CR 2006/21
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THHEAGUE LAAYE
YEAR 2006
Public sitting
held on Thursday 16 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Higgins presiding,
in the case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)
________________
VERBATIM RECORD
________________
ANNÉE 2006
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 16 mars 2006, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de Mme Higgins, président,
en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du
crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro)
____________________
COMPTE RENDU
____________________ - 2 -
Present: Presieitgins
Vice-Presi-Kntasawneh
Ranjevaudges
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Judges ad hoc AhmedMahiou
Kre Milenko ća
Couvrisrar
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 3 -
Présents : Mme Higgins,président
AlKh.vsce-prh,ident
RaMjev.
Shi
Koroma
Parra-Aranguren
Owada
Simma
Tomka
Abraham
Keith
Sepúlveda
Bennouna
Sjoteiskov,
MM. Ahmed Mahiou,
KMrilenko ća, juges ad hoc
Cgoefferr,
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ - 4 -
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is represented by:
Mr. Sakib Softić,
as Agent;
Mr. Phon van den Biesen, Attorney at Law, Amsterdam,
as Deputy Agent;
Mr.Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of ParisX-Nanterre, Member and former Chairman of
the International Law Commission of the United Nations,
Mr. Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law,
Ms Brigitte Stern, Professor at the University of Paris I,
Mr. Luigi Condorelli, Professor at the Facultyof Law of the University of Florence,
Ms Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec, LL.B, LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne, Australia,
Ms Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, London,
Ms Laura Dauban, LL.B (Hons),
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Morten Torkildsen, BSc, MSc, Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norway,
as Expert Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Fuad Šabeta, Ambassadorof Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Wim Muller, LL.M, M.A.,
Mr. Mauro Barelli, LL.M (University of Bristol),
Mr. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M,
Mr. Amir Bajrić, LL.M,
Ms Amra Mehmedić, LL.M,
Mr. Antoine Ollivier, Temporary Lecturer and Research Assistant, University of Paris X-Nanterre, - 5 -
Le Gouvernement de la Bosnie-Herzégovine est représenté par :
M. Sakib Softić,
coagment;
M. Phon van den Biesen, avocat, Amsterdam,
comme agent adjoint;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université de ParisX-Nanterre, membre et ancien président de la
Commission du droit international des Nations Unies,
M. Thomas M. Franck, professeur émérite à lafaculté de droit de l’Université de New York,
Mme Brigitte Stern, professeur à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Luigi Condorelli, professeur à la fact de droit de l’Université de Florence,
Mme Magda Karagiannakis, B.Ec., LL.B., LL.M.,Barrister at Law, Melbourne (Australie),
Mme Joanna Korner, Q.C.,Barrister at Law, Londres,
Mme Laura Dauban, LL.B. (Hons),
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Morten Torkildsen, BSc., MSc., Tork ildsen Granskin og Rådgivning, Norvège,
comme conseil-expert et avocat;
S. Exc. M. Fuad Šabeta, ambassadeur de Bosn ie-Herzégovine auprès duRoyaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Wim Muller, LL.M., M.A.,
M. Mauro Barelli, LL.M. (Université de Bristol),
M. Ermin Sarajlija, LL.M.,
M. Amir Bajrić, LL.M.,
Mme Amra Mehmedić, LL.M.,
M. Antoine Ollivier, attaché temporaire d’ense ignement et de recher che à l’Université de
Paris X-Nanterre, - 6 -
Ms Isabelle Moulier, Research Student in International Law, University of Paris I,
Mr. Paolo Palchetti, Associate Professor at the University of Macerata (Italy),
as Counsel.
The Government of Serbia and Montenegro is represented by:
Mr. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., Head of the Law Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Serbia and Montenegro, Professor at the Belgrade University School of Law,
as Agent;
Mr. Saša Obradović, First Counsellor of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the Kingdom of
the Netherlands,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro in the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agents;
Mr.Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the Central European University,
Budapest and Emory University, Atlanta,
Mr. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Member of the International Law Commission, member of
the English Bar, Distinguished Fellow of the All Souls College, Oxford,
Mr. Xavier de Roux, Master in law, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Ms Nataša Fauveau-Ivanović, avocat à la cour, Paris and member of the Council of the
International Criminal Bar,
Mr. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), Professor of Law at the University of Kiel, Director
of the Walther-Schücking Institute,
Mr. Vladimir Djerić, LL.M. (Michigan), Attorney at Law, Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, and President of the International Law Association of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Igor Olujić, Attorney at Law, Belgrade,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Sanja Djajić, S.J.D., Associate Professor at the Novi Sad University School of Law,
Ms Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Indianapolis),
Mr. Svetislav Rabrenović, Expert-associate at the Office of th e Prosecutor for War Crimes of the
Republic of Serbia, - 7 -
Mme Isabelle Moulier, doctorante en droit international à l’Université de Paris I,
M. Paolo Palchetti, professeur associé à l’Université de Macerata (Italie),
cocomnseils.
Le Gouvernement de la Serbie-et-Monténégro est représenté par :
M. Radoslav Stojanović, S.J.D., chef du conseil juridique du ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro, professeur à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Belgrade,
coagment;
M. Saša Obradovi ć, premier conseiller à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Vladimir Cvetković, deuxième secrétaire à l’ambassade de Serbie-et-Monténégro au Royaume
des Pays-Bas,
comme coagents;
M. Tibor Varady, S.J.D. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université d’Europe centrale de
Budapest et à l’Université Emory d’Atlanta,
M. Ian Brownlie, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., membre de la Commission du droit international, membre
du barreau d’Angleterre, Distinguished Fellow au All Souls College, Oxford,
M. Xavier de Roux, maîtrise de droit, avocat à la cour, Paris,
Mme Nataša Fauveau-Ivanovi ć, avocat à la cour, Paris, et membre du conseil du barreau pénal
international,
M. Andreas Zimmermann, LL.M. (Harvard), professeur de droit à l’Université de Kiel, directeur de
l’Institut Walther-Schücking,
M. Vladimir Djeri ć, LL.M. (Michigan), avocat, cabinet Mikijelj, Jankovi ć & Bogdanovi ć,
Belgrade, et président de l’association de droit international de la Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Igor Olujić, avocat, Belgrade,
comme conseils et avocats;
Mme Sanja Djajić, S.J.D, professeur associé à la faculté de droit de l’Université de Novi Sad,
Mme Ivana Mroz, LL.M. (Indianapolis),
M. Svetislav Rabrenovi ć, expert-associé au bureau du procureur pour les crimes de guerre de la
République de Serbie, - 8 -
Mr. Aleksandar Djurdjić, LL.M., First Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and
Montenegro,
Mr. Miloš Jastrebić, Second Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro,
Mr. Christian J. Tams, LL.M. PhD. (Cambridge), Walther-Schücking Institute, University of Kiel,
Ms Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
as Assistants. - 9 -
M. Aleksandar Djurdji ć, LL.M., premier secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Miloš Jastrebi ć, deuxième secrétaire au ministère des affaires étrangères de la
Serbie-et-Monténégro,
M. Christian J. Tams, LL.M., PhD. (Cambridge), Institut Walther-Schücking, Université de Kiel,
Mme Dina Dobrkovic, LL.B.,
comme assistants. - 10 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Brownlie.
Mr. BROWNLIE: Thank you, Madam President.
ISSUES OF S TATE RESPONSIBILITY : A FURTHER RECONNAISSANCE
A. Introduction
Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, may it please the Court: by way of
introduction I would like to refer to the attitudes of our distinguished opponents. They have
adopted a mindset which involves applying a princi ple of exceptionalism to Serbs, according to
which all Serb actions and aspirations were illegal and were part of a plan to establish a Greater
Serbia.
And yet the truth is very different.
First: Serbia did not take the initiative in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia; others did.
Second: there was substantial external assistan ce, that is, military assistance, to the Bosnian
Muslims.
Third: there was a certain haste on the part of extra-regional powers to recognize the process
of secession.
In the result civil war broke out and in th e circumstances the policies adopted by the FRY
during this turbulence were hardly surprising. The relevant circumstances included: the history of
ethnic tensions and atrocities in the region; an d secondly, the political problems of organizing the
evacuation and redeployment of JNA units in the period March, April and May 1992.
In this context the emergence of Republika Srpska and its armed forces simply mirrored
developments in Croatia and elsewhere.
In the circumstances, the assistance given to the Bosnian Serbs and their institutions by the
FRY was reasonable and lawful.
The mindset adopted by our opponents to the emergence of Republika Srpska and its
separate institutions involves double standards.
In conclusion, on the background to the issu e of attribution in these proceedings, it is
necessary to record the unfortunate forensic result of the anti-Serb mindset adopted by counsel for
the applicant State. This result is a persistentlack of candour in matters of evidence. The more - 11 -
remarkable examples include the actual régime of the safe areas ⎯ which were not
demilitarized ⎯, the relevance of the military situation, the role of foreign military assistance and
the role of the Bosnia Serbs in the significant pr ocesses of international diplomacy in the relevant
period.
Madam President, I shall now present my menu of seven special topics.
B. Was there a plan to commit genocide?
1. First of all, I shall have to address the question, was there a plan to commit genocide? The
oral arguments of the applicant State have been peppered with references to a plan adopted and
implemented by the FRY Government to commit genoc ide. And yet the applicant State has at no
stage succeeded in proving the existence of a plan.
2. As I shall demonstrate in the oral argument , various plans are referred to, but there is no
coherence in the presentation overall. Moreover, if a plan had been established, it might be
expected that it would be referred to at appropria te junctures. But the plan has not surfaced, in
spite of the access which the authorities of the ap plicant State have had to captured documents and
to telephone intercepts.
3. The persistent inability of the Applicant to prove the existence of a plan is visible in the
Reply. In this large document, only a short secti on is devoted to the alleged plan: I refer to
Chapter10, paragraphs 11 to 20. The Reply deals with the question of proof in the following
passages:
“The Yugoslav authorities planned, prepared and organised the genocide.
Yugoslav authorities drafted the RAM pl an and organised as early as 1990 the
transfer of armaments to Serbian populations in areas which were to become part of
Greater Serbia [see Reply, Chapter8, Sec tion2]. This is evidenced by talks and
meetings between high-level officials in Be lgrade and local Bosnian Serb leaders.
The police and the Ministry of Interior of Yugoslavia and Serbia played a prominent
role in the implementation of the plan.
Commenting on the RAM plan, the existence of which it does not deny, the
Respondent asserts that it does not amount to planning genocide since it involves ‘only
incitement to national and religious hatred’ [Counter-Memorial, p. 104, para. 1.3.17.9;
emphasis added]. This defence is left to the appreciation of the Court.”
Now that is part of the quotation from a statement by counsel. - 12 -
Madam President, I need to stop reading this quotation from the Reply at this point because
the Reply is wrong in its attribution of the statem ent about incitement to the respondent State.
Those drafting the Reply are misapplying the source. If reference is made to the
Counter-Memorial, it will be found that the stat ement was made by a United Nations source and
not the respondent State. Then the quotation from the Reply continues:
“The preparation and execution of the plan was enabled by the transformation
of the JNA into an instrument of the nationalist policy of Belgrade [see above,
Chapter8, Section 3]. General Veljko Kadijevi ć, former Federal Secretary of
National Defence and Chief of Staff of th e Supreme Command of the JNA, explained
in this book published in Belgrade in 1993 that since the spring of 1991, the JNA had
been utilised in order to protect and defend ‘the Serb people outside of Serbia’ and to
assemble the JNA ‘within the borders of th e future Yugoslavia [Greater Serbia]’
[Veljko Kadijevic, My view of the Break-up, An Army without a State, Belgrade, 1993,
p. 121, Annex 271].
I can assure the Court that if the origin of thaquotation is examined, there is no phrase “Greater
Serbia”. No doubt the square brackets indicate that that is an insertion, but it is most certainly not
in the original. And then the quotation continues:
“sheeeKerdlijevi ć describes the goals of the JNA after the
independence of Slovenia and Croatia as follows:
‘(1)defend the Serb nation in Cr oatia and its national interest;
(2) pull JNA garrison out of Croatia; (3) gain full control of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, with the ultimate aim of defending the Serb nation and its
national rights when the issue arose ; (4)create and defend the new
Yugoslav state of those Yugoslav nations that desire to be a part of it,
meaning in this phase the Serb and Montenegrin nations. The basic
concept for deployment of the armed forces was thus adjusted to this
modified task ’ [ ibid., p.97, emphasis added, Annex 271].” (Reply,
p. 765.)
4. Madam President, what is remarkable is the absence in these p assages of evidence of a
plan. In any event the purported RAM plan cons ists of suppositions based upon the insufficiently
legible part of the transcript of a telephone conversation between Milosevic and Karadzic of
29 May 1991. Not a single ICTY indictment contai ns details about the existence of a plan entitled
RAM. The controverted evidence of the RAM pl an has been examined at some length in the
Rejoinder, (pp.590-598). Incidentally, the so-called RAM plan has not been referred in the oral
argument.
5. I shall move now to the treatment of this question of the existence of a plan during the oral
argument. The introductory speech by Mr.van den Biesen reveals nothing concrete about the - 13 -
adoption of a plan to commit genocide (see CR 2006/2, pp. 18-52). The only passages which refer
to a plan in his speech are as follows:
“66. Earlier, two years before, in April 1993, Mladi ć presented the so-called
‘Analysis of the Combat Readiness Report of the VRS in 1992’ to the Republika
Srpska Assembly. In this report the leve l of so-called support given to the VRS in
1992 is discussed in more detail. It is a peculiar document and we will come back to
that later on. This is what Mladi ć stipulates in the introduction to his report on the
year 1992: ‘We have carried out individua l and concerted battle operations according
to a single design and plan.’”
And Mr. van den Biesen continues:
“67. Indeed, Madam President, everything went according to a single plan. The
pattern described earlier was, indeed, con tinued throughout 1992 and after 1992, for
that matter. The ‘plan’ that Mladi ć refers to, was most certainly not a plan which the
leaders of the self-proclaimed Republika Srps ka at the time designed on the day that
they proclaimed the ‘independent Republic’, and it was not a plan that the Republika
Srpska leadership only began to draft on 20May 1992, the day after the so-called
‘withdrawal’ of the JNA. This plan simply refers to something which formed the
guideline for Belgrade’s policies already fo r quite some time, which policies were
from May and June 1992 onwards very much implemented by the Pale leadership.
This guideline fits the Greater Serbia plan and the strategies to be employed in order
to achieve the goal thereof. The ICTY has established this through, for example, the
acknowledgment of Mrs. Plavsić, who said the following:
‘The SDS and the Bosnian Serb leadership were committed to a
primary goal that all Serbs in the former Yugoslavia would remain in a
common state. One method of achieving this goal was by separating the
ethnic communities in BH. By Oct ober1991, the Bosnian leadership,
including Mrs.Plavsi ć, knew and intended that the separation of the
ethnic communities would include the permanent removal of ethnic
populations, either by agreement or by force and further knew that any
forcible removal of non-Serb from Serbian-claimed territories would
involve a discriminatory campaign of persecution.’”
6. With respect, these sources do not provide any real assistance to the Bosnian case. The
Mladic plan obviously concerns military activities and is not quoted adequa tely in any case. The
second paragraph quoted explains that there was not a plan but a pattern, or perhaps only a
guideline.
7. Moreover, the statement relating to the Plavsic transaction based upon a plea bargain does
not refer to a plan to commit genocide, the passag e is not in the first person, of course, and the
draftsman of the statement has made argumentative inferences.
8. I move on to examine the argument pr esented by MsKaragiannakis on 28February
(CR2006/4, pp.10-21). In this lengthy presenta tion the emphasis is upon the subject of ethnic - 14 -
cleansing but no plan is proved to have existed in relation to genocide. Most of the material is
devoted to the steps taken by the Bosnian Serbs to organize institutions in the face of the turbulence
resulting from the secessions and civil war. If a plan to commit genocide had existed counsel
would no doubt have referred to it. Moreover, Ms Karagiannakis refers to the existence of at least
45 intercepts ⎯ 45intercepts ⎯ of conversations between Milosevic and Karadzic in the period
29May 1991 to 10February 1992 (CR2006/4, pp.11-12, para.8). It is strange indeed that no
reference to a plan ever emerged from these intercepted conversations.
9. In other speeches on behalf of Bosnia a nd Herzegovina counsel examined the evidence
alleged to show an intention to destroy a group but, in so doing, failed to identify a plan to commit
genocide. I refer, in particular, to the sp eech of ProfessorFranck on 2March (CR 2006/7,
pp. 46-48).
10. When specific episodes are examined, th e existence of a definitive plan, providing a
political chart of some kind, is seen not to be a part of the picture. And perspectives suddenly
change. This instability in the analysis of Bosnia n counsel is to be seen in the presentation of
Mr.van den Beisen on 28 February (CR 2006/4, p.37). In relation to Srebrenica and ethnic
cleansing in eastern Bosnia he observed:
“Before I go into a more focused description of what actually happened in
July 1995, I would like to provide some more context. If we want to give Srebrenica
its proper place in the ethnic cleansing campai gn that to a large extent destroyed the
typical Bosnia and Herzegovina of before 1992, we need to look at a larger picture.
‘Srebrenica’ was not a goal in itself, it was merely the finale, the climax, the
completion of what had been the plan all along, at least since the beginning of 1991.
We are today discussing part of that earlie r plan. This earlier plan did not focus on
Srebrenica alone but related to all of eastern Bosnia.
Yesterday and earlier today we have clarified how the Serbian project was
prepared. How, beginning in 1991, the Serb ian leadership in Belgrade organized the
arming of Serbs in Croatia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovi na, and how parallel
political structures were created to assu me governmental authority when the hour
would have come. We explained that this happened in all areas w ith substantial Serb
populations, although this was expressly not limited to municipalities with Serb
majorities.”
11. The Court will appreciate that counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina has avoided specifics
about the plan. The events at Srebrenica are now part of an earlier plan. And the earlier plan is
now a “project” and the “project ” is evidenced by lawful Se rbian activities, including the - 15 -
distribution of arms and the creation of parallel st ructures. Can our opponents show the Court that
the Croats and the Bosniaks did not distribute arms or create parallel political structures?
12. On the alleged plan or plans I would make two points in conclusion. First, the evidence
presented which purports to relate to one or more pl ans is incoherent, it is vague and, in the final
analysis, a fiction. Secondly, there is a major paradox in the approach of my opponents to the
political issues of boundaries, which formed part of the agenda of the peace negotiations led by
Owen and Vance. Thus, for example, MsKaragia nnakis regards references to such matters as
evidence of ethnic cleansing but those issues were prominent in the agenda for a peace settlement.
C. The question of paramilitaries
1. Secondly, I shall examine the question of paramilitaries. In the oral arguments our learned
opponents have devoted much attention to the qu estion of paramilitary units. In the first place
MsKaragiannakis provides a general account of what are described as “paramilitary units,
volunteers and the units and the organs of the Ministries of the Interior” of the Respondent (see
CR 2006/9, pp. 10-12). The argument is introduced by her as follows:
“Madam President, Members of the Court, various irregular forces were
involved in the targeting of non-Serbs in Bosnia. They included so-called volunteer
units, units of the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia and othe r Serbian paramilitary
units, and Bosnian Serb paramilitary units. This morning I am going to address the
Court on the role of organs of the Res pondent in controlling, directing and/or
supporting these irregular military units. I w ill also address the Federal and Serbian
Ministries of the Interior and the other mean s through which they participated in the
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.”
2. Professor Condorelli covers the same ground later in the same session (CR2006/9,
pp.49-56). Both counsel point out that the volunteer forces were constituted under legislation of
the FRY. The subject of volunteers and paramilitary units is touched again by
ProfessorsCondorelli and Pellet on 6Ma rch (see CR 2006/10, pp.31-34, and ibid., pp.44-46
respectively).
3. The question of attribution is clear enough in principle. Like other States, both the FRY
and Republika Srpska have made use of security police units and special forces, alongside units of
the regular army. In addition, such units may be seconded to the armed forces of another State and,
in the result form part of the command structure. In the alternative, such forces may take part in - 16 -
joint operations with the forces of another Stat e, whilst continuing to fall within the command
structure of the sending State.
4. Each situation obviously must be analysed in the context and reference must be made to
the pertinent command structures. Applying the principles of State responsibility is no doubt
sometimes difficult, and it is not therefore surprising to note a certain difference of opinion in these
matters between Professor Condorelli and Professor Pellet.
5. It is helpful to recall that the Bosnian Armed Forces included special purpose units known
by the public as the Green Berets.
D. The modalities of the test of effective control
1. With the Court’s permission I would like to return to the criteria of State responsibility
and the issue of effective control, or as our opponents would put it, global control. The background
is the use of paradigm cases in which the subject entity allegedly susceptible to control takes the
form of a State, or a State in statu nascendi, or a guerrilla movement with a political leadership,
like the contras. The adoption of this group of paradigm cases has almost certainly created a
source of distortion in the application of the legal principles.
2. In the first place, it is necessary to recall the standard formulation of the legal criteria. The
key statement in paragraph 115 of the Nicaragua Judgment is as follows: “For this conduct to give
rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it w ould in principle have to be proved that that
State had effective control of the military or pa ramilitary operations in the course of which the
alleged violations were committed.” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 65.)
3. This aspect of the legal criteria is brought into prominence in the Commentary of the
International Law Commission on Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility. The wording of
the Commentary in paragraph 7 is of considerable significance:
“It is clear then that a State may, either by specific directions or by exercising
control over a group, in effect assume res ponsibility for their conduct. Each case will
depend on its own facts, in particular t hose concerning the relationship between the
instructions given or the directions or control exercised and the specific conduct
complained of. In the text of article 8, the three terms ‘instructions’, ‘direction’, and
‘control’ are disjunctive; it is sufficient to establish any one of them. At the same
time it is made clear that the instructions, direction or control must relate to the
conduct which is said to have amounted to an internationally wrongful act.” - 17 -
4. This element in the legal position has not attracted the attention of our distinguished
opponents. No doubt this element indicates the operational inadequacy of the concept of “global
control”.
E. The Respondent’s continuing presence as alleged by the applicant State
1. My next subject is the Respondent’s continuing presence as alleged by the applicant State.
On 3March Mr.van den Biesen addressed the Court on a variety of topics assembled under the
rubric “The Respondent’s continued presence”. This presentation was introduced as a “general
overview of the facts which will be relevant ” for the establishment of State responsibility
(CR2006/8, pp.39-61). This division of facts and the relevant law has the result that the facts
offered are question begging.
2. The outcome of this treatment is a replay of the standard themes of the pleadings of the
applicant State.
3. Thus, in the first place, the arming and re deployment of Serbian forces after the political
and military disintegration of the federal State, is regarded as unacceptable and sinister. The
judicial finding relied upon by Mr. van den Biesen reads, in part, as follows:
“As President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic made
arrangements to ensure that Bosnian Serb forces could retain personnel and arms by
ordering, on 5 December 1991, that soldiers who were native of Bosnia and
Herzegovina be transferred to Bosnia and that those in Bosnia who were native of
other republics be moved out. [The judges continued]. On 25 December 1991, a JNA
commander reported to Milosevic that these transfers were 90percent complete.
According to the diary notes of Borisav Jovic (President of the SFRY Presidency),
Milosevic anticipated that several Yugosla v republics would soon be recognized as
independent States, and the Serbian President wanted to make sure [and he says I am
still quoting the Judgment], that the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina could qualify as
an indigenous Bosnian fighting force. Throughout 1991 and 1992, the Bosnian Serb
leadership communicated with the SFRY lead ership on strategic policy in the event
that Bosnia and Herzegovina would beco me independent.” (CR 2006/8, p.41,
para. 11.)
And that is the end of a quotation from Prosecutor v. Brdjanin on 1 September 2004.
4. These reactions of the Serbs are, in my submission, entirely to be expected in the
prevailing circumstances. Unfortunately, the Trial Chamber was unwilling to accept that the JNA
and VRS constituted two separate armies. - 18 -
5. Counsel for the applicant State also reli es on the evidence that Belgrade assisted the new
Serbian Republic by paying the salaries of officers. Counsel for the applicant State finds all this
very shocking. But again we have the problem of the attitude of exceptionalism against Serbs. In
fact, former JNA officers, who were Muslims, play ed a leading role in th e creation of the Bosnian
Army, and that is not particularly surprising (CIA History, Vol. I, p. 132).
6. The evidence of military and economic assist ance to the Bosnian Serb communities is not
related to the criteria of State responsibility by counsel for the applicant State in his argument.
7. The sequence of the topics includes a se ction on military action. This includes the
startling proposition that “there was only one ar my in Bosnia, being the Respondent’s army”
(CR 2006/8, p. 50, para. 37).
8. Then we come to an anomalous section of the speech, the segment is entitled “PAUK”
(ibid., pp. 52-54).
9. This strange interlude is introduced as follows:
“51. Bihac is, for the purpose of realizing a Greater Serbia, an important
strategic area that needed to be under the c ontrol of Serbs if the Greater Serbia project
were to be successful. Only in this wa y would the Croatian Serbs and the Bosnian
Serbs be able to merge together into a Stat e with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
this was effectively the realization of Strategic Goal No. 1.
52. In November 1994 a special military command group was set up to conduct
combat operations against the Bosnian army in the Bihac pocket the objective being to
seize this territory. The name of this operation was ‘Pauk’, which literally means
‘spider’, and this fits the na ture of the operation itself since it incorporated units from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbs in Croatia.
53. The units involved in the entire operation included those from the Ministry
of the Interior from the FRY, the army of the Bosnian Serbs and the army of the Serbs
in Croatia. The most revealing document regarding this operation is the ‘Pauk’
Operation Diary, a diary which was capture d by the Bosnian and Croatian Federation
Forces when they retook Bihac as part of the so-called Operation Storm [which was
itself a military operation]. This diary has been submitted in full in the Milošević case
at the ICTY.
54. It [the diary] details, day by day, hour by hour, the actions carried out by the
different units. And there are continuously cl ear references to Belgrade: particularly
meetings taking place in Belgrade, ammunitio n requests sent to Belgrade, and senior
military personnel visiting ‘Pauk’ from Belgrade.” (CR 2006/8, pp. 52-53.)
10. It is not clear why the applicant State h as introduced this material. The Bihac region for
a very long period was the centre of the politi cal domain of FikretAbdic, the ruler of the
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. Fikret Abdic was a prominent Mu slim political leader, - 19 -
opposed to PresidentIzetbegovic. This en tity is described in detail in the CIA History (Vol.2,
pp. 413-416, 513-517, 527-543).
11. The role of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia is difficult to describe and to
outline the complex relations of Mr. Abdic with bot h Croats and Serbs would be unlikely to assist
the Court very much in its present task.
12. The PAUK is an entity of obscure prove nance, probably created by a Croatian Serb
officer, and probably operating as a paramilitary unit apparently associated simultaneously with the
FRY, Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Kra jina and the Autonomous Province of Western
Bosnia. The evidence available includes excerpts, originally in the Serb language, from an
operational diary. The excerpts from the diary, in the English translation, form part of the
documents submitted by the applicant State on 16 January this year.
13. The excerpts available to the Court, in English, support the hypothesis that PAUK was
working alongside the armed forces of FikretAbdi c. A proportion of the entries include Muslim
names. In these circumstances, the contents of th e diary certainly do not support the view that the
agents of Belgrade ⎯ if that is who some of them were ⎯ had a genocidal animus against
Muslims.
14. The relations between Abdic and the Govern ment of Serbia were evidently opportunist.
They are described in the CIA History, Volume 2, at pages 531 and 535. At the most, the episode
is an example of special forces, of uncertain provenance, giving assistance to the Joint Command
of Fikret Abdic and Republika Srpska Krajina.
15. In continuing the evidence of the alle ged “continuing presence of the Respondent” in
Bosnia, the next topic invoked by counsel for the Applicant is the Council of Co-ordinating
Positions on State Policy (CR 2006/8, pp.55-60). Th e role of this institution is described by my
opponents as follows:
“The Belgrade authorities, apparently, felt the need to create a mechanism to
make sure that the positions of the three entities, the Federal Re public of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), Republika Srps ka and Republika Srpska Krajina would
discuss their common position. This mechanism came to be the Council for
Co-ordinating Positions on State Policy, wh ich Council fell under the auspices of the
President of the Federal Republic of Yugosla via. Members of this Council were, next
to the President of the FRY, the President of Serbia, the President of Montenegro, the
leadership of Republika Srpska and of Republika Srpska Krajina, and also the - 20 -
Yugoslav Chief of Staff and the Bosnian Serb Commander of the army of Republika
Srpska, Mladic.
On 9 January 1993 a session of this C ouncil took place. We know about this
due to the testimony of Mr.Lilic before the ICTY. I referred to that earlier. On
9January 1993 the Council met in a so- called ‘enlarged Session’, meaning that a
larger representation of the political and m ilitary leadership of the three entities was
present. The shorthand notes of this m eeting have been made public through the
Prosecutor of the ICTY in the course of the case against Mr.Krajišnik, one of the
leaders of the Republika Srpska.”
16. This natural and lawful arrangement for co-ordination between Serbian communities in a
war situation is caricatured by our opponents. The main subject of discussion by this body was
negotiations to improve conditions in the region. It is incidentally interesting to note the references
by the leader of Republika Srpska to Serbia and Montenegro as a separate entity (see paragraph 79
of the minutes).
17. Then there is a certain practice of what must be called reverse interpretation by our
learned opponents. In the discussion of the negotia tions envisaged, the Foreign Minister of the
FRY made the following statement:
“We must clearly, comprehensively and generously guarantee them that the
enclaves within the provinces [here, he clear ly refers to enclaves such as Srebrenica,
Gorazde], that is to say within the confeder al unit, would be fully protected and that
the refugees would have the right to retu rn and be compensated for the destroyed
property etc. It will not work out because the natural migration towards the mother
country would follow. Nobody has ever pa id the war reparation anywhere so I am
sure that it will not happen here either. However, we have to make the comprehensive
and generous gesture. Therefore, we must give a guarantee at the humanitarian aspect.
We must guarantee that a non-existential creation called Bosnia would be held in such
non-existential condition for many years. That should divert fears that the creation of
Greater Serbia is ahead.” (CR 2006/8, pp. 59-60, para. 82.)
18. For my opponents this is all too clear, this language, and it is not acceptable that Serbs
should make a generous gesture. So counsel fo r Bosnia and Herzegovina then proposes that the
passage be given its opposite meaning. Mr. van den Biesen then says:
“Here, again, it appears that the participants to this meeting, including this
Foreign Minister of Serbia, are well aware of the fact that they are accountable for
paying compensation ‘for the destroyed property etc.’, as he describes it. At the same
time he, the then Foreign Minister of Serbia, is confident that they will not have to pay
war reparation. He proposes to make a ‘comprehensive and generous gesture’,
including several guarantees. As appears from his words, those gestures would only
be made to ‘divert fears that the creation of Greater Serbia is ahead’. Another
preparation for another deceit.” (CR 2006/8, pp. 59-60, para. 82.) - 21 -
19. Madam President, in my submission, th is segment from the argument provides another
example of the habit of our opponents to construe every normal action of Serbia and Montenegro as
evidence of culpability.
F. The Genocide Convention and the question of remedies
1. Madam President, with your permission, I sh all return to the important business of how to
apply the Convention. My friend Professor Pe llet dealt with the consequences of State
responsibility on 7 March (CR 2006/11, pp.26-42). His theme is that of the specific remedies
available and he reviews the remedies listed in the standard sources on State responsibility:
compensation, restitution, satisfaction, cessation and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.
2. This material is interesting and if I may say so, well presented. But is it at all relevant? In
the first place, the applicable law is the Conve ntion itself and not the principles of general
international law. But counsel for the applican t State expressly adopts as the major premise of his
arguments on remedies, the application of general international law (CR 2006/11, p. 29, para. 7).
3. With respect, this is not the appropriate legal approach. The causes of action or, if you
wish, the bases of claim depend upon the applicable law, which consists of the provisions of the
Convention. And it must follow that the remedial consequences must be kept compatible also with
the causes of action.
4. In other words, Madam President, the pr inciples of State responsibility relating to the
content of responsibility, including reparation for in jury, do not have the quality of a tent, a sort of
turf, which can be placed over every treaty text. Everything must depend upon the nature of the
primary duties. The nature of the responsibilit y for breaches of the Genocide Convention, and the
availability of remedies, including reparation, were major issues of contention when the
Convention was drafted.
5. It is also to be recalled that, even w ithin the context of the Articles adopted by the
International Law Commission, the Commission did not recognize the concept of penal
damages ⎯ this in Articles40 and 41 ⎯ and this is acknowledged by Professor Pellet
(CR 2006/11, p. 33, para. 16). - 22 -
Madam President, there is here a useful anal ogue with the jurisdiction to order provisional
measures. As the Court indicated in the Order dated 8 April 1993, the Court cannot, on the basis of
general considerations of intern ational policy, extend its power to indicate provisional measures
under Article 41 of the Statute (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Provisional Measures, Order of
8 April 1993, I.C.J. Reports 1993, pp.18-19, paras.33-35). In the present context, the applicant
State cannot seek to extend the jurisdiction available to the Court by virtue of ArticleIX of the
Convention simply by invoking the general principles of international law relating to remedies.
My last topic this morning is the issue of provisional measures.
G. The issue of provisional measures
1. The general question of the Court’s indica tion of provisional measures in the Orders of
1993 has been examined by Professor Pellet on 7 Ma rch (CR 2006/11, pp. 42-48) and I shall avoid
adding any further information but there are certain points to be made.
2. At the outset an important distinction must be drawn. The provisions of Article 41 of the
Statute constitute primarily and, in my submis sion, exclusively, an aspect of the Court’s ⎯ so to
speak ⎯ public law competence. There is no indicati on in the Statute that breaches of procedural
orders have delictual aspects as between the States parties to the proceedings. After all, the account
in the standard work of Shabtai Rosenne does not suggest otherwise ⎯ I refer to his book in the
long section in VolumeIII on this subject (see The Law and Practice of the International Court ,
1920-1996, pp. 1419-1462).
3. It is important to bear in mind that, wh en the Court accedes to a request by a party to
declare that the other party has violated an order of the Court for provisional measures, it does not
follow that a readiness to act upon a request involve s a recognition that there is a basis for a claim
based upon State responsibility. This conclusion can be justified on various grounds. One ground
would be the problems of evidence which would be involved. Another ground would be the
onerous requirements of an enquiry on the issue whether new evidence had shown that the factual
premises of the original order were mistaken. The position is complicated by the danger of an - 23 -
imbalance in face of a request for a declara tion only from one party. In the Judgment of
19 December 2005 in the case of Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, the Court observed:
“265. The Court further notes that the provisional measures indicated in the
Order of 1 July 2000 were addressed to both Parties. The Court’s finding in
paragraph 264 is without prejudice to the question as to whether the DRC did not also
fail to comply with the provisional measures indicated by the Court.”
4. In any case, the Court will presumably take account of the conduct of the party requesting
such a declaration. The applicant State has not been consistent in this respect in these proceedings.
First: the submissions attached to the Memorial do not contain a request.
Second: during the preliminary objections the oral hearings containing the submissions were
unaltered.
Third: the Conclusions and Submissions attached to the Reply, at pages 971 to 973, do not
contain a request.
5. At the present stage of these proceedings th e Court has not heard the final submissions of
the Parties. However, counsel for the applicant St ate has, so to speak, in formally asked the Court
to treat the violation of an order as a basis of claim and has requested the award of a set of remedies
for State responsibility (CR 2006/11, pp. 46-47, paras. 46-56).
6. Madam President, the Court will be aware th at such a request rai ses a sensitive issue of
competence and admissibility. Even if, for the sake of argument, such a claim were possible in
law, the doctrine of forum prorogatum must operate and, in this case, must operate in reverse form.
It is surely too late to introduce a new cause of action.
7. But, Madam President, there is a pre-prel iminary issue, namely, whether there is such a
cause of action available in general international law. No evidence has been given of such a
phenomenon. If compensation is to be claimed, th ere would be a need for new pleadings and, in
the result, no doubt, for a trial within a trial.
8. In any event, Madam President, Members of the Court, it is not true that Serbia and
Montenegro had breached the Orders of the C ourt concerning interim measures. The measures
ordered on 8 April 1993, and confirmed on 13 September the same year, read as follows: - 24 -
“The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9December1948,
take all measures within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) should in particular ensure th at any military, paramilitary or irregular
armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well as any organizations and
persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not commit any
acts of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genoc ide, of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, whether directed against the Muslim
population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnical, racial or
religious group;
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and the Government of the Re public of Bosnia and Herzegovina should
not take any action and should ensure that no action is taken which may aggravate or
extend the existing dispute over the prevention or punishment of the crime of
genocide, or render it more difficult of solution.” ( I.C.J. Reports 1993 , p.24,
para. 52.)
9. In our submission, Serbia and Montenegro did not breach the Order, because in the first
place, genocide has not been committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina; secondly, even if genocide
has been committed, Serbia and Montenegro di d not have influence over the persons who had
committed it, as I have demonstrated on Monday; and third, Serbia and Montenegro not only
obeyed the Order not to aggravate the existing dispute, but it tried to stop it, and encouraged
Republika Srspka to sign the Vance-Owen plan. Af ter the plan had not been signed by Republika
Srspka, the Respondent introduced sanctions on Republika Srpska. And finally, Serbia and
Montenegro also contributed, on the request from Republika Srpska, to the Dayton agreement,
which ended the conflict.
Madam President, if I could thank the Court for their usual consideration and patience, I
have finished this speech. I would ask you kindly to call on the Co-Agent of Serbia to follow me at
the podium.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Brownlie. I do now give the floor to
Mr. Obradović. - 25 -
OMBr. ADOVI Ć: Thank you, Madam President.
INTRODUCTION TO THE TESTIMONIES
1. Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, at this stage of the oral
proceedings I would like to make a brief introduc tion to the following testimonies of the witnesses
proposed by Serbia and Montenegro, in order to emphasize the importance of that part of the
procedure.
2. In 1999, after the last written submission in this case, the representatives of the respondent
State intended to invite several hundred witnesses. Most of them were the eyewitnesses of the
atrocities committed against them, against members of their families or their neighbours in the
Bosnian war. The counter-claim of Serbia and Mo ntenegro has been supported with statements of
those witnesses, taken in accordance with the ru les of the criminal procedure of the former
1
Yugoslavia . On the other hand, the position of the A pplicant toward the purpose and necessity of
the testimonies before the International Court of Justice has been quite different from the said
position of the Respondent.
3. After the fall of the Milosevic régime in the Republic of Serbia, the new representatives of
the respondent State took the position that this disp ute was a matter of the past. The people from
the former Yugoslavia needed peace and reconcilia tion above all, and not the litigation by which
attempts would be made to historically justify th e previous conflict and continue it by the showing
of legal arguments. A ceasefire was necessary in this procedure as well, and for that reason, the
Respondent decided to withdraw the counter-claim. That was the act of our good will and our
confidence in the joint European future of the people from the former Yugoslavia. Unfortunately,
the Applicant did not follow that way, and today we are in the courtroom.
4. However, it does not mean that the affida vits submitted to the Court by the Respondent
should be treated as unnecessary pages in this case, re gardless of whether the counter-claim exists
or not. Those are the records of serious testimonies which can surely complete the general picture
of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and fill the gaps in the black-and-white description
1
Annexes to Part II of the Counter-Memorial, 23 July 1997. - 26 -
given by the representatives of the applicant State, according to which one side in the war has been
a victim, the other side has exclusively been a perp etrator, while the role of the third side, probably
for political reasons, should not be explained.
5. The fact that the Respondent withdrew the counter-claim has not had an influence to its
position on the significance of the testimonies as so urces of evidence in this case. I have already
demonstrated that the numerous international re ports had shortcomings in the methodology of
gathering information, since they did not employ adequate investigative methods and consequently
their results cannot be considered as reliable. The statement of a witness who appears before the
court should be treated as more reliable eviden ce than the statement of an anonymous witness,
given to a non-governmental organization during wart ime or attached to an application for asylum,
and subsequently, included in the report sent to the Bassiouni Commission of Experts or to the
Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights.
6. It is sure that experts’ reports and tes timonies can be sufficient evidence in some cases ⎯
for instance, in the case of a border dispute between two States. But this is not an ordinary
litigation; this is a case in which the State is accused of “the crime of crimes” ⎯ genocide.
7. One could say that there are enough testimonies before the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia which deals with the i ndividual criminal responsibility of the accused.
The Court can always examine a statement given to the Tribunal and try to infer some factual
conclusions from that. However, the direct t estimony before the Court Chamber should have
priority in relation to the reading of the record of the testimony previously given to another
chamber, or another court.
8. For example, the representatives of the app licant State have frequently quoted a statement
given to the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Milosevic case by another accused, Mr. Milan Babic, who
2
in the meantime has made the plea agreement with the Prosecutor . However, that statement, given
in the Milosevic case, could not be simply taken as a source of evidence in another ICTY case,
because it would harm the right of another accused to cross-examine the witness. For that reason,
the Prosecutor invited again Mr. Ba bic to testify directly in the Martic case. Unfortunately, in the
2
CR 2006/3, p. 36, para. 40; also, CR 2006/10, p. 56, para. 46. - 27 -
evening before the cross-examina tion, Mr.Babic committed suicide 3. This dramatic episode is
sufficient to show the seriousness of this case, the responsibility of all of us, the State
representatives, who try to demonstrate what they be lieve to be the truth, and the fatal challenges
facing the witnesses who were directly involved in the tragic events in the former Yugoslavia.
9. Of course, the Applicant can use a vast amount of official documents drawn up during the
war time, and they cannot be opposed as a reliable source of evidence. However, the documents
very often can be the object of different interpre tations by the Parties and it is clear that the
testimony of the person directly involved in the events can contribute to the explanation of the
meaning of the documents. I will try now to brie fly demonstrate how the Applicant misinterpreted
the transcript from the mentioned session of the Co uncil for Harmonization of Positions on State
Policy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, held before the Geneva negotiations, on
4
9 January 1993 .
10. Having read the 12 pages from the judg es’ folder prepared by the Applicant on
3March2006, we could agree with the Applican t only upon the cruel character of the Serbian
leaders which have been directly shown by their own words. However, it is all the more strange
when such persons as Mr.Karadzic and Mr.M ilosevic discussed that Mr.Izetbegovic, former
President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, be found gu ilty. It seems that they were convinced in
blaming him, but from the submitted pages of the document we cannot realize what would be the
reason for such an opinion.
11. However, the respondent State has some different observations to this document,
compared with the Applicant’s view. Firstly, it must be mentioned that the 12 pages have been cut
out from the context of the whole session. From the submitted fragments, it cannot be seen that the
purpose of that meeting was the intention of th e Serbian and Montenegrin politicians to convince
the Bosnian Serbs neither to demand nor to d ecide their union with the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. From that point of view, it is not clear whether Mr.Milosevic, who died in the
Detention Unit of the ICTY a couple of days ago, really meant that “integrity of the Serbian
people” had been de facto reached, or he told it just in orde r to prevent Mr.Karadzic, one of the
3
ICTY, Press Release, 6 March 2006.
4CR 2006/8, pp. 55-60, paras. 65-83 (Mr. van den Biesen). - 28 -
last ICTY fugitives, to provoke new political probl ems for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
the Serbian People on the whole.
12. Secondly, the integral version of this tr anscript cannot be fully understood without the
knowledge of the historical background and the political context in which that meeting was held. It
is obvious that the personal relations between Mr. Milosevic and Mr.Karadzic were very sour at
that moment. The stenographic notes of their discussion show the seriousness of the dispute, but it
is difficult to understand what the object of their dissonance was.
13. Thirdly, it cannot be inferred from this tr anscript that Mr. Karadzic was either under the
authority of Mr.Cosic, President of the Federa l Republic of Yugoslavia, or of Mr.Milosevic,
President of the Republic of Serbia. It is clearly visible that both of them did not give orders to
Mr. Karadzic, but tried to advise him. From their very confusing and even impolite conversation, it
is not clear whether they had any success in their intentions.
14. However, the delegation of Bosnian Serb leaders participated in that session of the
Yugoslav Federal body, not as members, but as guests invited by President Cosic, and that fact was
emphasized in the press release of the session prepared by Mr. Svetozar Stojanovic 5.
15. Finally, the Applicant should explain to the Court why none of the Serb leaders at this
meeting discussed the plan for the destruction of the Muslim community, in whole or in part, either
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or in the Republic of Srpska. The meeting was non-public,
the stenographic notes were confidential, and none of them could suppose that one day their words
would be repeated and interpreted before the C ourt. Of course, the remorseless Milosevic’s
question why the Bosnian Serbs had killed the De puty Prime Minister of the Bosnian Government
a day before the meeting and that Karadzic’s tough response moved us to shock, but it is obvious
that PresidentMilosevic did not agree with such behaviour of Bosnian Serbs. No one from the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia inc ited Bosnian Serb leaders at that session to commit atrocities.
6
“The territory is an essential issue”, said the late Slobodan Milosevic. “Only the map matters.”
16. After this short analysis of the mentioned document, it seems that it is really regrettable
that the Applicant has decided not to invite any witness who could explain the meaning of the
5
Judges’ folder prepared by the Applicant on 3 March 2006, p. 167.
6Ibid., p. 71. - 29 -
words and the main intentions of the participants to that session, their relations and the political
context in which that session was held. Without su ch an explanation, which would be given under
the solemn declaration, the Respondent cannot accept the conclusions which the Applicant has tried
to establish from some fragments of this document.
17. For all of these above-mentioned reasons , the Respondent has considered and still
considers that testimony of the persons directly in volved in the events is necessary in this case of
historical importance.
18. During the meeting with PresidentShi held on 14March 2005, the representatives of
Serbia and Montenegro informed the Court about the intention to invite 30witnesses in the oral
proceedings, considering that number as a reasonable one.
19. As you know, Serbia and Montenegro in the meantime has decided to significantly
reduce the list of witnesses in order to contribute to the economy and efficiency of the oral
proceedings, especially in light of the fact that we are confident that the honourable Court has no
jurisdiction in this case.
20. In addition, our Agent, Professor Stojanovi ć, in his letter of 8 September 2005, proposed
to the Court to invite five witnesses who have pl ayed very important roles during the conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the witnesses of the Court , because they did not want to be the
witnesses of any Party in this difficult case, due to their different nations, high moral integrity and
the strong intention for impartiality. Those were three generals of the United Nations Protection
Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, GeneralSi r Michael Rose, General Lewis Mackenzie and
GeneralSatishNambiar, who were directly involv ed in the events and who have very important
views about the relations between the main actors of the conflict which should be deliberated by
the Court. The fourth witness of the Court pr oposed by Serbia and Montenegro should be
Mr. Jose Cutileiro, who was the Secretary-Genera l of the European Community and was involved
in the early peace negotiations in 1992.
21. The Respondent considers that the fifth person proposed by Serbia and Montenegro as
the witness of the Court would be very important as well. That was Belgrade’s Mufti,
Mr.HamdijaJusufspahic, head of the Islamic co mmunity in Serbia. He would testify about the
position of the Muslim community in Serbia and Montenegro from 1992 to 1995, and we are sure - 30 -
that he would confirm some conclusions established yesterday by our Co-Agent,
Mr. Vladimir Cvetković.
22. However, the Court has so far not accepted the proposal of our Agent to invite the
mentioned persons as witnesses of the Court. We hope that such a decision was rendered for the
same reason which determined the Respondent to decide to reduce the list of its witnesses.
23. In the following days, Serbia and Montenegro will introduce to the Court eight witnesses.
All of them have very important knowledge about the events relevant for the present case.
24. Mr. Zoran Lilic was the President of th e Federal Republic of Y ugoslavia and we cannot
imagine a person who knows better the relation betw een Serbia and Montenegro and Republic of
Srpska during the Bosnian conflict. His high credibility was confirmed by the ICTY Prosecutor
who invited him as a witness in the Milosevic trial. Mr. Lilic will be our first witness.
25. The witnesses from the Republic of Srpska will be two prominent persons:
ProfessoVrr.ladLirukic, who was the Prime Minister in wartime, and
Professor Dr. Vitomir Popovic, current Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who was the
Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Srpska.
26. Sir Michael Rose will come to The Hague as well to testify in this case, notwithstanding
that the Court has not decided to invite him as its witness. The impartiality of this distinguished
United Nations officer is doubtless.
27. The expert Mr.Jean-Paul Sardon, Resear ch Director at the National Institute for
Demographic Studies from Paris will present to the Court his evaluation of the previous estimations
of the war casualties in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
28. Professor Dr.Dragoljub Micunovic, one of the Serbian opposition leaders and former
President of the Parliament of the Federal Re public of Yugoslavia, and Mr.Dusan Mihajlovic,
former Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, who was a member of the Government
during the Milosevic rule, as well as a member of the democratic Government after the fall of the
Milosevic régime, are the persons who have significant knowledge about the Yugoslav conflict.
29. Mr. Vladimir Milicevic was the H ead of the Police Department who accepted
800Muslim refugees after the fall of Srebrenica a nd Zepa in 1995. He will testify about their
destiny and treatment in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. - 31 -
30. All of these witnesses will be available for the Applicant’s cross-examination for the
time equal to the time of examination. We str ongly believe that these witnesses will significantly
contribute to the establishment of the factual findings and truth in the present case.
T HE A PPLICANT ’S NEW APPROACH TOWARDS PROCEEDINGS
IN THE PRESENT CASE
31. Madam President, allow me now to turn to another topic which, in our opinion, has to be
mentioned before the end of the first round of the oral pleadings of Serbia and Montenegro. It
concerns the fairness of the Applicant’s new appr oach towards proceedings in this case. This
approach was first noticed in the Applicant’s letters to the Court dated 28December2005 and
19January2006, in which the Deputy Agent of Bo snia and Herzegovina asked the Court to call
upon Serbia and Montenegro to produce several hundred new documents with English translations.
32. In the letter of 31January 2006, the Respondent informed the Court that the translation
of the requested documents as well as the preparation for the consideration of their relevance in the
present case would need a considerable amount of time. This new burden to the proceedings and
especially to the Respondent, only a month before the opening of the oral hearings, would clearly
put the Respondent in an unequal position. There was no reason which indicates that the Applicant
was prevented to ask for the production of th e new documents at an earlier stage of the
proceedings. In its letter, the Applicant explaine d its negligence in this regard rather than the
acceptable reason.
33. However, in spite of the fact that th e Court has not upheld the said request of the
Applicant, Professor Franck asked the Court to dr aw the negative inference from the behaviour of
the Respondent, even in the absence of the form al order for the production of documents pursuant
to Article 49 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
34. This Applicant’s new approach toward s the proceeding continued during the oral
pleadings. Firstly, I would like to remind the Court that Serbia and Montenegro, after the
submission of some confidential documents in acco rdance with Article56 of the Rules of Court,
submitted the list of the public documents that the Respondent would refer to during the oral
7
CR 2006/3, p. 27, para. 21 (Professor Franck). - 32 -
proceedings, as well as three folders of public docu ments which are part of the publication readily,
but not easily available.
35. In relation to the numerous documents of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, the Respondent considered th at judgments, decisions, indictments and basic
documents that can be easily found on the website of the United Nations Tribunal, as well as in the
Peace Palace Library, are easily available material.On the other hand, the ICTY transcripts from
the oral hearings which contain the witness’ statements, as well as some documents which have
been used as exhibits in the ICTY trials, are not documents easily available, and for that reason, the
Respondent decided to provide the Court and the App licant with them, as an act of courtesy. Of
course, all public documents that the Respondent will refer to in its oral pleadings cannot be fully
presumed before the opening of the oral hearings, because the role of the respondent State is just to
respond to the Applicant’s arguments which cannot be known in advance. For that reason, our list
of public documents should not be treated as a final, and some flexibility in that way is reasonable
and understandable.
36. Thus, Serbia and Montenegro submitted its list of public documents on 31 January 2006,
almost one month before the opening of the or al proceedings, while Bosnia and Herzegovina
submitted its compact disc entitled . . .
The PRESIDENT: Mr. Obradovi ć, I am going to interrupt you there. As you are aware the
matter of which you are about to speak is not now within the proceedings of the Court and that has
been settled between the Parties with the assistance of the Court and it would not be appropriate to
continue pleading to that point.
OMBr. ADOVI Ć: Thank you, Madam President, for that explanation. That assistance of
the Court will be appreciated and that will make my today’s speech significantly shorter. Anyway,
Madam President, distinguished Members of the Court, I would like then to thank you for your
kind attention and to respectfully suggest a short break before our Agent,
Professor Radoslav Stojanović, concludes the first round of the oral arguments of Serbia and
Montenegro. Thank you. - 33 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you Mr. Obradovic. The Court will now rise for a short break.
The Court adjourned from 11.20 a.m. to 11.35 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Professor Stojanović, you have the floor.
STMO.JANOVI Ć : Merci Madame.
C ONCLUSION
1. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, comme je l’ai déjà déclaré le premier jour, et
maintenant je vais souligner que c’est un grand honneur et un privilège pour moi de plaider devant
vous, mais je ne saisis pas cet honneur sans peine affliction, car mon pays est accusé devant la
plus haute cour universelle d’avoir commis le plus grave des crimes ⎯ le crime de génocide.
2. Mais mon pays n’est pas accusé seulement de génocide. Le demandeur nous accuse
constamment de vouloir nous échapper à la resp onsabilité par les moyens procéduraux, en
ajournant l’affaire et en la faisant traînerndant treize années. Le demandeur nous a même
accusé d’avoir essayé d’échapper à la responsabilité par le changement du nom de l’Etat. Vu le
langage de l’accusation, j’hésite à la citer devant la Cour. Je rappelle ce que le demandeur a dit :
«[t]his State cannot be allowed to rid itself the stench of the blood it has spilled merely by
putting on fresh new names» (CR 2006/5 (Franck), p. 16, par. 23).
3. Madame le président, le défendeur a en effet changé le nom au cours du déroulement de la
présente affaire. Ce changement de nom a eu lie u en 2003 pour des rais ons de politique interne
⎯ qui sont connues d’ailleurs ⎯ et il n’a aucun effet sur la présente affaire. Pourtant, ce qui a des
effets sur cette affaire, c’est le fait qu’en00 le défendeur a été admis à l’Organisation des
Nations Unies en tant qu’Etat nouveau. J’en parlerai un peu plus tard.
4. Treize ans se sont écoulés depuis l’introduction de la demande de l’Etat demandeur devant
la Cour. Tellement d’événements ont eu lieu dur ant cette période. Nous avons vécu la chute du
régime de Slobodan Milosevic et aujourd’hui la Serbie-et-Monténégro est reconnue par le monde
entier comme faisant partie de la famille des Etats démocratiques. Nous nous sommes engagés
vers l’intégration européenne et nous n’épargnons pas d’efforts en poursuivant ce but. - 34 -
5. Madame le président, nous marchons sur cette voie à côté du demandeur. Les relations
entre nos pays se sont améliorées de manière significative et la présente affaire fait partie de peu de
questions qui sont encore pendant es. Pour cette raison, nous sommes d’accord avec le demandeur
qu’il faut établir la vérité et qu’il faut aller en av ant. Toutefois, nous ne pouvons pas souscrire à la
version subjective des faits montrée par le demandeur et à sa perception de la vérité, telle qu’il nous
l’a présentée dans ses observations écrites, mais également lors des audiences.
6. C’est justement la raison pour laque lle nous avons essayé d’initier un processus de
réconciliation entre les deux Etats et d’y joindre la Croatie, en tant que troisième Etat intéressé.
Lors de ma plaidoirie initiale, j’ai présenté les efforts que nous avons déployés à cet effet, ainsi que
les réponses négatives que nous avons reçues du demandeur. Pourtant, nous maintenons cette
proposition, comme je l’ai déjà mentionné le premier jour de nos plaidoiries.
7. Madame le président, beaucoup de ch angements se sont produits pendant les
treizedernières années écoulées depuis l’introductio n de la demande par la Bosnie-Herzégovine.
Mais beaucoup de changements ont eu lieu pendant les trois dernières semaines écoulées depuis le
début des audiences. Les acteurs principaux des conflits dans l’ex-Yougos lavie ne sont plus
vivants. Alija Izetbegovic et Franjo Tudjman sont décédés, l’ancien leader des Serbes de Croatie,
Milan Babic, s’est suicidé le 5 mars 2006 et Slobodan Milosevic est décédé le 11 mars dernier.
8. Les deux derniers sont décédés ici, à la Haye , dans leurs cellules de détention. Je n’ai pas
l’intention de parler maintenant de leur responsabilité pénale, bi en que ce sujet ait été largement
débattu pendant les présentes procédures et qu’il ser a certainement discuté lors du deuxième tour.
Cependant, je veux souligner que ces deux hommes, à côté d’autres personnes de l’ex-Yougoslavie,
dont la majorité avait été des hauts fonctionnaires de leurs Etats, se sont trouvés devant le TPIY
pour répondre aux accusations pour des crimes qu’ils ont peut-être commis.
9. Nous avons soutenu devant la Cour, et ceci a été remarqué par notre estimé conseiller,
M. Ian Brownlie, qui n’a fait que paraphraser les honorables juges Shi et Vereshchetin que ce n’est
pas cette Cour, avec tout le respect que nous lui devons, mais le Tribunal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie
qui est le juste cadre pour connaître des griefs form ulés par le demandeur dans la présente affaire.
En conséquence, nous demandons à la Cour de dire et juger da ns la présente affaire que les
dispositions de la convention sur le génocide s’appliquent seulement pour ce qui est du - 35 -
manquement d’un Etat de prévenir et de punir les ac tes de génocide commis dans les limites de sa
compétence territoriale.
10. Mais, Madame le président, avant de se pronon cer à l’égard de ce que je viens de dire, la
Cour doit décider si elle est compétente ou non. Nous n’essay ons pas, comme l’affirme le
demandeur de nous échapper à la responsabilité par le biais des détails techniques («escape
responsibility on technicality», voir CR 2006/11 (Franck), p. 56, par. 38). Tout au contraire, et tel
qu’exposé en détail par le professeur Tibor Varady , soit qu’elle soit demandeur, soit qu’elle soit
défendeur, la Serbie-et-Monténégro a soutenu sa pos ition d’une manière constante et unitaire dans
toutes ses affaires devant cette Cour et nous avons demandé à la Cour de se prononcer sur la
question de la compétence en se fondant sur les mêmes faits et sur la même analyse.
er
11. En s’appuyant sur cette analyse, nous avons démontré qu’avant le 1 novembre 2000, la
Serbie-et-Monténégro n’avait pas accès à cette Cour , car elle n’était pas membre de l’Organisation
des Nations Unies, et car aucune autre base à un tel accès n’existait. Ce fait a été clairement établi
par cette Cour en 2004 ⎯et donc, ni dans cette affaire, la C our ne peut avoir la compétence, car
elle ne l’avait pas au moment pertinent.
12. Nous avons démontré également que l’Etat défendeur n’est pas rest é lié et n’est jamais
devenu lié par l’articleIX de la convention sur le génocide, qui est la seule base de compétence
invoquée. Le défendeur ne répondait pas aux conditions d’adhésion à la convention sur le génocide
avant de devenir Membre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies.
13. La seule supposition plausible qui aurait pu r accorder la Yougoslavie à l’article IX de la
convention sur le génocide au moment où l’arrêt de 1996 sur les exceptions préliminaires avait été
rendu est la supposition que la Yougoslavie en est restée liée en tant que successeur de la
personnalité de l’ex-Yougoslavie. Vu qu’il s’est avéré que le défendeur n’a pas succédé à
l’ex-Yougoslavie et n’a donc pas repris son statut dans les traités, cette supposition est dénuée de
tout fondement. En réalité, l’Etat défendeur n’est pas resté lié par l’article IX de la convention sur
le génocide.
14. Nous avons démontré ensuite que le défendeur n’est jamais devenu lié par l’article IX de
la convention sur le génocide. Le défendeur n’a jamais déposé une notification de succession à la
convention sur le génocide. La déclaration du 27avril1992 n’a pas et n’aurait pas pu avoir pour - 36 -
effet la succession. De même, la succession automatique n’est pas intervenue. Même si la
succession automatique avait eu lieu, celle-ci n’au rait pas pu inclure l’articleIX, vu son caractère
de clause relative au règlement juridictionnel des différends.
15. De plus, nous avons démontré que le dé fendeur ne remplissait même pas les conditions
d’adhésion à la convention sur le génocide avant de devenir Membre des NationsUnies. En tant
qu’Etat non-membre des NationsUnies il aurait pu adhérer à la convention seulement sur le
fondement d’une invitation en application de l’artic leXI. Une telle invitation ne lui a jamais été
adressée ⎯et personne n’a soutenu le contraire. Après l’entrée dans les NationsUnies, la
Yougoslavie a adhéré à la convention, avec une réserve à l’article IX.
16. Il faut souligner que le statut du dé fendeur par rapport aux traités est démontré de
manière factuelle par les enregistrements du dépositaire. Ces enregistrements montrent et
confirment de manière non équivoque que l’Etat dé fendeur est devenu partie à la convention sur le
génocide seulement au moment où il y a adhéré en2001, et ceci en déposant la réserve à
l’article IX.
17. Vu que la Cour n’avait pas de compéten ce pour juger le défendeur au moment pertinent
et que celui-ci n’est jamais resté ou devenu lié par l’articleIX de la conve ntion sur le génocide,
nous prions la Cour d’examiner la question de compétence, et de se déclarer incompétente dans la
présente affaire.
18. En dehors, de l’incompétence de la Cour, nous avons également démontré que la plupart
des preuves présentées par le demandeur, aussi bien dans ses observations écrites que dans ses
plaidoiries orales, sont contestables. Le plus fra ppant encore est que le demandeur perpétue une
partie de ces preuves douteuses tout au long d es observations écrites et continue à les répéter
encore une fois devant la Cour. Comme notre coagent, M. Sasa Obradovic, l’a expliqué, le seul but
probable de l’insistance continue sur de telles preuves est celui d’induire la Cour dans l’erreur et de
la choquer. Et pire encore, le de mandeur prie la Cour de tirer des inférences de ce type de preuves
malgré le fait que ces preuves ne répondent pas aux critères exigés pour la crédibilité des preuves
dans les affaires devant cette Cour. - 37 -
19. Mais, Madame le président, nous avons démontré aussi qu’il n’y a pas eu de génocide en
Bosnie-Herzégovine. Et aussi nous avons montré qu’ il n’a jamais existé en Serbie-et-Monténégro
ni dans le peuple serbe un plan de génocide.
20. Dans ma plaidoirie de la semaine derniè re, j’ai réfuté les allégations du demandeur
soutenant que le conflit de 1992-1995 a été la con séquence du plan de la création de la «Grande
e
Serbie», un plan qui, d’après le demandeur, date depuis le XIX siècle et a ses origines dans le plan
de Garasanin, intitulé «Nacertanije». Pour soutenir mes arguments j’ai rappelé, ici, devant la Cour,
des événements les plus importants de l’histoire de la Serbie et de l’ex-Yougoslavie.
21. Ce plan n’a été qu’un projet panslave envisag eant l’unification de tous les Slaves du sud.
De plus, ce projet n’a à nul point envisagé l’exte rmination d’aucune des na tions vivant dans le
territoire de l’ex-Yougoslavie. Tout au contraire, il était fondé sur l’union des nations différentes
dans un seul Etat. Ce projet a été, par ailleurs, réalisé après la première guerre mondiale par la
création du Royaume des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, et par la création de cet Etat ce plan est entré
dans l’histoire.
22. Tandis qu’entre les deux guerres mondiales les dirigeants ou l’élite intellectuelle de
Serbie n’avaient plus l’idée de la «Grande Serb ie», l’idée de l’«hégémonie serbe» fut lancée par le
parti communiste yougoslave, sous l’influence du Komintern, dont l’un des objectifs était de
démembrer la Yougoslavie, telle que créée par Versailles.
23. Lors de la deuxième guerre mondiale, ironiquement, les pouvoirs de l’Axe ont mis en
Œuvre les idées du Komintern et ont divisé la Yougoslavie dans un faisceau de petits Etats ayant
des statuts différents. Le plus grand d’entre e ux fut l’Etat indépendant de Croatie, un Etat qui, à
part la Croatie, comprenait des parties de la Se rbie d’aujourd’hui, ainsi que la totalité de la
Bosnie-Herzégovine. Des atrocités monstrueuses co ntre le peuple serbe ont été commises sur le
territoire de cet Etat et elles se sont ancrées da ns la mémoire du peuple. Malheureusement, un rôle
significatif dans la perpétration de ces atrocités fut joué par les Musulmans de Bosnie-Herzégovine.
24. Après la seconde guerre mondiale, dont Tito et ses partisan s sont issus comme
vainqueurs, les auteurs de ces atrocités n’ont pas été déferrés à la justice pour leurs crimes. Le parti
communiste a promu «l’unité et la fraternité» en tre les nations, une politique qui n’a pas manqué
d’effets positifs. - 38 -
25. Pourtant, la politique d’«unité et fratern ité» a été accompagnée par la décentralisation
exagérée de l’Etat, dans lequel les unités fédérale s jouissaient de la souveraineté au détriment de
l’Etat fédéral. Le pouvoir de l’Etat fédéral n’ét ait, par la suite, qu’une coquille creuse. Dans ce
contexte, la Yougoslavie n’était pl us une fédération, mais au mi eux une confédération, sinon une
association d’Etats indépendants.
26. Bien qu’à l’exception de la Slovénie tout es les unités fédérales fussent multinationales,
chacune d’entre elles, à l’excep tion de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, était toujours dominée par une
nation distincte. En conséquence, le processus de consolidation de la souveraineté des unités
fédérales a conduit progressivement à la consolida tion de la souveraineté des élites nationales,
quoique encore bien cachées par le voile du parti communiste.
27. Ce système a quand même fonctionné jusqu’à la mort de Tito et au début de la crise
économique des années quatre-vingt. La crise économ ique a aggravé encore plus la rupture entre
les unités fédérales et entre leurs élites nationales respectives.
28. Au moment de la chute du communisme dans toute l’Europe de l’Est, ces élites devaient
trouver une nouvelle doctrine leur pe rmettant de garder le pouvoir. La nouvelle doctrine fut le
nationalisme. Le nationalisme a été encouragé par des motifs divers et les motifs ne furent pas
difficiles à trouver dans l’histoire bouleversée des Ba lkans. Quant aux Serbes, la plus simple voie
fut de leur rappeler des atrocités commises par les Oustachas pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale.
29. Pourtant, le nationalisme serbe ne fut qu’ une réaction. Comme je l’ai déjà montré, le
peuple serbe avait atteint ses buts lors du congrès de Versailles et il n’avait aucune raison de
demander une revision. Par contre, les autres, et en particulier les Croates, n’avaient pas mis en
Œuvre leurs projets et ils ont saisi la chute du communisme en Europe de l’Est comme le moment
opportun pour créer leurs Etats indépendants.
30. A ce moment-là, le fameux «mémorandum» de l’Académie serbe des sciences et des arts
fut publié en réaction à la situation dans la Yougoslavie et en réponse aux autres nationalismes. Ce
document n’était qu’une lamentation sur le sort du peuple serbe et n’était ni un projet de création
de la «Grande Serbie», ni un appel à l’extermination des autres. - 39 -
31. Il n’y a point de continuité entre le plan de Garasanin du XIX esiècle et le
«mémorandum»; le seul point de continuité est, en effet, celui qu’aucun d’entre eux ne représentait
un projet de la «Grande Serbie» et n’appelait à la destruction des autres nations.
32. Au vu de tout ce qui précède, je prie la Cour de rejeter les griefs du demandeur qui se
fonde sur une analyse quasi historique de la con tinuité du projet de la «Grande Serbie» depuis le
XIX esiècle jusqu’au mémorandum de l’Académie serb e des sciences et des arts. En plus, ce débat
historique lancé par le demandeur manque de pert inence devant cette Cour mais, au nom de la
vérité historique et scientifique, le défendeur a considéré nécessaire d’y répondre dans ses
plaidoiries.
33. Il en ressort, Madame le président, Messi eurs les juges de la Cour, que le conflit de
l’ex-Yougoslavie n’est pas simple à expliquer et que , en tout cas, il ne peut pas être expliqué par
l’analyse manquant toute impartialité offerte par le demandeur. Il ne correspond pas à la vérité que
le conflit ait éclaté comme conséquence du nationali sme serbe. Au nom de la vérité mentionnée
ci-dessus, dans ma plaidoirie de la semaine dernière j’en ai parlé largement et par la suite je vais
parcourir ce sujet brièvement.
34. Les causes du conflit sont complexes et ell es peuvent s’expliquer par la combinaison de
plusieurs éléments. Dans le cas de la Slovénie, l es raisons de la sécession furent principalement de
nature économique, tandis que les prétentions po ur l’indépendance de la Croatie se fondaient
premièrement sur l’aspiration de créer un Etat national indépendant.
35. En tout cas, les républiques qui tendaien t à la sécession de la Yougoslavie se préparèrent
pendant plusieurs années. Les préparations incl uaient des activités politiques et diplomatiques et
aussi la procuration des armes et l’établissement des forces armées capables de s’opposer à la
l’armée nationale de la Yougoslavie. En d’au tres mots, la sécession allait être poursuivie soit par
des moyens pacifiques soit par la force.
36. Les préparations se sont déroulées da ns les limites des frontières nationales et,
naturellement, les Serbes n’ont pas fait excepti on. Les objectifs des Serbes étaient pourtant
contraires à ceux des autres nations. Les Serbes voulaient maintenir la Yougoslavie et dans ce but
ils ont commencé à se procurer des armes. - 40 -
37. Les préparations pour le conflit étaient dirigées et organisées par les leaders politiques
des groupes nationaux. Ces leaders ont utilisé les nouvelles circonstances pour consolider leur
pouvoir. Sous cet aspect non plus, les dirigeants politiques serbes, y inclus ceux de Belgrade, ne
furent pas une exception. Nous avons démont ré que ces activités n’ét aient pas différentes par
rapport à celles des autres groupes nationaux. En effet, Madame le prési dent, la procuration
d’armes est tout simplement procuration d’armes, peu importe la nation intéressée.
38. Malheureusement, les préparations ont réu ssi et ils ont amené la Yougoslavie dans une
situation d’où il était difficile de trouver une issue. Pour y arriver, l’appui et l’action diplomatique
ferme de la part de la communauté internationale étaient nécessaires. Plus encore, il était
nécessaire que les leaders locaux aient du bon sens et la capacité du compromis.
Malheureusement, les deux manquaient.
39. La communauté internationale était elle-même partagée et elle n’a pas réussi à prévenir
le conflit par une action politique ferme. Pour cet te raison, la communauté internationale porte
elle-même une partie de la r esponsabilité pour l’évolution des événements. La responsabilité
primordiale appartient, néanmoins, aux leaders des groupes nationaux, qui n’étaient pas prêts pour
les compromis.
40. De ce point de vue, Slobodan Milosevic porte une responsabilité politique importante
pour le conflit et la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’a pas l’in tention de le nier. En fin de compte, ce fut la
Serbie-et-Monténégro qui l’a fait arrêter et qui l’a envoyé à LaHaye, où mis à part sa
responsabilité politique, sa responsabilité pénale devait être établie, si celle-ci existait.
41. Cependant, les autres leaders portent une responsabilité similaire pour le conflit, et il
s’agit particulièrement des leaders croates et musulmans ⎯ Franjo Tudjman et Alija Izetbegovic.
Il est regrettable que même pas aujourd’hui les di rigeants de Croatie et de Bosnie-Herzégovine ne
sont pas prêts à accepter une telle responsabilité.
42. Il est également regrettable que le demandeur dans la présente affaire tente de justifier
toute action des Musulmans bosniaques, bien que parfois il admette, mais pas sans difficulté,
l’injustice de certains de leurs actes. D’autre pa rt, il traite chaque action des Serbes pas seulement
de criminelle, mais de génocid aire. Au début des plaidoiries du demandeur, son agent adjoint a
admis que la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine ava it été déclenchée par un Musulman bosniaque qui - 41 -
avait provoqué une fusillade lors d’une fête de mariage serbe (CR 2006/4 (van den Biesen), p. 23,
par. 6). M. van den Biesen a admis que cet acte avait été inapproprié, mais en même temps il n’a
pas omis de le justifier en affirmant que le tir eur avait été «choqué par les images de Vukovar et
par le discours de haine des leaders politiques de Belgrade» (loc. cit.).
43. Je suis persuadé que le but et l’objectif de cette haute Cour est celui d’établir la vérité sur
le conflit en Bosnie-Herzégovine, mais la vérité ne peut être établie par l’illustration préjugée, en
noir et blanc, des événements, où toute action de l’autre Partie est présentée comme constitutive de
génocide et agressive, lorsque toute action du demandeur est présentée comme pacifique et
défensive. C’est cette approche manquant cr uellement d’impartialité qui rend impossible la
réconciliation longuement attendue.
44. Il est alors incontestable que le conflit en Bosnie-Herzégovine a été déclenché par un
Musulman bosniaque qui a tiré des coups de feu lors d’une fête de mariage serbe. Pourtant, le fait
que ce fut un Musulman qui a tiré le premier coup de feu ne m’amènera pas à tirer les inférences
d’une conspiration datant depuis des siècles que les Musulmans auraient contre les Serbes, ou
d’une association criminelle qui aurait pour but la destruction des Serbes en Bosnie-Herzégovine.
45. Non, Madame le président, je ne crois pas que le peuple musulman de
Bosnie-Herzégovine ait eu l’intention de détruire le peuple serbe. Mais je ne crois pas non plus que
le peuple serbe ait eu l’intention de détruire le peuple musulman.
46. J’ai démontré que la guerre en Bosnie-H erzégovine a été une guerre pour le territoire.
Dans le contexte de la dissolution évidente de l’une des anciennes républiques yougoslaves, les
trois parties au conflit, les Serbes, les Musulman s et les Croates, poursuivaient chacune le même
objectif qui était d’obtenir le plus de territoire. Il est possible que les plans relatifs à ces territoires
eurent été différents, vu que les Musulmans asp iraient à une Bosnie-Herzégovine indépendante
qu’ils auraient pu dominer, tandis que les Serbes et les Croates avaient des objectifs
différents ⎯l’unification des territoires qu’ils considéraient comme les leurs avec leurs Etats
mères (la Serbie et la Croatie). Malgré cela, l’essence restait la même ⎯contrôler autant de
territoires que possible.
47. Il est tout à fait réel que l’occupation des territoires et l’installation des autorités dans ces
territoires ont été accompagnées par l’exode des me mbres des autres nations. Une partie de la - 42 -
population s’est échappée au conflit, une partie de la population fuyait la guerre. Certains ont
quitté volontairement leurs maisons après l’ascension au pouvoir de leurs adversaires politiques.
Malheureusement, une partie de la population a été forcée de quitter le territoire, ce qui est, sans
doute, un acte criminel.
48. Cependant, cet acte criminel a été commis par toutes les parties au conflit et, en
comparant les pourcentages des Musulmans ou des Cr oates qui ont été forcés de quitter Prijedor,
Banja Luka ou Zvornik, aux pourcentages des Serbes qui ont été forcés de quitter Tuzla, Zenica ou
Mostar (contrôlés par des Musulmans ou des Croates) , les résultats sont presque équivalents et ces
résultats ne peuvent être altérés par un film m ontrant une poignée de Serb es célébrant les Pâques
orthodoxes à Tuzla (que l’on a vu ici, à la C our, lors de la présentation du 28février2006 de
M. van den Biesen).
49. Les crimes de déportation, d’expulsion ou de transfert forcé que je viens de décrire sont,
en effet, à condamner et ont été poursuivis pénaleme nt, mais ils ne sont pas le génocide. Ce crime
est souvent dénommé «nettoyage ethnique», et même l’agent adjoint du demandeur ne le considère
comme constituant du génocide. Dans son interview à Der Spiegel du 7mars2006,
M. van den Biesen a déclaré : «All the individual cases that the ICTY deals with are only part of
the ethnic cleansing campaign and genocide. We are putting everything into one case. We are first
asking the Court to declare that this was genocide and not ethnic cleansing .» (Disponible en
anglais, sur Spiegel Online, à http ://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,404731,00.html.)
50. Madame le président, j’ai démontré que notre thèse selon laquelle la guerre en
Bosnie-Herzégovine a été en réalité une guerre pour des territoires est le mieux confirmée par la
solution finalement trouvée au conflit. L’accord de Dayton qui a mis fin à la guerre prévoit les
limites territoriales des parties au conflit, après d es concessions faites par toutes les parties. Après
la signature de l’accord, la paix fut rétablie en Bosnie-Herzégovine et, malgré la fragilité des
relations internes dans cet Etat, la paix a été ma intenue avec succès jusqu’à présent. Si le conflit
avait pour but de détruire l’une des nations de Bosnie-Herzégovine, l’accord de paix n’aurait
jamais été signé et, à plus forte raison, il n’aurait jamais été appliqué.
51. Le fait que la guerre en Bosnie-Herzé govine fut une guerre pour des territoires a été
démontré avec plus de détails par notre estimé conseiller, M. Xavier de Roux. A côté de - 43 -
Mme Fauveau-Ivanovic, M. de Roux a analysé la multitude des allégations du demandeur relatives
au prétendu génocide en Bosnie-Herzégovine.
52. Nous avons démontré que le génocide est une notion ambivalente utilisée dans le monde
juridique et dans le monde politique avec des signi fications différentes et que dans chaque conflit
les déclarations de nature politique banalisent ce terme.
53. Nous avons aussi démontré qu’en droit, le génocide, aux termes de la convention sur le
génocide, ne peut être constitué que par l’un des actes énumérés dans l’article II de la convention et
que, puisque la commission du génocide peut revêtir l’une des formes mentionnées dans
l’article III de la convention sur le génocide, le demandeur aurait dû spécifier les formes auxquelles
il se réfère ainsi que les actes qui auraient constitué l’une ou l’autre de ces formes.
54. Le demandeur aurait dû spécifiquement déte rminer le groupe qui aurait été la victime du
génocide. Puisque le génocide ne peut être perpétré que par des personnes physiques animées par
l’intention spéciale de détruire un groupe nati onal, ethnique, racial ou religieux en totalité ou
partiellement, cette intention spéciale doit être établie par le requérant, comme doivent être
identifiées les personnes physiques qui auraient commis le crime.
55. Enfin, nous avons montré que le dema ndeur n’a pas démontré que les actes pouvant
constituer le génocide avaient été commis ou que ces actes étaient dirigés contre un groupe
ethnique, racial, national ou religieux bien défini. Le demandeur n’a aucunement démontré que ces
actes avaient pour objectif la destruction entière ou partielle du groupe national, ethnique, racial ou
religieux bien défini ou que l’auteur de ces actes av ait agi dans l’intention de détruire entièrement
ou partiellement le groupe susvisé bien défini.
56. Dans notre analyse, Madame le président, nous nous sommes appuyés sur la
jurisprudence du Tribunal pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et sur ce point, bien que nous soyons à la fin de
nos plaidoiries dans le premier tour, je vous do is une explication pour ce qui est du fait que nous
nous sommes en effet écartés de nos opinions antérieures concernant le Tribunal pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie telles qu’exprimées dans notre duplique, rappelées par le professeurFranck
devant la Cour (voir CR 2006/5 (Franck), p. 21, par. 39).
57. Cependant, nous ne considérons pas que tous les matériaux du Tribunal pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie revêtent la même pertinence et aient la même valeur probante. Nous nous - 44 -
appuyons premièrement sur les arrêts et jugeme nts du Tribunal, vu qu’uniquement les jugements
peuvent être considérés comme établissant de mani ère crédible les faits concernant les crimes
perpétrés.
58. Ces jugements, Madame le président, mont rent que le Tribunal a établi, à l’exception de
Srebrenica, que le génocide n’a été commis en aucun des cas invoqués par le demandeur. Le seul
cas où le Tribunal a établi l’existence d’un génoci de territorialement limité est l’affaire de
Srebrenica.
e
59. Dans son analyse du jugement rendu par le Tribunal dans l’affaire Krstic, M de Roux a
mis en évidence les graves carences de ce jugement. Je veux souligner quand même que le
Tribunal a trouvé le général Krstic coupable de co mplicité au génocide, en omettant à la fois
d’indiquer qui étaient les auteurs principaux et ne pouvant donc pas établir leur intention, si
nécessaire pour la commission du génocide.
60. Mais aussi douteuses qu’elles soient, les conclusions dans l’affaire Krstic ne regardent
pas la Serbie-et-Monténégro. M.IanBrownlie a réussi à démontrer que les événements de
Srebrenica avaient eu un caractère local et que les autorités du défendeur n’avaient pas été
impliquées dans le massacre.
61. Permettez-moi, Madame le président, d’ajouter ici une note personnelle. Vous avez
remarqué peut-être pendant ces plaidoiries que je ne me suis pas particulièrement préoccupé de
SlobodanMilosevic. Depuis 1989, quand à côté des autres, j’ai posé des bases du premier parti
d’opposition en Serbie, jusqu’à sa chute en 2000, j’ ai été l’opposant farouche de M.Milosevic.
Mais malgré mon opinion intime sur sa personne, je ne partage pas l’avis qu’il ait participé aux
événements de Srebrenica ou qu’il les ait même connus d’avance.
62. Mais, mes opinions personnelles ont moins d’ importance. Ce qui est vraiment important
ce sont les preuves présentées devant vous pa r M.Brownlie, preuves confirmant que ni
Slobodan Milosevic ni tout autre représentant de la Serbie-et-Monténégro n’ont aucun rapport avec
cet événement criminel.
63. Cependant, M.Brownlie a démontré beau coup plus que le fait que les autorités du
défendeur n’ont pas été impliquées dans les événem ents de Srebrenica. Il a offert des preuves
significatives du fait que la Republika Srpska av ait été une entité indépendante tout au long du - 45 -
conflit et qu’elle n’était pas, une simple «subordonnée» du défendeur , comme le demandeur
voudrait la présenter.
64. L’indépendance de la Republika Srpska, bien qu’elle n’ait pas été acceptée formellement,
a été reconnue depuis le 30mai1992 par les rappor ts pertinents du Secr étaire général des
NationsUnies, par les documents et la pra tique de la Conférence internationale pour
l’ex-Yougoslavie et par le coprésident du comité permanent, par la reconnaissance par les Etats
intéressés du statut de partie aux négociations des Serbes de Bosnie, par l’avis de lord Owen sur les
relations entre Belgrade et Pale, ainsi que par la nature particulière de la conscience politique des
Serbes de Bosnie.
65. Le demandeur n’a pas réussi à prouve r que le gouvernement du défendeur avait le
contrôle effectif sur la Republika Srpska au moment relevant. Le demandeur n’a non plus réussi à
démontrer que l’armée de la Republika Srpska se trouvait sous le contrô le du défendeur, vu que
tout au long du conflit l’armée mentionnée était subordonnée exclusivement aux autorités de la
Republika Srpska.
66. En particulier, l’Etat demandeur n’a p as réussi à prouver que la Yougoslavie exerçait le
contrôle effectif sur les opérations militaires et paramilitaires durant lesquelles ont été commises
les prétendues infractions. De plus, le demandeur n’a pas abouti à prouver l’existence d’un ordre
ou d’une instruction provenant de la Yougoslavie et qui auraient constitué la planification ou la
perpétration des actes indiqués par l’Etat demandeur comme des violations de la convention sur le
génocide.
67. Enfin, notre coagent, M.Vladimir Cvetkovic, a démontré que le demandeur n’a pas
réussi à prouver que, sur le territo ire du défendeur, le génocide ou toute autre infraction au droit
international pénal ait été commise contre la population musulmane de Bosnie-Herzégovine ou
contre la population musulmane de Serbie-et-Monténégro.
68. Nous avons démontré en plus que le de mandeur n’a pas réussi à prouver qu’un ancien
représentant ou un représentant actuel du défendeur serait coupable de génocide ou de tout autre
crime commis à l’égard de la population musulmane sur le territoire de la Serbie-et-Monténégro.
Cette absence de tout élément du crime de gé nocide contre la population musulmane sur le
territoire de la Serbie-et-Monténégro, où une minor ité significative musulmane vit, est la preuve - 46 -
indéniable que les autorités de la Serbie-et-M onténégro n’auraient pas pu commettre le génocide
contre cette même population musulmane sur le territoire de la Bosnie Herzégovine.
69. Madame le président, Messieurs les juges, c’est le moment de mettre fin au premier tour
de plaidoiries orales. Nous y avons de vous présenter une image objective du conflit en Bosnie-
Herzégovine, une image fondée sur les faits et sur une analyse juridique solide et non pas
seulement sur des images choquantes que nous avons pu voir dans les médias encore une fois à la
fin de la semaine dernière, après la mort de Slobodan Milosevic.
70. Nous avons toute la confiance dans cette Cour et nous sommes persuadés que son arrêt
sera fondé sur une analyse approfondie de tous les faits et sur le droit applicable. Et une telle
analyse ne peut conclure que dans un seul sens. La Serbie-et-Monténégro n’est pas responsable
pour les actes qui ont eu lieu en Bosnie-Herzégovine et en tout état de cause, le génocide n’y a pas
eu lieu. Mais, avant tout, la Cour devra se prononcer sur la question de la compétence.
Merci, Madame le président. Et je fais m on petit résumé, il est mieux de dire peut-être un
résumé modeste par comparaison avec les plaidoiries de notre «team» qui ont été exposées pendant
ces dernières semaines. Merci, Madame le président.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Stojanović. This brings to an end the first round of
oral argument as such. The Court will meet tomorrow at 10 a.m. to begin the hearing of the
witnesses, experts and witness-experts called by the Parties. The Court now rises.
The Court rose at 12.40 p.m.
___________
Public sitting held on Thursday 16 March 2006, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Higgins presiding