Public sitting of the Chamber held on Friday 8 June 1990, at 2 p.m., at the Peace Palace, Judge Sette-Camara, President of the Chamber, presiding

INTERNATIONALCOUROF JUSTICE
1
1 PLEADINGS,ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS

CASE CONCERNING THE LAND, ISLAND
l
t AND MARITIME FRONTIER DISPUTE
1 (EL SALVADORIHONDURAS :NICARAGUA intervening)
I

VOLUMEV
Replyof Honduras(Vol. II); WrittenObservationson the Application
forPermissionto Intervene, and the relatedOralArguments

COUR INTERNATIONALEDE JUSTICE

MEMOIRES,PLAIDOlRlEET DOCUMENTS
I

AFFAIRE DU DIFFÉREND FRONTALIER
TERRESTRE,INSULAIRE ET MARITIME

(EL SALVADORIHONDURAS ; NICARAGUA (intervenant))

l VOLUME V

Répliquàfin d'intervention,et procédureorale y relative requete FIETH PUBLIC SITTING (8 VI 90,2 p.rn.1

Presenr. [Seesitting of5 VI 90, 11 am.]

Mr. ARGUELL GO~MEZ:Mr. President, Membcrs of the Chamber. Bcfore
initiating my reply to the spçechesof the distinguishcd Agentsand advocates of
El Salvador and Honduras, 1wish to reaffirm the answer given to the quesuon
posed by the Chambcr te the Agent at the end of the last hearing.
The Chamber is correct in understanding thai Nicaragua accepts that it is the
Chamber which is properly seisedof an application by Nicaragua forpermission
to intcrvcnebeforeit in the cascconcerning the Land, Islandand Maritime Fmn-

tier Dispute (El Sulvadur/Honduras);and that Nicaragua recognizes that the
eventual decision of the Çhamber granting or refusing permission to intervene
will be bjnding and final.
1 would add that the language used inmy tïrst speechand quoted in the ques-
tion posed by the Chamber had the object of explaining the problem ïaced by
Nicaragua in rnaking the decision to corne before a Chamber, formed at the
behestof, and wilh the participation thai the 1978Rules of the Courtafford10,
the original Parties, and that will giva judgment that will be çonsidered as
rendered by the full Court. It was in no way meant to lirnit the effects of
Nicaragua'sApplication.
The only limitationwehave madc to Ouroriginal Applicationto the full Court
was that WC arenot putting at this moment before the Chamber any request that
it reconstitute itself or that it exclude from its own cornperulione mareriae
those aspects of the casc that Nicaragua had requested that the full Court
excludefrom the mandate of this Chamber.
These werc petitions originally üddressed to the full Court and which we

understand cannot be decided at this incidental proceedingon the Application
for permission to intervene. In ihis respwt, we quotcd Ihe Order of thc full
Court saying that thematter of intervention was an antenor question that had
to be dmided by this Chamkr. Therefore, what weare putting before the Cham-
ber is the simple and unconditional request to be allowed permission to inter-
vencin the present case bas4 on Article 62 of the Siatute, for the reasons which
we have givenfully inOurapplication, Ourfirst oral pleadingsand which we will
amplify in the prescnt hearing.
This novelproblem of intcrvening before aChamber has not been faccd in the
pastby potential interveningStates.Ithas made the whole question of interven-
tion- particularly the decision itself on whethtoapply for intervention- al1
the more dificult to take.
El Salvador has sought to take advantage of this dilemma which Nicaragua
has been îacing, by arguing in its Written Observationsto Nicaragua's Applica-
tion that . "Nicaragua is time barred or estopped from seekingchanges in the
procedural aspectsof the principal proceedings."
We did not pursue this argument at any length in Our first pleading &cause
Nicaragua was noi putting before the Chamber thc question of its reformarion

or reconstitution. This argument, ncvcrtheless,has been amplifieciby the distin-
guished Agent of El Salvador in his opening speechin stating:"Another reason
for our opposition IOthe Application by Nicaragua is that it is untimely." And
goes on to say: "Now El Salvador is fully aware that the time-limits provided by the
Statute and the Rules of Court have in the technical sense ben complied

with by Nicaragua. But we are also aware that the Chamber has a power
of evaluation to exercise in considering the Nicaraguan request. We will
respectfullyrequest the Chamber to reject the Nicaraguan application, not
kcause it fails to meet a technical requirement of thc Rules but because it
failstomeet the substantive requirements of the Statute."

Appatently El Salvador now contends that not only is Nicaragua barred from
seeking changes in the procedural aspects, but barred or estopped in general
from making this application.
1would not have extended any great comment on this point if it had stopped
here. After all, Agents are alloweda certain leeway inusing arguments that tran-
scendstrict legrillogic with thepurpose of givinga bitter taste to the other side's
well.But the same argument was used byMr. Highet as part of the second point
of his address in which he attempts ta draw some distinctions betwen the pres-

ent case and the previous Malta and Italian intervention cases, presumably -
since that is what his speech was about - to demonstrate why a jurisdictional
link may not have been nasessary then, but was certainly necessas. now. The
pertinent part of his statement says:

"The second distinction is that, in relative terms, the application of
Nicaxagua to intervene in this case - which was submitted only shortly
kfore the filingof the final written pleadings- cornes,relaiivelyspeaking,
far later than either the application of Malta or that of ItalyCO intervene
did in the past. These distinctions must surely be of some rclcvance to the
Chambcr in the exercise of its powers,based upon prudentlal discretion,
under Article 62, paragraph 2, of the Statute."

Beforegetting to the bottom af this argument, let us set the historical record
straight. Malta's Application for permission to intemene was received in the
Registry of thc Court on 30 January 1981, that is, three days before the time-

limit set for the filing of the last Counter-Memorialon 2 February 1981.
The Italian Application was receivedin the Registry of rhe Court on 24 Octa-
ber 1983,that is, two days before the time-limit set for filing the Counter-Memo-
rials on 26 October 1983.
In paragraph 5 of the Judgment on both these cases,the Court had this to
Say :

"The Special Agrocment, however, included a provision for a possible
further exchange of pleadings, so that even when the Counter-Memorials
of the Parties had ken filecl,the date of the closure of the written proceed-
ings, within the meaning of the Article 81, paragraph 1, of the Rules of
Court, would remain still to be finallydetermined."

Presumably, the judgment rendered in the present case will contain a similar
reminder since the SpeciaIAgreement in this case also contains a similar provi-
sion.
But the differenceof this case from the other two is, firstly,that this applica-

tion was made on 17 November 1989, one month before the end of the time-
limit set for thc Replies and, secondly, that on 20 April 1988Nicaragua had
aven warning Ehatit had Article 62 of the Statutc under active consideration.
This communication went further in that it unequivocaliy conveyed the view728 DISPUTE(EL SALVADORIHONDURAS) [5: 13-15]

Mernorials were filed, when the Replies wcrc pending and, besidcs, the possi-
bility of Rejoinder was open.
kt us suppose Nicaragua had filcdits Application kfore the Counter-Memo-
rials were filcd. Then, if it was admitted, two situations woiild have presenied
themselves :
(CI) Nicaragua would haveben givcnits one shot at a writtcn statement imme-
diately.This would mean that the main Parties would havehad the occasion

of the Reply and the possibility of a Rejoinder in which ta address the
questions posed by Nicaragua even if indirectly. And finally,after al1this,
they would stillhavethe opportunity of answeringsquarely Nicaragua's one
wntten statement.
(b) In order to avoid the disadvantage posed to Nicaragua in the above circum-
stances, Nicaragua could have ben given a chance to present its written
statement to coincide with the filingof the Replies. But what would have
happened to the possibility of a Rejoinder? Would the Parties have ken
forced io renounce this right in ordcr not to have an unfair advantage over
Nicaragua?

5. And finallyon lhis point, in the present circurnstances the Parties are not
in agreement as to the objcçt or scope of the Special Agreernen:. In the present
circumstances it is only logical to have waircd for a clearview of the Party's
positions in order to determine the object of ourinterventionand the extent of
our legal interests.
My conclusion gencrallyis that it is more logical and fairer for an intervener
in the circumstances of Nicaragua to have waitcd until the endof the written
pleadings in order tobe perfectlyçlear what intercsts, if anycould be aKectd.
The fact that we gave ample noticc of our intention - which is not obliga-
tory - should Say enough about the good faith with which Nicaragua has pro-
ceeded.
Mr. President, we have attempted to explainhow Nicaragua views the law on
intervention based an Artrcle 62 of the Statute. In defining this position,we

were facedwith the difiïculty that the classical litesature on the subject is scant.
Dr. Rosenne refers to this Fact in his treatise on The Lüw wd Pracrice ofrhe
Internuriona Clourtof Justice (2nd ed., p. 431) in the foltowingfashion: "These
is no judicial experiencof discretionary intervention . . ." And I would add that
in so doing and describing it as "discretionary", unwittingly points to theFact
that the rcfcrcncesto intervention in the standard texts rnayeven be misleading.
This is certainly not the fault of bad scholarship, but undoubtedly it is due to
the fact that judicial theory and thinking arc dcveloped and promptcd by judi-
cial experiencc
For this reason we have had recourse on numerous occasionsta quote what
we have wnsidered to be the most knowledgeable and up-to-date opinions on
the subject particularly in iight of the two cases that have preceded the present
one brought by Nicaragua In many cases, thcscopinions haveben prcciselythe
disscnting opinions of somc of the Judges of the Court. Just as Professor
Bowctt, in discussing the question of a need for a jusisdictional link, felt the
nced to acknowledge his "indebtedness to the scparate opinion of Judge Mbaye

in the Isaliun Inferventioncasc", so too 1 must acknowledge the cnormous
intellectiial debt with his opinion and that of his colleagues in both cascs, in
shedding light on a most difiïcult subject.
Having said this,1wish to emphasize that our Application for permission to
intervene is not hascd on a particular interpretationof Article 62 that ignorcs
the previous decisions.Quite the çontrary, and in spite of our opinion as to the equality of rights, which has nevertheless never been transformed by the
same States into a condominium";

and further on in the subniissions:

"to adjudge and declare that the community of interests existing between
El Salvador and Honduras as coastai States bordering on the Gulf implies
an equal right for both to exercisetheir jurisdictions over maritime areas
siruated beyond the closing-line of the GulT".

It is obvious from these paragraphs that the so-called "community of inter-
ests" sought by Honduras to be declared by the Chamber, isnot an abstract con-
cept, but one thathas very concrete and rcal eîTects.
The second paragraph of the previous quote makes this absolutelyclear. Hon-
duras wants the Charnbcr to declare that this so-called "community of inter-
ests", and again 1quote "irnpliesan equal nght for both to exercisetheir juris-
dictions over maritime areas situated beyond the closing-line of the Gulf". In
other words, this "community of interests" gives Honduras sovereignty over
thousands of square milesof the PacificOcean.
1 will not try rhc impossible, that ista think up better arguments than the
learned advocate of Honduras, so 1 will borrowsome of his own arguments.
Therefore,rnyaliegation thcn is that al1the arguments made by Honduras to the
effect that the aspects of this case that refer to the El Salvador contention that
there is a condominium necessarily involvesNicaragua are also arguments and
good rcasons for sayingthat the contention that therc is this thing calfed a
"community of intcrests" within the Gulf also necessanly invalvesNicaragua.
(cJ Another of the divisionsthat I am following from Professor Bowett is the
point that here both Honduras and El Salvador maintain the position that if
thc Chamber decides that the Special Agreement calls for a delimitation inside
the Gulf, then this process can take place without affecting the interats

of Nicaragua.
Just a moment ago, 1 read some Iines from the Honduraa Written Observa-
tions to this Application to the effect rhat theattribution of sovereigntyover cer-
tain islands within theGulf could affect the delimitation of the Gulf. 1hasteto
point out that if Honduras thinks that any delimitation in the Gulf could tum
on the decision on the sovereigntyof some islands, then what of such items
as navigation routesin a Gulf whose mouth is less than 29 miles wide and the
reasonabfe security interests of the riparians.
So in spite of the statemcnt from counselof Honduras that il was no use for
the Agent of Nicaragua saying that it was obvious that any delimitation would
affect Nicaragua's rights, because it was not obviaus at all, the Agent of
Nicaragua reaffirms that it is perfectlyobvious by just looking aa map.Coun-
sel for Honduras made the followingstaternent of fact which does not reflect
reality.He said:

"The existing HonduranlNicaraguan delimitation under the 1900Treaty
runs from the terminai point of the land bonndary, which is hcre, following
median line principles to Farallones, this group of isIands here"
1 do not know what is the purpose of this statement. Perhaps to induce on the
Chamber the fe~ling that the 1300 dclimitation with Nicaragua practicaIIy

reaches to the mouth of the Gulf. In any case,the statement is simply not truc;
it1s not even in question. If anything, this type of statement should evince the
obvious need far Nicaragua to be permitted to defend its legal intercsis thaare
being affected bythis case. (d) The final contention of Honduras is that it has an entitlement to a mari-
time area outsidc the Gulf and that the Court should determine the delimitation
line. El Salvador, of course, denies this; but it also denies, as does Honduras,
that this determination and possible delimitationcould affect Nicaragua's legal
interests.
Since 1 do not want to use the word "obvious" again, let me point out whal
any chart shows Nicaragua and El Salvador are the only riparians situated at
the mouth of the Gulf at less than 20 miles of distance from each other. Now
cornes Honduras with its allegation of a "community of interests" that sup-
posedly gives it a right to launch an enormous protrusion into the Pacific
and Nicaragua is supposedly not affectedby this cunous contention.
If the delimitation in the Pacific were between El Salvador and Guatemala
or betwecn Costa Rica and Panama, Nicaragua would be interestcd in the
outcome but its legal interests would not be ipso facto affected as they are in
this case.
The determination sought by Honduras on this point affects the legal interests
of Nicaragua.
Anyeventual delimitation affectsthe legalinterests of Nicaragua. Whether the
protuberance into the Paciftc sought by Honduras hangs to the south into

Nicaraguan territorial waters or nses inio the north into Salvadorean tetritory,
certainly aîTectsthe legal intcrests of Nicaragua. This point wialso be fucther
elucidated éy Mr. Brownlie.
After reading what 1 had wntten and just finished reading at this moment, 1
reaiized that, again, we are ctearly pointing out what the legal interests of
Nicaragua are, and in what way they can be affected by the case before the
Chamber. I point this out because the Agents and advocates of Honduras and
El Salvador had failed to sec them clearly indicated in Our Application and in
our first oral pleading, in spite of the cfforts by counsel and Agent for
Nicaragua.
To end my arguments, there is one very dificult topic which1addrcssedin my
opening speech and at which 1will take another stab. It is the matter of the
jurisdictional link as a safeguard of the inviolabilityof the principle of consent.
In this respect, a distinction must be made. There is the consent to a pro-
cedurewhcnthe agreement or the parties is togo before the Court or to submit
a difference to arbitration. The other type of consent is ko the subject matter
that will be submittcd to this procedure.
Those who lock themsclvesinside the protcction of the jurisdictional link are
really proteekingwhat we could cal1the procedural consent. The othcrs who do
not see the need for this link when casesare brought before the Court wish to
proiect the subject rnatter consent.
If potential partics want to protect both types of consent given intheir agree-
ments, they should resort to arbitration. There they will find theconsolationof
the absolute pnvacy of their procedure but, if they want the authority of the
Court, they must accept that the main conmrn is to respect the subject matter

consent. That is why in my opening speech I said that the consent of the third
Party - and not that of the original parties - is a necessary must once it is
seen that it has legal interests that might be affectcd by the decision.
1frankly feel that it is bad policy to read int~ the Statute a protection that is
affordcd by arbitration. The prescnt instance is a good example. Why did the
original Parties chooseto corne ro the Court instead of resorting10arbitration?
It can not be becausc the decision will be more binding ktween them than an
arbitral award. The real reason is that a decision givenby the Court willhave for
third parties- in the present instance, Nicaragua- al1 theeffectsprovided for732 DISPUTE (ELSALVADOR/HONDURAS) [s:221

in the Charterand theStatuteand that wouldnot be thcaseif itwerea matter
of an award.
Mr.President,Membersof the Chamber, with this 1end rny second spwh.
The orderof the speakers willbe Mr. Brownlie who willaddress the principal
pointsof the legalintercsts of NicaraguaandProfessorRemiro the objeçt of
Our Application;both will generallmake comments on thespeeches of their
colleagues. REPLY OF PROFESSOR BROWNLIE
CQUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNUENT OF NICARAGUA

ProfessorBROWNLIE: It is an honourtabe able to address this Chamber
once again. Indeed, to takc parinthese proceedings involvesthe discharge of
the responsibilitiesof counsel verypleasant cirçumstances. We are witnesses
to the first appearance of Ihe Republicof El Salvador in the International Court
and thc reiations of the various teams have been very friendly and CO-operative.
The one qualificatio1would make to this happy picture is to say that the
geneeralcharacter of the oral pleadings or El Salvador and Honduras, but espe-
cially the former,has ken a little frustrating.
Their counscl havein gcneral failed to use the oral pleadtogadvance the
arguments ina constructive way and have thus failed to give Ihe necessary assis-
tance to the Charnber.

Counsel for El Salvador and Honduras delivered speeches whichappeared to
have been previously prepared and the content of which essentiallyignored the
tïrst speechesof Nicaragua.
Nicaragua would rcspectfullyrequest the Chambeto take note of the çonsid-
erablc extent to which both El Salvador and Honduras have fatoreact to the
Nicaraguan arguments on the issue of legal intcrest.

THE AUTI~ORIT TOYBE GIVEN TO PREVlOUS DEC~S~ONS
OF THE INTERNATIONA COURT

Mr. Prcsident, 1 shall moveon to a second general issue,namely, the signifi-
cance of judicial preccdent in the Court.
My colleague, Mr.Lauterpacht, has cmphasized the duty of the Chamber to
apply the lawasstated by the majority of the Court in a previous decisionof the
Court (6 June, afternoonj
HF has also stressed that the decisions of thc International Court "ave
special autbority" whilst accepting that there is "no Formal rule of binding
precedent" within the system of the Court.
Mr President, with your permission, sinca major elcment in my argument
involvcd the authority of the decision in the ltuIriferveniicase,F would
likeIOreturn to the questioof precedent, if onvery bricfly.
The prcmise must be that the Charnber has the same degree of flcxibility as
the full Court in these mattcrs and thereforeour position bears no toltheon
Factthat this is a Chamber case.
That being said, threc points cal1for clarifi:ation

Firsr: CounseEfor thc principal Partics have made no attempt to conrradict
the specificpoints madeon behalf ofNicaragua conccming either the autbority
of the decision of 1984 or the perfectly legitimate means availablc for distin-
guishing that case in the present pmccedings.
El Salvador has avoided detailed response, whilstcounsel for Honduras has
stated that hc is not impresse"by the precedent in the Italian case" (Profes-
sor Bowett,TJune, morning), and offercd some criticism of the course of action

adopted by the Court in that case.734 DISPUTE (EL SALVADOR/HONDURAS) [5:24-26]

Secondly :As a matter of general principle the procofsdistinguishing is very
well recognized in the practice of the International Court. Thus Judge Sir
Hersch Cauterpacht has recognized that: "The Court has not committed itself
to thc viewthat it is bound to followits previous decisionscven in cinwhich

it later disagreeswith thern."
I-Iowever,Sir Hersch goes on to state that the Court has adopted a polig of
judicial consistencywhich must co-exisrwith the process of "distinguishingIn
his wards: "No Iegalrulc or principle can bind the judge to a pre~edentwhich,
in al1the circumstances,he feels bound to disregard." These arc passagefrom
the classic work The Develupmen~of Internationni Law by the znlernutional
Court, firstpublished in1934 and revised and published as a second edition in
1958(pp. 13-14),
In his workon the Court, Dr. Rosenne presentsa similar picture and empha-
sizes the elerncntof continuity and consistency in the work of the Court.
He then continues:

"Corresponding tothis is the care evinced by the Court not fomallyto
overrule carlier deçisions but rather, where necessary, to try to explain
away, usually on the ground of some factual particularitan earlier deci-
sion which it feels unable ta follow. The attitudes adoptedin 1961 and
1964 in the 'Templeof Preuh fihiheurand the 'BarcelunaTmccion'cases
towards the 1959decision in the Aerial Incident' caareillustrative af this
process, and of the relative character of the rcquirement of censistcncy of
jurisprudence (which is probabIy the guiding element in this aspoct of the
Court's work)."

That is taken from his work, The Law and Practice of the Internationril Court
(2nd ed., reviscdand published in 1985,p. 613).
Thirdy: it followfrom the second point that Nicaragua'smodest suggestions
as to the possibilitof distinguishing the decision of 1484do not involve any
element of noveltyeithcr of principle or of practice

THERECOGN~T~ OF THE EXISTENC EF LEGAL INTERESTS
OF NICARAGUA IN ISSUE

There is another general issue touching directly on the question of
Nicaragua's Iegalinterest and that is recognition.
With one exception - Professor Bowett - counsel for the principal Parties

have maintained whal one may presurne to lxa deliberate silence on that sub-
ject. The principlc has not been mcntioned and the specificexamples given by
Nicaragua havenot ken contradicted.
Professor Weilwas completelydiscret and we stiil await his viewson this sub
ject.
Professor Bowett, showing a certain amount of real nerve, devoted a whole
paragraph to the subject (7 June, marning). In this paragraph he fails to address
the very precise wayin which the argument was expressed by Nicaragua in the
first round. In the resulthe usesthe argumcnt fhat because Honduranowc1aitt.w
that dclimitation inside the Gulf does not affect Nicaragua, tactualformula-
Lionson the position in the Gulfin the pleadings cannot involverecognition of
elernentswhichmust impingc directlyon Nicaraguan legal interests.
In general, Mr. President, counsel for both El Salvador and Honduras have
been remarkably reluctant to face up to the legal implications of the contents of
their own written pleadings iri tcase.736 DISPUTE (EL SALVADORIHONDURAJ) [5:28-31]

The analysis willprocd on the basis of the permutations presentcd in the
speeches of my colleagues Profcssor Weil and Professor Bowctt, the purposc
king to contravert their assertions that no Nicaraguan legal interest is involved
in the proceedingson the basis of the Special Agreement.
However,before the analysisis undertaken, 1would like to take up what Pro-
fesser Weildescribcsas the first stage, whichis the interpretation of the Special
Agreement. As the Chamber is awarc, El Salvador and Honduras are at odds

over the application of Artic2eof the SpecialAgreement within the Gulf.
Article 2 contains thc request to the Chambeto determine the legalstatus of
Iheislands and the maritime areas,
In parenthesis, 1would say that 1do no2 propose to discuss the question of
islands whichhas been referrcd to by Professor Remiro in the first round and by
the distinguishcd Agent of Nicaragua this afternoon.
In my submission the preferred interpretation of Article 2, that which corre-
sponds with ordinary good sense, is that it includes both the issues of overall
status of theGulf und the contingent or alternative issuc of delimi~ation.The
presump~ionmust be that the ciause was intcnded to be reasonably effectiveand
to comprehend the family - the entire famil- of interrelatcd legal issues.
From this flowsa further submission. Given the drafting of Article 2, given
the coastal geography of the Gulf, and given the principles of maritime delimi-
tation as they have dcvcloped since the Truman Proclamation, there is a very
strong presumption in our submission lhat theissuespresented to the Chamber
for decision would impingedircctly upon the legal interestsof Nicaragua.
It must follow that in the precise circumstances of the Gulf, and its ramifjca-
tions beyond the closing-line, the parties who seek to deny the existence of
Nicaraguan interests have the burden of proof.
Moreover, the issueswhich Flownaturally from the provisionsof Article 2 of
the Special Agreementdo not depend, as my friend Professor Weil frequently

suggests,on a seriesof mere hypotheses.
Mr. President, there are hypotheses and hypotheses.
The stalement that tomorrow the sun may disappear from the sky isa hypo-
thesis and no more than a figrnenof the imagination
The various legal solutions relating to the Gulf involvecornplexpermutations
of law and fact. They also can be descrikd as hypothcses but they represent
contingencies rooted in realisticanalysis of the IegaIand factual data.
Mat Counsel for ElSalvador refers to as hypoheses are in fact the issues
which the Chamberis aske do determine.
Without extreme artificiality, it is dificulr to see how resolution of those
issuescan bc carried out without the legal interests of Nicaragua being affected.
Mr. President, 1 shall now proceed with rny analysis of the permutations
presented in the speechesof Professor Weiland Profcssor Bowetr.

1.THE WATERS WITIIINTHE GULF IN THE PRESENCE
OF A RÉGIME OF CONDOMINIUM

The position of El Salvador is that there is a condominium which affects all
threeripariansin the Gulf, but that lhere is no legalcfoncNicaragua because
ihe decision of the Central American Court in 1917ha5 the effectof resjudicutu.
Therc is then the alternative thesis that, in any event, the decision of 1917is
binding on El Salvador and Nicaragua inler se.
Counsel for Honduras took the same position and made the concession that
therefore Nicaragua's legalinterest could be said to be affected.738 DISPUTE(EL SALVADOR~HONDURAS) [5:33-35]

Mr. President, thcre is simply no way in which it bencredibly arguai that
Nicaragua has no legal interest whicmay be ufjecredby a delimitation within
the Gulf.
The fact that ulrimurelyHonduras might have a corridor tothe Pacific, in
which caseonly Honduras would be involved inthe extension of the 1900lineto
the closing-lineof thGulf doesnot alter thecase.At the prcscnt stage the other
possibility is on the agenda,

Honduras has created an imaginary lineX (which appears as the midpoint of
the closing-rine)to Y(on the Honduran coast). And this was demonstrated by
my colleagueProfessor Bowett yesterday.
Aslines go it has much to commend it. It has Iength, it has regularity, it has
a continuous bcaring.
Ils purpose was to establish that Nicaragua has no claim to the western part
of the Gulf.
But this concept has no geographical or historical reality, and the line itself is
simply a tactical ploy.
firom the point of view of the Chamber - and forthis purpase also of
Nicaragua - it leaves completely intact the delimitation agenda within the
Gulf.
Neither hofessor Weilnor Professor Bowett confront this issue squarely.
Professor Weilrelieson the 1900Agreement which is,of course, a line form-
ing part of an incompleteagenda of delimitation in the Gulf.
The El Salvador role is to set aside on the basis of the alleged binding effect
of thc deciaration of 1917 the whole question of delimitation. ElsewherPro-
fessor Weilaffirms that El Salvador takes no position on thlinesof dclimita-
tion as proposed by Honduras (C41CR9013,p. 44).
Professor Bowett kas more or less the same dificulty in approaching this
question (C41CR901 4p. 39-41).The relevant passage inhis speech relates to
the part of his argument on methodology ashe calls it.
He tefers to thewestern tcrminus of the 1900boundary between Honduras
and Nicaragua and incorreçtly identifiesils location as the AgforNicaragua
has already had occasion to point out today.
Professor Bowett then says(CUCR3014,p. 39):

"And indeed, wheneverthis line is, in the future, extended to the closing-
line of theGulf. whatever its actual coursc may be, it musl surely lie in the
eastern sector. So that future line will not be prejudiced."

With respect, thisfailsto address the real issue,which is that the Chamber will
face the problem of completing the delimitation within the Gulf. The 1900

boundary appears tobe incomplete and it mattersnot whether its terminus lies
within this or that scctor of the Gulf.
Professor Bowett a1so says that El Salvador "essentially,makes no claim to
any delimitation within the Gulf(C41CR901 4.40).But ,f course, that not
decisive.
The Chamber willact under the mandate conferred by the Special Agreement.
It isperfectly possible that the condominium thesis wilEno1 be adopted and
indeed Honduras has ask~dfor a delimitation within the Gulf.
Such a delimitation will take place withinthe framework of the SpecAgrw-
ment and the pleadings ovcrall.
Moreover, as Nicaragua pointcd out in the Iirst round in its Counter-Merno-
rial (pp. 162-164)Honduras has contendcd that El Salvador cannot rely on a
line of strict equidistancc in the mouth of the Gulf.[s:35-37] REPLY OF PROFESSORBROWNLlE 739

III THE WATER SUTSIDETHE GULF ASSUMING
THAT HONDURAS ISEXCLUDED

1 turn to anather permutation employed by Professor Weil.This is the situa-
tion in which Honduras is excluded from the waters outside the GulK In this
case counsel for El Salvador Statesthat the rights of Nicaragua vis-&vis El Sal-
vador "demeurent évidemmentintacts'"(C41CR9013,p. 45).
With respectto my colleague, thiscannot conclude the matter. At the present
stageof the pleadings,we do not know whether Honduras willbc excluded From
the waters outside the Gulf. The fact that Nicaragua has to listen to counsel for
Honduras giving such an assurance as to its rights that 1sNicaragua's rights is
itself evidence that Nicaragua has a legal interest wmay k effected in the
waters outside the Gulf.
As to the waters outside the Gulf P~Q~~ssoB ~owett stressesthat the metho-
dology adopted by Honduras deliberately avoidsarcas relevant to future delimi-
tation between Honduras and Nicaragua (C4lCR9014, p. 43).
Even if thisbe accepted,forthe purposes of argument, it is question-begging.
Mr. President, the proposition that Nicaragua's interests areprotected on the
assumption that Honduras is aven access to areas outside the Gulf is far from
reassuring. First of all, it is contingent on the Chamber's determination.
But, more importantly, isis simplyirnplausibleto argue that the recognition of
Honduran nghts outside the Gulf willnot affectthe legalinterests of Nicaragua.

For when Counsel for Honduras refcrs to the mid-point on the closingline he
is speaking of methodology and he is not waiving the rights which rnight in
future be claimed oncea presenceoutside the Gulf had been givenlegilimacy in
principle by a chamkr.
In fact Professor Bowett in his speech admits this possibility.As he says "Rie
Court's delimitation will simply determinc whis to be Nicaragua's neighbour
for purposes of a future delimitatio(C4tCR901 p.44.)
Professor Weiltends to avoid theproblem by relyinon the position of El Sal-
vador that the Chamber does not havecornpetencc to efïect a delimitation either
inside or outside the Gulf (C41CR9013,pp.45-47).And in his vicw theissue of
cornpetenceis purcly bilateral (ibp.,46).
With respect this cannot prxlude the issue of how Artic62 is to be applied
On this argument even intervention as such would be excluded wheneverjuris-
diction was based upon a spacial agreement.
And, again, the possible prejvdice to Nicaragua's interesis no less real
because it depends upon a contingençy the substance of which is highly prob-
lematical.
Ms President,1have now completcd my analysis of the main permutations
applicable to the problems which,on a provisional view,fa11within the mandate
of the Chamber according to the Special Agreement.
By way of conclusion, I would point to several persistent naws in the argu-
ments prestnted against Nicaragua on the subject of lcgal interest.
First,counsel on the other side constantly argue on the basis that, if, if
certain conclusionsare reachcd, then Nicaragua's legalinterests willnot be
affected.

That 3snot the point. The questionis,on the basis of the Special Agreement
and the statc of the written pleadings on the merits, what are the legal interests
of Nicaragua whichmay be afj'pc~ed.
The concept is one of risk of prcjudice and not actual prqudice.
Secandly, the other side havc fai10daddress the question of the standard of
proof in relation to Article 62.740 DISPUTE (ELSALVAUOK/HONDURAS) [5:371

My friend ProfessorBowett has picked up the Factthatin the first round it
was staied on behalf of Nicaraguathat the applicaritStatenecd only show a
good arguabledaim or claims.Of course,this statementwasapplicableprecisely

with referenceto the contentof a legal intercstForthe purposc of Article 62.
The claims concernedareto the existence of legal interestswithin the terof
Article62.
Mr. President,1 would thank you for your courtesy and thatof your col-
leagues. REPLIQUEDE M. REMIROBROTONS

CONSElL DU GOUVERNEMENT DU NICARAGUA

M. REMIRO BROTONS: Monsieur le président, Messieursles membres de
la Cour, puisque j'ai la possibilitéde m'adresser de nouvcau à vous, permettez-
moi de vous indiquer que pendant ce tour de parole j'aborderai les points, déjà
trait& dans ma plaidoirie, dans la mesuroù les considérations faitespar les
agents et les avocatsdes Parties au différend soumisà la Chambre le requièrent.
II ne scrt à rien de finasser ni d'occuper le temps des illustres membres dc la
Cour dans des considérations superflues.
Mon intervention d'aujourd'hui sera plus brèvque celle de mardi et, je vous
le garantis, elle ne pasaaussi rapide. Que les interprètesen soient rassurés
1. Dans le climat de cordialitc où se déroulecette instance je dois cependant
vous signaler qu'in'ya pas eu de véritablecontradiction quant aux arguments
du Nicaragua relatifsà l'objet de l'intervention.

IIn'y adonc aucune raison pour que le Nicaragua modifie la position exposke
pendant le premier tour de parole.
El Salvador, le seua se prononcer sur cctte question, considèreque le Nica-
ragua n'a pas dûment prkisé l'objet de sonintervention. Si cette affirmation,
dépourvuede toute base, etait exactc, nQUSdevrions admirer l'extraordinaire
capacitéde l'agent et des conseillersdu Nicaragua pour tenir occupéspendant
des heures lcs illustres membres de ceCour avec de telles banalités,dans un
discours vide de contenu. Moi-mêmej,'ai consacré une bonne partiede ma prc-
mière allocution à préciser l'objetde I'intervcntion du Nicaragua. Dans le
compte rendu, ce sujet- si M. Lauterpacht nous permet d'uliliser ce syno-
nyme - comprcnd plus de treize pages(CR, 5juin 1990, CR90/2 p. 8-22),Je
m'étonne enconstatant comment nous sommes parvenus à parler autant d'une
chose dont nous n'avons riendit? S'ilest vrai que nous avonsdit quelque chose.
2. En générall,'exigencede l'article81, paragraphe 2, al6)Edu Règlement
de la Cour est utiliçte d'une manièreredondante par ceux qui contestent l'inter-
vention.Lorsqu'un requérant est accuséde ne pas avoir précisel'objet de son
intervention, il est en réaliteaccusé,une foisde plus, d'une absence de précision
dc sesintérêts.
Tout d'abord, le requkrant se voit attribuer qu'pasndémontrédes intérëts
d'ordre juridique susceptibles d'êtremis en cause Ensuite, dans une dcuxième
phrase, IIcst accusédu mkme fait, mais cette fois-ci, sous une nouvelle cou-
verture On lu1dit qu'il n'a pas précisé l'objetde son intervention parce que,
dit-on, in'a pas préciséses intbrets. II semblerait que, dans ce domaine, le
non bisin idemn'a pas su aboutir.
3. 11existesans aucun doute*un rapport étroitentre I'intéretsusceptible d'être
mis en cause et l'objet de l'intervention. J'oserais mcme dire qu'il est extrême-
ment dificile dc développerun discours sur I'objetde l'intervention sans se réfé-
rcraux intérêts juridiques susceptibles d'êtarfefectés.cessdeux questions
sont, conceptuellementparlant, bien distinctes, raison pour laquelleellesfigurent
dans des alinkas séparésdc l'article 81,paragrap2,du Règlementde la Cour
et, comme M. Sctte-Camara l'adit:

<<Lesdeux problèmessont diffêrentset ne coïncident ni dans leur signifi-
cation ni dans leurimportance pour la décisionde la Cour.)) (Op. diss.,
arrêtdu 21 mars 1984,par. 52.) Ilme sembleévidentque l'objet de I'intervention ne peutEtrc accuséd'irnprk-
cis en argumentant que les intéretssont imprkis. Lorsque le Reglement nous
demande de préciser l'objetdc l'intervention il est en train de nous demander
que nous indiquions ceque nous prétendons faireavecdes intérctsdont t'exis-

tence et l'éventuellemise en cause sont dkji démontrées.Cçci nous est précisé-
ment demandépour que l'intervention répondcà la nature de cet institut et non
point à autre chose. Comme l'a dit M. Ago:
«Si onI'a fait, c'est évidemrncntpour s'assurerque I'Etat désireux d'in-
tervenir ne se propose réellementque de protéger l'intérêt allég coéntre:les
atteintes pouvant découlerde la décision en l'affaireopposant entre elles les
parties principales, sans chercher à introdui-e sous apparence d'interven-

tion mais en réalitésur une tout autre base- une instance nouvelle et dis-
tincte contre l'une ou l'autre des partiea l'affaire en coursou contre les
deux à la fois» (Op. diss., arrêtdu 21 mars 1984. par.5.)
Que prétendons-nousainsi? Informer uniquement la Cour de nos iniérêts?
Essayerde les protégeren évitantque la Cour se prononce sur un aspect du litige
pouvant causer préjudiceauxdits intérêts? Peut-êtreobtenir une décisionqui les
reconnaisse au détriment desprétentionsdes parties? En ce qui nous concerne,

nous avons dkjaindiqut, clairement, ce que nous prétendons: protégerles inté-
rêtsjuridiques duNicaragua en empêchantqu'ils soientréeilementaffectéspar la
décisionquant au fond. Etsien pleinjour quclqu'uns'obstineàdire qu'ilfait nuit,
nous ne pouvonsque nous attendre qu'ilsoit leseulàcontinuer àlecroire.
4. Un conseiller d'El Salvador nous a invité a faireun bref «excursus»
sémantiquesur la signification en français du terme objet;sur ses acceptions et
ses synonymes en anglais (cf. CR du 6 juin 1990, p. 68-70). Objet en français
peut autant signifier«objectn que (subject». Bienquejc ne sois pas la personne
la mieux indiquéepour me prononcer sur la richessedc la langue française, en
toute modestie pourrais-je, néanmoins, remarquer qu'en dépd ite la polyvalence
du terme objet, la langue française connaît aussi un terme ccsujei>dont le.
champ sémantiqueest plus large, équivalantau mot ({subject))qui mmme nous
le constatons n'est pas aussi lointain?
Quoiqu'il en soit,je dois signalcr que le Nicaragua a ioujours su que lorsque
le Réglernentde la Cour, dans sa version française, parlede l'objede I'interven-
tion IIse réfèreà sa fin, à son propos, h son objectifet non point à la matière
sur laquelle il porte. En effet, dans sa requêteet lors des audicnms orales, le
Nicaragua s'est justement et largement rtférk à la tin de l'intervention, aux
propos de l'intervention, à l'objectif de I'intervention.

5. Mais puisque l'objet (object) de l'intervention estconstruit sur l'ob(sub-
ject)du litige et l'objet (object) de I'interventiondu Nicaragua n'affecte qu'un
seul aspect de l'objel(subject) du diffkrendcomplexeet plunel entre te Honduras
et El Salvador, il s'avkraitobligatoire dc concrétiser,de preciser, de spécifier,de
particulariser, de localiser, de situer et de centrer l'objet de l'intervention du
Nicaragua sur le sujet du différend.Voilàtout ce qiic nous avons fait en limitant
d'un point de vue matériell'objetde notre intervention. J'imagineque la Cour et
les deux Parties nous en sont reconnaissantes compte tenu des doutes que susci-
tait notre intérêatu diffkrcnd insulaire.
6. Alors que le concept de l'objet dc I'intervention paraît êtreclair pour
EI Salvador, il l'applique üsscz mal. Ce qui est gagnésur le dos du diable esc
dépensé sous son ventre. Et, comme il est bien connu, la foi sans les Œuvresest
morte en elle-meme.
On nous dit que le Nicaragua décrit le sujetde sa requête maisqu'il n'exprime
pas ce qu'iIprétend(CR du 6juin 1990,p. 67 et suiv.).S'ilen est ainsi pourquoi[5: 42-44] REPLIQUE DE M. KEMIROBROTONS 743

se plaignent-ils du fait que I'objetest impricen argumentant précisémenq tue
le Ni~aragua nc seprononce pas sur la situation juridique du golfe et des espaces
adjacents, qu'il n'avouepas s'ilest ou non d'accord avec le condominium. Qu'il
nc manifeste pas s'iaccepte ou non que le Honduras possede des espaces mari-
times i I'extkrieurdu golfe. Et même qu'ilne se prononce pas sur la portéede
l'articl2, paragraphe 2, du compromis du 24 mai 1986.Est-ce réellementtout
ce que réclame I'article81, paragraphe 2, alinéab), du Règlementde la Cour
pour El Salvador? Respecte-t-on la logique de I'objet de l'intervention, telle
qu'El Salvador la présente,lorsqu'il est dit que l'objet n'estpas pricis parce
qu'on ne spicifie ni lesdroits revcndiquksni comment seront-ilsmis en cause par

l'arrêtA venir?
7. La requêtedu Nicaragua est-elle réellement critiquée p,arce que l'on pré-
tend que le requérantse prononce dèsmaintenant sur des aspects concernant le
fond de l'affaire?Mais l'objetde l'intervention nc peut Etreni confondu ni idcn-
tifiéavecun prononcésur des questions de fond.
Ce ne sera qu'une fois admise a intervenir que la Républiquedu Nicaragua
pourra prendre légitimementposition dans la mesure où cette intervention
aurait étéautorisée.Comme M. Schwekl l'a dit en se référant a un autre
requerant :
((S'ilesvrai que l'Italie,unfoisadmise à intervenir, auraeu à prouver
le bien-fondéde son indrêtd'ordre juridique pour obtenir satisfaction au
fond, cette:preuve n'étaitpas nécessairepour qusa demande d'intervention
fût accueillie. Exigercettc preuve revenait a l'obliger à défendreet soutenir

une cause qu'elle n'était pas admise à présenrer.))(Op. diss., arrêt du
21 mars 1984,par. 5 ;cf. aussi M. Sette-Camara,op. diss., &id, par. 65.)
Devons-nous rappeler une fois de plus que la portée de l'article 2, para-
graphe 2, du compromis du 24 mai 1986est questionnéepar les Parties? El Sal-
vador, en tant que coauteur du compromis du 24 mai 1986,n'est vraiment pas
en mesure de donner des leçons sur la précision, cequi doit ëtre certainement
compris comme unc démonstrationde virtuosité diplomatique
8. Actuellement, il sufit donc que laCour parvienne à la conviction que
primnfucie des intkrêtsjuridiques du Nicaragua pourraient êtremis en cause par
sa décisionsur ledifférend lui ayant étsoumis.
Pour afirrner cette conviction le Nicaraguaa largement fourni les renseigne-
ments nécessaires.Si avant-hier, un touriste étaitentre dans cette magnifique et
imposante grande salle de justice, en entendant certains propos ici prononcés,il
aurait bien pu penser que le demandeur de l'intervention au différendmaritime
cntre le Honduras et El Salvador est un petitpays insulaire perdu au milieu de

l'oEst-ce que nous devons rappeler que le Nicaragua est, avec les Parties au di!--

fércnd,le seul pays riverain d'un golfede 700 milcs de surface et de 19 miles
d'embouchure, considérkpar les trois Etats comme une baie historique dont les
eaux sont qualifiéesd'eauxintkrjcures?Est-ce que nous devons rappeler que l'un
des pays riverains affirmela condition de condominium pour le golfe? Et, lcs
intérêts juridiques detsroipays,ne sont-ils pas en jeu lorsqu'une telle chose est
affirmée?Existe-t-il uninteret juridique plus susceptibled'etre mis cn cause par
une décisionde la Cour?
9. Le fait qu'El Salvadorse base sur la sentence de la Cour centraméricaine
du 29 mars 1917 pour affirmer ce régime(cerégimede condominium) et pour
argumenter que les intérëtsjuridiques du Nicaragua ne seront pas affectes,quelle
quc soit la décision prisepar cette Chambre, car selon lui l'arrêde 1917 esi
chosejugéeentre El Salvador et le Nicaragua (CR du 6juin 1990,p. 40 ct suiv.),[5146-48] REPLIQUE DE M. REhlIRO BROTONS 745

réglementaire comme cellede 1978; et ils se seraient encore moins bien cornpor-

tésen suivant la manière proposéepar le professeur Highet; la quatrième pro-
position est inappropriée;quant à la cinquième,clle révtledu talent crcatif; la
sixièmejoue a l'échanged'absurditéset ce n'est qu'à partir de la septikme que
l'on articule finalement une thèsecontradictoire à cclle que soutient le Nicara-
gua. Il s'agitd'un discours bien connu.
13. Autant les uns que les autres, nous représentons des positions opposées
devant la délicate quesiion. Et pour répliquer i la these soutenue par
Et Salvador il me suffitde vous renvoyer à l'argumentation soutenue dans la
deuxième partiede ma plaidoirie de mardi (CR 9012 du 5 juin 1990, p. 22 et
suiv.) qui bien sûr n'a pas convain~u le professeur Highet, mais je l'espère,
convaincra les juges dc cette Chambre. II s'agit maintenant de chercher, de
comparer et de choisir.
Néanmoins,je voudrais souligner que desriérechaque position se cachent des
conceptions bien distinctesen ce qui concerne la nature et la fonction de la Cour.
La nôtre répond, d'une part, i une vision institutionnelle et proprement judi-
ciaire de la Cour et, d'autre parila confiance que celle-cigarantit toujours la
propriétéde l'exercicede la juridiction par-dessus la volonté absolue des Parties
au compromis. Peut-être,pour cetteraison, tout cn étant plus réticentsavez la

méthodedes chambres, nous sommes plus respectueuxde leur autorité une fois
constituées,que ceux qui prêchentla méthode pourdiminuer ensuite la taille de
ses applications d'une maniérequi n'est pas toujours subtile.
14.L'institut de I'intcrvention est justement conçu pour permettre l'exercice
appropriéde la juridiction en conférantà 1'Etaitiers la sauvegarde de sesinté-
retsjuridiques au moment ou les Partics au compromis ont invitéla Cour à leur
octroyer cesrnEmes intkrets
Si, vu cet objectif, l'interventiondtpendade la dtrnonsiratian d'un lienjuri-
dictionnel entre 1'Ftattiers et les Parties, la Chambre devrait, immédiatementet
d'ofice dans le cas qui nous intéresse,reconnaître l'impropriéti:de L'exercicede
sa jundiction sur le différendmaritime entre le Honduraset El Salvador puisque
les intérêtjuridiqucs du Nicaragua constituent une partie inséparablede l'objet
du litige tel qu'ila étéposé,dans la mesurc où l'ondiscute le statut juridique des
eaux du golfe et que tout titre à l'extérieurdu golfeest conditionnépce statut.
L'institude l'intervention strictement limitéei l'objet propre correspondant a
sa nature constitue un mécanismede défensepermettant de combattre unc utili-
sation impropre de la Cour. Je voudrais ici rdppeler que si la Cour ne s'est pas
expressémentprononcke sur I'exigcnccou non d'un lien spkcialdejuridiction, ce
fait, ne peut être interprétédans le sens que la majorité silencieuse de ses
membres soutient cette exigence. Par contre, la majoritédes juges- la grande
majorité desjuges - qui ont &mis leur opinion l'ont fait pour la refuser. Une

majoritéqui nc se limite pas auxjuges qui divergkrentdu dispositif de l'arrêt du
21 mars 1984.
Et rappelons l'ancien juge,M. Morelli, puisqu'ilaktc citépar M. Highet (CR
du 7 juin 1990, p. 223.L'autoritéde M. Morelli, l'un des plus éminentsspkcia-
listes du droit procidural international selon les termes de l'ancien présidentde
liaCour, M. Jiménez deArechaga (op. diss, arrêtdu 21 mars 1984,par. 6), fut
déj8invoquéelors de l'affairede l'intervention de l'Italie autant pour soutenir la
Ihèsede I'exigcncedu lienjuridictionnel que pour la contester (cf.CR du 25jan-
vier 1984,CR 8412, p. 54et suiv.,et du27 janvier 1984,CR 8415,p. 46 et suiv.).
Et meme, dans le premier sens,soutenant la thèsede l'exigencedu lien de juri-
dicéion,l'opinion individuelle de M. Jiménezde Aréchagarecueille une large
citation d'un travail M. Marelli dans la Rivisra didirflto internmionalepubliée
en 1982 (cf. op. ind.,cil.par. 6) qui a vraiment plu à l'avocat d'ElSalvador.Cependant, si nous lisons directement cette publication et, qu'au lieu de nous
arrêterà la page813, nous poursuivons un peu plus jusqu'a la fin, nous remar-
querons facilement que M. Morelli soutient une IPiésccontraire, si je ne me
trompe, qui détruit de fait cette exigence, l'exigence d'un lien juridictionnel
spécial.
En effet,d'apr6s son aiguëfaçon italienne de voir les choses,le compromis dcs
Parties pour recourir i la Cour supposerait, selon M. Morelli, une offre irrévo-
cable pour consentir à l'intervention de I'Etat tiers. Une oKrequi serait acceptée
par celui-ci en prksentant la requête prévue par l'article 62 du Statut. Ainsi, je
regrette d'êtreporteur de mauvaises nouvelles, mais M. Morelli ne figure préci-
sémentpas au rang ou l'avocat d'ELSalvador croit le trouver.
16. Passons maintenant à un autre point. Le Honduras ainsistésur le fait que
le Nicaragua n'est pas partie et n'entend pas1'Ctrepuisqu'ilréserve cette qualifi-
cation aux protagonistes, et non ce que avons appeléune intervention impropre
(CR 9014du 7juin 1940, p.46). Le Honduras se montre dans ce sens particuliè-
rement préoccupé par lcs conséquencesde l'admissionde l'interventiondu Nica-

ragua. II ne s'oppose pasà une telle intervention- en cequi concerne le statut
des Cauxdu golfe - mais il ne souhaitepas que, en tant qu'intervenant, le Nica-
ragua dispose des droits des Parties, en particulier, disons-le clairement,du droit
a nommer un juge ad hoc.
Malgré l'affirmationexpressequeles conséquencesdel'interventionn'ajoutent
rien au problèmeccntral par lequel il faudrait decider si le Nicaragua doit être
ou non admis à intervenir (obs., p. 2) le Honduras a consacrt une partic de sa
plaidoirie à prendre enconsidiration cesconséqucnces(CR du 7juin 1990,p. 46
et suiv.),en ignorant délibérémen qtue l'agentdu Nicaragua a indiqué,en temps
voulu, que de telles conskquencesne faisaient pas partie de la requêted'inter-
vention formuléeà la Chambre (CR du 5juin 1990,p. 16).
17. Yu l'insistancede la part du Honduras, nous devons riitérerce que nous
avons déjàindiquéau cours de Iasession de mardidernier (CR du 5 juin 1940,
CR9012, p. 44-45). Lc débatsur les çonséqucnccs de l'intervention duNicaragua
ne doit point etre anticifi, la discrétionde la Chambre en examinant la requete
d'intervention doit Ctreexercée exclusivemene tn fonction des exigencesétablies
par l'article62du Statut. Er c'esttout comme l'adit M. Jennings (op.diss., arrêt
du 21 mars 1984,par. 9).
Si le Nicaraguaest admis à intervenir dans le diErend maritimc entre le Hon-
duras et El Salvador il faudra établi- et seulement alors- ses conséquences.
Le Nicaragua, naturcliement réclameraIcs droits qu'à son avis le Statut et le
Règlementde la Cour reconnaissent à 1'Etatintervenant sous l'égidedu principe
d'égalitéet Ic simple respect procédural.Dans ce sens il a manifesté qu'il se

considérera purrie intervenante.En tout cas, etcomme ledit le paragraphe 2 de
l'article 62 «la Cour décideii.
18. Pour conclure, en ce qui concerne certaines observations quiont étéfaites
icipar l'une des Parties(cf.CR du 6 juin 1990, p. 80 et suiv.),j'aimerais souli-
gner que la Cour n'a jamais rejeté-jamais rejcté- une requête a fin d'inter-
vention vériiubk,propre et sfriczrment limitéevisant Ia sauvegarde des intérkts
juridiques et, bien sûr, la Cour n'a jamais soutenu que I'acceptatîon de toute
intervention dépende du consentement des parties au différend.Dans ce sens,
personne n'a pu apporter une seule référenceL . es divergencesdans la Cour ont
tourné - dans le dernier cas résolu- autour de la qualification de l'interven-
tion demandk comme virilable, propre ou strictetnenilimitée,ou au contraire
impropre.
Par sa nature meme, la quaIification d'une requèted'intervention ne peut être
faite que cas par cas,en fonction de sescirconstances particulières. [5: 511 REPLIQUE DE M. REMIRO BROTONS 747

En conséquence,l'admissionde l'intervention du Nicaragua en l'espèce,invo-
quant l'article52 du Statut, ne signifieraitdans le registrCourlarien d'autre
que cette Chambre s'est trouvée devantla première possibilitéde rendre opéra-
tionnel ce précepte.
Le fait que dans lecas preddents - pas trèsnombreux d'ailleurs - laCour
ait rejetéles requêtesd'interventione signifie pas quc les requeies d'interven-
tion doivent toujours êtrerejet&
Au-delà de toute considération la Cour doit tenir compte de son propre
Statut, y compris l'article62. Comme l'a dit M. Sette-Camara:

«l'intervention ... c'est la voie de recours appropoureprotégerles inte-
r&tsdes tiers dans une affaire contentieuse pendante. C'est un instrument
indispensablepour la bonne administration de lajustice, son opportunit6 et
son efficacité:... il est importanmême nécessairede conscrvcr I'inslitu-
tion...» (op diss., arrêt21 mars 1984,p. 84-86).
' Et si un organe de la Cour parvient à la conclusion quelesconditions de l'ar-
ticle 62 ont étksatisfaites, l'obtention est aussi simple que naturelle: I'interven-
tion devraitêtredonc autorisée.
Monsieur le président, Messieursles membres de la Cour, j'arrive à ma fin.
J'espèreavoirsatisfaitce que je vous avais promis, de la clardeela concision.
Je vous remerciede l'attention que vousavez bien voulu me porter etje tiens à
vous manifester tout mon respect dont je fais part aussi à toutes les personnes
qui interviennent à ces audiences.

L'audience,suspendue d 15 h45, es1repriseà 15heures REPLY OFPROFESSOR BOWETT

COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF FIONDURAS

Dr. VALLADARES SOTO: Ms. Presidcnt, 1 would respectfully ask the
Chamber 10 givethe floor to our counsel, Professor Bowett.
The PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER. Yes 1 give the floor to Professor
Bowett.

Mr. BOWETT: Mr. President, 1 am grateful to you for affording me this
opportunity. 1willbeas briefas possibleand 1 must ask you toexcuseany inco-
hercncein rny remarks.They corne frorn the difficultyof those listening to inter-
ventions and drafting replies to thcm at one and the same time
1 must start, Mr. Prcsident, by expressing a certain disappointment in the
answer givenby the Agent for Nicaragua as to the Court's question. As1under-
stood that answer,it really leavesopen the possibilitythat Nicaragua will pursue
or may pursue a further recourse to the full Court either to rcconstitute ihis
Chamber or to seck a division of the subject-matter of this dispute into what
Nicaragua terrns its "territorias"opposed to its "maritime" aspects. AI have
already indicatcd,Mr. President, in the view of Honduras, ihat division is not
only ürtifici-l it is quite simplyimpractical and it will not be possible for the
dispute between the twoParties to proceed on the basis of a division of that
kind, and it would be my submiss~on, Mr. President, that this Chamber is fully
campetent, in its cvcntual judgment, to express its own vicwsaboui the feasi-
bility or practicability afdivision of that kind in the subject-mattes of this
dispute.
1 think there are other mattcrs on which ihis Chamber is competent to rulc
and those relate to the incidcntal rights which anyinteruenor, such as Nicaragua,
has before this Court. In particular, 1would submit that isfor this Chamber

to indicate its viewsas to whethera non-party such as Nicaragua, intcrvening
under Article 62,has in factthe right to appoint an hoc judge and so require
a reformation of this Chamber. Those are matters which must surely lie within
the cornpetenceof this Chamber.
I sense a certain desireto downgrade the Chamber and to, as it wcre, see
the Court as exercisinga supervisory role above this Chamber. Mr. President,
for the purposes of this case, thc Chamber is the Court and 1 hope that it
will, as the Court, rulon al1 these matters to which 1 have just referred with
finality.
Now, 1turn now if i may,to the areas of contest ushichcounselforthe Appli-
cants have raised. Mr. Browniie raiher chided bolh El Salvador and Honduras
by not having faccd up to what he had said about recognition. 1must say in
reply that1 did not quite understand what his point was. Was he in fact saying
that Honduras hus recognized the legal interests of Nicaragua in the arca rcle-
vant to any delimitation betwccn Honduras and El Salvador? Was hc saying
that? Ifso,he needs to do more than just say iHe needs to demonstratc it and
that demonstration was lacking.
But as rcgards the elements of thc maritime dispute in which Nicaragua was
keen to show~hatit had a legal intereswe were lold that there iastrong prc-
sumption that the decisionwiliaffcct Nicaragua'slegal interest. Well of course,
whethcr the decision will affect thosc intcrests must, at this stage, always be a750 DISPUTE (EL SALYAOOR~HONDURAS) [s 5:6-58]

matter of presumption because we do not know what the decision will be. But

there can bc no question of a presumption about the legal interests. The obliga-
tion on the Applicant, asa would be intervcnor, is to dernonstrate that it has a
legal intcrcst, not to leaveas a matter of presumption - it must demonstrate
that fact. And 1 regret to say that, in everything we have heard Lhisafternoon,
that dernonstration of legalinterests has bccn totally laçking.
Now, as regards the legal interests of Nicaragua in the issue of delimitation,
and it is that that I reallywant to concentrate on, of course the Court has inde-
pendent powers to define any relevant area both inside and outside the Gulf so
as to proteet the interests of a third Party.The Court does not havto adopt or
accept the definition of the rclcvant area that Honduras has proffcred Forpur-
poses of its ownpleadings The Court has absolute freedom to identify its own
relevant area sa as to giveany necessary protection ta third pariy.
With that in mind, 1 want to just turn to the issueswhich have bcen raised by
Nicaragua, both inside and outside the Gulf. Let me start with inside the Gulf.
Nicaragua says that any delimitation is bound to depend, upon the islands,
therefore, it follows, or is supposed to follow, thata legal interest exists in
Nicaragua because Nicaragua is sovereign over some of the islands. Now, of
course the island in question is Farallones, here. Now, ifthe line, the delimitation

line,as between El Salvador and Honduras, liesanywhere,nnywherein this west-
ern sector, then Farallones bçcomes irrelevant to ~haldelimitation. Of course,
not to a future delimitation between Nicaragua and whoeveris sovereign of the
waters between Farallones and the new line. But Farallones is irrelevant tthal
delimitation between El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Then we werereferred to the problem of joining the 1900Treaty line from
Farallones to the closing-liae, here across the moutfi of thc Gulf. Now, even
assuming that the whole of this relevant area, the whole of it, were tu bc allo-
cated to El Salvador, the problem of continuing the boundary line rrorn Faral-
lones to the closing-lineacross the Gulf, ii would stillabproblem of adelirni-
tation to be effected by agreement bctween Nicaragua and Honduras And 1
stress by agreemetzf,because the suggestiowas made thatit would be somehow
the task of this Court. Not at all. Nicaragua is not intervening to have this
Court delirnitfor Nicaragua. That is an entirely future problern for resolution by
agreement between thc two Parties. And if, of course,evena part of this western
mtor is allocated to Honduras, then clearly rfortiorithe problem of determin-
ing the remainder of this sector of the 1900line, utothe closing-line,ia prob-
lem for solution by agreement betwccn Nicaragua and Honduras. The only pos-
sibility of a tripoint existing hein the area of the Farallones, which was the
possibilityrefened to by Professor Brownlie, wouldanse if we supposed that the
waters of El Salvador came east af this line X-Y, into the eastern part of the
Gulf, outside the relevantarea; this is certainlynatpossibilitywhich Honduras
would admit, and is not a claim which El Salvador itself has made, so al1that is

entirely hypothelical. My conclusion is that, as regards the waters inside the
Gulf, provided the problemof delimitation is confined to an area of theGulf in
whichNicaragua makes no daims - and 1 stress that we haveheard no claims;
we haveheard not a single claimby Nicaragua to any of the relevant areas as 1
havedefined it - on that assumption then, there is no possibleconfliçt with any
real legalinterest of Nicaragua.
Wehad abrief mention of navigational interesrsWhat are these navigational
interests? Has Nicaragua undertaken the burden of identifying to the Court
whst these navigationalinterests arc andhow they will be affectcd by your deci-
sion? Certainly not. We were not given any explanation as to how navigational
interests, unspecifiedby Nicaragua, will be affected by your decision.[s:58-59] REPLYOF PROFESSORBOWETT 751

1turn now to the waters outside the Gulf and, again, the crucial questiis
whether Nicaragua is making any claim to the maritime area being relevant for
the purposes of this case between El Salvador and Honduras. Now, the fact is
that we havehad no such claim. There has ken no claim. If there was a real
legal interest, there is the obligation upon the intervenor to identify that legal
interest to make the clairnas Izaly made a claim in the Lib~yalMul~caase.We
heard no claim of any kind. 1sNicaragua opposing the clairn of Honduras ro a
part of the closing-line even? I am not sure, having listened to counsei for
Nicaragua. But what 1 am clear of is that therhas been no exprcss claim tu
oppose a claim to part of the closing-lineby Honduras in the western sector that

is west of poinX and that is what matters for the purposcs of tcase.1sthere
any claimby Nicaragua toa maritime area to the west of ihat line, the perpen-
dicular projector fmm point X? Wehope not and if that is the case, then there
has been identificd to youno legal interest which could be jeopardized by your
decision, propcrlylimited to the relevant area.
And al1of thesearguments by Nicaragua fail, not only in not identifying the
legal interest which it invokes,but they fail also in that they do not grapple with
this Court's inherent powers to safeguard the interests of Nicaragua. And those
powers,as I mentioned the other day,derive not only from Article 59,which you
may regard as a somewhat formal protection, but they derive most jmportantly
from this Court's power to show and definethe relevantarea in a delimitation
question as to prevent any intrusion, or risk of intrusion, into ascas properly
claimed by a third State.
Mr. Fresident, that is aI1wish tosay and 1 am grateful for patience. CLOSING OFTHE ORALPROCEEDINGS

ThePRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER :Sincethere areno more speakers, 1
should like tothank the Agents and counsel of the three States represented
before the Chamber for thc assistance they have givenus by their ihorough and
learncd argument on Ihe issues arising oofthe Application by Nicaragua for

permissionto intervene in the case.IRaccordance with Article 54 of the Statute,
the Chambcr will now proceed todeliberaton the question whether that Appli-
cationshould be granted and its decision, itheform of a Judgment, will be
given assoon as passible.In accordance with the usual practio1,request the
Agents of the three Stateconcernecito semainai the disposa1of theChamber
for any supplementary information it may need. Subjectthercto1 declare the
presenthearingsclosed.

The Chumberrose al4.20pin.