Non-Corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2007/21
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2007
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 7 November 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, presiding
in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malaysia/Singapore)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2007
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 7 novembre 2007, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président,
faisant fonction de président
en l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh,
Middle Rocks et South Ledge
(Malaisie/Singapour)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President
Judges Ranjeva
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc Dugard
Sreenivasa Rao
Registrar Couvreur
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : M. Al-Khasawneh, vice-président, faisant fonction de président en l’affaire
RaMjev.
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Buergenthal
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda-Amor
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
Dugard.
Sreenivasa Rao, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Malaysia is represented by:
H.E.Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, Ambassado r-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Malaysia, Adviser for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister,
as Agent;
H.E. Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, Ambassador of Malaysia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
H.E. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., Honorary Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit inte rnational, member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration,
Mr.James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr.Nicolaas Jan Schrijver, Professor of Public In ternational Law, Leiden University, associate
member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Marcelo G. Kohen, Professor of International La w, Graduate Institute of International Studies,
Geneva, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Ms Penelope Nevill, college lecturer, Downing College, University of Cambridge,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Datuk Azailiza Mohd Ahad, Head of Interna tional Affairs Division, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Datin Almalena Sharmila Johan Thambu, Deputy Head 1, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
MsSuraya Harun, Senior Federal Counsel, Inte rnational Affairs Division, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Mr. Mohd Normusni Mustapa Albakri, Federal Coun sel, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
Mr. Faezul Adzra Tan Sri Gani Patail, Federal C ounsel, International Affairs Division, Chambers
of the Attorney-General of Malaysia,
MsMichelle Bradfield, Research Fellow, Lauterpach t Centre for International Law, University of
Cambridge, Solicitor (Australia),
Coausnsel; - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Malaisie est représenté par :
S. Exc.M. Tan Sri Abdul Kadir Mohamad, ambass adeur en mission extrao rdinaire, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Malaisie, conseille r auprès du premier ministre pour les affaires
étrangères,
comme agent ;
S. Exc.Mme Dato’ Noor Farida Ariffin, ambassadeur de la Malaisie auprès du Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. Dato’ Seri Syed Hamid Albar, ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
M. Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail, Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, C.B.E., Q.C., professeur honorai re de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, membre de l’Institut de droit inte rnational, membre de la Cour permanente
d’arbitrage,
M. James Crawford, S.C., F.B.A., professeur de dr oit international à l’Université de Cambridge,
titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Nicolaas Jan Schrijver, professeur de droit international public à l’Université de Leyde, membre
associé de l’Institut de droit international, membre de la Cour permanente d’arbitrage,
M. Marcelo G. Kohen, professeur de droit interna tional à l’Institut universitaire de hautes études
internationales de Genève, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
Mme Penelope Nevill, chargée de cours au Downing College de l’Université de Cambridge,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Datuk Azailiza Mohd Ahad, chef du département des affaires internationales, cabinet de
l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Datin Almalena Sharmila Johan Thambu, pr emière adjointe au chef du département des
affaires internationales, cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Suraya Harun, conseiller fédéral principal au département des affaires internationales, cabinet
de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
M. Mohd Normusni Mustapa Albakri, conse iller fédéral au départ ement des affaires
internationales, cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
M. Faezul Adzra Tan Sri Gani Patail, conseiller fédéral au département des affaires internationales,
cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
Mme Michelle Bradfield, Research Fellow au Lauterpacht Research Center for International Law
de l’Université de Cambridge, Solicitor (Australie),
comme conseils ; - 6 -
Dato’ Haji Abd. Ghaffar bin Abdullah, Deputy State Secretary of Johor (Administration),
Mr.Abd. Rahim Hussin, Under-Secretary, Maritime Security Policy Division, National Security
Council, Department of the Prime Minister of Malaysia,
Mr.Raja Aznam Nazrin, Under-Secretary, Adjudi cation and Arbitration, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Malaysia,
Capt. Sahak Omar, Director General, Department of Hydrography, Royal Malaysian Navy,
Mr. Tuan Haji Obet bin Tawil, Deputy Director 1, Land and Mines Office of Johor,
Dr.Hajah Samsiah Muhamad, Director of Acqui sition, Documentation and Audiovisual Centre,
National Archives,
Cdr. Samsuddin Yusoff, State Officer 1, Department of Hydrography, Royal Malaysian Navy,
Mr.Roslee Mat Yusof, Director of Marine, Nort hern Region, Marine Department Peninsular
Malaysia,
Mr.Azmi Zainuddin, Minister-Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Ms Sarah Albakri Devadason, Principal Assistant Secretary, Adjudication and Arbitration Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
Mr. Mohamad Razdan Jamil, Special Officer to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
MsHaznah Md. Hashim, Principal Assistant Secr etary, Adjudication and Arbitration Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
as Advisers;
Professor Dato’ DrS. haharil Talib, Head of Special Research Unit, Chambers of the
Attorney-General of Malaysia,
as Consultant;
Mr.Tan Ah Bah, Director of Survey (Boundary Affairs Section), Department of Survey and
Mapping,
Professor Dr.Sharifah Mastura Syed Abdullah, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities, National University of Malaysia,
Professor Dr. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, Director of the Institute for Malaysian and International
Studies, National University of Malaysia,
Mr. Ahmad Aznan bin Zakaria, Principal Assistant Director of Survey (Boundary Affairs Section),
Department of Survey and Mapping, - 7 -
M. Dato’Haji Abd. Ghaffar bin Abdullah, secrétaire d’Etat adjoint du Johor (administration),
M. Abd. Rahim Hussin, sous-secrétaire au département de la politique de sécurité maritime, conseil
de la sécurité nationale, services du premier ministre de la Malaisie,
M. Raja Aznam Nazrin, sous-secrétaire au département de la justice et de l’arbitrage, ministère des
affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
Le capitaine Sahak Omar, directeur général du service hydrographique de la marine royale
malaisienne,
M. Tuan Haji Obet bin Tawil, premier directeu r adjoint du bureau du territoire et des mines du
Johor,
M. Hajah Samsiah Muhamad, directeur des acquisitions, centre de documen tation audiovisuel des
archives nationales,
Le commandant Samsuddin Yusoff, premier officier d’état-major du service hydrographique de la
marine royale malaisienne,
M. Roslee Mat Yusof, directeur de la marine pour la région septentriona le, département de la
marine de la Malaisie péninsulaire,
M. Azmi Zainuddin, ministre conseiller à l’ambassade de la Malaisie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Sarah Albakri Devadason, secrétaire adjointe pr incipale au département de la justice et de
l’arbitrage, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
M. Mohamad Razdan Jamil, assistant spécial du ministre des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
Mme Haznah Md. Hashim, secrétaire adjointe prin cipale au département de la justice et de
l’arbitrage, ministère des affaires étrangères de la Malaisie,
comme conseillers ;
M. Dato’ Shaharil Talib, professeur, directeur du service des études spéciales du cabinet de
l’Attorney-General de la Malaisie,
comme consultant ;
M. Tan Ah Bah, directeur de la topographie, ser vice des frontières, département de la topographie
et de la cartographie,
Mme Sharifah Mastura Syed Abdullah, professeur, doyenne de la faculté des sciences sociales et
humaines de l’Université nationale de la Malaisie,
M. Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud, professeur, directeur de l’Institut d’études malaisiennes et
internationales de l’Université nationale de la Malaisie,
M. Ahmad Aznan bin Zakaria, directeur adjoint pr incipal de la topographie, service des frontières,
département de la topographie et de la cartographie, - 8 -
Mr.Hasnan bin Hussin, Senior Technical Assist ant (Boundary Affairs Section), Department of
Survey and Mapping,
as Technical Advisers.
The Government of the Republic of Singapore is represented by:
H.E. Mr. Tommy Koh, Ambassador-at-Large, Mini stry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Singapore, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Anil Kumar s/o N T Nayar, Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
H.E. Mr. S. Jayakumar, Deputy Prime Minister, Co -ordinating Minister for National Security and
Minister for Law, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore,
Mr. Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of the Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Chao Hick Tin, Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., member of the English Bar, Chairman of the United
Nations International Law Commission, Emeritus Chichele Professor of Public International
Law, University of Oxford, member of the Institu t de droit international, Distinguished Fellow,
All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X-Nanterre, member and former Chairman of
the United Nations International Law Commission, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, member of the New York Bar,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Ms Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’ap pel de Paris, member of the Rome Bar,
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. S. Tiwari, Principal Senior State Counsel, Ch ambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic
of Singapore,
Mr. Lionel Yee, Senior State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of
Singapore,
Mr. Tan Ken Hwee, Senior Assistant Registrar, Supreme Court of Singapore
,
Mr. Pang Khang Chau, Deputy Senior State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the
Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Daren Tang, State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of Singapore, - 9 -
M.Hasnanbin Hussin, assistant technique principal du service des frontières, département de la
topographie et de la cartographie,
comme conseillers techniques.
Le Gouvernement de la République de Singapour est représenté par :
S. Exc. M. Tommy Koh, ambassadeur en mission ex traordinaire (ministère des affaires étrangères
de la République de Singapour), professeur de droit à l’Université nationale de Singapour,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Anil Kumar s/o N T Nayar, ambas sadeur de la République de Singapour auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
S. Exc. M. S. Jayakumar, vice-premier ministre, mini stre coordinateur pour la sécurité nationale et
ministre de la justice, professeur de droit à l’Université nationale de Singapour,
M. Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice de la République de Singapour,
M. Chao Hick Tin, Attorney-General de la République de Singapour,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Un ies, professeur émérite de droit international
public (chaire Chichele) à l’Univer sité d’Oxford, membre de l’In stitut de droit international,
Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College d’Oxford,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies, membre associé de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Rodman R. Bundy, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de New York, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
Mme Loretta Malintoppi, avocat à la Cour d’appel de Paris, membre du barreau de Rome, cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds, Paris,
comme conseils et avocats ;
M. S. Tiwari, Principal Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Lionel Yee, Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Tan Ken Hwee, premier greffier adjoint de la Cour suprême de Singapour,
M. Pang Khang Chau, Deputy Senior State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la
République de Singapour,
M. Daren Tang, State Counsel au cabinet de l’Attorney-General de la République de Singapour, - 10 -
Mr. Ong Chin Heng, State Counsel, Chambers of the Attorney-General of the Republic of
Singapore,
Mr. Daniel Müller, Researcher at the Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University
of Paris X-Nanterre,
as Counsel;
Mr. Parry Oei, Chief Hydrographer, Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore,
Ms Foo Chi Hsia, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
Mr. Philip Ong, Assistant Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
Ms Yvonne Elizabeth Chee, Second Secretary (Political), Embassy of the Republic of Singapore in
the Netherlands,
Ms Wu Ye-Min, Country Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Singapore,
as Advisers. - 11 -
M. Ong Chin Heng, State Counsel au cabinet de l’ Attorney-General de la République de
Singapour,
M. Daniel Müller, chercheur au centre de droit in ternational de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université de
Paris X-Nanterre
comme conseils ;
M. Parry Oei, hydrographe en chef de l’autorité maritime et portuaire de Singapour,
Mme Foo Chi Hsia, directeur adjoint au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Singapour,
M. Philip Ong, sous-directeur au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de Singapour,
Mme Yvonne Elizabeth Chee, deuxième secrétaire (affaires politiques) à l’ambassade de la
République de Singapour aux Pays-Bas,
Mme Wu Ye-Min, chargée de mission au ministère des affaires étrangères de la République de
Singapour,
cocomnseillers. - 12 -
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. The sitting is open. Before I
give the floor to Professor Pellet to resume his oral arguments, I should like to inform you that
Judge Shi, for reasons communicated to me, is unabl e to sit with us this morning. You have the
floor.
M. PELLET : Thank you very much, Mr. President.
JOHOR N ’AVAIT AUCUN TITRE SUR PEDRA BRANCA ET N ’A PAS DONNÉ
SA PERMISSION À LA CONSTRUCTION DU PHARE
I.L’ABSENCE DE TITRE DE JOHOR SUR PEDRA B RANCA
A. L’absence de document probant établissant l’existence d’un titre originel
de Johor sur Pedra Branca
18. Monsieur le président, Messieurs les jugeslorsque je me suis interrompu hier, j’avais
décrit les quelques rares documents (il n’y en a qutrois) invoqués par la Malaisie et qui, selon
elle, mentionneraient Pedra Branca et comporteraie nt la preuve du titre originel dont elle se
prévaut. Comme je l’ai montré, c’est faire dirà ces documents beaucoup plus qu’ils ne disent.
Mais le fait qu’il s’agisse des principales «cartouches» de la Partie malaisienne, montre à quel point
celle-ci manque de munitions. Elle n’en tire pas moins quelques autres cartouches, qui, plus
encore, ratent leur cible car elles ne mentionnent nullement Pedra Branca.
2. Les autres documents invoqués par la Malaisie
19. Outre ce que j’ai présenté hier, les prndus éléments de preuve du titre originel que
revendique la Partie mala isienne sont les suivants (et de nouveau leur petit nombre montre, à lui
seul, à quel point cette «preuve» se révèle malaisée). Il s’agit :
⎯ d’une lettre de John Crawfurd du 10 janvier 1824 au gouverneur général des Indes ;
⎯ des deux traités de 1824, entre la Grande-Bretagne et les Pays-Bas d’une part, avec le sultan et
le temenggong de Johor d’autre part ; et
⎯ du rapport Presgrave de 1828.
En outre, la Malaisie invoque quelques docum ents postérieurs à la prise de possession de
Pedra Branca par les Britanniques, qui, selon elle, confirmeraient aussi le titre originel de Johor sur
Pedra Branca bien sûr. Il s’agit cette fois : - 13 -
er
⎯ de la sentence Ord du 1 septembre 1868 ;
⎯ de la lettre du sultan de Johor du 20 mars 1886 ;
⎯ de l’accord de 1927 entre Johor et Singapour sur la délimitation de leurs eaux territoriales
respectives ; et même
⎯ de l’accord de 1973, également sur la mer territoriale entre l’Indonésie et Singapour.
Ni isolément ni considérés ensemble, ces docum ents ne viennent au soutien de la thèse
malaisienne, qu’ils datent d’avan t la prise de possession de Pedra Branca par les Britanniques, ou
qu’ils soient postérieurs.
a) Les «titres» documentaires antérieurs à 1847
20. Quelque effort d’imagination que l’on fasse, il est impossible de trouver dans l’un
quelconque des documents antérieurs à 1847 la preuve ou la confirmation du titre originel
qu’invoque la Malaisie. Cela es t tout particulièrement vrai en ce qui concerne la lettre de
John Crawfurd du 10 janvier 1824 1, lettre dans laquelle le réside nt britannique à Singapour décrit
l’extension territoriale de la principauté de Johor de la manière suivante en anglais :
«This principality extends on the Continent from Malacca to the extremity of
the Peninsula on both coasts. It had several settlements on the island of Sumatra, and
embraced all the islands in the Mouth of the Straits of Malacca with all those in China
2
seas, as far as the Natunas in the latitude of 4º North and the longitude 109º East» .
21. Comme Singapour l’a montré, il s’agit là d’une description très générale des possessions
du Sultan de Johor quand les Britanniques se sont établis à Singapour («when we formed our
settlement in the year 1819» écrit Crawfurd) ⎯ description qui, soit dit en passant, ne confirme pas
l’impression d’un Etat fort et puissant que veut donn er la Malaisie : «The present Sultan when he
connected himself with us was not only destitute of all authority, but living in a state of complete
3
indigence.»
22. Quoi qu’il en soit, on ne saurait certainement déduire de cette description que la
souveraineté territoriale de Johor s’étendait aux îles inhabitées de la région ni, évidemment, aux
mers incluses dans cette superficie (la description faite par Crawfurd porte sur plusieurs dizaines de
1
CMS, vol. 2, annexe 2.
2
Ibid., p. 10, par. 20.
3 Ibid., p. 11, par. 24. - 14 -
4
milliers de milles marins carrés!). Le rapport Pr esgrave de 1828 sur la pi raterie dans la région
5
appelle d’ailleurs les mêmes remarques .
23. Il est du reste révélateur que ni Crawfurd dans son Descriptive Dictionary of the Islands
6
and Adjacent Countries publié en 1856 , ni Presgrave dans la liste des cinquante-quatre «lieux
7
relevant de la juridiction de Johor» («places within the jurisdiction of [the Sultan of] Johor») , ni
Begbie dans son tableau de la population maritime de l’Empire de Johor, qui montre les différentes
8
îles et les tribus par lesquelles elles sont habitées de 1834 ne mentionnent Pedra Branca parmi les
possessions de Johor, il est significatif aussi que les deux derniers s’en tiennent à l’énumération des
seules îles habitées ce qui, comme nous le verrons tout à l’heure lorsque je terminerai cette
plaidoirie, n’est pas non plus sans signification. Il n’est d’ailleurs pas sans intérêt que la Partie
malaisienne se soit gardée de produire tous ces documents, pourtant tout à fait pertinents…
24. Les traités de 1824 ne confirment pas da vantage les prétentions de la Malaisie.
S’agissant du traité anglo-néerlandais du 24 mars 1824 ⎯dont M.Chan a rappelé hier les
circonstances dans lesquelles il a été élaboré et les effets globaux ⎯, la Malaisie semble interpréter
l’articleXII de ce traité comme signifiant que les Hollandais avaient reconnu la souveraineté
9
britannique sur le détroit de Singapour dans son ensemble . Ce n’est assurément pas ce que dit
cette disposition, dont il n’est peut être pas inutile de rappeler les termes :
«His Netherlands Majesty withdraws th e objections which have been made to
the occupation of the Island of Singapore, by the Subjects of His Britannick Majesty.
His Britannick Majesty, however, engages, that no British Establishment shall
be made on the Carimon Isles, or on the Isla nds of Battam, Bintang, Lingin, or on any
of the Islands south of the Straight of Singapore, nor any Treaty conclude[d] by
10
British Authority with the Chiefs of those Islands.»
25. En réalité, cette disposition n’a rien à voir avec le statut juridique du détroit, qui demeure
inchangé. Ceci, au demeurant, n’a guère d’importance en ce qui nous concerne : la seule question
4 MM, vol. 3, annexe 27.
5
Voir CMS, p. 51-52, par. 4.24-4.25.
6
CMS, annexe 17.
7
CMS, annexe 7.
8 Voir CMS, annexe 8.
9 Cf. CMM, p. 20, par. 32 ou RM, p. 38, par. 83.
10
MM, vol. 2, annexe 5. - 15 -
pertinente est celle de savoir si ce texte a pu a voir une incidence quelconque en ce qui concerne le
statut juridique de Pedra Branca. A cette question, la réponse est, très clairement, négative.
26. Dans son contre-mémoire , la Malaisie avait affirm é le contraire: «The 1824
Anglo-Dutch Treaty confirmed Johor’s title» 11 because, it wrote: «PBP is clearly to the north of
the line [defined by the Treaty], as part of the te rritory of Johor and within the British sphere of
influence» 12 ; cette ligne aurait été représentée, selon la Malaisie, sur la carte des Indes orientales
néerlandaises de van Hinderstein publiée en 1842 13. La Partie malaisienne persiste et signe dans sa
14
réplique, sans apporter d’éléments nouveaux sinon quelques citations d’historiens qui, en fait,
confirment l’analyse de Singapour 15.
27. Il en résulte en effet ⎯ et je cite la réplique malaisienne ⎯ que :
«In order to avoid confusion, Elout (at the time adviser to the Dutch Colonial
Minister) had sought to substitute in the dr aft text of 1 February 1824 the phrase «any
of the remaining islands belonging to the ancient kingdom of Johore» by the phrase
«any of the Islands South of the Straight of Singapore». This was agreed to. In the
final text, Article XII referred not to Johor , but to Carimon, Battam, Bintang, Lingin
and other islands South of the Straits.» 16
Comme l’a expliqué, M.Chan hier, on ne saurait m ontrer plus clairement que les Parties ont pris
grand soin de ne pas prendre position sur la possession des îles de la région par Johor ⎯ par
l’«ancien Royaume de Johor», cela mérite d’être noté.
Projection 3 ⎯ Extrait de la carte de van Hinderstein de 1842 (RS, encart 5) (dossier des
o
plaidoiries, onglet n 17)
28. Au surplus, Singapour a montré, dans sa propre réplique, qu’il résulte des travaux
préparatoires du traité de1824 que les Parties ont délibérément évité de tracer une ligne précise
17
entre les zones d’influence respectives des deux signataires et que la ligne figurant en rouge sur la
carte de1842 montrait simplement les lim ites de la résidence néerlandaise de Riau 18 (cette
11 CMM, p. 21, titre D.
12
Ibid., p. 22, par. 35.
13
CMM, section des cartes, p. 277-278, RM, p. 43 ou RS, encart 5, après la p. 22.
14
RM, p. 34-38, par. 78-83, et p. 42, par. 94.
15 Ibid., p. 36, par. 82.
16 Ibid.
17 RS, p. 18-19, par. 2.26-2.27, et p. 21-22, par. 2.34. Voir aussi CMS, p. 52-53, par. 4.26-4.27.
18
RS, p. 22-23, par. 2.35. - 16 -
résidence apparaît en plus clair sur la carte projetée en ce moment) mais il ne s’agissait pas des
limites de la zone d’influence reconnue aux Pays-Bas par le traité ni, moins encore, relevant de la
Grande-Bretagne.
[Fin de la projection 3.]
Projection 4 ⎯ Croquis des abords de Pedra Branca indiquant le couloir de navigation
(CMS, encart 3) (dossier des plaidoiries, onglet n 18) o
J’ajoute qu’il est discutable de considérer que Pedra Branca soit située «au nord du détroit de
Singapour» si, comme cela semble être le cas de la Malaisie, on a de cette voie d’eau maritime une
conception extensive, et si l’on veut bien se rappe ler que l’île est située au sud du chenal principal
menant au détroit proprement dit.
29. Mais il y a davantage. Comme souvent, la Partie malaisienne opère un tour de
passe-passe lorsqu’elle affirme benoîtement que la position de Singapour reviendrait à considérer
que le traité anglo-n éerlandais de 1824 aurait transformé Pedra Branca en une terra nullius («it
19
somehow became terra nullius») . Avec tout le respect dû à nos contradicteurs, c’est évidemment
absurde: le traité de 1824 n’a pas modifié le statut de l’île. Si elle était terra nullius, elle l’est
demeurée ; si elle avait appartenu à l’ancien Johor, elle aurait continué à lui appartenir. Mais il est
clair que le traité n’a ni créé, ni modifié, ni c onfirmé aucun titre et que la Malaisie ne peut s’en
prévaloir à l’appui de l’existence de son prétendu «titre originel».
[Fin de la projection 4.]
30. Il en va de même de la donation effectu ée l’année suivante par le sultan Abdul Rahman
(celui de Riau) à son frère Hussein (celui de Singapour), donation portant sur les terres et îles lui
20
appartenant dans la sphère d’influence britannique . Ici encore, sans qu’il soit bien nécessaire de
polémiquer avec nos contradicteurs sur la signification exacte de cet acte, il suffit de noter que
nemo transferre potest quod non habet 21 : si Pedra Branca était res nullius, elle l’est restée ; si elle
22
ne l’était pas, elle ne l’est pas devenue. Mais, en tout cas, la lettre du 25juin1825 n’a rien
19 RM, p. 35, par. 78 ; voir aussi, par. 78.
20 Voir CMS, p. 34-35, par. 3.31-3.34.
21 Cf. CPA, Max Huber, Ile de Palmas, sentence arbitrale du 4 avril 1928, RGDIP, 1935, p. 168 (texte anglais in
RSANU, vol. II, p. 842-843). Voir aussi Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6., Oxford University
Press, 2003, p. 120 et Marcelo G. Kohen, Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale, PUF, Paris, 1997, p. 138.
22 CMS, annexe 5 ; voir aussi l’annexe 6. - 17 -
changé à la situation et ne prouve en au cune manière l’existence d’un titre préexistant
(Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (In donésie/Malaisie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002 ,
p. 674-675, par. 109).
31. L’utilisation que la Partie malaisienne essai e de faire du traité conclu par Crawfurd avec
23
le sultan et le temenggong de Johor le 2août1824 ne convainc pas davantage. Bien sûr, par
l’article II, ces derniers ⎯ le sultan et le temenggong ⎯ cèdent à la Compagnie anglaise des Indes
orientales «the Island of Singapore, situated in th e Straits of Malacca, together with the adjacent
seas, straits and islets, to the extent of ten geogr aphical miles, from the coast of the said mainland
of Singapore». Singapour ne conteste évidemment en aucune manière que «it clearly follows that
this area was not an area which the English East India Company or Singapore could enlarge
unilaterally» 24. Mais, ici encore, ce traité n’a eu strictement aucun effet, ni dans un sens ni dans
l’autre, quant à la souveraineté sur les autres îles de la région, y compris Pedra Branca, qui n’entre
clairement pas dans ses prévisions. Et il ne conf orte évidemment pas la thèse malaisienne quant à
l’existence de son introuvable titre originel sur l’ île. Dès lors, l’affirmation selon laquelle «[t]itle
25
to other territories and sea areas remains where it was, namely in the Sultanate of Johor» demeure
une pure pétition de principe sans aucune justification.
32. Je souligne en particulier que la largeu r de 10 milles géographiques retenue pour fixer la
limite ne peut en aucun cas signifier, comme la Malaisie tente de le soutenir , que dans la région les
princes et souverains exerçaient des dro its souverains jusqu’à cette limite ⎯ arbitraire et sans
aucun fondement logique ⎯ de 10 milles et seulement dans cette limite. Dans les deux cas sur
lesquels la Partie malaisienne s’appuie, le traité Crawfurd et la cession de Labuan, cette limite a été
choisie pour de pures raisons de convenance dans le seu l but de leur garantir un contrôle effectif et
d’éviter les litiges avec l’Etat cédant 26. Dans l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan
et Pulau Sipadan, la Cour n’a d’ailleurs pas exclu que le sultan de Sulu pût exercer des droits sur
les îles litigieuses malgré leur «distance considérable» de Bornéo (21 milles marins pour Ligitan et
23MM, annexe 6.
24
CMM, p. 25, par. 41.
25Ibid., par. 42 ; les italiques sont de nous ; voir aussi RM, p. 35, par. 79.
26Voir RS, p. 11-16, par. 2.12-2.21. - 18 -
une quinzaine pour Sipadan) et bien que ce même sultan ⎯le sultan Sulu ⎯ ait cédé tous ses
droits et pouvoirs sur l’ensemble de ses possessions à Bornéo et «les îles situées dans la limite de
3lieues marines [ce qui correspond d’ailleurs à 9 m illes marins] à partir de la côte». Et au
contraire, la Cour s’est demandée si le sultan disposait d’un titre sur les îlots de quelque nature
qu’il soit (ce qui n’a pas pu être prouvé) ( Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan
(Indonésie/Malaisie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p. 674-675, par. 108-110).
Projection 5 ⎯ Extrait du croquis iloustrant le traité Crawfurd de 1824 (MM, encart 7)
(dossier des plaidoiries, onglet n 19)
33. Il est en outre impossible de suivre la Malaisie lorsqu’elle af firme : «Obviously, Johor
could not have ceded the territory of Singapore Is land and islets situated within ten geographical
27
(i.e. nautical) miles to the English East India Company if Johor did not have a title to it» . En
droit strict, ceci est évidemment exact ⎯toujours en vertu de l’adage nemo dat quod non habet .
Mais, en l’occurrence, il ne faut certainement pas prendre la formule au pied de la lettre ⎯ un
simple coup d’Œil à la carte projetée derrière moi le montre. Il s’agit d’un croquis établi par la
Malaisie et figurant à la page25 de son mémoire. Il montre que, si l’on interprète littéralement
l’article II du traité Crawfurd, la Compagnie aurait reçu non seulement de petites îles situées (celles
qui clignotent en ce moment) au nord de Bulan et de Batam, mais aussi une partie de l’île de Batam
elle-même ⎯ qui pourtant, sans aucun doute, ne relevait pas du sultan de Johor établi à Singapour,
mais de celui de Riau. En d’autres termes, il faut considérer que le sultan et le temenggong ont
cédé celles des îles situées dans la limite des 10milles leur appartenant ⎯pas les autres ⎯, et
au-delà, que la formule utilisée constitue un indice ⎯parmi quantité d’autres ⎯ des incertitudes
qui régnaient alors quant à l’étendue exacte de l’emprise territoriale des souverains locaux.
[Fin de la projection 5.]
b) Les «documents confirmatifs» invoqués par la Malaisie
34. L’érection du phare Horsburgh sur Pedra Bran ca constitue une date clé: après elle, le
titre de la Grande-Bretagne ⎯s’il a été acquis par celle-ci (ce que M.Brownlie montrera tout à
l’heure) ⎯ ne pouvait être déplacé que par un accord de cession en bonne et due forme. Il apparaît
27
CMM, p. 24, par. 40 ; voir aussi RS, p. 41-42, par. 93. - 19 -
donc à priori curieux que la Malaisie se préval e de documents postérieurs à cette date pour
«confirmer» son prétendu «titre immémorial». Singapour est néanmoins prête à admettre que l’on
pourrait concevoir des hypothèses où l’existence d’ un tel titre pourrait être confirmée ou révélée
par des documents plus récents qui en établiraient la continuité 28. Tel n’est pas le cas de ceux sur
lesquels se fondent nos contradicteurs.
35. Nous y reviendrons plus longuement plus tard lorsque nous discuterons la pratique
respective des deux Parties à l’égard de Pedra Bran ca. Et je me bornera i donc à relever qu’aucun
des documents que la Malaisie invoque à cette fin ne témoigne, de quelque façon que ce soit, de la
conviction d’un titre quelconque de Johor sur l’île.
Projection 6 ⎯ Carte 10 de l’atlas cartographique de la Malaisie (carte jointe à la sentence
Ord de 1868), annotée (en rouge) pour montrer la zone du différend entre Johor et Pahang
(SCM, encart 6) (dossier des plaidoiries, onglet n 20) o
⎯ La «sentence Ord» du 1 erseptembre 1868 29tranche un différend opposant le Johor moderne à
Pahang; elle porte sur une aire géographique située très au nord de Pedra Branca et ne
concerne nullement cette île ; interpréter la phr ase du dispositif décidant que «toutes les îles ...
situées au sud de cette ligne [le long du parallèle de 2° 59' 20''» nord] appartiendront à Johore»
(«all the islands … to the south of [the line of latitude 2°59'20''» N belong] to Johore»)
comme impliquant la reconnaissance de la souve raineté du Sultanat sur Pedra Branca revient à
prétendre que Bintan, ou … Bornéo ou l’Australie relèvent de Johor sous prétexte que toutes se
trouvent au sud de la ligne en question, ce qui n’a strictement aucun sens ;
[Fin de la projection 6]
⎯ La lettre adressée le 20 mars 1886 au comte de Granville, secrétaire d’Etat aux colonies, par le
sultan de Johor 30qui demandait que soit établi un registre des «îles situées dans la haute mer et
les détroits appartenant à l’Etat de Johore» (« Islands in the open Seas and Straits belonging to
the State of Johore») ne peut pas davantage être interprétée dans le sens de la thèse
28Cf. CPA, M. Huber, Ile des Palmes, sentence arbitrale du 4 avril 1928, RGDIP, 1935, p. 196 (texte anglais in
RSANU, vol.II, p. 866); sentence arbitrale du 29 septembre 1988, Taba, ILM, 1988, p. 1469, par.175. Voir aussi
e
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law , 6 éd., Oxford University Press, 2003, p.125-126 ou
Marcelo G. Kohen, Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale, PUF, Paris, 1997, p. 170-171.
29MM, vol. 3, annexe 86.
30Ibid., annexe 63. - 20 -
malaisienne ; d’abord, le moins que l’on puisse dire de cette démarche, est qu’elle ne témoigne
pas d’une connaissance très sûre de l’extens ion territoriale de Johor. Ensuite, comme
Singapour l’a montré dans son cont re-mémoire, l’objet de la requêt e était, en réalité de faire
reconnaître la souveraineté de Johor sur les Na tunas et n’avait strictement aucun rapport avec
31
Pedra Branca . Enfin et surtout, comme souvent, le ra isonnement de la Partie malaisienne est
«sens dessus dessous»: sans doute le sultan estime-t-il que certaines îles de la région ne lui
appartiennent pas, mais il ne sait p as lesquelles et on doit en déduire, a contrario, qu’il admet
que ce n’est pas le cas de toutes les îles de la région. Quant à savoir s’il considérait que c’était
ou non le cas de Pedra Branca, bien malin qui pourrait le dire: contrairement à ce qu’il avait
annoncé 32, le sultan n’a pas envoyé la liste des îles qu’il estimait lui appartenir et la
33
Grande-Bretagne n’a pas donné suite à la demande ;
⎯ Les deux épisodes suivants dans lesquels la Ma laisie croit voir une confirmation de son titre
imaginaire sont beaucoup plus tardifs puisqu’ il s’agit de l’accord du 19 octobre 1927 entre la
34 35
colonie des détroits et Johor confirmé en 1995 , et du traité du 25 mai 1973 entre l’Indonésie
36
et Singapour ; les uns et l’autre se bornent strictemen t à la délimitation de la mer territoriale
autour de l’île de Singapour et sont sans rapport aucun avec Pedra Branca 37. Et l’on ne peut
évidemment rien en déduire en ce qui concerne le titre originel sur cette île, dont se prévaut la
Partie malaisienne.
36. D’une façon plus générale , une remarque s’impose: la quasi-totalité des documents sur
lesquels la Malaisie fait fond p our affirmer son indispensable mais introuvable titre originel, ne
mentionnent pas nommément Pedra Branca. Il ne s’agit que de simples «assertions of sovereignty
and jurisdiction that fail to mention any islands whatsoever, and with general references to ‘the
31
CMS, p. 56-58, par. 4.35-4.37.
32
MM, annexe 63, lettre du 20 mars 1886, par. 5.
33
Voir CMS, p. 57-58, par. 4.36.b).
34 MM, vol. 2, annexe 12.
35 Ibid., annexe 19.
36 Ibid., annexe 18.
37
Voir la carte insérée à la page 49 du mémoire de la Malaisie. - 21 -
38
islands’ with no further specificity» . Comme dans l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pulau
Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie), le fait que l’île en litige ne soit «nommément cité[e]
dans aucun des instruments juridiques … que la Malaisie a produits pour démontrer» le titre
allégué (arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002, p.674, par.108) ne plaide certainement pas en faveur de son
existence et interdit de considérer les documents en question comme étant «en relation spécifique
avec [l’île] en litige pris [e] comme tel[le]» (ibid. , p. 683, par. 136). Sans rapport avec Pedra
Branca, qu’ils n’identifient pas, et que, bien s ouvent, ils ne concernent manifestement pas, ces
documents n’ont aucune valeur probante pour ce qui nous intéresse.
37. Que déduire de tout ceci, Monsieur le président ? Une chose très simple : à l’exception
d’un article de presse isolé et sujet à cauti on de 1835, dont j’ai parlé hier, il n’existe aucun
document, aucun traité, aucune proclamation, aucune décision de justice, aucune opinion
doctrinale qui fasse état, plus même, qui implique de quelque manière, que Johor jouissait ou se
prévalait d’un titre territorial quelconque sur Pedr a Branca avant que la Grande-Bretagne prenne
possession de l’île. Même les experts consultés par la Malaisie se gardent bien de l’affirmer.
Contrairement à ce qu’elle laisse entendre 39, le professeur Houben ne dit rien de tel: sans doute
considère-t-il que la souveraineté ou la suzeraineté (perentah) de ce qu’il appelle le Royaume de
Johor-Riau «consisted [during the first quarter of the nineteenth century] of a ring of islands in the
northwestern part of the Riau Archipelago and included Singapore and a portion of Johor
coastline» 40. Mais il ne va pas au-delà et s’abstient d’en déduire quoi que ce soit en ce qui
concerne et les îles précises dont il s’agit, et leur nature. En particulier, il ne s’aventure pas à
affirmer que cette perentah s’étendait à des îles inhabitées comme Pedra Branca ⎯ contrairement à
ce que la Malaisie veut faire croire d’ailleurs lors qu’elle ajoute, juste après avoir cité M. Houben :
«Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge faisaient partie du territoire du temenggong»
41
(«PBP, Middle Rocks and South Ledge fell within the Temenggong’s territory») : ceci, c’est ce
qu’affirme la Partie malaisienne, pas son expert ... Quant au professeur Andaya, il ne dit rien du
38 Erythrée/Yémen, première phase (souveraineté terr itoriale et portée du différend) , sentence arbitrale du 9
octobre 1998, RSANU, vol. XXII, p. 246, par. 136.
39
RM, p. 35, par. 80.
40
RM, appendice II, p. 227-228, par. 28.
41RM, p. 35, par. 80. - 22 -
statut juridique de l’île alors même qu’il n’hésite pas à alléguer, je l’ai dit hier , que Johor exerçait
e
(au XVII siècle il est vrai) sa souveraineté sur les mers environnantes.
38. La prudence de ces experts est compréhensible : à défaut d’être juristes, MM. Andaya et
Houben sont spécialistes de l’histoire de la ré gion et, à ce titre, ils ne peuvent ignorer que la
conception que les populations locales se faisaient d es rapports de l’autorité politique au territoire
excluait que la souveraineté territoriale s’étendît à des îles inhabitées et éloignées des côtes comme
Pedra Branca ⎯et, on ne saurait trop y insister, aucun document, pas un seul, ne confirme les
allégations malaisiennes à cet égard. Une telle prétention est d’ailleurs tout à fait incompatible
avec les principes du droit international général qui étaient applicables à l’époque dans les relations
entre les souverains locaux et les puissances européennes.
B. Ni les conceptions territoriales des populations locales, ni les principes du droit
international général n’établissent l’existence d’un titre originel
de Johor sur Pedra Branca
39. Monsieur le président, il ne faut sûrement pas exagérer les différences existant entre ces
deux conceptions des rapports au territoire: comme le fait remarquer la Malaisie, qui y consacre
inutilement de longs passages de ses écritures, Johor a toujours été considéré comme un Etat
indépendant, et traité comme tel par les puiss ances européennes. A ce titre, il relevait de
l’application du droit international général tel qu’il était en vigueur à l’époque (voir Sahara
occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 38-39, par. 79). Singapour n’a aucune querelle
avec cela. Il n’en reste pas moins que, comme l’a noté la Cour dans son avis consultatif de 1975
dans l’affaire du Sahara occidental, «aucune règle de droit international n’exige que l’Etat ait une
structure déterminée, comme le prouve la dive rsité des structures étatiques qui existent
actuellement dans le monde» ( Ibid., p.43-44, par. 94). Ainsi que cela ressort d’ailleurs des
opinions d’historiens que la Partie malaisienne a jointes à sa réplique, Johor, comme tous les
royaumes ou principautés de la région, quel que soit leur nom, connaissait une forme
d’organisation politique différente de celles qui avai ent cours en Europe ; et le pouvoir politique y
entretenait, avec sa population et son territoire, d es rapports très particuliers qui peuvent contribuer
42
Voir CR 2007/20, p. 56, par. 11. - 23 -
à montrer à quel point les prétentions de la Mala isie à un «titre originel» sur PedraBranca sont
infondées.
1. La conception malaise du territoire
40. Je peux cependant être rapide en ce qui concerne la conception malaise du territoire, que
Singapour a exposée de manière que je crois très claire aux pages 18 à 24 de son contre-mémoire et
que M.Chan a à nouveau expliqué hier. Il me suffit sans doute de dire que les opinions des
professeurs Andaya et Houben, que la Malaisie a jointes à sa réplique, confirment plus qu’elles
contredisent les vues de Singapour, même si, à cert ains égards, leurs affirmations doivent sans
doute être nuancées ⎯ surtout en ce qui concerne les conséquences qu’ils tirent de leurs exposés au
point de vue juridique.
41. Au paragraphe 61 de sa réplique, la Malaisie nous reproche d’avoi r soumis la formation
de l’Etat dans le monde malais à la «théorie du gruyère suisse» (a «Swiss cheese» theory). Ce
faisant, elle commet deux erreurs très regrettables : en premier lieu, nos contradicteurs font une
fâcheuse confusion entre le gruyère suisse ⎯ qui n’a pas de trou ⎯ et l’emmental français, qui lui
en a 43; ensuite, et cela est encore plus grave (e n tout cas pour l’affaire qui nous occupe), cette
remarque témoigne en réalité d’un eurocentrisme qui n’a pas lieu d’être. Alors qu’en Europe, le
pouvoir politique s’est, progressivement, «territorialisé» et que ce mouvement a marqué le passage
de la féodalité à l’organisation éta tique, il n’en est pas allé forcément ainsi dans le reste du monde
où les liens d’allégeance personnelle ont souvent été prédominants.
42. Comme l’a également relevé la Cour da ns son avis de 1975: «[des] liens politiques
d’allégeance à un souverain ont souvent été un élément essentiel de la texture de l’Etat» ( Sahara
occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975 , p. 44, par. 95) et c’est d’ailleurs en se fondant sur
les «liens de dépendance ou d’alliance qui avaient un caractère essentiellement tribal et non
territorial», et «compte tenu des particularités de ce territoire et de cette organisation sociale et
politique de la population, que la Cour [a examiné] la questi on des liens juridiques du Sahara
occidental avec le Royaume du Maroc et l’ensemble mauritanien au moment de la colonisation par
l’Espagne» (Ibid., p.42, par.88-89). Il doit en aller de même en la présente espèce. S’il ne fait
43
Voir http://www.lagruyere.ch/archives/2003/03.01.14/gruyere2.htm. - 24 -
guère de doute que les relations du souverain au territoire (qui existaient indiscutablement,
44
contrairement à ce que la Mala isie veut nous faire dire) passaient par l’intermédiation de la
population, il est évident que, comme l’a rappelé M. Chan hier, elles ne s’ étendaient pas à des îles
inhabitées et éloignées des côtes comme Pedra Bran ca. Et la présence occasionnelle d’Oräng-laut
⎯les pirates des mers ⎯ qui n’est d’ailleurs attestée par aucun document, ne change rien à
l’affaire.
43. Comme pour s’en persuader elle-même, la Malaisie présente à maintes reprises les
45
Oräng-laut comme des «sujets du temenggong» ; mais il s’agit d’une affirmation pure et simple
dont elle n’a jamais établi la réalité. Qu’il y ait eu des liens entre cette tribu et les sultans de Johor
(puis le temenggong), c’est probable. Mais le s «preuves» qu’avance la Partie malaisienne
concernent indifféremment les liens entr e les Oräng-laut, d’ une part, et les
sultans de Johor continental et de Johor-Riau-Lingga, d’autre part. Par exemple, lorsque
John Crawfurd affirme que les Oräng-laut qu’il a rencontrés «sont des sujets du roi de Johor» («are
subjects of the King of Johore») 46, compte tenu de la date de ce tte rencontre (1822), il ne peut, à
l’évidence, s’agir que du sultan établi à Riau, p as de celui du continent. En second lieu, ces liens,
s’ils ont existé, semblent avoir manqué de stabilité, ce qui est d’ailleurs l’une des caractéristiques
de ces populations nomades.
44. Il n’est pas sans intérêt de relever que, dans son arrêt de 2002, la Cour a écarté sans appel
le même argument avancé par la Malaisie à l’appui de sa prétention au sujet d’un titre traditionnel
sur Ligitan et Sipadan :
«La Malaisie invoque les liens d’allégeance qui auraient existé entre le sultan de
Sulu et les Bajau Laut, qui habitaient les îles au large de la côte de Bornéo et auraient
occasionnellement fréquenté les deux îles inhabit ées. La Cour pense que de tels liens
ont fort bien pu exister, mais qu’ils ne su ffisent pas, en eux-mêmes, à prouver que le
sultan de Sulu revendiquait le titre territorial sur ces deux petites îles ou les incluait
dans ses possessions. De même, rien ne pr ouve que le sultan ait exercé une autorité
effective sur Ligitan et Sipadan.» ( Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan
(Indonésie/Malaisie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2002 , p. 675, par. 110; voir aussi, p. 670,
par. 98.)
44
Voir par exemple, RS, p. 25, par. 54.
45
Voir notamment, pour la seule réplique: p. 11, par. 22 ; p. 27, par. 59-60 ; p.29, par. 64-65, ou p.204,
par. 435.
46RM, vol. 2, annexe 7. - 25 -
45. Il en va de même ici: même en admetta nt que les Oräng-laut aient eu des liens avec
Johor et se soient adonnés à leurs activités favorites, la piraterie et la pêche, autour de Pedra Branca
⎯ce que la Malaisie n’a nullement prouvé ⎯, ceci ne saurait en aucune manière établir un titre
traditionnel ou originel de Johor sur l’île en litige. Qu’il s’agisse de pêche ou de piraterie, ce sont
des activités de personnes privées qui, comme la Cour l’a également dit, dans le même arrêt, «ne
sauraient être considérées comme des effectivités si elles ne se fondent pas sur une réglementation
officielle ou ne se déroulent pas sous le contrôle de l’autorité publique» 47(Ibid., p. 683, par. 140).
A plus forte raison, elles ne sauraient constituer la preuve du titre originel dont se prévaut la
Malaisie.
2. Les règles de droit international applicables
46. Ces considérations valent d’ailleurs tout autant dans la perspective de la conception
traditionnelle des rapports du pouvoir politique au territoire, dans laquelle je me suis placé jusqu’à
présent dans la ligne de ce qu’a dit M.Chan hier , que dans celle des principes généraux du droit
international public qui étaient applicables à l’époque dans les relations entre Etats ⎯ et, dès lors,
dans celles qui s’étaient nouées entre Johor et les puissances européennes. Etant entendu, je le
répète, qu’il n’y a pas de solution de continuité entre ces deux manières de considérer les choses :
le droit international général tena it compte des conceptions locales et en tiraient les conséquences.
Ceci apparaît à nouveau très clairement dans l’avis consultatif de 1975 dans l’affaire du Sahara
occidental, dans lequel la Cour a dit :
«Quelles qu’aient pu être les divergences d’opinions entre les juristes, il ressort
de la pratique étatique de la période considérée que les territoires habités par des tribus
ou des peuples ayant une organisation social e et politique n’étaient pas considérés
comme terra nullius.» (Sahara occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975 , p. 39,
par. 80)
47. En revanche, les territoires inhabités l’étaient 48. Et tel était à l’évidence le cas de
Pedra Branca qui, nous l’avons vu, ne relevait pas de la souveraineté territoriale du sultan de Johor
47Voir aussi, par exemple, Ile d’Aves, sentence arbitrale du 30 juin 1865in A.deLaPradelleetN.Politis,
Recueil des arbitrages internationaux, vol. II, p. 413 ou Différend frontalier entre Chardjah et Dubaï, sentence arbitrale
du 19 octobre 1981, ILR, vol. 91, 1993, p. 606.
48Voir par exemple la sentence arb itrale du roi d’Italie, 28 janvier 193Île de Clipperton , RSANU, vol. II,
p. 1105-1111. Voir aussi: Patrick Daillier et Alain Pellet, Droit international public (Nguyen Quoc Dinh) , 72002,
p.530 ou Malcom N. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa. International Legal Issues , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986,
p. 31. - 26 -
dans la perspective même des conceptions du territoire prévalant dans le monde malais. Il va sans
dire qu’elle n’en relevait pas non plus au regard du droit international général.
48. Quant à la théorie de la contiguïté (tout e relative d’ailleurs en l’espèce), elle n’a jamais
été reconnue par le droit international. Il su ffit d’avoir à l’esprit la position limpide prise par
MaxHuber dans l’affaire de l’ Ile de Palmas , dans le cadre d’un litig e concernant des faits
contemporains à ceux qui nous occ upent. La citation est suffisamment convaincante et importante
pour mériter d’être faite intégralement bien qu’elle soit un peu longue :
«Bien que des Etats aient soutenu, dans certaines circonstances que les îles
relativement proches de leurs côtes leur appartenaient en vertu de leur situation
géographique, il est impossible de démontrer l’existence d’une règle de droit
international positif portant que les îles situées en dehors des eaux territoriales
appartiendraient à un Etat à raison du seul fait que son territoire forme pour elle la
terra firma (le plus proche continent ou la plus proche île d’étendue considérable).
Non seulement il semblerait qu’ il n’existe pas de précédents suffisamment nombreux
et d’une valeur suffisamment précise pour établir une telle règle de droit international,
mais le principe invoqué est lui-même de nature si incertaine et si controversée que
même les gouvernements d’un même Etat ont en diverses circonstances émis des
opinions contradictoires quant à son bien-fondé. Le principe de la contiguïté, en ce
qui concerne les îles, peut avoir sa valeur lorsqu’il s’agit de leur attribution à un Etat
plutôt qu’à un autre, soit par un arrangement entre les parties; soit par une décision
qui n’est pas nécessairement fondée sur le droit; mais comme règle établissant ipso
jure une présomption de souveraineté en faveur d’un Etat déterminé, ce principe
viendrait contredire ce qui a été exposé en ce qui concerne la souveraineté territoriale
et en ce qui concerne le rapport nécessaire entre le droit d’exclure les autres Etats
d’une région donnée et le devoir d’y exercer les activités étatiques. Ce principe de la
contiguïté n’est pas non plus admissible comme méthode juridique pour le règlement
des questions de souveraineté territoriale ; car il manque totalement49e précision et
conduirait, dans son application, à des résultats arbitraires.» (Voir aussi Sahara
occidental, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1975, p. 43, par. 92.)
La démonstration me paraît impeccable.
49. Avant d’aller plus loin, permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, je vous prie, de récapituler
les constatations faites jusqu’à présent :
i) aucun document (à l’exception d’un article de journal sans valeur probante), aucune
opinion doctrinale antérieure à la date criti que, n’avance la thèse d’un titre originel de
Johor sur Pedra Branca ;
ii) celle-ci n’est pas davantage corroborée par les activités invoquées par la Malaisie sur l’île
(qu’aucun document n’atteste) ou dans les mers environnantes, ni la pêche, ni la piraterie
49
Arbitrage relatif à l’île de Palmas, Cour permanend’arbitrage, sentence du 4 avril 1928, Nations Unies,
Recueil des sentences arbitrales, vol. II, p. 852. [Traction française: CH. Rousseau, Revue générale de droit
international public, t. XLII, 1935, p. 182] (texte anglais in RSANU, vol. II, p. 854-855). - 27 -
ne pouvant raisonnablement être tenues pour des preuves d’une quelconque volonté d’agir
«à titre de souverain» ; au surplus,
iii) les documents attestant de ces activités sont rares, souvent sujets à caution, et les liens
entre les Oräng-laut qui s’y livraient et le temenggong ou le sultan de Johor, en admettant
qu’ils eussent existé, ce que la Malaisie n’a pas prouvé, sont incertains et, pour paraphraser
les conclusions de la Cour dans l’affaire Indonésie/Malaisie, «de tels liens ont fort bien pu
exister, mais … ils ne suffisent pas, en eux-mêmes, à prouver que le sultan de [Johor]
revendiquait le titre territorial sur [cette petite île]» Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et
Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie), arrêt, C.I.J.Recueil2002 , p. 675, par.110.); du
reste,
iv) les princes et chefs locaux ne considéraient pas les îles inhabitées de la région, éloignées
des côtes et situées en dehors de leur mer terr itoriale, comme relevant de leur souveraineté
territoriale ; et
v) Pedra Branca ne peut pas davantage être rattachée à la Malaisie, au nom d’un principe de
contiguïté qui n’a jamais été reconnu dans le droit international positif.
II.L ABSENCE DE «PERMISSION » DONNÉE PAR JOHOR À LA CONSTRUCTION DU PHARE
50. Monsieur le président, la thèse de la Malaisie dans son ensemble dépend entièrement de
l’existence d’un titre originel de Johor sur Pedra Branca. En son absence, c’est son argumentation
tout entière qui s’écroule et, en particulier, l’argument selon lequel Johor aurait donné sa
«permission» à l’érection d’un phare sur l’île. L’absence indiscutable d’un tel titre suffit à en
disposer.
51. Selon la Partie malaisienne, «Pulau Batu Puteh, en tant qu’île placée sous la souveraineté
de Johor, était comprise dans cette autorisation» («PBP, an island under J ohor’s sovereignty, was
50
covered by that permission») . Cet argument repose sur deux prémisses :
⎯ Pedra Branca relevait de la souveraineté de Johor ;
⎯ la prétendue «permission» concernait l’île en question.
L’une et l’autre sont erronées.
50
RM, p. 94, par. 188 d). - 28 -
52. Je m’en suis déjà expliqué en ce qui concerne la première. Pour ce qui est de la seconde,
elle est tout aussi intenable. Nous l’avons déjà longuement montré dans nos écritures 51, mais je
voudrais mettre en lumière le caractère incongru du raisonnement, si c’en est un, tenu par nos amis
malaisiens.
53. Dès le départ, ils faussent quelque peu le problème, en écrivant au paragraphe 112 de
leur réplique: «Both Parties agree that Governor Butterworth wrote to the Sultan and the
Temenggong in order to request permission to construct the lighthouse.» [Les italiques sont de
nous.] Or il ne s’agit pas du phare (« the lighthouse»), Monsieur le président, mais d’ un phare (a
lighthouse) dès lors que, comme cela était envisagé alors, il devait être construit sur un
emplacement appartenant à Johor, ainsi que je l’expliquerai plus en détail dans un instant. Toutes
les allégations qui suivent s’en trouvent biaisées : «They also agree that th e Johor authorities gave
such permission by letters dated 25 November 1844.» «Such permission» ? «Cette permission» ?
Oui: cette permission de construire un phare, si il devait l’être sur le territoire de Johor; mais
seulement si il devait en aller ainsi. La seule chose sure est, assurément, que les Parties «disagree
as to the geographical scope of that permission» . Mais l’allégation suivante de la Malaisie ⎯ la
dernière sur ce point ⎯ est à nouveau trompeuse : «Singapore’s argues that Butterworth’s request
52
for permission concerned Peak Rock and only Peak Rock.» Ce n’est, à vrai dire, pas tout à fait ce
que nous disons…
54. La vérité est que personne ne sait ce que disaient les lettres que Butterwoth, le
gouverneur de la colonie des détroits, avait adressées au sultan de Johor et au temenggong, et que
ni Singapour, ni la Malaisie n’ont retrouvées et dont on ne connaît l’existence que par les réponses,
53 54
fort vagues du premier, le sultan , et plus précises du second, le temenggong . Toutes deux sont
datées du 25 novembre 1844. Le contenu des lettres du gouverneur ne peut donc qu’être inféré de
celles-ci et des autres lettres qu’il avait lui-même écrites à la même époque.
51CMS, p. 82-92, par. 5.28-5.50 et p. 95-108, par. 5.58-5.90 ; RS, p. 38-43, par. 3.8-3.22.
52
RM, p. 54, par. 112.
53MS, vol. 2, annexe 13.
54Ibid. - 29 -
Projection 7 ⎯ Croquis illustratif (Point Romania-Peak Rock-Pedra Branca)
55. L’argument de la Malaisie se polarise sur la réponse du temenggong qui constate que
«[his] friend [read: «the Gover nor»] is desirous of erecting a Light House near Point Romania»
and who (temenggong) goes on by saying that the British «were at full liberty to put up a Light
House there, or [at] any spot deemed eligible». Cette phrase, qui est au cŒur de l’argumentation
malaisienne, appelle deux précisions.
56. En premier lieu, elle implique nécessairement qu’il s’agit de «tout emplacement
appartenant à Johor » («any spot belonging to Johor »). Curieusement, d’ailleurs, la Malaisie
l’admet fugitivement, lorsqu’elle écrit, au paragraphe 148 de sa réplique que : «This can only mean
that the authorization extended to any place under Johor’s sovereignty that the EIC would select
for the erection of the envisaged lighthouse in honour of James Horsburgh» (les italiques sont de
nous) ⎯ «tout emplacement sous la souveraineté de Johor», cela pouvait être Peak Rock (comme
on l’envisageait alors), ou Point Romania, ou Pulau Mungging. Mais pas Pedra Branca. En
prétendant le contraire, la Malaisie se heurte de nouveau à l’obstacle, insurmontable pour elle, de
l’inexistence de tout titre de Johor sur Pedra Branca.
57. Et ceci constitue la première réponse, et la plus évidente, à l’allégation de la Malaisie
selon laquelle Pedra Branca était couverte par la permission donnée à la Grande-Bretagne de
construire le phare Hosburgh sur l’île : si le sultan et le temenggong l’avaient donnée, ils auraient
disposé d’un bien qui ne leur appartenait pas, ce qui ne se peut ou n’a aucune valeur juridique,
55
comme je l’ai exposé à propos du traité Crawfurd de 1824 . Pas plus qu’ils n’ont cédé à la
Grande-Bretagne des îles ou portions d’îles ne rele vant pas de leur domaine (mais de celui du
sultan de Riau-Lingga) comme Batu Berhenti, Pulau Belakang Padang, ou une partie de Batam, ils
ne pouvaient disposer de Pedra Branca. Décidément, nemo plus juris tranferre potest quam ipse
56
habet .
58. La Malaisie écrit, dans sa réplique , que «ce que Singapour doit montrer est que
l’autorisation concernait exclusivement Peak Rock» («what Singapour has to show is that the
57
permission exclusively concerned Peak Rock») . Pas du tout, Monsieur le président, le véritable
55Voir plus haut, par. 33.
56
Voir plus haut, note 21.
57RM, p. 61, par. 125 ; les italiques sont dans l’original. - 30 -
défi n’est pas, pour Singapour, de prouver que la permission ne concernait que Peak Rock ; il est,
pour la Malaisie de démontrer qu’elle concernait Pedra Branca. Elle ne l’a pas fait ; et elle ne peut
le faire : Johor n’avait aucun titre sur cette île…
59. Du reste, en second lieu, si l’accord du temenggong ne concernait pas «exclusivement»
Peak Rock (mais aussi, possiblement, d’autres emplacements situés dans les possessions de Johor),
il ne portait en revanche certainement pas sur Pedra Branca.
60. La Malaisie écrit dans son mémoire que «la question de l’emplacement du phare resta
58
ouverte jusqu’en 1846» («the location of th e lighthouse was an open question until 1846» . Cela
se pourrait, Monsieur le président. Mais, en 1844, au moment de l’échange de correspondances qui
nous intéresse pour l’instant, le balancier était bien fixé sur Peak Rock qui est, du reste, assurément,
«près de Point Romania» ⎯ il s’agit de l’un des îlots du groupe des Romania Islands ⎯ alors que
59
ceci est beaucoup plus douteux s’agissant de Pedra Branca, qui n’en fait nullement partie .
[Fin de la projection 7.]
61. La chronologie ne laisse aucun doute :
⎯ en avril 1844, le gouverneur Butterworth charge le capitaine sir Edward Belcher de déterminer
l’emplacement le plus approprié pour le phare envisagé 60 ;
er
⎯ le 1 octobre, celui-ci désigne à cette fin «l’île Ro mania la plus au large» («the Romania outer
61 62
island») ⎯ expression qui vise, sans aucun doute, Peak Rock ; il n’y a pas de désaccord
entre les Parties sur ce point 63 ;
⎯ le 3 octobre, dans une lettre au capitaine Faber, Butterworth, après avoir rappelé que Pedra
Branca fut, un temps, envisagé, endosse le rappor t de Belcher et fait part de son intention de
visiter Point Romania 64;
58
MM, p. 59, par. 116.
59
Cf. CMS, p. 97, par. 5.65, ou RS, p. 39-40, note 85, et encart 6.
60
Cf. MS, annexe 11.
61MS, annexe 11.
62Voir MS, p. 42-43, par. 5.34-5.36.
63Cf. MM, p. 57, par. 113 ; p. 62, par. 128, ou p. 64, par. 131.
64
CMS, annexe 10 ; voir aussi l’annexe 9. - 31 -
⎯ le 20 novembre 1844, Thomson, le géomètre du gouvernement (the «Government Surveyor»),
que Butterworth avait chargé de préparer une étude de faisabilité (concernant exclusivement
65
Peak Rock), remet son rapport ⎯ il ne porte que sur «Peak Rock Romania» . C’est durant
cette période que Butterworth écrivit au sultan et au temenggong pour obtenir leur accord à la
construction d’un phare et c’est le 25 novembre (1844) que ceux-ci le donnèrent, dans les
66
termes que j’ai indiqués . Il ne peut faire de doute que celui-ci portait sur Peak Rock ; en tout
cas pas sur Pedra Branca.
62. Ceci est du reste confirmé par la lettr e que le gouverneur Butterworth a adressée le
28 novembre 1844 au secrétaire du gouvernement des Indes, qui renvoie au rapport Belcher et à la
carte préparée par Thomson indiquant la position «of the Rock therein alluded to» (du rocher dont
il est question dans le rapport) «with reference to Pedra Branca» (par rapport à Pedra Branca), ce
qui montre qu’il ne pouvait s’agir de ce dernie r, mais que, à nouveau, seul Peak Rock était en
67
cause . Et Butterworth de préciser: « This Rock is part of the Territories of the Rajah of Johore,
who, with the Tamongong have w illingly consented to cede it gratuitously to the East India
Company.» 68 Trois jours après réception des lettres du sultan et du temenggong, le gouverneur de
la Colonie des détroits interprétait l’autorisation donnée par ceux-ci comme portant sur «ce rocher»
(«this Rock»), c’est-à-dire Peak Rock.
63. Ce n’est que, en août 1846 ⎯deux ans plus ⎯ que Butterworth changea d’avis et opta
⎯ cette fois définitivement ⎯ pour Pedra Branca. Et ce n’est surement pas la lettre qu’il adressa
69
au secrétaire du gouvernement des Indes qui modifie les choses :
⎯ le fait que les lettres de 1844 du sultan et du temenggong y fussent à nouveau jointes ne saurait
constituer la preuve que la permission s’étenda it à Pedra Branca: en demandant une décision
finale à ses autorités, le gouverneur joint le dossi er complet de l’affaire, mais on ne peut rien
inférer de ceci ⎯ d’autant moins que d’autres docume nts concernant exclusivement Peak
65
MS, annexe 12.
66
Voir plus haut, par. 55-56.
67Voir aussi la lettre de Butterworth au sous-ecrétaire du gouvernement du Bengale, 22 août 1845, MS,
annexe 14.
68MS, annexe 13 ; les italiques sont de nous.
69MM, vol. 3, annexe 51. - 32 -
er
Rock, le rapport de Belcher du 1 octobre 1844 et la lettre de Thomson du 20 novembre 1844,
y sont également annexés; et ceci est égalem ent vrai en ce qui concerne la dépêche du
3octobre du gouvernement des Indes au conseil des directeurs de la Compagnie des Indes
70
orientales et, à plus forte raison, le «rapport co mplet» (Full Report) de Butterworth au
sous-secrétaire du gouvernement du Bengale du 12 juin 1848 71;
Projection 8 ⎯ Extrait de la lettre du 24 août 1846 adressée à G.A. Bushby, secrétaire du
gouvernement du Bengale par W.J. Butterworth, gouverneur de l’île du Prince-de-Galles, de
Singapour et de Malacca (dossier des plaidoiries, onglet n 21) o
⎯ le rapport d’expertise graphologique de Mme Lee Gek Kwee que Singapour a produit le
21 août dernier 72 confirme ce que Singapour ava it indiqué dès son contre-mémoire 73, à savoir
qu’il est «hautement probable» que, dans cette lettre, Butterworth renvoyait à : «The whole of
the Details for the ca re of Light Houses as set forth in [his] letter under date
28 November 1844…» and not «for the case of Light Houses…», ce qui n’a d’ailleurs guère de
sens ;
[Fin de la projection 8.]
⎯ mais, et c’est sans doute le plus important, même si l’on admettait que Butterworth avait
entendu renvoyer au dossier de Peak Rock, celui -ci ne serait évidemment transposable que
mutatis mutandis à Pedra Branca; les distances, par rapport à la côte malaisienne ou à
Singapour, sont différentes; les raisons du choix le sont aussi; et il en va de même du statut
juridique.
Il est du reste extrêmement révélateur que, à partir du moment où le choix s’est fixé sur
Pedra Branca, il n’ait plus jamais été qu estion de permission de la part de Johor 74 ⎯ jusqu’à
l’épisode de 1953, sur lequel je reviendrai vendredi.
70MM, vol. 3, annexe 54 ; v. RM, p. 86-88, par. 175-178.
71
RM, p. 88-89, par. 179-181.
72
Voir les lettres du greffier aux Parties du 11 octobre 2007.
73CMS, p. 104-105, par. 5.83 ; voir aussi RS, p. 41-42, par. 3.18.
74Voir, notamment, CMS, p. 105-108, par. 5.86-5.90 ; RS, p. 38-39, par. 3.9-3.11, ou p. 43, par. 3.22. - 33 -
Projection 9 ⎯ Comparaison du texte du rapport Thomson ( Account of the Horsburgh
Light-house -1852) cité par la Malaisie et du texte intégral tel qu’il figure dans le rapport
(CMS, p. 114, par. 5.103) (dossier des plaidoiries, onglet n 22) o
64. Et la venue du temenggong à Pedra Branca quelques jours après la cérémonie
d’inauguration du phare en 1850 ne vient certainem ent pas conforter la thèse malaisienne de la
souveraineté de Johor sur Pedra Branca. Il n’est pas sans intérêt de noter que, pour retourner la
situation à son avantage, la Malaisie se soit crue autorisée à tronquer la citation du compte rendu de
Thomson relatant la scène. La Partie malaisienne s’est en effet prévalue du fait que le temenggong
est «venu dans un magnifique sampan rapide...gr éé de gracieuses voiles latines» («came in a
beautiful fast sailing sampan … rigged with grateful latteen sails» 7). Les trois petits points entre
les mots «sampan» et «rigged» dissimulent une précision de la plus haute importance puisque,
comme le montre la comparaison avec le texte original, le vrai, qui est projeté à l’écran 76, ce beau
sampan rapide appartenait … au gouverneur de la colonie des détroits («a beautiful fast sailing
sampan belonging to the Governor of the Straits Settlements » 77). Et je comprends l’embarras de
nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre —même si je ne suis pas sûr que cette embarras justifie une
citation tronquée — car cela change tout Monsieur le président : contrairement aux affirmations de
la Malaisie, le temenggong (dont il est également révélateur qu’il n’ait pas été convié à la
cérémonie d’inauguration) ne se comporte pas en souverain mais en invité du gouverneur
britannique, qui met l’un de ses sampans à sa disposition, car, contrairement au ssi aux affirmations
78
de la Malaisie , il est difficile de concevoir que le temenggong eût pu utiliser un navire du
gouverneur sans y avoir été invité et qu’il se fût re ndu dans l’île par ce moyen sans en avoir reçu la
permission.
[Fin de la projection 9.]
65. C’est que, comme M. Brownlie va le mont rer maintenant si vous voulez bien lui donner
la parole, Monsieur le président, Pedra Branca ét ait sans aucun doute de venue une dépendance de
Singapour à la suite de sa prise de possession par le s Britanniques. Auparavant, permettez-moi de
75MM, p. 70, par. 148.
76
Voir CMS, p. 114, par. 5.103.
77MS, vol. 4, annexe 61, p. 533 ; les italiques sont de nous.
78RS, p. 122, par. 233. - 34 -
tirer brièvement les conclusions qui me semblent se dégager de la seconde partie de ma plaidoirie
de ce matin :
i) en 1844, lorsque le choix d’un emplacem ent pour la construction du phare Horsburgh
semblait fixé sur Peak Rock, le gouverneur de la colonie des détroits s’assure de l’accord
du souverain territorial ⎯ qui était indiscutablement Johor ;
ii) le sultan et le temenggong donnent l’un el’autre l’autorisation requise, qui devient sans
objet dès lors que le choix définitif s’est por té sur Pedra Branca, qui n’est pas mentionnée
dans leurs lettres ;
iii)la Malaisie raisonne «à l’envers» lo rsqu’elle postule que cet accord s’étendait à
PedraBranca alors qu’elle n’a jamais établi l’existence d’un titre originel de Johor sur
l’île ;
iv) du reste, à compter de 1846, il n’a plus jamais été question de permission ; et
v) la visite du temenggong à Pedra Branca en juin 1850, après l’inauguration du phare, sur un
bateau appartenant au gouverneur, ne confirme en aucune manière la «permission» dont la
Malaisie fait si grand cas ⎯ bien au contraire, elle montre que si permission il y a eu, elle
a été donnée au temenggong, ce dignitaire s’est rendu sur l’île à l’invitation et avec la
permission des autorités britanniques.
Monsieur le président, Messieurs de la Cour , je vous remercie bien vivement de votre
attention.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Professor Pellet, for your pleadings.
I now call on Mr. Brownlie.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Mr. President.
THE A CQUISITION OF TITLE TO PEDRA B RANCA IN 1847-1851
1. Mr. President and Members of the Court, it is an honour for me to address the Court today
as counsel for Singapore.
2. It is my task to deal with the acquisition of title by Singapore. - 35 -
3. Singapore possesses sovereignty over Pedra Branca on the basis of the lawful possession
of Pedra Branca by Singapore’s predecessor in title, the United Kingdom, in the period 1847
to 1851.
4. Prior to 1847 Pedra Branca was terra nullius, and had never been the subject of a prior
claim, or any manifestation of sovereignty by other means, by any sovereign entity.
5. The available documents support the infe rence that the British Crown proceeded on the
basis that Pedra Branca was terra nullius.
6. Malaysia has suggested from time to time th at the British officials were not conscious of,
or sensitive to, issues of title, and were indifferent to the geographical location of the site to be
established: I refer to the Malaysian Counter-Memorial, Volume I, paragraph 104.
7. However, the evidence indicates that the British Crown was conscious of the ramifications
of sovereignty in the region. Thus, in th e letter dated 28 November 1844, Butterworth, as
Governor, refers to the fact that Peak Rock “is pa rt of the Territories of the Rajah of Johore...”
(MS, Vol. 2, Ann. 13). The Governor was writing to Currie, Secretary to the Government of India.
And on the map on screen you will see that Peak Rock was a part of the Romania group of islands,
which is tab23 in the judges’ folder. And that is a chart ⎯ it is not a sketch ⎯ prepared by
Thomson. You can also see the letter from Capt ain Belcher to Butterworth, dated 1 October 1844
(MS, Vol. 2, Ann. 11).
8. The question of title also appears in the letter from Church, the responsible official at
Singapore, to Butterworth, dated 7 November 1850, in which the following passage appears:
“4. I observe Mr. Thomson advocates the Establishment of a Station near Point
Romania, for the purpose of affording assistance to the inmates of the Light House in
case of need, and also to suppress Piracy; an armed party of the strength suggested
would, doubtless, be of some Service, but I doubt whether such is absolutely
necessary, or commensurate with the permanent expense which such an establishment
must necessarily occasion. Romania moreover belongs to the Sovereign of Johore,
where the British possess no legal jurisdiction; it will of course, be necessary for the
Steamer or Gun Boats to visit Pedro Branca weekly; some benefits would also accrue
by requesting His Highness the Tumongong to form a village at Romania under the
control of a respectable Panghuloo to rende r assistance to the inmates of the Light
House in a case of emergency.” (MS, Vol. 3, Ann. 48; emphasis added.)
9. It is thus clear that the taking of possession of Pedra Branca by the British authorities
elicited no protests or reservations of rights from other Powers. The process of construction of the - 36 -
lighthouse and other public works was necessarily public in character and the operations were
referred to in the Singapore newspapers. The building operations which began in 1847 did not
necessitate seeking permission from other Powers in respect of shipping movements, which
included patrolling by British gunboats for the purpose of protecting ships moving building
materials and workmen.
10. The continuous public activities of the Br itish Crown over a period of four years also
elicited no reservations from other Powers. And in this general context it comes as no surprise that
the Dutch General Secretary in Batavia, writing to the Dutch Resident in Riau in 1850, should refer
to ‘‘the construction of a lighthouse at Pedra Branca on British territory” (RS, Vol. 2, Ann. 8).
11. Malaysia in response asserts that no protest or reservation of rights was called for
(CMM, p. 69, para. 134). This response rests on several unproven assumptions: for example, that
the British authorities had the permission of Johor. In any event Malaysia accepts that there was no
protest or reservation of rights on the part of Johor.
The funding and construction of the lighthouse and the associated works
12. The entire process of planning, choice of site, and construction of the lighthouse was
subject to the control and approval of the British Crown and its representatives.
13. The construction of the lighthouse involve d a series of decisions and activities on the
ground:
⎯ first, there was the choice of Pedra Branca as the site of the lighthouse;
⎯ second, there was the choice of the name of the lighthouse;
⎯ third, there was the planning of the construction work;
⎯ fourth, there was the funding of the construction work;
⎯ fifth, there were the visits of officials to Pedra Branca in the course of the construction;
⎯ sixth, there was logistical support provided by government vessels;
⎯ seventh, there was protection provided by gunboats;
⎯ eighth, the Government of India was the exclusive source of lighthouse equipment and tools;
⎯ ninth, the Government established and concluded the construction contract;
⎯ tenth, the specifications and estimates for the construction were decided by the Government. - 37 -
14. This entire procedure was under the aut hority and control of the British Crown. The
East India Company was the relevant organ of the British Crown.
15. It is necessary to introduce the sources of British authority in the Straits Settlements, and
these are now on screen and are at tab25 in the judges’ folder. These sources comprised
Singapore, Malacca and Penang (also known as the Prince of Wales Island). The
Straits Settlements were created in 1826 and were administered by the East India Company.
16. The East India Company acted as an organ of the British Crown and its activities were
supervised by the Board of Control in London headed by a British government minister.
17. It will be helpful if the nomenclature is explained. In general, reference to the
Government of India involves the Governor-General of India and his Council sitting in Calcutta ⎯
all of whom were officers of the East India Company. The Governor-General of India was subject
to the authority of the Court of Directors of the East India Company. This, in turn, was under the
direction of the Board of Control, which was headed by the Secretary of State, a British
government minister. Consequently, all decisions of the Government of India were under the
control of the British Crown, that is to say, the British Government in London. Below the
Governor-General of India, the administration was divided into four presidencies (Bengal,
Bombay, Madras and Agra). The Straits Settlement s, including Singapore, were administered as
part of the Bengal presidency at the time when the lighthouse was being planned and constructed.
18. The ultimate approval for construction of the lighthouse was obtained from the Court of
Directors of the East India Company (sited in London) and this was the appropriate procedure.
19. The evidence of the entire process of planni ng and construction consists, in large part, of
correspondence between three linked pairs of offici als of the Government of India, who were
instrumental in the planning and execution of the enterprise. The three pairs of officials can be
seen mentioned on the screen and in the judges’ folder at tab 26.
20. The three pairs of officials functioned in this way:
⎯ first, the Government of India, through the Bengal presidency, had authority over, and
corresponded with, Colonel W.J. Butterworth, Gove rnor of the Straits Settlements (hereinafter
referred to as “Governor Butterworth”); - 38 -
⎯ second, Governor Butterworth had authority over, and corresponded with, Thomas Church, the
Resident Councillor at Singapore; and
⎯ third, Thomas Church had authority over, and corresponded with, J.T. Thomson, the
Government Surveyor at Singapore, who was the architect and engineer responsible for
planning and constructing the lighthouse on Pe dra Branca (hereinafter referred to as
“Thomson”).
21. Governor Butterworth was directly involved from early on, and he himself recorded his
visit to Pedra Branca in 1847. Governor Butterw orth was present at the formal laying of the
foundation stone on 24 May 1850; and his name app ears on the panel in the Visitors Room of the
lighthouse; and he it was who signed the British Notice to Mariners dated 24 September 1851. It
was also Governor Butterworth who was in charge of the final commissioning ceremony on
27 September 1851.
22. But the authoritative witness is clearly Thomson. Apart from the correspondence
involving Thomson, a major resource is the Account of the Horsburgh Light-house , written by
Thomson and published, in 1852, in the Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia . This
is in fact the text of the official report prepared by Thomson, in his role as Government Surveyor at
Singapore, after completion of the project. It is dated 14 August 1852. As the preface explains, the
account had been prepared at the desire of Govern or Butterworth. On the panel in the Visitors
Room, Thomson is described as the “Architect” and it was Governor Butterworth who selected
Thomson for that position.
23. Thomson was in charge of the entire c onstruction project, and it was under his direct
control. Not only did he make regular visits to Pedra Branca, but he spent long periods living on
the island in a house. The correspondence between the key officials, together with Thomson’s
Account, produces a detailed and reliable volume of evidence.
Mr. President, it would help me if we could have a slightly early coffee break. I have a
break point here but not an easy one for some time afterwards.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Then I think it will be convenient to take the
coffee break now. - 39 -
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you very much.
The Court adjourned from 11.20 to 11.35 a.m.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Please be seated. Please continue,
Mr. Brownlie.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you.
The question of the applicable law
24. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I must now move to the question of the applicable
law. The position of Singapore has been set fort h in detail in the Memorial (pp.79-87). The
submission of Singapore is that title was acqui red by the United Kingdom in accordance with the
legal principles governing acquisition of territory in the material period, that is, 1847 to 1851. The
contemporary doctrine is consistent in requiring both an intention to acquire sovereignty and the
taking of possession.
25. On this basis the legal claim of Singapore can now be formulated in more detail as
follows:
⎯ First, the basis of the claim to sovereignty in respect of Pedra Branca is the lawful possession
of Pedra Branca effected by a series of official actions in the period 1847to 1851, beginning
with the first landing on Pedra Branca by Thomson some time between 21June and
9July1847, and ending with the ceremonial official commissioning of the lighthouse on
27 September 1851.
⎯ Second, the decision to build the lighthouse on Pedra Branca was taken by the Court of
Directors of the East India Company as an official organ of the British Crown.
⎯ Third, the entire process of planning, choice of site, and construction, was subject to the
exclusive control and approval of the British Crown and its representatives.
⎯ Fourth, the pattern of activities and official visits in the period 1847 to 1851, constitutes an
unequivocal manifestation of the will of the Britis h Crown to claim sovereignty in respect of
Pedra Branca for the purpose of building the Horsburgh lighthouse and its appurtenances, and
maintaining them on a permanent basis. - 40 -
⎯ Fifth, the acts of taking possession were peaceful and public and elicited no opposition from
other Powers.
⎯ Sixth, in 1850 the Dutch authorities referred in official correspondence to the construction of a
lighthouse “at Pedra Branca on British Territory” (RS, Ann. 8).
⎯ And, finally, title to Pedra Branca was acqui red by the British Crown in accordance with the
legal principles governing acquisition of territory in the period 1847 to 1851.
26. The evidence and relevant legal considera tions establish that the British Crown acquired
sovereignty in the period 1847 to 18 51, an entitlement subsequently inherited by the Republic of
Singapore.
27. The other aspect of the applicable law is the absence of any support in the evidence for
the claim of Malaysia to an “original title”. As ProfessorPellet has demonstrated, Malaysia has
failed to explain the legal basis of her claim to an original title to Pedra Branca.
28. The approach of Malaysia to the question of the applicable law is never clearly defined.
In the first place, arguments are deployed which avoid a careful examination of the principles of
general international law governin g acquisition of title. Thus, in her Memorial, Malaysia relies
upon three concurrent arguments: the alleged existence of permission of Johor; the alleged special
character of a British practice; and the assertion that the lighthouse did not raise an issue of
sovereignty (MM, paras. 104-177).
29. In her Counter-Memorial, Malaysia adopts the same arguments (paras. 52-142). There is
also emphasis on the argument that on the facts there was no intention to acquire sovereignty on the
part of the British Crown (paras. 63-72).
30. In the Reply, Malaysia leans heavily on the argument that there is no evidence of the
taking of possession by the British Crown (paras. 191-216), and further that there was no evidence
of a British intention to acquire sovereignty (paras. 247-278).
31. The Reply of Malaysia also incl udes the baseless assertion that, in her
Counter-Memorial, Singapore has misrepresented the “doctrinal sources” (RM, paras. 195-203).
32. Mr.President, the approach of Malaysia to the question of the applicable law is both
tangential and evasive. At the same time in a general way Malaysia appears to accept that the - 41 -
principles of general international law apply in accordance with the doctrine of inter-temporal law
(RM, paras. 191-216).
33. But Malaysia also relies on the subsidiary argument that there was permission in any
case, and this issue has been examined by my friend Professor Pellet.
34. A further subsidiary argument is to the effect that Britain had no intention of establishing
sovereignty over Pedra Branca (MM, paras. 157-64; CMM, paras. 63-72, and RM, paras. 247-259).
35. As I have already said, Malaysia appears to accept that the principles of general
international law apply, but this position is some what obscured by the insistence by Malaysia on
the argument that British practice required a formal taking of possession of territories as the basis
of sovereignty (Memorial, paras1 .57-164; Counter-Memorial, paras7 .3-92, and Reply,
paras. 204-216).
36. For the present, it is necessary to emph asize the confusion which emerges from the
arguments of Malaysia. Thus, in the Counter-M emorial, in particular, the argument is based
exclusively upon the alleged “British practice” of taking possession and an alleged absence of a
taking of possession. In this section no reference is made to the principles of general international
law (CMM, paras. 73-92).
37. However, both in her Counter-Memorial a nd in her Reply Malaysia includes sections on
the theme that various British actions relating to Pedra Branca were not accompanied by the
requisite intention to acquire sovereignty (CMM, paras. 63-72, and RM, paras. 247-259).
38. In these sections, Malaysia refers to general international law instead of British practice.
While Malaysia does not explain whether her descr iption of British practice is compatible with
general international law in the relevant period, the significant fact is that neither general
international law nor British practice required any kind of formalities in the relevant period, nor has
the legal position changed since the relevant period. Thus, as a matter of general international law,
the presence of formalities in relation to Christmas Island was not regarded as conclusive by the
United States Department of State (see Hackworth’s Digest, Vol.1 (1940), pp.507-508; RS,
Vol. 1, paras. 3.104-3.106).
39. In this context the official position of other sovereigns in the region is of key
significance. In relation to Pedra Branca the Government of the Netherlands East Indies - 42 -
recognized that the island constituted British territo ry in November1850, some time before the
commissioning of the lighthouse in September 1851. The Dutch document consists of a letter,
dated 27 November 1850, from the General Secretary, Dutch East Indies, to the Dutch Resident in
Riau (judges’ folder, tab 27). The relevant passage reads as follows:
“As commissioned, I have the honour of informing Your Excellency that the
government has found no grounds for granting gratuities to the commanders of the
cruisers stationed at Riau, as proposed in your despatch of 1November 1850,
number 649, on account of their shown dedica tion in patrolling the waterway between
Riau and Singapore, lending assistance to the construction of a lighthouse at Pedra
Branca on British territory.” (RS, Ann. 8 (English translation); emphasis added.)
40. The Dutch recognition had practical consequences and the Resident in Riau sent a
gunboat to Pedra Branca which arrived on 6 May 18 50 and, with British approval, was maintained
during the term of the buildi ng operations (see Thomson, Account, pp.424 and 473, MS, Vol.4,
Ann. 61, pp. 527 and 576).
41. In her Reply Malaysia asserts that the description of the “doctrinal sources” by Singapore
is flawed, essentially because the sources cited do not support the taking of lawful possession as a
mode of acquisition of title (see the Reply, paras. 195-203). This exercise in obfuscation is rejected
by Singapore. The authorities governing acquisition of territory in the middle and late nineteenth
century are set forth in the Singapore Memorial (paras.5.108-5.111). Nine authorities are
indicated, published in the period 1864 to 1906.
42. The Memorial of Singapore also concludes the relevant section as follows:
“5.109. In looking at the legal doctrine of the second half of the 19th century
there can be no doubt that the appropriation of Pedra Branca to the exclusive use of
the British Crown in 1847-1851 constituted title by occupation, that is, by the taking
of possession. The literature requires an intention to acquire sovereignty, a permanent
intention to do so, and overt action to implement the intention and to make the
intention to acquire manifest to other States. It is difficult to conceive of a
manifestation of sovereignty and exclusive possession as unmistakable in meaning as
the taking of possession of Pedra Branca by pe rsons acting with the authority of the
British Crown, more particularly in the light of the purpose of taking possession and
the construction which followed.
5.110. The doctrine quoted in this Chap ter is compatible with the practice of
States at the material time. On this asp ect of the matter reference can be made to
McNair’s International Law Opinions, which cites Reports of the Law Officers dated
1842 and 1868. The Reports stress the need to establish title by means of effective
occupation, as McNair points out in his commentary.”
The Memorial refers here to McNair’s International Law Opinions , 1956, Volume1, at
page 285. And, lastly, we say: - 43 -
“5.111. The sources confirm that an uninhabited island (such as Pedra Branca)
was perfectly capable of appropriation by the taking of lawful possession.”
That is the end of the quotation of the analysis from the Memorial.
43. This presentation of the authorities on the part of Singapore attracted a minimum of
detailed comment in the Malaysian Counter-Memoria l, paragraphs3 to 7. The Government of
Malaysia, however, purports to find the phr ase “lawful possession” controversial (see the
Counter-Memorial, paras. 52-62).
44. This reaction is an artifice. The term “lawful possession is synonymous with the
effective occupation of terra nullius, and this is evident from the quotations from the authorities set
forth in the Singapore Memorial: and see also the Reply of Singapore, Appendix A, at pages 285
to 290.
45. The Malaysian argument rejects the use of the term “possession” but it is difficult to
understand why. The term “possession” is the normal general term used in the technical literature,
and in the judgments of this Court to describe the basis of title otherwise than by treaty of cession.
This is also seen in standard academic references including:
(a) ProfessorO’Connell, International Law, 3rd edition, 1970, at pages 405 to 421;
(b)Sir Robert Jennings, Acquisition of Territory in International Law , published in 1963, at
pages 4 and 20; and
(c) Professor Rousseau, Droit International Public , published in 1977, VolumeIII, at pages151
to 173.
46. The older sources sometimes refer to “o ccupation” or ‘”effective occupation”. The
modern judicial usages are primarily “possession” or a predominant pattern of effectivités.
47. For examples of “possession” the Court can refer to Minquiers and Ecrehos. The Court
used the term possession in several key statements in successive pages. Thus, on page 55:
“Basing itself on facts such as these, the United Kingdom Government submits
the view that the Channel Islands in the Middle Ages were considered as an entity,
physically distinct from Continental Norma ndy, and that any failure to mention by
name any particular island in any rele vant document, while enumerating other
Channel islands, does not imply that any such island lay outside this entity ... If the
Ecrehos and Minquiers were never specifically mentioned in such enumerations, this
was probably due to their slight importance. Even some of the more important
Islands, such as Sark and Herm, were only occasionally mentioned by name in
documents of that period, though they were held by the English King just as were the
three largest Islands. The Court does not, however, feel that it can draw from these - 44 -
considerations alone any definitive conclusion as to the sovereignty over the Ecrehos
and the Minquiers, since this question must ultimately depend on the evidence which
relates directly to the possession of these groups.” (Minquiers and Ecrehos
(France/United Kingdom), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953; emphasis added.)
And, for a second example, in the same report, at page 57, the Court, having summarized the
history of the islets since 1204, observed:
“In such circumstances it is difficu lt to see why the dismemberment of the
Duchy of Normandy in 1204 should have the legal consequences attributed to it by the
French Government. What is of decisive importance, in the opinion of the Court, is
not indirect presumptions deduced from even ts in the Middle Ages, but the evidence
which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups .” (Ibid.,
p 57: emphasis added.)
48. The Court has sometimes referred to a predominant pattern of effectivités, as in the
Judgment in the case of Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia),
(I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 685-686, paras. 148-149).
49. In parenthesis it is worth pointing out that whilst the significance of the decision in the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case is not to be underestimated, the basic elements of the Judgment
reflected a particular model, namely the exis tence of contemporaneous and competitive State
activities of the two parties. The circumstanc es of the present case are qualitatively different and
the absence of any competition from Malaysia and its predecessors persisted until 1979.
50. In her Reply Malaysia reiterates her criticism of what she calls Singapore’s “theory of
lawful possession” (paras.190-203). However, the emphasis in this part of Malaysia’s written
pleading is upon the facts, that is to say, what may constitute a taking of possession of territory.
51. In addition the Malaysian Reply makes complaints of Singapore’s references to
authorities. Thus, Malaysia asserts that Singapore quotes from the authority W.E. Hall, but fails to
explain the relevance of what he says. But the text of Hall is characteristically clear and speaks for
itself: and the Court may refer to the Singapore Counter-Memorial at paragraph 5.11. Hall makes
clear that the ultimate criterion is the manifestation of the will of the Crown.
52. The Malaysian Reply also reproves Singapore for not quoting from the 5thedition of
Oppenheim’s International Law , described by Malaysia as a “cl assic British work”. Singapore
does not deny that Oppenheim is a “classic British wo rk”. However, the particular edition cited by
Malaysia ⎯ the 5th edition ⎯ was published in 1937, which makes it neither relevant as a source
of inter-temporal law nor useful as a digest of the most current judicial thinking. - 45 -
53. According to Malaysia, the 5th edition of Oppenheim stands for the proposition that the
proof of animus occupandi requires some formal act. Malaysia is wrong. She refers to the passage
which reads:
“For this purpose [that is, the purpose of taking possession by an occupying
State] it is necessary that it should take the territory under its sway (corpus) with the
intention of acquiring sovereignty over it (animus). This can only be done by a
settlement on the territory, accompanied by some formal act which announces both
that the territory has been taken possession of and that the possessor intends to keep it
under his sovereignty.”
54. One wonders why Malaysia does not cite the latest edition of Oppenheim , which would
be more relevant for having collected and digest ed the most current jurisprudence emanating from
this Court. In contrast to the 5th edition, the 9th edition of Oppenheim reads:
“For this purpose it is necessary that it should take the territory under its sway
(corpus) with the intention of acquiring sovereignty over it (animus) . This ⎯ at least
for considerable and habitable areas ⎯ normally involves a settlement on the territory,
accompanied by some formal act which announces both that the territory has been
taken possession of and that the possessor in tends to keep it under his sovereignty.”
(Oppenheim, 9th edition, II, p.689)
55. The 9thedition provides a footnote at the end of this passage I have just read, and the
footnote is as follows:
“Earlier editions of this volume suggest that settlement is a sine qua non of
effective occupation. While this is doubtless true of large areas of habitable terrain, it
might not apply to, for example, offshore is lets. The rocky islets of Jersey in the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case [ I.C.J. Reports 1953, p.47], could hardly be ‘settled’ in
any true sense of the word; but they surely could be ‘occupied’ if not subject already
to a sovereignty?”
56. Clearly the editors of the 9thedition interpreted previous editions of Oppenheim as
suggesting that effective occupation requires a settlement, and not, as Malaysia alleges, that
effective occupation requires some formal act. Si milarly, SirHumphreyWaldock also interprets
the passage from earlier editions of Oppenheim as making settlement ⎯ and not formal acts, ⎯ an
essential element of effective occupation. Writing in 1948 Waldock notes:
“The most recent edition of Oppenheim still asserts categorically that territory
can only be taken into possession by settlement upon it and that otherwise the
occupation is only fictitious. But this theory has been decisively rejected by arbitral
and judicial decisions in the present century.” (25 BYBIL 311 (1948), p. 315.)
In the same article, Waldock made clear his view that no formal acts are required. He explained
that evidence of the intention to acquire soverei gnty “may consist either of published assertions or - 46 -
acts of sovereignty” (p.334). This, together with the 9thedition of Oppenheim, confirms that
Malaysia is wrong to rely on the 5thedition of Oppenheim for a proposition which it does not
support.
57. What is more significant for the present purpose is Malaysia’s complete disregard for the
sources of applicable inter-temporal law. The Singapore Memorial cites nine works published
between 1864 and 1906, including such classic British works as SirRobertPhillimore’s
Commentary upon International Law (published in 1879) and SirTraversTwiss’ The Law of
Nations in Peace (published in 1884). None of these author ities considered formal acts to be an
essential element of effective occupation. It is notable that Malaysia has made no attempt to
address any of these authorities directly.
58. In this context I shall turn to Malaysia’s treatment of British practice. In her Memorial,
Malaysia describes this as “the traditional and consistent British practice of formally taking
possession of territories under its sovereignty” (MM, p.73, para.157). The Malaysian
Counter-Memorial calls it “standard practice” (CMM, pp. 38-39, para. 76). In support of her claim
that there is such a “standard practice”, Malaysia refers to a number of examples where formalities
were undertaken in the course of taking of possessi on. In doing so, Malaysia has committed the
logical fallacy of leaping directly from a descrip tive account to a normative conclusion. As the
Singapore written pleadings have made clear, th ere is no evidence that British State practice
requires the performance of formalities as a positive rule. In fact, the evidence points the other
way.
59. While formalities are commonly performed, it is clear that British officials do not
consider formalities to be either “necessary” or “required”. One example is the United Kingdom
Application before this Court in the Antarctica case, which Malaysia so heavily relied on. In her
Counter-Memorial, Malaysia quotes half a sen tence from paragraph17 of the United Kingdom
Application: “Great Britain’s title to the is lands and territories of the Dependencies was thus
formally confirmed and defined by the issue of the Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917...” The
second half of the sentence, which Malaysia omits to quote, reads: “but, as has been shown, it did
not originate or depend on these Letters Patent, and had been in existence for many decades - 47 -
previously”. Clearly, the drafters of the Unite d Kingdom Application did not consider formalities
to be a requirement of British practice.
60. The Singapore Reply also cited the example of Pitcairn Island. A British Foreign Office
official noted in 1893 in relation to Pitcairn Isla nd that: “No record of the hoisting of the British
flag, or of its having been declared British territory , but so considered.” (RS, p.80, para.3.102.)
Here was yet another British official who had no difficulty accepting that territory can be acquired
without formalities. While still on the subject of Pitcairn Island, Members of the Court may recall
that, two years ago, certain Pitcairn islanders attempted to dispute British sovereignty over the
island. The Pitcairn Island Court of Appeal, consisting of three judges from New Zealand, whose
judgment is found at tab 28 of the judges’ folder, held that:
“It is not necessary to define with accuracy the time at which Pitcairn Island did
become a British possession. Sometimes there may be a gradual extension of
jurisdiction over a territory, as was recognised in Attorney General for British
Honduras v. Bristowe (1880) 6 App Cas 143. British Honduras was formally annexed
in 1862, but there were grants of land by the Crown made as early as 1817. The Privy
Council [that is, the final Appeal Court of the British Empire] held that sovereignty
was acquired on or before that earlier year. Similarly, a formal act of acquisition is
not required . It is the intention of the Crown, gathered from its own acts and
surrounding circumstances, that determines whether a territory has been acquired for
English law purposes. The same principle a pplies in the resolution of international
disputes as to sovereignty.” ((2005) 127 ILR 232, pp. 294-295; emphasis added.)
61. In short, the judges, after examining the British practice applicable in the mid-nineteenth
century, found that “a formal act of acquisition is not required” and that, as a matter of English law,
the intention of the Crown is to be “gathere d from its own acts and surrounding circumstances”.
This is a clear, unequivocal and authoritative refutation of the Malaysian thesis on British practice.
62. Finally, Singapore referred to SirKenneth Roberts-Wray. Roberts-Wray joined the
Dominions Office, subsequently the Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office in 1931
and rose to be the Legal Adviser to the Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office in
1945, holding that position for 15years until hi s retirement in 1960. He wrote the book
Commonwealth and Colonial Laws as a guide and manual for future generations of lawyers in the
Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office. If there is indeed a rule of British practice
requiring formalities in every case, one would have expected the chief legal adviser to the
Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office to say so in his book. He does not. Instead, - 48 -
where formalities are concerned, Roberts-Wray only records that they are “preferable” ⎯ not
essential ⎯ merely preferable.
The evidence of acquisition of title
63. Mr. President, I must now move on to examine the evidence of acquisition of title. In the
period 1847 to 1851 the British Crown acquired title by the taking of lawful possession or, which is
the same thing, a process of effective occupation. Malaysia seeks to gain some advantage by
suggesting that the length of the process is in some sense anomalous. But, of course, it is not. The
process of taking possession and the appropriation of Pedra Branca for the purpose of building a
lighthouse simply did take that period. It seems academic to speculate at what point in time title
was established. The acknowledgment of title by the Dutch authorities took place in 1850.
64. In any event, the very public process of c onstruction began in the months of January to
March 1850: I refer here to Thomson’s Account, pages 402 to 407. The operations were supported
by the steamer Hooghly and the gunboat Charlotte , together with decked lighters called tonkangs
(Thomson, p. 401).
65. MrP. resident, by the time that the lighthouse was commissioned on the
27 September 1851, Pedra Branca had been the subj ect of a major sequence of official acts set on
foot by the British Crown, and involving the ta king of exclusive possession of Pedra Branca as a
whole.
66. The Malaysian contention that the possession was only for the purpose of acquiring room
for the lighthouse flies in the face of common sense.
67. The strong evidence of the taking of la wful possession or effective occupation by the
British Crown has induced my distinguished opponents to produce a whole armoury of obfuscation,
and I shall now review those different forms of Malaysian obfuscation.
(a)Forms of Malaysian obfuscation
Malaysia: The requirement of a formal act of taking possession
68. In the first place Malaysia contends that there is a legal requirement of a formal act of
taking possession and that the (alleged) absence of any formal act of possession of Pedra Branca - 49 -
constituted evidence that Britain had no intention of establishing sovereignty over it (MM,
paras. 157-164; CMM, paras. 63-72).
69. As we have already explained to the C ourt, in fact Malaysia produces no credible
evidence of a requirement of a formal act of taking possession either in British practice or in
general international law.
70. The remarkable fact which emerges from the lengthy exposition in Malaysia’s
Counter-Memorial is that no source is indicated wh ich recites the alleged requirement of a formal
act of taking. The standard sources are invoked in Singapore’s Counter-Memorial. The sources
quoted by Malaysia are as follows:
⎯ first, Lord McNair, International Law Opinions (1956) Volume 1, page 285; and
⎯ second, T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (1895), page 147.
71. However, neither of these works indicates that a formal taking is necessary. Like the
doctrine generally, these sources make the assu mption that a formal taking is only a sufficient but
not necessary proof of intention.
72. On this question the position of Singapore is to be found in her Reply, where we say:
“Singapore, in her Memorial, quotes Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, a leading
authority. This is dismissed in Mala ysia’s Counter-Memorial as a ‘doctrinal
quotation’, whatever that might mean. But the passage from Roberts-Wray makes the
position absolutely clear: the unilateral manifestation of the will of the Crown is
sufficient. (P. 78, para. 3.96.)
(b)Malaysia misrepresents the character of activity à titre de souverain
73. The second form of obfuscation involves the argument, often reiterated, that the “mere”
administration of a lighthouse is entirely divorced from any question of sovereignty or title. This
argument forms the theme of Chapter 6 of the Malaysian Counter-Memorial.
74. The argument is stated in passages at pa ragraphs203 and204 which will appear in the
transcript: I shall not read them out.
“This Chapter also addresses the extensive body of practice by lighthouse
authorities around the world, whether governmental or non-governmental, concerning
the administration of lighthouses. Such practice, which neither hinges on the
sovereignty of the territory on which the lighthouse is situated nor is in any way
determinative of it, reflects the general conduct that would be undertaken by any
operator of a lighthouse as part of its administrative responsibilities. - 50 -
In particular, this Chapter illustrates th ese points by reference to the practice of
lighthouse administration in the Red Sea, in the Arabian/Persian Gulf, by Trinity
House, and in a number of other cases involving individual lighthouses. As will be
shown, the construction and administration of lighthouses around the world, especially
during the period from the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries, combined imperial
interest and the commercial objectives of private undertakings operating under an
imperial mantle. The practice of Britain, France and other European States during this
period focused on the objective of securing maritime safety and was driven by
commercial needs and the interests of international navigation rather than by concerns
to acquire tiny islets, rocks or other portions of territory on which the lighthouses were
to be constructed.” (CMM, pp. 99-100, paras. 203-204.)
75. Malaysia distorts the concept of activity à titre de souverain. The motivation involved in
taking possession of territory may be to acquire access to space for an airfield or port facilities, or
natural resources, but the legal vehicle for acquiring access is the acquisition of sovereignty. As
Singapore has pointed out in the Reply, the precise legal context is paramount in each case. This
context includes the evidence of intention. It do es not include facile typologies about lighthouses
or navigational aids.
(c) Malaysia separates the question of the intention of the British Crown from the process of the
taking of possession
76. The third form of obfuscation involves the separation of the question of intention and the
taking of possession. This separation is artificial. In the present case it is inappropriate to apply
the legal criteria of intention and taking of possession in separate compartments. In terms of the
detailed process of decision-making and construc tion of the lighthouse, the two criteria are
interdependent and complementary.
77. The entire sequence of planning a nd activities on Pedra Branca concerned the
manifestation of sovereignty over the island as a whole by the British Crown.
(d)The tendency of Malaysia to fragment the evidence
78. The fourth type of obfuscation involves the constant practice of the authors of Malaysia’s
pleadings to fragment the substantial body of ev idence and consequently to divorce intention from
the manifestation of intention. There are many examples of this fragmentation.
79. In the Malaysian Counter-Memorial we find the following on the subject of the placing
of the seven brick pillars on Pedra Branca in 1847:
“What is presented by Singapore as either the beginning of the taking of
possession of PBP, or the completed act of ‘taking of lawful possession’ in 1847, was - 51 -
nothing more than Thomson’s visit to stud y the feasibility of the construction of the
lighthouse and place seven brick pillars to t est the strength of the waves. Leaving
aside that these acts neither constituted a material act of seizure of the island nor
demonstrated the slightest intention to ac quire sovereignty, it should be noted that
Thomson also visited Peak Rock for the same purpose of assessing its feasibility for
constructing the lighthouse.” (P. 54, para. 106.)
80. In this passage the placing of the pillars is taken out of its context. Malaysia fails to
record that the building of the brick pillars on Pedra Branca was preceded by the decision of the
British Crown, after much deliberation, to select Pedra Branca as the s ite of the lighthouse.
Thomson was checking on the feasibility of the building materials to be employed, and the decision
to build on Pedra Branca had already been taken. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that no
brick pillars were placed on Peak Rock. No deci sion had been taken to construct a lighthouse on
Peak Rock.
81. A further example is the manner in which Malaysia analyses the laying of the foundation
stone on 24May 1850. Malaysia insists that the ceremony was simply one of “the various
formalities undertaken in the course of the constr uction of the lighthouse” and did not indicate any
intention to acquire sovereignty (CMM, para.66, and see par as.69-72). According to the
Malaysian argument, these “various formalities” re lated exclusively to the matter of private law
ownership, and did not even indicate the taking of exclusive possession ( ibid., para.70). Yet,
Mr.President, this characterization ignores the fact that the foundation-laying ceremony was
organized entirely by the British authorities, and that the persons in attendance, which included
civil and military officials, as well as foreign cons uls, had been invited by Governor Butterworth,
the highest ranking government official of the Straits Settlements. Moreover, Pedra Branca was
described as a “dependency” of Singapore during the ceremony.
The acts involved as evidence of taking possession
82. I must next examine the evidence relied upon by Singapore in establishing title to Pedra
Branca, as acquired in the period 1847 to 1851.
83. Certain observations are called for by way of introduction. In the first place, Malaysia
admits the predominantly governmental character of the enterprise to acquire Pedra Branca in order
to build a lighthouse. In her Counter-Memorial, in a discussion of the “taking of possession”,
Malaysia makes the following admission: - 52 -
“The point at issue here is not who constructed the lighthouse and operated it,
but whether this construction can be consid ered as an act of taking of possession of
that island. There is no question that Horsburgh Lighthouse was constructed by the
East India Company and that it belonged to it. Understandably, this construction was
carried out and supervised by British authoriti es. The question at issue is whether the
construction was conducted with the intention to acquire sovereignty over PBP.”
(CMM, para. 61.)
84. This statement is less than complete. The British Crown was not merely the instrument
of construction, it authorized and funded the construction. But nonetheless this statement
constitutes an admission of the essential character of the enterprise as a British official project.
Moreover, in the circumstances, there was a presu mption of an intention to acquire title. As a
matter of stability and effectiveness it would be appropriate and necessary to take possession of the
island as a whole.
85. In her Counter-Memorial, Malaysia remarks th at: “This is the first time in the history of
territorial litigation that a taking of possession is presented as a complex act lasting at least
fouryears and without a single manifestation dur ing that period of the intention to acquire
sovereignty.” (CMM, para. 61.)
86. But, Mr. President, Members of the Court, there is no reason, legal or otherwise, why the
taking of possession should not be a complex act. In the Clipperton Island Arbitration the Award
states, in the English translation:
“It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the force of law, besides
the animus occupandi, the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession is a
necessary condition of occupa tion. This taking of possession consists in the act, or
series of acts, by which the occupying State reduces to its possession the territory in
question and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there.”
The original French text of the Award will appear in the transcript.
“Il est hors de doute que par un usage immémorial ayant force de loi juridique,
outre l’animus occupandi , la prise de possession matérielle et non fictive est une
condition nécessaire de l’occupation. Cette prise de possession consiste dans l’acte ou
la série d’actes par lesquels l’État occupant rédu it à sa disposition le territoire en
question et se met en mesure d’y faire valoir son autorité exclusive.” ( Subject of the
Difference Relative to the Sovereignty over Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico ),
Arbitral Award dated 28 Jan. 1931, (1928) 2 United Nations, RIAA 1107, p. 1110 (for
the original French text) and 26 AJIL 390 (1932), p. 393 (for the English translation);
emphasis added.)
87. In her pleadings Malaysia insists that there was not a single manifestation of the intention
of the British Crown to acquire sovereignty in the material period (CMM, already quoted and
MR, paras. 249-256). - 53 -
88. Mr.President, this is an extravagant pos ition. The entire pattern of the decisions and
activities of the British Crown constitutes the evidence of an intention to acquire sovereignty. The
analysis of Malaysia rests upon an entirely artific ial dichotomy between the taking of control of
territory and the intention to acquire sovereignty.
89. The key point is the assessment of the evid ence as a whole. In the result, the physical
and administrative actions of the officials of th e British Crown form a part of the evidence of
intention.
90. In many cases involving title the signifi cant evidence consists of assemblages of
evidence of State activity and acts of jurisdiction. A good example is the Beagle Channel
Arbitration in which the Court addressed the issue of the interpretation of the 1881 Treaty on the
basis of the evidence of the acts of jurisdiction performed by Chile (see International Law Reports,
Vol. 52, pp. 220-226, paras. 164-175). The evidence of such an assemblage of State activities and
administration creates a strong inference of the existence of a title.
91. In face of this pattern of activity by the British Crown, Malaysia contends that no protest
or reservation of rights was called for (CMM, p. 69, para.134). But this bold assertion is based
upon the equally bold assertion that there had been no formal or informal taking of possession by
the British Crown.
92. And Singapore has responded to this argument in her Reply (pp. 88-89) where she says:
“3.121. The failure to protest in face of the flow of public activity, and
especially the continuous operations attending the construction of the lighthouse, must
cast a deep shadow upon Malaysia’s claim to ‘original title’. Johor had very complete
knowledge of the intentions of the British Crown through the correspondence
concerning the site for a lighthouse. The visit of the Temenggong is significant in this
respect, and the laying of the foundation stone was reported in the local press. As
Malaysia has herself indicated, the time frame was a period of four years.
3.122. The criteria indicating that a protest is called for have been stated
succinctly by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice:
‘There must of course be knowledge, actual or presumptive, of the
events or circumstances calling for a protest . . . Subject to that, it might
be said generally that a protest is ca lled for whenever failure to make it
will, in the circumstances, justify the inference that the party concerned is
indifferent to the question of title, or does not wish to assert title, or is
unwilling to contest the claim of the other party.’ (Fitzmaurice, The Law
and Procedure of the International Court of Justice , Vol.I, p.299,
note 3.) - 54 -
3.123. And Fitzmaurice, in the sam e source, describes the consequences of
silence:
‘a failure to protest, where a protest is called for, must have a detrimental
effect on the position of the party concerned and may afford evidence of
non-existence of title’.” (Ibid., p. 299.)
93. In the Beagle Channel Arbitration the distinguished Court of Arbitration accepted that
acts of jurisdiction were confirmatory and corrobor ative evidence in relation to the issue of treaty
interpretation which was central to the dispute.
94. In the words of the Court of Arbitration:
“The Court does not consider it necessary to enter into a detailed discussion of
the probative value of acts of jurisdiction in general. It will, however, indicate the
reasons for holding that the Chilean acts of jurisdiction while in no sense a source of
independent right, calling for express protest on the part of Argentina in order to avoid
a consolidation of title, and while not creati ng any situation to which the doctrines of
estoppel or preclusion would apply, yet tended to confirm the correctness of the
Chilean interpretation of the Islands clause of the Treaty.” ( International Law
Reports, Vol. 52, pp. 220-221, para. 165.)
95. In the analysis of the evidence which then follows, the Court of Arbitration in the Beagle
Channel accepts that the pertinent activities of Chile were “well-known to the Argentine
authorities” and “again public and well-known to Argentina” (see the Decision , paras.166 and
169).
96. And I shall complete this analytical exercise by repeating the warning that the
methodology adopted by Malaysia has a basic flaw, namely, the insistence of Malaysia upon a
simplistic typology of “relevant acts” which are s upposedly to be assessed individually. In other
words Malaysia persists in fragmenting the ev idence and divorcing intention from the practical
ways of manifesting intention.
Acts invoked by Singapore as evidence of sovereignty
97. In presenting the acts invoked by Singapore as evidence of the acquisition of sovereignty
in the period 1847 to 1851, I shall follow the categories outlined in the Singapore Memorial.
First: the selection of the site of the lighthouse
98. The British Crown had an exclusive role in respect of the selection of a site for the
construction of the lighthouse (MS, paras. 5.33-5.44). In the response to a request for advice from - 55 -
the Governor in 1844, Sir Edward Belcher proposed the Romania outer island, that is, Peak Rock,
and did so in the interests of general navigation.
99. The remainder of the history is straightforward, and appears in Singapore’s Memorial, as
follows:
“In due course, the results of a further survey of the Straits by Thomson and
CaptainCongalton, which disclosed many previously unknown rocks and shoals,
came to GovernorButterworth’s attention. He instituted further enquiries regarding
both Pedra Branca and Peak Rock as sites for the lighthouse. On 26 August 1846, he
wrote to the Government of India urging that the lighthouse be built on Pedra Branca.
In doing so, he reversed his long-standing position that the lighthouse should be built
on Peak Rock. In October 1846, the Government of India agreed, and recommended
the Pedra Branca site to the Court of Directors of the East India Company. In
February1847, the East India Company ag reed to the change of site; and in
May1847, GovernorButterworth was inst ructed to begin work on the Horsburgh
Lighthouse on Pedra Branca.” (Para. 5.44.)
100. The ultimate choice of Pedra Branca was politically and legally significant. In the
British documents it is recognized that Peak Rock “is part of the territories of the Rajah of
Johor...”. However, no document links the issue of Johor title to Pedra Branca (CMS,
pp. 92-108). The question of whether Johor had gr anted permission to build a lighthouse has been
addressed by my colleague, Professor Pellet. It is clear that once Pedra Branca had been selected
as the site, the question of permission became m oot and was never raised by Johor at any time
afterward.
Second: the decision to construct the lighthouse
101. The decision to construct the lighthouse has to be taken in conjunction with the decision
on its location and the basis of the funding. The planning of the construction has been described in
Singapore’s Memorial (paras. 5.47 to 5.53).
102. The decision to build the lighthouse followed the final discussion of the location and the
decision to use Pedra Branca. The key document is the letter dated 24February1847 from the
Court of Directors of the East India Company to the Governor-General of India in Council (MS,
Vol. 2, Ann. 18). The key paragraph is the first, which reads as follows:
“Your letter dated 3rdOctober1846 in reply to our Despatch of the
6th May preceding, forwards Copy of a Re port received from the Governor of Prince
of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca, which leaves no doubt as to the superiority
of Pedra Branca over Peak Rock on the outer Romania Island as a site for the
Lighthouse proposed to be erected in the neighbourhood of Singapore to the memory - 56 -
of Mr. Horsburgh. We concur therefore in your approval of the choice of the former
site.” (Emphasis added.)
103. In 1847 and 1848 certain practical measures were put in hand, and these are recorded in
the documents available.
104. The process of taking lawful possession of Pedra Branca for the purpose of constructing
and maintaining a lighthouse began in 1847. It was in the period 1846 and 1847 that the
Government of India decided that Pedra Branca was to be the site of the project rather than Peak
Rock. In a letter dated 21June1847, Church, the Resident Councillor in Singapore, instructed
Thomson to submit preliminary plans and estim ates. Thomson responded in a letter dated
9 July 1847 in which he reviewed a long series of practical matters, including the engagement of a
contractor, labour requirements, the housing of workmen on Pedra Branca, and the need to build
pillars to assess the force of the monsoon (MS, Ann. 21).
105. As a consequence of the instructions received from Church, Thomson, in his role as
Government Surveyor, made his first landing on Pedra Branca. The purpose was to build brick
pillars on the rock in order to assess the action of the waves at the worst se ason. This assessment
was directed to the making of an informed decision on the building materials to be used. The
decision to build on Pedra Branca had alread y been taken and it was the modalities of the
construction which were in issue at this stage.
106. On 1 March 1848, Thomson revisited Pedra Branca to examine the st ate of the pillars.
In the event he decided that it would be necessar y to use granite for the edifice rather than
brickwork. These findings are also record ed in the letter dated 1June1848 from
Governor Butterworth to W. Seton Karr, the Under-Secretary to the Government of Bengal (MS,
Ann. 27).
107. On 6 March 1850, Thomson again inspected the island prior to commencing operations.
Further public activity took place in the course of April 1850, when houses for the workmen were
built on Pedra Branca.
108. The entire process of preparation for th e construction, and the construction itself, was
public, and this particularly so in the relativelynarrow seas of the region. The key stages in the
construction were the subject of contemporary reports in the local newspapers. Thus the laying of - 57 -
the foundation stone was reported in the Straits Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce on
28 May 1850 (MS, Ann. 45).
109. The completion of the lighthouse and the visit of the Governor of the Straits Settlements
on 27 September 1851 were reported in the Straits Times and Singapore Journal of Commerce on
23September1851 and 30September1851, respectively (MS, Ann.56). The Singapore Free
Press and Mercantile Advertiser carried a report on 3 October 1851 (ibid.).
Third: the funding of the construction work
110. I move now to the process of funding the construction work which has been chronicled
in detail in Singapore’s Memorial (paras.5.60-5. 65). In response to the evidence presented
Malaysia claims that the idea to build a lighthouse was the private initiative of certain merchants in
Canton (CMM, p. 50, para. 95). This is true but it does not have the legal consequences desired by
Malaysia. The fact is that the British Crown was alone responsible for taking the decision to build
the lighthouse. These facts are accepted by Malaysia in her Counter-Memorial. There it is stated:
“In fact, the East India Company twice rejected the proposal to build the lighthouse. The Court of
Directors only acted in response to repeated requests by the merchants.” (Ibid., p. 50, para. 95.) In
other words, Mr. President, the decision was that of the British Crown.
111. And the conclusion can only be that the final decision to proceed was based upon a
number of political and economic c onsiderations connected with the issue of levying a duty on
shipping.
In my examination of the evidence of title the next item is the:
Ceremonial laying of the foundation stone
112. On 24May 1850 the foundation stone of the lighthouse was laid in the presence of an
official party transported to the island by two government vessels. The official account is provided
by Thomson, and it reads in part:
“The 24th day of May being the birthday of Her Most Gracious Majesty, Queen
Victoria, was fixed upon as the day on which the foundation stone was to be laid. Her
Majesty’s Steam frigate ‘Fury’ arrived off th e rock at 11½ A.M. on that day, having
in tow the H.C. [‘Honourable Company’] Steamer ‘Hooghly’ and the merchant vessel
‘Ayrshire’ carrying the Hon’ble Colonel W.J. Butterworth C.B., the Governor of the
Straits Settlements, who had invited hi s Excellency Admiral Austin the Naval - 58 -
Commander-in-Chief of the East India Station, and the Hon’ble T. Church, Esquire,
Resident Councillor at Singapore to accompan y him; also M.F. Davidson, Esq.,
Master of the Lodge Zetland in the East, No.748, who with the office-bearers of the
Lodge and other members of that Lodge, had been requested to perform the ceremony
of laying the foundation stone with Masonic honours. Various other civil and military
members of the Singapore community, together with the foreign Consuls had come by
invitation to witness the ceremony . . .” (Thomson, Account, p. 427.)
113. During the ceremony the Master of the Lodge Zetland in the East made the following
statement in the presence of Governor Butterworth and all of the other invited officials and guests
(tab 29 of the judges’ folder). He said: “May the All Bounteous Author of Nature bless our Island,
of which this Rock is a dependency...” (Source: Straits Times and Singapore Journal of
Commerce, 28 May 1850; Singapore Memorial, Ann. 45.)
114. This reference to “our island” is clear ly a reference to the main island of Singapore
from which the party had come, and it confirms the status of Pedra Branca as a dependency of
Singapore.
115. The standard dictionary definition of a dependency is “the condition of being
dependent, contingent logical or causal connec tion... something dependent or subordinate”
(source: Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1974), p. 521).
116. As Singapore has stated in her Reply, the connotation of the term in public international
law is essentially the same. Thus, the authoritative Dictionnaire de droit international public ,
edited by Jean Salmon, provides the following guidelines in an English translation:
“Dependency: . . . Part of a territory linked with another in a subordinate way.
Thus:
⎯ maritime territory, dependency of the land territory . . .
⎯ an island, dependency of another island or group of islands.”
And then two examples are set forth. The first example is a quotation from the Minquiers and
Ecrehos Judgment:
“When the British Embassy in Paris, in a Note of November 12th, 1869, to the
French Foreign Minister, had complained about alleged theft by French fishermen at
the Minquiers and referred to this group as ‘this dependency of the Channel
Islands’ . . .” (Minquiers and Ecrehos (France/United Kingdom ), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1953, p. 71.)
And the second example is:
“The small size of Meanguerita, its conti guity to the larger island, and the fact
that it is uninhabited, allow its characteriza tion as a ‘dependency’ of Meanguera, in - 59 -
the sense that the Minquiers group was clai med to be a ‘dependency of the Channel
Islands’.” ( Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras:
Nicaragua intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 570, para. 356.)
And the text of the French original will be in the transcript:
“Dépendance: . . . Partie d’un territoire se rattachant de manière subordonnée à
un autre. Ainsi:
⎯ Le territoire maritime, dépendance du territoire terrestre: . . .
⎯ Une île, dépendance d’une autre île ou d’un groupe d’îles.”
“Quand l’ambassade britannique à Pari s, dans une note du 12 novembre 1869
au ministre français des Affaires étrangèr es, s’est plaint de prétendus vols par les
pêcheurs français aux Minquiers et s’est référée à ce groupe en disant: ‘cette
dépendance des Îles de la Manc.h ..’( Minquiers et Ecréhous
(France/Royaume-Uni), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1953, p. 71.)
“L’exiguïté de Meanguerita, sa proximité de la plus grande île et le fait qu’elle
est inhabitée permettent de la qualifier de ‘dépendance’ de Meanguera, au sens où il a
été soutenu que le groupe des Minquiers ét ait une ‘dépendance’ des îles de la
Manche.” (Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime,
(ElSalvador/Honduras; Nicaragua (intervenant)), arrêt , C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p.570,
par. 356.)
117. In her written pleadings Malaysia asser ts that the ceremony of 24May1850 did not
relate to the question of sovereignty (see MM, paras.151-164; CMM, paras.66, 69-72; RM,
paras. 219-230).
118. In face of the evidence of the inauguration of the lighthouse Malaysia resorts to a series
of weak and self-serving arguments. The first principal argument is that the Masonic element in
the ceremonial allegedly outweighed the governmental and official elements. But, Mr.President,
the ceremony was organized under the authority of the Governor of the Straits Settlements,
Lieutenant-Colonel Butterworth, and the Masonic Brethren had been requested by the Governor to
participate in the ceremonial. Thus the cere mony originated with the British Crown and was
organized for its official purposes. The second argum ent used by Malaysia is to the effect that the
laying of the foundation stone was simply one of the “formalities” undertaken in the course of the
construction and that none of these formalities manifested any intention to acquire sovereignty or to
claim exclusive possession of the island (see the CMM, para. 66).
119. However, as Singapore has pointed out in her Reply:
“The substance of the matter is that the laying of the foundation stone was not
an isolated event. The newspaper account relied upon by Malaysia makes it clear that
the ceremony was held under the auspices of the Governor of the Straits Settlements. - 60 -
The Governor had requested the Worshipful Master and Brethren of the Lodge
Zetland in the East to lay the Foundation St one, and the distinguished visitors listed
were there at the invitation of the Governor. In fact, the laying of the foundation stone
formed part of a long process of decision-making and preparation for the construction
of the lighthouse under the control of and on behalf of the British Crown.” (Pp. 46-47,
para. 3.31.)
In face of all this evidence of British title Malaysia argues that:
The construction of the lighthouse was rel ated exclusively to administration and
ownership
120. Thus, in the Memorial Malaysia contends “that the construction and maintenance of
lighthouses or other aids to navigation are not per se considered manifestations of sovereignty”
(MM, p.78, para.171). The argument is expressed in two ways. First, on the basis that
navigational aids are not relevant to the issue of sovereignty and, secondly, that the construction
involved only the acquisition of the ownership of a lighthouse on the territory of another sovereign,
namely Johor.
121. The first argument, the alleged irrele vance of navigational aids is based upon an
erroneous characterization of the legal criterion. The criterion is not based upon an abstract
proposition to the effect that navigational aids are, or are not, manifestations of sovereignty, but
consists of the intention to acquire sovereignty as revealed in all the relevant circumstances.
122. As Singapore has stated in her Counter-Memorial, the jurisprudence invoked by
Malaysia does no more than demonstrate that each case depends on the legal and historical
circumstances. Thus, in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case the Court examined the evidence of
competing State activity as a whole and found that the British activities on the Minquiers
predominated. As the excerpts from the Judgment offered by Malaysia show, in the circumstances
the lighting and buoying carried out by France “can hardly be considered as sufficient evidence of
the intention of that Government , to act as a sovereign over the islets...” (MM, pp.78-79,
para. 172; emphasis added). Thus the criterion was the intention of the Government concerned in
the light of the evidence generally. On the other hand, in appropriate circumstances the
construction and maintenance of lighthouses may constitute evidence of sovereignty, as in the cases
of Qatar v. Bahrain and Indonesia/Malaysia. In the latter case, it was Malaysia who invoked this - 61 -
proposition in her favour ( Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan
(Indonesia/Malaysia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 684-685, para. 146).
123. In addition, Malaysia invokes the Award in the first phase of the Eritrea/Yemen
arbitration. The Malaysian Memorial asserts that: “The Arbitral Tribunal... rejected the
assertions that the establishment or maintenance of lighthouses constituted acts of sovereignty.”
(MM, p. 79, para. 173.) But, with respect, this categorical statement does not reflect the language
of the Award. The quotation given by Malaysia states that: “The operation or maintenance of
lighthouses and navigational aids is normally connected to the preservation of safe navigation, and
not normally taken as a test of sovereignty.” (Emphasis added.) And then the quotation continues:
“Maintenance on these islands of lighthouses by British and Italian companies and authorities gave
rise to no sovereign claim or conclusions. Th e relevance of these activities and of Yemen’s
presence at the 1989 Red Sea Lights Conference are examined in Chapter VI.” (Emphasis added.)
124. Both the content of this statement by the Tribunal and the content of Chapter VI of the
Award confirm that the legal significance of the operation of lighthouses depended on the
particular historical circumstances and, in particular, the overall evidence of intention to claim .
The criterion was thus the intention of the States concerned. The relevant passages of the Award
are set forth in Singapore’s Counter-Memorial (pp. 122-124).
125. These passages constitute a sufficient samp le of the reasoning of the Tribunal in
ChapterVI of the Award in Phase One. They establish, without any shadow of doubt, that the
significance of the lighthouses was assessed in the preci se historical context, and in relation to the
evidence of the intention and attitude of each Government at the material time, as evidenced by
available documents and the general circumstances. The implications for sovereignty or not, as the
case might be, were intention-related.
126. In this context it is useful to recall a part of Malaysia’s argument in the
Indonesia/Malaysia case. Thus in her Reply Malaysia observed:
“The second part of the Indonesian response draws upon two cases ⎯ the
Eritrea/Yemen case and the Minquiers and Ecrehos case ⎯ to support the contention
that the establishment of lights and buoys is not normally taken as a test of sovereignty
and does not constitute proof of occupation à titre de souverain. It is true that in those
two cases the Arbitral Tribunal and this Court respectively did not find that the
construction of the light was sufficient evidence of the intention of the Government - 62 -
concerned to act as sovereign over the territorial location of the lights. But that
conclusion was reached on the basis of the facts particular to each of the two cases,
and cannot be applied to the two islands here.” (Para. 5.25.)
And Malaysia continues:
“The circumstances in which the Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen case made its
remarks about the effect of the establishm ent of lighthouses are peculiar to that case,
whereas a reading of the whole of the releva nt part of the Award, and not merely the
lifting of a line out of context, shows that the States concerned did not, in their special
situation, regard the construction of a lighthouse with the knowledge and consent of
other interested States as leading to the conc lusion that the State constructing the light
thereby intended to act à titre de souverain in respect of the location of the light.”
(Para. 5.26; emphasis in the original.)
127. The conclusion must be that it is the historical and political circumstances that
determine the nature of the intention. The ev idence concerning the intention of the British Crown
in respect of Pedra Branca is voluminous and defin itive. There is a great deal of evidence to show
that the British Government selected Pedra Branca, funded the constructi on and provided every
kind of logistical support and protection during the process. Moreover, given the physical
circumstances of Pedra Branca and the purpose of th e appropriation, to suggest that there was no
appropriation of the island as a whole is to defy common sense.
128. In any event, the Malaysian pleadings in the present case have reiterated the argument
of the Memorial, and this can be seen in the Counter-Memorial (paras.228-37) and the Reply
(paras. 247-59).
I shall move now to the evidence of visits to Pedra Branca by British officials.
The visits of British officials
129. During the preparation for constructi on of the lighthouse, and the process of
construction, British officials made regular visits to the site.
130. In the period before construction bega n and together with the period of actual
construction, there were at least 19 visits by offi cials to Pedra Branca. These visits are chronicled
in the Singapore Memorial (paras. 5.66-5.68). At least 13 landings involved senior representatives
of the British Crown, GovernorButterworth, CouncillorChurch, and Thomson, the Government
Surveyor. On six other occasions, Government vessels landed workmen and building materials,
acting under the instructions and supervision of Thomson. - 63 -
131. In this very specific context I would dr aw the Court’s attention to the contemporary
paintings by Thomson (see judges’ folder, tab 30).
If the Court will observe the screen, we see images 11 and 12 from the Singapore Memorial.
These are paintings which show the supervision by Thomson of the construction activities on the
island. Also on screen is image13 from the Si ngapore Memorial, which is a painting showing
Pedra Branca with the living quarters of the construction workers in the background.
132. In addition there were several significant visits by senior officials after the completion
of the lighthouse (MS, paras. 5.81-5.84).
133. In response to this evidence, Malaysia argu es that the visits did not constitute evidence
of sovereignty (CMM, para.123). Singapore considers such a view to be disingenuous. The full
record available shows that the visits formed an integral part of the process of the construction and
the concomitant exercise of the authority of the British Crown. The visits formed part of the
implementation of an enterprise authorized and funded by the British Crown.
134. In any event, Malaysia contends that the visits of officials cannot be invoked
as
evidence of sovereignty (CMM, para. 124). And in this connection the decision of this Court in the
Minquiers and Ecrehos case is relied upon. In fact, the passage quoted from the Judgment does not
rely upon a principle that the visits of officials cannot qualify as evidence of title. The Court was
clearly taking the view that, in the circumstances, these facts were not “sufficient to show that
France has a valid title to the Minquiers”. It is useful to recall that, in the Minquiers case, both
sides had exercised acts of jurisdiction in the gro up of islets and the Court’s decision on title was
based upon an assessment of the relative strength of the claims. Similarly, in relation to the
Ecrehos the Court stated that it was “now calle d upon to appraise the relative strength of the
opposing claims to sovereignty over the Ecrehos . . .” ( Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1953, p. 67). The
situation in the Minquiers involved contemporaneous and competing acts of jurisdiction by the two
claimants in sharp contrast to the facts of the present case.
Logistical support provided by British government vessels
135. During the preparation for the constr uction and the construction itself, continuous
logistical support was provided by Government vessels, namely: - 64 -
(a) thesteamer Hooghly;
(b) thegunboat Charlotte;
(c) thegunboat Nancy: and
(d) two lighters (that is to say, flat-bottomed barges).
136. The Governor of the Straits Settlements sen t various letters to the Resident Councillors
of Singapore and Malacca ensuring the availability of the gunboats for conveying supplies to Pedra
Branca (MS, p. 62, para. 5.70).
Mr. President, that would be a convenient place to stop, thank you.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: I would not but if you prefer we can stop here.
You may go on because yesterday, part of the time allotted to Singapore was used by me for my
introductory remarks and the swearing in of the two ad hoc judges, so if you would like to go on
for a few more minutes, please?
Mr. BROWNLIE: Fine, thank you very much.
Protection by gunboats
137. In addition to the question of logistical support, the government also provided
protection by gunboats of the operations, and ther e were two gunboats always in attendance at the
works. As Thomson makes clear in the pertinent passage of his report, the prevalence of piracy “in
the immediate neighbourhood” made the protecti on of the gunboats a necessity. The gunboat
Charlotte was a vessel of 23tons, carried two 6-pounde r guns, and had a crew of 27men. The
other gunboat, the Nancy, was a vessel of the same size.
138. The provision of a government steamer and gunboats to assist in the movement of
building materials and to provide protection against pirates formed a regular feature of the various
plans and financial estimates relating to the construction of the lighthouse.
139. In her Counter-Memorial Malaysia asserts that the activities of the gunboats “did not
manifest the exercise of the sovereign functions” (CMM, p. 55, para. 108). However, earlier in the
same paragraph, Malaysia stat es more moderately that the activity of gunboats “does not in itself
constitute a manifestation of sovereignty” (emphasis added). - 65 -
140. Whilst Malaysia does not deny the logisti cal role of the government ships in the course
of the construction, she denies that the activiti es relate to “sovereign functions” (CMM, p.55,
para. 108). This denial involves an artificially con ceived view of State functions. Malaysia, in the
same paragraph, asserts that the procuring of water and provisions and the carriage of workmen
were not sovereign functions. But such activities, along with the provision of protection against
pirates, were intrinsically a part of the Crown’s operations in relation to the construction of the
lighthouse.
141. In the same general setting, it can be recalled that the Dutch recognition of British title
in 1850 had the direct result that the Dutch Reside nt in Riau offered the assistance of two gunboats
as long as the lighthouse operations we re in progress (see Thomson, Account, pp.424 and 473).
The Dutch letter referring to the construction of a lighthouse “on British territory” was addressed to
the Resident in Riau, and related to naval pa trols lending assistance to the construction of a
lighthouse “at Pedra Branca on British territory” (RS, Ann. 8).
Display of the marine ensign on Pedra Branca
142. The practice since the lighthouse first began to function was for the marine ensign of
Great Britain to be flown. The arrangements fo r the operation of the lighthouse were reviewed by
Thomson, the Government Surveyor, in a letter to Church, Resident Councillor at Singapore, dated
20July1851 (MS, Ann.54). In this letter Thomson wrote: “The Lighthouse flag, I presume is
different from the national one.” The use of the ensign represented contemporary British practice.
143. In addition, during the construction of the Lighthouse, the marine ensign was flown
from the structure in the course of building. Th e evidence consists of the contemporary paintings
by Thomson, the Government Surveyor, and we re fer to images 13 and 15 in the Memorial and on
the slide (judges’ folder, tab 30).
144. In the Singapore Reply (p.74), it is emph asized that Singapore’s argument is to the
effect that the subsequent flying of the marine ensign was evidence that possession had already
been taken, and thus constituted a manifestation of sovereignty already acquired. - 66 -
Conclusions on evidence of the acquisition of sovereignty in the period 1847 to 1851
145. I must now present my conclusions and in doing so, I shall not reiterate all the various
forms of evidence but focus upon a single aspect of evidence of sovereignty and State activities.
146. In summary, Mr.President, the activities of the British Crown constituted a major
public works project which included the following elements:
⎯ first, the planning and design of the lighthouse itself;
⎯ second, the logistical arrangements for the c onstruction, including the use of government
vessels;
⎯ third, the procurement and transport of the necessary building materials;
⎯ fourth, the building of a wooden pier including a loading boom (Thomson, p. 420). This pier,
by the way, was washed away in the subsequent monsoon season;
⎯ fifth, the procurement and installation of a derrick crane (Thomson, pp. 425-426);
⎯ sixth, the laying of the foundation stone on 24 May 1850;
⎯ seventh, the building of a lighter of the required dimensions (Thomson, pp. 428-429);
⎯ eighth, the erection of a jetty (Thomson, pp. 434-435);
⎯ ninth, the placing of a mooring buoy in 1850 (Thomson, p. 429);
⎯ tenth, the building of a south pier in 1851 (Thomson, pp. 445-448);
⎯ eleventh, the building of a platform near the entrance to the lighthouse (Thomson, pp. 442-443,
445);
⎯ twelfth, the cutting of rain channels ar ound all the higher rocks in 1851 (Thomson,
pp. 447-448);
⎯ thirteenth, the installation of the lantern, dome, machinery and apparatus for the lighthouse
(Thomson, pp. 449-453); and,
⎯ finally, the commissioning of the lighthouse during a visit by the Governor on
27 September 1851 (see Thomson, pp. 453-454; and MS, paras. 5.81-5.84).
147. There is strong judicial authority for the status of public works as evidence of title to
territory. Thus, in the Minquiers case this Court relied upon various public works constructed on
the Ecrehos by the British authorities. These constructions were as follows ( I.C.J. Reports 1953,
p. 66): - 67 -
(a) a customs house established in 1884;
(b) a slipway in 1895;
(c) a signal post in 1910; and
(d) the placing of a mooring buoy in 1939.
148. Evidence of a similar character was relie d upon in relation to title in respect of the
Minquiers. In the words of the Judgment:
“It is established that contracts of sale relating to real property in the Minquiers
have, as in the case of the Ecrehos, been passed before the competent authorities of
Jersey and registered in the public registry of deeds of the Island. Examples of such
registration of contracts are given for 1896, 1909 and some later years.
In 1909 Jersey customs authorities established in the Minquiers a custom-house
with the arms of Jersey. The islets have been included by Jersey authorities within the
scope of their census enumerations, and in 1921 an official enumerator visited the
islets for the purpose of taking the census.
These various facts show that Jersey aut horities have in several ways exercised
ordinary local administration in respect of the Minquiers during a long period of time.
Of other facts throwing light upon the dispute it should be mentioned that Jersey
authorities have made periodical official visits to the Minquiers since 1888, and that
they have carried out various works and constructions there, such as a slipway
in1907, a mooring buoy in 1913, a number of beacons and buoys in 1931 and later
years and a winch in 1933.”
And the Judgment continues:
“The evidence thus produced by the United Kingdom Government shows in the
opinion of the Court that the Minquiers in the beginning of the seventeenth century
were treated as a part of the fief of Noirmont in Jersey, and that British authorities
during a considerable part of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century have
exercised State functions in respect of this group.” (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953 ,
pp. 69-70).
149. The weight accorded to the emplacement of public works and ancillary features, such as
slipways, is significant, obviously, for the present case. Above all, it is clear that the British
authorities used Pedra Branca as a whole. The erection of a jetty and of the piers involved a use of
Pedra Branca as a unit and for public purposes. The cutting of the rain channels around all the
higher rocks in 1851 provides further evidence of the appropriation for public use of the island as a
whole.
150. There is other relevant judicial authority on the evidential significance of public works.
Thus in Phase One of the Eritrea/Yemen dispute concerning certain Red Sea islands, the - 68 -
Arbitration Tribunal recognized the evidential significance of the building and use of an airstrip on
Greater Hanish, an uninhabited island.
The relevant passages in the Award will be seen in the transcript:
“419. Incidental as it may have been to Total’s Petroleum Agreement, the
building and use of an airstrip on Greater Hanish is in the view of the Tribunal a
material effectivité. It demonstrates the exercise by Yemen of jurisdiction over
Greater Hanish, a recognition of that jurisd iction by Total, and the conduct of visible
indicia of that jurisdiction ⎯ an airstrip in active use ⎯ over a period of time. Eritrea
appears to have been unaware of it and in any event made no protest...”
(International Law Reports (ILR), Vol. 114, p. 109.)
“502. It was later that there was more activity; notably the construction in 1993
by the Total Oil Company of an air landing strip on Hanish, for the recreational visits
of their employees, and as a by-product of their concession agreement with Yemen.
That agreement did not encompass either Zuqar or Hanish. Nevertheless, the fact that
there were regular excursion flights constitutes evidence of governmental authority
and the exercise of it. Nor did it apparently attract any kind of protest from Eritrea;
though of course by this time the civil war was over and Eritrea was established as an
independent State.” (Ibid., p. 132.)
“507. Yemen has more to show by way of presence and display of authority.
Putting aside the lighthouse in the north of the island, there was the Ardoukoba
expedition and campsite which was made unde r the aegis of the Yemeni Government.
There is the air landing site, as well as th e production of what appears to be evidence
of frequent scheduled flights, no doubt mainly for the off-days of Total employees;
and there is theMay1995 licence to a Yemeni company (seemingly with certain
German nationals associated in a joint vent ure scheme) to develop a tourist project
(recreational diving is apparently the possible attraction to tourism) on Greater
Hanish.” (Ibid., pp. 133-134.)
151. These authorities confirm the significance of public works, more especially in the case
of uninhabited islands, as evidence of sovereignty.
152. Mr.President, I shall now examine the thesis of Malaysia according to which the
British Crown only took possession of a part of the island for the purpose of building a lighthouse
and then only gained an item of property and not a title to a parcel of territory. Two points
immediately arise. In the first place, international tribunals have had no difficulty in classifying
public works as State functions. And, secondly, in making their determinations of law and fact,
tribunals have shown no tendency to decide that public works only produce title, so to speak, to the
subsoil and the space they actually occupy. No court, and no writer, has taken such a view.
153. In this connection the cutting of rain channels around the higher rocks inMay 1851 is
typical of the State functions involved. Such improvements were ancillary to the purpose for which - 69 -
possession was taken and, like the lighthouse, the outside platform and the piers, constituted
evidence of the intention to appropriate the is land as a whole for a use which was both permanent
and exclusive. In the circumstances the Malays ian assertion that the cutting of the rain channels
had no bearing on the question of sovereignty is w ithout merit (MS, para. 580; CMM, para. 125;
RS, paras. 386-87).
154. The construction of public works is not, as such, conclusive evidence of an intention to
acquire sovereignty. In the present case, however, the taking of possession was accompanied by a
substantial flow of documents manifesting the intention of the British Crown to acquire an
exclusive control of Pedra Branca for public purposes. As I have demonstrated, the works involved
access to and use of the island as a unit.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, I would like to thank you for your patience and
consideration. Thank you very much.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, Acting President: Thank you, Mr. Brownlie. We meet tomorrow
morning at 10 o’clock. The sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 1.15 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Wednesday 7 November 2007, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, Acting President, presiding in the case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore)