Minutes of the Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on May 15th to 17th, and July 1st 1952, the Vice-President, M. Guerrero, acting President, presiding

PART II

ORAL ARGUMENTS ,

PUBLIC SITTINGS

held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, on May 15th to 17th, and
July rst, 1952, the President, Sir Arnold McNair, Presiding ut the
openiug of the hearing, and the Vice-President, M. Guerrero,

Acting President, pesidinin the Ambatielos case

DEUXIÈME PARTIE

PLAIDOIRIES

~ÉANCES PUBLIQUES

tenues au Paiais de la Paix, La Haye, du 15 nu 17 mai et le
I~ juillet 195SOUSla présidencede sir Arnold McNair, Président,
pour l'ouverturede l'audience, et sous la présidM.cGuerrero,
Vice-Président,pour l'aflaire Ambatielos SECTION A

ORAL ARGUMENTS CONCERNING
PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

PUBLIC SITTINGS
held ut the Peace Palace, The Hague, on May 1017th, and
,Julyrst, 1952, the Vice-PresM.eGuerrero,Acting President,

presiding

SECTION A

PROCÉDURE ORALE CONCERNANT

L'EXCEPTION PRÉLIMINAIRE

SEANCES PUBLIQUES

tznues au Palais de la PaixLa Haye, du 15 au 17 mai et le
I~~juillet 195SOUSla présidence M. Guerrero,Vice-Prksidenl
faisant fonctionde Président MINUTES OF THE SITTINGS HELD FROM

MAY 15th TO qth, AND JULY ~st, 1952

YEAR 19jz

FIRST PUBLIC SITTIXG (rj v jz, II am.)

Present : Presideltt Si.~RNOLD XCNAIR ; Vice-President GUERREKO ;
Judges ALVAREZ,BASDEVANTH , XCKWORTH\,~~NIARSKI,ZORIEIC,
KLAESTAOB , ADAWI,READ, HSU Mo, CARNEIROS ,ir BENEGALRAU,
ARMAND-UGOS ; Professor JEANSPIROPOULOS J, ge ad hoc ;Registrar
HAMBRO.
Also present:

For the United Kingdom O/ Great Britain and Northerir Ireland:
Air. V. J. EVANS,Assistant Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office,
as Agent ;

assisted by, as Counsel:
Sir Eric BECKETTK , .C.M.G., Q.C.;
Xr. D. H. S. JOHNSOX ;

Mr. J. E. .S. FAWCETT.
For the Royal Hellenic Gouernmeitt:
His Excellency M. N. G. LÉLY, Envoy Extraordinary and Dfinister
Plenipotentiary of Greece,

as Agent ;
assisted by, aS Counsel:

The Riglit Hon. Sir Hartley SHAWCROSQ S.,C., M.P., former Attomey-
General of the United Kingdom ;
Dr. C. J. COLOMBOQ S,.C., LL.D.;
Professor Henri ROLIN,Professor of International Law at Brussels
University, former President of the Belgian Senate;
M. Jason STAVROPOULO Leg, al Adviser to the Greek Foreign Office.

In opening the session, the PRESIDENT called upon the three newly-
elected Judges to make the solemii declaration prescnbed by Article 20
of the Statute of the Court.
M.CARNEIRO S,ir BENEGAL RAUand M.ARMAND-UGO iNturn made
the solemn declaration.
The PRESIDENT placed on record the declarations just made by
M. Carneiro, Sir Benegal Rau and M.Armand-Ugon, and declared them
duly installed as Judges of the International Court of Justice. PROCÈS-VERBAUX DES SÉANCES TENUES

DU 15 AU 17 MAI ET LE I- JUILLET 1952

ANNÉE 1952

PREI~IÈRE SÉAXCE PUBLIQUE (15v jz, Ir II.)
Prisenls: Sir ARPIOLD MCXAIR,Président ; M. GUERREROV , ice-
Préside~it . ALVAREZ,BASDEVANT,HACKWORTH~ , VINIARSKI,
ZoniEiC, KLAESTADB ,ADA\YIR, EAD,HSUMO,CARNEIRO S,ir BENEGAL
RAU, If. ARJIAND-UGON j,ges ;M. Jean SPIROPOULOjS u,ge ad hoc ;
hl.HAMSROG . refier.

Sont également présen ts
Pour le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagneet d'Irlande du Nord :

hl.V. J. EVANS,conseiller juridique adjoint au Foreign Office,
enqiialitéd'agen:
assistéde, commeconseils:

Sir Eric BECKETTK , . C. M. G., Q. C;
$1.D. H. N. JOHNSON ;
M. J. E. S. Fawcen.

Pour le Gouuernemenlroyal de Grèce :
S. Exc. M. N. G. LBLY.envoyéextraordinaire et ministre plénipoten-
tiaire deGrPce,
enqualité d'agen t

assistéde, comme conseils:
Le Trés Honorable Sir Hartley SHAWCROSS Q,. C., M. P., ancien
Attorney-General du Royaume-Uni ;
Dr C. J. COI.OMROQ S,. C., LL. D;
M. le professeur Henri ROI.IN.professeur de droit international à
l'université de Bruxelles, ancien Président du Sénatbelge;

étrangères.TAVROPOULO cSn,seiller juridique du ministère des Affaires

En ouvrant la séance,le PRÉSIDENT prie les trois nouveaux membres
de la Cour de prendre l'engagement solennel que prescrit l'articlezo
du Statut de la Cour.
hl. CAHNEIROs,ir BE^^^^^ RAU et M. ARMAND-UGOp Nrononcent
successivernent la déclaration solennelle.

Le ~'HÉSIDEPIT donne acte à hi. Carneiro, à sir Benegal Rau et à
M.Armand-Ugon de l'engagement qu'ilsviennent deprendre et lesdéclare
installésdans leurs fonctions de jugàsla Cour internationale de Justice.273 SITTING OF JIAY 15th, 1952

The President stated that, before calling upon the Vice-President ta
open the hearing of the first case on the Court's list, he wished to Say
a few words about the retiring President, M. Basdevant. \Vhen
hlBasdevant was elected to thecourtin 1946,healready enjoyed aworld-
wide reputation as Professor, author and counsel, and it only remained
for him ta apply his great qualities to the judicial office. In doing this
enhanced his own reputation and added to the prestige of the Court. bath
He had brought to bear upon the work of the Court a powerful intel-
lect and a wide legal culture. But intellectual qualities alone were not
enough ta make a good jiidge, much le& ta make a good President ;
certain moral qualities niust also be present-integrity, an iiiiiate
courtesy, infinite patience, a sense of fairplay and a capacity ta regard
al1facts as "free and equal" in their claim ta recognition. With al1these
qualities President Basdevant had heen generously endowed, and with
their aid he had indeed deserved well of the cause of international
justice.

The President referred to the fact that MM. Fabela, Charles De
Visscher and Krylov, who were elected Judges in 1946, were no longer
Members of the Court ; he was sure that his colleagues \rzouldnot wish
this occasion to pass without placing on record the Court's appreciation
of the services which they had rendered and the pleasure it Rad been
to work with them. The President mentioned in particular the value of
the collaboration ofhl. De I'isscher, for he, like the Vice-President, had
heen a hlember of the Permanent Court of International Justice and
thus made it easier for the International Court of Justice to draw upon
the traditions and experience of that Court.
The President welcomed ta the Bench two distinguished jurists from
Latin Amenca,Dr. Carneiro of Brazil, and Dr. Armand-Ugon of Uruguay,
and also Sir Benegal Kau, who had had long experience as judge, legis-
lator and statesman in India. It was deeply regretted that a fourth new
colleague, Dr. Golunsky of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was
prevented by illness from taking his seat.

The President stated that, in accordance with Article 13 of the Rules
of Court, he would now transfer the Presidency to the Vice-President,
and request him to open the proceedings in the Amhatielos case.
(The President and Vice-President exchanged chairs.)
The VICE-PRESIIENTa ,s Acting President, stated that the Court had
met to deal with a dispute between Greece and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Nortliern Ireland. Since the Greek Government did
not have a judge of its nationality on the Bench, it had availed itself of
its right under Article 31, paragraph z, of the Statute of the Court and
had appointed Professor Spiropoulos as its Judge ad hocin the present
case. The Acting President requested the Deputy-Registrar to escort
M. Spiropoulos to his seat on the Bench.

(M. Spiropoulos entered the Hall of Justice and took his seat.)
The Vice-l'residcnt. as :\cting k'residenr. c;illcd upon11. Spiropoulos
to inakc the soleniri decl;ir;itioii 1)rc.ssL>\.Article ?O of the 5t:itute
of the Court SÉANCE DU 15 AIAI 1952 "3
Avant de faire appel au Vice-Président pour ouvrir 1;iprocédure orale
en la première des affaires inscrites à l'ordre du jour, le Président pro-

nonce quelques mots d'hommage au Président sortant, M. Basdevaiit.
Lors de son élection en 1946,11. Basdevant jouissait déjà d'une réputa-
tion mondiale comme professeur; comme auteur, comme jurisconsulte,
et il ne lui restait qu'à donner la mesure de ses grandes qualités dans
l'exercice des fonctions de juge. C'est ce qu'ila fait pendant les six
dernières années, et en particulier pendant les trois dernières années';
et ainsi, il a tout à la fois accru son renom personnel et ajouté au pestige
de la Cour. Il a apporté à la tàche commune sa puissante intelligence
et sa culture juridique étendue. Mais des qualités intellectuelles ne suffi-
sent pas à faire un bon juge, bien moins encore un bon Président. Iles
qualités morales sont nécessaires : intégrité, courtoisie innée, patience
infinie, sens de ce qui est. juste dans la vie de tous les jours etapzicité
de considérer les faits comme,ayant tous, en pleine liberté et égalité.le
mêmedroit à êtrereconnus. Etant généreusementpourvu de toutes ces
qualités-là, le Président Basdevant a vraiment bien méritéde la justice
internationale.
Le Président rappelle que RIM. Fabela, De Visscher et Krylov, qui

avaient étéélusjuges en 1946, ont cesséde faire partie de la Cour. Il
traduit certainement l'intention de ses collègues en exprimant publique-
ment leur reconnaissance à MM. Fabela, De Visscher et Krylov pour les
services qu'ils ont rendus à la Cour, ainsi que,la satisfaction qu'ils ilnt
éprouvée à travailler avec eux. Il tient à clire tout particulièrement
combien la collaboration de M. De Visscher a été précieuse,car, comme
le Vice-Président, ila fait partie de la Cour permanente de Justice inter-
nationale, ce qui a permis à la Cour de tirer aisément profit de la tradi-
tion et de l'expérience acquise.
Le Président souhaite la bienvenue A deux juristes éminents de
l'Amérique latine : M. Carneiro, du Brésil, et M. Armand-Ugon, de
1'Urumav. ainsi qu'à sir Beneeal Rau. qui a acquis dans l'Inde une

trouvé emo&,~~Dar.son état deSanté.de rendre séance. .
Le I'rCsidciircI:cl.irr .lue, cuiilorni~niciit :,LI.\dispi>c1':irili.13-
Jti I<i.glrrt~vntJi1:iCotir, II tr,,i~:IiirtIrt I:Iprth lrnce 'tu \'it:~-I'r~~si-
~~,IIIc.11,.l~rla~!lcl'r,~~vrd l,rr~c~.cl~c)r-:1<31ijl':ih;~ir~:\IIIIY.~II~Ius.

(Le Président et le Vice-Président changent de fauteuil.)

Le VICE-PRÉSIDENT faisant fonction de Président déclare que la Cour
est réunie pour examiner un différend entre la Grèce et le Royaume-
Uni de Grande-Bretagne et 1'Irlande du Nord. La Grèce, ne comptant
pas sur le siège de juge de sa nationalité, s'est prévalue du droit que
lui confère l'article31, paragraphe z, du Statut, et a désignéM. Jean
Spiropoulos en qualité de juge ad hoc. Il invite le Greffier-adjoiiità
prier M. Spiropoulos d'entrer en séance, et à le conduire à sa place sur
le siège.

(M. Spiropoulos entre dans la salle de Justice et prend séarice.)
Le Vice-Président faisant fonction de Président prie M. Spiropoulos
de prendre l'engagement solennel que prescrit l'article zo du Statut de
la Cour. SITTISG OF niAY 15th, 1952
274
(M. Spiropoulos made the solemn declaration prescribed by Statute.)

the dispute hetween Greece and the United Kingdom were instituted by in
an Application of the Hellenic Government filed in the Registry on
April gth, I 51, the dispute relating to damages allegedly siiffered by
AI.Ambatie ?os,a Greek national. On February 4th. 1952, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdoin, the Respondent, filedits Counter-hlemorial
in which it challenged the Court's jurisdiction in the Amhatielos case.
It now fell to the Court to hear the Parties on the Objection.

The Vice-President, as Acting President, called upon the Registrar to
read the respective submissions of the Parties as they appeared in the
1st documents of the written proceedings filed by each of them.

The REGISTRAr Read the relevant passages from the Counter-Alemorial
of the United Kingdom and from the Observations and Conclusions of
the Hellenic Government.
The VICE-PRESIDENTa,s Acting President, stated that the Parties
were represented as follows :
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Bntain and
Northern Ireland by :

Mr. V. J. EVANS,Assistant Legal Adviser of the Foreign Office,
as Agent ;
assisted by:
Sir Eric BECKE~TK , .C.Wl.G.,Q.C.,
Mr. JOHNSONa ,nd

Afr.FAWCETT,
as Counsel ;
The Royal Hellenic Govemment by :

His Excellency M. Nicolas LÉLY, Greek Minister at The Hague,
as Agent ;
assisted by:

General of the United Kingdom,HAWCROSQ S.,C., M.P., former ilttorney-

Dr. COLOMBOo Sf,the English Bar, and
Professor Henri ROLIN,Professor of International Law at Brussels
University, former Presideiit of the Belgian Senate,
M. Jason STAVROPOULO Le,gal Adviser to the Greek Foreign Office,

as Counsel.

The VICE-PRESIDENT a, Acting President, noted that the Agents and
Counsel of the two Govemments were present in Court. He reminded
oral argument on the Preliminary Objection to the Court's jurisdiction,
and he directed them to confine their reinarks to this matter and, in so
doing, to touch upon the mcrits of the case only in so far as they con-
sidered this to be absolutely necessary. (JI. Spiiopoulos prend l'engagement solennel prévu au Statut.)
Le Vice-Président faisant fonction de Président rappelle que le dif-
férendentre la Grèceet le Royaume-Uni a étéintroduit par une requête
du Gouvernement hellénique, déposéeau Greffe le g avril 1951 ; il a
trait au dommage qu'aurait subi le sieur Ambatielos, ressortissant hellé-
nique. Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni, défendeur, a, daiis son
contre-mémoire déposéle 4 fbvrier 1952, excipé de l'incompétence de
la Cour pour connaître de l'affaire Ambatielos. La Cour est appelée
maintenant à entendre les plaidoiries des Parties sur l'exception d'in-
compétence.
Le Vice-Président faisant fonction de Président prie le Greffier de
donner lecture des conclusions des Parties telles qu'elles figurent dans
la dernière pièceécritedéposéepar chacune d'elles.

Le GREFFIERdonne lecture de l'extrait pertinent du contre-mérnoire
du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et des observations et conclusions
du Gouvernement hellénique relatives à l'exception d'incompéteiice.
Le VICE-PRÉSIOENT faisant fonction de Président déclare que les
Parties sont représentées commesuit :
Le Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande
du Nord par

M.V. J. EVANSc ,onseiller juridique adjoint du Foreign Office,
comme agent ;
assisté.de:
Sir Eric BECKETTK , . C.Xf.G., (2.C.,

XI.JOHNSONe,t
31.FAIVCETT,
comme conseils ;

Le Gouvernement royal helléniquepar
S. Exc. PI.Nicolas LÉLY,ministre de Grèce àLa Haye,
comme agent ;
assistéde :

Le Très Honorable sir Hartley SHAWCROSS Q,. C., M. I'., ancien
Attorney-General du Royaume-Uni,
Dr COLO.\IBOd S, barreau anglais,
Professeur Henri ROLIN,professeur de droit international à ]'Univer-
sitéde Bruxelles, ancien Président du Sénatbelge,
Al.Jason STAVROPOULO coSn,seiller juridique du ministère des tiffaires
étrangères,
comme conseils.

Le VICE-PRÉ~IDENfT aisant fonction de Président constate la présence
devant la Cour des agents ainsi que de leurs conseils. II rappelle que
l'audience actuellese tient pour entendre les arguments oraux sur I'excep-
tion préliminaire ;il invite donà ne toucher au fond de l'affaireque dans
la mesure où il leur paraît absolument nécessairede le faire.275 SITTING OF hIAY 16th, 1952

He called upon the Agent of the Governmcnt of the United Kingdom.
MI. EVANSbegged the Court's leave to allow Sir Eric Beckett to
present the United Kingdom Government's case.
The VICE-PRESIDENT, as Acting President, called upon Sir Eric
Beckett.

Sir Eric BECKETT commenced the statement reproduced in the annex '.
(The Court adjourned from 12.45 p.m. to 4 p.m.)
Sir Eric BECKETT continued and concluded the statement reproduced
in the annex '.

The VICE-PRESIDENaT s. Acting President, reminded the Parties of the
meeting to be held in his office the following morning, May 16th, atIO
am., conceming the production of certain documents which the Court
had requested. The hearing of the case would continue at 10.30 am..
on Friday, May 16th. at which time the Court would hear the presenta-
tion of the case of the Royal Hellenic Government.
(The Court rose at 6.30 p.m.)

(Signed) J. G. GUERREHO,
Vice-President.

(Signed) E. HAMBKO,
Kegistrar.

SECOND PUBLIC SITTING (16 v 52, II B.W.)

Present : [See sitting of hfay 15th.I
The ACTING PRESIDENT opened the hearing and called upon the Agent
of the Hellenic Govemment.

His Excellency M.LÉLYmade the statement reproduced in the annex
The ACTING PRESIDENT called upon Sir Hartley Shawcross.
Sir Hartley SHAWCROS bSgan the statement reproduced in the annex 4.

The ACTINGPRESIDEXT reminded Counsel for the Hellenic Govern-
Court's jurisdiction, which was the only question before the Court. (See
annex '.)

Sir Hartley SHAWCROS continued and concluded the statement repro-
duced in the annex O.

Sec pp.279-286.
,, ..286-299.
,.P. 300.
' ., P. 304.304.
..PP. 304-315. SÉANCE DU 16 MAI 1952 275
Il donne la paroleàl'agent du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.

M. EVANSdemande à la Cour d'autoriser sir Eric Becketà exposer
la thèse du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uni.
Le VICE-PRÉSIDENfT aisant fonction de Président donne la parole à
Sir Eric Beckett.

Sir Eric BECKETT prononce l'exposéreproduit en annexe 1.
(L'audience est suspendue de12 h. 45à 16heures.)

Sir Eric BECKETTreprend la parole et termine I'exposéreproduit eu
annexe
Le VICE-PRÉSIDENfT aisant fonction de Présidentrappelle aux Parties
la réunion qui doit avoir lieu dans son bureau le lendemain 16mai
à IO heures. au sujet de la demande de production de documents formulée
par la Cour. L'audience reprendra à IO h. 30, le vendredi 16mai. La
Cour entendra alors la plaidoirie du Gouvernement hellénique.

(L'audienceest levéeA 18h. 30.)

Le Vice-Président,

(Signé) J. G. GUERRERO.
Le Greffier,

(Signé) E. HAMBRO.

DEUXIÈME SÉANCE PUBLIQUE (16v 52, II h.)

Présents :[Voir séancedu 15mai.]

Le PRESIDENT EN EXERCICE ouvre l'audience et donne la parole à
l'agent du Gouvernement hellénique.
Son Excellence M. LÉLY présentela déclarationreproduite en annexaS.
Le PRÉSIDENT EN EXERCICE donne la parole à sir Hartley Shawcross.

Sir Hartley SHAWCROScSommence l'exposé reproduit en annexe *.
Le PRÉSIDENT EN EXERCICE rappelle au conseil du Gouvernement
hellénique la nécessitéde limiter son exposk à la question de compé-
tence, la seule dont la Cour soit actuellement saisie. (Voir ann%)e

Sir Hartley SHAWCROScS ontinue et termine l'exposé reproduit en
annexe O.

1 Voirpp. 279-286.
286-299.
X p.300.
"p. 301-304.
# p.304.
* PP.304-3'5.276 SITTINGS OF >TAY 17th AND JULY 1st. 1952

The ACTING PRESIDENf Tixedthe next sitting of the Court forSaturday,
May 17th, at 10.30 a.m.
(The Court rose at 12.50 p.m.)
[Signatures.]

THIRD PUBLIC SITTING (17 v 52, 10.50 a.m.)

Pvesent ; [See sitting of Rlay rjth.]
The ACTINGPRESIDENT opened the hearing and stated that, before
he called upon Counsel for the Government of the United Kingdom,
Judge Hsu Mowished to put a question to the representatives of the two
Parties.

Judge Hsu Mo put the question reproduced in the annex '.
The AGENT OF THE UNITEDKI~GDO& G~OVERNMEN gTve a provisional
answer to the question put by Judge Hsu Mo '.
The ACTINGPRESIDENT called upon Sir Eric Beckett to present the
oral reply on behalf of the United Kingdom Government.

Sir Eric BECKETT began and concluded the statement reproduced in
the aunex
The ACTING PRESIDENTcalled upon Professor Henri Rolin to present
the oral rejoinder on hehalf of the Hellenic Government.
Professor ROLINbegan the statement reproduced in the annex

(The Court adjourned fro~n1.30 p.m. until4 p.m.)
Professor R~LINconcluded the statement reproduced in the annexa,
in the course of which he gave the answer, on behalf of the Hellenic
Government, to the question put by Judge Hsu Mo at the morning
sitting.
The ACTING PRESIDENT declared that the hearings on the Preliminary
Objection were closed.

(The Court rose at 5.25 p.m.)
[Signatures.]

FIFTEENTH PUBLIC SITTING (1 VII52, 10 a.m.)

Pvesent: The President and the Judges present at the sitting of '
May 15th ;Registrar HAMBRO ; Mr. EVANS,Agent of the United King-
dom Gouernment ; MI. GARRAN,Counsellorof Embassy ut the Hague;
H. Exc. M. LÉLY, Agent of the Hellenic Government.
See p. 316.
..PP. 316-324.
,, .. 325.332.
' >> ,. 332.34'. Le PRÉSIDENT EN EXERCICE fixe la prochaine auaience de la Cour
au samedi 17 mai à 10 h. 30.

(I.'audience est levéeà midi 50.)
[Signatures.]

TROISIÈJIE SÉAXCE PUBLIQUE (17 v jz, IO h. jo)

Présents: [Voir swancedu 1j mai.]

Le PRESIDENT EN EXERCICE déclare, en ouvrant L'audience,qu'avant
de donner la parole au conseil du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uiii,
hl. Hsu hlo a demandé à poser une questioii aux représentants des deux
Parties.
hl. Hsu Mo pose la question reproduite en annexe '.

L'AGENT DU GOUVERNEME DU ROYAUME-UNdIonne à la questioii
poséepar hl. Hsu 110une réponse provisoire '.
Le PRESIDENT LN EXERCICE donne la parole à sir Eric Beckett pou?
présenter la réplique orale au nom du Gouvernement du Royaume-Uiii.

Sir Eric BECKETT commence et termine l'exposéreproduit en annexe *.

Le PRÉSIDEST EN EXERCICE donne la paroleà hl. Rolin pour présenter
la duplique orale au nom du Gouvernement hellénique.
Le professeur ROLINcommence l'exposé reproduit en annexe

(La séance est suspendue de 13 h. 30 à 16 heures.)

Le professeur ~ZOLIN conclut l'exposéreproduit en annexe ", au cours
duquel il répond, au nom du Gouvernement hellénique, à la question
posée à l'audience du matin par M. Hsu Mo.

Le PRÉSIDENT EN EXERCICE prononce la clôture des débats sur
l'exception préliminaire.

(L'audience est levéeà 17 h.2j)
[Signatures.]

QUINZIÈME SÉANCE PUBLIQUE (1 VIIjz, IO h.)
.
Présents : Le I'résideiet les Juges présents à la séance du 15 mai ;.
M. HAMI~KO G,reffie;M. EY.*NS, agent drr Gotrvernementdzr Koyaume-
Uni ; hl. GARRAN ,onseillerd'ambassaded La Haye ; S. Exc. M. L~LY,.
agentdtr Go~ivernemenh telléniqt~e.

1Voirp.316.
* pp.316-324.
a 325-332. a
S $ 332-347. SiTTlSG OF JULY ISt, 1952
277
Vice-President GUERREROA . cting President, opened the sitting and
stated that the Court was meeting for the reading of the Judgment
which it had to deliver in the Amhatielos case hetween the Kingdom of
Greece and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
These proceedings were instituted on Apnl gth, 1951, hy an Application
of the Hellenic Government.
In conformity with Article 58 of the Statute, the Agents of the two
Parties had been given due notice that the Judgment would be read in
open Court at the present public sitting.
Vice-President Guerrero, Acting President, noted that these Agents
were present in Court ;an officialcopy of the Judgment would be handed
to them during the present sitting.
Vice-President Guerrero, Acting President, added that the Court had
decided, in conformity with Article 39 of the Statute, that the English
text of the Judgment would be the authoritative text ; however. it was
the French text that he would read.
(Vice-President Guerren,, Acting President, read the Judgment '.)

He called upon the liegistrar to read the operative clause of the
Judgment in English.
(The REGISTRAR read the operative clause in English.)

Vice-President GUERREROA , cting President, said that Judge Levi
Cameiro and M. Spiropoulos, Judge ad hoc,had appended to the Judg-
ment statements of their individual opinions that Judge Alvarez
declared that there were in the present case sufficientgrounds for holding
that the Court had jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the Ambatielos
claim, and that the President, Sir Arnold McNair and Judges Basdevant,
ZoriEiC,Ellaestad and Hsu Mo appended to the Judgment statements
of their dissenting opinion3. He added that the authors of these opinions
had informed him that they did not wish to read them in open court.
Vice-President Guerrero, Acting President, closed the sitting.

(The Court rose at 10.4 am.)
[Signalzcres.]

1See Court'psublication:Reportsof Judgmcnts, Advisory OpirzionsandOrders
1952,PP. 28-47.
Zbid., pp. 48-57.
a .., ,.58-88. ~ÉANCE DU Jer JUILLET 1952 277

M. GUERREHOV , ice-Président faisant fonction de Président dans cette
affaire, ouvre l'audience et constate que la Cour s'est réunie pour pro-
noncer l'arrêt qu'elle doit rendre dans l'affaire Ambatielos entre le
Royaume de Grèceet le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlaiide
du Nord. Cette instance avait été introduite le 9 avril 1951 par requcte
du Gouvernement Iiellénique.
Conformément à l'article 58 du Statut, les agents des deux IJarties
ont étédiiment prévenus qu'il serait donné lecture de l'arrêt au cours

de la présente audience publique.
Le Vice-l'résident faisant fonctiori de Président ericette affaire coiistate
que ces agents sont présents ; une expédition officielle de l'arrêt leur
sera remise au cours de la présente audience.
Le Vice-l'résident faisant fonction de Président en cette affaire ajoute
que la Cour a décidé, conformément à l'article 39 du Statut, que le
texte anglais de I'arrèt ferait foi ; toutefois, c'est du texte français qu'il
donne lecture.

(Le Vice-L'rksident faisant fonction de Président donne lecturc clc
l'arrêt '.)
II prie le Greffier de donner lecture du dispositif de l'arrêt dniis le
texte anglais.

(Le GREFFIERlit le dispositif en anglais.)

BI. GUERREROV . ice-Président faisant fonction de Président en cette
affaire, constate que BI. Levi Carneiro, juge, et BI. Spiropoulos, juge
ad hoc, joignent à l'arrêtles exposés de leur opinion individuelle ', que
hl. Alvarez, juge, déclare que l'affaire présente des motifs de compé-
tente qui suffiraientà la Cour pour se pronoiicer sur le fond de la récla-
mation Ambatielos, et que sir Arnold McNair, Président, et MM. Basde-
vant, ZoriEib, Klaestad et Hsu Mo, juges, joignent à l'arrêtles exposés
de leur opinion dissidente 3.Il ajoute que les auteurs des opinions iiilli-
viduelles et dissidentes iie désirent pas en donner lecture.

M. Guerrero, Vice-Président faisant foiiction de Présideut, lève la
séance.
(L'audience est levée à IO h. 4j.)

[Sig~talrrres.]

' Voir publications de la Cour:Rect~rtl der ArrélrAvis coi$rr<llolLIr01d0,t-
nnnccr 1952.pp. 28-47.
* Ibid..pp. 48-57.
r . , 58-88.
'9 279
ANNEX TO THE MINUTES

ANNEXE AUX PROCÈS-VERBAUX

1. ORAL ARGUAIEXT 01: SIR ERIC BECKETT
(COUSSEL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM)
.4T THE PUBLIC SIITINGS OF MAY ljth, 1952

[l->ttblicsitting of May rjlh, 1952, moritiug]

May it please the Court.
In this case tlie Hellenic Government, taking up the case of its
national M. Xicholas Ambatielos, claims that the Government of the
United Kingdom is answerable for breaches of its obligations under
treaty and under the rules of general international law on the ground
that M. Ambatielos suffered a denial of justice in the English courts,
in 1922 and 1923. This claim, made by the Hellenic Government, is
certainly a claim of an international character and, if 1 am right in
inferring from a remark in paragraph 15 of the Greek Observatioris
of April that our opponents have thought that the United Kingdoin
denied that this claim by the Hellenic Government possessed this
character, that remark is based on a misunderstanding. The United
Kingdom did Say, and stiil says, that the original dispute between
Al.Ambatielos and the British Ministry of Shipping was not a dispute
of an international character, but that, of course, is quite a different
thing, because the dispute between M. Ambatielos and the Ministry
arose out of a contract for the sale of ships governed by English
municipal law. However, the United Kingdom is disputing the juris-
diction of tlie Court to entertain this internatioclaini by the Greek
Government. At first sight, this action may appear to be inconsistent
with the general policy of the United Kingdom towards this Court,
since the United Kingdom is known, both by its own conduct and
by its recomrnendations to others, to desire generally that the juris-
diction of the Court should be accepted as widely as possible by States
hegin with a few remarks to explain the reason why the United Kingdomo
in this case has chosen to exercise its undoubted right to contest the
jurisdiction instead of waiving that right and accepting the jurisdiction
of the Court even if not legally obliged to do so.
The United Kingdom first adopted the policy of accepting the
jurisdiction of the Hague Court generally in the year 1930 when it
ratified its acceptance bya declaration of ~gzgof the Optional Clause
of Article 36 of the Court'statute,a declaratioii which is still in force.
Previously, the United Kingdom had only accepted the jurisdiction
by clauses in particular treatiesapplying to disputes arising out of
those treaties orad hoc in regard to particular cases. But when it first
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court generally under the Optional
Clause. the United Kinedom made. bv its Declaratiori of ozo o.the
same exceptions rnlioneTemporis whici; various States had p&&usly
made and so manv other States have since made. It excluded dis~utes
whioh arose befoÏe Februaq 1930, or which arose out of sitnitions
and facts before February 1930. The reason for this exception was280 ORAI. ARGU~IEST OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 1.j2

admirably stated in the Morocco Phosphates Case by the Permanent
Court in tlie following words :
"Not only are the terms expressing the limitation ratione tem-
poris clear, but the intention which inspired it seems equally
clear: it was inserted with the object of depriving the acceptance
of compulsory junsdiction of any retroactive effects, in order
both to avoid, iii generala revival of old disputes, and to preclude
the possibility of the submission to the Court by means of an
application of situations or facts dating from a period wheii tlie
State whose action was impugned, was not in a position to foresee
the legal proceedings to which these facts and situations might
give rise." (Series AB, No. 74, p. 24.)
Now, it is part of my arhament that in this case there was no dispute
hetween the two Govemments until after 1930-not 1 think till 1933
at the earliest-but the facts out of which the dispute arose al1 took
place before 1930, namely in November rgzz, the date of the hearing
in first instance before the Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice in England, of the action between the Crown and M.Ambatielos.
and in 1923, the date of the decision of the Court of Appeal. It was
in these two hearings in the Admiralty Division aiid the Court of
Appeal respectively, that the alleged miscarriage or deiiial of justice
took place. So it is entirely consistent with the general policy of the
Goverument of tlie United Kingdom to dispute the jurisdiction of
this Court, in aiiy case where the claim arises out of facts prior to the
date of the ratification of its declaration accepting theptional Clause.
But there are in this particular case certain features which have led
my Government to consider that tliere are additional reasons for
exercising its right to dispute the jurisdiction, and 1 wish briefly, in
deference to the Court, to indicate them. 1 shall not, however, find
it necessary in order to do so, to go in detail into the merits of the
case, because as you, hfr. President, have reminded us, the Court is
not concerned with the merits at this stage.
The case arises out of a contract concluded in July 1919 between
M. Ambatielos and the hfinistry of Shipping in London, by whicli
M. Ambatielos coiitracted to huy nine ships then heing built for the
Ministry by shipyards in the Far East. The purchase price of the iiine
ships was ~z.275,ooo. M. Ambatielos had not this sum at his disposal,
but he took the risk that he would he able to realize a large part of
the money by profitable charters of the vessels which were to be
for freight existing in July 1919, continuing long enough after delivery
of the earlier vessels to enable him to pay for the later vessels out
of the charters of the earlier vessels. The vessels were completed by
the shipbuilders in the Far East rather later than M. Ambatielos
expected, and possibly the rates of freight fell sooner and further
than he expected. As a result, M. Ambatielos was unable to pay for
the later vessels as required by the contract, and when lie was in
difficulties he claimed that, though there were no dates specified in
thewntten contract of 1919 for the delivery of any of the ships, there
was, nevertheless, an oral agreement by which the vessels were to be
delivered in certain specified months, and that the British Governriient
was in default under the contract by reason of late delivery. No\\. ORAL .ARGUhIEST OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 V 52 281

that issue was tried between M. Ambatielos and the Crown in Novein-
ber 1922 in the Admiralty Division, and it was held that no such oral
agreement had ever been made.
M. Ambatielos lodged an appeal to the Court of Appeal against this
judgment and also applied to the Court of Appeal to he allowed to
cal1two witnesses in the appeal who had not been called at the hearing
in the Admiralty Division. The Court of Appeal refused this application
on the ground that both these witnesses were available at the hearings
in the Admiralty Division and M. Ambatielos could have called them
at this hearing if he had desired to do so.
The claim now made before this Court by the Greek Government

is that in the first place there was a denial of justice in the Admiralty
Division because the Crown did not call these two witnesses and did
not produce certain letters exchanged between these two persons,
which the Greek Government alleges the Crown was under a duty to
do. This is an alleged denial of justice for which the Grcek Government
States those conducting the case of the Crown were responsible.
Secondly, the Greek Government alleges that tliere was a denial of
justice in the Court of Appeal for whicli the judges of the Court of
Appeal were responsible, on the ground tliat the decision of the Court
of Appeal, refusing M. Ambatielos's application to cal1these two wit-
nesses, was not in accordance with English law and practice, was
influenced by aiiti-foreign prejudice and was a decision so wrong that
in giving it the Court of Appeal fell below the minimum standard of
justice required by internatioiiallaw.

M. Amhatielos did not prosecute his appeal in the Court of Appeal
when his application to call these two witnesses was refused, aiid lie
did not appeal to the House of Lords against the refusal of the Court
of Appeal to grant his application to cal1 the two witnesses. Thus.
M. Ambatielos did not exhaust his municipal remedies. If the decisicin
of the Court of Appeal had been as faulty as the Greek Governmeiit
alleges, and of course,1 contend that this decision affords no grouuds
for complaint at all, but if it had been, the House of Lords would
have been able, and no doubt would have reversed it. That, iii a
nutshell, is the international claim which the Greek Government brings
before tliis Court, and this complaint of two denials of justice in the
English Courts is developed in the Greek Memorial.
Confronted with the Greek Memorial, putting forward this complaint,
the Government of the United Kingdom took the somewhat unusual

course of putting in a Counter-Memorial, in which, at the same time
as it took thePreliminary Objection that the Court had no jurisdiction,
it made a full reply to the Greek Memorial on the merits. Whereas
al1 the United Kingdom need have done, if it were contesting the
jurisdiction, was to file the four pages of the Couriter-Memorial, where
the reasons why the United Kingdom contends that the Court has
no jurisdiction are set out in paragraphs 6-16, the United Kingdoni,
in fact, filed a Counter-Memorial of 35 pages with annexes of another
30 pages-al1 of whicli, except the four pages which1 have mentioned,
are devoted to the merits. The Government of the United Kingdoni,
while convinced it was both right in law and morally justified in
objecting to the jurisdiction of the Court in this case, was unwilling
that these aspersions on the administration of justice in the English
High Court and Court of Appeal should appear on the records of this 282 ORkL ARGUhIEST OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 V 52

Court without an answer to them also appearing in those records.
This Court, therefore, wlien hearing and determining this question
of junsdiction, which, of course, does not depend in any way upon
the merits, will not be in the position, as it otherwise might Iiave
heen, of knowing what Greece had to say on the merits and quite
imorant of what, if anything, -he United Kingdom had to Say on
the merits too.
The fact that the United Kingdom has taken this course enables
me, without going into tlie merits, to gire to tlie Court as one of the
additional reasons why in tliis case the United Kingdom lias thought
it was morally, as well as legally, justified in contesting the jurisdiction
-the reasoii that the Government of the United Kingdom considered
that this claim of denial of justice in the English courts has not the
faintest foundation. The grounds for this view of the United Kingdom
are in the Counter-Memorial, and we are not concerned with the merits
at this stage.
The second reason why the Govemment of the United Kingdom
feels morally as well as legally justified in objecting to the jurisdiction
no doubt that if he had appealed to the House of Lords Iiis appealve
would have failed, but that is because in my view the decision of the
Court of Appeal was right. However, there is no douht at al1 that if
the contentions made in the Memorial about that decision of tlie
Court of Appeal lind been correct, the House of Lords could and would
have reversed it. The ani~eal to the House of Lords was an effective
remedy against a decihoii wliich had the grave faults which the
Memorial alleges.
The tliird reason is that if there ever was a case where a government
is morallv iustified in contestine the iurisdiction to ~revent an old
and staleciaim being revived, the preSent case is on;
The decision of the Admiralty Division and of the Court of Appeal
were both given in 1923. Iii xgzjthe Government of the United
Kingdom received from the Greek Government an appeal on hehalf
of If. Ambatielos on a purely 0% gratin basis-in a communication
which admitted that legally the decisions of the courts had settled
the matter and made no complaint at al1 about denials of justice.
1 refer particularly to page Gg of the Greek Mernorial, Annex R 1.
This appeal exgratin was refused and since the AIemorialmakes amongst
other things a claim of unjust enrichment against the United Kiiigdom
Government, 1 miIl say one word about this poiiit. At first sight the
position of M. Ambatielos, wlio in the result had paid about ~1.600,ooo
and was left witli no ships at all, may seem a hard one and tlie position
. of the Governmerit of tlic United Kingdom which had receivcd that
snm from M. Ambatielos, as wcll as the proceeds of the sale of the
sliips, rather a11unjust one. But the United Kingdom was a loser
over these ships too. It had paid L2,3jz,114 to the builders in the
Far East who had constructed them and also substantial brokerage
fees to M. Ambatielos's I~rotlier, and in the end the United Kingdom
only realized about ~r,goo,ooo, including both what it received from
11. Ambatielos and what it was able to realize for the vessels.II. Am-
batielos's inability to fulfil liis contractual obligations to pay for the
ships left the United Kingdom Government out of pocket by some
&+jo,ooo. It must not be thouglit, however, that hl. Ambatielos mas284 OR.*L ARGUIIEST 01: SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 v j2
-1936 to 1939, 1946 to 1949-each of which also justified the belief
that the case had been dropped.

For these reasons, the Government of the United Kingdom aiIl in
this case accept the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits
of this case, only if the Court on a strict interpretation of the United
Kingdom's treaty obligations holds that the United Kingdom has
bound itself to do so. Consequently, in this case there is no question
of the Court acquiring jurisdiction on the basis of forum prorogatum.
The jurisdiction of the Court depends on Article 36 of its Statute.
The second paragrapli of Article 36, the Optional Clause, does not
apply for two reasons :first. Greece has never accepted the Optional
Clause at al1; secondly, the United Kingdom in its acceptance excluded
disputes arising out of facts prior to February 1930. We are left, there-
fore, with the first paragraph of Article 36, and the question is whether
or not the United Kingdom lias by some treaty provision on whicli
Greece is entitled to rely, bound itself to accept the jurisdiction of
the Court in this case.
The contentions of the United Kingdom on this issue have been
set forth in paragraphs 6 to 16 of the Counter-Afemorial. and my
principal task to-day is to aiiswer the Greek Observations of April
last. In doing so, 1 shall state as accurately as 1 can the arguments
of my opponents. As, however, in some cases these arguments are
expressed vaguely and are ratlier hinted at than developed, it may
to be so, it is possible that the reasoii for my failure is not merely my
own obtuseness, but that even in its written Observations of April.
the Greek Government has still not stated precisely its arguments
on the question of jurisdiction.
1have just said that the jurisdiction of the Court in this case depends
eiitirely on the first paragraph of Article 36 of the Court's Statute.
However, there are certain remarks both in the Greek Memorial and
in its Observations of April last where it appears to be contended,
though in a very subsidiary way, that the Court derives jurisdiction
from certain provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 1 find it
difficult to believe that these remarks are presented as a serious argu-
ment, but they have been presented to the Court and 1 think 1should
Say a few words about them. As they are short, 1will begin by quoting
the remarks which the Greek Government has made on this point in
its Pleadings. There is first of al1paragraph 30 (5) (30, sub-para.j) of
the Memorial, and that reads as.follows :

"Altematively, the United Kingdom Govemment is under an
obligation as a Member of the United Nations to conform to the
provisions of Article I (1)of the Charter of the United Nations,
one of whose principal purposes is 'to bring about, by peaceful
the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations'.
and to those of Article 36 (3) of the Charter, according to which
'legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties
to the International Court of Justice'. There is no doubt that the
dispute between the Hellenic Government and the United King-
dom Government is a 'legal dispute' susceptible of adjudication
by the Court." ORAL ARGUMEKT OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.I<.)-15 V 52 285

That is my first quotation.
In this passage of the Greek Memorial there are in fact two misquo-
tations of the provisions of the Charter. The first extract from ArticleI
(1)should be completed by the words "which might lead to a hreach
of the peace", because Article I (1) of the Charter refers to disputes
which might lead to a breach of the peace and it is difficult to helieve
that the Ambatielos claim falls into this category, and, secondly, :and
more important, Article 36 (3) of the Charter, when referring to the
reference of disputes to the International Court of Justice, adds "in
accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court", ivords
ornitted in the Greek Observations but which, of course, entirely destroy
the Greek argument. However, if the argument really is that these

provisions of the Charter give compulsory jurisdiction to the Court
and its jurisdiction is the only question with which the Court is concerned
at present, the contention can be answered briefly by the well-known
iacts that there were many States ivho desired that the Charter should
make the jurisdiction of this Court obligatory, but it is well known
and undisputed that this desire was not realized at San Francisco, ;ancl
none of the Charter provisions quoted says that the Court is given ;any
jurisdiction by them.
Now in the Greek Observations of April last we find two passages
referring to the Charter, and 1 shall again quote tlieni both.
Paragraph 4 reads :

"Subsidiarily, if the Court, contrary to the submissions of tlie
Hellenic Government, should hold that it cannot deal with the
claim for damages, the Helleuic Government will rely not only
on the 1926 Declaration, which is not severable from the Treaty,
but also on ArticleI (I),.4rticle z and Article 36(3)of the Charter
to request the Court to order the British Government to join in the
arbitration proceedings provided for in the Protocol annexed to
the Treaty of 1886."

Now this observation is completed in paragrapli ~j,ahere it is said-
and 1 quote again :
"But if it is the case that gencrally speaking breaches of treaties

are outside the jurisdiction of the Court unless the parties have
conferred such jurisdiction upon it, the Helleuic Government is
of the opinion that the position is quite different where a certain
method of settlement by arbitration has been accepted by the
parties, which one of the parties subsequently seeks to disregard.
For it is the Court's function to act as the guardian of the principle
accepted hy the United Nations to settle its disputes by peaceful
means in such manner that justice is not endaiigered (Article 2
of the Charter)."

There 1 end the quotation from tlie Greek Observations.
Now, in these passages the contention is apparently put forward that,
if in a treaty two States have agreed to submit a certain category of
disputes to arbitration and if in a particular case included in the category,
one of the parties refuses to do so, then, on the basis of the provisions
of the Charter which have just been mentioned, the Court has a compul-
sory jurisdiction over the dispute which arises from this failure tci go
to arbitration and the Court derives from the Charter the jurisdiction266 ORAL ARGUJIEXT 01; SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-1j V 52
to order that party to do so because the Court is the guardian of the
principle setforth in Article2 of the Charter.
Now there is not one word in the Charter which provides that the
Court derives any jurisdiction whatever from these provisions or which
says that the Court is the guardian of the principle laid down in Art2.le
Tliere is nothing in the Charter which says that the Court derives juris-
diction from the Charter in a case nhich is not covered bv Article 26
of its Statute, because a State has not complied with an; particu&
~>rovisionof the Charter. There is not a word in the Charter to sugeest
ihat, where two parties have agreed by treaty to have recourFë to
arbitration in any particular class of case and it is alleged that one party
has wrongfully refused to do so, the Court is constituted by the Charter
the euardian of arbitration clauses and derives from the Charter the
right to order that party to proceed to arbitration.
Now if, of course, the Court were to accept tliese contentions of the
Greek Government, its judgment would be of the highest importance
as a general precedent and it would have repercussions of the greûtest
significance in other cases, including another case with regard to juris-
diction which will very shortly come before this Court for decision.
1 Iiardly think, however, that these remarks form a serious part of
the contentions of the Greek Government in the present case, and,
therefore,1 will not delay the Court at the present time by making any
further answer to them. 1shall have another opportunity to do so, if
in its oral answer the Greek Government shows that it does present
these contentions as serious legal arguments relating to the jurisdiction
of the Court.

Mr. President, 1 should be grateful if you urould indicate your wishes
1 should be keeping the Court until abouthen,1.10lp.m. If 1were to stop,

now, 1 should be able to complete al1 1 have to Say to the Court,
necessary, if 1 were going to complete, tliat the Court should sit up to
about 6.30 p.m.

Le PRÉSIDEKT EN EXERCICE: Tenant compte de l'explication que
vous venez de nous fournir, j'estime que nous pouvons renvoyer
l'audience à cet apres-midi à IG heures. L'audience est suspendue.

[Publisc itling of May 151h,1952, afternoon]

May it please the Court. 1 now return to Article 36(1)of the Statute
on which alone in the present case the jurisdiction of the Court must
be based, and 1 observe in passing that, when Article 36 (1) refers
to "al1 matters provided for in the Charter of the United Nations",
it is well known that these words were inserted in the draft at a time
when it had not yet been decided whether the Charter would make
the Court's jurisdiction obligatory or not, and they were not removed
from this paragraph of the Court's Statute when. the decision was
taken at San Francisco that the Charter should not coiifer obligatory
jurisdiction on the Court.So far as 1 know, these words in Article 36 (1)
have no practical meaning at al1 at present, and 1 would remind the
Court that in the first Corfu case mhere the United Kingdom put OR.4L ARGUhIEST OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 ~'52 287

forlvard to the Court a contention which endeavoured to give these
words an application in a case where the Security Council had passed
a substantive resolution recommending the parties to submit the
dispute to the Court, a strong minority of this Court in a sepai-ate
opinion held this contention of the United Kingdom to be unfouncled,
while the majority of the Court, having reached a decision on other
grounds, thought it unnecessary to observe on this contention at al].
Therefore, under Article 36 (1).the Court has jurisdiction in this case
if, but only if, some treaty or convention in force provides for it. Now
there is only one treaty provision which has been invoked by Our
opponents as being a treaty in force which gives the Court jurisdiction
in this case, and that is Article 29 of the Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation between Greece and the United Kingdom, of ïgzG Article 29
of that Treaty reads as follows :
"The two Contracting Parties agree in principle tliat any dispute
which may arise between them as to the proper interpretation
or application of any of the provisions of the present Treaty
shall, at the request of either Party, be referred to arbitration.
The Court of arbitration to which disputes shall be referred shall
be the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague,
unless in any particular case the two Contracting Parties agree
othenvise."

No?, this provision, coupled with Article 37 of the Court's Statute,
does give this Court jurisdiction over disputes between the United
Kingdom and Greece relating to the interpretation or application of
any of the provisions of the Treaty of 1926. Jt7e have therefore to
-~~ wh~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~case involves a disvute as to the intemretation or
application of the provisions of the Treaty of 1926.
is important for the purpose of this case. a 1eam going to deal fullyh
with this Declaration later, but 1 first want to deal with the effect
of this Article 29 apart altogether from this Declaration.
Now, the Treaty of 1926 was brought into force, pending ratifica-
tion, on 28th July 1926 ; it only became operative on that date. None
of the provisions of the 1926 Treaty have any application at al1 to
anything that took place before July 1926. The United Kingdom only
became bound to apply to Greek nationals or Greek companies the
provisions of the Treaty of 1926 as from July 1926. It could not have
committed a breach of the Treaty of 1926 by any action which it took
before the Treaty of 1926 became binding on it. 1should have thought
that this was elementary and self-eldent, but 1am obliged to emphasize
it, having regard to certain contentions which form quite an important
part of the argument in the Greek Observations of April last. In these
Observations it is argued in more than one place-for instance, the
second sub-paragraph of paragraph 6, and again in the fourth sub-
paragraph of that paragraph ; sub-paragraph 3 of paragraph 7, and
again in sub-paragraph z of paragraph S-now, in these places, the
Greek Observations argue (1) that certain provisioiis of the 1926
Treaty, which came into force in July 1926, are in substance the
same as certain provisions of the earlier Treaty of 1886 betiveen the
two countries, a treaty which ceased to operate when the Treaty of
1926 came into force; and (2) tliat where the two Treaties contain288 ORAL .4RGUMENT OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 V j2

provisions similar in substimce, you can invoke the similar provision
of the 1926 Treaty in regard to acts dune at a time before the 1926
Treaty came into force, and when the old 1886 Treaty was still in force.
Or, it may be that Our opponents' argument is that you can invoke
Article 29 of the 1926 Treaty (the arbitration article) in respect of
a claim based on a provision of the 1886 Treaty, where there is a
similar pro\.ision in the 1926 Treaty. 1 admit 1 am not clear which
of these two things our opponents say. Some passages which 1 have
referred to suggest one way of putting it, other passages the other
way. 1 do iiot think it matters very much which of the two ways it
is put, but 1 do find their obser\rations on this point a little difficult
to follow. As 1 understand it, this position, that is to say, the position
that "a question-some act complained of-may be referable tu the

old and the neuz Treaty at the same time" (to use our opponents'
words) is alleged to result merely from the fact that the new Treaty
coritains provisions similar in substance to those of the old Treaty.
Now, Our opponents have iiot cited in support of this contention any
precedent or authority, and 1 must admit that it is a contention of
a kind which we have riever heard of being put forward before. My
answer to it is simply that there was a date in July 1926 when the
Treaty of 1886 ceased to operate so that the Treaty of 1886 could
iiot be invoked in regard to anything that happened after tliat date,
and that the Treaty of 1926 only began to operate in July 1926 and
cannot be invoked iiiregard to anything that took place before that
date. It is quite immaterial whether or not the two Treaties contain
provisions which are similar in wording or in substance. You can only
make a claim based on a trt:aty in regard to acts done, when the treaty
which you invoke was operative. By its own tenns, you cari only

invoke Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926 in regard to breaches of the
provisions of the Treaty of 1926, and not in regard to breaches of
the provisions of the 1886 Treaty, because Article 29 uses the words
"interpretation or application of the provisions of the present Treaty".
A claim that a provision oi the 1886 Treaty has been infringed is not
a claim relating to the application of the 1926 Treaty, el-en if the
1926 Treaty had a similar provision in it.
1 should have thought that what 1 have just said \vas self-evident
as a matter of general principle, but 1 have added-if verbal support
were needed-that by its own words, Article 29 of the 1926 Treaty
confines its own operation to the interpretation and application of
any of the provisions of the present Treaty. For these reasons 1
submit (1) that Article 29 of the 1926 Treaty is clearly confined to
the application of the provisions of 1926 and does not extend to the
application of any provision of the old 1856 Treaty unless the Decla-
ration-which 1 shall consider in a minute-produces this effect ;

(2) that the provisions of the 1926 Treaty do not apply to anything
which took place before July 1926 and therefore do not apply to the
matters complained of in the present case.
Before 1 deal with the Declaration, however, 1will just say a word
about the alleged similarity of those provisions of the 1886 and 1926
Treaties wliich the Greek Gonernment supposes to be relevant to
the claim which it makes.
It is in paragraph3 of the Observations of April last that the Greek
Government sets out in parallel columns the provisions of the twoTreaties which it holds to be the same in substance. As a matter of
fact, the first couple of allegedly parallel provisions are not in any
way the same in substance. Article 15 (3) of the Treaty of 1886 relates
to free access to courts of justice on tliesame conditions as nationals,
laws and regulations with regard to Customs and similar matters relates to
and redress for abuses in Customs matters. These two provisioiis, referred
ta as being provisions in almost identical terms, seem to have no
similarity at all, either in termiiiology or in regard to the sublect-
matter nith which they deal. 1 can see, rery vaguely, how the Greek
Government attempts to bring the Ambatielos case under Article Ij (3)
of the Treaty of 1666. 1 should very much like to see how they hring
the case of JI. Ambatielos uiider Article 12 of the Treaty of 1926.
which is said to have been almost identical. They have not so far
shown how tliey think they can do it.
While the next two pairs of provisions quoted in paragraph 3 of
the Greek Observations rire uncloiibtedly parallel iri the sense tliat
their substance is the same, we have so far been unable to understaiid
what conceivable bearing these provisioiis can have on the case at
all. They grant respectirely national treatment and most-favoured-
nation treatment to nationals of the other party in matters of com-
merce (trade) and navigatioii, but, of course, provisions relating to
the treatment of nationals in courts of justice are ?rotprovisions reiatiiig
to trade and navigation at all. 'l'heyare provisions relating to Estnb-
lishment. Yet in the penultimate sub-paragraph of paragraph 3 of
its Observations the Greek Govcrnmerit appears to be supposing tliat
a most-favoured-nation provision, relating to trade and navigation,
in the tiiiglo-Greek Treaty of 1866, will attract for the benefit of
Greece establishment provisions in other treaties concluded by the
United Kingdom. But, of coursc. this most-favoured-natioii provision
will only attract provisions in those other treaties relating to trade
aiid navigatioii.
Xow in this case, the claim of our opponents on tlie merits is really
a claim for redress for denials of justice in the courts in breach of
the principles of general international las;and in view of the provisions
of the 1886 Treaty, the only treaty provisions which caii be relied
upon, the daim can really only be put on the basis of the principles
of general international law. Now it is true that the Greek Government
Article 15 (3) of the Treaty of 1886 and it may be they now say it is
a breach of certain other articles of that Treaty ; but my opponeiits
find, 1 think, a certain difficulty in bringing the actual claim the?
do make under the wording of Article 15 (3) or of any other article
of the 1886 Treaty. And consequently we find the following passage
in their Observations of April last. 1 now quote from the last sub-
paragraph of paragraph 3 of these Observations :

"Lastly the Hellenic Government proposes to rely oii the rules
of the law of natioiis relatinr to the treatment of alieiis and in
particular on the general I><nciples of the law relating to the
denial of justice, because it appears to be clear tliat when tlie
United Kingdom and Greece agreed ta the favours aiid special
privileges which should be enjoyed by nationals of each of the ORAL .4RGUAIIEXT OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-1j V j2 291
the 1886 Treaty could be invoked, or that by virtue of some most-
faroured-nation clause in the 1886 Treaty. some provisions in other
treaties concluded by the United Kingdom could be invoked by Greece,
would, if it were correct, still make no difference at al1 to my con-
tention that the Court has by Article zg of the 1926 Treaty no juris-
diction to deal with breaches of the 1886 Treaty at ail, and that no
provision of the 1926 Treaty can be invoked in regard to acts done,

or events taking place before the 1926 Treaty came into operation.
And therefore, Article 29 gives this Court no jurisdiction to deal with
the merits of this case. If it were the case that Greece was able to
invoke other provisions of the 1886 Treaty in addition to Article 15 (3),
the effect of this would merely be to extend the grounds of claim
which the Court had jurisdiction to entertain, supposing that, contras.
to my contention, the Court found it had jurisdiction to deal with
alleged breaches of the 1886 Treaty at all.
1 now come to the Declaratiori of 1926 and will consider whether
the Court has jurisdiction to deal with this case by reason of this
Declaration, and 1 will begin by reading the provisions of the Decla-
ration itself. Itsays :

"It is well understood tliat the Treaty of Commerce and Navi-
gation between Great Britain and Greece of to-day's date does
not prejudice claims on behalf of private persons based on the
that any difference which may arise between Our two Govemments
as to the validity of such claims shall at the request of either
Govemment, be referred to arbitration in accordance with the
provisions of the Protocol of November ~oth, 1886, annexed to
the said Treaty."

In this Declaration the Governments Say two things : first, that
the conclusion of the new Treaty does not prejudice claims on behalf
of private persons based on the provisions of the old Treaty. 1 think
they might have expressed their meaning with more complete legal
accuracy if they had said that the replacement of the old Treaty by
the new Treaty did not prejudice these claims based on the old Treaty,
but it is quite clear that this is what they meant. The second thing
they said was that,if there was any differencebetween the two Goverii-
ments as to these claims based on the old Treaty, either Govemmerit
could secure that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration in

accordance with the Protocol annexed to the old Treaty. By this
Declaration the two Governments were making sure that, notwitli-
standing the disappearance of the old Treaty, there could still tie
recourse to obligatory arbitration for these cases. Now the Greek
Govemment claims that M. Ambatielos was, in 1922 and 1923, treated
in a manner which was in conflict with a certain provision of the
Treaty of 1886, namely Article 15, paragraph 3.It further contends
that the United Kingdom is obliged by this Declaration to arbitrate
this claim in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol of 1886,
and that the United Kingdom is committing a breach of this Decla-
ration by refusing to arbitrate. In order, however, to argue that this292 ORAL ARGUZIEST OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-I j \-j2
Court has jurisdiction to entertain this contention based on the Decla-
ration. the Greek Government must establish that the Declaration,
which I have just read, is so much a part of tlie Treaty of 1926 that
a dispute relating to the application of this Declaratioii is a dispute

relating to a provision of the Treaty itself within the meaning of
Article 29, because you will remember that Article 29 only applies
to provisions of the "present Treaty".
Now, tliis Court would have jurisdictioii to dccide whether the
United Kiiigdom had committed a breacli of the Declaration of 1926
in regard to the Ambatielos claim if :(1)the Declaration was a provision
.of the 'l'reaty o1926, and (2)the claim which the Greek Government
ismaking in respect of M. Ambatielos was bot11a claim based on the
Treaty of rS86, and a clairn which that Declaration covers. If al1 these
points were established, this Court would have jurisdiction to Say,
if it so found, that the United Kingdom \vas in breach of the Decla-
ration of 1926 in refusing to go to arbitration, and possibly also have
jurisdiction to make ail order that the United Kingdom should go
to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol of
1886. Uefore 1 go further, 1 wish to repeat what we have said in the
Counter-Xlemorial, that if, contrary to Our contentions, the Court
should hold (1)that the Declaration is a provision of the Treaty of
1926, and as siicli is covered by Article 29,and (2) tliat the claim in

this case is a claim to which the Declaration applies, and (3)that
the claim is one which the United Kiiigdorn is legally obliged to
arbitrate, then the United Kingdom is, at aiiy ratc to this estent,
in accord with its opponents, that it will, in that event, agree that
this Court should itself replace the arbitral tribunal provided for in
the 1886 Treaty, and should deal with the merits of the case in the
same maiiner and to the same estent that the arbitral tribunal would
have had to deal with them if it had been constituted. However, the
United Kingdom contcnds that the claim which tlie Greek Govemment
is iiow makiiig in respect of Il. Ambatielos, is not covered by that
Declaration nt all, and secondly, that the Declaration is not part of
the Treaty of 1g2G and does not constitute a provision of the 1926
Treaty for the purposes of Article 29. And 1 iiow propose to develop
the reasons already giveri in our Counter-Memorial why the United
Kingdom conteiids that this is so.
1 amnow going to deal with the United Kiiigdom argument that
the Declaration of 1926 does not cover the claim brought in this case
in respect of M. Ambatielos. In July 1926, when the Declaration

was signed, tliere were theoretically three classes of claims which
might arise on the 18S6 Treaty. The first class is claims already made,
concerning which the two Governments were already at that date in
dispute. Now the Declaration would cover this first class, but the
parties had not got that class in mind when tliey signed the Decla-
ration, because in fact il did not erist. There were in 1926 no such
-disputes.
The second class is claims already formulated on the basis of the
1886 Treaty but with regard to which at that date there was no
dispute because the other Government had not at .that date either
admitted or denied the claim. It is this second class of claim which
the United Kiiigdoin says the contracting parties had in mind, when
the Declaration of 1926 \vas signed and, so far as 1 caii see from sub- OR.4L ARGUMENT OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 V 52 293

agree that that mas the class of claims which the parties had in minds
at that time. 1 will revert to this point again later.
The third possible class of claims was claims which, in July 1926.
had never been formulated, though the facts which might gi\.e rise
to them had already occurred. The United Kingdom contends that
the Declaration does not cover this third class of claims and that it
is into this third class that theresent claim respecting hI.Ambatielos
falls, notwithstanding what our opponents say. in paragraph 16 of
their Observations.
1 submit this because in July 1926 the Greek Government had not
formulated any legal claim-with regard to the treatment iri 1922 and
1923 of M. Ambatielos-at all. It had indeed in 192j made some repre-
sentations, the purport of which was that M. Ambatielos had suffered
hardship as a result of what had happened under the contract for
the sale of the nine ships, and had requested the Government of the
United Kingdom to look into the matter again and take some action
to alleviate the financial losses wliich M. Ambatielos had suffered.
But it was made absolutely clear iii this communication, which was
made to the Foreign Office by the Greek Government in 1925, that
no legal claim \vas put forward on the basis of a breach of international
law or treaty. There was then no suggestion of any denial of justice.
On the contrary, the Greek communication stated-and 1 am now
quoting from, page 69 of the Greek hlemorial-"the final judgment
of a British court unappealed against closes the transaction from a
legal poiiit ofview. Such a judgment would in normal circumstances
be equally conclusive from a moral standpoint." And a little earlii:r,
at the bottom of page 68. cornes the following sentence :"The moral
title of M. Ambatielos to some substantial redress at the hands of
the British authorities would appear on the facts outlined above
difficult to resist." 1 submit again that these words make it abnndantly
clear that the Greek Governmeiit was saying at that time that there
\vas no legalclaim but tliat there was a moral claim for compensation
on an ex gratin basis. In fact, as1 have already reminded the Court,
no legal claim of any kind on behalf of II. Ambatielos was made till
eight years later in 1933 and no claim on the basis of the 1886 Treaty
-which would alone come under the Declaration of 1926, if (as the
had not even been formulated in 1926-noion coclaim on the basis of the
1886 Treaty was made till 1939.
Now in sub-paragraph 2 of paragraph IO of their Observations, the
Greek Government contend that the text of the Declaration is not
capable of the interpretation which the United Kingdom puts upon
it, because the Declaration refers to "disputes which may arise" aiid
not to disputes which have ariseu. But if, as the United Kingdom
contends, the whole purpose of the Declaration was to cover claiins
which had been formulated under the 1886 Treaty but about which
in July 1926 there was as yet no dispute, the text of the Declaration
iïts exactly the construction which the United Kingdom puts upon
Pt and tlie point made in tliis sub-paragraph .z falls to the ground.
Now it is quite true, as the Greek Government says, that the con-
struction put upon the Declaration by the Gorernment of the United
Kingdom means that there \vas potentially a class of disputes con-
20294 ORAL ARGUMENT CIFSIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 V 52

ceming the application of the 1886 Treaty in regard to which there
would be no compulsory arbitration, namely, cases where acts had
been done on one side or the other prior to July 1926 wbich might
be thought later by the other party to conflict with the 1886 Treaty,
but in regaid to which in July 1926 no claim had been formulated.
It is my submission. however, that the parties to the 1926 Declaration
pulsory arbitration in respect of claims arising out of acts occurring
before that date, when no claim at that date hadeven been formulated.
For that matter, this was not the only class of disputes which mi$ht
arise in the future on the past performance of the 1886 Treaty, which
the Declaration of 1926 does not cover. The Declaration of 1926 is
confined to claims on behaif of private persons. It does not cover
claims which one Govemrnent might wish to make against the other
on its own behalf, and claims of this kind might have arisen under
the Treaty of 1886, the provisions of which are by no means confined
to provisions relating to the treatment of nationals of one party in
the territory of the other, an1 may add that the Arbitration Protocol
of 1886 was not conhed to disputes arising out of claims made on
behalf of private persons. It covered claims of every sort for the
violation ofany of the provisions of 1886.
While, therefore, 1 agree with sub-paragraph 4 of paragraph IO of
the Greek Observations tliat our interpretation of the Declaration of
1926 leaves a vacuum in the sense that there is a category of claims
for which compulsory arbitration could not be claimed, 1do not agree
with the Greek Govemment's description of what that category was.
The vacuum was a wider one than the Greek Government here Say,
because it extends in addition to al1 claims which one Government
might have against the other and wliich did not relate to the treatment
of private perçons.
1 now come to the United Kingdom contention that its interpretation
of the Declaration is bonie out by the negotiations and discussions
which took place prior to the signing of the Declaration, and 1make
no apology for referring to these negotiations for the purpose of
as the Greek Government Say, the text certainly does not clearly clear,
hear the meaning which the Greek Governmerit put upon it. It
is not natural to read the words "does not prejudice claims on
behalf of private perçons" in the Declaration, as covering potential
claims, the nature of which has never been mentioned up to that date
and in particular a claim for a breacb of the 1886 Treaty which was
not made until 1939.
Now, it seems to be common ground that the Declaration was only
signed because the United Kingdom Iiad, in June 1926, raised an
issue about a certain class of claims on the basis oi the old Treaty.
It is also,1 think, common ground tliat what the parties then had in
mind was the British claim that British subjects should be exempted
from payments under a recent Greek forced loan on the ground that
the levy of contributions to this forced loan would be contrary to
Article 13 of the Treaty of 1886. The letter from the Foreign Office
of ~2nd June, which the Greek Government annexes to its Observa-
tions, makes this perfectly clear. It is also common ground that
the British claim for exemption from this forced loan had been for- ORAL .4RGUiZIENT OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 \'52 295

mulated before July 1926, but that there usas no dispute about it
at that date because up to that date the Greek Government had not
taken up any attitude contrary to the claim formulated by the United
Kingdom Government. So to this extent 1agree with sub-paragraph 6of
paragraph IO of the Greek Observations. It is also true, thougli so far
as 1 know it has no legal significance at all, that the Treaty of 1926
contained no article similar to Article 13 of the 1886 Treaty providiiig
for exemption from forced loans. 1 Say this is of no legal significance
at al1 because, even if there had been such an article in the Treaty
of 1926, it would not have been possible to rely on the article in the
1926 Treaty in regard to facts that occurred before that. Treaty came
into force. Now, in 1926 there was no difference of opmion between
the two Governments about the substance of what they wanted to
put in the Declaration, but it is true that the Greek Govemmentput
forward one text and the United Kingdom Government substituted
another text-and it was this second one that was ultimately signed.
The United Kingdom Goverument substituted another text on the
ground t+hatits text was more correct legally, although so far as the
substance was concerned, there was really no difference between the
two versions. The text which the Greek Government put forward
was quoted in paragraph 13 (1)of the Counter-Memorial and reads :

"It is well understood that in so far as-and 1 am here adoptiiig
the verbal amendment which the Greek Government themselves
sug est in their Observations-that in so far as the new Treaty
of tommerce between Great Britain and Greece does not cover
anterior claims eventually deriving from the Anglo-Greek Com-
mercial Treaty of 1886 ...."

Now, the United Kingdom Government did not think that this
was quite the right way of putting it. The reason clearly was because
the new Treaty of Commerce would not, whatever the nature of its
provisions, cover any claims deriving from an older treaty and relatirig
to events before the new Treaty came into operation. Thinking that
the Greek proposed text did not put the position quite correctly from
a legal point of view, the United Kingdom Governinent suggested
a text which, if not perfect, at any rate avoided this error.
Perhaps, however, the Greek Government of 1926 did not mean
"in so far as" as is suggested to-day, but "inasmuch as", in which
case no criticism could be made, but their words, as transmitted to
the Foreign Office, were at least ambiguous, so the Foreign Office
suggested another version, the one which was adopted. Still; if the
Greek Government of 1926 did mean "inso far as", its text was legally
inappropriate, and incidentally, the Greek Government to-day before
this Court are making the same error as the text proposed by it in
1926 for the Declaration, when they say that if a provision in the
Treaty of 1926 is the same in substance as the provision in the old
Treaty of 1886, then you can base your claim-wholly or partly-
on the provision in the new Treaty, although the claim relates to
events which occurred before the new Treaty came into force and
when the old Treaty was still in operation. And that is the commeiit
1 wish to make on sub-paragraphs 7 and S of paragraph IO of the
Greek Observations.296 ORAI. ARGUihIEKTOF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.R.)-15 V 52
Incidentally, the Court may notice that in the test for the Decla-

ration proposed by the Greek Govemment, the expression "anterior
claims" is used, and 1 do suggest that the words "anterior claims"
are only apt to describe claims mhich had already been formulated
and this sho\vs tliat the Greck Gol-ernment of 1426 onlv intended
to cover such cases.
For the reasons ivhich1 have iust summarized. the Uiiited I<inedom
Government coiiteiids tliat ttie~Declaration o,'I~~G only appli& to
claims already forn~ul;itetl nt that date, and therefore it does iiot
cover the claim iiithc preseiit case.
1.now come to the second inain argument of the United Kingdom
regarding the Declaration of 1926, namely that the Declaratiori is
not part of the Treaty of that date, andes not constitutea provision
of that Treaty forthe piirposes of Articl29.\\'hat are the facts with
regard to the Declaration ?
It was certainly signed on the same day as the Treaty, and by the
same vlenivotentiaries. butthe t\vo instruments bear seoarate siena-
tures.1 amin a position to file a certified photostato'fthe ori$iial
indeed 1 may saj thai it-was prepared at 'my oppoiienis' request,-

opponents some time before they ever gave copies to me. From this
photostat copy, it will be seen that the signatures at the foot of tlie
Treaty come on page zS, and that tlie signatures at the foot of the
Declaration coine on page 44. There is nothing in the Declaration
or iii the Treaty saying that the Declaration is an integral part of
the Treaty, and as a rule, wliere a separately signed instrument is
intended to be an iiitegral part of the Treaty, so that the provisions
of the separate instrument are deemed to be revisions of the Treaty,
this is stated in terms. Tlien the Declaration does not have in aiiy
sense the character of an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty
of 1926 ,or indeed has it anything to do with the manner iiiivhich
the provisions of the Treaty of 1926 are going to be applied by one
party or the otlier. If it liad that character, 1 should be prepared to
admit that it ivould be regarded as an integrai part of the Treaty,
even if this had iiot been stated in terms. In fact. the Declaration
does not relate to the Treaty of 1926 at ali;it merely says that the
Treaty of 1926 does not prejudice claims deriving from the old Treaty
(and if it had been more accuiately drafted, itwould have said that
the replacement of the old Treaty by the new Treaty did notprejudice
of the Treaty of f1886,tarid keeps alive a certain category of claimsovisioiis
made under the Treaty of 1886 and also the provisions of the Protocol
of 1886 regarding the arbitratioii of those claims, provisioiis wliich
are different from the pro\risions of t1926 Treaty itself, mith regard
to the arbitration of claims arising out of the26 Treaty. Xo~r.,.on
these facts, is there any reason at al1 mhy this Declaration, which in
fact has nothing to do with the 1926 Treaty, should be regarded as
an integral part of that Treaty-r be regarded as forming a provision
of that Treaty-wheii there is nothing in the test to Say tliat it ?s
1 would submit that there is no reason at al1for this view, and indeed
that the opposite \rie\\. is clearly the right one. ORAL :iRGUZIEST OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 V 52 297

By way of illustratioii of our argument tliat ail iiistrument which
not for that reason alone to be regarded as ail integral part of that
treaty and that, whether it should be so regarded depends on the
subject-matter of the t\vo instruments aiid on whether there is or is
not an express provision saying that one is part of the other, we
quoted in Our Counter-blemorial two other treaties signed by Greece
at approximately the same time as the Treaty of 1926, being treaties
to which other instruments were annexed, some of which were declared
to be integral parts of the treaty and others were iiot. 1 will only refer
now to the second of the two instances we quoted. iiamely, the Greek-
Italian Commercial Treaty of No\-ember 14th. 1926, and 1 could hardly
make the point 1 wish to make better thaii by quoti~ig a portion of
the Greek Observations, adopting it as my own and saying 1 think
it completely makes my point. This is what the Greek Government
says in the last t\\.o sub-paragraphs of paragraph S of its Observations
of April :
"The Greco-ltalian Commercial Treaty of Novemher qth, 1926,
was similarly accompanied by a final interpretative Protocol, hy
t\vo Declarations, and by a second Protocol and two exchanges
of letters. .And it is true that, while the Final Protocol and one
of the Declarations are expressed to be ail integral part of the
Commercial Treaty signed that day, this is not the case of the
second Declaration, the second Protocol and the two exchanges
of letters. Once again, the matter is easily explained :the Final
Protocol is purely and simply for the interpretatioii of the Treaty
laiid of the Greek entrv tariiï annesed theretol :similarlv one
of the two ~eclarations'is directly and exclusivély applicable to
the most-favoured-nation clause, the application of which it
in;rl;es siibject to the further condition of Îeciprocity in the case
of its being relied upon in relation to coastwise trading. On the
other hand the Protocol (and our opponents here are referring
to the second Protocoll and the letters are concerned with ~ure.v ,
pulitic;i;iiiiiior:il <~~icitiîf iio Ieg;tliriil>~~riniic~-tlieyin\.t~lvc(l
reii)cct of 1t;ili:rn :irririii;il ;<iiilivool. aiid Grcck \\.iclieiri
resbect of Greek tobacco and wiiie; to have incorporated them
in the Treaty of 1926 would not have been appropriate.
.As to the second Declaration, which is almost an exact repro-
duction of the Declaration accompanying the Greco-British Treaty
of 1926, the absence of any formal statement that it formed part
of the new treaty may be esplained by hesitatioii to incorporate
iii the new treaty matters equally referable to the earlier treaty."

To take the last observation, which 1 have just quoted, it is our
opponeiits' case that our Declaration of 1926 is "equally referable"
to the earlier Treaty and, therefore, according to my opponents, the
this Declaration in the 1926 Treaty-and,hesitateof course, it is my case
tliat they did not incorporate it. However, 1, of course, put it higher
still, because the Declaration of 1926 does not in any material sense
relate to the 1926 Treaty at al1 but exclusively to thc Treaty of 1686,
and, that heing so, Our opponents' words tliat "the parties may have298 ORAL ARGUXIEST 01: SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-1j V 52

hesitated to incorporate it in the new Treaty" in fact apply a fortiori.
The parties to our Treaty of 1926 did not in terms incorporate the
Declaration in the Treaty, and my contention is that they did not
wish to make the Declaration part of the Treaty and it is not part
of the Treaty.
Before we leave the mntter, let us look at the explanation given
ments which accompanied the Greco-Italian Treaty of 1926. Thisstru-
Treaty had a final interpretative protocol, and one declaration directly
and exclusively applicable to the most-favoured-nation clause in the
Treaty. These two instruments, tlierefore, were instruments interpreting
tlie provisions of tlie Treaty itself or indicating the manner in which
the provisions of the Treaty were to be operated. and these two instru-
ments were by express words made integral parts of the Treaty as,
1 submit, it is perfectly natural that they should. This Treaty was
also accompanied by another protocol and certain letters concerned
with what the Greek Government iiow describes as matters of political
and moral questions of no legal importance, and this second protocol
and the letters were not stated to be integral parts of the Treaty,
and 1 gather from the Greek Observations that the Greek Government
does not consider that they were an integral part of the Treaty. In
other words, if we look at this Greco-Italian Treaty of 1926, and al1
its annexed instruments, we reach the conclusion-and 1 gather that
the Greek Government does not dispute this-that where the Greek
and Italian Govemments nieant any annexed instruments to be integral
parts of the Treaty they said sa, and where they did not Say sa, the
instruments were iiot meant to be 'and are not integral parts of the
Treaty.
In conclusion, let me remind the Court that if Article 29 of the
rgzGTreaty is to be regarded as covering the Declaration, the Decla-
ration has to be considered to be one of the provisions of the 1926
Treaty itself, or in other words, the Declaration must he incorporated
in the 1926 Treaty. Article 29 would not apply to the Declaration
if the facts are that it is "equally referable" to the two Treaties, as
our opponents Say it is, and that the parties had hesitated to incor-
porate it in the new Treaty. In fact, however, 1 repeat, the Declaration
is not "equaüy referable" to the earlier Treaty, but relates entirely
and exclusively to the earlier Treaty, aiid has nothing whatever to
do with the new Treaty. and the Greek Government in its Obser-
vations, when it descnbed the Declaration as "equally referable" to
as the ill-founded contention that where you have similar provisionse
in the old and the new Treaty, you could bring a claim under the
provision in the new Treaty in respect of events which occurred'when
the old Treaty and not the new Treaty was in force.
1 will now conclude by summing up in skeleton form the argument
which 1 have submitted to-day to show that the Court has no juris-
diction to deal with the merits of the claim put fonvard by the Greek
Government on hehalf of hl. Ambatielos.

(1)The jnrisdiction of the Court, if it exists at all, must be derived
from Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926. ORAL ARGUMENT OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-15 V 52 299
(2) Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926 only confers jurisdiction on
the Court to deal with disputes relating to the interpretation
or application of the provisions of the Treaty of 1926 itself.

(3) The Treaty of 1926 only came into force in July 1926, arid
none of its provisions are applicable to events which took
place, or acts which were committed, before that date. This
is so whether or not the 1886 Treaty, which the Treaty of
1926 replaced, contained provisions similar to those of the
Treaty of 1926.
(4) The acts on which the Greek Government's claim is based
took place in 1922 and 1923, and therefore the provisions of
the Treaty of 1926 are not applicable to them.
(5) The Declaration which was signed at the sarne time as the
Treaty of 1926was not a part of that Treaty, and the provisions
of that Declaration are not provisions of that Treaty within
the meaning of Article 29.
(6) The claim which the Greek Government is makmg on behdf
of M. Ambatielos, in so far as it is based on any provision
of the Treaty of 1886, is not a claim covered by the Decla-
ration of 1926, becanse that Declaration only covered claims
which had been fonnulated nnder that Treaty before the
Declaration was signed, and the Greek Government did not
formulate any legal claim in respect of hl. Amhatielos until
1933, "or, indeed, any legal claim under the Treaty of 1886
till1939.
(7) The Treaty of 1886 contains no provisions incorporating in
the Treaty the general principles of international law with
regard to the treatment of foreigners in courts of justice or
othenvise, and in consequence it cannot be said that the
alleged denial of justice in breach of the general principles
of international law is a breach of the Treaty of 1886, merely
because it is a breach of the general principles of international
law.

That, MI. President, concludes the remarks which 1 wish to address to
the Court to-day on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom. 2. OBSERVATIONS OF M. LÉLY

(AGENT OF THE HELLENIC GOVERNMENT)'
AT THE PUBLIC SITTING OF MAY 16th, 1952, XORNIXG

It might well seem unusiial iiideed that my Government has resorted
to your esteemed Court for a case involving the Government of the
United Kingdom. The inipression is not incorrect, as the happily
existing, since time immemorial, friendly relations between the two
countries, never were closer and friendlier than they are to-day.
1 just wanted, Mr. President, to emphasize this point in order to stress
the fact that rny Government felt bound to protect the rights of one of
its subjects, to whom it felt that justice had not been accorded. On the
other hand, we thought that by resorting to your Court we are in a way
rendering a service to the British Government, because in spite of its
eventual willingness, they would be unable to re-examine a case which
was considered as closed. No government could act differently.
Our distinguished Counsel will be given, 1 am sure, the opportunity
to develop to the Court my Government's views in this case, but 1
feel that1 am in duty bound, MI. President, to express my regret for
the last phrase of one paragraph coutained in the Counter-Mernorial
of the British Government ; 1think it is page 165, paragraph 71.
1 believe that this must be due to an oversight, and1wish to assure
the Court that Our own exposé uill be confined purely to matters
of fact and law.,
Mr. President, may 1 ask to introduce to your Court, the Kt. Hon.
Sir Hartley Shawcross. 3. OIZAI- AI~GU~lEXT OF SIR HARTLEY SH..\\VCROSS
(COUSSEL FOR THE HELLESIC GOVERSJIEST)

AT THE PtiRLIC SITTlSG OF MAY 16th. 1952, >IORSING

AIay it please the Court. The point involved in this Preliminary
Objection by the United Kingdom Government is an extremely short
one ;indeed, 1 doubt.whether there is more in it than the question
whether thc Declaration which was appended to the Treaty of 1926,
in fact is to be regarded, for present purposes, as part of ttiat Treaty.
The whole argument is set out in considerable dctail in the written
Observations which the Greek Government have submitted to the
Court iii reply to the objections by the United Kingdom Government,
aiid 1 am very coiiscious of the fact that beforc a high tribunal such
being repeated over and over again, and 1 shall try, tlierefore, iny
addressing you to. be reasonahly brief. Xor shall 1 follow my learned
friend very far, although 1 shall have to follow him a little, in the quite
unespected excursion which he thought right to make into the merits
and substance of the maper, but 1 cannot allow to pass entirely unchal-
lenged the observations which he did address to the Court.
JIy learned friend saidas to the merits that he would condense what
he wanted to Say into a nutshell; urell, >Ir. President, the construction
of this interesting but not always edible fruit, occupied my learned
friend for considerably over an hour, but 1 am fortunate, 1 hope, in
being able to occupy rather less time because 1 shall try to go straight
to the kernel of the matter, if 1might pursue my learned friend's analogy.
On the merits of this case there really is no possibility of doubt that
hl. Ambatielos has suffered very grave damage owing to four facts-
1 think 1 can summarize them quite shortly under four headings-
which are themselves incapable of dispute or doubt, and the first fact
is this, that at the time when M. Ambatielos agreed to purcliase the
nine ships whichwere then building for the United Kingdom Government
at Hong Kong, the appropriate official, the appropriate civil servant
of the British Government concerned with the negotiations for the
contract-a gentleman called Major Laing, apparently supported by
another gentleman who was his superior officer, Sir John Maclay, who
afterwards became Lord Maclay, a person of some importance in the
hierarchy of the British Executive at that time-there is no doubt
that Major Laing, as 1 Say, supported by Sir John hlaclay, orally
promised If. Ambatielos that the ships which he was contracting to
buy would be delivered between certain dates, various dates between
August 1919 and hlarch of 1920. That fact was made clear after the
conclusion of the case in the English Court of trial by the fact that
information came to hl. Ambatielos of a letter written by this Major
Laing to hissuperior, Sir John Maclay, and not disputed by the superior,
and the text of that letter is set out in the Jlemorial of the Greek
Government at page 32, Annex E, and what Major Bryan Laing, writing
then during the course of the proceedings which were actually taking
place in the English Court, said to his superior officer who had been302 ORAL ARG. OF SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (GREECB)-16 V 52

with liim in the CivilService at the time the contract was made was th:s
"With regard to the sale of the ships to Ambatielos, 1 have, as
far as 1 can, with the help of my secretary, refreshed my memory
as to what actually took place prior to the sale of the steamers
then building in Hong Kong.
As you will remember, 1 was a pessimist as to the future of
shipping, and my one idea was to reduce the liability against the
Ministry of Shipping as rapidly as possible.
1 was of the opinion that it was most essential to dispose of
the ships building at Hong Kong, and 1 had cables sent to our
agents who were responsible for the building and completion, and
they cabled back dates which they considered quite safe, and it
was on this information that 1 was enabled to put forward a
proposition to you.
The Eastern freight market at that time being very high, 1
came to the conclusion, aiid laid my deductions before yourself
and the Committee of the Ministry of Shipping, that, provided
these ships could be delivered at the times stated by our agents
on behalf of the builders, they were wortli, with their position,
owing to the freight they could earn, another ~500,ooo. and this
1 added to what 1 considered an outside price for the ships. It
attach great weight-itenwas only by this argument that I induced 1
Ambatielos to purchase the ships. This figure worked out at l36

tonners.D.W. for 8,000 tonners and over £40 per ton for 5,000
The hlinistry of Shipping got a very large sum of money on
account, and in addition were relieved of the expense of sending
officers and engineers out to Hong Kong...."

Then he goes on to deal with similar transactions in the case of other
people, and he points out how it was by stipulating fixed delivery dates
that the British Ministry of Shipping at that time was able to secure
for the ships they were seeking to sel1 a far higher price than would
have been the case if no delivery date had been provided for. Indeed,
the truth of what Major Laing said is confirmed by a telegram from
another gentleman, a Sir John Esplen, who was an officia1in the Ministry
of Shipping at that time, which is set out at page 30 of the Memorial.
This was a telegram from the British Executive to Hong Kong, and it
referred to one of the nine ships which M. Ambatielos was buying. 1
mention it simply as a corroboration from another source-"As the
is of the utmost importance that she should be completed by that date.
Cable immediately progress of construction."
\Veilnow, that is the first fact, and it is beyond doubt that orally,
for whatever an oral promise may be worth-that is another matter-
but orally, M. Ambatielos was induced to pay ~5oo.000more for these
nine ships by the promise that they would be delivered within certain
fixed dates.
The second fact, also 1 think beyond dispute, is that the British
Government, knowing at the time of the trial before the British Courts
that this was the evidence which Major Laing and Sir John Maclay-
Sir Joseph Maclay it nas, iiot Sir John-could give, did not cal1either ORAL ARG. OF SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (GREECE)-16 V 52 303

of these two gentlemen as witnesses before the trial of the Court, or
disclose to M. Ambatielos the evidence which they could give to the
Court.
The third fact, which is also beyond dispute, is that when M. Amba-
tielos, on becoming aware independently of the existence of this evidence
which could be given by Sir Joseph Maclay and Major Laing, sought
leave tocall it in the Court of .4ppeal-he could uot cal1it in the Court
below, but when he got to know of it he wanted to cal1 it in the Court
of Appeal-his application for leave to call it, to place it before the
Court, was objected to by the United Kingdom Government on the
grounds that the evidence ought to have been called in the Court
below, although, as every advocate knows, it is an elementary rule of
advocacy that a party does not cal1 witnesses without first knowing

what evidence they are going to give, a knowledge which was withheld
from bl. Ambatielos by the United Kingdom Government, which itself
knew quite well what evidence they would be able to give. And the
fourth point is this, that as a result, 1 will not Say of the concealment
of this vital evidence by the United Kingdom Government, but of their
failure to make sure that it was ~laced before the Court of trial. the
Engliili ii,iii\\.aIIC,~ ipu5..t1~ii~ilci,f ii~rts \\.l$irIimiqlit, 1cxiinut s;ry
inUr%t%linri tlint, \i.liicli iiiiylit Iin\.c n vvrvittliif~,rriit ii~ii:lu~iun.
It\va: iaid bv III\I~~rncclfricntl rliat \f. .\nib:itieltn$l1~1t~xl~nii~t~d
al1 his legal qemedies before the Municipal Courts of England, that he
might have appealed still further to the House of Lords, and that tliat
Supreme Court of Appeal in England might have allowed him to cal1
this additional evidence. But that really is not so ; the decision of the

Court of Appeal in England was in relation to a matter of procediire
and it involved the exercise of a discretion by the Court of Appeal
which the House of Lords would not upset. Here 1 think 1 must alid,
because my learned friend may possibly have had this in mind when
addressing you about the possibility of an appeal to the House of Lords,
that 1 do not in any way associate myself with the attack on the good
faith and impartiality of the English Courts in this d natter. One can
understand that M. Ambatielos, having a real sense of injustice, perhaps
attributed the result of the case to a lack of fairness or1the part of the
judges-1 certainly do not associate myself with that view, and that is
not, in my submission, the point at all. The gravamen of this case against
the United Kingdom Government is this, that the United Kingdom
Government having itself knowledge of evidence whicli might have had
a vital bearine on the decision of the Enelish Courts. failed to make
that evidence Lown to the English Courts. rt is one thing not to prodiice

State documents, correspondence pas sin^ between different officials
of the government, documents for which, as a class, State privilege may
properly be claimed-1 do uot want to Say a word to diminish the
importance of the right of governments to withhold from disclosiire
State documents which are privileged in that way-that may be a v?ry
necessary and justifiable position, but it is quite another thing to
conduct litigation on a basis which is wholly inconsistent with eviderice
available from the government officials most closely concerned with
the matter, and to do so without making known to the other side-
the opposite party-that this evidcnce exists. That is the complaint
that ismade in this case, and that is the matter whicli causes such grave
anxiety. Whether the production of this evidence woiild have led the304 ORAL ARC. OF SIR HARTLEY SH.A\VCKOSS (CREECE)-16 V 52

Court toa different conclusion, nobody caii of course Say, but this at
least is certain about this matter, that RI. Ambatielos was induced to
buy these nine ships, was induced to enter into a written contract to
buy these nine ships, on the faith of oral representations, possibly wliat
we cal1 in our system of law in England a collateral oral warranty,
that the ships would be delivered by certain dates. It is certain that the
ships were not delivered by those dates, and that in the result XI.Amba-
tielos suffered grave loss instead of eaming a large profit.
Out of a total cost, a total in costs and charges of someIn fact, the
payments wliicli he made, if you include with tliem the necessary
disbursements in connection yith the purchase, amounted to a total of
about So % of the purchase price. a larger percentage of cash payment
than was normal at tlie time and far larger than is customary now in the
purdiase of sliips in such circumstances. Wliat was left unpaid was
left ovcr on the assumption, which would have beeii correct if the
Uiiited Kingdom Government had delivered the ships by the new dates,
that the balance would have been eariied by sliips carrying freights
long before the remainder of the sliips were actually due for delivery.
'Tliat is the transaction into whichM. Ambatielos entered, and which
was stigmatized by my learned friends.

Le PKES~DEST en exercice :J'aimerais vous rappeler ce que je vous
ai dit hier matin, à savoir que vous devez éviter autant que possible
de toucher le fond du différend.Je sais que, quelquefois, pour pouvoir
&leffleurer le fond du différend,mais ce n'est pas le cas dans la présente
affaire. D'ailleurs. dans l'exposé que vous venez de faire, vous étés
entré en plein sur le fond de la question du litige qui n'est pas eii ce
moment devant la Cour. Je sais aussi que vous avez étéun peu entraîné
par les remarques de sir Eric Beckett, mais je voudrais vous prier
de rester, autant que possible, sur le seul plan de la compétence de
la Cour.

Sir HARTLEV SHAIVCROSh Sf:r. President, I fully appreciate and accept
the observations which you have addressed to me. When 1 came here
yesterday, the plan of my speech did not involve oiie single word,notone,
oii the merits,ut asmy learnedfrienddevotednearly a thirdofhisspeech
to merits iia way which may gain publicity-1 don't know-1 feltthar
and to the public that there was possibly another point of view. But 1rt
have now left the matter and 1onlywanted to add-and this is not really
on the merits-two things :one is that it was said by my learned friend
that M. Ambatielos engaged on a gamble. If he did, it was a gamble on
the BritishGovernment carrying out the oral promise of one of its civil
servants. 1'L.enot hitherto heard that described as a gamble.
The final thing that 1 should like to add is just t:that the circum-
stances relating to this Ambatielos affair have for a long time been a
source of grievance and dispute andcontention betweeii theGoLernments
of Greece and of the United Kingdom, whose relations have othenvise
been, asthe Greek Minister has just said, whollyfriendly.Thematter may
not be offirst-class importance-1 should not suppose that the Security
Council will ever be inrited to intervene in regard to it-andyet it is a
source of what many Greek citizens regard as an injustice inflicted on ORAL ARC. OF SIR HARTLEY SHAM'CROSS (CREECE)-16 V 52
306
And, fifthly, 1 Say further, or in the alternative, that in so far as the
provisions of the 1926 Treaty replace and continue those of the Treaty
of 1886, the arbitration clause, Article 29 of the 1926 Treaty, took the
place of the 1886 Protocol and covers the present case.
Mr. President, 1 might have added a sixth point, based upon the
Charter of the United Nations and referred to, 1 think. in paragraph 5
of the Conclusions of the Greek Government's Memorial. That para-
graph-1 think I'm right that it is contained in that paragraph-yes-
that paragraph was put in because of the frequent protestations of the
English Government. made with absolute sincerity and made last in the
Persian case which is still hefore the Court. of its adherence to the prin-
ciples of the mle of law and international adjudication. It may, nodoubt,
be tme that the Charter of the United Nations, in requiring matters to
be siibmitted to the Interiiational Court, is dealing with those which
othenvise might lead to a breach of the peace. But surely, the United
Kingdom Government is not saying that its support of the mle of law
in international affairs and its devotion to the principle of international
arbitration before this Court or before some other independent tribunal,
is limited to cases in whicli otherwise wars might occur. 1 can't think
that is the contention of the United Kingdom Government. But I'm not
~oiiig tt?puriiic tliatpr~iiiiii~vbri.tiise1ij.cgoud 1,oiiil.iregooJ rn<,ugli
for nic \r.itli~~cxplorin: tlic puisil>ilitir<ii.isixIli point \ihirli i~erha,,i
is not so good. -

apparently taken up bythe United Kingdom Government. 1may perhapsion

put that position in language less diplomatic-less euphemistic-than
\vas. employed by my learned friend ; but the position is this : since
1886 to the present time, the United Kingdom Government has recipro-
callv ae~eed to extend to the citizens of Greece a most-favoured-nation
trcitn1;~iit311duttl~r 1)ri\.iieges,a1~151 in 111aLlcrrii.I:ltilll:to C~lnlllCrCt~.
wlti(.tIIIUS~, iiniv submii~ioii. iiiclii<lciiiarr<.rs.irisinfi.ifi:oiiirnïrci:il
transactions. suih as litieation' resultin~: from commercial contracts.
Moreover, the ~overnmenFs have agreedthat any dispute between the
respective Governments as to whether that most-favoured-nation
treâtment or those rights have, in fact, been accorded in a particular
case, should be the subject of one kind or another of international
arbitration. Before the 16th July 1926, it was arbitration by arbitrators
who were selected ad hoc. After the 16th lulv ",26. i, was arbitration
by the Permanent Court.
Mr. President, that being the general background, the position taken
up by the United Kingdom Government now is the remarkable one
that by accident-for it cannot seriously be argued that it was by
intention or design-there isa gapin this consistent policy of arbitration
in commercial disputes which has heen pursued by both Governments.
And the United Kingdom Government apparently Say this :

"At the verv moment when we were re-assertine and verhaos
extending the' privileges of most-fairoured-nation-treatkent in
commercial matters urhich we mutually accorded to each other'ç
citizens : at the verv moment when we were strenetheninrr the
principlé of compulsory arbitration by substituting the Ïnter-
national Court for ad ltocarbitrators, the principle which had distin-
guished our relations for over forty )leas [at that time] Ourtreaty ORAL ARG. OF SIR HARTLEY SHA\VCROSS (GREECE)-1 ' 52 307

arrangements resulted in this : That wrongs suffered by Greek
citizens in contravention of the 1886 Treaty before the coming
into operation of the Treaty of 1926, could not be the subject of
arbitration under the earlier Treaty, unless prior to the 16th July
1926 the Greek Government had intervened, and made fonnal
claims on behalf of its citizens;
and on the other hand, they could not be the suhject of arbi-
tration under the 1926 Treaty, because although the Goveriiment
of Greece might have intervened and made formal claims in respect
of them after the 1926Treaty came into operation, the facts and
the. circumstances on which the claims were based arose during
the period of the Treaty of 1886and not during the period of tliat
of 1926."

Tliat is the proposition-less euphemisticaiiy espressed-but tliat
is, in fact, the proposition which the United Kingdom Government
put before this Court. and 1 would respectfully submit that this pro-
position would seem to offend common sense, and that it can be shown
to demonstration that it involves a denial of justice to which one would
regret the United Kindgom Government being a Party.
Mr. President. 1 want as an exam~le to that, outside the merits of
tliiscase .iltogctti?r. to t:~kc3 l~~~~~~'fli~t iasel.'I-dkc. for i~irtanct:,
Articlc 1of tlict\i.<'l're:,ti; tli~tn.~ :~rti~.li.i-:\rticle I iii ccase-
are in almost indentical language, and they are set out side by side with
ment's Counter-Memorial. And under those articles, amongst otlierovern-
things, Greek subjects were to be entitled to come freely with their
ships and their cargoes to al1ports opento citizensof the United Kingdom.
Imagine the no-doubt-unlikely case of a refusal of the United Kingdom
authorities to permit the entry of Greek cargoes through-for instance
-the port of Southampton. Any other case arising under the article,
which contemplates al1 sorts of different possibilities, would be just as
good, but 1 am taking that unlikely case as an example on which to
base an argument. The refusal of the right of entry to Greek vessels
to the port of Southampton would obviously be a gross violation of
Article 1 of each of the two Treaties, and suppose that it had occurred
just a few days before the signing of the 1926Treaty in July of 1926.
Perhaps the Greek shipowner, being told that he could not go to
Southampton.made his protest to the port authorities there ;perhaps his
consignee, of the cargoes which he wanted to deliver, made representa-
tions to the English Board of Trade. But at that stage the Greek
Government had no knowledge of the matter at al1 ;there is no remn
why they should have done ;it had only just occurred. And consequently
it did not intervene, and it made no forma1claim on behalf of its citi-
zens. Then came, two or three days later, the signing of the Treaty of
July 1926.And the followingweek, the Greek Government \vas apprised
of the fact that its shipowner had beeii denied access to the port of
Southampton, and immediately intervened on behalf of its citizen and
made a forma1 energetic claim.
The United Kingdom Government apparently ask this Court to ac-
cept the view that in such a case they might not only refuse to admit the
claim made by the Greek Government, but they could also deny the right
to any arbitration at al1about it. No arbitration under the 1886Traty, ORAL ARC. OF SIR HARTLEY SHAIVCROSS (CREECE)-16 V 52 305)

'and no doubt you will think the proper course, of sending to the United
Kingdom Government the very statement which hl. Ambatielos Iiad
made to them. \\'ell. now. iio doiibt the letter of 25th se~tember was a
vcrv diplomntic duciiiiieiit, niid dil)loiiiatic 11nguagin 1925 \r.~s. I cldr?
say, ev,!ii iimrc il~plni~i:itrli 1,Ii~~lt,iii:ttitI::t~i<III 1c,5; ccrt~iiiilv
it \vasiinrcnuclic(l iiitli~I.iiicii:ttltiit~'~~SCÇU~IIICLOUIIJC ~nil~criiiz
a criminal before 21Criminal Eoict might be expecïed to use. But it ii
no more necessary in diplomatic correspondcnce tlian it is in municipal

law, when perhaps the question of whether a claim lias been made in
due time, in proper time, may arise, formally to specify the article and
the treaty, or thc section and the statute iinder which the particular
claim is made ; it is enough in making a claim tliat the subject-matter
of the claim is statecl, and if tliat suhject-matter is such as to come within
a particular treaty or a particular statute, although no reference is
made to the treaty or the statute, the claim is good. One must apply
a little common sense to correspondence of this kind and perhaps it is
not alwvaysvery easy or very diplomatic for a governmerit like the Greek
Government to challenge a much more powerfiil State in language of
any violence ; this was CIclaim which was made diploinatically but in
yhich 1 suggest the position was made perfectly clear. Indeed, when

my learned friend Sir Eric Beckett spoke about "reviving a stale claim",
he selected his language, as he always does, with grezrt accuracy and
care ; it was a claim, as Sir Eric said, which was later revived, and by
no means simply a request for some ex gratin payment.
It has further been contended by the United Kingdom Governnient
that the Declaration of the 16th July 1926 was iiot part of the Treaty
of 1926, and 1come to the third point of the five that Imentioned. But
as to that, my learned friend admitted that he would accept the Decla-
ration as part of the 1926 Treaty if it "liad anything to do with the
1926 TreatyM-and 1 attaclivery great sigiiificance to that admission
which my learned friend very properly made.
\\'ell, now, the question is : has the Declaratiori of 1926 "got anything

-to do with" the Treaty to which it was appeiided? If it has, that is
an end to the matter and the Greek Governmeiit is eiititled to go ou.
My learned frieiid agrees that that is the position.
Now, Iiow it can be said that the Declaratioii of 1926 has nothing
to do with the Treaty, it is a little difficult to iiiiderstand. It is really
.only necessary to read the first words of the Ileclaration itself, and
the first words of the Declaration are these :

"It is well understood that the Treaty of Conimerce and Xavi-
gation between Britain and Greece of to-day's date does not, etc."
How it can be said tliat that has nothing to do with the Treaty, when
the very words say in fact that it does, 1 don't altogether follow, but

the fact is, that the Declaration was necessary in order to explain the
effect of the 1926 Treaty itself. The position was this, although it is
not, 1 think, expressly stated in the Treaty itself. One of the effects of
the 1926 Treaty was, as Sir Eric Beckett said, that it would replace
the old Treaty-those were the words lie used arid tlicy were accurate
xvords. The 1926 Treaty replaced the old Treaty. Ifthere had been no
declaration' attaclied to the 1926 Treaty, the replacement of the old
Treaty would have wiped out, aiid taken tlie place of, al1the provisions
of tlie 1SS6Trcaty, and on that view it could have beeii arguecl al1tlie

21310 ORAL ARG. OF SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (GREECE)-16 V 52

more strongly that the arbitration clause, zg, of the 1926 Treaty had
replaced the Arbitration Protocol of the Treaty of 1886. The truth is
replaced the Treaty of 1886by restrictin the effect of the 1926Treaty
upon the 1886 Arbitration Protocol. -hat was the purpose of this
Declaration.
Of course, this argument of the United Kingdom Government is really
a very technical one. It may not be the worse for that, but it is highly
technical. If this Declaration is not part of the 1926Treaty, then it is
a separate treaty in itself. Nohody has ever so regarded it, nobody has
ever so published it. It is true that the Declaration is not contained in
the main body of the Treaty, but, of course, that is not necessary. There
is an interesting example of a declaration appended to a treaty and
accepted as part of the treaty, in an Anglo-French treaty of 1824which
is referred to in Sir Arnold McNair's book on treaties, and no doubt
many similar examples could be found if one occupied time in going
treaty, it was part of the same document, it was signed at the same time,
it was ratified by the Greek Government-not by the United Kingdom
Government, it is true, although of course it is clear that no ratification
of such a declaration is necessary-iwas publisbed in the same British
State Paper as the rest of theTreaty, and by its opening words it showed,
as 1 suggest. that it had to do, that its oblects was to have to do, with
the application of the 1926Treaty.
Now, Mr. President, if that is correct, if it is an integral part of the
1926Treaty, this Court has jurisdiction under Article zg of that Treaty
to Say what in fact the Declaration means.
What, then, Mr. President, does the Declaration mean ?It was laid
down as a principle of interpretation by the Permanent Court in the
Lotus case that there is no occasion to have regard to travaux prépa-
used in the document are clear in their ordinarv meanine. and it reallv terms
is no use attempting, as my learned friend Sir ~;ic ~eckeïi did, to mak;
some assumption as to what one of the parties meant or intended to
mean and then to Say that the words cankot mean anything else. That
is not a method of legal interpretation. The question :what do these
words mean on their face, in their ordinary sense, and if you can give
asensiblemeaningto them in that way, then there isnoneed to go behind
them and to enter into a controversial field as to what particular parties
may have meant orthought they meant,or wanted to mean at the time.
The answer here in this Declaration, in my submission, is clear and
certainly the trauaux préparatoiresdo not afford any indication of a
meaning differentfrom the ordinary meaning of the words which have
in fact been employed. This Treaty of 1926, it is declared, does not
noted well that the words are "based on", not "brought under", butt be
"based on"-the provisions of the Treaty of 1886.These words mean
no more. and certainly they mean no less, than they Say. If claims arose
in relation to facts arising before the 16th July of 1926,but as to which
the contracting parties would have been. or might have been, wholly
irnorant at that time. the fact that the Governments were contractin-
anew treaty would not prejudice such claims, if any there were, and the
following words, which are part of the same sentence, make the meaning ORAL ANG. OF SIR HARTLEY SH.A\\rCROSS (CREECE)-16 V 52 311

abundantly clear: "Any difference which rnay arise between the two
Governments:', it is declared, "as to the validity of such claimsH-that
is to Say, claims based on, but not made under. the Treaty of 1886
"shall be relerred to arbitration", and the words used are : "Any differ-
ence which may anse", in the French test "qiri pourraieiit s'élever".
Those words don't mean and they cannot mean claiins which have
already arisen prior to the 16th July 1926. They can only niean what
they Say, "which may arise"-that is to Say, which may arise in the
future, ancl if, therefore, the facts were that the dispute betweeu the
United Kingdom Government and the Greek Goveriiment, although
based on the provisions of the 1886Treaty, oiily arose as a dispute aftar
the signing of the 1926 Treaty [and that is what the United Kingdoin
contend], if the facts were that the dispute only arose alter the signing
of the 1926 Treaty, this Declaration in the 1926 Treaty would clearly
apply to it as being a dispute which on the 16th July 1926 "might
arise": might arise thereafter and did, iii fact, according to the United
Kingdom, arise thereafter, although it was based on the 1886 Treaty.
The Declaration of 1926 is either part of that Treaty, in which case,
as 1 Say, clause 29 applies to it, or othenvise it is a separate treaty with
the plain meaning that 1 have attributed to it, and in that case, the
United Kingdom Government is in the unenviable position of having
failed to carry out its terms by submitting this matter to arbitratioii,
although 1 agree that on that view the obligation might not be enforce-
able within the jurisdiction of this Court. That is really what the United
Kingdom Government is forced to say ; either it is part of the 1926
Treaty, in which case this Court has jurisdiction, or it is a separate
treaty in itself, in which case the United Kingdom Government is
apparently claiming to tear it up like a scrap of paper.
There is another point which may have some bearing on the matter,
although 1submit it with a good deal lesscoiifidence.Under the Protocol
to the 1886 Treaty, what could be submitted to arbitration there was,
firstly, any controversy respecting the interpretation or the execution
treaty and its validity. And secondly, the consequences of any violation a
of it. Clause 29 of the 1926 Treaty provided for arbitration as to the

place as to its application. But the Declaration appended to the 1926cond
Treaty involved what is possibly a significant departure in language.
Arbitration was to be retained, uot in re ard to the interpretation or
execution of the Treaty, but in respect ofclaims based upon the 1886
Treat ,and the purpose of the 1926 Declaration was therefore to keep
the 1J86 Protocol alive so far as the arbitration was one which related
to a claim based upon the 1886Treaty-in other words, the 1886 Arbi-
tration Protocol was to be kept alive in regard to thesamesubject-matter
and for the same purpose as was covered by Article 29 of the 1926
Treaty in respect of matters falling within the scope of the second
treatv. iiamelv. dis~utes as to the a~~lication of the Treatv-not as to
itj cseciiiiuii ur \.aii<lit;:il1tlint11.1siiuu. long siiicc I,;iss;(l. Thawns
;i1)urpojeilir~ctly :<siiic~:itr~\itli.rliiiiidced ~~~crsjitnt~< Ijlytlit:1926
'l're:itviis~.lf.Hadit iiot bccil C,i11:i'l'r<~t\,.tlie 1376D~UCL.<I\U vr~~~ilii
presumably have continued. S .
It would in my submission be taking a really over-technical view of
this matter, an over-legalistic view of this matter, to hold that the ORAL ARG. OF SIR H:\RTLEY SHA\\'CROSS (GREECE)-16 V 52 313

at least in regard to commercial matters. But whilst 1 am not going to
discuss those matters, it is clear that the Treaties of 1886 and 1926 on
matters which are relevant to the present dispute cover the same grouiid
and are often in identical language. and the articles on which 1 particu-
larly rely, 1 mentioned before (Articles 15 (3) and IO of the 1886
Treaty) ; and those are analogous, 1 think. most to Article 4 of the
Treaty of 1926. It may be said therefore (this is the fifth point), that in
respect of such matters-tliat is to Say matters which are covered in
corresponding terms by both Treaties-Article 29 of the 1926 Treaty
15 purely procedural and that its procedure in respect of disputes in
regard to matters common to both Treaties, although those matters
arose before the execution of the second Treaty, may be applied. In
other words, wliat 1 am sayiiig is that where you have a series of conse-

cutive treaties covering exactly tlie same ground, thelatter onereplaciiig
the former and tlie latter one setting up procedural machinery, matters
which arose during the currency of the first agreement may be submitted
to the procedural macliinery set up under the second agreement. That
would of course be a perfectly reasonablc arrangement, and the more
the United Kingdom Government seek to divorce the Declaration of
1926 from the Treaty of 1926, the more attractive that alternative
view-tliat Sectioii zg of the Treaty applies ipso facto in any case-
becomes.
There is reallv of course no difference in orincioie between the oro-
r.rlurt: b>r tlie :ettlsmciit of cliipiitcs lil&r,iiiiiiilci tlie 13% 'l'rcary
anii tlitproccdiir<:laid dowii iinder thc 'l'rc:iryofii,zG.I3orliart: bdsi.d
uii tlir i~riiiiiiileuf iiiterii;itii>ii;il;irbitr;tlit-r\voiild hi: iiotliiii~!
astonisking ii the two Governments having decided in 1926 that
cedures before the I'ermaiient Court should be substituted for pro-
cedures before ad Itocarbitration.
Having agreed to do that, tliere would be nothing astonishing in their
deciding at the same time that the latter procedure-the procedure
before the Permanent Court-should be adopted in respect to disputes
which are in every way identical with disputes wliich might arise under
the second Treaty, although in fact they happened to be based upon
certainly in the municipal law of Englandncy of(1hdo not know what thed
position is in the municipal law of other countries), procedural provi-
sions-and punishment, of course, is a more remarkable case-but
certainly as a mattcr of English municipal law, procedural provisions
and laws as to punishment are quite normally applied retroactively to
acts which, when they wcre committed, may have been within the terms
of diffcrent statutes laying down differcnt forms of procedurc. Indeed,
1 go further and Saytliat in so far asany presumptiou arises in the matter
at al1in English lai\., the presumption in English law as to procedural
statutes is in favourof retroactive application. And if, as the Fernanent
Court emphasize in the Phospltates in Morocco case, it is usual for
States in agreeing to accept a compulsoryjurisdiction to declare expressly
in the act by which they accept that compulsory jurisdiction that it is
not to be of retroactive effect, then the significant absence of any such
declaration in the present case might be thought to support the view
that a procedural provision of this kind may, in the absence of express
limitation, embrace antecedent disputes. ORAL ARG. OF SIR HARTLEY SHAWCROSS (GREECE)-16 Y 52
315
Treaty was in operation, and alleged to involve a breach of tlie provi-
sions of that Treaty ;and (5)this is such a case.

Mr. President, that concludes what 1 have the honour to address to
this Court, save that 1want to make two requests to it, the first is that
my persona1 presence may be excused in any subsequent proceediiigs,
because unfortunately 1 have a public engagement in London opening
some new public institution, whicli 1cannot very well escape, to-morrow.
The second is tliat if my learned friend shonld wish to reply, my friend
and colleague Professor Rolin may thereafter be heard in reply to him.
1 do not know, Sir, what your intentions are as to Sitting or what my
learned friend Sir Eric Beckett desires to do in regard to his reply, or
indeed whether he wishes to malie any reply, but 1 understand that if
the Court felt it possible, itould be for the convenience of both Parties
if the Court could sit to-morrow ; 1 am not saying whether the Court
shouid sit this afternoon or not, but assuming tliat the matter were not
finished this afternoon, and it may well befinished, that in that event it
u~ouldbe convenient ifthe Court could sit to-morrow. REP1.Y OF SIRERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-17 V j2 317

"Further, or in the alternative, that in so far as the provisions
of the 1926 Treaty replace and continue those of the 1SS6Treaty,
the arbitration provisions of -4rticle 29 take the place of the
1SS6 Protocol and cover the present case."

1 shall, tlicrefore, Say something, but not, 1 hope, \.ery much, on this
subsidiarycontention which Sir Hartle maintained rather half-heartedly.
Now, for convenience 1am going to reir to tliis Greek subsidiary conteii-
tioii as the "similar clauses theory". There is also the siibsidiary couten-
tion of the Government of the United Kingdom that, even if, contrary
toits principal contention, the Declaration is to be regarded as an integral
part of the 1926 Treaty, the claim now broiight in respect of M. Amba-
tielos does not fa11within the scove of that Declaration because that

Dcclnrnrion, \i.licit u,cj tlic ii.ord"'cl~ims", i,iilv ;o\.crccl clciims wliich
had bccn fonriii1;itccliiiicler thiSS6 'i'reat). hclorrti?c1;<tc?<flic sigiia-
tiirrof tlic Dcil:tr:itit,ri. ;iiid on rliis i)oio.il1makt: :ifi:\\.ciiiiinicnts
on the observations made by my learned lriend yesterday.
These three points, therefore, consisting of one main point and two
subsidiary points, appear to be really the only legal issues in the case.
Before 1 come to them there are just one or two things 1 should like
to Say. In the first place we warmly appreciate and reciprocate the refer-
ence made by His Excellency the Greek Agent to the old and continuing
friendly relations between the United Kingdom and Greece, and this .
case is not going to disturb those relations whichever way the decision
goes. The Greek Agent then said tliat there was only one thing which
he regretted in the case and that \vas tlic last sentence of paragraph 71
of the United Kingdom's Counter-Memorial. There we said this :

"Tlie United Kingdom Government considers this contention
false and scandalous."

Xow the contention whicli the United Kingdom called "false aiid
scandalous" \vas the contention tliat the decision of the Eiiglish Court
of .4ppeal in 1923, refusing hl. Ambatielos's application to cal1 two
witnesses, was not in accordance with English law and practice, was
influenced by anti-foreign prejudice and \vas a decision so mrong tliat
in giving it, the Court of Appeal fcll below the minimum standard of

justice required by international law. \\je were rery happy to see tliat
Sir Hartley Shawcross, on behalf of the Greek Government, withdrew
altogether these aspersions on the English Court of Appeal, and tliat
there is now only one denial of justice which it is alleged was committed,
and that is in connection with the conduct of the case for the Crown
at the hearing in the Admiralty Divisii>iiin 1922 in the matter of two
witnesses and two letters. Now we have reached the happy position
where something which we regrettcd and something which the Grcek
Agent regretted,both disappear altogether from the case.
Then, Sir Hartley did not contend tliat any provision in the Charter of
the United Xations invested this Court with jurisdiction in this case,
and as jurisdiction is the sole issue, 1 shall not comment on the remarks
he made on the conduct of the United Kingdom in this case in connection
with certain provisions of the Charter, because in the circurnstances

these observations were irrelevant. aiid I leave it with the comment that
if they had not been irrelevant, 1 might be able to Say a good deal on
the other side. Idonotmean to Say one word aboutthe merits of the case.Sir Hartley Sha\vcross, before you stopped him, Rlr. President, on the
ground that he was going too far into the merits of the case, had stated
that there were four points which he thought were beyond dispute, and1
will only Saythat the Counter-Memorial shows that the United Kingdom
does dispute the facts as he stated them.
Having briefly disposed of these matters, which are not of much-if
any-relcvance, it remains for me to make iny submissions to the Court
on the three arguments with which it really has to deal. As 1 said just
case. Like Sir Hartley, 1 will Say what 1 have to Say on the subsidiary
arguments first and close with my submissions upon the really vital
point in the case.
There is, however, one tlieme-which 1 cal1 the "vacuum theme"-
on which our opponents harp and which they use in one way and another
to support their views on al1 the three questions which 1have just
enumerated, and for this reason 1Saya word or two about it separately.
The vacuum theme crops up here and there in Sir Hartley's address
in the same way as what 1 have called the "similar clauses theory"
keeps cropping up in the Greek Observations of April. The vacuum
theme is advanced, 1 think, as a reason why the Court should take our
opponents' view on any one of the three questions, because, as 1 under-
stand it, our opponents Say that their view produces the result which
common sense demands or Cheresult which is most desirahle.
Our opponents point out-correctly-tliat there was a Treaty of
1886, under which the United Kingdom and Greece accorded to each
other and their nationals certain privileges and rights, and that nnder
that Treaty any dispute as to whether the rights specified in the
Treaty had been accorded in a particular case could be referred to
arbitration at the will of one party only. They then point out-equally
correctly-that when the Treaty of 1886came to an end and was
replaced by the Treaty of 1926, a treaty which accorded rights and
privileges, some of which were the same (or substantially the same) as
the 1926cTreaty also provided for disputes arising out ofit tobesubmitted
to arbitration at the will of one party only. From this our opponents
Say that common sense or expediency requires that there should be
no arbitral vacuum of any kind at the time of the change-over from the
old Treaty to the new one-tliat is to Say, that tliere should be no
claims in respect of wliich arbitration is not compulsory.
Now 1 think that our opponents admit that if there had been no
Declaration in 1926at all, there wouldhave been a gap, there would
have been a vacuum. They do not argue. as 1 understand it, that in
the absence of this Declaration the arbitral provisions of the old Treaty
could be invoked by either party after the old Treaty had ceased to
be in force in anydispute atall,or that Article 29of the new Treaty would
in this event (when there is no Declaration) have applied to al1disputes
after July 1926on facts occurring during the period of the old Treaty.
But for the Declaration, therefore, there would certainly have been a
vacuum.
Now there certainly would never have been any Declaration, if just
before the new Treaty was signed, the United Kingdoin had not formu-
lated to Greece a claim that British subjects should be exempt from
the payment of contributions to a Greek Forced Loaii, a loan which REPLY OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-17 V 52
319
had been decreed at tlie beginning of the year 1926. But for this fact
there wonld have been no Declaration at al1and the two Go\-emments
would apparently have been perfectly content that this vacuum, ahich
Ouropponents find so deplorable, should exist. Our opponents are attri-
buting to the two Governments of 1926 an abhorrence of an arbitral
vacuum for which there is no contemporary evidence. Sir Hartley. wlien
he described the Declaration as being-and 1 here quote-"desired to
modify the extent to which the 1926 Treaty replaced the Treaty of
Protocol", is simply inventing a supposed desire for which there is no
evidence at al1in tlie contemporary records. 1 took my quotation from
Sir Hartley from the top of page 310.
The contemporary records show that the purpose of the Declaration
in the minds of those who drew it up was to cover the British claim
with regard to the Greek Forced Loan. The United Kingdom stated
that this was so in its Counter-Memorial and the Greek Observations of
April, so far from contesting this, admit it in paragraph IO,sub-para-
graph 6, and the letter of June which the Greek Government annexes
toits'Observations of Aoril coinoletelv oroves that this was so.
Undoubtedly the ~eciaration does pa'rtially fil1this arbitral vacuum,
but even so, our opponents do not argue that the Declaratiou filled
this vacuum comofe~elv. Even on our'oooonents' case. there is not a
perfect and comptete continuity of comp&ory arbitration. Altogether
there is an unreality in our opponents' case that the two Govemments
in 1926 must be taken to ha% abhorred any arbitral vacuum. In fact,
the two Governments seemed perfectlyindifferent to an arbitral x-acuum,
providing that certain particular cases, which were actual, were covered.
The "vacuum theory" finds no support in the contemporary records of
1926 at ail.
1 now come to the contentioii of our opponents which Sir Hartley
maintained in a subsidiary way, which 1 call, for convenience, the
"similar clauses theory". The "similar clauses theory" is the contention
similar in effect to substantive provisions of the 1886 Treaty, thene
Article 29 can be invoked in respect of an alleged hreach of an article
which is similar in the two Treatie;a breach which occurred before the
new Treaty came into operation. Sir Hartley did not Say, andthe Greek
Government has not said in its written pleadings, that Article 29 could
be invoked in respect of acts occurring before the 1926Treaty came irito
force, uiiless it could be alleged that the act complained of infringecl a
provision which was similar in both Treaties.
Now on the basis of the "similar clauses theory", it is one of the two
alleged effects of tlie Declaration that the Declaration removed these
pre-1926 claims on behalf of private persons based on similar articles
from the jurisdiction of this Court as the arbitral body, in order to leave
these disputes within the jurisdiction of an arbitral body composed
according to the 1886Protocol. Theother effect of the Declaration on the
"similar clauses tlieory" was to provide a tribunal for pre-1926 claims
based on articles in the 1886 Treaty. which had no article similar to
them in the 1926 Treaty. Now, the second effect is intelligible enough,
but as for the first effect. it falls to those who put fonvard the "similar
clauses theory" to esplain-because 1 cannot-why the parties to the
1926 Declaration should have waiited to take away from the HagueCourt the cases based on similar clauses and keep them for an arbitral
body constituted accnrdiig to the 1886 Protocol. The fact that this is
one of the effects of the Declaration~~~~~~ur~ .~ ~enr.' theorv about
similar clauses is correct, is of course only one of many arguments against
the whole "similar clauses theorv". Xow. as 1 have alreadv indicated.
the iuntciiipornry records sliow ihat the Co\.ernmentî iri i9zii Iind no

idens of tliis kiiid in tlicir miiiris xt al1but \vc.recunccrneIO fiii(iiiitnble
-eneral words to cover the Forced Loan cases. and for natural reasons
of prrstigc tu cxl)rcsi irlint tlie!. \v;iiited to siii :reciproc:il foriiiSou,
that is what the (;o\.eriimcnts \vcrc rciilly ttiinkiiig :ibi>iiii1i)~0.
Sir Harrli:\. SIi:i\vcruj;, ivliile in;iiiit;iiiiiii:i iecondort~ \i,;i\tlie
',similar clauies tlieory", only contrihuted one new argumentuin sÜpport
of it, and that argument was- if1 may Sayso with the greatest respect-
the production of a completely false analogy. He said, and said rightly,
that in municipal law, nhen the code of procedure which the Courts
apply is changed, the new procedure applies to actions brought after

the change, though the actions may relate to events which took place
long before the change of procedure \vas made (and 1have no doubt that
is right). If Sir Hartley had been dealing here with the change in the
niles of procedure of this Court as applied to a case relating to facts
which had occurred before the rules were changed, his analogy would
have been a good one ; but since the present case relates to one bilateral
treaty, replacing another, perhaps a closer analogy in municipal law
would have been-if he had been able to invoke it on his side-the case
where two companies conclude a contract with an arbitral clause in it,

and then conclude a later contract \vith a different procedure for arhitra-
tion. If Sir Hartley had been able to say that in snch a case the arbitral
procedure in the second coiitract could be invoked for breaches of the
first contract, when, apart from the different periods to whicli they apply,
the substantive clauses of the second were suhstantially the same as
those of the first, then his municipal analogy might have helped it.
But of course that is not the case in municipal law at all, and 1contend
that it is not the case with regard to bilateral treaties in international
law. Apart from this, Sir Hartley produced no argument to show how
Article 29, which refers to the interpretation and application of the
provisions of the present Treaty. could apply to breaches of articles

of the old Treaty similar to those of the new Treaty, though the period
of time to which the two Treaties relate is different.
At the moment, therefore, when the United Kingdom is speakiiig
for the last time, the Court has before it no argument in support of
the "similar clauses theory" except the assertion that it is the position in
tliis case, backed up by a completely false analogy from municipal law.
In fact, if Our opponents fail on their contention that the Declaration
is part of the Treaty-a point of course to which 1 am coming later-the
"similar clauses theory" no doubt appeals to them as something on
which they can still seize as a sort of tabulain naufragio. Now this tabula

is constructed of entirely iiovel material, and 1 think Our opponents'
Advocate can claim credit for a most ingenious new invention. For the
rest, 1 will not repeat to-day al1that 1 said on Thursday on the "similar
clauses theor),". The Court has heard it, and my words are now on the
minutes.
1 now come to the subsidiary argument of the United Kingdom,
and tliat is Ourargument that the Declaration of 1926 does not cover the REPLV OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-17 v 52 321
Ambatielos claim, because iii the 1926 Declaration the words "clairns on
behalf of private persons" only referred to claims which had been fonnu-
lated before the relevant date in July 1926 and not to claims whicli

might be formulated later in respect of events taking place before July
1926.
Sir Hartley's argument in the first place \vas that the United Kingdoni
interpretation of the Declaration made the arbitral vacuum wider ;
1have already said that the Goverrrments of 1926 were not much con-
cerned with the eliminatioii of an arbitral vacuum, but Sir Hartley also
stated that on his interpretation of the Declaration, the arbitral vacuum
was closed, in fact if not in theory, because though the Governments in
July 1926 might well not know what private claims could be made in
respect of acts already committed, they would inevitablyknow whetlier
or not there were any government:il claims. Perhaps the difference ~II
this respect between go\~errimentnlarid private claims isabit exaggerated,
because in the first place it is iiot certain that the Governments woulcl

know, on 16th July, wlien they sigiied the Declaration, of acts committed
a dav or two before wliich mieht cive rise to eovernmental claims. III
the &cond place, private grievi;nce;aiid claimsLre generally reported to
Foreign Offices pretty quickly. However, as 1 said on Thursday, on our
interpretatioii of the Declaration, the Governments were content not to
provide for compulsory arbitration for claims which had not then been
formulated, and if that iiivolved a risk, and it was not a big risk.
hforeover. how indifferent the two Governments of that time reallv
were to therisk of not having compulsory arbitration for claims undér
the 1586 Treaty not yet formulated, is shown by the fact that but for
the British Forced Loan claims, which only arose when the negotiations
for the new Treaty were at a late stage, there would have been no
Declaration at all.
In this case it caniiot be said tli:it tlie Greek Government in 1926
kiie\v nurliiiig ;ilx,iil 11.:lriilrati;yet, but lor tllis liritisli initiati\,c

tliere \i.oiilclhiive bcen no Dccl:iratioii of iqzb. aiid ihcii tlirr<.ir.t.iild Iiavc
certainly been no question at al1of any 6ght to compulsoq arbitratiori
in connection ivith the Ambatielos claim.
In brief, our interpretatioii of the Declaration reposes on the solid
eround of contem»orarv facts. The Greek Government's ex~lanatioii
ul tli~ piir~~t~sc1 tlic l)ec13r3tioii rcst011iiotliirtIII<IItIi.ili tl~i:m~it
iripiious hiiclferrilc inia<iiistiun uf oiir ù~>l,<~i,eiit:,\'<l\~uc;itéi.
iir H~rtlv\,', urli<,r u11scrv;ilii~iiw;is t<i <lis~ute ni\. i.i~iirciitiuii tli:it
the ~mbatidos claim Ii:rd iiot been formulaied before July 1926 and
he pointed out that the passages in Annex R. I. of the Greek 3femorial.
on which 1 liad relied to show tliat in 1925 there was only an ap~ieal
ex grntiu and iio legal claim, were to be found in the Memorandum prc-
pared by hl. Ambatielos liimsclf, whicli tlie Greek Miiiister had merely
forwardcd to tlie I'orïign Office uiider cover of a short letter. That is

true, but tlien just look.at the Greek Minister's letter of September
1925 If the Greek hlinister did not actually say in his letter that there
was no legal claim, lie certainly diù riot make one; he merely transmitted
to the Foreign Office If. Ambatielos's hfemorandum, and reqiiested
His Illajesty's Government to study the matter and consider if they
could see their way to review tlie case. l'here was no legal claim in this
letter, and tliere was iio reference in it to the 1886 Treaty. The Decla-
.ration, however. refcrs to claims hased on the 1886 Treaty.322 REPLY OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-17 V 52
Now, tliose are oui reasoiis, coupled with those 1 gave to the Court
on Thursday, why the United Kingdom says tliat its interpretation
of the Declaration is the correct one.
1 now conclude by dealing with what appears to be accepted now
by both sides as being the principal point in the case, namely :is the
Declaration of 1926an integral part of the Treaty of 1926in the sense
that it is a provision of that Treaty within the meaning of Article 29 ?
1 must emphasize that our opponents, if they are to succeed on this
pain!. must show that the Declaration is a provision of the 1926Treaty
within the meaning of Article 29.
It is common ground that it is nowhere said, either in the Declaration
or in the Treaty, that the Declaration was an integral part of tlie Treaty.
1 do not think it is disputed that when more than one instrument is
signed by the same plenipotentiaries at the same time and it is intended
..at one shonld be an intemL. oa.t of the other. this is usuallv ,an~ 1
venture to say,alrnost invuiablv) stated. Ttiis \i.k th,-case in connection
iritli thc Grvco-Itdiari Coiiiinerci;ilI'rratv ancl its ;~iiiiez<~Idnstruiiicnt~
which weresiened in November of the sanie vear. Then the Parties siened
at the same the a treaty, tao protocols, tsyodeclarations and a number
of letters. and the Parties espressly declared that one vrotocol and one
declaration were integral ofthe Treaty and didAnot say so with
regard to any of the other instruments signed at that time. And 1 think
it follows clearly from the passage in the Greek Observations of April
1st. which 1 read to the Court on Thursdav. that the Greek Govemment
agree that, in tlic case of tlie~rïco-ltali.iii~l're.itthe oiily scydrately
signed ii~strumrnts \vliicliare iiitrgrdl parts of tlic 'l'aretthose \ihich
tlii:I'arties esi~ressl\~and in writinc Jeclared to I>esucli. arid tliat the
other ~eclaration which. as our oPponents Say, is almost exactly the
same as the Declaration in this case. was not declared to be an integral
part of the Treaty, and in fact was not so because, in the words of our
opponents, 'this Declaratioii "equally referred to the earlier Treaty"
and therefore the Parties "liesitated" to make it an integr-. part of the
Treaty.
My learned friend's principal argument seemed to be to quote-a
little incorrectly-an alleged admission by myself on Thursday, and
then try and base his case on what he said that 1said. Now, what were
the words 1 used in what Sir Hariiey calls my admission ;they corne on
page 296,and thisiswhat 1said :

"Then the Declaration does not have in any sense the character
of an interpretation of the provisions of 1926, nor indeed has it
anything to do with the manner in which the provisions of the
Treaty of 1926 are goiiig to be applied by one Party or the other.
If it liad that cliaracter1should be prepared to admit that it would
be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty, even if this had not
beeu stated in tenns."

character of an interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty, or having
something to do with the manner iii which the provisions of the Treaty
are going to be applied by one Party or the other" ?1 can best esplain
this by once again referring to what our opponents have said about the
Greco-Italian Commercial Treaty, and now 1 quote from my opponent : "The final Protocol-that is the one that was an integral part
of the Treaty-is pnrely and simply for the interpretation of the
Treaty and of the Greek Entry Tariff annexed tliereto. Sirnilarly,
one of the Declarations-and again, the one that was made an irite-
eral art-is directlv andexclusivelva~,liA.ble to the most-favoured-
EatiAn clause, the2application of which it makes subject to the
further condition of reciprocitv in the case of its being relied upon
in relation to coastwiçe frade."

In other words, if you find a protocol or a declaration saying that
article this or article that of the treaty means x or y, or that article z'
is in certain conditions to be dependent ou reciprocity, this protocol or
declaration gives an interpretation of the treaty which cannot. be
separated from the treaty, and therefore must fom an integral part. of
the treaty even if the parties have not actually, in writing, declarecl it

to he a part of the treaty, though in fact they usually do so declare it.
Now, that is what 1meant and that is, 1think,the sense which my words
should convey. Let us try my test-which, after all, is the Greek Govern-
ment's own test-to the Declaration we are nowtalking about. What the
Declaration says is that the 1926 Treaty "does not prejudice claims on
behalf of private persons based on the provisions of the Treaty of 1886".
Now this Declaration does not interpret a single one of the articles of the
Treaty of 1926. It does not impose any conditions for the enjoyment by
one party or the other of the benefits of any of its articles. The words
1 used, 1 hope advisedly, do not cover this Declaration at all.
Sir Hartley argues mainly on the verbal point that the Treaty of
1926 is mentioned in the first line of the Declaration. So it is, though 1
twice pointed out on Thursday that what the Parties really meant was
that the abrogation of the Treaty of 1886 or the replacement of the iold
Treaty by the new one, did not prejudice claims based on the 1886
Treaty. While 1 admit that 1 am criticizing a drafting which emanated
from the Foreign Office,it is clear that none of the provisions which we
find in the new Treaty could possibly prejudice the bringing of claims
on the basis of the old Treaty, and that the only thing which could or
would prejudice the bringing of claims on the basis of the old Treaty
would ~e ~he ~isa~ ~ ~ance of the old Treatv itself. That 1 should have
tliouglit \vas obviiiiis. Ily upyoiicnrs tliereforr iiinkt. a purel! \.crlsal
puiiit un tlit, haiii of \i.lintis ~,erti;i{;.pivcc ui irnpcrfc,:t dr;if[iiig.
1 (licsa!, .tricI itill:a?, tliat rht. LJrclnr.irisiirl8irqiii>triolly relnré iii
UII~,111dtdrta1 smd ro rlw'rrcary uf 1926 .II .il],but ivhnt it \V;IS~I~~ \~I~~
kecping nli\,c tlic .Arbitr;ition I'rurocol of tlie <ilcfri.aty fur thr purpiiies

i,fa certain cla,s oi clairiii u.liictlincl:iris,iiun rhc old 'I'rcntv. I'liioiilv
means by which our opponents can really maintain that the ~eclaratio;
had any effect on any article of the new Treaty is by means of their
"similar clauses theory", which they Saywould, but for the Declaration,
have produced the result that certain claims based on the old Treaty
could be arbitrated under Article 29 of the new Treaty, and they Say it
is the Declaration which prevents this result.
1 have already dealt with the "siniilar clauses theory", and 1 hope
1 shall have convinced the Court that it is completely ill-founded and
therefore 1 say no more on that.
For the rest, Sir Hartley Shawcross's arguments are simply state-
ments that the Declaration was not regarded as a separate treaty,324 REPL\. OF SIR ERIC BECKETT (u.K.)-17 V j2

that the Declaration was not published as a separate treaty, that it
appeared with the Treaty in British State Papers and that it was ratified
at the same time as the Treaty, although he admits that it was not
necessary to ratify it at ail. Bu1 wonder if al1these observations do not
equally apply to tliat Protocol and that Declaration, and those letters
which were appended to the Greco-Italian Commercial Treaty of Xovem-
ber 1926 and whicli. on the Greek Government's own admission, were
not part of that Treaty. All those instruments are certainly published
together in the League of Nations Treaty Series,which is the only place
where we can find them. Clearly, the mere fact that instruments are
signed at the same time by the same plenipotentiaries and are published
toeether does not decide one wav or another wliether one instrument is
anmtegral part of the other. ~,
For al1these reasons, together with tliose wliich 1gave on Thursday,
1 submit it is clear that the Declaration is not a provision of the Treaty
of 1926within the ineaning of Article 29 of that Treaty.
1can now concludc my remarks to the Court. At the end of my address
last Thursday, 1gave in skeleton form the argument of the Government
of the United Kingdom on the question of jurisdiction. 1 maintain
unchanged that summnry of my argument. ,
The formal conclusion of thc United Kinedoni is that the International

respect of the treatment of M. :\mEaticlos:

Before 1 sit dowii, Mr. I:'resi<lent,1 should like to sny that the whole
of this case has been conducte(1on botb sides in the spirit mentioned by
His Excellency the Greek Ageiit yesterdap,and that if the compression
of the oral hcaring into so short a space O time has involved both sides

in strenuous work, the spirit in whicli the matter has been dealt with in
Court by our oppoiients hris made our labours pleasurable. 5. DUPLIQUE IIE RI. LE PROFESSEUR HENRI ROLIN
(CONSEII. DU GOUVERNEMENT HEI.LÉNIQUE)

AUS S~AXCES PUBLIQUES DU 17 MAI 1952

[Séuiicepr~bliquedu 17 mai 1952, muti~z]

Monsieur le l'résident, Messieurs de la Cour,
Permettez-moi tout d'abord de vous donner lecture des conclusions

que hl.l'agent du Gouvernement hellénique a l'honneur de prendre
comme suite à l'invitation <lui lui a étéadressée hier. Ces conclusions
ont étécommuniqiiées hier soir à sir Eric Beckett. le premier conseil
du Royaume-Uni :
Revu les conclusions des Parties,

vu l'article 29 du traité de commerce entre le Royaume-Uni et la
Grèce, signé à Londres, le 16 juillet1926, et pour autarit que de
besoin la déclaration du méme jour,
PLAISE A LA COUK,

donner acte au Gouvernement hellénique :
1) que les griefs formulés par lui dans son mémoire relativement à
I'inobservatioii du contrat de yente des navires, à l'enrichissement indu,
à la non-production au procès de certains documents ignorés de

AI.Ambatielos et à une mauvaise administration de la justice (dénide
justice stricto sensro.nt tous suivant lui pour fondement juridique les
articles 1,X, Xi'. paragraphe 3, du traité de commerce et navigation
du IO novembre 1886 é,galement les articleIet3 'du traitédu16 juillet
1926,identiques ou équivalents aux deux premières dispositions préci-
tées ;
2) que le Gouvernement britannique a, par la voix de son conseil,
sir Eric Beckett, exprimé son accord pour que la Cour exerce des fonc-
tions arbitrales en cas où elle estimerait avoir compétericepour déclarer
si la demande hellénique doit être soumise à la procédure arbitrale
prévue au protocole annexé au traité de 1886 et où la Cour donnerait ilne
réponse affirmative à cette question.

CE FAIT,pour les raisons indiquées dans les observations helléniques,
est développé par ses conseils :
se déclarer compéten teur l'examen au fond de la demande hellénique
et, en conséquence, fixer aux Parties les délais pour le dép0t de la
réplique et de la contre-réplique. visant le fond du différend
subsidiairement,pour le cas où la Cour estimerait ne pouvoir se pro-
noncer sur sa compétence sans aborder le fond, faisant application de
l'articl62 de son Règlement, joindre i'incideiit au fond.

Monsieur le Président, Messieurs de la Cour,
Mon premier devoir est de remercier I'agent du Gouvernement britan-
-nique et ses conseils de la simplification qu'ils ont apportée à notre tâche

' Ce textea été modifié par l'agentdu Gouvernement hellénique: voir
.Correrpaidanceno, 84 et67.

iz 326 DUPLIQUE DE 31.HESRI ROLlS (GRÈCE) - 1.7V 52

' et à celle de la Cour en supprimant l'alternative devant laquelle nous
pensions que la Cour pourrait se trouver placée d'avoir à choisir, non.
pas sans doute arbitrairement, mais après audition des Parties, entre
une procédure éventuellement obligatoire devant la Cour poursuivie.
en vertu de l'article 29 du traité de 1926, OU une procédure arbitrale
comme prévue dans le protocole. On pourrait mêmehésiter quant à
l'option m'il v aurait lieu riventuellement de laisser préalablement aux
Parties. Car on pourrait imaginer que la procEd;re obligatoire fit
déclaréeêtre cellede la Cour, sauf accord sur la procédure arbitrale ou la
procédure arbitrale sauf accord en ce qui concerne la Cour. Il y avait
là un chevauchement, une complexité qui explique la complication des
conclusions que nous avions prises dans nos observations en réponse à
l'exception préliminaire. Aujourd'hui cela se trouve considérablement
sim~lifié.ouisau'il a étéadmis o.e.,dans le cas où la Cour. contrairement
aux'concl;sio& britanniques, estimerait avoir compétence pour décider
que le protocole de 1886 devait recevoir application, et que le différend
iutrait'bien dans ceux prévus par la déclaration, le Gouvernement
britannique était d'accord pour que cette procédure arbitrale soit confiée
à la Cour, conformément à ce oui était prévu à l'article 2q du traité de
1926.
Et, Monsieur le Président. ayant ainsi rendu justice à cette déclaration,
inspirée assurément par, à la fois, le bon sens et la bonne volonté, je ne

nuis me disnenser de marauer tout de mêmemon désaouoint..ent de ne
basvoir le &ouvernementAbritannique persévérerdanscette voie jusqu'à
accepter d'emblée cette procédure à laquelle. nous le pensons, il sera
tout'de mêmetenu de seconformer lorsiiue vous aurez-urononcé votre
arrêt.Car. en réalité,l'attitudebritanniquk d'aujourd'hui demeure, après
les explications de sir Eric Beckett. très difficilement conciliable avec la
politique générale<lu Gouvernement britannique en cette matière. En
effet, celle-ci, toute de fidélité Charte, ne vise pas seulement, comme
ilaétédit,le règlemerit des différendssusceptibles de mener à une rupture
de la paix : suivant une autre disoosition de la Charte. l'article 76.
paragraphe '3, les différends d'ordré juridique doivent, d'une manier;
générale,etre soumis par les parties à la Cour iiiternationale de Justice,
et c'est le Gouvernement bÎitannique lui-mêmequi, rappelantrécem-
ment dans une requête dont la Cour aura procllainement à connaître
l'une et l'autre de ces dispositions,exprimait le vceu que IeGouvernement
défendeur acceute de se présenter volontairemeiit devant la Cour afin
que les arguménts du GÔiivernement du Royaume-Uni puissent faire
l'objet sur le fond d'unexamen contradictoire. Le Gouvernement britan-
niqiie ne doit pas s'étonnersi, dans ces conditions, rious lui avons exprimé
un vceu semblable.
II est vrai que mon estimé contradicteur iious a dit qu'en ce qui
concerne la compétence obligatoire de la Cour, le Gouvernement bri-
tannique, quelque favorable qu'il y soit, avait eii 1929, lorsqu'il avait
signé la déclaration. marqué une réserve imposée par la prudence, la
réserve excluant ratione temporis les différends qui avaient une origine

dans des faits antérieurs à la déclaration. Nais je me permets de rappeler
que sir Hartley a déjà répondu à cette explication que: s'il était fort
raisonnable en 1929-1930 de prendre une précaution semblable parce
que, comme il nous était expliqué, uii gouvernement pouvait avoir agi
avec plus de nonclialance. moins de scrupules dans l'observation du
droit lorsqu'il n'envisageait pas le contrôle judiciaire que, postérieure- DUPLIQUE DE hl. HESRI ROLIN (GRÈCE) - I7 V 52 327

temporis manquait totalement de sens, puisque, depuis 40 ans-er1926a-ione

la compétence arbitrale, le contrôle du règlement arbitral avait été
accepté.
le constate au sur~ius aue l'obiection du Rovaume-Uni n'est oas
sellement dirigée en î'espèce cont;e la compéte&e de la Cour, Ais
ou'elle tend à voir écarter é"alement la orocédure arbitrale orévue
déjà pourtant dans le protocole de 1886 et qu'on essaie vraiment bien
singulièrement d'arriver à ce résultat en tirant argument ou profit de
l'entrée envigueur du nouveau traité de 1926. Etrange raisonnement
vraiment :s'iln'y avait pas eu de traité de 1926,le traitéde 1886demeu-
rant en vigueur, le Gouvernement britannique, j'imagine, n'aurait fait
aucune difficulté poursoumettre le diérend au protocole de 1886,mais
on soutient paradoxalement qu'il a suffi qu'en 1926 on procède à une
revision du traité, car c'est bien d'une revision qu'il s'agit, et quyon
introduise une clause renforçant la compétence arbitrale pour que le
protocole de 1886 soit brusquement privé de toute vertu et de toute
force obligatoire cluelconque. même oour les différends oui auraient
puisé leur origineà cette époque,mêmé pour ceux qui s'appuieraient sur
des dispositions non modifiéesdans le traité revisé. I'our tous ces diffé-
rends 1;s procédures de règlement seraient supprimées.
J'ajoute, Messieurs, que le Gouvernement britannique a lui-mêmesi
peu confiance dans cette thèse relative au champ d'application <lu
orotocole de 1886 ou'il ne vous demande oas en olaidoirie et ou'il ne
'conclutpas à ce quévous déclariezque le protocoie de 1886 n'&ait pas
a. .icable et que ce différendn'est pas susceptible de solution arbitrale
-même à titre subsidiaire ilne vousie demande oa- :ilvousdemande.
au contraire, de ne pas vous prononcer sur ce' point; de ne pas VOUS
borner à vous déclarer incompétents pourconnaître du fond du différend
mais de vous déclarer incomoétents éealement sur cette auestion de
savoir si le différend relève de la prozdure prévue dans & protocole
de 1886, en sorte que le litige se trouvera sans juge. Un tel résultat, je
me permets de l'indiquer, ne serait pas seulement décevant pour ie
assurément, lorsque le principe de l'arbitrage a étéaccepté par les,
parties, mais que l'organe arbitral primitif se trouve remplacé par la
Cour, l'on conçoit que la Cour puisse avoir certains scrupulesà savoir
si, en l'espèce,la disposition qui lui a directement conlérécompétence
ne doit oas céder devant la disoosition aui était seule en vimeur à
I'rpoilu<des ftiits. mais ce que iioii; ~,nii\.oiis';ittenclrec'estqu'en pr;,sence
[lecr coiiflit ile com~iéteiicc.In Cour disc tliicl est l'organe comp6tent.
L'article 77 du Statut. en vertu duauel la-Cour oeut ce orononier sur
sa compégnce, implique à mon avis qÛelorsque le irincipe'du règlement
arbitral ou judiciaire paraît admis par les parties pour le différend
soumis à la Cour, celle-ci ne se borne pasà se déclarer incompétente,
mais reconnaisse le caractère relatif de cette incompétence et indique
l'organe au profit duquel elle se dessaisit. Je rappelle au surplus qu'en
l'espèce, après la déclaration du conseil du Royaume-Uni, pareille
décisionécartant le différendde la compétencedirecte <lela Cour pour
le soumettre à une procédure arbitrale aboutirait à ramener indirecte-
ment l'affaire devant la Cour, et aurait ainsi les mêmes effetsqu'une
déclaration de compétence. DUPLIQUE DE M. HEXRI ROLlK (GRÈCE) - 17 V 52
326
C'est sous le bénéficede ces obseroatioiis, htonsieur le Président, que
j'aborderai I'exameiides arguments techniques par lesquels le Gouverne-
ment britannique s'efforcede vous gagner à sa thèse.
hfessieurs, un point sur lequel les Parties sont ù'accord, c'est que le
point de départde votre compétencedoit nécessairementse trouver dans
l'article 29du traité de 1926, seule disposition dans laquelle la compé-
tence oblieatoire de votre Cour on. tout au moins. de la Cour uermanente
à laquellevous succédez, setrouve directement acceptéepar'les Parties.
Je vous relis cet article, qui est très bref

irLes deux Parties contractantes sont d'accord en principe que
~ ~ ~d~f~érendoui eut s'éleverehtre elles ouant à la iuste inter-
pr6tation ou l'applicatitm <I'iiiiequelconqur. (les stil>iil:~tiriiiiii
prisent trait; sera, i la rt'(luFrlt:I'urit(IciI'arties coritraçtdritej.
suumis i I'arbitraec.. 1.(:OUI tl':irJ>itrâhe 1auurllt:IVSditii~rcii<l.i
seront soumis sera la Cour permanentede Juitice internationale,

à moins que, par une convention particulière, les deux Parties n'en
décident autrement. »

L'objection faite à l'application de cette disposition à la requête du
Gouvernement helléniqueparaît à première vue impressionnante. L'on
nous dit : aIc traité vise très directement les différendsrelatifsàl'inter-
prétation ou à l'application d'une stipulation du présent traité - c'est-
à-dire du trait6 de 1926. Or, les faits que vous dénoncezremontent à
19191 ,921, 19221 ,923. ils sont donc antérieurs au traité de 1926 ;il est
impossible dèslors que le différend ait trait à l'application de ce traité,
et donc la Cour n'est pas compétente. »
A ce raisonnement, à première vue convaincant, le Gouvernement
hellénique oppose deux objections. La première objection, c'est que
I'interprétation ou l'applicationc d'une quelconque des stipulations D du
traité de 1926visent égalementet a fortiori l'interprétation et l'applica-
tion du traité de 1926dans son ensemble, c'est-à-dire les effets de son
entrée en vigueur. La question qui se pose et qui a étélonguement
débattue par l'agent du Gouvernement britannique, comme par sir
Hartley Shawcross. est essentiellement celle de savoir quelle est l'inci-
dence de l'entrée en vigueur de ce traité de 1926sur les différends
antérieurs au traité de 1926qui trouvent leur origine dans des faits
survenus pendant que le traité de 1886était seul en vigueur. Nous
soutenons que l'article 29s'applique également à ces différends - tout
au moins dans toute la mesure où les règles de droit invoquées se
retrouvent en substance dans le traité de 1426 :doncl'article24 n'a vas
d'autre portée quela substitution d'un orgaLe de règlement ju&ciai;e à
un orcane de rè~lement arbitral, l'un et l'autre étant du reste appelés
arbiFrage la10sënsz<n,ce (lui, vous vous en souvenez, fut usuel pendant
les premières annéesde la Sociétédes Nations.
La deuxième objection est celle que sir Hartley Shawcross a principa-
lement défendue,sans du reste abandonner la premikre, comme le sig-
nalait très exactement sir Eric Beckett dans sa répliquetout à l'heure.
Cette préférences'explique par la circonstance que cette argumentation

conduisait plus simplement la Cour à un résultat qui, pratiquement,
était devenu identique àcelui auquel conduisait l'autre objection. Dans
ce dernier système, le présent différend tombe sous l'application du
protocole de 1886, mais à la suite de la declaration du Gouvernement DUPLIQUE DE .\I. HESRI ROLIS (GRÈCE) - 17 V j2 329
britannique, cette procédure du protocole de 1886 ram&nele différend à
l'accord commun devant votre propre juridiction.
Voyons tout d'abord l'objection qui dans notre réponse aussioccupait
la première place. Dans ce système, nous n'avons pas besoin de la
déclaration de 1926. Celle-ci joue un rôle auxiliaire mais non essentiel
dans l'application qu'il vous est proposé dc doniier à l'article 29 du

traité de 1926.
Sir Eric Beckett vous a dit qu'en réalitéle traité de 1926 avait rem-
placé letraité de 1886,et ce mot « replacement ilui a paru êtrele terme
exact qu'il a regretté ne pas avoir vu employé dans In déclaration. Je
veux bien, Nessieurs, que le traité de 1926ait remplacéle traité de 1886,
mais tout de mème c'est une expression trop sommaire pour exprimer
l'effet juridique exact de l'entrée envigueur du traité de 1926 ;et j'attire
votre attention sur une circonstance singulière, c'est qu'alors que le
traité de 1886 prévoyait très expressément l'abrogation du traité de
commerce antérieurement en vigueur, qui remontait aux années 1830
ou 18j0, le traité de 1926 ne contient pas de clause semblable, et c'est
par des échangesde lettres qu'il a étéconvenu (un échangede lettres
du 16juillet 1926 qui se trouvent citéespar nos estiméscontradicteurs)
que l'on n'attendrait mêmepas l'entrée en vigueur du traité,qui se
situe au mois de décembre 1926,mais qu'à partir du 26 juillet l'on était
d'accordpour substituer le nouveau traité à l'ancien.
.\lais, hlessieurs, substituant ainsi le nouveau traité à l'ancien traité,
il n'en demeure pas moins vrai que certaines règles sont demeurées
inchangées, cellesrelatives au traitement national et celles relatives à
l'application de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée,et que, dans ces
conditions, nous sommes en droit de considérerque c'est la même règle
qui est demeurée en vigueur au point que le nouveau traite aurait pu
étre rédigé commeuii avenant au premier traité contenant une série
d'articles, ajoutant un mot ou supprimant un mot à l'article premier,à
l'article X ;l'on a trouvé beaucoup plus simple de refaire un traité
d'ensemble, inais cela ne change rien à la réalitéiuridique et à la persis-
tance de deus des principes des clauses sur lesouelles nous nous aD-
~uvons-celle relati;e au iraitement n~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ c~lies-el~tives au traiie-
h&t de lanation la plus favorisée.Assurément, I'article 29 ditraité de
1926 a modifié le protocole.Maissir Hartlev Shawcrossvous a dit - et il
nia pas étécontrédit -que, en matière deAprocédure et aussi en matière
de compétence, il est conforme aux principes du droit anglais que les
lois de procédure et de compétence s'appliquent rétroactivement.
En réalité,il en est ainsi aussi en droit américain et en droit belge.
Et je crois pouvoi,r dire dans les divers systèmes de droit interne des
nations civilisées,ce qui en fait un de ces principes générauxde droit
que la Cour applique rétroactivement.
J'ai sous les yeux, Messieurs, un extrait du Hnlsbtrry Stntutes of
Englafzd (vol. 24, édit.de 1950. p. 158) :

eLa règlegéiiéraleest que là où un statut a rapport à une matière
de procédure, il peut opérer rétroactivemeiit, mais cet acte ne
pourrapas intervenir dans iles cas déjàdécidése ,t les Coursn'auront
pas la permission de rouvrir des jugemeiits qu'elles ont donnés
antérieurement sous des actes antérieurs ...ii

Cela va de soi.
Kent, en ce qui concerne le droit américain, dans ses Commentaires
du Droit américait~d ,éclarede mème (àla p. 632 du premier volume de DUPLIQUE DE M. HENRI ROLI'I (GRÈCE) - 17 V 52
330
rS~h) <lu" (1,s lites ~Iciclâr~toirejopcrclit gcnL:r~l<:mcntrGriuspi.ctiv~.-
meiit. qu'ilrn t.,t ;,insi iiot:imm~.ntdcs ;iit<relatifs:I I;pri,c;iluic et
des actes ayant pour objet de remédier à un mal existant Ôude donner
un nouveau remède aux parties qui ont été lésées.
Et voici un bref extrait denotre meilleur civiliste belgeHenri Depage,
qui, dans un ouvrage récent, son Traitéde Droit civil (vol.1, p. mo),
déclare queles lois de compétenceet de procéduredoivent, sauf disposi-
tions contraires expresses, être considérées commes'appliquant aux
procèsen cours ;et il cite en ce sens divers arrêtsde Liégeet de Bruxelles.
Sir Eric Beckett, confronté par cet argument, n'a pas contesté la
rétroactivité des lois de procédure, mais il nous a fait à ce sujet uii
curieux erief. D'a~rèslui. cela ne s'a'&li.uait ou'aux lois de Drocédure :
par exemple, si vous aviez modifiévotre règlement, il admettrait l'appli-
cation immédiate et généraledu teste nouveau. Par contre. il a Daru
mettre en doute ou ignorer que cela s'appliquait a fortioriau droit sbr In
compétence, et il a imagiriéune hypothèse qui me paraît tout à fait
dénuéede pertinence, celle de deux procédures arbitrales différentes
prévues dans deux conventions successives de droit privé. Imaginerait-
on, s'est-il écrié,que l'organe arbitral de la deuxième convention soit
prétendu compétent pour les différends survenant sous l'empire de la
première ? 3fessieurs. la réponseest aisée:cela dépenddu rapport entre
les conventions. Si ces conventions présentent entre elles la parenté
étroite que nous avons constatée entre les traités de 1886 et 1926,
réglant le mêmeobjet et contenant en partie les mêmes règles - une
convention apparaissant comme l'avenant de l'autre -, je répondrai
sans aucun doute affirmativement.
Au surplus, ce que je dis à cet égard est confirmépar la législation,
puisque - et les traités qiie vous appliquez me semblent avoir plus de
relation avec la législation qu'avec les conventions de droit privé - il
n'est pas contestéque la législationsur la compétences'applique à tous
les différendsnouveaux, même s'ilsont une origine antérieure à l'entrée
en vigueur de la loi nouvelle.
reprises, citéle traité gréco-italie;éor, j'ai eu la curiosité de m'en faire
apporter le texte tandis qu'il plaidait, et je constate que les signataires
du traité gréco-italien de 1926 ont fait très exactement et expressé-
ment ce que l'on s'étonnede nous voir supposer avoir étévoulu entre
la Grèceet la Grande-13retagne ;en effet, la déclarritiondu trait& italien
du 24 novembre 1926 prévoit qu'il reste entendu que la coriventioii de
commerce signée aujourd'hui entre la Grèce et l'Italie ne préjudicie
en aucune manière aux réclamations en faveur des particuliers, qui
sont baséessur les clauses du traité de commerce et de navigation italo-
hellénique signéen 1889, et que tout différend qui vien9ait à surgir
entre les deux gouvernements en ce qui concerne la validité desdites
réclamations (vous verrez, ce sont les mêinesmots que notre déclara-
tion, sauf la fin) sera déféré, la requêtede l'un ou de l'autre, à la déci-
sion du tribunal arbitral prévu par i'article 24 de la susdite con\,ention
de commerce et de navigation ù'aujourd'hui.
Enfin, hlessieurs, l'interprétation que je défeiidsme paraît trouver
un appui précieuxdans la jurispmdence de la Cour daris l'arrêtMavrom-
matis (p. 35). où 1:Cour fut d'avis que, dans le doute, une juridiction
basée sur un accord international s'étend à tous les différendsqui lui
sont soumis après son établissement. Certes, il est exact que, comme DUPLIQUE DE hl. HENRI ROLIS (GRÈCE) - I7 V 52 331

le signalait sir Eric, la plupart des gouvernements, dont le britannique,
ont excepté de la compétence obligatoire antérieure de la Coiir non
seulement les différendsantérieurs (ce qui allait de soi), mais les diffé-
rends qui aiiraient une origine dans les faits antérieurs. Maisles auteurs,
dont Dolleman dans un ouvrage néerlandais, Preliminaire Excepliesvoor
het Ivrternatioitale Gerechtshof (Leiden, 1949, p. 89). qui cite l'arrét
Mavrommatis (p. 35). déclarent que ces réservesmontrent la nécessité
d'une limitation expresse de la juridiction de la Cour à cet égard, sans
exclusion expresse du différend néantérieurement, ou de différends
baséssur des faits anciens. La Cour pourra donc connaître de l'affaire.
Voilà les conclusions que déjà nous paraît autoriser l'article 29 du
traité de 1oz6. Illais elle me ~araît trouver une confirmation tr&snette
dans la décfarationde 1926. '
Si on en comrlare le texte avec celui de I'article zq, on constate tout
de suite le soin'qui a étépris de le rédigerautrement que l'article 29
du traité de 1926 signé le mêmejour. L'article 29 vise les différends
qui s'élkvent au sujet de iil'interprétation ou de l'application d'une
quelconque des stipulations du traité n. 1926 prévoit les réclamations
faites au nom de particuliers IIqui sont baséessur les dispositions du
traité de commerce » et tous différends qui peuvent s'élever, cquant
à la validité de ces réclamations IIIl semble donc que les parties aient
eu en quelque sorte un souci d'employer des mots différents,sans doute
dans le but d'indiquer qu'il n'était pas exclu qu'un traité puisse d'une
part êtrebasé sur les dispositions du traité de commerce anglo-grec
de 1886 et, néanmoins, êtrerelatif à l'interprétation ou l'application
d'uiie quelconque des stipulations du nouveau traité, ce qui se produira
effectivement au cas où les stipulations visées de l'ancien traité se
retrouvent identiques ou équivalentes dans le nouveau.
Et les travaux préparatoires de la déclaration confirment que telle
a bien étéla pensée des gouvernements des parties. On vous a dit,
vous vous en souvenez. que la déclaration a pour origine une initiative
hellénique provoquée par une demande britannique. Or, le Gouverne-
ment hellénique proposa une rédaction qui me paraît particulikrement
significative : il proposa (as far as »....Nous avons cri1devoirrectifier
en « in so far as ii...., et notre estimé contradicteur propose de dire
« in so miich inu for so much as u,ou une expressioii analogue. J'avoue
que je ne suis pas assez expert en langage britannique pour choisir
entre ces diverses rédactions, mais ce qui me paraît certairi, c'est que
dans la pensée du Gouvernement hellénique il y avait des différends
basés sur 1886 qui étaient couverts par le traité de 1926, et il y avilit
d'autres différends basés sur 1886 qui n'étaient pas couverts par le
traité de 1926. Et nous savons qu'effectivement celui qui préoccupait
les Britanniques était l'éventuel différend qui pourrait surgir en cas
d'applicatioii aux sujets britanniques de la loi sur l'emprunt forcé.
Une telle mesure violerait une disposition du traité de 1886 qui inter-
disait de frapper les sujets britanniques d'une emprunt forcé- dispo-
sition non maintenue en 1926. Et le Gouvernement hellénique propose
donc de prévoir expressémentque l'ancienne procédure de 1886 demeu-
rera d'application dans la mesure où les différendsbasés sur le traité
de 1886 ne sont pas couverts par le traité de 1926. La rédaction finale
fut différente, mais le Gouvernement britannique qui l'avait proposée
déclara expressément qu'elle avait la mêmeportée. On peut donc en

déduireles mêmes conséquences.332 DUPLIQUE DE 11. HENRI ROLI'I (GRÈCE) - 17 v jz

Je sais, Messieurs, que l'on a prétendu tirer argument du fait queles
gouvernements avaient eu en vue ledifférendéventuelrelatif à l'emprunt
forcé,ajoutant qu'ils n'auraient pas eu connaissance d'autres et que,
qu'il y a là une contradiction qui vous aura frappés,car dans la même crois
réplique sir Eric Beckett vous a dit à un moment donné que, bien
entendu, le Gouvernement grec avait déjà, en 1926, connaissance de
l'affaire Ambatielos. Et il est certain qu'il en avait connaissance et
qu'il est dèslors téméraired'affirmer qu'iln'y a pas songé.
Supposons méme que le différend Ambatielos n'ait pas étéprévu
en 1926. Cela ne vous interdirait en aucune façon de constater que ce
différendtombe sous l'application de la déclaration. Car ilest raison-
nable d'admettre que si les parties ont cru devoir conserver laprocédure
arbitrale pour le règlement de différends baséssur des dispositions
abrogées, a fortiori ne peut-on leur attribuer l'intention de renoncer
à toute procédure pour l'application de dispositions maintenues.
J'ajoute, pour répondre à une observation que j'ai entendue tantbt
relativement à la déclaration gréco-italienne de 1926, que l'existence
certaine de certains différendsbaséssur le traité de 1886, qui ne pour-
raient plus êtreinvoqués sousl'empire du traité de 1926, fournit proba-
blement l'explication de la différenceentre les deux solutions admises
dans le traité gréco-italien et dans le traité gréco-britannique : dans
un cas l'on vous dit (traité gréco-italien) :iinous allons appliquer la
procédure de 1926 à tous les différendsanciens ,,; dans le cas gréco-
britanniau.. l'on semble vous dire. au contraire. « nous allons a~.,iau2r
l'ancienne procr'<liirc;~rl~itrale,,. I'ourquoi dans ce cas-ci I'aiici~.nne
procé<liircarbitr:ilr ;Certainenient i raisciil<leIn <lifficultilu'il y.i\.nit
i ;tendre la çvriiiii.tericJe IJ Cour or&.ue dans un tr:iité I';ii>i~licnrion
de dispositions que ce mêmetrait& abrogeait ! Le bon sens paraissait
commander de se rabattre sur l'ancienne procédureet peut-ètre a-t-on
voulu, par voie de simplification, maintenir celle-ci pour tous les diffé-
rends antérieurs i juillet 1926.
En résumé,il apparaît que l'article 29, sainement interprétécoufor-
mémentaux principes généraux dudroit, doit conduire la Cour à consi-
dérer que la procédure qui y est prévue s'applique également aux
différends baséssur le traité de 1886 pour autant que les dispositions
invoquées se retrouvent dans le nouveau traité. Et je crois avoir
démontré que cette interprétation de 1926 est pleinement confirmée
par la déclaration de 1926 dont assurément la Cour doit tenir compte
comme elle tient compte de l'échangede lettres qui a décidéde l'abro-
gation du traité de 1886.

[Séancepublique du 17 mai 1952. après-midi]

:.hlonsieurle Président, hlessieurs de la Cour,
Au cours de l'audience de ce matin, je vous ai indiqué que les deux
Parties étaient d'accord pour estimer que de toute façon l'origine de
votre comoétence. la source oremière. devait être recherchée dans
l'article 29: 1111~110sadversaires \.o).iiieiit un ubstacle insiirmuntal>le
daiis le fait que dans l'article 29 figiiraienr les mots NdiffCrcridsrclarils
A l'int~?ri~rétatiouu ;i I'ao~licariun d'une dijoosition auelconiiuc du
présent iraité a, tandis quê'le Gouvernement helléniquêestimâit que DUPLIQUE DE 31. HESRI ROLIS (CHÈCE) - 17 V j2 333

I'argumeiit n'était d'aucuiie façon irréfutable, car des différends pou-
vaient étre considéréscomme relatifs à l'interprétation ou à l'appli-
cation d'une disposition du présent traité, alors méme que les faits
dénoncés étaieritantérieursaudit traité, du moment que la règleinvoquée
était, elle aussi, antérieure audit traité et maintenue dans le traité
nouveau, en sorte que le différend tombait sous l'application d'iine
seule et méme règlemaintenue après 1926.
Je n'ai pas l'intention de passer un temps aussi long à la démons-
tration du deuxieme point, parce que sir Hartley Shawcross s'y est
longuement attardé et que la question de savoir - car c'est en réalité
notre thèse subsidiaire bien que pour des raisons pratiques, comme
je vous l'ai dit, elle ait occupé la place principale dans l'exposé de
sir Hartley Shawcross - notre thèse subsidiaire est que si méme la
Cour hésitait à se déclarercompétente à la faveurde cette construction
de l'article 29 du traité de 1926, elle devrait se déclarer compétente
Dar a~~lication de la déclaration de 1,26. Aarce ciue celle-ci est ~artie
Intég;inte du traité.
Qu'est-ce qui nous autorise à dire que la dbclaration est partie inté-
crante du traité ? Des considérations à la fois inatérielles et intellec-
tuelles tirées de la substance de la déclaration. Et tout d'abord, les
éléments matériels.
Les éléments matériels, iious les avons déjà en partie remis à
M. le Greffier de la Cour; nous avons ici une photocopie de l'original
du traité de 1926. Il està la fois rédigé enlangue aiiglaise et en lan,gue
grecque. Il comprend, dans un mêmedocument, avec uiie mêmepagina-
tion, le texte du traité proprement dit et le texte de la déclaration, et
il ne comprend pas, contrairement à ce que l'on supposait,le texte des
lettres échangées le mêmejour, 16 juillet 1926, et qui décidaient que
le traité de 1886 allait cesser d'êtreen vigueur à partir du 26 juillet,
date à laquelle on convenait de mettre provisoiremeiit en vigueuf le
traité non encore ratifié.
Deuxième élément, c'estque le White Puper soumis au Parlement,
ou plus exactement présentéau Parlement - car, sauf erreur,,il ne
fallait pas d'approbation parlementaire suivant le droit constitutionnel
britannique - contient, dans un mêmedocument, le traité et, dit le
un exemplaireclàrla disposition de la Cour.nNous en tenons également
Le troisième élémentest celui que nous avons remis en photocopie
à AI.le Greffier.Xous le devons àla courtoisie etàla loyauté du Forei n
Office auquel nous avons demandé l'instzument de ratification helfé-
nique, car nous avions cru - et c'est l'explication d'iine erreur maté-
rielle cominise dans notre mémoire eii réponse -, iious a\.ions cm,
sur le vu du Journal officielhellénique, qu'il n'y avait eu qu'une seule
signature, parce que le Journal officielhelléniquementionnait les noms
des plénipotentiaires exclusivement à la fin de la déclaration, la décla-
ration suivant le traité.Il n'en est pas ainsi. Nous avons donc com~nis
une erreur. Illais. d'autre Dart. il résulte du document oui nous est
produit le ~;ouvernemêntbritannique que l'instrument de ratifi-
cation que nous lui avons remis en décembre1qz6 etdont nous n'avions
pas co6ie à Athènes parce que les archives $?cques ont étébrûlées
pendant la uerre,visait expressément le traite et la déclaration du
mêmejour. 5 ur ce point, il n'y a aucun doute possible, et ainsi il est334 DUPLIQUE IIE hl. HESRI ROLlS (GRÈCE) - 17 \.52

répondu, en ce qui nous concerne, à In demande poséepar M. le juge
Hsu Mo.
Nous ne pouvons pas à l'heure actuelle compléter cette réponse en
ce qui concerne la ratification britannique, parce que nous ne l'avons
plus en original et que nous avons omis de nous informer du point de
savoir s'il en existait une copie au Foreign Officeet ce qu'elle contenait.
I)e deus choses l'une, ou bien cette ratification couvre, elle aussi, la
déclaratioii en mêmetemps que le traité. Ce serait assurément un argu-
ment de poids en notre faveur. Ou bien la ratification couvrira seule-
ment le traité et ne fera pas mention de la déclaration. En ce cas, Nes-
sieurs, nous nous trouvons devant cette situation assurément curieuse
qu'au Foreign Office, à Londres, on aura procédé à l'échange desrati-
fications, à la remise d'une ratification par le Gouvernement hellénique
contre une ratification du Gouvernement britannique, que l'une de
ces ratifications aurait porté sur le traité et la déclaration et l'autre
s~~~ement sur le traité. Peut-étre les deux Parties ne s'en sont-elle+ ~ ~ ~ - ~ -
pas aperçues. Si, ce qui me paraît plus probable, les deus Parties s'en
sont auercues. il faut admettre ~u'ellesauront considéréque cela n'avait
aucun; ikpoitance parce que i'accessoire suivait le piincipal et que

la ratification britannique du traité s'étendaitnécessairement, elle aussi,
à la ratification de la déclaration. Ce que je suis en tout casen droit de
conclure, c'est que vraiment les Parties ont considéréque les deux
actes formaientun tout.
Au surplus, encore une fois, cet exemple qu'avec obstination, je
crois pour sa perte, le délégué de la Grande-Bretagne a tiré du traite
gréco-italien, nous montre que, contrairement à ce qu'il pensait, il
est parfaitement possible qu'une déclaration soit partie intégrante
d'un traité et tombe sous I'a~~l..ation de ce traité. alors même<iu'ell~1~ ~ - - ~
ne soit pas mentionnée comme partie intégrante. ~t en effet, Messieurs,
vérification faite. ie constate que cette déclaration rréco-italienne de
1926, que je m'excuse d'avoir esaminée de trop loin lorsque nous avons
préparé nos observations écrites,fait trèsexactement entrer sous I'appli-
cation de l'article 24 de la nouvelle convention les différends qui se
trouvaient néssous l'empire de l'ancienne convention de 1859maintenue
en vigueur en 1899. Vous avez donc là un cas d'intégration flagrante
que n'accompagne aucune stipulation d'intégration. Esemple d'autant
plus frappant qu'il a étéreconnu dans la procédure écritebritannique
que cette déclaration était tout à fait semblable et quasi identique à
la nôtre, et c'est exact sauf pour les termes finaux. Je crois donc que
l'on ne peut vraiment pas tirer un argument a silentio de l'absence
d'une mention « partie intégrante » pour dire que la déclaration de 1926
n'est pas partie intégrante du traité de 1926.
Et mon deuxième argument est un argument intellectuel. C'est le
contenu de cette déclaration. Sir Eric Beckett, ce matin, a critiqué
sir Hartley Shawcross pour la façoii dont il avait, suivant lui, sollicite
le sens de ses ~léclarations.en lui faisant. dire au'il suffis:lit qu'une
il6cl:ir:itir,iiait i~iier:ilil>c,ltnvcciiitrait;liiiiir;rrcco~isi<l~rit,iiiiii~
~'artii:iiir;.?rantdt! cc traite. i,!qu'il x\.ait ilr:clarc't iqu'unc ilticIn-
rntioii uiii sér;iitinterr>ri:t;itrl'iiiicoii\~ziiti<iiii1evr;ctrt:i~~iisirl(~ric.
commeiaisant corps avec elle.
J'accepte cette rectification de sir Eric eckett, mais je vous demande
vraiment de vous poser la iquestion :quelle est la portéede cette décla-
ration de 1926 ? On nous a dit : cette déclaration change les effets de DUPLIQUE DE 11. HEKRI ROLIX (GRECE) - 17 v 52 335

l'abrogation de la convention de 1886. Mais je demande à mes adver-
saires: d'où résultait cette abrogation ? A toute évidence de l'entrée
en vigueur du traité de 1926. C'est donc bien d'une interprétation ou
d'une application du traité qu'il s'agit, et ce n'est donc pas du tout de
façon inexacte, mais .de façon tout à fait exacte, que la déclaration
commence par les mots : Le traité de commerce en date d'aujourd'liui
ne porte pas préjudice »,ce qui est synonyme du riprésent traité ».

Car la question qui se posait était très exactement de savoir si l'entrée
en vigueur de ce nouveau traité qui produisait une sorte de novation
juridique allait oui ou non étoufferet éteindreles derniers effetsjuridiques
du traité ancien, ou si au contraire il allales laisser survivre.Eh bien!
nos adversaires ont paru dire que s'il n'y avait pas eu de déclaratinn,
tous les effets du traité de 1886 étaient supprimés par l'entrée e1'guïur
du traité de 1926. Je crois, quant à moi, qu'ils exagèrent, et dans notre
thèse principale nous vous avons dit que nous pensions qu'il n'en était
pas ainsi et qu'il n'en était pas ainsi pour les dispositions qui étaient

demeurées en vigueur dans le traité de 1926. Mais je reconnais; je
reconnais très volontiers, que sans la déclaratioily avait tout au moins
certains effets du traité de 1886 qui étaient définitivement suppriniés
par l'entrée en vigueur du traité de 1926, et spécialement la loi sur
l'emprunt obligatoire, réputée, dans la mesure où elle aurait été étendue
aux sujets britanniques, constituer une violation d'une disposition du
traité de 1886, n'aurait plus pu donner, après le 28 juillet 1926, lieu
à une réclamation quelcoiique, puisque la règle substantielle sur laquelle
se serait appuyée cette réclamation était éteinte en mêmetemp que la
dis~osition créant une orocédure arbitrale. et au'il était tout à fait im-
possible d'aller placer &te règle d'une convekion, règleéteinte d'une
convention éteinte, sous l'em~ire d'une urocédure prévue pour des règles
nouvelles. -
Mais, Messieurs, s'il en est ainsi, c'est bien la démonstration qu'en

réalité, malgré ses termes lénifiants, la déclaration est non seulement
interprétative, bien plutôt un correctif, un amendement, en quelque
sorte, tout au moins une réserve accompagnant le traité de 1926 et
modifiant, limitant ses effets de remplacement.
Et alors je vous pose la question : est-ce que vraiment, de bonne
foi, on peut considérer que lorsque l'article 29 du traité considère que
la Cour est compétente pour les différends relatifs à l'application et
à l'interprétation d'une quelconque des stipulations du présent traité
il y a lieu d'écarter cette compétence pour l'interprétation ou l'apj~li-
cation de l'ensemble du présent traité, pour la détermination de l'effet
du présent traité ?Est-ce qu'il n'est pas également inévitable d'admettre
que la déclaratioii qui résout cette question; qui règle toute la question
des efffts de l'entrée en vigueur du traité de 1426. est assimilable
pleinement à une disposition~~~uelcon~uedes stipulations du traité de

1926 et doit donc êtreconsidérée commeentrant dans la compétence
de la Cour ?
Reste maintenant à démontrer - et j'en aurai firii quand j'aurai
fait cette démonstration - que du moment que la Cour est compé-
tente pour interpréter la déclaration, la Cour est également compéteiite
pour connaître du présent différend, parce que, contrairement à la
thèse de mon distingué contradicteur, ce différendentre dans les ternies
de la déclaration. DUPLIQUE DE 31. HENRI ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 17v j2
336
Monsieur le Président relativement à l'internrétation de la déclara-
~ ~~
tion, sir Eric Beckett i.ous a proposé un disti~zguo. Il vous a dit : en
réalité, la déclarationne vise pas toutes les réclamations mais seulement
c~rt~ines réclamations : les aùtres. n'étant viséesni dansla déclaration
iii<I:in> Iïtr,iir;. deii,i(i.11s:.zoiitsiiitniisei !iaiiciiiic ]irucCdureol>ligntr,iic.
!11i?li it9ii1Ir, ilifi6rt,iid\,ibCs : li:iiisI:iurochliiri t'iritr nous .i\.iiiiis
cornuris oue dans sa oenséela déclaration bisait seulement les réclama-

tions an(érieures à ;926. Aujourd'hui, il nous a dit, non, plutôt hier,
ce ne sont pas les réclamations nécessairement formuléesantérieurement.
mais ce soit les réclamations en puissance, les réclamations potentielles,
les réclamatiotis qui étaient conçues mais pas encore nées.
Monsieur le Président, je lis et relis la déclaration et je ne parviens pas
à comprendre comment il est possible, dans ce texte qui paraît vraiment

tout à fait général,de découvrir la distinction et la restriction que l'on
prétend y trouver. Eu effet, le texte dit très clairement que le traité de
commerce ne porte pas prbjudice aux réclamations basées sur le traité
de 1886 et que tous différends qui peuvent s'éleveu - le texte original est
en anglais : al1disputes whichmay arise, ce qui semble bien indiquer les
différends -, tous les différends qui vont pouvoir s'élever à l'avenir

doivent être soumis à l'arbitrage conformément aux dispositions du
~rotocole de 1886.

mois dernier. nous avons été~-~nés à con~~ ~ ~ ~au'en réalitéon ne

pouvait jamais interdire à une partie de recourir aux travaux prépara-
toires, mais que l'interurète, le iuee. l'autorité, ne pouvaient leuraccorder
de valeur qi'en propÔrtioii in\.<rse du degré de clarté du texte qu'on
prétendait ainsi éclairer. Si c'est un texte en apparence fort clair, il
faudra des travaux préparatoires d'une évidence éclatante pour en
modifier la oortée. Tandis oue s'il s'aeit d'un teste douteux. laissant la
p1.i~ :iplii.iiittr~ inr~~rl,t;t.,ttuiiil ,:;tr.~i;~~iiii,hlcqiir, d;iii,tiiitIi;.ait:i-

tioti iutnl,litc, <III<.lirrchciilt-ci. titi?igiic tI.aiis1i.rr4\.iuk lirC1i:.r.,t<iii,:s
(iitnnr :i I'iiit<~ri,rCratiiiiiiicorrc,sn<iti< :lI'tiiti.i.tii~ilcs t>.irrt<>.
Or, dans le cas nous akns un texte très clacr. Voyons donc
ce que l'on va tirer des travaux préparatoires: eh bien ! Messieurs, le
maximum qu'on tire des travaux préparatoires est que les Parties
n'auraient pas envisagéd'autres différendsque les différends qui étaient

sur le point de naître. Je crois, Messieurs, que cela est improbable ; je
constate du reste aue cela est en nartie contredit Dar ce aue disent nos

pose la question, à suppose<qu'il n'i ait pas songé,est-ce que vois seriez
autorisés, en présencede ce texte-ci, à le construire restrictivement et à

décider qu'il était conforme à l'intention des Parties d'établir entre les
différendsladistinction proposéeet deretenir exclusivement la procédure
arbitrale de 1886 pour quelque différend qui apparaissait comme pou-
vant encore surgir alors qu'ils auraient entendu tacitement exclure cette
réglementation pour des différends sur la valeur, la légitimité desquels
ils ne pouvaient pas, par hypothèse, se prononcer puisque, par hypothèse,

il ne les aurait pas connus ? Une telle espèce de pari sur l'inconnu me
paraît, je l'avoue, tout à fait déraisonnable et contraire à la pratique
généraledes gouvernements. DUPLIQUE DE W. HENRI ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 17 V 52 337

Encore une fois, ce malheureux traité gréco-italienrevient àmon aide
puisque, là aussi, je trouve cette déclaration formelle que tous les diffé-
rends, baséssur le traité de 1889.remis en vigueur en 1899.demeureront
réglés ouseront régléspar la procédurearbitrale - cette foissuivant le
nouveau système de 1926pour le cas gréco-italien. A moins que li aussi
on introduise une construction restrictive, mais j'ignore sur quelle base,
il faut y voir l'expression du désirdes gouvernements d'assurer à tous
les différendsrelatifsàl'ancien traité de commerce un règlement arbitral
soit sur base de l'ancien ~rotocole. soit sur base de l'article za nouveau.
Cependant, nos adveriaires prétendent trouver la que leur
interprétation restrictive est raisonnable dans le fait aii'elle serait~ ~ ~
au moins amorcéedans la déclaration. Ils soulignent 4ue la déclaration
prévoit que les anciennes dispositions seront d'application seulement
pour les réclamations faites au nom des particuliers. Or, disent-ils, il a
bien autre chose que les réclamations faites au nom des particuliers ;
il y a les réclamations faitesau nom desgouvernements pour des intér6ts
politiques étatiques. Il serait donc démontréque le Gouvernement bri-

sur la base de l'ancien traité. .
Ce raisonnement ne résiste pas à l'examen. Comme si! Hartley Shaw-.
cross, tout d'abord, j'ai imaginéque, à vrai dire, les Etats avaient pu
sans inconvénient et sans risque éliminer de leurs préoccupations de
règlement les éventuelsconflits étatiques parce qu'ils pourraient raison-
nablement écarter cette éventualité. En effet, si des gouvernements
peuvent ignorer, le 16juillet 1926,la lésiondont a étévictime uoparticu-
lier grec ou britannique, celle dont aurait étévictime leur Etat leur
serait, semble-t-il, suffisamment connue au moment où ils rédigent la
déclaration, et ils peuvent déduire de leur ignorance à l'inexistence de
pareils griefs.
Mais j'ajoute, Messieurs, que j'ai en vain cherché dans le traité de
1886 quels étaient ces engagements relatifs à des intérêtsétatiques aux-
quels il était fait allusion. Assurément, à un moment donné, je me siiis
dit :mais, peut-êtretout de même, puisquetoutes les dispositions sont
au profit des personnes et des biens des sujets réciproques,peut-êtreque
dans la penséede sir Eric Beckett il y a lieu de considérercomme une
réclamation étatique une réclamation qui ne serait pas faite au profit
d'un ressortissant déterminémais au profit de l'ensemble des ressortis-
sants éventuels, britanniques en Grèce, ou helléniqiies en Grande-
Bretagne ; par exemple, serait considéréecomme interétatique une
réclamation diriaéecontre une mesure léeislative avant au'elle n'ait été
effectivement appliquée à des ressortisGnts étrangers &terminés. Ce
sont ces réclamations dont les gouvernements auraient fait abandon
réciproque. Mais non, Messieurs, ce n'est Das dans ce sens-là aue nos
advërsahes emploient l'expressi6n, car ils'nous donnent un exemple.
Quelexemple ?Ils nous disent que la réclamation quela Grande-Bretagne
avait en vue était celle que provoquerait de sa part la loi sur l'emprünt
forcéau cas où il s'avérerait que cette loi étaitappliquée aux ressortis-
sants britanniques, avant même qu'ellene frappe des ressortissants
déterminés.Mais si de telles réclamations sont considérées commefaites
au nom de particuliers, que reste-t-il d'autre comme différendsinteréta-338 DUPLIQUE DE ai. HESRI ROLIS (GRÈCE) - 17 1'52

tiques et que reste-t-il de l'argument tiré de leur prétendue exclusion
du champ de la déclaration?
Pour le surplus, je m'en réfère à la démonstration que vous a faite
sir Hartley Shawcross de la portée de la déclarationd'aprèsson texte et
d'aprèsl'intention des Parties. C'estle moment de faire application de la
règlede l'effetutile. A suuvoser au'il v eût eu un doute fluelconaue dans

nements shataires. Cette intention était certainement d'assurer la
continuatioi de la sauvegarde assurée déjà par le protocole de 1886,
d'empêcher que les anciens différends ne tombent dans cette lacune
- ce vacuum, cette trappe - qui vous a étéindiquée et ilon pas
simplement d'en limiter les dimensions.
J'en aurai terminésur ce point par une dernière considération, celle-ci
de pur fait. Nous avons quelque mérite à avoir réfuté avec autant de
soin la thèse de sir Eric Beckett, car en fait,à supposer mêmeque vous
la reteniez, elle ne ferait pas obstacle à ce que vous vous déclariez
com~étents Dour connaître de la vrésente réclamation Iielléniaue. En
effet: comméon vous l'a dit, la piemière démarche du Gouve;nement
hellénique est une démarche de rqzs. Assurément. cette démarche est
vrésenae avec des eants. avec unem~dbratiou. une mesure. une timidité
iIui font que 1,01y lierc cher eiit.aiil l'indic~tioiid'une bise juridique.
in;.iscorniiie\.oii.iledisait Çgaleriiciit iiion coii:tcnlli.giiesir ll;irtle!.
Sha\r.crow. r.1r;:~litII n'est LUS du tuut s:,ii>i~rl:c;cltctt IcCour :I
déjàeu à connaître de négociationsamorcéesdancdeç conditions sembla-
bles. Pour qu'une note diplomatique ait la portée d'uneréclamation, il
suffit qu'elleait un objet certain et témoignede la volontéd'un gouverne-
ment de faire actede protection àl'égardde son ressortissant. En l'espece,
cette réclamation - ce claim - était antérieure à 1926, et à supposer
donc mêmeaue vous ~uissiezintroduire dans la déclaration de 1026une,
restriction que je n'y ai pas trouvée, encore la réclamation présentéeau
nom de hl. Ambatielos devait-elle êtreconsidérée commerecevable et
comme tombant sous l'application de ladéclaration.
Avant que j'aborde le point suivant, à vrai dire le deriiier de mon
exposé,je considére commeun devoir de loyautéde faire part à la Cour
d'une ~etite rectification <lueme fait varvenirà l'instant sir Eric Beckett.
Il me 'dit que je l'ai mal compris lorique tantbt je lui ai fait dire que la
déclaration de 1qz6 visait exclusivement des réclamations qui avaient
été ~enséesmaisnon formuléeset au'il ne connaît uas I'oriGne de mon
malintendu. Messieurs, je m'excusêsi j'ai mal comi>ris,la Cour verra le
compte rendu de l'exposéde sir Eric Beckett. J'ai exposé,sans repro-
duire les mots mémei, ce que j'avais comprisCommë désignépaf lui
sous le terme de réclamations potentielles. Si je me suis trompé,je m'en
excuse, mais j'avoue êtreencore maintenant dans le vague, et ne pas
comprendre par quel artifice nos estimés contradicteurs en arrivent à
déclarer que la note du Gouvernement britannique de 1925 relative à
l'affaire Ambatielos n'est pas un cdaim »,mais que la simple intention
manifestée par le Gouvernement britannique de «peut-être soulever
la question u de l'emprunt forcéde 1926 est un cidaim », en sortc que
la note de 19zj et le différendainsi amorcé ne tomberaient pas sous le
coup du protocole de la déclaration de 1926, tandis que celui-ci couvri-
rait au contraire le différend qui aurait pu naître des préoccupations
britanniques relatives à l'emprunt forcé. DUPLIQUE DE M. HENRI ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 17 v 52
3139
Mais j'en arrive maintenant au dernier point de mon exposé, et je
serai fort bref. Je l'aborde, je dirai par acquit de conscieiice et parce que
nous l'avons mentionné dans nos Conclusions, à titre très subsidiaire;
il s'agit de notre demande de jonction de l'exception d'incompétence;ru
fond. A première vue, rien n'est plus facile que la distinction entre
l'examen de la compétencede la Cour et l'examen au fond d'un différend.
Dans l'examen de sa compétence, le juge international vérifie si la
demande qui lui est soumise a trait à une prétendue violation d'obliga-
tions internationales dont le respect est soumis à son confrôle. Dans
l'examen de fond, la Cour vérifiesi cette violation est réelle,si elle est
démontrée,et quels en sont éventuellement les effets an point de vue ide
la rtiparation. Aussi votre Règlement vous impose-t-il d'aborder sépa-
rément et d'abord l'examen de la question de compétence. filais en
mêmetemps votre Règlement prévoitla possibilitéd'iine jonction. Et
M. Hambro. Greffier de la Cour. a. dansune sériede lecons donnéesici à
l'Académie,cité, rappelé, un certain nombre assez considérablede cas
où la Cour a étéamenée à ioindre l'incident de com~étenceau fond.
Je crois, Messieurs, que cela est souvent inévitable: parce que dans
la vérification de votre compétence vousêtesamenés à vérifiersi prima
tacie la demande qui vous est soumise a trait à la règlede droit que l'on
prétend invoquer. Il est tout à fait certain qu'il ne suffirait pas par
exemple que j'invoque à titre purement formel un traité sur la naviga-
tion aériennedansun différendqui aurait trait à un incident de frontière
pour que la Cour retienne sa compétence. La Cour a souvent estimé
ql'existence de ce rapport. C'est toutpàtfait légitime.prima fncie
Maisla Cour devra-t-elle éealement vérifier à cette occasion si l'obliea-
tiiiiqu'un iii\.oilui!est rt'r.llett iiiterprC1l:cr.x;icri:)1,:<roi, rlii51
cetrv ul,liq;irioii rclCvcd'iiiic r6~letic droit r;iiCuiiIiliinc ~~uiivvnti~~n
eénérale.TaCour eut considéreraue cetteauestion aoi~artient entière-
iiicnr:tu<loni;iiiie;Ir:ILcornl>c'tcnc:. niilnc:111sparitit p.is<I(JI~~CqueX
si I'ut,liglitiuiiiii\,r,r<-l;.<l'uiivc<inveiiii<iiarticiiliirr,liiiiI'iiitcr-
i~r<:l;iriuicist iiiscii1.('uiir5.1iuiliiilC-rclut:I'iilr~ru~<:tnr~dicc~ttt.
convention particuliè;e relève à la fois de la /ompéten& et du fond et va
êtrealors amenée à faire ce qu'elle a déjàfait dansun certain nombre ide
cas. à savoir ioindre l'incident au fond. sauf à décider aue. si dans
I'csaiiieii ;lu luiiil ellr coiistLtt. i~iiclclcdruit ii'cjtr?\~<~iitiic.lltiiieiit
p;ii i:t.ibliiiin1.diritt?rprct;t, qii~.I'd)lig:,rion iiii.o<,Sincsisl.inrc.
se déclarerincom~étentesansaborder Tedomaine du fait
Ilessieurs, je pense qu'en L'espècevous ne devrez pas joindre l'inci-
dent au fond, parce qu'il m'a sembléque mêmenos adversaires étaient
d'accord pour-estimer que parmi nos bases juridiques il y en avait
une au moins dont ils reconnaissaient la pertinence :c'étaitl'article15,
paragraphe 3, du traité de 1866, et que cela suffit, à mon sens, pour
que vous vous déclariez compétents. Je reconnais, par contre, qu'en
ce qui concerne les articles 1 et X du traité de 1886, reproduits aux
articles Iet 3 du traité de 1926,il y a divergence d'interprétation entre
les Gouvernements britannique et hellénique quant au contenu de
l'obligation d'accorder aux sujets helléniques le traitement national,
et le traitement de la nation la plus favoriséedépassaitce que le Gouver-
nement britannique comprit par cette disposition. Il est donc possible,.
Messieurs, bien que je ne le comprendrais pas, que vous déclariezque
notre première base juridique de la demande n'est pas à elle seule sutfi-340 DUPLIQUE DE 31. HEKRI ROLIN (GRECE) - 17 V 52
sante pour vous déclarer compétents et que vous désiriez vérifier égale-

ment, avant de vous prononcer, quelle est la portée à attribuer aux
deux dispositions de 1886 maintenues en 1926, que je viens de vous
rappeler. Dans cette hypothèse, vous joindriez l'incident aux iimerits
of the case ». J'ai cru devoir, pour être complet, vous rappeler cette
possibilité.
Me voici ainsi enfin arrivé à la conclusion de cette réplique qui, je
m'excuse, a étéquelque peu plus longue que je ne l'avais prévu.
Teme résume.
Ainsi que je vous l'ai dit au début, si nous avons cité des articles de
la Charte, ce n'était pas- et sur ce point il n'y a plus de malentendu-
pour vous demande? de baser sur eux votrë compétence obligatoire,
mais c'était, je dirai, à l'usage de notre adversaire, comme un rappel
d'un air qui lui est familier et qu'il affectionne parfoisde faire entendre,
non que nous ayons eu un grand espbir à cette heure tardive de le voir
revenir à de meilleurs seiitiments, mais parce que nous avons pensé

qu'éventuellement ce rappel d'une musique qui lui est chère serait pour
lui un réconfort aux heures d'affliction si, comme nous le pensons, la
Cour ne fait pas droit à ses conclusions.
Quant à votre compétence obligatoire, comme je vous l'ai dit, nous
la basons sur l'article za du traité de 1426. et ie n'ai nlus besoin
de rappeler à la Cour que nous avons essayé'd2enfalie la dékonstration
de deus façons : d'une part, en vous demandant de considérer que
vous étiez directement compétents sur la base de 1926, par une inter-
prétation de l'article 29 qui en étendrait l'applicationtous les différends
relatifs au traité de 1926. mêmesi supplémentairement ces différends
étaient également baséssur le traité de 1886,parce qu'ayant pour origine
des faits antérieurs àl'entrée envigueur du texte revisédes règles ancien-
nes invoquées. D'autre part, nous vous avons exposéque vous trouverez
dans l'article 29 également une base directe de compétence, en tant

que notre demande basée sur des articles du traité de 1886 fait surgir
une contestation relative aux effets du traité de 1926 par rapport aux
différends néssous l'ancien traité et que pareille contestation est com-
prise dans le chanip d'application de l'article 29 de ce traité. Mais, et
surtout, sur ce point nous avons une conviction dont sir Hartley Shaw-
cross s'est fait l'interprète : la réclamation du Gouvernement hellé-
nique relative à Ambatielos nous a paru tomber en tout cas dans le
champ de la déclaration, laquelle est inséparable du traité de 1926,
en sorte qu'un différend relatif à son interprétation doit être réglé
suivant l'article 29 du traité de 1926.
Ainsi la Cour est en tout cas compétente pour déterminer par inter-
prétation de la déclaratiori quelle est la juridiction compétente au fond.
Quant à celle-ci, la Cour se trouve placée devant le dilemnie suivant :
ou bien reconnaître que ce différendtombe directement sous sa compé-

tence, ou qu'il tombe sous la compétence de la procédure arbitrale de
1886 et que, par raccroc, il lui revient à la suite de la déclaration qui
lui a étéfaite, suivant laquelle le Gouvernement britannique est disposé,
comme le Gouvernement hellénique, à voir la Cour fonctionner, confor-
mément au traité de 1926, comme instance arbitrale.
Je désire terminer, Messieurs, par une dernière considération. Sir Eric
Beckett dans sa première plaidoirie a cité avec complaisance un
adage latin non dormientibus sed vigilantibus subvenit lex. Je ne sais
pas s'il y attachait une portée juridique. Je ne le crois pas. Laprescrip- DUPLIQUE DE hl. HENRI ROLIN (GRÈCE) - 17 V 52 341

tion est une notion agitée parfois de façon théorique, mais dont à ma
cuiiii;iissaiiil ii'y:<pas il'application en ]urisl)rudciice. :lu surplus,
quclle q~icji~it1'iiiiyvrt;inccuu I'intïrl)rCtatiriii qu'on xttache aux norcs
~ucct:ssi\~esdi1Guii\.éri~eiiicntIiellCni<~uei,io(luioiit &téJ'iinr prCci-
sion croissante, qui se sont succédé à deux ou trois années d'inter-
valle, pratiquemerit depuis 192j, sauf la période de la guerre, nous
pouvons dire qu'elles ont au moins suffi à interrompre une éventuelle
prescription et que nous ne sommes pas du tout dans la situation d'un
Gouvernement hellénique qui viendrait pour la première fois en 1951
ou 1952 porter devant la Cour un différendrelatif à un M. Ambatielos
dont le Gouvernement britannique n'aurait jamais entendu parler,
des conditions devenues invérifiables. Peut-être aurait-on pu parlerns
en pareil cas d'abandon ou de renonciation. Telle n'est pas du tout la
situation devant laauelle nous nous trouvons : le mot d'abandon n'a
du reste pas étéprofioncé.
Mais, Messieurs, le reproche d'inaction et d'avoir dormi a un sens
ironiqie qui m'a frappé:-dormientibus,dormiens.Assurément,Messieurs,
cette expression ne peut pas s'appliquer au protégé, à la principale
victime des actes dénoncés, à M.Ambatielos, qui,sans ;aucundoute, ri'a
pas connu beaucoup de nuits excellentes depuis qu'il a subi son étrange
aventure d'avoir payé en 1919-1920 environ deux millions de livres
sterling et de s'êtretrouvé au bout de moins de deux ans, alors que
-~~~vendeur était le Gouvernement britanniaue. à la fois dé~ouillé
de son argent et des navires. Certes, en ce qui le concerne, le tempSpesé
et la ~rolongation de sa privation de la iouissance et de la disposition
-~ -~ -omme au'il avait déoenséen'ont 6as étéde nature à com~enser
ou à éteindre <ue~~~up eeu son dommage.'
Je me rends bien compte que son infortune est peu de chose en compa-
raison des calamités dans lesquelles se débattent tant de millions d'êtres
humains que la Cour est impuissante à soulager. Je pense pourtant
que, si modeste que soit l'enleu, ce n'est pas chose iiidifférentepour le
climat, mêmeinternational,,que la réparation, fiit-ce <!'uneseuleinjustice,
et le rappel à une plus claire conception de ses obligations d'un grand
pays dont la bonne volonté n'est pas en cause.
Au surplus, Messieurs, vous n'en êtes pasencore Ii.
Il ne s'agit aujourd'hui que d'apprécier votre compétence ; mais
lorsqu'il s'agit de compétence, il s'agit toujoiirs d'un intérêt général,
d'une question d'ordre public, d'ordre public international, et cela
suffit assurément à expliquer la patience et la bienveillance dont la
Cour a fait preuve à l'égarddes deux Parties. Je crois êtrel'interprète
de sir Eric Beckett comme de sir Hartley Shawcross en vous disant toute
notre gratitude à cet égard.