Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on April 10th to 14th and on May 28th, 1951, the President, M. Basdevant, presiding

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

MEMOIRES, PLAIDOIRIET DOCUMENTS

.RÉSERVES A LA CONVENTION
POUR LA PRÉVENTION ET LA

RÉPRESSION DU CRIME

DE GÉNOCIDE
AVICONSULTDU28hIA1951 INTEIINATIOiVAL COUKL'OF JUSTICE

PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS

RESERVATIONS TO THE
CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION

AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE DEUXIÈME PARTIE

tenues ai Palais de la Paix, La Haye,
du IOau 14 avril et28emai 1951,
sous la firésiden111Basdevant, Président

EXPOSÉS ORAUX

PART II

PUBLIC SITTINGS

held at the Peace Palace, The Hague,
fromAfiril 10th to rqth, and on2811~gjr,
the President, M. Basdevant, pesiding

ORAL STATEMENTS PROCES-VERBAUX DES SÉANCES TENUES

DU IO AU 14 AVRIL ET LE 28 MAI 1951

PREMIÈRE SÉAXCE PUBLIQUEL (IOIV 51, II h.)

Présents: hf.I~ASDE~ANT P,résidenl; M. GUERREROV ,ice-Présiden;
MM. ALVAREZH , ACKWORTH W, INI.~RSKI,ZORICIC,DE VISSCHERS , ir
ARNOLD MCNAIR,M. KLAESTAD B,ADAWI PACHA,MM.READ,HSUMO,
AZEVEDOj,uges; M. HAHBRO,Grefier.

Présents également:
Dr Ivan S. Kenxo, Secrétaire généraaldjoint chargédu Département
juridique des Xations Unies, représentant du Secrétaire généraldes
Nations Unies, assisté de
M. Gurdoii \V. \VATILES,du Département juridique des Nations
Unies.

Les représentantsdes Gouver~tementssuivatits:
Républiquefrançaise :M. Charles ROUSSEAUp,rofesseur à la Iiaculté
de droit de Paris;conseiller juridique adjoint au ministère des Affaires
étrangères;
Israël: hl.Shabtai ROSENNE,conseiller juridique au ministère des
Affaires étrangère;

Royaume-Uni :M.G. G. FITZ&IAURIC CE,M.G., deuxième Conseiller
juridique au Foreign Office.
Ouvrant l'audience, lePR~SIDENT expose que la Cour se réunit pour
entendre les exposésoraux qui serorit préseritésdans l'affaire relative
aux réserves à la Convention vour la vrévention et la rémession du
crime de.génocide.
Par une résolution endate duIG novembre 19j0, I'i\ssembléegénérale
des Xations Unies a décidéde demander un avis consultatifà ce sujet.

Il prie le GREFFIERde donner lecture de cette résolution.

Cette lecture faite, leÉSIDENT rappelle que la requêtà fin d'avis
consultatifn fait l'objet des notifications d'usage. Conformémentà
l'article 66, paragrap2, du Statut de la Cour, elaeétécommuniquée
à tous les gou\,ernemeiits des Etats admià ester en justice devant la
Cour et à toutes organisations internatioiiales jugéessusceptiblelapar
Cour de donner des renseigiiemeiits sur la question.

' Sixièmeseance delaCour. MINUTES OF THE SITTINGS

HELD ON ..\PRIL 10th TO 14th, AND MAY28th, 1951

YEAR 1gj1

FIRW PUBLIC SITTING ' (10 IV 51, II am.)

Present : President BASDEVAY TVice-President GUEKRER OJtcdges
ALV.~REZH . ACKWORTH \,INIARSKIZ , ORICICD, E VISSCHERS ,ir Arnold
MCNAIR,KIAESTAD, BADAW IASHA, KEAD, HSU >IO, AZEVEDO;
Registrar HnhlBRo.

Also present:
Dr. Ivan S. KEHNO,Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the
Legal Department of the United Nations, representing the Secretary-
General of the United Nations,.assisted by
hlr. Gurdon W. \YATTLESo .f the Legal Department of the United
Nations ;

The RepresentatiuesO/ the following Gouernme~~ ts
French Republic : M. Charles Rouss~~u, Professor at the Faculty
of Law, Paris, Assistant Legal Adviser of the French hlinistry of
Foreign Affairs ;
Israel: Mr. Shabtai ROSENNEL , cgal Adviser of the Israeli hlinistry
of Foreign Affairs ;

United Kingdom : Mr. G. G. FrTznf2~uR1cEC ,.i\I.G., Second Legal
Adviser to the Foreign Office.
In opening the sitting, the PRESIDENT stated that the Court had
met to hear the oral statements to be submitted in the case relating
to the reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide.
By a Resolution dated November 16th, 1950 ,he General Assembly
of the United Nations had decided to request the Court to give an
Advisory Opinion on this subject.
He asked the Registrar to read the resolution in question.

The RECISTRAR read the relevant text.
The PRESIDENsT tated that the Request for an Advisory Opinion
had been notified in the customary manner. As prescribed in Article 66,
paragraph z, of the Statute of the Court, it had been communicated
to al1 the governments of States entitled to appear before the Court
and to ail international organizations which were considered as likely
to be able to furnish information on the question.
1 Sixth meeting of the Court. SEANCE DU IO AVRII, 1951
301
En outre, par application de l'article 63, paragraphe premier, et de
l'article68 du Statut de la Cour, la requêtede i'Asse,mbléegénérale a
étéégalement communiquéeaux gouvernements des Etats qui ne sont
pas admis à ester en justice devant la Cour mais qui ont étéinvités h
adhérer àla Convention sur le génocideen vertu de l'article II de celle-ci,
à savoir les Etats suivants : Albanie, Autriche, Bulgarie, Cambodge,
Ceylan, Corée,Finlande, Hongrie, Irlande, Italie,Jordanie, Laos,l\lonaco.
Portugal, Roumanie, Vietnam.
Tous ces gouvernements ont étéavisésque la Cour serait disposée à
recevoir de leur part un exposéécritsur la question à elle soumise pour
-vi...
D'RUI~L 1.;irt.coiisiilCirtUCi I'Orpani~ÿtiuiiiriteriiatioiiale du fra\.ail
ct I'Org;iiiis:~tionrlçiEtais ani;.ric:iins it;iieiit .iiiicel>tiblesde fournir
des renseignements sur la pratique des réserves enmatière de conven-
tions multilatérales, la Cour aavisé ces organisations qu'elle était égale-

merit disposéeh recevoir de leur part des exposésécrits.
Par une ordonnance en date du ICIdécembre rgjo, le délaipour le
dépôt des exposésécrits a étéfixéau 20 janvier 1951.
~a Cour aereçu du Secrétaire générald& Nations-unies un exposé
écrit ainsi que la documentation que celui-ci était char~é-e lui trans-
mettre.
Elle a reçu en outre, par ordre de dates, des obser\.ations écrites
émanant des gouvernements et organisations dont les noms suivent:
Organisation des Etats américains, Union des Républiques socialistes
so\piétiques,Royaume hashémite de Jordanie, Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, Israël, Orga-
nisation internationale du Travail, Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie,Pays-Bas,
République populaire de Roumanie, République socialiste soviétique
d'Ukraine, République populaire de. Bulgarie, République soviétique
socialiste de Biélorussie, République des Philippines.
La Cour a décidé detenir partir du IO avril, aujourd'hui, des
audiences au cours desquelles seraient entendus des exposésoraux.
Le Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies s'est fait représenter par
M. Ivan Kerno, Secrétaire généraa ldjoint chargédu Département jun-
dique, assistéde 31. Wattles. M. Kerno présentera un exposé oral.

Le Royaume-Uiii de Graiide-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord, la 1'rance
et Israël ont fait savoir qu'un exposéoral serait présenté en leur nom.
Les représentants de ces pays dans cette affaire sont :

Pour le Koy.îume-Ciii de (;railde-Bretagne et iI'lrl;iiide dii Sord :
sir Harrli,). Shaivcross, :\ttorn~y-Oeneral, 3 1 d 1. I:rtzri~aur~c<c,
clt:iixiCmcconseiller jtiridiquc au l:i>reigiiOthcc.

Pour la France :M.Charles Rousseau, professeur à la Faculté de droit
de Paris, conseiller juridique adjoint au ministère des Affaires étrangères.
Pour Israël: M. Shabtai Rosenne, conseiller juridique au ministère
des Affaires étrangères.

Le Président constate la présencedevant la Cour,du représentant du
Secrétaire générad les Nations Unies et de ceux des Etats susmentionnés.
II annonce qu'il donne en premier lieu la parole àM. Kerno, représentant SITTING OF APRIL 10th, IgjI 301

hioreover, as prescribed by the first paragraph of Article 63, and
by Article 68 of tlic Court's Statute, the Request of the General
Assembly had also been communicated to the governments of States
not entitled to appear before the Court but who had been invited to
sign the Convention on Genocide in accordance with Article II of
Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Korea,garia,
Laos, Monaco, Portugal, Romania, Viet Nam.

Al1 these governments had been informed that the Court would be
to it fortAdvisory Opinion.en statement on the question submitted

As the International Labour Organization and the Organization of
ation as to the practice of reservations in niatters of multilateralform-
conventions, the Court had also notified those organizations that it
would be prepared to receive written statements from them.

of written statements had been fixed at January zoth, 19j1. the deposit

General of the United Nations as well as the documents which he had
been asked to transmit.

ments and organizations in order of datess:The Organization of Americann-
States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan, United States of America, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, Israel, International Labour Organization,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Netherlands, People's Repubiic of Romania,
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, People's Repubiic of Bulgaria,
Byelomssian Soviet Socialist Republic, Republic of the Philippines.

The Court had decided to hold from to-day, April ~oth, public
sittings for the hearing of oral statements.
The Secretary;General of the United Nations was represented by
Mr. Ivan Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General iii charge of the Legal
Department, assisted by Mr. Wattles. Mr. Kerno would make an oral
statement.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France
and Israel had notified their intention of presenting oral statements.
The representatives of these countries in the case were :

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland :
Sir Hartley Shawcross, Attorney-General, assisted by Mr. Fitzmaurice,
Second Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office.
For France :M. Charles Rousseau, Professor at the Faculty of Law
in Paris, Assistant Legal Adviser to the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
For Israel: Mr. Shabtai Rosenne. Legal Adviser to the Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The President noted the presence in Court of the representatives
of the Secretary-General and of the other States mentioned. He would
first cal1 on Mr. Kerno, representative of-the Secretary-General, and302 SÉANCE DU II AVRIL 1951
du Secrétaire~énérad l es Nations Unies. et ensuite, selon l'accord inter-
venu à ce sulet, au représentant du Gouvernement d'Israël, puis au
représentant du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et enfin au représen-
tant du Gouvernement français.

puis le Président donne la parole à hl. KERXO,qui présente l'exposé
reproduit en annexe '.

L'audience est levée à 13 heures.

Le Président de la Cour :
(Sixné)BASDEVANT.

Le Greffier de la Cour :
(Signé)E. HAMBRO.

Présents:[Voir première séance.]

Le PRÉSIDENTo ,uvrant l'audience, donne la parole au représentant
du Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies.
M. Ivan KERN~reprend son exposé, qu'il termine (annexe)

Le PRÉSIDENTremercie le représentant du Secrétaire généraldes
renseignements qu'il a fournis à la Cour et donne la parole au représen-
tant du Gouvernement d'Israël.

M. Shabtai R~SENNEprésente l'exposéoral reproduit en annexe4.

(L'audience, interrompue à 13 heures, est reprise à 16 heures.)

Le PRÉSIDENTdonne la parole au représentant du Gouvernement
d'Israël.

M. Shabtai ROSENNE reprend son exposé6,dont la suite, interrompue
par la clbture de l'audience, est renvoyée par le Président au jeudi
12 avril,à IO h. 30.

L'audience est levée à 18h. 20.

[Signatures.]

Voirpp. 306-318.
' Septikme séance dela Cour.
a Voir pp.319-327.
D 328-339.
* 339-352. SITTING OF APWIL 11th, 1951 302

afterwards on the representatives of the governments in accordance
with the arrangement amved at with them.

The President calied upon Mr. Kerno to address the Court.
Mr. Ivan KERNO,Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations
in charge of the Legal Department, began the statement reproduced
in Annex '.

The Court rose at I p.m.

(Signed) BASDEVANT,
President.

(Signed) E. HAMBRO,
Kegistrar.

SECOND PUBLIC SITTING' (II IV 51, IO a.m.)

Present; [See first sitting.]

The PRESIDENT declared the sitting open and caüed on the repre-
sentative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. Ivan KERNOcontinued and conclnded his statement (Annex =).
The PRESIDENT thanked the representative of the Secretary-General
for the information he had given to the Court, and called on the
representative of the Government of Israel.

Mr. Shabtai ROSENNEpresented. the oral statement which is repro-
duced in the Annexa.
(The sitting was suspended at I p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.)

The PRESIDENT called on the representative of the Government of
Israel.
Mr. Shabtai ROSENNEcontinued his statements.
Before adjourning the sitting, the PRESIDENT stated that the Court
would meet again on Thursday, 12th April, at 10.30 a.m., when
Mr. Rosenne would resume his statement.

The Court rose at 6.20 p.m.

[Sig?iatures.]

aSeventh meeting of the Court.
See pp. 319.327. SEANCES DES 12 ET 13 AVRIL 1951
303

Présents:I\'oir première séance.]
Le PRÉSIDENTa ,près avoir déclaréla séance ouverte, invite le repré-
sentant du Gouvernement d'Israël à continuer son exposé.

La fin de l'exposéde M. Shabtai ROSENNE est reproduite en annexea.

Le PRÉSIDENT remercie le représentant d'Israël des renseignements
qu'il a fournisà la Cour et, avant de clore la séance,annonce que la
Cour se réunira de nouveau le vendredi 13 avril, à IO heures, pour
entendre l'exposéoral du représentant du Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni.

L'audience est levée à II h. 40.
[Signatures.]

Présents: [Voir première séance ;est également présentsir Hartley
SHAWCROSK S.,C.,.P., Attorney-General, représentandtu Gorrvernement
du Royaume-Uni.]

Le PRÉSIOENT,apr& avoir ouvert l'audience, ,donne la parole au
représentant du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.
Sir Hartley SHA\~CROSpSrésente l'exposé reproduit en annexe'.

(L'audience, interrompue i 13 h. 5, est repriseà 16 heures.)

Le REPRESENTANT DU GOUVERNEMEN DTU ROYAUME-UNrIeprend,
sur l'invitation du PR~SIDENTl,a suite de son exposés. Puis il déclare
que, rappelé dans son pays par les devoirs de sa charge, il ne sera pas
en mesure de terminer lui-mêmecet exposé.
Le PRÉSIDENT remercie sir Hartley Shawcross des informations dont
ila fait partà la Cour et annonce que la Cour se réunira de nouveau
le samedi 14 avril,à IO heures, pour entendre la fin de l'exposéoral
présentéau nom du Gouvernement britannique.
II prononce ensuite la clôture de l'audience.

L'audience est levée à 19 heures.
[Signatures.]

1Huitième sCûnce de la Cour.
'Voir pp.352-357.
arieuviemeseance de laCour.
Voir pp.358-375.
. 375-394. THIRD PUBLIC SITTING ' (12IV 51, 10.30 a.m.)

Present: [See first sitting.]

The PRESIDENT,after declaring the sitting open, called upon the
representative of the Government of Israel to continue his statement.
The conclusion of Mr. Shabtai ROSENNE'S statement is given in
the Annex '.
The PRESIDENT thanked the representative of the Government of
Israel for the information he had given to the Court and, before
adjourning the sitting, stated that the Court would meet again on
Fnday, April 13th, at IO a.m., when the representative of the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom would present his oral statement.

The Court rose at 11.40 am.
[Signalures.]

FOURTH PUBLIC SITTINGJ (13 IV 51, IO &m.)

Present: [See first sittin; also present Sir Hartley SHAIVCROSS,
K.C.. hl.P., Attorney-General. representative of the Gouernmentof the
United Kingdom.]
The PRESIDENT declared the meeting open and called on the repre-
sentative of the Government of the United Kingdom.
Sir Hartley SHAWCROSpS resented the statement reproduced in the
Annex

(The sitting was suspended at 1.5 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.)
The REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMEN OF THE UNITEDKINGDOM,
upon the request of the PRESIDENTc ,ontinued hiç statements, which
he was unable to conclude himself. having to get back on public duties
in his country.

The PRESIDENT thanked Sir Hartley Shawcross for the informatioii
he had given to the Court and stated that the Court would meet again
on Saturday, April 14th. at IO a.m., to hear the conclusion of the oral
statement presented on behalf of the British Government.
He then declared that the meeting was closed.
The Court rose at 7 p.m.
[Signatrcres.]

'Eighth meeting of theCourt.
'Sec PP. 352-357.
'Sinth meeting of the Court.
:Sec PP. 358-375.
" .. .. 375-394. CINQUIÈME SÉANCE PUBLIQUE' (14 IV 51. IO h.)

Présents : [Voir première séance.]

Le PRÉSIDENTo , uvrant l'audience, donne la parole au représentant
du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.
L'exposéde hf. G. G. FITZMAURIC est reproduit en annexe'.
Aprks avoir remercié lereprésentant du Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni des renseignements qu'il a fournis à la Cour, le PRÉSIDENT~O~~~
la parole au représentant du Gouvernement français.

Al.le professeurROUSSEAp Urésente l'exposéoral reproduit en annexe
(L'audience, interrompue à 12 h. 40, est repriseà 16 heures.)

M. le professeur ROUSSEAU s,ur l'invitation du Prbsident, reprend son
exposé qu'il termine.
Le PRÉSIDENT remercie le représentant du Gouvernement français
des informations dont il afait partà la Cour. Il prononce la clôture de
la procédure oraleet préciseque le Secrétaire générad les Nations Unies
et les gouvernements intéressésseront informésen temps utile de la date
à laquelle la Cour rendra son avis en audience publique.

L'audience est levée à 17 h. 45.

Présents : M. BASDEVANT P,résiden; M. GUERRERO V,ice-Présiden t
Mhl. ALVAREZ,HACKWORTH W, INIARSKIZ , ORIEIC,DE VISSCHEIIS , ir
ARNOLD MCNAIR,M. KLAESTAD B,AD.4\\.PACHAM , M.READ, HSU MO,
Juges ; hl. HAMBRO,Grefier.

Sont préseiztségalemen t
Les représentant s

du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande
du Xord ;
du Gouvernement d'Israël

En déclarant l'audience ouverte, le PRÉSIDENT signale que la Cour
tient une audience publique pour prononcer l'avis consultatif qui lui
a étédemandépar l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies au sujet des
réserves à la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime
de génocide.
Il prie le Greffier de donner lecture de la partie de la résolution du
16novembre rqgo.-ù est formuléela demande d'avis.
' Dixieme seance dela Cour.
' Voir pp.qoz-416.
a Q B 4'7-421. . -

: Q:arante-%t%ke séancede la Cour. SITTINGS OF MAY 14th AND 28th, 19j1 304

FIFTH PUBLIC. SITTING ' (14 IV 51, IO a.m.)

Present : [See first sitting.]

The PRESIDENT opened the meeting and called on the representative
of the Government of the United Kingdom.
The statement of Mr. G. G. FITZMAURICiE s annexed.heretoa.
The PRESIDENT,after having thanked the representative of the
United Kingdom for the information he had given to the Court, caiied
on the representative of the French Government.
Professor ROUSSEAU made the oral statement given in the Annex S.

(The sitting \vas suspended at 12.40 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.)
Professor ROUSSEAUu ,pon the request of the President, resumed
and concluded his statement '.

The PRESIDENT thanked the. representative of the French Govern-
ment for the information he had given to the Court. He declared the
oral proceedings to be closed, and,added that the SecretaryGeneral
of the United Nations and the governments concerned would be
informed, in due course, of the date on which the Court expected to
deliver its Opinion at a public sitting.
The Court rose at 5.45 p.m.

[Signatures.]
--

NINTH PUBLIC SITTING (28 v 51, 10.30 ~.m.)

Preseiit: President BASDEVAN TVice-President GUERRERO ; Judges
ALVAREZ,HACKIVORTH W,INIARSKIZ , ORIEICD, E VISSCHERS ,ir Arnold
MCNAIR, KEAESTAD,BADAWIPASHA, READ, HSU MO; Registrar
HAMBRO.
Also present :

The representatiues of:
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northem Ireland ;
the Government of Israel.

In opening the hearing, the PRESIDENT stated that the Court was
holding a public hearing to give the Advisory Opinion requested by
the General Assembly of the United Nations in the matter of reserv-
ations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.
He caüed on the Registrar to read the Resolution of Novemher 16th,
1g50. stating the Request for Opinion.
' Tenth meeting of the Court.
a See pp. 402-416.
= .. .,417.42'.
' ,, 421-430.
' Forty-firsmeeting of theCourt. SEASCE DU 28 MAI 1951
3O5
Le GREFFIERdonne lecture de ce texte.
Puis le PRÉSIDENT énonceque, conformément à l'article 67 du Statut,
le Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies et les représentants des Etats
qui ont pris part aux débats oraux dans la présente affaire, à savoir:
Israël, le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord et la
France, ainsi que les représentants des États et or anisations interna-
tionales directement intéressés ont étédûment prgvenus.

Aprèsavoir indiquéquela Cour, en application de l'article 39 duStatut,
a désigné commedevant faire foi le texte français de l'avis, lePrésident
donne^lecture de cet avis '.

Il prie le GREFFIER de donner lecture en anglais du dispositif de l'avis.
Cela fait, le PRÉSIDENT fait connaître que hl. Guerrero, Vice-Prési-
dent, sir Arnold McNair, MM.Read et Hsu Mo,juges, tout en admettant
que la Cour est compétente en l'espèce,déclarent ne pouvoir se rallier
à l'avis de la Cour et se sont prévalus du droit que leur confèrent les
articles57 et 68 du Statut pour joindre audit avis l'exposé commun de
leur opinion dissidente. D'autre part. M.Alvarez, dans la mêmesituation,
a joint à l'avis l'exposéde son opinion diidente. Les auteurs de ces
opinions ont informé le Président qu'ils ne désiraient pas en donner
lecture. Après avoir indiqué que lesdites opinions dissidentes seraient
jointes au texte de l'avis, le Président lèvel'audience.

L'audience est levée à II h. 30.

[Signatures.]

' Voir publications de la Cour, Recueil des Arréis.Avis coruullati/et
Ordonrrances 1951, pp. 15-69, SITTISG OF atAY 28th. 1gj1
305
The RECISTRAR read that text.
The PRESIDENTstated that by application of Article 67 of the
Statnte the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the repre-
seritatives of the States which had taken part in the oral proceedings
in the present case, namely, Israel, the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland and France, and the representatives of
States and international organizations directly concerned had been
notified.
By application of Article 39 of the Statnte, the Court had decided
that the French text shonld be the authoritative text. The President
read the French text of the Opinion'.
He called on the Registrar to read the operative part of the test
in English.
The REGISTRAR read tliat text.
The PRESIDENTstated that Vice-President Guerrero and Judges
Sir Arnold McNair, Read and Hsu Mo, while agreeing tliat the Court
was competent to give the Opinion, declared that they were unable

to concur in the Opinion of the Court, availed themselves of the right
conferred on them by Articles 57 and 68 of the Statute appénding
to the Opinion the common statement of their dissenting opinions.
Furthermore, Judge Alvarez, in the same situation, had appended to
the Opinion the statement of his dissenting opinion. The authors of
these opinions had informed the President that they did not wish to
read them. These dissents wonld be appended to the text of the Opinion.
The Court rose at 11.30 a.m.

[Signatures.]

' See Court's publications,Repvrls O/ Jiidpxents.Aduiso- Opiniotts aird
Ovders 1931,pp. r5-69. ANNEXE AUX PKOCÈS-VERBAUX

ANNEX TO THE MINUTES

[Séancepubliqite du 10 avril Ig51, matifz]

&Ionsieur le Président, hiessieurs les Membres de la Cour,
Une fois de plus, j'ai le grand honneur de paraître devant la Cour
en qualité de représentant du Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies,
dans une affaire pour laquelle l'Assemblée générale demande un avis
consultatif.
Dans le passé déjà, à cinq reprises différentes, vous m'avez donné
l'autorisation de faire un exposé oral pour des questions importantes
pour lesquelles l'Assembléea voulu recourir aux lumières de la Cour.
Le problème de l'effet juridique des objections formulées par certains
Etats contre des réserves à laConvention du génocideest certainement
égalementune question importante et, en me présentant devant la plus
haute juridiction mondiale, je sens pleinement ma responsabilité.
La prévention et la répressiondu crime de génocideont été pendant
longtemps et demeurent des sujets auxquels l'Assembléegénéraledes
Nations Unies porte le plus vif intérêt.Dès la deuxième partie de la
première session de l'Assemblée, celle-ci a adopté unanimement une
résolution affirmant que le génocideest un crime de droit des gens que
le monde civilisé condamne, et pour lequel les auteurs principaux et
leurs complices doivent étre punis. Cette résolution a. étéconfirmée,
au cours de la deuxième session, par une résolution nouvelledeI'Assem-
bléequi a déclaréen outre que le génocidecomporte des responsabilités
d'ordre national et international pour les indiv?dus et pour les Etats.
Après destravaux prolongés de divers organes qui ont agi sur les instruc-
tions de l'Assemblée,le texte définitifde la Convention sur le génocide
a étéélaboréet approuvé au cours de la première partie de la troisième
l'Assemblée générale, M. Evatt,Paaidéclaréque l'adoption de ce texte de
constituait un événementqui ferait époque. II a ajouté que ic'est
l'organisation des Nations Unies et d'autres organes avec elle, qui seront
chargés de contrôler l'application de la Convention sur le génocideet
leurs interventions se feront au nom de la loi internationalr.
Il ne saurait donc étre douteux que l'Assembléeest fortement inté-
resséeau bon fonctionnement d'une convention établie et approuvée
par elle en tant qu'instrument pour la prévention et la répressiond'un
crime international qu'elle a condamné à maintes reprises. 11est, clair
que la question qui se trouve maintenant devant la Cour peut avoir une
grande influencesur le bon fonctionnement et l'efficacitéde laiveution.
En outre, la question devant vous a une, importance généraleconsi-
dérable.Elle affecte, en effet, la pratique suivie par le Secrétairegénéral
dans l'exercice de ses fonctions de déuositaire, non seulementà I'é~ard
de la Convention sur legénocide. mais'aussià l'égardd'un grand nombre
d'autres conventionsmultilatérales. Lorsqu'ellese prononceraàsasixième EXPOSÉ DE Y. KERNO (SATIOSS USIES) - IO IV j1 307

session à la fin de cette année sur la question générale del'effet juri-
dique des objections aux réservesaux conventions multilatérales, i'Assem-
blée ne manquera certainement pas d'accorder à l'avis consultatif de
cette Cour toute la valeur que mérite l'opinion réfléchiede la plus
haute juridiction mondiale, mêmesi, formellement, cet avis n'a trait
ou'à un cas d'es~èce. L'avis de la Cour aura donc son im~ortance non
&iili:rnenr pour ÎL'S<!crL:ta~rein;.r:~I mais atissi puu~OUS'ICS lit~ts d11
monde (lui p<'iivc:iirriei.eilir p:irtides con!~cirrioirstloiit Ic !iccri:t;llrc

généralest-dépositaire.
La pratique suivie par le Secrétaire généralà l'égard des réserves à
la Convention sur le génocide fait partie du problème général qu'il
doit résoudre dans l'exercice de ses fonctions de dépositaire. J'ai donc
l'intention de faire tout d'abord une étude générale decelles des fonc-
tions de dépositaire à propos desquelles des questions relatives à des
réserves peuvent se poser. Ilans un deuxième et un troisième chapitre
de mon exposé j'étudierai ensuite les problemes juridiques qui se
trouvent impliqués dans ces fonctions et la règlede droit suivie jusqu'ici
par le Secrétaire généralpour les résoudre. Je passerai en revue, dans
une quatrième partie de mon exposé, les autres règlesqui ont étésuggé-

rées. Je terminerai par un examen des questions soumises à la Cour,
à la lumière des considérations précédentes.

Voyons donc d'abord un bref aperçu des fonctions du Secrétaire
généralen tant que dépositaire.
Le Secrétaire général estle dépositaire de plus de soixante conven-
tions multilatérales qui ont étérédigées ou reviséessous les auspices
de l'organisation des Xations Unies. Ces conventions ont trait, outre

le génocide, à des sujets tels que le règlement pacifique des différends
internationaux, les privilèges et immunités, le commerce international,
les tarifs douaniers, les transports maritimes internationaux, les statis-
tiques économiques, l'opium et autres drogues nuisibles, la sarité, la
traite desctres humains, les réfugiéset les personnes déplacées,la décla-
ration de décèsdes personnes clisparues, les publications obscèiies et
les cpestioris relativeà la science. l'éducation et la culture.
Vingt-cinq de ces conventions environ disposent que Ics Etats lit:
peuvent y devenir parties que par le dépôt auprès du Secrétaire général
d'instruments formels de ratification. d'adhésion ou d'acceotation.
suivant le cas. La Convention sur le ginocide, qui prbvoit des katifica:
tions et des adhésions, rentre dans cette catécorie. Seize autres converi-

tions prévoient que des États peuvent y d'éveirirparties soit en les
signant sans réserve quant à l'acceptation, soit par le dépôt auprès du
Secrétaire générald'un, instrument d'acceptation. Les autres conven-
tions disuosent oue les Etats v deviennent ~arties en les sienant.
1-a plipart des co~ivcntions(~uiexigent 1; dépôt d'iiistr&ents formels
stit~ulent expressément que le Secrétairegbnéraldoit procéderà certaines
formes de notifications nu sujet de ces iiistruments. Aux termes de sept
de ces conventions, le Secrétaire général doit notifier la réceptioii des
ratifications ou des adhésions. Dans la plupart des cas, soit douze
cotiventions. le Secrétaire eénéraldoit notifier le déoôt ou la date du
dépôt des kstruments. l'rois conventions importaites, à savoir, la

Constitution de l'organisation internationale pour les Réfugies, la308 EXPOSE DE ai.XERNO (NATIOXS UNIES) - IO 11'51

Coiistitution de i'oreanisation mondiale de la Santé et la Convention
relative à la créati& d'une organisation intergouvernementale de la
navieation maritime, cliareent le Secrétaire eénéralde notifier aus
les dates aus<]uellës d'autres États y sont devenus parties.
D'autres conventions contiennent des clauses rédigéesd'une façon
différente; c'est ainsi que l'article SV11 a) de la Convention sur le
génocide disposeque le Secrétaire généraldoit notifier « les signatures,
ratifications et adhésioiis reçues en application de l'article SI ». En
oiitre. trois conventions cliareent le Secrétaire eénéralde tenir une liste
spici,ilc des sigiiniurci. r..tific;itiuiii et adhr'siuns,qiii lieut Arc cuii;iilt+c
)i;tiles linrtics <:r<I,iitCtrc pubaussi c<,iii.ci~;rl~irpo~iible,ou s1t.s
instruchons du Conseil économiqueet social. Dans lei conventions aus-
quelles les États deviennent pariies par signature, il est souvent stipulé
que le Secrétaire général doitnotifier chaque signature.
Les conventions stipulerit souvent explicitement à quels ktats il faut
notifier les signatures, ratifications, adhésions ou acceptations. Ceperi-
dant, dans ce domaine, la pratique du Secrétairegénéras l'est développée
dans uiie direction très libéraleet ne s'esDas bornée à une a~~lication
stricte. des pro\-isions expresses des différeites conventions. 11'est cer-
tainement conforme à l'esprit généralde la Cliarte des Nations Unies que
les engagements internationaux soient rendus publics et que les États
qui sont ou qui peuvent devenir parties à une convention. soient
tenus au courant de tous les faits nouveaux relatifs à cette convention.
Le Secrétaire généralprocède donc à des notifications mêmelorsque
celles-ci ne sont pas obligatoires aux termes mêmesde la convention.
II les adresse pour toutes les conventions à tou5 les États hlembres de
l'organisation des Nations Unies et à tous les Etats non membres qui
sont susceptibles de devenir parties auxdites conventions.
Le Secrétaire généralreçoit également en dép0t certains autres
instruments que les Etats sont tenus de déposerafin de devenir parties
à des conventions. Le Kèglement intérieur de l'Assemblée générale
exige que tout Etat qui désire devenir Membre des Nations Unies
adresse au Secrétaire cénéralune demande à cet effet. contenant une
déclaration, faite dan; un instrument formel, attestant qu'il accepte
les obliaations de la Charte. Le Secrétaire cénéralest encore le déposi-
taire dës instmments rése enté Dsour satisÏaire aux conditions osées
par I':lssïinhll'c gt:n;r:sur I;ir~comniaiidnrii~n(lu Ci~iiseil(leSrcuritr:,
I>:irIcs Érars iioii niuml)rcs4,: 1'Or~nnii:itii~dvs S;,tii>iii I:nivs qiii
deviennent parties au Statut de la Cour. La question des réservesne
se pose évidemment pas dans le cas de ces derniers instruments.
Le Secrétaire généralsert aussi de dépositaire pour cn grand nombre
d'instruments divers, en plus de ceux par lesquels les Etats deviennent
parties à des conventions. Des Etats qui sont déjà parties à des conven-
tions peuvent, dans de nombreux cas. augmenter ou restreindre leurs
obligations en adressant des déclarations au Secrétaire général. 11
convient de citer à cet égard le cas, tr&s important, des déclarations
faites en application de l'article 36, paragraphe2,du Statut de la Cour.
En outre, dix-sept des conventions dont le Secrétaire généralest le
dépositaire, y compris la Convention sur le génocide, contiennent une
clause qu'il est convenu d'appeler ala clause colonialen,d'après laquelle
les ~arties Deuvent. Dar une déclaration. étendre l'application de la
conGention aux ternto'ires qu'elles représentent sur le international.
La plupart de ces conventions prévoient également que la convention310 EXPOSÉ DE LI.KERSO (SATIONS UNES) - IO IV 51

Il ne faut pas oublier non plus que ce n'est pas seulement à l'égard
des conventions qui ont étérédigéesou revisées sousles auspices des
Nations Unies que le Secrétaire général exerceles fonctions que je viens
de citer. Il a en effet succédéau Secrétaire généralde la Société des
Nations dans les fonctions de dépositaire. Cettesuccession s'esteffectuée
en vertu de résolutions adoptées par l'.4ssembléegénéraledes Nations
Unies et par l'Assembléede la Sociétédes Nations. Par sa résolii-
tion 24 (1)du 12 février 1946, l'Assemblée générald ees Nations Unies a
déclaré « que l'organisation est disposée à accepterla gardede ces instru-
ments et à charger le Secrétariat de l'organisation d'assumer pour le
compte des parties les fonctions de Secrétariat précédemmentconfiées i
la Société desNations II.Le 18avril 1a~6.l'Assemblée dela Société des
Natioris a adopté une résolution instant le Secrétaire généralde la
Société desXations à transférer au Secrétariat des Nations Unies. ipour
en assurer la garde et s'acquitter des fonctions exercées jusqu'icc par
le Secrétariat de laSociété desXations u,tous les textes originaux signés
des conventions qui avaient étédéposés aupres de la Société des
Nations. à l'exce~tion toutefois des conventions de l'or~a"isation inter-
nationale du ~ravail.
Au 31 juillet 1946, date à laquelle le Service de l'enregistrement de
la Société desNations a cesséde fonctionner. un erand nombre de ces
conventions et accords étaient encore ouvertsi laSignature, à la ratifi-
cation ou à l'adhésion.Cinquante et une de ces conventions n'ont pas
encore étérevisées ou remplacéespar des protocoles ou des conventions
élaboréessous les auspices des Nations Unies. Ces conventions ont trait
des sujets très différents tels que l'unification de la législation. le
rèelement desconflits de loiset la réwessiondes infractions.~.es transoorts
et le tr;irisit. 1'i:ncélectrique, le cummcrse iiiteriiatiuii;il, I'.~riciilliirc,
cert:iiiis 1>r~il~li.iiidcsordre soci~luu tiuin:init1tiiistructioii ct I'ciisei-
giieiiiciit. il serait jiiperflii d'ru:~rniii1:tliicstiuii ci~iii1,<lesa\.oii
sunil>ieii pnrmi ;es con\~ciitioii.isdnt buvertci, .'tIliei~re ;icttit.I:i,
de nou\.cllo >icnatiirej, rntific~tioiisi>in<lli6sioiisII iiiiht (le constater
oue beaucouo d'entre elles le sont encore.
7~Ces soii\'ciitions prc'voienrfrcqucmmi.nt I;iiutiiic;itiuii In rCseplion
des instrumcntj dt: rntificatiuri i>ud'adlii.sion. celle de la dlte d'ontrcc
en vigueur, et d'autres encore. Ici encore, le Secrétaire général s'est
conformé la méthode qu'il suit habituellement et il a,avisé de tout
dépBtd'instrument de ratification ou d'adhésiontous !es Etats Membres
de l'organisation des Nations Unies, ainsi que tous les Etats non membres

qui sont ou qui peuvent devenir parties à la convention en question.
Comme la plupart de celles conclues sous les auspices des Nations Unies,
les conventions de la Sociétédes Nations ne contiennent. dans le lus
grand nombre de cas. niiclinedisposition visant cspressrnicnt les r&strves.
D';iilleuri. ju%11I"arésent. aucuncas concret de r>ser\.s ne s'est prL:sciit$
.?II Secrétaire eCn&raIdes Satiuri5 liiiies suiicerri;tiit cette catéco"ie
de conventions:
II

J'nrrive maintenant à la deuxième partie de mon exposé.
Pliisieurs des fonctions dont doit s'acquitter le Secrétaire général,
en sa qualité de dépositaire, soulèvent évidemment des problèmes
juridiques dont la solution exige une règleapplicable aux réserves,tant

d'une manière générale quedans le cas particulier de la Convention
sur le génocide. EXPOSÉ DE 21. KERSO (SATIOSS USIES)- 10 IV 51
311
Permettez-moi tout d'abord de dire quelques mots de la situation
dans laquelle s'est trouvé le Secrétaire général lorsque, le 16 décembre
1949, la Convention sur le génocide a étésignéepar l'union des Répu-

bliques socialistes soviétiques, la République socialiste soviétique de
Biélorussie et la République socialiste'soviétique d'Ukraine. C'était, en
effet,à cette occasion que la question des réserves s'est présentée pour
la première fois, les troisIStats en question n'étant disposés à signer
qu'avec certaines réserves. Le Secrétaire généraldevait tout d'abord
décider s'il pouvait accepter ces signatures et sous quelle forme. Sans
une telle décision, il ne pourrait pas exécuter évidemment la mission
qui lui est imposée par. l'alinéa a) de l'articlXVII de la Convention
sur le génocide,et d'après laquelle il doit donner notification à tous les
Etats Membres de l'organisation et aux Etats non membres qui avaient
étéinvités à devenir parties à la convention, A cette date, quatre Etats
avaient ratifié la convention, trente-sept Etats l'avaient signéeet un
certain nombre d'aytres pouvaient la signer. II fallait donc décider
lesquels parmi ces Etats avaient, éventuellement, des droits spéciaux
vis-à-vis de ces réserves et devaient par conséquent êtreinvités à faire
connaître leur attitude. En outre, ces signatures avec réserves reiidaient

nécessaire l'adoption d'une procédure à suivre dans le cas où ces Etats
sienataires maintiendraient en fin de com~te les mêmes réservesdans

aue les mêmesréservesseraient maintenues au moment de laratification.
i1:st:ipparu que IIiiieilleurc solutioii coiisiit;iir i siiivrr iirie procédure
di: notification nnaloguci cclle qui seroit suivie dalisc.u d'une r6seri.c
au moment de la ralification ou de l'adhkion.
Le problème des réserves dans les instruments de ratification s'est
présenté dèsle 6 juillet 1g50, lorsque le Secrétaire général areçu de la
République des Philippines un instrument de ce genre. II fallait décider,
en premier lieu, si le Secrétaire généralpou\.ait recevoir cet instmment
en dépôtimmédiatement. Sinon, il fallait déterminer la ligne de conduite
à suivre. Il y avait à ce moment des Etats qui avaient déjà ratifiéou
adhéré; d'autres avaient seulement signé; certains États Membres

n'avaient mêmepas signé, mais avaient participé à l'élaboration Ge la
convention et pouvaient devenir parties; il y avait enfin des Etats
non membres qui avaient étéinvités i devenir parties. Si une ou plu-
sieurs de ces catégories d'États avaient 1,edroit de formuler des objec-
tions contre les réserves,il fallait que les Etats en question soient invités
à faire connaître leur attitude. Des .problèmes supplémentaires se
posaient : quels étaient les droits des Etats qui ratifieraient ou adhé-
reraient par la suite ou qui seraient invités ultérieurement à devenir
parties à la convention ? Il va de soi que le Secrétaire généralétait
obligé de savoir s'il devait ou non recevoir l'instrument en dépôt si
[les objections étaienbfaites par des Etats rentrant dans l'une des caté-
gories mentionnées. Il fallait enfin déterminer si, dans l'hypothèse où
aucune objection n'aurait été formulée contre les réserves au moment
où le nombre requis d'instruments de ratification ou d'adhé~ion~auraient
étéreçus, le Secrétaire général pouvait considérer que les btats qui

n'avaient soule\+ aucune objection expresse contre les réserves, les
avaient acceptées.
Chaque nouvelle ratification ou adhésion accompagnée de réserves
soulevait des questions analogues dont on voit aisément la gravité et
la complexité. Mais ces problèmes sont loin de surgir uniquement à propos de la
Convention sur le génocide, bien que ce soit à soli sujet qu'ils se sont
poséssous la forme la plus aiguë. Il sera donc utile d'examiner briève-
ment les difficultés et les problèmes du dépositaire sur un plan plus
général.
Comme ie l'ai mentioiiiié précédemmeiit,un certain nombre de
coriventions- prévoient que des États y deviennent parties par le dépôt

d'instruments de ratification, d'adhésion ou d'acceptation auprès du
Secrétaire général.Lors(lu'uii instrument est transmis par un État qui
souliaite devenir partie à urie convention, le Secrétaire général doit
s'assurer d'une manière ou d'une autre que l'iiistrument est juridique-
ment valable pour produire le but envisagk. Si un instrument contient
des réserves, l'attitude, quelle qu'elle soit, adoptée par le Secrétaire
généralà son sujet - pour autant qu'elle ne se borne pas à conserver
l'instrument purement et simplement sans en préjuger les effets -
implique l'existence d'une régle de droit relative aux réserves et uiie
conclusion tirée de l'application de cette règle aux faits. Par exemple,

si le Secrétaire général reçoit immédiatemelit en dépôt un instrument
contenant des réserves sans soulever aucun problème touchalit leur
recevabilité, cette attitude implique qu'i1,admet le principe selon Icguel
aiicuiie objection soule\~écpar d'autres Etats ne peut empêcherl'Etat
formulant des réserves de devenir partie à la conveiition. Si le Sccré-
taire généralnotifie les réserves aux Etats.iiitéressés et accepte ensuite
l'instrument en dépôt après que certains Etats qui ont déjà ratifiéou
adhéréont souleré des objections contre les réserves, cette manière de
faire implique que I'Etat qui formule des réserves devient partie à la

con\.ention au moins à l'égardde celles des parties qui n'ont pas soule\ré
d'obiections. Le refus du Secrétaire eénéral d'accepter en dépôt uii
iiijt;iiriiciir g.t,iiit7n:iiit<Ic:srCt:r\.es npCIU'IIII~ilil~crii~ii ct~ I:,itc
I I I I iln II I I r i i Iirn. l'Ji~ii;riicIr i.iit tI':i.i-c[
te; oÜ de refuser un instrument en dépôt, dans uri autre cas d'espèce
quelconque, supposera nécessairement l'applicatioii d'une certaine règle.
Ilserait vain d'espérer que le Secrétaire général puisse,en l'absence
d'uiie règle juridique, résoudre ces difficultés en demandant aux Etats
intéressés desinstructions sur la règle à suivre lorsqu'aucune règle n'a
étéprévue dans la convention elle-même.Pour commeiice?, le Secrétaire
généralne disposerait mêmed'aucun critère pour déterminer quels soiit

les Etats intéressés.Naturellement, il lui serait possible d'inviter les
Etats à lui faire connaître simplement le fait qu'ils font des objectioiis
contre les réserves. Mais il est très probable [lue leurs vues sur l'effet
juridique de ces objections seraient &ès divergentes et qu'il leur serait
impossible de parvenir à un accord à moins de procéder à de nouvelles
négociat.~ons.
Il serait difficilementconcevable que le Secrétairegénéral,afin d'éviter
l'application d'une règle juridique quelconque, conserve indéfiiiimeiit
uii instrument contenant des rése~vessans en préjuger les effets. Ceci
deviendrait même pratiquement impossible après l'entrée en vigueur

d'une convention. Le Secrétaire généraldoit, dans un délairaisoiinable,
soit :iccepter en dépôt un instrument de ratification, <adhésion ou
d'acceptation, soit le refuser une fois pour toutes. Les Etats doivent
étre en mesure de savoir s'ils sont liés-par uiie con\,ention et, dans
l'affirmative. vis-à-vis de quels autres Etats. Les principaux organes
des Xations Unies ont également intérét à connaître quels Etats sont EXPOSE DE Al. KERNO (NATIONS USIES) - 10 IV 51 313

parties à des conventions conclues sous les auspices de l'Organisation.
Si la question de savoir quelles sont les parties à une convention devait
rester en suspens pendant plusieurs années, peut-être mêmejusqn'au
moment où un différend s'élèverait au sujet de l'exécution des obliga-
tions assumées, il en résulterait certainement de très graves inconvé-
nients Dour tous les intéressés.
~orsgu'ils rédigent des conventions, les États eux-mêmesreconnaissent
liabituellement cet inconvénient et cherchent eénéralement h l'éviter
en confiant ex~ressément au Secrétaire eénéral'le soin de leur adresser

(les ni~tilicnrioiisnit siijct1;ic<oii\.eiitiiiii.
1.a Cunvrntion ;Ur le gcnocidc pr6v~ir In iiotific;itit,iImr le ~tcrtliairc,
r;!ii;r;il. (ls,r:iiific:itiuiis et adliCsiu.c'est-i-dim (Iiilc:i,«d6fiiiitif
des insiruments par lesquels les États i deviennent prtie;. Ainsi que
ie l'ai déià indiqué, une disposition de cette nature est fréauemment
i6digi.e rïiine f:i(oii eiiiore 'plus cat;guri<liie, polir <liie le ~ecr~rnire
géiiérnlnit cii tirer (lescoiicliisii~iissi11l;ijuridique. Ile iioiiil>reu~es
cun\,cnriuni çsiccnr (lue le Secr2t:<irecéii6r;iliiutifie Ic dLi11tes iiitrti-

d'autres Etats deviendront parties n.
Le Secrétaire général a donc la tâche de faire connaître, aussitbt que

possible, aux Etats iiitéressésl'identité des parties à une corivention.
11.est clair qu'il lui serait impossible de s'acquitter de cette tàche s'il
ne disposait pas d'une règlejuridique à appliquer.
Comme dépositaire, il a d'autres obligations qui lui imposent de déter-
miner quels États sont parties à une convention et d'agir en conséquence.
Une de ces obligations, parmi les plus importantes, est celle de notifier
la date d'entrée en vigueur. Cette procédure est souvent imposéed'une
façon expresse et, dans la pratique, elle est invariablement suivie pour
toutes les conventions. Dans le cas de la Convention sur le génocide,
cette fonction est liéeà celle aui consiste à dresser et à faire circuler
un procès-verbal dès le jour de fa réception d'un nombre de ratifications

ou d'adhésions suffisant pour faire entrer la convention en vigueur. Par
un concours heureux de-circonstances. des difficultés maieuÏes ont DU
être évitéesau cours de l'accomplissement de cette fonitioii re1ati;e-
ment à la Convention sur le géiiocide.Toutefois, ainsi que je l'ai indiqué,
de grandes complications peiivent surgir à propos d'autrés con\rentions
qui ne sont pas encore en vigiieur. En outre, le fait que des clifficultés
ont pu êtreévitéesh propos de la Convention sur le génocidene résout
pas en lui-même lesautres problèmes qui peuvent se poser parallèlement.
D'autres fonctions exigent du Secrétaire généralqu'il décide, afin de
déterminer si certaines conventions sont en vigueur, quels Etats eii sont
parties. L'une de ces fonctionsest celledel'enregistrement. J'aimentionné
précédemment que le Secrétaire général y procède d'office pour toutes
les conventions dont il est le dépositaire, conformément au règlement

adopté par l'Assemblée générale.II le fait à la date qu'il a déterminée
lui-même comme étant celle de l'entrée en vigueur. De iiombreuses
conventions, y compris la Convention sur le génocide, lui imposent
d'ailleurs espressémeiit cette tàche.
Des problèmes relatifs à I'identité des parties peuvent encore surgir
dans une certaine mesure, à propos des diverses catégories dedéclara-
tions subsidiaires dont ]'ai déjà parlé et par lesquelles les Etats peuvent
étendre ou restreindre leurs obligations, conformément aux clauses decertaines conventions. De Cellesdéclarations n'ont, bien entendu, d'effet
juridique que si elles sont faites par des parties. Si,, par exemple, uii
Etat qui n'est pas partie à la Convention sur le génocidevenait à faire,
eii vertu de l'article XII de la convention, une déclarrition tendant à
étendre l'application de la convention à des territoires dont ledit Etat
diriee les relations extérieures. il est évident que le Secrétaire général
- . .
iii:scr:iit pni tciiii <leprocL'diruiir notificaiiuiii:i\.eltu de.; ~lii}~uîitii,iis
il?I';iliiic:a0) aleI':trticlc S\'I i: I)c pIridem:iiiiles dc rvvisiuii pr(viic.i
par pliisieu~s conveiitioiis, iiotamment aussi par la Convention sur le.
génocide,ne peureiit avoir une valeur quelconque que si elles sont formu-
léespar des parties à la coiivention en question.
Enfin. dans l'aveiiir. le Secrétaire généralpourra avoir besoin d'une
règle à Suivie pour l'a~c~m~lissemen~des fonctions lui sont dévokes
concernant I'abro~ation &.entuelle de la Coiivention sur le génocide.
Nous savons que cette converition pourra êtredénoncéeaprèsune période
de dix ans et elle cessera d'&treeii vigueur si, par suite de dénonciations,
le iiombre des parties se trouve ramené à moins de seize. Le Secrétaire

généralest tenu de iiotifier l'abrogation, et dans ce cas encore il peut
avoir à déterminer quelles soiit les parties à la convention.
J'espère avoir amplemeiit démontré que le Secrétaire généraldoit,
afin de ouv voirs'acauitter convenablement de ses fonctions aussi bieii
dans 1e;circonstancês actuelles que dans celles q!i pourront se présen-
ter dans i'avenir, disposer d'une règle sur l'effet juridique des réserves
et des obiections au: réserves. Bien entendu. les ~ariies elles-mémes
prii\.c:iit fi,rniult!r ,:sprc:s<:iiunt.tri.llrCglc, niiqilel cni le Secrétaire
gC'iiera15,.horiiei I'nppli<li:i.r.Cette iii;:tlio:CIL :ido]>tr'c,plr i.xi:iiiplc.,
dsn; dt:iix con!.cntiuiis Ll.iborCcsou rvvis;i.î soiisIr..iiiii)iit-a ilcs Sntioiis
Unies. La Conventioii internationale concernant les statistiques écono-
miques, du 14 décembre rqz8, amendée par un Protocole du q décembre
1oÀ8. dismse: dans le deurième alinéadi son article 17. ciueiciespouver-

n&énts'des Pays qui sont disposés à adhérer à la coi~éntion en vertu
de l'article 13, mais qui désirent êtreautorisés à apporter des réserves à
l'application de la con\rention, pourront informer de leur intention le
Secrétaire généraldes Xations Unies. Celui-ci communiquera également
ces réserves à toutes les Parties à la présente convention en leur deman-
dant si elles ont des objections à présenter. Si, dans un délaide dix mois
à dater de ladite communication, aucun pays n'a présentéd'objection,
la réserve en question sera considérée commeacceptée. r La Convention
concernant la déclaration de décèsde personnes disparues, du 6 avril 1950,
dispose, dans son article 19, que itout Etat pourra subordonner sori
adhésionà la présente coiivention à des réserves,ces dernières ne pouvant
êtreformuléesqu'au moment de lradhésion.,Si uii Etat contractant n'ac-
cepte pas les réserves auxquelles un autre Etat aurait ainsi subordonné

son adhésion, il pourra, à condition de le fairedans les quatre-vingt-dix
jours qui suivront la date à laquelle le Secrétaire géiiérallui aura commu-
niquéces réserves, notifier au Secrétaire général qu'iltient cette adhésion
pour non intervenue. Dans ce cas, la c?nvention sera considéréecomme
n'étant pas en vigueur entre ces deux Etats. ii
Il existe aussi d'autres moyens d'obvier aux difficultés résultant des
objections formulées contre des réserves. Le texte de la convention
peut contenir une éiiumérationlimitative de toutes les réserves admis-
sibles. Citons à cet égard l'Acte généralrevis6 pour le règlement paci-
fique des différendsiiiternationaux, du 28 avril 1949. Tous les représeii- EXPOSÉ DE M. KERNO (XATIOXS UXIES) - IO IV j1
315
tants à une conférence peuvent aussi signer uii acte final déclarant
qu'aucune objection, ne sera formulée contre des réserves déterminées
faites par certains Etats. C'est cette méthode qui fut adoptée par la
ConférencedesNations Unies sur les transports routiers et les transports
automobiles, tenue à Genève en août et septembre 1949. Il peut y
avoir d'autres méthodes permettant d'éviter que des problèmes ne se
poseiità propos des réserves.
Toutefois, dans la plupart des cas, les conférencesoui établissent le
texte de conventionsne'donnent pas d'indications aus'siprécises. C'est
donc le Secrétaire généralqui doit régler lui-mémela question. On
pourrait supposer que les tiavaus préparatoires donneni parfois au
Secrétaire général certaines indications permettant <-leconclure que les
parties ont envisagéd'appliquer telle on telle procédure concrètequant
aux réserves. Mais dans la plupart des cas. les travaux préparatoires
sont en fait de peu de secours, soit parce que la question des réserves
n'a pas étéexaminée lors de la conférence,soit parce que les débats
peuvent donner lieu à des conclusions diverses. 11a~~artient d'ailleurs.
selon mon opinion, à un organe judiciaire plutdt qu'à';n organe adminis:
tratif de déciderquelle valeur interprétative il conviendrait d'attribuer
à des travaux préparatoires.
Le Secrétaire général n'adonc pas d'autre clioix que d'appliquer,
en l'absence d'indications coritraires dans le teste des coriventions, les
règles qu'il estime pouvoir déduire des principes géiiérauxdu droit
iiiternational et de la pratique internationale suivie précédemmentdans
ce domaine. Il sera naturellement très heureux de recevoir un avis
autorisé sur cette <iuestion.
Il y a un point encore que je voudrais ajouter et qui me paraît avoir
une importance considérable.
Le Secrétaire général atoujours estimé et il coiitiiiue de penser que
la règle relative aux réserves,de mêmeque la procédureen découlant,
doivent êtresimples et d'une application facile. Cette simplicité semble
esseiitiellà toute règlequi doit servir de baseà une procédure adminis-
trative. C'est pour cette raison que le Secrétaire général s'estefforcé
gories de conventions qu'il serait malaiséde distinguer dans la pratique.
On peut évidemment admettre qu'une règleétablissant une distinction
fondéesur de simples considérations de fait ne suscitera pas de grandes
difficultésd'application. C'est ainsi qu'une procédure spécialepourrait
étreadoptéedans le cas desconstitutions d'organisations internationales.
Alaisdes distinctions reposant sur des bases moins évidentes rendraient
uiie règle extrêmement difficile à appliquer.
On pourrait, par exemple, concevoir une règle qui prescrirait une
certaine procédure dans le cas des conventions de caractère législatif,
dites cnormatives IIet une procédure différente applicableaux conven-
tions qui constituent esseiitiellement le point de rencontre de plusieurs
scries de relations bilatérales. L'effet juridique pourrait ne pas êtrc
le mêmedans les deux cas. Cependant, une telle régle,ou toute autrequi
serait fondéesur une distinction du mêmeordre, ne serait pas souhai-
table du point de vue de la pratique. Ce serait, en effet, au Secrétaire
généralde décider dans quelle catégorie tomberait chaque convention
donnée.
IJne telle décision préseilterait souvent de grandes difficultés et ris-
querait, en outre, une fois prise, de soulever des contestations de la part316 EXPOS E E M. KERNO (NATIONS UNIES) - IO IV 51

des États intéressés.De plus, une telle distinction étant établie, il
arriverait fatalementque les différentesdispositionsd'une même conven-
tion rentreraient dans des catégories différentes. Pousàsa conclusion
logique, une telle règle demanderait donc l'application d'une certaine
procédure à une réserveformulée à l'égard d'un articled'une convention
et d'une procédure toute différente à une réserve touchant un autre
article de la mêmeconvention.
Au lieu d'y apporter une solution, une telle règlecompliquerait donc
les problèmes soulevéspar les réserves. 11 pourrait arriver que des
divergences d'opinion quant à la catégorie à laquelle appartient une
convention ou mêmeun article déterminé ne pourraient êtrerésolues
que moyennant un recours à une procédure judiciaire au moment où
nécessiterait fréquemment l'intervention d'une autorité judiciaire plutôt
que d'une autorité purement administrative.
Etant donnétoutes ces considérations,il serait évidemment désirable
que la solution du problèmeconcret soulevépar des réserveà la Conven-
tion sur le génocidene soit pas fondéesur des distinctions qui risque-
raient de soulever des difficultés dans le cas de nombreuses autres
conventions.

III

Après avoir exposé lesfonctions de dépositaire du Secrétaire général
et les problèmes iuridiaues qu'elles soulèvent, ie désirerais maintenant
examiner, du po<nt de'vue du dépositaire, la2règle que le Secrétaire
général a suivie jusqu'à présent pour résoudre lesdifficultésauxquelles
peut donner lieu le problème des réserves. Je m'efforcerai de le faire
dans un esprit de complète impartialité. Le Secrétaire général afait
de son mieux pour découvrir le droit en la matière et pour appliquer
une règle satisfaisante. Je dis une fois encore que le Secrétaire général
serait heureux de recevoir toutes directives au'une nlus haute autorité
pourrait lui donner.
La règle à laquelle le Secrétaire général s'estconformé jusqu'ici a
étéexaminée en détail dans le rapport qu'il a soumis à la dernière
Assemblée générale.Ln procédure, inspirée par cette règle, qui a été
suivie dans le cas de la Convention sur le génocide,a étéindiquée en
détaildans l'exvoséécritnrésenté àla Cour au nom du Secrétaire-énéral.
Je m'efforcerai'donc sim'plement d'apporter quelques précisionssur ce
qui a déjà été dit dansles documents précitésau sujet de cette règle
et de cette procédure.
Le principe auquel le Secrétaire général s'est confojusqu'à présent
est basé sur la théorie que les Etats les plus directemeiit intéressés
doiveiit tous consentir aux réserves, et a étéénoncédans les termes
suivants dans le rapport du Secrétaire généralà l'Assembléegénérale :
a Un État ne peut formuler une réserveen signant ou en ratifiant
une convention ou en y adliéraiit avant son entrée en vigueur,
qu'avec le consenternelit de tous les Etats qui, jusqu'à la date
d'entréeeu vigueur, ont ratifié ladite convention ou y oiit adhé;é
il ne peut formuler de réserve après la date d'entrée en vigueur
qu'avec le consentement de tous les Etats qui ont déjà ratifiéladite
cpnvention ou y ont adhéré. » Cette formule généraleest une énonciation simplifiéede la règle plus
détailléequi a étésuivie dans la pratique. Elle est caractérisé?par deux
points saillants : I) elle exige le consentement de tous les Etats, mais
seulement de ces États. oui ont définitivement manifesté leur intention
Ir 1 p.ir 1.i coii\.ctiri.,n2, vllc,rL,<lc IV 11roI>l~m~ v~s~~i~tir ,11

iii~~iii~<,ilI:'III' SIIUII t.tii.-.i-titiillii~t ;.IIrr;snlt)i.p111r.pi 1nii6re
fois. 1.3 foriiiiilc ?si airisi :iiiirle i~cstul:,tiiirIV.I:r.ir.d~i\~~~iii\r.c,ir
une grande facilitépour déterminer léurattitude concernant les réserves,
mais que cette facilité doit être limitEe par la nécessitéde dissiper le
plus rapidement possible tout doute quant aux obligations des parties.
On peut donc, jusqu'à une certaine date, lorsqu'une convention n'est pas
encore entrée en vigueur, ne pas préciser l'effet des réserveset laisser
à tous les Etats qui, avant cettedate, deviennent parties à la convention,
la faculté de faire des objections. Mais après que la date fixéeest passée,
la question de la recevabilité de chaque réserve doit être résolue et

elle doit l'être parles seuls Etats qui sont alors parties à la conveution.
Le moment critique qui sépare ces deux périodes est d'ordinaire la
date d'entrée en vigueur, ainsi que l'indique l'énoncédu principe que
je viens de citer. Toutefois, danscertains cas, notamment pour la Conven-
tion sur le génocide, il s'agira d'une date légèrementantérieure.
Dans le cas concret de la Convention sur le génocide, il était prévu
que vingt ratifications ou adhésions étaient nécessaires pour son entrée
en vigueur et qu'il appartenait au Secrétaire général de dresser un
procès-verbal le jour où les vingt premiers instruments auraient été
déposés.La convention devait entrer en vigueur le quatre-vingt-dixième

jour quisuivrait la date du dépôt du vingtième instrument de otification
ou d'adhésion. Si donc la ratification ou i'adhésion d'un Etat, faite
avec réserves, avait étéacceptée par tous les Etats qui ont déposédes
instruments de ratification ou d'adhésion avant que le procès-verbal
ne soit dressé, le Secrétaire généralaurait considéréque l'instrument
contenant des réservesdevait êtreaccepté en dépôtet comptéau nombre
des instruments nécessaires pour faire entrer la convention en vigueur.
Toutefois, un Etat qui aurait ratifié ou adhéré après ladate du procès-
verbal, mais avant la date d'entrée en vigueur, n'aurait pas eu le droit
de soulever des objections contre les réserves présentéesantérieurement
à sa ratification ou à son adhésion.
Le Secrétaire généralestime aue la fixation de la date d'entrée en

vigueur d'une convention marquela fin de la période aucours de laquelle
l'effet de toutes les réserves peut être laissé en suspens sans inconvé-
nient majeur pour les États intéressés.
Il peut évidemment arriver dans certains cas que la fixation de
cette date d'entrée en vigueur devra être suffisamment retardée pour
permettre aux Etats qui ont déjà déposédes instruments de ratification
ou d'adhésion de formuler des objections contre des réserves qui n'ont
étéprésentées qu'au dernier moment. Mais dès que la question de la
fixation de !a date d'entrée en vigueur se pose, il n'est possible de
laisser aux Etats parties à la convention qu'un délai raisonnable pour

faire leurs objections. Si aucune objection n'est formulée pendant ce
délai raisonnable, le Secrétaire généralest en droit dc présumer que les
parties acceptent les réserves et il peut par conséquent recevoir en
dépôt les instruments en question. Toutes objections faites après l'ex-
piration de ce délairaisonnable devraient êtreconsidérées commeétant
venues trop tard pour avoir un effet juridique. En outre, le Secrétairegénérala considéréque si un État dépose uii
instrument de ratification ou d'adhésion sans faire d'objection ?Ides
réservesantérieures dont il a été dûmentavisé,.on doit conclure qu'il
les a acceptées. Une objectioii ultérieure d'un Etat qui a ainsi ratifié
ou adliéréen gardant le silence doit donc nécessairement êtreconsidérée
comme ne produisant pas d'effet juridique.
Le cas de la Convention sur le génocide nécessitedirectement une
solution de cette auestion de l'acceotation tacite des réserves.Certai~s ~~~~~~-
États ont, en effet,'soutenu, contraiiement au ~,ointde vue du Secrétaire
~énéral,que, pour êtreliépar une réserve, unEtat doit l'accepter d'une
facon exoresse et formelle: Cette manière de voir est contenue dans les ~-~~.
cohmun~cations adresséesau Secrétairegénérap lar la France, le Viet-Nam
et le Cambodge. Cevlan, qui avait adhéré sansformuler d'obiections
contre les réserves.a-cru ~Ôuvoiren formuler aorès oue la date d'entrée ~~~.-
en vigueur eut été'fixée. '
Donc, de l'avis de la France, du Viet-Nam et dq Cambodge,un Ëtat,
Dourêtreliénar lesréserves formuléesoar un autre Etat. doit les accenter -r --
iormellemen;. Si cette manière de vok est exacte, une'?bjection contre
une réservene pourrait iamais êtretardive tant oue l'Etat oui formule
l'obiection n'a ;as forméllement acce~té laréservé. Sitoutes'les oa.------
doi;ent accepter une réserveet si l'acCeptation doit êtredonnée defa~on
expresse, le Secrétaire généralne pourrait recevoir en dépôtdéfinitifun
initrument de ratifica6on ou d'adhésion contenant des'réserves avant -
que toutes les parties lui aient notifiéleur acceptation formelle. Pratique-
ment, ce serait une périoded'attente sans fin et cette facon de procéder
conduirait au mêmerésultat qu'une règle aux têrmesde
laquelle aucune réserve nesaurait jamais êtreadmise.
Je crois avoir suffisamment démontré que la question de savoir si,
pour pouvoir produire des effets, les objections aux réserves doivent
êtreformuléesen temps utile, présente une importance exceptionnelle.
II eri est de mêmede la question connexe de l'acceptation tacite. Aussi.
le Secrétaire général éprouve-t-iu ln grand besoin de recevoir à cet égard
des directives faisant autorité.
Je crois d'ailleurs pouvoir ajouter que, dans l'opinion du SecrCtaire
général,le délairaisonnable après lequel il peut conclure à une accep-
tation des réserves peut êtrevariable et doit s'adapter aux caractéris-
tiques de chaque convention. Si, par exemple, l'objet de la conventiori
présenteun caractère très technique ou si les dispsitions en sont très
complexes et détaillées,ilconvient d'accorder aux Etats un délai relative-
ment long pour leur permettre de procéder à l'étudede la réserve, avec
tout le soin et tout le loisir nécessaires.D'un autre côté,il peut y avoir
des cas où certaines circonstances exigent que l'on détermine d'urgence
la situation de l'Etat formulant des réserveset que l'on prenne rapide-
ment une décision sur l'acceptation ou le rejet d'un instrument de
ratification ou d'adhésion.Dans un casnormal comme celui de la Conven-
tion sur le génocide,pour laquelle on ne semble pas se trouver en pré-
sence de circonstances exceptionnelles, le Secrétaire général a estimé
qu'un délai de quatre-vingt-dix jours - délai qui, en deux endroits,
est prévu par-la convention elle-même pourl'envoi de certaines noti-
fications aux Etats - est un laps de temps raisonnable pour permettre
aux Etats d'arrêter leur attitude. Ceci est particulièrem$nt vrai pour
une convention qui n'a été ouverte à la signature des Etats qu'après
une discussion de plu~ieurs annéesdans différentsorganes des Nations
Unies. donc après une préparation des plus minutieuses. EXPOSE DE JI. KEKSO (SAT~OSS USIES)- II IV 51 319

[SéancePtrbliqtredi6 II avril 1gj1, matin]

Dans la troisième partie de mon exposé,je me suis permis de vous
parler de la regle suivie jusqu'ici par le Secrétaire généralen matière
de réserves.On peut la résumer dela manière suivante :

vigueur ne soit fixéene peut êtreconsidéré commepartie d'ànla convention
aussi longtemps qu'il maintient sa réservesi un Etat qui estàce moment
partieà la convention fait une objection, soit avant que la date d'entrée
en vigueur ait étéfixke, soit avant l'expiration d'un délai,raisonnable
après que la réserve lui a étécommuniquée. Lorsqu'un Etat formule
une réserve après que la date d'entrée en vigueur a étédéterminée,
il ne peut êtreconsidéré commepartie à la convention si un Etat devenu
lui-même partie antérieurement soulève une objection dans un délai
raisonnable après que la réserve luia éténotifiée.
II. Étant donné que, d'après la règle appliquée par le Çecrétaire
général, uneseule objection formulée en temps utile par un htat ayant
qualité pour ce faire empéche 1'Etat qui formule des réservesde devenir
partie à une coi!vention, ilest impossible qu'une convention soit en
vigueur entre 1'Etat qui formule les réserves,et les parties qui les
acceptent et ne le soit pas entre ce mêmeEtat et les parties qui
soulèvent des objections.

III. Une objection contre une réserve formulée parun État signataire
signer ou y adhérer, mais qui rie l'a pas encore fait, ne produit aucuna
effet juridique.

II résuge de cette règle qu'une objection élevéeen temps utile par
un seul Etat partie à une convention empêche un État faisant .une
réservede devenir partie contractante. S'iln'y a pas d'objection, I'Etat
qui formule la réservedevient partie à la convention et se trouve engagé
envers toutes les autres parties. Selon l'opinion du Secrétaire général,
cette règle est d'une application généralepour toutes les conventions
dont il est le dépositaire,à moins que celles-ci ne contiennent des dis-
positions expresses dans le sens contraire.
Cette règle a legraiid avantage d'assurer que les effets de la conven-
tion ne seront pas paralysés par des réserves de grandc portiie. En
outre, il est toujours utile. et dans certains cas probablement néccssaire.
oue chaaue ~artie soit liéed'une manière égaleenvers toutes les autres.
s'il en é'tait'autrement, on risquerait de cyéerun réseau extrêmement
très- eu dvrobable aue certaines catégories de conventions, telles qu'en
premier Iirii les co;istitutions d'urg~nisatii)iis iiitrr~~;itionpuissent
produirc une cificncitL:siiffij:iritcsi toutes les partics n11:"éiigagccs
ies unes envers les autres
1.c St.cr<tairt: gL'ni.ra1se rend bien cornlitc qii12 r6gle sui\,ie par
lui peut rcndre plus difficilepoiir les plats, dans ccrtains c:is. de ilc\.ciiir
varties Aune convention s'ils iucciit indisvenssble de f:iirc ilcs r;serves.
) ne méconnaît nullement qie s'autres ;&glesseraient plus favorables
aux Etats qui ne croient pouvoir devenir parties qu'avec certaines
réserves. Cependant, il est arrivé à la conclusion que la règle qu'il a
appliquée était la meilleure qui puisse êtresuivie uniformément pour EXPOSÉ DE JI.KERNO ('IATIOSS USIES) - II IV jI
320
le genre de conventions dont il est .le dépositaire. Selon son opinion,
c'était en tout cas la solution qui présentait un minimum d'inconvé-

nients. Il faut ajouter qu'au point de vue purement administratif, il
est certainement souhaitable d'avoir une règlequi permette d'appliquer
la mêmeprocédure ?Itoutes les conventions. Il est non moins souhai-
table d'avoir une procédure facilement applicable dans la pratique. La
regle suivie par le Secrétaire générall'est certainement, comme l'a
clairement démontréle cas exceptionnellement compliqué de la Conven-
tion sur le génocide.Le Secrétairegénéral est parfaitement en état de

déterminer, après un délai raisonnable, s'il doit accepter ou refuser le
dépôt d'un instrument de ratification ou d'adhésion. La certitude qui
en résulte quant à l'identité des parties est sans aucun doute avanta-
geuse pour tous les intéressés.
Avant de terminer cette partie de mon exposé,je voudrais souligner
une fois de plus que la pratique suivie par le Secrétaire généralest la
continuation de celle qui a étéconstamment suivie par la Sociétédes
Nations. Il serait certainement dificile de prétendre que le Secrétaire

généraln'était pas obligéde suivre la pratique de la Société desNations.
dans le cas des conventions de la Sociétédes Nations dont il est devenu
le dépositaire. La résolution de la Société desNations qui a décidéde
transférer ces conventions au Secrétariat des Nations Unies spécifiait
qu'elle le faisait e pour en assurer la garde et s'acquitter des fonctions.
exercées jusqu'ici par le Secrétariat de la Sociétédes Nations D. Le
Secrétaire générad les Nations Unies a d'ailleurs estiméque la pratique

de la Société desNations était pleinement justifiéepar la raison et par
la doctrine. II l'a donc adoptée sans hésitation, mais après mûre
réflexion,lorsque des problèmes relatifs à des réservesse sont présentés
à l'occasion de conventions rédigéessous les auspices des Nations Unies.
11serait probablement malaisédans la pratique de suivre des procédures
différentesdans le cas des conventions de la Sociétédes Nations et dans.
le cas des conventions des Nations Unies. II serait certainement difficile

de justifier une telle distinction par des arguments théoriques.
Quant à la doctrine, je ne voudrais pas revenir sur la longue liste des
auteurs éminents 1 qui se sont prononcés nettement en faveur du
principe généralsuivi par le Secrétaire général.Ils appartiennent à
tous les continents et à toutes les écoles.Pour s'en rendre comnte. il
suffit de citer le projet du Harvard Research et l'étudede l'lnsti'tutde
droit de I'Académiedes sciences de 1'U.R. S. S.

--
aHarvard I<esearch I)raft Convention on the Law of Trïaties ., American
Journal of Int~rnation«l Low, vul. 29, Supplement (r935). pp. 870 et $99.; lnstilnt
Prasa Akadeiiiii i\'a?ilSSSR, i2lejdttnarodnoe Pratio (dloscou, 1947). p. 388 ;
J.L. Brierly, Rvppovt sr<les traités, document r\/CS4/z3, pp. 49-58 :C. \V. Jenks.
oLes instruments intcrnationnus h caracth collectin, Heci<eildescoiirsde I'Aco-
déwie de droit i»lernutionnlvol.Gg(rg39). pp. 471-472; C. G.Fcnivick, Inlarnntionol
Law (3me édition, ,948). 1).435 :P. Fauchille. Droit intentatio>rol pirblic, 1,3,
pp. 312-313 ;al. 0. tiudson. Internalioriol Lepislotion, vol1,p. i :C. I<ousseau,
Principes généraiix du droit infernatio~rol public(ig+q), vol. 1. pp. 298-299 ;
H. Accioly, I'railéde droit infertrotional public (P1942).vol. II, p. 451: L. Podesta
Costa,c Réserved sana les traitcn, Reuriede droit inter>zatio>ial(Lapradellc), u21.
(i93S). p. 16; K. Strupp, ~ldmenfr de droit inter>mtioitnl ptiblic (1930). vol. 1.
p. 2S6 ;C. Baldoni. aLe Riserve nelle convenrioni collective r. Rivista di diritto
internazimale (1929). pp. 356 et sqg. EXPOSE DE II. KERNO (NATIONS UNIES) - II IV 51 321

Je m'occuperai maintenant, du point de vue du dépositaire, des autres
règles sur lesquelles on a proposé de fonder la procedure que doit appli-
quer le Secrétaire généralau sujet des réserves. Etant donné que ces
règles ont étéexaminées en détail aussi bien dans divers rapports et
mémoranda présentés à l'Assemblée généralequ'au cours des débats
de la Sixième Commission et enfin dans les nombreux exposés écrits
présentésà cette Cour, il ne me paraît pas nécessaire d'étudier les argu-
ments juridiques et les considérations de politique généraleque l'on a

fait valoir pour ou contre ces rèkes, quoique ces arguments et ces

nombreui problèmes à résoudre dan<n'importe quel cas. Je suis sûr
que la Cour désirera connaître la nature et l'étendue deces problèmes.
II y a d'abord la règle qui permet non seulement aux parties mais
également aux simples signataires de faire des objections aux réserves
de manière à empêcher 1'Etat qui les formule de devenir partie à la
convention. Cette règle exigerait probablement une procédure différente
de celle que le Secrétaire générala suivie en ce qui concerne les signatures
faites avec réserves. En vqtu de la règle qu'il a observée jusqu'ici, la

signatuce ne place pas les Etats dans une position spéciale à l'égard des
autres Etats intéresséset, en cons$quence, le Secrétaire généralne s'est
pas cru obligé de consulter ces Etats avant d'accepter une signature
avecréserves. Si toutefois les Etats signataires ont le droit d'empêcher
les Etats qui font des réserves de devenir parties à une convention,
tous les signataires et tous les Etats parties à cette convention devraient
probablement être consultés avant qu'une signature avec réserves ne
soit acceptée.
Dans le cas de l'application de cette règle, la question se poserait
aussi de savoir si, après avoir reçu une signature avec réserves, on
devrait de nouveau obtenir le consentement à ces réserves lorsqu'elles
sont formulées dans un instrument de ratification. Il paraîtrait justifié

d'admettre qu'au moins les Etats qui signeraient ou adhéreraient après
la date de la signature avec réserves devraient avoir la possibilité de
faire des objections a de telles réserves lorsqu'elles sont maintenues dans
un instrument de ratification. Peut-être faudrait-il mêmeadmettre que
les Etats qui ont acceptédes réserves au moment de la signature puissent
élever des objections lorsque ces réserves sont formulées de nouveau
an moment de la ratification. De toute manière, il semble probable
qu'avec cette règle le Secrétaire généralaurait parfois à demander à
deux reprises le consentement aux mêmes réserves,une première fois
lorsqu'elles accompagnent la signature, et - de nouveau - lorsqu'elles
figurent dans un instrument de ratification. On voit aisément que dans
cette éventualité.iL serait particulièrement important, dans l'intérêt
d'une prompte application de la convention, que le Secrétaire général
puisse présumer le consentement en l'absence d'indication contraire

(acceptation tacite).
Après avoir déterminé la date d'entréeen vigueur, le Secrétairegénéral
consulterait les signataires ainsi que les parties à la convention chaque
fois qu!une réserveserait formulée quel que soit le délai qui s'est écoulé322 EXPOSE DE al.KERNO (NATIOSS USIES) - II IV 51

denuis la sirnature. 11 serait naturellement utile Dour tous les États

des &serves.
L'Assemblée a demande I'avis de la Cour sur l'effet iuridiaue d'une
objection non seulement dans le cas des signataires, mais au& dans le
cas des Etats qui ont le droit de signer ou d'adhérer, mais qui ne l'ont
vas encore fait. La nature des ~roblèmes iuridiaues et des auestions de
procédure que le Secrétaire gpinérala>ra;t à r4soudre dan; ce dernier
cas est la mêmeque pour le cas des Etats signataires. Par conséquent,

il ne me semble pas ntcessaire d'en faire une analyse séparée.
On a suggéréd'autres modifications partielles à la règle appliquée
par le Secrétaire général.Ainsi, par exemple, l'on a proposé de ne pas
appliquer Urie règle unique à toutes les conventions multilatérales.

Tout en maintenant que la rèple adovtée Dar le Secrétaire eénéral

si elléseiaient adresséesà des conférencesqui prépa;eitdes conve<tions
plutôt qu'au Secrétaire général.J'ai déjà fait remarquer que si la distinc-
tion à établir entre les diverses conventions n'était pas simple et évi-
dente, les difficultésd'ordre administratif qu'aurait à résoudre le Secré-
taire général seraient des plus considérables.
On a également proposé que le Secrétaire généralabandonne com-

plètement la règlequ'il a suivie jusqu'ici et en adopte une autre, entière-
ment différente. Une des méthodes que l'on a suggéréd'appliquer est
celle qui a étéadoptée en 1932 et en 1938, sous forme de règlement,
par l'Union panaméricaine, devenue maintenant l'organisation des
Etats américains. Cette règle a étéénoncéed'une faqon remarquable
dans l'excelleiit exposé écrit préparé à l'intention de la Cour par le
Département juridique et des organismes internationaux de I'Unioit.
panaméricaine. Il est donc superflu que je l'examine ici dans le détail.
Je me permets de répéter, Monsieur le Président, que si je parle de
ces problèmes, c'est uniquement dans le but de montrer à la Cour les
difficultés d'ordre pratique que rencontrerait le Secrétaire général -
dans le cas de la Convention sur le génocide comme dans d'autres cas
- s'il devait suivre un avis de la Cour et une décision de l'Assemblée

qui seraient baséssur d'autres règlesque celles qu'il a appliquées jusqu'a
présent.
Je n'analyserai donc pas en détail la théorie dite panaméricaine ;
j'en donne seulement un très bref aperçu. Nous savons que cette r+gle
s'inspire du principe qu'une convention entre en vigueur entre un Etat
qui formule des réserves et les Etats parties à !a convention qui les
acceptent. Mais elle n'entre pas en vigueur entre l'Etat qui faitla réserve
et les Etats parties à la convention qui élèvent des objections. Voilà
simplement quelques-uns des problèmes que le Secrétaire général, comme
dépositaire, aurait à résoudre dans le cas où la Cour'baserait son avis
sur la théorie panaméricaine.
Les règles qui ont étéénoncées pour mettre ce principe en appli-
cation ne semblent Das êtreentièrement dénuéesd'ambieuïté. Ainsi aue
le fait remarquer l'éxposéécrit présentéau nom de l'6rganisation &es
Etats américains, un seul caç d'objection à des réserves s'est présenté EXPOSÉ DE XI.KERSO (SATIOYS USIES) -- II IV jl 323

depuis l'application de ces règles. Il y a, par conséquent,peu de pratique
internationale à laquelle on pourrait recourir pour essayer de résoudre
des difficultésqui pourraient surgir. 11semble donc d'autant plus iiéces-
saire d'attirer l'attention sur certains des problèmes juridiques que le
Secrétaire généralaurait à résoudre s'il devait appliquer ce principe.
Nous savoris que la règleadoptée à Linin en 1938institue une procï-
dure préliminaire perniettant aux signataires de faire connaître leur
attitude concernaut une réserve avant la présentation formelle et
définitive de l'instrument de ratificatioii ou d'adhésion contenant la
réserveen question. Cette enquête préliminaire peut, sans aucun doute,
aider grandement I'Etat ayant I'intentioii de faire une réserve pour
lui faire apprécier d'avance les conséquences probables du maintien
ou de l'abandon de sa réserve. Cependant, le rôle du dépositaire peut
ne Das s'en trouver sim~lifié.

étdes obiectioiis cventuelles contre la réserve? Teciterai .uela.es-iiiics
des questions et des incertitudes qui pourront poser :
Quel est l'effet juridique d'uiie <obseroatioii» d'un signataire qiii
n'a pas encore ratifiéet d'un signataire qiii a d6jà ratif?Faut-il qu'un
signataire réitèreson ciobservation IIaii moinerit de sa propre ratifi-
cation et encore après le dépôt formel de l'instrument contenaiit la
réserve,pour que son « observatioii» devieniie uiie véritable objection?
Si un Etat ne fait pas d'cobservation » pendant qu'il est signataire,
conserve-t-il le droit de formuler des objectioiis au moment de sa rati-
fication? S'il ratifie ou s'il adhère sans se prononcer, ~ourra-t-il faire des
objections plus tard et jusqu'à quel moment ? Les Etats qui adhèrent
apres le dépôt définitif de l'instrument contenant la réserve, donc
à un moment où 1'Etat formulant la réserve est déjà devenu partie à
la coiivention, euvent-ils opter en faveur du texte initial?
On a suggérf enfin que !e Secrétaire généraldevrait appliquer une
regle d'après laquelle les Etats ont un droit absolu de formuler des
réserves, les objections élevéespar d'autres États ne pouvant avoir
aucun effet juridique. En vertu de cette règle, lorsqu'un Etat présente
une réserve au moment où il-devient partie à une convention, celle-ci
entre en vigueur entre ledit Etat et toutes les parties, mais avec les
réserves qu'il a formulées.
Du point de vue purement pratique, cette règleest évidemmentsimple
à appliquer pour le dépositaire, quels que puissent êtreses autres avaii-
tages ou inconvénients. Le dépositaire peut accepter des instruments
renfermant des réserves sans appliquer aucune procédure prélimiiiaire
pour demarider un consentement quelconque. Aucun doute ne s'él&\~e
quant à l'identité des parties. Cette règle ne demande donc aucune
analyse quant aux problèmes d'application pratique qu'elle pourrait
poser au dépositaire.
011 voit que dans cette partie de mon exposéj'ai surtout essayéde
démontrer quelle serait la position et quelle serait la tâche du déposi-
taire si l'on adoptait l'une quelconque des différentes règles qu'on ;I
suggérées.Les problèmes administratifs et les difficultéspratiques iic
sont naturellement pas identiques dans les différents cas.
La réponse à donner par la Cour aux questions de l'Assembléeest
évidemment loi11d'êtreconditionnée uniquement ou même principale-
ment par des considérations relatives à des difficultésadministrati\.es EXPOSE DE hl. KERNO (XATIOSS USIES) - II IV 51 325

sur cette question. Dans l'exercice de ces fonctions, le Secrétairegénéral
a eu et continue d'ayoir pour seul but de servir les intéressés,les parties
Kations Unies. les Etats qui peuvent le devenir, et l'organisation des
Je me pennets donc de répéteret de souligner : le Secrétairegénéral
ne demande qu'à êtrele serviteur fidèle, consciencieux et impartial de
tous les intéressés.Son désirsiiicère est de pouvoir s'acquitter de ses
fonctions de dépositaire à la satisfaction générale.Poiir pouvoir le
faire, il a cependant besoin d'une règle claire, acceptéeuniversellement
et facileà appliquer daris la pratique.
Par conséquent, j'espkre et j'ai pleine confiance quc I'avis de la Cour
sera de la plus grande utilité pour résoudreles difficultésd'application
d'une convention dont le bon fonctionnement présente un si grand
intérêtpour les Kations Unies. En outre, je suis sûr que l'avis de la
Cour aidera dans une très large mesure à résoudrele problème général
des réserves à des coriventions multilatérales. Il constituera ainsi une
contribution importante à la jurisprudence consultative de la Cour qui
a eu déjàune si grande part dans la clarification du droit international.

Monsieur le Président, j'ai terminémon exposé, mais,avaiit de quitter
cette tribune, je voudrais, avec votre permission, dire quelques mots
sur la correspondance que le Secrétaire général aéchangéeavec plu-
sieurs gouvernements depuis le 15 janvier 1951. Le texte définitif de
l'exposéécrit du Secrétaire général aétéen effet arrêté à cette date.
Il me semble que cette correspondance peut avoir un certain intérêt
pour la Cour, car ellecomplAteles informations contenues dans l'exposé
écrit. Puis-je le faire, Monsieur le Président ?
Le PRESIDENT . Certainement.

hl. KERNO. - D'ailleurs, dans mon texte il y aura des références à
certains documents dont le texte intégral sera déposéau Greffe à toutes
fins utiles'.
A. Équafeur.,- L'instrument par lequel l'Équateur a ratifié la
Convention sur le génocide a étédéposé le 21 décembre 1949. Le
21. novembre 1950, le Secrétaire générals'est enquis de l'attitude de
I'Equateur concernant les réservescontenues dans l'instrument d'adhé-
sion de la Roumanie (document 11'50, annexé l'exposéécrit).
Par une lettre en date du 9 janvier 1951, I'Equateur a répondu qu'il
n'acceptait pas les réserves faites par le Gouvernement de la Roumanie
(nouveau document no 6). Le 5 février 1951, le Secrétaire général a
communiqué la note de l'Équateur aux gouvernements intéressés(nou-
veaux documents nos 4 et s).
Le ?g novembre 1950. le Secrétaire générals'est enquis de l'attitude
de I'Equateur concernant les réserves contenues dans l'instrument
d'adhésion de la Pologne (do'cument,no 52 annexé à l'exposéécrit).
Par lettre en datedu gjanvier 1951,I'Equateur a répondu qu'il n'accep-
tait pas les réservesfaites par le Gouvernement de la Pologne (nouveau
document no 5). Le 5 février 1951, le Secrétaire général a communiqué
' Voirpp. 436.441).

22la note de l'Équateur aux gouvernements iritéressés(iiouveaux docu-
meiits nos 4 et 8).
B. Irait. - L'Iran a sieiié la Coiivention sur le génocide mais ne
l'a pas encore ratifiée. En Conséquence,le Secrétaire général ainformé

l'Iran de la réceptioii de toute nouvelle signature, ratificatioii ou adhé-
sion accompagnée de réserves. Le Gouvernement de l'Iran, afin que son
silence ne soit pas interprété dans le sens de l'acceptation des effets des
réserves formulées,a adressé au Secrétaire général,le 15 janvier 1951,
une lettre par laquelle il réserve sa position à l'égard de toutes les
réserves en atteiidaiit l'avis de la Cour iriteriiationale de Justice et
l'opinion de la Commission de droit iriterriational (nouveau document
no 9). Dans sa réponse du 12 mars 1951, le Secrétaire général a pris
ilote du fait que l'Irai1 réservait sa position, mais a déclaréque cette
position ne pouvait êtreenvisagée que comme une indication de l'atti-
tude actuelle de I'Iraii. et aue son silence au moment du dévotdel'ins-
trument de ratification devrait êtreinterprété dans le sens'de l'accep-
t:ition des réserves (nouïeau document no IO).

C. Austvalie. - L'instrument par lequel l'Australie a ratifié la
Converition sur le géiiocidea étédéposéle 8 juillet 1949. Le 21 novem-
bre 1950, le Secrétaire générals'est enquis de l'attitude de l'Australie
concernant les réserves contenues dans l'instrument d'adhésion de la
Roumanie (document no jo annexé à l'exposé écrit). Par sa lettre en
date du 19 janvier 1951, l'Australie a répondu qu'elle n'acceptait pas

les réserves formuléesdans ledit instrument (iiouveau document 11" ~j).
Le 28 février 1951, le Secrétaire général a communiqué la note de
l'Australie aux gouvernements iniéressés (nouveau docurnent II" 14).
Le zg novembre 1950, le Secrétaire général s'estenquis <lel'attitude
de l'Australie conceriinnt les réserves contenues dans I'iiistriiment
d'adhésion de la Pologne (document no 52 annexé à l'exposé écrit).
Par lettre en date <lu 31 janvier iqji, l'Australie a répondu qu'elle
n'acceptait pas les réserves formulées dans cet instrument (nouveau
document no 16). Le zS février1gj1, le Secrétaire général a communiqué
la note de l'Australie aux gouvernements intéressés (nouveau document
ilo II).
Le IQ mars IQ51, l'Australie a transmis au Secrétaire g&iiéralune
lettre sé référant-à sa propre lettre du 15 ~iovembre,195c (document
no 101 annexé à l'exposéécrit), par laquclle elle déclarait que le Gouver-
nement australien n'acceptait aucurie des réservesjusqu'alors formulées

à l'égard de la convention, y compris celles des Philippines, eet qu'il
ne considérera donc pas comme valides les ratifications de la coiivention
qui maintiendraient ces réserves ».L'Australie ajoutait dans sa nouvelle
lettre que l'exposéécrit adressé par les Philippines à la Cour internatio-
nale de Justice faisait mention d'un différerid entre l'Australie et les
Philippines, qui résulterait du passage précité.La nouvelle lettre faisait
savoir qu'après uri nouvel examen de la question, l'Australie retirait
de sa lettre du 15 novembre 1950 les mots «ne considérera donc pas
comme valides les ratifications de la convention qui maintiendraient
ces réserves n.

D. Ceylan. - L'instrument par lequel Ceylan a adhéré h la conren-
tion a étédéposéle 12 octobre 1950. Dans sa réponse à la iiotification
du Secrétaire général,en date du 15 novembre 1950, relative au dép0t EXPOSE DE H. KERXO (NATIOYS UNIES) - II IV 51 327

de cet instrument d'adhésion, Ceylan a informé le Secrétaire général,
par lettre du 27 janvier 1951, qu'il n'acceptait pas les réservesformulées
par l'union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, la République
socialiste soviétique de Biélorussie, la Tchécoslovaquie;les Philippines,
la Bulgarie et la Roumanie (nouveau document 11"17).
Le j mars 1951, le Secrétaire général afait savoir au Gouvernement
de Ceylan que l'Assemblée généralel'avait invité, en attendant une
nouvelle <-lécision, appliquer la méthode qu'il avait suivie jusqu'i
présent à l'égard des réserves, sans préjudice de l'effet juridique que
l'Assembléegénéralepourrait, i sa sixième session, recommander d'attri-
buer aux objections élevéescoiitre les réserves. Le Secrétaire général

précisait <lu$cette méthode se fondait notamment sur le principe seloii
lequel un Etat qui accepte un traité consent implicitement à toutes
les réserves dont il a connaissance lors de cette acceptation ; et il ajou-
tait que, comme l'instrumeiit d'adhésion de la Roiimanie avait été
reçu par le Secrétaire généralpostérieurement au dépôt de l'instrument
d'adhésion de Ceylan, la position de Ceylan a l'égard des réserves de
la Roumanie serait communiquée h tous les Etats intéressés(nouveau
document no 18). En conséquence, le 7 mars 1951, le Secrétaire général
a inforiiié les gouvernements intéressésque Ceylan n'acceptait pas les
réserves formulées par la Roumanie (nouveau clocurnent no 20).

E. Xorvège. - L'instrument par lequel la Xorvège a ratifié la
conveiition a étédéposé le 22 juillet 1949. Le 29 iio\~embre 1950, le
Secrétaire générals'est enquis de l'attitude de la Nor\rège concernant
les réserves formulées dans l'instrument d'adhésion de )a Pologne
(document II52 annexéà l'exposéécrit). Par lettre eii date du 9 février
1951, la Xorvège a répondu qu'étaiit donné que 1;i qu$stion de l'effet
juridique de certaines réserves formulées par divers Etats avait été
soumise pour avis consultatif à la Cour, la Norvège désirait attendre
cet avis a\raiit (l'exprimer uiie opinion concernant ces réserves (nouveau

document no 21). Le 16 février 19j1, le Secrétaire général a pris note
dans sa répoiise de cette déclaration de la Xorvége (nouveau docu-
ment iiD 22).
Je vous remercie, Alonsieur le Président. 2. ST~TERIEXT BY XR. SHABTAI ROSEXXE
(REPRESE'ITATIVE OF THE GOVEI<N~IEKT OF ISRAEL)

AT THE PUH1,IC SITTINGS OF APRII. 11th AND 12th, 1951

[Public sillirzg oApil 111h, 1951, morning]

Rlr. President and RIembers of the Court,
Rlaimonides, the great rnedieval Jewish sage, jurist and philosopher,
basing Iiimself on a Talmudic passage, prescribed that on entering in
the presence of men renowned for their knowledge one should praise
the Almighty for having given of His wisdom to mortal men.
I'ermit me, in so doing, to express the appreciation of the Government
of lsrael at the opportunity of participating in these proceedings before
this august tribunal. Although a relative nel+comer into tlie organized
international Society, in which the International Court of Justice plays
so eminent a role, the Government has closely followed the work of
the Court and of its illustrions~redecessor. realizine that the Court's
contribution to the establishmeni of thc ruie of law ;mong the nations
hastens the day wlieii "iiation shall not lift up sword against nation,
neither shall they learn war any more".
Added to our special concern for the efficacy of the Genocide Conven-
tion, because of the fact that so many Jews have so recently been
victims of deliberate acts of eenocide. it is also to aarge extent out

to make this oral statement, in the case with which the Court is now
seized.
1 should also like, at this opportunity, to express my feeling of the
great personal privilege accorded me to-day by being enabled to address
you on behalf of my Government on the occasion ofits first appearance
before the Court.

1.-THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHSIENT OF THE
CRIME OF GENOCIDE

In considering the problems raised in this case, it has to be kept in
niind that the situation is dominated by the provisions of the Genocide
Conveiition considered in the light of the general provisions of inter-
national law. Our first task is therefore to analyse the notion of genocide,
by outlining historicnl developments during the Second \Vorld War and
after it. in the Nuremberg trials. and bv examinine closelv the Conven-
tion itsélf.This will ampliYythe general ;emarks containedain the written
statement submitted bv the Government of Israel. particularly in
paragraphs 9 and IO.1shau then followby stating somegêneralconsider-
ations of law nhich seem to be applicable in this case. Finally,1 shall
try to dispose of certain possible challenges to the view that only. the
parties to the treaty are entitled to object to reservations made by
other States on their becoming parties to the Convention. STATEYEST BY MT. ROSESSE (ISRAIII.)-II I\'51 329

(a) Genocide i?~ the Second World War
Although. as indeed was pointed out in the written statement of the
Government of the United States, Court Distr. 51/10. at page 21l, the
practice of genocide has occurred throughout history, the twentieth
century lias witnessed some exceptionaily revolting examples of it,
morc particularly during the Second \Vorld \Var, when the Nazis
deliberately set about exterminating Jews, Russians, Poles, and members
of other groups of persons who came within their reach. Thns it has
been authoritatively estimated that, referring to the Jews alone, out
of g,270,000 Jews who lived in Europe in 1939, only some 3,000,000
have remaiued alive after the yar, the reinainder having perished, as
civilians, nt the hands of the Germans and their lienchmen. (See state-
ment of ùfr. Ben Gurion, who is now l'rime BIinistcr of Israel, in his
testimony before the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
in Doc. A/364/Add. 2, p. 15.) As the judgment of the Nuremberg
Tribunal put it :

"The persecution of the Jews at the hands of the Nazi Goaern-
ment has been proved in the greatest detail before the Tribunal.
It is a record of consistent and slstematic inhumanity on the
greatest scale." (American Jotrrnal of Iitter~zationnlLam, Vol. 41
(1947)> PP. 243-247.)
It was, indeed, these esceptionally vile maiiifestations of man's
inhumanity that reawakened universal interest and aroused universal
concern in the problem. From this interest and concerii were born the
attempts to provide an adequate statemeiit of the international legai
norms of universal application defining the nature of the international
crime, as wellas to devise agreed means oiiits preventiori and punishment.
Thc very name "genocide" itself dates from this rnodern period.
Already while the Nazi mass murders, exterminations, enslavements,
deportations and other iuhumane acts were being committed against
the various civiliaii populations who had the misfortune to fa11under
their control, the leading members of the United Nations took the first
steps to assure that just retribution would be iueted out for these
misdeeds. 1would refer tothe MoscowDeclaration on German Atrocities
of 30th October, 1943 : text in the Charter and Jzrdgmenlof the Nrrrem-
Oerg Tribtit~al, Jlemorandum by the Secretary-General to the Inter-
national Law Commission, Doc. A/CN.415 at page 87. Germany's uncon-
ditional surrender enabled the first practical steps to be taken. The
London Agreement of 8th August, 1945, provided for the establishment
of an international military tribunal for the prosecution and punishment
of the inajor war criminals of the European Axis. Article 6 of this Agree-
ment gave the foiiowing definition of what are called "crimes against
Iiumanity" :

"Crimes aeainst hnmanitv. namelv. murder. extermination
enslavement, "deportation, and other '&humarie 'acts committed
against any civilian population, heforc or during the war".

cliaiiged into a cornma with effects which 1 shall refer to in a minute.

' Sce p.25 ofthis publication330 STATE\IESï Bi' ZIF. ROSESSE (ISRAI;I.)-II IV 51
"or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds ,in
execution of, or in connexion with, any crime witliiii the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, whether or not in violatioii of the doinestic law
of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating
in the formulation or execution of a common dan or conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing crimes are res~onsible for dl acis
performed by any ..rson in execution of such plan." (See A/CN.
415, at 11.93.)

In a Protocol signed at Rerliii on 6th Octob1945 tlie four signatory
Governments agreed to change into a comma the semi-colonoriginally
appearing after the word "war" iii tlie first paragraph of the above
definition in the English and French texts. This change, wliich brought
these textsinto conformity ivith the Russian text, was of great substance.
It introduced a considerable limitation on the jurisdiction of theem-
berg Tribunal in relation to "crimes against humanity", for, to be
justiciable, such crimes Iiad to he committed "in execution of or in
connexiori with aiiy crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal". In
other words, they were ttius deprived of the independeiit existence they
would otherwise have liad. .4lthough many of the genocidal acts of
the Xazis were, in consequence of this cliangc in the Charter of the
Tribunal, lield to be not justiciable in this particular sense, the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, nevertheless, gave tliis description of what it did not
hesitate to cal1 "crimes" :

"\\rith regard to crimes against humanity, there is no doubt
the war, and that many of them were kept in coiicentration campse
in circumstances of great horror and cruelty. The policy of terror
mas certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in inany cases was
organized aiid systematic. The policy of persecutiou, repression
anclmurder of civilians in Germany, before thewarof 1939 w,howere
liliely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried
out. The persecutiori ofJews during the samc period is establislied
beyoiid al1doubt. To constitute crimes against liumanity, the acts
relied on before theoutbreak of war must have been in execution
of, or in connexion witti, any crime within tlie jurisdiction of the
Tribunal. Thc Tribunal is of the opinion tlint revoltiiig and horrible
as many of tliese crimes were, it lias not been satisfactorily proved
that they were done in execution of, or in connexion with, any
such crime. The Tribunal therefore caiinot make a eeneral declara-
tion that the acts before1939 were crimesagainst lGmanity mithin
the meaiiinrr of the Charter, but from the be~inning of the war in
1939. war &mes were committed on a vast Gale, Ghich were also
crimes against humanity; and in so far as the inhumaue acts
charged in the indictment, and committed after the beginning of
the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were al1 committed
in esecutioii of, or in connexion with, the agressive war, and
therefore constituted crimes against humanity." (Ibid.,at p. 66.)

With your permission, Mr. President, 1should like to give for inclusion
in the record a list of some of the doctrinal writings dealing with war STATB~IEXT BY nir. ROSESSE (ISRAEL)-II IV j~
331
crimes, and a note of some of the cases of lesser \var criminals in whiclr

genocidal problems were raised '.

(b) The drafti~zgof the GenocideConuentzonundtheposition ofthe United
Nations

It is against tliis background of indescribable mass-sufiering, of Stern
international justice and of doctrinal investigations, that the problem
of genocide was brought before the Geiieral Assembly, already at the
second part of its first session, in the autumii of 1946. The immediate

legal task was-looking to tlic .future-to prevent a rcpetition of the
jurisdictional situation such as had existed at Nuremberg, and to res-
pect the basic principle of law Fioncrimen sim lege. This was done in
Resolution 96 (1) unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on
11th December, 1946, which gave the followiiig descriptioii of genocidc :

"Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as Iiomicide is thc denial of tlie right to live of individu;il
human beiiigs ...."

The resolution went on to afirm that the punishment of the crime
of genocide is a matter of international concern, and instructed the

Economic and Social Council to undertake the necessary studies with
a view to drawing up a draft coii\~entionon tlie crime of genocide.
The written statement submitted by the United Nations contains,
oii pages Sz-64, a clear history of the way in which the Genocide Conven-
tion \vas actually drafted. From this emerges clearly the legislative
technique which was employed. This technique, in effect, \vas an inge-

nious combination of internatiorial experts witli national political spokes-
meii. The international poiiit of view was cxpressed in tlic main through
certain of tlie functional bodies of the United Nations, for example,
the General Assembly Committee on the Development and Codification
of Iiiternational Law, the Economic and Social Council's Commission
oii Human Riglits, aiid the Commission on Nnrcotic Drugs. The meetings

of the plenary sessions of the General Assembly and the Economic
aiid Social Coiiiicil, as well as tliose of the Sixth Coinmittee of the
Geiieral Assembly and the Social Committee and the ad hoc Committee
on Genocide of the Economic aiid Social Council, provided the forum

' For further comment on crimes against humanity, see in partieular Schwelb
"Criines against Humanity", in IirilisliYear Hook O/ Inlert~nliaal Law. Vol. 23

(rg+G)p .. 178 ; United Sations War Crimes Cornrnission, IfisloryO/ the Unilod
rVolions IVar Cyimes Coflz~ission and the Developnzent of the L<oasofIVar,particu-
larly at p. 196 ; Goldstein "Crimes against Humanity-Some Jewish Aspects" in
Jewish Yearbook 41 Internalional Law, 1948.p. 206 ; and the literature contained
in Bibliogrnphy on Inler?talion~ilCrirninnl Law and International Criminal Courls
(prepared by the Secretariat). AfCS.4fzS. For the conception of genocide in the
trialsofwar crimiiials other than thc German major war crirninalçsee the following
cases :trial of Ulricli Greilelt and otherç before the United States hlilitary Tribunal
at Siirrmberg,in Law Reports O/ Triols ofFVrir Criminals, Vol. SIII, particulariy
at pp. 36 to 42 ; trial of Goeth tjefore the Suprcmï Sational Triliunali>fPoland,
ibid., Vol. \'II, pi :trial of Hoess before the same Tribunal; ibsd. p. IC ;trial of
Greiser before the saine Tribunal. ibid., Vol. SIII.p. 70 ; trial of ~\ltctoetter and
others before the United States Jlilitary Tribunal at Suremberg, ibid., VI.
p. r (thesocallcd Juslice Trial), and general commcnt by Brand. ibid., Vol. X\', at
p. 122. STATBMENT BY >Ir.ROSliNNE (ISRAEI~)-II IV 51 333
la\\; aiid because the Convention itself was approvcd by a unaniinous

vote of j6 States. Geiiocide, as committed duririg the Second \Vorld \\'ar,
was on a scale to warrant the adjective "unirersal". The Conventioii
is likeirise universal, its universalism deriviiig from the number of
States which took part in its drafting, and which later espressed geiieral
approval of it, and not merely froin tlic factthat it was drafted \vithiil
the institutioiial frainework provided by the United N n t'ions.
The paradigmatic description of the draftiiig of tlie Convention giveii
by tlie United Nations emphasizes in the dry techiiical language of tlie
law and diplomacy, what were the tragic human causes which inspired
the Convention, that insensate slaugliter in the war standing in sharp
relief against the tcchnical difficulties encouiitered at iiuremberg. It is
interesting to observe horv immediately alter adopting the Geiiocide
Convention, the General Assembly adopted, as l'art R of the samc
resoliition, anotlier resolution relating to the study by the 1ntematioii:il
Law Commission of the question of an international criminal jurisdictioii,

a matter whicli arose directly out of the discussioiis on the Genocide
Coii\~ention. This lias been nnder close consideration by the Gciiernl
Assembly and the International Law Commission ever since : 1 \i.ould
refer to Resolution 489 (1') of 12th Dccember, 1950. 1701in point of fact
the tao questions are closely cotinected, as can be seen from Article VI
of the Genocide Convention.
The whole proccss of drafting the Convention rcqiiired two ycars
of almost continuous effort in tlic course of \i.liicli the government of
every State a Member of the United Xations had ample opportunity to
present its views aiid ta get to know the vielvs of other govemmeiits.
This fact may be of some considerable relevance to the Court wlien it
coines to apply the general conclusionswhich it will reach to the Coiioeii-
tion itself. For it may well follow that, having regnrd to al1thecircum-
stances, coni~ciitioris drafted in tliis way may iiot be found to possess
those particular characteristics tliey are sometimes said to havc ;iiid

which would justify appeal to certaiii special rules of customary inter-
national law said to govern the operation of treatiesdrafted in this ivay :
and that the rules applied to conventions drafted in the more corninori
fashion of a diplomatic conferencc are substantially applicable Iiere. Tn
connexion with this particular argument it may be pointed out that
recent United Nations uractice has tended to revert to the more usual
t!.pe c)Idil>liiiii:iticco:ii~r~.ti:c.Tliis x:is d*iiic~siiiiil>l~in il,,LI<.:
.>ftl,,. Cotivt.iirio,,Il)~.,.l..tr:itisf Ij*:.ill8 ~IIS~IIII~'ci~~t.~.CS\tell
as in rhnr r,frlic Coii\..:nrioii nt1[lie I-vgiil.it:lriii of I<~<fug~~s

(c) Analysis ofthe GeltocideCoi~ueiitio~t
1 now came to the analysis of the Genocidc Con\ze~ition.In its writteii
statement, the Government of Israel expressed the view that the Coiiveii-
tion as a whole possesses a gener;il normative cliaracter, and tliat iii
addition it coiitains stipulations of a contractual and of a ministerial

character. This view will be furtlier developed in the lollowing analysis
of the Convention.
The classification of treaties, if it is a practical proposition at ail, aiid
to the extent that it is a necessary function, cannot be a matter tliat
proceeds from their outer forrn, but from tlieir operntion. The develop-
melit of a satisfactory scientific system of classifyiiig treaties has tint

.yet crystallized itself to a sufficient (legree to permit the drawing of aiiy
hard-and-fast conclusions. Ftirthermore, it is difficult to see what is
the real value, in practice, of trying to classify treaties in a generic way.
For clearly such theoretical classification can produce no a prior ligal
results in a given concrete situation. \Ve are here eiigaged in the iiiverse
process of seeking to give a legal character to the various stipulatioiis of

the Geiiocide Convention in order to see how far tliey are susceptible to
reservations.
\\'hen me use the word iiormati\-e, ive have in minci what is sometimes
kno\vn as the "law-making" treaty. \Ve use the terin iii the sense that
what is iionnatii~e, being \-alid "at large", operates on the la\\.-making
plaiie, aiid sets authoritative staiidards. To the extent that these autho-
ritative standards :ire, in fact, already existing rules of interiiational
ciistoinary law set dowii in written form, the Iaw wliich they declare

is bincling on al1 States, whether or iiot they are pzirties to the coiiveii-
tion. The matter must not be approaclied as one of philology, but as
one of the intention of the parties viewed from the angle of the actual
cxecution of the convention.
Havirig said that, tlie next question that arises is, as a general propo-
sition, how far are coriveritioiis to be regarded as a single iiidivisible
wliole, and how fnr can their various stipulations be accorded different
treatmeiit in theliglit of their diffcreiit Eueasof operntion.

.flic answer to this question àepeiids upon the terms of the conventioii
itself and the intentioiis of the parties ivhen they concluded it. If tlieir
intention was simply to set up authoritative standards, it rnay bc found
that tlie contractual stipulations, if such there are, are aricillary to the
iiormative ones. In stich cases it may well be found to be impossible or
iinpracticable to sever tlie one from the other, and the gencral normati\re
chnracter will consequeiitly impress itself on every linc of the conventiori.
On tlie other liaiid, analysis of the test concerned rnay make it clear tliat

the interition of the parties was, iii orleandthe same document, to estab-
lisli authoritatioe standards and to impose reciprocal rights and duties.
III that case the coii\rention will be divisible. It is believed t~ ~~ ~
tlic (;ciit,i.iil: (:\niivc.iitioiiii ~>iiiiini Inct dcw; il,, tlicsc tu.o tliiiigs.
11:~vitirg<y;,r(Iinr iltc f2cr r11~ rij :\rticlr, l sl~~~cifi:;,Ilry<:i<%1is :IIItiii<Ic!r-
r:,l;iii; -i%iiiiit.<ILI? it :~~~ir.i~:riii~ ~: .irritIII ;,il.litici~ tnrliv ~:<>iii~ini,,-
tirii\vl.ic~liI cc~iit.iiiii,~iftlie iiit<ri~:iiinii,ilcriiiiin:<lcli;,rncr<.rgiig<:ii<isiilt..
'rhli :~llliioac~llu 11,~ ~~u~l~~~~ik ll:cl~jl,) \vIi;~!SC tnic1.t c;,11;ivcrtic;d
. . -
~Iiiscctioiiof it. Ho\ve\.cr. suint. of ilii:\\ritri-II st.ireiiieiits, in juggc.;ting
inorc eldborate forin of iri.:ity ~:lnsjitic~~tioiil.iiiit :it tlic c.sistciice uf
\vliït iniglir bt: terme<l 1 Ii<iii~i,iitnlcl:tssific.ition. tlie infcrimci. b<ii,g, ul
cnlirsc, tIi;tt trmii*!i arc i~iclivi~ibl~::i,nci t11:tr tlicri~lti tu iii:~k~ic+er$,:i-
~II.II~101,isiot t:xtciicItu tlw iiplicr II!Ii~~~i,r.ill:syt,rs.'SIIC,kiii<,g~:ii~:r,iIly
.ÏIIC\va\ tif lookiii;: nt rrcnti~i, iur 11.1sl>iirl'c,,r. isru SC \vIi;,tCIKIIIII~~;L~-
ces coiiclitionc<ltlie m:iiiii<,ruf il~eir ~)iilr.irdtioii, aiid rlie con>ritiitioii:il
rie I I gvril tir ti; cnilii;~~. Fur csanipli:, rlii~i<circiini-

jtaiices a110rulcs sIio\c 111t41 rcscrv:itioti> :ire iiiir~i~sic:ilI~ii~~~liii~s~ibl~
tlie iiitcriintioiinl Iahoiir con\.entions, btc~:iiisï uf ciri.iiiiiitaiict.i
cuiiiir.ctr<l\viIli ille Cunjriiutii~ii uf tlic Iiiterii.~lioii.?l 1.xlioiir Orgnni7-
:itiuii. 'l'lit\rritrt:ii itntt.mi.iiiui tlie Iiitcriiationnl I.nboiir 0rg;iiiiïstiuti
15 I 11iIil iitrt I I : I I 1sf1 loc~tin. I3ut \ritli ri >l~?<:t,its
r<lev;iiic~rn rliv pr.,bI~.ins \r.e :ir<lisciijsiiigtu-cl;iyis ti<,trt::t<lilyapplircnt Elsewhere in tlie written staternents we read about the organizational
type of treaty. This correspoiids to what we have termed theconstitutive
type. In its Resolution 171 (11) of 14th Xorember, 1947, the General
Assembly recognized the existence of an international constitutional
law, for which, indeed, much eridence cari he fonnd iii the Reports of
this Court aiid its predecessor. 'l'lieSecretary-General also referred to
this at paragrnpli 36 of his Report, A/137z. There is little doubt that :i
distinctinternational constitutioiial Iaw is evolving itself, and that special
rules are applicable to the treaties operative in this sphere of activity.
It does not follow, however, that such rules also apply to every treaty
concluded by, \i.itli, or under the auspices of theOrganization. Furtlier-
more, even if \ve admit that in the normal course of events reservations
are inadmissible to constitutire treaties, it is clear that they are not
outside the bouricls of possibility. 'l'liereservations of Switzerland when
that country accedcd to the Covenant League of Nations, those of the

United States to the Constitution of the World Health Organizatioii
(14 United Nntiorls Treaty Series, p. 185-see Report of the Secretary-
General, A/137z, paragraphs II and IZ), and of France, Guatemala and
the United States to the Coiistitutioii of the International Refugee
Organization (18 Uiiiled .Nations Trenty Series, p. 3) indicate that sucli
reservations may, in fact, be quite far-reaching.
The most serious of the aryments in this direction are those put
forward, with great skill and force, by the United I<iiigdom, which, if
1 understand them right, are more or less as follows : \Vhat has to be
looked at is not the form of the convention so much as its oberatio?~.
If its operation is cs;entially contractual. reservations are admissible.
'The more the convention is "universal", the less likely is its operation
to be contractiial, and you caniiot have a more uniGersa1 convention
than one drafted entirely under tlie auspices of the United Nations.
I'arenthetically it may be ohserved that the view that one should look

nt the operation, and not at the form, is not disputed, for we are agreed
tliat ail treaties are in lorm coiitractual, and tliat the whlole basis of
any classificatiori of treaty stipulations must be their operation. 1'om
this starting poiiit the United Kingdom goes on to indicate its vie\%,
tliat conventions of the social, Iaw-making, or status-, régime-, or
system-creatingtypecannot be the subject of reservations. 1have already
suggested that little purpose would be served by aiiy generalities on
tlie subject of the classification of treaties, and this in itself would be
a sufficient answer to this thesis. However, going furtherand admittirig,
for tlie purposes of tliis argument only. that certain n prioriassumptions
based upon the cl.assification of treaties do exist, the United Kingdom
is Iiere putting forward a very heterogeneous collection of treaty types,
and the connecting link between them is iiot easy to find. There is no
automatic analogy between the constitutional treaty, and the "social"
or the "law-makirig" treaty, whether such treaty creates new law or
merely purports to be, and is, decliiratory or coiifirmatory of existing

international law. In these cases the doctrine of iridivisibility has no
automatic application. It is at best an artificial doctrine made necessary
by the delicate system of checks and balances wliich underly interiia-
tional constitutions. \Vhen one is faced with a treaty, part of which is,
'z operation, law-making or law-declaring-or to use Our expression
normativem-and part is, in operation, contractual, the indivisibility
is not established, regardless of how the treaty was drafted. Now the Genocide Convention is clearly iiot constitutive. It may or
may not be social, depending upoii what is meant by that. It is not
easy to define what is meant by a social convention. \Vithout doubt
many, if not all, of the international labour conventions corne within
this category, but as we have seen, the very question of reservations
. does not and caniiot arise in re1:ition to thcm, for reasons which make
it impossible to draw from this type of convention any general conclu-
--~-~-~- ~ ~..ao'1ic~bl~ to al1social conventions. Other conventions of
this category are probably those relating to narcotic drugs, the Conven-
tions on the Su~~ressionof Traffic in Persons, on Obscene Publications,
aiid many of those classified by Oppenheim ashumanitarianconventions.
International Law, 7th ed., Vol. 1, page 890. It is a sweeping skitement
to say that reservitions are iiilierently inadmissible toconventions of
tbis type, and irideed it may here be recalled that reservations have
been made, for example, to the Geneva Conveiition of 11t1i February,
1925,concerning the Suppression of the Manufacture and Interna1 Trade
in and Use of Prepared Opium (51L.N.T.S. 337). the Opium Convention
of 19th Fehruary, 1925 (SI L.N.T.S. 3x7). the Geneva Coiiventioii of
13th July, 1931, for limiting the Rlanufacture and regulating the Distri-
bution of Narcotic Drugs (139 L.N.T.S. 301)~the Convention for the
Supression of the Traffic in Women and Children, of 30th December, 1921
(g L.N.T.S. 415). the Convention of rztli September, 1923, for the
Suppression of the Circulation of and Traffic in Obscene I'ublications.
(27L.N.T.S. 213). Particulars of these rescrvations wiii be coiiveniently
found in the publication entitled Signatures, Katifications, Acceptances,
Accessio~ls,etc., concerningthe ~MultilateralConventionsand Agreements.
in respect O/ 7vlziclzthe Secretary-Gcizeralncts as Bepository (U.N. Publi-
cation Sales No. 1949, V, 9). Each individual convention needs to be
thoroughly examined to see how it operates and how it is intended to.
operate, before reaching the definite conclusion that reservations are
inadmissible. To the estent tliat the treaty as a whole operates "at
large", the inhereiit inadmissibility of reservations as of right seems.
self-evident. But as soon as one reaches the level of bilateral-or even
multilateral-implementivc acts relating to stipulations wliich operate
"at large", it is not so apparent why the States concerned should not
be permitted. to modify, whether by enlargement or by contraction,
their contractual obligations. The same applies to a treaty such as the
Geiiocide Convention, in which the distinction between the parts of
the treaty operative at large and those operative on the purely bilateral
or multilateral level, is well marked.
'The Genocidc Convention as :r whole actiieves two main things :it
defiiies certain rules of international law, and it contains multilateral
bargains in connexion with some aspects of the implementation of
certain requirements which the international community found to be
desirable in order to provide a sanction for breaches of the rules of
international law. It is thus no argument to Say, for example, that the
Convention is a.code of domestic crimes which are already denominated
in al1countries as common law crimes : Finch in American Journal of
International Law (Vol. 43 (1949)~p. 732, at p. 735). Kelsen says the
same thing, adding that to protect mankind against these crimes, no
international agreement is necessary (The Law of the United Nations,
p. 47). Several delegations made substantially the same point in the
1948 session of the General Assembly. The international agreement is ST.*TE\IEST Bi' .\IIROSESSE (ISRAEI.)-II II' 51 337

necessary, iiot so much to define the crime (although the clear indication
that the crime can be committed in time of war as much as in time
of pcace Inay go further thari the criminal provisions of some systems
of muiiicip;il law), but to impose the obligation on the contracting
parties to co-operate with orle anotlier in its suppression and
puiiishment. The municipal qualification does not suffice to subject
individuals to the direct obligation and sanction of international law.
The fact tliat stipulations concerning these aspects are, in one way or
aiiother, contaiiied in an international convention supplies the requisite
internatiorial element and coricerii in the matter and does so subject
the individual to the direct obligation and sanction of interiiational law :
on this point I should like to refer to Lauterpacht, International Law
and .Hz~ma~R zights, page 44. At the same time, the Conventioii itself
also subjects States to the direct sanction of internatioiial law, because
its normative parts, iricluding in pnrticiilar Article IV, have the effect
of excluding the plea of "flct of State". This is why, witli al1 its weak-
nesses, especially, but not solely, on the jurisdictional side, the Genocide
Conventioii represents a great step forward.
Several articles of the Convention can be called normative iii the
sense that they establish rules or authoritative standards, whether for

the coiiduct of States or of individuals. The most important is Article 1,
by wliich the contracting parties confirm that genoci<le,whetlier com-
mitted in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law. This confirmation is not confined in its operation solely to the
contracting parties. The existence of genocide asa crime uiider inter-
national law is clear from the past history of the notion, and not from
the forma1 definitions in the Convention. or in Resolution 06 11).The
conventional definition is so to speak superimposed upon the dèfinition
of the ciistomary law, lust as a statutorv definition of a crime under
municipal law may be iuperimposed upoi the common law definition,
without necessarily doing away with the common law crimes. It is
always a moot point whether and to what estent in such circumstances
a written law-making document is declaratory of esisting customary
law. But one thing is clear : the written text usually has the effect of
rendering the law more certain than it was in its unwritten state, and
the positive text will in course of time take the place of the usage. In
other words, the text has a profound influence upon the future develop-
ment of the law, which in one sense it fetters and in anotlier diverts
into new channels. Time and experience are needed before such a written
text can be fully "declaratory" of existing law. Both these are lacking

in regard to the Genocide Convention.
Articles II, III, IV and VI are likewise normative. They aU follow
on Article 1,and with the sole exception of the second half of Article VI,
ivhich relates to a future international penal tribunal, neither the defi-
nition of acts of genocide and the description of its cliaracteristics, nor
the class of persons mho inay coinrnit it or be tried and punished for
it, is limited in any way to the coiitracting parties, persons under their
jurisdiction or their territory.That is why the Israel Crime of Genocide
(Prevention and Punishment) Law, 1950, specifically provides that the
law shall come into force on the date of its publication in the Oljicial
Records (which was 7th April, 1950) and shall remain in force zohelher
or not the Conuentioncornesinto force or remains in force. A translation
into Eiiglish of this law has been deposited with the Kegistry. For338 STATE>IEST BY arr.ROSESSE (ISRAEL)-II IV jï

genocide is a crime under international law and, therefore, the State
is under a duty to prevent and punish it, just as it is under a duty to
prevent and puiiish other acts which are crimes jure ,oe+ititrm,such as
piracy.
The Convention itself does riot, Iiowe\~er,exist in a vacuum. It operates
upon a general base provided by international laiv ivhicli lias been
painfully developing since 1919, and it partly codifies tliis law in its

latest stage of development. Neither the Genocide Corivention nos the
resolutions of the General tZssembly can change that. Nor can the
resolutions, which are practically, it seems, devoid of legal effect, create
a crime where none existecl before, even thougli they serve as clear
riotice that those who perpetrate such acts ivill be brought to trial.
13ut it is not iiecessary to go deep into this, for neither Resolutiori 96 (1)
iior the Convention purported to do more thaii confirm existing
rules of international law-or at least parts thereof. The Corivention
may. by its inherent weight, so to speak, change the sh;ipe of genocide
in tlic course of time. It will not be overlooked, for exainple, that the
coiive~itionaldefiiiitioii isdiffereiitfrom that contained in Resolutioi96 (1).
for the references in the resolution to cultural geiiocide, i.e. the
causing of loss to humanity in the form of cultural ....contril~utions

represented by the human groups tlie victims of genocidal acts, as well
as the inclusion of political groups among the victims of genocide, have
been dropped. This does iiot in itself mean necessarily that cultural
genocide, or genocidal acts committed against political groups. are not
crimes under international law. \\'bat it does mean is tliat tfiey are
not crinies for the purposes of the Convention : that is to say the contrac-
tua1 barr\,ins between the oarties to the Conventioii wliich are intended
tu f:,cilit:ttc, iiit~~r~i;itilco-opcr:ilion111 tlic ~>r~-\.ciitiuincl )iiiiiicli-
iltent,,itltc crl!l1ui~C:II>CI~CCI( ,101g,,..nf,~r.LAIVctgrcr tliv~ii.
I4v tl,eitiiiiil,i,lis rïrii~cd ci,iitrti11 III<:c.)iitri,ct111LixirtiIIJVC
houGd them<elves to pcrform certain impl'ementive acts, th6 dcsirability
for whicli, in 'the case of tlie Genocide Convention, follows frcirn the
normative stiuulatioiis. This becomes clear from the iindertaking to
prevent and p;nish genocide,contaiiied in Article 1. These implenie<tive

acts include : to enact certain legislation (Article \') : to enable ail inter-
national penal tribunal as may-have jurisdiction with respect to those
contracting parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction to try
persons charged with genocide-an obligation which requires at leasr
a double contractual engagement before it is executory (Article VI) :
to grant extradition for genocide and related acts-this, one of the most
important stipulatioiis of the Convention, also may recluire a multiple
bilateral contractual systeni to be fully executory (Article VII): to
subinit to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in cer-
tain circumstances (Article IX). The special rights iriclude: to cal1upon
tlie competent organs of tlie United Nations to take action for the
prevention and suppression of acts of genocide, etc. (Article VIII) : to
extend the application of the Convention to certaiii dependent terri-
tories-this also mav be reaarded as a ministerial orovision. to sonie

estent at al1 evenG (Article XII) : to denounce'the Convention in
certain circumstauces (Article SI\') : to request the revision of the
Convention (Article XVI).
In the performance of these implementive acts aiid iii the exercise
of thesr rights, the word "genocide" has the meaning attributed to it340 STATEMEST BY .\IrROSESSE (ISRAEL)-II IV 51
Xeverttieless, it should be made clear at this stage tliat if tlie Coiirt

should be of. opiriion that unde: no circumstarices are reservations
admissible as of riglit to the Genocide Convention. that would put an
end to the matter. There would be no need for tlie Court to proceed
to consider tlie specific questions addressed to it, for the Court is to
give its opinion always "in so far as concerns the Convention on the
Prevention and I'unishment of tlie Crime of Genocide". The questions.
in the form they have beeii put, pre-suppose the admissibility of reserv-
ations, aiid from this startiiig point do not even seek to eiiquire into
the legal validity of tbis or tliat of the reservations actually made.
Indeed, to do so is quite irrelevant in these particular proceedings.
111coniicxion with this, it is nccessary to emphasize that the question
of reservations \vas actual!y considered at every stage of the drafting
of the Convention, as is seen fromthe remarlcs on page 8.1of the United
Xations written statement. There is noticeable a striking difference
between what happened in the preliminary stages of the clrafting, and
mhat happened after the Sixtli Committee had approved the full test
of the Convention on 1st December, 1948. There was no mention then
of the idea, approved earlier by the ad IlocCommittee. that there was

'ziio need for any reserwtions" (see Docs. E/CA.zj/ro, p. 5,and E/CA.
zj/SK. 23, p. 7). On the contrary, the Rapporteur, 1 Spiropoulos,
specifically said that :"....reservations could be m;i<leat the time of
the signature of the Con\rentioii" (G.A.O.R., third session, l'art 1, 6th
Committee, p. 711). The brief discussion which followed-a discussion
which, incidentally, reminds us of that anonymous piece recorded on
page 201 of the 1930 volume of the Britisl~I'ear Book of I?~teniatio~inl
Law-did not concern the Cliairman's ruling as to tlie admissibility of
future reservations as such, but sirnply whether a reserving State could
be regarded as being a party to the Convention unless tlie othercontract-
ing parties accepted these reservations, expressly or tacitly. This is the
very questioii now before tlie Court. As this rulirigwas not challenged,
it must bc regarded as adopted by the Sixth Committee whicli tliereby
tacitly indicated its view as beiiig that reservations are inherently
admissible.

At tliis point, it is possible to approach more directly the actu2i
nroblem of reservations in relation to the Genocide Convention. Already

:n its written statement the Government of Israel gave its views as to
the juridical characteristics of reservations, stressing what it conceives
to be their esseiitial contractual character, and their iiiappropriateness
to normative and constitutive stipulations. This, of course, is subject
always to the agreement of al1 the other parties, with whom lies tlie
power to admit the inherently inadmissible.
1he remarks which follow are to be taken as being, broadly speaking.
additional to those contained in the written statenieiit,tliough here and
there tliev mav contain slie-t modifications of them, induced as the
result of iurthér reflexion.
In connexion with resemations, what is of fiindamental importance is
to fisin our rninds the kind ol transaction that takes place in connexion
with the proposing of, and objecting to, reservations, for once again, by
turning aside from the form to the actual substance of operation, we STATEMENT BY >Ir. KOSENNE (ISRAEL)-II IV 51 34I

will obtain a clearer picture of what the essential legal issues are and
where they lie. This, in turn, cannot be approached as though it stood in
isolation from the problem of the effect of an objection to a reservation.

As to this problern, 1 would refer to paragraphs 20 to 22 of the written
statement of the Government of Israel, for 1 do not consider it necessary
to Say anything further on this aspect at this stage of the proceedings.
Broadly speaking, it is Our view tliat the reserving State becomes a
party to the Convention, but the Convention is iiot in force as between
the reserving State and the othcr parties to tlie Convention which do
not accept the reservation.

(a) The cottnexionbetweefrratificationand reseniations

In any discussion about reservations, the first thing that has to be
stressed is that loose talk about "reservations" and "objections" is
liable to be misleading. It is clear tliat when speaking of reservations,
what is actually had in mind is an act of ratification or act of accession-
there is, for our purposes, no essential difference between these two acts,

and hercaftcr the word "ratilicatioii" is aiways to be taken as including
"accession" unless otherwise indicated-which is accompanied by a
reservation, as is pointed out in the written statement of the Government
of the United Kingdom. 1 woiild go further and suggest that it is not
only the reservation which lias to be looked at in this way, but the objec-
tion to the reservation as well. Iior it is only by depositiiig its act of
ratification that a State entitlcd to become a nartv to the convention

takes a necessary stcp towards realizing its inclioat; interests under the
convention. In other words, the rcservations and thc obiections are not
inde~endent lceal transactions wliicli stand or fnll on tlceir owri merits.
'I'I.vy:iic c.is~~.ti;,lly,eivisiit toili: (li~iiiiii;.;IL[oi r:itiiir.~tin!i I'ruiii
tltk it lull~~~~t1s1;t111Ix,tlt C:ISCSv11iitre:ill\1%at ij.itiIS tIic~!i~ct~v,:~i,:~s
of th,? i;~~ific:ctiu~i wl~iclithe s~rviclit 21ct 1; :~ti;,ctlcd, t.ii(l iiot siniply
tlic ~il~-~ti\~c~ito!jfstlie ii.i~.rv:itiuiior [tic objectioii tli~:as:iiicli
Soii tlic i:ffrct~\~~i~c 0~i;iiiAct of r:ir~nr.:~tioi(ilepeii(ls pririi;~ril!.iipon

tli<:ivr111sJI tlic ~~~iiv~iiti<~ Tno. t:i~s~~ ~cstrciiit; ;I!I-~soin6\vl1:.tI);iircl
example, a purported act of ratification by a State iiot eiititled to become
a party to the conventionwould obviously bc of no effect. \2'hen you have
a corivention, lilce the Genocide Convention, the corniiig iiito force of
which depeiids upon the deposit of a fised number of nets of ratification,
ratifications deposited prior to the completion of that number have a
somewhat limited efiect. They do not, for instance, talcen individually,
make the ratifying States parties to the convention, becanse the conven-

tion is not in force or in effect. They do not, taken individually, create
any fiexus of legal obligation betweeii the State depositing the ratifica-
tion and any otherStates. Having regard to the terms of the convention,
they are acts Iiaving suspended force. Although complete and valid in
themselves as acts of ratification, tbeir effectiveness in producing legal
consequences is in suspense iintil there exists a certain number of like
acts on the part of other States. From this the followiiig results. The

deposit of ail act of ratification will produce certain consequences upon
other States, which, initially, cannot be identified. Those are the States
which together will make up the number required to bring the conven-
tion into force or to maintain it in force when, by efluxion of time,
States are eiititled to denounce it. In relation to these States, and only

23342 STATEMEST BI. bfr.ROSENSE (ISRAEL)-II IV 51
in relation to these States, the deposit of the act of ratification has
corisequences which transcend the iionnal consequences of ratification,
i.e. the creation of a legal 9Gexrrs between the ratifying State and the
other States, for whom also the convention possesses a binding obliga-

torv cliaracter. For this reason those States are in a sixcial ~osition.
if,III addition to IIIC gciicr.11CUI.~~II~I~It-,siisPciis~\vliicl~(lcri\,t:s
froni the ieriiii of tic 1ri:nty it>~.lf.t$t.itc llt>jiicsro 11t;iclitu ils r.itilic;i.
tioii an nildition:il c<~ii~litiui i. Il r i of rrt. tliose Stiltcs
are entitled to ttirn around and say that they are uiiable'to accept~the
additional condition. If they do this, the ratification then will not possess
the transcendental effect which it would othenvise have. But their
refusal to accept such additional conditioiis will not affect the normal
consequences attaching ta the deposit of such an act of ratification.
That is why, in application to tlie Genocide Convention itself, the
Government of Israel suggested in itswritten statement tliat, in consider-
ing whether a State is a party to the Convention when its ratification
is subject to a reservation, the answer will differ according to whether
the question is being asked in relation to Articles XII1 and XV of the
Genocide Convention, or for other purposes. In other words, the expres-
sion "parties to the Convention" as used in the Convention itself and
in the request for an advisory opinion is thus to a considerable extent
an expression with more thaii onc meaning, depending upon whodesires
to know whether a State isa party to a convention. and for what purpose.

Aiiy other approacli mould, in the long run, lead to complete chaos.
\\'e have seen how under the Genocide Convention tliere is no.difierence,
from the point of view of tlie third party rights which the Convention
adrnittedly grants, between signatories, hlembers of tlie United Nations
and other States invited by the General Assembly to accede. This,
obviously, also includes States not yet in existence ; in their case the
right to accede will, liowevcr, only be exercisahlefrom the moment they
qualify under the conditions laid down by the General Assembly in
application of Article SI of the Convention. Indeed, of the States which
have ratified or acceded to the Convention, according to the list on t
.a:, Q, of the United Nations written statement. three were not in
esistence (1 thiiik it 13truc to say (rom tlir p88iritof vit\\. of tlie United
Sarion,) on <,th1)cccmher. 1946.iianirly (:.iri~l~r>rli1 a.,aosand \:let Saiii;
;iridse\,eri\ver<!thrii iiot t:ntitletc,:icrede bccaiisc the (;eiier;~l.Ass~mblv
had not at that time established the criteria for the sending of invita-
tions to non-mernber States, namely :Israel, Bulgana, Ceylon, Hashemite
Jordan, Korea, Monaco and Komania. Logically, if the right ta object
to ratifications or accessions accompanied by reservations can be exer-
cised by States which are not parties to the Convention, wliy stop at
signatories, or States which participated in its drafting ? \Vhy not also

include States now, or at a future date, entitled to hecome parties?
These States already possess some third party rights elearly conferred
upon them by the Convention. Why should they be discriminatedagainst
bv not havine e>tended to them the benefits of an alleeed rule "f inter- ~ ~ ~
natioiial I:i\nci:nrdiiigta \vliicliotlit:rrights. ~ddition:ilto tliosi:esyr<:ssly
conferréilbv the rrenry, arc J~SO exercis:ible hv States iiut unrtiçs to tlic
Convention-? (b) Poi?ttsof ajireementalid disngreementin theanriozissystcmsfor denliq
with reseruations
Ir is useful, at this stage, to indicate very briefly the essential points
of agreement and disagreement which exist betwcen the various systems
and views revalent for the handlin~ of reservations. based on tlie

ire inherently disallowed.
The right to accompany tlie ratification witli a rcservation is rccog-
nized in al1 systems and statemcnts, with the cxceptioii of that of tlie
United Kingdom. According to the United Kingdom, what exists is a
right of a State to seek or propose a reservation in ordcr to meet its
special difficulties, constitutional and other. There is, Iiowever, little
practical consequence in this different formulation, liaving regard to
mhat we conceive to be true of the transaction as esplained above.
As for the right to object to reservations, there is a slightly greater
divergence of opinion. Under the l'an-Americaii system, this riglit is
signatory ratifies the convention. Under the system of the League ofii the
Nations and of the United Nations, tiie right to object is granted to
the parties. There is no difierence in substance between the two views,
which are shared, for example, by the United States and the Soviet
Union. Furthermore, this practice accords with tlic essential nature of
the transaction itself. The approach ofthe United Icingdom is, however,
fundamentally different. In its view, the right of effective obiection to

.
to become parties.
As to the effect of an act of ratification accompanied by a reser-
vation to which objection is made, the main difference seems to lie
between the Pan-American system on the one hand, and the League
of Xations and United Nations systems on the other. Under the former,
the act of ratification is effective in relation to those parties to the
convention which do not object to the reservation. As to those which
do object, the treaty is not in force between them. This practice, whicb
actually seems to have been followed in other cases iis well, enables the
depository to accept the ratification subject to the reservation, and
this is the solution which we would urge the Court to adopt. Under the
other system, to which the United Kingdom also lends its support, the
act of ratification accompanied by a reservation is a legal nullity if
objection is made thereto'by a State entitled to doso, and the deposi-
tory is accordingly not entitled to accept such act of ratification.
It is appropriate here to draw attention to the extensive use made
been made to the reservations made to a number of tlie conventionsarlier
of which the United Nations actually acts as depository (see p. 33).
As for the Pan-American practice, the 1948volume of the Inter-American
Juridical Yearbook contains, on pages 160-171, instructive information
on the status of the Pan-American treaties and conventions. revised to
1stJanuary, 1949.Eighty-six treaties and conventions are theie described
and twenty-one States are concerned. The picture which emerges is the
following .344 STATEMENT BY Mr. ROSENXE (ISRAEI.)-11 IV 51

Forty-nine of these conventions are free altogether of reservations.
The remaiiider, thirty-seven, are affected by reservations.made and
maintained.
Of the conventions adopted at the Fifth Conference at Santiago in
1923, reservations were made in connexion with one, the Treaty to
avoid or prevent Conflicts bet\veen the American States (33L.N.T.S. ~j).
Of thc conventions adopted at the Sixth Conference at Havana, in
1928.reservations were made in connexioii witli :the Convention regard-
ing the Status of Aliens (132 L.N.T.S. 301) ; the Convention fixing the
Rules to be observed for the Granting of Asylum (ibid 3.23) ; the
Conventioii regarding Consular Agents (15j L.X.T.S. 289-it was liere
that one p:irty objected to this reservation, in the circumstances de-
scribed oii p. 15of the written statement of theorganization ofAmerican
States, and on p. 32 of the written statement of the Governmerit of the
United States) ; the Convention regarding Diplomatic Officers (155
L.N.T.S. 259) ; the Conveiition on Maritime Xcutrality (135 L.N.T.S.
187) ;the Coiivention concerning the Rights and Duties of States in the
Event of Civil Strife (134 L.N.T.S. 45) ; the Convention on Treaties ;
the Convention on Commercial Aviation (129L.N.T.S. 223) ;the Conven-
tion on the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property (132 L.X.T.S.
277);and the Convention on l'rivate Internatioiial Law (86L.X.T.S. III).
Of the conventions adopted at the Seventh Coiiferenceat Blontevideo,
in 1933, reservations were made in connexioii with : the Convention
on the Nationality of \Vomen ; the Conventioii oii Natioiiality ; the
Conveiition on Extraditioii (165 L.X.T.S. 45) ; tlie Additional I'rotocol
to the Coiiciliation Conventioii of 1,20,.:and the Convention on Kiehts "
and Duties of States (165 L.X.T.S. 19).
Of the coiiventions adopted by the Conference for the Alainteiiance
of Peacc, lield at Buenos Aires in 1936, reservations were made in
connexion with : the Convention for the Alaintenance, Preservation
and Re-establishment of I'eace (188L.N.T.S. 9) ;the Additional I'rotocol
relative to Xon-interveiition .~bid...,,. : the Treritv on the l'revciition
of Siiiitcu\.crsiL,s1!1.1.j:,, ,ilt,,II~IC..:I\i~it-ric:iii'i'rUIIiCr,~ocOIi~ic~s
;<nt1\lr.ili.itiiiii i/t,l, 75;ancl thc ~'~nv~~i~tio 1~i CU <r<Ii~i:itt:t,cx~c~id
;and .issiirc111~.1~11111111o1ft:t1h1c1tcxiil"i'I'ICL~III~S1'l~\~ccilll:i\tl:llerl~i~ll
States (195 L.X.T.S. 229).
Of the conveiitions signed at other Pan-American Confcrences, reser-
vations \i.ere made in connexion witli : the Convention for Educational
and I'ublicity Films (other particulars are ;lot ~iven) ; the \\'ashington
Convention of 1929 on Intcr-Arnerican Arbitratiori ;the Anti-\\'ar Pact
of Rio de Janciro of 1933 ;tlie l'an-American Sanitary Code (86L.N.T.S.
43) ;the \\'asliington Convention of 1935onhlovableProperty ofHistoric
Value ; the \\'ashington Declaration of 1936 relative to Foreign Com-
panies; the Biienos Aires Treaty of 1935 relative to the Transit of
Aeroplanes ; the \\'ashingtoii Protocol on Powers'of Attorney of 1940 ;
the Havaiia Convention of 1940 on European Colonies and Possessioiis ;
the \\'ashiiigton Treaty of 1940 on Xature Protection and \\'ild Life
Preservatioii ; the \\'ashingtoii Regulation of Automotivc Traffic of
1943; the Li'ashingtonAgreement of 1943relating ta the Inter-American
Institute of Agricultural Science ; the Panama Convention of 1943 on
the Inter-American University ;the Inter-Ainerican Treaty of lieciprocal
Assistance, sigiied at Rio de Janeiro on 2nd September, 1947(21 Ui~ited
~\~ntioiisTreiily Series, 77). STATEMENT BY &Ir. ROSENNE (ISRAEL)-II IV 51 345
'ill, of tlic cunvcnrioni :iduptcd ûr tlirTinrh i'r~iifcrciic~nt
11cgor:1 in ICA.\ rr,serv:itions wcrc 1ii:icIIIsoiiiicsioiuilti the .AI~II.~IC:III
r i or licic ttn~ 7 i=,): :ait11rtic I<conoiiiic
~ereément of Boeota. ~- ""
USimilar tabularuinformation about the status of the Hague Conven-
tionscan be obtained {rom 1. B. Scotts' Keborts to the H(IU~L CCo?%iercnces
of 1899 am1 1907. 898-901. ~hii discloses a &te of' affairs
comparable to that pcrtziining under the Pan-Americari system. Forty-
five States are conceriied. Ttiis table, which is correct to 1st October,
1915,discloses tliat reservations were made to each of the 17irst,Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sisth, Seventh, Eighth, Xinth, Tenth, T\velfth and Thir-
teenth Hague Conventions. Xo mention is there made of any objections
tliereto.
As for the Geneva Conventions of 1949,these were signed by sixty-one
States. Thirteen States proposed reservatioris to the Convention for
tlie Amelioration of the Condition of the h\'ounded aiid Sick in Armed
Forces in tlie Field, and to the Conventioii for the Amelioration of the
Condition of \\'ounded, Sick and Shipwrecked members of Armed Forces
at Sea. Fifteen States proposed reservations to the Convention relative
to tlie Treatment of I'risoners of \Var, and nineteen to the Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian I'ersons in Time of \Var. However,
only a few States have ratified these Conventions to date, and having
regard to their complexity, it is not yet possible to assess what effect
these reservations have had on the rclatively slow pace of r:itificatioii.
The foregoing information, apart from its purely statistical interest,.
illustrates the type of conventions to which reservations have, in the

differences between various systems tend to become blurred. practice the

of the Kegulations for tlie Kegistration and Publication of Treatiesle 5
adopted bythe Gcneral Assembly in Iiesolution 97 (1)of 14th December,
1946. to give effect to Article lui of the Charter. See also I Upzited
~V~ztio?frisnty Series, p. XX. Under this article, as amendecl, the party

-registeyinged a treaty or inteinational agreement shall certify that thel

made bv ~arties thereto. It aooears from a hlemorandum bv the Secre-ns
,, -~~
\\Iiicl. ~liîciis~trltliis in;,\vit11II.,. Sesr~.r..ri,r. c<msi~lcrritIr.iir:thle
to reqtiire a certification that the text submitted s'includes al1 reser-

vations made bythe parties thereto" since the reservatioiis form part of
the agreement registered : General Assembly Officiûl liecords, first
session, l'art II, Sixth Committee, page 197 :see also page 176 for the
brief discussion at the 33rd meeting of the Sixth Cornniittee. Xothing
is there said about the admissibility of reservations. This, of course,
is not decisive, though it is illustrative of a certain general approach
to the problem of reservations and is thus of more than negligibleinterest.
The question of the admissibility of rescrvations to geneial conven-
tions came before the Couiicil of the League of Xations in 1926and \vas
referred by it to the Committee of Experts forthe Progressive Codifi-
cation of International Law. The Committee of Experts entrusted the
task to a sub-committee. The report of the sub-committee \vas approved
by the Plenary Committee on 24th hlarch; 1927. and came before the346 STATE~IENT BY hlr.ROSENI~E (ISRAEL)-II IV 51
Council of tlie League at its forth-fifth session in June 1927. See League
of Xations, Oficia lotirn( 1192,. p. 680, for the text of the report of.
thissub-committee(Doc. C.zr1.1927.V). The report ofthe sub-committee,
in dealing with the problem of consent to reservations, especially when
put fonvard by States desiring to accede to conventions in the drafting
of wliich tliey did not participate, States :

"In order that any rescrvation whatever may be validly made
in regard to a clause of thç treaty, it is essential that this reservation
should be accepted by al1 the contracting parties, as would have
been the case if it had been put fonvard in the course of the negotia-
tions. If not, the reservation. like the signature to which it is
attached, is nuil and void."
Ii'hen the matter came before the Council, the Kapporteur. II.Zaleski,
of Poland, proposed including the following paragraph in the report
to be adopted by the Council :

,(If the principles of tlie report (i.e. of tlie Committee of Experts)
are acted upon, this will prevent States from attaching to their
signature or accession reservations which are not accepted by the
other parties to the convention, but it may well be that a State
niay desire to make a reservation which, if it had been put forward
during the conference, would have been accepted by the other
oarties. and no one wants a State which finds itself in such a position

.~~~~~- ~ ~ ~
excluding others."

In the discussion which followed, 41. Scialoja, of Italy, requested an
explanation of this paragraph. It seemed to him that the only rule
which might he adopted was one which contemplated the acceptance
of the reservation by tlie other States wliich signed the convention.
The President, sir Austen Chamberlain, thought that al1were agreed
that a reservation must be accepted by the parties to the convention and
unless it were so accepted, an adherence accompanied by the reservation
had not the effect of an adherence. JI. Scialoja, however, repeated his
view that a reservation was only valid if ratified by al1 the States which .
had signed the convention (League of Nations, Oficia Jliini(r1,1927,
pp. 770.772). After a bricf adjournment, hI.Zaleski amended the passage
in his report, which finally rend as follows :
"If the principles of the report are acteà upon, this will prevent
States from attaching to their signature of accession reservations
which are not accepted by the other parties to the convention, but
it may well be that a State may desire to make a reservation which,
if it Iiad been put forward during the conference, would have been
accepted by the other parties. In that case the reservation has
every chance of being accepted in order to permit theState in ques-
tion to become a party to the convention."

This report was adopted by theCouncil on 17th June, 1927 (ibid.p. 800).
Analvsis ofthis discussion shows that the sense of the Council was that
the &ht to object to reservations is given to the parties to the conven-
tion, and not to the States which took part in the conference at which STIITEMENT BY arr.ROSESNE (ISRAEL)-II IV 51 347

it was drafted, which do not have special rights in this regard. It is on
this basis tliat the practice of the Sccretariat of the Lcagiie, and later
of the United Nations, has developed. It will also be noted that this
incident did not go so far as to discuss in thorough detail the problem
of the legal consequences when a reservation is not accepted by the
other parties to the convention.

(c) Geneyalrzrles O! Lawapplicable is the present case
Faced with tliese divergencies of practice, the Court has to make its
choice. It can only do so on the basis of established rules of Iaw. It is
suggested that three general rules of the ciistomary international law
relating to treaties generally are applicable and of assistaiice in the
problems facing us. The consequences from the application ta the
GenocideConvention of each of these rules willaccordingly be considered.
The rules are :

. . The rule bacta tertiis iiec nocentliec brosunt :
(ii)The rule that the primary objective is to give effect to the
intentions of the parties ;and
(iii) The principle ut res magis vuleutqzlampereat.

(i) The rule p(iclatertiis nec ?socentnec proszcnt.
It can be stated ta he a general principle of customary international
law that treaties are confined, bath as regards their conclusion and as
regards their effects, to the parties which have concluded them. In Our
present coiitext the existence of this rule gives rise to the problem of
what States have concluded the Genocide Convention and what States
are to be considered as third States, as well as to consider the position
of would-be parties.
In considering this problem wc have to proceed from tlie terms of the
Genocide Convention itself. Incidentally, the Convention only once
actually refers to the parties to it, that is in Article SV. On the other
hand, Articles 1, V, VII, VIII, IS, XII, SIV and SV1 use the expres-
sion "contracting party", which means the same thing.
There is, of course, no doubt that when a State ratifies, or accedes
ta, the GenocideConvention, that State willhave done al1that isrequired
of it inorder to become a party to the Convention. It willhave concluded
the Convention. The Convention itself may not necessarily be in force,
either gerierally or in relation ta that particular State ; for as we have
seen the entry into force of the Conventiori is dependent not merely upon
ratification, but also upon certain other factors such as the passage of
time-ninety days-and the existence of a certain number-twenty-of
other instruments of ratification or acceptance. The implication is that
States which have deposited their instruments of ratification are parties
to the Convention. Othenvise it is not possible ta give any effect to
Article SV. That is why a distinction exists between a State which is a
party to the Convention actuallv in force-what we have termed an
ictuil contractiiig party-and a çtate urhich is a party to tlie Conven-
tion which has itself not yet entered into force, what we have termed a
potential contracting paity.
\Irhen each of the individual States has done al1that is required of it
to make the Convention binding upon it, the ?iexzcsof legal obligationwill have been established with every other State that does likewise.
As the Convention provides that it shall be ratified, and that the instru-
ments of ratification shall be deposited, the individual States will not
have done that until they have not merely ratified theconvention, but
actually deposited their iiistmments of ratification. Upon that date
they will have, concluded the Convention and become contracting par-
ties to it. The same applies, +izzitatis>izrta+zdnis,t to the signatories but
to States which subse<lueiitly accede to the Convention, and it is from
these contracting parties that the mle pactn fertiis ttec?aoce?n btc posiaat
emanates. They. and they alone, are not tliird States.
However, as we have seen, the Conventioii also gives some riglits to
States which are not parties to the Coiivention. These rights, which are
not complernented hy any corresponding duty, are enjoyed against a
body, the Secretary-General, ivhich likenziseis not a party to the Con-
ventioii. Obviously, the e.xerciseof thcse rights, including tlie right to
require performance of those duties, is not necessarily coiiditional upon
the Conveiition being in force. Pragmatically, indeed, the esercise of
some of these rights hy at least twenty States is essential for the Conven-
tion ever to become in force. It is part of the process of concluding the
treaty. The exercise of these third-party rights is so to speak a bilateral
traiisactioo between the State concerned and the Secretary-General,
wliicli produces effects as regards other parties to the Convention when
the quantitative and temporal conditioris laid down in tlie Convention
have been fulfilled.
The weight of authority in support of the proposition that the expres-
sion "party to a convention" refers only to tliose States which have
donc al1 that is required by the Con\.ention to make themselves legally
bound by its terms is overwhelming. Xevertheless, it is sonietimes
hearcl tliat the expression "contracting parties" refers to the signatories,
even where the Conveiition expressly states that it shall be ratified.
What is perhaps the most outspoken example of this point of view is
provided by the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Plzilipson
v. Il11erzal Ainn~ays sce Annzcal Digest of Reports of Inter?~atzo?~ll '
Lam &ses, 1~3~-1~qo,:~ase~o. riS. This case turned upoii the construc-
tion, in municipal law. of the phrase "High Contracting Party" as used
in the if'arsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Kules relating
to Iiiteruational Carriage by Air of 12 October, 1929 (137L.X.T.S. II).
This Convention also states that it "sh:ill be ratified" aiid that it shall
"come iiito force" on the ha~~enine of ce~~ain ouantitative and tem-
poral eveiits. The decision théte that the express& "High Contracting
Parties" referred to al1 the signatories \vas based uDon a close analvsis
precisely of the forma1clauses-of the Convention, ana not upon the more
fundamental basis of its operation, although it was the operation of the
Convention that was at issue. Little wonder that tlie learned editor of
the /In?tz~alDigest referred to it as "an unorthodov interl~retation by
the House of Lords of a technical term possessing an established meaniiig
in international law". This case gave rise to an exchange of diplomatic
correspondence sliortly aftermards and the Government of the United
States subsequently wrote, in relation to this case and the iVarsaw
Convention :

"This Government considers that, in the case of any treaty or
convention to which it is a signatory, it has not accepted any STATEIIIENT BY MT. ROSENNE (ISRAEL)-II IV 51 349

instrument ....and until the requirements of the treaty or conven-
tion with reference to exchange or deposit of ratification also have
been fulfilled by it." (Hackworth, Diges tf Irsternatimtal Law,
\'Cd. V, p. 199.)

It may be objected tliat this criticism of the theory that the expression
"Contracting Parties" refers to the signatories, and not merely to the
States which have ratified the Convention, as is here put forward, is
based upon excessive positivism ;and that if, in relation to the iriter-
pretation of treaties and the Iaw of treaties generally, the essential focus
point of attention is the operation of the treaty and not. its form, one
must have regard also tothe technique by whicli the treaty was drafted,
the need it was intended to meet and the States given rights under it.
poiiits might disclosethat signatories, and eveii States entitled to accede,
may Iinve rights and may be under duties \.irtirally undistiiigiiishable
from the rights posscssed or duties owed by States which have ratified
the convention, especially when the treaty has been draftecl under the
auspices of the United Nations. It could be pointed out, for example,
that there is a tendency to regard treaties not in force as nevertlieless
oossessine some value at least as evidence of customarv international
iaw. A n&eworthy exainple of this line of approach hasbeen furnished
only last year by the International Law Coinmission, which wrote in its
lieport : -

"l'erhaps the diflerentiation between coriventional international
law aiid customary international law ought not to be too rigidly
may be embodied in a bipartite or miiltipartite agreement sol law
as to have, within the stated limits, conventional force for the
States parties to the agreement so long as tlie agreementis iii for;e
yet it would continue to be binding as a principle or rule ofcustom-
ary international law for other States. Iiideed, not infrequently,
conventional formulatiori by certainStates ofnpractice also followed
by other States is relietl upon in efforts to establish the existence
of a ruie of customary international law. Elielzln~lltiparticonuen-
tio~rssi,.tiecZbid frot broupit i~to /orc6 are frequently regarcled as
havingvalue as evidence of customary international law." (G.A.O.R.
fifth session, Supplement Xo. 12 (A/r316), paragraph 29.)

This attitude did not pass unchallenged in the Sixth Committee last
given. See A/C.6/SR.z3o, pagestual 121,e 124, A/C.6/SR.z31, page 129.re
It cannot be regarded as reprcsenting an agreed and acceptcd statement
of the attitude of States, and it is, therefore, riot yet possible to draw
from such a tendency any conclusions \\.hich might strengthen the
existence of a right to object to reservations to treaties on the part of
States for whom the treaty does not possesswhat is their term "conven-
tional force".
This is a convenient place to refer to the alleged anomaly wliich is
. described on page 56 of the United Kingdom written statement, that
would exist if the solution of the Court should lead to the situation that
two countries can both be parties to the same convention, and yet that350 STATE~I~NT BY Mr. ROSENNE (KRAEL)-II IV 51

conventioii may not be in force between them. This state of affairs is,
in fact, not unknown to the customary rules of international law applic-
able to treaties. The cominonest instance of a multilateral treaty not
being in force as bet\vecii two parties to it is seen when the severence
of diplomatic relations between two governments suspends the opera-
tion of treaties between their two Statcs. This example is sufficient, it
is suhmitted, to show tliat the suggested anomaly is not so fat-reaching
as miglit be otherwise iiiferred.
\Ve have dwelt on this problem of the "parties to the convention" at
some lengtli, because it seems to be the most important basis upon
have not ratified the converition,t tcan rest. The analysis given above
tends to establish, in positive form, that rights connected with the
treaty arc only given to States which have ratified the treaty, that is to
Say, whicli have done al1that is imposed upon them in orcler to become
bound by tlie terms of the treaty. \\'ording it negatively, no rights of
any description whatsoever arising out of the treaty are given to States
which have not ratified it, including would-be parties, unless the treaty
expressly sa provides. In particular, such States have no right ta object
effectively to proposed reservations, unless and until their objection is
appended to a valid and effective act of ratification or accession.
Furthemore, this seems to he the only practical view. Trcaty-making
in international law has only the most superficialresemblance to contract-
making iimunicipal law. Treaty-making is a long and complex process.
The final text may not satisfy every l'ower. Indeed, the greater the
number of States that participate in the drafting, the harder it is to
secure universal agreement. The treaty is no more thaii the cornmon
denominator of agreement. For some it may go too far :for others not
far enough. Once the text is established. that argument is ended. The
making of reservations, wliich are limited to the framework established
by the text of the treaty itself, is a very restricted means by which a
State can nevertheless safeguard its point of view. To allow every State
individually a say in whether a State putting forward reservations can
or cannot be regarded as being a party to the convention would destroy
the whole efficacy of the international conference, whether within or
outside the United Nations, as a method of drafting treaties, without
putting anything in its place. Ttwould he impossible ever ta know, in the
words of the Preacher, when it is "a tirne to plant and a tiine to pluck
up that which is plantecl" (Ecclesiastes 3 :2).

(ii) The intentions of the parties.
The second rule, hlr. President, is tliat the primary object is to give
effectto the intention of the ~arties. Tbere is no room for doubt as to
the intention of the partics t'o the Genocide Convention. It is to give
effect tothe universal international desire to define clearlv what eno oc ide
is aiid tlius to dispcrsc the fog of uncertainty that surriunds cl&omary
international law on the topic, and at the same time to establish an
obligation to CO-operatein the prevention and punishment of the crime
so defined. This intention is clearly espressed in the Conveiition itself-
Preamble and Article 1. It is also clearly in evidence from the mhole
history of the United Xations action in relation to the problem of
genocidc.352 STATEMENT BY arr.ROSENNE (ISRAEL)-12 IV 51
parties to the convention are iievertheless entitled effectively to object
to reservations made by other States which are parties or intending
parties to that convention. i think that there are two broad grounds
upon which this thesis could be advanced, and 1 will deal with them
because they seem to be the most extensive aiid. by implication. to

include al1 other possibilities. The first is based upon what is snid to
be a new technique in treaty-drafting : the second is based on an alleged
rule of law under which Statcs entitled to become parties to the treaty
have actual rights to accede to the definitive test of the treaty as finally
draftcd, so tliat the parties to it have no right to alter the balance of
obligations arising under it. The first thesis is based on the inechniiics
of treaty-making : the second on the substance of treaty-law.
Before entering upon tliis examination, this is the place to digress
somewhat from our main tlieme, and to refer to the argument put
forward oii page 66 of the written statement of the United Kingdom,
tothe effcct that the third question put tothe Court assunies a ncgative
answer to the first question, because if it is found that States cals
become parties to the Corivention while maintaiiiing resenrations which
have been formally objected to by other States, then it becomes largely
pointless to enquire who has the right of objection, since no objection
at al1 can be effective to prevent participation in the Coiivention by
the reserving State. It is at once conceded that a negative answer
to the first question would makc it pointless to devote much tiine to
the third question. On the other hand, giveii the conditions under
which the Rcquest for the Advisory Opinion uf;isdrafted, includiiig the
material fact that the important Report of the Secretnry-General
(Doc. A/137z) was not circulated until 20th September, 1950, the very
commencement of the fifth session, and that the debate itself opened
in the Sixth Cornmittee on 5th October and the consequent haste and
strain in which the discussion proceeded, it is not a matter for surprise
that the Request for the Advisory Opinion shouldperhaps be somcwhat

imprecisc in its wording. It is clear that what the General Asscmbly
desired was an authoritative opinion on al1 the aspects now before the
Court, aiid it cannot be accepted that the fact that question III is
worded as it is ivorded, implicitely assumes anything as to the answer
to be given to question 1. Furthemore, thisargument does not take into
account the possibility that the Court might give a qualified answer
to question 1, such as is in fact suggested by the Government of Israel.
Having .,garu for the terms of Article XII1 and Article XV of the Genn- ~ . ~ ~ ~
cideZ~)ii\.c.iiti>ii,tisL>*.li~,ve rl:~t iti: \Cr! iii~iiltc. tlie li..iit.icii,qiiirc.
w11~1n:isilic riglit <IIr~iijvctioii;LII~ t11:1t>tic11~~ii(111iiryIIUI pt,siul1tt.(l
iipuli:iiiy ~irr.-cuii~,t,i\.ti,idinrsjito tlic riiisiie11)11,gi\ <,rtr,iluejtioii 1.
'\liiretl~:iiitlint:itii poisihle t1i:itI>ych:iiiiiiiingsoiiient tlit:poi~ihi1itii.i
inlier~iit iii cuiisidi~r;itionof <liieitioii111,tlie coiiclusi~iii\vil1I>eré:iclied
that an affirmative answer isthe correct answer to question 1, snbject
to the qualification proposcd wlien the matter arises out ofArticles XII1
and X\' of the Genocide Convention.

[Pt~blic sittiag of Apvil rath, Ig51, mor+zizilig]

llav. . ~leasethe Court.
(i) Possible consequences of new developments in treaty-making
techniques. STATEMENT BY xr. ROSENNE (ISRAEL)-12 IV 51 353
Tlie Genocide Conventioii is "the first international treaty ever

prepared by the United Xations to be proposed for signature and ratifi-
cation by the States of the ivorld". (XehemiahRobinson, Tlie Goioci~le
Co+$ue?ttio?ilis, Origifnlad I?iterpret(itionp. 1.)Tlie Secretaq-General
lias written that multilateral conveiitions drawn up under the auspices
of the United Xations "by their very nature have a norld-wide character
by which States in very diverse circiirnstances :igrcc to be bourid, and
presumably agree to be bound iri exchange for the similar consent of
al1 parties", and lie has called the Genocide Coiivention the "true type
of legislative conveiition having the object of creating rules of lau for
identical operatioii in theifferent States adopting them". See Documeiit
A/137', paragrapli 32.

1 Iiave tried to give in this statement another analysis of the Genocide
Conveiition as well :is certain concliisions which can or cannot be derived
from the manncr in wliich it w:is drafted, and tliese conclusions are
somewhat different from those put forward by the Secretary-General.
Iii the light of these different vielvs the question seems to arisc, having
.regard for the particular universal characteristics of the Genocide
Convention : would effect be better given to the intentioiis of its framers
by the application of wliat the United States has ternied "a liberal rule
respccting reservatioiis" ii-hich will "promote maximum acceptarice by
the greatest possible number of States of the obligations defined by the
Convention arid ivill avoid either a general nndcrmining of the stanc1:irds
accepted by many nrithout reservation, or imposing aiiy new obligat' IO~S
without the necessary consent of al1upon ivhom they fall" ?(Court Ilistr.
51/10, p.271.) Oris the Secretary-General'sapproacli, \i,liich isbased upon
what 1might cal1the preservatioii of the wholeness of a legislative test,
the more correct ? The Government of Israel believes tliat for rcasons
which ne have tried to express in these proceedings, there is notliing

wliich would warraiit any dcviation from tlic liberal rulc, wliich certainly
lias a well-establislied existence of its own in iiiteriiational relations,
aridiri international law.
It has already been explaincd that, making al1due allowance for the
institutional frameiirork provided by the United Xations, in mliicli the
Genocide Convention \iras framed. in the ultimate :iiialysis there \vas no
esseiitial difference bctween the procedure adopted for drafting tliis
Convention and tliat, Say, uscd in the case of the foiir Geneva Convcii-
tions of 1949, whicli were also coiicludcd after a diplumatic confercnce,
wliich itself \iras preceded by some years of experts' preparatory worlc ;
sec Filin1 RecordoftheDiploi~mticCorifcrercco efGe?ievu ofrg4g. Volume 1,
particularly pages 45.143 and letter aiid memorandum on pages 147-
148. Yet this procedure, what 1 would cal1 the normal procedure,
itself opens the w:iy to another challenge to the view that only parties
are entitled to object to reservatioiis. Cast in its widest form, this clial-
lenge is based upoii what might be termed the analogy of the bi-carner:il
legislature. Balladore Pallieri, in his recent lectures in this city, lias
suggested that the modern legislative technique of international law-
the conference aiid signature as one stage and ratification of the conven-
tion as the seconcl- has an analogy with the legislative process which

is followed 'in a bi-cameral legislative assembly : "1.a Formation des
-
' Sec p. 31 of thispublication.354 STATENENT BY &II'.ROSENNE (ISRAEI-)-12 IV 51

Traités dans la Pratique internationale contemporaine", in Recueil des
Corrrsde La Haye, Volume 74 (1949).469, at page 509.
On the basis of this analogy certain legal effectsare attributed to the
be taken to justify the view that States not bound by the conventionuld
nevertheless have rights in connexion with the making of reservations.
at al1 events if their acts of ratification are part of wliat might con-
veniently be terrned "the Iaw-making process". h'ow 1 thiiik that, speali-
ing generally, there is a logical fault in approacliing problems of inter-
national law and international administration by the standards of muni-
cipal law and municipal practiccs, and that there is a grave danger iri
dralving hasty analogies from muiiicipal 1awand practice-as indeed the
Court pointed out in its Advisory Opiiiion on the InleriialioisalStutfrsof
South-West .4fricu: I.C. J. Reports 1950, 1-28 a,t page 13-2 The essence
of this system of legislation is that both houses of the Legislature have
to pass, in the proper manner, an identical text, aiid iii that process the
Chamber whicli first passes the text lias rifhts against tliat which passes
it second :in particular, a right to approve the worlc of the Second
Chamber if it differs from that of tlie First. Clearly, iio such. analogy
exists with that particular form of international legislative technique
known as tlie diplomatic conference which, as we have seen, >vasactually
the technique employed here. The analogy would only exist if the process
of ratification were somehow or other carried out by a collegiate act of
al1the ratifying States in pleiiary conference, and tlie world is still far
from that, if such a process will ever be practicable.
(iij Alleged riilc of law under which third States do have certain
rights iinder the treaty.

From the starting point, which is not contested, that the treaty itself
gives certain riglits to States not parties to it, namely, iii particular. the
right to accede and the right to the benefit of certain ministerial services
to be perforrned by the Secretary-Generat, the suggestion is advanced
right to accede tobythe definitivc text of the convention ns drajted, and
this means tliat tlic States which actually take the nccessary steps to
become bound bp the convention are not entitled. by proposing or
agreeing to reservations, to alter that text. or rather tlie balancc of
legal obligations arising under it, without the consent of al1 the States
entitled to become parties to the convention, or at least of those which
took part iii its drafting. In this connexion it may be said that there is
seen to be no substantial legal difference between the position of States
wliich took part in the drafting of the convention, and that of al1other
States entitled to accede. Thesame inchoatecharacter is impressed upon
the rights ofal1 States entitled to accede which have not done so, and
the fact tliat some of them participated in the drafting of the convcn-
tion is, from the legal point of view, an immaterial fact, whatever othcr
implications and importance it might have.
This theory is open to several objections, whether considered in the
abstract, or in relation to the Genocide Convention itself.
In the first place, if this rule is correct, it will mean that in actual
practice 780reservations would ever be admissible to any convention
whose accessioii clause is similar to that in the Genocide Convention, .
for the simple reason that the corprbsof States entitled to become parties is never fixed but is, by operation of Article 4 of the Charter, or a resolu-
tion such as Resolution 368 (11')of the General Assembly, always liable
to variation. This means. carried to extremes. that it will never he
--
possible to solicit the vie& u priori of al1the siates entitlcd to become
parties to the convention. But, as we have seen, international vractice
iejects any solution which would result in excluding rese;vatioos
altogether.
Secondly : it will be noted that the third party rights given by the
Genocide Convention al1 derive from what are commoiily called the
forma1 clauses. The United Kingdom states that, strictly speaking, al1
such clauses ought to be placed in a separate protocol. (Court Ilistr.,
51/10, p. 6S1, fn. 1.) This is believed to be technically correct, and it
follows from it that the third party rights, which derive fromthe forma1
clauses which ought to be placed in a separate protocol, are operative
only against those clauses, and not in relation to the coiivention as a
whole, which ought to be included in a separate instrument.
Thirdly : even admitting, for the purposes of argument only, that
third States do have the right to accede to the text as draftcd, tliis does
not affect the question of reservations. Reservations do not alter the
dcfinitive text as it exists when tlie process of negotintion and drafting
is completed, or the general balance of obligations derivirig from the
convention. \Vhat they do achieve is admittedly an alteration in the
specific balance of obligations in force between the States wliich accept
the reservations and the States making the reservations :and in our
view the treaty is not in force at al1 hetween the reserving State and
the States which object tothe reservatioris. 1 do not think that tlie Court
is being asked to hold that a State which accedes to a convention at a
later date is bound to accept al1 the reservations antecedently inade,
at al1events if that State was entitled to hecome a party as from the
moment the treaty \vas open for signature. The position might be

different for a State not then in existence, but having regard for the
terms of the request for the advisory opinion, neither of these points
seem to be up for discussion in these proceedings.
The United Kingdom has stated that it would limit the exercise of
this right to a reasonable time. This offer seems to partake of a political
character and cannot change the legal situation, nor indeed does it
affect essentially their fundamental argument, hased as it is on what
is termed the provisional or inchoate character of tlie rights possessed
by these States. Furthermore, it raiscs the question of wlio sh:ill decide
what is a reasonahle time. This itself is a question which should be
considered during the drafting of the convention, and not subsequently,
and it seems rather difficult to see how a law-applying organ can decide
this sort of matter.
This thesis is one which, if carried to extremes, would make it practi-
cally impossible to conclude international treaties, particularly those
of a law-making character. The mle @acta brtiis 1;ecnoccftt nec .prosfnd
is not a simple rule of treaty interpretation. It is one which rplates as
much to the actual o~eration of treaties. For this reason ~lon~ ~t is
itself siibject IO :IIIcxtcnsive iiiter1)ret:ition ancl :qq~Ii~,~tir~iTi11:ttis
to Sn!. tlic grcint of riglits Io States \i.liiclitir<nit 1i;trtii.sto thc treat!,
is itselfttbt. rr.girde<lns :(Ie],:irtiircfrcmiu1i:trintcrnatioii:il rcgtir<li

' See p. 72 of thispublication.356 STATEMENT BY MT. ROSE'NE (KRAEL)-12 IV 51

as tlie normal state of affairs. The rule applies, therefore, not only to
rights, the root of title of whicli is the convention itself-and this
iiicludes the right to become party to the coiivention-but also to rights
rclating to the conveiition and the parties to it, the roots of wliich lie in
general principles of law. This can be demonstrated by several examples.
'îhus : only the parties to the convention may, subject to any applicable
jurisdictional clauses, interpret the convention with binding effect. Only

the actual parties are, pritrtnlncie,entitled to demand the performance
of the treaty, and to determine whether it is heing duly performed.
Oiily the actual partics to a convcntiori are, prinzn /scie, eiititled to
revise it. Once it is adinitted that the iiiclioate or provisio~ialinterests of
States entitled to become parties to the coii\zention are wide enough to
include not only the right to accede, but ipso lnctovarions other kinds of
rights as \\.ell, themselves not related to thé actual operation of the
accession clauses, it is difficult to see wherethese inchoate rights, which
are not balanced by aiiy form of diity, would end. The consequeiices of
permitting such extensive and ill-defiiied rights to States not parties
to a treaty, unaccompaiiied 'by any form of duty whatsoever, are so

far-reaching thût tliey theinselves ask the questioii whether thnt really
is the law.

1 have, JIr. I1resident, substantially completed my statement ; but
before vreseiitine"invdconclusions in summarv form 1 should like iust
to Say 'the followirig.
Ou reading tlirough the record of yesterday's meeting, 1 firid that1
.did not perhaps iii;il<cmyself sufficiently clear about oiic point in con-
iiextion with the ridmissibility of reservatioiis to tlie Genocide Coiiveiition

as of right. In Our\.ie\v, it is only possible to assert a right to put forward
~~-~~v~tions in coniiesioii with tlie oueration of the contractiial varts
of the Genocide Converitioii. There is'iio right to do so iii relation to
those parts of the Conveiition which operate at large-the normative
parts of the Conveiition. The reasons for this distinctioii have been
esplained in somewliat greater detail iii paragraph IO of our written
stntement, to ivhicli 1 beg leave here to refer.
In other words, the views expressed in these proceedings as to the
coiisequences of a rcserv:ition aiid of an objection to a reservatioii, refer
only to the contractual parts of the Convention. As for tlie norinative
parts, quite clearly reservations are only admissible with the consent,

which may be expressed, implied or tacit, of al1the parties to the Con-
veiition, the expression "parties", of course, Iiaving the meaning which
1Iiave tried to give it iii this statement. 1 find it necessary to make this
explanation because otherwise there exists a danger tliat my words
could be interpreted in such a way as would end up by destroying the
efficacy of the whole Coiivention. Needless to Say, nothing was further
from my mind than that.
\\'ith your permission, hfr. President, 1 will now summarize the
conclusions contained in the Government of Israel's written statement
as supplemented in these oral remarks.

1.-The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide contains stipulations of a normative character and stipula- STATEMENT BY nrr.ROSENNE (ISRAEL)-12 IV 51 357
tions of a contractual character. However, as is clear from its text and
from the wliole history of United Nations dealing with the problem of
genocide, the intention of its framers was equally to codify, at least in
part, substantive international law, and to establish international obliga-
tions to fatili::iie International CO-operationin the prevention and punish-
ment of the crime. Consequeiitly, the Convention cannot he regarded
as a single indivisible whole, and its normative stipulations are divisible
from its contractual stipulations.
2.-The esscntial legal characteristics of reservations is tliat they
are contractual. They are admissible as of nght in relation to the
coutractual stipulatioris of the Convention. As for its normative stipula-
tions, they are admissible only with the consent of al1the parties.

3.-The orily States which are entitled to make a valid aiid effective
objection to reser\rations put fonvard by other Statesare the parties to
the Convention at the time. "Parties to the Convention" means those
States which have effectively ratified or acceded to the Convention in
accordance with its terms.
4.-As and to tlie extent that reservations may be put forward as of
right, tlie fact tliat objection may be made hy a State entitled to do so
does not normally affcct the status of tlie reserving State as a party to
the Convention. But then there will be no liexziof treaty obligation
between the reserving State and the objecting State. However, for the
purposes of Articles SiII and SV of the Convention only, in those
circumstances the reserving State ought iiot to be included in the
enurneration of States required to bring the Convention into force, or to
maintain it in force.
The application of these conclusions to the Genocide Convention will,
it is respectfully submitted, lead to the answers suggested in the last
paragraph of tlie written statement of the Government of Israel.

1 thank you. Mr. I'resident, for the great courtesy and attention with
Whichyon have heard me. 3. STATEMENT BI' SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS

[Public sitting of April 13th, 1951, iiiorizita~]

Aïr. President, hïembers of the Court,

1 must apologize for not having been able to be preseiit during these
proceedings from the commencement ; but 1 am very grateful to you
for allowing me this opportiinity of presenting in person some part, at
least, of the case on behalf of the United Kingdom Goi~erriment.
Xly Government was particularly aiixious that 1, as the present Chief
I~wOfiicer of the Crown, should make an appearance hcrc, both because,
if 1may say so, of tlie very high respect in which thc United Kingdom
Governincnt holds the Court-a Court which is entitled to receive a11
possible assistance from tlie States which support it, as the British
Government traditionally has-and also because of the importance
which my Government attaches to the subject-matter wliich you are
considering. 1,personally, was also ansious to appear, not only because
it is al\vays a pleasure as \vell as an honour to appear before this great
international Court, but because of the fact that1 myself had some part
in the initial discussions about tlie question of genocide both at Yurem-
bcrg and later at Lake Success and Paris, although I must add that 1
accept no responsibility for the expression "genocide" itself.
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is in general
support of the practice whicli is growing up now in international aiiairs,
and which is exemplifieciiii the Genocide Convention, the clraft Coveriant

on Human Rights and other conventions, of concludiiig multilateral
treaty arrangements \<,hich seek to lay down minimum standards of
international conduct in regard to social and humanitarian matters.
\Ve view this procedure as beiiig of great importance, especially at this
time when there are conflicting ideologies of one kind and another, and
where basic principles olten seem to be imperilled. \Vc think that if
common rules of conduct .in thesc matters can be established between
States. it will not only promote humanitarian ideals and protect mini-
mum human rights, but in time it will conduce to better relationships
between the States. Rut, Blr. I'resident, they must be common rules and
general minimum standards, aiid that is why, speaking broadly, we are
opposed to any extended riglit to make reservations to the multilateral
conventions which may be concluded about matters of this kind. There
is, 1venture to suggest. a somewhat dangerous tendency nowadays to
lay down ambitious, high sounding, even sometimes extravagant stand-
ards. and then because they arc too ambitious and too much in advance
of general international practice. to permit reservations fromthem, so
that in the end, far from constituting common standards, they really
become frauds and delusions. \Ve would sooner see the conventions
frained in terms to which every State can honestly adhere without
reservations. \Ve would rather see that kind of convention drawn up
than something which is in advance of world opinion, cast in over- STATEYENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.I<.)-13 IV 51 359

ambitious terms to which Statesmay be preparcd tu give lip-service at
the Assemblv of the United Nations. but to wliicli thev iiiake res~ ~ ~ions
when it cornésto the question of ca;rying out the obl?gations wbich have
been agreed to. If the practice of allowing reservations to this kind of
inultiljteral convention-is discouraged, Staies mav approach the prepcir-
ation and the negotiation of these conventioiis witli more realism and
honesty, and less lip-service tlian perhaps they sometimes do.
hlr. l'resident, 1 venture to say that because that is the general
approach which iny Governmcnt makes to tliese matters. itIy leariicd
colleague, AIr. Fitzmaurice, lias esplained to riic the interesting and
important arguments which liavc already been addressed to the Court.

1 have thought that it \vould be more courteous and also more effective,
ifhlr. Fitzmaurice, having heartl the arguments in Court himself, should
make sucli comments as may be appropriate about them presently,
and 1 understand y011have been kind enough to say that Mr. Fitzmaurice
might follow ine presently and niake some additional comments to my
own. Tliat being so, 1 apologize to my collcagues who have alrcady
spoken-my colleague froni Israel, and my old frientl and colleague,
111.Kcriio-lor not haviiig Iieard their arguments, :ind for not prc-
tending iiow to deal in riiiy detnil with them. \\'li:i1 propose to do. if it
meets witli the approval of the Court, is to divide my arguments in this
wav. First 1 shall sav sometliine about the comvetcnce of the Court to
giG: :in t\(l\,isory OI~~~iio\iviInisecII:I:n::;iiIJ:<:~~~icstiui~t:oI ;LI :il1
ci,q,iitsit sceriis tu hc iiil;gestud tli.it tlir Coiirt, t:\cri if striirl!. crmil,,:tt:iit

to ci\.<:tri:\<l\.isi~r\,01)iiiioii. nit<i<IL-(:IIIIL.CZCICI;~ 11s ~iirisdi~.
tio; in the present-case. est, {&sing to the substaiice of the'mattcr,
1 shall bcgin by trying to eliminnte certain issues whicli are incliiied to
obtrude tliemsclves into this mltter, but which are in iny opinion irrele-
vant, and whicli 1 shall suggest the Court ought to try to exclude from
its mind. After that, 1shall discuss the three main doctrines which are
in existence about this mattcr or have been advanced on the subject
of the validity andthe effect of reservations which it inay be sought to
make to multilateral converitions, thus corering the first and second
questions put to the Court. Finally either 1,if 1 bave the time, or my
colleague, Mr. Fitzmaurice, will deal with the third (luestion.

As regards the question of competence, several grounds are advanced
on whicii it is suggested that the Court is incomprtent, or at any rate
that it shoiild decline jurisdiction. \irith some of these we have already
been made familiar in the Peace Treati~scase. It is argued that there is
a dispute actuallv uendine between certain States in relation to the
subj&t-matter of the pre;ent licquest, and it is suggested that, in
consequence, the Court should not give an Opinion without the consent
of those States-a consent wliich-is not forthcoming. One need not
discuss whethcr a dispute in tlie.norma1 sense of the term can be said to
have arisen solely because certain States have cntercd reservations to
the Genocide Convention to which other States have objected. Even if
that were so, the Court, in the Pence Trenties case, espressly rejected

the view that the existence of a dispute in relation to the subject-matter
of a Kequest for an Advisory Opinion constituted any bar to the exer-
cise of thc Court's jurisdiction, and 1 should like to recall to the Court360 STATEMENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 I\' 51

what it said on that occasion. 1 take this passage from page 71 of the
Couit's Reports for 1950 :
"Another argument that has been iiivokcd against the power of
the Court to answer tlie questions put to it in this case is based on
the opposition of the Governments of liulgaria, Hungary and
Itoinairia to the advisory procedure. The Court cannot, it is said,
give the Advisory Opinion reqoested without violating tlie well-
established principle of international law according to which no
judicial proceedings relating to a legal question pending between
States can take place without their consent.
This objection reveals a confusion between the principles govem-
ing contentious procedure and those which are applicable to Advis-
ory Opinions.
'The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the
Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases. The situation is different
in regard to advisory proceedings even where the Request for an
Opiiiioii relates to a legal question actually pending between
States. The Court's reply is only of an advisory character :as siich,
it has no binding force. It follows that no State, whether a Jlember
of tlie United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory
Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in
ordcr to obtain enligtiteirment as to the course of action it should
take. ïhe Court's Opinion is given not to the States, but to the
organ which is eiititled to reqnest it ; the reply of the Court, itself
an 'organ of the United Xations', represents its participation in
the activities of the Organization, and, in pnnciple, should not
be refused."

blr. President, 1suggest that those considerations apply with equal,
if not greater, force to the present c?se. Quite apart frorn the doubt
whether any specific dispute exists, there 1s the point, to wliich we
directed the attention of the Court in Ourargument in tlie Peace fieaties
the possihility that a Request for an Advisory Opinion may relate toaplate
dispute which is pending between two States, thus makiiig it clear, by
implication at least, that the existence of a dispute is not in itself a bar
to the rendering of an Advisos. Opinion by the Court. The effect of
these two rules of the Court is, first, that if an Advisory Opinion is
requested upon a legal question actually pending between two or more
States, either of them inay be allowed to appoint a judge ad hoc if a
judge of its own nationality is not already on the Court. Secondly, the
effect, taken in conjunction withArticle6S of the Court's Statute, is that
the Court is to be guided by the provisions relating to contentious
cases "to the extent to which the Court recognizes them to be applic-
able". III the Peace ï'renties case the Court dealt with that point also,
and with the question how far the non-consent or opposition of States
which miglit be affected by an Advisory Opinion constituted a reason
why the Court should not give such an Opinion ; and on page 72 of the
Reports the Court said :

"It is true that Article 68 of the Statute provides tliat the Court
in the esercise of its advisory functions shall further be guided
by the provisions of the Statute which apply in contentious cases. STATEMENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51 361

13utaccording to the same article these provisionswould be applic-
able oiily 'to the extent to which it [the Court] recognizes them to
be applicable'. It is therefore clear that their application depends
on the particular circumstances of each case and that the Court
possesses a large amount of discretion in the matter. In the present
case the Court is dealing with a Request for an Opinion, the sole
object of which is to enlighten the General Assembly as to the
opportunities which the procedure contained in the Peace Treaties
may afford for putting an end to a situation which has been presen-
tecl to it. That being the object of the Request, the Court finds in
the opposition to it made by Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania no
reason why it should abstain from'replying tu the liequest."

That, MI. President, again, 1suggest, applies with equal force to the
circumstaiices of the present case. In this passage which 1have read, the
Court was dealing not so much with the question of actual competence,
as with that of the proprie& of giving an Opinion. As the Court had .
pointed out in an earlier passage, there were certain limits to its duty
to reply to a Request for an Opinion, and Article 65 of the Statute was
empowering it, as the Court put it, "to examine whether the circum-
stances of thecase are of suchacharacter as to lead it to decline to answer
the Request". It is clear that in the Pzace ï'renlies case the Court, in
arriving at the conclusion which it did on this matter, was impressed by
tlie fact that tlie Opinion was one which was required by the General
Assembly of the United Nations for the purposes of carrying out its
own fuiictions. iiut the position, in our submission, is not really different
here in the present case. The Genocide Convention was a convention
drawn up by the General Assembly itself, after a great deal of labour, in
furtherance of one of the principal objects of the United Nations. The
Secretary-General of the United Nations is the depository of al1ratifica-
tions and accessions which may be made to the Genocide Convention.
It is essential that the Secretary-General should know, and that the
General Assembly should know and the Afembersof the United Xations
should also know, whether ratifications and accessions which are made
subject to reservations are valid. It is essential that they sliould know
what the effect of the reserv:rtions may be. This question of the effect
of any reservation, and of its effect on the validity of any particular
ratification or accession, is by no means a matter which solely concerns
the interests of two particular States, one of whicli has entered a reser-
vation and the other of which has made an objection toit ; it is a matter
which concerns the Or~anization as a whole and everv orleof its hlemberç.
;iii<I!i,liicti iilso :iffec?s the fuiictions arIsgiitiihuf tir,: S~:creinry-
(;encra1 Jr 13tlicrefure;iycrlcctly proper rn;lttcr for the (;cneraI ,\s.icin-
bis ro ask ilic Court for ;irOviiiiuii on tlieiii. ai1drcsnectfiillv siibiiiit
th& it is a matter on which {lie Court, as "the principal judicral organ
of theUnited Xations", ought not to decline togive the Opinion reques-
ted. Its object is not to settle a dispute hetween particular States but
to enlighten the Assembly, and the individual Afembers of the United
Nations, as to their position, andas to cacli other's positions, in relation
to the Genocide Convention.
There are also certain other grounds on which it is suggested that
the Court should decline jurisdictioo. One of these is that Article IX362 STATENEST Bi'SIR H:\KTLEV SHA\YCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV j1

of the Geriocide Convention itself should be regarded as a bar to tlie
exercise by the Court of its advisory functions in the present case.
Tliis is the article which s;iys that disputes between the contracting
parties to the Geiiocide Convention, relating to its interpretation. applic-
ation, or fulfilment, shall be submitted to the Court nt the request of
arguments seem ta be advanccd in support of the view that this articlery
forms a bar to the juris<liction of tlie Court. On the one hand, the
Government of the Philippines says, in effect, that there is a dispute
between it and the Goveriiment of Australia as to tlie validity of the
reservations to the Conveiition entered by the Goverrinieiit of the
Philippines. Therefore, in its submission, this is aatter which ought
ta go before the Court under Article IS of the Conveiition, although,
according to the Government of the Philippines, only b rneans of an
agreed submission on its part and on the part of the 2 overnment of
Australia, acting in conjunction. The Government of the Philippines
accordingly appears to suggest that the Court should decline juris-
diction in order to eiiable those two Governments, as parties to this
alleged dispute, to bring thc matter before the Court themselves by
ail agreed submission (if indeed one be agreed) under Article 1X of the
Convention. The Government of Poland, on the otlier hand, wliile
apparently maintaining that the existence of -4rticle 1S of the Genocide
Convention preveiits the matter coming before the Court in any otl~er
way, under that article, at the saine time seem to imply tliat it cannot
come before the Court evcn iiiider Article IX, because there is rot at
Iiailing the fulfilment of those conditioiis, the matter caiiiiot be hrought
before the Court under Article IS of the Convention, aiid tlierefore,
according to the Government of Poland, ought not to be brought before
the Court by way of a Request for an Advisory Opinion.
It is a curious sidelight on the attitude of the Goveriiment of Polaud
iii putting forward this argumeiit, that that Govcrnmeiit is itsclf one
of the governments whicli lias entered a reservatioii etcluding the
application of ArticleIS of thc Convention to itself. 1 find some diffi-
culty therefore in understanding its position when it puts forward the
existence of this article as a reason why the Court should decliiie to
give an Advisory Opinion.
But in any case 1 suggest that the views, both of tlie Government
of I'oland and of the Government of the Philippines, as to Article IS
are totally misconceived. In the first place, they exhibit tliat confusion
between the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases aiid its advisory
jurisdiction to which the Court drew attention in the relevarit passage
froin the Peace Treuties case whicli 1 have already cluoted. Even if
Article IX of the Genocide Convention were applicable iii the present
Opiriion on the matter to tlic Gciieral Assembly of the Uiiited Nations.y
However, 1 suggest that Article IX of the Convention is clearly not
applicable to the present case for reasons which, 1 suggest, must be
evident to anyone who considers its actual terms in the present context.
The article only applies ta disputes "between the contracting parties",
and the very question involved on the present occasion is whether
countries can be regarded as contracting parties ta the Convention if
they enter reservations which other interested couiitries abject to. That STATEMENT BY SIK HAKTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 I\' 51 363
is a question wliich lies outside the Convention, and has to be decided
before it can be settled whether Article IX is applicable at all. To put
the matter in another way, Article IX is itself a part of the Convention.
Before it can become applicable, the Convention itself must be applic-
able. The obligation to refer a dispute to the Court under Article 1S
can only arise where the Convention is operative bet~veen the parties
to the dispute. But it is prccisely the ohject of the present Request to
discover whether the Convention isoperative where reservations have
been cntered, and a diffcrence of opinion on that subject canriot there-
fore be a dispute under Article IX of the Convention. The Court is not
beingasked, on the present occasion, to interpret the Genocide Conven-
tion itself, but to Say whether; in certain circumstances, countries can
be regarded as being parties to that Convention at ali, and if so rvith
what effect. That is a completely different mattcr.
That. &Ir. President, is eauallv the answer to a further areumeut
advanced, which is advanced in :he written statement of the ~overn-
ment of I'oland, namely that "the riyht to interpret or to seek an inter-
pretation of the text of an ngreemenf has always been reserveù to those
States only which have signed the instrument or have acceded to it.
The request for interpretation of the convention voted upon by a
majority of States who are not parties to it constitutes a violation of
the undeniable right of its signatories." The short answer to this is that
even if this argument were othenrise valid, and 1 certainly would iiot
concedc it without much further examination. it assumes that an inter-
IIr~thtlOnof llii (;?nocliie C<lii\.r.iitiunis !\.15 Ibçin::,ski.d f"rIIItlic
~xhciit C:UC, hut tlt..ris iiot soIiii.icr. r1.cC.eii<-i:i.l\ssiiil>ly's rcqiicst
reln1c.10 sornerhin:: (iliii<Iiif~rciir.niid is iiot <lircirtl\,i.i,iic<!riictlwith
an interpretation ofthé terms of théconvention itself.
There is yet another argument as to competence which is advanced.
or apparently advanced. by the Government of Poland, namely, and
1 quote from their written statement, that Article 96 of the Charter
"entitles the General Assembly and the Security Council to request
the Opinion of the Court only in cases where this is not excluded by
special stipulations or ~>rovisions".hlr. President, for my part, 1 suggest
that there is no sucb limitation to be seen in Article 96, which, on the

request the International Court of Justice to give ail Advisory Opinion

says tliat the Court "may give an Advisory Opinion on any legal ques-
tion".

ing reasonsese grounds therefore, 1submit to the Court, that no convinc-
"principal jndicial organ of the United Natioiis", and as the body toe
which the Assembly of the United Nations naturally looks for advice

on juridical questions, should not comply with the present Request
for an Advisory Opinion. In my submission, the Court ought not to
restrict the exercise of its jurisdiction in assistance of the United
reasons to the contrary.requested, unless tliere are compeliing juridical STATEhlENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51 365

notice being given in that way, a reservation is in fact entered on sig-
nature, ratification or accession, and if no objection to it is then offered,
it can be presumed to have the tacit consent of al1the other parties,
provided it was duly communicated to them. But that is clearly not the
present case which the Court has to'consider, for here we know tliat the
reservations in question are ones to which objection is made. It is in
res~ect of reservations to which objection has been made that the Court
is asked to advise.

1 suggest, therefore, Mr. President, that ordinary and well-known
international practices already make full provision for, and give full
effect to, the possibility of the making of such ordinary reservations
as other States are normally prepared to agree to, either expressly or
tacitly, and that it is therefore quite unnecessary, and indeed not
strictly correct, to relate the present matter to the question of the
desirability of permitting reservations to which other countries tacitly
or expressly agree. Alternatively, if the two different questions are
to be related, then one should be very clear what one means by the
desiraoil oitpermitting reservations. As 1 have said, there is a very
great difference between in fact pemiitting reservations by a recognized
procedure involving the consent, express or tacit, of the other interested

countries, and the process of permitting reservations to be made
arbitrarily and unilaterally, and to be maintained in the face of the
actua~ disaereement and obiection of other interestcd ~arties adherina -
to the convention.
Next, 1 suggest tliat the Court is equûlly not called upon to consider,
except by way of illustration, the nature of any reservations that have
so far been made or may hereafter be made to this particular Conven-
tion. Xot only do the questions put to the Court not cal1for a pronoun-
cement on any specific reservation, but it is also not directly material
to the issue before the Court what the nature of the reservation is.
It is sufficient. in our submission, that it is a reservation to which
objection has been offered. Apart from this it is only necessary to
note that, as the written statement of the United Kingdom and certain

of the other written statements point out, it is not every declaration
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ - ~ uature. ratification or accession that constitutes a
reservation in the strict scnse of the term.
13rit,Mr. President, while the nature of the reservation is not directly
material to the questions put to the Court, it may well be material by
way of illustrating certain principles and theories which must be gone
into, and 1 shall cite certain of the reservations entered by the Genocide
Convention for that purpose. Aloreover, altliough the nature of the
reservation may not be directly material, apart from the fact that it
is :ireservation of such a kind as to have drawn objection from other
interested States, the very fact that it is a reservation.to which objection
has been made is itself material, because it gives rise to the inference
tliat the reservation must be of an importalit character, affecting the

substance of the Convention in a definite way, and not something of
a purely formai or minor nature. It must be assumed, in my submission.
that States do not ohject to reservations which other Statesput forward
inerely for the sake of being troublesome or difficult. If they ohject,
it is because they consider, either that the reservation, if pemitted,
would impair the value of the Convention so far as they are concerned,
or because they consider it to be of such character as to be inconsistent366 STATEMENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
with, or amount to a rejection of, the substance of the Convention or
some vital part of it. 1 submit therefore that the Court oucht to trv to
esclude froh its consideratioii of this matter the argumenr which i'sso
frequently advanced in relation to reservations, that thev are often of
an unimportant or forma1 character. not affectine the substance of ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~
obligati&is provided for in the conventiori, anvd that States should
therefore have a ri~ht to make them at will. 13vcnif this were otlicrwisc

true, it could notbe true of thc type of rcscrvation contempixted iii
the questions put to the Court, for we know, and it is indeed postulated
in the questions, that these reservations are of a sufficiently important
and substantial character to have drawn actual objection from one
or more of the other States concerned.
It also follows from al1tliat 1have been saying tliat the Court is also
not called upon to go into siich questions as to whether, in any given
case, consent to a reservation has in fact been obtained, or as to how
and by what means consent lias been offeredor how it can be manifested.
These questions caiiriot arise in my submission, since ex hyfiothesithe
reservations contemplated by the Request are reservations to wliich
consent has not been given, but are on the contrary reservations to
mhich objection has been made.
Before 1 leave this sectioii of my remarks, 1mould like to revert for
a moment to a point 1 have already touched upon. The questioiis put
to the Court of course relate to the Genocide Convention. But the Court
will see, both from the general way in which tlie questions are framcd,
and also from the language of the third operative paragraph of the
resolution containing the questions, that the Assembly did hope to
obtain some general guidaiice as to reservations to conventions which
may be drawn up under the auspices of the United Nations. The third
operative paragraph in the resolution makes this clear because it directs
the Secretary-General, iending the rendering O/ the Advisory Opinion
by the Court (amongst other tliings), to continue his present practice
aç the depositary, not merely of the Genocide Convention but of United
Nations conventions generally. 1 suggeçt therefore that the Court both
can and should, while giviiig its Opinion mainly with reference to the
GenocideConvention, frame that opinion in sucliaivay asto be applicable
so far as possible to United Nations conventions of this kind, generally.

IV

1 turii iiow to the actual qucstions put to the Court. 1 propose to
take tlie first two questions together, because, although the second'
question only arises if an affirmative answer is giveii to the first question,
it is in fact ver), difficult to arrive at the answer to be given to the
first question witliout takine account of the second. The fundamental
issue put to the Court on the basis of these two questions is, as 1 have
said, not a matter relative to the desirability of permittine a reservation.
or of encouraging as many countries as possible to be&me parties to
international conventions ;it iswhether a certain thing islegally possible.
The fundamental question wliich the Court has to answer iii relation
to the Genocide Convention is whether it is legally possible for a State
to become a party to the Convention, and to preserve that status, while
maintaining and benefiting from a unilateral reservation made by it,
to which objection has been offeredby another legitimately interested STATE>lENT Bi' SIR HARTLEY SHA\VCROSS (u.K.)-13 Il' 51 367
State. (The first question assumes that tlie legitimately iiiterested State
is an actual party to the Conventioii. The problem whetlier potential

as well as actual parties can offer effective objection is posed by the
third of the questions put to the Court.)
To the fundninental question 1 have just mentioned, threc completely
different answers liave been suggested, both in the discussions which
took place iii the General Assembly last autumn, and in the statements
which have been submitted to the Court iii the present matter. Accord-
ing to the first aiiswer, it is legally possible to make and inaintain a
reservation under al1 circumstnnces at tlie simple will of tlie reserving
country, and with tlie effect of making the reserviiig country a full
party to the coiivention with the benefit of its reservatioii, even if this
has been objected to by another party. According to the second view,
it is lsotlegallypossible under aiiy circumstances for a couiitry to become
a party to a coiivention ~vliilealso maiiitaining a reserv:ition which
has been objected to by another State: in other rvords, according to
that view, a country can only become a party to a convention subject
to a reservation which it desires to make, if that reservation is consented
to (by one means or aiiother) by all tlie countries which Iiave a right to
object to tlie rescrvation if tliey arc so miiided. Finally, there is the
third view, according to wliicli it is legally possible for a couritry to
become a party to a convention while maintaining a reservation objected

to by another iiiterestcd State, but only with limited eflect, that is to
say the conventioii will only beiii force as between the reserving country
and the countries \%.hichhave not objected to the reservation : it wiU
not be in force between the reserving country and those countries which
have objected to the reservation. According to that last view, therefore,
you can get tlie position that a nuinbcr of countries may al1 be parties
to a given convention and yet the convention will not he in force iri
the same way between certain of them.
These three vicws can be called, for short, the absolzrlesovcreignty
view (involving an absolute unilateral right of participating in conven-
tions subjcct to reservations made nt the ivill or whim of the reserving
country) ; secondly, the ortlrodoxview, as 1 submit it to be, involving
the necessity of consent to a reservation on the part of al1 those States
which are entitled to object to it. with the corollary that a State canuot
become a party to a convention while inaintaining a reservation which
has been objected to, and its ratification or accession is in tliose circum-
stances inoperative. Finally, tliere is wliat 1 may, with respect, perliaps
cal1 the P~~b-Ai~zericnv~ i&w. siiice tliat view is based ori the svstem
instituted by certairi States of the Aincrican continent for application

to conventioiis made between themselves. There is, in addition, the
theorv which. as 1 have heard. has been exoounded and ~ro~ounded
by m? colleague froin Israel, khich consists &hap$ of a Combination
of the orthodos view and of the l'aii-American theory. 1 propose to
coiisider these views in turn, reminding you that the qÜestioÏis of reser-
vations to interiiational conventionsis a general question. Many, though
not of course all, of thc principles wliicli apply in the case of one conven-
tion apply equally iii tlie casc of another: and iis impossible to arrive
at an answer in relation to the Genocide Convention without considering
(a) certain geiicral principles of law applicable to al1 reservations to
conventions, and (b) certain principles applicable to al1 conventions
belonging to the same class or category that the Genocide Coiivention368 STATEMEXT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51

belongs ta. It is in that spirit that 1 shall present the substance of my
argument.

1will now discuss the absolute sovereignty view, or, as 1 should prefer
to cal1it, the absolute anarchy view, but 1 shall not.spend a great deal
of time oii it because 1do not think this view can be taken very seriously.
The fundameiital objection to it, apart from the fact that it finds abso-
lutely no warrant in the authorities or the past practice of nations, is
that it makes complete nonsense of :the whole process of negotiating and
concluding conventions. That process is one which is iiitended to result
in a text which represents the utmost measure of agreement which
cati be reached in the circumstances :and. as 1 ventured to submit
in the very first remarks that 1 made; it is of the utmost importance
that that process shoul<lbe a real one. It is then for the countries which
have parficipated in the negotiations, and for such otlier countries

as may be given the riglit to become parties, subsequently to decide
whether the test is sufficiently acceptable to enable them to sign and
ratify it, or to accede to it, as the case may be; or whether, on the
other haiid, it is unacceptable, sa that they are not willing to become
parties to it. Obviously, thrit is a situation which only has meüning and
reality if the text, as drawn up, is final, something whicli, in principle.
countrics must either become parties to as it stands, or not become
parties to at all-unless derogations are permitted or agreed ta by other
States which are prepared to become parties to it as it stands. Clearly,
there is no meaning in the process of i~egotiating and drawing up the
text of a convention, which is then opened for signature and ratification
or accession. if it is nossible for anv countrv at will. and even in the
hicc of ol>jeitioii niit:&l by otlicr iiiicrcstL.Ci,iiiiii. ti~t oiilyri,ciiti:r

re.icriniioiii of EU~S~;LIICL.\IIIICIIinxy 111:11eriilllirtipnir tlic viliiïijf
rhc coii\~eiitiuii. tir \vliiciii.iiiiziiifiiniitl\~ :~lter 111~r'~>I:itis the
parties inter se, but also to bicorne a part$ to the convention in those
circumstances, while maintaining and beiiefiting from the reservations
whicli it is seen fit to make. A classic statement of the objections to
any process of this kind was made some years ago by 31. l'odesti Costa,
a former ilssistant Secretilry-General of the Leaguc of Nations, in an
article in the Reuue de droit ititeni<itiofialNo. I, 19:i)) cntitled "Les
réserves dans les traités internationaux", and 1 would lilie to read the
Coiirt the following extracts from this article ; which 1 sliall translate
as 1 go along :

"As has already been said, the object of al1 reservations is to
modify in some way the meaning or the legal implications of the
treaty.
Every treaty constitutes a balanced body of rights and obliga-
tions arrived at by a process of reciprocal concessions. In intro-
ducing reservations at the time of its accession, a State puts itself

in a privileged position and whilst those States which have made
concessions in the first place have made the maximum concessions
in order to reach a common basis, a State making such reservations
concedes nothing. On the contrary, after having coldly weighed
the pros and cons of the stipulations whicli have already becn STATEXEST BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
369
agreed, it selects those which suit itself, and rejects those which it
does not like. If such a position could be achieved without the con-
sent of the other parties, the latter's position might be untenable.
But it is even more serious than that. A State, without Iiaving
modified its own requirements, without having made any conces-
sions to others. without making any contribution to the collective
interest, is. able to restrain in its application to itself the sense
and effect of a body of stipulations which already constitute a

minimum common to all, and thereby upsets the balance in a way
which can easily affect the juridical unity of the treaty and compro-
mise the result of an agreement which had been arrived at with
much difficulty ~y t~e reciprocal process of mutual concession."
In the written statements furnished to the Court, the main argument
in favour of the absolute soverei~nty theory is that al1States must have
a ri"ht to make what reservat'ioni thev-like to conventions. aiid to
br.ci.iii,: ~>arrictri tliii,c cori\.eiitions suhjcct ru rliu;~ rcs~r\,:itiniis,
Ltï.,iis~: rliij ;IIIiiilieit%nrriglir(ifsu\.crciciiry. 'I'IIIYIV\%,iii\~~Ivcs;I
coiiinlctc inijii,iici:ritiofntht. rizl.II~~ILi~iso\~~.r~:i,'iiI~ ~IICr~I:~li~iii,

for every country which enters into ail agreement limits to that extent
the free exercise of its sovereignty. It is clear-1 wish it were more

generally realized and more.readily acceptable in practice-that every
treaty involves a derogation from absolute sovereignty ; but of course,
since States enter into treaties voluntarily, no real abrogation of sover-
eignty without consent is involved. The right sphere of operation for
the concept of sovereignty in relation to international agreements is
surely this, that it is a matter entirely for the discretion of every State,
in the exercise of its ahsolute sovereignty, to decide whether it will or
will not become a party to a given convention. No State is obliged to
do so, nor can it normally be made to, and in the exercise of its discretion
it can decide whether it will or not (although it may be added of course,
that treaty relationships between States, derogating to that extent
from their sovereignty, are essential if international affairs are to he
conducted in accordance with civilized concepts and are to differ from
anarchy). Il'hat is quite inadmissible is the argument that it is possible
to become a party to a convention but, in the exercise of sovereignty, to
pick out some part of that convention which (whether other interested
States agree or not) the reserving State will decline to observe.
The theory that because States are not obliged to become parties
to a convention at all, they can accept what parts they please and
make reservations on the rest, was considered and rejected by the late
Sir IVilliam Mnlkin, whose views 1think al1those who knew him would
agree are entitled to be given great weight on this subject. In his article
on reseivations in the British Year Book of International Law for 1926,
he said this :

"At first sight it might be tliought that, as no State is obliged
to sign any convention unless it wishes to do so, any State is
entitled to accept as much or as little of a convention as it may
think fit, and is therefore in a position to make any reservations
which it considers desirable, irrespective of the viem of the other
contracting parties and without obtaining their consent. But such370 STATEIIE'IT BY SIR HARTLEY SHA\VCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51

a view is not, it is suggested, consistent witli sound pririciple. i\Iulti-
lateral conventions are after al1 only a form of contract in which
the consideration for the acceptance of the contract hy any one
party is its acceptance by the others. In al1 conventions of this
nature there are probably provisions \\,hich do not appeal much
to certain signatories but whicli tliey are prepared to accept as a
return for securing the acceptance of other provisioiis, to which
they attach iinportaiice, by the other parties to the coriverition.
If, however, ariy party is entitled, without the consent of the otlier
signatories, to pick out of the convention any provisions to which

it objects and exclude them by mearis of a reservation from the
obligations which it accepts, it is obvious, not only that the object
of the convention miglit be largely defeated, but that the consider-
ation indicated above is impaired or even destroyetl; the other
signatories are not iii fact getting what they bargained for. It would
seem, therefore, that in principle a party to a convention is only
entitled to make such reservations as the other parties are content
that it should make, in which case the offer of tlie party coiicerned
to accept the convention without these provisioiis is :~ccepted by
the other parties as a sufficient consideration for their acceptance
of the convention as a whole. Or it may well be tliat most, if not
all, of the signatories have reservations which they desire to make,
iri which case the acceptance by each party of the reservations of

the others may be regarded as the consideration for their acceptance
of its own."

The truth is, Mr. IVesident, that a convention is not, and néver can
be, a mere frameworl<, within which are located a number of totally
independent and self-coiitained provisioiis. Broadly speakiiig, it is neces-
sary to regard a convention as an indivisible whole. In thosc cases
ivhere a treaty is divisible, this is made plain in the test of the treaty.
For instance, we have treaties, such as the London Xaval Treaty of
1930, where it \vas possible to become a party to certain parts of the
convention, and not to other parts. But this nas expressly provided
for in the treaty itself, and of course there have been other examples

of treaties which provided for divisibility in regard to acceptance.
\Vhere a convention does not provide for this, it must be assumed to
constitute a single whole and its different parts to be inter-related to
each other. A country which purports to make a reservation of substance
(and 1 would remind the Court that it is ex hyPothesi reservations of
substance which \veare considering) is in effect not acceptiiig the conven-
tion at all. It is really rejecting the convention and proposing to the
other parties something different. If they are willing to agree, well and
good. If not, then the would-be reserving country must choose either
to withdraw its reservation or not to become a Party.to .he convention
iLt :,II.
tlcrv 1 \i.otil<lintcrpul:ttv tlint tlic csjciittiiirlisihiliry uf tre.itici
cuiiirttiit~?; t1temain ob]rstii,ii in niy rcsl,ecifiil siilimi.ision. ro tlie tlicory

ad\.~iic~.<I)vIII\<listiii~tiisli~t,lllen~uc frotn 1sr:i111i)rncticLII \i.t,iilil
be impossible & Say defiiiitely whether a given clausé \sras normative
or contractual. Treaty clauses are often both, and that is certainly the
case with some of the articles of the Genocide Convention, for example,
Article VII. ST.+TE.\IENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
371
Reverting to the absolute sovereignty theory, the totally arbitrary
nature of the sovereignty conception of conventions is readily apparent
if you apply the underlying principle in other legal fields. If it is possible
for a coiintry to say that it will become a party to a conventioii, but
not to soine particular part of it whicli it dislikes, it shoiild equally
be possible for a country, when, for instaiice, enteririg irito tliplomatic

relatioiis with another country, to Say to the other country that it will
receive its di~lomatic and consular re~resentatives but will not accord
them al1the customary diplomatic or Eonsu~arimmunities or privileges.
This. 1 think, would be something qiiite inadmissible. States, in the
exercice of their sovereignty, have discretion whetlier to enter into
diplomatic relations with other States or not. They cannot he compelled
to do $0, but if they do do so, they must do it under the conditions
prescribed by the accepted rules of international law in regard to diplo-
matic reprcsentatives. They caniiot receive someone in a tliploniatic
cap:icity and ~iotaccord the prescribed immunities. In es:ictly the same
way, States are not obliged to become parties to treaties, but if they
do, they must become parties subject to the terms of the treaty as it
has been drawn up, unless tliey can obtain the conscrit of the other
parties to some variation or derogation from its terms.
The argument has been advanced that the sovereigiity concept ivould
facilitate the process of participation in internatiorial conventions. For
instance, the written statement of the Govemment of Czechoslovakia
foc so far as to argue that because paragraph 3 of Article r of the
harter provides that it is one of the purposes of the United Nations
to achieve international co-operation in the social and humanitarian
field, and to promote and encourage respect for humnn riglits and

fundarnerital freedoms, tlierefore it would be contrary to tliis piirpose
to prevcnt countries from becoming parties to such a converition as
the Genocide Convention becaiise other States objected to the reser-
vatioiis which those countries wished to make. It would be better if
..vernmeiits were to concern themselves, the Court ma\, think. with
te O an l~im:nraii co~il~r~ori r g itl~ri tticir otvii
bor<lers. iiiste:i<lof :iilv:iiiciii~arKiiriieiits of thiî isa falü. nrxu-
ment because there can clearly -be no point in promoting the utmost
degree of participation in international conventions, if such participation.
is simultaneously permitted to take place on terms and conditions
that would destroy an important part of its value. For again, one must
recall that we are neither dealing with, nor can we confine oiirselves
to tlie consideration of reservatioiis which might be of a purely formal
or uriimportant character. According to the absolute çovcrcignty concep-
tion, there could obviously be no limit either to the riumber of reser-
vations, or to the importance of the reservations which miglit be made.
Indeed. if one looks at the reservations which have been made to inter-
national conventions in the past, 1 mean, of course, permitted and
accepted reservations, one sees at once that a great many of them are
of a serious cliaracter which could not possibly have been allowed
without the consent, express or tacit, of tlie other parties. Nor can one
merely look at the matter on the basis of the reservations which have

so far been entered to the Genocide Convention. There are still I think
anotlicr forty States which have not yet acceded, and to whoni it is
open to r:itify or accede to the Convention. It is impossible to foretell
what reservations States may try to make to it, especially if the Coiirt372 STATEJIENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51

were to endorse the view that they had an absolute right to inake them
whether the other States consented or not.
In this connexion, attention was drawn in the written statement
wliich we put in, to the dangers which an uiirestricted facultyof making
reservations would entail in the case of conventions such as the Genocide
Convention. Ive pointed out that conventions such as this one (and
or humanitarian or law-making character drawn up under the auspicesial
of the United Nations), have the peculiarity that they do iiot coiisist
of an interchange of mutual benefits aiid obligations of a reciyrocal
character, or indeed of an interchaiige of specific benefits at all. They
consist for the most part of the assumption by States of a number of
obligations or liabilities, with very little in the way of concrete or
tangiblerights or benefits in retum. They are intended to set up standards
of international behaviour, benefiting Society as a whole and human
iiidividuals in particular. The main benefits entailed by tliese conven-
tions, apart from tlie kiiowledge that the State concerned is playing
ifs part asa good member of the international community, are first the
long-term benefits to be derived by every State from the evcntual
improvement in the social or economic conditions of the world, or in
the relations between States, which may result from the convention ;
aiid secondly the intangible but very real benefits involved in the mere
status of beinf a party to a convention of this kind, arhich involves
for the participating States a considerable degree of credit and prestige,
and influence in the world.
In such a situation, the dangers of an unrestricted riglit to make
reservations are manifest. In the ordinary case, the making of a reser-
vation may absolve the reserving State from the obligation concerned,
but on tlie other hand it also entails a renunciation by it of the corres-
ponding benefits which follow from the acceptance. In the case of the
social or law-making type of convention on the other hand, tlie making
of a reservation which detracts from the norm, absolves the reserving
State from an obligation or liability while not entailing the renuiiciation
of any corresponding benefit at all. The other parties are still obliged
to carry out the provisions of the convention, and to carry them out
iri fiill, while the reserving State only has to carry them out iii part,
yet retains the status and credit of being a fullparty to the convention
while not foregoing any benefit of a concrete or tangible type. This is
a point the full effect of which is more apparent in relation to the Pan-
American view of reservations, and 1 shall refer to it again later in
that connexion, but it is also very material in regard to the sovereignty
view.
hlr. President, 1 submit that the Court cannot countenance a theory
conventions which are concluded under United Nations auspices,w-making
while at the same time liberating themselves from any obligations of
the convention whicli they do not think it convenient to accept. We
cannot but assume that if a faculty of this kind existed, it would be
at least liable to serious abuse, and indeed some of the reservations
which have actually been entered to the Genocide Convention lend
colour to that view. The argument sometimes advanced that it is
better for countries to become parties to a convention such as the
Genocide Convention, even in an emasculated fom. than not to become STATEMEST HY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
374
The classic statemeiit of this view, if 1 may Say so, is contained in '
the following passage from Sir Arnold hlcNair's work on the law of
treaties:

"If 1 sign and submit to you for signature a written contract
coiitaining twenty clauses and you sign it after adding some such
words as 'excluding clause ten' or some other expression modifying
its terms, no contract is concluded. and the only effect of your
qualified signature is, firstly, to destroy my offer to you by a
refusal of it and, secondly, to make a fresh offer to me in a modified
form. If, on the otlier hand, beforc making the modification you
inquire of rne wliethcr 1 am prepared to assent to this change
in the terms of the contract and 1 assent. or if 1 sign the contract

after you have made your modification and with knowledge of
it, the situation is different : a contract is coiicluded, though
differing from that which was origirially put forwarcl."
Sir Arnold adds that "these principles have received general recog-
iiition as the basis of the la~vgoverning reservations to treaties". i'ou
find the same principles operating in thc sphere of multilateral as

well as in the sphere of bilateral domestic relationsliips. Suppose 1
own a swimrning pool in my garden and 1 form a little club in the
neighbourhood, of persons who will be entitled to use it on condition
of paying me a certain subscription. 'rhere again. it is clear that none
of the parties could validly claim to attach to his signature of the
contract, if there was a written contract, a stipulation in the nature
of a reservation that lie should be entitled to use it on payment of
a lesser sum. In this example al1the obligations are obligations between
myself and each of the other partics, and they have no obligations
inter se. But the position would he the same if they liad. Let us suppose
that we have an arrangement in the neighbourhood for the mutual
use of certain facilities, gardens, swiinming pools, woods. rights of
shooting, fishing and so on, each party making available certain agreed
facilities in returii for being able to use facilities provided by the
other parties. ..\gain, it is perfectly clear that after an arrarigeriient
of this kind had heen reached and reduced to writing no party could,

without the coriseiit of al1the others, sign it with a reservation attached
that he shou!d oiily be bound to provide something less than the
agreed facilities, arid yet at the same time claim to retain a full right
to enjoy the facilities provided by tlic other parties. l'liat is a sclf-
evident propositioii iii the municipal field and equally so in the inter-
national one.
\\'bat is it that al1 these situations havein common which so clearly
inakes the purported reservation invalid unless al1 the other parties
are willing to agree to it ?It surely is that a definite arrangement having
been arrived at and drawn up by al1 the interested parties, the party
making the reservatiori is in effect rejecting that arrangement and
attempting to substitute for it an arrangement which is different. The
variation may be slight or it may be considerable ; but it rcsults in a
diferend arrangement, and large or small, it is an attempt to alter
something already finalized, and therefore it requires the consent of al1
the other interested parties.

Al1 this is so clear when one considers it on the basis of an ordinary
contract of private or municipal law, that it is difficult to see how it STATEMEIIT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51 375

could ever have been doubted that the same situation exists in regard
to treaties and conventions between natioiis, since in this respect, at
any rate, there caii in my submission be no real difference of principle.

It is, 1 believe, wortli enqiiiring what reasoiis tliere can be for even
suggesting that tliere may be a difference between the domestic and the
international positioiis. Eiiquiry will show, I think, that there are no
real reasons, althougli two or three plausible points that at first sight
look like reasons have been advanced. and may suggest that the two
cases are capable of being, and ought to bc, distiiiguished in certain
respects. 1 \r,oul<llike to examine these because 1 think the examination
will prove eiilightening.

First of all, tliere is a point to which 1have already made'some refer-
ence. namely, the assumption constantlymade, but which is in fact quite
unjustified, botli iripractice and in law, that reservations to international
conventioiis will usually be of a comparatively minor, formal or unim-
portant character, and thereforc States should be permitted to make
them as this will fncilitate general participation in international conven-
tions. Xow, cveri if it were true that most reservations are of a forma1

or unimportant ch;~racter, tliis would not be a valid ground for giving
iip the principle of coiisent, whichmay indeed constitute precisely the
inain reason wliy more gcneral attemptsto enter important reservations
of substance are iiot made. They are not made because it is known that
the other parties are not likely to consent to them, and consequently
it is not worth while to put them forward. bloreover, where a reservation
reaüy is merely of a formal, minor or unimportant character, the

principle of consent forms i?~prnctic noe bar to its acceptance, since the
other interested parties normally never object to that kind of reserva-
tion, and accept it even if only tacitly. But in fact, of course, byiio ,
means al1 reservations are of that kind and wliere they are not. the
situation is very different. \\'e need not go beyond the Genocide Conven-
tion itself in order to see this, because, as 1 have saicl,some of the reser2
vations which have been made to that Converition~~elate~to ~ ~imnortant
article of substance, wliicb many of us who particil>nted in the draftiiig ~ ~ ~ ~

of the Conveiitioii tliiiik is vital to the whole of the Genocide Convention.
namely, the obligation to submit disputes concerning not oiily the
interpretation, but the execution and enforcement of the Convention
tothe International Court of Justice. That is a provisioii in the Genocide
Convention wliicli 1 would have submitted is absolutely vital to the
working of the Convention, hecause it gives the Convention teeth. and
that is one of the provisions to which it is desired to make reservations

without the consent of the other parties to the Convention.

hfr. President, it is sometimes argued that the right of objection to
reservations shoiild not be admitted becaiise it would enable a singlc
State to exclude the reservntion and even to prevent altogether the

participation of the would-be reserving State iii the convention, even
if other States did not object to the reservation which had heen made.
Even if that is theoretically true, the remedy proposed is, in our submis-
sion, worse thnn the disease. It is far better that a State should
occasionally-it is not likely to happen often, for in general it is a matter
of theory rather thaii of practice-not be able to participate iiia gil- en^376 STATEMENT BY SIR HARTLEV SHA\\'CROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
convention rather tliün that an unrestricted right to make reservations
should be aàmitted which might impcril the conveiition altogether and
lead to participation by States on terms which were destructive of the
value of the convention. But in fact. tlie danger of an objection by a

single State-of an unmerited objectioii by a single State-haviiig the
results suggested, is largely theoretical. l'here may have been cases,
but they must have heeii very few. In practice, States do not inaintain
objections to a reservation which are not felt by other States as well,
uiiless the circumstances are special, and the facts are such as to give
them a perfect right to object. as for example wbere they themselves
are, or would be, the principal suiierers from the proposed reservatiori,
or the party principally affected by it or there were other circumstances
of a special character. Othenvise, in practice, States do iiot object to
resenrations unless there is some consensus of feeling agaiiist the reser-
vation proposed, and the reservation is one which has a real significance.
In any case, in so far as there is difliculty here, it can only lead to
this conclusion, that perhaps some agreed rules should be forinulated
as to the circumstances in which the initial objection to a reservation
can legitimately be maintained. It is not a reasoii for doing away
altogether with the right of objection, or giving to States an uiilimited
right to make whatever reservations they please in any circuiiistances
whatever, no matter what the objections may be.

In regard to that point, namely, that the existence of a right of objec-
tion might enable a single objecting State to exclude the participation
of another State, it seems to me that the correct view is to be found,
as with many others of the relevant principles, in the Hnrvnrd Rescarch
Volume on Treaties, that is, that iii such a matter preference inust be
given to the Stnte which is prepared to accept the coriveiitioii as it
stands rather than to the State which is only prepared to do so subject
to a reservation. This is how the principle is formulated in the Haninrd
Resenrch Voltrine :

"Since a choice must be made. reason and the necessitv for

and that the iiiconvenience, if :iny, of.non-particil;ation in the
treaty should f;ill upon the State which seeks to restrict its effective-
ness by reservations."

That principle is reaffirmed later aiid 1 again quote :
"If any State is to be excluded frorn the treat), it shoiild be the
.oiie which seeks, by ineans of reservations, to altcr iii some way
the effectiveness tliereof in its own interest."

Implicit in that view is the feeling that States ,will not be prepared
-to become parties to intcrnatioiial coiiveiitions ifit is open to other
States to become parties subject to aiiy reservations they are pleased
to make. For this reason, the Harvard Voluiit~, in a fiii:il affirmation,
goes on to say :

"If aiiy State is to be excluded, it should be the State which,
iii exercising the privilege of acceding, seeks in effect. by means
of reservatioiis, to write into the treaty provisions whicli are unac- STATEXENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.I<.)-13 IV 51 377

ceptable to :iny State or States which have already become parties
to the treaty, or which, as signatories, may wish to become parties
to it in its original and unaltered form."

A11that leads, and in my submissioii can only lead, to one conclusion,
that there is no differenceof principle between the case of international
coiiventions aiid thzit of private domestic contracts. If reservations are
to he made, they mtist receive consent in one form or another. The few
passages which 1 have already quoted-and others to which 1 shall .
draiv attention-al1 go to show that the volume of authority in favour
of the view that a reservation must receive consent to be valid, is very
great. Indeed the consensus of opinion in support of that view is over-
whelming. If one looks at the books, there is hardly a suggestion to
the contrary.
MI. Presiderit, 1 know that quotation is always wearisome both tor
the reader and for the listener, and 1 am very loath to weary the Court
witli a lot of citations from differentbooks and authorities. With your

le:ive, therefore, 1 propose to annex to this speech, without reading
them now, a series of quotations from the authorities aiid some references
to the actual practice of States 1. It seems to nie that this would he a
more convenieiit coiirse rather than to take up your time by reading
them now. When you do have an opportunity of looking at the Annex
-it does not purport to give a great many of these :iutliorities, but it
will, 1 think, tairly indicate the general consensus of opinion-it is an
interesting cornmentary, perhaps, on the present position of the United
States of America, that the view which is now apparently contended
for on behalf of the State Department is wholly opposed to what has
hitherto been the clear trend of .4merican authority on this matter.
'Chesame I think c:iii he said of the view put forw:ird on hehalf of the
Soviet Union.
Itis iiot, of course, for the Court to allow any considerations of policy
or expediency, if any such there hc, to obscure the rules of law about
these matters, and the Annex will. 1 think, make it very clear that
there is a inost impressive body of authority, with hardly a aissenting
voice, in support of the view which I have been expressing, and also
that the general practice of States in the past has been in conformity

with that view aiid with that general body of authority. Whetlier
you look at the inherent principle, or whether you look at the views
of the authorities on international law or the views which governments
have expressed, ancl which experts have expressed in the past, or agaiii
whether you look at the actual practice which has been followed by
States in relation to treaties to which they have been parties, you will
find an alrnost universal recognition of the principle that consent is
necessary to any reservation which a State desires to m:ike to an already
agreed text. It follows that .in the absence of such consent-and, of
course, more particularly, if an actu:!l objection has been made-the
reservation cannot be inaintained. If it is niaintained, if the State which
seeks to make it insists on maintaining it, then the maintenance of the
reservation inevitably renders the signature, the ratification, or accession
towhich it is attached, invalid and inoperative for the purpose of making
the State concerned a party to the treaty.

' See Annex, p. 394.378 STATEAlEST BY SIR HARTLEY SHA\VCHOSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51

Having dealt with the general doctrine applicable to this subject
and reviewed the authorities, 1 want now to apply the gerieral principles
involved to the particular case of the Genocide Convention. Here,

MI.President. 1 think we reacli the heart of the matter. 1have statedthe
rules as we bélievethem to be applicable in principle to al1reservations
to multilateral conventioiis. It may be argued however, and 1 think some
of thestatementsfurnishedto thecourt do argue, that these rules are not
applicable to the Genocide Convention because the Genocide Conventioii
iS i special one of a social or law-makiiig type and not a convention
providing for the excliaiige of reciproc:il beiiefits arid obligatioiis as
between the contracting parties. It is, of course, quite true thatthe Geno-
cide Conveiition is not of thelatter kind aiid is of the social or law-making
kiiid. But Tvedraw quite a differeiit coiiclusion from this fact. In our
submission this fact makes the principles 1 have been discussiiig al1 tlie
more applicable. Actualiy, if a clioice has to be made, there woul<l be

more warraiit, in relation to the ordinary conventioii of tlie reciprocal
beriefit type, for taking the view that reservations miglit be made uiii-
laterally and withont the consent of the other parties, than there would
be in relation to this kind of social or law-making type of conventioii.
In the case of the ordinary recripocal benefit type of conventioii, the
position is that if one of the parties irisists on making a reservatioii,
and is allowed, or is to be allowed, to becorne a party subject to the
benefit of that reserv;itiori, at least the other parties :ire al1 entitled
to deny to the reserving party the benefit of the provisioii concerned.
Therefore it follows that the making of a reservation to this type of
convention entails a corresponding relief for the other parties, for they
equally are not bound to accord to the reserving State the benefits
which tliat State withholds from them. But of course that position does

not arise with the social or law-makiiig type of convention. As we have
seen, this type of convention does iiot provide for reciprocal benefits
between the parties of a tangible character. It provides almost exclus-
ively for the assumption by them of obligations of a social or humani-
tarian or lerral descriution. The obligat"on assumed bv each countrv
\r.liiclibcconïcsa l);irr!:ro the con\.viitioiiii>dt:pcndenioii ttiassumli-
I I i : siinIr oti~tiüi~ 1 II ot art Ir .irisc'jhirnlil!. frurn tlie
:ict tii hccomingL p:irty ruttic:uiivt.iirioii itsrli niid coiiscqii~ii;iSt;itc:
I I ~ .bccomcs :i ~>;irttu :Iciiii\.eiitioSIICIas r11~G~;~iociclCcuiivt!iitioii
becuiiits büiiiid bv :iltlié ul>ligations uftlicc~ii\.riitiuii ivhc'tlit,ror not
other countries join in, and whëther or not the other parties are similarly
bound. Oiice the Coiivention comes into force for a State. it is not

adequate for that State to Say that the iiidividuals witli whom it was
deaiing in a particular case were to be the nationals of another State not
a part! to the Convention. That does iiot arise at all. If you assume an
obligation to prevent and punish.the crime of genocide you assume that
obligation as, so to speak, an absolute. Your obligation is not dependent
on the assum~tion of a similar oblieation bv other countries. Nor is it
diminished to' the estent of any r&ervati& made by another State :
for the obligations of the States which have not made reservations remain
the same :-tliev are not in anv wav diminished. aiid there can be no
questioii of these States withholdi& from the reserving State or its
nationals tlie benefits of the provision on which it lias made a reserva- STATE&IES"T BY SIR HART1,EY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
379
tion. The Convention does not operate in that way. It does not consist
of benefits and liabilities exchanged reciprocally between the parties
inter se.
Now, it may be argued, Mr. President, that the same position arises
where a State, instead of making a reservation, does not become a party
to the convention at all. States which do become parties are bouiid by
the obligations of the convention, wliereas the States which do not
become parties are not ;but (so it may be urged) that it is not per se
a reason why a State should refuse to become a party to the convention.
This is true in a sense, but it is not really relevant. In the first place
States normally become parties to international conventions in the
expectation that other States will do the same. If they did not have this
expectation, tliey would be unlikely to become parties, or to remaiii
parties if the expectation were iiot duly realized. But secondly, a State
which does not become a party at al1to a convention suc11as the Geno-
cide Conventiori. if it loses little (and it may lose but little) in the way
of concrete benefits, does at least forego a certain status, and certain
advantages whicli, if of an intangible character, are, rievertheless, very
real and count for a good deal in the present climate of international
opinion. (1have already used the expression that the States which accede
to such conventions canclaim to be the good citizens of the world.) A
State which, on tlic other hand, becomes a party, but makes a reser-
vation on an imuortant article of substance. obtains al1 the credit and
siici1l:irynil\.:iiitagcs tu bc <Icrivellfrotii tlic stntiLdi~ia pcirty,\r.liilt,
:it tlic.saine tirnc (Iirniiiistiitir:tli~.ezofiits obli~;itiuii.\\.liercas Ilic
other parties, whicli have notmade any correspondi<greservaa ssimon,
the full obligations of the Convention without any diminution. There
would be verylittle limit to this process if it were once to be admitted as
a oossible one. Under the réeimeof the necessitv for obtaininr consent
to'reservations; States are obliged to adopt a ;esponsible atfitude, or
at least they ou~ht to adopt a responsible attitude, towards the question
whether thëy wzl or will not become parties to a convention such as the
Genocide Convention, and to ask themselves seriously whether they can
andare wiiling to carry outits obligations. If on the other hand unlimited
reservations could be made at will, there would be no further need for
such an attitude. These conventions, MI. President, as you know, are
often, and may increasingly be the result, in the first instance, of declar-
ritorv resolutions of the Assemblv of the United Nations intended to sct
up "ni' gencrril st:~ti~l;~ro~fl bi:iinviour. 'fli;it \ras urigiii:~llycnsc iti
rcg~rcltu tlic Geiiocitlci:on\.cntioii. Higli suutidiiig sp<'rclit,iivere m:idc
IIIsiilq>orr,ltlicstandard it iv.~ sougtit to estnl~lisli.hut unc iscurnpelletl
to x5k iilietlicr soine of tticsï ur;itors iïerc spcakini:\vit11tlieir tuiiyiit:~
iiitlir.ir cliecksIIItli:it tlit-y wcrc gcttin? tlic crrdit of :itx.~'l>tiiitfliiesc
Iii~Iist:iii<I.,rd<biit wirc .ilrc:i(l\, tiiriitiic IIItlieii.iiiiiidi [laciq:ser-
v:zions whicli ttiey would ultimitcly ma& toany applications in practice
of wliat they had been preaching about. That would certainly not be an
attitude of mind to encourage. Tlie truth is that many of the arguments
which have been advanced on this niatter are based on the assumption
that no State would, in fact, seek to limit its obligations beyond a certain
point, but tlie question is what point, and who woulcl be the judge of
whether that poiiit had been reached. The only practical answer to this
question is the answer we have already noticed, tliat there is nothing
to prevent a State from seekip~g to inake a reservation if it wishes, and STATE3IENT BY SIR HARTLEV SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV j1 3S1

which each party finds a compensatioii for the obligations contracted,
in the engagements eiitered into by the others". In an eminent degree,
they are conventioiis the obligatioris of which, being of a serious and
sometimes onerous character, States are (to quote another of these
authorities) in general only williiig to assume "oii the uiiderstanding
that the otlier participating countries are willing to act in the same
way and that general benefit will thus result". That theory is the basis
of every rule of law of the international field, as in the municipal field.
1 accept restrictioiis upon my liberty iii favour of the liberty of others
because the others accept similar restrictions on their liberty,and so it
is with States. As 1 have already 1i:id occasion to point out, it is this

anticipated general and long-term beiiefit tothe world social order which
constitutes the chief value and rtzisorc'l'étreof this type of convention.
It is in that belief that States are prepared to join in according those
humanitarian rights. An unlimited right of making reservations would
clearlv be destructive of their orirnarv Duroose for conventions of this
kind.çtates, iiistead of being obliged't& ccoose between iiot becoming
parties at all, and becoming parties on a basis of reality, would be able
to become parties on a moÏë or less nominal basis thai inight have no
real value at all. As one of the passilges referred to says. "such a practice
would tend to defeat the purposes for which multilateral agreements
are entered into" ;it would injure the credit of conventions such as the
Genocide Coiivcntion and of thc international organizations iinder whose
auspices they are drawn up.
In this connexion 1 would draw attention to the very interesting
information which has been given in the wntten statement furnished to

the Court on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as
to the history of the question of reservations in regard ta the Genocide
Convention. From what is stated on page 84' of the printed booklet
containing the written statemeiits, it is clear that the possibility of
including an article on reservations was considered during the earlier
stages of the drafting of the Convention and deliberately rejected as
unsuitable. 1 would ask the Court particularly to notice the terms in
which the attention of governments was called to the matter in the
comment accompanying the first draft of the Convention. This is what
it said :

"It would seem that reservations of a general scope have no
place in a convention of this kind which does not deal with the
Drivate intercsts of a State.but witli the ~reservation of an element
8r internationni order.
For example, the Convention will or will not protect this or that
human crouo. It is unthinkable that in that res~ect the scooe of
the ~on;ention should vary according to the resérvations poisibly
accompanying accession by certain States."

That, if 1 may say so, was very well put and 1 do not see how anyone
could fail to agree with it. It is equally applicable to any reservations
which might be made under the Pan-American system, to which 1 shall
come preseiitly.
\Vhat followed ? Only one governmeiit commented on the question
of having a reservations article. That was the Government of the United

' See p.S8 of this publication. STATEBlEST Bi' SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
382
States, which expressed the vie\\, that an article on reservatioiis should
be omitted. That seems verv difficult to reconcile with the attitude
ilie l'iiitcd St:itcs Guvvriiiiiviiiis takin"1)ai tliijtiiiii.\suI>.ccnimittrr
na; tlicii .ilyioil~tcti>:O iiito ttiiii:ittr.~:oiisistingof r<:l)rcseiitatives
f Ilii SI 11; i l 1: L'rd Si:. 'flgihSuh-i .miiiittrt,
reported that it "saw no need for any reservations". This again is very
difficult to reconcile witli the attitude al1 three of these Governments
are taking up on this subject to-day. They apparently Iiad second
tlioughts about the view \\,hich they espressed at the time wheii this
Convention mas under negotiatioii. The Sub-Committee's report \vas
unanimously adopted by the full Ad Hoc Committee that prepared
the basic draft of the Conveiition. This draft accordingly weiit forward
to the Assemhly without any article on reservations in it. The matter
was theii again discussed in tlie Sixth Committee of the Assembly, and
again the decisioii was to include nothing about reservations. 1 should
like to make one point clear which is not quite fully brought out in those
parts of the Secretary-Geiieral's written stateinent which deal with
the discussions iii the Sisth Committee, i.e. on pages 89-go'of the printed
booklet. 1-ou will find it stated there at the hottom of pageSY2and the
top of page8q3 tliat "the Uiiited Kingdom representative stated that
'he had abstaiiied from voting in order to indicate the United Kingdom
Government's reservations at tliat time iriregard to the draft convention',
and indicated that his Government might not find it possible to sign and
ratifv". \\'hat 1 want ta make quite clear about that is sometliing \\,hich
is consistent with wliat 1 said at the outset of my observations to the
Corirt tliis moriiing. 1 suggested that what is desirable in the negotiation
of this type of conveiition is to reach in the preliminary stages of the
iiegotiations a draft of the coiivention to which everyone, or at any rate
tlie majority, is prepared to adhere, rather than go beyond the general
consensus of opinion \\.hich most States are prepared to accept ana
theii allow States to come in and make reservations. \\'hat the United
Kingdom representative was doing iii the Sisth Committee was not

general orreserve of our whole position in relation to the Convention,ing a

whicli is a differeiit thing. He u.as not enterint a reservatjon, as to this
or that, but w,îs saying that we tliought tlie 'onvention in its present
form might not be acceptable andthat rvewere not at that stage voting
in favour of it. The Secretary-General's statement does not bring out
quite clearly the distinction betweeii a reservation and a reser\re-i.e.
a reservation of position. This is important because the discussion in
the Sixth Committee did not-iii the mairi-consist of for~ntilintima-
tions by delegatioiis that they would attach particular reservations to
their signatures or ratifications. On the contrary, it coiisisted mainly
of statements by delegations of the difficulties their governments might
experience in ratifying, on account of the provisions of certain articles.
It was not really suggested that there could be reservations and that
States could accede subiect to reservations. The auestion was whether
if tliose articles were included in the Convention at ail, some States
would be able to accede to the Convention, andthat isa far inore reali~tic

'See pp. 93-94 of this publication.
3 , p. gz of this piiblication.
". ,..93 ,. .. STATEBIEST Bi' SIR HARTLEY SH.4WCROSS (u.K.)-13 I\'jI 383

and honest way of approaching this type of convention. than the method
of speaking in favour ofit, voting in favour of it,and tlien in~ikingreser-
vations which detract from some important particular in it. These
delegations therefore reservetl the positions of their governments, which
is not the same thing as making or giving forma1 notice of an actual
reservatinn

mainly and precisely oii accourit of the unsuitability of nllowing-reser-
vations to bc made to this type of convention. The view taken \vas
that States must accede or not accede, and if they did not accede they
must accept the odium in inteniational Society in not accediiig to this
type of social law-makiiig con\~ention. It seems clear that the parties,
at the time this draft was heing considered and when the Convention
wasunder negotiation, took the viewthat there shouldbe no reservations.
They could have provided for them but they purposely did not provide
for them, and the trutli is that this kind of convention, the social law-
making convention, althougli contractual in forni is iiot contractual
in effect. Itoperatcs more like a piece of legislation; and in so far as
that is correct it afiords still further ground for prohibiting the making
of unilateral reservations, for whoever heard of a unilateral right to
derogate from a legislntive or quasi-legislative enactment-and if tliese
conventions arcof a quasi-legislntive nature there cannot be a unilateral
right to derogate from them. From a piece of legislation, derogations
can only be made by or with the consent of the entity that passed it.
Shat is a matter to which 1 want to come back again later.
For al1 these reasons, Afr. President, 1 submit that the iiiew that an
objection to a reservation renders it invalid and renders the ratification
or accession it accompanies invalid unless the reservation is withdrawn,
applies witb even greater force to, and is even more essential in, the
.case ofa convention such asthe Genocide Convention than it is in the
case of the ordinary convention providing for reciprocal benefits and
obligations betrveeii the parties.

VI11

These consideratioiis rrre eouallv a~uiicabic when one coines to

that they apply in exactly the saine way because. as 1 hopi to demon-
strate, the Pan-American system applied to the Genocide type ofconven-
tion would merely be an indirect way of allowing an unlimited right to
make reservations, a way of introducing by a side wind, the absolute
sovereignty theory in disguise.
.4t first sight, the Pan-American system may appear to reconcile
al1 points of view, and to combine al1 the advantages of any of them
without the disadvantages. It is said :"Yes, it is naturally understood
that no country can unilaterally impose acceptance of a reservation oii
another country. On the other hand, if States are not allowed to make
some reservations they may not be able to become parties. Therefore,
_they should make their reservations and become parties, but let it be384 STATEhiEST BY SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51

understood that the convention will onlybe in force as between them and
the couiitries which accent the reservations and will not be in force
betweeii them and any co;intry which does not accept the reservatioiisl"
That course sounds ideal when described in that ivay. But closer esamin-
ation suggests that it is illtisory, and opeil to ali the objections of the
absolute sovereigiity theory, when sought to be applied to the social
or law-making type of conveiition, of which the Genocide Convention is
ail example. The essence of the Pan-American system is the non-applica-
bility of the convention between the reserving State and the States which
object to the reservation, but it is prccisely there that the system breaks
down aiicl is illusory wheii applied to conventions of the Geiiocide type.
Howevcr, before 1 come to that, 1 would like to dcal with a prelimi-
nary point, which is this. Neither in any of the authorities, nor in the
whole field of the practice of States outside the very recent practice of
some of the countries of the American contiiient, will you find the slight-
est reference to any system or any possibility such as that now under
disciissioii. This system is in fact an entirely new one, which has been

instituted in a certain particular field by special agreement between a
particular group of States. This is not perhaps surprising hecause the
Pan-American system entails what 1 think any lawyer would nornially
regard as an anomalous and legally difficult positioii to support, naniely,
that a number of countries may al1 be parties to the same convention
and yet the convention inay not be in force between certain of them.
It will perhaps have wholly different implications which will vary accord-
ing to which of the total number of adhering States happen to be involved
in any particular question arising under the conveiition. You may, for
instarice, have a convention adhered toby twelve States, where one State
makes reservation A which is acce~ted bv four of the others, and reiected

bilateral treaties, some of which overlap. That kind of arrangement, as
faras one can see, cannot establish a common standard for al1 the States
parties to the convention. What it does is to set uo as manv se~arate
çtandards as there happen to be reservations. . .

According to al1 normal legal principles, if a number of individuals
or countriei are al1 parties Co the same identical contract or treaty,
that contract or treaty is ipso /acte in force between each one of theiri
and each one of the others. A departure from this position is soinething
wliich could only result from a special and deliberate agreement to depart
from it. This is, of course, what we have in the case of the system as it
is applied between the countries of the Americaii continent, though
strictly, what it results iri is not a single multilateral instrument applic-
able to au, but a comples of individual though related instruments.
However, we all of course know that whatever the basic legal principles
au..icable to anv situation. it is alwavs oDen.to a vro-. of countries to
1lii11:trtfrorii tlivic ~iriiiciplcs L>y:igrr..iiiei,t isi.o.r ro ~n~tiriite ;i
ipecinnliyst<:iii foi :ipl~lic;,tiiiLIILr.c!l.,rioiii,hct\i.ccii tliciiir.l\~es. This
iî ii,li:it rhc coiintrici II tliv i\nicrir:iii ;iiiiIinwt,I<iiiiiircl:itinii to
tlic r;in$çulcun~~cntiiiiis<lr.i\i~i~>~incItci :iiisl,iii.suf tlic l'an-Aiiir.ricnii
IJiiioii. rlieie ci~iiriiriesuccii:iver? =pt:ci.ilniitiiisonic \i.~).spvrli:.pî
i>cciiliarrclnti~>iislitn eacli otlicr. niicl the svstem. as set UI>hv nrrcc-
ment between them, may work ve;y well betGeen t'hem, and p&siGy it 386 STATEMEXT BY SIK HARTLEY SHAWCKOSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51

2. these rights and obligations must involve a reciprocal exchange
of benefits and liabilities between each of the parties and each of
the other parties ;
3. the obligation of aiiy party to the convention towards any other
party must be dependent on the other party haviiig tliat same
obligation to\vards tlie first party.

Xoiv al1 tliese elements are preseut in the case of many conventions,
for instance those of a commercial, financial or technical character,
but they are al1 of them conspicuously absent in the case of the social
or law-mal<ing type of convention. Indeed, their absence forms one of
the chief ch;rracteristics of tli;rt type of convention. The main advantage
claimed for tlie Pan-American system is that it enables reserving

countries to become parties, but does not enable them to impose their
reservatioiis on countries whicli do not accept them. 13ut in fact, this
is exactly what the systerri would do in the case of the Genocide type
of convention. In one of the written statements furnished to the Court,
'it is stated iii describing the Pan-American system tliat "while recog-
nizing thc right of a State to make reservations, full recognition ivould
be accorded also to the riglit of any other State to object to such reser-
vations, aiid thereby not to be bound by them, with the resnlt that the
convention may not be in force between the reserving State and the
objecting State". Xow iinfortunately this is quite misleading, because
matters <Ionot work that wûy iii the case of the Genocide typeof conven-
tion. Tlie application of the Pan-Americari system to tliat type of
conveiition would have precisely the effect of imposiiig a reservation
even on a State which objected to it. Tlie reason for that is this. The
whole essence of the Pan-American system is that the convention is
supposed iiot to be in force between a reserving State and any State

which objects to the reservations. Therefore, the State which objects
is not bound to apply the convention in its relations witti the reserving
State. There issanie point iii tliat situation wliere tlie coiiveiition iuvolves
relations between the parties, i.e. provides for rights as well as obliga-
tions aiid wliicl~provides for rights and obligations iuterchanged betii~eeti
the parties iitter se. In that case, the iioii-application of the conventioii
as between the reserving aiid the objectiiig State means tliat the object-
ing State is to that extent released fromthe obligations of the convention,
and does not have to exterid these particular benefits to the reserving
State. But, it is ineaiiingless to talli ori convention iiot being in force
between tlie reserving State aiid the objecting State if, notwithstanding
that fact. tlie obiectine State still has to carrv out al1 the oblieations
of the con\-eiitioi in fh, just as if it had iiof made :my objezion to
the convention at al]. Now that is exactlv what occurs with the Genocide
tvue of convention. because. as 1have said. tliat tvue ofconvention does
Gt operate by means of an$ mutual interciiaiige d'rights 2nd liabilities.
The oblirations under it are of an absolute character, iiot dependeiit
on the Gsumption of corresponding obligations by the other'parties.

A State may object stroiigly to reservatioiis made by aiiother party,
but if it is a party, and has iiot itself made a correspoiiding reservation,
it is obliged to carry out the convention in full. In such a case, the \vhole
notion of the convention having force or not haviiig force as between
particular parties who Iiave made reservations is misconceived and
irrelevant-in fact illusory. STA'iEhlE'IT BY SIR HARTLEY SH.A\VCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51 387

For tliis reason, the Court will, 1 think, readily see that wliat tlie
Pan-American system would really lead to when applied to conventions
of the social or law-making type would be the re-introduction by the
back-door of the absolute sovereignty conception. The system bvould
provide a means whereby the reserving State could make what reser-
vations it pleased,even ifthese reservations were rejected by an important
nuniber ofother States, and even if it were theoretically the position tliat
(owing to these objections) the convention was not in force betweeii the
reserving State and thc objccting State ; for this position would be
purely riominal, sincc the obligations of the objecting States ~vould
remain precisely the same. There would in practice be no differciicc at
al1 between this positiori and one according to which States liad an
absolute right to make wliat reservations tliey pleased. 1 suggest tliat
it isclcar that the Pan-American system breaks down and is inapplicable
to the Genocide type of convention precisely in that respect whicli is the
essence of the system aiid forms its main justification. Its application

to the Genocide Convention would be an indirect application of tlie
absolute sovereignty tlieory and therefore contrary to al1accepted legal
principle and the consensus of opinion of al1the autliorities.
In the written çtatement furnished by my Government at an carlier
stage of the present proceedings. some practical illustrations were given
of the illusory nature of the safeguards supposed to be involved iii the
Pan-American system when applied to conventions of the Genocide
type, ancl 1 would ask the Court to be good enoiigh, at its conveiiierice,
to re-reatl paragraphs zj and 26 of Our writteri statement, wlien they
corne to consider this matter. This same illosory character cari rcadily
be seen with regard to one of the principal rcservntions which it is iiow
being sought to make to the Genocide Coiiveiition, namely the reser-
vation on Article IX, containing the obligation to refer disputes about the
interpretation and executioii of the Convention to the Court, aiid 1
would like to eiilarge on tliat a little because it illustrates vwell the
inapplicability of the I'an-American systeiii to this type of case. At
first sight, it might indeed Iiave seemed as ifthe Pan-American system

would work quite well in regard to a reserv;ition on this article. It would
work like this. State .4 makes a reservation on an article providiiig for a
reference of disputes to the Court. If the reservation is admitted, then
State A cannot be taken comnulsorilv before the Court. but etiuallv it
may be said that State A cann'ot take'the otlier parties hifore th; CoGrt.
Therefore, it follows, and this is ahat the advocates of the Pan-American
system suggest, the position works very well in which the Convention,
with tliat reservation, is iii force betweeii StaAeandthe parties wliich
accept the reservation, but is not in force between State A and the parties
which i-Ionot accept the reservation. Tliat would be so in the case of ;ln
ordinary convention provii-lingfor riglits and obligations moving recipro-
cally bet~veen the parties interse. In that kind of case, if some dispute
arose between State A and State B as to the rights and obligations which
each owed to the other under the convention, then, if State A had made
a reservation on the article for reference to the Court so that State B
could iiot take State A compulsorily before thc Court about this dispiite,

equally, State A could not take State B compiilsorily before the Court.
But that is not how the thing works out at all iii the case of a conveiition
such as the Genocide Convention, because there nre no obligations under
the Convention betwee~zthe parties. Each p:irty aisumes obligatioris388 STATEhlEST BY SIR HARTLIiY SHAXVCROSS (u.K.)-13 Il'j1
it is true, but they arc not obligations to be esecutcd towartls or for tlic

beiiefit of the other States. If a certain State, which we will cal1 S.
becomes a party to the Genocide Convention, it assumes an obligatioii
to prevent aiid punish the crime of genocide. If it does iiot fulfil that obli-
gation, aiid ifit lias tiotmade a reservatioii on Article IS, nt~yof the other
parties can bring it before the Court. The fact that one particular party
cannot do so. because it has itself made a reservation on the subject
of the obligation to go to the Court, does not in any way affect the posi-
tion of State X, Save in relation to that particular State, nor prevent
State X haviiig to go before the Court if it breaks the Convention. The
fact that it cannot be taken before the Court by State A is merely iiici-.
dentaland avails State X nothing. Because its obligations are of a general
character, and not obligations particularly owed towards State A, it
follows that in the event of a breach, State S can be taken before the

Court, if not by State A,then hy States B, C, D or E.'l'husthe applica-
tion of the Paii-Americaii system in this casewould mercly allow State A
to make what reservations it pleased on Article IS of the Genocide
Convention, while affording iio reciprocal relief to tlic States whicli
objected to tlie reservation, or only a nominal aiid illusory relief iii
relation to State A itself. This esample illustrates very well the unreality
of the safeguards supposed to be involved by the Pan-American system
when applied to this typeof case, for ifhese are unreal (asobviously they
are) in regard ta Article IS of the Genocide Convcrition-a provision
wh~ ~ - ~ ~ ~v~- a~nominal element of reci~rocitv-how much more
unreal and illusory must they prove when ~pplie;l to reservations on
the eeneral ~rovisions of the Convention wliich coiitain absolute obliga-

tion;, not sübject to any consideratioiis of reciprocity at all. One cannot
assume, 1 am afraid, that no such reservations will be attempted on the
part of some of the forty or so States who may still become parties to
the Convention, particularly if iiieffect we license the making of reser-
vations of any kind bythe application of the Pan-American system. 'Shere
is only one effective safeguard against abuse of the faculty to seek or
attempt to make reservations, and that is tlie knowledge that other
States can object. and that their objections can or may be effective to
prevent the reserving State becoining a party. liemove tliat safeguard
aiid the Assembly aiid the world would very sooii have cause to regret
the results. 'Sliiscould be done in the case of conventions of the Genocide
type just as effectively by admitting the Pan-American system as by
admitting the absolute sovereignty theory ; it could be done even more

effectively, because the Pan-American system almost invitesreservations,
treating them as something to be espected, and leiiding to them an aura
of respectability which is absent from the absolute sovereignty theory-
ail aura of respcct:ibility whicli depends on the supposcd existence of a
safeguard mhicli proves illusory when applied to coiiventions of tliis
kind. and merelv reintroduces in aiiother form the facultv to make
reservatioiis at will.
Xow, 111.President, 1 fraiikly admit that the adoptiori of some such
system as this might facilitatc accession not only by governments mhicli
have no intention of really carrying out the provisions of the conrentioii
at all, but also by such governments as rny own which traditionally
take their interiutional obligûtioiis serioosly and do not enter into

conventions the legal obligatioiis of which are obscure or which thcy
cannot be certain they cati carry oiit. We could coriie,iri and make our390 STATESIENT BY SIR HARTLEY SHA\VCKOSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
'Theoretically, however, it is clear that such a situation would be
perfectly possible. Even if it is unlikely in practice that a proposed
reservation would be accepted only by one other State, and objected

to by al1the rest, something very like that could quite possibly happen.
It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which a particular group
of States, directed by a common policy, would by arrangement between
theinselves make certain reservations to a United Nations convention,
each of thern acceptiiig the reservations madc by the other. According
to the Pan-Americnn system, they would then al1be entitled to become
parties to thc coiiveiition in question. Thcy would al1acquire the status
of parties; they would al1 acquire the badge of good citizeiiship, and
even if al1 the other hlembers of the United Nations rejected those
reservations, the reserving States would still have that status. On the
other hand, they would have succeeded in arranging between them-
selves to be relieved from carrying out the obligations in respect of
which they had made reservations, whereas, owing to the nature of
this type of convention, the other Members of the United Nations who

had not made these reservations would be obliged to carry out these
obligations to the full, and, of course, in favonr of the nationals of the
States which had made the reservations, because these things do not
depend on the nationality of the particular individual who may be
affected.
As we saiù in our written statement, the social and law-inakiiig type
of convention has this peculiarity, that the maximum bcriefit in regard
to it would be obtaiiied by the State which succeeded in obtaining for
itself the status of being a Party, while assuming as little as possible
of the obligations iiivolved. We added that it was hardly too much to
say that the Pan-American system could not be more ideally suited
to the achievement of this purpose if it hnd bcen specinlly devised to
inake it possible. Under this system you would have a situation in which
al1 the benefits would accrue to the reserving State, and nllthe disad-
vantages to the non-reserving State whose objections would be without
effect. since the non-application of the coii\pention between them and

the reserving State would be purely nominal and theoretical, and \vould
not in any way diminish the full estent of their obligations. That is a
solution which is really indistinguishable from that which would be
brought about by the application of the absolute sovereignty theory.
Can we really regard such a position as tolerable when we remember
the principle formulated for instance in the Haniard lieseurclzVoliime,
that if any prefereiice is to be given in the matter it shoulù be given to
the State which is willing to accept the convention without modifi-
cation? The effect of the Pan-American system rnay be ideal in regard
to the mutual and reciprocal type of treaty to which no doubt it has
been applied in tlie Paii-Americaii Uriion ; but its effect wheri applied
to social or law-making conventions would be precisely the opposite of
that which the Harvard Research Voliwne Iays down-and in my submis-
sion very correctly lays down-as one of the basic principles in regard
to th/s matter. The application of the Pari-Arnerican system would
not even put reserving and objecting States on a footing of equality.

It would give al1 the preference and indeed a high degree of $rivilege,
to the resenring State. hloreover, this privileged position is one which
any State conld cre,ate for itself, provided only that it could findone
other State williiig to accept its reservations, perhaps as tlie price for STATEMENT BI' SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51 391

tlie reciprocal ncceptance of somc reservation which tliat other State
itself desired to make. 1 suggest tliat one must remember tliat in the
world as it esists to-day, it may well be precisely tliose States which
most wish to niake reservations to sociril and Iaw-making conventions
which can also most easily find other States willing to accept them, and
indeed to make the same reservations themselves. 1 do seriously submit
to the Court that this situation is one which ~vouldbe derogatory, quite

unacceptable and detrimental to the United Xations coiiventions. It
\i.ould encourage the present tendeiicy which 1 deplore, of clrawing these
conventions in :i way which is somctiines less tlian responsiblc by the
inclusion of vague iind cven meaiiiiiglcss provisions in them. and which
would greatly discourage the gradii:il process of establishiiig hiimani-
tarian staiidards iii the world. That tencleiicy would, 1 suggest. merely
be encouragecl by the application of the Pan-Americaii system, just as
it xvould be encouraged by the applicatioii of the absolute sovereignty
doctrine.
?\part from tlie purely legal aspect there is also the question of the

good taste and siiitability of this method. The system of cross relation-
ships entailed by the Pan-American system, with the coiivention being
enforced between some of them aiid not enforced between others of the
States coricerried. and in force betwceri vet other ~:irtics subiect t@
ii:ri.ii1i ~iiiirliiic:it:ijiiii,iurtli. iii:iy bc rliiitc ,ipl)rupii.irc ro .iriliii.ir).
r~c~pro~~clo~ivciiri~~isI,ILIis \vli~~lliii:~~~~)rn~~r~~tt~~.~vri~g III~~riiit;t[~l,!
\\,Iii:;iiiiilied tu cuiiveiiriuiij ut rhc wci:il ;ind 1;iii.-ni:ikiii~t.vi>e Suc3i
position kas iiever intended forconveiitions likethe~enoci';leC'onvention,.
or conventions like the one ivhich is in clraft-the Covenaiit oii Humaii

Riehts-and it would. 1 sueeest. be ciuite contrarv to the whole snirit

bzng, or to that of the social order of the\o;ld, and Ales to which it
is expected everyone \vil1generally adliere. How can a inultiplicity of

clifferent reservatioiis havine different effects between differentoarties
be tolerated in this kind of case ?The intention was, and surely m;st be,
that if couritries become parties to tliese conventions thev do so to the
conventions as tliey stand, and not subject to a whole s& of particular
reservations of a diverse character whicli tlie parties m;ike unilaterally
aiid accept, or do not accept, inter se. Here 1 want to recall iigairi rny
earlier observations on the Iiistorv of the ouestion of reservations in
relatioii ir, tliGC:III~C: II~~<.Iv~~IIIu~:itd tl~<~r~u~idj\vtticli \i.erc gi\.~ii
for I I li.i\iiig:i r~jcrv:irioiis article in tlie Lc~ii\~eiiiii.. iitiinfttioiu
grounds, as stited in the commentary \%.hichaccompanied one of the

earlier drafts. !ras that it was "untliinkable that ....the scopc: of the
Convention shoulcl Vary according to the reservatioiis possibly accom-
panying accessions by certain States". Xow it is precisely such a situa-
tion which the application of the l'an-American system would not only
permit of, but aould liceuse and indeed encourage, and one might evcn
sav. invite.Herc :igairiwe must bear iii niind that we arc not dcalirie wit-
u6important or fo;mal reservations. \Ve must presume tliat reservations
which have, or :ire likely to draw forth objection, are reservations of392 STATEXENT BY SIR HARTLEI- SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51

substance. Then. one must ask, is it really tolerable that, despite these
objections, reservations of substance should be maintained in regard
to these coiiveiitions, and that perhaps a whole number of different
reservations of this sort should be superimposed upon the text of the
convention. sonie of them in force between ccrtaiii oarties: somc of
rli~.niiiur <.rlier111Iurc,; hf;t\rcc~i0t1.~rl>:irrlsd,tl~:,rlivrr 13 uiii.
forin scr of nl~lig;iti~~iir~it,j~,i~i(iiuiioriii, :~p~~lir.c0:IIItlnep:irti<s
tilikc. 'i'lirrc:i; iiuttiiiic. f~IIIrlitii<lc:i1 do iiot tliiiik tlint ;in\,nnc

who has attended thekeetings at which the Covenant on Human Rlghts
has been drafted, could have any doubt that the applicatiori of any
system which facilitated and,.indeed, like the Pari-Americaii system,
even invited, tlie making of reservations, might very well result in the
kind of situation that 1 have suggested.
Personally, as 1 have saicl, 1 doubt nhether reservations to United
Xations conventions are desirable at all. 1 have said, and 1 repeat. that
themattertowhich theUnitcdSatjonsshould devote itself,is tlie drawing
up of serious responsible conventions which the great mass of the nations
-not all, but at any rate the great mass of the nations-can be espected
to acceptwithout reservation i~tall. If you go beyond that, as 1am afraid

sometimes useIi:ive in the United Nations, you produce something which
may be a fraud and a delusion to the world at large. Even if it were
thought desirable to institute some means of enabliiig States to make
reservations under proper safeguards,there are other methods of doing
it which would iiot be open to the objections involved both by the abso-
lute sovereignty theory and the l'an-American system, and which would,
nt the same time, enable harmless or legitimnte reservations to be made
with relative ease. 1 am not speaking officially now, but if one takes the
view that United Nations conventions, such as the Covenant on Human
Rights for instance, have a semi-legislative aspect-precisely for the
reasons which 1 have indicated. that they do not operate as an inter-

change of rights and obligations between the parties ider se-it might be
possible to institute a system whereby any subsequent reservations an
intending party desired to make, would be submitted to the body which
framed the Covenant in the first instance, i.e. the General Assembly,
and admitted if approved by that body perhaps by a two-thirds majority.
In that way, reservations for which there was fairly general agreement
could not be blocked. while, on the other hand, reservations could not
be made unilaterally or without a wide measure of consent, and, if
admitted, would not be likely to upset the standard or the norm which
the convention had intended to secure.

1 said that by way of parenthesis. The institution of any such system
is, of course, necessarily a matter for the United Nations Assembly and
not for the Court, which can only take the law as it finds it. The basic
legal principle involved, which 1 suggest the Court must apply, is that
consent to reservations is necessary on the part of all the States having
rights in the matter. The application of that principle necessnrily leads
to the rejection of the absolute sovereignty view, and so far as the
Genocide type of convention is concerned, also to the rejection of the
Pan-American system which would equally permit unilateral reservations
to be made nt the will of the reserving State, and, in practice. to be
imposed on the rest of the States concerned.

To conclude, then, on the first and second questions, 1 would submit,
Mr. President, that for al1 the reasons which 1 have tried to indicate, STATEIIEST BY SIR HAKTLEY SHAWCROSS (u.K.)-13 IV 51
393
the answer to the first question must be in the negative. An affirmative
answer could only be given either by applying the absolute sovereignty
conception, which 1 cannot believe the Court would endorse, or by
applying the Pan-American system, which, as 1 suggest, would, in the
case of the GenocideConvention, merely amount to applying the absolute
sovereignty conception under another name. Any attempt to divide
a convention into parts in respect of some of which reservations might
he made, and in respect of others might not he made, as proposed by
my distinguished coileague from Israel, would, as 1 have ventured to
inappropriatenessctiand unsuitabilityn tof these theories to the whole
hilosophy and spirit of United Nations conventions, and there is the
ract that there has been no agreement to apply them or to admit reser-
vatious. Indeed, as 1 have endeavoured to show, from the discussions
in the Assemhly, rather the contrary was the case.
If the answer to the first question is in the negative, as 1 submit it
must he, then of course, the second question does not arise. That being
the position, the next matter to which the United Kingdom wishes to
devote itself is the third question, and you may think it convenient
that my learned friend, Mr. Fitzmaurice, should follow me to-morrow
morning on that part of the matter. If that is so,1 should like in conclu-
sion to express my personal appreciation of the fact that you made it
possiblc for me to appear here at any rate to-day. 1hope you will acquit
me of nny discourtcsy if 1am not here to-morrow, but 1 have to fly
back to-night on important public duties in my own country.
It kas been a very great prïizilege to appear iiithis matter, about
which my Government are greatly concerned becaiise of the view that
they have always taken, that the important thing in entering into inter-
national conventions and in drawing them up in the first place, whether
between the parties or under the auspices of the United Nations, is to
approach them in a spirit of responsibility which will ensure that the
clauses which are put into the treaties or conventions in the first place,
are serious, are understandable, and are enforceahle ones, and ones
which the great ~najority of nations will accept, and are, therefore, oncs
to which there is no iiecessity to make reservations at all. We think
that it is only in that way that the United Nations will be able ta
establish the standards and norms of world behaviour in these humani-
tarian and social mattew. which it is so desirable should be established.
the Genocide Convention, that we have not yet found it possible-ase of
although we are still giving the most serious consideration to the matter
-to accede to the Convention. 1 said that it would be easy if we could
make reservations. WC do not invite you to Say that reservations can
be made in order to facilitate Our position. We shall consider our
position, and are considering Our position, in relation to the Convention
as it stands.1must not say what Ourposition willeventually be, although
it is right to Say that my Government has from the beginning, from
the time of Nuremberg, always supported and worked to secure the
basic principles for suppressing genocide, and that it has been concerned
only at the attempt to extend these principles in what we think to be
a vague and perhaps inoperative way. \Ve 'ewantthis kind of convention
(this iswhy wepress the view that reservations ought not to be permitted
without consent) concluded with responsibility by al1 concerned, thosewho vote in favour of the draft at the Assembly being preparcd to sigii
the conventions for which they vote without sobseqiiently making
reservations to them. l'hat \ve think is the responsible way of going
about this important matter, and we fcel that the possibility of inaking
reservations at will would merely lead to the encouragcinent of those
elements in the world which seem to put out a lot of papcr icleals,to
enter into DaDerconvciitioris which arc civcn no teeth. which are far
in advance Gmetimes of the possibilit; of world enforcement, and
which consequently really act as a fraud and delusion upon world opinion.

ANNEX OF AUTHORITIES '

1. - GENERAL OPINIONS OF JURISTS
OPPENHEI~(IVol. 1,Sixth Edition 517 (a)) says :

"Reservations raisc ail important question of principle because
tliey modify the terms of the offer whicli a State iii sigiiing or rati-
fying or acceding to a treaty purports to accept. A reserration is
upon analysis the refusal of an offer and the making of a fresh offer.
Tlierefore in principle it seems necessary that the otlier party should
assent to the reservation either expressly or by implication arising
from acquiescence, and practice accords with this view. It not
infrequently happcns that this assent is given in advaiice in the
course of the sessioiis of a conference preceding a treaty, it being
tacitly agreed that a State which declares a reservatiori at that time
sliall be allowed to renew its declaration on signing the treaty."
The same view is expressed by the great French authority FAUCHILI.E
(Droit international public, Vol. 1, l'art 3, para. 823, pp. 312-313). He
says :
"Comment admettre, au surplus, qu'une même convention
n'entraîne pas les mêmesdroits et lesmèines obligationssans distinc-
tion vis-à-vis de ceux qui y participent ? Entre un contractant qui
signe la convention en bloc, purement et simplement, et un autre
qui la signe partiellement, avec des réserves, la situation n'est
vraiment pas égale .... Pour nous, des réserves à la signature ne
sont acceptables que si toutes les Puissances contractantes consen-
tent à y donner, expressément ou tacitement, leur adhésion :
il y aura alors finalement un traité nouveau, entièrement distinct
de celui qu'on avait primitivement négocié.Si les signataires purs
et sim~les ne consentent ~aç. ils seront en droit d'oblieer leurs
contractants qui ont fait des réserves à y renoncer ou à soüffrir que
la convention ne s'applique pas dans les rapports des Puissances
intkresséeç." .. . . ..

Coming to more recent writers, Professor Jean SPIROPOULOiS n, liis
Traite de droit international public, makes the following statement on
the subject :
"En ~rincioe. un traité est oblieatoire dans I'ensembl~de ses
dispositions. Au& ne doit-on pas reconnaitre comme établie en due
forme une ratification aui contiendrait certaines réserves.Le traité,
--
Aclditionato thoseciter1in the body ofthï speech of SirHartlçy Shawcross. ANSEX TO STATE>TEST Bi' SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS 395

pour êtreobligatoire, doit étre ratifié telqu'il est et sans réserve,la
ratification sous réserve nedevant êtreconsidérée que commepropo-
sition d'un nouvel accord qrii pourra êtreadopté ou non par le
CO-contractant."
A receiit statement of the same view wiil be fouiid in an article in the
Revue gérrérald ee droit irrler~zaliorrplublic by Al.Sisa of the United
Nations Secretariat :

"La réserve formuléepar un État i un traité, qu'elle soit faite
au moment de lasignature ou de la ratification, a toujours posédes
problèmes délicats. En effet.la réserveconstitue quant au fond un
amendement unilatéral à un accord multilatéral. Pour qu'elle soit
valable, il faut donc qu'elle soit acceptée par les CO-coiitractants."
"L'adliésionsous réserve exigecependant dans cecasl'acceptation
au moins tacite de tous les coiitrrictants, et le refus par un seul des
contractants pourra empêcherune adhésion pourtant jugée estrê-
mement utile par tous les autres contractants."

A classic statement of the doctrine of the principle of consent is
contained oii pages 870 to 871 of tlie Haruard KcsearchVolume, where
the following passage occurs :
"\\'ben a State proposes to make a reservation to a multipartite
treaty, whether at signature, ratification, or accession, it seeks in
effect to write into the treaty at that time 'certain terms which will
limit tlie effect of tlie treiriso far as it m:iy apply in the relations
of tliat State witli the other State or States' which are or which
become parties to the treaty. It proposes, in effect, to insert in the
treaty a provision which will operate to exempt it from certain of
the consequences which would othenvise devolve upon it from the
treaty. while leaving the other States which are or which become
parties to the treaty fully subject to those consequences in their
relations inter se and possibly even in their relations vis-à-vis the
State making the reservation. It seems clear tliat a State should be
permitted to do tliis only witli tlie consent of al1other States which
are parties, or wliich;as signatories, are likely to become parties to
the treaty, and this because, as has been said, States are willing
in general to assume obligations under a rnultipartite treaty only
'on the understanding that the other participating Powers are
prepared to act in the same way and that general benefit will thus
result'.A multipartite treaty is 'an agreement in which each party
finds a compensation for the obligations contracted in the engage-
ments entered into by the others'. [League of Nations Document
A.Io.I~~o.V, p. 2.1"
The viewexpressed in the Harvard I/olz~me findssupport in the opinion
of other eminent United States authority, for instance in Volume V of
HACKWORTH 'igestwhere the followingpassageoccurs on page 130 :

"If reservations are not made at the time of signing a multila-
teral treatv. ratifications with reservations. in order to be bindiua.
niiist bc b;uiiKht tutliikiiutiledge of the othçr ~.uiitr:icriiigl>o\vc;s
and recri\.t: tlit:ir :ililiro\.al, uiiless orht.riviw specifiédin the tre;ity,
siiiceth^.)c<in~titiiti~ii~>~lificatiofnthe iigreeinfilt." The same view is taken by Professor hfanley HUDSON.Writing in
the Am3rican Journal of International Law /or 1938 (Vol. XXXII,
p. 335). he drew attention to the fact that
"....when reservations other than those agreed to at the time of
.signature are proposed, the alternatives are absence of objection
from any State consulted, on the one hand, and abstention from
proceeding to deposit of a ratification or accession on the other
hand".
A similar view is expressed in HUDSON'SInternational Legislation,
where it is stated (Vol. 1, p. I) that
"Siniilarly, an adhesion subject to reservation cannot be received
in deposit without the consent of al1 States which have previously
ratified or adhered, and possibly without the consent of al1signatory
States."

Of the duty of a depositary autliority Ha~sos's I?zternatio~zaL l egisla-
tion says :
"....an authority designatecl as the depositary of ratifications
would not be justified in allowing a defioitive deposit of a ratifica-
tion which is subject to a reservation unless the consent of other
signatory States were obtained. though the consent may, in some
cases, be inferred fromafailure toobject afteradequateopportunity".

of the practice of the American State Department, saysII, p. :42). speaking

"The Department of State has found occasion to declare that
reservations to a multipartite treaty should be made and recorded
at the time of signature in order that al1parties to the treaty may,
previous to and in considering ratification, understand to what
extent each signatory is bound by the terms of the agreement."
An American judicial view ta the same efiect was expressed by
Mr. Justice B~owr, in the case of FozirteenDianiond Rings v. the U.S.
[I~OI, 163 U.S. 1761.With referencc to an amending resolution which
the United States Senate sought to introduce. into a treaty with Spain
which the Senate was asked to ratify, hlr. Justice Brown said :
"lt can not be regarded as part of the treaty, since it received
neither the approval of the President nor the consent of the other
contracting Power.... The Senate has no right to ratify the treaty
and introduce new terms into it, whicli shnll be obligntory on the
other Power, although it may refuse its ratification, or make such
ratification conditional upon the adoption of amenclments to the
treaty.... But it could not, in my opinion, ratify the treaty and then
adopt a resolution declaring it not to be its intention to admit the
inhabitants of the Philippine Islands to the privileges of citizenship
of the United States. Such rcsolution would be inoperative as an
amendment to the treaty, since it had not received the assent of
the President or the Spanish commissioners."
It is equally difficult to reconcile the views noxvput forward hy the
Government of the Soviet Union, and by the other governments
supporting the Soviet view, with the quite recent and apparently
officially approved expressions of high Soviet legal opinion. These are ANNEXTO STATEMENT BY SIR HARTLEYSHAWCROSS 397
quoted in the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
(Dûcumerit -4j1372) which forms part of the dossier of the Court in

this case, and 1 would like ta rccall them here. Thus a study receiitly
published by the Institute of Law of the Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R. favours the making of any reservatioiis prior to, signature so
that
"....the parties to the treaty become familiar with them prior to
signature and agree to them (if only by remaining silerit). As a
general rule reservations must be acceptcd and countersigned by
al1 parties to the treaty."

In a connected publication on the same subject it is stated that
"Reservations at the time of ratification cannot be unilateral:
they must receive the agreement of the States who are parties to
the international agreement."

2.-VIEWS EXPRESSED BY JURISTS AT 01s IN CONNEXION \YITH
INTERNATIONAL CONFEKENCES

The representative of Poland at the Confereiice which drew up the
Convention on Customs Formalities (1923) announced his intention of
making reservations to certain substantive articles of the Convention.
It was thereupon pointed out by M. SERRUYSo,f the Economic Commit-
tee of the League of Nations. that the Polish delegate
" ...had made so wide a reservation as to include at least one
ustii f ricil il Ir u n f iliit~i . Iri Iiis
opinion, no rcsérvations cnuld I,e niad<: 111 claiises contniniiig
c~ucstruiisuf ~)nnciple.... The qiiestion of the piihlication of im110rt

:iiid esport prohibitions \Y%, for instance. essenti;il for the cumri1i.r-
cial \i.orlcl.RIIJt(~rnakc? :irçsrrviitiuii rcgnrtlirigitivi,iiltbc to ruil
cuunter tu onc of tlic viral ririricii>lesu.liicli thé (:onférencr. \i:ij
seeking to establish in the CÔnveniion.
In conclusion he desired to point out to hl. Rasinski tliat certain
reservations made bv a State to a coiivention could not be of such
2 n:iturc :lsto reiider nuil anil \.oi[tlicprincipal ol>liçntionsssiiinc.l
by that State, aiiil i>nrticiil:irly<irii:rouitlie ol>lijiarioriiassumccb!.
dtlier St:ttc,s\i.liicli ti:id :icloi>tedthe conwntioii :i:i\\,lii>learicldid
not thereby obtain recipr6cal advantages." lLeague of Xations
Document C.66.M.z4.1924.11,p. 123.1
M. RENAULT ,s rapporteur of the Drafting Cornmittee of the con-

ference at which the Declaration of London of igog on Naritirne \Varfare
was drawn up, made the following statemeiit :
"The rules containecl in the present Declaration relate to matters
of great importance and great diversity. Tliey have not al1 been
accepted \vith the same degree of eagerness by al1the delegations.
Concessions have been made on one point in consideratioii of
concessions obtained on another. The whole, al1 things considered,
lias been recognized as satisfactory aiid a legitimate expectation
would be falsified if one Power mieht make reservations~on a rule~ ~ ~
to which auother Power attached p.îrticular importance." [S Ameri-
can Jot~rnalofInternational Law, (1g14), Supplement, pp. SS, 142.1 The sub-committee of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive
Codification of International Law which sat in 1927, consisting of
Messrs. FROMACEOT D,IES.^and MCSAIR,made the following statement
in their report on the admissibility of reservations to conventions :
"It no doubt frequently happens that, in the course of the
negotiatioii of a treaty, agreement is reached between tlie contract-
ing parties regarding a reservation whicli is put forward hy one of
tliem and accepted by the others. In such a case the former party
may naturally, when appending its signature to the act concluded,
mention and maintain its reservation. The other contractinz par-
ties, when they also append their signatures, signify thereby chat
they have accepted tlie reservation and consent thereto.
riut wheu the treaty declares, as we have seen above, that it
permits signature by Powers which have not taken part in its nego-
tiation, such signature can only relate to what has heen agreed
upon between the contracting Powers. In order that any reservation
whatever may be validly made in regard to a clause of the treaty,
it is essential that this reservation should be accepted by al1 the
coiitractine ~arties. as would have been the case if ithad been ut
fonvard inthe coirse of the negotiations. If not, the reservatlon,
like the signature to which it is attached, is nuIl and void."

3.-VIE\VS AKU PRACTICB OF GOYERNbIENTS

The United Kinedom Government. in a Alemorandum which it
addressed to the Se;etary-~eneral ofthe League of Kations in regard to
certain reservations whicli had been entered to the Opium Convention
of 1525, made the following statement :

"It may he said that such conventions [Le. multipartite conven-
tions] are,in their essence, a matter of offer and acceptance. Indivi-
inconvenient or disadvantageous to themselves as part ofs waigeneral
lbargain on the understanding that the other participating Powers
are prepared to act in the same way and tliat general benefit will
thus result.
But ifindividual States are to be entitled, without consultation
witli other signatories, to accept an agreement as a whole while
declining to adopt tliose of its provisions which may be unwelcome
to tliem, there is a danger that such a practice would tend to defeat
the purposes for which multilateral agreements are entered into."
[League of Nations Oficiul Jozrrnal,1926, pp. 612-613.1

In its written statement to the Court, the Government of the Nether-
lands refers to the case where several governments wished to make a
reservation to an article of one of the Hague Conventions drawn up in
1Sg9. The Netherlands Government, as headquarters government,
observed that the only reservations which could be admitted were those
which had been expressly made at an earlier date and recorded in the
minutes of the conference. ft went on to Say:
" ....If this were not so, any State might sign one of the conven-
tions with a reservation as regards its most important provisions
and thus be relieved of a Iieavy obligation, while the other Powers, ANNEX TO STATEIIENT Bi' SIR Hi\KTLIJY SHAWCROSS 399
who had already signed without auy reservation, would iieverthe-
less be bound bv those oblie-tions vis-&vis of the State in ouestion.
'l'he1)iitcli ~;t>\~eriiriieiirtl,icrefort., cuuld iiut :icccpt [lie rescr\.atioii
!vitlinut rcferriny it tu111201lit-rsi~iiiitori~s,hut th?!. \wrc \i'ill-nl:
to do so and recommend its accepiance."

Paragrüph 22 of thc Secrct:iry-General's Report (Docilmerit A/137z)
describes an occasion when the French Government took a similar line.
-4 striking case is alsogiven in paragraph 23 of tlie Secretary-General's
Report. Germany proposed to sign the \\'hite Slave Traffic Coiivention
of 1920 subject to a reservation in practically the same terms as a
provision she had sought to introduce at the conference, but which had
been rejected. Objection to the reservation was made and Germany
was eveiitually obliged to abaridon it.
This may be comparecl with the action of the Soviet Government
in the present case in relation to its reservation on Article IS of the
Genocide Convention. Durine theudraftinr of -he Convention. the Soviet
G~~vcriiriit:iitonsisreiitly nppujcil tliijiirticlc nii<lfdriiinlly propoieiti
<Icletion. lie 1r:i :\;;e1111)lylier insi;ts.l .>IIrct:iiiiiiirliij
:irticlr :iii<lr<:icctt:;ltlie So\,i?t i>ri.vt.>iIcIt:trit rlie jc~vicrCSC CI-
vation on the.subject is thcrefoi'e a'unilateral attempt to secure for the
benefit of tlie Soviet Uiiiori the elimination of a provision the iiiclusion
of which was espressly iusisted on at the draftcng of the Convention.
Another case was the Ciiban ratification to the Protucol of Revision
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The
Cuban ratification containecl a reservation in regard to Article 23 of
that Statute, which corresponds to Article 23 of the present Statute of
the Court. To this reservation a number of States made definite objec-
tion. Upon it being pointed out that (quoting from the Harvlrrd Volz~me,
p. 864) the Cuban reservation "would amourit to a modification, at the
request of a single State. of an instrument already accepted by a large
number of signatones, Cuba eventually withdrew her reservation and
gave an unqualified ratification to the Protocol".
It seems clear, therefore, that there is no basis of fact for the view
that reservations are usually confined to formal or unimportant matters,
and no real ground of principle for distinguisliing between substantive
and noii-substantive reservations, except in the sense that non-sub-
stantive reservations are often unobjectionable, could therefore be
permitted, and normally will be permitted. Such reservations can indeed
be taken to Iiave been consented to if no objection to therii is offered.
But none of this applies to reservations on matters of substance, and
if objection to tliese is made they must be regarded as inadmissible.

4.-PRI\CTICE IS RELATIOS 10 PARTICUI.AR TREATIES

The Haniard Kesearch ITol~i~ti (p. S76) sums up the practice relative
to reservations appended ton signature as follows :

"Furthermore, although tliere may be relatirely few cases where,
as a result of obiection bv other sienatories to its sienatiire with
reservatioii, a state lias either aba~loiiecl the reservgtion or else
foregoiicsigning a treaty, it can be said thnt in practice reservations
at signature have geneially been made in such manner arid under400 ANNEX TO STATEhlENT Bi' SIR HAHTI.IiY SHAWCROSS

such circumstances as to lend support to the rule here laid down.
That is. reservations at signature have usually been so made as.
ta indicate that the other signatones did, as a matter of fact,
consent thereto either expressly or by implication, and there seem
to be no precedents to suggest that such consent is not necessary.
See, in tliis sense, Malkiii, article cited, 7 Britislz Year Book of
Iiiternational Law (1926), p. 159.
States have sometimes made reservations at signature simply by
appending to their signatures, where al1 the other States signing-
the treaty could readily see and read them, the complete terms of
their reservations. \Vhere this has been done, and the other States.
have affixed their signatures at the same time, the latter fact
may in itself be taken to indicate that the other signatory States.
consented to the making of the reservations. It is not important
that at the time of signing some States necessarily signed imme-
diately before and some iinmediately after the State making the.
reservations ;the significant fact is that, under the circumstances,
and even if they had no previous knowledge of the proposed reser-
vations, al1States signing the treaty presumably had notice of the.
reservations and made no obiection thereto. See I Hudson. Ifder-
natioital Legislation (193r), Aix and n. 3.
Frequently. in the case of multipartite treaties concluded at
laree conferences. the reservations made bv States at the time of.
sigGature have. been previously announced at one of the formal
sessions of the conference or commissions aiid duly recorded in the-
firocès-verbui~xor minutes."

In relation to tliis the Harvard Research Voli~megives a great many
instances of conventions which either expressly permitted reservations.
to be made, or where, the question of the making of reservations having
arisen, it was made quite clear that none would be permitted which did
not secure general consent. The following are the principal conventions.
cited in this connexion by the Harvard Reseurch Volz~me :
Convention on the Simplification of Customs Formalities, 1931 ;
Convention providing for a Uniform I.aw of Bills of Exchange-
and Promissory Notes. 1930 ;
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes ;.
Conventions for the Codification of International Law, 1930 ;
The Hague Conventions of 1699 ;
The International Conference of American States on Conciliation!
and Arbitration, 1929 ;
The Convention on Economic Statistics ;
The Treaty of Versailles, 1919 ;
The Convention forthe Suppression of the White Slave Trade, 1910 ;
Protocol of Signature of the International Sanitary Convention of

1903 ;
The International Sanitary Conventioii for Air Navigation, 1933 ;.
The Havana Convention on Treat'les.
In his article in the British Year Book of Internatioiial Law on reser-~
vations to multilateral conventions. alreadv referred to. Sir William
MALKIN similarly undertook a review of a l&e number of international
multilateral conventions entered into durina th- last three quarters of
n century. These included the following : Treaty respecting the Navigation of the Danube, 1883;
International Sanitary Convention, ~Sgz ;
International Sanitary Convention, 1893 ;
International Sanitarv Convention. 1804 :

. -
Act of Algeciras, 1906 ;
Geneva Red Cross Convention, 1906 ;
Agreement for the Unification of Pharmacopæial Formulas, 1906 ;
International Copyright Convention. 1908 ;
White Slave Traffic Conventiori, rgro ;
Conventions relating to Collisions and Salvage at Sea, 1906 ;
International Sanitary Convention, 1912 ;
Opium Convention, 1912 ;
Radio-Telegraphic Convention, 1912 ;
Industrial Property Agreement, 1920,

Sir William MALKIN also cited the Hague Conveiitions of 1899 and
1907. the Treaty of Versailles, 1919, ancl the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923.
He then pointed out, in the following passage, that in virtually every
one of these cases consent, express or implied, was given to thereserva-
tions to these Conventions which were admitted :
"It will be seen that of al1 the cases examined above where an
actual reservation was made to any provision of a convention, there
is hardly one as to which it cannot be shown that the consent of
the other contracting Powers was given either expressly or by
implication. Where the reservation is embodied in a document
(which must have formed the subject of previous discussion and
agreement) signed by the represeiitatives of the other contracting
Powers, consent is express ; whcre the reservation Iiad been pre-
viously announced at a sitting of the conference and was repeated
at the time of signature without any objection being taken, consent
is implied. And certainly there is no case among those examined
which could be quoted as a precedent in favour of the theory that
a State is entitled to make any reservations it likes to a conventioii
without the assent of the other contracting parties. It is unlikely
that a wider examination of the precedents would lead to a very
different result, and. if so. it mav fairlv be said that the oractice
of nations is strongly in favour of the Gew which it was siggested
at the beginning .f this article is the only one consistent with sound
principle?'

CENERAL CONCLUSION FI<OMTHE AUTHORITIES

Whetlier it be the viewsof authorities on international law, of govern-
ments or of experts, or the actual practice followed by States in relation
to the treaties which they have drawn up, there is a quasi-universal
recognition of the principle that consent is necessary to any reservation
a State desires to make to an already agreed text ;and from this it
follows that in the absence of such consent. and more particularly if
an actual objection has been made, the reservation cannot be maintained.
If it is maintained, it inevitablv renders the sienature. ratification or
:iccejsiun to \itliiclii15 att-iclic<l;nv:ili(l,ancliniilGr.~tivrfor tlic piirposes
of in;ikirigtlic .Stat~ conit-riif<l;Iprty tu tllç trC:tty. 4. STATEhlEXT Bi' AIR. FITZJIAURICE

(REI>RESESTIS GHE UKITEII KIKGDOM GOVERSMENT)
K1'THE PUBLIC SITTING OP AI'RIL 14th. 1951, MORNIKG1

\Ir. I'residciit1 am aware that a great deal of indulgence has beeii

eztended to tlie United Kingdom in the course of these proceediiigs,
and 1 shall eiideavour to Say what 1 have to say very briefly. \\'lien
Sir Hartley Shawcross terminated yesterday evening, he had iiot yet
dealt with the third of the three questions put toheCourt,anàiny prin-
cipal task will be toeal with that question. 13utthe Court will recollect
that, earlier in the day, Sir1.iartley asked tliat 1 might be allowecl to
reply to one or two points which had been made previously by the distiii-
guished represeiitative of Israel, Alr. Rosenne. kiost of the pointswhicli
AIr. Roseiiiie made were in connexion witli the third question, and so 1
shall deal \irith them iii connexion with that question. But there were also
one or two points that arose on the first questions, and 1 sliould like
to begin by dealing with those very shortly. Xow, Air. Rosenne put
forward a very interesting theory. He suggested, in relation to the

Genocicle Coiiventiori, that the articles of the Convention coiild be
divided into wliat he crilled normative articles and contractual articles,
and he suggested that whereas there could clearly hc no riglit to make
reservations to normati\.e articles-and on that 1 entirely agree witli
him-there was on the other hand an inherent right to inake reser-
vations to the contractual articles, subject only to this proviso, that iii
the event of sirch a reservation being objected to by any State, tlie
Convention would not be in force between the rescrvirig State aiid the
objecting State.
>Ir. I'resident, whatever merits this tlieory may have, one caii, 1
think. s:ty tliis about it, thit is entirely new. 1 for my part kiio\i. of
no existing rule of international law which says tliat tliere is any inherent
right to make reservations to contractual articles, even with the proviso

which \Ir. l'tosenne attached to it, narnely, that the convention \i70ul<l
not be in force betmeen the reserving aiid the objecting State. \\'e have
there, 1 think, a completely new theory, and in so far as it derives partly
from the saine idea as the l'aii-American theory, we have, 1 think, tlie
same position. In the case of the Pan-Amcrican system, we have
something which has been instituted by special agreement for use iii
a special case u,hich woul<l need agreement to be applied in another
field. The position at preseiit, at any rate, certainly is that there hris
been no agreement on the part of any of the States concerned in the
Genocide Convention to apply such a system to any reservations that
may be made to tbat Convention, and in the absence of an agreement
to that effcct, 1 do suggest that it would not be possible to regard tliis
system as applicable in the case of the Geriocirle Convention.
I3ut let us assume that 1 am wrong ; let us assume for tlie sake of

argument that there might be an existing riile of international lam
which gave an inherent right to make reservatioiis to articles so loiig
as they were of a contractual character. Severtheless, even if there STATEMEST BY Mr. FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-14 IV jI 403

were such a rule, at least it would be necessary to know, and to know
for certain, which articles of the convention were purely contractual,
and which were purely normative. There, 1 think, one comes up against
the great practical difficulties which would be involved in the theory
wliich the distinguished representative of Israel put forward.
Here 1 would digress a moment to remind the Court that of course
it does often liappen that countries, when concluding a convention,
specify certain particular articlesin respect of which reservations caii
be made. \\je al1 know of cases of conventioiis which contain a reser-
vations article, and very often that reservations article says tliat
reservations may be made to articles S, Y and % of the conveiition :
and that works perfectly well because, but only because, it is known
iii advance to which of the articles of the convention the reservations
can be made. 1 sueeest that that vractice demonstrates bv imnlicatioii

able to work a system by which rëservations can be made tÔ somc
articles of a convention and not to others.
Now 1 should like to ask the Court to look with me at some of the
articles of the Genocide Convention mith a view to seeing whetlier tlie
difficulties 1 have been speakirig of are real or not. Of course, iii :iiiy

convention of this type you fiilcl certain articles which are cle;lrly
normative, and you will probably find certain other articles whicli are
clearly and solely contractual, but 1suggest that you will find a gootl
many articles as to which it is very difficult to say whether they are
normative or contractual, and indeed in respect of which you can Say
that they are bath normative and contractual. 1 will not go through
the whole of the articles of the Convention, but we might have a look
at Article 1. That article says that the contracting parties confirm
that genocide, wlietlicr committcd iii time of pence or in time of war,
is a crime uncler international law, which they znulertaketa preueictnnrl
ptcnish.Now there. in the very tirst article of the Convention, and tlie
rnost important article of all, you have an evident ambiguity. Ijy
ambiguity 1 mean from the point of view of determining whethcr it is
iiormative or contractual. It begiiis with something normative, a declnr-
ation of the principle that genocidc is a crime under international Iaw.
but then it gocs oii with an undertaking on the part of the parties to
prevent and to punisli ;and therefore 1suggest yoii have the introduction
of something which has a contractual element. There may be room for
argument about that, but the point 1 am makiiig is tliat there is room
for areument. It is not clear into whicli caterorv Article 1 falls. It is
normafive, but also partly of a coiitractual nctuqe.
Sow let us look at Article IV, which reads:

"Persons committing genocicleor any of the othcr acts eiiurner;ited
in Articlc III sliall be punislied whetlier tliey are constitutiorially
responsible rulers, public ofiicials or priv:ite individuals."

1s that a normative article or is it a contractu:il article1?am renlly
iiot quite sure, and1 think it could be argued to have elements of hoth.
'Thenwe come to an even more striking case, Article V :

"The Contracting Parties undertake to cnact, in accordnncc witli
their respective Constitutions, tlie necessnry lcgislation to give cffect STATEMEST BY air. FITZAIAURICE (u.K.)-14 IV 51 405

Ar. President, the distinguished representative of Israel laid very
rreat stress in this matter on the will of the narties. That. of course. is
rivery important factor. If 1untlerstood him 'rrectly, what hcsuggested
was this. that it was the will. or it must be assumed to have been the will
of the parties, that as many coiintries as possible should become parties
ta the Genocide Convention. He went on to say that it miist, therefore,
so to speak, be presunied that the parties intended that that process
shoiild he facilitated by giving a faculty to countries to make reserva-
tions, at :iiiy rate, to certain articles. Clearly there is nothing to that
effect in the Convention. The Convention, as we know, contains no

provision on reservations, and one would have thought that if the parties
had intended tliat the process of becoming a party to the Convention
should be facilitated by the faculty to make reservations, and if the);
had really attached importance to that, they would have included an
article to that effect in the Convcntiori, or, at any rate, they wonld have
made some mention of the mattcr expressly in a separate protocol or
takeii some step about it. As we know, however, nothing of the kind
was done, and it seems to me that what Mr. Rosenne is really asking
the Court to do is ta read into the Genocide Convention a provision
which is not there. 1 think that on analysis it will be found that he is
asking the Court to read iiito the Genocide Convention a reservations
article, or to imply a right to make reservations as a necessary conse-
quence of what must be assumed to have been the will of the parties.
'TheCourt has had occasion to coiisider that type of contention before
in at least three cases, i think, which have been before the Court. In
those cases-the first case on the admission of new Membcrs, the South-
West-ilfrican case, and the second pli:ise of the Peace Treaties case-
the Court had to consider whether it was possible to imply in an inter-

national instrument provisions ivhich were certainly iiot written into
those instrumeiits, and each time the Court rejected the idea and refused
to imply such provisions. The striking thing is this, that in each case
it \iras siiggested to the Court tliat the provision in question ought to
be implied in order to givc effect to the presumed will of the parties;
and if I have read the opinions of the Court correctly on that subject,
in each case they rejected the iden, and said that it was not possible to
read into an international instrument provisions which were not part
of that iiistrument merely in order to give effect to the presumed inten-
tions of the pxrties.
It is inore than that in this case: Not only 1s thcre no evidence that
tlieintentions of the parties wcre wliat the distinguished representative
of Israel suggests that they were in regard to reservations, but there
is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. 1 shall riot go into al1 that
because Sir Hartley Shawcross went into it yesterday ;but we know that
at ,several stages of the preparation of the Genocide Convention express
consideration was given to the possibility of including an article on
reservations, and the matter was fully discussed in several committees,
and each time the idea was rejected. There may have been intimations by
individual delegations that they would have difficulty in becoming parties
to the Convention unless they were permitted to make reservations, but

certainly those who framed the Convention rejected the idea of any
general riglit to make reserv;itions, and refused to incluclean articleon
the subject in the Convention.406 STATEHENT BY MI. FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-14 IV 51

Therefore, it seems to me, Mr. President, quite clear that, in so far as
this depends on the will of the parties, that will was certainly in the
sense of rejecting the making of any reservations.
In parenthesis 1 should like to make one point clear arising out of
something which Sir Hartley Shawcross said. He mentioned that certain
governments, the Governments of Poland, the Soviet Union and the
United States had at that time taken a view different from that which
they al1appear to take now. That is true, but 1 should like to make it
clear that of course there is a considerahle and, 1 think, important
difference in the reasons on which the views of those three Governments
are now hased, because whereas the Government of Poland and that of
the Soviet Union are in favour of what Sir Hartley Shawcross called the
ahsolute sovereignty theory, the Government of the United States does
not put forward that theory but favours something more in the nature
of the Pan-American theory.

There is one other point which was made hy Mr. Rosenne about which
1 should like to Say a few words before 1 come to the third question.
There was a part of the United Kingdom's written statement in which we
said that the application of the l'an-American system would lead to
what we characterized as a curious and rather unusual position, in that
two parties might hoth he parties to the same convention aiid yet the
convention would not be in force between them. hlr. Rosenne, 1 think,
said that there was nothing particularly unusual in that situation, and
that it arose whenever two States broke off diplomatic relatioris. Well,
with great respect, 1do not think that there is any rule of international
law which causes treaties to cease to 1i:rveforce between parties merely
because diplomatic relations between them are suspended or broken off.
The suspending or breaking off of diplomatic relations does not stop
al1 intercourse between countries. l'or instance, ordinary commercial
intercourse continues, and very often the consular representatives of
the two countries remain. The utmost effect that the suspeiisiou or
breaking off of diplomatic relations might have would he to render the
actual operation of some treaties difficult in oractice. and there mieht
be a tcr~;~~(~r,~iuypcnsioiiiritht!~ri>per,tlto~hut tliat'i<II~IIC:rliifccnt
tliiiig froiii iayi~IILItl~etr~?.itihetu.<!~n tliubcc,~~r~triticcnsi.i:iitirilv
to be in force.

1 now come to the third question and 1 should like to begin with a
reference to what 1might cal1the ':had boy argument". There are sugges-
tions-several have been made in the course hoth of the oral proceedings
and ofthe written proceedings-that countries which do not immediately,
as it were, ratify or accede to a convention are really hehaving rather
badly, and that they should in some way be penalized because they have
not immediately hecome parties. It is on some sucli conception 1 think-
because 1 cannot otherwise account for it-that the idea is founded
that countries which are only potential parties to a convention are
absolutely devoid of any right of objecting to a reservation which it may
he attempted to make. STATEhlENT BY Mi. FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-14 IV 51 4O7

1 should like to ask the Court just to consider the facts in relation
to the Genocide Convention. The Genocide Convention was originally
framed and adopted by the Assembly in December 1948, and it was
opened for simature. Oui-e a number of countries siened , , but 1think
I niiiriglitIII >I).III~-~fncccss<LryI nlii iiircflic rclir<>crit.tti\.r,of flic
Sccrt l:,iy-i;ciii.rwilliijrrvcr mc, rli:,;<y,-nr I.itiriit rl:iiitiiiti,;~y,
Yov~m~bcr I<,J<Jonlv :tImittfour t.t8i~r~rr~Iad tlisii r.ttii,tl~,Crviinticlc
Convention.%for whole year after the Convention was open for signa-
ture hardly any country had hecome a party even to the extent of rati-
fying it, and of course the Convention was not in force. Then a year later,
two years after the Convention had been open for signature, 1 think I

am right in saying that in October of last year there were still only about
fifteen countries which had ratified or acceded. By November acertain
number of other countries had ratified or acceded-just over twenty-
which was sufficient therefore to start the process of bringing the Conven-
tion into force. Even to this dav there are not more than about thirtv
countries out of seventy whichdare actual parties to the convention.
Therefore, you see that very considerable ueriods mav ela~se durinc:
which courÏtries for various keasons are nof able, or do noi ratify 07
accede to international conventions. 1 suggest that it is really much too
sweeping a proposition to Say that during those periods only countries
which have ratified or acceded have rights in the matter of objecting
to reservations, and that the other countries have no rights at all.
It seems to me that there is really only one ground on which this
can be suggested. It is that a potential party must not be regarded as
having any rights in the matter because if it had, then even although it

did not intend to become an actual party to the Convention, it could,
nevertheless. urevent a State which wished to make a reservation from
becoming a even although al1 the other States were prepared to
accept that reservation.
Assumins that there is some realitv in this difficultv. that it is some-

State wished to make and which al1the other interested countries were
prepared to admit), it seems to me that it can be met by the method
which we proposed towards the end of our written statement and about
which I shall have more to say later on, that method being to impose
some kind of time-limit on the period dnring which potential parties
would have the right to make or maintain objections. Since the difficulty,
if it exists, can easily be met in that way, it can, I think, coustitnte no
valid reason for denying to potential parties the right of effective objec-

tion. In our written statement we suggested that a potential party must
have a definite legal right of, at any rate, an initia claracter, to make
effective objection to reservations which other States seek to make,
because if the potential party did not have this right, another right,
which no one can seriously doubt it does have, would be prejudiced.
This other right is the right of the potential party to become an actual
party to the Convention. That is a definite legal right arising out of the
Convention itself, which either specifies or indicates in some way what
are the countries who are entitled to become party to the Convention.
I might pause here to mention a point which was made by hlr. Rosenne.
Referring to a passage in our written statement in which we pointed .
out that strictly speaking al1such clauses ought to be put into a separate408 STATE>IEST BY >Ir. PITZ3IAURICE(u.I<.)-14 IV 51
protocol-of course they never are hecause it is inconvenient to do so
but from the strictly legal point of view they ought to be-hlr. Rosenile.

on the basis of that observation, said that it showed that the potential
parties. in so far as they had any rights in this matter, had rights only
in relation to the formal clauses of the convention which might figure
in a scparate protocol but had no rights in regard to tlie rest of tlie
convention. \Veil, that may be true. but it seems to me to leave the
position exactly the same, because even if you put the formal clauses
into a separate protocol. tlie right which you would be giviiig to a
potential party under the separate protocol would still be a right to
hecome a party to a particular convention. There would still be that
right as a definite legal right. and whether you embody that right iii
the convention itself or in a separate protocol seems to me to be
completely immaterial. IVhichever method you adopt you are conferring
on the potciitial party a right to become a party to a convention and
to a particiilar convention having a particular text. For that reason
1 suggest that Mr. Kosenne was not strictly correct when he spoke of
potential parties as being in tlie position of "third States". He quoted
the maxim uctu tertiis nec lzocentirecbroszbnt. It is a ~erfectlv correct
maxim, but'in relation to this matter the potential pariies arekot third
States :tliev are directlv interested States. Thev are States wliich uiidcr

the convention have vësted in them an actuairight to become parties
to a particular convention having a particular text.
1 woiider whether 1 might explain in French one point whicli was
not auite clear from the translation. It is this :M. Roseplne a dit oue si
MI ;ettait les clazises/orinelles dans zrvt$rolocoleséparéil seraitAulors
évidentqiie les brrrties+oteirlieZZee,?t+frissa~ccea,uraierrtdes droits setile-
?nmteiice qriiErn~erqilé es clazises/or;~iellesel ils ?r'auraipastde droils
sur les clatbsessribsta?tivesde la conueritioit. .4cela, je répopzdsque la
chose est la nzéme,parce qzre,ou bieqrle droit de devenirzmepartie B1s
coqiuentionest irisérédalis lacoriventio?e%lle-niénie,u bien o?tle nzetilans
un protocolespécial.Mais c'est totrjozirsLe mêmedroit. C'est zis droit
acqrris.Ce droit pezd provenir dz~protocoleozi de 111conventiorr.Mais ce
n'cisestpas moires liidroitdedevenirunepurtic <iuiieco?wen.tio?ditermi*ibc
qf~iu t<tctestc déternzi+zé.
011 this question of the text of the conventioii, iny contention is that
the right of the potential party relates to a particular convention having
a particular text, and that the party is not entitled to have that text
chaiiged, as it were, before it lias had an opportunity of ratifying or
acceding to the convention. One point which was made against that
arguineiit was that a reservation does not change the actual tex& of the

convention. In the purely literal sense of the term it is no doubt true
that a reservation leaves the actual text of the convention uiichanged,
but it does, or it can, very much alter the general balance and efiect
of the convention. If you get reservations of a sufficiently important
character made to sufficiently important articles by important States,
you have n situation which, 1 suggest, does alter the whole general
bal:ince of the convention. It can be a very serious factor. Let Ine give
an example in relation to the Genocide Convention. It is not an extreme
example but it is a possible example. 1 sliould like to quote once more
the article on extradition. That is a very important article of the
Convention, but it is an article on which reservations would be extremely
likely to be made, if the faculty of making resenrations on such articles STATEYEST RY MT. FITZZIAURICE @.K.)-14 IV j~
409
existed, because the article declares that genocide can never be regarded
as a political offence for the purpose of extradition. and involves an
obligation to extradite persons for the offence of genocide. This is one
of the articles \rrhichhas caused very considerable dificiilty to a number

of countries in becomiiig prirties to the Genocide Convention. It is at
least one of the reasoiis why my own country has hesitated and is still
hesitating on that subject. \fie have traditionally graiited political
asylum, and while L am not for a moment suggesting that asylum ought
to be granted to persons who have been guilty of the crime of genocide,
nevertheless, it is not altogetlier easy to reconcile that article of the
Genocide Convention with the traditional right of graiiting political
asylum. Therefore, it is an article to which, if it were possible to make

reservations to the Genocide Convention, it would probably be found
that reservations would be made.
Now 1 suggest that that is eminently a case where the balance aiid
intended effect of thc Convention would be considerably nltered if a
large number of importaiit States made reservations to that article.
Anci,of course, the same applies a fortio triother articles of the Conven-
tion, but 1 purposcly chose an article which is perhaps not absolutely
fundamental to the Convcrition, but on which reservritions might quite

reasonably be niade, and 1 suggest that even there it would have an
effect on the general bahnce of the Convention.
Here 1 should like figurntively to ask the distinguished representative
of Israel a qoestiori-l will not nctiially ask him to answer it, but 1 pose
to him, as it were a rhetoricnl questii~n. How would he deal with the
period during which therc are iio parties to a convention-because we
know of course, that when a convention is opened for signature, some
States sign but do not ratify, and some can accede but do not accede,

ancl there is a period diiring which there are no parties. Accordiiig to
the thepry that only the actual parties to a convention are eiititled to
object, then at that point-and it is a period ivhich may lnst quite a
long time, a year or two or eveii more-according to that theory I say,
there is no one who can object to any reservations. Therefore during
al1that period. according to this theory, people can make what resenTa-
tions they like. They can come in, quickly ratify or accede with some
important reservatiori whicli no one can prevent them making. hloreover,

two or three countries acting in conjunction could not only make those
reservations at a time wlien no one was in a position to object. because
tliere were no parties to the convention : they could also often bring the
convention into force on that basis, and once a convention has come
into force with reservations, it is too late-those reservations can never
afterwaràs be altered or cancelled. To be effective, the reservations miist
beobiected to and must be withdrawn in conseou~~ce. either before the
iun\~ciiriuri cc,riiç irir<>furct,r:it Icnsr I,i.furc:rtic r;iriticntiuii or nccv..-

siori of tlic 5tate ii n(lniittr.<l,biir Iilie h:iw a sitii:tti01111\vhicIt riii
one can challenge riratification or accession with a reservation becaiise
there are as ?et no parties to the convention. Therefore, two or three
countries acting together perhaps could bring a convention into force
like that, with reservations which thereafter could not be altered.
Now, that is not at a11a faiicifuldanger, because it is often purposely
provided that a conveiition shall come into force upon ratification or
accession by a very small niimber of States, aiid an extreme case often
mentioned in connexion with the present proceedings is the case of the41° STATEMEXT Bi' MT. FITZMAURICE (u.K.)-14 IV 51

Geneva Conventions of 1949which came into force on ratification by
only two States, and that is done to bring them into force as quickly as
possible. Incidentally, they are very important conventions on the
treatment of prisoners of war, the sick and wounded in the field, and
civilian internees. Those are conventions to which countries might want
to make serious reservations, and according to the system propounded
those conveiitions into force, that is for two countries to bring them

into force, the two countries attaching to their ratification important
and far-reaching reservations which no one would be in a position to
to this system, merely potential parties havetual pno rights of oblection.
The Court cnn, 1 think, easily sec the serious objections to which that
position would lead, and we submit that that is a position which could

only be avoided by givirig to the potential, as well as to the actual
iairi ~wriocl~ow.rafor III?part. &III),secioguocl :iiiiii.erto tlic argiiini:nt
Ih;i\~:11iit111itt,rii,ar<l,huirlins becn siifig,.iteirioiie of tlic \i.ritteii
iintciii~nt~. 1 thiiikLIIL.inreiriciit of the IJii~ieÇt;it~j.tt~:ct\vh3tcver
force that argument might have, it haS none to-day in relation to the

tions or accessions to brinr: it into force. and it is now in force having
secured that number. Thèrefore, according to what is statcd in th;
United States written statenient, we are past the period when this
particular danger arises.
On that point 1 want to Say this. 1 submit that the Court, which is
asked to pronounce on a general question of principle in relation to the
Genocide Convention. namelv. whether uotential as well as actual
parties to that convention <ossess the right of effective objection to
reservations, must begin at the beginning and not iii the middle of
things. \Ve must begin by placing ourselves at the point when the Con-
vention was first opened for signature. 1 submit that at lhatdate. when
none but potential parties existed, those potential parties must have
possessed the right to make objections to any reservations tliat anothcr
State might tlien have purported to make on signing or ratifying.
Otherwise, tliere would have been nothing to prevent any State imme-
diately signing and ratifying subject to some important reservations
expressly rejected during the drawing-up of the Con\,ention.
Now, if 1 am correct in saying that this right inust at least have
existed for the potential parties to the Genocide Convention when that
Conveiition was first drawn up or adopted by the Assernbly, then it
becomes simply a matter of determining how long that right of objec-
tion continiies and how and at what point it is eventiially lost. The
question liecoines one not of the initial existence of the right but of the
extent to ivhich it can be indefinitely maintained. If we can agrce that
what is really invol\.ed in tlie third question addressed to the Court is
not whether the potential parties have a prima faci6 right of objection,
but how long they can continue to have that right if they remain only
potential, and do not become actual parties, 1 thiiik tlie task of the
Court would be greatly simplified.
Before 1 corne to the question of the period, hlr. President, 1.should
like to Say just a little more about the right itself, the initial right of
potential parties to object. 1 suggest that that right miist exist, not STATEMENT BY MT. FITZMAUKICE (u.K.)-14 IV 51 411

only for reasons of principle such as 1 have indicated, but that its
existence is really essential for the orderly conduct of the conclusion of
international conventions. Consider the process of framing such a con-
length, with more or less difficulty, a text is established which embodies
the greatest coinmoii factor of agreement which can he achieved and the
convention is then open for signature. 1 suggest that nt that point it is
essential that there should be some measure of finality and certainty
about the text of the convention, and tliat it should not he immediately
susceptible of alteration hy a process of entering reservations to which
no one can object. It is not difficult to see why it is essential for good
order that this should be so. Having, perhaps after a great deal of
difficulty, framed a convention and established a definite text, States
then wish to reflect on the result, and consider whether they can hecome
parties. They havc constitutional processes to go through, consultations
to carry out, perhaps in distant territories, and legislation to be enacted.
All that takes time, and not only that, it requires the existence of a text
which is a definite and certain text and which is not susceptible to alter-
ation, or to having its balance or effect altered, as il were, in the middle
of the whole process, when States are considering the matter and
endeavounng to carry out their consultations and their constitutional
processes leading to eventnal ratification or accessiori.
Unless there is, so to speak, a "closed period" during which no alter-
ations can be effected in the text of the convention or initsgeneral balance
or effect,1 suggest that the carrying out of the necessary constitutional
processes becomesextremely difficult,and that is the reason why 1 think
the potential parties must be regarded as having the right to object
to any attempt during that period to change the convention. Then, of
countries accomplish the processes necessary preliminary to ratification
or accession. The constitutions of certain countries enable them to .act
very quickly once the government has made up its mind it wishes to
become a party to the convention. \Vith other countries the process is
slow and difficult, and here 1 should again like to Say that 1 could not
Free with the suggestions made that countries which do not, as it were,
immediately and speedily ratify or accede to a convention are in some
wav blameworthv and have onlv themselves to thank ifthev do not have
an; right of obl&ting to reser;ations. 1 do not think thai that takes a
realistic view of the situation that exists after an important international
convention has been drawn up and is opened for signature. These consti-
tutional processes may quite easily, and in many countries do normally,
take a matter of two or three years, and even this is not a long period
when set against the background of a convention intended to last for
decades or indefinitely. If the. position of the slower States-and there
are many of them-is to be protected, or if it is not protected, theyy
well find, by the time they do come to ratify and have completed tlieir
interna1 processes, that they are then confronted by reservations already
made, to which they have not been able to object and which they must
accept or not become parties to the convention.
To my mind no clearer prejudice to the rights of potential parties
could be imagined, and it is a prejudice which can only he avoided if
those States are regarded as endowed with a primafacieright of objec-
tion to any attempted reservations. 1 would therefore ask the Court, STATEXEST Bi'>Ir.FITZY.AURICE (u.K.)-14 IV j1
4'3
some other country wants to make to a convention. Personally 1 thiiik
it is a case ofde minimis no>& curat lex. A situ:ition of that kind is so
extreinely unlikely to occur in practice that the Court need hardly
consider it.
In addition to that. 1 think it will be found tliat if the various stages
of a convention are considered, as to its coming into force, that danger
reallv has no substance. If a new State comes into existence before a
codention comes into force, 1, formy part, see no particular reason
whv it should not have the same rights of obiection as anv other potential
to the convention. If the ëouvention has corne-into focce, then
:iny reservations admitted iip to that time are iii force and no one can
aftermards object to them. States which ratify :ifter the convention
comes into force rnay seek to attach reservations to their application.

'îliose reservations may or may not be objected to. According to my
view, if objected to, they must be withdrawn or the country cannot
ratify. Again, if at ttiat period and at the moment when a ratification
is deposited alter a convention has come into force-that is if a ratifi-
cation with reservations is deposited-and if at that periocl a new State
comes into existence whicli has a right to become a party to the conven-
tion, 1 do not see why it should not have the same right as any other
State to make objection to the reservations. The, fact that yet another
new State may come iiito existence still later is immaterial, because
once a reservation has been admitted it cannot subsequently be objected
to by a State coming into existence at a future date. So apart from the
uiilikelihood of a Stnte putting itself in the position of being the sole
objector, 1 do iiot think that in practice the danger has any reality.

- III

Mr. President, 1 iiow come to the question of duration, and 1 think
we have a clue to the correct principle to be applied in the concluding
words of one of the passages of the Harvard ReseurchT'olirmewhich 1
rluoted earlier, where the Court will remember tliere was a reference
to States "likely to become parties to the treaty", and it was suggested
that reservations ought iiot to be made without the consent of States
which either were parties, or which were likely to become parties to
tlie treaty. 1 fully admit, and indeed 1 put it forward as part of my case.
that not only would it be inequitable that a State which did not intend
or was never likely to become a party to a convention should not be
able indefinitely to block the ratification by other parties-but also
tlie existence of such an unlimited right would also be contrary to the
very bais and principle on which the initial right itself is founded. The
right itself of a potential party to object to a reservation is founded
on the need to protect the right of States to become parties to the
convention in the form in which the convention was originally framed
and drawn uo. The rirrh- of obiection can therefore onlv be used for
that p!rpose:and not merely fo; the purpose of blocking'the participa-
tion of anotber State. Once it is clear that the potentialpartv does not
intend to become an actual party or is unlikely 'todo so, iherë no longer
remains any right to protect, or at any rate the need for protecting
it disappears, and the same would apply where a State had so delayed
its ratification or accession that it could reasonably be regarded as
having lost or renounced its original interest in maiiitaining the text4I4 STATEMENT BY MI'. FITZ.\IACiRICE(u.K.)-14 IV 51
or the effect of the convention in the form in which it was originally
drawn up.
At such a point the right of objection has lost its raison d'étreand its
legal justification, and the State concerned cannot make objections
any longer, or maintain as effective, objections which may have beeii
valid and effective at the time when they were originally put fonvard.
Here 1 think we may profitably recall a test to which Sir Hartley
Shawcross ailuded yesterday, applied by the Haward ResearchVolume.
that preference should be given to the State prepared ta accept the
coiivention as it stands rather than to the State that wishes to alter
its effect by means of reservations. That. of course, assumes that the
objecting State to whom preference is to be given is prepared to accept
the convention, to become a party to it or, at any rate, that has the
possibility of becoming a party under consideration. By a parallel test
we might Say that if the question anses of choosing between a State
not prepared ta accept the convention atail, and a State which isprepared
to accept it, thongh only subject to certain reservations, preference
should go to the latter State, and this test is e ually applied by the
Homard ResearchVolume. 1 quote the following 'rom page 887 :
".... it being necessary in the circumstances to deprive some
possible signatories of the right to object ta reservations, it may
properly be done witli respect to States which are even more dilatory
about signing thetreaty than thestatewhich makesthe reservation".

that a potential party shouldrsimmediatdy be deprived of the right tong
make an effective objection to a reservation. Here we reach the question
of the moment at which it can reasonably be said that the initial right
of objection to reservations can no longer be maintained by a State
which is still only a potential party to the convention. Clearly, if this
right is to have substance, and be something more than nominal, and
is to serve the purpose for which it exists, it must endure for some time,
at least for a snfficiently long time to give the States conceriied time
to complete the constitutional processes of ratification and accession.
Tlierefore the actual period can really only be determined in relation
to the circumstances of the case and there may be a number of factors
to be taken into account besides the actual length of time involved,
such as the attitude of the State concerned. Sometimes States make
itclear that they have no intention of becoming parties to a convention,
aiicl then there is the nature and de~ree of complication of a State's
coiistitutionalDrocesses. the nature of the coiivention and so forth. So
far as the Genocide ~on;ention is concerned, bearing in mind that three
or four years is not in any way an uncommon period forStates to require
before deciding to ratify or accede to major conventions, and that the
Geriocide Conventioii itself only came into force a few weeks ago, and
that even now some twenty to thirty States out of a possible seventy
or more are parties to it,1would have said that the period witbin which
valid and effective objections to reservations can be made by potential
parties cannot yet be regarded as exhausted.
very pertinent question, and he posed this difficulty. He said, admitting
that the matter can be dealt with on the basis that there is an initial
right of objection but that that right does not last indefinitely, how are41~ STATEAIEST BY blK. FITL>lAURICE (u.K.)-14 IV 51
actual party-it prcrreiits the reserving State from becoming a Party
unless it withdraws its reservations ; but that the riglit of a potential

party tu offer or niaintain a valid and effective objection to areservation
is lost when it becomes clear either that the uhjecting State does iiot
intcnd to become n pnrty, or that its participation scems likely tu br
unduly or indefinitely delaycd.

'Thank you, JIr. President. 5. ExrosÉ DE M. CHARLES ROUSSEAU

(REPRÉSENTANT DU GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS)

AUX SÉANCES PUBLIQUES DU 14 AVRIL 1951

[Séaucepublique du 14 avril 1951.~natin]

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Membres de la Cour,

La Cour est appelée à se prononcer sur la validité des réserves aux-
quelles certains fitats ont subordonné, les uns leur signature à la Conven-
tion pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, lesautres
le dépôt de leur instrument de ratification ou d'adhésion à cette conven-
tion
Le' gouvernement que j'ai l'honneur de représenter ici est heureux
que la Cour soit amenée à donner un avis consultatif devant lequel, je
n'ai pas besoin de le dire, ce gouvernement, pour sa part, s'inclinera
sans aucune peiiie.

Avant d'entrer dans l'examen au foiid du problème qui se pose à la
Cour. je crois qu'il ne sera pas inutile d'en circonscrire exactement
i'objet puisque, dans certains exposés écrits qui ont étéprésentésà la
Cour, des divergences se sont fait jour sur ce point.
1.- Une délimitation du problème me semble devoir étre faite à

un double point de vue : d'abord sur le point de la compétence mêmeet
ensuite en ce qui concerne la question de fond qui est présentée la
Cour.
A. - En cc qui concerne la compétence de la Cour, celle-ci a été
contesttie dans les exposésécrits présentéspar certains gouvernemeiits :
notamment par la Pologne, la Roumanie et les Philippines.

A vrai dire, on discerne assez mal pourquoi cet effort a ététenté, car
la Cour n'est appeléeauiourd'hui qu'à émettre un avis consultatif dans
iii[xublénieqt;i: i tiucur; rlt.gri.,iici>rcsentc iin ;isprct coiirt:iiticus. C<:tt,:
coriildteiice consiilt:~tiv~ s't.s~rce C\.i<Ic:rnmr I:iiIc.cr,ii<lirionqui
ont <,téfis;és t;iiit inr I:Ii:Il;ilrjS:~rioiis I.'iii<.sriuc Ii:Statut il,?
la Cour, et le fondement de cette compétence ne'noÙs semble guère
soulever de difficultés.
Présentée en termes généraux par le Gouvernement polonais, cette
tlièse aété exposée d'une manière pliis détailléedans l'exposéécrit de
la République des Philippines.
J'aurai peu à dire sur l'argumentation préseiitéepar le Gouvernemeiit
des Philippines dans l'exposéécritqu'il a déposéau Greffeil y a quelques
mois. Ce gouvernement estime en effet que la Cour devrait se refuser ii
émettre l'avis qui lui est demandé parce qu'en réalité la question qiii

est poséesous les numéros 1 et II de la Résolution de l'Assembléegént-
rale du 16novembre 1950 serait en liaison directe avec le point principal
d'un différend concret qui opposerait ce gouvernement à un autre
gouvernement partie à la convention, en l'espèce le Gouvernement
australien.418 oxrosÉ DI: al. ROUSSEAU (FRANCE) - 14 IV 51
Ici encore, il semble bien qu'il y ait abus de qualification. Le prétendu
différendqui existerait ainsi entre deux Etats parties à la convention :
les Philippines et l'Australie, résulte simplement, rien de moins et rien
de plus, d'une divergence de vues qui s'est produite entre ces deux
Etats relativement aux réserves formuléespar l'un d'eux, en l'espèce
le Gouvernement des Philippines. Ces réserves, le Gouvernement des
Philippines les a énoncéesquand il a déposéson instrument de ratifi-
cation, le 6 juillet 1950.
Quelques mois plus tard, le 15 novembre 1950, le Gouvernement
australien avisait le Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies que, pour sa
part, il ne considérait pas comme valide une ratification accomplie dans
ces conditions et,à son tour, le 15 décembre1950, le Gouveoement des
Philippines informait le Secrétaire général desNations Unies qu'il ne
reconnaissait pas la' validité des objections ainsi énoncéespar le Gou-
vernement australien.
Je n'examinerai pas ici s'il suffit que deux États soient en désaccord
sur un point de fait ou de droit pour que cette situation soit qualifiéede
«différend ».Sans doute la Cour permanente de Justice internationale a
répondu affirmativement à cette question dans son premier arrêt sur
la compétence rendu le 30 août 1924, dans l'affaire Mavrontmatis, à la
page II de l'arrêt. Mais encore faut-il, semble-t-il, que ce,différendse
traduise sur le plan juridictionnel par une prise de position qui nous
parait, en l'espèce, fairedéfaut.Je sais bien que, pour sa part, le Gouver-
nement des Philippines s'est cdéclaréprét u,suivant ses propres termes,
à soumettre l'affaireà la Cour. Mais se déclarer prêt à porter une affaire
devant la Cour et l'y porter effectivement sont deux choses différentes.
Par ailleurs, si I'on devait admettre l'argumentation des Philippines,
ce n'est pas un diffbreiid unique que la Cour aurait àrésoudre,mais une
trentaine ou une quarantaine de différends analogues :en effet il y a
déjà huit Etats au moins qui ont fait des réserveslorsqu'ils ont adhéré
ou ratifiéla convention ; il y en a au moins cinq autres qui n'ont pas
vuscrit à ces réserves. SiI'on admet qu'il existe un différendentre tout
Etat qui a formulé des réserves à la convention et tout Etat qui a pré-
sentédes objections à ces réserves,ce n'est pas un seul mais une infinité
de différendsque la Cour aurait devant elle. Enoncer une telle consé-
quence suffit à juger le système dont elle s'inspire.
Pour nous, nous constatons que la Cour est saisie d'une demande
d'avis, dans les conditions habituelles, par une résolutionde l'Assemblée
générale des Nations Uniesen date du 16 novembre 19jo. Cette résolu-
tion pose, en termes généraux, un certain nombre de questions dont
aucune ne permet de supposer qu'elle se réfère à un litige néet actuel
entre deux Etats parties à la convention. Nous nous en tiendrons donc
au texte de la requêtede l'Assemblée,laquelle ouvre une procédure qui
est consultative - et qui n'est que consultative - tant <ans la forme
que dans le fond. Au surplus, et s'il était vraiment nécessairede justifier
la compétencede la Cour, il serait facile de le faire. II suffirait pour cela
de faire appel à la jurisprudence de la Cour elle-même. Je neveux pas
infligerà la Cour une longue énumération. Qu'il me soit permisseulement
de rappeler le passage suivant de son avis consultatif du 30 mars 1950
concernant l'interprétation des traités de paix conclus ayec la Bulgarie,
la Hongrie et la Roumanie: n Le consentement des Etats parties à
un différendest le fondement de la juridiction de la Cour en matière
contentieuse. II en est autrement en matière d'avis, alors mitme que la EXPOSE DE hl. ROUSSEAU (FRASCE) - 14 1V 51 49

demande d'avis a trait à une question juridique actuellement pendànte
entre États. » (P. 71. )e considère comme close la controverse sur ce
point.

B. - Une seconde objection a été,il est vrai, présentéepar le Gouver-
nement polonais, qui a reproché à la procédure adoptée en l'espèce
par l'Assembl6e des Nations Unies, dc constituer ce qu'il appelle eune
tentative inadmissible » en vue de reviser la Convention sur le génocide.
Je me perniets de lire le passage suivant de l'exposéécrit présentépar
ce gouveriiement :

n Le Gouvernement de la Pologne désire souligner que, confor-
mément aux principes du droit international, la référence à un
organe international quelconque de questions néesde conventions
constitue une tentative inadmissible de reviser ces conventions
si celles-ci iic prévoient pas la compétence de ces organes inter-
nationaux. ii

On pourrait déjà observer que lu Cour internationale de Justice n'a
pas le pouvoir de reviser les traités et que certainement la résolution
de i'Assemblke généralene le lui attribue pas en l'espbce.
Si l'on va au fond des choses, on s'aperçoit que les critiques formulées
par le Gouvcrnement polonais semblent maiiquer de pertinence. De
quoi, en effet, s'agit-il en l'espècea question posée à la Cour consiste
à déterminer la portde juridique des réserves énoncéespar certaiiies
parties à la Conventioii sur le génocide dès lors que d'autres Etats ont
fait des objections à ces réserves. Au sens matériel, intrinsèque du mot,
ce n'est certainement pas là une question « née de la convention o.Le
problème qui se pose à la Cour n'est pas d'apprécier le contenu de la
convention, mais d'apprécier l'attitude de certains États relativement
à cette convention. II ne serait mêmepas difficile de soutenir que, une
réserve constituant par définition une modalité extérieure à la conven-

tion à laquelle elle s'applique, la question dont la Cour est saisie est
précisémentune question extérieure à la convention h l'égardde laquelle
l'argumentation dbveloppée par le Gouvernement polonais reste
inopérante.
Kons croyons ainsi avoir justifié la compétence de la Cour.

II.- II reste maintenant à opérer une deuxième délimitation en ce
qui concerne le fond mêmedu problème qiie celle-ci a à examiner.
De quoi, en efiet, la Cour est-elle saisie ? II s'agit uniquement pour
eue de répondre à une demande d'avis consultatif, qui lui est adressée
par l'Assembléegénéralede l'organisation des Xations Unies et qui est
relative aux effets juridiques des réserves énoncéespar certains Etats
lors de la signature, de la ratification ou de l'acceptation de la Conven-
tion sur le génocide, lorsque ces réserves ont fait l'objet d'objections
de la part d'antres parties à la convention.
Le problème est ainsi parfaitement délimité. La Cour n'a pas du tout
à se prononcer sur le problème généralde l'admissibilité des réserves
dans les traites multilatéraux et. d'autre vart - c'est un voint oui
mérite d'êtreindiqué, au moins brièvement -, le problème ne se p8se

que dans la mesure où il y a véritablement réserve au sens technique
du mot.
C'est uniquement sur ce terrain limité qu'entend se placer le Gouver
nement français. Les observations que je serai amené à présenter en son nom n'ont
trait qu'au seul problème des réserves énoncéesrelativement i la
Corivention sur le crime de génocide. et elles ne sauraient uréiuAer ,-
la position que ce gouvernëment pourrait fitre appelé à prendre sur
le problème général de l'admission des réserves dans les conventions
miiltilatérales.
Le ~roblème se Dose tout d'abord uniouement en fonction de la
~orlve&ion sir le g'ériocide.Reste donc en'tièrement liors des débats
devant la Cour le problème généralde l'admissibilité des réserves dans
les traités multil~téraux lorsque ces traités ne contiennent aucune
disposition B cet égard. C'est Ih uri problème d'ordre généralet théorique
qui est du ressort de la Commission du droit international des Natioris

Unies, dont la solution pourra éventuellement Ctre affectée par l'avis
consultatif que la Cour est appelée à émettre, mais c'est là un problème
aui doit rester complètement en dehors de nos préoccu~ations.
' S'agissant du cai particulier de la convention sur la prévention et
la répression du crime de génocide,le problème ne se pose, d'autre part,
que dans la seule mesure où ilv a techniauement rrhierve u.c'est-&dire
dans la mesure où nous nous trouvons' en présence d'uni limitation
unilatérale, de la part d'un État, des obligations énoncées dans cette
convciition.
Cette interprétatioii est d'ailleurs conforme i l'opinion comniune
touchant la définitiori des réserves.
Sans abuser des citations, et sans vouloir fatiguer la Cour, à cet égard,
il me suffira de prendre les définitionsbien souvent citées et qui figurent
dans le Haniard Research il& Ii>lernational Law. Xous y lisons que s la

réserve est une déclaration formelle par laquelle un État, lors de la
signature d'un traité, de sa ratification ou de son adhésion, stipule,
comme conditions de son consentement i devenir partie au traité,
certaines conditions qui limitent l'effet du trait6 dans la mesure où ce
traité s'applique aux' relations entre cet État et l'autre ou les airtres
Gtats qui peuvent &tre parties au traité D.
1.e commentaire détaillé qui accompagne cette définition est encore
plus explicite. 11précise, en eiiet, que :

n la phrase cclimitent l'effet» implique une diminution ou une
restriction des conséquences qui découleraielit ordinairement <III
rapport juridique institué par le traité s'il n'yavait pas de réserve ».

Le problème est, je crois. ainsi parfaitement défini. On iie peut
certainement pas ualifier de i<réserves i)les déclarations unilatérales
par lesquelles un Itat précise le sens qu'il convient de donner selon
lui à telle ou telle dis~osition du traité ou la nortée des oblieations issues
de celui-ci, dès lors,&ore une fois, que ce; effort d'interprétation n'a
pas pour objet de restreindre la portée des obligati-ns conventionnelles
assumées par cet État.
De ce de vue, je laisserai de c6tél'examen de la portée i attribuer
à la réserve faite à l'articleXII de la convention par certains Etats -
en l'esp6ce sept sur huit - réserve qui n'en est pis véritablement une.
L'article XII de la Converition sur le g6nocide est en effet rin article

qui limite l'application géographique de cette convention :.
«Toute partie contractante pourra 21tout moment, par notifi-
cation adressée au Secrétaire généralde l'organisation des Nations EXPOSE DE hl. ROUSSEAU (FRAXCE) - 14 1\' j1 421
Unies, étendre l'application de la présente convention à tous les

territoires ou à l'un quclconque des territoires dont elle dirige les
relations extérieures. ,,

Peut-on viaiment parler de CIréserves n en la circonstance. lorsqu'un
l?tat annonce ainsi, comme certains l'ont fait, qu'il n'accepte pas cette
<lisposition du traité ? Cc qui est qualifié ici de réserve constitue en
réalité uneffort pour étendre les obligations des autres CO-contractants.
Cela n'est donc vas une réserve mais se vrésenterait vlutôt comme un
:iint:ii(Icmciir in<lirci:tà In coiivtiiiinn cl cela cii cdclIUIIILrC:IL:rcncc
à la jctilc ~~ruc<<liirixL:cpiirktc~~iv~ntiorip011r il prnprc revi-ion, fell~
iiu'elli: rit ~1;iiic:tiirL:\,iicinr 1':~rticlçS\'I (le çcllc-ci.
' C'est bien plutôt &ans ceGe hypothèse et si une telle réserve devait
êtreadmise qu'il serait légitime alors de parler d'une irrevision» de la
convention comme certains l'ont fait à tort quand ils ont cherché à
qualifier par cette expression singulière le libelléde la demande d'avis
consultatif.

[Séaitce @nbliqiredi6 14 avril 1951. après-inidg

Le problème qui se pose devant la Cour est iin problème d'ordre
juridique international concernant une convcntiori multilatérale déter-
minée - la Convention sur le génocide -, converition élaboréeelle-
mèine par un organe détermin6 : les Nations Uiiies. C'est donc, iue
semble-t-il, dans une triple direction qu'il convient de rechercher 1:i
solution du problème en examen. D'une part, il conviendra de s'attacher
aux principes générauxdu droit international concernant la conclusion
des traités ; il importera également de dégager la pratique suivie en la
matière par les Xations Unies ; enfin il y aura lieu de ne pas perdre de
vue que la Convention sur le génocideest un type particulier de conven-
tion qui a son caractère propre. C'est sur cette base que j'envisagerai,

dans un premier développement, la réponse aux deux premières ques-
tions poséesà la Cour qui, liéesdans l'énoncéde la demande d'avis, le
sont écalement dans la réi~onscà fournir: . .e consacrerai un second
dïvclo~pcment à éJucider ia troisième question posée à la Cour: la
détermination des Mats ayant qualité pour adresser éventuellement des
objections aux auteurs di réseks. :

III.- Demandons tout d'abord quel va ètre l'effet juridique des
objections aux réserves. Sur ce point il y a des considérations au-quelles
oii doit tout d'abord nécessaireinent faire appel, ce sont celles qui soiit
tirees du droit international des traités. Je ne les examinerai pas très
longuement, car elles ont déjà étéprésentées à diverses reprises devant
la Cour. On ne peut cependant en faire entièrement abstraction car
certaines de ces données déterminent directement le r&glement du pro-
blhc eri cause. Si Von se place sur le terrain des principes, il semble que
la solution du problème soit commandée par deux considérations décisi-

ves touchant l'une A la nécessitéde consentement des parties contrac-
tantes pour que les réserves soient opérantes, l'autre aux formes et aux
inoclalitésque doit revêtirce consentement. Je demanderai à la Cour la
permission d'insister quelque peu sur ce dernier point, qui intéresse
particulièrement le Gouvernemeiit français.
28422 EXPOSÉ DE >I.ROUSSEAU (FRASCE) - 14 IV 51

A. - Il convient de rappeler tout d'abord que les réserves à uii
traité n'ont de validité juridique que si elles sont acceptées par les
autres parties contractantes. Comme Rivier l'a dégagé jadis dans une
analyse devenue classique, la présentation d'une réserve s'analyse
comme le rejet du traité ou d'une clause du traité accompagné d'une
offre nouvelle de négocier. Si l'offre est acceptée par l'autre partie
contractante, le traité se reconstitue dans des conditions nouvelles; mais
si l'offre est rejetée par la partie contractante, l'accord de volontésn'est
pas réaliséet le traité n'est pas conclu, moins que la partie auteur de

l'offre ne renonce à la réserve. La validité juridique du traité est ainsi
subordonnée au consentement ou, si l'on préfère,à l'acceptation de la
rart~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~'arties contractantes.
Ce point de vue est affirméd'une façon très géiiéralepar la doctrine.
II serait inutile et fastidieux de multi~lier les citations. Teine bornerai à
rappeler trois opinions récentes et importantes qui présentent ce trait
commun qu'elles sont collectives et résultent d'études attentives sur le
problème. Je citerai tout d'abord le rapport présentéle 15 juin 19'27nu
Cmseil de la Sociétédes Nations par le Comitéd'experts pour la coclifi-
cation progressive du droit international (Jozrrnirloficielde la Société
des Nations, 1927 ,p. 880-882). Dans ce rapport on trouve l'affirmation

suivante :

c Pour qu'il puisse êtrevalablement fait iine réserve quelconque
sur telle ou telle clause du traité, il est iii<lispensable que cette
réserve soit acceptée par tous les contractants, comme elle l'eiit
étési elle avait étéexprimée au coiirs de la ri&gocintion.Siriori. la
réserve, comme la signature elle-mémcsubordonnée cette réservï,
est sans valeur. »

Cette opinion est confirméedans le projet de convention sur le droit
des traités, élaboréen 1935 par la Research in Z$~lcr~zaliona Llaw de
Harvard, et auquel on s'est souvent référé devant cette Cour. Ce projet
dispose, dans ses articles 14 et rj, qu'un État ne peut valablement
formuler une réserve une convention qu'avec le consentement de tous

les États signataires de la convention. II existe enfin un précédent plus
récent : nous le trouvons dans le commentaire adopté l'an dernier par
la Commission de droit international des Nations Unies après étude du
urofesseur Brierlv sur les traités:la ulupart des membres de la commis-
Sionont accepté,'comme allant de soi; sq'u'uneréservedoit êtreacceptée,
à tout le moins par les parties, pour pouvoir prendre effet r.
Il serait supe?flo d'ajouter dbutrei esempies.
En ce qui concerne la pratique internationale, je nie bornerai à rap-
peler un précédentcélèbre.Au moment de l'élaboration du Traité de
Versailles, leG mai 1919, la délégationchinoise avisa officiellement la
Conférence de la paix qu'elle avait l'intention de formuler une réserve
aux articles 1515 1j8 relatifs au Chantoung. Le 26 mai suivant, le
Secrétaire général dela conférence iiiforma la délégatioiichinoise que sa

réserve ne serait pas acceptée. La délégationchinoise insista en modi-
fiant le texte de sa réserve et en proposant de l'introduire dans une
annexe au traité. Le 24 juin, le Secrétaire généralinforma la délégation
chinoise (iu'il était im~ossibie d'accci>tcr une siennture donnée dans ces
conditions. En raisonde l'oppositio~ manifest& contre ses réserves, la
délégationchinoise s'abstint de signer le Traité de Versailles. EXPOSÉ DE LI.ROUSSEAU (FRANCE) - 14 IV 51
423
B. - Iln l>rohlenie<liffércntc.it Ic point <les;i\.uir scliicllforinc et
sui\.;iiit iiuellc..;niod;ilitc:scc cuiisciitrincntCiretexr>riiiii. I.'i:x;iiiieii
de la pâtique nous révèlesur ce point que le consentement peut être
donné tantôt sous une forme expresse, tantôt sous une forme tacite.
Quelquefois, les réserves sont acceptées par une déclaration expresse ;
narfois aussi cette accentation découledu fait oue les autres contrac-
'tautssignent sans objeciion i'acte de dépôtdes ratifications dans lequel
la réserveest mentionnée :enfin, dans de nombreux cas, le silence ~ardé
d'une façon persistante par les autres parties vaudra acceptation des
réserves.
C'est un problème dont la solution offre un intbrêtdirect pour l'esp6ce
soumise à la Cour, puisque celle-ci a à se prononcer sur le régimejuri-
clique des objections faites aux réserves. Encore que l'énonciation de
ces objections ne soit pas astreinte à des formes sacramentelles. 1'Etat
<luiformule des réservesest en droit de s'attendre à ce aue les obiec-
fions éventuelles à ses propres réservessoient présentéesdans une foime
non équivoque. La seule difficultéconsiste à déterminer si le silence
oersistànt eârdé à cet éeard var un État oartie à la convention. au mo-
ment du dépôt d'instrcmenis d'adhésion'oude ratification imbliquant
une réserve,doit êtreassimilé à une absence d'obiections. Ce problème
n'est pas seulement un problèmethéorique,il a surgi àdifférentesreprises
au cours de la phase préliminaire précédant l'entrée en vigueur de la
Convention sur le génocide ;il serait d'un grand intérêtjuridique pour
les États «objecteurs », s'il m'est permis d'employer ce néologisme,
d'êtrefixésexactement sur l'étenduedes devoirs qui leur incombent dans
cetordre d'idées.
Si nous examinons, en effet, certaines des réponses présentéesau
Secrétaire généraldes Nations Unies par les Etats signataires de la
Convention sur le génocide,nous constatons que dans cet ordre d'idées
<idéfautd'objections Bn'est pas nécessairementsynonymed'approbation,
mêmetacite ; cette situation peut, dans certains cas-limites, recouvrir
un désaccord véritable, voire mémeune désapprobation catégoriquede
certaines réserves formuléesantérieurement.
Tel est le cas, par exemple, en ce qui concerne l'Équateur. Le IOfévrier
~gjo, ce Gouvernement notifiait aux Nations Unies qu'il n'avait pas
d'objections aux réservesérioncéesantérieurement par certains Etats ;
le 31 mars suivant, il exprimait sa désapprobation. Quant au Salvador,
il notifie, 28 septembre 1950,qu'il ne fait pas d'objections aux réserves.
Par une lettre du 6 octobre 1950, le Secrétaire généralinterprète cette
formule comme une acceptation des réserves ; le 27 octobre 1950, le
Salvador déclare qu'il nepeut partagercette manièrede voir. C'est égale-
ment le cas du Gouvernement de la République française, autorisé par
la loi du ICIaoût 1950 à ratifier la Convention sur le génocide;I'instru-
ment de ratification est transmis par lui aux Nations Unies le 26 septem-
bre 1950. Quelques jours plus tard, le 14 octobre 1950, le dépôtde cet
iiistrumeut est effectui. sans observations de la part du Gouvernement
français. Dans ces conditions, le Secrétaire général desNations Unies
adresse au Gouvernement français, le 15 août 1950, uncllettre où figure
le passage suivant :

c Le dé~ôt Dar votre Gouvernement de l'instrument de ratifi-
cation ayant 'été effectué sans aucune observation relative aux
réserves ci-dessusmentionnées, le Secrétaire général comprend que
votre Gouvernement accepte ces réserves. i, EXPOSE DE M. ROUSSEAU (FRANCE) - 14 IV 51
424
Cette interprétation a étécontestée par le Gouvernement français
dans sa lettre du 6 décembre 19j0, dont je me permets de rappeler les
termes :

CrT'ail'honneur de vous rappeler que la thèse du Gouvernement
fraGçais, longuement expos'éèpar'son représentant devant la
Sixième Commission de l'Assembléegénéraledes Nations Unies
et dont vos services ont certainement eu connaissance, est que les
réserves formuléespar un Etat lors de la signature ou de la ratifi-
cation d'une convention ou de son adhésion à celle-cine sont oppo-
sables à une partie contractante au'après avoir fait I'obiet d'un
accord formeI.de sa part. L'absence d.'observations du Gouverne-
ment français ne saurait donc, dans le cas présent,êtreconsidérée
comme une acceptation desdites réserves. a
Nous trouvons uii processus analogue dans l'examen des réponses
adressées au Secrétaire générald , 'une part, par le Vietnam, le II août
et le 3 novembre 1950, d'autre part, par le Cambodge, le 14octobre et le
6 décembre 10,..
Coiiinient ris.iii<lriiiitel l>iohl;nit; l<;iiicrik IJnit~u'il suit ~>usiiblc
<Ir.le tr;iiiclicr p:(Icifurmulrs iipriori, riaiis unsens oit<I;~iis II:iiitr;
il n'est pas paisible. pour des raisons pratiques, d'adopter ici un critère
trop rigide. C'est dans l'examen de chaque cas d'espèce qu'ilconviendra
de rechercher les élémentsd'une solution appropriée. Ce problème ne
paraît d'ailleurs pas s'êtreposédans la pratique antérieure, problable-
ment parce qu'on a interprétéen pareil cas le silence comme une accepta-
tion tacite des réserves.
Le problème a été cependantsoulevé à deux reprises aux Etats-unis,
iiotamment lors des réserves formuléesau moment de la discussion du
Traitéde Versailles en 1919,et dix ans plus tard. en 1929.au moment du
vote par le Sénataméricainde dispositions interprétant le PacJe général
de renonciation à la guerre. L'idée sembles'êtrefait jour aux Etats-Unis
qu'une distinction était possible entre les réserves au sens technique
du mot - dis~ositions limitant les effets du traité - et les clauses
pureincnt inrcrpr<'t:itivéspar 1viqii~~ll~ itr: lurtic indiqiic <~iieblens <:II<-
rloiinc ;,tcllcuu 1i:llc<Iij~u~siliodu traité Iltins I:I~>rc.riiit?Irie?potlit!sr,
l'acceptation des ré~ervesproprement dites serait subordonnéeaüconsen-
tement exprèsdes Etats contractants ;au contraire, pour lesclauses inter-
prétatives, le consentement tacite suffirait. Cette interprétation a été
présentéenotamment dans une lettre de hl.Charles Evans Hughes au
sénateur Hale, le 24juillet 1919,et dans l'exposéprésentépar le sénateur
Lodge, le 19août 1919 Un point de vue aiialogue s'est expriméau cours
des discussions engagéesdevant le Sénat américain à propos du Pacte
Briand-Kellogg, et plus précisémenten ce qui concerne le sens à attribuer
au rapport interprétatif présenté le ~j janvier 1929 au Séiiat par le
s6iiateur Borah au nom de la Commissiondes Affairesétrangères. Certains
sénateurs, comme le sénateur Swanson, avaient en effet envisagél'idée
d'une acceptation tacite de ce rapport par les autres Etats parties au
l'acte Kellogg. ..
On peut néanmoinsse demander si cette distinction ingénieuseoffre
une base solide de solution. Car de deux choses l'une :ou bien la disposi-
tion en face de laquelle oii se trouve constitue véritablement une réserve
au sens technique du mot - auquel cas le consentement des autres
signataires est juridiquement nécessaire, qu'il soit donné d'une façon expresse ou tacite - ou bien elle est une clause interprétative et dbs
lors sa validité n'est subordonnée à aucune acceptation - fût-ce mcme
tacite- de la part des autres Etats intéressés.
L'application des principes générauxsur la portée du silence en droit
international conduirait à décider qu'il dépend des seuls signataires
d'empkher, s'ils le désirent, que la réserve n'acquièrevalidité : s'ils
ne le font Das. c'est à eux. semble-t-il. au'il conviendrait d'imnuter les
conséquenceshridiques deieur inaction. Ôn peut se demander cipendant
si, dans le cas de la convention qui nous intéresse, cette solution stricte
n'est pas trop rigoureuse. 12'attiiudc adoptée par certains Gtats sigii;r-
taires de la Convention sur le génocidemontre qu'un certain libéralisme
s'impose dans l'appréciation du défaut d'objections. Au surplus, mhe
les gouvernements, comme par exemple le Gouvernement du Royaume-
Uni, qui assimilent en principe le défaut d'objections à une acceptatiori
tacite des réservesadmettent qu'il n'en est ainsi que cdans certains cas D.
Ce qui est décisifdans ce domaine, c'est la volonté de l'État ; dès lors
que cette volonté s'exprime d'une manière claire et dépourvue d'ambi-
guïté,elles'impose à l'autorité,étatique ou inter-étatique, dépositairedu
traité et chargéede recevoir conime telle les instruments de ratification
et d'adhésion.
Sur ce point, le Gouvernement français s'est volontairement abstenu
d'adopter une attitude trop catégorique.Dans la réponsequ'il a adressée,
le 6 décembre 19jo. au Secrétaire généraldes Xations Unies, il a bien
marqué que la position qu'il adopte, il ne l'adopte qu'envers la conven-
tion en cause, et qu'il conserve à cet égard une position d'attente. II
s'est exprimé comme suit :
Le Gouvernement de la itépublique française ne pourrait
éverituellement modifier son point de vue en ce qui concerne la
validité des réserves aux traités multilatéraux qu'après que se
seront prononcées, conformément à la résolutioiide l'Assembléedu
16 novembre 19j0, la Cour internationale de Justice et la Commis-
sion du droit international. »

C'est là une position qui, encore une fois, n'est pas rigide et qui pourra
étremodifiéedans l'avenir. Ce seront, d'une part, l'avis consultatif que
la Cour est appelée à émettre et, d'autre part, les résolutionsqui seront
éventuellement proposéespar la Commission du droit international (lui
détermineront la portée exacte à attribuer sur ce point au silence de
1'Etat signataire d'un traité multilatéral appelé à se prononcer sur les
réservesénoncéesDar d'autres États ~artiesà ce traité.
La Convention ;ur la prévention et la répressiondu crime de génocide
ayant étéélaboréepar l'Assembléegénéraledes Xations Unies, il est
naturel. uour résoudre levrobièmeaui est vosédevant la Cour. aue nous
nous toûrnions maintenânt vers lâ pratique suivie en la madère par
l'organisation des Nations Unies.
Cette pratique a étéexposéeavec beaucoup de précisionet de perti-
nence aussi bien dans l'exposéécrit du Secrétaire généraldes Nations
Unies que dans l'exposé oral du représentant du Secrétaire général
devant ia Cour.
Il me suffira de retenir que cette pratique confirme les principes géné-
raux du droit international en la matière. Elle admet que, lorsqu'une
convention multilatérale élaboréepar les Nations Unies ne contient
aucune clause particulière sur les réserves, l'usage est que, dans ses426 EXPOSE DE M. KOUSSEAU (FRANCE) - 14 IV 51
fonctions de dépositaire des instruments de ratification ou d'accession,

le Secrétaire généralse conforme au vrinci~e.ré-éralsuivant lequel une
ri.ser\.c nc ]>éiitCire vnlnbleineiit ;i;c~l,t;c que lurs<lu'rllCnc ~oul>\~c
aiirunc objectioii il<:la p;irt des ;iiis rnts signat:iirrs
I.'nccei>tntioii de cci I?t;its est donntc iuit de f:icon cxi3rcsse soit de
façon tacite. Ce système pourrait évidemment avoir un ;nconvénient,
car il risquerait de laisser peser une incertitude prolongéesur le sort de
la convention. En général,-on a paré à cet inconvénient en laissant aux
parties contractantes un court délaipour prendre une décision. Lorsque
la conventioii est en vigueur, ce délai est conçu comme un délai R raison-
nable n ;lorsqu'elle ne l'est pas, c'est en généralla date d'entréeen vigueur
qui marque l'expiration de la période dans laquelle les États doivent
avoir accepté ou refuséles réserves.
C'est cette procédure qui a étéappliquée; par exemple, en ce qui
concerne les réserves exprimées par certains Etats comme la Nouvelle-
Zélande et la France lors de leur accession à la Convention sur les privi-
lèeeset immunités des Nations Unies.

'?:'?sr,;galement cdtc procC<lurcqui :L;.ici :~[>l>licp~'11Ic~ r<scr\.cs
formul~cs 11;irles I'-tnti-l:nij lurs (Ir leu! acccpt:irioii1.Constitutioii
dc I'0rtr:iiiisntloii intcrn:itiijiiale iles"I\'etude crlle de I'Ora-nisn-
tion mondiale de la SantE.
Ce systeme a également étésuivi pour les réserves formulées pir la
Rhodésie et l'union sud-africaine lors de leur accevtation du Protocole
de La Havane du 24 mars 1948, modifiant certiines dispositions de
l'Accord généralsur les tarifs et le commerce.
Cette pratique des Nations Unies n'est que l'expression particul,ière
- en somme, l'application à un milieu donné qui est celui des Nations
Unies - de la pratique généralequi s'appliquait antérieurement et qiii
correspond au principe suivant : pas de réserveyalable sans acceptation,
soit expresse soit tacite, de la part des autres Etats parties au traité.
A ce titre, cette pratique apporte une confirmation intéressante à

la règle d'après laquelle le désaccord d'un seul ne peut pas modifier ce
qui a été btabli par le consentement de plusieurs.
II convient maintenant de faire applicatioii de ces données génér?les
à Ia coiivention ~articulière aui est en cause auiourd'hui : la Coiivention
sur la préventioi et la répre;sion du crime de génocide. Y a-t-il quelque
raison de s'écarter,s'a~issant de cette convention,des princip-s g~néraux
auxquels je viens deme référer?
Je ne le pense pas, mais il faut reconnaître que la thèse inverse a
été soutenue et développ6e. d'ailleurs avec beaucoup d'ingéiiiosité,
notamment dails certains exposés écrits. C'sst notamment en, cc sens
que s'est prononcé le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis, qui estime que
l'objet propre de la Convention sur le génocide commande en I'espècc
une solutioii différente.
Je me permets. à cet égar?, de citer le passage ci-après de l'exposé
écrit du Gouvernement des 1Stats-Unis :

KL'acceptation généralede la convention et la ferme reconnais-

sance de celle-ci, cn tant que règle de droit universelle, constitueiit
un objectif qui dépasse de loin toutes les considérations subtiles
visant l'opportunité de décourager des réserves peu désirables,
mais dont les conséquences néanmoins ne sont pas fatales. Icj, en
fait, nous nous trouvons en présence d'une convention destinée, dc I':,r ion c;ir:icti'q rscjiiol>jct: cleiiieiirer nii-clesi(lupoi!w~ir.

pour Ics 13t:itsiiicliviiliirls, clesclurc In particip~tiuii (l':iutres Ct:its.
m;inc si siirtt! pnrticipntion peiit p:tr:iirrej.ccrt:iiiis pcii jiirlicieuse-
ment conditionnée. n

Voilà, par conséquent, un point de vue catégorique. On peut néan-
moins sedemander si un examen attentif de la convention ne mènerait
pas à une conclusion différente.
La convention dont il s'agit est une convention multilatérale élaborée
par l'organisation des Nations Unies et qui se propose un objet bien
déterminé. Elle vise à assurer l'unité de la qualification et de la répression
d'un crime ciparticulièrement odieux » - je cite le préambule - le

crime de génocide. C'est un u crime du droit des gens - déclare encore
le préambule - en contradiction avec l'esprit et les fins des Nations
Unies et que le monde civilisé condamne in,IIcrime que les parties
contractantes - dit l'article premier - s'engagent à prévenir et à
punir n.
II peut évidemment sembler désirable - et je ne m'inscrirai pas du
tout en faux contre ce souhait - qu'une telle convention recueille
l'assentiment du plus grand,nombre possible d'Etats ; mais il n'est
pas moins désirable que les Etats signataires ne portent pas atteinte,
en multi~liant leurs réserves. à l'unité de la réaleinentation iuridiciue

que la ~Ônveiitioii a eu pour but d'énoncer. ~Gst cependani à ce'tte
conséquence qu'on aboutirait nécessairement si les réserves devaient
êtreGceptéeCmalgré les objections qui pourraient leur étre opposées.
Je n'ai pas à examiner ici les mérites propres des différentes réserves
qui ont étéénoncées.mais il est difficile de ne pas envisager ce qui se
passerait si l'on acceptait des réserves l'article IX, qui est peut-étre
l'article capital de la convention, puisqu'il établit un contriile juridic-
tionnel. On sait assez quelle importance peut avoir un tel contrale pour
la vie d'une institution ou l'application d'un régime juridique dans
l'ordre international.
Comme n'importe quel traité,, la Convention sur le génocide forme

un tout. S'il était possible à un Etat d'accepter un article en en refusant
un autre, c'est tout l'équilibre du traité qui se trouverait altéré.
l'lus encore peut-être qu'un traité bilatéral, un traité multilatéral -
on l'a indiqué hier avec beaucoup de force démonstrative - constitue
un ensemble équilibré de droits et d'obligations entre lesquels il n'est
pas possible de choisir arbitraireme~it. Si l'on adoptait une solution
différente, le traité multilatéral se diluerait en une série d'engagements
bilatéraux, ce qui, je crois, ne serait certainement pas un progrés
technique.
Une solution transactionnelle a étésuggérée, ilest vrai, avec beaucoup
de finesse et de sens des nuahces, par le distinguéreprésentant du Gouver-

nement d'Israël, lorsqu'il a dit qu'il serait possible, dans la convention,
de faire une distinction suivant la nature matérielle des clauses. On
uourrait distineuer. Dar exemole. les clauses ~-n~r~ ~uelles. les disuosi-
'tioiis qu'il appille administrativés, et enfin les disr,ositionsnorma~ives.
L'éminent représentant du Royaume-Uni a apprécié ce matin ce
système avec un certain scepticisme. A mon tour,'Sans vouloir répéter
ce qu'il a parfaitement énoncé,il me semble bien difficilede choisir entre
les clauses, et tout d'abord parce que, dans la Convention sur le génocide,
il n'y a pas, si je peux dire, de clause contractuelle h i'état pur. Ontrouve beaucoup de clauses mixtes et.on en arrive à se demander si.
toutes les clauses de la convention étant eu partie ou en totalité des
clauses normatives, les seules clauses contract;elles ne seraient pas dès

IOB,pour le représentant d'Israël, celles qui renvoient i chaque contrac-
tant pour l'exécutioii, par des moyens de droit interrie, des oblig rt'1011s
qu'il a souscrites en acceptant la conventiori, ce qui serait un peu
surpreiiant. En effet, les obligatioiis issues G'uri .'tC multilatéral sorit
par définition des obligations que chaque Etat exécute par soi] action
propre et qu'il s'eiigage à faire passer dans son droit interne. Si l'on
devait attribuer la qualification de <contractuelles i,à de telles ctisposi-
tions, on trouverait bien peu de traités multilati.raux qui seraient
véritablement normatifs.
On peut aussi faire valoir que, si cette thèse devait. triompher, cllc
ajouterait un fardeau extrêmement lourd aux taches du Secrktairc
généralde l'organisation des Nations Unies en l'obligeant à des discri-
miiiations nécessairement arbitraires et qui pourraient prêterà critique.
En vérité,il est un principe essetitiel qui doit êtremaintenu. 11ii'a

peut-êtrepas produit jiisqu'ici en droit des gens toutes les conséquences
qu'on pouvait en :itteiidre : c'est celiii de l'intégritéou de l'indivisibilité
du traité. Ce priiicipe s'applique notamrnent en matiEre d'iriterprétation.
où l'on a fait plus d'iine fois appel au contextc d'un zirticle ou à d'autres
articles du mêmetraité pour éclairer une disposition donnée.Ce principe
s'applique également en ce qui concerne l'extinction destraités : lorsqu:un
traité tombe, il tombe tout entier ; il ne subsiste paà l'étatfragmentaire.
Ce principe de l'intégritédu traité devrait, à mon sens, inspirer la
réponse à donner à ce problème. D'ailleurs - je in'escuse auprès de
mon collègue d'Israël - je me demaiide si la solution qu'il suggère ne
serait pas pire que l'ancienne façon de procéder. t\utrefois, lorsqii'oii
voulait conclure uri traité multilatéral, c'était sous la forme bicii
compliquée d'une sériede traités bilatéraux entre les mêmesÉtats. Les
rapports juridiques entre les États A, B, C, D, E, par exemple, ne
s'exprimaient pas dans la forme unique d'un traité multilatéral ABCDE,
comme aujourd'hui; il y avait des traités entre A et U, A et C, A et D,

.4 et E, B et C, B et D, etc. Ce système était médiocre, mais
il avait tout de mêmeiin avantage, c'est que le contenu de ce systhme
diversifié était le même,tandis qii'ici avec la conception proposée, il
y aurait bien ilne pluralité d'engagements bilatéraux mais dont le
contenu serait différent :
11 y aurait tout d'abordune série d'engagenients bilatéraux entre
les États n'ayant fait aucune réserve ;

Puis d'autres engagements bilatéraux eritre les États ayant fait une
réserve et ceux qui auraient présenti: des objections ;
Enfin, une troisiErne série d'engagements bi1atér:iux entre les Iztats
ayant fait des réserves et ceux qui les auraient acceptées.
On a parlé dans le passé de droit naturel à contenu variable. Je me
demande si, en l'espèce, nous ne nous trouverions pas en présence d'un
droit positif à contenu variable.

Il est un dernier argument auquel je pourrais faire appel, mais doiit
je n'abuserai pas, car il n'a peut-êtrepas une trèsgrande force en l'espèce,
c'est l'appel aux travaux préparatoires de la Conveiition sur le génocide.
On a indiqué, en effet, que les auteurs de la convention avaient été
d'accord pour exclure toute référence formelle aux réserves dans le EXPOSÉ DE ai. KOUSSEAU (FRANCE) - 14 IV 51 429

teste de la convention. Toutefois, la valeur de cet argument est peut-
êtrediscutable, car les travaux préparatoires n'ont pas une force détermi-
nante pour l'interprétation d'un traité multilatéral; mais il est bien
certain que, si l'on devait faire appel aux travaux préparatoires, cet
argument conduirait plutôt à exclure les réserves 2 la Coiivention sur
le génocide qu'à les admettre.
Pour toutes ces raisons, le Gouvernement de la République française
estime qu'il convient $c refuser toute \,aleur juridique aus réserves
énoncEespar certains 1-tats i la Convention sur le géiiocide, dès lors

que ces réserves n'ont pas étéacceptées, soit expressénieiit, soit, d'uiie
manière non équivoque, tacitement, par les autres parties contractantes.
lèlle est, semble-t-il, la réponse qu'il convient de faire à la première
question.
Quant i la deuxième qiiestioii, elle ne pourrait se poser, semble-t-il,
d'après la forme même dont elle a étélibellée, que si la réponse à la
premihre question était affirmative. Comine nous venons d'y répondre
par la riégative, il rie me semble ni nécessaire ni pertinent d'envisager
cc deuxième problème.
Avant de passer à l'examen de la troisi&me question qui fait l'objet
de la demande d'avis, je voudrais répondre brièvement à un argument

qui dépasse le plan de la technique juridique dans lequel s'est déroulé
ce débat, et qui a +téprésentépar sept des huit Etats qui ont formulé
des réserves. Ces Etats ont justifiéleur attitude par un appel à la notion
de souveraineté. C'est ainsi que, dans l'exposé adressé à la Cour le
13 janvier 1951 par le Gouvernement de l'Union des ICépiibliques
socialistes soviétiques, nous trouvons cette phrase :

iChaque Etat, se basant sur les principes de souveraineté, a
le droit incontestable ile faire une réserve à n'importe quel traité. r>

Des formules très voisines, sinon dans les termes tout au moins dans
l'inspiration, figurent dans les réponses d'aiitres gouvernements.
Il ne semble pas que l'appel à une telle argumentation soit de nature
:ifaire progresser le débat devant la Cour, tout d'abord pour la raison
très simple que Iü facultb de conclure des engagements internritionaux
est nrécisémentiin attribut de la souveraiiietb de l'État. C'est ce ou'a
cxprim: l:iCoiir pt?rni:sisclit{IV ~iisti~.ci~it~ri~~t~n~i;(~I:iis .son arri.1
du 17 ;fioiit1923. ~kiiisI':fiihir,(IIIll'~~i~bl~.lo ~~LKC2.5.

Si1'011\,iniilniti)ousser ict arziiiiit:iit iii%aii'LI'nl>siird1.1:irri\,cr:nit
à dire qiie la sede manière poGr un Eiat ;le sauvegardér pleinement sa
souveraineté, ce serait de ne jamais conclure de traité. Dès lors qu'un
Êtat souscrit un engagement, il ne peut le faire qu'aux conditions du
droit commun, c'est-i-dire en s'abstenant d'altérer la règle générale
par une modification unilatérale de ses dispositions.
On ~ourrait alléeu-.. il est vrai. a.e la Charte des Kations Unies.
dans &n article 2, paragraphe I, est fondée sur l'«égalitésouveraine ;)
des Etats. Précisément,cette expression a ététestuellement reprise dans
les exuosés écrits des Gouvernements ~olonais et tchécosloviaue. Alais
alorsil faut Iiivr.i~IiiiertrIIII'Itlroit cg;irt coiiil>t~ns~toirede s'ol>poser

:iiisrCser\.c.s;ipp:irtit:nI aiix p;irtics ori~inaires ail trditi~ii nles:iclc~
ment la mèmëCaleur que ceiui d'en énoncer.
IV. - 11reste à déterminer un dernier point : la question de savoir

à qui appartient le droit de s'opposer aux réserves. Si l'on s'en tient EXPOSÉ DE M. ROUSSEAU (FRASCE) - 14 IV j1
430
au libelléde la demande d'avis adressée h IaGCour,la questioii se pose
essentiellement, d'une part, pour ceux des 1-tats signataires qui ii'ont

pas encore ratifié la convention, d'autre part.pour les États qui, ayant.
le droit de signer la convention ou d'y adhérer. ne l'ont pas encore
fait. C'est encore un de ces problèmes que l'one peut prétendre résoudre
sur la base de principes abstraits. II est bon de rappeler comment se
présente à cet égard la situation pour les États qui sont parties :l la
Convention sur le génocide et d'avoir présents A l'esprit les articles S.
SI et XIII. L'article X stipuleque la Convention sur le génocideportera
la date du 9 décembre 1948. L'article XI est ainsi rédigé:

u 1.a présente Convention sera ouverte jusqu'au 31 décembre.
1949 à la signature ail nom de tout Ileinbre de I'Orgaiiisatioii des
Xatioris Unies et de tout Etat non membre à qui l'Assemblée
généraleaura adressé une invitation à cet effet.
La préseilte Convention sera ratifiée et les instruments de rati-
ficatioii seront déposésauprhs du Secrétaire général de I'Orgaiii-
satiori des Nations Unies.
t\ partir du rrrjanvier 1950, il pourra êtreadhéré à 1a.présente
Convention au nom de tout Membre de l'organisation des Natioiis
Unies et de tout État non membre qui aura reçu l'invitation

susmentioiinée. »
L'article XII1 est ainsi conCu :

Dès le jour où les vingt premiers instruments de ratificatioii
ou d'adhésion auront été dé~osés.le Secrétaire - - ~ ~ en~dressera
procès-verbal. Il transmettra copie de ce procès-verbal à tous les
Etats Membres de l'organisation des Sations Unies et aux non
membres visés par l'ar6cle SI.
La présente Convention entrera en vigueur le quatre-vingt-
dixième jour qui suivra la date du dépbt du vingtième instrument
de ratification ou d'adhésion.

Toute ratification ou afiliésion effectuée ultérieurement A la
dernière date prendra effet le quatre-vingt-dixième jour qui suivra
le dépbt de l'instrument de ratificationon d'adhésion. ii
Si l'on s'en tient au texte m6me de la convention, on voit que celui-ci
nous invite. en réalité,à nous placer à deux moments bien différents

pour apprécier la qualité des Ptats ayant droit d'objections : le problème
ne se pose pas en effet dans les rnêinestermes rivant et après l'entrée
en vigueur de In convention.
La Convention sur le géiiocide n étéouverte, à partir du g décembre
194s. à la signature des États Membres des Xations Unies et de cer-
tains Etats iioii membres invités à cet effet par l'Assembléegénérale.
Le jeu de cette signature différéen'était pas indéfiniment extensible
dans le temps : le délai expirait exactement, d'après l'article SI. le
31 décembre 1949. Pendant cette période de treize mois, qui constitue
un délai raisonnable, les htats ont eu tout le temps nécessaire pour
prendre position à l'égard de la convention et pour manifester leur
volonté. 1)urant cette période de treize mois, on doit admettre que
tous les Ettits sigiiataires avaieiit le droit d'élever desobjections contre

les réservesqui viendraient éventuellement à Ctre formuléespar certains
États. On pourrait de mêmeadmettre durant cette période qu'un État
qui n'a pas fait d'objections aux réserves et dont on aurait pu inter- EXPOSE DE hl. KOUSSEAU (FRASCE) - 14 IV jI 431
pré!e~ le silence comme une acceptation tacite prenne délinitivement

position en sens contraire. Mais les choses changent, semble-t-il, après
l'entrée en vigueur de la convention. Ce droit des États signataires ne
peut pas s'étendre indéfiniment dans le temps car il risquerait alors de
laisser peser sur l'étendue et la portée de la convention une incertitude
extrhement dangereuse. D'autre part, on ne eut oublier qu'une
sigrlaturc non suivie de ratificationn'engage pas 1'Z tat dont elle mane.
Il y aurait quelque chose de choquant à voir uri État simplement signa-
taire - dont on ne sait s'il ratifiera jamais la convention - paralyser
par son opposition l'entrée dans le système de la convention d'un État

ayant signéet ratifié celle-ci et dont les réserves ont pu êtreacceptées
par la plupart des États parties à la convention.
A partir du moment où la convention est entrée en vigueur, le régime
juridique auquel elle sert de support est devenu une réalitépositive.
Les parties qui jusque-là étaient quelque peu fluides sont déterminées
et individualisées ; les «parties 1%au sens technique du mot, ce sont les
États qui ont signéet ratifié la convention, ce sont tous les États dont
les ratifications ou les adhésions ont étédéposi-esen temps utile auprès
du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies et en nombre suffisant pour
que la convention soit juridiquement applicable. Seuls ces États peuvent

élever des objections aux réserves qui seraient énoncéespar la suite.
C'est normal puisqu'ils sont seuls à êtreliéspar la convention et qu'ils
ont un intérêtnon vas .irtuel. vote.tiel ou éventuel - comme certains
I'<giipr6rciiilii- rii.iiilil111rCrc;:itctuïl. di.fiii:icc.quc I;coli\~eiilioil
suit ;ippliqii;c~.l'<911III~Ip..lrt, d':~iIlct~rs,nt! sxis ~IS tr~p cc qn'cs~
IIIIC.l>.trlit: <'i.rntiii.lieiic i.irriirll8:; iiritr:iir<t. \l;~i. p:ir conti'.!
le \.ois hieii iltic, cl<inj Ics tr:tit6s iiiiillilat(r:tiis ~.oIiipIIII~cl.it~s<<
d':iccessioii iIlimit;c- tel le 1":icti.~<iiirnl de reiii~iici:itiila gucrrc
du 27 août 192s - rien ne distingue plus alors, dans cette conception,
les parties effectives au traité des États tiers. C'est là un système qui

ne trouve aucun appui en droit positif.
I'endant combien de temps peut-on reconnaitre le droit aux objections?
L'article XIII, paragraphe 2, a lui-même prévuque la Convention sur
le génocide n'entrera pas en vigueur par la seule addition d'un nombre
déterminé de ratifications ou d'adhésions ;la convention n'entrera en
vigueur qu'après un minimum de temps. Je cite l'article XII1 :

«La présente Convention entrera en vigueur le quatre-vingt-
disieme jour qui suivra la date du dépôt du vingtième instrument
de ratification ou d'adhésion. n
Mêmesi cette disposition n'a pas eu pour objet direct de réglementer

l'époque durant laquelle peut se déployer la faculté d'objection aus
réserves, il n'est pas déraisonnable de penser que i'existencc d'un tel
délai permet également ;tus États ayant signéou adhéré à cette date
de prendre parti sur des réservesdont ils auraient étésaisis et de mani-
fester i cet égard leur opinion.
La seule difficulté vise l'hypothèse où le nombre des ratifications ou
des adhésions intervenues avant l'entrée en vigueur de la convention
dépasse le chiffre de vingt qui est prévu par l'article XIII comme
devant déterminer l'entrée en vigueur. L'hypothèse du reste s'est véri-
fiéeen fait puisqri'?~la date du 12 janvier rgjr, la convention avait
recueilli non pas vingt mais vingt-quatre adhésions ou ratifications.

On pourrait dès lors se demander si les quatre Etats ayant ratifié posté-432 EXPOSÉ DE hl. KOUSSEAU (FRASCE) - 14 IV 51

rieurement au vingtième mais toujours antérieurement à l'entrée en
vigueur de la convention, bénéficient à leur tour d'uii iiouveau délaide
quatre-vingt-dix jours pour prendre parti sur les réserves on bien si ces
États ont simplement le droit d'épuiser lapartie résiduelledu délaide
quatre-vingt-dix jours comprise entre le dépôtdu vingtième instrument
de ratification et la date d'entréeeii vigueur de la convention.
Le Gouvernement français, pour sa part, ne pense pas que ce soit là
une difficulté majeure et il s'en remet entièrement sur ce point à la
décision de la Cour.
Nous nous écartons ainsi de l'opiiiion libérale,peut-etrc top libérale,
taires, un Etat signataire n'étant pastuiie«partie contractanteaasau sens
plein du inot.
Il est difficilepour la même raisond'adhérer à la thèsetransactionnelle
présentéepar le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. Ce gouvernement a, en
effet. urouoséd'attribuer le droit d'obiection non seuleineut aux Etats
ayant'rafifié mais aux États signataireç ayant déclaré leurintention de
ratifier. Une déclaration d'inteiition en cette matière ii'a de valeur que
si elle émanede l'organe ayapt qualité au point dc vue constitutioniei
pour engager valablement I'Etat.
Or, il arrive fréquemment qu'une ratification soit subordonnée par le
droit public interne àune autorisation préalabledu parlement. Dans ces
conditions, ilest impossible de considérer comme Npartie contractante »
un Etat dont la ratification est hypothétique et dont on ne sait pas dès
lors s'il «contractera» iamais.

ratifieront alors la conGentionou qui y adliéreroiitdevront, bien entendu,
prendre celle-ci telle qu'elle se présente au moment où elle entre en
vigueur, c'est-à-dire éventuellement assortie des réserves qui ont été
acceptées par les Etats qui étaient en situatiqn de le faire.
Faut-il aller plus loin et reconnaître aux Etats qui ratifieront ulté-
rieurement la convention ou qui y adhéreront ultérieurement le droit
d'élever àleur tour des objections contre les réserves formuléesavant son
entrée en vigueur ?
Xous ne le pensons pas et cela pour une raison très simple :il serait
singulier qu'un acquiescement tardif à la convention permette à son
auteur de remettre en cause un régime juridique accepté peut-être
plusieurs annéesauparavant par vingt ou trente Etats.
La faculté d'éleverdes objections aux réservesne doit pas êtreune
prime offerte à la négligenceou à la tardivité;elle ne doit pas davantage
récompenser ceux qui ne s'engagent pas.
Cette solution pourra sembler rigoureuse ;mais il dépend de i'État
intéresséde l'éviter enratifiant à temps, c'est-à-dire sqffisamment tôt
pour faire valoir ses vues propres. La situation de cet Etat n'est d'ail-
leurs pas sans remède, l'article X\'I de la convention lui permettant de
formuler àtoute époqueune demande de revision de la convention en se
conformant aux prescriptions de celle-ci, c'est-à-dire en adressant par
écritune notification au Secrétaire générad l e l'organisation des Nations
Unies.
Je remercie Monsieur le Président et lei Membres de la Cour de la
bienveillante attention qu'ils ont bien voulu témoigner cet exposé oral. EXI>OSÉ I>E M. ROUSSEAU (FRANCE) - 14 IV 51
433
En terminant, jc me permettrai de donner lecture des conclusions
auxquelles est parvenu le Gouvernement de la République française sur
l'ensemble du problhme soumis à la Cour :

I" l'État qui a formuléune réserve à la Conventioii pour la préven-
tion et la répressiondu crime de eénocidene Deut êtreconsidéré
comme parfie à la convention aÜssi longtemps qu'il maintient
sa réserve si une ou plusieurs parties à la convention font une
objection à cette réserve;

z" le droit de faire des objections aux réservesappartient à tous
les Etats signataires lorsqu'il s'exerce dans le délairéservéà la
signature de la convention.
« Passécette date, ce droit appartient aux seuls ??tais ayant
ratifi,éla convention ou y ayant adhéré,dès lorsque le dépôtpar
ces Etats de leur instrument de ratification ou d'adliésionest
intervenu antérieurement à l'entrée en vigueur de la conven-
tion.i,