97/14
International Court Cour internationale
of Justice de Justice
THE HAGUE LA HAYE
YEAR 1997
Public sitting
held on Monday 14 April 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
President Schwebel presiding
in the case concerning Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia)
_______________
VERBATIM RECORD
_______________
ANNEE 1997
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 14 avril 1997, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Schwebel, Président
en l'affaire relative au Projet Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros
(Hongrie/Slovaquie)
____________
COMPTE RENDU
____________ -2-
Present: Presidhentbel
Vice-PWeeeramantry
Oda Judges
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Parra-Aranguren
Kooijmans
Rezek
Judge ad hoc Skubiszewski
ValRegiastrarina -3-
Présents : M. Schwebel, Président
WeerVice-Pryésident
Oda MM.
Bedjaoui
Guillaume
Ranjeva
Herczegh
Shi
Fleischhauer
Koroma
Vereshchetin
Parra-Aranguren,
Kooijmans
jugeszek,
Skubijugewski, ad hoc
ValenMciGresffier, -4-
The Republic of Hungary is represented by:
H.E. Mr. György Szénási, Ambassador, Head of the International Law
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Agent and Counsel;
H.E. Mr. Dénes Tomaj, Ambassador of the Republic of Hungary to the
Netherlands,
as-Agent;
Mr. James Crawford, Whewell Professor of International Law,
University of Cambridge,
Mr. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Professor at the University Panthéon-Assas
(Paris II) and Director of the Institut des hautes études
internationales of Paris,
Mr. Alexandre Kiss, Director of Research, Centre National de la
recherche Scientifique (ret.),
Mr. László Valki, Professor of International Law, Eötvös Lorand
University, Budapest,
Mr. Boldizsár Nagy, Associate Professor of International Law,
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Reader in International Law, University of
London, School of Oriental and African Studies, and Global
Professor of Law, New York University,
Ms Katherine Gorove, consulting Attorney,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Dr. Howard Wheater, Professor of Hydrology, Imperial College,
London,
Dr. Gábor Vida, Professor of Biology, Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest, Member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
Dr. Roland Carbiener, Professor emeritus of the University of
Strasbourg,
Dr. Klaus Kern, consulting Engineer, Karlsruhe,
asvocates;
Mr. Edward Helgeson,
Mr. Stuart Oldham,
Mr. Péter Molnár,
asvisers; -5-
La République de Hongrie est représentée par :
S. Exc. M. György Szénási, ambassadeur, directeur du département du
droit international au ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme agent et conseil;
S. Exc. M. Dénes Tomaj, ambassadeur de la République de Hongrie aux
Pays-Bas,
commeagent ;
M. James R. Crawford, professeur de droit international, titulaire
de la chaire Whewell à l'Université de Cambridge,
M. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, professeur à l'Université Panthéon-Assas
(Paris II) et directeur de l'Institut des hautes études
internationales de Paris,
M. Alexandre Kiss, directeur de recherches au Centre national de la
recherche scientifique (en retraite),
M. Lászlo Valki, professeur de droit international à l'Université
Eötvös Lorand de Budapest,
M. Boldizsár Nagy, professeur associé de droit international à
l'Université Eötvös Lorand de Budapest,
M. Philippe Sands, chargé de cours en droit international à
l'Université de Londres, School of Oriental and African Studies,
et Global Professor of Law à l'Université de New York,
Mme Katherine Gorove, juriste-conseil,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Howard Wheater, professeur d'hydrologie à l'Imperial College de
Londres,
M. Gábor Vida, professeur de biologie à l'Université Eötvös Lorand
de Budapest, membre de l'Académie des sciences de Hongrie,
M. Roland Carbiener, professeur émérite de l'Université de
Strasbourg,
M. Klaus Kern, ingénieur-conseil à Karlsruhe,
comameocats ;
M. Edward Helgeson,
M. Stuart Oldham,
M. Péter Molnár,
commenseillers ; -6-
Dr. György Kovács,
Mr. Timothy Walsh,
Mr. Zoltán Kovács,
as Technical Advisers;
Dr. Attila Nyikos,
assistant;
Mr. Axel Gosseries, LL.M.,
asanslator;
Ms Éva Kocsis,
Ms Katinka Tompa,
ascretaries.
The Slovak Republic is represented by:
H.E. Dr. Peter Tomka, Ambassador, Legal Adviser of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs,
asent;
Dr. Václav Mikulka, Member of the International Law Commission,
as Co-Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., Emeritus Whewell
Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge,
Former Member of the International Law Commission,
asunsel;
Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Professor of International Law at the
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento,
United States of America, Former Member of the International Law
Commission,
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris X — Nanterre
and at the Institute of Political Studies, Paris, Member of the
International Law Commission,
Mr. W. Walter D. Sohier, Member of the Bar of the State of New York
and of the District of Colombia,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., Barrister, Member of the Bar of
England and Wales, -7-
M. György Kovács,
M. Timothy Walsh,
M. Zoltán Kovács,
comme conseillers techniques;
M. Attila Nyikos,
commesistant ;
M. Axel Gosseries, LL.M.,
commeaducteur;
Mme Éva Kocsis,
Mme Katinka Tompa,
commecrétaires .
La République slovaque est representée par :
S. Exc. M. Peter Tomka, ambassadeur, conseiller juridique du
ministère des affaires étrangères,
commeent ;
M. Václav Mikulka, membre de la Commission du droit international,
comme coagent, conseil et avocat;
M. Derek W. Bowett, C.B.E., Q.C., F.B.A., professeur émérite, ancien
titulaire de la chaire Whewell à l'Université de Cambridge, ancien
membre de la Commission du droit international,
commenseil ;
M. Stephen C. McCaffrey, professeur de droit international à la
faculté de droit McGeorge de l'Université du Pacifique, Sacramento
(Etats-Unis d'Amérique), ancien membre de la Commission du droit
international,
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l'Université de Paris X-Nanterre et à
l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris, membre de la Commission du
M. Walter D. Sohier, membre des barreaux de l'Etat de New York et du
district de Columbia,
Sir Arthur Watts, K.C.M.G., Q.C., avocat au barreau d'Angleterre et
du pays de Galles, -8-
Mr. Samuel S. Wordsworth, avocat à la Cour au barreau de Paris,
Solicitor England and Wales, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Mr. Igor Mucha, Professor of Hydrogeology and Former Head of the
Groundwater Department at the Faculty of Natural Sciences of
Comenius University in Bratislava,
Mr. Karra Venkateswara Rao, Director of Water Resources Engineering,
Department of Civil Engineering, City University, London,
Mr. Jens Christian Refsgaard, Head of Research and Development,
Danish Hydraulic Institute,
as Counsel and Experts;
Dr. Cecília Kandrá_ová, Director of Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Mr. Lud_k Krajhanzl, Attorney at Law, Vyroubal Krajhanzl Skácel and
Partners Law Firm, Prague,
Mr. Miroslav Liška, Head of the Division for Public Relations and
Expertise, Water Resources Development State Enterprise,
Bratislava,
Dr. Peter Vršanský, Minister-Counsellor, chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Embassy of the Slovak Republic, The Hague,
asunsellors;
Ms Anouche Beaudouin, allocataire de recherche at the University
of Paris X — Nanterre,
Ms Cheryl Dunn, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Ms Nikoleta Glindová, attachée, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Drahoslav Štefánek, attaché, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Legal Assistants. -9-
M. Samuel S. Wordsworth, avocat à la Cour, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Solicitor auprès de la Cour suprême d'Angleterre et du pays de
Galles,
comme conseils et avocats;
M. Igor Mucha, professeur d'hydrogéologie et ancien directeur du
département des eaux souterraines à la faculté des sciences
naturelles de l'Université Comenius de Bratislava,
M. Karra Venkateswara Rao, directeur du Génie, section des
ressources hydrologiques, département du Génie civil, Université
de la ville de Londres,
M. Jens Christian Refsgaard, directeur de la recherche et du
développement à l'Institut danois d'hydraulique,
comme conseils et experts;
Mme Cecília Kandrá_ová, directeur de département, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
M. Lud_k Krajhanzl, avocat, membre du cabinet Vyroubal Krajhanzl
Skácel et associés, Prague,
M. Miroslav Liška, directeur de la division des relations publiques
et de l'expertise, entreprise d'Etat pour le développement des
ressources hydrauliques, Bratislava,
M. Peter Vršanský, ministre-conseiller, chargé d'affaires a.i. à
l'ambassade de la République slovaque, La Haye,
commenseillers ;
Mlle Anouche Beaudouin, allocataire de recherche à l'Université de
Paris X-Nanterre,
Mme Cheryl Dunn, Frere Cholmeley, Paris,
Mme Nikoleta Glindová, attachée, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Drahoslav Štefánek, attaché, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme assistants juridiques.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. This morning the Slovak Republic's oral
presentation in reply begins and I call first on the distinguished Agent of Slovakia
Dr. Tomka.
M. TOMKA :
1. INTRODUCTION DE L’AGENT
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges, -11-
Permettez-moi, au moment où commencent les dernières plaidoiries orales de la
République slovaque, de vous exprimer la reconnia ssance de mon pays pour la visite que vous
avez bien voulu effectuer sur les lieux, la disponbiilité constante dont vous avez fait preuve et
l’intérêt que vous avez manifesté.
J’ai la conviction que la peine que vous avez prise n’a pas été inutile et que cette
descente sur les lieux vous aura permis d’apercevoir, plus concrètement que des plaidoiries
peuvent le faire, combien la mise en oeuvr e partielle du traité de 1977 a eu des effets
bénéfiques sur la protection contre les inondati ons, l’amélioration de la navigation et de
l’environnement et la préservation des bran ches du Danube qui, sans cela, eussent été
appelées, inexorablement à s’assécher.
Aujourd’hui, le professeur Alain Pellet reviendra brièvement sur certaines questions
relatives au droit applicable. Il sera suivi par M. Wordsworth, M. Mikulka, coagent de la
Slovaquie, et le professeur McCaffrey qui exam ineront la prétention renouvelée de la Hongrie
à s’appuyer sur la «nécessité» pour tenter de jutsifier et la suspension et l’abandon des travaux
lui incombant, et la prétendue «terminaison» du traité de 1977. Demain matin, le professeur
Mucha et M. Refsgaard examineront la situation actuelle et ses effets bénéfiques à tous les
points de vue dans une perspective scientifi que; sir Arthur Watts abordera ensuite les
questions juridiques liées à la variante C et M. Pellet répondra à l’argumentation hongroise sur
la tâche de la Cour et l’objet de son arrêt. Enfin, si vous le voulez bien, je reviendrai à cette
barre pour résumer les points essentiels de notre argumentation avant de lire les conclusions
finales de la Slovaquie.
Avant de terminer cette brève introduction, j’aimerais cependant faire une remarque,
Monsieur le Président. Inaugurant les plaidoiri es hongroises, le professeur Crawford a cru
pouvoir déduire que nous nous ralliions à la thèse de la Hongrie du fait que nous n’avions pas
répondu à certains de ses arguments (CR 97/12, p. 13). Je me permets d’attirer l’attention du
conseil de la Hongrie sur l’article 60 du Règlement de la Cour : ce n’est pas parce que nous
renoncions à notre argumentation antérieure que nous n’avons pas jugé utile de répondre à
certains arguments de la Partie hongroise mais, simplement, parce qu’il nous a semblé
superflu - et parce que c’est interdit par le Règlement - de répéter les faits et arguments déjà -12-
invoqués dans nos écritures. Nous les maintenons da ns leur intégralité; et cette remarque vaut
aussi, bien sûr, pour le round de plaidoirie qui va suivre.
Je vous remercie Monsieur le Président, et je vous prie de bien vouloir donner la
parole au professeur Pellet.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Tomka. I call on Professor Pellet.
M. PELLET : Merci, Monsieur le Président.
2. LE DROIT APPLICABLE
Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Juges,
1. Nous avons déjà longuement parlé du droit applicable et, comme l’agent de la
Slovaquie vient de le rappeler, il ne serait pas convenable de répéter ce qui a déjà été dit. J’y
suis d’autant moins enclin que nos contradict eurs ont eu la bonté d’affirmer à plusieurs
reprises (cf. CR 97/12, p. 11 etsuiv., M. Crawford, p. 62-63, M. Sands ou CR 97/13, p. 56, M.
Dupuy) que nous étions d’accord avec eux. J’ai lafaiblesse de penser qu’ils le sont avec nous.
Mais peu importe, l’essentiel serait que nous soyons d’accord. Malheureusement, je n’en suis
pas certain, ou plutôt nous sommes, apparemmend t’accord sur un certain nombre de principes
importants - je n’y reviendrai donc pas -, mais,en ce qui concerne leur application, c’est autre
chose.
Il me faut donc préciser les choses à au moins deux points de vue; en ce qui concerne :
1 ° la définition même «du traité» et ses liens avec divers autres instruments; et
2 ° la succession de la Slovaquie à ce fameux traité;
en outre, en introduction aux interventions qui vont suivre, je dirai quelques mots au sujet de
la notionjuridiquede «nécessité».
I. LA DÉFINITION DU «TRAITÉ» ET SES LIENS
AVEC DIVERS AUTRES INSTRUMENTS CONVENTIONNELS
2. Monsieur le Président, l’alinéa premier du préambule du compromis du 7 avril 1993
évoque les contestations qui ont surgi entre la Tchécoslovaquie et la Hongrie «concernant
l’application et la terminaison du traité rela tif à la construction et au fonctionnement du
système de barrage de Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros, ... et des instruments y afférents», il précise -13-
expressément que ce sont ce traité d’une part, et ces instruments y afférents d’autre part, qui
sont, dans la suite du texte, «dénommés le ‘traité’». Par ailleurs, l’article 2 du compromis
envisage l’application par la Cour «de tous autres traités qu’elle jugera applicables».
Ainsi, d’emblée, l’accent est mis sur le fait que le traité de 1977 est indissociable
d’autres instruments. Le compromis ne précise pas quels sont ces instruments, mais la chose
ne fait guère de doute : il s’agit d’une part de conventions existantes auxquelles le trais tricto
sensurenvoie, d’autre part, des accords qui sont n écessaires pour le mettre en application. Les
deux Parties se sont longuement expliquéessur ce point (cf. MS, par. 6.06-6.54, p. 224-240;
CMS, par. 2.57-2.99, p. 37-40 ou RS, par. 2.04- 2.28, p. 24-34; et MH, chap. IV, par. 4.24-
4.54, p. 121-134; CMH, par. 4.04-4.19, p. 188-194 ou RH, par. 1.14-1.21, p. 14-16) et M. Kiss
y est revenu lors de sa première interventi on, le 3 mars dernier (CR 97/2, p. 40-52). Sur le
principe donc, nous sommes d’accord : c’est bien d’un ensemble conventionnel que la Cour
est appelée à connaître. Mais les choses se gâtent lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer la consistance
et les contours exacts de ce complexe d’inst ruments juridiques, et les relations qu’ils
entretiennent les uns avec les autres. -14-
a) Définition du traité - la nature conventionnlele du plan contractuel conjoint et ses
conséquences
3. Monsieur le Président, il peut paraître surprenant, à ce stade ultime des plaidoiries, de
revenir sur la définition de l’instrument qui es t au coeur de nos débats depuis le début de
l’affaire. Mais nous croyons que c’est importantcar, en s’en tenant à une définition tronquée,
la Hongrie s’est employée à donner une vue totalement erronée, non seulement du droit
applicable mais de son contexte factuel et cela s’est traduit par l’incroyable insistance mise sur
le concept dépassé, «dinosaurien» aurait dit M. la ’gent de la Hongrie, de «projet original», qui
n’a plus aucune espèce de consistance si l’on examine la situation actuelle de bonne foi.
4. Les Parties n’ont pas de divergence sur ceque l’on pourrait considérer comme une liste
«minimale» des «instruments afférents autraité de 1977 (MH, vol.3, annexe 21, p. 241), qui
comprend l’accord sur l’assistance mutuelle signé le même jour ( ibid., annexe22, p. 293) les
protocoles qui ont modifié, en 1983, ces deux instruments (ibid., annexes 28 et 29, p. 334 et
335) et, en 1989, l’accord sur l’assistance mutuelle seulementib (id., annexe 30, p. 338). Il faut
y ajouter l’accord de 1979 su r le statut conjoint (ibid., annexe 26, p. 329) et divers instruments
postérieurs d’importance moindre, dont ceux que mentionne l’article 24, paragraphe 1, du
traité de base.
Indissociables de celui-ci, ces «instrumentsy afférents» doivent subir le même sort que
lui. Cela veut dire en particulier que la Hongrie doit être tenue pour responsable de ses
violations à leur égard, et qu’ils demeurent enprincipe en vigueur. En principe, car il y a une
exception, qui concerne le protocole de 1989, qui, à la demande de la Partie hongroise,
prévoyait l’accélération des travaux et leur achèvement en 1994. Monsieur le Président, nous
sommes en 1997 et comme même votre Haute Juri diction ne dispose pas de la machine à
remonter le temps, force est de se rendre à l’évidence : cet instrument n’est plus susceptible
d’application; la Hongrie en a rendu l’exécution impossible par la suspension des travaux lui
incombant à Nagymaros puis à Gabcíkovo en mai et en octobre 1989, engageant ainsi sa
responsabilité, si bien que les deux Partie s devront négocier de bonne foi un nouveau
calendrier pour l’achèvement des travaux.
5. Mais de tous les «instruments y afférents», le plus important est sans aucun doute celui
sur lequel nos amis hongrois ont jeté un voile de plus en plus impudique à mesure du
développement de l’affaire. Je veuxparler du plan contractuel conjoint. -15-
Dans son mémoire, la Hongrie, tout en lui déniant un caractère conventionnel, n’en
reconnaît pas moins que :
«Plutôt que du traité lui-même, c’est du plan contractuel conjoint que le projet a
tiré une grande partie de sa substance. Ainsi qu’il est stipulé dans le traité de 1977,
c’est dans le plan que devaient être réglées des questions comme les spécifications
techniques (art. 1, par. 4), les dimens ions des ouvrages, le calendrier des
opérations du projet et la responsabilité des frais d’exploitation, d’entretien et de
réparation (art. 4, par. 2, et 12, par.2), le problème crucial de la spécification de
l’équilibre hydraulique (art. 14, par. 2) etl’élaboration des moyens de protection
de la qualité des eaux (art.15, par. 1) etde la nature (art. 19).» (MH, par. 4.14, p.
116.)
Toutefois, dès son contre-mémoire, la Partiehongroise s’efforce de minimiser l’importance de
cet instrument, puisqu’elle se borne à contes ter sa nature conventionnelle (CMH, par. 4.08, p.
190). Elle insiste sur ce point dans sa réplique(cf. RH, par. 1.16, p. 14).
Ce faisant, Monsieur le Président, la H ongrie trahit ses véritables préoccupations : il
s’agit pour elle d’échapper à toute responsab ilité pour la violation des obligations lui
incombant au titre du plan contractuel conjoint, dontelle avait, au début de l’affaire, reconnu
l’extrême importance. Elle en est restée à cettethèse durant ses plaidoiries orales : M. Kiss, a
concédé, lors de son intervention du 3 mars, que leplan contractuel conjoint complète le traité
et exprime l’unité du «projet intégré, unique etindivisible» prévu par le traité (CR 97/2, p. 40-
45); mais M. Nagy s’est employé à présentercet instrument comme un document sans portée
conventionnelle et de nature purement technique, et à le «diaboliser» en le décrivant comme le
reflet «of the specific role of a socialist State as investor in a transborder economic venture»
(CR 97/3, p. 20).
6. Mon bon maître Paul Reuter, dont je n’ ai pas connaissance qu’il professât des
convictions socialistes, n’était pas de cet avis lorsqu’il rappelait que les engagements
internationaux portent sur des opérations de plusen plus complexes, si bien qu’il «devient de
plus en plus difficile de conclure ces traités en une seule opération et [que] les Etats signent
des accords de principe en renvoyant les mesuresd’application à des accords ultérieurs qu’ils
s’obligent à négocier» (P. Reuter, «De l’obligation de négocier», Comunicazioni e studi, n°
14, 1975, p. 712).
C’est exactement ce dont il s’agit ici : la Tchécoslovaquie et la Hongrie ont conclu un
traité-cadre, le traité de 1977, portant sur une opération particulièrement complexe,
l’investissement conjoint, dont il n’était psaquestion de fixer d’emblée les détails,ne varietur. -16-
Les deux Parties ont donc décidé de renvoyer les mesures d’application à des accords
ultérieurs qu’elles ont pris l’engagement de négoicer au fur et à mesure des besoins, selon une
procédure souple permettant les adaptations cons tantes qu’elles savaient inévitables. Ce n’est
pas particulièrement «socialiste»; et c’est en tout cas très raisonnable.
Il ne fait pas de doute que ces accords ultéri eurs -et ils ont été très nombreux- sont
subordonnés au traité de base dont ils assurent la mise en oeuvre. Mais ceci ne les prive
nullement de leur caractère conventionnel, qui est d’autant plus certain qu’ils trouvent leur
fondement juridique non seulement dans un trait- écadre, mais dans deux, puisque dès le 6 mai
1976, les Parties avaient adopté un accord fixant la nature, la consistance et les modalités
d’adoption et de modification du plan contractuel conjoint (MS, vol. II, annexe 3, p. 25 ou
MH, vol. 3, p. 219). Fondé sur des traités, qu’il met en oeuvre et qu’il complète, celui-ci,
négocié internationalement entre des Etats,est indiscutablement un accord «conclu par écrit
entre Etats et régi par le droit international, consigné dans ... plusieurs instruments connexes»
auxquels on a donné une dénomination particulière. C’est très exactement la définition d’un
traité que donne la convention de Vienne de 1969.Pacta sunt servanda; les pactaqui forment
le plan contractuel conjoint le sont comme tout accord et ils obligent la Hongrie; leur violation
engage sa responsabilité.
7. Mais il y a plus. Et qui explique mieux encore pourquoi la Partie hongroise se montre si
soucieuse de nier la nature conventionnelle du pa ln contractuel conjoint et de ne pas y voir un
«instrument afférent» au traité de 1977.
Non sans quelque intrépidité, la Hongrie ava it, au début de la procédure, rejoint la
Slovaquie pour considérer que le traité était -dufait surtout de sa mise en oeuvre par le biais
du plan contractuel conjoint - un instrumentv éolutif, souple, adaptable (voir par exemple MH,
par. 4.13, p. 116).
Cette conviction - fondée pourtant - a faibli à mesure que le temps passait et il n’en reste
plus guère de traces dans les plaidoiries oralesa,u point que, vendredi dernier, M. l’agent de la
Hongrie en est venu à parler de «soi-disant souplesse» («so-called ‘flexibility’») (CR 97/13,
p. 83).
8. C’est que, Monsieur le Président, la Hongr ie semble s’être convaincue qu’elle faisait
fausse route : si «le traité» - c’est-à-dire l’ensemble conventionnel formé par le traité de 1977 -17-
et les instruments y afférents- est évolutif, souple et adaptable, la notion de «projet original»
apparaît, au mieux, comme un objet d’étude pour historiens en mal de thèse et ne correspond
plus à aucune réalité tangible et actuelle. Ildevient totalement artificiel d’opposer, comme la
Hongrie se plaît tant à le faire, «le projet original» à «la variante C», carle soi-disant «projet
original» n’existe tout simplement plus. Il a, à vari dire, cessé d’exister dès le jour où le traité a
commencé à être mis en oeuvre, car, dès ce moment-là, il a fallu préciser progressivement, les
contours d’un projet dont le traité ne fixe -mais fermement- que les très grandes lignes. Et
l’instrument de cette adaptation, c’est, priorita irement, le plan contractuel conjoint, que la
Hongrie a rendu inapplicable dès la première suspension des travaux en mai 1989, en évidente
contradiction avec ses obligations internationales.
La Hongrie, je viens de le rappeler (supra, n° 4 et 6) ne disait pas autre chose dans son
mémoire. Aujourd'hui, elle ne le dit plus du t out. On le comprend : entre temps, elle s’est
aperçue que, ce faisant, elle se privait de t oute possibilité de caricaturer la position de la
Slovaquie : pour cette caricature, l’artifice du «projet original» lui était indispensable.
M. l’agent de la Hongrie a cru pouvoir, vendredi dernier, accuser la Slovaquie de
vouloir ressusciter un dinosaure (CR 97/13, p. 84). Avec tout le respect dû à nos
contradicteurs, c’est la Hongrie qui joue à se faire peur ou à tenter d’ effrayer la Cour en
réinventant «Jurassic Park»; c’est elle qui a «fossilisé» le «projet original» pour les seuls
besoins de sa démonstration. C’est elle, et c'estelle seule, qui ne veutpas voir que, mis à part,
bien sûr ce qui était prévu dans le traité-cadre, le projet de1989 n’avait plus grand chose de
commun avec celui de 1977; et qu’il n’était pas figé; et qu’il ne l’est toujours pas.
9. M. Nagy évoquait, le 4 mars, les 74 amendemn ets apportés au plan contractuel conjoint
(CR 97/3, p. 22 - voir aussi CMH, par. 2.22, p. 105-106). Je lui laisse la responsabilité du
chiffre; mais il est certain que les aménagemen ts et les améliorations apportés au «projet
original» ont été nombreux et significatifs, quece soit en matière d’irrigation, de sécurité des
constructions ou de facilitation des migrations de poisson par exemple. Et, bien sûr, des
améliorations de ce type étaient toujours en c ours de discussion en 1989 lorsque la Hongrie a,
brutalement, arrêté le processus. Et pas sur de s points secondaires ou anodins : les Parties, par
exemple, débattaient, à cette époque, du meilleur moyen d’améliorer l’alimentation en eau des
branches du Danube ou du Moson; elles étudiaien t aussi un régime satisfaisant de production -18-
d’électricité de pointe, question qu'elles étaeint, d’un commun accord, convenues de laisser en
suspens et sur laquelle, comme le professeurMcCaffrey le rappellera, la Slovaquie a toujours
fait preuve d’une totale disponibilité, n’excluant nullement l’éventuelle limitation de la
production d’électricité de pointe, voire son abandon pur et simple, SI les études conjointes
des experts des deux Parties (avec, le cas échéant, l’aide de tiers) établissaient l’existence de
risques réels pour l’environnement.
Où est le «projet original», agité comme unépouvantail par la Hongrie? Ce n’est pas de
«projet original» qu’il faut parler, mais de la recherche, toujours en cours en1989, des
meilleures solutions possibles, par des discussionsouvertes et sans idées préconçues, dans le
cadre du processus mis en place par le traité de1977. Mais ce processus, la Hongrie y a mis
fin brusquement, pour s’arc-bouter sur l’idée, inexacte à tous points de vue, d’un «projet
original» qui n’existe que par la grâce de sa stra tégie judiciaire et qui l’oblige, contre toute
raison, et en contradiction avec ses premières affirmations, à nier la flexibilité du traité
de 1977 et à vider de toute substance juridique le plan contractuel conjoint. -19-
b) Les relations du traité avec les autres instruments conventionnels pertinents
10. Monsieur le Président, les instruments «afférents au traité» de1977, qui en sont partie
intégrante aux termes du compromis, plan contractuel conjoint compris, ne constituent pas les
seuls instruments pertinents au titre de la présente affaire. Sur cela aussi, les Parties sont, me
semble-t-il, d’accord (voir les références donnéessupra, n° 2). Elles ne le sont pas du tout, en
revanche, en ce qui concerne les relations qu’entretiennent ces autres instruments
conventionnels pertinents avec le traité lui-même.
Les principes applicables sont pourtant si mples et connus de tout étudiant en droit
raisonnablement doué. Ils sont universelleme nt admis comme s’appliquant en droit
international et on les exprime par des adages latins :
1 ° lex posterior priori deroga;tet
2 ° specialia generalibus derogan.t
Les règles postérieures dérogent aux règles an térieures, sous réserve qu’elles soient plus
précises; faute de quoi les normes antérieures continuent à prévaloir. Ce n’est pas très
compliqué et le goût du paradoxe que cultivent parfois nos contradicteurs ne va pas jusqu’à
mettre en doute l’existence ou la pertinence de ces principes très généraux de droit (cf. MH,
par. 10.93, p. 318, CR 97/12, p. 64, M. Sands).
11. Mais, ici encore, c’est au niveau de l’application que «rien ne va plus»...
Je ne rappelle que pour mémoire l’extrao rdinaire thèse hongroise selon laquelle vous
devriez appliquer, Messieurs les Juges, des conventions très générales dont certaines ne sont
pas en vigueur ou ne lient pas les Parties (voir MH, par.7.51, p.221-222, 7.59-7.62,
p. 225-226, par. 7.76, p. 230-231; CMH, pra.4.28-4.39, p.197-200; etc., ou CR97/2,
p. 49-50, M. Kiss, p. 95-96, M. Crawford ; CR 97/4, p. 55, M. Kern ; CR 97/5, p. 24, M. Kiss,
p. 71, M. Sands ou CR 97/12, p. 25, M. Kiss, p. 16, M. Crawford, p. 66, M. Sands, CR 97/13,
p. 80 et 82, M. Szenasi), pour ne rien dire du pojet sur l’utilisation des fleuves internationaux
à des fins autres que la navigation, qui doit être soumis à la prochaine session de l’Assemblée
générale (cf. CR 97/2, p. 49, M. Kiss, CR 97/12, p. 67, M. Sands ; CR 97/13, p. 30,
M.Dupuy), mais dans lequel j’avoue éprouver quelque difficulté à voir une convention en
vigueur liant les Parties qui se substituerait aux règles précises du traité de 1977. -20-
Je sais bien, Monsieur le Président, que la Hongrie part du postulat selon lequel ce traité
ne serait plus en vigueur. Admettons-le un inst ant: quand bien même le traité de1977 ne
serait plus en vigueur -quod non, est-il besoin de le dire ? -, ces conventions auraient-elles un
effet rétroactif ? pourraient-elles justifier rétsectivement, les dires de la Hongrie en 1989 ou
1991 ou 1992? Evidemment pas! Et s’appliqueraient-elles à la chimère que poursuit la
Hongrie d’une situation d’«avant le pêché» - jeveux dire de l’avant variante C ? Bien sûr que
non ! Elles ne pourraient s’appliquer qu’à la sitution concrète, existant aujourd’hui, et elles ne
peuvent être d’aucune utilité à la Hongrie pour établir l’illicéité des comportements passés
qu’elle impute à la Tchécoslovaquie.
12. Mais nos amis hongrois ne s’arrêtent pas ensi bon chemin. Si, nous disent-ils, le traité
de1977 n’est plus en vigueur, il faut applique r non seulement toutes ces conventions très
récentes, dont plusieurs ne relèvent pas du droit positif, mais il faut aussi ressusciter les
dispositions des traités antérieurs à1977 auxquelles celui-ci avait substitué des règles
spéciales, et d’abord la convention de 1976 entrela Hongrie et la Tchécoslovaquie concernant
la réglementation des eaux frontières (cf. CR97/2, p.43, M.Kiss, p.91-92, M.Crawford;
CR 97/3, p. 19, M. Nagy; CR 97/5, p. 14-15, M. Kiss; CR 97/6, p. 33, M. Crawford;
CR 97/12, p. 13, M. Crawford; CR 97/13, p. 80, ae gnt). Comment combiner les unes et
l’autre ?Lex posteriorou lex specialis? la Hongrie se garde de nous le dire, mais ce n’est pas
l’essentiel, même s’il ne me paraît faire aucundoute que, dans un cas de ce genre, c’est, bien
entendu, la règle spéciale qui s’applique.
Certes, la convention de1976 est applicable. Mais pas «en l’air», «dans l’abstrait»,
comme si le traité de1977 n’avait jamais exis té! Même s’il n’était plus en vigueur, ce que
j’admets un instant encore pour les besoins de la discussion, il l’a été; la Hongrie elle-même le
reconnaît pour toute la période antérieure au 25mai1992. Il a créé, dans le chef de chacune
des Parties, des droits et des obligations; il a dérogé aux règles générales du droit des cours
d’eau internationaux; il a autorisé la Tchécoslovaquie à détourner vers un canal construit sur
son territoire, l’eau du Danube et nul ne peut raisonnablement prétendre qu’il y ait eu une
quelconque atteinte à la souveraineté territoriale ou à la souveraineté sur les ressources
naturelles de l’un des Etats; c’est le genre d’arrangements auxquels tout Etat, dans l’exercice
de sa souveraineté (cf. C.P.J.I. série A n° 1, p.25, arrêt du 17août1923, affaire du Vapeur -21-
Wimbledon), peut consentir: c’est vrai de la Tchécoslovaquie qui pouvait accepter la lourde
tâche d’accueillir sur son territoire un canal et un lac de retenue couvrant une étendue
considérable; c’est vrai aussi de la Hongrie qui pouvait tout aussi bien consentir à cette
dérivation de la ressource partagée que constituent les eaux du Danube.
C’est fortes de ce consentement que laTchécoslovaquie puis la Slovaquie ont procédé à
la mise en Œuvre du traité de1977 et à ce que la Hongrie appelle maintenant le
«détournement» des eaux du Danube. Est-elle fondée à s’en plaindre? La réponse est
évidemment négative; et, indépendamment même de toutes les raisons qui plaident pour le
maintien en vigueur du traité, cette réponse négative est négative en outre pour au moins deux
motifs distincts et complémentaires :
1 ° le traité a créé des droits réels dans le chefde la Slovaquie, et je vais y revenir dans
un instant; et
2 ° par la conclusion du traité, par sa miseen Œuvre durant douze ans (ou quinze ans s’il
faut l’en croire), par son insistance à obtenir de son partenaire l’accélération des travaux, la
Hongrie a conduit la Tchécoslovaquie à consentir des efforts énormes pour réaliser le projet
commun; elle ne peut pas, en mai1989 (ou en mai1992 -les mois de mai ne valent rien à la
Hongrie), dire «pouce ! je ne joue plus ! je meretire du projet et j’exige que l’on fasse comme
si le traité de1977 (que je reconnais, au demeurant, comme parfaitement valide jusqu’à
aujourd’hui) n’avait jamais existé et j’impose d’autres règles, celles de la convention de 1976
par exemple».
Monsieur le Président, on ne peut joue r ainsi avec des engagements conventionnels
librement consentis. Et cela constitue par excellence un cas de préclusion ou, si l’on préfère le
vocabulaire de la common law, d’estoppel by conduct. Comme la Chambre de la Cour l’a
clairement expliqué dans l’affaire du Différend frontalier, terrestre insulaire et maritime :
«une déclaration qu’une partie a faite à une autre partie ou une position qu’elle a prise envers
elle et le fait que cette autre partie s’appuiesur cette déclaration ou position à son détriment»
constitue un exemple caractéristique d’une telle situation d' estoppel (arrêt du
13 septembre 1990, intervention du NicaraguaC , .I.J. Recueil 1990, p. 118). Dès lors, de toutes
manières, la Hongrie ne peut reprocher à la Tc hécoslovaquie d’avoir pris sa parole au sérieux
et d’avoir réalisé, du mieux qu’elle l’a pu, ce qui était prévu. -22-
Non seulement, ceci constitue une justification supplémentaire de la variante C, mais
encore, ceci interdit absolument à la Hongrie d’exiger l’application des traités bilatéraux
antérieurs, et d’abord de la convention sur les eaux frontières, exactement comme si rien ne
s’était passé.
13. Il y a d’ailleurs autre chose : je me demande avec étonnement et perplexité comment la
Hongrie justifie le maintien en vigueur de laconvention de 1976 sur les eaux frontières entre
elle-même et la Slovaquie alors qu’elle nie farouchement que le traité de 1977, qui doit bien
avoir la même nature puisque les deux textes seraient interchangeables et superposables, que
le traite de 1977 donc, aie jamais été en vigue ur entre les deux pays, au prétexte que la
République slovaque n’y a pas succédé... Si la Hongrie avait raison sur le traité de 1977, son
raisonnement s’appliquerait également à la convention de 1976; en invoquant celle-ci avec
tant d’insistance, la Hongrie montre qu’elle ne croit pas une minute à son argumentation
fondée sur la succession d’Etats.
Je la comprends. Cette thèse, que je me propose d’aborder tout de même, très
brièvement maintenant, en même temps que celle de la nature du traité de 1977, est vraiment
déraisonnable.
II. LA NATURE DU TRAITÉ DE 1977
ET LE FAUX PROBLÈME DE LA SUCCESSION D’ÉTATS
14. Pourquoi est-elle déraisonnable, Monsieur le Président ?
- D’abord parce que l’interprétation hongroise du compromis n’est pas raisonnable à
cet égard : il faut tout de même une bonne dose d’imagination juridique pour voir dans le
deuxième alinéa du préambule autre chose que la reconnaissance expresse par la Hongrie, du
fait que la Slovaquie a succédé à la Tchécoslovaquie comme partie au traité.
- Ensuite, je n’arrive pas à comprendre comment mon ami James Crawford peut à la
fois admettre qu’il y a «a presumption of successoin in relation to treaties outside the colonial
context» (CR 97/13, p. 53 - voir aussi CR 97/6, p. 47)et en nier la pertinence en l’espèce, au
prétexte que les Parties pourraient l’écarter : certes, il ne s’agit pas d’une présomption
irréfragable -, mais, justement, elles ne l’otas écartée... -23-
- En troisième lieu, il me semble que le savant conseil de la Hongrie a dû avoir un
moment - un assez long moment, à vrai dire...- d’inattention lorsqu’il se plaint de ce que
M. Mikulka n’a pas répondu à son argument fondé su r la position de la Cour dans l’affaire du
Plateau continental de la mer du Nord(CR 97/13, p. 52), qui consistait à affirmer que la règle
posée à l’article 34 de la convention sur la succession d’Etats en matière de traités, n’avait pu,
faute de l’écoulement d’un délai suffisant depuis la conclusion de la convention, en 1978, se
consolider en une règle coutumière (cf. CR 97 6/, p. 41-42). Or, il me semble que le coagent de
la Slovaquie, par ailleurs rapporteur spécial de la CDI sur la succession d’Etats, a consacré
près de 15 minutes, lors de son intervention du 25 mars dernier, à démontrer que la règle de
l’article 34 relevait en cas de dissolution d'Et at, seule hypothèse qui nous intéresse ici (CR
97/9, p. 10-14), non du développementprogressif mais de la codification la plus traditionnelle,
si bien que la jurisprudence de 1969 ne présenteaucune espèce de pertinence dans la présente
espèce.
15. Mais la thèse hongroise est déraisonnable aussien ce sens qu’elle fait totalement fi de
la seconde série d’arguments de la Slovaquie qui, dans ses écritures, avait clairement montré
que le traité de 1977 avait une portée éminemment territoriale et avait conféré des droits réels
(in rem) aux Parties (cf. surtout CMS, par. 2.35-2.2.56, p. 30-37), ce que M.Mikulka a à
nouveau démontré lors de sa plaidoirie du 25 ma rs (CR 97/9, p. 14-17) même si, ici encore, le
professeur Crawford, qui devait décidément avoir l’esprit ailleurs ce jour-là, ne paraît pas non
plus l’avoir entendu (cf. CR 97/13, p. 53-54).
Comme, Messieurs les Juges, je suis sûr que vous avez suivi sa démonstration avec
attention, je ne vais pas répéter ce qu’a dit M.Mikulka, ni citer à nouveau les autorités
auxquelles il s’est référé. Je me permets seulement de vous renvoyer respectueusement aux
pages 53 et 54 du CR 97/9 et de vous faire part d’une remarque qui me paraît relever de
l’évidence : que peut-il y avoir de «plus territo rial» qu’un traité qui prévoit la construction
d’un très gros ensemble d’ouvrages sur une partie , bien déterminée et localisée, des territoires
respectivement slovaque et hongrois (pour le plus grand bénéfice des deuxParties), qui établit
le régime de la navigation sur la portion du fleuve international et le canal de dérivation qu’il
concerne et qui confirme - il confirme, il ne modifie pas (cf.l’article 22, par. 1, du traité de
1977) - l’emplacement d’une frontière? Or, et c’est M.Crawford qui le dit, «the category of -24-
territorial régime» « is [souligné dans le texte du compte-rendu] relevant in the Vienna
convention and ... does [id.] have support in State practice» pour ce qui est de la succession
automatique (CR 97/13, p. 54 - voir aussi la récen te opinion individuelle de M. Weeramantry,
jointe à l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 dans l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour
la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide , n° 10, p. 9 [dact.]). Du même coup, bien
sûr, il crée des droits réels, qui, de toutes manières, survivent à son éventuelle extinction (cf.
CMS, par. 2.35 et suiv., p. 24 et suiv.). D’a illeurs, si, comme on nous l’a assez longuement
expliqué, la convention de 1976, qui présenteun caractère «objectif» nous dit-on, a créé des
droits in rem (cf. CR 97/5, p. 14, M. Kiss ou CR 97/6, p. 32-34, M. Crawford) et si les deux
traités - celui de 1977 et la convention de 1976 - «overlapped» (ibid., p. 34), au point que la
seconde s’appliquerait maintenant à la place du premier, c’est bien qu’ils ont le même
caractère : celui d’instruments «territoriaux», créant, l’un et l’autre, des droits réels.
Les conseils de la Hongrie ont redécouvert, en fin de plaidoiries, que le traité portait
sur un investissement conjoint (cf. CR 97/2p ,. 12, M. Crawford; CR 97/6, p. 46, M. Crawford,
CR 97/13, p. 10 et 14 et suiv., M. Nagy, p. 40 et 54, MC . rawford). Certes ! mais ceci n’exclut,
en aucune manière, qu’il soit « in rem»; les deux aspects se situent à des niveaux très différents
: si l’investissement avait porté sur des valeurs mobilières par exemple, il n’aurait pas eu ce
caractère; mais il porte, en l’espèce, sur l’aménagement de portions de territoiresdes deux
Parties. L’investissement estle moyende réaliser cet aménagement, qui constitue, lui, l’objet -
territorial - du traité.
16. J’ajoute - car je ne veux pas laisser le monopole de la lecture des bons auteurs au
professeur Dupuy (cf. CR 97/5, p. 39 et CR 97/ 13, p. 27) - que la neuvième édition
d’Oppenheim précise en outre, dans la pa rtie introductive aux développements sur la
succession d’Etats : «Where the contract can be said to have a local character, such as a
scheme for irrigation or for the building of locks on a river, the case for continued survival is
stronger than in the case of other contracts.» (Sir Robert Jennings and sir Arthur Watts eds.,
Oppenheim’s International Law , Longman, London, 1992, vol. I, p. 217.)
Ceci pourrait présenter une certaine importan ce, au moins aux yeux des conseils de la
Hongrie, puisque ces derniers se sont également ingéniés à ramener le traité de 1977 au rang
d’un simple contrat de construction. Mais j’avoue ne me placer sur ce terrain, sur lequel -25-
sir Arthur reviendra, que pour surplus de droit : il est clair qu’il est beaucoup plus que cela, et
qu’il s’agit bien d’un traité à portée territoriale, qui a créé des droits et des obligations réels
dans le chef des Parties. Il est clair aussi, et par voie de conséquence, que la Slovaquie y a
succédé à la Tchécoslovaquie en tant que Partie.
III. QUELQUES REMARQUES INTRODUCTIVES SUR LA CONCEPTION
HONGROISE DE LA «NÉCESSITÉ»
17. Monsieur le Président, je dois dire que c’est avec un peu d’ahurissement que j’ai
entendu, jeudi dernier, M. Sands, affirmer, a pparemment le plus sérieusement du monde,
«Hungary treated the 1977 Treaty as having fu ll legal effects right up to May 1992» (CR
97/12, p. 71). Est-ce lui reconnaître «full legal effect» que de suspendre l’exécution des
obligations de construction d’une partie essentielle de ce projet «indivisible et intégré» ? et
d’étendre cette suspension àtoutesles obligations incombant à la Hongrie en vertu du traité ?
«Full legal effect» lorsque la Hongrie décrète unilatéralement qu’elle abandonne purement et
simplement la construction de Nagymaros ? et «full legal effect» encore lorsqu’elle fait de
même à Gabcíkovo ? Non, Messieurs les Juges, il s’agit de violations pures et simples, des
«clear breaches, indeed!» plus que cela : une répudiation (illicite s’il faut le préciser) du traité.
D’ailleurs, décidément, Monsieur le Prés ident, la Hongrie l’admet bel et bien
puisqu’elle invoque, pour s’en excuser, la pl us incertaine des «circonstances excluant
l’illicéité», la très discutable excuse de nécessité, qui, comme toutes les circonstances de ce
type, implique, d’abord qu’un fait internationalement illicite a été commis, ensuite que, pour
une raison spécifiquement définie par le droit, celui-ci perd son caractère illicite (ou, plus
exactement sans doute, qu’il ne l’acquiert pas).
18. Ceci, il est vrai, n’émeut guère nos confrères hongrois : pour eux, il est clair que l’état
de nécessité n’est pas une institution juridique, c’est une situation de fait, aux contours vagues
et incertains, qui peut être utilisée à des finsindéterminées et, en tout cas, illimitées. J’en veux
pour preuve la réponse, assez étonnante tout demême, que le professeur Sands a apportée à la
remarque que j’avais cru pouvoir faire (CR 97/8, p. 46) quant à la contradiction qu’il y a à
affirmer d’une part, que seuls les motifs limitatiement énumérés par la convention de Vienne
de 1969 permettent de suspendre l’application d’un traité ou d’y mettre fin (ce qu’admettait -26-
M. Dupuy - cf. CR 97/3, p. 89-91), et,d’autre part, que - et c’est, cette fois, M. Sands qui parle
- «[t]he first ground invoked by Hungary [to terminate the Treaty is] necessity» (CR 97/5, p.
69; voir aussi CR 97/12, p. 77). Laconciliation, Messieurs les Juges, tiendrait à ceci : les faits
étant les mêmes, la justification vaudrait, indifféremment, pour les violations initiales et pour
la «terminaison» du traité; je cite à nouveau M. Sands : «The circumstances of necessity
which applied in May 1989 were all the more applicable in May 1992. ...There is no
contradiction: necessity may be invoked in resp ect of suspension of works and termination of
Treaty.» (Ibid.) J’ai presqu’envie de dire : «no comment!»
Mais, Monsieur le Président, si, assurément, un fait est un fait, il n’est pas moins vrai
qu’un concept est un concept. Et un même fait ne répond pas forcément aux exigences
juridiques distinctes découlant de concepts juridiques différents! Je le répète : la nécessité
n’est pas un fait, c’est un concept juridique , auquel certains faits peuvent correspondre;
l’impossibilité d’exécution est un autre concep t juridique, auquel il peut-être recouru à
d’autres fins, si les faits (qui peuvent êtreles mêmes ou différents) remplissent les conditions,
différentes, qui sont requises; et c’est vrai ssi du changement fondamental de circonstances;
ou encore de la force majeure.
Les conseils de la Hongrie font la mê me confusion, lorsqu’ils affirment que la
Slovaquie se fonderait, elle aussi, sur la nécesité pour justifier la variante C (cf. CR 97/13, p.
26-27 - M. Dupuy). Sir Arthur Watts y reviendra demain.
19. Je me bornerai donc, pour terminer, à trois remarques de caractère très général :
1 ° En premier lieu, il me paraît à peine nécessaire de rappeler que la nécessité n’est,
décidément, pas une cause licite d’extinction des traités.
2 ° En deuxième lieu, je relève que, pour soutenirle contraire, le professeur Crawford
affirme que «[t]here is no difficulty in recognizing that a case of necessity could last for an
indefinite period» (CR 97/13, p. 44). Dans ce cas, affirme-t-il, «il est évident («the position
must be») que le traité prend fin. Oui, peut -être, si l’on entend le mot «nécessité» comme
désignantun fait- mais à condition que ce fait réponde aux conditions juridiques imposées par
l’article 61 de la convention de Vienne pour justifier une «impossibilité d’exécution» au sens
du droit des traités. Mais, en tant que concept juridique, la nécessité n’est qu’une circonstance -27-
excluant l’illicéité, pertinente dans le cadre du droit de la responsabilité; elle peut effacer
l’illicéité; elle ne peut, en tant que telle, avoir aucun effet sur l’existence de l’instrument violé.
3 ° En troisième lieu et enfin, la Slovaqui e entend insister à nouveau sur un point,
essentiel à ses yeux : l’état de nécessité n’est pas la notion vague et floue autour de laquelle
tourne toute la thèse hongroise. Elle ne peut r, est-il besoin de le dire à nouveau, que si la
mesure en cause est « le seul moyen de sauvegarder un intérêt essentiel » de l’Etat qui
l’invoque, et à la condition de ne pas porter atteinte à un intérêt tout aussi essentiel de l’Etat
victime (article 33 du projet d’articles de la CDI sur la responsabilité des Etats).
Il s’en déduit que les choses doivent être claires, évidentes, manifestes. Je suis certain,
Messieurs de la Cour qu’en écoutant les explications si compliquées, si hypothétiques aussi,
de la Partie hongroise sur les risques prétendument encourus par elle, que l’idée d’évidence
qui imprègne le concept juridique d’état de nécessité ne vous est jamais venue à l’esprit, à
l'esprit d'aucun d'entre vous ! C’est un test qui, je crois, ne trompe pas.
Je vous remercie, Messieurs les Juges, et jevous prie, Monsieur le Président, de bien
vouloir donner la parole à MSamuel Wordsworth.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you so muc h, ProfessorPellet. I call now on
Mr. Wordsworth.
WMORr.DSWORTH:
The Factual Basis for Hungary's Claims
that a State of Necessity existed in 1989-1990
Mr. President, Members of the Court, in this presentation, I shall examine the factual
basis for Hungary's claims that a state of necessity existed in 1989 and 1990, justifying its
suspension and abandonment of Nagymaros and Gabcíkovo.
1. The Awareness of Impacts Prior to 1977
I wish to start by turning the clock back to 1977. For, during the site visit of 10 days
ago, the following question was posed on at least one occasion: "Which of the harmful
impacts of the Project - that Hungary nowivokes - were known to the Treaty parties in 1977
when they signed the G/N Project Treaty?" -28-
This is a very important question. If the Parties knew what the impacts would be in
1977, a state of necessity could not arise 12years later, in 1989, on the basis of exactly those
same impacts - and certainly not according tothe ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
on which Hungary has built its legal case (see, Draft Art.33 (2) (b) - contraMs Gorove, CR
97/12, p. 32). Again, if the Parties knew what te impacts would be in 1977, there could be no
fundamental change of circumstances at the tim e of Hungary's purported Treaty termination in
1992 - at least not on environmental grounds. The extent -and effect - of the obligations still
to be performed under the Treaty would havebeen known 15 years earlier (Art. 62 (1)(b) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
Hungary is therefore very sensitive to thisissue of what was, or was not, known in 1977.
Ms Gorove claimed: "It cannot be said that Hungary acquiesced in 1977 to the significant
risks which the Project is now known to pose. " (CR 97/12, p. 32.) "Acquiesced." That is a
strange choice of words to describe the signature and formal ratification of a treaty after a
decade or more of extensive research. For, Ms Go rove did not contest the evidentiary value of
the 1973 joint list of 364 pre-Project studies, andshe did not contest the existence of 176 pre-
1977 environment related studies listed in the 1994 Bibliography of the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences (Annotated Bibliography of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest,
1994). Ms Gorove merely focused on two studies: the 1975-1976 Bioproject and the
UNDP/WHO Report of 1976.
First , the Bioproject and the related procedural issue. Once again, Slovakia’s position
here is that the existence of the Bioproject, in its entirety, is further evidence that Project
impacts were extensively studied by Czechos lovakia prior to 1977. Once again, Hungary has
never contested the existence of the Bioproject - or, at least, not until a few days ago. Now,
Ms Gorove and my literate friend, Professor Sand,shave expressed their doubts as to whether
Slovak counsel have ever even seen the Bo iproject (CR, 97/12, pp. 29and 68). Well, seeingis
believing and here, on the table behind me, are just the closing reports of the famous
Bioproject. I hope the Court will understand why Slovakia did not see fit to annex this to its
pleadings - particularly given the fact that mot of the Bioproject has already been published. -29-
What of the more serious point? Hungary claims that it has no copy of the Bioproject
and that the 1984 Protocol, which Slovakia has subm itted as evidence to the contrary, refers to
something quite different. According to MsGo rove, this 1984 Protocol refers only to the
handing over of the "plan" of a Bioproject update, not the Bioproject itself (CR97/12, p.29).
There are three points to make here.
First, the Hungarian version of the 1984 Protocoldoes use the word "plan", but this is
not so surprising. The 1975-1976 Biopo rject was part of Czechoslovakia's so-called Territorial
Plan for the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros area, completed in 1977. A mere "plan" for the 1986
Bioproject update would clearly not have been handed over through the formal channels of the
Joint Operating Group.
Second , the Slovak version of the 1984 Protocol , which is a jointly signed original
version, uses the word "documentation", not "plan" (Meeting of Plenipotentiaries of
28-29 November 1984 and Annex 2 thereof signedby the Heads of the Joint Operating Group
on 23 November 1984-accepted into evidence by the Court on 26 February 1997 and, see,
the letter of the Slovak Agent to the Registrar dated 28 February 1997).
Third , according to Ms Gorove, those involved for the Hungarian side have confirmed
that only a plan was handed over (CR, 97/12, p. 29).It now transpires that the support for this
contention - which, no doubt, the Court took se riously-is, "oral discussions" with a
Hungarian representative involved with the Projectback at the time. "Oral discussions." That
means a conversation, a conversation which apparently took place on 9th April 1997, that is,
the day before Ms Gorove's pleading. I need hardly refer to Articles 50 and 56 of the Rules of
Court to say that these "oral discussions" are evidence of nothing—save possibly for
desperation on Hungary's part.
I turn, now, to the 1976 UNDP/WHO Report. According to MsGorove, the G/N
Project was not studied by the UNDP/WHO team of experts (CR, 97/12, p. 30). But, in the
1989 Report of the Hungarian Academy of Science,swhich Hungary continues to rely on, it is
stated quite clearly that "the most importa nt water quality problems" concerning the G/N
Project were considered in the UNDP/WHO fi nal Report (HM, Vol. 5, Ann. 7, at p. 134). -30-
With all due respect, the Hungarian Academy ofSciences is surely best placed to comment on
these sorts of issues. Ms Gorove was alsocritical of my calling the 1976 UNDP/WHO Report
"comprehensive" (CR 97/12, p. 30). But this was not an invention. I was merely quoting Dr.
Laszlo Somlyody in his 1989 study, where he refers again and again to this important joint
report (e.g. HC-M, Vol. 4, Ann. 13, at pp. 530, 541, 548, 555, 567 and 575).
This brings me to my next point. C ounsel for Hungary contends that during the
UNDP/WHO five-year programme, Hungary could nog t et data from Czechoslovakia and that
Czechoslovakia refused to take part in the joint program. This is a serious allegation which,
again, the Court will have treated seriously in assessing Hungary's presentation. So what is
the evidence for this contention? It is, once again, "oral discussions"-this time with Dr.
Laszlo Somlyody (CR 97/11, p. 31). Another conversation, who knows, by telephone? In a
meeting room? Certainly, no written record wasmade and no attempt whatsoever to comply
with the Rules of Court, and this time we do noteven have a specific date. The conversation
apparently took place some time in April 1997.
Tishis not serious. It is a sign of desperation. For, the fact is that the UNDP/WHO
Reportis an important document and itis damaging to Hungary's case. Otherwise, we may be
sure that Hungary would not have totally ignored - until last Thursday - a five-year
programme, costing five million dollars, and considering the "most important water quality
problems" of the G/N Project.
That is enough background. I wish, now, to return to the question as to which impacts
were known to the Treaty parties prior to 1977 and to look at the kindsof impact which
Hungary alleges it perceived for the first time in 1989.
Turning to Nagymaros, during the site vis it, Hungary placed a subtle but continual
emphasis on the beauty and national importance of the Danube Bend, where the Nagymaros
barrage was to be built. The construction of this barrage in 1989, the Court was given to
understand, would have despoiled this famous landscape. I need hardly point out that it was as
evident in 1977, as it is today, that the Nagymaros barrage would not be invisible. If threat
there was, it was scarcely a new threat in 1989. -31-
Similarly, Dr. Kern now claims as an adverse impact the submerging of various small
islands and areas of riverbank behind the Na gymaros barrage (CR97/12, p. 55). But this,
again, was a known and accepted Project impact: where water is impounded behind a dam,
certain areas of land will be submerged. That isself-evident now, just as it was self-evident in
1977.
What, then, of Hungary's key argument on Nagymaros-that the bank-filtered wells
supplying Budapest would suffer once the barrage was constructed, particularly due to the
dredging downstream of the barrage that the Project allegedly called for. There are several
important points to make here.
First , Hungary itself studied this issue prto 1977. This is evidenced by the 1973 joint
list of studies compiled by Czechoslovakia andHungary (SM, Vol.3, Ann.23, e.g., at p.29)
and, also, by the 1976 UNDP/WHO Report. This concluded that precisely those impacts in
terms of changing sedimentation and flow conditions that Hungary now invokes would not
occur (UNDP/WHO Report No. Hungary/71/505 - H un/PIPOO1, p. III-22). This has not been
contested. Clearly, then, the potential impacts ereconsidered.
Second , the Parties' awareness of potential iacts from dredging on the Budapest wells
is clear from the 1976 Joint Contractual Plan Agreement. Hungary, I repeat, Hungary is
obliged to carry outfurtherresearch in this respect (HM, Vol. 3, Ann. 18, at p. 226).
Third , in response to one of the questions from the Court during the site visit, it was
claimed that possible impacts to the Budapest wells only became known when the five-year
research and development programme of the Budapest Waterworks Company was completed
in 1985. Dr.Kern came back to this point during his presentation (CR 97/12, p.53). He
referred to the "comprehensive" 1985 study then completedib (id.).
But, if Hungary only became aware of impacts in 1985, why was special mention made
of the very same impacts in the1976Joint Contractual Plan Agreement (HM, Vol. 3, Ann. 18,
at p. 226)? If Hungary only became aware of impacts in 1985, why was the industrial
dredging stopped in1980because of adverse impacts to the Budapest wells (HM, p. 428)? If
the "comprehensive study" of the Budapest waterw orks did indeed express concerns as to the -32-
impacts of Nagymaros, why has Hungary never put this document into evidence? The little
we do know of this study does not suggest that the Nagymaros barrage would have had
adverse impacts (HM, App. 3, p. 428). Finally, why, if Hungary became aware of potential
adverse impacts to the Budapest wells in 1985, w hy did it formally reaffirm its commitment to
the Project in August 1985, commence construction of the Nagymaros barrage in May 1986
(HM, para. 3.56) and push for an accelerationof Project construction thereafter? Hungary's
version of events simply does not make sense.
I turn to Gabcíkovo. Was Hungary aware ofpotential impacts here in 1977? Of course
it was. Ms Gorove felt obliged to play down the findings of the 1976 UNDP/WHO Report.
But this provides ample evidence that the potentially adverse impacts on water quality in the
Gabcíkovo section of the "Original Project" were known 20 years ago o(. cit., pp. II 20-21).
The sequence of events is as follo ws: in 1976, the UNDP/WHO Report warned of
certain adverse impacts that would be caused if there was little or no discharge in the old
Danube stretch and an extreme peak operation mode. Hungary wasfully advisedof the worst
possible impacts. Then, in 1977, Hungary signed a carefully worded Treaty which left open
precisely these issues. The amount of water to bedischarged into the old Danube was left to be
decided by the experts at a later date (Art. 16.)Absolutely no mention was made in the Treaty
of any peak operation mode, extreme or otherw ise. Provisions for the protection of water
quality and the environment were included (Arts. 15 and 19). Then, by 1989, the Project had
been substantially modified - as Hungary accepts and as Professor Pellet has just demonstrated
(CR 94/4, p. 32). The risks to waterqualityhad been addressed.
What of water quantityand the decrease in the water level of the old Danube? Once
again, this impact of the Project was knownprior to 1977. The Parties were concerned about
this problem back in the 1950s (e.g. HM, Vol.4, Ann. 3; HR, Vol. 3, Ann. 36). According to
the Hungarian Reply, prior to 1977, Hungary was studying two alternative designs for
underwater weirs which would raise surface andgroundwater levels in the old Danube stretch
(HR, para. 1.142). And, as the Joint ContractualPlan Summary shows, at the time of Treaty
signature, the Parties had agreed on a means of remedying this impact. -33-
"In the event of need, bottom sills can be constructed in the old Danube bed. By
means of this solution ... such water le vels can be produced equal to the low
waters prior to the construction." (HM, Vol. 3, Ann. 24, at p. 326.)
Dr. Kern contends that "bottom sills" are notunderwater weirs (CR 97/12, at p. 50). But, the
issue of what these structures arecalled is totally irrelevant. Whatis relevant is that, in 1977,
the Treaty parties were fully aware of the problem of reduced water levels and had agreed on a
possible solution.
That, then, was the situation in 1977. The Parties were not merely fully awareof all the
issues that Hungary treats as if they were revelations in 1989, but they had also ensured
sufficient flexibility in the 1977 Treaty to enab le potential environmental impacts to be
addressed and minimized.
2. The Awareness of Impacts Prior to May 1989
I fear the Court may be tiring now even of the very word "studies". But, I would like to
consider briefly the period from 1977 up to My a 1989. Ms Gorove tried to convince the Court
that the studies carried out prior to 1989 - just like those prior to 1977 - were not
comprehensive, were not adequate, were not reliable. At the same time - and this was rather a
difficult balancing act - she gallantly tried to s how that the studies available to Hungary in
1989, although apparently not comprehensive, not adequate and not reliable, provided a
sufficient basis for Hungary's suspension and abandonment of Treaty performance.
The inherent contradiction in these two contentions is now shown on the screen. On
page 33 of the transcript of Ms Gorove's speech, the contention is made that only a "few,
occasional studies" were made, while on pages 34 and 35 the most extraordinary series of
footnotes purports to show how many studiessupported Hungary's actions in May 1989. I will
deal with these contentions one by one.
The evidence that only a few studies were made is contained in a letter of 6 April 1997
from Professor Laszlo Somlyody to His ExcellencyDr. Szenasi. This letter was in the Judge's
Folder supplied by Hungary. Extracts were even shown up on the screen by Ms Gorove. -34-
Hungary's senior counsel appears to have allowed this procedure on the grounds that
this letter was part of Hungary's written response to the PHARE Report (CR 97/12, p. 18).
Well, it is not just that the text of this letter does not say a single word about the PHARE
Report. It is not just that this is anotherident breach of the Rules of Court by Hungary. The
problem is that both this Court, and Slovakia, were presented with afait accompli. The Court
had no choice but to see this letter and, it fo llows, Slovakia had no possibility of making a
meaningful procedural objection. In terms of its evidentiary value, this letter is improperly
introduced and clearly worthless. And in terms of its content, I can only say that the 1994
Bibliography of the Hungarian Academy of Scien ces listed more than a "few" studies carried
out in the 1977-1988 period; it listed 277 studies.
I turn to Ms Gorove's footnotes, which are copied directly from Hungary's Reply (HR,
pp. 39-41). Here, seeing isnot believing.
First, there is an enormous amount of repetition in these footnotes (HR, pp. 39-41). The same
studies are repeated seven or eight times.
Second, the footnotes even contain an amount of written pleading.
Third, many of the studies relied upon in these footnotes, as I showed during my
presentation of three weeks ago, did not call into question the Project's environmental
sustainability (CR 97/8, pp. 12-15). I refer, fr example, to the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences’ papers of October 1981 and December 1983, and its Opinion of June 1985.
Fourth, the majority of the studies referred to here became redundant when the Project was
modified in the mid-1980s. Hungary admits th is. Professor Nagy specifically stated that
"as a consequence of criticism" the Project was modifiedin 1986 and remedial measures
were incorporated (CR 97/4, p. 32).
Finally, the great majority of the studies referred to have neither been published nor annexed
to Hungary's written pleadings. The closest the Court will ever get to seeing these
studies is the "summaries" contained in a specially prepared annex to Hungary's Reply
(HR, Vol. 3, Ann. 10). There is another obvious procedural problem here. A summary -35-
of a document, which is neither published norannexed, in a specially prepared exhibit,
doesnot qualify as evidence of what the document actually said.
One document notably absent from these footnotes is Hungary's 1985 Environmental
Impact Assessment. This is not referred to becau se it suffers from the "defect" of undermining
all Hungary's scientific contentions. I am criticized for calling this assessment "first rate in
terms of its substance" (CR 97/12, p. 37). But all I did was to refer to Hungary'oswn Counter-
Memorial, where its own expert review described the 1985 EIA's evaluation of G/N Project
impacts on "flora and fauna, soil, water, air, cliate, landscape, material assets" as "generally
well performed, no important tasks left incomplete" (H-CM, Vol. 4, Ann. 23, at pp. 903 and
907).
It is also claimed that the 1985 EIA wasonly 67 pages long and the impression is given
that this was a lightweight piece of work (CR 971 /2, p. 36). This is misleading. In fact, as part
of this EIA, some 33 new research studieswere completed by Hungary (HM, Vol. 5, Ann. 4,
p. 16). This fact is not contested.
Ms Gorove does, nonetheless, contend that Hungary's 1985 EIA suffered from "major
constraints" in terms of gathering data (CR 97/12, p. 36); but she cites in support a 1992
Czechoslovak report to UNCED, which does not refer to the Project area at all and which,
unsurprisingly, does not discuss data gathering inHungary either; she cites in support the fact
that at this time some 30 organizations worked on Project research in Czechoslovakia. How
this can be evidence ofHungary'sproblems with data gathering, I simply do not know (ibid.).
I wish to address five final points on this pre-May 1989 period.
First , it is still claimed - with no substantiation -that scientists could not say what they
thought and that "controversial conclusions" ha d to be avoided (CR 97/12, p. 37). Why, then,
did two Hungarian Academy of Sciences reviews recommend Project postponement or
abandonment in the mid-1980s - foreconomicreasons, of course (HAS December 1983, HC-
M, Vol. 3, Ann. 36; HAS Opinion, June 1985,ibid., Ann. 39 and, see, CR 97/8 at pp. 12, 13
and 15)? -36-
Second , an attempt is still made to play down the importance of the February 1989
Protocol. This is now on the basis that the e nvironmental studies of the time "were for the
most part not allowed to be published" CR 97/12, p. 39). This may or may not be true, but it
can surely be assumed that, when the HungarianGovernment took the formal step of signing
this Protocol, it had not somehow deprived itself of seeing itswn studies.
Third , as to the question-what happened between Hungary's formal reaffirmation and
acceleration of the Project in February 1989, and its suspension of the Project in May 1989
(CR 97/12, p. 39) - the answer is, nothing. The only evidence before this Court is the Ecologia
study of March 1989 which, as Professor McCa ffrey explained three weeks ago, did not
conclude that Project implementation would leadto a to a state of necessity (CR 97/8, pp. 20-
21).
Fourth , Hungary's claim that, because of a lack of studies prior to May 1989, it called at
that time for a "thorough EIA", has now disa ppeared (e.g., HC-M, para. 1.38). It has
disappeared because it is wrong. Hungary didnot call for a new EIA in 1989. Nor did it carry
out such an EIA, either then, or subsequently.
Fifth , Professor Sands argues that the existen ce of an obligation to carry out an EIA
from May 1989 can be based "on the practice ofthe two States themselves" (CR 97/12, p. 68).
This can only mean that the practice of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as of May1989, was
the performance of EIAs, environmental impact assessments, not the carrying out of a few,
occasional, inadequate, unreliable studies. State practice is important. But we should not
forget, as ProfessorSands did, that Hungary in fact repealedits existing EIA legislation in
1989 and did not replace it until many years later.
3. There Was No State of Necessity in 1989-1990
Mr. President, in the third and final secti on to this pleading, I will briefly re-examine
Hungary's claim that there was sufficient evidence in 1989-1990 to justify its suspension and
abandonment of the Project. I shall pay particular attention to Nagymaros, as my colleague,
Dr. Mikulka, will focus in the next presentation on alleged impacts in the Gabcíkovo section. -37-
The evidence of environmental impact available to the Parties in 1989-1990 was
examined in detail by Professor McCaffrey during Slovakia's first round presentation
(CR97/8, pp. 18-33). He was criticized by Hunga ry's counsel for ignoring "27 Hungarian
studies prepared in 1989" and "45 Hungarianstudies" prepared between 1990 and 1992 (CR
97/12, p. 43). No supporting refe rence was given by Hungary's counsel, and however closely
one examines the Hungarian written pleadings, itis simply impossible to know what is being
referred to. My guessis that the reference is to studieslisted in the 1994 bibliography of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences. But, as I explained during my first presentation, Hungary
has never annexed this document to its written pleadings, it has never examined the studies it
refers to, and, even now, it criticizes Slovakia for holding this document up as evidence that
the Project was extensively studied prior to 1989 (e.g., CR 97/12, pp. 11 and 31).
Otherwise, Hungary has barely responded toProfessor McCaffrey's presentation. It has
no response. The evidence available to the Parties at this crucial time didnot point to a state
of necessity as a result of Project implementatin. Of course, Hungary has been able to come
up with a series of quotations from the all-important, independent reports of this period-the
Bechtel and HQI Reports-which point to certain impacts in certain areas. This is not
surprising, and it is not relevant. For the greater part, Hungary's quotations are taken out of
context or reflect nothing more than recommendations for additional studies in certain areas.
Of course the Bechtel and HQI Reports contain such recommendations. They would hardly
be credible otherwise. The key point is, neither report predicts or even hints at a state of
ecological necessity as a result of Project implementation (CR 97/8, pp. 18-33). And,
Slovakia's position has never been that the G/N Project would be the first everbarrage system
to have no impacts whatsoever on the environment.
For good measure, Slovakia has prepared and placed in the Judge's Folder its own
extracts from the Bechtel and HQI Reports, which give a more accurate impression of what
these reports actually said. These show, forexample, that I was not quoting the HQIReport
"completely out of context" in order to s how that Czechoslovak environmental impact
assessment was in line with international practices (CR 97/12, p. 31). In fact I was putting -38-
into context a quote "consistently passd over" by Hungary. And HQI examinedfivedifferent
means of evaluation adopted by Czechoslovakia totest Project impacts on groundwaters. It
described these respectively as:
1. "très acceptable selon les standards internationaux"
2. "fondée dans ses principes"
3. "appropriée" pour "l'époque"
4. "valide"
5. "correct" et avec "du mérite" (HM, Vol. 5, Ann. 9, at pp. 233-235).
But there is no need for a battle of quotationson this point. I merely refer the Court to
the sections in the Slovak Memorial and Counter-Memorial where these reports are
considered in detail (SM, paras. 2.87-2.117; SC-M, paras. 7.16-7.20, 7.38, 7.49-7.55 and
7.72). And if the Bechtel Report really "queried many important aspects of the Project", as Ms
Gorove now claims (CR 97/ 12, p.43), why did Hungary wholly ignore-in its own
Memorial - the conclusions of itsown commissioned, comprehensive, independent report?
Alleged Impacts to the Budapest bank-filtered wells
Mr. President, I move now briefly on to the alleged impacts of the Nagymaros barrage
on the Budapest bank-filtered wells. I can be brief, because Hungary has also been brief on
this point. Why? Because it has no evidence. Dr. Kern referred merely to the allegedly
"comprehensive" 1985 study of the Budapest waterworks and stated that "no other detailed
investigation" took place (CR 97/12, p. 53).
As I mentioned earlier, Hungary has not put this "comprehensive" 1985 study into
evidence. The only quoted extract we have shows that the principal area of concern wasnot
the Project but the damage caused by dre dging prior to 1980 (HM, App. 3, p. 430). In
Appendix 3 to Hungary's Memorial, this was de scribed as "industrial gravel dredging" or
"commercial gravel dredging" (HM, pp. 428-429). During the site visit, both of Hungary's
experts explained openly that this excessive dredging wan sot connected to the Project (Day 4,
Szentendre Island). And, yet, this same dredgingwas described last week as "Project-related" -39-
(CR 97/12, p. 52)-on the basis of an unsubstan tiated assertion made in Hungary's Counter-
Memorial.
In fact, by 1980, Hungary had dredged far moregravel from the riverbed than originally
intended by the Project. This hadnothingto do with the Project (HM, pp. 428-429). Indeed,
Hungary only began work on Nagymaros in th e mid-1980s (HM, para.3.56). No further
dredging was required in 1989 - as Hungary also admits (HC-M, Vol. 4, Ann. 13, at p. 576).
On what other evidence could Hungary po ssibly justify the abandonment of Nagymaros
in October 1989 so as to avoid damage to the Budapest wells? Dr. Kern says there is none.
Appendix 3 to Hungary's Memorial also records that "no detailed investigations that could
have quantified" the impacts to the Budapest wells were made (HM, App. 3, p. 432).
Slovakia cannot contest this. There are, th erefore, only two choices. Either Hungary
has breached its Treaty obligations and is guilty oftotal indifference up to this date-because
there are stillno scientific studies or reports that describe the risk to the Budapest wells - or
the risks have been exaggerated out of all proportion during the current proceedings.
In this respect, I conclude by pointing to the 1989 study of Hungary's new "homme
orchestre", Professor Laszlo Somlyody. As Slova kia explained in its first round presentation,
Professor Somlyody noted that there were two solutionsif there was a problem due to erosion
downstream of the Nagymaros barrage.
Two solutions. Hungarian counsel now onl y speak of the second solution, the
construction of another barrage downstr eam of Budapest ( CR 97/12, pp. 40 and 53l,
MsGorove and Dr. Kern). The first of the two solutions put forward by ProfessorSomlyody
and ignored by Hungary's counsel was "The replacement of the gravel on the riverbed" (HC-
M, Ann. 13, at p. 576). This is not fanciful. Up on the screen, and in theJudge's Folder, the
Court can now see Plate 4 of the Hungarian C ounter-Memorial which shows precisely "Gravel
replacement instead of barrage building in the Upper Rhine" (HC-M, opposite p. 40 and see
HC-M, para. 1.68). And, if I may just read the caption below these photographs: "Sediment
addition since 1978 has proven to be an effectiv e tool to control erosion without disturbing -40-
navigation." Thus, in the event of erosiondownstream of Nagymaros, a solution was readily
available - from 1978! There was absolutely no necessity to abandon Nagymaros. -41-
4. Conclusions
Mr. President, my conclusions will be brief.
First , as of 1977, all the potential adverse impacstof the Project were well known to the
Parties. The existence of a state of necessity in 1989 is excluded on this ground alone.
Second , between 1977 and 1989, the Treaty pa rties continued their detailed
investigations into potential Project impacts, and the weight of evidence did not support
Project suspension or abandonment. In this respect, it is important to recall that after the 1985
EIA, the Hungarian Governmentformallyreaffirmedits commitment to the Project in August
1985 and, again, in February 1989.
Third , both Parties commissioned impartial, ous tide reports in 1989-1990. Both Reports
- the Bechtel Report and the HQI Report - strongly support the Slovak position that there was
no environmental state of necessity.
Fourth , there was - and is - no evidence of adverse impact to the Budapest water wells.
Finally , Hungary's attempts to fill the gaps inthe evidence by "oral discussions" and last
minute letters simply highlight the weakness ofits case. Good Hungarian evidence exists - the
1976 UNDP/WHO Report, the 1985 EIA, the 1990 B echtel Report, the 1994 Bibliography of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences - but thisgood evidence is systematically passed over by
Hungary because it does not support its legal position.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, thac toncludes my presentation. It has been a great
honour for me to appear before you and I thank you for your attention. May I ask you to call
next, or possibly after the pause, on Dr.Mikulka, who will examine Hungary's allegations as
to impacts in the Gabcíkovo section.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr.Word sworth. The Court will suspend for
15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.25 to 11.45 a.m. -42-
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. I call now on Dr. Mikulka.
MMIr. ULKA:
Hungary's Allegations of Adverse Impacts in Relation to Gabcíkovo
Mr. President, my colleague Mr. Samuel Wordsworth has just shown how all the risks
that Hungary pretends to have discovered only in 1989 had been studied long ago and were
either not significant or could be mitigated successfully.
I will complete Slovakia's examination of the factual basis to Hungary's claims of
necessity by focusing on Hungary´s allegations as to the negative effects of the Gabcíkovo
part of the Project.
Here, unlike in the case of Nagymaros, we have - in addition to the multiple studies and
models-the evidence of actual results of four year's operation. For example, we have the
Environmental Impact Review published by the Slovak Faculty of Natural Sciences
(Environmental Impact Review, Comenius University, Bratislava, 1995 ). Contrary to the
impression Professor Wheater would like to give, Slovakia has no problems with the content
of the "Blue" book. This book was written by people with intimate knowledge of the
problems of the region. If this book is in some sense remarkable, then it is because it is
balanced. Science-as Professor Wheater well knows-is not a register of black and white
conclusions. The "Blue" book evaluates the Proe jct in a generally favourable way, but it does
not exclude critical views on particular aspects. What is scientifically incorrect is to select
isolated adverse comments and to distort the ral meaning of the "Blue" book's reports. I will
come to this in more detail later.
There are some major questions that I would like to address first.
SURFACE - WATER QUALITY
A lot has been said by Hungarian counsel a bout the threat that the reservoir allegedly
poses - both in respect of the so-called "Origl Project" and the reduced reservoir of Variant
C-to the water quality. Slovakia dealt at le ngth with this argument in the first round of
pleadings. Dr.Kern and ProfessorWheater, however, insisted again on the alleged poor
surface water quality that the Gabcíkovo project miht cause. Both of them, however agreed -43 -
with Slovakia´s view that Danube water qualityhas improved in the last 20 years (Dr.Kern,
CR 97/12, para. 32, p.57) and that "an improvementin water quality in Bratislava has been,
not unexpectedly, accompanied by an improvement in some water quality indicators
downstream" (ProfessorWheater, CR 97/12, para. 16, p.93). Of course, not a single word
was said as to why this is so. The cons truction of sewage water treatment plants by
Czechoslovakia and, now, Slovakia is not H ungary´s favourite theme. However, the
conclusions of the Bechtel Report commissioned in 1989 by Hungary were unequivocal:
"One of the most effective ways of improving the quality of both surface and
groundwater and its attendant effects on ecological conditions is to clean up the
sources of the pollution . . . some of hmore critical areas of concern are the
sewage discharge into the Mosoni at Györ; the leaching of bauxite red muds, and
the asbestos cement plant, near Komárom; and the excessive amounts of farm
fertilizers seeping into the groundwater in the Szigetköz and along the lower
reaches of the project." (Bechtel Environmental Inc. Report, pp. 1-19.)
Irrespective of these conclusions Hungary stopped its programme of the construction of
the sewage water treatment plants together with its works on the Project.
Mr.President, a week ago, Dr.Kern, referring to the values of chlorophyll-a in the
Danube in the pre-dam conditions stated that "ismulated increases due to the Hrušov reservoir
were disturbing" (CR, 97/12, para. 33, p.57). And ProfessorWheater when speaking about
Variant C asserted that "chlorophyll-a has doubled downstream of the reservoir" (CR 97/12,
para. 16, p.93). He quotes no source for this contention. In any event, ProfessorWheater is
mistaken. There is a continuingdecreaseof chlorophyll-a in all the monitored profiles of the
Slovak-Hungarian reach of the Danube during lastsix years. It may be seen on the graphs on
the screen. They show the values measured atcross-sections at Bratislava, then at Medvedow
and Komárno which are downstream of the reservoir and, finally, at Budapest (source: Water
Quality Protection Working Group of th e Transboundary Water Commission BRATISLAVA-
BUDAPEST, December 1996, Joint Report).
ProfessorMucha will tomorrow point out other major mistakes and misinterpretations
presented last week by counsel for Hunga ry concerning the quality of surface and
groundwater as well as sediments.
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GROUNDWATER LEVELS
During the site visit, ProfessorMucha explained to the Court how groundwater levels
have risen due to the filling of the reservoir. Hungary tries to belittle the importance of this
beneficial impact by suggesting that the decrease in the groundwater level during the
preceding decades was due to commercial dredging which coincided with the signing of the
Treaty (CR 97/12, para. 36, p. 58).But Hungary ignores the fact that the dredging was largely
necessary for flood protection of Bratislava a nd the removal of ford sections hampering
navigation. It also ignores the fact that qts for dredging on the Slovak-Hungarian reach of
the Danube were jointly agreed by Czechoslova kia and Hungary and were equally shared.
And Hungary nowhere explains why and for whic h legal argument this discussion is relevant
(SR, Vol. III, p. 228).
The rise in groundwater levels on large areaof _itný Ostrov and Szigetkoz is one of the
most positive impacts of the Project. This does not fit in with Hungary´s thesis of
environmental disaster and, on the contrary, shows the beneficial environmental impact of the
Project.
Counsel for Hungary repeated their ar guments about the large-scale drop in
groundwater levels that the "Original project"would allegedly cause (CR 97/12, paras. 28 and
31) and that Variant C allegedly has caused in e Szigetkoz. But the impact of the project on
groundwater levels here was fully understood and accepted by the Treaty parties long prior to
1989 and important mitigation measures were envisaged, including the recharge of the
branches on both sides of the Danube. Moreover,the construction of the famous underwater
weirs was not only envisaged by the Joint Cont ractual Plan as Mr.Wordsworth has just
mentioned, it wasHungary´s responsibility. And the use of underwater weirs was once again
recommended by the EC experts (Report of the Working Group of Independent Experts on
Variant "C", Budapest, November 23, 1992, p. 36, SM, Vol. II, Ann. 12, p. 127).
Dr.Kern insists on the loss of sub-irriga tion in an area of more than 100km2 in
Szigetkoz due to the "Original project". Of course, he comes to this result by assuming a
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -45 -
minimum discharge of 50 m3/s into the old riverbed which, according to him, has "never been
altered" (CR 97/12, para.29, p.56). Simulations presented by Hungary also ignore the plans
for underwater weirs (because these, as Hungaryinsists, were not agreed upon) as well as the
direct recharge into the side arms, the structures for which, however, were largely completed
in 1989. Such an abstract form of modelling has no meaning.
As stated in the Bechtel Report:
"Project mitigations to minimize adverse impacts on the hydrologic regime have
been incorporated into the project design, including the artificial recharge system
in the Szigetköz, and interceptor channel system at Dunakiliti reservoir..."
(Bechtel Environmental Inc. pp. 1-19 and pp. 1-13.)
The correctness of this conclusion was recently confirmed by the data provided by
Hungary in the framework of the joint monitoring of the impacts of the Gabcíkovo project.
This shows that both in the _itný Ostrov and inthe major part of Szigetkoz, the groundwater
level under average discharges has increased. Infact, the only territory affected by the drop of
groundwater levels is the narrow strip along th e old riverbed where the Danube drains the
adjacent terrain-because of the absence of underwater weirs (Hungary's National Annual
Report of Environmental Monitoring in the Szigetkoz, 1997).
FLOODPLAIN FORESTS
Mr.President, the Project certainly would have, and as operated under Variant C, has
had some impact on the floodplain forest. The Pa rties were fully aware of this since the
signing of the 1977 Treaty. Some changes in the composition of tree plantations were
envisaged. Later, as I have already said, the system of direct discharge to the branches was
incorporated into the Project to preserve conditioss close to the natural situation as possible.
Even a scheme allowing for the flooding of the inundation area was developed. During the
site visit the Court has been shown the rele vant structures on the Slovak side. Similar
measures were developed in the Hungarian branch system-prior to 1989. The Court,
however, had no chance to see these. From the site visit, the Court could not possibly know
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -46 -
3
that an inlet enabling up to 200 m /s into the Hungarian side arms was constructed in the
Dunakiliti weir - prior to 1989.
The effects of the Gabcíkovo part of the Project on forestry in general are positive (SR,
Vol. III, pp. 84, 87). Professor Wheater tried to challenge this fact by highly selective
quotation from the Blue book (CR 97/12, para. 26,pp. 10-11), looking only at sections in the
report concerning the narrow riverbank area alongside the old Danube stretch. This narrow
stretch, incidentally, was all the Court got tosee of the Hungarian inundation area during the
site visit and gave another very misleading impression of Project impacts.
The only important difference between the Slovak and Hungarian inundation areas
consists in the fact that the system of wate r recharge on the Hungarian side was put into
operation two years later than in Slovakia, after the April 1995 Agreement which provided for
the construction of the underwater weir near to Dunakiliti. The reason why this simple and
effective measure was so long postponed is we ll known. As stated at the meeting of the
Hungarian Parliamentary Council for the Envir onment in February 1994, Hungarian officials
were afraid that "the construction of [evena temporary weir could unfavourably influence the
decision of the ICJ in The Hague". And Mr . Lajos Zsebok was even more explicit when
describing, at the same meeting, the danger inthe following words: "we would confirm with
this solution that it is possible to eliminat e unfavourable effects of the Danube diversion
through technical measures and thus we w ould give up ... a decision of The Hague
favourable for us" (Magyar Hírlap, 1 March 1994, SC-M, Ann. 33, p. 437).
In a certain sense Mr. Zsebok was right. The construction of a single underwater weir
near Dunakiliti has finally provided a clear example of the beneficial impact of underwater
weirs on the groundwater levels in the area.
With the construction of several underwaterweirs along the Danube, the draining effect
of the old riverbed could be eliminated and the groundwater levels in the narrow strip along
the river affected by the drop, could be restored. This is accepted by counsel for Hungary
even if called "illusion d'optiques" (Prof. abiener, CR 97/13, para. 10, p. 71). The problems
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -47 -
concerning water flow velocities, sedimentation behind the weirs and even the groundwater
level dynamics may be resolved through the prope r design of these weirs in combination with
appropriate discharges into the old Danube. I will not further tire the Court with technical
details. Instead I refer to the PHARE Report which will be discussed by Mr. Refsgaard
tomorrow.
FISH
Professor Wheater reproaches me for "numerous errors" in my response to his assertions
concerning the alleged disappearance of certain fih species as a result of the damming of the
Danube. In fact there are no such errors. The famous two Ru ssian sturgeon from 1986,
referred to by Professor Wheater, have never beenseen by any ichthyologist, and as the author
of the article to which Professor Wheater hints they may have been wrongly identified. And
also this same author, not me,does indeed say that "the lastverifiedRussian sturgeons in the
Slovak stretch of the Danube were [sighted] in the 1960s."
Concerning the mud minnow that Hungary also says disappeared after the damming
from the Szigetkoz, Professor Wheater advise s me not to believe one Hungarian Expert,
Ms Keresztessy, but rather a certain Mr. Gutiwho says that "before 1992 Umbra krameri was
a common species in the Szigetkoz floodplain". But what then about the list of fish species
annexed to the Hungarian Memorial (Vol. 2, App.2). Should the Court believe this evidence
or not? This list does not mention the mud minnow in the Hungarian floodplain area. It is
surely better to keep such dispts out of this Great Hall of sice and leave them to be fought
out between the Hungarian fish experts themselves.
Professor Wheater did not challenge my othreremarks concerning fish species which he
alleges have disappeared but whose occurrencehas nevertheless been recently confirmed by
official Hungarian reports ("Evaluation of the function of the underwater weir " document
prepared by the Hungarian Ministry for Tarnsportation, Communication and Water Economy,
and handed over to the Slovak monitoring agent in the framework of the Joint
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -48 -
Slovak-Hungarian Agreement on 3 October 1995). Accordingly, I suppose he admits that 3
weeks ago he was wrong.
Two more remarks:
First-Hungary continuously refers to manymigratory species in the Danube. But it is
evident that, after the construction of the Iron Gates downstream on the Danube, they ceased
to appear in the Slovak-Hungarian stretch of the Danube.
Second - the biomonitoring of fishes in Slovkia as well as in Hungary is today done by
electro-catching (Slovak National Annual Report of the Environment Monitoring in 1996,
National Annual Report on Environmental Monitoring in the Szigetköz in 1996). With this
method it is possible to catch fish upto the depth of maximum 1.5 m. But most of the
rheophile species are living on the bottom and cannot be found by this method.
Accordingly, the categoric conclusions of Hungary´s counsel concerning the alleged
impact of the Gabcíkovo project on fish are not justified.
PEAK OPERATION
I turn, now, to another issue which Hungary has blown up out of all proportion: peak
operation. Dr. Kern well knows that no specific mode of peak operation, let alone an extreme
one, has ever been agreed between the Parties,and that a moderate peak operation would not
support his thesis of devastating effects on aquatic habitat. He nonetheless claims that "what
is extreme, however, is the magnitude of peak operation underlying the Project design"
namely "the number and capacity of turbines installed, the size of the power canal and of the
reservoir" (CR 97/12, paras. 6 and 8, p. 50). But, Mr. President, the Project was a
multipurpose project, and its dimensions were not defined exclusively by plans for energy
production. Its dimensions are, first of all, dictated by the dimensions and properties of the
river itself. The bypass canal, which mayseem to large in conditions of anaveragedischarge
on the Danube, has the capacity to accommodate only one half of the flood discharge-still
provided that all eightturbines at Gabcíkovo operate at full capacity. This division of flood
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -49 -
waters between the canal and the old riverbed is precisely the principle on which protection
against the 10,000-year flood is achieved.
Similarly the reservoir. No doubt, its existence was indispensable for the accumulation
of water for peak operation. But, again, duringfloods the reservoir provides the route for fast
evacuation of flood waters from the narrow Bratis lava reach of river. Earlier, flood waters
built up below Bratislava and the backwater effect caused the flooding of Bratislava's streets.
Dr. Kern insists that "the magnitude of peak operation presented in the Hungarian
pleading was not extreme, but represented a va riety of peaking modes which were studied
during the Project designs" (CR 97/12, para. 22, p. 55.) If it is so, why then does he insists on
the water level fluctuation of 4m at the confluence near Sap and above 1m at Kamarno,
which can only mean the mode of operation based on "a complete closure of the turbines at
Gabcíkovo for 18 hours and a sudden releae s of 4200 m3/s increasing up to 5,200 m/s during
6 hours per day...causing a considerable artificial flood wave in the Nagymaros reservoir"
(HC-M,Vol. 1, 1.210; Kern Impacts. HC-M, A nns., Vol. 4, Ann.6). Dr. Kern contradicts
himself when he says in the very next sentence thatl" arge-scalepeaking . . . wouldmost likely
result in damage to aquatic habitats over the length of the Nagymaros reservoir" (CR97/12
para. 23, p. 55). Yes Mr. President, "large-scale" peaking. But nothing like this was agreed
between the parties, precisely because no specific mode of peak operation was agreed.
Accordingly all alleged damage on aquatic ha bitats and even on "the roman ruins only
recently discovered" ( ibid., para. 24, p. 55) resulting from the peak operation is purely
hypothetical.
From the discussion of the alleged impact s of large scale peak-operation Hungarian
counsel pass to the extraordinary allegation that the Gabcíkovo power plant is operated in a
peak mode (Wheater, CR 79/12, paras. 31-33, p. 13). This is not so. The fact that the run of
river operation requires from time to time a change in the number of turbines put into
operation was explained in two letters of the Agent of Slovakia (letter of 24 February 1997) to
the Agent of Hungary who raised this ques tion a few weeks before the opening of oral
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proceedings. But this issue has already been addressed by the technical experts of the two
countries. In order to terminate this discussion,once and for all, I invite the Court to have a
look at the hourly graphs for electricityrduction at Gabcíkovo for January 1996 - the month
chosen by Hungary's experts. I want to demonstrate by these graphs that the putting of one
extra turbine into operation doesnotcoincide with the hours of the peak consumption. There is
no regularity there. It depends entirely on reaching limits for the water level in the reservoir,
which itself depends on the changes in the discharges in the Danube, caused both by natural
phenomena as well as by changes resulting from the operation of the upstream hydropower
plants in Austria.
PROJECT´S FUNCTIONS
At this stage, I would like to say a few words about Hungary's combination of the
discussion of the alleged risks posed by the Pr oject with its claims that the Project is
essentially useless, particularly in terms of flood protection and na vigation. Even Hungary
does not challenge the use of electricity production, although Ms Gorove did claim that the
consumption of electricity in Hungary since 1989 has been in decline (CR 97/3, para. 40, p.
72). Is this good or bad? Who knows. It is cer tainly not relevant, save for as a possible
explanation for why Hungary lost interest in the Project.
FLOODS
Ms Gorove also concluded that "the flood issue is a smoke screen" and that "flood
protection was neither a motivating factor nor an objective justification for the Project" (CR
97/12, p. 46). I leave it for the Court to evaluahrespective merits of this legal pleading and
what the Treaty parties themselves unambiguouslystated in the Treaty and in the JCP (refs.).
Ms Gorove´s view according to which "had th ere been no Treaty, the [flood protection] work
would have proceeded in accordance with the [traditional] standards" sufficient for 100-year
flood is entirely irrelevant to this case, just because there is a Treaty. Finally her attempt to
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -51 -
belittle the importance of the huge additionallod protection works below Sap, that Slovakia
carried out because of Hungary´s non-compliance with its Treaty obligation and the
subsequent accusation that "Slovakia has ignoredthe state of flood control works as of 1977"
is breathtaking in its audacity. Under the 1977 Treaty and the Joint Contactual Plan, the
excavation works in this sector of the project weHungary'sresponsibility..
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -52 -
NAVIGATION
What as to Ms Gorove´s conclusions con cerning navigation, and the contention that her
claim of a steep decline in navigation in the last decades has not been refuted (CR 97/12, p.
47), it is only a pity that she did not compare this trend with the worsening conditions in
navigation in this stretch of the Danube. The ch art indicating the decline of fully navigable
days is contained in the Slovak Memorial (S M, para. 1.47, p. 33). There is an obvious parallel
between declining navigation and worsening na vigation conditions which supports Slovakia´s
view that the Project was essential to improve navigation in this sector.
Ms Gorove also tries to obscure the fact that Czechoslovakia and Hungary inter se
adopted the recommendations of the Danube Commission concerning the gabarits for
navigation into binding standards by means of a specific provision to this end in the 1976
Boundary Waters Convention (SM,Vol. II, Ann. 4.)The question therefore is not whether the
Danube is still navigable, as she suggests, butwhether the required parameters for navigation
exist. In the Nagymaros sector they certainly arnot assured at present. The concerns over this
fact have been repeatedly voiced by the Danube Commission (SM, Vol.II, Ann.15, p. 266;
SM, Vol. IV, Ann. 137, p. 421;SCM, Vol. II, Ann. 48, p. 515). The traditional river-training
measures that Ms Gorove recommends arenot a long-term solution, as it is clear also from the
Delft Hydraulics Report to which she refers (CR 97/12, para. 55, p. 47, ftn. 99). But again,
such considerations are irrelevant, given that the parties agreed in the Treaty on a specific
scheme for the improvement of navigation.
As Dr. Tomka said at the end of the firtsround of Slovakia´s pleaings, Hungary has not
found a single positive element in the project. It has portrayed it exclusively in the most
negative way. Hungary retained this approach in the second round of its pleading. All its
scientific discussion of the "Original Project"well as of the effects of the Gabcíkovo part of
the Project as implemented by means of Variant C,has been a continuation of this approach.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -53 -
SITE VISIT
But, I most sincerely hope, the Court will have got a different impression from the site
visit. It has now had the opportunity to see the Gabcíkovo part of the project as jointly built
and which, by 1989, was nearly ready for joint implementation by Czechoslovakia and
Hungary. The photographs at the beginning of the Judge's Folder have shown how little
remained to be done to put Gabcíkovo into operation in 1989 when Hungary suspended and
then abandoned its work on the Project. And the C ourt has now seen the structures of Variant
C, which made it possible to put this part of the Project into operation. It finally saw that
nearly no traces remain of what Hungary built on the Nagymaros part of the project.
Again, I sincerely hope that the multi-purposecharacter of the Project was evident -at a
glance, and that it is therefore not at all surp rising that after the site visit Hungary has felt
uneasy about repeating its rather absurd argument about the primarily ideological purpose of
the Project. Instead Hungary now recognizes theeral purposes of the Project, but finds them at
best "archaic" (CR 97/13, para. 2, p. 67). Professo r Carbiener's views in this respect would
hardly meet with the approval of any me mber State of the Danube Commission, obviously
except Hungary, which nevertheless is one of the biggest users of the new navigational route
created by the Gabcíkovo project.
And as always expected by the parties tothe 1977 Treaty, the Project has brought about
many opportunities in terms of regional development. Forestry and agriculture have and will
benefit from the restoration of the groundwaterlevels over the greater part of the region. The
construction of sewage water treatment plants -at least insofar as Slovakia is concerned - has
had a very positive impact on water quality in the Danube. The recharge system into the
branches on both sides of the river has stoppedthe process of gradual drying of the floodplain
and marked the beginning of its revitalization. ungary speaks only of lost water fluctuations.
It does not deny that these side arms now containfar more water than they did in the pre-dam
era. In all these respects the Gabcíkovo part of the Project put into operation by means of
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -54 -
Variant C, provides the benefits it was expecteto provide in the period before the completion
of the Nagymaros part of the Project.
There are, however problems which still ca ll for solution - the old riverbed where
Hungary had, specifically under Article5, paragraph5, of the 1977 Treaty, the responsibility
for the remedial measures aimed at restoring the water levels. This responsibility has been
"abandoned", alongside all Hungary's other works on the Project. But the actual state of the
old riverbed is not an inevitable result oe damming of the Danube, neither do the scientists
lack the knowledge as to how to solve the problem.
CONCLUSIONS
Mr. President, Members of the Court, my conclusions will be brief.
First , the studies available to the Treataties in 1989-1990, just as for Nagymaros, did
not point to an ecological state of necessity at Gabcíkovo.
Second , a wealth of evidence since 1990 has c onfirmed the absence of a state of
necessity. I refer to the EC Expert Reports, to the Slovak Data and Monitoring Report (SR,
Vol.III),the Environmental Impact Review ofComenius University, and the PHARE Report,
which Mr. Refsgaard will return to tomorrow.
Third , the Court has now seen the Gabcíkovosection, the Slovak floodplain forests and
the bypassed section of the old Danube with its on eyes. The simple lesson to be drawn from
this historic site visit is that there is clearly no environmental catastrophe on the ground and
that the Project has been well conceived with certain well-established development goals in
mind.
Mr. President, may I now ask you to callon Professor McCaffrey, who will address the
legal aspects of Hungary's claims of necessity.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Mikulka. I call now on Professor McCaffrey.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -55 -
Professor McCAFFREY: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
III. HUNGARY'S PLEA OF NECESSITY
C. The Legal Basis for Hungary's Plea of Necessity
Introduction
Mr. President, Members of the Court, it ismy task to respond to the arguments made by
Hungary's counsel last Thursday and Friday concerning Hungary's plea of necessity. My
colleague Mr. Wordsworth has already dealt with the facts. I will address three main points of
law: First, Hungary's "reasonableness" test; second, Hungary's argument that there was a state
of necessity under Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the 1977 Treaty and evolving norms of
environmental protection; and third, Hungary's application of the doctrine of necessity to its
suspension and abandonment at Nagymaros and Gabcíkovo.
I.Hungary's "Reasonableness" Test
I begin, then, Mr. President, with Hungary's "reasonableness" test. Hungary claims to
rely on necessity, but in fact asks the Court to say whether the course of action, theoption, it
1
chose was "reasonable". Hungary therefore treats "necessity" and "reasonableness" as one
and the same thing.
The obvious problem with this line of ar gument is that it is based on an implicit
assumption that Hungary was not bound by the Treaty to a certain course of conduct. I say
this because, faced with a problem, a State mayhave several options, all "reasonable". But if
the State adopts one option by a treaty with a nother State, it cannot later take a different
option, unilaterally, however "reasonable". In s hort, as a defence to a breach of a treaty,
"reasonableness" isnot a defence.
1
E.g., CR 97/11, p. 16 (Crawford); and pp. 26, 36, 41, 45 (Gorove).
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -56 -
With respect, Professor Sands seems not tounderstand this. He says, as Alain Pellet has
already noted this morning, that "Hungary treae td the 1977 Treaty as having full legal effects
2
right up to May 1992" - ! Yet he defends Hungary's conduct,conduct in clear breach of the
Treaty, on the ground of "reasonableness". 3
Mr. President, Hungary cannot have it both way.sIf its position is that the Treaty was in
"full legal effect" in 1989-1990, then it did nothave the option to ignore it by suspending and
subsequently abandoning work at Nagymaros and Gabcíkovo - however "reasonable" a
decision might have been to suspend work on a dam it no longer wanted in its own territory
that wasnot part of a joint project being constructed pursuant to a treaty.
There is also a fatal self-contradiction in Hungary's "reasonableness" argument. It is
this: by asking the Court to find that its chosen course of conduct was "reasonable", Hungary
destroys its argument based on necessity: for, in a real state of necessity, there is no question
of "reasonableness" of choosing one option against another; rather the course of action must
be, in the ILC's words, the "only meansof safeguarding an essential interest . . . against a grave
4
and imminent peril". I repeat, not a "reasonable" choice among a number of options, but the
"only means" of warding off the threatened peril. As Slovakia has demonstrated, and I will
recall presently, there were a number of options to Hungary other than suspending and
terminating work. But for Hungary, "necessity" dos enot mean being forced to adopt a course
of conduct inconsistent with its legal obligations in order to avert a grave and imminent peril,
but rather it means, that a course of conduct was "necessary" only in the sense of being
"needed" or "desirable", to advance a unilaterally-determined "ensemble" 6 of policy goals -
2
Ibid., p. 71.
3 Ibid.
4 International Law Commission, Draft Article s on State Responsibility, Part One, Article
33(1)(a), [1980]Y.B. INT'LL.C OMM N, Vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 34 (emphasis added).
5
E.g., CR 97/9, p. 63; SR, para. 7.33.
6 CR 97/3, p. 83 (transl. p. 90) (Dupuy).
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -57 -
including not just "ecological guarantees" but al so, and revealingly, "economic costs" of a
project having what Hungary saw as "questionable energy benefits". 7
II.Hungary's Argument that there was a Stat e of Necessity under Articles 15, 19 and 20
and Evolving Norms of Environmental Protection
Professor Sands continues Hungary's lega l-smorgasbord approach to this case by
arguing that the Parties' environmental oblig ations under the 1977 Treaty "entitled Hungary to
insist upon[] further studies" and that "the failure to agree on further studies created a state of
8
necessity under Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the Treaty..." Mr. President, this is like saying
"one plus one equals . . . ten!" It is based ona concept of the doctrineof necessity that would
be totally unrecognizable to the late Judge Ago and the International Law Commission.
Specifically, ProfessorSands argues that "[a]s new environmental norms emerged,
whether through treaty or custom, they became applicable . .[ .inter alia]through . . . Articles
9
15 and 19." ProfessorSands then says that "the new norms were to be operationalized into
10
the Treaty." Thus ProfessorSands argues that th e effect of Articles15, 19 and 20 of the
1977 Treaty was to oblige the Parties to up-date,or revise, the Treaty-Project by reference to
new, evolving norms of environmental prot ection; the obvious implication is that
Czechoslovakia's alleged refusal to revise theTreaty was a breach of these new norms and of
11
Articles 15, 19 and 20. There are two points to address here.
First, this is a very strange sequence of argument. Let us assume for the sake of
argument that Professor Sands is right about th e effect of Articles 15, 19 and 20. Now in that
case the onus would be on Hungary to de monstrate to Czechoslovakia by argument and
7
Ibid.
8
CR 97/12, p. 62.
9
CR 97/12, p. 69.
10 Ibid., p. 70.
11 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -58 -
evidence (1) that a new norm of environmentalprotection had evolved, (2) that this new norm
required revision of the Treaty, because (3)the effectsof implementing the Treaty-Project
would contravene the new norm - in short, create an environmental risk contrary to the new
norm.
Now the record is clear. Hungary did none of these things. It did not identify the so-
called new norms; it did not identify the existi ng risks which contravened such norms; and it
did not provideevidenceof such risks. Its attitude was: "You must take our word for it!" Mr.
President, it is hardly surprising that in this situation Czechoslovakia chose to stand by the
Treaty it had signed and to refuse unsupported, unsubstantiated demands for radically revising
the Treaty. As Slovakia has repeatedly dem onstrated, however, Czechoslovakia did meet
12
Hungary more than half way in response to Hungary's expression of concern .
The second point is that while Profe ssorSands strongly suggests that it was
Czechoslovakia's duty to revise the Treaty to "operationalize" 13 these new norms, he
recognizes that this would have to occur"through the procedural means provided by the 1977
Treaty" . Not only does he recognize these procedural requirements, he said the following
about whether new norms had to be made operational: "No doubt both Parties could agree
otherwise, could conceivably agree not to apply a new norm which was imposing costly
obligations for the protection of water orendangered species, or even new studies" 1. So now,
Hungary agreeswith Slovakia that the substantive elements of Articles15 and 19 were not
directly applicable, but were to be implemented in the manneragreed by the parties- that is,
in the words of Articles15 and 19, through "the means specified in the joint contractual
plan" 1.
12
E.g., CR 97/9, p. 63; SR, para. 7.33; and infra, this statement.
13
CR 97/12, p. 70.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 1977 Treaty, Arts. 15, paras. 1 and 19.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -59 -
In conclusion on this point, Mr. President, how can Czechoslovakia be said to have
breached these new norms of environmental law, when Hungary never even attempted to
discharge its onus with regard to them, a nd when-even assuming Hungary had met its
burden - the new norms would have to be "operationalized", as Mr. Sands puts it, through the
procedural mechanisms of the 1977 Treaty; thatis, the precise content of the new norms and
the way in which they were to be implemented would have to have been agreed upon by the
Parties.
III.Hungary's Application of the Doctrine of Necessity
Mr. President, I come now to Hungary's application of the doctrine of necessity to the
facts of this case. Let me begin by noti ng the narrowing of the area of the Parties'
disagreement. First, last Thursday ProfessorSands allowed as how Hungary acknowledged
that "it may be unlawful to take certain measures in the context of a treaty obligation unless
the illegality of that fact is excluded by the oration of one of the circumstances foreseen by
17
the law of responsibility, including necessity" - a rather elliptical way of saying that by
invoking necessity Hungary admits that it breached the Treaty. And second, Hungary now
implicitly admits that if therequirements for invoking necessity are fulfilled, they might justify
suspension, but not abandonment. ProfessorSands states that "[t]he Parties agree that
necessity may in principle justify suspension of works" but does not challenge Slovakia's
position that necessity cannot justify abandonment ofworks. With that, Mr. President, I turn
to the conditions for invoking what the International Law Commission has described as the
"very restrictive" concept of necessity8- a characterization with which Hungary agrees. 19
The first requirement is that the unlawful actof the State, in respect of which it invokes
necessity, must be the "only means" of avoidinga grave and imminent peril. Mr. President, it
17
CR 97/12, p. 77.
18 [1980]Y.B.I NT'LL.C OMM 'N, Vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 41.
19 CR 97/5, p. 70 (Professor Sands).
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -60 -
is obvious that whether Hungary's suspension a nd abandonment really were the "only means"
turns very much on the facts.
An accurate account of the events surroundi ng Hungary's material breaches of the
Treaty in 1989-when it unilaterally suspended and abandoned, first, Nagymaros, and then,
Gabcíkovo - establishes beyond the slightest doubt that a defence of necessity is not available
to exonerate Hungary. My colleague Professo rPellet and I attempted to demonstrate this
during the first round of oral hearings.
But after listening to the same account from Hungary again last Thursday and Friday,
one had the feeling that not the slightest progresshad been made - even in these final days of
the case - to narrow the major differences betw een the Parties over what the evidence actually
shows. It is really quite extraordinary how fundamentally the Parties continue to differ over
what happened and to disagree over the meaning of the evidence.
But I am afraid it is predictable that H ungary would continue to try to obfuscate the
facts. It is predictable because Hungary obviously has to fabricate a story if it is to have a
ghost of a chance of sustaining its necessity defence to its abandonment of the Project. The
true story exposes the many flaws in its necessity thesis.
ProfessorCrawford introduced his br ief but nevertheless inaccurate account by
describing the standard he would have the C ourt apply in evaluating Hungary's conduct: only
"[i]f Hungary's expressed concerns were completely fictitious,...if they were incredible,"
could Hungary's account of the diplomatic record be rejected 21. This, of course, is the precise
opposite of the standard recognized by the ILC a nd in State practice. For example, in the
22
"Neptune" case, referred to by ProfessorDupuy , one of the commissioners, citing Grotius,
20 CR 97/9, pp. 42 et seq; ibid., pp. 62 et seq.; and CR 97/10, pp. 10-17. See also SR,
paras. 7.01-7.40, 8.01-8.26, and 9.01-9.55; and SC-M, Chaps. IV-VI.
21 CR 97/12, pp. 16-17.
22 CR 97/3, p. 82.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -61 -
said the necessity "must be real and pressing" 23. Another commissioner said the necessity
24
"must be absolute and irresistible" . As JudgeAgo himself put it, the defense may be
25
invoked "only in a case of truly extreme and irresistible necessity" , not incidentally where it
would be reasonable to do so.
Against this background, MrP . resident, let us look at the way in which
ProfessorCrawford summarized Hungary's accountof the evidence. His summary contained
the following points:
-First, that Hungary had legitimate concerns about the Project in 1989—as to its cost and
validity as well as its environmental impact.
-Second, that for a few months, Czechoslovakiawas understanding of these concerns, but this
sympathy was soon overtaken by the demandsof the Water Company to proceed
with Variant "C". Mind you, ProfessorCrawford still talking about early to mid-
1989.
-And third, Variant "C" promptly acquired a lie f of its own and by late 1990 or early 1991 the
only choice open was VariantC-the "die was cast", as ProfessorCrawford put
it .
And what evidence did ProfessorCrawford decd ie to support this highly incorrect summary-
a newspaper article of last Month on Mr. Binder, the head of the Slovak Water Company-
"the person who presently controls the Da nube at Gabcíkovo", as Professor Crawford
described him 27.
23
J.B. M OORE , NTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIONS , Vol. IV, pp. 398-399 (New York, Oxford
University Press 1931) (Mr. Pinkney).
24 Ibid., p. 433 (Col. Trumbull).
25
[1980]Y.B.I NT'LL.C OMM 'N, Vol. 1, p. 158.
26
CR 97/12, p. 17.
27 Ibid., p. 15.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -62 -
The baton was then passed to ProfessorSandsto further elaborate on this false account
and he performed his role admirably. He opened with the remarkable statement concerning
the critical events of 1989: Czechoslovakia was "intransigent"-it refused, "point blank", he
said, to contemplate "any deviation whatsoeverfrom the construction of Nagymaros, from the
Original Project, or from peak power".8
Then ProfessorSands went into more detail-again, inaccurately-claiming that
between May and July1989 Czechoslovakia had act ually participated in negotiations with
Hungary that recognized the legitimacy of Hunga ry's environmental concerns. But according
to ProfessorSands, when the work of the scientific expert groups was concluded on 19July,
and Hungary thereafter proposed further joint research, Czechoslovakia rejected the proposal
and insisted that any problems could be dealtwith only by continuing with the construction of
Nagymaros. ProfessorSands then said that Czechoslovakia's position required Hungary to
extend the Nagymaros suspension until 31 Octobre1989 and to suspend works at Dunakiliti to
prevent the damming of the Danube.
Mr. President, there is not the time - nor would I expect the Court to have the patience -
to unravel ProfessorSands' confused version ofthe events. I can only respectfully refer the
Court to the careful account of the events leading to the abandonment of Nagymaros and
Gabcíkovo set out in Chapters VII and VIII of Slovakia's Reply, where references to its earlier
pleadings and to the evidence may be found. But I will briefly attempt to summarize what
took place in the period between Hungary's first breach in suspending work at Nagymaros on
13May1989 and the end of that year, pointing out some of the more serious mistakes in
Professor Sands' version of the events.
Up until 20 July 1989, there had been no promising set of negotiations as to Hungary's
concerns; Czechoslovakia had had to wait 44 dayseven to learn what those concerns were in
any detail. The three-day meeting in July 1989 was the first technical discussion between
28
CR 97/12, p. 71.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -63 -
them, and it served to bring out how far they were apart. Yet, the very next day, Hungary's
Government acted to extend the suspension at Nagymaros and-contrary to all prior
assurances-to stop work at Gabcíkovo, puttingoff for a year the possibility of damming the
Danube at Dunakiliti.
But Czechoslovakia's position was anything but intransigent, in spite of Hungary's
unilateral acts. At meetings of 24 May and 20July, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister agreed
to pursue joint investigations into the con cerns of Hungary. As Hungary's Deputy Prime
Minister made clear before the scientific meteing to examine the technical position papers that
had been exchanged, the risk of proceeding with Nagymaros in Hungary's view arose from
lack of study.
Therefore, with respect, Professor Sands wa s absolutely wrong when he said that by the
meetings in July 1989, Czechoslovakia had adopted an inflexible, "build now-investigate
later" position. On the contrary, it agreed to participate with Hungary in joint studies which
were to form the basis for further discussions of Hungarian concerns. These studies were
never even initiated by Hungary before it abandoned either Nagymaros or Gabcíkovo, even
though it was Hungary's concerns that had given rise to the agreement to investigate further
before acting.
It is not necessary to argue with Prof essor Sands over exactly when the different
contracts for work at Nagymaros and Gabc íkovo were terminated by Hungary. But the
evidence-including Hungary's own admissions in its 1992 Declaration-establishes beyond
question that Nagymaros was unilaterally and irreversibly abandoned by Hungary on 27
October 1989 and all related contracts terminated at that time. Equally, it is clear that
Gabcíkovo had been unilaterally abandoned by Hungary by mid-1990 and that all related
construction contracts had been terminated by then. In this regard I should now like to
examine with the Court the circumstances in which these abandonments occurred.
The crux of Professor Sands' analysis of events is contained in this assertion: "By the
end of October the die had been cast [this is apparently a favourite phrase of Hungary's
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -64 -
counsel]: he continues, what was on offer was the original Project or unilateral diversion.
29
Nothing else. Modification of the Project orprior environmental studies were not on offer" .
Mr. President, there could hardly be a less accurate picture of the situation as of October
1989 than this.
And here I must dwell for a moment on Hungary's continued insistence that
Czechoslovakia steadfastly refused to modifythe 1977 Treaty in any respect whatsoever. As
Professor Crawford put it last Friday, "Czeh coslovakia never accepted that the 1977 Treaty be
amended in any respect." It was presumably because Profe ssor Crawford felt this point to be
so important that he in fact stated it twice in a row . For good measure, Professor Sands on
32
Thursday referred to Czechoslovakia's "intransigence". He even went so far as to assert that
"the SlovakParty has shown not the slightest inclin ation to deviate" from this alleged
"intransigence" 33.
Mr. President, these statements lead one to wonder whether Hungary's counsel have
read their own pleadings. I refer them, for ex ample, to Annex 28 to their Memorial, which
contains the CzechoslovakNote Verbaleof 30 October 1989, confirming the offer made at the
meeting of Prime Ministers on 26 October 1989 . I would have thought that at this late stage
it would not be necessary to recall yet again thao t ffer by Czechoslovakia, and that it had three
elements - but the persistent refusal of Hungara in counsel to acknowledge any flexibility at all
on the part of Czechoslovakia compels me to doso - and I apologize in advance to the Court,
which must by now be weary of hearing this. The three elements of Czechoslovakia's offer
29
CR 97/12, p. 74.
30
CR 97/13, p. 51.
31 Ibid.
32 CR 97/12, p. 71.
33
Ibid. (emphasis added). See alsoibid., p. 74.
34
Also contained in SM, Vol. 4, Ann. 76. Seealso, e.g., the proposed compromises in HR,
Vol. 3, Ann. 66.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -65 -
were: (1) To "compl[y] with the wish of the Hungarian side to conclude an agreement...on
the system of technical, operational and eco logical guarantees concerning [the Gabcíkovo
section of the Project]". (2) A proposal to conclude "a special agreement in which both sides
would pledge to limit or exclude peak operation of the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros System of
Locks". This proposal "was aimed at eliminating the fears of the Hungarian side of possible
ecological impacts of the peak operation". A nd (3) Czechoslovakia proposed "the abolition of
the provisions of the February1989 Protocol concerning the Nagymaros section and [a] return
to the timetable included in the October1983 Protocol"-in other words, delaying the
Nagymaros schedule by 15months -"to enable the Hungarian side to use this period for
studying the ecological questions . . . ". The Czechoslovak Prime Minister explained that
these "compromise proposals", as he describedthem, "proceed from the [1977] Treaty . . . and
fully conform to it", confirming once again thatCzechoslovakia treated the Treaty as being a
flexible, framework agreement. But I must re peat, Mr. President, that this package was
offered by Czechoslovakia at a meeting of Prime Ministers of 26 October 1989. If this is
evidence of "intransigence", one can only concu lde that for Hungary, "flexibility" must mean
saying, "Yes, of course, I'll sign absolutely anything you propose."
Why do counsel for Hungary persist in re fusing to acknowledge this and other clear
evidence of Czechoslovak flexibility and w illingness to compromise? It takes only a
moment's reflection to realize what Hungary's counsel are up to here: they wish to avoid at all
costs a declaration by this Court that the 1977 Treaty is in force. Therefore, their obvious, if
not openly-stated, purpose is to create the im pression that Hungary had no choice but to
abandon the Project because of Czechoslovakia's wooden and unreasonable "intransigence".
A purpose that is perhaps less obvious, but no less real, is to convince the Court that finding
the Treaty to be in effect would mean fo rcing Hungary to endure the unendurable: to
construct, and accept the operation of, every last detail-and for Hungary, every last
35
HM, Vol. 4, Ann. 28; SM, Vol. 4, Ann. 76.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -66 -
excruciatingdetail-of the so-called "Original Project "-and thus to capitulate to inflexible
Slovak demands. In short, Hungary would have th e Court believe that to find the Treaty to be
in force would be to force Hungary to dig its own grave. But Mr.President, Members of the
Court, this is a scenario built on a fantasy that exists only in the imagination of Hungary's
counsel. I have just reviewed one example ofCzechoslovak flexibility. Additional examples
will be referred to by Sir Arthur Watts tomorrow. But it is abundantly clear, even from the
single - yet important - example I have noted,that the Hungarian horror story bears not one
iota of resemblance to reality.
Thus Mr. President, Czechoslovakia can hard ly be said to have been inflexible, or
"intransigent". Nor by any stretch of th e imagination can Slovakia's position be so
characterized - as will have been obvious to anyone who listened at all, for example, to my
colleague Alain Pellet's pleading, on 27 March inthis Great Hall of Justice, on remedies. He
said the following ""Pour la Slovaquie, [la notion d'réversibilité'] signifie non pas le retour au
'projet original'... mais la mise en oeuvre du traité de 1977 tel qu'il a été
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -67 -
progressivement adapté, précisé et complété - et peut encore l'être ...". 36 Hungary's false
characterization of Slovakia's position betray s Hungary's defensiveness as to its own
intransigence: Professor Sands says "[t]he 1977 Treaty did not allow either party to impose its
37
will on [the] other[]" but he does not explain how this squares with Hungary's unilateral
suspension and abandonment of the Project, on which it never showed the slightest
willingness to compromise; and Hungary's counsel would like very much for the Court to
forget Hungary's attitude toward negotiationwith its Treaty partner in 1990-1991, which was:
"Yes, please, let's negotiate - but, of course, only with regard to the termination of the
38
Treaty."
Mr. President, I have responded to Hungary's charges of Czechoslovak inflexibility in
the specific context of Hungary's argument that there was a state of necessity. From what I
have said, it is clear that there was no such state of necessity. Even if we assume that there
39
was a "grave ... peril", which Hungary did not even attempt to demonstrate, it is obvious:
first, that any peril cannot have been "imminent" in view of the offer of the 15-month delay;
and second, that suspension and abandonment were not the "only means" of avoiding that peril
- the Czechoslovak Prime Minister had offe red to conclude new agreements on both
ecological guarantees and the limitation or exclusion of peak operation. But, Mr. President,
while I have demonstrated Czechoslovak flexibility in this particular context, the flexibility
and willingness to compromise of both Czechoslova kia and Slovakia is central to this dispute
36 CR 97/11, e.g., pp. 45 ("Pour la Slovaquie, [la notion de 'réversibilité'] signifie non pas
le retour au 'projet original'... mais la mise en oeuvre du traité de 1977 tel qu'il a été
progressivement adapté, précisé et complété - etpeut encore l'être ...."); and 53 ("la Slovaquie
ne se refuse pas à priori à des aménagements du traité .... ... [I]l s'agit d'apurer le passé et
d'organiser la transition").
37
CR 97/12, p. 70.
38
Hungarian Government Resolu tion 3507/1990, 20 December 1990, HM, Vol. 4,
Ann.153; Hungarian Parliamentary Resolu tion 26/1991 (IV.23.), 16 April 1991, HC-M, Vol.
3, Ann. 51.
39 International Law Commission, Draft Ar ticles on State Responsibility, Part One,
Art. 33 (1)(a), [1980]Y.B.I NT L L.C OMM 'N, Vol. 2, pt. 2, p. 34.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -68 -
as a whole. For it shows that to find that 1977Treaty is in full force and effect is a long way
indeed from forcing Hungary to lie in a Po rcrustean Bed. Suspension and abandonment were,
quite clearly,not the only means available to Hungary of averting the alleged peril.
40
Mr. President, Hungarian counsel ha ve professed to be "surpris[ed]" , and even
41
"astonish[ed]" at the argument that the availability to Hungary of the dispute settlement
procedures under Article 27, coupled with ample time in which to have recourse to them,
meant that suspending and abandoning were not the "only means" of avoiding the alleged
peril. But what does Hungary argue? Hungaryargues that its suspension of Nagymaros was
"necessary" because while any effect of Nagym aros on Budapest's water supply would, in
Professor Crawford's words, "[n]o doubt take some time to follow", the fact that the
42
Nagymaros barrage was under constructionin 1989 made the situation "imminent". But in
fact, under the Protocol of 6 February 1989 thatwas in force at the time, Nagymaros was not
scheduled to begin coming on line until 19 92 - severalyearslater! This is a strange notion of
"imminence" indeed. But it also bears upon the availability of other means of avoiding the
problem - such as raising it through the proce dures of Article 27. Of course, Hungarian
counsel's disdain for Article 27 might be understandable if the procedures under that article
were completely meaningless. Professor Valki suggests that no real dispute could be settled
by the lowly Plenipotentiaries. The trouble withthis argument is that the parties to the 1977
Treaty themselves obviously thought that real disputes could be settled by the
Plenipotentiaries, or they would not have bothere d to include this means of dispute settlement
within Article 27. (I might mention in passing that this is not at all uncommon; the famous
agreement concerning another of the world's major rivers, the Indus, contains exactly the same
40 CR 97/13, p. 37 (Prof. Valki).
41
CR 97/12, p. 15 (Prof. Crawford).
42
CR 97/4, p. 14.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -69 -
kind of provision. 43 It calls for disputes to be settled by the Permanent Indus Commission,
44
which consists of one commissioner from each of the two parties - just as in the case of the
Plenipotentiaries.)
As part of his attempt to belittle Article27, Professor Valki asserts that "Czechoslovakia
never once complained about the Hungarian fa ilure to invoke the Article 27 procedure". 45
Mr.President, the documentary evidence submitte d by the Parties speaks for itself: taking for
this purpose only the first major Hungarian breach, thv eery first responseof the Czechoslovak
Government to Hungary's decision to suspendwork at Nagymaros, a response handed to the
Hungarian Ambassador in Prague on 15 May 1989, st ated in part: "This step infringed the
provision of the Treaty concerning the solution of points at issue" 46- an unmistakable
reference to Article 27. This protest confirmsthe proposition that this means of avoiding the
alleged perilwas worth bothering with, contrary to the argument of Hungary's counsel.
The final point as to the first requirement concerns Professor Sands' argument that
Hungary's suspension of work in May 1989 was the only means of protecting its essential
interests because "[i]t was the only way to stop construction of Nagymaros and guarantee
47
Budapest's water." It will be clear from what I have already said, in particular from the
language of the CzechoslovakNote Verbaleof 30 October 1989, that suspension wasnot the
"only way" to accomplish these objectives. In fact, it was not even necessary to "stop
construction of Nagymaros" - because Czechoslova kia had already offered to put it off for 15
months. This is like saying you have to slam on the brakes of a car that is already in the
43 Indus Waters Treaty, 19 September 1960 (Indiaand Pakistan), Article 9, United Nations,
Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions concernn ig the Utilization of International Rivers for
other Purposes than Navigation, Treaty No. 98, p. 300, Sales No. 63.V.4.
44
Ibid., Art. 8.
45
CR 97/13, p. 35; also p. 38.
46
SC-M, Vol. 2, Ann. 10.
47 CR 97/12, p. 78.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -70 -
garage with its emergency brake on. That thee r was no need to suspend Nagymaros given the
extra time available, in that there was no needalso goes to the imminence requirement, which
I will come to in a moment. But all of th ese circumstances leave no doubt that the first
requirement was far from having been satisfied. As Judge Anzilotti put it in his individual
opinion in the Oscar Chinn case, decided by the Permanen t Court in 1934: "the plea of
necessity ... implies the impossibility of proceeding by any other method than the one contrary
to law."48
The second condition for the invocation of necessity is that the otherwise unlawful
conduct must be necessary to safeguard an "essential interest". There is really no significant
disagreement between the parties on this point:they both accept that safeguarding a country's
"ecological balance" has come to be considered an "essential interest". The problem is, rather,
whether Hungary's "ecological balance" was under a "grave and imminent peril" in 1989-
1990. This is the third condition for invoking necessity, to which I now turn.
On this condition, ProfessorSands says the following: "Why environmental necessity
cannot be invoked to justify further studiesto reduce uncertainty is unclear to me" . It was
also, evidently, "unclear" to Hungary. Mr.Pr esident, with apologies to my Francophone
friends, all one can say to that expression ofpuzzlement is, "Nous y voilà"! Hungary simply
does not understand the "very restrictive" condito ins for invoking a stateof necessity. But on
a purely factual level, Mr.President, this argument entirely misses the target. There simply
was no need to invoke necessity to justify the fruther studies that Hungary deemed necessary -
Czechoslovakia had already agreed to them! Otherwise on this condition, ProfessorSands
recycles the argument that suspension was n ecessary to prevent completion of Nagymaros,
adding that what he refers to as the "preventive and precautionary approach" made the peril
50
imminent . Aside from the fact that the precauti onary approach had barely begun to be
48 Judgment of 12 December 1934,P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 63,p. 65, at p. 114.
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid., pp. 78-79.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -71 -
formulated in 1989, Hungary's problem here is, yet again, with the facts. As I have already
noted, Hungary never provided any evidence of thekind of "grave peril" required to establish
a state of necessity. It did assert a risk to Budapest's drinking water supplies-but there was
nothing new in this: as my colleague Mr.Wo rdsworth explained earlier, all Hungary now
claims is that this risk became known thanks to a study by the Budapest Waterworks in "the
early 1980s" ! And what did that study recommend? It recommended this: "The channel
regulation downstream of Nagymaros must be planned with due concern for the [risk to the
Budapest water supply]." Mr.President, planning to avoid an identified risk, whether a high
risk or a low one, is certainly reasonable. Howevert,hatkind of risk - one that can be planned
for and avoided - is most certainlynot what Judge Ago or the ILC had in mind in formulating
its rules on a state of necessity.
Mr.President, I have about eight to te n more minutes. Should I go on? Thank you,
Mr. President.
The fourth requirement is that even where the conditions for invoking a state of
necessity are otherwise satisfied, a Stat e may not invoke this ground for precluding
wrongfulness if it "has contributed to th e occurrence of the state of necessity" 52. In this
connection ProfessorWillemRiphagen, a formerspecial Rapporteur of the International Law
Commission on State Responsibility, had this tosay during the Commission's plenary debate
on Judge Ago's proposed draft of what became Article 33 on state of necessity:
"Often, a situation in which a State's essential interest was threatened by a grave
and imminent peril could have been fore seen and avoided. ...Inevitably, that
implied assessing the internal policy measures that a State had taken, or failed to
take, and that had brought about, or contributed to, the situation of peril"
In the present case, Hungary admittedly knew about the possible risk to Budapest's water
supply at least since the early 1980s, as we have just seen, yet did not do anything about it.
51
CR 97/12, p. 53.
52 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 33(2)(c).
53 [1980]Y.B.I NT'L L.C OMM N, Vol. 1, p. 161.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -72 -
We do not know why. It may have concluded that adequate precautions had been taken, that
since the possibility was of remotedamage it would deal with it later-we simply do not
know. But what we do know is that having deci ded not to take preventive measures with
regard to this situation for the better part of a decade, Hungary could not claim in 1989 that
there was suddenly a state of necessity. And even if there was, Hungary would be precluded
from invoking it because its failure to take th e necessary preventive measures had clearly
"contributed to this situation of peril."
Mr.President, the fifth and final condition for invoking a state of necessity is that the
breaches whose wrongfulness Hungary wishes topreclude must not have seriously impaired
an essential interest of Czechoslovakia 5. Here, in five lines, ProfessorSands simply
characterizes the 1977 Treaty as a "building contract" and implies that, by definition, that
cannot be something in which a State has an essetn ial interest - certainly not one that compares
55
with Hungary's "essential and vital intere st in safeguarding drinking water supplies" .
Mr. President, this caricature of the interestof Slovakia and Czechoslovakia does not begin to
do them justice. Briefly: Did Czechoslovaki a, and does Slovakia, not have an essential
interest in protecting its population from devasta ting floods? Is there not an essential interest
in providing the 10 per cent of the country's energy that Gabcíkovo supplies? Did
Czechoslovakia not have an essential interest inseeing that its costly investment of billions of
dollars in the Treaty-Project should be utilized -and not left to decay and stand idle? And - a
most surprising omission, given Hungary's stratg ey - did Czechoslovakia not have an essential
interest in re-vitalizing the river branch system and protecting the water quality of the
Bratislava region-both clear aims of the 1977 Treaty? Hungary presumably chose not to
address these questions because it realized the answers to them are obvious: Hungary's
actionsdid seriously impair essential interests of Czechoslovakia - and now, of Slovakia.
54 Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 33(1)(b).
55
CR 97/12, p. 79.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -73 -
Mr.President, Hungary's defence of necessity for its suspension and abandonment of
works in the Gabcíkovo section is dealt with in one brief paragraph by ProfessorSands. He
says that the imminence of the diversion at Dunakiliti, coupled with the emergence of
concerns about the impacts on the Szigetköz, created a situation of necessity with regard to
56
suspension . And as to abandonment, he says that, "these factors when combined with the
refusal of Czechoslovakia even to discuss the future of the downstream sector or peak power
operation, continue to give rise to an enhanced state of necessity".
Let us first take the so-called "imminence of the diversion...at Dunakiliti". This
assertion is astonishing. It was Hungary's own PrimeMinister who advanced a proposal on
20 July 1989 for proceedingwith Gabcíkovo subject to a guarantees agreement. This
proposal was renewed in early October and, at the famous meeting of PrimeMinisters on
58
26 October, accepted in principle by Czechoslovakia. It is true that also on 20 July Hungary
had effectively postponed the damming of th e Danube at Dunakiliti for a whole year by
unilaterally suspending work at Gabcíkovo. But the point, Mr.President, is that Hungary
actually proposed proceeding with Gabcíkovo subject to an agreement on ecological
guarantees - that is, an agreementto safeguard Hungary against thepreciseperil it professed to
fear-and Czechoslovakia accepted in principle. How, then, Mr.President, Members of the
Court, how then, can Hungary claim that there was a peril, let alone that it was imminent?
So it was the expectation of both Partiesthat Gabcíkovo would proceed on the basis of
environmental guarantees-albeit a year behind schedule. In the meantime, on 27October,
Hungary explicitly abandoned Nagymaros and terminated the related construction contracts;
from that moment on, Nagymaros was non-negotia ble. But the fact remains that Hungary
itself had proposed to go ahead with the Project upstream, at Gabcíkovo.
56 CR 97/12, p. 79.
57 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
58 See CzechoslovakNote Verbaleof 30 October 1989, HM, Vol.4, Ann. 28; SM, Vol. 4,
Ann. 76.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -74 -
What, then, of the claim that ab andonment of Gabcíkovo was justified by
Czechoslovakia's refusal, in ProfessorSands' word s, "even to discuss...the future of the
downstream sector or a peak power operation"? Again, Mr.President, one wonders whether
we are talking about the same case. I have already shown that Czechoslovakia did offer to
discuss precisely these matters, at the 26Oct ober meeting of the PrimeMinisters. So
Hungary's factual basis for abandonment on the ground of necessity likewise disappears.
Getting back to the chronology, by the end of October1989, Hungary had abandoned
Nagymaros, but there was still on the table the offer of the Hungarian PrimeMinister to
proceed with Gabcíkovo subject to an ecol ogical guarantees agreement. But then,
Mr.President, the roof fell in. In January 1990, Hungary's PrimeMinister reneged on his
offer. By mid-1990, all Project contracts had been terminated. But Hungary does not even
attempt to show how "necessity" suddenly entered the picture to bring about this volte face.
Finally, in its Resolution of 20December1990, the HungarianGovernment formally decided
to proceed with negotiations to terminate the Treaty. And Hungary speaks of Czechoslovak
"intransigence".
Mr. President, there is no doubt that under these circumstances, circumstances fairly
bristling with opportunities for Hungary to avoidany perceived peril, there can have been no
state of necessity at Gabcíkovo, especially in the very restrictive sense intended by the
International Law Commission.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, that concludes my presentation. It has been a
great honour and privilege to appear before you and I thank you very much for your kind
attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you Professor McCaffrey. The Court will suspend and
resume tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc -75 -
The Court rose at 1.00 p.m.
t016/HS/CR97/14/moc
Public sitting held on Monday 14 April 1997, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace, President Schwebel presiding