Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2011/5
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2011
Public sitting
held on Monday 21 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Owada presiding,
in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995
(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2011
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 21 mars 2011, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Owada, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995
(ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presiewtada
Vice-Presdenkta
Judges Koroma
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Judges ad hoc Roucounas
Vukas
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Owada,président
vceMpra,ident
KoroMa.
Al-Khasawneh
Simma
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Crnçade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue mes
Djngogshue,
RoMcou.nas
juVeskas, ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is represented by:
H.E.Mr.Antonio Miloshoski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,
as Agent;
H.E.Mr.Nikola Dimitrov, Ambassador of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr.Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, Un iversity College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Mr.Sean D.Murphy, Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington
University,
Mrs. Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, Professor of Law, University of Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
Mr.Pierre Klein, Professor of International Law, Director of the Centre of International Law,
Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Counsel;
Mr. Saso Georgievski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Toni Deskoski, Professor of Law, University Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje,
Mr. Igor Djundev, Ambassador, State Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr.GoranStevcevski, State Counsellor, International Law Directorate, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
MsElizabetaGjorgjieva, Minister Plenipoten tiary, Deputy-Head of Mission of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the European Union,
Ms Aleksandra Miovska, Head of Co-ordination Sector, Cabinet Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Advisers;
Mr. Mile Prangoski, Research Assistant, Cabinet of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Remi Reichold, Research Assistant, Matrix Chambers, London,
as Assistants; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de l’ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Antonio Miloshoski, ministre des affaires étrangères de l’ex-R épublique yougoslave de
Macédoine,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Nikola Dimitrov, ambassadeur de l’ ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M.PhilippeSands, Q.C., professeur de droit au Un iversity College de Londres, avocat, Matrix
Chambers, Londres,
M.SeanD.Murphy, professeur de droit à la George Washington University, titulaire de la chaire
de recherche Patricia Roberts Harris,
Mme Geneviève Bastid Burdeau, professeur de droit à l’Université Paris I, Panthéon-Sorbonne,
M.PierreKlein, professeur de droit internationa l, directeur du centre de droit international de
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles,
Mme Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh, avocat, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme conseils ;
M. Saso Georgievski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Toni Deskoski, professeur de droit à l’Université Saints-Cyrille-et-Méthode de Skopje,
M. Igor Djundev, ambassadeur, conseiller d’Etat au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M.GoranStevcevski, conseiller d’Etat au minist ère des affaires étrangè res, direction du droit
international,
Mme Elizabeta Gjorgjieva, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef adjoint de la mission de l’ex-République
yougoslave de Macédoine auprès de l’Union européenne,
MmeAleksandraMiovska, chef du département de la coordination au cabinet du ministre des
affaires étrangères,
comme conseillers ;
M. Mile Prangoski, assistant de recherche au cabinet du ministre des affaires étrangères,
M. Remi Reichold, assistant de recherche, Matrix Chambers, Londres,
comme assistants ; - 6 -
Ms Elena Bodeva, Third Secretary, Embassy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Liaison Officer with the International Court of Justice;
Mr. Ilija Kasaposki, Security Officer of the Foreign Minister. - 7 -
MmeElenaBodeva, troisième secrétaire à l’ ambassade de l’ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme attaché de liaison auprès de la Cour internationale de Justice ;
M. Ilija Kasaposki, agent chargé de la sécurité du ministre des affaires étrangères. - 8 -
The Government of the Hellenic Republic is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Georges Savvaides, Ambassador of Greece,
MsMariaTelalian, Legal Adviser, Head of the Public International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agents;
MrG. eorgeAbi-Saab, Honorary Professor of In ternational Law, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.AlainPellet, Professor of International Law, University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
member and former Chairman of the Interna tional Law Commission, associate member of the
Institut de droit international,
Mr.MichaelReisman, Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law, Yale Law School,
member of the Institut de droit international,
as Senior Counsel and Advocates;
Mr.ArghyriosFatouros, Honorary Professor of International Law, University of Athens, member
of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Professor of International Law, University of Athens,
Mr. Evangelos Kofos, former Minister-Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specialist on
Balkan affairs,
Csounsel;
Mr.TomGrant, Research Fellow, Lauterpacht Ce ntre for International Law, University of
Cambridge,
Mr.AlexandrosKolliopoulos, Assistant Legal Advi ser, Public International Law Section of the
Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, Assistant Legal Adviser, Public International Law Section of
the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MsAlinaMiron, Researcher, Centre de droit inte rnational de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
Asdvisers;
H.E. Mr. Ioannis Economides, Ambassador of Greece to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
MsAlexandraPapadopoulou, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of the Greek Liaison Office in
Skopje, - 9 -
Le Gouvernement de la République hellénique est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Georges Savvaides, ambassadeur de Grèce,
MmeMariaTelalian, conseiller juridique, chef de la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agents ;
M.GeorgesAbi-Saab, professeur honoraire de droit international à l’Institut universitaire des
hautes études internationales de Genève, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.JamesCrawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M.AlainPellet, professeur de droit international à l’Université ParisOuest, Nanterre-LaDéfense,
membre et ancien président de la Commission du droit international, membre associé de
l’Institut de droit international,
M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationa l à l’Université de Yale, titulaire de la chaire
Myres S. McDougal, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
comme conseils principaux et avocats ;
M.Arghyrios Fatouros, professeur honoraire de dr oit international à l’Université nationale
d’Athènes, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, professeur de droit international à l’Université nationale d’Athènes,
M. Evangelos Kofos, ancien ministre-conseiller au ministère des affaires étrangères, spécialiste des
Balkans,
comme conseils ;
M.TomGrant, collaborateur scientifique au La uterpacht Centre for International Law de
l’Université de Cambridge,
M. Alexandros Kolliopoulos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la secti on de droit international public
du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Michael Stellakatos-Loverdos, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international
public du département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
MmeAlinaMiron, chercheur au Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseillers ;
S. Exc. M. Ioannis Economides, ambassadeur de Grèce auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Alexandra Papadopoulou, ministre plénipotentiaire, chef du bureau de liaison de la Grèce à
Skopje, - 10 -
Mr. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, First Counsellor, Embassy of Greece in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr.EliasKastanas, Assistant Legal Adviser, P ublic International Law Section of the Legal
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Konstantinos Kodellas, Embassy Secretary,
as Diplomatic Advisers;
Mr. Ioannis Korovilas, Embassy attaché,
Mr. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, Embassy attaché,
as Administrative Staff. - 11 -
M. Efstathios Paizis Paradellis, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Grèce au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M.EliasKastanas, conseiller juridique adjoint à la section de droit international public du
département juridique au ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Konstantinos Kodellas, secrétaire d’ambassade,
comme conseillers diplomatiques ;
M. Ioannis Korovilas, attaché d’ambassade,
M. Kosmas Triantafyllidis, attaché d’ambassade,
comme personnel administratif. - 12 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is open.
Before we start our judicial proceedings today, I would first like to express, on behalf of the
Court, our deepest sympathy to the Japanese people who have had to face the devastating impact of
last week’s earthquake and subseque nt tsunami. It is with particular sorrow that I have seen the
images of utter destruction caused in my homela nd by this natural calamity and learnt of the
appalling loss of life ⎯ with over 20,000 fatalities and missing pe ople. It is a cruel and shocking
death toll. The Court extends its heartfelt condol ences to the families of the victims, and to the
people and Government of Japan. We place our sincere hope in the success of the recovery efforts
and the resilience of the Japanese people in finding a way to overcome this terrifying ordeal.
I would like to invite you to stand and obser ve a minute’s silence in memory of the many
earthquake victims.
The Court observes a minute’s silence.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Please be seated. The Court now meets to hear the oral
arguments of the Parties in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of
13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece).
I note initially that Judge Skotnikov, for reas ons made known to me, is unable to take his
seat on the Bench today.
I further note that, since the Court does not include upon the Bench a judge of the nationality
of either of the Parties, both Parties have availed themselves of the right, under Article31,
paragraph2, of the Statute, to choose a judge ad hoc . The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia chose Mr. Budislav Vukas and Greece Mr. Emmanuel Roucounas.
Article 20 of the Statute provides that “[e]very Member of the Court shall, before taking up
his duties, make a solemn declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially and
conscientiously”. Pursuant to Article 31, paragraph 6, of the Statute, that same provision applies to
judges ad hoc. Notwithstanding that Mr.Vukas is currently serving as a judge ad hoc in another
case and has made a solemn declaration for the purposes of those proceedings, Article8,
paragraph 3, of the Rules of Court provides that he must make a further solemn declaration in the
present case. - 13 -
In accordance with custom, I shall first say a few words about the career and qualifications
of each judge ad hoc before inviting him to make his solemn declaration.
Mr. Budislav Vukas, of Croatian nationality, was professor of public international law at the
University of Zagreb from 1977 until 2008. He has held numerous other teaching positions around
the world including at the Universities of Boston, Paris, Rome, Split and Tilburg and has also
taught a course at the Hague Academy of Intern ational Law. Mr.Vukas has represented his
Government on various occasions including in the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General
Assembly, at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and at the World
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. Mr.Vukas has combined his academic and diplomatic
achievements with a career as an international ju dge. He was a member of the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea during almost a decade and, as such, its Vice-President from 2002
until 2005. He is currently Judge ad hoc before the Court in the case concerning Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishme nt of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia and
Montenegro). He is also a member of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration within the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Mr.Vukas is further a member of
numerous academic institutions including the Croatian Society of International Law and the Institut
de droit international. In addition, he h as published numerous works and articles on different
aspects of public international law, particularly in the field of the law of the sea, environmental law
and international human rights law.
Mr. Emmanuel Roucounas, of Greek nationality, is Honorary Professor of International Law
at Athens University, where he has taught since 1970. He has given lectures at numerous other
academic institutions around the world including at the Universities of Thessaloniki, Paris, London,
San Sebastián, Berkeley and Yale. Mr. Roucounas has also taught a course at the Hague Academy
of International Law. He is a former Member of the International Law Commission and is a
member of the Institut de droit international and a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.
In addition, Mr.Roucounas has served as a memb er of the United Nations Committee for the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, as a member of the Group of Experts of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe for the Balkans and as a member of various committees
within the Council of Europe. Mr.Roucounas has represented his Government on a number of - 14 -
occasions including as delegate at the General As sembly from 1980 to 1999 and as part of the
Greek delegation at a number of international diplomatic conferences. He has appeared before this
Court as counsel to the Greek Government in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey)
case. Mr. Roucounas has published numerous works a nd articles in diverse fields of international
law, ranging from the law of the sea, human rights and humanitarian law to bioethics and European
unification.
In accordance with the order of precedence fixed by Article7, paragraph3, of the Rules of
Court, I shall first invite Mr. Roucounas to make the solemn declaration prescribed by the Statute,
and I would request all those present to rise.
Mr. ROUCOUNAS:
“I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and exercise my powers as
judge honourably, faithfully, impartially and conscientiously.”
«Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et
en toute conscience.»
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. I shall now invite Mr. Vukas to make the solemn declaration
prescribed by the Statute. Mr. Vukas.
M. VUKAS :
«Je déclare solennellement que je remplirai mes devoirs et exercerai mes
attributions de juge en tout honneur et dévouement, en pleine et parfaite impartialité et
en toute conscience.»
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Please be seated. I take note of the solemn declarations
made by Mr.Roucounas and Mr.Vukas and declare them duly installed as judges ad hoc in the
case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia v. Greece).
* - 15 -
I shall now recall the principal steps of the procedure so far followed in this case.
On 17November2008, the Government of the former Y ugoslav Republic of Macedonia
filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting proceedings against the Government of
Greece contending that Greece has acted in violat ion of its legal obligations under Article11,
paragraph1, of the Interim Accord signed by the Parties on 13September1995 and which entered
into force on 13 October 1995.
In its Application, the former Yugoslav Re public of Macedonia, referring to Article36,
paragraph1, of the Statute, relied on Article21, paragraph2, of the Interim Accord to found the
jurisdiction of the Court.
By an Order dated 20January2009, the C ourt fixed 20July2009 and 20January2010,
respectively, as the time-limits for the filing of th e Memorial of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and the Counter-Memorial of Greece. The Memorial of the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia was duly filed within the time-limit so prescribed.
By a letter dated 5 August 2009, Greece stated th at, in its view, “the Court manifestly lacks
jurisdiction to rule on the claims of the Applicant in this case”, but informed the Court that, rather
than raising preliminary objections under Article 79 of the Rules of the Court, it would be
addressing “issues of jurisdiction together with those on the merits”.
The Counter-Memorial of Greece, which addressed issues relating to jurisdiction and
admissibility as well as to the merits of the case, was duly filed within the time-limit prescribed by
the Court in its Order of 20 January 2009.
At a meeting held by the President of the Court with the representatives of the Parties on
9March2010, the Co-Agent of the former Y ugoslav Republic of Macedonia indicated that his
Government wished to be able to respond to the C ounter-Memorial of Greece, including the
objections to jurisdiction and admissibility contained therein, by means of a Reply. At the same
meeting, the Agent of Greece stated that her Gove rnment had no objection to the granting of this
request, in so far as Greece could in turn submit a Rejoinder. - 16 -
By an Order of 12March2010, the Court authorized the submission of a Reply by the
former Yugoslav Republic of Ma cedonia and a Rejoinder by Greec e, and fixed 9June 2010 and
27 October 2010 as the respective time-limits for the filing of those pleadings. The Reply and the
Rejoinder were duly filed within the time-limits so prescribed.
*
Having ascertained the views of the Parties, the Court decided, pursuant to Article53,
paragraph 2, of the Rules, that copies of the pl eadings and the documents annexed would be made
accessible to the public on the opening of the oral proceedings. Further, in accordance with the
Court’s practice, the pleadings without their annexes will be put on the Court’s website from today.
*
I note the presence at the hearing of the Agents , counsel and advocates of both Parties. In
accordance with the arrangements on the organizati on of the procedure which have been decided
by the Court, the hearings will comprise a first and second round of oral argument.
*
The first round of oral argument will begin today and will close on Friday25March2011.
For the purposes of today’s sitting, due to the length of the opening speech, additional time will be
allocated to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia after 6 p.m. as needed. The second round
of oral argument will begin on Monday28 March2011 and will close on Wednesday
30 March 2011.
*
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which is the Applicant in the case, will be
heard first. I now give the floor to HisExcelle ncy Mr.AntonioMiloshoski, Agent of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. - 17 -
Mr. MILOSHOSKI: Distinguished President, first allow me on behalf of my Government to
associate with the condolences and the sympathies that you have presented for the people of Japan.
All our countries will give its contribution to support in this tragedy.
1. Distinguished President, distinguished Members of the Court, my Government is
exceptionally honoured to appear for the first time before this Court ⎯ the principal judicial organ
of the United Nations ⎯which serves as the paramount guardian of international justice. At the
outset, I hope you might allow me to express my d eepest respect to the Members of the Court,
availing myself of this opportunity also to congratulate ProfessorEmmanuelRoucounas and
Professor Budislav Vukas on their appointments as ad hoc judges in this case. I should also like to
express my appreciation to you, Mr.President, and Members of the Court, for the flexibility you
have shown in scheduling this hearing. We are fully aware of the Court’s case-load and the time
constraints that you are dealing with.
2. If you allow me, Mr.President, Members of the Court, at the very outset of this case I
would like to pay my respect and express my profound appreciation to the late
ProfessorThomasFranck. He appeared before you on a number of occasions, with great
distinction, and he served also as an ad hoc Judge. He was an invaluable part of our legal team and
in the very last days of his life we were privile ged and honoured to draw inspiration from his sharp
thought, iron logic and noble spirit.
3. Mr.President, since winning its indepe ndence peacefully in 1991, 20years ago, the
Republic of Macedonia has been committed to peace, the rule of law, respect for human rights and
peaceful resolution of international disputes. We are a multi-ethnic democracy pursuing a policy of
good neighbourliness and regional co-operation. We have joined the international community in its
efforts to bring lasting peace, stability and prosperi ty in the Balkans and in integrating the Balkans
into the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
4. Indeed, at key moments during the last two turbulent decades in the Balkans, my country
has been an important part of the solution, not pa rt of the problem. In the early 1990s, during the
break-up of the former Yugoslavia, we were fu lly aware of the danger of an armed conflict
spreading to our country, so that as early as 1992, upon our request, we hosted the first - 18 -
“preventive” deployment mission in United Nations history. This mission, aptly titled the United
Nations Preventive Deployment Force or UNPREDEP, helped stabilize our security situation.
5. Further, through the 1990s, we built a multi-ethnic society, developing a strong system for
protection of human and minority rights. In 2001, when my country faced severe internal crisis, it
was the maturity of the Macedonian citizens and the moderation of our leaders, supported by the
European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi zation, and the other international actors, that
brought about a political solution to this crisis.
6. The conclusion and implementation of th e Ohrid Framework Agreement, along with
NATO and EU-oriented reforms, additionally contributed to my country’s role as an active
provider of security. In the spirit of the good-neighbourly relations, my country has regulated its
borders with all our neighbours, in a peaceful way, respecting international law.
7. Today, we participate in several peace missions in other countries. For example, we
participate in the European Union’s ALTHEA miss ion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, charged with
implementing the Dayton Agreement. We participate in the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, working closely with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
For nearly two years our military medical staff in Afghanistan has had a joint mission with our
Greek colleagues. Given our constructive polici es and performances at home but also abroad, we
had been well on track to be invited to join NAT O at the Summit in Bucharest 2008, together with
Croatia and Albania.
8. Mr. President, the Republic of Macedonia has a strong interest in and continues to develop
friendly relations with all countries, including the Hellenic Republic, the Respondent in this case.
Regretfully, our bilateral relations are burdened wi th the unfortunate issu e of the difference over
the name of my country. Though resolution of this issue is not before the Court in this case, let me
provide you some background. The Respondent raised concerns about my country’s name
following our peaceful proclamation of independence, in 1991. This difference caused the serious
delays in the process of international recognition by other States, in the integration of my country
into the United Nations and other internationa l organizations, and in the development of our
relations with the Respondent. The Greek-Macedonian dialogue on the difference over the name
started in 1993. Since then, we have activel y engaged in good faith negotiations with the - 19 -
Respondent under the auspices of the United Nations, in an effort to resolve that difference. We
regretted that, in 1994, our neighbour decided to introduce a unilateral embargo on trade and transit
of goods between our countries, and sought to obstruct international recognition by other States and
impede our membership in international organizations.
9. It was the Interim Accord that both Par ties signed on 13 September 1995, that created the
legal basis for normalization of re lations between our two countries 1. Today, after more than
15years, we can say that, in general, the Interi m Accord has worked successfully. It has largely
enabled both Parties to put behind them a period of tension, and to open a new chapter of bilateral
co-operation, and providing an impetus to g ood-neighbourly relations and understanding. In
particular, the Interim Accord contributed to the removal of the Respondent’s economic embargo
and ⎯ for a period of 13years ⎯ removed the impediments to our successful integration in the
international community, allowing us to join international organizations such as the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council of Europe.
10. In recent years of negotiations, as previous ly, the Parties and the Personal Envoy of the
United Nations Secretary-General, Mr.Matthew Nimetz, have tabled various proposals, which
have been accepted as a basis for a solution, or rejected by the one or the other Party. In
October2005, we accepted a proposal by Mr.Nimetz which, according to his correspondence to
both Parties, meets the minimum requirements of both sides, and thus should be the basis of an
honourable and acceptable solution. Previously the same year, the Respondent accepted a different
proposal by Mr. Nimetz. In March 2008, immedi ately before the NATO Summit in Bucharest my
country accepted a proposal by Mr.Nimetz and we expressed the readiness to put it for a vote
before the Macedonian citizens on a referendum. Un fortunately, the proposal was rejected by the
Respondent. Instead, and in contravention of the 1995 Interim Accord, the Respondent resorted to
objecting to the extension of an invitation to my country to join NATO.
11. In the period from November 2009, the Greek-Macedonian dialogue concerning the
name difference has continued in parallel with high-level leadership m eetings between the two
Interim Accord between the Applicant and the Respondent (New York, 13 September 1995), in force on
13 October 1995; tab 1. - 20 -
countries. As recently as last month, Amba ssadorNimetz commended both countries in the
ongoing name negotiations, stating:
“both sides expressed a positive attitude towards moving forward on this issue. I think
the biggest development of the last year has been the dialogue of the two Prime
Ministers ⎯ eight meetings between them. In my view, this has had a positive effect,
starting to build trust and understanding at the highest levels.” 2
12. Mr.President, Members of the Court, I convey that information simply as background,
for your understanding of the present situation. C ontrary to what the Respondent may say, in this
case before you, we do not seek that resolution of the name difference, either directly or indirectly.
This is and remains the object of the mediation process under the auspices of the United Nations.
13. What do we seek in bringing this case? Th is case has been brought to ensure that the
Respondent upholds one of its key obligations under the 1995 Interi m Accord, nothing more and
nothing less. Our Application concerns the Respondent’s violation of one aspect of the provisional
régime established under the Accord , an obligation that has enabled the normalization of bilateral
relations pending resolution of the name differenc e. Specifically, our Application concerns the
Respondent’s obligation under Article 11 (1) of th e Interim Accord, which had been respected for
nearly 13years, following the entry into force of that agreement. By its conduct in the period
leading up to and at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Respondent violated Article 11 (1) by
objecting to our accession to NATO, even though it was clear and not in dispute that we were to be
provisionally referred to in that organization as the “former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
Indeed, that is the reference by which we ar e known in our contribution to NATO’s efforts in
Afghanistan since 2002. Yet in 2007-2008 the Respondent reverted to its pre-1995 practice,
bringing to an end our ability to join international organizations of which the Respondent is already
a member. We very much regret this action, a nd hope that the Court will assist the Parties in
returning to the system that was envisaged by the Interim Accord. This would enable us to
continue to pursue membership in NATO and the European Union, a goal that we have had since
1993 and this is of tremendous importance for the internal stability of the Macedonian multi-ethnic
2“Nimetz: No New Proposal”, VOA News , 9 Feb2 .011, available at : http://www.voanews.com/
macedonian/news/Macedonian-VOA-Macedonia-Greece-UN-Negotiations-Mathew-Niemitz-115695 309.html . - 21 -
democracy. The European and Euro-Atlantic integration has and will contribute to the stability in
the region.
14. Mr. President and Members of the Cour t, this is a simple and narrow case of pacta sunt
servanda. For a reason not permitted under the Interim Accord, the Respondent objected to our
membership in NATO. The Respondent seeks to present this case as a complex one, and advances
a series of strained or irrelevant assertions, as well as novel legal and factual assertions that were
not raised before April2008. Its arguments appear to be designed to obfuscate what is a rather
straightforward violation of a straightforward obligation in the Interim Accord.
15. In its pleadings, the Respondent pursues f our central arguments. First, the Respondent
insists that it may object if my country uses its constitutional name when communicating with
international organizations or other countries, or even when other countries use the name of my
country. The Interim Accord, however, allows no objection on that basis. In any event, there are
no facts supporting that basis as the true reason for the Respondent’s objection.
16. Indeed, the Respondent goes so far as to claim that the reference “former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia” is the provisional name of my country and that there is an obligation erga
omnes for its use, including by my country. Yet, su ch a claim is fully contradicted by the text of
Security Council resolution817 (1993) and the stat ements of those who drafted that resolution.
Such a claim is also contrary to the long-time understanding of this resolution as applied in the
practice of the United Nations, of other internati onal organizations and of third States. This
understanding was even confirmed by Mr.Nimetz himself upon the conclusion of the Interim
Accord in 1995. We note that the Hellenic Republic itself has agreed to accept official
correspondence from the Republic of Macedonia in one of the bilateral agre ements concluded to
put into effect the Interim Accord.
17. Second, the Respondent attempts to jus tify its breach by creating the impression that
there have been violations of the Interim Accord on our side. This is a false assertion, to which we
have responded in our pleadings. Yet, more importantly, it is an argument concocted ex post facto.
At no point before April2008 did the Respondent inform us that it considered us to have been in
material breach of the Interim Accord, and that it intended to suspend in whole or in part the
Interim Accord, nor did it inform us that it intended to pursue countermeasures if any alleged - 22 -
breaches on our part were not remedied. In this wa y, the Respondent seeks to sidestep the law of
treaties and the law of State responsibility, and to re place one stable system of treaty relations with
rights unilaterally accorded and determined.
18. Third, the Respondent repeatedly mischaracterizes our claim by insisting that this case is
about NATO’s conduct, over which the Court has no jurisdiction. Let me be clear: we are not
asking the Court to issue any declaration or order in respect of NATO or any other international
organization. We ask only for an assessment of the actions of the Respondent, undertaken at the
time when NATO was deciding on the extension of an invitation for membership to my country.
We ask for a declaration that the acts of the Respondent represent a violation of its obligation under
Article 11(1), together with an order that th e Respondent must in the future abide by this
obligation in respect to our accession to NATO, to the European Union and to other international
organizations of which the Respondent is a member , so long as we are to be referred to in such
organizations as provided in Security Council resolution 817 (1993).
19. Fourth, the Respondent seeks to justify its breach of Article 11 by pointing to a different
article of the Interim Accord, Article 22, whic h the Respondent says allows it to object when
exercising rights under the North Atlantic Treaty. While I will leave the legal arguments in this
respect to our legal counsel, allow me to make one observation. If one accepts this reasoning,
which is contrary to the plain meaning of the provision, Article 22 would completely eviscerate
Article 11, denying to my country one of the central reasons why it agreed to the Interim Accord.
20. By granting the relief sought in our Application, the Court will reaffirm the fundamental
principle of pacta sunt servanda and ensure respect for the provisions of the Interim Accord. Our
ability to secure membership of international orga nizations must not be an instrument for the
Respondent to impose its preferred solution for overc oming the name difference. This is exactly
what Article 11 of the Interim Accord was meant to prevent, and did prevent for 13 years.
21. Mr. President, our decision to institute pr oceedings with the Court was not an easy one,
nor was it taken without serious consideration. Ho wever, we were left with no other choice. We
followed the path that the Respondent should have ta ken: if it truly believed that we were in
material breach of the Interim Accord it coul d have instituted proceedings against us under
Article21 of the Interim Accord, or invoked the procedures provided by the 1969Vienna - 23 -
Convention on the Law of Treaties, or the procedures envisaged under the rules applying to
countermeasures. It did none of these things. In stead, it took matters into its own hands and acted
outside the law. By contrast, we have followed the prescripts of the Interim Accord and initiated
these proceedings. When the Parties concluded the Interim Accord, they agreed on the jurisdiction
of the Court to settle issues deriving from the Accord, with the exception of the name difference
itself. The Applicant asks the Court to hold the R espondent to its obligations under this extremely
important bilateral instrument, concluded exactly for the purpose of ensuring the legal framework
for the development of good-neighbourly relations.
22. I am pleased now, Mr. President, to let y ou know how the case will proceed. I will be
followed to the Bar by Professor Philippe Sands, w ho will deal with a number of legal and factual
matters predating the actions of April2008. ProfessorSean Murphy will then address the NATO
membership process and the events leading up to and including April 2008, and the Respondent’s
objection to our membership of NATO. Professor Pie rre Klein will then deal with the first part of
our arguments explaining why the Respondent is wrong to assert that the Court lacks jurisdiction
and that our claim is inadmissible, an argument he will conclude tomorrow morning. Following on
from there, we will address in detail the circ umstances in which the Respondent has violated
Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord. We will then conclude the morning with submissions on why
the Respondent’s violations of Article 11 (1) cannot be excused by the law of treaties, or the law of
State responsibility, or any other newly-embraced rules or principles of international law. We will
also address the remedies that we seek. Finally, we will bring our presentation to an end with some
brief concluding remarks. I take the opportunity to express my thanks to Ms Blinne Ní Ghrálaigh
for her important contribution. She expresses her re gret for being absent this week due to personal
family reasons.
23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is truly a privilege for me and for my country on
the occasion of its first appearance before this Co urt. I will remain available to provide such
assistance to you as you may need from us througho ut these proceedings, and I now invite you to
call on Professor Sands. Thank you for your attention. - 24 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency Mr. Antonio Miloshoski, Agent of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for his opening statement. Now I invite Professor Philippe Sands
to take the floor.
Mr. SANDS:
THE F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND : 1991 TO THE INTERIM A CCORD
1. Good afternoon, Mr.President, Members of this Court, on this first day of Spring I am
privileged to appear before you on behalf of the A pplicant in this important case. Whilst the issues
in the case may be discrete, the stakes are high: the case is about holding the Respondent to its
treaty obligations under a bilateral treaty, so that it is no longer allowed to object to the Applicant’s
entry into NATO and other international organizati ons. The case is of evident significance for the
country’s internal stability, and also for regional we ll-being. This Court, of course, has extensive
knowledge about the Balkans region, and by its judgments has contributed to the processes of
reconciliation and renewal that underpin future developments and stability. At the heart the
Court’s approach has always been the recognition th at stability and respect for treaties are closely
connected.
2. The 1995 Interim Accord has played a key role in providing conditions of stability
between the Applicant and the Respondent. For 13 years, until the Respondent’s actions leading up
to April2008, the Interim Accord has functioned without difficulty. There was no claim by the
Respondent to the Applicant that it was in material breach of any of the obligations imposed by the
Interim Accord.
3. And so my task this afternoon is to provide a brief overview of the period from the
Applicant’s emergence as a State in 1991 to the conclusion of the Interim Accord in 1995. And I
am going to focus in particular on the circumstances that led to the adoption of the Interim Accord;
the deal that it reflected; on its objectives and terms; and the manner in which it functioned
between 1995 and the period that will then be taken over by my colleague Professor Sean Murphy.
4. Before I turn to these matters, I hope you might allow me, Mr. President, if I take a single
moment to express my personal, deep regret and sadness that Professor Thomas Franck is not with
us today. His professional contribution to our prep aration was very far-reaching, but beyond that I - 25 -
owe Tom the greatest debt of personal gratitude for his constant support and friendship to me over
many years, benefiting from a desire that ma ny of you yourselves recognize to foster the
development of new generations from every continen t, and for inspiring us in the vital significance
of principle and integrity in the face of a troubl ed and very cruel world. His beloved partner
Martin Daley continues to follo w the case from New York, and to him, through you, I express the
condolence of our entire team, our deep sense of sadness, and also our very great appreciation to
him for his support.
5. Mr.President, in August 1944, the Macedonian people proclaimed their State as
“Democratic Macedonia”. In 1946, the State became the “Peoples Republic of Macedonia”, and in
1946 it became one of the six constituent republics of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia
3
(FPRY). From 1963 to 1991 it was the “Socialist Republic of Macedonia” .
6. Then, on 25 January 1991, the Applicant adopt ed a declaration of sovereignty. On 7 June
of that year, the Applicant’s Parliament cha nged the constitutional name to the “Republic of
Macedonia”, Republika Makedonija . And on 25September1991, following a referendum, the
Parliament adopted a declaration of indepe ndence of the “Republic of Macedonia”, and on
4
17 November 1991 a new constitution .
7. Over five decades, 50 or more years, the Applicant’s name elicited no objection from the
Respondent. And we note that in its Opinion No.6 of 14January1992, the Badinter Committee
expressed the view “that the use of the name Macedonia” did not imply any territorial claim against
5
the Respondent . What was true in 1992 is evidently also true today in 2011. That said, the
difference between the Applicant and the Respondent as to the name is not before this Court. This
case is about the Respondent’s objection to the Applicant’s membership of NATO, in blatant
violation of a bilateral treaty.
8. From late 1991 until 1993, following the Ap plicant’s declaration of independence,
increasing numbers of States recognized the Applican t’s statehood. In July 1992 the Applicant
3
AM, para. 2.3.
4Ibid., para. 2.6.
5Ibid., para. 2.13; Arbitration Commission on the Conference on Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 6 on the Recognition
of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States (14 Jan. 1992) annexed at
Ann. III to the letter dated 26 May 1993 from the United NationSecretary-General to the President of the Security
Council, United Nations doc. S/25855 (28 May 1993): AM, Vol. II, Ann. 33. - 26 -
applied for membership of the United Nations. Re grettably, because the Respondent objected to
the Applicant’s constitutional name, it lobbied United Nations Members not to support admission.
Faced with the necessity of enabling the App licant’s admission in the United Nations, a
compromise solution was developed: and on 7April1993 the Security Council adopted
resolution 817. [Plate 1 on] You can see that now in relevant part on the screen, Mr. President and
Members of the Court; and you will also find it ⎯together with all other materials that we will
show on the screen during today and tomorrow ⎯ also in your judges’ folder, tab 2; Mr. President,
resolution 817 recommended membership of the United Nations, on the basis of the Applicant
“being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as ‘the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia’, pending settlement of the di fference that has arisen over the name of the
State”. And the following day, with the ad option of United Nations General Assembly
6
resolution 47/225, the Applicant was admitted to United Nations membership . [Plate 1 off]
9. Now a central aspect of the Respondent’s ar guments in this case is whether the Applicant
is itself required to use that provisional referenc e in communications with the United Nations, with
NATO and with other international organizati ons, or whether the resolution 817 compromise,
which is also reflected in the Interim Accord, allo ws it to call itself by its constitutional name, the
Republic of Macedonia. In that regard, it must be noted that resolution 817 did not require the
Applicant to call itself by the provisional reference of “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia”. Indeed, has never called itself in that way, and that has raised no difficulties
whatsoever with the United Nations Secretariat or with any other United Nations organ: the
Applicant has always used its constitutional name in written and oral communications with the
United Nations, its members and officials: and the same has been the case in all other international
7
organizations . Nor did, for the avoidance of doubt, resolution 817 on its face or otherwise require
any other State to refer to the Applicant by the provisional reference.
10. This understanding was recognized by pa rticipants in the 1993 decision-making process
that resulted in the adoption of resolution 817, it w as led by the troika comprising of France, Spain
and the United Kingdom. In our Reply, for exampl e, we referred to a statement prepared by
6
Ibid., para. 2.19.
7Ibid., paras. 2.20 and 5.66. See also AR, paras. 4.51-4.61. - 27 -
Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, who was involved in the drafting of resolution 817. He states that
the provisional designation “meant, for example, th at the nameplate and all official UN documents
would refer to the member only by that name, until such time as the difference over the name had
been resolved”. [Plate 2] “However”, he continues,
“this did not mean that the new member was required to refer to itself orally or in
writing by that provisional designation. It was, as I recall, informally recognized that
the new member would be likely to continue to refer to itself by its own constitutional
name, the Republic of Macedonia. Similarly, it was understood that any third state
might also refer to the new United Nations member as it considered appropriate,
whether by the country’s own preferred name or by the agreed provisional reference
8
that was determined by UN Security Council resolution 817.”
Now the Respondent has made no effort whatsoever in its pleadings to challenge the veracity
of AmbassadorGreenstock’s statement that is before you in evidence; what it does is merely to
9
complain that Mr. Greenstock’s statement was not made contemporaneously . Has the Respondent
introduced any evidence ⎯ any evidence whatsoever ⎯ other than its own statements, to promote
a contrary view to that expressed by Ambassa dorGreenstock? No, Mr.President, it has not.
[Plate 2 off]
11. Nor has the Respondent sought to rebut the statement made in similar terms by
10
Mr.Matthew Nimetz, to which we drew the Court’s attention in our Reply . Given what the
Respondent had to say about the lack of contempor aneity of Ambassador Greenstock’s statement,
the Respondent’s silence on this is rather curious: Mr.Nimetz’s st atement was made in
September 1995, at the very time the Interim Accord was adopted. Mr. Nimetz is not just anybody:
at the time he was the Special Envoy of the United States to the negotiations on the Interim Accord,
and he was therefore intimately involved in the negotiations, and deeply knowledgeable about what
was involved. Today, he is the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on
the name difference between the Parties, so it is rather difficult to imagine a more authoritative or
independent voice on this issue. [Plate 3 on] So let us look at what he said in 1995:
“[T]he people from [the Applicant’s] country, when they talk about themselves,
use their constitutional name, Republic of M acedonia. And we have found this to be
8AR, para. 4.43, and Ann. 59; judges’ folder, tab 2; emphasis added.
9
RR, para. 7.18.
1AR, paras. 2.26-2.33. - 28 -
the case, that there is no requirement for them to use a name that they don’t accept.
But that doesn’t mean that the organization accepts the name.” 11
The Respondent’s silence on this evidence is very telling. Mr. President, our point is a very
simple one: whilst organizations to which the Applicant becomes a member are required to refer to
it by the provisional designation, the Applicant is entirely free to call itself as it wishes, as are other
States, as a great many of them do. 12 If the Applicant wishes to call itself the Republic of South
Australia, in honour of a professor who might occasionally aspire to such a presidency, it is
perfectly entitled to do so 13. If it wishes to call itself by its constitutional name, there is nothing in
resolution817 or in the Interim Accord to prev ent itself from doing so: to the contrary, such a
practice is entirely consistent with and preserved and authorized by paragraph 2 of United Nations
Security Council resolution817. [Plate 3 off] Now, curiously, the approach outlined by
Mr. Nimetz is one that the Respondent itself acce pted and signed off on in writing: a month after
the Interim Accord was signed, on 13October1995, the Pa rties adopted two Memoranda, one on
Practical Measures and the other related to the In terim Accord and the establishment of liaison
offices. These Memoranda and the practical measures explicitly confirmed that the Applicant
reserved the right to call itself by its constitutional name, and that the Respondent did not object to
14
it doing so .
12. So allow me now to turn to the conclusi on of the Interim Accord, the treaty that lies at
the heart of this case, a case that is squarely about pacta sunt servanda and the need to ensure
respect for the law of treaties. Having read the Respondent’s written pleadings, you really could be
excused for concluding that this is a really difficult and complex case that raises a multitude of
factual and interconnecting legal issues. It is not. It is a very straightforward case about respect for
11
AR, para. 4.57.
12 The States that have agreements or diplomatic relati ons with the Applicant by its constitutional name include
Republic of Austria, Republic of Albania, the Federative Republic of Brazil, Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the People’s
Republic of China, Republic of Croatia, Czech Republic, Ki ngdom of Denmark, Republic of Estonia, Republic of
Finland, French Republic, Republic of Hungary, Ireland, th e Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Italian Republic, Republic
of Lithuania, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Norway, Republic of Poland,
Kingdom of Morocco, the United Mexican States, Romania, the Russian Federa tion, Slovak Republic, Republic of
Slovenia, Republic of Sierra Leone, th e Somali Democratic Republic, Kingdom of Sweden, Republic of Turkey, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
13The Accordance with International Law of the Unilate ral Declaration of Indepe ndence by the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for A dvisory Opinion submitted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations), Statement by Professor James Crawford on behalf of the United Kingdom, 10 Dec. 2009, CR 2009/32,
p. 48, para. 5.
14AM, para. 5.67, and Anns. 3 and 4. - 29 -
a treaty. Our distinguished friends and colleagu es on the other side of the room have had to
embrace complexity. Why? The fog they have sought to create is, in this case, their only hope.
Yet the Court is bound to have noticed, even at this stage of the dispute, how much the
Respondent’s case has changed: the arguments made in April 2008 have just disappeared in the
face of the rather obvious difficulties that they rai se when confronted with the text of the Interim
Accord. Indeed, it cannot be said that the Res pondent was unaware of th e implications of the
Interim Accord back in 2007 and 2008, or its deeply constraining consequences. [Plate 4 on]
Rather helpfully, in October 2007 the Respondent’s Embassy in Washington DC put out a press
release containing an interview between a Gr eek journalist and MsDora Bakoyannis, the
Respondent’s then Foreign Minister; and you will be able to find the entire text at Annex 73 of our
Memorial. The journalist asks MsBakoyannis why does not her Government just adopt the
“painless solution” to “invoke the Interim Ac cord” and “consent to accession to NATO under the
name FYROM”. Did Ms Bakoyannis say that the Interim Accord was not pertinent? No, she did
not. Did she say that the actions of objecting to NATO membership were permitted by the Interim
Accord? No, she did not. What she said was: “Politically painless solutions are not in the national
15
interest. Hiding one’s head in the sand alwa ys has a cost, as does political cowardice.” So there
you have it ⎯ there you have it, Mr. President ⎯ a clear admission on the part of the Respondent
that it knew about its legal obligations and that it simply chose to ignore them, to avoid a charge of
“political cowardice”. [Plate 4 off]
13. Did the Respondent assert to the Applicant at that time that it was in material breach of
the Interim Accord? No, it did not. That is a new, ex post facto claim, a claim of material breach
that was made to the Applicant only after the objection by the Respondent at NATO, and then only
as a response to our side characterizing the NATO ob jection as a material br each of the Accord.
And then, as these proceedings got under way, all the new arguments came tumbling out ⎯
magically, no doubt, as new lawyers joined the team, and there are quite a few of them; in the face
of the evident chronological and juridical weaknesses the argument on material breach gave way to
another new argument, this time we got the sight of the exceptio; and then came an entirely new
1Embassy of the Respondent in Washington, DC, Interview of FM Ms. Bakoyannis in Athens daily Kathimerini,
with journalist Ms D. Antoniou (Sunday, 14 Oct. 2007)Oct. 2007), at AM, para. 2. 60, footnote 121; and AM,
Ann. 73; judges’ folder, tab 2, plate 4. - 30 -
doctrine in international law, concerning the right of immediate and unilateral action for special
“stop-gap” treaties; and then ⎯ that is not good enough ⎯ yet another new argument in relation to
Article22; and then, having said in their Counter-Memorial that they are not going to argue
countermeasures, what do they do in their Rejo inder? They argue countermeasures. Now,
Mr.President, I ask our distinguished friends, with the greatest respect: what was your case in
April 2008? What is your case today? And I mi ght also ask, given the ever-changing arguments
on that side of the room: what is your case going to be on Thursday, and then what is your case
going to be next Wednesday?
14. Resolution 817 opened the door to the Applicant’s membership of other United Nations
bodies and agencies. But the Respondent continue d to object to the Applicant’s constitutional
name and just took matters into its own hands : in February 1994 it imposed a comprehensive
embargo on trade: that dealt a serious blow to th e Applicant’s already weak economy. And then it
moved to object to the Applicant’s membership of important international organizations of which
16
the Respondent was a member . Against this background Lord Owen and Mr. Cyrus Vance began
the process of bringing the Parties into agreem ent on the way forward, under the auspices of the
17
United Nations . Now, initially, the process sought to r esolve the name difference itself, but as
that proved difficult the process shifted to an agreem ent to resolve key issues on an interim basis.
For present purpose the central point I want to make to you is this: the evolving drafts that became
the Interim Accord had as a core objective ensuring that the Applicant could join any international
organization provided that it followed the a pproach required by the United Nations in
resolution 817. In those circumstances, the Respondent would be prohibited as a matter of law ⎯
so as to force, for example, a resolu tion of the difference as to the name ⎯ to object or to threaten
to object. Until the Interim Accord, the Respondent was under no specific legal obligation not to
make any such objection; after the conclusion of the Interim Accord, however, any right to object
was severely limited. Professor Murphy will say more about this in due course.
15. You can find the Interim Accord at tab1 of your folder: it is widely recognized as a
singular diplomatic and legal ac hievement of the mid-1990s. The Court, as I have mentioned
16
AM, para. 2.25.
1Ibid., paras. 2.21-2.22. - 31 -
already, is acutely aware of the great and many difficulties that were faced in the Balkans between
1991 and 1995. Wisely, very wisely, the Applicant and the Respondent adopted another route, we
might call it the “rule of law” route. They negotiated and ⎯ on 13 September 1995 ⎯ adopted a
treaty. It entered into force a month later and it has now been in force for 16 years; neither Party
has ever taken any steps to suspend the treaty in whole or in part, or to seek to withdraw. Indeed, at
no point before the Bucharest Summit of April 2008 did the Respondent assert to the Applicant that
it had acted in material breach. And that is an important point in this case because both States are
bound by the rules expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and thereby
well aware of the detailed procedural steps and othe r rules they must follow if they wish to raise
concerns about the other party’s alleged action in relation to the Interi m Accord. The law of
treaties establishes a comple te régime, yet the Respondent is now asking the Court ⎯ asking
you ⎯ to legislate new rules for this treaty and for it s actions. And that is what this case is really
about: whether the Respondent can avoid the requirement of the law of treaties. In our view, if the
Court accedes to the Respondent’s invitation to rewrite the law of treaties it risks doing grave
damage to the stability of the international system. We are going to say more about that tomorrow.
In the meantime it is appropriate to consider the Interim Accord briefly and in the round.
16. The Accord was largely drawn from a draft Treaty proposed by CyrusVance and
Lord Owen in May 1993, in an effort to normalize relations between the two States. This draft was
forwarded by the United Nations Secretary-Genera l to the Security Council and it served as the
basis for the negotiation of the 1 995 Interim Accord. The 1993 draft and the 1995 Accord share a
common structure and elements ⎯ and we have described this in detail in the Memorial. The 1993
draft Treaty was divided into six sections, Secti ons A to F, each of which was adopted without
change in the final text subject to one excepti on: in the 1993 draft, Section C relating to the
Applicant’s organizational and institutional membership, had been entitled “European Institutions”,
but the Parties eventually agreed that the secti on should cover all “Inter national, Multilateral and
Regional Institutions”.
17. The Interim Accord as adopted comprises a preamble and 23articles, divided into six
sections. Section A addresses “Friendly Rela tions and Confidence-Building Measures”, and
consists of eight articles addressing matters such as diplomatic relations, the inviolability of the - 32 -
existing frontier and respect for sovereignty and territorial integr ity, and political independence.
The Section also includes the agreement in Article 5 to continue negotiations under the auspices of
the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Applicant’s name, and the commitments in
Article 7 to prohibit certain activities or propaganda and avoid the use of a particular symbol. And
it creates for that purpose specific procedures to address concerns relating to that article.
18. Section B then addresses “Human and Cultural Rights”, and it provides for respect for
human rights and for the rule of law, by refe rence to eight instruments, including the United
Nations Charter, as well as the encouragement of contact between the Parties. As I have just noted,
Section C relates to “International, Multilateral and Regional Institutions” and it consists of a single
provision ⎯Article11. That provision lies at the heart of this dispute. The fact that this
obligation merits a specific section is not without significance, as Professor Murphy will explain.
Section D comprises three articles that are intende d to normalize the treaty relations between the
Parties, including both bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Section E then addresses
“Economic, Commercial, Environmental and Legal Relations”, comprising six articles intended to
enhance co-operation between the two States. Section F contains some “Final Clauses”, addressing
the settlement of disputes (Article 21 that provides for the jurisdiction of this Court), the Accord’s
effect on third States and international organizations (Article22, to which we will refer in due
course), and the Accord’s entry into force.
19. The object and purpose of the Interim Acco rd is readily apparent from these provisions.
It was intended to provide for the immediate normalization of relations between the Applicant and
the Respondent ⎯and this is an objective that it achieved. It was also to provide for future
co-operation, notwithstanding the continuing difference concerning the Applicant’s name ⎯ an
objective that was also achieved over the next 13 year s. In particular, having regard to the mutual
interest of the Parties “in the maintenance of in ternational peace and security”, reflected in the
Preamble of the Accord, it provided for the recognition of the Applicant by the Respondent, for the
establishment of diplomatic relations, for the adoption of practical measures in those relations, for a
commitment to the free movement of persons and goods, including requiring the lifting of the
economic embargo that had still been maintained by the Respondent and, significantly, the
confirmation of “the existing frontier” between the Parties as “an enduring international border”. - 33 -
The Accord reaffirmed the App licant’s lack of territorial claims against the Respondent, and
provided for the Applicant to join the family of nations and to become an active member of the
international community.
20. In short, the adoption of the Accord confirmed that the Respondent recognized the
Applicant’s commitment to the purposes and prin ciples of the United Nations Charter, to the
promotion of democracy, to individual liberty and the rule of law, and to stability in relations
between the two countries. That, Mr.President and Members of the Court, is why the Accord
includes right at its heart the binding and clear co mmitment in Article 11, by which the Applicant
would be able to join regional and global in ternational organizations, notwithstanding the
difference over the name.
21. Against this background, there are certain points of agreement between the Parties. They
may be obvious, but they are not without significance. The Parties agree that the Interim Accord is
a treaty. They agree that the Interim Accord, as such, is govern ed by the law of treaties, as
reflected in the 1969 Vienna Convention to which th ey are both parties. And they agree that from
1995 until the beginning of 2008 the Interim Accord ope rated without any particular difficulties:
as I have mentioned, at no point before April 2008 did the Respondent invoke any rights under the
law of treaties to challenge the Applicant’s performance of its obligations under the Interim
Accord. The evidence before you, on the record, is absolutely clear on that point. They also agree
that the Respondent had withdrawn all of its objections, and had ceased to make any further
objections, to the Applicant’s membership in any of the organizations and institutions the Applicant
was then able to join between 1995 and 2008.
22. So Article11 has worked very well. Since 1995, the Applicant has joined a great
number of international organizations ⎯ beginning with the Council of Europe in November 1995
until, most recently, the European Patent Office a couple of years ago ⎯without facing any
objection on the part of the Respondent 18. In 1995, following the adoption of the Interim Accord,
the Applicant was even offered ⎯ and accepted ⎯ membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace
programme, under the provisional reference provide d for by resolution817, and in 1999, the
18
See list at AM, para. 2.40. - 34 -
Applicant was invited ⎯ and accepted ⎯ to participate in the NATO Membership Action Plan
(MAP), also under the provisional reference. The Applicant’s military forces have since
participated in numerous NATO exercises and contributed to a number of NATO campaigns,
19
including the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission . The Applicant has contributed to the
NATO-led operation in Afghanistan since 2002, a nd currently has approximately 170personnel
operating under NATO command ⎯ coincidently a significant number more than the Respondent.
23. Throughout this period the Applicant was re ferred to by the organization in the manner
provided by resolution 817, but it called itself by its constitutional name. Did this cause any
difficulties? It did not. [Plate 5 on] On the screen you can see an image that shows clearly an
20
ISAF officer giving an award to a soldier on whose outfit one can read the word “Macedonia” .
The uniform does not have an insignia with th e words “the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia”. Nor does it say “Party of the Second Part”. Nor does it say “Applicant”. It says
“Macedonia”. If there had been a difficulty one wo uld assume that the ISAF officer who is to be
seen in the photograph would not be engaging in the friendly act with which he seems to be
engaging. Did the Respondent raise concerns about the Applicant’s contributions to NATO? It did
not. Did it raise concerns about the manner in wh ich the Applicant was referred to within NATO?
It did not. So the curiosity is, it is good e nough for Macedonian men and women to risk loosing
their lives in Afghanistan but the country is not entitled to join the organization. Now that is not to
say that there were never any issues: a few years back, for example, at an end of year party in
Kabul, Afghanistan, contributing forces to the ISAF were invited to bring a national dish. I
understand that the Applicant’s offering was presented as “Macedonian Moussaka”. This did not
garner universal Hellenic appreciation. Gastronomic matters aside ⎯ and I for one can certainly
attest to the delights of a good Macedonian moussaka served with a decent Greek salad and a good
bottle of Retsina, perhaps even a 2008 Ritinitis Nob ilis produced by the excellent Gaia winery on
Santorini ⎯ never once did the Respondent raise with the Applicant any formal allegation of
material breach of the Interim Accord for putting Macedonia on its uniforms or indeed in relation
19
See AM, para. 2.50.
2The photograph is available at: http://www.morm.gov.mk/morm/mk/ pr/news/svecenost_ispr_ ISAF.htm ;
judges’ folder, tab 2, Plate 5. - 35 -
to any other matter whatsoever. There is no eviden ce before the Court to the contrary. Nothing.
These are facts, not the subject of disagreement. [Plate 5 off]
24. Yet since April 2008 the Parties have disagreed about how the Interim Accord is to be
interpreted. And these differences arise from the Respondent’s conduct leading up to the Bucharest
Summit in April 2008, as set out in Chapter 2 of th e Memorial and Reply. To justify its conduct,
the Respondent has identified four principal lines of argument, as we are able to work them out,
relating to the Interim Accord, around which it has woven its legal case.
25. First, the Respondent says the objection was permissible under Article11 because it
anticipated that at some point in the future the Applicant would use its constitutional name in
21
communications with NATO . Professor Murphy is going to address this in greater detail
tomorrow, but for present purposes let me simp ly note that in the period between 1995 and
April2008 the Respondent never ⎯ not once ⎯ asserted that such practice by the Applicant was
wrongful so as to justify an objection by the Respondent under the Interim Accord as a violation of
the Treaty. In its application to join NATO, the Applicant made clear that it would follow the same
practice in NATO as it has followed in every other organization it has joined since 1995. There is
no dispute as to that fact, as Professor Murphy will explain.
26. Second, the Respondent claims that the Accord is a “synalla gmatic agreement”, so that
the fulfillment of the Article 11 obligation not to object to the Applicant’s membership of NATO is
somehow linked to the Applicant’s fulfillment of each and every other obligation under the
Accord 22. Now according to the Respondent the conseque nce of this is that it, the Respondent, is
perfectly entitled to decide unilaterally ⎯ without giving any notice and avoiding all of the
constraints imposed by the law of treaties ⎯ that it is not going to give effect to the Article11
obligation because of a purported violation by the App licant of some other part of the agreement.
Now this, as you will recognize, is a novel argument and it suffers from a key difficulty: putting
aside the question of whether this is a “synallagmat ic” agreement or not of the kind identified by
the Respondent, on which we make no concession whatsoever, the Respondent has not been able to
find a single authority from this Court ⎯ or indeed from any other international court or
21
RCM, para. 4.72
2RCM, paras. 3.41-3.49. - 36 -
tribunal ⎯ that supports the novel argument on which it no w relies. And the Court, of course, will
recognize that if accepted, the argument would just drive a coach and horses through the law of
treaties: it is a régime that provides for stability and predictability and it would be replaced with a
system of unilateral acts adopted without notice by reference to no objective criteria. And we made
all of these points in our Reply, making clear why we do not accept that the Interim Accord is a
“synallagmatic agreement”, in the way proposed by the Respondent, or that the obligation under
Article11(1) of the Accord is somehow cond itional upon fulfillment of each and every other
obligation being met. But even if Article11(1) or the Interim Agreement as a whole were to be
regarded as “synallagmatic”, what would be the c onsequences of such a finding? Let us take their
case at the highest. Well let us consider wh at was said by the Special Rapporteur of the
International Law Commission in his Second Repor t on State Responsibility, in 1999 [Plate 6 on].
This is what he said:
“the Special Rapporteur is firmly of the vi ew that the justification for non-compliance
with synallagmatic obligations should be resolved (a)by the law relating to the
suspension or termination of those obligations (which is sufficient to deal with most
problems of treaty obligations), and (b) by the law of countermeasures” 23.
Now that view ⎯ which in our submission is perfectly correct ⎯ did not find disfavour with the
International Law Commission at that time, as a number of individuals present in the Great Hall
today will be well aware. In other words, if there is a violation of a synalla gmatic obligation, this
does not lead to some sort of specialized legal ré gime; it just leads you to the standard rules that
arise with respect to either breach of treaty or countermeasures, the latter of which the Respondent
24
had said in its Counter-Memorial it di d not seek to invoke in this case . The Respondent had
nothing to say about this statement by the Special Rapporteur in its Rejoinder. Again, it is a big
and notable silence. Far be it for me to refer to my good friend Professor Crawford as an elephant,
but it is the elephant in the room. And we look forward very much to hearing from counsel for the
Respondent on this point later in this week, and we particularly look forward to hearing who on
behalf of the Respondent might be willing to stand at this Bar and say that the Special Rapporteur
just got it wrong. Nothing has changed in law or practice since his self-evidently correct view was
23
AR, para5..77, citing International Law Commi ssion, Second Report on State Responsibility,
Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, United Nations doc A/CN.4/498/Add.2, at para. 329; judges’ folder, tab 5.
2RCM, para. 8.3; see also para. 8.1. - 37 -
set out. And that is why, we assume, the “syna llagmatic” argument has been reduced to just a
small number of pages in the Rejoinder and no l onger really seems to be at the heart of the
Respondent’s case. Frankly, it is hopeless. [Plate 6 off]
27. The Respondent’s third argument on the character of the Interim Accord is that it is
25
merely, as it puts it, “a provisional protective framework” . So, the Respondent puts this rather
creatively. How can I put it, it is a “stop-gap” treaty, it is a “holding operation”; and somehow
from this they segue into the argument that this gives the Article 11 obligation a totally different,
more conditional character. So we searched and lo oked high and far in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, the entire text, every article, every line, for the section that deals with
“stop-gap” treaties. We looked for the special ru le on which the Respondent seems to rely to be
able to act entirely as it wishes, when it wishes ⎯ this is what the Respondent calls the right of
26
“immediate action” ⎯ once it has decided to characterize the Accord as falling within this
particular category of internati onal legal instruments. Now th is argument is as hopeless as the
previous one, as every student of international law who is in this room, this Great Hall today, will
immediately recognize. It is entirely without merit. It is unsupported by any authority whatsoever,
a characteristic feature of the Respondent’s written pleadings.
It is not immediately apparent to us what more remains to be said about the doctrine of “immediate,
unilateral action for stop-gap treaties”. For th e British among us, it reminds one of Monty Python
and the “dead parrot” of issues. It is a dead argument; it is not a stunned argument; it is not a
sleeping argument; it is a dead argument 27. The Respondent’s fourth treaty argument is that the
28
meaning and effect of Article11 has to be read in the context of Article22 . According to the
Respondent, while it was barred from objecting to the Applicant’s membership of an international
organization under Article11, somehow it is neve rtheless entitled to object to the Applicant’s
membership under Article22 due to purported rights or obligations arising under the constituent
instrument of that organization. This claim w ill be addressed by Professor Klein later, and we are
25RR, paras. 2.32-2.38.
26
RR, para. 2.39 (v).
27The sketch may be viewed at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=npjOSLCR2hE.
28RCM, paras. 6.52-6.63 and 7.26-7.31. - 38 -
going to return to it tomorrow. For the time being we simply invite you to ask yourself this
question: in the context of its desire to join international organizations, and having regard to the
practice that was followed over the next 13 years, why on earth would the Applicant have agreed to
a provision that would, on the Respondent’s appro ach, deprive Article 11 of any practical meaning
and effect? You give with one hand, and you take back with the other. It just makes no sense. It is
nonsensical.
28. Mr.President, this short submission sets out the context of the adoption of the Interim
Accord. It is intended to provide you with a “road map” to the arguments that lie ahead. And you
are going to pick and find a theme running through our presentations, and it is this: against a
background of facts that are clear, that are unambiguous and that are hardly in dispute, the task for
the Court becomes an essentially legal one, namely to interpret and apply the Interim Accord by
reference to those pertinent facts and the system of international rules within which it finds itself
and to which this Court has contributed so significantly. It will be clear to all that the Respondent’s
position is one of constant fl ux, in which a totally evolvi ng set of new and novel legal
arguments ⎯sometimes based on facts that do not even exist and are not in the record ⎯ is
brought to bear in support of a totally unjustifiable action. But the simple point is this: if you take
yourselves back to 2007 and 2008, and you look at the facts in evidence, at the record that is before
this Court in the two rounds of pleadings, we invite you to ask yourselves two questions: first,
what did the Respondent do in 2007 and 2008? What did the Respondent do? And, second, when
it was doing it, what did it say was the reason for its actions? Why? Those two simple questions
lie at the heart of this straightforward case, and to assist the Court in answering them, perhaps after
a short break, Mr.President, I would ask you to invite ProfessorMurphy to the Bar. Thank you
very much for your kind attention.
The PRESIDENT: I thank ProfessorPhilippeSands for his presentation. Before I invite
Professor Murphy to the floor, I think it is an appropriate moment to have a short coffee break for
15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 4.40 p.m. to 4.55 p.m. - 39 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The sitting is resumed and I now invite
Professor Murphy to take the floor.
MMUr. PHY:
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND : THE RESPONDENT S OPPOSITION TO THE
A PPLICANT ’SNATO MEMBERSHIP
Introduction
1. Thank you very much, Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a privilege once again to
appear before you, and to do so on behalf of the Applicant in this case.
2. As our Agent and Professor Sands underscored in their presentations, this case generally is
not legally or factually complex. And, indeethere is little complexity in the central facts upon
which the case rests, which concern the Respondent’s conduct in 2007 to 2008, with respect to the
Applicant’s bid for membership in NATO. My task today is to recount that conduct on the basis of
the evidence set out in the pleadings and publicly available. Tomorrow, we will explain why that
conduct constitutes an unlawful “objection” within the meaning of Article 11(1) of the
1995 Interim Accord.
3. While our written pleadings provide much more detail on these facts, this presentation
highlights four key points upon which we ask the Court to focus.
4. First, from 1995 to 2007, the Applicant engaged in all the steps necessary to be considered
for admission to NATO and, by early 2008, was approaching the final stage of that admission
process. A decision to invite the Applicant join NATO required a consensus of the existing
NATO membership at NATO’s April 2008 Summit in Bucharest; opposition by any one NATO
member State would preclude the Applicant from being so invited.
5. Second, in 2007 and 2008, the Respondent engaged in a vigorous, systematic, and public
campaign against the Applicant’s admission to NATO, a position maintained throughout the
months leading up to the Bucharest Summit, and at the Summit itself. At that Summit, two other
Adriatic States were invited to join NATO, but the Applicant was not.
6. Third, all of the evidence shows that th e Respondent’s opposition in this period was based
upon its concern about the non-resolution of the di fference over the name. The evidence does not - 40 -
show that the Respondent’s opposition was based upon a concern that NATO would refer to the
Applicant by anything other than the provisional re ference. The evidence also does not show that
the Respondent’s opposition was based upon a con cern that, in communications with NATO, the
Applicant would call itself by its constitutional name or that third States would do so.
7. And fourth, there is nothing about the admission process at NATO that makes it
impossible for a member State to oppose admissi on of a new member. Indeed, the process is
predicated upon the idea that any member State can, by its opposition, preclude admission of a new
member. Moreover, while the ultimate decision reac hed by NATO is not at issue in this case, the
Respondent is simply wrong that, even in the absence of the Respondent’s objection, NATO
member States would have denied membership to the Applicant.
I. During 1995 to 2007 the Applicant pursued the NATO admission process
8. Mr.President, allow me to return to my first point, which is that from 1995 to 2007, the
Applicant engaged in the requisite steps to be considered for admission to NATO.
9. As the Court is no doubt aware, NATO was founded in 1949 by 12States, but it has
adopted an “open door policy” for the admission of new members. Today, NATO has more than
doubled in size, so as to now consist of 28member States. For example, the Respondent in this
case joined NATO in 1952, while Albania and Croa tia were invited to join at the Bucharest
29
Summit in April 2008 .
10. This expansion has proceeded in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
[Plate 1 on] Article 10 provides in part:
“The Parties may, by unanimous agreemen t, invite any other European State in
a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty . . .”30
Due to that requirement of “unanimous” consent, opposition from any single NATO member State
is sufficient to prevent agreement and thereby block the applicant Stat e from successfully joining
NATO. [Plate 1 off]
29
AM, para. 2.44.
3North Atlantic Treaty, Art. 10, 4 Apr. 1949, 34 UNTS 243. - 41 -
11. As Professor Sands noted, in the immediat e aftermath of the conclusion of the Interim
Accord in 1995, the Applicant was offered and accepted membership in NATO’s Partnership for
Peace programme, without any opposition from the Respondent. Now that programme, also known
also as “PfP”, is designed to promote practical co-operation between the partnership countries and
NATO; it allows the partner country to trai n with NATO forces and to participate in NATO
peacekeeping missions, which the Applicant pro ceeded to do and continues to do today in
31
Afghanistan .
12. In 1999, NATO launched a different prog ramme, called the “Membership Action Plan”
or “MAP”. This programme is specifically created to assist those countries that wish to join NATO
by providing them with tailored advice and prac tical support on the different requirements for
NATO membership. Again, the Applicant accepte d membership in this programme without any
opposition from the Respondent. Of the ten countries that have participated in this programme
32
since 1999, the Applicant is the only one not to have been offered membership in NATO .
13. During its participation in both of these pr ogrammes, and continuing to the present, the
Applicant has always been referred to in NATO as “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”.
That is the reference used by the NATO Secretariat in communications with the Applicant, it is the
reference used in official NATO documents and reports, and so on. At the same time, the
Applicant has always ⎯ ever since 1995 ⎯ used the constitutional name in official correspondence
with NATO, it has used it when signing NATO documents, and so on. For example, it uses
“Macedonia” on its uniform in exercises and mi ssions with NATO forces, as the photograph that
Professor Sands presented to you made clear. This practice has been consistent and has never been
33
viewed by NATO or NATO member States, other than perhaps the Respondent, as inappropriate .
14. NATO periodically holds a “summit” meeting attended by the Heads of State or
Government of the NATO members; the purpose of these summits is to provide strategic direction
for the Alliance. Moreover, the final stage of the admission process begins with a decision made at
a NATO summit, at which the members agree to i nvite a country to begin accession talks. Those
31
AM, paras. 2.47, 2.50.
32Ibid.
33AR, paras. 2.29-2.32. - 42 -
accession talks ensure that the coun try takes final steps so that it can uphold all of its political,
legal, and military obligations as a NATO member . Once those talks are completed, an accession
protocol is signed and ratified by all NATO members, and the Applicant country deposits an
instrument of accession, whereupon it formally becomes a NATO member. The important point
for purposes of this case is that in the absence of an invitation at the NATO summit for a country to
become a member, the final process cannot go forward 34.
15. By mid-2007, it became apparent that thr ee countries were on the verge of being invited
to join NATO at the next NATO summit, to be held in Bucharest in early April of 2008. Those
countries were: Albania, Croatia, and the Applic ant. The Applicant made it known that, if it
became a NATO member, it fully accepted that the existing situation of NATO’s use of the
provisional reference would continue. [Plate 2 on] Indeed, the Applicant’s President, in June 2007,
stated as follows:
“Naturally, our accession to NATO under our constitutional name would be the
most satisfactory for us. Nevertheless, if no solution to the dispute is found before we
join NATO, we are ready to become a full member with the name with which we are
35
currently referred to at the UN, as a temporary solution.”
[Plate 2 off]
16. Consequently, with the next NATO summ it at Bucharest approaching, NATO member
States appeared poised to invite the Applican t to accede to NATO, as reflected in several
36
statements by NATO members in this time period, which we have included in our pleadings .
And by way of example, the Defence Minister of the Czech Republic, during a visit to Skopje in
September of 2007, said: “My visit is a symbol of our support to Macedonia on its path to
Euro-Atlantic organizations. I hope that Macedonia will be invited to join NATO at its summit in
Bucharest in April 2008.” 37
17. To conclude this first point, the inform ation and evidence before you shows that from
1995 to 2007, the Applicant was fully engaged in the process that would normally result in
admission to NATO, was one of the three countries that were to be considered for admission at the
34
AM, para. 2.48; AR, paras. 2.37-2.43.
35AM, Ann. 69, p. 2.
36See, e.g., AM, para. 2.53.
37AM, Ann. 72. - 43 -
Bucharest Summit, and was prepared to join NATO in circumstances where it would be referred to
in NATO by the provisional reference.
II. In 2007-2008, the Respondent vigorously and systematically opposed the
Applicant’s NATO Membership
18. Mr.President, I turn now to my second point, which concerns the evidence of the
Respondent’s conduct in 2007 to 2008 with respect to the impending invitation for the Applicant to
join NATO.
19. The evidence does not pinpoint with laser precision the exact moment when the
Respondent changed its position with respect to the Applicant’s ability to join NATO. For at least
ten years following the adoption of the Interim Accord, the Respondent accepted that, under the
Interim Accord, it could not object to the Applicant’s admission to international organizations, so
long as the provisional reference would be used in that organization. Statements by the
Respondent’s officials as late as 2005 seem to continue to accept that obligation 38 and to support
the Applicant’s accession to NATO 39.
20. Yet that position appears to have begun ch anging in 2004 to 2005 following the formal
recognition by various countries, including the United States, of the Applicant under its
40
constitutional name . Over the next two years the Respondent’s position hardened, so that by the
summer of 2007, the Respondent made a new “strategy” decision on how to handle the Applicant’s
accession to NATO. The Respondent’s former Foreign Minister, Dora Bakoyannis, reflecting upon
this period, has stated that: “We knew what strategy we would pursue on the Skopje issue even
before the summer of 2007. The decision had been made.” 41
21. What was the decision? The evidence before this Court, discussed in Chapter II of both
42
our Memorial and our Reply, and reproduced in our Annexes , is extensive, clear, and
unequivocal: it has not been challenged in any serious way by the Respondent. In late 2007 and
38AR, paras. 2.50-2.51.
39AR, para. 2.49.
40AM, para. 2.60, No 121; AR, para. 2.52.
41AR, para. 2.53; Ann. 189, p. 5.
42See generally AM, Anns. 65-106 and 123-135; AR, Anns 5-7, 75-82 and 89-153. - 44 -
early 2008, the Respondent engaged in a vigorous and systematic campaign in opposition to the
Applicant’s membership in NATO solely because the name difference had not yet been resolved.
This evidence arises from the Respondent’s own wr itten and oral diplomatic communications, and
from statements by its senior officials made pub licly and within its own formal governmental
institutions.
22. Now I will not repeat this afternoon a ll the evidence we have placed before you, but
allow me to highlight a few examples.
23. First, in the fall of 2007, the Res pondent began making clear and unambiguous public
statements about its intention to use the Bucharest Summit as a tool for advancing its foreign policy
interests. [Plate 3 on] Consider again the interview of the Respondent’s Foreign Minister,
Ms Bakoyannis, which Professor Sands previously mentioned. In the course of discussing how the
Respondent intended to proceed in the negotiati ons over the name difference, the following
exchange occurred:
“Journalist: Is the Greek side willing to go to extremes, to exploit Skopje’s
prospects of accession to NATO, to use all the means and options at its disposal?
MsBakoyannis: Yes. The answer is yes. The Greek side sees good
neighbourly relations and the resolution of problems as a prerequisite for membership
in the Alliance.”43
[Plate 3 off]
24. Now, behind the scenes, the Respondent fully made known its opposition to the other
NATO member States. The Respondent developed a lengthy Aide Memoire for use in discussion
with all NATO member States. [Plate 4 on] We place that Aide Memoire in evidence before you.
In the conclusions that appear on pages 3 and 4, the Respondent asserts that: “The satisfactory
conclusion of the [name] negotiations is a sine qua non in order to enable Greece to continue to
support the Euro-atlantic aspirations of Skopje.” 44 Then, in a final bullet point, the Respondent
maintains: “It is therefore to everybody’s interest that this important issue is resolved before any
43
AM, Ann. 73.
4AM, Ann. 129. - 45 -
upcoming Euro-atlantic enlargement decisions. Th is is going to be the decisive criterion for
45
Greece to accept an invitation to FYROM to start the NATO accession negotiations.”
25. Thus, the Respondent was communicating in writing to other NATO Member States ⎯
through formal diplomatic channels ⎯ the Respondent’s intention not to accept a NATO decision
favouring admission for the Applicant. Moreover, the “decisive criterion” for the Respondent ⎯
indeed, the evidence shows that it w as the only criterion for the Respondent ⎯ but the “decisive
criterion” for the Respondent in agreeing to th e Applicant’s admission to NATO was whether the
name negotiations had been concluded on terms acceptable to the Respondent. [Plate 4 off]
26. This opposition was expressed publicly and re peatedly at the most senior level of the
Respondent’s Government, by its Prime Mini ster, Kostas Karamanlis. For example,
Mr.Karamanlis made a speech before Parliament on 22February 2008, wh ich is reflected in
Annex 80 or our Memorial. Among other things, he states in that speech “our positions, arguments
and the means at our disposal are well known” an d then he goes on to say, “without a mutually
accepted solution to the main issue, there can be no invitation to participate in the Alliance” 46.
[Video 1 run]
27. In a similar speech, the same month, in fact just a week later, the Prime Minister made
clear that opposing the Applican t’s membership in NATO was a “strategic goal” for the
Respondent. [Plate 5 on] In that speech, he said:
“The philosophy, the strategic goal, th e framework, the basic elements of our
policy are well-known. The strategy we mappe d out is clear. Our will for a mutually
acceptable solution [to the name difference] is genuine. Our position, ‘no solution ⎯
no invitation,’ is clear. If there is no solution, our neighbouring state’s aspirations to
participate in NATO will remain unrealised.” 47
[Plate 5 off]
28. The Respondent remained unwavering in implementing this strategic goal. In
mid-March2008, one month before the Buchares t Summit, the Respondent’s Foreign Minister
attended an Informal Meeting of NATO Foreign Mi nisters in Brussels, which was called for the
45
Ibid.
4Video Excerpt of Speech by Kostas Karamanlis, Respondent’s Prime Minister, Session of the Greek
Parliament, 2ebruay008, reprinted in part at AM, Ann8.0. The video is available at:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrWBlzCQahQ&feature=related.
4AR, Ann. 97. - 46 -
purpose of previewing and preparing the decisions that were to come at Bucharest. On that
occasion, she made a public statement indicating the position that was taken by the Respondent at
the Informal Meeting of the NATO Minister. [Plate6 on] Among other things, MsBakoyannis
stated: “Greece was therefore unable to provide its consent to the invitation, as I stressed to my
48
fellow colleagues in the Council. We are not happy about that. Nobody likes ‘vetoes’.”
29. Mr.President, we submit the words admit of no doubt, she says “Greece was unable to
provide... consent to the invitation”. The Respondent’s Foreign Minister herself refers to
Greece’s position with the alliance as akin to a “veto” which, of course, is not a technical term, but
certainly conveys the role and effect of the Respondent’s opposition. Mo reover, although not done
in this particular statement, the Foreign Mini ster would later characterize the “position...
presented” at Brussels as “essentially the first ve to on sending an invitation to Skopje at the
Bucharest Summit” 49. [Plate 6 off]
30. In late March 2008, as the time for Bucharest is rapidly approaching, the Respondent’s
Prime Minister made a speech to his governing part y’s parliamentary group. [Plate 7 on] Here the
Prime Minister reflected upon the path taken by the Respondent in the months leading up to
Bucharest. He said: “These past few months, we have responsibly made it clear that without a
mutually acceptable solution the road to NATO cannot be opened for our neighbouring country. It
50
cannot be invited to join.” [Plate 7 off]
31. Two days before the Bucharest Summit, the Respondent’s Foreign Minister published an
article in the International Herald Tribune entitled “The View From Athens”. [Plate 8 on] In the
article, MsBakoyannis was crystal clear as to the Respondent’s intentions, stating in the second
and third paragraphs: “We will strongly back the inclusion of Albania and Croatia in NATO. We
will not be able to do the same for FYROM, however, as long as its leaders refuse to settle the issue
of its name.” The final paragraph of the artic le concludes by saying: “As long as the problem
48
AM, Ann. 83.
49AM, Ann. 89.
50AM, Ann. 88. - 47 -
persists we cannot and will not endorse FYROM joining NATO or the European Union. No Greek
51
government will ever agree to it. No Greek parliament will ever approve it.” [Plate 8 off]
32. This takes us to the Bucharest Summit itself in April2008, there was, of course,
considerable public interest as to whether th e Respondent would maintain its opposition to the
Applicant’s membership.
33. While the Respondent’s Prime Minister, in a speech that he made after the announcement
that NATO would not extend an invitation to the Applicant was quite clear about the Respondent’s
position at the Bucharest Summit. The speech, which was directed to “the men and women of
Greece”, is included at tab 4 of your judges’ folder, in case you wish to refer to it. Since the speech
captures the overall approach the Respondent took in the months leading up to Bucharest, allow me
to read just the first few paragraphs of the speech. The Respondent’s Prime Minister, on the
3 April 2008, stated as follows:
“Men and women of Greece,
United, with confidence in our abilities, we fought a successful battle. With
firmness and resolve, we are moving toward our ultimate goal: A definitive solution
to the problem.
At the NATO Summit Meeting here in Bucharest, we discussed the applications
of three countries that want to become new members of the North Atlantic Alliance:
Albania, Croatia and the former Yugos lav Republic of Macedonia. It was
unanimously decided that Albania and Croatia will accede to NATO. Due to Greece’s
veto, FYROM is not joining NATO.
I had said to everyone ⎯ in every possible tone and in every direction ⎯ that ‘a
failure to solve the name issue will impede th eir invitation’ to join the Alliance. And
that is what I did. Skopje will b52able to become a member of NATO only after the
name issue has been resolved.”
34. I will stop reading from tab 4 at that point. You can continue to look at other aspects of
that speech, but I do think that captures the gist of the Respondent’s position at the Bucharest
Summit itself. From that I think it is clear that th e Respondent’s Prime Minister is stating that they
did “fight a successful battle”, which in our view is full recognition that the Respondent’s
opposition was aggressive, sustained, and strategic. As stated in this statement, the decision not to
invite the Applicant to join NATO was due to one factor ⎯ “Greece’s veto”. And how was that
51
AM, Ann. 90.
5AM, Ann. 99. - 48 -
“veto” undertaken? The Prime Minister says that he said to everyone “in every possible tone and
in every direction” that in the absence of a r esolution to the name issue, there could be no
invitation.
35. Now rather curiously, in the Rejoinder of the Respondent they say that we have “adduced
53
no evidence that Greece made an objection duri ng the proceedings of the Bucharest Summit” . If
you look at the fifth full paragraph of the sp eech that was made by the Respondent’s Prime
Minister, the Prime Minister actually seems rather keen to convey to the “men and women of
Greece” that: “Today and yesterday, during the meeting, we reiterated our strong arguments,
clearly stating our positions and intentions.” 54 So we submit that the fact of the Respondent’s
opposition, conveyed in the “strongest” terms by its highest officials at Bucharest, is beyond doubt.
[Plate 9 off]
36. Immediately after the Bucharest Summit, on 14 April 2008, the Respondent’s Permanent
Representative to the United Nations sent a letter to the United Nations Secretary General and to all
United Nations member States. [Plate 10 on] In it, the Respondent confirmed to the entire United
Nations membership its opposition at Bucharest. They stated:
“At the recent NATO Summit meeting in Bucharest and in view of the failure to
reach a viable and definitive solution to the name issue, Gree ce was not able to
consent to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia being invited to join the
North Atlantic Alliance.” 55
[Plate 10 off]
37. Mr.President, Members of the Court, these are all official statements. They are all
unequivocal. They are contemporaneous admissions on the part of the Respondent of the fact of ⎯
and the reason for ⎯ the Respondent’s opposition to the Applicant’s admission to NATO. We
submit that, because of the nature and circumstances of these statements, they are of the highest
56
evidentiary value . Indeed, this Court has recently confirmed that it prefers “contemporaneous
evidence from persons with direct knowledge”. And you said that you will “give particular
53RR, para. 6.23.
54AM, Ann. 99; emphasis added.
55AM, Ann. 132.
56AR, para. 2.17 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicarav. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 41, para. 64). - 49 -
attention to reliable evidence acknowledging facts or conduct unfavourable to the State represented
by the person making them” (case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 201, para. 61).
38. Significantly, the Respondent does not challenge the fact of these statements, and there is
no dispute between the Parties as to the authenticity of the evidence we have placed before you.
The Respondent does not deny that the Respondent’s senior representatives ⎯ Prime Minister,
Foreign Minister, Permanent Representative to the United Nations ⎯ made these statements. The
Respondent makes no claim that the words have been misrepresented or inaccurately transcribed,
or even taken out of context.
39. Instead, the Respondent denigrates their significance by saying that these statements are
“unilateral acts,” that they make no “attempt accurately to describe Greece’s conduct” 57, and that
58
“they are casual expressions of dissatisfaction or political declarations for atmospherics” .
40. Yet, Mr. President, with all due respect, when a Prime Minister speaks in the parliament
of his own country, as the head of government, he does not speak lightly or cavalierly, and
certainly does not speak in a personal or unoffici al capacity. When a Foreign Minister issues a
public statement after concluding a major NATO mee ting, she does not do so flippantly or without
regard to her State’s international legal obligations. And when a State’s Ambassador to the United
Nations communicates a letter for distribution to all United Nations member States, this is not done
for atmospherics or for personal reasons unconnected to the interests of the State.
41. We do not have to look only at the Responde nt’s own official statements. Officials of
NATO confirmed the opposition of the Respondent. For example, the evening before the final
meeting at the Bucharest Summit at which consensus could not be reached, NATO’s spokesman,
Mr.JamesAppathurai, explained to the media what had happened. He said ⎯ and the entire
statement he gave is in our Annexes at Annex 30 of the Respondent’s Counter-Memorial. But he
said in part: [Video 3 run]
“The Greek government has been very clear, including in this evening’s
discussions, that until and unless the name issue is resolved, there cannot be consensus
57
RCM, para. 5.55.
5RR, para. 5.31. - 50 -
on an invitation for the former Yugosla v Republic of Macedonia to begin accession
59
talks.”
It is NATO’s own spokesman, c ontemporaneous at the Bucharest Summit, saying that the Greek
Government has been very clear and unless the na me issue is resolved th ere can be no consensus
on an invitation.
42. Other NATO member States that participated in the accession negotiations also
confirmed the opposition of the Respondent, including Spain, Slovenia, and the United States 60.
Contemporaneous reports from a wide variety of media sources tell the same story, as reflected in
the more than 150 press reports annexed to our pleadings.
43. Put all of this together, and the evidence shows, without any doubt or ambiguity, that the
Respondent vigorously and systematically opposed the Applicant’s NATO membership before and
at the Bucharest Summit. The Respondent’s of ficials have themselves characterized this
61 62
opposition as a “methodical and well-organised” “battle” , involving oral and written “contact[s
with] foreign leaders” 63, “constant meetings” 64 and “intensive” 65and “painstaking negotiations” . 66
In the Respondent’s own words, this campaign w as intended “to convince . . . allies and friends on
67
the soundness of [its] positions” .
44. In summary of this point, it is a plai n fact that the Respondent’s opposition to the
Applicant’s membership existed. And as will be explained tomorrow, that opposition constituted
an “objection” within the meaning of Article 11 (1) of the Interim Accord.
5Video Excerpt of Remarks by NATO Spokesman James Appathurai, Bucharest Summit, 3 Apr. 2008, reprinted
in full at RCM, An3n0.. The video is available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=sF4fD5g9dco&feature=related .
60
AM, para. 2.61; AR, para. 2.22.
61
See, e.g., AM, Ann. 99 and AR, Ann. 147.
62
AR, Ann. 121.
63
AR, Anns. 143 and 145.
64
Ibid.
65
AR, Ann. 189.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid. - 51 -
III. The basis of the Respondent’s objection was not because the Applicant would be referred
to in NATO differently than it is referred to in the United Nations
45. Mr. President, I now turn to my third point, which is that none of the evidence shows that
the Respondent’s opposition in this period was based upon a concern that the Applicant would be
referred to in NATO differently than it is referred to in the United Nations.
46. Within the numerous examples of contemporaneous statements and communiqués by the
Respondent’s senior representatives, the Court will find no mention that the Respondent opposed
membership because the Applicant would be k nown in NATO by something other than the
provisional reference. In particular, there is no evidence before you that the Respondent’s
opposition was due to a concern about how NATO woul d refer to the Applicant, how other States
would refer to the Applicant, or how the Applicant would call itself, either within or outside
NATO. The Respondent has adduced nothing in support of such a claim.
47. Rather, the evidence points inevitably in one direction and one direction only: the
Respondent objected to NATO membership because a solution had not yet been reached over the
name difference. The basic mantra in the statemen ts we have placed before you today and in the
written pleadings is “no solution to the name differe nce, then no invitation to join NATO”. That is
68
what the Respondent’s Prime Minister said in his statement to the Parliament in February 2008 ,
that is what he said in the press statement in mid-March 2008 69, and that is what he said to his
70
governing party’s parliamentary group in late March 2008 . There is absolute consistency in the
evidence; no solution to the name difference, th en no invitation to join NATO. The Respondent
may not like those facts, but it is stuck with them.
In4d8e.ed, everyone in the process understood that this was the reason for the Respondent’s
opposition, because the Respondent communicated it loudly and clearly. As the Respondent’s own
Foreign Minister put it less than a week before the Bucharest Summit: “No solution ⎯ no
invitation. We said it, we mean it, and everyone knows it.” 71 NATO certainly got the message, as
68
AR, Ann. 97.
69Ibid., Ann. 109.
70AM, Ann. 88.
71Ibid., Ann. 89. - 52 -
72
is evident in the statement of its spokesperson at Bucharest . And, as the United States
Congressional Research Service put it: “Although the alliance determined that Macedonia met the
qualifications for NATO membership, Greece blocke d the invitation due to an enduring dispute
over Macedonia’s name.” 73
49. To sum up this point, although the Responde nt has produced a prolific catalogue of its
complaints to various United Nations bodies a nd international organizations concerning the
Applicant, the Respondent has not produced a shred of evidence in support of its new and
post-litigation contention that it objected to the Applicant’s NATO membership because of the way
the Applicant would be known in NATO.
IV. Although NATO’s decision is not at issue before this Court, the Respondent
mischaracterizes that decision and its relationship
to the Respondent’s opposition
50. Mr.President, I turn to my fourth and final point, which addresses two aspects of
NATO’s decision process that are misrepresented by the Respondent.
51. First, in its pleadings, the Responde nt seeks to argue that because NATO requires
consensus for a membership invitation to be extended, then there is no individual position taken by
each NATO member State either in favour or against such membership. In other words, the
Respondent attempts to portray a NATO consensus decision as emerging out of thin air, without
any input, in the form of acceptance or rejection, by individual member States. It asserts “given
that the NATO decision of 3 April 2008 was a consensus decision . . . Greece was . . . never put in
74
a position of having to lodge an objection” .
52. In our Reply, we demonstrated that such assertions are wholly without foundation 75.
Through reference to several official NATO sources , we explained the lengthy process that occurs
pursuant to Article10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Though final decisions are taken at summit
72
RCM, Ann. 30.
73AM, Ann. 135; see also AR, Ann. 82.
74RR, para. 6.27.
75AR, paras. 2.34-2.47. - 53 -
meetings, such as the Bucharest Summit, the process itself spans many months, involving “frank
and direct” 76discussions amongst member States as to their respective positions.
53. The consensus procedure means that “there is no voting or decision by the majority” 77,
and no formal “veto” procedure. However, that does not mean that there is “no mechanism of
objection” 78, as the Respondent puts it, within NATO. Quite to the contrary. Consensus can only
be reached where there is no explicit objection by any NATO member State to the decision in
question. The mechanism of objection is therefore central to the consensus-building process:
where one or more member States explicitly object s to a decision, that objection serves to block
consensus. Although this is not technically termed a “veto” within NATO, “il peut conduire a un
veto de fait dans la pratique des choses”, as NATO itself makes clear 7.
54. The Respondent could have chosen not to oppose formally and explicitly the Applicant’s
NATO membership, just as it could have chosen not to formally démarche other NATO members
in an attempt to garner support for its position. Ho wever, rather than adopt such an approach, the
Respondent chose to vigorously and systematically oppose the Applicant’s NATO membership.
55. A second point on NATO’s decision-making process: the Respondent attempts to argue
that its opposition was irrelevant since there al ready existed a consensus within NATO that the
80
Applicant had not met the accession criteria . We respond to that contention, in the first instance,
by noting that the ultimate position taken by NATO, as well as the positions by the other NATO
member States at Bucharest, are totally irrelevant to this case. This case concerns exclusively the
legality of the Respondent’s conduc t in 2007 to 2008 under the Inte rim Accord; that conduct can
be either lawful or unlawful regardless of the positions taken by other NATO member States.
56. Nevertheless, we feel compelled to note that prior to the Bucharest Summit NATO never
81
considered the resolution of the name difference to be a “sine qua non” for the Applicant to
accede to NATO membership. Over the 15years of the Applicant’s involvement with NATO,
76RCM, Ann. 22, p. 8.
77Ibid.
78Ibid., para. 1.6.
79Ibid., Ann. 15.
80RR, paras. 6.3-6.24.
81Ibid., para. 6.6. - 54 -
prior to the meetings leading up to the Buchar est Summit, resolution of the name difference had
never been identified by NATO as a condition-pr ecedent or an accession criterion for its
82
membership in the Alliance . The simple reason is that the difference over the name was, in the
words of NATO’s Secretary General, “not NATO’s business . . . not NATO’s affair” 8. Rather, it
84
was “a bilateral dispute... between Skopje and Athens” , one that had “been kept on a separate
track from Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic Ambitions”, “the two issues” only “becoming inextricably
linked in the run-up to the Bucharest Summit” 85, because of the Respondent’s actions. That view
was repeatedly confirmed by NATO member States, who underscored that “the name issue is not
86
one of NATO’s membership criteria” , and that the Applicant “met the qualifications for NATO
87
membership” .
57. Now, the Respondent, in this regard, tries to point to various statements at NATO as
supporting the views that the name difference barred the Applicant’s accession, but in doing so the
88 89
Respondent is compelled to deliberately redact words from or add words to NATO’s
statements, twisting their meaning. Certainly NATO has regarded stability and friendly relations in
the region, as well as working towards the reso lution of the name difference, as important to
NATO, but it has never said, prior to the Bucharest Summit, that the existence of the difference was
a bar to the Applicant’s admission 90.
58. Indeed, contrary to the Respondent’s claims, “NATO rules” do not preclude the
91
accession to membership of States that have an ongoing bilateral dispute with another State . This
is evidenced by the accession to membership of both the Respondent and Turkey, of the United
82
AR, para. 2.58.
83
AR, Ann. 4.
84
AR, Ann. 5.
85
AM, Ann. 135.
86
AR, Ann. 96; see also AM, paras. 2.63-2.65; AR, paras. 2.58-2.59.
87
AM, Ann. 135.
88
RCM, para. 5.38; AR, para. 2.57.
89
RR, para. 6.8.
90
AR, paras. 2.54-2.65.
91
RR, para. 6.5. - 55 -
Kingdom and Spain, and of Croatia and Slovenia, despite ongoing bilateral disputes, including
92
disputes of a territorial nature, between those States .
59. To summarize this point, the process fo r accession to NATO does not preclude or make
impossible positions being taken by individual member States of NATO, who are able to support or
oppose inviting a new State to join NATO. Wh ile the ultimate decision reached by NATO at
Bucharest is not actually at issue before this Court, the Respondent misrepresents that it was a
requirement of NATO, in the lead-up to Bucharest, that the name difference be resolved. No such
requirement existed and all the evidence indicat es that, but for the opposition of the Respondent,
there would have been no difficulty for NATO in extending an invitation to the Applicant.
V. Conclusion
60. Mr. President, allow me to conclude by br iefly reiterating my central points. From 1995
to 2007, the Applicant undertook all the necessar y steps on the road to admission to NATO,
including participation in NATO’s PfP and MAP pr ogrammes. By 2007, it appeared likely that
three countries would be invited to join NATO at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, including
the Applicant.
61. However, in 2007 and 2008, the Respondent engaged in a vigorous and systematic
campaign in opposition to the Applicant’s membership in NATO. This campaign was not subtle;
it was not discreet; it was a “b attle” waged openly and aggressively in various ways. Moreover,
the reason for the campaign, as repeatedly articulated by the Respondent, had nothing to do with
the manner in which NATO would refer to the A pplicant were it to become a member or the
manner in which the Applicant would call itself in relations with NATO. And further, contrary to
the Respondent’s assertions, there is nothing about this consensus process at NATO that precludes
individualized decision making, nor any evidence that the existence of the name difference
constituted a NATO membership criterion which the Applicant had failed to meet.
62. Mr.President, before I finish, allow me to note that senior leaders of the Respondent
continue to refer to its opposition to the Applicant’s admission in the same way as they did in 2007
92
AR, para. 2.65. - 56 -
and 2008, although they try to do so only among themselves since it complicates their case before
this Court.
63. I hope that in the course of the proceedi ngs before the Court this week and next week,
the Court will allow us to present some of the material of these recent statements by the
Respondent’s senior officials, which are publicly av ailable, and indeed available on an official
website of the Respondent itself ⎯ statements that arose prior to the filing of our Reply.
64. Mr. President, that concludes my presentation. You may wish to invite Professor Klein
to continue our case. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Sean Murp hy for his statement. Now I invite
Professor Klein to take the floor.
M. KLEIN : Je vous remercie, Monsieur le président.
L A C OUR EST PLEINEMENT COMPÉTENTE À L ’ÉGARD DU PRÉSENT DIFFÉREND
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, c’est un honneur
pour moi d’intervenir dans la présente procédure au nom de l’Etat requérant. Il me revient, dans un
premier temps, de traiter des questions de compétence que soulève la présente instance. Il est sans
doute à peine besoin de rappeler à cet égard que l’ Etat requérant fonde la compétence de la Cour
sur la clause de juridiction obligatoire c ontenue dans l’accord intérimaire de1995, dont
l’interprétation et l’application se trouvent à la ba se du différend qui vous est aujourd’hui soumis.
[Projection] Selon les termes de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, de cet accord ⎯ dont vous trouverez le
texte sous l’onglet no1 du dossier des juges,
«[à] l’exception de la divergence visée au paragraphe 1 de l’article 5, l’une ou l’autre
des Parties peut saisir la Cour internationale de Justice de toute divergence ou de tout
différend qui s’élèvent entr93elles en ce qui concerne l’interprétation ou l’exécution du
présent accord intérimaire» .
Sous réserve du membre de phrase par lequel il débute ⎯ et sur lequel on reviendra tout à l’heure
beaucoup plus en détail ⎯, ce texte apparaît parfaitement clair. Il permet à chaque partie de
soumettre à la Cour «toute divergence ou … tout différend … en ce qui concerne l’interprétation ou
93Recueil des traités des Nations Unies (RTNU), n 32193, vol. 1891, p. 42. - 57 -
l’exécution [de l’] accord intéri maire». Cet énoncé est particu lièrement large. Il couvre ⎯ je
répète encore ses termes ⎯ toute divergence ou tout différend relatif à l’interprétation ou à
l’exécution de l’accord. [Fin de projection]
2. Dans son argumentation écrite, l’Etat défe ndeur a cependant contesté que la Cour soit
compétente pour connaître du litige. Il a avancé trois arguments à cet effet. Tout d’abord, le
différend porté devant la Cour entr erait dans le champ de la clau se d’exclusion par laquelle débute
le second paragraphede l’article21. En d’autr es termes, la Cour ne pourrait se prononcer sur ce
différend car il s’agirait d’un différend qui porte sur le nom de l’Etat requérant. Deuxièmement, la
Cour ne pourrait exercer sa compétence en l’ espèce car cela la conduirait inévitablement à se
prononcer sur une décision prise pa r une organisation internationale ⎯ l’OTAN ⎯ tierce à la
présente instance. Cela reviendrait à soumettre cette organisation ⎯voire l’ensemble de ses
membres ⎯ à la juridiction de la Cour en l’absence de leur consentement. Enfin, l’application de
l’article 22 de l’accord intérimaire aurait pour effet de priver la Cour de toute compétence à l’égard
du litige qui lui est soumis. Ces trois arguments sont tous dépourvus de fondement.
A. La clause d’exclusion contenue dans l’article 21 doit se comprendre
de manière restrictive et ne fait pas obstacle à l’exercice
par la Cour de sa compétence
3. La première objection formulée par l’Etat défendeur pour contester la compétence de la
Cour consiste dans l’affirmation selon laquelle le présent litige porterait en réalité sur la question
du nom de l’Etat requérant. Ce différend n’entrer ait de ce fait pas dans le champ de la clause
compromissoire contenue dans l’article21, paragr aphe2, de l’accord de1995. On rappellera que
cette disposition permet de soumettre les différends relatifs à l’inte rprétation ou à l’exécution de ce
traité, «[à] l’exception de la divergence [« difference», dans le texte authentique anglais] visée au
paragraphe1 de l’article5». [Pro jection] Aux termes de l’article5 ⎯dont le texte est lui aussi
reproduit à l’onglet no1 du dossier des juges,
«[l]es Parties conviennent de poursuivre les négociations sous les auspices du
Secrétaire général de l’Organisation des Nations Unies, conformément à la
résolution845(1993) du Conseil de sécurité, en vue de parvenir à régler le différend
mentionné dans cette résolution et dans la résolution 817 (1993) du Conseil». - 58 -
C’est donc à ce dernier texte qu’il faut se référer pour savoir ⎯ enfin ⎯ quelle est la divergence
⎯ le différend ⎯ en question. [Fin de la projection] La résolution 817 (1993) est reproduite dans
o
le dossier des juges, sous l’onglet n 5. Dans le troisième paragraphe de son préambule, cette
résolution mentionne la «divergence [qui] a surgi au sujet du nom de l’Etat, qu’il faudrait régler
dans l’intérêt du maintien des relations pacifiques et de bon voisinage dans la région».
4. La question centrale est donc ici de dé terminer quel est l’objet du différend visé à
l’article21, paragraphe2, de l’accord intérimair e, et que cette disposition exclut du champ de la
clause compromissoire. Les Parties expriment à cet égard des vues diamétralement opposées.
L’une et l’autre invoquent pourtant à l’appui de leur position des principes d’interprétation qui sont
essentiellement identiques : ceux de l’article 31 de la convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des
94
traités, et en particulier le renvoi au sens ordinaire des termes . Les deux Etats s’accordent aussi
⎯cela vaut la peine d’être relevé ⎯ sur le fait que la Cour est appelée à jouer un rôle «central»
95
dans l’interprétation et le contrôle de l’exécution de l’accord intérimaire . Les convergences de
vues s’arrêtent néanmoins là.
5. Au-delà de ces points d’entente, l’Etat défendeur propose une lecture de la clause
compromissoire qui revient en réalité à priver cette disposition d’une part considérable de son effet
pratique. Selon l’Etat défendeur, en effet, l’ex clusion de la compétence de la Cour à l’égard du
différend relatif au nom doit se comprendre de mani ère particulièrement large. Cette notion de
«différend» devrait inclure ⎯je cite les écritures du défendeur ⎯ «tout litige dont le règlement
96
préjugerait, directement ou indirectement, du différend relatif au nom» . Pour l’Etat défendeur, tel
serait le cas, en particulier, de tout litige relatif à l’interprétation ou à l’application de l’article 11 de
l’accord intérimaire. Le défendeur affirme sur ce point que les faits soumis à la Cour sont
indissolublement liés au différend sur le nom 97. Et il conclut à cet égar d que toute décision de la
Cour sur la question de savoir si les conditions d’ application de la seconde clause de l’article11,
paragraphe premier, de l’accord intérimaire étaient réunies en l’espèce ⎯ et en particulier le fait de
94
Duplique («RR»), par. 3.19.
95
Réplique («AR»), par. 3.12 ; duplique, par. 3.13.
96RR, par. 3.13 ; voir aussi contre-mémoire («RCM»), par. 6.43.
97RR, par. 3.3. - 59 -
savoir si cette disposition autorisait ou empê chait l’Etat requérant d’utiliser son nom
98
constitutionnel ⎯ impliquerait forcément que la Cour se prononce sur la question du nom .
6. Cette interprétation de la clause compromiss oire est indéfendable. Les textes mêmes qui
sont en cause ⎯l’accord intérimaire, bien sûr, mais aussi la résolution817(1993) ⎯ imposent
manifestement une lecture plus restrictive de la clause d’exclusion contenue dans l’article21 de
l’accord 99. La «divergence» évoquée par la résolution817(1993), à laquelle renvoie l’article21,
par le biais de l’article 5 de l’accord intérimaire, est celle qui ⎯ je cite le texte de la résolution ⎯
«a surgi au sujet du nom de l’Etat». C’est ce différend que les Parties sont invitées par le Conseil
de sécurité à régler. C’est à l’égard de ce différend ⎯et de ce différend seulement ⎯ que la
compétence de la Cour est écartée par le premier me mbre de phrase de l’article21, paragraphe2.
Que cette question soit clairement différente ⎯ et différenciable ⎯ de celle de l’usage de la
«désignation provisoire» de l’Etat requérant sous la dénomination d’«ex-République yougoslave de
Macédoine» ressort très clairement des termes mêmes et de la structure de la résolution 817 (1993).
La «divergence au sujet du nom» est la seule ques tion qui est identifiée dans la résolution comme
faisant l’objet d’un différend entre les Parties, que celles-ci sont appelées à régler.
7. La question de l’utilisation de la dénomination provisoire ⎯ pour sa part ⎯ y est
simplement évoquée comme solution temporaire dans l’attente d’un règlement de la «divergence au
sujet du nom». Il n’y avait, pas plus au moment de l’adoption de la résolution 817 (1993) que de
celle de la résolution845(1993), l’ombre d’ un différend entre les Parties sur la portée de
l’obligation de désigner l’Etat requérant sous le nom d’«ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine».
Il est donc tout à fait évident que cette dernière question ⎯ sur laquelle la Cour aura en effet à se
prononcer dans son interprétation de l’article11 ⎯ n’était nullement celle visée par l’article5 de
l’accord intérimaire. Ce que la première phrase de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, vise manifestement à
éviter, c’est qu’il revienne à un tiers ⎯ et en l’occurrence plus spécialement à la Cour ⎯ d’imposer
aux Parties une solution au différend relatif au nom. C’est cette question, et cette question
seulement, que les deux Etats ont entendu mettre hor s d’atteinte d’une procédure de règlement
juridictionnel, en raison de son extrême sensibilité. Que ce soit dans les textes pertinents ou dans la
98
RR, par. 3.10.
99
AR, par. 3.12. - 60 -
logique qui sous-tend la clause d’exclusion contenue dans l’article21, rien, absolument rien ne
vient donc appuyer l’allégation du défendeur selon laquelle la notion de «différend relatif au nom»
au sens de l’article21, paragraphe2, et de l’ar ticle 5, paragraphe premier, devrait inclure, pour
reprendre encore ces termes, «tout litige dont le règlement préjugerait, directement ou
indirectement, du différend relatif au nom».
8. L’Etat requérant a par ailleurs mis en évidence dans ses écritures le fait que
l’interprétation particulièrement large de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, soutenue par le défendeur aurait
pour effet de réduire considérablement l’étendue de la compétence de la Cour à l’égard de l’accord
intérimaire. Dès lors que l’objet même de l’accord est de permettre aux Parties d’éviter les
difficultés soulevées par la poursuite du différend re latif au nom, tout litige concernant n’importe
quelle disposition de l’accord serait nécessairement, s’il fallait suivre l’interprétation avancée par le
défendeur, liée à la question du nom 100. L’Etat défendeur, dans l’espoir de contrer cet argument,
s’est aventuré dans un exercice qui se révèle particulièrement périlleux pour ses propres thèses. Il a
en l’occurrence identifié les clau ses de l’accord à l’égard desquelles, selon sa propre lecture, la
compétence de la Cour ne serait pas exclue par le jeu combiné de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, et de
l’article 5, paragraphe premier. Le bilan ⎯ c’est le moins qu’on puisse dire ⎯ est parlant.
9. Je vous propose de le visualiser, en ne re tenant que les clauses «opératives» de l’accord,
c’est-à-dire en mettant de côté son préambule et ses clauses finales, les articles21 à23.
[Projection] Selon la vision proposée par le défe ndeur, l’article 21 ne s’opposerait pas à ce que la
Cour exerce sa compétence à l’égard de litiges ⎯ potentiels ⎯ concernant treizeclauses de
l’accord 101. A contrario , la compétence de la Cour se trouverait donc exclue, au terme de
l’exercice même mené par l’Etat défendeur, à l’égard de pas moins de onze clauses du traité ⎯ soit
près de la moitié. Selon cette lecture, la Cour ne pourrait donc connaître de différends relatifs aux
articles1, 2, 5, paragraphe1), 8, paragraphe 2), 9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18 et 19. [Disparition
successive] Il reviendrait donc aux Parties ⎯et à elles seules ⎯ d’apprécier la conformité des
comportements de chacune d’elles à ces différentes clauses. Tout contrôle extérieur ⎯ en
particulier juridictionnel ⎯ serait exclu. Cet exercice ⎯ mené par le défendeur lui-même, il faut le
100
AR, par. 3.15.
101
RR, par. 3.21. - 61 -
rappeler ⎯ montre bien à quel point l’interprétati on qu’il propose de la clause d’exclusion
contenue dans l’article 21, paragraphe 2, est indéfendable.
10. Mais il y a plus. Si l’on devait suivre l’interprétation large de la première phrase de
l’article21, paragraphe2, avancée par l’Etat dé fendeur, il n’est pas du tout exclu que la Cour se
trouve en fin de compte dans l’impossibilité d’ exercer sa compétence, même à l’égard d’un
différend portant sur une des dispositions de l’accord que le défendeur identifie comme n’étant pas
affectée par cette clause d’exclusion. Perme ttez-moi, Monsieur le président, de donner une
illustration de ceci. L’Etat défendeur inclut dans la liste des dispositions dont l’interprétation ou
l’application entrerait dans le champ de compétence de la Cour l’article 8, paragraphe premier, de
102
l’accord . Aux termes de cette disposition, «[l]es Parties s’abstiendront de faire obstacle de
quelque façon que ce soit au mouvement de personnes et de biens entre leurs territoires ou à travers
le territoire de l’une d’entre elles en direction du territoire de l’autre».
Supposons ⎯pour les seuls mérites de l’argumentation, bien entendu ⎯ que l’Etat défendeur
adopte des mesures contraires à cette disposition en vue de faire pression sur l’Etat requérant pour
qu’il adopte tel ou tel nom. Dès lors que ce scénario soulèverait ⎯même de façon lointaine et
indirecte ⎯ la question du nom, tout différend au sujet du respect de l’articl8,
paragraphe premier, en pareil cas d’espèce échappera it également à la compétence de la Cour. Et
ceci pourrait tout aussi bien être le cas pour toute violation des autres dispositions restantes de
l’accord. Il suffirait que leur violation soit motivée d’une façon ou d’une autre par la volonté
d’imposer une solution au différend sur le nom pour que la compétence de la Cour à l’égard de tout
litige concernant l’interprétation ou l’application de ces dispositions s’évanouisse. [Fin de
la projection.]
11. Le résultat de l’interprétation de la prem ière phrase de l’article21, paragraphe2, de
l’accord de1995 soutenue par l’Etat défendeur est donc de réduire la compétence de la Cour à
l’égard de cet instrument à très peu de chose. De son propre aveu, près de la moitié des
dispositions de l’accord serait d’office exclue du champ de la clause compromissoire. Et même à
l’égard des autres dispositions de cet instrument , la Cour pourrait se trouver privée de compétence
102
RR, par. 3.21. - 62 -
dès l’instant où un litige qui y serait relatif soulèverait, même de très loin, une question touchant au
nom de l’Etat requérant. On se demande où a bien pu passer le sens ordinaire des termes dont
l’Etat défendeur prétendait se faire le héraut. Et si tous les Etats parties au Statut de la Cour avaient
la même approche de son «rôlecentral» dans le règlement des différends que celle soutenue par
l’Etat défendeur, il serait sans doute grand temps pour la Fondation Carnegie de trouver un autre
locataire pour le Palais de la Paix. Plus sérieus ement, tout ceci montre bien qu’en réalité, seul le
différend ayant pour objet le nom de l’Etat requérant au sens strict est visé par cette clause. Dès
lors que la demande soumise à la Cour en la présente instance n’a nullement pour objet de faire
trancher ce différend-là, il ne fait aucun doute que la Cour est pleinement compétente pour se
prononcer sur ce litige.
B. L’exercice par la Cour de sa compétence ne la contraindrait pas à se prononcer
sur les droits ou obligations d’Etats ou d’entités tiers à l’instance
12. La deuxième exception d’incompétence soulevée par l’Etat défendeur est fondée sur
l’allégation selon laquelle l’exercice de sa compét ence par la Cour dans la présente affaire la
contraindrait forcément à se prononcer sur les droi ts et obligations d’Et ats ou d’entités tiers à
l’instance. Selon la Partie adverse, l’objet de la réclamation de l’Etat requérant serait le suivant.
Le requérant prétendrait avoir s ubi un dommage résultant de la décision prise à l’unanimité par
l’OTAN, à l’occasion du sommet de Bucarest de 2008, de ne pas l’inviter à accéder à cette
organisation 10. L’objet même de cette réclamati on entraînerait de ce fait d’importantes
conséquences procédurales. Dès lors que l’acte incriminé constitue une décision collective d’une
organisation internationale, il serait exclusivemen t attribuable à cette dernière, et non à ses Etats
104
membres ⎯ et particulièrement à l’Etat défendeur . La personnalité juridique propre que possède
cette organisation génèrerait un «e ffet de voile» qui mettrait ses membres à l’abri de toute
réclamation relative à un tel acte collectif 105. Et ceci aurait pour conséquence ultime que la Cour
ne pourrait exercer sa compétence à l’égard du diffé rend dont elle est aujourd’hui saisie, puisque
cela la contraindrait à se prononcer sur les actes d’Etats ou d’entités tiers à l’instance. La
103
RCM, par. 6.1.
104
Ibid., par. 6.67 et suiv.
105Ibid., par. 6.85 et suiv. - 63 -
jurisprudence de l’ Or monétaire s’appliquerait pleinement ici, dès lors que les intérêts juridiques
d’Etats tiers «seraient non seuleme nt touchés par une décision, ma is constitueraient l’objet même
de ladite décision» 106.
13. Cette exception est en réalité basée sur des prémisses factuelles incorrectes. Elle repose
par ailleurs sur des fondements juridiques tout aussi erronés. Permettez-moi de détailler
successivement ces deux points. Tout d’abord, il est manifeste que l’exception formée par l’Etat
défendeur ne peut avoir de sens que si sa descrip tion de l’objet de la demande portée devant la
Cour est exacte. Or, il n’en est rien. Contrair ement à ce qu’affirme le défendeur, la requête de
l’Etat requérant ne vise nullement la décision pr ise par l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique
Nord lors de son sommet de 2008. Ainsi que l’Et at requérant l’a exposé très clairement dans ses
écritures, c’est un acte séparé, clairement individu alisable et clairement attribuable à l’Etat
107
défendeur qui se trouve à la base de la requête . C’est cet acte qui constitue l’objet de la requête,
indépendamment des conséquences ultérieures qu’il a eues au sein de l’OTAN. Le requérant ne
conteste nullement ⎯ pas plus maintenant qu’à un quelconque stade antérieur de la procédure ⎯ la
décision prise par l’OTAN lors du sommet de Bucarest. Et pas plus maintenant qu’à un
quelconque stade antérieur de la procédure, il ne demande à la Cour de se prononcer sur la
conformité de cette décision aux règles mêmes de l’organisation ou au droit international général.
Le seul objet de sa requête est ⎯et a toujours été ⎯ d’obtenir un prononcé de la Cour sur la
conformité à l’article11 de l’accord intérimaire de 1995 d’une action spécifique posée par l’Etat
défendeur préalablement à la décision de Bucarest.
14. Il n’est sans doute pas inutile de rappele r à ce stade les termes mêmes des conclusions
présentées par l’Etat requérant. Le premier élément de sa demande est, très clairement, de solliciter
de la Cour qu’elle «juge et déclare que le défendeur, par le biais de ses organes et agents étatiques,
a violé ses obligations en vertu de l’article11, paragraphepremier, de l’accord intérimaire» 10.
Que cette action présente des liens avec la décision atteinte au sommet de Bucarest, qu’elle en ait
106Affaire de l’Or monétaire pris à Rome en 1943 (Italie c. France, Royaume-Uni et Etats-Unis
d’Amérique), question préliminaire, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1954, p. 32, tel que cité in RCM, par. 6.95.
107
AR, par. 3.17.
108Mémoire («AM»), p. 123. - 64 -
même en l’occurrence été à la base, n’y change rien. C’est bien un acte individuel, propre à l’Etat
défendeur, qui est visé par la requête. L’existence même de cet acte, ainsi que sa portée, ont été
amplement détaillées par mon collègue le professeur Sean Murphy il y a quelques instants. Ce n’est
donc qu’au prix d’un travestissement pur et simple de l’objet de la requête que l’Etat défendeur
peut donner un semblant d’assise à l’exception qu’il prétend avancer 109. Une fois la demande
rapportée à son objet exact, la construction élaborée par le défendeur tombe en poussière.
15. Son argumentation ne s’avère d’ailleurs p as plus convaincante sur le plan strictement
juridique. La Partie adverse stigmatise à cet égard le refus de l’Etat requérant de s’engager dans un
véritable débat juridique sur l’argument de l’atteinte aux droits d’Etats ou d’entités tiers à l’instance
110
qui résulterait de l’exercice par la Cour de sa compétence en l’espèce . Que nos estimés
contradicteurs se rassurent : il n’entre nullement da ns notre intention d’esquiver un tel débat. Tout
au contraire. On l’a dit, l’Etat défendeur a ppuie son argumentation sur ce point sur les décisions
d’incompétence atteintes par la Cour dans les affaires de l’ Or monétaire et du Timor oriental .
Mais il passe soigneusement sous silence les au tres décisions dans lesquelles la Cour s’est
prononcée sur la question des limites éventuell es à sa compétence susceptibles de résulter de
l’absence de certains Etats tiers à l’instance.
Tant dans l’affaire de Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c.Australie) que dans celle
des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (Ré publique démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda),
la Cour énonce très clairement les critères qu’il co nvient d’appliquer pour déterminer si elle peut
exercer sa juridiction en pareille situation. Il ne fait pourtant aucun doute que l’affaire aujourd’hui
soumise à la Cour correspond très exactement aux situations dont la Cour était saisie dans ces deux
instances.
16. Qu’il me soit permis de rappeler les conc lusions que la Cour a atteintes en l’espèce.
Dans son arrêt de 2005, la Cour se réfère à l’affaire Nauru en ces termes :
«la Cour a fait observer qu’il ne lui est pas interdit de statuer sur les prétentions qui lui
sont soumises dans un différe nd [où un Etat tiers a] un intérêt d’ordre juridique … en
109
Voir déjà AR, par. 3.19.
110RR, par. 3.37. - 65 -
cause pour autant que les intérêts juridiques de l’Etat tiers111entuellement affectés ne
constituent pas l’objet même de la décision sollicitée» .
Dans l’affaire Nauru, la Cour relève à cet égard que dans l’affaire de l’ Or monétaire , «la
détermination de la responsabilité de l’Albanie était une condition préalable pour qu’il puisse être
statué sur les prétentions de l’Italie». La Cour a estimé, tant dans l’affaire de Certaines terres à
phosphates à Nauru que dans celle des Activités armées en territoire du Congo , qu’elle n’était pas
confrontée à une situation de ce type 11. Rien ne lui imposait de se prononcer préalablement sur la
responsabilité d’un Etat tiers à l’instance pour pouvoir trancher la question de la responsabilité
d’un Etat partie à l’instance.
17. A l’évidence, il en va de même dans la présente affaire. Rien n’impose à la Cour de se
prononcer sur la conformité de la décision prise par l’OTAN au sommet de Bucarest à l’égard du
droit de cette organisation ou du droit internati onal général comme préalable à la position que la
Cour est appelée à prendre sur la licéité de l’act e posé par l’Etat défendeur dans les jours qui ont
précédé ce sommet. Et s’il faut aborder cette question en termes de préalables, il est évident que
c’est l’acte de l’Etat défendeur qui constitue un préalable à la décision de l’OTAN, et non l’inverse.
A cet égard encore, on est donc très loin de la séquence envisagée dans l’affaire de l’Or monétaire.
Voilà donc comblé le silence que regrettait l’Etat défendeur.
C. L’article 22 n’exerce aucune influence sur l’étendue de la compétence de la Cour
dans la présente instance
18. Le troisième argument d’incompétence av ancé par l’Etat défendeur est certainement
celui qui appelle le moins de développements. Selon cette argumentation, une clause de l’accord
intérimaire autre que la clause compromissoire au rait en l’espèce pour effet de faire échapper le
présent litige à la compétence de la Cour. Il s’agit en l’occurrence de l’article 22 de l’accord, que
o
vous trouverez dans le dossier des juges toujours sous l’onglet n 1, et qui se lit comme suit :
«Le présent accord intérimaire n’est dirigé contre aucun autre Etat ou entité et il
ne porte pas atteinte aux droits et aux devoirs découlant d’accords bilatéraux et
111Affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Cong(République démocratique du Congo c.Ouganda),
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2005, p. 238, par. 203, citant l’affaire de Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c. Australie).
112Affaire de Certaines terres à phosphates à Nauru (Nauru c.Au stralie), exceptions pr éliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 262, par. 55 ; affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du
Congo c. Ouganda), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2005, p. 238, par. 204. - 66 -
multilatéraux déjà en vigueur que 113 Etats parties ont conclus avec d’autres Etats ou
organisations internationales.»
L’Etat défendeur affirme que cet te clause neutraliserait en quelque sorte l’article11. Les
engagements pris par le défende ur au terme de cette dernière disposition seraient, selon cette
argumentation, subordonnés à la nécessité, pour cet Etat, de préserver les droits et obligations
114
découlant pour lui de sa participation à l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord . Dès lors
que l’article 11 de l’accord serait, à suivre ce ra isonnement, «mis entre parenthèses» par l’effet de
l’article22, l’application de cette disposition aura it aussi pour conséquence de priver la Cour de
toute compétence à l’égard d’un différend portant, pr écisément, sur l’interprétation et l’application
de l’article 11.
19. Il est évidemment impossible pour la C our de se prononcer sur l’incidence potentielle
qu’aurait l’article22 de l’accord intérimaire su r sa compétence sans examiner dans un premier
temps la pertinence de l’argumentation de la Partie adverse au fond. Cette disposition a-t-elle bien
pour effet, comme l’Etat défendeur le prétend, de subordonner l’application de l’article11 de
l’accord aux droits et obligations qui découler aient du traité de l’Atlantique Nord pour le
défendeur, en particulier en ce qui concerne l’admission de nouvea ux membres au sein de
l’OTAN? L’Etat requérant montrera demain qu’il n’en est rien. L’article22 n’exerce de ce fait
aucune influence sur la compétence de la Cour. Et il s’agit de plus d’une question qui n’a rien de
préliminaire. Tout au contraire, comme l’Etat requérant l’a déjà observé à plusieurs reprises dans
ses exposés écrits, cette argumentation renvoie avant tout à un débat de fond 115. On ne s’étendra
donc pas davantage sur cet argument à ce stade. La portée exacte de l’article22 de l’accord
intérimaire et son absence d’impact sur l’application de l’article 11 de l’accord seront pour leur part
analysées de manière détaillée demain par mon collègue, le professeur Philippe Sands.
*
20. L’ensemble des exceptions d’incompétence invoquées par l’Etat défendeur s’avère donc
dépourvu de fondement. La première d’entre ell es, selon laquelle le présent différend porte sur le
113 o
RTNU, n 32193, vol. 1891, p. 42.
114
Voir, entre autres, RCM, par. 6.25 et suiv. et 6.52 et suiv.
115Voir, entre autres, AR, par. 3.22 et suiv. (et sp 3.25 et 3.26). - 67 -
nom de l’Etat requérant et est à ce titre exclu de la clause compromissoire attribuant compétence à
la Cour, ne peut être retenue. L’interprétation de la première phrase de l’article 21, paragraphe 2,
de l’accord intérimaire sur laquelle le défendeur s’appuie pour atteindre cette conclusion s’est
avérée totalement déraisonnable et contraire au sen s ordinaire des termes de cette disposition. La
deuxième exception soulevée par l’Etat défendeur, selon laquelle l’exercice de sa compétence par
la Cour à l’égard du présent différend aurait pour conséquence de porter atteinte aux droits d’Etats
et d’entités tiers à l’instance, doit elle aussi êt re rejetée. Elle est en effet basée sur une
interprétation erronée tant de la situation de fait qui se trouve à la base de la demande dont la Cour
est aujourd’hui saisie, que des principes juridiques applicables en l’espèce. Rien n’impose en effet
à la Cour de se prononcer sur la situation juridi que de tiers à la présente instance en tant que
préalable à l’examen de la demande formulée par l’Etat requérant. Enfin, la troisième exception,
fondée sur l’article22 de l’accord intérimaire n’est pas davantage de nature à faire obstacle à la
compétence de la Cour. Il ne pourrait éventuellement en être ainsi que si cette disposition avait
pour conséquence de priver l’article 11 de l’accord de ses effets juridiques. Or, comme on le verra
demain, tel n’est pas le cas. Le débat est en tout état de cause un débat de fond, et non de
compétence à proprement parler.
21. Ce bilan d’ensemble n’est, en fin de compte , guère surprenant. L’Etat défendeur est en
effet toujours apparu lui-même peu assuré du succès des arguments qu’il a avancés à titre
d’exceptions préliminaires. Le fait qu’il n’a jama is envisagé de faire traiter de ces exceptions par
la Cour dans une phase séparée de la procédure est en soi particulièrement révélateur à cet égard.
En conclusion, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la Cour, l’Etat
requérant demande respectueus ement à la Cour de rejeter l’ensemble des exceptions
d’incompétence formées par l’Etat défendeur.
22. La Partie adverse a par ailleurs soulevé dans sa duplique un autre type d’argument qui
s’opposerait à l’exercice par la Cour de ses pouvoirs en l’espèce. Il s’agit des limites inhérentes à
l’exercice par la Cour de sa fonction judiciaire, qui feraient en l’occ
urrence obstacle à la
recevabilité de la demande. J’y reviendrai, si vous me le permettez, demain matin. Pour l’heure, il
ne me reste qu’à vous remercier, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres de la
Cour, pour votre aimable attention. - 68 -
The PRESIDENT: I thank Professor Pierre Klein for his statement. This marks the end of
today’s sitting. Oral argument in the case will resu me tomorrow at 10 a.m. in order for the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue its first round of oral argument. The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will then conclude its first round of oral argument tomorrow,
from 3 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. The sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 6.20 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Monday 21 March 2011, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace, President Owada presiding, in the case concerning Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v. Greece)