Public sitting held on Tuesday 27 June 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Document Number
087-20000627-ORA-01-00-BI
Document Type
Number (Press Release, Order, etc)
2000/21
Date of the Document
Bilingual Document File
Bilingual Content

Non-Corrige

Uncorrectecl

InternationalCourt Cour internationale
of Justice deJustice

THEHAGUE LAHAYE

YEAR 2000

PublicSitting

heldon Tuesday27June 2000,at 10am., utthePeacePalace,

PresidentGuillaumepresiding

in the casencerningMaritime Delimitationand TerritorialQuestionsbetween
QatarandBahrain(Qatarv.Bahrain)

VERBATIM RECORD

Audiencepublique

tenuele mardi27juin 2000,10heures,auPalaisdelaPaix,

souslaprésidencede. Guillaume,président

en l'affairedelaDélimitation maret desquestionsterritorialesentre Qatar etBahreïn

(Qatarc.Bahreïn)

COMPTE RENDUPresent: President Guillaume
Vice-President Shi
Judges Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh

Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Higgins
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek

Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal
Judgesad hoc TorresBernhrdez
Fortier.

Registrar CouvreurPrésents:M. Guillaume,président
M. Shi,vice-président

MM. Oda
Bedjaoui
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin

Mme Higgins
MM. Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Al-Khasawneh
Buergenthal,juges

MM. Torresemhrdez
Fortier,juges ad hoc

M. Couvreur,greffierTheState of Qataris representedby:

H.E. Dr. Abdullahbin AbdulatifAl-Muslemani,Secretary-Generalof theCabinet,

asAgentand Counsel;

Mr.Adel Sherbini,LegalAdviser,
Mr. SamiAbushaikha, LegalExpert,

as Counsel;

Mr.Eric David,Professorof InternationalLaw,Université libde Bruxelles,
Dr.Ali binFetaisAl-Meri, DirectorofLegalDepartment,DiwanAmiri,
Mr.Jean-PierreQuéneudec,Professor of International Law at the Universiv of Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
Mr.Jean Salmon,Professoremeritus of InternationalLaw,Universitélibrede Bruxelles,Member

of the Institutdedroit international,
Mr. R. K. P. Shankardass, Senior Advocate, SupremeCourt of India, Former President of the
InternationalBarAssociation,
SirIan Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., Bamsterat Law, Memberofthe Institute ofInternationalLaw,
SirFrancis Vallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., Professor emeritusof InternationalLaw,Universityof
London, Memberemeritusofthe Institutdedroitinternational,
Mr.Rodrnan R. Bundy,Avocat à la Cour d'appel de Paris, ember of theNew YorkBar, Frere

Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Ms Nanette E. Pilkington,Avocatàla Courd'appelde Paris,FrereCholmeley/EvershedsP , aris,

as Counseland Advocates,

Ms Cheryl Dunn,MemberoftheStateBarofCalifomia,FrereCholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Ms Ines SabineWilk, Lawyer beforethe German Court of Appeal, Memberof the Chamber of
Lawyers ofBerlin, Germany,

as Counsel;

Mr. ScottB. Edmonds,Directorof CartographieOperations, MapQuest.com,Columbia,Maryland
(United Statesof America),
Mr.Robert C.Rizmtti, ProjectManager,MapQuest.com,Columbia, Maryland(United States of
Arnerica),

Ms Stephanie K. Clark, Senior Cartographer, MapQuest.com, olumbia,Maryland (UnitedStates
of Arnerica),

asExperts;

H.E. SheikhHarnadbin Jassimbin Jabor Al-Thani, MinisterfororeignAffairs,
H.E.Mr. Ahmedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,Minister ofStatefor Foreign Affairs,

TheState ofBahrainis representedby:

H.E.Mr. JawadSalimAl-Arayed,Ministerof State of the Stateof Bahrain,

asAgent;L 'EtatdeQatarest represéntépear :

S.Exc. M. AbdullahbinAbdulatifAl-Muslemani,secrétairegénérad lu gouvernement,

commeagentet conseil;

M. Adel Sherbini,conseillerjuridique,
M. SamiAbushaikha, expertjuridique,

commeconseils;

M. Eric David,professeurde droitinternationàl'universitélibrede Bruxelles,
M. Ali bin FetaisAI-Meri,directeurdesaffairesjuridiquesduconseilde l'émir,

M. Jean-Pierre Quéneudec, professeur de droit international à l'université de Paris1
(Panthéon-Sorbonne),
M. Jean Salmon,professeurémérite de droit internatioàal'universitélibre de Bruxelles,membre
de 1'Institutde droit international,
M. R. K. P. Shankardass, avocat principaà la Cour suprêmede l'Inde, ancien présidentde
l'AssociationinternationaleduBarreau,

Sir Ian Sinclair,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., avocat,membrede l'Institutde droit international,
Sir Francis Vallat,G.B.E.,K.C.M.G.,Q.C., professeur éméritee droit internatioàal'université
de Londres,membreémérite de l'Institutde droitinternational,
M. RodmanR.Bundy,avocat à la Cour d'appelde Paris,membredu barreaude New York,cabinet
Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mlle Nanette Pilkington, avocat à la Cour d'appelde Paris, cabinet Frere Cholmeley/Eversheds,
Paris,

commeconseilsetavocats;

Mme Che~l Dunn, membre du barreau de 17Etat de Californie, cabinet Frere
Cholmeley/Eversheds,Paris,
Mme InèsSabineWilk, avocat près d'unecour d'appel d'Allemagne,membre de la chambredes
avocatsàBerlin,Allemagne,

comme conseils;

M. Scott B. Edmonds, directeur du service des levés cartographiques, sociétMapQuest.com,
Columbia,Maryland(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),
M. Robert C.Rizmtti, administrateur de projet, société MapQuest.com, Columbia,Maryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),

Mme Stephanie K. Clark, cartographe hors classe, société MapQuest.com, ColumbiaM , aryland
(Etats-Unisd'Amérique),

comme experts;

S.Exc. le cheikhHamadbin JassimbinJaborAl-Thani,ministredes affairesétrangères,
S. Exc. M.Ahrnedbin AbdullahAl-Mahmoud,ministred7Etataux affaires étrangères,

comme observateurs.

L'EtatdeBahreïnest representépar :

S.Exc. M. Jawad SalimAl-Arayed,ministred'Etatde 17EtatdeBahreïn,

commeagent;Dr.Fathi Kemicha, MemberoftheBarofParis,Kemicha& Associés(Tunis),
ProfessorSir Elihu Lauterpacht,Q.C., C.B.E.,HonoraryProfessorof the Universityof Cambridge,
Memberof theInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr. JanPaulsson,Freshfields,Paris,MemberoftheBarsofParisandtheDistrict of Columbia,
Professor Michael Reisman,Myres S. McDougal Professor of InternationalLaw of Yale Law

School,MemberoftheBar ofConnecticut,AssociateoftheInstitutde droitinternational,
Mr. RobertVolterra,Freshfields,London,Memberof theBarof UpperCanada,
ProfessorProsperWeil,EmeritusProfessorat the Universityof Paris II (Panthéon-Assas),Member
of the Académie dessciencesmoraleset politiques (Institutde France), Memberof theInstitut
dedroitinternational,

as CounselandAdvocates:

SheikhKhalidbin AhmedAl-Khalifa, First Secretary, Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the State of
Bahrain,

Commander ChristopherCarleton, M.B.E.,Head of the Law of the Sea Division of the United
KingdomHydrographieOffice,
Dr. HongwuChen,Freshfields,Pans, Memberofthe Bars ofParis andBeijing,
Mr.Graham Coop, Freshfields, ParisB, arristerand Solicitorofthe HighCourtof NewZealandand
Solicitorof theSupreme Court ofEnglandandWales,
Mr. AndrewNewcombe,Freshfields,Paris,Member ofthe Barof BritishColumbia,
Dr.BethOlsen,Advisor,Ministry ofStateof the Stateof Bahrain,

Dr. John Wilkinson, Former Readerat the University of Oxford, Emeritus Fellow, St.Hugh's
College, Oxford,

asAdvisors,

H.E.SheikhMohammedbin MubarakAlKhalifa,MinisterforForeignAffairs,Stateof Bahrain,
H.E. Sheikh Abdul-Azizbin MubarakAl Khalifa, Ambassadorof the State of Bahrain to the
Netherlands,
H.E.Dr. Mohammed Jaber Al-Ansari, Advisorto His Highness,the AmirofBahrain,
Mr.GhaziAl-Gosaibi,Under-Secretaryof Foreign Affairs,Stateof Bahrain,

Her Excellency Sheikha Haya Al Khalifa, Arnbassadorof the State of Bahrain to the French
Republic,
Mr.YousefMahmood,Directorof the Office oftheForeignMinister, StateofBahrain,

as Observers;

Mr.JonAddison,Ministryof StateoftheStateof Bahrain,
MsMaisoon Al-Arayed,MinistryofStateofthe StateofBahrain,
MsAliaAl-Khatar,Freshfields,
Mr.NabeelAl-Rumaihi, Ministry ofStateof the State of Bahrain,

Mr.Hafedh Al-Qassab,Ministry of Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
Mr.Yousif Busheery, Ministry ofForeignAffairsofthe Stateof Bahrain,
MsJanetCooper,Ministry of StateoftheStateof Bahrain,
MsEleonore Gleitz,Freshfields,
MsAneesaHanna,Embassy ofBahraininLondon,
MsJeanetteHarding, Ministryof Stateofthe StateofBahrain,
MsVanessaHarris, Freshfields,
MsIva Kratchanova,Ministry of Stateofthe State ofBahrain,

MsSonjaKnijnsberg,Freshfields,
MsSarahMochen, Freshfields,
Mr.Kevin Mottrarn,Freshfields,
Mr.YasserShaheen,Second Secretary,Ministry ofForeignAffairs of theStateof Bahrain,

asAdministrativeStaffM.Fathi Kemicha,membredubarreau deParis,cabinet Kemicha & Associés, Tunis,
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C.,C.B.E.,professeurhonorairà l'universitéde Cambridge,membrede
l'Institutde droit international,
M. Jan Paulsson, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, membre des barreaux de Pans et du district de
Columbia,
M. Michael Reisman, professeur de droit internationàl'université deYale, titulaire de la chaire

Myres S.McDougal, membre du barreau du Connecticut, associé de l'Institut de droit
international,
M. Robert Volterra,cabinetFreshfields,Londres,membre dubarreaudu Haut Canada,
M. Prosper Weil, professeur émérite à l'universitéde ParisII (Panthéon-Assas),membre de
l'Académie des sciencesmoraleset politiques(Institut de France), membre del'Institutde droit
international,

comme conseils et avocats;

Le cheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa,premier secrétaire,ministèredes affaires étrangères de
17Etatde Bahreïn,
Le capitainede frégateChristopherCarleton,M.B.E., directeurde la division du droit maritimedu
bureau hydrographiquedu Royaume-Uni,
M. Hongwu Chen,cabinetFreshfields,Paris, membredesbarreauxde Paris et de Beijing,

M. Graham Coop, cabinet Freshfields, Paris, avocat et conseil de la High Court de
Nouvelle-Zélandeet conseiller de laCoursuprême d'Angleterreet du Paysde Galles,
M. AndrewNewcombe, cabinetFreshfields,Pans, membre dubarreaude la Colombiebritannique,
Mme BethOlsen,conseiller,ministèredYEtat de1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. John Wilkinson, ancien maîtrede conférence à l'université d'Oxford,membre émérite du
CollègeSaintHugh, Oxford,

commeconseillers;

S. Exc. le cheikhMohammedbin MubarakAlKhalifa,ministredesaffairesétrangères de Bahreïn,
S.Exc. le cheikh Abdul-Aziz bin Mubarak Al Khalifa, ambassadeur de 17Etatde Bahreïn aux
Pays-Bas,
S. Exc. M. MohammedJaber Al-Ansari, conseillerde SonAltessel'émirde Bahreïn,
M. GhaziAl-Gosaibi, sous-secrétairedYEtatauxaffaires étrangèresd1'Etatde Bahreïn,

S. Exc. la cheikha Haya Al Khalifa, ambassadeurde 1'Etatde Bahreïn auprèsde la République
française,
M. YousefMahmood,directeurdubureauduministredes affairesétrangères deBahreïn,

commeobservateurs;

M. Jon Addison,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme MaisoonAl-Arayed, ministèred7Etatde17Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme Alia Al-Khatar, cabinetFreshfields,
M. Nabeel Al-Rumaihi,ministèred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. HafedhAl-Qassab, ministèred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
M. YousifBusheery,ministère des affairesétrangèresde 1'EtatdeBahreïn,
Mme Janet Cooper,ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,

Mme EleonoreGleitz,cabinetFreshfields,
Mme AneesaHanna,ambassade de Bahreïn,Londres,
Mme JeanetteHarding, ministèred'Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme VanessaHarris,cabinetFreshfields,
Mme Iva Kratchanova,ministèred7Etatde 1'Etatde Bahreïn,
Mme SonjaKnijnsberg, cabinetFreshfields,
Mme SarahMochen, cabinet Freshfields,
M. KevinMottram,cabinet Freshfields,

M. Yasser Shaheen,second secrétaire,ministèr dees affairesétrangères1'Etatde Bahreïn,

commepersonneladministratg Le PRESIDENT : Veuillezvous asseoir.La séanceest ouverte et je donne la parole pour

1'Etatde BahreïnàMe Jan Paulsson.

Mr. PAULSSON: Thankyou Mr.President.

A SUMMARYOF BAHRAIN'P SOSITION ON ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY

1. Bahrain believes that it is convenient, at the outset of its final rounds of pleadings,to

presentto the Courta summaryof its contentionswith regardto issuesof sovereignty.

2. At themost general level,these issues fa11into threecategones: first, the HawarIslands.

Second,the Zubarahregion. And third, theremaining islands andfeatures which both sidesagree

mayattract temtorial sovereignty.

3. The reason the Hawar Islands are in a special categoryis of course that they were the

subjectof anunambiguousdecisionrenderedby Britainin 1939.

4. Bahrain's position with respect to the Hawars is founded on four fully established

propositions,al1consistent with each other,and each suficieinand of itselfto prove Bahrain's

sovereign title over thelands. These simple four propositionsare the following. 1know from

experience that while some judges and arbitrators find this kind of visual outline to be useful,

others find them to be an imtating distraction which should remain in the world of television

advertising, where it belongs. 1am a pragmatist, Mr.President, so may 1 Say that this visual

depiction of Bahrain'sarchitecture of its thesis is there pour ceux qui voient, others are very

welcometo disregardthe visual aids andto concentrateon the spokenword. The four propositions

are:

(1) Utipossidetisjuris;

(2) Resjudicata;
8
(3) Original title;

(4) Effective andcontinuousmanifestationsof sovereignauthority.

5. It is Bahrain'srespectfulsubmissionthat once the Court gives effectto the principleof uti

possidetis juris, as it should, Bahrain's rightto the Hawar Islands will be maintained, and it

becomes unnecessaryto examinewhetherthe 1939 decisionisresjudicata. 6. Similarly,if for purposes of argumentone sets aside utipossidetis, then the effect of res

judicata favours Bahrain and makes it unnecessaryto go on to examine the issue of prior title.

Finally, it is only if insome extraordinaryway Bahrainis considered tohave lost itsoriginal title

that the Courtneedsto considerthe eflectivités,ffectiveand continuousdisplay of authority.

7. These arguments are not necessarily presentedin the order of their importance, but as a

matter of their logicalsequence. The Court does not need to look back fürther than 1971, so we

begin there. Ifnot 1971,then the Courtneed lookno furtherbackthanto 1939. But asBahrain has

said many tirnes,even if there had been noBritishdetermination of Bahraini sovereignty over the

Hawars the situation wouldbe the same in view of the ovenvhelrningevidence of the social and

administrativeintegrationof the Hawar Islands intothe history, and therefore into the identity, of

thenation of Bahrain.

1. Utipossidetis

8. Still, in pnnciple and in logic, utipossidetisjuris should be the alpha and the omega. It

thereforeappearsworthwhile to considerthebasicnatureand effectofthis pnnciple. My colleague

Fathi Kemichawill deal with it in somewhatgreaterdetail, but for thepurposes of this overview it

is importantto distinguishit from the separateprincipleof resjudicata.

9. Thefollowing formulation seemsuncontroversial:

"the line thatis protected is that in existenceat the moment of independence and not
that existing at some unclear point in the past. Any other approach would import
considerableinstabilityinto an already sensitivepolitical situation."'

10.So what was the line "inexistenceat the moment of independence"in the present case?

There can be no doubt the line lay between theHawar Islands and the Qatar peninsula, this is

where Britain, as the dominate power drew the line, and this is the line that must be respected,

whether by applicationof the pnnciple of utipossidetis, or as a matter of resjudicata, or one of

title establishedon a clean slateby reference toanover-abundanceofdisplayof authority.

11.For the purposes of utipossidetisjuris, the line in existence atthe time of Bahrain's full

independencein 1971 does not haveto bejustified. As has often been pointed out, many colonial

borders are open to moral criticisms; the rule of uti possidetis upholds such boundaries simply

'~alcolm Shaw,"The Heritageof States: the Pnnciple of UtiPossidetisJuris Today",BYBIL 1996,pp. 75, 113.because they existed; their perpetuation serves the higher purpose of maintaining peace. The

Chamberof this Court putit this way in theEl Salvador/Hondurascase: "whenthe principleof uti

possidetisjuris is involved, thejus referred to is not internationallaw but the constitutionalor

administrativelaw of the pre-independence sovereignU2.So in the case of the Hawar Islands,as

long as the situation was clearly disposed of by the British administration, for whateverreason,

goodor bad, the issue of title begins andendsrightthere. There isno need to considereffectivités,

becausethere is nodoubt as to the scopeofthetemtory Britainattributedto Bahrain.

12. The only possible issue relating to theHawars concerns Janan, and on that issue the

Chamberin El Salvador/Honduras held, in conformitywith ajurisprudence constante, that in the

case of small uninhabited islands sovereignty should be resolved consistently with that of

irnmediatelyadjacentlarger islands3. As Judge Huberputs it in Island ofpalmas4: "it is possible

that a group may under certain conditionsbe regarded in law as a unit, and that the fate of the

principal parimay involve the rest". In our case, Qatar's ownMemorialrelies on a passagefrom

Lorimer, whose geography is not controversial,which declaresthat the main island of Hawar is

"adjoined"by an an^.

13. Britain determined in 1939 that the Hawars belonged to Bahrain. Britain rebuffed

objectionsby the Sheikh of Qatarby respondingthat the matterwas settled6. That outcomestood

undisturbed when the two States were allowed to resume full international responsibility as

sovereignand independent States. It does not matter whether the 1939 decision was an arbitral

awardor somethingelse. It doesnot matterwhetherthe 1939decisioncontradicted prioropinions

of British officiais(which Bahrain does not believe to have beenthe case). What matters is that

this was unquestionablythe delimitationwhichthe two States,Bahrain and Qatar, inheritedwhen

theyresumed their full independencein 1971.

14. Nor does conduct matter, nor indeed effectivités. As was stated in Burkina Faso/Mali: '?

"Wherethe act correspondsexactly to the law, where effective administrationis additional tothe

%C.L Reports 1992,p. 559.

%~.~.~e~orts 1992,pp.270 and579.
4?.UNRIAA,831at855.

'~emonal ofQatar,p. 68,para.5.38.
6~ounter-~emoriaol f Bahrain,p. 118,para.118.uti possidetis juris, the only role of the effectivitésis to confirmthe exercise of the right derived

from a legaltitle."' What is that legaltitle in ourcase? Quiteobviously: thetitle derivedfromthe

application of uti possidetis juris. Al1 the efectivités are Bahraini effectivités. "The act

corresponds exactly tothe law." We thereforedo not get into the secondhypothesisenvisagedby

the BurkinaFaso/Malicase, namely administrationby the non-title-holding State. In the present

case, such a situation would have arisen if we imagine that Qatar had occupied the Hawars

sometimeafter 1971 - Le., after the restoration offull independenceof the two States- and in

that case,accordingto the BurkinaFaso/Malidecision, "preference shouldbe given to the holder

of the title" and this, no matter how much Qatar would like to believe the contrary, must be

Bahrain: the preferenceis given tothe Statewhichreceivestitle (i) at the date of full independence

and (ii)byvirtue of utipossidetisjuris.

15.As Professor Shaw concludesin his comprehensive recent study on "The Heritage of

States: The Principleof UtiPossidetisJuris ~oda~"*,the utiposseditisline is the one established

by the previously dominant power "by virtue of a positive act of legislative or administrative

authorityor as a consequence of a seriesofrelevantand authoritativeacts".

Who can doubt that Britain as the dominant authority, until the restoration of full

independencein 1971,had determined that the Hawarsbelongedto Bahrain?

16.What you see now on the screen and attab 117 of yourjudges' folder, is a map which

Bahrain includedin the body of its frst Memorial, in 1996'. This is Map H-6C publishedby the

Director of Military Survey of the United Kingdom. It was published in 1972,that is to Sayjust

after the dates which are celebratedas the national holidays of independencein Bahrain andQatar.

The internationalboundaryis unmistakable. The respective "heritage"of independentBahrainand

independentQataris clear.

17.Incidentally,you will notethat the legendon thismapindicatesfourtypes of roads,from

dividedhighwaysto simpletracks or trails. 1do not needto tell the Court that militarymapstend

to be very careful aboutthe existence of roads. Onthe peninsulajust across fromthe Hawarsthere

'I.c.Reports1986,p.586.
'1996BYBIL75, at 152.

bernonal of Bahrain,p. 164.is no indication of any road: whetherprimary,secondary,or indeed "tracksor trails". As Bahrain

has alwaysmaintained, this was anempty space - even in 1972,and indeed itis hardlymore than

that even today.

18. 1would in this connectionremindthe Court that this map confms the pages from the

edition of AlMunjidpublishedin 1975which yousaw in thecourse of the first round. The Hawar

Islands are defined as belonging to Bahrain; the international border is clearly indicated to lie

between the Hawars andthe Qatari coast; and indeed we find no roads within Qatar anywherein

the proximity ofthe Hawars.

19. That is al1there is to it. In the second round of its pleadings, Qatar has, in Bahrain's

view, sought to confuse both the principle of uti possidetis and its application. With your

permission, my colleague FathiKemicha will, in a few moments,set matters straight in rebuttal.

The result of his rebuttal will, in Bahrain'srespectful submission, be that the Court will readily

acknowledge Bahrain'stitle to the Hawar Islands on the first principle that 1have statedin these

simple terms.

2. Resjudicata

20. It is only if the Court,par impossible,shoulddisregardutipossidetisjuris withrespect to

the Hawar Islandsthat the issue ofthe statusofthe 1939Awardneeds to be addressed.

21. In its second round of pleadings, Qatar hasmade a nwnber of both factual and legal

submissionswhich Bahrain wishesto rebut.

22. Alrnost al1of ProfessorSalmon'sargument in the second round, on 20 June, focused on

negotiations in the mid-1960srelating to anarbitrationwhichQatar wished to initiate. The issues

Qatar wished to debate in such an arbitrationincluded title to the Hawar Islands. Britain agreed

that therecouldbe suchan arbitration,providedthat Bahrainalso consented. Qatar arguesthat this

shows that Britainimplicitly acceptedthat the 1939decisionwas not a resjudicata. This is a non 4

sequitur. Britain was merely acknowledgingan elementary principle: Bahrain's consentwas
c

required for theresjudicata to be reopened.

23. Indeed,this argument takesmuchlesstime to refutethan it tookto be constmcted. What

was being discussedin the mid-1960swas not the disputethat had been resolved alreadyin 1939.It was a far broader dispute, involving principally Bahrain's claimto Zubarah aswell as

controversyover various pearlingbanks. These were issues about which Bahrain had for many

years soughtto be heard, because Bahrain never acceptedthat title to Zubarahcould follow from

the anned aggressionin 1937. A debateon this subjectwasnot an attractive propositionfor Qatar.

So,as a countenveight,Qatarraisedthe matterofthe HawarIslands. Britain'sreaction was entirely

unremarkable. This wouldhave been an issue, as part of the wider dispute,as to whether the 1939

decisionhad, or hadnot, disposed ofthe issue of sovereigntyover the Hawars. It would havebeen

in the nature of a "specijîc, express, additional" submission agreement of the type

ProfessorReisman discussedon 9 une'' .f this is what Qatar wanted to debate, and ifBahrain

had agreedto that debate,therewasno reason whateverforBritainnotto accept it.

24.But Bahraindid notagree torelitigatethe Hawardecision.

25. Andso the Hawar decisionremained. As we haveseen, that decisioncertainlyremained

as part of the British conception ofthefully independentBahrain which Britainrestored in 1971.

And soit remainstoday.

26. There are some factual submissionsby Qatarregardingthe 1939decision, which1have

been askedto deal with ina separatepresentationlaterthis morning; Professor Reismanwill then

answer Qatar's legal contentionsconcemingresjudicata.

3. Originaltitle

27. "Originaltitle" is not a term of art, but merelya way of sayingthat ifthe Hawars do not

appertainto Bahrain as a result of independencein 1971,nor as a result of the British Award of

1939,Bahrain neverthelesshadpriortitle-and not Qatar.

28. This debate is not one which the Court will find in the Memorials and

Counter-Memonals. It is one which emerged tentativelyin Qatar's Reply, and then appeared

full-blownas a fundamentalpartof Qatar'scasewhentheseoral proceedings cornmenced.

29. This developmentis directly traceable to the disappearance of the 82 documents. As

long asQatar thoughtit could relyon those documents,Qatarwas preparedto debate with Bahrain

on the terrain ofeffectivités.Qatar'songinal argumentwas that it could establish its title to the

''CR 2000112pp.46-48,paras9-14.Hawars on the basis of evidence similar tothat which Bahrainhas brought beforethis Court. The

only problem,of course, wasthat the documentswere forged,and Qatar had to abandon them. At

that point,quite suddenly, Qatar beganto argue that thiskind of proof is of no valueanyway- it

is insufficient toestablishtitle. Like the fox in Aesop's fable,once it found thatthe grapes were

beyond its grasp, Qatar beganto Saythatthey are Sour. Sir Elihu Lauterpachtaddressedyou on this

subject in the first round1'. He pointed out that Qatar shouldbe held to the cnteria of probative

value which it implicitly but unmistakablyhad supportedat the time it was putting forth alleged

evidence of its own alleged eflectivités. Bahrain has heard no answer from Qatarto Sir Elihu's

argument.

30.Instead, Qatar has conceiveda new theory of originatlitle, a purelyabstractnotion which

Qatar seemsto hope will miraculouslycover up the fact that ithas no evidence whatever of ever

having extendedits authorityto the HawarIslands.

31. But once one examines this thesis of original title, itreveals itself to be favourable to

Bahrain.

32. Qatar has concededon many occasions- and most prominentlyin paragraph5 of its

Application to this Court in July 1991 - that at least up to 1868al1of the Qatar peninsula was

under Bahraini authority. Bahrain fülly accepts that Qatar subsequently established itself as a

political entity, first in Doha and subsequently elsewhereon the peninsula, and that as a result

Bahrainrelinquished sovereigntyoveran ever larger area.

33. But as was the case with respect to Zubarah, Bahrain never relinquished title to the

Hawar Islands.

34. Qatar now says that the British somehowceded the Hawars to Qatar. Bahrain has two

answers:

(1) The record,as Sir Elihu Lauterpachtwill demonstratetomorrow morningd , oesnot supportthe 4

conclusionthat Britain purportedto assign the Hawarsor for that matter Zubarah,or for that

matterany otherplaces in theGulfof Bahrain to anewQataripoliticalentity.

"CR 2000111,p. 11,para7; see alsopp. 13-14,paras.11-13.(2) Moreover,Britainwasnot the title-holder; and onecan only alienatewhat one has. Nemodut

que nonhabet.

35. Bahrain need notprove that it had original title to the Hawars, because Qatar has

concededthat Bahrainhad original title. It was for Qatar to haveprovedthat it wrestedtitle away

from Bahrain in 1868 or aftenvards, and this, as Sir Elihu will explainin greater detail,Qatar has

failedto do.

4. Effectiveand continuousmanifestationsof sovereignauthority

36. In the written phase of these proceedings, Qatar produced nearly 8,900 pages of

memorials and exhibits. Bahrain producedjust over 2,300 pages. Yet despite having submitted

fourtimes more paper than Bahrain did, Qatarstill has comeup with nota single itemof evidence

ofthe "effectivedisplayof authority"- atanytimewhatsoever.

37. Sohistory repeatsitself. The reasonsgivenwhen Bntain acknowledgedBahrain'stitle to

the Hawars in 1939included, predominantly,the following:

"To sum up. The Shaikhof Qatar has produced no evidence whatsoever. He
relies solely on an uncorroborated assertion of sovereignîy, on geographical
propinquity andonthe allegedstatementsof certainunidentifiedpersons."'2

38. Sixtyyears later,with al1the resourcesimaginableat its disposa1including a legalteam

of the highest abilityand inventiveness,Qatar has not been able to come up with anythingmore

thanSheikhAbdullah (orfor that matter Mr. John SklirosofPCL)wasableto present backthen.

39. One couldhardly imagine a better illustration ofthe wisdomof the principle that settled

matters should not be relitigated. Qatar hasoffered nothingnew. Itjust wants anotherroll of the

dice.

40. Qatar's relianceon "natural borders" is but a new way of repeating the proximity

argument. To saythat Qatar shouldencompassthe temtory it now desiresbecause Qatarshouldbe

coextensivewiththe physical peninsula - andeverythmgwithin its temtorial waters- is nothing

more than a restatementofthis proximityargument.

41. There are, of course, numerousexarnplesof neighbouringpolitical systems which have

emerged as independentone from the other although there is no natural border between them.

I2~eportof SHugh Weightman,22Apnl 1939,Ann. 281,Memonal ofBahrain, Vol.5,p. 171,13.a.Converselythere are numerous exarnples of important natural featuressuch as rivers or mountain

rangeswhich havenothinderedpeopleonboth sidesfromforginga cornmonnational destiny.

42. Thus, one of the consultants which Qatar itself has relied on this caseI3,

ProfessorPrescott,wrotealmosta quarterof a centuryago:

"The idea of 'naturalborders'has been discredited fordecades . ..al1political
borders are artificialbecausethey requirethe selectionof a specificlinewithin a zone
where change in the physical characteristics of the landscape may be more or less
rigid."14

43. Indeed, the Arbitral Tribunalin the Guinea-Bissau v. Senegalcasedefined the notionof

an "internationalfiontier" by reference to "thearea of validity in space of the noms of the legal

orderof a particularstate"lS.

44. To putit simply: Qatar hasnot shownthat its "legalorder"everextendedto the Hawars.

45. At the end of hisaddresstomorrow,Sir ElihuLauterpachtwill demonstrate thefutilityof

Qatar's continuing attemptsto overcomethe formidablelegal hurdle toany claim based solelyon

proximity- even when the claiming partytries, as Qatar bravely does, to suggest that thereis a

specialright to drive out one's neighbourfiom the islandsinthe temtorial sea.

46. Mr. Robert Volterra will then deal with Qatar's attempts to discredit Bahrain's

overwhelming efictivités, including the preposterous fiction that Bahrainillegally invaded and

"occupied"the Hawarsin 1937.

47. 1shouldperhapsjustiij my use of the word "preposterous",which1can assurethe Court

was quite deiiberate. The Court has heardthe Agent for Qatar express himself with emotionon

22June, aboutthe way Bahrainallegedlyviolated Qatar'sterritoryby occupyingthe HawarIslands

in 1937. Whatisthe basis ofthis emotion? Was there asingleQatari citizendriven fromhis home

on the Hawar Islands? Was the life of a single Qatari family disrupted? Was a single Qatari

village comrnunitytaken away fiom its place of worship,fiom its fishing traps, from theburial

groundsof its ancestors?

'3~urphy/~rescoteport,Supplemental ocumentsofQatar.
I4~oundarieandFrontiers(1978),atp. 106.
"83 ZLR36. 48. Of course not. There is a fact which is so basic in this case that there may be some

danger of its being overlooked. The basic fact is as follows. In the thousands of pages of

documents that have been provided to this Court, and exceptingthe 82 forgeries, there is no

evidence whatsoever that any single Qatari person ever lived on the Hawar Islands- or even

visited people there. Certainly no Qatari Sheikh ever set hisfoot on these Islands. The only

evidence of anyQatariperson ever spendingeven a few momentson the Islands involvedthe case

of trespassersin 1938who saidthey were Qatarifishermen. In 1938,there was of course a dispute

about the Islands, and one might well surmisethat SheikhAbdullah sentout some men to have a

look at these Islands about which his ignorance was so complete. The trespassers were

imrnediatelyapprehended,taken to the main islandof Bahrain, andthenreturnedto Qatar.

49. 1 had the occasion to address the Court at length on this curious subject of

SheikhAbdullah'scompletelack of knowledgeofwhatthe Hawarswerelike - indeedeven where

they mightbe located. He thought theywere inthe north. He saidthey had never been inhabited.

He saidthere had neverbeen livestockthere. He saidthey were five timesas small as they in fact

are. 1expressedmyselfin firm language:

"How can one explain that someone is so confident, and so wrong? The

simplest answeris that SheikhAbdullah who,as the PoliticalAgent determined, had
never been to the Hawar Islands, simply assumed thathe was claiming the little
islandsnear thepointof Ras Rakkan,not so far fiom zubarah."I6

50. There was no answer from Qatar in the second round. Qatar contented itself with

complainingthat Bahrain"occupied"the Hawars inviolation ofQatar'snew mysterious theoryof

"original title". Perhaps in a new world of virtual reality, Qataris seeking to describe the first

instancein historyof a virtual invasion whichtook placein the abstract,oron paper.

51. Sadly, in our turbulent world, there are, as we know, real occupations. Sadly, recent

history includesthe tragicdestiniesof multitudes offamiliesuprooted,of people drivenaway from

their ancestral homes, fiom their places of worship, their schools,their roots. Of people whose

friendsand familieswere slaughteredby the thousands. Some ofus have families and &ends who

have suffered such tragedy. These are people who are entitled to speak with true emotion of the

injusticedoneto them, andhow cantherest ofus failto sharetheir emotion?

' 6 2000/12p.27,paras.121-122. 52. But for Qatar to equate itselfwith thevictims of such tragic destiniesis a travesty of

history. It isunworthy. It is profoundlyunacceptable.

53. Andneed 1Saythat in the course ofthesemany generationsof disputebetweenBahrain

and the Sheikhsof Qatar, theonly killingoccurredin 1937 - not in the Hawars,not by the hands

of Bahrain.

54. After Mr. Volterra's rebuîtalof Qatar'scontentions about eflectivités,Bahrainwill have

said whatitbelieves needsto be saidwith respectto sovereigntyoverthe Hawar Islands.

55.We then turnto the other elementsofthetemtorial dispute.

1.Original title

56. Unlikethe situation with respectto the Hawar Islands, Bahraincannotpoint to aspecific

fiontier tracedby Britain andin forceatthe dateofindependence, which unambiguouslydelineates

a BahrainiZubarahregion.

57. However, the record establishesthat Britainhad acknowledgedthat Bahrain hadrights in

these areas, and that it had not rescinded that acknowledgmentat the time of full independence.

Here, the arguments tobe developedby SirElihuwith respect to theHawars will retain their full

relevance.

58. This is where the questions put by JudgeVereshchetin on Thursday 15June2000 are

wholly relevant: what was the legacy which Bahrain inherited at independencewith respect to

Zubarahandthe other contested areas,which Bahraincontendswereits dependencies?

59. Since our opponents, Mr.President, have chosen to do so, we shall also answerthis

question in a written submission to be handed in at the end of these hearings, the day after

tomorrow.

2. Cornparisonof effective and continuousdisplayof authority

60. The word effectivitéhas oftenbeen pronounced in this Great Hall of Justice overthese

past four weeks. Yet Qatar has produced no effectivités of its own, whether with respect to

Zubarah, the Hawars, includingJanan, andthe islandsand other maritimefeaturesin the contested

area. Not a single effectivité!Nor, asidefrom unsubstantiated suggestions that some of Bahrain's

evidence,particularlythe testirnonyof witnesses,is "doubtful", hasQatar undertakento disprove asingle effectivitéthat Bahrain has produced. Not a single one! As Bahrain concludes the

presentationof its case, this striking asymmetrybetween the Parties should be noted and a nurnber

of observationsare in order. First, despiteQatar'sefforts to evade the issue, title in international

law is establishedby demonstrationsof manifestationsof sovereigntyor effectivités.Second,Qatar

itself, in claiming title to various islands and low-tide elevations in the contested areas,

acknowledges that they are susceptible to national appropriation and that the mode of

accomplishing thatis by the demonstrationof effectivités.Third, Bahrain, over a period of some

five years, duing the progress of this case, has invested a great deal of time in confirming the

relevant effectivitésin this case- for Zubarah,the Hawars, and the islands and othermaritime

features in dispute. They are set out in great detail, in our written submissions and consistof

documentary evidence fiom British, Bahraini and Ottoman archives17,photographic evidence18,

petroleum activityI9 under concession and licence, fishingZ0,coastguard activig' and parole

evidence,in the form of affidavitsof ahr rai n an"d third-StatenationalsZ3.We looked forwardto

the opportuniîy of defending this massive evidencein oral arguments,but our adversarieshave

elected toignore it, as ifit did not exist. Butit does exist andthis, in Ourrespecthl submission,is

of decisiveimportancefor resolution oftheterritorialissues here. We are confidentthat theCourt

will notignoreit.

61. Finally, it would beunfair to the State of Bahrain and to my colleagues if 1failed to

commenton the tendency of counsel for Qatarto refer to parts of our documentary evidencethat

"~awar Islands: Memorial ofBahrain, Sects.3.5-3.7, pp. 185-218; Counter-Memonal of Bahrain, Sect. 2.3,
pp. 69-188; Reply ofBahrain, Sects.2.1-2.4,pp.6; andReply ofBahrain,Sect. 1O,pp. 81-88.
Zubarah: Memonal of Bahrain,Sects.2.1-2.12,pp. 27-101; Counter-MemonalofBahrain,Sect.2.2, pp.12-68;

and Replyof Bahrain, Sect.4.1,pp. 123-143.
Islands and Maritime Features:morial ofBahrain, Sects.6.1 and 6.2, pp. 247-281; Counter-Memonal of
Bahrain,Sect.6.2, pp. 220-234; and Replyahrah, Sect. 5.3, pp. 160-192.

's~emonal of Bahrain, Ann.310, Vol. 6, p. 1329; Reply of Bahrain,Ann.25, Vol.2, pp. 163-175; Reply of
Bahrain,photographsafterpp. 172and 180; andSupplementalDocumentsofBahrain,Ann. 12,pp. 100-139.
Ig~emorialof Bahrain, Sect. 2.12, pp.101-108andCounter-MemonalofBahrain, Sect.2.3 (G),pp. 89-112.

2"Memorialof Bahrain,pp. 18-182,para.405; Memonal of Bahrain,p. 186,para. 415; Memonal of Bahrain,
pp. 193-194.,paras. 433-436;emonal of Bahrain,pp. 195-200, paras. 439-447; Memorial of Bahrain,pp.216-217,
paras. 480-482; Memorial of Bahrain, p. 259, paras.594-597;monal of Bahrain, pp. 274-281, paras.639-648;
Counter-Memonalof Bahrain,pp. 150-151,para.361; andCounter-MemorialofBahrain,pp. 215-217, paras.497-501.
2'~emonal of Bahrain,p. 260,para. 599andReply ofBahraiAM. 24,Vol. 2,p. 148.

22~emonal of Bahrain, Anns.313-316, Vol. 6, pp.1363-1413; Memonal of Bahrain, Anns.348-349,
pp. 1499-1506;Reply ofBahrain,Anns. 15-23,Vol.2, pp. 125-147; and Replyof Bahrain,Ann.31,pp. 188-189.
23~eplyof Bahrain,Anns.26-30, pp. 176-187.they find inconvenientas "doubtful". The Court willhave observedthat counselfor Bahrain have

neverused that term. If we haddoubtsaboutthe authenticityof a document,we investigated itin a

timely fashion and in an appropnate professional and forensic fashion. If it was fraudulent,we

exposedit as such. If it was authentic,wemayhave questionedits materialityor relevance, butwe

did not try to slide it into a juridical twilight of "doubtfulness", thereby implying that our

adversaries were seeking to foist an inauthentic document on the Court. My colleaguesand 1

consider this Qatari usage with respect to our submissions to be regrettable as a matter of

professionalbehaviour. It is particularlynitating when itemanatesfrom a litigantthathas had the

unenviably unique distinctionof having beenexposed for introducing 82forged documentsbefore

theInternationalCourtof Justice.

62. At any rate, under the circumstancesof this case,the efectivitésplay two distinctroles:

first,toconfm title and, secondly,to assessthe balanceofthe competingsovereigntyclaimsto the

extent necessary to determinethe scope of title. 1shallreturn, perhapsjust before the Courtrises

tomorrow, to address the effectivitésrelating to Zubarah, and to show that although Bahrain's

eflectivitéshere are not as overwhelmingas with respect to the Hawars, they are first, sufficient

given the cultural and ecological contextand second, at any rate far superior to what Qatar has

shown- which isnothing.

63. At that point, before concluding,1 shall bnefly demonstrate two propositions with

respect to Britain's1939 decision on the Hawar Islands. First, this decision in time became a

settledmatter, laterresuscitatedby Qatar asa matter ofpuretactics. Secondly, apartfromits legal

irrelevance,Qatar'sattack onthe moralityofthe Britishdecisionis factuallyunsustainable.

64. My colleagues ProfessorsReisman and Weil will then comment on some of the

assertionsmadeby Qatar in thissecondroundrelating to the maritimedelimitation. 1would invite

the Court to note that inorder to be consistentin organizingthe presentation ofour evidence and

arguments, the issue of sovereignty overFasht ad Dibal, Qit'atJaradah and various other features

also fa11withinthe scopeof their presentations.

65. In the hope that this overview will be of assistance to the Court in understanding

Bahrain's position,1 would askyou now,Mr.President,to cal1on MeFathi Kemicha todiscussthe

firstbasis on whichBahrain's sovereigntyoverthe HawarIslandsisjustified. Thankyou. Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercie, MaîtrePaulsson, et je donne maintenant la parole à

MeFathi Kemicha.

M. KEMICHA :

UTZ POSSZDETIS

1. Monsieur le président, Madameet Messieursde la Cour, ma tâche consisteaujourd'hui à

répondre auxarguments développés à cette barre par mon éminent contradicteur, leprofesseur

Salmon, lorsde sa dernièreplaidoirie le20juin dernier. Ce seraégalementpourmoi l'occasionde

vous soumettreune vision aussiclairequepossiblede la positionde 1'Etatde Bahreïn par rapporà

l'applicabilide l'utipossidetisau différend qui l'oppel'Etatde Qatar au sujetdes îles Hawar.

2. Je dois auparavant vous avouer que je ne pensais pas que les arguments présentép sar

Bahreïn en faveur de l'applicationde l'uti possidetis allaient susciter controverse et passion,

comprisen dehorsde cette enceinte. Certes,nous pouvions envisager queQatarpuisse ne pas être

séduitpar I'utipossidetis maisdeà à«en faireunemontagne)) !

3. C'était doncnon sans appréhension queje m'apprêtais mardd iernierà venir entendre les

argumentsdenos contradicteursausecondtour.

4. Ayant entendu le professeurSalmon en sa plaidoirie du 20 juin dernier,je dois dire, et

sans avoir à faire appelà La Fontaine qu'affectionne apparemmentmon éminentcontradicteur

(CR2000117,p. 15,par.13),que lamontagne a tout simplementaccouché d'une souris !

5. Au surplus, notre argumentation surl'applicabilité del'uti possidetis est loin d'avoir été

ébranlée malgréles assauts répétédse nos adversaires. Tout au contraire, elle se trouve même

renforcéepar denouveauxélémentf sournispar les conseilsdu Qatar.

6. Constatantque les considérationsquej'avais expriméea s,u nom de 1'Etatde Bahrein,sur

l'uti possidetis,ne pouvaientêtrepartagéespar luini en fait ni en droit)),le professeur Salmon a

de prime abord prévenu la Cour qu'il ne prendrait pas de son temps pour ((réfuter des

considérationsgénérales puisqu'elles [étaient]..hors sujet)) (CR 2000117, p. 9, par. 2); voire

même, devait-ialjouterplustard, ((doublementhorssujet))(CR2000117, p.20,par. 17). 7. La Cour aura certainement constatéque le professeur Salmonavait pris ...pas moins de

quarante-cinq minutes pour essayer,sans succès, de réfuter ce qu'il avait considérécomme étant

horssujet.

8. Il y atoutde même un point sur lequelBahrein etQatar serejoignent. Leconseilde Qatar

considère, en effet,que:

«la règle de l'uti possidetisjuris est aujourd'huiune règlede droit international de
portée générale,en ce sens qu'elle est liée au phénomènede l'accession à
l'indépendanceoù qu'il se manifeste, et en vertu de laquelle les Etats nés dela
décolonisationsuccèdent aux limites qui étaientles leurs quand ils étaient sous
l'administration de1'Etatcolonial))(CR200011 7,p. 9, par. 3).

9. Le professeur Salmon cite à son tour un passage de l'arrêt du 22 décembre1986dans

l'affaire du Différenfrontalier (BurkinaFaso/RépubliqueduMali), dans lequelil est dit :

«En tant que principe érigeant en frontières internationales d'anciennes
délimitations administrativesétablies pendant l'époque colonialle',uti possidetis est
donc un principe d'ordre général nécessaireme létà la décolonisation ouqu'elle se
produise.)) (C.I.J.Recueil1986,p. 566,par. 23.)

10.Le professeurSalmonconsidèreensuiteque :

«L7uti possidetis-principe de succession d'Etats-implique donc une

accession à l'indépendancec'est-à-dire l'émergence d'un nouveau sujd et droit,à
l'issue de la décolonisation.»

avant de décréter qu7«[a]ucunede ces deux conditionsn'est présentedans le cas d'espèce,ni en

générad lans lesEmiratsdu Golfe)) (CR 2000117,p. 9,par.4; les italiques sontdans l'original).

11. Avant d'examiner cette proposition,je souhaite, avec votre permissionMonsieur le

président, m'arrêterquelques minutes pour déterminer au préalable quels sontles sujets

destinatairesde I'utipossidetis.

12.On a déjà établique l'uti possidetiss'applique,par sa logique mêmep,artout oùil y a un

processusde décolonisationou d'accession à l'indépendance.

13. Le paragraphe 23 de l'arrêtde 1986citépar le conseil de Qatar se lit, en effet, avec le

précédent paragraph2 e0 dumêmearrêt, lequel considèrqeue :

«17utipossidetis constitue un principe général, logiquemenltiéau phénomène de

1'accession à 1'indépendance,où qu'ilse manifeste. Sonbut évidentest d'éviterque
l'indépendance etla stabilitédes nouveaux Etats ne soient mises en danger par des
luttes fratricides nées de la contestation des frontièresà la suite du retrait de la
puissance adrninistrante.)) (C.I.J.Recueil 1986,p. 565, par.20; les italiques sont de
nous .) 14. L'uti possidetis s'appliquera donc,en premier lieu, aux Etats issus d'un processus de

décolonisationquelle qu'en soitla forme et les modalités. Les anciens protectoratsdevront tout

naturellement trouverleurplace danscette catégorie.

15. Lemême principe s'appliquera,en second lieu,aux Etats ayantaccédél'indépendance

en dehors du contexte de la décolonisation. Cela voudradire que même en l'absence d'une

situation coloniale,de tels Etats se verront appliquerl'utipossidetis; tel a été lecas desEtats issus

de l'ancienne Yougoslavie,phénomène dont on a rendu comptele 13juin dernier.

16. En d'autres termes, la décolonisationn'est pasun préalableà l'application de l'uti

possidetis. C'est alternativement et non simultanément que l'accession l'indépendanceet la

décolonisationouvrentla voieàl'utipossidetis.

17.Combien mêmeB , ahreïn etQatar ne seraientpasissus d'un processus de décolonisation,

ce qui est loin d'êtrele cas commenous allons nouveau le démontrer;le fait mêmequ'ils aient

accédé à l'indépendance leur ouvre lvoie de l'uti possidetis et à la préservationdes frontières

existantesàla date de cette accessàol'indépendance.

18. Monpropos, ce matin, sera de démontrer queles proclamations de l'indépendancede

Bahreïnet Qatarétablissent,sans aucun doute possible,que les deux Etatsont recouvréen 1971,et

pour lemoins,le pleinexercice deleursouverainetésurleplan international.

19. Cette accessionà l'indépendance totaleet l'émergencesur la scène internationale de

deux nouveauxacteursa engendrépar là même un processusde successiond7Etats.

20. Je vais tout d'abord m'employeà réfuter lesarguments développé s cettebarre par le

professeur Salmon et démontrer à nouveau que Bahreïn et Qatar sont d'anciens protectorats

britanniques,et qu'à ce titre, l'uti possidetisleur est applicableàla date de leur indépendance.Je

m'efforcerai toutefoisde nepasrépétere quej'ai dit le 13juin dernier.

1.BAHREÏNET QATAR SONT D'ANCIENS PROTECTORATS BRITANNIQUEE S,TÀ CETITRE,
L'UTIPOSSZDETZS LEUREST APPLICABLEÀ LADATE DELEURINDÉPENDANCE

21. Le professeur Salmonpersiste toujourà considérerque«Les deux Emiratsn'étaientni

dans une situation coloniale,ni sous protectorat du Royaume-Uni.)) (CR200015,p.29, par. 6.)

Mais cettefois,il utilise une nouvelleformule «JarnaisBahreïnet Qatarn'ontétéconsidéré psr leRoyaume-Uni [lesitaliques
sontde nous] commedes «colonies»ou «desprotectorats))de type colonial. C'étaient
des «Etats protégés))" ,protectedstates", ce qui est tout autre chose.)) (CR2000/17,
p. 10,par. 5; lesitaliquessontdansl'original.)

22.Onjoue sur lesmots ! Tout le mondesaitque lecolonialisme«parle»plusieurslangues.

23. Qatar s'appuiesur diverses positions officiellesdu Gouvernement britannique, telleque

celle de lord Curzon, Vice-Roi de l'Inde qui est citédans la sentence Doubaï/Charjah, que le

conseil de Qatar a jointe au dossier d'audience du 20 juin dernier, et pour laquelle il a

généreusemenftourniune traductionen français.

24.Pardonnez-moi,Monsieurle président,d'avouerqueje ne suis guèreexperten littérature

coloniale;je relèvecependantquecette déclarationcontienu tnephrase qui éclairel'observateursur

les intentions britanniquesdel'époque,cettephrasedit deci:«leGouvernementbritanniquedevint

votre suzerainet protecteur)).

25. S'adressant, je cite M. Salmon à «ceux qui ont vécuce qu'étaitune administration

coloniale», il considère qu'«assimiler cetétatde fait et de droit une situation coloniale est un

non-sens))! (CR 2000/17,p. 13,par. 8.)

26. J'ignore quelleidéese faitle professeur Salmonde lasouveraineté,lui quinous reproche

«de confondre funestement limitationde souverainetéet absence de souveraineté)) (CR2000117,

p. 15,par. 12).

27. Permettez-moi,Monsieur le président, de trouverdans ce contexte, et précisémend tans

cette enceinte, toutà fait déplacé leparallèle- je regrette de le dire - maladroit qu'établitle

conseil de Qatar entre la Communauté européenneet le régime, heureusement révolu,du

protectorat(CR 2000/17,p. 15,par. 12).

28. Je persiste en ce qui me concerne àconsidérer,commeje l'ai dit devant cette Cour le

13juin dernier, que :

«Quel que soit le qualificatif qu'ondonne à la nature de ces «liensspéciaux)),

nul ne peut prétendre que Bahreïnet Qatar disposaientalors de la plénitudeet de
l'exclusivité des compétences interneset externes qui sont les attributs de la
souveraineté.))(CR 2000113,p. 58,par.57.)

29. Il ne fait aucundoute que la Grande-Bretagneavait faitle choix toutàla fois stratégique

et psychologique de donner aux relations avec les Etats du Golfe le qualificatif de ((relations

spécialesde traité». De la mêmemanière,qu'elle avaitestimé,comme le rappelle le conseil deQatar, ne pas devoirinclure les Etats du Golfedans la liste communiquéeàl'Assemblée générale

des NationsUnies au titre de l'article73e) de la Charte qui répertorie les territoires non

autonomes.

30. Je dois, ce propos, exprimerma surprisede voir le conseil de Qatar faireréférence àla

procédureinstituéepar l'article73 e), quandon sait,comme lerelève un éminentjuriste, spécialiste

desproblèmesde décolonisation, que :

«les Etats administrants avaientdécidéau départquel'article 73ne s'appliqueraitqu'à
celles de leurs colonies qu'ils voulaient placer sous le contrôle prévu par cet
article..et que de fait l'Australie, la Belgique, le Danemark, les Etats-Unis, la
France,les Pays-Bas,la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Royaume-Unise concertèrenten 1946

et établirentuneliste de 74 territoiresàl'égarddesquels ilsdéclarèrenrteconnaîtreles
obligations de l'article73)) (Mohammed Bedjaoui in Cot (Jean Pierre) et
Pellet (Alain):«La ChartedesNations Unies»Economica-Bruylant,1991p. 1073).

31.Le moinsque l'on puisse direest que la procédure ainsiinstituéereposaitsur l'adhésion

volontairede la puissance administrante;et quede ce fait l'inclusion ou nonde tel ou tel pays était

soumiseàla seule appréciationde cettemême puissance.

32. Faut-il en conclure que Bahrein et Qatar étaient, avantleur indépendance,des Etats

souverains et indépendants ? Répondrepar l'affirmative serait, à notre avis, (cunon-sens en fait

comme en droit» pourparaphrasermon éminentcontradicteur.

33. Tout indique aucontraire qu'en vertudes traitésconclus avec la Grande-Bretagneet au

vudu comportement surle terrain des différentes parties concernées,Bahreinet Qatarne pouvaient

jouir avant 1971duplein exercicede leursouverainetéinterne et externe.

34. Les deux Etats étaient placédsans la position de protectorats, institutionbien connue en

droit international.

35. A la suite de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale et son avis consultatif

du 7 février1923 concernantles Décrets de nationalitépromulguée sn Tunisieet au Maroc (avis

consultatif de 1923, C.P.J.I. sérieB no4, p. 27) -auquel j'ai déjàfait référence- laCour

internationale de Justice s'est penchée, à son tour, sur le régime du protectorat à l'occasion de

l'affairerelative auxDroits des ressortissants desEtats-Unisd'Amériqueau Maroc.

36. Dans sonarrêt du 27 août 1952,laCoura ainsi relevéce qui suit :

«Le troisièmegroupe de traitésconcerne l'établissementdu protectorat. Il

comprend les accords qui précédèrent l'établissemp eat la France d'un protectorat sur le Maroc, ainsi que le traitéde Fez de 1912. En vertu de ce traité,le Maroc
devenait unEtatsouverain,mais il concluaitunaccordde caractèrecontractuelpar
lequellaFrances'engageait à exercercertainspouvoirssouverainsaunometpour le
compteduMaroc,et à se charger,enprincipe, de toutesles relations internationales
duMaroc.))(C.I.J.Recueil1952,p. 188;les italiquessont de nous.)

37. Bahreïninvite,à présent,respectueusementla Cour à garder àl'esprit cet extrait de son

arrêdt e 1952,touten examinant la descriptionque faitleprofesseur Salmondu statutde Bahreïnet

deQatar lorsde la«présence»britannique. Le conseilduQatarnous dit

«seul l'exercice de certaines compétences, essentiellement enmatière de relations
extérieures, futconventionnellementtransférépar eux au Royaume-Uni, sans que la
substance de leurs droits, qu'ils soient territoriaux ou autres, en ait étéaffectée))

(CR 2000117,p. 9, par. 4).

38. Le professeur Salmon a,par ailleurs, reluà son tour à la Cour l'échangede lettres

intervenu le 15aoûtet le3 septembre 1971entre d'unepart le Royaume-Uniet Bahreïnet d'autre

part le Royaume-Uniet Qatar. Je vous rassure Monsieurle président,je n'ai pas l'intention de

vousles relireànouveauaujourd'hui!

39. Je souhaitetoutefoisrelever cequele conseildeQatar aditàleur sujet. Ceslettres, nous

précise le professeurSalmon, ((prennent acte simplement que le plein exercice de leur

responsabilitésouveraine leur étaitrendu)) (CR 2000/17, p. 12, par. 7; les italiques sont dans

l'original);avantd'ajouter que

«Sousréserve dequelques engagements particuliers,l'administration intérieure

du temtoire étaitsouveraine, seul l'exercicedes relationsextérieures sevoyait limité
par l'intermédiaireobligduRoyaume-Uni.))(CR2000117,p. 12,par. 8.)

40. Ai-je besoin de rappelerque c'esttoujours le professeur Salmonqui parle. La situation

qu'ildécritest en tout lieu similaiàecelle exposéedans l'arrêtde la Cour de 1952à propos du

protectorat françaisauMaroc. Je laissebienévidemment à la Cour le soin de tirer les conclusions

appropriées.

41. Ainsi par le fait mêmede l'abrogation du régimespécialde traité,nous assistons à

l'émergencesur le planinternational,de deuxpersonnalitésjuridiques nouvelles. C'est ce qui va

m'amener àparlerde la successiond7Etats,préalable,selonle conseil de Qatarà l'applicationde

1'utipossidetis. II.BAHREÏN ET QATAR ONTBIENSUCCÉDÉAU ROYAUME-U NAR LE FAITMÊME DE LA
RÉCUPÉRATIONDE LEURS PLEINESRESPONSABILITÉSINTERNATIONALES

42. Je n'apprendrai rien au professeurSalmon en lui disant que les règles de succession

d7Etatsne s'appliquent pas exclusivementaux changements de souverainetétemtoriale mais

s'étendentaussi aux situations où il est question de ((substitutiond'un Etatautre dans la

responsabilitédes relations internationalesd'unterritoire))(lesitaliquessont de nous).

43. Le professeurSalmonauravite reconnuce passage; il s'agit de l'article2, paragraphe1,

alinéab), communauxconventionsdeVienne de 1978et de 1983,qui est ainsi rédigé:

((L'expression «successiond7Etats»s'entend de la substitution d'un Eàaun
autre dans la responsabilité des relations internationalesd'un territoire.)) (Article2,
paragraphe 1,al.b), commun aux conventionsde Vienne surla succession d7Etatsen
matière de traitésde 1978 et en matièrede biens, de dettes et archives de 17Etat
de 1983;les italiques sontdenous.)

44. Cette mêmedéfinitionaété retenueparla sentencearbitrale du1juillet 1989relativà

la Déterminationde la frontière maritime entre la Guinée-Bissauet le Sénégal(RGDIP, 1990,

p. 227) et par l'avis 1de la commission d'arbitragepour la Yougoslavie du29 novembre 1991

(RGDIP,1992, p. 265).

45. La fin d'unprotectoratest,par excellence,une successionoù ila pas changementde

souverainetétemtoriale.

46.Il y a donc, s'agissant de Bahreïn et de Qatar, un véritable processus desuccession

d7Etatsque met, par ailleurs,en lumièrel'échangede lettres intervenu en 1971,auquelildéjàté

faitréférence.

47. Voilààtitre de rappel rapidece qui estdit dans la lettrebritannique aàrl'émirde

Bahreïn

«Le régimespécialde traitéentre leRoyaume-Uniet 1'Etatde Bahreïn, qui est
incompatibleavec1'exerciced'uneentièreresponsabilité,ur leplan international, en
tant qu7Etat souverain et indépendant,prendra fià la date d'aujourd'hui.» (Les

italiquessontdenous.)

48. La lettre adressée parle résidentpolitiquebritanàil'émirde Qatar parle àson tour

du ((désirqu'a manifestévotre gouvernement de voir 17Etatde Qatar reprendre les pleines

responsabilités internationaletantqu7Etatsouverainet indépendant».

49. Certes, les Etats de Bahreïn et de Qatar existaient avant 1971, en tant qu'entités

étatiques;mais la proclamation de leur indépendanceet la récupérationde leurs «pleinesresponsabilités internationaen tant qulEtat(s) souverain(s) et indépendant(s)»,en font de

nouveauxsujets de droitinternational;précisétarcequ'ils succèdenta puissance protectrice

dansl'exercice defonctions internationales.

50. Y a-t-il meilleureillustrationde l'émergenced'un Etatsu la scèneinternationale,que sa

demanded'adhésion àl'organisation desNationsUnie?

51. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, vous trouverez dans votre

dossierd'audience [documento 1181 ,t présentemenàl'écrandevant vous,la lettre adresséepar

feucheikhIsa bin SulmanA1Khalifah, émir de 1'Etat de Bahrein au Secrétaire générales

NationsUnies. Permettez-moi, Monsieurleprésident,devous lirecette lettre

LETTRE DATÉEDU 15AOÛT 1971,ADRESSÉEAU SECRETAIR GEÉNÉRALPAR
L'ÉMIR DE L'ETAT DEBAHREÏN

«Par suite de l'accord conclu le 15 août 1971 entre le Gouvernement du

Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagneet d'Irlandedu Nord et 1'Etatde Bahrein visànt
mettre fin aux relations régiespar traitéspécial qui existaient entre Bahreïnet le
Royaume-Uni,

Considérantque ledit accorda reconnu et confirmait que1'Etat deBahreïn
a lapleine responsabilité internatile la conduitedesesafaires étrangèr,te

Considérantque1'EtatindépendandteBahreïnest désireuxde devenir Membre
desNations Unies conformémentà l'article4 de laCharte desNationsUnies,

Nous avons l'honneur de demander que 1'Etatde Bahreïn soit admis comme
Membre desNations Unies.

En sa qualité d'Etat pacifique, le Bahreui croit que l'Organisation des
Nations Unies présenteune valeur considérablepour les petites nations et pour les
nations en voie de développement, aussi attache-t-il unegrande importanceà
l'acceptationde sa demanded'admissioncommeMembre desNationsUnies.

Nous vous serions donc obligéd'avoir la bonté de soumettre la présente

demandeau Conseil desécuritéàlapremière occasion.

En application de l'article 58 du règlementintérieurdu Conseil de sécurité,
nous avons le plaisir de joindre à la présente lettreune déclarationdistincte rédigée
conformémentauditarticle.

L'émirde I'EtatdeBahreïn,

(Signé)Isa bin SulmanAl-Khalifah.))(Les italiquessontde nous.)

52. Faut-il ajouter que la démarche hautementsymboliqueentreprisepar l'émirde 1'Etatde

Bahreinlejour mêmedel'accession desonindépendancele 15août 1971estàrelever. 53. On notera par ailleursque l'adhésionde 1'Etatde Bahreïn ainsi que celle de 1'Etatde

Qatar à l'Organisationdes Nations Unies furent entérinéepar l'Organisation,le mêmejour; à

savoir,le 21septembre 1971.

54. Les rapports entre succession d7Etatset uti possidetis, s'agissant dela continuitédes

frontièresexistant au moment de l'indépendance, ont étexaminéspar la Chambre de la Cour,

constituée pour connaîtrede l'affairedu Dzférendfrontalier (BurkinaFaso/Républiquedu Mali),

qui a considéré,anssonarrêtdu22 décembre1986,que :

«l'obligation de respecter les frontières internationales préexistantesen cas de
succession d7Etats découle sans aucun doute d'une règle générale dedroit
international, qu'elle trouve ou non son expression dans la formule utipossidetis))
(C.I.J Recueil 1986,p. 566,par. 24).

55. Les deux conditions poséespar Qatar lui-même à l'application de l'utipossidetis au

différendqui oppose les deuxpaysétantainsiréunies,je souhaità présent,avecvotre permission

Monsieurle président, rappeleàl'attentionde la Cour la positionde Bahreïn quantau contenu de

1'utipossidetisapplicabledanscetteaffaire.

111.LES RAPPORTS ENTRE LETITREETLESEFFECTIMTESDANSLE CONTEXTE D'UN
UTIPOSSZDETIS APPLICABLE AUXÎLES HAWAR

56. Les rapportsentre titre et effectivitésdans le contexte d'un utipossidetis applicable aux

îles Hawar ayant étélargement développés lors de ma précédente communicatiodnu 13juin, je

vais me limiteraujourd'hui l'essentiel.

57. Bahreïn a démontré que l'application de l'uti possidetis dans la présenteaffaire avait

l'avantagede prendreen comptetout àla fois lestitresdont on peut seprévaloirmaiségalementles

effectivitprouvées.

58. Bahreïn a aussi indiqué respectueusemeà la Cour qu'il estimait répondreaux critères

définisdans la première hypothèse envisagée par la Chambre de la Cour, dans l'affaire du

Dzfférendfrontalier, celle où:((une administration effective s'ajouàeI'uti possidetis juris,

l'effectivitén'intervient en réaque pour confirmerl'exercice du droit né d'untitre juridique))

(C.I.J.Recueil 1986,p. 586,par. 63). 59. Nous avonsdit que la souverainetéde Bahreïnsur les îles Hawar,où une administration

effective confirme tout naturellement un titre juridique, constituait une situation d'exacte

correspondanceentre lefaitet le droit.

60. Permettez-moi à présent,Monsieur le président,d'ouvrir une parenthèse à propos de

Zubarah,qui fera l'objetd'unexamenplusapprofondidemainpar mon confrèreJan Paulsson.

61. Son Excellence Monsieur l'agent de 1'Etat de Qatar a déclaré,dans son ultime

communication à la Cour,je le cite: "fact I amsure thatBahrainwouldhardlyhavearguedso

stronglyfor applicationoftheprinciple ofuti possidetisifit had really beenserious in its claimto

Zubarah. "(CR2000119,p. 39,par. 5.)

62. Indépendamment dece qu'il a voulu direpar cette phrase, je suis au regret de dire à

Monsieurl'agent qu'àZubarah, commeauxîles Hawar,l'utipossidetis neprofitepas àQatar.

63. Si nous devions,en effet, appliquer Zubarah«le test», sij'ose m'exprimer ainsi, dela

Chambre de la Cour, dans l'affaire du Diffërendfrontalier; la situation de Zubarah sera tout

simplementla suivante

«Dans le cas où le fait ne correspond pas au droit, où le temtoire objet du

différend est administréeffectivementpar un Etat autreque celui qui possèdele titre
juridique, il y a lieu de préférer titulaire du titre.» .(C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 587,
par. 63.)

64. Du fait même de sonoccupationillégalepar Qatar, à la suite du recours à la force, le

titulaire du titre juridique relatif Zubarah demeure 1'Etat de Bahreïn. Comme l'a dit le

professeur Salmon : ((Selonun principe fondamentaldu droit international, aucun titre valablene

peutnaître d'uneoccupationillégaledutemtoire d'autrui.))(CR2000117,p. 21,par. 21 .)

65. Monsieurle président,Madameet Messieursde laCour, revenons,si vous le permettez,

à l'application del'utipossidetis auxîles Hawar et aux rapports harmonieuxqui y existententre le

titreet lesffectivités.

66. Bahreïn a clairementétabli queses effectivitéssont,dans une largemesure, antérieuràs

la décisionde 1939et ont mêmeconstitué le fondement sur lequel la souveraineté sur les

îlesHawar a été attribuéeàBahreïn,envertude la décisionbritanniquede 1939. 67. Il a été aussi démontréque les effectivitostse prévaut Bahreïncouvrent aussibien la

périodecoloniale que post-coloniale, la décision britanniquede 1939 se trouvant ainsi encadrée

dans une séquenceininterrompued7effectivités.

68. Bahreïn a bien pris soin de démontrer, comme le fera encore aujourd'hui le

professeurMichael Reisman, que la décisiondu 11juillet 1939constitue bel et bien un titre sur

lequel Bahreïnse fondepour asseoir sa souverainetésurlesîles Hawar.

69. Dans le contexte de l'utipossidetis maintenant, il importepeu que cette décision aitle

caractère d'une sentence arbitraleou d'une décisionpolitique ou mêmeadministrative ! Nous

sommesenprésenced'untitrejuridique; avais-jedit le 13juin dernier.

70. Le professeur Salmon a traité cetteaffirmation avec ironie et a même appelé à son

secourscettefois «la chauve-souris»deLaFontaine(CR2000117,p. 16,par. 14).

71. Pourtant, son collègue,sir Ian Sinclair,nous a donnéquelque partraison en admettant

que cette décisionconstituait, sesyeux, unfait : "The1939 decisionis no morethan afact in the

present case. It ispart of the record,but not bindingsan arbitralawardor as an administrative

decision."(CR2000119,p. 26, par.29.)

72. On notera qu'en exposant ses griefs à l'encontre de cette décisionet de ses anciens

collèguesduForeignOffice, sirIan Sinclair relève :

"a very limited numberof Britishofficiaisin the Gulfand in London acted with less
thanfull impartialityand objectivity in settingup andparticipating intheprocedures
applied between 1936and 1939 to determine, as between Qatar and Bahrain, the
issue of which of these two sheikhdoms had sovereignty over the Hawar Islands"

(CR2000119,p. 17,par. 9).

73. Ces allégations, dontmes collèguesaurontà juger le bien-fondéen l'espèce,ne peuvent

que donner crédit àl'idéeselonlaquelleon étaitdansune situationquasicoloniale où la puissance

protectrice, par l'intermédiaire de ses agents,pouvait avoir pris, selon la thèse développépear

sirIan, une décision motivéepar la vision qu'elle avait alors de ses intérêts stratégiquo es

économiques.

74. Sir Ian Sinclair invite la Courconsidérer cettedécisionnon pas comme une sentence

arbitrale maiscomme un fait. Cette décision, quellequesoit sa qualification,a crééeffectivement

un étatdefait qui s'impose aujourd'hui à deux Etats issusde la colonisation britanniquecomme

s'étaientimposées,partout ailleurs,desfrontièresdélimitéesparlespuissances coloniales. 75.Quelleque soit sa naturejuridique je le répète la décisionbritanniquede 1939fait

incontestablementpartie intégrantedu legs colonial. Cela ne plaît pas au professeur Salmon

(CR2000117,p. 20,par. 19)etencoremoins à Qatar. Maislesfaits ont la vie du!e

76. L'indépendance, acquise en1971,a intégrécettedécisiondans un ensemble plus global

quiestprécisément 1utipossidetis.

77. L'ancienne Puissance protectricea rendu compte de la situation qu'elle a léguée à

Bahreïn età Qataren établissanten 1972,quelques mois à peineaprèsl'accessiondes deuxpays à

l'indépendance, unecarte que MePaulsson vous a présentée.C'est en quelque sorte «un étatdes

lieux».

78. Monsieur le président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, la situation dans notre

affaireest la suivante. Je l'ai dit le13 juin dernier et je le répète,avec votre permission,

aujourd'hui :

79. Un Etat, Bahreïn, hériteau moment de la proclamation de son indépendance,d'un

utipossidetis, dont fait partie intégranteune décision rendue par l'autorité coloniale,et

reconnaissantexplicitementla souverainetéde Bahreïn surlesîlesHawar sur la based7effectivités

prouvéeset établies.

80. La Cour,Bahreïn en est convaincu,a toute autoritépour appliquerdans cette affairele

principe de 1'utipossidetis, et permettre à Bahreïn de vivre en paix, à l'abri de toutemenàce,

l'intérieurde frontièresfondéesurle droitinternational.

81. J'en arrive ainsi au terme de ma présentation. Il me reste à vous exprimer,

Monsieurle président,Madame et Messieurs de la Cour, ma vive et réelle reconnaissancepour

votrepatience etvotre indulgence.

82. Je prieàprésent laCour de bien vouloir appeleà nouveau àla barre mon confrèreJan

Paulsson.

Le PRESIDENT :Je vous remercieMaître Kemicha.Je croisque le momentserait opportun

pourla Cour de suspendrepourun quart d'heure.

L'audience est suspendudee II h20 à II h35. Le PRESIDENT :Veuillez vous asseoir. La séanceest reprise et je donne la parole à

Me Jan Paulsson.

Mr. PAULSSON: Thankyou,Mr.President.

FIVE FACTUALTOPICSRELATINGTO THE 1939AWARD

1.1 have five factualtopics relatingto the 1939Award. 1cannotpromise thatthere is some

ovenvhelminglogicat work inthesefivetopics,butthat is the natureof rebuttal.

The demographiccontext

2. The 1939decisionmustbe understood incontext. A fundamentalfactoris the plain truth

that Qatar'spopulation has always beenlocated on the east coast of the peninsula, further away

from the Hawars than the distancebetweenthe Hawarsandthe mainisland of Bahrain.

3. ThisconcentrationofQatar'spopulacearoundDohais constantthroughoutitshistory.

4. Ninety-seven per centof Qatar's population todaylives in Doha or elsewhereon the east

coast. Given the fact that the initialsettlementatha was to exploit the pearling banks to the

east, Qatarhasdiligentlyandsuccessfullypursueda widemaritimedomainto the east.

5. If we go back in time,the population wasof course even smaller, but its distributionwas

the same.

6.1 amholding abook entitledTheCreationof Qatar - anintriguingtitl- authoredby a

member of the Qatar Histoncal Commission. This book, which has been cited by Qatar as

authoritative,givesthe estimated populationof Qatar as 27,000in908'. Given the decline in the

pearling industryand the emigrationproblems,30 yearslaterthis numberwas practicallythe sarne,

28,000 in 193g2.

7. As youmay recall,the authorof this book also recordsthat in 1908therewere only three

populated townson the north-westcoast of Qatar- Zubarahis inruins- so the populatedtoms

are Abu Dhaluf,Hadiyah,andKhawrHassan or Khuwayr, as itis moreoften knowntoday.

8. Thepopulationofthesethreevillagesdid notexceed 800people - 800- this leftno one

on theentirewestcoast anywherenearthe HawarIslands. Theauthorexplainsthat "thelocationof

IR.S.Zahlan,TheCreationof Qatar,pp. 1119.

'lbi d,119.the villages was determinedby the existence of water". So,when PCL began its oil operations at

Dukhan and brought in 300workers inthe early 1940s,water had to be supplied by boat fi-om

~ahrain~.Qatarhascontestednoneof thesefacts.

9. The evidenceis clear; thepeopleof Doha didnotapproachthe Hawars. Indeed,the Court

mayrecall that the much-discussedmap attached to the 1935Qatar concessionwith PCLshowed

this roadnetwork,which speaksforitself andis includedas item 119ofthe judges'folders.

10. How could it possibly be said, to use the words of the Guinea-Bissauv. Senegal

decision,that Qatarhad, as ofthe date ofthe British Awardin 1939,expanded"the area ofvalidity

in spaceof the legalnoms ofthe stateU4of Qatarto establish dominionoverthe HawarIslands?

11.Now, may 1 Saythat 1hopethat my distinguishedopponent,Mr.Bundy, livesto be 100,

and 1,too, hope that 1will live aslong; 1also hope that we willremain goodfiiends, but 1 must

admit that 1 am somewhat womed that people who might see us together then will avoid us,

saying - there'sold Bundy, there's oldPaulsson, let us escape before they start quarrellingagain

aboutthat dreadfulmap fi-omIstanbul!

12. 1do hesitatebefore showingthe Court something whichit has alreadyseen threetimes,

but 1count on yourindulgence tolet me exercisea nght ofreply for 30 seconds. Let me ask: why

exactlywas Mr. Bundy so anxiousaboutthe Izzet map? It is because he insiststhat al1of whathe

calledthe "map evidence"showsthat Qatar - the word Qatar- meant theentire peninsula. The

Izzetmap is therefore inconvenient forQatar. Andof coursethis map was prepared by somebody

whoactually wentthere in 1878 - immediatelyfollowingthe time when Qatar would like youto

believethat it achievedcoast-to-coasttemtorial integrity. The image presentedby CaptainIzzet is

verydifferent.

13. On Ourside, we are saying somethingvery simple. CaptainIzzet noted that there was

somethinghere in the Gulf of Bahrain - settlements,people, a social concentration. The Hawar

Islandswere part ofthat concentration.

14. Over here,there is another, smaller, concentration of people-and this is whathe called

Qatar.

3~~ 2000f8,p29,paras.134-137.
483ILR36. 15.In between: nothing,anempty space.

16.Now Mr. Bundymadethe pointthat it is not necessarilyhard to travel over this gravelly

desert terrain. He is right: you do not have to cut your way throughthejungle, or cross fearsome

rivers. But his commentmissesthe point: back then this was a wild and dangerous place. When

he crossed it in 1941, you may recall, the Political Resident, Sir RupertHay, remarked "it was

strangeto travel about thesewildparts ...withoutanykind of armedescorf"'. Oneof the recurrent

problems of travelling fromDoha was that as soon astravellers leftthe town they were exposedto

plunder, piracy, robbery, kidnapping. For exarnple,if one reads one of the earlyannual reportsby

the BritishPoliticalAgent for "Katr", as submittedby Bahrain in its ~emorial~,one finds that this

part of his annual report devotedto Qatar almost entirely deals with security problems: raids,

attacks, looting, ambushes. As a result, the Political Agentwrote "the caravanescorts have been

strengthenedto 250horsemen". Two hundredand fi@ horsemen means a significant expedition.

It means significant costs. Therewas no reason to mount such expeditions to cross the Qatari

desert to go to the HawarIslands. The Hawarislanderssold their modest outputof fish andpearls

and gypsumin the marketsofManamaandMuharraq,a short and pleasantboatride to the north.

TheLaithwaitereport

17. The only evidence referred to by Qatar to support its assertion that Britain always

recognizedQatar'ssovereigntyover the HawarIslandsuntil an allegedlysuddenreversa1of policy

in 1936relatesto the views expressedby British officials in London when theybegan to examine

the questionof sovereignq overthe HawarIslandsin 1933.

18. The firstthingto observe is that if Qatar werenght in sayingthat these British officials

had determined in 1933that the Hawars did not belong to Bahrain, that would havebeen an

extraordinarydeparhirefrom at least a centuryof preceding history, from CaptainBrucks'sreport

in 1829 that the Hawars belonged to ~ahrain', to Britain's clear positionin connection with the

'CR2000/12,p. 27,para. 127.

6~ol.5, Ann.237,p. 1047.
'~emorial of Bahrain,Ann.7,Vol. p.92.Zakhnuniya episode, in the early 1900s8,to the recognition that the Hawars were regularly

inhabitedby Bahrain ~owasir~,to AdrniraltyReportsin 1915and 1916".

19.In other words,sucha volte-facein 1933wouldhavebeen an aberration.

20. But, as a more careful examinationofthe recordwillshow, therewasno suchreversa1of

the constantprevious conclusion that theHawarsbelong to Bahrain.

21. Qatar cites a letter dated 3 May 1933sent from Mr.Laithwaite to Mr. Starling. These

weretwo British officiaiswho worked in on don" .n the letterMr. Laithwaitelists certain ofthe

islands of the Bahrain archipelago. He did not include the Hawar Islands among them. Qatar

deduces that the official policy of the British Govermnent was that the Hawar Islands did not

belongto Bahrain and insteadbelonged to Qatar. But this stretchesthe words usedby Laithwaite

beyondrecognition. Laithwaitesaid no suchthing in the letter,indeed he wenton to observe,and

thispart of the documentwas notcitedby Qatar:

"The information above, which is1fear rather scrappy, is taken from Lorimer's
Gazetteer. ThePersianGulfPilot suggeststhat the archipelagois surroundedby reefs
running out to a considerable distanceandbanks to whichthe Sheikhwould no doubt

lay claim if any question arose; and in consideringany grant of a concession in
respect of his 'dominions'or 'Bahrein'it would seem necessary to have a clear
understanding astoprecisely whatiscovered." (Emphasis added.)

Laithwaiteconcludesthe letterby refening to aninterdepartmental meeting organizedfor laterthe

sarnedayto discussthe issueof the extentofBahrain'stemtories, and he writes:

"1am also suggesting toMoorethat the Admiraltyrepresentativemight bring a
chart of Bahrain, which would give a clearer idea of the position than the rather
scattered informationabove,to thisafternoon'smeeting."

22. But Laithwaiteappears to have advancedno furtherby August 1933when he continues

to speculatethat theterritoryof Bahrain: "presumably .. .wouldexcludeHawarwhichbelongsin

any case geographicallyto Qatar, and is the westernmostandlargest of a group of islandsjust off

the Qatar coast"12.

ette frrmCapt.Pndeaux, British PolitiAlgentto MajorCox,BritishPolitical Resid,0 March1909,
MemonalofBahrain,Ann.235,Vol.4,p. 1034.

'lbid a.,CR2000113,p. 18,para.92.
'%emorialof Bahrain, aras.11172.

"~emorialof Qatar,Ann.111.8, ol. 6,pp.431-435.
'*~emorialof Qatar,Ann.III.91, Vol.6,pp.461-467. 23. Counselfor Qatar concludedfiom these two letters: "So Laithwaite,who was the most

knowledgeable officia1in the India Office at that time of the geography"- the geography,

Mr.President - "of this part of the Gulf, wasunhesitatinglyof the view in 1933that the Rulerof

Bahraindid not exercise anycontrolwhatsoeverovertheHawar ~slands."'~

24. "Unhesitatinglyof the view that Bahrain didnot exercise any control whatsoeverover

the Hawar Islands." The Court will undoubtedlyrecall that the remarks of Mr. Laithwaite,the

geographical experts, are directedto geography,not sovereignty. And to describe his words as

unhesitatingly expressing a view as to political control- not to speak of legal entitlement- is

surprisingto saythe least.

25. The letters express clearly a tentativeview, expressly qualifiedby the warningthat real

information was required before reaching a conclusion. One simply cannot say that they

constituteda definitiveopinionofthe BritishGovernent that the Hawar Islandswere not Bahrani.

Laithwaite warned that his informationwas "scrappy"and "scattered" and that he had asked for

better informationto be obtained inorder "tohave a clearunderstandingas to precisely"whatwas

the extent of the territones,of Bahrain. Laithwaite obviouslydid not intend his comrnentsto be

relied upon in anyway. He qualifies his geographicobservationsabout theHawars with theword

"presumably".

26. When the short extractof the letter citedby Qatar is put in context, it becomes evident

that the letter gives no support to Qatar's assertion that Laithwaite- let alone the British

Government - has decidedthat the Hawar Islandsdidnot belong to Bahrain. Perhapsevenmore

significantly,thereis no referenceinthe letter,whetherexplicitor implicit, tothe Stateof Qatar,its

Ruleror the Al-Thani.

27. Yet Qatar's entire thesis that Britain recognized Qatar as sovereign over the Hawar

Islandsis basedentirely on thesetwo lettersI4.

28. The subsequent investigations of the Britishofficiais chargedwith the matter confirmed

that the Islandsbelonged to Bahrain. The conclusion thatBritain'sview from 1820until 1939and

beyondthat the Hawar Islandsbelongedto Bahrainthereforeremainsunchallenged.

1 3 2000/6,p. 25, para.37(4).
1 4 2000/6,pp.24-25,paras.37(1)and38 (4). 29.This background nowputsus inapositionto evaluate Professor's Salmon's argumen that

«les plus hautes autoritiésbritanniques»15had reached the conclusion that the borders of Qatar

should be accepted simplyas extending to the sea along its entire shore. He cited a Laithwaite

memorandurnI6in which itis true that Laithwaitemade thisrecornmendation,but it is alsotrue that

the entiretyof this lengthy memorandum concerns thethreatof Ibn Saud,and how to establishand

maintainasouthern Qatari borderto allowtheBntish Petroleurninterestto operate in safety.

30. Anyone who thinks that this had to do with an issue of legal pnnciple of delirnitation

would do well to look at the detailed BritishMilitary Report from 1939entitled "Appreciationof

the Situation Regardingthe Defence ofQatar ~eninsular"" where the premise is stated bluntlyas

follows:

"5.It is necessary toconsiderthedefence ofQATARforthe followingreasons:

(a) The promise ofprotectiongiven by HisMajesty'sGovernment.

(b) The possibility of oil being found and the Oil Company developing,
which might make QATAR of considerable importancein connection
withEmpire oilfuel supplies.

(c) The desirabilityofmaintainingthe R.A.F.landinggroundat DOHA."

31.Laithwaite's memorandumwas thus al1aboutthe threat of Ibn Saud. Bahrain's position

was not evenconsidered. There was no intentto dispossess Bahrain.The British authoritieswere

aware of the Bahraini possessions18. And any notion that there was an implicit intention to

dispossess Bahrainof the Hawar Islandsis of course decisively contradictedby the unambiguous

decisionof 1939.

32.In closing the discussion of Laithwaite'stwo letters, it is interesting to compareQatar's

treatment of them with Qatar's treatmentof Mr. H. G.Darwin of the British Foreign Office who

concludedin 1964that the Hawar Islandsproperly belonged to Bahrain. As we havejust seen,

Laithwaite was making geographical observationsand noted that his information was "scrappy"

"CR 2000/5,p. 35, para. 15(a).
'6~ounter-~emorialof Qatar,Ann.111., ol.3,p. 213.

"~emorial of Bahrain,Ann.275, Vol. 5,p. 1136.
'8~ounter-~emonalof Bahrain, paras.215-218; Letter fiom the British Political Agentto the Bntish Political
Resident,29May 1933,Counter-Memonal ofBahrain, Ann.59, Vol. 2,pp. 203-206; Telegram fiom PoliticalResident
to the Secretaryof State for the Colonies, 23July 1933,Memonal of Qatar, Ann.111.85,Vol. 6, p. 437; and Telegram
fiom the BritishPolitical Resident to the Govemmentof India, 31July 1933, Memorial ofQatar, Ann.111.8,Vol. 6,
p.449.and "scattered". He cautioned thathis views werepreliminary. Even as he made them, he asked

for evidence about sovereigntyover the HawarIslands. Neither Party has been able to locate

Mr. Laithwaite's final,reasoned conclusions.

33.Yet Qatar tries to tellthe Courtthat Laithwaite'slettersntaina reasoned and definitive

determinationby the BritishGovernment.

34.Now let us consider Mr. Darwin. With respectto his view that the Hawar Islandswere

legallyBahrain's,SirIan Sinclairargued thatMr.Darwinwas "uninformed"and based his viewon

"incomplete inf~nnation"'~. Now, Darwin was a lawyer- an Assistant Legal Adviser to the

BritishForeign Office. In 1964,he askedthe ForeignOfficeto investigatethe issue of sovereignty

over the Hawar Islands. A Mr. C.W. Long of the ForeignOffice canied out the assignrnent. In

conducting his analysis,Mr.Long had accessto the ForeignOffice archives,as evidencedby the

citationsinhis memorandum.

35. Mr. Long prepared a memorandumthat took into account the evidence of activitieson

the Hawar Islands. It includes citationsto no less than 15documents fiom the British archives,

including Sir Hugh Weightman's 1939 memorandum of fact and law, with attached evidence.

Sir Ian called Mr. Long'smemoranduma "potted and incomplete"account of the events of 1936

and 1939. However,Sir Ianfailed to identify whichof the 15documentsor their attachmentswas

allegedly potted. Nor did Sir Ian identiSr which documentswere missing. True enough, the

fancifultheones proposed byQatardonot find a place in Mr.Long'smemorandum. May 1suggest

that Mr.Long did not have the same imagination as Qatar's lawyers and so he limited his

considerationto the factsbeforehim.

36. Mr. Long sent his memorandum,as well as the documents upon which he relied, to

Mr. Darwin. Darwin read the memorandumand the attached documents. And Mr. Darwin, the

internationallawyer,cameto the onlyconclusionpossibleonthe facts: Bahrainhad evidenceof its

authority and Qatar had nothing but geographical proximity, so "Bahrain wins easi~~"~'. A

definitiveconclusion,basedon facts.

"CR 2000119,p.14,para.3.

2%eplyof Bahrain,Ann.2, p. 2; ReplyofBahrain, para.120. 37. Nevertheless, Sir Ian speculated that: "indeed, it could well be ... that. ..

Mr.HenryDarwin ...did not have access at the time to the very wide range of documentaryand

cartographicmaterials" availablenowto the Court,and it wastherefore, he concluded,in favourof

~ahrain~'.

38. We know that while the numberof documentsbefore this Court are greater than what

might have beenavailableto Mr.Darwin,thesubstanceisthe same.

39. Sir Ian then asserted that Darwin'sconclusion was based on assumptions that Qatar

challenges today. What SirIan calls assumptions wasin fact histoncal evidence drawn from

documents in the Bntish Archives. It seems thatMr. Darwin,like Mr. Long, wasguilty only of

being less willingto speculatein favourof Qatarthan Qatar'slegaltearn is willing to do.

40. To sumup, Sir Ian asserts that Mr.Laithwaite'sviews, descnbed by Laithwaite himself

as preliminary, based on "scrappy" and "scattered" information,was a definitive and informed

conclusion, whileMr. Darwin'sunequivocallegalevaluationof the evidencepresentedto him after

a Foreign Office investigationwas wrong. Bahrain can only observe that this is an inversion of

realiîy.

Dowasirallegianceto Bahrain

41. Qatar'smain argumentregarding the Hawar Islandsseemsto be thatthe allegianceof the

Dowasir to Bahrainwas not sufficiently constant,and that thereforetheir presenceon Hawar does

not equalBahrainipresence there.

42. First of all, may1point outthat althoughit is clearthat some Dowasir were inconflict

withthe Rulerof Bahrainin the 1920s,this didnot includeal1ofthem.

43. Second, the Hawar Islands were not exclusively populated by the Dowasir. The

Al Ghatarnfarnily was prominent in the North Village; theremains of one of their houses there

may still be seen today. The Al Ghatam wereimportantpeople; Bahrain has submittedits Civil

Lists for the year 1924, which includes nine members of this familg3 who thus received annual

stipends as persons making particular contributions to the nation of Bahrain. Moreover,

"CR 2000/19,p. 13,para. 3.
"CR 2000119,p.13,para.3.
23~ounter-~emorialofBahrain,Ann.54,pp. 173-174;seealsoAnn.55,pp. 175-82.intermarriage connectedmanynon-DowasirBahrainiwith the Hawar Islands. As long as a century

ago, as noted by Prideaux, a relativeof SheikhIsabin Ali, the Ruler of Bahrain, was headmanon

the Hawar ~slands*~N. aturally,this processof intermamage has intensifiedover the years.

44. Third,those Dowasirwho did leave Bahrainwent to the Hasa Coast; theydid not try to

stay in theHawarIslands; theyknewthis was Bahrainitemtory.

45. Last but not least, one must be careful about drawing too many conclusions from

references,here andthere, to a tribe as being "fiercely independent". Thisis often true of people

who live in isolated places. My own people,if youwill allowme a persona1reference, come from

a remote part of northem Sweden. They are happy if the King visits them, but they havealways

prefened to invite him first. They like to think of themselves as self sufficient and "fiercely

independent" - although to be perfectly honest others seem more often to describe them as

exasperating. As for officials from Stockholm,the less they see them the better. A century ago,

before income taxes began to takemoney away andsocial securitybegan to give some of itback,

to some people, Stockholm was a fairly abstractnotion. But that does not mean that these people

do not considerthemselves Swedish. And 1certainly wouldnot recornrnendfor anyoneto suggest

to them that,as a resultof their independentstreak,they shouldbe partofNorway!

46. So even if some Dowasir were occasionallyunhappy, as many of us occasionallyare

when we thinkof thosewho govem us, the factremains thatfor many generations,year afteryear,

season after season, al1of their contacts werewith Bahrain. No contactswere with Qatar. No

contactswithQatar.

47. The Court will have noticed that Sir IanSinclair attempted to achieve the considerable

featof makingthe Dowasirsimplydisappear.

48. They left in the 1920~~ he argued, and we do not know that they ever came back. He

noted referencesto the fact that some of the Dowasir who had left were only trickling back to

Budaiya as late as 1933,and this, he insisted,is no proof that they ever went back to the Hawar

Islands.

24~emonalof Bahrain,Vol. 5,Ann.236,pp. 1041-1042. 49. Bahrain wouldsuggest that Qatar spend abit moretime studyingthe historical sources.

Firstof all, ashave stated,not al1of the Dowasirleft. Thosewho lefiwere mostlyfiom Budaiya.

Andmost of the Hawarislanders were in fact from Zellaq,whichmakes quite a lot of sense when

you considerthat Zellaqis almosthalf as close tothe Hawarsasis Budaiya.

50. Moreover,there is the testimonyof the witnesses who were bom on the Haww Islands,

or brought up there, in the 1920s, and who did not leave Bahrain with the Budaiya ~owas?.

Qatarhas argued- with a seemingly scholarly scepticismwhich, however, it certainlydoes not

applyto its own historical proposition- that these statements shouldbe treated "with caution".

Let metherefore Saya fewwords abouttheweightto be givento thesewitnessstatements.

5 1.Bahrain is well aware of the fact that proceduresbeforethis Court arenot conducive to

the use of oral evidence. Indeed, not much is achieved if each side brings an equal number of

witnesses,and onegroupmakes some emphatic affirmations whilethe other groupsaysexactlythe

opposite.

52.But the situationin this caseis entirelydifferent,inthreequite significantways.

53. First, Qatar has not produced a singlewitness statement. The simplereasonis that there

is no Qatari who could affim that he has ever been on the Hawar Islands, no Qatari who could

affim that the Al Thani govemed Zubarah before 1937,no Qatariwho could contradictBahrain's

effectivitéon the other features in the Gulfof Bahrain. In otherwords, the witnessstatementsare

both uncontradictedandcorroboratedby thewrittenrecord.

54. Second, what the witnesseshave to Saydoes not involve any subjectivejudgments, or

controversial opinions. The main point is that these witnessesexist; they are realhuman beings

anditis only the most basicfacts of their life whichare of interest. Where were theybom? Where

did they grow up? Who were their neighbours? Where are their houses and fish traps and the

gravesof their friends and families? Theseare simple facts. They could be tested in very simple

ways.

55. Third, precisely, Qatar has never sought to challenge these statements, which were

cornmunicatedin 1996. This is hardly surprising. What could Qatarhave said? Thatthese people

25~emorialof Bahrain,Ann. 314,StatementofNasrbin MakkibinAlial Dosari, 16Sept. 1996andMemorialof
Bahrain,nn.315, Statementof SalmanbinIsabin Ahmad binSaad alDosan, 15Sept. 1996.are impostors? That they are not who they Saythey are? That they did not live on the Hawar

Islandswhen they did? That their identificationof buildingsandplaces and graves are erroneous?

But al1of these simple things can be checked. Thesewitnesses, surrounded by their fiiends and

family,havewithout the slightest doubtbeen followingevery momentof these proceedingsas they

are broadcast live and in extenso on Bahraini television. Can anyone imagine how utterly

preposterousit would be if these patriarchs would beexposed as having fabricated their identities,

theirparents,their upbringing,the way theyhave spenttheir lives?

56. More than anything else, this part of the controversy illustrates, yet again, the

unsatisfactory nature of a claim which asks the judges who compose the International Courtof

Justiceinthe year 2000to conductaninvestigationintocircurnstanceswhich couldonly havebeen

properlyand fully understoodat the time, whichwere in fact examinedat the time, and which led

to adecisionon the basis ofwhich life has nowcontinuedfor severalgenerations.

Thecriticaldate

57. This leads me naturallyto my very shortesttopic: cntical date. The Agent of Qatar in

his concluding remarks stressedthat developments subsequentto 1983 should have no weight in

thiscase. Whetherthe date shouldbe 1983or 1991,whenQatarmadethe Application tothisCourt

could bedebated.

58. But this is purely academic,becauseBahrainhas not invokedany matter takingplace in

the last20years as a foundationfor its title. Bahrain'songoing activitiesin the HawarIslandsare

the consequence of its earliertitle, andnot its source.

59. But counselfor Qatar has ofcourse alsoarguedthat a criticaldate shouldbe recognized

as far back as 1936, and that the Court should therefore give no weight to anything which has

happenedin the last 65 years.

60. This cannot fail to throw the most subtle mind into great perplexity. How could one

possiblyconsider, in particular,that the years between 1939and 1971, when Bahrain achievedfull

independence, should be off bounds to any enquiry? How could Bahrain be criticized for

complyingwith a decision from the highest level of the British Government? What does Qatar

imaginethat the Ruler of Bahrain should have saidto Britain in 1939? As the dominantPower,Britain confirmedthat the HawarIslandsbelonged to Bahrain. This involved rights - and duties.

Sowas the Rulerof Bahrain supposedtorebuke the British,to explainthat Britainwould one day

probably or certainlybe exposedas "shameful andsordid",that the British decisionwas a cynical

and "hypocritical" impositionof its own interests, andthat the Ruler of Bahrainwas going to have

nothing to do withit? Shouldhe immediatelyhave toldthe Dowasirthat they shouldimmediately

clearout of theIslandsbecausedespitewhatthe Britishhad said,the Ruler of Bahrainknew that in

truth the British had granted an original title to the Al-Thani long ago- including al1of the

peninsula,includingeverythingin its territorialsea?

61. This is not, in Bahrain's respectful submission,an argument which merits serious

attention. If Qatar'swild ideasabout critical date were accepted, half of ourplanet might well be

living right now in the middle of vast epochs of critical date. Former Yugoslaviaalone would

probably be entirelycovered with overlapping critical dates going far back to the early Middle

Ages, withthepeopleof everyregionandevery ethnicgroupwishingto redressgrievanceshanded

downfrom generationto generation.

62. To conclude on this point: theearliest possible critical date is the one referred to by

Qatar'sown Agent,namely 1983.

Qatar'saiiegations of "shamefua lndsordid"manipulationsbyBritain

63. 1 corne now to my fift and final point of the factual context of the 1939decision.

Britain, Qatar says,perpetrated afiaud of historic proportionson Qatar. This revisionist theory

focuseson SirHughWeightman,who is saidto haveharbouredan irrational and indeed "paranoic"

loathing forthe Al-Thani - althoughthe Court might still bewaitingto hear whatWeightman,as

analleged paranoid,was afraid of.

64. By blackeningthe name of Weightman - and indeed the name of anyonewho had the

temerityto disagreewith Qatar - Qatartoday seeksa radicalsolutionto the dilemmaof its failure

in 1938-1939to present any probativeevidencebeyond thefact of proximity. Qatar thus suggests

that itwouldhaveproved its case if its evidence had notbeen suppressed,or if it had been given

adequate time, or if the PoliticalAgent had not misconducted himself. Of course, now even with

60years to prepareitself, Qatartodayhas still donenobetterthan what SheikhAbdullahdid ... 65. Like somanyconspiracy theories Qatar'sstory suggestsdesperation.

66. It is easy to launch such accusations,but difficult to demonstratethat they arejustified.

Here,it is impossible. What Qatar offers today is the fi-uitof wishful thinking. Qatar would like

the Court to believe that Bahrain'sovenvhelming evidence of its sovereignty over the Hawar

Islandswas pervasivelycontarninated, andthat Qatarhad good evidencethat was suppressed. But

whatwas that evidence? The Courtis today in apositionto seethat therewas nothingtosuppress.

67. To suit its ends, Qatar has invented a history based on inferences and innuendo. The

materialsand argumentspresentedby Qatar fa11very far short of proving Qatar'sthesis. First, the

attacks on Weightmanand his colleagues fail becausethey are based on implausible speculation.

Second,for the conspiracytheory to succeed,Qatarmust showthat many senior British officiais,

and not just Weightman, were part of the scheme. The Qatari allegations are audacious,

contumacious, irresponsible,andtotally unfounded.

68. In its Memorials,Qatar sought to conveythe impressionthat Bahrain was hardly even

awareof the HawarIslands until the 1930~~when SheikhHamadof Bahrain encouragedBelgrave

to fabricatea baselessclaim.

69. Fortunately,Bahrain was able to locatethebook by Mr. ThomasWard. The map in that

book which was submitted to the Courton 1 March 2000~~shows conclusively the futility of

Qatar'sspeculations. Contraryto Mr. Bundy's assertionsthat Bahrainhas no maps that contradict

Qatar'sposition, again- like the Izzetmap - here is one drawnup by people who were actually

living and working in the region. It shows that theHawar Islands were considered to be part of

Bahrainlong before Belgraveeverputhis foot in Bahrain.

70. In thefrst round, Qatar showedthe Courtmaps whichhad beendrawnup unilaterallyby

MajorHolmes, but Qatar avoided any mentionof the "Ward map" - the one which was actually

usedin negotiatingthe 1925Bahrain concession.

71. Naturally Bahrain pointed outthis remarkableoversight2',which completely discredited

Qatar'sargument.

72. Last week,inthe secondround, Qatar attemptedto rescuethe situationin twoways.

26~upplementaDlocumentsof Bahrain,No. 18,p. 170.

2 7 ~2000/14,p24,para.33. 73. First, counsel toQatarengagedin somespeculation. Therewas no reasonfor Holmes to

exclude the Hawar Islands from his draft of the concession agreement, he argued,if anyonehad

thought that they belonged to ~ahrain~'. Holmes would surely have liked Bahrain to be as

extensiveas possible.

74. But what counsel seemedto forget is his own earlier account of the facts - whichare

undeniable - that Holmes hadalso been Qing to get a concession from IbnSaud to cover the

entirety ofthe Qatar peninsula. This was until the Britishreached an understanding withibn Saud

in the course of afarnousmeeting with SirPercy Cox,High Comrnissionerfor Iraq, that ibn Saud

did not have dominion overQatar. But until then, it was, a priori, indifferent to Holmes who

controlled the Hawars- to use a familiar expression, Holrneswas "playing both sides of the

street".

75. Now we come to the second and far more interesting way in which counsel to Qatar

sought,in the secondround,to rescue its compromisedargument.

76. Counsel statedthat the Holmesrnap was published in 1965and that it shows the extent

of the Bahrain concession after the British decisionof 1939, which, as Qatar puts it, "wrongly

decidedthat Hawarwaspartof ~ahrain"'~.

77. This argument,1regret to say, but 1must say it, goes beyond the limits of responsible

advocacybeforethis Court.

78. Counsel said that this rnap was post-1939- "it says so," he said30. The truth isthat it

says quite the contrary. You have this rnap under tab 120of thejudges' folders. Ward indicates

that: "The reference on the rnap is to the original concession for the Neutra1 Zoneof May 17,

1924."

79. And when one looks at that referenceon the original map, one sees that it explicitly

defines: "the Area to which the- NEUTRAL ZONECONCESSION- attached heretorefers".

In otherwords,thisrnapexistedin 1924.

"CR 200011 8p.19,para.11.

2 9 ~2000118,p. 19,para.12.
3 0 ~2000118,p. 19,para.12,line 13. 80. Holmes therefore understood sometime before May 1924 that the Hawar Islands

belonged to Bahrain, and wouldbe included in theexploration licence - exploration licence-

covenng al1the dominionsofBahrain.

81. May 1remind theCourtthat thismap is not an incidentalfeature buried in the depthsof

Ward's296-pagebook. It is the first thing that appears inthe book- the frontispiece- and it

indicatesthe sceneof al1of thenegotiations in the 1920s. And in a postscript, at page 255 of the

book, Ward specifically identifiedthe map as the one used by Holrnes "in connection with his

original negotiations".

82. 1s Qatar now reduced to suggesting that Mr. Ward, a distinguished and successful

Americanoil executive,was a part of Britain's"sordidand shameful"schemes? That he, a quarter

of a century after the decision in 1939, as an old man reminiscing arnong his papers back in

NewYork, altered the map before he put together his book in 1965? For what possible motive?

Was he in some kind of collusionwith Bahrain? If so, why did he not somehow get the book to

Bahrain, instead ofleaving it tous tofindit by accidentin the late stages of this case, some mere

monthsago?

83. Finally,one noticesthe stamponthismap: "Forand on behalf of The Eastern & General

Syndicate, Limited." Thiswas, ofcourse, Major Holmes's Company. It was, of course, out of the

oilbusiness as ofthe late 1920s,when it transferredits interests toStandardOil of California.

84. Bahrain needs to Saynothing more, exceptto note with regret that whenever one of

Qatar's misrepresentationsof history is exposed, Qatar'sreaction is not to acknowledge its error,

but to present anothermisrepresentation,orofferother irresponsibleallegations.

85. Qatar has made much of the fact that two British officiais, Prior and Alban, expressed

opinionscontraryto the 1939decision. Noneof theseopinionsis the least convincing. Theywere

expressed by persons who had not examined the parties' submissions, and merely reflected

superficial impressions. Theirdisagreementwiththe 1939 decisionwas not basedon any evidence

which might havebeen overlookedby SheikhAbdullah. Neither Prior nor Albanhad ever been to

the Hawar Islands. Of course dissenting views are a healthy thing, but they do not invalidate

formai decisions. What would happen, Mr.President, if someone were to Say that the only

judgments of this Court entitledto recognitionare those issued without dissent? Moreover, thedissenters here were not even part of the relevant decision-makingbody. The more apposite

considerationis, therefore,the followingpassage fromthe Eritrea-YemenAward:

"intemal memoranda do not necessarily represent the view or policy of any
government, and may be no more than the persona1view that one civil servant felt
moved to expressto another particularcivil servant at that moment: it is not always
easyto disentanglethe personality elementsfiom whatwere, afterall, intemal,private
and confidentialmemoranda atthe timethey weremade."31

86. It is rather surprising to find Qatar still, at this eleventh hour, thinking that it can find

some comfort in the views expressed by Pnor to the effect that the 1939award was "a grave

miscarriage of justice"32. There is considerable correspondencewhich examined at the time his

contention. That subsequent correspondencewas reviewed in no less than 20 paragraphs of

Bahrain's Counter-Memorial. The Court will recall that Prior'ssuperiorsdiscreditedor dismissed

Prior's~iews~~.1shallnot go overthis old ground,exceptto recall that Prior particularly criticized

Weightman'smethodology- whichWeightman,in this correspondence,was ableto refüte - and

that theIndian Govemment'sExtemal Affairs Departmentfeltthat Pnor had allowedhimselfto be

influencedby persona1animosip.

87.But sinceQatar continuesto rely on this intemal note by Pior, it may be worthwhile to

pursuethe case ofMr.Priorjust a littlebit further.

88.When his superiorschallengedhim on his views aboutthe 1939decision,Priorasked for

the assistance of Major Alban, the recently appointed Acting Political Agent in Bahrain who

obviously had neverbeen to the Hawars either,and was under the impression that aperson could

wadeto the HawarsfromQatar.

89. In the letterwhich Sir IanSinclairshowedthe Court (preparedon the basis of anote by

Alban),Prior gaveasthe reason forhis criticismthat:

"The Hawar Islands case has been decided according to western ideas, and no
allowancehas beenmade forlocal customand sentiment. Dunng 3%years in Bahrain
1neverheardanythingto suggestthattheseislandsbelongedto ~ahrain."~~

31~ward inthe Firttage,9 Oct.1998,para.94.

32~emonalofQatarA, nn.111.212, ol. 8, p.53.
33~ounter-~emonaolfBahrain,paras.288-308.

34~ounter-~emoriaolf Bahrain,para.306.
35~etteof 26Oct.1941,Memorialof Qatar,Ann.111.2, ol. 8,p. 127. 90. Was Lt.- Col.Pnor an expert on "local custom and sentiment"? We have no reason to

believe so. We do fmd in Belgrave's diaryan entry where Belgrave describes a meeting atthe

residence of the Ruler of Bahrain where Priorwas present. "There were long pauses," writes

Belgrave, "andan occasionalremarkby Prior throughhis interpreter"36(emphasisadded).

91.Someindicationof the level of Prior's cultural sensitivityis given by Belgrave'saccount

of a meeting between Prior and an old Sheikh who asked Pnor whether it was true that

King Ibn Saud hadgiven Prior, then a 36-yearold Political Agent, a fine horse. Writes Belgrave:

"Prior replied 'yes, a horse'. Ibrahimagain repeated'afine horse'and looked profoundly shocked

when Prior saidhe would prefer a presentthat didn'teat."37

92. Prior also had a habit of writing ill-considered letters. Given Qatar's relianceon his

correspondence regardingthe Hawars, letme mentiontwo instancesin Belgrave'sdiaries. (1feel

free to read out these private reflections,because two of Qatar's counsel have alreadyused these

diaries.)

93. Veryearly duringPrior's termas PoliticalAgentin Bahrain(1929-1932),a generatorwas

installed inManama. This generator bothered Prior.We see inBelgrave'sdia$*:

"Priorwrote another tiresomeletter aboutthe smellandthe noise of the electric
machine. The Shaikh sentin to meabout it andhe evidentlywas very annoyedby the
letter... Myself 1really don't think there is much to complain of [conceming this
generator]."

94. Anda year later there is this (30 March 1932): "Abdulla bin Jabr camein from the

Shaikh." Now,allowme to remindyouthat the Shaikhis the Rulerof Bahrain, SheikhHamed,and

that Abdullahbin Jabr was andremainedfor manyyears the influentialsecretaryof the Emir. His

full name, allow me to remind you, was Abdullahbin Jabr al Dosari. He spent much of his

childhood on the Hawar ~slands~~A . nd it is his grandson who has been the Minister for Foreign

Affairs of Bahrain for nearly 30 years, and who has been with us twice during these hearings.

Now, back to Belgrave's diary:

36~ntryfor3 March1930.

378Feb.1932.
388Jan.1931.

39~emorialof Bahrain.Anns.31and 314. "Abdullahbin Jabr camein from the Shaikh and we talked about the letter
which Prior has written to him about a recent case in which the Shaikh interfered

unsuitably. [The inference is that thiswas Prior'sopinion of what was 'unsuitable'.]
The ShaikhdislikesPriorvery muchandis veryangryabout theletter."40

95. There is much more in this vein, but suffice it to Say that by 1946, when the Emir

discoversthat Prioris finally leavingtheGulf,Belgravewrites: "HisHighness intenselypleased &

relieved at hisdeparture."4'

96. Beforehe left, BelgraverecordsthatPrior's

"one & only object now seems tobe to prevent Hugh Weightmanor Hay gettingthe
job after him- he never thinks of what will be the best for the Gulf if any persona1
reasons comeinto it."42

97. Apart fiom the possible factorthatWeightmanwas a graduateof CambridgeUniversity

whereas Prior was a pure military man, a product of Sandhurst,Weightrnan's cardinalsin appears

to have been that he temporarily occupiedthe position of Acting Political Residentin 1938just

before Prior tookover.

98. Prior'swn career, however,wascut short. Ifonewonders why,it sufficesto lookup his

record, where one finds thathis problems werenot limitedto the Emir of Bahrain,or Belgrave,or

Weightman. Two years before he left the Civil Service, Prior was censured by his ultimate

supenor, Sir OlofCaroe, for:

"overgeneroususe of explosives on paper. These defects give the impression of a
certainimrnaturity ... They are importantin thathis position as Resident in the Gulf
necessarilybrings his workto the directnotice ofthe Secretaryof State and ofvarious
high authoritiesin the Middle~ast."~~

99. Pnor was warned: "HisExcellencyhas observedthat you are inclined to be too lavish

withexplosivesinyour telegrams,which oftenspoils a goodcase."

100. Prior was noted to be a "masterof the pasquinade",which seemsto be one of those

French wordsused exclusivelyby certain Englishmen. 1 am not farniliarwith it, but the dictionary

tells us apasquinadeis a way of ridiculingpeople in writing. Synonyrnsare: burlesque,travesty,

charade.

4030March1932.
4113April1946.

4218~eb. 1945.
43~auRl ich, ne InvasionsoGulfeI,,BiographicalAnnexes. 101. So here is a man taken to task for imrnaturity,hastiness in his written opinions, and

unsuitability to be dealing with seniorfficiais. Prior resigned, as 1 said, within two years, at

age 50, and went to workas a local representativeof aank. Belgravenotes hisown unease as the

suddenlyfriendlyPriorpays him a visit,gives him a "silvercigarettebox fromthe Directorsof the

Bank", andasks Belgraveto open aBahrainGovemment accountwiththem44

102.What is relevant aboutthisis that one of the objectsof Prior's intemperatewritingswas

none otherthan Weightman. In 1940,justbeforeWeightmanlefi Bahrain tobe replacedby Alban,

Prior cornmunicatedthe followingevaluationofWeightman:

"He [Weightman]was also unpopularwith thelocal British communitywhich
did not appreciate his de-haut-en-basmanner [this is Prior's French expression]...
[Weightman] recommended aworîhlesscreature as Defence Officer, whoturned out
to be not merelya drunkardbut probably a pervert as well ... 1 hope [Weightman]

will considerthe award [of Commanderof the IndianEmpire] as payment inadvance
andjustify itby continuedinterestin ~ulf affair~."~~

103. A notationin the file from a more senior officia1receiving this evaluation, identified

only as "Lu,is devastating- for Prior: "1do notproposeto waste my time inan attemptto purge

Mr.Prior of his bumptiousness. [Bumptiousmeans "conceited,"or suffisant,prétentieux.] 1 agree

thatthe victims shouldbe protected." (Ibid.)

104.As one of those "victims", Weightmanat any ratewent on to a far better career than

Prior.

105. Weightman left Bahrain in August 1940 for a promotion to the position of

Deputy Foreign Secretaryand then Joint Foreign Secretary,tothe Government ofIndia, where he

worked with Nehru, and in due course he received his knighthood. (We now see Prior's bitter

comments against Weightman as those of a resentful man whose former subordinate has

leapfroggedoverhim toassume ministerialduties.)

106.As for Mr. Alban- just a word - his was, it seems,the least distinguishedcareer of

any officia1whosenameoccurs in thiscase. Hejoined thearmy at age 18,becarneActingPolitical

Agent in Muscatat age25, and 17years laterhe was backin Muscat inthe sameposition-Acting

441OApril1950.

4S~i~hp,.234.Political Agent. In between, hehad beenActing Political Agentin four places, including Bahrain

twice. People alwaysseemedto be wantingto send him someplaceelse.

107. Perhaps ahint of an explanationis givenby Belgrave, once more, in a diary entryfor

"Albancame over & discussedelectricaffairs- behaved verystrangely down
below ...he shouted some remarks about everyonebeing anti-Englishwhich al1the
clerks heard. He arrived in my office in a very queer condition and talked about

peoples'throatbeing cut - 1tried to calm him down & eventually succeeded. Either
he is il1or slightlymental, helookedveryil1when hecameu~."~~

108. My pointis, of course, that these two dissenting voicesare not entitled to the slightest

weight.

109. 1 do not need to establish the bona fides of SirHugh Weightman, or

SirTrenchardFowle, or Sir EricCaroe, or the other various officials in the British and Indian

Governments - includingthe Marquessof Betland and LordHalifax- whomade the decisionto

recognizeBahrain'stitle to the HawarIslands,withinthe scope of their authorityas representatives

of their Government. 1 have already had the occasion to submit to the Courtthat the charges of

bias against Weightmanare nothing but speculationon the part of Qatar. 1would now onlyadd,

before leaving Belgrave'sdiaries, that there is a curt but rather eloquent entrywhich undermines

Qatar'sattacks on Weightman. The entryis on 26April 1939. This is nearly two years after

Qatar'sattack on Zubarah. The Naim reîugees are camped on the main island of Bahrain.

Weightmanis PoliticalAgent in Bahrain. Belgravenotesthat the Emir and other senior members

ofthe Al-Khalifa cameto seehim and talked about Zubarah. Hewrites: "Al1much upsetbecause

Abdulla[Al-Thani of Qatar]is saidto bebuildingat Zabara. Wrote a protest - ofno use."

110.The protest,of course,wasto Weighûnan,whoaccordingto Qatarwas biasedin favour

of Bahrain and who SirIan Sinclairsays must have forsome incomprehensible reason loathedthe

Al-Thani Sheikh. Well,why did Weightman fail to seizethe occasion to come to Bahrain'said?

Why did he not seek to mobilize supportfor a punitiveexpedition? Bahrain cannot answerthese

questions; we only know that he did not, and that his conduct in this matter was a great

disappointmentto Bahrain.

4611Jan.1941. 111. 1know 1have spoken too long of these old Stones. There is too much hearsay, too

many persona1grudges and animosities, and interpretations of bitsof old records which may be

entirely misleading. We have not found Prior'sdiary, if he kept one.We have not found the

diaries of MajorHolmes, or of Mr.Skliros, as much as we have tried. And as far as we know,

SheikhAbdullahkeptno diary.

112. So 1 have the very real sense that1 am wasting the Court's time with subjective

reflectionsabout peoplewe have nevermet, whythey might have donewhat they did years before

manyof uswere evenbom.

113. That, however, is exactly my point: the judges who in the year 2000 compose the

International Courtof Justice should notbe askedto delve into speculationsabout the actions and

motivations ofmoreor less obscureindividuals0or 70 years ago. Arewe now going to invitethe

whole world to redraw borders on the basis of speculation about colonial Powers' motivation?

Surely not. This is a matter of the most compelling cornrnon sense, and fortunately, as

ProfessorReismanwill confirm,it also coincideswiththe law.

114.May1askthereforeyou,Mr. President,to cal1on Professor Reisman atthis time.

Le PRESIDENT : Je vous remercie, Maître Paulsson. 1 now give the floor to

Professor Michael Reisman.

Mr. REISMAN:

REPLY ON RESJUDICATA

1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court. 1 had the honour of presenting

Bahrain's submissionswith respectto the 1939decision in the first round. It is apparent fromthe

amount of time that each Party has devoted to this issue that they share a conviction that it is

important and couldbe dispositive of the questionof title to the Hawars. So beg the Court's

indulgencefor arathercarefulexaminationofQatar'sfinal replyonthis matter.

The issuesin contention

2. As for the issues in contention: the 1939decisionmust have some legal characterization.

Bahrain submitted that the 1939 decision was either an arbitral award, in which case it is resjudicata, or an administrative, political decision,in which caseit is final. If it is an arbitral award,

then a preliminary questionis whetherthe specialconsentthat the Court has deemed necessary to

enable it to reopen the resjudicata of another international tribunal has,in fact, been granted. If

that special consent has not been granted, in Bahrain's submission,the Court should confirmthe

award'sfinality, based on resjudicata, and proceedno furtheron the issue of sovereignty overthe

Hawars. Only if the Court decides that special consent was granted by Bahrain, must the Court

examine the allegations of Qatar that the 1939Arbitral Award is void because of (i) absence of

consent, (ii) bias of the arbitrator, (iii) procedural improprieties, and (iv)absence of reasons.

Qatar's various allegations of bias may, however, themselvesbe inadmissible, as the Parties, 1

think, now agree that the Governmentofthe United Kingdomwas the arbitratoror decision-maker

and that allegations of bias against the United Kingdom wouldrequire the Court to pass upon the

lawfulness of the action of a government that has not consented to itsjurisdiction. If the 1939

decision is characterized as an administrative,political decision, then none of the criteria for

determining the validity of international arbitration will apply; the only question as to its

lawfulnessis whetherit was authorized,by a specificconsentorby a moregeneral authorizationin

a treaty.

3. Happily,my taskis limitedby a numberof factors. As Qatarhas electednot torespondto

a number of these points- for example,the issue of Qatar's supposedprotestappearsto havebeen

abandoned - and seemsto have concededothers - for example,the irrelevance oftheabsenceof

an oral hearing- 1needonly commenton thepoints it hasraised. Andas myfriendMr.Paulsson

has dealt with several of Qatar's allegations of procedural defectsin the first round, 1 need not

address them in detail. 1 will not comment on Our adversaries repeated, rather sarcastic

characterization of the arbiîration in terms of a "so-called arbitration". It is, we submit,

incontestable that there was an arbitral procedure,albeit a simple one, with consent, procedure,

reasons and an award. If one does not assumethat there was an arbitration,then none of Qatar's
I
objections to it are pertinent, since a political decision does not require compliance withthe

standardsof arbitration; once consentis established - and we believe there is no seriousfactual

question as to consent - Bahrain's titleto the Hawars becomesincontestableas of 1939. Qatar

cannothaveit both ways. 4. If it pleasethe Court,1tum to the matters stillin issue.

Didthe Court receivethe specialconsentnecessaryto review
theresjudicata of anotherinternationaltribunal?

5. With respect tothethreshold questionof whetherBahrain explicitlyconsentedto waive its

rights to the res judicata character of the 1939 Award, we assume from the cornments of

Professor alm mo and'the more detailed observationsof the ~~ent', that Qatar does not contest

that three successive cases, one of the Permanent court3, two of this court4, have established a

jurisprudence constanteto the effect that even the broadest general submissionto jurisdiction,

indeedone accepting thewidestjurisdiction under Article 36,paragraph2, of the Statute,doesnot,

in itself, conveythe special consent the Court hasrequiredbefore it will undertake to reopen ares

judicata of another international tribunal. So the question atissue is really reduced to one of fact:

didBahrain agree,in theDoha Minutes,to sucha specialjurisdiction?

6. Qatar has offered a variety of responses to that question. SirIan said the Court's

jurispmdence is irrelevant,because the arbitrationwas not an arbitration5. But, as 1said, if it was

not an arbitration,then al1of the arbitralobjectionsthat SirIan laboured to develop are irrelevant

and the 1939 decision is valid as a political decision. Dr. Al-Muslemani said "the British

Government agreed, in the 1960s, that its decision could be reopened in an arbitral

proceeding .. ."6. SirIan, too, was impressed by the fact that "the sole 'arbitrator',the British

Government, was prepared 35years ago to see its 1939 and 1947 decisions on Hawar and the

maritimedelimitationreferredto aprocessof independentarbitrationbetweenQatar and ~ahrain"'.

But is it for a prior arbitrator, longsincefunctus oflcio, to waive the resjudicata effect of an

award? Or is it the parties, andin particularthe party that prevailed in the arbitration, thatlone

can set asidethe resjudicata character? Considering Qatar'sunwavering insistenceon the needfor

'CR 2000117,p. 20, June20,para. 18.
'CR 2000119,p. 42, June22, para. 22.

3~ociétCommercialede Belgique1939,P.C.I.J.(SeriesA/B)No. 78,p. 160.

4~aseconcerning theArbitralAward Madeby theKing ofSpainon 23 Decemb1906,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports
1960,p. 192; caseconcemingtheArbitralAward 31July 1989I.C.J.Report1991,p. 53.
'CR 2000119,p. 14,para.4.

6~bid., .43, para. 23.
'lbid., p. 17,para. 8.its own consent to the 1939 arbitral procedure, Dr. Al-Muslemani andSir Ian are cavalierly

dismissive of a corresponding need for Bahrain'sconsent. ProfessorSalmon asserts, in a single

sentence, that the exchange of letters in 1987 and the Doha Minutes in 1990 conveyed this

jurisdiction8. Dr.Al-Muslemani asserts,also in a single sentence, that the Court has already

decidedthis issueg.

7. The question of whetherthere wasa special consentto reopen a res judicata is important

and difficult, both as a matter of fact and of internationalpolicy. It cannot be dismissedwith

"one-liners". The Court is well aware that Bahrain did not believe that the Doha Minutes

constituted a compromisat al1and, indeed,the Court gavethe Parties an opportunityto draftone,

by means ofwhichthe disputewouldthenbe submitted". When that initiativefailed and theCourt

itself established the terms of jurisdiction", Bahrain vigorously opposed it in the first phase,

contendingthatthe Doha Minuteswerenot a submission. The Court hasyetto addressthespecific

question of whetherBahrain has grantedthe special consentnecessary forreopening a res judicata

ofanother tribunal.

8. Bahrain has subrnittedthatneitherthe DohaMinutesnor thejurisdictionaljudgmentof the

Court addressed thisissue. In its pnorjudgments on thisgenenc problem, theCourt has insistedon

the most explicit and unequivocal assent to this specialjurisdiction. Anything less - and, in

particular, a new corollary of "implied"special consent - will encourageal1losers to try to move

the matter into court and even if they cannot,it will permitthem to reject, in the broader political

arena,what wouldothenvise be the unquestionable authorityand finalityof the award orjudgrnent.

In sum, the contentof the principleofres judicata will suffera legal and political erosion.

9. Whenthe Court takes up this issue,we ask it toconsiderwhetherthere is any indication,

let alone anyhypotheticalreason,why Bahrain, a tiny, densely populatedcountry,that prevailedin

the 1939 Award,would have sirnply put aside the resjudicata that ensures its tenure in virtually

one-third of itsterritory. Bahraincertainlydid not expresslywaiveits rightsunder the res judicata.

'CR 2000117,p. 20, para. 18
'CR 2000119,p.43, para. 23.

''case concerningMaritimeDelimitationand TerritorialQuestions BetweenQatar and Bahrain, Jurisdiction
andAdmissibility,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports94,p. 125,para. 38.
"case concemingMaritimeDelimitationandTerritorialQuestionsbetween QatarandBahrain,Jurisdiction and
Admissibility,Judgment,C.J.Report1995.1s it reasonable to assume that Bahrain impliedly waived its confirmed title to one-third of its

temtory- assuming, of course, that the law allows an implied waiver here? We make three

submissions. First, that Bahrain never gave the special consent necessary to reopen the res

judicata. Second, that international ordre public is served if the degree of explicitness of this

special consent requirement is kept as high as it has been. And third, that inthe absenceof sucha

special consent here, the Court should, consistentwith its own jurisprudence, confine itself to

declaring the finaliiy of the 1939 Award, which had confirmed Bahraini sovereignty over the

Hawars.

Did Qatarconsenttothe 1939procedure?

10.The Parties arein total agreementthat consent isa prerequisite for a valid international

arbitration. International law allows consentto be expressedin many forms, explicit as well as

implicit. And indeed,Mr. Ian Sinclair,as he then was, in a Foreign Officeminute of 9 May 1962,

dealing with the BahraidQatar dispute, said, "the only real legal basis for Our [the British

Government] making'awards'oftemtory in the PersianGulfwas the impliedconsent of the Rulers

in questiontoour doingso ...1112

11. Mr.President, Membersof the Court. Sincecounsel for Qatarseem to be having some

difficulty understandingour submission here, may 1put onthe screen, once again, the pertinent

sections of thetwo letters sent by the Ruler of Qataron 10May 1938and 27 May 1938, inwhich

he expressly stated his consent- black on white- to the arbitration. The letters are in your

folders (tab 121)so 1willnot read themto the Court again. Yet, in the faceof these letters, Sir Ian

on 22 June concludedQatar'spositionon this point, by saying,"Qatar entirely deniesthe Bahraini

assertion that, by virtue of his letters of 10and 27 May 1938, the Ruler of Qatar indirectly

consentedto a process ofarbitrationwith the British Governmentas solearbitrat~r."'~

12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights

instructs us that each person is entitled to hisor her opinion,but they arenot entitled to their own

I2~inutedated 9 May 1962by Sincl(F.O371/162824),Memonal of Qatar,Ann.IV.240, Vol. 11,p. 385.
"CR 2000/19,p. 20,para. 15.facts. And the factsare that the Ruler of Qatarnot only expresslyand in writing consentedto the

1939arbitrationprocedure,but that he initiatedtheprocess. Therewas nothing indirectaboutit!
i
13. The Court will recall that Sir Ian earlierhad acknowledged thatthese letters may have

constitutedconsent, butnot to arbitrationI4.But of course the invocationof the words "justiceand

equity"as the criteriaof decision disproves that,so Qatar'sdubious argumenthas apparentlybeen

abandonedin favourof a new one: the need for "informedcon~ent"'~.Accordingto SirIan, on

22June, the Ruler ofQatar may have consented,but would not have consentedif he had known,

first,that Bahrainhad claimed the Hawarsin connection with negotiations for an oil concession,

and, second, that in 1936, the BritishGovernmenthad statedthat it "appearsto them that Hawar

belongs to the Sheikhof Bahrain, and that the burden of disprovingthis claim would lie on any

other potentialc~airnant"'~.Pace Sir Ian, if the Ruler of Qatar had only known these things, he

wouldnot have consented.

14. Mr. President, Membersof the Court, are we now to believe that the Ruler of Qatar,

busily mng to signoil concessions foras much territory as he could, did not know that he could

not sign concessions for the Hawars? Are we to believe that he did not knowthat Bahrain,with

British approval, was giving concessions over the Hawars, an island group we are told by our

friends he thought was his? Are we now to believe that he did not know that his own

concessionairewasnegotiatingwith Bahrain over rights to workin the Hawarsbecause the Ruler

of Qatarcould not grantthem? Are we nowto believe thattheRulerdid not know thatBritainwas

reviewing al1of his- and Bahrain's - concession negotiationsand approving or disapproving

them? Are we nowto believethat he did not knowof the intenseactivity - over severalyears -

onthe Hawars, hischerished islands,at only 80miles fromDoha? Sir Ian may have forgottenthat

twoweeks ago, he himself quotedthe Ruler'sletterin 1939in whichthe Ruler stated that he knew

of the activities on Hawar prior to February 1938 and that he complained of them". Despite

SirIan'sprior statementand the evidencecarefullymarshalledby Mr. Shankardassof a veryastute

.

I4CR200017, p.47,para.6.
"CR 2000119,p.20,para.15. Italicsinoriginal.

I6hfemonalofQatar,Ann.11110,Vol. 7,p. 47,quotedin CR2000/19,p. 20,para.15.
"CR2000/8 at p.46, para.23, quoting the Rulerof Qatar'sletterof 4 Aug. 1939 inMemorialof Qatar,
Ann.111.1.and informed political leader, Sir Ian would now haveus believe that the Ruler was a most

uninformedman, indeed, utterly,totally ignorantof everythingabouthim. Everything.

15.Mr. President, Membersof the Court, these arguments strain credulity to the point of

being frivolous. If there is onething that is clearbeyondperadventureor doubt, it is that the Ruler

of Qatar solicited the 1938-1939 arbitration, expressly and "directly" consented to it and

participatedin it and that both Rulers understood the conceptand essentials of arbitration. These

are facts,notmatters of opinion.

The allegationsof bias againstthe UnitedKingdom

16. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Bahrain has submitted that allegations of bias

againstthe United Kingdomare inadmissible,because they would require the Court to adjudicate

the lawfulnessof the behaviour ofa Statethat has not acceptedthe Court'sjurisdiction. In the past

four weeks, Qatar has not contested this point of law but has tried to evade the inevitable

jurisdictional impediment to its argumentby adjusting the facts. The Court has witnessed a

continuingrefocusing of allegations. Initially in the Memorial,they were specifically againstthe

United ~in~dorn'l*t,hey refocusedto "only" individualsin the ~e~l~'~t,o individuals engagedin a

"sordid .. .and sharneful"tale2'in Sir Ian'sfirst oral argument,and to "a very limitednumber of

British officials in the Gulf and in London [who] acted with less than full impartiality and

objectivityin setting up and participatingin the procedures applied between1936and 1939 ..."21

in SirIan'ssecond-phase argument. They were finally reformulated as individuals who are no

longer conspiratorsin a shameful and sordid tale, but guilty only of being "economical withthe

tnith", or, atad more generously,"beingengagedin an exerciseof self-de~e~tion"~~.

17.1will spare the Courtmore of Qatar's spiralof escalating euphemisms. Mr.President,

Membersof the Court, govenunents can onlyoperatethrough theirofficials. The actions oftheir

officialsarethe actionsof the govemrnent. The1938-1939arbitration wasnot a "rogue operation".

"~ernorial of Qatar,para. 6.251.

'keply of Qatar,para.4.295.
''CR200017,p. 45,para.3.

"CR 2000119,p. 17para.9.
22~bi at.,13,para.2.It was an action of the British Government, effected, as must be every governmental action,

through its authorized officials. The action was reviewed and approved at higher levels of

govemment in London, as Sir Ian himself acknowledgesZ3. Qatar's allegationsof bias are

necessarilyallegationsabout the lawhlness of official actionby the United Kingdomand they are

not admissible.

18.My friendMr.Paulssonhas show howfancihl, infact,areal1the "conspiracytheories",

so there is no need to view them again, but 1must observe the absurdity of one of the allegations

that was repackaged by Qatar on 22 June. 1refer to the allegedprejudice and bias caused by the

Bntish responseto PCL'srequestin 1936regardingthe HawarIslands. Happily,fourweeks of oral

argumenthave clarifieda numberof issues. Qatar no longercontendsthat the Bntish response in

1936was an arbitration. Sothe contentionthatthe parties didnotparticipateis notrelevant. There

were no parties in 1936. Qatar also now appears to agree that the British response, by its own

terms, was provisional and,upon Qatar's forma1request, the entire issue was reconsideredin the

procedurein 193 8-1939. Bahrainwould have thought thatthis was the end of this rather artificial

contention. But the argument has now been recycled. Now, says Sir Ian, "that 'provisional

decision'obviouslycreated anexpectationamongBntish officialsdealing with thismatter that the

eventualfinal decisionwouldbe in Bahrain'sfa~our"~~.

19.If one readsthe memorandumof law and fact of April 1939on whichthe British award

was based,one findsno evidenceof prejudgment; the memorandumis entirelystraightforward,an

examinationof the factsand the law. Indeed,how could it be otherwise? The law was clear and

Qatar produced no evidence. So, is Qatar'sargument in effect that provisional administrative

decisions that precede final legal decisions by their nature invalidate the final legal decision,

because the provisional ones "create an expectation" in favourof the beneficiary? Do interim

measuresof this greatCourt, especially interimmeasures sua sponte,indicate a biason the part of

the Court and invalidate a final decision, if that final decision happens to confirm the interim
t
measures?

231bid.,. 16,para.6.
2 4 ~2000/19,p. 18,para.13. 20. The wheels of justice grind fine, but often slow, and life, more and more, just cannot

wait. Thetechniqueof provisionaldecisions iswidelyused in al1developedsystemsand performs

an indispensablefunction. Bahrain submits that the provisional administrativeresponse of 1936

was exactly what it called itself: "provisional". As such, it was reasonable in terms of the

circumstances, cogentin terms of the evidence available and, as is clear from the April 1939

memorandurn,playedno prejudicialrole in the subsequentarbitration.

Mr. President, if 1 may ask, 1would need about 15minutes to conclude and, if the Court

wouldindulge me, 1could concludethis presentationby about, 1believe, 1.10p.m. In any case, 1

shouldSaythat Bahrain will in no circumstanceuse al1of its time on Thursday,so an indulgence

nowwould notcreateaprocedural disequilibriurn.

Le PRESIDENT :Si le temps que vous prenez en plus aujourd'huiest compenséun autre

jour, vouspouvezterminer,ProfesseurReisman.

Mr. REISMAN:

1sthereanybasisto the aiiegedabsenceof reasons?

21. On the matter of the alleged absence of reasons, once again happily, four weeks of

pleadinghave considerablynarrowedthe issues. From our study of the compte renduand what

Qatar said- and not said- Bahrain takes it that both Parties now agree, first, that the

1939decisionwas, indeed,supported byreasons, clearlyexpressedin the memorandurnof lawand

fact, but that, second, only the dispositiJ without the reasons, was notified to the parties on

11July 1939. In the second round, Mr. Shankardass and Sir Ian challenged the validity and

accuracy of the reasons, and SirIan argued that Britain'sfailure to transmit the reasons to the

partiesinvalidatedthe Award.

22. Bahrain submitsthat it is impermissible to challenge an arbitralaward on the grounds

that the reasons are not correct and submits that the Court's holdings in King of Spain and

Guinea-Bissau v. senegaPs- to the effect thatreviewis not appeal-are dispositiveofthis issue.

But even if, in spite of the absence of Bahraini special consent, the Court were to decide that it

2S~aseconcemingtheArbitralAwardMade by theKingofSpainon23 December 1906,Judgmen,.C.J.Reports
1960,. 192;case concemingtheArbitral Awardof 31 July1989,Judgment,I.C.J.Reports 1991,p. 53.could review the award,it could not, we submit,consistent with its ownjurisprudence, admit an

appealon the correctness ofthereasonsoftheaward.

23. As for the substance of Qatar'scriticismof the reasons,they denve from CaptainPrior's

letter of 1941. My friend, Mr.Paulsson, has raised a nurnber of questions about the general

credibilityofthis particular witness.

24. That aside,whatis the criticismPriormakes? "TheHawarIslandscase hasbeen decided

according to western ideas, and no allowance has been made for localcustom and ~entiment."~~

"Westernideas",internationallaw. Andwhatwas wrong with that? After all, Qatarhas spenttwo

weeks of the past four weeks contendingthatit had been a Statesincethe middle of the nineteenth

century. Sowhatlawis to be appliedto a Stateifnot internationallaw?

25. Because both Parties now acknowledge that there were reasons supporting the

1939Award, Sir Ian'sprincipal objectionhereis to the fact that the reasons werenottransmitted to

either of the parties, andthis is correct. In mypresentation tothe Courton 9 June,1reviewed the

practice of public international arbitrationsin which governments actedas sole arbitrator and 1

showed that, for thisgenre of arbitration,the transmission of elaboratereasons, such as those that

would have been preparedby a body of jurists, was neither expectednor demanded2'. Indeed, the

boundary case between Bolivia and Peru of 1909 produced an award by the President of the

Republic of Argentins of one half of a page. Nor was this particular practice unknown to the

region that is subject to this case: QatarPetroleumCompanyv. Qatarin an Award of 1950"is

limited", as the note in the International Law Reports puts it, "to a bare decision without any

indication of the reasoningon which it is basedUz8.Qatar has not responded to any of this and, 1

might add, has carefully avoidedal1mention of the Halul Islanddecision of 1962between Qatar

and Abu Dhabi, by which Bntain awardedHalul Island to Qatar. In that proceeding as well, al1

that was sent to the parties was the dispositg 38 years later, the parties are yet to receive the

reasons. Qatar, which won that case, has never, to our knowledge, protested that decision or

claimedits validity,becauseits reasonswerenottransmittedto the parties.

26~emonalof Qatar,Ann.111.22, ol. 8,p. 127atp. 129.

"CR2000112,p.56,para.38.
28~e&oleuDevelopment(Qatar)LM. vRulerofQatar,Award,April1950,18ILR ,. 161,at 164. 26. Sir Ian entirely ignores these practices of the period and region,but states, for the first

time, that"[tlhejustification for the rule that arbitralawardsmust be reasonedis to ensurethat the

losingpartyis made aware ofthe groundson which the decision hasbeental~en"'~.Withrespect, 1

disagree. The function ofthe reasons requirementis to enforce the disciplineand non-arbitrariness

in the decision-maker seised of the case. And Bahrain submits that a reading of the award's

memorandum of law and fact and the evidence of its review by higher levels in London will

establishbeyond doubtthat this functionwas fullyserved.

27. Bahrain submits that Qatar's objections to theaward on thebasis of allegedlymistaken

reasonsare both wrong and inadmissibleand its claimto annul on thebasis of the non-transmittal

ofthe reasonsto the partiesis groundless.

The alleged procedural violations

28.BecauseMr.Paulssonthoroughly reviewedQatar's allegationsop froceduralviolationsin

the first round, 1 will lirnit myself to very few remarks. Sir HughWeightman, who was not a

lawyer, conducted the arbitration under the oversight of the Foreign Office. When he took a

procedural misstep, it was brought to his attentionby theoversight mechanismand he corrected it,

just as a hypothetical failure of an official, Say,of the Regisûy of this great Court to transmit a

documentwouldbe notedby a superior andpromptlycorrected. Sowhena mistake wasmade and

a documentwas not initially transmitted to the other side, Qatar statesthat it was "deliberately"

withheld3'. But there is no evidence in the record to support this attribution of intentional

malfeasance.

29. SirIan would havethe Court impeachthe award also becauseSir Hugh took account,in

addition to the submissions of the parties, of three other matters. First, statements in Lorimer's

Gazetteer,which at that time was a confidentialdocument; second, agency archives dating from

1909; and third, his own knowledge derivedfrom two brief trips to Hawar in 1938 and 193g3'.

But this was perforce the nature of a procedure in which a govemment acted as arbitrator. A

British officia1 in this sort of arbitration could hardly ignore the collective memory of his

2 9 2000, p. 22,para. 18.

3 0 2000/19,p. 24,para. 21.
3'~bi p.2,,para. 23.govenunent,norwould he, asarbitratorchosenby the RulerofQatar, have beenexpectedto. Most

important, and 1emphasizethis, none of these actions by SirHugh was prejudicial for or against

the interestsof either Bahrainor Qatar. 1

30. In this respect 1agree withSirIan that whatis importantin the evaluationof the faimess

of the procedureis what he calls the"principleof equality ofrm~"~~ b,ut Bahrainsubmits thatany

objective reading of the record shows that that equality was in no way disturbed. Each party

presented its evidence and was aware of the other party'sevidence; Qatar was given a further

opportunityto add to its evidence,but did (or could)not. In the context, there wereno procedural

violations nor, for thatatter, any procedural events that wouldhave warrantedsetting aside the

award.

1sDubai/Sharjahrelevanttothis case?

31.Finally, Mr. President,and parenthetically,1mustrespond to Qatar'sbrief referencesin

its ultirnate Reply to the 1981 Dubai/SharjahAward, a case which is, incidentally, discussed

thoroughly in our written submi~sions~~. In Dubai/Sharjah,a majority held that a senes of

decisions taken in 1956 and 1957 by Tripp, then the Political Agent there, in response to the

respective Rulers'requests for arbitration, did not constitute arbitral a~ards~~,on two grounds:

first, "the lack of opportunity for the Parties to present their arguments andthe absence of

reasoning for thede ci si on^ W"i^h.respect to the needfor an opportunityto present arguments,

theDubai/SharjahTribunalfoundthatrepresentativesof Dubainever spoketo the functionarywho

was gathering e~idence~~.

32. Now neither of thesegrounds apply tothe 1939Award. The Awardis fully reasoned, a

point on which the Parties no longer seem to disagree, and the Ruler of Qatar himself had two

opportunities to address the arbitrator. On the other hand, two other findings mayhave some

pertinence forour case: first,the Tribunal found consent, for,as it said, "the Court is of the view

321bid,. 24,para. 21.

33~eeReplyofBahrain,pp. 59-61,paras. 101-110.
34~ubai-~harjahBorder Arbitration,A19October1981,ILR, Vol.91 (1993),p. 543at 577.

351bid.
36~bid.a,t576.that international law does not require herean excessive formalism. It is not the form but the

realityof consent whichis important."37Second, the Tribunal rejectedthe contention thatTripp,as

PoliticalAgent, lacked independence3'.

33. Despite the fact that Dubai/Sharjah could be cited in favour of Bahrain'sposition,

Bahrain has been reluctant to rely upon it, among other reasons,due to what one may cal1its

"anachronism". Because the proceduresunder review in thatcase had taken place in 1956and

1957,by which time,to quote that Tribunal, "the modem conceptof arbitration became quickly

understood in the area of the ~ulf'~~,the majority applied as its standard the International Law

Commission's "ModelRules of International Arbitration"of 1958. Our arbitration tookplace in

1938-1939, some two decades earlier, a period in which the "Model Rules", indeed, the

InternationalLaw Commissionitself,had noteven been conceived. Most important, as 1 said on

9June,

"the idiosyncratic proceduresofpublicinternational arbitrationwere not yetpart of the

regional legal culture nor familiarto the Rulersof Qatar and Bahrain. It might well
have been unfairto have imposedthem."40

Hence, as 1saidthen, the 1939procedure was"[a] simplearbitration,given that neither ruler was

greatly familiar with international procedure. But an arbitration nonetheless, with al1 the

requisites."41

Conclusion

34. Mr. President, Membersof the Court. Foral1of the abovereasons, Bahrainsubmitsthat

the Court should confirm the res judicata of the 1939Award, which held that Bahrain has

sovereignty over the Hawars. More generally, Bahrain respectfully suggests that the Court

appreciate that Qatar's claim here puts the very principle of res judicata into jeopardy. Its

importance cannot be overstated for a region in which there are many boundary and temtorial

settlements, some fiom colonial arbitrationsand impositions,that still arouse anger and passion.

371bid,t576.
3s~bid.

3g~bidat575.

4 0 ~2000112,p.55,para.34.
4'~bidatp. 45para.6.Qatar itself should be aware of the importanceof res judicata, for the tenure it enjoys in Halul

Island is based on theaward of that name. It is no exaggerationto Saythat the principle of res
O
judicata is an indispensable stmt upon which the political boundary structure of a sometimes

precarious regionalorderrests. %

35. Mr. President, Membersofthe Court,thankyou foryour attention.

36. Mr. President,1appreciate theindulgence in permittingme to complete. May 1ask that

tomorrow, if it pleasesthe Court,Sir Elihu beinvitedto addressit. Thankyou.

The PRESIDENT: Thankyou very much Professor Reisman. La séance de laCour est

levéeet la Course réuniraà nouveau demain matin à 10heures.

L'audienceest levéeà 13h 10.

Document Long Title

Public sitting held on Tuesday 27 June 2000, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Guillaume presiding

Links