Public sitting held on Tuesday 2 July 2013, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Tomka presiding, in the case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening)

Corrigé
Corrected

CR2013/12

International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice

LAHAYE THE HAGUE

YEAR2013

Public sitting

held on Tuesday 2 July 2013, at 3p.m., at the Peace Palace,

President Tomka presiding,

in the case conceming Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan:
New Zealand intervening)

VERBATIM RECORD

ANNÉE2013

Audience publique

tenue le mardi 2illet 201à,15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,

sous laprésidencede M. Tomka, président,

en l'affaire relative Chasse à la baleine dans l'Antarctique
(Australie c. Japon ; Nouvelle-Zélande(intervenant))

COMPTE RENDU -2-

Present: President Tomka
Vice-President Sepulveda-Amor
Judges Owada

Abraham
Keith
Bennouna

Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood

Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde

Bhandari
Judge ad hoc Charlesworth

Registrar Couvreur -3-

Présents: M. Tomka, président
M. Sepulveda-Amor, vice-président

MM. Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov

Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Mmes Xue

Donoghue
M. Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M. Bhandari, juges

Mme Charlesworth, juged hoc

M. Couvreur, greffier -4-

TlleGovemme111 of Austra/ia is represe11tehy:

The Honourable Mark Dreyfus Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General of Australia,

as Counsel and Advocate;

Mr. Bill Campbell, Q.C., General Counsel (International Law), Attorney-General's Department,

as Agent, Counse/ and Advocate;

H.E. Mr. Neil Mules, A.O., Ambassador of Australia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Co-Agent;

Mr. Justin Gleeson, S.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,

Mr. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,

Mr. Henry Burmester, A.O., Q.C., Special Counsel, Australian Govemment Solicitor,

Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,

Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva,

as Counsel and Advocates;

Ms Kate Cook, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,

Dr. Makane Mbengue, Associate Professor, University of Geneva,

as Counsel;

Ms Anne Sheehan, Acting Assistant-Secretary, Attorney-General's Department,

Mr. Michael Johnson, Principal Legal Officer, Attomey-General's Department,

Ms Danielle Forrester, Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,

Ms Stephanie Ierino, Acting Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General's Department,

Ms Clare Gregory, Senior Legal Officer, Attomey-General's Department,

Ms Nicole Lyas, Acting Senior Legal Officer, Attomey-General's Department,

Ms Erin Maher, Legal Officer, Attomey-General's Department,

Mr. Richard Rowe, Senior Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

Dr. Greg French, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, - 5-

Le Gouvememe11tdel'Australieestreprése11p tar:

L'honorable Mark Dreyfus, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General d'Australie,

comme conseil et avocat ;

M. Bill Campbell Q.C., General Counsel (droit international), services de l'Attorney-General

d'Australie,

comme agent, conseil et avocat ;

S. Exc. M. Neil Mules, A.O., ambassadeur d'Australie auprèsdu Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme coagent ;

M. Justin Gleeson, S.C., Solicitor-General d'Australie,

M. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l'Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l'Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Henry Burmester, A.O., Q.C., Special Counsel, Solicitor du Gouvernement australien,

M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit au University College de Londres, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),

Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéde Genève,

comme conseils et avocats ;

Mme Kate Cook, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),

M. Makane Mbengue, professeur associéà l'Universitéde Genève,

comme conseils ;

Mme Anne Sheehan, secrétaireadjoint par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,

M. Michael Johnson, juriste principal, services de l'Attorney-General,

Mme Danielle Forrester,juriste principal, services de l'Attorney-General,

Mme Stephanie Ierino,juriste principal par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,

Mme Clare Gregory, juriste hors classe, services de l'Attorney-General,

Mme Nicole Lyas, juriste hors classe par intérim,services de l'Attorney-General,

Mme Erin Maher, juriste, services de 1'Attorney-General,

M. Richard Rowe, juriste hors classe, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce,

M. Greg French, secrétaireadjoint, ministèredes affaires étrangèreset du commerce, -6-

Mr. Jamie Cooper, Legal Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

Ms Donna Petrachenko, First Assistant Secretary, Department of Sustainability, Environment,
Water, Population and Communities,

Mr. Peter Komidar, Director, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and
Communities,

Dr. Bill de la Mare, Scientist, Australian Antarctic Division, Department of Sustainability,
Environment, Water, Population and Communities,

Dr. David Blumenthal, Senior Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General,

Ms. Giulia Baggio, First Secretary,Senior Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General,

Mr. Todd Quinn, First Secretary, Embassy of Australia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Advisers;

Ms Mandy Williams, Administration Officer, Attorney-General's Department,

as Assistant.

Tlle Governmelltof Japa11 is represe11tedby:

Mr. Koji Tsuruoka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,

as Agent;

H.E. Mr. Yasumasa Nagamine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Co-Agent;

Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,President of the
Sociétéfrançaise pour le droit international, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,

Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, associate member of the Institut de droit international,

Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, member of the
English Bar,

Mr. Yuji Iwasawa, Professor oflnternational Law at the University of Tokyo, member and former
Chairperson of the Human Rights Committee,

Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, McGill University,
member of the Bar of New York and the Law Society of Upper Canada,

Mr. Shotaro Hamamoto, Professor of International Law, Kyoto University,

Ms Yukiko Takashiba, Deputy Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

as Counsel and Advocates; - 7-

M. Jamie Cooper, juriste, ministère des affaires étrangèreset du commerce,

Mme Donna Petrachenko, premier secrétaire adjoint, ministère du développement durable,

de l'environnement, de l'eau, des populations et des communautés,

M. Peter Komidar, directeur, ministère du développement durable, de l'environnement, de l'eau,
des populations et des communautés,

M. Bill de la Mare, scientifique, division de l'Antarctique australien, ministère du développement
durable, de l'environnement, de l'eau, des populations et des communautés,

M. David Blumenthal, conseiller principal, services de l'Attorney-General,

Mme Giulia Baggio, conseiller principal, services de l'Attorney-General,

M. Todd Quinn, premier secrétaire,ambassade d'Australie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme conseillers ;

Mme Mandy Williams, administrateur, services de l'Attorney-General,

comme assistant.

Le Gouvernement du Japon est représentépar:

M. Koji Tsuruoka, ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères,

comme agent ;

S. Exc. M. Yasumasa Nagamine, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Japon auprèsdu
Royaume des Pays-Bas,

comme coagent ;

M. Alain Pellet, professeurà l'UniversitéParis Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,présidentde la Société
française pour le droit international, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,

M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d'Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit

internationalà l'Universitéd'Oxford, membre associéde l'Institut de droit international,

M. Alan Boyle, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéd'Edimbourg, membre du barreau
d'Angleterre,

M. Yuji Iwasawa, professeur de droit international à l'Université de Tokyo, membre et ancien
président duComitédes droits de l'homme,

M. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D (Harvard), professeur de droit international à l'Université

McGill, membre du barreau de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,

M. Shotaro Hamamoto, professeur de droit international à l'Universitéde Kyoto,

Mme Yukiko Takashiba, directeur adjoint à la division chargéede l'affaire de la chassà la baleine

devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,

comme conseils et avocats ; - 8 -

Mr. Takane Sugihara, Emeritus Professor of International Law, Kyoto University,

Ms Atsuko Kanehara, Professor of International Law, Sophia University (Tokyo),

Mr. Masafumi lshii, Director-General, International Legal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,

Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

as Counsel;

Mr. Kenji Kagawa, Director-General, Resources Enhancement Promotion Department, Fisheries

Agency,

Mr. Noriyuki Shikata, Minister, Embassy of Japan in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland,

Mr. Kenichi Kobayashi, Director, International Legal Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Joji Morishita, Director-General, National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries,

Mr. Akima Umezawa, Ph.D., Director, Fishery Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ms Yoko Yanagisawa, Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Naohisa Shibuya, Deputy Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Ken Sakaguchi, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ms Akiko Muramoto, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Masahiro Kato, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Takaaki Sakamoto, Assistant Director, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency,

Mr. Shigeki Takaya, Assistant Director, Fisheries Management Improvement Division, Fisheries
Agency,

Mr. Toshinori Uoya, Assistant Director, Fisheries Management Division, Fisheries Agency,

Mr. Shinji Hiruma, Assistant Director, International Management Division, Fisheries Agency,

Mr. Sadaharu Kodama, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Mr. Nobuyuki Murai, LL.D., First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, -9-

M. Takane Sugihara, professeur éméritede droit international de l'Universitéde Kyoto,

Mme Atsuko Kanehara, professeur de droit international à l'UniversitéSophia (Tokyo),

M. Masafumi Ishii, directeur généraldu bureau des affaires juridiques internationales, ministère

des affaires étrangères,

Mme Alina Miron, chercheur, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université Paris
Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,

commeconseils;

M. Kenji Kagawa, directeur généraldu département de la promotion de la valorisation des
ressources, agence des pêcheries,

M. Noriyuki Shikata, ministre à l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d'Irlande du Nord,

M. Kenichi Kobayashi, directeur à la division des affaires juridiques internationales, ministère des
affaires étrangères,

M. Joji Morishita, directeur généralde l'Institut national de recherche sur les pêcheriesen eaux

lointaines,

M. Akima Umezawa, Ph.D., directeur à la division des pêcheries,ministère des affaires étrangères,

Mme Yoko Yanagisawa, directeur à la division chargéede l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant
la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Naohisa Shibuya, directeur adjoint à la division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine
devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,

M. Ken Sakaguchi, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ, ministère
des affaires étrangères,

Mme Akiko Muramoto, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ,
ministèredes affaires étrangères,

M. Masahiro Kato, division chargée de l'affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ, ministère

des affaires étrangères,

M. Takaaki Sakamoto, sous-directeur à la division des affaires internationales, agence des
pêcheries,

M. Shigeki Takaya, sous-directeur à la division de l'amélioration de la gestion des pêcheries,
agence des pêcheries,

M. Toshinori Uoya, sous-directeur à la division de la gestion des pêcheries,agence des pêcheries,

M. Shinji Hiruma, sous-directeur à la division de la gestion internationale, agence des pêcheries,

M. Sadaharu Kodama, conseiller juridique àl'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

M. Nobuyuki Murai, LL.D., premier secrétaire de l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des
Pays-Bas, - 10-

Ms Risa Saijo, LL.M., Researcher, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

Ms HéloïseBajer-Pellet, member of the Paris Bar,

as Advisers;

Mr. Douglas Butterworth, Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town,

Ms Judith E. Zeh, Ph.D., Researcher Professor Emeritus, University of Washington,

Mr. Dan Goodman, National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries,

Mr. Luis Alberto Pastene Perez, Ph.D., Director, Survey and Research Division, Institute of

Cetacean Research,

as Scientific Advisers and Experts;

Mr. Martin Pratt, Professor, Department ofGeography, Durham University,

as Expert Adviser;

Mr. James Harrison, Ph.D., Lecturer in International Law, University ofEdinburgh,

Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,

Mr. Jay Butler, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School,

member of the New York Bar,

as Legal Advisers.

Tlle Govemment of New Zealand is represented by:

The Honourable Christopher Finlayson Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General of New Zealand,

as Counsel and Advocate;

Dr. Penelope Ridings, International Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,

as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;

H.E. Mr. George Troup, Ambassador ofNew Zealand to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,

as Co-Agent;

Ms Cheryl Gwyn, Deputy Solicitor-General, Crown Law Office,

Ms Elana Geddis, Barrister, Harbour Chambers, Wellington,

as Counsel;

Mr. Andrew Williams, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, - Il -

Mme Risa Saijo, LL.M., chercheur à l'ambassade du Japon au Royaume des Pays-Bas,

Mme HéloïseBajer-Pellet, membre du barreau de Paris,

commeconseillers;

M. Douglas Butterworth, professeur éméritede l'Universitéde Cape Town,

Mme Judith E. Zeh, Ph.D., chercheur, professeur éméritede l'Universitéde Washington,

M. Dan Goodman, Institut national de recherche sur les pêcheriesen eaux lointaines,

M. Luis Alberto Pastene Perez, Ph.D., directeur à la division des enquêtes et de la recherche,
Institut de recherche sur les cétacés,

commeconseillerset expertsscientifiques;

M. Martin Pratt, professeur au départementde géographiede l'Universitéde Durham,

commeconseillerexpert;

M. James Harrison, Ph.D., chargéde cours en droit international à l'Université d'Edimbourg,

Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d'Angleterre,

M. Jay Butler, professeur associé invité de droit à la faculté de droit de l'Université George
Washington, membre du barreau de New York,

co1mneconseil/ersjuridiques.

Le Gouvernement de laNouvelle-Zélandeestreprésenté par :

L'honorable Christopher Finlayson, Q.C., M.P.,Attorney-General de Nouvelle-Zélande,

commeconseilet avocat;

Mme Penelope Ridings, conseiller juridique pour le droit international, ministère des affaires
étrangèreset du commerce,

commeagent,conseilet avocat;

S. Exc. M. George Troup, ambassadeur de Nouvelle-Zélande auprèsdu Royaume des Pays-Bas,

commecoagent;

Mme Cheryl Gwyn, Solicitor-Generaladjoint, Crown Law Office,

Mme Elana Geddis, avocat, Harbour Chambers (Wellington),

commeconseils;

M. Andrew Williams, conseiller juridique, ministère des affaires étrangèreset du commerce, - 12-

Mr. James Christmas, Private Secretary, Attomey-General's Office,

Mr. James Walker, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

Mr. Paul Vinkenvleugel , Policy Adviser, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,

as Advisers. - 13-

M. James Christmas, chef de cabinet, services de l'Attorney-Genera/,

M. James Walker, chef de mission adjoint, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,

M. Paul Vinkenvleugel, conseiller politique, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,

comme conseillers. - 14-

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good afternoon. The sitting is now open. This

afternoon the Court will hear Japan begin its first round of oral argument.

1 give the tloor to Mr. Koji Tsuruoka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Agent of

Japan. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. TSURUOKA: Thank you, Mr. President.

1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is the first time that Japan appears before the

Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. 1 am honoured to be the first ever

Agent representing my Government before this august body. Please allow me to be a bit personal

before proceeding. My tate father, Senjin Tsuruoka, devoted much of his life to international law,

serving as a Member of the International Law Commission for 20 years. He would have been

terrified to see me standing in front of the Court. 1must humbly admit that 1 may not satisfy ali

the requirements of an Agent, but 1am determined to do my best.

2. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, 1cannat but be struck by an irony ofhistory. lt was

this very subject, whaling, that forced Japan to open itselfto the world after 300 years of isolation.

Major maritime powers engaged in a massive scale whaling in the nineteenth century demanded

that Japan open up its ports to supply their whalers. And now whaling is testing whether we are

indeed a good global citizen, complying with international law, or whether we have manipulated

the law to circumvent our international obligations.

3. Although we strongly question the jurisdictional basis for Australia's claim, if the Court

is to rule on the merits of the case, we wish to emphasize that the case concerns the legality of

Japan's activities under international law and not ethical values or the evaluation of good or

bad science. The question put to the Court is the interpretation of Article VIII of the International

Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) regarding special permit whaling.

4. Japan is fully committed to upholding international law and we take Australia's

allegations very seriously. When a sovereign State is accused of breaching international law,the

accusation must be supported with convincing legal evidence. Australia failed to prove such an

allegation last week. We intend to present our case clearly so that there will be no room to

doubt our faithful observation of our international obligations. - 15-

5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Japan has lived in harmony with nature throughout

her long history. Surrounded by sea, Japan would be the last to misuse whales as resources because

we know we benefit from the fruits of the sea. Sustainable use of living resources is indeed at the

very heart of the Japanese ethos precisely because Japan has scarce resources and has always

relied for her survival on what nature can provide. Japan is deeply aware of the duty to pass on

to future generations a clean environment and rich biological diversity. Japan regards the

environment as one of the important global issues that requires the whole international

community to work co-operatively and inclusively. Japan has a long history of participation in

wildlife conservation treaties.

6. lt was in this spirit that Japan joined the ICRW in 1951. As stated in its preamble, the

ICRW is a régime that provides "for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make

possible the orderly development of the whaling industry'', which is fully consistent with the

Japanese understanding of natural resource utilization.

7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we have witnessed substantial development of

international environmental law on the management of living resources arising out of serious

reflection on the effect of human activities on the unmanaged fishing and hunting on the species.

Japan has embraced such development including the conservation and management of ali living

species. And it welcomes the tangible progress of implementation of such multilateral management

mechanisms.

8. We agree that animal protection, including the prohibition of unnecessary killing and the

preservation of biodiversity, is an essentially good cause. The ICRW was established to remedy

the whaling practice prevalent before 1946 with a view to ensuring conservation and management

based on science.

9. We are conducting the scientific research in a manner such that no harm to stocks

will occur in full application of the precautionary approach. Australia's own expert confirmed last

week that the catch of 850 minke whales a year does not endanger this population. Little is

known of the ecosystem in the Antarctic Ocean. lt is required by the ICRW that management of

whales as marine living resources be conducted based on the best scientific advice. lt is

precisely to supply the Scientific Committee with necessary scientific data that Japan is - 16-

pursuing research whaling and, combined with other nations' contribution, conservation and

management based on science under the IWC has been making progress.

1O. Australia was engaged in commercial whaling until 1979 and used the ICRW to

conduct sustainable whaling • In 1979, however, it drastically changed its position, when Prime

Minister Malcom Fraser announced a total ban on Australia's whaling and vowed to work for the

prohibition of whaling by other countries, saying,

"The Govemment upholds . . . that Australia should pursue a policy of

opposition to whaling and that this policy should be pursued both domestically and
intemationally through the International Whaling Commission and other
organizations."2

Australia has the sovereign right to decide its position. But Australia cannot impose its will on

other nations nor change the IWC into an organization opposed to whaling. Since 1979, Australia

persistently continued its efforts to transform the ICRW and the IWC to a régime of total ban

on whaling. As transformation requires entirely rewriting the ICRW, Australia to this day remains

unsuccessful.

11. Why does Australia take such a position? Are ali cetaceans sacred and endangered? 1

can understand the emotional background to this position, but fail to understand how it can be

translated to a legal or scientific position. The basic objective of a multilateral convention is to

bring States of widely differing social, economie and political systems with diverse interests to

co-operate for agreed global interests under an agreed framework. Inclusiveness in any

multilateral régime can only be ensured through encouraging harmony amongst States by

concentrating upon agreed, basic principles and objectives. A unilateral attempt at changing the

agreed rule seriously disrupts the effective operationof a multilateral convention.

12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, throughout the IWC process devoted to agreeing

on methods of better management, Australia opposed any whaling and blocked consensus. When

anti-whaling member States constituted three quarters of the IWC membership, the moratorium on

commercial whaling, as embodied in the Schedule paragraph 10 (e), was adopted. When that

The IWC Summary Catch Database, Version 5.3.
2
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debate, House, 4 April1979, pp. 1481-1482, CMJ Ann. 163. - 17 -

three-fourths majority cou1d not be maintained, Australia pushed for resolutions reflecting its own

policy which required a simple majority for adoption. These resolutions are not binding.

13. Failing to surmount the necessary threshold required to amend the Convention in the

direction Australia wished to see, it came to the Court. After many years of hard negotiation, the

IWC was at last at the culminating point of the "Future of the IWC" process; that is to say,

normalization process undertaken with a view to saving the IWC from complete derailment. Since

the increase in the membership in the 1980s of anti-whaling nations, the IWC suffered from

polarization that stood in the way of constructive discussions. The situation could only be putto

an end when a compromise was reached. Australia's intransigence aborted an agreement that

was about to be reached. Australia took the lead in opposing the consensus that would have

produced the rules acceptable to ali member States of the IWC on the management of cetacean

resources. Japan finds it disturbing that a State, while refusing to make sincere efforts and engage

in co-operation in the most prominent multilateral framework in this field, brings disagreements to

the Court.

14. Another aspect of the case pertains to confining the geographie coverage of Japan's

special permit whaling in the area of Australia's self-proclaimed Exclusive Economie Zone (EEZ)

in the Antarctic Ocean. As amply demonstrated by numerous actions, Australia attempts to

exercise its jurisdictionn this area. Japan does not recognize the Australian position on the EEZ in

relation to the Antarctic. By limiting the geographie coverage of the case toits claimed area in the

Antarctic Ocean and adjacent areas, is Australia attempting to give legitimacy to its self-proclaimed

position on the EEZ? Oris Australia trying to avoid putting its Antarctic claim to the test, as it

would if it imposed a ban on whaling within its claimed Antarctic EEZ, which it has not done.

We have serious doubts about the jurisdiction of the Court in light of Australia's reservation

attached toits acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court.

15. Japan, for its part, has acted in good faith and has achieved tangible scientific results

by presenting its findings to the Scientific Committee. Japan has continued to contribute to the

development of new management methods and painstakingly co-operated with a view to ensuring

conservation and management ofwhales. Even when, as a sovereign country, Japan could have left - 18-

the ICRW and the IWC to resume commercial whaling outside this régime,Japan chose to work

with other members within the given framework.

16. Although the moratorium on commercial whaling was adopted originally on a temporary

basis up to 1990, we are faithfully implementing the moratorium despite its practically indefinite

extension. Since Australia cannat argue scientific whaling is illegal, it claims Japanese special

permit whaling is commercial. The drastic change of the whaling conducted by Japan after its

acceptance of the moratorium on commercial whaling will be presented in detail by counsel and

will amply demonstrate that such whaling is not commercial, but scientific.

17. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me now address the fundamental question

presented to the Court. The difference between Japan and Australia is whether sustainable use of

marine resources may be permitted both in light of law and science.

18. Why is Japan engaged in research whaling? Is it because there is a moratorium on

commercial whaling and Japan needs to continue commercial whaling in disguise as Australia

alleges? Not at ali. Japan is conducting a comprehensive scientific research program because

Japan wishes to resume commercial whaling based on science in a sustainable manner.

19. The IWC needs scientific advice because Article V requires that regulations "shall be

based on scientific findings" and because the language of the moratorium says that "this provision

will be kept under review based upon the best scientific advice". This means that the lifting of

the moratorium requires that convincing scientific data be presented to the Scientific Committee

of the IWC to demonstrate that safe catch limits can be recommended for the resumption of

sustainable commercial whaling. This position is not unique. For example, Norway stated

recent!y, "[c]ontinued gathering of scientific data may also prove to be relevant in the context of

the moratorium on commercial whaling ... due to such moratorium essentially being a temporary

suspension pending further decisions as to future management" 3•

20. Why was JARPA started when Japan accepted the moratorium? Because the justification

for the moratorium was that data on whale stocks was inadequate to manage commercial whaling

properly. In these circumstances it was best to start the research program as saon as possible.

3
Written question from Terje Aasland (A) to the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Answered:
20 June 2013 by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Lisbeth Berg-Hansen;
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/tkd/Whats-new/News/20 13/scientific-research-on-whales.html?id =731449. - 19-

21. Why is JARPA Il conducted around the same waters as commercial whaling had been

conducted? This is because we know from past experience and current scientific data on whale

abundance that this is where whaling could be conducted in a commercially viable way, and

unless it is established that whaling is sustainable in those waters, Japan cannat resume commercial

whaling in those waters.

22. Should Japan be ashamed of trying to resume commercial whaling? As long as

commercial whaling is conducted in a sustainable manner and in accordance with agreements about

humane killing, it is legitimate use of marine living resources and this is precisely what the ICRW

is about.

23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we know only too weil that there are countries

that are opposed to whaling as a matter of principle. This makes it even more important that we

present to the Scientific Committee evidence that resuming commercial whaling is possible so that

the Commission's decisions can be based on science as required by the Convention. If Japan's

scientific research whaling is terminated, there will be no data for the Scientific Committee that

will demonstrate that the resumption of commercial whaling on a sustainable basis is possible, and

a Jackof data will extend the moratorium for commercial whaling indefinitely. That is why we

scrupulously abide by the rules of ICRW. Had there been doubt concerning our observance of

the ICRW,we would havejeopardized our most important goal of resuming sustainable commercial

whaling.

24. Australia, however, bases its arguments on its policy of absolutely no killing of whales.

This is demonstrated by the statement of the Australian Commissioner, stating that "Australia's

view is that we are opposed to any research that involves the killing of whales... ,.4 emphasis

added). By contrast, Japan is committed to science. We rest our case not on an opinion of one

scientist but on requirements of the ICRW and Annex P, which was agreed by the Scientific

Committee of the IWC. The scientific achievements of our special permit whaling are

recognized, appreciated and used by the Scientific Committee of the IWC, composed of over

150 experts in whale studies.

4
VerbatimRecordsof the IWC,1998,p. 131. -20-

25. In spite of the literai interpretation of Article VIII of the Convention

"[n]otwithstanding anything contained in this Convention ... ", we are not advocating an "absolute

discretion". Our position is clearly based on efforts to respect the highest precautionary approach.
5
We have fully complied with the procedural requirements • It is scientifically demonstrated that

there is no harm to stock of the targeted species under JARPNJARPA Il. Japan has always

been present in the negotiations through the IWC, has accepted what was agreed and faithfully

complied with it. lt is solely on these solid bases that Japan wishes to resume sustainable

whaling based on the best scientific advice as clearly stipulated in the ICRW.

26. In our pleadings to follow my speech, we will deal with both the jurisdictional question

as weil as the merits. Our counsel will explain that our special permit whaling for purposes of

scientific research is founded in law and based on science, as recognized by the Scientific

Committee of the IWC. In doing so, we will explain why Australia's arguments of last week are

without merit and cannat substantiate such a serious allegation as a breach of the international

convention.

27. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, le droit évolue. Mais

seulement par voie d'accord entre les Etats. On ne peut juger de la portéede ce qui a fait l'objet

d'un accord -ou non -qu'en recourant aux règlesbien établiesde l'interprétationdes traités. Le

Japon a respectéle principe fondamental pacta sunt servanda, en respectant en toute bonne foi ce

qui étaitconvenu et nous nous présentonsaujourd'hui devant vous dans l'espoir que votre arrêt

contribuera au renforcement de la stabilitédes relations internationales. Il va de soi que si la Cour

devait introduire une révolutiondans le droit des traités,cela serait lourd de conséquencesà long

terme pour le droit international. Mais nous sommes convaincus que la Cour, principal organe

judiciaire des Nations Unies, fera respecter le principe fondamental du respect de la parole donnée

dans les termes où elle l'a été.

28. Il appartient à la Cour de se prononcer sur la licéitédes actes des Etats ; pas sur

leur moralité ou leur valeur éthique. Pour certains, les baleines sont des animaux sacrés,

comme les vaches le sont pour les Hindous. Les religions et les cultures perçoivent les animaux

5ArticleVIII, Schedule,para. 30,Ann.P. -21 -

de manière différente. Nous vivons dans un monde où vivent plus de sept milliards d'êtres

humains répartis entre les cinq continents ; et la seule manière de leur permettre de coexister

pacifiquement est de respecter leurs différences, et de ne pas imposer les vues de certains aux

autres.

29. Après avoir lu et écoutéavec attention les arguments de l'Australie, je suis convaincu

qu'il s'agit d'une tentative unilatérale de ce pays pour imposer l'interdiction de toute chasse

baleinière en se fondant sur ses propres valeurs plutôt que sur une argumentation juridique relative

à la chasse scientifique autorisée par le Japon. Certes, dans ce cadre, le Japon capture et tue des

baleines. Devons-nous en êtrehonteux? Mêmesi cela peut êtrel'avis de certains, cela ne veut

pas dire que nous violons le droit international. Si l'on parle en termes de culture, le Japon est

fier de son histoire, qui remonte très loin dans le temps, et de sa tradition de proximité avec la

nature et de préservation de l'environnement pour les générationsà venir. Nous ne critiquons pas

les autres cultures. Monsieur le président,je le dis clairement: s'il fallait établir la supérioritéde

telle culture sur telle autre, le monde ne pourrait pas êtreen paix.

30. Pacta sunt servanda, j'y reviens... Tel est le fondement du droit qui a permis la

coexistence entre les nations durant des siècles etil serait fort regrettable d'écarter ce principe de

sagesse pour la mauvaise raison que les actes de certains Etats semblent moralement répréhensibles

àd'autres.

31. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre

attention et je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler à cette barre

M. le professeur Pellet. Merci beaucoup.

Le PRESIDENT: Merci beaucoup, Monsieur l'agent, et je donne la parole au

professeur Pellet. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur. -22-

M. PELLET:

L'incompétencede la Cour

1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l'agent de l'Australie l'a dit

sans fard : l'affaire que ce pays vous a soumise fait partie de sa campagne en faveur de

l'interdiction généraleet définitive de toute chasse commerciale à la baleine 6• Faisant mine

7 8
d'emprunter à la Nouvelle-Zélande le concept de «réglementation collective» , l'Australie lui

substitue sa vision unilatéraleet relaie le slogan de ses activistes en se faisant la championne

de la «tolérance-zéro» à l'égard de toute recherche baleinière utilisant des méthodes létales.

Pour cela,

1) elle modifie l'objet et le but de la convention de 1946 «sur la réglementation» -pas

l'interdiction, Monsieur le président, la réglementation- «de la chasse à la baleine» que

l'Australie transforme en un instrument de pures «conservation et reconstitution» -c'est 9 sa

nouvelle formulation, alors que l'objectif de cet instrument, clairement défini dans le

préambule, est la sauvegarde de la ressource naturelle que constituent les baleines en vue

de «donner à l'industrie baleinière la possibilité de se développer d'une manière

méthodique»;

2) L'Australie interprète l'article VIII de cette convention d'une façon incompatible avec son

texte, son contexte, ses travaux préparatoireset la pratique dont cette disposition a fait l'objet;

en particulier, elle entend soumettre le recours à certaines méthodes de recherche à des

conditions telles qu'elles deviennent complétement inutilisables -alors mêmequ'elles sont

expressémentprévuespar cette disposition clef. Ce faisant, l'Australie entend réduireà néantla

portée de cet article VIII qui laisse expressément une très large marge d'appréciation aux

gouvernements contractants, et ceci alors qu'aucun texte juridiquement contraignant, limitant

6
CR 201317, p. 19, par. 4 (Campbell).
7
Voir OEN, par. 6, 7, 14-32.
8
CR 201317,p. 20, par. 7, p. 22, par. 12 (Campbell).
9CR 2013/7, p. 29, par. 20 (Gleeson); p. 40, par. 1-2, p. 41, par. 6-7, p. 43, par. 13, p. 45, par. 20, p. 46, par. 22,

p. 49, par. 33-34,51, par. 35 (Boisson de Chazoumes). -23-

ou, a fortiori, excluant le recours à de telles méthodes, n'a jamais étéadopté au sein de la

commission baleinière internationale (la «CBI»).

3) Tout ceci au nom de «La Science», présentéecomme une religion révéléeq ,ui correspondrait à

une véritéindiscutable et dont l'Australie se fait le zélateur; le propre de toute attitude

scientifique me paraît pourtant êtrela conscience de la relativitédes approches, la modestie, la

confrontation des points de vue ; on est loin du compte, Monsieur le président: «Moi,

Australie» ou «Moi, professeur Mangel, je sais: il n'est qu'une science etj'en détiensseul(e) la

vérité.«La vraie science», disait Montaigne, «est une ignorance qui se sait» 10;on ne peut pas

dire que l'Australie et ses experts aient la science modeste.

4) Et pourtant, Monsieur le président,les réactionsde la communautéscientifique- y compris au

sein du comitéscientifique de la CBI- sont loin de conforter le méprisdans lequel l'Australie

semble tenir le programme JARPA II :certes, il a fait 1'objet de critiques -parfois vives-

dans certains cercles liésaux Etats hostiles par principe à la chasse baleinière; mais, si l'on

veut bien ne pas s'en tenir à quelques citations sorties de leur contexte et émanant de ces

milieux, le tableau est nettement moins sombre que nos amis australiens veulent le dépeindre;

il existe une grande diversité de points de vue à cet égard, et cette diversité témoigne de

l'absence de toute certitude en ce domaine; il paraît difficile, pour dire le moins, qu'une

juridiction internationale, pour éminentequ'elle soit, puisse trancher entre ces vues divergentes

e .asse preva mr . "~"' "' vente sctentt tque controversee sur une autre.

5) Enfin, il est certainement vrai que les Etats doivent agir de bonne foi et ne pas abuser des droits

que leur reconnaît le droit international ; mais, outre que «la mauvaise foi ne se présumepas» 11,

où est l'abus?

- dans le fait que le Japon, après avoir acceptéle moratoire, ait, dans l'esprit de l'article VIII,

paragraphe 4, de la convention, pris des mesures pour compenser (en partie) la perte des

donnéesscientifiques que fournissaient traditionnellement la chasse commerciale? Ou qu'en

10Michel de Montaigne, Pensées, 1580.

11 Affaire du lac Lanoux (Espagne, France), sentence arbitrale du 16novembre 1957, Recueil des sentences
arbitrales,vol. XII, p. 305. Voir également l'affaire Tacna Arica (Chili/Pérou),sentence arbitrale du 4 mars 1925,
Recueil des sentences arbitralevol. Il, p. 929-930Concessions Mavrommatis à Jérusalem,arrêtn° 5, 1925, C.P.JI.
sérieA n° 5,p. 43 Certains intérêtasllemands en Haute-Silésiepolonaise, fond, arrêt7, 1926, C.P.JJ. sérieA n°7,
p.30. -24-

vertu du moratoire lui-même, le Japon ait cherché à obtenir l'information scientifique qui

donne à la CBII'assurance qu'elle peut, sans risque, reviser le moratoire? Assurémentpas:

12
JARPA et JARPA Il ne sont pas des moyens de contourner le moratoire ; la montée en

puissance des méthodes de recherche létales est la conséquence du moratoire et de

l'assèchement des donnéesen résultant;

- l'abus serait-il alors dans le simple fait de recourir à ces méthodes? Mais, je l'ai dit, elles sont

expressément envisagées par l'article VIII, et mêmeles experts de l'Australie ont dû concéder

qu'il n'existait pas de méthodes alternatives raisonnablement utilisables et susceptibles de

13
fournir des informations équivalentes ;comme l'a également reconnu M. Gales en réponseà

une question de Mme la juge Donoghue, la connaissance de l'âge des baleines, qui, on peut le

regretter, ne peut êtreobtenue que par ce moyen, est indispensable pour évaluerleur mortalité

14 15
et établirun modèle de distribution des âges -ce qui est l'un des buts de JARPA 11 ; cela

explique aussi le nombre relativement élevéde petits rorquals capturés à cette fin, car

l'établissement de ce modèle suppose des statistiques portant sur un assez grand nombre

d'animaux; qu'il y ait, entre les experts, des divergences d'appréciation sur des problèmes de

ce genre, c'est certain (et naturel) -mais que la Cour puisse trancher ces querelles de

spécialistes,voilà qui est beaucoup moins évident;

l'abus serait-il dans le fait que les produits obtenus à partir des baleines capturées sont,

conformément aux directives du Gouvernement japonais, dans la mesure du possible, mis en

vente sur le marché afin de couvrir les frais entraînés par la recherche ? Mais ceci est

conforme aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l'article VIII et aux bonnes pratiques actuelles

communément suivies en matière de financement de la recherche ;

ou y aurait-il abus parce que le Japon ne respecterait pas certaines résolutions adoptéespar la

CBI- souvent à d'étroitesmajorités? Mais ces textes ne sont pas juridiquement obligatoires

et, en revanche, le Japon s'est toujours scrupuleusement conformé à toutes les obligations

12
CR 201317, p. 25, par. 4, p. 27, par. Il, p. 30, par. 25 ; CR 2013/11, p. 30-31, par. 21 (Gieeson).
13Voir CR 2013/9, p.65 (Mange!).

14CR 2013/10, p. 31 (Gales).

15Voir Govemment of Japan, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II)- Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale Resources», SC/57/01(2005), p. 2, 6-7 [CMJ, annexe 150]. -25-

procéduraleslui incombant en vertu de la convention ou du paragraphe 30 du règlementqui lui

est annexé; et il est mêmeallétrès au-delà en coopérantde bonne foi avec les organes de la

convention dont il a toujours considéréles points de vue avec attention- il n'est pas sûr que

l'on puisse en dire autant de l'Australie qui s'est, pour sa part, servie de ces organes pour tenter

d'obtenir une interprétationde la convention de 1946 contraire à sa lettre et à son esprit.

2. Mes collègues et moi-mêmedévelopperont ces points -et d'autres- plus tard cette

après-midi et dans les deux jours qui viennent. Mais nous ne le feront que par précautionou,

comme l'on dit, pour surplus de droit, car nous avons la ferme conviction que la Cour n'est pas

compétentepour se prononcer sur la requêtedont l'Australie a cru pouvoir vous saisir.

3. En effet, bien que le Japon n'ait pas exercé son droit de soulever des exceptions

préliminaires, il n'en objecte pas moins à la compétence de la Cour. C'est cette exception

d'incompétence -dont l'Australie ne conteste pas la recevabilitéet qu'elle a dit prendre très au

sérieux -qu'il m'appartient de vous présenteraujourd'hui.

4. Toutefois, Monsieur le président,le Japon se trouve dans une position assez particulière

et, à vrai dire, fort inconfortable. L'Australie n'a pas cru devoir demander un second tour de

plaidoiries écrites etla Cour ne l'a pas ordonné. Du coup,jusqu'à vendredi dernier-l'Australie a

pris soin d'attendre la toute dernière minute pour plaider ce point liminaire... -nous étionsdans

l'ignorance complètede la position du demandeur sur cet aspect, à nos yeux essentiel, de l'affaire.

5. Tout ce que nous savions concernait un point annexe relatif à la portéede sa requête

-qui a son importance, il est vrai. En effet, durant les réunionsde procéduremenéesavec le

présidentde la Cour, l'agent du demandeur a pris l'engagement formel de ne pas étendrela portée

de ses réclamations, ni ratione materiae (à d'autres conventions), ni ratione loci (au Pacifique Nord

en particulier). Dans sa lettre au greffier dela Cour en date du 22 mai 2012, M. William Campbell,

agent de l'Australie, écrivaiten effet:

«l confirm, as I did at the meeting of the President of the Court with the Agents

of the Parties on 23 April 2012, that Australia's claim in these proceedings concerns
Japan's JARPA II programme in the Southern Ocean (see Australia's Application
Instituting Proceedings, paragraph 2)».

16
CR 201317,p.38,par.60 (Gleeson) et CR 2013/1p.41,par.2 (Bunnester). -26-

Ce dernier détailest significatif, dans la mesure où il établitque l'Australie ne saisit pas la Cour

d'un programme similaire à JARPA 11 17,mais qui se déploiedans une zone maritime sur laquelle

1'Australie n'a pas de prétentions.

6. La Cour est donc saisie de la compatibilité avec la convention de 1946 du programme

JARPA Il, qui se déroule dans l'océan Austral, à l'exclusion de toute autre question. Et, je le

rappelle, c'est la requête,telle qu'interprétéepar les Parties qui fixe et limite la compétence de la

Cour 18• Or il se trouve, Monsieur le président, que la requêteainsi définie n'entre pas dans sa

juridiction telle que l'établissent les déclarations facultatives d'acceptation de la juridiction

obligatoire de la CIJ en vertu de l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut, faites respectivement par

l'Australie et le Japon. Ces déclarationsfigurent sous l'onglet n° 16 du dossier des juges. L'une et

1'autre comportent un certain nombre de réserves.

7. La prétendue coïncidence de ces déclarations constitue en l'espèce la seule base sur

laquelle l'Australie entend fonder la compétence de la Cour 19• Aucune autre n'est invoquée. Je

note en particulier que la convention de 1946 dont l'Australie invoque la violation -à l'exclusion

de tout autre traité- ne contient pas de clause de règlementdes différends.

8. Conformément à l'article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut, la déclaration du Japon précise

qu'elle est faite «à l'égardde tout autre Etat acceptant la mêmeobligation». Au nom du principe

de réciprocité,que vous avez rappelé, par exemple, dans votre arrêtdu 11juin 1998 relatif aux

exceptions préliminaires dans l'affaire Cameroun c. Nigérict 0 et que la Cour a mis en Œuvre à

17CR 2013/8, p. 57, par. 7 (Sands).

18Voir l'article 40, paragraphe 1 du Statut et l'article 38, paragraphe 2, du Règlement; voAdministration
du prince von Pless, ordonnance du 4février1933, C.P.Jl. sérieAIB n°52, p. 14; Certaines terres à phosphates à

Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions préliminaires,arrêt,C.lJ Recuei/1992,p. 267, par. 69;Différend territorialet
maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrê,t
C.I.J Recueil2007 (Il), p. 695, par. 108 ;Certaines questions concernant l'entraide judiciaire en matière pénale
(Djiboutic. France), arrêt,C.I.J Recueil2008,p. 205-206, par. 66-70 Immunitésjuridictionnelles de l'Etat (Allemagne
c. Italie; Grèce(intervenant)arrêtdu 3 février2012, C.I.J., par. 37-39.

19Requête,par. 4; MA, par. 1.10; CR 2013/11, p. 41, par. 5 (Burmester).
2
° Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), exceptions
préliminaires,arrêt,C.lJ Recueil/998, p. 298-299, par. 43. Voir aussi la jurisprudence citéPhosphatesdu Maroc,
arrêt, 1938, C.P.Jl sérieAIB n° 74, p. 22; Licéitéde l'emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Espagne), mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance du 2juin 1999, C.lJ Recuei/1999 (Il), p. 23, par. 25 etLicéitéde l'emploi de la force
(Yougoslaviec. Belgique), mesuresconservatoires,ordonnance du 2juin 1999,C.I.J Recueil 1999(1),p. 135, par. 30. -27-

plusieurs reprises, le Japon peut invoquer les réservesde l'Australie- en tout cas l'une d'elles-

21
pour s'opposer à ce que la Cour exerce sa juridiction. L'Etat requérant ne le conteste pa•

[Projection n°1:La deuxième réserveaustralienne.]

9.Permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de lire cette réserve, incluse dans la déclaration

australienne du 22 mars 2002, et qui exclut la compétence de la Cour en la présente espèce ; je le

ferai dans le texte original anglais car la traductifrança eitét~range à certains points de vue.

~
~qu'on la trouve dans leRecueildes Traités,lltife.(ïN;;.asiH-!;H;i§ai:M

«This declaration does not apply to :

(b) any dispute conceming or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including
the territorial sea, the exclusive economie zone and the continental shelf, or arising
out of, conceming, or relating to the exploitation of any disputed area of or
adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation;

............................................................... ))

1O.Interprétéeconformément aux intentions de l'Australie, cette réservecouvre l'objet de la

requêteet prive la Cour de compétence pour se prononcer.

1.La portéede la réserveb) de l'Australie

11.Lorsqu'elle doit interpréter une déclaration facultative de juridiction obligatoire, la Cour

met l'accent sur la volonté de l'Etat déclarant, telle qu'elle ressort des termes de la déclaration.

Ainsi, dans l'affaire de laompétenceen matièredepêcheries(Espagnec. Canada), elle a estimé

qu'

«étantdonné qu'une déclaration en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l'article 36 du Statut est
un acte rédigé unilatéralement, la Cour n'a pas manqué de mettre l'accent sur
l'intention de 1'Etat qui dépose une telle déclaration. Aussi bien, dans l'affaire de

I'Anglo-IranianOil Co., la Cour a-t-elle jugé que les termes restrictifs choisis dans la
déclaration de l'Iran étaient «une confirmation décisive de l'intention du
Gouvernement de l'Iran, lorsqu'il a accepté la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour»
(ibid.,p. 107).

49. La Cour interprète donc les termespertinents d'une déclaration, y compris
les réserves qui y figurent, d'une manière naturelle et raisonnableen tenant dûment

21
Voir CR 2013/11, p. 41, par. 6 (Burmester). -28-

compte de l'intention de 1'Etat concernéà l'époque où ce dernier a accepté la
22
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour» •

Mon vieil ami Henry Burmester, que je suis heureux de retrouver ici, mêmesi nous ne sommes pas

cette fois du mêmecôtéde la barre, admet que ces principes sont ceux qu'il convient d'appliquer

23
dans notre espèce •

12. Pour répondre à la question de savoir si le présent différend relève ou non de la

compétence de la Cour, il convient donc de se placer du point de vue de l'Australie et de se

demander si celle-ci pourrait s'opposer avec succès au règlement du différend par la Cour dans

l'hypothèse où elle serait défenderesse dans une affaire du mêmetype que celle qu'elle vous a

soumise.

13. Les termes de la seconde réserveaustralienne sont très larges et, visiblement, ils ont été

rédigésdélibérémend te façon à couvrir tout différendliéaux zones maritimes qu'elle vise. Malgré

les dénégationsde nos amis australiens 24, la réserveb) de l'Australie ne se limite pas à exclure les

différends relatifs à la seule délimitation d'un territoire maritime. Elle y ajoute ceux qui sont «en

rapport» avec une telle délimitation et, surtout pour ce qui nous concerne, ceux «découlant de

l'exploitation de toute zone faisant l'objet d'un différend adjacente à une telle zone maritime en

attente de délimitation ou en faisant partie» ou encore, «concernant une telle exploitation ou en

rapport avec celle-ci». Je note au passage que, dans son arrêtdu 28 mai dernier dans l'affaire du

Louisa invoqué par M. Burmes 5,le Tr~ibunal international du droit de la mer s'est fondé sur

«l'emploi du terme «relatifs» dans la déclaration» de Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines en vertu de

l'article 287 de la convention de Montego Bay pour conclure que «l'interprétation étroitede [cette]

dec arat10n ... ne peut etre re enue» .6

14. La formule adoptéepar l'Australie dans la réserve b) n'est pas sans rappeler celle dont le

Canada avait assorti son acceptation de la compétence obligatoire de la Cour, qui a fait l'objet

22Compétencede la Cour, arrêt,C.I.J. Recuei/1998, p. 454, par. 48-49; les italiques sont de nous; voir aussi
Plateau continental de la mer Egée(Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt,C.l.J. Recuei/1978, p.77., par.

23CR 2013/11, p. 43, par. 12 (Bunnester).

24CR 201317,p. 38-39, par. 62 (Gieeson) et CR 2013/11, p. 42, par. 10, p. 44, par. 18, 21 (Bunnester).

25CR 2013/11, p. 49-50, par. 38.

26T.J.D.M., arrêtdu 28 mai 2013, Affaire du navire «LouisaJJ(Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines c. Royaume
d'Espagne),par. 83. -29-

d'une interprétationpar la CIJ dans l'affaire de la Compétenceen matièrede pêcheries. Dans son

arrêt du 4 décembre1998, la Haute Juridiction a commencé:

«par relever qu'en excluant de sa juridiction les «différends auxquels pourraient
donner lieu» les mesures de gestion et de conservation qu'elle mentionne et leur
exécution, la réserve ne réduit pas le critère d'exclusion au seul «objet» du
différend» 2•

Il en va de mêmedans la présenteespèce: du fait de la formulation de la réserveaustralienne, la

Cour ne doit pas avoir égardseulement à l'objet du différendstrictement entendu. La formule

large de la réservel'autorise et lui impose mêmed'aller au-delà. Comme la Cour le remarque dans

ce mêmearrêtde 1998 :

«La version anglaise «disputes arzsmg out of or concerning» laisse plus
clairement apparaître le caractère large et englobant de la formule. Aux termes de la
réservesont exclus non seulement les différendsqui auraient directement pour «objet»

les mesures envisagées et leur exécution, mais aussi ceux qui y auraient «trait»
(«concerning») et, plus généralement,tous ceux qui y trouveraient leur «origine»
(«arising out of»), c'est-à-dire les différendsqui, en l'absence de telles mesures, ne
28
seraient pas nés.»

15. Or, si 1'on compare les deux déclarations-celle de 1'Australie, d'une part, et celle du

Canada qui étaitapplicable dans l'affaire de 1998, d'autre part, on constate que la première- celle

de 1'Australie - est plus large encore, puisqu'aux expressions «différend ... découlant de

l'exploitation>> (dispute ... arising out of the exploitation) de l'une des zones concernées ou

«concernant une telle exploitation» (concerning [such] exploitation), l'Australie a ajouté les

différends «en rapport avec celle-ci» (relating to [such] exploitation). «[L]e caractère large et

englobant de la formule» est encore plus frappant donc: aux termes de la réserveb) sont exclus

non seulement les différends qui auraient directement pour «objet» l'exploitation d'une zone

contestée,mais aussi, pour paraphraser votre arrêtde 1998, non seulement ceux qui auraient «trait

à» (concerning) une telle exploitation ; non seulement, plus généralement, tous ceux qui

trouveraient leur «origine dans» (arising out of) une telle exploitation ; mais aussi tous ceux qui,

d'une manière ou d'une autre, seraient «en rapport avec» (would relate to) une telle exploitation.

27Compétenceen matière de pêcheries(Espagne c. Canada), compétencede la Cour, arrêt,C.lJ. Recueil1998,
p. 458, par.62.
28
Compétenceen matièrede pêcheries(Espagne c. Canada), compétencede la Cour, arrêt,C.lJ. Recuei/1998,
p.458, par.62. Voir aussi Plateau continental de la mer Egée(Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt,C./.J. Recuei/1978, p. 36,
par.86 Certains biens (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne), exceptionspréliminaires,arrêt,C.lJ. Recu25,2par46.. -30-

Sur ce point, nous sommes tout à fait d'accord avec M. Burmester mêmesi, curieusement, il nous

29
fait dire le contraire •

16. La présencecumulative d'expressions comme «ayant leur origine dans» (arising out of)

ou «ayant trait à» (concerning) fait d'ailleurs observer à la Cour, dans l'affaire des Pêcheries,que :

«[L]a portéede la réservecanadienne semble mêmeplus large que celle de la

réservedont la Grèce avait assorti son adhésionà l'Acte générald'arbitrage de 1928
(«différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce») et que la Cour avait été
amenéeà interpréterdans l'affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Egéel3°1» 31•

Dans cette dernière affaire d'ailleurs, mer Egée, l'expression «relates to» est systématiquement

traduite en français par «a trait à»3•

17. Au surplus -et là, par contre, je ne suis plus d'accord avec mon contradicteur,

l'utilisation répétitivede la conjonction «OU»(employée pas moins de quatre fois dans la seule

réserveb)) établitl'intention australienne d'exclure largement la compétencede la Cour: les cinq

h ypotheses visees ne sont pas cumu atives, mais . b'Ien a ternatJves; ou, ou, ou, ou.""" '' En aucune

manière, la réservene porte exclusivement sur les différendsrelatifs à la délimitationde l'une des

zones qui y sont mentionnées et qui serait «en rapport» avec celle-ci, pas davantage qu'elle ne

porte exclusivement sur un différend«découlant»de son exploitation et la concernant, et en rapport

avec celle-ci (ce qui serait d'ailleurs assez absurde): il n'y a que des «ou» (or); il suffit donc que

l'on se trouve dans l'un de ces cas de figure pour que la Cour doive déclinersa compétence. Et

33
comme M. Burmester s'en ::r aperçu in extremis durant sa plaidoirie, le «OU»primordial est le

deuxième, celui qui séparela séquence«délimitation»de la séquence «exploitation». Il ne ferait

d'ailleurs aucun sens de répéterdeux fois dans le texte original anglais: «concerning or relating

to» la délimitation d'une part et l'exploitation d'autre part, si l'on devait lire les deux «blocs»

d'exclusion de la compétencede la Cour comme identiques et ne concernant que la délimitation.

29
CR 2013/11, p. 47-48, par. 32 (Burmester).
Jo«(C.l.J Recueil 1978, p. 34, par. 81 et p. 36, par. 86)».

JICompétenceen matière de pêcheries(Espagne c. Canada), compétencede la Cour, arrêt,C.I.J Recueil 1998,
p. 458, par. 62.
2
J Voir Plateau continental de la mer Egée(Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt,C.l.J Recueil 1978, p. 34, par. 81 et p. 36,
par. 86 in fine et p. 37, par. 90. Voir aussi l'article 102, paragraphe 2 du Règlement de la Cour; Juridiction territoriale
de la Commission internationale de l'Oder, arrêtn° 16, 1929, C.P.Jl. sérieA n° 23, p. 16.

JJCR 2013/11, p. 46, par. 28 (Burmester). - 31 -

18. J'admets volontiers qu'il ne s'agit pas de délim•taMais rien dans le texte de la

reserveb) n'implique qu'elle vise exclusivement un différend de délimitation maritiAu.

contraire et plusieurs observations peuvent êtrefaitesrd:

1) Il n'est pas inintéressantde noter que la déclarationaustralienne de 1954 contenait une réserve

35
concernant les droits sur les eaux et les zones marines revendiquées par l'Aus;ralie

réserveétait nettementmoins large que celle figurant danslarationactuelle ; elle avait, au

36
surplus, étéabandonnéeen 1975 • C'est donc tout à fait délibérémtue le Gouvernement

australien a modifiénouveau sa déclarationen 2002 en l'assortissant d'une réservelargissime

en ce qui concerne les différendsen rapport avec une délimitationmaout(et j'insiste sur

le «om>,Monsieur le président!)- ou avec l'exploitation d'une zone maritime faisant l'objet

d'un différendou d'une zone adjacente une telle zone dans l'attente de la délimitation. Je

note au passage que l'Australie conteste pas en l'espècel'applicabilitératione loci de cette

large réserve-dont acte.

2) La séquencedes «OU»dont je viens de parler est parfaitement claire : elle exclut la compétence

de la Cour, d'une part en matièredélimitationdes espaces maritimes contestés,de l'autre au

sujet leur exploitation; et l'expression «en attente de délimitation» (pending delimitation) ne

change rienà l'affaire : elle décritun moment, un étatde fait, mais pas, ici, l'objet du différend

exclu; la Cour ne peut se prononcersur la délimitationni, tant que la délimitationn'a pas eu

lieu, sur l'exploitation des zones contestéesou des zones adjacentes.une pause pour les

interprètes.'ai dû rajouter in extremis un petit passage puisque nous n'avons reçu que ce

matin un document fort intéressant etimportan!J Du reste, telle est très exactement la

présentation qu'a donnée l'Attorney-General de l'Australie, dans un document officiel,

analysant au moment de son adoptionla nouvelle déclarationaustralienne, que M. Burmester

avait mentionnéau paragraphe 32 de sa plaidoirie,H jeel'i Eit\eusavons feçfte

le texte à Il heures ce matin. Je cite ce texte:

34
Sur la distinction, voir, par Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt,
C.I.Recueil 19p. 41, par. 50.
35
Nations UniRecueil des tr6 février1954, 1-2484, vol. 186, p. 82-83.
36Nations UniRecueil des tr17 mars 1975,1-13809, vol. 961, p. 183.
37
Voir CR 2013/11, p. passi(Burmester). -32-

«The new declaration limits Australia's acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J.. This means that an action cannot be commenced against
Australia in the following circumstances:

[and you have iton your screens]

(b) where disputes involve maritime boundary delimitation, or disputes
concerning the exploitation of an area in dispute, or adjacent to an area in
dispute.» (Les italiques sont de nous.)

C'est limpide.

3) L'interprétation contraire avancée par l'Australie conduit à un résultat parfaitement absurde et

prive de signification toute la seconde partie de la réserve: elle signifierait que la Cour ne peut

trancher un différend relatif à la délimitation mais qu'une fois celui-ci résolu,elle pourrait se

prononcer sur l'exploitation...Si telle étaitla signification de la seconde partie de la phrase, elle

la rend totalement superflue et l'Australie aurait dû se contenter d'exclure la compétencede la

Cour en matière de délimitation -«point-barre»! Pour que la référenceà l'exploitation ait un

sens utile, il faut admettre que, dans l'attente de la délimitation (pending limitation), la Cour ne

peut se prononcer ni sur la délimitationdes zones visées,ni sur leur exploitation.

4) Les discussions au sein du Parlement australien (qui sont relatéesdans un document produit par

le Japon- ils'agit de l'annexe 167 à notre contre-mémoire) et dont M. Burmester s'est efforcé

de tirer le moins mauvais parti possible, confirment cette interprétation et montrent que la

réserve b) concerne non seulement la délimitationdes frontières maritimes, mais plus largement

38
les différends ayant «une connotation maritime» • L'expression a été employée par

M. Campbell durant ces débats, à propos de l'affaire des Essais nucléaires,dont je suis prêtà

admettre qu'elle peut êtreprésentéecomme étant«partiellement maritime» (a «semi-maritime

matter», he said) mais dont l'aspect «délimitation» ne m'avait, je dois dire, jamais frappé. Un

autre exemple d'affaires ayant un aspect maritime donné par M. Campbell lors de cette

discussion avec les parlementaires est celle du Timor Oriental, à propos de laquelle

M. Burmester a très justement fait remarquer qu'elle ne concernait pas une délimitation

maritime mais qu'elle «put at risk existing resource exploitation by Australia», because

38Voir Parliamentary Dehales, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 12 July 2002 (William Campbell), TR 49,
CMJ. [annexe 167], p. 217. -33-

«American oil companies, with interest in exploiting areas off Timor-Leste, were telling anyone

who would listen that they had legal advice that Timor-Leste could properly claim not just a

share of the resources within the former joint zone but also in areas which lay outside its

39
boundaries, including areas already being exploited by Australia» • C'est bien ce que nous

disons, Monsieur le président: en rédigeantsa déclaration, l'Australie a voulu échapperà la

compétencede la Cour en matière d'exploitation des ressources naturelles de zones maritimes

contestéesou adjacentes àcelles sur lesquelles elle a des revendications. Pourquoi pourrait-elle

se prévaloir de cette exclusion lorsque le pétrole qu'elle convoite est en cause et en

refuserait-elle le bénéficeau Japon à propos de l'exploitation d'une autre ressource naturelle?

5) Et pour en finir avec la fable de la réserveexclusivement relative à la délimitationmaritime, un

mot sur l'analogie esquissée par M. Burmester avec la déclaration,faite au mêmemoment par

1'Australie en vertu de 1'article 298, paragraphe 1, de la convention des Nations Unies sur Je

droit de la mer. Mon contradicteur laisse entendre que cette «réserve» Ge lui laisse la

responsabilitédu mot...) aurait la mêmeportéeque celle figurant dans la déclarationfacultative

40
australienne • Il est intéressant de lire cette déclaration et de la confronter au texte de la

réserveb). Vous avez la réserveb) sur l'écran,je lis en anglais la déclarationaustralienne en

vertu de l'article 298 :

«The Government of Australia further declares, under paragraph 1(a) of
article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (... ), that it does

not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including the
procedures referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this declaration) with respect of
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating

- relating, c'est çà qui nous intéresse- to sea boundary delimitations as weil as
those involving historie hays or titles.»1

Si réserve il y a, Monsieur Je président,elle porte, en effet dans cette déclaration,exclusivement,

sur la délimitation (de la mer territoriale, de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau

continental) mais il n'y est pas question d'exploitation des ressources naturelles de ces zones;

moins encore de l'exploitation des ressources naturelles de zones adjacentes dans l'attente de la

39CR 2013/11, p. 45, par. 23-24 (Bunnester).

40Ibid., p. 43-44, par. 17.

41 Declarations of States Parties Relating to Settlement on Disputes in Accordance with Article 298 (Optional
Exceptions to the Applicability of Part XV, Section 2, of the Convention), disponible en ligne:
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic _texts/298_declarations_June_20Il_ english.pdf. -34-

délimitation. Et pour une raison bien simple: cela eût étécontraire à l'article 309 de la convention,

qui prohibe toute réserveet exception non prévuesexpressément -en matière de règlementdes

différends: celles qui ne sont pas autorisées par 1'article 287, paragraphe 1, disposition qui ne

concerne que le règlementdes différendsrelatifs à la délimitationdes zones maritimes. Dans cette

déclaration-là, 1'Australie ne pouvait pas ajouter à 1'exclusion de la délimitation celle de

l'exploitation des ressources naturelles. En revanche, elle le pouvait dans sa déclarationfacultative

de l'article 36-et elle l'a fait: cette exclusion est expriméepar la réserve b).

19. Exploitation -le mot est sans grand mystère. Il inclut 1'ensemble des utilisations des

ressources de la mer et, du reste, le mot «exploitation», qui figure dans le texte anglais de

l'article65 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer consacréaux mammifères

marins, est traduit en français par «utilisation optimale». Et l'article 120, qui renvoie à l'article65,

montre qu'il faut intégrer dans cette notion «la conservation et ... la gestion des mammifères

marins».

20. Comme on l'a écrit,le mot «exploitation»- «exploitation»:

«is a broad term which covers the utilization of animais for reasons such as pure

commercial gain, subsistence or in the interests of conservation or control. The means
by which it is carried out can be consumptive, either permanently removing animais
from the population by hunting or live-trapping or harvesting products from wild
42
individuals under management regimes.»

21. Clairement, Monsieur le président, les activitésque l'Australie reproche au Japon de

mener concernent l'exploitation des ressources d'une zone maritime. Ratione materiae, elles

relèventde la réserve b) de la déclarationaustralienne de 2002 ; elles sont au centre du différend;

elles en constituent l'objet même.

22. Voici, Monsieur le président,pour l'interprétationde la deuxième réserveaustralienne;

la Cour ne peut se reconnaître compétente si la requêteporte sur un différend découlant de

l'exploitation d'une zone maritime en attente de délimitationou d'une zone adjacente à une telle

zone - arising out of, concerning, or relating to the exploitation, of any disputed area or adjacent

42VictoriaJ.Taylor and Nigel Dunstone, «The exploitation, sustainable use and welfare of wild mammals», in
V. J.Taylor and N. Dunstone (eds.), The Exploitation of Mammal Populations, Chap&anHall, Bury St Edmunds,
Suffolk, 1996,. 3-4-les italiques sont de nous. -35-

to any such maritime zone pending ils delimitation. Il en va sans aucun doute ainsi en la présente

espèce.

[Fin de la projection no 1.]

II. La réserve b) s'applique en l'espèce

23. Il me semble que, d'une certaine manière, on peut dire, Monsieur le président, que le

différend qui nous occupe «découle de l'exploitation» (arises out of the exploitation) puisqu'il

porte sur les activitésmenéespar le Japon en vue d'assurer l'exploitation durable d'une ressource

naturelle d'une zone maritime. En tout cas, il n'y a aucun doute qu'il la «concerne» et est «en

rapport avec elle».

24. Comme l'a indiqué l'Australie dans sa requête 43, comme elle l'a répétédans son

4
mémoire \ comme son agent l'a redit durant la réunionde concertation du 23 avril2012 avec le

45
présidentde la Cour et confirmédans sa lettre du 22 mai suivant que j'ai citéetout à l'heure ,et

comme le conseil de l'Australie l'a dit à nouveau la semaine dernière 46, «Australia's claim in these

proceedings concems Japan's JARPA II programme in the Southern Ocean» -«la demande

47
australienne dans la procédureen cours concerne le programme JARPA II dans l'océanAustral» •

Le programme JARPA II dans l'océanAustral, pas donc, le programme, pourtant jumeau, JARPN,

mais qui, lui, se déroule dans le Pacifique Nord, dans lequel l'Australie n'a pas d'intérêts

48
particuliers à préserver • Voici qui confirme, Monsieur le président, que, tout en donnant des

gages à son opinion publique, 1'Australie n'agit pas en défenseur altruiste de la légalité

internationale mais bien plutôt pour préserverses revendications maritimes.

25. Quelle que soit la perspective que l'on adopte -que l'on interprète à la lettre la

définitionque le Japon lui-mêmeen donne ou que l'on se réfèreaux allégations de l'Australie,

JARPA II, qui constitue de l'aveu insistant du demandeur l'unique objet du différend, est,

43
Requêtep ,ar. 40-41.
44MA,par. 1.3-1.7.

45Voirsupra, par. 5.

46CR2013/7,p. 22, par. 13(Campbell).

47Voirsupra, par.5.
48
Voiribid. -36-

indiscutablement, un programme concernant l'exploitation d'une ressource marine et en rapport

avec elle.

26. Le Japon a toujours fait savoir que JARPA étaitdestiné à collecter de l'information qui

permette la reprise de la chasse commerciale àcertaines espèces de baleines. Le but du programme

est d'établirsi cette chasse est durable -sustainab/e. Il s'agit de recherche scientifique appliquée,

liéeà l'exploitation des ressources naturelles de la mer.

27. Ainsi, la mise en place du programme JARPA 1 partait de la volonté du Japon de

participer à «l'examen régulier» de la limite de chasse zéro prévue par le paragraphe 10 e) du

règlement annexéà la convention, examen fondésur «les meilleurs avis scientifiques», qui devait

permettre à la CBI de procéder, au plus tard en 1990, à une «évaluation exhaustive des effets» du

49
moratoire • Les objectifs de ce premier programme étaient ainsi tournés vers une meilleure

gestion des stocks baleiniers dans l'océanAustral 50afin d'établirla possibilitéde leur exploitation.

L'objectif numéro1 visait une «estimation of the biological parameters required for stock

51
management of the Southern Hemisphere minke whale» • Pour sa part l'objectif 4 portait sur «the

elucidation of the stock structure of Southern Hemisphere minke whales to improve stock
1
management» 5• JARPA II, initié en2005, s'inscrit dans la lignéede''JARPA 1 S~es objectifs sont

étroitement associés à la «procédure de gestion revisée»(«RMP» selon le sigle anglais), méthode

53
que la CBI a définie en vue de calculer le niveau raisonnable des prises , et que le

professeur Hamamoto présentera de manière plus précisedemain matin. L'ambition de JARPA II

4
est de <mltimately lead to the improvement of the whale stock management procedures» 5 •

«Looking to the future, the IWC will need to consider a multi-species management approach in the

49Voir CMJ, par. 4.1-4.2, 4.40.

50Voir CMJ, par. 4.18, 4.25-4.37.

51Gouvernement du Japon, «The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere Minke Whale and for
Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic», SC/39/04 (1987) p. 3-4 [CMJ, annexe 135].

5Gouvernement du Japon, «The 1996/97 Research Plan for the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic», SC/48/SH3 (1996), p. 2 [CMJ, annexe 146].

53CMJ, p. 50, par. 5.20.
54
Gouvernement du Japon, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA Il)Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale ResourceS)),SC/57/01 (2005), p. 12 [CMJ, annexe 150]. -37-

Antarctic Ocean, which has the world's largest whale resources, for the conservation and

sustainable use of these resources» 55•

28. Certes, le programme JARPA II est un programme scientifique, il n'en fait pas moins

partie d'un processus dont la finalitéest l'exploitation durable de certains stocks de baleines dans

l'océanAustral. Ayant comme objectif ultime d'établir si et dans quelle mesure les conditions

d'une reprise de la chasse à la baleine sont réunieset quelles précautionsdoivent êtreprises pour

que cette activité soit durable grâce à une gestion raisonnable des stocks, JARPA II est, à

l'évidence,«en rapport» avec l'exploitation des ressources marines. Il la concerne mêmetrès

directement.

29. Pour le montrer, je me suis fondé,Monsieur le président,sur ce que j'appelleraitt «la

véritésur JARPA Il». Mais, pour les besoins de la discussion, je peux aussi bien me référeraux

allégations -erronées- de la Partie australienne, qui veut voir dans le programme japonais des

actes de chasse commerciale à la baleine. Elle prétendque : «the whales are killed for commercial

56
exploitation of the whale meat and to sustain the Japanese whaling industry» , ou encore que : «the

Convention contemplates three types of whaling. The only one that fits JARPA II is commercial

57
whaling that is exploitatiom> • Je relève d'ailleurs qu'en soutenant que «la conservation des

baleines même à des fins économiquesrequiert un système collectif, prévisibleet contraignant de

supervision» 5 ,l'Australie caractérise les activités de chasse à la baleine sous le régime de la

convention comme relevant de l'exploitation (ou parfois de la surexploitation) du stock 59•

30. Monsieur le président, je ne concède en aucune manière que JARPA II serait un

60
programme déguiséde chasse commerciale à la baleine • Ce que je dis simplement est que, s'il

l'était comme le prétendl'Australie, ils'agirait à l'évidencede l'exploitation des ressources des

55 Gouvernment du Japon, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA 11)-Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management

Objectives for Whale Resources»,SC/57/01 (2005), p. 6 [CMJ, annexe 150].
56CR 201317,p. 26, par. 6 (Gleeson).

57CR 2013/11, p. 15, par. 45 (Crawford).

58CR 201317,p. 43, par. Il (Boisson de Chazournes); voir aussi, par exemple, ibid., p. 26, par. 6 (Gieeson).
59
Voir aussi MA, chap. 2, sect. IV, passim. Voir aussi MA, par. 1.2 ou par. 2.125 et Expert Opinion, p. 294,
par. 2.15, ou p. 318, par. 6.12Parmi les auteurs qui font la mêmeassimilation, voir Elle Hey, The Regime for the
Exploitation ofTransboundary Marine Fisheries Resources, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 237-244.

60Voir CR 2013111,p. 48, par. 33 (Burmester). -38-

zones maritimes dans lesquelles ilse déroule. En d'autres termes, que l'on retienne la description

-exacte- qu'en donne le Japon ou celle -erronée- qu'avance l'Australie, le résultatest le

même: JARPA Il, qui est l'objet mêmedu différend que celle-ci a soumis à la Cour, est «en

rapport» étroitavec l'exploitation de la zone maritime dans laquelle il se déroule et «concerne»

cette exploitation trèsdirectement.

31. De toute manière, l'Australie ne peut avoir raison à la fois sur la compétenceet sur le

fond. En effet, de deux choses l'une: soit elle a raison sur le fond -JARPA II est de la chasse

commerciale- mais alors le différend est évidemment exclu de votre compétence car ils'agit

do..\~c.nV"
•é·f'iEienmae dn'txploitation; soit la raison sur la compétence -l'affaire ne concernerait pas

.l'exploitation stricto sensu des baleines- mais alors elle a nécessairementtort sur le fond.

32. Dès lors, il importe peu que le Japon n'ait pas de différend de délimitation avec

l'Australie61,au sens étroitdéfinivendredi par le conseil de l'Etat requérantcomme portant sur des

62
«prétentions maritimes concurrentes» • Les deux pays ont un différend relatif à l'exploitation

d'une zone maritime que l'Australie considère comme relevant de sa zone économiqueexclusive,

ce que le Japon conteste, et de la zone adjacente àcette zone en litige.

33. En résumé,Monsieur le président,Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, le différendque

l'Australie a cru pouvoir vous soumettre est couvert par la réserveb) de sa propre déclaration

facultative -dont le Japon peut se prévaloir au titre du principe de réciprocité. La réserve

australienne couvre les différends

découlantde l'exploitation de toute zone (maritime) objet d'un différend,qui est en attente de

délimitation,ou d'une zone qui lui est adjacente;

concernant une telle exploitation ; ou

en rapport avec elle.

Le différend soumis à la Cour, à propos du programme JARPA Il, qui vise à permettre

l'exploitation durable des baleines dans l'océan Austral, peut rentrer dans chacune de ces

catégories. A tous ces points de vue, vous ne pouvez, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, que

déclinerl'exercice de votre compétenceet il serait fort injuste que l'Australie puisse se prévaloirde

61CR 2013/11, p.48,par.34 (Burmester).
62
Ibidp. 47,par.30 (Burmester). -39-

sa déclarationfacultative après avoir fait en sorte de se mettre à l'abri de requêtescomparables à

celle qu'elle a elle-mêmeforméepour complaire à son opinion publique.

34. Un dernier mot relatif à l'intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande: si, comme nous Je

croyons, vous vous déclarez incompétents pour connaître de l'affaire que l'Australie vous a

soumise, il va de soi que la demande en intervention de ce pays sera sans objet. En effet, nous nous

trouverons dans une situation comparable àcelle crééepar la demande d'intervention d'El Salvador

dans l'affaire des Activitésmilitaires entre le Nicaragua et les Etats-Unis à la suite de laquelle la

Cour a relevé:

«que la déclaration d'intervention de la République d'El Salvador ... porte en fait
aussi sur des questions, y compris l'interprétationde conventions, qui présupposent
que la Cour a compétencepour connaître du différend entre Je Nicaragua et les

Etats-Unis d'Amérique et que la requête du Nicaragua c63tre les Etats-Unis
d'Amériqueconcernant ce différendest recevable» •

De même,dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires, la Cour a considéré,suite à l'adoption de ses

arrêtsconstatant que les demandes de l'Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélandeétaient «désormaissans

objet», «qu'en conséquence il n'exist[ait] désormaisplus d'instance sur laquelle la requêteà fin

d'intervention [de Fidji] puisse se greffer». Et la Cour a conclu: «que la requêtepar laquelle le

Gouvernement fidjien demande à intervenir dans l'instance introduite par l'Australie [ou la

64
Nouvelle-Zélande]contre la France tombe et que la Cour n'a plus aucune suite à lui donner» • Il

doit en aller de mêmede la demande en intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélandedans l'affaire qui nous

occupe.

Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre écoute. Mon successeur à cette

barre sera le professeur Payam Akhavan -si, bien sûr, vous voulez bien lui donner la parole,

Monsieur le président- mais peut-êtreconsidérerez-vous que c'est Je moment approprié pour

notre sacro-sainte (et toujours bienvenue !) pause-cafésurtout aprèsune plaidoirie fort technique?

63
Activitésmilitaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amérique),
déclarationd'intervention, ordonnance 4 octobre 1984, C.1.J.Recueil 1984, p.216, par. 2 (les italiques sont de nous).
Voir aussi: Essais nucléaires(Nouvelle-ZélandeFrance), requêteàfin d'intervention, ordonnance du 12juillet 1973,
C.1.J.Recueil 1973, p. 325, par. 1-3 ; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélandec. France), requêteà fin d'intervention,
ordonnance du 20 décembre1974, C.J.J.Recueil 1974, p. 535-536.
64
Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), requêteà fin d'intervention, ordonnance du 20décembre 1974,
C.1.J.Recueil 1974, p. 530-531 ; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), requête à fin d'intervention,
ordonnance du 20 décembre1974, C.J.J. Recueil 1974, p. 535-536. -40-

Le PRESIDENT: Merci, Professeur Pellet, je crains qu'il n'y ait plus rien de sacra-saint

dans ce monde d'aujourd'hui mais il faut respecter quand mêmeles traditions et, avant de déclarer

la pause, quand même,j'ai une petite demande à la délégationjaponaise. Vous avez citéun

document que vous avez reçu, comme vous l'avez déclaré,ce matin à 11 heures. Ce document

-si je me souviens bien- s'appelle National Interest Analyses. Ce document ne fait pas partie

du dossier de l'affaire ni du dossier des juges de ce matin, est-ce que vous pourrez transmettre au

Greffe le texte avec l'indication des sources. Merci beaucoup.

M. PELLET : Je le fais immédiatement.

Le PRESIDENT : Et maintenant, je déclareune pause de 15 minutes.

The Court adjourned.from 4.30 p.m. to 4.55 p.m.

The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and 1 give the floor to

Professor Payam Akhavan. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr.AKHAVAN:

SCIENCE VERSUS POLITICS AT THE IWC

1.Introduction

1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour to appear before

you today on behalf of Japan.

2. 1will be addressing the factual background of this dispute. In particular, 1will focus on

the characteristicsf Australia's anti-whaling policy, how it has shaped the relationship between

science and politics at the IWC, and what this context says about the meritsthis case.

3. Australia's allegations are serious and far-reaching. Japan stands accusedf 30 years of

deception and defiance against the IWC. lts programme of scientific research is disparaged as

"commercial whaling" in disguise, in violation of Article VIII of the Convention. But prior to this

case, Australia expressly admitted before the IWC that despite its opposition,apan's programme -41 -

is strict!y legal under Article VIII of the Convention" 6'. So, what is this case really about? Why

has Australia now come before this Court?

4. The question is best answered by considering what Australia insists the case is not about.

The Agent's opening speech emphasized that while "Australia is totally opposed to any form of

66
commercial whaling" this "is not relevant to the resolution of the case before the Court" • This is

a rather curious remark given the subject of this dispute. Why would Australia say that its

opposition to commercial whaling is irrelevant? Mr. Campbell insisted that this case is only about

Japan's "unlawful misuse of the scientific exception under Article VIII". But what if that

exception is used to gather scientific data for the resumption of sustainable commercial whaling?

That, after ali, is exactly the programme of scientific research contemplated by the 1982

moratorium. If Australia is "totally opposed" to lifting the moratorium, then is it not also totally

opposed to the scientific purpose of JARPA II?

5. But what the Agent's speech left unsaid goes much further. Moments after the conclusion

ofhis opening speech, Mr. Campbell toldjournalists, outside this very courtroom, that: "You don't

7
even need to kill one whale to conduct scientific research.'.G The following day, Australia's own

expert witness, Professor Mangel, admitted that "lethal take" may indeed be "appropriate" for

scientific research 68• So what is the Australian position on whether lethal sampling may ever be

justified? The answer may be gleaned from the statement of another Mr. Campbell, the former

Environment Minister of Australia, who stated categorically that Australia opposes- "ali

forms"- "ali forms of scientific and commercial whaling" 69• Minister Campbell clarified that, for

70
Australia, Article VIII is merely a "loophole" that must be closed •

65
Counter-Memorial [CMJ], para. 7, referring to Chairman's Report of the Forty-Ninth Annual MeetiRep. /nt.
Whal.Commn 48, 1998, p. 39, CMJ, Ann. 57; emphasis added.

66CR 2013/7, p. 24, para. 18 (Campbell); emphasis added.
67
Associated Press, "Australia to World Court: Ban Japanese Whaling", 26 June 2013, available at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/australia-world-court-ban-japanese-whali… (last checked on 1July
68
CR 2013/9, p. 61.
69
Australian Antarctic Division, "Australia taking strong action to protee! whales," Press Release, 16 Feb. 2006,
available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2006/australia-taking-strong-ac…
o-protect-wha(last
checked on 1July 2013).
70
Australian Antarctic Division, "Australia Appeals to Japan to Reconsider its 'Scientific' Whale Slaughter,"
Press Release, 8 Nov. 2005, available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media!news/2005/australia-appeals-to-japan…­
reconsider-its-scientific-whale-slaughter (Iast checkeduly 2013). -42-

6. As 1 will show, for Australia, the scientific purpose of lethal sampling is largely irrelevant.

It is a mere afterthought to what the Agent called a "strongly-held" anti-whaling policy. This

policy is based on the fundamental belief in Australian public opinion that, unlike other inferior

members of the animal kingdom, whales are unique, sacred, charismatic mammals that should

never be killed. Since 1979, Australia has pursued an express policy of using the IWC, against its

stated purpose, to ban ali whaling. lt has politicized science in order to impose Australian values

on Japan, in disregard of international law. Having failed to achieve its objective, it now cornes

before this Court and makes arguments that manifestly contradict its earlier positions on the

legality of JARPA. To borrow a phrase from the Agent's speech, Australia seeks to cloak its

political and cultural preferences "in the !ab-coat of science" 71• Having put an end to commercial

whaling for the past 30 years through the moratorium, it now also seeks to end scientific whaling.

lt seeks to apply the Whaling Convention as if it were the anti-Whaling Convention.

7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my presentation will be divided into five parts.

First, 1 will briefly situate Japan's scientific research in the global context of contemporary

whaling. Second, 1 will examine the origins and assumptions of Australia's anti-whaling policy.

Third, 1will show how this "no compromise", "zero tolerance" policy has politicized science at the

IWC and brought the organization to the brink of collapse. Fourth, 1 will discuss the evidentiary

significance for this case of the Scientific Committee's findings on JARPA. 1will then conclude

with sorne observations about the circumstances surrounding Australia's decision to initiate this

proceeding, circumstances that shed light on what this case is really about.

ll. The IWC and Global Whaling in Context

8. Turning first to the global context ofwhaling, the IWC was established in 1946 because of

over-exploitation of whale species, main!y for oil rather than food. The International Convention

for the Regulation of Whaling was adopted- to quote its preamble- in order "to establish a

system of international regulation for the whale fisheries" 72• lts fundamental object and purpose

was and remains sustainable whaling.

7CR 2013/7, p. 24, para. 18(Campbell).
72
CMJ, Ann. 6, Preamble, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (entered into force
10 Nov. 1948) 161 UNTS72, amended by Protocol of 19 Nov. 1956, 338 UNTS336 (Whaling Convention). -43-

9. By the 1970s, the combination ofiWC regulation and the collapse of the whale-oil market

had significantly reduced commercial whaling. According to the IWC Secretariat, because of "the

improved management of whaling that began in the mid-1970s" many species "are now in the

process ofrecovering". There are now at least three "highly precautionary scientific 'management

procedure' approaches developed by the IWC's Scientific Committee for commercial and

73
aboriginal subsistence whaling in order to ensure that past mistakes will not be repeated" •

1O. Today, most whale species are no longer endangered. For example, the IWC notes that

"humpback whales have shown evidence of strong recovery ... with annual increase rates of about

74
10 per cent" • The graph at tab 19-1 of your folders demonstrates the dramatic drop in global

whaling beginning in the early 1970s, at least a decade prior to the 1982 moratorium. Fortunately,

the days of over-exploitation and unsustainable whaling are long over.

11. The Antarctic minke whale is the smallest and most abundant ofthe "great whales". The

IWC's most recent "best estimate" ofthis population in the Southem Ocean is 515,000 75• The next

76
largest abundance in the Antarctic is the humpback whale estimated by the IWC at 42,000 • Thus,

the Antarctic minke whale exceeds the next largest population by a magnitude of 12.

12. As indicated in tab 19-2, the IWC observes that: "there are several hundred thousand

Antarctic minke whales and thus they are c/early not endangered" 77• "C1early not endangered".

This stands in stark contrast to the alarmist assertions of impending catastrophe in Austra1ia's

p1eadings.

13. To further put matters in perspective, the sample size of Antarctic minke whales under

JARPA II is 1essthan 0.3 per cent- or three tenths of 1 per cent- of the relevant population.

Even Australia's own expert witness, Professor Mangel, readily admitted that what he called a

"very small take ofwhales" will not "in any way endanger this stock" 78•

73
International Whaling Commission, "A Brief Overview of the 'Status' of Whale Populations," available at:
http://iwc.int/status#overview (last checked on 1 July 2013).
74
Internationa1 Whaling Commission, "The Status of Whales",
http://archive.iwcoffice.org/conservation/status.htm (last checked on 1July 2013).
75
International Whaling Commission, "Whale Population Estimates," available at: http://iwc.int/estimate (last
checked on 1Ju1y2013).
76
/bid.
77
Ibid., emphasis added.
78
CR 2013/9, p.63 (Mange!). -44-

14. Japanese scientific research may further be situated in the broader context of global

whaling. The IWC recognizes three categories of whaling: commercial, aboriginal subsistence,

and special permit whaling. The illustrative map in tab 19-3 demonstrates in dark blue Norway and

lceland, both of which engage in commercial whaling in the North Atlantic.

15. The IWC Contracting States engaging in aboriginal subsistence whaling are indicated in

purple. These are Denmark in Greenland, the Russian Federation, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,

and the United States of America.

16. The map also indicates in red whaling nations that are not members of the IWC. This

includes Canada, which withdrew from the IWC in the 1980s when the moratorium was adopted,

as weil as Indonesia. Such whaling activity is outside the scope of the Convention.

17. Finally, the map indicates in green, Japan, as the only country committing resources to

special permit whaling. Japan withdrew its objection to the moratorium on commercial whaling in

1986.

18. Japan has complied with the moratorium despite a 2,000 year tradition of subsistence

whaling. lt has done so although the IWC anti-whaling block has opposed even small-type

community-based whaling in Japan's own waters. These coastal communities have been anguished

because they can no longer practise their ancestral traditions. The Australian Environment Minister

once remarked in this regard that "many cultures and traditions ... don't belong in a modern

79
world" • IWC resolutions, and even United Nations human rights declarations however, recognize

an inextricable link between sustainable "customary resource use" and cultural survival 80• For the

anti-whaling moral crusaders, saving whales that are clearly not endangered outweighs saving

foreign cultures and communities.

m. Australia's anti-whaling policy and the 1982 moratorium

19. 1will now turn to the origins and characteristics of Australia's anti-whaling policy and

the adoption of the 1982 moratorium. At its inception in 1946, the IWC consisted of a cartel of

15 whaling nations. Japan joined in 1951, at a time when, amidst the devastation of the war, whale

79
ECO, St. Kitts Vol. LVIII, No. 1 (16 June 2006), p. 4, availab1e at:
htto://www.earthisland.org/jmmp/EC02006/2006EcoNol.pdf(1astchecked on 1July 2013).
80
IWC Resolution 2000-1. -45-

meat helped prevent starvation. Despite the Convention's purpose, and despite improved

management procedures in the 1970s, from the 1980s onwards, anti-whaling nations would take

over the IWC, intent on banning ali whaling, irrespective of science-based sustainability.

20. Article V (2) of the Convention specifically provides that Schedule catch quotas "sha/1

be based on scientific findings " 81• The right of Contracting Govemments under Article VIII (1) to

issue special whaling permits clearly contemplated the necessity of such "scientific findings" for

82
sustainable commercial whaling •

21. In this regard, the Scientific Committee plays a pivotai role. It was established to

provide independent scientific advice to the Commission. State representatives may participate in

the Committee's deliberations. But unlike the Commission, the Committee is not a political organ.

It is composed of sorne 150 of the world's leading scientists in the fields of ecology, marine

biology, population dynamics, statistics, genetics, modelling, and other relevant disciplines. It is an

independent expert body.

22. Given the politicization of science in the Commission, it should come as no surprise that

the Commission and the Scientific Committee may express different views on scientific matters. A

useful illustration, which may be found at tab 19-4 in your folders, is Professor Sands's

considerable emphasis on IWC resolution 2003-2 calling for scientific research to be limited to

83
"non-lethal methods only" • The contrary view of the Scientific Committee is that despite the

availability of non-lethal methods, "logistics and abundance of minke populations ... precluded

their successful application" 84• The contrast between these two views is the contrast between

science and politics.

23. Japan has been a leader in cetacean research since the establishment in 1941 of the

85
Nakabe Foundation for Whale Science • It has played a crucial role in the International Decade of

Cetacean Research (IDCR) and the Southem Ocean Whale and Ecosystem Research (SOWER),

81Article V (2), The International Convention for the Regulation ofWhaling.

82Article VIII (1), The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.

83CR 2013/9, p. 29, para. 50 (Sands).
84
SC/49/Rep. 1, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 48, 1998, p. 386.
85
The Institute of Cetacean Research, "Overview and Purpose", available at:
http://www.icrwhale.org/abouticr.html (last checked on l July3). -46-

86
recognized as the largest whale research program in the Southern Ocean • Survey cruises were

conducted under IWC auspices for more than 30 years, covering 216,000 miles and

43,000 sightings. The Scientific Committee noted in 2009 that "[w]ithout the generous provision

of vessels by the Government of Japan ... the success of this programme would never have been

87
possible" •

24. Australia's politicization of science at the IWC can best be understood through

examining the origins of its anti-whaling policy. In the 1970s, the protest group Project Jonah led a

highly publicized anti-whaling campaign against Australia's last whaling company, Cheynes

Beach. In the 1977 federal elections, whaling became an important political issue, and in 1978,the

Australian Government appointed Sir Sydney Frost to conduct an inquiry into whales and whaling.

The resulting report was submitted to Parliament in February 1979 and Prime Minister Malcolm

Fraser endorsed its recommendations on 4 April 1979. This report would have a fundamental and

lasting impact on Australia's policy towards the IWC.

25. The Frost Report's findings were based on Australian "community attitudes to

whaling" 8• This inc1udednumerous petitions and opinion poils, demonstrating that "the killing of

whales is wrong in the eyes of the Australian community" and that its continuation "would outrage

89
a significant proportion of the population" •

26. One "ethical" argument was avoidance of "pain and suffering ... irrespective of whether

90
the being is a human or nonhuman anima1" • But Australia was the world's largest exporter of

beef, much of it to Japan. A more appealing argument was that whales were unique. The Frost

Report thus emphasized that whales are unlike other animais "such as cattle, sheep and pigs that are

traditionally bred for slaughter" in abattoirs or "kangaroo species" and wild carnets that are killed

91
in the millions because they are "a nuisance to farmers" •

86Elwen S. H., et al 20Il. "Cetacean research in the southem African subregion: a review of previous studies and
current knowledge", African Journal of Marine Science 2011, 33(3): pp. 469-493.

87http://iwc.int/sower (last checked on 1July 2013).

88Whales and Whaling, Vol. 1: Report of the Independent Inquiry conducted by The Hon. Sir Sydney Frost,
(Australian Govemment Publishing Service, Canberra 1978) [Frost Report], p. 183.

89/d.,p.193.

90/d.

91Id.p. 186. -47-

27. In brief, the Frost Report was based on the premise that whaling was of no economie or

cultural significance for Australians. In contrast to other animais sacrificed to Australia's giant

meat industry, Australians had a special, emotional attachment to whales. As the Report explained,

"reasonable Australian citizens would conclude that ... it is wrong to kill an animal of such special

significance as the whale" 9• The Report even referred to whales as "sacred animals" 93•

28. It should thus come as no surprise that Australia is categorically opposed to lethal

sampling. The Frost Report explicitly recognized that a whaling ban would result in the Joss of

scientific data. It concluded however that, "the Jossof data for research ... is not a consideration

which can outweigh the matters of principle upon which the Inquiry's views are based" 94•

Opposition to lethal sampling was based on belief in the uniqueness of the whale. It had nothing to

do with scientific merit.

29. In this light, the Frost Report recommended that "Australia should remain a member of

the [IWC] which is the forum where its anti-whaling policy can best be pursued" 95• In other words,

Australia would remain in the IWC for the purpose of defeating its purpose.

30. The Frost Report's conclusions and recommendations were adopted unconditionally and

became Government policy. On 4 April 1979, in his statement to the Australian House of

Representatives, Prime Minister Fraser referred to whales as a "special and intelligent" species and

indicated that: "The Government is to prohibit ali whaling within the impending 200 mile

96
Australian Fishing Zone, including. . . the Australian Antarctic Territory." He further

emphasized that "Australia should pursue a policy of opposition to whaling ... both domestically

and internationally through the International Whaling Convention'.97.

31. In July 1979, the Australian IWC Commissioner announced a policy shift from "the

conservative utilisation ofwhale stocks to ... banning [ali] whaling". Pointing to the Frost Report,

92/d.,p.204.

93/d.,p.189.

94/d.,p.205.

95/d.

96"Ministerial Statementon Whalesand Whaling,Australia,Houseof Representatives,4 Aprill979, available at:
http://www.unimelb.edu.aulmalcolmfraser/speeches/parliamentary/whaling…
m (llast checked on l Jul2013).

91/d. -48-

he explained that this new policy was based on the belief that "whales have the potential of high

intelligence" 98•

32. lt was obvious that Australia could not force whaling nations to adopt a new

Anti-Whaling Convention. Thus, the most expedient strategy was to ban whaling by hijacking the

IWC. This could be achieved by imposing a permanent ban disguised as a temporary moratorium.

The Scientific Committee was of the view that sorne stocks could be sustainably harvested based

on improved management procedures. But the anti-whaling nations pushed for a blanket

moratorium. The Schedule amendment procedure could be used to achieve this because it was

legally binding. But this required a three-quarters majority ofthose Contracting States voting.

33. Having failed to get sufficient votes between 1972 and 1974, sorne of the anti-whaling

nations and non-govemmental organizations initiated a takeover of the IWC through a sudden

expansion of its membership. Greenpeace explains that from 1979 "more and more countries

joined the IWC which had never been involved in whaling" and that "[t]his influx of membership

99
allowed the IWC to adopt a series of conservation measures" • One scholar observes that

Greenpeace "added at !east six new anti-whaling members from 1978 to 1982 through the paying

of annual dues ... [and] naming of commissioners to represent these countries, at an annual cost of

100
more than $150,000" •

34. The illustration at tab 19-5 shows the progression of this takeover by anti-whaling

nations. The first pie-chart shows IWC membership in 1970. It may be recalled that the 1970s

coincided with both a significant decrease in commercial whaling and increased IWC regulation.

Nations in favour of sustainable whaling are indicated in green and anti-whaling nations of course

in red, together with numbers and percentages of each relative to the total membership. The second

pie-chart shows the membership in 1979, when anti-whaling nations had a slight majority but not

the three-quarters required for Schedule amendments. And finally, the third pie-chart shows the

90pening statement by the Australian Commissioner, 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC, London, July 1979;
CMJ, Ann. 164.

9Greenpeace, "The International Whaling Commission considers reopening commercial whaling", available at:
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/campaigns/oceans/whale-defenders/iwc/ (last checked on 1July 2013)

10Eiizabeth de Sombre, "Distorting Global Governance: Membership, Voting, and the IWC", in
Robert L. Friedheim (ed.), Toward a sustainable whaling regime (2001), p. 187. -49-

membership in 1982, when anti-whaling nations had more than doubled, giving them the

three-quarters majority required for imposing the moratorium.

35. In 1980, in view of this impending take-over, Canada protested that "a moratorium on ali

commercial whaling, not based on scientific grounds, is inconsistent with the express purposes and

101
with Article V of the Convention" • Canada withdrew its membership the following year, citing

102
"the changing composition and operations of the IWC" •

36. In 1982, the commercial whaling moratorium was adopted by just one vote over the

required majority as an amendment contained in paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule. lt provided that

"catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from ali stocks for the 1986 coastal

and the 1985/86 pelagie seasons and thereafter shall be zero" 103• It expressly stated however, that

"[t]his provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at

the latest the Commission will ... consider modification of this provision and the establishment of

other catch limits" (emphasis added). Sorne anti-whaling nations emphasized that this was not "a

104
total ban" but just "a temporary interruption of the activity" • But Australia had a different

agenda.

37. Japan, Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union, exercised their right to abject against the

moratorium under Article V (3) (a) of the Convention. Japan however, removed this objection,

believing in good faith that the moratorium was a temporary measure that would be reviewed by

1990 "based upon the best scientific advice". Japan focused instead on contributing to scientific

research, consistent with paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule and the Scientific Committee's work. lt

resolved to collect scientific data for estimating biological parameters required for stock

management of the Antarctic minke whale. Thus, scientific whaling in the context of the Schedule

was for the specifie purpose of resuming commercial whaling on a sustainable basis.

38. This however, would not come to pass for the 30 years that followed. Science-based

sustainable whaling, the very purpose of the Convention, became increasingly politicized. For

101
Verbatim Record of the 32nd !WC Annual Meeting, pp. 59-61.
102
Department of External Affairs Communique, "Canada withdraws from the International Whaling Convention
and Commission" 26 June 1981.
103
Schedule, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, para. 10 (e)
10Verbatim Record, 34th !WC Annual Meeting, p. 82. -50-

Australia, there was no room for compromise. The moratorium had to become a permanent ban.

By extension, lethal sampling in support of sustainable whaling also had to stop. Bath the purpose

and the means of scientific whaling had to be defeated.

39. The former United States IWC Commissioner, Professor William Aron noted that the

moratorium "marked a significant change: instead of trying to force the IWC to comply with the

convention and support only sustainable whaling, the anti-whaling majority was trying to force the

commission to tlout it" 105•

IV. Australia's policy of defeating science-based sustainable
whaling at the IWC

40. 1 will now turn to Australia's policy, post-moratorium, of defeating the resumption of

science-based sustainable whaling. As 1will explain, this policy of "no compromise" has brought

the IWC to the brink of collapse.

41. Allow me first to address the claim in Australia's Memorial that: "[i]t was no

coïncidence that Japan only started to issue special permits ... immediately after the moratorium

106
on whaling for commercial purposes came into effect ... in May 1987" • Japan agrees with

Australia that it was no coïncidence. JARPA was necessary exact!y because scientific data could

no longer be acquired incidental to commercial whaling. The Scientific Committee had opposed a

blanket moratorium in the 1970s because it would "bring about a reduction in the amount of

research whereas there was a prime need for a substantial increase in research activity" 107• It had

called instead for "a decade of intensified research on cetaceans" in support of sustainable whaling.

Even the Frost Report had noted that a ban on commercial whaling would result in "the loss of data

for research" 108•

42. The Court may recall that on two occasions, Australia used this graph, at tab 19-6, in

support ofits case. But it only tells halfthe story. Ifit is contrasted with this graph, at tab 19-7, of

10WilliamAron, WilliamBurke,and MiltonFreeman,"Fiouting the Convention",TheAtlantic(May 1999).
106
MA,para. 1.4.
107
Chairman'sReportof the 24th IWCAnnualMeetingin 1972,pp. 5-6.
10Frost Report,Vol. 1,p. 205. -51 -

the pre-moratorium catch, it starkly demonstrates the sequence and difference in scale, between

commercial and scientific whaling. Australia's conspiracy theory is wholly without merit.

43. But what is a truly remarkable distortion of the facts is Australia's statement in these

hearings that "Japan does not like the RMP" whereas Australia endorses it as "a robust and widely

109
supported management procedure" • Australia completely ignores its long-standing and explicit

policy of blocking the RMP's adoption. lts implementation is tantamount to lifting the

moratorium, which Australia totally opposes. Assuming it is not merely a litigation tactic, Japan

welcomes Australia's new policy.

44. The RMP was developed over a decade from 1982 to its unanimous adoption by the

Scientific Committee in 1992. The Chair of the Commission later described it as: "the most

advanced method for the conservation and management of a natural resource", concluding that it

110
would allow "catches ofsome stocks ofminke whales" • However, when it came before the IWC

in 1992 and 1993, it was squarely rejected by the IWC anti-whaling majority, including Australia.

45. The whaling nations that had complied in good faith with the moratorium felt betrayed.

In 1992, Iceland withdrew from the IWC. Its Fisheries Minister explained that white "the IWC was

set up both to conserve and exploit whales ... in recent years it has switched solely to conserving

them. This change gives Iceland the right to leave" 111• Iceland would re-join the IWC ten years

later. But it would do so with a reservation to the moratorium on commercial whaling.

Furthermore, having realized in 1992 that the anti-whaling majority would not allow the IWC to

manage sustainable whaling, lceland joined Norway, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, to establish

a parallel regional organization: the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, or NAMMCO.

46. The fallout escalated further. A year after Iceland's withdrawal, in 1993, the Chair ofthe

Scientific Committee, Professor Philip Hammond of the United Kingdom, resigned in protest. He

bluntly asked: "what is the point of having a Scientific Committee if its unanimous

10CR 2013/9, p. 22, para. 30 (Sands).

11Extract from the Chair's Proposais for a way forward on the RMS- Preface to Chair's Proposais: Why an
RMS is needed. http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/tihtvmg9n6880gco0okssgsk/56-26%20Preface…
df Clast checked on
1July 2013).

11"Ice1and goes it alone on whaling", New Scienlist (15 Feb. 1992):
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg13318081.300-iceland-goes-it-a1on…(last checked on
1July 2013). -52-

112
recommendations on a matter of primary importance are treated with such contempt?" His

resignation symbolized the open confrontation between science and politics at the IWC.

47. In 1994, the anti-whaling nations finally relented and allowed the Commission to accept

the RMP but with qualifications that made the seeming compromise an illusion. In 1992, Australia

had co-sponsored a resolution calling for "additional steps" before the RMP's implementation 113•

114
This so-called Revised Management Scheme or RMS imposed onerous requirements • The

resolution demanded that until there is agreement on ali its aspects, "the Catch Limit Algorithm

should not be implemented". In 1997, Australia suddenly reversed course, stating that "its position

is one of seeking an end to whaling, and [that] it will not support the RMS or engage in the

debate" 115• Between the adoption ofthe RMP in 1994 and 2006, theRMS was discussed at no less

than 52 meetings. Although Australia was absent from most of this scientific work, it was active in

deprecating it before the Commission.

48. Of course, Australia's withdrawal from the RMS deliberations in 1997 was not a

coincidence. lt was in May of that year that a National Task Force on Whaling established by the

Govemment had issued its much publicized Report entitled: "A Universal Metaphor: Australia's

Opposition to Commercial Whaling" 116• Building on the Frost Report, its premise was that "there

is no need for whales to be killed to provide food" based on the belief that "whaling is inherent!y

117
cruel and inhumane" •

49. The Task Force had recommended that: "Australia should oppose and vote against any

proposai to adopt the Revised Management Scheme (RMS) by resolution or to incorporate the

RMS or Revised Management Procedure (RMP) into the Schedule." 118 lt also called on Australia

to seek a prohibition against "special permit (scientific) whaling" 11• Like the 1979 Frost Report,

12
CMJ, para. 3.82.
13
IWC Resolution 1996-6.
114
IWC Resolution 1992-3.

JJSCMJ,Ann. 57; Chairman's Report of the 49th Annual Meeting, p. 36.
116
A Universal Metaphor: Australia's Opposition to Commercial Whaling: Report of the National Task Force on
Whaling, (Canberra: Environment Australia, 1997) http:/1155.187.3.82/coasts/publications/whaling/index.html (last
checked on 1July 2013).
117
Id., p. vii.

uaIbid.,p.xi.
9
llIbid.,p. x. -53-

the 1997Task Force Report was adopted as policy by the Government. lt was thus no surprise that

Australia would undermine both the RMP and the RMS. Perhaps this brief history explains why

Japan was astonished at Australia's sudden endorsement of the RMP at this hearing. If this reflects

a genuine change in policy, it is certainly welcomed by Japan.

50. By 2004, ten years after the adoption of the RMP, and more than 20 years after the

adoption of the moratorium, the IWC Chair, Henrik Fischer of Denmark, finally presented an RMS

"package" to the Commission. He explained that its adoption "is essential for the credibility of the

IWC" 12• His plea for compromise feil on deaf ears. Having ignored theRMS deliberations since

1997, Australia suddenly reappeared in 2004, only to state categorically that it "will not endorse a

121
Revised Management Scheme should one be agreed" • Australian Environment Minister,

Senator lan Campbell, made it clear that even defeating the RMS was not enough. In 2005, just

before the Jaunching of JARPA Il, he stated that Australia wanted to close the "loophole in the

122
[Convention] which allows whales to be killed for 'science"' • Thus, while admitting that Japan

was allowed to pursue scientific whaling, Minister Campbell made clear Australia's strong

123
objection to "ali forms", "ali forms of scientific and commercial whaling" •

51. Amidst this assault on Japan's scientific research, the Scientific Committee's exasperated

Chair, Professor Judy Zeh of the United States, openly complained that "she was disturbed by the

124
way the Scientific Committee's deliberations were misrepresented" by sorne IWC delegations •

Australian intransigence and IWC's possible collapse

52. Australia's intransigence and politicization of science has brought the IWC to the brink

of collapse. Australia has made much of the IWC resolutions adopted by the anti-whaling

12Extract from the Chair's Proposais for a way forward on the RMS- Preface to Chair's Proposais: Why an
RMS is needed http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/tihtvmg9n6880gco0okssgsk/56-26%20Preface.
pdf, last checked on
1July 2013.

12"Responses to the questionnaire related to the 'cali for comments/positions on key issues in relation to the
Chair's proposais for a way forward on theRMS"', IWC/N04/RSWG4, p. 6.

12Australian Antarctic Division, "Australia Appeals to Japan to Reconsider its 'Scientific' Whale Slaughter,"
Press Release, 8 Nov. 2005, available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/medialnews/2005/australia-appeals-to-japan-
to­

reconsider-its-scientific-whale-slaughter, last checked on 1July 2013; emphasis added.
12Australian Antarctic Division, "Australia taking strong action to protect whales", available at:
http://www.antarctica.gov.au/medialnews/2006/australia-taking-strong-act
ion-to-protect-whlast, checked on

1July 2013.
12CMJ, Ann. 60, Chairman's Report of the 52nd Annual Meeting, p. 44. -54-

majority. But it omits to mention those adopted when the anti-whaling block was a minority

125
amidst the shifting sands of IWC politics. For instance, the 2006 St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration

stated rather bluntly that "the IWC can be saved from collapse" only by adopting the RMP. It

called for "normalising the functions of the IWC", "respect for cultural diversity and traditions of

coastal peoples", and "the need for science-based policy and rulemaking".

53. In 2007, it was agreed to discuss "The Future of the IWC" with a view to achieving a

consensus solution. In 2009, a Support Group was established as part of a confidence-building

process aimed at adopting a consensus solution. Its distinguished Chair was Sir Geoffrey Palmer,

IWC Commissioner and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, and its members included

Australia, Japan, Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Cameroon, Germany, Iceland, Mexico, St. Kitts and

Nevis, Sweden and the United States.

54. On 20 February 2010, just as a consensus proposai was within reach, Australian

Prime Minister Rudd warned visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Okada that if special permit

whaling continued, Australia would take Japan to the Court. Given the timing, it was difficult not

to conclude that this threat was intended to kilt any hope of an IWC consensus.

55. Australia filed its Application on 31 May 2010, 20 days before the IWC's 2010 Annual

Meeting in Agadir, Morocco. Sorne days earlier, on Il May 2010, the IWC Chair,

Cristian Maquieira of Chile and the Vice-Chair, Anthony Liverpool of Antigua and Barbuda, had

presented a "Proposed Consensus Decision to lmprove the Conservation of Whales" 126• They had

127
also issued a Press Release with the rather explicit title of: "If you really care about whale

conservation- give our proposai a fair reading". In a desperate plea, they warned of "the possible

collapse of the IWC" and emphasized that the confrontational "status quo is not an option for an

effective multilateral organisation".

56. The consensus proposai however, was dead on arrivai. Almost immediately after it was

circulated by the IWC Chair, the new Australian Environment Minister Peter Garrett said that "it

12SCMJ,Ann. 60, "St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration", Resolution 2006-1, Ann. C, Chair's Report of the
58th Annual Meeting,Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 20p. 68.
126
"Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conservation of Whales", available at:
http://iwc.int/index.php?ciD=752&cType=document, last checked on 1July 2013.
127
Revised Press Release: IWC Chair and Vice-Chair; "If you really care about whale conservatgive our
proposai a fairading", http://iwc.int/index.php?ciD=50&cType=document&download=l, last checked on 1July 2013. -55-

was now time to close the door on the Proposed Consensus Decision" 12• He rejected the

compromise because it failed to close what he described as the Article VIII "loophole" and

demanded that Japan "immediate[ly] hait" scientific whaling 12• Amidst the ruins of his hard work,

the Chair of the Support Group, Sir Geoffrey Palmer of New Zealand, "paid tribute" to the United

States "for its . .. leadership" and 1 quote, "to Japan for their huge commitment and their

willingness for compromise" 13• lt was against this backdrop that Australia came before the Court

in 2010, accusing Japan of bad faith.

57. lt is opportune to say a word here about "collective regulation", which is a theme in both

Australia and New Zealand's pleadings. Japan accepts, of course, the obligations that flow from

membership in a treaty-based multilateral organization. The important question is what those

obligations are. The IWC is empowered to decide on certain issues, just as Contracting States are

permitted, by Article V (3), to opt out of the binding effect of such decisions. Yes, Contracting

States collectively consider what steps are appropriate for the proper conservation and the orderly

development of the whaling industry. But this is not a system in which the majority is empowered

to impose its will upon the minority, not !east if the majority is intent on defeating the fundamental

object and purpose of the treaty. lt would be as if an anti-navigation majority took over the

International Maritime Organization and banned ali navigation on the seas.

58. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the main victim of Australia's "no compromise"

"zero tolerance" policy has been the IWC. The attempt to impose what the Agent described as

Australia's "total" opposition to science-based sustainable commercial whaling has alienated

whaling nations and undermined future regulation. A notable example was the anti-whaling

block's rejection in 2012 of Denmark's request to slightly adjust Greenland's aboriginal

131
subsistence catch • In response, the exasperated Inuit people of Greenland decided to set their

128
Peter Garrett, "Whales worth more alive than dead", available at:
http://www.theage.eom.au/opinion/politics/whales-worth--more-alive-than… 100428-trc llast checked on
1July 2013.

129/bid.
130
IWC Chair's Report of the 62nd Annual Meeting, p. 8.
13Chair's Report of the 64th Annual meeting 2-6 July 2012, p. 30. -56-

own quota in defiance of the IWC 13• They did so with the support of Denmark. They took their

business elsewhere, to a sustainable whaling organization that functions, to the North Atlantic

Marine Mammal Commission, NAMMCO, that, as 1 explained earlier, was established in 1992

when anti-whaling nations sabotaged the RMP and Iceland withdrew from the IWC. The report of

a 2006 workshop in Denmark explains why these whaling communities are creating an alternative

organization. In the words of the participants:

"NAMMCO is a totally different organisation with a very different attitude and
debate than what we have experienced in the International Whaling Commission

(IWC). The tendency in IWC has been that the hunter in sorne quarters is looked upon
as the 'enemy', whereas in NAMMCO the hunter has always been an important
133
co-player."

59. It may be asked whether Australia is "Saving the Whales" by bringing the IWC to the

brink of collapse? Even the former United States IWC Commissioner spoke of the "intransigence

of anti-whaling nations" that has degenerated the IWC into what he called "a science-free forum

for eco-posturing". He warned that in a world with far more serious challenges, "the example of an

international environmental agency politicizing itself into irrelevance is alarming" 13•

60. Surely, other nations may look at Australia's IWC campaign against Japan and wonder if

the treaty that they sign in good faith today will come back to haunt them tomorrow. Surely, even

more whaling nations will consider withdrawing from an increasingly dysfunctional organization.

Australia can best save the whales by saving the IWC. The choice is not between sustainable

whaling and no whaling at ali. The choice is between sustainable whaling and no regulation at ali.

V. The Scientific Committee's view on the scientific

merit of JARP A

61. I now turn to the fundamental question before the Court; namely, whether Japan is

acting in bad faith when it asserts that JARPA has a scientific purpose. In this regard, we agree

with Professor Sands that in tine with itsjurisprudence, the Court should draw on "findings of fact

13Government of Greenland, "Greenland Quotas for Big Whales", available at:
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Press-Statements/2013/0l/Wh
ales, last checked 2013.

13Report of the NAMMCO Workshop to Address the Problems of "Struck and Lost" in Seal, Walrus
and Whale Hunting, North Atlantic House, Copenhagen, Denmark, 14-16 Nov. 2006, p. 12:
http://www.nammco.no/webcronize/images/Nammco/818.pdf, last checked on 1July 2013.

13William Aron, William Burke, and Milton Freeman, "Flouting the Convention", The Atlantic, May 1999. -57-

135
made by third bodies, independent third bodies, third parties with no direct interest in the case" •

We agree further with him that the Scientific Committee is exactly such an "independent third

body". lt is after ali established for the specifie purpose of providing independent scientific advice

to the IWC. Where we disagree is his assertion that the Scientific Committee, and 1 quote, "has

never- never- offered any positive assessment of either program's contribution to the

·conservation and management ofwhales" 13•

62. Mr. President, Members of the Court, English is not my mother tangue, but it would

seem that "never" is a rather categorical ward. "Never say never" Charles Dickens wrote,

especially if an assertion is patently false. Professor Hamamoto will address the Scientific

Committee's findings at greater length. For present purposes, 1will provide just a few illustrative

examples ofwhat are clearly positive assessments of JARPA's scientific merit, shawn at tab 19-8.

63. These are sorne conclusions from the 1997 Mid-Term Review:

"JARPA ... has provided substantial improvement in the understanding of stock structure." 137

"JARPA data ... would allow estimation ofthe biological parameters with reasonable levels of

138
precision."

"There was general agreement that the data presented on stock structure, particularly the new

genetic data, were important contributions to the objectives of JARPA and stock

management." 139

64. These are sorne conclusions from the 2006 Review:

140
"[T]he JARPA dataset provides a valuable resource."

"The results of analyses of JARPA data could be used ... to increase the allowed catch of

141
minke whales in the Southern Hemisphere, without increasing depletion risk."

135
eR 2013/8, p. 62, para. 16(Sands).
136
eR 2013/8, p. 63, para. 19(Sands).
13eMJ, para 4.159; "Report of the Scientific eommittee", Rep.int.Whai.Commn48, 1998, p. 103.

138/bid.

13eMJ, para. 4.34; Se/49/Rep1, 3.5.

14eMJ, para. 4.132; "Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from Special Permit
Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic", Se/59/01, J. eetacean Res. Manage. pp 411-445, 5.5.

14eMJ, para. 4.161; ibid., 8.1. -58-

"considerable progress has been made in addressing the issue of stock structure" 142•

"[T]he JARPA dataset provides a valuable resource to allow investigation of sorne aspects of

143
the role ofwhales within the marine ecosystem."

65. There is yet more:

"[JARPA] has also resulted in a number of publications in the IWC Journals and in other

international peer-reviewed journals."

"[T]here have been 22 articles in Rep. !nt. Whal Commn and J. Cetacean Res Manage., and

58 articles in English languagejournals."

"[A] total of 182 scientific documents based on JARPA data have been presented to the IWC

Scientific Committee meetings." 144

66. And if this is not enough, at tab 19-9, here is a statement of the Scientific Committee

Chair from 2008:

"The Japanese input into cetacean research in the Antarctic is significant, and 1 would say

145
crucial for the Scientific Committee."

67. Against this record, it is difficult to understand how Professor Sands could stand before

this Court and assert that there has "never- never been any positive assessment" of JARPA by an

independent body. Indeed, the Scientific Committee reports are fatal to Australia's contention that

JARPA has had "no or negligible scientific results" 146•

68. lt should be noted further that JARPA II will be reviewed by the Scientific Committee

next year, in 2014, under its enhanced Annex P procedure, unanimously endorsed by the IWC.

Perhaps Australia's haste in coming before the Court is to try and pre-empt yet another positive

revtew.

69. It is telling that even staunchly anti-whaling IWC members recognize the scientific merit

of JARPA. A notable example is United States Ambassador David Balton, who testified before a

14CMJ, para. 4.53; ibid.8.1.1.
143
CMJ, para. 4.132; ibid.5.5.
144/bid.

14Arne Bjorge, President of the Scientific Committee at the time of this statement, 2008, quoted in CMJ,

para. 4.166.
14MA, para. 5.132. -59-

Congressional committee on 6 May 2010 that, and 1quote: "Japan does perfonn scientific research

on the whales they take, and probably have the best whale science as a result." 147

70. Instead of reliance on these unambiguous scientific reviews, Australia's oral pleadings

resembled an introductory seminar on scientific methodology. There were musings on hypotheses

about hypotheses, a quaint book on scientific masonry from 1905, an NGO-sponsored open letter in

the New York Times signed by environmental activists, and two expert witnesses whose authority

must be weighed against that of sorne 150 independent experts comprising the Scientific

Committee.

71. Mr. President, Members of the Court. We are not here to detennine if JARPA should

win the Nobel Prize for science. We are here only to detennine if it falls within the Article VIII

exception. We submit that no third party independent body is better situated than the Scientific

Committee to assess JARPA's scientific merit. We therefore invite the Court, consistent with the

line of cases referred to by Professor Sands -Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Pulp

Mills, and the Genocide Convention case- to rely substantially on the factual findings of the

Scientific Committee, as retlected in its official records. Those findings, we submit, leave no

doubt, no doubt whatsoever, asto the scientific merit of Japan's research program.

VI. Australia's case is about neither science nor
the Whaling Convention

72. Mr. President, Members ofthe Court, Australia's case can best be described as "science

fiction". lt is perplexing to understand why it would bring such a manifestly untenable case against

Japan, a case that can easily be refuted by the Scientific Committee's official record.

73. It cannot go unnoticed in this regard that Professor Crawford went to great lengths to

distance Australia from Sea Shepherd's violent actions. He explained that "it is of no relevance to

the present case" and that "[t]he real reason for the Japanese Govemment's decision to reduce

148
target catches is ... the sharp decrease in domestic demand for whale meat in Japan" • Of course,

14U.S. Leadership in the International Whaling Commission and H.R. 2455, the International Whale
Conservation and Protection Act of2009: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human

Rights and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Asia, theifie and the Global Environment of the Committee Foreign
Affairs, Housef Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, May 6, 2010, Seriai No. 111-95, p.f
29.
148
CR 2013/11, p. 20, para. 68 (Crawford). -60-

once again, the Scientific Committee would disagree. Its 2013 Report recognized that "research

activities were interrupted severa! times by the Sea Shepherd, which directed violent sabotage

149
activities against Japanese research vessels" • The so-called "business mode!" argument is also

easily refuted as Professor Iwasawa will explain in his presentation. The Japanese chef in the

Tokyo restaurant would tell Professor Crawford that under Article VIII (2) of the Convention,

Japan is obligated to sell the meat rather than dumping it into the sea. The Australian tourist seated

in the next table would add that his Government uses the same self-financing mode! for its fisheries

scientific research. Leaving these issues aside, the insistence that Sea Shepherd is irrelevant to this

case is rather intriguing.

74. Sea Shepherd's violent actions have been repeatedly condemned by the IWC and the

International Maritime Organization. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation has

labelled it as "eco-terrorism" 150• On 25 February 2013, the United States Court of Appeal for the

Ninth Circuit held that the Sea Shepherd attacks against Japanese research vessels are, and I quote,

151
"the very embodiment of piracy" under international law • There is currently an Interpol Red

Notice against its notorious founder, Paul Watson, for multiple criminal charges in different

75. A quick glanee at the Sea Shepherd website demonstrates what is a private army used to

wage war against Japanese research vessels on the high seas, using Australia as a base. The image

before you, and at tab 19-10, is entitled "Operation Zero Tolerance" and refers to a fleet of "four

ships", "drones", "helicopters", and "new tactics". A little below you will see that this year's

"Operation Zero Tolerance" was launched from the Australian port of Williamstown, using ships

registered in Australia and the Netherlands. This sampie photo, at tab 19-11, demonstrates one

such ship, named after the Hollywood celebrity Bob Barker, attacking Japanese research vessels in

February of this year in Antarctic waters.

149 tana·
sc, 2013,~7.2 JA.RPA;Il, p. 79.
15
°Federal Bureau of Investigations, "The Threat of Eco-Tourism", available at:
http://www.tbi.gov/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-terrorism, last checked on 1July 2013.
151
/nstitute ofCetacean Research et al v Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Opinion, US Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Feb. 2013, p. 6, available at: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2013/02/25/1235266.pdf,
last checked on 1July013.

15"1NTERPOL Red Notice issued for Paul Watson at Japan's request", available at:
http://www.internol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2012/N2012091
4, last checkedJuly 2013. -62-

tactics ... "15• He had also "urged thousands of Australians to vote for [Prime Minister] Rudd" in

157
the August 2010 federal elections because he "promised to take Japan to court" • Indeed, on

29 April2010, just a month before the Application was filed, an opinion poli had asked whether

"the Rudd government has done enough to stop commercial whaling?" Eighty-seven per cent

responded "no" and agreed that "it's time for the government to finally take international legal

action" 158•

80. Now Australia's motives for bringing this case may or may not be legally relevant. But

it cannot go unnoticed that prior to this case, senior Australian officiais openly admitted that

Japan's scientific whaling was within its rights under Article VIII. When asked about potential

litigation in 2006, the Environment Minister of the previous Government, Senator lan Campbell,

endorsed the view of New Zealand's IWC Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, as follows- and I

quote here from the Australian Antarctic Division website, which is at tab 19-14:

"We have been looking at the legal theories that are available against the
Japanese for sorne months ... and there is no legal theory that is available that can
159
prevent, in our view, the Japanese from doing what they are doing."

81. Minister Campbell and Sir Geoffrey were by no means alone in this assessment. The

following year, in August 2007, the Australian Minister of Defence, Dr. Brendan Nelson, stated in

the House of Representatives that: "although we find it objectionable, scientific whaling is

160
permissible under the Whaling Convention" • Perhaps it was put best by Australia's former IWC

Commissioner, Peter Bridgewater, who wrote in a 2012 Opinion Editorial that: "[i]t may not feel

161
good but the Japanese are largely right" •

156
"Sea Shepherd Urges Australia to Take Legal Action against Japanese Whalers", available at:
http://www.seashepherd.it/news-and-media/news-090120-3.html (last checked on 1 July 2013).
157
Paul Watson, "The Sea Shepherd Dilemma Down Under", available at: http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and­
media/2009/I0/06/the-sea-shepherd-dilemma-down-under-293 (last checked on 1 July 2013).
158
Peter Garrett, "Whales worth more alive than dead", available at:
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/whales-worth-imore-alive-than… 100428-trc l.html (last checked on
1 July 2013).

15http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2006/australia-tak ing-strong-action-to-protect-whale(last checked

on 1July 2013).
16House of Representatives, Question No. 5013, 7 August 2007, p. 167.

16Peter Bridgewater, "Australia's anti-whaling lobby is missing the point", 2 March 2012, available at:

http://www.smh.eom.au/opinion/austral ias-antiwhaling-lobby-is-missing-the-point012030 1-1u5nr.html?skin=text-only
(last checked on 1 July 2013). - 61 -

76. Now 1 would imagine that Sea Shepherd would be very disappointed at

Professor Crawford's suggestion that they are of no relevance to Japan's reduced catch this year.

As shown at tab 19-12, their website triumphantly states: "[t]his was Japan's most disastrous

whaling season ever. Congratulations to Sea Shepherd Australia for leading such a successful

153
Antarctic whaling campaign." Just below you will see a red tab inviting supporters to "Donate

Now". Minimizing Sea Shepherd's relevance as Professor Crawford has done is clearly unhelpful

for their fund-raising campaign.

77. lt would seem that Sea Shepherd's influence in Australia is considerable. In a

22 May 2012 statement, former Environment Minister, lan Campbell, hailed the fugitive

Mr. Watson, as "one of the world's greatest environmental activists". Remarkably, as indicated at

tab 19-13, he admitted on the Sea Shepherd website that: "1was proud to support Captain Watson

154
when 1was a Cabinet Minister in the national govemment of Australia" • Senator Campbell is

currently on the Advisory Board of Sea Shepherd, together with other influential Australian

political figures. It would seem that Australia has outsourced Antarctic maritime enforcement to

Sea Shepherd.

78. This brings me to Sea Shepherd's broader relevance to this case. On the first day of this

hearing, a Sea Shepherd representative spoke to joumalists outside this courtroom. He proudly

claimed that the opening of this case "was a vindication of the group's controversial tactics" in

attacking Japanese shipsJSS.

79. In 2009, Mr. Watson had made what he called "an offer" to the Australian Govemment

"to take legal action against the Japanese whalers". He had stated publicly that "[i]f Australia or

New Zealand ... can agree to take legal action, Sea Shepherd will agree to back off our aggressive

153
"Sea Shepherd Commentary on the Cruise Report of the Japanese Whale Research Program Under Special
Permit in the Antarctic- Second Phase (JARPA Il) in 2012/2013", available at:
http://www.seashepherd.org.au/commentary-and-editorials/2013/06/13/sea-s
hepherd-views-on-the-cruise-report-of-the­
japanese-whale-research-program-613 (last checked1July 2013).

15"Letter From the Former Minister of the Environment of Australia Senator lan Campbell to the President and
Environment Ministerof Costa Rica", available at: http://www.seashepherd.orglnews-and-media/2012/05/22/letter-from­
the-former-minister-of-the-environment-of-australia-senator-ian-campbell
-1383 (last checked on).

15Mike Corder, "Japanese Whaling Ban Urged By Australia in Highest U.N. Court", available at:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20 13/06/26/japanese-whaling-ban n 3502842.html?utm hp ref=green (Jast checked on
1July 2013). -63-

82. So, it may be asked, what new theory emerged from one Government to the next to

justify a case against Japan? As 1have explained, this case is plainly not about the scientific merit

of JARPA. lt is about an emotional anti-whaling moral crusade that in the name of "zero

tolerance", tolerates Sea Shepherd's violent extremism, the politicization of science, the collapse of

the IWC, and now before this Court, baseless accusations of bad faith against Japan.

83. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Australia's position on lethal sampling is

absolutely clear. lts IWC Commissioner has stated in categorical terms that Australia is "opposed

162
to any research that involves the killing of whales" • Its Agent in this proceeding has said, just

beyond the confines of this hall, that: "You don't even need to kill one whale to conduct scientific

research." 163This position cannat possibly be reconciled with the plain terms of Article VIII of the

Convention.

84. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the days of civilizing missions and moral crusades

are over. In a world with diverse civilizations and traditions, international law cannat become an

instrument for imposing the cultural preference of sorne at the expense of others. Whether

JARPA II offends Australian public opinion or not, it is clearly within Japan's rights under

Article VIII of the Convention.

85. That concludes my presentation and Japan's pleadings for today. 1thank the Court for its

patience and indulgence.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Akhavan. However, today's sitting does not

conclude with your presentation. Two Members of the Court have questions to put to Australia or

Japan. To that end, 1 shall now give the floor to Judge Greenwood. Judge Greenwood, if you

please.

Judge GREENWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, my question is

for Australia but also for New Zealand.

162
Verbatim Records ofthe JWC, 1989, p. 131.
163
Associated Press, "Australiato World Court: Ban Japanese Whaling", 26 June 2013, availabie at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/australia-world-court-ban-japanese-whali… (last checked on 1 July -64-

"What is the precise legal basis on which it is said that Japan has a legal
obligation arising from the recommendations contained in resolutions of the IWC, and
what is the precise content of that obligation?"

Mr. President, obviously 1 do not expect an answer from Australia until its second round

presentation, but 1ask the question now so that New Zealand has a chance to give its observations

and also, of course, 1look forward to any comment Japan wishes to make in their second round.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Greenwood. 1 shall now give the floor to

Judge Donoghue. Judge Donoghue, you have the floor.

Judge DONOGHUE: Thank you, Mr. President. 1have two related questions and they are

bath addressed to Japan. My first question is:

"What analysis of the feasibility of non-lethal methods did Japan conduct prior

to the settingof sample sizes for each year of JARPA Il?"

And my second question is:

"How did any such analysis bear on those sample sizes?"

Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Japan is invited to reply orally to the question if possible

during the first round of oral argument, and Australia will be free during its second round of oral

argument to comment on the reply of Japan. Should Japan require more time to prepare the answer

to the question, and answers the question during the second round of oral argument, then the Court

will determine the procedure for Australia having the opportunity to comment.

As there is no more business for today, this meeting is closed and the Court will meet again

tomorrow on Wednesday 3 July at 10.00 a.m. to hear the continuation of Japan's first round of oral

argument. The sitting is closed.

TheCourtroseat 6p.m.