law by Decree No 8 of 1993 with
respect to the territorial sea and contiguous zone of tlic State ciJ'
Bahrain, issued on 20 April 1993,Law of the Seo Bulletin, No 24,
Deçember 1993, p. 5.....................................................
........1..........
9. United Arab Elnirates,Federal Law No 19 of 1993 in respcct of the
delimitation of the maritime zonesof the United Arab Einiratcs, 17
October 1993,Law of theSeu Bulletin,No 25, June 1994,pp. 94-94 ..............265....IV.283 3. Iran (Islamic Republic of), Act on the Marinc Areas of the lslainic
Republic of Iran in the PersianGulf and the Omaiî Sea, 2 May 1993,
Law of theSeu Bulletin, No24, December 1993, pp. 10-1 5.......................27 1 LIST OF DOCUMENTARY ANNEXES
(Volume 13)
PART IV
IV.284 Department of State, Lirnifin the Seas, No 36, Nalioi~alClaims to
Maritime Jurisdictions, 7thRevision, 11 January 1995, p.10, 73 aiid
Cases
IV.285 Amire des Grisbudnrnu, 23 October 1909, Rect~eil desSe~?te~ces
Arbitrales, Yol.XVIII, p.160.....................................................7 ..................
IV.286 Arbitration hetweenPefroleurnDevelopment (TrucialCoust) Ltd. aand
the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Ai.i~nrd of 28 Augzr.sf19.51. Decisions,
International und ConzparativeLaw Quarlerly, Vol. 1, 4th Scries,
1952,pp. 247 and 256 ...................................................
....................
IV.287 Case cuncerning the delimitation of the conlinenta1,she!f'betwecthe
United Kingdom of Great Britain und Northern Ireland, and ~he
French Republic, Decision of 30 .lune 1977, United Nations K~~uI.Is
of International ArbitralAward.~,Vol.XVIII, pp. 27,45-46,56-58, 92,
96-97and 112-117.................................................
..........1...........
iV.288 Affaire de la d&limifulionde lupontière maritime enire Iu Guinie et
la Guinée-Bissau,Decision ut'14 Februavy 1985, Unilrd Nuiions
Reports of InternalionaArhiir~rAwurds, Vol. XLX, pp. 181-183, 189,
190, 193 and 195...................................................
.........33....................
Published Works
IV.289 AI-Baharna,H.M.,"The Legai Status of theArabian Gulf'S~~ites"T,he
Arahian Gulf ,Ylules, Their Legul and Political Srarzrs und Thcir
Internuticmu2Prohlems,2nd ed.,Libraire du Liban , pp. 246-249,380
and 289-290 ....................................................
............4.................
1V.290 Alexander, L.M., The Gu@ c?fMaine i?nsc: An Intrrrzutiunol
Discus.sinn,West Publishing Company, 1988, pp. 37-38.........................5.3............
1V.291 Amin, S.H., "Customary Rules of Delimitation of tlie Continental
Shelf. The Gulf States Pracliçe", Journal qf Maritime I,uw and
Commerce, Vol. 11,No. 4, July 1980,p. 510....................................57...................... Amin, S.H., "Law of the Continental SShelf delimitation: the Gulf
Example", NelherlundslntcrniztionalLaw Review, Vol. XXVII, 1980,
pp. 335-346 .........................................................
..............1...............
Bowett, D.W., The Legal Regime of Islands in InfernatiorlulLrrw.
Oceana, 1979,p. 2..................................................
...............5......
Clharlcs, H., "Les îles artificielles", Revue ginircrle dc dmil
international public,,1967, pp. 348-349 ...........................................79......................
David, E., "La scntcnce arbitraledu 14février1985sur ladéliinitation
de la frontiCrcmaritime Guinée-Guinée-Bissau" ,nnucrrv.eJr.unçni s k
droit international, Vol. XXXI,1985,pp. 382-389 .................. .............83....
Decaux, E.,"1,'arrêdte la Cour Internationale de Justice darisl'affaire
du Plateau Continental (Tunisie/Libye), Arrêt du 24 févricr 1982".
Annuuire)unçcrr~ de droit international, Vol. XXVIII,1982, pp. 388-
Decüux,E., "L'arrê dte la Chambre de laCour Interiiationalede Justice
surl'affaire dela délimitationde la frontiéremaritime dans leGolfe du
Maine (CanaddEtats-Unis), arrêtdu 12 octobrc 1984", Annzlnire
.fiançais de droit internaiiunal, Vol. XXX, 1984,pp. 337-338 ......................97.........
Departinent of State, Treaty Information, "UnitedSiales and Colombia
Sign Treaty Conçeriling Certain Caribbean ReeSs", Departrnent of
StuteBulletin, Vol.LXVII,No. 1736,2 October 1972 ............................101............
Evans, G., in Fairbridge, R. (ed.), "Persiaii Gulf", TheEncycloprredia
of Oceanogrnphy, ReinholdYublishingCorporatioil,New York, 1966,
pp.689-694 .......................................................
..............1.5..............
Gidel, G., Le droit international public de la mer, Paris, 1981, Vol.
IIIpp. 746-759 and 768-770........................................................
................
Hay, Sir R., The Persinn Gul,f'Slates and thei~.Bo~tndory l't.ohlenzs,
Royal Geographical Society, 1954, pp. 434-443 ...................................33........
International Hydrographie Organisation, A Manz~nl on Teçhnrc~rl
Aspects qf the United Nalion.9 Convention on ~heLUIY of /he LSe~l,
1482,SpecialPublicationNa. 51,2nd ed., 1990, p. 125, para. 6.3.4.2.............147...
Johnson, D.H.N., "ArtificialIslands", International and ('aml?ffruth)e
Law Quarterly, 1951,Vol.4, pp. 214-215 ............................................51...............1
Kelly, J.B., Last Arahiun Frontiers, Faber and Faber, London, pp.
130-131 and 154-155......................................................
.......1..5......IV.305 La~iterpacht,H., "Suvereignty over subinarine areas", British Yeur
Book of lnlernatic)nalLaw, 1950,pp. 394-395 .................. ................161....
1V.306 Legault, L.H. and MçRae,D.M.,"Thc Gulf of'MailleCase", c~nncli~lr~
Yeurhnokc$lnternntional Law,, Vol. XXII, 1984, pp. 284-286 ....................165......
IV.307 Lorimer, J.G., Gnzetteer of the Persian GulJ: Ornnn and C'enr~cii
Arubiu, Archive Editions, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 2240-2241. 2257-3258
and 2288-2289........................................................
...............7.....1
1V.308 Moorehead, J.,In de$ance of the elements:a personal vicJ?o~f QLIILIT.
Quartet Books, London, 1977,pp. 30-33, 35-26, 89 üiid9 1-92.....................179......
IV.309 Nelsotî, T,.D.M.,"The roles of equity in the delimitatioiiof inaritimc
houndaries",AmericunJournal qfInternational I,aw, 1990, p. 838 ................191....
IV.310 Oppcnheim'sInternational Law, Sir Robert Jeiiiliiigsand Sir Arthtir
Watts (eds.) 9th ed., Vol. 1, "Peace", Longman, Harlow, 1993, pp.
688-689........................................................
.....................19..........
IV.3 11 Papaddcis, N., The Infernational Legal Regimc qf ArtifificiulI,slands,
1977,pp. 96-97........................................................
............1...........
IV.3 12 The Persian Guy HiLsloricalSurnrnnries 1907-1 953, Hi.stcirica1
Summury of Evenls in the Peïsian Gulf Shaikhdoms und ~he,Sz~ltnnnfc
oJ'Muscat and Oman 1928-1953,Vol. II, Archivc Ediiions, 1987, pp.
26-30 .....................................................
....................................2
1V.313 Prescott, J.R.V., "MaritimeBoundaries and Issues in the Soutliwcst
Pacific Ocean", Ocean Boundury Making Regionni! Iss~nes UM~
Developrnent,D.M. Johnstonand P.M. Saunders (eds.),Croom 1-Ielm,
London, 1988, pp. 298-301......................................................
...2.............
IV.314 Presçott, J.R.V., The Maritime Political L3oun~r'urie of' the Wo~ld,
Methuen,LondonandNewYork, 1985,pp. 1Y8-20 I ...............................17...........2
IV.3 15 Reuter,P., "Uneligne uniquedc dclimitatioiîdes espacesmaritiines?",
MélangesGeorgesPerrin,Lausanne, 1984,pp. 258-259. ..........................223..
IV.316 Rovine, A.W., "CoiiteinporaryPraclice (ifthe United States Relatiiig
to Internatioilal Law", ArnericnnJournal clflnlerncztiorznl Lnw, Vol.
67, 1973, pp. 118-119......................................................
.........2....2..
IV.317 Rumaihi, M.G., Bahrain: Social and Polilictrl Chunge since the I<'i~-st
World War,Bowker, London,1976,pp.41-49 ....................................231................
IV.318 Schneider, J., "Gulf of Maine: An Equitable Result", Au?ericar?
Journal ofInternationalLaw,Vol. 79, 1985, pp. 572-573 ..........................43........IV.319 UK Cabinel Paper on the Truman Proctamation (F.O. 371151708) in
O'Connell, D.P.,TheInternationalLuw uflhe Seu, Vol. 1.pp. 471 and
IV.320 Waldock, Sir H., "Disputed Sovereignty in the T;alklaiid Islands
Depeildencies",British YearBook uf Infernationnb lai.^1948, p. 334
............25.1...
IV.321 Weil, P., Perspectives du droit de lu ddimitcrtion rnnrititne, Paris,
Pédoile,1988, pp,64,263-264,267, 268, 273and 292-293 ......................255..........
1V.322 Yeurbouk uj' the International Law Conzmission, 1950, Vol. 1,
Sumnwy Records of the second session,5 Juiie-29 July 1950, IJniled
Nations, New York, 1958,pp. 233 and 306 ......................................2.5............
IV.323 Yeuvbot~k of the Inlernutianal Luw Commission, 1951, Vol. II,
Siunmary records of the third session,16 May-27 July 1951,Régime
of the High Seas, Deuxiémerapport sur la haute iner par J.P.A.
François, Rapporteur SpéçiaI,[texte original en Li-nnc;r-ii1, avril
1951,pp. 75and 97-98 .....................................................
..................
IV.324 Yearbook uf the International Law Commi.ssion, 1951, Vol. II,
Documents of the third session including tlie report of tlie
Commission to thc General Assembly, United Nations, Ncw York,
1957, p. 142.....................................................
...............7............
1V.325 Young, R., "The International Law Corninission and tlie Continental
Shelf' AnzericunJr,urnulof InternationalLaw,Vol. 46, 1952,p. 126 .............7.9
IV.326 Young, R., "Equitable Solutions for Offshore Boundarics, the 1968
Saudi Arabia-Iran Agreement", American Journul qf Internalicinul
Law, Vol. 64,No. 1,1970,pp. 152-157 ...........................................8...........
IV.327 Youiig, R., "The Persian Gulf' in New Directions in ihe Luw] of'the
Seu, Collected Papers, Vol. III, R. Churchill, K.R. Simrnonds, J.
Welcli,Oceana Publications, 1973,pp. 23 1-240...................................9..1.........
IV.328 Prediction oJ'Highand Low Waters,Ministry of Communication and
Transport, Qatar,October 1995and July 1996 ....................................0.3.............. LIST OFAPPENDICES
Paac
(Volume 14)
APPENDIX 1 Exchange of Notes Verbales betweeil Qatar and
Bahrain.........................................................................
(Volume 15)
APPENDIX 2 Report on Bahrain's Actions and Activiiies on
HawarIslands.......................................................
......1
APPENDIX 3 l'he BritishAdministration inthe Gulf (1616-1971) ........95..
APPENDIX4 The So-called Special Circumstüilce: Tlie Pcarl
Fisheries...................................................1
..............1
APPENDIX 5 Fasht ad Dibal and Qit' al Jaradali as Low-tide
Elevations ........................................................
..
APPENDIX 6 Report by Ingénicur-Général , . Roubertou, CR.:
The Measuring of Coastal Lengll-i.Application in the
Present Case...............................................4.....
..........1
APPENDTX7 Photographs of Mosaics of Slides taken of Hawar
Islands ...................................................
1....................
APPENDIX8 Map Atlas .......................................................
........I
Memorial of the Government of the State of Qatar