Order of 5 February 2003

Document Number
128-20030205-ORD-02-00-EN
Document Type
Incidental Proceedings
Date of the Document
Document File
Bilingual Document File

INTElRNATlONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER

MEXICAN NATIONALS

(MEXICO 1UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASliRES

ORDER OF 5 FEBRUARY2003

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSI'ICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE AVENA ET ALJTRES
RESSORTISSANTS MEXICAINS

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 5 FÉVRIER2003 Officia1citati:n
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico
v. United Statqf Arnerica), Provisional Measures,
Order oj 5Fehruary 2003,1.C.J.Reports
2003,p. 77

Mode officielde citati:n

Avena et autres ressorti.ssants mexicains
(Mexique c.Etats-Unis d'ilïnérique), mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance 5fivrier 2003,
C.I.J.Recueil 2003, p. 77

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 No devente: 863 1
ISBN 92-1-070970-5 5 FEBRUARY 2003

ORDER

AVENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NriTIONALS

(MEXICO v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PRO\'lSIONAL
MEASURES

AVENA ET AUTRES RESSORTISSANTS MEXICAINS

(MEXIQUE c. ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMI~RIQUE)

DEh4ANDE EN INDICATION DE MESIIRES
CONSERVATOIRES

5 FÉVRIER 2003

ORDONNANCE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2003 YEAR 2003
5 February
General List
No. 128 5 February2003

CASE CONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER

MEXICAN NATIONALS

(MEXICO v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER

Present: PresidentGUILLAUME;Vice-President SHI; Judges ODA,
RANJEVA,HERCZEGH,FLEISCHHAUERK , OROMA, VERESH-
CHETINH, IGGINS, ARRA-ARANGURE KNO,OIJMANSR,EZEK,AL-

KHASAWNE BHU,ERGENTHALE ,LARABYR ;egistrar COUVREUR.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 41 andf the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court
on 9 January 2003, whereby the United Mexican States (hereinafter
"Mexico") instituted proceedings against the United States of America

(hereinafter the "United States") for "violations of the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relatio(done on 24 April1963)"(hereinafter the
"Vienna Convention") allegedly committed by the United States,

1.Whereas in its aforementioned ApplicaMexico bases the juris-diction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1,of the Statute of the
Court and on Article 1of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compul-
sory Settlement of Disputes, which accompanies the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (hereinafter the "Optional Protocol");

2. Whereas the Application states that 54 Mexican nationals are on
death row in the United States; whereas it is alleged that these individ-

uals were arrested, detained, tried, convicted and sentenced to death by
competent authorities of the United States following proceedings in
which those authorities failed to comply with their obligations under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention; whereas it is con-
tended that this provision requires that the authorities of the receiving
State inform without delay any national of another State detained by
those authorities of his right to contact his consulate, that, if the detained

national so requests, it further requires those authorities to inform with-
out delay the nearest consular post of the State concerned of the deten-
tion, and lastly that it obliges those authorities to forward without delay
any communication addressed to the consular post by the detained indi-
vidual; and whereas it is alleged that, in the cases of 49 of the detained
Mexican nationals, the competent authorities of the United States made

no attempt at any time to comply with Article 36 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, that in the cases of four other detained individuals, the required
notification was not made "without delay", and finally that in one case,
while the detained national was informed of his rights, it was in connec-
tion with proceedings other than those involving capital charges against
him ;

3. Whereas in its Application Mexico states that "[tlhe rights conferred
by Article 36 . . . are not rights without remedies" and that in particular,
as the Court determined in the Judgment delivered on 27 June 2001 in the
case concerning LuGrand (Germany v. United States of A~nerica) :

"If the receiving State fails to comply with Article 36, and the
sending State's national has been subjected to 'prolonged detention
or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties', . . .the receiving
State must 'allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction
and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set
forth in the Convention'";

4. Whereas Mexico alleges that various rules of United States munici-
pal law, specifically "[tlhe rule of procedural default, the need to show
prejudice and the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment of the

United StatesConstitution followed by the United States tribunals", ren-
dered ineffective al1actions brought before state or federal courts in the
United States seeking relief for the violations of the Vienna Convention,
whether those actions were brought by Mexican nationals or by Mexico
itself; 5. Whereas in the Application Mexico explains that it has made numer-
ous démarches to the competent authorities of the United States with a
view to vindicating its rights and those of its nationals, but that these
authorities have consistently refused to provide relief adequate to put an
end to these violations and to ensure Mexico that they will not reoccur in
the future;

6. Whereas Mexico further notes that the diplomatic démarches which
it has made over the last six years to the executive branch of the federal
Government of the United States and to the competent authorities of the
constituent States have been ineffective; whereas, despite many diplo-
matic protests during that period, those authorities carried out the execu-
tion of several Mexican nationals whose rights under the Vienna Conven-
tion had been violated; and whereas the only response ever received by

Mexico from those authorities has consisted of formal apologies made
after the executions;

7. Whereas in itsApplication Mexico maintains that the United States,
by breaching its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), of the
Vienna Convention, prevented Mexico from exercising its rights and per-
forming its consular functions pursuant to Articles 5 and 36 of the Con-

vention, which "could have prevented the convictions and death sen-
tences"; whereas it contends that the steps taken by the United States to
improve compliance with the Vienna Convention do not enable full effect
to be given to the rights established by the Convention; whereas it claims
that apologies by the United States in cases of breaches of the Conven-
tion are an insufficient remedy; and whereas Mexico accordingly asserts

that it has suffered injury, in its own right and in the form of injury to its
nationals, and that it is entitled to restitutio in intrgrum, that is to say, to
the "reestablish[ment ofl the situation which would, in al1 probability,
have existed if [the violations] had not been committed";

8. Whereas Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and declare:

"(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convict-
ing, and sentencing the 54 Mexican nationals on death row
described in this Application, violated its international legal
obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its
right of consular protection of its nationals, as provided by
Articles 5 and 36, respectively of the Vienna Convention;

(2) that Mexico is therefore entitled to restitutio in integrum;
(3) that the United States is under an international legal obligation
not to apply the doctrine of procedural default, or any other
doctrine of its municipal law, to preclude the exercise of the
rights afforded by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; (4) that the United States is under an international legal obligation
to carry out in conformity with the foregoing international
legal obligations any future detention of or criminal proceed-
ings against the 54 Mexican nationals on death row or any
other Mexican national in its territory, whether by a constitu-
ent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether that
power holds a superior or a subordinate position in the organi-
zation of the United States, and whether that power's functions
are international or interna1 in character;

(5) that the right to consular notification under the Vienna Con-
vention is a human right;
and that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,

(1) the United States must restore the stutus quo unte, that is, re-
establish the situation that existed before the detention of, pro-
ceedings against, and convictions and sentences of, Mexico's

nationals in violation of the United States international legal
obligations ;

(2) the United States must take the steps necessary and sufficient
to ensure that the provisions of its municipal law enable full
effect to be given to thepurposes for which the rights afforded
by Article 36 are intended;
(3) the United States must take the steps necessary and sufficient
to establish a meaningful remedy at law for violations of the
rights afforded to Mexico and its nationals by Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention, including by barring the imposition, as a
matter of municipal law, of any procedural penalty for the fail-
ure timely to raise a claim or defence based on the Vienna Con-
vention where competent authorities of the United States have
breached their obligation to advise the national of his or her
rightsunder the Convention; and

(4) the United States, in light of the pattern and practice of viola-
tions set forth in this Application, must provide Mexico a full
guarantee of the non-repetition of the illegal acts";

9. Whereas, on 9 January 2003, after filingits Application Mexico also
submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures in order to
protect its rights, pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and
to Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court;
10. Whereas in its request for the indication of provisional measures

Mexico refers to the basis of jurisdiction of the Court invoked in itsApplication, and to the facts set out and the submissions made therein;
and whereas it reiterates in particular that the United States has syste-
matically violated the rights of Mexico and its nationals under Article 36

of the Vienna Convention;
11. Whereas in the request for the indication of provisional measures
Mexico states that three Mexican nationals, namely Messrs. CésarRoberto
Fierro Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos and Osvaldo Torres Aguilera,
risk execution within the next six months and that many other Mexican
nationals could be executed before the end of 2003; and whereas Mexico
further states that César Roberto Fierro Reyna's execution could take

place as early as 14 February 2003;

12. Whereas in the request for the indication of provisional measures
Mexico notes that the Court indicated provisional measures to prevent
executions in two prior cases involving claims brought under the Vienna
Convention by States whose nationals were subject to execution in the

United States as a result of criminal proceedings conducted in violation
of the Convention; whereas it states that "[tlhere can be no question of
the importance of the interests at stake", that "[ilnternational law recog-
nizes the sanctity of human life" and that "Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a
State Party, establishes that every human being has an inherent right to

life and mandates that States protect that right by law"; and whereas
Mexico states in the following terms the grounds for its request and the
possible conseyuences if it is denied :

"Unless the Court indicates provisional measures directing the
United States to halt any executions of Mexican nationals until this
Court's decision on the merits of Mexico's claims, the executive
officiais of constituent states of the United States will execute

Messrs. Fierro [Reyna], Moreno Ramos, Torres [Aguilera], or other
Mexican nationals on death row before the Court has had the
opportunity to consider those claims. In that event, Mexico would
forever be deprived of the opportunity to vindicate its rights and
those of its nationals. As the Court recognized in the LaGrarzd case,
such circumstances would constitute irreparable prejudice . . .";

13. Whereas Mexico concludes that "[p]rovisional measures are there-

fore clearlyjustified in order both to protect Mexico's paramount interest
in the life and liberty of its nationals and to ensure the Court's ability to
order the relief Mexico seeks" ;
14. Whereas Mexico adds in its request that "[tlhere can also be no
question about the urgency of the need for provisional measures";

15. Whereas Mexico states that, while it recognizes that the Court maywish to leave to the United States the choice of means to ensure corn-
pliance with the provisional measures ordered, it nevertheless requests
that the Court "leave no doubt as to the required result";
16. Whereas Mexico notes specifically in its request that "[als a matter
of international law, both the United States and its constituent political

subdivisions have an obligation to abide by the international legal obli-
gations of the United States"; and whereas Mexico takes the view that,
"[hlaving undertaken international obligations on behalf of its consti-
tuent political entities, the United States should not now be heard to
suggest that it cannot enforce their cornpliance with its obligations";

17. Whereas Mexico further states that,

"[gliven the clarity of both international law and United States
municipal law, there can be no doubt that the United States has the
means to ensure compliance with an order of provisional measures

issued by this Court pursuant to Article 41 (1)[of its Statute]";

18. Whereas Mexico asks that, pending final judgment in this case, the

Court indicate :
"(a) that the Government of the United States take al1 measures
necessary to ensure that no Mexican national be executed;

(6) that the Government of the United States take al1 measures
necessary to ensure that no execution dates be set for any
Mexican national ;
(c) that the Government of the United States report to the Court
the actions it has taken in pursuance of subparagraphs (a)

and (b) ; and
(d) that the Government of the United States ensure that no
action is taken that might prejudice the rights of the United
Mexican States or its nationals with respect to any decision
this Court may render on the merits of the case";

and whereas Mexico further asks the Court to treat its request as a
matter of the greatest urgency "[iln view of the extreme gravity and
immediacy of the threat that authorities in the United States will
execute a Mexican citizen" ;

19. Whereas on 9January 2003, the date on which the Application and
the request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in the
Registry, the Registrar advised the Government of the United States of
the filing of those documents and forthwith sent it originals of them, in
accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and
with Article 38, paragraph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Court; and whereas the Registrar also notified the Secretary-General of

the United Nations of that filing; 20. Whereas on 9 January 2003 the Registrar informed the Parties that
the President of the Court. in accordance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of
the Rules of Court, had fixed 20 January 2003 as the date for the opening
of the oral proceedings;
21. Whereas, pending notification under Article 40, paragraph 3, of
the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court by transmission, in two

languages, of the printed text of the Application to the States entitled to
appear before the Court, on 9January 2003 the Registrar informed those
States of the filing of the Application and of its subject-matter, and of the
request for the indication of provisional measures;

22. Whereas, following the Registrar's subsequent consultations with
the Parties, the Court decided to hear the Parties on 21 January 2003

concerning Mexico's request for the indication of provisional measures;
and whereas the Parties were so advised by letters of 14 January 2003
from the Registrar;
23. Whereas by a letter of 17January 2003, received in the Registry on
the same dav. the United States Government informed the Court of the
appointment of an Agent and a Co-Agent for the case;
24. Whereas by a letter of 20 January 2003 Mexico informed the Court

that, further to the decision of the Governor of the State of Illinois to
commute the death sentences of al1convicted individuals awaiting execu-
tion in that State, it was withdrawing its request for provisional measures
on behalf of three of the 54 Mexican nationals referred to in the Appli-
cation: Messrs. Juan Caballero Hernandez, Mario Flores Urban and
Gabriel Solache Romero; whereas it further stated that its request for
provisional measures would stand for the other 51 Mexican nationals

imprisoned in the United States and that "[tlhe application stands, on its
merits, for the fifty-four cases";

25. Whereas, at the public hearings held on 21 January 2003 in accord-
ance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, oral statements
on the request for the indication of provisional measures were presented
by the following representatives of the Parties:

On behaif'of Mexico : H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo,

H.E. Mr. Santiago Ofiate,
H.E. Mr. Alberto Székely,
Ms Sandra Babcock,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan;

On hehaif'ofthe United States: The Honorable William H. Taft, IV,
Mr. Stephen Mathias,
Ms Catherine W. Brown,
Mr. James H. Thessin,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,
Mr. Daniel Paul Collins;and whereas at the hearings a question was put by a Member of the
Court, to which an oral reply was given;

26. Whereas in the first round of oral argument Mexico restated the
position set out in its Application and in its request for the indication of
provisional rneasures, and stressed that the requirements for the indica-

tion by the Court of the provisional measures requested were met in the
present case ;
27. Whereas Mexico has stressed that neither the apologies offered by
the Government of the United States following the execution of Mexican
nationals whose rights under the Vienna Convention had been violated,
nor the review by an executive official "as a matter of grace and not of

legal right" could represent a sufficient remedy for violations by compe-
tent authorities in the United States of obligations arising from the
Vienna Convention; that a "meaningful 'review and reconsideration' of
its nationals' claims in accord with the Judgment in LaGrand" requires
the provision of "a remedy litlait."; and that only the restoration of the
stutus quo ante, that is, the re-establishment of the situation that existed

before the violation, would be such a remedy;

28. Whereas Mexico has insisted that, unless provisional measures are
indicated by the Court, three of its nationals, namely Messrs. Fierro
Reyna. Moreno Ramos and Torres Aguilera, risk execution in the next
few months and that many others could also be at risk of execution

before the Court rules on the merits; and whereas it accordingly contends
that the condition of urgency required for the indication of provisional
measures is satisfied;
29. Whereas in the first round of oral argument the United States con-
tended that the request by Mexico was without foundation in fact or
in law and that the requirements for the Court to indicate provisional

measures were not met;
30. Whereas the United States submitted that the Court had ruled in
the LuCrand case that, where there had been a violation of the obligation
of notification prescribed by Article 36,paragraph 1 (h), of the Vienna
Convention "in death penalty cases", the remedy to be provided by the
receiving State was to ensure that there was in every case review and
reconsideration of the decision; whereas it stated that, following the

L~~Grundcase. the competent authorities in the United States had insti-
tuted measuresproviding for review and reconsideration in al1such cases,
that so far these measures had proved effective and that there was no rea-
son to think that they would not be effective in future cases; whereas it
added that the receiving State was, on the other hand, under no obliga-
tion to quash al1convictions and to recommence the trial process in such

cases; and whereas the United States accordingly concluded that the
request by Mexico seeking, by way of indication of provisional measures,to preserve a right to the restoration of the stutus quo unte was not a
request seeking preservation of a right protected by the Vienna Conven-

tion, and that therefore the request should be denied;

31. Whereas the United States further contended that the request by
Mexico did not satisfy the condition of urgency and did not show that
imminent serious harm was likely, because United States proceedings in
each of the 51 cases were continuing and none of the Mexican nationals
covered by the request for indication of provisional measures was sched-
uled to be executed; and whereas it pointed out that in some of the cases
referred to by Mexico no violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Conven-
tion had been established, that in others Mexico would have an oppor-
tunity to raise any failure of notification at a later stage in the domestic
legal proceedings, and, finally, that review and reconsideration remained
available in al1the cases;

32. Whereas the United States further maintained that the request by
Mexico was too sweeping and did not respect the essential balance of the
rights of the Parties because, if it were accepted by the Court, it would

prejudice the sovereign right of the United States to operate its criminal
justice system; and whereas the United States concluded that the order
for the indication of provisional measures requested by Mexico "would
constitute a wholly unprecedented and unwarranted interference with the
sovereign rights of the United States even as itoes far beyond preserving
Mexico's rights under the Convention";

33. Whereas in its second round of oral argument Mexico stated that
it could not accept the conclusions derived by the United States from the
Court's Judgment in the LaGrand case in regard to the remedies available
for breaches of its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Conven-
tion; whereas Mexico added that the Court would not, however, need to
address those issues until its examination of the merits of the case; and
whereas it submitted that the purpose of its request was unquestionably
to preserve rights arising out of the Vienna Convention and that its
request should accordingly be upheld;
34. Whereas Mexico contended that, for the condition of urgency to

be met, it was sufficient that there was a "likely" threat of irreparable
prejudice, and that in the present case, since execution dates for the
Mexican nationals named in the request could be set at any time by the
competent authorities of the United States and since, once those dates
had been set, those nationals could be executed at very short notice, the
condition of urgency was accordingly met;

35. Whereas, finally, Mexico argued that an order of the Court enjoin-
ing the United States not to proceed with the execution of the said Mexi-
can nationals could not be considered as capable of causing any realharm to the legitimate interest of the United States in operating its crimi-
na1justice system;
36. Whereas in its second round of oral argument the United States
stressed the fact that, following the Court's Judgment in the LaGrand

case, it had put in place a vast programme to ensure compliance with the
obligation of notification under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention and had also taken measures to ensure review and
reconsideration in al1death penalty cases where that obligation had been
breached; and whereas the United States reiterated its view that Mexico's
request for the indication of provisional measures was not consistent with
the LaGrand Judgment and that it was seeking to preserve non-existent
rights, so that there was neither any risk of irreparable prejudice nor any

urgency; whereas the United States further pointed out that, according
to the United States Supreme Court, "the clemency power .. . [was] an
integral mechanism in the administration of Our criminal laws", and
"clemency 'has provided a fail-safe in Our criminal justice system'";

37. Whereas at the hearings a Member of the Court put the following

question to the Agent of the United States:
"Under what circumstances will the Legal Adviser of the State

Department notify an appellate court rather than later notify a
clemency body of the obligations of the United States consequent
upon an admitted violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention?
1s the matter simply one of timing?";

whereas, in response to that question, the Agent stated inter aliuthe fol-
lowing :

"We . . . have made a conscious choice to focus Our efforts on
clemency proceedings for providing the review and reconsideration
this Court called for inLaGrand. [That Judgment] expressly left the
choice of means of providing the review and reconsideration to the
United States[.] . . [Cllemency proceedings provide a more flexible

process that is best suited for achieving, without procedural
obstacles, the review and reconsideration this Court called for";

and whereas the Agent added that his

"Government would . . . inform a court upon request, at any time,
of the international legal obligations of the United States, and how
in the particular posture of a given case they [might] or [might] not
apply and whether and how they might be carried out under the
applicable domestic law in that court",

while explaining that "a court [might] determine . . . that domestic lawprinciples still preclude[d] an express judicial remedy for a failure of con-
sular notification" ;

38. Whereas, on a request for the indication of provisional measures,
the Court need not finally satisfy itself, before deciding whether or not to
indicate such measures, that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case,
yet it may not indicate them unless the provisions invoked by the Appli-
cant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which thejurisdiction of the
Court might be founded;

39. Whereas Article 1of the Optional Protocol, which Mexico invokes
as the basis of jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, is worded as
follows :

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by a written application made by any party to the dispute
being a Party to the present Protocol";

40. Whereas, according to the information communicated by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary, Mexico and
the United States have been parties to the Vienna Convention since
16 June 1965 and 24 November 1969 respectively, and to the Optional
Protocol since 15 March 2002 and 24 November 1969 respectively, in
each case without reservation;
41. Whereas Mexico has argued that the issues in dispute between
itself and the United States concern Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Con-
vention and fa11within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol; and whereas it has accordingly con-
cluded that the Court has the jurisdiction necessary to indicate the pro-
visional measures requested; and whereas the United States has said that
it "does not propose to make an issue now of whether the Court
possesses prima facie jurisdiction, although this is without prejudice to
its right tocontest the Court's jurisdiction at the appropriate stage later
in the case" ;
42. Whereas, in view of the foregoing, the Court accordingly considers

that, prima facie, it has jurisdiction under Article 1 of the aforesaid
Optional Protocol to hear the case;

43. Whereas in its Application Mexico, as stated previously (see para-
graph 8 above), asks the Court to adjudge and declare that, the United
States "violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own
right and in the exerciseof its right of consular protection of its nationals,as provided by Articles 5 and 36, respectively of the Vienna Conven-

tion"; whereas Mexico seeks various measures aimed at remedying these
breaches and avoiding any repetition thereof; whereas it contends, the
Court should preserve the right to such remedies by calling upon the
United States to take al1 necessary steps to ensure that no Mexican
national is executed and that no execution date be set in respect of any
such national:

44. Whereas the United States acknowledges that, in certain cases,
Mexican nationals have been prosecuted and sentenced without being
informed of their rights pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention; whereas it argues, however, that in such cases, in
accordance with the Court's Judgment in the LaGrand case, the United
States has the obligation "by means of its own choosing, [to] allow the

review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in that Convention";
whereas it submits that in the specificcases identified by Mexico the evi-
dence indicates the cornmitment of the United States to providing such
reviewand reconsideration; whereas the United States contends that such
review and reconsideration can occur through the process of executive
clemency - an institution "deeply rooted in the Anglo-American system
of justice" - which may be initiated by the individuals concerned after
the judicial process has been completed; whereas it claims that such
review and reconsideration has already occurred in several cases during
the last two years; that none of the Mexicans "currently under sentence of
death will be executed unless there has been a review and reconsideration
of the conviction and sentence that takes into account any failure to carry
out the obligations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention"; that, under

the terms of the Court's decision in the LaGrand case, this is a sufficient
remedy for its breaches, and that there is accordingly no need to indicate
provisional measures intended to preserve the rights to such remedies;
45. Whereas, according to Mexico. the position of the United States
amounts to maintaining that "the Vienna Convention entitles Mexico
only to review and reconsideration, and that review and reconsideration
equals only the ability to request clemency"; whereas "the standardless,
secretive and unreviewable process that is called clemency cannot and
does not satisfy this Court's mandate [in the LaGrand case]";

46. Whereas there is thus a dispute between the Parties concerning the
rights of Mexico and of its nationals regarding the remedies that must be
provided in the event of a failure by the United States to comply with its
obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention;
whereas that dispute belongs to the merits and cannot be settled at this

stage of the proceedings; whereas the Court must accordingly address the
issue of whether it should indicate provisional measures to preserve any
rights that may subsequently be adjudged on the merits to be those of the
Applicant ; 47. Whereas the United States argues, however, that it is incumbent
upon the Court, pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute, to indicate provi-

sional measures "not to preserve only rights claimed by the Applicant,
but 'to preserve the respective rights of either party'"; that, "[alfter bal-
ancing the rights of both Parties, the scales tip decidedly against Mexico's
request in this case"; that the measures sought by Mexico to be imple-
mented immediately amount to "a sweeping prohibition on capital pun-
ishment for Mexican nationals in the United States, regardless of United
States law", which "would drastically interfere with United States sov-

ereign rights and implicate important federalism interests"; that this
would, moreover, transform the Court into a "general criminal court of
appeal", which the Court has already indicated in the past is not its func-
tion; and that the measures requested by Mexico should accordingly be
refused :

48. Whereas the Court, when considering a request for the indication
of provisional measures, "must be concerned to preserve . . . the rights
which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either to the
Applicant or to the Respondent" (Land und Muritinle Boundary betiz,een
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cumeroon v. Nigeria), Provisional Measures,

Order oj 15 Murch 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 22,para. 35),with-
out being obliged at this stage of the proceedings to rule on those rights;
whereas the issues brought before the Court in this case "do not concern
the entitlement of the federal states within the United States to resort to
the death penalty for the most heinous crimes"; whereas "the function of
this Court is to resolve international legal disputes between States, inter
ulia when they arise out of the interpretation or application of interna-

tional conventions, and not to act as a court of criminal appeal";
(LaCrand f Cermuny v. United States of Anzerica), Provisional Meas-
ures, Order of3 Murch 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I),p. 15, para. 25);
whereas the Court may indicate provisional measures without infringing
these principles; and whereas the argument put forward on these specific
points by the United States accordingly cannot be accepted;

49. Whereas
"the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures under

Article 41 of its Statute is intended to preserve the respective rights
of the parties pending its decision, and presupposes that irreparable
prejudice shall not be caused to rights which are the subject of a
dispute in judicial proceedings" (ihid. pp. 14-15, para. 22); 50. Whereas, moreover,
"provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute are indicated
'pending the final decision' of the Court on the merits of the case,
and are therefore only justified if there is urgency in the sense that
action prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be taken

before such final decision is given" (Passage through the Great Belt
(Finland v.Dennîark), Provisional Meusures, Order of 29 July 1991,
I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 17, para. 23);

51. Whereas Mexico's principal request is that the Court should order
the United States "to take measures sufficient to ensure that no Mexican

national be executed and that no date for the execution of a Mexican
national be set"; whereas the jurisdiction of the Court is limited in the
present case to the dispute between the Parties concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of the Vienna Convention with regard to the indi-
viduals which Mexico identified as being victims of a violation of the
Convention; whereas, accordingly, the Court cannot rule on the rights of
Mexican nationals who are not alleged to have been victims of a violation
of that Convention;
52. Whereas, however, Mexico argues that 54 of its nationals have
been sentenced to death following proceedings that allegedly violated
the obligations incumbent on the United States under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention; whereas Mexico provides a list
of those nationals and some information relating to their respective
cases; whereas it adds that three of them have had their sentences com-

muted; whereas at the oral proceedings its Agent requested that the
United States be ordered "to refrain from fixing any date for execution
and from carrying out any execution in the case of the 51 Mexican
nationals covered by the Application, until the Court has been able to
decide on the merits of the case":
53. Whereas the United States'argues that no execution date has been
scheduled with respect to any of the Mexican nationals concerned (see
paragraph 31 above); whereas it points out that this is so both for the
three individuals specifically named in its request for the indication of
provisional measures and in regard to the others; whereas it observes
that, in the case ofhese latter, "any execution date iseven more remote";
and whereas it accordingly concludes that the request for the indication
of provisional measures is thus premature;
54. Whereas "the sound administration ofjustice requires that a request
for the indication of provisional measures founded on Article 73 of the

Rules of Court be submitted in good time" LuGrand (Germuny v.United
States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 Murch 1999,
I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 14,para. 19);whereas, moreover, the Supreme
Court of the United States observed, when considering a petition seeking
the enforcement of an Order of this Court, that: "It is unfortunate that
thismatter came before us while proceedings are pending before the ICJthat might have been brought to that court earlier" (Breard v. Greene,

523 US 371, 378 (1998)); whereas, in view of the rules and time-limits
governing the granting of clemency and the fixing of execution dates in a
number of the States of the United States, the fact that no such dates
have been fixed in any of the cases before the Court is not per se a cir-
cumstance that should preclude the Court from indicating provisional
measures;

55. Whereas it is apparent from the information before the Court in
this case that three Mexican nationals, Messrs. César Roberto Fierro
Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos and Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, are at
risk of execution in the coming months, or possibly even weeks; whereas
their execution would cause irreparable prejudice to any rights that may
subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong to Mexico; and whereas
the Court accordingly concludes that the circumstances require that it
indicate provisional measures to preserve those rights, as Article 41 of its
Statute provides;
56. Whereas the other individuals listed in Mexico's Application,
although currently on death row, are not in the same position as the three

persons identified in the preceding paragraph of this Order; whereas the
Court may, if appropriate, indicate provisional measures under Article 41
of the Statute in respect of those individuals before it renders finaljudg-
ment in this case:

57. Whereas it is clearly in the interest of both Parties that their
respective rights and obligations be determined definitively as early as
possible; whereas it is therefore appropriate that the Court, with the co-
operation of the Parties. ensure that a finaljudgment be reached with al1
possible expedition;
58. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way
prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and whereas it leaves
unaffected the right of the Governments of Mexico and the United States
to submit arguments in respect of those questions;

59. For these reasons,

Unanimously.

1. Indicutes the following provisional measures:
(a) The United States of America shall take al1measures necessary to ensure that Mr. CésarRoberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno
Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera are not executed pending
final judgment in these proceedings;
(h) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the
Court of al1measures taken in implementation of this Order.

II. Decides that, until the Court has rendered its final judgment, it
shall remain seised of the matters which form the subject of this Order.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifth day of February, two thousand
and three, in three copies, one of which will beplaced in the archives of
the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the United
Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America,
respectively.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME:
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.

Judge ODA appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.

(Initialled)G.G.
(Initialled)Ph.C.

Bilingual Content

INTElRNATlONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS OF JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

CASE CONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER

MEXICAN NATIONALS

(MEXICO 1UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASliRES

ORDER OF 5 FEBRUARY2003

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSI'ICE

RECUEIL DES ARRÊTS,
AVIS CONSULTATIFS ET ORDONNANCES

AFFAIRE AVENA ET ALJTRES
RESSORTISSANTS MEXICAINS

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE DU 5 FÉVRIER2003 Officia1citati:n
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico
v. United Statqf Arnerica), Provisional Measures,
Order oj 5Fehruary 2003,1.C.J.Reports
2003,p. 77

Mode officielde citati:n

Avena et autres ressorti.ssants mexicains
(Mexique c.Etats-Unis d'ilïnérique), mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance 5fivrier 2003,
C.I.J.Recueil 2003, p. 77

Sales number
ISSN 0074-4441 No devente: 863 1
ISBN 92-1-070970-5 5 FEBRUARY 2003

ORDER

AVENA AND OTHER MEXICAN NriTIONALS

(MEXICO v.UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PRO\'lSIONAL
MEASURES

AVENA ET AUTRES RESSORTISSANTS MEXICAINS

(MEXIQUE c. ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMI~RIQUE)

DEh4ANDE EN INDICATION DE MESIIRES
CONSERVATOIRES

5 FÉVRIER 2003

ORDONNANCE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

2003 YEAR 2003
5 February
General List
No. 128 5 February2003

CASE CONCERNING AVENA AND OTHER

MEXICAN NATIONALS

(MEXICO v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)

REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL
MEASURES

ORDER

Present: PresidentGUILLAUME;Vice-President SHI; Judges ODA,
RANJEVA,HERCZEGH,FLEISCHHAUERK , OROMA, VERESH-
CHETINH, IGGINS, ARRA-ARANGURE KNO,OIJMANSR,EZEK,AL-

KHASAWNE BHU,ERGENTHALE ,LARABYR ;egistrar COUVREUR.

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,
After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 41 andf the Statute of the Court and to
Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the Application filed in the Registry of the Court
on 9 January 2003, whereby the United Mexican States (hereinafter
"Mexico") instituted proceedings against the United States of America

(hereinafter the "United States") for "violations of the Vienna Conven-
tion on Consular Relatio(done on 24 April1963)"(hereinafter the
"Vienna Convention") allegedly committed by the United States,

1.Whereas in its aforementioned ApplicaMexico bases the juris- COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JIJSTICE

ANNÉE 2003 2003
5 février
Rôle général
5 févri2003 no 128

AFFAIRE AVENA ET ALJTRES

RESSC)RTISSANTS MEXICAINS

(MEXIQUE c. ÉTATS-UNIS D1AM13RIQUE)

DEMANDE EN INDICATION DE MESURES
CONSERVATOIRES

ORDONNANCE

Prksent:~M. GUILLAUME pr,ési~ltM.;SHI,vice.prI'sident; MM. ODA,
RANJEVA,HERCZEGH,FLEISCHHAUER, KOROMA, VERESH-

CHETINM , m"HIGGINSM , M. PARRA-AR INGURENK , OOIJMANS.
REZEK, AL-KHASAWNEHB , UERGENTH,\LE , LARABYd, uges;
M. COUVREUR g,ref3er.

La Cour internationalde Justice,

Ainsi composée,
Après délibéren chambre du conseil.

Vu les articles 41 etu Statut de la Cour et les articles 73, 74 et 75
de son Règlement.
Vu la requêteenregistrée au Greffe de la Cour lenvier 2003, par
laquelle les Etats-Unis du Mexique (ci-après dénomles«Mexique»)

ont introduitune instance contre les Etats-Unis d'Amérique (ci-après
dénommésles «Etats-Unis») en raison de «violaticns de la convention de
Vienne sur les relations consulaires »du 24 avril 19b3(ci-après dénommée
la ((convention de Vienne))) qui auraient étécommises par les Etats-Unis,

1. Considérant que, dans sa requête susmentionnée,le Mexique fondediction of the Court on Article 36, paragraph 1,of the Statute of the
Court and on Article 1of the Optional Protocol concerning the Compul-
sory Settlement of Disputes, which accompanies the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (hereinafter the "Optional Protocol");

2. Whereas the Application states that 54 Mexican nationals are on
death row in the United States; whereas it is alleged that these individ-

uals were arrested, detained, tried, convicted and sentenced to death by
competent authorities of the United States following proceedings in
which those authorities failed to comply with their obligations under
Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention; whereas it is con-
tended that this provision requires that the authorities of the receiving
State inform without delay any national of another State detained by
those authorities of his right to contact his consulate, that, if the detained

national so requests, it further requires those authorities to inform with-
out delay the nearest consular post of the State concerned of the deten-
tion, and lastly that it obliges those authorities to forward without delay
any communication addressed to the consular post by the detained indi-
vidual; and whereas it is alleged that, in the cases of 49 of the detained
Mexican nationals, the competent authorities of the United States made

no attempt at any time to comply with Article 36 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, that in the cases of four other detained individuals, the required
notification was not made "without delay", and finally that in one case,
while the detained national was informed of his rights, it was in connec-
tion with proceedings other than those involving capital charges against
him ;

3. Whereas in its Application Mexico states that "[tlhe rights conferred
by Article 36 . . . are not rights without remedies" and that in particular,
as the Court determined in the Judgment delivered on 27 June 2001 in the
case concerning LuGrand (Germany v. United States of A~nerica) :

"If the receiving State fails to comply with Article 36, and the
sending State's national has been subjected to 'prolonged detention
or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties', . . .the receiving
State must 'allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction
and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set
forth in the Convention'";

4. Whereas Mexico alleges that various rules of United States munici-
pal law, specifically "[tlhe rule of procedural default, the need to show
prejudice and the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment of the

United StatesConstitution followed by the United States tribunals", ren-
dered ineffective al1actions brought before state or federal courts in the
United States seeking relief for the violations of the Vienna Convention,
whether those actions were brought by Mexican nationals or by Mexico
itself;la compétence de la Cour sur le paragraphe 1 de I7;~rticle36 du Statut de
la Cour et I'article premier du protocole de signatiire facultative concer-
nant le règlement obligatoire des différends qui accompagne la conven-
tion de Vienne sur les relations consulaires (ci-après dénomméle ((proto-

cole de signature facciltative)));
2. Considérant que:, dans cette requête, il est indiqué que cinquante-
quatre ressortissants rnexicains se trouvent dans le <:ouloirde la mort aux
Etats-Unis; qu'il est !soutenu que ceux-ci ont étéarrêtés,détenus, jugés,
reconnus coupables et condamnés à la peine capitale par des autorités
compétentes des Etats-Unis à l'issuede procédures ;tu cours desquelles ces

autorités ont manqué aux obligations qui leur incombaient en vertu de
l'alinéah) du paragraphe 1 de I'article 36 de la conv1:ntionde Vienne; qu'il
est préciséque cette disposition prescrit aux autoritésde 1'Etatde résidence
d'informer sans retard tout ressortissant d'un autre Etat, qui est placé en
détention par lesdites autorités, de son droit de contacter son consulat,
qu'elle prescrit égalementà ces autorités, si le ressortissant détenu en fait la

demande, d'avertir saris retard de cette détention le poste consulaire le plus
proche de I'Etat concerné, et qu'elle prescritenfin iices autorités de trans-
mettre sans retard toute communication adressée au poste consulaire par
la personne détenue; et qu'il est alléguéque, dans IIcas de quarante-neuf
desdits ressortissants mexicains détenus, les autorités compétentes des
Etats-Unis n'ont à aucun moment tenté de se conformer aux dispositions
de I'article 36 de la coinvention de Vienne, que, dans le cas de quatre autres

détenus,les notifications prescrites n'ont pas étéeffectuées«sans retard)),
et enfin que dans un cas, si le ressortissant détenu a été informé deses
droits, c'est dans le cadre d'une procédure différente decelle dans laquelle
les accusations portées contre lui pouvaient entraînrr la peine de mort;
3. Considérant que:,dans sa requête,le Mexique expose que «les droits
conféréspar I'article 36 ne sont pas dépourvus de: voies de recours)) et

qu'en particulier, comme la Cour l'a établi clans l'arrêt rendu le
27 juin 2001 en l'affaireLaGrund (Allemugn~ r. Et(7t.s-Unisd'Amériqurj :

«[si]1'Etat de résidencemanque de se conformer aux dispositions de
I'article 36, et si le ressortissant de I'Etat d'envoi a fait l'objet d'une
((détention prolongée ou [a]étécondamn[é]à des peines séveres)),...
1'Etatde résidencedoit ((permettre le réexamenet la revision du ver-
dict de culpabilité et de la peine en tenant con-pte de la violation des
droits prévuspar la convention))));

4. Considérant qui? le Mexique allègue que plusieurs règles du droit
interne des Etats-Unis, et en particulier «la règledite de la ((carence pro-
cédurale)),l'obligation d'établir l'existence d'un préjudiceet I'interpréta-

tion que donnent lesjiuridictions des Etats-Unis du onzième amendement
de la Constitution aniéricaine)), ont empêché toutas les procédures enga-
géesdevant lesjuridictions étatiques ou fédéralesainéricainesafin de por-
ter remède aux violations de la convention de Vieiine d'aboutir, que les-
dites procédures aienit été engagées par des ressortissants mexicains ou
par le Mexique lui-même; 5. Whereas in the Application Mexico explains that it has made numer-
ous démarches to the competent authorities of the United States with a
view to vindicating its rights and those of its nationals, but that these
authorities have consistently refused to provide relief adequate to put an
end to these violations and to ensure Mexico that they will not reoccur in
the future;

6. Whereas Mexico further notes that the diplomatic démarches which
it has made over the last six years to the executive branch of the federal
Government of the United States and to the competent authorities of the
constituent States have been ineffective; whereas, despite many diplo-
matic protests during that period, those authorities carried out the execu-
tion of several Mexican nationals whose rights under the Vienna Conven-
tion had been violated; and whereas the only response ever received by

Mexico from those authorities has consisted of formal apologies made
after the executions;

7. Whereas in itsApplication Mexico maintains that the United States,
by breaching its obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1 (h), of the
Vienna Convention, prevented Mexico from exercising its rights and per-
forming its consular functions pursuant to Articles 5 and 36 of the Con-

vention, which "could have prevented the convictions and death sen-
tences"; whereas it contends that the steps taken by the United States to
improve compliance with the Vienna Convention do not enable full effect
to be given to the rights established by the Convention; whereas it claims
that apologies by the United States in cases of breaches of the Conven-
tion are an insufficient remedy; and whereas Mexico accordingly asserts

that it has suffered injury, in its own right and in the form of injury to its
nationals, and that it is entitled to restitutio in intrgrum, that is to say, to
the "reestablish[ment ofl the situation which would, in al1 probability,
have existed if [the violations] had not been committed";

8. Whereas Mexico asks the Court to adjudge and declare:

"(1) that the United States, in arresting, detaining, trying, convict-
ing, and sentencing the 54 Mexican nationals on death row
described in this Application, violated its international legal
obligations to Mexico, in its own right and in the exercise of its
right of consular protection of its nationals, as provided by
Articles 5 and 36, respectively of the Vienna Convention;

(2) that Mexico is therefore entitled to restitutio in integrum;
(3) that the United States is under an international legal obligation
not to apply the doctrine of procedural default, or any other
doctrine of its municipal law, to preclude the exercise of the
rights afforded by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention; 5. Considérant que, dans ladite requête,le Mexique explique qu'il a
entrepris de nombreuses démarches auprès des autoritéscompétentesdes
Etats-Unis dans le but de faire valoir ses droits et ceux de ses ressortis-

sants, mais que lesdites autoritésont systématiquenientrefuséde prendre
des mesures approprié:espour mettre un terme iices violations et garantir
au Mexique qu'elles niese reproduiraient plus à l'avenir;
6. Considérant que le Mexique préciseencore qu'ilesdémarches diplo-
matiques qu'il a effectuéesau cours des six dernières annéesauprès du
pouvoir exécutifdu Ciouvernement fédéral desEtats-Unis ainsi que des
autorités compétentes des Etats fédérés sont restéessans effets; que, en
dépit de nombreuses protestations diplomatiques, ces autorités ont fait
procéder durant cette: période à l'exécutionde p;usieurs ressortissants
mexicains dont les droits découlant de la convention de Vienne avaient
étéviolés; etque la seule réaction jamais obtenue tie ces autorités par le

Mexique a consistéen des excuses officiellespréseniéesaprèslesdites exé-
cutions ;
7. Considérant que, dans sa requête,le Mexique soutient que, en
méconnaissant leurs obligations aux termes de l'alinéa h) du para-
graphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne, les Etats-Unis
l'ont empêché d'exercelres droits et les fonctions consulaires prévuesaux
articles5et 36 de la convention, «ce qui aurait pu empêcherqu'un verdict
de culpabilitéet de peine de mort ne soit prononcé));que lesmesures prises
par les Etats-Unis en vue d'assurer un meilleur respect de la convention
de Vienne ne permettraient pas la pleine réalisation desdroits créés par la
convention de Vienne; que les excuses présentées parles Etats-Unis en
cas de violation de la convention ne constitueraien. pas un remède suffi-

sant; et considérant que le Mexique en conclut qu'il a subi un préjudice,
en son nom propre et en la personne de ses ressortissants, et qu'il a droit
A une rrstitutio in i~ztegrumc'est-à-dire au «rétabli[ssementde] la situa-
tion qui aurait vraiseinblablement existési [les violations] n'avaient pas
été commis[es] ));
8. Considérant que le Mexique prie la Cour de (lire et juger que:

(<1) en arrêtant,détenant,jugeant, déclarant t:oupables et condam-
nant les cinquante-quatre ressortissants mexicains se trouvant
dans le couloir de la mort, et dont les cas sont décritsdans la
présenterequête,les Etats-Unis dlAmériqiieont violé leurs obli-

gations juridiques internationales envers le Mexique, en son
nom propre et dans l'exercicedu droit qu'a cet Etat d'assurer la
protection consulaire de ses ressortissants, ainsi qu'il est prévu
aux articles5 et 36, respectivement, de la convention de Vienne;
2) le Mexique ;ien conséquencedroit ii la restitutio in integrum;
3) les Etats-Unis d'Amériqueont l'obligation juridique internatio-
nale de ne pas appliquer la doctrine de la carence procédurale
(procedural dejault), ni aucune autre doctrine de leur droit
interne, d'uniemanière qui fasse obstacle ii l'exercice desdroits
conféréspar l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne; (4) that the United States is under an international legal obligation
to carry out in conformity with the foregoing international
legal obligations any future detention of or criminal proceed-
ings against the 54 Mexican nationals on death row or any
other Mexican national in its territory, whether by a constitu-
ent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether that
power holds a superior or a subordinate position in the organi-
zation of the United States, and whether that power's functions
are international or interna1 in character;

(5) that the right to consular notification under the Vienna Con-
vention is a human right;
and that, pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations,

(1) the United States must restore the stutus quo unte, that is, re-
establish the situation that existed before the detention of, pro-
ceedings against, and convictions and sentences of, Mexico's

nationals in violation of the United States international legal
obligations ;

(2) the United States must take the steps necessary and sufficient
to ensure that the provisions of its municipal law enable full
effect to be given to thepurposes for which the rights afforded
by Article 36 are intended;
(3) the United States must take the steps necessary and sufficient
to establish a meaningful remedy at law for violations of the
rights afforded to Mexico and its nationals by Article 36 of the
Vienna Convention, including by barring the imposition, as a
matter of municipal law, of any procedural penalty for the fail-
ure timely to raise a claim or defence based on the Vienna Con-
vention where competent authorities of the United States have
breached their obligation to advise the national of his or her
rightsunder the Convention; and

(4) the United States, in light of the pattern and practice of viola-
tions set forth in this Application, must provide Mexico a full
guarantee of the non-repetition of the illegal acts";

9. Whereas, on 9 January 2003, after filingits Application Mexico also
submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures in order to
protect its rights, pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and
to Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court;
10. Whereas in its request for the indication of provisional measures

Mexico refers to the basis of jurisdiction of the Court invoked in its 4) les Etats-Uriis d'Amérique sont tenus, au regard du droit inter-
national, d'agir conformément aux obligationsjuridiques inter-
nationales susmentionnées dans le cas ou, a l'avenir, ils place-
raient en détentionles cinquante-quatre ressortissants mexicains
se trouvant dans le couloir de la mort ou tout autre ressortis-

sant mexicain sur leur territoire ou engageraient une action
pénale à leur encontre, que cet acte soit accompli par un pou-
voir constitué - législatif, exécutif, judiciaireou autre -, que
ce pouvoir occupe une place supérieure ou subordonnée dans
l'organisation des Etats-Unis ou que les fonctions de ce pouvoir
présentent un caractère international ou nterne; et
5) le droit de riotification consulaire garanti par la convention de
Vienne est un droit de la personne humaine;
et que, conformément aux obligations juricliques internationales
susmentionnées :

1) les Etats-Uriis d'Amérique doivent restaurer le stutu quo unte,
c'est-à-dire rétablir lasituation qui existait avant les actes de
détention, cle poursuite, de déclaration de culpabilité et de
condamnation des ressortissants mexicains commis en violation
des obligationsjuridiques internationales des Etats-Unis d'Amé-
rique ;
2) les Etats-Unis d'Amérique doivent prendre les mesures néces-
saires et suffisantespour garantir que lesdispositions de leur droit
interne permettent la pleine réalisation d:s fins pour lesquelles
sont prévusles droits conféréspar l'article 36;

3) les Etats-Uriis d'Amérique doivent prendre les mesures néces-
saires et suffisantes pour établiren droit ulle voie de recours effi-
cace contre les violations des droits conférésau Mexique et àses
ressortissants par l'article 36de la convention de Vienne, notam-
ment en empêchant quene soit, en droit interne, pénalisésur le
plan procédural un ressortissant n'ayant pas, en temps voulu,
fait valoir une réclamation au titre de la convention de Vienne
ni excipé dc celle-ci dans le cadre de sa défense, lorsque des
autorités colmpétentes des Etats-Unis d'Amérique ont violé
l'obligation qui est la leur d'informer ce ressortissant des droits
qu'il tire de cette convention; et
4) les Etats-Unis d'Amériquedoivent, au vu du caractère récurrent
et systématiquedes violations décrites daiis la présenterequête,

donner au Mexique une pleine garantie que de tels actes illicites
ne se reproduiront pas »;
9. Considérant que, le 9janvier 2003, après avoir déposésa requête,le
Mexique a égalemenl présentéune demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires à l'effet de protéger ses droits, en se référaitl'article 41
du Statut et aux articles 73, 74 et 75 du Règlemen: de la Cour;
10. Considérantque, dans sa demande en indicat on de mesures conser-
vatoires, le Mexique se réfère àla base de juridictioil de la Cour invoquéeApplication, and to the facts set out and the submissions made therein;
and whereas it reiterates in particular that the United States has syste-
matically violated the rights of Mexico and its nationals under Article 36

of the Vienna Convention;
11. Whereas in the request for the indication of provisional measures
Mexico states that three Mexican nationals, namely Messrs. CésarRoberto
Fierro Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos and Osvaldo Torres Aguilera,
risk execution within the next six months and that many other Mexican
nationals could be executed before the end of 2003; and whereas Mexico
further states that César Roberto Fierro Reyna's execution could take

place as early as 14 February 2003;

12. Whereas in the request for the indication of provisional measures
Mexico notes that the Court indicated provisional measures to prevent
executions in two prior cases involving claims brought under the Vienna
Convention by States whose nationals were subject to execution in the

United States as a result of criminal proceedings conducted in violation
of the Convention; whereas it states that "[tlhere can be no question of
the importance of the interests at stake", that "[ilnternational law recog-
nizes the sanctity of human life" and that "Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a
State Party, establishes that every human being has an inherent right to

life and mandates that States protect that right by law"; and whereas
Mexico states in the following terms the grounds for its request and the
possible conseyuences if it is denied :

"Unless the Court indicates provisional measures directing the
United States to halt any executions of Mexican nationals until this
Court's decision on the merits of Mexico's claims, the executive
officiais of constituent states of the United States will execute

Messrs. Fierro [Reyna], Moreno Ramos, Torres [Aguilera], or other
Mexican nationals on death row before the Court has had the
opportunity to consider those claims. In that event, Mexico would
forever be deprived of the opportunity to vindicate its rights and
those of its nationals. As the Court recognized in the LaGrarzd case,
such circumstances would constitute irreparable prejudice . . .";

13. Whereas Mexico concludes that "[p]rovisional measures are there-

fore clearlyjustified in order both to protect Mexico's paramount interest
in the life and liberty of its nationals and to ensure the Court's ability to
order the relief Mexico seeks" ;
14. Whereas Mexico adds in its request that "[tlhere can also be no
question about the urgency of the need for provisional measures";

15. Whereas Mexico states that, while it recognizes that the Court maydans sa requête,ainsi qu'aux faits qui y sont exposés etaux conclusions
qui y sont formulées; et qu'il réaffirrne en particulier que les Etats-Unis
ont violéde manière systématique les droits que le Mexique et ses ressor-
tissants tirent des dispositions de l'article 36 de la (.onvention de Vienne;

11. Considérant aile. dans cette demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires, le Mexique expose que trois resscrtissants mexicains, à
savoir MM. César Roberto Fierro Revna. R> ,rto Moreno Ramos et
Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, risquent d'êtreexécutésau cours des six pro-
chains mois. et aue (le nombreux autres ressortis:iants mexicains Dour-
raient être exécutésavant la fin de l'année 2003; et qu'il préciseque

l'exécutionde M. César Roberto Fierro Reyna po~rrait avoir lieu dès le
14 février 2003 ;
12. Considérant que, dans ladite demande en ndication de mesures
conservatoires, le Mexique rappelle que la Cour a indiqué des mesures
conservatoires pour empêcher des exécutionsdans deux affaires précé-
dentes portant sur de:$demandes présentéesen veriu de la convention de

Vienne par des Etats dont les ressortissants risquaientd'êtreexécutésaux
Etats-Unis à l'issue de procédures pénales au cours desquelles les dispo-
sitions de ladite convention avaient été méconnu-.^;qu'il souligne que
«[l]'importance des intérêtsen cause ne saurait êtr:mise en doute)), que
«[l]e caractère sacré (le la vie humaine est reconnii par le droit interna-
tional » et que «[l]'artic6edu pacte international relatif aux droits civils

et politiques, auquel les Etats-Unis d'Amériquesont parties, stipule que le
droit à la vie est inhérent à la personne humaine ei que les Etats doivent
protéger ce droit par la loi)); et qu'il expose en ces termes les motifs de la
demande et les consécquenceséventuellesde son rejet:

<<Sila Cour n-indique pas des mesures conservatoires enjoignant
aux Etats-Unis dl'Amériquede surseoir ë toute exécution de ressor-
tissants mexicains jusqu'à ce que la Cour se prononce sur le bien-
fondédes prétentions du Mexique, les autoritis publiques des Etats
constituant les Etats-Unis procéderont à 1'exéi:utionde MM. Fierro

[Reyna], Moreno Ramos, Torres [Aguilera] ou d'autres ressortis-
sants mexicains se trouvant dans le couloir de la mort, avant que la
Cour n'ait pu examiner ces prétentions. Dans ce cas, le Mexique
serait àjamais privéde la possibilitéde faire vdloir ses droits et ceux
de ses ressortissants. Ainsi que la Cour l'a reconnu en l'affaire

LaGrand, un i.el état de choses constituerait un préjudice
irréparable...»;
13. Considérant que le Mexique en conclut que «des mesures conser-

vatoires sont clairement justifiéestant pour protéger l'intérêtprimordial
qu'attache le Mexique à la vie et ëla libertéde ses ressortissants que pour
permettre à la Cour cleprescrire les remèdes demandés par le Mexique));
14. Considérant que le Mexique ajoute dans sa demande que
«[l]'urgence de mesures conservatoires ne saurait non plus faire de
doute» ;

15. Considérant que le Mexique préciseque, s'il reconnaît que la Courwish to leave to the United States the choice of means to ensure corn-
pliance with the provisional measures ordered, it nevertheless requests
that the Court "leave no doubt as to the required result";
16. Whereas Mexico notes specifically in its request that "[als a matter
of international law, both the United States and its constituent political

subdivisions have an obligation to abide by the international legal obli-
gations of the United States"; and whereas Mexico takes the view that,
"[hlaving undertaken international obligations on behalf of its consti-
tuent political entities, the United States should not now be heard to
suggest that it cannot enforce their cornpliance with its obligations";

17. Whereas Mexico further states that,

"[gliven the clarity of both international law and United States
municipal law, there can be no doubt that the United States has the
means to ensure compliance with an order of provisional measures

issued by this Court pursuant to Article 41 (1)[of its Statute]";

18. Whereas Mexico asks that, pending final judgment in this case, the

Court indicate :
"(a) that the Government of the United States take al1 measures
necessary to ensure that no Mexican national be executed;

(6) that the Government of the United States take al1 measures
necessary to ensure that no execution dates be set for any
Mexican national ;
(c) that the Government of the United States report to the Court
the actions it has taken in pursuance of subparagraphs (a)

and (b) ; and
(d) that the Government of the United States ensure that no
action is taken that might prejudice the rights of the United
Mexican States or its nationals with respect to any decision
this Court may render on the merits of the case";

and whereas Mexico further asks the Court to treat its request as a
matter of the greatest urgency "[iln view of the extreme gravity and
immediacy of the threat that authorities in the United States will
execute a Mexican citizen" ;

19. Whereas on 9January 2003, the date on which the Application and
the request for the indication of provisional measures were filed in the
Registry, the Registrar advised the Government of the United States of
the filing of those documents and forthwith sent it originals of them, in
accordance with Article 40, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court and
with Article 38, paragraph 4, and Article 73, paragraph 2, of the Rules of
Court; and whereas the Registrar also notified the Secretary-General of

the United Nations of that filing; AVEN.4 ET AUTRES (ORDONNANC 5EII 03) 82

puisse laisser aux Eta1.s-Unisle choix des moyens à mettre en Œuvrepour
assurer le respect des imesuresconservatoires ordonnées, il prie cependant
celle-ci «de spécifieralvecla plus grande exactitude le résultat exigé));
16. Considérant que le Mexique rappelle en particulier dans sa
demande que, «[e]nvertu du droit international, les Etats-Uniset les sub-

divisions politiques qui les constituent doivent se conformer aux obliga-
tionsjuridiques internationales qui pèsentsur eux » ;et qu'il souligne que,
«[a]yant accepté desobligations internationales au nom des entitéspoli-
tiques qui les constituent, les Etats-Unis ne sauri~ient maintenant pré-
tendre qu'ils ne peuvent veiller à ce que les obligations qui sont les
leurs soient rempliesc,;
17. Considérant que le Mexique a-jouteencore ciue

«[c]ompte tenu de la clarté a cet égard tant (lu droit international
que du droit interne américain, il ne fait aucun doute que les Etats-
Unis ont la capacité de faire appliquer une ordonnance en indication
de mesures conservatoires rendue par la Cour au titre du para-
graphe 1de l'article 41 de son Statut));

18. Considérant que le Mexique prie la Cour d'indiquer, en attendant
l'arrêtdéfinitifen l'instance, des mesures tendant 11ce que:
«a) le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique prenne toutes les

mesures nécessairesDour faire en sorte ciu'aucun ressortissant
mexicain ne soit exécuté;
b) le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique prenne toutes les
mesures nécessairespour faire en sorte qu'aucune date d'exécu-
tion ne soit fixéepour aucun ressortissarit mexicain;
c) le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Américlueporte à la connais-
sance de la Cour toutes les mesures qu'ililura prises en applica-
tion des aliriéasa) et h);et
d) le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique fasse en sorte
qu'il ne soit pris aucune mesure qui puizse porter atteinte aux
droits des Etats-Unis du Mexique ou de leurs ressortissants en

ce qui concerne toute décisionque la Cour pourrait prendre sur
le fond de l''affaire;
et qu'il prie en outre IlaCour d'examiner sa demande avec la plus grande
urgence «eu égard à l'extrêmegravité et à I'imniinence de la menace
d'exécutiond'un cito:yenmexicain par des autorites des Etats-Unis));

19. Considérant que, le 9 janvier 2003, dateà liquelle la requêteet la
demande en indication de mesures conservatoire:, ont étédéposéesau
Greffe, le greffier a aviséle Gouvernement des Etats-Unis du dépôtde ces
documents, et lui en a adresséimmédiatement des originaux en applica-
tion du paragraphe 2:de l'article 40 du Statut de la Cour, ainsi que du
paragraphe 4 de l'article 38 et du paragraphe 2 de l'article 73 de son
Règlement; et considérant que le greffier a égalenlent informé le Secré-
taire généralde l'organisation des Nations Unies de ce dépôt; 20. Whereas on 9 January 2003 the Registrar informed the Parties that
the President of the Court. in accordance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of
the Rules of Court, had fixed 20 January 2003 as the date for the opening
of the oral proceedings;
21. Whereas, pending notification under Article 40, paragraph 3, of
the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court by transmission, in two

languages, of the printed text of the Application to the States entitled to
appear before the Court, on 9January 2003 the Registrar informed those
States of the filing of the Application and of its subject-matter, and of the
request for the indication of provisional measures;

22. Whereas, following the Registrar's subsequent consultations with
the Parties, the Court decided to hear the Parties on 21 January 2003

concerning Mexico's request for the indication of provisional measures;
and whereas the Parties were so advised by letters of 14 January 2003
from the Registrar;
23. Whereas by a letter of 17January 2003, received in the Registry on
the same dav. the United States Government informed the Court of the
appointment of an Agent and a Co-Agent for the case;
24. Whereas by a letter of 20 January 2003 Mexico informed the Court

that, further to the decision of the Governor of the State of Illinois to
commute the death sentences of al1convicted individuals awaiting execu-
tion in that State, it was withdrawing its request for provisional measures
on behalf of three of the 54 Mexican nationals referred to in the Appli-
cation: Messrs. Juan Caballero Hernandez, Mario Flores Urban and
Gabriel Solache Romero; whereas it further stated that its request for
provisional measures would stand for the other 51 Mexican nationals

imprisoned in the United States and that "[tlhe application stands, on its
merits, for the fifty-four cases";

25. Whereas, at the public hearings held on 21 January 2003 in accord-
ance with Article 74, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court, oral statements
on the request for the indication of provisional measures were presented
by the following representatives of the Parties:

On behaif'of Mexico : H.E. Mr. Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo,

H.E. Mr. Santiago Ofiate,
H.E. Mr. Alberto Székely,
Ms Sandra Babcock,
Mr. Donald Francis Donovan;

On hehaif'ofthe United States: The Honorable William H. Taft, IV,
Mr. Stephen Mathias,
Ms Catherine W. Brown,
Mr. James H. Thessin,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht,
Mr. Daniel Paul Collins; 20. Considérant que, le9 janvier 2003, le greffier a informé les Parties
que le présidentde la Cour, conformément au para~raphe 3 de l'article 74
du Règlement, avait fixéau 20janvier 2003 la date d'ouverture de la pro-

cédure orale;
21. Considérant que, en attendant que la communication prévue
au paragraphe 3 de l'article 40 du Statut ea l'article 42 du Règlement
de la Cour ait été effectuéepar transmission ilu texte imprimé, en
deux langues. de la requête aux Etats admis A ester devant la Cour, le
greffier a, le 9 janvier 2003, informé ces Etats du dépôt de la requêteet
de son objet, ainsi que de la demande en indicatiori de mesures conserva-
toires;

22. Considérant que, à la suite de consultationa que le greffier a ulté-
rieurement tenues avec les Parties, la Cour a déc:'entendre celles-ci le
21 janvier 2003 sur la demande en indication de mesures conservatoires
du Mexique, et que 11:sParties en ont été avisés,ir lettres du greffier en
date du 14janvier 2003;
23. Considérant que, par lettre du17 janvier 2003, reçue au Greffe le
mêmejour, le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis a informé la Cour de la dési-
gnation d'un agent et d'un coagent aux fins de l'affaire;

24. Considérant que, par lettre en date du 20 janvier 2003, le Mexique
a informé la Cour q,ue, suitea la décision du gouverneur de 1'Etat de
l'Illinois de commuer les peines capitales de tous les détenus attendant
leur exécution dans cet Etat, il retirait sa demiinde en indication de
mesures conservatoires en ce qui concerne trois des cinquante-quatre
ressortissantsmexicains visés dans la requête, à savoir MM. Juan
Caballero Hernandez, Mario Flores Urban et Gabriel Solache Romero;

qu'il a par ailleurs précisé qu'ilmaintenait sa demande pour ce qui est des
cinquante et un autres ressortissants mexicains détenus aux Etats-Unis
et que «la requêtedemeur[ait] inchangée sur le fond en ce qui concerne
les cinquante-quatrecas));
25. Considérant que, lors des audiences publiq~tesqui ont été tenuesle
21 janvier 2003 conformément au paragraphe 3de l'article 74 du Règle-
ment, des observations orales sur la demande en indication de mesures
conservatoires ont été présentéepsar les représentants des Parties sui-

vants:
Au non1 du Mexique: S. Exc. M. Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo,
S. Exc. M. Santiago O?ate,

S.Exc. M. Alberto Székely,
Mn'" Sandra Babcock,
M. Donald Francis Donovan;
Au nom des Etats-Unis: l'honorable WilliamH Taft, IV,

M. Stephen Mathias,
Mm" Catherine W. Brown,
M. James H. Thessin,
sir Elihu Lauterpacht,
M. Daniel Paul Collin!;;and whereas at the hearings a question was put by a Member of the
Court, to which an oral reply was given;

26. Whereas in the first round of oral argument Mexico restated the
position set out in its Application and in its request for the indication of
provisional rneasures, and stressed that the requirements for the indica-

tion by the Court of the provisional measures requested were met in the
present case ;
27. Whereas Mexico has stressed that neither the apologies offered by
the Government of the United States following the execution of Mexican
nationals whose rights under the Vienna Convention had been violated,
nor the review by an executive official "as a matter of grace and not of

legal right" could represent a sufficient remedy for violations by compe-
tent authorities in the United States of obligations arising from the
Vienna Convention; that a "meaningful 'review and reconsideration' of
its nationals' claims in accord with the Judgment in LaGrand" requires
the provision of "a remedy litlait."; and that only the restoration of the
stutus quo ante, that is, the re-establishment of the situation that existed

before the violation, would be such a remedy;

28. Whereas Mexico has insisted that, unless provisional measures are
indicated by the Court, three of its nationals, namely Messrs. Fierro
Reyna. Moreno Ramos and Torres Aguilera, risk execution in the next
few months and that many others could also be at risk of execution

before the Court rules on the merits; and whereas it accordingly contends
that the condition of urgency required for the indication of provisional
measures is satisfied;
29. Whereas in the first round of oral argument the United States con-
tended that the request by Mexico was without foundation in fact or
in law and that the requirements for the Court to indicate provisional

measures were not met;
30. Whereas the United States submitted that the Court had ruled in
the LuCrand case that, where there had been a violation of the obligation
of notification prescribed by Article 36,paragraph 1 (h), of the Vienna
Convention "in death penalty cases", the remedy to be provided by the
receiving State was to ensure that there was in every case review and
reconsideration of the decision; whereas it stated that, following the

L~~Grundcase. the competent authorities in the United States had insti-
tuted measuresproviding for review and reconsideration in al1such cases,
that so far these measures had proved effective and that there was no rea-
son to think that they would not be effective in future cases; whereas it
added that the receiving State was, on the other hand, under no obliga-
tion to quash al1convictions and to recommence the trial process in such

cases; and whereas the United States accordingly concluded that the
request by Mexico seeking, by way of indication of provisional measures,et considérant qu'à l'audience une question a étéposéepar un membre de
la Cour, à laquelle il a étérépondu oralement;

26. Considérant que, dans ses plaidoiries, le Mexique a réitéré I'argu-
mentation développéedans sa requêteet sa demande en indication de

mesures conservatoires, et a insistésur le fait que les conditions requises
pour que la Cour indique les mesures conservatoires demandées étaient
remplies en l'espèce;
27. Considérant que le Mexique a soulignéque ni les excuses présen-
téespar les Etats-Unis à la suite de l'exécutionde ressortissants mexicains
dont les droits issus de la convention de Vienne avaient étéviolés,ni le

réexamen effectuépar un fonctionnaire de l'exécutif«dans l'exercice de
son droit de grâce et non d'un droit prévupar la loi» ne sauraient cons-
tituer un remède adéquat aux violations, par les autorités compétentes
des Etats-Unis, des obligations découlant de la convention de Vienne;
qu'un ((véritable((réexamenet [une véritable]revi:;ion)>des demandes de
ses ressortissants conformément à l'arrêtLaCrarrd)) imposent que soit

ouverte «une voie L~Pdroit)); et que seul le rétabissement du stutu quo
ante, c'est-à-dire le rktablissement de la situation qui existait avant la vio-
lation, constitueraitun tel remède;
28. Considérant que le Mexique a insisté sur ce que, en l'absence
d'indication de mesures conservatoires par la Cour, trois de ses ressortis-
sants, i savoir MM. Fierro Reyna, Moreno Rarros et Torres Aguilera,

risquaient d'êtreexécutésdans les mois àvenir et que de nombreux autres
risquaient de même(l'êtreexécutésavant que la Cour se prononce sur le
fond de l'affaire: et qu'il en a conclu que la condition d'urgence requise
pour l'indication de mesures conservatoires était remplie;
29. Considérant que, dans leurs plaidoiries, les Etats-Unis ont fait
valoir que la demande du Mexique n'était fondéeni en fait ni en droit et
que les conditions pour que la Cour indique des mesures conservatoires

n'étaient pas remplies;
30. Considérant que les Etats-Unis ont soutenu que la Cour avait jugé
en l'affaire LaCrund qu'en cas de violation de l'obligation de notification
prévue à l'alinéahj du paragraphe 1 de l'article36 de la convention de
Vienne, dans des ((affaires concernant des crimes passibles de la peine
capitale)), 1'Etat de résidenceavait l'obligation, à titre de remède, d'assu-

rer le réexamen et la revision des décisions rendu1:s dans chaque affaire;
qu'ils ont affirméqui'àla suite de I'affaire LaGru:îd les autorités compé-
tentes des Etats-Unis avaient pris des mesures visant à permettre un
réexamen et une revision dans chacun de ces cas, que ces mesures s'étaient
jusque-là révélées eifficaces et qu'il n'y avait aucune raison de penser
qu'elles ne le demeureraient pas à l'avenir; qu'ils ont ajouté qu'il n'exis-

tait pas, en revanche, d'obligation pour 1'Etatde résidenced'annuler tous
les verdicts de culpabilité et de recommencer les procès dans les hypo-
thèses envisagées; et qu'ils enont conclu que la demande du Mexiqueto preserve a right to the restoration of the stutus quo unte was not a
request seeking preservation of a right protected by the Vienna Conven-

tion, and that therefore the request should be denied;

31. Whereas the United States further contended that the request by
Mexico did not satisfy the condition of urgency and did not show that
imminent serious harm was likely, because United States proceedings in
each of the 51 cases were continuing and none of the Mexican nationals
covered by the request for indication of provisional measures was sched-
uled to be executed; and whereas it pointed out that in some of the cases
referred to by Mexico no violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Conven-
tion had been established, that in others Mexico would have an oppor-
tunity to raise any failure of notification at a later stage in the domestic
legal proceedings, and, finally, that review and reconsideration remained
available in al1the cases;

32. Whereas the United States further maintained that the request by
Mexico was too sweeping and did not respect the essential balance of the
rights of the Parties because, if it were accepted by the Court, it would

prejudice the sovereign right of the United States to operate its criminal
justice system; and whereas the United States concluded that the order
for the indication of provisional measures requested by Mexico "would
constitute a wholly unprecedented and unwarranted interference with the
sovereign rights of the United States even as itoes far beyond preserving
Mexico's rights under the Convention";

33. Whereas in its second round of oral argument Mexico stated that
it could not accept the conclusions derived by the United States from the
Court's Judgment in the LaGrand case in regard to the remedies available
for breaches of its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Conven-
tion; whereas Mexico added that the Court would not, however, need to
address those issues until its examination of the merits of the case; and
whereas it submitted that the purpose of its request was unquestionably
to preserve rights arising out of the Vienna Convention and that its
request should accordingly be upheld;
34. Whereas Mexico contended that, for the condition of urgency to

be met, it was sufficient that there was a "likely" threat of irreparable
prejudice, and that in the present case, since execution dates for the
Mexican nationals named in the request could be set at any time by the
competent authorities of the United States and since, once those dates
had been set, those nationals could be executed at very short notice, the
condition of urgency was accordingly met;

35. Whereas, finally, Mexico argued that an order of the Court enjoin-
ing the United States not to proceed with the execution of the said Mexi-
can nationals could not be considered as capable of causing any realvisant à obtenir, par le biais de l'indication de mesiires conservatoires, la
préservation d'un droit au rétablissement du statzlquo ante n'étaitpas
une demande tendant à préserver un droit protégépar la convention
de Vienne, et qu'en conséquenceelle n'était pasrecevable;
31. Considérant que les Etats-Unis ont par ailleurs soutenu que la
demande du Mexique ne remplissait pas la condition d'urgence et ne dé-
montrait pas l'existence d'un risque de préjudice grive et imminent, dans
la mesure où la procédure dans chacune des cincluante et une affaires

concernées suivait son cours aux Etats-Unis et où aucune date d'exé-
cution n'avait étéfixéepour les ressortissants niexicains visés par la
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires; et qu'ils ont souligné
que, s'agissant de certaines affaires mentionnéespar le Mexique, aucune
violation de l'article 316de la convention de Vienne ii'avait étéétablie,que
dans d'autres cas le Mexique aurait l'occasion de soulever tout manque-
ment à l'obligation de notification à un stade ultirieur de la procédure
judiciaire interne, et qu'enfin dans tous les cas la ~~ossibilid'un réexa-
men et d'une revision restait ouverte;
32. Considérant que les Etats-Unis ont également fait valoir que la
demande du Mexique était trop large et ne respectait pas le nécessaire
équilibre des droits des Parties car, si elle était acceptéepar la Cour, il

serait porté atteinte au droit des Etats-Unis d'organiser leur procédure
pénale de manière s~ouveraine;et que les Etats-Unis ont conclu que
l'ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires demandée par
le Mexique «constituerait une ingérence sans prlicédent et totalement
injustifiée dans les droits souverains des Etats-Unis puisqu'elle irait
bien au-delà de la prc~tectiondes droits que le Mexique tire de la conven-
tion ));
33. Considérant que, dans sa répliqueorale, le Mexique a indiquéqu'il
ne pouvait accepter llesconclusions que les Etats-Unis tirent de l'arrêt
rendu par la Cour en l'affaire LaGratzdpour ce qui est des remèdesappli-
cables en cas de violation des obligations qui leur ncombent en vertu de
l'article36 de la convention de Vienne; qu'il a ajouté qu'il s'agissait là

toutefois d'une question sur laquelle la Cour ne devrait se pencher que
lorsqu'elle examinerait le fond de l'affaire; et qu'il a fait valoir que sa
demande visait bien 51préserver desdroits qui lui 6taient reconnus par la
convention de Vienne, et que ladite demande devait dèslorsêtreaccueillie;
34. Considérant que le Mexique a affirmé qu'afin que la condition
d'urgence soit remplie il suffisait qu'un risque «probable» de survenance
d'un préjudice irréparable existe; et qu'en l'espèce,dans la mesure où,
d'une part, les dates d'exécution desressortissants mexicains viséspar la
demande pouvaient ètre fixées à tout moment par les autorités compé-
tentes des Etats-Unis et où, d'autre part, une fois ces dates fixées,les exé-
cutions pouvaient se dérouler dans de très brefs délais,il y avait bien
urgence ;

35. Considérant que le Mexique a enfin soutenuqu'une ordonnance de
la Cour enjoignant aux Etats-Unis de ne pas procéder à l'exécutiondes-
dits ressortissants mexicains ne saurait êtreconsidéréecomme pouvantharm to the legitimate interest of the United States in operating its crimi-
na1justice system;
36. Whereas in its second round of oral argument the United States
stressed the fact that, following the Court's Judgment in the LaGrand

case, it had put in place a vast programme to ensure compliance with the
obligation of notification under Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention and had also taken measures to ensure review and
reconsideration in al1death penalty cases where that obligation had been
breached; and whereas the United States reiterated its view that Mexico's
request for the indication of provisional measures was not consistent with
the LaGrand Judgment and that it was seeking to preserve non-existent
rights, so that there was neither any risk of irreparable prejudice nor any

urgency; whereas the United States further pointed out that, according
to the United States Supreme Court, "the clemency power .. . [was] an
integral mechanism in the administration of Our criminal laws", and
"clemency 'has provided a fail-safe in Our criminal justice system'";

37. Whereas at the hearings a Member of the Court put the following

question to the Agent of the United States:
"Under what circumstances will the Legal Adviser of the State

Department notify an appellate court rather than later notify a
clemency body of the obligations of the United States consequent
upon an admitted violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention?
1s the matter simply one of timing?";

whereas, in response to that question, the Agent stated inter aliuthe fol-
lowing :

"We . . . have made a conscious choice to focus Our efforts on
clemency proceedings for providing the review and reconsideration
this Court called for inLaGrand. [That Judgment] expressly left the
choice of means of providing the review and reconsideration to the
United States[.] . . [Cllemency proceedings provide a more flexible

process that is best suited for achieving, without procedural
obstacles, the review and reconsideration this Court called for";

and whereas the Agent added that his

"Government would . . . inform a court upon request, at any time,
of the international legal obligations of the United States, and how
in the particular posture of a given case they [might] or [might] not
apply and whether and how they might be carried out under the
applicable domestic law in that court",

while explaining that "a court [might] determine . . . that domestic law AVENA ET AUTRES (ORDONNANC 5 'II03) 86

causer un préjudice réel a l'intérêt légitimd ees Etats-Unis d'organiser
leur procédure pénale;
36. Considérant que, dans leur réplique orale, es Etats-Unis ont in-
sistésur le fait que, ;ila suite de l'arrêtrendu par la Cour en l'affaire
LuGrand, ils avaient inis en place un vaste prograinme visant a garantir
le respect de l'obligation de notification prévue à l'alinéa 6) du para-

graphe 1 de l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne, et qu'ils avaient en
outre pris des mesures tendant a assurer un réexamcnet une revision dans
toutes les affaires où ladite obligation aurait étévioléeet une condamna-
tion i la peine capitale aurait étéprononcée; et qii'ils ont réaffirméque
la demande en indicaition de mesures conservatoires du Mexique était en
contradiction avec l'arrêtLuCrtrntl susmentionné et qu'elle cherchait a
préserverdes droits inexistants, de sorte qu'il n'y avait ni risque que sur-

vienne un préjudice irréparable, ni urgence; cons dérant que les Etats-
Unis ont en outre préciséque, selon la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis, «le
pouvoir de grâce ... [faisait] partie intégrante de [lcur] système de justice
pénale))et que «la grâce «[avait] fourni à [celui-ci]un dispositif de sécu-
rité»»;
37. Considérant qu'à l'audience un membre de la Cour a posé à

l'agent des Etats-Unis la question suivante:

«Dans quelles circonstances le conseiller jur dique du département
d7Etat informera-t-il une cour d'appel plutôt que, à un stade ulté-
rieur, une commiission des grâces, des obligations découlant pour les
Etats-Unis d'une violation reconnue de l'article 36 de la convention
de Vienne'?Est-ce simplement une question d: calendrier?));

qu'en réponse à cette question l'agent des Etats-1Jnis a précisénotam-
ment ce qui suit :

«Nous avons ... délibérémenc thoisi de concentrer nos efforts sur
les recours devarit les commissions des grâces pour le réexamenet la
revision demandés par la Cour dans l'affaire LuGrand. [L'arrèt

rendu dans cette affaire] a expressément laissé aux Etats-Unis le
choix des moyens destinés a réexaminer et à r:viser les procédures...
[Lles recours portés devant les commissions des grâces constituent
un moyen plus souple, qui est le mieux adilpté pour effectuer le
réexamenet la ri-vision prescrits par la Cour, sans que ne se posent
des obstacles d'ordre procédural »;

et qu'il a ajouté que son

((gouvernement ne manquerait pas d'informer toute juridiction
[interne], à la demande de celle-ci et à n'importe quel moment, des

obligations juridiques internationales des Etats-Unis, et de lui indi-
quer comment, dans le cas particulier soumis iicette juridiction, ces
obligations peuvent ou non s'appliquer)),

tout en exposant qu'«une juridiction [pourrait] toujours déciderque desprinciples still preclude[d] an express judicial remedy for a failure of con-
sular notification" ;

38. Whereas, on a request for the indication of provisional measures,
the Court need not finally satisfy itself, before deciding whether or not to
indicate such measures, that it has jurisdiction on the merits of the case,
yet it may not indicate them unless the provisions invoked by the Appli-
cant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which thejurisdiction of the
Court might be founded;

39. Whereas Article 1of the Optional Protocol, which Mexico invokes
as the basis of jurisdiction of the Court in the present case, is worded as
follows :

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the
Court by a written application made by any party to the dispute
being a Party to the present Protocol";

40. Whereas, according to the information communicated by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations as depositary, Mexico and
the United States have been parties to the Vienna Convention since
16 June 1965 and 24 November 1969 respectively, and to the Optional
Protocol since 15 March 2002 and 24 November 1969 respectively, in
each case without reservation;
41. Whereas Mexico has argued that the issues in dispute between
itself and the United States concern Articles 5 and 36 of the Vienna Con-
vention and fa11within the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under
Article 1 of the Optional Protocol; and whereas it has accordingly con-
cluded that the Court has the jurisdiction necessary to indicate the pro-
visional measures requested; and whereas the United States has said that
it "does not propose to make an issue now of whether the Court
possesses prima facie jurisdiction, although this is without prejudice to
its right tocontest the Court's jurisdiction at the appropriate stage later
in the case" ;
42. Whereas, in view of the foregoing, the Court accordingly considers

that, prima facie, it has jurisdiction under Article 1 of the aforesaid
Optional Protocol to hear the case;

43. Whereas in its Application Mexico, as stated previously (see para-
graph 8 above), asks the Court to adjudge and declare that, the United
States "violated its international legal obligations to Mexico, in its own
right and in the exerciseof its right of consular protection of its nationals,principes de droit interne interdisent un recours juridique spécifiqueau
titre d'un défaut de notification consulaire»;

38. Considérant qu'en présence d'une demande en indication de me-
sures conservatoires la Cour n'a pas besoin, avant de déciderd'indiquer

ou non de telles mesures, de s'assurer d'une maniire définitive qu'elle a
compétence quant au fond de I'affaire, mais qu'elle ne peut cependant
indiquer ces mesures que si les dispositions invoquées par le demandeur
semblent prima jacie constituer une base sur laquelle la compétence
de la Cour pourrait êtrefondée;
39. Considérant que l'article premier du protocole de signature facul-

tative, que le Mexique invoque comme base de la campétence de la Cour
dans la présente affaire, est ainsi libellé:

«Les différends relatifs iil'interprétation oiiiil'application de la
convention relèvent de la compétence obligat~ire de la Cour inter-
nationale de Justice, qui, à ce titre, pourra êtresaisie par une requête
de toute partie au différend quisera elle-mêmepartie au présentpro-
tocole)>;

40. Considérant que, selon les informations c:ommuniquées par le
Secrétairegénéralde l'organisation des Nations Unies en tant que dépo-
sitaire, le Mexique e:t les Etats-Unis sont parties à la convention de
Vienne, depuis le 16juin 1965 et le 24 novembre 1969respectivement, et
au protocole de signature facultative, depuis le 15 mars 2002 et le

24 novembre 1969 respectivement, dans chaque cas sans réserve;
41. Considérant que le Mexique a exposé que les questions en litige
entre lui-même et le,çEtats-Unis d'Amérique coiicernent les articles 5
et 36 de la convention de Vienne et relèvent de la compétence obligatoire
de la Cour en vertu de l'article premier du protocole de signature facul-
tative; etqii'il ena conclu que la Cour dispose d~:la compétence néces-

saire pour indiquer les mesures conservatoires demandées; et considérant
que les Etats-Unis ont affirmé qu'ils «ne préte~d[aient] pas soulever
maintenant la question de savoir si la Cour a compétence prima ,facie,
tout en se réservant le droit de contester la compétence de la Cour au
stade opportun de la procédure));
42. Considérant qu'au vu de ce qui précède laCour estime qu'elle a

prima jacie compétence en vertu de l'article prcmier du protocole de
signature facultative pour connaître de l'affaire;

43. Considérant que, dans sa requête,le Mexique prie la Cour, ainsi

qu'il a été mentionnéprécédemment(voir paragraphe 8 ci-dessus), de dire
et juger que les Etats-Unis «ont violé leurs obligations juridiques inter-
nationales envers le Mexique, en son nom propre et dans l'exercice duas provided by Articles 5 and 36, respectively of the Vienna Conven-

tion"; whereas Mexico seeks various measures aimed at remedying these
breaches and avoiding any repetition thereof; whereas it contends, the
Court should preserve the right to such remedies by calling upon the
United States to take al1 necessary steps to ensure that no Mexican
national is executed and that no execution date be set in respect of any
such national:

44. Whereas the United States acknowledges that, in certain cases,
Mexican nationals have been prosecuted and sentenced without being
informed of their rights pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the
Vienna Convention; whereas it argues, however, that in such cases, in
accordance with the Court's Judgment in the LaGrand case, the United
States has the obligation "by means of its own choosing, [to] allow the

review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in that Convention";
whereas it submits that in the specificcases identified by Mexico the evi-
dence indicates the cornmitment of the United States to providing such
reviewand reconsideration; whereas the United States contends that such
review and reconsideration can occur through the process of executive
clemency - an institution "deeply rooted in the Anglo-American system
of justice" - which may be initiated by the individuals concerned after
the judicial process has been completed; whereas it claims that such
review and reconsideration has already occurred in several cases during
the last two years; that none of the Mexicans "currently under sentence of
death will be executed unless there has been a review and reconsideration
of the conviction and sentence that takes into account any failure to carry
out the obligations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention"; that, under

the terms of the Court's decision in the LaGrand case, this is a sufficient
remedy for its breaches, and that there is accordingly no need to indicate
provisional measures intended to preserve the rights to such remedies;
45. Whereas, according to Mexico. the position of the United States
amounts to maintaining that "the Vienna Convention entitles Mexico
only to review and reconsideration, and that review and reconsideration
equals only the ability to request clemency"; whereas "the standardless,
secretive and unreviewable process that is called clemency cannot and
does not satisfy this Court's mandate [in the LaGrand case]";

46. Whereas there is thus a dispute between the Parties concerning the
rights of Mexico and of its nationals regarding the remedies that must be
provided in the event of a failure by the United States to comply with its
obligations under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention;
whereas that dispute belongs to the merits and cannot be settled at this

stage of the proceedings; whereas the Court must accordingly address the
issue of whether it should indicate provisional measures to preserve any
rights that may subsequently be adjudged on the merits to be those of the
Applicant ;droit qu'a cet Etat d'a:isurer la protection consulaire de ses ressortissants,
ainsi qu'il est prévuauixarticles5 et36, respectivement, de la convention
de Vienne»; qu'il sollicite diverses mesures ayant pimr objet de remédier
ii ces manquements et d'en éviter le renouvellement; que, selon le
Mexique, la Cour devrait sauvegarder le droit à de tels remèdes en invi-
tant les Etats-Unis a prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour faire en
sorte qu'aucun ressoritissant mexicain ne soit exécuté et qu'aucune date

d'exécution ne soitfixéeen ce qui concerne celui-ci;
44. Considérant aue les Etats-Unis reconnaisse~t aue. dans certains
cas, des ressortissants mexicains ont été poursuivis et condamnés sans
avoir été informés deleurs droits en vertu de l'alinéab) du paragraphe 1
de l'article 36 de la (convention de Vienne; qu'il:. exposent cependant
qu'en pareil cas, conhrmément à l'arrêt rendupar la Cour en l'affaire
LaCrund, ils ont I'obl,igation, «en mettant en Œuvre les moyens de leur

choix, [de]permettre le réexamen et larevision du VI-rdictde culpabilité et
de la peine en tenant compte du droit prévu par la convention)); qu'ils
soutiennent que, dans les cas spécifiques mentionnes par le Mexique, ila
étédémontré que les Etats-Unis s'étaient engagis a permettre un tel
réexamenet une telle revision; que les Etats-Unis allèguent que ce réexa-
men et cette revision peuvent être opéréà s l'occasion des recours en grâce
- une procédure «solidement ancrée dans le sys ème judiciaire anglo-

américain)) -- ouverils aux personnes concernées une fois le processus
judiciaire parvenu a son terme; qu'il en aurait dija étéainsi dans plu-
sieurs affaires au cours des deux dernières années; qu'aucun des Mexi-
cains ((condamnés rnort ne seralit] exécutésans qu'il y [eût] réexamen et
revision du verdict et de la peine tenant compte de toute violation de
l'article 36 de la convention de Vienne)); qu'il serait de la sorte remédié,
dans des conditions conformes a l'arrêt rendupar la Cour en l'affaire

LaGrand, aux manquements constatés; et qu'il n'y aurait par suite pas
lieu d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires ayant pour objet de préserver
les droits à de tels remèdes;
45. Considérant que, d'après le Mexique, la position des Etats-Unis
revient à soutenir que «la convention de Vienne ne donne au Mexique
qu'un droit au réexamenet a la revision, et que ce droit se limiaeintro-
duire un recours en grâce)); que ((cette procédure non uniforme, secrète

et sans recours que l'on appelle le reco<rs en grâce ne peut répondre, et
ne répond pas en l'espèce,aux critères imposéspar la Cour [dans l'affaire
LaGrand] »;
46. Considérant qu'il existe par suite un différe~dentre les Parties sur
les droits du Mexique et de ses ressortissants quant aux remèdes qui
doivent être apportés en cas de méconnaissance par les Etats-Unis de
leurs obligations en vertu du paragraphe 1de l'article 36de la convention

de Vienne; que ce différend relèvedu fond et ne murait être tranché a ce
stade de la procédure; que par voie de conséquence il y a lieu pour la
Cour de rechercher s'il convient de sauvegarder par des mesures conser-
vatoires les droits que I'arrêtau fond pourrait éve~ituellementreconnaître
au demandeur ; 47. Whereas the United States argues, however, that it is incumbent
upon the Court, pursuant to Article 41 of its Statute, to indicate provi-

sional measures "not to preserve only rights claimed by the Applicant,
but 'to preserve the respective rights of either party'"; that, "[alfter bal-
ancing the rights of both Parties, the scales tip decidedly against Mexico's
request in this case"; that the measures sought by Mexico to be imple-
mented immediately amount to "a sweeping prohibition on capital pun-
ishment for Mexican nationals in the United States, regardless of United
States law", which "would drastically interfere with United States sov-

ereign rights and implicate important federalism interests"; that this
would, moreover, transform the Court into a "general criminal court of
appeal", which the Court has already indicated in the past is not its func-
tion; and that the measures requested by Mexico should accordingly be
refused :

48. Whereas the Court, when considering a request for the indication
of provisional measures, "must be concerned to preserve . . . the rights
which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either to the
Applicant or to the Respondent" (Land und Muritinle Boundary betiz,een
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cumeroon v. Nigeria), Provisional Measures,

Order oj 15 Murch 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), p. 22,para. 35),with-
out being obliged at this stage of the proceedings to rule on those rights;
whereas the issues brought before the Court in this case "do not concern
the entitlement of the federal states within the United States to resort to
the death penalty for the most heinous crimes"; whereas "the function of
this Court is to resolve international legal disputes between States, inter
ulia when they arise out of the interpretation or application of interna-

tional conventions, and not to act as a court of criminal appeal";
(LaCrand f Cermuny v. United States of Anzerica), Provisional Meas-
ures, Order of3 Murch 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I),p. 15, para. 25);
whereas the Court may indicate provisional measures without infringing
these principles; and whereas the argument put forward on these specific
points by the United States accordingly cannot be accepted;

49. Whereas
"the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures under

Article 41 of its Statute is intended to preserve the respective rights
of the parties pending its decision, and presupposes that irreparable
prejudice shall not be caused to rights which are the subject of a
dispute in judicial proceedings" (ihid. pp. 14-15, para. 22); 47. Considérant toutefois que, selon les Etats-lJnis, il appartient i
la Cour, agissant conformément à l'article 41 du Statut, d'indiquer
des mesures conservatoires «non pas pour préserver uniquement les
droits revendiqués par le demandeur, mais pour prendre des mesures
((conservatoires du droit de chacun »» ; que, après avoir soupesé «les

droits de chacune des Parties, la balance penchtt[rait] décidément en
défaveur de la demande du Mexique en l'espèce));qu'en effet les mesures
dont le Mexique sollicite la mise en Œuvre immt-diate se traduiraient
par «une interdiction absolue de condamner à la peine capitale des
ressortissants mexicains aux Etats-Unis, sans teiiir compte du droit
interne des Etats-Unis)), ce qui «porter[ait] gravement atteinte aux droits
souverains des Etats-Unis et remettr[ait] en question certains intérêts

importants liés au fédéralisme)); qu'en outre ces mesures transforme-
raient la Cour en ((juridiction d'appel en matière pénale)),alors que la
Cour a déjà indiquépar le passé que telle n'était pas sa fonction; et
que les mesures demandées par le Mexique devraitant pour ce motif être
refusées ;
48. Considérant aue la Cour. à l'occasion de l'examen d'une demande

en indication de mesures conservatoires, «doit se préoccuper de
sauvegarder ... les droits que l'arrêtqu'elle aura ultérieurement à rendre
pourrait éventuellement reconnaître, soit au dem>ndeur, soit au défen-
deur» (Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Crlnzerounet le Nigériu
(Curneroirn c. Nigériu), ordonnunet, du 15 mars 1996, C.I.J. Recueil
lY96 (Il, p. 22, par. 35), sans qu'il y ait lieu à ce stade de la procé-

dure de prendre parti sur ces droits; que les questions portées devant la
Cour en l'espèce «nie concernent pas le droit cles Etats fédérésqui
composent les Etats-Unis de recourir à la peiiie de mort pour les
crimes les plus odieux)); que «la fonction de la (:our est de régler des
différends juridiques internationaux entre Etats, notamment lorsqu'ils dé-
coulent de l'interprétation ou de l'application de conventions interna-
tionales, et non pas d'agir en tant que cour d'appel en matière criminelle))

(LuCrunri (Allerî~agize c. Etats-Unis d'Amkriqui,). mesures conserva-
toires, ordonnance du 3 mcrrs1999, C.1. J. Recueil 1999 (1) ,p. 15,par. 25) ;
que la Cour peut indiquer des mesures conservatoires sans qu'il soit
porté atteinte aux principes ainsi rappelés; et que l'argumentation déve-
loppée sur ces point:; précispar les Etats-Unis nt saurait par suite être
retenue;

49. Considérant que

«le pouvoir d'indiquer des mesures conservatoires que la Cour tient
de l'article 41 de son Statut a pour objet de iauvegarder le droit de

chacune des parties en attendant qu'elle rendc sa décision, etprésup-
pose qu'un préjudiceirréparable ne doit pas i-tre causéaux droits en
litige dans une procédure judiciaire)) (ihid., p. 14-15, par.22); 50. Whereas, moreover,
"provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute are indicated
'pending the final decision' of the Court on the merits of the case,
and are therefore only justified if there is urgency in the sense that
action prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be taken

before such final decision is given" (Passage through the Great Belt
(Finland v.Dennîark), Provisional Meusures, Order of 29 July 1991,
I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 17, para. 23);

51. Whereas Mexico's principal request is that the Court should order
the United States "to take measures sufficient to ensure that no Mexican

national be executed and that no date for the execution of a Mexican
national be set"; whereas the jurisdiction of the Court is limited in the
present case to the dispute between the Parties concerning the interpreta-
tion and application of the Vienna Convention with regard to the indi-
viduals which Mexico identified as being victims of a violation of the
Convention; whereas, accordingly, the Court cannot rule on the rights of
Mexican nationals who are not alleged to have been victims of a violation
of that Convention;
52. Whereas, however, Mexico argues that 54 of its nationals have
been sentenced to death following proceedings that allegedly violated
the obligations incumbent on the United States under Article 36, para-
graph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention; whereas Mexico provides a list
of those nationals and some information relating to their respective
cases; whereas it adds that three of them have had their sentences com-

muted; whereas at the oral proceedings its Agent requested that the
United States be ordered "to refrain from fixing any date for execution
and from carrying out any execution in the case of the 51 Mexican
nationals covered by the Application, until the Court has been able to
decide on the merits of the case":
53. Whereas the United States'argues that no execution date has been
scheduled with respect to any of the Mexican nationals concerned (see
paragraph 31 above); whereas it points out that this is so both for the
three individuals specifically named in its request for the indication of
provisional measures and in regard to the others; whereas it observes
that, in the case ofhese latter, "any execution date iseven more remote";
and whereas it accordingly concludes that the request for the indication
of provisional measures is thus premature;
54. Whereas "the sound administration ofjustice requires that a request
for the indication of provisional measures founded on Article 73 of the

Rules of Court be submitted in good time" LuGrand (Germuny v.United
States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 Murch 1999,
I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 14,para. 19);whereas, moreover, the Supreme
Court of the United States observed, when considering a petition seeking
the enforcement of an Order of this Court, that: "It is unfortunate that
thismatter came before us while proceedings are pending before the ICJ 50. Considérant en outre que
«les mesures conservatoires visées à l'article 41 du Statut sont indi-

quées «en attendant l'arrêtdéfinitif))dela Coi~rau fond et ne sont
par conséquentjustifiéesque s'il y a urgence, c'est-à-dire s'ilest pro-
bable qu'une action préjudiciable aux droits ce l'une ou de l'autre
Partie sera com~~iiseavant qu'un tel arrêtdéinitif ne soit rendu))
(Passrzgepar Ir G~vund-Belt(Finlande c. Danemurk), mesures conser-
vatoires, ordorznancedu 29 juillet 1991, C.1.J. Recueil 1991, p. 17,
par. 23):

51. Considérant que le Mexique demande à titrr principalà la Cour
que celle-ci «prenne toutes les mesures nécessaires afinqu'aucun ressor-
tissant mexicain condamné àla peine de mort aux Elats-Unis ne soit exé-
cutéet qu'aucune date:d'exécution nesoit fixée));que la compétence dela
Cour est limitéeen l'espèceau différend néentre les Parties en ce qui
concerne l'interprétation et l'application de lanvi:ntion de Vienne pour
ce qui est des personnes que le Mexique a mention iéescomme ayant été
victimes d'une violation de la convention; qu'elle lie saurait par suite se
prononcer sur les dro:itsde ressortissants mexicains dont il n'est pas allé-
gué qu'ilsaient été victimesd'une violation de ladite convention;
52. Considérant que le Mexique expose cependant que cinquante-
quatre de ses ressorti:ssants auraient étécondamnis à mort au terme de
procédures qui auraient violéles obligations qui incombent aux Etats-
Unis en vertu de I'alinih) du paragraphe 1de l'article36de la convention
de Vienne; que le Mexique fournit la liste de cesre:isortissants et diverses

informations sur leur situation; qu'il ajoute que trois d'entre eux ont été
graciés;qu'au cours de la procédure orale son agerit a demandéqu'il soit
((ordonné qu'aucune date d'exécution ne soitfixéeet qu'aucune exécu-
tion n'ait lieu dans le cas des cinquante et unesso:*tissantsmexicains qui
font l'objet de la requête, jusqu'àce que la Cour ait pu trancher le fond
de l'affaire));
53. Considérant que les Etats-Unis font valoir clu'aucunedate n'a été
fixéepour l'exécutionde l'un quelconque des ressortissants mexicainsen
cause (voir paragraphe 31 ci-dessus); qu'ils soulignent qu'il en est ainsi
tant en ce qui concerne les trois personnes spécifiquementviséespar le
Mexique dans sa demande en indication de mesure:)conservatoires que les
autres; qu'ils relèventque, dans le cas de cesernikres, ((toute date d'exé-
cution serait encore plus éloignée));et qu'ils en concluent que ladite
demande en indication de mesures conservatoires est par suite prématurée;
54. Considérant (<:qu'unebonne administraticln de la justice exige

qu'une demande en indication de mesures coni;ervatoires fondée sur
l'article 73 du Régl'ementde la Cour soit préslntéeen temps utile»
(LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d'Amériqu?), mesures conserva-
toires, ordonnance du 3 mars 1999, C.I.J.Recueil 1)99 (I), p.14,par. 19);
qu'aussi bien la Cour suprêmedes Etats-Unis, saiiie d'une requêteayant
pour objet de donner effet a une ordonnance cle la présente Cour, a
observé: «Nous déplorons que cette question nous ait été soumise authat might have been brought to that court earlier" (Breard v. Greene,

523 US 371, 378 (1998)); whereas, in view of the rules and time-limits
governing the granting of clemency and the fixing of execution dates in a
number of the States of the United States, the fact that no such dates
have been fixed in any of the cases before the Court is not per se a cir-
cumstance that should preclude the Court from indicating provisional
measures;

55. Whereas it is apparent from the information before the Court in
this case that three Mexican nationals, Messrs. César Roberto Fierro
Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos and Osvaldo Torres Aguilera, are at
risk of execution in the coming months, or possibly even weeks; whereas
their execution would cause irreparable prejudice to any rights that may
subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong to Mexico; and whereas
the Court accordingly concludes that the circumstances require that it
indicate provisional measures to preserve those rights, as Article 41 of its
Statute provides;
56. Whereas the other individuals listed in Mexico's Application,
although currently on death row, are not in the same position as the three

persons identified in the preceding paragraph of this Order; whereas the
Court may, if appropriate, indicate provisional measures under Article 41
of the Statute in respect of those individuals before it renders finaljudg-
ment in this case:

57. Whereas it is clearly in the interest of both Parties that their
respective rights and obligations be determined definitively as early as
possible; whereas it is therefore appropriate that the Court, with the co-
operation of the Parties. ensure that a finaljudgment be reached with al1
possible expedition;
58. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way
prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the
merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the
Application, or relating to the merits themselves; and whereas it leaves
unaffected the right of the Governments of Mexico and the United States
to submit arguments in respect of those questions;

59. For these reasons,

Unanimously.

1. Indicutes the following provisional measures:
(a) The United States of America shall take al1measures necessary tomoment où uneinstancesetrouve pendante devant la clousinternationale de
Justice alors que celle-ci aurait pu en être saisi: plus tôt» (Breurd
v. Greerîe.523 US 371, 378 (1998)); considérant que, compte tenu des
règleset délaisgouvernant l'exercicedu droit de grâce et la fixation de
la date des exécutions capitales dans plusieurs Etats des Etats-Unis,
la circonstance que de telles dates n'aient étéixée!,dans aucun des cas
soumis à la Cour n'est pas en soi de natureà interdire àcelle-ci d'indi-
quer des mesures conse~vatoires;
55. Considérant qu'il ressort des informations dont la Cour dispose en
l'espèceque trois ressortissants mexicains, MM. ('ésar Roberto Fierro

Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos et Osvaldo Torris Aguilera, risquent
d'êtreexécutésdans les prochains mois, voire dans les prochaines
semaines; que leur exécutionporterait un préjudice rréparable aux droits
que l'arrêtde la Cour pourrait éventuellement reconnaître au Mexique;
et que la Cour en conclut que lescirconstancesexigcnt qu'elleindique des
mesures conservatoires, pour sauvegarder ces droits, ainsi qu'il est prévu
à l'article 41 de son SLatut;
56. Considérantque les autres personnes énumér~iedsans la requêtedu
Mexique, bien que se trouvant A l'heure actuelle dans le couloir de la
mort, sont dans une situation différente decelledes trois personnes citées
dans le paragraphe précédentde l'ordonnance; coiisidérant qu'il appar-
tientà la Cour d'indiquer, le cas échéant,des m<:suresconservatoires,
conformément à l'article 41 du Statutà l'égarddf:ces personnes avant
que soit rendu l'arrêt définitif;

57. Considérantqu'ilest manifestement de l'intérêdtes deux Parties de
voir définitivementdéterminésleurs droits et ob1ig;itionsrespectifs aussi-
tôt que possible: quecièslors il convient que la Cour, avec la coopération
des Parties, veilleparvenir à un arrêtdéfinitifdaiis les meilleurs délais;

58. Considérant qu'une décisionrendue en la présenteprocédure ne
préjuge enrien la compétence de la Cour pour connaître du fond de
l'affaire, ni aucune question relatiàela recevabilitédela requêteou au
fond lui-même,et qii'elle laisse intact le droit dis Gouvernements du
Mexique et des Etats-Unis de faire kaloir leurs moyens en ces matières;

59. Par ces motifs,

A l'unanimité,
1.Indiq~wà titre provisoire les mesures conservatoires suivantes:

u) les Etats-Unis d'Amérique prendront toute mesure pour que ensure that Mr. CésarRoberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto Moreno
Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera are not executed pending
final judgment in these proceedings;
(h) The Government of the United States of America shall inform the
Court of al1measures taken in implementation of this Order.

II. Decides that, until the Court has rendered its final judgment, it
shall remain seised of the matters which form the subject of this Order.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at
the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifth day of February, two thousand
and three, in three copies, one of which will beplaced in the archives of
the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of the United
Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America,
respectively.

(Signed) Gilbert GUILLAUME:
President.

(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.

Judge ODA appends a declaration to the Order of the Court.

(Initialled)G.G.
(Initialled)Ph.C. MM. CésarRoberto Fierro Reyna, Roberto Moreno Ramos et Os-
valdo Torres Aguilera ne soient pas exécutés taritque l'arrêtdéfinitif
en la présente instance n'aura pasté rendu;
h) le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique portera à la connais-
sance de la Cour toute mesure prise en application de la présente
ordonnance.

II. Décideque, jusqu'à ce que la Cour rende scn arrêtdéfinitif, elle
demeurera saisiedes questions qui font l'objet de la présenteordonnance.

Fait en anglais et en français, le texte anglais faisant foi, au Palais de la
Paix, à La Haye, le cinq février deuxmille trois, rn trois exemplaires,
dont l'un restera déposé auxarchives de la Cour et les autres seront
transmis respectivement au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis du Mexique et
au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Le président,
(Signé) Gilbert GUILLAUME.

Le greffier,
(Signé) Philippe COUVREUR.

M. le juge ODAjoint une déclaration à 1'ordonn.ince.

(Paraphé) G.G.
(Paraphé) Ph.C.

ICJ document subtitle

Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures

Document file FR
Document Long Title

Order of 5 February 2003

Links