Note: This translation has been prepared by the Registry for internal purposes and has no official
character
14682
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO
(DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO v. UGANDA)
SECOND PHASE
QUESTION OF REPARATION
MEMORIAL
OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
VOLUME 1
(Annexes 0.1 to 1.11)
September 2016
[Translation by the Registry]
LIST OF ANNEXES
Volume 1
Annexes 0.1 to 1.11
Annex Page
Introduction
0.1 Ngurdoto-Tanzania Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and
the Republic of Uganda on Bilateral Cooperation, Ngurdoto, Tanzania,
8 September 2007
1
0.2 Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of Uganda and Congolese Experts on the
Implementation of the Ruling of the International Court of Justice of
19 December 2005, 10-14 December 2012, Kinshasa
12
0.3 Agreed Minute of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of
Uganda/Democratic Republic of Congo on the Implementation of the Ruling of
the ICJ (2005), 24-27 November 2014, Indaba, Johannesburg
17
0.4 The Agreed Minutes of the 4th Meeting of Ministers of the Democratic Republic
of Congo and the Republic of Uganda on the Implementation of the Judgement
of ICJ of 19th December 2005, held in Pretoria, South Africa, on
17-19 March 2015
17
Chapter 1
1.1 Ministerial Order No. 0002/CAB/J&DH/2008 of 26 February 2008 establishing
an Expert Commission in charge of identifying and assessing the damage caused
by Uganda to the DRC and its peoples following the armed attack and
occupation of Congolese territory by Ugandan troops between 1998 and 2003
18
1.2 Ministerial Order No. 049/CAB/MIN/JGS&DH of 19 December 2015
establishing a commission responsible for defending the interests of the DRC in
the second phase of the proceedings before the International Court of Justice
relating to the fixing of the amount of the reparations owed by Uganda
18
1.3 Software giving access to individual victims’ records (in electronic format only) 18
1.4 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of
the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003,
August 2010 (excerpts)
19
1.5 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-sixth Session, Report on
the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/56, document E/CN.4/2000/42,
18 January 2000 (excerpts)
33
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Annex Page
1.6 MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,
document S/2004/573, 16 July 2004
45
1.7 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/357, 12 April 2001
111
1.8 United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/1072,
13 November 2001 (excerpts)
169
1.9 United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/565, 22 May 2002
199
1.10 United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002
219
1.11 Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo 2001 (“Porter Commission”), Final Report, November 2002
279
ANNEX 0.1
Ngurdoto-Tanzania Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo
and the Republic of Uganda on Bilateral Cooperation,
Ngurdoto, Tanzania, 8 September 2007
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T!ll! IU!P\JIIUC OP UOANOA
NCURDOTO-TANZANIA AGRE,EMENT
.BETWEEN
THE
DEMOCRATIC REP,UB'LIC OF THE c ·oNGO
·:,
AND
THE
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
~ ..
ON
BILATE,RAL COOP'ERATION
r-~- Ngurdoto, Tanzant~ 9th September, 2007
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Preamble
'l'HR REPU1!UC 0~ UCJANDA
NGURDOTO-TANZANIA AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
.ON
BILATERAL COOPERATION
This Agr.e.ement Is made between the Democratic Republic of Congo (the DRC)
and the Republic of Uganda (hereinafter referred to jointly as the Parties). <;
CONSIDERING that the common cultural heritage and shared natural resources
in the two countries offer enormous opportunities and strengths for the pursuit of
stability and prosperity;
RECALLING the Agreement establishing a Joint Permanent Commission of
Cooperation, 1J9~6 b~tween the two cbuntries; the Agreement of Cooperation for
the Exploration of Hydrocarbons· and E:xploitatlon of Common Fl~lds, June 1990
and the Luanda. Agreement on Cooperation and Normalization of Relations,
September 2002; , Yfjj
FUF.ffHER RECALLING the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July 1999, the
Trlparthe Agreement, October 2003; the Principles of Good Neighbourly
Relations and Cooperation, September 2003, the Pact for Security, Stability and
Development In th~ Great Lakes Region, December 2006, the United Nations
Charter and tlie Constitutive Act of the African Union;
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the letter and spirit of the said instruments;
REGRETrlNG the v.iolen(lncldents, some Involving loss of life, that have recently
taken place along the common border;
DETERMINED to promote social, cultur~l, e6.onomic, and political ~ooperatlon In
order to achieve peace, security and prosperity,
,;
The Parties hereby agree as follows:
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llfE RDtlBU<: OP UO.I.NOA
CHAPTER I: DEFENCE AND SECURITY
Article 1
Negative FQrces
The Parties undertake to strengthen bilateral efforts to eliminate all negative
forces operating from the two countries, particularly for Uganda, the Lord's
Resistance Army {LRA), the Allled Democratic Alllance {ADF), the People's.
Redemption Army {PRA), and the National Liberation Army of Uganda (NALU)
and for DRC, Forces Armees du Pel!ple Congolals (FAPC) of Jerome Kakwavu,
Mouvement Revolutionaire Congolais (MRC) of Bwambale Kakolele, CNDP of
Laurent Nkunda. To this end, the Parties agree that:
(a) the process of appr~hension, disarmament, demoblllzatlon, repatrl~tlon,
resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) of persons In the negative forces
rl:lferred to above, shall, within 90 days from the date of this Agreement, be
demonstrably undertaken in either cotmtry, respectively. The foregoing may
be achieved through joint military operations in concert with MON:UC. The
Parties shall deny sanctuary to any person opposed to DDRRR.
(b) .The Government of the DRC shall formuliate. an ,ration plan tp neutrallze the
negative forces, particularly the LRA and ADF, which shall become effective
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by January 2008; }Ja, U
(c) the Joint Verification Mechanism already existing between Parties shall be ~'
strengthened by opening liaison offices In the towns Aba. Beni, Bunia,
Kif"!shasa, Fort Portal, Arua, Kisoro, Kanungu and Kampala;
(d) the decisions rea~hed in previo4s bi[ateral meetings with regard fo the
negative forces but have not been lrnplemented·shall be Implemented wlthlh
three months frpm the date of this Agreement and future Joint d'ecisions shall
be implemented' without delay; · ..
(e) there shall be meetings of Minlst~rs of Defence and Securlty and their
Permanent Secretaries at leasl twice~ a year to review progress In this
respect. These meetings shall be preceded by those of Chiefs of Def~nce
Forces ·and Chiefs of Military lntel/lgence, which shall be held at least once a
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I Tli6 JU!PIJBUC OF VdM'OA
. ~ ·,tyear.
In addition, there shall be meetlngs of Regional Commanders as well as
those of !coal political leaders every month;
(f) At the Tripartite Plus One meeting scheduled to take place In Kampala, the
Government of Uganda shall support a proposal by the DRC to ensure the .
successful Integration of the DRC national army, disarmament of the ·
lnterahamwe and other negative forces. and the Joint pacification, by MON UC
and the· DRC national army, of areas In North Kivu currently affected by
hostilltlell,
Article 2
Settlement and Repatriation of Refugees
The Parties agree to set up a Tripartite Commission on Refugees Involving the
Government of the Dembcratlc Republic of the Congo, the Government of the
Republ!c of Uganda and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees In
the las.t quarter of 2007 with a view to ensuring that: ·,
M mfu.gees 13re sett!~ away et Jeast 150 km from the common border, as
require9 by ln.teq;,atio8.ai Instruments governing re'fUgees;
(b) refu9ees are s1;1nsltized about the situation pertaining in their countries;
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(c) ietugeei; a~e repatriated once the conditions that compelled them to flee their
countries Improve in accord'ance with intematlonal rules governing refugees.
Article 3
Bor9er Demarcation and Security
(1) The Partlea reaffirm their commibnent to respect the principle of
·tnvlolablllty of bord,ers as-.lnher!teq from.the colonial powers. ·
(2) The Parties agree to the joint re-marking, where necess:ary, of the
lntematlonal boundary between the two countries as deff'ned In the
Agreement between the United Kingdon, and Belgium Respecting
/ Boundaries In East Africa (Mt. Sablnio to the Congo-Nile Watershed) of r~
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rd Tll1i REl'\IBUC OP UOAIIOA , 3 February 1915 and Its annexes as recognised under the Charter of the
Organisation of African Unity and Its successor, the Constitutive Act of the
African Union.
(3) The Parties agree to set up a joit,t team of experts within one month from
the date of this Agreement to 'work out the modalities of carrying out the
task i.n (2) above. The ]dint team may co-opt any person or persons from
any couotry or body as it may be deemed necessary.
(4) The parties agree that upon being constituted, In remarklng the
international boundary, the Joint committee shall give priority to Rukwanzi
Island and In the territory of Mahagl, particularly the areas of Uriwo,
Anzida/Panzuru, Angiero, Paglra and Pamltu; and In the territory of Aru
the border of Vura.
(5) The Parties agree that Rukwanzl Island and Mahagl, particularly the areas
of Uriwo, An'zida/Panzuru, Anglero, Pagira and Pamitu shall be
Immediately demilitarized.
(6) The Parties further agree that the DRC administration on Rukwanzl island
snail remain In place for one month from the date of this Agreement and
rh1rino th;:it month. it shall sAnsitl7A thA rMlrlAnt nooulatton about this
aspect of the Agreement. Immediately after the said one month, Uganda
shall appoint a co-administrator to jointly administer the Island with the
• DRC administrator, and post pollce personnel: equal In number to those
~tationed by the DRC on the Island to maintain civil order.
(7) The Parties agree to ensure that the existing mechanism under which
regular joint border meetings are held alternately on both sides of the
border involving local political leaders, mllitary commanders and other
technical officials as well as central government representatiVes shall have
the responsibility of. monitoring and ensurfng the implementation of the
provisions of (5)'. and (6) above.
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'lliE REPlJllUC OP'UCWlt>l,
CHAPT~8 II: ijCONOMIC COOPERATION
Article 4
Management of Trans-boundary Resources and ~egularizatlon of Crossborder
Trade In Minerals
(1) The Parties agree to ensure and facilitate cooperation In all economic
n~lds of common interest, particula)iy the use .and management of transboundary
llvlng resources. To this end, the Parties agree to convene a
session of ,the Joint Permanent Commisslpn of Cooperation In Uganda in
December, 2007 for the r,urpos.e of'explonng ways of harmonising and
adopting best p~ettces for preserving trans-boundary resources such as
crops, animals, fisheries, forests and national parks, f~.: mutual benefit.
(2) The Parties reiterate their commitment to cooperate in the exploration of
trans-boundary hydrocarbons and in the exploitation of trans-boundary
fields. To this end, the Parties agree that ·
(a) Wh~e en. oll field is found to strc1ddle their common border, the
·Parties snail Jolptly 1;.xplorE; -and exp loft that field and proportionately
~·hare the- ,cwsts •and proceeds In accordance with the prlnciple of
vn1tlsa!Jon. The respective Ministers responsible for the oil sector ~
shalr meet within one month from .the d~te of this Agreement to
deHberate and agree on the detailed modalities In this regard; ..
(b) they shall within three months from the date of this Agreement
attach petroleum experts In their r~~ve eWib~s who will,
under a framework to be agreed upon een t e es, observe ~'· ··,
(c)
(d)
(e)
petroleum exploration actlvltles on each other's side of the border;
they st,~fl ·continue to exchange Information, experience and
expertise · In petroleum matter:s;
·the Dem~cratic Republic of- Congo shall enhan'ce ·Petroleum
exploration In the Albertine basin as soon as possible to enable the
Parties Identify and evaluate trans-boundary fields; ;
the DRC Government shall seijd a team of experts within one
me1nth from the date of this Agreement to visit areas where oil has
been discovered near the common border.
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(3)
THI! REPUBLIC OR VO N'IOA they shall update me saia Agreement of Cooperation for the
£.xp/oratf.on of Hydrocarbons and £.xploitation of Common Fields,
23 June 1990 wrth a view to Improving and strengthening It.
The Parties undertake to ensure the following In order to enhance
economic cooperation and trade regularisatlon:
(a) the concluston of an agreement for mutual assistance in Customs
matters for preventive research and repres~lon of illegal activities;
(b) setting up a common project to fight illegal trade and fraudulent
networks ln minerals, starting within 90 days;
{c) the establishment of a regional gold trade ceptre and refinery in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, starting wlthlri 30 days;
(d) the enhancement of exchange of Information by the respective
mine surveillance authorities;
(e) active participation in the Traceability Group In the Great Lakes
Region.
('f) the-signing of an Agreement betweeh the twd countri'es' Ministries
respon'sfbfe for Minerals, on economic and technical cooperation in '-f/,
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the sectors of geology, mines and steel;withln 30 days. f1;:,J
Article 5
Development of Cross-border Infrastructure and Trading in Electrlcffy
(1)
(2)
The Pert(es agree that their respective Ministers responsible for
Infrastructure sf:iall convene, In the framework of 'the session of the Joint
Permanent Commission scheduled for December 2007 in -Uganda, meet
, to work out. modalities for developing rbad, rail and water transport
infrastructure linking the two countries;
The Parties agree to conclude an Agreement for cooperation In the
interconnection of their respective poY'er g,rids in the framework of the Nile
Basin lnttiative through, among others, extending the 132 kv transmission
line from Kasese (Uganda) to provide electricity for the areas of BeniButembo-
Rutchuru in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo.
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(3)
THE ltEl'UBUC OP UOANDA
The Parties agree to Jointly undertake studies on the project In (2) above
which will be reinforced by the ' electrlclty generation project on River
Semlikl. Their respective Ministries responsible for energy and their
energy distribution companies should meet within one month in Kampala,
Uganda, to study modalities for implementing this .project.
CHAPTER Ill: POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC
COOPERATION
Article 6
Normalization and Strengthening of Bilateral Relations
The Parties agree to normalize and strengthen their bilateral relations by, among
others
(a) reviving the activities of Joint Permanent Commission of
cooperation which should hold its next session In December, 2007
In Uganda to review what has been done or has not been done
..:111..!,.,c, thole<>+ 1n yocra r,f Ito lnal'tl\lity ,:,nrl ~<>rnmmPnrl w::1y.<: nf
ensuring a solid foundatl'on for future bilateral cooperation;
'(b)
(c)
upgrading their diplomatic representatio~ t9 ambassadorial level; l Of1 J J1
holding an annual summit of the Heads of State of the 'i.fl/'
Parties to be held alternately on each Party's territory, or wherever
they may decide.
Artlcle 7
Claims
(1) The Parties agree ,o form, with each Patty nominating not more than three
members, an ad hoe joint technical team to study and advise the respective
Ministers of Foreign Affairs on matters relating to:
(a) claims by the Embassy of the DRC in Kampala in connection with:
(i) plot 25 A Elizabeth Avenue, Ko1olo which is a subject of a dispute
involving a Ugandan national; and
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I 'I'll£ IU!l'UllUC OF UOAND1,
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(ii) three villas on Acacia Rd No. 78, Mb~ya No.14 and Bugolobl No.12
which were auctioned due to the Embassy's indebt~dness.
(b) a claim of outstanding payment of US$1 million for services
rendered by M/s Uganda Al'r Cargo to the DRC Government.
(2} The Joint" team In (1) above shati report Its findings within one month from the
date of this Agreement. ·
Article a
Implementation of the Judgmiant of the lnternatlonal Court of Justice (ICJ)
The Parties agree to constitute, with each Party nominating ·not more than 7
members, an ad hoe cornmlttee to •study t~e ICJ Judgment in the Case
Concerning Armed . Activities on tfie DRC Territory (DRC v Uganda) and
recommend to the·JPC modalrtles of Implementing Its· orders on the question of
Reparations. ·
CHAPTER IV: GENERAL PROVISION'S
Article 9
Amendment
Thfs Agreement may be amended or revised with the wrltten consent of
the Parties.
Article 10
Dispute Resolution
Any dispute between the Parties to this Agreement, relating to
the Interpretation and application shall be resolved amicably.
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THI! RDUBUC Q'F UOAl'ID;.
I Art.lei~ ,11
J Date of Effectiveness
J This Agreement takes effect upon signature by the Parties.
IN WITNESS .WHEREOF, the Parties have signed this Agreement at
NGURDOTO on this ath day of the me.nth pf ~eptember in the year 2007 in
English and Fr.enc.h, b0th texts being equally authentic.
H. Joseph Ila K bange
PRESIDENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
H.E owerl Kaguta Museveni
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
WITNESSED BY:
. ·.··~··· ......L.-. .,. .. ....t.....: .,. ............ .
H.E: Jakaya Mrl:.ho Klkwete .
PRESIDENT OF THE UN'ITED REPUBLIC TANZANIA
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ANNEX 0.2
Minutes of the 3rd Meeting of Uganda and Congolese Experts on the Implementation
of the Ruling of the International Court of Justice of 19 December 2005,
10-14 December 2012, Kinshasa
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MINUTES Of THE 3Rt> MEETING Of UGANDA AND CONGOLESE EXPERTS ON
t
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULLING OF THE INTERNATIQNAL COURT OF
JUSTICE OF 19 D.ECEMBER 2005 I .
I.INTRODUCTlS)N
In c'onformit{with Article 8 of the Ngun::loto Agreement (Tanzania) of 8th September 2007
the DRC an~ Uganda delegations sat in a meeting in Johannesburg (South Africa) onl 13th
ar-1d 14th September 2012 to examine the response to the DRG: financial claim in tts
I
evaluation report submitted to the Government of Uganqa during the meeting organized
between both pa~ies at Kampala on 25th May 2012 . .
I
During the worRing meeting above held in Johannesburg~ both parties condudf j a
bilateral Agreement on 14th September 2012 as indi.cated in part V that within six mon1th s
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from that date both P.artieffe y..,:ill work together to assemble evidence of their respective
claims In order to reach an a.ccept:able: agreement in the qifferent pres~ntatic;>ns. I !
That the i'lrst meetil'ig was t0 be iiefd Kin511aSa in vvhich the L,'ganda;; Experts will ic'-'fiVe
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and verify documents su_pμ,orting the DRC claim and at tlie same occasion the Uganp~n
Experts were to presents documents to prove the dam.age~ daimed against Ugaf da
E111bassy in Kinshasa. I
i
The· working meetln91> at Kinshasa are argani4ad iri ao11,torrY<11ty of the Ngur~otp
Agreement and the JohanF1-esbur:g meetings cited above. Th~ list o,f !:he experts of ~
ADHOC committee of both parties is attached in this document} I
II.OPENING OF WORKING SESSION l
,The working sessi.on starte<!l l!ln Monday 10 December 2012. During this occasion, Mrs'.
. I I Mumb-a Wivlne Matipa, Minister of Justice ar,id Human Ri!llrits, In her introductory remarks
welcomed· the Uganda delegation to Klnshasa, Indicated that the DRC and Uganda tr~
frrend ly and brotherhood countries that are bound to live t-0getber and to hold amicable
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relations of good neighborhood and requested experts of both parties to work in sp rit of
trust and amicabfo transparency.
III. WORKING PROCEDURE
The actual ~chnlcal work c:if the Experts Committee started on Tuesday 11 Decerber
2012, after the brief speech made by Honorable Tunda Y~ Kasende, Vice Ministyr!of
Foreign Affairs to the particlpal)ts. I.n his speech the Vice Minister insisted on the fratjrnal
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and excellent relation that does not only exist between the U!)landa and Cong0lese Pjople
but alsd between thefr Excellencies, Presidents Yoweri K. Museveni and Joseph bila
Kabal'lge. He also r.equested the experts of both parties to work in a spirit of trust and
amicable transparency.
During the working session the Uganda experts saw, photocopied the evidence preseolted
by the Congolese Party of the damages caused In Iturl, Kisangani, Benim Butembo ~d
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Djamena; and documents related to the physical and moral damages and to t~e
Congolese State.
They have therefore photocopied approximately 10950 documents and taken th to
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Kampala for evaluation of the proof of the claim made by the DRC. The Oemocrr1c
Republic of Congo will transmit the Verbal Note to the Emba.s.sy C!f Uganda 1n Kinshrsa
related to identification of the photocopies that were made. h
The Congolese experts on their sfde received dCil.cuments of evidence supporting the cl Im
to the damag.es of the-Embassy at Kinshasa amo\,Jnting tG 141 fages. I
The bott-1 parties in conformity with part V 2/a of the Johannes~urg Agreement agreed t{
meet a·gain in February 2012.. In )(:)hann.esburg to dlscusst the proposed amour.its
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presented by both parties in the execution of the decision of the International Court of
Justice of 19 December 2005. ! I
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,1v~cL:~SING OF WQR,KING SESSION
The experts working sessibn of b0th j:Jarties ended on Frida.y 14 Decembef 2012 by
Honorable Tonda· Ya Kasende, Vice Minister of Foreign Af.fairs. During the oc a,si on, he
wished a safe journey to the return of the Uganda dele.gatlan to Kampala I
v.woRKING. LANGUAGE j
The text of this etocument was drafted in EngHsh and ,fr-ench, both texts bei g equally
autlilentfc.
Done at Kinshasa this 14th day of December- 2012.
f.er the DefT.lo.cratl:cr Re!D.u~Jic-0.f Congo
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Fqr the Re.public of· ganda
~u,
A . JA ES KINO,E
AmQassador of thr
Reppb,.lic of Ugan a
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A TTACHEMENT
LIST Ot= DELEGATIONS
Ugandan Delegation
") 1· Amb. Jame'S W.L. KINOBE. Hee5J'of.Oelegelion
( 2-1\mb. Alaxle K¥E'IUNE, Head ofU,eTeehnlcal Expert Team/Ministry of Foreign Affairs
~- Mr. John Bosco R. 8UU2A
4· Mr. Timoty KANYOGONY'A
5- Ms. Lucy KABEGE
6· Ms. Patricia HASlJ
4. Mr. MB'ABAZI ARAALI
8- Mr. St&vat\ MUHUMUZA
9- Benon KAYEMBA
DRC de[egation
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1:- KALONDA KELE-OMA Yvon, He.Bifoftht108/l)§ellon, D/rec/Qrof Ceb/nel/Mln. ,/usli, end HumarJ Rig/Its
2- flrpf. TSHIBA~U KALALP, Lawyer of the Congpl11sa Govamm!!Jll
?· NTUM.BA KAPITA Patr1ce
4- KASOOGO KIOMBA Oomlolque
5· MVAMBA TSHIBANGU John
6- KITENGE OTUL Palrick
7- Mrs. PAONI TUPA Melanie
8- KILQMBA NGOZI MALA Noel
9. NT6NDAYl t,JSHIMBA Honorll
10- NGAf.U KALALA Jutes
4
ANNEX 0.3
Agreed Minute of the 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of
Uganda/Democratic Republic of Congo on the Implementation of the
Ruling of the ICJ (2005), 24-27 November 2014,
Indaba, Johannesburg
AGREED MINUTE OF THE 2ND MINISTERIAL
MEETING OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE OF UGANDA
I DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULING OF THE ICJ
(2005) WAS HELD ON 24·27 NOVEMBER 2014 AT
INDABA, JOHANNESBURG
1.0. INTRODUCTION:
The 2nd Ministerial Meeting of the Ad hoe Committee of
Uganda/ Democratic Republic of Congo on the
Implementation of the Ruling of the ICJ (2005) was held
on 24·27 November 2014 at Indaba, Johannesburg in line
with Article 8 of the Ngurdoto Agreement (2007).
1.1. List of Delegation
Uganda delegation was led by Hon Peter Nyombi,
Attorney General of U ga:qda and included Hon. Kahinda
Otafiire, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs,
Hon. Daudi Migereko, Minister of Lands, Housing and
Urban Development, Hon. Henry Oryem Okello, Acting
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Hon. J eje Odongo,
Minister of State for Defence.
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COMMUNIQUE FINAL DE LA 2eme REUNION
MINISTERIELLE DU COMITE AD HOC
REPUBLIQUE D'OUGANDA/REPUBLIQUE
DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO SUR
L'EXECUTION DE L'ARRET DE LA CIJ(2005)
TENUE DU 24 au 27 NOVEMBRE 2014 A
INDABA,JOHANNESBURG
. 1.0. INTRODUCTION
La 2eme Reunion Ministerielle du Comite ad hoe
Republique d'Ouganda / Republique
Democratique du Congo sur l'execution de l'Arret
de la CIJ (2005) s'est tenue du 24 au 27
Novembre 2014 a Indaba,Johannesburg en
conformite avec !'Article 8 de !'Accord de
N gurdoto (2007).
1.1. Liste des delegations
La delegation de la Republique d'Ouganda etait
conduite par l'Honorable Attorney General de
l'Quganda et comprenait l'Honorable Kahinda
Otafure, ministre de la Justice et des Affaires
Constitutionelles, Hon. Daudi Migereko, Ministre
des Terres, Habitat et Developpement Urbain,
Hon. Henry Oryem Okello.t. Ministre a.i. des
Affaires Etran eres et Hon. J e · e Odon o
DRC Delegation was led by H.E Wivine MUMBA Matipa,
Minister of Justice and Human Rights of DRC, Principal
Adivisor of the DRC President in Charge of Legal Affairs,
H.E. Bene L. MPOKO, DRC Ambassador in Pretoria and
H.E. Jean-Charles OKOTO LOLA.KOMBE.
A list of the delegations is attached as Annex A.
1.3.AGENDA
The meeting adopted the following agenda:
1) Registration
2) Opening Statements
3) Response by Uganda on DRC Claim
4) Consideration of the Report of the Committee of
Experts
5) Response by DRC on Counter claim
6) Any other Business (AOB)
2
Ministre d'Etat a la Defense.
La delegation de la RDC etait conduite par S.E.
M. Wivine MUMBA Matipa, Ministre de la
Justice et Droits Humains et comprenait le
Conseiller Principal du President de la
Republique en charge du college J uridique, Mr
Nehemie Mwilanya, S.E.M. L'Ambassadeur
Plenipotentiaire de la RDC a Pretoria, Bene L.
M'POKO et S.E.M. L'Ambassadeur de la RDC a
Kampala, Jean-Charles OKOTO LOLA.KOMBE.
La liste des delegues est jointe en Annexe A.
1.3. ORDRE DU JOUR
La reunion a adopte l'ordre du jour ci-apres:
1) L'Enregistrement
2) Les discours d'ouverture
3) La reponse de l'Ouganda a la reclamation
de la RDC
4) L'examen du rapport des Experts
5) La reponse de la RDC a la demande
reconventionnelle de l'Ouganda
6) Divers
2.0. OPENING STATEMENTS
2.1. Statements by the delegation of Uganda
Hon. Oryem Okello, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Uganda delivered the opening remarks on behalf of
Uganda. The statement is attached as Annex B.
2.2. Statement by the delegation of DRC
H.E Wivine MUMBA Matipa delivered opening remarks
on behalf of the DRC. The statement is attached as Annex
c.
3.0. RESPONSE BY UGANDA ON THE CLAIM OF
DRC
Hon. Peter Nyombi, the Attorney General of Uganda
presented a speech on the general response to the DRC
Claim. The speech is attached as Annex D.
3
2.0. LES DISCOURS D'OUVERTURE
2.1. Discours de la delegation de la Republique
d'Ouganda
L'Hon. Oryem Okello, Ministre a.i. des Affaires
Etrangeres de la Republique d'Ouganda a fait le
discours d'ouverture au nom de l'Ouganda. Le
discours est joint en Annexe B.
2.2. Le discours de la delegation de la RDC
S.E.M Wivine MUMBA Matipa a livre le discours
d'ouverture au nom de la RDC. Le discours est
joint en Annexe C.
3.0. LA REPONSE DE REPUBLIQUE
D'OUGANDA A LA RECLAMATION DE
LARDC.
L'Hon. Peter Nyombi, Attorney General de la
Republique d'Ouganda a presente le discours en
guise de reponse generale a la reclamation de la
RDC. Le discours est joint en Annexe D.
4
4.0 CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF EXPERTS 4.0. EXAMEN DU RAPPORT DES EXPERTS
(i) The Ministers took note of the Report of
Experts in Annex E.
(ii) Ministers directed that the two positions
be harmonized as soon as possible.
Thereafter, the two parties shall meet
before mid February 2015 in South Africa
to conclude the negotiations.
(iii) DRC proposes that Uganda look at the
parameters used by DRC and Uganda will
be at liberty to criticize them and make a
response on what is right instead of coming
with new parameters. The response should
be done within one month.
(i) Les Ministres ont pris acte du rapport des
experts en Annexe E.
(ii) Les Ministres ont decide que les deux
positions soient harmonisees des que
possible.
Des lors, les deux parties ont convenu de se
reunir a nouveau avant mi-fevrier 2015 en
Afrique du Sud pour conclure les
negociations.
(iii) La RDC propose que l'Ouganda
examine les parametres utilises par la RDC
et reconnait a la Republique d'Ouganda la
latitude de les critiquer et de faire une
contre proposition sur ce qu'il estime
approprie plutot que de proposer des
nouveaux parametres. La reponse devrait
etre donnee dans un mois.
Done at Johannesburg, South Africa on 27th November
2014
rl._' 't~· ~ &audi 1\1.]gereko, MP
Minister of Lands, Housing and Urban Development
For and on behalf of the Republic of Uganda
Fait a Johannesburg, Afrique du Sud le 27
Novembre 2014
5
THE UGANDAN DELEGATION: ANNEX A
NAME: ORGANIZATION: CONTACTS:
1. Hon. Peter Nyombi Attorney General of Uganda
2. Hon. Okello Oryem Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3. Hon. Kahinda Otafire Ministry of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs
4. Hon. Daudi Migereko Ministry of Lands Housing and
Urban Development
5. Hon. Teie Odongo Minister of State for Defence
6. Amb. Tames MuID1me Permanent Secretary MOFA
7. Amb. James Kinobe Ugandan embassy Kinshasa [email protected]
om
8. Amb. Julius Peter Mato Ugandan High Commission ugacomer@mweb ~
Pretoria o.za
9. Christopher MoJCA gashirabach@gma il
Gasharibake .cam
10. Cheborion Barishaki MoJCA bcheborionbarish
[email protected]
11. Maj Gen. David Muhoozi CLF UPDF Land Forces HQs
Bomba
12. Col. Godard Busingye MoD godardbusingye@ ~
ahoo.com
13. Benon Kayemba Uganda Embassy Kinshasa [email protected] D
m
14. OlgaAdnette Muzungu MoFA olgaadnette@gma ,
.cam
15. Dr. Albert A Musisi MoFPED albert.mtisisi@fin,
nce.go.ug
16. Julius J. Kivuna MoFA [email protected] .
uk
17. Kamugisha Robert Office of the President kamugisharoberts
@yahoo.cam
18. Charity Genevive MoFA C natukunda@ya !l.
Natukunda oo.com,
..
19. Wamai David MoFPED david;[email protected]
nce.co.ug
20. Kabege Lucy Unita MoLHUD [email protected]
om
21. Rotsette Nakavuma MoFPED Rotsette.nakavurr :1
@finance.co.ug
22. Gilbert Kerumundu MoLHUD kerumundugilbert
@yahoo.co.uk
23. Jeffrey Atwine MoJCA jeffreyatwine@gm l
il.com
24. Geoffrey Madere MoJCA [email protected]
om
25. Patricia Habu MoJCA pingabire@yahoo.
om
26. Fadhil Mawanda MoTCA
27. David W amono Uganda High Commission , wamonosira@yah
Pretoria a.corn
ANNEXE A
LISTE DE LA DELEGATION DE LA RDC
NOMS QUALITE/ORGANISME CONTACTS
1 S.E.M Wivine Ministre de la Justice et
MUMBA Matipa Droits Humains
2 Mr Nehemie Conseiller Principal du
Mwilanya President de la
Republique en charge du
colleqe Juridique
3 S.E.M. Bene L. Ambassadeur de la RDC a [email protected]
Mpoko Pretoria
4 S.E.M. Jean- Ambassadeur de la RDC a
charles Okoto Kampala
Lola Kombe
5 LUGUNDA Directeur de cabinet de flugunda@:tahoo.fr
LUBAMBA S.E. le Ministre de la
FRANCIS Justice et Droits Humains
6 ARTHUR Conseiller de cabinet du [email protected]
DITULUAK1Dl Ministre de la Justice et
Droits Humains
7 BOONGI Conseiller/CAB Min j [email protected]
EFONDA Infrastructures Travaux
Publics et Reconstruction
8 NTENDAYI Conseiller, Ministere des [email protected]
NSHIMBA Affaires Etranqeres
9 Me N 'TSHILA wa Expert ea bntshila@gmail .corn
N'TSHILA M
10 Prof. NTUMBA Expert gatriceka gita@ya hoo. fr
KAPITA
11 PHILIPPE KADIMA Assistant de [email protected]
l'Ambassadeur de la RDC
en Republique d' Afrique
du Sud
12 EBBE MONGA Chef de Bureau/Droits de [email protected]
PIERRE I' Homme et Droit
International
Humanitaire/ Affaires
Etranqeres
13. KASSONGO eliekass@hotmail .corn
KASHAMA Conseiller, Ministere des
Affaires Etranqeres
ANNEX 0.4
The Agreed Minutes of the 4th Meeting of Ministers of the Democratic Republic
of Congo and the Republic of Uganda on the Implementation of the
Judgement of ICJ of 19th December 2005, held in Pretoria,
South Africa, on 17-19 March 2015
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.. __ .. ,."' ......... '-Vl'lJUlNT DE LA 41ime REUNION! DES 1YIINISTRpS
' I LA REPUBLIQUE DElVIOCRATIQUE DU CONGO ET DE LA I i
REPUBLIQUE DE L'OUGANDA SUR L'EXECUTIO~ DE L'~ RRET VE
COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE DU 19 DECEMBR~1,2005, TEN \
A PRETORIA AFRI UE DU SUD DU 17 AU [9 MARS 2 . . . l . ' : ~
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PREAMBULE · . ' . I (_f,/0
C;,,sidirant l'an~t de la Cour Jntemationale de Justice \du 19 hfcembre 20 5
clans la cause intitulee « Activites annees sur le territoird du Congo (Republi e
Dlmocratiq,ie du Congo amtre Ouganda) » ; . \ \ , ·, ·,. : ·.
RapPelant le contenu des paragraphes 260 et 261 .d~ l'arret de la ·co
Intemationale · de Justice du 19 decembre 2005 qJi reco1mmande de
n~gociations d~ bonne foi entre les deux parties, en ~ue de \deter · er 1
montant de la r~paration d-0. ~ la Republique Democratique du \conga ar 1
Republique de l'Ouganda; \ 1
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Guidees pai 1~ Accord de Ngourdoto en Tanzanie, signe 1k 08 septembre 2.007 : .-·entre
la Republique Democratique du Congo et la Repu~lique de l'Oug~ da
sur la cooperation bilaterale, plus sp~dalement en son a~~cle 8 qui
recommande notamment aux parties de trouver les mod.alites :pfatiques ~e 1
l'ex~cution de ·l'arret du 19 decembre 2005 de la Cocl- I.nt~tionale de
Justic~; \ ,
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Pour ce faire, · : . \ ·\ \1
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1. Les delegations ministerielles de la Republique Democr!tique du Congo et
de la Republique de · I' Ouganda se sont rencontrees d6s un~ 1
• ambiance
empreinte de cordialite, pour la 4~e R~unior: ministerielle ~u Corriite conjoint
ad hoe, tenue a Pretoria en Republique Sud-Africaine, du 17 au 191*ais 2015 _.
2. La delegation d~ la Republique Democratique du Congo .etait c~~~uite ~bS.
E Monsieur Alexis TIIAMBWE MW AMBA, Ministre de la iJustice,1 Garde dbs
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Sceaux et Droits . humains, accompagne de S.E Monsieur Aim~ NGCDI
MUKENA LUSA DIESE, Ministre de la Defense nJ tionale! I Ancietls
combattants et Reinsertion, Monsieur BENE L. M'POKO, Ahibassad1eur de la '
Republique Democratique du · Congo a Pretoria, MonsiJur Jeah1 Charl~.s :·
OKOT~ LOLAKOMBE, Ambassadeur de la Republique ~ emocr~hque du ·.
Congo a Kampala, Monsieur N~hfanie MWILANYA WILOlN'DJA, bonseiller
principal du Chef de l'Etat charge des questions juridiqu s et ~dmini~iatives. . ·
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3 .. La Ml~gation de 1 Ouganda etait conduite par S.J Mons :er r le . dFle al._
Major KAHINDA OTAFIIRE, Ministre de la Justice · et_ \des Affa' e~ ;·
Constituti.onnelles, accompagne par Monsieur ' FRE~ \ _: RU1-1IN I, ·
Ministre/Procureur General de la Republique, S.E 1'1Ionsieur DA I
MIGEREKO, Ministre des Aff~ires Foncieres, c:1i~ l'H~~itat e: . u ·
Developpement Urbain, S.E. Monsieur HENRY OKELLO OR~tM, ~ e
des Affaires Etrangeres a.i, S.E. Monsieur le General Jt:JE OQ<l:>NGO, ,Vic -
Ministre de la Defense, S.E Monsieur JAMES KINOBE, Amb~s~adeur ·1d~ a
Republique d'Ouganda a Kinshasa. · '\ · I 1: · :: ; ·
4, La rettnion a:exa~in~ les documents suivants: · . \ ·. , .
a) les rapports respectifs de Hauts Fonctionnai1es et ExpTrts de _eux paYjs -~
17 mars 2015; 1
b) les nouveaux critl!res d'~valuation propos~s par\ la R~ 1.1bliqu~ d
l'Ouganda; · · . \ \ 1
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:~i::::.ponse specifique de la Republique D~mocratique\ du c tb\go a~d~
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S. L'Ouganda a propose : \ I ·t :-
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a) la necessite pour les parties de s' accorder Sur des crite:r S a utili.ser comme
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base de calcul pour la compensation a payer a la RDC; 1
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b) I a v:oJ.- if1 · cat.i on. con1· o.m te et une ana1 y se commune e 7 .4©\ 0 pi~c·. esI a
conviction prod.uites par la Republique D~mocra . que d.u Con'go, · ·\
conformement aux crit~res a accepter de commun accord ; I l .. : .. l I ;• f •
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6. L'Ouganda s'estresolu en outre: . I
a) de r~noncer, ~ans un esprit de fraternit~ et d~ bo'i' vois1kge, ~: '~ : .,
r~cl~tio~ du montant de 3.760.000 USD, en rapport a,tec les kommag~. \ .
causes a 1 unmeub~e de son ambassade a Kinshasa et aux m~uvais trhitements
infliges a son personnel diplomatique; I \ ,
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b) de revoir a la hausse sa proposition initiale de reparati~ du m.lntan~ de
25 500 O~O US, en le portant a 37. 028.368 USD i tl ;
ite e . voir s;e ,• ' l
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En definitive, la R~publique de l'Ouganda a vivement so
poirrsuivre les negociations entre les deux parties.
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·1. J:'our sa part, la Republique Democratique du Cohgo a Jie1agi a la P? 'ti6n
de la pa~tie ouga!ldaise de la maniere ci apr~s: \ \ \ : , I ':. ·; ·
. a) elle a fai~ objection a l'utilisation d' autres crit~res ~our {!val~er sad~ de
de r{!paratior i \ . .
b) elle a in.sis~ sur le fait qu'il ne devrait plus y avoir d'autes n~go ia
tant au_niveau technique que m.inisteriel, conforrnembnt a I~ resoluti ,\n
3eme reunion minist~rielle tenue a Indaba, J oharmesbur~ du 24 ~
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novembre 2014; . l ·.; ' · · 1 ·
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c) elle a pris acte de la renonciation par la partie ougarldaise . sa r€!clama ·~m
du montant 'de 3 760 OOO US; nl!anmoins, elle a fe~ement ejete l' offr tie
l'Ouganda de 37.028.368 USD comme etant toujours ri . ·rte, au r~ d
des prejudices ea uses ; · .
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d) enfin, tor~e a ete pour ene de constater que 1e ctes~t corct R1rsiste enti-e 1es.
deux parties, ce qui l' am~ne a envisager de retolllmer devant la C hr
In~ernationale de Justice pour la suite de Ja procMure; I \ 1 I , ·~
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DE CE QUI PRECEDE, · , i
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Vu le desaccord persistant entre les parties, celles-ci ont resolu de do er es
n~gociations aJeur niveau, conformement ~ la resolution susmentionnee de la
troisi~me r{!union m.inist{!rielle, et de s' en remettre a 1a ~sposip:on des \ ~ fs
d'E.tat, dans 1' esprit de l' Accord de Ngorudoto de 2007 sur \la coop{!rati :t:l
bilat{!rale ·entre l'Ouganda et la Republique D{!mocratiqJe du c61 go, paw · E; .
• I I ; ·.
orientation. : · 1 : • • ·
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Fait a Pretoria, en Afrique du Sud, a Burgers Park He,t~l, le 19\Mars 2015~
deux exemplaires originaux, en frarn;ais et en angl~is, les; \deux · fais
egalement foi l : 1 ..
Pour la Republiq e de l'Ouganda, Pour la Republi'll e De4 ocrati ue .
Congo, ,
Ministre la Justice et
Constitu.tionnelles ' Affaires
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l'TfH-19111 MARCH 2015
PREAMBLE
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CONSIDERING the ruling of the International Co t of I ystice cif 1 t:h •• :
December: 2005 in the case entitled "Anned ActiviJ s on le.171tory rift e
Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) 1 . . '. .
RECALLING the contents of paragraphs 260 and 261 of th ruling f e
International Court of Justice of 19th December 2005, l·whlch ,provide\d f r
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negotiations to . be conducted between the two parti;es in g9od faith .... : - i .
derermine the amount of reparation .due to the DRC an¥ U gJ~; ·_ \ : . .
GUIDED by the Ngurdoto-Tanzarua Agreement beJeen the \Democrati , ·
Republic of Congo and the· Republic of Uganda on Bilaieral Ccb(])peration o
8th September 2007 signed by the Heads of State and 1~etermihed to 0giv .• ·.
full effect to · Article 8 on the implementation of thk Jud I \ ent of. th :
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International Court of Justice (ICJ of 191:h December 2005); \
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THEREFORE : \ ' . I .
1. The :tvfinisterial Delegations of the Democratic Reputlic of 1Cong~ ~d ·
Repu~~c o~ .u?~da_met in a ~ordial manner for the 4th Jo\nt Ad H~c
Co.mnuttee . Ministenal Comnuttee from 171:h to 19tl\ Marc{h,. 1 2015 \ m
Pret?ria, Republic of South Africa. 1
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2 The Delegation of De~o':atic Repu~lic of Congo led .ilr H.E. fl'y1r. Ale.~i~
Thambwe Mwamba, Minister of Justice and Human Rights and Guardian
of Official Seals, acc·ompanied by H.E. Mr. 'me Ngoi Muk\ena Lusa i ..
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Diese, Ministe~ of National Defence, Veterans an Re-inttlation\ H .
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1Bene L. M-'Poko, Ambassador of the DRC in Pr toria; tLE Mr ... -
Okoto Lolakombe, Ambassador of the DRC Kartlpala, · and
Nehemie Mwilanya Wilondja, Legal ~dvisor of the Presi, ent of ule
3. The delegation·of the Republic of Uganda was le1 by H9n. Maj. l
~ahinda Otafiire, Minister of Justice and Constitutio1 al Aff4r's
· accompanied by Hon. Fred Ruhindi, Minister VAtto141ey G~~er
,Uganda; Hon. Daudi Migereko, Minister of Lands, Hou!i\ng and U 'an
Development; Hon. Henry Okello Oryem, Actint ~ ter of Fo~ · gn
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Affairs; Hon. General Jeje Odongo, Minister of State for Defence; a:nd .E
. . I I ·1 I 1 '· Mr. James Kinobe, Ambassador of Uganda in Kinshasa 1
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I Experts
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4. The Meeting considered the following documents:
(a)The Joint report of the Senior Officials and
countries dated 17th March 2015,
~)The proposed criteria by the Republic of Ugandct, and \
(c) Specific Response by the DRC to the new proposed
. ·. Uganda I
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5. Uganda p:oposes that: . . \ . . · . 1
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(a1Ther~_~s nee~ for the parties to a~ee on the criteria w~tshotil~ e · \
· used as a basis for the compensation payable to t~e DRG. ; , . :: t ·.' : i · ·
(b) The DRC and Uganda should conduct Joint ve · ·cation d analys s ,,'\~
of the 7400 documents provided by the DRC ased ci~ the agree , ,
criteria. i I :
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6. In the spirit of brotherhood and good neighbo liness ·artd withou
prejudice,: l l : : ' 1 ••
(a) Uganda withdrew its counter claim in respect o the dkage on i
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Embassy property in Kinshasa. 1
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(b) Ugana revised her initial offer of reparatiohs payble to 1,
.. · from USD 25, 5 00,000 to USD 37,028,368. I I
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7. The Democratic Republic of Congo : I I : · : , ..
(a) Objected to using any criteria to asess her claim.
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(b) The . DRC insisted tha t there should be no furth er rgotiatio
technical an 1vlinisterial l eve l following the spirit df th e 3
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Joint -A
Ministerial Committ ee Meeting of 24 -27 Nove mb er 2614 .. 1
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(c) The DRC accepts the withdrawal of Ugand a's cb unter's[c!aim of D
3 ,760,000, which DRC had admitted as d ue and owtjig b ut r ej ects th e o er I. I I
by U ganda of the USD3 7, 2 80,3 68 as being insignific
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( d) The DRc insists that since there is no agreement the mt1;er sh,ciu!d be,
rf rred to th ICJ. 1
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: NOW THEREFORE: ! 1 • • .
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I . I Since there is o consensus re ached, the Parti es r e sol ved that there iho
· be no further negtiations at technical 'and Mini sterial level! and illat
matter should : be referred to the Heads of State wit¥n the i £:ramewprk
the Ngurdoto Agreement on Bilateral Cooperation 1:letweet\Uganda
th e DRC of 2007 for furthr guidance . J · ·
Done on this 19th day of March, 2015, at Pretoria in le Republic of Sou
Africa in both French and English languages and b!th textS are equ
th ti r . - ..
;:it:: ;public of Uganda For the Dem1atic Reub!i i
Hon.
Congo j : ·1
7Y ,
I-,,
Minister · of )ustice
Constitutional Affairs
on Ale . ambwl Mw M amL ' . er of Justice, Human RiJhts
and Guardian Ji the tjicial S
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REPONSES SPECIFI
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ues DE LA RDC AUX NOUVEAUX 1 TERE~
1
PROPOm
LA PARTIE OUGANDAISE
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La' delegat.i on 'congolaise a pris connaissance du docu ent lui transrnis pa ..la.
delegation ougandaise et, apres analyse approfondie, donne sa I I · rep n.se ciapres:
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I. De la proposition d''etre guide par l'arret de la C/1 \pour exclure c rtai es
rl?damations : _ \ I. : ' ,' _
La RDC reaffirme, comme l'Ouganda, son adhesion sans reserve aux termes . e
l'arret de ta CIJ d~ 19/12/2005. · \ I .j , . ·(
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1° Cela s'entend par une reparation integrale des prejudices; . auses, 'ce ui
n'~xclut pas certains prejudices particuliers. En effet, l'a I ret dit 1: « rouganda a
/'obligation> envers Ja RDC, de reparer le prejudice cause {parag}aphes 34l-5.3 t .
345.5 de l'arret). . \ : : 1
26 La RDC affirme qu'elle s'en est tenue a la periode k occu ation effecti e :.
allant d~ 08/08/1998 au 02/06/2003. Aucune reclamat'.on ne lporte ni sur a
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periode anterieure, ni encore Sur la periode posterieure. I . :
3° ·Quant aU; t~rritoires occupes, la reclamation de la RIDC ne tkit pa; a 1iusl
aux localites de Zongo, Bomongo et Bongandanga. \ l · '. . , I . .
4° S'agissant d'autres forces qui operaient sur le territo,ire de ~1 RDC dans I .·
partie occupee par l'Ouganda, la Cour elle-meme reconn~it en d s termes l'o
ne peut plus clalrs la responsabilite de l'Ouganda {para 1 raphe 3 5.1},· uniqu) ·-:
I I . . j I '
I '
II. Recours aux principes du droit international et de I juris iudence' p:~u
I
puissance occupante.
exc/ure certafns dommages
I
I I .
L'arret consacre le principe de la reparation integrale et a ce sujr t, rapp lie I
jurisprudence des usines de Chorzow, en Polog e. L'on ne p~ut des I rs
l .I
l ./
.,
I
I
I t
: .
.. .
I
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revenir, sous peine de vouloir remettre en cause !edit ~rret
de chose jugee.
d 'ja cou_le en . rce
tl '
I ..
~).
. '
/II~ Proposition d"'une compensation mutuellement cicaeptable our Jes ea des·
tueries et des deces. I
·En rE!ponse, la RDC affirme que les congola!s tuE!s, doint du ~~'ste l'idE!nt!t
chacun a ete precisee, sont des etres humains, et a ce sujet, J11e invJque
jurisprudence: plus appropriee relative a l'affaire lrak:.K~we'it. . 1 I
!
I ;· ; i
I .
IV. Prise en compte du degre des blessures et du ha17dicap };,J;wsique d.an
de
ne
I
I . -... ~,
'
le
t ;
'· ·
I' I
I
cos des lesions corporel/es \ . \ :
Po.ur ce faire, la ' commission d'enquete etait desc~ndue ur ·'ter:a'!n p : ur . \ . . ·
constater les lesions et leurs degres, puis les a decrites avec p I ecision dan . le : i ·
document dont dispose l'Ouganda, ou les montant~ des ~ rr;images s, nt
ventiles avec prE!cision. Comment l'Ouganda qui n'a pak E!te s~ terrain1 Peu -i!'.
apres coup, tout contester en bloc, sans offrir la moindrb preuv,e contraire?
V. Perte de propriete
;: \ I ~ . I
La RDC re~voie l'Ouganda au rapport etabli pa; la Comrfi ission d'enqu~t~ ~t e
par plus de 7000 pieces a conviction. I \
. . . I . : . : ; . l \ 'I . I '
;,
. [ ' l
VI. Perte en matiere comm~rcia/e et manque a gagner j I I I
. I . I
Le principe en droit veut que l'on indemnise non seulement 1pour l~s pert s
subies (valeur des biens perdus), mais encore pour le ~ anque i' gagner (gal s
futurs). · 1 I
. . : I I : ..
Vil. Cas de pifloge et d'exp/oitotions iflegoles des ressoLrces nature/Jes
... .
La RDC est guidee par l'arret de la Cour {paragraphe 345.4) en ce · q e
l'Ouganda n1a p~s empeche les actes de pillage e~,t 'exp! itation des ress~~.rc s
, • · ) • t )° I " > .
· . • . 1 , • • r
• - I
1.
~ -
l '
l.
. I I .
.• It .
I • I
naturelles cong'olaises. Au demeurant, comment l' Ouganda, partie oc~u1pan e,
peut-11 ignorer ce que lui ont rapporte ces activites ii icites q~i · o t
I
positivement impacte sur sa balance commerciale. I
- I . : • • I
vm.' Violations des ri:gles du droit international human ·taire ~t des drai~s e
J'homme : paiement ex gracia
.- .
La RDC estin:1e que s'agissant de cette reparation, e]le nr peut .~tre lais Jee
bon vouloir de l'Ouganda tant l'arre_t de la Cour (paragra'.~he 34~1.2, ") _.:.
stigmatise la violation par l'Ouganda des droits de ~'homm · et du· dr ·t
les dommages causes aux individus et ceux subis par l'Eta congoUis. .
. j .
. ! .·
. I : . , •
IX. Verification conjointe des 7400 pieces presentees pa,1/a Roe l i
. . . . . 1·
Qua~t a la verification demandele, cela equivaudrait a lreprenf re toutes' I ~
enquetes faites pendant 6 ans, alors que l'Ouganda dispbse de ,la recla~ atio ·
de la RDC .~epuis le. mois de mai 2010 et de toutes lef ·piE!ceb1 a conv/ctio ,
depuis au moins _2 ans . Ce serait revenir a la case du depart, pa~a\nt un etern l
recommencement que la RDC ne peut en aucune maniere accepter.. ·. i : : . ' . l I . ·\
I t
Ministre
, '• :•
i . I ' ' I i
·[
i I
'
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J'ROPqSED CRITE~A .- I &i 1,
· : ; : I 0
;,
1. W~ propose that we be· guided by the ICJ Judgmen~ of 19J ecem~er
2005; thus excluding claims outside the scope of the Jud I ent. These
I ' I .
include; .·
a) Rape
b) Claims arising in the period outside 8th Augusi 1998 ft~. 2nd J~e
2003. .. . . ·I I I ..
c) Areas court said Uganda was not present; Zan o, Bomanga and
Bongadanga i · I ·
2. Follow princ.iples of international law and exclude the follojing
claims; Macro Economic damages, wounded so~diers, ~ass to the
treasury, b;eakdown of · civil order and ;econorhic eh -as,
disorganization of health and education system, de[ay of lthe . . l I I .
ec?n~rnic and social development plan and 9t11er ffrr rel'tted 1
damages. . · i I .
3. We propose that in arriving at a mutually acceptaple corhpensatable ·
amount for acts of killing and death, reliance sli.ould bJ madei 6n · :·' ·
: I I
judicial prece~authorities. : 1 ; ;
4. In the case of personal injury, the amount payaJl should take into
consideration the level of injury and disability. _ lj · ! ·
5. In case of 10Ss of property and other related clai ·,we~ ,opose :that
upon proof; the assessment should be bas(ed on, :equi~~ble
considerations and the fair market value of the pr~perty testroye at
the time. . j . . .
6. Loss of business and profits: we propose that claifs in-t~s cate o~
should be based on the lost future profits of the incom~ ·generaJ:ing
activity, ass~ts of the bll:sirless, anticipated profits j [~d 9a~ic
accounting principles. , ( · IJ : ; ·:
7. Looting, plundering and exploitation of natu±al res.1urces: we
propose to rely on the DRC's submissions to ti e Uniled Nations
Se~uri·ty· ~ouncil, reports of_ UN Agencies and 9ther hr: !r anitarian
orgaruzations. · , i: , . . . I : .. ' I •
' ; I i [
I . .
f •
I
I I
I
I•
I
1 1
1 I
I
I I : ' .1
. . I . :
8. Violation. Of International Human Rights la and j lntemahon
Humanitarian law in Ituri province as an oc~ pyin~ I poweJ als
~eferred to as moral prejudice: we _propose an ex lgratia f aym~ ,
IS mutually, acc~ptable to both parties. , .. 1 ' : : ' I ·;
9. · A joint verification and analysis of the 7400 doetpnentsj provid d b
the DRC should be carried to isolate credible cla:fun.s from unre listi
I I ~d exaggerated claims. I , :
'\Ve believe that if the\wo parties can agree on specific briteri1 n whi1 h ta
base the amount of compensation payable to the DRC !we sh . be ab1e t
• o 1 I
resolve the matter amicably. 1 I ; ·.
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I
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--
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-
2
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.
-
. --------
.•'"' --- ···
- --- ...
"NEWPROP05At _ _ _ - -- -· .- . ... ··.· .. - - ·
-· ....
----- - - -- '
Category Numbers Rates Old --
Acts of killing; and death -- -- - ·-- -- . . - - - -
G!iginal · --- .. - -
Taking· into account the principles of .. - -- -
international law !:_eJ~tingJQ....comperu;aaen- ·- -
-for-rteaffi, average life expectancy of 1998,
GDP per capita and Net Income per
person 4,985.00 308.00 1,535,380
New proposal (including the over 3,500
death claims that could not be verified by
the DRC)
Taking into account humanitarian
grounds, good neighborliness, Obuntu
and brother hood
4,985.00 2,000.00
-
Acts of Torture and personal iniurv .. -
Original .· ..
- ..
Taking into acsount the principle~ ~f . .
international law relating to compensation ..
for death, average life expectancy of 1998,
GDP per. capita and Net Income per - .
-
person . 1,069.00 308.00 329,252
New proposal n
Taking into account fo1n) 'tarian 1,069.00 2,000.00
I/
.I - -
.. t . -. ·- - -· . - .. ~, '
. . ,; . .. ....
. ew
9,970,000.00
..
..
.
.
2,138,000.00
--- - .--
----·----
-
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_ ..... --·· - -~-" ..
,_ ..,_ __ :___ . .:_ -----· ,• .. - . . - .. ,. . ···- . -- -·· . . ... ··- -- .. . . . . . . .. ·- -· ... .. .· .. . ..
- . .,•,..-_ _.. .. .. ...
,. -
0 _ vcrr1u::;, goo a ~e1ghborliness, Obuntu . . .. .•. .. · • - .. - -- - .. . . - . -.
.. and brother h.o.o.d- - --- .. . -.. " ..
. . .. . . - - . .. - ' .. - ·- -- - - . - - ·--· ·-·- -- - - - - - -- ~- - -
_ Lo~f__building,c--lotfiings-and ·o'ther - -- --- - - . -- · . -- ~ · .. - - - -3 personal property - ---
- - - - - - · - - - - - - -
- - - - ,_ -Old- ---- - - 2,570.00 2,000.00 5,140,000 New proposal .
Taking into account humanitarian
grounds, good neighborliness, Obuntu .. -
and brother hood / .. "
- - " 2,570.00 2,500.00 6,425,000.00
-
-
4 Loss of profits and business 3,995,368 3,995,368
Lottoing Plundering and expoilation of
5 natural resources 9,000,000 9,000,000 . -
.• .~
Incting ethic conlifct and failure to take ' . . . .
.. -
6 measures to put an end to such conflicts - - . . - . 500,000 500,000
.• . Viloations of international Human - ..
Rights Law, International Humanitarian
7 Law as occupying power in Ituli 5,000,000 5,000,000 .. .
, I ..
"
Grand Totals ,• 25,500,000.00 37,028,368.00
1 l ..
. - - - - ··- .- .. . -- - .
- · .. ..
~
ANNEX 1.1
Ministerial Order No. 0002/CAB/J&DH/2008 of 26 February 2008 establishing an Expert
Commission in charge of identifying and assessing the damage caused by Uganda to the
DRC and its peoples following the armed attack and occupation of Congolese
territory by Ugandan troops between 1998 and 2003
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 1.2
Ministerial Order No. 049/CAB/MIN/JGS&DH of 19 December 2015 establishing a
commission responsible for defending the interests of the DRC in the second phase
of the proceedings before the International Court of Justice relating to the
fixing of the amount of the reparations owed by Uganda
[Annex not translated]
___________
ANNEX 1.3
Software giving access to individual victims’ records
(in electronic format only)
[Annex not translated]
___________
- 18 -
ANNEX 1.4
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping
Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010
(Excerpts)
[Complete document available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/ DRC_
MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf]
- 19 -
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping
Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010
Pages 172-173
347. Following these incidents, the Mayi-Mayi restarted and intensified their attacks on
UPDF convoys between Beni and Butembo. In retaliation, the UPDF forces led operations against
villages suspected of sheltering Mayi-Mayi groups. UPDF soldiers often made disproportionate use
of force during these attacks, killing combatants and civilians indiscriminately.
On 1 November 2000, UPDF soldiers allegedly killed between seven and eleven people during
an attack on the population of the villages of Maboya and Loya, 16 kilometres north of the
town of Butembo. A few hours before the attack, four UPDF soldiers had been killed by
Vurondo Mayi-Mayi during an ambush close to the village of Maboya. During the afternoon,
UPDF soldiers apparently launched an indiscriminate attack on the inhabitants of both villages
and set 43 houses on fire. Some victims were shot and killed, whilst others were burned
alive532.
Page 173
348. On 8 November 2000, close to the village of Butuhe, 10 kilometres north of Butembo,
Vurondo Mayi-Mayi attacked a UPDF convoy that was escorting lorries transporting minerals.
On 9 November 2000, UPDF soldiers are alleged to have killed indiscriminately 36 people in
the village of Kikere, close to Butuhe, north of Butembo. The soldiers fired blindly on
civilians using rifles and rocket-launchers. Some civilians died as a result of being burned alive
in their homes. The soldiers also systematically killed domestic animals and destroyed civilian
property533.
349. In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for several years with
complete impunity. They carried out summary executions of civilians, arbitrarily detained large
numbers of people and subjected them to torture and various other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatments. They also introduced a particularly cruel form of detention, putting the detainees in
holes dug two or three metres deep into the ground, where they were forced to live exposed to bad
weather, with no sanitation and on muddy ground.
In March 2000, UPDF soldiers allegedly killed four civilians and wounded several others in the
town of Beni during an operation to quell a demonstration. The victims had been protesting
against the murder of a woman, the arbitrary arrest of her husband and the pillaging of their
house, committed a few days earlier by UPDF soldiers534.
350. During the period under consideration, UPDF soldiers carried out several operations
against an armed group of Ugandan origin, the ADF-NALU (Allied Democratic Forces–National
Army for the Liberation of Uganda535) based in the Ruwenzori massif in the Beni region. For their
part, ADF-NALU carried out attacks on villages in the Ruwenzori region, kidnapping numerous
civilians and pillaging their property. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the following
alleged incidents.
- 20 -
Pages 189-190
361. In August 1999, whilst international pressure on the leaders of the RCD-Goma to sign
the Lusaka Agreement596 was intensifying, the simmering crisis between Rwanda and Uganda for
the control of the RCD degenerated into open conflict in Kisangani. On the morning of 7 August,
APR and UDPF soldiers fought with heavy weapons for several hours without any civilians being
wounded. The situation calmed down again over the course of the following days. Tension
continued to build, nonetheless, and both sides strengthened their positions and brought large
numbers of weapons into the town. On the evening of 14 August, fighting again broke out between
the two armies at the airport and extended along the main roads and into the town centre.
From 14 to 17 August 1999, APR and UPDF soldiers are said to have used heavy weapons in
areas with a dense civilian population as they fought to gain control of the town of Kisangani.
The fighting allegedly caused the deaths of over 30 civilians and wounded over 100 of them.
The APR fired on both military targets and private homes belonging to civilians suspected of
supporting the Ugandans. Once the hostilities were over, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers
pillaged several places in Kisangani.597
362. After three days of fighting, Uganda and Rwanda signed a ceasefire agreement that
provided for Kisangani to be demilitarised and the headquarters of the pro-Ugandan branch of the
RCD, the RCD-Kisangani-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-K-ML) led by Wamba dia Wamba, to
be relocated to Bunia on 1 October 1999. During the months that followed, Orientale Province
found itself divided into a “Rwandan zone” under the control of the RCD-G and a “Ugandan zone”
dominated by the various movements supported by Kampala. In May 2000, however, tension
between the Ugandan and Rwandan armies again moved up a notch in Kisangani. The UPDF
strengthened its military positions to the north-east of the town and the APR reacted by bringing in
additional weapons.
On 5 May 2000, the APR and UPDF are said to have used heavy weapons in densely populated
areas, causing the deaths of over 24 civilians and wounding an unknown number of them.
Before the start of the hostilities, the Ugandan army had warned the population of the imminent
bombardments and had asked for the evacuation of several areas located close to their
targets598.
Page 190
363. On 12 May 2000, a team of United Nations military observers was sent to the area.
Under international mediation, the two parties adopted a demilitarisation plan for the town, which
they began to implement on 29 May. Fighting broke out again on 5 June, however, resulting in the
so-called “Six-Day War”.
The APR and UPDF fought each other in Kisangani from 5 to 10 June 2000. Both sides
reportedly embarked on indiscriminate attacks with heavy weapons, killing between 244 and
760 civilians according to some sources, wounding over 1,000 and causing thousands of people
to be displaced. The two armies also destroyed over 400 private homes and caused serious
damage to public and commercial properties, places of worship, including the Catholic
Cathedral of Notre-Dame, educational institutions and healthcare facilities, including hospitals.
The UPDF had taken steps to avoid civilian losses by ordering the evacuation of combat zones
before the start of hostilities and prohibiting access to three areas that were declared off-limits
to non-combatants. This restriction was, however, also extended to humanitarian workers, in
particular the ICRC, which was not able to get help to the wounded for several days599.
- 21 -
7. Ituri
364. In mid-August 1998, UPDF soldiers arrived in Ituri and quickly took control of the
district without encountering any real resistance. Like the rest of Orientale Province, Ituri was
placed under RCD administration. Following the movement’s split, in March 1999, into a
pro-Rwandan branch (RCD-Goma) and a pro-Ugandan branch (RCD-ML), Ituri was integrated into
the RCD-ML zone and administered from Kisangani. The key man on the ground in Ituri, however,
was the UPDF Chief of Staff, General Kazini. He applied a policy that supported autonomy for the
region in relation to the rest of Orientale Province and openly favoured the interests of the Hema
community, thus reviving former conflicts over land.
Page 191
365. The Hema-Gegere farmers600 who, a few years previously, had acquired new
concessions from the land registry in the Djugu region, took advantage of the new political
situation to enforce their rights. As the Lendu from the Walendu Pitsi601 community, who held the
customary rights to the land concerned, disputed the value of their title deeds, the Hema-Gegere
farmers appealed to the courts and had the Walendu Pitsi expelled from the concessions they
wanted. The latter refused to leave, however, and clashes broke out with the police officers who
had come to remove them. Several senior Lendu, including the leaders of the Walendu Pitsi and
Walendu Djatsi communities, were arrested for vandalism. In April 1999, the Hema-Gegere
concession-holders paid UPDF and APC soldiers to attack the Lendu villages located in the
disputed concessions602.
366. . . .
Between June and December 1999, UPDF and APC soldiers killed an unknown number of
Lendu civilians in villages in the Djugu region close to the concessions claimed by the
Hema-Gegere farmers. Villages in the Dz’na Buba, Linga, Jiba, Dhendo, Blukwa Mbi, Laudjo,
Laudedjo Gokpa, Nyalibati and Gbakulu groupements were particularly badly affected. Most
of the victims were Lendu but Hema were also killed during the attacks. Numerous victims
died when their village was set on fire or following heavy arms fire directed at their homes.
Some victims were shot dead at point-blank range605.
Page 192
Between June and December 1999, members of the Lendu militia killed several tens of
Hema-Gegere in the village of Libi from the Walendu Pitsi community and in the village of
Fataki from the Walendu Djatsi community. These attacks led to the displacement of almost
all the Hema-Gegere living in the Walendu Pitsi community606.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On 20 June 1999, members of the Hema militias and UPDF soldiers killed at least 25 people,
including several civilians, during an attack on the village of Dhendro, in the Walendu Pitsi
community, on the border with the Dhendro groupement608.
On 14 September 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Walendu Pitsi community
used edged weapons to kill several hundred Hema-Gegere, including a majority of civilians,
during widespread attacks on locations in the Dhendro groupement in the Bahema-Nord
community. Members of the militias also pillaged and set fire to tens of villages. The victims
were buried in mass graves. According to several sources, the massacre took place in
retaliation for an attack committed on 20 June by members of the Hema militias in the village
of Dhendro609.
- 22 -
On 14 September 1999, during a night-time offensive on the village of Fataki, in the Walendu
Djatsi community, members of the Hema militias and Hema soldiers from the APC killed
several tens of civilians with edged weapons, including at least 15 minors and several women.
The assailants then buried the bodies themselves. Following the attack, all the Lendu left the
village and Fataki became a Hema bastion in the Walendu Djatsi community.610
367. During the months that followed, members of the Lendu militias tried to regain control
of Fataki on several occasions. For its part, the UPDF concentrated its troops on Fataki and Linga
and led several offensives against Lendu militia bases in Kpandroma and Rethy, in the Walendu
Djatsi community.
Page 193
368. During the period under consideration, the Lendu militias also attacked villages in the
Djugu region on the shores of Lake Albert, the majority of which were populated by Hema611.
In July 1999, members of the Lendu militias from the Buba group in the Walendu Pitsi
community allegedly killed over 100 Hema civilians in the fishing village of Musekere in the
Bahema-Nord community. Having encircled the village at dawn and forced six APC soldiers
there to flee, they massacred the population using machetes and other edged weapons. From
the start of the conflict, the Lendu leaders of the Buba groupement had threatened to attack the
inhabitants of Musekere on several occasions612.
369. . . .
On 1 December 1999, members of the Lendu militias confronted elements of the UPDF and
members of the Hema militias over control of the mining town of Bambou, in the Walendu
Djatsi community in the Djugu region. The fighting allegedly led to the deaths of over
200 members of the civilian population. Numerous victims were mutilated and the town
looted. Most of the victims’ bodies were thrown into the River Chari614.
370. . . .
Page 194
In January 2000, members of the Lendu militias from the Walendu Pitsi and Bahema-Nord
communities attacked people living in the Blukwa groupement, killing several hundreds of
Hema with edged weapons. The groupement had been the site of violent inter-ethnic
confrontations since September 1999. The attack in January took place after the departure of
APC troops, fleeing from the increasing violence617.
On 26 April 2000, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops attacked the Buba
groupement, in the Walendu Pitsi community, causing around 10 deaths, the majority of whom
were Lendu civilians618.
Between 27 August and 12 September 2000, members of the Hema militias from Mangala,
Ghele, Gele and Liko, sometimes acting with the support of the Hema APC soldiers, pillaged
and set fire to several villages in the Walendu Djatsi community including Mbau (27 August),
Glakpa and Gobi (28 August), Logai (29 August), the villages in the Dz’na groupement
(31 August) and Mayalibo (6-12 September)619.
- 23 -
Page 206
10. Équateur
381. In November 1998, a new rebellion, the Mouvement pour la libération du
Congo (MLC) began with support from Uganda. Led by Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, in the early
days the MLC had just one battalion consisting mainly of ex-FAZ soldiers supported by elements
of the UPDF. In a few months, however, the MLC army, the Armée de libération du Congo (ALC)
added numerous ex-FAZ to its ranks and took control of several urban areas in the north of
Équateur province. The town of Bumba fell on 17 November, the town of Lisala on 10 December,
the village of Businga, on the crossroads to the towns of Gemena and Gbadolite on 20 December,
the town of Gemena on 24 December and the village of Libenge, in the far west of the province, on
the border with the Central African Republic, on 4 January 1999. The FAC conducted very intense
air bombardments in December 1998 to block the advance of the ALC/UPDF. In this context, the
Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
On 22 December 1998, an FAC Antonov dropped 11 home-made bombs on the village of
Businga, killing five civilians. On 24 December, an FAC Antonov plane bombed the village a
second time, killing two civilians669.
Page 209
386. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of ANT troops and the arrival of reinforcements
from the recruitment and training camps, ALC/UPDF soldiers launched a second major offensive
in May 1999. In three months, ALC/UPDF troops regained control of the towns of Kateke
(27 April 1999), Businga (14 May 1999) and Gbadolite (3 July 1999).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
387. In June 1999, the ALC/UPDF troops took control of Bongandanga, a town south of
Lisala.
Pages 216-217
402. During the period under consideration, the Bas-Uélé district remained under the control
of ALC/UPDF soldiers. The latter allegedly committed serious violations against all those who
dared to dispute their authority or criticised their involvement in pillaging the natural resources of
the region. The case below is mentioned for illustrative purposes.
From 2001 to January 2003, elements of the ALC/UPDF apparently tortured and killed an
unknown number of civilians in the town of Buta. Most of the victims were held in muddy
holes in conditions likely to cause death through disease or exhaustion. After a human rights
activist had been tortured and held in one of the muddy holes by the soldiers, MONUC and
United Nations organisations sent out an investigative mission and had these prisons shut
down708.
Pages 218-219
B. Ituri
404. During the second half of 2000, the underlying conflict between the President of the
RCD-ML, Wamba dia Wamba and his two principal lieutenants, the Nande Mbusa Nyamwisi714
and the Hema John Tibasima715 broke out in public. Wamba dia Wamba had long criticised
Nyamwisi and Tibasima for trying to orchestrate the conflict between the Hema and Lendu
- 24 -
communities716 in order to establish a power base in the district and control the region’s natural
resources. In August, Wamba dia Wamba tried to regain control of the movement by dismissing
Nyamwisi and Tibasima from their posts, but they resisted and the number of incidents on the
ground between the different factions of the APC increased. After several unsuccessful attempts at
mediation by Uganda and a series of confrontations in the centre of Bunia, Wamba dia Wamba was
exiled to Kampala in December, leaving the leadership of the RCD-ML to Nyamwisi and
Tibasima.
405. In January 2001, Ituri saw a resurgence of violence in the Djugu area. Between January
and February, members of the Hema militias from Bogoro, generally accompanied by Hema
soldiers from the APC and UPDF soldiers, led indiscriminate attacks in the Walendu Tatsi
community, next to the Bahema-Nord community, killing an unknown number of civilians. In this
context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
On 4 January 2001, during a failed attack on Kpandroma, members of the Hema militias based
in Fataki killed at least 35 Lendu civilians in the Zabu groupement in the Walendu Pitsi
community, particularly in Aruda and Mola and the surrounding area717.
In early 2001, members of the Hema militias killed at least 16 people and kidnapped two
minors who have been since recorded as having disappeared in the Salimboko,
Poli-Masumbuku and Penyi groupements in the Walendu Tatsi community718.
Page 219-220
Also in early 2001, members of the Lendu militias killed an unknown number of civilians,
including a majority of Hema and Alur in the villages alongside Lake Albert in the Bahema
Banywagi and Bahema-Nord communities719.
Between January and February 2001, UPDF soldiers attacked around 20 villages in the
Walendu Tatsi community, killing around 100 people, including various Lendu civilians.
During the attacks, the soldiers also committed rape, looted and caused an unknown number of
people to disappear. Most of the victims were killed in villages located near the Zumbe power
station, in the Bedu Ezekere groupement, where they had gathered under the protection of
members of the Lendu militias720.
On 3 February 2001, members of the Hema militias and UPDF troops killed 105 people,
including numerous Lendu civilians, in the villages in the Bulo groupement in the Ndo Okebo
community in the Djugu region. The victims often came from the Walendu Pitsi community.
They had taken refuge in the Bulo groupement following recent attacks on their village721.
406. At the end of 2000, the conflict between the Hema and Lendu finally reached the Irumu
region. The UPDF soldiers lent their support to the local Hema communities and violent incidents
broke out on the ground.
Between 9 and 18 January 2001, members of the Hema militias allegedly killed around
60 people, including numerous Lendu and Ngiti civilians722, in the village of Kotoni, in the
Irumu region and the surrounding area723.
407. Following the bombardment of the Walendu Bindi community by a UPDF helicopter,
Ngiti militiamen, originally in conjunction with the Djugu Lendu from the Walendu Bindi
community, launched an attack on 19 January 2001 against UPDF positions at the airport in Bunia.
During the attack, Ngiti militiamen tried to destroy the helicopter the UPDF had used to bomb their
villages. The UPDF finally repelled the attack but at the cost of a significant loss of human life.
- 25 -
Page 220
On 19 January 2001, Hema militiamen and civilians allegedly killed between 200 and
250 civilians from the Lendu, Ngiti, Nande and Bira ethnic groups in the Mudzipela
neighbourhood in the town of Bunia. The victims, who included a large number of women and
children, were killed with machetes, spears or studded batons. Most of them were subjected to
mutilation. Some were decapitated and their heads carried through the town as trophies. The
Hema militiamen and civilians also systematically looted the victims’ property and set fire to
several houses. Shortly before the massacre, UPDF officers and senior members of the Hema
community in Bunia had held a meeting and called on Hema civilians to attack the Lendu
population.724
408. In order to restore calm to Ituri and avoid new splinter groups developing within the
RCD-ML, Uganda forced the RCD-ML and MLC to join forces within a new movement, the Front
de libération du Congo (FLC), led by Jean-Pierre Bemba725. On 6 February 2001, the FLC
organised consultations with the traditional chiefs in Ituri and on 17 February, the latter signed a
memorandum of agreement, providing in particular for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the
disarmament of the militiamen and the dismantling of the training camps726. During the months
that followed, the number of violations decreased significantly. Inter-community tension on the
ground nonetheless remained high and the militias continued to arm themselves. In this context,
the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
On 26 April 2001, armed men killed six members of the ICRC during an attack on a
humanitarian convoy in the area around Fataki in the Walendu Djatsi community, in the Djugu
region. Local sources indicate that the attack is thought to have been perpetrated by Ugandan
soldiers and Hema militiamen. The attack was supposedly aimed at ending the presence of
humanitarian personnel in areas where the displaced Lendu had taken refuge. During the
period under consideration, numerous sources indicate that Hema militias and armed groups
severely hampered the work of humanitarian organisations in areas populated principally by
Lendu727.
Pages 221-222
In 2001, Hema soldiers from the APC killed 40 Lendu, a majority of them civilians, including
women, children and elderly and disabled people, in the village of Gobu in the Bahema-Nord
community. The victims were taken to a ditch and shot. Their bodies were then thrown into
the ditch728.
In January 2002, UPDF troops and Hema militiamen opened fire on the population of the
village of Kobu in the Walendu Djatsi community in the Djugu region, killing 35 Lendu
civilians. As they entered the village, Ugandan soldiers killed four civilians in the marketplace,
including one disabled person. Almost all of the population fled and hid in the forest for nearly
two months. On their return to the village, the villagers found 35 decomposed bodies, which
they buried in various places. Those responsible for the massacre were trying to remove Lendu
populations from the Kobu area, close to the Kilomoto gold mines. Following the killing, the
population of Kobu sent a petition to Governor Lopondo, who visited the area shortly
afterwards accompanied by senior figures in the UPDF. Following the visit, UPDF soldiers
left the area729.
On 26 January 2002, members of the Hema militias killed around 100 Lendu in a forest a few
kilometres from Datule, in the Bahema-Sud community in the Irumu region. The victims had
been chased from the village of Datule the previous day by a UPC commander. They were
killed with machetes, spears and studded batons. A young girl of 13 was the only person to
survive the attack730.
- 26 -
On 28 January 2002, Hema militiamen killed and mutilated around 50 Lendu civilians in
Kasenyi in the Irumu region. Having been informed of the massacre that had taken place on
26 January, the victims had fled the village of Datule on 27 January in the hope of reaching the
Lendu villages in the Walendu Bindi community. They were hiding behind a police station
when they were surprised and killed731.
Between January and May 2002, Hema militiamen in the region forcibly recruited all the men
from the Alur ethnic group living in the village of Gobu in the Bahema-Nord community in the
Djugu region732.
Between February and April 2002, elements of the UPDF and Hema militiamen killed several
hundred Lendu civilians in the Walendu Bindi community in the Irumu region. They also
tortured and raped an unknown number of people. The villages of Aveba, Bukiringi, Nombe,
Kaswara, Djino, Kagaba, Biro, Kapalayi, Gety étang, Tsubina, Kinyamubaya, Karach, Bolomo,
Bachange, Tsede, Molangi, Tamara, Irura, Modiro, Mukiro and Anyange were all pillaged733.
Page 222
409. In February 2002, against a background of growing economic rivalry between Hema
and Nande businessmen and disagreements on the new strategic directions taken by the
Mouvement734, the Defence Minister of the RCD-ML, Thomas Lubanga, and the Hema soldiers of
the APC broke away from the RCD-ML to form a political and military Hema group, the Union des
patriotes congolais (UPC). In response, Mbusa Nyamwisi and Nande officers in the APC,
supported by certain members of the UPDF, reduced Hema influence in the district735, intensified
their cooperation with the FAC736 and encouraged members of the Lendu and Ngiti militias to join
forces in political military groups, namely the Front National Intégrationiste (FNI)737 and the
Forces de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI)738. During the course of 2002, these various armed
groups received significant supplies of weapons from Uganda and the Government in Kinshasa. In
this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
Starting on 21 May 2002 and during the course of the next six months, elements of the UPC
killed at least 46 civilians, most of them from the Bira ethnic group, in Walu in the
Ngombe-Nyama groupement, in the Irumu region. The militiamen also raped an unknown
number of women, looted and destroyed educational institutions and hospitals. These attacks
were supposedly intended as retaliation for the help given to the Lendu by the Bira during the
previous attacks against the Hema in the region739.
In May 2002, Lendu militiamen accompanied by civilians killed at least 80 people, mainly
Hema and Alur, in the village of Gobu in the Bahema-Nord community. The victims were
civilians or soldiers who were no longer able to fight. Most were summarily executed with
edged weapons. According to several witness statements, the Hema militiamen in the area had
fled before members of the Lendu militias arrived in the village740.
Pages 223-224
In early June 2002, elements of the UPDF and Hema militiamen indiscriminately killed
members of the Lendu militias and an unknown number of civilians in the Lendu villages in
the Walendu Pitsi community. By way of example, in June 2002, Hema militiamen and
elements of the UPDF killed at least 27 people in Buba741.
410. In June 2002, faced with the advance of Lendu militiamen into the Banyali-Kilo
community in the Djugu region, the local Security Council for the town of Mongwalu decided to
chase away or eliminate any Lendu living in the town. In this context, the Mapping Team
documented the following alleged incidents.
- 27 -
On 10 June 2002, elements of the UPC supported by local youths, systematically attacked the
houses of Lendu living in Mongwalu, killing around 20 civilians. The victims, who were
long-term residents of Mongwalu, were either shot dead or killed with studded batons742.
On 11 June 2002, in retaliation for a massacre carried out the day before, several hundred
Lendu from the villages of Kobu, Bambou and Kpandroma killed tens of civilians with edged
weapons, most of them from the Hema ethnic group, in the town of Mongwalu. The Hema left
Mongwalu following the massacre743.
411. In early August 2002, elements of the UPC, with support from UPDF troops, are
reported to have chased elements of the APC out of the town of Bunia. In this context, the
Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
Between 7 and 10 August 2002, in Bunia, at least 300 civilians were killed on the basis of their
ethnic origin, most of them by UPC militiamen. Between 7 and 8 August, elements of the UPC
killed an unknown number of Bira, Lendu and Nande civilians during raids on the
neighbourhoods of Mudzipela, Bigo and Saio. Lendu and Ngiti militiamen responded by
killing an unknown number of Hema civilians in the districts of Mudzipela, Saio, Rwambuzi
and Simbiliabo. At the same time, Lendu and Ngiti militiamen killed 32 Hema civilians and
wounded and mutilated an unknown number of them at a farm in the village of Lengabo, a few
kilometres from Bunia. Between 9 and 11 August, elements of the UPDF and the UPC killed
at least 80 Lendu, Nande and Bira civilians at the Governor’s residence, at the hospital in Bigo
and at Bunia central prison. The bodies of the victims were then placed in mass graves744.
Page 224
412. Over the course of the following months, violent fighting broke out on several fronts,
between elements of the UPC and UPDF on the one hand, and those of the APC and FNI-FRPI on
the other. Both coalitions targeted civilian populations on the basis of their ethnic origins.
Numerous civilians from non-belligerent tribes were also massacred on the basis of their actual or
supposed support for one or other camp. Many of them were also victims of forced recruitment to
the various armed groups. The mining regions north of Bunia, control of which was seen as
strategic by the various groups involved, were the theatre for some particularly violent fighting.
413. On 9 August 2002, having had to leave Bunia quickly, Governor Lopondo, the APC
troops and Lendu and Ngiti militiamen745 established a base in Komanda for the purpose of
preparing the counter-offensive. The UPC, meanwhile, consolidated its positions south of Bunia in
order to prevent the counter-attack from elements of the APC and FNI-FRPI and to gain control of
the area’s mining resources. In this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged
incidents.
On 9 August 2002, elements of the APC and Lendu and Ngiti militiamen killed tens of
civilians, mostly Hema, in the town of Komanda and the surrounding villages in the
Basili-Basumu community, in the Irumu region. Guided by the Ngiti militiamen who had
infiltrated the village and by local youths, elements of the APC and members of the militias
moved from house to house, killing Hema civilians purely on the basis of their ethnic origin.
Most of the victims were killed with edged weapons. Some were tied up and then killed with
spears746.
From 14 to 19 August 2002, elements of the UPC killed over 50 civilians from different ethnic
groups during an attack on the village of Komanda. Most of the victims were shot or killed
with edged weapons when they fled Komanda for Beni. Many of the victims had left Bunia a
few days previously following the takeover of the town by the UPC and had taken refuge in
- 28 -
Komanda. The aim of the UPC attack was to avenge the massacre committed in Komanda on
9 August747.
Page 225
On 28 August 2002, Hema-Gegere militiamen associated with the UPC killed several tens of
“non-native” inhabitants748 in the gold-producing town of Mabanga in the Mambisa
community, in the Djugu region. The victims were killed either with machetes or with studded
batons. Sixteen of them were clubbed to death with planks of wood. The Hema-Gegere
militiamen associated the “non-natives” with Governor Lopondo and APC soldiers. Whilst the
Lendu militiamen were trying to take control of the region’s mines, the Hema-Gegere
militiamen feared that the “non-natives” were helping them. During previous fighting in
Mabanga, the Lendu militiamen had systematically killed Hema civilians but had spared the
“non-native” populations. After the massacre, UPDF troops intervened to provide cover for the
flight of the non-natives to Bunia749.
On 31 August 2002, elements of the UPC supported by Bira militiamen killed at least
14 civilians, including women and children, in several villages in Songolo in the Walendu
Bindi community, in the Irumu region. They also carried out acts of pillaging and widespread
destruction, setting fire to over 1,000 houses. Several victims were mutilated and killed in an
extremely cruel fashion. At least three women were impaled. Songolo was considered to be
one of the FRPI fiefdoms750.
Between 5 and 15 September 2002, elements of the FRPI and APC systematically massacred
over 1,000 Hema-Gegere and Bira civilians, including large numbers of children, in Nyakunde
and the surrounding villages in the Andisoma community, in the Irumu region. They also
carried out numerous acts of pillaging. The victims were killed purely on the basis of their
ethnic origin, mostly using arrows or edged weapons. Elements of the APC and FRPI had set
up road blocks so that no-one from the Hema or Bira ethnic groups was able to escape from
Nyakunde. FRPI militiamen sorted civilians and the soldiers there who were no longer able to
fight based on their ethnic origin in the Evangelical Medical Centre. They systematically killed
Hema and Bira and spared the members of other ethnic groups. Numerous victims were
detained in cruel, inhuman or degrading conditions for several days before they were finally
executed. Most of the massacres took place once the fighting with the UPC militiamen present
in Nyakunde had been over for several days751.
Pages 226-227
On 13 September 2002, elements of the FRPI from Gety killed around 150 people, including
numerous civilians, most of them Hema, in the lakeside groupement of Bandikado in the
Bahema–Sud community, in the Irumu region. They killed and mutilated an unknown number
of people in Nyamavi, for example. They also looted the villages before leaving the
groupement. These attacks also caused several thousand people to be displaced for several
years752.
On 11 October 2002, in the Djugu region, elements of the FNI from the Walendu Djatsi
community killed an unknown number of Alur, Hema, Bira and Nyali civilians in the mining
town of Nizi in the Mambisa community. They also killed 28 people and kidnapped 23 women
in the mining area of Kilomoto. During these attacks, the militiamen mutilated numerous
victims, carried out large-scale pillaging and set fire to numerous buildings, including the
community offices, schools and a hospital. The victims’ bodies were buried in nine mass
graves. According to witnesses, the FNI militiamen accused inhabitants of the town from all
ethnic groups of supporting the UPC753.
- 29 -
414. Between October and December 2002, confrontations between elements of the
FNI-FPRI and UPC had spread throughout the Irumu region. The UPC troops led major military
operations in the same region directed at the FRPI bases in the Walendu Bindi community and
Lendu enclaves in the Bahema-Sud community. The Bira farmers living in Pinga, in Songo in the
Irumu region were also attacked, with the UPC suspecting them of funding the FNI and FRPI. In
this context, the Mapping Team documented the following alleged incidents.
Between 15 and 16 October 2002, UPC militiamen killed at least 180 people, including
civilians, in Zumbe in the Walendu Tatsi community. The militiamen also raped at least
50 women. Most of the victims were killed with machetes or spears. Some were shot dead.
Some survived but were badly mutilated. Having looted large amounts of property and stolen
1,500 head of cattle, the UPC troops set fire to the village, destroying more than 500 buildings,
including health centres and schools. Zumbe was an FRPI fiefdom754.
On 20 October 2002, elements of the UPC from Bunia and Bogoro killed at least 10 Lendu
civilians during attacks on several villages, including Nombe, Medhu, Pinga, Kagaba, Singo
and Songolo in the Walendu Bindi community, in the Irumu region. A Bira woman married to
a Lendu civilian was also killed. The militiamen systematically pillaged property and stole
cattle belonging to Lendu in the villages they attacked755.
Page 227
On 24 October 2002, elements of the UPC killed several dozen Lendu in the Walendu Bindi
community, particularly in the villages of Nombe, Kagaba, Lakabo, Lokpa, Medhu, Songolo,
Pinga, Androzo and Singo. Most of the victims were killed with edged weapons. The
militiamen also kidnapped more than 20 people, including women. They also stole some
1,450 head of cattle and burned at least 351 houses, including schools and health centres756.
On 5 November 2002, elements of the FRPI killed at least 14 civilians, including two women,
in the village of Saliboko in the Mobala community, in the Irumu region. They also pillaged
and set fire to the village. Most of the victims were Bira. They were attacked at night in their
houses. First they were tied up and then killed with machetes. Some civilians managed to
escape but were often severely mutilated. The militiamen were critical of the Bira in Saliboko
for having given shelter to displaced Hema. The village has not been rebuilt since757.
415. The signing of a peace agreement in September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda
offered new prospects for peace in Ituri. In addition to the withdrawal of UPDF troops from
Gbadolite and Beni, the agreement provided for the creation of a Peacekeeping Commission in Ituri
and the setting up of an Administration intérimaire de l’Ituri (AII) [Interim Administrative
Authority for Ituri] responsible for managing the district after the departure of the Ugandan
soldiers. On the ground, however, far from stabilising the region, the closer relationship between
Kinshasa and Kampala prompted new patterns of alliances that made the situation even more
volatile. As mentioned previously, in October 2002, the MLC army, the ALC, and its allies in the
RCD-N launched a major operation east of Orientale Province, called “Clean the blackboard”.
This operation aimed to destroy the APC once and for all, so as to deprive the Government in
Kinshasa of its ally in eastern Congo and get hold of the natural resources still under the control of
the RCD-ML before the transition period began. The UPC, which was also trying to crush the
APC, joined in with the operation.
416. On 12 October 2002, the ALC and its allies from the RCD-N entered the town of
Mambasa. On 29 October, however, they were forced to withdraw, before regaining control of the
town from the APC on 27 November. During the attacks, the ALC soldiers (MLC and RCD-N)
committed numerous atrocities directed at civilians.
- 30 -
Page 228
Between 12 and 29 October 2002, elements of the ALC and RCD-N taking part in the “Clean
the blackboard” operation allegedly killed at least 173 Nande and Pygmy civilians in Mambasa
and in the villages along the main road between Mambasa and Beni, particularly in Teturi,
Mwemba and Byakato, in the Mambasa region. The soldiers also carried out acts of
cannibalism, mutilated an unknown number of civilians, raped a large number of women and
children and committed widespread pillaging. The victims were killed purely on the basis of
their ethnic origin, with Nande and Pygmies accused of supporting the RCD-ML758.
417. Following their victory over the APC in Mambasa, elements of the ALC/RCD-N/UPC,
with the help of UPDF soldiers, launched a major military operation in order to take control of the
mining town of Mongwalu.
On 20 November 2002, during their attack on Mongwalu, elements of the ALC/RCD-N/UPC
are alleged to have killed at least 50 Lendu, including civilians and Lendu militiamen who
were no longer able to fight. Most of the victims were shot dead or killed with edged weapons.
Some were killed whilst they were hiding in a church. Some survived but were badly mutilated
and tortured759.
Page 230
421. On 6 March 2003, after the UPC had attacked the UPDF base in Ndele, a few
kilometres from Bunia, UPDF soldiers and elements of the FNI and FRPI set up a joint military
operation and regained control of the town of Bunia.
Page 231
On 6 March 2003, elements of the UPC and UPDF/FNI/FRPI fought each other with heavy
weapons in Bunia, reportedly killing between 17 and 52 civilians. After the withdrawal of
UPC troops from the town, elements of the FNI killed an unknown number of Hema civilians
on the basis of their ethnic origins. Elements of the UPDF/FNI/FRPI also looted and destroyed
numerous buildings, private homes and premises used by local and international NGOs.
UPDF soldiers sometimes intervened to ask elements of the FNI/FRPI to stop the atrocities and
leave the town769.
Pages 234-235
429. During the period under consideration, all the armed groups in Ituri (UPC, FNI, FRPI,
FAPC and PUSIC) are alleged to have recruited thousands of children along ethnic lines.
Between 2001 and 2003, thousands of Hema children recruited by the UPC had undergone
military training in the Mandro, Katoto and Bule camps. During the training, they were often
tortured, subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading acts and raped. In 2000, at least 163 of these
children were sent to Uganda to undergo military training at a UPDF camp in Kyankwanzi
before finally being repatriated to Ituri by UNICEF in February 2001. Between 2002
and 2003, some children associated with the UPC were kidnapped and taken to Rwanda to
undergo military training in the APR camps. An unknown number of Lendu children were
taken to military training camps in North Kivu. Other communities were affected by the same
phenomenon, primarily the Alur, largely in the Mahagi region782.
- 31 -
Page 243
2. Beni and Lubero regions (Grand-Nord)
442. In the Beni and Lubero regions controlled by the RCD-ML, fighting continued between
the troops from the APC (the armed wing of the RCD-ML) and the UPDF on the one hand and the
various Mayi-Mayi groups on the other.
In 2001, elements of the APC allegedly killed at least five civilians and set fire to houses in the
village of Kiantsaba, 15 kilometres from Beni. APC soldiers and the Vurondo Mayi-Mayi had
long been in dispute over control of the village808.
443. From 2001, Mayi-Mayi groups and UPDF soldiers, sometimes supported by elements
of the APC, engaged in fierce fighting to gain control of the village of Irango, around 20 kilometres
from Beni.
In 2001, elements of the UPDF allegedly killed an unknown number of people in the village of
Irango. The victims had been accused of supporting the Mayi-Mayi. The soldiers also raped
numerous girls. During the attack, they set fire to and looted several houses809.
444. In the town of Beni, UPDF soldiers instituted a reign of terror for several years with
complete impunity. They summarily executed civilians, tortured and arbitrarily detained an
unknown number of people, several of them in muddy holes two or three metres deep.
Page 340
Mouvement national de libération du Congo (MLC)
697. The MLC’s army, the ALC, with the backing of the Ugandan Army, the UPDF,
allegedly also recruited children, primarily in Mbandaka, Équateur Province. In 2001, the MLC
admitted to having 1,800 CAAFAG within its ranks1272. The child soldiers were involved in ALC
offensives during which serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were
committed. This was particularly the case in the attacks carried out within the context of the
“Erasing the Board” operation1273.
___________
- 32 -
ANNEX 1.5
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-sixth Session, Report on the
situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, submitted
by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/56,
document E/CN.4/2000/42, 18 January 2000
(Excerpts)
- 33 -
UNITED
NATIONS E
Economic and Social
Council
Distr.
GENERAL
E/CN.4/2000/42
18 January 2000
ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH/FRENCH
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Fifty-sixth session
Item 9 of the provisional agenda
QUESTION OF THE VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
FREEDOMS IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD
Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Roberto Garretón, in accordance with
Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/56
CONTENTS
Paragraphs Page
Summary.................................................................................................................. 6
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................... 1 - 12 9
A. Mandate and activities............................................................ 1 - 6 9
B. Joint mission to investigate allegations of massacres ............ 7 - 8 10
C. Reprisals against individuals who cooperated with the
United Nations........................................................................ 9 - 10 11
D. International human rights agreements and cooperation
with the United Nations.......................................................... 11 - 12 11
II. THE ARMED CONFLICT ........................................................... 13 - 30 12
GE.00-10229 (E)
- 34 -
E/CN.4/2000/42
page 2
CONTENTS (continued)
Paragraphs Page
III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.................................................... 31 - 47 17
A. In Government-controlled territory........................................ 31 - 41 17
B. In territory controlled by RCD and MLC............................... 42 - 47 19
IV. SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS............................................ 48 - 107 20
A. In the territory controlled by the Kinshasa Government........ 48 - 80 20
B. In the territory controlled by RCD and MLC......................... 81 - 107 28
V. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW ........................................................................................... 108 - 117 33
A. By the Kinshasa Government................................................. 108 - 111 33
B. By RCD and MLC forces....................................................... 112 - 117 33
VI. CONCLUSIONS........................................................................... 118 - 137 35
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................................. 138 - 151 38
Annexes
Page
I. Previous resolutions and reports of the General Assembly and the
Commission on Human Rights ........................................................................ 41
II. Officials of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
with whom the Special Rapporteur met........................................................... 42
III. Officials of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie with whom
the Special Rapporteur met .............................................................................. 43
IV. Other institutions, churches, judges, public organizations, non-governmental
organizations and political parties met in territory controlled by the
Kinshasa authorities ......................................................................................... 44
V. Other institutions, churches, judges, public organizations, non-governmental
organizations and political parties met in territory controlled by the
authorities of the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie..................... 46
- 35 -
E/CN.4/2000/42
page 3
CONTENTS (continued)
Page
VI. Places visited by the Special Rapporteur ......................................................... 47
VII. International instruments to which the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is a party ............................................................................................... 48
VIII. Irregular armed groups directly or indirectly involved in the armed
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .......................................... 49
IX. Armed conflicts developing in the territory of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo..................................................................................................... 50
X. Main peace initiatives undertaken by the international community since
the outbreak of the conflict .............................................................................. 51
XI. Ceasefire implementation timetable................................................................. 52
XII. Non-exhaustive list of human rights abuses committed in
Government-controlled territories and brought to the Special Rapporteur’s
attention............................................................................................................ 54
XIII. Non-exhaustive list of human rights abuses committed in territories
controlled by RCD and MLC and brought to the Special Rapporteur’s
attention............................................................................................................ 71
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 19
38. One of the key provisions of the Lusaka Agreement is that “the inter-Congolese political
negotiations shall be under the aegis of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the Congolese
parties” (art. III, para. 19) and that the facilitator should be appointed within 15 days of
signature. The dialogue itself was to be held within 45 to 90 days. All these deadlines passed
without any agreement being reached, even though the international community has put forward
eminent individuals with impeccable democratic credentials and acknowledged moral and
intellectual prestige, credibility and experience. The RCD and MLC leaders have rejected all the
names put forward, thereby delaying one of the key aspects of the Agreement. At a meeting of
the parties in Lusaka on 19 November, there was agreement in principle on Father Mateo Zuppi
and the former President of South Africa Nelson Mandela, but the Government continues to be
opposed to the appointment of the latter.
39. The Government has also been criticized for establishing People’s Power Committees
(CPPs) to replace the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL),
which brought Kabila to the Presidency. Their functions include organizing the people and
establishing policy in all aspects of national life. All inhabitants, at their respective levels
(neighbourhood, commune, town, city), are members. At their first congress, the President
defined the Committees as the new democracy. They are financed by the State and their
Executive Secretary is a former minister of President Kabila’s Government, Rafael Ghenda. The
population likens them to a single party and complains that sometimes its members have acted as
police informants to have opponents arrested. There have even been reports that its members
have taken part in the arrest of opponents and that they are inclined to interfere in the
administration of justice.5
40. Worse still, in a clearly provocative move against the civilian population, condemned by
the Special Rapporteur for the huge risk it carries for the civilian population, on 14 November,
the Government authorized the CPPs to carry weapons. For that purpose, it created the People’s
Self-Defence Force (FAP), a private militia with 50 members per neighbourhood who will be
given weapons to defend the homeland on the grounds that it is an extension of the army.
41. The army continues to have a very strong influence. According to reliable reports, there
are 13 security, military and police forces, apparently all authorized to make arrests. One
positive feature is the recent replacement of the former classification between commanders and
troops by the establishment of ranks - lieutenant-general, brigadier-general, colonel,
lieutenant-colonel, major, force commander and regional commander - which should prove
useful in determining responsibility and ending impunity. However, that progress is cancelled
out by the virtual incorporation into the army of the Mai-Mai and their criminal activities, which
invites a reaction from RCD.
B. In territory controlled by RCD and MLC
42. In the territory controlled by RCD, there is no party but it and another small party called
the Reformers’ Movement. In January, when confronted with the defection of its first president,
RCD held a general assembly that established an assembly and a collegial presidency consisting
of eight members as the only way of harmonizing its various civilian, military and Congolese
components and those perceived as foreign by the population. In March, the rift was
consolidated when its new president, Wamba dia Wamba, who is supported by Uganda, left for
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Kisangani and, later, Bunia. In May, supporters of the Rwanda-backed Goma faction clashed
with supporters of the Kisangani faction, leaving between three and eight people dead. In Goma,
the assembly established in January was dissolved in June and a further defection in October was
added to those in January and March, when the Katanga section rebelled against the majority,
which was perceived as foreign.
43. The worst confrontations occurred between 15 and 18 August, when Ugandan soldiers
clashed with Rwandan soldiers in Kisangani, resulting in the deaths of some 200 soldiers and 30
civilians, who, needless to say, were Congolese. The residence of the Congolese bishop Laurent
Monsengwo, who has been critical of the Rwandan presence in his homeland, was attacked by
the Rwandans. Other clashes between the factions have taken place in Beni, Butembo, Rutshuru
and other towns.
44. In order to deal with the civilian population, most of which is hostile to it, RCD has
established “self-defence groups”, trained by Rwandan soldiers. These groups have often been
accused of arresting or kidnapping individuals. State radio has called on people to join them.
The groups constitute a real paramilitary force, which has even been accused of the death of a
priest.
45. Various measures adopted by RCD have increased hostility towards it: the flight of
national wealth to Uganda and Rwanda; the introduction of a new flag for the region; the
declaration of the “twinning” of Kigali and the South Kivu region; and, lastly, the formation of a
so-called parliament (baraza), the members of which were appointed by the Governor of
South Kivu. In November, a dispute within RCD/Goma introduced a further factor, the intention
being to establish a sort of federal state in South Kivu, so as to be no longer dependent on Goma.
46. During his two visits to Goma and one to Bukavu, the Special Rapporteur was struck by
the prevailing climate of terror and humiliation in RCD-controlled territory.
47. The Special Rapporteur has not been able to obtain information on the political situation
in the territory controlled by MLC.
IV. SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. In the territory controlled by the Kinshasa Government (annex XII)
1. Right to life
Death penalty
48. In his oral presentation to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-fifth session, the
Special Rapporteur said that “in 1999, such sentences (by the Military Court) have not been
carried out, which indicates progress with regard to what I stated in the report”. That same
month, the practice of public executions was resumed and, during the year, a very large number
of people – particularly members of the former Armed Forces of Zaire (FAZ) or civilians found
guilty of armed robbery – were sentenced to death. Over 130 executions were reported, some for
such petty reasons as refusing to eat the food served up, which was considered a “military
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 33
war and for “ideological education”. Unfortunately, RCD, citing reasons of security, is not
prepared to participate in the pan-African conference on demobilization organized by Kinshasa
that is due to be held in the third week of December.
107. There are many street children owing to the death of their parents during the war or in the
massacres that have occurred in many villages. In South Kivu, 1,324 unaccompanied children
whose parents were killed in massacres in the region have been registered. At least 13 of these
survivors died as a result of neglect. It was reported that there are 400 children in Kisangani in
danger of dying from malnutrition and lack of medical care.
V. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
A. By the Kinshasa Government
108. The principal violations of the law on armed conflicts by the forces of the Kinshasa
regime and their allies were as follows:
Attacks on the civilian population
109. Especially the bombing of Kisangani and pillaging in the city in January (17 dead); the
bombing of Zongo (120), Libenge (200), Goma (between 30 and 65 dead) and Uvira (3) in May;
and the atrocities perpetrated by Chadian soldiers in Bunga and Gemena. In addition, the
Zimbabwean army’s bombing of rebel-occupied towns claimed many victims.
Murders in the north-east
110. In Mobe, some 300 civilians were killed, apparently during an unsuccessful search for
rebels (second week of January 1999).
Sexual violence against women
111. While many general charges have been made, the most specific information relates to the
flight of FAC soldiers from Equateur at the beginning of the year, when, in addition to
committing robberies, they raped women.
B. By RCD and MLC forces
Attacks on the civilian population
112. The cruellest and most violent actions, committed without heed for the laws of war, were
attacks on the civilian population, as reprisals for acts committed by Mai-Mai in Chipaho and
Lemera (3 and 4 December 1998, around 70 dead); Makobola (end of 1998 and beginning
of 1999, up to 800 or more dead according to some sources); Burhale and Musinga
(12 January, 12 dead); Bashali (14 January, many Bahutu refugees killed); Lukweti, South Kivu
(25 February, 45 dead); Budaha, South Kivu (17 March); Walungu, Mwenga (19-21 March);
Mikondero (15 February, around 100 dead, including in the towns of Kyondo, Beni,
North Kivu); Kamituga (around 100 dead between 14 and 17 March, in the towns of Kutunda,
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E/CN.4/2000/42
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Kenge, Lubila, Kabukungu); Budaha, Burhinyi, Ngweshe, Kigulube (31 May, around 90 dead,
according to the sources); Kibizi, Buyankiri (similar incidents throughout the year, of varying
intensity); Kasala (Katanga) (45 dead, many of them burned alive, on 28 July); Kalambi
(Menga, 30 September); Kahungwe (23 October, around 100 dead); Kashambi (61 dead,
on 31 October); Kalami (October); and Chifunze (South Kivu, over 60 dead). Many of these
massacres were carried out using machetes, knives or guns, and houses were usually set on fire
at the same time. RCD claims that these incidents were provoked by the Interahamwe or the
Mai-Mai, but these groups have no reason to commit massacres against the Congolese
population or Hutu refugees, who account for most of the victims. These incidents - like those in
Kasika (1998) and Makobola - were denied by RCD, before finally being acknowledged as
unfortunate mistakes. That is how they were described by both the Head of the Department of
Security and Information, Bizima Karaha, and the Head of the Department of Justice,
Institutional Reform and Human Rights, Jean Marie Emungu, in a report sent to the Governor of
South Kivu. A feature common to all these incidents is the attempt to cover up all traces
immediately. Ugandan troops carried out similar massacres in Beni on 14 November, with an
unconfirmed death toll of 60 civilians.8
113. The attacks on the defenceless civilian population during the dispute between Ugandan
and Rwandan soldiers in Kisangani in August, which claimed 30 civilian lives, and later attacks
on Beni and Rutshuru were also a violation of the rules of international humanitarian law.
Arson and destruction
114. In incidents mostly, though not always, unconnected to the massacres, RCD forces have
set fire to and destroyed many villages.
Deportations
115. Mai-Mai and other persons have been arrested during military operations and transported
to Rwanda and Uganda, where they usually disappear without a trace.
Mutilation
116. The Special Rapporteur received many reports of mutilation and, in at least one case, was
able to verify it. During his mission in February, he met an 18-year-old man, arrested along with
another young man by Rwandan soldiers in a village in South Kivu on suspicion of collaborating
with the Mai-Mai. The first man’s genitals were cut off completely and he was abandoned in the
jungle, from where he was later rescued, although he was left with irreparable physical damage.
His comrade died when his heart was torn out.
Rape of women as a means of warfare
117. The Special Rapporteur received reports of rapes of women in Kabamba, Katana, Lwege,
Karinsimbi and Kalehe. There were also reports of women being raped by Ugandan soldiers in
towns in Orientale province.
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 35
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A. The armed conflict
118. Since 2 August 1998, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been
living through a war started by a movement known as the Congolese Rally for Democracy
(RCD), which subsequently split in two and is supported by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and
Burundi (countries the Security Council calls “uninvited”). A new rebel movement, the
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), was formed later on. Faced with this
situation, the Government of the Democratic Republic had to request help, in accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter, from the armies of five other countries: Zimbabwe, Chad, the Sudan,
Angola and Namibia. The presence of these armies, in addition to the involvement of various
militias, i.e. the Interahamwe, the Mai Mai, the former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the Front
pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD) and the Lord’s Resistance Army, has created a climate
of great insecurity. Conflicts which should be characterized as international are thus going on in
the country at the same time as others which are internal in nature. The parties have all
committed serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as murders and attacks on
the civilian population, including the rape of non-combatant women.
B. Violations of international humanitarian
law committed by Government forces
119. The most serious acts have been the bombing of civilian populations by the Congolese
Armed Forces and its Zimbabwean and Chadian allies (Kisangani, Gemena, Zongo, Libenge,
Goma, Bunga) and reprisals against the civilian population in Bunga and Gemena.
C. Violations of international humanitarian law committed
by the rebel forces allied with the uninvited countries
120. In reprisal for attacks on those the Congolese population calls “aggressors” and
“Rwandan soldiers”, RCD forces have retaliated by massacring defenceless civilian populations
with machetes, knives and guns, causing thousands of victims, most notoriously in Chipaho,
Lemera, Makobola, Burhale, Musinga, Bashali, Lukweti, Budaha, Walungu, Mwenga,
Mikondero, Kamituga, Budaha, Burhinyi, Ngweshe, Kigulube, Kibizi, Buyankiri, Kasala,
Kalambi, Kahungwe, Kashambi, Kalami and Chifunze.
D. Human rights violations attributed to the Kinshasa Government
121. The continued application of the death penalty, which President Kabila justifies by the
need to guarantee the population’s security, even though he describes himself as abolitionist; the
existence of a Military Court (COM) which does not guarantee the rights of the accused;
continuous attacks on the independent press (the arrest of journalists, raids on printers,
summonses, the use of Mobutu-era freedom-killing legislation); the systematic use of torture;
and the practice of enforced disappearance and summary executions appear to be the most
serious violations. On the positive side, the Minister of Human Rights has tried to make
improvements in some specific areas and a solution was found for “persons at risk” (those of
Tutsi appearance, who had to be protected to prevent reprisals by the population); a national
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 36
human rights plan of action has been prepared with the participation of the main human rights
organizations; and, in November, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was
authorized to visit detention centres.
E. Human rights violations in RCD-controlled territory
122. The most striking thing in the territory occupied by the “rebel or aggressor” forces is the
prevailing atmosphere of terror and an increasingly stronger feeling of rejection of those in
power. The people of the area feel humiliated. The right to life is constantly being violated, but
so are all the public liberties, such as the right to freedom of association, assembly, expression
and opinion. There are no independent news media and the few that did exist, such as
Radio Maendeleo, were banned. Any dissent or opposition is presented as “attempted
genocide”. The deportation of prisoners to Rwanda and Uganda is a particularly serious matter.
It is also symptomatic that the latest RCD/Goma structural adjustment eliminated all public
human rights organizations. The one positive aspect is that the death penalty, which is provided
for by law, is not being applied.
F. The situation of human rights advocates
123. In the two parts into which the country is divided, the situation of human rights advocates
is particularly serious. The annexes contain several specific examples of violations of their
rights to freedom of association, expression and assembly, as well as of their rights to life,
physical integrity and liberty of person. In the opinion of President Kabila, NGOs should be
regarded as “political parties”. For the Governor of South Kivu, civil society is a grouping of
extremist political parties funded by the Kinshasa secret services.
G. The right to democracy in Government-controlled territory
124. An analysis of Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/57 of 27 April 1999 on the
promotion of the right to democracy, whose existence the Special Rapporteur has supported in
all his reports since 1994, shows not only that this right does not exist in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, but that nothing has been done to guarantee it.
125. The rights to freedom of opinion and expression, thought, conscience and association and
assembly are being violated and only the right to freedom of religion may be considered to be
applicable. Political parties are banned (unless they are in conformity with a new law which
does not meet democratic requirements) and, in their place, People’s Power Committees (CPPs)
have been systematically set up with State funding and ideological support; they are no more
than an extension of the State itself for the implementation of its policies and they have also been
authorized to organize armed neighbourhood militias known as People’s Self-Defence Forces
(FAPs).
126. The human right to receive and impart information and ideas is being violated and is
subject to harsh penalties of arrest, trial (even by the Military Court), prohibition on leaving the
country and torture.
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E/CN.4/2000/42
page 37
127. The rule of law is applicable only to private individuals, not to the Head of State, who has
arrogated to himself the most absolute discretionary powers, in accordance with Decree-Law
No. 3 of 1997, which concentrates all executive and legislative powers and the majority of
judicial powers in his hands. There are no effective remedies for the protection of the
fundamental freedoms and security of citizens.
128. The right to vote has not been restored and nothing has come of any of the
announcements made, even before the attack of 2 August 1998 in the eastern part of the country.
129. The right to political participation on terms of equality has also not been restored.
According to the new law on political parties, only those which are authorized by the Ministry of
the Interior may take part in politics. In the “national debate” called for by the Government, only
the issues proposed by the President may be discussed.
130. The Government continues to have a stranglehold on government institutions. Even
ministers of State, judges, soldiers of all ranks and senior public officials have been sent to
prison, often without trial, thus showing that power is being exercised non-transparently, with
the most absolute impunity.
131. The Congolese people does not enjoy the right to choose its system of government and
the “national debate” proclaimed by the President is restricted to the issues he proposes.
132. The right of citizens to have access, on terms of equality, to public service is not
recognized.
H. The right to democracy under RCD
133. In RCD-controlled territory, there are no parties, no freedom of expression, information,
association, assembly or political participation and no right to vote. People do not even have the
right to criticize what they see as “foreign aggression and occupation”. Only RCD is authorized
and it is effectively a party-State. The population has endured terrible political humiliations,
such as the changing of the flag without consultation and the declaration of the “twinning” of the
Rwandan capital, Kigali, and the territory of South Kivu, which is even seeking autonomy for
itself.
I. The Lusaka Peace Agreement
134. Following many attempts at peace, the Lusaka Peace Agreement was signed on 10 July,
but signed by RCD only on 31 August. It contains both military and political agreements and
provides for observer participation by countries (Zambia) and organizations (OAU and the
United Nations). The Ceasefire Agreements have not been observed, since fighting and troop
mobilizations have continued, the militias have not been disarmed and the massacres have gone
on. Worse still, the parties have continued to use warlike language, in increasingly louder tones
every day, thereby undermining the participation of the so-called “international community”,
which, apart from civil society in the two parts of the territory, so far appears to be the only one
interested in the Agreement’s success. Since the date of signing, however, there have been no
major changes in territorial positions.
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E/CN.4/2000/42
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135. The political commitments provided for in the Agreement have also not been
implemented: the facilitator for the Congolese components of the Agreement has not yet been
appointed and President Kabila’s Government refuses to hold an all-inclusive “national
dialogue” (inter-Congolese political negotiations) on the future of the country with the
participation of widely recognized political parties and civil society, preferring instead a
“national debate” limited to the issues it is prepared to discuss.
136. None of the agreements provided for in the Lusaka Agreement was implemented within
the time limits set and most of them have still not been implemented.
137. The joint mission to investigate violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law committed during the 1996-1997 war has still not been able to begin its activities, as the
Commission on Human Rights requested, because the required security measures have not been
taken.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Respect for the peace process
138. The parties involved must fully implement the Peace Agreement, both in its military
aspects (halt to warlike language; disarming of militias; withdrawal of all foreign troops, whether
invited or “uninvited”; respect for the inviolability of borders; a proper ceasefire; and security for
movements of United Nations and OAU observer and auxiliary staff; etc.) and in its political
aspects.
139. With regard to the political agreements, the appointment of a facilitator cannot continue
to be put off, especially as the Special Rapporteur found that there was broad consensus on the
San Egidio community, which meets all the requirements of recognized moral and intellectual
standing, credibility and experience provided for in the Agreement.
B. Democracy
140. The restoration of democracy is essential and urgent. To this end, the political parties
and NGOs organized in accordance with the law in force at the time of their establishment must
be respected and must take part in any serious process of reconciliation and democratization.
Democracy is built by peoples or by no one.
141. In the east, RCD must accept the fact that it is not popular with the Congolese people and
must allow organizations in which the people is represented to operate. It cannot continue seeing
every opponent as a perpetrator of genocide or as an instigator of ethnic hatred. It cannot go on
adopting measures which anger the population, such as the twinning of Kigali and South Kivu
and the change of flag.
142. Human rights, especially liberty of person and the freedoms of expression, opinion and
association, must be restored in the two parts into which the war has divided the territory, since
their enjoyment today seems more like a concession from the authorities than an enforceable
- 44 -
ANNEX 1.6
MONUC, Special report on the events in Ituri, January 2002-December 2003,
document S/2004/573, 16 July 2004
- 45 -
- 46 -
United Nations
• Security Council Distr.: General
16 July 2004
Original: English
Letter dated 16 July 2004 from the Secretary-General addressed to
the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to transmit to you a report from the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, regarding the
events which occurred in lturi, in the north-eastern part of the country, from January
2002 to December 2003.
I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate my grave concern about the
continuing human rights abuses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in
particular the impunity with regard to crimes committed against the citizens of that
country. As the Security Council has noted in several of its resolutions and
presidential statements pertaining to the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
impunity must be brought to an end, and perpetrators of crimes such as those
highlighted in the attached report brought to justice.
I should be grateful in you would make this letter and the report available to
the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
04-43063 (E) 050804 1•1•••••••
S12o041s13
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S/2004/573
Special report on the events in lturi,
January 2002-December 2003
Contents
2
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
I. Summary .............. .. .. ... . .. . ...... . ..... . .. .. .. .... . ........... .
II. Introduction: the lturi district ................. . .... . .... . . . ... . .... . . ... .
m. · Background to the conrnct ..... .. .. ...... .. . .. ...... . . ......... : : .. . : . . .
IV. Methodology of the investigation ......... . .... ... . ....... . .. . . . ... . ..... .
V. Most serious human rights abuses committed in lturi district from January 2002
to 31 December 2003 . . .... ... .. .. ...... .. . ............................ .
A. Ethnically targeted attacks . . .. . . .. . . ..... . . . ... ... ... : . . . .. . . .. ... . .
B. Other mass killings .............. . ................ . .... . .. . . . . . . . . .
C. Political killings, abduction and forced displacement of suspected opponents.
l. Political killings, enforced disappearances, illegal arrest and forced
displacement of selected persons by UPC . ....... ... .... .. ........ .
2. Political killings, illegal arrest and forced displacement of selected
persons by FA PC . . . ... . .. .. ... . .. . ... .. ... .. .... . .. . . .. .. .. .. .
D. Children associated with armed groups . ... . .. . .... . .. . .. ... .... ...... .
I. A profile of children associated with armed groups in Jturi: fighting
for survival ............. . . .... ..................... . ......... .
2. Training of children ....... . ....... . ........................... .
3. Use of children in combat and attacks .................... . ... . ... .
4. Presence and use of girls in armed groups . . . . .... .. .. ..... . . ...... .
5. Use of children by armed groups in the exploitation of natural
resources: a vicious circle ..... . . ....... .. ..... ... . ..... . .... . . . .
6. Prospects for separating children from armed groups .... .... . . . . ... .
VI. Conclusion and recommendations ... . ... . . .. . . . . . ..... . ..... . .... . .. .. ... .
Annexes
1-11
12-16
17,-3 I
32-34
35-158
41-94
95-117
118-137
119-132
133-137
138- 158
141-146
147-148
149-150
151-154
155
156-158
159-161
4
6
·s
14
15
16
29
34
34
38
39
40
42
42
43
44
44
45
I. Armed and political groups involved in the Ituri conflict 47
ll. Chronology of main political events and incidents of gross violations of human rights
in lturi, 1998 to 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Maps
lturi district . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Collecliviles of Djugu and lrumu territories .... ..... .. .. . . . .. . .. . 64
Main military camps where children were trained or present. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
... ·-··--··----
- 48 -
Abbreviations
AFDL
APC
ASADHO
FAC
FAPC
FJPJ
FLC
FNI
FPDC
FRPI
ICRC
IRIN
MLC
MONUC
MSF
PRA
PUSIC
RCD
RCD-K/ML
RCD-N
UPC
UPDF
Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo
Armee populaire congolaise
Association africaine de defense des droits de l'homme
Forces armees congolaises
Forces armees du peuple congolais
Front pour I' integration et la paix en lturi
Front de liberation du Congo
Front nationaliste integrationniste
Forces populaires pour la democratie au Congo
Front de resistance patriotique de l'Ituri
International Committee of the Red Cross
Integrated Regional Information Network
Mouvement de liberation du Congo
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Medecins sans fronrieres (Doctors without Borders)
People's Redemption Army
Parti pour !'unite et la sauvegarde de I 'integrite du Congo
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratic
RCD-Kisangani/Mouvement de liberation
RCD-National
Union des patriotes congolais
Ugandan People 's Defence Forces
S/2004/573
3
- 49 -
S/20041573
4
I. Summary
I. The lturi district. located in the Orientale Province of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, currently has one of the world's worst - and for a long time largely
ignored - human rights records. Based on the investigations carried out by
MO UC and other human rights entities, it is estimated that 8.000 civilians.
probably more. were deliberately killed or were the victims of indiscrim inate use of
force from January 2002 to December 2003. The exact number of female victims of
rape or sexual slavery is impossible to estimate at this time . Countless women were
abducted and became --war wives··. while others were raped or sexually abused
before being released. More than 600.000 civilians have been forced to flee their
homes. Thousands of children aged from 7 to 17 were drawn forcibly or voluntari ly
into armed groups, placing their very lives at risk and depriving them of a
childhood. [n addition, entire villages - belonging to all the different ethnic
groups - were destroyed, including health and education facilities, housing and
other infrastructure.
2. These abuses have been carried out with total impunity by all lturi armed
groups and several non-lturi groups (MLC, RCD. RCD-ML. RCD-N). In addition,
the pre-transition Government in Kinshasa and the Governinents of Rwanda and
Uganda all contributed to the massive abuses by arming, training and advising local
armed groups at different times.
3. The European Union-led Interim Emergency Multinational Force (Operation
Artemis) and then the MONUC lturi Brigade with a mandate from the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, have been
instrumental in reducing the intensity of the conflict and the capacity of tht: local
groups to operate. However, ending the violence and abuses. bridging the gaps
between communities to install and extend a lasting peace, and establishing
structures to strengthen human rights protection and reduce the total impunity
enjoyed by the perpetrators remain major challenges, which the international
community must assist the Government of the Democratic Republ ic of the Congo to
address. Though there have been timid attempts to restore some kind of State
presence in Jturi through the deployment of a small group of judges and police,
neither currently has the capacity to maintain law and order in the district. It is
therefore of vital importance that MON UC continues to have a Chapter VII mandate
to ensure security.
4 . There have long been tensions and conflict between the Hema and Lendu
communities in the district, fuelled by bad governance. The latest conflict - which
has provoked so many of the abuses - was sparked off by a particular land dispute
in 1998 when some Hema cvm:essionaires 1 took advantage of the weakened State
apparatus to illegally enlarge their estates to the detriment of neighbouring mostly
Lendu agriculturalists.~ The agriculturalists revolted when law enforcement agents
came to evict them and in response they tried to destroy the land of the Hema
concessionaires. Initially starting to the north of Bunia, this violence gradually
1 T he concessionaire is the person who rents a concession from the Siate. The conccssinn is
dtdined by law as a contract by which the State n::c,)gnizcs the right of an individual or
o rganization. under conditions defined by law. tn u c a piece of land or a building belonging to
the State. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo. a ll land llelongs to the St;itc.
1 The lirst conflict crupt.:d in the col!ec11\·ire nf Walt:ndu Pirsi. localed in Ujugu tl.' rritor} .
- 50 -
extended to the whole of lturi district. Moreover, while spreading through the
district, the conflict quickly turned into a confrontation opposing the two
communities. the Hema and the Lendu. This conflict would not have reached such a
level of violence without the involvement of national Congolese players, as well as
of foreign Governments. The Ugandan army, already present in Jturi since late 1998,
fuelled the conflict by initially supporting some Hema notables and allegedly
bombed hundreds of Lendu villages. Some Lendu traditional authorities created
self-defence units. Believing that a Hema conspiracy existed against them, the
Lendu militias began attacking Hema villages solely on account of their ethnicity.
They also benefited from external support to organize themselves, from either the
Congolese (pre-transition Government, rebel movements) or individual Ugandan
officers.
5. The conflict entered a new phase of violence at the end of 200 I with the
intensification of ethnically targeted attacks on villages. including killings, torture.
rape of civilians, looting of homes, and destruction of social infrastructure. When
the Hema militia UPC took over Bunia, first in August 2002 and again in May 2003,
they adopted an ethnic cleansing policy, to empty the town of its Lendu and Bira
populations, as well as the "non-lturian" Nande community, which was a
commercial rival to the Hema businessmen. Hundreds of Lendu villages were
completely destroyed during attacks by Ugandan army helicopters together with
Hema militia on the ground.
6. Different rebel faction leaders struggling for political power in lturi have
continued to profit from the ethnic resentment originally created by the land dispute.
A series of splits, from 1999 to mid-2003, have in fact resulted in Bunia, the capital
of lturi, being the stage for repeated power struggles and skirmishes_ At each stage
in the fragmentation of the rebel groups, new militias were recruited loyal to one or
another commander or faction leader. Often half of the militias were children. They
were deployed not only to fight each other but also to whip up insecurity in the
countryside and seize strategic localities and commercial opportunities. Ugandan
army commanders already present in lturi, instead of trying to calm the situation,
preferred to benefit from the situation and support alternately one side or the otherJ
according to their political and financial interests.
7. The chiefs of armed groups took over the roles traditionally held by
administrators, businessmen, traditional chiefs and law enforcement officers. They
appointed "public officers'', collected local raxes, sold the natural resources of their
area of control, arrested civilians, judged them and in some cases executed them.
The competition for the control of natural resources by combatant forces,
exacerbated by an almost constant political vacuum in the region. has been a major
factor in prolonging the crisis in lturi. Those resources have also been of continued
interest to foreign business networks in the region. One source of revenue for rebel
groups has been the sale of concessions to foreign businesses.
8_ By the end of March 2004. at the time of finalization of this report, MONUC
had been able to lessen the inter-ethnic conflict of lturi, acting to enforce peace and
to restore the rule of law. Since taking over from Operation Artemis on I September
2003, the MONUC lturi Brigade has implemented its Chapter VII mandate by
consolidating its positions in Bunia, carrying out search operations which resulted in
3 Ugandan authorities alternately supported and provided W<!apons tu RCD-ML. MLC. RCD-N.
UPC. PUSIC. FNI and FAPC.
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the declaration of Bunia as a weapon-free zone. and establishing seven outposts.
north, north-east, south and south-cast oi Bunia (lga Barriere. Bogoro. Mongbwalu.
Marabo, Tchomia, Mahagi and Kpandroma). MON UC continues to implement
security measures such as patrolling and launching military operations in different
parts of lturi.
9. To reinforce the rule of Jaw and ensure public order. MONUC has detained
suspects including the Chief of Staff of FNI Mathieu Ngudjolo. and several senior
military personnel of UPC, including Aimable Saba Rafiki and Etienne Nembe.
Those actions were taken given the lack of local judicial and security structures.
including a functioning judiciary and prison facility. On I 4 January, MON UC
transported to Bunia 12 out of 20 judicial personnel appointed by the Transitional
Government. The judges took their oath of office on 28 January 2004. thereby
allowing them to work legally in Bunia. A minimum judicial capacity has thus been
restored in Bunia.
10. However, since mid-January 2004. F. I and UPC. as well as FAPC, a militia
J()cated along the Ugandan border in Aru. have become increasingly aggressive
towards MONUC and the civilian population. In mid-January 2004, as many as 200
civilians were killed in Gobu. located on the edge of Lake Albert. By the end of
March 2004, MONUC' was still inve!\ligating the incident with the aim of
ascertaining the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. This was the most
serious mass killing since the events of Kachele in October 2003 . After the incidents
in Gobu, militias conducted several attacks on MON\JC aircraft and patrols, the
most serious being the killing on 12 February of a MON UC military obst>rver in an
ambush by unidentified militia elements on a convoy of vehicles returning from a
multidisciplinary investigation 20 km north-east of Bunia.
11. This report has been drafted by the MONUC Human Rights and Child
Protection Sections. It examines more closely the background to the conflict and
gives details of many cases of massacres and other abuses often committed during
attacks on villages. It includes information about political killings, harassment of
political opponents, and the recruitment and use of children in armed groups from
January 2002 to December 2003 . The report also highlights the total impunity with
which the armed groups have committed these atrocities . It is not intended as a
political analysis of the situation. and is by no means a complete record of abuses in
the area, given the scale of violations and abo the consrraints on carrying out such
investigations, inc luding continuing security concerns.
II. Introduction: the Jturi district
6
12. The region of lturi is a district of the Orientale Province, bordering Uganda,
with a population of 3_5 million to 5.5 million - - 110 census ha been carried out for
years. The population is made up of l 8 ethnic groups. including the: Lendu and its
southern sub-clan, the Ngiti; the Hema and its northern sub-clan. the Hema/Gegere;
the Bira, the Alur, the Ne.lo Okebo. the Lugbaru, the Mambissa and the Nyali.
Population figures vary greatly, but the Alur consider themselves the largest ethnic
group, which would represent up to 25 per cent of the lturi population, followed by
the Lendu. No reliable population census by ethnic grouping is available at this
- -~ .. -·---·--~-------
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time. The city of Bunia, which had approximately 100,000 inhabitants before the
conflict,4 is said to have doubled, owing to displacement created by the conflict.
13. lturi district, wilh its capital at Bunia. is composed of Five territories: Aru.
Mahagi, Mambasa, Djugu and lrumu. Each territory is divided into several
col/ectivites.5 The Hema/Gegere and Lendu groups are concentrated i11 Djugu
territory, while the Hema and Ngiti groups are found in lrumu territor)'. The territory
of Djugu, where the conflict erupted, is composed of 10 c:ollecrivitest, -- three
Len du, three Hema and four of other ethnic groups - plus the city of Mongbwalu,
which has a special administrative status. Djugu territory is thl~ richest and most
densely populated territory, with around 700,000 persons. The territory of lrumu,
embroiled in the conflict by the end of 2001 , is composed of 12 colle .. :rivires - one
Ngiti (Walendu Bindi), and four Hema (Bahema Sud, Bahema Boga. Bahema
Mitego and Bahema d ' Irumu); the remainder are of other ethnic groups.7 The
Administrator of a territory is appointed by the Government. but works very closely
with the traditional chieftains of each col/ectivite. The Administrat(lr reports to the
Governor of the province. based in Kisangani, who is the only one with the power to
remove the Chief of the col/ectfrite.
14. The population of lturi is for the most part agriculturalist. with a significant
minority engaged in livestock raising, fishing and commerce. Generally speaking,
the Hema are perceived to be associated with livestock raising. while the Lendu are
perceived to be associated with agriculture. The Hema population of Oahema Boga.
in lrumu territory, is agriculturalist, however. During the Belgian colonial era, some
Hema were favoured, notably through access to either the religious hierarchy or the
education system. and given much wider access to managerial fur1ctions, while the
Lendu were overwhelmingly treated as manual labour. In facr, the colonial
administration accentuated social inequalities between the ethnic groups in the
region through its ethnic 'favouritism" in almost all fields. including the
administration and the Catholic clergy. /\s a result. some Hema remained as the elite
in lturi upon the collapse of the t:olonial State.
15. The power struggles and ethnic prejudices became entangled with the land
issue. Most of the land of the Lendu col/ectivites of Walendu Pitsi and Walendu
Djatsi are divided into concessions belonging to a select few Hema community
members who employed Lcndu manual labour. However, in the poorer and rural
areas, both Hema and Lendu communities generally coexisted peacefully. and
intermarriage was common.8 The concessions belonging to the colonialists but
~ This figure is given by the former Mayor of Bunia town. uilbert Sugabo Ngulaho. who was in
office until May 2003.
• The collectivites are administrative sub-districts with a traditional chieftain. who exercises
authority over the population in his area on the basis of tribal/ethnic allegiances. Chieftains are
hereditary among the Hema. Bira and Alur groups but elected among l.cndu and Ndo Okebo
groups. The collectivires are divided into groupt'me111s. and 15rouperne,us into localit~s.
6 Walendu Pitsi. Walendu Djatsi. Walendu Tatsi. Banyari Kilo. Mambisa. Mabendi. do Okebo.
Bahema Banywagi, Bahema Nord and Bahcma liadjcrc.
7 Other co/lectivites are Andisoma (Bira population). Baboa-Bokoe. Babe le be, Ranyari-1 chabi.
Ra~i li , Mobal:i and Wale · Vonkutu
• A statement of a Hema woman quoted by IRIN and reported by Jacques Depelchin. a reb1:I
ollicial involved in reconciliation efforts in 1999. summari1es the situation; "War is not between
llema and Lendu. but between the rich Hema and rhe rest of us".
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located in Lendu collecrivires. mostly in the territory of Djugu,'' were utilized
according to an agreement between the two parties, where the foreign
concessionaires would have access to the land in return for special fee paid to the
traditional Chief of the co//ecrivile.10 In 1973, when the foreign concessionnaires
were forced to leave, they entrusted their Hema managers with the task of taking
care of their land, hoping to come back once the ·'Zairianization·· was over. 11 After a
while, since the foreign concessionnaires were not authorized to come back, the
managers registered the concessions in their own names. This phenomenon was
accelerated after President Mobutu's appointment as Minister of Agriculture in 1969
of Zbo Kalogi. a Hema, who had considerable influence on the distribution of
Jturian concessions to Hema. This succession of events Jed to a common Lendu
perception that the Hema population was the rich. educated class that not only had
unjustly accumulated land and control of commerce, but also constituted the
administrative class, with greater access to wealth. education and political power.
16. Ituri 's natural wealth has driven the conflict in the district. Apart from the
region·s farmland and forests, most notably coffee plantations, and valuable crossborder
trade, lturi is the home of the Kilo Moto gold field. one of the world's
largest. Of added interest are potential large oil reserves in the Lake Albert basin.
The competition for control of resource-rich centres such as Mongbwalu, Gcty and
Mabanga (gold fields} and Arn, Mahagi, Tchomia and Kasenyi (wood. fishing,
customs revenues) by the combatant forces and their allies - Uganda, Rwanda and
rhe Kinshasa authorities - has been a major factor in the prolongation of the crisis
since they provide those who control production and export with very considerable
profits.
III. Background to the conflict
8
17. During the year 1997, several Hema/Gegere concessiunnaires extended the
limits of their territory by bribing the land authorities and getting the registration
certificates without obtaining the atleslarion de vacance delivered after a vacancy
investigation carried out by the local land authorities as requested by law. This
illegal act was given a legal patina by being secretly lodged with the court. In 1999,
after the two-year statute of limitations on the appeal against the auestation had run
out. the petitioner went to the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Bunia and obtained an
enforcement order to evict the population living on that illegally acquired territory,
if necessary using military force . Had these evictions been executed, they would
have resulted in a total of 200,000 Lendu inhabitants having to leave their land and
homes. Evictions were never fully carried out by law enforcement forces because
the Lendu revolted and destroyed and occupied many estates as a result.
18. These local problems would not have turned into massive slaughter without
the involvement of national and foreign players. In 1998, the lturi district was taken
over by the RCD rebel movement, supported by the Ugandan and Rwandan armies.
~ Djugu is by far the richest agricultural area of lturi.
10 Obligations included the paying of special taxes 10 the local aulhorities, paying for local labour
and taking care of !;Ocial infrastructures.
11 The Zairianization was a policy based on the appropriation of all goods belonging to foreign
nationals and their transfer to Congolese nationals as administrators of the goods in the name of
the State.
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When RCD split into RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda. and RCD-ML, backed by
Uganda, lturi came under the control of RCD-ML. Since then. lturi has been at the
crossroads of all the eastern players. both Congolese and foreigners: RCD-ML.
MLC and its proxy RCD-N, as well as the Ugandan army. In 2002, RCD-Goma
made an alliance with UPC, following contacts between this militia and Kigali.
Simultaneously, the pre-transition Government supported some rival militias
through Beni. Moreover. at the end of 2002. MLC and RCD-N coordinated part of
their offensive against RCD-ML with UPC. The lasting involvement of national and
foreign players has enabled the various lturi militias to obtain supplies and to
increase the number of combatants. This interaction has led to a regularly increasing
level of violence against the civilian populations of lturi since 1999.
I 9. In 1999, when the land dispute erupted, lturi was under the control of the rebel
RCD-ML movement and its ally UPDF. In May 1999 six land disputes emerged, one
after the other, in the collectivite of Walendu Pitsi. 12 Witnesses interviewed by
MONUC stated that, under the leadership of the Savo family, the concessionaires
began to organize militias around Fataki. They imposed a fund-raising system on the
Hema/Gegere businessmen. Two prominent Hema/Gegere businessmen who were
opposing the fund-raising were murdered. As the collegial leadership of this militia
was expecting violence, all of the Hema concessionnaires. by the end of May 1999.
contracted squads of UPDF soldiers to protect their land. On 29 May 1999,
important Hema families reportedly paid Captain Kyakabale, the UPDF sector
commander, 13 the alleged amount of $12.000 for a punitive action to be undertaken
against the populations occupying their concessions and surrounding areas in the
collectivite Walendu Pitsi. and to arrest the Administrator of Djugu territory,
Christian Dhedonga Nganga-Lolo. because of his refusal to sign the attestation de
vacance a posteriori .14 Christian Dhedonga Nganga-Lolo was arrested by UPDF the
same day together with Longbe Chabi, the traditional Chief of Walendu Pitsi, the
President of the Conseil de collectivite and five other local notables, and they were
kept in a container in Bunia airport- Apart from the Administrator, who was
accompanied by Congolese police, they were all reportedly tortured because of their
refusal to sign the attestation de vacance. They were subsequently released. Later,
the Lendu Chief of the groupemem of Pitsi, Chief Djiba, was allegedly executed on
the orders of one of the Hema concessionaires. UPDF carried out its first attacks on
the village of Loda, located between Fataki and Libi, in 1he night of 29 to 30 May
1999. burning it down and burning alive several elderly persons and women locked
in their houses. Later, the villages of Lubea, Buba, Giba, Linga. Ladejo, Petro and
Arr were reportedly all destroyed by UPDF forces under the command of Captain
Kyakabale, who was reportedly paid by Lobo Tasoro. and several Hema
concessionnaires. UPDF, together with Hema militias, continued their punitive
12 On 12 April 1999, land dispute: between Kadjo Singa and 1111: pupulaliun ofGonsenge in the
concession of Leyina; on 14 May 1999. land dispute in the Lcyina concession. where witnesses
interviewed by MONUC alleged that the Singa family paid PDF to attack. the Lendu on its
land. as a result of which 20 civilians were killed; May l 999. land dispute between the
concessionaire Abisayi (Hema) and the population of the locality of Londju ( Lcndu): May 1999,
land dispute among the concessionaire Yasona (Hema) and the l.endu population of l.audjo;
I May I 999. land dispute between the Savo family ( Hema) and 1hc l.endu population of
Sanduku in the concession of Bidha: 28 May 1999. land dispute between the concessionaire
Ugaro and the population of omba. in the loca lity of ·1supu Lihi. chef lieu of Walendu Pitsi.
13 Captain Kyakabale subsequently left lJPDF and took refuge in Rwanda.
14 In spite of the fact that he was a Hema like the estate (1\\ ncrs.
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10
actions, burning down villages of first the collectivite of Walendu of Pitsi, then of
Walendu Djatsi, from 1999 to the end of 200 I .
20. The new administrative authorities paid little attention to the deteriorating
situation and the Governor of the time. Adele Lotsove, a Hema/Gegere installed by
General Kazini of UPDF in June 1999, took action to put down the Lendu revolt
using UPDF soldiers. Some Lendu tried to request justice by legal means, as the
tribunals in Bunia found in favour of the concessionnaires who had bribed them
generously. Subsequent efforts to contain the inc reasing inter-community violence
were frustrated by individuals from both communities interested in the continuation
of the conflict. Moreover. several concessionnaires were able to profit from the
conflict to increase their land, s ince the Lendu living close to their estates were
evicted and their villages destroyed.
21. The collectivite of Walendu Tatsi where the Hema and L~ndu communities
were living in peace became involved in the conflict only late in 2001. 15 In 2002,
important Hema South families were reportedly involved in financing the
involvement of UPDF in attacking the col/ectivite of Walendu Bindi, the only Ngibi
co/lectivite located in lrumu territory. Hundreds of localities were destroyed by
UPDF and the Hema South militias. Meanwhi le, the Lendu were organizing
themselves into armed groups to take revenge. The Ugandan military trained
thousands of Hema youth in lturi and in Uganda. After 2002. others were reportedly
trained in Rwanda. However, the Hema militiamen were not the only ones to carry
weapons; in some Hema localities such as Mandro and Bogoro each family was
reportedly given weapons to defend itself. This was one of the reasons given by
Lendu combatants to justify the massacre of civilians suspc1.:ted of carrying
weapons.
22. The Institut superieur pedagogique and the Catholic Church of Bunia had been
the locus of the power struggle between the Hema intellectual elite and other ethnic
groups for some time. For example, while the Institute was under the direction of
Tharcisse Pila Kamaragi, from 1993 to 1997 until the arrival of AFDL, most of the
non-lturians, who constituted the majority of the teaching staff, were forced to leave
and all new posts were allocated to Hema/Gegere professors to the detriment of
other groups. According to testimony offered by several intellectuals living in the
Mudzipela area of Bunia. some well known Hema/Gegere professors at the Institute
were reportedly holding regular secret meetings, sometimes together with Hema/
Gegere militia members, in order to decide strategies 10 create ethnic hatred. The
same sources indicated that the killing of some 200 Lendu inhabitants of Mudzipela
on 19 January 200 I was organized and even directed by the same group with the
15 According to sources in the administration of Walendu Tatsi, a total of 257 localities were
burned down from 2000 to the end of 2002 alone. It appears that virtually all localities of
Walendu Pitsi were already burned down in I 999.
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complicity of UPDF under the command of Edison Muzora. 16 The Catholic Church
is often named by the inhabitants of Bunia as .. pro-Hema··. This perception dates to
the period of Leonard Dhejju. the Hema Bishop of Bunia, 17 who not only favoured
his own ethnic group within the Church but who had also reportedly been in close
contact with Hema militia commanders. 18 His activities allegedly included
transferring money collected from members of the Hema community to their own
bank accounts in a private bank in Kigali and negotiating with the Rwandan
authorities to buy weapons and obtain military training for Hema militia members in
Rwanda. Bishop Dhejju was reportedly present at the first meeting between Chief
Kawa and the Rwandan military authorities in June 2002. Bishop Dhejju was asked
to resign by the Vatican in 2002, and he is now living in Kigali. Following the
decision to remove Bishop Dhejju. Monseigneur Mosengwa Basinya arrived in
Bunia on 7 April 2002 with a newly named Apostolic Administrator of Nande
ethnicity, Janvier Kataka. While the Church was preparing to officially announce the
leadership change, the largely Hema audience became aggressive and the
installation of the Apostolic Administrator was forcibly delayed. On 11 April,
Archbishop Mosengwa, together with a group of priests, were taken hostage by a
group of Hema youth including some brought from Katoto village by the
businessman Liripa Savo_ The day after, the Archbishop left together with the new
appointee_
23. Having fled to the bush after the destruction of their villages between 1999
and 200 I, the Lendu people of Djugu, and later those of Irumu, chose to take justice
into their own hands- Their reprisals resulted in the massacre of thousands of
innocent Hema civilians. They replaced their arrows and machetes from the first
period of the conflict with modern weapons that they were able to buy mostly from
Uganda, using the illegal mining revenues of the Mongbwalu gold field . They also
received weapons from the Kinshasa government via some members of RCD-ML
hailing from Ituri, and some Ugandan authorities. One well known Ugandan
supporter and reputed weapon-provider of Lendu combatants was Colonel Peter
16 On 19 January 2001. the day after an attack launched by Lcndu militia on UPDF forces based in
Bunia airport reportedly to destroy the helicopter bombing their villages, an organized massacre
of Lcndu inhabitants was carried out in Mudzipcla. Each Lcndu family was visited, house by
house_ by Hema of Bunia and approximately 250 persons were killed, mostly hy sticks with
nails distributed before the attack. and their houses set on fire . Several witnesses from
Mudzipela gave the names of Hema professors of the lnsiitut supericur pedagogique of Bunia as
the organizers. and the chief of the operations was reportedly also a professor. Among the
victims were also several Lendu professors and students of the Institute. Since this incident. all
Lendu have left Mudzipela: there are neither Lendu students nor teachers at the Institute.
Just before the massacre. Colonel Muzora reportedly said in a public speech: .. From now on, we
can start killing Lcndu .. _
17 Monseigneur Dhcjju, a Hema/Gcgerc. was the Bishop of Bunia from 1976 to 2002. He was
accused of having favoured his own ethnic group. giving the Church land of Mudzipela to
members of the Hema/Gegerc tribe from the villages and nominating only Hema or Hema/
Gcgere priests. It is as a result of his action that Mudzipela, originally inhabited by Bira, began
to be a Hema neighbourhood_ Also, several students of theology who had successfully finished
their studies were never appointed. apparently because they were not Hema. When he was
forced to resign by the Catholic hierarchy, there were only 6 Lendu and 2 Bira priests out of 49
priests appointed by him . Among the priests that he appoinled there were also sons of the Hema
militia chiefs_
18 The Bishop of Goma has reportedly very close links with the Rwandan authorities. He was the
one who introduced Bishop Dhcjju to them.
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12
Karim, an Alur omcial of UPDF. Otherwise. most of the UPDF officers continued to
support UPC.
24. In August 2002, UPDF forced the RCD-ML military forct:s out of Bunia. As
UPC was temporarily in a position to benefit from supply from both Uganda and
Rwanda, it was able to attack and to take control of the Mahagi territory. UPC then
benefited from its alliance with the Aru-based militia of Commander Jerome
Kakwavu, a former RCD-ML officer. The Mahagi territory then suffered from
massive human rights abuses, included destruction of villages, forced recruitment of
child soldiers by UPC and Jer6me's militia. as well as sexual violence that UPC
notably resorted to in order to terrorize the local elite and population. As a
consequence of this spillover into Mahagi territory, some Alur notables tried to
create a militia, FPDC. The plan failed, however. because of the reluctance of the
business community to fund it and, above all, the active opposition of the Mahagi
bishop, himself an Alur. Unlike the Catholic clergy in Bunia. throughout the conflict
the diocese of Mahagi was instrumental in conflict management initiatives as well
as preventing armed mobilization within the Mahagi territory.
25. The Lendu attacks became more cruel and destructive after March 2003, when
the support of UPDF for the Hema was terminated. Moreover after UPDF expelled
UPC from Bunia, the Lendu militias took over stocks of ammunitions and weapons
from UPC. The Lendu youth created self-defence militia groups to protect their
villages, which often lacked any organized hierarchical structure. Even after the
creation of FNI, several Lendu or Ngiti militia groups kept their independence and
often refused to obey the orders of their supposed FNI hierarchy to cease the
hostilities. The combatants forced everybody to be part of the militia including
women and children . Some community leaders tried to resist while others became
pan of the armed groups. Some Lendu elderly advised reviving the old methods of
taking special drugs, wearing amulets and eating some parts of the human body to
give supernatural forces to the combatants. The5e methods rendered the militia
members more cruel and inhuman.
26. The other ethnic communities such as the Bira. Alur. Nyali. Lugbara, Kakwa,
Ndo Okebo and Lese, who were not directly involved in the conflict, were forced to
take sides and/or were attacked by both parties, who accused them of sheltering the
enemy. This polarization reduced the possibility of continuing to implement local
conflict management initiatives. The various militias were not only terrorizing and
abusing the populations, they were also intentionally preventing local initiatives
from defusing tensions or containing violence. The Bira community, whose territory
includes Bunia, lost the chief of their Andisoma co/lectivire, Chief Dieudonne
Bulamuzi. Several hundred civilians, including the intellectual elites, were killed,
and health structures, including the largest one at Nyankunde. were destroyed. The
Nyali community. whose territory includes the Kilo Moto gold field, were attacked
by both sides. They lost most of their social infrastructures and many were forced to
leave their villages to go into hiding in the bush.
27. Role of Uganda. Uganda claimed on several occasions to be in lluri to defend
"its legitimate security concerns'' and to be acting for reconciliation and the
protection of civilians. However. although in some cases UPDF did intervene to halt
fighting between opposing forces. its commanders were responsible for the creation
of almost all of the armed groups. training their militias - sometimes even in
Uganda - - selling weapons and even lending the ir soldiers to rich Hema to
- - --.... ----
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massacre Lendu civilians and destroy villages in Walendu Tatsi in 1999. UPDF also
carried out widespread bombing and destruction of hundreds of villages from 2000
to 2002 in the Lendu/Ngiti colleclivi1es of Walendu Pitsi and Walendu Bindi. The
same UPDF commanders also became businessmen who traded in the resources of
Ituri. In four years. seven Ugandan sector commanders were sent to lturi: Captain
Kyakabale, Lieutenant Colonel Arocha, Colonel Charles Angina. Lieutenant
Colonel Edison Muzora. Colonel Fred Seka Mwenge. Major Muhozi and Kale
Kayura. Only Charles Angina and Kale Kayura left without serious allegations
being levied against them. Uganda supported first RCD, 19 then MLC and RCD-ML.
lt was also directly involved in the creation of UPC and in the training and arming
of its militia.
28. Uganda reconsidered its support to UPC because of close ties between UPC
and Rwanda, around December 2002. To counter that alliance, Uganda supported
several other lturi armed groups. UPDF was involved in the creation of FIPI, a
platform including PUSIC, FPDC and FNI/FRPI. However, that Front did not last
long and de facto came to an end in February 2003 after the attack on Bogoro by
FNI. In March 2003, FAPC was created with direct Ugandan support. In March
2003 UPDF commanders also supported FNI/FRPI, which assisted them in
removing UPC from Bunia. Following its commitment to the Luanda Agreement,
UPDF withdrew from lturi in May 2003 . Since then. it has continued to give open
support to PUSIC and FAPC, both spun off from UPC in order to weaken it.
29. Role of Rwanda. On 6 January 2003, RCD-Goma. a Congolese rebel
movement supported by Rwanda, announced an alliance with UPC. Rwanda had
become involved in the lturi crisis much earlier, however. The Chief of Staff of the
Rwandan army, James Kabarebe Kagunda, was reportedly the biggest advocate of
Rwandan support to Hema militia and was in contact with Chief Kawa, who
negotiated the arms supplies in June 2002. Rwanda reportedly supplied arms by
airdrop to the UPC camps located in Mandro, Tchomia, Buie, Bulukwa and Dhego
and sent military experts 10 train Hema militias, including child soldiers. Moreover,
some UPC elements (estimated at 150) went for training in Rwanda from September
to December 2002. On 31 December 2002, Thomas Lubanga visited Kigali for the
first time. Kigali also facilitated the transport to lturi of PRA elements, earlier
trained in Rwanda, and used some Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese to organize
this support. One ex-UPDF sector Commander of lturL Colonel Muzora, who had
left the Ugandan army to join the Rwandan forces, was seen by several witnesses in
the UPC camps, mainly to orient the newcomers from Rwanda. Practically all
witnesses interviewed by MONUC believe that Rwandan nationals occupied posts in
UPC military commands. MONUC obtained testimonies about adults and children
being trained in Rwanda and being sent through Goma. in 2002 and 2003. to fight in
lturi with UPc.20 It also appears that, when Thomas Lubanga and other highranking
UPC officers fled from lturi in March 2003, they were evacuated by air to
1" Both Uganda and Rwanda initially supported RCD (1998-1999) before il began to splinter into
different factions. a phenomenon renecting the end of the Uganda-Rwanda alliance in the
conflict.
2n In September 2002, I 07 children and adults were allegedly airlifted from Tchomia to Kigali
airport and driven to the Gabiro training centre. They were reportedly trained in artillery skills
and returned to lturi in November of the same year. On their way back. they landed in an
Antonov (often based in Goma) at Bunia airporl. Each of lhe trained combatants was given a
sub-machine gun. An officer known as ··Safari"' led this operation.
sn0041s13
13
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Rwanda. Arms and ammun1t1on were then supplied from Rwanda to UPC by air
before UPC retook Bunia in May 2003. On 11 and 12 May 2003. two aircraft landed
at Dhc:go - not far from Mongbwalu - from Rwanda. with grenades. rocketpropelled
grenades. mortars and ammunition. The first of the aircraft was also
carrying back Lubanga and Bosco from Kigali.
30. Role of the Kinshasa Government. Until 2002. the pre-transition
Government in Kinshasa was hardly involved in lturi. Its first delegation arrived in
Bunia in August 2002, after a visit to Kampala. During a second visit, on 29 August
2002, the Minister for Human Rights, Ntumba Lwaba, was abducted by Hema
militia and freed only after three days in exchange for the release of Lubanga and
several UPC members who had been arrested in Kampala and transferred to
Kinshasa. Early in 2002, the involvement of the Kinshasa Government centred on
military assistance that it provided to RCD-ML in Beni. Kinshasa sent trainers,
weapons and also some military elements. allegedly amounting to four battalions, in
support of APC, which reported ly was sending weapon supplies from Benito Lendu
militia. FAC and APC were also named by eyewitnesses and victims as parties in
some attacks on 1-lema villages. It is alleged that, in the last three months of 2002,
some military supplies may a lso have been sent directly to the Lendu militia,
notably to Rethy, in Djugu territory.
31 . The political initiative of the Transitional Government to calm the tension in
lturi has focused on the deployment of some judicial and police personnel and
sending official delegations. There have also been a number of press statements.
Apart from the delivery of a humanitarian aid shipment early in 2004, humanitarian
aid from the Government to the lruri victims has been. negligible. More concrete
actions and active engagement would be needed to find a solution to the ongoing
crisis. It was planned that the first brigade of the new national army would be
deployed in lturi before June 2004. However, there are no guarantees that these
troop5 will receive regular payments and supplies.
IV. Methodology of the investigation
14
32. For the special report on lturi, MONUC carried out a total of nine
investigations. More than 1,600 persons were interviewed, including victims,
eyewitnesses, community leaders. intellectuals. health workers and children
associated with armed groups. Additional written testimonies were received from
eyewitnesses and victims through local non-governmental organizations. Witnesses
ancl other sources were heard in private interviews. so as to keep their accounts
confidential and not expose them 10 risks of retal iation . Whenever possible. alleged
perpetrators and chiefs of armed groups were confronted with allegations raised
against them. Several field visits were made. to Bunia. Nyankunde. Mambasa,
Bogoro. Mandro, Lipri. Bambu. Kobu. Drodro, Kasenyi, Tchomia, Mahagi, Aru,
Ariwara, Zumbe, Boga. Koga, Katoto. Fataki, Kachele, Kilo and Marabo, all locaced
in lturi. MONUC travelled twice to the Beni area and three times to border areas in
western Uganda. In Beni, they received testimonies of displaced persons from lturi
located in Oicha. Erengeti, Burembo and Beni; the first visit took place after the
Mambasa events of late 2002, the second after the Bunia events of May 2003. In
Uganda, MONUC travelled to the areas of Rwebisengo, Ntoroko and Paidha and
interviewed hundreds of lturian refugees. Several military and political leaders were
also met in Kinshasa .
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33. Until the arrival of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in June 2003,
MONUC personnel had very limited access to lturi Therefore the information on
the human rights situation was gathered through short-term investigation missions to
a limited number of localities. After the opening of a MONUC' office at Bunia in
June 2003, the human right~ and child protection presence facilitated the
investigations but security restrictions did not allow them to cover each incident of
gross human rights violations that occurred in lturi. Even after the deployment of
the lturi Brigade in different parts of lturi allowed greater access, some areas are
still inaccessible. However, MONUC investigated most of the ethnically targeted
attacks on villages, acts of mass killing and mass destruction of property and social
services that occurred in different parts of lturi. as well as extrajudicial executions,
abductions of or threats against selected persons such as administrators, nongovernmental
o~ganization workers, journalists, teachers and businessmen that
occurred in Bunia, Aru and their surroundings. The Child Protection Section .of
MONUC has been focusing on the recruitment and use of children associated to
armed groups.
34. To cover the reporting period as thoroughly as possible, MONUC has also
made use of reports written by national and international non-governmental
organizations and United Nations agencies on tht: i.s.sut: of gross human rights
violations and their analysis. When an incident has not been investigated directly by
MONUC, the source of the information v.ill accordingly be noted.
V. Most serious human rights abuses committed in lturi
district from January 2002 to 31 December 2003
35. All of the armed groups have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity
and violations of human rights law on a massive scale in lturi. Unarmed civilians
have been deliberately killed, contrary to anicle 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions, often solely on the basis of their ethn icity. Attacks on villages have
been accompanied by the killing of several thousands of civilians. widespread
looting and destruction of housing and soc.ial structures, abduction of civilians,
including women for sexual slavery, rape and torture (see section A below).
36. Lendu combatants engaged in inhumane acts such as mutilation and
cannibalism, often under the effect of drugs prepared by their traditional healers.
They abducted children and women for forced labour and sexual slavery. According
to two eyewitnesses who were released, Lendu combatants told them that they were
not killing Hema children bu1 giving drugs to .. transform them into Lendu".
Hundreds of Hema women were sexually abused and forced into working for the
combatants. Many children and women of Hema origin were never released (see
section A).
37. UPC forces shelled hundreds of Lendu villages without making any distinction
between armed combatants and civilians. Some villages in Djugu territory were the
object of repeated attacks when the inhabitants returned and rebuilt during calmer
periods. Each time that they took control of Bunia - August 2002 and May 2003 -UPC
forces conducted a manhunt for Lendu, Bira, Nande and non-lturians whom
they considered opponents: many pcrsom were killed and many others disappeared
or chose to leave Bunia. UPC soldiers also committed large-scale rape in the
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16
different areas of the town, sometimes abusing girls as young as 12 (see sections A
and C).
38. Both Hema and Lendu militias repeatedly attacked localities belonging to
other ethnic groups, often bordering their own co/lecrivires, for different reasons: in
the Nyali territory of Banyari Kilo to have access to the gold mines; in Mahagi and
Aru for the customs taxes; and. in other localities, just to punish them for having
agreed to host the party considered to be the enemy (see section 8).
39. All of the armed groups have recruited and trained children to turn them into
combatants. According to some estimates. 40 per cent of each militia force could be
composed of children under 18 years of age. Given the uncertain figures for the total
strength of the armed groups, it is impossible to give accurate figures for children.
Current estimates suggest 6,000 children in armed groups. with several thousand
others possibly involved in local defence groups. Children have been used as
combatants but also as labour in the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Girls
have been forced into domestic labour and sexual slavery. Throughout the lturi
conflict, there have been a number of allegations that Uganda and Rwanda have
been involved in aiding and abetting lturi armed groups to recruit and train children
(see section D).
40. Some 8,000 civilians lost their lives as a result of deliberate killing or
indiscriminate use of force from January 2002 to December 2003. More then
600,000 have been forced to flee from their homes. The area bordering Uganda and
North Kivu hosted thousands of extremely vulnerable refugees and internally
displaced persons.
A. Ethnically targeted attacks
41 . During attacks on localities occupied by the ethnic groups of the opposite side
and often hosting a UPC battalion or a local Lendu militia group deployed for the
"protection" of civilians. fighting between the armed groups would most often be
intense and of short duration. Attackers often ended up killing civilians, destroying
homes and social infrastructures, abducting women for sexual abuse and looting the
entire village. Lendu militias and UPC justified their actions, stating that all
civilians were part of the armed groups since most of them were given weapons for
self-protection. The attacks described below illustrate some of the most serious
incidents. but the list is not exhaustive. Several other attacks were orchestrated by
both sides with hundreds of civilian victims. for example in Mahagi, Komanda,
Dungu, Ambe, Gety, Mitega and Fataki.
Col/ectivite of Walendu Bindi: mass killing and destruction of hundreds
of lotalities
42. From 9 February to 24 April 2002, UPDF based in Gety, together with Hema
and Bira militia groups. carried out large-scale operations against the Lendu villages
of the Boloma, Bukiringi, Zadhu, Baviba and Bamuko groupements, all located in
the col/ectivite of Walendu Bindi, in the territory of lrumu. Mass killings continued
for another two weeks after the visit on 4 April of the then Governor of lturi, JeanPierre
Lompondo Molondo, with Colonel Peter Karim, from UPDF. who was sent
by Kampala to investigate abuses committed by UPDF soldiers. Both called upon
UPDF to end the hostilities. A local non-governmental organization reported a total
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of 1,867 civilians killed,21 and 77 localities completely destroyed. together with all
social infrastructures, resulting in the displacement of 40.000 civilians. The
collectivite of Walendu Bindi, located in the southern part of lturi. hatl not been
involved in the conflict unti l late 2001 .12
43. Early in 2002, UPDF was deployed in Gety, the main town of rhe co/lectivite.
reportedly at the request of the llema South families accusing the Lendu of
allegiance with the Ugandan rebellion. The military operations were not carried out
by tbe UPDF command based in Bunia. however, but by military who came directly
from Uganda and who were under the command of Colonel Arocha. now appointed
to Bundibujo, in western Uganda bordering lturi district.~3 The sector Commander
Fred Seka Mwenge, based in Bunia, was reportedly not involved in the operation.
The operations on Lendu villages were carried out by lJPDF based in Gety together
with Hema militia members from Bogoro Kagoro. Boga Mitego. Kyakurundu and
Bukiringi and Bira militias from Talolo. One eyewitness from Gety named a certain
Madilu as one of the UPDF commanders.
Mabanga: ethnic cleansing of a mining town
44. Mabanga, in the col/ectivite of Mambisa. territory of Djugu. was a multi-ethnic
town because of its gold fields, which attracted non-lturian gold traders and
workers. On 28 August 2002, after an attack by Lendu militias. the local
Hema/Gegere militia forced the non-lturians to fight with them to repulse the
attackers. Witnesses interviewed by MON UC stated that, when the reinforcements
came from lga Barriere, their Commander T'Sirba Rene, stated that he had seen
non-lturians among the Lendu forces and gave the order to eliminate the non-lturian
population.
45. MON UC obtained a number of first-hand witness accounts of the attack. The
father of one victim reported how his son was killed, his body mutilated and his
head and arms brandished around the town. It appears that as many as I 50 people
may have been deliberately killed. The chief of operations. T'Sirba Rene. originally
from Mabanga, was living in lga Barriere. 24 lJPDF had a military camp in Mabanga;
the Ugandan army did not intervene to stop the killing of civilians but gave refuge
to those who were able to reach the camp. Some 2.000 civilians. who sought refuge
in the Ugandan camp, were escorted to Bunia the day after the event.
21 The most serious mass killings were the following : on I O February 2002. anack on the localities
of T~arukaka. Nombc. Tsubina and Kagaba with 173 civilians ki lled; nn 15 February 2002.
:Jllad a11d destruction of 1111: localities of Kagaba. Rudjokll. Rim. Kapalayi and Kinyamubaya
with 120 civilians k illed; on 21 February 2002. attack 1H1 Bukiringi with :!20 ,· 1 ilians killed: nn
14 March 2002. a1tack on tht: local ity of adji/Kaguma A with 146 civilians kil led: on 29 March
2002. massacre of the population of<iety by l lPDF hnscd there with 109 ci, ilians killed.
n In January 2001. several attacks were carried out on loc,ilities ol'Walcndu Rindi by APC' forces
together with UPDF when Lubanga was Minister or Defence. mostly to Jcstrny the localities
and their social infrastructures. One l lPDf helicopter based in Bunia wds used 10 bomb the
localities. fhc co//ec,ivi1e had a calm period from Fcbruar.i, 200 I to Fehruar) 2002.
13 Cokrncl Arocha was Chief lJPDF Scuor Commander of l1 11ri fr om ,\11gu,1 11) <) 1) lo June 2000.
when he was replaced by Colllnc l Charles Angina.
i , l"Sirba Rene wa condemned to death in 2002 h) the Tribunal d<' (.ir;in:lc ln,1 .J111.:c o l l\unia f..r
!he :i<~1ssin:.11 i11n n .-iht· DircctM c, f thee Mahan{!u gc1ld lie-Id . l.odiu '\Jn.,
S/2004/573
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J!I
Bunia: ethnically targeted massacres for the control of the capital city
46. Early in August 2002, the hostilities between RCD-ML and UPC that had
begun in March 2002 with the arrival of Governor Jean-Pierre Lompondo reached
the point of direct confrontation for the control of the town. Jean-Pierre Lompondo
had been sent to Bunia by Mbusa Nyamwisi of RCD-ML as chief of military
operations and Governor of lturi, to thwart the UPC leader. Thomas Lubanga. The
refusal by Mbusa of the nomination of Bosco by Lubanga as deputy chief of
operations had created further tension. The fighting between the two forces ended
with the withdrawal of RCD-ML from Bunia to Beni after UPDF and UPC on
9 August, shelled the residence of Governor Lompondo. UPC and its ally UPDF and
the Ngiti/Lendu militias both killed civilians, many of them targeted only because of
their ethnicity.
47. On 7 and 8 August, UPC militias and civilian vigilante groups under the
command of Bosco roamed mostly the neighbourhoods of Mudzipela, Bigo I, II and
Ill and Saio, killing those suspected of belonging to "opposing'' ethnic groups. In
Mudzipela, they completely destroyed all houses belonging to Bira, Lendu and
Nande community members. Around 110 civilians, mostly Bira, Lendu and Nande
were killed. According to several witnesses who testified to MONUC, UPC killed
selected individuals according to a pre-established list. They also attacked Lendu
civilians from Lipri market. located at 15 km from Bunia. The Lendu militias
counter-attacked Mudzipela and killed dozens of Hema civilians as an act of
revenge. UPC continued the killing of Bira, Lendu and Nande in Kolomani and the
centre of Bunia until 10 August 2002.
48. While the fighting was going on for the control of Bunia town, Lendu militias
attacked the farm of John Tibasima Ateenyi, the Hema Vice-President of RCD-ML,
located in Lengabo, approximatdy 20 km from Bunia. According to Human Rights
Watch, they killed 32 Hema workers and their families who were on the farm,
mostly with machetes.25
49. On 9 August, UPDF and UPC attacked Governor Lompondo's residence using
heavy weapons. The day before, all ethnic groups of Bunia, including a large
number of Lendu, had ned to the Governor's residence hoping that APC forces
based there would protect them. Jean-Pierre Lompondo and APC troops fled on foot
towards Beni, while UPC massacred the civilian population around the Governor's
house, as well as near the main hospital in the Bigo neighbourhood and near the
central prison. Around 80 persons were killed at the Governor's house alone.
Several mass graves were discovered later by MONUC, including two near the
Governor's house and others near the prison and the hospital. UPC and UPDF,
taking advantage of the chaos in the town, also conducted large-scale looting
operations. UPC closed all the roads out of Bunia erecting roadblocks and
summarily executing several c ivilians who were trying to flee the town. On
9 August 2002, UPC took complete control of Bunia and established an ethnically
based government with very few non-Hema members. From the first day of its
n See Human Rights Watch. lturi: "Covered in Blood": Ethnical(v Targeted Violence in Northeastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. July 2003. Available from http ://www.hrw.org. Path:
Publications/by country/Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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reign, UPC launched a manhunt in the town, looking for Lendu, Bira and nonlturians.~
6 The total number of victims of the fighting for the control of Bunia was
never known exactly. However. taking into consideration the accounts of
eyewitnesses, at least 300 persons lost their lives, killed mostly by UPC, but also by
Lendu militias. The fighting also displaced 10,000 families, according to the
humanitarian agencies present in Bunia. Most of the Nande community left Bunia
for Beni in the following weeks. UPC extended its control in all directions,
stabilizing its forces in Nyankunde, and taking the Mahagi-Aru area in the north.
Songolo: massacre of mostly women and children
50. Songolo, located in che colleclivite of Walendu Bindi, hosted an important
number of Ngiti from Nyankunde who were targeted and eventually driven out by
the Chief of the collectivite of Andisoma, throughout 200 l and early 2002. In
August 2002, UPC troops came to relieve UPDF in Nyankunde. The aim of this
move was apparently to launch attacks on the bordering Ngiti localities. UPC
reportedly requested the assistance of the Bira community in attacking the Ngiti.
SI . On 31 August 2002, at 7 a.m., a group of some 500 UPC soldiers together with
around 50 Bira attacked Songolo. According to a witness, most of the males were
not in the village. The attackers used mortars and rockets before entering the
village. After a short fight with Lendu forces, the attackers went into houses,
reportedly guided by Bira civilians, to kill the inhabitants. Many civilians, mostly
women, children and the elderly. were killed in their sleep. The attack lasted nine
hours. According to witness statements collected by MONUC, the attackers looted
the village and the health centre of Songolo and left with hundreds of cattle. It is
difficult to estimate the number of victims killed. According to Human Rights
Watch, around 140 persons were killed. mostly women and children.27 Survivors
who returned to Songolo after the attack to bury the bodies did a survey among the
population and found that 787 people were missing. Up to now. it has not been
possible to establish how many were killed and how many simply ran away.
According to a Congolese non-governmental organization, UPC abducted 12
civilians.
Nyankunde: "ethnic cleansing" of Bira, Hema and Hema/Gegere groups
52. During and after an attack on Nyankunde and its neighbouring towns and
villages carried out jointly by Ngiti, APC and Mai-Mai on 5 September 2002, more
than I ,OOO people may have been victims of de! iberate ki II ing because they
belonged to the Hema, Hema/Gegere and Rira ethnic groups. Nyankunde and
apparently many of the 45 localities making up the three groupements (LoyBanigaga,
Chini Ya Kilima/Sedzabo and Sidabo/Bagabela) of the col!ec1ivite of
Andisoma suffered destruction, looting and massive displacement.
53 . Before the devastating attack of 5 September 2002, Nyankunde, the main 1own
of Andisoma, mostly populated by Bira, was a major centre because of its
commercial activities and its well-equipped hospital, the Centre medical
evangelique, which hosted several international staff and provided high-quality and
specialized care in the region. According to a census done by the local
administration between 200 I and 2002, around 21 ,000 people were living in the
16 For specific killings. see section B.
27 See Human Rights Watch. lwri: "Cowred in Blood .. ...
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19
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S/2004/573
20
col/ectivite, 14,000 of whom were in Nyankunde. Since September 2002, several
thousand have been displaced to camps in North Kivu and the premises of the
hospital. the lnstitut d'enseignement medical and the lnstitut superieur des
techniques medicates, as well as several other educational and religious institutions,
have been looted and abandoned.
54. Tension had been high between the Ngiti population and the Bira and Hema of
Nyankunde. Throughout 2001 and 2002, the Ngiti were targeted with acts of
intimidation and other abuses. They were eventually forced out of Nyankunde. Ngiti
attacks on Nyankunde and other Bira villages in the col/ecrivile of Andisoma during
the same period further fuelled hatred between the three ethnic groups and were
followed by bloody reprisals. such as the alleged indiscriminate bombing by UPDF
of Ngiti positions after the Ngiti attack on Nyankunde of January 200 I. It is
reported that the Chief of the collectivite, Dieudonne Bulamuzi, accused of being
pro-Hema, boarded a UPDF gunship during those reprisal attacks. The attack of
S September 2002 followed the bloody aggression by UPC forces, reportedly
assisted by Bira elements. on 31 August 2002 on neighbouring Songolo. mostly
populated by Ngiti (see paras. SO and 51 ).
SS. A few days before the attack of S September. a five-member high-level
delegation from Nyankunde, composed of Chief Bulamuzi, the Medical Director of
the Centre medical evangelique and others, had travelled to Bunia to alert MONUC
about the risk ofa bloodbath in Nyankunde. MONUC did not have the means or the
mandate to take any preventive action at the time.
56. The attack was apparently launched from three different directions, Singo,
Songolo and Atele. From S September to mid-month, Ngiti combatants - many of
whom were former inhabitants of Nyankunde - systematically sought and killed
Bira, Hema and Gegere individuals. mostly with machetes, spears and arrows. The
combatants were wearing civilian clothes. appeared overexcited by drugs and were
wearing vials and jeriches on their chest. MONUC obtained several accounts of
mutilation of victims' bodies (notably the throat and the heart were removed) by
Ngiti combatants. Apparently these parts of the bodies are used for f etiche.L
57. The hospital of Nyankunde. the Centre medical evangelique, was not spared.
Killings and looting were carried out in the hospital compound from the very first
day of the attack. On 10 September. Colonel Kandro Ndekote, the Ngiti commander.
led a search and arrest operation in the hospital. That operac ion resu lied in the
detention in inhumane conditions of some I 00 people who were hospital staff or had
sought refuge there. According to some sources. the number of people arrested at
the hospital could be higher. It is alleged that many of the detainees were
subsequently executed extrajudicially or disappeared after being forcib ly taken to
Bavi. located between Singo and Olongba, and other Ngiti bases. The fate of the
others is unknown, but there are fears that they were executed extrajudicially.
58. From 80 survivors' statements gathered by MONUC, it appears that mainly
Ngiti forces were responsible for the killings. APC committed widespread looting
and extortion, but according to witness accounts intervened at least on a number of
occasions to prevent killings or allow the evacuation of survivors. According to a
high-ranking APC ofticer and other reliable sources. APC Commander Faustin
Kakule negotiated and agreed on the details of the attack on Nyankunde with the
Ngili Commander, Colonel Kandro. There is no cenain information about the terms
of the agreement. However, Commander Faustin claimed to some hospital staff that
- 66 -
he had requested that the hospital not be attacked. APC Commander Bisima from
Komanda reportedly visited Nyankunde. including the Centre medical evangelique,
on I O September. but left on the same day. APC Commander Hilaire is also reported
to have been involved in the attack.
59. MONUC conducted separate interviews with more than 15 people who had
collected corpses for burial in Nyankunde. The few burials, conducted very much in
a hurry given the prevailing insecurity, were limited to some parts of Nyankunde
and were not completed by 12 September, when hundreds of the inhabitants of
Nyankunde who had sought refuge at the hospital were eventually allowed to leave
the town. According to witness accounts, it appears that several hundred bodies
were found lying in the streets and in the houses. Most of them appeared to be
civilians and many of them had died of machete wounds. In most cases, no graves
were dug and most of the bodies were thrown into latrines. In some cases, bodies
were burned. Individuals from Ngiti villages, including Gety. Songolo and Aveba
and wearing Red Cross aprons also carried out burial of bodies. Their leader was
heard saying that they had to bury the bodies quickly so that nobody could claim
that there had been "genocide" in Nyankunde. According to reports, the Ngiti Red
Cross may have buried or burned hundreds of bodies.
60. MONUC has obtained some 800 names of victims of alleged deliberate
killings or forced disappearance in Nyankunde and neighbouring villages. At the
time of the attack on 5 September, Nyankunde was under the control of UPC forces,
which had entered Nyankunde after the departure of UPDF troops in July 2002.
According to consistent reports. the Ngiti attackers quickly overwhelmed UPC and
the fighting in the streets did not last long. This reduced the number of civilians who
might have been victims of stray bullets. Scores of civilians were also apparently
abducted and forced to carry the loot to Ngiti villages, includ ing Songolo, Singo,
Bavi, Bolo, Gety, Kagaba and Atele. Their exact number is unknown . It appears that
at least I 00 of them were killed in Singo. More than I O people from Nyankunde
who had sought refuge in nearby Marabo allegedly disappeared after being captured
on the orders of Colonel Kandro in the aftermath of the attack. Some 70 people were
allegedly killed in villages of the woupement of Musedzo and in Mambesu
(groupement of Mayarabu), both in the col/ectivite of Mobala, which were attacked
on the same days.
61. To date, none of those alleged to be responsible for the mass killings in the
collectivite of Andisoma in September 2002 has been brought to justice. After
September 2002, APC Commander Faustin was reportedly arrested in Beni and
detained by APC for letting his troops desert. He was subsequently released and he
is reportedly still a member of APC. The Ngiti Colonel Kandro was allegedly killed
during the sharing of the loot that followed the attack on Nyankunde. However,
other commanders such as Commander Matata are reportedly sti ll leading Ngiti
militias in lrumu.
Bedu-Ezekele: scorched earth operation in 24 villages
62. Bedu-Ezekele, a Lendu groupement, located in the col/ectivite of Walendu
Tatsi, was attacked several times from January 2001 to March 2003. Several persons
were killed and a ll of its 24 local ities were destroyed at each attack. Zumbe, well
known as one of the headquarters of the Lendu militia, is part of this col/ectivile,
which may explain the repetition and intensity of the attacks. The attackers were
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reportedly UPDF forces under the command of Muzora. together with Hema militias
from Bogoro. Mandro. Tchomia, Kasenyi and Bunia under the command of Chief
Kawa.
63. In 2002 and 2003, the grc>11pement experienced a total of I I attacks with 445
civilian victims of killing, according to a Lendu teacher who took notes of each
event. The most serious attacks occurred on l 5 and 16 October 2002. when Hema
militias. together with UPDF from Bogoro, attacked Zumbe and stayed there for 48
hours. From Zumbe, the attackers burned all the surrounding villages, killed around
125 civilians and planted several anti-personnel mines.
Bogoro: mass killing of civilians and destruction of the entire village
64. Bogoro, a Hema village, was a strategic place for UPC who had a military
camp in the middle of the town. Bogoro is located on the Bunia·Kasenyi main road.
The presence of UPC therefore prevented the Lendu communities of Walendu Bindi
from using the road to reach Bunia. The Lendu (FNI) Chief of Staff at the time,
Mathieu Ngudjolo, who admitted to having organized the attack on Bogoro and
Mandro, told MONUC human rights investigators that his forces carried out the
military operations in order to dislocate UPC military forces. which had been
shelling the Lendu villages around Bogoro for several months.2t According to
MONUC investigations, however. the Lendu attack was not confined to military
targets but also appeared to be a reprisal operation against the Hema civilian
population.
65. On 24 February 2003, Bogoro was attacked by Lendu and Ngiti militias at
5.30 a.m. The aggressors came trom four directions: Kasenyi. Gety. Nyankunde and
Mission. They were reportedly wearing green military combat clothes and civilian
clothes, and used machetes, spears and arrows but also heavy weapons. such as
mortars, rocket-propelled grenades. light mac-hine guns and rocket launchers. UPC
soldiers had their camp around the school and called the civilian population to seek
refuge inside it. Some people v. cre able to reach the camp, others were killed while
fleeing. When UPC forces ran out of ammunition, they opened a corridor through
which they fled, together with some civilians; others left in the direct ion of Kasenyi.
The Lendu/Ngiti militias reportedly continued killing and !noting after UPC
abandoned the village. According to the testimony of 100 survivors, around 260
persons were killed and another 70 are missing. Among the victims. 173 were under
the age of 18.
66. MONUC human rights investigators who travelled to Bogoro on 26 March
2003 saw that most of the buildings and houses on the main road had been destroyed
or burned. They also had a discussion with the Lcndu chief of operations still in
control of the town, Commander Dark from FNI, who refused to grant permission
for a thorough vis it of Bogoro including the place where the killings allegedly
occurred. According to the Ugandan officials. the reason for his refusal was the
existence of unburied bodies in the vicinity of the local school. Commander Dark
2K This information was confirmed later. during a visit to Lurnbc on 13 Dect:rnbcr 2003. by the
inhabitants or Zurn be and Zckcle. two Lem.Ju h,.:alitics that were attacked and complett:ly
destroyed by Hema militia from Bogor.-,_
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informed the team tha1 he was under the order of Commander Germain Katanga. the
officer in charge of military operations in the south of Bunia.2''
67. According to child soldiers who took part in the operation on the UPC side, the
aggressors were Lendu North, Ngiti from the south, APC and some Ugandan
soldiers. Two of the children claimed lo have heard Ugandan Swahili through a
radio communication and to have witnessed the killing of Ugandan military. Other
victims reported having heard soldiers speaking Portuguese. These elements wen:
thought by some to be FAC special forces who had been trained in Angola.
Lipri, Bambu, Kobu: operation Chikanu Namukono
68. On 13 January 2003, around two UPC battalions com ing from Mongbwalu
arrived in Nyangaraye at around 5.00 a.m. They forced the populatiC1n out of their
homes and forced 15 to go into the chapel. They reported ly chopped all of them to
death with machetes and burned their bodies. Eyewitnesses were ab!P. to identify
two victims, one of them a child. From Nyangaraye, UPC began carrying out its
military operation called Chikana Namukono10 under the command ol' Salumu
Mulenda. UPC first took control of Lipri and Kobu on 18 February 2003 .
69. From 18 February to 3 March 2003, UPC militias carried out a large-scale
military operation against the villages located between Lipri and Nyangaraye. The
first attack lasted until 23 February; 15 villages were destroyed and most of their
inhabitants killed.31 Witnesses reported that, on 24 February. the UPC Commander,
Salumu Mulenda, sent a written message - - a copy of which was pn'>vided to
MONUC - to Lendu notables in the area and Lendu militia leaders, including
traditional Chief Djatsi, and the militia commander Kabuli , inviting them to a
pacification meeting. On 25 February when the Lendu leaders, accompanied by 50
persons, came to attend the meeting in Rule, they were all arrested and brought to
Kobu during the night. The prisoners were then taken beh ind the UPC camp in Kobu
with their hands tied and were attacked with machetes, knives and wooden sticks.
Only two persons. one of them met by MONUC. were able to run away; <'Ill of the
others were confirmed killed. According to the persons who buried the bodies, there
were 47 victims. They reportedly found another 53 corpses in the bush around Kobu
and buried them in two other mass graves. In the following days, UPC continued its
manhunt in the Jicho forest. Another 92 persons were reportedly killed in the forest,
most of them dismembered with machetes. During the last days of February, UPC
attacked another eight villages~2 using the same methods of killing civil ians, looting
and burning all the houses. During this operation, Bambu, the headquarters of the
Kilo Moto gold mining company. was attacked several times: all the offices of the
company, the main hospital of the region. all religious structures, the orphanage and
the schools were looted and all electronic devices, archives and medicat equipment
destroyed.
70. MONUC human rights invesligators were able to visit Lipri, Bambu and Kobu
on 3 April 2003. The team saw several villages on the way that were burned and
deserted, visited the place where 47 persons were killed in Kobu and interviewed
2• Commandant Germain is lhc currenl Chief of Staff of FNI/FRPI.
3" In Lingala this means " to take with hands··.
31 Lipri. Ndrt Chupka, Dhcpka. Tsili. Ndjaza. Mbidjo, Ngbachulu. Kpaki . Bukpa. Djuba. Bemu.
Nduy, Ngaru, Ndalu and Thali.
32 Jichu. Buli, Ngabuli. Pili. Athe, Bakpa, Lambi and Widdc.
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around 90 victims of abuse or eyewitnesses of killings. The interviewees gave the
team the names of 250 victims, but more victims were identified by another
investigation team in May 2003. and still more during the investigations in the Beni
area in November 2003. Operation Chikana Namukono resulted in the killing of at
least 350 persons and the complete destruction of 26 localities.n Around 60,000
civilians were forced to flee to the relative safety of the surrounding bush, and the
number of those who died of hunger and sickness remains unknown.
Mandro: attack and mass killing in a stronghold of UPC
71 . Mandro, located in the co/Jectivite of Bahema Banywagi, is the birthplace of
Chief Kawa. The village was known from the first period of tht! conflict as a
stronghold of UPC and was the location of a military and training camp for newly
recruited children. The Lendu population suspected several attacks on their villages
as coming from Mandro. According to corroborating testimonies, Mandro was
attacked several times by Lendu since the beginning of 2003 but the UPC forces
were able to push them back and hold the town.
72. On 4 March 2003, early in the morning, the Lendu and Ngiti attack on UPC
military positions in Mandro lasted for no more than a few hours. The armed groups
succeeded in overrunning Mandro and attacked civilians, killing some 168 persons
according to the testimonies received by MONUC in Mandro and Bunia. According
to the Chief of the groupement, the attackers kidnapped several young men and
girls, who were forced to carry the looted goods. Since the attack did not last long,
few houses were looted but the UPC military camp was completely destroyed. The
aggressors were reportedly Lendu militias from Zumbe and Loga. Interviewed later
in Bunia, the former FNI Chief of Staff, Mathit:u Ngudjolu, acknowlc:dged having
organized the attack with the Ngiti in order to stop UPC operations against Lendu
villages. According to him, each person in Mandro was a combatant in possession of
a weapon.
Bunia: chasing of UPC by UPDF and Lendu militias
73. On 6 March 2003, reportedly responding to an attack by UPC on their forces
based in Ndele, UPDF drove UPC out of Bunia and took control of the town with
the assistance of Lendu armed groups. 34 On 6 and 7 March 2003, during and after
fighting between UPC and UPOF in Bunia, several civilians were killed, houses and
shops were looted and civilians were wounded by gunshots. According to the
inhabitants of Bunia fighting between UPC and UPDF began around 6 a.m. and
lasted until the end of the same day. Stray bullets reportedly killed ~everal civilians;
others had their houses shelled. There were also selected killings of Hema c ivilians
who were known to have financed UPC and selected looting of shops belonging to
Hema businessmen in the market area of Bunia.
33 According to a reliable local non-governmental organization. the number of civilians killed
during the operation is much higher.
34 On 6 January 2003. UPC signed a military alliance with RCD-Goma. In the following weeks,
RCD-Goma started airlifting troops and weapons to UPC territory. On 23 January. PC formally
requested Uganda lo withdraw from lturi. Chief Kawa. who h11d already defected from lJPC in
November 2002 and moved to Uganda, expressed a desire for Uganda to remain in lturi. He
became the new ally of Uganda and he was supported by IJganda as leader of the newly created
FI Pl .
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74. The local Red Cross buried a total of 54 soldiers and 17 civilians but informed
MONUC that Ugandan forces had buried their nationals. Local non-governmental
organizations carried out investigations into the events on 12 March 2003 and
compiled a list of 52 civilians killed. 30 others injured, 15 houses completely
destroyed, 60 others including offices of the non-governmental organizations Coopi,
Aciar, J-plus. Hellenique and Cemif were completely looted. Eyewitnesses accused
UPDF of being directly involved in the looting of the town. The situation was
brought under control by UPDF on 8 March . Hema community members who had
fled started to come back. The local Red Cross buried the bodies from 6 to 12 March
2003 .
Drodro: killing of hundreds of civilians
75 . Drodro, well known for its parish and its well built social infrastructure, is part
of the territory of Djugu, col/ectivite of Bahema Nord approximately 80 km from
Bunia. After its forced withdrawal from Bunia, UPC and its leader Thomas Lubanga
relocated first in Buie, then in Blukwa and Drodro. On 3 April 2003, because of this
presence and also as part of a revenge operation. Drodro parish (located in Duma
village) and the surrounding villages of Dhassa (Largu), Nyali, Dzathi, Kiza,
Ngazba, Jissa, Kpatiz, Koli, Lera, Ndjala and Kpaluma were attacked between
5.45 a.m. and 8 a.m. by Lendu militias. The attackers killed both military and
civilians using AK-47 and Kalashnikov rifles but also machetes, spears and arrows.
A team composed of personnel of MONUC and personnel of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights travelled to the affected
areas, and received testimonies of survivors, eyewitnesses. family members and
church and administrative authorities, who reported the killing of 408 civilians, the
serious injury of 80 others, 48 of them still in the local hospital at the time of 1he
investigation, and the destruction by fire of 150 houses and shops. Two forensic
experts who accompanied MON UC and examined one of the several mass graves in
Largu confirmed that killings had happened. The team saw other mass graves in
Largu, Nyali and Jissa.
76. The attackers were reportedly Lendu combatants from the surrounding Lendu
villages of Andu, Juk;, Masumbuko, Tsoro. Ango and Asso. Some eyewitnesses
reported that they saw also soldiers wearing green uniforms and camouflage
uniforms. According to a Congolese human rights organization. the presence of
Lubanga and Edison Muzora, a former UPDF commander who had joined the
rebellion. during the second half of March 2003 in Drodro would explain the
alliance between Lendu militias and UPDF. This version was rejected by UPDF,
who stated that at that date UPDF troops were in Buie, 30 km from Drodro. and was
not responsible for the Drodro killings.
Buoia, return in strength of UPC and mass flight of the population
77. On 6 May 2003, under pressure from the international community, the last
UPDF soldier left Bunia, after a Jong presence of four and a half years_H
Approximately 20,000 civilians, mostly Hema and a few from other ethnic groups,
followed them towards Uganda fearing an attack by Lendu combatants. From the
first day of their departure, the city was the scene of fierce fights between UPC and
the Lendu militias, which lasted until MONUC was able to broker a ceasefire
;~ UPDF entered Bunia in November 1998.
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agreement. on 17 May. Fighting in various neighbourhoods caused hundreds of
civilian casualties, systematic looting of buildings and destruction by fire of around
I ,OOO dwellings. Following the ceasefire. the two parties agreed to withdraw their
forces to their respective military headquarters in the town. This situation lasted
until 27 May, when UPC drove the Lendu combatants out of Bunia. Thereafter,
human rights abuses continued to be committed on a smaller scale.
78. Two investigations were carried out into the events by two different MONUC
teams, one in Bunia at the beginning of June 2003 and the second in the camps of
internally displaced persons in the Beni area in November 2003.16 The team
interviewed 311 eyewitnesses and family members of victims. A total of 563 cases
of deliberate killings have been reported to MON UC, 260 of them by UPC and 303
by Lendu combatants. Other victims were killed by non-identified perpetrators. The
Lendu combatants reportedly commiued several ethnically motivated killings of
Hema and other ethnic groups somehow associated with them, while UPC
apparently killed at random, although possibly targeting non-natives and some
professions like police officers and taxi drivers. According to a source. UPC killed
several dozen Lendu civilians in Simbilyabo and buried them secretly.
79. Particularly heavy casualties were reported in the Mudzipela area of Bunia.
considered to be a safe heaven for Hema civilians, and the Lumumba area, which is
the city centre. The killing of around 16 Hema civilians and two Hema priests on
l O May 2003 by the Lendu militia in the compound of Nyakasanza church is an
example of ethnically motivated killing. According to corroborating testimonies of
Lendu and Hema survivors of the massacre. some hundreds of Lendu combatants
arrived at I O a.m. and penetrated the compound after a short fight with the national
police. Both Hema and Lendu internally displaced persons had sought refuge in the
church and were housed in two different halls. After killing lwo Hema priests in
their rooms, the combatants penetrated the hall containing Hema civilians and one
of them massacred 12 adults and 4 children. The combatants visited the room
containing the Lendu but only took their money. The reason for this particular
massacre was apparently to take revenge for the killing of the Ngiti priest Father
Boniface Bwanalongo by UPC in November 2002 in Mongbwalu. Furthermore.
Father Aime, one of the Hema priests killed, was publicly known to be a UPC
supporter and had been seen several times driving UPC officials in the church
vehicle.
80. The team received reports of 18 cases of rape, some of the victims being as
young as 11 , committed by UPC soldiers, after the ceasefire was signed. Most of the
victims were abducted while they were out to look for food or water, and were taken
to military places or private houses for sexual abuse.
81. Looting started in the town as soon as the Ugandan forces left. carried out first
by Lendu combatants then by UPC elements. They were later joined by civilians
who profiteered from the situation, resulting in systematic looting of private houses
and business premises with no distinction of ethnic affiliation. The market place was
completely devastated. During visits to the neighbourhoods, in addition to the looted
dwellings, the MONUC team saw a considerable number of shops and houses
destroyed by fire . Some thousand houses were set on fire .
36 Investigations were carried out in camps in Erengeti. Oicha. Bulembo and Beni.
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82. The MONUC team received reports of numerous cases of threats or
intimidation committed by UPC elements once they had total control of the town.
This is one of the main reasons behind the reported fleeing of around 200,000
people from Bunia and the surrounding villages from 8 to 14 May 2003. The
inhabitants left Bunia mainly using two roads. One group took the road to Beni via
Komanda and another took the route Medu-Bole-Beni. passing through the forest.
One group of Lendu fled to Gety and another to Zumbe. According to humanitarian
agencies, around 74,000 civilians reached the Beni area. passing through Komanda,
at the beginning of June 2003. The total of the new internally displaced persons as a
result of the May events in Bunia was reportedly 180,000 persons.
83 . On their way, the group that took the road towards Komanda was attacked in
Chayi by UPC, all their belongings were looted and an unknown number of civilians
were killed. The group that took the road towards Medu and Bole was stopped by
Ngiti combatants who killed the Hema civilians who were part of the group. A
Nande survivor met by MONUC reported the summary execution at Longba on the
basis of ethnic origin, of 13 civilians, mostly Hema and those thought to be Hema,
because of their facial type, by the combatants and their Commander, Matata
Banaloki Justin, known as Cobra. The same witness added that the bodies of the
victims were mutilated and certain organs extracted and eaten by the combatants.
An important number of Hema were reportedly killed also near Olongbo and
Masini.
Tchomia: mass killings and abduction of civilians in two different attacks
84. Tchomia used to be a big trading centre of around 12,000 persons, located in
the co/lectivite of Bahema Banywagi in the territory of Djugu on the shore of Lake
Albert. The locality was also host to an important PUSJC military camp.37
According to the Hema authorities, the area around Kasenyi and Tchomia, both
located by Lake Albert, became subject to insecurity after the capture of Bogoro by
Lendu militia at the end of February 2003 .
85. On 31 May 2003, Tchomia was attacked around 5 a.m. and the operation lasted
until I p.m. The attackers, allegedly from Zumbe and Loga, approached the town
from three directions and attacked first the military camp and then the civilian
population using rocket-propelled grenades, rifles, mortars, spears, machetes and
axes. They spoke Kiswahili, Kilendu and Lingala. The attackers openly asked
victims about their ethnic origin, which suggests that their objective was to kill only
men from the Hema ethnic group. The majority of the victims identified the
attackers as being Lendu combatants, with some APC and FAC soldiers The
MONUC human rights investigators who travelled to Uganda to interview witnesses
drew up a list of 96 victims, mostly of summary executions, including 30 patients
who were killed in the hospital beds and 6 victims of abduction . The assistant to the
Administrator of the territory of Kasenyi, who came to Tchomia with Chief Kawa
on the day of the attack, stated that they buried a total of 250 corpses. Chief
Kisembo of Kasenyi stated that a militiaman called Naydo affiliated with the Lendu
militia of Zumbe carried out the operation.
86. According to corroborating information received by MONUC later, in Beni
and Kinshasa, after UPDF left Bunia they based themselves in Tchomia with the
7 PUSIC was formed only in October/November 2002. The militia was previous!) under UPC.
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intention of organizing a new attack on Zumbe together with PUSIC. UPDF was
still reportedly in Tchomia on the day of the attack. contrary to lheir previous
statement according to which they left around 20 May, and a large number of UPDF
soldiers were reportedly killed as a result of the attack.
87. On 15 July 2003. Tchomia was attacked for the second time around 5 a.m. by
the same attackers, coming from Zumbe. The attackers killed some 11 civilians,
since the town was almost emptied after the first attack .
Katoto: killing of civilians during several attacks
88. Katoto, a Hema village, is located some 25 km north of Bunia, in the
col/ectivite of Bahema Nord, in the ierritory of Djugu. The village suffered from
two severe Lendu attacks in June 2003. On 7 June, J 04 people were killed,
according to local authorities and eyewitnesses. On 20 June, a new attack reportedly
left 32 more people killed and an undetermined number of displaced people. It
appears that Katoto had a population of 17 ,OOO before the attacks and was
afterwards reduced to around 7,000. The attacks came from FNI mil itias led by
commanders Ngakpa, Nyanya, Ngerey, Kame and Lonu, among others, principally
from the locality of L.oga, some I O km north-west of Katoto.
Kasenyi: mass killing and abduction of civilians
89. Kasenyi, a fishing town of around 8,000 inhabitants according to the
traditional chief of the place, located on the shores of Lake Albert in the collectivite
of Bahema Sud, in the territory of lrumu, was the site of an important PUSIC
military camp. The town was auacked twice, on 11 June and 23 July 2003, by Ngiti
combatants seeking to dislodge the PUSIC soldiers there.
90. On 11 June 2003, Kasenyi was attacked around 6 a.m. by Ngiti militias,
reportedly together with some APC and FAC elements. The attackers first dislodged
PUSIC forces and subsequently auacked the civilians in the town. MONUC
received testimonies on the killing of more than 80 civilians and the abduction of 30
others. A victim, who was abducted and taken to Zumbe, reported that the chief of
the operations was called Mumbere, a Lendu who had taken a Nande name. On the
road to Zumbe, the victim witnessed the execution by machete of six persons
because they were not able to continue walking. The victim was kept in Zumbe for
one week. I-le later moved with two Alur hostages to Bcni, accompanied by 200
persons, both Lendu militia and APC soldiers. According to the witness, the journey
from Zumbe to Beni had been organized with the aim of bringing ammunition given
by RCD-ML. The father of the two Alur hostages came to Benito take his children
away together with the witness and brought them to Ntoroko, Uganda. On 23 July
2003, Kasenyi was attacked for the second time by Lendu combatants. MONUC
received testimonies on the killing of 16 civilians and the abduction of 4 others.
Fataki: killing and abduction of civilians in two attacks
91. Fataki, the administrative centre of Djugu territory, was inhabited by around
16,000 persons of mostly Hema origin before the conflict. Fataki was the target of
two serious attacks during July 2003, the first on 19 July and the second on 31 July.
The attack of 19 July resulted in the killing of 51 civilians the abduction of 50
others, the displacement of hundreds more and the destruction of many buildings,
including the orphanage. two convents. the hospital and the school buildings. The
·----·---- - --·-------
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attack of 31 July was more deadly: around 71 people were identified as having been
killed, including seven survivors of the first attack who were in the hospitaL38 As a
result of the two attacks, around 10,000 civilians fled the area_
92_ The attackers were identified by the survivors as being Lendu combatants
alone, in the first attack, and Lendu combatants with FAPC members in the second
one_ After the second attack, the Lendu militia stayed in the town for a while and
killed a few survivors who came to look for their belongings. The combatants and
FAPC reportedly continued to abduct civilians during August 2003.
Kacbele: mass killing of civilians
93 . Kachele is a small Hema village located in the collectivite of Bahema Badjere,
in the territory of Djugu. On 6 October 2003, between 5 and 10 a_nL, Kachele and
the surrounding villages of Loko, Bu, Luguba and Lutsiko were attacked by Lendu
militias from the nearby villages of Laudju and Petro. A total of 65 civilians were
killed, 42 of them children, and another 26 injured_
94. A MONUC investigation team arrived at the scene of the incident the day it
occurred to verify facts, gather evidence and comfort and assist the population. The
following day, a new mission, including human rights observers, continued the
inquiry, drew up lists of victims, gathered new evidence, interviewed survivors and
visited a number of mass graves. Immediately after the attack, the lturi Brigade was
deployed to Buie and has been conducting several foot patrols in the area from
which the attackers allegedly came. They have already found evidence of the
existence of armed elements and weapons; they also found traces of the withdrawal
from Kachele to the Petro area, which confirms the origin of the attack.
B. Other mass killings
95 . Both Hema and Lendu combatants attacked territories belonging to other
ethnic communities for different reasons: in some cases to punish them for having
hosted enemy combatants, in others. because they took one side or the other in the
conflict. Some towns, such as Mongbwalu, Mahagi and Aru, were attacked for
control of their natural or financial resources. Regardless of the reasons for the
attack, both Lendu and Hema militia parties committed similar types of exactions:
mass killing of civil ians, destruction of social infrastructures, looting of goods.
abduction of women for sexual slavery and forced labour.
96. The only attack that can be considered different from the rest is the one named
Operation effacer le tableau carried out by M LC and RCD-N forces with the direct
assistance of UPC in the area of Mambasa (see paras_ 105 ff below)_
Walu: killing of civiliaos, destruction of social infrastructure
97. On 11 May 2002, the village of Walu, located in the colfectivite of Babelebe in
the territory of lrumu, was attacked by Hema militias from 5 a .m. to I p.m. The
attackers completely burned social infrastructures. including two schools and three
health centres. They killed civilians who were not able to flee_ Once the attack was
J8 The real number of deaths may be higher but, owing to the displacement caused by the attack.
the investigators were able to reach only some of the survivors_
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over. the popu lation camt out of hiding to bury the bodies. One of the eyewitnesses,
who was present at the burials. reported having counted 42 bodies, including that of
the Chief of the village. The village was attacked a second time a few days later hy
the same militia, who killed four more civilians. The militia reportedly came from
Mazangina. Kabarole and Sota and was under the command of Kisembo, the Chief
of Kabarok.
Moogbwalu: a town to conquer for its natural resources
98. Mongbwalu, an important gold mining centre, was the second most populated
town in lturi after Bunia, with around 80.000 inhabitants before the conflict. Though
located in the Nyali col/ectivi1e of Banyari Kilo, the majority of its inhabitants were
of Lendu origin . Lendu moved to Mongbwalu to work for the Kilo Moto gold
mining company as labourers beginning in the 1980s. The Lendu families were
concentrated on the outskirts or the town, in the Camp Sayo area, where the workers
compounds were located, while the Hema were living in the cite (town centre). The
town changed hands frequently in a series of attacks and counter-attacks. During the
attack of June 2002 by Hema militia and some bribed APC elements. RCD-ML was
still in control of the town.
99. On 11 June 2002. Lendu workers left the workers camp and sought safety on
the hill where an armed camp of Lendu was located, as they had been informed that
"something" would happen. The same day, the Chief of the cite, Taga Mpigwa
Atenyi, a Hema. reportedly made a speech in which he stated : "tomorrow we'll have
our coffee in the Lendu area of the town.'·
I 00. On 12 June 2002, the Lendu quarters of Mongbwalu were attacked by APC
soldiers based there, together with Hema inhabitants of the town. APC had been
bribed by rich Hema with the aim of emptying Mongbwalu of its Lendu population.
The auack lasted from 3 a.m. to 7 a.m. The attackers killed an unknown number of
Lcndu civilians, threw them into the roadside ditches and set tire to Lendu homes.
The chief of the Hema militia was Bakambu, called le maitre because he had been a
teacher in the nearby Bambu mines. Towards the end of the attack, the Lendu
combatants arrived from their encampment. They destroyed Hema homes and killed
approximately JOO Hema civilians in an act of revenge. The majority of the Hema
had enough time to flee to hide in the APC camp and so were saved. The Governor
of the time, Jean-Pierre Lompondo, sent a new APC commander. Papi Yani, to
replace his bribed former one, Commander Alemi. Meanwhile, the notables of the
N)'ali community, the traditional rulers of the collectivite, went to see the Lendu
comhatants to propose a peace plan. The l.endu accepted their proposal on condition
that the Hema population leave Mongbwalu for Watsa and Ariwara. The Hema left
and the Nyali population stayed with APC and Lendu civilians and militia members.
This first Hema operation to recover Mongbwalu and its gold mines was reportedly
financed by Lombe, who had a gold board in Bunia, and by Mandefu, Kazana and
Labomba, all businessmen. Mongbwalu was attacked again in August 2002 by UPC
forces, but they were pushed back by Lendu combatants and APC. However, UPC
was determined to gain control of the town and went to look for stronger allies such
as MLC. present in the Watsa area.
IOI. On 8 November 2002, UPC began its operation by shelling Mongbwalu with
heavy weapons. An eyewitness met by MONUC went to the Lendu camp to seek
protection at that time. While there. the witness saw a wounded Lendu combatant
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returning from Watsa who said that UPC was advancing under the command of
Bosco. Lendu combatants were able to repulse this first attack and succeeded in
capturing a young lJPf' militia hoy According 10 the boy. UPC. had prepared a big
operation after receiving assurance of M LC assistance to take Mongbwalu and to
make it the headquarters of Lubanga. From 9 to 17 November 2002, APC went to
fight on the road to Watsa to stop the advance or MLC forces.
I 02. On 20 November 2002. UPC and MLC jointly attacked Mongbwalu, using
heavy mortars and other explosive devices. The fighting lasted for two days and
resulted in the killing of around 200 civilians and the destruction of infrastructures.
UPC took control of the town on 24 November 2002. According to Human Rights
Watch, an unknown number of civilians, who tried to hide in a church called Mung11
Samaki located in Sayo, were followed by UPC and MLC soldiers.39 The UPC
soldiers found them in the church and slaughtered them. Other civilians were
captured and imprisoned in <1 military camp, where they were later killed. During its
stay, UPC tried to exploit the gold mines. They called on the Lendu to return
because they had the expertise in gold di~ging. Since the Lendu refused to go back,
they forced the remaining Nyal i populJt1un and the Hema who went back 10 work
for them. Mongbwalu was then occupied by Lendu militias of FNI, when UPC lost
the backing of Uganda in March 2003.
Nizi: mass killing of civilians
I 03 . Nizi, located in the co/lecr,vite of Mambisa in the territory or Djugu, was a
wealthy mining village with 20.000 inhabitants before the conflict. On 11 October
2002, Lendu combatants from Bambu and Mabanga attacked Nizi. UPC had a
military camp in Nizi and the Lendu were accusing the inhabitants of Mambisa of
being pro-Hema. According to a local non-governmental organization. a total of 320
bodies were buried. The persons who buried them were able to identify 69 of them.
I 04. The village was attacked again on 20 July 2003 around I O a.m. by Lendu
combatants of FNI from Bambu. The attackers killed 22 civilians and abducted 15
others. The number of victims was limited. owing to the arrival of the Multinational
Force, which was able to stop the aggression and arrest four Len<lu combatants. On
23 August, Nizi was attacked again by combatants from Zanzi mountain, who
abducted 12 persons and killed 2 of them on their way to their military camp of
Mbao.
Mambasa: Operation effacer le tableau
I 05. Mambasa is a medium-sized town on the road to Heni, located in the territory
of Mambasa, inhabited by approximately 25,000 people. As Mambasa was not
affected by the conflict raging in the territories of Djugu and lrumu. its inhabitants
had maintained a fairly decent standard of living. TllC'usands of internally displaced
persons from lturi had moved to Mambasa. which was then considered safer than
the rest of the lturi district.
l 06. On l 2 October 2002, the forces of M LC and RCD-N, with the assistance of
UPC. attacked the town for the first time. 1 he aim or the operation, called
Operation e.[facer le tahleau40 W.\S apparently the control of the whole RCD-ML
1 '1 Sec Human Righi~ Watch. lturi: · C()\·ered in Blood ..
'> Operation "C'lean t!,c blackt>o~rd"
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area, notably the Beni airport and the economically active area of Beni-Butembo.
With the Mambasa attack. the region witnessed a new scale of violence
characterized by a premeditated operation and the use of looting, rape and summary
execution as tools of warfare.
107. The MLC and RCD-N forces remained in Mambasa, after taking it for the first
time, from 12 to 29 October 2002, after which the RCD-ML forces were able to
push them out. They were able to retake the town again on 27 November 2002 and
stayed until 5 February 2003; a month later, on 30 December 2002, a ceasefire
agreement was brokered by MONUC in Gbadolite.
108. During those two periods, the MLC and RCD-N forces, although under
different command, committed serious human rights abuses such as summary
executions, systematic rape, systematic looting and acts of cannibalism. After
Mambasa, similar abuses were also systematically carried out in the villages south
of the town and between Komanda and Eringeti, with the involvement of UPC. The
number of rape cases - mainly young girls or women between 12 and 25 years
old - also rose to an alarming kvel.
109. MONUC interviewed a total of 502 eyewitnesses and family members of
victims from 3 January to 20 January 2003; they reported the killing of 173
civilians, both adulls and children, in Mambasa, Komanda and on the two roads to
Beni. The reported cases included 12 incidents of cannibalism. Most of the victims
from Mambasa and neighbouring areas were reportedly killed by MLC or RCD-N
soldiers. whereas the majority of victims from Komanda were reportedly killed by
UPC elements. The incidents targeted mainly the Nande population to which Mbusa
Nyamwisi, President of RCD-ML, belongs, and later also Pygmy populations, who
were accused of assisting APC.
l I O. The first operation, which lasted from 12 to 29 October 2002. was carried out
under the MLC command of Colonel Freddy Ngalimu, alias Grand Mopao. The
second operation was carried out under the MLC command of Colonel Widdy
Ramses Masamba, alias Roi des imbeciles,41 and lasted from 27 November 2002 to
the end of January 2003, when the last MLC elements left Mambasa. Both
commanders were under the command of General Constant Ndima, located in
lsiro.42 General Ndima reported directly lo the MLC Chief of Staff, General Amuli.
He reportedly took the order from General Amuli to replace Freddy Ngalimu with
Colonel Ramses. According to an MLC informer, Colonel Rarnses is very close to
General Amuli, a Hema from lturi.
111 . Just after the preliminary findings were made public by MONUC, the MLC
authorities agreed to conduct an inquiry into the events. The report of the team was
the basis for the trial of 27 suspects from the MLC forces . The trial of the 27
individuals accused by MLC of involvement in the atrocities in and around
Mambasa began on 18 February and lasted until 25 February. The United Nations
• 1 Widdy Ramses Masamba was appointed in Nov.:mber 2003 as the chief of the Kindu-based
seventh military region.
42 Sevl!ral sources reportedly stated that General Ndima·s nickname was effacer le tableu and they
reponed that he was part of a group known as effa,·er le tableu established in 200 I during the
existence of FLC. The battalion callcJ effacer le tableu was well known for its tough personnel
and the way it behaved in war time. After the break-up of FI.C six months later. the battalion
reportedly remained in lsiro. and some of its companies were sent on tough missions like the
invasion of territories lost in Marnbasa.
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High Commissioner for Human Rights stated clearly that the trial was both illegal
and illegitimate.
112. Beyond the constitutional issue of its legitimacy, four additional issues about
this trial need to be pointed out. First the admission as evidence of self..
incriminating statements made by defendants held incommunicado during police or
military questioning. Second, the obvious disparity between the charges and the
sentences handed down. For instance, the charge of rape carried a maximum prison
sentence of 13 months. The charge for deserting the armed forces. which routinely is
punishable by death, most surprisingly carried 39 months in this '·court martia l" .
Third, no one was charged with any of the horrendous crimes against humanity and
war crimes, such as murder, group rape and cannibalism, referred to in the MONUC
report on the events in Mambasa (see S/2003/674). Fourth and finally, since the
sentencing, a wave of arrests of defence witnesses who had testified on behalf of the
accused has begun.
Collectivite of Baoyari Kilo: constant insecurity and summary executions
113 . The collectivite of Banyari Kilo, in Djugu territory, has been changing hands
between Hema and Lendu militias because of the attraction of its Kilo gold mines.
UPC entered the area around January 2002 and stayed there until March 2003 .
While there, UPC organized several attacks on Lendu localities. When they were
chased away by UPDF and Lendu militias in March 2003, Nyali inhabitants,
considered by Lendu as having hosted UPC. were harassed and killed.
114. On 15, 17 and 23 May 2003, Lendu combatants from Nyangaraye and
Ngotochu attacked the localities of Batata. Kilo. ltende and Lisey. They killed
around 50 civilians and abducted 28 girls. All the villages on the routes SindoniKilo
and Kilo-Mongbwalu were destroyed and deserted by their inhabitants after
several Lendu militia attacks. At least half of the population of Banyari Kilo, around
40,000 according to the Chief of the collectivite, went into hiding in the forest of
Madombo and Kirongazi during May and June 2003. Five health centres located in
Kilo, ltende, Kabakaba, Kilo-Etat and Kilo-Mission and one maternity centre in
Kilo-Mission were forced to close because they were almost completely looted.
Nioka: mass killing and rape of civilians, serious destruction of
social infrastructure
115. N ioka, a small town of 20,000 persons of mostly A lur origin, is located in the
colleclivite of Pandoro, in the territory of Mahagi. Nioka was first occupied by UPC,
then by FAPC under Commander Jerome Kakwavu following the split with the
former in September 2002. According to a witness, the Alur community had been
paying FAPC to protect them by giving them livestock. However, most of the FAPC
soldiers left on 28 May 2003. A certain Dilo from Nioka decided to gather together
all the inhabitants who had received some military training and organized an armed
group of 15 militia members. On the day of the attack, it was reportedly FAPC that
fired first with rocket-propelled grenades into the barracks housing the new militia
members, probably with the aim of fighting a newly created armed group.
116. On 10 June 2003, Nioka was attacked from 5.30 a.m. until around 2 p.m. by
Lcndu militias from Kpandroma and Livo. The militia killed around 55 civilians
according to the testimonies provided to MONUC by victims. Another 60 civilians
were abducted to carry the loot first to Livo, then to Kpandroma. Accorrling to an
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abducted girl, several girls were forced into sexual slavery. Only 56 of the hostages
were released, most of them after payment by their family members. Three days
later. the inhabitants went back escorted by FAPC to bury the dead. They reportedly
buried 70 bodies. several of them in one mass grave in Nioka. The Lendu militia
visited Nioka several times after this first attack to finish looting and burning all of
the buildings.
117. A certain Lego was reportedly the chief of the operations. Floribert Ndjabu.
the leader of FNI at that time, confirmed that the operation was conducted by Lego
and his 40 followers, without the consent of the FNI authorities of Kpandroma. He
added that Lego and 20 of his men were executed after this operation by FNI in
Kpandroma.
C. Political killings, abduction and forced displacement of
suspected opponents
118. The militia groups of lturi executed, abducted, arrested or forced to flee
persons they thought to be political opponents. as well as judges, intellectuals of
enemy ethnic groups, journalists and members of non-governmental organizations.
MONUC was able to carry out investigations into such abuses only in Bunia and
Aru, while they were under the authority of UPC and FAPC, respectively. This does
not mean that the other armed groups did not also commit political killings,
abductions and forced displacement of opponents.
1. Political killings, enforced disappearances, illegal arrest and forc.ed displacement
of selected persons by UPC
119. Soon after taking power in August 2002 in Bunia and later in other parts of
lturi. UPC launched a campaign of manhunts, with summary executions, arbitrary
arrests and forced disappearances. According to several witnesses, UPC had a preestablished
list of persons to eliminate in Bunia.43 UPC Commanders Bagonza,
Kisembo, Chief of Staff, and Aimable Saba Rafiki. Chief of Security. reportedly
directed the operation in Bunia. Those who were informed in time and were able to
go into hiding had their houses destroyed by fire and their belongings looted, which
suggests a desire to chase them for good. Among the victims were political
opponents, intellectuals, businessmen, religious leaders. j ournalists and
administrators of mainly Bira, Lendu and Nande origin. non•lturians but also a few
moderate Hema. In August and September 2002 alone. more than 100 people
reportedly became victims, in Bunia town, of this campaign. -14 A new campaign was
launched in May 2003, with the return of UPC to Bunia. This time. the victims were
mostly non-Iturians. Some professions such as taxi drivers and police officers were
spec ifically targeted.
120. Among the victims of the UPC manhunt campaign in August 2003 were lleri
Kuba, a 70·year-old Lendu, retired parliamentarian; Nasser Nbuna, 65-year-old non·
lturian, a former member of parliament; M. Ngura, Alur, Chef des Travaux of the
lnstitut superieur pedagogique together with his daughter; M. Mateso, Lendu
43 The list was reportedly drawn up by the Hema extremists of Bunia town. including the extremist
intellectuals of the lnstitut superieur pedagogique.
• 4 The number was given hy Human Right~ Watch in lr«ri: ··Covered in Blooct ·· ...
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director of discipline of the high school of Kigonze: Reverend Basimaki Byabasaija,
an Anglican church minister; Eric Duandro Akobi, a 38-year-old Protestant minister
and theology student: Monaco Mbaduale. a 25-year-old Lendu student of the Institut
superieur pedagogique; Ngure Gabriel Ukumu. a 45-year-old Alur administrative
secretary of Radio Candip: Selian, a Bira journalist of the same radio; Malili, a
police officer from lsiro; Giselaine Bofende. a Topoke worker of the nongovernmental
organization ABC. Several Lendu were also abducted, and taken to
the houses of Bosco, Bagonza or Lubanga. Their fate is unknown to date.45
121 . Several traditional eh iefs and adrn inistrators were killed in the interior of the
district mostly for not collaborating with UPC: Nobamuzi, Chief of the col/ectivite
of Babelebe, killed in December 2002; Matata. Chief of the collectivite of Basili.
killed in July 2002; Mundukukuwe, Chief of the collectivite of Baboa Bokowe,
killed in December 2002; Bulabato Aloise, Chief of the groupement of Chendabo,
killed in mid-2002; Fundi Kusu. Administrator of Bambu, killed in June 2002;
Richard Bokalala Elanga, RCD-ML Administrator of Djugu territory, killed on
11 May 2002.'11'
122. Chief Dieudonne Bulamuzi Binmangili, the 52-year-old traditional Chief of
the collectivite of Andisoma, was forcibly abducted in Bunia on 5 September 2002.
Earlier that same day, when Nyankunde was attacked by a coalition of Ngiti and
APC, Chief Bulamuzi was able to escape with a member of the judiciary police. The
two were able to reach Bunia by passing through Sota, Masabo and Badiya. In each
place, they informed the UPC elements of the attack and requested military
assistance. Witnesses interviewed by MONUC stated that, when he reached Bunia,
Chief Bulamuzi was taken to the UPC headquarters; he was interrogated by
Commander Kisembo and appan:nlly tortured; Kisembo accused him of being aware
of the Ngiti attack on Nyankunde. Chief Bulamuzi's condition was very serious
when he was taken home. Witnesses further stated that, around 6 p.m., six UPC
elements, including Jaguar from the Senga family, arrived and took Bulamuzi away
again. A few minutes after they left, the family heard a gun shot. When they went
out. they saw blood just outside the gate but no body. The same day, the UPDF
commander, who had been informed, went to see UPC commanders Kisembo and
Bagonza for some explanation. They told him that Chief Bulamuzi had been beaten
because of his complicity with the Ngiti and sent to hospital. The body has never
been returned to the family. Instead, the whole Bulamuzi family, being under
constant threat, decided to leave Bunia.
123. Adriko Johnson, a 33-year~old Lubara, assistant Mayor of Bunia and member
of UPC, disappeared on 29 September 2002. It appears that Mr. Johnson left his
home on 29 September 2002 in the afternoon and never returned. The following day,
his brother-in-law found out that he had last been seen on his motorcycle near the
UPC military camp. All the efforts of the family members to have UPC launch an
investigation were frustrated. His body has never been found . It appears that one
possible reason for his disappearance could be the fact that he had given refuge in
his house, in August 2002, to Lendu civilians when UPC troops were searching for
4~ Some names listed by local non-governmental organizations are: Claude, 30. son of Valery;
Zakayo. 24; Claudine. 22; Loba, 48; Ndalo. 29; Justin. 28; Edward Wamba. 54: and Pierre Minzi
Kakado. 30.
4 " Reportedly by UPDF soldiers under the command of the 1--lema po litical elite.
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Lendu. Adriko Johnson had also apparently publicly criticized the targeting and
killing of Lendu and Ngiti .
124. Abbe Boniface Bwanalonga. the Ngiti Roman Catholic priest of Mongbwalu
parish, was a, rested shortly after UPC captured Mongbwalu. on 20 November 2002,
together with two nuns. The nuns were later released. When they went back to hring
food to the Abbe, the UPC combatants refused to give them permission to see him
and chased them away. Abbe Bwanalonga has not been seen since. The
disappearance of the Abbe was very badly received by the Lendu/Ngiti community
who held him in high esteem. They later justified the killing of Abbe Ngona of
Nyakasanza as an act of revenge for the killing of Abbe Bwanalonga.
125. Joseph Eneko Nguaza, 4 7-year-old Alur Governor of ltur i. appointed by UPC
with the aim of gaining wider support us ing his well-respected personality, was
killed on 21 November 2002. The Governor was based in Aru and was delaying his
departure for Bunia. Meanwhile, he announced that he was dissociating himself
from UPC and initiated peace talks with different groups. UPC sent a delegation
headed by Floribcrt Kisembo. then Chief of Staff of UPC. to bring the Governor to
Bunia. On 21 November. before leaving for Bunia. the Governor set out for Mahagi
to install a new territorial administrator. Just before his departure, the then UPC
Commander in Aru, J~rome Kakwavu, changed the Governor's bodyguards and
driver. The delegation was ambushed 8 km from Mahagi. Except for two
bodyguards who managed to escape. all the passengers were k illed: Governor
Eneko, his driver, his secretary, the Chief of the Public Office and five other guards.
According to the testimony of local residents, obtained by Human Rights Watch, the
attackers were UPC soldiers."7 According to the testimony provided to MONUC by
two witnesses who lived in Aru at the time of the event and who had met the two
survivors, the operation was organized by Commander Jerome. who received a
considerable sum for his services.
126. Jacques Kabasele, the 43-year-old President of the Tribunal de Grande
Instance of Bunia, from Kasai, was arrested on 11 November 2002 by UPC. accused
of having contacts with their enemies. The judge was arrested by two persons from
the Direction generate de migrarion. which was under the command of Rafiki, and
taken to the prison of that unit. He was kept there for two days without any formal
charges. On the third day, a team came to interrogate him, mainly on his contacts
with Beni, Kinshasa and the outside world. They also told him that the order to
arrest him came from Lubanga himself. He was not physically th reatened but was
kept there for 18 days and then released without charge. After his release, he was
threatened and left Bunia in April 2003.~7
127. Honore Musoko, a lawyer and president of the Bunia-based human rights
non-governmental organization Justice Plus, tried to defend several victims abused
by UPC authorities. He also worked for a short period as Minister of Justice under
Jean-Pierre Bemba. He was accused of working with former Governor Jean-Pierre
Lompondo and of being an enemy of UPC. Honore Musoko was forced to flee the
region in November 2002, but UPC authorities raided his organization, Justice Plus.
on 5 February 2003. after he gave an interview to an international radio network on
the human rights situation in lturi. The UPC authorities then went to the office of
Bunia Business Communications, owned by Musoko. arrested two workers and
4 7 Sec lluman Rig.hls Watch. /111r i "Co,·en·cl in /Jfo od ·· ...
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seized the equipment. One of the members of Justice Plus who was also an officer of
Bunia Business Communications was given refuge in the MONUC offices until
UPC sent a letter stating that he had freedom of movement. The offices of Justice
Plus were visited again by UPC in May 2003, all documents and materials looted
and its members forced to go into hiding.H
128. MON UC also received testimony from eight victims of harassment, five Bira,
one Nande, one Ngiti and one Topoke, who were forced to ·1eave Bunia. These
victims are mostly intellectuals, journalists, teachers and civil servants. All were
reportedly on a list of persons to be eliminated and six of them had their houses set
on fire by UPC elements; the parents of the Ngiti victim were killed after he left
Bunia. They all left Bunia between May and September 2003 and have not come
back since.
129. There have also been several cases of harassment of humanitarian workers and
church members, with the aim of halting the delivery of humanitarian assistance to
members of "rival" ethnic groups. According to Human Rights Watch, there have
been more than 30 cases where humanitarian workers have been arrested,
threatened, beaten, or expelled from the area.47 In some cases, UPC soldiers have
arrested aid workers who have refused to provide them with food and medicines.
UPC expelled even the representative of the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat from Bunia in November
2003, for protesting against the illegal arrest of humanitarian workers. Priests also
came under threat when they tried to assist Lendu civilians. On 15 January 2003, the
parish of Nioka, where a centre for malnourished children had been set up with the
assistance of an international non-governmental organization, was attacked by four
UPC elements and one Hema called Jabu. The foreign priests working in the centre
were arrested and beaten and the centre completely looted.
130. Mark Deneckere, a Belgian priest of the congregation Missionnaires
d' A frique, was expelled in early 2003 for having helped a group of displaced Lendu.
In his testimony to Human Rights Watch.47 Father Mark stated that the Lendo came
to seek refuge in August when UPC was attacking Lendu inhabitants of Bunia. UPC
got angry when the international press picked up the story. They said they had not
been informed that 120 Lendu had been given refuge by the M issionnaires
d'Afrique. On 11 February 2003. the priest was called in for interrogation. UPC
accused him of helping the Lendu and of giving them weapons. On 14 February,
Father Mark was given 48 hours to leave lturi .
131 . MONUC received reports of numerous cases of summary executions, threats
or intimidation committed by UPC elements when they again took total control of
Bunia in May 2003. The intimidations targeted mainly the non-natives, the Bira, the
Nande, the few Lendu left in town, some businessmen, journalists, taxi drivers and
police officers. UPC also attacked the non-Iturian civil servants, accusing them of
being pro-Lendu. Even after the installation of the Jturi Brigade, the selected
killings continued, committed by UPC elements dressed in civilian clothes during
the night. The level of violence created the biggest mass exodus in the history of
Bunia, forcing around 200,000 persons from Bunia and the surrounding villages
nearby to flee their homes.
132. A number of members of the national police and taxi drivers stated to MONUC
that the members of their profession were victims of targeted summary executions
by UPC soldiers. The taxi drivers, in majority non-lturians, were indeed accused of
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having driven Lendu out of lhe town, while the national police officers, most of
them non-lturians, were considered to be pro-Lendu. From 6 May 2003 to the end of
the month, 11 police officers and 12 taxi driver were apparently victims of
summary executions by UPC.
2. Political killings, illegal arrest and forced displacement of selected persons
by FAPC
133. After September 2002, a former RCD-ML commander, Jerome Kakwavu, took
over Aru in the name of UPC.48 Disagreements between UPC and Jerome appeared
at an early stage, regarding control of the significant financial benefits of the
territory, where there is an important market at Ariwara where gold. diamonds and
timber can be traded and there are two tobacco companies and the Aru Customs, the
last safe exit point from lturi. Finally Jerome left UPC, created FAPC on
6 September 2002 and extended his area of influence to Mahagi after reaching an
agreement with FNI.
134. In the territory under FAPC control, Aru and also Mahagi, since UPC was
driven out in March 2003, mass violence appears to have been limited. However,
there were allegations of killing either to get rid of potential opponents or to
maintain control over part of che economic activities.
135. In August 2003, MONUC human rights investigators were able to visit first
Aru and Ariwara and, the day after, Mahagi, all under the control of Commander
Jerome. They spoke to a few victims but they were always followed by the civilian
intelligence officers and told not to ask questions about security. In Uganda.
investigators met with well-informed sources from Aru who reported the illegal
arrest of two civilians by Jerome. According to their testimony, which corroborates
information received from other independent sources. the population under the
control of Jerome is living under serious psychological threat, with no way of
showing opposition; the few who tried to oppose him were all executed.
136. On 22 May 2003, a group of FAPC elements under Commander Raymond
lsala tried to overthrow Jerome. The coup failed reportedly thanks to the assistance
of U PDF Commander Justus Basisira, based in Arua, Uganda, who intervened with
one platoon. On the same day, the commander of the airport, Jean Ngoyi
Mwanawasa, was arrested by Jerome, brought before a so-called tribunal and killed
in the presence of Commander Justus. After this attempt, Jerome declared that he
would kill anybody who had been close to Raymond lsala. Two civilian victims who
were close to the commander decided to leave Aru on the same day for Arua,
together with Commander Idris Hobale. During the days that followed , the two
victims, Commander Idris and his two body guards were all abducted in Ugandan
territory on different days by a group composed or Jerome's militia and elements of
Ugandan military intelligence and put in a military jail under the command of Justus
Basisira. They were kepi in jail for 18 days without interrogation until 10 June,
when they were told they would be et free . However, on the same day. Commander
Ali, Jerome's chief of military intelligence, arrived, accompanied by a Ugandan
intelligence officer called Chris, and took them by force back to Aru to be put in a
container with other detainees. The container that was used as a detention facility
had also housed the former Administrator of Aru. Kanyi Lubara, for a period of two
48 Commander Jerome claims 10 be Banyamulc.:nge hu1 ii i,;; more likely that he is a Ranyarwanda
from North Kivu. in Rulshuru terr itory.
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months. The Administrator was released after paying enough money to appease
Jerome. The two civilian victims and Commander Idris were called the day after by
Jerome. stripped naked and flogged. After being tortured, the three men were put
back in the container and given no food or water for four days. On the fifth day, the
Ugandan Commander Justus came back and took the two civilian detainees back to
Arua. The victims were kept another two days in jail in Arua and released with no
explanation. The bodyguards of Commander Idris who were taken out of the jail in
Arua by Commander Justus to be brought back to Aru never reappeared and
Commander Idris stayed in the container. As of December 2003. Idris was still in
custody.
137. According to credible sources, Commander Justus of UPDF is paid by Jerome
to serve his interests. He is also policing Arua and catching military defectors from
FAPC to take them back to Aru. MONUC has obtained the names of three such exFAPC
who were reportedly brought back by Commander Justus and killed by
Jerome.
D. Children associated with armed groups
138. The information on children associated with armed groups was gathered
during special investigations, as part of MONUC regular monitoring and advocacy
work, through preliminary interviews with more than 200 children associated with
armed groups, with partner organizations, during field visits, including to a small
number of military camps. and interviews with military and other authorities. It is
far from being a complete picture of the presence and use of children given the very
limited, uneven and at times complete lack of access to children in the different
groups and to their communities, both to obtain and to corroborate information.
Taking testimony from children is also particularly sensitive. Nevertheless, as has
been reported and witnessed many times. there can be no doubt that all of th1: armed
groups have systematically recruited, used and abused children - ranging from 7 to
17 years old - throughout the district of lturi. ,IQ
139. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has ratified both the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol thereto on the involvement of children
in armed conflict. Obligations under those international instruments, further defined
under the terms of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and
ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, ban the recruitment of
anyone under l 8 years of age into the military forces of a State party. The Protocol
also bans any armed group found within the national territory of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo from recruiting any child below the age of 18. The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, ratified by the Democratic Republic of
the Congo on 30 March 2002, defines as a war crime the conscription or enlistment
of children under the age of 15 into national armed forces or armed groups and their
active participation in hostilities.
140. Presidential Decree Law 66 of December 2000 and article 184 of the Interim
Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo brought these international
obligations into the realm of domestic law. although recruitment has yet to be
4 " The youngest child associated with an armed group interviewed by the Child Protection Section
of MON UC, in Tchornia in September 2003. was a 7-year-old hoy who claimed !hat he had
served for some time with PUSIC.
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criminalized. The Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002, concerning the
resolution of the lturi conflict and establishing the lturi Pacification Commission,
expressly recognized these international and national obligations to children
associated with the armed groups in lturi. including minimum protection measures
for children found among the various armed groups. ln April 2003. the lturi
Pacification Commission, within its peace agreement, made a solemn appeal to
respect those national and international obligations through the creation of
conditions for an environment facilitating the demobilization of those children.
I. A profile of children associated with armed groups in lturi: fighting for survival
Children became soldiers because they were orphaned, sought vengeance or did not
have anyone 10 care for them. Etienne Nembe, Chief of Intelligence, UPC
(interview, 2003)
If I had to give a weapon lo a two-year-old [to defend his community] I would do so.
Chief Kawa, PUSIC (interview, 2003)
Many children decide to enrol because they lost their parents after the massacres.
Everyone was obliged lo resist, even women and children. Commander Banga, FNI/
FRPI (interview, 2003)
[Children) were looking for protection or support when they joined [my] troops.
Commander Jerome Kakwavu Bukande, FAPC (interview, 2003)
141 . As already indicated, all of the armed groups in lturi have recruited children
into their ranks over the past few years. Although the exact number of children is
unknown, child protection partners believe that. as a conservative estimate, at least
40 per cent of each militia force are children below the age of 18, with a significant
minority below the age of 15. Contacts and requests for information on the number
of minors in each armed group have been made on a systematic basis since March
2003 but have not so far yielded accurate information. including in the context of
the Comite de concertation des groupes armes. Groups that have recru ited children
into their ranks are often hesitant to give child protection agents reliable information
on the full extent of child participation in their forces, and indeed at times have
clearly given blatantly false information. For example, FAPC insisted to the
MON UC Chi Id Protection Section in an interview on 28 December 2003 that they
had gathered all of their children at Aru. When the team travelled later that day to
another FAPC-controlled area 100 km to the south at Kandoy. it was presented with
four child members of the platoon stationed there. fn addition, obtaining a fixed
number of children associated with lturi armed groups proves a difficult task, as the
armed groups have divided and regrouped around the shifting political and military
exigencies of the region throughout the conflict. A number of the children
interviewed recounted how they had passed from one group to another at different
times, some even alleging that they were first recruited by AFDL in 1998. Others
claimed they started with FLC or A PC before moving on to other groups.
142. The presence first of the multinational force (Operation Artemis) in June 2003
and its subsequent replacement by the MONUC lturi Brigade had an impact on the
number of children in armed groups by reducing the level of conflict and facilitating
the release of children. It is difficult to know how many have been released by the
armed groups as not all went through any kind of process, but some progress has
been made (see paras. 156-158 below). Few new reports of recruitment have been
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received over the past few months. Nevertheless, current estimates suggest that
there are still several thousand children - possibly around 6,000 - in UPC, FAPC,
FNI , FRPI, FPDC and PUSIC. with many more attached Lo loosely formed local
defence forces or militia. In addition, the former APC also has numerous children in
its ranks, though most are not in lturi. In December 2003. MONUC interviewed
several mothers who said that their children had joined APC in lturi after the
massacres of September 2002 in Nyankunde and remained in APC ranks in and
around Beni.
143. Recruitment into all armed groups has been both "voluntary" and through
abduction, often as the children were in the markets or in the streets where they
were forced to get into trucks and taken away. UPC recruitment drives took place
regularly throughout 2002 and early 2003. FAPC was reportedly recruiting as late as
July 2003 around Aru and Mahagi. PUSIC also recruited in 2003, including in
September according to some reports. During the frequent attacks on civilian
settlements perpetrated by militia of one ethnicity against another, children and
families were thrown into the logic of survival at any cost. FNIIFRPJ Commander
Augustin Ngabo-Tchepo stated thar, in the Bambu area of Djugu territory. almost all
the children of Bambu were recruited during the series of attacks on Barnbu (in
January/February 2003). Furthermore, the massive recruitment and utilization of
children of all ethnicities on the part of RCD-K/ML in Ituri prior to the Hema-Lendu
schism left large numbers of children at risk of re-recruitment by the forces that
controlled their home areas at the time.
144. The scope of this report does not include examining in detail the (often
complex) reasons why children joined armed groups in lturi. As stated in interviews
with children who have been released they include basic survival, the desire for
revenge, especially for the killing of family members, adventure. and ethn ic-based
reasons. Whatever the reasons, the term "voluntary" must be treated with caution
given the extremely limited options available. Whether ·•volunteer" or forced
recruits, most children interviewed said they soon became disillusioned with the
extreme conditions in the training camps and on the battlefield. The child 's choices
to remain or leave at that moment were even more restricted. Even for children
released from an armed group, the risk of re-recruitment remains. although for the
time being there has been a reduction in the level of conflict.
145. When renewed fighting broke out in lturi in 2003, most of a group of J 63
children who had been repatriated from a Ugandan training camp and re integrated
into their families were cut off from protection agencies. According to the testimony
of SOS-Grand Lacs at the time, 130 were reportedly re-recruited by UPC and sent
into fighting units.50 The Child Protection Section spoke with one of the children
who returned from the UPDF camp at Chakwaozi in 2003 . According to the child.
•· . .. in 2003, after the attacks on the (South Hemal town of Bogoro. I went back into
the UPC under Commander Germain". He was I 2 years old at the time.
146. FNI/FRPI, although based in village units and having apparently demobilized
a large majority of their child recruits into their home villages with the help of aid
agencies, are not immune to the practice of re-recruitment of children. A child
protection agency official alleged that FNI may still be using former FNI children in
local defence forces, designed to protect their home villages from attack . The
l " Se~ Human Rights Watch. lturi: ··covered in Blood '" ...
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official further stated that FNI/FRPI know very well that, if the security situation
deteriorates, they will be able to call up these child ex-combatants and reintegrate
them into their militia.
2. Training of children
147. Once recruited, whether forcibly or voluntarily, children were either trained in
organized camps or in ad hoe sites in villages and towns. The attached map shows
the locations of 28 training camps and 9 military bases, used by FNI/ FPRI, UPC.
APC, PUSIC and FAPC, where children were either seen being trained or
themselves claimed to have been trained over the past two years. The training lasted
from several days to several months depending on the capability of the armed group
and/or its foreign backers. As a rule, the Lendu/Ngiti militias (FNI/FRPI) seem to
have been offered a summary training either in their home villages or nearby, given
that recruitment tended to be community-based and according to operational needs.
Kpandroma and Zumbe were, however, known to be regular training sites for FNI/
FRPI. UPC, PUSIC and FAPC were provided with military advisers and undertook
the establishment of more stable camps. By all accounts, training conditions were
generally physically gruelling and extremely hard, in terms of food rations and
punishment regimes (children cited death threats, beatings and in one case an
execution). At times trainers were minors themselves.
148. Rwandan and Ugandan trainers were also said to have been present in some of
the camps, such as those at Mandro, Rwanpara and Montawa. In a number of cases,
children were reportedly transferred to Uganda or Rwanda for specialist training
with adults, the first such large-scale training (of APC child recruits) by Uganda
occurring in 1999. The best known case is that of some 163 UPC children, cited
above, who were located undergoing training in Uganda and returned and
reintegrated into their families in lturi by UNICEF in 200 I . As late as July 2003,
there were allegations of PUSIC transferring more than 200 children from Tchomia
to UPDF training camps in Rwebisengo County and at Kibuku in Uganda. While
PUSIC claimed that the children were taken for security and/or educational
purposes, several boys and a girl interviewed subsequently alleged that they had
received military training before being returned to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to fight in September 2003. Likewise, allegations that children were taken to
Rwanda, for example in September 2002, for training in artillery have also been
received from different sources. This is in clear violation of the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed
conflict, which condemns recruitment, training and use across national borders.
3. Use of children in combat and attacks
149. On completion of training, children were frequently used in hostilities,
depending on the military of the time. Sending children into battle constitutes
potential violation of their right to life, survival and development. There is little
precise or complete verified information so far regarding the names and numbers of
children who have died or suffered injuries as a result of taking pan in hostilities in
lturi. Most children interviewed told of having been sent to fight in various battles
in 2002 and 2003. Testimonies of individual children report losses of other children,
for example in Dele and Nyankunde (September 2002); lrumu (November 2002)
including a 10-year-old; Kasenyi (2003): Marabo. Tchai (December 2002/January
2003); Bambu (February 2003); Buie (March 2003); Bogoro (March 2003); Drodro
-·--··---- -------
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(April 2003}; and Linga (September 2003). Once conditions allow, further research
needs to be done on this issue to document individual cases in detail, if only so that
the families can be informed, but also as part of the documenting of violations
committed by those who recruited the children in the first place.
150. In some cases, children did not necessarily take part in the fighting itself but in
subsequent pillaging. This was particularly true in the case of attacks by Lendu/
Ngiti groups; examples include an FNI attack on Tchomia on 31 May 2003 where
women and children carried loot back to their bases in Zumbe and Loga; and in
April 2003, when Lendu militia. accompanied by women and children, completely
pillaged houses and other buildings and took away many items, as well as cows,
goats and other animals.
4. Presence and use of girls in armed groups
151 . All of the armed groups in lturi recruited girls (very often forcibly) into their
ranks, although few have been brought forward for official separation. Once
released. a climate of denial, shame and fear prevents many of them from seeking
assistance. Tenuous links with military commanders sometimes persist even after
release. The girls have played a range of roles. Trained to handle weapons they have
taken part in combat and worked as escorts and domestics.
152. For many, however, entry into an armed group meant being subjected to sexual
abuse. A number of accounts indicate that the sexual abuse started in the training
camps, with instructors being responsible. and persisted throughout the training. It
should be noted that two girls interviewed by MONUC said that the presence of
women officers in the respective training camps protected them from sexual abuses
at the time. In some cases, sexual abuse. when it did occur, was of limited duration
or was carried out in a sporadic manner, with different perpetrators depending on the
situation at hand. Other girls were subjected to a more regular pattern of sexual
abuse, effectively repeated rape. over longer periods, assigned to one military
officer for example. These girls are commonly referred to as "war wives". In many
ways the girls suffer a double jeopardy, many reportedly serving both as fighting
elements in active combat and concomitantly being used to satisfy the sexual
appetites of their commanders. Some, however, were reportedly abducted solely for
use as sexual slaves.:;1
153. One witness stated that girls as young as 14 were abducted, apparently for
sexual purposes, by members of FNI at Lalu, Goda, Vissa and Kakro villages in
Djugu territory beginning in September 2003 . One commander reportedly told the
villagers that it was on his orders that the girls were taken, stating" ... the soldier
who takes a girl, that's his pleasure; the girl is his ... he will come to pay the dowry
later ... ". There is little information about the current whereabouts of these girls. A
15-year-old girl allegedly abducted in April 2002 in Luguba by UPC described how
she was banded over to a commander "as his wife'' as soon as she arrived at Buie
training camp. In October and November 2003, the Child Protection Section
received information that UPC forcibly abducted girls in another part of Djugu
territory. On one occasion, a witness reported that a woman was beaten to death
trying to prevent her 15-year-old daughter from being forcibly taken. In the same
~• The Cape Town Principles of 1997 identify any girls used as sexual slaves or "'war wives·· as
child soldiers for identification purposes, whether or not they received previous training of a
military nature.
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community, on 30 November, two girls. aged 14 and 15, were reportedly taken from
their homes by military of the same unit. to be used as sexual slaves. One of the
kidnappers was reportedly an adolescent of Bira ethnicity, aged 18. On JO June,
Lendu militias reportedly abducted at least seven girls as war wives during an attack
on Nioka, where an FAPC group was based.
154. The deployment of international troops in lturi in mid-2003 facilitated the
release of some adolescent girls and access to support programmes to help them deal
with some of the consequences. Even while members of armed groups, some of
them had required medical and even hospital treatment for the consequences of
violent abuse. Others are now child-mothers. But it is likely that many st ill remain
within the groups. The question of the status of the undoubtedly numerous war
wives is a serious one, as many traditional beliefs dictate that once a girl is sexually
''taken" by a man, she is his property. The issue simply becomes one of payment to
the family of a dowry. An FAPC colonel stated in an interview with the Child
Protection Section on 9 November 2003, referring to these girl victims of abduction
and sexual abuse within his ranks, that there would be ·• ... difficulties in taking
these girls out of these forced 'marriages'".
5. Use of children by armed groups in the exploitation of natural resources:
a vicious circle
155. In December 2003 , the Child Protection Section visited the Kilo-Etat and Iga
Barriere/Nizi areas, where there are gold fields, the latter controlled by UPC militia
and the former by FNI. In the UPC-controlled lga Barriere area. the former
headquarters of the Kilo Moto Mining Company. the Section staff saw that three
quarters of a mine pit team were under 18 years of age, most being between 11 and
15. Sources at the site alleged that the children present in the mine were all active or
former child soldiers who worked on behalf of their UPC commanders. At KiloEtat.
an FNI commander acknowledged that he had 12 children in his armed group,
the youngest of whom was 11 years old, and also that there were "a lot of chi ld
soldiers" at Bambumines (nearby). These preliminary reports merit further
investigation to assess the extent of the use of children associated with armed
groups in exploiting minerals, the profits of which are subsequently used to
purchase weapons, some of which almost certainly end up in the hands of children .
6. Prosptcts for separating children from armed groups
l 56. Child protection partners and UNICEF have been actively participating in the
planning for disarmament and reinsertion programmes for the lturi armed groups.
Since the start of the lturi pacification process, the installation of the lturi Interim
Administration and the arrival of the multinational force in June 2003,
representatives of armed groups have been changing cheir attitudes with regard to
children. UPC and later FAPC began unilateral separation of minors from the camps
without prior arrangements with child protection partners. FNI have sent many
children directly back into their home communities, where a measure of school
access has been provided to the child.ren. Sixteen UPC commanders, without
following procedures, reportedly released scores of children in November, telling
them to go to Bunia where they were led to believe that a ·'school for child soldiers"
had been set up. Many of them turned up at MONUC offices or one of the Transit
and Orientation Centres. The PUSIC leadership even established a transit facility for
former child combatants in the vicinity of Chief Kawa's residence in Tchornia.
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Identification of local partners for child protection and reintegration work in the
different communities is ongoing.
157. The first formal family reunifications from transit care facilities in lturi started
in September/October 2003 _ With improved access and communications. contacts
between community networks have facilitated family-tracing activ ities. MONUC
and the Comite de concertation des groupes armes have carried out verification
missions to proposed regroupemenr sites. sometimes with child protection partners.
Official figures of minors received are however far short of the real situation, owing
perhaps to the deterrent factor of possible future criminal proceedings. In many
instances, children have been demobilized and sent back to school by the
communities who mobilized them in the first place. UPC commanders released
children without letting them go through any formal process or transit facilities_
15 8. Prospects for the children still associated with armed groups in Ituri, and even
those already released. will depend very much on the development of security,
access to all parts of the district, and to the start of a viable disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration plan for adults. This is important, as the
investigation team spoke to a number of children demobilized from armed groups in
lturi who expressed extreme reluctance to return to their home vi II ages for fear of
re-recruitment by armed groups who still exercise control over the local population,
often through intimidation and terror. A child protection worker in lturi stated the
situation plainly to the Child Protection Section in Bunia: " Even where
disarmament. demobilization and reintegration of children is going well, such as in
the FNI areas, it is clear that, should the situation turn bad, these armed groups
know exactly where these children are and will certainly use them''_
VI. Conclusion and recommendations
159. Despite the disengagement of foreign forces from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the establishment of the Transitional Government and the integration of
all of the armed groups into the new Congolese national army, lturi remains a
battlefield for the proxies of Rwanda, Uganda and Kinshasa. The security conditions
improved by the end of 2003 only thanks to the Operation Artemis. the subsequent
deployment of the lturi Brigade under Chapter VII. and progress towards restoration
of the rule of law resulting from the efforts of MONUC in cooperation with
members of the international community. For security to stabilize and become
sustainable it is now time for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to assume its responsibilities and assert its authority.
160. As a result of the robust action of the lturi Brigade, some of the loca I warlords
revised their policies. and created new alliances to actively resist the pacification
efforts of MONUC. This volatile situation does not encourage the large number of
internally displaced persons who are still in camps in Bunia and elsewhere in lturi,
as well as in North Kivu and Uganda, to return to their places of origin, where their
homes and social structures are often completely destroyed or occupied by military
elements.
161. To bring real peace to the region and end human rights abuses several issues
need to be addressed together by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the international community, including:
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(a) Continuation of a robust implementation of the MON UC mandate under
Chapter VII of the Charter:
(b) State control over natural resources to end their exploitation;
(c) Full restoration of State authority, with adequate police, competent and
impartial administration and military capabilities;
(d) Intervention of the State to revise the land Jaw and all existing land
certificates;
(e) Full implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration programme, beginning with the children;
(f) Rebuilding of public infrastructure and repair of private housing;
(g) Information campaigns to encourage the return of communities to their
places of origin;
(h) Restoration of local conflict management initiatives with the aim of
rebuilding trust and reconciliation among all the inhabitants of lturi .
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Annex l
Armed and political groups involved in the Ituri conflict
A. lturi armed groups
None of the Ituri armed groups can be considered an armed wing of a political
movement, as they were originally created as military movements. The political
wings were an afterthought. created to facilitate their integration into the local and
national structures and negotiations, and to be used as an interface with the
international community.
Union des patriotes congolais (UPC)
Initial leader: Thomas Lubanga
Current leaders: Lubanga for UPC-Lubanga group
Floribert Kisembo for UPC-Kisembo group
Ethnic composition: Predominately Hema North/Gegere
UPC was created as an embryo in January 2001, with funding from a large
Gegere business community and the support of Uganda. Later, it enlarged its
infiuence to some Hema South, notably Chief Kawa Panga Mandro. However,
personal rivalries, as well as the Hema North monopoly of key positions. led to a
split in September 2002. UPC began existing officially only in mid-2002, when
Lubanga left RCD-K/ML and initiated the battle for control of Bunia. UPC
eventually took control of Bunia in August 2001 with the help of the Ugandan army.
It turned to Rwanda for support and formed an alliance with RCD-Goma in January
2003 . Having turned from Uganda politically, it was ousted from Bunia by the
Ugandan army in March 2003 but fought its way back into the town in May. After
the 1.lt:parture of Lubanga for Kinshasa in August 2003, the Chief of Staff,
Commander Kisembo, announced early in December 2003 that he was the new
leader of UPC. This resulted in a split: those responding to Kisembo and located in
Bunia and those responding to Lubanga represented in lturi by his new Chief of
Staff, Bosco.
Parti pour l'unite et la sauvegarde de l'integrite du Congo (PUSIC)
Initial leader:
C urrent leader:
Chief Kawa Panga Mandro
Chief Kisembo Bitamara•
Ethnic composition: Predominantly Hema South
PUSJC was created in October/November 2002 by the former UPC member
Chief Kawa. Its militia rec.:eives its supplies mainly from Uganda, as part of its
proxy strategy. Uganda tried to merge it with FNI and FPDC, under the umbrella of
FIPI. That has totally failed. PUSIC allied itself with UPC against the Lendu in
Bunia in May 2003, but that alliance of convenience lasted only a few days. During
June 2003. Chief Kawa spent two weeks in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, having
been introduced to Colonel A 1-Qadhafi by President Museveni, during which time
he converted to Islam and is now reported to be receiving large monetary
• At the time of writing of the present report.
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contributions from the Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya. PUSIC is reportedly incrc::asingly
involved in arms trafficking across Lake Albert.
Forces populaires pour la democratie au Congo (FPDC)
Current leader: Thomas Unencan (a Member of Parliament during
the Mobutu era)
Ethnic composition: Predominantly Alur
FPDC was created in October 2002 by Uganda. It comprises mostly Alur from
Mahagi with the support of Alur exiled in Paidha, Uganda, to counter UPC. Around
500 Congolese Alur received a brief military training in Uganda, close to Mahagi
territory. It was supported by Uganda as part of the FIPI coalition, which did not last
long. The military branch of the movement was dislocated by FAPC. wh ich took the
control of the Mahagi area with the support of FNI at the end of June 2003.
Forces armees du peuple congolais (FArC)
Current leader: Commander Jerome Kakwavu Bukande {a Banyarwanda
from North Kivu}
Ethnic composition: Mostly non-lturians
FAPC was created in March 2003 as the political umbrella for Commander
Jerome's battalion in control of Aru territory. Commander Jerome has changed
alliances several times, moving from FAC to RCD-K/ML. to RCD·N, to UPC,
before creating his own group with the support of Uganda. Following an
arrangement to share security and income in Mahagi together with FPDC and FNI,
FAPC attacked its " partners" and claimed control over the town and the territory at
the end of June 2003. Commander Jerome remains in touch with Ugandans while
claiming to be loyal to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Front nationaliste integrationniste (FNI)
Initial/current leader: Floribc::rt Ndjabu
Ethnic composition: Predominantly Lendu North
FNI was created at the beginning of 2003 as the political umbrella of the
Lendu armed groups located mainly in Kpandroma and Rethy. The party claims
broad support from the Lendu community in its efforts to oppose UPC. FNI has
benefited from military training and support from RCD-K/ML and. through it, from
Kinshasa. During 2001-2002, one of the Ugandan factions is likely to have supplied
this group with light automatic weapons on an irregular basis. FNI established
alliances with the Lendo militia groups based in Lipri and Zumbe as well as with the
Ngiti FRPI and participated in the political negotiations of the fturi Pacification
Commission as the Lendu party representing the entire Lendu community. In the
field different geographical armed groups seem to keep their independence,
however. Supported by Uganda as part of the FIPI coalition, it joined the Ugandan
army in driving UPC from Bunia in March 2003 .
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Front de resistance patriotique de l'lturi (FRPI)
Current leader: Commander Germain Katanga
Ethnic composition: Predominantly Ngiti/Lendu South
FRPI was launched in November 2002 as the political umbrella of Ngiti armed
groups mainly from Gety, Bogoro and Songolo. Ngiti militia initially benefited from
the support of Ngiti defectors from APC. They have also received occasional
support from one faction of the RCD-K/M L. FRPI joined the Ugandans in driving
UPC from Bunia in March 2003 and, together with FNI, briefly controlled Bunia in
May 2003 . Since then, FRPI has created an alliance with FNI and one of its
commanders. Germain, was appointed Chief of Staff of the united militia.
Front pour l'intcgration et la paix en lturi (FIPI)
Composition: Platform of three ethnic-based parties
A coalition of three parties. PUSIC, FN I and FPDC. created in December 2002
with Ugandan support. Its main objective was getting rid of UPC, with no apparent
programme. After the attack on Bogoro by FNI, the coalition collapsed.
B. Regional political groups
Mouvement de liberation du Congo (MLC)
Current leader: Jean-Pierre Bemba
Ethnic composition: Mixed ethnic groups
MLC. originally backed by Uganda. was based in Gbadolite. The movement
tried twice to enter lturi: in 200 I Jean-Pierre Bemba moved to Bunia as the
President of the short-lived FLC coalition of Ugandan-backed rebel groups, and in
2002 MLC attacked Mambasa in western lturi with the aim of taking control of
Beni, but was forced to withdraw after a ceasefire agreement signed under the
auspices of MON UC. MLC has an alliance with RCD-N and has occasionally fought
alongside UPC. MLC was part of the inter-Congolese dialogue and its leader.
Jean-Pierre Bemba. has one of the posts of Vice-President.
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de
liberation (RCD-K/ML)
Current leader: Mbusa Nyamwisi
Ethnic composition: Predominantly Nande
RCD-K/ML was launched in September 1999 in Kampala when Wamba dia
Wamba split from RCD-Goma. After several splits, and a short-lived alliance with
MLC, because of leadership struggles, Mbusa Nyamwisi eventually took control of
the movement. The RCD-K/ML military wing is the Congolese People's Army
(APC). RCD-K/ML was part of the inter-Congolese dialogue and its leader is now
Minister for Regional Cooperation. RCD-K/ML was involved d irectly in the lturi
conflict via MLC, then on its own and also providing a link for the pre-transition
Government. It left Bunia in August 2002 after it was defeated by UPC and UPDF.
After that date, it continued its support to Lendu militia groups.
S/2004/S73
49
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S/2004/573
50
Rassemblement congolais pour Ja democratie-National (RCD-N)
Current leader: Roger Lumbala
Ethnic composition: Mixed ethnic groups
Based currently in Isiro and Watsa, in the neighbouring Haut-Uele, RCD-N
was initially supported by the Ugandans in exploiting the diamond riches of
Bafwasende. In 200 I and 2002, RCD-N became a political movement with the
assistance of Jean-Pierre Bemba to act as a politico-military front and provide a
second support group (proxy) for M LC during the inter-Congolese dialogue. It has
never had a military capacity of its own.
·--··-·· ________________ ,
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S/2004/573
Annex II
Chronology of main political events and incidents of gross
violations of human rights in lturi, 1998 to 2003
1998
30 January 1998
2 August 1998
November 1998
November 1998
1999
8 February 1999
April 1999
May 1999
16 May 1999
June 1999
18 June 1999
5 July 1999
JO July 1999
Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garret6n (E/CN .4/ 1998/65 and
Corr. I).
RCD rebels launch armed rebellion against the President of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Laurent-Desire Kabila. Uganda and Rwanda back the
rebels. The movement rapidly takes control of much of the eastern part of the
country.
UPDF establish a base in Bunia.
Another rebel movement, MLC, is created in Equateur Province under JeanPierre
Bemba with Ugandan backing.
Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garret6n (E/CN .4/1999/31 ).
Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, the first President of RCD, moves to Kisangani as the
movement starts a series of splits.
UPDF Captain Kyakabale appointed Bunia sector commander.
A new RCD (Goma faction) leader is named: Emile llunga. The Goma and
Kisangani factions of RCD ally themselves with Rwanda and Uganda,
respectively.
Following abusive and illegal extension of the concessions, the Lendu revolt
against the Hema estate owners and attack their estates. UPDF supports the estate
owners. The collectivity of Walendu Pitsi is completely destroyed by UPDF.
Bombardment of hundreds of Lendu villages by UPDF in the three Lendu
communities of Djugu. Local non-governmental organizations denounce
indiscriminate and disproportionate bombing, of which between 5,000 and 7,000
people are victims.
Adele Lotsove, a Hema, appointed Governor of lturi and Haut-Uele {two districts
in the vast Orientale Province) by UPDF. She is later widely criticized for
inflaming the situation and for her partisan handling of subsequent peace talks.
Lotsove announces the formation of the "province·· of Kibali-Ituri.
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement is signed in Zambia by the six States involved in the
conflict. The rebel MLC signs on I August. RCD rebels sign on 31 August.
SI
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6 August 1999
September 1999
14 September 1999
18 September 1999
I 8 October 1999
October 1999
October 1999
2 I October 1999
November l 999
28 November 1999
End of November 1999
I December 1999
13 December 1999
December 1999
16 December 1999
20 December 1999
52
The Security Council authorizes the deployment of United Nations liaison
personnel in suppon of the Lusaka Agreement.
Military operation in Arne, collectivite of Walendu Pits i. by U PDF under Captain
Kyakabale. Lendu civilians are killed on the bridge over the River Aruda
Major attack by Lendu forces on Dhendro, a Hema vi llage located in the
col/ectivite of Bahema Nord; 416 Hema reported killed.
The RCD-Kisangani faction is renamed RCD-ML. Wamba is confirmed
President, with Bunia as his stronghold. Mbusa Nyamwisi and Jacques Depelchin
are appointed prime minister and local administration minister. respectively.
"Province" of lturi splits from Haut-Uele district.
A United Nations assessment mission declares the human rights and humanitarian
situation in Ituri ··catastrophic"', estimating over 100,000 internally displaced
persons and scores of villages burned ro the ground. Estimates of deaths range
from 5.000 to 7 ,OOO.
RCD-ML appoints Jacques Depelchin as the chairman of a peace and security
commission with the aim of promoting diak)gue and reconciliation among the
parties.
First mission of Unitc:d Nations liaison personnel to Bunia.
Divisions between Wamba and Nyamwisi become more serious. Nyamwisi takes
control of Ben i.
Slaughter by UPDF soldiers of I O Lendu peasants who come to sell their food
products at the market of Bambumines, col/ectivite of Banyari Kilo.
Confrontations between Lendu combatants and UPDF soldiers based in
Bambumines, the shopping centre of Kobu. Thousands of Lendu peasants leave
their villages to take refuge in Bambumines, which they regard as a secure refuge
because of the presence of the office of the gold mines of Kilo Moto.
Killings of Len du at Barn bu. collectivite of Banyari K ilu , .-~oo c ivilian deaths
reported.
According to ICRC, up to 150,000 people are displaced as a result of fighting in
Ituri.
According to Wamba, Captain Kyakabale of UPDF is dismissed for "hiring out
soldiers to Hema leaders". He is replaced by UPDF Lieutenant Colonel Arochn.
Wamba dismisses Lotsove and replaces her with Ernest Uri11g1 Padolo. an /\ lu r.
The Depelchin Commission publishes its report and a draft treaty for the
pacification of the region.
- 98 -
December 1999
December 1999
2000
January 2000
18 January 2000
24 January 2000
29 January 2000
End of January 2000
February 2000
24 February 2000
March 2000
24 March 2000
April 2000
4-10 June 2000
August 2000
August 2000
September 2000
S/2004/S73
The human rights organization of the DRC, ASADHO, in Rapport de / 'Asadho
sur le conflit inter-ethnique Hema-lendu en lerritoire de Djugu dans la Province
Orientale, accuses Captain Kyakabale of massive human rights violations.
The former President of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, is appointed to serve as facilitator
of the inter-Congolese dialogue provided for in the Lusaka Agreement.
MSF reports 180,000 internally displaced persons in lturi. Humanitarian
organizations attempt to gear up in a period of relative calm.
Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garret6n (E.'CN .4/2000/42).
MONUC announces first phase of deployment of liaison officers to Bunia.
MSF-Holland suspends all operations in lturi and says that growing distrust
among the population towards MSF with regard to its neutrality has led to a
violent attack on an MSF team.
The entire community of Walendu Djatsi is engulfed in inter-ethnic war. Many
Lendu villages are set on fire by Ugandan soldiers. More than I ,OOO Lendu are
allegedly killed . The Lendu organize and create a military camp in Mbau.
A report by the human rights group ASADHO says the conflict was sparked off in
April 1999 when Hema landowners evicted Lendu farmers from land adjoining
theirs, with the support of RCD-ML and lhe Ugandan authorities. ASADHO
claims that Ugandan soldiers were actively involved in the killing of Lendu.
The Security Council expands MONUC mandate in resolution 1291 (2000).
MONUC deploys liaison officers to Bunia.
A United Nations inter-agency assessment mission finds humanitarian situation
"close to catastrophic".
Ugandan authorities replace Colonel Arocha with Colonel Charles Angina.
Heavy fighting breaks out between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in Kisangani.
Training of Hema militia members in Uganda, in the camp of Kyakwanzi. In six
months, 750 militia members are trained. Thomas Lubanga and Chief Kawa are
reportedly among the trainees.
The conflict gradually reaches the col/ectivite of Walendu Tatsi where several
villages are burned, including the main town of Masumbuko.
A group of Lendu seek refuge in the church of Lita located in Walendu Tatsi
because of military operations in the region. Hema militiamen, accompanied by
UPDF based in Katoto, enter the church and massacre the ci vilians.
53
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S/2004/573
5 November 2000
20 November 2000
2001
December 2000-January 200 I
6 January 200 I
January 200 I
15 January 200 I
16 January 200 I
I 8 January 200 I
19-21 January 200 I
16 January 200 I
I February 200 I
February 200 I
54
UPDF appoints a new sector commander. Colonel Angina is replaced with
Colonel Edison Muzora.
Divisions in RCD-ML come to a head. Nyamwisi and Tibasima remove
Wamba from power in the "November putsch' . Uganda appears to give up
protecting Wamba. Meanwhi le splits in RCD-ML produce several militias
and two new factions : RCD-ML dissident Roger Lumbala starts a movement
called RCD-National and, in Beni, Governor Bwanakawa Nyonyi sets up the
short-lived RCD-Populair.
Hema dignitaries of lrumu travel to Kampala to convince President Museveni to
deploy three battalions in the collectfrite of Walendu Bindi. Once on the ground,
UPDF battalions target hundreds of villages, schools, dispensaries and parishes.
Many die as a result of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks.
Lendu Ngiti militias attack Nyankunde town, killing some 50 persons. mostly
Hema civilians. and displacing thousands.
The RCD-ML power struggle results in Governor Uringi and Depelchin being
expelled from Bunia. Wamba remains in Kampala.
At least 3,500 people. mainly Hema, in the territories affected by the conflict
seek refuge over the border in Uganda.
President Laurent-Desire Kabila is shot dead. Joseph Kabila succeeds him.
Ngiti militias from [rumu attack the UPDF base at Bunia airport in order to
destroy the Ugandan helicopters. which lhey believe took part in the
bombardment of Ngiti villages in Walendu Bind i. Several Ugandans are
allegedly killed during the operation.
An organized massacre of Lendu inhabitants is carried out in the Mudzipela
area of Bunia. Each Lendu family is visited house by house by Hema of
Bunia, and approximately 250 persons are killed, mostly by nail-studded
sticks distributed before the attack, and the ir houses are set on fire.
A new rebel alliance, FLC. is formed after weeks of talks in Kampala. It
combines Bernba's MLC. RCD-ML and Lumbala's RCD-National. Bemba is
to lead the group while Nyamwisi is appointed Vice-President and Tibasima
Minister for Mines and Energy. Wamba rejects the deal.
Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Roberto Garret6n (E/CN.4/2001 /40).
A major peace meeting is held in Bunia. A peace agreement is signed by Hema and
Lcndu community leaders. Bemba. now the most senior rebel leader in the region,
states: "The militia will have to be disarmed and dispersed. ' A follow-up
commission is to monitor and move the process forward.
----·----·--- - -·
- 100 -
20 February 2001
27 February 2001
March 2001
29 March 200 l
12 April 2001
26 April 200 I
9 May 2001
4 June 2001
11 June 2001
27 June 2001
27 June 2001
July 200 I
t 8 August 2001
S/2004/573
The United Nations estimates 140,000 displaced in lturi.
Dual Hema and Lendu deputy governors are appointed by FLC.
Human Rights Watch publishes a 50-page report entitled Uganda in Eastern
DRC: Fuelling Poiitica/ and Ethnic Strife, alleging that Ugandan soldiers had
involved themselves in the conflict and had ''blatantly exploited Congolese
wealth for their own benefit and that of their superiors at home".
Bemba announces an agreement reached with the Mai-Mai militia and
arrangements for the demobilization of the Ugandan rebels of ADF and
NALU.
The United Nations Panel of Experts issues its first report on the exploitation
of resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, concluding that the
Governments of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda profited from the conflict by
looting gold and other precious minerals, diamonds, timber, ivory and tax
revenues.
Six ICRC workers, four Congolese, one Colombian and one Swiss, are killed on the
road between Djugu and Fataki. All international humanitarian agencies halt their
activities. A group of Hema professors from the lnstitut superieur pedagogique are
alleged to have been among the organizers. Hema militias are alleged to have
executed the killing.
Colonel Mohammed Buli Bangolo, from Equateur Province, is appointed
Governor of lturi by FLC.
Fighting between Bemba's and Nyamwisi's troops breaks out in Beni.
Nyamwisi 's forces appear to win. FLC starts to disintegrate, and Nyamwisi
and Bemba part company by August, dividing the territory into spheres of
influence in August. The Nyamwisi faction becomes known as RCDKisangani/
ML, and Wamba continues to claim legitimacy as leader of the
original RCD-ML.
Uganda establishes a judicial commission of inquiry, which later becomes known
as the Porter Commission, into allegations of the exploitation of natural resources
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Humanitarian agencies resume work in lturi.
Nyamwisi and RCD-National of Lumbala announce an alliance. Lumbala is
named as part ofNyamwisi's delegation to the inter-Congolese dialogue but
remains allied to Bemba.
UPC is created with Thomas Lubanga as leader. Lotsove is reportedly a cofounder.
The party comes to prominence only a year later.
Wamba's rump factions of RCD-ML ally themselves with Bemba's alliance,
FLC, possibly to secure participation in the upcoming inter-Congolese
dialogue.
55
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S/2004/S73
November 200 I
11 November 200 l
21 November 200 I
28 November 200 I
December 200 I
December 200 l
2002
January 2002
January 2002
l February 2002
2 February 2002
9 February 2002
19 April 2002
17 May 02
19 May 2002
May 2002
56
Colonel Fred Seka M wenge is appointed new UPDF commander.
RCD-K/ML sets up as a separate parry under Nyamwisi with Tibasima as
Vice-President.
Bemba's MLC withdraws troops from Bunia, citing· confusion" in RCD-ML
and RCD-K/ML.
Appointment of lulia Motoc as Special Rapporteur on the human rights
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Commission on
Human Rights.
RCD-K/ML attempts to broaden its base by including Thomas Lubanga as
Minister for Defence and bringing back Wamba and Uringi.
Joseph Eneko Nguaza, from Aru, is appointed Governor of lturi.
Bemba and Lumbala make territorial gains against the RCD-K/ML, taking
lsiro, Watsa and Bafwasende.
Clashes reported for the first time between Alur and Lendu in Nioka, to the
north of Bunia. Ugandan media report 50 deaths. The Alur and Lendu had
previously been regarded as not hostile to one another.
Ugandan Defence Minister Amama Mbabazi remarks that the situation in
Bunia is explosive and calls on the United Nations to send troops to take
control of the area.
Jean-Pierre Lompondo Molondo from the Kasai is appointed Governor of
lturi by Nyamwisi. Lubanga is sidelined from the military control of RCD-K/
ML.
Hema militias and UPOF attack Gety. They destroy houses and allegedly kill
35 civilians.
ICD Sun City peace meetings adjourn after reaching a wide agreement, but
defer key provisions on power sharing. Both Wamba and Nyamwisi attend as
representatives of RCD-ML. Lubanga starts to split from RCD-K/ML and
initiates the creation of UPC.
Attack by Hema militia on Walu. col/ectivite of Babalebe, lrumu territory. A
witness reports to MONUC having buried 42 bodies.
A delegation from Kinshasa, inc luding the Ministers of the Interior and
Human Rights, visits Ituri. The Minister for Human Rights, Ntumba Lwaba,
says that three years of fighting have led to 20,000 deaths.
Humanitarian agencies estimate 500,000 people are displaced in lturi.
- 102 -
June 2002
7 June 2002
10 June 2002
9-12 June 2002
12 June 2002
13 June 2002
Early July 2002
28 July 2002
30 July 2002
Beginning of August 2002
6-9 August 2002
9 August 2002
9-28 August 2002
14 August 2002
18 August 2002
23 August 2002
S/2004/573
The first UPC delegation, including Chief Kawa, meets Rwandan authorities.
Lendu militia attack Hema militia training camp at Mandro and claim to have
killed Rwandan trainers.
Heritage Oil Corporation announces it has signed an agreement with the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to explore oil
opportunities in a vast swathe of the north-eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo, including eastern lturi.
Following an attack by APC and Hema militias, Lendu forces agree not to
attack Nyali provided that the Hema population leaves.
The former Prime Minister of Senegal, Moustapha Niasse, appointed United
Nations Special Envoy to help to advance the inter-Congolese dialogue.
Lubanga and others arrested in Kampala and transferred to Kinshasa. At the
same time, UPDF officers maintain close contact with the UPC movement in
Bunia.
Scores of people die in fighting in Bunia between RCD-K/ML and a militia
supporting Lubanga. UPDF allegedly back Lubanga.
The lnstitut superieur pedagogique is empty, most of the Hema students
having left for the military training camp in Mandro. They will stay there for
two weeks. The students will then be organized, formed in patrols, and some
of them will be given weapons.
Peace agreement between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
signed in Pretoria.
Deployment of UPC in Nyankunde.
Fighting starts between UPC and APC in Bunia. UPDF supports UPC. Some
300 civilians are killed.
Governor Lompondo and APC are chased out of Bunia, and UPC takes control of
the city. UPC and UPDF continue to kill, plunder and destroy houses belonging to
the ethnic group they wish to remove.
Several military operations carried out by UPC against Lendu localities of
Lipri, Zumbe. Penyi, Loga, Za and Ezekere. Villages are burned down and a
large number of civilians killed, including Chief Pilo of Ezekele.
Mbusa Nyamwisi agrees to withdraw his troops from Irurnu in order to
facilitate a negotiated approach, and states that there will be no counterattack
against Bunia.
Cross-roads between Beni, Bunia and Komanda taken by UPC.
Fighting between Ngiti and UPC in Komanda. High numbers of civilians are
reportedly killed.
57
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S/2004/573
23 August 2002
August 2002
31 August 2002
27-29 August 2002
29 August 2002
August 2002
I September 2002
2 September 2002
5 September 2002
6 September 2002
10 September 2002
16 September 2002
58
Mission report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial. summary or arbitrary executions and a member of the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: note by the Secretary~
General (A/57/349).
Kidnapping and summary execution of Lendu and Bira civilians in Bunia and
its surroundings. Other Bira and Lendu intellectuals have their houses burned
but succeed in escaping to North Kivu.
Military operation of UPC, from Nyankunde, against the Lendu locality of
Songolo. The group finds mostly children and women and reportedly
massacres around 140 of them.
UPC attack is launched against the non-lturian population in the gold mine of
Mabanga, 32 km from Bunia. Around 150 civilians are killed.
Human Rights Minister Ntumba Lwaba visits Bunia to bolster peace talks
under way in Kinshasa. He is taken hostage by Chief Kawa in Mandro. The
kidnapping is resolved with the release of nine UPC prisoners, including
Lubanga, from Kinshasa 's custody.
In Boga. a Hema militia is organized in the city, with a majority of youths
including minors.
Community leaders at the Kinshasa peace talks demand the departure of the
Ugandans and their replacement by a police force. Ntumba Lwaba alleges
Rwanda is moving forces into Ituri in preparation for the departure ofUPDF.
A UPC government is formed in Bunia with Lotsove as Finance Minister,
Jean-Baptiste Dhetchuvi as Foreign Minister and Eneko as Governor.
A coalition of APC, Lendu, Ngiti and Mai-Mai militias attack Nyankunde,
target Hema and Bira ethnic groups, and allegedly kill more than I ,OOO
people in the town and neighbouring villages.
Luanda Agreement signed between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. A I 00-day timetable is set for U PDF withdrawal after the
establishment of the Jturi Pacification Commission.
Special report of the Secretary-General notes that, in the lturi district,
200,000 people have been killed since June 1999, 500,000 newly displaced,
and that 60,000 of those displaced are in Bunia; UPC have captured
imponant towns on the Mahagi-Bunia-Beni axis and reduced the RCD-K/ML
power base.
APC and Lendu militia from Kpandroma, col/ectivite of Djugu, launch an
attack against Mahagi, 53 km from Bunia.
- 104 -
29 September 2002
7 October 2002
15 October 2002
October 2002
20 October- I O November
2002
22 November 2002
November 2002
End November-end
December 2002
December 2002
17 December 2002
20 December 2002
3 I December 2002
2003
6 January 2003
6 January 2003
15 January 2003
S/2004/573
Interim report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, fulia Motoc (A/57/437).
UPC elements occupy Mahagi.
The second report of the Panel of Expens on the illegal exploitation of
natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo accuses UPDF o f
continuing to provoke ethnic conflict for economic gain, particularly in lturi.
Humanitarian agencies encounter difficulties in securing permission to land
flights in Bunia from UPC which controls it. Relations between UPC and
humanitarian agencies remain strained.
UPC launches several military operations against the Lendu localities of
Nombe, Kagabe, Songolo, Androzo, Pinga, Singo, Mongbwalu and
Tseletsele. Hundreds of localities are burned down and an unknown number
of civilians massacred.
The former Governor of lturi, Joseph Eneko Nguaza, is killed in an ambush
20 km from Mahagi, together with eight representatives of Iturian
collect ivi tes.
Stalemate with regard to the lturi Pacification Commission due to insistence
of Lubanga that lturi be recognized as a province, not a district. Kinshasa
refuses.
MLC together with RCD-N and UPC attack Mambasa, conduct systematic
looting, rape and killing of hundreds of civilians. The operation is known to
the population as "effacer le tableau".
UPC reportedly organizes a sizeable military operation in Mongbwalu with
the assistance of MLC and finally succeeds in seizing Mongbwalu.
Comprehensive peace deal signed at inter-Congolese dialogue talks
in Pretoria.
Creation of FlPI; including PUSIC, FPDC and FNI/FRPl in Ariwara.
MLC, RCD-N and RCD-ML sign a ceasefire agreement under the auspices of
MONUC in Gbadolite.
RCD-Goma announces that it has formed an alliance with UPC.
Rethy and Kpandroma captured by RCD-K/ML and Lendu militia during
operations against UPC.
UPC attacks Nioka and destroys the nutritional centre for children
established by an international non-governmental organization. They arrest
and beat priests accused of assisting the Lendu population.
s,
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S/2004/573
17 February-6 March 2003
21 February 2003
24 February 2003
4 March 2003
6 March 2003
17 March 2003
20 March 2003
2 April 2003
3 April 2003
4-14 April 2003
7 April 2003
15 April 2003
6 May 2003
10 May 2003
14 May 2003
6-16 May 2003
17 May 2003
23 May 2003
60
UPC attacks the Lendu localities of Lipri, Bambu and Kobu, in the
collectivite of Banyari Kilo, and burns down all surrounding villages.
The Secretary-General, in his thirteenth Report on the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (S/2003/211 ), notes widespread insecurity, massive
displacement and severely restricted humanitarian access in lturi;
displacement of I 00,000 persons in the north-east since October 2002;
ongoing human rights violations; ongoing fighting between Hema and Lendu
aligned groups; and difficulties in monitoring by MONUC due to security
conditions.
Ngiti attack Bogoro, collectivite of Bahema Sud. Execution of around 350
civilians.
Jer6me Kakwavu creates a new rebel group, FAPC.
Fighting breaks out between UPDF and UPC in Bunia. UPC is chased out of
Bunia.
Attack on Drodro Catholic compound results in deaths of 17 students.
The Security Council in resolution 1468 (2003) requests Secretary-General to
increase presence of MON UC in the lturi district and to monitor
developments on the ground.
final Act of the inter-Congolese dialogue is signed in Sun City.
Len du attack on Drodro results in killing of some 400 civilians.
First meeting of the lturi Pacification Commission in Bunia.
Joseph Kabila is formally sworn in as President for the transitional period.
Report on the situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Julia Motoc (E/CN.4/2003/43).
UPDF troops leave Bunia.
Killing of2 priests and 16 civilians in Nyakasanza church, Bunia, by
Lendu militia.
Two MONUC military observers reponed missing at Mongbwalu (bodies
recovered on 18 May).
Fighting breaks out between Lendu militias and UPC. Some 500 civilians are
reportedly killed. Most of the population of Bunia flees the city.
Ceasefire is negotiated by MONUC between UPC and FNI.
Kilo, ltende and Lisey, in the colleclivite of Banyari Kilo, are attacked by
Lendu combatants from Nyangaraye; 35 villages are reportedly set on fin:.
- 106 -
24 May 2003
27 May 2003
30 May 2003
31 May 2003
5 June 2003
10 June 2003
11 June 2003
12 June 2003
19 June 2003
I July 2003
6-7 July 2003
15 July 2003
19 July 2003
23 July 2003
28 July 2003
5 August 2003
22 August 2003
End August~beginning
September 2003
15 September 2003
S/2004/~73
Signature of a ceasefire agreement between FNI and UPC under the
patronage of Joseph Kabila and Amos Namanga Ngongi. Special
Representative of the Secretary-General.
UPC drives FNI troops out of Bunia.
The Security Council by resolution 1484 (2003) authorizes the deployment of
an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia until I September 2003
to provide protection and security to civilians.
Attack against Tchomia by Lendu and Ngiti militias with the alleged support
of APC and FAC. Some 90 civilians are killed.
The European Union Council by decision 2003/432/CFSP authorizes
Operation Artemis in accordance with the mandate set out in resolution 1484
(2003) and establishes the logistics (France is the framework nation, Major
General Neveux is appointed Commander).
Following a Lendu attack on Nioka, the town is destroyed; according to
investigations carried out by MON UC, some 60 civilians are killed.
Lendu and Ngiti militias attack Kasenyi and kill at least 80 civilians.
Operation Artemis begins; 400 soldiers deployed in Bunia and 500 in
Entebbe for logistical support.
Ceasefire agreement signed in Burundi.
Transitional Government installed.
Attack against Ambe and its surroundings by Lendu and Ngiti militias. At
least 30 civilians are allegedly killed.
Attack on Tchomia by Len du an<l Ngiti militia results in I O civilians killed.
Attack on Fataki by FNI and FAPC· 22 civilians are allegedly killed.
Attack on Kaseyni by Ngiti militia results in 16 civilians killed.
By resolution 1493 (2003) the Security Council places the mandate of
MONUC under Chapter VII and authorizes the Mission to take the necessary
measures to protect civilians in lturi and the Kivus.
Attack on Fataki by FNI and FAPC. Perhaps as many as 100 civilians killed.
Reports of massacre in the locality of Gobu, located between Mandro and
Katoto. At least 23 people appear to have been killed.
Reports of new attacks against the population of Fataki and Buie. First reports of
the existence of forced labour camps near Fataki (Habo, Libi, Bali, Aleda, Ali and
Beau Marche) run by Lendu combatants.
The Multinational Force leaves Bunia and is replaced by the military
elements of MON UC under the name lturi Brigade.
61
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S/2004/S73
15 September 2003
29 September 2003
6 October 2003
17 October 2003
9 November 2003
2004
January
62
UPC organizes demonstrations in Bunia to celebrate its anniversary and
demands that leaders arrested by MON UC be released. The demonstrations
provoke incidents that result in the arrest of 74 people, and 28 the following
day. Kisembo, Rafiki and Lobo are kept under house arrest for a few days,
the rest are released the following day. During the incidents caused by UPC,
at least 12 people are injured.
Eight police officers arrested in May 2003 are released. Kisembo, Rafiki and
Lobo organize the handover to MONUC. The police officers are transferred
back to Kinshasa.
Lendu forces attack Kachele, near Buie, in the col/ectivite of Bahema Badjere,
leaving 65 people dead.
MON UC arrests Matthieu Ngudjolo, Chief of Staff of FNI.
MON UC arrests Aimable Saba Rafiki. Chief of Security of UPC.
Magistrates and members of the Prosecutor's Office of the Tribunal de
Grande Instance of Bunia return to Bunia with the assistance of MONUC, the
European Union and French Cooperation. Victims of human rights violations
start lodging complaints.
- 108 -
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ANNEX 1.7
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, document S/2001/357, 12 April 2001
[Complete document]
- 111 -
- 112 -
United Nations
• Security Council Distr.: General
12 April 2001
Original: English
Letter dated 12 April 2001 from the Secretary-G.eneral
to the President of the Security Council
I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 2 June 2000
($/PRST/2000/20) in which the Security Council requested me to establish a Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The
Council also requested that the expert panel, once established, submit to the
Council, through me, its final report at the end of the mandate.
Further to my letter dated 2 April 2001, I have the honour to transmit to you
the report of the Panel, submitted to me by the Chairperson of the Panel. I should be
grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security
Council. ·
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
01-32354 (E) 130401
111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
S120o113s1
- 113 -
S/2001/357
Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction ........... . ................ .. ...... . ... ... ... , . ... ....... . 1-24 3
A. Summary .. ......... . ......... . . ... . . ....... . . . ........... .. ..... . 4- 8 3
B. Methodological framework ....... . ............. . ....... ... ...... .. . . 9- 16 4
C. Overview .. .... .. .... : .... ... ......... ... .......... ..• ........ . .. . 17- 20 5
D. Background . . ..... . . ... ... . .... . ... . .... . ... . . .... ... , . ... . .. .... . 21-24 6
II. Illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth .. . .. .. . . .... . 25- 108 6
A. Pre-existing structures that facilitated illegal exploitation . .. .. .... . ..... . . 26- 31 6
B. Mass-scale looting .. . . .. . ............................... . ...... . . . . 32-45 8
C. Systematic and systemic exploitation . .. . ......... ... ..... .. . .. . . ..... . 46-70 9
D. Current structures of illegal exploitation .............................. . 71 - 86 14
E. Individual actors .... . . ....... .... . . ..... . . .. ....... ..... ...... . .. . . 87-93 17
F. Economic data: confirmation of the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo .. . . . ..... .. . . ... . . .. . 94-108 19
III. Links between the exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the
conflict .......... . .. .. ........ ..... ....... . . .. ......... .... ....... .. . 109- 212 27
A. Budgets compared to military expenditures. . . . .. ........ .. .. . ... . ..... . 110-124 27
B. Financing the war .... .. . . . .......... .... ........ .... ...... ..... ... . 125- 172 29
C. Special features of the links between the exploitation of natural resources
and the continuation of the conflict . .......... .. .......... . . . ....... . . 173- 180 36
D. Facilitators or passive accomplices? ............ . ............... . ..... . 181- 212 37
IV. Conclusion and findings .... . . . ... . ...... ... ......... . . .. ......... ... . . . 213-218 41
V. Recommendations ........... . ........... . .......... .. ....•............ 219-242 42
Annexes
I. Sample of companies importing minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
via Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
II. Countries visited and representatives of Governments 'and organizations interviewed . . . . . . . 48
III. Abbreviations ...... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2
···"--------·------------------------
- 114 -
I. Introduction
l. By the statement of its President of 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council requested the
Secretary-General to establish an expert panel on the
illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms
of we·alth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for
a period of six months, with the following mandate:
To follow up on reports and collect information
on all activities of illegal exploitation of natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, including in
violation of the sovereignty of that country;
To research and analyse the links between the
exploitation of the natural resources and other
forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and the continuation of the conflict;
- To revert to the Council with recommendations.
2. The Secretary-General, in his letter to the
President of the Security Council dated 31 July 2000
(S/2000/796), notified the President of the Security
Council that the composition of the Panel was as
follows:
Mme Safiatou Ba-N'Daw (Cote d'Ivoire)
(Chairperson);
Mr. Franyois Ekoko (Cameroon);
Mr. Mel Holt (United States of America);
Mr. Henri Maire (Switzerland);
Mr. Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
3. The Panel was assisted by a technical advisor, an
associate political officer, an administrator and a
secretary.
A. Summary
4. Illegal exploitation of the mineral and forest
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
taking place at an alarming rate. Two phases can be
distinguished: mass-scale looting and the systematic
and systemic exploitation of natural resources.
5. Mass-scale looting. During this first phase,
stockpiles of minerals, coffee, wood, livestock and
money that were available in territories conquered by
the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda were
S/200l/357
taken, and either transferred to those countries or
exported to international markets by their forces and
n·ationals. ·
6. Systematic and systemic exploitation. Planning
and organization were required for this phase. The
systematic exploitation flourished because of the preexisting
structures developed during the conquest of
power of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo-Zaire. These pre-existing
structures were improved over time and new networks
for channelling extracted resources were put in place.
However, the systemic exploitation used the existing
systems of control established by Rwanda and Uganda.
In both cases, exploitation was often carried out in
violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the national legislation and
sometimes international law, and it led to illicit
activities. Key individual actors including top army
commanders and businessmen on the one hand, and
government structures on the other, have been the
engines of this systematic and systemic exploitation.
7. The consequence of illegal exploitation has been
twofold: (a) massive availability of financial resources
for the Rwandan Patriotic Army, and the individual
enrichment of top Ugandan military commanders and
civilians; (b) the emergence of illegal networks headed
either by top military officers or businessmen. These
two elements form the basis of the link between the
exploitation of natural resources and the continuation
of the conflict. Other contributing factors however
exist - the roles played by some entities and
institutions, and the opportunistic behaviour of some
private companies and influential individuals,
including some decision makers in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe. Some leaders in
the region bear a direct responsibility. The Panel
concludes that tough measures must be taken to bring
to an end the cycle of exploitation of the natural
resources and the continuation of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
8. The Panel's recommendations revolve around six
broad themes: (1) sanctions against countries and
individuals involved in the illegal activities;
(2) preventive measures to avoid a recurrence of the
current situation; (3) reparations to the victims of the
illegal exploitation of natural resources; ( 4) design of a
framework for reconstruction; (5) improvement of
international mechanisms and regulations governing
some natural resources; and (6) security issues.
3
- 115 -
S/2001/3S7
B. Methodological framework
9. Methodology. Owing to the nature of the work
and the complexities of the issues, a methodology that
allows flexible data collection was essential in order to
complete this project. The Panel has therefore utilized:
(a) Primary data collection. Official
documentation from ministries and other institutions as
well as recorded minutes of meetings involving various
relevant actors;
(b) Secondary sources. Reports, workshop
proceedings, published and unpublished literature;
(c) Interviews. Structured, semi-structured and
open interviews as well as interviews resulting from
various network referrals.
I 0. A vast amount of data was obtained from three
essential sources:
(a) Countries and other entities involved in the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
namely: Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe,
RCD-Goma and RCD-ML;
(b) "Third-party" sources such as Belgium,
Cameroon, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Kenya,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania,
the United States of America, Switzerland, various
United Nations agencies, the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization,
OECD, the International Coffee Organization, De
Beers, the Diamond High Council, the International
Diamond Manufacturers Association, the University of
Maryland, the World Resource Institute and CIFOR;
(c) Various individual actors and stakeholders
who expressed an interest for various reasons in
sharing their knowledge and understanding with the
Panel.
11. The production and export data series available
for the analysis cover the period 1995-2000. Data were
systematically analysed separately and then compared
with one another. Comparative · analysis thus
contributed to the Panel's ability to develop a good
understanding of the issues. In addition, the Panel
sought to cross-check every item of information
received. In relation to this and to the extent possible,
Panel members attempted to speak to individuals
against whom serious allegations were made. When
access to those key witnesses or primary actors was
denied, Panel members often relied on their closest
collaborators for insight. The Panel however faced a
problem of imbalance in the acquisition of data. Indeed
data was abundant for Rwanda, Uganda, RCD-Goma,
RCD-ML and MLC. This is partly due to the high
number of insiders living in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and in Europe who were directly involved
with those entities and who offered to share almost
everything they knew or had experienced or gathered
as documentation while they were involved with them.
The same quantity and quality of data were not
available for Angola, Namibia or Zimbabwe, although
the Panel visited those countries. This constraint can be
felt in the report. Overall the report was written using
the empirical method combined with the economic
analysis of data collected, supported by elements of
evidence.
12. Establishing bonndaries. Geographically, data
were gathered for occupied and non-occupied
territories within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo as well as for any country involved in the
conflict or of other strategic importance, geographic,
financial or other. With respect to natural resources, the
Panel focused on minerals, forest and agricultural
products and other forms of wealth, primarily taxes.
Given the high number of natural resources found in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the high level
of exploitation by numerous parties, and the limited
time and resources available to the Panel, the following
criteria for the selection of resources to be examined
were developed:
• The commercial value of the resources in
absolute terms;
• The interest of parties in the resources;
• The scale of exploitation.
13. Based on these criteria, three categories of
products were of primary consideration: (a) mineral
resources, primarily coltan, diamonds, gold and
cassiterite; (b) agric1,llture, forests and wildlife,
including timber, coffee and ivory; and (c) financial
products, mainly in regard to taxes. Copper, cobalt,
livestock, gorillas, okapis, tobacco, tea, palm oil and
land allocation deserved to be among the resources and
products to be studied. Some did not meet established
criteria, however, and for others, such as copper and
cobalt, time constraint was the main reason for a lack
- 116 -
of study. These resources are touched upon in the
report for illustrative purposes, but were not
systematically studied.
14. Defining the key concepts. In determining the
parameters of the project the definition or
interpretation of illegality and exploitation was
vigorously debated.
15. Illegality. The most conteQtious. concept in the
mandate has been the term "illegality" with regard to
exploitation. Almost all actors in the conflict and
observers requested a clear definition of illegality. In
the Panel's view, the understanding of illegality is
underpinned by four elements all related to the rule of
law, namely:
(a) Violation of sovereignty. The first element
is based on the Security Council's understanding of
illegality as described in the Panel's mandate (see the
statement of the President of the Security Council of 2
June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/20)). This posits that all
activities - extraction, production, commercialization
and exports - taking place in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo without the consent of the legitimate
government are illegal. This interpretation suggested
that only non-invited forces and their nationals are
carrying out illegal activities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
(b) Respect by actors of the existing regulatory
framework in the country or territory where they
operate or carry out their activities. The Panel
considers that if authorities exerting effective power
and control over their sovereign area recognize or set
up a regulatory framework to govern the use or
exploitation of resources, this framework shall be
respected. Failure to do so may lead to the
infringement of the law and, therefore, activities
considered illegal or unlawful. In this case, the Panel
deems illegality to be the carrying out of an activity in
violation of an existing body of regulations.
(c) The discrepancy between widely accepted
practices in trade and business and the way business is
conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In
this category, the Panel has considered that the use and
abuse of power by some actors fall into the category of
illegality. This includes forced monopoly in trading,
the unilateral fixing of prices of products by the buyer,
the confiscation or looting of products from farmers,
and the use of military forces in various zones to
Sl20<J1l357
protect some interests or to create a situation of
monopoly.
(d) The violation of international law including
"soft" law. The Panel considers that business activities
carried out in violation of international law are illegal.
The Panel utilized the aforementioned elements in a
complementary manner, refusing to be exclusive or to
foe:us O[). on~ . s~~gle element. On the basis of
discussions with different members of the Security
Council, the Panel has interpreted the wish of the
Security Council to be a broad interpretation of the
concept of illegality.
16. Exploitation. The Panel opted for a broad
understanding and interpretation of exploitation.
Exploitation was used beyond the mere consideration
of production and extraction. It was viewed as all
activities that enable actors and stakeholders to engage
in business in first, secondary and tertiary sectors in
relation to the natural resources and other forms of
wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
broad interpretation enabled the Panel to look into
extraction, production, commercialization and exports
of natural resources and other services such as
transport and financial transactions.
C. Overview
17. This section offers a general overview of the
report. Initially, the Panel examined the pre-existing
structures that have facilitated the illegal exploitation
of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. These elements encompass the
financial/commercial links and the transportation
networks that essentially laid the foundation for the
current situation of illegal exploitation.
18. The Panel then reviewed the primary processes
by which the natural resources are physically exploited
by the occupying forces, primarily Rwanda and
Uganda, in conjunction with their respective rebel
counterparts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Subsequently, the current structures of exploitation
were discussed in order to demonstrate the evolution of
the process to its present state. Selected individuals
were then profiled to illustrate the extent to which this
is an organized and embedded venture. Economic data
were then analysed to confirm the findings described
above.
s
- 117 -
S/2001/357
19. The focus then moved to exploring the
complexities of the links between the continuation of
the conflict and the exploitation of resources through
the use of specific country examples. The aim is to
demonstrate the varying means by which power
structures can manipulate situations for the most
favourable outcome. This section is directly linked to
the previous one and, in some cases, information
overlapped. This was unavoidable because of the
intricate nature of the problem at hand.
20. The report goes on to discuss more incidental
elements in this exploitation, which are nonetheless
important and relevant: official and non-official fronts
utilized as well as the facilitators or passive
accomplices within the processes. The report concludes
with a summary of the findings and recommendations
for action.
D. Background
21 . The Democratic Republic of the Congo is located
in the heart of equatorial central Africa and has an area
of 2,267.600 square kilometres and a current
population estimated at 50 million. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo is endowed with a unique
biodiversity, vast mineral and forest resources, and rich
soils conducive to agriculture (see map). These
favourable conditions, concentrated in the eastern
regions, are the setting for the current ongoing
occupation and struggle to exploit these natural
resources.
22. The initial disruption, predominantly affecting the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, began with
the 1994-1995 refugee crisis in the region, spawned by
the war in neighbouring Rwanda. The sudden influx of
hundreds of thousands of refugees, including members
of the lnterahamwe, created a new demographic
dynamic in the subregional population, abruptly
disturbed the delicate balance of the ecosystems and
generated a new security situation along the border
between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Rwanda.
23. The situation further deteriorated in 1996 with the
war between the Zairian forces and the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
(AFDL), the rebel movement led by the late LaurentDesire
Kabila and supported by the Angolan, Rwandan
and Ugandan forces. This AFDL-led conquest of then
6
eastern Zaire fundamentally altered the composition of
the regional stakeholders and the distribution of natural
resources. Previously, the distribution norm was (via
legal and illegal channels) through locally based
Congolese, mostly civilian-managed, business
operations. However, these traditional modes were
quickly overtaken by new power structures. Along with
new players came new rules for exploiting natural
resources. Foreign troops and their "friends" openly
embraced business in "liberated territories",
encouraged indirectly by the AFDL leader, the late
President Kabila.
24. In August 1998, fighting erupted again in the
northern, western and eastern parts of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, this time between Rwandan and
Ugandan troops and the Congolese army, with the
assistance of Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean
armies, as well as Sudanese and Chadian forces. The
last two countries have since withdrawn their soldiers
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
II. Illegal exploitation of natural
resources and other forms of
wealth
25. The illegal exploitation of resources by Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda took different forms, including
confiscation, extraction, forced monopoly and pricefixing.
Of these, the first two reached proportions that
made the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
a very lucrative business. Prior to defining the type and
manner of illegal exploitation, however, it is important
to examine the pre-existing structures which facilitated
this process.
A. Pre-existing structures that facilitated
illegal e~ploitation
26. Illegal exploitation 1 by foreigners aided by the
Congolese began with the first "war of liberation" in
1996. The AFDL rebels. backed by Angolan, Rwandan
and Ugandan soldiers conquered eastern and southeastern
Zaire. As they were advancing, the then AFDL
leader, the late Laurent-Desire Kabila, signed contracts
with a number of foreign companies. Numerous
accounts and documents suggest that by 1997 a first
1 In the context of the Panel's mandate.
- 118 -
wave of "new businessmen" speaking only English,
Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili had commenced operations
in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.2
Theft of livestock, coffee beans and other resources
began to be reported with frequency. By the time the
August 1998 war broke out, Rwandans and Ugandans
(top officers and their associates) had a strong sense of
the potential of the natural resources and their locations
in the eastern the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Some historians have argued that Ugandan forces were
instrumental in the conquest of areas such as Wasta,
Bunia, Beni and Butembo during the first war.
27. Numerous accounts in Kampala suggest that the
decision to enter the conflict in August 1998 was
defended by some top military officials who had served
in eastern Zaire during the first war and who had had a
taste of the business potential of the region. Some key
witnesses, who served with the Rally for Congolese
Democracy rebel faction in early months, spoke about
the eagerness of Ugandan forces to move in and
occupy areas where gold and diamond mines were
located. Other sources informed the Panel that, late in
September 1998, they were already engaged in
discussions with General Salim Saleh on the creation
of a company that would supply the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo with merchandise, and on the
import of natural resources. The project never
materialized in this form, but the sources reportedly
also discussed this and other business venture
possibilities with the President of Uganda, Yoweri
Museveni.
28. There are strong indications that, if security and
political reasons were the professed roots of the
political leaders' motivation to move into the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, some top army
officials clearly had a hidden agenda: economic and
financial objectives. A few months before the 1998 war
broke out, General Salim Saleh and the elder son of
President Museveni reportedly visited the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. One month after
the beginning of the conflict, General James Kazini
was already involved in commercial activities.
According to very reliable sources, he knew the most
profitable sectors and immediately organized the local
commanders to serve their economic and financial
objectives.
2 Cross-border commercial exchanges between people of
the region have traditionally existed.
S/2001/357
29. Financial and commercial links. During the
early months of the rebellion, the financial setting and
networks were already in place. At the heart of the
financial setting is the Banque de commerce, du
developpement et d'industrie (BCDI) located in Kigali.
According to some sources, there was an understanding
between the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame,
President Museveni and the late Laurent-Desire Kabila
on the collection and use of financial resources during
the time of the AFDL rebellion. This collaboration led
many sources to believe that the three leaders were
shareholders in BCDI. But this was not the case.
30. The following example illustrates the nature of
the financial transactions and links involving BCDI,
Citibank New York as a corresponding bank, and some
companies and individuals. In a Jetter signed by
J. P. Moritz, General Manager of Societe miniere de
Bakwanga (MIBA), a diamond company, and Ngandu
Kamenda, the General Manager of MIBA ordered a
payment of US$ 3.5 million to la Generate de
commerce d'import/export du Congo (COMIEX),3 a
company owned by late President Kabila and some of
his close allies, such as Minister Victor Mpoyo, from
an account in BCDI through a Citibank account. This
amount of money was paid as a contribution from
MIBA to the AFDL war effort.
31. Transportation networks. Illegal activities also
benefited from the old transportation network that
existed prior to the 1998 war. This network consists of
key airlines and trucking companies, a number of
which aided AFDL troops in their war against the
Mobutu regime. The pattern of transport remains
similar today: merchandise or arms are flown in and
natural resources or their products are flown out. For
example, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali, a businesswoman
operating within the region for some time, utilized this
network even in the 1980s. She contracted Air Cargo
Zaire to transport arms to the FDD Hutu rebels in
Burundi and smuggled cigarettes on the return flight.
Since 1998, aircraft also fly from the military airports
at Entebbe and Kigali, transporting arms, military
equipment, soldiers and, for some companies,
merchandise. On the return flights, they will carry
coffee, gold, diamond traders and business
representatives and, in some cases, soldiers. The Panel
3 COMIEX is registered as follows: immatricule No.
43797, identification nationale No. 31837T, Siege
sociale Kinshasa/Gembe No. 4 Avenue de la Justice.
Administrateur Directeur generale: Frederic Kabarele.
7
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S/20011357
concludes that these pre-existing networks and
structures constitute the basis for the current
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
B. Mass-scale looting
32. Between September 1998 and August 1999,
occupied zones of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo were drained of existing stockpiles, including
minerals, agricultural and forest products and livestock.
Regardless of the looter, the pattern was the same:
Burundian, Rwandan, Ugandan and/or RCD soldiers,
commanded by an officer, visited farms, storage
facilities, factories and banks, and demanded that the
managers open the coffers and doors. The soldiers were
then ordered to remove the relevant products and load
them into vehicles. The Panel received numerous
accounts and claims of unlawful removal of products
by Rwandan or Ugandan armies and their local RCD
allies. The Panel has chosen to illustrate this point with
some examples.
33. In the mining sector, SOMINKI (Societe miniere
et industrielle du Kivu) had seven years' worth of
columbo-tantalite (coltan) in stock in various areas.
From late November 1998, Rwandan forces and their
RCD allies organized its removal and transport to
Kigali. Depending on the sources, between 2,000 and
3,000 tons of cassiterite and between 1,000 and 1,500
tons of coltan were removed from the region between
November 1998 and April 1999. A very reliable source
informed the Panel that it took the Rwandans about a
month to fly this coltan to Kigali. The Panel, however,
received official documents including one in which
RCD acknowledged removing 6 tons of coltan and 200
tons of cassiterite from SOMINKI for a total of
US$ 722,482.
34. Late in late August 1998, General Kazini's
soldiers absconded with the stockpiles of timber
belonging to the logging company Amex-bois, located
in Bagboka. In December that year, the same General
ordered the confiscation of all the stocked timber
belonging to the logging company La Forestiere.
General Kazini was reportedly seen in the area at least
twice during the period when the looting occurred and
temporarily established his headquarters in the area.
35. Then, in January 1999, in Equateur Province,
Jean-Pierre Bemba and General Kazini organized a
8
large operation for the confiscation of coffee beans.
Mr. Bemba initiated, encouraged and perpetuated such
practices in the Province. In a written letter to one of
his commanders, he urged him to release a bigger
vehicle he was using because it was needed urgently.
The source indicated that this was later used to carry
away tons of coffee beans. A participant in this
operation, who has since left the movement, explained
that two months were required to remove the enormous
quantities of coffee. In the past, this province produced
60 per cent of the country's robusta coffee. The
localities of Bumba, Lisala, Bosonzo, Binga and
Mindembo for a year did not have coffee stocks to
export because of these seizures. The Societe
congolaise du cafe, the largest owner of coffee stocks
in the area, went bankrupt. The mass-scale looting
reached such levels that, in one instance, Mr. Bemba
seized 200 tons of coffee beans from the SCIBE
company, which was owned by his father, Saolona
Bemba. The matter remains unresolved in court.
36. In some cases, factories were dismantled or
machinery spare parts were taken away, as in the case
of the sugar factory of Kaliba in South Kivu. When the
Panel asked about the dismantling of some factories,
the RCD cabinet replied that investors were free to
dismantle their factories and relocate wherever they
wanted. In essence, RCD recognized the phenomenon,
but explained it in terms of the investors' decision to
relocate the factories while taking the raw materials
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Cars and
other items were apparently also taken from the
country, as statistics on Ugandan registered cars
reflected an increase of about one quarter in 1999.
37. The financial sector was not left untouched either.
A defector from RCD who participated in some looting
informed the Panel that Rwandan soldiers
systematically targeted local banks as soon as they
conquered a town. In many cases, they would use the
RCD soldiers to collect the money while those who
were armed would surround the bank. For example, the
Kisangani Bank, a branch of the central bank, received
a visit of RCD staff accompanied by Rwandan soldiers.
Depending on the source (central bank in Kinshasa or
eyewitness), anywhere between $1 million and
$8 million worth of Congolese francs was taken. The
Panel was told that the operation took place a couple of
days after the central bank and Ministry of Finance
officials deposited money to pay civil servants and old
Congolese franc notes were replaced by new ones.
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38. Under the escort of soldiers, the money was taken
to the Palm Beach Hotel. The hotel management
recalled that bags full of money were stored in one of
the rooms and that during those few days armed
soldiers who could not speak Lingala (the most
commonly spoken Congolese language) guarded the
hotel premises. Could such an operation involving a
number of armed soldiers be carried out without the
knowledge and consent of the highest Rwandan
commander in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
39. Aides of Jean-Pierre Ondekane (an RCD leader)
reportedly collected the money from the Palm Beach
Hotel, flew with it to Goma and handed it over to
Emmanuel Kamanzi (former chief of the Finance
Department of RCD), who then flew on to Kigali. The
Panel could not identify the final recipient of the
money or how much disappeared between Kisangani,
Goma and Kigali. However, some sources told the
Panel that Mr. Kamanzi was imprisoned briefly at some
point after this transaction. According to the same
sources, he had apparently helped himself to the money
he was ordered only to transport. Mr. Kamanzi told
friends that he simply took a break of two months in
Kigali.
40. During the period when this operation was under
way, in Equateur Province, Mr. Bemba's men visited
several banks. According to a reliable source
Mr. Bemba's instructions to his soldiers were to
systematically empty the bank once a town was
captured. His troops took an equivalent of $400,000
from the Banque commerciale du Congo branch in
Bumba, $500,000 in Lisala, and approximately
$600,000 in Gemena.
41. The pilfering was also occurring in Kinshasa. The
Panel has evidence of a widespread practice by which
the late President Kabila would by proxy have
companies give a certain percentage of their profits.
For example, certain oil companies in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, under the umbrella of taxe
parafiscale, were delivering sums of money, in hard
cash, daily or weekly to the late President via his
Minister, friend and right-hand man, Mr. Mpoyo. Other
companies, such as MIBA, were asked to hand over
part of their profits to the late President's regime, and
all parastatals and important private companies were
invited to open bank accounts in the Banque de
commerce et du developpement (BCD) (see para. 78).
S/2001/357
42. However, over time the mass-scale looting
described above diminished and theft by individual
soldiers became more visible. For example, in Bunia,
during Panel discussions, local non-governmental
organizations, eyewitnesses and victims mentioned
cases in which Congolese civilians were injured or
murdered for resisting the attempted seizure of
property by the RCD rebels and foreign soldiers. In
Bukavu, individuals have told Panel members how
Rwandan soldiers confiscated their life savings in
dollar notes and some of the gold they were buying and
keeping as monnaie refuge in the face of the repeatedly
devalued Congolese franc. Partially, this has
contributed to the increasing resentment felt by the
Congolese population towards foreign soldiers and
some rebels.
43. The lootings of manufacturing plants, stocks and
private property were not only acts of isolated
individual soldiers but were encouraged, sometimes
organized and coordinated, by the highest army
commanders of both Rwanda and Uganda.
44. General Kazini used the same method to facilitate
looting activities. He would appoint loyal commanders
and reliable civilian Congolese in the civil
administration in areas potentially rich in natural
resources in order to secure his networks. This was
exactly the case in Ituri, where he appointed Adele
Lotsove in 1999 (see para. 7 I). In turn, these top layers
of collaborators, colonels and majors utilized their
right-hand men to carry out the actual looting.
45. The Panel has strong indications after talking to
numerous witnesses (key and others) that key officials
in the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda were aware
of the situation on the ground, including the looting of
stocks from a number of factories. In some cases, the
level of production of mineral resources would have
alerted any government, such as those of gold for
Uganda and coltan for Rwanda (from 99 tons in 1996
to 250 tons in 1997).
C. Systematic and systemic exploitation
46. Extraction phase. The mass-scale looting carried
out on many levels within the Democratic Republic of
the Congo by rebels and foreign soldiers overshadowed
extraction activities during the first 12 months of the
second war. When resource stockpiles were looted and
exhausted by occupying forces and their allies, the
9
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S/2001/357
exploitation evolved to an active :xtraction phase: Both
Congolese (civilians and soldiers) and foreigners
(civilians and soldiers) became involved in the
extraction of natural resources. This section highlights
one particular case study rather than offering a number
of shorter illustrative examples. The study will in effect
demonstrate how a company used illicit business
practices and complicity with occupying forces ~nd the
Government as well as its international connections to
exploit the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
47. DARA-Forest case study. A Ugandan-Thai
forest company called DARA-Forest moved to the Ituri
area late in 1998. In March 1998, DARA-Forest
applied for a licence to carry out logging activities. in
the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, but was dented
a forest concession by the Kinshasa authorities. In
J 999 the company began to buy production by hiring
indiv,iduals to harvest timber and then sell it to the
company. Initially, these individuals were Congolese
operating in partnership with Ugandans. The same
year, DARA engaged in industrial production wi!h the
construction of a sawmill in Mangina. By 2000, it had
obtained its own concession from RCD-ML. Analysis
of satellite images over a period of time reveals the
extent to which deforestation occurred in Orientate
Province between 1998 and 2000. The most harvested
forests in the areas were around Djugu, Mambassa,
Beni, Komanda, Luna, Mont Moyo and Aboro. This
logging activity was carried out without conside~ation
of any of the minimum acceptable rules of timber
harvesting for sustainable forest management or even
sustainable logging.
48. Timber harvested in this region, which is
occupied by the Ugandan army and RCD-ML, has
exclusively transited or remained in Uganda. Our own
investigation in Kampala has show~ that mahoga~y
originating in the Democratic Repubhc of the ~ongo 1s
largely available in Kampala, at a lower price than
Ugandan mahogany. This difference in price is simply
due to the lower cost of acquisition of timber. Timber
harvested in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by
Uganda pays very little tax or none at all. In addition,
customs fees are generally not paid when soldiers
escort those trucks or when orders are received from
some local commanders or General Kazini. Timber
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is then
exported to Kenya and Uganda, and to other continents.
The Panel gathered from the Kenyan port authorities
10
that vast quantities of timber are exported to Asia,
Europe and North America.
49. The Panel also discovered during its investigation
that individual Ugandan loggers violated forestry
legislation, recognized by their ally RCD-ML, by
logging (extracting) the timber directly. According to
the Congolese legislation on the permis de coupe, only
individual Congolese nationals are allowed to harvest
timber and only in small quantities. Foreigners must
apply for the larger concessions. Initially, Ugandans
operated in partnership with a Congolese permit holder.
Soon, the Ugandans began to pay the Congolese to
sub-lease the permit and, subsequently, to obtain the
licence in direct violation of the law.
50. Timber extraction in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and its export have been characterized by
unlawfulness and illegality. Besides extracting timber
without authorization in a sovereign country and in
violation of the local legislation, DARA-Forest
consistently exported its timber without any
certification procedure. It tried to approach some
certification bodies licensed by the Forest Stewardship
Council. These bodies requested documentation and
elements that the company failed to provide. Yet
DARA-Forest exported timber in violation of a normal
procedure generally required and accepted by the
international forest community and gradually
considered to be international "soft law". Companies
importing this uncertified timber from DARA-Fo~est
were essentially in major industrialized countnes,
including Belgium, China, Denmark, Japan, Kenya,
Switzerland and the United States of America.
51. The Panel also realized that DARA Great Lakes
Industries (DGLI), of which DARA-Forest is a
subsidiary, along with a sister company in Uganda,
Nyota Wood Industries, is in collusion with the
Ministry of Water, Land and Forests of Uganda in
establishing a scheme to facilitate the certification of
timber coming from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In May 2000, DGLI signed a contract for forest
stewardship certification with SmartWood and the
Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy in Oregon,
United States of America. On 21 March 2000, the
Director of the DARA group, Prossy Balaba, sent a
letter to the Commissioner asking him to allow an
official of SmartWood to visit certain forests, such as
Budongo and Bugoma; he was due to visit the region in
mid-April. The visit was meant to deceive the offi~ial
by presenting those forests as the ones for which
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certification was sought and to convince SmartWood to
work for the certification of their timber. Indeed, when
the visit took place, from 14 to 16 April, the DARA
group had not even applied for the concession of the
Budongo forest (Uganda). It was only on 5 July 2000
that John Kotiram of the DARA group wrote to the
Commissioner to request the concession on the
Budongo forest.
52. The idea behind this is to use Budongo forest as a
model of forests from which timber is harvested and
which comply with the international requirements for
certification, in order to certify timber coming from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for which basic
elements of certification do not exist. Future plans for
beating the international system are already in place.
According to internal documents of DGLI, DARAForest
will import timber from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo into Uganda, which will be
processed for different types of products in the new
plant in Namanve for the sawmilling of hardwood, both
imported from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and harvested in Uganda. DGLI partners in this new
scheme include DARA Europe GmbH Germany,
Shanton President Wood Supply Co. Ltd China,
President Wood Supply Co. Ltd Thailand, DARA
Tropical Hardwood, Portland, Oregon, United States of
America. The distribution of sales of the company is
thought to remain the same, about 30 per cent to the
Far East, China, Japan and Singapore, 40 per cent to
Europe and 25 per cent to North America. DARA Great
Lakes Industries shareholding and management is
between Thai and Ugandan nationals, among them
John Supit Kotiran and Pranee Chanyuttasart of
Thailand and Prossy Balaba of Uganda. Some
unconfirmed information indicates that members of
President Museveni's family are shareholders of DGLJ,
although more investigation is needed.
53. The DARA group also established another
scheme to carry out fraudulent activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The objects of
DGLI range from logging to financial and industrial
activities. Because of the confusion created between
DARA-Forest, which received a concession from RCD,
and DGLI, DARA-Forest has also been dealing in
diamonds, gold and coltan. The Panel has received
reports from the custom posts of Mpondwe, Kasindi
and Bundbujyo of the export from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo of minerals such as cassiterite
and coltan in trucks. During the Panel's visit to Bunia it
S/2001/357
was reported that other products were loaded in trucks
which are supposed to carry timber only; it is likely
that coltan and cassiterite were these products.
Moreover, the fraud extends to the forging of
documents and declarations "originating" in Kinshasa.
54. The logging rate was alarming around Butembo,
Beni, Boga and Mambassa. The RCD-ML
administration acknowledged its lack of control over
the rate of extraction, the collection of taxes on logging
activities and the customs fees at the exit points. On the
basis of eyewitness accounts, satellite images, key
actors' acknowledgements and the Panel's own
investigation, there is sufficient evidence to prove that
timber extraction is directly related to the Ugandan
presence in Orientale Province. This has reached
alarming proportions and Ugandans (civilians, soldiers
and companies) are extensively involved in these
activities. In May 2000, RCD-ML attributed a
concession of 100,000 hectares to DARA-Forest. Since
September 1998, overall DARA-Forest has been
exporting approximately 48,000 m3 of timber per year.
55. Other extraction schemes. Burundians and
Rwandans have also extracted timber or have been
associated with Congolese loggers. Roads to evacuate
timber from places deeper in the forest are in a very
bad state. Yet Congo timber, as it is referred to in
Bujumbura, is readily available in Burundi and
Rwanda. Some Burundians, however, are also involved
in the harvesting of bark from prunus Africana. This
tree is known and used in medicine for prostate
treatment. Statistics gathered from the Tanzanian Port
Authority clearly indicate that Burundi exported· those
barks in 1998 and 1999. Prunus Africana is not found
in Burundi, however, but rather in the forests of South
Kivu.
56. Mining sector. In the mining sector, direct
extraction was carried out in three ways, namely (a) by
individual soldiers for their own benefit; (b) by locals
organized by Rwandan and Ugandan commanders; and
( c) by foreign nationals for the army or commanders'
benefit.
57. The Panel came across a number of cases in
which soldiers were directly involved in mining in
Watsa. In September 1999, the UPDF local commander
demanded the extraction of gold on the pillars of the
Gorumbwa mine galleries in which dynamite was used.
On 9 September, the galleries collapsed, leading to the
death of a number of Congolese miners. Some months
11
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S/2001/357
later, Ugandan soldiers who came to mine in the same
area contracted respiratory disease. Other returning
UPDF soldiers have themselves told friends how they
operated in order to acquire the gold. From these
accounts, it appears that, even when the local
commanders were informed about these activities,
there was an acceptable level of tolerance. Although
the Panel qualifies this behaviour as passive complicity
on the part of some commanders, it is not clear whether
soldiers shared the acquired minerals with their allies.
58. Local Congolese have been mining for years for
their own benefit. The novelty of their involvement lies
in the fact that some of them were used as "convincible
labour" to mine gold, diamonds or coltan. In the Bondo
locality within Equateur Province, young men from 12
to 18 years were recruited by Jean-Pierre Bemba. The
Ugandan allies trained the recruits and shared with
them the idea that the Ugandan army was an "army of
development" that aimed at improving ordinary
people's living conditions. After the one-hour morning
physical training session, they were sent to gold mines
to dig on behalf of the Ugandans and Mr. Bemba.
According to eyewitnesses, in Kalima, RPA
commander Ruto enrolled two teams of local
Congolese to dig coltan; these Congolese worked under
the heavy guard of Rwandan soldiers.
59. In the Kilo-Moto mineral district, Ugandan local
commanders and some of the soldiers who guarded the
different entry points of the mining areas allowed and
encouraged the local population to mine. The
arrangement between the soldiers and the miners was
that each miner would leave at the entry/exit point one
gram of gold every day. A key informant of the Panel
indicated that on average 2,000 individuals mined this
large concession six days a week. This source,
confirmed by other sources, informed the Panel that it
was so well organized that the business ran smoothly.
On average 2 kg of gold are delivered daily to the
person heading the network.
60. The last pattern of organized extraction by the
occupying forces involves the import of manpower for
mining. Occupying forces brought manpower from
their own countries and provided the necessary security
and logistics. In particular, Rwanda utilized prisoners
to dig coltan in exchange for a sentence reduction and
limited cash to buy food. The Panel was recently
informed that there is a presence of 1,500 Rwandan
prisoners in the Numbi area of Kalehe. According to
the same report, these prisoners were seen mining
12
coltan while guarded by RPA soldiers. Human Rights
Watch also reported the same information in March
200 I. This recent report confirms numerous other
reports and eyewitness accounts of the involvement of
prisoners, some of whom are former refugees.
61. Impact on wildlife. Wildlife has also suffered a
great deal from the conflict. Numerous accounts and
statistics from regional conservation organizations
show that, in the area controlled by the Ugandan troops
and Sudanese rebels, nearly 4,000 out of 12,000
elephants were killed in the Garamba Park in northeastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo between
1995 and 1999. The situation in other parks and
reserves is equally grave, including Kahuzi-Biega Park,
the Okapi Reserve and Virunga Park. The number of
okapis, gorillas and elephants has dwindled to small
populations. In the Kahuzi-Biega Park, a zone
controlled by the Rwandans and RCD-Goma and rich
in coltan, only 2 out of 350 elephant families remained
in 2000. There is serious concern among
conservationists that the rest fled of their own accord
or were killed, as two tons of elephant tusks were
traced in the Bukavu area late in 2000. Already by
April 2000, about three tons of tusks were temporarily
seized by RCD-ML in Isiro. After strong pressure from
Uganda, the cargo was released and transferred to
Kampala.
62. The Panel has indications that, in most cases,
poaching of elephants in violation of international law
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)) was well
organized. Either soldiers hunted directly with the
consent of the commander or they provided equipment
and protection to local villagers to execute the task
with the objective of collecting elephant tusks. For
example, in August 2000, UPDF Colonel Mugeni and a
crew of his soldiers were discovered with 800 kg of
elephant tusks in their car near Garamba Park. The
Government of Uganda received detailed notification
of this incident. Eyewitnesses reported to the Panel
several incidents that involved Rwandan soldiers in the
trading of elephant and buffalo meat. In the Bukavu
and Goma areas, there appears to be a pattern: high
commanders take the tusks, soldiers negotiate the
wholesale price with some locals, and the locals sell
the meat in the market place as retailers.
63. Harvesting of coffee by non-owners has been
another feature of the exploitation of natural resources.
Jean-Pierre Bemba, the leader of MLC and now the
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President of the Front de liberation du Congo, a partner
in the coffee business with General Kazini, has been
harvesting coffee directly from plantations he does not
own. During our visit to Gbadolite, some locals
mentioned that coffee was harvested by Mr. Bemba's
men from some private plantations that belonged to
individuals who had fled the region.
64. Monopolies and price-fixing. In addition to
looting and extracting resources, rebels and Rwandan
and Ugandan troops have abused the commerce and
trade system. In some cases, they forced locally owned
and some foreign-owned businesses to close down. The
methods used varied from looting to harassing the
owners. The end objective was to gain control of local
commerce. The result is unprecedented control of the
economy of the eastern and north-eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. During its field visit, the Panel
noted that consumer goods and other merchandise
found in Gbadolite and Bunia originated mostly in
Uganda. During its field visit to Bunia, the Panel
members witnessed the unloading of beer crates from
an aircraft coming from Uganda. In Gbadolite, most
cigarettes, beverages, toilet paper etc. are imported
from Uganda. Equally, goods in Kisangani, Bukavu
and Goma come mainly from Burundi or Rwanda.
Imported goods for the occupied zones arrive via the
ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam. This was
confirmed during the Panel's visit to the customs
services (Internal Revenue Authority) in Kampala.
Furthermore, depending on the importer of the goods,
taxes are not paid. The failure to pay taxes, especially
in Orientale Province, was acknowledged to the Panel
by RCD-ML during our discussions in Bunia in
October 2000.
65. Rwandan and Ugandan troops and their
Congolese allies have also been exploiting local
farmers. They have imposed prices and conditions on
the farmers. In one instance, a farmer living near the
Ubangi River, 20 km from Gbadolite, explained to a
member of the Panel how he is dependent on the coffee
dealers for the supply of the bags imposed by the
coffee collectors (buyers). Failure to use these bags
leads to an automatic reduction in the price of the
coffee. These bags are not produced in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo and they have to
buy them.
66. In another instance, one woman explained how
she and her husband could no longer sell their palm oil
to the neighbouring Central African Republic or ship it
S/2001/357
to Kinshasa for a better price. The control of trade and
other business networks for commercial crops, such as
coffee and palm oil, is almost total within the occupied
zones. This translates into a de facto monopoly like the
one Jean-Pierre Bemba has on coffee exports in
Equateur Province. The locals who desperately remain
in the villages work more for less, if anything at all.
Humanitarian organizations working in the occupied
zones told the Panel stories of a number of women in
some villages who have simply stopped taking their
children to the health centres because they no longer
possess simple items of clothing to preserve their
dignity.
67. Exploitation of resources becomes even more
questionable, as some ofthe players not only produce
counterfeited Congolese francs, but use them to
purchase natural resources. According to reliable
sources, the Victoria Group, whose key shareholder is
General Khaleb Akandwanaho, alias Salim Saleh, was
involved in the making of counterfeit Congolese
francs. These notes are used for the purchase of
commercial crops, primarily coffee. A very reliable
source told the Panel that in mid-1999 Jean-Pierre
Bemba ordered the production of 100-franc Congolese
notes. Simultaneously the Victoria Group also
produced counterfeit Congolese francs. By the end of
1999, Equateur Province was flooded with counterfeit
Congolese currency so that Mr. Bemba decided to
suspend all 100-franc notes, including the ones he had
produced, so as to stop inflation in the areas he
controlled.
68. The Panel has evidence that the illegal
exploitation of natural resources goes beyond mineral
and agricultural resources. It is actively occurring also
in respect of financial transactions, taxes and the use of
cheap labour, which our mandate qualified as other
forms of wealth. Local banks and insurance companies
operating in Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani, Bunia and
Gbadolite deal directly with Kigali or Kampala. A
system of tax collection - enforced in some cases -
has been implemented by MLC, RCD-ML and RCDGoma
with their established Ugandan and Rwandan
counterparts. In the rebels own words, these taxes are
aimed at "financing or supporting the war effort".
Indeed, part of the funds collected is sent to Kigali (in
the case of RCD-Goma). In the case of the former
RCD-ML and MLC, not only was part of the taxes sent
to Kampala but also individual colonels would claim
direct payment from RCD-ML. In Bunia and Bukavu,
13
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S/200J/357
people protested, demonstrated and denounced this
practice of abuse. In areas controlled by Mr. Bemba,
peasants carrying palm oil on bicycles have to pay
taxes on the bicycles.
69. The use of child labour is also rampant in the
occupied territories. Some children are reportedly
mining gold in the Kilo Moto mines. In Equateur
Province, some children were seen in the diamond
mines. The Panel members witnessed the presence of
young MLC recruits at Gbadolite airport and in the
city. They were at the airport waiting for a flight,
having recently completed their military training.
70. The aforementioned demonstrates that the
procedures and processes for exploiting the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are
continuously evolving. Occupying forces began with
the easiest method, looting stockpiles. As the wells ran
dry, they developed efficient means of extracting the
additional resources necessary to keep the coffers full.
Eventually, any means necessary was recognized as a
legitimate mode of acquisition. From all the evidence
offered above, it appears that this process will continue
to evolve as is deemed necessary.
D. Current structures of illegal
exploitation
71. Administrative structures. The illegal
exploitation of natural resources is facilitated by the
administrative structures established by Uganda and
Rwanda. Those countries' leaders directly and
indirectly appointed regional governors or local
authorities or, more commonly, appointed or confirmed
Congolese in these positions. Typical examples are, on
the Ugandan side, the appointment of the Governor of
Ituri Province. On 18 June 1999, Ugandan General
Kazini appointed as Governor of this Province Adele
Lotsove, a Congolese who had already been employed
by the Mobutu and Kabila administrations. Information
gathered clearly indicates that she was instrumental in
the collection and transfer of funds from her assigned
administrative region to the Ugandan authorities in
I 999. According to some sources, she also contributed
to the reallocation of land from Lendus to Hemas. On
the Rwandan side, according to one reliable source,
Rwandan authorities have helped secure the
appointment of Gertrude Kitembo as Governor of
Maniema.
14
72. Modes of transportation. Illegal activities have
benefited from the evolution of the means of
transportation in the region. Prior to the second war
most exchanges of goods and products were conducted
through road transportation. To a large extent,
smugglers utilized Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika to
smuggle goods and products to and from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and, in limited
circumstances, used aircraft. The shift over the past
four years has been noticeable. An increasing number
of aircraft are utilized to transport products and arms
into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while
transferring out vast quantities of agricultural products
and minerals, in particular to Kampala and Kigali. The
other novelty of increased air transport has been the
use of aircraft leased by the army for commercial and
non-military functions. Different categories of people,
including soldiers, journalists and traders, have told the
Panel about their journeys in aircraft alongside bags of
coffee and other non-military products.
73. This change in mode of transportation was
accompanied by a change in players as well as a
redefining of transportation companies. Traditional and
well-established companies such as TMK saw their
share of the market erode while others simply
disappeared (Air Cargo Zaire). At the same time, new
companies emerged and expanded, such as Air Navette
and Jambo Safari; they are owned or controlled by the
relatives and friends of generals, colonels and
Presidents. At the other end, outsiders who entered the
region with the AFDL "conquest" of Kinshasa during
the first war, by transporting troops, remained and
consolidated their position; that is the case of Victor
Butt, a notorious arms dealer in the region. Most flights
to and from Equateur and drientale Provinces originate
from the Entebbe military airport. During a visit to
Kampala, the Panel was informed about the concern
expressed by the Ugandan Internal Revenue to the
Ministry of Defence. This complaint raised the issue of
revenue loss to the treasury due to the fact that
products entering or leaving the Democratic Republic
of the Congo by air to and from Entebbe military
airport are not checked, and taxes are not levied by the
customs services.
74. On the Ugandan side, three main private
companies are involved:
• Air Alexander, whose owner is Jovia
Akandwanaho, the wife of Salim Saleh and sisterin-
law of President Museveni. Her company
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mainly operated between Entebbe and Kisangani
before the last battle of Kisangani. According to
some sources, the company continues to operate
in the territory held by Ugandan troops.
• Air Navette has dealings with General Salim
Saleh and Jean-Pierre Bemba. The company flies
to Gbadolite, Gemena, Kisangani, Bunia and
Kampala. This company uses an Antonov 26 and
an Antonov 12.
• Uganda Air Cargo, which mainly deals with the
Ugandan Ministry of Defence. Previously, it was
using a C-130, but currently uses an llyushin 76
and an Antonov 12. This company flies to
Entebbe, Gemena, Basankasu, lsiro and Buta.
The Panel has indications that most private air
companies do not own the aircraft they use; the owners
are usually people like Victor Butt.
75. On the Rwandan side, a number of private
companies operate in the territory. These are:
• New Gomair, which flies to Kisangani-Goma and
Kigali. According to some sources, the wife of
the current Minister of Finances of Rwanda is a
shareholder.
• Air Navette flies to Goma, Bukavu, Kisangani
and Kigali. According to some sources, one of the
major shareholders, Modeste Makabuza, also
owner of Jambo Safari, is a known figure in the
entourage of President Kagame.
• Air Boyoma is a shuttle between Goma and
Lodja; according to some sources Mr. Ondekane,
former first Vice-President of RCD-Goma, is a
shareholder.
• Other companies, such as Compagnie aerienne
des Grands Lacs et Cargo fret international, Sun
Air Services and Kivu Air Services, operate in the
area.
76. Clients and other very reliable sources have
indicated that Sabena Cargo is transporting illegal
natural resources extracted from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Sabena Cargo is said to carry
coltan extracted from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo from Kigali airport to European destinations.
The Panel asked to meet with the management of
Sabena in Kampala and in Brussels, but no one was
made available to speak to the Panel members.
S/20011357
77. Financial network. All illegal activities in the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, primarily
the commercial and trade operations, utilize the
financial network to some extent. One of the
characteristics of this network has been its ability to
quickly adapt to the new political and economic
environment. Cities like Kisangani and Goma were
already big trading centres for diamonds and consumer
goods. Most banks operating in the occupied zones
were already in operation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo before the August 1998 war. Their
headquarters or corresponding banks were generally in
Kinshasa. With the occupation, headquarters and
corresponding banks tended to move to Kigali. Some
of these banks are:
• Union des banques congolaises. Although the
headquarters remains in Kinshasa, it has ongoing
operations in areas controlled by Rwanda.
• Banque commerciale du Congo. The headquarters
is in Kinshasa and it has branches in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Director
was transferred to Kigali in order to oversee
operations in the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo. This bank is linked to the Belgolaise,
a Belgian bank consortium.
• Banque commerciale du Rwanda. The
headquarters is in Kigali, but it has operations in
Kisangani, Bukavu and Goma. The Government
of Rwanda is said to be one of the shareholders.
• Banque a la confiance d'or (BANCOR). One of
the newest banks in Kigali which started its
activities in 1995. It was family owned until 1999
but early in 2000 a businessman, Tibere Rujigiro,
purchased the bank at a very low price according
to various sources.
78. Special cases: BCDI and BCD. The Banque de
commerce, du developpement et d'industrie is the
newest bank, created in November 1996 and
headquartered in Kigali. Its involvement with the
Democratic Republic of the Congo dates back to the
beginning of the AFDL conquest of the former Zaire.
BCDI operated most AFDL financial transactions
before Laurent-Desire Kabila took power. The Panel
was told that its shareholders are essentially the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, COMIEX, Alfred Khalissa
and some Angolans. The real shareholders are the
allies, except Uganda. Some documents, receipts for
payments and authorization for payments made by
15
- 127 -
S/2001/357
some large companies in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo between early and late 1997 clearly indicate
that payments are to be made through BCDI for the
contribution to "the war effort". When the late
President Kabila came to power, he created the Banque
de commerce et du developpement, which has the
peculiarity of having as shareholders Tristar, COMIEX
and Alfred Khalissa of BCDI. The Rwandan Patriotic
Front remains, through BCDI and Tristar, a shareholder
in BCD in spite of the war situation.
79. Other private companies. A number of
companies were created to facilitate illegal activities in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Others have
existed in the region for decades and joined the
bandwagon to pursue the obvious financial windfalls
involved in the exploitation of the country. On the
Ugandan, MLC and RCD-ML side, rebel leaders and/or
Ugandan military officials created new companies and
businesses using prete-noms. Most, if not all, of these
companies are privately owned by individuals or a
group of individuals.
80. Among the companies involved in the illicit
acquisition of natural resources in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Trinity and Victoria seem to be
the most interesting given their modus operandi,
activities and respective shareholders. Victoria Group
is chaired by Mr Khalil and its headquarters is in
Kampala. According to reliable sources, Mr. Khalil
deals directly with Mrs. Akandwanaho on diamond
issues. Mr. Khalil has two collaborators in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, based in Kisangani
and Gbadolite. Both are said to be from Lebanon, they
are Mohammed Gassan and Mr. Talal. During its visit
to Gbadolite, the Panel received confirmation of the
presence of one of them and his leading role in the
purchase of diamonds in the region. A reliable source
told members of the Panel that the Victoria Group
belongs jointly to Muhoozi Kainerugabe, son of
President Museveni, and Jovia and Khaleb
Akandwanaho. Victoria Group is involved in trading
diamonds, gold and coffee. The Group purchases these
mineral and agricultural products in Isiro, Bunia,
Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani. The company paid
taxes to MLC, but failed to do so with RCD-ML. When
counterfeit currencies (Congolese francs and United
States dollars) were found in areas where the company
buys the natural resources, fingers were pointed at the
Victoria Group. Other sources have confirmed to the
16
Panel the involvement of the Victoria Group in the
making of counterfeit currency.
81. Trinity is an equally interesting case. Ateenyi
Tibasima, second Vice-President of RCD-ML and now
the Commissaire general adjoint of FLC, was the
"manager" of the company. According to reliable
sources, Trinity is a fictitious company and a
conglomerate of various businesses owned by Salim
Saleh and his wife. Its primary purpose was to facilitate
their business activities in Orientale Province. To this
end, Mr. Tibasima granted a tax holiday to all Trinity
activities in the areas controlled by Uganda and
administered by RCD-ML in November 1999. Trinity
has imported various goods and merchandise and has
taken from Orientale Province gold, coffee and timber
without paying any tax. Different individuals,
Ugandans as well as Congolese, have taken the
opportunity created by the confusion over Trinity to
export from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (on
behalf of Trinity) various natural resources, also
without paying taxes.
82. On the Rwandan side, most companies with
important activities related to the natural resources of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo are owned
either by the Government or by individuals very close
to the inner circle of President Kagame. Rwanda
Metals, for example, is a company involved in coltan
dealing. It purchases coltan and exports it out of the
continent. The Panel has strong indications that RPF
controls Rwanda Metals. In mid-January 2001, some
very reliable sources met with the senior management
of Rwanda Metals in Kigali. During these discussions,
the Director told them that Rwanda Metals was a
private company with no relation to the army. He
further explained that he was expecting key partners
that very morning for discussions. As discussions
continued, the so-called partners arrived as planned;
unfortunately they were in Rwandan army uniforms
and were top officers. This incident confirms accounts
from various sources indicating that Rwanda Metals is
controlled by RPF. Meanwhile there are also
indications that RPA is a shareholder of Grands Lacs
Metals, a company also dealing in coltan.
83. Jambo Safari is another company whose
emergence and growth has raised some eyebrows in
Goma and Bukavu. When the August 1998 war started,
Modeste Makabuza was buying oil from Kenya and
selling it in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Jambo Safari has benefited from an internal
- 128 -
network of false receipts within RCD-Goma and RPA.
According to a very reliable source, Jambo Safari
would charge RCD-Goma for three times the quantities
of oil delivered and any attempt to question the figures
would be suppressed. In a rare .attempt to clarify the
situation, some members of RCD-Goma during the last
General Assembly meeting, in June 2000, requested
that a commission be set up to conduct an internal
audit. Kigali agreed to send a colonel to conduct the
audit along with an RCD team. When the issue of false
receipts and overpayment · was established, Kigaii
recalled the colonel and suspended the inquiry. Some
·sources have confirmed the close ties between Mr.
.Makabuza, the apparent owner of Jambo Safari, and
President Kagame. Jambo Safari has diversified since
its original business venture, is now dealing in coffee,
recently purchased a fleet of new trucks and is also
involved in air transport with Air Navette.
84. Other minor companies also operate with the
protection of some local commanders. For example,
Etablissement Habier is involved in the.distribution of
oil and petrol in Goma and Bukavu. This company is
said to belong to Ernest Habimana, who is closely
linked to RPA, especially to Major Karasira and
Mr. Gakwerere. STIPAG, a company owed by Mr.
Mbugiye operating in collaboration with Major Kazura
(chief of security of the Rwandan Army in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Major Gatete,
is among those junior companies involved in coffee
and diamond dealing. Finally a myriad of small
companies was created and their shareholders are
invariably powerful individuals in the Rwandan
nomenklatura or in RCD structures. That is the case of
Grands Lacs Metals, where Majors Gatete, Dan and
Kazura are reportedly shareholders. In other cases,
foreign companies incorporate local potentates on their
board, as in the case of Gesellschaft ftlr
Elektrometallurgie (GFE), with Karl Heinz Albers and
Emmanuel Kamanzi as partners, or MOM with Mr.
Makabuza.
85. The Panel, on the basis of the data, accounts and
documents received and analysed, came to the
conclusion that the systems of illegal exploitation
established by Ugandans and Rwandans differ from
each other. In the case of Uganda, individuals, mainly
top army commanders, using their hold over their
collaborators and some officials in rebel movements,
are exploiting the resources of the Democratic
S/2001/357
Republic of the Congo. However, this is known by the
political establishment in Kampala.
8(>. In the case of Rwanda, things are more systemic.
There are linkages and bridges between some key
companies, as in the case of Tristar and BCDI and,
above all, the relationship between RPA, RPF, BCDI,
Rwanda Metals, Grands Lacs Metals and Tristar. The
senior management of these companies seems to report
separately to the same people at the top of the pyramid.
On the other hand, all key managers have personal
relationships with different army commanders who
themselves report to the leadership. This pyramidal and
integrated structure coupled with the strict discipline of
the group has made the exploitation of the resources of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo more
systematic, efficient and organized. There is equally a
bridge between the internal Rwandan structures of
illegal exploitation and the RCD-Goma structures. The
Government of Rwanda made arrangements with RCDGoma
to drain resources from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. There is a case of loans made by BCDI
to RCD to pay suppliers whose business is related to
RPA. This "financial bridge" is statutory; indeed the
RCD statute indirectly recognizes the role of Rwanda
in overseeing the finances of the movement and its
participation in decision-making and control/audit of
finances.
E. Individual actors
87. The list that follows is not exhaustive, but the
Panel's choice was based on the crucial roles played by
these persons and their direct involvement in either
providing support, entertaining networks or facilitating
the exploitation of natural resources within the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. On the Ugandan
side, some familiar names surface frequently, such as
Major General Salim Saleh, Brigadier General James
Kazini, Colonel Tikamanyire, Jovia Akandwanaho,
Colonel Utafire, Colonel Mugeni, Mr. Khalil, Ateenyi
Tibasima, Mbusa Nyamwisi, Nahim Khanaffer, Roger
Lumbala, Jean-Yves Ollivier, Jean-Pierre Bemba,
Adele Lotsove, Abdu Rhaman and latecomers such as
Colonel Muyombo.
88. The Panel has selected to focus on three key
actors. First and second are Major General (retired)
Salim Saleh and his wife, Jovia Akandwanaho. Khaleb
Akandwanaho, alias Salim Saleh, and his spouse Jovia
are at the core of the illegal exploitation of natural
17
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S/2001/357
resources in areas controlled by Uganda. He is the
younger brother of President Museveni (very popular
in the army) and he pulls the strings of illegal activities
in areas controlled by Uganda and allies. James Kazini
is his executing arm and his right hand. He controls
and protects Mbusa Nyamwisi and Ateenyi Tibasima.
In return, they protect his commercial and business
interests in regions controlled by the former RCD-ML.
He used both the Victoria Group and Trinity for the
purchase and the commercialization of diamonds,
timber, coffee and gold. Very reliable sources have told
the Panel that behind Salim Saleh there is Jovia
Akandwanaho, who is more aggressive on the issue of
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. She is particularly interested in
diamonds. According to very reliable sources, she is at
the root of the Kisangani wars. She wanted control of
the Kisangani diamond market after having
confirmation from Mr. Khalil, "Director" of the
Victoria Group, that it was a good idea and that it was
feasible to control the Kisangani market.
89. The third is Brigadier General James Kazini,
former Chief of Staff of UPDF and former commander
of military operations in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. He is the master in . . the field; the
orchestrater, organizer and manager of most illegal
activities related to the UPDF presence in north and
north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is
the right hand of Salim Saleh. He very much relies on
the established military network and former comrades
and collaborators, such as Colonels Tikamanyire and
Mugeni. He has been close to Messrs. Nyamwisi,
Tibasima and Lumbala and to Jean-Pierre Bemba, all of
whom have facilitated his illegal dealings in diamonds,
coltan, timber, counterfeit currency, gold and coffee,
and imports of goods and merchandise in Equateur and
Orientale Provinces. He is said to have a good
relationship with Mr. Baramoto, a former general of
President Mobutu. In spite of being discharged from
his responsibilities as commander of UPDF forces in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, his networks
remain in place. The Panel asked to meet with these
key actors, but the request was turned down.
90. Actors from Rwanda and RCD-Goma involved in
the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be separated
from the structure they serve. Most of these people
serve a system. The Panel has, however, noticed a
recurrence of some names or the particular role that
18
some individuals have played at a given time and for
some operations. In addition to the names mentioned in
the paragraphs on main companies, certain names can
be highlighted.
91. First, Ali Hussein, who plays a major role in
diamond and gold deals in Bukavu and Kisangani.
Those who have dealt with him in the past have
mentioned the presence of a Rwandan national during
commercial negotiations. There are indications that the
Rwandan citizen attending the meetings is a civil
servant working in the President's office in Kigali.
Second is Colonel James Kabarebe, who is the RPA
facilitator for some deals. According to some sources
he has been in contact with Victor Butt [or Bout} for
the lease of an Ilyushin 76 that served to carry coltan
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Kigali.
He is said to be a partner to Mohamed Ali Salem,
manager of the company Global Mineral. This
company is involved in coltan purchasing in Bukavu
and Goma. Third, Tibere Rujigiro, member of RPF,
who is considered to be one of the main money
providers to the party during the 1990-1 994 war. He is
a major shareholder in Tristar Investment, a company
equally close to RPF. He is said to be also involved in
the tobacco business.
92. The fourth, Aziza Kulsum Gulamali, is a unique
case among key actors in the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Mrs. Gulamali is said to hold several passports.
She lives in Bukavu, Brussels or Nairobi, depending on
her schedule. Mrs. Gulamali has acknowledged having
been involved in the past in the Burundi civil war.
According to reliable sources she armed and financed
the Hutu rebels of FOO in Burundi. Yet she built new
alliances with the Government of Rwanda and has
become a major ally of the Kigali regime and RCDGoma.
Mrs. Gulamali is involved in gold, coltan and
cassiterite dealings in territories controlled by the
Rwandans. Prior to that, she was involved in arms
trafficking for the benefit of the Burundian Hutus and
was equally involved in gold and ivory trafficking. Her
name was also mentioned in connection with cigarette
smuggling. Very reliable sources told the Panel that she
covered her illegal dealings by her cigarette factory,
now in bankruptcy. In the coltan business, her clients
include Starck, Cogecom and Sogem; the Bank
Bruxelles Lambert handles some of her financial
transactions. The Panel requested RCD-Goma several
times for a meeting with Mrs. Gulamali and also
- 130 -
contacted her aides, but she never arranged a meeting
with the Panel.
93. She was recently appointed by RCD-Goma as
General Manager of SOMIGL, a conglomerate of four
partners, which obtained the monopoly for the
commercialization and export of coltan. This monopoly
has strengthened her position as a major player in the
trade in coltan in the region. RCD-Goma, in an attempt
to explain this partnership, said that she is a very useful
person and would bring $ I million to RCD monthly.
Some sources have told the Panel members that her
network of contacts is impressive and that she controls
almost every official in RCD-Goma. According to
some sources, sh~ is .also involved with her daughter
Djamila in counterfeiting currency. Mrs. Gulamali is
famous for forging customs declarations, especially for
the products she exports. Confronted recently with a
false customs declaration where coltan was declared as
cassiterite, she replied, "in this business everybody
does that". Her declaration alerted the Panel to the
extent to which fraud is prevalent among the
companies that export coltan.
F. Economic data: confirmation of the
illegal exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
94. All the empirical evidence provided above is
complemented by the economic analysis of data
provided by different sources.
Uganda
95. At the request of the Panel, the Ugandan
authorities provided extensive data, including
production and export values for agricultural products
such as coffee, cotton, tea and tobacco. In terms of
minerals, the data also cover gold and coltan
production and export figures.
96. The official data contain substantial
discrepancies. First, export figures for gold are
consistently greater than production values, as shown
in table l and figure 1.
97. The gap between production and export could
originate from the exploitation of the natural resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Central
Bank of Uganda has reportedly acknowledged to IMF
S/2001/357
officials that the volume of Ugandan gold exports does
not reflect this country's production levels but rather
that some exports might be "leaking over the borders"
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
central bank reported that, by September 1997, Uganda
had exported gold valued at $105 million, compared
with $60 million in 1996 and $23 million in 1995.
98. Second, the data from the Ugandan authorities are
silent with regard to diamond production and export.
Several third party sources (WTO, World Federation of
Diamond Bourses, Diamond High Council) indicate
diamond exports from Uganda during the last three
years. These diamond exports are suspicious for many
reasons:
(a) Uganda has no known diamond production;
(b) Diamond exports from Uganda are observed
only in the last few years, coinciding surprisingly with
the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo as shown in table 2 and figure 2;
(c) Finally, these facts corroborate the Panel's
findings from field investigation, discussions and
external observers on the need to control the rich
diamond zone near Kisangani and Banalia.
99. These figures are understated and there are
indications that Uganda exported more diamonds.
However, this is not well captured in the statistics
because of the loose regulations governing the free
zone areas. These regulations permit diamonds
originating in any country to be repackaged, and then
to be sold from any country as diamonds from a
country of origin that is not necessarily the one
mentioned in the statistics.
19
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S/2001/357
Table 1
Uganda: mineral exports and production, 1994-2000
Year Gold 7in Cohan Cobalt
A. Mineral exports (tons)
1994 0.22
1995 3.09
1996 5.07 3.55
1997 6.82 4.43 2.57
1998 5.03 18.57
1999 11.45 69.5 67.48
2000 10.83 275.98
B. Mineral production (tons)
1994 0.0016 3.704 0.435
1995 0.0015 4.289 1.824
1996 0.003 0.38
1997 0.0064 1.81
1998 0.0082 1.102
1999 0.0047 76.74
2000 0.0044 287.51
Source: Uganda, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 2000 data are from January to
October.
Figure 1. Uganda: gold production and exports, 1994-2000
14
12
10
3
! l~I
4
Yea<
20
- 132 -
Table 2
Uganda: rough diamond exports, 1997-
0ctober 2000
Volume Value
Year (carats) (United States dollars)
1997 l 511.34 198 302
1998 11 303.86 I 440 OOO
1999 11 024.46 1 813 500
2000 9387.51 1 263 385
Source: Diamond High Council.
I 00. Data collected from any third party consistently
show that Uganda has become a diamond exporting
country; they also show that diamond exports from
Uganda coincide with the years of the wars in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, that is from 1997
onward.
l O l . As far as niobium is concerned, the pattern
appears to be the same: no production prior to 1997
followed by a series of increases in exports as shown in
table 3 and figure 3.
Table 3
Uganda: niobium exports, 1995-1999
(thousands of United States dollars)
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Source: World Trade Organization (aggregated data).
Niobium
0
0
13
580
782
l 02. Third, the Ugandan authorities, in their response
to the Panel's questionnaire, stated that there was no
record of transit of mineral products. However, the
Panel received information from one Ugandan customs
post at the border between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and Uganda. Records for 1998, I 999 and
2000 reveal that mineral products as well as other
commodities left the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and entered Uganda (presumably this would
also prove true for the other dozen or so points of
entry). The following three examples show an increase
--- ------------· ·-----·-- - -
S/20011357
in the transboundary movement of natural resources
between 1998 and 1999.
Coffee
Timber
1998: 144,911 bags
1999: 170,079 bags
2000: 208,000 bags
I 998: 1,900 m3
1999: 3,782 m3 and 46,299 pcs
2000: 3,272 m3 and 3,722 pcs
Cassiterite* 1998: None
1999: 30 kgs
2000: 151 drums
* The sudden increase in the import of cassiterite may
also mean an increase in the import of coltan. The Panel
discovered that cassiterite is often listed in lieu of
coltan, as coltan possesses a higher value, which
implies high import taxes in Uganda.
Rwanda
I 03. In response to the request for statistics by the
Panel, the Rwandan authorities provided the following
data:
Table 4
Rwanda: mineral production, 1995-2000
Gold Cassiterite Co/tan
Year (kg) (tons) (tons)
1995 247 54
1996 1 330 97
1997 10 327 224
1998 17 330 224
1999 10 309 122
2000 10 437 83
Source: Rwanda Official Statistics (No. 227/01/10/MIN).
21
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S/2001/357
Figure 2. Uganda: rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997-0ctober 2000
12000
10000
8000
6000
!•Volume I
4000
2000
1997 1998 1999 2000
22
- 134 -
800
700
600
500
300
200
100
0
SIZ001l3S7
Figure 3. Uganda: niobium exports by volume, 1995-1999
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
•us Dollars
(thousands)
23
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S/2001/357
Cl
X:
24
Figure 4.A. Rwanda: mineral production, 1995-2000
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
a Gold (kg)
• Cassiterite (tons)
D Coltan (tons)
Figure 4.8. Rwanda: gold production, 1995-2000 (kg)
18
16 -·-·--- -- - -
14 ·-·---· --
12 ·-·-- -- --- - -
10
8
6 --- --~-----
4 -----·
2 .... _,___,_
0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
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S/2001/357
104. The Rwandan authorities also underline the fact and pending deals give clear indications of their
that "Rwanda has no production of diamond, cobalt, potential impact on the balance of payments.
zinc, manganese, and uranium". However, in spite of
this statement, there is substantial evidence that
Rwanda has been exporting diamonds. In fact, several
organizations such as WTO and the High Diamond
Council, and Belgian statistics, have computed import
data for selected commodities and provide support for
the fact that Rwanda has been exporting diamonds (see
table 5 and figure 5). Production figures display some
irregular patterns for gold and coltan starting from
1997 (see figures 4.A and B). It is revealing that the
increase in production of these two minerals appeared
to happen while AFDL, backed by Rwandan troops,
was taking over power in Kinshasa.
Table 5
Rwanda: rough diamond exports, 1997-
0ctober 2000
I 07. The economic and resource-based analysis above,
by using the figures given by the respective
Governments, reveals that Uganda and Rwanda have
been exporting diamonds, and that this activity is
hidden and does not appear in the statistics they
disseminate. They do not produce diamonds, nor do
they officially export this mineral. It is probable that
these minerals are coming from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and would constitute the basis
for the re-exportation economy.
I 08. Regarding the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, mineral production and export display a
declining trend, imputable partly to the occupation of
the eastern side of the country. However, the
deterioration of the ~ural infrastructure represents a
limiting factor for mining as well as for agricultural
-------------------------=a-ctivities.
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
Source: Diamond High Council.
Volume
(carats)
13 060.39
166.07
2 500.83
30 491.22
Value
(United States dollars)
720 425
16 606
439 347
1 788 036
105. Burundi. An IMF office memorandum indicates
that "Burundi does not produce gold, diamonds,
columbo-tantalite, copper, cobalt, or basic metals".
Burundi however has been exporting minerals it does
not produce. As in the case of Uganda and Rwanda,
Burundi's export of diamonds dates from I 998,
coinciding with the occupation of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The coltan exports
span a longer period ( 1995-1999), perhaps suggesting
that this might be a regular activity.
106. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Only third
party sources were used to determine whether
production and export trends in these countries
displayed abnormalities. Available production and
export statistics relative to Angola, Namibia and
Zimbabwe were fairly normal in terms of trend. They
did not reveal any suspicious behaviour. Additional
data are -however needed for a definite stand on the
issue. In the case of Zimbabwe, accounts of ongoing
25
- 137 -
S/2001/357
Figure 5. Rwanda: rough diamond exports, by volume, 1997-0ctober 2000
35000
30000
20000
15000 !•Volume!
10000
1997 1998 1999 2000
26
- 138 -
ill. Links between the exploitation of
natural resources and the
continuation of the conflict
109. The following sections explore the links between
the exploitation of natural resources and the
continuation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The sections are interrelated, but
separated for clarity. The first section outlines the
countries' budget allocations for their respective armed
forces versus the actual expenditures. It will be
demonstrated that military expenditures far outweigh
the supposed money allocated for such expenses. The
subsequent section will explore in depth the means by
which these countries find the necessary additional
financial resources to continue the war.4 The panel
finds a link between the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the continuation of the conflict.
A. Budgets compared to military
expenditures
S/20011357
I I 2. An aircraft owner operating in the region has
indicated that he charges on average $2,000 per hour.
Based on his experience of three rotations per day in a
smaller area, the Panel estimates five ro~ations for
Rwanda at an average of six hours each. A simple
calculation gives a figure of $1.8 million per month
and $21.6 million per year.
113. Based on the minimum number of25,000 soldiers
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and an
average $100 for pay and bonuses, the Panel has
calculated a total of $2.5 million per month and
$30 million per year. Transportation and pay of troops
alone in the Democratic Republic of the Congo amount
to $51.6 million per year, which is about three quarters
of the total Rwandan official defence budget. By taking
into consideration the remaining 20,000 soldiers
stationed in Rwanda and their average pay of $50 per
month, almost the total defence budget ($63 million) is
used on two items. RPA soldiers in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo have other basic needs,
however, such as ammunition for even their light
equipment, and maintenance and replacement of the
equipment.
Rwanda 114. All military experts consulted suggested that the
official defence budget of Rwanda cannot alone cover
110. Rwanda spends about 3 per cent of its GDP or 29 the cost of their war and presence in the Democratic
per cent of its annual budget on its defence needs. In Republic of the Congo. The Panel concurs with
the current fiscal year, $70 million ':Vas allocated to President Kagame, wh9 described the conflict in the
defence in the .national budget. These official figures Democratic Republic of the Congo as "a self-financing
provided by the Minister of Finance comprise every war".
single expense of the army, including, soldiers' pay and
bonuses and the maintenance and acquisition of new
military equipment.
Uganda
115. Uganda officially spends about 2 per cent of its
111. Military specialists with a great deal of GDP on defence, which is being monitored by the
experience in the region agreed on the fact that Bretton Woods institutions. For the fiscal year 2000,
Rwandan soldiers use light equipment, so that expenses the defence budget was about $ ll O million. This
on equipment have for a long time been limited. They budget covers pay of about $70 per month for 50,000
also recognize that, given the size of the Democratic soldiers, I 0,000 of whom are stationed in the
Republic of the Congo and the portion of the territory Democratic Republic of the Congo, pays for the
under Rwandan control, there is a minimum number of . pension of retired soldiers, buys equipment and
soldiers needed to cover this area, which could be addresses other needs.
estimated at 25,000 soldiers on average during the
period of the conflict. Moreover, the use of aircraft for
the transport of troops and some types of equipment
and supplies may be costly.
• The number of soldiers has fluctuated during the period
of the war; the numbers used are therefore average
estimates.
116. According to various sources, UPDF has on
average 10,000 soldiers in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo out of the 50,000 total. Indeed, the budget
line for pay alone for a year is about $41 million for
the 50,000 Ugandan soldiers. If a bonus of $20 is paid
to each of the 10,000 soldiers, that would amount to
27
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S/2001/357
$200,000 per month (in 1998 and 1999), a total of
$2.4 million per year.
1 17. On the basis of a rate of $2,000 per hour and six
hours on average for a return journey and three
rotations a day, UPDF spends on average $12.96
million per year on transportation alone. Other
expenses for purchase, maintenance and replacement of
equipment are important. According to some sources,
Uganda spent about $126 million on its armed forces in
1999, an overspending of about $16 million.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
118. Of all the warring parties, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo presented the greatest challenge
as far as defence budget figures and number of troops
were concerned. Lack of reliable data and the barely
existent State apparatus have made the collection of
data very difficult. The country has been at war since
1996 and prior to that the army was already
disintegrating. Various military experts that the Panel
members met agree on one point: the extreme difficulty
of giving an estimate of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo army. Those who try to give an estimate speak
of 50,000 to 55,000 soldiers.
119. According to some government sources, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo relies on Chinese
and Eastern European companies to supply its military
arsenal and required equipment. The Panel has strong
indications that the Government, despite its economic
problems, has invested a great deal in the defence of its
territory.
Zimbabwe
120. Zimbabwe's overall defence budget has been
decreasing at the very moment ZDF has· troops engaged
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A reduction
was announced early in January 2000, lowering the
budget from Z$ 15.3 billion in 2000 to Z$ 13.3 billion
in 2001. Yet, ZDF with approximately 10,000 troops
engaged in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
spent on average about $3 million per month, a total of
$36 million in a year.
Angola and Namibia
121. Angola's presence is smaller than Zimbabwe's in
terms of troops. According to some sources, Angolan
troops number about 3,000. Namibia's presence is
limited to 2,000 troops. The defence budget of
28
N$ 24 million has remained at the same level since
1999 in spite of the support given to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, the emergency or
additional budget for the armed forces has decreased
from N$ 89 million in 1999 to N$ 76 million in 2001.
Rebels
122. The rebel movements MLC, RCD-Goma and
RCD-ML have their own troops. MLC troops are
evaluated at 12,000 to 15,000 men. They usually use
light military equipment bought from Kampala. In
some cases, deals are done between Jean-Pierre Bemba
and other traders and businessmen. These deals consist
of giving them the opportunities to carry out business
activities or granting a mining concession, in exchange
for which the beneficiary would supply some military
items. In 1999, when Mr. Khalil demanded of Mr.
Bemba a concession for a diamond mine, he obtained a
concession in exchange for military fatigues and socks,
all made in Uganda.
123. The pay of these soldiers is unknown. The Panel
gathered however that these young men were not paid,
but could receive from time to time some money as
"help". The consequence has been their involvement in
the exploitation of natural resources. The cost of war
appears to be minimal. The war expenses are the
purchase of ammunition and light weapons, transport
of soldiers by air and the money MLC paid to UPDF
and individual top officers for their support. A similar
scenario was played out with RCD-ML, which has
approximately 3,000 soldiers.
124. The RCD-Goma troops are estimated to be
around 12,000 to 15,000. According to some sources,
the Rwandan army until recently used to supply the
RCD-Goma troops with military equipment. The
military budget was not offered to the Panel in spite of
its request, and the estimates are very difficult to make.
Military equipment and the transport of troops as well
as supplies of oil and petrol are the major expenses.
Pay is apparently uncertain, so that the soldiers when
possible try to survive, even at the expense of the local
population and the wildlife. For all parties involved in
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
this war seems to be expensive by African standards.
The question is: how do the different parties finance
their war effort?
- 140 -
B. Financing the war
125. There are three primary means of financing this
war: (a) purchase of arms and equipment through direct
payment; (b) barter (arms for mining concession~); and
(c) creation of joint ventures. The economies of
Rwanda and Uganda, unlike those of Angola and
Namibia, have to varying extents financially benefited
from the conflict. Zimbabwe is a special case given the
potential of concessions attributed to Zimbabwean
companies. Data received from various sources,
including the countries involved in the conflict, OECD
and the Bretton Woods institutions, demonstrate that in
broad terms the mineral production of those three
countries has decreased. However there are some
interesting peaks between 1997 and 1999 (see sect. II.F
above). Isolated and varied examples of how these
countries finance their military presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are given below.
Rwanda
126. Rwanda's military appears to be benefiting
directly from the conflict. Indeed, the Panel has noted a
great integration between the milita?' apparatus, !he
State (civil) bureaucracy and the busmess commumty.
RPA finances its war in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in five ways: (a) direct commercial activit~es;
(b) profit from shares it holds in some compames;
(c) direct payments from RCD-Goma; (d) taxes
collected by the "Congo desk" and other payments
made by individuals for the protection RPA provides
for their businesses; and ( e) direct uptake by the
soldiers from the land.
127. Since 1998, the Department of External
Relations, through the Congo desk has been receiving
substantial amounts of money from various comptoirs.
Several diamond comptoirs were operating in
Kisangani before the monopoly was given to two in
July 2000. According to very reliable sources, taxes
were paid directly to the Congo desk. On average, a
comptoir with a turnover of $4 million per month
would pay $200,000 per month to the Congo desk.
Every diamond dealer who intends to purchase
diamonds in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo or at Kigali would pay 5 per cent of the
diamond value to the Congo desk before the
transaction. This amount is consistent with the
so-called mandatory 5 per cent of the value of
purchased diamonds that the Congo desk takes from
S/2001/357
the two comptoirs controlling the Kisangani diamond
market. Messrs. Nassour and Arslanian, the "conflict
diamond dealers" in the eastern Democratic Republic
of the Congo, provided on average $2 million per year,
each directly to the Congo desk. A similar percentage
is applied for other mineral resources in the area
controlled by RCD-Goma.
128. Before July 2000, monopoly holders used to pay
the sum of $200,000 per month in its entirety to Kigali;
this has changed slightly since RCD-Goma claimed its
share. The larger diamond comptoirs would therefore
pay $100,000 to the Congo desk and $100,000 to the
RCD-Goma authority. The Panel believes that over a
period of two years the Congo desk would have
received about $4 million as direct payment for
granting the authorization to operate in the areas under
its control.
129. Some documents point to a direct implication of
the Rwandan Patriotic Army in commercial activities.
As mentioned earlier, RPA, through the companies
Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals, has big stakes
in the coltan business. Most of the coltan extracted by
civilians and prisoners is sold to intermediaries
(civilians or soldiers) who in turn sell it to comptoirs,
some of which are controlled by the Rwandan military.
The quasi-totality of this coltan is sent to Kigali, and
generally stored in facilities owned by the Government.
A good portion goes to Rwanda Metals and the rest is
exported directly by some professionals. Rwanda
Metals and Grands Lacs Metals, directly or through
Congo desk, contact clients on the availability of
coltan. Some of the letters sent to potential clients in
Europe and the United States of America are signed
Dan, who was the head of the Congo desk.
130. Given the substantial increase in the price of
coltan between late 1999 and late 2000, a period during
which the world supply was decreasing while the
demand was increasing, a kilo of coltan of average
grade was estimated at $200. According to the
estimates of professionals, the Rwandan army through
Rwanda Metals was exporting at least 100 tons per
month. The Panel estimates that the Rwandan army
could have made $20 million per month, simply by
selling the coltan that, on average, intermediaries buy
from the small dealers at about $10 per kg. According
to experts and dealers, at the highest estimates of all
related costs (purchase and transport of the minerals),
RPA must have made at least $250 million over a
period of 18 months. This is substantial enough to
29
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S/2001/357
finance the war. Here lies the vicious circle of the war.
Coltan has permitted the Rwandan army to sustain its
presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The
army has provided protection and security to the
individuals and companies extracting the mineral.
These have made money which is shared with the
army, which in turn continues to provide the enabling
environment to continue the exploitation. The last
illustration of how Rwanda finances its war deals with
the financial transactions involving Rwandan banks,
RPA suppliers and RCD institutions. In these particular
cases, Rwanda has used BCDI and SONEX to pay RPA
suppliers.
131. SONEX was founded in March 1999 in Kigali. It
belonged to RCD-Goma and was managed by
Emmanuel Kamanzi, former chief of the Finance
Department of RCD-Goma. Its primary purpose was to
serve as the commercial and financial arm of RCD,
handling most commercial and financial deals. SONEX
was dissolved late in 2000, but it had sufficient time to
put in place a pattern for the transfer of resources from
RCD to Kigali. The Panel received documents
highlighting the financial transactions of SONEX and
BCDI. According to those documents, BCDI released
$1 million in mid-1999 for SONEX as a loan to pay
fuel bills to Jambo Safari. SONEX was to repay this
loan with the money obtained from the selling of coltan
and cassiterite. By February 2000, $200,000 to
$300,000 had already been reimbursed to BCDI. This
loan seems to be part of the financial transaction by
which money is transferred to Kigali, and some
individuals in RCD take their own substantial cut.
132. The same year, SONEX requested another loan of
$10 million from BCDI in Kigali, and $5 million was
approved. According to one of the actors at the time,
the $5 million loan was not physically paid to SONEX.
Instead, BCDI ordered Citibank in New York to pay
RCD suppliers with the loans technically given to
SONEX. This financial arrangement is suspicious in
many ways.
133. First, RPF through Tristar is a shareholder in
BCDI. Second, the suppliers of RCD are mostly
Rwandan companies whose owners are closely
acquainted with RPA or RPF. Third, the deal with
SONEX is handled by Major Dan, at the Congo desk,
who is related by marriage to Mr. Kamanzi, head of the
Finance Department and mastermind of the whole
operation.
30
134. The BCDI loans to $ONEX could be well-crafted
operations to transfer money from BCDI to RPA and to
pay RPA suppliers by using SONEX. Paying RPA
suppliers is one way of financing the war without
taking from the official budget. Reliable sources report
that about $700,000 has already been paid back by
RCD. According to a RCD-Goma document explicitly
detailing how debts should be repaid with money made
out of the coltan sale, part of the $1 million per month
in taxes that Mrs. Gulamali pays to RCD for the
monopoly on coltan could also be used to pay back the
BCDI loan.
Uganda
135. Uganda unlike Ryvanda did not set up an
extrabudgetary system to finance its presence in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The regular
defence budget is used and broadly the deficit is
handled by the treasury. However, the Ugandan
economy benefited from the conflict through the reexportation
economy. In turn, the treasury benefited
and this allowed an increase in the defence budget.
136. The re-exportation economy implies that natural
resources imported from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo are repackaged or sealed as Ugandan natural
resources or products and re-exported. That is the case
for some gold, diamonds, coltan and coffee exported by
Uganda. The re-exportation economy has had a
tremendous impact on the financing of the war, in three
ways.
137. First, it has increased the incomes of key
businessmen, traders and other dealers. In the coffee
sector, gains have been substantial for the traders in
Kampala and Bujumbura. According to an expert in the
sector who lives in the region, there is a trick used by
coffee exporters in the region. Arabica coffee produced
in Bujumbura is of a higher grade than the one
produced in Kivu. The difference in price could be in
some cases one third. Burundian dealers by importing
Congolese coffee and mixing it, then presenting it as
Burundian coffee, gain a higher price. The Ugandan
traders use the same schemes. In the case of Uganda,
the dealers gain both ways. The trader buys
inexpensive coffee in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, often with counterfeit currency, eventually
mixes it with Uganda coffee, and then re-exports this
coffee as Ugandan robusta, which is of better quality
than Congolese robusta.
- 142 -
138. Second, the illegal exploitation of gold in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo brought a
significant improvement in the balance of payments of
Uganda. This in turn gave multilateral donors,
especially IMF, which was monitoring the Ugandan
treasury situation, more confidence in the Ugandan
economy. Third, it has brought more money to the
treasury through various taxes on goods, services and
international trade. Discussions with the Deputy
Commissioner of the Ugandan Revenue Authority
revealed that the tax collection level has increased
dramatically over the past five years. IMF figures on
Ugandan fiscal operations confirm this positive
evolution over the past three years. A detailed analysis
of the structure and the evolution of the fiscal
operations reveals that some sectors have done better
than others, and most of those tend to be related to the
agricultural and forestry sector in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Logs, sawn wood or planks
destined for Uganda, Kenya or for export out of the
continent pay customs duties as they enter Uganda.
139. Between 1998 and 2000, about 1,800 trucks
carrying logs, timber, coffee, medicinal barks,
cassiterite, pyrochlore, iron ore, tea and quinina have
transited through Uganda. The official figures from the
Government of Uganda show an average of 600 lorries
per year, all registered by customs officers. As Mrs.
Lotsove once noted, the tax exoneration given to the
Victoria and Trinity companies represents a net loss of
$5 million per month (there are 15 points of entry). The
Panel concludes that, given the absence of the
exoneration on the Ugandan side, and a higher level of
taxes in Uganda, customs duties related to the
transiting of Congolese natural resources exploited by
Ugandans and some Congolese in Equateur and
Orientale Provinces would bring the treasury at least
$5 million every month.
140. Another way of financing the presence of the
army in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was to
purchase military supplies on credit. The Ugandan
army has purchased petrol on credit from a number of
private companies. The accruing debt is treated as
internal debt.
141. The Panel also gathered that the local
commanders of UPDF turn a blind eye to soldiers'
racketeering among the populations or their
involvement in small business. This is seen as a way to
pay their bonuses and this has proved to be a very
successful method. Information received from friends
S/2001/357
and relatives of UPDF soldiers who served in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo clearly shows that
there were elements of self-payment much more
satisfactory that the official bonus. Overall, the
military, its leaders and other involved individuals
manage to manipulate budgetary and other factors to
retain their control in the occupied territories.
142. The Ugandan situation can be summarized as
follows: the re-exportation economy has helped
increase tax revenues, allowing the treasury to have
more cash. Businesses related to the conflict and
managed by Ugandans have contributed to an extent to
generate activities in the economy in a sector such as
mining (gold and diamonds). The growth in these
sectors has had a trickle-down effect on the economy
and permitted Uganda to improve its GDP in 1998 and
maintain it somewhat in 1999.5 The improvement in
GDP has permitted, according to Ugandan officials, an
increase in absolute terms of the military budget while
keeping the level of the military budget at the agreed 2
per cent of GDP. The apparent strength of the Ugandan
economy has given more confidence to investors and
bilateral and multilateral donors who, by maintaining
their level of cooperation and assistance to Uganda,
gave the Government room to spend more on security
matters while other sectors, such as education, health
and governance, are being taken care of by the bilateral
and multilateral aid.
MLC, RCD-Goma and RCD-ML
143. Officially, the rebel movements receive the bulk
of their military equipment through UPDF and RPA.
During discussions with the Ugandan Minister of
Defence and the Chief of Staff of UPDF, the Panel was
informed that weapons seized from the Congolese
armed forces are usually given to MLC and RCD-ML.
According to other sources, some military equipment is
acquired by these groups through direct purchase and
barter. The Panel came across a very interesting case in
which Mr. Bemba, at the instigation of General Kazini,
bargained with the highest authorities of Uganda for
the release of some Ukrainian pilots whose Antonov
has been captured. A very reliable source told the Panel
that in exchange Mr. Bemba received military fatigues,
boots and medical supplies for his soldiers from a third
party.
s Uganda's GDP has been increasing since the early
1990s. However, a slight decrease was noted in 1999.
31
' ' ·!'
I
'
- 143 -
S/2001/357
I 44. RCD-Goma has designed a fiscal system based
mainly on the mining sector. About six different forms
of tax exist in this sector, and they are applied on
approximately eight different types of minerals
including the most important (coltan, gold and
diamonds). From RCD official statistics the Panel
notes that in 1999 on average 60 kg of gold was
extracted every month from the area controlled by
RCD. That is about 720 kg a year. In 2000, the
extraction was higher, up to 100 kg a month. With
regard to coltan, 27 tons were extracted every month in
1999, while 29 tons were produced every month in
2000. Given the number of comptoirs (19 for coltan)
and the six types of tax, the Panel concludes tha;
substantial revenues through tax collection are
available to RCD. It is however difficult to estimate the
figures, although some insiders have told the Panel that
the financial situation has been improving since late
2000, and the prospects for a balanced budget are
better than two years ago. Information obtained from
documents and individuals suggests that, in addition to
taxes levied and shares it holds in SOMIGL, RCDGoma
has given a monopoly of coltan to SOMIGL, in
exchange for which it receives $1 million monthly.
145. Illustration of the commercial activities of
RCD. A preponderance of information obtained from
documents and individuals regarding the activities of
RCD-Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Dar es Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, and
elsewhere during the current hostilities
overwhelmingly suggests that RCD-Goma and others
are marketing the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo - gold, diamonds and
timber - through Dar es Salaam. Gold and diamonds
belonging to RCD-Goma are shipped through their
financial and logistical network, via Dar es Salaam, for
sale on the international market. In order to facilitate
the movement of the commodities and to give the
appearance of legitimacy, RCD-Goma obtains
documents to hide or cover their ownership. The
documents covering the shipments of gold and
diamonds are completed forms of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The forms indicate issuance
from a government organization, complete with the
required stamps and signatures indicating approval and
issuance in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. RCD-Goma's
represen_tatives in Dar es Salaam coordinate the receipt,
forwarding and sale of gold and diamond shipments.
The gold shipments transit through Dar es Salaam
international airport for sale to buyers in Sri Lanka and
32
elsewhere. The diamond shipments are held at the
Bank of Tanzania before being forwarded to Belgium,
the Netherlands and South Africa.
146. The gold and diamonds are being sold by RCDGoma
in exchange for cash or bartered for armaments
and medicines to support continuation of the current
hostilities. RCD-Goma's representatives in Dar es
Salaam also arrange for the purchase of foodstuffs and
~ther logistical needs for the war effort. In addition,
timber resources from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo are being shipped through Dar es Salaam to
Greece and Belgium. In the case of Greece, the timber
~ansaction is . be!ng partially arranged by an
import/export busmess located in Goma. The
shipments of gold, diamonds and timber are also
processed in Dar es Salaam in cooperation with RCD
representatives by a company believed to be a covert
business entity created for the purpose of facilitating
support for the financial and logistical operations of
RCD-Goma. It is important to note that the activities
described above represent an RCD-Goma operation and
are exclusive of operations handled by the Government
of Rwanda, via Kigali.
147. The Panel concludes on this point that the major
rebel groups are gradually becoming autonomous
(~~C/FLC a~d RCD-Goma) in terms of supply of
military equipment. They are capable of raising
sub~tantial amounts of cash, enough to buy the light
eq~1pment they use. Equally they have put in place
their own network and contacts, which would allow
the_m to pu_rchase their own equipment when necessary.
This growmg autonomy has manifested itself recently
as RCD-Goma has requested that money usually given
to the Congo desk by diamond dealers be shared
equally between both entities. Equally RCD-Goma has
~nitiated some military attacks on RCD-ML positions
m order to occupy mineral-rich areas as shown earlier.
As the need for an autonomou~ supply of weapons
grows, so does the need to find additional resources
and therefore clashes for the control of mineral-rich
areas will be recurrent; so goes the vicious circle of
war and exploitation of natural resources on the side of
the rebellion.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
148. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has relied on its minerals and mining
industries to finance the war. Between 1998 and early
2001, the strategy for financing the war was based on
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three pillars, namely (a) search for cash through the
attribution of monopolies; (b) direct and indirect
uptake of funds from parastatals and other private
companies; and (c) creation of joint ventures between
parastatals and foreign companies in countries allied
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
149. Search for cash. The late President used
different schemes to raise funds. He instituted the tax
parafiscale (see para. 4 I) and also implemented
schemes such as the creation of a monopoly for the
commercialization of diamonds.
150. Monopoly on diamonds granted to
International Diamond Industries (IOI). According
to government sources, the objective of this monopoly
was twofold: first, to have fast and fresh money that
could be used for the purchase of needed arms, and
address some of the pending problems with the allies.
Second, to have access to Israeli military equipment
and intelligence given the special ties that the Director
of International Diamond Industries, Dan Gertler, has
with some generals in the Israeli army.
151. This deal turned out to be a nightmare for the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and a disaster for the local diamond trade as well as an
embarrassment for the Republic of the Congo, which is
currently flirting with illicit diamonds. According to
different sources, IDI paid only $3 million instead of
$20 million and never supplied military equipment.
152. President Joseph Kabila has expressed
willingness to liberalize the diamond trade in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and IMF and the
World Bank are very supportive of this move. IDI is,
however, threatening to sue the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The IDI deal also
turns out to be a disaster for the local diamond trade.
As the monopoly was granted to IDI, most diamond
dealers operating in the Government-controlled area
crossed to Brazzaville to sell their diamonds. It is
estimated that during the first three months of the
monopoly, $60 million worth of diamonds from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo were sold on the
international market, and the Republic of the Congo
was mentioned as the country of origin. This
smuggling of diamonds deprived the already ailing
economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo of
substantial sums of money and the treasury of
substantial tax revenues. This case shows that the
desperate need for quick cash to finance the defence of
S/2001/357
its territory has instead brought other problems to the
Government and has paradoxically deprived the
treasury of substantial revenue.
153. Uptakiog money from parastatals. Another way
of financing the war has been the direct and indirect
uptake of money from parastatals and other private
companies, mainly the Societe miniere de Bakwanga
and the . Generate des carrieres et des mines
(Gecamines). The Government has claimed from
MIBA since August I 998 on average two fifths of their
earnings. The Panel was told that in some cases three
fifths, the equivalent of $4 million per sale, was sent to
the President's office. The Panel has also confirmation
that oil companies gave important sums of money as
taxes parafiscales to the Government. In most cases,
this cash in Congolese francs was delivered to Victor
Mpoyo, who then reported to the late President Kabila.
This money was used for the salary and bonuses of
Congolese soldiers in the battlefield. According to
some Congolese officials, the taxes parafiscales were
never used for the purchase of weapons.
154. MIBA receives from the Government the
equivalent of two fifths of its sales of diamonds in
Congolese francs changed at the official rate, which is
only one quarter of the black market rate. It is believed
that about 75 Congolese francs for each dollar changed
is unaccounted for and possibly used for defence
needs.6
155. The contribution of Gecamines to the war effort
appears to be on two levels. On the one hand, one third
of the company's profit was taken directly by the
Government in 1999 and in 2000. On the other, the
Government contributed indirectly to the expenses of
the Zimbabwe Defence Forces between May 1999 and
October 2000.
A special case: Zimbabwe
156. Zimbabwe has financed its involvement in the
conflict in two different ways: (a) by using the defence
budget - the bulk of Zimbabwe's military expenses
seem to be covered by the regular budget; (b) by
indirect financing of the war through direct payment by
some Congolese entities, mainly companies. According
to two very reliable sources, during the tenure of Billy
Rautenbach money from Gecamines paid bonuses to
the Zimbabwean soldiers. These payments might be
6 In 2000, the official exchange rate was one dollar for 23
Congolese francs.
33
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S/2001/357
linked to the contract between the Government and
Ridgepoint. Indeed, part of the rights to exploit
Gecamines mines was transferred to Ridgepoint
without apparent compensation. According to some
sources, the compensation, which is not mentioned in
the contract, could be the sharing of profits between the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Ridgepoint, on the basis of 80 per cent for the
Government and 20 per cent for Ridgepoint. According
to some sources, curiously, Mr. Mpoyo, the Congolese
minister, signed the contract as one of the officials of
Ridgepoint rather than signing on behalf of the
Government. Two months after the contract of Mr.
Rautenbach as Director of Gecamines came to an end,
discontent among Zimbabwean soldiers in Katanga
over their lack of bonuses was reported.
157. The Panel has, however, noted a practice which is
neither the financing of war nor the provision of direct
assistance. The practice is qualified in this report as
"incentives for assistance". The former Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo often used the
potential of its vast resources in the Katanga and Kasai
regions to secure the assistance of some allies or to
cover some of the expenses that they might incur
during their participation in the war. Among all of its
allies, Zimbabwean companies and some decision
makers have benefited most from this scheme. The
following examples illustrate how different schemes
were implemented and benefited the decision makers,
the very group of officials who can decide about ZDF
assistance to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The most utilized scheme has been the creation of joint
ventures.
158. Joint ventures. One way of securing the
engagement of some allies in the war has been the
provision of financial incentives by way of creating
business opportunities in the mining sector. At least
three features emerged from the scheme:
(a) Zimbabwean companies received interesting mining
concessions; (b) Zimbabwean companies using their
influence with the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo developed business partnerships
with private companies and parastatals; and (c) in turn,
received preferential treatment for their businesses.
159. Sengamines: example of a joint venture. The
Panel gathered that, late in 1998, a private
Zimbabwean company, Operation Sovereign
Legitimacy (OSLEG), whose shareholders are
Lieutenant General Vitalis Musungwa Zvinavashe, Job
34
Whabira, former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry
of Defence, Onesimo Moyo, President of Minerals
Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe, and Isaiah
Ruzengwe, General Manager of Zimbabwe Mining
Development Corporation, got into a partnership with
COMIEX; COSLEG was · born of this partnership.
Through COSLEG, Zimbabwe (ZANU-PF) could
exploit and market minerals, timber and other
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
160. Reliable sources told the Panel that a
Zimbabwean delegation headed by the then Minister of
Justice, Emmerson Munangagwa, visited the Kasai
region to see the various mining concessions given by
the late President Kabila to ZDF as barter payment for
its military support. The team was composed of the
former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of
Defence, Moven Mahachi; the Chief of the Armed
Forces, General Zvinavashe; and the President of
MIBA, Kadende Muya. President Kabila's gift to the
Zimbabwean military was causing a problem, however,
as they did not have the financial and technical
expertise to exploit their mining concessions. Late in
1998, Thamer Al Shanfari, Chairman of Oryx Natural
Resources, was asked to provide the needed financial
and technical expertise. Mr. Al Shanfari decided to
create Oryx Zimcon, Ltd., a joint venture between
Oryx Natural Resources and COSLEG.
161. Instead of selecting one of the various mines
belonging to COS LEG to start its investment, Oryx·
Zimcon wanted the best mines which initially belonged
to MIBA. At the request of ZDF and on the advice of
Victor Mpoyo and Mwenze Kongolo,' the late
President Kabila transferred two of MIBA's richest
concessions - the kimberlite deposits in Tshibua and
the alluvial deposits in the Senga Senga River, to Oryx
Zimcon. Oryx Zimcon and COSLEG together created
Sengamines.
162. As promised, Mr. Al Shanfari started investing in
Sengamines and used the Breco group of companies of
John Bredenkamp to transport mining equipment to the
mines. As the technical and financial partner, Oryx was
to receive 40 per cent, OSLEG 40 per cent and
COSLEG 20 per cent. As the need for money grew,
7 According to some sources, Mwenze Kongolo is involed
in most COMIEX dealings. Most importantly, it is said
to the main bridge between Zimbabwean officials such
as the influential Emmerson Munangagwa and the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
- 146 -
Mr. Al Shanfari decided to launch Oryx on London's
Alternative Investment Market under the name Oryx
Diamonds. Upon strong objections from various
stakeholders, Oryx Diamonds was withdrawn from the
market. The new statute of the company does not
mention the name OSLEG.s The Panel was informed,
however, that the increase in the shares of COMIEX as
seen in the new statute was meant to preserve the
interests of Zimbabweans. The Panel was also told that
payment would be made to the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo only after the loan
taken for this operation (about $25 million) was repaid.
163. The ease with which the Tshibua and Senga
Senga River concessions were given to Oryx without
due regard ·for the legal requirements and the
preferential treatment given to Oryx show the
determination of the former Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to reward some of
its allies.
Attribution of concessions
164. According to some sources, a very recent (26
February 2001) concession of cobalt and copper in
Kambove-Kakanda was to be given KMC Group of the
Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach. According to very
reliable sources, different ministers had signed the
concession two days before the assassination of the late
President Kabila and only his signature was missing.
The trade unionist of Gecamines has indicated that the
cession was completed, but President Joseph Kabila
told the Panel that the deal has not been signed yet. If it
is signed, there could be a rapprochement of activities.
165. This case shows rapprochement of the activities
and interests of some Zimbabwean businessmen, and a
possible link between arms dealing and mining
activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Indeed Mr. Bredenkamp is said to have an interest in
this venture, although he was alleged to be an arms
dealer. In November 2000, a month after the departure
of Mr. Rautenbach from Gecamines, Mr. Bredenkamp
is said to have established a direct link with Mr.
Rautenbach. According to three reliable sources, Mr.
Rautenbach, Mr. Bredenkamp and Mr. Munangwana,
the current Speaker of the House of Zimbabwe,
Chairman of ZANU-PF and director of many
s The distribution of shares is a follows: Oryx 49 per cent,
COMIEX 33 per cent, MIBA 16 per cent and Congolese
partners 3 per cent.
S/2001/357
companies belonging to ZANU-PF, met with the late
President Kabila to negotiate this contract of the
central part of the Gecamines concessions. The Panel
does not draw any conclusions, but wishes to highlight
the quality of the people involved in the negotiations,
their past records, current activities and position in
Zimbabwe.
166. Many other deals are ongoing such as the one
concerning the supply of foodstuffs to the Congolese
army, for which General Zvinavashe's company is said
to have been attributed the transport. President Robert
Mugabe once told interlocutors that the late President
Kabila had given him a mine concession.
167. The Government of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, in its effort to defend its territory and
secure the supply of military equipment, has signed a
contract worth several million United States dollars
with the Government of China. Official sources in
Kinshasa, while confirming this deal, have informed
the Panel that in exchange a mining concession was
awarded to a joint venture between a Chinese company
and a parastatal of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
168. In the same vein, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has made a deal
with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
which trains troops of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and in exchange, it is believed, has received a
mining concession around Shinkolobwe, very rich in
uranium. The Americans in the past extracted uranium
from this mine. Challenged on this issue, officials of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo mentioned high
radioactivity in the area, making it impossible for
anyone to work there.
169. According to some officials, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo has asked the United States of
America to consider addressing the problem of
radioactivity in the area, given their historical presence
in mining that particular area for uranium. The official
denial of a deal between the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea was based on the fact that the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has sought United
States assistance - which it cannot receive if the
Koreans are mining the same area.
170. The Panel has enough elements and evidence to
suggest that the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo under the late President Kabila,
JS
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S/2001/357
gave strong incentives in the form of access,
exploitation and management of mineral resources.
These incentives in tum have "convinced" the
Zimbabwean authorities to remain engaged in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The incentives
have, however, been so important that the whole
balance of the mining industries is likely to be affected.
The question in the region is which course of action
will sidelined companies take in the future to guarantee
their presence in the mining sector? Will it be another
cycle of war or intensification of war in relation to the
securing of access to the rich cobalt and copper area of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo?
Angola and Namibia
171. These two countries have financed their
participation in the conflict with their regular defence
budget. In the case of Angola, some deals, minor
compared to those of Zimbabwe, have been signed,
such as the creation of Sonangol, in which Sonangol
Angola has 60 per cent of shares and COMIEX 40 per
cent. Sonangol Angola is a 100 per cent State-owned
company (Sonangol supplies oil to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo). The two countries have also
signed a letter of intent to jointly exploit crude oil off
their coast when peace returns to the region.
I 72. In the case of Namibia, the Panel was informed
by the Namibian authorities of the existence of a joint
venture between a Namibian company called August
26, whose main shareholder is the Ministry of Defence,
an American company and a "company" of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other deals
involving individuals have been signed. At this point,
the Panel has not found substantial evidence that
Angola and Namibia have signed commercial deals in
the nature of "arms and support for natural resources".
Their motivation seems to be solely political and
strategic (for Angola). According to very reliable
sources, joint ventures proposed to these two countries
were a sign of gratitude rather than an incentive for
their support and they never pressed for it.
C. Special features of the links between
the exploitation of natural resources
and the continuation of the conflict
173. It is often said that the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is low-intensity warfare, as
36
armies do not confront each other on a daily basis and
battles or rather serious battles are not frequent. The
Panel noted that the conflict, especially in occupied
zones, is fought on three levels:
(a) Government forces and the allies versus the
rebels and their Ugandan-Rwandan and Burundian
allies;
(b) RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allies versus
MLC or RCD-ML and their Ugandan allies;
(c) Rebel movements and their allies (Rwanda
or Uganda versus the so-called negative forces:
lnterahamwe, MaY-MaY and other dissident groups).
174. Indeed, the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo is being fought on two fronts, official and
unofficial. The official front is that of classic
warfare - two or more armies confronting each other.
This front goes from Pweto to Mbandaka on an uneven
line crossing various localities. The unofficial front is
concentrated inside zones controlled by rebels and their
Ugandan and Rwandan allies.
175. The analysis of battles and skirmishes recorded
from mid-1999 to 2001 shows that:
(a) Overall, the number of battles on the official
front with the engagement of the army is lower than the
number of skirmishes, about 96 between 1999 and
2001;
(b) The number of battles has been decreasing
over the years. In the first quarter of 2001, only eight
confrontations were reported on the official front line;
(c) Current big battles have been fought in
areas of major economic importance, towards the
cobalt- and copper-rich area of Katanga and the
diamond area of Mbuji Mayi. Military specialists argue
that the Rwandan objective is to capture these mineralrich
areas to deprive the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo of the financial sources of its
war effort. Without the control of this area, the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
cannot sustain the war. This rationale confirms that the
availability of natural resources and their exploitation
permits the continuation of the war. This may be true
for all the parties. In view of the current experience of
the illegal exploitation of the resources of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo by Rwanda and
Uganda, it could also be thought that the capturing of
this mineral-rich area would lead to the exploitation of
- 148 -
those resources. In that case, control of those areas by
Rwanda could be seen primarily as an economic and
financial objective rather than a security objective for
the Rwandan borders.
176. The number of skirmishes between rebel forces
and their allies, and the armed group Mar-Mar has
increased. From May to December 2000, about 177
clashes were reported. The battlefields are generally
around coltan- and diamond-mining or coltan-rich
areas. The Panel has strong indications that most of the
fights between Rwandan soldiers and Mar-Mar have
occurred in the so-called "coltan belt". Some areas
experienced up to I O skirmishes in 2000. According to
some sources, numerous reports and accounts of
eyewitnesses mention the presence of Rwandan and
Ugandan soldiers providing security around coltan and
diamond mines. Officials of RCD-Goma have
confirmed the risk posed by the MaY-MaY and "negative
forces" in those areas. A senior RCD official specified
that only very well organized entijies ~ith the
necessary security infrastructure can carry out the
exploitation of coltan in those areas. In this particular
case, the Rwandan army is the only institution with that
capability in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
177. Rwanda's "unusual" tactics. The Rwandan
forces will attack the same area for two days then pull
back. According to our sources, these attacks seem to
coincide with the period when coltan has been
extracted and put in bags for evacuation by the MaiMar.
Attacked, the Mar-Mar abandon their coltan,
which is then taken away by small aircraft. The
Rwandan soldiers retreat again waiting for the next
information on available coltan. In the areas where
their grip is weaker, Rwanda in particular has designed
strategies to retain control within certain echelons of
the existing local hierarchies. In those areas controlled
by the Interahamwe and Mai-Mar forces, either RPA,
from time to time, mounts military operations that
allow it to capture the areas temporarily and evacuate
the coltan, or else middlemen are used for the purchase
of coltan from the MaY-Mar and "negative forces".
178. Battles between rebel movements are also
reported in areas rich in mines. On 18 November 2000,
RCD-Goma and its Rwandan allied troops based in
Kisangani attacked positions of MLC in Bengamisa, 50
km north-west of Kisangani, and took control of this
rich diamond area. On 31 December 2000, RCD-Goma
and its allies launched an attack on the area controlled
S/2001/357
by RCD-ML and captured Kandole, an area rich in
diamonds and with some coltan. Also late in December
2000, RCD-Goma initiated an attack from Lindi to
conquer Lakutu, another diamond-rich area.
I 79. Finally, in areas where the risks are too high,
adversaries, if not enemies, become partners in
business. That is the case of the MaY-Mar doing
business with RPA civilian coltan dealers, who in turn
sell to comptoirs controlled by Rwandans and their
companies Grands Lacs Metals and Rwanda Metals.
The most famous case was when the Mar-Mar chief,
General Padiri, informed people in Kigali in November
2000 that he was selling 60 tons of coltan.
180. Strategies to sustain the vicious circle of war
and exploitation: the example of Uganda. Top UPDF
commanders have essentially used the Hema/Lendu
conflict. The Panel has received very reliable
information clearly showing how General Kazini and
Colonels Kyakabale and Arocha assisted in training
different Hema militia, and manipulated those groups
to fight each other. Reports clearly showed that while
the Kazini camp · was helping with the training of the
Hemas, the Colonel Peter Karim camp was assisting in
training the Lendus. Both camps belonging to UPDF.
There are strong indications that some UPDF elements
may spark violence so as to remain in the region in an
attempt to control the gold-rich area and the potentially
coltan-rich areas ofNyaleki. There is, therefore, a clear
intent of the military commanders to control these
mineral-rich areas and. keep them for long-term
exploitation. The Nia-Nia confrontation in October
2000, in which UPDF General Kazini and Roger
Lumbala fought another UPDF group and RCD-ML is
a variation of the fighting inside UPDF for control of
coltan-rich areas. According to different sources, Roger
Lumbala, of RCD-national, has been used by General
Kazini to control the Bafwasende area, rich in
diamonds and coltan.
D. Facilitators or passive accomplices?
181. The link between the continuation of the conflict
and the exploitation of natural resources would have
not been possible if some entities, not parties in the
conflict, had not played a key role, willingly or not.
Bilateral and multilateral donors and certain
neighbouring and distant countries have passively
facilitated the exploitation of the resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
37
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S/2001/357
continuation of the conflict; the role of private
companies and individuals has also been vital.
182. The Panel has gathered information showing that
linkages between different actors and stakeholders are
very well structured to the point that Governments and
large reputable companies operate in confidence. In the
case of coltan, all the needed documentation for its
export is provided in Kigali, but there are accomplices
in Kinshasa in the Ministry of Mines. The importing
companies and their facilitators are aware of the real
origin of the coltan, however. According to manifests
that the Panel received, Sabena Cargo as well as SDV
of the Bollore group have been among the key
companies in this chain of exploitation and
continuation of war. Thousands of tons of coltan from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo were carried
from Kigali or through the port of Dar es Salaam.
183. The Panel also has indications of the direct and
indirect involvement of some staff of tlie embassies and
cooperation agencies of developed .countries. They
have facilitated the purchase of illegal minerals. The
United States honorary consul in Bukavu, as he
presented himself, Ramnik 0. Kotecha, in addition to
promoting deals between American companies and
coltan dealers in the region, is himself Chairman of the
Kotecha group of companies based in Bukavu and
deals in coltan.
184. On the basis of the facts and their analysis, the
Panel reaches the conclusion that the increase in
revenues of the Rwandan army from coltan sales was
made easy by three key factors:
(a) The passive role of some private companies
such as Sabena and SDV for the transport of coltan,
Citibank for the financial transaction as the
corresponding bank of BCDI, the self-proclaimed
United States honorary consul in Bukavu and some
staff in various embassies· in Kigali;
(b) The rush to profit of some foreign
companies that were ready to do business regardless of
elements of unlawfulness and irregularities (see
annex I for a sample of companies);
(c) The political legitimization provided by
some developed countries. In November 2000 in
Kigali, the Panel was told that the illegal exploitation
of resources and the financial gains of RPA were
justified as the repayment for the security that Rwanda
provides.
38
Bilateral donors
185. The main bilateral donors to Rwanda and Uganda
have been the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Denmark, Germany and the United
States of America in various sectors. The analysis of
their cooperation shows that sectors benefiting from
this assistance are related to poverty, education and
governance. Priority sectors have been water and
sanitation, health and governance, including
institutional reforms, justice and human rights,
especially for Rwanda. In some cases, direct aid to the
budget is provided. The balance of payments of
Rwanda shows that budget support has steadily
increased, from $26.1 million in 1997 to $51.5 in 1999.
While such support is legitimate, the problem is that
expenditures and services which were supposed to be
provided and covered by the Governments of Rwanda
and Uganda and which arc covered by the bilateral aid
constitute savings in the national budget. Were these
savings used to finance this war?
186. The German Ambassador in Kigali told the Panel
about German support to German business dealing in
pyrochlore and coltan in the occupied Democratic
Republic of the Congo. In this particular case, German
cooperation has given a preferential loan of DM
500,000 to Karl Heinz Albers, a German citizen, to
expand his coltan business in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (SOMIKIVU) and Mr. Albers's business
is guarded by RCD-Goma soldiers.
Multilateral donors
187. The World Bank has praised Uganda for its
economic performance and the reforms under the
structural adjustment programme as a success story and
bas promoted its case for the new debt relief
programme, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
initiative.
188. The Panel has however indications that this
economic performance was driven in part, especially
over the past three years, by the exploitation of the
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Notes exchanged between World Bank staff clearly
show that the Bank was informed about a significant
increase in gold and diamond exports from a country
that produces very little of these minerals or exports
quantities of gold that it could not produce (see para.
97). Internal discussions of the World Bank staff also
confirm this knowledge of the situation: in one of those
- 150 -
internal exchanges, a staff member warned his
colleague that the World Bank silence would blow up
in the Bank's face.
189. In the case of Uganda and its exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the World Bank never questioned the
increasing exports of resources and in one instance a
staff member even defended it. During the Panel's visit
to Uganda, the representative of the Bank dismissed
any involvement of Uganda in the exploitation of those
resources. The Bank not only encouraged Uganda and
Rwanda indirectly by defending their case, but equally
gave the impression of rewarding them by proposing
these countries for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
debt relief initiative.
190. The Bank's shadow on the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is even more
apparent on the budget. The balance of payments of
both Uganda and Rwanda shows a significant increase
in long-term borrowing in support of the budget. The
defence budget however has increased in absolute
terms, allowing Uganda and Rwanda , to continue the
conflict. There seems to be a precedent for the Bank's
behaviour. During the Cambodian crisis in the 1980s,
the Bank turned a blind eye to the illicit exploitation of
Cambodian timber; the question is whether it is World
Bank policy to ignore broad governance issues (hard or
soft) while dealing with its clients.
Transit countries
19 l. Countries in the region have indirectly and
passively facilitated the cycle of exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the continuation of the conflict. This has
usually happened without any intent to cover up or
protect some interests. That is particularly the case of
countries with seaports. Those countries have served as
the hub for the export of natural resources. They were
bound by regulations and agreements signed within the
framework of subregional organizations such as
COMESA for the seaports of Mombasa and Dar es
Salaam and UDEAC/CEMAC for the port of Douala.
Mombasa and Dar es Salaam were the main ports used
by Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi to export some
natural resources, such as timber, cassiterite, coffee and
various barks. Douala seaport was also used for coffee
from Equateur Province and transported from Bangui.
S/20011357
192. According to some sources, the Government of
the Central African Republic was aware of the
commercial activities of MLC in Bangui. Jean-Pierre
Bemba's friends, · Jean-Yves Ollivier, Jean-Pierre
Dupont and Jean-Pierre Saber, have all used Bangui as
the arriere-base for their diamond and coffee deals.
The Government never prevented MLC from using the
Central African Republic for economic activities. In
addition, some individuals were using the territory of
the Central African Republic to carry out their illegal
activities, as was the case with Victor Butt, who used
Bangui airport to load and offload coffee and arms.
193. According to some sources, some countries in the
region have been very attractive to Rwandan families
with an acceptable level of wealth. Army salaries
cannot sustain such lucrative properties and standards
of living. How do they sustain these families? Where
did the money come from?
194. Kenya has played a different role in the
exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. It has been the base for the
supply of counterfeit United States dollars and also the
venue of financial transactions of various traders who
export their resources (timber, coffee and tobacco)
through the port of Mombasa.
The pivotal role of leaders
195. This section aims to show how Presidents and
other decision makers tolerate, organize or put in place
the framework and conditions to maintain the status
quo of exploitation and war. The Panel refrains from
making allegations about the personal involvement of
Presidents in the illegal and financial activities until
further investigation is carried out. For instance, the
Panel received but dismissed, for lack of evidence,
allegations of the involvement of President Kagame's
family in diamond dealing; it focused rather on the
objective elements of the President's political
responsibility. In some reports and accounts, the name
of President Museveni was mentioned as a shareholder
in a specific company. The Panel refrains from citing
these accounts until further research is conducted.
196. President Paul Kagame. His position in the
State apparatus with regard to the exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the continuation of the war has evolved, yet
his role has remained pivotal. This role can be situated
on three levels: his relations with the Rwandan
39
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S/2001/357
business community operating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, control over the army, and the
structures involved in the illegal activities.
197. According to some reliable sources, President
Kagame has close relationships with top Rwandan
businessmen. For instance, he maintains good relations
with Modeste Makabuza, "owner" of Jambo Safari. He
is also close to Alfred Khalissa, the "founder" of BCDI
and former manager of BCD. The same sources told
the Panel that President Kagame is very close to Tibere
Rujigiro, who is known for generous financial support
to RPF during the 1990-1994 war. Mr. Rujigiro is one
of the shareholders of Tristai: Investment, with very
close ties to RPF. This close aide to President Kagame
has business relationships with Faustin Mbundu, who
is known for his arms dealing activities. What all these
businessmen have in common is their direct
involvement in the exploitation of natural resources in
the areas that Rwanda controls. Different sources have
told the Panel that each of these businessmen has at a
certain point benefited from the President's "help".
198. President Kagame, when he was Minister of
Defence, reorganized or approved the reorganization of
the Rwandan army and the Ministry of Defence, which
subsequently led to the creation of the Department of
External Relations in which the Congo desk is located.
This unit has been the cornerstone of the financial
transactions of RPA. The former Minister of Defence
should have been aware of the functioning of RPA as
well as the daily operations of the army.
199. Two very reliable sources told the Panel that in
September 1998 the then Vice-President, during a
meeting with various officials of RCD ·and RPA top
commanders, informed the participants that there was a
need to raise $50 million to make it possible to reach
Kinshasa in two months.
200. Finally, when faced with the question of the
involvement of RPA in the exploitation of the resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the President
announced in a radio interview that private Rwandan
citizens were carrying out commercial activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Was this a
deliberate act to mislead various partners or was it
translating the President's lack of information on the
issue? Meanwhile, the President has admitted in the
past that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo was self-financing. All these elements
combined suggest the President's degree of knowledge
40
of the situation, his implicit approval of the
continuation of the illegal exploitation of the resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and somehow
his complicity as well as his political and moral
responsibility.
201. President Yoweri Museveoi. President Yoweri
Museveni's role in the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the continuation of the war can be situated at the
following levels: his policy towards the rebel
movements, his attitude towards the army and the
protection provided to illegal activities and their
perpetrators.
202. He has shaped the rebellion in the area controlled
by Uganda according to his own political philosophy
and agenda. He opted for a more decentralized
authority and only intervenes when major problems
arise, but he has a very good knowledge of the
situation on the ground.
203. Messrs. Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasima, former
first and second Vice-Presidents close to General Salim
Saleh and General Kazini, are more inclined to
business and the extraction of natural resources. In
December 1999, a report was handed over to the
President of Uganda, specifically pointing out the
embezzlement of $10 million by Mr. Nyamwisi and
$3 million by Mr. Tibasima. Another report was handed
to President Museveni in February 2000, specifically
denouncing the collusion between Trinity Group and
Mr. Tibasima and the impact on the collection of
customs duties. President Museveni chose to give the
direction of the Congolese Liberation Front to those
who are the accomplices of illegal cartels.
204. President Museveni was also informed of the
situation on the ground, the exploitation being carried
out and the involvement of officials of MLC and RCDML,
including the conflict between Hemas and Lendus.
205. The President's family has also been very
involved in business in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in the occupied zones. General Salim Saleh and
his wife, shareholders in Victoria and Trinity, have
confidently carried out their activities undisturbed.
206. The Panel concludes that when the information is
passed to the President and he chooses not to act, when
he appoints the very people who carry out criminal
activities, and when his family members get away with
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criminal activities, it becomes overwhelming that the
President has put himself in the position of accomplice.
207. The late President Laurent-Desire Kabila. His
role in the continuation of the war has survived his
death. On three levels, he bears part of the
responsibility for the current situation. First, as the
chief of AFDL, he created a precedent in giving a
character of "legality" or legitimacy to otherwise
illegal operations. During his advance on Kinshasa, he
granted concessions even though he did not have
authority to do so. These are the same methods being
used by some armed groups to fight for power.
208. Second, he allowed and tolerated some unlawful
ventures as a way of rewarding allies. He also initiated
the barter system in order to defend his territory. This
is gradually becoming the normal practice for the rebel
groups.
209. Third, he offered a good excuse and a pretext to
those who had carefully planned the redrawing of the
regional map to redistribute wealth. Many sources have
told the Panel how they were approached and asked to
think about the distribution of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in terms of their
personal enrichment.
210. According to the facts, accounts and information
gathered, the pivotal roles of the Ugandan and
Rwandan leaders reside in the way in which they
diverted the primary mission of their armies from
protection of their territory and made them armies of
business. By the same token, they indirectly created
within their armies conditions for top officers to put in
place networks that they controlled. These networks
are becoming cartels, which will take over the war for
natural resources.
211. Presidents Kagame and Museveni are on the
verge of becoming the godfathers of the illegal
exploitation of natural resources and the continuation
of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. They have indirectly given criminal cartels a
unique opportunity to organize and operate in this
fragile and sensitive region. Finally, the attitude of the
late President has possibly planted the seeds for
another round of war for resources in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Politicians such as Jean-Pierre
Bemba, Mwenze Kongolo, Victor Mpoyo, Adolphe
Onusumba, Jean-Pierre Ondekane and Emmanuel
Kamanzi are ready to make any deal for the sake of
power or for personal enrichment. Companies such as
S/2001/3S7
IOI and Sengamines some of which reportedly have
ties with arms dealers, are likely to create a more
troubling situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Equally, joint ventures and concessions given
to some allies as rewards may cause some problems
given the nature of the shareholders who are either
armed forces or powerful and influential politicians.
The situation is now deeply embedded and the regional
power structures are consequently not stable.
212. The link between the exploitation of natural
resources and the continuation of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo does exist, and it is
based on five factors which are not mutually exclusive.
First, the capacity of countries to use their own
resources to sustain the war up to a certain stage, as in
the case of Angola. Second, the ability of countries to
take resources from enemies and use it to fight the socalled
"self-sustaining'; war; as in the case of Rwanda.
Third, the intent of some Governments to take
advantage of the war situation and use it to transfer
wealth from one country to their national economy, as
is the case with Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Fourth, the
will of private citizens and businesses who endeavour
to sustain the war for political, financial or other gains;
for example, generals and other top officers in the
Ugandan and Zimbabwean army and other top officials
and unsavoury politicians (Victor Mpoyo, Gaetan
Kakudji, Mwenze Kongolo) in the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fifth, the capacity
of one of the warring parties to give incentives
(mineral and others) to its allies and soldiers, for
example the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
IV. Conclusion and findings
213. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo has become mainly about access, control and
trade of five key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds,
copper, cobalt and gold. The wealth of the country is
appealing and hard to resist in the context of
lawlessness and the weakness of the central authority.
214. Exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by foreign armies
has become systematic and systemic. Plundering,
looting and racketeering and the constitution of
criminal cartels are becoming commonplace in
occupied territories. These criminal cartels have
ramifications and connections worldwide, and they
41
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S/2001/357
represent the next serious security problem in the
region.
215. The role of the private sector in the exploitation
of natural resources and the continuation of the war has
been vital. A number of companies have been involved
and have fuelled the war directly, trading arms for
natural resources. Others have facilitated access to
financial resources, which are used to purchase
weapons. Companies trading minerals, which the Panel
considered to be "the engine of the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo" have prepared the
field for illegal mining activities in the country.
2 I 6. Bilateral and multilateral donors have sent mixed
signals to Governments with armies in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
217. Top military commanders from various countries,
for different reasons, needed and continue to need this
conflict for its lucrative nature and for temporarily
solving some internal problems in those countries as
well as allowing access to wealth. They have realized
that the war has the capacity to sustain itself, and
therefore have created or protected criminal networks
that are likely to take over fully if all foreign armies
decide to leave the Democratic Republic ofthe'Congo.
218. The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, because of its lucrative nature, has created a
"win-win" situation for all belligerents. Adversaries
and enemies are at times partners in business (Mar-Mar
and Rwandans and Congolese rebels), prisoners of
Hutu origin are mine workers of RPA, enemies get
weapons from the same dealers and use th'e same
intermediaries. Business has superseded security
concerns. The only loser in this huge business venture
is the Congolese people.
V. Recommendations
Prerequisite
219. The Panel acknowledges the validity of Security
Council resolutions 1304 (2000) and 1341 (200 I), as
well as the Lusaka Agreement, and puts its report and
recommendations within their broad framework. The
Panel believes its report and recommendations are
consistent with those resolutions.
42
Follow-up
220. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, to allow it to conduct a follow-up investigation
and report on the structures and networks put in place
or facilitated by warring parties to illegally exploit the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, including the situation after the withdrawal of
foreign military forces.
Sanctions
22 I. The Security Council should immediately declare
a temporary embargo on the import or export of coltan,
niobium, pyrochlore, cassiterite, timber, gold and
diamonds from or to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda
until those countries' involvement in the exploitation
of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo is made clear and declared so by the
Security Council. All countries should abstain from
facilitating the import or export of these resources. Any
country breaking this embargo should face sanctions;
Governments should take the measures necessary to
ensure that companies registered in their territory and
individuals breaking the embargo are punished.
222. The Security Council should decide that all
Member States without delay should freeze the
financial assets of the rebel movements and their
leaders. Member States should take the necessary
measures to ensure that their public and private
financial institutions stop doing business with banks
named in this report that are located in Burundi,
Rwanda and Uganda.
223. The Security Council should strongly urge all
Member States to freeze the financial assets of the
companies or individuals who continue to participate in
the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo immediately after
the publication of this report.
224. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
declare an immediate embargo on supply of weapons
and all military materiel to the rebel groups operating
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and consider
extending this embargo to the States that support or
assist those groups.
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225. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
decide that all military cooperation with States whose
military forces are present in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo in violation of its sovereignty be
suspended immediately until those armies withdraw
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Financial and economic matters
226. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
urge Member States to suspend balance of payments
support to the countries of the region involved in the
illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, until the Security
Council has evidence to its satisfaction that the illegal
exploitation of natural resources has stopped.
227. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
requests the World Bank and IMF to consider
suspending their support to the budgets of these
countries until the end of the conflict. If, within two
months after the publication of this report, clear
evidence and signs of the disengagement of these
countries from the exploitation of the natural resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are not given
to the Security Council, cooperation between those
institutions and the countries involved should be
suspended. The World Bank and IMF should design a
policy guideline on cooperation between each
institution and countries involved in conflicts.
228. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
urge Member States sharing a common border with the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or serving 'as transit
countries for goods and natural resources from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to form a
commission to investigate financial and economic
activities conducted on their territories in connection
with the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and take the necessary action to curb or halt activities
that contribute to the continuation of hostilities.
Diamond business
229. The Security Council should call upon the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to take the
necessary steps to curb the flow of illicit diamonds by
liberalizing the diamond trade. A clear signal in this
regard should be sent to all companies that resist and
obstruct the liberalization of the mineral markets.
230. All diamond dealers operating in the territories
occupied by foreign forces should immediately stop
S/2001/357
doing business with rebels and Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda. Failure to do so should lead to action through
the World Diamond Council. The Republic of the
Congo and the Central African Republic should take
the necessary measures to stop abetting the trade in
illicit and conflict diamonds.
231. Furthermore, the Panel endorses all the relevant
recommendations on diamonds made by the Panel of
Experts established by resolution 1306 (2000) in
relation to Sierra Leone in its report (S/2000/1195,
paras. 155 to 166), in particular:
(a) A certification scheme similar to that
adopted by Sierra Leone should be required of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and all other
diamond-exporting countries in the region, within a
period of six months;
(b) Major trading centres should agree on a
recording and public documentation system for rough
diamond imports that clearly designates countries of
origin and provenance;
(c) All countries importing rough diamonds
must apply a "rough control" system whether they have
free trade zones or not;
(d) The European Union should have few entry
points for diamonds;
(e) The United Nations and the World Diamond
Council should form a commission to conduct an
annual review of the proper implementation of the
certification system;
(t) An annual statistical production report
should be compiled by each exporting country and
gathered into a central annual report, compiled by the
World Diamond Council and/or by the certification
body that is expected to emerge from the "Kimberley
process".
Forest and timber
232. The Panel proposes that countries with seaports
and those with transit facilities report to the United
Nations Forum on Forests on the transit of timber
through their territory. As the timber from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo transits through the
ports of Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, the Governments
of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania should
declare to the Forum on Forests the origins of the
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S/2001/357
timber that is being shipped from their seaports, as well
as the certification documents of such timber.
233. The Panel recommends that the United Nations
Forum on Forests unify the different schemes and
procedures for timber certification. The certification
scheme should be based on the broad framework of
principles, criteria and indicators promoted by the
International Panel on Forests and the International
Forum on Forests. New criteria on "conflict timber"
should be considered. The Forum on Forests should
become or designate one single accrediting body for
timber certification. The composition of such a body
should reflect the diversity of actors and interests as
well as the specificity of regions. Such a unified
mechanism would prevent some "loose codification"
and purely commercial certifying bodies from
delivering or attempting to deliver certificates. The
Panel urges the Security Council to declare timber and
non-timber forest products coming from warring areas,
"conflict timber and non-timber forest products".
Countries importing non-certified timber should put in
place minimum guidelines and sanctions for companies
that import timber and non-timber forest products from
countries at war or experiencing civil war related to the
allocation or distribution of natural resources.
234. The Panel proposes, following the declaration on
the control of illegal logging made by the Group of
Eight in 1998, and the ongoing discussions on "conflict
timber products", that a mandate be given to the United
Nations Forum on Forests:
(a) To compile information in collaboration
with various non-governmental organizations on illegal
logging and "conflict timber products" in the world;
(b) To publish annually a list of countries
involved in illegal and "conflict timber products" trade;
(c) To submit an annual report to the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
235. The Panel recommends that countries of transit
and final destination of the timber trade request from
logging companies certificates of origin for the timber
that is transiting through or arriving in their territory.
Those countries should send copies of these certificates
to Governments of countries of origin within three
days. Failure to abide by this should be considered to
be complicity on the part of those countries and they
should be listed as countries facilitating "illicit timber"
44
and "conflict timber product" trade in the report of the
Forum on Forests.
Reparation and compensation
236. The Panel recommends that individuals, in
particular farmers, religious groups and companies
whose properties, livestock and crops were damaged,
looted or expropriated by the Burundian, Rwandan or
Ugandan armed forces and their allies should be
compensated by the States concerned. Properties
confiscated should also be returned to their legitimate
owners. The Governments of Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda and their allies should pay compensation to the
companies whose properties and stocks of coltan,
cassiterite, gold, timber and other materials which were
confiscated or taken between 1998 and 2000. The
Security Council may consider how the Office of the
United Nations Resident Coordinator in Kinshasa could
help in gathering information on the claims.
237. UNESCO, in collaboration with UNEP, the
secretariat of CITES and non-governmental
organizations working in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo should assess the extent of damage to
wildlife in Garamba Park, Kahuzi-Biega Park, the
Okapi Reserve and Virunga Park, and propose
sanctions to be taken against those Governments whose
soldiers were involved in the mass killing of
endangered species.
Framework for reconstruction
238. The Security Council would give mandate and
means to a United Nations commission created to help
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo manage the transition in the formerly occupied
regions. The Commission will help design and put in
place the legal and administrative framework and
create an enabling environment for economic activities.
The Commission will also help put in place the
necessary conditions for the enhancement of State
authority and security over its territory.
General
239. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
consider establishing an international mechanism that
will investigate and prosecute individuals involved in
economic criminal activities (such as Khaleb
Akandwanaho alias Salim Saleh, Jean-Pierre Bemba,
James Kazini, Mbusa Nyamwisi, Ateenyi Tibasima,
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Roger Lumbala, Aziza Kulsum Gularnali and others
named in this report), companies and government
officials whose economic and financial activities
directly or indirectly harm powerless people and weak
economies.
240. The Panel recommends that the Security Council
consider establishing a permanent mechanism that
would investigate the illicit trafficking of natural
resources in armed conflicts so as to monitor the cases
which are already subject to the investigation of other
panels, such as those of Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone.
241. Member States should be encouraged to adopt
legislation that will forbid companies registered in their
territory from importing or exporting natural resources
to or from invading countries.
Security
242. The Panel urges the Security Council to hold
Governments of countries parties to the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, rebel movements
and those military representatives cited in the report
responsible if any harm is done to any member of the
Panel. The Security Council should encourage
individual countries to assist the Panel members by
providing security to each of them well after the Panel
is dissolved. The Security Council should urge the
Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements
to ensure the security of the Panel members well after
the Panel is dissolved. The Panel has received
information of harassment in Bunia and other localities
of individuals who may have been in.contact with the
Panel members. The Security Council should hold the
authorities of Rwanda, Uganda, RCD and FLC
responsible for any harm to witnesses who shared their
knowledge with the Panel.
S/20011357
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S/2001/357
Annex I
46
Sample of companies importing minerals from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo via Rwanda
Company Co1mtry of destjnat/on Me.r,;hflndise
Cogem Belgium cassiterites
M uka-Enterprise Belgium cassiterites
Issa Germany cassiterites
Chpistopa Floss Germany cassiterites
Redemi Rwanda cassiterites
Banro-Resources Corp. Malaysia cassiterites, coltan
Canada cassiterites
Bharat United Republic of cassiterites
Tanzania
Extano-Office Rwanda coltan
Coopimar Rwanda coltan
Geologistics Hannover Germany coltan
Rwasibo-Butera Switzerland coltan
Eagleswings Netherlands coltan
Veen Netherlands coltan
Soger Belgium coltan
Patel Warehouse Netherlands coltan
Afrimex United Kingdom of Great coltan
Britain and Northern
Ireland
Netherlands cassiterites
Chimie Pharmacie Netherlands coltan
Belgium coltan
Sogem Belgium coltan, cassiterites, tin
Cogecom Belgium coltan, cassiterites
Cogea Belgium coltan
Panalpina Kenya coltan
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Company
Tradement
Ventro Star
Raremet
Finconord
Finiming Ltd.
Finconcorde
Patel
Cicle International
Masingiro
Union-Transport
Specialty Metal
MDW
Transintra
Co,mtry of destination Merchandise
Belgium coltan, cassiterites
United Kingdom of Great coltan
8ritain and Northern
Ireland
India coltan
Pakistan coltan
Belgium coltan
Russian Federation cassiterites, coltan
India cassiterites
Belgium coltan
Germany coltan
Germany coltan
Belgium coltan
Belgium cassiterites, coltan
Belgium cassiterites
Source: The Rwandan Revenue Authority.
S/2001/357
47
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Annex II
48
Countries visited and representatives of Governments
and organizations interviewed
The Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo wishes to express its
deep appreciation to the government officials, diplomats, non-governmental
organizations, individual relief workers, journalists, and others who assisted it in its
enquiries and helped to make this report possible.
The Panel further wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), in
particular Ambassador Kamel Morjane; to the United Nations Office at Nairobi, in
particular Klaus TOpfer and Alexander Barabanov; and to the Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, in
particular Ambassador Berhanu Dinka.
Among countries involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Panel would like to make special note of the cooperation received from
the Republic of Uganda, which provided the Panel with all information that was
requested.
The following list is incomplete in deference to the wishes of those who
requested anonymity, in particular Congolese individuals who put their lives at risk
in order to provide the Panel with information.
Angola
Government officials
Vice-Minister of External Relations
Vice-Minister of Finance
Minister of Petroleum
Minister of Geology and Mines
United Nations agencies and offices
Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office
in Angola
United Nations Office in Angola
Belgium
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Communications, Civil Aviation Administration
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Cabinet of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs and Accounts
Office beige du commerce exterieur
Departement de douanes et droits indirects
International organizations
Eurostat
World Customs Organization
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Other
Belgolaise
BHP Diamonds and Minerals
BHV
Diamond High Council
Independent Diamond Valuators
Institute of Politics and Development Management
Langer Diamonds
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet (Nordic Africa Institute)
Royal Museum for Central Africa, Department of Geology and Mineralogy
SwissCargo
World Federation of Diamond Markets
Burundi
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Pierre Buyoya, President of the Republic of
Burundi
Minister of Agriculture and Livestock
Ministry of Finance
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
Minister of National and Regional Development and Environment
Minister of Transportation, Post and Telecommunications
Representatives of States
Belgium
Democratic Republic of the Congo
France
United States of America
United Nations agencies and offices, and international organizations
MONUC
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
UNDP
World Bank
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Commissariat general du Gouvernement charge des affaires de la MONUC
Banque nationale du Congo
Banque centrale
Departement des Forets
Direction generale des contributions (DGC)
Direction generate des recettes administratives, judiciaires, domaniales et de
participations (DGRAD)
Institut congolais pour la conservation de la nature (ICCN)
Ministre des affaires foncieres de l'Environnement, de la conservation de la
nature et du developpement touristique
Ministre de !'agriculture et elevage
Ministre des droits humains
S/2001/357
49
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S/2001/357
50
Ministre de l'economie, du commerce, et de l'industrie
Ministre de l'energie
Ministre des finances et du budget
Ministere des mines
Ministre d'Etat charge du petrole
Ministre des transports et communications
!'Office des douanes et accises (OFIDA)
Representatives of States
Belgium
China
France
Italy
United States of America
Diplomatic Corps of Kinshasa
United Nations agencies and offices
FAO
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
WFP
WHO
Other
COSLEG Holding
Federation des entreprises du Congo (FEC)
Georges Forrest International
Governor of South Kivu and Provincial Directors
Observatoire gouvernance-transparence (OGT)
Kotecha Group of Companies
Mouvement pour la liberation du Congo
Olive Company
RCD-Goma
Rally for Congolese Democracy-ML/Kisangani
Trafca
World Resource Institute
France
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry- Department of the Treasury
French Development Agency
Inspector General of Civil Aviation and Meteorology
Direction generale des douanes et droits indirects - Sous-Direction de !' Union
douaniere et de la cooperation internationale
Bureau of Geological and Mining Research (BRGM)
- 162 -
International organizations
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Kenya
Government officials
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Kenya Ports Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
Democratic Republic of the Congo
France
Japan
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Special Representative
for the Great Lakes
Zimbabwe
International organizations
Office of the Facilitator for the peace process in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
United Nations agencies and offices
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great
Lakes Region
UNDP
UNEP
United Nations Office at Nairobi
Other
International Crisis Group (ICG)
Namibia
Government officials
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Information and Broadcasting
Minister of Finance
Deputy Minister of Defence
Minister of Mines and Energy
Minister of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development
Minister of Environment and Tourism
Representatives of States
China
France
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
S/2001/357
51
- 163 -
S/2001/357
52
Rwanda
Government officials
His Excellency Major General Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of
Rwanda
Chef d'Etat major
Minister of Energy, Water and Natural Resources
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning
Minister of Agriculture, Forests and Livestock
Minister of Works, Transport and Communications
Minister of Energy, Mines and Water
Minister of Land, Resettlements and Environment
National Bank of Rwanda
Secretary-General of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Rwanda Revenue Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
Canada
China
France
Germany
Netherlands
Russian Federation
Switzerland
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Office of the European Union Delegation
United Nations agencies and offices
ECA
FAO
Heads of United Nations agencies represented in Rwanda
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
South Africa
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Other
Anglo-American
De Beers
Switzerland
Government officials
Department of Foreign Affairs, Chef de la direction politique
Swiss Federal Administration
- 164 -
International organizations
World Trade Organization
Other
Societe generale de surveillance
Uganda
Government officials
His Excellency Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda
Civil Aviation Authority
Internal Revenue Authority
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mineral Development
Minister of State for Environment, Water and Land
First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Finance
Minister of State for Planning and Investment
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications
Parliamentary Committee on Presidential and Foreign Affairs
Vice-President of the Republic of Uganda
Representatives of States
Belgium
Denmark
France
Italy
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
European Union Special Envoy to the Great Lakes
United Nations agencies
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
Heads of United Nations agencies in Kampala
Media
East African
Monitor
New Vision
Radio Uganda
Top Radio
Ugandan Television
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
S/2001/357
53
- 165 -
S/2001/3S7
54
Other
Cluff Mining
De Beers
The Economist
International Coffee Organization
World Diamond Council
United States of America
Government officials
Department of State
Bureau of African Affairs
Bureau of International Organization Affairs
Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, Fifth District, Georgia
United Nations agencies and offices
UNESCO and United Nations Foundation/White Oak Conference
International organizations
World Bank
Other
Oregon Certification Group
Smart Wood
University of Maryland
Zimbabwe
Government officials
Senior Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Energy and Mines
Chief Executive Officer, Civil Aviation Authority
Representatives of States
Belgium
China
France
Russian Federation
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
United Nations agencies and international organizations
UNDP
Heads of all United Nations agencies represented in Zimbabwe
Media
Zimbabwe Independent newspaper
Daily News
Other
First Banking Corporation Limited
Zimbabwe Transparency International
ZimTrade
-----------------------------------------~--~
- 166 -
Annex III
Abbreviations
AFDL
BCD
BCDI
CEMAC
CIFOR
coltan
COMESA
COMIEX (I)
COMIEX (2)
COSLEG
ECA
FAO
FDD
FLC
Gecamines
IDI
IMF
MIBA
MLC
MONUC
OECD
OSLEG
RCD
Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du CongoZarre
(Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Congo-Zaire)
Banque de Commerce et du developpement (Trade and
Development Bank)
Banque de commerce, du developpement et d'industrie, Kigali
Communaute economique et monetaire de I' Afrique centrale
(Central African Economic and Monetary Community)
Centre for International Forestry Research
columbo-tantalite
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
Cornpagnie rnixte d'import-export
La Generale de commerce d'import/export du Congo
COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
Economic Commission for Africa
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Forces pour la defense de la democratie
Front de liberation du Congo (merger ofMLC and RCD-ML)
Generale de carrieres et des mines
International Diamond Industries
International Monetary Fund
Societe miniere de Bakwanga (Mining Company of Bakwanga)
Mouvement de liberation congolais (Congolese Liberation
Movement)
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (Rally for
Congolese Democracy)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie, based in Goma
RCD-Kisangani Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie, based in Kisangani,
later based in Bunia and referred to as RCD-ML
S/200I/3S7
SS
- 167 -
SJ2001/357
RCD-ML
RCD-National
RPA
RPF
SOMIGL
SOMIKIVU
SOMINKI
UDEAC
UNDP
UNEP
UNHCR
UNESCO
UNICEF
UPDF
WFP
WHO
WTO
ZANU-PF
ZDF
56
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie - Mouvement de
Liberation, first based in Kisangani, later in Bunia
Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie - National, located
in Bafwasende
Rwandan Patriotic Army
Rwandan Patriotic Front
Societe miniere des Grands Lacs (Great Lakes Mining Company)
Societe miniere du Kivu
Societe miniere et industrielle du Kivu
Union douaniere et economique de I' Afrique centrale (Central
African Customs and Economic Union)
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Children's Fund
Uganda People's Defence Forces
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
World Trade Organization
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front
Zimbabwe Defence Forces
-------------------------------------- -·-·-.
- 168 -
0
0
0
0 ••
* •* II
•
A •• •• •• ••
Repoblique £>emocratique du Congo
Gisemeots de classe A et B
Substances
/W Cl_ A> 250 I Au
Aueta.eB50-250tAu
CoCl•••A> 1000001Co
CoCl•HB 10000-100000tCo
CUCI-A> 10000000tCu
cua-e 1 000000-10000000
Diam a.a. A> 100 OOO OOO c1a
Clam Clasae B 10 OOO OOO· 100 OOO
FeCIMHA> 1000000000tFe
Fe Cl-B 100 OOO OOO. 1000 OOO
U CIUN B 500 000. 5 000 000 t
Mn Cl-B 10 OOO OOO. 100 OOO 00
Nb a ... A> 250 OOO t Nb205
Nb ClaaH B 50 OOO· 250 OOO t
Pb Cl-8 100 OOO· 1 OOO OOO I
SnCI-A> 1000001Sn
Sna-e 10000-1000001Sn
Ta a-B 500 • 2500 t Ta205
U ClaM 8 5000 • !50 OOO t U
Zn Cl_ A> 2000 OOOtZn
Au:Or
U:Llthlum
Ta: Tantale
Co: Cobalt
Mn:llanganeu
U: Uranium
CU: Culvn,
Nb: Niobium
Zn :Zinc
Diam : Diamant
Pb : P1omb
S/2001/357
/ Ki~to (District)
' ~ Zani-Kodo (Fe) ,
-----· lturl-Uele (COO)
--t<llo (Zone de)
.Ami
Fe : Fer
Sn :Etaln
57
ANNEX 1.8
United Nations Security Council, Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2001/1072, 13 November 2001
(Excerpts)
- 169 -
United Nations S/2001/1072
Security Council Distr.: General
13 November 2001
Original: English
01-63001 (E) 151101
*0163001*
Letter dated 10 November 2001 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council
I wish to refer to the presidential statement dated 3 May 2001
(S/PRST/2001/13), in which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a final period of three months. I
also wish to refer to the President’s letter, by which the Panel’s mandate was
extended until 30 November 2001 (S/2001/951), and the Panel was requested to
submit, through me, an addendum to its final report.
I have the honour to transmit to you the addendum to the report of the Panel,
submitted to me by the Chairperson of the Panel. I should be grateful if you would
bring the report to the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
- 170 -
2
S/2001/1072
Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms
of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–9 4
II. Historical perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10–11 5
III. Situation in the Great Lakes region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12–14 5
IV. Exploitation of the natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15–55 6
Coltan (columbo-tantalite) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17–25 6
Gold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26–29 8
Copper and cobalt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30–35 8
Diamonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36–47 9
Timber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48–55 11
V. The link between exploitation of resources and the continuation of the conflict . . . 56–104 13
Democratic Republic of the Congo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61–75 14
Zimbabwe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76–82 16
Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83–86 18
Namibia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87–90 18
Rwanda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91–94 19
Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95–100 20
Burundi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101–104 21
VI. Transit countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105–122 21
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106–109 21
Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110–114 22
United Republic of Tanzania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115–117 22
Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 23
Central African Republic and Republic of the Congo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119–122 23
VII. Armed groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123–142 23
National armed groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123–134 23
Foreign armed groups (the negative forces). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135–142 25
VIII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143–151 26
IX. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152–160 27
- 171 -
3
S/2001/1072
Annexes
I. Countries visited and representatives of Governments and organizations interviewed . . . . . . . 29
II. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
- 172 -
4
S/2001/1072
I. Introduction
1. By the statement of its President of 2 June 2000
(S/PRST/2000/20), the Security Council requested the
Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts on
the illegal exploitation of the natural resources and
other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo with the following mandate:
(a) To follow up on reports and collect
information on all activities of illegal exploitation of
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, including in
violation of the sovereignty of that country;
(b) To research and analyse the links between
the exploitation of the natural resources and other
forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo
and the continuation of the conflict.
2. By his letter dated 12 April 2001 (S/2001/357),
the Secretary-General transmitted the report of the
Panel. The Security Council, in the statement of its
President of 3 May 2001 (S/PRST/2001/13), requested
the Secretary-General to extend the mandate of the
Panel for a final period of three months, at the end of
which the Panel would present an addendum to the
report which would include the following:
(a) An update on the relevant data and analysis
of further information, including as pointed out in the
action plan submitted by the Panel to the Security
Council;
(b) Relevant information on the activities of
countries and other actors for which necessary quantity
and quality of data were not made available earlier;
(c) A response, based as far as possible on
corroborated evidence, to the comments and reactions
of the States and actors cited in the report of the Panel;
(d) An evaluation of the situation at the end of
the extension of the mandate of the Panel, and of its
conclusions, assessing whether progress has been made
on the issues, which come under the responsibility of
the Panel.
3. The new Panel was composed as follows:
Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt),
Chairman;
Brigadier General (Ret.) Mujahid Alam
(Pakistan);
Mel Holt (United States of America);
Henri Maire (Switzerland);
Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
4. The Panel was assisted by a technical adviser,
Gilbert Barthe, two political officers, as well as an
administrator and a secretary.
5. Following a brief period of consultations in New
York, the Panel began its work in Nairobi on 30 July
2001. Panel members, together or individually, because
of time constraints, visited Angola, Belgium,
Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Kenya,
Namibia, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South
Africa, Uganda, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania,
the United States of America, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
6. In acquiring and updating its information, the
Panel relied on meetings with heads of State,
government officials, non-governmental organizations
and stakeholders, business people, academics, members
of the press, individuals and others. Meetings were also
held with parties cited in the report, representatives of
Governments, entities, private companies and
individuals who had submitted written reactions to the
report.
7. The Panel did not have the power to compel
testimony and thus relied on information voluntarily
provided by States and other sources. Information was
not forthcoming from South Africa, the United
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Information was finally received, but with considerable
delay, from Angola. This factor, as well as the
constraints of its short mandate, limited the Panel’s
ability to present a more complete addendum.
8. Throughout its consultations and work, the Panel
was mindful of the progress being achieved in the
ongoing peace process in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, regarding the implementation of the
Ceasefire Agreement signed at Lusaka on 10 July 1999
(S/1999/815) and, in particular, the inter-Congolese
dialogue.
9. The Panel tried its best to address the complaints
and reactions as a consequence of the report and
succeeded in meeting most of the parties. However,
owing to severe time constraints, it was not possible to
address this issue in its totality.
- 173 -
5
S/2001/1072
II. Historical perspective
10. The Panel wishes to emphasize that the history of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, regardless of
the political system or governing authority in place, has
been one of systematic abuse of its natural and human
resources. This exploitation has almost always been
backed by the brutal use of force and directed to the
benefit of a powerful few. As the country’s precious
resources were plundered and mismanaged, an informal
economy based on barter, smuggling and fraudulent
trade in commodities thrived, becoming the sole means
of survival for much of the population. This commerce
reinforced pre-existing ties based on ethnicity, kinship
and colonial structures between the Kivu regions and
neighbouring States such as Burundi and Rwanda, as
well as Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of
Tanzania. Similar patterns of informal trade closely
linked Katanga Province with Zambia and Angola.
11. The result was that a country renowned for its
vast natural wealth was reduced to one of the poorest
and debt-ridden States by the early 1990s. From the
early days of the rebellion of the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire,
President Laurent-Désiré Kabila perpetuated many of
the practices of his predecessors. He wielded a highly
personalized control over State resources, avoiding any
semblance of transparency and accountability.
Management control over public enterprises was
virtually non-existent and deals granting concessions
were made indiscriminately in order to generate
quickly needed revenues and to satisfy the most
pressing political or financial exigencies. Familiar
patterns of unaccountability, corruption and patronage
re-emerged rapidly. This is the setting in which the war
of August 1998 began.
III. Situation in the Great Lakes region
12. Since 12 April 2001, the ceasefire has held along
the confrontation line among the parties. Uganda began
pulling out some troops and Namibia withdrew almost
all its troops. Disengagement to new defensive
positions, in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement, appears to have been completed. Sporadic
fighting nonetheless continued, shifting the conflict
towards the east along the borders with Rwanda and
Burundi and the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Much of
this fighting has pitted the Rwandan and Burundi
armed groups or “negative forces” and the Congolese
Mayi-Mayi militias against the Rwandan Patriotic
Army, the Burundi Army and the RCD-Goma rebel
forces. ALIR I, regrouping ex-FAR and Interahamwe,
moved through the Kivus and crossed the border to
attack RPA. The attack was repelled by RPA. The most
recent armed activity has centred on the town of Fizi in
South Kivu near Lake Tanganyika. There have also
been reports of sporadic clashes between Mayi-Mayi
fighters and different forces in the north-eastern
regions of Orientale Province and North Kivu. Some
fighting was also reported to have broken out among
different factions of the Ugandan-backed rebel groups.
13. Efforts towards reconciliation and reunification
moved forward. In August 2001, the preparatory
meeting for the inter-Congolese dialogue, the
negotiations among the Congolese parties on a postconflict
political transition, was held at Gaborone. A
sense of compromise and cooperation reigned and one
result was the signing of a Declaration of Commitment
by all the participants. Among the many issues on
which the participants committed themselves to start
taking action was the protection of natural resources
from illegal exploitation. The dialogue itself began at
Addis Ababa in September; the talks, which adjourned
prematurely, in part because of funding problems, will
reportedly resume in December in South Africa. The
Kinshasa Government continued to push for the
participation of the Mayi-Mayi groups in the
negotiations. Talks aimed at building confidence were
held between President Joseph Kabila and the heads of
State of the signatories to the Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement. As a gesture of good will, intended to
encourage the withdrawal of Rwandan troops,
President Kabila announced that 3,000 soldiers in
Katanga Province, identified as ex-FAR and
Interahamwe, would be disarmed and demobilized
under the supervision of the United Nations.
14. As regards the exploitation of natural resources,
Zimbabwe is the most active of the allies. Many of its
joint ventures are in the development stage and likely
to mature with the help of badly needed capital from
outside investors. While many of the investors are
offshore companies, Zimbabwe also appeared to be
considering a less active role for its army in these
commercial activities and more involvement by
government ministries. On the side of the uninvited
forces, the commercial networks put in place by UPDF
commanders have allowed them to continue their
- 174 -
6
S/2001/1072
exploitation activities despite the withdrawal of a
significant number of troops. RPA continued to collect
and channel profits from trade in natural resources
through a sophisticated internal mechanism.
IV. Exploitation of the natural
resources
15. Investigations conducted by the Panel, which
focused on evaluating whether changes in trends had
occurred since the release of the report, confirmed a
pattern of continued exploitation. The exploitation is
carried out by numerous State and non-State actors,
including the rebel forces and armed groups, and is
conducted behind various facades in order to conceal
the true nature of the activities. While some of these
activities may be conducted under the umbrella of joint
ventures, other activities are carried out by the de facto
authority in the area, which purports to exercise the
same authority and responsibilities as the legitimate
Government. Still others take different forms, which
will subsequently be highlighted. Given its mandate,
the Panel limited its examination of specific material
resources to coltan, gold, copper and cobalt, diamonds
and timber, since they best illustrate the current
patterns of exploitation. Selecting these resources also
permitted the Panel to examine some of the reactions
presented to the report.
16. The Panel would also like to emphasize another
very important aspect of the exploitation that
previously was not given sufficient importance. This
relates to the exploitation of human resources by all
parties to the conflict, a far graver phenomenon than
the exploitation of material resources. This form of
exploitation has resulted in flagrant and systematic
violations of the fundamental human rights of the
Congolese people. Human resources constitute the
most important wealth of a nation, and the Panel
strongly feels the need to reinforce the international
community’s attention to this situation so that urgent
measures are taken.
Coltan (columbo-tantalite)
17. An excellent conductor, this metal ore occurs
throughout the eastern region of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. After increased demand from
the hi-tech, communications and aerospace industries
drove coltan prices to an all-time high of more than
$300 per pound in 2000, prices plummeted during the
first six months of 2001, levelling off at the current $20
to $30 per pound. This price fluctuation, due to an
increase in world production — in particular in
Australia — and diminished demand, coincided with
the publication of the Panel’s report. There have been
some accounts that part of the decrease in demand
resulted from manufacturers’ desire to disassociate
themselves with what became known, following release
of the report, as “blood tantalum”.
18. The fluctuation in the price, as well as the Panel’s
report, have had a number of effects on the coltan trade
from the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. In response to the recommendations of the
Panel, a bill was introduced in September 2001 in the
United States House of Representatives to prohibit
temporarily coltan imports from certain countries
involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Some United States corporations that
process and use tantalum, such as Kemet and Cabot
Corporation, cancelled orders for coltan originating
from the region. The Panel also confirmed that the
Belgian company Sogem, a subsidiary of Umicore
(formerly Union Minière), which was cited in the
report, ended its partnership with its coltan supplier,
MDM, in Bukavu in November 2000. Sogem, it should
be added, had been operating and was established in
the area long before the outbreak of hostilities.
19. These factors have also led to a change in tactics
by the Rwandan army. Congolese operators were
selected as partners to handle the coltan trade. In
addition, the Rwandans relocated some of their
comptoirs, which had operated in Bukavu and Goma,
back to the Rwandan border towns of Cyangugu and
Gsenyi. In addition, the decrease in coltan prices has
meant a sharp reduction in revenues for the Congolese
rebel groups such as RCD-Goma. For example, the
Panel received reports that only one of the six
remaining comptoirs d’achat has been able to pay its
mandatory contribution to RCD-Goma. The rebel
group has, as a result, resorted to other means of
collecting revenue. RCD-Goma officials are now
retroactively demanding higher taxes from local
businesses and have imposed much higher customs
tariffs. Desperately short of funds, RCD-Goma has
even begun imposing customs duties on relief material
brought in by humanitarian organizations.
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covered in the early 1990s for economic losses
incurred because of the wars in the east of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo”. The Government
of Germany has emphasized that it does not offer
“trade promotion measures” to SOMIKIVU or any
other company named in the report.
Gold
26. Gold deposits can be found in the north-east and
eastern regions, in the Kivus and Maniema and Ituri
Provinces. During the last days of the Mobutu era, this
was the only mineral that was recording increases in
sales. Following an initial attempt at privatizing the
gold mines through joint ventures, industrial gold
mining practically came to a halt as a result of the civil
war that began in 1996. However, artisanal gold mining
continued and continues to this date on a large scale.
27. The Panel’s report sheds light on the gold mining
activities carried out by the Ugandan army, which
assumed control of this gold-rich area. The sharp rise
in Ugandan gold exports, which also exceeded national
production, was given as further evidence that this gold
is transported by UPDF elements to Kampala, from
where it is exported. The Government of Uganda
contested the findings of the Panel in its report,
attributing the increase in its exports to 1993 policies
liberalizing gold sales and exports, where the revamped
policies permitted artisanal miners in Uganda to keep
hard currency earned from sales. Officials claimed that
as a result of the ease with which gold can be
smuggled, Uganda became the preferred destination for
gold produced by artisanal miners in the surrounding
region.
28. The discrepancy between the gold export figures
registered by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral
Development and those recorded by the Uganda
Revenue Service was attributed to the fact that the
Ministry’s figures reflect the quotas set for the
production of the Ugandan export permit holders.
These permit holders can buy from artisanal miners,
the total of which appears on the export permits. While
small-scale smuggling may in part explain the
discrepancy in Uganda’s production and export figures,
the Panel has evidence that artisanal gold mining
activities in the north-east by UPDF and RCD-ML, as
well as the short-lived rebel coalition FLC, have
continued. In the Kilo-moto area for example,
operations at the Gorumbwa and Durba sites are under
the control of UPDF and RCD-ML. The Malaka site
reportedly employs 10,000 diggers and generates
amounts of gold valued at $10,000 per day. Gold
produced is still being sold through the Victoria
comptoir in Kampala.
29. Another destination for the gold originating in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is Bujumbura. The
Panel has learned from official and business sources in
Bujumbura that gold smuggling into Burundi from
Bukavu, Fizi Baraka and Uvira is a traditional activity
because of the porous borders and Bujumbura airport’s
capacity to handle large cargo planes. In Bujumbura,
gold dealers from countries such a Senegal, Pakistan
and Greece buy this smuggled gold, which they
subsequently transport personally to Europe and other
destinations.
Copper and cobalt
30. Gécamines, the largest mining operation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and once wholly
State-owned, has holdings in government-controlled
Katanga Province, which contain one of the largest
concentrations of high-grade copper and cobalt in the
world. Embezzlement, theft and pilfering,
mismanagement and a lack of re-investment
transformed it from the pillar of the Congolese
economy, once earning 70 per cent of the country’s
hard currency in exports, into a dilapidated enterprise
with production now at only one tenth of its former
capacity.
31. Although Australian, United States, Canadian,
Belgian and South African companies have established
joint ventures in Gécamines’ concession areas, the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
has primarily relied on it as a means to ensure the
continued support of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean Billy
Rautenbach was named the Managing Director of
Gécamines in November 1998 during a visit to Harare
by President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. According to this
deal, some of Gécamines’ best cobalt-producing areas
were also transferred to a joint venture between Mr.
Rautenbach’s Ridgepoint Overseas Development Ltd.
and the Central Mining Group, a Congolese company
controlled by Pierre-Victor Mpoyo, then Minister of
State. Mr. Rautenbach also acted as Managing Director
of the joint venture, a blatant conflict of interest. The
Panel has information that President Kabila’s decision
to appoint Mr. Rautenbach — a man with no mining
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experience but with close ties to the ruling ZANU-PF
party in Zimbabwe — was made at the request of
President Robert Mugabe during that visit.
32. However, President Kabila replaced
Mr. Rautenbach with Georges Forrest, a Belgian
businessman, in March 1999, reportedly after the
former failed to pay the Government’s share of the
profits from the joint venture. President Kabila accused
him of transferring profits to a shell company, as well
as stockpiling cobalt in South Africa. Shipments of
cobalt had allegedly been seized in Durban to pay
Gécamines’ South African creditors. Mr. Rautenbach
has since taken legal action against the Government of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
33. Under Zimbabwean pressure, in January 2001
John Bredenkamp’s Tremalt Ltd. formed a joint venture
with Gécamines, the Kababancola Mining Company
(KMC). In a 25-year agreement, KMC acquired rights
to a concession representing the richest Gécamines
holdings. Mr. Bredenkamp, who pledged to invest $50
million in the mining operations, controls 80 per cent
of this venture. Profits from his company’s share will
be split between the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (68 per cent) and Tremalt
(32 per cent).
34. The management of Gécamines changed hands
again following an audit of all State-owned enterprises.
The Minister to the Presidency, who has oversight for
all public enterprises through his other post as Minister
of the Portfolio, supervised an audit of these
enterprises early in 2001. The audit reportedly revealed
gross mismanagement and led to the firing of senior
management officials at these enterprises in August
2001. A relative of the Minister was subsequently
appointed to an influential post in the new management
committee of Gécamines.
35. As in the past, Gécamines still continues to serve
as a source of revenue for the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. However,
Gécamines’ revenue-generating capacity no longer
stems primarily from actual production, as it did during
the early years of President Mobutu’s regime. Instead,
revenue mainly flows from the initial payments
pledged by potential foreign joint-venture partners in
return for the granting of concessions. The Panel has
established that the amount of the payment is one of
the primary considerations for the cash-strapped
Government in granting concessions. As a result,
unsustainable and environmentally hazardous mining
operations currently characterize Gécamines’ copper
and cobalt mining activities. The future of what was
once the giant of the country’s economy appears bleak.
Diamonds
36. Owing to the size of the industry and the
relatively stable price of diamonds, it is now an
established fact that diamonds have had a significant
effect on conflicts in Africa. In Angola and Sierra
Leone, “conflict diamonds” mined in rebel-held areas1
have served as a motivation for and a means by which
some of the longest and bloodiest civil wars in Africa
have been and are still being fought. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo is not an exception. In this
respect, the Panel would like to emphasize the
importance of efforts by those involved in the
“Kimberley process” in developing an international
regulatory framework that will prevent conflict
diamonds from being marketed and traded through
legitimate industry channels. The Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has recently begun
participating in these efforts.
37. In 1998, the former Governor of Kasai Oriental
Province, Jean Charles Okoto, was named Managing
Director of Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA).
Statistics obtained by the Panel show that while
industrial and lower grades of diamonds have
consistently accounted for over 90 per cent of MIBA
production over the past decade, the small proportion
of gem and near-gem quality stones, which averaged
around 4 per cent of production, has shrunk
progressively since 1999. By 2001, they represented
barely 1.8 per cent of total production. The data,
together with information provided by highly reliable
sources, suggest that much of the company’s most
valuable diamond production is being embezzled and
sold for personal profit by high-level MIBA and
possibly other Government officials. The Panel
believes, on the basis of credible, independent reports,
that a portion of these embezzled gems are being
smuggled through South Africa for sale in third
countries. Credible information also suggests that
__________________
1 Diamonds that originate in areas controlled by forces or
factions opposed to legitimate and internationally
recognized Governments, and are used to fund military
action in opposition to those Governments or in
contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.
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Congolese authorities regularly skim millions of
dollars from the proceeds of MIBA sales. In some
cases, the funds are directly transferred from the
company’s Brussels account at the Banque Belgolaise.
There are also widespread allegations, which the Panel
was not able to substantiate, that diamonds from the
Angolan rebel force UNITA are being laundered
through MIBA in its tenders.
38. One of the largest joint ventures involving the
Zimbabwe Defence Forces is the Sengamines diamond
concession. The 25-year concession clearly represents
the richest diamond deposits of MIBA holdings, with a
potential production value estimated at over several
billion dollars.
39. The joint venture originally featured a partnership
between the ZDF-owned OSLEG (Operation Sovereign
Legitimacy) and the Congolese company COMIEXCongo.
COMIEX-Congo is a State-private venture that
acts as the Government’s main platform for
commercial deals and is reportedly linked to the
Presidency and senior government ministers. The
resulting joint venture, COSLEG, had neither the
capital nor the expertise to develop the full potential of
the concession. In a pattern that has developed in all of
Zimbabwe’s commercial investments in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, technical and financial support
was sought from a third party. In this case, the party
was Oryx Natural Resources, a British-Omani
company.2
40. The exact capital structure of Sengamines
remains somewhat unclear. Information obtained from
Sengamines representatives and COMIEX in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated that Oryx
retained 49 per cent of the shares, COMIEX 33.8 per
cent and MIBA 16 per cent. The remaining 1.2 per cent
is divided among several individuals, including the
Minister for Public Security. Sengamines
representatives also told the Panel that COMIEX would
soon be dissolved and the government share in the
venture would be controlled by the Ministry of the
Portfolio. In a document concerning a planned reverse
takeover of Oryx Natural Resources in 2000, reference
is made, however, to dividing the “distributable
profits” from the concession on the following basis: 40
per cent to the Oryx group, 20 per cent to OSLEG and
20 per cent to COMIEX-COSLEG. In this scenario, the
__________________
2 The company, directed by an Omani entrepreneur, is
registered in the Cayman Islands.
Congolese partners would be considerably
marginalized, especially MIBA. The separate Oryx
Zimcon joint venture, involving yet another ZDFowned
company, is described as holding 90 per cent of
the concession mining rights. Many well-informed
sources emphasized to the Panel that the concession
granted to Sengamines was the last strategic diamond
reserve of MIBA and that MIBA has been irreparably
weakened by the loss of this concession. Some sources
even alleged that the granting of the concession is the
prelude to liquidating MIBA, with Sengamines
replacing it as the new premier diamond producer in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
41. While the Congolese partner provides the
resources to be exploited, Oryx furnishes the necessary
capital and expertise. Through Abadiam, its agent in
Antwerp, Oryx is also directly involved in the
marketing process. Although sharing substantially in
the profits, the Zimbabwean side in this complex joint
venture has no apparent role, apart from its strategic
troop deployment in the diamond-rich Kasai region.
This area is known for its secessionist tendencies and
being the stronghold of popular opposition politician
Etienne Tshisekedi of the Union pour la démocratie et
le progrès social (UPDS).
42. An estimated one third of the total rough diamond
production of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
valued at $300 million a year, is smuggled to the
Central African Republic and the Republic of the
Congo because the export duties are much lower in
those countries. A significant percentage of these
diamonds also find their way to South Africa. The
Panel believes that the stones are mostly exported from
these transit points, to the major diamond trading
centres in Belgium, the Netherlands, Israel and the
United Kingdom. The smaller diamond centres in
Mauritius, India and the United Arab Emirates (Dubai),
reportedly receive a lesser share. The new mining code
of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, being drafted with assistance from the World
Bank and advice from the World Diamond Council, is
expected to redress the issue of the heavy taxes levied
by the revenue-starved Government on diamond
exports, which helps spur this illicit trade.
43. In following the trail of diamond exports from the
Zimbabwean ventures in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the Panel learned from the Ministry of
Mines of Zimbabwe that the import of rough diamonds
into Zimbabwe is prohibited. This information was
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corroborated by data provided by other credible
sources, which showed no diamond imports originating
from Zimbabwe. The Panel has been able to establish
that these diamonds are handled by the South Africanbased
Petra Diamonds Ltd.,3 which now owns Oryx
Natural Resources, following a reverse takeover in
2000.
44. Diamonds from artisanal mining in the northern
Kisangani area have provided a source of revenue for
the rebels, RPA and UPDF for the continuation of the
conflict. The high combined taxes imposed by the
RCD-Goma rebel group and RPA ultimately resulted in
diamonds mined in this area being redirected to
Kampala, where lower tax rates prevail. Data on
Ugandan diamond exports confirm this. From 1987 to
1996, no diamond exports from Uganda were recorded
for this market. From 1997 to 2000, exports from
Uganda ranged from 2,000 to 11,000 carats, with
values of up to $1.7 million per year. Figures for 2001,
extrapolated from the sales for the first eight months,
show an estimated 35,000 carats, valued at $3.8
million, in Ugandan diamond exports to Antwerp.
45. To gain a better understanding of the diamond
exploitation activities carried out in the rebel-held and
occupied territories, the Panel has taken a closer look
at the activities of the Belco-Diamant comptoir in
Kisangani. Following the rebel administration’s
cancellation of the monopoly on diamond exports
granted to Mr. Nassour in Kisangani, the Belco
comptoir was established. This comptoir is owned by
Mr. Lukasa, a former minister under President Mobutu,
as well as Emile Serphati, and was licensed to export
diamonds by the rebel administration. Although Belco
pays a 5 per cent export tax to the RCD-controlled
Ministry of Mines, the Panel has information that a 10
per cent tax is also levied on the comptoir by the
“Congo desk” in Kigali. Buyers, such as Arslanian
Frères, purchase diamonds from Belco, which are then
shipped directly to Antwerp in Belgium. As there is no
sanctions regime in effect against diamonds originating
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Diamond
High Council in Antwerp inspected and approved
__________________
3 Petra Diamonds Ltd. is actually registered in Bermuda
although most of its operations and holdings are in South
Africa. The company also has subsidiaries or
concessions, some active and other not, in Namibia,
Botswana and Angola. Its directors include a former
United States diplomat, an Omani government official
and a Commonwealth Secretariat official.
Arslanian Frères’ imports of diamonds originating in
the rebel-controlled region of Kisangani. The owner,
Raffi Arslanian, told the Panel that Arslanian Frères
had ceased all imports from Belco in May 2001 and
furnished purchase receipts to substantiate this.
46. Statistics from credible sources also showed that
diamond exports from Rwanda to Antwerp, in contrast
to Uganda, have not increased. They informed the
Panel that the reason behind this is the Rwandan Congo
desk’s relatively high tax (10 per cent) levied on the
export of diamonds from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, added to the 5 per cent tax charged by the
Congolese rebel administration. These taxes have
driven many of the artisanal miners from the Kisangani
area to smuggle their production through the Central
African Republic and the Republic of the Congo.
Diamonds are also reportedly transported personally by
Asian and Lebanese traders operating in the eastern
region, to South Africa and to Belgium and other
European countries.
47. Belgium, along with the Diamond High Council
in Antwerp, has taken serious steps to halt imports of
conflict diamonds, for example from Angola and Sierra
Leone, by instituting strict controls and by playing a
leading role in the design and adoption of an
international diamond certification system. However, it
still remains an important destination for those tainted
diamonds owing to the lack of similar controls in other
European Union countries. Another related issue raised
in the Kimberley process is the difficulty of adapting a
certification and inspection regime to the customs and
other trade procedures of a single integrated trade
market such as the European Union.
Timber
48. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is
endowed with some of the finest hard woods in the
world. Most timber products from the eastern region
have traditionally been shipped via the Congo River for
export in Kinshasa. The Panel learned, however, that
since the beginning of the 1998 war, logging
companies in the eastern region have used the port of
Mombasa in Kenya for exports. Although the Panel has
evidence to show that timber from the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo is exported both
from the port of Dar es Salaam and through Kampala to
the port of Mombasa, the Governments of both the
United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda denied that
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any transited through either country. Information
provided to the Panel proves however that timber
processed at Mangina (North Kivu) transits through
Uganda on its way to Mombasa, transported by the
freight company TMK. With regard to the United
Republic of Tanzania, the Panel has obtained
documents that clearly indicate that, during the period
from December 2000 to March 2001, at least two
shipments of timber originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo were transported across the
United Republic of Tanzania by railway from Kigoma
to the port of Dar es Salaam. The documents also show
that both shipments were intended for transit through
the port. These shipments were consigned to companies
in Greece and Belgium.
49. The exploitation of timber is also occurring in the
Government-held territories. In 2000 COSLEG, the
joint venture between the ZDF-owned OSLEG and
COMIEX, established a subsidiary, Société congolaise
d’exploitation du bois (SOCEBO), for the exploitation
and commercialization of timber in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. It was set up with the aim to
“contribute in the war effort in the framework of
South-South cooperation”.
50. The Panel has gathered contradictory information
about the exact size of the concessions granted to the
joint venture, as well as its operational status and
investment strategies. SOCEBO representatives told
the Panel that six concessions had been applied for in
the Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Kasai and Katanga
Provinces, totalling 1.1 million hectares. However, the
United Kingdom non-governmental organization
Global Witness reports that four concessions totalling
33 million hectares were granted, making it the largest
timber exploitation operation in the world. According
to Global Witness, these concessions cover 15 per cent
of the national territory. The by-laws show COSLEG as
holding 98.8 per cent of the shares in the joint venture,
with the remaining 1.2 per cent of shares divided
between Mawapanga Mwana Nanga, Abdoulaye
Yerodia Ndombasi, Godefroid Tchamlesso, Charles
Dauramanzi, Collins Phiri and Francis Zvinavashe.
51. According to some sources, timber from the
Kasai and Katanga concessions would be transported
by train from Lubumbashi, through Zambia to the port
of Durban in South Africa, where it would be exported
to Asia, Europe and the United States. The Panel also
received very credible information that SOCEBO target
markets would include South Africa.
52. President Mugabe told the Panel at a meeting in
Harare that, although SOCEBO was supposed to
commence logging activities in May 2001, it had been
delayed owing to an inability to pay the customs duties
to the Zimbabwe Revenue Service on machinery
imported for the project. The SOCEBO Directors in
Kinshasa emphasized, however, that a lack of sufficient
capital had been the main obstacle to making SOCEBO
fully operational. The Panel also received credible
reports that the initial start-up capital of $600,000
intended for SOCEBO operations had been embezzled
by representatives of the diamond buying office,
Minerals Business Company, another COSLEG
subsidiary. The Panel learned that a police inquiry into
the disappearance of those funds had been suspended.
53. Heavy investment will still be required in order
for the company to realize its objectives, over $5
million according to the company’s own business plan.
The Panel has not been able to substantiate reports that
ZDF have contacted Malaysian, Lebanese and French
investors to explore the possibility of forming joint
ventures to develop these concessions.
54. According to information provided by SOCEBO,
however, in July 2001 a joint venture was established
with Western Hemisphere Capital Management
(WHCM), described by some as a United Kingdom
company based in Harare. The venture, SAB-Congo,
was formed to develop one of the concessions in
Katanga Province. WHCM, which is providing the
needed capital and equipment, currently owns 60 per
cent of the shares. SOCEBO holds 35 per cent, while
the Institut National pour l’étude et la recherche
agronomique (INERA), a Congolese State-run institute
for agriculture, holds 5 per cent. The duration of the
agreement is 10 years. The first timber sales from the
venture are expected in November 2001. The Panel was
unable to determine if WHCM is in any way linked to
Western Hemisphere Resource Exploration (WHRE),4
which recently formed a diamond mining joint venture
with COSLEG, the Société congolaise d’exploitation
minière. SOCEBO is also currently conducting
negotiations with Assetfin, a Zimbabwean company
owned by Time Bank, in a similar arrangement for
another concession.
55. The Directors of SOCEBO told the Panel during
an interview in September in Kinshasa that, while it
__________________
4 WHRE is registered in the Isle of Man and according to
the by-laws is owned by Elki Pianim.
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continues to seek investors, it is currently exporting
timber bought from local small-scale loggers. It is also
in the process of annulling a partnership deal with a
private Congolese logging company for its concession
in the Bas-Congo, which it described as “unprofitable”.
While SOCEBO directors painted a picture of a
company still struggling to get operations under way
and burdened by debts and back-tax bills, the Panel has
received credible reports that Zimbabwean military
personnel have been carrying out intensive logging
operations in the SOCEBO concession in Katanga,
apparently in conjunction with SAB-Congo.
V. The link between exploitation of
resources and the continuation of
the conflict
Overview
56. Through its fact-finding, the Panel attempted to
analyse to what degree the exploitation of natural
resources and other forms of wealth constitutes the
motivation behind each party’s activities in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and to what extent
the exploitation provides the means for sustaining the
conflict. In doing so, it assessed the recent
developments in the conflict area and their implications
for the exploitation activities. The Panel then
evaluated, on an individual basis, the activities of the
different States involved in the exploitation process.
Recent developments and their implications
57. There are indications that clashes during the past
seven months in the Oriental and Kivu regions between
the Mayi-Mayi, who appear to be better equipped and
coordinated than before, and UPDF and the MLC rebel
group have been directly related to control of coltan
and gold. Similar short-lived battles have been fought
by the Mayi-Mayi with RPA over access to coltan
throughout the Kivus. The Panel also believes that the
infighting among the Congolese rebel groups in recent
months, which has caused them to splinter and led to
occasional violence, has been related to control over
coltan, gold and diamonds in the Beni and Bafwasende
areas.
58. The Panel received credible information,
corroborating reports from independent sources, that
Zimbabwe is supporting the Burundian FDD rebel
forces by supplying them with weapons and expertise.
Many reliable sources have informed the Panel in this
regard that the Zimbabwe Defence Forces are training
FDD in Lubumbashi, where the FDD leadership is
based and where Zimbabwean copper and cobalt
investments are located. Another sign of their loosely
structured coordination with the Burundian rebels is
that the ALIR II forces are based near FDD in South
Kivu and also have a command and liaison presence in
Lubumbashi. The Panel concluded that the arming of
these irregular groups is contributing to sustaining
what could be viewed as a war by proxy in the east. It
allows the ceasefire to remain intact, while creating a
“controllable” conflict in the occupied zone that
satisfies the interests of many parties. With this
sporadic, low-intensity conflict dragging on, a certain
status quo is being maintained in this region where
many precious resources are extracted, traded and
routed for export. Zimbabwe and Rwanda have the
most important commercial presence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo as a result of their involvement
in the war. The role that Zimbabwe plays in regard to
continuing the conflict may well be shared with the
Government of the Democratic of the Republic of the
Congo, or at least some elements in it, as well as
others. This armed activity can continue to feed
Rwandan and Burundian security concerns, becoming
an added justification for those two countries to
maintain their military positions. In the case of
Rwanda, control can then be legitimately deepened
over a considerable expanse of territory, as well as its
population and resources. As Zimbabwe’s joint
ventures in mining and timber begin to mature and
become profitable, it may be tempted to retain a
sizeable military presence in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The profiteering of private businesses of
all kinds in illicit and criminal activities gives them
vested interests in seeing the conflict continuing, in
particular businesses in South Africa, Kenya and the
United Republic of Tanzania.
59. The link to the control and commercialization of
the resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
is more implicit than explicit. The Fizi Baraka region,
where the most recent and intense fighting has
occurred, is strategic for many reasons. It has been a
stronghold for certain Mayi-Mayi groups and a base for
the Burundian rebel forces, particularly FDD. ALIR II
forces, which many military sources describe as the
better armed and commanded of the Interahamwe and
ex-FAR groups, use this area and nearby Shabunda to
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66. Documentary evidence gathered shows that, in
1999, over 30 per cent of the first semester earnings of
MIBA were transferred to Government accounts. Those
transfers were vaguely labelled “payments to fiscal
accounts” (paiements accomptes fiscaux). It is not clear
who within the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo controls these accounts, or what
the funds transferred to them are used for. Another 11
per cent of the earnings from that period were
funnelled directly to the Congolese armed forces. Other
transfers from MIBA sales are described in official
documents as “deductions for the war effort”,
amounting to tens of millions of dollars. Testimony
from very credible sources corroborates what these
documents suggest: a pattern over the past three years
of diverting a hefty percentage of MIBA earnings to
high-level government officials for their personal
benefit, as well as to cover war or military-related
expenses.
67. In some cases, it appears that deals were
concluded because they were linked, directly or
indirectly, to arms and military support. In 1997, the
Kabila Government ended the exclusive contract it had
with De Beers to buy all of the industrial diamond
output of MIBA. Following a period in which
Congolese diamonds were sold on the international
auction market to the highest bidder, President Kabila
reached an agreement with the Israeli-owned
International Diamond Industries in August 2000 for a
monopoly on diamond sales. According to the terms of
the agreement, IDI agreed to pay $20 million in return
for a monopoly on sales valued at $600 million
annually. The Panel was informed by very credible
sources that this deal included unpublished clauses, in
which IDI agreed to arrange, through its connections
with high-ranking Israeli military officers the delivery
of undisclosed quantities of arms as well as training for
the Congolese armed forces.
68. IDI ultimately paid only $3 million from the
agreed sum of $20 million. President Joseph Kabila
decided in April 2001 to end the contract, citing failure
to pay as the reason. In his statement, the owner of IDI,
Dan Gertler, claimed that IDI had complied with its
obligations and alleged that the Government’s decision
was motivated by the fact that information about the
agreement was included in the Panel’s final report. The
statement also insisted that the Panel did not consult
with IDI and demanded that the Panel rectify its report.
The Panel requested to meet with IDI representatives in
Kinshasa in September 2001. IDI declined this request.
IDI is reportedly trying to negotiate some form of
compensation for breach of contract with the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
69. It is important to look at this failed Kabila-Gertler
deal as a number of key aspects are significant. On the
Congolese side, it comes within a pattern of
miscalculated decisions taken by the cash-strapped
Laurent-Désiré Kabila, whose main interest was the
immediate cash flow. Although there was some
discontent within Kabila’s entourage at the
outrageousness of the deal, it was, nonetheless, not
revoked until seven months after it was signed. The
Panel has credible information indicating that there is a
growing involvement of Israeli businessmen in the
region. Taking advantage of the withdrawal of De
Beers from conflict diamond regions, a whole network
of Israelis was established, including Mr. Gertler in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lev Leviev in
Angola and Shmuel Shnitzer in Sierra Leone. In all
three cases, the pattern is the same. Conflict diamonds
are exchanged for money, weapons and military
training. These diamonds are then transported to Tel
Aviv by former Israeli Air Force pilots, whose numbers
have significantly increased both in UNITA-held
territory in Angola and in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. In Israel, these diamonds are then cut and
sold at the Ramat Gan Diamond Centre.
70. During their meetings with the Panel, members of
the Congolese Commission indicated that, as the
country moves towards greater political openness, the
Kinshasa Government will have to take action on the
issue of Zimbabwe’s activities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Commission also
expressed their view that the question should figure on
the agenda of the inter-Congolese dialogue, and that a
protocol d’accord must be established between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe to
rectify the irregularities, including agreements secretly
signed under pressure of the military situation at the
time.
71. Further evidence of this collapse of a functional
State, and its inability to make decisions in its national
interest, is reflected in the stance currently adopted by
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo towards the activities being carried out in the
rebel-held areas. The Panel has learned, from
commercial companies and individual business people
who have operated under both the Kinshasa
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Government and rebel authorities, that the regulations
and procedures have not, for the most part, changed
under rebel administrations. In fact, civil servants
appointed by the Government are still performing such
duties as customs control and tax collection in rebelheld
areas. However, the taxes are not received by the
Government in Kinshasa but are diverted for the use of
the rebels and Uganda and Rwanda. This is
acknowledged by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which, offered in September
2001 to pay the 37-month arrears and salaries of those
civil servants. Furthermore, the Government in
Kinshasa appears to have recognized the activities of
the commercial entities in the rebel-held areas. One of
the many examples is the German-owned company
Somikivu, which operates in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, but continues to pay taxes to
the rebels and maintains an office in Kinshasa. When
asked about the legal status of the commercial entities
operating in the rebel-held and occupied territories, the
Congolese Minister of Justice informed the Panel
during a meeting in September 2001 that none of the
concessions had been revoked thus far, and that an
evaluation on a case-by-case basis would be conducted
when the Government regained control of the areas in
which they are operating.
72. To further demonstrate this, the Panel has taken a
closer look at the legal status of DARA Forest, a Thaiowned
company operating in North Kivu Province.
DARA Forest is a Congolese-registered logging
company owned by five shareholders. Royal Star
Holdings is the main shareholder, and is partly owned
by the managing director of DARA Forest, John
Kotiram. Besides Mr. Kotiram, there are three
Congolese shareholders. In March 1998, DARA Forest
registered as a Congolese company in Kinshasa, after
which work was begun on building a sawmill in
Mangina in North Kivu Province. In June 1998, DARA
Forest was granted a 35,000-hectare logging
concession from the North Kivu Provincial Authority,
which grants these concessions following registration
with the central Government. DARA Forest also
acquired an exploitation licence from the same
authority to buy and export from local loggers. Its
exports, which were to the United States and China,
started early in 1999, months after the beginning of the
war.
73. DARA Forest, which the Panel has found to have
complied with all the regulations in effect, currently
pays its taxes at the same bank as it did before the area
came under rebel control. It also deals with the same
customs officials as it did before the rebels took control
of the area when it exports its products and imports
production equipment. The Panel has also learned that
a bimonthly check is conducted by the local Congolese
authorities in North Kivu to ensure that DARA Forest
is complying with the terms of licences granted to it.
Furthermore, DARA Forest was granted on 12
September 2001 a certificate of registration from the
Ministry of Justice in Kinshasa. This would appear to
be a clear sign of recognition of the company and
acceptance of its work in the rebel-held areas by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
74. The case of Arslanian Frères also demonstrates
the ambiguity of the Government’s approach. The
diamond company Arslanian Frères, based in Belgium,
has an agreement to buy all the stock of the Belco
Diamants comptoir in Kisangani and to “help them
financially when needed” and has been travelling to
Kisangani to openly purchase diamonds mined in the
rebel-held areas surrounding the town. Nevertheless,
one of the owners of the company, Raffi Arslanian, was
approached in writing in 2001 by the Government’s
Minister of Mines to invest in a multi-million-dollar
project aimed at reorganizing the State-owned
diamond-producing enterprise MIBA.
75. There are many indications that President Joseph
Kabila is genuinely interested in bringing about
positive changes in his country. The Panel has noted
that, not withstanding the political considerations
involved in the granting of favourable concessions to
his allies, there are serious attempts to attract foreign
investment to restructure, modernize and liberalize the
remaining State assets in the mining business. In this
respect, the country’s new mining code is expected to
bring about some fundamental and positive changes to
the mining industry in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
Zimbabwe
76. According to information available to the Panel,
there are five main factors at play, which helped to
shape the Zimbabwean objectives in its involvement in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. One
determining factor is Zimbabwe’s desire to assert its
role within SADC. Supporting the Democratic
Republic of the Congo militarily presented such an
opportunity. A second factor lies in Zimbabwe’s ailing
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of the shares in BCDI. The 2000 audit report on BCD,
set up as a joint venture by the AFDL-controlled
COMIEX, shows that Tristar owns 10 per cent of the
shares. Mr. Kalisa told the Panel that information in its
report regarding a banking transaction for monies paid
to COMIEX-AFDL in 1997 was inaccurate. The Panel
has been able to corroborate Mr. Kalisa’s description of
the transaction, in which $3.5 million were transferred
from the Banque Belgolaise through Citibank to BCDI
for payment to COMIEX. Mr. Kalisa also told the
Panel that information in the report regarding a
$1 million loan to the RCD-Goma controlled SONEX
for payment of fuel bills with Jambo Safari airlines was
incorrect. The loan was made, according to Mr. Kalisa,
for payment of fuel from Alliance Express airlines.
Uganda
95. Uganda also has some legitimate security threats,
which prompted its military intervention in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In so intervening,
the Government of Uganda enacted a protocol between
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda,
signed in April 1998, allowing two battalions from
each country to cross the border in pursuit of
perpetrators of terrorist activities.
96. The Panel notes that Uganda has complied with
the presidential statement (S/PRST/2001/13) by
establishing a national Commission of Inquiry, the
Porter Commission.
97. While the effect of the Panel’s report and the
significant withdrawal of UPDF troops have given the
impression that the exploitation activities have been
reduced, they are in fact continuing. The commercial
networks put in place by Ugandan army commanders
and their civilian counterparts that were described in
the report are still functioning in Oriental Province and
Kampala. The Trinity and Victoria companies, for
example, are still actively exploiting diamonds, gold,
coffee and timber. UPDF have thus been able to pull
out their troops, while leaving behind structures that
permit military officers and associates, including rebel
leaders, to continue profiting.
98. While the Government of Uganda does not
participate directly in the exploitation activities, the
culture in which its military personnel function
tolerates and condones their activities. The commercial
activities of senior UPDF officers are public
knowledge. In an interview with the Panel in August
2001, the now retired General Salim Saleh admitted
that, while never having been in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, one of his companies had been
engaged in exporting merchandise to the eastern part of
the country. He noted that the aircraft transporting the
merchandise was initially confiscated by General
James Kazini. General Kazini, who also participated in
the interview, in turn described his role in facilitating
the transport of Ugandan merchandise to Kisangani and
other areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
In full control of the areas under their administration,
General Kazini and others used this power, as they
would have done elsewhere, to establish a mechanism
to promote their business interests. The characteristics
of the area under their control predominantly determine
the kind of exploitation activities carried out by UPDF
personnel.
99. The Panel has noted that the UPDF officers
usually conduct their business through a Congolese
affiliate, on whom they bestow power and support.
This was the case with Jean-Pierre Bemba, Adele
Lotsove and, more recently, Roger Lumbala of the now
defunct RCD-National, as well as Mbusa Nyamwisi.
Sources have informed the Panel that RCD-National
was formed by General Kazini in 2000 from RCDGoma
defectors, who gave them Bafwasende as their
base. More recently, the Panel learned that
Mr. Lumbala had signed two commercial agreements
bearing the signatures of UPDF Commander Kahinda
Otafire and Belgian and Austrian parties. In addition,
the Panel has learned that, late in December 2000,
Lumbala — who is reportedly a front for the monopoly
of the Victoria company on the Bafwasende
diamonds — was in Kampala delivering diamonds to
what the sources termed his “masters”. Another
activity UPDF officers are involved in is the liberal
siphoning off of the customs revenues on the illicit
trade between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda. A very credible source informed the Panel
in that regard that Mr. Nyamwisi “skims” up to
$400,000 off the tax revenues collected from the Beni
customs post at the Uganda border. According to the
same source, Mr. Nyamwisi shares this money with
General Kazini and General Salim Saleh.
100. There is a link between the continuation of the
conflict and the exploitation of the natural resources, in
the case of Uganda. Influential Government officials,
military officers and businessmen continue to exploit
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the security situation for their vested commercial
interests.
Burundi
101. The Panel found no evidence directly linking the
presence of Burundi in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo to the exploitation of resources. Although its
army is positioned in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo near a traditional trade and transit point for
minerals, its presence has been and continues to be
directed at blocking attacks from the Burundi rebel
groups, particularly FDD, which are based in South
Kivu and Katanga.
102. In its reaction to the Panel’s report, the
Government of Burundi contested the Panel’s
conclusions that Burundi had been exporting minerals
it did not produce, and specifically mentioned the case
of diamond exports coinciding with the 1998
occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. In an effort to verify this information, the Panel
contacted the Africa Department of IMF, requesting a
copy of an IMF memorandum which supports the
report’s statements. Although IMF representatives
confirmed that they were trying to locate the document,
the Panel has not been able to obtain a copy of it. In
addition, the Minister of Energy and Mines and
representatives of Burundi’s mining sector provided the
Panel with information supporting Burundi’s claims
that gold, coltan and cassiterite deposits can be found
in its northern and north-eastern regions. Modest
quantities of coltan and cassiterite have also been
produced and exported during the past eight years. The
Panel found however that the data on gold production
and exports were not coherent, as they confirmed that
artisanal gold mining has continued over the past eight
years, whereas export statistics recorded zero gold
exports from 1997 to 2000. Concerning cobalt, the
Panel was informed that there are significant deposits,
but that production has not yet been developed. Private
sector and Government representatives also stressed
that there is no domestic production of copper or
diamonds at this time.
103. The Panel confirmed that Burundi has
traditionally served as a re-export and transit centre for
gold and diamonds originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Much of this trade has however
subsided following a three-year embargo imposed on
Burundi in 1996. Officials also emphasized that
Burundi’s inability to control its borders, together with
its tradition of cross-border trade, has led to
widespread smuggling by small-scale operations.
104. The Government of Burundi also provided the
Panel with information to the effect that it had had a
legitimate opportunity to profit from the mineral
wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
1997 and had turned it down. A copy of the draft
agreement shows that the Congolese Minister of Mines
had offered the Government of Burundi and
businessmen a joint mining venture in the Bafwasende
region for a concession area of 20,000 km2, with
abundant deposits of gold, diamonds, coltan and
cassiterite.
VI. Transit countries
105. Although they are not directly involved in the
conflict, the Panel has investigated the role of some of
the neighbouring countries in the region to establish a
more comprehensive picture of the exploitation
activities.
South Africa
106. South Africa maintains a neutral stance towards
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and is calling for the implementation of the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement and the end of the conflict. South
Africa also maintains close ties with all the parties and
is actively involved in the peace process. Its former
President, Nelson Mandela, is also the mediator for the
Arusha peace process in Burundi.
107. On the commercial level, South Africa is very
much involved in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. The Panel was able to see this at first hand
during its visit to the northern Zambian border area
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Around
150 large trucks cross this border every day, carrying
foodstuffs, machinery and other products
predominantly from South Africa. Many of the trucks
transport copper and cobalt to South Africa on the
return trip, where it is processed and shipped from the
ports of Durban and Nelson Mandela (Port Elizabeth)
to its final destinations, thus effectively ending the role
of the port of Dar es Salaam as the traditional port of
exit for Congolese copper and cobalt. As South Africa
is a country with potential water shortages, South
African businessmen are currently studying the option
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142. ALIR II, over 5,000 strong, is mostly based in
South Kivu, near Shabunda, Fizi and Baraka, but also
has a command and liaison presence in Lubumbashi in
Katanga Province. Some of its troops are reportedly
recruited from the Zambian refugee camps. As part of a
fluid, ongoing alliance with FDD and the Mayi-Mayi,
they reportedly have been clashing with RCD-Goma
and Rwandan and Burundian forces in the South Kivu
region. The continued, and sometimes intensifying,
fighting appears aimed, in the opinion of many
informed sources, at either controlling a corridor into
Burundi or continuing to destabilize the region so as to
prevent an effective demobilization effort from getting
under way. Credible sources also indicate that several
thousand ALIR combatants were recently incorporated
into the Congolese Armed Forces. During the visit of
the Secretary-General to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo in September, President Kabila announced
that 3,000 ex-FAR and Interahamwe soldiers located in
Kamina (Katanga Province) would be demobilized,
under the supervision of the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
VIII. Conclusions
143. The systematic exploitation of natural resources
and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo continues unabated. These activities
involve a large number of State and non-State actors,
belonging both to the region and outside, some directly
involved in the conflict, others not. The exploitation
has resulted in the further enrichment of individuals
and institutions, who are opportunistically making use
of the current situation to amass as much wealth as
possible.
144. Without a resolution of the broader conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, it
would be highly unrealistic to expect an end to the
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth in the country. Exploitation of natural resources
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo cannot be
viewed and dealt with in isolation, disregarding the
factual situation existing in the area. It needs to be
realized that this is one part of the problem which is
inextricably linked to other serious issues in the region.
145. A primary and fundamental reason for the
continuing and systematic exploitation by various
“predatory” groups operating in the country is the
effective collapse of all State institutions and structures
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Unable or
unwilling to resist any pressure, it is vulnerable in the
extreme. It must be remembered that a weak State
offers significant financial opportunities and rewards to
unscrupulous elements operating under the garb of
various Governments, businesses, mafias, individuals
etc. It would be highly unrealistic to expect a State
under such conditions to exercise even a modicum of
authority over its territory. In order to redress this
grave condition, it is of the utmost importance to start
rebuilding the State institutions. This will require a
systematic and sustained approach stretching over
many years, and with the full assistance and
cooperation of the international community.
146. The conflict continues at a low intensity level,
mainly by the various armed groups confronting the
foreign forces so as to deny them access to and control
of various resources. However, the ceasefire is
generally respected on the front line, leaving the
exploitation of the resources as the main activity of the
foreign troops, as well as the different armed groups,
where the former tolerate the activities of the latter as a
controlled military opposition to ensure the
continuation of the security threats, and hence justify
their continued military presence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
147. Accordingly, there is a clear link between the
continuation of the conflict and the exploitation of
natural resources. It would not be wrong to say that one
drives the other. The military operations and presence
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo of all sides
have been transformed into self-financing activities,
whereby no real budgetary burden is borne by the
parties concerned. This allows them a greater degree of
freedom and no financial compulsion to end the
conflict.
148. The initial motivation of foreign countries or
armies to intervene in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo was primarily political and security-related in
nature; over a period of time, and owing to the
evolving nature of the conflict, it has become the
primary motive of extracting the maximum commercial
and material benefits. This holds true for both
government allies and rebel supporters.
149. Owing to the prolonged nature of conflict and
civil war in the region, many countries appear to have a
sense of heightened insecurity and suspicions about
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their neighbours’ motives. Countries involved in the
conflict should not, however, be allowed to use this as
a pretext for furthering their own national ambitions
and agendas.
150. Contrary to its strong protestations, the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
has been involved in allowing some foreign companies
to continue the exploitation of resources in rebeloccupied
areas without renouncing or cancelling any
concessions. This is borne out by the fact that some
ministries in Kinshasa maintain contacts with these
companies, with whom they actively interact.
151. The actual sources for financing the war effort by
all parties in the conflict, including the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, remain shrouded in mystery.
No clear answer was given by anyone the Panel
questioned and it was evident that there was much to
conceal and not make public. The official defence
budgets of countries engaged in the hostilities, in those
cases where selected information was provided, clearly
indicate that these countries could not afford the cost of
their involvement in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. It is evident that in such cases the war effort
was financed from extrabudgetary sources, giving rise
to much suspicion and misgivings. Some of the
international aid may have been misused for financing
the conflict. This can be misconstrued as recognition
and acceptance of their activities in perpetuating the
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
IX. Recommendations
Institutional
152. To enable the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to have effective control over its territory and to protect
its natural resources from illicit activities, the
international community should assist in formulating a
plan of action on the rebuilding of State institutions in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This should be
linked to the convening of an international conference
on peace and development in the Great Lakes region.
153. All concessions, commercial agreements and
contracts signed during the era of Laurent-Désiré
Kabila (1997-2001) and subsequently in the rebel-held
areas, including such concessions, contracts and
commercial agreements signed secretly and under
duress, should be reviewed and revised to address and
correct all the irregularities. In redressing these
contractual obligations, the renegotiation process
should be conducted under the auspices of a special
body to be created by the Security Council. This
process will enhance President Joseph Kabila’s efforts
towards rebuilding and reconstructing his country in a
transparent and structured manner, which would
encourage the genuine foreign investment of which the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is in such dire need.
Establishment of a broad-based government of national
unity may facilitate this process.
154. The United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo should accelerate
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
process in order to reduce the security concerns
expressed by a number of States in the region,
including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to a
level that makes it possible for the countries concerned
to negotiate among themselves the modalities of
securing their borders without infringing upon the
sovereignty of any State.
Financial and technical
155. The World Bank, IMF and the other international
donors are best placed to critically evaluate their
assistance. Those international donors may consider
submitting to the Security Council, within the shortest
possible time, their assessment of the role of their
assistance in helping to finance the continuation of the
conflict and the maintenance of the status quo in the
Great Lakes region.
156. A moratorium should be declared for a specific
period of time banning the purchase and importing of
precious products such as coltan, diamonds, gold,
copper, cobalt, timber and coffee originating in areas
where foreign troops are present in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, as well as in territories under
the control of rebel groups.
157. During the period of the moratorium, countries
directly or indirectly involved in the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo — in particular
transit countries such as Zambia, South Africa, Kenya
and the United Republic of Tanzania — should review
their national legislation, and pass the necessary laws
to investigate and prosecute the illicit traffickers of the
high-value products from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo.
158. During the same period, all technical measures
that are under consideration should be finalized, such
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as the standardization of certificates of production,
harmonization of tax regimes and verification
regulations, compilation of analyses of diamond
production and trade statistics. These measures should
be monitored to verify their effectiveness by the related
bodies such as the World Diamond Council, the United
Nations Forum on Forests and CITES. Emphasis on
standardization and unification of procedures and
regulations should also be placed at the ports of entry
at the final destination.
159. Revenues from the resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo should be channelled through
States’ budgets. Tax collection and use should be
rigorously controlled, transparent and accountable.
Sanctions
160. The Security Council may consider the
imposition of sanctions. The timing of such sanctions
would depend, however, on the evolution of the
situation with regard to the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as
well as developments in the Great Lakes region, after
the present addendum is issued. Pending any action
that the Security Council may decide to take, there is a
need to establish a monitoring and follow-up
mechanism, which would report on a regular basis to
the Security Council on whether progress has been
made in exploitation activities and other issues under
consideration by the Council, prior to a decision on
sanctions.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem, Chairman
(Signed) Mujahid Alam
(Signed) Mel Holt
(Signed) Henri Maire
(Signed) Moustapha Tall
(Signed) Gilbert Barthe
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Annex I
Countries visited and representatives of Governments and
organizations interviewed
The Panel wishes to express its deep appreciation to the government officials,
diplomats, non-governmental organizations, journalists and others with whom the
Panel met and who have assisted it in making possible the present addendum. The
Panel would especially like to express its gratitude for the high level of cooperation
extended to it by the Governments of Burundi, Namibia and Uganda.
The Panel, however, expresses its disappointment at the lack of adequate
cooperation from the Governments of South Africa, the United Republic of
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The Panel also wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and, in particular,
both Ambassador Kamal Morjane and Ambassador Amos Namanga Ngongi; the
United Nations Office at Nairobi, the United Nations Office in Angola and the
United Nations Office in Burundi, as well as the United Nations Development
Programme offices in Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Harare, Kampala, Kigali, Lusaka,
Pretoria and Windhoek.
The following is the list of government officials and others with whom the
Panel met during the course of its mandate. This list does not include many others
with whom the Panel met, who, in their interest, did not wish to be mentioned.
Angola
Government officials
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Minister of the Interior
Minister and Vice-Minister of Geology and Mines
Minister of Petroleum
Governor of the Central Bank
Vice-Minister of Commerce
Vice-Minister of Finance
Chairman of Sonangol
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Embassy of Portugal
Embassy of the United States of America
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola
Others
Chairman and General Director of the Angola Selling Corporation (ASCORP)
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Belgium
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Others
Chairman of the Belgian (Geens) Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on the
Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Diamond High Council (HRD), Antwerp
University of Antwerp
International Peace Information Service (IPIS)
Burundi
Government officials
His Excellency President Pierre Buyoya
His Excellency Vice-President Domitien Ndayizeye
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Minister of Commerce and Industry
Minister of Energy and Mines
Minister of Finance
Department of Customs
Bank of the Republic of Burundi
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of the United States of America
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
Heads of the United Nations agencies
World Bank
Others
Association de banques commerciales
Comptoir minier des exploitations du Burundi (COMEBU)
Burundi Mining Company (BUMINCO)
International Rescue Committee
Central African Republic
Government officials
Ministry of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics
Central Bank of the States of Central Africa
Office de la réglementation de la commercialisation et du contrôle des produits
agricoles
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State representatives
Embassy of France
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Honorary Consul of Belgium
European Union
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
UNDP
Others
Diamond export comptoirs
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
His Excellency President Joseph Kabila
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister to the Presidency
Minister of National Security and Public Order
Minister Delegate of Defence
Minister of Economy, Finance and Budget
Minister of Justice
Minister of Planning and Reconstruction
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Health
Minister of Environment and Tourism
Minister of PTT
Minister of Transport and Communications
Minister and Vice Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons
OFIDA (Office of Customs and Excise)
State representatives
Ambassador of Angola
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Namibia
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Embassy of France
Embassy of the United States of America
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
MONUC Force Commander and Chief of Staff
Major General Chingombe, SADC Task Force Commander
UNDP Resident Coordinator and Deputy Resident Coordinator
Others
Jean-Pierre Bemba, MLC/FLC
Banque de commerce et du développement
Commission of National Experts on the Pillaging and Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth
COMIEX
COSLEG
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Catholic Relief Services
Group Forrest
International Human Rights Law Group
Kababankola Mining Company
Kisenge Manganese
Oxfam (United Kingdom)
Sengamines
SOCEBO
SODIMICO
France
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kenya
Government officials
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Office of the President
Ministry of Finance and Planning
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources
Department of Defence
Customs and Excise Division
Port Authority, Port of Mombasa
Customs Division, Port of Mombasa
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of China
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of Rwanda
Ambassador of Switzerland
Ambassador of Thailand
Ambassador of the United States of America
High Commissioner of Uganda
High Commissioner of the United Republic of Tanzania
High Commissioner of Zambia
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of Germany
Embassy of the Netherlands
Embassy of the Sudan
High Commission of South Africa
High Commission of the United Kingdom
Head of the European Commission delegation
Namibia
Government officials
His Excellency President Sam Nujoma
Minister and Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Minister of Trade and Industry
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Minister of Mines and Energy
Permanent Secretary of the National Planning Commission
Office of the President
State representatives
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Ambassador of France
Head of the European Commission delegation
International organizations
UNDP Resident Coordinator
Others
August 26 Holding Company
Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Department of Customs
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Union
Rwanda
Government officials
His Excellency President Paul Kagame
Office of the President, Special Envoy for the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and Burundi
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Patriotic Army
Minister of Commerce
Minister of Energy, Water and Natural Resources
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Justice
National Bank of Rwanda
Rwanda Revenue Authority
Magasins généraux du Rwanda (MAGERWA)
State representatives
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of Canada
Embassy of France
Embassy of Germany
Embassy of the Netherlands
Embassy of South Africa
Embassy of Switzerland
Embassy of the United States of America
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International organizations
World Bank
Heads of the United Nations agencies
Others
Federation of the Rwandan Private Sector (FSPR)
Federation of Customs Clearance Commissioners
Bank of Commerce, Development and Industry (BCDI)
Rwandan Bankers Association
Banque commerciale du Rwanda
Banque de Kigali
Eagles Wings Resources
Rwanda Metals SARL
SOGERMI SARL
South Africa
Government officials
Department of Foreign Affairs
Government Diamond Valuator
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ambassador of France
International organizations
Heads of the United Nations agencies
Others
Institute for Strategic Studies
Anglo American Corporation
Uganda
Government officials
His Excellency President Yoweri Museveni
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
Minister of Agriculture
Minister of Tourism, Trade and Industry
Minister of State for Mineral Development
Minister of State for Environment
General James Kazini
Lieutenant Colonel Nobel Mayumbu
State representatives
High Commission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Embassy of France
International organizations
Resident Representative of the World Bank
Resident Representative of the International Monetary Fund
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Others
General (Ret.) Salim Saleh
The Ugandan Commission of Inquiry (Porter Commission)
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
The East African
The Monitor
The New Vision
DARA Forest
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Customs and Excise
Others
Amnesty International
Africa Confidential
Global Witness
British Petroleum
De Beers
Anglo American Corporation
America Mineral Fields
Oxfam
Hart Ryan Productions
United Republic of Tanzania
Government officials
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals
Ministry of Industry and Trade
Ministry of Home Affairs
Governor of the Bank of Tanzania
Tanzania Harbour Authority
United States of America
World Bank
International Monetary Fund
Zambia
Government officials
His Excellency President Frederick Chiluba
Minister of Defence
Minister of Finance and Economic Development
Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry
Minister of State for Presidential Affairs
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Development
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State representatives
Ambassador of the United States of America
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of France
International organizations
Secretary-General of COMESA
SADC Mining Coordinator
Others
Afronet
Zimbabwe
Government officials
His Excellency President Robert Mugabe
Minister of Mines and Energy
Minister of Transport and Communications
Minister of Environment
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chief of the Army
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
International organizations
United Nations Resident Coordinator
Others
Commercial Farmers’ Union
Zimbabwe Defence Industries
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Annex II
Abbreviations
AFDL Alliances des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-
Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-
Zaire)
ADF Allied Democratic Forces
ALIR Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of
Rwanda)
BCD Banque de commerce et du développement (Trade and Development
Bank)
BCDI Banque de commerce, de développement et d’industrie, Kigali
coltan columbo-tantalite
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COMIEX Compagnie mixte d’import-export
COSLEG COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
FAC Forces armées congolaises
ex-FAR former Forces armées rwandaises
FDD Forces pour la défense de la démocratie
FLC Front de libération du Congo
FLEC Frente para a Libertaçao do Enclave de Cabinda (Front for the
Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda)
FNL Forces nationales pour la libération
Gécamines Générale des carrières et des mines
IDI International Diamond Industries
IMF International Monetary Fund
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
MIBA Societé minière de Bakwanga
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
OSLEG Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
PRA People’s Redemption Army
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese
Democracy)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
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RCD-ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de
libération, initially based in Kisangani, now based in Bunia
RCD-National Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, was based in
Bafwasende
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC Southern African Development Community
SCEM Société congolaise d’exploitation minière
SOCEBO Société d’exploitation du bois
SOMIKIVU Société minière du Kivu
Sonangol Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces
ZDI Zimbabwe Defence Industries
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ANNEX 1.9
United Nations Security Council, Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/565, 22 May 2002
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United Nations S/2002/565
Security Council Distr.: General
22 May 2002
Original: English
02-38366 (E) 210502
*0238366*
Letter dated 22 May 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed
to the President of the Security Council
I wish to refer to the presidential statement (S/PRST/2001/39) dated 19
December 2001, in which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a period of six months. The Security
Council requested the Panel to submit an interim report after three months and a
final report at the end of its mandate.
I have the honour to transmit to you the interim report of the Panel submitted
to me by the Chairman of the Panel. The report contains the Panel’s independent
assessment of the situation on the ground and its observations on the illegal
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I
should be grateful if you could bring the report to the attention of the members of
the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
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Interim report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
I. Introduction
1. At the request of the Security Council, the Panel
of Experts returned to Nairobi on 18 February 2002 to
carry out a third round of fact-finding on the
plundering of the natural resources and other forms of
wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
the links between those activities and the continuation
of the conflict.
2. Two Panels were earlier mandated by the Security
Council (see S/PRST/2000/20 and S/PRST/2001/13) to
investigate these same issues and submit reports. The
Panel’s first report to the Security Council was issued
on 12 April 2001 (S/2001/357). The second Panel
continued the investigations in order to provide an
update, gather information on the countries and actors
that had not been sufficiently covered in the report and
respond to the reactions generated by the report. It
submitted to the Security Council an addendum to the
report, dated 13 November 2001 (S/2001/1072). In the
addendum, the Panel examined the role in the illegal
exploitation of Congolese resources not only of the
seven countries directly engaged in the conflict but also
of six African transit countries.
3. The Security Council, in a statement by its
President dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39),
requested the Secretary-General to renew the Panel’s
mandate for six months and asked the Panel to submit
both an interim and a final report. The mandate, which
has been enlarged, stipulates that the reports should
include the following:
(a) An update of relevant data and analysis of
further information from all relevant countries, in
particular from those which thus far have not provided
the Panel with the requested information;
(b) An evaluation of the possible actions that
could be taken by the Council, including those
recommended by the Panel in its report and the
addendum thereto, in order to help bring to an end the
plundering of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, taking into account the impact
of such actions on the financing of the conflict and
their potential impact on the humanitarian and
economic situation in the country;
(c) Recommendations on specific actions that
the international community, in support of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
might take, working through existing international
organizations, mechanisms and United Nations bodies,
to address the issues in the report and the addendum;
(d) Recommendations on possible steps that
might be taken by transit countries as well as end-users
to contribute to ending the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
4. The Council also stressed the importance of the
Panel’s “maintaining a high level of collaboration with
all the Congolese players, governmental and nongovernmental,
throughout the national territory”.
5. The current Panel is composed of:
Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt),
Chairman
Jim Freedman (Canada)
Mel Holt (United States of America)
Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium)
Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
6. The Panel has been assisted by a part-time
technical adviser, Gilbert Barthe (Switzerland) and two
political officers, as well as an administrator and a
secretary. Certain administrative difficulties have
hampered the Panel’s work during this period. Some
have been resolved, but the Panel continues to operate
without one member and one part-time technical
adviser. The Panel has nevertheless striven to fulfil its
mandate to the best of its ability.
7. To guide its work, the Panel developed a plan of
action, which was transmitted to the Security Council.
The Panel decided during the first three months to
focus on four aspects of its mandate, namely, an update
of information; the role of transit and end-user
countries; the humanitarian and economic impact of the
exploitation activities and the armed conflict; and
maintaining a high level of collaboration with all
Congolese actors. Several of these elements are being
carried out in preparation for evaluating which
measures would be most effective in curbing the illegal
exploitation. Fact-finding is being limited to diamonds,
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gold, coltan, copper, cobalt, timber, wildlife reserves
and fiscal resources. The relationship between the
exploitation activities and arms trafficking and other
organized criminal activities is also a part of the
Panel’s investigations.
II. Activities in Africa
8. The Panel visited three of the countries in the
Great Lakes region that have been involved in the
conflict and which have also served as transit points for
certain natural resources: Uganda, Rwanda and
Burundi. The Panel visited the Democratic Republic of
the Congo twice, as well as two African transit
countries outside the region, the Republic of the Congo
and the Central African Republic. During those visits,
the Panel met with high-level government authorities,
technical officials, leading members of Congolese rebel
groups, representatives of the diplomatic corps,
MONUC, United Nations agencies, multilateral donors,
non-governmental organizations and civil society
associations. It also met with private commercial
operators. Technical meetings were held with officials
in each of the five transit countries visited to discuss
Governments’ responses to questions submitted by the
Panel regarding transit trade in resources such as
coltan, diamonds and gold.
Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi
9. As the mandate of the Judicial Commission of
Inquiry established by the Government of Uganda was
originally due to expire in March, the Panel scheduled
its first visit in the region to Kampala. A working
session was held with the Commission, headed by
Justice David Porter. The Commission is also
investigating the illegal exploitation of resources in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and specifically the
involvement of the Government and other Ugandan
parties. This was the third meeting between the Panel
and the Porter Commission.
10. At the request of the Commission and
government authorities, and with the encouragement of
members of the international community, the Panel
decided to transmit to the Commission three pieces of
documentary evidence gathered in the course of its own
investigations. This evidence, which the Panel feels is
of considerable value, was presented to Justice Porter
in mid-March. The Panel hopes that this gesture of
cooperation will assist the Porter Commission in
advancing its inquiry and formulating constructive
recommendations for action by the Government of
Uganda. The Commission’s mandate has been extended
to the end of May 2002.
11. During the Panel’s visit to Kigali, Rwandan
authorities continued to insist on the persistent and
extensive nature of their security concerns as a result of
the actions of Hutu armed opposition groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. They emphasized
that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo should address these concerns within the
framework of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. They
also expressed the view that the exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and trade in many of these commodities, which
has traditionally existed across the two countries’
borders, are secondary issues which cannot be properly
resolved before progress is made on the fundamental
political and security issues.
12. The Panel also visited Bujumbura. The
relationship between the conflicts in Burundi and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and the possible
repercussions for regional stability were one important
aspect of the Panel’s fact-finding during this visit.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Inter-Congolese dialogue
13. In accordance with its mandate and its plan of
action, the Panel had intended to visit South Africa in
order to meet with representatives of the various
sectors participating in the inter-Congolese dialogue at
Sun City. The Panel consulted with the office of the
facilitator, the Government of South Africa and
MONUC regarding the advisability and the timing of
its proposed visit to South Africa to meet with the
delegates at the inter-Congolese dialogue. On the
advice of the facilitation team, which expressed the
view that the Panel’s presence might have a detrimental
impact, the Panel decided not to visit South Africa
before the end of the dialogue. As a result, the Panel
has been obliged to seek out representatives of the
sectors invited to the dialogue in different regions of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These efforts
will continue under the second half of its mandate.
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Kinshasa and the eastern Democratic Republic
of the Congo
14. The extension of the inter-Congolese dialogue for
one week coincided with the Panel’s visit to Kinshasa,
making it difficult for the Panel to meet with leading
members of various delegations. Despite these
complications, the Panel was able to meet with some
ranking government and civil society representatives,
as well as a few opposition party and Mayi-Mayi group
members during its visit.
15. Congolese actors and international observers
communicated their views on developments at the
inter-Congolese dialogue and the potential
ramifications of decisions taken at Sun City. The Panel
pursued its enquiries into different strategies,
mechanisms and actors implicated in the exploitation
of resources. Environmental and human rights issues
relating to the exploitation activities and the conflict
were an important focus of this visit. Part of the Panel’s
fact-finding also concerned reforms being undertaken
by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo that could contribute to curbing the exploitation.
The Panel met twice with members of the Commission
of National Experts, established by the Government in
May 2001. The Panel submitted a series of questions to
the Commission relating to various elements of its
mandate.
16. Two Panel members visited the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, travelling for
almost three weeks in Orientale Province and North
and South Kivu. Panel members collected extensive
information on the plight of civilian populations and
the state of local economies in the eastern region as a
consequence of the armed conflict and the economic
exploitation. They also investigated the strategies and
mechanisms for the exploitation of natural resources,
appropriation of fiscal resources and control of trade by
foreign armies and a variety of armed parties present in
the region, with the collusion of private operators in
some instances.
Republic of the Congo and Central African Republic
17. Part of the Panel’s fact-finding visit in the
Republic of the Congo focused on the illicit trade in
diamonds originating in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Authorities and some private operators
emphasized the difficulties in controlling the transit
trade entering from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo via the Congo River. The Panel also visited
Bangui. Transit trade in coffee as well as trafficking in
diamonds and gold were among the issues raised in
discussions with officials of the Central African
Republic.
Briefing for the Security Council mission in
South Africa
18. At the request of the head of the Security Council
mission, Ambassador Jean-David Levitte, the Panel
travelled to Pretoria to meet on 28 April with the
mission to the Great Lakes region, which was intended
to bolster support for peace initiatives in the region.
During the closed-door meeting, the Panel briefed the
Security Council mission about recent developments in
the Great Lakes region and the recent findings of its
fieldwork.
III. Activities outside Africa
Consultations in New York and Washington
19. Before resuming its work in the Great Lakes
region, the Panel reconvened at United Nations
Headquarters on 4 February. The Panel held
consultations with the Permanent Representatives of 17
Member States, including members of the Security
Council and countries involved in the conflict, who
expressed their support for the Panel’s work. The Panel
met with United Nations Secretariat officials and
representatives of United Nations agencies and nongovernmental
organizations. In Washington, the Panel
met with representatives of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. They discussed the types
of assistance provided to countries involved in the
conflict and the extent to which their respective
institutions could contribute to curbing the illegal
exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in those countries.
Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom
20. Secondary transit and end-user countries. One
of the methodologies being used in the Panel’s
investigations is an analysis of the commercial chains
for specific commodities originating from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has
attempted to piece together these chains, from the
extraction and production phases to the processing and
end-use phases, including transport networks. This
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approach was adopted in order not only to identify
those involved in the commercialization of the
commodities and where they are located, but also with
a view to developing proposals for the most effective
measures to curb the illicit trade. On the basis of a
partial analysis of these chains, the Panel has been able
to identify various countries which are not only endusers
of the processed or refined commodities but are
also key secondary transit points for primary
commodities. Among them are several western
European countries, which are the principal locations
for some of the wholesale traders, assayers, trade
associations and air transport companies dealing in
commodities targeted by the Panel. The Panel visited
the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany and France
from 1 to 10 April. Meetings were held with officials
from government ministries, representatives of
Parliament, members of non-governmental
organizations and commercial operators. Private
operators in the coltan and diamond trade, as well as
representatives of one trade association, expressed the
view that they had gained a better understanding of the
implications of the exploitation of the resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo as a result of
meetings with the Panel.
IV. The donor community
21. Pursuing contacts it had initiated in Washington
with donors, the Panel in the course of its enquiries in
both Europe and Africa has sought to meet with both
multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as
international non-governmental organization donors.
The Panel regards these contacts with the donor
community as integral to its work. In Belgium, the
Panel met with the European Commission’s
Development Directorate-General. These officials
briefed the Panel on the various types of aid granted to
countries in the Great Lakes region and their respective
control and auditing mechanisms. The issues of the
fungibility of European Community financial
assistance and the monitoring of financial flows used
for money-laundering were also discussed. It was
agreed that the Panel and representatives of the
Commission’s delegations in the Great Lakes region
would meet at the end of May in Kinshasa for further
discussions on how international donor assistance
might contribute, either indirectly or directly, to the
continuation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo.
22. In both Europe and Africa the Panel has detected
a growing interest among donors in exploring ways in
which aid policies may be used as effective vehicles for
conveying the convictions of donor organizations, and
perhaps for influencing the policies of these countries.
V. Transit trade
23. The Panel was mandated by the Security Council
to submit recommendations on possible steps that
could be taken by transit as well as end-user countries
to contribute to curbing the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
24. In accordance with its plan of action, the Panel
submitted a series of questions to 11 African transit
countries. Some of those countries are directly
involved in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, namely, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe. The Panel also contacted other African
countries it identifies as key transit routes for
commodities from the Democratic Republic of the
Congo: the Central African Republic, Kenya,
Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo, South Africa,
the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia.
25. Through its nine questions, the Panel enquired
about relevant legislation, official investigations into
the illicit flow of commodities, measures already taken
to try to curb the flow, the effectiveness of those
measures, other possible measures that could be
enacted and those Governments’ needs for additional
assistance and expertise.
26. The Panel followed up with a number of on-site
visits to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Central African
Republic and the Republic of the Congo, during which
it met with representatives from various ministries and
institutions in charge of different aspects of the transit
trade. Written responses promised by some
Governments are still pending. Consultations with
other government officials for the purpose of gathering
additional information will be necessary before the
Panel can complete its analysis.
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VI. Context and orientations of the Panel’s
work: resource exploitation, its links to
the conflict and the humanitarian and
economic crisis
Exploitation of natural resources and other forms of
wealth and the links to the conflict
27. The Panel continues to pursue investigations into
the different strategies used by both local and foreign
actors in the exploitation of resources and the degree to
which these different strategies contribute to the
continuation of the conflict. The following are some of
the trends and investigative leads that have guided and
will continue to guide the Panel’s work in the field.
28. On the basis of two months of fact-finding within
and outside the region, the Panel’s tentative assessment
is that the illegal exploitation of Congolese resources is
continuing, and that it is being consolidated in many
areas. For example, despite the sharp decrease in coltan
prices in 2001, coltan mining operations are continuing
throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. While several commercial operators based
outside the Great Lakes region have stopped exporting
coltan from the Democratic Republic of the Congo
because the price decrease drastically reduced the
profitability of this trade, operators linked to the parties
involved in the conflict have continued to export a
substantial volume of coltan. Another example of the
continuing exploitation is an increase in licensing fees,
taxes and customs levies, apparently to compensate for
decreased revenues from the trade in coltan.
29. The Panel is gaining a more incisive
understanding of the varying roles of foreign armies,
foreign armed opposition groups, Congolese rebel
groups and Mayi-Mayi groups1 in the exploitation of
resources and the armed conflict. Enquiries are also
being focused on how the diverse types of conflict that
exist among these armed parties, some of which seem
__________________
1 Mayi-Mayi groups are a distinctly Congolese
phenomenon and should not be confused with the
foreign armed groups explicitly mentioned in the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement. The term generally refers to
community-based fighters who organize themselves to
defend their local territory, including against foreign
armies and their allies. However, the structure, military
capability and political orientation of the many groups
scattered throughout the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo that identify themselves as Mayi-Mayi vary
widely.
to be intensifying while others appear to be
diminishing, may be linked to control of resources,
territory, fiscal revenues and trade in general. It
appears that the scope, intensity and modalities of the
activities related to the exploitation of resources are in
some cases reflected in the highly commercialized
power bases of certain military and political actors in
the conflict. In the case of the foreign armies present in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Panel is
investigating the direct, institutionalized involvement
of some in the exploitation of resources and in
exercising far-reaching control over local economies.
30. There are indications that criminal networks and
activities are being imported into the Great Lakes
region from other African countries and regions outside
Africa. The Panel is looking into alleged criminal
networks based outside Africa that may be using trade
in certain resources from the Democratic Republic of
the Congo for the purposes of money-laundering. The
Panel is also following up on the activities of an
organized crime network which has been involved in
the extraction of Congolese resources, the transport of
certain commodities out of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo for export and the import of arms into the
Great Lakes region. That network’s operations are now
the target of judicial investigations in at least one
country. Another network, based in Africa, is
purportedly financing one set of criminal activities
through profits garnered from the smuggling of certain
resources. Other networks may be connected to
poaching and related smuggling activities. Additional
investigations are being carried out into allegations
linking the trafficking in the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo to certain
organizations inside and outside Africa. Those
organizations have reportedly begun to use precious
mineral resources for transactions instead of hard
currencies, which are more and more easily traced by
financial institutions and Governments. Some of these
organized criminal activities may also aim at political
destabilization.
31. The Panel is continuing to study the commercial
chains for specific commodities. This study has
permitted the Panel to gain more insight into various
aspects of the commerce in these commodities and
progressively verify certain patterns, for example:
(a) The well-established links between certain
individual commercial operators and private companies
and government officials and institutions;
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(b) The varying degrees to which individuals,
companies or entities and Governments are implicated
in the trafficking in natural resources;
(c) Which segments of the commercial chains
involve criminal networks;
(d) The importance of the use of military bases
by different actors in the conflict for the evacuation of
commodities to the initial export point;
(e) The lack of adequate controls in the civil
aviation systems in different regions in Africa,
resulting in part from outdated legal instruments and
procedures, poor implementation of existing
regulations and procedures and insufficient resources;
(f) A growing awareness among some
commercial operators, who wish to conduct trade in a
more transparent and ethical manner, that certificate of
origin regimes should be established for commodities
other than diamonds;
(g) How market factors are affecting the
exploitation activities;
(h) How those involved in the illicit trade in
Congolese resources are once more evolving their
operations and tactics in an attempt to dissimulate their
activities.
The Panel has learned that transit routes for
commodities are again being altered and Congolese
resources are apparently being relabelled during transit
to disguise their origins. “Congolese” or foreign
business partners are being used as a legitimizing
facade, while commercial entities are being
reconfigured so as to obscure links and activities. A
greater emphasis is also being placed by different
actors on controlling customs and tax revenues
resulting from trade in general, specifically the trade in
natural resources, as well as on the seizure of assets.
32. A substantial volume of certain resources
continues to transit through countries bordering the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, some by
clandestine means and some openly under the guise of
legitimate transit trade. The Panel is in the process of
identifying which operators are involved in these
commercial flows and determining whether they are
connected to the main actors in the conflict.
33. The Panel is reviewing the impact on the
exploitation of resources of a series of reforms being
undertaken by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. These include the
implementation of a diamond certification scheme
already concluded on a bilateral basis with the Diamond
High Council in Belgium, the pending implementation
of the new mining code and the drafting of a forestry
code, the latter two activities being carried out with the
support of the World Bank. During the remaining part of
its mandate, the Panel will also evaluate the potential
impact of the application of the resolution on the review
of all commercial agreements and contracts signed
during the conflict, adopted during the inter-Congolese
dialogue at Sun City, and the establishment of an anticorruption
and ethics commission, one of the civic
institutions created under the partial agreement on the
democratic transition reached during the dialogue. In
addition, the Panel is following the participation of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
the Kimberley Process, which is scheduled to finalize an
international diamond certification scheme by late 2002.
34. The status and functioning of joint ventures in
certain resource sectors in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo also continue to be the focus of the Panel’s
fact-finding.
The current nature of the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo
35. In the Panel’s view, direct confrontation among the
principal adversaries that are parties to the Lusaka
Ceasefire Agreement has all but disappeared. In a
conventional sense, the armies of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and its allies no longer militarily
engage their enemies, the Congolese rebel forces and the
foreign armies backing them. Overall, the main
adversaries remain separated by the ceasefire line, which
has de facto partitioned the country and has virtually
eliminated direct encounters between the previously
warring parties. The most notable exception to this was
the ousting in March 2002 of Government troops (FAC)
and Burundian rebel forces (FDD) from the village of
Moliro in Katanga Province during an offensive by the
RCD-Goma army, with support from RPA.2
__________________
2 Moliro is a strategic point on the southernmost shores of
Lake Tanganyika near the Zambian border. Despite the
agreements worked out under the Kampala and Harare
disengagement plans in 2000, it seemed that claims on
Moliro as a new defensive position had never been
properly resolved. The build-up of forces around this area
over the course of several months infused preparations
for the inter-Congolese dialogue with uncertainty and
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36. On either side of the ceasefire line, foreign armies
have consolidated their presence and the struggle over
maintaining control of natural resources and territory
has become a principal preoccupation. Conflict over
the resources has a different complexion on either side
of the ceasefire line. Foreign forces in the west, in
concert with certain Congolese parties, have
entrenched themselves and continue to pursue their
economic interests in the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, while adopting a
more discreet profile. Their activities may also include
asserting a certain control over local economies. For
example, while Zimbabwe has officially declared the
withdrawal of a substantial number of troops over the
past year and a half, the Panel has received reports that
replacement troops are being brought into areas such as
Kasai, where Zimbabwean parties have interests in
diamond mining. In Government-controlled regions,
there may not be open armed conflict among
competitors for resources or political adversaries as in
the eastern region. The Panel has, nevertheless,
received reports of the continuing negative impact that
the presence of foreign troops, in particular
Zimbabwean forces, has had on civilian populations.
These include grave human rights violations and
abuses of authority.
37. In contrast to the relative calm along the ceasefire
corridor and the quieter pursuit of the exploitation of
resources in the west, the quest for natural resources in
the east is characterized by armed violence of varying
degrees of intensity among foreign armies, foreign
armed groups, rebel armies and Mayi-Mayi groups.
These conflicts incite others. Some of the conflicts are
about dispersing opposition forces. Some are linked to
rekindled ethnic tensions. Others are about large
numbers of people bearing arms for survival purposes.
38. Over the past five months, fighting has re-erupted
continuously throughout the east. The fighting has at
times been heavy. The areas where the clashes have
occurred are strung out across the entire length and
breadth of the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, stretching from the centre of Orientale
Province east to the areas bordering Uganda,
throughout the Kivus and west and south into the
__________________
tension. Following the attack, the Security Council
adopted resolution 1399 (2002), demanding the
immediate withdrawal of RCD-Goma troops from Moliro
and Pweto in Katanga Province and for all parties to pull
back to positions defined under the disengagement plans.
Maniema and Katanga Provinces. Reports and
testimony indicate that civilian populations have
suffered greatly as a result, with casualties, forced
displacements, increased food insecurity and
malnutrition. A state of generalized insecurity reigns in
many rural areas in the Orientale Province and the
Kivus, as bands of youthful “soldiers” or free-floating
militias attack, loot and burn villages and fields.
39. In the area of the north-eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo where two battalions of
Ugandan troops are still stationed, violent armed
conflicts have primarily been among the three
Ugandan-backed Congolese rebel groups that dominate
the northeast — MLC, its purported ally RCD-N and
RCD-ML. Some of these rebel armies have been
reinforced at times by highly fluid alliances with what
have been described as Mayi-Mayi groups. In some
cases, UPDF soldiers also intervened. Battles have
been fought over control of Buta, Isiro, Watsa,
Bafwasende and Bunia, all endowed in varying degrees
with deposits of gold, diamonds, coltan or cassiterite as
well as stands of timber. Butembo, a major import and
distribution centre where the country’s second largest
customs post is located, was also attacked repeatedly.
Control of precious resources and customs and tax
revenues, all vital to the consolidation of the highly
commercialized power bases of certain individuals and
groups, have reportedly fuelled these battles. Over the
course of three-and-half years of conflict, various
armies have clashed over these economically strategic
areas, trading control back and forth among them.
40. Well ensconced in four of the mineral-rich
provinces of the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Rwandan-controlled forces, RCD-Goma and
RPA, have been pushing northward in North Kivu in
recent months and advancing north-west of Kisangani
in Orientale Province in April, towards territories
occupied by RCD-ML and MLC forces respectively.
RPA forces recently occupied Kowe, an area in North
Kivu where diamond deposits have been discovered.
More or less simultaneously, additional forces were
being deployed farther south in Katanga Province. Few
of these troop movements reportedly resulted in any
engagements of Rwandan Hutu armed groups.
41. Since February, RCD-Goma and the Rwandan
army have come under pressure from intensifying
attacks in the south. Offensives have multiplied against
Rwandan-backed forces in South Kivu, Maniema and
upper Katanga, regions rich in coltan, cassiterite, gold
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and diamonds. In these areas both RCD-Goma and
RPA have a long-established presence and appear to be
expanding their control of territory, assets, tax revenues
and mineral wealth. These conflicts, some short-lived,
but recurring, have mostly been initiated by different
Mayi-Mayi groups, occasionally allied with ALIR II
forces. The Panel recently received reports that various
Mayi-Mayi groups have adopted a strategy of attacking
the locations of mining activities controlled by RCDGoma
or RPA, in an effort to either wrest control of
them or disrupt them and make them less profitable.
The locations of a few recent battles led by Mayi-Mayi
groups correspond with such tactics, such as fighting in
South Kivu in Shabunda (gold and coltan as well as the
location of an airport) and Kitutu near Kamituga (gold
and cassiterite or coltan).
Humanitarian and economic situation: the toll of the
exploitation and the conflict
42. The Panel has been compiling and reviewing
reports on the economic, social and humanitarian
impact of the conflict and the exploitation activities. It
is applying this to orienting its fact-finding and
developing its own analysis and conclusions.
43. The Panel’s investigations are in part focusing on
how different strategies for the exploitation of
resources affect populations at the local level,
according to conditions that are unique to each locality,
and how this in turn shapes the specific humanitarian
impact of both the conflict and the trade in resources,
which also varies from locality to locality. There are
some broad generalizations that can be made,
particularly with regard to the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and this has been the primary
focus of the Panel’s work during the first half of its
mandate.
44. In the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,
population displacement, repeated outbreaks of violent
armed conflict and generalized insecurity are common.
One of the consequences is the destruction of crop and
grazing fields in rural areas, halting food production
and increasing pressure on existing food resources.
This has resulted in mounting food insecurity.
Humanitarian organizations, refused protection by
armies or militias, find it difficult to gain access to
these areas to provide assistance.
45. A variety of sources report that local populations,
including children, are being conscripted and used as
forced labour in the extraction of resources by some
military forces in different regions. Other tactics, such
as the destruction of the infrastructure for agricultural
production, are allegedly employed by different armed
parties in order to constrain local populations to
participate in the extraction of resources.
46. In some areas, entire communities have been
forcibly displaced by armed forces so that they can
take control of resource-rich zones or the access roads
for those zones. Military forces and militia have
reportedly evicted local artisanal diggers in order to
seize production or take control of informal mining
sites. Other serious human rights violations, including
killings, sexual assaults and abuse of power for
economic gain, have been reported as directly linked to
military forces’ control of resource extraction sites or
their presence in the vicinity of such sites.
47. Excessive taxes, revenue siphoning, seizure of
local resources, forced requisitioning of assets and
deepening control over general trade by foreign and
local military, with or without the collusion of
commercial operators, have paralysed local economies.
As a result, very few commercial enterprises are still
operational in many areas. Conditions in some towns,
which have become more and more like enclaves, are
increasingly similar to those that might result from an
embargo.
48. Almost no revenues are allocated for public
services such as utilities, health services and schools.
Infrastructures and services are quasi-inexistent. The
Panel has learned that few, if any, State administration
employees are paid salaries. This appears also to be the
case for members of local armies and police. With
most workers unemployed or unpaid in urban areas,
and food production plummeting in rural areas,
malnutrition rates are rising to very high levels,
especially in areas where economic exploitation is most
intensive.
49. Large numbers of conflict-related deaths are
adding to an even greater number of deaths from
malnutrition and disease, resulting in extremely
elevated mortality rates for all ages. Infants and
children have been particularly affected. Mortality
rates surveyed in conflict areas in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo are among the
highest recorded in the world.
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Environment: other consequences of the conflict and
the exploitation activities
50. The Panel is updating its earlier investigations
regarding the extent of the ecological destruction that
the conflict has engendered. One focus of the Panel’s
enquiries concerns the situation within the national
parks of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
particularly in terms of the illicit exploitation of
wildlife, forest and other resources. The intensive and
unsustainable mining and logging activities being
conducted outside these protected wildlife reserves, in
both the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Government-controlled regions, also present real
environmental dangers, which will require further
investigation. In the course of its information
gathering, the Panel was informed of the negative
impact of the conflict, due to massive refugee
movements, on the environments of neighbouring
countries such as the Republic of the Congo and the
Central African Republic.
51. Five of the eight national parks established in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo are located in the
eastern region. This region features one of the highest
mountain ranges in Africa and is renowned for its
unique diversity of habitats and wildlife. Of the five
wildlife reserves, many of which are home to rare
endangered species, four have been designated as
World Heritage sites by UNESCO — Virunga National
Park, Kahuzi-Biega National Park, Garamba National
Park and Okapi Wildlife Reserve. One of the reserves,
Okapi, is also the traditional habitat of nomadic pygmy
tribes.
52. The combination of the exploitation activities and
ongoing conflict has effectively eliminated State
administrative control over the parks and led to the
militarization of many of them, for example, the
Virunga, Kahuzi-Biega and Okapi reserves. These
parks are strategically located along the eastern border,
and are regularly used as crossing points by military
forces to gain access to the interior of the eastern
region. The increased presence of foreign military,
local rebel forces and armed groups, some of which
occupy areas within the parks on a quasi-permanent
basis, has resulted in the development of highly
organized and systematic exploitation activities at
levels never before seen. These activities include
poaching for ivory, game meat and rare species,
logging, and mining for coltan, gold and diamonds.
Exploitation activities reportedly involve a wide range
of Congolese operators and armed groups. They are
mostly carried out under the control of foreign military,
however, often with their logistical support and under
their protection. Much of the production or bounty is
transported first to neighbouring countries, to be
exported to third countries. Poaching activities and the
massive military presence have given rise to arms
trafficking within some parks. The reserves are also
occasionally the sites of violent clashes between some
of the armed parties. Armed conflict has exacted its toll
in human lives in the parks. Over 50 park guards and
other staff employed by the Congolese Institute for
Nature Conservation3 have been killed since 1996.
53. The impact of the conflict on the economies of
nearby communities has also spurred local populations
to relocate in increasing numbers to the parks, settling
there to carry out more and more subsistence logging,
fishing and poaching activities. There are additional
reports that populations from neighbouring countries
have moved to the parks. The natural migration
patterns of many wildlife species have been
significantly disrupted, contributing to long-term
problems in terms of repopulating certain park areas or
maintaining population balances within others.
VII.Observations
Recent strategies for profiteering and sustaining
the conflict
54. Control over fiscal resources — licensing fees,
export taxes, import duties and general state and
community taxes — seems to be gaining increasing
importance in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo for the rebel groups and the foreign armies.
Some of the revenues are reportedly diverted to
individuals or groups of individuals for their personal
profit. Others are allegedly siphoned off for payments
to foreign armies, either to maintain their support
against rival groups or to finance continuing, extensive
military operations. Recent periods have seen tax rates
double or triple in certain areas and increasingly harsh
penalties imposed when payment is not made. With
many land routes impracticable and unsecured and
river traffic having ceased, some areas have become
increasingly isolated, making control of trade all the
easier. The immediate impact of these strategies has
been the further collapse of most local economies and
__________________
3 The government body that oversees the wildlife reserves.
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the deepening impoverishment of most Congolese
families.
The inter-Congolese dialogue and the issue of the
exploitation of resources
55. Regarding the general issue of the illegal
exploitation of natural resources, the Panel was
informed by a variety of sources that repeated attempts
by civil society representatives at the inter-Congolese
dialogue to open discussions on this subject were
thwarted. It was interesting to note that there was a
great reluctance on the part of at least the three major
belligerent parties to discuss the issue. This raises the
question whether those three parties, as well as others,
are implicated in and benefit from the exploitation
activities.
56. At the inter-Congolese dialogue, the Economic
and Finance Committee adopted resolutions on setting
up mechanisms for the review of all commercial
agreements and contracts signed during the current
conflict as well as evaluating the costs of both conflicts
fought since 1996. The review and revision of all
concessions and agreements was one of the Panel’s
previous recommendations, the issue of the cost of the
war being the subject of the Panel’s earlier fact-finding.
Those resolutions reflected the views of most
Congolese. However, certain Congolese officials
expressed the view that only the concessions and
agreements relating to the rebel-held eastern region of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be
reviewed, in accordance with the new mining code. On
the other hand, representatives of civil society
organizations, the private sector and the political
opposition were of the opinion that all the concessions
and agreements signed, whether on the side of the
allies or the rebel groups, should be reviewed or
revised.
The humanitarian tragedy
57. The occupation of large portions of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by the armies of
neighbouring States has caused considerable suffering
among all segments of the population, affecting
farmers, traders, businessmen, public servants,
professionals, men and women of all ages, as well as
children. Military support to the rebel movements and
the use of national armies from neighbouring States to
support the exploitation of resources have resulted in
widespread conflict, indiscriminate arming of large
portions of the population and considerable insecurity.
A minimum of 15 per cent of the population of North
and South Kivu has been displaced over the past 18
months as a result of the conflicts. The economies of
many of the principal urban centres and surrounding
areas have collapsed while rural economic activities
have ceased altogether in many places. Food insecurity
is rampant, unemployment may be as high as 80 to 90
per cent in many areas, reducing both rural and urban
populations to extreme poverty. Acute malnutrition
rates are alarmingly high. While mortality levels vary
greatly from place to place depending on the extent of
conflict and the availability of health services, overall
they are among the highest in the world.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem, Chairman
(Signed) Jim Freedman
(Signed) Mel Holt
(Signed) Bruno Schiemsky
(Signed) Moustapha Tall
(Signed) Gilbert Barthe
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Annex I
Countries visited and representatives of Governments and
organizations interviewed
The Panel wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Government officials,
diplomats, United Nations agencies, donor institutions, non-governmental
organizations, civil society groups, journalists, commercial operators and others
with whom it met and who have assisted in making possible the present report.
The Panel also wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in particular to
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Amos Namanga Ngongi. In addition, the Panel would like to thank the
United Nations Office in Burundi and the UNDP offices in Bangui, Brazzaville,
Bujumbura, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa and Yaounde for their assistance and
support.
Belgium
Government officials
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural
Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Inter-Ministerial Ad Hoc Working Group on the Illegal Exploitation of the
Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
State representatives
European Union
Others
Tantalum Niobium International Study Center
SOGEM mineral trading company (division of Umicore)
Arslanian Frères
International Peace Information Service
Burundi
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mines
Minister of Finance
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of France
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International organizations
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi
Others
ASYST mineral trading company
Affimet gold trading company
Comptoir minier des exploitations du Burundi (COMEBU)
HAMZA mineral trading company
Central African Republic
Government officials
Minister of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics
Minister of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Economy
Ministry of Equipment, Transport and Settlement
Ministry of Finance and Budget
Department of Customs
State representatives
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of France
European Union
International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
ASECNA
UNHCR
UNDP
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Land Affairs, Environment and Tourism
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Vice-Minister of Mines
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Governor of the Central Bank
Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification des matières précieuses
Comité interministériel du Small Scale Mining (CISSCAM)
Régie des voies aériennes
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State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Canada
Ambassador of Germany
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Embassy of Denmark
Embassy of France
Embassy of the United States of America
European Union
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
ECHO
GTZ
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank
World Food Programme
RCD-Goma
Vice-President
Department of Mines and Energy
Vice-Governor of Kisangani
RCD-ML
Second Vice-President
Minister of the Interior
Acting Chief of Staff for APC
Governor of Ituri Province
Mayor of Butembo
Others
Anglican Church
Ashanti Goldfield
Association africaine des droits de l’homme (ASADHO)
Banque internationale de commerce
Centre national d’appui au développement et à la participation populaire
(CENADEP)
Church of Christ of the Congo
Conseil apostolique des laïques catholiques au Congo (CALCC)
Dara Forêt
Exploitation forestière, sciérie raffinage de la papaine (ENRA)
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Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC — Kinshasa, Kisangani, Beni,
Goma, Bukavu)
Groupe Lotus
Groupe musulman des droits de l’homme
Héritiers de la Justice
International Human Rights Law Group
International Rescue Committee
Mayi-Mayi representatives
Medecins sans Frontières (Belgium and France)
Mennonite Church
National Commission of Experts on the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
National Council of Development NGOs
Okimo
Parti démocrate et social chrétien (PDSC)
Peace and Justice Commissions
Pharmakina
Pole Institute
Programme d’appui aux femmes victimes des conflits et des catastrophes
Regional Committee of Development NGOs
SOCEBO
Société civile du Congo (SOCICO)
Société de renforcement de comunauté de base (SERACOB)
Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA)
Solidarité
TOFEN-CONGO
TRAFCO freight company
UDPS (provincial committee of Goma)
UPDF Sector Commander in Bunia
UPDF Battalion Commander in Butembo
UPDF Colonel Peter Karim
Union des banques congolaises
France
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Others
Air France Cargo
Germany
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Others
Karl-Heinz Albers Mining and Minerals Processing
H. C. Starck
Kenya
Government officials
Kenya Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Rwanda
High Commissioner of Uganda
Belgian Ministry of Defence
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
High Commissioner of the Republic of South Africa
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
World Customs Organization
Others
Chairman of the Association of Cargo Airliners
International Crisis Group
Kencargo
Martin Air
Oxfam
World Vision
Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Environment
Ministry of Transport
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Union
International organizations
UNDP
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Rwanda
Government officials
Special Envoy of the President for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Burundi
Office of the President of Rwanda
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Customs Commission
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
European Union
International organizations
MONUC
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
Adolphe Onusumba, President of RCD-Goma
SDV transportation company
Eagles Wings Resources
SOGERMI mineral trading company
Uganda
Government officials
First Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Chief of Staff of UPDF
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry
Bank of Uganda
Department of Geological Survey and Mines
Uganda Bureau of Statistics
Uganda Civil Aviation Authority
Uganda Coffee Development Authority
Uganda Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Denmark
Ambassador of France
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
Head of the delegation of the European Union
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International organizations
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
Amnesty International
Judicial Commission of Inquiry
Uganda Debt Network
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
United States of America
State representatives
Permanent Representatives of Security Council members and other Member
States
International organizations
International Monetary Fund
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict
UNDP
Forum on Forests
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
World Bank
Others
Human Rights Watch
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Annex II
Abbreviations
ALIR Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (Army for the Liberation of
Rwanda)
APC Congolese Patriotic Army (of the RCD-ML rebel group)
ASECNA Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à
Madagascar
coltan columbo-tantalite
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
FAC Forces armées congolaises
ex-FAR former Forces armées rwandaises
FDD Forces pour la défense de la démocratie
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German
Government agency for international cooperation)
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Okimo Office des Mines d’or de Kilo-Moto
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese
Democracy)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
RCD-ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de
libération, initially based in Kisangani, now headquartered in Bunia
RCD-N Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-National
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
SOCEBO Société d’exploitation du bois
UDPS Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
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ANNEX 1.10
United Nations Security Council, Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, document S/2002/1146, 16 October 2002
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United Nations S/2002/1146
Security Council Distr.: General
16 October 2002
English
Original: French
02-62179 (E) 171002 181002
*0262179*
Letter dated 15 October 2002 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council
I have the honour to refer to the statement by the President of the Security
Council dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39), whereby the Security Council
renewed for a period of six months the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Council requested the Panel to submit to it
an interim report after three months, followed by a final report at the end of its
mandate. I refer also to the letter dated 12 July 2002 from the President
(S/2002/763), by which the Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel
until 31 October 2002.
I have the honour to transmit to you the final report of the Panel, which was
submitted to me by its Chairman, Mr. Mahmoud Kassem. This independent report
comprises an evaluation of the situation on the ground and the Panel’s observations
on the illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. I should be grateful if you would bring the report to the attention of the
members of the Security Council.
(Signed) Kofi A. Annan
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Annex
Letter dated 8 October 2002 from the Chairman of the Panel of
Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and
Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
addressed to the Secretary-General
[Original: English]
In accordance with the statement of the President of the Security Council
(S/PRST/2001/39) dated 19 December 2001 and the letter dated 12 July 2002
addressed to you by the President of the Council, the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo is pleased to submit its report for transmission to the
President of the Security Council.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem
Chairman
Panel of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–11 4
II. Change in tactics by elite networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12–21 5
III. Government-controlled area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22–64 7
IV. Rwanda-controlled area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65–96 14
V. Uganda-controlled area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97–131 19
VI. Collaboration of the Panel with the Porter Commission in Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132–138 24
VII. Transit and end-user trade issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139–148 26
VIII. Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149–154 28
IX. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155–160 29
X. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161–188 30
Annexes
I. Companies on which the Panel recommends the placing of financial restrictions
II. Persons for whom the Panel recommends a travel ban and financial restrictions
III. Business enterprises considered by the Panel to be in violation of the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises
IV. Countries visited and representatives of Governments and organizations interviewed
V. Abbreviations
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I. Introduction
1. The Security Council, in a statement by its
President dated 19 December 2001 (S/PRST/2001/39),
requested the Secretary-General to renew for six
months the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the
Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and asked the Panel to submit both an interim
and a final report. The new mandate stipulated that the
reports should include the following:
(a) An update of relevant data and an analysis
of further information from all relevant countries,
including in particular from those which thus far had
not provided the Panel with the requested information;
(b) An evaluation of the possible actions that
could be taken by the Council, including those
recommended by the Panel in its report (S/2001/357)
and the addendum thereto (S/2001/1072), in order to
help bring to an end the plundering of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
taking into account the impact of such actions on the
financing of the conflict and their potential impact on
the humanitarian and economic situation of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo;
(c) Recommendations on specific actions that
the international community, in support of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
might take, working through existing international
organizations, mechanisms and United Nations bodies,
to address the issues in the report and its addendum;
(d) Recommendations on possible steps that
might be taken by transit countries as well as end-users
to contribute to ending illegal exploitation of the
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
2. The Security Council also stressed the importance
of the Panel’s maintaining a high level of collaboration
with all the Congolese players, governmental as well as
non-governmental, throughout the national territory.
3. The Panel submitted to the Security Council an
interim report (S/2002/565) on 22 May 2002. At the
request of the Council, the Panel responded in writing
to questions and comments from Council members
regarding the interim report and the Panel’s ongoing
work. Prior to presenting its interim report, and at the
request of the head of the Security Council mission to
the Great Lakes region, the Panel travelled to Pretoria
on 28 April to brief the mission’s members.
4. To orient its work under the current mandate, the
Panel developed two successive plans of action, which
were transmitted to the Council. Under these plans,
fact-finding focused on diamonds, gold, coltan, copper,
cobalt, timber, wildlife reserves, fiscal resources and
trade in general.
5. The Panel determined that a central focus of its
work should be gathering information about politically
and economically powerful groups involved in the
exploitation activities, which are often highly
criminalized. As a result, the Panel developed the
central concept of the elite network (outlined in section
II) as an operational thesis.
6. In organizing its investigations, the Panel divided
the Democratic Republic of the Congo into three areas,
namely, the Government-controlled area, the Rwandacontrolled
area and the Uganda-controlled area. These
descriptors are based on the identity of the actors that
constitute the three principal networks involved in the
exploitation. The Panel also concluded that each of
these three areas, while conforming to the Panel’s
understanding of the elite networks, featured
substantive variations.
7. The Panel obtained information from a wide
variety of sources, including from Governments
(civilian and military representatives),
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
organizations, businesses and private individuals.
Owing to the nature of its mandate, gaining access to
information has been difficult. Nevertheless, the Panel
collected well-substantiated and independently
corroborated information from multiple sources. These
knowledgeable sources provided documents
and/or eye-witness observations. It is this type of
information — consisting mostly of documentary
evidence — that the Panel has relied on its report.
8. The Panel has operated under a reasonable
standard of proof, without recourse to judicial authority
to subpoena testimony or documents. It obtains
information from sources on a strictly voluntary basis.
Furthermore, the Panel has made every effort to fairly
and objectively evaluate the information it has
gathered.
9. Throughout its work, the Panel has paid close
attention to the evolution of the peace process in the
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Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as that in
neighbouring Burundi. The Lusaka Ceasefire
Agreement of 1999 and the Arusha Agreement on
Peace and Reconciliation, of 2000, served as important
points of reference for its work. The Sun City, Pretoria
and Luanda Agreements have also informed the Panel’s
work.
10. The Panel was composed as follows:
Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem (Egypt),
Chairman
Jim Freedman (Canada)
Mel Holt (United States of America)
Bruno Schiemsky (Belgium)
Moustapha Tall (Senegal).
11. Two part-time technical advisers, Gilbert Barthe
(Switzerland) and Patrick Smith (United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland), also served with
the Panel. In addition, two political officers, an
administrator and a secretary assisted the Panel.
II. Change in tactics by elite networks
12. The regional conflict that drew the armies of
seven African States into the Democratic Republic of
the Congo has diminished in intensity, but the
overlapping microconflicts that it provoked continue.
These conflicts are fought over minerals, farm produce,
land and even tax revenues. Criminal groups linked to
the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
have benefited from the microconflicts. Those groups
will not disband voluntarily even as the foreign
military forces continue their withdrawals. They have
built up a self-financing war economy centred on
mineral exploitation.
13. Facilitated by South Africa and Angola, the
Pretoria and Luanda Agreements have prompted the
recent troop withdrawals from the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Welcome as they may be, these
withdrawals are unlikely to alter the determination of
Rwanda and Zimbabwe, and Ugandan individuals, to
exercise economic control over portions of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The departure of
their forces will do little to reduce economic control, or
the means of achieving it, since the use of national
armies is only one among many means for exercising
it. All three countries have anticipated the day when
pressure from the international community would make
it impossible to maintain large forces in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The Governments of Rwanda
and Zimbabwe, as well as powerful individuals in
Uganda, have adopted other strategies for maintaining
the mechanisms for revenue generation, many of which
involve criminal activities, once their troops have
departed.
14. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces continue to
provoke ethnic conflict, as in the past, clearly
cognizant that the unrest in Ituri will require the
continuing presence of a minimum of UPDF personnel.
The Panel has evidence that high-ranking UPDF
officers have taken steps to train local militia to serve
as a paramilitary force, directly and discreetly under
UPDF command, which will be capable of performing
the same functions as UPDF. There will be little change
in the control that Ugandans now exercise over trade
flows and economic resources. As UPDF continue to
arm local groups, only less conspicuously than before,
the departure of Ugandan armed forces is unlikely to
alter economic activities by those powerful individuals
in the north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
15. Like UPDF, and under pressure from its closest
allies, Rwanda has started withdrawing. It has prepared
for withdrawal by putting in place economic control
mechanisms that do not rely on an explicit presence of
the Rwandan Patriotic Army. It has replaced Congolese
directors of parastatals with businessmen from Kigali
to ensure continuing revenue from water, power and
transportation facilities. It has replaced local currency
with Rwandan currency. RPA battalions that specialize
in mining activities remain in place, though they have
ceased wearing RPA uniforms and will continue the
activities under a commercial guise. The Panel’s
sources have reported that RPA recently undertook an
operation to obtain a large number of Congolese
passports so as to give an appropriate identity to RPA
officers who continue to be stationed at strategically
important sites in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
16. The Panel has learned of other tactics for
disguising the continuing presence of an armed force
loyal to Rwanda. Reliable sources have reported an
initiative by the Chief of Staff of the Armée nationale
congolaise, Major Sylvain Mbuki, to reorganize the
RCD-Goma forces in order to accommodate large
numbers of RPA soldiers inside ANC units and local
defence forces made up of pro-Rwanda elements. Most
of the ANC units have had RPA leadership for some
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time, and now, with this reorganization, a significant
number of RPA soldiers will be integrated into the
ANC rank and file. Instead of departing for Rwanda,
large numbers of Rwandan Hutus serving in RPA have
been provided with new uniforms and assigned to ANC
brigades as Congolese Hutu. Rwanda has diverted
attention from those soldiers staying in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo by drawing particular attention
to those who depart. Ceremonies have been held at
points of re-entry. In fact, the number of soldiers who
have left the Democratic Republic of the Congo is so
far only a portion of the total number of RPA troops in
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, which
various sources estimate at between 35,000 and 50,000.
Simultaneously with the RPA troop withdrawals,
Rwandan officials have repatriated to North Kivu
thousands of Congolese Tutsi refugees under duress
from the camps around Byumba and Kibuye Provinces
in Rwanda. Schools in the Rwandan camps have
remained closed and some camp structures have been
razed to encourage further repatriations. All the Panel’s
sources have also suggested that this movement could
be part of the new tactic for maintaining Rwanda’s
presence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
17. Although troops of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces
have been a major guarantor of the security of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
against regional rivals, its senior officers have enriched
themselves from the country’s mineral assets under the
pretext of arrangements set up to repay Zimbabwe for
military services. Now ZDF is establishing new
companies and contractual arrangements to defend its
economic interests in the longer term should there be a
complete withdrawal of ZDF troops. New trade and
service agreements were signed between the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe just
prior to the announced withdrawal of ZDF troops from
the diamond centre of Mbuji Mayi late in August 2002.
18. Towards the end of its mandate, the Panel
received a copy of a memorandum dated August 2002
from the Defence Minister, Sidney Sekeramayi, to
President Robert Mugabe, proposing that a joint
Zimbabwe-Democratic Republic of the Congo
company be set up in Mauritius to disguise the
continuing economic interests of ZDF in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The memorandum
states: “Your Excellency would be aware of the wave
of negative publicity and criticism that the DRCZimbabwe
joint ventures have attracted, which tends to
inform the current United Nations Panel investigations
into our commercial activities.” It also refers to plans
to set up a private Zimbabwean military company to
guard Zimbabwe’s economic investments in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo after the planned
withdrawal of ZDF troops. It states that this company
was formed to operate alongside a new military
company owned by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
19. At the same time, local militias and local
politicians have supplemented the role that State
armies previously played in ensuring access to and
control of valuable resources and diverting State
revenue. The looting that was previously conducted by
the armies themselves has been replaced with
organized systems of embezzlement, tax fraud,
extortion, the use of stock options as kickbacks and
diversion of State funds conducted by groups that
closely resemble criminal organizations.
20. Such activities have become increasingly
prominent in the techniques of exploitation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Panel has
identified three distinct groups engaged in activities in
three different areas and refers to them as elite
networks. These elite networks have control over a
range of commercial activities involving the
exploitation of natural resources, diversion of taxes and
other revenue generation activities in the three separate
areas controlled by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda,
respectively.
21. The Panel has identified the following elements
that are common to all of the elite networks and that
are essential to understanding the nature of the
exploitation carried out by these networks in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo:
• The networks consist of a small core of political
and military elites and business persons and, in
the case of the occupied areas, selected rebel
leaders and administrators. Some members of the
elite networks occupy key positions in their
respective Governments or rebel groups.
• Members of these networks cooperate to generate
revenue and, in the case of Rwanda, institutional
financial gain.
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• The elite networks ensure the viability of their
economic activities through control over the
military and other security forces that they use to
intimidate, threaten violence or carry out selected
acts of violence.
• The networks monopolize production, commerce
and fiscal functions.
• The elite networks maintain the facade of rebel
administrations in the occupied areas to generate
public revenues that they then divert into the
networks, thereby depleting the public treasury.
• The elite networks derive financial benefit
through a variety of criminal activities including
theft, embezzlement and diversion of “public”
funds, undervaluation of goods, smuggling, false
invoicing, non-payment of taxes, kickbacks to
public officials and bribery.
• The elite networks form business companies or
joint ventures that are fronts through which
members of the networks carry on their respective
commercial activities.
• The elite networks draw support for their
economic activities through the networks and
“services” (air transport, illegal arms dealing and
transactions involving the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo) of organized
or transnational criminal groups.
III. Government-controlled area
22. The elite network of Congolese and Zimbabwean
political, military and commercial interests seeks to
maintain its grip on the main mineral resources —
diamonds, cobalt, copper, germanium — of the
Government-controlled area. This network has
transferred ownership of at least US$ 5 billion of assets
from the State mining sector to private companies
under its control in the past three years with no
compensation or benefit for the State treasury of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
23. This network benefits from instability in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Its representatives
in the Kinshasa Government and the Zimbabwe
Defence Forces have fuelled instability by supporting
armed groups opposing Rwanda and Burundi.
24. Even if present moves towards peace lead to a
complete withdrawal of Zimbabwean forces, the
network’s grip on the richest mineral assets of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and related
businesses will remain. Zimbabwe’s political-military
elite signed six major trade and service agreements in
August 2002 with the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Reliable sources have told the
Panel about plans to set up new holding companies to
disguise the continuing ZDF commercial operations in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and a ZDFcontrolled
private military company to be deployed in
the country to guard those assets.
The elite network
25. The elite network in the Government-held area
comprises three circles of power, namely, Congolese
and Zimbabwean government officials and private
businessmen. Chief figures in the Congolese branch of
the network are the National Security Minister,
Mwenze Kongolo, a shareholder and deal-broker for
both diamond and cobalt ventures; the Minister of
Presidency and Portfolio, Augustin Katumba Mwanke,
a former employee of Bateman’s mining company in
South Africa and a key power broker in mining and
diplomatic deals; the President of the State diamond
company, Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA), Jean-
Charles Okoto; the Planning Minister and former
Deputy Defence Minister, General Denis Kalume
Numbi, a stakeholder in the lucrative Sengamines
diamond deal and in COSLEG; and the Director
General of Gécamines, Yumba Monga, pivotal in
facilitating several asset-stripping joint ventures
between the State mining company and private
companies.
26. The Congolese branch also includes active, but
less visible members. Frédéric Tshineu Kabasele is a
director of three joint ventures with Zimbabwe using
the COSLEG platform — the diamond trading
Minerals Business Company, the logging company
SOCEBO and the First Banking Corporation Congo.
The Director of the National Intelligence Agency,
Didier Kazadi Nyembwe, has oversight of many of the
private commercial operations and has been linked by
several sources to arms supplies for Burundi opposition
groups and Mayi-Mayi groups in Maniema and South
Kivu. COSLEG, a Congo-Zimbabwe joint stock
company, remains a key vehicle for military-backed
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commerce involving mostly diamonds, banking and
timber in the Government-held areas. The Technical
Director of COSLEG, Mfuni Kazadi, specializes in the
writing of joint venture contracts to accommodate the
private interests of the elite network.
27. The key strategist for the Zimbabwean branch of
the elite network is the Speaker of the Parliament and
former National Security Minister, Emmerson
Dambudzo Mnangagwa. Mr. Mnangagwa has won
strong support from senior military and intelligence
officers for an aggressive policy in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. His key ally is a Commander of
ZDF and Executive Chairman of COSLEG, General
Vitalis Musunga Gava Zvinavashe. The General and
his family have been involved in diamond trading and
supply contracts in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. A long-time ally of President Mugabe, Air
Marshal Perence Shiri, has been involved in military
procurement and organizing air support for the pro-
Kinshasa armed groups fighting in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is also part of
the inner circle of ZDF diamond traders who have
turned Harare into a significant illicit diamond-trading
centre.
28. Other prominent Zimbabwean members of the
network include Brigadier General Sibusiso Busi
Moyo, who is Director General of COSLEG. Brigadier
Moyo advised both Tremalt and Oryx Natural
Resources, which represented covert Zimbabwean
military financial interests in negotiations with State
mining companies of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Air Commodore Mike Tichafa Karakadzai is
Deputy Secretary of COSLEG, directing policy and
procurement. He played a key role in arranging the
Tremalt cobalt and copper deal. Colonel Simpson
Sikhulile Nyathi is Director of defence policy for
COSLEG. The Minister of Defence and former
Security Minister, Sidney Sekeramayi, coordinates with
the military leadership and is a shareholder in
COSLEG. The Panel has a copy of a letter from Mr.
Sekeramayi thanking the Chief Executive of Oryx
Natural Resources, Thamer Bin Said Ahmed Al-
Shanfari, for his material and moral support during the
parliamentary elections of 2000. Such contributions
violate Zimbabwean law.
29. In June 2002, the Panel learned of a secret new
ZDF diamond mining operation in Kalobo in Kasai
Occidental run by Dube Associates. This company is
linked, according to banking documents, through
Colonel Tshinga Dube of Zimbabwe Defence Industries
to the Ukrainian diamond and arms dealer Leonid
Minim, who currently faces smuggling charges in Italy.
The diamond mining operations have been conducted
in great secrecy.
30. Among the businessmen in the elite network, a
Belgian national, George Forrest, pioneered the
exploitative joint venture agreements between private
companies and Gécamines. Mr. Forrest owes his
commercial ascendancy to his long-standing ties to the
establishment in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. One of his companies also makes and markets
military equipment. Since 1994, he has owned 100 per
cent of New Lachaussée in Belgium, which is a leading
manufacturer of cartridge casings, grenades, light
weapons and cannon launchers. In a flagrant conflict of
interest, Mr. Forrest was appointed Chairman of
Gécamines from November 1999 to August 2001 while
his private companies negotiated new contracts with
the explicit intention of using Gécamines’ assets for
personal gain. During that time he built up the most
wide-ranging private mining portfolio in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. He benefits from
strong backing from some political quarters in Belgium
where some of his companies are based. His operations
have been strongly criticized (one Belgian diplomatic
cable referred to Mr. Forrest running a “strategy of
attrition” in the mining sector of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo) and have recently come under
the scrutiny of the Belgian Senate’s investigation into
resource exploitation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
31. The techniques used by Mr. Forrest have since
been replicated by Zimbabwean-backed entrepreneurs
John Arnold Bredenkamp and Mr. Al-Shanfari. Mr.
Bredenkamp, who has an estimated personal net worth
of over $500 million, is experienced in setting up
clandestine companies and sanctions-busting
operations. Mr. Al-Shanfari has gained privileged
access to the Government of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and its diamond concessions in exchange
for raising capital from some powerful entrepreneurs in
the Gulf such as Issa al-Kawari who manages the
fortune of the deposed Amir of Qatar. Also working
with ZDF is a convicted criminal based in South
Africa, Nico Shefer, who has arranged for Zimbabwean
officers to be trained in diamond valuation in
Johannesburg. Mr. Shefer’s company, Tandan
Holdings, has a 50 per cent stake in Thorntree
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Industries, a joint venture diamond-trading company
with ZDF.
32. Zimbabwean Billy Rautenbach headed a joint
venture cobalt-mining company and was Chief
Executive of Gécamines from November 1998 to
March 2000. Although stripped of his cobalt
concessions in Katanga, Mr. Rautenbach told the Panel
that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo had offered his company, Ridgepointe
International, mining rights to Gécamines concessions
at Shinkolobwe, which include substantial deposits of
uranium, copper and cobalt. Mr. Rautenbach’s
representatives said that any new agreement would be
subject to the new mining code of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and any uranium mining
operations would be open to inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
33. Such high levels of mineral exploitation would be
impossible without the collusion of highly placed
government officials who provide mining licences and
export permits in return for private gain. The Panel has
compiled extensive documentation of such
facilitations. For example, in its attempts to buy rights
to the Kolwezi Tailings, First Quantum Minerals
(FQM) of Canada offered a down payment to the State
of $100 million, cash payments and shares held in trust
for Government officials. According to documents in
the possession of the Panel, the payments list included
the National Security Minister, Mwenze Kongolo; the
Director of the National Intelligence Agency, Didier
Kazadi Nyembwe; the Director General of Gécamines,
Yumba Monga; and the former Minister of the
Presidency, Pierre-Victor Mpoyo. The FQM share offer
to those officials was premised on a sharp rise in its
share price once it was announced that it had secured
some of the most valuable mineral concessions in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
34. The Panel has documents showing that three
“clans” of Lebanese origin, who operate licensed
diamond businesses in Antwerp, purchased diamonds
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo worth
$150 million in 2001, either directly through Kinshasa
or through comptoirs in the Republic of the Congo. The
three “clans” — Ahmad, Nassour and Khanafer — are
distinct criminal organizations that operate
internationally. Their activities, known to intelligence
services and police organizations, include
counterfeiting, money-laundering and diamond
smuggling. Several credible sources have reported that
the clans also have ties with Amal and Hezbollah.
Some businesses associated with the clans are Sierra
Gem Diamonds, Asa Diam, Triple A Diamonds and
Echogem. A group linked to the clans operations is
providing counterfeit United States dollars to former
generals from the time of President Mobutu, who are
trying to overthrow the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Strategies and sources of revenue
35. The Panel has identified five strategies for
generating revenues for the elite network through
diamond, copper and cobalt mining companies. The
network coordinates its operations between its
political, military and business wings to generate
maximum income.
Asset stripping of State mining companies
36. The richest and most readily exploitable of the
publicly owned mineral assets of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo are being moved into joint
ventures that are controlled by the network’s private
companies. These transactions, which are controlled
through secret contracts and off-shore private
companies, amount to a multi-billion-dollar corporate
theft of the country’s mineral assets. Some 30
businessmen, politicians and military officers are the
main beneficiaries of the arrangements. The elite
network has been trying to legitimize such corporate
theft and market these assets to legitimate international
mining companies.
37. The Panel has now obtained documentary
evidence that Mr. Al-Shanfari’s company, Oryx Natural
Resources, is being used as a front for ZDF and its
military company OSLEG. Sengamines claims an 800
square kilometre concession, just south of Mbuji Mayi,
carved out of the concession of the Société Minière de
Bakwanga. According to company officials,
Sengamines’ diamond concessions would be worth at
least $2 billion if they were put into full production.
38. Sengamines claimed that it had reconfigured its
equity after a failed attempt to be listed on the London
Stock Exchange in June 2000, as follows: 49 per cent
for Oryx Natural Resources, 35 per cent for COMIEXCongo,
and 16 per cent for MIBA. The Panel has
learned that this purported buyout never happened. It
was a device to disguise the close association between
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Sengamines and ZDF, and to deceive international
investors. ZDF, through OSLEG, owns the 49 per cent
of Sengamines that is publicly claimed by Oryx. In the
course of a meeting held on 1 August 2000, OSLEG
nominated Oryx to hold its 49 per cent interest in
Sengamines; 35 per cent is held by COMIEX-Congo,
and 16 per cent has been allocated to MIBA.
39. Tremalt Ltd., represented by Mr. Bredenkamp,
holds the rights to exploit six Gécamines concessions
containing over 2.7 million tons of copper and 325,000
tons of cobalt over 25 years. Tremalt paid the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
just $400,000, but the estimated worth of the six
concessions exceeds $1 billion. The joint venture
running the concession is the Kababankola Mining
Company, in which Tremalt has an 80 per cent share to
Gécamines’ 20 per cent. Under this agreement, the
Panel has learned that Gécamines derives no direct
financial benefit. Although Tremalt representatives told
the Panel that they have invested $15 million to date,
there are no signs of substantial investments having
been made on the concessions, nor has any schedule of
investment in the form of a business plan been released
to Gécamines.
40. Like Oryx, Tremalt insists that its operations are
not linked to ZDF or the Government of Zimbabwe.
However, the Panel has obtained a copy of the
confidential profit-sharing agreement, under which
Tremalt retains 32 per cent of net profits, and
undertakes to pay 34 per cent of net profits to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and 34 per cent to
Zimbabwe. This profit-sharing agreement was the
subject of a confidential memorandum from the
Defence Minister, Mr. Sekeramayi, to President
Mugabe in August 2002. Tremalt also undertakes to
provide the Congolese and Zimbabwean militaries with
motor vehicles, trucks, buses and cash payments as
necessary. These are to be subtracted from the two
countries’ part of the profit share. A forum has been
established between Tremalt and ZDF to plan strategy
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and “look
after the interests of the Zimbabweans”. Meeting
monthly, the forum’s main members are General
Zvinavashe, Brigadier Moyo, Air Commodore
Karakadzai, Mr. Bredenkamp, the Managing Director
of KMC, Colin Blythe-Wood, and the Director of
KMC, Gary Webster.
41. Gécamines officials told the Panel that the
National Security Minister of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Mwenze Kongolo had pressured their
negotiators to agree to the joint venture contract
despite its negative implications for the State
company’s finances. The ultimate owners and
beneficiaries of Tremalt are hidden behind a web of
trusts and private holding companies registered in the
British Virgin Islands and the Isle of Man to whose
records the Panel was not allowed direct access.
Control of procurement and accounting
42. Management control is essential to the elite
network’s strategy for extracting maximum revenue
from the joint ventures. Much of the revenue from the
joint ventures is off the balance sheet in overpriced
subcontracting and procurement arrangements with
companies and individuals linked to the network. The
two biggest Zimbabwe-Democratic Republic of the
Congo joint ventures — Sengamines and KMC — are
declaring huge losses.
Enterprise General Malta Forrest and Groupe
George Forrest
43. Groupe George Forrest (GGF) in partnership with
the United States-based OM Group currently runs one
of the most profitable mining operations from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo with only the most
marginal benefit for the State mining company,
Gécamines. Through this venture, the Scories du Terril
de Lubumbashi (STL), also known as the Big Hill
Project, Mr. Forrest and OM Group have secured
access to a copper and cobalt stockpile which contains
over 3,000 tons of germanium, a rare metal used in
optical fibres, infrared lenses and telecommunication
satellites. This stockpile, formerly the property of
Gécamines, has a current market value of more than $2
billion. Although the shareholdings for the STL project
are divided between OM Group (55 per cent), GGF (25
per cent) and Gécamines (20 per cent), the State
company has been expressly excluded from the
revenues derived from the germanium processing.
44. Gécamines officials complain that OM Group and
GGF have deliberately ignored the agreed technical
plan for the STL project, which provided for two
electric-powered refineries and a converter to be built
adjacent to the copper and cobalt stockpile. This would
have meant that all the germanium would have been
processed within the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Gécamines would have been entitled to a
revenue share. Instead the semi-processed ore is
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shipped to OM Group’s plant in Finland where the
germanium is extracted. The former Chairman of
Gécamines, Mr. Forrest, whose construction companies
built the STL project, has declined to intervene on
behalf of the State company. Gécamines has rejected an
offer by OM Group to cede the State company just 5
per cent of the revenues from the germanium
processing in Finland.
45. Mr. Forrest has used his position in the elite
network in an attempt to control the mining sector in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to
several reliable sources. For example, the Kinross Gold
Corporation of Canada had sought to invest up to $1
billion in copper and cobalt mining operations, but was
thwarted by interventions from Mr. Forrest and senior
Government officials. The company returned to the
Democratic Republic of the Congo late in 2001 as part
of Kinross-Forrest Ltd., a company registered in the
British Virgin Islands. A smaller Belgian-based
company, Madsa, obtained the support of the World
Bank and the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization for a $20 million development package to
build processing plants to service the mining sector: a
smelter, an acid manufacturing plant and a cement
factory. Mr. Forrest and his business allies have
opposed this development, in part, it seems, because it
would cut their profits from the current overpriced
procurement contracts.
Tremalt Ltd. (John Bredenkamp)
46. Tremalt’s 80 per cent stake in KMC gives it
management control over day-to-day administration
and longer-term strategic decisions about exploiting the
concession. Tremalt also procures equipment for ZDF
and the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the cost of
which it deducts from their share of KMC profits.
Although Ridgepointe International, run by Mr.
Rautenbach, the previous foreign investor in the
Kababankola concessions, had to operate with much
more dilapidated processing plants, it generated more
than $20 million profit within 18 months of taking
over. Industry analysts say that Tremalt’s claimed
losses of more than $13 million from February 2001 to
July 2002 are not credible.
Organized theft
47. FAC and ZDF officers who controlled security at
the main joint venture sites have been involved in and
facilitate high levels of theft from production. Reliable
sources have informed the Panel that managers in
several companies, with support from the members of
the elite network, collude in these thefts.
48. The State-owned Société minière de Bakwanga
diamond company has been plundered by a
management that condones widespread theft by
company insiders. Three theft rings operate in the
MIBA compound known as the polygone. The first of
these rings was organized and operated by 48
Zimbabwean soldiers who had been stationed at five
different locations throughout the large mining site.
Zimbabwe military personnel allow groups of people to
enter the polygone and dig for diamonds, and in
exchange receive compensation in the form of money
and diamonds.
49. A second theft ring is operated by the Brigade
Minière or provincial mining police, who are trained to
guard the mine. Previously sacked for theft, Brigade
Minière Commander Mushitu has returned to the force.
In exchange for protection, the Commander receives
sacks of diamond-rich gravel. However, the diamond
diggers are often caught in exchanges of fire between
the Brigade Minière and the Zimbabweans in their
efforts to control the diamond thefts.
50. These losses are probably modest compared to
the losses from a third theft ring that involves highlevel
MIBA managers and occurs inside the cleaning,
sorting and classification operation facility. The thefts
include gem and near-gem production. About 50 per
cent of all company revenues are generated by the 3 to
4 per cent of gem and near-gem production. The drop
in revenues resulting from theft has been estimated at
about 25 per cent of total revenue, roughly 25 million
dollars per annum. Under pressure from its creditors,
MIBA was obliged to engage the services of a private
security firm, Overseas Security Services, which
determined that a criminal syndicate was operating
inside the classification operation.
Using the corporate facade as a cover for
criminal activities
51. Some members of the elite network running joint
ventures are linked to the smuggling of precious metals
and gems, arms trafficking, illegal foreign exchange
trading and money-laundering. The Panel has received
extensive documentation and first-hand testimony
explaining the mechanics of these criminal operations.
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52. Sengamines supplements its revenues by
laundering diamonds smuggled from Angola and Sierra
Leone. Sengamines also smuggles its own diamonds
out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
Panel has learned of specific instances, times, places
and persons involved. For example, in March 2001, Mr.
Al-Shanfari instructed his security chief to smuggle
diamonds from the Sengamines concession to
Johannesburg, South Africa, and deliver them to Ken
Roberts, the chief executive of Serengeti Diamonds.
53. Sengamines has also served as a front for illegal
foreign exchange transactions using several routes into
and out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most
of the latter involved breaking the country’s foreign
exchange laws and profiting from arbitrage between
differential exchange rates for the United States dollar
and Congolese franc in Kinshasa and the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, respectively. In one
example, on 13 March 2000, Oryx officials in Kinshasa
loaded an aircraft belonging to Mr. Bredenkamp with
eight crates of Congolese francs for shipment to
Harare. The Panel also has documentation
substantiating information that an Oryx employee
regularly transported parcels of United States dollars
($500,000 at a time) that were withdrawn from
the Oryx account at Hambros Bank, London, to
Kinshasa without declaring them to the Congolese
authorities; at Kinshasa the money was changed into
Congolese francs and further transported to Harare
and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Oryx employees said they were asked to pay
Mr. Mnangagwa a commission on these transactions
which contravened Zimbabwe law. Despite repeated
claims by Mr. Bredenkamp’s representatives that he has
no business relationship with Mr. Al-Shanfari,
the Panel has received a document — dated January
2001 and jointly signed by Mr. Bredenkamp and
Mr. Al-Shanfari — guaranteeing a $1.5 million loan to
Oryx Natural Resources from Python Services Ltd.
Mining revenues and the military
54. The procurement of military equipment and
services is a major source of revenue for the elite
network. Several joint venture mining companies have
strong links with the military supply companies who
facilitate their operations in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. The Panel has information that diamond
revenues were used to pay for arms purchases for FAC
and indirectly used to finance the contribution of the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
to salary payments for ZDF. It has received a document
recording a transfer of MIBA funds requested by
Brigadier General François Olenga for the purchase of
weapons for FAC.
55. Oryx Natural Resources has a close working
relationship with Avient Air, a military company which
supplies services and equipment to ZDF and FAC. In
April 2002, Avient Air brokered the sale of six attack
helicopters to the Kinshasa Government. Bank records
show several transactions between Avient and accused
trafficker Leonid Minim. Under the management of
Andrew Smith, a former British army captain, Gerry
O’Brien and Lewis Kling, Avient was contracted to
organize bombing raids into the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo in 1999 and 2000. At the same
time Avient organized logistics and transportation of
mining equipment for Sengamines and enjoyed security
clearance as a military company working with ZDF.
The Panel has a record of a payment in September
2001 of $35,000 from the Oryx account at Banque
Belgolaise to Avient Ltd., Avient Air’s sister company
based in the United Kingdom.
56. John Bredenkamp, who has a history of
clandestine military procurement, has an investment in
Aviation Consultancy Services Company (ACS). The
Panel has confirmed, independently of Mr.
Bredenkamp, that this company represents British
Aerospace, Dornier of France and Agusta of Italy in
Africa. Far from being a passive investor in ACS as
Tremalt representatives claimed, Mr. Bredenkamp
actively seeks business using high-level political
contacts. In discussions with senior officials he has
offered to mediate sales of British Aerospace military
equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Mr. Bredenkamp’s representatives claimed that his
companies observed European Union sanctions on
Zimbabwe, but British Aerospace spare parts for ZDF
Hawk jets were supplied early in 2002 in breach of
those sanctions. Mr. Bredenkamp also controls
Raceview Enterprises, which supplies logistics to ZDF.
The Panel has obtained copies of Raceview invoices to
ZDF dated 6 July 2001 for deliveries worth
$3.5 million of camouflage cloth, batteries, fuels and
lubricating oil, boots and rations. It also has copies of
invoices for aircraft spares for the Air Force of
Zimbabwe worth another $3 million.
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Case study of a commercial chain involving
diamonds
57. The Democratic Republic of the Congo-
Zimbabwe joint venture Minerals Business Company
represents Zimbabwe’s interests in the lucrative
diamond trade of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. It buys and markets production from the joint
venture Sengamines, which has attempted to conceal its
links with ZDF. The Minerals Business Company uses
Zimbabwe’s military and political influence to evade
the legal requirements of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and to avoid paying the costly licensing
fees. The refusal of MBC to honour its obligations to
the public treasury has prompted official complaints
from the Ministry of Mines demanding that MBC
comply with the law. MBC officials have asserted that
Zimbabwean entities are not obliged to adhere to the
laws of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
58. The Minerals Business Company allows a limited
number of other diamond companies to take advantage
of the privileged status it enjoys in Kinshasa. Sandrian
Mining, based in Kinshasa, has a contractual
relationship with MBC. Thorntree Industries, a joint
venture between South Africa-based Nico Shefer’s
Tandan group and ZDF, also has contracts with MBC,
as does Mixen Trading, which has offices in
Zimbabwe. MBC sells to the United States-based
Flashes of Color, and the Swiss-registered Ibryn &
Associates, as well as to the Belgian-registered Jewel
Impex, Komal Gems and Diagem. One of the most
important trading partners of MBC is the Belgianbased
company Abadiam, which buys from MBC as
well as directly from Sengamines. The Panel has bank
records dated September 2001 showing transfers of
more than $1 million from the Belgian account of Oryx
Natural Resources to Abadiam.
Collapse of the public sector; armed
conflict and its humanitarian
consequences
Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental
59. The diversion of funds from State companies and
public coffers, by fraud or under the pretext of effort de
guerre, has contributed to eliminating funds available
for public services. The public sector in the two Kasai
Provinces has effectively disappeared. Of the five
water production plants in Kasai Oriental, four plants
no longer function and the fifth, in the city of Mbuji
Mayi, is said to function at less than 20 per cent
capacity. Of the six water production plants in Kasai
Occidental, five no longer function; the sixth, in the
city of Kananga, operates at best at 10 per cent
capacity.
60. Government officials blame the precipitous
decline in public spending on the war. Most soldiers
are unpaid and become social predators, financing
themselves through theft and pillage, living off the
population they are presumed to protect, and provincial
governments make little effort to discourage them.
Taxes and licensing fees have nevertheless increased,
as have the forced acquisition of the resources of State
enterprises in the name of the war effort. The
Government has therefore benefited from the state of
war by using it as a pretext, not only to justify an
increase in demands on the population to increase
government revenues, but also to justify a decrease in
expenditure. Insecurity in the Government-controlled
area is only a small part of the consequences of support
for the military in war. It is much more a consequence
of the deliberate neglect of the military, who by virtue
of this neglect turn their weapons on the population.
61. The pretext of war, increased government levies,
unpaid salaries and the absence of government services
have combined to precipitate a collapse in the urban
economies of Mbuji Mayi, Kananga and, to a lesser
extent, of Lubumbashi. Banks no longer offer credit in
the Kasai Provinces. The absence of local credit and
the decline of road transport have forced most local
industries in Kananga to close.
Katanga
62. Lubumbashi, and southern Katanga generally,
have been affected by Rwanda’s presence in the north.
The occupation by RPA of the northern portion of
Katanga, the rich agricultural plains around Nyunzu
and Kongolo, has cut the southern portion off from
what was once the breadbasket of Katanga.
63. A recent study by Médecins sans Frontières in
Kilwa, a representative town in southern Katanga south
of the front line, with a population of 350,000, has
found a death rate for children under 5 of 3.2 per
10,000 per day. Over the course of a year this means
that 12 per cent of all children under 5 years old will
die, and one out of every four children die over a
period of two years. Notably, virtually none (0.6 per
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cent) of the deaths resulted from violence. Deaths
instead result from illness — malaria and dysentery:
conditions closely linked to malnutrition and the
absence of medical facilities.
64. Malaria and dysentery are treatable. International
non-governmental organizations — World Vision and
Médecins sans Frontières in this case — try to step in
where government facilities no longer function.
However, the soaring death rates in the Governmentheld
areas around Ankoro, Kilwa, Dubie and Lwanza,
especially where medical facilities are non-existent and
where State medical professionals receive no salaries,
are indications of Government negligence. The rates of
malnutrition and mortality are measures of that
negligence and are the consequence, in part, of
diverting State resources from State companies such as
Gécamines into the private accounts of Zimbabwean
individuals, other private interests, and Congolese
individuals.
IV. Rwanda-controlled area
65. The claims of Rwanda concerning its security
have justified the continuing presence of its armed
forces, whose real long-term purpose is, to use the term
employed by the Congo Desk of the Rwandan Patriotic
Army, to “secure property”. Rwanda’s leaders have
succeeded in persuading the international community
that their military presence in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo protects the country against
hostile groups in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, who, they claim, are actively mounting an
invasion against them.
66. The Panel has extensive evidence to the contrary.
For example, the Panel is in possession of a letter,
dated 26 May 2000, from Jean-Pierre Ondekane, First
Vice-President and Chief of the Military High
Command for RCD-Goma, urging all army units to
maintain good relations “with our Interahamwe and
Mayi-Mayi brothers”, and further, “if necessary to let
them exploit the sub-soil for their survival”.
67. Prominent members of a Congolese Hutu group,
Benemugabohumwe, recently began to encourage
Hutus living in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
some of them opposition groups, to work instead for
the cause of Rwanda in the country. Eugene Serufuli,
RCD-Goma Governor of North Kivu Province and
reportedly himself a Hutu, has promoted a nongovernmental
organization, Tous pour la paix et la
démocratie, aiming to conscript Hutus of all political
persuasions to throw in their lot with the Rwandans.
Their purpose, as described by the Nord Kivu Reveil in
a circular dated 16 April 2002, has been to “express
allegiance to Rwanda by joining its efforts to control
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo”.
68. A 30-year-old Interahamwe combatant living in
the area of Bukavu described the situation in a taped
interview with a United Nations officer in early 2002.
We haven’t fought much with the RPA in
the last two years. We think they are tired of this
war, like we are. In any case, they aren’t here in
the Congo to chase us, like they pretend. I have
seen the gold and coltan mining they do here, we
see how they rob the population. These are the
reasons for their being here. The RPA come and
shoot in the air and raid the villagers’ houses but
they don’t attack us any more. If you are lucky,
and you have a big brother in the RPA, he might
be able to get you some food and ammunition.
69. On the basis of its analysis of considerable
documentation and oral testimony, the Panel holds the
view that the rationale for Rwanda’s presence is to
increase the numbers of Rwandans in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo and to encourage
those settled there to act in unison to support its
exercise of economic control. The recent departure of
troops should not be interpreted as a sign of Rwanda’s
willingness to reduce its considerable involvement in
the evacuation of valuable resources, to reduce the
level of armed conflict or to diminish the humanitarian
crisis in the region. Economic exploitation in its
various forms will continue, relying on a less
conspicuous armed force and alternative strategies for
carrying out the exploitative activities.
The elite network
70. The elite network’s operations in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo are managed
centrally from the RPA Congo Desk, which serves to
link the commercial and military activities of RPA. The
Panel has described this function in some detail in
previous reports. The Panel continues to receive
documentation on ways in which the proceeds of the
RPA commercial wing finance an armed presence. As
an illustration, the Panel has recently acquired
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documents showing coltan sales being negotiated by
ranking Congo Desk officials. The Panel has copies of
faxes sent from the office of RPA Major Dan Munyuza
on behalf of Maniema Mining Company and another
fax sent from the office of RPA Chief of Staff General
James Kaberebe.
71. While revenues and expenditure in the Congo
Desk are considerable, they are kept strictly separate
from Rwanda’s national budget. A reliable source
associated with the Congo Desk has calculated that
income to the Desk provided 80 per cent of all RPA
expenditure in 1999. The official Rwandan budget for
1999 allocated $80 million to the military. If this
official budget allocation of $80 million represents the
20 per cent referred to by the Panel’s source as the
portion of military expenditure not covered by the
Congo Desk, then the total military budget from all
sources would approximate $400 million. This comes
to 20 per cent of GNP for 1999 and approximately 150
per cent of recurring budget expenditure for that year.
The Congo Desk’s contribution to Rwanda’s military
expenses would therefore have been in the order of
$320 million. The activities funded by revenues
generated by the Congo Desk strongly shape Rwanda’s
foreign policy and directly influence national decisionmaking
in a number of domains. These transactions
are, however, hidden from the scrutiny of international
organizations.
72. The elite network maintains close commercial
ties with transnational criminal networks, including
those of Victor Bout, Sanjivan Ruprah and Richard
Muamba Nozi. Victor Bout’s aircraft are utilized for a
number of purposes including transport of coltan and
cassiterite, the transport of supplies into mining sites,
and the transport of military troops and equipment.
During the last major military campaign in Pweto,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Victor Bout’s
aircraft were used to transport RPA personnel to the
area.
73. While Sanjivan Ruprah has frequently worked
within Victor Bout’s criminal organization, he
maintains an independent affiliation with the Congo
Desk in Kigali. On 7 February 2002, Mr. Ruprah was
arrested in Belgium on suspicion of planning to
provide 6 million new zaire banknotes — still valid in
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo — to
RCD-Goma with financing by diamond dealers based
in Belgium. The President of RCD-Goma, Adolphe
Onusumba, who has kinship and business ties with
Mr. Ruprah, played a key role in this counterfeit
operation. Another group, the Muamba Nozi
counterfeiting operation, also provides counterfeit
Congolese francs to RCD-Goma. Its regional base of
operations is located at Nairobi, where they print and
distribute to the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo large quantities of counterfeit Congolese francs.
Officials in the Central Bank of Kinshasa have
informed the Panel that Mr. Muamba Nozi’s counterfeit
activities are politically motivated and designed to
deliberately destabilize the present regime by
weakening the currency.
Strategies and sources of revenue
Coltan
74. The end of the SOMIGL coltan monopoly in
April 2001 was less a consequence of the falling price
of coltan and more a consequence of Rwanda’s
determination to capture more of the revenue that was
being taken in taxes by the RCD-Goma rebel
administration. The termination of the agreement with
SOMIGL made it possible for RPA to frustrate the
efforts of RCD-Goma to raise revenue for its own
purposes.
75. The bulk of coltan exported from the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo, as much as 60 to
70 per cent, has been mined under the direct
surveillance of RPA mining détachés and evacuated by
aircraft from airstrips near mining sites directly to
Kigali or Cyangugu. No taxes are paid. Rwandan
military aircraft, Victor Bout’s aircraft and small airline
companies are used in the evacuation of the coltan.
RPA has maintained control over most of the coltan
sites where rich deposits are found, where the
percentage of tantalum is high, and where local
airstrips are accessible. A variety of forced labour
regimes are found at sites that have been managed by
RPA mining détachés, some for coltan collection, some
for transport, others for domestic services. Many
accounts report the widespread use of prisoners
imported from Rwanda who work as indentured labour.
76. A smaller portion, perhaps 15 to 25 per cent of
the total coltan exported, is purchased by comptoirs
owned by Rwandans who buy from local négotiants at
remote coltan sites or from the agents of local defence
groups. More typically these comptoirs, owned by
Rwandan army officers or those closely linked to the
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Government of Rwanda, such as MHI comptoir, Eagle
Wings or Rwanda Metals, have obtained their own
mining sites and conscript their own workers to exploit
the sites under severe conditions.
77. The smallest portion of coltan is purchased by the
few remaining Congolese-owned comptoirs at one of
the large number of coltan sites in remote areas. Most
of the Congolese comptoirs have found it impossible to
compete with the RPA or Rwanda-owned comptoirs.
78. As mining profits to the Congo Desk have
increased, the share of RCD-Goma has declined. The
Congo Desk has perennially deprived its junior partner,
RCD-Goma, of any significant share in resources and
prerogatives, and RCD-Goma has perennially
complained. RCD-Goma administrators have
frequently pointed out that they were unable to manage
their army without sufficient revenue. Lacking
financial support, the ANC brigades have turned to
pillaging villagers throughout the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The third Brigade has stolen a
large number of cattle around Kalemie, and the first
Brigade has taken diamonds from Opala. The Panel
possesses extensive documentation on these activities.
Most of these rebel forces are under the command of
RPA officers. They have little hesitation, when so
directed, in attacking local self-defence groups who
obstruct their commercial operations, to eliminate
specific enemies, to provide security around gold,
coltan and diamond rich areas, to provide police
services in urban areas and occasionally to keep a force
present along the front lines. Since ANC troops are
neither paid nor disciplined, they use their weapons to
prey on the population, frequently burning whole
villages to acquire property and food.
Case study of a commercial chain involving
coltan
79. Eagle Wings Resources International, a coltan
comptoir in Bukavu, is a subsidiary of Trinitech
International Inc., based in Ohio, United States. Eagle
Wings has offices in Rwanda, Burundi and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The manager of
Eagle Wings in Kigali has close ties to the Rwandan
regime. Consequently, Eagle Wings operates in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo as a Rwandacontrolled
comptoir with all the privileges derived
from this connection. Eagle Wings is not obliged to
fulfil its full responsibilities to the public treasury
managed by the RCD-Goma administration. Like other
Rwanda-controlled coltan comptoirs, Eagle Wings
collaborates with RPA to receive privileged access to
coltan sites and captive labour.
80. Approximately 25 per cent of Eagle Wings coltan
is shipped from Kigali to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant
of NAC Kazatomprom, in Kazakhstan. Another 25 per
cent is sold to the parent company of Eagle Wings,
Trinitech International Inc. in the United States, which
arranges for sales to both Ulba and to the Chinese
processing facility at Ningxia Non-Ferrous Metals
Smeltery (NNMS). H. C. Starck, based in Germany and
a subsidiary of the transnational corporation Bayer AG,
purchases about 15 per cent of Eagle Wings coltan.
H. C. Starck has denied on numerous occasions
obtaining coltan originating from Central Africa. In a
press statement issued on 24 May 2002, H. C. Starck
reiterated that the company had purchased no material
originating in Central Africa since August 2001. The
Panel possesses documents showing the contrary. In the
same press release, H. C. Starck claimed that its coltan
originates from “peasant suppliers” and not from rebel
groups. In fact, no coltan exits from the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo without benefiting
either the rebel group or foreign armies.
81. In one instance on which the Panel has
documentation, Mozambique Gemstone Company
provided false documents establishing Mozambique as
the origin of a shipment of coltan originating in
Rwanda and transiting through South Africa.
Mozambique Gemstone Company then sold the
consignment to AMC African Trading and Consulting
Company Ltd., based in South Africa, which
subsequently sold the consignment to H. C. Starck Ltd.
in Rayong, Thailand, on 21 September 2001. H. C.
Starck sent a letter of credit for this consignment on
9 May 2002 to Chemie Pharmacie Holland, which
oversaw the transaction, and which is a commercial
partner of Eagle Wings providing logistical and
financial services. Eagle Wings is the only coltan
source for Chemie Pharmacie. Eagle Wings has no
operations in Mozambique.
82. The Panel has also had direct contacts with the
Chinese processing facility, NNMS, to determine
whether they use coltan originating in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo. NNMS
categorically denied doing business with “any
individual or any entity that represents somebody or
some entity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”
In fact, a number of brokers trading in coltan
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originating from the eastern Democratic Republic of
the Congo have informed the Panel of their sales to
NNMS. A publicity presentation prepared by NNMS
itself has stated that the reason that they are able to
provide low prices for their output is that NNMS buys
significant amounts of cheap raw material from Central
Africa. One NNMS report notes that 50 per cent of all
coltan purchased for processing originates in Central
Africa. Frequent follow-up Panel enquiries with NNMS
were ignored.
Diamonds
83. The diamond market was the prize Rwanda
fought Uganda to have for its own. After the last clash
in Kisangani in June 2000, RPA worked through the
RCD-Goma administration to funnel all the diamonds
in Kisangani through the Congo Desk control. The
technique was to oblige all local diamond traders to
sell to one principal comptoir holding exclusive export
rights.
84. The Congo Desk gave Aziz Nassour the first
monopoly. Aziz Nassour fell out of favour with the
Congo Desk and was replaced by an Israeli diamond
dealer, Philippe Surowicz. Diamond traders in
Kisangani remember the Surowicz period as a “reign of
terror”. Diamond sellers frequently reported entering
“Monsieur Philippe’s” comptoir only to be confronted
with RPA military who named a derisory price and
took the diamonds. The Congo Desk replaced
Mr. Surowicz in October 2001 with a Lebanese, Hamad
Khalil, who worked through the Bakayoko comptoir in
Kisangani.
85. In mid-November 2001, the Department of
Lands, Mines and Energy of RCD-Goma conducted a
study of Hamad Khalil’s performance in the first month
of his tenure. His quota had been set at a minimum of
$500,000 per month. Mr. Khalil met his quota
exporting diamonds valued at $576,380 over a period
of 27 days. The performance was adequate, but it was
far below the Kisangani sales potential of up to
$2 million per month. His poor performance raised the
suspicion that the Congo Desk was using Mr. Khalil to
divert revenues that might otherwise accrue to the
RCD-Goma administration. A similar inspection of
diamond production in the Sankuru and Lodja areas of
Northern Kasai the week before had also revealed that
RPA officers were clandestinely taking large quantities
of diamonds out of Northern Kasai directly to the
Congo Desk in Kigali. RCD-Goma determined that Mr.
Khalil was undervaluing the diamonds, and the
consequence was a reduction in taxes payable to RCDGoma’s
public treasury as well as a greater margin of
profit for Mr. Khalil and the Congo Desk. The study
concludes that “The public treasury would have four
times the present revenue from diamonds were it not
for fraudulent practices and the under-valuation of
diamonds”.
Imports, taxation and requisition by the
public sector
86. The controversial “conflict” diamonds from
Kisangani are marketed by criminal networks.
Proceeds from these criminal sales are laundered by the
purchase of large quantities of household goods in
Dubai — sugar, soap, cloth and medicines — which are
then imported to the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and offered to local sellers at attractive prices. The
Rwandan wholesalers use the profits in Congolese
francs to buy dollars and, to close the trade circuit, to
purchase diamonds.
87. The interest of the RPA commercial wing in
selling consumables at attractive prices is not only to
launder money from criminal diamond sales, but also
to place the once-thriving Kisangani economy under
Rwanda’s control. The cloths that were once
manufactured at the Kisangani Sotexki factory and
renowned for their quality no longer compete with the
cheaper imports, and the result is that the Sotexki
labour force, once 2,000, now stands at 100. The palm
oil once produced locally at the Unilever-owned plant
can no longer compete with the imported oil that is
sold in Kisangani at a third of the price of locally
produced oil. The Unilever-owned palm oil plants in
Kisangani are practically at a standstill. Weakening
local production not only undermines the local
manufacturing economy and makes the Kisangani
population captive consumers, it also shifts Kisangani’s
manufacturing economy to Kigali.
88. Another strategy for raising revenue is to use
RCD-Goma’s public sector facade to requisition funds
from public enterprises. On 21 November 2001, the
Secretary General of RCD-Goma requisitioned by
decree all revenues generated by public utilities and
parastatals. On the following day the Secretary General
annulled all existing collective agreements for workers
in those enterprises. The decrees were applicable to all
public enterprises, including the water utility, the
airport authorities, the electricity utility, the road and
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transport authority among others. RCD-Goma declared
the requisitions to be in the public interest. Within a
month, the water utility lacked sufficient funds to
purchase water purification chemicals in Kisangani and
Bukavu and power stations stopped functioning for
lack of necessary repairs. The International Committee
of the Red Cross has stepped in to provide 60 tons of
chemicals for water purification and has financed
costly repairs at Tshopo power station to avert a
discontinuation of water supply in Kisangani and avert
a cholera outbreak. The parastatal transport company
ceased to function, and the airport authorities appealed
to RCD-Goma to restore a portion of the requisitioned
funds since no salaries had been paid for six months.
89. Following a decree on 15 March 2002, new taxes
were introduced and all existing tax rates have been
increased. Over an 18-month period, since the previous
tax decree of September 2000, taxes on electrical
consumption have increased by 200 per cent. Licences
for trading in agricultural products increased fourfold.
Most licensing fees for operating a business were
doubled or tripled. The number of different taxes
collected in the area under RCD-Goma administration
has increased four times since 1998. None of the tax
revenue is used to provide public services.
Armed conflict and its consequences
90. Medical practitioners, church workers, and nongovernmental
organizations in northern Katanga all
attest to rapidly escalating disorder in Kalemie and an
increased use of arms by a wide range of groups, some
affiliated with RCD-Goma and others not. Fighting
between RPA and FAC has been limited to Rwanda’s
seizure of northern Katanga in November 1998 and a
government counter-offensive in October 2000. These
confrontations resulted in considerable displacement of
populations in the path of troop movements. However,
it was the aftermath of those confrontations that
resulted in the most severe armed conflict. Rwandan
troops seized material for their campaigns. The RCDGoma
third ANC Brigade, following Rwanda’s
example in their own random fashion, seized food and
other property. Armed movements arose among local
populations for self-defence, and occasionally these
local militias banded together with other local militias
to create larger armed groups. The Panel has received
extensive documentation from local lawyers, Catholic
and Protestant churches, the Fédération des Entreprises
au Congo and others detailing thefts of cattle valued at
more than $15 million, thefts of over $1 million worth
of retail goods and the destruction or fraudulent sale of
equipment from the Société nationale de chemin de fer
du Congo.
91. The Catholic Church in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo has spoken out boldly about the
thefts, killings, torture, extortions, rapes and piracy on
Lake Tanganyika perpetrated originally by RPA and
continued by ANC, the RCD-Goma police and the
Banyamulenge militia. The Church, and most notably
the Bishop of Kalemie-Kirungu, recently headed a
campaign to expose these abuses. Directors of RCDGoma’s
Department of Security and Information
responded by threatening to kill prominent church
leaders. The Catholic Diocese published a list of those
threats on 15 May 2002.
92. The multiplication of armed forces and fighting
in the interior have all but destroyed farm production
on the rich plateau in the interior of northern Katanga.
Excesses by RPA in requisitioning resources for the
“war effort” set a standard for behaviour by the far less
disciplined ANC rebel forces, who have ravaged the
countryside. Growers are reluctant to invest in crops
when they are so likely to be stolen. Large numbers of
persons have been displaced from their homes and have
abandoned their lands out of fear. The Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has estimated
that, in the northern Katanga area alone, 350,000
displaced persons are living away from their homes,
with neighbours, in the cities or in the bush.
93. Armed conflict along the Masisi-Walikale-Goma
axis arises from tensions between the large numbers of
RPA in place to manage mining operations and Hutus
who may be resident, but who are also imported or
conscripted by Rwandan forces to carry out mining
under forced labour conditions. Separate Rwandaowned
comptoirs have quarrelled among themselves
for access to sites. RPA forces have attacked and
burned villages to seize coltan mined by some Hutu
groups or local villagers. The Panel has taken
testimony from villagers who have been forced to leave
their villages following attacks. With minor exceptions,
the objective of military activity is to secure access to
mining sites or ensure a supply of captive labour.
94. Population displacement is the outcome of
frequent armed conflict, with the predictable
consequences of food insecurity, malnutrition and high
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mortality rates for both the displaced and host
populations. The Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 1.5 million
persons were displaced in March 2001 in the areas
occupied by Rwanda in North and South Kivu,
Maniema and Katanga, nearly 14 per cent of the
population. More than three quarters of families living
in the rural areas have probably been forced to move at
least once in the last five years. This degree of armed
conflict undermines local authority and encourages an
abusive social environment. Public infrastructure is
destroyed. School enrolment in Shabunda has dropped
56 per cent since 1998. Men are led to abuse women on
a surprising scale throughout the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo. International non-governmental
organizations have provided comprehensive reports
about groups of women being taken hostage and
submitted to long periods of sexual abuse. Children
become instruments of war, forced to work in the
mines and conscripted into armed forces. United
Nations officials have suggested that the number of
child soldiers in the rebel armies is much higher than
reported by the rebel administrations, and that 50 per
cent of local defence and Mayi-Mayi groups are
children.
Malnutrition and mortality
95. Malnutrition studies carried out by nongovernmental
organizations in both northern Katanga
and the Kivus have shown that, in some places, as
many as 25 to 30 per cent of all children under 5 years
are malnourished. In most cases, this is due to the large
numbers of displaced persons who have been forced to
leave their own agricultural production and have taken
refuge in nearby host villages. A number of studies
have shown the close link between elevated
malnutrition levels and mortality rates in this region.
96. The most commonly quoted conclusion from the
International Rescue Committee’s surveys is that 2.5
million more people died since the beginning of the
war than would have died had the war not occurred.
While the study is directly relevant to the sample
population of 1.3 million, the International Rescue
Committee has assumed that conditions are sufficiently
similar throughout all five provinces of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo to justify applying
the mortality rates found in the sampled population to
the larger population in all five provinces. The study
covered the period from August 1998 to April 2001. If
one assumes mortality to have continued at the same
rate, this would mean that more than 3.5 million excess
deaths would have occurred from the beginning of the
war up to September 2002. These deaths are a direct
result of the occupation by Rwanda and Uganda.
Extensive mortality, especially mortality among
children, is the consequence of a cycle of aggression,
the multiplication of armed forces, a high frequency of
conflict and its consequences, especially displacement.
One should not be surprised to find, in areas most
affected by the conflict, a mortality rate for children
under 5 years of 35 per cent.
V. Uganda-controlled area
97. The objective of the elite network in the areas
controlled by Uganda has been to exercise
monopolistic control over the area’s principal natural
resources, cross-border trade, and tax revenues for the
purpose of enriching members of the network.
Notwithstanding the current political rapprochement
and the apparent momentum towards normalizing
relations between Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, the elite network continues to increase its
economic hold over the area.
The elite network
98. The elite network operating out of Uganda is
decentralized and loosely hierarchical, unlike the
network operating out of Rwanda. The Uganda network
consists of a core group of members including certain
high-ranking UPDF officers, private businessmen and
selected rebel leaders/administrators. UPDF Lieutenant
General (Ret.) Salim Saleh and Major General James
Kazini are the key figures. Other members include the
Chief of Military Intelligence, Colonel Noble
Mayombo, UPDF Colonel Kahinda Otafiire and
Colonel Peter Karim. Private entrepreneurs include
Sam Engola, Jacob Manu Soba and Mannase Savo and
other Savo family members. Rebel politicians and
administrators include Professor Wamba dia Wamba,
Roger Lumbala, John Tibasima, Mbusa Nyamwisi and
Toma Lubanga.
99. The network continues to conduct activities
through front companies such as the Victoria Group,
Trinity Investment, LA CONMET and Sagricof. Each
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of these companies may concentrate on one or two
commercial niches, though these may change. The role
of the companies is to manage their respective niche
activities by assembling the personnel, logistics and
occasionally the financing for the operations.
100. The network generates revenue from the export of
primary materials, from controlling the import of
consumables, from theft and tax fraud. The success of
the network’s activities in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo relies on three interconnected features,
namely, military intimidation; maintenance of a public
sector facade, in the form of a rebel movement
administration; and manipulation of the money supply
and the banking sector, using counterfeit currency and
other related mechanisms.
101. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces and their
associated rebel militias have been used as the de facto
enforcement arm of the network, ensuring the
network’s pre-eminent commercial position through
intimidation, and the threat and use of force. UPDF or
militias associated with individual UPDF officers have
established physical control over areas containing
commercially viable natural resources — coltan,
diamonds, timber and gold. They establish authority in
major urban and financial centres, such as Bunia, Beni
and Butembo, where they use the rebel administration
as a public sector facade to generate revenue,
specifically to collect taxes under various pretexts,
including licensing fees for commercial operators,
import and export duties and taxes on specific
products.
102. Uganda has recently agreed to withdraw all
UPDF troops except for a reinforced battalion in Bunia
and a small number of units on the slopes of the
Ruwenzori Mountains. In anticipation of this
withdrawal, a paramilitary force is being trained under
the personal authority of Lt. General Saleh which,
according to the Panel’s sources, is expected to
continue to facilitate the commercial activities of
UPDF officers after UPDF have departed. This military
group draws on dissidents from Jean-Pierre Bemba’s
MLC, members of the Uganda-supported RCD-Congo
including its leaders Professor Kin-kiey Mulumba and
Kabanga Babadi, and others in the north-eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo who have supported
UPDF in the past. It has been reported that Lt. General
Saleh discreetly provides financial support for this new
rebel group. The Panel’s sources have indicated that
Heckie Horn, Managing Director of Saracen Uganda
Ltd., is a key partner with Lt. General Saleh in
supporting this paramilitary group and that Lt. General
Saleh himself is a 25 per cent owner in Saracen.
Saracen’s managing director also provides military
training and arms to members of this group. In an
interview with Panel members, the Managing Director
of Saracen Ltd. categorically denied any involvement
with Lt. General Saleh’s activities in the north-eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
103. Panel sources report that Lt. General Saleh and
Mr. Horn consulted President Joseph Kabila to obtain
support for this covert operation. Its primary objective
has been to replace Mbusa Nyamwisi with Roger
Lumbala as head of RCD-K/ML in order to ensure
access to the diamond-rich areas around Buta and Isiro
controlled by Mr. Lumbala’s rebel group, RCDNational.
This objective has largely been achieved.
Their more long-term objective is to bring about the
downfall of Jean-Pierre Bemba, adding the growing
number of dissidents in Mr. Bemba’s ranks to the new
rebel movement RCD-Congo. With increased numbers
and training, they will then be in a position to confront
RCD-Goma and Rwanda.
104. Members of the Ugandan network are typically
tax exempt. The Panel is in possession of documents
showing that the network uses its control over the
RCD-K/ML rebel administration to request tax
exonerations for imports of high-value commodities.
The granting of numerous tax exonerations to UPDF
Colonel Otafiire between late 2001 and early 2002 is
one of numerous cases. Not only did Colonel Otafiire
benefit financially but, eventually, those exonerations
forced local competitors out of markets in Bunia and
Beni, leaving the petrol trade largely under the control
of the network.
105. Local commercial operators are, however,
required to pay substantial import and export duties.
These operators may be favoured with discounted tax
payment deals, in the form of prefinancing
arrangements, but tax payment for local operators is
mandatory. Prefinancing arrangements involve the
payment by an importer of discounted tax payments in
exchange for a financial payment to an authorizing
rebel politician or administrator. None of these
payments to the rebel administration is used to finance
public services.
106. The network uses its economic influence to
control the banking sector, which in turn allows the
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network to further control access to operating capital
for commercial operators in the area. Economically
speaking, this region has become a captive region, where
the types of commercial ventures are manipulated and
the viability of local businesses is controlled.
Furthermore, the flow of money is regulated by the
network through currency trading and the widespread
introduction of counterfeit Congolese francs.
107. As in the past, the network continues to involve
the transnational criminal group of Victor Bout. Mr.
Bout recently purchased the Uganda-based nonoperational
airline company Okapi Air. The purchase
of the company allowed Victor Bout to use Okapi’s
licences. The company was subsequently renamed
Odessa. The Panel is in possession of a list of outbound
flights from 1998 to the beginning of 2002 from
Entebbe International Airport, which confirms the
operational activities of Mr. Bout’s aircraft from
Ugandan territory. Currently, Mr. Bout’s aircraft share
the flight times and destinations (slots) with Planet Air,
which is owned by the wife of Lt. General Salim Saleh
and which facilitates the activities of Mr. Bout by filing
flight plans for his aircraft.
Strategies and sources of revenue
Coltan
108. Coltan has been exploited extensively in
Orientale Province by various armed groups under the
protection of UPDF. A number of coltan operations,
especially under the supervision of UPDF Colonels
Muzora and Burundi, have been coordinated under the
front company Trinity Investment, where UPDF Major
General Kazini is the principal figure. Armed groups
frequently identified with militias under the command
of UPDF officers manage sites in remote locations
where diggers pay a daily fee to exploit an area.
Case study of a commercial chain
involving coltan
109. During March 2002, Panel members met with
Valentina Piskunova who, together with her husband
Anatoly Piskunov, represents and operates the company
LA CONMET from its base in Kampala. During
discussions with the Panel, Ms. Piskunova explained
that, because of the collapsed international coltan
market, prices for the mineral in the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo had dropped
dramatically. However, Ms. Piskunova told the Panel
that the continuing international interest in coltan from
the Democratic Republic of the Congo is due to the
“very low” labour costs for extracting the mineral.
Therefore, the company continued to buy coltan from
its office at Butembo in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. She said that their purchase price for coltan
with a 30 per cent tantalum content was $10 per
kilogram. The same coltan was then sold for $17 per
kilogram.
110. Ms. Piskunova went on to tell the Panel that the
company’s coltan was transported by road across the
border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda at Kasindi to Entebbe International
Airport, where it was then transported by Boeing 707,
via Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, at a cost of
$140,000 per flight, to Ulba, Kazakhstan, for
processing.
111. In addition to the profit made on the sales of
coltan, LA CONMET also experienced savings by
being granted “full exoneration” for “all activities
involving exploitation for the territory of Beni-Lubero”
(Democratic Republic of the Congo), including
freedom from paying fiscal and customs duties. The
document granting the exonerations is in the possession
of the Panel. It was signed at Kampala by Mbusa
Myamwisi, then Commissioner General for RCDKisangani,
on 5 January 2000, identifying Salim Saleh
as the owner of LA CONMET and designating his
representatives as “the Russian group LA CONMET”.
Diamonds
112. The network coordinates all elements of the
diamond trade, local buying houses, Lebanese
exporters, army protection from UPDF and individual
militias, tax exonerations from the public sector, and
Lebanese connections in Antwerp, under the aegis of
the front company, the Victoria Group. Considerable
evidence available to the Panel has named the
Lebanese-born, Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim, and another
known as Mr. Abbas, as the present focal points in
Kampala for Victoria’s diamond operations. The Panel
has credible evidence that Khalil Nazeem Ibrahim used
the capital and marketing services of Hemang Nananal
Shah, proprietor of Nami Gems in Antwerp. Lt.
General Saleh is recognized by the Panel’s sources in
Bunia, Kisangani and Kampala as the founder and
director of the Victoria Group and as the mastermind of
its operations.
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113. The Lebanese individuals, together with their
families, who are commonly named in connection with
the Victoria Group, are also regarded as closely
associated with the Lebanese families Khanafer and
Ahmad. Khanafer Nahim, in particular, has been named
as a key figure in Victoria Group operations. He is well
known by a number of national intelligence and police
organizations for the production of counterfeit
currency, money-laundering and diamond smuggling
on behalf of generals who were prominent in President
Mobutu’s time and are still interested in returning to
power. The Victoria Group’s use of counterfeit United
States currency in Bunia to purchase gold from local
comptoirs is widely known.
Tax fraud and the requisition of assets
114. Control over imports is as lucrative as the
monopolization of exports. Exoneration from import
duties gives the network an advantage in the northeastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo over local
importers who pay duties and taxes. An across-theboard
exoneration was recently proclaimed in the
Protocole d’Accord issued by RCD-K/ML on 22
February 2002, which ensured Ugandan commercial
operators complete exoneration from all taxes in the
area under their control.
115. But increased profit margins from tax-free
imports provide only a fraction of the benefits. Equally
lucrative is access to the taxes themselves,
monopolized by the network that uses the rebel
administration’s facade of a public treasury and its
collection agents to raise revenue from local
businessmen and the population at large. Hundreds of
containers are imported each month into the Butembo,
Beni and Bunia areas, and importers are obliged to pay
an average of $8,000 per container. Revenue from these
import duties can be considerable. Some revenue is
also diverted through prefinancing arrangements,
which provide discounted import duties in exchange
for kickbacks to rebel politicians. The Panel’s sources
insist that the revenues generated from import duties
and prefinancing payments are diverted to UPDF
officers. None is utilized for public services.
116. Trinity Investment’s local transporters in Bunia,
the Savo family group among others, carry agricultural
products, wood and cattle from Bunia to Kampala
exempt from UPDF toll barriers and export taxes.
Trinity investment also works with another front
company under the name of Sagricof to fraudulently
evacuate wood from North Kivu and the Ituri area.
Tree plantations have been raided in the areas of
Mahagi and Djugu along the north-eastern border with
Uganda. Concerned citizens and research by local nongovernmental
organizations have identified Colonel
Peter Karim and Colonel Otafiire, in addition to the
Ugandan parliamentarian Sam Ngola, as key figures in
the illegal logging and fraudulent evacuation of wood.
117. Many of the cattle removed have been forcibly
taken from villages that have been the objects of attack
by Hema militia supported by UPDF troops. The Panel
has received reports from ranchers in areas to the south
of Bunia as well as to the north in Mahagi detailing the
removal of large numbers of cattle by UPDF troops.
The representative of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations in Bunia has
reported the more recent UPDF practice of offering
protection to ranchers against attacks that they
themselves have orchestrated, in exchange for regular
payment in animals. UPDF have also required local
butchers to hand over hides from animals butchered
locally, and these hides are then transported to
Kampala where they are reputedly sold to Bata Shoe
Manufacturing.
Economic exploitation and ethnic conflict
118. The ongoing armed conflict between members of
the Hema and Lendu clans stems, in part, from
attempts by powerful Hema businessmen and
politicians to increase the benefits they derive from the
commercial activities of the elite network through their
front companies, the Victoria Group and Trinity
Investment, in the Ituri area.
119. Hema clan members, particularly members of the
sub-clan Gegere, have justified the purchase of arms
and the training of their own militia by the need to
defend themselves against their traditional enemies, the
Lendu. It is true that a long-festering dispute over land
has resulted in discord between the two groups.
Recently, however, the traditional enmity over land and
the ongoing feud between the two groups is used as a
rationale by the Hema, and especially by the extremist
sub-clan Gegere, for importing arms and training their
own militia with the ultimate unspoken objective of
consolidating their economic strength in the region.
120. The Gegere sub-clan plays an important role in
the operation of the elite network. The majority of
transporters and local traders in Bunia come from this
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group. Jacob Manu Soba, Manasse Savo and other
members of the Savo family are among those who have
provisioned UPDF in the area and who provide
transport, logistical services and local commercial
links. They have established close links with a
succession of UPDF commanders and troops in the
area and work closely with them in conducting crossborder
trade.
121. The Hema fill an important niche in the operation
of the criminal enterprises as truck owners and
businessmen. They transport shipments of primary
products from Ituri across the border to Uganda under
the protection of UPDF troops and return with
gasoline, cigarettes and arms, all exempt from taxation.
They benefit from the trade and the generous profit
margins, and from their association with the Trinity
Group’s Ugandan patrons. But their niche has remained
marginal. They control none of the primary product
exports themselves. They remain peripheral to the
alliance between RCD-K/ML leaders, the Ugandan
patrons and UPDF. The plot to replace Mr. Nyamwisi
with Mr. Lubanga, which appears now to be a fait
accompli in Bunia, is part of an attempt by these Hema
traders to secure greater control over the spoils
available to inside members of RCD-K/ML.
122. UPDF have created the conditions that require the
presence of troops and their continued involvement in
commercial operations. This has entailed providing
arms to both sides in the ethnic conflict, the Lendu and
the Hema. The consequent increase in ethnic fighting
has resulted in UPDF being urged to assist in furthering
the peace process in Bunia. This function was
formalized in an official Protocole d’Accord signed on
22 February 2002 by Mbusa Nyamwisi and John
Tibasima as President and Vice-President of RCDK/
ML and by Colonel Noble Mayombo as an official
representative of the Government of Uganda. The
Protocole d’Accord gave UPDF official responsibility
for reducing the conflits armés inter-ethnique en Ituri
and for assisting in bringing about a retour de la paix
by keeping a contingent in place for observation and
for negotiating an eventual long-term solution. In
exchange, UPDF were promised a monthly stipend of
$25,000 from the RCD-K/ML public treasury, and all
Ugandan enterprises that were approved by UPDF were
accorded exoneration from all duties and taxes due to
the rebel administration. This has given UPDF a
legitimate cover for continuing military support for the
elite network’s activities in the area.
123. The Protocole d’Accord was signed a week after
UPDF had been involved in a succession of attacks,
from 11 to 16 February 2002, on villagers at Geti. The
Panel’s sources on the matter stated that the attack had
been financed by Hema businessmen in Bunia. The
UPDF motive was clarified even further in the course
of a meeting with RCD-K/ML department chiefs on 12
July 2002, when a Panel member was informed that the
Hema businessmen in question sought to have control
over gold deposits in the Geti area, and that in fact the
ethnic conflict was a minor issue.
Armed conflict and its consequences
124. UPDF military operations have contributed to the
arming of large numbers. UPDF have trained the
militia of their Ituri commercial allies, the Hema, and
provoked the need for the victims of Hema attacks to
defend themselves. Lendu villages have mounted their
own local forces, and they in turn have frequently
attacked Hema villages. The creation of local selfdefence
groups is a familiar pattern: local ethnic groups
frequently assemble armed groups to defend their
villages or collectivities.
125. Armed conflict has spread throughout society, as
economic and personal insecurity reach extreme levels.
Large numbers of young men join one or another
armed group because they have no other means of
finding food or medicine or because they have no one
to care for them. The young men in the Armé
Patriotique Congolaise are unpaid but are provided
with weapons and a uniform giving them the tools for
menacing others. Widespread armed activity is
characterized by opportunistic and chaotic encounters.
Children are killed, adult victims are eviscerated,
women are raped, property stolen, houses burned,
churches demolished and whatever infrastructure exists
is laid waste.
126. In the cities, young men dressed in military
uniform and equipped with guns target businesses,
households and churches. In the countryside, armed
groups target whole villages. The attack on the village
of Mpingi on 24 December 2001 is illustrative. A small
Mayi-Mayi group had teamed up with a group claiming
to be members of a Hutu opposition to set up a
roadblock on the road from Butembo to Kanyabayonga.
When the roadblock drew the attention of APC, the
Mayi-Mayi group withdrew to the west into the village
of Mpingi where they sought refuge. APC followed
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them in force and attacked the entire village of Mpingi,
destroyed and burned houses, vandalized the church,
razed the school and clinic and forced the residents to
flee. Targeting whole villages with violence, brutally
raping and murdering residents, removing livestock,
food and other property and dispersing residents has
been the trademark of armed aggression. A portion of
those who flee seek protection in nearby villages,
abandoning their own productive activities in their
home village while becoming dependent on the
resources of host populations.
127. A portion of the displaced population take refuge
in urban areas where they benefit from somewhat better
security but have little, if any, means for survival.
Unemployment rates in cities and towns often reach 90
per cent. An income survey by civil society groups in
Butembo found that 90 per cent lived on a few cents a
day and ate one meal a day. Urban families break up to
seek survival in separate ways. The women engage in
prostitution, the older men may return to what remains
of their villages or mining sites and the young men
enter the rebel army, swelling both the ranks of its
forces and the numbers of young boys without
subsistence possessing weapons.
128. In March 2001, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs estimated that there were
620,000 displaced persons in North Kivu, which
amounted to 16 per cent of the total population. The
area covered by the Office’s survey includes both
Uganda-controlled and Rwanda-controlled areas, but
the conditions surveyed are representative of the
Uganda-controlled area. Given the frequency of
displacement in the area, this would mean that four out
of five rural residents have been forcibly displaced at
one time or another since 1998. This is the highest
number ever registered for Africa. These aggregates
have been confirmed for specific localities surveyed by
international non-governmental organizations.
129. The spread of HIV/AIDS, the large numbers of
child soldiers and the rape of women are other
consequences of the pervasive armed conflict. Many
soldiers are young boys who hardly seem capable of
wielding the weapons they carry. The issue of child
soldiers surfaced when 700 young recruits from the
Bunia area were discovered at a UPDF training camp
in Tchakwanzi, Uganda, of whom 165 were between 14
and 16 years of age. The programme to demobilize
those 165 children, two of whom were girls, has
attracted considerable attention. The issue also
received attention recently when the Governor of
Bunea, Jean-Pierre Molondo, revealed that, of the
recruits being trained for the extremist Hema militia,
60 per cent were under the age of 18.
Malnutrition and mortality
130. Population displacement has a direct impact on
agricultural production, food security and levels of
malnutrition. The threat of attack and displacement is
so prevalent in this area that farm families adopt
farming strategies that minimize losses under
conditions of extreme insecurity. They cease raising
animals, since animals can be easily stolen. Fewer
families raise protein-rich legumes, since these crops
require attention through the growing cycle, and this
attention can rarely be given. Malnutrition, in turn,
substantially increases the exposure of the population
to life-threatening illnesses.
131. The International Rescue Committee surveys
provide the most comprehensive research into mortality
in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. None
of the health zones sampled in its two major surveys
was in the areas now controlled by Uganda. However,
the pattern of armed conflict, population displacement,
food insecurity and malnutrition in Uganda-controlled
areas resembles the pattern that explains the very high
mortality rates in the seven health zones where the
research was conducted. The Committee’s team judged
the similarities to be sufficient to warrant extrapolating
the results of areas sampled in the Kivus to the entire
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including
areas under Ugandan control. The Panel concurs. One
can expect the same range of mortality for children
under 5, from nearly 30 per cent per year in areas of
extreme insecurity without health facilities to 7 per
cent in areas where there is less insecurity and some
services. For the more than 20 million people living in
the five eastern provinces, the number of excess deaths
directly attributable to Rwandan and Ugandan
occupation can be estimated at between 3 million and
3.5 million.
VI. Collaboration of the Panel with the
Porter Commission in Uganda
132. During its previous mandate, the Panel’s relations
with the Judicial Commission of Inquiry headed by
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Justice David Porter (Porter Commission) were
occasionally strained. However, with the
encouragement of Member States, notably the members
of the Security Council, the Panel established an
amiable working relationship with the Commission.
This relationship is unique in the history of panels of
experts mandated by the Council, given the degree and
the nature of the cooperation developed between the
two bodies.
133. Panel members held frequent discussions with the
Porter Commission. From the outset, Justice Porter was
critical of the quality of the Panel’s reports and the
credibility of its sources. At the same time, he claimed
that the Commission’s investigations, ongoing now for
more than a year, were stymied primarily because of a
“conspiracy of silence” within UPDF. Under the
Commission of Inquiry Act, the Commission has the
power to conduct searches and compel the production
of documents and testimony.
134. The Panel made evidence available to the
Commission, including copies of 12 letters and a
statement from a witness, together with five original
audiotapes containing testimony given by a primary
source. These materials represent only a small sample
of the documentation gathered by the Panel on the
involvement of leading Ugandan military and senior
Ugandan Government personnel. They provide
evidence of criminal activity by such ranking Ugandan
authorities. They show officials demanding extortionist
payments and tax exonerations from Congolese rebel
movements, including the UPDF Chief of Staff
demanding that his vehicles transporting coltan be
allowed to cross the border without paying export
duties. The Panel also arranged for one of its sources to
testify before the Commission at a special hearing in
spite of the risk of exposure to the source. In exchange,
the Porter Commission provided the Panel with copies
of the testimony of certain high-ranking military
officers, Government officials, private businessmen
and other individuals who had appeared before it.
135. The Panel’s many efforts to establish a
constructive relationship with the Commission have
mostly been met with attempts to dismiss its
credibility. The Commission has challenged the
authenticity of letters provided by the Panel that show
significant payments to UPDF officers from rebel
movement budgets, even when reliable witnesses have
testified to their validity. It has submitted other
documents signed by ranking officials to handwriting
analysis and used this analysis to imply that they may
be forgeries. The analysis of those documents,
however, suggested that the signatures were probably
genuine. During a specially arranged hearing aimed at
corroborating the authenticity of certain documents
transmitted by the Panel, the Porter Commission
submitted one of the Panel’s informants to an unusually
aggressive questioning designed to frighten the
individual and discredit his testimony.
136. When the Commission recalled Major General
James Kazini in May 2002 to question him on the basis
of documents supplied by the Panel, the UPDF military
commander finally admitted that the signatures on the
documents were indeed his and accepted that the
documents related to his actions as the former
commander of UPDF operations in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Justice Porter commented
during the questioning that General Kazini, who had
consistently denied under oath any involvement in such
illicit economic exploits, had perjured himself
repeatedly during both that hearing and his original
testimony before the Commission the previous year.
The head of the Commission also conceded, according
to transcripts of the hearing, that the Panel’s
“allegations” about General Kazini’s involvement in
exploitation activities, including those related to the
diamond trade and tax revenues, “were actually true”.
Justice Porter reconfirmed these observations in
meetings with the Panel, again conceding that the
conclusions of the Panel’s earlier reports about this
officer and the involvement of UPDF in the illicit
exploitation were “right”. In an electronic message
dated 25 May 2002, Justice Porter wrote to the
Chairman of the Panel regarding the documentary
evidence provided and General Kazini’s second
appearance before the Commission. He expressed his
appreciation to the Panel, saying, “We feel, and hope
you agree, that with your assistance we have at last
been able to break what we have described as a
conspiracy of silence within UPDF, at least in relation
to diamonds and ‘security payments’, and we are
extremely grateful to you for enabling us to do so.”
137. During the Panel’s last meeting with the
Commission in September 2002 in Kampala, Justice
Porter explained that any recommendation by the
Commission to refer an individual for criminal
prosecution as the result of its enquiries must first be
approved by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and
President Museveni. A criminal investigation would
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then be necessary before the authorities could
determine if grounds for prosecution existed. The Panel
also understood that, in spite of the Commission’s
extensive investigative powers, its terms of reference
restrict the scope of its enquiries into the activities of
military personnel. It is not empowered to obtain
military records and documents from the Defence
Ministry. Nor can it conduct audits of individual
officers’ finances.
138. The Porter Commission’s mandate has now been
extended beyond that of the Panel, to 15 November
2002, allowing it the opportunity to comment on the
Panel’s report. In the event that the Porter Commission
ignores or rejects the validity and evidentiary value of
the documents provided or attempts to further discredit
the Panel’s work, the Chairman of the Panel requests
that the Security Council authorize the Panel to
respond to the Commission’s report in a letter
addressed to the Security Council, which would be
circulated as a United Nations document.
VII. Transit and end-user trade issues
Transit countries
139. The Panel identified 11 African States through
whose territory goods originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo are likely to pass. Some are
directly involved in the conflict, namely, Burundi,
Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The remaining seven
are the Central African Republic, Kenya, Mozambique,
the Republic of the Congo, South Africa, the United
Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The Panel submitted
questions to all 11 countries and held substantive
discussions with government representatives from five.
The Panel enquired about relevant legislation,
investigations into the flow of the commodities,
measures taken to curb those flows, other possible
action to be taken and those Governments’ needs for
assistance. Four of the 11 countries — the Republic of
the Congo, Mozambique, the United Republic of
Tanzania and Zimbabwe — declined to respond. The
Panel later identified yet another transit point for
Congolese coltan, Nigeria, and requested information
about this trade. No response was received. Virtually
none of the countries that responded to the Panel’s
questions had conducted any investigations or adopted
any specific procedures for the identification or
inspection of the transiting of commodities from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Ugandan
authorities mentioned the impounding of a cargo of
smuggled ivory. South African officials confirmed the
seizure of a sizeable clandestine shipment of diamonds
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but
provided no details. None of the authorities in these
countries gave any indication that Congolese resources
traded through their territories should or could be
regarded as conflict goods. Almost none of the
countries proposed any meaningful measures to help
curb trade in Congolese commodities that are tainted
by criminality and militarization. Kenya, however,
proposed the reopening of the Northern Corridor route,
under the Transit Transport Coordination Authority,
with the assistance of the international community.
140. Reliable sources have told the Panel that gem
diamonds from Mbuji Mayi in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo account for much of the
phenomenal increase in diamonds transiting through
Dubai in recent years. Exports from the United Arab
Emirates to Antwerp increased to $149.5 million in
2001 from $4.2 million in 1998 according to the
Diamond High Council’s statistics. The Panel has been
told of chartered flights direct from Mbuji Mayi to
Dubai, and other routes via Dar es Salaam, on which
illicit diamond exports have been carried. Likewise,
Dubai has become a transit point for coltan from the
Uganda-controlled area and a portion of the diamonds
originating from Kisangani in the Rwanda-controlled
area. The arms and diamond smuggler Victor Bout uses
the United Arab Emirates as his permanent base, with
nine of his aircraft stationed at Ra’s al Khaimah
International Airport.
End-user countries
141. In an effort to determine what measures might be
taken at the end of the commercial chain to control the
trade in resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and sever its links to the armed conflict, the
Panel surveyed 17 end-user countries in Asia, Europe,
the Middle East and North America. Many of these
countries serve as secondary transit points and
processing centres as well as major consumer markets.
They included Belgium, China, France, Germany,
India, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malaysia,
the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, Switzerland,
Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom and the United States. In its requests, the
Panel stressed that its aim was not to obstruct trade, but
to identify mechanisms or practices that would
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eliminate the costs in war and human lives that occur in
the course of extracting and commercializing resources
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In seeking
these countries’ views, the Panel made reference to a
range of possible initiatives, while leaving open the
possibility for innovation based on lessons learned
from other conflict situations. Four countries did not
respond: India, Kazakhstan, Malaysia and the United
Arab Emirates. Few respondents commented explicitly
on the role that the trade in these commodities plays in
fuelling the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
142. The responses nevertheless indicated that efforts
are being stepped up to tackle the illicit trade in natural
resources and that awareness is growing of the ethical
responsibilities posed by conflict-driven trade in
commodities. France, Japan, Israel, Thailand and the
United States emphasized the adequacy of existing
certificates of origin or product certification regimes in
stemming the illegal trade, including the certification
scheme now in the process of being implemented under
the Kimberley Process. Like China, the Russian
Federation stressed that its participation in the
Kimberley Process is aimed at helping to sever the
links between the illegal trade in rough diamonds and
armed conflict, particularly in Africa. Germany stated
that companies in transit and end-user countries should
cease all commercial and transport activities related to
the trade in resources from the region, “unless their
counterparts are able to provide clearly documented
certificates of origin”. Most responses did not evaluate
the comparative successes and failures of certification
regimes in the face of highly criminalized or opaque
commercial chains. Switzerland expressed the view
that until the Kimberley Process certification scheme
had entered into force and more experience had been
gained from its implementation, it would be premature
to comment on the use of such regimes in regulating
the trade in commodities from certain regions. Enduser
countries did not specifically call for countries
bordering the Democratic Republic of the Congo such
as Burundi, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and
Uganda, which also trade in rough diamonds, to join
the Kimberley Process. Lebanon suggested that
standardized, mandatory certificates of origin could be
developed for certain precious commodities through
the relevant United Nations body or bodies.
143. The Russian Federation cautioned that any
proposed measures on curbing conflict-linked trade
should not hinder legitimate trade in primary
commodities or “impose an excessive burden on the
countries participating in such trade”. Several
European Union members, including France and the
Netherlands, observed that any measures affecting
trade flows would have to be taken within the
framework of the European Union and its trade
regulations. Belgium and the United Kingdom stressed
that the burden of ensuring transparency in commercial
and financial flows or supply chains should be borne
primarily by private companies and should be based on
either voluntary measures or the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Germany echoed this, saying
that it had appealed to German companies to adhere to
those guidelines as well as the principles of the
European Union Commission’s Green Paper on Social
Responsibility and the United Nations Global Compact
in their business activities in the region. Germany also
encouraged the Panel to continue its efforts to increase
the transparency of the commercial chains for the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, especially by intensifying its dialogue with
private companies. Only Belgium suggested the
possibility of imposing targeted sanctions against
businesses or individuals profiting from the trade in
conflict goods. The Netherlands expressed the view
that the verification of commodities would be less
difficult and costly if carried out at the beginning of the
commercial chain.
144. Belgium, Germany and the United States also
highlighted the re-establishment of the State’s authority
throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo as essential to combating the illicit
exploitation, and the need for capacity-building to help
achieve this. Similarly, Lebanon said that the customs
administration of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo should be reinforced so that it could more
effectively control borders, monitor trade flows and
prevent smuggling.
International and regional organizations
145. The Southern African Development Community
shared the view of some end-user States that existing
certificates of origin were adequate for demonstrating
that products had been legally produced and acquired.
Customs intelligence and investigative capability for
combating smuggling are still being developed within
SADC. Issues of capacity-building and information-
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sharing within the region will have to be addressed as
this process advances.
146. The World Customs Organization informed the
Panel that it had established a network of Regional
Intelligence Liaison Offices, each assigned to a number
of countries, to facilitate the exchange of information
and cooperation within a region. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo and many francophone
countries in the surrounding region are attached to the
Liaison Office at Douala, Cameroon. WCO observed
that the use of the Liaison Office and the WCO
Internet-based Customs Enforcement Network by the
Douala region’s members was quite low. It stressed that
curbing fraudulent trade in commodities transiting
through a region depends on effective communication
between the countries concerned.
147. With regard to trade flows, the World Trade
Organization explained in its reply to the Panel that
two provisions of the 1994 GATT, a component of the
WTO treaty, authorize members to take measures that
otherwise would be inconsistent with GATT/WTO
rules. These rules generally prohibit trade restrictions
and discrimination. Articles XXI (c) and XX describe
situations and policy aims permitting exceptional
measures. The former, the security exception provision,
refers to exceptions related to a State fulfilling its
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.
This might serve as justification for Members taking
action in compliance with a Security Council resolution
on maintaining peace and security, commented WTO.
Article XX, the provision on general exceptions, may
be evoked if the measure is adopted pursuant to one or
more policies listed in the article’s subparagraphs. For
example, subparagraph (b) refers to measures
necessary to protect human life.
148. The Economic Commission for Africa concurred
with Belgium that “smart sanctions” should be part of
the solution to ending the illegal trade. It added that the
Governments of the countries involved should also be
“held accountable for the illegal activities of
individuals and/or companies as well as banks that are
operating in their country since they have the power to
regulate them”.
VIII. Observations
149. The illegal exploitation of natural resources,
gross violations of human rights and a dire
humanitarian situation are some of the consequences of
four years of war and the lack of a central government
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the
authority and capacity to protect its citizens and
resources.
150. The withdrawal of foreign forces is an important
step towards ending the illegal exploitation of natural
resources. Yet the necessary networks have already
become deeply embedded to ensure that the illegal
exploitation continues, independent of the physical
presence of the foreign armies.
151. Another step towards halting the exploitation of
natural resources will be the early establishment of an
all-inclusive transitional government in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which would ensure that
central government control is reinstated and that viable
local administrations are empowered to protect and
regulate the exploitation activities to the benefit of the
populace. However, it is clear that, even with the
establishment of an all-inclusive government,
exercising effective control over territory and natural
resources would require time and would be possible
only within the context of a broader framework of
sound institution-building. In the interim, it is the view
of the Panel that continued monitoring and reporting on
the illegal exploitation of resources will at least serve
to deter these activities.
152. The most important element in effectively halting
the illegal exploitation of resources in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo relates to the political will of
those who support, protect and benefit from the
networks. This may pose a great challenge, given the
intricate relationships they have forged and the
dependency they have developed on the profits from
these activities. The war economy controlled by the
three elite networks operating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo dominates the economic
activities of much of the Great Lakes region. Yet the
Lusaka, Pretoria and Luanda Agreements do not
address this all-important economic component of the
conflict.
153. Armed groups, whether foreign or Congolese,
who are benefiting from these exploitation activities,
should also be taken into account in efforts to halt the
exploitation. Years of lawlessness and a Government
incapable of protecting its citizens have allowed the
armed groups to loot and plunder the country’s
resources with impunity. While some hide behind a
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political agenda, all are pursuing illegal economic
activities as a matter of survival. It is hoped that
progress in the peace process, together with an
effective and responsive programme of disarmament,
demobilization, rehabilitation, reintegration and
resettlement, would provide better alternatives to the
armed groups. This would require the necessary
funding for reintegration programmes and security
assurances for those who are not wanted for war crimes
or acts of genocide. The international community must,
therefore, provide the assistance to these programmes,
invest in publicizing them and encourage the armed
groups to participate.
154. The Panel is hoping that this report will
contribute to a shift in policies — in the light of the
recent encouraging political and military developments
on the ground — that will bring the exploitation of
resources back to a legally acceptable level.
IX. Conclusions
155. An embargo or a moratorium banning the export
of raw materials originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo does not seem to be a viable
means of helping to improve the situation of the
country’s Government, citizens or natural environment.
Massive technical and financial assistance for the
population would be required to offset the
humanitarian impact of such restrictive measures. At
the same time, if the Panel in its report does not
recommend any punitive measures to curb the illegal
exploitation and trade originating in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, this will only encourage a
continuation of the exploitation by different criminal
organizations. This could easily lead to an increase in
these activities. There must be sustained efforts to deter
illicit and illegal exploitation.
156. Restrictive measures nevertheless need to be
taken vis-à-vis the role of companies and individuals
involved in arms supply and resource plundering. The
international and multinational dimension of these
illegal activities is very important. Ethical and
transparent business practices are needed to combat
these illegal activities.
157. The establishment of a transitional government in
Kinshasa should be accompanied by four elements,
namely, the disarmament of all rebel groups in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo; phased withdrawal
of foreign troops; measures to drastically curb the
illegal exploitation and encourage legal exploitation;
and the application of serious leverage through
multilateral pressures and incentives. To these elements
must be added a dynamic monitoring process. All must
be phased, interlinked and ongoing. This dynamic
package would not only advance the peace process in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but would also
lead to a peaceful and final settlement of the
exploitation issue, ensuring that legal modes of
resource exploitation prevail. The first two elements
seem to be finding their way to an interlinked and
phased implementation as a result of the recent
agreements signed in Pretoria and Luanda. The third
element is intrinsically linked with the fourth, namely
applying leverage through incentives and disincentives.
158. In order to readjust the present process of illegal
exploitation and encourage legal exploitation, which
could contribute to the economic stability of all parties,
there is a need to apply forceful disincentives and
incentives. These should be monitored through a
proactive monitoring body. Until now, all the parties
involved in the illegal exploitation have had no strong
incentive to alter the economic status quo. It is
necessary, therefore, to find measures that address their
fears of losing revenues. Such measures will however
be effective only if a political process is undertaken
simultaneously.
159. Reconstructing and reorienting the region’s
economies are essential to peacemaking and peacebuilding.
The Panel believes that a peace dividend in
the form of economic incentives should be emphasized
by the international community in order to promote the
parties’ adherence to the peace agreements and
encourage confidence-building. The Panel also
proposes in its recommendations that a set of
disincentives be enacted to apply pressure in the case
of non-compliance with the agreements.
160. Many of the Panel’s conclusions about the
economic roots and consequences of the conflict have
been echoed in ideas associated with the proposals for
an international conference on peace, security,
democracy and sustainable development in the Great
Lakes region. Recently signed agreements may signal
that the time for organizing this conference is
approaching. Such a conference would be an ideal
forum to address the need to reorient the regional
trading system to post-conflict imperatives and for
negotiating the framework of a multilateral agreement
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to carry this out. This reorientation will require
providing the incentives and means to promote regional
economic integration, which would marginalize
criminal and military-driven trade in favour of
legitimate commercial development that is transparent
and growth-oriented. Supporting regional economic
integration could help to gradually draw the countries
involved in the conflict closer and act as a barrier to
future outbreaks of armed conflict.
X. Recommendations
Peace dividend
161. In the light of the new dynamic and progress
created by the signing of the political and military
agreements in Sun City, Pretoria and Luanda, the Panel
believes that a set of agreements or initiatives on
reconstruction and sustainable development are needed
to address the economic dimension of the Lusaka peace
process and provide incentives for continuing progress.
The first set of initiatives could be for quick-disbursing
aid for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
other Great Lakes countries involved in the conflict,
for reconstruction and rehabilitation programmes,
aimed at creating jobs, rebuilding infrastructure and
improving conditions for local populations, notably in
the areas of education, health, water and sanitation.
162. Regional economic integration and trade could be
the focus of an agreement or set of agreements that
could emerge from discussions regionally, including at
the international conference on peace, security and
sustainable development. The international community,
in particular the United Nations and the developed
countries that have actively supported the signing of
the recent agreements, can take a leading role in
convening this conference.
Institutional reforms
Capacity-building for the State institutions
163. Reconstructing and reforming the State
institutions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
particularly the State’s capacity to secure its territory
and borders, is the counterpoint to the withdrawal of
the foreign troops. The main purpose should be to
enable the legitimate transitional government to control
the country’s natural resources and borders without
foreign intervention.
164. A fast-track programme is needed to retrain and
professionalize the entire national security apparatus,
including military and intelligence, law enforcement
and regulatory bodies, such as customs, revenue
authority, immigration and natural resources agencies.
This process will require extensive international aid
and careful monitoring of progress over a sustained
period. There is a need for multilateral and bilateral
donors, together with international organizations, to
coordinate their efforts, draw on best practices
developed during other post-conflict transitions and
encourage the participation of all sectors of Congolese
society.
165. The priority areas for reform and the
strengthening of national or central institutions would
include:
• Combating the widespread criminalization in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
• Enhancing scrutiny and transparency
• Increasing accountability and ending the impunity
enjoyed by high-ranking officials and various
levels of civil servants
• Building regulatory capacity and controls
• Professionalizing institutions and their personnel,
including ensuring their independence and
neutrality
• Reforming customs and revenue administrations,
such as the Office des douanes et accises and the
Direction générale des recettes administratives,
judiciaires, domaniales et de participations
• Building the capacity of ministries and
specialized agencies related to natural resources
such as the Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de
certification des matières précieuses and the
Institut congolais pour la conservation de la
nature.
Promoting legitimate and accountable civil
administrations in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo
166. The Panel recommends that a comprehensive
economic and social development programme in the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo be set up to
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assist a transition to a legitimate civilian administration
with a capable security and law-enforcement apparatus.
Such a programme may be partially financed from the
substantial assistance commitments pledged by the
European Union, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund for post-conflict reconstruction in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Good governance in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and its compliance with peace
agreements
167. The Panel regards the quick disbursal of
development assistance as essential to addressing the
pressing social and economic needs of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. However, it also recommends
that disbursal should be contingent on the adherence of
the Government to the peace agreements it has signed
with Rwanda and Uganda, its commitment to
democratization and its progress in curbing the illegal
exploitation of its natural resources.
Reform of natural resource sectors
168. Reforms of the mining and the forestry sectors
should include the review of all concessions and
contracts signed during both wars. The resolution
adopted during the inter-Congolese dialogue,
establishing a special commission to examine the
validity of economic and financial agreements, could
serve as the framework for this process. On the basis of
the Panel’s findings, this could also target all informal
agreements on the awarding of concessions and the
implementation of contracts. The international
community, including the World Bank, the
International Finance Corporation and UNDP, could
collaborate closely with this commission and provide
the support necessary for it to carry out its work in a
thorough and objective manner. This could include
expert advice and technical assistance, part of which
could be focused on raising long-term international
investment for the rehabilitation of the mining and
forestry sectors and sustainable revenue generation.
Financial and technical measures
169. In the event of non-compliance with the recently
signed agreements, and the continuing illicit and illegal
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the Panel recommends that a
series of measures be taken against the concerned
parties.
Role of Governments
170. The Governments of the countries where the
individuals, companies and financial institutions that
are systematically and actively involved in these
activities are based should assume their share of the
responsibility. The Governments have the power to
regulate and sanction those individuals and entities.
They could adapt their national legislation as needed to
effectively investigate and prosecute the illegal
traffickers. In addition, the OECD Guidelines offer a
mechanism for bringing violations of them by business
enterprises to the attention of home Governments, that
is, Governments of the countries where the enterprises
are registered. Governments with jurisdiction over
these enterprises are complicit themselves when they
do not take remedial measures.
Reducing official development assistance
171. The Panel’s exchange of views with bilateral and
multilateral organizations, as well as a review of
applicable agreements such as the Cotonou
Convention, indicates that there is ample justification
for donors to respond to a Security Council
resolution — which might be necessary — which
would propose certain reductions in official aid to
promote peace and good governance.
172. Measures should also be aimed at making aid
disbursements to Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and
Zimbabwe conditional on their compliance with the
relevant agreements in the Lusaka peace process and
on verifiable measures taken to halt the illegal and
illicit exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo which can help to achieve
multiple objectives. Non-compliance would
automatically trigger a review and reduction of
assistance programmes for those countries. It should be
stipulated that reductions of aid disbursements are to
be applied to institutional budget support, stabilization
lending or project lending and not sector-specific
allocations.
173. Implementation would proceed in three stages:
(a) A brief grace period to permit the
verification of the compliance of all the parties to the
conflict;
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(b) An initial period when aid disbursements
are reduced by a modest percentage if the countries
involved have not met withdrawal targets;
(c) A subsequent period during which the aid is
proportionately reduced at regular increases at regular
intervals unless troop withdrawals and compliance with
the peace agreements meet the required standards.
Restrictions on business enterprises and
individuals
174. The Panel has compiled an extensive list of
business enterprises and individuals whose
involvement in the commercial activities of the three
elite networks active in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo is well documented. At this time it is however,
focusing its recommendations regarding restrictive
measures on only a small number of enterprises (annex
I) and individuals (annex II) — many of them cited in
this report — as a result of the wealth of information
and documentary evidence gathered on them by the
Panel.
175. By contributing to the revenues of the elite
networks, directly or indirectly, those companies and
individuals contribute to the ongoing conflict and to
human rights abuses. More specifically, those business
enterprises are in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Therefore, the Panel
recommends that the Security Council consider
imposing certain restrictions on a selected number of
business enterprises and individuals involved in
criminal and illicit exploitation that are identified in
this report. The list emphasizes the implication of
foreign enterprises as well as nationals of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in the economic
exploitation.
176. There could be a short grace period of four to five
months before the restrictions set out below are
applied, during which the targeted entities and
individuals would have the opportunity to prove that
they have ceased all involvement in the exploitation
activities. The restrictive measures could include:
(a) Travel bans on selected individuals
identified by the Panel;
(b) Freezing of the personal assets of persons
involved in illegal exploitation;
(c) Barring selected companies and individuals
from accessing banking facilities and other financial
institutions and from receiving funding or establishing
a partnership or other commercial relations with
international financial institutions.
Adherence of business enterprises to the OECD
Guidelines
177. The Panel has drafted another list of business
enterprises (annex III) which, in the view of the Panel,
are in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Countries which are
signatories to those Guidelines and other countries are
morally obliged to ensure that their business
enterprises adhere to and act on the Guidelines.
178. The OECD Guidelines outline a procedure for
bringing violations of the Guidelines to the attention of
the Governments of the States where the business
enterprises are registered. Home Governments have the
obligation to ensure that enterprises in their jurisdiction
do not abuse principles of conduct that they have
adopted as a matter of law. They are complicit when
they do not take remedial measures. The monitoring
body, as described below, will contribute to
implementing these procedures by verifying and
updating its list of business enterprises in violation of
the OECD Guidelines and transmitting evidence of
those violations to the OECD National Contact Points
in the home Governments of the enterprises.
Transit trade and regional organizations
179. To promote post-conflict peace-building
programmes, the Panel recommends that the
international community support the following
confidence-building measures:
(a) Encouraging the East African Community,
composed of Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic
of Tanzania, to include Rwanda and Burundi in its
membership;
(b) Helping to re-establish historical and legal
trading patterns, for example by reopening the
Northern Corridor transit route to legal trade among the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda,
Uganda and Kenya;
(c) Assisting the relevant African regional trade
organizations to improve their customs and trade
monitoring mechanisms. These might include
juxtaposed border control facilities, harmonization of
controls to promote the system and use of certificates
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of origin and destination, and assistance in developing
national legislation for monitoring financial flows
related to trade;
(d) Improving air traffic control services in the
Great Lakes region. The Technical Cooperation
Programme of ICAO can provide assistance to States in
the region that need to improve their air traffic control
service.
Regulating commodity trade from conflict areas
180. Specialized industry organizations such as the
Tantalum Niobium International Study Centre, the
International Gold Council and the International Coffee
Federation could be requested, in cooperation with the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
to monitor trade in commodities from conflict areas.
This would result in a reliable body of data that
includes information relating to the evacuation of
commodities, transit routes through neighbouring
countries and information on end-users and their
operations. The data produced could be the basis of
industry policing of those individuals, companies and
financial institutions that trade in commodities from
conflict areas. The data could also serve in the event
that a moratorium is called for on the illegal trade in
commodities originating in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, such as coltan.
Kimberley Process
181. All Member States where trade in rough
diamonds is being carried out should join the
Kimberley Process. Universal participation will make
the Kimberley Process a more effective instrument.
182. Diamond-producing countries should apply
internal controls from extraction to exportation.
Consideration should be given to establishing a set of
internationally agreed upon standards for this process.
A specialized enforcement organization within each
member country needs to be formed that has the
authority, knowledge and specialized training
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Kimberley
Process.
183. A permanently staffed secretariat should be
created with the responsibility of coordinating the
implementation of the Kimberley Process.
Protecting timber and forestry products
184. The Panel recommends that Member States
actively support the efforts by intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations at both the
international and regional levels to halt illegal logging
and to develop an international definition of “conflict
timber”.
Trade in endangered species
185. Trade involving endangered species of wild fauna
and flora taken from protected areas of the eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo is another activity
in which elements of the criminal networks are
engaged. Member States are asked to support the Task
Force established under the Lusaka Agreement on
Cooperative Enforcement Operations Directed at
Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora by
(a) strengthening their national legislation to reinforce
the powers of investigation and prosecution of the Task
Force’s personnel and (b) ensuring that their National
Bureaus, established under that Agreement, intensify
their investigations into the criminal traffic in
endangered species of wild animals and plants as
outlined by CITES.
Monitoring process
186. There is a need for a monitoring process that
continues to scrutinize the situation in the Great Lakes
region to ensure that exploitation activities are
significantly curbed. A monitoring body, which the
Security Council may consider establishing, could
report to the Security Council on a regular basis on its
findings, including recommendations about further
action to halt activities that violate the Council’s
decisions. The Panel’s expertise could be helpful in this
regard.
187. The monitoring body could report to the Security
Council on any State or company that might be
involved in the illegal exploitation of natural resources.
The monitoring body could recommend to the Council
that major multilateral institutions and bilateral donors
review and reduce the financial assistance programmes
of any State found to be involved in these illegal
activities. It could recommend to the Council that any
company found to be implicated in the illegal economic
exploitation be added to or kept on the list of those
enterprises subject to financial and travel restrictions.
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In addition, the monitoring body could collaborate
closely with national officials, including from the
Central Bank of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Office des douanes et accises (customs
administration) and the Direction générale des recettes
administratives, judiciaires, domaniales et de
participations (revenue administration), the Ministry of
Mines and Hyrdocarbons, the State mining enterprises
and private mining and mineral companies, in order to
update information on how capacity-building and
reforms are affecting the exploitation activities. In
carrying out these tasks, the monitoring body could
coordinate with the international financial institutions,
the African Union, and the Economic Commission for
Africa.
188. The Panel would also recommend that the
monitoring body, with the adequate expertise and
resources, track the following:
(a) Possible reductions in the level of illegal
exploitation;
(b) The implementation of possible travel bans
and the freezing of assets;
(c) Ongoing investigations into the illicit
commerce in minerals, timber and endangered species
of fauna and flora. The monitoring body could also
collaborate further on some of these investigations;
(d) The sectors of the economy that have been
affected by the exploitation activities;
(e) The impact on the humanitarian situation in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region;
(f) The reduction in violent conflict and the
maintenance of civil order in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, as well as the viability of local
administrations and institutions related to the mandate
of the monitoring body which might be adopted by the
Council.
(Signed) Mahmoud Kassem
Chairman
(Signed) Jim Freedman
(Signed) Mel Holt
(Signed) Bruno Schiemsky
(Signed) Moustapha Tall
(Signed) Patrick Smith
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Annex I
Companies on which the Panel recommends the placing of
financial restrictions
Name Address Business Principal officers Comment
1 AHMAD DIAMOND
CORPORATION
ANTWERP
BELGIUM
Diamond
trading
Mr. AHMAD Imad
2 ASA DIAM ANTWERP
BELGIUM
Diamond
trading
Mr. AHMAD Ali Said
3 BUKAVU AVIATION
TRANSPORT
DRC Airline
company
Mr. BOUT Victor
4 BUSINESS AIR
SERVICE
DRC Airline
company
Mr. BOUT Victor
5 COMIEX-CONGO KINSHASA
DRC
Mr. KABASELE
TSHINEU Frederic
6 CONGO HOLDING
DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY
DRC Trading and
exploitation of
natural
resources DRC
Mr. Félicien
RUCHACHA
BIKUMU
Mrs. Gertrude
KITEMBO
7 CONMET UGANDA and
DRC
Coltan trading Mr. Salim Saleh
Mr. and Mrs.
PISKUNOV
8 COSLEG ZIM and DRC Joint-venture
COMIEX and
OSLEG
Mr. KABASELE
TSHINEU Frédéric
ZVINAVASHE Gava
MUSUNGWA Vitalis
9 EAGLE WINGS
RESOURCES
INTERNATIONAL
PO BOX 6355
Kigali, Rwanda
Exploitation
coltan from
the DRC
Mr. Alfred RWIGEMA
Mr. Anthony
MARINUS
Mr. Ronald S.
SMIERCIAK
Tel:
+250.51.17.25
10 ENTERPRISE
GENERAL MALTA
FORREST
Exploitation
Cobalt,
Copper in
DRC
Mr. George FORREST
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Name Address Business Principal officers Comment
11 EXACO Exploitation
Cobalt,
Copper in the
DRC
12 GREAT LAKES
GENERAL TRADE
BP 3737
KIGALI,
RWANDA
Mineral
trading
Maj Dan MUNYUZA
Mr. E. GATETE
Mr. Steven K.
AKHIMANZI
Tel/Fax:
+250.78.792
13 GREAT LAKES
METALS
Kigali, Rwanda Mineral
trading
14 GROUP GEORGE
FORREST
Exploitation
Cobalt and
Copper
Mr. George FORREST
15 MINERALS BUSINESS
COMPANY
Boulevard Du
30 Juin,
Immeuble ex-
SCIBE,
Kinshasa, DRC
Mineral
trading
Mr. KABASELE
TSHINEU Frederic
Lt General
ZVINAVASHE Gava
Musungwa Vitalis
Mr. Charles
DAURAMANZI
16 OKAPI AIR
ODESSA AIR
Uganda Airline
company
Mr. BOUT Victor
17 OPERATION
SOVEREIGN
LEGITIMACY (OSLEG)
Pvt Ltd
Harare,
Zimbabwe
Commercial
interests ZIM
in DRC
Lt General
ZVINAVASHE Gava
Musungwa Vitalis
18 ORYX NATURAL
RESOURCES
DRC Diamond
exploitation in
the DRC
Mr. AL-SHANFARI
Thamer Said Ahmed
19 RWANDA ALLIED
PARTNERS
Kigali, Rwanda Mineral
trading
Mr. Hadji OMARI
Mr. Simba MANASE
20 RWANDA METALS Kigali, Rwanda Mineral
trading
21 SARACEN UGANDA
Ltd
Uganda Security
Company
Lt General (Rtd) Salim
Saleh
Mr. Heckie HORN
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Name Address Business Principal officers Comment
22 SIERRA GEM
DIAMONDS
ANTWERP
BELGIUM
Diamond
trading
Mr. AHMAD Said Ali
Mr. AHMAD Hassan
Mr. AHMAD Nazem
23 TANDAN GROUP SOUTH
AFRICA
Holding Mr. Niko SHEFER
24 THORNTREE
INDUSTRIES (Pvt) Ltd
Provides
capital to
MBC
Mr. Niko SHEFER
25 TREMALT Ltd Exploitation
cobalt and
copper
Mr. John Arnold
BREDENKAMP
26 TRINITY INVESTMENT
GROUP
DRC and
UGANDA
Exploitation
resources and
tax fraud
Mr. NGOLA Sam
General KAZINI
27 TRIPLE A DIAMONDS ANTWERP
BELGIUM
Diamond
trading
Mr. AHMAD Moussa
Ahmad
Mr. AHMAD Ahmad
Ali
28 TRISTAR Kigali, Rwanda Holding FPR
29 VICTORIA GROUP DRC and
UGANDA
Exploitation
resources and
tax fraud
Lt General (Rtd) Salim
Saleh
Mr. KHANAFER
Nahim
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Annex II
Persons for whom the Panel recommends a travel ban and
financial restrictions
Last name First name Alias Date of birth
Passport
number Designation
1 AHMAD Ali Said 01.03.1959 Businessman
2 AHMAD Ahmad Ali 01.01.1929
3 AHMAD Imad Businessman
4 AHMAD Said Ali 09.04.1935 Businessman
5 AHMAD Hassan 21.05.1957 Businessman
6 AHMAD Moussa Ahmad
7 AHMAD Nazem 05.01.1965 Businessman
8 AKHIMANZA Steven K. Businessman
9 AL-SHANFARI Thamer Said Ahmed 03.01.1968 00000999
(Oman)
Chairman & Managing
Director ORYX Group and
ORYX Natural Resources
10 BOUT Victor Anatoljevitch BUTT,
BONT,
BUTTE,
BOUTOV,
SERGITOV
Vitali
13.01.1967
or
???
21N0532664
29N0006765
21N0532664
21N0557148
44N3570350
Dealer and transporter of
weapons and minerals
11 BREDENKAMP John Arnold 11.08.1940 Businessman
12 BURUNDI Colonel UPDF
13 DAURAMANZI Charles Shareholder MBC
14 ENGOLA Sam Businessman
15 FORREST George A. Businessman
16 GATETE Edward Officer RPA; Operation
Congo Desk
17 HORN Heckie Manager Saracen Uganda
Ltd
18 KABANDA Emmanuel Officer RPA; Operation
Congo Desk
19 KABAREBE James Chief of Staff RPA; Former
Chief of Staff DRC; in
charge of Congo Desk
20 KABASELE
TSHINEU
Frédéric Manager COMIEX,
representative of COSLEG
21 KALUME
NUMBI
Denis General, shareholder SENGA
SENGA
22 KARIM Peter Officer UPDF
23 KATUMBA
MWANKE
Augustin Minister of Presidency, DRC
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Last name First name Alias Date of birth
Passport
number Designation
24 KAZADI
NYEMBWE
Didier Director Agence National de
Renseignements DRC
25 KAZINI James Chief of Staff, Maj. General
UPDF
26 KHANAFER Nahim Businessman
27 KIBASSA
MALIBA
Politician, former Minister of
Mines, shareholder SENGA
SENGA
28 KITEMBO Gertrude Businesswoman
29 KONGOLO Mwenze Minister DRC, shareholder
SENGA SENGA
30 MANASE SIMBA Businessman
31 MAWAPANGA Mwana Nanga Ambassador DRC in Harare
32 MAYOMBO Nobel Chief Military Intelligence
(CMI) in Uganda
33 MNANGAGWA
DAMBUDZO
Emmerson Speaker of Parliament
ZIMBABWE
34 MOYO Mike Wing Commander ZDF
35 MOYO Sibusio Bd-Gen (Rtd) ZDF
36 MUAMBA NOZI Richard MWAMBA
NOZY
Congolese diamond trader;
Counterfeiter
37 MUNYUZA Dan Colonel RPA; In charge of
security DRC (96-98)
38 MWENZE
KONGOLO
Minister National Security,
DRC
39 NUMBI
KALUME
Denis Minister of Planning and
Reconstruction DRC
40 NZIZA Jack Officer RPA
41 OKOTO
LOLAKOMBE
Jean-Charles PDG MIBA
42 OMARI HADJI Businessman
43 OTAFIRE
KAHINDA
Colonel UPDF
44 MARINUS Anthony Manager Eagle Wings
45 PISKUNOV Anatol Businessman
46 PISKUNOVA Valentina Businesswoman
47 RUCHACHA
BIKUMU
Felicien Businessman
48 RUPRAH Sanjivan Samir Nasr
Medhi Khan
09.08.1966 D-001829-00 Businessman
49 RWIGEMA Alfred Manager Eagle Wings
50 SALIM SALEH AKANDWA
NAHO Caleb
Lt General (Ret.) UPDF
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Last name First name Alias Date of birth
Passport
number Designation
51 SHEFER Niko Nico 25.12.1950 7616225
(Israel)
6651101
(Israel)
Businessman
52 SMIERCIAK Ronald S. Manager Eagle Wings
53 YUMBA MONGA Manager GECAMINES
54 ZVINAVASHE
GAVA
MUSUNGWA
Vitalis Lt General ZDF, Rep. of
COSLEG, shareholder MBC
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Annex III
Business enterprises considered by the Panel to
be in violation of the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises
Name of company Business Country
Country signatory of
OECD Guidelines
1 AFRICAN TRADING
CORPORATION Sarl
Trading of natural resources
from DRC
SOUTH AFRICA NO
2 AFRIMEX Coltan trading UK YES
3 AHMAD DIAMOND
CORPORATION
Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
4 A.H. PONG & Sons Import-Export SOUTH AFRICA NO
5 A. KNIGHT
INTERNATIONAL Ltd
Assaying UK YES
6 A & M MINERALS and
METALS Ltd
Trading minerals UK YES
7 ALEX STEWART (Assayers)
Ltd
Assaying UK YES
8 AMALGAMATED METAL
CORPORATION Plc
Trading coltan UK YES
9 AMERICA MINERAL FIELDS
(AMFI)
Mining USA YES
10 ANGLO AMERICAN Plc Mining UK YES
11 ANGLOVAAL MINING Ltd Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
12 ARCTIC INVESTMENT Investment UK YES
13 ASA DIAM Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
14 ASA INTERNATIONAL BELGIUM YES
15 ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS Mining GHANA NO
16 AVIENT AIR Private military company ZIMBABWE NO
17 BANRO CORPORATION Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
18 BARCLAYS BANK Banking UK YES
19 BAYER A.G. Chemical industry GERMANY YES
20 B.B.L. Banking BELGIUM YES
21 BELGOLAISE Banking BELGIUM YES
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Name of company Business Country
Country signatory of
OECD Guidelines
22 CABOT CORPORATION Tantalum processing USA YES
23 CARSON PRODUCTS Commercialization of resources
of the DRC
SOUTH AFRICA NO
24 CHEMIE PHARMACIE
HOLLAND
Financial and logistical support
to EWRI
NETHERLANDS YES
25 COGECOM Coltan trading BELGIUM YES
26 C. STEINWEG NV Freight Forwarders BELGIUM YES
27 DARA FOREST Timber exploitation THAILAND NO
28 DAS AIR Airline company UK YES
29 DE BEERS Diamond mining and trading UK YES
30 DIAGEM BVBA Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
31 EAGLE WINGS RESOURCES
INTERNATIONAL
Exploitation coltan from the
DRC
USA YES
32 ECHOGEM Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
33 EGIMEX BELGIUM YES
34 ENTREPRISE GENERALE
MALTA FORREST
Construction, Mining, Trading DRC NO
35 EUROMET Coltan trading UK YES
36 FINCONCORD SA Coltan trading from DRC SWITZERLAND YES
37 FINMINING Coltan trading from DRC SAINT KITTS NO
38 FIRST QUANTUM
MINERALS
Mining CANADA YES
39 FLASHES OF COLOR Diamond trading USA YES
40 FORTIS Banking BELGIUM YES
41 GEORGE FORREST
INTERNATIONAL AFRIQUE
Management DRC NO
42 HARAMBEE MINING
CORPORATION
Mining CANADA YES
43 H.C. STARCK GmbH & Co
KG
Processing coltan GERMANY YES
44 IBRYV AND ASSOCIATES
LLC
Diamond trading SWITZERLAND YES
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Name of company Business Country
Country signatory of
OECD Guidelines
45 INTERNATIONAL
PANORAMA RESOURCES
Corp
Mining CANADA YES
46 ISCOR Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
47 JEWEL IMPEX Bvba Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
48 KABABANKOLA MINING
COMPANY
Mining ZIMBABWE NO
49 KEMET ELECTRONICS
CORPORATION
Capacitor manufacture USA YES
50 KHA International AG Minerals trading and
exploitation
GERMANY YES
51 KINROSS GOLD
CORPORATION
Mining USA YES
52 K & N Project development BELGIUM YES
53 KOMAL GEMS NV Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
54 LUNDIN GROUP Mining BERMUDA NO
55 MALAYSIAN SMELTING
CORPORATION
Coltan processing MALAYSIA NO
56 MASINGIRO GmbH Minerals trading GERMANY YES
57 MELKIOR RESOURCES Inc Mining CANADA YES
58 MERCANTILLE CC Trading in natural resources
from DRC
SOUTH AFRICA NO
59 MINERAL AFRIKA Limited Trading in natural resources
from DRC
UK YES
60 NAC KAZATOMPROM Tantalum processing KAZAKHSTAN NO
61 NAMI GEMS Diamond trader BELGIUM YES
62 NINGXIA NON-FERROUS
METALS SMELTER
Tantalum processing CHINA NO
63 OM GROUP Inc Mining USA
FINLAND
YES (USA)
YES (FINLAND)
64 OPERATION SOVEREIGN
LEGITIMACY (OSLEG) Pvt
Ltd
Commercial interests
ZIMBABWE in the DRC
ZIMBABWE NO
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Name of company Business Country
Country signatory of
OECD Guidelines
65 ORION MINING Inc Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
66 PACIFIC ORES METALS
AND CHEMICALS Ltd
Coltan trading HONG KONG NO
67 RAREMET Ltd Coltan trading from DRC SAINT KITTS NO
68 SARACEN Security company SOUTH AFRICA NO
69 SDV TRANSINTRA Transport FRANCE YES
70 SIERRA GEM DIAMONDS Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
71 SLC GERMANY GmbH Coltan transport GERMANY YES
72 SOGEM Coltan trading BELGIUM YES
73 SPECIALITY METALS
COMPANY SA
Coltan trading BELGIUM YES
74 STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK
Banking U.A.E. NO
75 SWANEPOEL Construction SOUTH AFRICA NO
76 TENKE MINING
CORPORATION
Mining CANADA YES
77 THORNTREE INDUSTRIES
(Pvt) Ltd
Provides capital to MBC ZIMBABWE NO
78 TRACK STAR TRADING 151
(Pty) Ltd
Exploitation and trading
minerals DRC
SOUTH AFRICA NO
79 TRADEMET SA Coltan trading BELGIUM YES
80 TREMALT Ltd Mining British Virgin
Islands
NO
81 TRINITECH
INTERNATIONAL Inc
Coltan trading and exploitation USA YES
82 TRIPLE A DIAMONDS Diamond trading BELGIUM YES
83 UMICORE International Metals and
Materials Group
BELGIUM YES
84 VISHAY SPRAGUE Capacitor manufacture USA and
ISRAEL
YES (USA)
NO (ISRAEL)
85 ZINCOR Mining SOUTH AFRICA NO
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Annex IV
Countries visited and representatives of Governments and
organizations interviewed
The Panel wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Government officials,
diplomats, United Nations agencies, donor institutions, non-governmental
organizations, civil society groups, journalists, commercial operators and others
with whom it met and who have assisted in making possible the present report.
The Panel also wishes to extend special thanks to the United Nations
Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition, the
Panel would like to thank the United Nations Office in Burundi and the UNDP
offices in Bangui, Brazzaville, Bujumbura, Kampala, Kigali, Kinshasa, Pretoria and
Yaounde for their assistance and support.
Austria
International organizations
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
Belgium
Government officials
Inter-Ministerial Ad Hoc Working Group on the Illegal Exploitation of the
Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural
Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
State representatives
European Union Commission
Others
Arslanian Frères
International Peace Information Service
Sibeca
Sogem mineral trading company (division of Umicore)
Tantalum Niobium International Study Center
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Burundi
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Energy and Mines
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Minister of Finance
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of France
International organizations
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi
Others
Affimet
ASYST mineral trading company
Comptoir minier des exploitations du Burundi (COMEBU)
HAMZA mineral trading company
Central African Republic
Government officials
Ministry of Economy
Ministry of Equipment, Transport and Settlement
Ministry of Finance and Budget
Minister of Mines, Energy and Hydraulics
Minister of Trade and Industry
Department of Customs
State representatives
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Embassy of France
European Union
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International organizations
Representative of the Secretary-General in the Central African Republic
ASECNA
UNHCR
UNDP
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Defence
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Land Affairs, Environment and Tourism
Minister of Planning and Reconstruction
Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vice-Minister of Mines
Deputy Chief of Staff of the FAC
Governor of the Central Bank
Governor of Equateur Province
Governor of Katanga
Governor of Mbuji Mayi
Vice-Governor, in charge of the Economy, Finance and Development, Equateur
Province
Centre d’évaluation, d’expertise et de certification
Comité interministériel de “Small Scale Mining”
Générale des carrières et des mines (Gécamines)
Office national des transports
Régie des voies aériennes
Société minière de Bakwanga (MIBA)
State representatives
Ambassador of Angola
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Canada
Ambassador of Germany
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
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Belgian Consul
Embassy of Denmark
Embassy of France
European Union
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)
FAO
GTZ
MONUC
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
World Bank
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
MLC
President
Secretary-General
RCD-Goma
Vice President
Commissioner of the Interior
Governor of Kalemie
Department of Mines and Energy
Vice-Governor of Kisangani
Customs officials
RCD-K/ML
Second Vice-President
Minister of Interior
Acting Chief of Staff for the APC
Governor of Bunia
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Governor of Ituri Province
Mayor of Butembo
Others
Action contre la faim
ADETE
Agro Action Allemand
Associazione per la Cooperazione Internationale e l’Ainto Umanitario
Anglican Church
Ashanti Goldfield
Association africaine des droits de l’homme (ASADHO)
Banque internationale de commerce
BEP Productique (BEPROD)
Conseil african et malgache pour l’enseignement supérieur (CAMES)
Caritas
Centre d’information et d’animation missionnaire (CIAM)
Centre d’etudes national sur le développement populaire (CENADEP)
Centre de formation, recherches en conservation forestière
Centre national d’appui au développement et à la participation populaire
(CENADEP)
Church of Christ of the Congo
Comité provincial des diamantaires (CPD)
Commissions diocésaines Justice et Paix (CDPJ)
Conseil apostolique des laïques catholiques au Congo (CALCC)
Conference on Central Africa Moist Forest Ecosystems participants
Confédération de petites et moyennes enterprises du Congo (COPEMECO)
COSLEG (joint venture of COMIEX Congo and OSLEG)
Dara Forêt
Exploitation forestière, sciérie raffinage de la papaine (ENRA)
Fédération des entreprises du Congo (FEC — Kinshasa, Kisangani, Mbandaka,
Beni, Goma, Gémena, Bukavu)
Fédération nationale des parents d’élèves du Congo (FNPEC)
Fédération des ONG laïques à vocation économique au Congo (FOLECO)
Forces novatrices pour l’union et la solidarité (FONUS)
Groupe de recherches et d’échanges technologiques (in Kabinda)
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Groupe Lotus
Groupe musulman des droits de l’homme
GST (Gécamines labour union)
Héritiers de la justice
International Human Rights Law Group
International Rescue Committee
Inter Press Service (IPS)
JAMS
Journalistes en danger
Justice et Paix
Ligue des avocats pour les droits de l’homme
Kababankola Mining Company
Kotinne Plantation
Jardin botanique d’Eala
Maintenance, Assistance, Technique and Design
Mayi-Mayi representatives
Médecins sans Frontières (of Belgium and France)
Mennonite Church
Mouvement nationale congolais Lumumba (MNCL)
Mouvement des pionniers de l’indépendence
Mouvement populaire de la révolution (MPR)
National Commission of Experts on the illegal exploitation of the natural
resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
National Congolese Railway Society (SNCC)
National Council of Development NGOs (CNONGD)
Nganga Plantation
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
Organisation concertée des ecologistes et amis de la nature (OCEAN)
OKIMO
Oxfam
Parti démocrate et social chrétien (PDSC )
Parti lumumbiste unifié (PALU)
Pharmakina
Pole Institute
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Promotion de la femme rural (PROFER)
Programme d’appui aux femmes victimes des conflits et des catastrophes
Radio Okapi
Regional Committee of Development NGOs (CRONGD)
Religious community representatives
Radio Télé Debout Kasaï (RTDK)
Save the Children
Sengamines
Shenimed Coltan Comptoir
Syndicat des exploitants alluvionnaires du diamant (APLOKA)
SOCEBO
Société civile du Congo (SOCICO)
Société de renforcement de communauté de base (SERACOB)
Solidarités
TOFEN-CONGO
TRAFCO Freight Company
UDPS representatives
UPDF Sector Commander in Bunia
UPDF Battalion Commander in Butembo
UPDF Colonel Peter Karim
Union des banques congolaises
Voix du handicape pour les droits de l’homme (VHDH)
Wildlife Conservation Society
France
Government officials
Ministry of Economy and Finance
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Others
Air France Cargo
Germany
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
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Others
H. C. Starck
Karl-Heinz Albers Mining and Minerals Processing
Kenya
Government officials
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Trade and Industry
Ministry of Transport and Communications
Kenya Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
High Commissioner of the Republic of South Africa
Ambassador of Rwanda
High Commissioner of Uganda
Belgian Ministry of Defence
German Embassy
Belgian Parliamentary Inquiry Commission
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Democratic Republic of the Congo National Parks representatives
Institut congolais de conservation de la nature (Ministry of Environment,
Democratic Republic of the Congo)
International organizations
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
Special Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
World Customs Organization
World Wildlife Fund
Others
Association of Cargo Airliners
Congolese Commission of National Experts
Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund
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International Crisis Group
Kababankola Mining Company/Tremalt Ltd.
Kencargo
Lusaka Agreement Task Force
Martin Air
Oryx Natural Resources
Oxfam
World Vision
Republic of the Congo
Government officials
Minister of Environment
Ministry of Transport
Department of Customs (Ministry of Finance)
State representatives
Embassy of Belgium
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
European Union
International organizations
UNDP
Rwanda
Government officials
Special Envoy of the President for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Burundi
Office of the President of Rwanda
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism
Customs Commission
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
European Union
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International organizations
MONUC
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
President of RCD-Goma
Eagle Wings Resources
SDV Transintra
SOGERMI mineral trading company
South Africa
Government officials
Acting Director-General for Foreign Affairs
Department of Foreign Affairs
Department of Defence
Department of Home Affairs
Department of Minerals and Energy
Financial Intelligence Centre
National Intelligence Agency
National Intelligence Coordinating Committee
National Prosecuting Authority
National Treasury
Secretariat for Safety and Security
South African Diamond Board
South African Police
South African Revenue Service
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of France
Ambassador of the United States
High Commission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
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Others
Banro
Bateman Minerals and Metals
Centre for the Study of Economic Crime
Cobalt Metals Company
Compliance Institute
De Beers Group
DiamondWorks
Executive Outcomes
Fluxmans Attorneys
Grove Family Trust
International Institute of Security Studies
Kimberley Process Secretariat
Money Laundering Forum
Overseas Security Services
PricewaterhouseCoopers Forensic Services Division
Rand Afrikaans University
Rand Merchant Bank
SaferAfrica
STK Consulting
Tandan Holdings
Trans Hex
Ware Associates
University of South Africa at Pretoria
University of Witwatersrand/South African Institute for International Affairs
Uganda
Government officials
First Deputy Prime Minister
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Chief of Staff of UPDF
Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry
Bank of Uganda
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Department of Geological Survey and Mines
Uganda Bureau of Statistics
Uganda Civil Aviation Authority
Uganda Coffee Development Authority
Uganda Revenue Authority
State representatives
Ambassador of Belgium
Ambassador of Denmark
Ambassador of France
High Commissioner of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland
Ambassador of the United States of America
Head of the Delegation of the European Union
International organizations
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank
Others
Amnesty International
Judicial Commission of Inquiry
Saracen Uganda Ltd.
Uganda Debt Network
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Government officials
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
United States of America
Government officials
Department of Justice
State representatives
Belgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Permanent Representatives to the United Nations, Security Council members
and other Member States
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International organizations
International Monetary Fund
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and
Armed Conflict
UNDP
Forum on Forests
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
World Bank
Others
Human Rights Watch
Oxfam
Winston Strawn and Partners
Zambia
Others
Non-governmental organizations
Zimbabwe
Government officials
Ministry of Mines
State representatives
British High Commission
Others
Renaissance Bank
Dozer Parts
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Annex V
Abbreviations
ADB African Development Bank
ANC Armée nationale congolaise (army of RCD-G movement)
APC Armée patriotique congolaise (army of the RCD-ML rebel group
ASECNA Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à
Madagascar
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora
coltan columbo-tantalite
COMIEX Compagnie mixte d’import-export
COSLEG COMIEX-OSLEG joint venture
FAC Forces armées congolaises
ex-FAR former Forces armées rwandaises
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Gécamines Générale des carrières et des mines
GTZ Deutsche Gesellschafte für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German
Government agency for technical cooperation)
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
KMC Kababankola Mining Company
MIBA Société minière de Bakwanga
MLC Mouvement de libération congolais
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OKIMO Office des Mines de Kilo-Moto
OSLEG Operation Sovereign Legitimacy
RCD Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (Rally for Congolese
Democracy)
RCD-Congo Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie (newly formed rebel
group made up of MLC and RCD-Goma dissidents)
RCD-Goma Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie, based in Goma
RCD-K/ML Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie — Mouvement de
libération, initially based in Kisangani, now headquartered in Bunia
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RCD-N Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-National
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
SADC Southern African Development Community
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SOMIGL Société minière des Grands Lacs
SOCEBO Société congolaise d’exploitation du bois
UDPS Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WCO World Customs Organization
ZDF Zimbabwe Defence Forces
- 278 -
ANNEX 1.11
Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo 2001 (“Porter Commission”), Final Report, November 2002
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JUDICIAL COMMI S S ION OF
INQUIRY
INTO
A L L E G AT I O N S I N T O I L L E G A L
E X P L O I TAT I O N O F N AT U R A L
R E S O U R C E S A N D O T H E R F O RMS O F
WE A LT 10 H I N T H E D EMO C R AT I C
R E P U B L I C O F C O N G O 2 0 0 1
(May 2001– November, 2002)
Legal Notice No. 5/2001, as amended
FINAL R E P O R T
November, 2002
I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION . 1
1. INTRODUCTION ................................ 1
2. MEMBERS: .......................................... 2
3. TERMS OF REFERENCE ................... 2
4. TIME FRAME OF THE INQUIRY ..... 3
5. CONSTRAINTS/LIMITATIONS ........ 3
6. METHODOLOGY ............................... 4
6.1. Documentation: ....................... 5
6.2. Evidence ................................... 5
7. RULES OF PROCEDURE ................... 9
8. WORKING HOURS............................. 9
9. PLACE OF WORK .............................. 9
10. SECTIONS OF EVIDENCE ................ 9
2. DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS ........................ 10
11. ILLEGALITY. .................................... 10
11.1. Violation Of Sovereignty ........ 10
11.1.1. Whether the UPDF should have gone into the Democratic
Republic of Congo. ................ 10
11.1.2. Whether Businessmen and International Companies may
trade in a war zone without compromising the Sovereignty of the
country 11
II
11.2. Respect By Actors Of The Existing Regulatory Framework 11
11.3. Use And Abuse Of Power....... 12
11.3.1. Forced monopoly in trading 12
11.3.2. Unilateral fixing of prices of products by the buyer 13
11.3.3. Confiscation and looting of products from farmers 13
11.3.4. Use of military forces in various zones to protect some
interest or to create a situation of monopoly. 13
11.3.5. Violation of international law including “soft” law. 13
12. EXPLOITATION ............................... 15
3. ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 16
13. THE KAZINI REVELATIONS. ........ 16
13.1. UPDF Officers conducting business 16
13.2. Gold Mining ........................... 19
13.3. Intelligence/Security Funding 20
13.4. Looting ................................... 21
13.5. Smuggling .............................. 21
14. PRE-EXISTING STRUCTURES THAT FACILITATED EXPLOITATION
23
14.1. Allegations against the Government of Uganda 25
14.2. Allegations against General Salim Saleh 27
14.3. Allegations against Kainerugaba Muhoozi 28
14.4. Allegations against top UPDF Officers 28
14.5. Allegations against General Kazini. 28
14.6. Transportation Networks ....... 29
III
14.6.1. Military Air Base .... 29
14.6.2. Allegations against the Government of Uganda 37
14.6.3. Implied Allegations against The Civil Aviation Authority
38
15. MASS SCALE LOOTING ................. 48
15.1. Amex Bois .............................. 48
15.2. La Forestiere ......................... 48
15.3. Confiscation of Coffee Beans . 49
15.4. Cars........................................ 49
15.5. Theft from Banks .................... 50
15.6. Murder of Civilians ................ 50
15.7. Organised Looting ................. 50
15.8. Allegations against Uganda... 51
15.8.1. Appointment of Adele Lotsove 51
15.8.2. Knowledge of Key Ugandan Officials 53
16. SYSTEMATIC AND SYSTEMIC EXPLOITATION 53
16.1. Timber : Dara Forêt and Dara Great Lakes International. 53
16.1.1. Allegations against His Excellency the President and his
family 62
16.2. Mining Sector ......................... 63
16.2.1. Mining Disasters and Soldiers imposing “Gold Tax” 64
16.2.2. Harrassment of Civilians 70
16.2.3. Trainees used as Convincible Labour to Mine 71
16.2.4. Foreign Labour ...... 71
IV
16.3. Wildlife. .................................. 72
16.3.1. Poaching in Garambwa National Park 72
16.3.2. Tusks seized in Isiro 72
16.3.3. Tusks seized from Col Mugenyi near Garambwa National
Park 72
16.3.4. Allegations against the Government of Uganda 73
17. MONOPOLIES AND PRICE FIXING74
17.1. Coffee Harvesting by J P Bemba74
17.2. Control of the Economy ......... 74
17.3. Allegations against Uganda... 75
17.4. Individual Colonels collecting or demanding taxes 77
18. CURRENT STRUCTURES OF ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION 78
18.1. Administrative Structures. ..... 78
18.1.1. Appointment or confirmation of Congolese Administrators
78
18.2. Modes of transportation......... 79
18.2.1. Allegations against Uganda 79
18.3. Air Alexander International Ltd80
18.4. Take Air Ltd ........................... 81
18.5. Other Private Companies ...... 81
18.5.1. Victoria Group ....... 81
18.5.2. Trinity ..................... 83
19. SYSTEMATIC EXPLOITATION ..... 85
19.1. Allegations against Uganda... 85
V
19.2. Allegations against Top Army Commanders 86
20. INDIVIDUAL ACTORS .................... 86
20.1. Major General Salim Saleh ... 86
20.2. Jovial Akandanawaho ............ 88
20.3. General James Kazini ............ 88
20.3.1. General Kazini's Coltan. 89
20.3.2. General Kazini's demand for $5000. 91
20.3.3. General Kazini’s assets. 92
20.4. Colonel Tinkamanyire............ 92
20.5. Col Otafiire. ........................... 92
20.5.1. Documents obtained at the request of the Nairobi witness
when giving evidence ............. 93
20.5.2. Letter dated 3rd August 2000 from Professor Wamba,
instructing payment of $13,000 to Col Otafiire. 94
20.6. Col Otafiire, Col Mayombo and Hon. Wapakhabulo 94
20.6.1. Payment of US$380,000. 94
20.6.2. Letter from Professor Wamba dia Wamba authorising
payment. (2) ........................... 96
20.7. Colonel Mayombo’s advice to Professor Wamba dia Wamba. 105
20.8. Ateenyi Tibasiima and Roger Lumbala 106
20.9. Other Individual Actors ....... 106
20.10. The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF) 106
21. ECONOMIC DATA : CONFIRMATION OF THE ILLEGAL
EXPLOITATION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE Democratic
Republic of Congo ......................................... 108
21.1. Gold ..................................... 108
VI
21.2. Diamonds. ............................ 112
21.3. The Diamond Link ............... 114
21.3.1. Victoria ................. 115
21.3.2. Khalil .................... 116
21.3.3. Picadilly Import and Export 118
21.3.4. General Kazini ..... 119
21.3.5. Jovial Akandwanaho122
21.4. Niobium................................ 123
21.5. Mineral Transit figures ........ 124
21.6. Cobalt: ................................. 126
4. LINKS BETWEEN THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT. 127
22. NATURE OF THE LINKS ............... 127
22.1. Budgets compared to military expenditure. 127
22.2. Financing the War ............... 129
22.2.1. Primary Means of Financing The War 129
22.2.2. The Re-Exportation Economy 130
22.2.3. Purchase Of Supplies On Credit 132
22.2.4. Racketeering By Soldiers 132
22.2.5. Handing over of Arms132
22.2.6. MLC, RCD Goma and RCD-ML 135
22.3. Allegations against Uganda. 137
22.4. Special Features of the Links137
VII
22.4.1. Lendus And Hema Conflict: 137
22.4.2. Nia Nia Confrontation: 139
22.4.3. The Kisangani Clashes 140
22.5. Facilitators or passive accomplices 142
22.5.1. Bilateral Donors ... 142
22.5.2. Mulilateral Donors142
22.5.3. Transit Countries .. 143
22.6. The pivotal role of leaders ... 143
22.6.1. President Museveni143
5. PANEL’S CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS146
23. MINERAL RESOURCES ................ 146
24. SYSTEMIC AND SYSTEMATIC EXPLOITATION 146
25. ROLE OF PRIVATE SECTORS...... 147
26. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DONORS 147
27. TOP MILITARY COMMANDERS . 148
6. UGANDAN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATIONS 148
28. Registrar of Companies .................... 148
28.1. Recommendations – Companies.152
29. Uganda Revenue Authority .............. 153
29.1. Recommendations: –URA .... 154
7. CONSIDERATION OF THE ADDENDUM 155
30. INTRODUCTION ............................ 155
30.1. Methodology ........................ 155
VIII
31. EXPLOITATION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES 157
31.1. “Illicit” and “Illegal” ......... 157
31.2. Coltan .................................. 160
31.3. Gold ..................................... 160
31.4. Copper and Cobalt .............. 162
31.5. Diamonds ............................. 162
31.6. Timber .................................. 163
32. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST UGANDA IN THE ADDENDUM 163
33. THE LINK BETWEEN EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES AND THE
CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT ...... 167
33.1. Recent Developments ........... 167
33.1.1. Uganda ................. 167
33.1.2. Democratic Republic of Congo - Dara Forêt 167
34. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANEL IN THE ADDENDUM 168
35. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANELS 169
35.1. Institutional .......................... 169
35.2. Financial and Technical ...... 170
35.3. Sanctions .............................. 171
8. CONSIDERATION OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE PANEL 172
36. Methodology ..................................... 172
37. Elite Networks .................................. 173
37.1. Key Figures .......................... 173
37.1.1. Lt General Salim Saleh 173
IX
37.1.2. General Kazini ..... 173
37.2. Members of Networks .......... 173
37.2.1. Col Mayombo ....... 173
37.2.2. Col Otafiire ........... 174
37.2.3. Sam Engola ........... 174
37.3. Front Companies ................. 176
37.3.1. Victoria ................. 176
37.3.2. Trinity ................... 176
37.3.3. La Conmet and Sagricof 176
37.4. Methods used by Networks .. 177
37.5. Intimidation and use of force by UPDF 177
38. Training of Paramilitary Force ......... 177
39. Tax Exemptions ................................ 180
39.1. Local Operators ................... 181
39.2. Victor Bout ........................... 181
40. Strategies and Sources of Revenue ... 181
40.1. Coltan: ................................. 181
40.2. La Conmet ............................ 182
40.3. Diamonds - Victoria ............ 183
40.4. Tax Fraud and the requisition of assets 184
40.5. Economic exploitation and ethnic conflict. 184
40.6. Armed Conflict and its consequences: Malnutrition and mortality
185
X
40.7. Cooperation ......................... 186
40.7.1. “Concessions” ...... 188
40.7.2. Questionable documents 191
40.7.3. Credibility ............. 192
40.7.4. Comparative Procedures 192
40.7.5. Powers of the Commission 193
40.8. Agreement in General .......... 194
41. Recommendations in the Final Report194
42. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ............. 195
43. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
196
43.1. Inquiry into allegations of illegal exploitation of natural resources
196
43.1.1. Exploitation .......... 196
43.1.2. Illegality ................ 196
43.2. Inquiry into allegations of Mass Scale Looting and Systematic
Exploitation ....................................... 197
43.2.1. Mass scale Looting197
43.2.2. Systematic and Systemic Exploitation 197
43.3. Inquiry into Allegations of Complicity by His Excellency the
President and his family ................... 198
43.4. Inquiry into Allegations of Involvement of Top Ranking Army
Officers and other Ugandans ............ 199
44. RECOMMENDATIONS of the Commission 200
44.1. Indiscipline of UPDF Officers200
44.2. General Kazini ..................... 200
XI
44.3. UPDF Officers conspiring to allow illegal flights 200
44.4. UPDF and the Ongoing Defence Review 200
44.4.1. Assessment ............ 200
44.4.2. Professional ability201
44.4.3. Constitutional Requirements 201
44.5. Senior Officials of CAA........ 201
44.6. Military Air Base ................. 201
44.7. Mining Sector ....................... 201
44.8. Lt. General Salim Saleh ....... 202
44.8.1. Disobedience to the orders of the President 202
44.8.2. Take Air Ltd .......... 202
44.8.3. Offences against the Companies Act 202
44.9. Diamond smuggling: ........... 202
44.10. Registration of Companies . 202
44.10.1. Updating of Register202
44.10.2. Proactive management of Registration 203
44.10.3. Revision of penalties203
44.10.4. Air Alexander ..... 203
44.11. URA .................................... 203
44.12. Addendum to the original Panel Report 203
44.13. Panel’s Final Report .......... 203
44.13.1. General ............... 203
44.13.2. Colonel Burundi and LA CONMET. 204
XII
44.13.3. Sam Engola ......... 205
44.13.4. Colonel Peter Karim.205
44.13.5. Major General James Kazini. 205
44.13.6. Colonel Noble Mayombo. 205
44.13.7. Colonel Otafiire. . 205
44.13.8. Lt. General (ret’d) Salim Saleh. 206
9. ANNEX 1: EXHIBITS .................................. 208
10. ANNEX 2: WITNESSES .............................. 223
11. ANNEX 3: PAPER ON ILLEGALITY ......... 230
45. Introduction. ...................................... 230
46. The Concept of ‘Illegality’ and the Democratic Republic of Congo Expert
Panel’s Interpretation. .................................... 231
47. Theoretical and Doctrinal Postulations on Illegality – Concept 236
48. Concept and Parameters of ‘Illegality’ Revisited 239
49. Concluding Remarks......................... 241
1
1 . ESTABLI SHMENT OF THE
COMMISS ION
1. INTRODUCTION
This report is as a result of an inquiry made into the allegations contained in a UN Expert
Panel Report on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Expert Panel was appointed by the Secretary General
at the request of the Security Council through its President’s Statement S/PRST/2000/20. It
produced a report which was submitted to the Security Council on 16th April, 2001. In that
report, the Expert Panel alleges that there has been illegal exploitation of Congolese natural
resources by individuals, governments and armed groups; 10 and that the Government of the
Republic of Uganda was one of those involved.
The Security Council considered the original Panel and made a number of decisions and
observations. It noted that the report contained disturbing information about the illegal
exploitation of Congolese resources. It took note of the action plan of the Expert Panel for
time extension of the original Panel’s mandate to allow it to conduct a follow-up investigation
and to prepare an Addendum to its final report. It also urged governments named in the report
to conduct their own inquiries into these allegations. Accordingly His Excellency the
President of the Republic of Uganda, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs took urgent
steps to implement the decision to set up an inquiry.
20 The reconstituted Panel of Experts under the new Chairmanship of Ambassador Kassem has
produced an Addendum to the original Panel Report which this Commission will also
consider.
This Commission produced an Interim Report which was sent to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs on 15/10/01 and immediately published on the World Wide Web. That Interim Report
was directed at Legality, involvement in illegal activities by the Ugandan Government, His
Excellency the President and Members of his family only, although other issues have had to
be addressed to deal with these matters.
This Commission has used the basis of its Interim Report to answer both the issues left
outstanding by the Interim Report, and additional matters arising from the Addendum to the
2
original Panel Report in this Final Report. The Report attempts, so far as possible, to follow
the headings and the order of Paragraphs in the original Panel Report and the Addendum.
On 23rd May 2001, the Minister of Foreign Affairs issued Legal Notice No.5 which was
published as Supplement No.23 in the Uganda Gazette of 25th May 2001, and by which the
Minister established the Commission of Inquiry (Allegations into Illegal Exploitation of
Natural Resources and other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo ) 2001.
2. MEMBERS:
The Commission consisted of the following persons:
Hon. Justice David Porter : Chairman
Hon. Justice J.P. Berko 10 : Member
Mr. John Rwambuya retired Senior UN official : Member
Mr. Bisereko Kyomuhendo Principal State Attorney : Secretary
Mr. Alan Shonubi, Advocate : Lead Counsel
The Commission was ably assisted by Dr. Henry Onoria particularly on International Law
and Mr. Vincent Wagona from the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions as Assistant
Lead Counsel.
3. TERMS OF REFERENCE
The terms of reference of the Commission are as follows; _
to inquire into the allegations of illegal exploitation of natural resources and
20 other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, to wit minerals,
coffee, timber livestock, wildlife, ivory, moneys or other property from the
Democratic Republic of Congo contained in the said report.
To inquire into the allegations of mass scale looting and systematic
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth from the
Democratic Republic of Congo by the Government of Uganda made in the
said report;
To inquire into allegations of complicity or involvement by His Excellency
the President and his family in the alleged illegal exploitation made in the
said report;
3
To inquire into allegations of involvement in the illegal exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo by top ranking UPDF
officer and other Ugandan individuals named in the said report.
4. TIME FRAME OF THE INQUIRY
The Commission was required to submit a report of its findings and recommendations to the
Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs within three months after commencing duties. This
time period has been increased from time to time by Legal Notice, and includes a 6 week
Christmas break
The Commissioners were sworn in on 4th June 2001, but because of logistical set backs, they
did not open public hearings until 12 July 2001. The intervening 10 period was spent in
preparing office, acquiring equipment, recruiting secretariat, collecting and reading source
documents and relevant data (such as the original Panel Report) and interviewing, selecting
and summoning witnesses.
5. CONSTRAINTS/LIMITATIONS
The Commission has experienced various constraints in its task. One of the major snags was
the lack of sources of information. Although the original Panel was prepared to accept
unsworn, and often hearsay evidence in private, this Commission is forced by the
Commissions of Inquiry Act to work only with sworn evidence, given in public.
The Commission had hoped for the original Panel’s assistance in providing some of the
20 sources it had not included in its report, but disappointingly from the outset, this was not the
case. In initially refusing to share with this Commission their sources of information, the
original Panel made it clear that it was the policy of UN not to disclose such sources in its
reports. However, later on during further visits by members of the reconstituted Panel to this
Commission, some documents were availed which have assisted enquiries to a certain extent.
Further documents were provided from time to time, although some of them turned out to be
impossible to rely upon, while others were translations from French into English. The
reconstituted Panel availed one witness, together with facilities to hear him in Nairobi, which
was of great assistance. All in all, however, this Commission has been left with the
impression that the reconstituted Panel could have done a great deal more to assist, and could
30 have done it earlier in the investigations.
In that regard it is important to be aware of the difference in emphasis between the original
Panel and this Commission. Broadly put, it is for the original Panel to gather intelligence,
4
evaluate it, and base allegations on the result. It is for this Commission to look at the
allegations raised, search for evidence to support or deny such allegations, and to make
recommendations to the calling Minister, and ultimately to the Uganda Government upon
those allegations. This Commission’s writ runs only in Uganda. In the nature of things,
therefore, the original Panel is in the position of accuser, whilst this Commission has to try to
obtain prima facie evidence of the accusations for action by the Government of Uganda.
Normally then, the original Panel would be in the position of complainant, providing the basis
and evidence, or at least lines of inquiry, to convince this Commission of the truth of specific
allegations. The provision of a few documents, even including the undoubted assistance given
in respect of the interview of one witness in Nairobi (to whom this Commission 10 will refer as
“the Nairobi witness”) has not amounted to sufficient to assist to any great extent.
This has been a problem, since one of the things this Commission has had to bear in mind is
not blindly to accept the original Panel’s evaluation of the intelligence it has gathered, but to
look at the evidence available on specific matters, and to make its own evaluation. In doing so
there are important occasions upon which the evaluation of intelligence by the original Panel
has been found to be unreliable- for example, the Case Study of Dara Forêt, and the various
documents supplied by the reconstituted Panel to this Commission upon which the
reconstituted Panel clearly relied which have been found probably to have been forged. This
theme is further examined in Paragraph 6.2 below
20 Other constraints included unwillingness from fear by witnesses interviewed to tell all they
knew, inefficiency of some officials or poor record keeping, fear of self incrimination in
instances of corruption and in some cases fear of reprisal. Also financial shortage and
bureaucracy in releasing approved funds had an adverse effect on the work of the
Commission.
6. METHODOLOGY
In conducting its inquiry, the Commission looked at its task as one of inquiry and
investigation rather than that of prosecution or defence of any one who appeared before it.
With few exceptions, the hearing was conducted in public and evidence was given on oath.
Witnesses were free to be accompanied or assisted by counsel before the Commission, if they
30 so wished. Members of the Public were repeatedly encouraged to give information to this
Commission, and any interested party was free to engage counsel to question witnesses. The
Commission utilized two types of information for its inquiry: documentation and evidence.
5
6.1. Documentation:
Abundant documents were available to the Commission. They included;
Report of the original Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural
Resources and other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, dated 16th April 2001.
Addendum to the above Report
Response by the Government of the Republic of Uganda to the above report
dated 23 April 2001.
Response to the Addendum
Statement by H.E President Museveni 10 about the original Panel Report dated 3
May 2001.
Legal Notice issued by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs/Holding the
Portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 23 May 2001, establishing the
Commission and terms of reference therein.
The Commission of Inquiry Act, Cap. 56 of the Laws of Uganda as amended
by Statutory Instrument 200 of 1965.
Sections 89 and 93 of the Penal Code Act.
Lusaka Agreement 1999 (and subsequent protocols).
A list of other relevant documents is given in Annex I Exhibits:
20 6.2. Evidence
His Excellency President Museveni gave evidence. Also all Ugandans and some non-
Ugandans mentioned in the original Panel Report provided evidence on oath. They
included, the Defence Minister, Mr. Amama Mbabazi, the former Army Commander,
then Major General . J. J. Odongo, the former Secretary of Defence, Dr. Ben Mbonye,
the Current Secretary of Defence, David G Musoke, the former Chief of staff, Brig.
James Kazini, Major General . Salim Saleh (Caleb Akandwanaho). Also interviewed
were Government officials from various Ministries and institutions. They produced
and defended or explained data and reports presented to the Commission. This
enabled the Commission to cross check or compare the figures or sources with those
30 given in the original Panel Report.
6
Only one witness appeared in response to the Commission’s appeal to the public to
come forward and give evidence. Unlike the original Panel of Experts, the
Commission’s terms of reference restricted its task to the allegations relating to
Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A full list of witnesses is given in
Annex II Witnesses
On the question of consideration of evidence, there is an obvious difference between
the proceedings of the original Panel and of this Commission. The original Panel said
on this subject :
“Methodology. Owing to the nature of the work and the complexities of the
issues, a methodology that allows flexible data 10 collection was essential in
order to complete this project. The Panel has therefore utilized:
(a) Primary data collection. Official documentation from ministries and
other institutions as well as recorded minutes of meetings involving various
relevant actors;
(b) Secondary sources. Reports, workshop proceedings, published and
unpublished literature;
(c) Interviews. Structured, semi-structured and open interviews as well as
interviews resulting from various network referrals.
10. A vast amount of data was obtained from three essential sources:
20 (a) Countries and other entities involved in the conflict in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, namely: Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, RCD-Goma and
RCD-ML;
(b) “Third-party” sources such as Belgium, Cameroon, China, Denmark,
France, Germany, Kenya, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United
States of America, Switzerland, various United Nations agencies, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade
Organization, OECD, the International Coffee Organization, De Beers, the
30 Diamond High Council, the International Diamond Manufacturers
Association, the University of Maryland, the World Resource Institute and
CIFOR;
(c) Various individual actors and stakeholders who expressed an interest
for various reasons in sharing their knowledge and understanding with the
Panel.
The production and export data series available for the analysis cover the
period 1995-2000. Data were systematically analysed separately and then
compared with one another. Comparative analysis thus contributed to the
Panel’s ability to develop a good understanding of the issues. In addition,
40 the Panel sought to cross-check every item of information received. In
relation to this and to the extent possible, Panel members attempted to
speak to individuals against whom serious allegations were made. When
access to those key witnesses or primary actors was denied, Panel members
7
often relied on their closest collaborators for insight. The Panel however
faced a problem of imbalance in the acquisition of data. Indeed data was
abundant for Rwanda, Uganda, RCD-Goma, RCD-ML and MLC. This is
partly due to the high number of insiders living in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and in Europe who were directly involved with those entities
and who offered to share almost everything they knew or had experienced
or gathered as documentation while they were involved with them. The
same quantity and quality of data were not available for Angola, Namibia
or Zimbabwe, although the Panel visited those countries. This constraint
can be felt in the report. Overall the report was 10 written using the empirical
method combined with the economic analysis of data collected, supported
by elements of evidence.”
The Addendum to the Report does not address this subject, and must be assumed to
have adopted the same approach. Often the reconstituted Panel refers to only one
source, whether reliable or credible.
This is a pity, because the Government of Uganda in its response took exception to
the original Panel’s methodology, and accused the original Panel of not following its
own expressed methods of work.
For this Commission, bound as it is to hear sworn evidence in public, it would seem
20 that the majority of evidence likely to be obtained by such a methodology would be
either hearsay, biased, or pure gossip, all untested.
An example of the sort of problem which this methodology, as practiced by the
original Panel, would create all by itself is the swingeing criticism of the Uganda
Government, His Excellency the President, and of various companies by the original
Panel in their so-called Case Study of Dara Forêt.
As this Commission has already shown in its Interim Report and repeats here in
Paragraph 16.1 below, that investigation was in many areas one sided, biased, and
completely wrong, because the original Panel did not do what it said it was going to
do, that is to interview those accused, or ask to do so.
30 The original Panel Report directly caused the misconceived and wrongful kidnapping
and detention by the Mayi Mayi of 24 of Dara Forêt’s expatriate employees for a
considerable period of time.
The Addendum to the Report hides an admission that the original Panel was wrong,
shyly tucked away in a passage on payment of tax, under the heading of “The
Democratic Republic of Congo” within the heading of “The Link between
exploitation of resources and the continuation of the conflict”. and fails to
8
acknowledge the obvious fact that the original Panel’s accusation, levelled against
the President and the Government of Uganda as conspirators with Dara Great Lakes
Industries Ltd to facilitate fraud against the Timber Certification system, is totally
unsupported, and even worse, untrue.
So far as this Commission can see, the very minimum standard of proof or
methodology would be to hear both sides of every story, which the original Panel
failed to do. The reconstituted Panel heard both sides of the Dara Forêt saga, as they
interviewed Mr. Kotiram, as they did many other accusees, but failed to record their
conclusions having done so.
For this sort of inquiry, acknowledging that open hearings 10 on oath are likely to give a
very limited picture, one could well adopt the methodology of the original Panel of
Experts on Sierra Leone, who said on this subject::
“C. Standards of Verification
The Panel agreed at the outset of its work to use high evidentiary standards
in its investigations. This required at least two credible and independent
sources of information to substantiate a finding. Wherever possible, the
Panel also agreed to put allegations to those concerned in order to allow
them the right of reply. In the past, allegations against various parties to
the conflict in Sierra Leone have been denied with the question, ‘Where is
20 the evidence?’ An example of this is the standard response to charges that
weapons have been channelled to Liberia through Burkina Faso. In the
report that follows, we have dealt in detail with this particular allegation. It
might still be asked, ‘Where is the evidence?’ On this charge and others,
full details of the sources will not be revealed, but the evidence is
incontrovertible. The Panel examined the flight records maintained at the
offices of Roberts Flight Information Region (FIR) in Conakry for all
aircraft movement in West Africa during the period in question. It saw
photographs of the aircraft being loaded in Burkina Faso. It examined
flight plans. It spoke to eyewitnesses of aircraft movement in Burkina Faso
30 and Liberia, and it spoke to individuals who were on board the aircraft in
question. In addition to its own detailed verification, the Panel received
corroborating information from international intelligence agencies and
police sources operating at international as well as national levels. The
assistance of Interpol specialists was also taken as and when required. This
is an example of one of the more difficult issues examined by the Panel. All
issues have been judged and reported using the same standard. “
Unfortunately the traps warned against by the Sierra Leone Panel are exactly the traps
into which the original Panel fell: it is not very clear that the Addendum has helped to
free them.
9
7. RULES OF PROCEDURE
While the Commission was empowered to adopt its own rules of procedure, it on the whole
adhered to the Evidence Act (cap.43).
8. WORKING HOURS
The working hours of the Commission were from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. from Monday to
Friday of each week. Public hearings were normally conducted between 9:00 a.m. and 5:30
p.m.
9. PLACE OF WORK
The Commission’s office was located in suites 102-104 Nile Hotel. The Commission had
open hearings at the International 10 Conference Centre.
10. SECTIONS OF EVIDENCE
The evidence gathered was divided in the following briefs;
1. Background to Uganda involvement in the Congo.
2. Exploitation allegations pertaining to timber – Dara Forêt Case Study and other
timber related allegations.
2A Aviation and Airport
3. Exploitation allegations pertaining to minerals, diamonds, gold, cassiterite, other
minerals and economic data.
4. Exploitation allegations pertaining to coffee, livestock, wildlife, ivory, money and
20 other property.
5. Exploitation allegations pertaining to mass scale looting systematic and systemic
exploitation.
6. Allegations against His Excellency the President and his family in alleged illegal
exploitation.
7. Exploitation by individuals and top UPDF officers named in the report.
10
8. Upcountry considerations and evidence.
The Briefs were generally intertwined in such a way that the evidence in one brief could also
appear in another brief or, to some extent, be mentioned in another.
2 . DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS
11. ILLEGALITY.
This Commission has read Paragraph 15 of the Report of Experts on illegality. Bearing in
mind that there are pending proceedings before the International Court of Justice between the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, this Commission takes the view that it would be
wrong to attempt a full definition of illegality in the context of exploitation of resources in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, particularly with regard to Uganda’s 10 intervention in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. As to violation of sovereignty, it would be wrong for this
Commission to come to any conclusion. However, as to illegality of alleged exploitation of
natural resources, this matter may be considered.
The original Panel Report defined four concepts of illegality:-
11.1. Violation Of Sovereignty
The history of Zaire now the Democratic Republic of Congo since independence has been
characterised by the seizure of power by military means. There is no doubt that, even before
the rebellion in 1996 Kinshasa had little or no control over the Eastern the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and that to all intents and purposes, apart from the technical drawing of
20 lines on a map, in practice these were different countries.
The point about sovereignty is that consideration of it falls into two headings:-
11.1.1. Whether the UPDF should have gone into the Democratic Republic of Congo.
This Commission’s consideration of the evidence shows that the original incursion
into the Democratic Republic of Congo was by consent between Uganda and the
Laurent Kabila government. It has been shown that movement across the
Democratic Republic of Congo over the period of a year was strategically
necessary from Uganda’s point of view, and this Commission has said that in view
of the outstanding ICJ case, it will not attempt finally to decide the matter.
11
However, there are many examples from up-country visits of breach of
Uganda’s sovereignty, prior to the first incursion by the UPDF, by groups actively
supported and sheltered, first by the Mobutu regime, and later by the regime of
Laurent Kabila.
Whether or not the movement across the Democratic Republic of Congo was legal
or illegal under International Law is irrelevant to the consideration of illegal
exploitation of the resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo, because
exploitation would be by trade, and this Commission has been advised that even
during an illegal occupation, trade is not affected (see Annex III Paper on
Illegality and International Law). Further, this Commission 10 has great difficulty in
differentiating in principle between the events in the Democratic Republic of
Congo and recent events on the International Stage.
11.1.2. Whether Businessmen and International Companies may trade in a war zone
without compromising the Sovereignty of the country
Even if it were to be argued that Uganda’s presence in the Democratic Republic of
Congo is unlawful on the basis of UN resolutions, this does not necessarily imply
that commercial activities in the Eastern Part of the Democratic Republic of
Congo should be deemed illegal. For International Doctrine and Practice admits of
the continuity of the political, socio-economic and cultural life of the people and
20 communities in territory occupied. Trade by businessmen and International
Companies is only a facet of that continuity. The alleged exploitation found by
this Commission after hearing ample evidence appears to have been mainly in the
nature of trade, rather than deliberate policy of the Uganda Government as
consistently alleged in the original Panel Report. The reconstituted Panel have
come to the same conclusion as this Commission in the Addendum to the Report
(see Paragraph 98 of the Addendum )
11.2. Respect By Actors Of The Existing Regulatory Framework
There is no doubt that since 2nd August 1998, the Kinshasa Regime has never had
effective control in Eastern and North Eastern the Democratic Republic of Congo.
30 This was a mere reflection of the situation which prevailed before the rebellion
against the Mobutu regime. Therefore the authorities exerting effective power and
control over Northern, Eastern and North Eastern the Democratic Republic of Congo
after August 1998 were the various rebel groups, as recognised in the Lusaka
Agreement.
12
This Commission is surprised to see, in Paragraph 15(b) of the Report, the
suggestion by the original Panel that rebels in effective control of an area somehow
adopt the title of “sovereignty” over that area. This Commission’s view is that
sovereignty is indivisible within borders and relates to the whole of the Democratic
Republic of Congo. This Commission thinks that the original Panel was ill advised to
use this phraseology.
The original Panel appears to say on the one hand that breach of sovereignty is illegal,
and on the other hand that rebels exerting effective power and control over an area
can set up a regulatory framework to govern the use and exploitation of natural
resources in t 10 hat area. The two are incompatible.
This Commission is inclined to the view that Congolese, in effective control of
territory in the Democratic Republic of Congo, who set up or adopt a regulatory
framework, commit no breach of sovereignty, and therefore that regulatory
framework must be obeyed by traders and businessmen who operate in that territory.
It is not, however, for those traders or businessmen to look into the application of
taxes, merely to comply with the regulations.
Throughout the Addendum the reconstituted Panel does not use the word “illegal”
once as an active criticism, merely in titles. Only at the end is the word “illicit”
allowed to creep in, and then only on one occasion in relation to Uganda.
20 The Addendum to the original Panel Report appears to accept that rebel leaders have
in the main adopted the regulatory framework which previously existed, sometimes
with variations: and that accords with this Commission’s observation of import,
export and transit documents.
11.3. Use And Abuse Of Power
The original Panel gives five examples of abuse of power :
11.3.1. Forced monopoly in trading
Forced monopoly should not be confused with price fixing in the ordinary course
of trade. For example in the coffee trade, quite often coffee buyers will provide
sacks, either free or at a price, for the growers: this is an advantage to both parties:
30 clean coffee for the trader, and facilitation of packing for the growers. However,
coffee prices will be fixed by the buyers, and if there are fewer buyers, the
13
situation will appear more and more like a monopoly: but such a practice is in
the ordinary course of business. (see Panel Report Paragraph 65)
Similar practices exist in the tobacco industry, where seed money, fertilizers,
chemicals and hand tools are provided, and recovered from the farmer through
tobacco prices.
But where the circumstances amount to a use of military force as considered under
Paragraph 11.3.4 below, this should obviously be considered as illegal.
11.3.2. Unilateral fixing of prices of products by the buyer
In view of the practices in the coffee and tobacco trade, this Commission cannot
agree that the examples given in the original Panel Report 10 involve illegality in the
examples quoted. (See 11.3.1 above)
11.3.3. Confiscation and looting of products from farmers
These would obviously be rightly considered as illegal where there is evidence.
However the examples quoted throughout the original Panel Report do not have
sufficient evidentiary support to ground this complaint. (See e.g. Paragraph 15.3
below)
11.3.4. Use of military forces in various zones to protect some interest or to create a
situation of monopoly.
Once again one has to distinguish circumstances. There is a great deal of
20 difference between provision of security in the general sense, which enables
businessmen to trade safely, and specific protection of interests for the benefit of a
particular party. To satisfy this commission’s conditions of work, this Commission
would need evidence of specific instances, which evidence in the main is not
available. The evidence of Adele Lotsove and General Kazini clearly shows that,
after initial occupation, what was expected of the UPDF was to provide security.
11.3.5. Violation of international law including “soft” law.
In Paragraph 15 (d), the original Panel considered that business activities carried
out in violation of international law were illegal, and included "soft" law in that
definition.
14
This Commission has received a great deal of evidence relating to import,
export and transit of timber. Certification of timber is an example of “soft” law,
and the only one referred to in the original Panel Report. This Commission was
told that the only certified Forest in Africa is in Gabon: researches on the Internet
show that Smartwood, one of the certifying bodies, do not even have a category
for Africa. Other certifying bodies mention forests in South Africa only
On the basis of evidence this Commission has received there is no doubt whatever
that, although the international community quite rightly promotes proper forest
management for the protection of the environment, and uses certification as a
powerful tool to that end, nevertheless in commercial 10 terms the difference between
certification and non-certification amounts to a difference in price only, and as a
matter of fact, companies involved in the timber trade will use certification where
they can, but will nevertheless sell uncertified timber where certification is not
possible or too expensive.
It is difficult to describe an act as illegal unless there is some penalty attached to
the performing of the act, which is not the case for certification of timber, and this
Commission doubts that the original Panel of experts was correct in including
"soft" law in their definition of illegality.
This Commission does not think that the definition of illegality is quite as simple as
20 the original Panel of Experts has set out in the report.
On the basis of the response of the Republic of Uganda, and that of His
Excellency President Museveni, this Commission takes the view that there are
many considerations which the original Panel did not include, some of which are
implicitly recognised in documents such as the Lusaka Agreement to which the
original Panel does not refer throughout the Report, although the reconstituted
Panel have the Agreement well in mind. The omission of the original Panel was
unfortunate, because there is no doubt that the Lusaka Agreement recognizes and
legitimises the various rebel groups, and their administrations and indeed
Uganda’s role as a peacekeeper. The Agreement itself is witnessed by major
30 nations and representatives of the UN and is recognized and being implemented
by the United Nations Security Council.
As this Commission understands the position of the Government of the Republic
of Uganda, and the case put forward by His Excellency the President in their
respective responses, there is a level of trade which must be expected to continue
15
whatever the political situation, and for which provision must be made during
times of trouble. In respect of a country like the Democratic Republic of Congo,
which on the Eastern side is in practice landlocked due to the difficulty of
communication with Kinshasa, and indeed Uganda itself, cross-border trade is a
fact of life, and in some cases is the support of life itself.
Control of that level of trade must be allowed to be exercised by whoever is in de
facto control of the area in question. Coffee, for instance, grows, is picked, dried,
packed and stored: but it does not wait for 30 years for politicians to settle their
differences. A market must be found for it before it goes off. If that market is
across the border of another country, then that is where 10 it will be sold, whatever
the rules of an administration thousands of kilometres away, which has no de facto
control over the area where the coffee was grown.
At a higher level of trade, such as mineral resources, wherever there are such
resources, there will be miners to mine them. Those miners have to make a living,
and in order to do that they have to sell what they mine. There have been earlier
precedents of rebels while in de facto control, granting concessions to companies
based in other countries, before being successful and later forming the
government. For instance, the original Panel Report cites concessions granted to
Zimbabwean companies during Laurent Kabila’s rebellion against Mobutu.
20 12. EXPLOITATION
This Commission has also read the original Panel's definition of exploitation in Paragraph 16
of the original Panel Report. Once again, this Commission hesitates to enter upon a full
definition of the word for the same reason as above. However the word itself does not bear the
overtones of illegality with which it has been used in the present context. It is perfectly
normal to exploit a forest, or a Gold Mine or a diamond mine in the ordinary course of trade.
Many national or international companies enter onto the sovereign territory of another country
than their own in search of opportunities for exploitation of natural resources. It is the
question of illegality which should bring such actions to the attention of the international
community. The original Panel was somewhat confused about this, while the reconstituted
30 Panel has abandoned the use of the word “illegality” almost entirely.
16
3 . ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
Originally this Commission received no assistance from the reconstituted Panel. However
when the Commission was about to wind up, some documents were received from the
reconstituted Panel, which prompted this Commission to recall General Kazini for the third
time. After some difficulty in securing his attendance, the General attended, and after giving
evidence about the documents obtained from the new Panel, produced a number of radio
messages which affected this Commission’s understanding of what was going on in the the
Democratic Republic of Congo. so far as the UPDF was concerned, 10 and confirmed certain
suspicions which this Commission had entertained throughout. That evidence is considered
here first, as it affects the consideration of the subsequent Headings, taken from the original
Panel Report. The relevant allegations in the original Panel Report involve confiscation,
extraction, forced monopoly and price fixing. Some of the revelations made by General
Kazini in the radio messages which he produced go to confirm some of the allegations made
by the original Panel.
13. THE KAZINI REVELATIONS.
The radio messages concerned the undermentioned subjects:
13.1. UPDF Officers conducting business
20 In answer to the President's radio message (set out in a quotation of the message at
Paragraph 14.6 below), General Kazini wrote the following message (dated the 20th
December 1998) within hours: --
"It is true that some officers were getting excited about doing business in
Congo from the beginning but it was discouraged. What is happening is
that some Ugandans could be in business partnership with some
commanders but no officers or men are directly involved in trade in Congo.
There is a big influx of Congolese businessman into Entebbe using our
Aircraft on their return journeys they are still facing difficulties to take
items bought. We have been squeezing to assist them but we cannot handle
30 all their cargo. So I suggest that the Ministry of Commerce or a trade
delegation from UMA to meet the RCD leadership on your
recommendation to agree on modalities of doing business with their
17
counterparts in Congo. By a copy of this message 2 i/c 1 DIV should not
allow any officer to trade using our aircraft. Meanwhile 2DIV CO, 4DIV
CO to make sure boarders are thoroughly monitored."
The speed at which General Kazini replied shows that he was aware of all these
problems, would take no real action until the matter became public, and had not
previously himself made His Excellency the President aware of them.
From this message, General Kazini was admitting the following: --
1. That the allegation by the original Panel that some top officers in the UPDF
were planning from the beginning to do business in Congo was generally
true, although the specific examples given were 10 incorrect. On the first
occasion when General Kazini came before this Commission to give
evidence, he denied the allegations in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the original
Panel Report, and was extremely evasive while doing so. In view of his radio
message in reply to the President's radio message, he was clearly lying to this
Commission.
2. That Commanders in business partnership with Ugandans were trading in the
Congo, about which General Kazini took no action.
3. That Military aircraft were carrying Congolese businessman into Entebbe,
and carrying items which they had bought in Kampala back to the Congo, but
20 the military were unable to handle all the cargo. On the first occasion that
General Kazini gave evidence before this Commission, he said that it was not
allowed for Congolese businessman or Ugandan businessman to bring items
from the Congo on military airplanes. In this he has been revealed to have
lied to this Commission. The whole question of the use of military transport
is considered at Paragraph 14.6 below, and a graphic representation can be
found below.
As a result of the President's message, General Kazini took the following steps: --
He directed that officers should not be allowed to trade using military aircraft
He directed that passengers on military aircraft be thoroughly monitored.
30 He took no action in relation to Ugandans in partnership with UPDF officers or
Congolese
18
The third paragraph of the President's radio message directed that Ugandan businessmen
should be given security assistance to do business in Congo in order to alleviate the acute
needs of the population and to establish links for the future. The radio message itself is clear,
and when this Commission interviewed His Excellency the President, he confirmed that he
had no intention to assist Congolese businessmen, save as to security, and pointed out that in
his message he had specifically mentioned Ugandan businessman.
However when General Kazini gave evidence to this Commission on the third occasion, he
said that he had given directions to assist Congolese businessman to travel back and forth
from Congo, and had even allowed them to carry goods from Uganda for sale in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. His counsel also interrupted 10 his evidence to argue that the
Presidential Radio message included assistance to Congolese businessmen, which it clearly
did not, save of course in relation to the provision of security.
This Commission’s researches in comparing the data from the Uganda Revenue Authority
which related to collection of customs duty on flights landing at the Military Air Base since
1999, data from Liaison Officers at the Military Air Base and from the Ministry of Defence
relating to flights for the UPDF, and data from the Civil Aviation Authority showing all
flights recorded by them to the Democratic Republic of Congo, both Civil and Military,
showed quite clearly that on many occasions, military flights paid for by Ministry of Defence,
or flown on Uganda Air Cargo (flying for Ministry of Defence) were carrying large quantities
20 of coffee in particular back from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Not only was this originally denied by General Kazini, but also by all of the liaison officers
who served at the Military Air Base. There was only one admission concerning coffee flown
in from the Democratic Republic of Congo for Mr. Bemba.
19
Figure 1: Data from URA Customs at Old Airport Entebbe
However, as Figure 1 shows, the comparison between Military and Civilian dutiable flights
arriving at the Military Air Base shows, for flights during 1999 and 2000 which were
recorded by URA, military flights and civilian flights were almost equally disposed during
1999, with a wide difference during 2000. There was no data available before 1999 and after
December 2001, which is the reason for the dips at each end. General kazini, and the liaison
Officers at the Military Air Base have been lying to this Commission.
On the 11th of February 1999 in a radio message General Kazini said that reports had started
coming to him that officers in the Colonel Peter Kerim sector, 10 Bunia and based at Kisangani
airport were engaging in business contrary to the presidential radio message, and he pointed
out that the cover being used was "Uganda businessmen / Congolese".
This corroborates many of the Original Panel's allegations in respect of officers of the UPDF.
13.2. Gold Mining
On the 31st of December 1998 General Kazini messaged Major Kagezi, saying that
his soldiers and detach commanders were writing chits for gold mining and
smuggling and instructing him to stop this immediately. Major Kagezi replied that his
investigations revealed that Lieutenant Okumu had been giving chits, and
recommended changing his platoon because they had stayed for a long time, but he
20 had been unable to do so because the Commander had refused (an interesting
comment on co-operation and discipline within the UPDF). On the 1st of January
1999, General Kazini ordered that the platoons be changed and Lieutenant Okumu
arrested. This does not agree with the evidence of Lt Okumu who said that he had
20
already been arrested from Durba on 27th December 1999. On the 11th of February
1999 General Kazini sent a message to say that he was sending intelligence officers
on a fact-finding mission on the gold trade involving UPDF officers and men. This
was the first time that this Commission had heard of this investigation, and is
surprised not to have heard about this from Colonel Mayombo, who said that he did
not conduct any investigations until after the original Panel Report.
As late as the 15th of February 2000 General Kazini was receiving reports from
Professor Wamba that UPDF soldiers in Watsa were in conflict with civilians in
relation to mining, and on 23rd February 2000, he sent a message in which he said
that he had seen three messages concerning 10 uncoordinated deployments. He pointed
out that no soldier of the UPDF was supposed to guard mines, although Major Kagezi
had deployed soldiers to Durba. He directed that all soldiers must be withdrawn to
Isiro. This message backs up some of the allegations in the original Panel Report
relating to mining. It is extremely difficult to reconcile with General Kazini's
evidence that he did not know that the soldiers at Durba had been detached to guard
the bridge there, and that Lt Okumu’s direct mission written instructions in
September 1999 were to guard the bridge and the airfield.
Further on the 3rd of October 1999, General Kazini was asking Lieutenant Colonel
Sula, Major Kagezi (who had already posted soldiers to Durba against orders) and
20 Captain Kyakabale to let him know if there was any UPDF deployed in either gold or
diamond mines, directing them to withdraw them immediately and send their names.
General Kazini's actions, radio messages, and evidence to this Commission have been
inconsistent throughout.
13.3. Intelligence/Security Funding
On the 21st of January 1999 General Kazini complained in a radio message that some
commanders were getting money from Congolese rebel leadership under the pretext
of intelligence gathering. This is an extremely interesting complaint, given that he
himself later, in July 2000, instructed Commanders in that area to refer any payment
of security funding to himself at TAC HQ, and is an example of what this
30 Commission is beginning to suspect, that General Kazini was writing all these radio
messages, and copying many of them to His Excellency the President, to cover
himself, without any intention that they should be followed.
21
13.4. Looting
On the 29th of January 1999 General Kazini was complaining that soldiers of the 19th
Battalion were involved in looting civilians. He directed that soldiers should not man
roadblocks anywhere, and asked for an explanation and details of a specific
occurrence. This was another matter raised by the original panel, and denied by
General Kazini initially, but confirmed by these radio messages.
13.5. Smuggling
On the 5th of July 1999 General Kazini directed that an investigative team be
stationed in Arua and Nebbi at the customs stations to monitor goods in transit. He
explained that a dangerous habit was developing where 10 goods supposedly in transit to
Congo were returned to Ugandan markets tax-free. He said that the suspects were
army officers aided by “Kampala and Arua Boys”. He directed Captain Kyakabale to
take the appropriate measures. On 23rd August 1999 General Kazini accused the 19th
Battalion of being involved in smuggling in Bunia and Beni sector. On the 25th of
December 1999, General Kazini sent a message to, among others Lieutenant Colonel
Arocha, Lieutenant Colonel Mugenyi, Lieutenant Colonel Nyakaitana, and Lieutenant
Colonel Burundi. He accused of all of them of being suspected of indulging in
smuggling goods re-entering Uganda territory from the Democratic Republic of
Congo. On the same date he was asking for liaison with the Inspector General of
20 Government to send experts to monitor various customs those on the Uganda border.
He said that these were border points where goods were smuggled into the country
aided by the UPDF without paying taxes. This Commission was able to check this
information with the Inspector General of Government, who said that he had never
been approached by the UPDF for this purpose. These were the kind of events,
together with others referred to below, to which this Commission was referring when
asking Col, Mayombo why he had not investigated such matters. His reply after some
questioning, and after the witness indicated that he did not know of these matters,
although General Kazini clearly did, was:-
“Lt. Col. Mayombo: I am saying My Lord that: At that time I did not
30 investigate it. It was a failure in judgement, I accept.”
What General Kazini has done by producing these radio messages is to confirm that
his information in respect of many of the allegations of misconduct of the UPDF was
the same as that which reached the original Panel. There is no doubt that his purpose
in producing these messages was to try to show that he was taking action in respect of
22
these problems. For it is to be noted that many of these messages were copied to
His Excellency the President, who had made his position clear in his radio message in
December 1998.
General Kazini's position then was that, while problems did exist, they were being
dealt with. However little was being done, although there were complaints as late as
February 1999, and continual trade often, according to evidence, with General
Kazini’s personal clearance contrary to the orders of His Excellency the President, on
Military Aircraft throughout 1999, 2000 and 2001. There appears to have been little
or no action taken as a result of these messages, and the allegation that the Inspector
General of Government was to be involved has 10 been specifically denied by him,
going to confirm that all this correspondence was intended by General Kazini to
cover himself, rather than to prompt action. There also appears to be little or no
follow up to the orders given.
General Kazini also had access to the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence on all these
subjects, but on checking Col Mayombo’s evidence the following appears:-
“Lead Counsel: Did you ever receive reports of soldiers involved in mining
of gold or diamonds?
Lt. Col. Mayombo: The only report we received My Lord, I received, as
Chief of Military Intelligence, was the UN Report.
20 Lead Counsel: I am in particular referring to an incident mentioned in
paragraph 57 where some people actually even died in Yoruba mines on the
9th September – Gorumbwa Gold Mines, that’s September – the UPDF
Local Commander – if you can look at that paragraph – you have never
received a report to that effect?
Lt. Col. Mayombo: We did investigate this to….
Justice Porter: But not until you received the UN Report?
Lt. Col. Mayombo: I received this UN Report My Lord
Justice Porter: So you didn’t investigate until you saw the UN Report
Lt. Col. Mayombo: Yes. Until we did see the UN Report we did not have
30 information – I did not have information. My office My Lord, did not have
any information that there was mining in that area, being done by UPDF
soldiers.”
The picture that emerges is that of a deliberate and persistent indiscipline by
commanders in the field, tolerated, even encouraged and covered by General Kazini,
as shown by the incompetence or total lack of inquiry and failure to deal effectively
with breaches of discipline at senior levels. The best example of such tolerance
23
appears from this Commission's questioning of General Kazini, when it became
clear from the documents supplied by the reconstituted Panel that he was expecting
intelligence/security funding to be offered to his commanders, and directed them to
refer such matters to himself at TAC HQ, presumably so that he could administer the
funds. At the very least, it has become clear that the UPDF as at present established is
not capable of dealing with the sort of infractions exemplified by these radio
messages.
It follows from the production of these radio messages that many of the allegations
made in the original Panel Report were true, and conducted by senior officers in the
UPDF. It does not follow that the Uganda Government 10 or His Excellency the
President were involved. Rather what is revealed is a deep-seated indiscipline
throughout the UPDF which requires further investigation and a full review of the
capability, discipline and honesty of senior officers. That is what this Commission
recommends as an urgent matter.
14. PRE-EXISTING STRUCTURES THAT FACILITATED EXPLOITATION
With the above general consideration of evidence in mind, this Commission now turns to
specific allegations in the original Panel Report. This Commission has done its best to follow
the headings in the the original Panel Report, which has involved a certain amount of
repetition and cross referencing.
20 In Paragraph 23 and 26 of the original Panel of Experts Report, the original Panel recites the
outbreak of war between Zairean forces and the AFDL, a rebel movement led by the late
Laurent Kabila. The original Panel recites that the AFDL was supported by the Angolan,
Rwandan and Ugandan forces.
The original Panel leaves the impression that Ugandan forces marched with the AFDL,
certainly in eastern Zaire. The original Panel develops that point in the following way in
Paragraph 23:
“This AFDL-led conquest of then eastern Zaire fundamentally altered the
composition of the regional stakeholders and the distribution of natural
resources. Previously, the distribution norm was (via legal and illegal
30 channels) through locally based Congolese, mostly civilian-managed,
business operations. However, these traditional modes were quickly
overtaken by new power structures. Along with new players came new rules
for exploiting natural resources. Foreign troops and their “friends” openly
24
embraced business in “liberated territories”, encouraged indirectly by
the AFDL leader, the late President Kabila.”
And in Paragraph 26 and onward, under the heading “Pre-existing structures that facilitated
illegal exploitation”:
“26. Illegal exploitation by foreigners aided by the Congolese began
with the first “war of liberation” in 1996. The AFDL rebels, backed by
Angolan, Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers conquered eastern and southeastern
Zaire. As they were advancing, the AFDL leader, the late Laurent-
Désiré Kabila, signed contracts with a number of foreign companies.
Numerous accounts and documents suggest 10 that by 1997 a first wave of
“new businessmen” speaking only English, Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili
had commenced operations in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Theft of livestock, coffee beans and other resources began to be
reported with frequency. By the time the August 1998 war broke out,
Rwandans and Ugandans (top officers and their associates) had a strong
sense of the potential of the natural resources and their locations in the
eastern the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Some historians have
argued that Ugandan forces were instrumental in the conquest of areas
such as Watsa, Bunia, Beni and Butembo during the first war.
20 27. Numerous accounts in Kampala suggest that the decision to enter the
conflict in August 1998 was defended by some top military officials who
had served in eastern Zaire during the first war and who had had a taste of
the business potential of the region. Some key witnesses, who served with
the Rally for Congolese Democracy rebel faction in early months, spoke
about the eagerness of Ugandan forces to move in and occupy areas where
gold and diamond mines were located. Other sources informed the original
Panel that, late in September 1998, they were already engaged in
discussions with General Salim Saleh on the creation of a company that
would supply the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo with
30 merchandise, and on the import of natural resources. The project never
materialized in this form, but the sources reportedly also discussed this and
other business venture possibilities with the President of Uganda, Yoweri
Museveni.
28. There are strong indications that, if security and political reasons were
the professed roots of the political leaders’ motivation to move into the
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, some top army officials clearly
had a hidden agenda: economic and financial objectives. A few months
before the 1998 war broke out, General Salim Saleh and the elder son of
President Museveni reportedly visited the eastern Democratic Republic of
40 the Congo. One month after the beginning of the conflict, General James
Kazini was already involved in commercial activities. According to very
reliable sources, he knew the most profitable sectors and immediately
organized the local commanders to serve their economic and financial
objectives. “
25
14.1. Allegations against the Government of Uganda
As this Commission understands the original Panel’s argument in Paragraphs 23 and
26-28, leaving aside for the moment alleged personal involvements, and
endeavouring to separate alleged Ugandan and Rwandan involvement, which
unfortunately the original Panel failed to do, the original Panel say:
1) Ugandan top Officers gained experience of business potential in the
Congo because they supported the ADFL in eastern Congo during
Laurent Kabila’s rebellion against President Mobutu, while conquering
East and South East Zaire
2) Top Military officials in the UPDF who had 10 served in eastern Zaire in
1996 argued for Uganda’s involvement in 1998 for their own selfish ends
3) The original Panel acknowledges that political leaders might have been
motivated to move into the Congo for security and political reasons
4) However top army leaders had a hidden agenda : economic and financial
motives
5) General Kazini organised local commanders to achieve economic and
financial objectives
Reference to the transcript of evidence will quite clearly show that, so far as Uganda
was concerned, while the AFDL, together at least with the Rwandan army, if not the
20 Angolan army, swept across the country, and finally attacked and took Kinshasa, the
UPDF was concerned with dealing with incursions into Uganda at Uganda’s northwestern
border with the Sudan and Zaire. The UPDF therefore went into Zaire at its
north eastern-most point, and pursued West Bank Nile Front rebels successfully.
Thereafter, the UPDF was withdrawn from Zaire. This Commission was told that this
was a short campaign and that the UPDF moved quickly.
There is some evidence that Uganda provided extremely limited assistance to the
Rwandans, by detaching a pilot to fly Rwandan soldiers on quick response in a plane
chartered by Rwanda. The pilot has told this Commission that he never flew Ugandan
troops. Uganda's former Ambassador to Kinshasa told this Commission that, although
30 he was away at the time of the fall of Kinshasa to Laurent Kabila, he returned only
ten days later to witness the swearing in of Laurent Kabila, and he saw no sign of
Ugandan troops.
All of this evidence is supported by the evidence of Ministers and Permanent
Secretaries responsible at the time. This Commission, in default of representation for
26
the opposing view, has been forced to descend into the arena and put the points
raised in the original Panel Report strongly to the witnesses who have come before it.
On point 1 above, on the evidence which this Commission has heard, this
Commission finds as a fact that there is no indication whatever that in 1998
“Ugandans (top officers and their associates) had a strong sense of the potential of the
natural resources and their locations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo”
due to their earlier experiences, because the earlier experiences were brief and in
north eastern Zaire and the Sudan, rather than eastern Zaire. It would not however
have been necessary to have had such experience: the richness of the resources of the
10 DRC are widely known.
On point 2 above, it is beyond contest that in April 1998, Uganda’s Ambassador to
Kinshasa had briefed His Excellency the President on the situation in the Congo after
several visits to the border area and discussions with traditional chiefs, opinion
leaders and local authorities in Beni and Irumu: there were also intelligence reports
from UPDF Intelligence. The situation was that ADF, NALU, EX-FAZ, EX-FAR and
WNBF were operating along the common border. Vehicles stolen from Uganda were
ending up in the Congo. ADF, EX-FAZ and EX-FAR were getting support through
Sudan. On this side of his report, the Ambassador recommended a military solution in
addition to a political one : as a joint operation between Uganda and the Democratic
20 Republic of Congo to get rid of the armed groups.
There was a Ministerial Meeting on Security and Refugee Matters between Uganda
and the Democratic Republic of Congo on 7.4.98 in Kampala. Uganda recommended
Joint Command for the UPDF and the ADFL, with increased deployment of ADFL
on the border, and other cooperative measures: the Democratic Republic of Congo
preferred joint operations rather than joint command. However, there was a clear
understanding of the problems of security, and acknowledgement of the problem. The
language of the discussion clearly indicates that the Democratic Republic of Congo
expected any joint command to include “foreigners into the affairs of a foreign state”
A joint communiqué was prepared on 26th April after a meeting between Ministers, in
30 which it was stated that there was agreement on ways and means to eradicate
insecurity, although no details were spelt out.
Thereafter at a date late in April, a Protocol was drawn up at Kinshasa in which the
two parties (Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo) recognised the existence
of enemy groups which operate on either side of the common border. Consequently
27
the two armies agreed to “co-operate in order to insure (sic) security and peace
along the common border”.
It was at about this time probably, on the evidence this Commission has heard, that
shortly before the Protocol, the UPDF went into the Democratic Republic of Congo,
with a force of three battalions in three places, Bukira, Buswaga and Lhume. When
they did that they met no resistance from the ADFL: and presumably, whatever the
political or legal situation, it follows that the two armies were in agreement to this
action: which the politicians appear to have attempted (unsuccessfully in this
Commission’s view) to legalise in meetings and by the drafting of the Protocol to
which this Commission has referred above. The circumstances, 10 leaving aside the
documentation, shown by the evidence amount to a genuine invitation to Uganda to
take part in security operations over the border.
Now this does not sound to this Commission like a collection of gung-ho top military
commanders wanting to dash off into the Democratic Republic of Congo to make
money, and persuading even their commander-in chief, whose decision it finally must
have been, to agree with them, and commit Uganda to the danger and expense of
occupation of another country. There were sound reasons for the concerns of both
countries, and the action Uganda took was as a result of discussions and agreement.
There was a problem of security, to which the original Panel does not refer, although
20 the Addendum in Paragraph 95 acknowledges that there was a problem.: there clearly
were discussions and agreements of the most open kind: all these documents were
available to the original Panel. This Commission thinks that, taken together with this
Commission’s finding on Point 1, it cannot be said either that the Government of
Uganda acted for any other motive than for security and political reasons: and this
finding also deals with Point 3 above.
As to Point 4 above as to the involvement of army leaders, these allegations should
not be dealt with here, as this Commission has in mind the overall policy and the
actions of Government. The evidence on the point is at Paragraph 13.1 above, and
consideration is at Paragraph 14.4 below
30 14.2. Allegations against General Salim Saleh
General Salim Saleh in Paragraph 27 of the original Panel Report was criticised for
visiting the Eastern the Democratic Republic of Congo before the 1998 war broke
out. General Saleh told this Commission on oath that he had never visited the Eastern
28
the Democratic Republic of Congo, but that he had gone to Kinshasa at the
invitation of Laurent Kabila, and there discussed trade possibilities, and in particular
air services. This was at a time when there was every reason to count on the cooperation
of Laurent Kabila, and this Commission sees no problem in such matters as
trade being discussed at that time.
14.3. Allegations against Kainerugaba Muhoozi
Apart from a later general allegation, this is the only time Lt Muhoozi’s name is
mentioned (in Paragraph 28) in the whole original Panel Report.
Before this Commission Lt Muhoozi said that he went, not to Eastern the Democratic
Republic of Congo but to Kinshasa on two occasions. The 10 first was in 1997, during
the regime of Laurent Kabila, when he went to look for a market for meat products on
behalf of his family ranch, which is well known for the keeping of cattle and the need
for a market. The second occasion was in early 1998 when he had started working for
Caleb International, Salim Saleh’s firm, for discussions with some potential partners
in the Democratic Republic of Congo with the possibility of developing some mining
interests there. This was early in the regime of Laurent Kabila, when friendly
relations were thought to exist between the Kinshasa Government and Uganda.
This Commission is fully satisfied that these were genuine visits during peacetime to
promote international trade, and this Commission cannot understand why they appear
20 as criticisms in the original Panel Report.
14.4. Allegations against top UPDF Officers
As to Point 4 above, see Paragraph 13.1 above: General Kazini’s radio message in
reply to that of His Excellency the President shows that, although there was no effect
on the policies of the Uganda Government, some officers were excited about the
possibility of self-enrichment in the Democratic Republic of Congo. To that extent
the allegations in the original Panel Report are true.
14.5. Allegations against General Kazini.
As to Point 5 above, this Commission has received some evidence in support of the
allegation against General Kazini in relation to his conduct at the inception of the
30 campaign in the Democratic Republic of Congo, From August to December of 1998,
he was clearly aware of a problem as his radio message shows, but took little action:
29
he only appears to have acquainted His Excellency the President of the problem as
late as December 1998.
14.6. Transportation Networks
14.6.1. Military Air Base
The original Panel said that the Military Air Base was used during Operation Safe
Haven for transport of goods to and from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The
Commission therefore investigated the operations at the Military Air Base. What
the Commission found left a lot to be desired.
The first question to be asked was how a supposedly secure Military Air Base
came to be used for 10 transport of civilians and goods.
This Commission asked His Excellency the President about this because it had
been intimated to this Commission that this was on reliance on his radio message
dated 10/12/98. Set out below is part of the transcript of his evidence:
……………….when my army went into Congo, I had to give them terms of
reference on all major matters; there is no major matter which we did not
regulate by a document. For instance, on the 15th of December 1998, no, on
the 10th of December, 1998 at 1500hrs, I sent a message myself to all army
units in Congo, which I could read for their Lordships: “From President
for Chief of Staff, Inform Army Commander, Minister-of-State for
20 Defence, and All Stations.
(All stations means all units).
Ensure that there is no officer or man of our forces in Congo who engages
in business. Also report to me any other public servant, whether currently
based in Congo or not, who tries to engage in business in the Congo.
However, other Ugandan businessmen (who are not soldiers or public
servants, including all politicians or their families) ….”
This is in brackets: (businessmen who are not soldiers or public servants,
including all politicians or their families), end of brackets.
“ … should, given the fluid security situation in Congo, be assisted, if
30 necessary, to do business there in order to alleviate the acute needs of the
population ….”
(Of the population in Congo).
“… and also to establish links for the future. The purpose of this directive
is to erase the feeling that I ordered our forces into Congo because we
wanted to loot minerals from Congo, and not to defend our security
interests.”
Your Lordships, if they have not given you this copy of this message, then I
will give it to you. This is the ….
30
Justice Porter: We have it.
H. E. The President: You have it?
Justice Berko: We have it.
H. E. The President: Very good. Give it to the rumourmongers. Give a copy
to those rumourmongers.
Justice Porter: Your Excellency, would you mind if I asked you?
H. E. The President: Yes?
Justice Porter: In that radio message, sorry. In the bit in brackets, did you
mean to stop politicians or their families, or did you mean to allow
politicians and 10 their families to trade?
H. E. The President: To stop them.
Justice Porter: To stop them?
H. E. The President: Yes.
Justice Porter: I thought that was probably it.
H. E. The President: [Affirmative response].
Justice Porter: And the ….
H. E. The President: Because I did not want leaders to be involved in …
they were not part of the businessmen I was talking about.
Justice Porter: I thought that must be it. It is oddly drafted, though, so I
20 was not quite clear.
And the other thing was, in that third paragraph you were encouraging
Ugandan businessmen?
H. E. The President: [Affirmative response].
Justice Porter: Were you also prepared to encourage Congolese
businessmen?
H. E. The President: Of course, why not?
Justice Porter: You were?
H. E. The President: [Affirmative response].
Justice Porter: Yes. Because UPDF took it that way, but it does not say so
30 in your radio message, so ….
H. E. The President: No. I was more concerned …. Of course, the
assumption was that the Congolese businessmen are always there. They are
always there, so this was not my ….
Justice Porter: Yes. What was worrying us is that nearly four thousand
businessmen travelled back from the Congo, over the three years that we
are talking about, on military aeroplanes; and we did not think that your
radio message authorized that.
H. E. The President: No, no. No, that is a separate matter; I was not talking
about that.
40 Justice Porter: Right. Because those who authorize actually rely on this
radio message ….
31
H. E. The President: Oh! No.
Justice Porter: … to say that they could do that.
H. E. The President: Oh, no.
Justice Porter: All right. Sorry, I interrupted you, please ….
H. E. The President: No problem, no problem.
But what I was saying was that: soldiers, politicians or their families should
not do any business in Congo, because if they do, first, they would be
diverted. (This one, of course, I did not have to say all this in the message).
They would be diverted from their work and they may be involved – you
know, because businesses always involve conflicts 10 and so on and rivalries,
and they would be involved in all that. But business people – Ugandan
business people – should, if necessary, be assisted to do business; with
security because of the insecurity there because, I mean, there was also
insecurity there. With security, not transport; transport is not my … nobody
asked me about that. Because here, we had … I was bearing in mind that a
town like Kisangani is a town of half-a-million people. If they go on
without supplies for two weeks, three weeks, you can have a humanitarian
disaster. So you had to provide … to enable them to get supplies, so that
they … we do not get a humanitarian problem.
20 It is very clear from the radio message, particularly the underlined part of it, and
the evidence set out above that His Excellency the President was quite startled to
hear that Immigration Authorities had recorded so many civilians to have travelled
on Military transport. His intention was quite clear, that businessmen, whether
Ugandan or Congolese should be assisted with security, but not with free transport
for them and their goods. This Commission was fully satisfied that his reaction
was impromptu and quite genuine, and that operations at the military airport have
been kept from him.
And indeed Salim Saleh said:
Maj. General . Salim Saleh: The nature of the talks – we were looking at
30 the socio-economic situation in the areas which UPDF had taken over.
Which needed services of that nature – of essential commodities, of
medicine – those services. So, we were discussing it from the perspective of
assisting, delivery of these supplies into the areas which were already
controlled by UPDF. Because nobody was willing to do it, so we were
discussing it from that angle.
Lead Counsel: And did you ever come out with any documentation? Did
you sign any documents to that effect?
Maj. General . Salim Saleh: No.
Ruhinda Magulu(representing Salim Saleh): Before that please, you were
40 discussing this with who? You have not told us.
32
Maj. General . Salim Saleh: With the different interest groups
Justice Berko: In which place – Congo or where.?
Maj. General . Salim Saleh: No in Kampala
Lead Counsel: So, did you ever execute anything after these talks, or sign
any document?
Maj. General . Salim Saleh: We presented the ideas – the proposals to the
Commander-in-Chief. Because this would have been a civil military
operation and he rejected it. And issued a specific order that the military or
people associated with the military should not engage in delivery of those
services. That it should be left to the business 10 community – to see how they
can deliver those services to the areas under UPDF. This was in a specific
directive.
Justice Porter: Are you talking about the radio message?
Maj. General . Salim Saleh: Yes My Lord
This evidence confirms His Excellency the President’s evidence, There never was
any intention to allow civilians to use military transport. The matter had been
brought up by Salim Saleh, apparently discussed by the High Command, and
specifically rejected by President Museveni. All that was intended was that UPDF
should assist traders by providing security in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
20 Somehow or another, it is clear from the evidence of the Liaison Officers at the
Military Air Base, and of General Kazini, that it became to be understood that
civilian traders, Ugandan, Congolese and indeed Lebanese were entitled to, and
did, travel on military flights when there was space, contrary to the Commander in
Chief’s instructions. Goods were stored at the Air Base to await the availability of
planes. Authority was given by various officers, but the most senior was General
Kazini according to the evidence: there were also occasions when the Permanent
Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, by then Dr Mbonye, gave authority. It
should also be remembered that one or more of the airline operators was owned
and/or controlled by Lt General . Salim Saleh who would have been closely
30 involved in interpretation of the Presidential directive, with knowledge of its
purpose and intent.
These were direct recipients of the radio message: how then did they come to
authorise such trips? In numbers, the evidence revealed that Immigration checked
in nearly 4000 travellers from the Congo on Military airplanes over a period of
just under 3 years. No doubt those travellers had either come from Uganda and
were returning, or were coming from the Congo and planning to return. Only
33
sometimes were these travellers recorded on outgoing military flights. There is
no UPDF record of incoming flights.
The whole subject of the use of military airplanes for civilian travel and trade is
full of questions which have not been satisfactorily answered: what this
Commission can conclude, however, is that the UPDF appears to do whatever it
likes, even when specifically told not to by its Commander in Chief, and this
raises the whole question of transparency and accountability within the UPDF.
As set out below, His Excellency the President did later allow civilian planes to
use the military airbase, on the grounds that ENHAAS charges were too expensive
for traders to be able to assist 10 in any humanitarian effort.
The Commission heard evidence on oath from the liaison officers at the Entebbe
Military Airport, Major Jones Musinguzi Katafire and his colleagues at the airport
during Operation Safe Haven. These included Lt. David Livingstone
Komurubuga, Lt. Badogo and Lt. Col. John Kasaija Araali. When Operation Safe
Haven started the first Liaison Officers were Lts. Ahimbisibwe and Kiwanuka.
These two officers never kept records of goods going to and coming from the
Democratic Republic of Congo. This Commission finds this unbelievable, in terms
of accountability within UPDF.
Lt. Col. Kasaija was deployed at the Military Air Base in September 1998 as Co20
ordinator and Liaison Officer. He introduced for the first time Loading Schedules
for goods going to the Democratic Republic of Congo from The Military Air Base
and Acknowledgement Forms which were to be signed by the Local Commanders
in Congo who received the goods. However, there were no similar Loading
Schedules kept in the Congo for goods that came from Congo. That, in the view of
this Commission, was contrary to the Military System.
Lt. Col. Kasaija told the Commission that he recorded whatever came to the
Military Air Base from Congo. He said that this was limited to purely military
matters, namely wounded soldiers, body bags and military hardware, as according
to Lt. Col. Kasaija he had no interest in non-military terms that came from Congo
30 and so he kept no records of them. The implication here, which later evidence has
proved beyond doubt is that there were in fact civilian goods being transported by
military transport, but that the Liaison Officers were not recording them. Lt Col
Kasaija lied to the Commission.
34
From August 1998 to May 1999 URA did not have a presence at the Military
Air Base. This Commission has evidence that URA insisted on inspecting goods
imported, for transit, or re-export as from May 1999. This implies first that URA
realised that customable goods were being flown in from the Congo without their
being able to check them (and the most likely customable goods were the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo), and second that neither the
military nor URA were recording such goods for a period of 8 months.
Lt. Col. Kasaija left the Military Air Base in June 2000 and was succeeded by
Major Katafire in July 2000. Records of military return goods began to be kept
when Major Katafire 10 took over from Lt. Col. Kasaija.
The evidence given to the Commission shows that there was no clear policy
regarding who could travel and what could be carried on military charter planes.
That was largely left to the discretion of the Liaison Officers on the ground and
sometimes senior military officers such as Lt. General. Kazini according to the
evidence. There was obviously a lack of accountability and a lack of security both
in regard to civilians and goods.
What the Commission found remarkable was that the Liaison Officers were
prepared to take responsibility for whatever was wrong rather than betray their
commanders who at times clearly directed them to do what they did. This is clear
20 from the evidence of Major Katafire and Lt. Col. Kasaija. As so often this
Commission was faced with a conspiracy of silence, which forced middle ranking
officers to be first embarrassed into silence under cross examination followed by
evasion, and then outright lies. For instance Captain Richard Badogo told the
Commission on oath that the military charter planes never carried non-military
goods and also that Uganda businessmen and women were not allowed on military
flights. Capt. Badogo obviously lied, as there is clear evidence on record that nonmilitary
goods were carried on the military charter planes. There is also evidence
before the Commission that many civilian businessmen and women used the
military planes and charter planes to take their goods to Congo. A notable example
30 was Sam Engola, a Ugandan businessman, whose salt and other goods were
carried to the Democratic Republic of Congo on military flights free of charge.
A motor-cycle was also flown from Congo for one Humphrey who was said to be
a Congolese businessman. That was obviously contrary to the humanitarian
assistance the President of Uganda talked about as the basis for his radio message.
35
URA did not establish its presence at the Military Air Base until 1st May 1999,
nearly a year after the start of the war. Since the army was not interested in
recording non-military goods, it meant that until then neither the UPDF nor URA
would have records of the goods. It also meant that military transport could be
used for carrying goods from the Democratic Republic of Congo with no record
being made, with no possibility of checking. If the goods were dutiable, the
customs duty on them would not be collected by URA, thereby causing a loss to
the State.
Evidence received by the Commission shows that even after URA started
operating at the Military Air Base, it did not maintain 10 a 24 hour presence as it
operated from 8a.m. to 5p.m. There is evidence that some flights from Congo
came at night when URA had closed. URA informed the Commission that there
was an understanding between them and the UPDF that aircraft that arrive at night
from Congo should not be off-loaded. This Commission has serious doubt as to
how this gentleman’s agreement could have been enforced if the goods on the
night flights belonged to a high-ranking army officer, who would have no problem
in clearing the so called security at the rear gate to the Air Base. This
Commission’s observation on the flight to Gbadolite was that security was almost
non-existent overnight and early in the morning until officers started turning up at
20 8.30a.m. to 9.30p.m.
The Commission was informed that at times civilian porters from nearby Kitoro
Trading Centre were allowed onto the Air Base to load and off-load planes at the
Military Air Base. This Commission thinks that the practice is highly improper as
loading and off-loading of planes is a specialist job and the Military Air Base was
supposed to be a secure place.
According to the evidence of His Excellency The President, the need for use of the
Military Airport by civilian planes was presented to him as necessary because of
the high cost of ENHAAS charges.
H. E. The President: Now on the question of transport, Your Lordship, the
30 only thing I know about transport, which people asked me about – the
officers, I do not know which officers, was whether …. Or was it Bemba? I
think it was Bemba who was asking me whether we should allow them to
use the old airport for cargo going to Congo, because at the new airport
there is a company – a handling company there called ENHAS, which was
forcing them to pay more – to pay money for handling; so this was raising
their costs, raising their costs. Instead of just paying what, they were paying
36
more because they had also to pay ENHAS. And I remember I talked to
some people, I do not know which ones, I said: why do you …? These
Congolese are in a lot of problems. If they are taking merchandise to
Congo for Congolese people, since it is a war area …; because, you see,
people in a war area, people fear to go there (they fear to go, they fear to
take their planes there, there is some risk), so if you put on other
impediments then you are discouraging them even more. That is the only
thing that I remember some people consulting me about, but I do not
remember how it was concluded. But I do not remember whether it was
Bemba or who on that particular issue, but that is 10 the only legitimate case I
remember about this transport: to use the old airport or the new one. For
me, I was for using the new one if it would help them not to pay the …
Justice Berko: The old one.
Justice Porter: The old one.
……………………….
H. E. The President: Then the Customs people were saying, but how shall
we charge customs if they are using the old airport? And I remember I told
them, I said: that is no problem, you come and base yourselves at the new
airport, charge the customs, if necessary, but not this ENHAS charges. I
20 was looking at it as an exemption for cargo going to Congo in order to help
those people get supplies a bit cheaply. That is the only thing I remember
about transport, but I do not know how it was concluded; because
sometimes the … when you are discussing, they say: President has directed.
So it seems President is not supposed to think, or any opinion of the
President is a directive – for those who want to steal: President directed.
But I remember I gave some opinion like that. I think it was Bemba or
somebody, I do not remember how it started, but somebody brought it to
me; and my opinion was: do not overburden the Congolese with these
ENHAS charged because they have enough problems already. That is the
30 only thing I remember about transport.
It clearly made sense in view of the President’s humanitarian approach, to allow
Ugandan traders to get to the Democratic Republic of Congo as easily and cheaply
as possible. The theory could not be criticised. However, to advise His Excellency
to allow use of what was supposed to be a secure Air Base (as Senior Army
Officers interpreted the matter) was totally unnecessary. If porters from Kitoro
could be allowed to go onto a supposedly secure Air Base, then there would be
less problem involved in allowing them onto the civilian side of the Airport to
load and unload planes operating in the Congo, in order to save ENHAAS
charges.
40 The Commission found, during a visit to the Military Air Base, that there is a back
road which links the Military Air Base to the Kampala/Entebbe Airport road. It is
therefore possible for one to enter or leave the Military Air Base without passing
through the International Air Port where URA has a 24 hour presence. It is
possible to avoid URA Customs by using that road which is secured by very junior
37
UPDF officers. That would make the country lose revenue. The Commission
therefore recommends that the road should be closed with immediate effect if
businessmen are to continue to use the Military Air Base. However, this
Commission’s recommendation is that they should not and that they should use
the civilian side with Airworthy Air Craft cleared by Civil Aviation Authority,
subject to clearance from the proper military authority in respect of security issues
only.
The Databases constructed by this Commission from Data provided by URA,
Civil Aviation Authority and MOD provide clear evidence that in fact military
airplanes flying for Ministry of Defence were carrying 10 private goods from the the
Democratic Republic of Congo to the Military Air Base in Entebbe (See Figure 1).
Clearly the evidence of the Liaison Officers at the Military Air Base that this was
not happening was untrue. The Liaison Officers have been lying to this
Commission.
The Commission was not permitted to inspect the hangars at the Military Air Base
on the pretext that the hangars could not be opened without the permission of the
Officer-in-Charge who was said not to be there even though he had advance notice
of the visit. The Commission thinks that the UPDF had some things in the hangars
that they did not want the Commission to see.
20 Disciplinary action is recommended against those officers named in this section of
the Report.
14.6.2. Allegations against the Government of Uganda
In Paragraph 31 of the Report, it is alleged that the Government of Uganda
permitted these flights to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources of Congo.
The problem here is a matter of perception. What was happening was two entirely
separate operations, one private and the other military. It would have been easy for
an observer to assume that all operations were military, because the planes used do
not carry any special markings, for instance camouflage, and the Ministry of
Defence planes were not armed. In fact some of the planes were chartered by both
30 the UPDF and by civil organisations. Figure 2 shows the relationship between
civil and military flights as recorded by CAA.
38
Figure 2: Flights out of Military Airbase
Having made that incorrect assumption, that all operations were military, the
observer would wrongly conclude that military officials were carrying out
enormous amounts of trade at the military airport. So far as this Commission can
tell, whilst military transport of goods from the Congo, which cannot have been
anything else than natural resources, has been proved to have been taking place,
by far the largest number of flights were private, carrying merchandise to and
from the Congo.
This Commission actually saw an Antonov Aircraft carrying 10 a cargo of 19 tons of
Cocoa for Unilever land during the visit to the airport. It was using the military
airport, and had dropped passengers from the Democratic Republic of Congo at
the International Airport for Immigration and Customs formalities. It was met by
Customs officials when it taxied over to the military installation.
Evidence before this Commission clearly shows that trade through the Military
Air Base was being hidden, and that those involved were perfectly prepared to lie
to this Commission to cover it up. It has only been after a protracted effort in
gathering data and collating it into databases that this Commission has been able
to show what was going on. In those circumstances, it is difficult to lay blame at
20 the door of the Uganda Government.
14.6.3. Implied Allegations against The Civil Aviation Authority
The Civil Aviation Authority was established by the Civil Aviation Authority
Statute of 1994 (Statute No. 3).
The provisions of the Statute apply to all aircraft operating in Uganda airspace, be
it of Foreign or Ugandan registry and to Ugandan aircraft operating outside of
39
Ugandan territory. The Statute does not apply to State aircraft, which are
defined to include military aircraft and any aircraft commandeered by the army
and military aircraft belonging to a foreign country.
The authority was established for the purpose of promoting safe, regular, secure
and efficient use and development of Civil Aviation inside and outside Uganda. Its
functions include:
advising the Government on policy matters concerning Civil Aviation locally and
internationally,
the licensing of air transport,
the designation of domestic 10 and international air carriers;
the provision of air navigation services;
the registration of aircraft;
the control of air traffic;
the certification of operators of aircraft; and
the licensing of Civil Aviation personnel.
Uganda has one International Airport, which is the Entebbe International Airport,
part of which is called the New Airport; the other part is the Old Airport or the
Military Air Base, which is for the military.
The Civil Aviation Authority has no presence on the ground at the Military Air
20 Base and therefore cannot supervise what goes on there, in matters such as
airworthiness, crew qualifications etc. In the air one would expect Civil Aviation
Authority to control flight paths and Air Safety, and there are records to show that
Civil Aviation Authority did authorise and supervise at least some flights,
although the records of landings and take-offs are not complete.
The data from the Civil Aviation authority shows that private flights outnumber
the military flights by a large number (See graph above). These private flights
were operating independently of the military. The justification for the private
flights operating from a military airport was that they were flying to the
Democratic Republic of Congo, which is a war zone and therefore needed to be
40
under military control, and further to avoid ENHAAS charges. These private
flights carry merchandise and civilian passengers to and from the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
The Civil Aviation Authority does not issue an Air Service Licence for aircraft
that operate from the military airport. The reason being that Civil Air Services
operate under ICAO recommended standards and practices which are different
from military aircraft or, allegedly, civilian aircraft for military operations. They
were however private flights as defined, and therefore should have come under
Civil Aviation Authority control. Hardly any of the planes using the Military Air
Base could have been licensed as airworthy by 10 Civil Aviation Authority .
Authorisation for aircraft operators to operate from the Military airport was given
by Liaison Officers of UPDF at the Military Air Base, senior UPDF officers
including General Kazini, and Ministry of Defence personnel who may have little
or no knowledge of air-worthiness standards. A typical example is Knight
Aviation, which was refused an Air Service Operation Licence by Civil Aviation
Authority. Nevertheless it operated from the Military Air Base under the Ministry
of Defence Charter arrangement and flew civilians to and from Democratic
Republic of Congo. What is remarkable is that the very same Civil Aviation
Authority, that refused Knight Aviation Air Services Operation Licence because it
20 did not meet the Uganda Flying Air Worthiness Standard, allowed Knight
Aviation to take off and land on the New Airport Runway, which also
accommodates International and Civilian services, regardless of Aviation Safety.
These aircraft, which are not airworthy, are also allowed by Civil Aviation
Authority to fly over Ugandan Air space. This is an example of submission to
military pressure which should not be tolerated. This is contrary to Civil Aviation
Authority ’s Motto which is “to maintain the highest standards of safety and
service in civil aviation.”
The Commission also observed that civilian planes using the Old Airport and
going to and from Congo and doing non-military operation are not under the
30 supervision of the army because they are not doing military operations. They are
also not under the supervision of Civil Aviation Authority since they operate from
the military base. The Civil Aviation Authority is therefore unable to enforce
compliance of safety standards relating to personnel, airworthiness of aircraft,
41
conditions under which persons, or personal belongings, baggage and cargo
may be transported by air.
The use of the Entebbe military airbase was a big problem. As considered in
Paragraph 14.6.1 above, before May 1999, URA did not have a presence at the old
airport. Non-military goods could be brought in or taken out without paying taxes.
Even after URA established its presence this was only from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
It is said that an arrangement was made with the military not to offload planes
arriving at night. There is also an access road from the Entebbe/Kampala airport
road leading to or from the old airport. This could be used to bring goods to or
10 from military planes.
As a result of the questions raised above, the Civil Aviation Authority was asked
to assist this Commission to understand how private aircraft were allowed to
operate from the Military Airbase in Entebbe for flights to the Democratic
Republic of Congo.
In a written submission the Civil Aviation Authority refer to the Chicago
Convention, the Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Services and the Civil Aviation
Authority Statute, which is the Ugandan legislation establishing the Civil Aviation
Authority . The Statute in Section 2 states:
“(1) This Statute shall extend to all aircraft operating in Ugandan airspace,
20 be it of foreign or Ugandan registry and to Ugandan aircraft operating
outside of Ugandan territory
This Statute shall not apply to state aircraft except where it is expressly
stated”
The expression “state aircraft” is defined in S 3 of the Act to include:
“aircraft of any part of the Defence Force (including any aircraft that is
commanded by a member of that force in the course of duties); and
aircraft used in the military, customs, or police services of a foreign
country”
The Civil Aviation Authority written submission refers to the Chicago Convention
30 for a full definition of the expression “state aircraft”, on the basis that S 33(1) of
the Civil Aviation Authority Statute requires the Authority to carry out its
functions in a manner consistent with the Convention, annexes to it and
42
recommended practices, with amendments. The basis of the submission is that
the way in which the expression is defined in the Ugandan Act must be read with
the intention expressed in the Convention.
The Convention in Article 3 deems “state aircraft” to be :
“Aircraft used in military, customs and police services”
and states that the Convention shall not apply to such aircraft. The Civil Aviation
Authority Act makes similar provisions.
Thus, on any view, the expression “state aircraft” certainly includes aircraft of any
part of the Defence Force, and aircraft used in military, customs and police
services. Neither the express definitions or inclusions, 10 nor the intent of either the
Civil Aviation Authority Statute or the Chicago Convention could possibly be
read to include aircraft chartered from privately owned and run airlines, carrying
goods for sale to the Democratic Republic of Congo, and returning with goods
therefrom.
On any reading therefore, the rules and requirements of the Civil Aviation
Authority Statute are required to be enforced by the Authority in respect of such
aircraft. The Authority’s witnesses have told us that the aircraft flying from the
Military Airbase could not have been licenced for various reasons. This
Commission has seen for itself an aircraft in dangerous condition. The question
20 this Commission has to ask is, why then did the Authority relinquish authority
over these private flights?
In the submission of the Civil Aviation Authority, it is stated that pursuant to the
provision that the Authority is required follow the Convention, and given existing
practices referred to in the Convention, Civil Aviation Authority has regarded
civilian aircraft hired/leased by the military in the course of duty to be state
aircraft. With that statement this Commission has no quarrel.
However, the subject to be addressed is the question of private aircraft used for
trade by private entrepreneurs to the Democratic Republic of Congo: the statement
therefore is of no assistance.
30 It is clear from correspondence that in July 1999 that this question was raised by
the Managing Director of the Civil Aviation Authority by his letter of 7th July
43
1999 to Dr Mbonye, then Secretary for Defence. In that letter the Managing
Director said:
“In the recent past we have received some aircraft at Entebbe whose
operators claim to be exporting consignments or supplies for Ministry of
Defence. On Verification, it has been found that the Aircraft are carrying
general cargo and some passengers to or from the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Some of the aircraft park at the Old Airport which is not under the
direct operational control of the Civil Aviation Authority .”
Pausing there for a moment, this is the exact problem with which this Commission
has asked the Civil 10 Aviation Authority to assist.
The letter quotes an example aircraft, and continues:
“I would request you to clarify whether this aircraft is on contract from the
Ministry of Defence.”
The Managing Director then proposes that the then Major Katafiire be given the
mandate to guide Civil Aviation Authority about aircraft that are on military
business, when the remainder would be appropriately handled (which no doubt
meant that if they could not comply with safety regulations, they would not be
allowed to fly).
The Managing Director was reassured by the then Permanent Secretary, Ministry
of Defence, Dr Mbonye, who said in a letter of 13th 20 July 1999:
“At the moment the Ministry of Defence is operating aircraft from Uganda
Air Cargo Corporation, VR Promotions and Knight Aviation. The aircraft
you have mentioned in your letter has never been engaged in any official
business with the Ministry of Defence.
Concerning clearance of Aircraft on Ministry of Defence business, the
UPDF Liaison Officer, currently Major Musinguzi Katafire remains the
officer to give your staff such clearance.
I am available any time for consultation should you at any stage need
further clarification with regard to aircraft claiming to be handling
30 Ministry of Defence business.”
Pausing there for a moment, a number of conclusions can be drawn from this
correspondence:
44
There was a problem of aircraft falsely claiming to be operating
for the Ministry of Defence, raised by Civil Aviation Authority and
acknowledged by Ministry of Defence
A method of dealing with the problem was set out, with
responsibility given to the Liaison Officer to confirm when asked on
behalf of MOD that any particular flight was a military flight.
On 20th July 1999, Col Otafiire, who was then the Special Presidential Advisor for
Security, wrote to the Managing Director of the Civil Aviation Authority
requesting Civil Aviation Authority to allow an aircraft Reg No LZ-FK to use the
airbase. H 10 e said in his letter:
“Whatever cargo, non-military subject to tax, shall be taxed according to
your financial regulations.”
By this paragraph, Col Otafiire revealed such an astonishing misunderstanding of
his duties, and of the Civil Aviation Authority requirements and those of the fiscal
system that he either was not the man to fill his important position, or he had a
financial interest in enabling the flights.
On 23rd July 1999 the Managing Director of Civil Aviation Authority replied to
Col Otafiire, with reference to the landing of that Aircraft LZ-FK Antonov 12F.
He quite rightly said:
20 “We wish to advise you that Civil Aviation Authority has difficulty in
authorising civil air operations in/out of DR Congo for the following
reasons:
The ICAO rules and regulations that govern international air operations do
not permit such operations given the current situation prevailing in the
eastern part of the Congo
The aircraft LZ-FK Antonov 12 F you intend to use does not meet our
flight safety standards”
However, he continued, wrongly in the view of this Commission:
“However, if the flights have to be operated, then they should be operated
30 as purely military flights which are not subject to Civil Aviation Authority’s
strict regulations and safety requirements…………. ”
45
Pausing again for a moment, there are some further conclusions which can be
drawn, and comments which can be made:
Civil Aviation Authority agree with this Commission that private
flights should be under Civil Aviation Authority supervision
There were flight safety issues.
Civil Aviation Authority was proposing that a fiction be adopted,
whereby any such private aircraft going to the Democratic Republic
of Congo should be called military flights. This fiction was contrary
to the rules in the Chicago Convention and also the provisions of the
Civil 10 Aviation Authority Statute.
On 6th August 1999, General Kazini got into the act on behalf of Planet Air,
(which, it will be remembered was connected to Salim Saleh). He wrote from
TAC HQ in Kisangani to the Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority as follows:
“1. This is to bring to your attention that Aircraft Planet Air has been
authorised to continue with its normal duties of Humanitarianism.
2. Owing to the current situation where we have been stopping aircraft over
flying our areas of control, you are therefore informed to allow Aircraft
Planet Air resume their Humanitarian work in the Democratic Republic of
Congo ”
20 This appears to be a similar approach to that of Col Otafiire, and constitutes a
complete disregard of all the earlier correspondence, which could only be justified
by a personal and financial interest.
The Managing Director of Civil Aviation Authority attached this letter to a letter
of 13th August 1999 to his Chairman, copying to the relevant officers in his
Ministry. In his letter he said:
“It is recommended that the Government comes out with clear guidelines
on how Civil Aviation Authority should handle Air Operators who apply for
clearance to operate into the the Democratic Republic of Congo while
having regard to Articles 1,2 and 3 of the Chicago Convention (copy
30 attached).”
Pausing there for the moment, it did not need Government to issue guidelines. As
this Commission has considered above, if the operator was private and not
military, and the aircraft was not chartered to MOD, then it should not be allowed
to fly, as it came under Civil Aviation Authority rules. And indeed that is exactly
46
the correct action taken in respect of Planet Air, which clearly was not flying as
a military aircraft, for the letter continued:
“In this particular case, Planet Air is not licenced in Uganda, Civil
Aviation Authority therefore does not have jurisdiction over the operator. I
have informed the representative of Planet Air accordingly.”
Civil Aviation Authority had also received a request for a permit to allow aircraft
LZ-FK, referred to above, on the basis that it would be conducting military flights
between Entebbe Airport and the the Democratic Republic of Congo “under the
command of Col K Otafiire”. This of course was a direct lie, told to try to bring
the aircraft under the definition of state aircraft in the 10 Civil Aviation Authority
Statute.
There were a number of requests for clearance signed apparently by military
officers at the air base. But everything seems to have gone quiet until 24th March
2000, when in an internal memo from the Managing Director to the Director Air
Transport, the following instructions were given:
“At a meeting held in Bombo on 17th February 2000 with the Military
Leadership, it was clarified that Government has stated clearly that Uganda
has military personnel in the East the Democratic Republic of Congo. This
fact was also recognised under the Lusaka Peace accord.”
20 No surprises so far.
“It was further clarified that, as long as the soldiers are still in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Government is obliged to send supplies
and provisions to them.”
There is no argument with that, These were clearly military missions.
“It is under this situation that some flights have to be cleared to the Eastern
the Democratic Republic of Congo. ”
The argument so far complies with aircraft on true military missions, but the
Memo continues:
47
“It was agreed with the Military, however, that the flights shall be
facilitated under Military Clearance and Operational Supervision”
Now if the flights were military flights, or aircraft chartered by MOD, nothing in
this memo was anything but self evident. It apparently took the matter no further
forward, and recorded that the meeting of 17th February was a complete waste of
the time of the military and Civil Aviation Authority personnel involved. However
the last paragraph shows the purpose of the memo and the meeting which
preceded it. It reads:
“You should therefore handle flight clearances to the Eastern the
Democratic Republic of Congo 10 accordingly. Where you are in doubt, you
may refer the matter to this office. It should be made clear, however, that
Civil Aviation Authority charges must be paid up front by the operators.”
It is unlikely that the instructions in this memo were to refer only to military
flights, but if they did, then Civil Aviation Authority charges would be invoiced to
MOD, as one clearance letter records. These instructions were to give an
apparently legal gloss to the private trading flights to the Democratic Republic of
Congo from the airbase. Nor did they account for or deal with flights to Western
Congo, Gbadolite for instance.
In fact UPDF Military authorities and Civil Aviation Authority had conspired to
20 see that flights illegal by both Ugandan Law and International Convention were
falsely recorded as the flights of State Aircraft, which they were not, thereby
endangering Ugandan participation in International Air Transport.
This Commission sees a weakness in the top administration of the Civil Aviation
Authority in conspiring to break the international air safety rules at the behest of
the UPDF, whom Civil Aviation Authority ought to have refused, instead of
apparently capitulating, when throughout they had been in the right, at the meeting
at Bombo of 17th February 2000.
This commission also sees an unseemly wielding of military power and contempt
of civil rules and regulations which appears throughout its investigations of the
30 conduct of the UPDF.
What should have happened is that private flights to the Democratic Republic of
Congo should have been conducted, whether from the military airbase or from the
48
International Airport, under Civil Aviation Authority rules and regulations.
Senior officers in Civil Aviation Authority and UPDF are responsible for this
situation, and should be investigated and the necessary disciplinary action taken,
for the protection of Uganda’s participation in International Air Travel.
15. MASS SCALE LOOTING
The original Panel Report states as a general proposition in Paragraph 32 that between
September 1998 and August 1999, occupied zones of the Democratic Republic of Congo were
drained of existing stockpiles. Specific examples were given, as below:
10 15.1. Amex Bois
Ugandan soldiers under General Kazini were accused in Paragraph 33 of having, in
late August 1998 absconded with stockpiles of Timber belonging to Amex Bois. The
Report does not state whether General Kazini was present at the time. This
Commission has been able to investigate this allegation to some extent. This
Commission found on the evidence that only a short time after this was supposed to
have happened, Amex Bois was transiting quantities of timber through Uganda: and
wonders, if Amex Bois was drained of stockpiles of timber, how they were able to
replenish their stocks so quickly. This creates a serious doubt in this Commission’s
minds as to the truth of this allegation. One suggestion given to this Commission on
20 oath is that some UPDF soldiers had used a little of the timber for firewood, falling
far short of draining the stocks. This allegation cannot be confirmed, and is unlikely
to be true in view of the above.
15.2. La Forestiere
In Paragraph 33, General Kazini was also alleged to have ordered the confiscation of
stockpiles of timber of La Forestiere in December of that year. The original Panel rely
on an allegation that General Kazini was seen in the area at the time of the alleged
incident, and it is true that General Kazini set up his HQ at La Forestiere. In fact
when General Kazini left La Forestiere, he obtained a withdrawal document signed
by the relevant authorities which stated that La Forestiere had no such complaint.
30 This allegation is unlikely to be true.
49
15.3. Confiscation of Coffee Beans
Paragraph 35 of the original Panel Report states that in January 1999 Jean Pierre
Bemba with General Kazini was alleged to have organized a large operation for the
confiscation of coffee beans. Although there is an allegation against General Kazini,
the recital of information upon which the original Panel relied, deals with acts of Jean
Pierre Bemba, but does not implicate General Kazini. In any case both General
Kazini and Jean Pierre Bemba have denied the allegation.
Jean Pierre Bemba told the Commission that on hearing the story he wrote to the
companies mentioned and requested them to confirm the allegation and inform him
the quality and quantity of the coffee his men had taken. 10 He told them that he was
prepared to reimburse the cost. He said that he did this although he was aware that his
men had not taken any coffee.
In response the Company is said to have stated that the coffee he was talking about
was taken by Chadians and not his men. He showed the exchange of correspondence
to the Commission (Exh. JPB/7/116.) He also said that he had given copies of those
documents to the reconstituted Panel. The Commission was impressed by the orderly
manner in which Jean Pierre Bemba kept his records, and conclude that this allegation
is unlikely to be true.
15.4. Cars
20 It is further alleged by the original Panel that :-
“Cars and other items were apparently also taken from the country, as the
statistics on Ugandan registered cars reflected an increase of about one
quarter in 1999”.
The assumption that the increase in registered cars in Uganda at the relevant period
represented cars stolen from the Democratic Republic of Congo was obviously wrong
as it ignored completely other probable sources from which the increase could have
come.
Besides, the information this Commission has received from the Interpol Data Base
shows that the number of stolen vehicles that were recovered by Uganda and handed
30 over to the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1998 and 2001 was only three.
50
If the allegation were true, there would have been a significant number of left hand
drive cars in the streets of Kampala. This Commission has evidence, and has
observed, that this is not the case and cannot confirm this allegation.
The evidence of Adele Lotsove also shows that cars in the Democratic Republic of
Congo are junk, as there are no good roads in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
therefore would not be worth stealing and transporting.
15.5. Theft from Banks
Paragraph 40 of the original Panel Report alleges that Jean Pierre Bemba had
instructed his soldiers to empty banks once a town was captured and that the soldiers
had taken the equivalent of $400,000 from Banque 10 Commerciale du Congo branch at
Bumba, $500,000 in Lisala and about $600,000 in Gemena. Jean Pierre Bemba
denied the allegation. As in the case of coffee referred to in paragraph 15.3 above, he
told the Commission that he heard of the allegation and wrote to the banks concerned
requesting them to confirm that money was taken from them by his men during the
liberation of their towns. The banks replied saying that they had never been looted by
his soldiers. He gave copies of the correspondence to the Commission (Exh.
JPB/7/116) and said that he had also given copies of those documents to the second
original Panel. He also pointed out that when a town was about to be captured, the
occupying troops would be ill advised to leave cash in the banks, knowing that it
20 would be lost to them, and converted to funding for the victorious rebels. This
allegation is unlikely to be true.
15.6. Murder of Civilians
In Paragraph 42 it is alleged that in Bunia Congolese civilians were injured or
murdered for resisting the attempted seizure of property by “RCD rebels and foreign
soldiers”. It is not clear whether this is an allegation against the UPDF, but the
allegation is not sufficiently detailed to investigate, or to rely upon. This Commission
does however have a record of a General Court Martial in which a soldier was
accused and convicted for murdering civilians who were in custody in Gemena. This
was much later in April 2001, but indicates that Uganda appears to have taken at least
30 one such allegation seriously.
15.7. Organised Looting
In Paragraph 43 and 44, the highest army commanders of Uganda are alleged to have
encouraged, organized and coordinated looting, and in particular General Kazini is
51
said to have appointed loyal commanders and reliable civilian Congolese to secure
his network in areas rich in mineral resources. The appointment of Adele Lotsove was
quoted as an example, and is further dealt with in Paragraph 71. This Commission has
considered the matter at Paragraph 15.8 below of this report. In particular, it should
be born in mind that General Kazini was aware of looting, as his radio message of
29/1/99 shows, and was inappropriately involved in promoting Victoria Diamonds,
indicating actions consistent with the allegations of the original Panel, which cannot
be totally ruled out.
15.8. Allegations against Uganda
15.8.1. Appointment o 10 f Adele Lotsove
In paragraph 71 of original Panel Report it was stated that the illegal exploitation
of natural resources of Democratic Republic of Congo was facilitated by the
administrative structures established by both Uganda and Rwanda. The original
Panel cited as an example the appointment as Governor of Ituri Province of Adele
Lotsove on 18th June, 1999 by Major General Kazini.
This Commission has seen the letter of appointment among the exhibits. The
Commission has also heard evidence on oath from Madam Adele Lotsove and
General Kazini on the issue. Madam Adele Lotsove told the Commission that she
was a native of Ituri. She was once the 1st Deputy Governor of Kisangani in-
20 Charge of Upper Zaire Province or Haut Zaire. She said that Ituri Province was
one of the Provinces of Zaire in 1962, but was abolished by Mobutu. During a
National Conference in 1991 it was proposed that the whole of Zaire should be
divided into 28 Provinces. Ituri was supposed to be one of the Provinces, but the
proposal was never carried out. So when she was appointed the 1st Vice Governor
of Kisangani, she considered that as an opportunity to implement the 1991
proposal by proclaiming Ituri a Province as that was the aspiration of her people.
Her aim was to adopt the Ugandan model of administration and political system,
which she had seen during her stay in Nebbi in Uganda.
When she discussed with General Kazini her aspirations and ambition, she found
30 him very receptive. Since General Kazini was the one in charge of Security she
asked him to take charge of her security whilst she fought for the creation of Ituri
Province. The letter written by General Kazini dated 18/6/99 allegedly appointing
her a Provisional Governor in-Charge of the Districts of Ituri and HAUT–UELE
52
was for the purpose of enabling his Commanders on the ground to understand
that she had the support of UPDF so as to give her maximum security.
Armed with Major General Kazini’s letter, she left Kisangani on 22/6/99 and went
to Bunia and proclaimed Ituri Province on 5/7/99. She was positive that, apart
from the provision of security, General Kazini had no hand in both the
proclamation of Ituri as a Province and the declaration of herself as Governor of
the Province.
This has been confirmed by General Kazini during his last testimony before this
Commission. He said he did not appoint her as a Governor as she was already a
Deputy Governor. He said that his role was 10 to provide security and its
enforcement. The additional matters he mentioned in his letter were only intended
to enable her execute her duties properly in an area where there was total
confusion. This is clearly different from his earlier testimony in which he admitted
appointing her as Governor. Once again General Kazini lied to this Commission.
In the opinion of this Commission neither General Kazini nor Adele Lotsove told
the Commission the whole truth about the circumstances regarding the creation of
Ituri Province and the appointment of Adele Lotsove as Governor of that Province.
Considering the evidence of His Excellency the President, the original evidence of
General Kazini, in which he admitted appointing Adele Lotsove, for which he was
20 said to have been reprimanded, and the terms of the appointment letter itself, there
is no doubt that in fact he did make this appointment, and the later evidence of
General Kazini and Adele Lotsove cannot be true. The possibility that General
Kazini had a personal interest in appointing Adele Lotsove is further examined at
Paragraph 21.3.4 below
As to the allegation that Madame Lotsove was instrumental in the collection and
transfer of funds from her assigned administrative region to the Uganda authorities
in 1999, this Commission has been interested in the mechanics of such a transfer
of funds.
It would have helped this Commission in its work had the original Panel named
30 the authorities concerned. If local UPDF authorities were concerned, this
Commission does not see how it would now be possible to check any payments
made. If government authorities in Uganda were concerned, this Commission does
not see how any payments made could have reached Treasury without being
53
recorded. In those circumstances this Commission is at a loss to work out what
information gathered by the original Panel could clearly indicate that such
payments were made, and this Commission therefore doubts this conclusion.
There is one additional consideration which does not seem to have been borne in
mind by the original Panel, which is that Adele Lotsove was only in office for
some 3 months before she was dismissed by Professor Wamba, and would
therefore have had little time to get involved in such matters.
15.8.2. Knowledge of Key Ugandan Officials
In Paragraph 45 it is alleged that key officials in the Government of Uganda were
aware of the situation on the ground: and further, in 10 the case of gold, that the
increased production would have alerted any government.
It has proved impossible to trace or investigate the allegation in Paragraph 45,
because the key officials and the sources of information upon which the original
Panel relies are not given. In evidence on oath before this Commission, this
allegation has been denied in toto. As to the allegation relating to the levels of
production of mineral resources, in particular gold, this Commission has dealt
with this at Paragraph 21.1 below
16. SYSTEMATIC AND SYSTEMIC EXPLOITATION
In Paragraphs 46-54 of the original Panel Report, the original Panel allege that a company
20 (Dara Forêt ) used illicit business practices and complicity with occupying forces and the
Government (presumably the Government of Uganda ) as well as its international connections
to exploit the natural resources of the Congo. The original Panel conducted a case study
which is alleged to support this proposition.
The allegations of impropriety concern Dara Forêt, Dara Great Lakes Industries and
associated companies, and the Uganda Government.
16.1. Timber : Dara Forêt and Dara Great Lakes International.
This Commission reproduces here the example according to the original Panel Report.
Evidence brought, and severely tested by this Commission, is interpolated together with this
Commission’s comments.
54
DARA-Forest case study. A Ugandan-Thai forest company called
DARA-Forest moved to the Ituri area late in 1998.
Dara Forêt is a company registered in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Whilst it has Thai
(5%) and Congolese (40%) Directors and Shareholders, it has no Ugandan Directors
shareholders, or any other Ugandan Interest apart from a Ugandan Company named Royal
Star Holdings, whose Directors and Shareholders are exclusively Thai Nationals. Royal Star
Holdings has 55% of Dara Forêt.
In March 1998, DARA-Forest applied for a licence to carry out logging
activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but was denied a forest
10 concession by the Kinshasa authorities.
Mr. John Supit Kotiram, the managing Director of Dara Forêt, denied before this Commission
that he had ever made any application to Kinshasa authorities. This Commission has no
evidence of any such application.
In 1999, the company began to buy production by hiring individuals to
harvest timber and then sell it to the company. Initially, these individuals
were Congolese operating in partnership with Ugandans.
The evidence of Mr. Kotiram was that the company was buying individual trees from
Congolese, with the assistance of Local Chiefs in the Congo. He was then shipping them in
transit through Uganda (with the exception of a trial run of two containers which he imported
20 to Uganda and in respect of which he has produced the relevant customs documents) to
foreign destinations.
The same year, DARA engaged in industrial production with the
construction of a sawmill in Mangina. By 2000, it had obtained its own
concession from RCD-ML.
So far as this Commission can ascertain, this is correct.
Analysis of satellite images over a period of time reveals the extent to which
deforestation occurred in Orientale Province between 1998 and 2000. The
most harvested forests in the areas were around Djugu, Mambassa, Beni,
Komanda, Luna, Mont Moyo and Aboro. This logging activity was carried
30 out without consideration of any of the minimum acceptable rules of timber
harvesting for sustainable forest management or even sustainable logging.
55
Timber harvested in this region, which is occupied by the Ugandan army
and RCD-ML, has exclusively transited or remained in Uganda. Our own
investigation in Kampala has shown that mahogany originating in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is largely available in Kampala, at a
lower price than Ugandan mahogany. This difference in price is simply due
to the lower cost of acquisition of timber. Timber harvested in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by Uganda pays very little tax or none at
all.
There is no evidence before this Commission that Uganda as a country or as a Government
harvests timber in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This 10 Commission doubts that the
allegation in the Report is correct. Timber does come across the border as an import, and there
is no doubt that timber is also smuggled through the porous borders. Congo timber is cheaper
in the market because it is usually cut by chain saws, which are not allowed in Uganda. Such
documentation as this Commission has seen indicates that timber cut in the Democratic
Republic of Congo is dutiable there on export, and that such duties are levied by the rebel
authorities and paid.
This Commission toured the Kampala Timber Market at the Ndeeba area. The Commission
found that timber from Congo is available in the market. The timber from Congo is mainly
hardwood.
20 The Commission found that timber from Congo is cheaper than those from Uganda. The
reason for the difference in price depends on the method of cutting the timber. In Uganda
timber is processed either by handsaw or pit saw or by sawmills or what is commonly known
as machine cut. Timber from Congo is processed by chain saw. Timber processed with
handsaws has a smooth surface while those cut with chain saw have rough or uneven surface.
Chain saws are illegal in Uganda.
Transit timber is always accompanied by Forest Products Movement Permit issued by the
District Forest Offices. One needs to get a concession from the Forestry Department to cut
timber from Forest Reserves. The application is made through the District Officer of the area
where the Forest Reserve is situated. It is then forwarded to the headquarters in Kampala
30 where it is processed and issued.
This Commission was informed that there is a ban on raw timber export. Only finished or
semi-finished wood products are permitted to be exported.
In addition, customs fees are generally not paid when soldiers escort those
trucks or when orders are received from some local commanders or
56
General Kazini. Timber from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is
then exported to Kenya and Uganda, and to other continents. The Panel
gathered from the Kenyan port authorities that vast quantities of timber are
exported to Asia, Europe and North America.
The Panel also discovered during its investigation that individual Ugandan
loggers violated forestry legislation, recognized by their ally RCD-ML, by
logging (extracting) the timber directly. According to the Congolese
legislation on the permis de coupe, only individual Congolese nationals are
allowed to harvest timber and only in small quantities. Foreigners must
apply for the larger concessions. 10 Initially, Ugandans operated in
partnership with a Congolese permit holder. Soon, the Ugandans began to
pay the Congolese to sub-lease the permit and, subsequently, to obtain the
licence in direct violation of the law.
In so far as the above relates to Dara Forêt, Mr. Kotiram has told this Commission that he has
not yet cut a single tree within his concession. He has given good and sufficient reason for
that, and this Commission will recite it in due course.
During a visit to Mpondwe/ Kasindi and also at Arua/ Ariwari, this Commission spoke to the
Congolese Officers there, and they denied strongly that it would be possible for UPDF to
influence the passage of merchandise, or for their commanders to give orders in that regard. It
20 is true that large quantities of timber transit Uganda for export to Europe and America, in the
ordinary course of trade.
In so far as individual Ugandan loggers are concerned, this Commission has no way of
investigating this non-specific matter: This Commission has had evidence that there are
Ugandans who go over to the Congo and buy trees by negotiating with individual Congolese
permit holders or Chiefs, and import the timber once cut to Uganda, which helps to account
for the presence of Congolese hardwood in the Uganda market. This Commission was
informed that the low price of Congolese hardwood is due to the fact that Congolese timber is
harvested and cut with chain saws, while chain saws are not permitted in Uganda. The
efficiency of chain saws accounts for the increase in cross border trade. This cross border
30 trade has been carried on throughout living memory.
Timber extraction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and its export
have been characterized by unlawfulness and illegality. Besides extracting
timber without authorization in a sovereign country and in violation of the
local legislation, DARA-Forest consistently exported its timber without any
certification procedure.
In this Paragraph the original Panel raise the whole question of de facto control of
administration which this Commission has dealt with under the heading of “Illegality” at
Paragraph 11 above.
57
It tried to approach some certification bodies licensed by the Forest
Stewardship Council. These bodies requested documentation and elements
that the company failed to provide.
Mr. Kotiram has told this Commission that he wants to gain certification for his concession in
the Congo, for reasons which are to do with timber for his processing factory at Namanve in
Kampala which is yet to be built. It is because certification has not yet been achieved that he
has not cut any trees on his concession
Yet DARA-Forest exported timber in violation of a normal procedure
generally required and accepted by the international forest community and
gradually considered to be international “soft 10 law”. Companies importing
this uncertified timber from DARA-Forest were essentially in major
industrialized countries, including Belgium, China, Denmark, Japan,
Kenya, Switzerland and the United States of America.
If companies so widely spread around the developed world are prepared to trade in
uncertified timber, this Paragraph lends weight to this Commission’s conclusion
under the title “Illegality” at 11 above that international commercial practice is to
trade in timber whether certified or not, but at different prices. It again raises the
question of “soft law” which this Commission has considered in Paragraph 11.3.5
above. Mr. Kotiram gave this Commission some interesting information: he said
20 that there is no other company certified in Africa except one company in Gabon.
This Commission does not know if that is true or not, but has no reason to doubt
it. If so, then in Africa this cannot be said to be a “procedure generally required”.
Researches on the Internet show that Smartwood, one of the certifying bodies, do
not even have a category for Africa. Other certifying bodies mention forests in
South Africa only
The Panel also realized that DARA Great Lakes Industries (DGLI), of
which DARA-Forest is a subsidiary, along with a sister company in
Uganda, Nyota Wood Industries, is in collusion with the Ministry of Water,
Land and Forests of Uganda in establishing a scheme to facilitate the
30 certification of timber coming from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
There are a number of matters here, which this Commission has investigated intensively, and
called sworn evidence from the Companies Registrar, who confirms what Mr Kotiram said.
First, DGLI is not a subsidiary of Dara Forêt. They are both subsidiaries of the Dara Group.
Mr. Kotiram is managing director of both, and holds the controlling interest in both
58
companies, either personally, or by his interest in yet another company, Royal Star
Holdings, which, while registered in Uganda, is a wholly Thai owned Company. Since the
shareholding in Nyota Wood is much the same, presumably it falls under the same umbrella.
This is the evidence of Mr. Kotiram, and probably in practice it is true: but probably also
these are not in law subsidiaries of Dara Group, (a company registered in the Virgin Islands)
since that company does not appear to hold any direct interest in any of the companies.
Then it can be shown that there was no collusion between Nyota Wood and the Ministry of
Water, Land and Forests of Uganda, because one application which was made to the Ministry,
which, if the original Panel is right, would have been essential to the alleged conspiracy, was
10 refused by the Ministry.
In May 2000, DGLI signed a contract for forest stewardship certification
with SmartWood and the Rogue Institute for Ecology and Economy in
Oregon, United States of America.
This is not true. Smartwood is the certifying Agency: the Rogue Institute for Ecology and
Economy was an agency whom Mr. Kotiram contracted to advise him on SmartWood’s
requirements for certification. Thereafter Dara contacted another Company, UNIQUE,
Wegerhäuser & Partner, who later gave a presentation to the reconstituted Panel. UNIQUE
were advising Dara on the way to go about certification of their concessions in Democratic
Republic of Congo and in Uganda.
20 On 21 March 2000, the Director of the DARA group, Prossy Balaba, sent a
letter to the Commissioner asking him to allow an official of SmartWood to
visit certain forests, such as Budongo and Bugoma; he was due to visit the
region in mid-April.
Prossy Balaba was not “the director of the Dara Group”. She was a director and minority
shareholder of the Ugandan Company referred to above as DGLI. In that regard it will be
noted that Mr. Kotiram set up his companies with himself in control, supported by the
participation of local directors and shareholders. This is quite normal, and indeed required in
some countries. In any event, for a Thai National whose grasp of French and English is not
that good, it is certainly advisable.
30 It is true that the request above was made : this Commission has a copy of the letter.
59
The visit was meant to deceive the official by presenting those forests as
the ones for which certification was sought and to convince SmartWood to
work for the certification of their timber.
The evidence of Mr. Kotiram, and of the Forestry Commissioner is quite clear and consistent.
DGLI had applied and obtained an investment licence for a factory to process finished and
semi-finished timber in Kampala. The specifications for the factory were that it would require
an enormous amount of timber, far more than it turned out that Uganda could supply once
investigations were made. It was therefore necessary for DGLI to turn to Dara Forêt in the
Democratic Republic of Congo for additional supplies. But Mr. Kotiram was advised that, in
addition to certification of the timber from Uganda, he would 10 have to show that timber from
the Congo was also certified if it was to be processed in the factory, and sold as certified
produce. This he was told would be a requirement of SmartWood, who would be interested
not only in the forests, but the whole operation. DGLI therefore needed to start with
certification in Uganda at least.
Indeed, when the visit took place, from 14 to 16 April, the DARA group had
not even applied for the concession of the Budongo forest (Uganda). It was
only on 5 July 2000 that John Kotiram of the DARA group wrote to the
Commissioner to request the concession on the Budongo forest.
The visit never took place, because the concessions in Uganda had not been granted by the
20 suggested date. Prossy Balaba and Mr. Kotiram told this Commission that to write this letter
so early was a genuine mistake brought on in the belief, based on discussions with the
Forestry Commissioner that the concessions were to be granted more quickly than they in fact
were.
The idea behind this is to use Budongo forest as a model of forests from
which timber is harvested and which comply with the international
requirements for certification, in order to certify timber coming from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo for which basic elements of certification
do not exist. Future plans for beating the international system are already
in place. According to internal documents of DGLI, DARA- Forest will
30 import timber from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into Uganda,
which will be processed for different types of products in the new plant in
Namanve for the saw milling of hardwood, both imported from the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and harvested in Uganda. DGLI
partners in this new scheme include DARA Europe GmbH Germany,
Shanton President Wood Supply Co. Ltd China, President Wood Supply
Co. Ltd Thailand, DARA Tropical Hardwood, Portland, Oregon, United
States of America.
60
The original Panel’s informant no doubt did not have, as this Commission has, DGLI’s
application to the District Forestry Officers concerned for concessions in three Ugandan
Forests, namely Budongo, Bugoma and Mabira dated 11thOctober 1999, and therefore have
seen conspiracies where no conspiracies exist. Mr. Kotiram has explained to this Commission
what he planned to do: there is no way that the conspiracy alleged would have fooled experts
from SmartWood, as the capacity of the factory would have been obvious, as would the
inability of the Ugandan Forests to supply it. The first question would have been where the
balance was to come from. Mr. Kotiram accepts the list of overseas companies with whom his
companies trade.
In a letter of 5th July 2000, what is alleged to have been r 10 ecorded only in internal documents is
in fact publicly acknowledged.
The distribution of sales of the company is thought to remain the same,
about 30 per cent to the Far East, China, Japan and Singapore, 40 per cent
to Europe and 25 per cent to North America. DARA Great Lakes Industries
shareholding and management is between Thai and Ugandan nationals,
among them John Supit Kotiram and Pranee Chanyuttasart of Thailand
and Prossy Balaba of Uganda.
These figures are accepted by Mr. Kotiram and Prossy Balaba. Pranee Chanyuttasart is his
wife, who is now unfortunately and lately deceased. Mr. Kotiram retains firm control of
20 DGLI, and is its managing Director
Some unconfirmed information indicates that members of President
Museveni’s family are shareholders of DGLI, although more investigation
is needed.
This Commission agrees that a great deal more investigation is needed before such an
allegation appears in a report to a United Nations body. This Commission’s investigations
with the Companies Registry reveal nothing whatever of that nature, and the allegation is
denied by Mr. Kotiram and Prossy Balaba, and for himself by His Excellency the President.
The DARA group also established another scheme to carry out fraudulent
activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The objects of DGLI
30 range from logging to financial and industrial activities. Because of the
confusion created between DARA-Forest, which received a concession
from RCD, and DGLI, DARA-Forest has also been dealing in diamonds,
gold and coltan. The original Panel has received reports from the custom
posts of Mpondwe, Kasindi and Bundibujyo of the export from the
61
Democratic Republic of the Congo of minerals such as cassiterite and
coltan in trucks. During the original Panel’s visit to Bunia it was reported
that other products were loaded in trucks which are supposed to carry
timber only; it is likely that coltan and cassiterite were these products.
Moreover, the fraud extends to the forging of documents and declarations
“originating” in Kinshasa.
The confusion between Dara Forêt and DGLI, on the basis of the evidence, exists only in the
mind of the original Panel. These appear to this Commission to be two separate Companies,
registered in two separate countries. Mr. Kotiram agrees that Dara Forêt has been exporting
coltan for which he has a licence, which he has produced to this 10 Commission. It does not
appear to be forged. The mineral has been sent in transit through Uganda. Mr. Kotiram has
produced before this Commission Customs documents which have been verified for this
Commission by URA. There is no evidence whatever that any of the Dara Companies have
been dealing with diamonds or gold.
The original Panel is not specific as to the forgery alleged: but this Commission suspect that
the problem may arise from the use by rebels of original forms left by the Kinshasa
Government before the rebellion. In any event, this Commission would be slow to accuse
parties of criminal offences such as fraud and forgery without being able to set out specific
details with particulars
20 The logging rate was alarming around Butembo, Beni, Boga and
Mambassa. The RCD-ML administration acknowledged its lack of control
over the rate of extraction, the collection of taxes on logging activities and
the customs fees at the exit points. On the basis of eyewitness accounts,
satellite images, key actors’ acknowledgements and the Panel’s own
investigation, there is sufficient evidence to prove that timber extraction is
directly related to the Ugandan presence in Orientale Province. This has
reached alarming proportions and Ugandans (civilians, soldiers and
companies) are extensively involved in these activities. In May 2000, RCDML
attributed a concession of 100, 000 hectares to DARA-Forest. Since
30 September 1998, overall DARA-Forest has been exporting approximately
48, 000 m3 of timber per year.
UPDF presence in Orientale Province provided the security and access to overseas markets
denied to the Congolese for so long. One would therefore expect to see increased activity in
the area, not only by Dara Forêt but by other companies as well.
So far as Dara Forêt is concerned, while Mr. Kotiram agrees the figures quoted, he tells this
Commission that in his concession he has not cut even a single tree, and he has given this
Commission good and sufficient reason for this. The source of his timber has been from
62
individuals, in accordance with a long standing practice outlined to this Commission by
another witness.
This Commission is extremely concerned at the approach of the original Panel to this subject.
Nowhere in the whole of this passage is the reliability of sources quoted, but, considering the
emphasis put on these alleged events, the original Panel must have come to the conclusion
that it was safe to rely on its undisclosed and apparently un-evaluated sources. Yet the
perception of those sources, and that of the original Panel, was quite clearly wrong. A short
interview with Mr. Kotiram and his associates would have established the truth, but he was
never approached, according to his evidence. This problem casts doubt on the original Panel’s
collection and reliance upon information given to it, not only 10 in respect of Dara Forêt, but
throughout the Report, given the emphasis placed upon this so-called Case Study.
From the evidence, this Commission has come to the conclusion that the investigation by the
original Panel of Dara Forêt was fundamentally flawed and is unable to find support for any
single allegation made in this so-called Case Study.
16.1.1. Allegations against His Excellency the President and his family
The original Panel say :
Some unconfirmed information indicates that members of President
Museveni’s family are shareholders of DGLI, although more investigation
is needed.
20 As above, this Commission agrees that a great deal more investigation is needed
before such an allegation appears in a report to a United Nations body. This
Commission’s own investigations with the Companies Registry reveal nothing
whatever of that nature. All the relevant witnesses were called, and all the
Companies Registry files were obtained. The allegations are specifically denied by
Mr. Kotiram, Prossy Balaba, Salim Saleh, Jovial Akandwanaho, and, for himself,
by His Excellency the President
During a consideration of the link between exploitation of resources by the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the continuation of the conflict, the
reconstituted Panel point out that Dara Forêt registered as a Congolese registered
30 Company in Kinshasa in March 1998: it will be remembered that that was at a
time when relationships between Kinshasa and Kampala were good, and trade
opportunities were being investigated (see Paragraph 14.2 above). Then in June
63
1998 Dara Forêt was granted a logging concession from North Kivu Provincial
Authority, and an exploitation licence. The reconstituted Panel found that Dara
Forêt had complied with all the regulations in effect, and paid taxes as before. It is
checked by local authorities in North Kivu to see that it is complying with the
terms of its licence. It was also granted a certificate of registration by the Ministry
of Justice in Kinshasa. The reconstituted Panel then concludes that:
73. DARA Forest, which the Panel has found to have complied with all the
regulations in effect, currently pays its taxes at the same bank as it did
before the area came under rebel control. It also deals with the same
customs officials as it did before the rebels 10 took control of the area when it
exports its products and imports production equipment. The Panel has also
learned that a bimonthly check is conducted by the local Congolese
authorities in North Kivu to ensure that DARA Forest is complying with
the terms of licences granted to it. Furthermore, DARA Forest was granted
on 12 September 2001 a certificate of registration from the Ministry of
Justice in Kinshasa. This would appear to be a clear sign of recognition of
the company and acceptance of its work in the rebel-held areas by the
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
This is a completely different story from that of the original Panel, whose
20 criticisms of Dara Forêt were attributed by the Mayi Mayi for their formation, and
for the kidnapping of 24 Thai Nationals working there. There is no
acknowledgement of any mistake by the original Panel: this Commission has
examined the whole of the so-called Case Study of Dara Forêt and DGLI, and the
allegations against the Uganda Government, and His Excellency the President, and
found that far from there merely being no evidence of the original Panel’s
allegations, those allegations were false to fact: and the reconstituted Panel have
independently agreed, on the basis of additional evidence.
This Commission was expecting to see a specific withdrawal of and even perhaps
an apology to Uganda and His Excellency the President for the disgraceful and
30 unsupported allegations made in the original Panel Report: it is absent.
16.2. Mining Sector
Under the heading of systematic and systemic exploitation, the original Panel states in
Paragraph 56 that direct extraction of minerals was carried out in three ways, namely:
1) by individual soldiers for their own benefit;
2) by local people organised by Rwandan and Ugandan commanders;
and
64
3) by foreign nationals for the army or commanders’ benefit.
The original Panel specified a number of specific examples as under:-
16.2.1. Mining Disasters and Soldiers imposing “Gold Tax”
The original Panel states, in Paragraph 57, that it came across a number of cases in
which soldiers were directly involved in mining in Watsa. It cites an incident that
happened in September, 1999 where:
UPDF local commanders demanded the extraction of gold on the pillars of
the Gorumbwa mine in which dynamite was used and which caused the
galleries to collapse, leading to the death of a number of Congolese miners.
In Paragraph 59 the original Panel further states that in Kilo-10 Moto mineral district,
Ugandan local Commanders and some of the soldiers who guarded the different
entry points of the mining area allowed and encouraged the local population to
mine on an arrangement that each miner would leave at the entry/exit point one
gram of gold every day. The original Panel states that about 2,000 miners were
involved and on the average 2 kg of gold were delivered to the person heading the
network. The reconstituted Panel came up with a figure of 10,000 miners, but did
not quote a source: Dr Mido gave evidence that Professor Wamba had appointed a
Commission of soldiers who were to guard the Kilo Moto mine and collect gold
worth 15$ a day from artisanal miners, and that this was yielding some two
20 hundred to three hundred grams a month. This might have raised the possibility of
a confusion between RCD and UPDF soldiers.
This Commission did its best to investigate these incidents, and in the evidence of
Col Mayombo and of General Kazini, including the radio messages produced by
him, found references to similar incidents in which one Lt Okumu was alleged to
be involved. Also Lt Col Mugenyi told this Commission that he received a direct
report regarding an incident of an explosion in a mine on 10/10/98. This incident
could not have been the same as the one referred to by the original Panel, as Lt
Okumu only reached the area of his responsibility in Watsa and Durba on 9/9/98,
He left on 27/12/98 as a result of investigations into his conduct, and therefore
30 could not have been involved in the incident to which the original Panel refer. The
other possibility might be that the original Panel was incorrectly informed as to
the year of the occurrence, or perpetrated a typing error.
65
However, when the original Panel Report was published, the Chieftaincy of
Military Intelligence was asked to investigate a number of incidents. It was
already known that there had been problems in the Watsa area before Lt Okumu
went there, which had reached Senior Levels. These problems no doubt prompted
the phraseology of the orders he received. Lt Okumu’s orders on arrival from Lt
Col Mugenyi (409 B/ Co) who was based in Isiro Exhibit FM/07/102 (inter alia)
read :
No soldier should interfere with the authorities of the gold mining area
without consulting (B/Co) into.
No Loitering of Soldiers in the centres and 10 on the area of gold mining
(must be halted)
These orders were signed by Lt Col Mugenyi, and countersigned by Lt Okumu.
This Commission took Lt Col Mugenyi to task at length about these orders: it
suggested that the way in which they were phrased clearly indicated that soldiers
had been interfering with the authorities of the gold mining area, and that soldiers
had been loitering in the centres and in the area of gold mining : the orders
specifically said that this behaviour must be halted. Such allegations went a long
way to support the allegations in the original Panel Report. Lt Col Mugenyi was
not prepared to accept that this was the case.
20 This Commission on a consideration of the evidence found that the Lt Col was not
telling the truth, and that these specific orders arose from events such as the
original Panel described, Otherwise for example, the written orders would not
have said that such behaviour must be halted.
Apart from that specific finding, this Commission was not at all impressed by the
evidence of this senior officer who was evasive on many points throughout his
evidence. It also interested this Commission that this officer was prepared to put in
writing that, although in the general sense soldiers were prohibited from
interfering with the gold mining authorities, they nevertheless might do so after
consulting with himself, the Battalion Commander.
30 Only a month later after the date of the above document, Lt Col Mugenyi was
writing to one Maj. Sonko who was an Intelligence Officer temporarily in Durba.
66
In that communication, Lt Col Mugenyi was saying that he had received
information that the Detach Command (Lt Okumu) had been reported to have
been:
1) Mining with his soldiers
2) Selling diesel, empty drums, fridge and cookers
3) Using 275 detonators from the gold mine, and primers from UPDF
mortars to mine.
4) Breaking the store where there were Walkie Talkies belonging to the
factory
He also said that he had information that 10 Maj. Sonko and Lt Okumu were
harassing civilians, causing workers to have started running away from the place.
Lt Col Mugenyi then stated that he wanted Maj. Sonko to Countercheck those
allegations stating :
Otherwise I am going to arrest all of you
This Commission was astonished by the suggestion that Maj. Sonko should be the
officer to investigate his own alleged misconduct, and to be expected to report
usefully. And indeed Lt Col Mugenyi was quite unable to deal with questioning on
this subject. One thing that is clear is that Lt Col Mugenyi took his information
very seriously.
20 In fact Maj. Sonko did report on Lt Okumu: the numbering above is used as follows:
1) Mining with his soldiers : Maj. Sonko was asked to crosscheck and
report later. He did not do so in writing, although he claimed to have
done so verbally. In evidence he said that he found nothing in the
allegation against Lt Okumu, having spoken to local people, the mine
director, and the local Intelligence Sergeant. He said that he had
cleared Lt Okumu as a result of his investigation, but then was unable
to report in writing, he said, in order to keep the matter secret from Lt
Okumu. But in evidence he also said that another team came to
investigate from Makindye Barracks, and it was that team which
30 cleared Lt Okumu.
67
2) Selling diesel, empty drums, fridge and cookers: the Report
catalogued the full and empty drums of diesel and aviation fuel,
coming to a total of 323 full drums, and recording that 100 drums had
been issued to Kilo Moto. This Commission tried to get out of Maj.
Sonko how these figures related to the stock which ought to have
been present, so as to establish whether there was a shortage, but he
was not able, or prepared, to go into that. On the subject of fridges
and cookers, there was nothing in the report, and Maj. Sonko was not
prepared to go into the matter, because, he said, there was no
electricity in the area. His conclusion, 10 according to his evidence, was
that Lt Okumu should be transferred because of selling National
logistics. This was later investigated by a team from Makindye: this
Commission does not know the results, apart from Lt Okumu’s word
that he was cleared, and some other unclear evidence, including an
allegation by General Kazini that the matter was dealt with by court
martial, in respect of which General Kazini appears to have done
little to obtain the record, despite repeated requests from this
Commission, and ample time to do so.
3) Using 275 detonators from the gold mine, and primers from
20 UPDF mortars to mine. Maj. Sonko said that he “arrested” 115
Cordex Wires, which, after some questioning turned out to be
detonators and which he said was stolen from the stock of Kilo Moto.
He said he “arrested” them from among the 20,000 artisanal miners
who were digging on the site. He set out the munitions found with the
Unit. His investigation was inconclusive, to say the least. On this
subject, although Lt Okumu denied knowing anything about this
allegation, Lt Col Mugenyi said that he had been informed during
October 1998 of the incident. It is inconceivable therefore that Lt
Okumu knew nothing of it.
30 4) Breaking the store where there were Walkie Talkies belonging to
the factory. Maj. Sonko said that the Walkie Talkies were removed
from Kilo Moto “to assist communication of our detach. For every 3
kms we deployed 1 Walkie Talkie”. He also reported that a ManPack
Radio had been removed from Kilo Moto because “they were
communicating to Bunia”. A further one was recovered from
Colombo Mission by the Police of Watsa, in what circumstances was
68
not recorded. (In the original orders above referred to, it was set
out that five Walkie Talkies were given to the Platoon at Durba by
the Director of Gold Mining to ease co-ordination with his office.
There was one ManPack Radio with “all its gadgets” for the platoon).
Once again Maj. Sonko’s investigation was inconclusive.
On questioning by the Commission, Maj. Sonko finally admitted, on the question
of fuel, that he did not investigate properly. He said that in fact he did not belong
to the detach, but was an Intelligence Officer on another duty, and had just been
pulled in by Lt Col Mugenyi to assist in what he called “a little investigation”.
This Officer was almost incapable of expressing himself 10 in any intelligible
fashion. Time and again this Commission had to abandon questioning of this
officer because he had contradicted himself so many times that it was almost
impossible to understand what he was trying to say. For instance, when he was
trying to say that the manager of the Mine had asked Lt Okumu for assistance
because he had been attacked by miners who wanted to steal detonators and fuses,
instead he said, and it is clearly on record, that the mine manager attacked Lt
Okumu. As a result, in any event, according to this witness, Lt Okumu provided
soldiers, and went himself with them to reinforce the mine police, something Lt
Okumu specifically denied doing.
20 Lt Okumu said that he knew nothing about the mine except what he had been told
by Congolese Police who guarded it, and that he had never been there. At first he
said that he was not investigated for anything to do with the mine, neither for
being involved in blowing it up, nor for arranging for his soldiers to charge miners
1 gram of gold a day to allow them to mine in an artisanal fashion. In the end he
admitted that he was investigated by a team from Makindye (which accounts for
General Kazini’s knowledge of this matter) and cleared, but he thought that that
was only in respect of fuel. This Commission cannot imagine that a serious
investigation could have been conducted without interview of the suspect, and
once again is of the view that Lt Okumu was not telling the truth about this. Nor
30 does the evidence available confirm General Kazini’s evidence that a Court
Martial was conducted, of which for some reason difficult to understand, General
Kazini has been unable to obtain a copy: one would have expected Lt Okumu to
have said something about that, but he did not.
Lt Col Mayombo said:
69
Lt. Col. Mayombo: I am aware that a Lt. Okumu, who was in charge of
a platoon, got involved with civilians by issuing chits that they could mine
and he was arrested by the overall operational commander and his case
was investigated by the Special Investigations Branch of the Military
Police.
He promised to let this Commission have details of the investigation, but has
never returned with that information. This would have assisted this Commission’s
investigations enormously.
General Kazini at first said that the officer was reprimanded for his offences: later
he said that there was a court martial which acquitted 10 him. The entry of reprimand
on this officer’s record has never been produced. Lt Okumu said that he was never
even investigated in respect of any offences relating to mines, but that he was
cleared of any charges in respect of selling fuel.
This has been a cover up: and it is in respect of the conduct of Lt Col Mugenyi, a
senior officer whom this Commission has caught out in lies and contradictions of
a serious nature, Maj. Sonko, who is not fit to fill the rank which he has attained,
and Lt Okumu, who also lied to this Commission, and whose misconduct has been
badly investigated. Particularly this Commission is unable to reject the allegation
by the original Panel (for this is the purpose of the cover-up) that UPDF soldiers
20 were posted at mines to take contributions of gold from miners to allow them to
mine.
The evidence of Major General Kazini, General Jeje Odong and Lt. Col. Noble
Mayombo clearly shows that the incident did happen and that the culprits were Lt.
David Okumu and the soldiers under his command. Lt. Col. Mugenyi claimed that
Lt. David Okumu was investigated and found innocent. This Commission has
found that no proper investigation was conducted because Lt. Col. Sonko who was
instructed by Lt. Col. Mugenyi to investigate the matter was also implicated in the
matter. His conclusion therefore did not come as a matter of surprise to the
Commission.
30 The evidence about the final investigation of this matter was extremely unclear.
General Kazini promised to let this Commission have a copy of it: he took no
action for many months, and on his last appearance stated that the matter had
come before a General Court Martial. He said that he had tried to get a copy of the
proceedings, and had been told that they could not be released to him for reasons
70
which were unclear. This was far too late for this Commission to take any
further action. The whole situation was most unsatisfactory.
In December 1998 General Kazini sent a message to one Major Kagezi, then C/O
of 409 BDE in which he said:
Your soldiers and Detach Commanders are writing chits for Gold Mining
and smuggling. You should stop this immediately and inform me of the
steps taken. You will be held responsible for Breach of Standing Orders
In reply Major Kagezi said:
…. an information received reveals that Lt Okumu have been giving chits
to those people but I am still 10 going on with investigations
This Commission has no doubt that the original complaint, and the original
Panel’s report of it, in this matter was true.
But the investigations have been so poorly conducted, either purposely or through
incompetence, that no court properly directed could convict on the evidence
available. It is this Commission’s recommendation that the whole question of
inquiry into complaints against officers of the UPDF be looked into extremely
carefully.
For the purposes of this Commission, the important matter is that the allegations
that individual soldiers, to a quite senior level are probably true, but that
20 allegations that Government was involved cannot be supported.
16.2.2. Harrassment of Civilians
There was another allegation which involved both Maj. Sonko and Lt Okumu, of
harassing civilians, which appears to have resolved down to the fact that 400
civilians had been recruited as an LDU Unit, and were required for training. The
evidence was not at all clear, but apparently the case for Maj. Sonko and Lt
Okumu was that they did recruit, but were unable to feed these people, and they
seemed to think that it followed that therefore they could not train them. In
evidence Maj. Sonko said that these 400 were going home for food. Nothing of all
this made any sense, still less the fact that if they were unable to train these
30 people, then why they should have kept them coming back and forth. In his report,
71
however, Maj. Sonko referred to a quite different incident in which two
soldiers from Bunia were said to have connived with three FAC soldiers from
Watsa Barracks who harassed and robbed civilians. According to his report the
detach managed to get the stolen money back and to restore it to its rightful owner.
The whole matter was indecipherable, and amounts to just another example of the
frustrations one encounters when one tries to investigate what was going on within
the UPDF. However, in the Kazini Revelations at Paragraph 13.2 above, it is
obvious that there is confirmation of some of the original Panel’s allegations.
16.2.3. Trainees used as Convincible Labour to Mine
In Paragraph 58 the original Panel states that local 10 Congolese were used in what
the original Panel termed as “Convincible labour” to mine gold, diamonds or
coltan. The original Panel gives, as an example, Bondo locality in Equator
Province where young men from 12 to 18 years recruited by Jean- Pierre Bemba
were given one-hour morning physical training in the morning, and then sent to
gold mines to dig for gold on behalf of the Ugandans and Bemba. Jean Pierre
Bemba denied the allegation concerning the recruitment of young men from the
ages of 12 to 18 years. He stated that the minimum age of recruits was originally
17 years, but that it was later put at 18 years. Even when he was told that the
Commission had had evidence from a journalist who showed some video of some
20 young people being trained, Jean Pierre Bemba insisted on saying that the
minimum age was 17 years. He could not see the purpose of recruiting 12-year-old
young men.
The UPDF officers and men this Commission interviewed have admitted that
Jean-Pierre Bemba was an ally and that they trained the rebels under his
command, but denied that they trained young men recruited by him to mine gold
diamonds or coltan. Jean-Pierre Bemba has also denied the allegation. Since the
names of the alleged eyewitnesses who gave information to the original Panel
were not disclosed, this Commission is unable to investigate the matter further,
concludes that there it is unable to find evidence to support this allegation
30 16.2.4. Foreign Labour
The allegation in Paragraph 60 of the original Panel Report is that occupying
forces brought manpower from their home countries to mine in Congo. UPDF was
one of the occupying forces, but Uganda, unlike Rwanda, was not mentioned in
72
connection with that pattern of organised extraction of minerals from Congo.
This Commission has not received evidence that tends to prove the allegation. The
probability is that the original Panel did not find that Uganda was involved and
that was the reason why Uganda was not specifically mentioned by the original
Panel. Accordingly this Commission rejects it as a mere allegation so far as
Uganda is concerned.
16.3. Wildlife.
16.3.1. Poaching in Garambwa National Park
Paragraph 61 of the original Panel Report states that between 1995 and 1999, 30%
of elephants were killed in Garambwa National 10 Park in areas controlled by
Ugandan troops and Sudanese rebels, and that there are similar problems in other
parks. There is no evidence available as to who was responsible for this. There is
however evidence that although there was a detach at Durba, near the Park, its
duties did not cover the Park. Congolese Security Reports produced complained of
poaching by SPLA in Garambwa Park and there were other reports of trouble
caused by the SPLA there. (Exh. FM/07/102). It should also be noted that the
original Panel’s allegation covers the period from 1995 to 1999. Ugandan troops
did not reach the area until late 1998, and therefore could only have been involved
in this allegation, if at all, for a very short time.
20 16.3.2. Tusks seized in Isiro
It is also said in Paragraph 61 of the original Panel Report that RCD-ML
temporarily seized about 3 tons of tusks in Isiro. After strong pressure, it is said,
from Uganda, the cargo was released and transferred to Kampala.
16.3.3. Tusks seized from Col Mugenyi near Garambwa National Park
Paragraph 62 of the original Panel Report alleges that Lt. Col. Mugenyi of the
UPDF and a crew of his soldiers were found with 800 kgs of elephant tusks in
their car near Garambwa Park. The Uganda Government is alleged to have
received notification of the incident.
The original Panel Report does not state the date on which he was found nor by
30 whom he was found, nor to which department or officer of the Uganda
Government Report was made. The Uganda Government denies in its response
that it received notification of this incident as alleged in the original Panel Report.
73
The Ministry of Defence, Finance, Army, Uganda Revenue Authority and
Uganda Wildlife Authority Officials were questioned by the Commission on this
issue and confirmed this position.
Lt. Col. Mugenyi denied the incident though he stated further that the area of
Garambwa National Park was under his jurisdiction during Operation Safe Haven
and the District Administrator of the area did inform him of various problems,
with SPLA, poaching and other problems in the Park. Lt. Col. Mugenyi said
during investigations which were started after the original Panel Report:
“I told them (Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence) that I do not know
anything as regards those 800 kilograms 10 of elephant tusks because I have
never operated in those areas not even passed through those areas.”
Lt. Col. Sonko Lutaya testified that Lt. Col. Mugenyi passed through the
Garambwa National Park regularly on his way to Isiro. Although this Commission
has problems with Lt Col Sonko’s evidence in other respects, the route he
describes makes sense, and his evidence is probably true.
This shows that Lt. Col. Mugenyi was not being truthful and one wonders what he
was hiding. This Commission was unable to visit the area or find out which crew
Lt Col Mugenyi may have been with. However, since the army was in the area
they should have been able to carry out an exhaustive investigation. The matter
20 should be investigated more thoroughly by the responsible organs. Too long has
passed now for meaningful further investigations to be made.
16.3.4. Allegations against the Government of Uganda
In Paragraph 61, the implication is that RCD-ML seized about 3 tons of tusks
from Ugandans, or possibly Congolese who are not named, and that strong
pressure was exerted from some unnamed people in Uganda to release these tusks
so that they could continue on their journey to an unnamed destination.
With the evidence at hand, it is impossible to investigate this incident, and
certainly not to attribute it to the State of Uganda. Officers from the Wildlife
Authority told this Commission on oath that they had no information about this
30 alleged incident, and one would have expected them to have been the agency
informed.
74
In Paragraph 62, that the Government of Uganda received detailed notification
of the incident, and, by implication, did nothing.
This Commission is again in problems due to the lack of available information.
This Commission has no idea who found the Colonel, or where the recovered
tusks are. Nor does this Commission know to whom the report to the Government
of Uganda was made: an officer from Wildlife Authority appeared before this
Commission and told this Commission on oath that he had not received any such
report, nor did he know about the recovered tusks. Col Mugenyi (who was not a
particularly impressive witness) denied the whole incident on oath, and there was
no evidence to the contrary. It is therefore impossible 10 to attribute blame for this
alleged incident to the Government of Uganda. This Commission is however
unable to exclude the possibility of the involvement of this senior UPDF Officer.
17. MONOPOLIES AND PRICE FIXING
17.1. Coffee Harvesting by J P Bemba
In Paragraph 63 of the UN Report it is alleged that Jean Pierre Bemba, leader of MLC
with General Kazini, had been harvesting coffee directly from plantations that did not
belong to him.
This allegation has been denied by both General Kazini and Jean Pierre Bemba. The
latter stated that distance alone would make the alleged coffee harvesting virtually
20 impossible since General Kazini was based in Kisangani, which was 1,000km away.
On hearing the allegation Jean Pierre Bemba wrote to the Company from which he
had allegedly taken the coffee. The Company responded denying the allegation. He
showed the relevant correspondence to the Commission. (Exh. JPB/7/116). There is
no evidence to support this allegation.
17.2. Control of the Economy
In Paragraph 64 of the original Panel Report, Ugandan Troops are alleged to have
abused commerce and the trade system by forcing unnamed locally owned and
foreign owned businesses to close down with a view of gaining control of local
commerce. The original Panel say that the result was unprecedented control of the
30 economy of the Eastern and North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
75
As examples of that, the original Panel refer to their field trips to Gbadolite and
Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo where they found consumer goods which
emanated from Uganda.
17.3. Allegations against Uganda
Uganda is only involved in the allegations in Paragraph 64 by implication. However,
this Commission has visited the border posts at Kasindi and Ariwari in the Congo,
and was particularly interested in the markets over on the Congo side. This
Commission agrees that those markets are full of goods imported from Kenya and
Uganda, and indeed from even further afield. However, this Commission does not
agree with the original Panel that this is unprecedented 10 control of the economy, nor
that it is attributable to the actions of Ugandan Troops, apart from the provision of
overall security.
First, it is suggested that local and foreign companies have been forced out of
business due to trade from Uganda. These companies have not been named, and this
Commission doubts whether sending merchandise from Uganda, which is not
available in the Democratic Republic of Congo would have the effect of forcing a
company in the Democratic Republic of Congo to close down. This Commission has
affidavits from reputable companies such as BAT who have continued trade with the
Democratic Republic of Congo throughout. This Commission saw an Antonov loaded
20 with cocoa for Unilever on a visit to the military airport.
All that this Commission’s investigations show is that on each side of the border there
are similar or the same tribes, with common languages and culture. On each side of
the border are close family relationships, and cross border trade is only to be
expected, and historically has existed. The evidence before this Commission shows
quite clearly that cross border trade has been there in one form or another since time
immemorial. This Commission was told that trade through the Western side of the
Democratic Republic of Congo is not now practical due to the poor infrastructure and
the comparative level of economic development of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and
Burundi as against the Democratic Republic of Congo, and that the obvious markets
30 for Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo dwellers have always been Uganda,
Rwanda and Burundi, due to proximity and infrastructure.
Certainly Congolese goods can be found in quantity on the Ugandan side: this
Commission has seen that to be true on its visit to the border posts, and the opposite
is also true, although at Kasindi in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the most
76
noticeable trade item was salt from Kenya, who do not feature in this regard in the
original Panel Report.
Further, the cross border markets are not some hole in the corner affair. There are
market days arranged by agreement from both sides of the border, and proper
arrangements in the market places : the best market this Commission saw was in
Ariwari which was fully stocked with an array of goods for local purchase. In
Mpondwe and Kasindi there were representatives on both sides for Chamber of
Commerce, and proper arrangements for resolution of trade disputes had been put in
place. Every sign that this Commission saw was that OFIDA and Ugandan Customs
were op 10 erative and visibly present.
The other level of trade involves those who fly goods from Entebbe to places in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and back from the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and also those (like Dara Forêt) who trade within the Democratic Republic of Congo
without using the markets, but using lorries.
It is clear that this was happening, and on a major scale. This Commission has dealt
with the legality of such trade at Paragraph 11.1.2 above and has required manifests
and import documents from most of the airlines and companies involved. Attached to
almost every transaction are papers from the Congo showing payment of the relevant
taxes. In the case of Dara Forêt, this Commission has details of every cross border
20 transaction the company engaged in, and in each case, again, there is evidence that
taxes were paid.
This Commission wonders therefore whether the statement attributed to RCD-ML
about non-payment of taxes is correct. Mr Bemba in his sworn evidence to this
Commission showed accounts which clearly recorded payment of taxes in the areas
under his control. There is the possibility which traders such as Sam Engola, Grace
Majoro and Idi Taban have raised on oath before this Commission, that there was an
unusual arrangement which rebel factions used to raise money quickly. As this
Commission understands it, and there are documents in support, traders used to pay a
sum to a particular rebel faction in advance of importing goods, and were given a
30 time within which to complete the import. The race then began to get goods through
the border before the expiry of the time limit, which might, for example, be three
months. This practice has been confirmed in the affidavits of rebel leaders. In the case
of MLC, a document procured from the reconstituted Panel specifically accepts
$100,000 from Victoria Diamonds as prepayment of taxes, which is attached to
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correspondence endeavouring to ensure that no further taxes were to be paid.
Sometimes this system worked, but on other occasions differences would arise within
the rebel organisations which resulted in the promise to allow import against the
prepayment not being honoured.
After talking to rebel leaders, it was made clear that taxation was at the root of
funding for the movements, and one would expect every effort to be made to collect
as much as possible, whether for personal gain, or to finance the movements. The
evidence of the Nairobi witness was that Trinity was established for just this purpose,
to collect pre-financing of taxes from intending importers and exporters, but had to be
ended because the money was not ending up where 10 it was supposed to, and less tax
than would otherwise have been collected was obtained by this method, according to
Professor Wamba.
In Paragraph 68 of the original Panel Report, it is suggested that part of the taxes
collected by RCD-ML and MLC were sent to Kampala, and individual colonels, who
are not named, would claim direct payment from RCD-ML. There is a similar
allegation in Paragraph 71 relating to Adele Lotsove, which this Commission has
dealt with in Paragraph 15.8 above All the rebel leaders who gave evidence before
this Commission have dismissed the suggestion as ridiculous. As to the allegation in
relation to individual colonels see17.4 below
20 17.4. Individual Colonels collecting or demanding taxes
At first there was no evidence or complaint before this Commission from any of the
rebel leaders who have provided evidence that individual colonels were demanding a
cut of taxes collected. However, on the last occasion that General Kazini gave
evidence before this Commission, he introduced the possibility that individual
colonels under his command, were collecting sums of money from Congolese Rebel
Leaders under the pretext of Intelligence Gathering (See Paragraph 13.3 above).
Indeed he produced a Radio Message which was copied to, among others, His
Excellency the President, which complained of this behaviour. Further, in the
correspondence General Kazini sent to the Governor of Kisangani in July 1999, there
30 is the clearest statement that General Kazini was instructing the Commanders under
his control, if they were approached with payments for security funding, to forward
the matter to him at TAC HQ. What that meant in relationship to General Kazini’s
conduct will be examined in due course. the Nairobi witness gave evidence that a
monthly tribute of $25,000 was sent to UPDF Officers in Rwampala, an enormous
78
sum for soap and pocket money as he described the purpose: whether this evidence
is reliable or not, it is clear that the original Panel’s allegation against individual
colonels who were in command is supported.
There is a need for further investigation and disciplinary action against the officers in
volved in this section.
18. CURRENT STRUCTURES OF ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION
18.1. Administrative Structures.
Paragraphs 43 and 71 of the original Panel Report state that the illegal exploitation of
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo was facilitated by the
administrative structures 10 established by Uganda and Rwanda.
18.1.1. Appointment or confirmation of Congolese Administrators
It is alleged in Paragraph 71 that the leaders of Uganda and Rwanda directly and
indirectly appointed regional governors or local authorities or, more commonly,
appointed or confirmed Congolese already in those positions. It cites the
appointment of Madame Adele Lotsove, a Congolese who had already been
employed by the Mobutu and Kabila administrations, and by then had been
appointed as First Vice Governor of Kisangani by RCD-Goma. General Kazini at
first stated that he appointed her in June 1999 as Governor of Ituri Province. The
original Panel Report alleges that this woman was instrumental in the collection
20 and transfer of funds from her assigned administrative region to the Ugandan
authorities. She was also alleged to have contributed to the reallocation of land
from Lendus to Hemas. The matter of Adele Lotsove has been dealt with
exhaustively in Paragraph 15.8 above, and does not bear the connotations put to it
by the original Panel, particularly where she was only in place for a very short
period of time.
So far as confirmation of Congolese already in position is concerned, if such
confirmation took place, this Commission fails to see what complaint could be
made. On the evidence, the UPDF tended to accept whoever was the local
authority in place, so as to be able to concentrate on providing security in the
30 relevant area. Had new appointments been made, as in the case of Adele Lotsove,
the original Panel would have criticised that as well. Perhaps a less biased word
than “confirmation” would have been the word “recognition”.
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18.2. Modes of transportation
In Paragraph 72 and 73 with 74 of the original Panel Report, the original Panel reverts
to criticism of the airlines, including the Ministry of Defence, who operated from the
Military Airport at Entebbe on the basis that illegal activities, that is transport of
products and arms into the Democratic Republic of Congo, and vast quantities of
agricultural products and minerals out to Kampala, have benefited from the increase
in airline traffic, and in Paragraph 73 that existing airlines are put out of business.
18.2.1. Allegations against Uganda
What is criticised by the original Panel Report here is the conducting of illegal
activities. While this Commission would deal 10 with the question of the UPDF
being involved in such activities elsewhere, under “Illegality” at Paragraph 11
above, this Commission cannot see that ordinary trade can be said to be an illegal
activity, and this strikes at the whole basis of these Paragraphs. For this reason for
instance, this Commission cannot see any basis for the criticism of Sabena
contained in Paragraph 76, particularly as the evidence is that Air France appears
to have taken over the market Sabena has voluntarily left.
This amounts to a criticism of the Ministry of Defence who are credited with using
aircraft leased by the UPDF for commercial and non-military functions. This
Commission has already dealt with the misperception which this involves at
20 Paragraph 14.6 above. There clearly were two operations at the military airport,
military and civilian, and the major operation was civilian, as can be seen from the
graph above. UPDF officers were acting secretly, hiding what was going on from
the Ministry, as they have tried unsucessfully to do before this Commission, and
therefore allegations against Uganda as a state cannot be supported.It is odd that
the original Panel starts Paragraph 72 by saying that prior to the second war the
major forms of transport were only by road and by smuggling across the lakes, not
by air: and thereafter in Paragraph 73, allege that the new means of transport by
air put existing air operators out of business. The argument does not seem to be
consistent. No doubt in any business opportunity, it is open to any company to
30 develop where there is an opportunity to do so. This Commission cannot see how
Uganda as a State can be blamed if Congolese Air Operators failed to react to the
changing circumstances. It is alleged that the airlines involved are owned or
controlled by “relatives and friends of generals, colonels and Presidents”. This
Commission has on every opportunity to do so, investigated connections with such
80
people. Leaving aside Air Alexander and Take Air for the moment, but bearing
in mind Paragraphs 18.3 and 18.4 below, there is nothing in this allegation. Air
Navette which is specifically mentioned is owned and firmly controlled by Shiraz
Hudani, a Canadian, and the other directors and shareholders are Mrs. Hamida
Hudani, and one Abu Mukasa, a Ugandan, not so far as can be traced a relative or
friend of generals, colonels and presidents, according to Mr. Hudani’s evidence.
Modeste Makabuza who is mentioned in Paragraph 75 as a major shareholder is
not and never has been a shareholder of Air Navette.
Mr. Hudani of Air Navette specifically denied having any connection with Salim
Saleh or any of his companies. In fact he is a 10 competitor. He admits however
dealing with Jean Pierre Bemba commercially, and that is confirmed by Jean
Pierre Bemba who said that he used Air Navette to carry coffee for MLC and
showed to this Commission relevant documents and accounts to support the
legality of MLC’s coffee exports.
18.3. Air Alexander International Ltd
Salim Saleh clearly committed offences under Section 396 of the Companies Act
when he falsely stated that Alexander Mahuta was an adult businessman in the returns
he filed with the Registrar of Companies, when he knew he was a minor, and further
offences with which this Commission has dealt with at Paragraph 28 below.
20 There is one further matter upon which this Commission wishes to comment. The
coincidence of the date of transfer of shares, and the date of the President’s Radio
message to the UPDF, forbidding the conduct of business by politicians and Army
Officers in the Congo is too close to ignore. Having heard Salim Saleh giving
evidence, in particular the manner in which he tried to wriggle out of being covered
by the Radio Message, and bearing in mind that although he disposed of his shares,
he did so amidst a welter of backdated paperwork, to his wife, in a Company where
the only other shareholder was his infant son, this Commission has no doubt that he
wished to give the appearance of disposing of his interest while in fact keeping
control of the Company: and indeed, Jovial in her evidence, admitted that Salim Saleh
30 kept an active interest. Whether as a soldier or as a Public Servant Salim Saleh was
clearly covered by the President’s Radio Message.
This Commission is satisfied that what Salim Saleh did was to find a way to cover his
disobedience of the order of his brother, his Commander in Chief and President by
lying to him, while continuing to do business. This has resulted in a perception, which
81
has harmed Uganda, and allowed investigators to conclude that His Excellency the
President must have been involved in illegal exploitation of the natural resources of
the Congo. This Commission takes the matter very seriously indeed, and recommends
that the matter be further investigated by the relevant authorities for further action.
18.4. Take Air Ltd
In 1998 Take Air, in which General Salim Saleh was a shareholder and director,
submitted invoices to UPDF and was paid Shs. 111 million for flights to the Congo
that could not be identified. Lt. General . Saleh could not explain the reason for the
payment. He promised to check with his staff and report back to the Commission.
This was not done. Months later the General appeared before 10 the Commission again.
When asked about the documents he had promised including manifests, he said that
he had so far failed to get them. Take Air had closed in late 1998 and he (Saleh) had
difficulties in tracing its Managing Director who left Uganda in March 1999. To-date
the payment is still not accounted for. Further investigations are necessary and
recommended.
18.5. Other Private Companies
In Paragraph 79 of the UN Report it is alleged that a number of Companies were
created to facilitate the illegal activities in Democratic Republic of Congo. On the
Ugandan side, it is alleged that military officials created new companies and
20 businesses using prête-noms. It is said that most of the companies are owned by
private individuals or groups of individuals. Trinity and Victoria Group are
specifically named in Paragraph 80 as some of the said companies.
18.5.1. Victoria Group
Victoria Group is said to be chaired by one Mr. Khalil and has its headquarters in
Kampala and is owned jointly by Muhoozi Kainerugaba, son of President
Museveni, Jovial Akandwanaho and her husband. It is said the Group deals in
diamonds, gold and coffee. These products are purchased from Isiro, Bunia,
Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani. The Group is also suspected in the making of
counterfeit currency.
30 The evidence the Commission has on oath from Mrs. Ketra Tukuratiire, the Acting
Registrar – General, is that Victoria Group is not known in Uganda. It is neither
registered as local Company nor as a foreign Company. Apart from Khalil whom
this Commission has not been able to interview, as he is a non-resident in the
82
Country, all the alleged owners of the Groups have denied any connection with
the Group.
Further evidence this Commission has received however, shows that there is a
Company known as La Societe Victoria which is owned by two people who have
not been mentioned throughout the evidence. The Company is registered in Goma
and deals in diamonds, gold and Coffee which it purchases from Isiro, Bunia,
Bumba, Bondo, Buta and Kisangani. The Company pays taxes to MLC to back up
what the Army Commander, Major General Kazini, terms’ “the effort in the armed
struggle”.
For that reason, General Kazini gave specific 10 instructions to UPDF Commanders
in Isiro, Bunia, Beni, Bumba, Bondo and Buta to allow the Company to do
business uninterrupted in the areas under their command.
Though General Kazini has denied on numerous occasions that he has any
connection with Khalil and that he only knew him casually, from the special
favours he gave to La Societe Victoria and the lies he told about his dealings with
the Company, one cannot resist the conclusion that he has some interest in the
Company, though this Commission has no conclusive evidence to prove it.
It is clear, however that the steps he took to facilitate the interests of the Company
were above and beyond the call of duty, and further, inappropriate to the UPDF’s
20 role of providing security.
As regards the alleged dealings of Mr. Khalil with Jovial Akandwanaho in
diamonds, this Commission originally had only the evidence of Jovial on the
issue. She admitted that she knew Khalil and that herself and Khalil at one time
established a Lebanese Restaurant known as Leban (U) Ltd on Bombo Road in
Kampala, in the middle of 1999. They are no longer operating the restaurant.
Jovial has denied that, apart from restaurant business, she had had any other
dealings with Khalil and in particular, diamonds. However under the heading “The
Diamond Link” at Paragraph 21.3 below, and particularly at Paragraph 21.3.5
below, this Commission has come to the conclusion that Jovial’s participation in
30 Khalil’s operations, and Victoria in particular, cannot be excluded.
83
18.5.2. Trinity
According to Paragraph 81 of the UN Report, Trinity is a fictitious Company and
a conglomerate of various businesses owned by Salem Saleh and his wife. Mr.
Ateenyi Tibasiima, second Vice-President of RCD – ML is said to be the
“Manager”. It is said that the primary purpose of the Company was to facilitate the
business activities of Salim Saleh and his wife in the Orientale Province. It is said
that Tibasiima granted a tax holiday to all Trinity activities in the area controlled
by Uganda and administered by RCD – ML in Nov. 1999. Trinity imported
various goods and merchandise and took from Orientale Province gold, coffee and
10 timber without paying taxes.
The evidence before the Commission shows that Trinity is neither registered as a
local or foreign Company in Uganda. Both Salim Saleh and his wife have denied
any connection or association with the Company. Witnesses who appeared before
this Commission have given different accounts of the nature and ownership of the
Organisation.
According to Tibasiima Ateenyi, Trinity is not a fictitious company as alleged, but
that it is owned by well known Congolese business people. He cited Iddi Taban
and Manu Soba as the owners. According to him, these two businessmen, in the
name of Trinity assisted the rebel movements with money for their activities. The
20 money so advanced would be recouped by exoneration from taxes on goods
imported by Trinity into the areas held by the rebels.
One of the alleged owners, Iddi Taban, on the other hand, said that Trinity was set
up by RCD through Tibasiima Ateenyi to raise funds from business community by
way of custom dues paid in advance. On payment of a stipulated amount, the
businessman would be issued with a letter, which he would present at the customs
entry points to enable his goods to enter the rebel held areas within a specified
period without paying custom dues. He and his partner Manu Soba paid money to
Trinity in order to be able to conduct their businesses in the rebel held areas. Iddi
Taban denied ownership of Trinity.
30 The account of Iddi Taban agrees in material particular with the evidence of Sam
Engola, a Ugandan businessman with business interests in the rebel control areas
of Congo and alleged to be engaged in pre-financing activities before Trinity was
established.
84
The only evidence which appears to link Salim Saleh with Trinity came from
the Nairobi witness, a civil servant who was one time Inspector of Taxes and later
became Inspector General of Finance of RCD under Tibasiima Ateenyi and a
member of Wamba dia Wamba’s cabinet.
According to him, the owners of Trinity were Tibasiima, Manu Soba and Salim
Saleh. He said he saw documents during the period he was in Wamba’s cabinet,
which showed that Salim Saleh had interest in Trinity. Unfortunately he was
unable to produce any of the alleged documents or any concrete proof of the
ownership of Trinity. He admitted he was not in a position to produce any of the
alleged documents establishing Salim Saleh’s connection 10 with Trinity. He said
that the only person who was in a position to tell the Commission who were his
partners in Trinity is Tibasiima Ateenyi. This Commission obtained an affidavit
from Mr. Tibasiima Ateenyi. In that affidavit he never said that Salim Saleh or his
wife had interest in Trinity.
It is clear from the evidence of Hon. Wapakhabulo that Trinity was the
organisation set up by Tibasiima Ateenyi who was the Deputy Commissar
General, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in charge of Finance and Budget, as
well as Mines and Energy. The organisation was handling all imports and exports
more or less on monopoly basis particularly in the Ituri Province. How he was
20 accounting for the revenue generated from Trinity’s operations became a source of
conflicts between him and Professor Wamba dia Wamba. Uganda, under the
chairmanship of Hon. Wapakhabulo, made several attempts to set-up transparent
regulatory methods of collecting and accounting for revenue from the Ituri and
North Kivu provinces. Those attempts failed mainly due to disagreement between
Professor Wamba dia Wamba and Mbusa Nyamwisi on one side and Tibasiima on
the other side. When Professor Wamba dia Wamba moved to Bunia in September
1999 as head of RCD, he set up a new administration headed by Mbusa Nyamwisi
as the Commissar General and removed Tibasiima Ateenyi from Finance.
From the evidence of the Nairobi witness and Professor Wamba dia Wamba the
30 removal of Tibasiima from Finance should have marked the demise of Trinity. But
the Addendum to the report of the original Panel of Experts of UN gives the
impression that the activities of Trinity are still continuing in the Oriental Province
of Congo.
85
While the Commission agrees that Trinity is a dubious company, it does not
agree that it was set by Salim Saleh and his wife to facilitate their business
activities in the Oriental Province. The preponderance of the evidence the
Commission has received shows that it was set up by Tibasiima when he was the
Minister in charge of Finance in RCD – ML to collect funds purportedly to
finance their campaign against the Kinshasa Government. How he accounted for
the revenue so collected became a source of conflict between him and Professor
Wamba dia Wamba. In the result the Commission does not agree with the
allegations in Paragraphs 79, 80, and 81 of the UN Report.
19. SYSTEMATIC 10 EXPLOITATION
In Paragraph 85 the involvement of Uganda was treated differently from Rwanda. Effectively
the Uganda Government was acquitted of the charge of Systemic and Systematic exploitation
by government, and the blame was put on to individuals, mainly top Army Commanders. This
was, however, said to be known by the political establishment in Kampala.
19.1. Allegations against Uganda
There are two bases upon which the Government of Uganda could be said to be
involved. First that the amount of trade, especially in items where statistics are kept,
signalled what was going on in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Second, there is a
specific allegation that the political establishment knew.
20 There are only very few examples given in the original Panel Report where
knowledge can be imputed to the Government of Uganda as such, and in each case
this Commission does not have sufficient details to be able to investigate, or to
attribute knowledge to the Government of Uganda. However, looking at the Civil
Aviation Authority statistics and the relationship between flights of the Ministry of
Defence airplanes and private airplanes, and the manifests available to this
Commission, this Commission would think that, if the Ministry of Defence airplanes
were being used for transport by senior officers, then it would not have been for the
majority of the resources alleged to have been exploited. Further most of the
resources flown or driven out of the Democratic Republic of Congo appear to have
30 transited Uganda, rather than to have been exported to Uganda: and in such case, this
Commission cannot see that a message would necessarily be transmitted to the
Government of Uganda
86
19.2. Allegations against Top Army Commanders
As to whether top army commanders are the main illegal exploiters of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, this Commission deals with this matter at Paragraph 20.10 below
.
20. INDIVIDUAL ACTORS
Paragraphs 87 – 89 of the original Panel Report deal with individual actors on the Uganda
side. Sixteen persons were chosen based on the crucial roles they played and their direct
alleged involvement in the exploitation of natural resources within the Democratic Republic
of the Congo in one way or the other. Six out of the sixteen individuals are Ugandans. These
are Major General Salim Saleh, Brigadier James Kazini, Jovial 10 Akandwanaho, Col. Otafiire,
Col. Mugenyi and Col. Mayombo, one, Col. Tinkamanyire, is not known among UPDF
soldiers and the remaining nine are Mr. Khalil, Ateenyi Tibasiima, Mbusa Nyamwisi, Nahim
Khanaffer, Roger Lumbala, Jean Yves Ollivier, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Adele Lotsove and Abdu
Rhoman are either Congolese or Congo residents.
Out of these sixteen the original Panel selected three to focus on as the key actors. The three
“key actors” appeared before the Commission and were thoroughly examined. They denied
the allegations made against them in the original Panel Report.
They are :-
20.1. Major General Salim Saleh
20 Lt. General Salim Saleh and his wife Jovial were said to be at the core of the illegal
exploitation of natural resources in the areas controlled by Uganda. It is alleged that
Salim Saleh pulls the strings of illegal activities and that James Kazini is his
executive arm and right hand; and that he protects and controls Mbusa Nyamwisi and
Ateenyi Tibasima. In return these two protect his commercial and business interests
in the regions controlled by the former RCD – ML. It is further alleged that he uses
both Victoria Group and Trinity for the purchase and the commercialisation of
diamonds, timber, coffee and gold.
Lt. General Salim Saleh’s business interests include aircraft services. When he was
interviewed by the reconstituted Panel in August, 2001, he admitted that although he
30 had never been in eastern Congo, one of his companies had been engaged in
exporting merchandise to that part of the country; and that the aircraft transporting the
87
merchandise was initially confiscated by General Kazini. This Commission has
considered this question in Paragraph 32, and found that this allegation is based on a
misunderstanding.
Furthermore, two of General Saleh’s Airlines – Take Air and Air Alexander
International Ltd - were among companies whose planes were chartered by UPDF to
fly to Congo. Another case which has come to the attention of this Commission
relates to the unsatisfactory registration and irregular handling of Air Alexander
International Ltd. The case is dealt with at length in Paragraph 28 below.
The Commission recommends that these cases should be pursued for appropriate
10 action.
In paragraph 99 of the addendum to the original Panel Report, it is alleged that Mbusa
Nyamwisi “skims” up to $400,000 off the tax revenue collected from Beni customs
post of the Uganda border and shared the money with GeneralKazini and Lt. General
Saleh. All, including Nyamwisi, have denied this allegation. In the absence of
supporting evidence and considering the fact that the amount seems to be too large for
the Beni customs post, the Commission does not accept the allegation.
In his sworn evidence Salim Saleh said that he visited Kinshasa only during
peacetime, that is before 1998, at the invitation of the late Laurent Kabila; and that he
has never been in any part of Eastern Congo.
20 There is evidence from the Nairobi witness that Salim Saleh was part of the Trinity
organisation. The nature of Trinity appears to have been largely involved in the
collection of taxes by pre-financing, and evidence from the Nairobi witness and
Professor Wamba was that money collected was not reaching the movement’s coffers.
There is clear evidence that Trinity was run by Mr Tibasiima, and if there was a
relationship in relation to Trinity then it would have been between Salim Saleh and
Mr Tibasiima. However when giving evidence, the Nairobi witness was very hesitant
in naming Salim Saleh, and since he is the only witness on this point, this
Commission cannot come to the conclusion that a recommendation should be made
for further investigation of Salim Saleh. However the evidence should be borne in
30 mind in case other evidence later appears, as there is cause for suspicion. Trinity,
however, is not a conglomerate of various businesses owned by Salim Saleh and his
wife as stated in Para 81 of the original Panel Report.
88
This Commission has asked the Inspector General of Government to provide
copies of the declaration of assets of Salim Saleh unfortunately he has not made one
for any of the past years, nor yet for 2002.
20.2. Jovial Akandanawaho
Jovial told the Commission that she has never been in any part of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Salim Saleh denied business dealings with any of the persons
mentioned. Jovial stated that she co-owned a restaurant with Khalil in Kampala for a
limited period in 1999, but denied having any other commercial dealings with him.
She further denied the allegation that she wanted control of Kisangani diamond
market. She and her husband refuted the allegation that 10 she was at the root of the
Kisangani wars. However, this Commission has evidence connecting Jovial with
Khalil and Victoria in Diamond smuggling, which is considered at Paragraph 21.3.5
below where this Commission has found that it is unable to rule out the participation
of Jovial Akandwanaho in the diamond smuggling operations of Victoria, revealing
that there is some truth in the allegations made against her by the original Panel.
20.3. General James Kazini
In Para 89, General James Kazini is said to be the third key actor. It is alleged that he is the
master in the field, the orchestrator, organizer and manager of most illegal activities related to
the UPDF presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He is said to rely on the
20 established military network and former comrades and collaborators such as Colonels
Tinkamanyire and Mugenyi and to be close to Messrs. Nyamwisi, Tibasiima, Lumbala, Jean-
Pierre Bemba all of whom have facilitated his illegal dealings in diamond, coltan, timber,
counterfeit currency and imports of goods and merchandise in Equator and Oriental
Provinces.
General Kazini is accused of many wrong doings in the original Panel Report, and this
Commission has tried to deal with the allegations in the same order as did the original Panel.
He was examined by the Commission at length, but he denied any involvement in business
activities. One of the witnesses, Ateenyi Tibasiima, confirmed what Kazini had said. He
stated in an affidavit that he had not helped or seen Kazini in business activities. However,
30 consideration of General Kazini’s involvement with Khalil and Victoria can be found at
Paragraph 21.3.4 below. Throughout this report, General Kazini’s name surfaces in respect of
many allegations which relate to the misbehaviour of senior officers of the UPDF in the DRC,
in respect of which he has taken little action: he has lied to this Commission on many
occasions. Whilst this Commission bears in mind that he was the man on the ground, and that
89
many allegations have been freely made from the DRC which have not stood up to close
examination, nevertheless this Commission has found that many of those made against
General Kazini are supportable.
General Kazini’s alleged dealings with Jean-Pierre Bemba in respect of coffee beans is
covered by Paragraph 17.1 above. He and a number of other witnesses have stated that they
were never asked to meet with the original Panel. Aside from his meddling in local
administration when he appointed Mme Adele Lotsove a Provisional Governor and created a
new Ituri Province for which he was reprimanded (see Para 15.8), the Commission has not
found any evidence to implicate him as accused in the original Panel Report.
However, the Commission has received documentary evidence implicating 10 General Kazini in
other local administrative matters. In one case he instructed UPDF Commanders in Isiro,
Bunia, Beni, Bumba, Bondo and Buta to allow one company, La Societe Victoria, to do
business in coffee, diamonds, gold uninterrupted in areas under their control as it had been
cleared of taxation by the President of MLC, Jean Pierre Bemba. He concluded by saying
that: “Anything to do with payment to you in form of security funding, it will be done through
OSH-Tac HQS”, i.e. his office.
In another letter addressed to the Governor of Kisangani, the Major General attached a copy
of communication from the chairman of MLC and his own comments and stated that
VICTORIA had officially cleared taxes with MLC authorities and asked the Governor “to
20 leave VICTORIA do his business and he will continue to pay taxes to MLC to back up the
effort in the armed struggle”.
While General Kazini and other UPDF officer denied collecting or receiving any money from
Congolese for their services, the General’s first letter above leaves little doubt that some of
the UPDF Senior Officers expected money from Congolese for security purposes. His
evidence makes clear that he also expected it, and that the Commanders would keep the
money for themselves, rather than accounting to him for it.
20.3.1. General Kazini's Coltan.
Letter from General Kazini requesting one Thomas Mathe as minister of finance
of RCD-ML to allow his Coltan through customs.(Document 5)
30 On the face of it this appears to be a proper copy letter from General Kazini (who
then was a Brigadier). However it is apparent that there are a number of strange
things about it. In the first place Captain Balikudembe’s name is spelt wrong. He
90
is described as “Commander Sector” which is not the manner in which General
Kazini would have put it: he says so, and throughout his evidence he uses the
English method of “Sector Commander” rather than “Commander Sector”, which
is the order a Frenchman, for instance, would naturally put the words. It might be
thought that this was a translation from French, which would account for the order
of the words, but then the question arises as to why General Kazini would draft a
letter in French (which he does not speak), and then have it translated into English
obviously by a Frenchman. If it was so drafted, and then the translation prepared
for General Kazini’s benefit, then why would he sign the translation? Even if that
happened, it would be the French version which would 10 be sent, and therefore
available to the reconstituted Panel: the English version would remain on General
Kazini’s file.
Further, to General Kazini’s knowledge, Captain Balikudembe was not the Sector
Commander of UPDF/Butembo. He was an Intelligence Officer according to both
himself and General Kazini: General Kazini said that he would have described
him as “Sector Intelligence Officer – Beni” as the sector name was Beni, to
include Butembo, and he would not have referred to the UPDF in that description.
Someone from outside, of course, might well make that mistake.
General Kazini also said that he would not have signed as “Brig. Gen.” because he
20 was a Brigadier, not a Brigadier General, which rank does not exist in the UPDF,
he said: he produced a file in which most of the letters are signed in that way.
However there is one letter which he signed as “Brig Gen” and another where the
typist has described him as “Brig”, and he has written, after his signature, “Brig
Gen”. That file was also produced to show that he always signs below the typed
description, although it shows the exact opposite.
However, whatever this Commission’s reservations about General Kazini’s
evidence on this and other occasions, its observation of the conduct and manner of
giving evidence by Captain Balikudembe was that he was an honest witness doing
his best to tell the truth despite strong questioning, and that his evidence was
30 credible. That may be that this letter is a forgery, or that the proposed convoy was
never communicated to him: there is no way of telling, without seeing the original
of the document.
Professor Wamba said that Thomas Mathe was “Mbusa’s Finance Officer”, and
that Mbusa, not Mathe, was Minister of Finance of RCD-ML.
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There are many factors in the evidence which go to show that that the
possibility that this letter is forged cannot be excluded.
The letter is produced to show that General Kazini was shipping Coltan: in that
object it fails.
20.3.2. General Kazini's demand for $5000.
Unheaded copy letter with no address signed by one D.X.Lubwimi.(6)
General Kazini denies knowledge of this letter. It makes no pretence at originality:
it is an unsigned copy, with no heading : the addressee is not known and none of
the witnesses before this Commission said that they knew anything about anyone
10 named D.X. Lubwimi.
There is nothing this commission can do to counter General Kazini’s denial in
default of further information.
On the bottom of the translation there is a note, probably added by the Panel,
stating “Note: This letter is clearly about extortion and threat”. No doubt this letter
is produced as proof of such allegations: however it fails in that object.
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20.3.3. General Kazini’s assets.
General Kazini in evidence, said that he was a poor man and invited this
Commission to look under his bed. Unfortunately the sort of asset which the
Commission would have in mind would not fit there. It is very obvious that the
building pictured in Figure 3 has required a great deal of capital investment, which
is being presented publicly as coming from General Kazini. This material, which
this Commission has been unable to confirm or exclude, is included in this report
for the assistance of any body which
wishes to undertake further
investigations, 10 for example the
Inspector General of Government.
This Commission strongly
recommends such further
investigations.
20.4. Colonel Tinkamanyire
Colonel Tinkamanyire who is reported
to be one of Kazini’s comrades and
collaborators does not exist. There is no soldier in UPDF known by that name and
rank.
20 In addition this Commission has found other names upon which to focus:
20.5. Col Otafiire.
The name of Col Otafiire has featured in respect of two cars alleged to have been
imported from the DRC.
Proper ownership of two vehicles had been raised in the newspapers: a Mercedes
Benz saloon car and a Jeep Cherokee.
Col. Otafiire has told the Commission that he bought for ESO the Mercedes Benz in
Uganda from a Rwandese called Paul Nyangabyaki. This was when he was the Head
of ESO. The vehicle was deployed in Congo for under cover operational work for
ESO. He did not get the logbook for that car.
30 The car was returned from Congo to Uganda in 1997 and he drove it for some time.
He stated that it is now in a garage in Kampala.
Figure 3: Photograph of Hotel being built
at Kasese attributed to General Kazini's
ownership: Acknowledgement New Vision
93
The ownership of the car was raised when Col. Otafiire was seen driving it.
According to Col. Otafiire, the Jeep Cherokee belongs to a Mr. Joseph Maditi a
Sudanese national working for UNHCR in Yumbe. He occasionally leaves the car
with Otafiire. It is registered in Sudan, although Otafiire has sometimes used it in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
This Commission would conclude that the explanation given by Col. Otafiire of an
allegation contained only in a newspaper report is consistent with his duties at the
time, and this Commission would not recommend taking the matter further.
20.5.1. Documents obtained at the request of the Nairobi witness when giving evidence
A letter dated 4th October 2001 from Col Otafiire 10 to the President RCD
introducing John Kalimasi
This letter was not originally sent to this Commission by the Panel, but arose in
the evidence of the Nairobi witness. In his evidence the Nairobi witness stated that
“A lot of things were sorted out between RCD and UPDF by compensation and
exports”. This was a subject this Commission was very interested in, and asked for
examples with names. And surprisingly, at first the Nairobi witness refused to do
so. In the end, after an evasive interlude, the Nairobi witness agreed to give an
example, and said “I have been interested in a file, somehow related to Col
Otafiire, for exoneration of imports of petroleum products about 15 trucks under
20 the name for a certain economic operator, Mr John Kalimasi”. the Nairobi witness
said that the Panel had the document, and asked for it to be produced.
A copy was produced later in the day, with another letter attached from Mr Kulu,
the Commissaire of RCD-Kis’s Comissariat of Finances and Budget. This letter,
copied to all and sundry, attaches Col Otafiire’s letter, and asks by reference to
Col Otafiire’s letter, that the petrol be imported with exoneration of tax.
The letter from Col Otafiire does not amount to an example of things being sorted
out between RCD and UPDF by compensation and exports. Col Otafiire, who
accepts writing the letter told the Commission that it was within his portfolio as
Minister in charge of Regional Cooperation, to introduce businessmen to
30 Congolese authorities, and pointed out that he made no request in the letter for any
exoneration from taxes. Col Otafiire also pointed out that, although he dictated the
letter in his office in Kampala in the morning of the 4th of October 2001, and
94
signed it and gave it to Mr Kalimasi in the afternoon, he could not understand,
as this Commission could not understand, how Mr Kulu’s letter could have been
dated on the same day, since it was signed, as was to be expected, in Beni.
There is indeed a mystery here: but there is no purpose in further investigation, as
any arrangements were clearly made between Mr Kalimasi and the rebel
authorities: all Col Otafiire did was to introduce him. There may be other
examples which have not been shown to us by the reconstituted Panel, but this is
not an example of “things being sorted out between RCD and UPDF by
compensation and exports”.
20.5.2. Letter dated 3rd August 2000 from Professor Wamba, 10 instructing payment of
$13,000 to Col Otafiire.
Col Otafiire denies knowing anything about this letter which he says must be a
forgery. Consequently this Commission sent the letter to the handwriting expert.
His opinion was that there were two parts to the letter, the top, and the signature,
and that they were out of line and made in two operations, that is, probably forged.
20.6. Col Otafiire, Col Mayombo and Hon. Wapakhabulo
With regard to the other individual actors mentioned in Para 87, no specific
allegations were made against Colonels Otafiire and Mayombo in the original Panel
Report. Nevertheless both were summoned and examined by the Commission
20 because their names appear as generally mentioned in the original Panel Report and
they had been in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the course of their official
duties. No evidence was originally found to implicate them in the exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but as a result of some
documents received from the reconstituted Panel, this Commission has heard
evidence from the Nairobi witness that Col Mayombo was involved in obtaining a
payment of $380,000 from RCD for himself, Col. Otafiire and the Hon Wapakhabulo.
20.6.1. Payment of US$380,000.
Letter from Colonel Mayombo requesting payment (1).
In this letter, Colonel Mayombo is purported to have written to Professor Wamba
30 on the 5th of June 2000, reminding him to pay US$380,000 which he says is owed
to him following "the operation which you know very well". In his last paragraph
95
Colonel Mayombo is purported to have said that if there was a financial
problem they could be sorted out by compensation through the means of customs.
Colonel Mayombo in his evidence stated that the signature on the letter appeared
to be his, but that he was not aware of the contents of the letter and had not written
it. He therefore declared that the letter was a forgery and alleged that his signature
had been copied from elsewhere and put on the bottom of the letter.
Whether such copy is achieved by photocopying the signature from another
document and sticking it on the forged document, or by scanning the signature
into a computer and constructing the whole document with the signature so
obtained attached, it is well known that it is extremely difficult, 10 if not impossible,
to line up the typing which appears below the signature. An example of this
appears below as Document (4).
In the case of this document, the typing below the signature appears to be in line
with the typing of the body of the letter. It is most probable, therefore, that it was
typed at the same time, and it appears in the font which this commission knows
that Colonel Mayombo is accustomed to use. This is the opinion of the
handwriting expert who has been assisting this Commission.
It follows then that if this letter is a forgery, only the signature was stuck on to the
letter for photocopying, either physically, or in a computer program after scanning
20 of the signature. The handwriting expert is unable to tell whether this happened as
alleged or not, because he has not had a sight of the original document, only of
photocopies.
Colonel Mayombo in his evidence pointed out that the word "sort” in the second
paragraph was misspelt as "soot", something which he would have edited when
signing the letter, and that in the typing identifying himself below the signature, he
was described as "COL.", whereas at the time he was a Lieutenant Colonel, and
was accustomed to describe himself as such in correspondence. Neither of these
matters are particularly convincing or decisive in trying to decide whether the
letter is a forgery.
30 Professor Wamba said that he had never seen this letter, apart from having been
shown it on his way through Nairobi by the reconstituted Panel. He said he had no
financial dealings with Mayombo.
96
In view of the fact that Col. Mayombo admitted that the signature on this letter
appeared to be his, although taken from elsewhere, this commission did not take
handwriting samples from him.
Nonetheless, this letter has been submitted to a handwriting expert, but beyond the
matters pointed out by Colonel Mayombo there is little that can be done to
establish whether this letter is a forgery or not without being able to look at the
original letter which has not been afforded to this commission, or, apparently, to
the reconstituted UN Panel.
Without the original, and in view of Col Mayombo’s evidence, on its own it would
be dangerous to conclude that this letter is either genuine 10 or forged. This letter
however would need further consideration in the light of document(2) with which
it should be taken together.
20.6.2. Letter from Professor Wamba dia Wamba authorising payment. (2)
This letter purports to have been written by Professor Wamba on the 25th June
2000 on RCD notepaper, bearing a reference 0172/BP/PR/RCD -- KIS./2000. It is
addressed to the Nairobi witness, who is said to be the senior finance Inspector for
RCD Kisangani in Bunia.
The letter purports to authorise one the Nairobi witness to pay for RCD-Kis the
20 sum of $380,000 to Hon James Wapakhabulo, Hon Kahinda Otafiire and Col
Mayombo. The reasons for payment given are two-fold: first as a refund for
exoneration on commodities, mainly the exportation of mineral products (Coltan)
and second, because these personalities had taken care of some RCD-Kis unpaid
bills in Kampala, which remained unpaid.
When taking evidence from those concerned, this Commission invited each
witness to indicate anything on the face of the document which might indicate that
it was a forgery, because all of them stated that it was.
Col Mayombo said that it must be a forgery, although he had never seen it before,
on the basis that he could not envisage a situation where Professor Wamba would
30 write such a letter to him. He said that the signature on the document was that of
Professor Wamba, with which he was familiar, and that the document appeared to
be stamped with the RCD-Kis stamp, over the top of the signature. He said that he
97
was not a Colonel at that time, but a Lt Colonel, and would not have signed as
“Col” or have been addressed by Professor Wamba as “Col”.
Hon Otafiire was no better witness than on previous occasions. He appeared to
treat this very serious allegation as a huge joke. He denied assisting RCD-Kis in
his personal capacity. He did not know the Nairobi witness, to whom the
document was addressed and alleged that he did not exist (although Professor
Wamba said that he did, and this Commission interviewed him in Nairobi). He
said that he did not know of RCD-Kis having an Inspector General of Finance,
although this office clearly did exist. He was not aware of a liaison office of RCDKis
in Kampala, but he agreed that Professor 10 Wamba stayed in a house provided
by Uganda Government, and the rest stayed at Silver Springs Hotel.
He stated that the signature on the document was not that of Professor Wamba,
drawing attention to a difference in the “E” of the signature, and the end of the
signature: he also pointed out that the stamp on the document was not that of
RCD-Kis which he said was smaller. He is not borne out in this by the report of
the document examiner, or by this Commission’s observation of the samples
provided.
He said that the headed notepaper was not that of RCD-Kis, because in the third
line of the heading, he thought that it should say “RCD Kisangani-ML”. The
20 Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence supplied samples from their files of headed
notepaper received from RCD-Kis: one sample was like document 4 without “-
ML”, and another included “-ML”, and so this difference does not assist. In that
regard, the handwriting expert concluded that the headed notepaper was from a
different source of printing than the samples provided: it can be seen however that
although there are printing differences between the samples and this document, it
is probable that these differences arise from different print runs of the notepaper,
rather than from forgery.
Hon Otafiire pointed out that his name was wrongly spelt, which this Commission
had also noticed, and that Mayombo by then was not a Colonel. He said that RCD30
Kis never had so much money as $380,000.
Hon. Wapakhabulo also said that he knew nothing about this letter, or the payment
of $380,000 in which he was alleged to be involved.
98
Professor Wamba denied writing this letter: he said that the signature at the
bottom looked like his, although the first part looked shorter, and there was
something about the end which did not look right. He said that such a subject fell
under Finance, and he would not have been writing to an Inspector: and even if the
matter was out of the ordinary course, he would not use someone he did not trust.
He also pointed out that Mayombo was not by then a Colonel, and that Hon
Otafiire’s name was misspelt. Nor could he understand how Hon Wapakhabulo
could have been thought to be involved in such matters.
As to the Nairobi witness, Professor Wamba said that he was at first a Finance
Inspector, and then involved with a Commission 10 for General Inspection, and was
sent to Beni to investigate there. He failed to make a report, and made
arrangements to leave the country, but was stopped, in possession of $5,000 under
suspicious circumstances. Later he became an assistant to one Onore Kadiima who
was working with Mbusa in FLC. However this person was never in charge of
making payments.
The handwriting expert stated that the signature appeared to be fluently written,
with four distinct parts matching closely with the specimens in letter construction,
letter slope and shape. The typescript has lines which are parallel to each other,
signifying that the document was done in a single typing operation from top to
20 bottom, unlike document No 4. He confirmed the point taken by both Professor
Wamba and Hon Otafiire, pointing out the extent of the final flourish underline to
the left, thereby giving detail to their misgivings about the signature. The variation
can clearly be seen.
It is also apparent that the highest strokes of the signature run into the typed name,
something which would be extremely difficult to achieve by copying means,
although a forger writing the signature could achieve it.
However, there is no doubt that, if this signature is a forgery, the forger is
extremely good, as the handwriting expert concludes that it is possible that
Professor Wamba signed this document: he is unable finally to conclude only
30 because he was asked to work with photostats, where he would need originals for
a final conclusion. It cannot be imagined that such an accomplished forger would
make such an obvious mistake as to get the final flourish on Professor Wamba's
signature wrong: it is more likely that this is a variation rather than a forgery.
99
This Commission interviewed the Nairobi witness in Nairobi, and also Dr
Mido, who was mentioned by the Nairobi witness in evidence, in London.
the Nairobi witness said that he was Inspector of taxes, in charge of taxes since
1997 before the rebellion, and when the rebellion started he was taken by RCD as
Inspector of Finances at a time when Tibasima was deputy commissioner in the
Ministry of Finance until May 2000, when he moved to Wamba's Cabinet as
general Inspector of Finance in Bunia with Wamba as Minister of Finance. He
remained there until September 2000. From June 2000 RCD was divided into two:
Mbusa was in charge in Beni Butembo, while Wamba was in charge in Bunia.
When working with Tibasima as Inspector of 10 Finance, he was in charge of
overseeing everything concerning Finance, taking account of receipts, controlling
money received, and control of keeping the money of the state.
When working with Tibasima, the Nairobi witness, would get his instructions
direct from Mr Tibasima, usually verbally. And the Nairobi witness said that when
he was working with Mr Tibasima, Mr Tibasima was at the origin of a lot of
things, and that when he was working with Professor Wamba, this was no longer
true and "effectively the Inspector himself was in the field." Probably this means
that he was left a lot to his own devices. He was reporting to Dr Mido, whom he
described as Wamba's major collaborator, although Dr Mido was not a financial
20 person and would discuss financial matters with the Professor .
He said he was responsible for making payments (contrary to the evidence of
Professor Wamba), and in particular he told this commission about a payment
which Professor Wamba was calling the debt of the RCD to Uganda. RCD had
been taken to court in Kampala by hotel managers, landlords and airline
companies. The way the Nairobi witness described it, due to the split in the RCD,
and the differences between Mbusa and Wamba, Wamba had reached an
agreement with the Ugandan authorities that he would find a way to pay the debt,
and in return the Ugandan authorities would support him in his ongoing dispute
with Tibasiima. The debt amounted to some $380,000, and Professor Wamba was
30 unable to obtain the amount from Mr Tibasima, who was initially Minister of
Finance.
After discussions between the Nairobi witness and Dr Mido, the Nairobi witness
advised Dr Mido that he would be able to go to the field and collect receipts of the
proceeds and bring them back to Bunia. It was also discussed whether it would be
100
possible to obtain some refinancing in respect of coltan to be exported from
the Beni Butembo area, once the Ugandan authorities had helped Professor
Wamba to regain control in that area.
The precondition would be payment of the outstanding $380,000. The Nairobi
witness in his evidence was not at all clear as to how all this happened, but
according to the Nairobi witness the result of all the negotiations was the drafting
by Professor Wamba of a payment order addressed to him, and that payment order
was document No 2 in a bundle of documents which this commission received
from the UN panel. It was brought to him by Dr Mido.
This commission was initially extremely suspicious 10 of this document, arising from
the fact that the translation of it supplied by the UN panel stated first that the sum
of $380,000 was to be paid "as a refund for exoneration on commodities, mainly
the exportation of mineral products (Coltan)" and secondly that the payment was
due to some unpaid bills in Kampala. Initially it appeared that there were two
conflicting reasons for the payment, but it was made clear at the hearing in Nairobi
that the translation provided was wrong, and should have read not "as a refund",
but "by a refund", which made more sense and was consistent with the evidence of
the Nairobi witness.
the Nairobi witness said that he was given a mission order to go to the field and
20 collect money: it is not clear whether the mission order he received was document
No 2 or another document. In any event he went to Mahagi and Aru border points
where he obtained $45,000 from taxes collected and at Bunia he negotiated with
companies and managed to collect a further $30,000 by way of refinancing, a total
of $75,000. By one means or another the money was paid into the bank. The
Nairobi witness said that later he was approached by Dr Mido who told him that
Col Mayombo was in the country and that they had to go with the money which
they had to pay it to him. Mayombo was staying in a flat which was rented by
RCD from one Mr Lubenga of Solenki. The Nairobi witness and Dr Mido went
together to the Bank and Dr Mido withdrew the money in cash.
30 the Nairobi witness was cross-examined at great length by all parties as to why
Professor Wamba would communicate directly with him in Document 2, rather
than through the hierarchy. His answer, after great confusion, was that it was he
who had the experience of negotiating with Economic Operators for prefinancing
deals, and that he and Dr Mido had discussed and recommended to Professor
101
Wamba that the authority to collect and to pay should be made out to him.
The manner of his evidence, and the importance attached to the hierarchical
system by the other witnesses, particularly Dr Mido, makes this Commission think
that this transaction was at the least conducted out of the ordinary, and probably
that the Nairobi witness's explanation was a little thin.
There was also confusion about the manner of withdrawal of the $75,000. The
Nairobi witness said that the withdrawal was made, specifically not by a cheque,
but by a payment order signed by Professor Wamba the sole signatory, which was
then signed by Dr Mido in acknowledgement of receipt of the money. Dr Mido,
who was In Charge of General Inspection, and 10 the Nairobi witness's boss, however
said that to get money out of the bank a cheque had to be signed by Professor
Wamba for large amounts, and by the Minister of Finance, countersigned by
himself for smaller amounts. Dr Mido's account is the more familiar and
acceptable, and this Commission might be forgiven for thinking that perhaps the
Nairobi witness was not as au fait with the proper procedure as he said in
evidence.
According to the Nairobi witness, he and Dr Mido went then to see Col Mayombo
at the flat in Bunia where he was staying, and Dr Mido handed over the money,
and then started talking to Col Mayombo first about finance and Trinity, and then
20 the dispute between Tibasiima and Professor Wamba, which he said had been
planned by Col Arocha with others. He said that Tibasiima had soldiers in the
bush, and there was no UPDF intervention to support Professor Wamba. He put
this down to the fact that the $380,000 had not been paid. After the $75,000 was
paid, he said that Professor Wamba received the support he needed. In his
statement (supplied to this Commission by the reconstituted Panel) he said that
"the only issue was to tame the Hema militia of Tibasiima". In later questioning,
the Nairobi witness inclined to the view that there was probably no debt in
Kampala, but that the money was paid for UPDF support. There was also the issue
of Mbusa's control of Beni Butembo, and this somehow came in to the Nairobi
30 witness's evidence, but not in a clear manner: this however was an important
matter, because part of the way the $380,000 was to be collected, according to the
Nairobi witness, was by the expectation that the UPDF would assist Professor
Wamba in regaining control of those areas, so that prefinancing of coltan from the
Beni Butembo area (referred to in Document 2) could proceed once control had
been re-established. This portion of his evidence did not make sense.
102
This Commission was not impressed by the Nairobi witness's way of dealing
with these subjects. In his statement he attributed the payment to persuading Col
Mayombo "to inquire about the crisis within RCD-KIS between Wamba and
Tibasiima whose militia retired in Bogoro to strike and dislodge Wamba in
Bunia". Then initially in his evidence the whole issue according to him was to do
with the debt in Kampala: then he reverted to the reasons given in his statement:
later he was shown Document 1, which purported to be a letter to Professor
Wamba written by Col Mayombo asking for the payment of $380,000 "for the
operation which you know", and his opinion then became quite firm, that the
10 money was for UPDF support.
The Commission and those cross-examining the Nairobi witness took him to task
as to why no receipt was signed by Col Mayombo. The reason he gave was that
accounting in RCD was not satisfactory. He said that the law of the jungle applied
and senior people would never identify themselves by signature. It was pointed
out that he himself had been an inspector in finance with RCD from the start and
that if he was doing his job properly, with his qualifications, as an inspector he
would have something to say about that. Further it has occurred to this
Commission that the case put forward is that Mayombo wrote a letter demanding
the sum of money, thereby putting himself on record, which the Nairobi witness
20 says that the senior people would never do. The whole matter of the lack of a
receipt is most unsatisfactory and inconsistent, bearing in mind the Nairobi
witness's qualifications, and the circumstances.
Every allegation made by the Nairobi witness has been denied by Dr Mido. He at
the moment, as he told this Commission on oath, is in London, working as a
doctor, and awaiting the coming of peace in the DRC. This Commission sees no
reason for him to lie, while the Nairobi witness clearly has a grudge, whether
justified or not, arising from his arrest by the UPDF
Lastly, evidence from Mr Khan of Silver Springs Hotel, and from Col. Otafiire,
supported by correspondence from Col Otafiire and Col Mayombo, is quite clear
30 that the Uganda Government accepted responsibility for hotel bills of RCD
members in Kampala: it may be that the amounts have not been paid yet, but the
responsibility for payment appears to be clear. The evidence was that, as at June
2000, there were outstanding amounts, which Col Otafiire accepted were for the
Uganda Government to pay. This was the understanding of Silver Springs as well,
for they have issues a plaint against the Uganda Government for outstanding
103
amounts. Whilst Professor Wamba's payment order is not specific as to the
nature of the outstanding debts, and he denies that he ever wrote the order, the
Nairobi witness appears to have some, at least, details of how the debt arose.
These details are not consistent with evidence that the government of Uganda was
responsible for these bills. The comparison of the evidence shows that the Nairobi
witness, if not lying about this transaction, is at least wrong about its purpose, and
since his is the only evidence that this did occur, on a balance of the evidence this
Commission is bound to reject his claim, or at the least to conclude that there is
not sufficient evidence for the Commission to advise Government of Uganda to
take any action 10 against the parties involved.
The Nairobi witness also alleged that a 10 kg gold bar worth $100,000 which he
said was the result of a "gold tax" imposed, not by the UPDF, but by RCD on
artisanal miners allowed to work at Kilo Moto, had also been paid to someone he
did not know by Madame Colette against the $380,000 debt. He started by saying
the gold bar had "disappeared" (meaning to imply "stolen") from the Kilo Moto
Office, and that the manager had fled the country because he did not want to be
blamed for it. However the Nairobi witness was soon acknowledging that the gold
bar went to the Presidency, no doubt in the ordinary course as funding. It was this
allegation relating to a gold bar which brought this whole matter within our terms
20 of reference, amounting to an allegation of exploitation of the natural resources of
the DRC. Once again the Nairobi witness in his evidence started out on one tack,
and as that was shown in questioning to be a bit thin, changed course to another
tack. His source of information about this, he said, was Dr Mido, who in his
evidence to this Commission said that it would have been impossible at Kilo Moto
to smelt gold into a bar, as they did not have the facilities to do so. This would
normally be done at the Central Bank, he said.
Again the Nairobi witness said that Dr Mido had paid $50,000 at the end of July :
Dr Mido denied it and said that there was never enough money in the bank to
make this or other payments. According to the Nairobi witness, he managed to
30 collect this from one Angina Tombe, and gave it to Dr Mido in Beni. Dr Mido said
that pre-finance arrangements were paid direct into the Central Bank by the
economic operator, and that cash was not handled.
Lastly, the Nairobi witness said that he and one Polly Siwako had paid to Col
Burundi $20,000, about which there is no other evidence.
104
There is a clear difference between the evidence of the Nairobi witness and
the Ugandan witnesses, which might be expected whether this transaction took
place or not, although it is extremely difficult to believe that the Hon.
Wapakhabulo has been telling this Commission barefaced lies. Professor Wamba
also differs from the Nairobi witness on major matters, and the Nairobi witness
put that down to the fact that he thought he was arrested for treason on the
Professor's instructions: but that would not account for the fact that, on the face of
it as presented, this transaction was a straight reimbursement for money paid,
occasioning no reason to lie on the part of Professor Wamba. The Nairobi witness
also said that he had a close relationship with Dr Mido, 10 who failed to confirm any
detail of evidence which he might have been expected to confirm where such a
relationship existed.
There was also one other matter which has caused this Commission concern. It
relates to the letter purported to have been written by Col Mayombo, making
demand for this $380,000. It is apparent that this letter is a photocopy of the
original. Dr Mido told us that all such correspondence would end up with Madame
Colette who was Chief of Cabinet: and it ought to have comments on it for action:
comments by Professor Wamba, or by Mme Colette: this is quite normal in the
ordinary course: but there are no such comments. To set against these problems is
20 the opinion of the handwriting expert on both letters: he can find nothing in
particular to show that either of them is a forgery, but he points out that he is
working with a photostat, and could have given a better opinion if he had been
working with an original.
The Nairobi witness was introduced to this Commission by the reconstituted UN
Panel as a witness who could support the documentation which the UN Panel also
forwarded to this Commission to show that specific senior government officials
were involved in illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC. It is also
noted that the reconstituted Panel have not set out this alleged event in their Final
report.
30 On the balance of the totality of the evidence, this Commission is not satisfied that
the UN Panel has achieved its object to a satisfactory standard, so that action can
be taken by the Ugandan Government.
105
20.7. Colonel Mayombo’s advice to Professor Wamba dia Wamba.
Letter from Colonel Mayombo advising Professor Wamba dia Wamba to monitor one
the Nairobi witness.(4)
On this letter there are a number of features which clearly indicate a forgery. First, the
typing of the identification line at the bottom (NOBLE MAYOMBO (MP) COL
DCMI) is not in line with the rest of the typing on the letter, which indicates that it,
and the signature above it, have been carefully (but not carefully enough) been stuck
on or added from a scanned signature.
Then it has to be remembered that Col Mayombo is an intelligent, educated man,
Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence, able to speak 10 perfect English, although he says
he does not know French. He is purported to be writing to Professor Wamba, who,
although his main language is French, is also able to speak perfect English, and does
not hesitate to do so, as he has done before this Commission. It has been suggested
that this is a translation from the French original. After checking the language of the
letter, which is clearly a translation from the French by a Frenchman, the question
arises as to why Col Mayombo would have had a letter written for him in French, and
then translated, and then signed the translation. There seems to be no logical answer
to these questions, and Col Mayombo says that it did not happen.
The first sentence of the letter makes no sense at all, being devoid of a verb. Since a
20 verb is required in both languages, this is not decisive, although it would indicate a
less careful writer than Col Mayombo. However no member of this Commission can
imagine that Col Mayombo would for one minute consider calling the National
Political Commissar the “National Politics Commissioner”, nor of spelling his name
wrongly, or of failing to edit such a mistake.
The hand writing expert found that the last three lines of the document, describing
Col Mayombo were not parallel to the lines of the rest of the typescript, suggesting
that these last lines were added on to the document after the upper lines had been type
and removed from the typewriter/printer.
All the evidence available in respect of this letter is that it is a forgery, and nothing
30 short of production of the original would convince the members of this Commission
otherwise.
106
20.8. Ateenyi Tibasiima and Roger Lumbala
Ateenyi Tibasiima and Roger Lumbala gave evidence in affidavits. They did not
accuse Ugandan troops, Kazini or anyone else of any exploitation of natural resources
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but Lumbala said that he had received
complaints from civilians in artisanal mining areas that some individual soldiers of
the UPDF demanded money from Congolese citizens who were engaged in artisanal
mining. He said that he had no record of those who complained or the names of the
soldiers involved, but they wore UPDF uniforms. In the Commission’s view this does
not amount to the allegations made. Jean Pierre Bemba on oath gave much the same
10 evidence.
20.9. Other Individual Actors
A number of allegations have been difficult to investigate because they are
purportedly based on what the original Panel described as “very reliable sources”.
The Commission has not had the opportunity to cross check the evidence received
from such sources, or at least received some documentation to assist. The work of the
Commission would have been easier had the original Panel agreed to name those
sources, or provide documentation. Unfortunately this was not the case. Nonetheless
on the basis of the evidence received, the Commission’s finding is that there is no
ground for sustaining the allegations made against the individual actors concerned,
20 except as earlier set out.
20.10. The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Force (UPDF)
The original Panel Report contains serious allegations against UPDF and Top Military
Officers, and many of those allegations were repeated and enlarged in the Addendum. Some
of those affected have appeared before this Commission and on oath asserted that the
allegations were untrue. Many of these were poor and unreliable witnesses. However, no
soldier is prepared to come forward and say to the contrary. There appears to this Commission
to be a conspiracy of silence, which it is not easy to breach.
One way in which it could have been breached would have been for the reconstituted Panel to
reveal sources, who could have given evidence before this Commission, or to provide reliable
30 documentray evidence to support the allegations.
To get to the root of the matter this Commission thought a proper and thorough investigation
of UPDF would be the best option. This Commission’s inquiries have established that the
107
only organisation that can investigate UPDF is the Military Intelligence, which is part of
the military.
Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo, the Acting Chief of Military Intelligence and Security appeared
before this Commission. The conclusion, after listening to him, is that the Military
Intelligence’s investigations are not good enough, nor concentrated on misbehaviour of
officers and soldiers in the field. In some cases investigations were made long after the
incident. This Commission refers, in particular, to the allegation in Paragraph 62 of UN
Report that in August, 2000 UPDF Col. Mugenyi and a crew of his soldiers were discovered
with 800kg of elephant tusks in their car near Garambwa Park.
From the evidence of Lt. Col. Mayombo the allegation was not investigated 10 until nine months
after the incident, and then only on receipt of the original Panel Report. Naturally nothing
turned out. That was to be expected. For after nine months potential witnesses might not be
around and vital evidence might have been destroyed or disappeared for one reason or the
other.
Lt. Col. Mayombo admitted before this Commission that some cases were not reported to the
Military Intelligence Headquarters by the Intelligence Officers in the field. This is a clear
admission of weakness in the Intelligence establishment.
There is also an incident where an allegation was made against a Senior Army Officer and a
Junior Army officer. The Local UPDF Commander asked the Senior Army Officer to
20 investigate himself and the Junior Officer and report to him. The case in point relates to the
instructions given by Col. Mugenyi to Major Sonko to investigate the allegation made against
himself and Lt. Okumu in respect of mining.
Further it appears that all an officer has to do is to deny an incident for the investigation to be
dropped.
From the above it is clear that this Commission’s hands are therefore tied as far as UPDF is
concerned and there is nothing further this Commission can do than to express dissatisfaction
with the conduct of many of the UPDF officers who gave evidence, not the least because
when they started to be asked awkward questions they resorted to a conspiracy of silence, or
in the case of one very Senior Officer, levity and disrespect of the civil process.
30 The credibility of evidence given to the Commission by some army officers has been
questionable in many cases especially with regard to cargo transportation at the old airport
108
and the mining incidents referred to in Paragraphs 57 and 59 of the original Panel Report,
with which this Commission has dealt at Paragraph 16.2.1 above.
A serious consideration of those holding Senior Posts in the UPDF is called for, and
recommended by this Commission .
21. ECONOMIC DATA : CONFIRMATION OF THE ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION
OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO
In Paragraphs 94 to 108 economic data is set out in the report.
21.1. Gold
The conclusion of the original Panel Report in relation to 10 the economic data was that
the official data provided by Uganda authorities, contained substantial discrepancies.
The original Panel pointed out that the export figures for gold were consistently
greater than production values. The original Panel attributed the gap to the
exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo. They
point out that the Bank of Uganda has acknowledged to IMF officials that the volume
of Ugandan gold exports does not reflect Uganda's production levels, but rather that
some exports might be leaking over the borders from the Democratic Republic of
Congo. According to the Bank of Uganda exports in 1996 6.4 million dollars, and in
1995 $23 million, and in 1997 were $105 million.
20 This Commission has heard evidence from Bank of Uganda officials that their data is
collected from forms provided by the Bank of Uganda which express an intention to
export only. This Commission therefore looked at the URA figures for gold exports
and transit. It was not possible to separate the figures for exports originating from the
Congo, although it was possible to separate the transit figures, but only for 1999 and
2000.
This Commission thought to confirm figures from the UN COMTRADE database
said to have been provided by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, which revealed totally
different Ugandan export figures to those quoted by the UN panel, sourced from the
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. When comparing those figures with
30 the figures provided by Uganda's trading partners in terms of imports from Uganda an
even more disparate picture emerged.
109
There are problems in comparing figures, since some are in millions of shillings
and others in thousands of dollars, and some others are in tones/tonnes. But a general
picture can be obtained of a steady rise until 1997, with a dip in 1998 and an increase
in 1999. In 2000 there is a small dip.
There is also one other thing which appears from the figures, and that is that the
figures from the COMTRADE database as provided by Uganda Bureau of Statistics
as to Uganda's export figures, and the figures provided by Uganda's partners as
imports differ wildly, and bear no relation at all to the figures provided by URA. It is
quite clear therefore that there is massive smuggling of gold, and that the figures from
any source cannot be relied upon. One wonders how it 10 can be suggested that Uganda
must have realised what was going on with respect to Gold, or how Uganda can be
blamed for anything but an inefficient Customs Service and a porous border. It is not
the only country in Africa with these problems. The Commission will have
recommendations to make on this subject in due course.
It is also clear that there is no mine in Uganda which is fully operative; the same is
also true for the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The only source of gold
available is artisanal mining in open areas and abandoned mines (such as Kilo Moto).
The original Panel themselves indicate that a great deal of artisanal mining is going
on: they quote a figure of 2000 people mining in Kilo Moto mines per day, paying
20 soldiers a total of 2 kg per day; no doubt the workers also take an appreciable amount
of gold out of the gate. The Addendum to the original Panel Report increases that
figure to 10,000 people per day, generating £10,000 a day, 6 days a week, or
$3,120,000 a year. Whether or not soldiers are involved, this is an appreciable amount
of gold. Maj. Ssonko put the figure at 20,000 artisanal miners. Dr Mido gave
evidence that Professor Wamba appointed a Commission of soldiers to charge
artisanal miners at Kilo Moto about $15 worth of gold to go into the mine, and that
the proceeds from that were about two to three hundred grams a month, which raises
the possibility that RCD soldiers were mistaken for UPDF soldiers.
According to the Uganda Government, the figures for production in Uganda do not
30 reflect true production, because artisanal miners do not declare production, whereas
exporters do. Nevertheless there is widespread artisanal production in Uganda, since
this would be the only source of gold production in Uganda, apart from the
production from one mine in development.
110
What concerns this Commission is that the COMTRADE figures declared by
Uganda Bureau of Statistics are 16,35, and 43 million dollars for 1998,1999, and
2000 respectively. These figures are far too high to be matched by likely artisanal
production in the Democratic Republic of Congo even taken together with Uganda,
and they are not matched by COMTRADE Partner Import figures which are 2,4,and
14 million dollars only, (which are much more acceptable in relation to artisanal
production.
The original Panel has relied upon figures provided by the Ugandan Bureau of
Statistics. These figures do not match URA figures, or figures from Import partners
who, with respect, might be expected to be more reliable. 10 This Commission thinks
that perhaps if a little comparative research had been done, the original Panel would
have realised that the figures upon which they relied were, to say the least,
questionable, even though provided by Uganda, and that artisanal mining was the
only realistic source of gold production in this part of the world. The original Panel
might have been able to look with sympathy on the parlous state of the Uganda
Customs Service, and to make constructive recommendations in that regard. This
Commission cannot support their conclusion in Paragraph 45 that :
"The Panel has strong indications after talking to numerous witnesses (key
and others) that key officials in the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda
20 were aware of the situation on the ground, including the looting of stocks
from a number of factories. In some cases, the level of production of
mineral resources would have alerted any government, such as those of
gold for Uganda and coltan for Rwanda (from 99 tons in 1996 to 250 tons
in 1997)."
In passing this Commission would point out that in view of this Paragraph, and
similar comments in the Addendum, this Commission will not be considering coltan
under this heading, although there undoubtedly was coltan from the Congo transiting
through Uganda.
With relation to the acquisition of proper statistics, the problem appears to be the
30 recording of production. This Commission visited a gold exporter, and saw one
transaction through from the visit of the client with unprocessed gold dust to the
melting of the gold, and payment for it. The client was a businessman in Arua, and he
brought one large packet which was split up into many smaller packets, each of which
belonged to an artisanal miner. Each one was painstakingly labelled with the name of
111
the artisan, and they were all melted and assessed individually, and the payment
for each man calculated.
In such circumstances it is impractical to expect the artisans to notify gold production
and source, even where the law requires it. It is only the exporter who is required to
fill in statistical forms for export. Production and, more importantly, source figures
ought also to be required of whoever is the first person in Uganda to melt the gold
down, because the gold dust brought contains many impurities. In that regard, it was
quite clear from the visit that URA has no hope of charging import duties, because the
individual packets were so small (smaller than a matchbox,though heavy, and quite
valuable) that they were easy to hide. For the same reason, it 10 might be impractical to
require source figures, because gold smuggled through the border would be unlikely
to be declared as sourced from outside Uganda, so that it was not dutiable. This
Commission was told that the sources were all within Uganda: but looking at some of
the names involved, and bearing in mind the fact that the client was from Arua, this
was unlikely.
This Commission’s observation of the practice and procedure of, at least, artisanal
gold production was that it would be very difficult, if not impossible to control gold
imports from across the border, or to produce production statistics of any kind.
Therefore, even if the Uganda Government ought to have noticed that production
20 figures did not match export figures, there was very little that could be done about it.
Practically speaking this Commission is unable to suggest an approach to solve the
problem, but would recommend further study of the problem.
Table 1: Comparative figures for Gold from various sources
GOLD
INFORMATION FROM 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
URA EXPORTS Mshs 24,296 22,233 18,972 12,988 22,497
URA TRANSIT from
Congo Value Mshs 0 0 0 0 13 53
BOU Mshs 2,539 6,409 8,059 1,860 3,836 3,184
112
COMTRADE UGANDA -
EXPORTS ($000) 27,375 24,506 18,737 16,015 35,812 43,284 0
COMTRADE PARTNERSIMPORTS
($000) 4,286 28,161 20,744 2,234 4,235 14,405
COMTRADE UGANDA -
EXPORTS Tonnes 2 2 1 3 21 43 0
COMTRADE PARTNERSIMPORTS
Tonnes 2 3 8 0 0 0 0
URA TRANSIT from
Congo Grams ?? 0 0 0 0 1,780 7,030
PANEL (Tons) 3 5 7 5 11 11
21.2. Diamonds.
The original Panel in their report say
"98. Second, the data from the Ugandan authorities are silent with
regard to diamond production and export. Several third party sources
(WTO, World Federation of Diamond Bourses, Diamond High Council)
indicate diamond exports from Uganda during the last three years. These
diamond exports are suspicious for many reasons:
(a) Uganda has no known diamond production;
(b) Diamond exports from Uganda are observed 10 only in the last few years,
coinciding surprisingly with the occupation of the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo as shown in table 2 and figure 2;
(c) Finally, these facts corroborate the Panel's findings from field
investigation, discussions and external observers on the need to control the
rich diamond zone near Kisangani and Banalia.
99. These figures are understated and there are indications that Uganda
exported more diamonds. However, this is not well captured in the statistics
because of the loose regulations governing the free zone areas. These
regulations permit diamonds originating in any country to be repackaged,
20 and then to be sold from any country as diamonds from a country of origin
that is not necessarily the one mentioned in the statistics.
100. Data collected from any third party consistently show that Uganda has
become a diamond exporting country; they also show that diamond exports
113
from Uganda coincide with the years of the wars in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, that is from 1997 onward."
So far as this Commission is concerned, the data from Ugandan Authorities is not
silent. It is quite clear from URA, BOU and Uganda Bureau of Statistics data to
COMTRADE that there is no record whatever of diamond production in Uganda.
There is a slight possibility of some artisanal surface diamond collection, but nothing
has been officially declared.
On the other side, the original Panel's information, which is said to have come from
WTO, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the Diamond High Council,
agrees quite closely with the COMTRADE Partner 10 Import figures on diamonds,
except for the figures for 2000. This Commission has checked the original Panel's
information with the Diamond High Council. It is revealed that, although much more
care is now exercised by the Belgian Authorities, at the time in question, the source of
diamonds was accepted upon the information of the importer, and Diamond High
Council statistics (which the original Panel quoted as their source) relate to import to
Belgium.
Therefore, although the original Panel treat as suspicious the fact that, according to
external statistics, Uganda was a diamond exporter, in fact that information was based
upon the most unreliable figures.
20 For example this Commission has traced a Police case in Uganda where one Khalil,
who is mentioned in the original Panel Report, admitted to obtaining diamonds in the
Democratic Republic of Congo in April 2000, flying them in to the Military Air Base,
and ultimately sending a packet of them through associates to the International
Airport, where the diamonds were exchanged (in the Gents toilet at the airport) for
$550,000 in cash with a courier from Belgium who caught the next flight back. This
was hardly an honest exchange, particularly as there is no record of import, export or
transit through Uganda.The reason the matter was reported to the Police in Uganda
was because on the way back to Kampala, the car was stopped by armed men and the
money stolen. The case is dealt with more particularly at Paragraph 21.3 below. The
30 point is that the source of information in Belgium that the diamonds originally came
from Uganda (which they did not) was the courier who had been involved in this
shady deal. Had the original Panel known all this, perhaps they would not have been
so hasty as to lay the blame at Uganda’s door: and to establish the source of the
information upon which they relied was only a telephone call away, for that is how
114
this Commission established this information. There is no doubt that diamonds
are being smuggled, and falsely declared as sourced in Uganda. Bearing in mind that
a fortune can be carried in a pocket, it is difficult to see what Uganda as a State can
do about this. Partner Countries must be aware that Uganda is not a diamond
producing country, and yet are prepared to publish figures which deny that fact. The
original Panel acknowledge the difficulty, and make recommendations in respect of
it, which the Uganda Government, in its response, accepts.
Although the original Panel refers to diamond exports from Uganda as commencing
"with the occupation of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo" the figures
they produce clearly show considerable trading in 1997, 10 a year before the UPDF went
in. This however would coincide with the start of the Laurent Kabila regime, and the
coming of relative peace and security to the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,
followed by security provided by UPDF even in troubled times, both of which
enabled overseas trading. There is no surprise in this.
This Commission cannot therefore understand why the original Panel referred to
these figures as suspicious, or as supporting their conclusions from field trips.
Table 2: Comparative figures for Diamonds from various sources
DIAMONDS 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
URA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BOU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COMTRADE UGANDAEXPORTS
($000) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COMTRADE PARTNERSIMPORTS
($000) 0 0 203 1,364 1,232 13 0
PANEL ($000) 198 1,440 1,813 1,263
21.3. The Diamond Link
20 An opportunity presented itself to investigate the way in which diamonds were
exported to Europe from the Democratic Republic of Congo, arising from a document
115
provided by the reconstituted Panel, combined with information that this
Commission had obtained about the smuggling of diamonds. The evidence and
conclusions to be drawn from it are set out below.
21.3.1. Victoria
Throughout this Commission’s investigations the name of Victoria Diamonds or
Victoria Group has surfaced on many occasions. The allegations in the original
Panel Report were that Salim Saleh was a key shareholder in the group, which was
said to have been involved in the making of counterfeit Congolese Francs
(Paragraph 67). Later in paragraph 80 the original Panel described Victoria Group
as being chaired by one Mr. Khalil with its headquarters 10 in Kampala. The original
Panel said that Mr. Khalil deals directly with Salim Saleh's wife on Diamond
issues, and had two collaborators in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Mohammed Gassan and Mr. Talal. The original Panel were also told that Victoria
Group belongs jointly to the son of President Museveni and Salim Saleh and his
wife, and was involved in trading diamonds, gold and coffee.
In Paragraph 88, when focusing on Salim Saleh and his wife, and accusing Salim
Saleh of controlling Mbusa Nyamwisi and Ateenyi Tibasima through General
Kazini, who were protecting his commercial and business interests, the original
Panel stated that Salim Saleh used the Victoria Group (and also Trinity) for the
20 purchase and commercialisation of diamonds, timber, coffee and gold. The
original Panel also reported that Salim Saleh's wife wanted to control the
Kisangani diamond markets on the recommendation of Mr. Khalil.
In the Addendum, Victoria comptoir in Kampala is mentioned in Paragraph 26 as
continuing to sell gold mined from Malaka, and in Paragraph 97 as still exploiting
diamonds, gold coffee and timber, enabling the UPDF to “pull out their troops,
while leaving behind structures that permit military officers and associates,
including rebel leaders, to continue profiting”. In Paragraph 99 of the Addendum,
Roger Lumbala is alleged to be a front for Victoria in respect of Bafwasende
diamonds.
30 This Commission’s original researches were centred on a Ugandan Company of
that name because of the insistence of the original Panel that the Company was
connected with Kampala, and it took very little time to establish that there was no
such company registered in Uganda, either local or foreign. All that was
116
discovered relevant to the allegations in the original Panel report was that at
one time Jovial Akandwanaho and Khalil were associated in a Lebanese
restaurant. They were directors in a company named Leban (U) Ltd which was
registered on 5th August 1999, and opened a Lebanese Restaurant in Kampala
Road in mid-1999. Later, Jovial said, she had sold her shares to Khalil.
Later on in this Commission’s researches, a registration document of a company
called Victoria Diamonds, registered in Goma in February 1999 was obtained. The
Directors of that Company were Ahmed Ibrahim (a Lebanese living in Goma) and
Kay Nduhuukire (a Ugandan living in Goma), who were mentioned nowhere else
in the reports or evidence. This Commission therefore 10 thought that this Company
was not the Company referred to by the Original Panel, and reported as such.
However, an event in Uganda came to the attention of this Commission. On 14th
July 2000 a robbery took place on the Entebbe Road. The robbery was from a
vehicle which was travelling from Entebbe Airport to Kampala: and a sum of
$550,000 was reported to have been robbed from the occupants. The matter was
reported to the Police, and it turned out that the loser was the same Khalil, who
made a statement to the Police.
21.3.2. Khalil
In that statement Khalil identified himself as Khalil Nazem Ibrahim, of British
20 Nationality. He said that he came to Uganda in January 1999 and that he had a
Lebanese restaurant on Kampala Road and did business of buying diamonds from
the Congo especially in Kisangani, Buta and Bunia. He did not name the company
under which he worked. He said that he used to send money for buying diamonds
through one Hussein, and sometimes would go himself. He was receiving
diamonds through the Entebbe airport and also sending them to Europe especially
to Belgium, and received the money in dollars for buying the diamonds from one
Nasser Murtada at Entebbe Airport. His base was in Bugolobi in Kampala. Due to
problems in the Congo he said that he stopped the business and in June 2000
brought a man named Ismail from Buta to start buying diamonds from the Congo.
30 Khalil said that he then went back to Belgium to arrange finance after showing
Ismail what to do. The procedure was that Nasser Murtada delivered money in
dollars from Belgium at Entebbe airport and took the diamonds already purchased
back to Belgium.
117
The man Ismail identified himself as Ismail Kamil Dakhlallah, a diamond
dealer aged about 22 years. He said he was based in the the Democratic Republic
of Congo and used to buy diamonds from Buta and Kisangani. He said that after
the wars in Kisangani and shortly before the robbery in July 2000 he moved to
Kampala to join a company named Beccadilly Ltd which was based in Bugolobi.
He said that his partner in Uganda was Abas Khazal, and they were financially
supported by Nami Gems who were based in Belgium. On the particular occasion
of the robbery, he was telephoned by a Mr. Hemang Shah (of Nami Gems) who
said he would be sending money to him with Nasser Murtada on the Sabena flight
arriving 10 on Friday the 14th of July 2000.
He went to the airport, met Nasser, picked up the money which was $550,000, and
started back to Kampala but on the way the money was robbed at gunpoint. After
the robbery he was assisted by Mohammed Jawad (who according to his statement
runs a Lebanese restaurant in Kampala Road, the one in which Jovial and Khalil
were originally associated) and Abas Kazal. It is interesting to notice that in his
statement, Ismail did not mention that he had handed over diamonds to Nasser at
the airport, although Khalil said that the procedure was to deliver money and pick
up the diamonds already purchased.
These people were quite clearly engaged in smuggling diamonds through Uganda,
20 since URA statistics show no import or transit of diamonds from the Democratic
Republic of Congo. At the very least the law would require them to declare the
diamonds for transit through Uganda from the Congo to Belgium. As this
Commission has pointed out elsewhere, there would be no income to Uganda from
such a declaration, but Uganda would be entitled to check the transit and ensure
that there was no import to Uganda of some or all of any particular consignment,
upon which duty would be payable. In fact, since parcels of diamonds from the
Democratic Republic of Congo were collected in Bugolobi before being sent to
Belgium, this was an import/re-export situation, which all the more should have
been reported to Customs.
30 There is also interesting material in the statements made to the police by various
Congolese and Ugandan businessmen who were coming and going from the
Congo using military air transport through the military air base.
118
21.3.3. Picadilly Import and Export
Part of the Police enquiries were based upon a report made by insurance
investigators who were looking into the loss on behalf of the insurance company
involved. The report was produced in evidence before this Commission. The
investigators met Khalil, who described himself as a rough diamond buyer trading
under the named Piccadilly Import and Export from premises in Bugolobi. This
was clearly the same company for which Ismail said he was working, although in
his statement it is spelt “Beccadilly”. The Company was incorporated on 28th
October 1983: the present directors are Hussein Ali Hamad and Nazih Ali Hamad,
both of PO Box 2533 Kampala according to the latest return filed 17th 10 April 2002.
Hussein Ali Hamad is referred to in Paragraph 91 of the orginal Panel Report as
being an individual actor with Rwandan contacts in the diamond and gold trades.
The report gives the history of Khalil's operations in the diamond trade in the then
Zaire, Brazzaville, Kisangani, and in January 1999 Bugolobi in Kampala. A clear
link was established in the report between Khalil and Abbas Khazal of Beldiam
Ltd, who runs his diamond business from a room in the Sheraton hotel in
Kampala: this link is confirmed by information this commission has received from
the investigators working in the diamond trade in Belgium.
When interviewing witnesses, this Commission has done what it can to find out
20 about Victoria: Salim Saleh said that he had only heard of it from the original
Panel Report: Jovial Akandwanaho said she knew nothing about it, although she
did know Khalil, and was involved with him in a Company which ran a Lebanese
restaurant: Sam Engola said that he did not know of the company although he had
business dealings with Khalil and transported him in his plane: Mr. Bemba at first
said that he did not know of Victoria, but when asked if he knew Khalil, agreed
that he did, and that he was working under the company name Victoria in
Kisangani: Adele Lotsove knew of Victoria in Kisangani, and of Khalil, although
she did not connect them: General Kazini on the third time he came before the
Commission was emphatic that Khalil whom he knew was trading as Victoria in
30 Kisangani, although on the first occasion he was very unclear about it, and
descended into broken sentences and inaudibility as he was accustomed to do
when faced with an embarrassing question.
The preponderance of the evidence is that Khalil’s operations in Kisangani were
under the name Victoria, and in Bugolobi under the name Piccadilly, and that the
Military Air Base was being used to smuggle diamonds across Uganda, sometimes
119
with Military Transport. It is the name Khalil which connects these operations
and the allegations in the original Panel Report. It seems to matter little whether
the Goma registered Company La Societé Victoria is the same Victoria Group or
Comptoir referred to in the original Panel Report or not. Khalil’s operations are
therefore referred to in this report simply as “Victoria”.
21.3.4. General Kazini
In considering these operations, this Commission wonders how they could have
been set up, obviously with UPDF assistance, so far at least as transport is
concerned. Those concerned in smuggling of diamonds from the Congo to the
Military Air Base in many cases were admittedly 10 Lebanese, who were plainly and
visibly neither Ugandan nor Congolese, and again it is fair to ask, in view of the
President’s radio message, how these Lebanese were allowed to travel to and from
the Military Airport. This Commission had no evidence as to how these operations
were set up, until the reconstituted Panel provided a set of documents which had to
be put to General Kazini.
The first document was a receipt for payment of ad valorem tax in advance to
MLC of $100,000 each from Siporia Diamonds and Victoria Diamonds. The payer
on behalf of Victoria Diamonds was Abbas Kazal, a connection which helps to
confirm this Commission’s above finding.
20 The receipt was attached to a note on MLC notepaper signed by Mr. Bemba
addressed to all civil and military authorities, dated 26th June 1999 which states
that La Societe Victoria was authorised to proceed with purchases of gold, coffee
and diamonds in Isiro Bunia Bondo Buta Kisangani and Beni, and that all the local
taxes would be paid to MLC.
The note was an interesting document in itself, confirming that Mr. Bemba
initially lied to this Commission, and confirming what appears to have been a
universal practice of pre-payment of taxes.
But also endorsed on the note were the comments of General Kazini addressed to
the Commanders in all of the mentioned towns, except Kisangani, also dated 26th
30 June 1999. From other writings of General Kazini this commission had no doubt
that it was in his handwriting: and there is quite a large sample in this case. It was
therefore astonishing to hear General Kazini deny flatly that he wrote it. It was not
until it was pointed out that in another document with which this Commission will
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deal below, the comments were referred to, and that it would be a simple
matter to call handwriting expert evidence that he admitted that he was indeed the
author. This was not a mistake: having watched General Kazini giving evidence,
this Commission is fully satisfied that it was a deliberate lie by Uganda’s Acting
Army Commander, displaying an arrogance and contempt of civil authority
similar to that which has been displayed by other witnesses in the UPDF.
General Kazini’s comments were actually instructions to his Commanders,
pointing out that La Societe Victoria had been granted permission to do business
in coffee, gold and diamonds in their areas, that taxes were to be paid to MLC, and
that the Commanders should “let Victoria to do 10 its business uninterrupted by
anybody”. This makes one wonder what the Commanders would have done if they
had not received this instruction.
In his last paragraph General Kazini instructed the commanders that anything to
do with payment to them in the form of security funding, it should be done
through OSH TAC HQS, that is, through himself. Throughout these proceedings,
every UPDF witness, including General Kazini, has denied that any such funding
was taking place, but it clearly was. Senior Officers have again been lying to this
Commission.
All of the above documents were copied in a letter from General Kazini on UPDF
20 notepaper addressed to the Governor Kisangani, datelined July 1999. The letter
referred to Mr. Bemba's letter and General Kazini’s comments endorsed on the
same document. He informed the Governor that Victoria had officially cleared
taxes with MLC authorities and MLC was a recognised organisation by all
Congolese and allies. He asked the Governor to "leave Victoria to his business and
he will continue to pay taxes to MLC to back up the effort in the armed struggle."
Pausing there for a minute, it is worth considering the position in Kisangani at the
time. Contrary to what this Commission understood at the start of this
investigation, the UPDF never took control of Kisangani town, but established
headquarters at La Forestiere some 17 km outside Kisangani. According to the
30 evidence of General Kazini and Adele Lotsove, Kisangani itself was under the
control of RCD Goma, and indeed the letter is copied to them. General Kazini was
questioned on his authority to give instructions to the Governor of Kisangani. His
explanations were confused and unconvincing.
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Whilst the Governor of Kisangani would also be responsible for territories
north of Kisangani, in areas which were under UPDF control, it has to be
remembered that Adele Lotsove had been talking to General Kazini for some time
with a view to establishing the province of Ituri so that she could take the
governorship of the province, and indeed it was on the 18th of June 1999 that
General Kazini wrote the letter of appointment, some 8 days before the date of the
correspondence under consideration: General Kazini therefore knew on the date
on which he wrote the letter to the Governor that the areas North of Kisangani,
which were destined to become Ituri Province, which were the same areas
controlled by the commanders listed in his comments, 10 either were already, or soon
would come under the administration of Adele Lotsove, not of the Governor of
Kisangani.
Evidence shows that Kisangani, though not a diamond producing area in itself,
was the basis of collection and distribution. It was also Victoria’s base. Clearly
Victoria’s operations involving pre-payment of tax to MLC could not succeed
without some co-operation from the Rwanda supported Kisangani Administration
in the matter of tax.
Set in that light then, this Commission asked General Kazini why he, who had no
control in Kisangani Town, was giving instructions to the Governor of Kisangani
20 in administrative matters, and why, in his last paragraph he wrote what amounts to
a veiled threat. His replies were not satisfactory, particularly in view of the fact
that apart from the appointment of Adele Lotsove, he denied being involved in any
other administrative matters.
This Commission can only come to one conclusion, that General Kazini had more
interest in Victoria’s operations than he has been prepared to admit: and that
conclusion supports many allegations of the original Panel in respect of General
Kazini.
The Governor of Kisangani was not notified in advance of the intended
appointment of Adele Lotsove, or of the carving out from his Province of the new
30 Province of Ituri. General Kazini therefore was involved in secretly appointing, or
conspiring in the appointment of Adele Lotsove to take administrative control of
the mineral producing areas. This can only have been because she was a
sympathetic administrator. In appointing her, General Kazini was acting against
the existing Governor who clearly was not sympathetic, as is revealed by the
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phraseology of the last paragraph of General Kazini’s letter to him: “Let me
hope that I have been clearly understood”. In the circumstances this letter was
inflammatory, and calculated to upset the appointed administration, RCD Goma
and its ally, Rwanda.
It is also revealing that, amongst others, he copied his letter to Victoria, as though
reporting that he had obeyed his instructions, and done what he had been asked to
do by Victoria.
These conclusions put General Kazini at the beginning of a chain as an active
supporter in the Democratic Republic of Congo of Victoria, an organisation
engaged in smuggling diamonds through Uganda: and it is difficult 10 to believe that
he was not profiting for himself from the operation.
Perhaps also an answer to the question posed above, as to how Lebanese were
being allowed to fly on Military Aircraft to and from the Democratic Republic of
Congo, in breach of the President’s Instructions, is beginning to appear. General
Kazini according to the evidence, was one of those who gave clearance
instructions to the Liaison Officers at the Military Air base.
21.3.5. Jovial Akandwanaho
It is fairly clear how diamonds were smuggled into Uganda through the Military
Air Base, and smuggled out to Belgium. The question that arises is how the
20 courier was able on many occasions to get through Entebbe Airport Security
unscathed. He had to have had assistance at the airport.
Enquiries have revealed that a Civil Aviation Authority officer in the VIP lounge
was in fact assisting Nasser as he came into the country on Sabena. His evidence
had to be taken in camera on the basis that he feared for his life should he give
evidence in public. This fear was based upon an allegation that one of the
investigators into the robbery had been killed. What this officer told this
Commission on oath was that he had been introduced to Khalil by Jovial
Akandwanaho with a view to assisting him through Customs when he came from
Belgium, and returned to Belgium with the diamonds.
30 When he met Khalil, they came to an arrangement where the officer would assist
couriers from Belgium, and the officer was rung on several occasions by Jovial
123
Akandwanaho, on occasions by Khalil, and also by others and asked to meet
the courier, which he did, and assisted him through Customs.
On one occasion he received a call from Jovial and was asked to go to the
departure lounge where the courier had been stopped because he was carrying
diamonds. When he got there, he rang Jovial who spoke on his phone to the
security officer, as a result of which the courier was allowed to continue onto his
flight. The officer said that this was how he came to know that diamonds were
involved. He showed Jovial’s mobile number on his phone: it was found to be
correct.
This Commission had the opportunity of seeing this 10 witness give evidence, and
was impressed by him as a truthful witness. He clearly thought that he was putting
himself in danger by giving evidence, but nevertheless volunteered information
which supported the allegations made by the original Panel. It might be thought
that this Commission might have further interviewed Jovial Akandwanaho, but it
had regard to her denial that she had anything to do with diamonds, and was only
associated with Khalil through a Lebanese restaurant: only a renewed denial was
to be expected where it was obvious that the identity of the witness would become
known, contrary to this Commission’s promise to the witness.
As a result, this Commission is unable to rule out the participation of Jovial
20 Akandwanaho in the smuggling operations of Victoria as alleged by the original
Panel : on the contrary there is every indication that there is a link between
General Kazini, Victoria, Khalil and Jovial Akandwanaho, and perhaps others in
the smuggling of diamonds through Uganda to Belgium.
It is clear to this Commission that the incident of the robbery opened many
channels of investigation, and the recommendation would be that further
investigations should be conducted on the basis of what has been revealed so far,
and appropriate action taken.
21.4. Niobium
The original Panel say that the pattern of Niobium Export appears to be the same : no
30 production prior to 1997, followed by an increase in exports. In respect of all these
minerals, due to the original Panel's recital of data source, this Commission
communicated with WTO, who said that they did not keep such statistics, and
referred this Commission to the UN COMTRADE Database. So there is some
124
confusion there, as the figures are somewhat different. Uganda declares exports
as from 1995, whilst Partner Imports start in 1998. This makes a nonsense of the
original Panel's conclusion that Export started in 1997, to coincide with the start of
the war. The original Panel's figures are much higher than those from the
COMTRADE database, but the figures never exceed $782,000 in a year from
whatever source. This Commission does not think that the figures bear out the
original Panel's conclusion, or that Niobium bears any real relation to the alleged
illegal exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Table 3: Comparative figures for Niobium from various sources
NIOBIUM 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
URA 7
BOU
COMTRADE UGANDA
EXPORTS ($000) 210 32 231 7
COMTRADE PARTNERS
IMPORTS ($000) 435 713 422
PANEL ($000) 0 0 13 580 782
21.5. Mineral 10 Transit figures
In Paragraph 102 of the Report, the original Panel say:
102. Third, the Ugandan authorities, in their response to the Panel's
questionnaire, stated that there was no record of transit of mineral
products. However, the Panel received information from one Ugandan
customs post at the border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda. Records for 1998, 1999 and 2000 reveal that mineral products
as well as other commodities left the Democratic Republic of the Congo and
entered Uganda (presumably this would also prove true for the other dozen
or so points of entry). The following three examples show an increase in
20 the transboundary movement of natural resources between 1998 and 1999.
Coffee 1998: 144,911 bags
1999: 170,079 bags
2000: 208,000 bags
Timber 1998: 1,900 m3
125
1999: 3,782 m3 and 46,299 pcs
2000: 3,272 m3 and 3,722 pcs
Cassiterite* 1998: None
1999: 30 kgs
2000: 151 drums
* The sudden increase in the import of cassiterite may also mean an
increase in the import of coltan. The Panel discovered that cassiterite is
often listed in lieu of coltan, as coltan possesses a higher value, which
implies high import taxes in Uganda.
This Commission is totally confused by this Paragraph: the 10 original Panel start by
implying that the Ugandan authorities were dishonest in stating that there was no
record of transit of mineral products, and then quote examples of Coffee and Timber,
which are not mineral products. There is indeed one example relating to Cassiterite
between 1998 and 2000, and it is of such a small quantity as to be totally ignored. In
fact, URA have been able to give this Commission transit figures for all sorts of
commodities: but it has taken an extended exercise to do so, as transit figures,
although recorded at the customs stations, were not being recorded centrally, because
there was no duty on transits, and therefore it was thought, wrongly of course, that it
was not necessary to assemble this data centrally. This was the procedure, however
20 unwise. It was therefore true, at the time the original Panel was dealing with this
matter, that there were no centrally available figures for mineral transits : but the
figures could be, and were for this Commission, made available. This Commission
agrees that coltan is declared as cassiterite, from which it (and Niobium) is extracted.
The original Panel's complaint in Paragraph 96 is that the official data on minerals
contains substantial discrepancies. This Commission does not think that the three
examples given in the Report bear out this conclusion, but would point out that the
Commission had great difficulty using the statistics and records provided by the
Uganda Revenue Authority on the one hand and Bank of Uganda, Uganda Bureau of
Statistics and the Coffee Development Authority on the other hand.Most of these
30 bodies had different years, starting in different months, different yardsticks. Whereas
one body would quantify export of a given product in kilograms, another would give
it in US$ (Dollars) then another in Uganda Shillings.
Hence depending on which body or authority one went to, one would receive
different results for the same period. There is need to standardise or harmonise
statistics in order to churn out consistent statistics by Government and other
126
authorities/bodies which can be used by Government itself for future planning
and meaningful records.
21.6. Cobalt:
In the original Panel Report cobalt is only mentioned in passing. It was not
investigated by the original Panel and is not included in the list of recommended
minerals in Paragraph 221 to be subject to a temporary embargo. However, it has
been dealt with in the Addendum, although Uganda is not mentioned. Nonetheless a
major local company, Kasese Cobalt Company, has noted with concern that cobalt is
mentioned in the report as a mineral of interest and might therefore be affected by a
10 possible embargo.
Kasese Cobalt Company processes cobalt pyrites that were stockpiled as a by-product
from the Kilembe Copper Mine in Uganda. Those stockpiles were set aside in the
period from 1955-1980. Kasese Cobalt has informed this Commission that it has
invested some US$135 million since 1996 in building a plant to convert the pyrite to
cobalt metal and associated amounts of cobalt and nickel and other mixed hydroxides.
Kasese Cobalt exports the resultant cobalt cathodes and hydroxides via Kenya to
customers worldwide.
Given the location of the the Democratic Republic of Congo cobalt plants along the
Zambian border in the Democratic Republic of the Congo it is the company’s opinion
20 that if cobalt was being illegally exported from the the Democratic Republic of
Congo it is highly unlikely to be exported via Uganda. In addition the Katanga cobalt
mining areas are reported to be controlled by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and its allies, which does not include Uganda, making it even
more unlikely that cobalt is exported via Uganda. Furthermore the figures for cobalt
which are included in Table 1 (on page 20 and entitled Uganda Minerals exports and
production 1994-2000) exactly match those from Kasese Cobalt Company’s
production and export records for 1999 and up to October in 2000. This leaves no
room for imported cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo.
It would be unfortunate and most unfair if the Security Council were to declare a
30 temporary embargo on the import or export of cobalt from Uganda.
127
4 . LINKS BETWEEN THE
ALLEGED ILLEGAL
EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE
CONTINUATION OF THE
CONFLICT.
22. NATURE OF THE LINKS
The original Panel, between Paragraphs 109 and 218 examines the possibility that there is a
link between the alleged exploitation of natural resources and the continuation of the conflict.
The headings under which the original 10 Panel considered the matter were;
Budgets compared to military expenditures
Financing the War
Special Features of the Links
Facilitators or passive accomplices
22.1. Budgets compared to military expenditure.
In Paragraph 115 of the original Panel Report the Uganda military budget is set out,
with one error by which it is assumed that the military budget pays for the pension of
retired soldiers. It has been explained to this Commission, as it would have been to
the original Panel had they asked, that the budget which they quote covers
20 programme 2 (Land Forces) and programme 3 (Air Forces) only. There is an
additional programme 1 which provides for Headquarters, out of which pensions are
paid.
In Paragraphs 116 and 117 calculations are made, based on various assumptions and
directed to show that the budget was overspent by about $16 million. Particularly the
calculation relating to the cost of air transport is based upon fantastic and unrealistic
figures. The correct figures could have been obtained by the original Panel from
128
Ministry of Defence. For 2000/2001 the figure for air charter was Shs 6 billion,
instead of $12.96 million as calculated by the original Panel.
Life has been made rather more simple for this Commission. This Commission has
not had to make any assumptions or do any calculations, because the actual figures
have been availed to this Commission on request. According to the evidence,
overexpenditures during the years 1998 to 2001 were:
Table 4: Military Budgets and Overexpenditures
Financial
Year
Overexpenditure Defence
Budget
Total
98/99 47 145.6 192.6
99/00 6 188.4 194.4
00/01 14 187.7 201.7
Evidence before this Commission was that these overexpenditures were necessary for
various reasons, not all of which related to Operation 10 Safe Haven: they were covered
by supplementary budgets, and the money provided by Ministry of Defence from
funds obtained from Ministry of Finance.
Therefore, in the case of Uganda, the link between exploitation of natural resources of
the Democratic Republic of Congo and the continuation of the conflict, based upon
the suggestion that such exploitation was swelling the funds of Uganda’s treasury in
order to pay for the war is tenuous, to say the least.
The original Panel say in Paragraph 109 on this subject that it had demonstrated that
military expenditures far outweighed the supposed money allocated for such
expenses.
20 First, the use of the word “supposed” is unfortunate: the “supposed money allocated
for such expenses” was approved by Parliament by budget in fact, not supposedly.
It is difficult to criticise the budget overrun in 99/00, less difficult to criticise the
overrun in 00/01, and easy to criticise the overrun in 98/99, if one looks only at the
figures.
129
If however one looks at the circumstances obtaining at the time, these criticisms
fall away. In 1998, this was the move from Peace to War; and an overexpenditure is
only to be expected on the initial move of troops and equipment across the border in
respect of a new venture which could not have been foreseen at budget time. In
2000/01, this was the start of withdrawal and included transport of troops and
equipment back to Uganda: once again an unforeseen expense. Budget overruns in
such circumstances are only to be expected. There is little here to support the original
Panel’s finding.
22.2. Financing the War
In Paragraph 135 of the report, 10 the original Panel say:
“Uganda unlike Rwanda did not set up an extra budgetary system to
finance its presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The regular
defence budget is used and broadly the deficit is handled by the treasury. “
However the original Panel continues to conclude that Uganda was only able to
finance the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the following manners:
22.2.1. Primary Means of Financing The War
The original Panel Report in Paragraph 125 alleges that Uganda’s economy
benefited from the conflict through:
1) Purchase of arms and equipment through direct payment. There is no
20 basis in the text to support this allegation.
2) Barter of arms for mining concessions. There is no basis in the text to
support this allegation.
3) Creation of joint ventures. There is no basis in the text to support this
allegation
With respect to these sources, the original Panel’s arguments appear to relate
mainly to their investigations of Rwanda. What is specifically stated against
Uganda relates to:
130
22.2.2. The Re-Exportation Economy
In Paragraphs 136 – 142 the original Panel attempt to make a case for saying that
Uganda was able to pay for the war out of what they call a “re-exportation
economy”. They summarise the case in the following way:-
“142. The Ugandan situation can be summarized as follows: the reexportation
economy has helped increase tax revenues, allowing the
treasury to have more cash. Businesses related to the conflict and managed
by Ugandans have contributed to an extent to generate activities in the
economy in a sector such as mining (gold and diamonds). The growth in
these sectors has had a trickle-down effect 10 on the economy and permitted
Uganda to improve its GDP in 1998 and maintain it somewhat in 1999. The
improvement in GDP has permitted, according to Ugandan officials, an
increase in absolute terms of the military budget while keeping the level of
the military budget at the agreed 2 per cent of GDP. The apparent strength
of the Ugandan economy has given more confidence to investors and
bilateral and multilateral donors who, by maintaining their level of
cooperation and assistance to Uganda, gave the Government room to spend
more on security matters while other sectors, such as education, health and
governance, are being taken care of by the bilateral and multilateral aid.”
20 Specifically in Paragraph 136/7, the original Panel explain the re-exportation
economy to imply that natural resources imported from the Democratic Republic
of Congo are re-packaged or sealed as Ugandan Natural resources or products and
re-exported. They say that that is the case for gold, diamonds, coltan and coffee
exported by Uganda.
In Paragraph 137, an example is given (which relates to Burundi) where it is
alleged that coffee dealers mix Congolese coffee with Burundian Coffee to
increase its value. A similar “trick”, as the original Panel calls it, is alleged against
Ugandan Coffee dealers.
As pointed out in the Uganda Government’s response to the original Panel Report,
30 there is no sign of a drop in the quality of Uganda’s coffee, and exports have been
on the decline from 4.2 million bags in 1996/97 to 2.9 million bags in 1999/2000.
The facts do not seem to support the allegations.
This Commission has no evidence leading to either conclusion.
In paragraph 138, there is an allegation that illegal exploitation of gold improved
balance of payments, leading to improving donor confidence in the economy
theoretically leading to higher tax collection. So far as this Commission can trace,
131
there is no income to Uganda arising from exploitation of gold. According to
the figures, if the source of much of the gold is indeed the Democratic Republic
Congo as alleged by the original Panel, there are no URA records of import, and
the gold is therefore being smuggled into Uganda, thereby avoiding Ugandan
taxes. Whilst a small service industry may have grown up around such dealings, it
can hardly be said to have had a significant contribution to the Ugandan Treasury.
Uganda does not profit from export of Gold, and it is difficult to see how the
original Panel could conclude that this would be a manner in which Uganda
finances the war.
Further in Paragraph 138, the original Panel 10 refer to improvement on tax
collection levels, particularly in the agricultural and forestry sectors. They do not
refer to Ugandan efforts to improve revenue collections as a possible root cause of
this.
They state that timber “destined for Uganda, Kenya or for export out of the
continent pay customs duties as they enter Uganda”. Timber destined for Kenya or
the continent, emanating from the Democratic Republic of Congo, for transit or reexport
do not pay customs duty in Uganda. Timber imported properly to Uganda
would be dutiable, but there is the example of Dara Forêt and DGLI, where only
two container loads were imported, and found not to be profitable. Timber
20 smuggled into Uganda would, by definition, not fall into the net.
As to the question of collection of taxes in the Congo, also referred to in
Paragraph 139, that is a matter for such Congolese authorities as are recognised
under the Lusaka Agreement, and as this Commission has examined elsewhere at
Paragraph17.3 above the allegation that taxes were not paid is doubtful.
Then there appears to be a suggestion that if customs duties were to have been
paid on items in transit, then that would bring in $5 million per month: but in the
context of the subject being discussed, that $5 million would not be income to
Uganda from transit goods. In the affidavit of Ateenyi Tibasiima, he doubts that
the figure of $5 million is realistic in any event.
30 In Paragraph 139, examples are given of road transit of all manner of goods
through Uganda. This example is irrelevant, because transit goods do not pay duty
or taxes in Uganda.
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22.2.3. Purchase Of Supplies On Credit
In Paragraph 140 the original Panel suggest that Uganda was financing the war by
buying military supplies, specifically petrol, on credit.
It seems to this Commission that these are normal commercial transactions, and
are matters between, for instance, the petrol companies and Government. This
Commission has no doubt that if the credit extended gets too great, the petrol
companies would neither extend further credit nor be able to.
22.2.4. Racketeering By Soldiers
In Paragraph 141, the original Panel talk of official bonuses. This Commission has
the clearest evidence that no official bonuses were 10 paid to soldiers in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. There was a payment in lieu of rations to enable
soldiers to buy food, which was cheaper for the UPDF than flying food over from
Uganda.
If individual soldiers were lining their pockets, with or without the approval of
their commanders, this cannot be connected to the alleged re-exportation
economy: and this is an inappropriate place to consider this matter. It has been
considered by this Commission elsewhere at Paragraph 22.2.5 below.
22.2.5. Handing over of Arms
There is also a suggestion in Paragraph 143 under the heading of the rebel
20 movements that weapons seized from Congolese armed forces are given to MLC
and RCD-ML. The point made in evidence is that such arms belong to Congolese,
and should not be taken by UPDF, but rather handed over. Right or wrong,
Ministry of Defence, UPDF and individual witnesses from UPDF are quite open
about this, and think it the right thing to do. It is difficult to see how the Ugandan
economy could be said to benefit from this.
A far greater portion of this area of consideration by the original Panel, with
specific examples, relates to the actions of Rwanda in the Democratic Republic of
Congo: Uganda is, as so often in the original Panel Report, tagged on behind by
association.
30 Again, there is nothing here to support the findings of the original Panel in
Paragraph 143.
133
To assist, the verbatim evidence on the re-exportation economy, is set out :-
“Justin Zake: (Justin Zake is a Deputy Commissioner General with
Uganda Revenue Authority) Yeah. I saw in the report $5 million, reexportation
went to the treasury and my reaction was to laugh because if it
was re-exportation, and re-exportation does not benefit the Government of
Uganda, unless the company doing the re-export is resident and registered
in Uganda. In other words, we would not go for income taxes from them
because these are transit items, I mean, from one place passing through
Uganda, so that would not benefit the Government of Uganda. And I beg
your indulgence my Lords, I talked 10 about contribution of the top 200
taxpayers and as I said the top 20 contribute about 50%. Now any of these
companies that were mentioned in the report are not in the top 20 and 50%
of about a trillion shillings, and that is a lot of trillions. $5 million, and I
think that is the captured value, the mere captured value, but not tax out of
that value, and not a tariff attached on a particular item off what they
thought maybe ends up in Uganda. So I would like to tender as well the top
taxpayers in Uganda, these are 200 for both 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 just
to give you a feel of what it is. So the issue of dramatic revenue arising out
of Democratic Republic of Congo and significant contributions to the
20 treasury, the data that I have doesn’t bear that out.
Justice J.P. Berko: Actually the UN were not concerned with the legitimate
trading between the two countries and that is what would be reflected in
your documents. But they were really worried about the illegal trade
between the two countries.
Justin Zake: My Lord I do understand that.
Justice J.P. Berko: And that one would not reflect, in treasury accounts.
Justin Zake: It wouldn’t reflect in treasury accounts, not as far as we are
capturing. Maybe after having read the report and they were talking of reexportation,
there are no taxes on exports, so somebody resident in
30 Uganda, and registered in Uganda can take out whatever they want, there
will be no tax on the export, however, he will be liable to the profit tax if he
makes profits. If a company is non-resident in Uganda and consigns
directly from the Democratic Republic of Congo to wherever and it is just
transiting Uganda I cannot tax them because they are not resident in
Uganda. Yes, the Income Tax Act 1997 talks about the concept of global
income, but that is for a company that is resident in Uganda and it is
earning from global sources, that is taxable. And of course where there is a
double taxation agreement there is a set off, so that is my submission.”.
And
40 “Michael Atingi-Ego: (Michael Atingi-Ego is Acting Director of Research
at Bank of Uganda) My Lords, I would not want to entirely believe
that re-exports have benefited the Ugandan economy as such, if there were
benefits to Uganda economy they should be clearly spelt out. First of all reexports
are not taxed just like any exports are not taxed so I do not know
how benefits would have come in there and if there are re-exports that are
going out through Uganda the beneficiaries of these might be the non
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residents may be the foreigners given the good infrastructure that they
are using for re-exporting the receipts they get from those re-exports go
direct to the economy, so how will it benefit Uganda?
Assistant Lead Counsel: So you are saying that any re-exportation
would not benefit?
Michael Atingi-Ego: I cannot say that there is no benefit at all, for
example, if you have trucks coming from Rwanda or Sudan or Congo
going through Uganda may be re-exporting, there are indirect effects that
you have e.g. business might boom for small owners of restaurants, lodges,
eating places etc. It can get an indirect 10 benefit just like you have Ugandan
traders who are bringing oil from Mombasa, we buy our oil from there and
it is a re-export of Kenya and it comes to Uganda and as the truck drivers
go to Kenya to pick the oil they may stop in Kisumu for a night, spend some
money there so the owners of such business benefit If that is the kind of
benefit that you are talking about
Assistant Lead Counsel: No I am talking in the terms of benefit to the
treasury in terms of taxes or custom duties. Please look at Paragraph 138
where they make that allegation that there were trucks carrying timber,
coffee, minerals etc
20 Michael Atingi-Ego: Paragraph 138, the very first sentence reads:
“Secondly, illegal exploitation of gold in the Democratic Republic of Congo
brought a significant improvement in the balance of payments of Uganda
That statement is wrong because our current account balance has been
deteriorating so much, our exports are far less than our imports so I do not
know how it is improving and the improvement in the overall balance of
payment is largely as a result of donor in flows coming to this country not
as a result of exports because these are far less compared to our imports
even the tables I have here show that the current account has been
deteriorating for a long time and this is being financed by donors to the
30 extent that exports, leave alone the re-exports are not taxed I do not see
how the treasury benefits from this
Assistant Lead Counsel: Because you are saying that customs wouldn’t
be paid on transit and re-exports. Customs duties wouldn’t be paid on reexports
so the treasury wouldn’t benefit?
Michael Atingi-Ego: No they do not tax exports, any exports in Uganda
are not taxed
Assistant Lead Counsel: The statement that the Ugandan treasury got at
least 5 million dollars every month …….
Michael Atingi-Ego: To the best of my knowledge that is not the case
40 because exports are not taxed so how would the treasury benefit
Assistant Lead Counsel: I want to make this final question, is there a
significant relationship between the policy of liberalization and the volume
of trade that Uganda has enjoyed in those years?
Michael Atingi-Ego: My Lord there is a strong significant relationship
between liberal policies pursued by the government of Uganda and the
volume of trade in that during the period of controls farmers were paid
farm gate prices for the products an amount which was not competitive to
make them recover the costs of production so what happened was that in
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most cases the cost of producing an item that is sold to a state owned
enterprise e.g. Produce Marketing Board, Coffee Marketing Board, the
farmers could not recover some of the costs they were incurring so as a
result they abandoned growing of these cash crops and resorted to
subsistence. Evidence shows that non monetary economy picked up at or
during the time of controls, however, when the government of Uganda
liberalized its economic environment the incentives for farmers produce
picked up so much because a farmer was now free to sell his/her products
at a price that would cover the production costs. Ever since the government
of Uganda began liberalizing 10 production has picked up and then we also
liberalized both the current and capital accounts and so the border trade
has also picked up, e.g. The trade between Uganda and Kenya, Uganda and
Rwanda and the trade between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo particularly when West Nile got some degree of peace as a result
that there are some items which are produced in Uganda that may not be
produced in other countries. We are well known for supplying food to
Kenya and in return agents get manufactured goods particularly when we
had our manufacturing sector here not working. It was a normal border
trade but what is happening is that when we liberalized production picked
20 up and therefore the volume of trade has picked up”
22.2.6. MLC, RCD Goma and RCD-ML
There are a number of armed rebel groups operating in the eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo. The first group is RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la
democratie) (Rally for Congolese Democracy). This group was formed by
Congolese politicians and intellectuals, including remnants of Mobutu regime and
former Kabila associates. Professor Wamba dia Wamba was its first Chairman
with Moise Nyarugabo as its Vice Chairman. Following a disagreement over who
should assume control, RCD split into RCD – Goma based in Goma and RCD –
Kisangani based in Kisangani. It later moved to Bunia and is often referred to as
30 RCD-ML. RCD-ML was led by Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba. His two
deputies were Mbusa Nyamwisi and Tibasiima Ateenyi. RCD-Goma was
previously led by Dr. Emile Ilunga and is currently led by Adolphe Omusumba. A
former founding member of RCD, Roger Lumbala, after disagreement with his
colleagues, broke away and formed another rebel group known as RCD –
Nationale (Rassemblement Congolais pour la democratie – Nationale) based in
Bafwasende. Following the ousting of Professor Wamba dia Wamba RCD-ML is
currently headed by Mbusa Nyamwisi.
Another anti-Kabila group known as MLC (Movement Liberation de Congo) was
formed in 1998 by Jean Pierre Bemba. Following in-fighting within the ranks of
40 RCD-ML, Uganda brokered the formation of a united movement. RCD-ML
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merged with MLC to form FLC (Front de Liberation du Congo). That alliance
appears now to have broken down.
If newspaper reports are anything to go by, then it appears that thereafter RCDNationale,
with Roger Lumbala as its head, has merged with two other rebel
groups, namely, RCD-Kisangani and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo,
MLC. However, it is reported that Roger Lumbala backed by Jean Pierre Bemba
has captured four towns of Isiro, Watsa, Poko and Bafwasende from Mbusa
Nyamwisi’s RCD-Kisangani. The situation in the Congo is ever changing, and
reports confusing : it is therefore impossible to give an up-to-date history of the
10 relationship of rebel groups.
The original Panel, in paragraph 143, alleges that officially, the rebel movements
receive the bulk of their military equipment through UPDF and Rwanda. It says
that during discussions with the Ugandan Minister of Defence and the Chief of
Staff of UPDF, the original Panel was informed that weapons seized from the
Congolese armed forces were given to MLC and RCD/ML. This was admitted by
Major General Kazini. He said that the weapons were Congolese weapons. That
was the reason why they were given to the rebels in the areas controlled by
Uganda. This has been dealt with at Paragraph 22.2.5 above
It is further alleged in the same paragraph 143, that Mr. Bemba, at the instigation
20 of Major General Kazini, bargained with the highest authorities of Uganda for the
release of some Ukrainian pilots whose Antonov aircraft had been captured in
exchange for military fatigues, boots and medical supplies for Bemba’s soldiers
from a third party.
The first observation of this Commission is that the alleged third party was not
disclosed. That made it impossible to crosscheck the allegation.
General Kazini appeared not to know anything about the incident. The evidence
of Jean Pierre Bemba is very clear on the incident. He said that the Antonov plane
was bringing military supplies to the Kabila regime. The plane landed at
Basankusu airport when his soldiers had just captured Basankusu airport (against
30 strong opposition from Ugandan authorities). The plane was carrying brand new
military hardware – SMG, LMG (machine guns) and big bombs. He seized both
the plane and the weapons and flew them to Gbadolite under escort. He released
the pilots without any intervention from any body after speaking with the family
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of the pilots and the owners of the plane. He was positive that neither Kazini
nor Ugandan authorities knew anything about the incident.
This Commission thinks that the evidence of Jean Pierre Bemba is more credible
and preferable to the unsupported allegation made by the original Panel,
particularly since the original Panel never interviewed Jean Pierre Bemba to afford
him opportunity to explain.
Jean Pierre Bemba is very hurt by the manner in which he has been maligned by
the original Panel. He has no kind words for the original Panel and its
Chairperson.
22.3. Allegations 10 against Uganda
This Commission thinks therefore that the attempt of the original Panel to show that
Uganda was financing the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo through the reexportation
economy fails.
22.4. Special Features of the Links
In Paragraph 180 the original Panel raise the question of the Hema/ Lendu and Nia-
Nia conflicts: elsewhere the question of the Kisangani confrontations is also raised.
And it is suggested that these conflicts were strategies used to sustain the vicious
circle of war and exploitation.
22.4.1. Lendus And Hema Conflict:
20 It is alleged in Paragraph 180 of the original Panel Report that some top UPDF
Commanders trained Hemas whilst others trained the Lendus. They then
manipulated the two groups to fight each other. It was alleged specifically that
General Kazini and Colonels Kyakabale and Arocha assisted in training different
Hema militia whilst the Colonel Peter Kerim Camp assisted in training the
Lendus. It was further alleged that these UPDF elements spark off the inter-ethnic
violence so as to remain in the region in an attempt to control the mineral wealth
of the area.
This Commission heard the UPDF Officers mentioned in the report on oath. All of
them denied that they trained the tribes as alleged and manipulated them to fight
30 each other. This Commission did not find them to be credible witnesses. Col.
Mayombo, who was the Acting Head of Military Intelligence and Security,
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travelled to Bunia when he received a report of a flare up of the inter-ethnic
fighting between the Lendus and the Hemas and remained at Bunia for two weeks.
His evidence shows clearly that Cap. Kyakabale, Colonels Arocha, Angina, and
the then Cap. Peter Kerim were in one way or another, highly suspected of being
involved in the ethnic conflicts between the Hemas and Lendus. UPDF High
Command took immediate action against the Officers involved. Cap. Peter Kerim
has been on indefinite leave ever since. Col. Angina was relieved of his duties as
Section Commander. Cap. Kyakabale was removed from Bunia immediately.
The evidence available against these officers, which this Commission accepts,
does not, amount to concrete evidence that the UPDF 10 Officers named did what the
original Panel alleged they did, but because at the time the clashes flared up,
UPDF, under the Lusaka Agreement, was playing the role of peacekeeping, Bunia
was within UPDF area of Operation. Consequently UPDF High Command did not
want the Congolese to perceive that some of the UPDF Officers were taking sides
in their inter-ethnic conflict. That would have undermined their credibility as
peacekeepers. UPDF, as peacekeepers, must not only be neutral, but they must
demonstrably appear to be neutral.
The original cause of the ethnic conflict, however, has nothing to do with
minerals. The evidence clearly shows that it is about the distribution of land:
20 where to live, where to farm and where to graze their animals. The Lendus think
that the Hemas have been favoured in the land distribution. The inter-ethnic
clashes occur when one tribe encroaches on land belonging to another tribe.
The evidence also shows that the conflict had existed ever since the two tribes
found themselves living in the area. This was long before the UPDF entered
Congo and long before the on-going war started. This is confirmed by witnesses
who appeared before the Commission prominent among them being Adele
Lotsove.
The recent conflicts have been exacerbated as a result of the absence of effective
authority capable of maintaining law and order in the Eastern Congo following the
30 withdrawal of the UPDF from the area.
Having said that, this Commission is of the view that the prompt action taken to
remove the officers when the complaints were made demonstrates that the Uganda
Government and the approach of the High Command was not to foment trouble
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between the Hemas and the Lendus for the purpose of controlling the mineralrich
areas of Nyaleki or to keep them for long-term exploitation as alleged.
22.4.2. Nia Nia Confrontation:
The Nia-Nia Confrontation in October 2000 in which it was alleged UPDF
General Kazini and Roger Lumbala, President of RCD – Nationale, fought another
UPDF group and RCD-ML has been cited as one of the strategies used by Uganda
to sustain the vicious circle of war in Congo in order to control the rich-mining
areas of Bafwasende in Congo.
According to the evidence of Major General Katumba Wamala, who was the
Operational Commander of Operation Safe Haven 10 in the Democratic Republic of
Congo, the Confrontation arose when Roger Lumbala, who used to be with
Wamba dia Wamba of RCD and had fallen out with Wamba dia Wamba and
formed another rebel group known as RCD – Nationale, tried to attack Wamba dia
Wamba’s forces that were guarding the Nia-Nia Bridge regarded as a strategic
centre for Bafwasende.
According to Roger Lumbala it was rather Wamba dia Wamba and his forces that
came from Bunia to attack his men at a bridge called Abakuli with the aim of
capturing Bafwasende area.
Whatever might have been the reason for the conflict the evidence of these
20 witnesses clearly shows that at the time of the incident General Kazini was not in
Congo and had long been replaced by Major General Katumba Wamala. The
evidence also shows that the confrontation had nothing to do with the mineral
wealth of the area. Rather it was a leadership struggle between Roger Lumbala
and Wamba dia Wamba for the control of Bafwasende area. It was about political
power over an area.
UPDF merely intervened to stop the wrangle and advised the factions to settle
their differences politically. UPDF’s role was peacekeeping within the Lusaka
Peace Keeping Agreement and nothing else.
This is another example of the original Panel ’s lack of appreciation of the reality
30 of the situation. The original Panel found exploitation of natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of Congo and continuation of the war a convenient peg on
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which to hang any conflict in Congo. By so doing they disabled themselves
from an in-depth analysis of the underlying causes of the problems of Congo.
22.4.3. The Kisangani Clashes
The Commission has sought and received evidence regarding the cause of three
clashes between Uganda and Rwanda, who had previously worked as allies.
The first clash took place in August 1999; a month after the Lusaka Peace Accord
was signed. The second one took place in May 2000 and was followed by the third
one a month later.
The original Panel report does not discuss these clashes. It simply mentions them
in pa 10 ssing. In Paragraph 88 it states
“very reliable sources have told the Panel that behind Salim Saleh there is
Jovial Akandwanaho, who is more aggressive on the issue of exploitation
of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. She is
particularly interested in diamonds. According to very reliable sources, she
is at the root of the Kisangani wars.”
This could be interpreted to mean that minerals were the cause of the clashes. The
evidence received by this Commission does not support this assumption.
In his evidence Col. Mayombo stated that most of the diamond areas of the
Democratic Republic of Congo were in the North or in the areas of Bafwasende
20 which were already controlled by UPDF. Kisangani had diamond shops only. In
his view the areas where the fighting took place and the areas where the diamonds
are, are not related. Therefore minerals could not have been a reason for the wars.
This argument is a little thin, because Kisangani was the place where diamonds
were expected to be collected into convenient lots: access to diamonds in
Kisangani therefore would be easier than running around all over the country
digging them up.
Witnesses interviewed by the Commission on this subject include Major General
Kazini, Acting Army Commander; Col. Mayombo, Chief of Military Intelligence
and Security; Mr. Amama Mbabazi, Minister of Defence who was Minister of
30 State for Foreign Affairs in-Charge of Regional Cooperation; and Mbusa
Nyamwisi, President, RCD – Kisangani.
141
All stated that the first clashes were due to disagreement as to who would sign
the Lusaka Peace Accord for RCD which had split into two factions namely,
RCD–Goma and RCD–Kisangani. Difference in strategy between Rwanda and
Uganda was also mentioned as another possible reason.
According to the evidence given by Mr. Amama Mbabazi, who attended the
Lusaka meetings, the negotiations had almost been completed. They were trying to
identify the groups which would be signatory to the Lusaka Agreement and who
would sign for RCD, which had split into two movements. Rwanda insisted that
RCD must sign as one organization. Uganda’s position was that RCD was de facto
two movements with two different leaders. The issue 10 reached the summit and it
was decided that President Chiluba who was chairing the meetings should
investigate whether Wamba dia Wamba had an organization that existed in
Kisangani and whether he had the capacity to cause problems. President Chiluba
sent a team of Ministers to undertake the investigation, and establish whether or
not RCD – Kisangani existed.
On the Saturday morning when the delegation was supposed to undertake its
investigations RCD started sabotaging the investigations by shooting in the streets.
UPDF was ordered to clear them out of the street to enable the team to carry out
its work.
20 Mr. Mbabazi stated that the reasons for the second and third clashes were
essentially the same as those for the first clash. The other side tried to kill Wamba
dia Wamba (leader of RCD–Kisangani) in order to resolve the question once for
all but Ugandan troops protected him.
During his meeting with this Commission, His Excellency President Museveni
described the clashes as “very unfortunate”. He said that he was horrified,
infuriated and very unhappy. The matter remains unresolved. There are
contradictory claims as to who started the fights. Rwanda claims that Ugandan
troops are the one who started the fights and Ugandan troops claim that it was the
Rwandese who did. Committees set up by both sides to study the matter have so
30 far not produced any acceptable conclusions.
Unfortunately the Commission cannot reach any conclusions on this matter
without hearing evidence from the Rwanda side. However this Commission would
certainly hesitate, even on the limited investigations which have been possible, to
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attribute responsibility for the clashes to Jovial Akandwanaho, as did the
original Panel.
22.5. Facilitators or passive accomplices
The original Panel Report deals with this subject under the following headings;
22.5.1. Bilateral Donors
The gravamen of the report is that the major donors to Uganda, by contributing to
poverty education and governance have enabled Uganda to free funds for the war
in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The question asked, which the original
Panel does not answer, is whether these savings were used to finance this war?
The consequences of such an allegation are so wide that 10 it is difficult to answer the
question; perhaps it would have been better not to ask it, particularly when the
ramifications have not been set out and considered. For this Commission, it would
be right to assume that all these matters have been considered by the donors before
such projects are commenced, and that they have found that the country itself is
unable to deal with these problems without assistance. Indeed there is a limit,
related to GDP, for Defence expenditure which is agreed with the donor
community. Is it to be that whenever a country acts against attacks of whatever
nature, any bilateral assistance to such country is to be immediately withdrawn, at
whatever cost to the population, in order to avoid such allegations? The
20 reconstituted Panel have come to much the same conclusion in the Addendum.
22.5.2. Mulilateral Donors
Under these Paragraphs (187 – 190), the original Panel accuse the World Bank of
being aware of gold and diamond exports from Uganda based upon what the
original Panel refer to as the exploitation of the resources of the Democratic
Republic of Congo, and nevertheless promoting Uganda’s case for the Highly
Indebted Poor Countries initiative. It is interesting that in this section, as in the
last, the original Panel has again dropped the word “illegal”. The original Panel’s
criticism is based upon the fact that the World Bank was aware that Uganda was
registering as a gold and diamond exporter, when she did not produce such
30 minerals, and extends to one official who “in one instance even defended it”. This
Commission has dealt with the theory of export of minerals at Paragraph 21
above. The World Bank is further criticised for permitting long term borrowing in
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support of Uganda’s budget, which is stated to have allowed both Rwanda
and Uganda to continue the conflict. All one can say is that this criticism totally
ignores the closely monitored and worthwhile Projects being conducted by the
Uganda Government with World Bank assistance, and the relationship agreed
between GDP and Defence expenditure which is also, even according to the
original Panel, closely monitored by the Breton Woods Institute. Uganda’s
response to the original Panel Report contains a table that shows Uganda’s
Poverty Alleviation Expenditure (which is the main area for support) to be
increasing annually, in addition to the donor PAF expenditure, which it exceeds by
a great margin. The original Panel’s conclusion 10 does not stand up to close
examination.
22.5.3. Transit Countries
As this Commission has said elsewhere, it is difficult to understand how the
original Panel can expect a transit country to have in mind the considerations
which so concerned the original Panel. Uganda is criticised for using Mombasa
and Dar es Salaam to export natural resources: so far as this Commission can see,
Uganda, as a state, did not export any resources whatever. It may be that firms in
the Congo or Uganda used Uganda and Kenya as transit countries to export to
their customers abroad, but that is an entirely different matter which is irrelevant
20 under this heading. So far as this Commission can see, with some slight
exceptions, such as the recent refusal under CITES to transit 200 kilograms of
worked ivory which had been exported from the Democratic Republic of Congo as
Works of Art, Uganda is bound to allow transit of goods (See Right of Passage
through Territory of India (Portugal v India) [1960] I.C.J. Rep. Again there is little
in this criticism by the original Panel.
22.6. The pivotal role of leaders
22.6.1. President Museveni
The original Panel in Paragraph 201 accuse President Yoweri Museveni of
complicity in the exploitation of the natural resources of the Democratic Republic
30 of Congo and the continuation of the war in that country on three grounds, namely
his alleged policy towards the rebel movements, his attitude towards the Uganda
Army and the protection provided to illegal activities and their perpetrators. On his
alleged policy towards the rebel movements, the original Panel alleged in
Paragraph 202 that President Museveni has shaped the rebellion in the area
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controlled by Uganda according to his own political philosophy and agenda
of a more centralised authority and being prepared to intervene only when major
problems arise, even though he has a good knowledge of the situation on the
ground.
This Commission thinks that matters pertaining to the President’s political
philosophy and agenda are beyond this Commission’s terms of reference and not
suitable for the enquiries which this Commission has been asked to conduct.
However, President Museveni has publicly declared on many occasions that the
internal administration of the Democratic Republic of Congo is for Congolese
themselves, so long as the security 10 concerns of Uganda are addressed.
It was for this reason that General Kazini was reprimanded for meddling in the
local administration in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
President Museveni has been accused in Para 203 of not taking action against
Nyamwisi and Tibasiima for alleged embezzlements of $10 million and $3 million
respectively. This Commission thinks the accusation is misconceived as the
President of Uganda has no jurisdiction over Congolese Nationals or rebel leaders
for that matter.
In the same Paragraph 203 President Museveni was accused for not taking action
about an alleged collusion between Trinity Group and Tibasiima and its impact on
20 collection of customs duties. It is also clear from later evidence from the Hon.
Wapakhabulo, the Nairobi witness, and Dr Professor Wamba that the operations of
Trinity, and tranparency in Financial matters was the subject of many diplomatic
meetings hosted by Uganda, and the root cause of the attempt to bring together
RCD- Kis and MLC.Here again this Commission wishes to point out that the
original Panel was ill advised to accuse President Museveni as he had no
jurisdiction over the actors alleged in the collusion. The same might be said in
relation to Paragraph 204.
President Museveni has again been accused in Para 205 for having allowed
members of his family namely General Salim Saleh and his wife who are alleged
30 to be shareholders in Victoria Group and Trinity to carry on business activities in
the occupied zones of the Republic of Congo undisturbed.
This Commission has evidence on oath that Victoria Group does not exist in
Uganda. The original Panel report quotes Victoria Group as a company with its
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Headquarters in Kampala. This Commission called for every single company
file registered in Uganda containing the words “Trinity” or “Victoria”. None of
them bore any relationship to either of these alleged companies, and none of the
shareholders of the companies found were in any way familiar. This
Commission’s enquiries bear out the evidence. Therefore General Salim Saleh and
his wife could not have been shareholders in a Ugandan Company as alleged. Nor
could Lt Muhoozi. One Company called Victoria Diamond SPRL has been traced.
It has a Lebanese and a Ugandan, whose names have not been mentioned
throughout, as Shareholders and Directors, but it is registered in Goma in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, not Kampala. 10 Although this Commission has
shown that General Kazini and Jovial Akandwanaho had connections with
Victoria’s operations, these operations were conducted in secret, and no
connection with his Excellency the President has been shown in the case of
Victoria.
There is also evidence on oath that Trinity is a dubious company established by
the rebels in the Eastern the Democratic Republic of Congo to generate funds by
pre-financing to organise their campaign against the Kinshasa Government. The
affidavit of Iddi Taban is quite clear on that, and agrees with the sworn evidence
of Sam Engola. General Salim Saleh and his wife have said that they have no
20 interest in that company. Unlike the case of Victoria, there is no reason to
disbelieve them, although the evidence of the Nairobi witness is enough to raise
great suspicion in respect of the secret participation Salim Saleh.Consequently it
was wrong for the original Panel to accuse President Museveni for allowing the
two companies to operate in the Democratic Republic of Congo undisturbed.
Therefore the original Panel’s conclusion in Para 206 is misconceived and
unwarranted, and consequently there is no basis for the original Panel’s accusation
in Paragraph 211 that President Museveni is on the verge of becoming the
godfather of the illegal exploitation of the natural resources and the continuation
of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. There is no evidence to
30 suggest that he has given criminal cartels unique opportunity to organise and
operate in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
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5 . PA N E L’ S CONCLUSIONS
AND FINDINGS
23. MINERAL RESOURCES
In paragraph 213 the original Panel states that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo has become mainly about access, control and trade of five key mineral resources,
Coltan, Diamonds, Copper, Cobalt and Gold.
Whilst this Commission agrees that the Democratic Republic of Congo is endowed with
immense natural resources, it does not agree that the conflict 10 in the country is mainly about
access, control and trade of the mineral resources. The main rebel groups in Congo are not
fighting the Central Government with the aim of getting control of the mineral resources of
the areas they seek to control. It is the view of this Commission that their main objective is,
undoubtedly political power. The access and control of the natural resources of the area is
secondary. This Commission has indicated earlier in the report that, contrary to the assertion
of the original Panel, the Hema/ Lendu conflicts have nothing to do with access to and control
of minerals. Rather they are about Land. It is an obvious fact and it is remarkable that the
original Panel failed to see it.
24. SYSTEMIC AND SYSTEMATIC EXPLOITATION
20 The original Panel, in paragraph 214, states that exploitation of the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by foreign armies has become systematic and systemic. It
states that plundering, looting and racketeering and the constitution of Criminal cartels are
becoming commonplace in occupied territories. These criminal cartels are said to have
ramifications and connections worldwide.
The original Panel, in paragraphs 46 – 54, used Dara Forêt as a case study to demonstrate how
a company used illicit business practices and complicity with occupying forces and
Government as well as its international connections to exploit the natural resources of the
Democratic Republic of Congo. This Commission has already shown that whatever the
original Panel said about Dara Forêt was clearly wrong and that the investigation by the
147
original Panel of Dara Forêt was fundamentally flawed. The Addendum to the original
Panel Report has also exonerated Dara Forêt of any wrongdoing. This casts a serious doubt on
the conclusion and findings in paragraph 214, and indeed the capacity of the original Panel to
sift evidence.
25. ROLE OF PRIVATE SECTORS
Paragraph 215 deals with the role of private sectors in the exploitation of the natural resources
and the continuation of the war in Congo. It states that a number of companies are involved
and have fuelled them directly, trading arms for natural resources. Others have facilitated
access to financial resources, which are used to purchase arms. Companies trading in minerals
have prepared the field for illegal mining activities 10 in Congo. On Uganda side, two companies
have featured prominently, namely, Trinity and Victoria Group. The evidence before this
Commission shows that these two organisations have no Ugandan connections, although
facilitated secretly by General Kazini and Jovial Akanwanaho, possibly Salim Saleh
Consequently the conclusion and findings in paragraph 215 do not seem to affect Uganda.
26. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DONORS
The original Panel, in paragraph 216, states that bilateral and multilateral donors have sent
mixed signals to Governments with armies in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The
implication in this paragraph is that the major donors to Uganda, by contributing to poverty
eradiation, education and governance, have enabled Uganda to free funds for the war in the
20 Democratic Republic of Congo.
The World Bank has been accused that, in spite of its awareness that Uganda is exporting
gold and diamonds exploited from the Democratic Republic of Congo, nevertheless has
promoted Uganda’s case for the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiatives. The World Bank
is further accused for permitting long-term borrowing in support of Uganda’s budget, which
is said to have allowed both Uganda and Rwanda to continue the conflict.
This Commission has said that the original Panel’s conclusion does not stand up to close
scrutiny as it totally ignores the closely monitored and worthwhile projects being conducted
by the Uganda Government, with World Bank assistance, and the relationship agreed between
GDP and Defence expenditure, and the fact that Uganda does not profit from transits or
30 exports
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27. TOP MILITARY COMMANDERS
The original Panel, in paragraph 217, states that top military commanders from various
countries that are in the Democratic Republic of Congo needed the conflict because they have
found it lucrative. They have therefore created criminal networks to takeover after the foreign
armies have left the Democratic Republic of Congo. This Commission has interviewed and
examined the top Ugandan military officers alleged to be involved, and is unable to exclude
some of the allegations against top military commanders in the UPDF. However, where it has
been possible to confirm the original allegations by evidence, this Commission recommends
that Uganda relieve the International Community from the need to act against these officers,
until Uganda has a chance to act against them: only on failure 10 to do so would it be necessary
for International action to be taken.
6 . UGANDAN
ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANISATIONS
There are areas of weakness which investigations have revealed and which are not
specifically mentioned in the original Panel Report, but which are dealt with below.
28. REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES
The Companies Registry does not come well out of its investigations. As an example, this
Commission considered the case of Air Alexander.
Air Alexander International Ltd was incorporated on 7th 20 February 1994. For incorporation
requirements the Registrar relied upon a Declaration of Compliance filed by Kasirye
Byaruhanga & Co Advocates under S 17(2) of the Companies Act, on the same date, sworn
by William Byaruhanga. The Memorandum and Articles referred to four subscribers,
Caleb K Akandwanaho (whom this Commission shall refer to by his more familiar
alias as Salim Saleh) (31%),
Ramesh Sheth (32%)
Roy Ndisi (31%), and
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Wolfgang Thome (6%)
According to a Statement of Nominal Capital dated and filed on 7th February 1994 the
Nominal Capital was Ushs 2,000,000 divided into 100 shares of Ushs 20,000 each.
A Notice of Situation of Registered Office was filed just over 5 years later on 24th of March
1999: out of time for the current change : no notice had been filed 14 days after incorporation
as required.
Annual Returns were filed as follows:-
Date of Filing For AGM of Out of date by
(years)
Age of Alexander Mahuta at
AGM
23.3.99 1995 4 4
23.3.99 1996 3 5
23.3.99 1997 2 6
23.3.99 1998 1 7
All these Returns show that all shares had been taken up, no shares had been paid for, and that
the shareholders were Alexander Mahuta 10 (50 shares) and Caleb Akandwanaho (50 shares)
Alexander Mahuta was described as a Businessman in all the forms: at the time of the first
AGM, according to the evidence of Salim Saleh he was aged 4, and was a Director of the
Company. In the particulars of Directors he was described as an adult businessman. The
forms are signed by Salim Saleh, and by someone for the secretary who is said to be Kasirye
Byaruhanga & Co Advocates.
On the following day, 24.3.99, particulars of Directors and Secretaries under S 201(4) were
filed. The Directors are stated to be :
Jovial Akandwanaho (Salim Saleh’s wife)
Alexander Mahuta and
20 Agad Didi
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Alexander Mahuta was described as an Adult Businessman, although by then he was
aged about 7.
The Company passed two resolutions at a meeting of the 4th January 1999, and filed
resolutions dated 22.3.99 on that same date. The first appointed Atari Iddi as Managing
Director, and the second recorded the transfer of Salim Saleh’s shares to his wife Jovial. The
Company resolved to make its first (apparently) allotment of shares as to 50 shares to Jovial,
and 50 shares to Alexander Mahuta.
A return of allotment to Jovial and Alexander, said to have been made on 18th January 1999,
(although in fact the allotment was made on 4th January 1999) was filed on 24th March 1999
under S54(1) of the Companies Act. It described Alexander 10 Mahuta as a Businessman. He
was aged about 7 at the time. The shares were still not paid up. It was also a little difficult to
see how the Companies Registry could have accepted this, since the original subscribers to
the Memorandum and Articles were still on record at the time of filing.
However, on 13th May 1999, rather belatedly, a Board Resolution was filed in respect of a
meeting said to have been held on 10th August 1994: in that meeting the Board accepted the
resignation of Ramesh Sheth, Roy Ndisi and Wolfgang Thome as Directors (they had never
been declared as such), “and to relinquish all their shares in the Company”. And that the
shares be offered to Salim Saleh and Alexander Mahuta so that they could hold in equal
shares : and that the shares be so allotted. No return of allotment was filed.
20 This resolution of allotment to Salim Saleh and Alexander makes nonsense of the previous
return of allotment to Jovial and Alexander made and filed before the filing of the resolution.
If the Company had resolved to allot shares to Salim Saleh and Alexander Mahuta in 1994,
then although no return of allotment was filed getting rid of the 3 original subscribers to the
Memorandum and Articles, (which is only a matter of failing to file within time), the shares
were nevertheless allotted, and could not be allotted again, but only transferred thereafter.
One is tempted to wonder whether that Board Resolution was in fact passed in 1994, or
whether it was an afterthought, passed by a Board which was not properly constituted: it
would be interesting to see a copy of the minutes. However that would be going far outside
this Commission’s terms of reference. It may however be of interest to others to have a
30 further look, relying on S 399 of the Companies Act.
The matter is now further confused by the Registration of a Share Transfer from Salim Saleh
to Jovial of his 50 shares for Ushs 1,000,000: the shares not paid up. This Share transfer was
undated, but filed on 13.5.99. There are also two other share transfers with similar effect both
filed on 20th January 1999, and another return of allotment, this time not accompanied by a
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Board Resolution, now allotting all the shares in the Company to Jovial and Alexander
equally. And it is signed by Salim Saleh as a Director, which he continued to be despite the
transfer of shares. Alexander Mahuta is described as a businessman.
And the matter is even further confused by the inclusion by the Companies Registry of two
documents (which are totally irrelevant to Air Alexander) in the Air Alexander bundle. They
quite clearly are misfiled, and demonstrate an inefficiency in the Companies Registry which
cannot be tolerated
The first comment this Commission has to make is that the Companies Registry is not doing
its job. Documents are accepted for Registration without consideration of compliance with the
Companies Act, and the Register itself does not reflect the 10 current situation of many
Companies. This Commission hears that efforts are being made to update the Registry, and to
take action against Companies in breach of the requirements of the Companies Act.
Officers in the Registry should realise that particulars of Shareholders and Directors are
extremely important, and that to allow Annual Returns to remain outstanding for 4 years is
unacceptable.
This Commission would point out that in the case of Air Alexander, the Registered Office
was not notified to the Registry until nearly 5 years after incorporation : since service of
documents is required to be on the Registered Office of a Limited Company, how can any
company be served unless the registered office can be established by search. And this is not
20 the only example this Commission has come across: there are companies who have never
filed notification of registered office. This is just not acceptable.
The next comment this Commission has to make relates to fines and sentences in the
Companies Act. For example the default fine for failing to notify the registered office, (which
as far as this Commission can see is never exercised), is Ushs 100 per day. Thus a Limited
Company can avoid service of proceedings for Ushs 100 per day: a good deal. The Secretaries
for the Company say that on registration of a share transfer at the Registry (if that is necessary
at all: the Company is required to keep its own Share Register ), the Registrar requires a
Return of Allotment relating to those shares. This reveals such an inadequate understanding of
Authorised Share Capital and Share Transfers on the part of either the Advocates, the
30 Registry or both that this Commission despairs of correcting the situation.
Lastly, as a general point of law, an infant has no capacity to hold shares: although they can
be held by an adult in trust for the infant. There are good reasons for this: it would not be
possible for the Company to enforce a call on unpaid shares against an infant, for instance,
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and here was a severely undercapitalised company. In this case, on repeated occasions
Salim Saleh has represented Alexander Mahuta as an Adult, and as a Businessman in official
documents. Throughout Alexander Mahuta has been a child, and could not be described as a
businessman. He could not hold shares.
Now the serious consequence of this arises under S 396 of the Companies Act. It is an offence
:
“396. If any person in any return report certificate balance sheet or other
document required by or for the purposes of any of the provisions of this
Act specified in the Tenth Schedule to this Act, wilfully makes a statement
false in any material particular, knowing it to be 10 false, he shall be guilty of
an offence and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding ten thousand shillings”.
While this Commission is quite sure that the continual filing of Returns of Allotment
throughout the life of the Company was unnecessary, there is one exception, and that is the
first Return. Returns of Allotment are filed under S 54(1), and therefore are covered in the
Tenth Schedule to the Companies Act. This Return is signed by Salim Saleh, and filed by
Kasirye Byaruhanga Advocates: Mr Saleh in his evidence referred to his advocates for
responsibility for the offence committed. In the view of this Commission further action is
required. It may be thought that this is not a sufficiently serious offence for further
20 investigation. However this Commission takes the view that over a period of more than 5
years what is in fact a one man outfit has been presented as a limited company with all the
protection that that implies, and takes the matter extremely seriously.
28.1. Recommendations – Companies.
This Commission recommends that the updating of the Registry referred to above be
implemented speedily.
This Commission recommends that the Registrar and the staff of the Registry should
seriously accept responsibility for proactive management of the Registry and of the
important actions required of Registered Companies. All current files should be
checked for compliance, and immediate action taken against companies which offend
30 the requirements of the Companies Act.
This Commission recommends that fines and sentences for offences under the
Companies Act be revised urgently.
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This Commission recommends that, as an example of the Government’s
determination to rationalise the Registry, and to encourage other Companies to
comply with the Act, the facts revealed by this Commission’s investigation of the file
of Air Alexander at Paragraph 28 above be presented to the Director of Public
Prosecutions for further investigation with a view to prosecution of the responsible
parties.
29. UGANDA REVENUE AUTHORITY
URA is not specifically mentioned in the original Panel report, but its functions, particularly
those relating to imports and exports of goods between Uganda and the Democratic Republic
of Congo are of great interest 10 to the Commission’s inquiry.
In Para 72 of the original Panel Report about modes of transportation, it is stated that there
has been noticeable increase in the number of aircraft utilized to transport products and arms
into the Democratic Republic of Congo, while transferring out vast quantities of agricultural
products and minerals, in particular to Kampala and Kigali. The increase in the use of aircraft
leased by the army for commercial and non-military functions is also mentioned.
The evidence given to the Commission has shown that URA systems of controlling imports
and exports are not entirely effective. In fact there are many loopholes for smuggling products
to or from one country to the other.
For example one witness (Joseph Olea) from Arum told the Commission that 10 to 20 trucks
20 a day were transporting timber from Congo to Uganda without paying taxes. The trucks use
feeder roads and join the main road after the customs post. While the Commission thought
that the number of daily trucks was exaggerated, there was no doubt that smuggling of timber
at that point was actually taking place. The efforts of the Special Revenue Protection Service
in the West of Uganda appear to have had little effect. There was clear evidence from a
Congolese who lives near the border in the Democratic Republic of Congo of daily smuggling
of timber over the border to Uganda. This Commission believed that evidence, and suggested
that further enquiries be made. The report from Special Revenue Protection Service came up
with a facile explanation of the evidence which could not have been true. Since the original
evidence talked of up to 20 lorry loads a day (which, although probably an exaggeration of
30 reality, nevertheless gives an indication of the scale of the problem), and since there was only
one or two roads which needed policing to check the situation, this Commission has difficulty
in taking the efforts of the Special Revenue Protection Service on the Democratic Republic of
Congo border seriously.
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The Commission was told that Uganda has five major and two minor customs posts on its
border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. These are too few considering the length of
the border and the poor condition of roads from the Democratic Republic of Congo. This
alone is a ground for smuggling goods across the border. Allen Kagina stated that there are
businessmen who try to smuggle timber by under declaring its weight at entry point, but that
they are normally caught and that their penalty was deterrent. This was borne out by the
evidence of one witness from whom the Commission heard during an up-country visit to
Arua, which confirms the fact that policing smuggling is possible, and can work.
URA has no power to inspect any items said to be classified.
The procedure o 10 f importing goods is as follows:
Goods intended to remain in Uganda are declared at entry point, assessed for taxation and tax
collected. Goods in transit are also declared at entry point. The container is sealed and a bond
is deposited. The bond is refunded when the goods have exited.
The impression created by the URA officers who testified before this Commission, was that
all transit goods do exit Uganda. This Commission was therefore surprised to read in the New
Vision newspaper of 5 October, 2001 (page 65) a statement attributed to URA Commissioner
of Customs and Excise, Allen Kagina that in most cases transit goods do not exit Uganda. She
was called to explain this and said that she had been misquoted, that there had been a few
incidents where transit goods from Kenya to Rwanda or to the Democratic Republic of Congo
20 did not reach their destination and that additional measures should be devised to eliminate
such incidents. The big item investigated by the Commission was timber. Minerals have been
considered but it was difficult to tell their sources of origin.
URA has admitted that it does not yet have experts who can identify the difference kind of
minerals and timbers.
29.1. Recommendations: –URA
It is noted that the Uganda Government has appointed a Commission of Inquiry into
the URA, which Commission will have a far closer focus than this Commission on
the problems facing that body. It is suggested that this Commission’s remarks on the
URA be copied to that Commission for further consideration in the context of the
30 mandate of that Commission.
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7 . CONSIDERATION OF THE
ADDENDUM
In November 2001 the reconstituted Panel of Experts produced an Addendum to the original
Panel Report. This Commission has been able since, on 4th March 2002, to meet with the
reconstituted Panel, and to obtain from them certain documents which have enabled this
Commission to take its enquiries further forward.
In the Addendum, the following matters arise:
30. INTRODUCTION
30.1. Methodology
The reconstituted Panel’s mandate is recited in 10 the Introduction as follows:
1 a) An update on the relevant data and analysis of further information,
including as pointed out in the action plan submitted by the Panel to the
Security Council:
1 b) Relevant information on the activities of countries and other actors for
which necessary quantity and quality of data were not made available later.
1 c) A response, based as far as possible on corroborated evidence to the
comments and reactions of States and Actors cited in the report of the
Panel
1 d) An evaluation of the situation at the end of the extension of the
20 mandate of the Panel, and of its conclusions, assessing whether progress
has been made on the issues which come under the responsibility of the
Panel.
However, In Paragraph 15, the reconstituted Panel say that their investigations
focused on evaluating whether changes in trends had occurred since the release of the
report, and that those investigations confirmed a pattern of continued exploitation,
that is, a consideration of 1 a) above, although the reconstituted Panel also adds at the
end of the Paragraph that the selection of the resources upon which they focused
permitted them to examine some of the reactions presented to the Report, a reference
to 1 b above.
30 This Commission had occasion to discuss this subject with the reconstituted Panel at
our meeting on 4th March 2002, particularly with regard to 1 b above, the question of
a response on the basis of corroborated evidence to the comments and reactions of
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States and Actors. This was a subject which was of great interest to this
Commission, as the hope was that from such a consideration would come some
specific allegations which could be investigated. It did not appear that the members of
the reconstituted Panel who visited us were aware of, or perhaps had in mind, the
response by the Uganda Government.
It became clear that the reconstituted Panel had not addressed this subject in any
depth at all. The reason, with which this commission sympathises, is the lack of time.
It is true that a great deal of the time of the reconstituted Panel was taken up with
investigation of other countries which had not been looked at before in very great
detail. An example of the reconstituted Panel’s failure 10 can be found in Paragraph 31.5
below.
This has therefore raised problems, once again problems of perception.
In Paragraph 15 of the Addendum it is made clear that there was no emphasis placed
on such a review, since the reconstituted Panel say that their investigations focused on
evaluating whether changes in trends had occurred since the release of the report,
thereby apparently approaching their task by accepting the original Report, which has
been the subject of so much criticism, as a basis.
This was an important omission from the point of view of the accused countries, and
from Uganda’s point of view in particular. Uganda submitted detailed, item by item
20 responses. His Excellency the President also submitted a particularised response to
the allegations made against himself and his family. These responses appear in the
main to have been ignored by the reconstituted Panel. This Commission examined
those responses in tandem with the relevant paragraphs of the original Panel Report,
and, to take an example, in its Interim Report found no evidence whatever to back up
the criticisms by the original Panel against His Excellency the President. The
reconstituted Panel has done nothing to confirm or deny those allegations, which
remain in the air.
The second arises from the apparent complete acceptance of the original Panel Report
in the Press, the International Community and the proceedings of the United Nations
30 Security Council. One International Donor has already withdrawn substantial Aid
from Uganda on the ground of the allegations in the original Panel Report. This
demonstrates that the mandate to the reconstituted Panel recited in Paragraph 1 b)
above was not an unimportant issue to which the reconstituted Panel might merely
refer, but an issue at the basis of the whole perception of the situation by the
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International Community as regards the allegations against Uganda made in the
original Panel Report, which have caused Uganda a great deal of harm. On this
Commission’s evaluation, allegation by allegation, there is little evidence to support
most of the allegations, and none at all in respect of those against Uganda as a State,
and against His Excellency the President. The reconstituted Panel’s mandate was to
come up with a response, based as far as possible on corroborated evidence to the
comments and reactions of States and Actors cited in the report of the original Panel.
The reconstituted Panel so far has failed to do so.
31. EXPLOITATION OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES
31.1. “Illicit” 10 and “Il legal”
As can be seen from the title of this section, the reconstituted Panel have abandoned
the use of the word “Illegal”, save in referring to their mandate. This is the case
throughout the Addendum, in which only the word “illicit” is used on nine occasions
instead, and only once in relation to Uganda.
It is important to understand the difference between these two words. “Illegal” is
defined as “not allowed by law”. “Illicit” as either “not allowed by laws or rules, or
strongly disapproved of by society”. (Longman – Dictionary of Contemporary
English).
In usage, “Illegal” appears to be the more uncompromising and restricted meaning of
20 “breach of the law”: the example given is “they were caught selling illegal drugs”
whereas “illicit” has a wider use and more often is used in the sense of moral
disapproval: the examples given are “an illicit love affair” (which would normally
involve no breach of the law, but more probably would attract society’s disapproval)
and “illicit diamond trading”, which expression arose from the days when there were
no controls, and now remains in the language.
Thus an illegal action will also be illicit: but an illicit action is not necessarily illegal.
One wonders then why the reconstituted Panel have moved to the word “illicit”, when
their mandate, as the mandate of this Commission uncompromisingly relates to
alleged “illegal” acts. In this Commission’s view, this constitutes a movement, not
30 only of the goalposts, but of the whole playing field, and this Commission is unable
to accept the view expressed by the Chairman of the reconstituted Panel in an
interview with this commission that, in view of differing interpretations, the word
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illicit may be used instead of the word “illegal” in respect of the allegations
against Uganda and Ugandans in the original Panel Report.
Indeed in a Press briefing by the President of the Security Council on 19th November
2001, the Chairman is reported in the following manner:
But during the second phase of the fact finding mission, the Panel
discovered that whether it was legal or illegal, most of the exploitation was
illicit. ‘There may be differences in style and forms of exploitation, but in
the end it was illegal’ he said.
If correctly reported, (and this was a specific quotation in a Press briefing by the
President of the Security Council), a finer example of 10 circular logic could not be
imagined.
Further in answer to a question specifically on the point of the definition of illegality,
the Chairman is reported to have said:
During the first phase of the Panel, the issue was whether the exploitation
was legal or illegal. In the second phase, the Panel found that the words
legal or illegal became irrelevant. In the end it discovered that those who
claimed to be operating legally were actually engaged in illicit activities
with regard to exploitation. Also between those activities classified as legal
and those classified as illegal there was a wide grey area
20 The grey area to which the Chairman refers is the area described by the word “illicit”,
in the sense of strong to mere disapproval by the International Community, by whom
the reconstituted Panel is mandated.
The report continued:
For example, those whom the Panel thought were illegal were not
denounced by the Democratic Republic of Congo Government – in fact the
Democratic Republic of Congo dealt with them to allow the continuation of
the activity
Just such a case was the operation of Dara Forêt as found by the reconstituted Panel.
In Paragraphs 72 to 73 of the Addendum, the reconstituted Panel found that Dara
30 Forêt had complied with all the regulations in effect and was recognised by the
Kinshasa Government. As an entity therefore, the reconstituted Panel was forced to
recognise that Dara Forêt had to be accepted as legal. Nevertheless, in interviews with
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this Commission, representatives of the reconstituted Panel continued to be
critical of Dara Forêt, on the basis that chopping down trees was not a good thing,
that is, it is frowned on by the International Community. This was why the original
Panel continued to think that the operation was illegal. However, it was not illegal: it
was illicit in the eyes of the International Community: perhaps not even illicit,
however, in the eyes of the schoolchildren who sit at the desks the timber might be
made into. Therefore, Dara’s operation, while clearly exploitation of the natural
resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo, was not illegal exploitation, because
Dara was not forbidden by the law administered by the Kinshasa Government or the
controlling rebel administration, nor by International 10 Law, and therefore should not
have been criticised in the original Panel Report, or used as a basis for criticism of the
Uganda Government or His Excellency the President. This Commission has in mind
such questions under its specific Terms of Reference, which are based on the findings
of the original Panel.
The matter becomes even more complicated when the reconstituted Panel approaches
Governments with requests to assist on curbing the transit of “illegal goods”, as it has
done. This phraseology raises all sorts of impossible questions. It is not the item itself
which is illegal, but the manner of dealing with it. A diamond, for instance is not
innately illegal, but to smuggle it out of a country without paying duty where
20 applicable is an illegal transaction with it. So the first question Governments are
likely to ask is “what goods do you mean?” According to its own definitions, this is a
question the reconstituted Panel will be unable to answer.
This Commission has the temerity to suggest what is in fact going on. It is not hard to
define what is illegal: there will be some law somewhere, whether national or
international which forbids the doing of the act, and Panels of Experts or
Commissions such as this will be able to quote it.
In the reconstituted Panel’s grey area, the area of the “illicit”, what is being
considered is the quite proper international disapproval of areas of excess: for
instance, pollution leading, we are told, to holes in the ozone layer: or stripping of the
30 tropical rain forest: such matters, hopefully, become the subject of international
agreements, such as CITES, which control excesses on an International level, and
these agreements become part of the International Law. But until such agreements are
concluded, actions properly described as “illicit” are not yet “illegal” by any standard.
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The problem has arisen from the mandate of the original Panel of Experts, which
was in part:
To follow up on reports and collect information on all activities of illegal
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of Congo ….
What the reconstituted Panel appears to have come to realise is that the International
Community is surely most interested in trying to find a way to control excesses,
particularly in conflict situations, and that in that task, the question of whether actions
are legal or illegal is irrelevant: the function of the United Nations and the Security
Council is to identify excesses (the original Panel’s grey 10 area) and then to find ways
of controlling them by negotiating the necessary agreements to establish legality or
illegality, as has been done in relation to Sierra Leone’s diamonds.
In International Terms, the question of, and inquiries into, whether actions were legal
or illegal are for the ICJ: in National Terms for the National Courts. To establish a
Panel of Experts to look into “illegal exploitation” was to place that Panel into an
inappropriate prosecutorial stance, a stance that the original Panel adopted with a will,
and that the reconstituted Panel is quite rightly in the process of renouncing
Put in that way, possible solutions begin to present themselves, such as import, transit
and re-export quotas for timber and minerals, although the question of diamond
20 smuggling is much more complicated, and can probably only be resolved by
International negotiation to control purchases by end users. It also begins to be clear
that to ask the original Panel to investigate “illegal exploitation” was
counterproductive, forcing Governments into defensive, rather than co-operative
positions in dealing with the real problem, that of excesses in war situations.
31.2. Coltan
In the Addendum there is no criticism of Uganda in respect of exploitation of Coltan.
There is only a reference in Paragraph 20 to a Ugandan-owned freight Company
transporting coltan through Kigali, an allegation for others to consider.
31.3. Gold
30 The reconstituted Panel recite the well known fact that artisanal gold mining
continues on a large scale. The Addendum states:
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27. The original Panel’s report sheds light on the gold mining activities
carried out by the Ugandan army, which assumed control of this gold-rich
area. The sharp rise in Ugandan gold exports, which also exceeded
national production, was given as further evidence that this gold is
transported by UPDF elements to Kampala, from where it is exported. The
Government of Uganda contested the findings of the original Panel in its
report, attributing the increase in its exports to 1993 policies liberalizing
gold sales and exports, where the revamped policies permitted artisanal
miners in Uganda to keep hard currency earned from sales. Officials
claimed that as a result of the ease with 10 which gold can be smuggled,
Uganda became the preferred destination for gold produced by artisanal
miners in the surrounding region.
28. The discrepancy between the gold export figures registered by the
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and those recorded by the
Uganda Revenue Service was attributed to the fact that the Ministry’s
figures reflect the quotas set for the production of the Ugandan export
permit holders. These permit holders can buy from artisanal miners, the
total of which appears on the export permits. While small-scale smuggling
may in part explain the discrepancy in Uganda’s production and export
20 figures, the original Panel has evidence that artisanal gold mining activities
in the north-east by UPDF and RCD-ML, as well as the short-lived rebel
coalition FLC, have continued. In the Kilo-moto area for example,
operations at the Gorumbwa and Durba sites are under the control of
UPDF and RCD-ML. The Malaka site reportedly employs 10,000 diggers
and generates amounts of gold valued at $10,000 per day. Gold produced is
still being sold through the Victoria comptoir in Kampala.
The original Panel Report quotes a figure of only 2000 artisanal diggers operating at
Kilo Moto, producing sufficient gold to “pay off” up to 2 kg of gold a day. The
reconstituted Panel gives no account for this inflationary figure, which raises
30 suspicions of exaggeration by the original Panel’s informants. The reconstituted Panel
do not deal with this problem. There is another example of such exaggeration relating
to the “skimming” by Mbusa Nyamwisi of taxes, dealt with at Paragraph 32 below of
this report.
This Commission has dealt with Gold at Paragraph 21.1 above. As with diamonds,
there are no import figures of gold, which, if it is sourced in the Democratic Republic
of Congo, is clearly being smuggled. There is something in what the reconstituted
Panel say, with regard to gold being sold through Victoria, who were licenced in
respect of gold as well as diamonds, and this Commission is unable to exclude this
possibility.
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31.4. Copper and Cobalt
There are no allegations which involve Uganda in respect of these minerals. This
Commission has drawn attention to the situation of Kasese Cobalt Ltd in Paragraph
21.6 above. The company has now ceased to function.
31.5. Diamonds
The reconstituted Panel say:
Diamonds from artisanal mining in northern Kisangani area have provided
a source of revenue for the rebels, RPA and UPDF for the continuation of
the conflict. The high combined taxes imposed by the RCD-Goma rebel
group and RPA ultimately resulted in diamonds 10 mined in this area being
redirected to Kampala, where lower tax rates prevail.
The reconstituted Panel continue to quote the same figures from the Diamond High
Council as were used in the original Panel Report, and to draw the same conclusions
as the original Panel.
This Commission has dealt with the question of diamonds at Paragraph 21.2 above of
this Report. Its conclusions are undeniable: there are no import figures for diamonds,
nor transit figures. Diamonds are therefore quite clearly being smuggled through
Uganda, and declared as sourced in Uganda by the smugglers on arrival in Antwerp.
This Commission has evidence of one such transaction, privately conducted. That
20 being so, since no tax is paid in Uganda, it is difficult to understand the relevance of
lower tax rates in Kampala, how the Ugandan Treasury benefits, and how the UPDF
is able to use the proceeds for the continuation of the war, as the reconstituted Panel
claim. Tax paid in the Democratic Republic of Congo would be paid to rebel
authorities, who would be able to use the money for the continuation of the war. This,
however, would not be a matter to be laid at Uganda’s door, although it is true that
there is cause to believe that some top Commanders were secretly profiting for
themselves from “Security Funding”, a different matter.
This point is a specific example of the unfortunate failure of the reconstituted Panel to
carry out its mandate, as mentioned in Paragraph 1 b) above. The response of the
30 Uganda Government to the original Panel Report raises exactly this point, and the
investigations of this Commission have confirmed the likelihood that the response
was correct.
163
31.6. Timber
The reconstituted Panel complain that although timber is exported through Kampala
to Mombasa, the Government of Uganda denies that timber is transited through
Uganda. In the meeting with the reconstituted Panel, it was made clear that in their
interviews, information such as this had mistakenly been given to the original Panel
by a senior Ugandan Government official, but this Commission has discovered such
information is quite wrong. URA has provided this Commission with transit
information for Timber, and also import figures both from the Democratic Republic
of Congo. It is difficult to understand how this misunderstanding has arisen, but a
misunderstanding it certainly is. If only referring to the data 10 from Dara Forêt, there is
clear evidence of transit of timber: and this information was no doubt provided to the
reconstituted Panel during their interview with Mr Kotiram. It certainly was provided
to this Commission from that source, and finally from URA. There was without
doubt, constant transit of timber through Mpondwe, and transit and import through
Arua.
32. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST UGANDA IN THE ADDENDUM
In Paragraph 95 of the Addendum, the reconstituted Panel acknowledge what Uganda
has said all along, that it had legitimate security interests which prompted its military
intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Addendum acknowledges
20 that there has been a significant withdrawal of UPDF troops, resulting in the
perception that exploitation activities have reduced.
In paragraph 97 of the Addendum it is stated that while the effect of the original
Panel’s report and the significant withdrawal of UPDF troops have given the
impression that the exploitation activities have been reduced, they are in fact
continuing. It alleges that commercial networks put in place by Ugandan Army
Commanders and their civilian counterparts that were described in the original
Panel’s report are still functioning in Orientale Province and Kampala. It cites, in
particular, Trinity and Victoria Companies as examples of Commercial networks that
are still actively exploiting diamonds, gold, coffee and timber from the Democratic
30 Republic of Congo.
The two named companies have no direct Ugandan connection. Trinity was set up by
the rebel leaders in control of the Oriental Province to generate funds to finance their
war efforts, although it is possible that much of the income ended upo in private rebel
164
pockets. According to Professor Wamba and Col Otafiire, Uganda has made
strenuous diplomatic efforts at the time of the forming of FLC to bring it to an end.
Victoria Group is registered in Goma and operates in Isiro, Bunia, Bondo, Buta,
Kisangani, Beni and other places in the Democratic Republic of Congo and pays
taxes to MLC as evidenced by one of the documents made available to this
Commission by the re-constituted Panel of Experts. Neither of the companies has
Ugandans living in Uganda as shareholders. They are not registered in Uganda and
have no registered or Branch offices in Uganda. While it is true that this Commission
has found that there are Ugandans who have interests in Victoria, nevertheless those
individuals have done everything to keep their interests secret. 10 Uganda as a state is
not involved in their activities.
The ownership and nationality of the Companies could easily have been ascertained
from the Registrar of Companies’ offices in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. That would have prevented the erroneous allegation that the two companies
are owned (rather than facilitated) by Ugandan Army Commanders and their civilian
counterparts. In the case of Victoria, however, this Commission is unable to exclude
that possibility. Trinity on the other hand appears to be a mainly Congolese affair, in
respect of which strenuous efforts have been made by Uganda to end it and therefore
this Commission doubts the reconstituted Panel’s conclusion.
20 Paragraph 98 of the Addendum states that while the Government of Uganda does not
participate directly in the exploitation activities, the culture in which its military
personnel function tolerates and condones their activities. It alleges that Commercial
activities of Senior UPDF officers are public knowledge but does not provide any
evidence of that. To prove the alleged involvement of Senior UPDF officers in
Commercial activities, it cites the alleged admission by General Salim Saleh that one
of his Companies had been engaged in exporting merchandise to the eastern part of
the Democratic Republic of Congo and the confiscation of the aircraft that was
transporting the merchandise by Major General Kazini. The paragraph also alleges
that General Kazini told the original Panel about his role in facilitating the transport
30 of Uganda merchandise to Kisangani and other areas in the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
This Commission interviewed both General Kazini and Lt. General Salim Saleh about
the allegation. It appears that the reconstituted Panel in the Addendum has mixed up
the role of Lt. General Salim Saleh as a businessman dealing in merchandise and as
an aircraft operator. As a businessman, Lt. General Salim Saleh has denied that any of
165
his Companies has transported merchandise to the Democratic Republic of
Congo. What he admits is that some of his aircraft have been chartered by Ugandan
businessmen to transport merchandise to the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was
one of these aircraft that landed at Kisangani airport without clearance and was
confiscated by General Kazini and ordered to return back without discharging
whatever cargo it was carrying. According to General Kazini it was the role of Lt.
General Salim Saleh as an aircraft operator in the Democratic Republic of Congo that
they tried to explain to the reconstituted Panel in August 2001 and not his role as a
businessman sending merchandise to the Democratic Republic of Congo. He said that
the aircraft came to Kisangani once and never returned. Further 10 this took place in late
1998 or early 1999, and therefore cannot serve as an example of continuing
exploitation.
With regard to the alleged role of General Kazini in facilitating the transport of
Ugandan merchandise to Kisangani and other areas of the Democratic Republic of
Congo the explanation of General Kazini was that when UPDF first went to the
Democratic Republic of Congo they found that the people of the Democratic
Republic of Congo were in dire need of basic commodities, like salt, sugar and soap.
The UPDF had aircraft that brought military supplies to the Democratic Republic of
Congo and returned empty. The Congolese businessmen pleaded with him to allow
20 the aircraft to give them lifts to Kampala to buy some commodities and bring back to
the Democratic Republic of Congo. He appreciated their problem and so whenever an
aircraft was returning empty, he allowed the Congolese businessmen to go on board
the aircraft to Kampala to buy commodities and if there was space, transport them
back to the Democratic Republic of Congo. He assisted the Congolese in this way
until some of the businessmen had money to charter their own aircraft.
He claims that he thought, quite wrongly, that he was implementing His Excellency
The President’s radio message to assist businessmen to do business in the Democratic
Republic of Congo so as alleviate the acute shortage of the Congolese and also
establish links for the future. General Kazini seems to have thought the President
30 meant that Congolese businessmen, and apparently Lebanese, should be facilitated as
well. When it was pointed out to him that the President only meant Ugandan
businessmen, and only for security as opposed to transport, he admitted his mistake
but said he was only trying to be flexible in the application of the President’s
directive.
166
In the Commission’s view the role General Kazini played, as indicated above,
supports to some extent the allegation in the Addendum that at least he established a
mechanism to promote business in the areas under the control of UPDF. We find the
allegation in Paragraph 98 sustainable, but are unable to lay blame at the door of the
State of Uganda.
In paragraph 99 of the Addendum it is alleged that UPDF officers usually conduct
their business through a Congolese affiliate, on whom they bestow power and
support. To prove their point the reconstituted Panel stated that they had learnt that
recently Mr. Lumbala had signed two Commercial agreements bearing the signatures
of UPDF Commander Kahinda Otafiire and Belgian and Austrian 10 parties. During a
working session with the reconstituted Panel in Kampala in March 2002, this
Commission asked the reconstituted Panel if they had in their possession copies of the
Commercial agreement alleged to bear the signatures of UPDF Commander Kahinda
Otafiire. The Chairman of the reconstituted Panel replied that they had only heard
about the allegation, as stated in the Addendum, and had no documentation to support
it.
This Commission finds it difficult to understand how a Panel of such stature could
make such a serious allegation against Colonel (not Commander) Kahinda Otafiire,
who is now a Minister of State in-Charge of Regional Co-operation, on hearsay
20 evidence of a single uncorroborated witness. The Commission’s immediate re-action
was to ignore the allegation. But in order to put matters beyond dispute, the
Commission summoned the Minister to come and tell the Commission what he
knows about the alleged Commercial agreements. He told the Commission that he
had not signed any commercial agreement with anybody and challenged the original
Panel to produce the signed Commercial Agreements to prove him wrong. He had not
been asked about them by the reconstituted Panel.
It is also alleged in paragraph 99 that Mbusa Nyamwisi “skims” up to USD 400,000
off the tax revenues collected from the Beni Customs post at the Uganda border and
shared the money with General Kazini and General Salim Saleh. This allegation has
30 been denied by Nyamwisi, General Kazini and General Salim Saleh and constitutes a
substantial advance on the original allegation. As the alleged credible, and apparently
very inflationary, source of the original Panel’s information was not disclosed, this
Commission has no alternative but to accept their denial, particularly as the source is
quoted by the reconstituted Panel as single, and is not corroborated
167
In view of the findings of this Commission regarding the allegations in
paragraphs 97, 98 and 99 above, this Commission thinks that the original Panel’s
conclusion in paragraph 100 that there is a link between the continuation of the
conflict and the exploitation of the natural resources and that Ugandan influential
Government Officials, military officers and businessmen continue to exploit the
security situation for their commercial interests, is tenuous with the possible
exception of the operations of Victoria. In particular the suggestion that Ugandan
influential Government Officials are involved has no basis in the text. While it is true
that businessmen continue to trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that does
not necessarily have the result of the c 10 ontinuation of the conflict.
33. THE LINK BETWEEN EXPLOITATION OF RESOURCES AND THE
CONTINUATION OF THE CONFLICT
33.1. Recent Developments
33.1.1. Uganda
In Paragraph 57 the original Panel say:
There are indications that clashes during the past seven months in the
Oriental and Kivu Regions between the Mayi Mayi, who appear to be better
equipped and coordinated than before, and UPDF and the MLC rebel
group have been directly related to control of coltan and gold
20 It is odd that, while the reconstituted Panel do not mention Uganda when
considering the exploitation of Coltan, nevertheless the Mayi Mayi clashes are
attributed to the UPDF’s desire for coltan. As to the desire for control of gold,
when talking of the clashes with the Mai-Mai, this allegation appears to be
geographically unrelated.
It is therefore probable that the reconstituted Panel ought perhaps to have gone
beyond relying on pure indications, and to have looked for evidence, as has this
Commission. This Commission has not found any such evidence, and would have
appreciated any assistance either of the Panels could have given in this regard.
33.1.2. Democratic Republic of Congo - Dara Forêt
30 During a consideration of the link between exploitation of resources by the
Democratic Republic of Congo and the continuation of the conflict, the
168
reconstituted Panel point out that Dara Forêt registered as a Congolese
registered Company in Kinshasa in March 1998: it will be remembered that that
was at a time when relationships between Kinshasa and Kampala were good, and
trade opportunities were being investigated (see Paragraphs 14.2 and 14.3 above).
Then in June 1998 Dara Forêt was granted a logging concession from North Kivu
Provincial Authority, and an exploitation licence. The reconstituted Panel found
that Dara Forêt had complied with all the regulations in effect, and pays taxes as
before. It is checked by local; authorities in North Kivu to see that it is complying
with the terms of its licence. It was also granted a certificate of registration by the
Ministry 10 of Justice in Kinshasa.
This is a completely different story from that of the original Panel, whose
criticisms of Dara Forêt were attributed by the Mayi Mayi for their formation, and
for the kidnapping of 24 Thai Nationals working there. There is no
acknowledgement of any mistake by the original Panel: this Commission has
examined the whole of the so-called Case Study of Dara Forêt and DGLI, and the
allegations against the Uganda Government, and His Excellency the President, and
found that far from there merely being no evidence of the original Panel’s
allegations, those allegations were completely wrong : and the reconstituted Panel
have independently agreed, on the basis of additional evidence.
20 This Commission was expecting to see a specific withdrawal of the false
allegations contained in the original Panel Report: it is absent.
34. CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANEL IN THE ADDENDUM
In paragraph 143 of the Addendum the reconstituted Panel alleges that the systematic exploitation of
natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo continues unabated.
It alleges that the exploitation activities are carried out by a large number of state and non-state actors
from the region and outside the region, some of whom are involved in the conflict, others not. It stated
that some individuals and institutions who have been enriched from the exploitation are
opportunistically making use of the current situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo to amass as
much wealth as possible. And in paragraph 144 it alleges that without resolution of the broader conflict
30 in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the region, it would be highly unrealistic to expect an end to
the exploitation of the natural resources and other forms of wealth in the country.
This Commission agrees that exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the
Democratic Republic of Congo is still continuing. The Government of Uganda has been acquitted of
any wrong doing by the reconstituted Panel and no state institution has been found by it to be involved
169
in exploiting the natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. This Commission, however, agrees that some top military Commanders and civilians have been
enriched from the exploitation. This Commission also agrees that unless and until a permanent and a
realistic solution is found to end the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes
Region the exploitation will not end. It is the absence of effective state institutions and structures to
maintain law and order in the Democratic Republic of Congo that have enabled the systematic
exploitation to continue. However, this Commission notes the absence of the words “illegal” or “illicit”
from this part of the Addendum, and therefore cannot see that these conclusions form a basis for
interference or criticism from the International Community, although Uganda itself needs to look to the
obvious contempt which Senior Army Officers 10 have for civil institutions.
In paragraph 147 it is alleged that there is a link between the continuation of the conflict and
exploitation of natural resources. The reason the original Panel gives is that all the parties involved in
the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo have transformed their military operations and
presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo into self financing activities, whereby no real budgetary
burden is borne by the parties concerned. This allows them greater degree of freedom and no financial
compulsion to end conflict. In paragraph 151 it is alleged that the actual sources for financing the war
effort by all parties in the conflict remain shrouded in mystery.
While the allegations might be true of some of the countries involved in the conflict, that is not so with
Uganda. In Uganda, the war was financed by the regular defence budget and any deficit was handled
20 by the Treasury by way of a supplementary budget. This fact was acknowledged by the original Panel
in paragraph 135 of its report and the policy has not changed since. This Commission has no doubt that
if the original Panel had asked Uganda Government, it would have received a clear answer.
Since the reconstituted Panel agrees that the Government of Uganda did not participate directly in the
exploitation activities, its military operations and presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo could
not be self-financing activities as alleged in paragraph 147.
35. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PANELS
The original Panel in its report made a number of far-reaching recommendations which are set
out in full in the original Panel Report. This Commission thinks that those recommendations,
some of which in this Commission’s view are unreasonable and not well thought through,
30 have been overtaken by the recommendations of the reconstituted Panel in the Addendum,
which are more pragmatic than those of the original Panel.
35.1. Institutional
The first recommendation in the Addendum is a call on International Community to
assist in formulating a plan of action on the building of State institutions in the
170
Democratic Republic of Congo which should be linked to the convening of an
International Conference on peace and development in the Great Lakes Region. This
is clearly in line with the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement and a move in the right
direction.
The second recommendation relates to concessions, commercial contracts and
agreements signed during the era of Laurent Désiré Kabila (1997 – 2000) and
subsequently in the rebel-held areas. These were to be reviewed and revised under the
auspices of a special body to be created by the Security Council to address and
correct all the irregularities. This Commission sees nothing objectionable with such a
recommendation, which in this Commission’s view will 10 free the country from
obligations arising from badly negotiated and dubious agreements.
In the third recommendation the reconstituted Panel urges the United Nations
Organisation Mission in the the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to
accelerate the disarmament, demobilisation and re-interrogation process in order to
reduce the Security concerns of a number of states in the region, including the
Democratic Republic of Congo, to a level that makes it possible for the countries
concerned to negotiate among themselves the modalities of securing their borders
without infringing upon the sovereignty of any state. This Commission thinks that
this is a laudable recommendation within the spirit of the Lusaka Cease Fire
20 Agreement to which Uganda is committed.
35.2. Financial and Technical
Unlike the call made by the original Panel to the World Bank and IMF to consider
suspending their support to the budgets of the countries involved in the conflict in the
Democratic Republic of Congo until the end of the conflict without regard to the
effect of the measure on the ordinary people of those countries, the reconstituted
Panel thinks that the World Bank, IMF and the other International donors are best
placed to critically evaluate their assistance. In this Commission’s view, this is a more
pragmatic and humane way to deal with the matter.
The original Panel, in paragraph 221, recommended to the Security Council as part of
30 recommendations on Sanctions to immediately declare a temporary embargo on the
import or export of specified minerals and timber from or to Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda until those countries involved in the exploitation of the natural resources of
the the Democratic Republic of Congo satisfy certain conditions. The reconstituted
Panel, on the other hand, calls for a declaration of moratorium for a specific period of
171
time, banning the purchase and importing of precious products originating in
areas where foreign troops are present in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well
as in territories under the control of rebel groups.
It also recommends that during the moratorium, countries directly or indirectly
involved in the conflict in the the Democratic Republic of Congo and in particular
transit countries such as Zambia, South Africa, Kenya and the United Republic of
Tanzania, should review their national legislation, and pass the necessary laws to
investigate and prosecute the illicit traffickers of the precious products from the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
It further recommends that during the moratorium period, 10 all technical measures such
as standardisation of certificates of production, harmonisation of tax regimes and
verification regulations, compilation of diamond production and trade statistics that
are under consideration, should be finalised.
It was further recommended that Revenues from the resources of the Democratic
Republic of Congo should be channelled through the States’ budgets and that tax
collection and use should be rigorously controlled to ensure transparency and
accountability. This Commission has nothing against the above recommendations,
which are considered reasonable and appropriate.
35.3. Sanctions
20 On sanctions, the reconstituted Panel has left it entirely to the discretion of the
Security Council and the timing was made to depend on the Security Council’s
assessment of the evolution of the situation with regard to the exploitation of the
natural resources as well as the developments in the Great Lakes region. This
recommendation is preferable to the blanket imposition of sanctions by the original
Panel without regard to the situation on the ground and the negative consequences of
sanctions. However, so far as Uganda is concerned, now that troops have been
withdrawn for the main part from the DRC, and although transit trade no doubt
continues, there would seem to be little justification for consideration of sanctions
against Uganda itself.
30
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8 . CONSIDERATION OF THE
FINAL REPORT OF THE PANEL
36. METHODOLOGY
The reconstituted Panel say that owing to the nature of its mandate, gaining access to
information has been difficult, but that in the end it was able to rely on information, mostly
documentary evidence for its Report. The Panel claims to have made every effort to fairly and
objectively evaluate the information it has gathered.
If all that is true, this Commission would ask why it has not been provided with further
documentation.
The reconstituted Panel forwarded to this Commission a total 10 of 12 documents (some with
translations, one of which was a bad translation which misled this Commission severely), and
a further 3 (counting attachments), were provided at the request of the Nairobi witness during
the hearing in Nairobi. Of those twelve documents seven had problems as set out in Paragraph
20 above under the relevant individual actors: others were from Congolese officials, and
incapable of verification. One was the statement of the Nairobi witness, kindly taken by the
Panel at this Commission’s request to save the expense of a double trip to Nairobi. All
documents save the last were photocopies, making handwriting analysis more difficult. No
documents were provided until this Commission had been working for nearly a year.
Leaving aside the question of “illegal and illicit” to which the reconstituted Panel suddenly
20 return, countries involved in such matters all have their Constitutions to respect. In Uganda’s
case, the implication is that before action can be taken as required, evidence of wrongdoing
contrary to the law is required. That is why the investigations of this Commission were not
supposed to be a repeat of the Panel’s work, but an examination of it, and why this
Commission depended on the Panel to provide some evidence of its allegations, so that
Uganda could take action in appropriate cases.
If a 59 page report, alleged to be based mainly on documentary evidence, resulting in
allegations against 29 companies and 54 individuals, is in fact based upon 12 documents, then
its basis must be very thin. The reconstituted Panel could clearly have assisted this
Commission further.
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37. ELITE NETWORKS
In Paragraph 98 the Panel turn to a description of the elite networks operating out of Uganda,
which the Panel describe as “decentralized and loosely hierarchical”. This description seems
to exclude the possibility of a network, and seems to show that the theory of a network, elite
or not, is an unsuccessful attempt to fit all countries involved into the same description. There
are probably separate and distinct organisations, on the basis of the evidence before this
Commission, under generic names such as Victoria, or companies trading in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, some of whom are entirely disconnected from the problems identified in
the Panel reports: for instance Unilever, whose cocoa this Commission saw at the Military Air
Base. This Commission has interviewed representatives 10 of many companies who produced
copies of tax payments: Sam Engola was one of them and yet he is supposed to have been the
initiator of Trinity, the archetype network, and exonerated from taxes.
37.1. Key Figures
Key figures are said to be Lt General Salim Saleh and Major General James Kazini.
37.1.1. Lt General Salim Saleh
This Commission has no evidence to prove that Salim Saleh is a key figure in any of
the networks described, nor has the reconstituted panel provided any such evidence.
37.1.2. General Kazini
This Commission has found that General Kazini is involved in the Victoria network
20 to such an extent that, on their behalf he was prepared to write what this Commission
is satisfied was a veiled threat to the Rwanda supported Administration in Kisangani.
(see Paragraph 20.3.1 above) To that extent, this Commission agrees with the Panel
as to key figures.
37.2. Members of Networks
37.2.1. Col Mayombo
In support of its allegations against Col Mayombo, the reconstituted Panel supplied
this Commission documents which purported to show that Col Mayombo claimed
$380,000 from RCD, through Professor Wamba, and supplied a witness who gave
evidence as to payment thereof. This Commission has taken further evidence on the
174
matter, and is unable to agree with the Panel that this evidence is convincing. A
full consideration is at Paragraph 20.6 above.
37.2.2. Col Otafiire
In support of its allegations against Col Otafiire, the Panel sent various documents to
this Commission which have been considered at Paragraph 20.5 above. This
Commission has been unable to rely upon them.
37.2.3. Sam Engola
Sam Engola gave evidence to this Commission. Mr. Engola was first mentioned as a
Ugandan businessman working in the Democratic Republic of Congo by General
Kazini. After some embarrassment, Major Katafiire was 10 forced to admit that Mr.
Engola had been travelling to the Democratic Republic of Congo on military planes.
Capt Badogo was forced to admit that the plane also carried 1.5 tons of salt for Mr.
Engola, on the authority of the Chief of Staff. Mr. Engola himself said that he was
operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo, that he exported salt, sugar, soap,
cigarette fuel, beer, jerrycans, and carried business people. He also travelled to the
Democratic Republic of Congo, he said, over one hundred times. He described the
prefinancing system which was set up by rebel leaders, and produced an exemption
letter signed by Tibasiima: he told the Commission that he had been granted tax
exemption against pre-financing payments by Mme Lotsove, Mbusa, Tibasiima and
20 Professor Wamba, and described the problems which arose from the system for the
businessman. He pointed out that he had written a letter of complaint where a prefinancing
payment had been made and a letter of exemption issued but not honoured,
to Professor Wamba and produced it. He also described the Trinity organisation as
follows:
Sam Engola: As I told you that, it is not registered officially, so the people
who run the company are the movement of Congo rebel leaders.
Lead Counsel: Which ones in particular?
Sam Engola: Tibasiima. (Let me help the Commission), as I told you
earlier, the rebel group does not have the money or office or salary, now
30 they tried to form a company called Trinity to raise money to help them
meet their obligations and their finances. Now as I told you that, the
government is not in the rebel territory to register a company, they just
formed Trinity Investment, then they go to the Congolese business
community i.e. all who were doing business in Congo. They invite us and
175
say; we want to raise money. Now when you pay money to Trinity then
you get the exemption letter, that any goods under the name of Trinity is
free in Congo, but you have paid. So this is prepayment of taxes. Now you
find that my Congolese friends whom I know, whom I deal with, that is why
they can implicate me and say that; I am among, Mr. Manu Soba signed by
Tibasiima and Mr. Idi Taban, these are the rich men in Bunia. Now
because Mr. Tibasiima comes from Bunia, you know, when you come from
the area, you know who is who and who is rich and who can afford. So he
would say; give us $100,000 for Trinity, but there is no agreement, there is
no receipt. But because he is a Minister, 10 his signature is honoured at the
border or at the Customs post, they would say; we were given a tax already
for 6 months, but you have paid. But because the leaders are fighting for
this money, or how to use this money or the accountability, then they mix
the business community also and start saying that; they have not paid taxes,
and yet you have paid. So these people have been paying money to Trinity’s
account which is for the movement and then they get the exemption letter
and with this, they use it only for fuel, essential goods like, sugar, salt and
soap, but you have paid.
In describing what he said was Mr. Engola’s part in Trinity, and pre-finance, the witness
20 supplied by the panel and interviewed by this Commission in Nairobi said:
Lead Counsel: So what exactly was Trinity doing? How did this work
within this framework that you’ve mentioned?
Witness: Tibasiima took charge of all the functions of Finance Minister, if
my memory serves me right, between August and October 1999. Until when
Wamba had to come, and established in Bunia, and during this time, there
was already an analogue operation, which was operating under the name
of Sam Engola. We did not understand that Tibasiima was going to take
responsibility, to change the names, but to keep in place the same system.
Sam Engola was going to disappear, to give way to Trinity, to pave way for
30 Trinity.
Justice D. Porter: And who is Sam Engola?
Witness: He is a Ugandan businessman.
This Commission had difficulty in understanding how an operation similar to Trinity as
described by witnesses could be operated by a Ugandan businessman, when the organisation
clearly was of a nature which could only be authorised and profited from by a rebel leader,
since it involved exoneration from tax against a pre-payment. The witness was unable to
enlighten this Commission any further.
Any suggestion that Sam Engola was a founder or member of Trinity does not seem to make
sense: what does seem to make sense is that he was, as the reconstituted Panel say, a private
40 entrepreneur trading with the Democratic Republic of Congo, but finding that the only way he
could do so was to take the risk of paying the authority in control a sum to represent taxes in
advance against an exemption letter (which did not always work) on an informal basis, which
176
system was later formalized by Tibasiima (though Tibasiima denies it). The fact that Mr.
Engola, as a private businessman was trading with the Democratic Republic of Congo cannot,
as has been examined elsewhere, be criticized.
It cannot be supported, on the evidence before this Commission, that Sam Engola was a
member of the alleged network: the evidence does reveal that he, according to his own public
admission, was conducting trade with the Democratic Republic of Congo, which cannot in
itself be said to be illegal, illicit, or subject to criticism. There appears to be no reason to
advise the Uganda Government to take any action against him.
37.3. Front Companies
10 37.3.1. Victoria
In Paragraph 99 the reconstituted Panel cite Victoria, Trinity, La Conmet, and
Sagricof as front companies for the network.. This Commission has advised the
Ugandan Government to take appropriate action in respect of those shown to have
been involved in Victoria
37.3.2. Trinity
On the evidence received, Trinity is involved in tax fraud and personal theft by
Congolese officials, and appears to be a Democratic Republic of Congo -based
informal and unregistered organisation, headed by Tibasiima. Apart from the
vague and unsupported allegation that Salim Saleh is at its head, of which this
20 Commission has no convincing evidence, there does not appear to be any Ugandan
involvement. Indeed there is clear evidence that Uganda did its best to persuade
rebel leaders to establish a financial system of transparency and accountability,
and promoted FLC as a means to achieve the fair distribution of funds for all
purposes.
37.3.3. La Conmet and Sagricof
This Commission has considered the position of La Conmet in Paragraph 40.2
below, and cannot see that it is anything but a trading company: there is no
evidence that Sagricof is any different. One would expect such companies to be
involved in personnel, logistics and financing, and this cannot be considered to be
30 a problem.
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37.4. Methods used by Networks
The reconstituted Panel complain that the network relies on intimidation,
maintenance of a public sector façade in the form of a rebel administration, and
manipulation of money supply and the banking sector using counterfeit currency and
other related mechanisms.
Certainly the evidence against General Kazini shows intimidation on behalf of
Victoria: and his correspondence implies that without his assistance, a company
trying to work in the Democratic Republic of Congo would run into all sorts of
problems with the UPDF, whose Commanders were warned off Victoria by General
Kazini. This evidence also shows that an attempt was 10 being made to control the
various administrations, including those who had no alliance with Uganda, and this
Commission therefore agrees with the reconstituted Panel that a façade in the case of
Victoria was being used.
As to manipulation of the banking sector, there is no evidence before this
Commission, or in the text of the Final Report of the reconstituted Panel, to support
these allegations.
37.5. Intimidation and use of force by UPDF
In Paragraph 101, the reconstituted Panel deal with the networks’ use of the UPDF
through intimidation and the threat and use of force. This Commission’s finding on
20 intimidation is dealt with in the preceding paragraph. In the case of gold, there is clear
evidence of occupation of gold producing areas, though not originally for the sole
purpose described, and the subsequent armed interference with artisanal production.
As to the collection of taxes, there seems to be a dichotomy: on the one hand the
reconstituted Panel complain of the pre-financing operations of Trinity, while on the
other they accuse the networks of collecting taxes to generate revenue for the UPDF.
This commission doubts, as it has said elsewhere in this report, that if such a thing is
occurring, that it is a policy of the UPDF. On the other hand, individual officers have
been shown to be only too ready to charge for “Security services”, and General
Kazini found it necessary to direct them to refer such matters to himself.
30 38. TRAINING OF PARAMILITARY FORCE
It is alleged in paragraph 102 that in anticipation of Uganda’s agreement to withdraw all
UPDF troops from the Democratic Republic of Congo , except for a reinforced battalion in
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Bunia and a small number of units on the slopes of the Rwenzori Mountains, a
paramilitary force is being trained under the personal authority of Lt. General Salim Saleh
which is expected to continue to facilitate the commercial activities of UPDF officers after
UPDF have departed. It is said that the paramilitary group is drawn from dissidents from
Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC, members of the Uganda-supported RCD-Congo including its
leaders Professor Kin-Kiey Mulamba and Kabanga Babadi and others in the north – eastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo who had supported UPDF in the past. It is said that Mr.
Heckie Horn, the Managing Director of Saracen Uganda Ltd and Lt. General Salim Saleh are
jointly supporting the paramilitary group. It is also said that Mr. Horn provides military
training and arms to the group. The Panel do no 10 t say where this is taking place.
It is further said in paragraph 103 that Lt. General Salim Saleh and Mr. Horn consulted
President Joseph Kabila to obtain support for this covert operation, whose primary objective
had been to replace Mbusa Nyamwiisi with Roger Lumbala as head of RCD – K/ML in order
to ensure access to the diamond-rich areas around Buta and Isiro controlled by Mr. Roger
Lumbala’s rebel group, RCD-Nationale, whilst their long-term objective is to bring about the
downfall of Jean-Pierre Bemba. It is further said that the ultimate aim of the group is to
confront RCD-Goma and Rwanda after it had obtained increased members and training.
The Panel agrees that when it interviewed Mr. Horn he denied categorically that he was
involved in any such covert operations with Lt. General Salim Saleh. In spite of Mr. Horn’s
20 denial, the Panel included the allegation in its report to make it appear that it was true without
indicating why it disbelieved Mr. Horn. It did not interview Salim Saleh on the subject.
This Commission has received sworn evidence from both Mr. Horn and Lt. General Salim
Saleh on the issue. Mr. Horn has categorically denied the allegation. He said that he has
personally never been to any part of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The nearest the
company, Saracen Uganda Ltd, of which he is a Managing Director, has been to the
Democratic Republic of Congo is along the banks of Semliki River where the company is
providing security services to a company that is doing oil exploration. Semliki River is on the
border between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Lt. General Salim Saleh admits he has 50% shares in a company called Special Services that
30 has 25% shares in Saracen Uganda Ltd; 75% of the shares of Saracen Uganda Ltd is owned
by Saracen International. Lt. General Salim Saleh consequently owns not 25% of Saracen
Uganda Ltd, but 12.5%. Lt. General Salim Saleh told the Commission that neither Mr. Horn
nor Saracen Uganda Ltd is involved in any covert operation with him in Democratic Republic
of Congo or elsewhere, and that he has never been to Congo with Mr. Horn. He, however,
179
said that as part of the efforts to try and bring peace between Uganda and Democratic
Republic of Congo, he has been given a special assignment by the President of Uganda to
reorganise the Congolese rebel deserters whom he has gathered at Namboole near Kampala,
so that they can be sent back to Kinshasa. That is the only force he was in touch with. The
force was neither a paramilitary group nor a covert operation. What he is doing has the
support of the President of Uganda, and of President Kabila. He said that he appeared before
this Commission on 30th October, 2002, only two days after he had returned from a visit to
President Joseph Kabila on the issue.
The Commission visited the Sports Hotel at Namboole where it observed a large number of
families living, identified to this Commission as soldiers from rebel 10 groups in the Congo, the
same groups as mentioned by the reconstituted Panel, and Salim Saleh. These soldiers and
their families were under the care of Pan Afrikan Center for Strategic and International
Studies. There was no sign of any military training, and the only sign of security was two
guards on the gate coming, not from Saracen, but from Interid. There was information that,
spread around Kampala were other groups totalling some 500 ex-rebel soldiers in all. Visits to
the Project, which was being handled by Salim Saleh, had been made by a Minister and others
from Kinshasa, and also the Charge d’Affaires from the Embassy in Kampala. The desire of
the participants was to go back to Kinshasa as soldiers for the Kinshasa Government. This
appears to be a genuine project, supported jointly by the Uganda and Kinshasa Government.
20 There is no evidence of any other group being trained in Uganda or the Democratic Republic
of Congo for such purposes, and since the reconstituted Panel have not revealed their source,
nor where the alleged paramilitary training is taking place, there is nothing further this
Commission can do to investigate this allegation.
To quote Mr Horn:
If I may say something; I just feel that it’s extremely irresponsible for
people to make allegations like this without any proof. And I can say we are
supplying work to 1300 people in this country. This can have a tremendous
ripple effect within the commercial market. Our clients can turn around
and say, look at what Saracen is doing. And that’s one of the reasons why I
30 am standing here today, is again I want to categorically deny these things,
we are not selling guns in the Congo, we are not training rebel groups in
Congo, I’ve never been inside the Congo, we are a commercial security
company. And I want to protect the company as well as the people working
for the company. Because to put 1300 people out of work because of
malicious rumours I think it is very, very unfair. From what is supposed to
be a responsible panel organisation - or whatever you want to call it.
180
It is of course possible that there is some secret paramilitary group being organised and
funded by Lt. General Saleh as the Panel describe. It is also possible that the group Lt General
Saleh has told this Commission about at Namboole and elsewhere in Kampala is the group to
which the Panel refer. From the Panel’s report, it is impossible to tell whether they and Lt
General Saleh are talking of the same group. If they are, then the Panel has clearly been
misled by its sources. If not the matter could have been cleared by specifying where the group
was being trained: either the Panel or this Commission could have then visited the area, when
the matter would no longer have been in issue. Now that there has been a general withdrawal
of UPDF troops, without evidence of such a paramilitary force, the Panel’s theory of networks
under the continuing control 10 of the UPDF is considerably weakened.
This Commission therefore has no reason to disbelieve Lt. General Salim Saleh and Mr.
Horn: indeed the composition of the people collected at Namboole derive from such disparate
rebel organisations according to the Panel that that fact alone gives support to his evidence.
It also follows that, if there is no training of a paramilitary force to take over from the UPDF
when the UPDF leaves, then the case for the establishment of networks controlled by UPDF
becomes even thinner.
39. TAX EXEMPTIONS
In Paragraph 104 the reconstituted Panel refer once again to tax exemptions. On the evidence
the probability is that tax exemptions arise from pre-financing deals. Those not directly
20 involved would only see the letter of exemption, particularly in cases where it is said that
those payments were made to Trinity or others, and disappeared into a Congolese pocket. This
would give rise to a perception that the companies were benefiting, and this Commission
thinks that, in the majority of cases, it is this perception upon which the reconstituted Panel
has been misled to rely
As an example of the granting of a tax exoneration to Col Otafiire, at the request of the
witness interviewed in Nairobi the reconstituted Panel provided him with a document which
he produced in evidence. This was a letter from Col Otafiire introducing a proposed
commercial operator who wanted to import petrol. It bore no request for tax exoneration: and
in the circumstances, if it had, the exoneration would have benefited the commercial operator,
30 not Col Otafiire. Col Otafiire agrees that he introduced a number of commercial operators to
authorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and said that as Minister of State for
Regional Cooperation, such things were part of his duty. If the reconstituted Panel is relying
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on such letters, (and only the one example has been provided), then this Commission
cannot agree with their conclusions in this Paragraph.
39.1. Local Operators
In Paragraph 105, the reconstituted Panel point out that such favours shown to
Ugandan importers would affect local commercial operators badly. Obviously this
would be so, where no tax was paid, but the reconstituted Panel leave out of account
the pre-financing payments which the evidence, even that of the Nairobi witness,
clearly shows were being collected from importers. The question of the sufficiency,
and the application of these collections would be a matter which should be taken up
with the rebel authorities 10 to whom they were paid.
39.2. Victor Bout
In Paragraph 107 the Panel refer to the involvement of the transnational criminal
group of Victor Bout. From a list of outbound flights from 1998 to 2002 from
Entebbe (which was provided to the reconstituted Panel by this Commission), the
reconstituted Panel make a connection with Planet Air, which is said to file flight
plans on behalf of his airlines, named as Okapi Air, renamed Odessa.
This Commission prepared the list in question from CAA log entries of flights to the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and also has the incoming flights on another
database. The list with outgoing flights was submitted to Mr. Raeymaekers of IPIS,
20 who was able to match up the plane registration numbers with ownership of the
planes. There are 97 flights of planes said to belong to Victor Bout recorded. They
have been registered by CAA individually as operated variously by ACS, Air Cess,
Central African Air, Air Pass, Military and Nyota. There is only one flight recorded
as of Planet Air. There are no flights for Okapi Air or Odessa.
While it is clear that planes of Victor Bout have been used extensively from Entebbe
to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the connection to Planet Air and Jovial
Akandwanaho is unsupported by the database to which the reconstituted Panel refer.
40. STRATEGIES AND SOURCES OF REVENUE
40.1. Coltan:
30 In Paragraph 108, the reconstituted Panel make the first specific allegations against
Ugandans in respect of Coltan. In earlier reports the matter has been largely ignored.
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It is too late in the day for this Commission to launch a further inquiry on this
subject. This Commission would point out that the description by La Conmet, which
is accused of operating within Trinity, of the gathering of Coltan, supported by their
copy purchase receipt book, reveals purchase of small amounts of Coltan from
hundreds of different artisans over a period of 6 months, and payment of taxes on the
subsequent export. This does not reveal a coordination of the supply under Trinity.
40.2. La Conmet
The reconstituted Panel, in its Final Report, allege in paragraph 108 that Coltan has
been exploited extensively in Oriental Province by various armed groups under the
protection of UPDF and used a company called 10 La Conmet as a case study of a
commercial chain involving coltan in paragraphs 109 – 111. The allegation was that
in March 2002, the reconstituted Panel members met with one Valentina Piskounov
who, together with her husband, Anatoli Piskounov, represents and operates La
Conmet from Kampala. It alleged that Ms Piskounov told the Panel that because of
the collapse of the international coltan market, prices for the mineral in the eastern
Democratic of Congo had dropped dramatically, but the international dealers continue
to have interest in coltan from Democratic Republic of Congo due to ‘very low’
labour costs of extracting the mineral. Therefore La Conmet continue to buy coltan
from its office in Butembo in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Ms Piskounov is
20 alleged to have told the Panel that their purchase price for coltan with a 30% tantalum
content was $ 10 per kilogram, which the Company sold at $ 17 per kilogram.
Ms Piskounov is also alleged to have told the Panel that the company’s coltan was
transported by road from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Entebbe International
Airport from where it was transported to Kazakhstan for processing. It is said that in
addition to the profit made on the sales of the coltan, La Conmet had been granted
‘full exoneration’ for all its activities involving exploitation for the territory of Beni-
Lubero in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The exoneration included freedom
from paying fiscal and customs duties. The document granting the exoneration signed
by Mbusa Nyamwisi, who was then Commissioner General for RCD – Kisangani on
5th 30 January, 2000 in which General Salim Saleh is identified as the owner of La
Conmet, was said to be in possession of the Panel. This Commission has not seen it.
This Commission received evidence from Ms Valentina Piskounova and her husband
as well as Lt. General Salim Saleh. The evidence of the Piskounovs show that La
Conmet S.P.R.L is a company registered in the Democratic Republic of Congo. It is
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owned by a Uganda registered company Kullinan Finance Investment Company.
Kullinan Finance Investment Co. Ltd is owned by Mr. Anatoli Piskounov and an
offshore company called Term Invest Company INC, an international Business
Company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands on 11th September, 2000.
Kullinan Finance Investment Co Ltd owns 99% of the shares in La Conmet whilst 1%
of the Shares is owned by Ituri Gold Mining Co.
The Commission is in possession of the registration documents of both companies.
Lt. General Salim Saleh has no interest in any of the companies that own La Conmet.
Therefore he could not be the owner of La Conmet. Lt. General Salim Saleh has
testified on oath that he has no interest in La Conmet. His 10 evidence is corroborated by
Mr. and Mrs. Piskounov.
According to the evidence available, La Conmet exported only one consignment of
coltan from Democratic Republic of Congo to Ulba, Kazakhstan in October 2000.
The commission has in its possession receipts for taxes paid by the company to the
Congolese authorities in respect of that export. Therefore it is not correct that the
company was exempt from paying fiscal and customs duties.
It will be remembered that the original Panel ran into some trouble in its case study of
Dara Forêt: here is another example of a problematic case study, involving a report of
an interview which does not reflect the facts revealed by documentation. No doubt a
20 complete case study would have involved looking at the documentation available
from the Piskounovs, compared with the document in the panel’s possession.
Unfortunately the reconstituted Panel did not avail that document to this Commission,
which must proceed on available evidence.
Consequently this Commission has come to a conclusion that the allegations
contained in paragraphs 109 – 111 are not supported by credible evidence.
40.3. Diamonds - Victoria
In Paragraph 112 the reconstituted Panel set out briefly the information supplied to it
by this Commission in relation to Victoria’s diamond operations, and Khalil. This
Commission has no evidence to connect Lt. General Saleh with Victoria, nor is there
30 any evidence available upon which this Commission could act, that Victoria has been
purchasing gold from local comptoirs with counterfeit money: it may or may not be
so, but there is no evidence upon which this Commission can recommend any action
by the Government of Uganda.
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40.4. Tax Fraud and the requisition of assets
This Commission has no information on the matters dealt with by the reconstituted
Panel in Paragraphs114 to 117.
40.5. Economic exploitation and ethnic conflict.
This Commission has dealt with the ethnic conflicts at Paragraph 22.4 above.
According to the reconstituted Panel in Paragraph 122, and 123, there is a Protocol
d’Accord dated 22nd February 2002, signed by Mbusa Nyamwisi and John Tibasiima
for RCD-K/ML, and by Col Mayombo as an official representative of the
Government of Uganda. It is alleged to provide for reduction of armed conflict in
Ituri, keeping a contingent in place for that purpose, with 10 a provision for payment of
the UPDF of $25,000, and exoneration from all duties and taxes due to the rebel
administration. If such an agreement exists, this Commission is astonished that the
reconstituted Panel would not have supplied this Commission with a copy of it, and
access if necessary to the original. It is not quite clear whether the reconstituted Panel
are saying that the document, or a copy of it, is in their possession, or whether, as in
another case, they had merely heard of it. The alleged document has been denied on
behalf of the Ugandan Government by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in
evidence before us by Col Mayombo. In the face of such direct evidence, this
Commission cannot take the matter any further, nor make any recommendations
20 which might be able to put into effect action based upon the allegations in these
Paragraphs, other than that, if it does exist, it should be publicly renounced.
Since completion of the final draft of this Report the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
requested, and was availed from the UN Panel Office, a copy of the alleged Protocole
d’Accord, and in view of Col Mayombo’s evidence, this Commission sent it to the
handwriting expert for analysis, together with specimen signatures of the three parties
who are alleged to have signed it. In respect of the purported signatures of Mr
Tibasiima and Col Mayombo, the opinion of the handwriting expert is
uncompromising, and matches the untutored observation of this Commission, that
these signatures are clumsy forgeries. The purported signature of Mr Nyamwisi is not
30 so obviously forged to the untutored eye,. However, the handwriting expert reports
that it is highly likely that the document was not executed by Mr Nyamwisi.
In addition to the evidence obtained from the handwriting, Col Mayombo points out
that it would have been crazy for the parties to execute such a document at a time
when the UN Panel and this Commission were actively investigating
185
This Commission itself is confused as to the purpose of the document. On the
face of it, it appears to be an agreement for, inter alia, payment of US$25,000 per
month to UPDF Officers, and further, exoneration from tax for the UPDF and certain
airlines.
The document describes “the ally” in Paragraph 2 of the decisions, not as the Uganda
Government, on whose behalf the Panel would have Col Mayombo as signing, but as
the UPDF.
Only a little thought makes it very unlikely that the whole UPDF, from Army
Commander to the lowest private, would be able to secure complete exoneration from
tax on behalf of favoured companies, or indeed themselves, 10 merely by signature, for
ever more. This in itself raises doubts about the document.
Further, the agreement would be an agreement which could never be used, because it
could never be made public in the event of a dispute, and therefore never enforced.
This is so because, as the Final Report of the Panel shows, publication of the terms of
the agreement would immediately be accompanied by an outcry from the
International Community.
The purported Protocole d’Accord is a final attempt by the Panel’s informants to drag
the name of Uganda as a state into the limelight for criticism. The attempt fails.
40.6. Armed Conflict and its consequences: Malnutrition and mortality
20 This Commission groups together Paragraphs 124 to 131, because in those
Paragraphs the reconstituted Panel describes the horrifying consequences of war, not
solely attributable to the actions of the UPDF. This Commission does not wish to
minimise the seriousness of these problems, and joins with the reconstituted Panel,
and no doubt the whole International Community, in decrying such actions wherever
in the world they occur, and in fervently praying for peace, particularly in the
Democratic Republic of Congo . So far as Uganda is concerned, any step of
disengagement taken, consistent with Uganda’s border security and the Lusaka
Agreement is recommended. It might also be thought that officers named in the
Panel’s Final Report, whether found by this Commission to have been implicated or
30 not, should be removed from all official connection with the Democratic Republic of
Congo, in order to avoid unfortunate perceptions, and further allegations of
interference.
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40.7. Cooperation
Under the heading “Collaboration of the Panel with the Porter Commission in
Uganda”, the reconstituted Panel appear to be critical of the work of this
Commission.
At the inception of the enquiries of the reconstituted Panel, this Commission was
unable to obtain any documents at all from the reconstituted Panel. On one visit to
this Commission, it was explained by the Panel’s Chairman that UN Panels never
released their sources of information, bearing in mind protection of their sources. This
Commission therefore lobbied many of the Diplomats in Kampala to exert pressure
through the UN for the release of some information: and, 10 late in the proceedings, one
document with attachments relating to General Kazini was sent, whether as a result of
that lobbying or not being unknown. After a successful (from the point of view of the
Panel) cross examination of General Kazini, other documents were sent.
This Commission has been disappointed that more documents have not been made
available, to enable it to take to task officers of the UPDF who have clearly been
lying before this Commission. As an example, this Commission would have expected
the Panel to have volunteered a copy of the Protocole d’Accord alleged to have been
signed, amongst others, by Col Mayombo as an official representative of the
Government of Uganda, referred to in the reconstituted Panel’s Final Report at
20 Paragraph 122. Minutes of the meeting referred to in the following paragraph would
also have been of great assistance. This Commission has been able to take evidence
from Col Mayombo on this matter: he denies having signed any such document, and
it would have been beneficial to have been able to put it to him, in order to
demonstrate that he is the liar the reconstituted Panel believes him to be. In fact after
completion of the final draft of this report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs obtained a
copy of the alleged Protocole, which this Commission has examined at Paragraph
40.5 above. The document is clearly, even to the untutored eye, a forgery.
Since the Panel is in the position of accuser, rather more help, in the form of
ammunition for cross-examination of witnesses, was hoped for, although this
30 Commission would immediately acknowledge the great assistance given by the
reconstituted Panel in availing the statement of, and facilities for interview of, the
Nairobi witness.
In respect of those documents which have had to be ignored due to the opinion of the
handwriting expert, and the observation of the members of this Commission, it should
187
be pointed out that the opinion of the handwriting expert is supported by
photographs clearly showing the problems he identified: it should also be said that a
simple test by lining up a piece of A4 paper, while not definitive, can easily identify
such problems before making the decision to forward such matters for expert opinion,
and can even now be conducted on the exhibits available to confirm for the
uninitiated what the expert has clearly demonstrated in his reports. Such evidence is
not easy merely to dismiss by statement without investigation.
The original purpose of the Panel was to investigate allegations of illegal exploitation.
It reported on many such matters, and its report was met with criticism, a great deal of
which this Commission has found to have been justified. 10 Early meetings with the
reconstituted Panel reflected this, and could well have contributed to a perception of
strained relations, and criticism on the part of the Panel, which at that time was
composed of a majority of original Panel members. The initial refusal of the Panel to
name sources or release documents certainly contributed to the difficulty of
conducting this Commission.
In the Addendum, the reconstituted Panel moved from the word “illegal” to the word
“illicit”. This Commission has also explained the consequences of this, both to the
reconstituted Panel in meetings, and in this Report.
In the final Report, so far as Uganda is concerned, the reconstituted Panel appears to
20 have abandoned the use of either word completely, contenting itself with talking of
networks which in themselves, “closely resemble criminal organisations” supported
by organized or transnational criminal groups.
The reconstituted Panel has clearly moved on from its original mandate to look at
excesses: this Commission had dealt with this at Paragraph 31.1 above, and would not
criticize the reconstituted Panel for that: it would merely comment that the
Commission’s terms of reference are tight, relating to illegal exploitation of the
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and therefore the
Commission could not accompany the reconstituted Panel on its wider journey.
Nevertheless, on that journey, the reconstituted Panel has come across additional
30 factors which go to show that some of the criticisms of the original Panel, though
denied by witnesses before this Commission, and unsupported by evidence before this
Commission, were in fact right: and there is no better example than the
correspondence showing that General Kazini was working on behalf of Victoria,
leading to a connection with a chain of evidence referred to by the reconstituted Panel
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in Paragraph 112 of their report, which evidence was supplied to the
reconstituted Panel by this Commission, (although there is no acknowledgement of
that).
The Chairman of this Commission communicated to the Chairman of the
reconstituted Panel his satisfaction that at last it had been possible to make a finding
based on clear evidence with respect to that, in the hope that once the deadlock over
the supply of documentation by the reconstituted Panel had been broken, further
assistance would be availed.
The wording of the communication, set out in the Final report, clearly shows a,
perhaps inappropriate, satisfaction that finally the 10 Commission was able to get
somewhere, and to make a finding which the reconstituted Panel might have
recognised as a desire fairly to investigate and confirm, according to its rules of
evidence, an allegation the truth of which the reconstituted Panel was satisfied, and
reveals this Commission, where evidence was available, as being prepared to support
the objects of the reconstituted Panel.
This Commission was a little surprised that a personal comment such as this,
revealing a conclusion apparently reached before publication of its final report, has
been published in such a public way. However, what is done is done, and this
Commission has found no reason to change what, by then, was a tentative conclusion.
20 No harm has in fact resulted.
40.7.1. “Concessions”
However the reconstituted Panel seems to have continued to treat this Commission
with suspicion, as can be seen from Paragraph 136 of the Final Report. The
evidence for this is contained only in one word, but the word is so inappropriate,
and twice repeated, that it bears a certain amount of consideration.
When cross-examining General Kazini with the benefit of the three documents
supplied by the reconstituted Panel, the record is quite clear that this Commission
was extremely tough on General Kazini, as is its function if it is forced to descend
into the arena. It accused him of lying on previous occasions. In later discussions
30 with the reconstituted Panel, this was indeed repeated.
But on neither occasion was this a “concession”: on both occasions it was a
comment on the situation as this Commission saw it at the time on the evidence
189
before it, and indeed now as it completes its Final Report. To use the word
“concede” on both occasions is to imply an antagonistic stance by this
Commission which it has never taken: far from antagonising the reconstituted
Panel, this Commission supplied evidence of the chain which connected with
General Kazini, which the reconstituted Panel has set out and relied upon at
Paragraph 112. The transcript was provided with a view to apprising the Panel of
what was being said to the Commission, in the hope that this would provoke some
reaction in the form of documentation upon which the Panel claim to have relied.
Further, as the transcript (most of which has been supplied already to the
reconstituted Panel) will show, this Commission 10 has throughout done its best to
expose weaknesses in the evidence of those who have given evidence before it,
although it has had little ammunition upon which to base that cross-examination.
This Commission is criticized for submitting “one of the Panel’s informants to an
unusually aggressive questioning designed to frighten the individual and discredit
his testimony”. This Commission concedes (this time) that the session was
unusually long, and points out that it offered a break to the following day, of
which offer the witness did not want to take advantage.
However, the manner of questioning was in no way unusual, nor designed to
frighten or discredit: those accused by the Panels have been treated in the same
20 manner. That is the function of a Commission, and a method of getting at the truth
established over centuries. Establishing the credit of a witness cannot usually be
achieved merely by listening to what is said without testing it The offer has
always been open to the reconstituted Panel to observe or participate in the
proceedings if it wished. It has not done so.
In the circumstances obtaining here, leaving aside technical data and similar
matters, and confining the area of investigation to the involvement of Ugandans,
one can expect four types of witnesses: the Democratic Republic of Congo
Government supporters of various ranks, rebels and their leaders residing in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, dissident rebels and Ugandans residing out of the
30 Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ugandans who may or may not have been
misbehaving in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Each of those classes can be
expected to have an interest in criticizing the others, and in telling less than the
whole truth. Complainants who are not prepared to make their complaints in
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public should be treated with particular care. Possible mistaken perceptions
should also be taken into account and challenged.
In the nature of things, the Panel would have primary access to those who were
complaining about the behaviour of Ugandans, normally of the first three classes,
and would, (or at least should) thereafter approach and interview those accused,
that is, normally, Ugandans on the subject of the complaints. This may be an oversimplification,
but that is why this Commission views the Panel as accusers, or
complainants.
This Commission’s position is different: it is tasked to investigate the allegations
made by the Panel, and recommend to the Government 10 of Uganda steps which the
Government could take. In performing its task, while it has wide powers of
investigation in Uganda, it has none elsewhere, and particularly not in the
Democratic Republic of Congo . This Commission would in the nature of things
have primary access to the fourth class, those accused who would also have an
interest in criticising others and telling less than the whole truth. The best manner
top resolve any differences would have been for open communication between the
Panel and the Commission.
In regard to a general allegation there is little that can be done. The Uganda
Government has asked in its response for specificity and supporting evidence.
20 In regard to an allegation against a particular individual, unsupported by primary
evidence of a witness in complaint (which the Panel appears not to be able to
avail, due to protection of its informants, a position this Commission understands
in some cases), or by supporting documentation, this Commission’s hands are tied.
All it can do is to put the allegation to the person accused, listen to him deny it,
and conclude that it cannot recommend to the Government of Uganda that further
steps be taken, for lack of evidence. Sometimes the accused person, in denying
accusations, provides information which can be used in cross-examination of other
accused persons, which may result in a useful conclusion. Sometimes evidence
can be compared with other sources, such as the databases prepared by this
30 Commission, copied to the Panel.
To simplify the matter, imagine a prosecution of a man for murder, based upon an
newspaper article, with no witnesses for the prosecution, no weapon no motive
and no dead body: or a civil case in which the Plaintiff files a Plaint but does not
give evidence. These are parallel situations.
191
The first documentation supplied by the reconstituted Panel in respect of
General Kazini, gave this commission some hard evidence upon which to come to
a conclusion which supported the Panel’s. Its consideration of the evidence, the
documents themselves, and a transcript of the evidence taken are there for all to
see.
40.7.2. Questionable documents
With regard to the next bundle of documents, there were problems. The
documents were not received until shortly before the end of this Commission’s
already extended life, and in order to investigate, a further extension of 3 months
10 was required.
This Commission has considered those documents at Paragraphs 20.3 above to
20.7 above. Unlike the first set, which General Kazini admitted writing after some
of the “aggressive” questioning of which the reconstituted Panel complain, those
concerned on oath said that many of the documents were forgeries. This cast the
burden on this Commission of looking into the matter.
None of the members of this Commission profess any knowledge of the
technicalities of forgery of documents, and documents which appeared suspicious
were sent to a handwriting expert, in the normal course of investigation. The
expert has reported: his evidence is contained in exhibits and is available for all to
20 see. In some cases he has advised this Commission that some documents are
forgeries, and this Commission has decided, on the basis of that evidence, and in
some cases, due to the contents of the documents themselves, that it is unable to
rely upon them. This decision was communicated to the reconstituted Panel in the
spirit of co-operation, and resulted in the offer of a witness in support. This
witness was interviewed (in Nairobi, with the Panel’s welcome assistance), and a
further witness, mentioned by that witness as one who would confirm his
evidence, but who gave contrary evidence, interviewed in London.
In addition to the above, the Protocole d’Accord referred to by the Panel has
turned out to be a definite forgery: and this adds verisimilitude to the decisions
30 made by this Commission in respect of other questionable documents. The danger
of relying on these documents cannot be dismissed out of hand, as the Panel has
done in Paragraph 135 of their Report.
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40.7.3. Credibility
The Panel say “The Panel’s many efforts to establish a constructive relationship
with the Commission have mostly been met with attempts to dismiss its
credibility”, and gives the above as examples. This Commission has been
presented with evidence, has examined it, found problems with some of it, and
decided that it is unable to recommend to the Government of Uganda that it can
take action upon it. This should not be construed as an attempt to discredit the
Panel.
As the reconstituted Panel say, this relationship is unique, and in the respectful
submission of this Commission, eminently desirable. However, 10 it is plain, from
what the reconstituted Panel say, that without the encouragement of Member
States, no working relationship could have been established. This Commission has
had no such approach, and was always desirous of establishing a working
relationship. The difficulty has always been the Panel’s reluctance to release
information. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that this Commission had
been working for nearly a year before information considered useful by the
reconstituted Panel began to be provided. This Commission takes the view that an
opportunity to enable Uganda to confirm Panel allegations and to act upon them
with hard evidence has been lost.
20 40.7.4. Comparative Procedures
This Commission has not questioned the Panel’s credibility as alleged: it has
merely considered the evidence before it, and recorded its conclusions. On many
occasions this information has been supplied to the Panel. This Commission takes
the view that there are sufficient arguments over the Democratic Republic of
Congo and would have preferred not to have to enter the lists. However, in view of
Paragraph 135 of the Final Report, this Commission would ask, in view of its own
consideration of the evidence, whether the Panel is right in saying that “reliable
witnesses have testified to their (letters) validity”. Are the witnesses truly reliable?
Did the Panel ever entertain any doubt of it, or test the witnesses and the
30 documents as has this Commission, whether aggressively or not?
Is the Panel right, by saying that this Commission “has submitted other documents
signed by ranking officials to handwriting analysis to imply that they may be
forgeries”, to suggest that this Commission has by some underhand and unfair
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means cheated the Panel out of the ability to rely on documents which appear
to be at the basis of the Panel’s case against certain officers?
How can the Panel say “The analysis of those documents, however, suggests that
the signatures were probably genuine.” What analysis? By whom? How does it
compare with the expense, care, effort and time spent by this Commission on this
subject? Is it available to the public for assessment, as are the evidences and the
deliberations of this Commission?
This Commission takes the view that, if documents are shown on the evidence to
be questionable, they should not be relied upon either by this Commission or by
10 the reconstituted Panel.
As to the matter raised by the Panel, relating to its credibility (considered at
Paragraph 40.7.3 above), or, as this Commission would prefer to put it, the
credibility of its Report, it is only necessary to refer to the unfortunate matter of
the forged Protocole d’Accord to form an opinion on the matter. The whole report
of the Panel is undermined by the failure of the Panel to deal with this problem,
since if the Panel can be so badly misled by one informant on a subject so strongly
relied upon in their Report, it cannot be ruled out that the same has happened in
other areas.
40.7.5. Powers of the Commission
20 Lastly, the reconstituted Panel, in Paragraph 137 have set out what it conceives to
be the position of this Commission. Unfortunately, there are some
misunderstandings. Commissions of Inquiry report direct in confidence to the
Minister who called them, in this case the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It is a
matter for that Minister to decide whether to publish the report or not. In this case
the Minister is on record, sight unseen, as saying that it will be published. His
Excellency the President, on behalf of Government, has said publicly that action
will be taken on recommendations in the report. If a report contains
recommendations for investigation with a view to prosecution, it is a matter for the
Minister involved to decide whether the recommendation for prosecution is
30 justified, and if he does, then he will forward the papers to the Director of Public
Prosecutions who has a Constitutional discretion to initiate a prosecution.
The Final Report also states that this Commission has no powers to obtain military
records and documents from the Defence Ministry. This is not so, and indeed this
194
Commission has obtained sheaves of information from such sources, included
in the exhibits. Therein lies the problem. There is too much information. What this
Commission was trying to get over to the Panel was that in order to make
meaningful requests for such records and documents, that is, to narrow the field,
this Commission needed documents in support of the Panel’s allegations, and that
there was no purpose in making such requests without such documentation. This
was a problem in communication which was probably the fault of the Chairman of
this Commission in trying every tactic to obtain documentary evidence from the
reconstituted Panel, which is regretted.
40.8. Agreement 10 in General
Nevertheless, leaving aside details and personalities, in general this Commission and
the reconstituted Panel are not so far apart. There is agreement that the original
Panel’s allegations against Uganda as a State, and against President Museveni were
wrong. There is agreement that officers to a very senior level, and men of the UPDF
have conducted themselves in the Democratic Republic of Congo in a manner
unbecoming. Arising from this, this Commission recommends that the ongoing
Defence Review include:
a careful assessment of the ability, intelligence, and educational achievements
of, particularly, officers. Some of those who have given evidence before this
20 Commission have barely been able to make themselves understood, even to
the rank of Major.
A stringent examination of the capacity of the officer to fill his office as a
professional soldier
The commitment of the officer to the defence of the State rather than selfadvancement
and self-enrichment, and respect for Civil Authority as required
under the Constitution.
41. RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE FINAL REPORT
Many of the recommendations in the Final Report are of a wide nature, and far outside this
Commission’s terms of reference. Most are unobjectionable, and a valuable contribution to
30 resolution of the regional problem.
However there are problems with some of the recommendations. This Commission has in
Paragraph 36 above pointed out the difficulty in complying with the recommendations in
Paragraph 172, relating to phased reductions in aid disbursements, due to lack of specific
evidence.
195
There are similar problems in the recommendations as to restrictions on business
enterprises and individuals, many of whom appear in the Annexes without a word in the text
to support allegations against them.
Before action is taken against companies alleged to be breaking OECD guidelines, it would
be necessary to be sure that the companies involved were covered by those guidelines.
42. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
Since completing the final draft of this report, this Commission has been approached by a
possible witness who stated that he had information which appeared to support some of the
allegations made by the Panel in the Final Report. These were matters involving Col Peter
Kerim, Salim Saleh, Mr Horn and others. The reliability of this 10 prospective witness was
instantly in question, first because he has come so late, second because he refused to assist, or
even to sign the statement taken from him without payment of a very large sum of money.
Additionally, one of the allegations he made was that Salim Saleh was using a company
called Eagle Drill to pump crude petroleum from the Democratic Republic of Congo to
Kasese along pipes which he had obtained from some abandoned water pipes belonging to the
Government. This allegation was so ridiculous that this Commission was unwilling to take the
matter further: however, one allegation relating to the possession of elephant tusks could be
investigated by the Police, and this Commission set these investigations in train. At the time
of writing, the investigators have been given the run around.
20 For these reasons, this Commission cannot take the matter further.
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43. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
In this Commission’s Terms of reference, the Commission was tasked to cover four general
subjects as set out below:-
43.1. Inquiry into allegations of illegal exploitation of natural resources
43.1.1. Exploitation
There is no doubt that there has been excessive exploitation of the natural
resources of the the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1998, and indeed from
before that. This exploitation includes minerals, coffee, timber, livestock, wildlife
and ivory, and has been carried out by foreign governments, but not by the
Ugandan Government: by foreign armies under the policies 10 of their governments,
but not in the case of Uganda: by international companies (such as Unilever) and
businessmen in the ordinary course of trade, operating through Uganda, mainly for
export to Europe and America: by senior army officers working on their own and
through contacts inside the Democratic Republic of Congo : by individual soldiers
taking advantage of their postings: by cross border trade and by private
individuals living within Uganda, and, for all this Commission knows, within
other countries who have established contacts and assist in facilitating transport
and clearance of goods through transit countries.
43.1.2. Illegality
20 This Commission has dealt at length with the question of illegality of exploitation
at Paragraphs 11 and 31.1 above. It is clear that the paths of this Commission and
of the reconstituted Panel now diverge on this point. This Commission’s Terms of
reference are specific as to illegality, while the reconstituted Panel are now
looking at ways to stem excessive exploitation, whether illegal, illicit or merely
prejudicial to the interests of the Democratic Republic of Congo when political
normality returns. While this is a praiseworthy object, with which this
Commission would have liked to assist, it is not within this Commission’s Terms
of Reference. The only matter to note is that the reconstituted Panel have almost
completely abandoned allegations that what was going on in the Democratic
30 Republic of Congo was illegal, terming it “illicit” instead. As this Commission has
shown in Paragraph 31.1, this volte face removes many of the allegations of the
original Panel from the need for consideration by this Commission. The Final
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Report abandons any pretence of “illegal” or “illicit” in respect of Uganda
until its recommendations, for instance Paragraph 172. This reference has no
support in the text.
43.2. Inquiry into allegations of Mass Scale Looting and Systematic Exploitation
43.2.1. Mass scale Looting
This Commission has dealt with the allegations of Mass Scale Looting at
Paragraph 15 above, and notes that the reconstituted Panel has abandoned this as a
separate heading. Each specific instance given by the original Panel was
considered separately by this Commission, and in most cases this Commission
found that the allegations were unlikely to 10 be true for reasons given. The
outstanding matter was Looting, about which General Kazini clearly knew as he
sent a radio message about it. This commission is unable to exclude the possibility
that individual soldiers of the UPDF were involved, or that they were supported by
senior officers
43.2.2. Systematic and Systemic Exploitation
This section of the original Panel Report contains the flawed Dara Forêt Case
Study, with which this Commission has dealt at length in Paragraph 24 above, and
in respect of which the reconstituted Panel have found Dara Forêt to be legally
established. In the Addendum the reconstituted Panel have cleared the Uganda
20 Government of involvement in such exploitation, and this Commission’s
investigations have revealed the same. However in the Final Report, Dara Forêt
resurfaces as a company which breaches OECD guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises. There is no basis in the text for this allegation, and further, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, where Dara Forêt is registered, (not in Thailand as
alleged in the Annex III), is not a member or signatory of the OECD. Nor is
Uganda. It is difficult then to understand the inclusion of Dara Forêt in Annex III
to the Final Report.
In respect of the Mining sector, there were allegations of Mining Disasters caused
while UPDF soldiers were using civilians to mine for them, and the imposition of
30 a gold tax. This Commission’s investigations in Paragraph 16.2 above reveal that
there is no doubt that both RCD and UPDF soldiers were imposing a gold tax, and
that it is very likely that UPDF soldiers were involved in at least one mining
accident. Unfortunately investigations conducted by the UPDF were so
198
compromised as to be useless. There was also confirmation available of
harrasment of civilians as alleged by the original Panel (See Paragraph 16.2.2
above). In this area, the UPDF has revealed a lack of discipline which has shamed
Uganda on the International Scene.
Under the heading of Wildlife, this Commission’s investigations raised many
suspicions, but due to lack of specificity in the original Panel Report, this
Commission was unable to investigate sufficiently.
Additionally there were allegations of Monopolies and price fixing. On
examination of each allegation, this Commission found nothing in these
10 allegations.
43.3. Inquiry into Allegations of Complicity by His Excellency the President and his
family
Those involved are:
His Excellency the President. This Commission has examined each and
every allegation against His Excellency with great care. None of the
allegations are based in fact: in one case, the so-called Dara Forêt Case
Study, this would appear to call for a specific admission that the original
Panel was wrong.
Salim Saleh. This Commission is not impressed by the denials of Salim
20 Saleh, bearing in mind his involvement in air transport to and from the
Democratic Republic of Congo. However, apart from the deception practiced
upon His Excellency the President, to which this Commission has referred in
Paragraph 18.3 above, there is no evidence available to this Commission to
take the matter any further, though there is great suspicion arising from
evidence from the Nairobi witness that Salim Saleh was involved in Trinity.
There are some internal matters upon which recommendations for
investigation with a view to prosecution have been made in Paragraph 28
above relating to Salim Saleh, Air Alexander and Take Air. In the Final
Report, there are new allegations in relation to Salim Saleh’s involvement in
30 La Conmet, which this Commission is unable to confirm (see Paragraph
37.3.3 above), and he is also said to have been the head of Trinity, upon
which the evidence before this Commission is confined to the evidence of the
Nairobi witness which amounts to an unsupported undetailed allegation only.
199
Jovial Akandwanaho. This Commission has set out Jovial
Akandwanaho’s involvement with Khalil’s diamond smuggling ring at
Paragraph 21.3.5 above
Muhoozi Kainerugaba. There is nothing in the allegations against this
officer. This Commission has dealt with the allegations at Paragraph 14.3
above.
43.4. Inquiry into Allegations of Involvement of Top Ranking Army Officers and other
Ugandans
This Commission has found a number of areas in which the allegations of the original Panel
against General Kazini are soundly based in evidence. The main 10 area was General Kazini’s
involvement with Khalil and Victoria, dealt with at Paragraph 21.3.4 above. In the matter of
control of his commanders in the field, investigation, follow up and disciplinary action in
relation to complaints under this officer’s area of command were suspiciously weak. There is
no doubt that as a matter of practice “Security/Intelligence Funding” was imposed on RCD,
businessmen and companies, or that General Kazini’s regret was that his commanders were
likely to take the money for themselves, rather than accounting to him. (See Paragraph 21.3.4
above)
The reconstituted Panel have forwarded to this Commission two documents which involve the
Hon Wapakhabulo, Col Mayombo and Col Otafiire in a claim that there was a payment to
20 them by RCD Kis of $380,000. This Commission heard evidence from a witness in Nairobi
provided by the Panel, and another witness interviewed in London: their evidence was
completely opposite. This Commission has considered this matter in full detail (see Paragraph
20.6), and is unable to confirm the Panel’s conclusions in this matter. This Commission
would further comment that the two documents, one signed by Col Mayombo and the other
by Professor Wamba appear to the handwriting expert to be genuine so far as can be told from
a photocopy, although denied by the signatories,. This Commission is not satisfied that the
main witnesses involved have told the whole truth. However there is no reliable evidence
against Col Otafiire and the Hon Wapakhabulo.
There are other allegations against Col Mayombo (Paragraph 20.7 above and Col Otafiire
30 (Paragraph 20.5 above) which were supported by questionable documents upon which this
Commission is unable to rely.
There are a number of occasions on which this commission has found that senior officers
have lied to protect themselves while giving evidence: those involved in the mining incidents,
Col. Mugenyi, Major Ssonko, and Lt. Okumu as examples. Further the evidence of the liaison
200
officers at the Military Air Base has been shown to be untrue in respect of goods arriving
at the Air Base on military aircraft.
44. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION
44.1. Indiscipline of UPDF Officers
This Commission recommends that the deliberate and persistent indiscipline by General
Kazini and his Senior officers throughout the Democratic Republic of the Congo as revealed
by General Kazini’s radio messages should be further and thoroughly investigated urgently,
and disciplinary action taken (see Paragraph 13 above). Disciplinary action is recommended
against those officers named in this section of the Report at Paragraph 13 above.
44.2. 10 General Kazini
This officer has been mentioned in connection with a number of incidents in all the reports
prepared by the UN Panels. This Commission has heard very clear evidence to confirm many
of those allegations. In particular, this Commission recommends that thorough investigation
and appropriate action should be undertaken in respect of General Kazini’s radio instructions
to his commanders not to keep any payments for security funding given to them, but to send
such payments to him at TAC HQ (see Paragraph 17.4 above).
This officer has shamed the name of Uganda, and this Commission recommends that
disciplinary action against him be taken by the relevant authority.
44.3. UPDF Officers conspiring to allow illegal flights
20 The Commission recommends that investigations and disciplinary action should be taken
against UPDF military authorities who conspired to see that flights illegal by both Uganda
Law and International Convention were falsely recorded as the flights of State Aircraft, which
they were not, thereby endangering Uganda’s participation in International Air Transport (see
Paragraph 14 above)
44.4. UPDF and the Ongoing Defence Review
This Commission recommends that the ongoing Defence Review include:
44.4.1. Assessment
a careful assessment of the ability, intelligence, and educational
achievements of, particularly, officers. Some of those who have given
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evidence before this Commission have barely been able to make
themselves understood, even to the rank of Major.
44.4.2. Professional ability
A stringent examination of the capacity of the officer to fill his office as
a professional soldier
44.4.3. Constitutional Requirements
The commitment of the officer to the defence of the State rather than
self-advancement and self-enrichment, and respect for Civil Authority as
required under the Constitution.
44.5. Senior 10 Officials of CAA
The Commission recommends that senior officials in the Civil Aviation Authority be
considered for fitness, arising from their failure to see that the provisions of the Chicago
Convention and the Civil Aviation Authority’s Statute were followed, thereby putting
Uganda’s international standing in air transport at risk. (See Paragraph 14.6.3 above)
44.6. Military Air Base
This Commission recommends that the Military Air base at Entebbe be closed, or revert to
civilian operation under the CAA. In any event, apart from true Military Flights, shown to be
chartered by Ministry of Defence, all traffic from the Air Base should immediately stop. In
that regard, it is recommended that CAA insist on production of written proof of charter
20 before clearing the flight for takeoff. Customs should maintain a full time presence at the Air
Base. (See Paragraph 14.6 above)
44.7. Mining Sector
The Commission recommends that the whole question of inquiry into complaints against
officers of the UPDF relating to mining sector should be looked into extremely carefully. The
officers involved in this matter include General Kazini, Lt. Col. Mayombo, Lt. Col.
Mugyenyi, Major Sonko, Major Kagezi, Lt. Okumu. Investigations made by UPDF in respect
of these complaints have been poorly conducted either purposely or through incompetence
(see Paragraphs 16.2,16.2.1 and 16.2.2 above)
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44.8. Lt. General Salim Saleh
44.8.1. Disobedience to the orders of the President
The Commission recommends that the disobedience shown by Lt. General Salim
Saleh in respect of purporting to dispose of control of Air Alexander International
Ltd., while retaining control in fact, contrary to the President’s orders be further
investigated for appropriate action. (See Paragraph 18.3 above)
44.8.2. Take Air Ltd
The Commission recommends further investigations in respect of Take Air Ltd, to
trace and confirm accountability for Ushs 111 million. The Commission has been
unable to complete inquiries as Salim Saleh has failed 10 to produce the necessary
supporting documentation. See Paragraph 18.4 above
44.8.3. Offences against the Companies Act
The Commission recommends that two other specific offences against the
Companies Act committed by Lt. General Salim Saleh should be pursued for
appropriate criminal action. (See Paragraph 28.1 above or Paragraph 20.1 above
and Paragraph 44.10.4 below)
44.9. Diamond smuggling:
The Commission has had information which confirms the participation of Jovial
Akandwanaho in the smuggling operations of Victoria. There is every indication that there is
20 a link between General Kazini, Victoria, Khalil and Jovial Akandwanaho. The evidence
which came to light during Police investigation of a robbery case opened many channels of
investigations. In the circumstances, this Commission recommends strongly that this
smuggling of diamonds, contrary to the Laws of Uganda, should be thoroughly investigated
for further action on the basis of the evidence revealed in this report.(see Paragraph 21.3
above)
44.10. Registration of Companies
44.10.1. Updating of Register
This Commission recommends that the updating of the Registry referred to above
be implemented speedily (see Paragraph 28 above).
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44.10.2. Proactive management of Registration
This Commission recommends that the Registrar and the staff of the Registry
should seriously accept responsibility for proactive management of the Registry
and of the important actions required of Registered Companies. All current files
should be checked for compliance, and immediate action taken against companies
which offend the requirements of the Companies Act.
44.10.3. Revision of penalties
This Commission recommends that fines and sentences for offences under the
Companies Act be revised urgently. They are currently too low.
10 44.10.4. Air Alexander
This Commission recommends that, as an example of the Government’s
determination to rationalize the Registry, and to encourage other Companies to
comply with the Act, the facts revealed by this Commission’s investigations of the
file of Air Alexander at Paragraph 35.1 above be presented to the Director of
Public Prosecutions for further investigation with a view to prosecution of the
responsible parties.
44.11. URA
A Commission of Inquiry into the URA has been established. It is suggested that
this Commission’s recommendations on the URA be copied to that Commission
20 for further consideration in the context of the mandate of that Commission.
44.12. Addendum to the original Panel Report
For this Commission’s comments on the recommendations in the Addendum, see
Paragraph 34 above)
44.13. Panel’s Final Report
44.13.1. General
In Paragraph 41 above this Commission said the following
Many of the recommendations in the Final Report are of a wide nature,
and far outside this Commission’s terms of reference. Most are
204
unobjectionable, and a valuable contribution to resolution of the
regional problem.
However there are problems with some of the recommendations. This
Commission has in Paragraph 36 above pointed out the difficulty in
complying with the recommendations in Paragraph 172, relating to phased
reductions in aid disbursements, due to lack of specific evidence.
There are similar problems in the recommendations as to restrictions on
business enterprises and individuals, many of whom appear in the Annexes
without a word in the text to support allegations against them.
Before action is taken against companies 10 alleged to be breaking OECD
guidelines, it would be necessary to be sure that the companies involved
were covered by those guidelines.
However, in respect of the Panel’s general conclusions, as stated in Paragraph 40.8
above:
Nevertheless, leaving aside details and personalities, in general this
Commission and the reconstituted Panel are not so far apart. There is
agreement that the original Panel’s allegations against Uganda as a State,
and against President Museveni were wrong. There is agreement that
officers to a very senior level, and men of the UPDF have conducted
20 themselves in the Democratic Republic of Congo in a manner unbecoming.
The necessary recommendation in that regard is made above.
In Annex II to the Panel’s final report, recommendations are made for a personal
travel ban and financial restrictions. These recommendations involve the following
(references to Paragraphs in the Final Report):
44.13.2. Colonel Burundi and LA CONMET.
This officer is named in Paragraph 108 only as having been involved in Coltan
operations under Trinity. The question of Coltan has been dealt with in this report
at Paragraphs 40.1 above and 40.2 above. The second paragraph deals with the
30 Piskunov’s of LA CONMET, who are also mentioned in the list. This Commission
is unable to recommend any action against these individuals, due, in respect of
Colonel Burundi to lack of specific information, and in respect of the Piskunov’s
due to evidence, documentation and explanations given on oath before this
Commission.
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44.13.3. Sam Engola
Mr Engola is named in Paragraph 98. Paragraph 98 is a catchall Paragraph
describing the alleged elite networks. This Commission has no idea what Mr
Engola is accused of specifically. This Commission is therefore unable to
recommend any action against this individual. He is also mentioned in Paragraph
116 (with a different spelling, and as a Ugandan parliamentarian, which he is not)
as being involved with illegal logging and fraudulent evacuation of wood.
Paragraph 116 also names Colonel Peter Karim and Colonel Otafiire as similarly
involved. These are serious criminal accusations, which require support, and at
least some indication of the grounds upon which 10 the accusations are made. These
are absent. This Commission is therefore unable to recommend any action against
these individuals
44.13.4. Colonel Peter Karim.
This officer is named in Paragraph 98, and for the same reason, on this ground
alone this Commission is unable to recommend any action against this individual.
This officer is also mentioned in Paragraph 116 dealt with above.
44.13.5. Major General James Kazini.
This officer’s name figures throughout this Report, and recommendations for
action by the Uganda Government have been made. It is respectfully submitted
20 that no action by the International Community is required, pending action by
Uganda.
44.13.6. Colonel Noble Mayombo.
This officer is mentioned in Paragraph 98. On this ground alone this Commission
is unable to recommend any action against this individual. He is also mentioned in
Paragraph 122 in relation to the forged Protocole d’Accord. No action is called for
in this regard. There have also been allegations, not mentioned in the Final Report,
which this Commission has investigated and found to be unsupportable.
44.13.7. Colonel Otafiire.
Colonel Otafiire is mentioned in Paragraph 98, in respect of which no action can
30 be recommended. Also in Paragraph 104, as benefitting from tax exemptions,
which this Commission has dealt with at Paragraph 20.5 above, in respect of
206
documents produced by the Panel upon which this Commission has been
unable to rely. He also is mentioned in Paragraph 116, dealt with above. A travel
ban in respect of this officer bearing in mind his responsibilities for regional Cooperation,
would have far reaching consequences for Uganda.
44.13.8. Lt. General (ret’d) Salim Saleh.
This officers name has also been mentioned throughtout this Report, and
recommendations made on the basis of supportable evidence. There are allegations
which have been investigated, and which cannot be supported.
Signed by Justice 10 D C Porter …………………………………… Chairman
Signed by Justice J P Berko ……………………………………. Commissioner
Signed by John G Rwambuya …………………………………… Commissioner
20
This 15th day of November 2002
207
10
ANNEXTURES
208
9 . ANNEX 1 : EXHIBITS
N.B Scanned copies of the exhibits are available from Ministry of Foreign Affairs on CD
ROM
NO. MARKED
AS
SUBJECT TENDERED BY
1. BKB/1/1 Minutes of Good Neighbourliness
Meeting between Uganda/Zaire officials
held at Rukungiri District H/Q on 9-
10/6/1990.
CW/01 /01 Bernadette Kyomugisha Bigirwa
2. BKB1//2 Minutes of Border Meeting held at
Kasindi on 16/6/1993.
“
3. SKB/1/3 Protocol between DRC/Uganda on
Security along common border in April
1998.
CW/01/02Steven B. Kavuma
4. SBK/1/4 Radio Message by HE President to Chief
of Staff banning trading in DRC by
UPDF Officers/Men on 15/12/1998.
“
5. SBK/1/5 Press report of interview with Mr. Steven
Kavuma, the then Minister of State for
Defence: New Vision, 24/11/1998.
“
6. SBK/1/6 Press reports on refutation by the army of
Congo claims of UPDF forces’ presence in
the DRC territory: New Vision, 12 Aug.
1998.
“
7. SBK/1/7 Press reports of continued plane flights
from DRC into Old airport, Entebbe in
spite of CAA directive: New Vision,
16/08/1999.
“
8. SBK/1/8 Agreement for a Ceasefire in DRC
(Lusaka Peace Agreement), 1999.
“
209
9. JK/1/9 Photocopy of document from one
Embaba, a FAC officer, to an ADF officer
(captured doc. On 15/2/98).
CW/01/03 Brig. James Kazini
10. JK/1/10 Letter from Intelligence Officer, Capt.
Kasule to the Chief of Staff on allegations
against Col. Kerim (interference with
customs) dated 14/3/1999.
“
11. JK/1/11 Letter of appointment by Brig. Kazini of
Ms. Adele Lostove as a provisional
administrator of Ituri province in DRC
dated 18/6/99.
“
12. KBC/1/12 Brief to H.E President Y.K. Museveni by
Uganda’s Ambassador to DRC (Dr.
Kamanda Bataringaya Cos) on the
insurgency in Rwenzori Mountains along
Common Border.
CW/01/04 Dr. Kamanda Bataringaya Cos
13. KBC/1/13 Press Article Titled, “ Uganda is in Congo
Legally”, Sunday Vision, 13/09/1998, pg.9.
“
14. KBC/1/14 Joint Communiqué Between DRC and
Uganda of 1/6/1999.
“
15. BM/1/15 Ministry of Defence Approved Estimates
of Revenue and expenditure (Recurrent
and Development) 1998/99.
CW/01/05 Ben Mbonye
16 BM/1/16 Ministry of Defence Proposed Estimates
1998/99, Financial Analysis of
Programme 02 and 03 as at 30/06/99.
“
17 BM/1/17 Ministry of Defence Approved estimates
of revenue and expenditure (Recurrent
and Development) 1999/2000.
“
18 BM/1/18 Ministry of Defence Proposed Estimates
1999/2000, Financial Analysis of
Programme 02 and 03 as at 30/06/2000.
“
19 BM/1/19 Ministry of Defence Draft Estimates of
Revenue and expenditure (Recurrent and
development) 2000/01.
“
20 RO/1/20 Peace (SIRTE) Agreement Between
Uganda, Eritrea, Chad and DRC
(18/04/1999).
CW/01/06 Ralph Ochan
210
21 RO/1/21 UN Security Council Resolution 1258
(1999) dated 6 August 1999.
“
22 RO/1/22 UN Security Council Resolution 1291
(2000) dated 24 February 2000.
“
23 RO/1/23 UN Security Council Resolution 1304
(2000) dated 16 June 2000.
“
24 RO/1/24 UN Security Council Resolution 1323
(2000) dated 13 October 2000.
“
25 RO/1/25 UN Security Council Resolution 1332
(2000) dated 14 December 2000.
“
26 RO/1/26 UN Security Council Resolution 1341
(2001) dated 22 February 2001.
“
27 RO/1/27 Letter by Uganda’s Charge d’ Affaires
(Fred Beyendeza), Permanent UN
Mission, New York, 18/08/1999. – to PS,
Min. of Foreign affairs, Uganda.
Attached: - Statement to the UN by DRC
Permanent Rep. to UN and the Rep.’s
letter to UN security Council.
“
28 RO/1/28 Letter dated 4 may 2001by UN Sec. Gen.
Kofi A. Annan to H.E., Y.K.Museveni,
appealing to Uganda not to withdraw
from the Lusaka Peace Process.
“
29 RO/1/29 Govt. Response to UN Panel Report “
30 KT/2/30 Certificate of Incorporation,
Memorandum and Articles of Association
for TRINITY (U) LIMITED.
CW/02/01 Ketrah Tukuratire
31 KT/2/31 Certificate of Incorporation,
Memorandum and Articles of Association
for DARA GREAT LAKES
(INDUSTRIES) LIMITED.
“
32 KT/2/32 Certificate of Incorporation,
Memorandum and Articles of Association
for NYOTA WOOD INDUSTRIES (U)
LIMITED.
“
211
33 KT/2/33 Certificate of Incorporation,
Memorandum and Articles of Association
for ROYAL STAR HOLDING
LIMITED.
“
34 PB/2/34 Application for CERTIFICAION
authority in respect of Budongo and
Bugoma forests dated 21st march 2000 by
Pross Balaba of DARA GREAT LAKES
(INDUSTRIES) LTD., to the
Commissioner, Forestry.
CW/02/03 Pross Balaba
35 PB/2/35 Application for CONCESSION in respect
of Budongo, Bugoma and Mabira forests,
dated 21st march 2000 by Pross Balaba of
DARA GREAT LAKES (INDUSTRIES)
LTD., to the Commissioner, Forestry.
“
36 PB/2/36 3 PROVISIONAL LICENCES No 149,
150 & 351 all dated 18/09/2000 for DARA
GREAT LAKES (INDUSTRIES) LTD.,
to Harvest and Process Forestry Produce
in Budongo, Bugoma and Mabira Forests.
“
37 DNB/2/36A 3 LICENCES No 149, 150 & 351 all dated
18/09/2000 for DARA GREAT LAKES
(INDUSTRIES) LTD., to Take Forest
Produce from Budongo, Bugoma and
Mabira Forests.
CW/02/04 Deogratius Nkeija Byarugaba
38 KT/2/37 Certificate of Incorporation,
Memorandum and Articles of Association
for M/S DARA EXPRESS (UGANDA)
LIMITED.
CW/02/01 Ketrah Tukuratire
39 KT/2/38 Certificate of Incorporation,
Memorandum and Articles of Association
for TRINITY INTERNATIONAL
LIMITED.
“
40 KT/2/39 Letter dated March 27, 1996 by
MAYANJA – NKANGI, EDWARD
ELUE & CO, to the Registrar of
Companies, inquiring whether the name
TRINITY HOLDINGS [UGANDA]
LIMITED, was available for registration
as a Company. Plus attachments
including the Certificate of Incorporation.
“
212
41 KT/2/40 Certificate of Incorporation,
Memorandum and Articles of Association
for TRINITY 2000 LIMITED.
“
42 PB/2/41 Application for a Permit to Harvest Hard
Wood (Cynometra Alexandria, Celtis and
Pirinari) from Budongo forest dated 11th
October 1999, by Pross Balaba of DARA
GREAT LAKES (INDUSTRIES) LTD.,
to the Commissioner, Forestry.
CW/02/03 Pross Balaba
43 PB/2/42 Letter dated July 5, 2000 by John
Kotiram of DARA GREAT LAKES
(INDUSTRIES) LTD., to the
Commissioner, Forestry as a follow up of
the subject in PB/2/41 above.
“
44 DNB/2/43 SI 56/1987 The External Trade (Export
Restricted Goods) Order, 1987. Prohibits
the Export of TIMBER.
CW/02/04 Deogratius Nkeija Byarugaba
45 DNB/2/44 Letter dated 25th July 2000 by Jacques
Chan of NYOTA WOOD INDUSTRIES
(U) LTD, to the Commissioner of
Forestry, seeking clearance for transit
timber traded by their sister company,
M/S DARA FOREST of Beni, Congo.
“
46 GMD/1/45 (UPDF) 2000/2001 Proposed Budget
Financial Analysis of Programme 02 and
03 as at 30/06/2001.
CW/CW/01/07 Gabindade Musoke David
47 GDM/1/46 UPDF Salary Payments to units Under
operation Safe Haven for: - August –
December 1998; January – December
1999; January – December 2000; January
– June 2001.
“
48 GDM/1/47 UPDF RCA Payments to Units Under
Operation Safe Haven for: - August –
December 1998; January – December
1999; July 1999 – June 2000; July 2000 –
June 2001.
“
49 GMD/1/48 UPDF Aero plane Charter Payments for
1998/1999; 1999/2000; 2000/2001.
“
213
50 GDM/1/49 Agreement for Lease and Charter
Services Between the Government of the
Republic of Uganda and Uganda Air
Cargo Corporation dated 26th July 2000.
“
51 GDM/1/50 Amendment to and Renewal of the
Agreement in GDM/1/49 above.
“
52 JSK/2/51 French Version of Articles and
Memorandum of Association for DARA
FORET.
CW/02/06 John Supit Kotiram.
53 AM/1/52 Joint Communiqué of 26/04/1998 Between
Uganda and DRC, on Security along
Common Border, Police Training and
refugees.
CW/01/08 Amama Mbabazi
54 AM/1/53 Agreed Minutes of the Ministerial
Meeting on Security and Refugee Matters
Between the Uganda and the DRC held in
Kampala on April 7, 1998.
“
55 AM/1/54 Statement of 23/03/1999 by Hon. Amama
Mbabazi to the 53rd Resumed Session of
the UN General Assembly.
“
56 AM/1/55 Statement of 27/10/1998 by Hon. Amama
Mbabazi to the Lusaka Ministerial
Meeting on the Conflict in DRC.
“
57 AM/1/56 DRAFT SECURITY COUNCIL
PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT dated
January 26, 2000 by Hon. Amama
Mbabazi to UN Security Council
President.
“
58 AM/1/56 (b) Uganda’s Reaction (Hon. Amama
Mbabazi) of 30 January 2000 to 1/27
SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT
RESOLUTION ON DRC.
“
59 AM/1/57 GoU Response to UN Panel Report dated
3rd April 2001.
“
60 KT/2/58 Memorandum and Articles of Association
of VICTORIA BIOTECHNOLOGY
LTD.
CW/02/01 Ketrah Tukuratiire
214
61 NM/1/59 Photographs Depicting Scenes of and
Atrocities by Rebels Fighting Uganda
Government.
Statements made to CMI by Lt. Soko
Lutaya, Lt. Col. Fenekas Mugyenyi, Lt.
Col. John Waswa and Col. Sula Semakula
following allegations against UPDF and
individual Officers, contained in the UN
Panel report.
CW/01/11 Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo
62 JN/2/60 Volume of Timber Production in Uganda
in Cubic Metres From Mid 1997 to 2000
as Per Forestry Department
Computerized Data Bank.
CW/02/07 James Ndimukulaga
63 JN/2/61 Two Copies of Letters dated 11th October
1999 from DARA GREAT LAKES
(INDUSTRIES) LTD by Pross Balaba,
being Applications for Permits to Harvest
timber from Bugoma and Mabira Forests
Respectively.
“
64 JN/2/62 Letter dated 18th September 2000 from
Ag. Commissioner of Forestry to M/S
NYOTA WOOD INDUSTRIES (U) LTD.,
being a reply to theirs, seeking a permit
or special clearance for their transit
timber from DRC.
“
65 WLA/1/63 Contract dated 19th October 1998Between
GoU and KNIGHT AVIATION.
CW/01/12 William Luwemba Apuuli
66 MJK/1/64 Summary of Troops and Logistics Sent
and withdrawn From DRC Between 1998
and 2000.
CW/1/13 Maj. Musinguzi Jones Kafiire
67 MJK/1/65 UPDF Loading Schedules for Goods
Originating From Entebbe Military Air
Base (Old Airport) Destined for the DRC,
Contained in a File Opened on 05/04/2000
and Closed on 31/12/2000.
“
68 JJ/1/66 RESPONSE BY UPDF TO THE
REPORT OF THE PANEL OF
EXPERTS ON THE ILLEGAL
EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND OTHER FORMS OF
WEALTH OF THE DRC.
CW/01/14 Maj. Gen. J.J. Odongo
215
69 JSK/67 Customs Documents Relating to Imports
and Exports of Timber and Minerals
From the DRC by DARA GREAT
LAKES (INDUSTRIES) LTD.
CW/02/06 John Supit Kotiram
70 DLK/2A/68 UPDF Loading Schedules for Goods
Originating From Entebbe Military Air
Base (Old Airport) Destined for the DRC
for 1998 and 1999.
CW/02A/01 Lt. David Livingstone Komurubuga
71 DLK/2A/69 UPDF Loading Schedules for Goods
Originating From Entebbe Military Air
Base (Old Airport) Destined for the DRC
for: October – November 1998, January
and February 1999, March 1999, April
1999.
“
72 RB/2A/70 UPDF Loading Schedules for Goods
Originating From Entebbe Military Air
Base (Old Airport) Destined for the DRC
for June 1999.
CW/2A/02 Capt. Richard Badogo
73 AKA/2A/71 Map (Lay out) of the Entebbe
International Airport and Military Air
Base.
CW/02A/04 Ambrose Akandonda Kashaya
74 AKA/2A/72 Revenues Billed and Received in Respect
of Operations at Old Airport: Sept. 1998
– June 2001.
“
75 AKA/2A/73 Flight Schedules, Operations and ICAO
Destination in DRC.
“
76 AKA/2A/74 Specimen of Flight Plan Form to be filled
by Aircraft.
“
77 AKA/2A/75 Correspondence Between CAA and MOD
on Knight Aviation (Letter dated
13/07/1999).
“
78 AKA/2A/76 Documents on Air Navette from UPDF to
CAA (Letter of 7/8/1999).
“
79 AKA/2A/77 Air Service Licence Air Alexander, for
Operating a Helicopter dated 16/6/1999.
“
80 AKA/2A/78 Air Service Licence for Bogol Air Services
(U) Ltd. Dated 21/6/1999.
“
216
81 AKA/2A/79 Letter from URA to CAA dated 8/8/2001
relating to request by CAA on Timber
Imports/Transit.
“
82 WB/03/80 Map of Uganda Detailing Concessions
and Licences for Prospecting/Exploration
of Minerals Plus Details of Concession
Holders.
CW/03/01 Watuwa Bwobi
83 WB/03/81 List of Companies Licenced to Trade in
Minerals.
“
84 WB/03/82 Statistics of Production and Export of
Minerals – 1992– 1995.
“
85 BK/02A/83 Video Tape Recording in DRC, Showing
Among Others an Interview With
Ugandan Rebels of WNBF.
CW/02A/05 Bart Kakooza
217
86 YKM/01/84 DOCUMENTS TENDERED BY
PRESIDENT YOWERI KAGUTA
MUSEVENI: -
A bound file of photo copies of news
paper cuttings with articles on ADF
atrocities;
Another file similar to 1 above on the
MPONDWE attack by ADF on
13/11/1996;
The President’s Statement on -
Background to the situation in the Great
Lakes Region;
The Presidents Statement on Conflicts in
the Great Lakes Region, circulated to the
U.N. Security Council, 24/01/2000
The President’s speech to the SADC
FORCE, 18/08/1998;
Record of Meeting Between the President
and the UN Expert Panel on Illegal
Exploitation of Resources of DRC;
The President’s Response to the UN
Expert Panel Report, 02/05/2001.
UPDF Court Martial Criminal
Proceedings against RA – 134917 PTE
Okello Otim Tonny for the murder of
Congolese nationals in Gemena, DRC on
23/5/2001.
A specimen of UPDF FORM NO.
AC/DRC/01 filled during withdrawal of
UPDF from DRC.
CW/01/15 President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
87 RC/03/85 Documents Relating to Minerals
Transported out of Entebbe Airport by
SABENA Airways, 1998, 1999 & 2000.
CW/03/02 Roger Carion
88 MA/03/86 BOU Data on Internal Debt and Uganda’s
Trading Partners, 1995 – 2000.
CW/03/03 Michael Atingi - Ego
89 JZ/3/87 Table of Revenue Collections and Growth
– 1990/1991 – 2000/2001.
CW/03/04 Justin Zake
90 JZ/3/88 Annual Report for URA 1999/2000. “
218
91 JZ/3/89 List of the Top 200 Tax Payers in Uganda
– 1999/2000..
“
92 AK/2/90 Importation and Transit of Timber CW/02/05 Allen Kagina
93 AK/2/90A Re-arranged exhibit AK/2/90 plus
additional material on export, transit
minerals, timber, coffee, hippo teeth.
“
94 AK/2/91 Transit Timber From DRC by Grace
Majoro (GCK Enterprises), via Air
Navette.
“
95 AK/2/92 Transit Timber From DRC by Grace
Majoro (GCK Enterprises), via Air
Navette and later sold to MS.
BITANGARO & CO. ADVOCATES.
“
96 AK/2/93 Transit Timber from DRC via Malaba,
brought by Sodhi Tonny aboard air
Navette.
“
97 AK/2/94 Import of 105 pieces of Timber for Grand
Imperial Hotel via Air Navette.
“
98 AK/2/95 Graph of Transit Timber from DRC –
1993 – 2001.
“
99 AK/2/96 DARA FOREST Transit Exports
(Tantalite) from DRC – 2001.
“
100 AK/2/97 Transit Gold via Entebbe Airport – 1999
– 2001.
“
101 HAN/4/98 Coffee Exports during the coffee years
1995/1996 – 1999/2000 in 60 KG bags and
corresponding values as prepared by
UCDA.
CW/04/01 Henry Agyenda Ngabirano
102 JKT/4/99 1. Map showing Wildlife and forestry
protected areas in Uganda.
2. Summary of Wildlife specimen seizures
and court cases, 1994-June 2001.
3. Report on ‘Trade in Ivory in Uganda’
dated 18 Nov. 2000.
4. Wildlife Statute, No. 14/1996.
CW/04/02 Justus Kashagire Tindigarukayo
219
103 SS/7/100 Memorandum and Articles of Association
for AIR ALEXANDER.
Cw/07/01 Hon. Maj. Gen. Caleb Akandwanaho
alias Salim Saleh
104 SS/7/101 Memorandum and Articles of Association
for TAKE AIR.
“
105 FM/7/102 Statement (and attachments) to CMI by
Lt. Col. Fenekasi Mugyenyi in response to
allegations of illegal possession of ivory by
himself and gold mining by the members
of UPDF, contained in the UN Panel
report.
CW/07/03 Lt. Col. Fenekasi Mugyenyi
106 KM/3/103 A Sample of a mineral from DRC, called
Coltan.
CW/03/05 Kasule Mohamed
107 TM/3/104 Documents Tendered by Capital Finance
Corporation relating to Gold Trade –
trading licences 1995 to 1997; register of
gold dealings 1995 to 1997; customs
documents for the last export in 1998, of
20 KG via Sabena Airlines; BOU letter
stopping the Company’s gold trade on
grounds of non viability.
CW/03/06 Twinomujuni Julius
108 EK/5/105 Statistics on Stolen / Robbed Motor
Vehicles 1994 – 2000.
CW/05/01 Elizabeth Kutesa
109 FKM/3/106 Documents pertaining to trade in Coltan
from DRC and Prospecting for Coltan in
Uganda, by UGANDA MARINE
PRODUCTS LTD.
CW/03/07 Farouq Kigozi Makubya
110 SM/3/107 Documents relating to trade in DRC in
Coltan between one Songa Museme
(Congolese) and John Sopit Kotiram of
DARA FOREST.
CW/03/08 Songa Museme
111 GM/2/108 Documents relating to trade in timber
from DRC by Grace Majoro of G.C.K.
ENTERPRISES.
CW/02/08 Grace Majoro
112 SE/5/109 Documents relating to trade in general
merchandise between Uganda and DRC
by SAM ENGOLA.
CW/05/03 Sam Engola
220
113 PK/5/110 1. Letter dated 17/12/1999 by Col. Peter
Kerim to President Museveni on ethnic
fighting in Ituri Province.
2. Letter dated 26/2/2000 by Gen Kazini
appointing col. Peter Kerim to streamline
liaison duties in Bunia, DRC.
CW/05/05 Col. Peter Kerim
114 SH/2A/111 Documents relating to AIR NAVETTE
and its trading activities between Uganda
and DRC.
CW/02A/06 Shiraz Hudani
115 GAW/8/112 Message by Col. Katumba Wamala (as he
then was) to Zaire authorities and
Businessmen at the height of West Nile
bank Front (WNBF) insurgency.
Tape recording.
CW/08/10 George Ambe William
116 EA/08/113 Forestry Statistics relating to Timber
Movement from Congo and Uganda
(Arua) – 11/9/97 – 15/5/2000.
CW/08/12 Edison Adiribo
117 SL/7114 Report by the then Major Sonko Lutaaya,
following assignment by Lt. Col. Fenekasi
Mugyenyi to investigate allegations of
indiscipline by troops under Lt. Okumu
near Kilomoto gold mines in DRC.
CW/05/07 Lt. Col. Sonko Lutaaya
118 SL/7/115 Report to CMI by Lt. Col. Sonko
Lutaaya, following mission to DRC.
CW/05/07 Lt. Col. Sonko Lutaaya
119 JPB/7/116 Documents in French tendered by Jean
Pierre - Bemba
CW/07/08 Jean Pierre - Bemba
120 AR/02A/117 Aircraft time log and flight reports for
KNIGHT AVIATION for 10/1/99,
13/1/99, 25/1/99, 12/2/2000;
Aircraft time log and flight report for VR
PROMOTIONS LTD. for 28/2/2000;
CAA Tax invoices serial Nos. 1056, and
1623, issued to Ministry of Defence and
KNIGHT AVIATION respectively
CW/02A/11 Andrew Rugasira
221
121 BMS/3/118 Insurance claim investigation report
relating to a claim by NAMI GEMS
BVBA for robbery of cash US $ 550,000
from diamond sales vides Criminal Case
Ref. ENTEBBE CRB 280/2000.
CW/03/10 Simon Mugenyi Byabakama
122 SS/7/119 Document titled, ‘MY PERSPECTIVE
ON THE ALLEGATION OF ILLEGAL
EXPLOITATION’ authored by Lt. Gen.
Salim Saleh.
CW/07/01 Hon. Maj. Gen. Caleb Akandwanaho
alias Salim Saleh
123 JK/01/120 Various Army instructions or messages
during Operation Safe Haven (OSH) in
DRC
CW/01/03 Brig. James Kazini
124 JK/01/121 Map of the Democratic Republic of
Congo
“
125 SM/03/122 Copies of a Police File on robbery of cash
US $ 550,000 from diamond sales vide
Criminal Case Ref. ENTEBBE CRB
280/2000.
CW/03/11 Steven Musobya
126 ZK/07/123 Documents and correspondences between
GOU and Silver Springs Hotel relating to
accommodation bills for Congolese
nationals
CW/07/10 Zia Khan
127 CE/1 Letters attributed to the authorship of
Brig. Kazini seeking clearance for
business by VICTORIA in areas of DRC
Provided by UN Panel
128 CE/2 Documents relating to Trinity and the
alleged payment of $ 380,000 to Hon.
Wapakhabulo, Col. Mayombo and Col.
Otafiire
Provided by UN Panel
129 CE/3 Report by handwriting expert on the
signatures attributed to Prof Wamba Dia
Wamba, Brig. Kazini and Col. Mayombo
in exhibits CE/2 above.
Report submitted by Mr. A.M. Ntarirwa, GOU
Analyst / handwriting Expert.
130 CE/4 Report by handwriting expert on the
signatures attributed to Prof Wamba Dia
Wamba and Col. Otafiire in exhibits CE/5
below.
Report submitted by Mr. A.M. Ntarirwa, GOU
Analyst / handwriting Expert.
222
131 CE/5 Letter attributed to the authorship of
Prof. Wamba Dia wamba authorizing
payment of $ 13,000 to Col. Otafiire;
Letter by Col. Otafiire introducing one
John Kalimasi a Ugandan businessman,
to RCD authorities for possible assistance.
Provided by UN Panel
132 AP/07/124 Documents relating to registration of a
company called LA CONMET S.P.R.L,
its purchases from Congo and export of
coltan f through Uganda.
CW/07/12 Anatoly Piskunov
223
1 0 . ANNEX 2 : WITNESSES
N.B. The complete transcript of evidence is available from Ministry of Foreign Affairs on CD
ROM.
BRIEF 1
Background to Uganda Involvement in Congo
NO. FULL NAMES REFERRED AS
01 Bernadette Kyomugisha Bigirwa CW/01/01
02 Steven B. Kavuma CW/01/02
03 Brig. James Kazini CW/01/03
04 Hon. Dr. Kamanda Bataringaya Cos CW/01/04
05 Ben Mbonye CW/01/05
06 Maj. Gen. Katumba Wamala CW/01/06
07 Ralph Ochan CW/01/07
08 Gabindade Musoke David CW/01/08
09 Hon. Amama Mbabazi CW/01/09
10 Hon. Maj. Tom Butime CW/01/10
11 Lt. Col. Noble Mayombo CW/01/11
12 William Luwemba Apuuli CW/01/12
13 Maj. Musinguzi Jones Kafiire CW/01/13
14 Maj. Gen. J. J. Odongo CW/01/14
224
15 President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni CW/01/15
16 Lt. Col. Andrew Lutaaya CW/01/16
17 Dr. Cripus Kiyonga CW/01/17
18 Adele Lotsove Mugisa CW/01/18
19 Prof. Ernest wamba dia Wamba CW/01/19
BRIEF 2
Exploitation Allegations Pertaining to Timber – DARA Case and Other Timber Related
Allegations
NO. FULL NAMES REFERRED AS
01 Ketrah Tukuratiire CW/02/01
02 Joseph Olea CW/02/02
03 Pross Balaba CW/02/03
04 Deogratius Nkeija Byarugaba CW/02/04
05 Allen Kagina CW/02/05
06 John Supit Kotiram CW/02/06
07 James Ndimukulaga CW/02/07
08 Grace Majoro CW/02/08
09 Boniface Kakare CW/02/09
BRIEF 2 (A)
225
Transport
NO. FULL NAMES REFERRED AS
01 Lt. David Livingstone Komurubuga CW/02A/01
02 Capt. Richard Badogo CW/02A/02
03 Lt. Col. John Kasaija Araali CW/02A/03
04 Ambrose Kashaya Akandonda CW/02A/04
05 Bart Kakooza CW/02A/05
06 Shiraz Hudani CW/02A/06
07 Anthony Rubombora CW/02A/07
08 Valentine Tendo CW/02A/08
09 Capt. Johnson Turyahikayo CW/02A/09
10 Andrew Musoke CW/02A/10
11 Andrew Rugasira CW/02A/11
12 Samuel Muneza CW/02A/12
13 Binta Kasojo CW/02A/13
BRIEF 3
Exploitation Allegations Pertaining to Minerals, Diamonds, Gold, Cassiterite, Other Minerals
and Economic Data
226
NO. FULL NAMES REFERRED AS
01 Watuwa Bwobi CW/03/01
02 Roger Carion CW/03/02
03 Michael Atingi – Ego CW/03/03
04 Justin Zake CW/03/04
05 Kasule Mohamed CW/03/05
06 Twinomujuni julious CW/03/06
07 Farouq Kigozi Makubya CW/03/07
08 Songa Museme CW/03/08
09 WITNESS X CW/03/09
10 Byabakama Mugenyi Simon CW/03/10
11 Steven Musobya CW/03/11
BRIEF 4
Exploitation Allegations Pertaining to Coffee, Livestock, Wildlife, Ivory, Money and other
Property
NO. FULL NAMES REFERRED AS
01 Henry Agyenda Ngabirano CW/04/01
02 Justus Kashagire Tindigarukayo CW/04/02
BRIEF 5
227
Exploitation Allegations Pertaining to Mass Scale Looting, Systemic and Systematic
Exploitation
NO. FULL NAMES REFERRED AS
01 Elizabeth kuteesa CW/05/01
02 Lt. Col. Joseph Arocha CW/05/02
03 Sam Engola CW/05/03
04 Col. Kahinda Otafiire CW/05/04
05 Col. Peter Kerim CW/05/05
06 Lt. Col. Sonko Lutaaya CW/05/06
07 Capt. Joseph Balikudembe CW/05/07
BRIEF 7
Alleged Exploitation by Individuals and Top UPDF Officers
NO. FULL NAMES REFERRED AS
01 Maj. Gen. Caleb Akandwanaho Salim Saleh CW/07/01
02 Lt. Muhoozi Kainerugaba CW/07/02
03 Lt. Col. Fenekasi Mugyenyi CW/07/03
04 Lt. David Livingstone Okumu CW/07/04
228
05 Jovial Akandwanaho CW/07/05
06 Mbusa Nyamwisi CW/07/06
07 Jean Pirre – Bemba CW/07/07
08 Felly Tshiama CW/07/08
09 Dr. Gala Mido CW/07/09
09 Zia Khan CW/07/10
10 Heckie Horn CW/07/11
11 Anatoly Piskunov CW/07/12
12 Valentina Piskunova CW/07/13
BRIEF 8
Witnesses from Border Areas (Kasese, Bwera, Fort Portal, Arua)
NO. FULL NAMES REFERRED AS
01 Tushabe Christopher alias Benz CW/08/01
02 Masereka Ibrahim CW/08/02
03 Ramadhan Kalihod CW/08/03
04 Ezekiel Mwehga CW/08/04
05 James Burolerro CW/08/05
06 Maisho Fred CW/08/06
07 Moses Ikagobya CW/08/07
229
08 John Masoro CW/08/08
09 Kasoro Williams CW/08/09
10 George Ambe William CW/08/10
11 Milton Rahuka CW/08/11
12 Edison Adiribo CW/08/12
13 Alex Angundru CW/08/13
AFFIDAVITS
NO. FULL NAMES
01 ROGER LUMBALA
02 TIBASIIMA ATEENYI
03 IDDI TABAN
04 MICHAEL J. STEVENS
05 GARY JOHN JEFFERY
06 HANNINGTON KARUHANGA
07 COL. PETER KERIM
230
1 1 . ANNEX 3 : PAPER ON
ILLEGALITY
The Concept of ‘Illegality’ in International Law: Theoretical and Doctrinal Analysis vis-à-vis
Allegations of Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other forms of Wealth in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
45. INTRODUCTION.
The concept of illegality in international law has been subject of theoretical analysis and
controversy in legal scholarship, international relations as well as doctrinal pronouncements by
courts. The earliest post-19th century statement of the concept is 10 traceable to the Manchuria
question and the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of a puppet statal entity created in the
aftermath of Japan’s invasion of China. The non-recognition policy urged by then US
Secretary of State was premised on the perceived illegality of Japan’s action as being in
violation of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations.1 Since then the
concept of illegality and the doctrine of non-recognition have come to underpin conduct of
states in international law.2 This has been the case in the respect of the unilateral declaration of
independence in Rhodesia; conduct of South Africa after termination of its mandate over
South West Africa; creation of bantustans in South Africa; Israel-occupied territories in the
Middle East; Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus; and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
1 The position taken at the League of Nations was that Japan’s action was a violation of the
prohibition on non-use of force contained in the Covenant and the Pact of Paris: LNOJ Special Supp. No.
101/I, 81, 11 Mar. 1932.
2 See, e.g. illegality (and voidness) of treaties concluded under coercion in violation of the principles
of the UN Charter: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, art. 52.
231
Traditionally, the consequence of an illegality is non-recognition of acts or conduct of the
illegal entity or authority with respect to territory. However, this concerns acts or conduct that
pertains to a claim or alteration in status of a territory. Thus, for instance, conduct on the part
of South Africa that tended to confirm its continued claim to administer South West Africa as
a mandatory power after the termination of the mandate by the UN Security Council was
regarded as invalid.3 Or for that matter conduct on part of then apartheid South Africa that
confirmed the segregation policy in creation of bantustans as separate statal entities.4 Or the
case of Israel’s policy of settlements which was seen as intended to alter the Arab-character of
its occupied territories and give an impression of disguised annexation.5 Thus if Uganda (and
Rwanda) purported to annex the eastern part of the Democratic Republic 10 of Congo territory,
this would in effect amount to an alteration of the status of that part of territory, and would
prima facie be an illegal act or conduct.6
46. T H E C O N C E P T O F ‘ I L L E G A L I T Y ’ A N D T H E D E M OCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
C O N G O E X P E RT PA N E L’ S INTERPRETATION.
A significant concern has been the conceptualisation of illegality in respect of the ‘illegal’
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (the Democratic Republic of Congo). The Panel of Experts established by the United
3 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in South West Africa
notwithstanding Security Council resolution 667(1970), adv. op. [1971] ICJ Rep. 6 (here-inafter Namibia case)
4 See e.g. Resolution on the so-called Independent Transkei and other Bantustans, GA Res. 31/6, 26
Oct. 1976.
5 See e.g. GA Res. 32/5, 1 Nov. 1977; SC Res. 446 (1979), 22 Mar. 1979.
6 The illegality would inure from the existing condemnation contained in the numerous Security
Council resolutions, but generally on the principle of international law on the non-recognition of
acquisition of territory by the use or threat of force. This intention is apparently denied by Uganda (and
Rwanda) according to press reports on the matter: E. Allio, ‘Uganda, Rwanda dismiss plot to annex
Congo’, The New Vision, 5 Dec. 2000.
232
Nations7 saw it necessary as a starting point to give a definition or interpretation of
illegality as a key concept. The Panel admits that it was the ‘most contentious concept in [its]
mandate’.8 Further, it states that: ‘almost all actors in the conflict and observers requested a
clear definition of illegality’.9 In the finality, the Panel adopted what it saw as a wish of the
Security Council for a broad interpretation of the concept, and in this regard it understood it to
be underpinned by four elements (related to the rule of law), viz.: (a) violation of sovereignty;
(b) respect of existing regulatory framework for conduct of activities; (c) accepted practices in
trade vis-à-vis those obtaining in the Democratic Republic of Congo and (d) violations of
international law (including ‘soft law’).10
In respect of violation o 10 f sovereignty, the Panel states:
The first element is based on the Security Council’s understanding of illegality as
described in the Panel’s mandate. This posits that all activities – extraction, production,
commercialization and exports – taking place in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
without the consent of the legitimate government are illegal. This interpretation suggested that
only non-invited forces and nationals are carrying out illegal activities in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.11
This should essentially be the fundamental starting point of determining that a particular act or
conduct is an illegality. In this case, the presumption is that the United Nations having
condemned the presence (and continued presence) of Uganda (and Rwanda) in the Democratic
20 Republic of Congo territory as a violation of territorial integrity and political independence of
7 The Expert Panel was constituted by the UN Secretary-General on 31st July 2000 (letter to the
President of the Security Council: S/2000/796) in response to a request by the Security Council (letter by
President of the Security Council to the Secretary General: S/PRST/2000/ 20), 2 June 2000). The Expert
Panel submitted its report through the Secretary-General on 12 April 2001: S/2001/357.
8 Expert Panel report, para. 15.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Ibid., para. 15(a). The Panel refers for this element to the statement of the President of the Security
Council of 2 June 2000.
233
the Democratic Republic of Congo,12 this particular conduct on the part of Uganda is in
itself an illegality. This in itself however does not dispose off the question of whether all the
activities involving exploitation of resources in the territory of another State are to be
considered illegal. This probably explains the Panel’s contention that it employs the four
elements it identified as a basis of its definition of illegality in a complementary manner.13 But
this in itself has a shortfall in that it presumes in the corollary that activities of the (so-called
legitimate) Kinshasa regime (and its allies) are legal. This may not necessarily be the case.
With regards to the second element, the Panel expressed thus:
… if authorities exerting effective power and control over their sovereign area recognise or set
up a regulatory framework to govern the use or exploitation 10 of resources, this framework
should be respected. Failure to do so may lead to the infringement of law and, therefore,
activities considered illegal and unlawful. In this case the Panel deems illegality to be the
carrying out of an activity in violation of an existing body of regulations.14
This is a rather vague recognition that activities in rebel-held areas of the Democratic Republic
of Congo territory may be legal if they are carried out in accordance with a regulatory
framework. The authorities exerting effective power in this case must be taken to mean the
rebel groups (and their backers). One may assume that this is an implied recognition that in a
situation in which the legitimate government has lost effective control over part of its territory
(to rebels or a foreign occupier), those exercising effective authority must ensure continuity of
20 civil life in its various manifestations. This tends to be in contradiction with the Panel’s view
in their first element that ‘non-invited forces and nationals are carrying out illegal activities in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’.
12 See, e.g. Security Council resolutions:
13 Expert Panel report, para. 15.
14 Ibid., para. 15(b).
234
It is to be admitted that those in effective control must not allow society to degenerate into
lawlessness and anarchy. This is perhaps crucial in the Panel’s concerns about an existing
regulatory framework for exploitation and trading in natural resources. What exactly the
existing regulatory framework for that purpose is or was, either in the Democratic Republic of
Congo generally or the rebel-held parts, is not stated or outlined by the Panel, although this
may imply regulations on, for instance, concessions, reforestation, etc. The crucial questions
are thus:
who was or were the authorities in effective power; and
was or has there been in existence a viable regulatory framework prior to or after exerting of
effective control by such authorities i 10 n the Democratic Republic of Congo?
These concerns were not adequately addressed and one is left to infer from particular incidents
in the report. Are the authorities in effective power the rebel groups clothed with
administrative authority by the Lusaka agreement of 1999? Further, it is contended that the
history of the Democratic Republic of Congo shows harvesting of timber and mining of
minerals permitted to individuals outside the realm of state control – is this the regulatory
framework to bear in mind?
The third element identified by the Panel was:
The discrepancy between widely accepted practices in trade and business and the way business
is carried in the Democratic Republic of the Congo … [T]he Panel considered the use and the
20 abuse of power by some actors fall in the category of illegality. This includes forced monopoly
in trading, the unilateral fixing of prices of products by the buyer, the confiscation or looting
of products from farmers and the use of military forces in various zones to protect some
interests or to create a situation of monopoly.15
15 Ibid., para. 15(c).
235
This element largely ties in with the second. Similarly, inferences can only be read into
particular incidents documented in the report. Here, it also begs the question of what is
accepted practices of trade and business, given that in the Democratic Republic of Congo for
decades in the Mobutu era, the exploitation of and trading in natural resources might not have
followed the so-called ‘accepted practices’. In any event, incidents of looting, confiscation,
forced monopolies are perhaps better conceptualised in relation to the functioning of the de
facto authorities.
The fourth and final element of illegality identified by the Panel is stated as:
The violation of international law including ‘soft law’. The Panel considers that business
activities carried out in violation of international law are illegal.16 10
What the international law in question is (including the so-called ‘soft law’) is not stated or
outlined. Incidents such as those alleged to involve exploitation of wildlife (e.g. elephant
tusks) in violation of CITES can be considered to be in this category–these acts would prima
facie be illegal irrespective of whether undertaken by the Kinshasa government or authorities
in rebel-held parts if they were in violation of CITES. Is the certification of timber, for
instance, an instance of ‘soft law’ and would the failure to do so entail an illegality in real
terms?
However, what is perhaps more crucial and was not dealt with by the Panel is the principle in
international law on permanent sovereignty of States and peoples over their natural
resources.17 20 In this regard, the exploitation of natural resources by either side or all parties to
16 Ibid., para. 15(d).
17 This principle is stated in several resolutions of the United Nations dating as far back as 1960s: e.g.
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res. 1803 (XVII) (1962); Charter on
the Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (1974). The principle as right of peoples is
conceived in human rights treaties: e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
(1966), art. 47; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966), arts.
1(2) and 25; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, art. 21.
236
the conflict that would not benefit (or is inimical to the interests of) the Congolese peoples
would be in violation of international law and, therefore, inherently illegal.
47. THEORETICAL AND DOCTRINAL POSTULATIONS ON ILLEGALITY –
CONCEPT
and its Application
A concept of illegality has in application in international law been founded on the desire to
proscribe certain conduct on part of States. This is particularly so where the conduct offends
the so-called values in the realm of order public of the international community, e.g. non-use
of force, self-determination, non-discrimination (apartheid). Traditionally, theory and doctrine
was concerned with the illegality and non-recognition of entities or territorial 10 acquisitions in
violation of international law such as Manchuria and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait
respectively. In the past century, theory and doctrine came to embrace humanistic elements in
situations such as Rhodesia, Namibia, bantustans, Israel-occupied territories. The emphasis
was placed on the human character of the illegal statal entities or acquisitions in the nature of
peoples deprived of rights to self-determination or sovereignty over natural resources. The
state or territory thus ceased to be an abstraction.
The very transcendence of abstractions of state or territory and recognition of the ‘human
element’ in those erstwhile abstractions was also to be the premise for exempting certain acts
or conduct of the otherwise illegal statal entity or authorities from the realm of illegality.
20 Doctrine and state practice has sought to except certain acts or conduct of an other illegal statal
entity or authority in effective power if the acts or conduct, while they do not affect the status
of territory, are nonetheless beneficial to the social ordering of human existence in that
territory. Therefore the illegality would exclude activities that support the social fabric and
livelihood of inhabitants/people in the particular territory.
237
Illegality (and non-recognition) would concern with the external aspects of territory – and
a duty would thus be placed on states to refrain from dealings that otherwise legitimise or
entrench an illegality. This has been distinguished from acts or conduct that are beneficial to
the internal ordering of society. This distinction was made by the International Court of
Justice with regards to South West Africa in the wake of termination of South Africa’s
mandate. The Court observed that the duty imposed was to abstain from diplomatic relations
and economic and other forms of relationships or dealings with South Africa in respect of the
territory18 - in effect, relations that would affirm South Africa’s continued exercise of
mandatory powers over Namibia. The Court nonetheless recognised the fact that the ‘injured
entity is a people’,19 10 and that:
… In general, the non-recognition of South Africa’s administration of the Territory should not
result in depriving the people of Namibia of any advantages from international co-operation.
In particular while official acts performed by the government of South Africa on behalf or
concerning Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid, this invalidity
shall not extend to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration of births and deaths,
marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the
Territory.20
Similar positions were taken in respect of the non-recognition of statehood with regards to
Rhodesia (1965-1980) and the Bantustans (1970s-1994) where acts and conduct affecting
private lives and social ordering of peoples were to be excepted from the realm of illegality.21 20
18 Namibia case, supra, note 3, paras. 123-4.
19 Ibid., para. 127.
20 Ibid., para. 125.
21 In any event, international law has in fact taken analogies from municipal law – with the most
prominent example often given being the years of the American civil war (1862-70), whereby after the
conclusion of the civil war, the courts recognised the legality and validity of the acts and conduct of the
renegade (rebel) southern states on the premise of the doctrine of ‘necessity’. The cases pertaining to the
American civil war are largely referred to in the case of Uganda v. Commissioner of Prisons, ex parte
Matovu [1966] EA 514.
238
What is admitted is that certain acts and conduct are excepted from illegality if it ensures
survival of inhabitants or peoples in the territory – whether it is a situation of rebel-controlled
areas (e.g. eastern the Democratic Republic of Congo), territory occupied by a foreign power
(e.g. Israel-occupied territories in the Middle East and Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus) or
even illegal entities in violation of self-determination (e.g. The Bantustans).
The acts or conduct that is to be regarded as beneficial to inhabitants are wide-ranging as long
as it is not a disguised attempt at legitimising status of the illegal entity.22 Thus apart from
registration of births and deaths and of marriages, it can encompass the ‘maintenance of law
and order’, ‘provision of social services (education, health)’, ‘economic policy’, commercial
activities etc.23 10
What has perhaps been a critical concern has related to the exploitation of natural resources by
an illegal entity or authority in effective power. The position has generally been that the illegal
entity and occupier cannot exploit resources in the territory in question, and any act or conduct
in that regard is manifestly illegal.
in Namibia, after the termination of its mandate, South Africa had no power to enter into
agreements for the exploitation of natural resources in Namibian territory;24
22 Thus in respect of Rhodesia, issuance of passport was included in the ‘illegal’ acts, as it tended to
lend legitimacy to Ian Smith’s UDI as a mark of statehood (only a state can confer nationality and
citizenship). It was then still taken that Rhodesians were British protected persons.
23 Detention of an individual under preventive detention laws: Madzimbamuto v. Ladner-Burke (1969) Ac
645 (Rhodesia). Of course, concerns were expressed over the non-usurpation of the authority of the lawful
sovereign: per Lord Pearce. See also trial of an individual for treasonable offences: Binga v. The Administer-
General for South West Africa & Ors (1984) 82 ILR 464 (Namibia). The economic policy (e.g. marketorientation,
taxation, currency) should not however seem a disguised attempt to unify the economy of
the occupier state with that of the occupied territory – this was apparent in the criticism of the tax
policies of Israel with respect of the occupied territories. See also on export/import trade with Northern
Cyprus: R v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, ex parte SP Anastasiru (Pissouri) Ltd. & Ors (1994)
100 ILR 244.
24 Namibia case, supra, note 16. In fact, the United Nations established the United Nations Council
for Namibia. The Council adopted Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia,
27 Sept. 1974 which was endorsed by the UN General Assembly: GA Res. 3295 (XXIX), 13 Dec. 1974.
239
in the occupied territories, the United Nations generally treated Israel’s exploitation of
resources as illegal and unlawful;25
in respect of Rhodesia during Ian Smith’s regime, concern was expressed by the United
Nations over chrome ore;26
in respect of East Timor, Portugal did institute proceedings before the International Court
against Australia in respect of a treaty concluded by the latter and Indonesia to exploit
resources in the ‘Timor Gap’.27
The concern over natural resources has thus been a pivotal one in some of the problematic
situations in the post-United Nations period. Nonetheless, it is notable that these situations did
entail an official policy of the illegal entity or authority in effective 10 control in illegal
exploitation of resources. Further, there has not been a specific excepting of acts of inhabitants
in the exploitation of resources especially as is asserted that right of individuals to harvest
timber or mine minerals has traditionally existed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and
that such activities (and related trading or commercial activities in such resources) have been
the mainstay of the livelihood of its peoples.
48. CONCEPT AND PARAMETER S O F ‘ I L L E G A L I T Y ’ REVISITED
The conceptual definition of illegality remains crucial in determining which exploitation or
trading in the Democratic Republic of Congo natural resources is to be considered or treated as
illegal. One may vouch a number of positions:
25 See e.g. GA Res. 3171 (XXVIII), 17 Dec. 1973.
26 See e.g. concerns expressed over import of chrome from Rhodesia by the United States: SC Res.
232 (1966)
27 East Timor case (Portugal v. Australia) [1992] ICJ Reports. The essence of the Portuguese claim was
that the treaty would violate the right of the East Timorese people to permanent sovereignty over natural
resources.
240
that all exploitation that deprives the Congolese peoples of their right to permanent
sovereignty over their natural resources is illegal. This is a general exposition of the principle
of international law recognised in GA Resns. 1803 and 3218. In effect, if the resources are
being systematically exploited to detriment of the Congolese peoples (and not their benefit) –
whether by the Kinshasa government and its allies (Zimbabwe, Angola, etc); Uganda (and
Rwanda) or by any other non-state entities (e.g. rebel groups, foreign companies) – then it is
illegal exploitation;28
that exploitation of resources by occupier of territory exercising effective power, where the
presence of armed forces in territory of another State has been condemned, is prima facie
illegal. 10 This is however dependent upon:
proof that the exploitation is part of official policy of the occupier state or that acts of its army
officers are attributable to the state;
demonstration that the state is indeed in a situation of occupation and thus international law
rules on occupation apply to proscribe any exploitation of resources;
that certain activities involving the exploitation – extraction, production, trading – in natural
resources of a territory not in the de facto control of the legitimate state is to be excepted from
the realm of illegality if such exploitation is beneficial to inhabitants (e.g. allow for provision
of social services – education, health, infrastructure) or that it is part and parcel of the normal
and daily life, wage-earning employment or activities of the inhabitants of the territory. In
20 effect, even activities that are taking place without the consent of the legitimate government
may be legal if they meet this criterion. In effect, the Panel’s definition of illegality in its first
element can be taken as only partially correct, with the second part of that definition being not
entirely correct in light of the practical realities of societal existence (requiring that activities
28 One can draw reference to the exploitation of phosphate by the administering powers, New
Zealand, Australia and United Kingdom in Nauru: Phosphates in Nauru case (Nauru v. Australia) [1991]
ICJ Reports.
241
that support livelihood of a people should continue being carried out) and more so in the
specific peculiarities of the Democratic Republic of Congo.
that exploitation of resources must in the event that it meets element 3 above must be
undertaken under a clear regulatory framework put in place by occupier state or other authority
in effective power (e.g. rebel groups). The existence of a regulatory framework established and
put in place by groups such as RCD, MLC, etc. must be ascertained. Otherwise, an absence of
such a framework permits for lawless and arbitrary acts in exploitation of resources. If there
are regulations requiring exploitation of timber with licence, then harvesting and extraction of
timber without a licence or one granted by one who has no authority to grant it should be
regarded as unlawful and thus illegal. In the finality, such 10 acts would revert to element 1
above.
49. CONCLUDING REMARKS
What amounts to illegality remains problematic given the implications of the various United
Nations resolutions and the Lusaka Agreement. The Security Council has consistently
condemned the presence of Uganda (and Rwanda) armed forces in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. On the other hand, the Lusaka agreement supposedly vests administrative authority in
the rebel groups signatory to the agreement. In this regard, the Uganda government has
remained insistent that it has no administrative role in the Democratic Republic of Congo (at
least after Lusaka agreement) while its conduct remains at least ambivalent in that regard.
20 Uganda thus escapes the status of an occupier state, as is traditionally the case of a state whose
forces occupy another state’s territory (e.g. Israel). Nonetheless, in-fighting between rebel
groups (and factions within groups) has left a very fluid situation which in itself poses the
question of existence of effective administrative structures in several parts of eastern the
Democratic Republic of Congo. This seems to have left a vacuum of authority in which
lawlessness and arbitrary acts in the exploitation of the Democratic Republic of Congo
resources thrives, and thus left any concept of illegality highly fluid in itself.
Volume I - Annexes 0.1 - 1.11