Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Document Number

1489

Document Type

written_pleading

Case

1 - Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania)

Date of the Document

Tue, 09/30/1947 - 12:00

Document File

1489.pdf

SECTION B. - EXPOSÉS ÉCRITS

SECTION B.-WRITTEN STATEMENTS.

THE NORTH CORFU CHANNEL.

1.-MEMORIAL SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN

AND NORTHERN IRELAND.

Claim in respect of damage by mines tu ships of the Royal Navy
ilzth2 North Corfu Channel on zznd Octobev,1946.

Part 1.

INTRODUCTORY.

I. This Memorial is submitted to the Court in pursuaiice of
an Order made by the President of the Court following upon
an Application dated 13th May, 1947, addressed by the Agent
of the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of
the Court. As stated in that Application, the Government of
the United. Kingdom contend that the Court has jurisdiction
in the present dispute under Articl36 (1) of its Statute as being
a matter which is one specially provided for in the Charter of
the United Nations, on the grounds-

(a) that the Security Council of the United Nations at the
conclusion of proceedings in which it dealt iviththe
dispute under Article36 of the Charter, by a Resolution,
of which a copy formed Annex 2 to the Application (and
will now be found in Annex 23,S/PV 127,p.393).decided
to recommend both the Government of the United King-
dom and the Albanian Government to refer the present
dispute to the InternationalCourt of Justice;
(b) that the Albanian Government accepted the invitation
of the Security Council under Article32 of the Charter
to participate in the discussion of the dispute, and accepted
the condition laid down by the Security Council, when
conveying the invitation,' that Albania accepts in the
present case al1 the obligations which a Member of the MEMORIAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOJI

United Nations would have to assume in a similar case
(a copy of the invitation of the Security Council and
of the Albanian Government's reply thereto formed
Annex 3 to the Application, and will now be found in
Annex S3 of this ~emorial) ;
(\, that Article 25 of the Charter orovides that "the Members
of the unitid Nations agree Io accept and carry out the
decisions oi the Security Council in accordance with
the present Charter".

2. By a letter dated 2nd July, 1947 addressed to the Registrar
of the Court and communicated to the latter on 23rd July by
the Agent of the Albanian Governm nt, the Governmentof the
People's Republic of Alhania informed the Court that it con-
sidered that the Government of the United Kingdom "was not

entitled to refer this dispute to the Court by unilateral applica-
tion", and disputed the validity of that Government's conten-
tions based on Article 25 of the Charter. The Albanian Govern-
ment, however, added that "it is prepared, notwithstanding
this irregularity in the action taken by the Government of the
United Kingdom, to appear.before the Court". The Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom interprets this to mean, and submits
accordingly to the Court, that the Albanian Government ,bas
therefore accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in the present
dispute, without, however, accepting the contentions of the
Government of the United Kingdom as set out in the preceding

paragraph. In the circumstances the difference of opinion as
to the effect of Articlejzof the Charter is of no practical import-
ance for the purpose of the present case. The Government of
the United Ki gdom for its part does not, however, admit that
the observations of the Albanian Government on the subject of
the Court's jurisdiction are well founded in law, nor does it with-
draw its own submission in this regard as set forth in its Applica-
tion of 13th May, 1947.

3. By an Order made on 31st July, 1947, the President of
the Court fixed as time-limits for the filing of the Memorial and
Counter-Mernorial the 1st October, 1947, and 10th December,
1947, respectively.

Part II.

4. This claim arises out of an incident which occurred in the
North Corfu Channel on zznd October, 1946, while a squadron
of His Majesty's ships were proceeding through that channel.
Two destroyers, H.M.S. Saumarez and H.M.S. Volage, struck
mines which had been laid in the fairway, and as a result forty- MEMORIAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOJI

Part II.

four officers and men lost their lives, forty-two officers and men
were injured and Serious damage was caused to the two ships.
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom contend-
(1) that the Albanian Government on some date in 1946
befoi-e zznd October, either caused to be laid, connived
at or had knowledge of the laying of mines in certain

areas of its territorialwaters in the Strait of Corfu ;
(2) that these areas were part of an international highway
and to the knowledge of the Albanian Government were
being used as such by the shipping of other States;
(3) that, whether or not thcse areas were part of an interna-
tional highway, a State is not entitled to lay, or know-
ingly to permit the existence of, an unnotified minefield
constituting a danger to shipping of othër States;
(4)that the Albanian Government did not notify the existence
of these mines as required by Articles 3 and 4 of The
Hague Convention No. VI11 of 1907, by the general
principles of international law, and by the ordinary
dictates of humanity ;

(5)that the Albanian Government is internationally respon-
sible for the said deaths, injury and damage; and
(6) that the Albanian Government is under an obligation to
make reparation or compensation to the Government
of the United Kingdom in respect thereof.

5. The incident to which this claim relates took place in the
Strait of Corfu, which is a strait between the north-eastern
corner of the Island of Corfu and the mainland of Albania. The
Strait varies in width from I to 69 miles. In the wider portion
the western side of the Strait lies within the territorial waters
of Greece and the eastern side within the territorial waters of
Albania while, as it becomes narrower than 6 miles, it is entirely
within the territorial waters of one or the other country, thedivid-
ing line hetween such waters being, according to the well-estah-
lished rule of international law, in mid-channel. The Strait

affords a normal and direct route between the open seas lying
to the north-east, north and north-west and the seas lying to
the south-east of the Island of Corfu, and is an international
highway for shipping much used in peace-time. Apart from
coastal traffic, it is a commonly used route for traffic from the
heel of Italy or the Northern Adriatic ports piying to Greece
or the Eastern Mediterranean. For navigational reasons many
types of shipping prefer a coast;wise route in this area.

6. During the war of 1g3g-rgqj, mines were laid by the
Italians and Germans in the Strait through which the Axis Powers
established and maintained a swept channel for purposes of
navigation. This swept channel is hereafter referred to as the22 hIEhlORIAI. OF THE USITED KINGDOZI
"North Corfu smept channel". It is about a mile \vide and lies

within both Greek and Albanian territorial waters. This route
was subsequently re-swept by British minesweepers in the cir-
cumstances hereafter set out. A chart showing the Strait is
attached (Annex 1). The position of the "North Corfu swept
channel" is shown in Annexes j and 7.

7. A German mine information chart is annexed to this
Alemorial (Annex z), showing the position of a German minefield.
It \vil1be seen that this minefield \vas mainly in Greek territorial
waters but a small part of it \\,as in Albanian territorial waters,
and that the North Corfu swept channel as established by the
Axis authorities lay east\vards of this minefield. The North
Corfu swept channel has existed and been used' for navigation
since approvimately June 1940. as the Albanian Government
at al1 material times in the year 1946 were well aware.

8. During the war of 1939-1945, some hundreds of thousands
of mines were laid in the waters of the Mediterranean and North-
West Europe. Of these mines only about zo,ooo had been swept
by the end of hostilities. In order to carry out the task of remov-

ing the remainder in a CO-ordinated manner, an international
organisation was set up in May 1945, by agreement between
the Governments of the U.S.S.R., United States, United King-
dom and France. The, objects of this Organisation, entitled
the International Central Mine Clearance Board, as defined by
a written Agreement dated zznd November, 1945 (of which the
text is in Annex 3). were-

(i) to use the available minesweeping forces to the best advan-
tage for-
(a) the clearance of fishing grounds,
(b) the widening of al1 channels,
(c) the establishment of clear waters for vessels repairing
important telegraph cable routes,
(d) the clearance of areas containing mines dangerous to
surface shipping,

(e) clearance of deep anti-submarine mines ; and
(ii) to promulgate information about mines and mine clearance
to the shipping of the world.

g. This Board was composed of the representatives of the four
Powers mentioiied above. Further, as provided by the Agreement
of zznd November, 1945, there was set up to CO-ordinate mine-
sweeping in the Mediterranean area a Mediterranean Zone Board
consisting ofrepresentatives of France, Greece, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, United States and
Yugoslavia. Certain other governments were invited to send
observers to the Mediterranean Zone Board, but the four Powers .\IEZIORI.4L OF THE USITED KISGD03I 23

did not invite' Albania primarily because she possessed no mine-
sweeping forces.

IO. In pursuance of the second of the two objects mentioned
in paragraph 8 above, charts and pamphlets described as "Medri
Charts" were issued by an organisation known as the International
Routeing and Reporting Authority, consisting of representatives of
the European maritime Powers whose function it was to CO-ordinate
the information on swept channels and minefields passed to it by

the International Central MineClearance Board. These charts and
pamphlets showed the areas and the routes for shipping in the
Mediterranean area and ivere published to al1Alediterranean coun-
tries who relied on them for purposes of safe navigation. Thirty
copies of these documents were forwarded monthly from October
1945 to October 1946 to the Albanian Government. Proof of the
despatch of these documents will be found in Annex 4.

II. During the winter of 1944-1945 the following areas of
Albanian territorial waters were swept, or searched, by British

minesweepers :-
. . North Corfu Channel (October 1944 and January and
February 1945).
12) Valona Bav (November 1044).
2 \
i3j Durazzo Approaches (~ec&i;t :r1944, March 1945)
No objection to this action was raised by Albania or any other

Power. The fact that these areas had been swept of mines \vas
shownon the Medri Charts and pamphlets, which, as already stated,
were communicated to the Albanian Government. In addition,
the head of the British Military Mission personally handed a Rledri
Chart of the minefields and swept route to the Albanian Govern-
ment in or about January 1946. In Annex 5 is attached the
relevant portion of a key Medri Chart. Charts in this form were
in force and were issued between October 1945 and October 1946.

There are also attached in the same annex the relevant Medri
pamphlets, showing as safe for navigation the route tbrough the
"North Corfu s\vept chaiinel" (numbered in the MedriIndex Chart
18/32 and 18/34) l.

rz. No mines were fouiid iiithe North Corfu Channel either
during the sweeping \\,hich took place in October 1944. or in the
subsequent sweeps which took place in January and February 1945,
or at any time subsequently until ~2nd October, 1946. There is
no record of any enemy or Allied mineshaving been laid in the
Channel since February 1945.

Originally these two routes mre designated 18/53 and 18/54. but hfedri 5
(in which theyço appear)was cancelled on 8th hlarch~gqG,by the issue of
3Iedrig: then:upon they became r8/3z and 18/34.
324 >IEYORI;U. OF THE UKITED KISGDOII
13. As a result of the publication of the Nedri Charts and pam-
phlets as stated above, it \\.as publicly notified each month from
October 1945 that the North Corfu Channel was once again open

to navigation, as an international highway for navigation, and it
and other swept channels, \vholly or partly in Albanian territorial
waters, were used by British and other ships in possession of these
documents. In fact, until May 1946shipping of all kinds used the
Channel without hindrance from either Greeceor Albania, whowere
the territorial Powers concerned, and without encountering any
mines.

14. On 15th May, 1946, however, His Majesty's cruisers Orion
and Superb, while passing southwards,through the swept channel
on a routine voyage during which they wereexhibiting theirnational
naval ensign in accordance with normal procedure and the regula-

tions in force in the Royal Navy, were fired on by Albanian bat-
teries, fortunately \vithout damage. His Majesty's Government at
once protested strongly to the Albanian Government against this
breach of international law, which recognises that, in peace and
in war, there is both for warships and merchant vessels a right of
innocent passage through straits forming highways ofinternational
maritime traftic. There ensued a diplomatic correspondence
culminating in a note from His Majesty's Government to the Alba-
nian Government, dated 2nd August, 1946, in which the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom maintained its attitude that it could
not recognise any right of a territorial Power to demand the fulfil-
ment of conditions before entry was permitted into a recognised
international channel. The correspondence is attached (Annex 6).

Ij. In the early afternoon of zznd October, 1946, a squadron
of British warships was proceeding through the Strait. The
squadron had, in accordance with many years of peace-time iradi-
tion, been visiting Greek ports and, ultimately, the port of Corfu.
It was proceeding in innocent passage by the normal and direct
route to a rendezvous with other British ships in the open seas
north-west of Corfu. It was proceeding in normal passage forma-
tion, the gunstrained fore and aft. Theexact positions and tracks
of the ships are shown in the chart at Annex 7. No mine detection
devices were used. The cruiser !Ifaurilius (11,090 tons) was lead-
ing, followed at an interval ofa few hundred yards by the destroyer
Saumarez (2,545 tons) ; behind them, after a gap of two miles but

on the same course, was the cruiser Leader (9,560 tons), follo\\red
at an interval of a few hundred yards by the destroyer Volage
(2,530 tons). The course they were taking was through the North
Corfu swept channel, which, as shown in paragraphs 2 and j above,
had been check-swept for mines in October 1944 and again in
January and February 1945. and was denoted 18/34on the 3Iedri
Charts. This course was in any event the natural course to take >lE>IORI.4L OF THE USITED KIXGDOM 25

for nayigational reasons. The weather was clear and the depth of
nater about 30 fathoms.
16. At 14.43 hours tuVobursts of machine-gun fire were heard
on the Albanian coast. Thc ships proceeded on their passage and

did not alter formation. At 14.53 hours a heavy explosion took
place in H.M.S. Saunzarez. The destroyer Volage was immedia-
tely ordered forward to give her assistance and to take her in tow.
At 15.32 hoiirs an Albanian launch came out of the port of Saranda
(Porto Edda) and hailed the damaged destroyer, enquiring what
the ships were doing there. The launch remained in the area for
twenty or thirty minutes without offering any assistance, and then
returned to port. A photograph of H.M.S. Saumarez taken thirty
seconds after the explosion is attached (Annex 8).

17. Three-quarters of an hour later, at 16.16 hours, there was
a heavy explosion in H.;\I.S. Volageand her bows were blown off.
Annex 8 also contains a photograph of the Volagetakeu immedia-
tely after the explosion. The exact position of the ships at the
time the explosions took place is shown on the chartat Annex g.
All ships, including the ships damaged, were within the swept
channel.

18. The two incidents above mentioned caused the death of
44 sailors and injury to 42 others. H.M.S. Saumarez became a
total loss and H.M.S. Volage was seriously damaged. There
are attached :-

(a) Report on damage to H.M.S. Saumarez (Annex IO).
(b) Report on damage to H.M.S. Volage (Annex II).
(c) List of sailors killed with~statement of pensions and other
benefits payable to dependants for which His Majesty's
Government has become liable as the result of such deaths
(Annex 12).

(d) List of sailors injured with statement of expenses, pensions
and other payments to which His Majesty's Government
has become liable as the result of suchinjury (Annex 13).
(e) Statenient of cost of repair to the Volage and the cost of
replacement of the Sazimarez (Annex 14).

19. The nature of the explosions and the extent of the damage
were such asto indicate that they were caused by contact mines.
It was urgently necessary to ascertain the cause of the explosions
and, if caused by mines, what mincs thcy were-whether they were
moored or not and houxthey camc to be in a channel which had
for two years been clear. The Government of the United King-
dom therefore notified the Albanian Government on 26th October,
1946, that, in view of the serious incidents to two of His Majcsty's
ships when passing through the North Corfu Channel, it would
shortly be re-smept by British minesweepers.26 IIEMORIAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

20. The matter was also reported immediately to the XIediter-
ranean Zone Board, whose composition has been described in
paragraph 9 above. The relevant minutes of the Central and
Mediterranean Boards are annexed (Annex 15). The International
Kouteing and Keporting Authority, on receipt of this information,
closed the Channel ta shipping and on 28th October, 1946, the
Mediterranean Zone Board recommended a check sweep of the
"North Corfu swept channel" (Annex 15,.pp. 125-126, para. 138).
The recommendation was submitted to the Central International
Mine Clearance Board which, on 1st November, 1946 (Annex 15,

p. 104, para. 326), confirmed that the Channel should be re-swept
at a favourable opportunity, at the same time recording that the
sweeping of the Channel raised an issue outside its scope.

zr. Afeanwhile, the reply of the Albanian Governrnent to His
Majesty's Government's note communicating its intention to
re-sweep the North Corfu swept channel had been received on
31st October, 1946. The Albanian Government in this reply
expressed no objection provided the minesweepers did not enter
territorial waters. In view of the nature ofthe Channel, thegreater
part of which lies exclusively in Albanian territorial waters, such
a reply was tantamount to a refusa1 to allow this necessary human-
itarian task to be carried out, and is open to the interpretation

that the Albanian Government did not desire to have the cause
of the incidents ta His Majesty's ships on zznd October, 1946,
investigated. Having regard to the recommendations of the com-
petent Mine Clearance Board, and, as the sweeping of thc Channel,
being an international highway, was of international benefit,
His Majesty's Government decided that the sxveeping should
proceed. The Albanian Government was therefore, by a note
dated 10th November, 1946 (Annex 6, 2nd Incident, Item IV),
warned of the date on which it was intended to carry out the
operation and of the exact area t,o be swept. By a note dated
11th November, 1946, addressed to the Government of the United
Kingdom, and by a separate note dated 12th November, 1946,
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the
Albanian Government protested against this decision (Annex 6,

2nd Incident, Item VI).

22. The North Corfu swept channel was accordingly re-swept
by British mincsweepers under the direction of the Allied Naval
Commander-in-Chief. Mediterranean, on 12th-13th November, 1946.
In order to obtain an unbiased report of the happenings during
the period of sweeping, the Amcrican and French members of the
Mediterranean Zone Board (the only members considered likely
to be available) were invited to attend the operation. The Amer-
ican representative was unable to participate ;the French repre-
sentative accepted, and Capitaine de Frégate Mestre accordingly >IE.\lORIBLOF THE UNITED KINGDO.\I 27

attended the minesweeping operations. His reports are annexed
hereto (Anriex 16).
23. During the sweeping operation carried out on 13th Novem-
ber, 1946, twenty-two moored mines were detectcd and cut. In
order to destroy these mines small arms fire and anti-tank rifles
only were used and instructions were given to the vesselsconcerned

not to fire towards the coast and not to procced outside the swept
channel. Contrary to the statements made by the Albanian repre-
sentative or1the Security Council, at no time were machine-guns
used during the operation. As many as possible of the mines
were destroyed by small arms fire, but, owing to the severerestric-
tions under which the minesweepers operated, not al1 the mines
wcre cleared, some remaining outside the charted confines of the
Channel, particularly to the Korth and East. Reports on the
operation are annexed hereto (Annex 17). The positions in which
these iniries were fouiid are shorvn in the chart at Annex18. They
extended right across the swept chan~iel. Two mines were taken
to Malta for expert examination. This examination was carried

out in the presence of Capitaine Mestre, the French observer. The
examinatiori showed that the mines were of German manufacture,
containing tjoo lb. of explosive, being the largest type of anchored
mines in existence, capable of inflicting the most serious damage
upon the largest type of ship afloat (photographs of the mines
taken at the time are at Annex 19). The mines werc free from
marine growth ; the paint was fresh, the mooring wire was still
loaded with grease, there was IIO rust on the mechanism plate,
and the horns unscremed casily (see Annex 20). These facts leave
no doubt whatever that the mines were laid only a very short
time before the date on which H.M.S. Sauntarezand H.1N.S.Volage
suffered damage and casualties.

24. During the period since May 1946, when, as indicated in
paragraph 14 above, British vessels were fired on, it is clear that
the Albanian Government had maintained a close watch over
events takirig place in the North Corfu swept channel: The chart
at An~iex 21 shows the defcnces maintained by the Albanian
Government overlooking the Bay of Saranda and in addition
defences exist at other points along the coast. The degree of

vigilance maintaincd (as well as the violation of the rights of inno-
cent passage) is shown by the fact that the Tanac Tug F/CT. 12,
accompanying three U.N.R.R.A. barges, was fired on at night on
29th October, 1946 (Annex 22). As.further evidence of the vigil-
ance of the Albanian Government during the six months preced-
ing this, the Government of the United Kingdom will rely on the
statement rnade by the Albanian representative at the Security
Council that, in consequence of alleged provocations on the part
of Greek vessels up to 30th April, 1946, the Albanian Government
"took measures of vigilance against any fresh violations of the28 blE3lORIAL OF THE USITED KIhCDO>I

sovereignty of the Albanian State" (Annex 23, Security Cozmcil,
Oficial Records, Second Year, Xo. 16, p. 223). The nearest
mine found on the sweeping of 13th November, was only some
500 yards from the shore. Each mine weighed approximately
I ton and however launched would make a considerable splash
and noise on entering the water. It would be impossible for over
twenty of such mines to be laid without the laying of the mines
and the engines of the craft laying the mines being heard by the
look-outs and coastguards around Saranda. The process of laying
mines of this type is, on the other hand, a simple one and they
can be laid from almost any type of vessel ; no specialised equip-
ment is required, by contrast to what is needed for sweeping mines.

In point of fact the positions of the recently laid mines
found on 13th November, 1946 (see Chart in Annex IS), strongly
point to the conclusion that the mines were carefully placed with

the express intention of providing a defensive minefield covering
the Bay of Saranda.
26. The Government of the United Kingdom contends that
these facts point to the irresistible inference that :-

(a)The mines which caused damage and casualties to British
ships on zznd October, 1946, were part of a minefield of
anchored automaticcontact mines deliberately laid shortly
before the incident in the international highway which had
last been swept and found clear of mines in February 1945
and had been extensively used by maritime traffic since
that date ;
(6)the mines were laid, or caused to be laid, either by Albania,

or with the knowledge and connivance of the Albanian
Government.
Xo notification was given by Albania of the laying or
27.
existence of the mines.
28. In the light of the facts set out above the Government of
the United Kingdom addressed to the Albanian Government a
note dated 9th December, 1946,setting forth its grounds for believ-
in: that the Albanian Government was responsible for the damage

and casualties sustained by His Xajesty's sbips. as aforesaid and
requesting an apology and compensation. The Goverument of
the United Kingdom added that if no satisfactory reply to its
note was received from the Albanian Government within fourteen
days of the receipt of its note, it would be obliged to bring the
matter before the Security Council. The Albanian Government
replied on 21st December, 1946 (Annex 6,znd Incident, Item VIII).
but the Government of the United Kingdom, regarding this reply
as unsatisfactory, by a letter dated 10th January, 1947 (Annex 6,
2nd Incident, Item IS) and addressed to the Secretary-General MEMOKIAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 29

of the United Nations Organisation, brought the dispute before
the Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter of the United
Nations. '(See also Annex 23, Security Council, Oficial Records,
Second Year, Supplement No. 3.)
On 20th January, 1947, the Security Council commenced
its consideration of the dispute and in pursuance of Article 32 of
the Charter decided to invite Albania (not being a Member of the

United Nations) to participate withont a vote in the discussion
relating to the dispute (that is to Say on the same footing as the
United Kingdom, which, as a party to the dispute, exercised no
vote by reason of Article 27 of the Charter). The Security Council
decided also to ask the Albanian Government, if it chose to accept
this invitation, to accept for the purposes of the dispute al1those
obligations which wonld fa11upon a Member of the United Nations.

30. In pursuance of this decision the Acting Secretary-General
of the United Nations addressed a communication to Colonel-
General Enver Hoxha, President of the Council of Ministers of
The People's Republic of Albania, enquiring whether his Govern-
ment accepted this decision. The Albanian Government after
some delay replied that it accepted the decision and nominated
as its reprasentative to the Security Council, M. Hysni Kapo.
The matter was further discussed at meelings of the Security
Council held pn the 28th and 31st January, 1947, but, as the
Albanian representative had not arrived in New York, considera-
tion of the merits of the dispute was postponed. (Annex 23,
Cecz~rityCoz~nczl,Oficial Records, Second Year, No. 7 and No. 8.)

31. On 18th February, 1947, the Security Council at its
107th Meeting proceeded to hear the arguments of the parties
to the dispute. At this meeting, Sir Alexander Cadogan, per-
manent representative of the United Kingdom on the Security
Council, addressed the Council setting forth the facts of the case
as recited in this Memorial. In explaining the standpoint of
his Government he used exhibits which are detailed in Annex 24
hereto, and these exhibits were before the Security Council and
were taken into account by it in reaching its conclusions. Al1
these exhibits are annexed to this Memorial to the extent shown

in Annex 24.
32. On 19th February, at the 109th Meeting, the representa-
tive of the Albanian Government replied to the charges of the
Government of the United Kingdom, making a number of totally
unfounded allegations concerning the actions and intentions of
His Majesty5s ships. He also made a number of irrelevant
allegations regarding the snpposed violation of Albanian terri-

torial waters by Greek vessels, stating that "after successive
acts of provocation.by Greek ships the Albanian Government
fully within its rights and without breach of international rules30 3IE>IORIAL OF THE USITED KISGDOlI

took measures of vigilance against any fresh violation of the
sovereignty of the Albanian State. 'The coastal State's right
of sovereignty over its territorial waters is not invalidated by
the right of innocent passage which is recognised and respected
by our Government." (Annex 23, Sectirity Cozincil, Oficial
Records, Second Year, No. 16, pp. 223-224.)
The Court is asked'to take note of this admission by
Albania of the special vigilance exercised by it over its coasts

and adjacent waters and also of the admission by the Albanian
Government of the existence of the right of innocent passage
according to international Ia\v. The Government of the United
Kingdom in paragraph 80 of this Memorialwill invite the atten-
tion of the Court to other statements made by Albania in which
the right of innocent passage is recognised to exist. The state-
ment of the Albanian representative concluded by denyiiig that
the Albanian Government was responsible for the incident of
zznd October, 1946.

34. On 24th February, 1947, at the 111th Meeting of the
Security Council, the Australian representative spoke. He stated
that if the facts as alleged by the United Kingdom were
established, the Council had before it not merely a dispute, but
an act which'could only be characterised "as an international
crime of the most serious sort". (Annex 23, Security Council,
Oficial Records, Second Year, No. 18, p. 24.) rn the circum-
stances he emphasised the importance of establishing the facts
and proposed a resolution appointing a sub-committee consisting
of three Members to examine the material in the case and to report
not later than 3rd March, 1947.

3j. As this meeting the representative of the Soviet Union
also spoke. He expressed the view that the facts refuted the
statement "that Albania was responsible for the damage by mines
to the British destroyers" (Annex 23, ibid., p. 248). He held
that Article 35 of the Charter had no relation to the question at
issue on the ground that "any statement that the behaviour
of Albania in connexion with damage by mines to the British
destroyers in the Corfu Channel constitutes, or may constitute,
a threat to peace is devoid of al1 foundaiion" (Annex 23, ibid.,

P. 252).
36. The representative of the United States then spoke.
He stated that his Governmeni found it difficult to believe the
professed Albanian ignorance regarding these mines and their
laying. He favoured a further examination of the facts and
supported therefore the Australian motion (Annex 23, ibid.,
p. 2j2).

37. The representative of Poland said that the parties were
in disagreement as to the facts on several points. He was, never- JIEJIORI.4LOF THE USITED KISGDO>I 3 1.

theless, opposed to the appointment of a sub-committee on the
ground that on the basis of the documents available "at the
present moment here in New York, it is impossible to find any
conviucing c\'idence" (Annex 23, ibid., p. ~j7). In his view
there had been negotiations within the meaning of Article 33
of the Charter, but it was open to the Security Council to
cal1 upon the parties to use some other means for the peace-
ful settlement of the controversy. In addition he referred to
Article 36 (3) of the Charter and Article 36 (2)of.the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, and stated that, if the Council
so wishcd, the Polish delegation would not oppose the reference
of the dispute to the International Court.

38. Iiurther opinions were expressed on the subject whether
a sub-comniittee should be appointed and the discussion \vas
adjourned and rcsurned by the Security Council on 27th February,
1947, at its 114th Meeting. At this Meeting the representativc
of China spoke supporting the Australian motion made at the
Meeting on 24th February. Other speeches were made by mcm-
bers of the Soviet Union, Australia, Poland, United Kingdom,

Brazil, United States concerning what procedure the Security
Council should adopt. At the conclusion of this discussion the
Council votcd on a resolution submitted by the representative
of Australia deciding to set up a sub-committee. Eight votes
were cast in favour of this resolution ; none against. There
were three abstentions, and as a result the motion \vas carried
(Annex 23, Secirrity Council, Oficial Records, Second Year,
No. 21, p. zSo).

39. At the samc Meeting, the Sub-Committee consisting of
represen tatives of Australia, Colombia and Poland, was appointed.
This Sub-Committee was empowered to request further informa-
tion as it might deem necessary from the parties to the dis-
pute. The Sub-Cornmittee reported on 12th March, 1947, and
a copy of this report is at Annex 23, Oficinl Records, S/3oo '.

40. The Sub-Cornmittee stated that it had proceeded on the
principle that it was neither a commission of investigation nor
a fact-finding sub-cornmittee in the strict sense of the word, and
that its main duty was to examine the statements and evidence
already submitted to the Security CounciI and to ascertain
whether additional evidence existed. The Sub-Committee held
ten meetings; some of the meetings were devoted to the inter-
rogation of the representatives of the United Kingdom and
Albarlia. Another meeting \vas devoted to questioning Ambas-
sador Dendramis, the permanent representative of Greece to the
United Nations. The remaining meetings were taken up with
the study by members of the Sub-Committee of the allegations32 ~IEXIORIAL OF THE UXITED KISCDOXI
and evidence submitted by the two parties. The Syrian delegate

to the Security Council having expressed the desire to put several
questions to the representatives of the United Kingdom and
Albania, took part in one of the meetings of the Sub-Committee.
In addition to the documents submitted directly to the Council,
the Sub-Committee examined other documents, such as extracts
from the records of the International Central Mine Clearance
Board and the Mediterranean Zone Mine Clearance Board, and
also various charts submitted by the representative of the United
Kingdom. Commander Sworder, an expert from the British
Admiralty, \vas made available to the Sub-Committee in order
to give the necessary technical evidence and explanations on
the matters at issue.
41. In its conclusions the Sub-Committee submitted that

the first question which the Security Council should face was
whether or not, having regard to the nature and extent of the
evidence available, the Çecurity Council felt itself able to pro-
nounce upon the following questions :-
(a)whether or not a minefield existed in the swept channel .
opposite Saranda Bay on zznd October, 1946, and
(b) whether or not this minefield \vas laid by the Albanian
Government or with the connivance of the Albanian
Government ?

42. On zoth, ~1st and 25th March, 1947. the Security Council
discussed the Sub-Committee's report. The representative of
Albania took part in the discussions without the right to vote and
the representative of the United Kingdom did not vote.
43. On 20th Rlarch, at the 120th Meeting of the Council, the
report of the Sub-Committee was introduced by its Chairman (the
representative of Colombia). He pointed out tbat the Sub-Com-
mittee \vas not making any precise recommendations on the

measures to be taken and was not submitting any conclusions
on the evidence given or on facts to be taken as proof, "because
it felt that its function was rather that of vufiporteur than that
of a'comrnission of investigation". Each of its three members
reserved the right to "state his opinion to the Council on the sub-
stance of the problem and to give such fnrther reasons as he may
have for feeling that the two questions at the end of the report"
(set out in para. 41 of this Memorial) "can or cannot be anslvered
affirmatively".
44. The representative of Colombia then proceeded to give his
own opinion on the subject (Annex 23, Secz~rityCouncil, Oficial
Rezords, Second Year, Ko. 27, p. 288). He stated in the first place

that there was no doubt in his mind that on 13th November, 1946,
there were, in fact, discovered in the navigable channel which had
been previously swept in 1944, twenty-two German Y type mines >IE.\IORIAL OF THE USITED KIXGDOll 33
containing six hundred pounds of explosives. In his opinion

therc was no doubt (a)that such mines had been laid there recently,
certainly not more than six months before the incidents occurred ;
and (b) that this was the minefield which, on zznd October, 1946,
caused serious damage to two ships of the British Navy and some
loss of life.The minefield discovered on 13th November was in
his opinion identical with that which caused the damage on
zznd October, 1946.
As regards the second question at the end of the Sub-
Committee's report (set out in para. 41 of this Memorial) the
representative of Colombia observed that it was not maintained

by the Government of the United Kingdom that there was direct
evidence beyond doubt of the laying of the mines by Albania or
with her connivance. It was simply contended that there was a
strong presumption based on previous events and particularly on
the vigilance maintained by the Albanian authorities over the
Channel.
46. The Colombian representative concluded that he considered
the presumption that the minefield could not have been laid in
the Corfu Channel without the knowledge of the Albanian Govern-
ment so strong that he was prepared to vote in favour of putting

that opinion on record. If, however, the majority of the Council
did not consider themselves sufficiently informed to state that
the mines could not have been laid without Albania's knowledgc,
he was inclined to suggest that in that case the Council should
recommend the two parties to bring their dispute before the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
47. The representative of Australia (the second member of
the Sub-Committee) then spoke (Anuex 23, ibid., p. 293). He
pointed out that the additioiial report presented by the repre-
sentative of Poland was not strictly speaking part of the report
of the Committee. He theii proceeded to give his own opinion
on the questions raised in the Committee's report. He stated

that his delegation supported the opinions regarding the nature
of the evidence and the conclusions to be reached from the evidence
in this case as,set forth by the representative of Colombia. He
agrced that there was no doubt whatever that twenty-two mines
were found on zznd November, in the swept channel opposite
Saranda Bay, and that the explosion of two mines which took
place on zznd October, took place iii this identical minefield.He
also held the view that the Council "is justified in finding that
the mines must have been laid with the knowledge of Albania
while there is a strong probability that they were also laid with
the connivarice of Albania" (Annex 23, ibid., p. zgj). He held
this view "having regard to the detailed evidence regarding the.
conditions of the mines, the nature of the minelaying operation
and. the places in which the mines were found".34 . >IE>IORI.Al.OF THE USITED ICIXGDOZI

48. The representative of Poland (the third member of the
Sub-Committee) then spoke. He emphasised the fact that the
report was unanimous and was accepted by him. He agreed
that mines were found on 13th November, but "some mines
might have been laid later, some time between ~2nd October and
13th November, rather closer to the latter date" (Annex 23, ibid.,
p. 298). He thought it possible that the mines might have been
laid without the knowledge of the Albanian Government. He
referred to Article 33 of the Charter and stated that in his view
the Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their
dispute by the means enumerated in that Article. Further speeches
were made at this meeting of the Security Council, in which the
Polish representative gave explanations of his separate report in

reply to a request from the representative of the United Kingdom.
At the conclusion of the discussion at this meeting a resolution
was presented by Sir Alexander Cadogan which, subject to certain
amendments proposed by the representative of the United States,
was put to the vote at a later meeting (para. 59 below).

49. On the zrst March, 1947. at its 121st Meeting, the Security
Council resumed its discussion ofthedispute (Annex23, S/PV/IZI l).
The representative of Albania made a long statement expressing
his views cn the report. He was followed by the Soviet repre-
sentative, who stated that he was not satisfied with the evidence
or with Sub-Committee's report.

50. At this meeting the Belgian representative spoke. He
stated that "the Belgian delegation considers that after the sweep-
ing operations of 13th Novembe~, 1946, it is established that a
minefield has been secretly laid on the Corfu Channel". He
observed that "apart from the just reparation for the damage
caused, the Sec~rity Council has the duty to prevent, as far as
it is in its power, the repetition of similar incidents which are of
a nature to endanger peace and security". ,In the opinion of the
Belgian delegation the existence of the minefield, which was dis-
covered on 13th Xovember, 1946, was established. Further, this
delegation held the view that "this minefield was laid in those

waters as the Albanian Government wished to prevent the entrance
of foreign ships, and particularly of British ships, and in which,
as a consequence, it exercised a strict vigilance" (Annex 23,
S/PV/I~I, p. 351). He concluded : "In these circumstances, the
Belgian delegation, wile noting that there are no direct witnesses
to establish the fact that the mines were laid by the Albanian
Government, cannot conceive that these mines \\.ere laid without
the kno\rrledge of that Government."

j1. The representative of the United States then spoke
(Annex 23, ibid. p,. 353). He made the following statement :"It
Sce pp. 338 et rgp. IIIEJIORIALOF THE UNITED KIKGDOM 35
seems, too, that another conclusion which we" (i.e. , the United

States delegation) "have reached is shared by the majority of the
Members of the Council who have spoken. IVe find it difficult
to reach the conclusion that the Council ought to find that Albauia
laid these mines in the absence of direct evidence to that effect.
However, the weight of the evidence, it seems to the United States
delegation, seems to be overwhelmingly in favour of the propo-
sition that these mines, under al1 the circumstances, could not
have been laid without the knowledge of the Albanian authorities.
1 find it impossible to believe that the Albanian Government is
and was entirely ignorant of the laying and placing of these mines."

52. In view of his reluctance to support a finding that Albania
actually laid the mines, the representative of the United States
suggested two small amendments to the resolution proposed by
the representative of the United Kingdom on 20th March (as
mentioned in para. 48 of this Memorial) (Annex 23, ibid., p. 353).
53. The Security Council met again on 25th March, 1947
(Annex 23, S/PV/IZ~*). At this meeting the representative of

France expressed bis opinion on the matters in dispute. He had
no doubt that the two mines which caused the two explosions on
zznd October, 1946, belonged to the minefield "which was dis-
covered only some two or three weeks after the incident". He
did not agree that it was established that the Albanian Govern-
ment laid the minefield, on the ground that they did not possess
the expert staff and equipment necessary for the pnrpose. He
held, however, that it was "very unlikely" that these mines were
laid without the knowledge of the Albanian Government. Accord-
ingly, he reached a conclusion "which is very close to the view
expressed by the representative of Colombir and the represent-
ative of the United States".

54. Sir Alexander Cadogan accepted the amendmenis proposed
by the United States at the Council meeting on zrst Rfarch (as
mentioned in para. 52 of this Memorial), and the Albanian and
Polish representatives made fnrther speeches.
55. The representative of China then spoke. He stated that

"In view of the very great and zealous care and strict vigilance
with which the Albanian Government has guarded its sovereignty
ovcr its territorial waters and the close proximity of the mines
the existence of which resulted in the blowing up of the British
warships, 1 also have come to the conclusion that it is impossible
for the mines to have been laid without the knowledge of the
Albanian Gi>vernmentn (Annex 23, ibid., p. 361).
The representative of Syria spoke (Annex 23, ibid., p. 364).
56.
He held the view that the matter should be studied further and
that the parties to the dispute should try some other means,
See pp.355 esqq. 36 JIEIIORIAL OF THE UNITED KIXGDOX
such as mediation, which is mentioned in Article 33 of the Charter.

Further speeches were made by the representatives of the United
Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and thereafter a vote was taken
on the resolution set forth in the next paragraph of this Memorial.
57. At the ~~2nd Meeting of the Security Council on
2jth March, 1947 (Annex 23, ibid., p. 36g),'the representative
of the United Kingdom presented a resolution in the following
terms :-

"The Security Council, having considered statements of represent-
atives of the United Kingdom and of Albania, concerning a dispute
between the United Kingdom and Albania arising out of an incident
on zznd October, 1946, in the Strait of Corfu in which two British
ships were damaged by mines with resulting loss of life and injury
to their crews ;
(I) Considers that the laying of mines in peace-time without noti-
fication is unjustified and an offenceagainst humanity;
(2) Finds that an unnotified minefield was laid in the immediate
vicinity of the Albanian coast, resulting in serious injury to
two of His Majesty's shi Swith loss of life and injury to their
crews ; that the minefied could not have been laid without
the knowledge o? the Albanian authorities ;
(3) Recommends that the United Kingdom and Albanian Govern-
ments should settle the dispute on the basis of the Council's
finding in (2)above, and that in the event of failure to settle,
either party may apply to the Council forfurther considera-
tion of the matter ;
(4) Resolvesto retain this dispute on its agenda until both parties
certify that it has been settled to their satisfaction."
jS. A vote was taken on the above resolution with the result
that seven States (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia,
France, United States)voted in favour of it. Two States (Poland
and the U.S.S.R.) voted against it. One State (Syria) abstained,

and the United Kingdom did not vote (Annex 23, ibid.,p. 369).
jg. This resolution having failed to obtain the concurring
vote of one of the five permanent Members of the Council, was,
under Article 27 of the Charter, not effective as a decision of the
Council.

60. Such an expression of opinion by seven members out of
ten votes cast fortifies the Government of the United Kingdom
. in their submission that the inferences of fact set out in para-
graph 26 of this Rlemorial are correct.
61. At the 127th Meeting of the Security Council on 9th April,
1947 (Annex 23, S/PV 127~) (the representatives of Albania and
the Soviet Union having made further speeches), the represent-
ative of the United Kingdom presented a resolution in the fol-

lowing terms :- AIE>IORIAL OF THE USITED KIXGDOM 37
'The Security Council having considered statements of repre-
sentatives of the United Kingdom and of Albania concefning a
dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania arising out
of an incident on zznd October, 1946, in the Straits of Corfu,
in which two British ships were damaged by mines withresulting
loss of life and injury to their crews;
Recomnzends that the United Kingdom and the Albanian
Governments should immediately refer the dispute to the Inter-
national Court in accordance with the provisions of the Statute
of the Court."
This resolution was carried by eight votes, two vates (Poland
and the U.S.S.R.) having abstained, and the United Kingdom
not having voted. The proceedings of the Security Council in
this matter, careful, deliberate and prolonged, as they had been.
thus terminated (ibid., p. 393).

62. By its Application dated 13th May, 1947, and in pur-
suance of the above resolution, the Government of the United
Kingdom commenced these proceedings.

Part III.

THE LAW.
The international law on the subject of the laying of
mines is, in the submission of the Government of the United
Kiiigdom, well establislied. In the first place, in view of the
inevitable danger to the lives and property of innocent persons

cau~ed by the existence of minefields, the laying of minefields
is pyimn facie forbidden and is an international wrong invohlng
responsibility..This is based upon the elementary principle
that one \\.ho, knou-ingly and without legal justification, creates
a danger to the life or property of another is answerable for any
injury or damage sustained by that other.
64. IVhile this primary principle remains generally applic-

able .both in peace and \var, it was recognised by nations that
in war-time some use of mines by belligerents, and also by neu-
trals in defence of their neutrality, had for the time being to be
accepted. Accordingly, in order to regulate such uses and to
minimise the damage and suffering caused thereby, certain rules
were formulated and adopted by the Second Peace Conference
held at The Hague in 1907 and attended by forty-four States;
these rules are referred to in detail in the following paragraph.
The rules so adopted were drawn up Io estjblish a minimum
standard of conduct for nations in the particular circumstauces
of war and indeed appear to contemplate the use of mines as
legal in war-time only, though no doubt there is no objection
to laying (with al1 due safety precautions) minefields in peace-
time for the purposes of trairiing and practice. The Hague rules AIE>IORIAL OF THE USITED KIXGDOM 37
'The Security Council having considered statements of repre-
sentatives of the United Kingdom and of Albania concefning a
dispute between the United Kingdom and Albania arising out
of an incident on zznd October, 1946, in the Straits of Corfu,
in which two British ships were damaged by mines withresulting
loss of life and injury to their crews;
Recomnzends that the United Kingdom and the Albanian
Governments should immediately refer the dispute to the Inter-
national Court in accordance with the provisions of the Statute
of the Court."
This resolution was carried by eight votes, two vates (Poland
and the U.S.S.R.) having abstained, and the United Kingdom
not having voted. The proceedings of the Security Council in
this matter, careful, deliberate and prolonged, as they had been.
thus terminated (ibid., p. 393).

62. By its Application dated 13th May, 1947, and in pur-
suance of the above resolution, the Government of the United
Kingdom commenced these proceedings.

Part III.

65. The position therefore is that, apart from the limited
exceptions referred to above, States remain bound by thc stricter
general principle stated in paragraph 63, and the Government
of the United Kingdom contends that in this case thc Govern-
ment of Albania has committed a breach not only of the stricter

general principle of international law but also of the rules which
establish a minimum standard of conduct applicable in time of
\var to belligerents and neutrals.

66. The war-time rules above referred are to be found in the
Hague Convention No. VI11 of 1907 which is set out in Aiinex zj.
The Convention, in its Preamble, declares itself to be "inspired
by the principle of the freedom of the seas as the common high-
way of al1 nations", and continues : "seeing that, while the exist-
ing position of affairs makes it impossible to forbid the employ-
ment of automatic submarine contact mines, it is, nevertheless,
expedient to restrict and regulate their employment in order
to mitigate the severity of war and to ensure, as far as possible,
to peacefulnavigation the security to which it is entitled, despite
the existence of war".
This clearly contemplates that, apart from the necessities of
\var, the employment of automatic submarine contact mines

would be wholly illegal.
67. After prohibiting (Art. z) the laying of automatic contact
mines off the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object
of intercepting commercial navigation, the Convention lays down

(Art. 3) that, when anchored automatic contact mines are
employed, every possible precaution must be taken for the secur-
ity of peaceful navigation. Belligerents must provide, so far
as possible, for mines becoming harmless after a limited time
kas elapsed, and, where the mines cease to be under observation,
must notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies
permit by a notice to mariners which must also be communi-
cated to governments through the diplomatic channel. The
same rules and precautions must, according to Article 4, be
observed by neutrals who lay automatic contact mincs off their
coasts. The duty of notification in the case of neutrals is, how-
ever, higher, for they must give advance notice of arcas mined,
and governmeuts must be informed as a matter of urgency,
through diplomatic channels.

68. Article j lays down that at the end of a \var every effort
must be made to remove mines laid. Each Power is obliged
to remove the mines it has laid except in cases where anchored
automatic contact mines have been laid off the coast of another JlEJlORlAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 39
Power, in which case the latter Power, after notification, is obliged

to remove the mines.
69. The Convention thus, while recognising that contact

mines may be used in war-time by belligerents, and even by
neutrals in defence of their neutrality, imposes on this use the
severest restrictions compatible with military exigencies, the
most important being the requirement of notice to governments
of the use of mines. In prescribing, by Article 5, that mines
must be removed at the end of hostilities, it clearly contemplates
that the use of mines in peace-time is illega;and Article 4, which
requires neutrals to give notice of mines laid in advance, shows
that only the most strict military exigencies in time of war can
jiistify such use.

70. This Convention was ratified by twenty-nine States and
must be regarded as establishing the general rules of interna-
tional law governing the laying of mines. Autlioritative writers
upon international law treat the provisions of the Hague Con-
vention No. VI11 as declaratory of principles of international

la~v,now generally applicable, and it is to be observed that the
Institute of International Law in the resolutions adopted at
their conferences held at Paris in 1910, at Madrid in 1911 and at
Oxford in 1913, proposed even more stringent rules for the use
of naines in the interests of the safety of innocent shipping.
Furthermore, since the adoption of the Convention in 1907.
States have in their practice treated its provisions as having
been received into general international law. Even Germany,
who in the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939.1945 was guilty of
serious breaches of the Convention,.publicly professed to be com-
plyi~igwith its provisions. The Allied Powers in both wars held
themselves bonnd by the Convention and throughout observed

the provisions relating to notification. ' Similarly, the action
taken by certain of the United Nations, through the vanous
Mine Clearance Boards, to remove mines from channels of navi-
gation was dictated by the provisions of Article 5.of the Con-
vention.

71. Albania, although not a party, has declared that it
was aware of the terms of the Convention and respected them.
(Annex 23: Report of Silb-Coirimittee to Security Council,
Appendix II, Question 2-S/3oo, p. 320. and Security Council
Proceedings S/PV/III, p. 101.) The Albanian Government,
therefore, appears to be at one witli the United Kingdom Govern-
mcnt in holding that the laying of mines in the Corfu Strait in
time of peace and \vithoiit notification contrary to the terms of
the Convention would be a breach of international !aw. The
same vie\\, was taken by the Security Council at its Meeting of
25th March, 1946, when in the first paragraph of its draft

44O IlEMORIAL OF THE UKITED KINGDOY

resolution it characterised the laying of mines in pcace-time with-
out notification as unjustified niid an offeiiceagainst humanity (see
para. 57 of Part 11 of this iViemoria1). No objection was at any
time taken by any &lemberof the Security Council to this pas-
sage in the draft resolution, as was pointed out by the Australian
representative at the Meeting of the Council of 9th April (see
Annex 23, S/PV/IZ~, p. 389).

72. The United Kingdom Government accordingly submit
that for the purpose of deciding the present case the following
are the established rules of international law relating ta the lay-
ing of mines :-

(a) A State, which lays, or connives in the laying of, mines
without the special necessity which in war exonerates
from liability belligerents and neutrals acting in con-
formity with the Hague Convention No. VIII, commits
a breach of international law and an international delin-
quency.
(b) A State, which lays, or connives in the laying of, mines
in a channel of navigation as in (a) and fails ta satisfy
the categorical requirements of the Hague Convention

No. VI11 concerning advance notification of the mine-
laying, is guilty of an offence against humanity which
most seriously aggravates the breach of international
law and the international delinquency committed by
that State.
(G)A State found ta be delinquent under either (a)or (b) is
liable under international law to make reparation for
the damage resulting ta otbers from the delinquency.
(Such liability was expressly recognised in Art. g of the
resolution of the Institute of International Law adopted
at the meetings of 1911 and 1913.)

The Corfu Strait, including that portion of it known as
the North Corfu swept channel, is a channel of navigation for
the shipping of al1 nations in that it connects two parts of the

open sea and, as shown in paragraph j above, is a natural route
for a considerable amount of navigation. It has long been
used, irequently and unrestrictedly, by shipping without distinc-
tion of flag as an international highway. It was for that
reason that the North Corfu swept channel was so quickly re-
established as a maritime highway in 1944. and notified as such
ta the Government of Albania, through the Rledri Charts and
pamphlets. As such, the Strait is subject ta the principle of the
freedom of the seas upon which the Hague Convention No. VI11
itself is founded. The laying of mines, and especially without
notification, in such a waterway is thus, on the well-established
principles of international law set out in the preceding para- \IE>IORIAL OF THE UNITED KIKGDOM 4I

graph, an aggravated offence and a serious international delin-
quency entailing the fullest responsibility for any damage caused
thereby to foreign shipping.
74. The Government of Albania, in diplomatic notes and
before the Security Council, has sought to repudiate respon-
sibility for the damage caused to His Rlajesty's ships by mines
laid in the North Corfu swept channel within Albanian territorial

waters by two main contentions. First it has denied any corn=
plicity in, or knowledge of, the existence of the mines, and secondly,
it has alleged that the damaged ships were not at the time law-
fully making passage through the Channel.
Both these contentions are denied by the Government
of the United Kingdom. The second contention in any case

affords no defence to the charge of maintaining an unnotified
minefield.
76. The contention of the Albanian Government that it had
no complicity in the existence of the minefield which damaged
His Majesty's ships was rejected by the majority of the Members
of the Security Council who voted in favour of the draft resolu-
tion of the 25th March, 1947. The terms of this draft resolution
and the details of the voting are set out in paragraphs 57 and 58

of the Statement of Facts of this Memorial. Seven out of the
nine representatives who cast their votes at that meeting tbus
endorsed the submission made at paragraph 26 of this Memorial
that an irresistible inference arises from the facts of this case
that the mines which damaged His Rlajesty's ships and caused
death and injury to men on board were laid by the Albanian
Government or at least with its connivance or knowledge.
The Albanian representative, on the other hand. main-
77.
tained at the Meeting of 25th hlarch, 1947. that to draw this
inference would be mere supposition and, as such, contrary to
principles of justice, a point of v ew which was also expressed
by the Polish representative. But, in fact, the conclusion of
the majority of the Security Council is in full accord with the
principles of justice relating to judicial proof. For under these
principles responsibilityfor breaches of law may be fixed upon
a delinquent by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence.
If tliis were not so, it would be impossible for any system of law,
including i~iternational law, to be effectively enforced. More-
over, in the present case the circumstantial evidence consists
of the cumulative evidence of several circumstances al1 pointing
in one direction. It has therefore a compelling force leading
only to one conclusion and, in the submission of the Government
of the United Kingdom, establishes the complicity of Albania
beyond al1 reasonable or moral doubt. No explanation of the

mining of H.M.S. Volage and Snzcniavezon zznd October, 1946,42 hIEMORIAL OF THE UNITED KIKGDOM

is consistent with the established facts of this case other than
that the mines were laid by, or with the connivance or knowledge
of, the Albanian Government. It is particularly significant in
considering the question of the complicity of Albania in the
existence of the minefield, that Albania, while showing the utmost
promptitude in protesting against alleged violations of her sover-
eignty by His Majesty's ships, did not make, and to this day has
not made, any protest against the far more serious violation of
her sovereignty, which would have been committed by the laying
without her knowledge and consent of so large and dangerous
minefields in her territorial waters, and blocking the entrance
to one of her ports nor, as would have been the natural course
for an innocent party to take, has she demanded an enquiry
into such an illegal action. Her representative before the Secur-
ity Council did not even appear to be very concerned over the

existence in Albanian waters of an unexplained minefield whose
origin he could not explain.

His Majesty's ships when mined were not lawfullyvernmmaking pas-

sage through the North Corfu swept channel must equally, in
the submission of the United Kingdom Government, be rejected
as being without foundation in law or fact. As stated in para-
graph 73 of this part of the Memorial, the North Corfu swept
channel, being a natural channel of navigation between two parts
of the open sea, constitutes an international highway. By inter-
national law such an international highway is subject to a right
of innocent passage in favour of foreign shipping, but even if
that were not so, the laying, or knowingly permitting the exist-
ence, of a minefield which may destroy ships passing through,
even if they have no such right of passage, is an international
delinquency as well as a crime against humanity.

79. Nevertheless, the Government of Albania in their diplo-
matic notes of zrst May and 19th June, 1946,relating to the earlier
incident of 15th May, when fire was opened upon H.M.S. Ovion
and Superb and in their note of 31st October, 1946, concerning
the mining of H.M.S. Volage and Saumarfz appeared to adopt the
attitude that the mere navigation of any foreign vessels through
Albanian territorial waters isa breach of international law unless

specially authorised.
80. Later, in the note of zrst December, 1946, Albania professed
that she respects the principles of maritime navigation and accord-
ingly changed the nature of her allegations by complaining that
the British warships were not making an innocent passage.
Similarly, before the Security Council on 19th February, 1947,

the representative of Albania retracted the Albanian Government's
former denial of the right of innocent passage in its diplomatic I\lE.\IORIAL OF THE UNITED KIKGDOM 43
notes and declared that his Government respected that pnnciple.

SI. The representative of Albania then proceeded to contend
that, having regard to Articles 4 and 3 of the draft code annexed
to the Final Act of the Hague Conference on the Codification of
International Law held in 1930 (League of Kations publication
C. 230. M. 117 1930, V), the passage of His hlajesty's ships was
iiot innocent and violated the sovereignty of Albania in regard
to its territorial waters. These later contentions of the Albanian
Government are dealt with in paragraphs 85-88 below.

82. The eventual recognition by the Albanian Government of
the existence of the principle of innocent passage is in full accord
with the established rules of international law and the practice
of civilised States.The published regulations of the large majority
of States and their practice previous to the Hague Conference of
1930 acknowledged a right of passage through territorial \rraters
in the ordinary course of navigation for foreign shipping, whether
merchant ships or warships, and Albania itself has never published
any regulations restricting navigation in territorial waters. The
majority of governments, which replied to the qacestionnairecir-
culated before the Conference, stated their opinion that warships
possess a right of innocent passage through the territorial waters

of another State ("Bases of Discussion", Vol. II, pp. 65-70).
Such a right had in fact received express recognition in Article 5
of the Convention of 1921 for the neutralisation of the Aaland
Islands, in urhich it was explicitly reserved. In time of peace-
and, indeed, in time of war-warships habitually pass through
the territorial waters of other States without notice or authorisa-
tion when using them as a mere channel of passage.
So far as concerns straits, like the Corfu Strait, which
constitute a route for international maritime traffic between two
parts of the high sea, the Committee on Territorial Waters at the

Conference of 1930 annexed to its report articles stating in the
most categorical language that under no pretext may there be any
interference with the passage of warships through such a strait.
(League of Nations publication C. 351. hl. 145 (b). 1930. V, p. 217.)
In conformity with this principle warships have long exercised
an undisputed right of passage through straits like the Straits of
Bonifacio, the entrances to the Baltic and the territorial waters
of Hong Kong.
84. Accordingly, the Government of the United Kingdom

maintain that on 15th May and zznd October, 1946, His Majesty's
ships were exercising a right which they possessed under interna-
tioiial law to make innocent passage through Albanian territorial
waters as incidental to the ordinary navigation of the Corfu Strait.
S5. The Albanian Government has, however, had recourse to
the allegatioii that the passage of the British warships through the44 hlE31ORIAL OF THE USITED KISGDOJI
Corfu Strait on zznd October mas not innocent passage and nas
for that reason unlawful. Xo proof or evidence \iras produced

or can be produced substantiating this allegation. Indeed, it is
significant that the Albanian Government now contend that the
earlier passagc of H.M.S. Orion and Superb on I5th May \vas also
not innocent, whercas no such suggestion \vas made at thc time
in its diplomatic note of zrst May, 1946 (see Annex 6, First Inci-
dent, item III). This fact indicates that the allegatioii concern-
ing the non-innocent character of the passage of His Majcsty's
ships \vas a mere pretcnce to provide a spurious justification for
the unwarrantable intcrfcrence with their right of passage.

86. The arguments advanced by the Albanian Government
in support of this allegation, which will now be examined, are
submitted to be without foundation. First it was said that His
Majesty's ships penetrated into internal waters and were not in
a channel of navigation. In refuting this allegation the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom refers to paragraph Ij above and to
the charts at Annexes 7 and g, which show beyond dispute that
the ships proccedcd through the swept and established channel
to avoid the danger of mines and without deviating from it to
penetrate into Albanian internal waters. The course take.3 by

His Majesty's ships on both occasions was, in fact, prccisely the
normal and proper course of navigation through the Strait in the
prevailing mine conditions of which the Albanian Govcrnment
were at al1 material times fully auxare.
Secondly, it was said that the passagc of His Rfajesty's
ships in this case amounted to a violation of Albanian sovereignty.

The meaning of this allegation \vas not, it is presuined, merely
that His hfajesty's ships were in Albanian territorial \vaters since
the right of innocent passagc exists precisely in relation to such
waters. It appears, in fact, that the basis for the objection was
that His Majesty's ships acted in some maiiner provocatively.
Such an allegation to be cstablished must be supported by some
evidence, and nonc was or could be produced by the Governmeiit
of .4lbania in the circumstanccs of the case. The passage of His
hlajesty's ships, as relatcd in paragraph 15 above, \vas a normal
passage through an iiitcrnational highway and, as sucb, innocent
according to the law and practice of civilised nations. So far as
concerns the allegation that the British warships werc in battle
formation when making passage on zznd October, this is untrue.

They were in passage formation. On the other hand, it is the case
that the crews were ordcred to be at action stations as a necessary
precaution for sclf-defence in view of the wholly unwarranted
attack upon H.M.S. Orionand Superb on I jth hfay, 1946. This
measure, \\,hich amounted to no more than a readiness to meet
the eventuality of renewed Albanian illegalities, cannot bc charged
to His Majesty's ships as provocation. In any case the mines >IEYORIi\L OF THE EKITED KINGDOM 45
had then been laid and the injuries would have been the same in
whatever formation His Majesty's ships had sailed. Indeed, the
mines would have injured any ships which used this portion of the

snept channel.
88. Thirdly, it was argued that the sovereignty of Albania was

violated in that no prior notice was given of tlie intended passage
of His Majesty's ships through Albanian territorial waters. The
Government of the United ICingdom ernphasise that it is contrary
to the practice of civilised States, and to international law, that
States should ordinarily either give or demand notice of the pas-
sage of warships through territorial waters when used merely as
a channel of navigation. This is particularly soin the case of
straits, in regard to which the Cornmittee on Territorial Waters
at the Hague Conference of 1930, annexed articles to its report
stating that on no pretext whatever may the right of passage even
for warships be interfered with. (League of Nations publication
C. 351. RI. 145 (b). 1930, V, p.217.) In its diplomatic notes the
Albanian Government appeared to claim that, owing to special
circz~nzstancespretended to existin the area at the time, it had a

particular right to restrict or forbid the passage of foreign ships
through its territorial waters. But it is plain that Albanian
Government at the mnterial dates was not acting bona fide in
reliance upori any such particular right (which in any case must,
in view of the right of passage through straits,be a strictly limited
one), but under the mistaken bclief that it was entitled at al1times
to regard the mere navigation of a foreign ship, whether merchant
ship or warship, within Albanian territorial waters as a violation
of its sovereignty, unless specially authorised, and to oppose it
by,opening hostilities. This is manifest both from-

(1) the fact that the first notice received by the Government
of the United Kingdom of any pretended claim ta restrict
passage was the outrageous attack upon His Majesty's
ships Orion and Superb on 15th May, 1946; and
(2)from the terms of the Albanian Government's diplomatic
notes, in particular those of- 19th June (Annex 6, First
Incident, item V) and 31st October, 1946 (Annex 6, Second
Incident, item II), addressed to the Government of the
United Kingdom, and that of 29th October, 1946 (Annex 6,
Second Incident, item III), addressed to the Secretary-

General of the United Nations.
89. Indeed, such a mistake as. to a State's general rights

under international lai\, is the only explanation that can he
imagined of the attack upon H.M.S. Orion and Sufierb on
15th May, and of Albania's complicity in the establishment of
a new unnotified minefield in a swept channel used by foreign
shipping. (The fact that Albania subsequently .before the46 MEMORIAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOX
Security Council paid lip-service to the principle of innocent
passage and denied knowledge of the existence of the minefield,
only serves to emphasise that on 15th May and zznd October,
1946, Albania was either ignorant of, orwas ,disregarding, the

fundamental principles of maritime international law, with
regard to the rights of innocent passage and to the laying of mine-
fields, and later thought it more prudent to adopt a different
line of argument.)
90. The Government of the United Kingdom therefore
submit that both on 15th Rfay and zznd October, 1946, the
passage of His Majesty's ships through Albanian territorial
waters-

(a) was the exercise of a right lawful under the recognised
principles of international law, and
(b) was "innocent" within the meaning of that term as defined
in Article 3 of the draft code prepared at the Hague
Conference of 1930, and indeed within any possible mean-
ing of the term "innocent".

91. Even if, for some reason, the passage of His Majesty's
ships through Albanian territorial 'waters on ~jth May or
zznd October might be considered as not in accordance with
international Law,that would still not justify the laying or main-
taining of an unnotified minefield in a channel of navigation.
The recently-laid and unnotified minefield, which was in fact
discovered in the North Corfu swept channel on 13th November,
1946, endangered al1 shipping, merchant vessels equally with
warships, and was a violation of international law which could

not be justified or excused on any pretext whatever. Accord-
ingly, the Government of the United Kingdom submit that,
even if, for any reason, the Albanian Government might have
regarded themselves as entitled to exclude His Majesty's ships
from making passage through Albanian territorial waters within
the North Corfu swept channel, the grave measure of war taken
by the Albanian Government, in allowing the secret minefield
to be across the swept channel and letting His Majesty's ships
run into it, to effect that exclusion was illegal and constitutes
an international delinquency for which it is liable to make repa-
ration. In this connexion the Government of the United King-
dom emphatically repeat that the passage of His Majesty's ships
was innocent in its intention and was taken in the bona fidebelief
of their possessing a legal right of passage through the Corfu Strait
as an international channel of navigation.

92. In Part II of this Memorial, the Government of the
United Kingdom has submitted (para. 26) that an irresistib!e
inference arises that the mines which damaged His Majesty's
ships and caused the deaths and injuries of British naval personnel >lEMORIAL OF THE UNITED KINGDO11
47
were laid by the Albanian Government, or at least with the con-
nivance or. kiiowledge of the Albanian Government. Whichever
is in fact the case, Albania remains in law responsible in the same
degree. As the territorial Power, Albania is responsible for
any minefield existing with her knowledge in her territorial
waters and for the consequences thereof. If it was beyond her

power in the circumstances to remove the dangerous situation
created tbereby, it was her duty at once to issue warnings
to governments and/or to al1 shipping likely to use the inter-
national highway which would enable them to avoid the
danger, and a lortiori to warn vessels seen to be actually
approaching the dangerous area. In this connexion it is
stress-d that on zznd October, 1946, the intended passage of the
British warships through the Channel must have been known to
the Albanian authorities in time for warning of the danger to be
given. Even if they were unaware of the programme of the
cruise of this part of the British Mediterranean fleet, they could
observe the progress of the ships up to the swept channel for
some time before the minefield was approached. The ships
were proceeding at IO knots. Even, therefore, if they were not

seen until they were 5 miles away-which is most unlikely, the
weather beirig quite clear-this would allow 30 minutes for a
warning to be given. In these circumstances, to permit the
ships to sail directly into a minefield, the existence of which was
known to them (as the Government of the United Kingdom sub-
mit is established), was an act equivalent in law to placing the
mines in the way of the ships, with the intention of destroying
them, apart from being contrary to the principles of notification
established by the above-mentioned Hague Convention. As
the territorial Power Albania came under a clear duty to warn
the sbips, and failure to fulfil this duty entails responsibility.

93. But, in the submission of the Government of the United
Kingdom, the grave inference arises from the established facts
of this case, from the conduct of Albania prior to the incident

(in particular thefiring on His Majesty's ships on 15th May, 1946),
from its active opposition afterwards to any suggestion that
the area in question should be swept, from its apparent indif-
ference to the violation of its sovereignty which would have been
involved in an unauthorised mining of its territorial waters,
and lastly from the hostile attitude of the Albanian represent-
ative before the Security Council, that Albania was influenced
by active hostility towards the Government of the United
Kingdom. In short, the laying of the mines or, at least, the
acquiescence of the Albanian Government in the existence of .
a dangerons and unnotified minefield in a channel known to be
used, or about to be used, by British shipping was not merely
a matter of negligence but flowed from an animus nocendi.48 IIEIlORIAi OF THE UNITED KINGDOll
For al1 the above reasons the Government of the United
Kingdom contends that the Government of Albania .must bear

full responsibility forthe loss of life, injuries and damage caused
by the mines laid within its territorial waters in the Corfu Strait.
The laying of the minefield by itself was, without question, an
international delinquency of a grave character. The respon-
sibility of Albania rests, firstly, upona direct complicity in the
existence of the minefield which is created by her knowledge-of
it, whether or not she laid it or connived in its actual laying.
Secondly, it rests upon a failure-which was, in the submission
of the Government of the United Kingdom, a wilful failnre-to
discharge an imperative international duty to notifythe existence
of this dangerous minefield. Thirdly, it rests upon the failure
of the Albanian authorities to warn His Majesty's ships of their
danger when they were seen to be approaching it.

95. As to the measure of reparation or compensation, the
Government of the 'United Kingdom submits that this should
be based upon the damage sustained by the Government of the
United Kingdom, as set out in paragraph 18 above and
Annexes 10, II, 12, 13 and 14. The Government of the United

Kingdom accepts as applicable to the present case the principles
laid down by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
the case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Judgment No. 13,
Series A., No. 17, p. 47). in which the judgment contained this
passage :-
"The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an
illegal act-a principle which seems to be established by interna-
tional practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribun-
als-is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out al1the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which
would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, pay-
ment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution
in kind would bear ; the award, if need be, of damages for loss
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or
payment in place of it-such are the principles which should serve
to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary
to internation.l.law."

Part IV.

96. The Government of the United Kingdom asks the Court
to adjudge and declare as follows :-

(1)T'hat on zznd October, 1946, damage was caused to His
Majesty's ships Saumarez and Volage which resulted
in the death and injuries of 44, and persona1 injuries48 IIEIlORIAi OF THE UNITED KINGDOll
For al1 the above reasons the Government of the United
Kingdom contends that the Government of Albania .must bear

Part IV.

96. The Government of the United Kingdom asks the Court
to adjudge and declare as follows :-

(1)T'hat on zznd October, 1946, damage was caused to His
Majesty's ships Saumarez and Volage which resulted
in the death and injuries of 44, and persona1 injuries 3lEllIORIALOF THE UNITED KINGDOM 49
to 42, British officers and men by a minefield of anchored

automatic mines in the international highway of the
Corfu Strait in an area south-west of the Bay of Saranda.
The facts on which the Government of the United
Kingdom relies in support of this finding are set out in
paragraphs 15 to 18 and paragraph 23 of this Memorial
together with the annexes thereto.

(2) That the aforesaid minefield was laid between ~jth May,
1946, and zznd October, 1946, by or with the conniv-
ance or knowledge of the Albanian Government, and
in support of this finding the Government of the United
Kingdom submits the following facts :-

(a)The minefield was situated in a channel maintained
first by the Axis and then by the Allies as a swept
channel in which no mines had been encountcred
since it was first check-swept by the Allies in 1944.
(b) His Majesty's cruisers Orion and Sufierb passed
through the North Corfu sweptchannel on 15th May,
1946, without encountering mines.
(c)The said minefield as shoxvn from the examination of
the mines which were recovered during the sweep-
ing operation, carried out on 13th November, 1946,
was laid a short time before the date on which

His Majesty's ships suffered damage and casualties.
(d) The position of the mines strongly points to the conclu-
sion that they were carefully placed with the express
intention of providing a defensive minefield cover-
ing the Bay of Saranda.
(e) It was impossible for mines to be laid on such a scale
and so near the coast without being either observed
or heard by the Albanian coastal authorities. The
special measures of vigilance taken by the Albanian
Government during the six months preceding the
incident to His hlajesty's ships (which measures
are admitted hy the Albariian Government), further
exclude the possibility that the said minefield was

laid without its knowledge.
The facts upon which the Government of the
United Kingdom relies to support this finding are
set out in paragraphs 6, II, 12, 13, 14, 24 and zj
of this Memorial.

(3) That the Albanian Government knew that the said mine-
field was lying in a part of its territorial waters which was
being used as an international highway for maritime traffic,
and had been so used for a period of several months before
zznd October, 1946. MEMORIAL OF THE UNITED KISGDO>l

The facts upon which the Government of the United
Kingdom relies to support this finding are set out in
paragraphs 6, IO, II, 13 and 24 of this Memorial, in
which the following reasons for this finding are devel-
oped :-

(a) The Albanian Government was regularly informed
between October 1945 and October 1946 of the
routes which had been declared open for navigation
by the International Routeing and Reporting
Authority amongst which was Medri Route 18/32
and 18/34, in which was included the area where

the said mineficld was laid.
(b) The -4lbanian Government, from its own observation,
-and from the fact tbat it took special measures of
vigilance over the North Corfu Channel, knew that
the said Channel was used as an international high-
way by ships of al1 nations.

rhat the Albanian Government did not notify the existence
of these mines as required by the Hague Convention
No. VI11 of 1907 in accordance with the general prin-
ciples of international law and humanity.
The fact that the Albanian Government did not notify
the existence of these mines is not and cannot be disputed
by that Government. The Government of the United
Kingdom claims, however, that such notification \vas an
international obligation of the Albanian Government for
the following reasons :--

(a) The laying of mines in an international highway for
maritime traffic is, firima jacie, an international
wrong and can only be justified in special circum-
stances in time of war (paras.63-6j of theMernorial).
(b) Hague Convention No. VI11 regulates strictly the
circumstances in which such mines may be laid and
provides that, if and when they are laid, their

existence must be notified to foreign governments
(paras. 66-69 of the Memorial).
(c) The said Convention is declaratory of principles of
international law regarding mines which, as the
Albanian Government admitted before the Security
Council, are bindin~ on al1 States, including Albania
(paras. 70-71 of tKe Memorial).
(dl The oblieation to notifv the minefield rested on the
~lban&n ~overnmenf, whether or not the minefield
was laid by it or with its connivance, inasmuch
as, in any event, and to the knowledge of the Alba-
nian Government, the said minefield was situated ME~~ORIALOF THE UNITED KIKGD3M 5I
in Albanian territorial waters (paras. 68 and 92 of

the Memorial).
(5) That the Albanian Government or its agents, knowing that
His Majesty's ships were going to make the passage through
the North Corfu swept channel, and being in a position
to observe their approach, and having omitted as alleged
in paragraph 4 of these Conclusions to notify the existence
of the said mines, failed to warn His Majesty's ships of

the danger of the said mines of which the Albanian Govern-
ment or its agents were well aware (para. 92 of the Memo-
rial).
The fact that the Albanian Government or its agents
failed to give such warning is not and cannot be disputed
by the Albanian Government.
(6) That in addition, and as a further aggravation of the conduct

of Albaiiia as set forth in Conclusions 3,4 an5,the permis-
sion of the existence of the minefield in the North Corfu
Channel without notification was a violation of the right
of innocent passage which exists in favour of foreign
vesseIs (whether warships or merchant ships) through an
international highway (paras. 82-84 of the Memorial).
(7) That the passage of His Majesty's ships through the North
Corfu Channel on zznd October, 1946, was an exercise

of the right of innocent passage according to the law and
practice of civilised nations (paras. 15 and 85-90 of the
Mernorial).
(8) That even if for any reason it is held that Conclusion No. 7
is not established, nevertheless the Albanian Government
is not thereby relieved of its international responsibility
for the damage caused to the ships by reason of the exist-

ence of an unnotified minefield, especially in the circum-
stances set forth in Conclusion 5 (paras. 75 and gr).
(9) That in the circumstances set forth in this Memorial as
sunimarised in the preceding paragraphs of these Conclu-
sions, the Alhanian Government has committed a breach
of its obligations under international law and is inter-
nationally responsible to His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom for the deaths, injuries and damage

caused to His Majesty's ships and personnel as set out more
particularly in paragraph 18 of this Memorial and the
annexes thereto.
(IO) That the Albanian Government is under an obligation to
the Government of the United Kingdom to make repara-
tiori in respect of the breach of its international obliga-
tioiis as aforesaid (para. 95). 52 IIEXIORIAL OF THE USITED KISGDOZI (ASNEXES)
(II) That His hIajesty's Government in the United Kingdom

has as a result of the breach by the Albanian Government
of its obligations under international law sustained the
following damage :-
2

Damage to H.3I.S. Snzciliarez (total loss) . 7j0,ooo
Damage to HAIS. Volage . 75,000
Compensation for deaths and injuries of
naval personnel . . . . jo,ooo

Total . 875,000

(Paras. 18 and Annexes IO to 14.)

Ilated this 30th day of September, 1947.

(Signed) IV. E. BECKETT,
Agent for the Government

of the United Kingdom.

Part V.

Annex Admiralty Chart So. 206 shouing the Corfu Strait sprcial uolu+nc
Annex
Section of German >&ne Information Chart . . special voli<me
North Corfu Channel and the position of mines laid by the Axiç
there, and the original chart has been lïled with the Registry.)

Annex InternationalAgreement between the Governments of the United
liingdom, France, U.S.S.R. and the United States, setting up
the Mine Clearance Boards and dated îznd Nuvemher, 1945 . .
Annex Affidavit by deîpatchclerk at the Admiralty proving despatch
of hfedri Charts to Aibania ............
Annex Section'of lledri Index Chart showing North Corfu çwept channel
and the internationahighway established therein together with
>leciri pamphlets fuseu.ith the Index Char.......
(A single copy of the entire Chart and oi the complete pamphlets
numhered 5, g and rz have heen filed with Registry.)
Annex Diplomatic correspondence between the Government of the
United ICingdom and Albania regarding the right of navigation
in the Strait of Corfu ..............
Annex Admiralty tracings sbowing the Sorth Corfu swept channel and
the position and nacks of H.31. ships Orion. SsperbLeander,
Snumares and i>Inurifius.pazsing through the North Corfu Chan-
nel on 15th Afay, 1946, and on mnd October, i946specinlvoltrme
Annes Photographa of H.3I.S. Saurnarcz (below water line) and Volags
(boivs b1oirofftaken shortly after the explosion on nnd Octo-
ber, 1946 .......... specinl volt~mc
Annex Admiralty tracingshowing position of II.>f.'s ships at the time
of the explosion. .........:. special uolume 52 IIEXIORIAL OF THE USITED KISGDOZI (ASNEXES)
(II) That His hIajesty's Government in the United Kingdom

has as a result of the breach by the Albanian Government
of its obligations under international law sustained the
following damage :-
2

Damage to H.3I.S. Snzciliarez (total loss) . 7j0,ooo
Damage to HAIS. Volage . 75,000
Compensation for deaths and injuries of
naval personnel . . . . jo,ooo

Total . 875,000

(Paras. 18 and Annexes IO to 14.)

Ilated this 30th day of September, 1947.

(Signed) IV. E. BECKETT,
Agent for the Government

of the United Kingdom.

Part V.

Page.
Report on damage to H.M.S. &t<mare# ........
Annex 10. 87
Annex 11. Report on damage to H.hf.S. Volage ......... 89
Annex 12. List of sailors killed uith statement of pensions, &C., payable
to dependants ................. 93

Annex 13. List of sailors injured with statement of expenses, pensions, &c. g9
Annex 14. Statement of cost of repairs to the Volage and cost of replace-
ment of the Sar'marel .............. 101
Annex 15. Minutes of Aline Clearance Boards .......... IOI

Annex 16. Report of Capitaine Alesire ............ '47
(There were two reports,both in French. The reason why there
,%ere two reports was because Capitaine hfestre \%+shedto make
certain corrections in his second report of certain sratements
which he had made in his first report.)
Annex 17. Reports on Operation "Retail" ........... 150
(The minesweeping operation of 13th November, 1gq6.)

Annex 18. Chart showing position in which mines were found on 13thNo-
"ember, 1g46 ............ specid uoluwze --
Annex 19. Photographs of the mines ....... specialvolume --
Annex zo. Report on mines examined at Admiralty Mining Establishment,
Leigh Park House, Hants ............. 170

Annex 21. Chart showing the, defences of Saranda .. special volume -
Annex 22. Affidavit of Skipper Bargellini regarding the incident of
U.X.R.R.A. barges on 29th October, 1g46 . 171
Documents and records of the Security Council, &C., relative to
Annex 23.
the dispute ............ separate uolumel
Annex 24. List of exhibits before the Security Council, in the present dis-
pute, showing which of these exhibitsare annexed to this Memo-
rial ..................... 398
Annex 25. Hague Convention No. VIII of 1go7 relative to automaticsub-
marine contact mines .............. 400

1 See pp. 174-403. [Note by the Registmr.]

Document Long Title

Memorial submitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland