Written reply of Côte d'Ivoire to the questions put by Judges Cleveland, Tladi, Aurescu and Charlesworth at the end of the hearing held on 13 December 2024

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REPUBLIQUE DE COTE D’IVOIRE
Union – Discipline – Travail
MINISTERE DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT,
DU DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE
ET DE LATRANSITION ECOLOGIQUE
Audiences publiques de la Cour Internationale de Justice, dans le
cadre de la procédure consultative sur les Obligations des États en
matière de changement climatique
La Haye, le 13 décembre 2024
Réponses de la République de Côte d’Ivoire aux questions posés
par la Cour aux participants
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________________________________________________________________
A. Question asked by Judge Cleveland
“During these proceedings, a number of participants have referred to the production of fossil
fuels in the context of climate change, including with respect to subsidies. In your view, what
are the specific obligations under international law of States within whose jurisdiction fossil
fuels are produced to ensure protection of the climate system and other parts of the environment
from anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, if any?”
1. In light of the projected rise in global temperature of 2.1-2.8ºC on the basis of full
implementation of the latest nationally determined contributions,1 the State Parties to the
Paris Agreement decided in 2023 to call upon Parties to contribute ‘in a nationally
determined manner’ to various global efforts to achieve ‘deep, rapid and sustained
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in line with 1.5 ºC pathways’.2 These include
‘accelerating efforts towards the phase-down of unabated coal power’, ‘transitioning away
from fossil fuels in energy systems’ and ‘phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies’.3
2. Côte d’Ivoire submits that paragraph 28 of Decision CMA.5 did not create new obligations
for State Parties in itself. This is reflected in the hortatory language used (calls upon) and
its status as a decision of the CMA rather than an amendment to the Paris Agreement.
However, it is submitted that paragraph 28 is a ‘subsequent agreement’ of State Parties
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.4 Consequently, it provides ‘external context’ for the interpretation of the
1 CMA.5 (‘First global stocktake’) UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/L.17 (13 December 2023) paras 18, 24.
2 Ibid., para. 28.
3 Ibid.
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Art. 31(3)(a), 1155 UNTS 331. See also: Oliver Dörr, ‘Article
31: General rule of interpretation’ in Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: A Commentary (2012) 521, 561-564; Sorel and Eveno, ‘Article 31: Convention of 1969’ in Corten
and Klein, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2011) 289, 304-307.
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obligations under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement both for producers
and consumers of fossil fuels, alongside all other participants in their supply chains.
3. In its oral submissions,5 Côte d’Ivoire referred to the specific obligations of States within
whose jurisdiction fossil fuels are produced in two respects: 1) the duty under Article 4(2)
of the Paris Agreement to execute environmental impact assessments, including
‘downstream’ or ‘Scope 3’ emissions accounting for the inevitable combustion of the fuels;
and 2) the duty under Article 4(3) of such States with ‘high socio-economic indicators’ to
‘transition away’ from reliance on the production of fossil fuels for national income deeper
and faster than fossil-fuel-producing States with low indicators. Our interpretation of
Article 4(2) for the former is based upon the meaning of the words ‘pursue domestic
mitigation measures’ in light of the ‘object and purpose’ of the Paris Agreement under
Article 2(1)6 in conjunction with customary international law on environmental impact
assessments and the reference to ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels’ in Decision CMA.5
(2023) as ‘external context’.7 Our construction of Article 4(3) for the latter rests upon the
ordinary meaning of the words ‘in light of different national circumstances’ in combination
with Decision CMA.5 as ‘external context’.
4. The duty to assess the Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions pertains to new projects for fossil fuel
production rather than existing projects.8 As States must align their NDCs under Article
4(2) to the annual synthesis reports produced by the UNFCCC Secretariat,9 the duty to
5 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Request for advisory opinion) Oral Hearings, Verbatim
Record (uncorrected) CR 2024/39 (Wednesday 4 December 2024, 10 a.m.) pp.25-26 (paras 8-9)
6 VCLT, Art. 31(1).
7 VCLT, Art. 31(3)(a), 31(3)(c).
8 E.g. – Sharma by her litigation representative Sister Marie Brigid Arthur v Minister for the Environment, Federal
Court of Australia (13 September 2021) (FCA 560) paras 88-89. See also, for example, the pending proceedings
before the European Court of Human Rights in App. No. 34068/21 Greenpeace and others v. Norway concerning
the lawfulness of permits for new fossil fuel production projects in the North Sea.
9 For example, see the discussion on Zeph Investments Pte. Ltd. (II) v. Australia in the response to the question
posed by Judge Tladi. See also, e.g. – ICSID Case No. ARB/23/5 Ruby River Capital LLC v. Canada (Request
for Arbitration) (17 February 2023) paras 122-130; ibid. (Memorial) pp.59-61, 85-88; ibid., (Contre-mémoire)
pp.15-21, 39-63.
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‘pursue domestic mitigation measures’ entails the assessment of new fossil fuel projects
against the evolving state of the global carbon budget, as measured in those reports. While
a fossil fuel producing State Party could meet this procedural obligation by accurately
assessing the emissions impact of a new project and yet decide to proceed with the project,
such a decision could constitute a breach of its substantive duty to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions if the assessment showed the emissions impact of the project to exceed the level
required for alignment with the collective temperature objective.10
5. Decision CMA.5 shapes the construction of the obligations of State Parties for the
consumption of fossil fuels. When the Netherlands enacted legislation for a progressive ban
on the consumption of coal for the generation of electricity until 2030,11 for example, they
were motivated by their duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions produced in their
territories. In this respect, the references in the decision to ‘accelerating efforts towards the
phase-down of unabated coal power’ and ‘transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy
systems’ are relevant. The reference in paragraph 28 to ‘a nationally determined manner’
refers to the margin of appreciation for States to decide the combination of measures to
adopt in their particular circumstances.
6. However, the reference to ‘phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies’ in paragraph 28 of
Decision CMA.5 refers to a specific measure to be taken by fossil fuel producing and
consuming States. Though not binding in itself, this measure provides interpretation to the
duty under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 concerning how State Parties must ‘transition
away’ from fossil fuel production and consumption. Consequently, it is submitted that State
Parties using fossil fuel subsidies are obliged to include a plan for the progressive
discontinuance of subsidies in their NDC submissions.
10 Ibid.
11 See the response to the question posed by Judge Tladi.
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7. In construing Article 4(3) to oblige States with high socio-economic indicators and in
whose territory fossil fuels are produced to transition away from fossil fuel production
‘deeper and faster’ than States with low indicators, Côte d’Ivoire argued that such criteria
are wealth, technical capacity and human development. One basic indicator of wealth is
gross domestic product per capita, as measured by the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. Another is the size and power of sovereign wealth funds of which the
largest in the world (save the China Investment Corporation and the SAFE Investment
Fund) were built on fossil fuel income. In this respect, the pace and depth of progressive
transition away from fossil fuels is to be aligned to the annual synthesis reports. Due to the
alignment of NDCs with the collective objective, this means that fossil fuel-producing
States with wealth and technical capacity (e.g. – Kuwait, Saudi Arabia) are obliged to
design and implement NDC submissions with ‘economy-wide emission targets’ providing
for transitional plans away from fossil fuels according to ‘deeper and faster’ targets than
poorer producers (e.g. – Timor Leste, Colombia).
B. Question asked by Judge Tladi
“In their written and oral pleadings, participants have generally engaged in an interpretation
of the various paragraphs of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement. Many participants have, on the
basis of this interpretation, come to the conclusion that, to the extent that Article 4 imposes any
obligations in respect of Nationally Determined Contributions, these are procedural
obligations. Participants coming to this conclusion have, in general, relied on the ordinary
meaning of the words, context and sometimes some elements in Article 31 (3) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. I would like to know from the participants whether,
according to them, “the object and purpose” of the Paris Agreement, and the object and purpose
of the climate change treaty framework in general, has any effect on this interpretation and if
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so, what effect does it have?”
1. On 4 December,12 Côte d’Ivoire made the following submission:
‘On question (a), Côte d’Ivoire supports the remarks of Pakistan13 and others14 in asserting the collective
objective on global temperature [in Article 2(1)] to be the cornerstone of the Paris Agreement15. As this
provision does not use binding language16, we agree with Australia17 and others18 in averring its non-binding
character in light of its drafting history19. Given the consensus on the binding character of the individual
duties in Article 420, we submit that the collective objective as ‘internal context’21 infuses their
interpretation22.
Consequently, the standard of the collective objective is a key issue for the clarification of the standard of
these individual duties. In this respect, neither the text nor any subsequent [CMA] decision elaborates upon
the meaning of the words ‘well below 2º C’. While we concur with China that the collective temperature goal
‘is a range instead of one fixed level’,23 it is submitted that a ceiling exists between the hortatory ambition to
12 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change (Request for advisory opinion) Oral Hearings, Verbatim
Record (uncorrected) CR 2024/39 (Wednesday 4 December 2024, 10 a.m.) pp.25-26 (paras 8-9) (translated by
Côte d’Ivoire from the original French).
13 Pakistan, Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras. 50-51.
14 Ecuador, Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras. 3.76-3.77; Grenada, Written Statement (21 March 2024), paras. 25-30;
Indonesia, Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras. 51-53. Voir aussi : CIJ, Obligations des États en matière du changement
climatique, audience publique, CR 2024/35, p.142, par. 12 (Allemagne).
15 E.g. Colombia, Written Statement (11 March 2024), paras. 3.32-3.34; Chile, Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras. 55,
59; El Salvador, Written Statement (22 March 2024), para. 30; Solomon Islands, Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras.
61-63; Micronesia, Written Statement (25 March 2024), para. 89; Timor-Leste, Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras.
96-101. The temperature target ‘reduces the uncertainty that has long attached to the UNFCCC’s Objective’ – Navraj Singh
Ghaleigh, ‘Article 2: Aims, Objectives and Principles’ in Geert van Calster and Léonie Reins, The Paris Agreement on Climate
Change: A Commentary (2021) 73, 80 ; Halldór Thorgeirsson, ‘Objective (Article 2.1)’ in Klein et al., The Paris Agreement
on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary (2017) 123, 127-128.
16 Ghaleigh (note 15) 81; Thorgeirsson (note 15) 128.
17 Australia, Written Comments (15 August 2024), paras. 2.23-2.24; Australia, Written Statement (22 March 2024), para. 2.62.
18 Saint Lucia, Written Statement (21 March 2024), para. 53; Saudi Arabia, Written Comments (15 August 2024), paras. 4.22-
4.30; Saudi Arabia, Written Statement (21 March 2024), para. 4.58-4.60; United States of America, Written Statement (22
March 2024), para. 3.15; United Kingdom, Written Comments (12 August 2024), para. 14-18 ; Kuwait, Written Statement (22
March 2024), paras. 31-32.
19 Contra: Sierra Leone, Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras. 3.23-3.24; Germany, Written Statement (March 2024),
para. 44, 100-102; Nepal, Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras. 18-19; Romania, Written Statement (February 2024),
para. 88; Marshall Islands (March 2024), paras. 64-65; Viet Nam, Written Statement (22 March 2024), para. 19; Namibia,
Written Statement (22 March 2024), paras. 46, 72; Portugal, Written Statement (March 2024), paras. 51, 53.
20 United Kingdom, Written Comments (12 August 2024), para. 20.
21 Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, art. 31, al. 2.
22 Latvia, Written Comments (14 August 2024), para. 19; Sierra Leone, Written Comments (15 August 2024), para. 3.5; Samoa,
Written Comments (15 August 2024), para. 52; Mauritius, Written Comments (15 August 2024), paras. 40-42; Kenya, Written
Comments (13 August 2024), paras. 4.36-4.37, 4.44.
23 China, Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 22. Contra: Sierra Leone, Written Comments (15 August 2024) para. 3.5.
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‘pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5ºC’24 and the reference point of 2ºC.25 Whilst certain
participants maintain that the limit is below 1.5º C,26 this construction is not sustained by the words ‘pursuing
efforts to’ [in Article 2(1)]. In its ‘internal context’,27 including the precautionary principle,28 it is submitted
that the most faithful interpretation of the common intention [of the Contracting States] is the level of 1.6º C,
which constitutes the least dangerous of the five ‘possible climate futures’ beyond 1.5º C as presented by the
IPCC.’29
2. In its submissions on the construction of paragraphs 1 to 5 of Article 4,30 Côte d’Ivoire
agreed with those participants who maintained in their written pleadings that the word
‘should’ carries a hortatory meaning in paragraphs 1 and 4. By the same token, we also
concurred with the great majority of participants in averring that the words ‘shall’ in
paragraph 2 and ‘will’ in paragraph 3 manifest their binding character. Since Article 2(1)
does not impose a joint duty to achieve the collective objective of the global temperature
goal, a failure to achieve the collective objective would not give rise to joint responsibility.
3. Rather, State Parties would incur individual responsibility for breaches of their individual
duties under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4. We consider the key issue concerning the
mitigation duties under the Paris Agreement to be the identification of the precise standards
imposed upon State Parties thereto. As we argued: ‘Though ‘ambiguous’ on its own
terms,31 the drafting history of paragraph 132 shows it to be “internal context”33 linking the
24 CMA.5 (‘First global stocktake’) UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/L.17 (13 December 2023) paras 3-4.
25 Contra: China, Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 24.
26 E.g. – Namibia, Written Statement (22 March 2024) paras 46, 69; Vanuatu, Written Statement (21 March 2024) paras 401-
403; Tuvalu, Written Statement (22 March 2024) paras 105-111; Tuvalu, Written Comments (14 August 2024) paras 30-33.
27 CVDT, art 31 alin. 2.
28 Convention-cadre des Nations-Unis sur le changement climatique, signé le 9 mai 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, préambule. Voir
aussi : Xue Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in International Law (2003) 256.
29 GIEC, « Changement climatique 2021 les bases scientifiques physiques : Contribution du groupe de travail I au sixième
Rapport d'évaluation » page 15 (octobre 2021)
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WG1_SPM_French.pdf.
30 CR 2024/39 (note 12) pp.27-36 (paras 11-22).
31 VCLT, Art. 32. See also: Oliver Dörr, ‘Article 32: Supplementary means of interpretation’ in Dörr and
Schmalenbach (note 4) 571, 582-585.
32 Winkler H, ‘Mitigation (Article 4)’ in Daniel Klein and others (eds), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change:
Analysis and Commentary (OUP 2017) 141, 144; Benoît Mayer, ‘Article 4: Mitigation’ in van Geert van Calster
and Leonie Reins, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change : A Commentary (Edward Elgar 2021) 109, 112.
33 VCLT, Art. 31(2). See further: Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (OUP 2015) 210.
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binding duties in paragraphs 2 and 3 to the collective objective in Article 2(1).34’ In our
view, the collective objective, as the ‘object and purpose’ of the Paris Agreement, is thus
‘internal context’ to identify the standards of mitigation for the individual duties of
mitigation.
4. Whereas Côte d’Ivoire has argued that the precautionary principle in customary
international law applies as ‘external context’ to the interpretation and application of the
collective objective and individual mitigation duties under the Paris Agreement, it also
applies as ‘internal context’ through Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC.35 Whilst we have argued
that the lex posterior rule precludes the application of the UNFCCC unless consistent with
the Paris Agreement,36 the precautionary principle embodied in the ‘principles’ of the
‘framework’ Convention is consistent with its treaty of implementation.
5. If the Court were to accept our interpretation of Article 2(1) in the application of the
precautionary principle as providing for a range between an aspirational goal of 1.5º C and
a legal limit of 1.6º C, this would mean that State Parties are bound to strive to achieve the
1.5 º C aspiration with 0.1 º C as the permitted ‘excess’.37 This is manifested in the design
and implementation of their NDCs under the customary standard of due diligence38 as
‘external context’39 for the interpretation of Article 4(3):
34 Winkler (note 32) 144.
35 CR 2024/39 pp.26, 33, 34-35 (paras 9, 18, 21, Côte d’Ivoire).
36 Ibid., p.22 (para. 3, Côte d’Ivoire).
37 On expert evidence concerning the likelihood of ‘overshoot’ in the middle of the twenty-first century with a
view to recovery to 1.5 degrees by 2100, see: Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v. Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors (No 6) Land Court
of Queensland [2022] QLC 21, paras 1394-1409, 1595-1597.
38 Note 30.
39 VCLT, Art. 31(3)(c).
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‘Whereas Kuwait,40 Saudi Arabia41 and the United States42 maintain that the standard of NDCs is exclusively
determined by each State Party, Côte d’Ivoire agrees with Australia,43 Colombia,44 Sierra Leone,45 Tonga46
and others47 that they must be aligned to the ‘object and purpose’48 of the collective objective, as decided by
the CMA in 2022.49 This alignment is evaluated against the Global Stocktake in the annual synthesis reports
under the enhanced transparency framework.50’
In our submission, State Parties must align their NDCs to the 1.5º C aspiration as the
benchmark designated by the CMA for due diligence efforts under Article 4(3). Varying
according to the ‘different national circumstances’ of each State,51 the collective
temperature goal indirectly defines the targets of each State under its own carbon budget,
which, we contend,52 is a duty under Article 4(3).
6. The ‘bottom-up’ system of the Paris Agreement requires State Parties to continually align
their national emission targets in their carbon budgets to the fluctuating state of the global
carbon budget. Since the annual synthesis reports of the UNFCCC Secretariat provide State
Parties with a clear indication of the state of the global carbon budget in terms of emissions
40 Kuwait, Written Statement (22 March 2024) paras 42, 51, 54-55.
41 Saudi Arabia, Written Statement (21 March 2024) paras 4.66-4.68.
42 United States of America, Written Comments (15 August 2024) para. 3.13.
43 Australia, Written Comments (15 August 2024) para. 2.28.
44 Colombia, Written Comments (14 August 2024) para. 3.29; Colombia, Written Statement (11 March 2024)
paras 3.35, 3.39.
45 Sierra Leone, Written Statement (22 March 2024) paras 3.20-3.24.
46 Tonga, Written Statement (15 March 2024) para. 160.
47 République démocratique du Congo, Exposé écrit (4 mars 2024) par. 208 ; Mauritius, Written Comments (15
August 2024) paras 44, 48; Seychelles, Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 96; Vanuatu, Written Statement
(21 March 2024) para. 404.
48 VCLT, Art. 31(1). See further: Gardiner (note 33) 210-222.
49 CMA Decision 1/CMA.4, UN Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2022/10/Add.1 (17 March 2023) para. 23.
50 Bahamas, Written Comments (14 August 2024) paras 46-47; Latvia, Written Comments (14 August 2024) paras
12-14, 16; United Kingdom, Written Comments (12 August 2024) paras 25-26; Australia, Written Comments (15
August 2024) paras 2.34-2.37; Australia, Written Statement (22 March 2024) paras 2.47-2.53; European Union,
Written Statement (March 2024) paras 145, 162; Mexico, Written Comments (August 2024) para. 33; Germany,
Written Statement (March 2024) para. 57; New Zealand, Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 54; Indonesia,
Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 55; Madagascar, Exposé écrit (22 mars 2024) par. 42; Dominican
Republic, Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 4.26, 4.31; Singapore, Written Statement (20 March 2024)
paras 3.32, 3.35; Antigua and Barbuda, Written Statement (22 March 2024) paras 263-284; Solomon Islands,
Written Comments (15 August 2024) para. 50.
51 Ibid., pp.35-36 (para. 22, Côte d’Ivoire).
52 Ibid., pp.32 (para. 17, Côte d’Ivoire).
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and the current state and rate of global warming,53 they are able to readily identify their
own national targets in each NDC iteration. As many State Parties have done,54 this
includes ‘updates’ to NDCs to adjust them to an annual synthesis report during the course
of the regular quinquennial NDC cycle. Whereas a State Party might breach its mitigation
duties by failing to exercise due diligence ‘leading to the precise result’55 of 1.5º C
aspiration, it might also violate them in the event of the 1.6º C limit being exceeded.
7. As ‘internal context’ through Article 4(1), the ‘object and purpose’ also defines the
standards of mitigation applicable to the duty to take national mitigation measures under
paragraph 2. At the sector level, for example, State Parties are obliged to align their
environmental impact assessments to the 1.5º C collective objective. For instance, the
lawfulness of the 2019 Prohibition of Coal in Electricity Production Act of the Netherlands
– directly prompted by the Urgenda Case56 in providing for a phasing out of coal-based
electricity production variable according to the exact facility between 2022 and 2030 – for
the rights of the investors was upheld by the District Court of The Hague in 2022.
8. The Court found the impugned ban for the Amercentrale electricity plant was justified by
the failure by the Claimant to achieve the decarbonisation ambitions in the Sector
Agreement with the Dutch State; in particular, the failures to convert the facility in question
to the use of biomass and to use carbon capture and storage to offset its greenhouse gas
emissions.57 While the Court found the use of a transition period instead of compensation
in the impugned measures to have respected the proprietary rights of the foreign investors,58
the latter initiated a claim under the 1991 Energy Charter Treaty for ‘at least’ EUR 1.4
53 UNFCCC, ‘Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Synthesis Report by the
Secretariat’ (14 November 2023) UN Doc FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/12, paras 8-16.
54 Ibid., paras 81-84.
55 CR 2024/39 (note 12) pp.27-28 (para. 11, Côte d’Ivoire).
56 Case No. C:/09/608588/HA ZA 21-245 RWE Generation NL B.V. v. State of the Netherlands, District Court of
The Hague (Judgment of 30 November 2022) paras 5.17-5.17.58.
57 Ibid., paras 5.17.32-5.17.33, 5.17.35, 5.18.1-5.19.8.
58 Ibid., paras 5.20-5.22.1.
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billion.59 While the arbitration was ultimately discontinued60 by the majority-State-owned
German investors in the context61 of the ‘intra-EU jurisdictional objection’ for investor-
State arbitrations initiated by a national of one EU Member State against another EU
Member State,62 it exemplifies the salient importance of the standards of mitigation defined
by the Paris Agreement. In that case, the measures of the Netherlands for the coal sector –
a major source of their economy-wide GGEs – were taken pursuant to their mitigation
targets, as embodied in the relevant Dutch and European Union legislation implementing
the NDC submission of the European Union under the Paris Agreement.63
9. At the project level, this infusion of the collective objective into Article 4(2) is exemplified
in the pending investor-State arbitration of Zeph Investments Pte. Ltd. (II) v. Australia.64
The dispute concerns the denial by the Queensland Department of Environment and
Science65 of a land lease and environmental permit for the Galilee Coal Mine project on
the basis of an advisory opinion of the Queensland Land Court that it would, inter alia,
‘contribute to climate change directly and indirectly’.66 In taking extensive expert and
59 ICSID Case No. ARB/21/4 RWE AG and Another v. Netherlands (Memorial of 18 December 2021) paras 573,
626.
60 ICSID Case No. ARB/21/4 RWE AG and Another v. Netherlands (Discontinuance Order and Decision on Costs
of 12 January 2024) para. 72.
61 Case No I ZB 75/22 Kingdom of the Netherlands v. RWE AG Federal Court of Justice of Germany
(Budesgerichtshof)(First Civil Senate)(Judgment of 27 July 2023) paras 117-147, English translation at:
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw181754.pdf.
62 For an overview of the Achmea and Komstroy judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
ongoing question of their effects in the context of enforcement of arbitral awards, see: Case C-516/22 European
Commission v. United Kingdom, Court of Justice of the European Union (Judgment of 14 March 2024)
https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=90174EB992CC05434F32D79310A3812C?text
=&docid=283829&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=587471; Affaire no
4A_244/2023 Royaume d’Espagne c. la Société de droit français « A » Tribunal federal de la Suisse (arrêt du 3
avril 2024) https://www.bger.ch/ext/eurospider/live/de/php/aza/http/index.php?highlight_docid=aza://03-04-
2024-4A_244-2023&lang=de&zoom=&type=show_document.
63 Approving the judgments of the courts below, which were cited in RWE Generation NL B.V. v. Netherlands
judgment rendered in the same month, see: Urgenda Foundation v. The State of Netherlands, C/09/456689/ HA
ZA 13-1396, Supreme Court of the Netherlands (9 October 2019) paras 7.2.7-7.2.11. 7.4.1-7.5.2.
64 PCA Case No. 2023-67 Zeph Investments Pte Ltd v. Australia (II), https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/304/.
65 Queensland Government, Department of Environment, Tourism, Science and Innovation, Press Release,
‘Waratah Galilee Coal Mine EA refused’ (3 April 2023) https://www.desi.qld.gov.au/our-department/newsmedia/
mediareleases/2023/waratah-galilee-coal-mine-ea-refused.
66 Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v. Youth Verdict Ltd & Ors (No 6) Land Court of Queensland [2022] QLC 21, para. 1018.
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documentary evidence on its environmental impact, the Court assessed the anticipated
emissions – including ‘downstream’ Scope 3 emissions emanating from the exported
combustion of the mined coal for the production of electricity – against the benchmark of
the 1.5 º C temperature goal under the Paris Agreement.67 According to the Department of
the Attorney General of Australia, the Claimant in the pending arbitration seeks AUD 41
billion in damages from the Commonwealth of Australia.68
10. In summary, we submit that the ‘object and purpose’ of the Paris Agreement and the
UNFCCC permeates the interpretation of Article 4. Like the magnifying and focusing
effects of a telescope, it provides ‘internal context’ within which States are to design and
implement their NDCs and take regulatory, administrative and judicial measures at project,
sector and economy levels to execute their duties under paragraphs 2 and 3 under the
customary standard of due diligence. The precautionary principle in Article 3(3) of the
UNFCCC also provides ‘internal context’ to construe the ‘object and purpose’ of the Paris
Agreement and individual duties of mitigation.
C. Question posée par M le juge Aurescu
“Some participants have argued, during the written and/or oral stages of the proceedings, that
there exists the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment in international law. Could
you please develop what is, in your view, the legal content of this right and its relation with the
other human rights which you consider relevant for this advisory opinion?”
« Certains participants ont fait valoir, dans leurs écritures et/ou lors de la phase orale de la
procédure, que le droit à un environnement propre, sain et durable existe en droit international.
67 Ibid., paras 22, 35, 692-695, 757-797, 944-954, 1015-1028, 1394-1409, 1595-1597.
68 Parliament of Australia, Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, ‘Budget Estimates
2023-2024, Attorney-General’s Department, BE23-059 – Mr Palmer’s entity Zeph – contents of notice of
intention’, https://www.aph.gov.au/api/qon/downloadestimatesquestions/EstimatesQuestion-CommitteeId6-
EstimatesRoundId21-PortfolioId5-QuestionNumber58.
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Pourriez-vous expliciter, de votre point de vue, quel est le contenu juridique de ce droit et quelle
est sa relation avec les autres droits de l'homme que vous considérez pertinents aux fins du
présent avis consultatif ? »
11. La Côte d’Ivoire a voté en faveur de la résolution 76/300 en 2022 (Droit à un environnement
propre, sain et durable). Certains participants ont identifié au second tour des plaidoiries
écrites que la question d’un « droit à un environnement propre, sain et durable » concerne
l’interprétation de cette résolution touchant les deux Pactes internationaux.69 La CEDH a
remarqué que « ni l’article 8 ni aucune disposition de la Convention ne garantit
spécifiquement une protection générale de l’environnement ».70
12. Selon la Côte d’Ivoire, la résolution n’a pas modifié les deux Pactes internationaux pour
fonder un nouveau droit pas prévu à l’origine. Cette interprétation est basée sur le texte de
la résolution dans lequel il n’y a aucune référence à une modification aux deux Pactes
internationaux. Par ailleurs, l’article 51 du Pacte internationale sur les droit civils et
politiques et l’article 29 du Pacte international sur les droits économiques, sociales et
culturels prévoient des procédures spécifiques pour la modification des deux Pactes qui
n’avait pas touchée par la résolution 76/300. Par exemple, elle a n’établit aucun mécanisme
pour la mise en oeuvre d’un nouveau droit, comme, par exemple, l’établissement d’un
« ombudsman71 » ou du droit d’actio popularis72 pour la représentation de
l’« environnement » par un État partie.
13. Cependant, nous soutenons que la résolution est un « accord subséquent » au sens de
l’article 31 alinéa 3) b) de la CVDT à propos de l’interprétation des droits établis dans les
69 Requête no 41666/98 Affaire Kyrtatos c. Grèce, Cour européenne des droits de l’homme (arrêt de 22 mai 2003)
par. 52.
70 Ibid.
71 E.g. – the National Ombudsman (nationale Ombusman) of the Netherlands.
72 E.g. – Requête no 39371/20 Affaire Duarte Agostinho et autres c. Portugal et 32 autres (décision du 9 avril
2024) Cour européenne des droits de l’homme [GC] par. 40, 219-220.
14
deux Pactes internationaux. À notre avis, celle-ci est le sens des mots « Constate que le
droit à un environnement propre, sain et durable est lié à autres droits et au droit
international existant.73 » Le soutien des Etats parties pour l’établissement d’un droit à
l’environnement constitue « opiniones juris » en faveur de l’avis que les « atteintes graves
à l’environnement peuvent affecter le bien-être d’une personne et la priver de la jouissance
de son domicile de manière à nuire à sa vie privée et familiale sans pour autant mettre en
grave danger la santé de l’intéressée…l’élément crucial qui permet de déterminer si, dans
les circonstances d’une affaire, des atteintes à l’environnement ont emporté violation de
l’un des droits sauvegardés…est l’existence d’un effet néfaste sur la sphère privée d’une
personne, et non simplement la dégradation générale de l’environnement.74 »
14. À propos de la question de la mise en oeuvre des devoirs d’atténuation dans le cadre des
traités sur les droits de l’homme, la France75 et d’autres76 rappellent que la CEDH dans
l’affaire Agostinho a approuvé l’argument conjoint selon lequel les demandeurs n’avaient
aucune capacité juridique pour invoquer la responsabilité des 32 défendeurs sauf celle du
Portugal à cause du manque du lien juridictionnel.77 Concurring with Germany,78 Russia,79
New Zealand,80 the Nordics81 and others,82 Côte d’Ivoire supports the approach of the
ECtHR83 to reject the ‘cause and effect’ test proposed by the IACtHR84 and endorsed by
73 Résolution 76/300 de l’Assemblée générale du 28 juin 2022, par. 2.
74 Requêtes nos 54414/13 et 54264/15 Cordella et autres c. Italie (arrêt du 24 janvier 2019) Cour européenne des
droits de l’homme, par. 101.
75 France, Exposé écrit (22 mars 2024) par. 24.
76 Voir par ex. – Netherlands, Written Comments (15 August 2024) para. 2.13.
77 Duarte Agostinho (note 72) par. 208, 213.
78 Germany, Written Statement (March 2024) paras 91-93, 99.
79 Russian Federation, Written Statement (22 March 2024) p. 11.
80 New Zealand, Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 116(a).
81 Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Joint Written Statement (21 March 2024) para. 86.
82 Australia, Written Comments (15 August 2024) paras 4.14-4.15; Canada, Written Statement (20 March 2024)
para. 28.
83 Duarte Agostinho (note 72) para. 210. See further: App. No. 38263/08 Georgia v. Russia (II)(Judgment of 21
January 2021) European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) para. 124.
84 State Obligations in relation to the Environment (Advisory Opinion OC-23/17) Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (15 November 2017) paras 102-103.
15
the Committee on the Rights of the Child.85 As Albania86 and Indonesia87 have argued,88
this is consistent with Urgenda89 and subsequent cases in finding that States have mitigation
duties for sources under their jurisdiction to prevent harm to individuals under their
jurisdiction. In the Future Generations Case, the Supreme Court of Colombia held the
authorities to have breached duties on deforestation under the Paris Agreement owed to its
residents.90
D. Question asked by Judge Charlesworth
“In your understanding, what is the significance of the declarations made by some States on
becoming parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement to the effect that no provision in
these agreements may be interpreted as derogating from principles of general international law
or any claims or rights concerning compensation or liability due to the adverse effects of
climate change?”
15. Côte d’Ivoire made no declaration in expressing its consent to be bound by the UNFCCC
and Paris Agreement. In its view, such declarations are ‘interpretative declarations’ within
the meaning of the 2011 ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties.91 The
declarations of Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, the Cook Islands,
Micronesia, Niue, the Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands and Vanuatu provide
contemporaneous evidence of their individual interpretations of the UNFCCC and Paris
Agreement. It is plain from the phrasing of the declarations that these eleven States
85 Chiara Sacchi and Others v. Argentina Committee on the Rights of the Chile, UN Doc. CRC/C/88/D/104/2019
(11 November 2021) paras 10.7-10.9.
86 Albania, Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 102.
87 Indonesia, Written Statement (22 March 2024) para. 44.
88 Contra : République démocratique du Congo, Observations écrites (2 août 2024) par. 31-32.
89 Urgenda (note 63) paras 2.2.1, 5.2.1, 5.6.2, 5.9.2, 6.1.
90 Future Generations v. Ministry of the Environment and Others, Colombia Supreme Court, Decision STC 4360-
2018 (5 April 2018) (excerpts, selected and translated by Dejusticia), No. 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01,
https://climatecasechart.com/wp-content/uploads/non-us-case-documents/2018/20180405_11001-22-03-000-
2018-00319-00_decision.pdf.
91 International Law Commission, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties 2011, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission (2011) vol. II, Part Two, p.26, para. 1.2.
16
considered the provisions of the two treaties – in particular, Article 8 of the Paris Agreement
– not to comprise a waiver of legal claims or a derogation from the general international
law of State responsibility under Article 55 of the 2001 Articles.92
16. However, none of these declarations contains conditional language that would subject their
‘consent to be bound by the treaty to a specific interpretation of the treaty or of certain
provisions thereof.’93 Likewise, none of them expresses an intention ‘to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State’
as reservations.94 In any event, reservations are excluded by Articles 27 and 24 of the
UNFCCC and Paris Agreement, respectively.
17. Whilst these interpretative declarations are contemporaneous evidence of the positions of
the declaring States, the approval or opposition of other State Parties is not to be presumed
from their silence.95 While Côte d’Ivoire is not aware of such approval or opposition being
expressed by other counterparties, the positions expressed during the course of these
advisory proceedings do so opposition. Consequently, Côte d’Ivoire submits that the Court
may rely upon these positions to identify the dominant or majority view amongst the State
Parties to the climate change treaties on the question of their effect (if any) on the
applicability of the general international law of State responsibility to claims arising from
alleged internationally wrongful acts with respect to climate change.
92 CR 2024/39 (note 12) pp.38-39 (para. 25, Côte d’Ivoire).
93 ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties 2011 (note 91) para. 1.4.
94 Ibid., para. 1.1.
95 Ibid., para. 2.98.