Annex 1
S.M .Glas er et a l., “Securin g Soma li fisheries” ,On e Earth Future Foundation,
2015
(Extracts)
w w w . s e c u r e f i s h e r i e s . o r g
SECURING
SOMALI
FISHERIES
Sarah M. Glaser
Paige M. Roberts
Robert H. Mazurek
Kaija J. Hurlburt
Liza Kane-Hartnett
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | i
SECURING
S OMA L I
FISHERIES
Sarah M. Glaser
Paige M. Roberts
Robert H. Mazurek
Kaija J. Hurlburt
Liza Kane-Hartnett
Contributors:
Ashley Wilson, Timothy Davies, and Robert Arthur (MRAG, London)
Graphics:
Timothy Schommer and Andrea Jovanovic
Please send comments and questions to:
Sarah M. Glaser, PhD
Research Associate, Secure Fisheries
One Earth Future Foundation
+1 720 214 4425
[email protected]
Please cite this document as:
Glaser SM, Roberts PM, Mazurek RH, Hurlburt KJ, and Kane-Hartnett L
(2015) Securing Somali Fisheries. Denver, CO: One Earth Future Foundation.
DOI: 10.18289/OEF.2015.001
Secure Fisheries is a program of the One Earth Future Foundation
Cover Photo: Shakila Sadik Hashim at Alla Aamin fishing company in Berbera, Jean-Pierre Larroque.
Annex 149
ii | Securing Somali Fisheries
LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, BOXES ............................................................................................. iii
FOUNDER’S LETTER .................................................................................................................... v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................. vi
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................ vii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Somali) ............................................................................................. viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (English) ............................................................................................. xiii
ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................... xvii
CHAPTER 1. Introduction to Somali Marine Fisheries ...............................................................1
Political and economic history of Somalia ......................................................................2
History of fisheries legislation ........................................................................................4
The marine environment and ecology of Somali waters ................................................6
History of fishing in Somali waters .................................................................................9
Our assessment of Somali fisheries ..............................................................................16
CHAPTER 2. Foreign Fishing in Somali Waters ........................................................................21
The context: fishing in the Western Indian Ocean........................................................22
The problem of IUU fishing in Somali waters ...............................................................23
Estimating foreign fishing in Somali waters ..................................................................28
The impact of trawling in Somali waters ......................................................................41
Potential revenue generation through licensing of foreign vessels ..............................44
Conclusions...................................................................................................................47
CHAPTER 3. Economic Value of Somali Domestic Fisheries ....................................................55
Domestic and export markets for Somali fish products................................................56
Fisheries value chains ...................................................................................................59
Valuation of Somali domestic fisheries .........................................................................63
Conclusions...................................................................................................................67
CHAPTER 4. Sustainability of Fishing in Somali Waters ..........................................................73
The importance of sustainable fisheries .......................................................................73
Fishery production potential in Somali waters .............................................................73
Sustainability of fisheries at current levels of fishing effort .........................................76
Conclusions...................................................................................................................79
CHAPTER 5. Opportunities for Developing Somali Marine Fisheries ......................................85
Developing policies and structures to combat IUU fishing ...........................................87
Building a foundation for sustainable fisheries management ......................................89
An international call to action to stop illegal and destructive foreign fishing ..............94
Glossary....................................................................................................................................99
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDICES available online at:
http://securefisheries.org/report/securing-somali-fisheries
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | iii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.1 Map of Somalia and its regions
1.2 Map of Somali territorial waters and proclaimed Exclusive Economic Zone
1.3 Presence of foreign fishing vessels in Somali waters (1960—2013)
2.1 The Western and Eastern Indian Ocean, divided by FAO Area boundaries
2.2 Marine capture production for the Western Indian Ocean as reported to the FAO
2.3 Marine species caught in the WIO as reported to the FAO
2.4 Estimates of catch by foreign fishing fleets in Somali waters (1981–2013)
2.5 Estimated catch of HMS by IOTC member nations in Somali waters
2.6 Spatial distribution of the IOTC fleet in the Western Indian Ocean over time
2.7 Proportion of catch assigned to IOTC nations fishing in Somali waters during 2013
2.8 Reconstruction of catch by Iranian-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.9 Reconstruction of catch by Yemeni-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.10 Estimated catch by Spanish-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.11 Estimated catch by Egyptian-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.12 Estimated catch by French-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.13 Estimated catch by Seychelles-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.14 Estimated catch by Taiwanese*-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.15 Reconstructed catch by Italian trawlers in Somali waters
2.16 Catch composition of Italian trawlers
2.17 Estimated catch by Pakistani-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.18 Estimated catch by South-Korean-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.19 Estimated catch by Japanese-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.20 Estimated catch by Thai-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.21 Estimated catch by Chinese-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.22 AIS tracks of eleven Chinese longline vessels fishing during March-May 2015
2.23 Estimated catch by Soviet (or former Soviet)-flagged vessels in Somali waters
2.24 Days trawling per South Korean vessel per year
2.25 Proportion of days trawled in Somali waters by Korean trawlers
2.26 Total extent of area trawled by five South Korean vessels during 2010-2014
2.27 Concentration of AIS broadcasts during trawling for five South Korean vessels, 2010-2014
2.28 Composition of trawl catch by South Korean vessels during 2010-2014.
2.29 Estimated total catch by the foreign tuna fleet in Somali waters
3.1 Major domestic and export flows of Somali fisheries commodities
3.2 Catch composition of Somali domestic fisheries
3.3 Catch by Somali domestic fisheries
3.4 Value chain for the finfish fishery
3.5 Value chain for the shark fishery
3.6 Value chain for the lobster fishery
3.7 Landed value of fish commodities from the Somali fishing sectors
4.1 Example of global fishery production potential for top predators
4.2 Global estimates of sea surface chlorophyll
4.3 Fisheries catch in Somali waters (benthivores, planktivores, piscivores)
4.4 Fisheries catch in Somali waters by species group
4.5 Sustainability of commercially-fished stocks in Somali waters
*Province of China
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iv | Securing Somali Fisheries
1.1 Summary of ecologically important fishes and invertebrates found in Somali water
1.2 Summary of joint fishing ventures operating in Somali waters
2.1 Marine capture production for the Western Indian Ocean as reported to the FAO in 2013
2.2 Summary of foreign catch in Somali waters, 1981—2013
2.3 Price per mt of tuna used to estimate total values of tuna caught in Somali waters
2.4 Estimated value of the catch of tuna caught in Somali waters by the foreign fleet
2.5 Potential license fee revenues from the sale of fishing licenses to the foreign tuna fleet
3.1 Prices for fishery commodities in the Somali domestic fishing sector
3.2 Economic value of Somali fisheries
4.1 Fishery production potential compared to current catch in Somali waters
Box 2.1 The personal side of IUU fishing
Box 2.2 How IUU vessels avoid detection
Box 2.3 The complicated relationship with Yemen
Box 3.1 Violence against Somali fishers
Box 3.2 Conservation of sharks and rays
Box 4.1 The potential for investment in Somali fisheries
Box 4.2 Conservation of overlooked species
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF BOXES
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | v
In 2013, Somali representatives came together to visualize and create the Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy.
This plan outlines many aspirations for a prosperous Somalia. The report herein honors a step towards that future.
The One Earth Future (OEF) foundation is proud to deliver Securing Somali Fisheries, the inaugural report of our Secure
Fisheries program. This report closes previous gaps in knowledge about the state of Somali fisheries and documents
the extent and impact of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing on Somalis and their fisheries resources. As the
founder of OEF, I employ the skills that helped me build a successful business—analysis, evidence, foresight, and longterm
thinking—to apply to global problems. As such, OEF conducts research and promotes ideas that lead to increased
cooperation and conflict reduction. My hope is that the evidence presented by Securing Somali Fisheries will help
catalyze the international fishing community, Somali fishing authorities, and NGOs to come together in their common
interest to (1) strengthen fisheries management, (2) guide investment in fisheries resources, and (3) improve monitoring,
control, and surveillance efforts in Somali waters.
Two years ago, several European Union countries, the United States, the World Bank, the African Development Bank,
and others pledged €1.8 billion towards peace and state-building efforts in Somalia (the Somali New Deal Compact).
Revitalizing and expanding the Somali economy is a central component of these efforts. Fisheries is one of three
high-priority economic sectors targeted for growth. If developed sustainably with an eye towards building long-term
prosperity, Somali fisheries will provide jobs and economic opportunity in many under-served communities.
Today, Somali fisheries face numerous challenges. Decades of unregulated fishing by foreign vessels and a severe lack of
fisheries management have taken their toll. This report shows that foreign vessels from over a dozen different countries
catch many times more fish than Somalis do every year. This unregulated foreign fishing risks depleting a resource that
should promote food and economic security for Somalis. Rampant bottom-trawling also causes substantial damage to
important coastal ecosystems that are needed to sustain local fisheries. Conversely, if foreign vessels were regulated
by their governments and properly licensed and monitored, Somalia and Somaliland could invest license fees to build
domestic fisheries and processing activities. Eventually, foreign vessels could land their regulated catch in Somalia,
providing much-needed revenue as seafood products move up the value chain. Further, growth of the domestic
fishing sector will benefit from a long-term approach to development that balances short-term needs with longerterm
economic goals. This will ensure fishing is developed around a resource base that will provide a reliable source of
income for generations to come, rather than around one that will be depleted.
To achieve this combination of economic development and resource security, foreign fishing must be limited in order
to promote a vibrant domestic fishing economy. Domestic fishery laws must translate into effective management plans
promoting sustainability and prioritizing the livelihoods of Somalis. This report offers key recommendations to help
achieve these ends and secure prosperous and sustainable fisheries for Somalia.
These steps can contribute to lasting stability in Somalia. Given the potential for a rebound in piracy and the ongoing threat
from Al-Shabaab, improved security in this region is of vital importance to the EU, the US, and the international community.
Secure Fisheries was developed as part of Oceans Beyond Piracy’s work to facilitate public-private partnerships and
promote maritime governance and security. They, along with Shuraako, our Somali finance and business development
program, are funded by the One Earth Future Foundation.
Marcel Arsenault
Founder and Chairman, One Earth Future Foundation
FOUNDER’S LETTER
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vi | Securing Somali Fisheries
This report benefitted substantially from the input of many individuals within One Earth Future, in Somalia, and in the
international community.
Secure Fisheries was developed as part of Oceans Beyond Piracy’s work to facilitate public-private partnerships and
promote maritime governance and security. Input for this report came from Jon Huggins, Jerome Michelet, Jens
Vestergaard Madsen, John Steed, Matthew Walje, Ben Lawellin, and Peter Kerins. We had significant assistance from
Shuraako members Abdikarim Gole and Mahad Awale who distributed our survey of Somali fishers and gave us valuable
advice. We also had support from Lee Sorensen, Alex Wise, John Linton, and the entire Shuraako team.
We are indebted to many Somalis who provided photographs, stories, and information about their lives as fishers to
guide some of our reporting. In particular, we thank Yusuf Abdilahi Gulled Ahmed and Jama Mohamud Ali for their
advice. We are incredibly grateful for expert feedback and input from people who have lived and worked in Somalia
and the region, including Julien Million, Andy Read, Marcel Kroese, Per Erik Bergh, Jorge Torrens, Kifle Hagos, and
Stephen Akester.
Timothy Davies, Ashley Wilson, and Robert Arthur of MRAG collected and analyzed price data, created value chain
diagrams, estimated the value of Somali fisheries presented in Chapter 3, estimated the potential license fee revenue
in Chapter 2, and wrote a significant portion of Chapter 3. We received valuable comments on early drafts of this report
from Julien Million, Dyhia Belhabib, Stephen Akester, Rashid Sumaila, and Steve Trent. Technical advice was provided by
Dirk Zeller, Christopher Costello, and Daniel Ovando.
Graphics and layout are compliments of Tim Schommer and Andrea Jovanovic. Administrative support was provided
by Laura Burroughs. Photography and video creative support by Jean-Pierre Larroque. Web design and support by Tim
Schommer and Michael Stadulis.
We are extremely grateful to our data partners. exactEarth provided a significant amount of satellite Automatic
Identification System data. The Sea Around Us at the University of British Columbia, including Dirk Zeller, Dyhia Belhabib,
Kyrstn Zylich, and Deng Palomares, provided the domestic catch data reconstructions used throughout the report. The
U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, particularly Michael
Fogarty, provided output from model runs of their fishery production potential model for Somali waters. Andy Hickman
provided valuable data, photographs, and interviews that were invaluable to our estimates of foreign fishing.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | vii
This report is dedicated to the memories of Jorge Torrens and Yahye Osman. Jorge and Yahye worked for the UN Food
and Agriculture Organization fisheries sector. Tragically, they lost their lives in a car accident in Somaliland on April 29,
2015. Jorge joined FAO in 2010 and worked as a fisheries officer in Mauritania, Kenya, and Somalia. Yahye joined FAO in
2009 and worked as a driver in Somalia; he had recently been promoted to the fisheries technical team. Both men were
dedicated to and loved their work in Somali fisheries. Jorge was an early contributor to this report. Our thoughts and
prayers are with their colleagues, family, and friends.
DEDICATION
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Securing Somali Fisheries | xiii
Somali waters have the potential to support some of the most productive fisheries in the world. Yet, the domestic fishing
sector in Somalia is relatively small. Development of fisheries proceeded fruitfully during the 1970s and 1980s, but the
1991 civil war reversed this development and opened Somali waters to an influx of unregulated fishing from foreign
vessels. Although Somali fisheries are poorly documented, a recent surge in interest from investors has highlighted the
need to understand the state of Somali fisheries.
This report was created to close the significant gaps in knowledge of Somali fisheries, such as:
• The magnitude of foreign fishing;
• The effects of illegal foreign fishing on Somali fisheries and supporting habitat;
• The sustainability status of economically important species; and
• The economic value and supply chain potential of domestic markets.
This report promotes sustainable harvests of Somali fisheries by identifying underused resources and highlighting
challenges. By creating a shared set of knowledge about the resource, it also provides a foundation for improved
stakeholder partnerships, data sharing, and transparency. Finally, the report calls on the international community to
prioritize the health of Somali fisheries and ensure that their fishing vessels follow Somali law in order to promote jobs,
growth, and stability.
Our report shows that the biggest cause for concern is foreign illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing. We
estimate foreign IUU vessels catch three times as many fish as the Somali artisanal fishing sector, and many of those
vessels cause significant environmental damage. Our analysis suggests that foreign fishing must immediately be limited,
regulated, reported, and licensed. We also find a significant number of Somali fish stocks are overfished and, if these
trends continue, Somali fishers will face declining catches and profits.
Chapter 1: Introduction to Somali Marine Fisheries
In Chapter 1, we review a brief history of Somalia as it relates to its fisheries sectors. While national-level statistics are
outdated, the most recent numbers available document 4,500 full-time and 5,000 part-time fishers across the region. In
1996, fisheries indirectly employed an additional 30,000 persons full-time and 60,000 part-time in occupations. Fisheries
in all regions face significant challenges to development. The lack of infrastructure, especially ice, freezing, and cold
storage facilities, is a major constraint on the expansion of fisheries.
After decades of limited fisheries management, several important steps have been made recently:
• In April 2014, Somali representatives agreed to cooperate on fisheries management through federal and
regional licensing schemes.
• In May 2014, Somalia joined the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and engaged the international community in
shared management of tuna and tuna-like species.
• In June 2014, Somalia proclaimed its Exclusive Economic Zone, strengthening its legal foundation for fisheries
management, especially with respect to foreign vessels in Somali waters.
• In October 2014, the parliament adopted an updated draft fisheries legislation, the Somali Fisheries Law (Law
no29), which was signed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in November 2014. This legislation prioritizes
sustainability, promotes cooperation between federal and regional administrations, recognizes the importance
of including fishers’ perspectives in fisheries management, and takes a strong stand against IUU fishing.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - ENGLISH
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xiv | Securing Somali Fisheries
Chapter 2: Foreign Fishing in Somali Waters
In Chapter 2, we report the results of the first comprehensive review and measurement of foreign fishing in Somali
waters. We combine published reports, interviews with experts, analysis of satellite data, and reported catch data to
estimate total catch by foreign vessels. Foreign vessels caught over 132,000 metric tons of marine life in 2013, nearly
three times the amount caught by Somali artisanal and subsistence fishers. Iran and Yemen have the largest fishing
presence in Somali waters. Vessels from Europe and Asia also have had a significant presence in Somali waters. Many
of the foreign purse seine and longline vessels crowd the outside border of the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone, while
others have been granted license to fish inside the EEZ.
IUU foreign fishing in Somali waters has been a problem for decades. During the 1990s, IUU fishing became an initial
justification for pirate attacks on foreign fishing vessels. The sustainable development of fisheries by Somalis is made
significantly more difficult while foreign IUU vessels operate with impunity. Furthermore, rampant unreported and
unregulated foreign fishing, whether illegal or not, has galvanized public resentment. Foreign vessels have been accused
of hiring armed guards and shooting at Somalis, spraying Somalis with hot water, destroying artisanal fishing gear,
depleting fish stocks at the expense of domestic catch, and destroying coral reef habitat. Somali authorities have asked
for international cooperation to fight back against illegal foreign fishing. It is imperative to reduce foreign IUU fishing in
Somali waters, and now is a critical time for the international community to act.
The presence of foreign fleets also damages habitat. Bottom trawlers, vessels that drag nets along the seafloor in shallow
waters, are active in Somali waters during 75% of the year. Bottom trawling wreaks havoc on marine habitat, reduces
biodiversity, and diminishes fish populations long after trawling ceases. Furthermore, the number of active trawlers is
higher than what we tracked, and the negative impact of trawling is much greater than we can document. As such, we
recommend that bottom trawlers cease operating in Somali waters immediately, in line with Somalia’s new fisheries
legislation.
However, the presence of some foreign vessels could be leveraged for the benefit of Somalis. We estimate Somalis
could generate between US$4 and US$17 million in revenues each year from licensing foreign longline and purse seine
tuna fleets. Licensing revenue would be even greater if vessels from Iran and Yemen were licensed. This potential
revenue represents an important opportunity for investment in the Somali fisheries sector. To facilitate the sustainable
development of Somali fisheries, foreign fishing (both legal and illegal) must be limited, licensed, recorded, and regulated
as soon as possible.
Estimated catch by foreign vessels and Somali vessels in Somali waters, 1981–2013.
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Securing Somali Fisheries | xv
Chapter 3: Economic Value of Somali Domestic Fisheries
In Chapter 3, we analyze domestic value chains for fish products. The market for fish products that are landed by Somalis
shows significant opportunity for growth and development, both within Somalia and for export. Somali fish catch
increased dramatically from the mid-1980s to today, but markets did not concurrently diversify. We develop value chains
to demonstrate the potential for market development of Somali fish products.
We estimate the total economic value of domestic fisheries, after value is added through the supply chain, to be US$135
million per year. Substantially greater economic benefit could be obtained by the Somali fishing and seafood industries
through improved value addition. Landing sites are not equipped with sufficient support services or infrastructure for
off-loading, chilling, storing, and transporting fish. As a result, Somali fishers cannot leverage price premiums that accrue
to processed fish. Developing small-scale processing facilities could enable fishers to add value to catches and provide a
means to improve marketing opportunities.
Our conversations with Somali fishers reveal growing concern over the state of the resource, lost profits attributed to
competition from foreign industrial vessels, and a lack of access to formal markets. If developed equitably, fisheries have
the potential to be an important source of food and income security and, eventually, of stability.
Chapter 4: Sustainability of Fishing in Somali Waters
In Chapter 4, we assess the sustainability of fish stocks in Somali waters. We find almost half the groups of fishes we
analyzed, including sharks and groupers, are currently fished at unsustainable levels. Other groups, including sardines
and jacks, appear to be sustainable for the time being.
Additionally, we calculate the amount of fish that could be sustainably harvested from Somali waters, and we compare
that to the amount of fish that is currently harvested from Somali waters. Our comparisons demonstrate marine top
predators (e.g., tuna and sharks) are being harvested at maximum capacity and there is no room to sustainably increase
catch of these fish. However, fishes such as sardines, anchovies, and some bottom fishes could sustain higher levels
of catch in the future. For sustainable development to be successful, we recommend a more balanced approach to
harvesting that decreases catch of top predators and increases catch of forage fishes and bottom fishes that are not
currently harvested.
Ultimately, there are reasons to be optimistic about the sustainability of fisheries in Somalia. On average, Somali
fisheries are more sustainable than in the rest of the world and immediate action to manage these fisheries could
preserve that sustainability. However, caution is warranted. If Somali stocks continue on their current path, we estimate
well over half of stocks will be fished at unsustainable levels in under a decade.
Chapter 5: Opportunities for Developing Somali Marine Fisheries
There is great potential in Somali fisheries, but there is also great risk. Run-away foreign fishing, much of it illegal,
poses the greatest threat to the long-term health of the Somali fishery ecology and economy. In Chapter 5, we outline
nineteen opportunities to support a sustainable foundation for Somali fisheries, for Somalis to reduce illegal fishing
in their waters, and for international action to stop illegal and destructive fishing in Somali waters. Some of the most
important opportunities include:
• Finalizing a mechanism for licensing foreign vessels and investing that revenue into the Somali fishery sector;
• Developing greater capacity for monitoring, control, and surveillance;
• Increasing data collection;
• Growing the domestic sector through investment in cold storage, freezers, and infrastructure;
• Developing fisheries management plans;
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xvi | Securing Somali Fisheries
• Stopping foreign illegal fishing by enforcing sanctions against vessels;
• Improving data sharing by foreign navies and fishing vessels with Somali officials;
• Inspecting vessels suspected of fishing illegally in Somali waters that unload in foreign ports; and
• Supporting regional agreements to end IUU fishing.
Conclusions
Ultimately, Somali fisheries have the potential to bolster food and income security throughout the region. A more robust
domestic fishery would increase jobs and wages in one of Somalia’s most vulnerable employment sectors. Management
of foreign fishing is important to ensure lasting benefits for Somalis. Given the decades of IUU fishing by foreign vessels
within Somali waters, the international community bears a responsibility to help support sustainable fisheries through
investment, regulation of its vessels, and respect for Somali law. Accordingly, investment in the Somali fisheries economy,
especially infrastructure, would spill over and improve other domestic sectors, set the foundation for long-term
prosperity, and improve national security.
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Securing Somali Fisheries | xvii
ABBREVIATIONS
AIS Automatic Identification System
ASCLME Agulhas and Somali Current Large Marine Ecosystem Project
CMM Conservation and Management Measures
CPI Consumer Price Index (World Bank)
DG-Mare Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
DWF Distant Water Fleets
DWFD Distant Water Fisheries Development
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FGS Federal Government of Somalia
FMC Fisheries Monitoring Center
FPP Fishery Production Potential
FSFA Federal Somali Fisheries Authority
FV Fishing Vessel
HMS Highly Migratory Species
ICU Islamic Courts Union
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IMO International Maritime Organization
IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
IUU Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing
LME Large Marine Ecosystem
MCS Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance
MMSI Maritime Mobile Service Identity
MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield
NECFISH North-East Coast Fishing Enterprise
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OSY Optimum Sustainable Yield
PSMA Port State Measures Agreement
SHIFCO Somali High Seas Fishing Company
SMRSS Somali Maritime Resource and Security Strategy
TAC Total Allowable Catch
TFG Transitional Federal Government
TURF Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
VMS Vessel Monitoring System
VSF-S Vétérinaires Sans Frontières Suisse
WIO Western Indian Ocean
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 21
2 Foreign Fishing
CHAPTER 2. FOREIGN
FISHING IN SOMALI WATERS
Fishing by Somalis is primarily an artisanal endeavor, and
catch by domestic fisheries is fairly moderate —estimated
to be between 29,800a mt and 65,000b mt in 2010 (see
Chapter 3). Foreign vessels catch a significant amount of
additional fish in Somali waters. Most catch by foreign
vessels never directly benefits Somalis or the Somali
economy. The following analysis demonstrates that in
order to sustainably develop Somali fisheries beyond
current levels, foreign fishing (both legal and illegal)
must be limited, licensed, recorded, and regulated as
soon as possible. If done properly, revenues gained from
a Estimated by the UN FAO and listed in FishStatJ software.
Accessed 30 July 2015.
b Estimated by the Sea Around Us. Available from www.
seaaroundus.org. Accessed 28 July 2015.
licensing foreign fishing can be invested and distributed
to benefit Somali people, especially fishers.
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in
Somali waters has been problematic for decades.1,2,3
During the 1990s, the specter of IUU fishing became an
initial justification for pirate attacks on foreign fishing
vessels.4,5 The success of this piracy, and the ransoms
received, encouraged attacks on merchant and private
vessels in Somali waters. Piracy became such a risk that
distant water fleets (DWF) targeting tuna and tuna-like
species dramatically altered their fishing habits and
effectively withdrew from Somali waters during the mid-
2000s.6 While piracy has declined due to the presence
of foreign naval vessels and armed guards on merchant
FIGURE 2.1 The Western and Eastern Indian Ocean, divided by FAO Area boundaries.
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22 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
vessels,7 the continued presence of foreign fishing vessels
within sight of the Somali coast is again galvanizing
public anger.8 This, in turn, risks greater public support of
piracy (see Chapter 1 4.5). Furthermore, the sustainable
development of fisheries by Somalis is made significantly
more difficult while foreign vessels operate with impunity.
The imperative to reduce foreign IUU fishing in Somali
waters is of immediate importance.
1. THE CONTEXT: FISHING IN THE
WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN
The Western Indian Ocean (WIO, Figure 2.1), congruent
with UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Area 51,
accounts for approximately 5.5% of global marine capture
production.9 Since around 2003, capture data reported
to the FAOc for the WIO show stagnation between 4
c Marine capture production reported to the FAO and listed in
FishStatJ software. Accessed 19 June 2015 for data spanning
1950–2013. The FAO fisheries database is a commonly used source
of global capture production, but the reliability of these data is
questionable. Countries may misreport for various reasons: some
nations have incentives to overreport in order to mask declining
catches, some nations have incentives to underreport in order
to obscure high levels of fishing pressure, and some nations lack
data collection and management capacity, which hinders accurate
reporting. Thus, the trends illustrated by these graphs must be
understood in the context of uncertain reporting. This report
illustrates the need for improved reliability of the data reported
to the United Nations. See, for example, Pauly, D. and Zeller, D.
(2003) The global fisheries crisis as a rationale for improving the
and 4.5 million mt per year (Figure 2.2). By comparison,
global capture production began to stagnate in the late
1980s,10 suggesting that fisheries development in the
WIO has lagged behind global development. Caution is
needed when inferring trends from these data, however,
because IUU fishing may mask the true patterns of fishing
in the WIO. The recent plateau in capture from the WIO
could be caused by stagnation in fisheries productivity
or a decrease in reporting. If the
former, there may be little room to
increase annual capture beyond
the current 4.5 million mt. Some
have argued11 that Somali waters
represent an untapped source of
fisheries potential given the low
levels of domestic development.
However, considering the
extensive amount of foreign
fishing within Somali waters we
document in this report, and the
high levels of IUU fishing in the
WIO in general,12 the capacity
to increase fish catch in Somali
waters may be limited.
Half of fisheries capture in the
Indian Ocean comes from artisanal
fleets. This creates significant data
challenges across the region.13
Small, artisanal fleets have
characteristics that complicate
fisheries data collection and
hence management: many small boats, low governance
capacity, dispersed and numerous landing sites, diverse
market chains, multi-species and multi-gear fleets, and
no clear distinction between target and bycatch species.
Consequently, data quality varies widely, underreporting
is widespread, and catch is rarely documented at the
species level.
Today, India dominates fishing in the WIO (Table
2.1), accounting for almost 50% of all marine capture
production reported to the FAO. The second ranked
country, Iran, accounts for only 10% of the total. Somali
marine capture production ranks seventeenth in the WIO
according to these reported data.d
FAO’s database of fisheries statistics. Fisheries Centre Reports.
11(6). 9 pp.
d Since 1988, Somalia has not reported capture to the UN, so the
FAO estimates capture based on prior years of reporting. The Sea
Around Us has produced a reconstruction of Somali capture, by
which they estimate 65,000 mt was caught in 2010. See Chapter
3 for details.
FIGURE 2.2 Marine capture production for the Western Indian Ocean as reported
to the FAO.
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Securing Somali Fisheries | 23
2 Foreign Fishing
The top species captured in the Indian Ocean are Indian
oil sardine (Sardinella longiceps, 9%), skipjack tuna
(Katsuwonus pelamis, 7%), yellowfin tuna (Thunnus
albacares, 7%), and Bombay duck (Harpadon nehereus,
4%) (Figure 2.3). The Indian artisanal fleet targets
Indian oil sardine and Bombay duck lizardfish, whereas
tuna and mackerel are targeted by most other fleets.
Sixteen percent of all marine life caught in the WIO is
unidentified, adding to the challenge of fully assessing
the stocks of commercially important fishes.
2. THE PROBLEM OF IUU FISHING IN
SOMALI WATERS
IUU fishing poses a serious threat to the ecological and
economic sustainability of Somalia’s marine fisheries and
to the livelihoods of Somali coastal communities (Box
2.1).14 In general, IUU fishing interferes with a nation’s
ability to meet fisheries management goals, reduces the
profitability of its fisheries, and hastens the collapse of
overfished stocks.15
In 2000, the FAO defined IUU fishing as follows:16
● Illegal fishing includes poaching (vessels fishing in
territorial waters without permission to be there),
failure to observe conservation and management
measures, and fishing on the high seas in violation of
the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).
● Unreported fishing involves any fishing that is not
reported or is misreported to a relevant agency.
● Unregulated fishing includes fishing in areas where
reporting is not mandated, where management does
not exist or is not enforced, or where detailed
knowledge of fishery resources is lacking.
All three components of IUU fishing exist in
Somali waters. Determining how widespread
illegal fishing has been in the past is difficult.
Since passage of the Somali Fisheries Law17
in December 2014, licenses previously
issued to foreign vessels became null and
void, and new licenses must be issued.e All
bottom trawling, regardless of whether a
vessel is flagged to Somalia or elsewhere, is
e Article 16
TABLE 2.1 Marine capture production for the Western
Indian Ocean as reported to FAO in 2013.
FIGURE 2.3 Marine species caught in the Western Indian
Ocean as reported to the FAO (summed over 2004-2013).
The category misc. marine species includes 321 taxonomic
groups, each 2% or less of total catch.
Nation Landings (mt) % of total
India 2,180,030 47.7
Iran 473,658 10.4
Pakistan 351,748 7.7
Yemen 210,000 4.6
Oman 206,170 4.5
Spain 158,968 3.5
Mozambique 137,241 3.0
Maldives 129,842 2.8
Madagascar 81,434 1.8
Seychelles 73,905 1.6
United Arab Emirates 72,000 1.6
Saudi Arabia 71,947 1.6
Tanzania 67,422 1.5
Taiwan (Province of China) 66,329 1.5
France 65,754 1.4
Egypt 43,634 1.0
Somalia 29,800 0.7
Zanzibar 30,712 0.7
Republic of Korea 16,606 0.4
Bahrain 14,978 0.3
Qatar 12,006 0.3
All others 78,307 1.5
Total 4,572,491 100
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24 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
now illegal in Somali waters.f Finally, the first 12 nm of
Somali waters are reserved for Somali fishers only.g
Prior to passage of the law, however, legality of foreign
fishing was unclear. The Somali Maritime Code (see
Chapter 1 2) clearly mandated licenses for all foreign
fishing vessels, and that provision applied to the 200
nm territorial sea claimed by Somalia in 1972. Despite
the fact that Somalia’s territorial waters claim occurred
before UNCLOS, many nations challenged the validity of
f Article 33
g Article 3
the claim and used it as an excuse to fish in Somali waters
beyond 12 nm without license. Foreign vessels sometimes
obtained licenses to fish from regional or local fishing
authorities,18 from local village or clan leaders,19 and, in
some cases, from warlords.20 Licenses were frequently
issued by parties with no legal authority to do so, and
foreign vessels were either ignorant of or complicit in such
activity. Widespread corruption around these licenses
has been reported,21 and in some cases license fees were
exchanged for protection from pirates.22 Some vessels
Box. 2.1: The Personal Side of
IUU Fishing
Jama Mohamud Ali, Puntland
Mr. Jama Mohamud Ali has been in the fishing industry
for over 24 years. He founded one of the largest fishing
companies in Puntland, Corno Africa Fishing Company
(CAFCO), with facilities in Bosaso and Bander Beyla. King
fish, grouper, snapper, tuna, lobster, and sharks comprise
the majority of the company’s income. In addition to fishing,
his company markets fresh fish, sells fuel to fishing boats,
repairs outboard engines, and refills air tanks for lobster
divers. He and his 74 employees have witnessed foreign
fishing in their waters for years. He believes the problem is
widespread and worsening. In his own words:
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Securing Somali Fisheries | 25
2 Foreign Fishing
obtained what appeared to be legitimate licenses, but
allowed those licenses to expire while continuing to fish.
Vessels from some nations, such as Yemen, entered into
arrangements with local fishers and authorities to trade
fish or fishing rights for ice and fuel (Box 2.3).23 Given the
lack of a central authority, especially in fish-rich regions
such as Puntland or Somaliland, such arrangements were
made out of necessity and may not have been illegal.
However, many vessels took advantage of the instability
in Somalia and never attempted to obtain a fishing
license from any authority.
It is neither practical nor fruitful to retrospectively
assign legal status to most fishing that has occurred
in Somali waters. The past confusion over licensing
authority demonstrates that ad hoc licensing without
a robust regulatory framework in place is highly
problematic. Recent progress has been made in pung
such a framework in place. In April 2014, the Federal
Government of Somalia (FGS), Somaliland, and the
federal coastal states, under the Fisheries Working
Group of the Somali Maritime Resource and Security
Strategy (SMRSS),24 signed a communiqué that gave the
authority to license foreign demersal coastal fishing to
the states and the authority to license foreign highly
migratory species (HMS) fishing to the FGS. Federal and
state authorities must still agree on a revenue-sharing
system before further action can be taken.
Much of the fishing in Somali waters is unreported. The
FGS is not collecting nationwide domestic catch statistics,
nor have they reported catch to
the FAO since 1988. Recently,
local efforts to report catch have
been initiated. For example, fishers
working for Somali Fair Fishing, an
NGO operating in Berbera, have
systematically reported their catch.
However, there is an important
need for a nationally or regionally
coordinated attempt to report,
archive, and analyze catches from
domestic fisheries. Domestic and
foreign vessels are now legally
requiredh to report all catch, but
there is not yet a mechanism by
which this can be accomplished. For
foreign vessels, flag state reporting
mandates vary. Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (IOTC) Members or
h Somali Fisheries Law, Article 24.
Non-Contracting Cooperating Parties are required to
collect catch data from their vessels and to report it
to the IOTC. However, vessels operating outside IOTC
mandate, including trawlers, may not report catch to any
agency. In particular, it is unclear whether vessels from
Yemen report the catch they make while in Somali waters
to any central authority.
Finally, for the past several decades, all fishing (foreign
or domestic) in Somali waters has been unregulated. The
management measures enacted during the 1980s have not
been regularly or effectively enforced. Scientific surveys
of Somali waters have not been conducted since the
1980s25 and fishery data collection has been piecemeal.
As a result, detailed knowledge about the fisheries is
severely lacking. While much attention is given to illegal
fishing, unregulated fishing is equally problematic for the
ecological and economic sustainability of fish stocks.26
Without resource assessments and management policies
informed by sound science, unregulated fishing can lead
to resource depletion and collapse.27 This can happen
without warning as a consequence of poor monitoring.
While some foreign vessels may be able to relocate their
fishing effort to overcome local depletions of fishes,
Somali fishers have no such capacity.
The failure to implement and enforce a national,
comprehensive approach to licensing foreign vessels has
resulted in the widespread perception28 in Somalia that
all foreign boats are fishing illegally. This, in turn, has
galvanized the Somali public’s resentment against foreign
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26 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
vessels. This anger is not unwarranted. Foreign vessels
have been accused of hiring armed guards and shooting
at Somali fishers,29 spraying Somalis with hot water,
destroying artisanal fishing gear (Box 2.1), depleting fish
stocks at the expense of domestic catch, and destroying
coral reef habitat. Regardless of the technical definition
of illegal fishing, Somalis experience the negative impacts
of rampant foreign fishing whether it is legal or not.
An uptick in public anger at foreign fishing has had
consequences for foreign fishing vessels. Vessels that
were once allowed to fish freely, often under legal
arrangements, have recently lost that right. For example,
Egyptian trawlers that had been licensed to fish in
Somaliland are now subject to inspection and have
even been arrested.30 Piracy, which in 2014 was almost
eliminated, may be resurging; two Iranian fishing
vessels were captured in March 2015 and as of this
writing 19 of these fishers are being held in Somalia.31
In May 2015, another Iranian vessel thought to be
fishing illegally ran out of fuel and drifted onto shore
in El-Dheer, an Al Shabaab stronghold.32 After paying
a fishing fee, the crew and cargo were released. In
addition, 26 fishers on the highjacked Naham 3 have
been held hostage since 2012.
Somali authorities have asked for international
cooperation to fight back against illegal foreign fishing.
In April 2015, the Somali delegation to the annual IOTC
meetingi documented33 specific occurrences of illegal
fishing in its waters. They presented evidence, including
vessel tracks and photographs, of illegal fishing by four
Iranian gillnetters (the FVs Aresh, Siraj, Jabber, and an
unknown vessel). At least one of these had an altered
(and expired) license on board. At least nine Chinese
longline vessels were operating illegally in Somali waters
during March and April 2015.j And a long battle against
foreign trawlers continues. The Somali delegation named
four trawlers that were formerly flagged to South Korea
and that have been operating close to shore since 2006
(see 4 below). Two additional trawlers, both with Korean
origins,34 have been operating illegally throughout 2015.k
It appears these vessels were recently allowed to leave
port in Mogadishu with a cargo of fish,35 but there was
an attempt to have the trawlers inspected when they
i Nineteenth Session of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, 27
April–1 May 2015, Busan, Korea.
j The Chinese delegation to the IOTC took swift action and their
vessels left Somali waters immediately thereafter. There were
reports in June 2015 that at least some of these nine vessels had
returned under license by the Federal Government.
k These are two of the same trawlers we have included in our AIS
analysis of trawling. See 4.
landed in Mombasa, Kenya.
Somali authorities were
successful at preventing
one of these trawlers from
unloading cargo in Salalah,
Oman by imploring Oman
to invoke the Port State
Measures Agreement, to
which they are a signatory.l
The agreement allows ports
to deny entry to vessels
believed to have engaged
in IUU fishing. That trawler
appears to have landed its
cargo in Yemen, while the
other successfully unloaded
in Oman after presenting a
license from Puntland.
Below, we reconstruct the
levels of foreign fishing
occurring in Somali waters
to the best of our ability
based on the data available.
We choose not to put a
precise number on illegal
versus legal foreign vessels
in Somali waters because the
designations are too individualized and contextualized,
as explained above. Rather, understanding that all
foreign fishing in Somali waters is unregulated, most
of it is unreported to Somali authorities, and unknown
amounts of it are illegal, we posit that knowing the
exact numbers of illegal vessels is not necessary. IUU
fishing is a significant, urgent, and ongoing threat to the
sustainability of Somali fisheries. Political will by Somali
politicians, the international community, and within
fishing communities is needed in order to overcome
these challenges. There has been real progress towards
adopting national legislative instruments that can
address IUU fishing, but they need to be implemented
and respected by foreign vessels to be effective. Given
the tenuous state of commercially important fish stocks
in Somali waters (see Chapter 4), the next 7 to 10 years
will be a critical period for the international and Somali
communities to take immediate steps to stop IUU fishing
in Somali waters.
l As of June 12, 2015, two of these vessels were spotted (from AIS
on ShipView) in Yemeni waters.
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2 Foreign Fishing
Box 2.2: How IUU Vessels Avoid Detection
IUU fishing is a significant problem around the globe, not just in Somali waters. The
value of fish that IUU vessels pursue far outweighs whatever consequences they
might incur if caught poaching.36 Governments are implementing increasingly harsher
penalties meant to deter IUU fishing, and while there are international statutes targeted
at reducing illegal fishing, loopholes remain that allow vessels to avoid detection while
they are conducting illicit activities.
The increasing geographic footprint of the global distant water fishing fleet means
vessels can travel far from their home ports to plunder the waters of countries, like
Somalia, that have weak governance, poor law enforcement, or minimal monitoring,
control, and surveillance (MCS). Many developing countries lack sufficient capacity to
detect, deter, or prosecute IUU vessels, making their fish stocks desirable targets.
Ships use a variety of methods to avoid detection during and after IUU activities.
• A vessel may use a flag from a country different from that
of the vessel’s beneficial owner in order to obscure its identification and to avoid
penalties for IUU fishing. Notoriously, some nations are known to sell their flags, and
vessels shop around for nations that offer the least oversight and fewest regulations at
the best price. This is often called a flag of convenience or flag of non-compliance.37
• Vessels cover or obscure their names and
identification numbers, making it difficult for others to report suspicious activities.
• AIS is not a tamper-proof system. The broadcast
information is easily adjusted to mask vessel identity.38 Tactics include:
o Completely disabling the AIS unit during illicit activities
o Using generic Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) and International Maritime Organization
(IMO) identification numbers or using numbers that belong to other vessels
o Not listing an IMO number at all
o Changing the radio call sign
o Adjusting latitude and longitude coordinates to show a location different from where fishing
actually occurred
• PThere are many regulations in place to prevent IUU fish from entering global markets, most
notably the Port State Measures Agreement. To avoid compliance with such measures, boats will avoid ports
during ooading. A transport (reefer) vessel will meet the fishing vessel on the water and the fish will be
transferred to the transport vessel, often mixing illegal fish with legally captured fish and making the illegal fish
undetectable in the market.39
• Flag of convenience vessels undermine fishery conservation measures by exceeding
regional quotas because they often lack a mandate to report catch to the flag state
As a reaction to these practices, there has been a push to increase the liability for IUU activities of boat owners and
the countries in which they reside, rather than the flag state. However, vessel ownership is often hidden behind
complicated and deceptive business arrangements, making it difficult to enforce such laws.40,41 It is crucial for the
international community to close legal loopholes that allow IUU fishing to flourish around the world.
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28 | Securing Somali Fisheries
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3. ESTIMATING FOREIGN FISHING IN
SOMALI WATERS
While foreign fishing in Somali waters has been problematic
for at least the past two decades,42 the lack of reporting
and monitoring means that little data is available to
quantify the problem. A systematic assessment of foreign
fishing in Somali waters has never been done until now.
Here, we combine a variety of methods to estimate the
volume of fish removed from Somali waters by foreign
fleets. As discussed, we do not distinguish foreign vessels
fishing legally from those fishing illegally in Somali waters.
Rather, our goal is to estimate the total volume of fish
catch from Somali waters since the early 1980s by boats
not flagged to Somalia.
3.1 Methods for Estimating Foreign Fishing
in Somali Waters
We used four approaches to estimate fishing by foreign
vessels: (1) analysis of fish catch reported to the IOTC,
(2) catch reconstruction using data found in scientific
and media reports, (3) analysis of AIS vessel broadcast
data that have date, time, and location stamps, and (4)
catch allocation estimates published by the Sea Around
Us. Where available, we supplemented these data with
information on catch composition. For a given fishing
nation, the approach chosen was dependent on the type,
quality, and duration of data available. Following an
established method for estimating IUU fishing outlined
by Pitcher et al.,43 we began our analysis by creating a
detailed fishery timelinem through extensive searches
of the literature, expert interviews, and conversations
with Somalis (Appendix 1). We started our estimation in
1981, based on our review of the literature and available
data, which show that foreign fishing in Somali waters
began to increase in earnest during the early 1980s. We
do not make estimates for 2014 or 2015 due to a lack of
consistent data: IOTC data run through 2013, AIS data
run through 2014, and Sea Around Us data run through
2010. Appendix 2 provides detailed methodologies for
the approaches used to estimate catch for each country.
Nations that are Members or Non-Contracting
Cooperating Parties of the IOTC are required to submit
annual records that describe the number and/or volume
m Available from http://securefisheries.org/report/securing-somalifisheries
of fish species caught (nominal catch data), the amount
of fishing effort (e.g., hours fished), the gear used, and
the date and location of the catch (catch and effort
data). These reporting requirements apply only to the
16 speciesn under IOTC mandate plus commonly caught
shark species.44 The IOTC makes these data available on
its website,o and the catch-and-effort data are available in
three sets: from longline vessels, from purse seine vessels,
and from coastal vessels (e.g., gillnets or handlines). We
estimated catch by IOTC-reporting nations in Somali
watersp based on the latitude and longitude reported
with catches.
Appendix 2 provides details of our analysis of IOTC catch
and effort data. Briefly, we overlaid a 11 grid (for the
purse seine dataset) and a 55 grid (for the longline
and coastal datasets) onto the boundaries of Somali
waters. Catch in 1 cells that overlapped Somali waters
or touched the boundary line was assigned 100% to
Somali waters. Catch in 5 cells that overlapped Somali
waters was disaggregated by the proportion of the cell
that overlapped. For example, if a 5 cell fell half in and
half out of Somali waters, the catch reported for that cell
was assigned 50% in and 50% out of Somali waters.
This approach introduces uncertainty to the estimates
of IOTC-reported catch assigned to Somali waters. Our
disaggregation assumes an equal likelihood of catch at
any point in a grid cell. However, it is possible that none
(or all) of the catch in a given 5 cell occurred in Somali
waters. We urge the IOTC and its members to report all
longline data at a finer (11) resolution to reduce the
uncertainty associated with locating fishing activities in
the Indian Ocean.
We modeled our reconstruction approach after that
developed by Pauly et al.45 to estimate the volume and
patterns of catch by the Chinese distant water fishing
fleet. Our modified approach was as follows: (1) establish
n Albacore, skipjack, yellowfin, southern bluefin, longtail,
kawakawa, bullet, frigate, and bigeye tunas; swordfish, black
marlin, blue marlin, striped marlin, Indo-Pacific sailfish, Indo-
Pacific king mackerel, and narrow-barred Spanish mackerel.
o Available from http://www.iotc.org/data/datasets, downloaded
on December 9, 2014.
p Somali waters were defined by the EEZ boundaries submitted to
the United Nations in July 2014. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/SOM2014EEZ.pdf Secure
Fisheries understands and respects disagreement about these
boundaries, but we use them because they provide concrete
boundaries for mapping and analysis purposes.
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2 Foreign Fishing
the presence of a given nation’s
vessels in Somali waters from
available literature and expert input;
(2) estimate the likely number of
vessels flagged to a given nation that
are fishing in Somali waters for years
in which data are available; (3) use
various records of catch (e.g., catch
rate or vessel capacity) and species
composition to estimate total catch
amount and type by fishing vessels
of a given nation for years in which data are available;
(4) extrapolate catch amount between years for which
data exist (anchor points) to years for which data do
not exist; (5) generate 95% confidence intervals for our
estimates of catch as a measure of uncertainty (a Monte
Carlo simulation) based on ranges of vessel numbers and
catch amounts. Methods varied slightly from country to
country given available information. See Appendix 2 for
country-specific details.
AIS is a vessel tracking system used by ocean-going vessels
for collision avoidance, tracking, and identification.
Signals are broadcast from vessels and intercepted by
ship, land-based station, or satellite-based receivers.
The IMO mandates that all vessels 300 gross tonnage or
larger, and all passenger vessels, be equipped with AIS
for safety. Fishing vessels are not required to broadcast
AIS, although many larger vessels do so voluntarily. We
obtained AIS dataq for a set of foreign trawlers operating
in Somali waters from July 2010 through December
2014. These seven trawlers were flagged to South Korea
during that period. Using speed over ground from AIS
broadcasts, we estimated the trawlers’ locations and
days spent trawling. We then matched estimates of days
spent trawling to reports of volume and composition of
fish caught during seven fishing campaigns of various
lengths (between 20 and 27 days each). These catch
reports were obtained from three of the seven trawlers.
See Appendix 3 for details.
We used catch allocated to Somali waters by the
algorithms46 developed by the Sea Around Us to estimate
catch by Pakistan. These estimates of catch were
q exactEarth, Cambridge, Ontario, Canada. Data obtained March
26, 2015.
obtained from their publicly available online datasets.r
Sea Around Us assigned foreign catch to Somali waters by:
(1) estimating total catch for a given foreign nation using
FAO catch statistics; (2) overlaying species’ geographical
distributions with Somalia’s EEZ; and (3) including
consideration of any access agreements between Somalia
and the foreign fleet.
3.2 Results: Estimates of Foreign Fishing in
Somali Waters since 1981
Between 1981 and 2013, we estimate that foreign
vessels fishing in Somali waters landed approximately
3,100,000 mt of marine life (Table 2.2 and Figure 2.4).
In comparison, reconstruction of Somali domestic catch
is only 1,404,125 mt over the same time period.s In the
most recent year analyzed (2013), we estimate annual
catch by foreign vessels was 132,000 mt while Somali
artisanal catch was only 40,000 mt per year, less than
one-third that of foreign catch. Foreign catch peaked
at 193,000 mt in 2003 as regional fleets (primarily from
Iran and Yemen) became firmly established, but before
the peak of pirate activity caused IOTC vessels fishing for
HMS to avoid Somali waters.47 Today, Iran and Yemen are
by far the dominant foreign presence in Somali waters.
Our estimates are bolstered by informal interviews in
early 2015 with Somali fishers and fish processors in
Puntland and Somaliland (see Appendix 1). When asked,
What country do the foreign fishers come from
33 respondents listed the following nations (listed in
descending order of the number of times a country was
mentioned): Yemen, Iran, South Korea, India, Seychelles,
Thailand, Egypt, Taiwan (Province of China),
Pakistan, Spain, Oman, France, and Sri Lanka. More
than 60% of those interviewed reported seeing foreign
vessels in their waters more than once per day.
r Available from www.seaaroundus.org.
s Sea Around Us reconstruction stopped in 2010. Therefore, to
estimate Somali catch from 2011–2013, we carried forward the
estimate of catch in 2010.
Securing Somali Fisheries | 29
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30 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
Purse seine and longline vessels catch
significant amounts of tuna and tuna-like
species as they migrate through Somali
waters (Figure 2.5). The peak IOTC catch
in 2003 (about 95,000 mt) was likely
driven by an unusually good fishing
year for HMS in the Somali basin.48 The
decline in catch around 2005 was driven
by several factors: the expiration of
private agreements with EU purse seine
vessels49 that allowed access to Somali
waters, the southward movement of the
purse seine and longline fleets to follow
record numbers of tuna in Kenyan and
Tanzanian waters, and a peak in pirate
activity50 that caused vessels to avoid
Somali waters (Figure 2.6). In 2013,
we estimate IOTC nations caught just
under 50,000 mt of HMS, approximately
equivalent to the catch of all species by
the Somali domestic fleet (see Chapter
3). Spain and the Seychelles top the list
of nations whose flagged vessels catch
fish assigned by our approach to Somali
waters; in the case of the Seychelles,
many of these vessels are owned
and operated by Taiwan (Province of
China). France, South Korea, and
Taiwan round out the top five foreign
fleets that likely had a presence in
Somali waters in 2013 (Figure 2.7).
Fishing
Nation
1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s Total
1981–2013
Estimation
Method
Iran 9,444 31,874 44,853 44,853 1,031,673 Reconstruction
Yemen 4,635 15,644 26,537 28,970 579,404 Reconstruction
Spain 1,995 14,803 16,178 8,884 363,296 IOTC
Egypt 3,240 8,370 12,420 12,240 286,020 Reconstruction
France 4,369 6,345 8,335 7,352 215,529 IOTC
Seychelles 13 650 7,407 6,315 105,948 IOTC
Other 694 4,912 4,440 0 99,756 IOTC
Korea 3,172 1,361 2,654 5,495 90,680 IOTC
Taiwan* 387 2,481 5,066 2,360 88,393 IOTC
Italy 1,758 3,440 2,408 0 74,306 Reconstruction
Pakistan 0 792 6,595 0 73,878 Allocation
Japan 840 507 1,809 158 31,348 IOTC
Thailand 0 0 2,818 9 28,215 Reconstruction,
IOTC
China 0 0 922 239 10,174 IOTC
Ex-Soviet 6 148 653 0 8,067 IOTC
Kenya 0 0 4,800 3,200 8,000 Reconstruction
Greece 447 0 0 447 2,235 Reconstruction
Portugal 0 0 208 0 2,080 IOTC
Mauritius 0 138 1 0 1,390 IOTC
Rèunion 0 35 0 0 348 IOTC
Total 30,999 91,500 144,104 118,123 3,100,741
TABLE 2.2 Summary of foreign catch (in metric tons) in Somali waters,
1981–2013. The decadal columns give the average catch in one year for that
decade (not the total catch over ten years).
P
P
*
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Securing Somali Fisheries | 31
2 Foreign Fishing
We must stress the uncertainty inherent in our approach
to estimating the location of fishing by IOTC Member
nations and Non-Contracting Cooperating Parties. Purse
seine catch is reported in 11 cells, and longline catch
is reported in 55 cells. Our disaggregation approach
(assigning cells that overlap the boundaries of the Somali
EEZ) makes the assumption that catch is uniformly
distributed in these cells. Our assignment of catch
to Somali waters is the best estimate made with the
available data. The spatial patterns of catch by countries
estimated to be fishing in Somali waters since 2006
(Spain, France, Taiwan (Province of China), Seychelles)
FIGURE 2.5 Estimated catch of HMS by IOTC member nations in Somali waters.
FIGURE 2.6 Spatial distribution of IOTC-based fishing fleet in the Western Indian Ocean over time.
*
P
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32 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
show these countries fishing the line of the Somali
EEZ. While our approach assigns this catch to Somali
waters, the fishing vessels may have been just outside
the boundaries. More accurate reports of catch location
would significantly aid in estimation, and we welcome
new sources of information from the relevant nations.
For a better understanding of the spatial extent and
temporal patterns of catch reported to the IOTC, please
see the animations made available on our website.t
In the following pages, we report estimates of catch
by each country that we believe fishes (or has fished)
in Somali waters; countries are listed in order by the
accumulated volume of fish caught between 1981 and
2013.
Iran
We estimate Iran caught 45,000 mt of fish in Somali waters
in 2013 and has caught 1,032,000 mt since 1981 (Figure
2.8). Iran has a large fishing fleet: in 2007, its gillnet
fleet had 6,363 boats51 (1,296 of which are authorized
by the IOTC to fish outside Iranian waters). In 2013, the
UN Security Council reported 180 Iranian gillnet vessels
were fishing in Somali waters.52 Our reconstruction was
t http://securefisheries.org/report/securing-somali-fisheries
based on a range of 5 vessels minimum53 and 180
vessels maximum.54 The vast majority of Iranian vessels
in Somali waters are targeting tuna. Quantitative catch
composition was not available, but a significant amount
of catch is known to be yellowfin and skipjack tuna.55
Bycatch likely includes billfishes, sharks, rays, and
mammals.56 To estimate the amount of catch made
by these vessels, we applied global estimates of fish
storage capacity on coastal gillnet vessels.57 Vessel
data were available spanning 2000–2013, and we
extrapolated from 2000 to zero catch in 1981. Given
the large ranges of possible numbers of boats
and their catch capacities, the 95% confidence
intervals (CI) are very large (9,000 mt–104,000 mt
for the years 2000–2013). Iranian vessels have been
accused of fishing illegally in Somali waters by the
Somali delegation to the IOTC, who recently provided
photographic evidence of their charge.58
Yemen
Yemen and Somalia have a complicated fishing history
that is simultaneously mutually beneficial and conflictual
(Box 2.3). Our research suggests Yemeni fishing boats
began operating in Somali waters in notable numbers in
the early 1980s, especially in Somaliland.59 At that time
there was little reason for conflict between Yemeni and
Somali fishers, although Mohamed Yassin,60 anticipating
future conflict, advised a coordinated management plan
for the Indian oil sardine because these fish regularly
traverse the Somali-Yemeni border in the Gulf of Aden.
In the early 1990s, Yemeni vessels purchased fish directly
from Puntland-based Somali fishers in the Gulf of Aden.
The price received was favorable to Yemeni purchasers61
and still represents a large market for Somali fishers.
FIGURE 2.7 Proportion of catch assigned to IOTC nations
fishing in Somali waters during 2013.
FIGURE 2.8 Reconstruction of catch by Iranian vessels
in Somali waters. Solid line is the mean; shaded area is
P between 5% and 95% CI.
*
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 33
2 Foreign Fishing
Box 2.3: The Complicated Relationship with Yemen*
In April 2015, Houthi rebels forced Yemen’s President
Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee, and hundreds of
Yemeni civilians died in the ensuing conflict. Saudi
Arabia intervened soon thereafter with a bombing
campaign and a blockade of Yemen’s port cities to cut
off Iranian resupply of rebels. Besides blocking weapons,
the blockade also had a major impact on food security
and food assistance in Yemen, and its effects spilled over
into Somalia.
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization estimates
that 10.6 million Yemenis are currently food insecure
and nearly 5 million are facing emergency conditions
characterized by malnutrition and lack of food access.63
The rapid escalation of fighting increased domestic food
prices, disrupted food markets, and interrupted access
to marine fisheries.
Yemen’s marine fish catch has increased tenfold since the
1970s. To sustain this increase, fishers have expanded
their reach into Somali waters. In 1994, an agreement
was reached with local authorities in Heis whereby
Yemenis would deliver fuel in exchange for rights to fish
in Somali waters. Such arrangements continue today,
but in a slightly different form: Yemenis bring ice as
well as fuel (which is subsidized in Yemen, but difficult
to come by in Somalia) and in exchange purchase fish
directly from Somali fishers at favorable prices.
But as stocks in Yemeni waters have declined due to
heavy fishing, more and more boats have crossed into
Somali waters without licenses. Estimates suggest that
before the blockade between 20064 and 30065 Yemeni
boats were fishing illegally in Somali waters at any
given time.
Mahad Awale, a field manager in Puntland for the nonprofit
Shuraako, says the number of Yemeni fishers
coming to Somali waters dropped to almost zero when
the blockade began. According to the State Minister
for Fisheries and Marine Resources in Puntland, Abdi-R
Kulmiye, Yemenis that came to trade fuel for fish usually
made three trips a month, carrying home between 10
and 18 metric tons of fish per trip.66 For those Yemenis
living in coastal cities where fish protein is important,
the cessation of these trips will exacerbate already
critical food shortages.
The interruption of this trade has also impacted
Somalis. Without a Yemeni market, Somali fishers have
taken their catch from Bosaso to the major port city
of Berbera, almost 900 kilometers away by road. On
average, the prices obtained in Berbera are lower than
those received from Yemeni boats, and our sources
suggest the ability of the Berbera market to absorb
excess fish is likely short-lived. Furthermore, without
access to ice brought from Yemen, Somali fishers risk
spoilage of current inventory. One Puntland-based
fishing company reported a 50% decline in profits since
the outbreak of conflict, largely driven by a decline in
fish prices. The short-term effects, therefore, are likely
to be negative for Somali fish traders.
P
* Modified from http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/04/blockade-yemeni-ports-unintended…-
fishing-industry/
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34 | Securing Somali Fisheries
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We estimate that Yemen currently catches 29,000 mt
of fish in Somali waters each year, catching 579,000 mt
since 1981 (Figure 2.9 and further details in Box 2.3).
Yemeni reports to the IOTCu indicate catch composition
of yellowfin (48%), other tunas including longtail, narrowbarred
Spanish mackerel (or kingfish), frigate tuna and
kawakawa (38%), and sharks (5%). However, others62
report very high landings of sharks to support a profitable
shark fin export industry.
Spain
We estimate that Spanish vessels caught approximately
16,000 mt of fish in Somali waters in 2013 and have caught
363,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.10). Estimated annual
u While Yemen reported catch to the IOTC for 2003–2007, the
reports were not spatially explicit (and they were unrealistically
high) so we did not include them in the IOTC analysis.
catch ranged from 933 mt (1987) to 36,983 mt (2003) and
consisted of skipjack tuna (56%), yellowfin tuna (35%),
and bigeye tuna (8%). The vast majority of catch (99%)
was from purse seine vessels, with the balance from
longline vessels.
Egypt
Egyptian trawlers have operated in the waters of
Somaliland since the early 1980s, filling a vacuum left by
the dissolution of the Soviet joint venture SOMALFISH.69
At that time, no more than 10 trawlers from Egypt and
Italy combined were operating in Somali waters. By 2003,
36 Egyptian trawlers were operating and in 2007, 34 were
reported. Published estimates70,71 of catch by these vessels
agreev on a value of 30 mt per trawler-month; of that, 5%
v It is unclear whether the two references for catch refer to the
same raw values, refer to each other, or arrived at these estimates
independently.
On the other hand, long-term impacts may be a boon.
For almost 18 years, Yemen has dominated the fish
market in Somalia and a significant amount of that
catch is re-exported to Djibouti, Oman, and Dubai.
Awale notes that Somali fishers have expressed
optimism that the current shock to their markets may
have a diversifying effect by removing Yemen as a pricesetter
and intermediary. Somali fishers stand to earn
higher profits if they can sell directly to other regional
markets. Finally, the absence of Yemeni fishing boats
during the conflict may improve Somali fish catch.
In an interesting twist, piracy justified Iranian military
engagement near Yemen. In late March 2015, Somali
pirates took hostage two Iranian fishing vessels that
were in Somali waters without license. In response,
Iran deployed two warships to the Gulf of Aden,
which in turn provoked additional naval deployment
from the United States67 and Saudi Arabia.68 While the
Iranian navy maintained that deployment of these
warships was to protect its fishing fleet from pirates,
their presence near Yemen may also have provided
support to the Houthi rebels.
The most immediate impact of violence in Yemen
was on the civilian population, as the Saudi-led
bombing campaign claimed civilian lives, destroyed
infrastructure, and disrupted markets. But indirect and
long-term impacts on fishing communities, in both
Yemen and Somalia, could be substantial as well.
Box 2.3, continued
FIGURE 2.9 Reconstruction of catch by Yemeni vessels
in Somali waters. Solid line is the mean; shaded area is
between 5% and 95% CI.
FIGURE 2.10 Estimated catch by Spanish-flagged vessels
in Somali waters.
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Securing Somali Fisheries | 35
2 Foreign Fishing
of catch was shrimp and the remainder was finfish. We
estimate Egyptian trawlers caught approximately 13,000
mt per year when 36 trawlers were operating and that
catch totals 286,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.11). Unlike
our reconstructions for Iran and Yemen, we do not have
enough data to estimate confidence intervals.
While trawlers have been licensed through Somaliland
since at least the early and mid-2000s, there has been
a recent shift in policy and public opinion against
Egyptian trawlers. Somaliland ceased licensing foreign
fishing vessels in 2012.72 Reports73 that are difficult to
verify indicate two trawlers were arrested and held
in Las Koreh in 2009, and one trawler was arrested in
Somaliland in 2014.74
France
We estimate French vessels caught approximately 6,000–
8,000 mt of fish in Somali waters per year in 2013 and
have caught 216,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.12). Their
catch consisted of skipjack tuna (53%), yellowfin tuna
(38%), and bigeye tuna (9%). Vessels are exclusively purse
seiners. Annual catch has ranged from 610 mt (1984) to
26,634 mt (2002).
Seychelles
We estimate Seychellois vessels caught approximately
9,000 mt of fish in Somali waters in 2013 and have
caught 106,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.13). Annual catch
ranged from 1 mt (1996) to 15,257 mt (2003), primarily
by longline vessels, although purse seiners and coastal
vessels employing handlines were also reported. Catch
composition included skipjack (51%), yellowfin tuna
(33%), and bigeye tuna (12%). Other tuna, swordfish,
other billfishes, and several species of shark comprised
the remaining 4%.
Taiwan (rovince of China)
We estimate Taiwanese vessels caught approximately
5,000 mt of fish per year in Somali waters in 2013, and
have caught 88,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.14). Annual
catch has ranged from 38 mt (1982) to 11,358 mt (2005).
Catch consists of bigeye tuna (45%), yellowfin tuna (29%),
swordfish (14%), and blue and striped marlin (6%). All
catch is from longline vessels, except two data points in
1987 and 1991 that are gillnet vessels. Taiwan is also likely
flagging its vessels to other countries (like the Seychelles).
Italy
Italy has a long history of involvement in Somali fisheries.
In the 1930s, Italians built two tuna canneries on the
north shore of Somalia to process catch by their fleet.75
Fishing for tuna off northern Somalia continued through
at least the 1950s. Trawling began in the late 1970s and
continued, under various auspices, until 2006. Three
Italian trawlers owned by an Italian seafood company,
Amoroso e Figli, operated during 1978–1979. In 1981,
FIGURE 2.11 Estimated catch by Egyptian-flagged vessels
in Somali waters.
FIGURE 2.12 Estimated catch by French-flagged vessels
in Somali waters.
FIGURE 2.13 Estimated catch by Seychelles-flagged
vessels in Somali waters.
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36 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
a joint venture between Italy and Somalia, SOMITFISH,
began operations that continued through 1983. After a
lull in trawling, SOMITFISH was reconstituted as SHIFCO,
and between three and five trawlers operated until 2006.
Finally, in addition to the SHIFCO trawlers, one trawling
vessel operated in (at least) 1984,76 two in 1985,77 and five
in 1988,78 but very little information about these trawlers
is available.
Our reconstruction of Italian fishing in Somali waters
is based on data available for the SHIFCO trawlers. An
Italian seafood importer, PanaPesca SpA, built and then
gifted trawlers to the Somali government for operation.
In return, the catch of these vessels was sold exclusively
to PanaPesca. Three trawlers were built and operated
beginning in 1981, and two more were added to the fleet
in 1990. Each trawler was 57–66 m in length and held 40
crew members.79 These vessels reflagged from Somalia to
Belize in 1997 or 1998 (see Appendix 2). For the purposes of
our reconstruction, catch from vessels flagged to Somalia
are included in domestic numbers, therefore catch
assigned to Italy from these trawlers covers the period
1998–2006. Catch from SHIFCO vessels was applied to
known trawling activity during 1981–1997. Today there
is no fishing by Italian-flagged vessels in Somali waters.
Between 1981 and 2006, Italian trawlers landed between
2,000 and 5,000 mt of fishery resources annually, for a total
of 74,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.15). The vast majority
of catch was coastal, often reef-associated species of fish;
cephalopods were also a significant component (Figure
2.16). In 2006, the vessels stopped operating in Somali
waters due to high fuel costs and conflict
between vessel owners and authorities in
Aden, and SHIFCO’s involvement ceased.w
At that point, most had reflagged to a
variety of countries. The area trawled by
the former Italian fleet, and the market
they supplied, was replaced by the South
Korean trawlers discussed below.
Pakistan
Little information is available to inform
reconstructions of fishing by Pakistan.
Our interviews with experts80 suggest that
their fishing presence in Somali waters is
likely. Estimates from catch allocation are
74,000 mt during 1991–2005, or 5,000 mt
w Additionally, in 2006 the vessels violated their exclusivity
agreement with SHIFCO and sold catch to another Italian
company.
FIGURE 2.14 Estimated catch by Taiwanese*-flagged
vessels in Somali waters.
FIGURE 2.16 Catch composition by Italian trawlers.
FIGURE 2.15 Reconstructed catch by Italian trawlers.
P
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Securing Somali Fisheries | 37
2 Foreign Fishing
per year, exclusively from gillnets (Figure 2.17). A high
ratio of sharks to non-sharks in the gillnet fleet suggests
targeting.81 Spanish mackerel also is a significant
component of catch by Pakistani vessels.82
South Korea
South Korean fishing in Somali waters consists of two
general fleets: longline vessels targeting HMS covered
by the IOTC, and trawlers targeting demersal fishes and
cephalopods. To estimate catch by South Korean vessels,
we combined analysis of IOTC catch data with analysis of
AIS satellite data. We estimate South Korea has caught
47,000 mt of HMS inside Somali waters since 1981. Their
catch consists of yellowfin tuna (45%), bigeye tuna (39%),
swordfish (5%), and blue and striped marlin (5%). The
IOTC-registered vessels are almost exclusively longline,
with a small tonnage of catch by purse seiners in 2012
and 2013. Annual catch of HMS has ranged from 2 mt
(2009) to 5,971 mt (1978).
To estimate catch by the South Korean trawl fleet, we
used AIS to calculate days trawled per year for seven
known trawl vessels operating in Somali waters in 2010–
2014 (for more details, see 4 below and Appendix 3).
We combined these data with six months of catch data to
determine mean catch per boat per day. We calculated
that the South Korean trawl fleet caught 27,000 mt
during this period. On average, this equates to 5,495 mt
per year from trawling. We applied this value to the years
in which South Korean trawling has occurred (beginning
in 2006). Catch consisted largely of cephalopods, with
cuttlefish comprising 20% of catch and squid comprising
19%. The main fish catch was emperors (17%), followed
by barracudas (9%), and grunts (7%). Our estimate of
5,495 mt annually may be an underestimate as there
may have been vessels trawling in Somali waters that
were not broadcasting AIS. A regional expert estimated
that catch by these trawlers that was landed in Salalah,
Oman, was greater than 6,000 mt in 2014.83 Figure 2.18
combines longline and trawl catch by South Korean
vessels.
Japan
We estimate Japanese vessels caught approximately
300 mt of fish in Somali waters in 2013 and have caught
31,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.19). However, Japan has
reported data to the IOTC since 1955, the earliest records
available, and some of this early catch appears to have
occurred in Somali waters as well. Japanese vessels were
absent in the Somali EEZ during 2010 and 2011, but
returned during 2012 and 2013. Their catch consists of
yellowfin tuna (50%), bigeye tuna (25%), striped marlin
(10%), and small volumes of other tunas and billfishes.
Vessels are predominantly longline vessels, with some
catch by purse seiners during the early 1990s. Annual
catch has ranged from 21 mt (2009) to 3,772 mt (2005).
Thailand
We estimate Thai vessels have caught 28,000 mt since
1981 (Figure 2.20). Thailand did not report spatially
disaggregated data to the IOTC until 2006; at that point,
its purse seine fleet was widely distributed across the
Indian Ocean.x Spatially disaggregated catch was not
reported in 2007, 2008, or 2010, but we assumed the
distribution of purse seine vessels was similar to 2006,
2009, and 2011–2013. We estimate between 35 and
490 mt of HMS were caught by Thai purse seine vessels
during this time. Catch was 74% skipjack, 16% bigeye,
10% yellowfin, and 1% swordfish.
x http://securefisheries.org/report/securing-somali-fisheries
FIGURE 2.17 Estimated catch by Pakistani-flagged vessels
in Somali waters.
FIGURE 2.18 Estimated catch by South Korean-flagged
vessels in Somali waters.
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38 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
Thai trawlers also operated in Puntland from at least
2005 to 2009. A document84 produced by the Puntland
Coast Guard reports an incident in which three Puntlandbased
officers guarded a Thai trawler. The official notes a
private agreement between the State of Puntland and the
Thai seafood company Sirichai. Seven trawlers, owned by
Sirichai, operated year-round in Puntland. These vessels
were licensed, operated for six consecutive months by
transshipping to a Thai freezer ship in Somali waters, and
returned twice a year to Salalah (Oman) for repairs and
unloading.85 We were unable to find estimates for the
amount of catch by each vessel; consequently, given the
location of trawling and type of vessel, we reconstructed
catch by these seven trawlers by applying the vessel
catch-rate calculated for the Korean trawlers discussed
above (785 mt per vessel per year). We believe this is a
minimum estimate and likely underestimates the catch
by these trawlers. Thai vessels withdrew from Somali
waters in 2009 after a pirate attack in November 2008 on
the trawler : the Indian navy, thinking they
were targeting a pirate mothership, sank the vessel, killing
14 Thai crew members along with the pirates.86 Another
Thai trawler, Thai Union 3, was hijacked in October 2009
and released in March 2010.
China
We estimate Chinese vessels caught approximately 500
mt of fish in Somali waters in 2013, and have caught
10,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.21). Their catch consists
of bigeye tuna (59%), yellowfin tuna (27%), swordfish
(7%), and small volumes of other tuna, billfishes, and
blue sharks. Vessels are exclusively longliners. Annual
catch has ranged from 3 mt (2000) to 2,361 mt (2006).
FIGURE 2.19 Estimated catch by Japanese-flagged vessels
in Somali waters.
FIGURE 2.20 Estimated catch by Thai-flagged vessels in
Somali waters.
FIGURE 2.21 Estimated catch by Chinese-flagged vessels
in Somali waters.
FIGURE 2.22 Automatic Identification System tracks of eleven
Chinese longline vessels fishing during March-May 2015.
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 39
2 Foreign Fishing
However, we suspect Chinese catch in Somali waters is
much higher than that reported to the IOTC. Reports
indicate Siad Barre sold fishing access rights to China in
exchange for weapons. This exchange was formalized in
a 1989 agreement, but this fishing likely continued well
after the collapse of his regime in 1991.87 No records
exist to quantify this fishing, however. China’s distant
water fleet has a large footprint around the world, and
it harvests approximately 3.1 million mt per year in
African waters.88 This catch is largely underreported,
and it seems likely that this underreporting applies to
Somali waters. In March 2015, the Somali delegation
to the nineteenth session of the IOTC presented AIS
evidence89 that China had unlicensed longline vessels in
Somali waters. The Chinese delegation responded and
their vessels withdrew immediately, but they have since
returned (Figure 2.22).
The Former Soviet Union
We estimate Soviet Union (or member) vessels have
caught 8,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.23). Annual catch
by purse seiners ranged from 12 mt (1986) to 2,730
mt (2000) and consisted of skipjack (69%), yellowfin
(23%), and bigeye tuna (6%). Soviet trawlers were also
important joint ventures with Somalia, likely targeting
bottom fishes and lobster (see Chapter 1, 4.3).
Portugal
We estimate Portuguese vessels have not recently caught
fish in Somali waters but have caught approximately
2,000 mt since 1981 (Figure 2.23). In 2005, Portuguese
longliners caught 2,043 mt of fish, primarily blue shark
(64%), swordfish (27%), and mackerel sharks (4%). Catch
in 2006 (34 mt) and 2007 (3 mt) also were estimated.
Greece
We estimate Greek trawlers have caught 2,235 mt of
fish in Somali waters since 1981. Greek trawlers began
operating in Somalia during the 1960s. Haakonsen90
reported a few licensed Greek trawlers operating in
the mid-1960s and Bihi91 noted a number of Greek
trawlers operating in at least 1983. After 1983 and until
recent times, we found no reports of Greek vessels in
Somali waters. Two Greek trawlers flagged to Belize, the
and , have been operating since 2010. These
vessels appear to be licensed and have been fishing off
the southern Somali coast. The composition of catch
is unknown. To estimate catch by these trawlers, we
assumed catch rates per gross tonnage were similar to
the Korean-flagged trawlers operating in recent years.
That is, we applied the same catch per gross ton from
the Korean trawlers (1.16 mt per GT) to the Greek
trawlers (each 193 GT),92 for a total of 447 mt per year.
We assumed two trawlers were present in 1983, and two
were present from 2010 – 2013.
Kenya
Kenyan prawn trawlers have operated along the southern
Somali border, near the Juba River, since at least 2004.93
There are reports of 19 illegal trawlers catching 800 mt of
prawns each year, for a total of 8,000 tons since 2004.94
The border between Somalia and Kenya contains sensitive
nesting grounds for sea turtles, and the prawn fishery has
been accused of killing turtles as bycatch in trawl nets.95
Recently, the Kenyan government banned fishers from
crossing into Somali waters because of security concerns
around Al Shabaab. This has resulted in a significant loss
of income for Kenyan fishers in the region.
Mauritius
Mauritian fishing in Somali waters has been extremely
limited. During 1989–1999, we estimate their purse
seiners caught 1,400 mt, between 20 and 500 mt of
fish annually. Catch was primarily skipjack (83%) and
yellowfin tuna (13%). We estimate 7 mt were caught in
Somali waters by a longline vessel in 2008, but this is
likely an artifact of the methodology by which longline
data were assigned to the Somali EEZ.
FIGURE 2.23 Estimated catch by Soviet-flagged vessels in
Somali waters.
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40 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
La Réunion (France)
We estimate La Réunion, a French departement, has
caught 350 mt of fish in Somali waters since 1981. Catch
from longliners ranged from 2 to 158 mt per year and
comprised swordfish (88%), yellowfin tuna (6%), and
other tunas and billfishes. Like Mauritius, this could be
an artifact of the method used to assign longline catch to
Somali waters.
Other IOTC Vessels
The IOTC reports catch from vessels that are not assigned
to a specific fishing nation. We estimate between 20 mt
and 14,000 mt has been caught in Somali waters each year
between 1984 and 2009. This catch consisted of skipjack
tuna (58%), yellowfin tuna (34%), and bigeye tuna (8%).
We include these estimates, a total of 100,000 mt over
the time period, in our summary figures.
Sri Lanka
There are infrequent reports of fishing by Sri Lankan
vessels in Somali waters. In the late 1990s, three Sri
Lankan longliners were fishing for sharks out of Berbera
and trawlers were also operating in Somali waters.96 Catch
composition and volume are not known. More recently,
indirect evidence suggests fishing vessels from Sri Lanka
may occasionally operate in Somali waters. In October
2011, the Nimesha Duwa was captured by pirates while
fishing illegally in Somali waters.97 In November 2010 and
January 2011, two Sri Lankan fishing vessels (the
and Darshana 6) were hijacked by Somali pirates.98 Both
vessels were reportedly in international waters; some
of the crew from the escaped from the hijacked
vessel to the island of Minicoy off the coast of southern
India, lending support to the claim that at least this boat
was fishing in international waters. It is unclear whether
the other vessel was operating within 200 nautical miles
of the Somali coast. In our interviews with Somali fishers
(see Appendix 1), only one person (of 39 respondents)
identified Sri Lanka as a country whose vessels they saw
in their waters. Finally, Sri Lanka does report catch to the
IOTC, and all of the reported catch we analyzed fell in the
EEZs of either Sri Lanka or the Maldives. Consequently,
while there is some evidence of Sri Lankan fishing in
Somali waters, especially in prior decades, the scale of it
may be small. However, there are reports of Sri Lankan
vessels in Maldivian and Chagos waters,99 indicating the
possibility of their presence in Somali waters.
India
India claims almost 50% of all marine life caught in the
Western Indian Ocean (2.2 million mt in 2013, Table
2.1), but there is little evidence of Indian fishing activity
in Somali waters. The vast majority of the Indian fishing
fleet is composed of small, coastal vessels that do not fish
far from shore.100 Forty-one drifting longline vessels are
currently authorized to fish for tuna and tuna-like species
outside the Indian EEZ;101 however, none of the reported
longline catch in the high seas falls within Somali waters.
Further, most of India’s catch is not HMS, which is
what most commonly draws vessels to Somali waters.
According to data reported to the FAO, India’s catch in
the Western Indian Ocean is Indian oil sardines (13%),
croakers (9%), Bombay duck (8%), giant tiger prawns
(6%), natantian shrimp (5%), hairtails (5%), cephalopods
(3%), and anchovies (3%). Fish not identified comprise
over 22% of all catch. These species are predominately
confined to nearshore environments and are likely
caught in Indian waters.
Experts102 interviewed by Secure Fisheries agree that
Indian vessels are likely not fishing in Somali waters. In
our survey of Somali fishers (see Appendix 1), India was
named frequently (by 12 of 39 respondents) as a country
of origin for foreign fishers. However, our survey did not
distinguish between the flag of a vessel and the national
origin of its crew. Indian seafarers are commonly crew
members on vessels flagged to other countries. Finally,
there are no reports of Indian fishing vessels being
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 41
2 Foreign Fishing
attacked by pirates.
While circumstantial,
there are records of
pirate attacks against
virtually all other
nations who have a
fishing presence in
Somali waters; this
suggests a small Indian
fishing presence in the
waters frequented by
pirates. Consequently,
at this time we do not
assign any catch in
Somali waters to Indian
vessels. However, we
urge the Government
of India to require vessels fishing on the high seas and
outside Indian EEZ boundaries to report more explicitly
the location of their fishing activities and catch.
Oman and Djibouti
We have received anecdotal reports of fishing by vessels
from Oman and Djibouti, but these have not been
substantiated with numbers. Djibouti is negotiating their
maritime boundaries with Somaliland103 and Somalia, and
there may be Djiboutian vessels fishing in this disputed
area (see Chapter 1, Figure 1.2). When surveyed, fishers
from Puntland and Somaliland reported seeing Omani
vessels in their waters, but the reports were few.y Given
the proximity to Somali waters and the similarity of
Djiboutian and Omani fleets to other regional fishing
fleets (e.g., Yemen), it is likely vessels from these two
nations fish in Somali waters.
4. THE IMPACT OF TRAWLING IN
SOMALI WATERS
Foreign trawlers have been operating in Somali waters
since the mid-1970s. From then until the government
collapsed in 1991, joint ventures were established with
Italy, Egypt, Greece, Japan, France, the Soviet Union,
Singapore, and Iraq. These agreements required licensing,
landing the catch in Somalia, and catch reporting.104 With
the collapse of the government came the dissolution of
most of these ventures and a loss of Somali oversight of
trawlers.
A handful of trawlers operated through the ensuing
political chaos (Chapter 1) and the surge in piracy. Five
y Out of 39 respondents, three indicated foreign vessels from
Oman were present in their waters.
Italian vessels belonging to SHIFCO and 36 trawlers from
Egypt operated along the northern coast (see 3). Due
to high fuel costs,105 the Italian effort ceased in 2006,
and South Korean trawlers took over supplying the
Italian market. Since then, those South Korean vessels
have been targeting similar fishing grounds and species
in Somali waters. Two Greek trawlers, the and
, have been operating in southern Somali waters since
2010. Today, bottom trawling is illegal under the new
Somali Fisheries Law (Article 33.1). Not only do some of
these trawlers continue to operate, four of them are now
flagged to Somalia and licensed in Puntland. Because
of the lack of monitoring, control, and surveillance in
Somalia, these trawlers have been free to operate at
will, fishing without restrictions on time or location (i.e.,
unreported and unregulated). We do not know the full
extent of the damage these vessels are doing to demersal
fish stocks and benthic habitat as they drag nets along
the bottom; here we make conservative estimates of the
impact bottom trawling is having on Somali fisheries.
4.1 Trawling by Seven Korean Vessels
To better understand the impact of the South Korean
trawling fleet, we analyzed Automatic Identification
System dataz broadcast in Somali waters during 2010–
2014 for seven known bottom trawlers (ranging from
49–68 m long, 439–888 gross tonnage).106 Active trawling
was identified107 based on the speed at which the vessels
were traveling (speed over ground). Catch composition
for two of the trawlers was combined with trawl location
and duration information to estimate total catch and
species composition. While the presence of seven vessels
was confirmed by AIS, data needed to quantify trawling
was only available for five of these vessels. For complete
methodology, see Appendix 3.
It is important to note that the amount of trawling, area
covered, and catch amounts are likely underestimates
because of the limitations of AIS data. AIS is not mandatory
for fishing vessels, nor is it a tamper-proof system, so
vessel operators can turn it off at will or adjust the kind
of information broadcast (Box 2.2). Crucial information
was often missing from broadcasts we obtained, such as
speed over ground. Some latitude/longitude coordinates
were obviously incorrect, and large gaps in the data
stream were created when the system was turned off.
Finally, it is possible there were vessels trawling in Somali
waters that were not broadcasting AIS at all.
z exactEarth, Cambridge, Ontario, Canada. Data obtained March
26, 2015.
Annex 149
42 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
The amount of time these vessels
spent in Somali waters is significant. On
average, each vessel trawled for 229 days
per year in Somali waters (Figure 2.24).
This is comparable to the South Korean
vessels’ Italian counterparts that trawled
for approximately 55 days during each of
four trips per year.108
During May through January, these
vessels trawled 73% to 87% of days in
any given month (Figure 2.25). Trawling
was reduced during February through
April, with trawling occurring during 34%
to 62% of those months, likely due to
challenging ocean conditions during that
period.
Most trawling took place off the coast
of Puntland, partly driven by an ocean
bottom type favorable to trawling and high fish availability
over the wide continental shelf, but also due to licenses
provided by the state of Puntland. The vast majority of
trawling (95%) was concentrated in shallow waters within
the 75 m depth contour (Figure 2.26 and Appendix 3).
Each boat trawled approximately 3 km2 per day. Over
the time period for which we have data, this scales up
to 120,652 km2, an area slightly greater than the land
mass of Somalia’s near neighbor, Eritrea. This estimate,
while large, does not account for the magnified impact
of trawling over the same habitat again and again.
Several areas in northeast Puntland are bearing the
brunt of trawling by these vessels (Figure 2.27) and likely
experience significant ecosystem damage as a result.
Volume of catch made
during a fishing campaign
was estimated from catch
certificates that two of
the vessels submitted to
the European Union. We
extrapolated catch from
these certificates to the
additional vessels and trawl
periods for which we had
AIS data (see Appendix 3
for detailed methods). As
a result, we estimate that,
on average, these trawlers
caught 5,495 mt per year.
Data on the composition
of this catch was supplied
by a European seafood
importer. The catch varied widely depending on time of
year (Figure A3.1) and, on average, was dominated by
cephalopods with cuttlefish comprising 20% of catch and
squid comprising 19%. The main fish catch was emperors
(17%), followed by barracudas (9%), and grunts (7%)
(Figure 2.28).
4.2 Potential Impacts of Trawling
Due to the limited ability to conduct scientific surveys
in Somali waters, there have been no studies since
the 1980s on benthic habitat type, nor on distribution
and diversity of benthic invertebrates and demersal
fishes.109,110 Thus, the direct and indirect impacts of
trawling in Somalia are purely speculative and are based
on studies conducted around the world on the effects of
FIGURE 2.24 Days trawling per South Korean vessel per year.
FIGURE 2.25 Proportion of days trawled in Somali waters by South Korean trawlers.
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 43
2 Foreign Fishing
trawling. Trawling results in significant levels of bycatch
of non-target species, including at-risk species such as
marine turtles and sharks. Unwanted bycatch is usually
thrown overboard and mortality rates of those animals
are very high.111
Moreover, trawling can change the structure of bottom
sediments by: carving tracks from the doors onto the
seafloor; re-suspending sediments, nutrients, and
minerals into the water column; and smoothing and
compacting sediments over time. Such changes disrupt
the biogeochemical exchange systems between the
bottom and the water column.112 More alarming are
the effects on the benthic community, such as corals,
sponges, echinoderms, and other mollusks, which can
be damaged or killed by trawling. This decreases benthic
productivity113 and shifts community structure away from
larger organisms (macroinvertebrates) to
smaller organisms, reducing diversity of
prey and negatively impacting fish stocks.114
Given the dearth of studies investigating
impacts of trawling in Somali waters,
we are left to draw lessons from other
regions. Unregulated commercial trawling
has occurred for at least four decades.
Thus, the probability that considerable
ecosystem damage has already occurred
is high. Recovery times for trawl-impacted
ecosystems vary widely depending on
bottom type, but a global synthesis of
trawling studies115 showed that a 20%
recovery could take over 8 years. A similar
analysis116 showed that ecosystem recovery
generally took 500 days regardless of
bottom type or gear used. For areas that are
most heavily trawled, such as the waters
around Ras Hafun in the northeast of
Somalia (Figure 2.27), this could mean that
the benthos and associated communities
never have the chance to recover before
being disturbed by a trawl again.
Promisingly, the new Somali Fisheries Law
(Article 33.1) bans bottom trawling. This
is an important first step toward stopping
this destructive practice and allowing the
affected marine communities to recover.
Enforcing the ban will benefit marine
habitat and improve fish stocks, increasing
the sustainability and profitability of fishing
for Somalis.
Despite the long history of foreign trawling
in Somali waters, there has recently
been intense local and international scrutiny of bottom
trawling by the vessels flagged to or owned by companies
from South Korea.117 These large vessels have become
emblematic of the negative effects of foreign fishing in
Somali waters.118,119,120,121 Because the Somali continental
shelf is narrow, trawling in shallow water brings these
vessels close to shore within view of coastal communities
and Somali fishers, drawing attention to their activities.
The legality of the trawlers’ presence prior to the
declaration of the EEZ in 2014 was nebulous. Flagged
to South Korea, these vessels had licenses that were
issued by the government of Puntland. This highlights the
need for consistency of fishing laws among the regions
and with federal fisheries law. With the declaration of
FIGURE 2.26 Total extent of area trawled by five South Korean vessels
during 2010–2014.
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44 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
the EEZ and the adoption of the new Somali
Fisheries Law, trawling by these vessels is
illegal in Somali waters. Some have attempted
to capitalize on a perceived loophole by reflagging
to Somalia.122 However, the ban on
bottom trawling is not exclusive of domestic
vessels, which means Somali flag or not, these
vessels are operating illegally. This has recently
been recognized internationally, by Oman,
who, under the auspices of the Port State
Measures Agreement, initially blocked some
of these vessels from using the port of Salalah
(but later, upon receiving licensing documents
from Puntland, allowed the trawlers to land).123
5. POTENTIAL REVENUE
GENERATION THROUGH LICENSING
OF FOREIGN VESSELSAAaa
While unregulated foreign fishing negatively
affects Somali fisheries, properly regulated
and licensed foreign fishing may present
opportunities. We estimate foreign vessels
catch at least three times as much fish as the
Somali domestic fleet, and the imbalance is
even greater for high-value HMS (see Chapter
3). Given the highly competitive nature of
global tuna fishing and the large scale of the
companies engaged in it, coupled with the
need for growth and technology in the Somali
domestic fleet, it is unlikely that a nascent
Somali tuna fleet will be competitive in the
short term. A small-scale longline fleet, similar
to the domestic tuna fisheries in La Rèunion
or Mauritius, may be possible in the medium
term (e.g., 10 years). In the interim, however,
licensing foreign tuna vessels is a potential
source of revenue that could be used to bolster
the Somali fisheries sector and its governance.
Here, we estimate the revenue that could be
gained from licensing foreign purse seine and
longline vessels fishing for yellowfin, skipjack,
or bigeye tuna in Somali waters.
5.1 Estimating Potential Revenue:
Methodology
Potential license fee revenue from foreign purse
seine and longline operations was estimated
as a percentage of the annual gross market value
aa Analysis in Section 5 completed by MRAG.
FIGURE 2.27 Concentration (point density) of AIS broadcasts during
trawling for five vessels, 2010–2014.
FIGURE 2.28 Composition of trawl catch by Korean vessels during
2010-2014.
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 45
2 Foreign Fishing
of three commercially important tropical tuna species
harvested in Somali waters: yellowfin, bigeye, and
skipjack tuna. We multiplied annual catch of tuna (in
metric tons) by the price commanded for a metric ton of
tuna and applied a range of possible license rates.
The movement of foreign longline and purse seine fleets
out of Somali waters (see Chapter 1 and 2 above)
means recent years have not been representative of the
full potential of tuna fishing in Somali waters. Before
the threat of piracy peaked in 2011,124 and before the
expiration of EU purse seine agreements in 2006,125
fishing for HMS by foreign boats was at much higher
levels than in the following years. Given an expectation
of a return to those conditions,ab we used catch by
foreign tuna vessels during 2001–2005 as a baseline
approximation for the amount of tuna fishing that could
occur once proper licensing arrangements are secured
and if piracy remains at or below 2014 levels.
Catch of tuna in metric tons (mt) was calculated from
monthly catch of yellowfin, bigeye, and skipjack by purse
seine and longline vessels estimated to be in Somali
waters for the period 2001–2005 based on reports to
the IOTCac (see 3 above and Appendix 2 for detailed
methods). Monthly global market prices ($US/mt)ad of
yellowfin, bigeye, and skipjack tuna for the same period
came from reported import values and varied for the two
fisheries:126,127 prices from Thailand for frozen yellowfin
and skipjack were applied to purse seine
landings, and prices from Japan for
fresh bigeye and yellowfin were applied
to longline landings (Table 2.3).ae Based
on case studies of similar nations
and contexts,128 we assumed Somali
authorities may charge a license fee
revenue rate ranging from 2% to 10%
of the gross value of tuna caught within
Somali waters. The upper end of this
range is relatively high when compared
to most examples in the region, but
Somali waters lie within some of the most
ab In fact, the reduced threat of piracy in 2013
and 2014 has already correlated with higher levels of fishing
activity in the region (see Figure 2.5).
ac We have focused only on tuna fishing by IOTC-compliant
(reporting) vessels because they are the most likely to take
advantage of legal licensing schemes.
ad Adjusted for inflation using the World Bank Consumer Price
Index (CPI).
ae Derived from Thai and Japanese customs import datasets and
COMTRADE website: http://comtrade.un.org/data/
productive fishing grounds in the Western Indian Ocean,
and therefore they may be able to command these license
fee rates.129 See Appendix 4 for additional methodological
details.
5.2 Value of Somali Tuna Fisheries and
Potential Licensing Revenue
During 2001–2005, we estimate annual catch of yellowfin,
bigeye, and skipjack tunas by IOTC-reporting longline and
purse seine fleets within Somali waters ranged between
29,500 and 83,000 mt (on average, 54,291 mt). Applying
the price of tuna during these same years (Table 2.3), this
catch is valued at between US$38 million and US$121
million per year (US$94.9 million, on average) (Table 2.4).
Assuming a licensing rate ranging between 2% and 10% of
the total value, the potential annual revenue from licensing
would range between US$1.9 million and US$8.4 million
(Table 2.5). These values assume all catch was reported
correctly to the IOTC and that all relevant vessels inside
Somali waters would purchase a fishing license.
The market value of tuna in 2013 was considerably higher
than in the early 2000s, particularly for longline-caught
fish. If we assume catches inside Somali waters return to
a level similar to that observed during 2001–2005, the
estimated landed value of that catch using 2013 prices
would have averaged US$173.4 million, with revenues
from licensing ranging between US$3.5 million (at 2%
return) and US$17.4 million (at 10% return).
When licensing schemes are based on market value of
catch, revenue will vary with both catch volumes and
prices. Variation in year-to-year catches (Figure 2.29)
has been driven by at least three factors: migration of
tuna, piracy, and access agreements. For example, during
TABLE 2.3 Price (import prices, $US) per mt of tuna used to estimate total
values of tuna caught in Somali waters.
P
P
Species Fishery 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2013
Yellowfin Longline $3,414 $3,438 $3,417 $3,887 $3,730 $9,421
Bigeye Longline $5,873 $5,028 $5,344 $6,098 $5,594 $9,644
Skipjack Purse seine $1,087 $1,036 $965 $1,170 $1,093 $2,040
Yellowfin Purse seine $1,336 $1,499 $1,493 $1,438 $1,565 $2,291
Annex 149
46 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
2004–2005, tuna vessels experienced unusually large
catches of yellowfin tuna in the waters of Tanzania and
Kenya, which may have resulted in less fishing than usual
in the Somali Basin during those years. The large decline
in catches starting in 2006 was driven by a combination of
these three factors, and the impact of any one of them on
catch is not distinguishable in these data. However, tuna
catches in Somali waters have increased rapidly since
2008. During the time period analyzed here (2001–2005),
83% of catch was produced by the purse seine fleet. Of
the catch reported, 55% was skipjack, 31% was yellowfin,
and 14% was bigeye tuna.
Since 2006, EU-flagged vessels have been prohibited
under their relevant national legislations from fishing in
Somali waters. It is important to note the volume of catch
shown in Figure 2.29 contains significant uncertainty in
allocation to Somali waters for reporting grid cells that
border the Somali EEZ. Several of the important purse
seine fleets, especially those of Spain and France, have
reported fishing near the Somali EEZ, but not necessarily
within it. From visualizations of their reported catch,af it
is clear they have been fishing the line of the Somali
EEZ. If companies for these two fleets enter into new
licensing agreements with Somali authorities, we believe
the data presented here represent a likely estimate of the
variability in catch that could be expected in the future.
Our method of estimation includes several sources of
uncertainty. First, as noted in 3 above, we have assigned
af For detailed animations of Spanish and French fishing locations,
seehttp://securefisheries.org/report/securing-somali-fisheries.
catch that was reported in 11
(purse seine) and 55 (longline)
resolution to Somali waters. These
cells fell across the Somali EEZ
boundaries, and we assumed catch
was made uniformly throughout
these cells. Additionally, because
ex-vessel prices were not available,
the total market values calculated
(Table 2.4) are likely an overestimate as
import prices are invariably higher than exvessel
prices.ag
Ultimately, the estimates presented here
represent a baseline of license revenue
possible in Somali waters. We have included
data from the fleets most likely to obtain legal
licenses in the near future. Catch from the
countries that fish the most in Somali waters (Yemen and
Iran) is not represented in the IOTC longline and purse
seine catch-and-effort dataset (their catch is largely by
gillnet vessels). Additionally, in the recent past, Egyptian
mid-water trawlers have been licensed to fish in Somali
waters. If industrial gillnet vessels and mid-water trawl
vessels were also licensed, Somalia could earn revenue
off the balance of foreign fishing.
Even with uncertainty in the estimates of the tuna
resource value presented here, the potential license
revenue Somali authorities could earn is high and license
fee revenues could be realized in the near future. Total
catches of tropical tunas in Somali waters, and the
northwest Indian Ocean more generally, have increased
rapidly in recent years, primarily due to a reduction in the
threat of piracy to fishing vessels. The increase in catch
in and around Somali waters suggests foreign fishing
fleets have resurrected their presence in the productive
northwest Indian Ocean fishing grounds (i.e., Somali
ag Noting the limitation of the methodology used in this analysis, it is
perhaps more appropriate to calculate license fees as a proportion
of the marginal benefit arising from fishing inside Somali waters,
rather than as a proportion of the catch taken inside them. This
is because the value to foreign fishers of obtaining a license
arises from the difference between the catches that can be taken
inside and those taken outside, rather than just the amount of
catch taken from within. Unfortunately, such an analysis was not
possible in this case given that vessel- and trip-specific data–held
by fishing companies but not shared with the IOTC to preserve
vessel confidentiality – were not available.
TABLE 2.4 Estimated value ($US) of the catch of yellowfin, bigeye, and skipjack
tuna caught in Somali waters by the foreign longline and purse seine fleets.
TABLE 2.5 Potential license fee revenues leveraged from the sale of
fishing licenses to longline and purse seine vessels.
Fleet 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Longline $29,780,393 $83,031,075 $74,838,950 $57,738,476 $34,595,906
Purse seine $8,629,712 $15,840,676 $46,341,434 $60,718,410 $62,899,933
Total $38,410,105 $98,871,751 $121,180,384 $118,456,886 $97,495,839
Fee
rate
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2% $768,202 $1,977,435 $2,423,608 $2,369,138 $1,949,917
5% $1,172,886 $4,943,588 $6,059,019 $5,922,844 $4,874,792
8% $3,072,808 $7,909,740 $9,694,431 $9,476,551 $7,799,667
10% $3,841,010 $9,887,175 $12,118,038 $11,845,689 $9,749,584
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 47
2 Foreign Fishing
Basin area) relatively quickly. Purse seine vessels, which
never left the northwest Indian Ocean entirely,130 have
recently had more freedomah to search for tuna schools.
Longline vessels, which generally avoided the northwest
Indian Ocean region during the height of piracy, have
started to return to these fishing grounds. This trend is
expected to continue, and catches inside Somali waters
may increase slightly or at least stabilize at current levels
(excluding short term spikes). Increase in catch is most
likely for the longline fishery because it was the most
displaced by piracy and has not yet moved back into the
region to the same extent as the purse seine fleet.
Somalia does face challenges to realizing the full
potential of licensing. Transparency regarding the nature
(e.g., levels of effort and catch) and benefits derived
from foreign fishing agreements is low. This can make it
difficult to ascertain whether the benefits from the fishing
agreements are being maximized. In general, coastal
states face a number of challenges in negotiating and
enforcing fishing agreements. Their negotiating positions
are often weakened by a combination of incomplete
knowledge of the fish resources and their final market
value, the benefits and costs associated with different
policy options, lack of capacity to undertake fisheries
assessments and gain market intelligence, and low
capacity to monitor and enforce fisheries regulations.
ah For a short period in 2006–2007, the purse seine industry
established a voluntary exclusion zone roughly corresponding
to the Somali EEZ, and for a time French-flagged vessels were
instructed to fish in pairs, disrupting their freedom to search for
tuna schools.
Making access agreements publicly available can
help overcome this challenge. If the terms of fishing
agreements are in the public domain, it is possible to hold
governments, vessels, and corporate entities accountable.
Equally, only if the amount of catch and effort can be
estimated from the terms of access agreements can the
biological status of the fish stock be assessed. Fishing
interests have been accused of underreporting catches
in order to protect commercial interests and maintain
advantages in negotiating agreements.131 Increasing
transparency in the sector would make it more difficult
for fleets to perpetrate infractions of the arrangements
and would allow immediate
corrective action to be taken.
A regulatory framework
to encourage and facilitate
transparent licensing schemes
will improve the economic
benefits Somalia can extract
from its natural resources.
Weak management
arrangements mean that the
revenue generating potential
of the resource cannot be
fully realized. Without MCS
and associated enforcement
mechanisms, including port
inspections, foreign vessels
may exploit tuna resources
within Somali waters illegally
and reduce the returns
available from the sale of
licenses. However, the significant amount of tuna catch
that is reported and that should be readily subject to
licensing in the very near future is promising for Somalia.
If widespread licensing of the foreign tuna fleets can
be accomplished by the start of the 2016 tuna season,
Somali fisheries authorities can begin building the coffers
needed to invest in the domestic sector.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Fishery development in the Western Indian Ocean in
general, and in Somali waters in particular, has lagged
behind the rest of the world. However, WIO fisheries
have expanded rapidly and the stagnation in fish catch
suggests the species currently being targeted may not
be able to support higher levels of fishing. The relatively
unguarded Somali maritime domain has been an
FIGURE 2.29 Estimated catch by longline and purse seine fleets of yellowfin, skipjack,
and bigeye tuna in Somali waters. Data obtained from reports to the IOTC.
Annex 149
48 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
attractive target for foreign fishing fleets. We estimate
foreign vessels catch at least three times as much fish
as Somalis do (around 132,000 mt in 2013)—and our
estimates are decisively conservative. All of this catch
is illegal, unregulated, or unreported. The consequences
of rampant IUU foreign fishing in Somali waters are
declining catch and profits for Somali fishers, habitat
destruction, a loss of knowledge about the type of fish
being caught, large amounts of bycatch, and physical
injury to Somalis and their fishing gear.
We therefore conclude the major threat to Somali
fisheries is IUU catch by foreign fleets. Somalis are losing
millions of dollars each year to fishing by foreign vessels
(Chapter 3). Furthermore, the health of Somali fish stocks
is in jeopardy (Chapter 4). In order for Somali domestic
fisheries to grow in a sustainable and profitable manner,
the international community and national authorities
must take swift action to reduce the presence of foreign
IUU fishing in Somali waters.
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 49
2 Foreign Fishing
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R., Beddington, J. R., & Pitcher, T. J. (2009). Estimating the
worldwide extent of illegal fishing. P, (2), e4570.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0004570
27 Pitcher, T. J., Watson, R., Forrest, R., Valtysson, H. P., &
Guénette, S. (2002). Estimating illegal and unreported
catches from marine ecosystems: a basis for change.
Fish and Fisheries, 3(4), 317–339. doi:10.1046/j.1467-
2979.2002.00093.x
28 African Development Solutions. (2015). Illegal
. Nairobi, Kenya.
29 Katz, A. (2012). Fighting piracy goes awry with killings of
fishermen. Bloomberg Business. Retrieved from http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-09-16/fightingpiracy-
goes-awry-with-killings-of-fishermen
30 Somaliland seizes Yemeni and Egyptian vessels. (2014,
December 17). BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-30513110
31 Oceans Beyond Piracy. (2015). OBP issue paper: Will
illegal fishing ignite a preventable resurgence of Somali
piracy Retrieved from http://obp.ngo/sites/default/files/
attachments/OBP%20Issue%20Paper%20-%20Fishing%20
Boat%20Hijackings%20off%20Somalia.pdf
32 Somali’s Shabaab holds Iran fishing boat. (13 May 2015).
. Retrieved from http://www.
worldbulletin.net/todays-news/159123/somaliasshabaab-
holds-iran-fishing-boat
33 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. (2015). Report on
presumed IUU fishing activities in the EEZ of Somalia
(IOTC-2015-S19-Inf01). Busan, Korea. Retrieved from
http://www.iotc.org/documents/report-presumed-iuufishing-
activities-eez-somalia
34 Ibid.
35 Auditor-general breaks silence over illegal fishing. (2015,
January 23). Somali Agenda. Retrieved from https://
somaliagenda.com/auditor-general-breaks-silence-illegalfishing/
36 Sumaila, U. R., Alder, J., & Keith, H. (2006). Global scope
and economics of illegal fishing. P, (6),
696–703. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2005.11.001
37 Miller, D.D., and Sumaila, U.R. (2014). Flag use behavior
and IUU activity within the international fishing
fleet: Refining definitions and identifying areas of
concern. P, 44, 204–211. doi:10.1016/j.
marpol.2013.08.027
38 Flothmann, S., Kistowski, K., Dolan, E., Lee, E., Meere,
F., and Album, G. (2010). Closing loopholes: Geng
illegal fishing under control. Science, 328, 1235–1236.
doi:10.1126/science.1190245
39 Ibid.
40 Rigg, K., Parmentier, R., Currie, D. (2003). Halting IUU
fishing: Enforcing international fisheries agreements. The
Varda Group. Retrieved from http://www.imcsnet.org/
imcs/docs/haltingiuufishingoceana.pdf
41 Gianni, M. and Simpson, W. (2005). The Changing Nature
.
Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry, International Transport Workers’ Federation,
and WWF International.
42 Musse and Tako, Illegal fishing and dumping
43 Pitcher, T. J., Watson, R., Forrest, R., Valtysson, H. P., and
Guenette, S. (2002). Estimating illegal and unreported
catches from marine ecosystems: a basis for change.
Fish and Fisheries, 3,317–339. doi:10.1046/j.1467-
2979.2002.00093.x
44 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. (2010) Resolution 08/01
Mandatory statistical requirements for IOTC Members
and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties. Retrieved from
http://www.iotc.org/cmm/resolution-1002-mandatorystatistical-
requirements-iotc-members-and-cooperatingnon-
contracting.
45 Pauly, D., Belhabib, D., Blomeyer, R., Cheung, W. W. W.
L., Cisneros-Montemayor, A. M., Copeland, D., Zeller,
D. (2014). China’s distant-water fisheries in the 21st
century. Fish and Fisheries, (3), 474–488. doi:10.1111/
faf.12032
46 Sea Around Us. Catch reconstruction and allocation
methods. Retrieved from http://www.seaaroundus.org/
catch-reconstruction-and-allocation-methods. Accessed
6/15/2015, updated 30 July 2015.
47 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. (2008). Updated
analysis of the SFA 2008 PS data: 2008 effects of the
closed area in Somalia (IOTC-2008-SC-INF27). Retrieved
from http://www.iotc.org/documents/updated-analysissfa-
2008-ps-data-2008-effects-closed-area-somalia
48 Davies, T.K., Mees, C.C., Milner-Gulland, E.J. (2014). The
past, present and future use of drifting fish aggregating
devices (FADs) in the Indian Ocean. P, 45,
163–170. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2013.12.014
49 Chassot, et al. (2010). Analysis of the effects of Somali
piracy on the European tuna purse seine fisheries of
the Indian Ocean (IOTC-2010-SC-09). Report to the IOTC
Scientific Committee.
50 Oceans Beyond Piracy,P
51 Waugh, S.M., Filippi, D.P., Blyth, R., and Filippi, P.F.
(2011). Assessment of bycatch in gillnet fisheries. Report
to the Convention of Migratory Species. Retrieved from
http://www.cms.int/en/document/assessment-bycatchgill-
net-fisheries
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 51
2 Foreign Fishing
52 United Nations Security Council. (2013, July 12). Report
on Somalia of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea (S/2013/413). Retrieved from http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s2013413.pdf.
53 Somalia: Puntland seizes five illegal fishing boats,
78 Iranians arrested. (2013, April 24).
. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/
stories/201304250101.html
54 United Nations Security Council, Report on Somalia
55 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. (2015). Report on
presumed IUU fishing activities in the EEZ of Somalia
(IOTC-2015-S19-Inf01). Busan, Korea. Retrieved from
http://www.iotc.org/documents/report-presumed-iuufishing-
activities-eez-somalia
56 Waugh et al., Assessment of Bycatch in Gillnet Fisheries
57 Pauly et al., China’s distant-water
58 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Report on presumed
IUU
59 Yassin, M. (1981). Somalia: Somali fisheries development
and management. Retrieved from http://ir.library.
oregonstate.edu/dspace/bitstream/1957/6400/1/
MohamedYassinocr.pdf.
60 Ibid.
61 J. Million (personal communication, February 24, 2015).
62 MRAG,
63 UN News Service. (2015, April 15). Millions of Yeminis
face food insecurity amid escalating conflict, UN
agency warns. UN News Centre. Retrieved from http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.aspNewsID50584.
VXhNgWAipFJ
64 Nur, H.A. (2006, February 20). Somaliland says arrests 84
Yemeni fishermen. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.
planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/35201/story.
htm
65 United Nations Security Council. (2013). Report of the
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 2060 (2012) (S/2013/413).
Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ga/search/viewdoc.
aspsymbolS/2013/413
66 Kulmiye, A. (2010).
P
. VSF Suisse and UNDP.
67 U.S. aircraft carrier sent to Yemen in response to Iran.
(2015, April 20). CBS News. Retrieved from http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/us-aircraft-carrier-sent-to-yemen-inresponse-
to-iran-convoy/
68 Iran raises the stakes in Yemen faceoff. (2015, April 8).
CBS News. Retrieved from http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/iran-warship-gulf-of-aden-yemen-sunni-saudiarabia-
bombs-shiite-houthi/
69 Yassin, Somalia: Somali fisheries
70 Berbera and Maritime Fisheries Academy. (2013).
Business Plan. Berbera, Somaliland.
71 Anon. (2012). Summary report FAO TCPF fisheries
mission to Somaliland and Puntland (2505/R/01D).
72 Government of Somaliland Ministry of Trade and
Investment. (2014).
. Retrieved from
http://somalilandinvest.net/somalilandinvestment
guide.pdf
73 Toxic waste behind Somali pirates. (2010, 8 May). Project
Censored. Retrieved from http://www.projectcensored.
org/3-toxic-waste-behind-somali-pirates/.
74 Somaliland seizes Yemeni and Egyptian vessels. (2014, 17
December). BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-30513110.
75 Bihi, A. I. (1984).
.
Mers Regionales. Programme des Nations Unies Pour
L’Environment, pp. 1–17.
76 Ibid.
77 Van Zalinge, N. P. (1988). Summary of fisheries and
resources information for Somalia. Rome: FAO.
78 Somali Democratic Republic Ministry of Fisheries and
Marine Transport. (1988). Yearly fisheries and marine
transport report 1987/1988. Mogadishu, Somalia.
79 SHIFCO. (1998, November 18). Final Mission Report,
Somalia. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/
inspections/vi/reports/somalia/virepsoma1522-
1998en.pdf. Accessed 15 October 2014.
80 J. Million (personal communication, February 24, 2015).
81 MRAG,
82 Gillett, R. (2011). Bycatch in small scale tuna fisheries:
a global study. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical
Paper No. 560. Rome.
83 S. Akester (personal communication, July 5, 2015).
84 Puntland State of Somalia Office of Coast Guard Forces.
(2006, March 3). Letter to the Supreme Court of Royal
Thai Government, subject: Release of Somali nationals
detained in Thailand. http://www.somalitalk.com/2006/
thailand/letter2.pdf
85 Fry, E. (2009, March 29). Fishing for trouble.
Post.
86 United Nations Security Council, Report on Somalia
87 Persson, L., Lindop, A., Harper, S., Zylich, K. and Zeller,
D. (2015). Failed state: reconstruction of domestic
fisheries catches in Somalia 1950–2010. Pp. 111–127
In F. Le Manach and D. Pauly (Eds.) Fisheries catch
.
Annex 149
52 | Securing Somali Fisheries
2 Foreign Fishing
Fisheries Centre Research Reports 23(2). Fisheries Centre,
University of British Columbia ISSN 1198–6727.
88 Pauly et al., China’s distant-water
89 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Report on presumed IUU
90 Haakonsen, J. M. (1983). Somalia’s Fisheries Case
Study. In PP
(pp. 170–184). Rome.
91 Bihi, A. I.,
92 MarineTraffic.com. Retrieved from http://www.
marinetraffic.com/ais/details/ships/shipid:905264/
mmsi:-8615679/imo:8615679/vessel:GREKO1. Accessed
11 August 2015.
93 Bocha, G. (2012, February 18). Fishermen living in
near destitution since October ban. .
Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenyanfishermen-
living-in-near-destitution/-/1056/1330558/-/
ft4ick/-/index.html
94 Waldo, M. A. (2014, January 8). The two piracies: why the
world ignores the other . Retrieved
from http://wardheernews.com/Articles09/Jan/
Waldo/08ThetwopiraciesinSomalia.html http://
wardheernews.com/Articles09/Jan/Waldo/08The
twopiraciesinSomalia.html
95 Megalommatis, M. (2008, December 8). Somali piracy
– the other side. . http://www.ocnus.net/
artman2/publish/Analyses12/SomaliPiracy-The
OtherSide.shtml
96 Jennings, T.M. (1998). Marine living resource governance
in the absence of a central authority: A study of Somalia
(Master’s thesis). University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington.
97 Perera, M. (2012, April 27). Six Sri Lankan fishermen
held by Somali pirates are rescued. AsiaNews. Retrieved
from http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Six-Sri-Lankanfishermen-
held-by-Somali-pirates-are-rescued-24607.
html
98 Fernando, S. (2011, February 2). Sri Lankan fishermen
killed by Somali pirates. Asian Tribune. Retrieved from
http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2011/02/01/srilankan-
fishermen-killed-somali-pirates
99 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. (2014). IUU Fishing in
BIOT waters by fishing vessels flagged in Sri Lanka. (IOTC-
2014-CoC-11-08bE).
100 Marine Fisheries Census 2010. Central Marine Fisheries
Research Institute, Kochi. Ministry of Agriculture,
Government of India. http://eprints.cmfri.org.in/8998/
101 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Vessels. Retrieved from
http://www.iotc.org/vessels Accessed 24 June 2015.
102 J. Million (personal communication, February 24, 2015)
and M. Kroese (personal communication, February 10,
2015).
103 Somaliland Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone &
Exclusive Economic Zone. Retrieved from http://www.
somalilandlaw.com/territorialseaandwaters.htm
104 Somali Democratic Republic Ministry of Fisheries and
Marine Resources. (1985). Guidelines for fisheries joint
venture with foreign partners. Retrieved from http://
faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/som2144.pdf
105 nterview with Augusto Spina, PanaPesca SpA, 24
October, 2014. Conducted by Andy Hickman. Pisa, Italy.
106 www.vesselfinder.com
107 Hiddink, J.G., Jennings, S., Kaiser, M.J., Queiros, a.M.,
Duplisea, D.E., & Piet, G.J. (2009). Cumulative impacts
of seabed trawl disturbance on benthic biomass,
production, and species richness in different habitats,
736, 721–736. doi:10.1139/f05-266
108 Interview with Augusto Spina
109
P
P.
(1976). Bergen, Norway: Institute of Marine Research.
110 Stromme,
111 Alverson, D.L., Freeberg, M.H., Pope, J.G., Murawski,
S.A. (1994).
discards (FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 339). Rome:
FAO.
112 Pilskaln, C. H., Churchill, J. H., & Mayer, L. M. (1998).
Resuspension of sediment by bottom trawling in the
Gulf of Maine and potential geochemical consequences.
, (6), 1223–1229. doi:10.1046/
j.1523-1739.1998.0120061223.x
113 Kaiser, M. J., Clarke, K. R., Hinz, H., Austen, M. C. V,
Somerfield, P. J., & Karakassis, I. (2006). Global analysis
of response and recovery of benthic biota to fishing.
P, 311(2000), 1–14.
doi:10.3354/meps311001
114 Dayton, P. K., Thrush, S. F., Agardy, M. T., & Hofman, R. J.
(1995). Environmental effects of marine fishing.
,
5(March), 205–232. Retrieved from doi:10.1002/
aqc.3270050305
115 Kaiser et al., Global analysis
116 Collie, J. S., Hall, S. J., Kaiser, M. J., & Poiner, I. T. (2000).
A quantitative analysis of fishing impacts on shelf-sea
benthos. , 69 (5), 785–798,
(785-798). doi:10.1046/j.1365-2656.2000.00434.x
117 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Report on presumed
IUU
118 Kulmiye, Militia vs Trawlers
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 53
2 Foreign Fishing
119 Coastal Development Organization. (2013).
.
120 Somalia, Report on presumed IUU
121 S. Akester (personal communication, February 9, 2015).
122 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Report on presumed
IUU
123 EJF: Oman takes decisive port measures to block
suspect fishing vessels. (2015, May 22). Undercurrent
News. Retrieved from http://www.undercurrentnews.
com/2015/05/22/ejf-oman-takes-decisive-portmeasures-
to-block-suspect-fishing-vessels/
124 Oceans Beyond Piracy, P
125 Chassot, et al. (2010). Analysis of the effects of Somali
piracy on the European tuna purse seine fisheries of
the Indian Ocean (IOTC-2010-SC-09). Report to the IOTC
Scientific Committee.
126 Jeon, Y., Reid, C., & Squires, D. (2008). Is There a Global
Market for Tuna Policy Implications for Tropical Tuna
Fisheries. ,
39(1), 32–50. doi:10.1080/00908320701641594
127 Miyake, M., Guillotreau, P., Sun, C.-H., & Ishimura, G.
(2010). Recent developments in the tuna industry: Stocks,
fisheries, management, processing, trade and markets.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Rome, Italy.
128 Barnes, C. & Mfodwo, K. (2012). A market price
evaluation of tuna resources in the Western Indian
Ocean – and indicative regional and country/EEZ
perspective. Gland, Switzerland: WWF.
129 Davies, T. K., Mees, C. C., & Milner-Gulland, E. J.
(2014). The past, present and future use of drifting fish
aggregating devices (FADs) in the Indian Ocean. Marine
P, 45, 163–170. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2013.12.014
130 Floch, L., Molina, A.D.D., Assan, C., Dewals, P., Areso, J.J.,
& Chassot, E. (2012). Statistics of the European purse
seine fishing fleet and associated flags targeting tropical
tunas in the Indian Ocean (1981–2011). Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission document IOTC-2012-WPTT-14 21.
131 Kaczynski, V. M., & Fluharty, D. L. (2002). European
policies in West Africa: who benefits from fisheries
agreements Marine Policy, 26(2), 75–93. doi:10.1016/
s0308-597x(01)00039-2
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 73
4 Sustainability
CHAPTER 4. SUSTAINABILITY
OF FISHING IN SOMALI
WATERS
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF
SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES
For almost two decades, fisheries scientists, marine
ecologists, and conservation NGOs have been sounding
the alarm about the state of global fisheries. A stagnation,
and then decline, in global catch starting in the late 1980s
suggested demand for fish was beginning to outstrip
supply.1 In the 1950s almost 80% of all fisheries were
undeveloped; today, only 3% are undeveloped.2 The
number of collapsed and overexploited fisheries has
grown to over half of all stocks in the world today, and
most remaining stocks are fully exploited.3 Unsustainable
levels of fishing have important consequences for marine
ecosystems: biodiversity is reduced,4 fish populations
decline,5 and extinctions are more likely.6 Unsustainable
fisheries also negatively impact the human populations
who depend on them. As the costs associated with
fishing grow, coastal fishing communities, especially
those in developing nations, are receiving fewer of the
direct benefits of their marine resources.7
In the case of Somali fisheries, long-term sustainability
is a critical goal shared by government, fishers, and
coastal communities. It is embodied in the new Somali
Fisheries Law through mandates of improved monitoring,
ecosystem-based approaches to management,
protection of threatened and endangered species, and
total allowable catches based on optimum sustainable
yield. But sustainability cannot be achieved through
legislative tools alone. Our analysis (Chapter 2) shows
foreign fleets harvest significantly more fish than Somalis
do. Most of the vessels in foreign fleets are bigger,
faster, and more technologically advanced than Somali
vessels. Consequently, in the race to fish that ensues
when resources decline, foreign vessels will have the
competitive edge. Around the world, industrial distant
water fishing fleets are crowding out small-scale and
artisanal fishers. Small-scale fishers are some of the
poorest in the world and are extremely vulnerable to
changes in resource status.8 Sustainable harvest of
resources is therefore a safeguard against economic
shocks and loss of income for Somali fishers.
Here, we analyze the potential for fishing in Somali waters
at sustainable levels and whether current fishing levels
achieve sustainability. As noted before, the analyses
possible are constrained by the amount (e.g., duration
and resolution) and quality of data available. Data-poor
approaches to sustainability analysis have been developed
in recent years and promise to advance our understanding
of under-monitored fisheries. But they carry with them
important caveats and cautions. To the best of our ability
we offer here a baseline estimate of fishery potential and
sustainability of fisheries in Somali waters. Somali fishery
scientists and authorities, international actors, and NGOs
should capitalize on this beginning to improve estimates
and further our understanding of the health of Somali
fisheries.
2. FISHERY PRODUCTION POTENTIAL
IN SOMALI WATERS
Somali waters are known for supporting high biomass
of marine life (see Chapter 1 3). The fishery production
potential (FPP) of an area refers to the total biomass
(in metric tons) of marine life that could be extracted
on an annual basis when both economic (e.g., demand
and feasibility) and ecological (e.g., food web links and
sustainability) considerations are made. A recent FAO
assessment9 of global FPP ranks Somali waters among the
world’s highest (Figure 4.1). The Somali Coastal Current
Large Marine Ecosystem (LME),a1 along the Somali
a Large Marine Ecosystems are contiguous areas of the coastal
ocean that have similar physical and biological characteristics,
often defined by water masses or currents and biological populations.
See http://lme.edc.uri.edu
Annex 149
74 | Securing Somali Fisheries
4 Sustainability
east coast, is ranked fourth in the world in FPP.b2 Out
of 54 ranked LMEs, only the Baltic Sea, Canary Current
(African northwest coast), and Benguela Current (African
southwest coast) could sustainably produce more fish per
square kilometer. Likewise, the Arabian Sea LME, along
the Somali north coast, is ranked eighth in the world. This
makes Somali waters potentially more productive, per
unit area, than some of the largest fishing regions in the
world, such as the California Current LME (U.S.) or the
Humboldt Current LME (Chile/Peru).
A scientifically rigorous estimate of the amount of fish
that could be sustainably harvested each year from Somali
waters is sorely needed. Somali Fisheries Law mandates
regulation of fishing to produce optimum sustainable yield
(OSY), and catch can only be allocated to foreign vessels if
surplus resources are available after domestic allocation.
Estimates of fishery potential can be used to understand
how much fishing the ecosystem can tolerate, what levels
of fishing correspond to OSY, and how much surplus
resource is available to foreign vessels. A best-practices
approach to estimating fishery production potential
would involve robust estimates of energy in the system
(annual primary productivity derived from chlorophyll
estimates, see Figure 4.2), quantifying how that energy
moves through the Somali marine ecosystem, and having
clear estimates of the amount of fishing pressure the
system experiences.
b This refers to the amount of fish that could be caught, not the
amount that is currently being caught.
Several historical estimates of potential fish catch in
Somali waters exist. However, our review of their origins
leaves us hesitant about their rigor and comparability.
Estimates range from 180,000 metric tons (mt) per
year11 to over 680,000 mt per year,12 leaving ample
room for misjudgment over the degree of fishing that
can be sustainably conducted. In his 1981 thesis,13
Yassin aggregated data published in other reports with
surveys conducted by the R/V Fridtjof Nansen14 to
estimate an annual catch potential of 680,000 mt. In
1983, Haakonsen15 reported annual catch potential of
180,400 mt for large and small pelagic fishes, demersal
fishes, sharks and rays, lobster, and shrimp. The methods
and data by which this estimate was derived were not
reported. In a 1999 conference paper, Hassan and Tako16
report an FAO estimate of 300,000 mt of fish catch
possible per year, but they do not reference the original
source (or method by which it was derived).
We mention these estimates because they have been
used in the past to inform the discussion of fishery
potential in Somali waters. However, in the past year a
new global FPP model (introduced above) has been built.
A version of the model and its results exist in Rosenberg et
al. published in 2014.17 The model is undergoing regular
revision, and we obtained more recent estimates of FPP
directly from the authors.18
Briefly, the model divides the world into Large Marine
Ecosystems19 and estimates primary production from
satellite images of ocean color in each LME. Primary
FIGURE 4.1 Example of fishery production potential (FPP)
estimated for top predators (i.e., piscivores like tuna) in 53
Large Marine Ecosystems around the world. Reproduced
from Rosenberg et al. 2014.10 Color bar is in units of tons
per km2.
FIGURE 4.2 Global estimates of sea surface chlorophyll
(averaged from 1998 – 2006) derived from satellites as
an example of data used to estimate fishery production
potential. Image from Wikipedia.
Average sea-surface chlorophyll, 1998 to 2006 mg chl m-3]
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 75
4 Sustainability
production measures the amount of energy being created
by photosynthesis by phytoplankton (see Figure 4.2). A
food web model traces the flow of energy between prey
and predators in each LME. The model measures FPP by
estimating the biomass in different parts of the food web
and applying constraints that account for the viability
of a fishery for a given type of fish (e.g., whether it is a
desired food source and whether harvest is economically
practical). FPP is calculated as the amount of fish that
could be sustainably harvested, assuming harvest should
not exceed 20%–25% of available production. To simplify
the model and data requirements, species of marine life
were aggregated into categories of piscivores (animals
that consume fish and are generally considered top
predators, such as tuna), planktivores (animals that
consume plankton and are consumed by predators, such
as sardines), and benthivores (animals that consume
bottom-dwelling organisms, such as flatfishes). Please
see the original FAO document for full methodological
details.20
We were provided with the most recent model estimates
of FPP for piscivores, planktivores, and benthivores for
the Somali Current LME and Arabian Sea LME (Table 4.1
and Figure 4.1). The LMEs are much larger than the area
defined by the Somali Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
so to estimate FPP of the Somali EEZ, we calculated
the overlap between the two LMEs and the EEZ (see
Appendix 6). Northern Somali waters encompass 5.3% of
the Arabian Sea LME, while eastern and southern Somali
waters encompass 55.4% of the Somali Current LME. The
FPP estimated for the full LME area was then reduced
(weighted) by the percent of areal overlap (Table 4.1,
area-weighted FPP columns). Finally, we combined FPP in
the two LMEs that overlapped Somali waters. Fish catch
in Somali waters by the foreign fleets (Chapter 2) and fish
catch from the Somali domestic fleet (Chapter 3) were
aggregated into categories of piscivores, planktivores, or
benthivores (Figure 4.3) and compared to the total FPP in
Somali waters (Table 4.1).
Somali waters have a FPP of 835,000 mt per year (Table
4.1). By comparison, we estimate only 194,000 mt of
fish were caught in Somali waters in 2013. However, the
harvest of these fish is severely unbalanced with respect
to categories of fish. The FAO model estimates Somali
waters can sustainably produce 136,000 mt of piscivores
each year. This category includes tuna, billfishes, sharks,
and predatory coastal fishes such as snappers. In 2013,
we estimate 139,000 mt of piscivores were harvested
from Somali waters. Consequently, this category of fishes
appears to be fished at maximum capacity. We conclude
fishing fleets in Somali waters cannot increase the amount
of piscivores caught without implicating the sustainability
of these commercially valuable fisheries.
On the other hand, planktivores (such as sardines) and
benthivores (such as flatfishes) are fished far less than
their estimated FPP (Table 4.1); 335,000 mt of planktivores
could be harvested from Somali waters each year but only
26,000 mt were harvested in 2013. Likewise, 364,000 mt
of benthivores could be harvested from Somali waters
each year but only 28,000 mt were harvested. In order to
protect the long-term sustainability of Somali’s fisheries,
development of fisheries for planktivores and benthivores
may be most profitable and ecologically sound (but see
§3 below in which specific families of benthivores, such
as emperors, are classified as unsustainable).
It is extremely important to note that the total FPP
estimated for Somali waters, 835,000 mt per year, is only
achievable if significant increases in catch are made for
benthivores and planktivores. A significant amount of the
planktivore biomass is composed of small mesopelagic
TABLE 4.1 Fishery production potential (FPP) compared to current catch in Somali waters. Catch is
from foreign and domestic fishing combined. The area-weighted FPP columns give estimates of FPP in
the LMEs that overlap Somali waters as defined by the Somali EEZ. All units are mt.
Fishery Category FPP in
Somali
LME
FPP in
Arabian
Sea LME
Area-
Weighted
FPP, Somali
LME
Area-
Weighted
FPP, Arabian
Sea LME
Total FPP
in Somali
Waters
Total Catch in
Somali
Waters (2013)
Piscivores 215,000 323,000 119,000 17,000 136,000 139,000
Planktivores 542,000 646,000 301,000 34,000 335,000 26,000
Benthivores 597,000 633,000 331,000 33,000 364,000 28,000
Total 1,354,000 1,603,000 751,000 84,000 835,000 194,000
Annex 149
76 | Securing Somali Fisheries
4 Sustainability
fishes (myctophids or lanternfishes) that are not currently
harvested at meaningful scales. Myctophids are not likely
to be sold for direct human consumption, but they could
contribute to fishmeal production in the future. The large
imbalance in harvest between piscivores on the one hand
and planktivores and benthivores on the other hand is
illustrative of a global pattern: top predators have been
highly desired for human consumption for many decades
and their harvest levels are likely at (or in excess of) levels
that are sustainable. For humans to increase fish catch
in a sustainable manner, a more balanced approach to
harvesting should increase catch of benthivores and
planktivores. In this regard, Somali waters are no different
than those in the rest of the world’s oceans.
3. SUSTAINABILITY OF FISHERIES
AT CURRENT LEVELS OF FISHING
EFFORT
The FPP analysis compares potential to actual harvest
at highly aggregated taxonomic scales. But for a fuller
understanding of the status of Somali fish stocks,
sustainability analysis should be done for more useful
groupings. Fisheries management plans must account
for the health of different species of fishes because they
may react very differently to changing environments or
fishing practices. When comprehensive fisheries and
biological data are available, the sustainability of fished
stocks can be assessed by dataintensive
methods such as formal
stock assessments. However,
Somalia, like the vast majority of
fished stocks around the world,
lacks sufficient data for such
assessment. Instead, we used
methods30 developed specifically
for data-poor fisheries to classify
the sustainability of fish stocks in
Somalia at current levels of catch
(foreign plus domestic).
We classified sustainability based
on the ratio of current levels of fish
biomass to the biomass needed
to produce maximum sustainable
yield, or MSY (B/BMSY). This ratio is
a common metric of sustainability
used by the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission (IOTC), among
others. If the ratio is greater than
1.0, the biomass of a fish stock is higher than that needed
to produce MSY for the fishery. Theoretically, then, the
fishery could support a higher level of fishing. If the ratio
is less than 1.0, the biomass of a fish stock is below that
needed to produce MSY for the fishery, and fishing levels
should be reduced to improve sustainability.
Biomass is difficult to measure even in well-studied
systems. In systems such as Somalia’s, which lack
regular scientific surveys of marine resources, it is nearly
impossible. Costello31 and colleagues developed an
approach for estimating B/BMSY when only catch and basic
biological information are available. Using information
from data-rich fish stocks from around the world, they
built a statistical modelc3 that related B/BMSY to various
fishery metrics such as how long the fishery has existed,
whether catch has peaked, and the length of the fish in
question. They then applied that model to over 1,700
stocks of fishes that had never been assessed before.
Their analysis did not explore stocks in Somali waters, so
we applied the model they developed to the catch data
we have reconstructed for Somali waters.
We limited our analysis to catch from those species
groups that (a) had sufficient data for analysis and (b)
c A panel regression model built from FAO catch data and validated
against full stock assessments. The coefficients thereby
derived were then applied to 1,793 unassessed stocks.
FIGURE 4.3 Fisheries catch (foreign and domestic) in Somali waters.
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 77
4 Sustainability
Box 4.1: The Potential for Investment in Somali Fisheries
As the political and security situations in Somalia stabilize, Somali and foreign businesspeople are seeking opportunities
to invest. The Somali energy, telecommunications, and agriculture sectors are growing, and private sector
investment promises to improve supply chains, create jobs, build civil society, increase civic participation, reduce
poverty, and promote economic growth. Additionally, there is potential for Somalis to earn millions of dollars each
year from licensing foreign fishing vessels, and this revenue could be used to expand the fisheries sector. Somalia’s
small-scale fisheries sector would benefit greatly from investment in infrastructure and services, but that investment
must be targeted wisely to achieve sustainability. In the course of our research, the following sectors presented
some of the most promising opportunities for investors and the Somali fishing sector:
• Cold storage—One of the greatest challenges to expanding
fisheries in Somalia is the lack of infrastructure,
especially a well-developed cold chain. Cold
storage at every point along the boat-to-market continuum
is crucial to maintaining the quality of fish and
thereby commanding high prices, especially in export
markets. Progress in the cold chain is being made
through the construction of freezers made from cargo
containers.21 Increased ice-making facilities, cold
storage, and freezer transport would greatly increase
the value and marketability of Somali catch. In particular,
a variety of freezing technologies are needed
to accommodate different markets: while ice is useful
for fish that will be sold domestically in short time
frames, deep and flash freezers are needed to preserve
fish for long time frames in the export market.
• Fishing boats and technology—Somali fishers are
limited by the small size of their boats and lack of access
to fish-finding technologies. Larger boats, navigational
equipment (e.g., GPS and navigation charts),
and fish-finding sonar systems would increase the
ability of Somali fishers to compete with industrial
and foreign vessels.
• Sanitary processing facilities—Somali fish products do
not always adhere to the food safety and sanitary import
laws of most countries,22 and this limits the markets
to which Somalis can send fish products. After preventing
spoilage through greater cold storage capacity,
investment in state-of-the-art sanitary processing facilities
and training in international sanitation standards
would open new markets for Somali fish products.
Such facilities could be built in regional hubs and serve
catch from a variety of smaller supply locations.
• Small-scale tuna fisheries—Most Somali vessels
catch fish using gillnets; this precludes catching large,
highly migratory (and highly profitable) tuna such as
yellowfin, and gillnets create unwanted bycatch. We
believe there is great potential in an artisanal poleand-
line yellowfin tuna fishery. The Maldives have
leveraged their artisanal tuna fishing practices onto
a larger scale, and they market their products accordingly:
pole-and-line caught tuna from the Maldives is
highly desired and commands above-market prices
because it is certified sustainable by the Marine Stewardship
Council.23 Somalia has similar potential. Targeted
investment into pole-and-line gear or longlines
equipped with bycatch prevention measures could
create a niche market for Somali tuna. Our analysis
(2) shows catch of highly migratory tuna in Somali
waters is approaching the limits of sustainability, so
increases in domestic harvest must be reconciled with
the large amounts of tuna caught by foreign vessels.
Somalis would earn greater income from a profitable
artisanal tuna fishery than from licensing foreign vessels
to land the same fish, but development of such
a fishery will take time. However, there may be even
greater potential for catch of the coastal species of
tuna (e.g., frigate tuna, bullet tuna, or kawakawa).
We caution that the IOTC does not yet perform sustainability
analyses for these species, but Somali-led
data collection initiatives could help fill this gap.
• Fishmeal—In Somalia, there is first-mover opportunity
to develop fisheries for forage fishes and process
those fish into fishmeal, a growing product on
the international market for animal and aquaculture
feed.24, 25 Additionally, fishmeal could provide an affordable,
organic, and local source of fertilizer for
Somali agriculture. Our sustainability analysis shows
that forage fishes (planktivores), including sardines
and anchovies, are underexploited in Somali waters.
To develop this opportunity, investment is needed in
both the fishery itself and in building fishmeal pro-
Annex 149
78 | Securing Somali Fisheries
4 Sustainability
were not highly migratory species (HMS). HMS stocks
undergo more rigorous sustainability analysis by the IOTC,
and we defer to and report their results for HMS below.
We used combined foreign and domestic catch estimates
for dolphinfish, emperors, goatfish, jacks, clupeids,
snappers, sharks, rays, groupers, and grunts (Figure 4.4).
Uncertainty in catch reconstructions at the species level
and limitations with the sustainability model precluded
analysis of individual species. Maximum length of each
fish group (calculated as an average across species in
that group) was included as a biological parameter in
the model. Although we have catch reconstructions for
squid, shrimp, spiny lobster, and cuttlefish in Figure 4.4,
the sustainability model produced by Costello et al. did
not include these groups. See Appendix 6 for further
methodological details.
We find 8 of the 17 fish groups we analyzed are currently
fished at unsustainable levels (Figure 4.5). These include
swordfish, striped marlin,
emperors (including the
commercially important
spangled emperor, Lethrinus
nebulosus), goatfish, snappers,
sharks, groupers, and grunts
(including the commercially
important painted sweetlips,
Diagramma pictum).
We urge caution when
interpreting these results.
First, the analysis was
done on categories of
catch that range from
species (e.g., yellowfin
tuna) to groups of families
(e.g., sharks). Results
found for aggregated
categories do not
translate to the species
that make up that group,
cessing plants. Forage fishes are subject to large population
fluctuations caused by climate and natural cycles,
26 so strong fisheries management plans should
first be adopted. Energy and water use considerations
for fishmeal plants also must be assessed. If established
wisely, sustainable harvest of forage fishes for
fishmeal could produce jobs in fishing areas and away
from the coast.
• Shellfish mariculture—Aquaculture is the fastest-
growing food production sector in the world, but
land-based systems require high water inputs. Mariculture,
aquaculture that occurs in the ocean, may offer
an important alternative in water-strapped Somalia.
27 Coastal culturing of mussels, in which mussels
are grown on rafts, ropes, or poles and harvested by
hand, is one of the most sustainable forms of aquaculture
in the world.28 Mussels are extremely nutritious,
and mussel farms have been highly profitable
in suitable locations. Although suitability studies and
environmental impact assessments are needed for
Somali waters, mussel mariculture may be a creative
and lucrative opportunity.29
FIGURE 4.4 Fisheries catch (foreign and domestic) in Somali waters by species group.
Box 4.1: CONT’D
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Securing Somali Fisheries | 79
4 Sustainability
and variation between species will occur. Second, for
the non-HMS species, the analysis was based on catch
reconstructions. The methodology used for these
reconstructions (see Chapters 2 and 3) creates patterns
in the data that are different from those that would exist
in real observations of catch (i.e., higher autocorrelation).
However, the creators of the sustainability model found
catch underreporting and misreporting did not affect
results. Third, our classification scheme creates a clear
line (B/BMSY 1.0) above which a group was classified
as sustainable and below which it was classified as
unsustainable. Some categories have B/BMSY values near
1.0 and could plausibly be classified another way if data
were slightly different. Likewise, some categories had
B/BMSY much greater than 1.0 suggesting high levels of
sustainability, while others had B/BMSY much lower than
1.0, suggesting immediate conservation measures are
needed. Our catch estimates are not robust enough for
additional interpretation.
4. CONCLUSIONS
There are reasons to be optimistic about sustainability of
fisheries in Somalia. On average, fisheries in Somalia are
more sustainable than in the rest of the world. In two
analyses, 63%43 and 64% of global stocks were found to be
unsustainable (with B/BMSY below 1.0). By comparison, less
than half of the categories we analyzed are unsustainable
in Somali waters. None of the Somali fisheries are
collapsed, while worldwide 24% are collapsed. Some
of the most lucrative species, particularly yellowfin and
skipjack tuna, appear to be healthy. And the species most
likely to be turned into fishmeal (clupeids) also appear
sustainable at current levels.
However, caution is warranted. On average, global fish
stocks had comparable levels of sustainability in 1978
(66% sustainable, 44% unsustainable), but a mere 13
years later sustainability had declined such that 64%
of stocks were unsustainable, a level that persists 25
years later. Somali fish stocks may have an advantage
over global stocks because the history of industrial-level
fishing in its waters began much later and increased more
slowly. If Somali stocks follow a path similar to that taken
by global stocks, we estimate more than half of stocks will
be unsustainable in under a decade.
Fisheries have the potential to yield significant income,
nutrition, and employment for Somalis. The strides made
recently to build a foundation for management and
ownership of fisheries by Somalis is a critical step towards
greater sustainability in the future.
FIGURE 4.5 Sustainability of commercially-fished stocks in Somali waters.
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80 | Securing Somali Fisheries
4 Sustainability
Box 4.2: Conservation of Overlooked Species
Many species with vulnerable, threatened, or endangered conservation status live in Somali waters, including whale
sharks, sea turtles, cetaceans, seabirds, and sea cucumbers. These groups may be targeted or captured as bycatch
in the gillnet, trawl, longline, and purse seine fisheries. Proper protection and management is hindered by a severe
lack of data. Catch of these species in the Indian Ocean is frequently underreported because it is not required by
individual nations, and because vessels fear the consequences of reporting illegal capture of threatened species
where such laws exist.32 The high bycatch rates associated with gillnet vessels, deployed by the two foreign fleets
with the largest presence in Somali waters (Iran and Yemen), is cause for concern.
Whale Sharks
Whale sharks (Rhincodon typus) range throughout the Indian Ocean, and tagging experiments confirm their
presence in Somali waters.33 Targeted fisheries for this species, which is listed as Vulnerable by the International
Union for Conservation of Nature,34 have been banned in many Indian Ocean countries, and whale sharks have
been protected to promote ecotourism in the Seychelles. Unfortunately, these massive filter-feeding sharks are
subject to accidental mortality in gillnet, purse seine, and driftnet fisheries.35
Sea Turtles
Of the seven species of sea turtles worldwide, five live in Somali waters, all of which are protected by various
international treaties.36 The green turtle (Chelonia mydas) and hawksbill turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata) range
throughout the Western Indian Ocean and nest on northern Somali beaches.37 Sea turtles are extremely vulnerable
to entanglement in gill nets,38 so they are often captured incidentally by foreign fishers and Somali fishers who keep
them to sell their meat. In our survey of Somali fishers (Appendix 1), 22% of respondents reported that they had
caught turtles and that they fetched between US $0.50 -$15.00 per kg. These high prices incentivize fishers to keep
accidentally caught turtles rather than release them.
Seabirds
Seventeen species of seabirds live in Somalia. Worldwide, seabird populations are on the decline.39 Seabirds are
primarily surface feeders, scanning the waves for prey in the top few meters of water. These eating habits mean
they are easily enticed by baited longlines40 or the dead fish in gillnets.41 Both gears pose threats to birds which can
drown if hooked on a line or entangled in a net. Unfortunately, the number of seabirds accidentally caught in the
Indian Ocean is entirely unknown. We believe that with the heavy use of gillnets and longlines in Somali waters,
unreported seabird mortality in this region is likely high.
Sea Cucumbers
Little is known about the size of the sea cucumber fishery or the status of their populations in Somali waters.
According to our survey of Somali fishers, processors, and exporters, sea cucumbers are captured by Somali fishers
for export and they fetch a high price compared to most fish species: between US $60 and $92 per kg, depending
on the market. Worldwide, few sea cucumber management plans exist and those that do are undermined by a
lack of knowledge.42 Given their high value and lack of management, sea cucumbers are poised to be overfished in
Somali waters.
The recently enacted Somali Fisheries Law calls for the protection of endangered marine animals, prohibits
fishing for endangered animals, and mandates release of accidentally caught endangered marine animals.
Additionally, fishers are obligated to report quantities and types of bycatch.* Upon joining the IOTC, Somalia began
the process of coming into compliance with Conservation and Management Measures (CMMs). CMMs are binding
resolutions with which IOTC Member nations comply, and they provide a framework for reducing bycatch and
Annex 149
Securing Somali Fisheries | 81
4 Sustainability
protecting threatened and endangered species. CMMs for the protection of whale sharks, turtles, and seabirds
exist, but they do not exist for sea cucumbers. These are excellent first steps toward conserving threatened species;
however fishers, both local and foreign, need to be better informed of these regulations and their consequences,
and enforcement of the law is crucial for the protection of these sensitive species. Over the next few decades, as
stability in Somalia grows, the conservation of these species today is critical to ecosystem function and societal
development (e.g., ecotourism) in the future.
*Article 25 of the Somali Fisheries Law
Box 4.2: CONT’D
Coastal tuna from Somali waters, Jean-Pierre Larroque
Annex 149
82 | Securing Somali Fisheries
4 Sustainability
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41 MRAG, A review of bycatch in the Indian Ocean
42 Purcell, S. W., Mercier, A., Conand, C., Hamel, J. F.,
Toral-Granda, M. V., Lovatelli, A., & Uthicke, S. (2013).
Sea cucumber fisheries: Global analysis of stocks,
management measures and drivers of overfishing.
Fish and Fisheries, 14(1), 34–59. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
2979.2011.00443.x
43 Worm et al., Rebuilding global fisheries
Annex 149
Annex 150
C. Devlin et al., “Rough seas — the causes and consequences of fisheries conflict
in Somali waters”, One Earth Future Foundation, 2020
THE CAUSES and CONSEQUENCES
of FISHERIES CONFLICT IN SOMALI WATERS
ROUGH SEAS
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Annex 150
ROUGH SEAS:
THE CAUSES and CONSEQUENCES of
FISHERIES CONFLICT IN SOMALI WATERS
http://dx.doi.org/10.18289/OEF.2020.042
Cover Image: Two fishers prepare their boat for a night of fishing at a port in Bossaso, Puntland. Photo: Tobin Jones, United Nations.
Design & layout by Liz Allen, One Earth Future.
January 2020
Colleen Devlin
Sarah M. Glaser
Ciera Villegas
Natasia Poinsatte
Annex 150
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Annex 150
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.................................................................................................................... iv
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 01
II. THE SOMALI REGION................................................................................................................. 02
Civil Conflict in the Somali Region................................................................................................................ 02
Fisheries in the Somali Region....................................................................................................................... 03
III. RESEARCH APPROACH.............................................................................................................. 06
IV. RESULTS.......................................................................................................................................... 08
V. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................................. 16
ENDNOTES........................................................................................................................................... 19
Annex 150
vi | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the Somali region, as in a growing number of places around the world, the stability of fisheries and the maritime domain more
broadly are critically linked to the economic and physical security of the Somali people. As Somali waters are the gateway between
the Indian Ocean and the Red and Mediterranean seas, smooth passage facilitates maritime economic commerce on a global
scale. Likewise, the nutrient-rich waters around the Horn of Africa support domestic and foreign fishing fleets that harvest tens of
thousands of tons of valuable fish every year. However, low capacity for enforcement of maritime laws since the civil war began in
1991 has enabled illegal fishing while undermining domestic maritime domain awareness.
Here, we investigated conflict in Somali waters in order to add to the limited but growing understanding of the factors contributing
to or mitigating conflict over fisheries resources. In particular, we assessed the actors in and motivations driving fisheries conflict in
the Somali region. To do so, we collected and analyzed reports in the media of fisheries conflict in Somali waters from 1990–2018.
We found three distinct periods of conflict with different defining characteristics: conflict between domestic and foreign fishers
(1998–2000), conflict driven by piracy in Somali waters (2007–2010), and conflict resulting from the return of foreign fishing fleets
(2014–2015).
20
25
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
15
10
5
NUMBER OF FISHERIES DISPUTE EVENTS
1990s
Fisheries conflict has clustered
around distinct periods of foreign fishing
and has been exacerbated by institutional instability.
late 2000s 2010s
mid- late
Foreign vs
domestic fishers
Pirate attacks
led to international warships
deployment of
on foreign fishing vessels
Foreign vs
domestic fishers
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Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | vii
In the Somali region, fisheries conflict emerged from unmanaged competition over fish stocks and was exacerbated by institutional
instability within the Somali fishing sector. We found five significant causes of fisheries conflict: the presence of foreign fishers
(whether illegal or legal), territorial disputes, illegal fishing, weak governance, and piracy. Contrary to the causes of many other
fisheries conflicts around the world, declines in fish stocks was not a leading cause of conflict in Somali waters.
The Federal Government of Somalia has taken important steps towards strengthening fisheries governance and thereby reducing
institutional instability. For example, they recently formally declared the boundaries of their exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
joined international management efforts through the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, provided online transparency about recent
licensing of Chinese fishing vessels, and are spearheading collaborative efforts to collect fisheries catch data across the region.
Our findings have several important implications for the continued development of fisheries governance in Somali waters.
• First, weak governance can be enhanced by strong cooperation between federal and state authorities, but, more importantly,
by INCREASING THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO FEDERAL AND STATE MINISTRIES OF FISHERIES for technical and
institutional capacity.
• Second, the laws and regulations governing fisheries resources need to be developed more fully with the PARTICIPATION
OF FISHING COMMUNITIES. At the local level, fishing communities should be integrated into the fisheries management
process. Community-driven natural resources management partnerships present an opportunity to build both management
capacity and government legitimacy.
• Third, the transparency around legal licensing of foreign fishing vessels should continue and be supplemented by outreach
to and engagement with fishing communities about the process. GREATER INFORMATION-SHARING ABOUT LEGAL
FOREIGN FISHING MAY REDUCE CONFLICT between domestic and foreign fishing vessels.
• And fourth, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST TAKE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR STOPPING ILLEGAL
FISHING BY GLOBAL FLEETS IN SOMALI WATERS in order to support the nascent but growing Somali fisheries sector.
Given that the presence of foreign vessels is the most significant cause of fisheries conflict at this time, it is incumbent upon
the nations responsible to track and report upon their own vessels while also removing vessels that are fishing illegally in
Somali waters.
Foreign Fishers
Illegal Fishing
Weak Governance
Grounds Limitation
Piracy
LEADING CAUSES OF
FISHERIES CONFLICT
IN THE SOMALI REGION:
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Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 01
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 11, 2018, the Federal Republic of Somalia issued legal fishing licenses to foreign vessels for the first time in over
20 years. Thirty-one Chinese longline fishing vessels acquired one year of legal access to tuna, sharks, and billfishes in the Somali
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a region with abundant and valuable fish stocks. In exchange, the Somali government earned over
$1 million in license revenue that could be reinvested into the domestic fishing sector. According to Somalia’s Fisheries Law No.
23, updated in 2014, licensed foreign vessels may only operate outside 24 kilometers from the coastline; this provision is intended
to protect small-scale domestic fishers from interference and competition.1 Foreign boats must also declare to the government
their positions and the weight and types of fish they catch.2 All licensed vessels are monitored using an automatic tracking system,
and there have been no reports of the 31 newly licensed vessels breaking the boundary rules or clashing with domestic fishers.
Despite the improvements to fisheries governance and management that a legal licensing mechanism for foreign fishing provides,
segments of the Somali public protested the licensing of Chinese fishing vessels, highlighting the contentious history of foreign
fishers in Somali waters. Decades of violent interactions between Somali boats and foreign fishing boats, the looming threats of
overfishing and habitat damage from industrial vessels, and the legacy of piracy have entrenched hostility to foreign fishing boats.
This report investigates how the Somali fishing sector arrived at this point.
Following the outset of the Somali civil war in 1991, foreign fishers began taking advantage of the anarchy in the region by
illegally fishing in Somali waters. Some Somali opposition groups, such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), began
“arresting” these vessels. In 1996, reports surfaced of Somali fishers’ arming themselves and fighting against illegal, unreported,
and unregulated (IUU) foreign vessels. The increased presence of foreign trawlers (vessels that drag large nets along the seafloor)
led to more clashes and harassment. Organized civilian groups like the “National Volunteer Group” in Jubaland3 and the “Defenders
of Somali Territorial Waters” in Galmudug4 patrolled to defend Somali maritime resources. Tension grew between local Somalis
and organized pirate groups, increasingly controlled by warlords driven by ransom opportunities.5 Opportunists’ quests for profit
drove piracy to grow beyond something the Somali region could extinguish alone.6 The Somali government’s plea for assistance
brought foreign naval warship coalitions into the region.7 The naval vessels were also a response to foreign governments’ concerns
with the attacks on cargo vessels, a significant threat to global commerce. Somali fishers alleged that the harassment they endured
multiplied with the arrival of foreign warships, who denied locals access to fishing grounds, sabotaged nets, and confused their
vessels for pirates’.8 Many fishers decided to remain close to their beaches to not fall victim to mistaken identity.9 Finally, the new
practice of bringing private contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) aboard foreign boats of all kinds served to increase
tensions (see Box 4).
EU Naval Force French frigate Surcouf and NATO warship USS Halyburton apprehending twelve people, alleged to be pirates, off the Somali coast in 2013.
Photo: EU Naval Force.
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02 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
As warships and PCASP quelled the threat, the cost of carrying out pirate attacks increased. This deterred the armed robbery
and hijackings, but an unintended consequence was renewed foreign illegal fishing in Somali waters. In 2015, 86 percent of
fishers reported seeing foreign fishing vessels near their coastal village.10 In 2016, fishers voiced frustrations over stolen gear, the
kidnapping of local fishers, toxic pollution, and terrorizing of locals.11 A drought in 2017 drove Somali food prices up and increased
domestic dependence on fishing, but illegal vessels had already severely impacted the health of Somali fisheries.12
Today, the domestic fishing sector is still wary of large, foreign boats in their waters.
The small, artisanal vessels are unable to compete with the powerful, better-equipped
foreign vessels, and communities are frustrated by inconsistent and—sometimes—
corrupt licensing. Local fishers lack understanding of how central and local fisheries
management might work, undermining the legitimacy of government policies and
enforcement capacities.13 Neither the Somali Federal Government nor its federal
member states have sufficient naval or coast guard capacity to patrol their massive
EEZ.14 There is a concern that even licensed foreign boats may further deplete stocks,
which are already targeted by illegal vessels.15
While the causes and consequences of piracy in Somali waters are well known, the role of fishing in perpetuating (or even
reducing) conflict in and around the Horn of Africa is less understood. To inform mitigation strategies for future fisheries conflict,
we investigated the key actors and drivers involved in fisheries conflict in Somali waters and the patterns that emerge. Fisheries
conflict is a complex, underreported, and under-investigated issue—most conflict occurs at the local level and affects marginalized
communities. The salience of this issue will grow as competition for finite fisheries resources and the attendant risk of violent
conflict also rise. Globally, fisheries are the primary source of protein for 1.5 billion people. This sizeable population is at risk of
food insecurity, loss of livelihood, and heightened violent conflict if fish stocks collapse. To prevent this, we aim to understand what
situations lead to violence over fisheries, and how we can best prevent that violence from occurring.
II. THE SOMALI REGION
Civil Conflict in the Somali Region
The Somali region, at a strategic location connecting Africa, the Middle
East, and Asia, was under colonial rule from the 1880s to the 1950s.
Northern Somalia was colonized by Great Britain in 1887 and southern
Somalia by Italy in 1889. Following the merger of the British and Italian
territories, the independent United Republic of Somalia was formed
in 1960 and lasted until 1969, when Somalia’s second president was
assassinated. At this time, Mohammed Siad Barre, the major general of
the Somali army, assumed power in a coup that overthrew the Somali
Republic to form the Somali Democratic Republic, a socialist state aligned
with the former Soviet Union. Siad Barre was ousted by a rebellion in
January 1991, marking the beginning of the Somali civil war.
From 1991 to 2006, the Somali region was without a recognized central
government as clan-based militia groups fought for power. This period
of anarchy and violence was ruinous to Somali infrastructure and
security resources. Former British Somaliland declared independence
as the Republic of Somaliland in 1991. In 1998, the Puntland region
declared itself an autonomous state. Meanwhile, the central and
southern parts of the country divided into competing factions. In
2006, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that had been
operating from Kenya convened its first parliament in the Somali
region, but the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an Islamic group of sharia
courts in opposition to the TFG, soon seized control of Mogadishu and
most of the southern regions. The ICU brought a significant degree of
lawfulness to a lawless state, garnering public support for the security
While the causes and
consequences of piracy
in Somali waters are well
known, the role of fishing
in perpetuating (or even
reducing) conflict in and
around the Horn of Africa is
less understood.
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Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 03
that the courts’ infrastructure provided.16 In early 2007, an internationally supported Ethiopian intervention defeated the ICU, at
which point it splintered into militant groups to continue their fight against the TFG. One of these groups became Al Shabaab, a
jihadist extremist group that aligned with al-Qaeda in 2010. These Islamist groups maintain a presence today and continue to pose
a threat to national stability.
The establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia occurred in 2012, upon the conclusion of the TFG mandate. The Federal
Government of Somalia (FGS) provided Somalis with formal international representation for the first time in over two decades.
Because there had not been a permanent central government since the beginning of the Somali civil war in 1991, however, other
self-governing authorities predated the FGS. Somaliland, though it declared itself an independent republic in 1991, is considered
by the FGS and international bodies as an autonomous region of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Puntland has considered itself
an autonomous state since 1998. These conflicting jurisdictions have led to legislative confusion and tension in the fishing sector.
Fisheries in the Somali Region
In 2014, the FGS declared an EEZ according to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (200 NM from shore). At 3,333 km in length, the Somali region has
the longest coastline in mainland Africa.17 The 2014 declaration made the Somali
government responsible for surveilling fisheries practices over 0.78 million square
km18 (an area 0.15 million sq. km larger than the Somali region’s land territory19)—a
daunting task for any government. The productive fishing grounds on the region’s
continental shelf exacerbate this challenge. Sharing the Gulf of Aden in the north
with Djibouti and Yemen, and the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean to the east,
productive Somali waters attract fishing fleets from all over the world.
In the 1980s, fishing cooperatives were established and financially supported by the Soviet Union, but many of them stalled after
the Somali civil war began in 1991. The fishing sector lost any support it was receiving from the central government, including
maritime managers and enforcers, during the three decades of civil conflict. Any law enforcement capacity that the Somali region
did have was unable to match the number of foreign vessels fishing in its vast maritime territory. Private companies began exploiting
the market space left open by the government, prompting IUU fishing by foreign vessels to become the most significant concern
for Somali fisheries management.20 IUU fishing is any fishing that violates the law, is not reported to legal and scientific authorities,
or occurs in parts of the ocean not subject to fisheries management or regulations. In Somali waters, rampant IUU fishing is driving
overfishing of stocks while depriving the Somali government of millions of dollars of revenue it might otherwise gain through
licensing.21 Overfishing not only negatively impacts marine ecosystems; it also threatens coastal livelihoods in communities that
cannot compete with foreign vessels’ efficient gear.
In Somali waters, foreign fishing vessels typically are of two kinds: those
fishing for highly migratory species (HMS) and those fishing for coastal
pelagic or bottom-dwelling species.22 HMS vessels are large, industrial
longline or purse seiners from European and Asian distant water fleets
or smaller gillnet vessels from Yemen or Iran (see Box 1). Industrial
trawlers and coastal dhows using gillnets predominantly seek the
small pelagic fishes like sardines, demersal fishes like groupers, and
invertebrates like shrimp. These vessels come from countries across
the globe, such as South Korea, Egypt, Greece, and Kenya.23 Before the
buildup of piracy in Somali waters, foreign fleets took advantage of the
region’s lack of governance over its maritime space to fish throughout
Somali waters without licenses and without benefit to Somalis. Foreign
fleets decreased their presence in Somali waters following the rise of
piracy in the region in the mid-2000s, but many distant water fleets
returned to Somali waters once piracy began to decline in 2014. In
2015, there were reports of vessels returning from Iran, South Korea,
and China following the improved maritime security situation.24 Iran,
Egypt, and Yemen (Box 2) were accused most commonly of overfishing
and destructive bottom trawling in Puntland in 2016.25
In Somali waters, rampant IUU
fishing is driving overfishing
of stocks while depriving the
Somali government of millions
of dollars of revenue it might
otherwise gain through
licensing.
Photo: Jean-Pierre Larroque, One Earth Future.
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04 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
PURSE SEINE
LONGLINE
GILLNET
TRAWLER
A long wall of netting that surrounds
the target species. The bottom of the
net has a purse line that, when pulled,
closes to prevent fish from swimming
downward—a natural response of fish to
danger.
Purse seines target high-value, highly
migratory species in the deep sea, like
sharks and schooling tunas.
A long mainline that has shorter branch
lines, or snoods, attached. Each snood
has a single baited hook.
Longline vessels operate in deep water,
targeting the larger, more solitary,
highly migratory stocks such as sharks,
swordfish, or billfishes, and the larger
schooling fishes such as tuna.
A single vertical wall of netting, with
floats on the top and weights on the
bottom. When fish attempt to swim
through, their gills get caught in the net.
Gillnets are one of the more versatile
types of gear used in Somali waters. They
can target highly migratory fishes (tuna,
swordfish, billfish) in deep water or reef
fishes close to shore.*
They are popular among artisanal fishers,
and the most common gear used by
Somalis.
A net, coupled to heavy doors that keep
the net open, towed along the ocean
floor or through the water column.
Bottom trawlers in Somali waters operate
close to shore in relatively shallow water,
targeting reef fishes or demersal fishes
(bottom feeders). Relatedly, midwater
trawls do not contact the seafloor and
target pelagic invertebrates (squid and
shrimp).
Foreign bottom trawlers are the most
likely to interact with Somali fishers.
Purse seining can result in bycatch.**
The degree of bycatch depends on
how tightly the target species swim,
or school, together and whether a
fishing vessel sets the net on nontarget
indicator marine life. This highefficiency
gear, if mismanaged, can also
put too much pressure on fish stocks.
Description: Environmental Impact:
Longlines could be less environmentally
harmful because each snood can only
catch one fish. If the longline is pulled
in shortly after hooking bycatch, the
non-target species can be released.
Unfortunately, most bycatch dies on
the snood before release.
Gillnets trap whatever swims into
them, so they can result in higher rates
of bycatch, including of endangered
species like sea turtles and mammals.
Bottom trawlers destroy seafloor
habitats by gathering everything they
encounter and harming fragile seafloor
ecosystems.
Trawling is non-selective and can result
in significant bycatch, including corals,
sea turtles, and seafloor foraging
mammals.
*In Somali waters, fishing within 24 NM is protected by Somali fisheries law and limited to domestic, artisanal fishing. These nearshore waters overlap most of the shallow continental
shelf. Deepwater fishing, where foreign-flagged vessels can be licensed, occurs outside of 24 NM, where the continental shelf drops off into the open water pelagic zone.
**Bycatch is the unintentional catch of non-target marine life while fishing for other species.
BOX 1. FISHING GEAR TYPES AND IMPACTS
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The Somaliland Coast Guard arrested 50 Yemeni fishers
and seized their eight boats as part of a campaign to
enforce territorial sovereignty in the Gulf of Aden.27
Yemen reported the event as a pirate attack.28
Puntland signed unofficial deals with Yemen to establish
coast guards, trade fish with each other, and allow
Yemeni fishers in their waters. Yemenis sailed their
boats to Puntland and either bought Somali catch or
paid a “hefty fee” to the Puntland Ministry of Fisheries
for a license to fish for themselves. The license included
provision of an armed man to go on the vessel with the
crew. Before reaching the Puntland coast, Yemeni fishers
risked encountering pirates who would stop their boats
and seize the fishers’ diesel and food. Sometimes the
pirates kidnapped them and demanded $20,000 for their
release. Some Yemeni fishers were killed trying to outrun
the pirates, but fishing in Somali waters was their only
way to earn a living. Many Yemeni fishers belonged to the
Fishery Cooperative Union (FCU) in Mukalla, the umbrella
organization for fisherfolk along Hadramaut’s (Yemen’s
largest state) coastline. The leader of the FCU advised
fishers to not go on individual fishing trips into Somali
waters.29
TFG warned Puntland not to make deals over its territorial
waters with other federal governments.30
Puntland complained that illegal Yemeni fishing vessels
played a large role in depleting stocks in their water.31
One hundred thirty Yemeni fishers in nine dhows were
seized by Puntland security officials for illegally fishing in
Puntland’s waters as a part of their crackdown on illegal
fishing.32
Yemeni media reported about 50 fishing boats had been
attacked.33
Somali pirates hijacked two Yemeni fishing vessels, the
M/V Qana’a and the M/V Falluja, near the Mait area close
to the port of Aden (Yemen). Seven fishermen managed
to escape and report the event. The 22 remaining fishers
were held hostage. The pirates had intended to use the
fishing vessels as mother ships for their attacks on other
ships in the Gulf of Aden.34
Yemeni fishers in Somali territorial waters were fired
upon by pirates, killing one fisherman and injuring two
others. The boat managed to escape and return to the
Yemeni port of Mukalla.35
An official report by the Yemeni government linked
piracy to a US$200 million loss to their fishing industry,
as Yemeni fishers stopped fishing in Yemen’s territorial
waters out of fear of pirate attacks and being mistaken
for pirates by international defense forces.36
Pirates killed Yemeni fishers for something as simple as
an engine, and international forces sent aircrafts to hover
over boats until they were convinced the boats were used
for fishing. Many fishers were wrongly accused of piracy.37
Eighty-one Yemenis in six fishing boats were arrested
by the Somaliland coast guard for fishing illegally near
Berbera (northern coast). The commander of the
Somaliland Coastal Guard said their forces doubled their
efforts to combat illegal fishing.38
Pirates took over Yemeni fishing boats in the Gulf of Aden
and the Indian Ocean, used fishers as human shields while
carrying out attacks, and used Yemeni dhows as weapons
storage facilities. Additionally, Yemeni fishers were attacked
by international coalition forces as collateral damage in
the fight against piracy or because they were mistaken for
Somali pirates.39
Fishing boats from Oman and Yemen that used to sail to
Eyl (the northeast region) to buy fish and trade goods no
longer arrived because foreign vessels were looting and
destroying their boats. The fishers also complained that
foreign warships were unable to differentiate between
fishing crews and pirates.40
Three Yemeni fishermen were kidnapped by a gang of
pirates that assaulted them and threw them into the Gulf
of Aden. They were found alive on a Yemeni beach three
days later. This story caused most Yemeni fishers to be
too afraid to travel more than 20 miles offshore. They
said their business was cut in half. They also felt their
lives were threatened by international forces patrolling
the waters.41
BOX 2. FROM SUPPLIERS TO SCAPEGOATS: THE YEMENI AGREEMENT
Yemen has had an increasing interest in its maritime resources since the 1970s, and with a much smaller EEZ, Yemeni fishers
expanded into Somali waters to meet the onshore demand.26 Informal agreements developed between the Yemenis and Somalis
starting in the 1990s. Yemenis would bring fuel, and eventually ice (subsidized in Yemen), and in exchange, the Yemenis had access
to the local fishing grounds and were able to buy fish directly from Somali fishers at a cheaper cost.
The illegal overfishing that developed on the Somali coast caused tension to grow between Somali communities and their past
trading partners. What was once a peaceful relationship declined as competition over fishing grounds escalated. Some Yemenis
began to take advantage of unlicensed fishing opportunities in their neighbor’s waters, joining the armada of foreigners invading
Somali fishing grounds and helping drive frustration and mobilization by fishing communities. Conflict and contention grew highest
in Somaliland and Puntland, where the state governments were attempting to establish their maritime authority. Fishing grounds
competition, rampant piracy, and warship harassment eventually made their way into the Yemeni EEZ.
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
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06 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
III. RESEARCH APPROACH
To investigate the primary drivers and consequences of fisheries conflict in Somali waters, our team of researchers analyzed
articles from news outlets for incidents in which a fisheries resource was the source of conflict in Somali waters during the period
1990–2018. Our systematic search included all reports of incidents that occurred in Somali water bodies (specifically, the Jubba
and Shabelle Rivers and all marine waters extending to the 200 NM EEZ). Using NexisUni, an online archival database of newsbased
print publications, we created the Fisheries Conflict Database.
To be coded into our database, an incident had to meet our definition of a fisheries dispute event (FDE), which is an incident or
incidents where a fisheries resource is contested, disputed, or the source of conflict, between a minimum of two actors at a discrete
location. Temporal moments and places may be approximate, but events need to occur within bounded time and space. FDEs
were identified and characterized using a standardized codebook that recorded the date, location, actors involved, measures of
violence, and causes of conflict. Causes of conflicts, referred to as “drivers,” were sorted into 15 categories:
• WEAK GOVERNANCE: corruption, weak enforcement, weak institutional capacity, a lack of public participation, inadequate
information, or organized crime
• FISH STOCKS: an actual or perceived decline in fish population(s)
• ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: changes to the natural ecosystem, excluding the health of fish populations
• POVERTY: limited livelihood options, lack of public health services, or a lack of public education services
• FOOD INSECURITY: a lack of access to a reliable source of sufficient and nutritious food (both fisheries and non-fisheries
food)
• MARGINALIZATION: actors targeted for their social, economic, ethnic, tribal, gender, or political identity
• GROUNDS LIMITS: limitations on access to fishing grounds
• OPERATIONAL SCALES: competition between actors that operate at a different scale of fishing
• FOREIGN FISHERS: the presence of foreign fishers in domestic waters
• MARKETS: the supply or demand from transnational markets
• GEAR EFFICIENCY: destructive fishing practices that collect fish rapidly in high volumes (illegal), highly efficient gear
types (legal), or technological advances aimed at increasing catch
• INCREASED PRESSURE: increased domestic market demand for seafood or an increased number of fishers at a
water body
• PIRACY: acts of piracy (outside 24 NM) or armed robbery (inside 24 NM) by members of organized gangs and not fishing
vessels. (Note: In a related study42, we coded piracy in a category of maritime crime, but for clarity we use the term
“piracy” here.)
• STRATEGIC LOCATION: the strategic importance of a fishery’s land location
• ILLEGAL FISHING: illegal methods of fishing, such as gear, location, species, or without license
Illegal fishing and foreign fishing often occur together in Somali waters, but their motivations for conflict should not be confused.
Conflict driven by illegal fishing involves one actor’s ignoring a regulation that other actors respect, such as using banned gear,
fishing during closed seasons, catching endangered species, or fishing without a license. The other actor in an illegal fishing conflict
usually engages out of frustration that they are losing by following the rules. Illegal fishing vessels can be foreign or domestic. A
domestic fisher might incite an illegal fishing conflict by fishing in a marine protected area. Conflict driven by foreign fishing is
usually motivated by the presence of foreign fishers in domestic waters, whether or not they have permission. One foreign fishing
event could include the arrest of unlicensed foreign fishers but would also apply to an attack against a licensed foreign fishing
vessel motivated by locals’ anger that their government is approving licenses.
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BOX 3. AN IMPORTANT DISTINCTION: PIRACY AND FISHERIES
The belief that pirates operating off the
Somali coastline are fishers is a common and
unfortunate misconception.43 Media coverage
and pirates’ justifications for their actions
promoted this misunderstanding. Most of the
coverage on the rise of piracy in the early 2000s
sounded like this: “The problem of piracy in
the Horn of Africa began five years ago when
Somali fishermen reacted to foreign overfishing
by seizing trawlers and their crews and holding
them for ransom. Civil war and anarchy had left
their shattered government unable to protect
its fisheries. When such tactics produced
money, it emboldened the pirates to go after
freighters and yachts on their way to and from
Europe and Asia.”44 The narrative developed
that victims of war were trying to defend
themselves when they stumbled upon an
exploitative moneymaking opportunity.
While it is true that fishers organized to defend their fish stocks against illegal vessels in the 1990s, the narrative omits that
the piracy this region is known for actually originated with prominent businessmen and politicians who entered the system by
licensing foreign vessels as a method of extortion.45 Somali fishers became casualties in rivalries between warlords who wanted
to issue fishing licenses. Vessels granted fishing rights in water controlled by one warlord were often targeted by rival groups who
disputed control of the area.46 Hijack-for-ransom activities began in the early 2000s when international financing transformed
piracy into an “industry” with an organized business model.47
The relationship between organized piracy and coastal fishing communities is a complicated one that varies by the village. Some
viewed the maritime space as a dangerous environment to operate in, getting caught between pirates and warships.48 On occasion,
communities mobilized to suppress piracy. In 2008, the mayor of Eyl told the Puntland government that his village, and others,
had stopped allowing pirates to dock near their towns.49 In another small community in Mudug, at least two people died in a
conflict between villagers and pirates attempting to anchor a hijacked vessel.50 Residents of Eyl told the media they were tired of
pirates’ dominating their town following a dispute in which the village prevented the pirates from relaunching a hijacked vessel
as a mother ship, eventually forcing them to free the hostage fishers.51 Other communities viewed piracy as their country’s only
option to protect resources and saw the pirates as Somali heroes.52 A 2009 survey found that 70 percent of coastal communities
strongly supported piracy as a form of national defense of territorial waters.53 When foreign warships arrived in Somali waters,
some communities voiced concern that their presence would impede the pirates’ ability to protect their natural resources. In
2015, with illegal foreign fishers once again causing overfishing and impacting Somali fishers’ incomes, some communities feared
a return to piracy,54 while others threatened it.55
Another source of the “pirates are fishers” narrative stems from pirates themselves: if arrested, pirates commonly claimed they
are or once were fishers.56 Though not always the case, there are instances when acts of piracy can be considered fisheries conflict.
Piracy is defined as “armed robbery” in attacks that occur within states’ EEZ boundaries. Armed robbery targeted at fishing vessels
meets our definition for a fisheries conflict motivated by piracy. For example, the pirates who hijacked the Spanish fishing vessel
Playa del Bakio in international waters used missiles and machine guns—far beyond the capacity of organized domestic fishers in
the 1990s. Yet, the pirates aboard the Playa del Bakio explained to their hostages that the attack occurred because the foreigners
were plundering their fishing waters. The men who hijacked the Indian dhow, M/V Safina al-Birsarat, held the crew hostage while
they used the vessel as a mother ship to carry out hijackings. Once arrested, they claimed they were innocent fishers who did not
understand why the US Navy had abducted them. That claim was often a cover for criminal behavior.
When coding events for this research, our project defers to court decisions. The United Nations established specialized antipiracy
courts in the Somali region and other nations, with prosecution assistance provided by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia
(UNPOS). In the M/V Safina al-Birsarat case, the suspects received piracy convictions.
The crew of the merchant vessel Faina, seized by pirates in 2008.
Photo: Jason R. Zalasky, US Navy.
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08 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
IV. RESULTS
Three clusters of fisheries conflicts occurred: (1) during the years when informal groups of Somali fishers came in conflict with
foreign fishers (1998–2000); (2) during the height of piracy in Somali waters (2007–2010); and (3) during the resurgence of foreign
fishing in Somali waters (2014–2015) (Figure 1). The decline in conflict in 2012 was likely a result of the increased international
maritime security presence during 2010–2011.
The primary drivers of fisheries conflict in Somali waters are the presence of
foreign fishers, grounds limitations, illegal fishing, weak governance, and piracy
(see Figure 2). Foreign fishing motivated approximately 80 percent of Somali FDEs.
In the first conflict cluster, clashes between domestic fishers and foreign vessels
over the locals’ fishing nets and catch were frequent. Following one such conflict in
1997, locals accused the foreigners of looting and fishing illegally in Somali waters
and threatened they would destroy every foreign fishing vessel they saw in their
area of operation (Ego Beach).57 This example also shows how grounds limitations
can be a cause of conflict, because there are perceived limitations to access to
fishing grounds, in the opinion of at least one of the actors (in this case, the local
fishers). During the third and most recent conflict cluster, in 2014, the president of
Puntland issued a declaration that illegal foreign fishing was a national disaster and
directed the Puntland Maritime Police Force to take action to deter future foreign
fishers.58 The examples from 1997 and 2014 illustrate the role of illegal fishing in
causing conflict, as well. Fifty-seven percent of Somali FDEs involved vessels that
20
25
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
15
10
5
NUMBER OF FISHERIES DISPUTE EVENTS
FIGURE 1. THE OCCURRENCE OF FISHERIES DISPUTE EVENTS IN A GIVEN YEAR IN THE SOMALI
REGION FROM 1990 TO 2018. Three clusters of conflict are seen in 1998–2000, 2007–2010, and 2014–2015.
80%
FOREIGN
FISHING
motivated nearly
of Fisheries Dispute Events
Annex 150
Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 09
were fishing without a legal license. Somali fishing grounds
were tempting to foreign vessels because the productive
fishery existed under a governance structure with limited
capacity to enforce maritime laws (weak governance).
Many of the informal coast guard cooperatives in the
1990s grew from perceived vulnerability in the absence of
government.
Fisheries dispute events received a violence score based on the intensity of the event, ranging from 1 to 3. Level 1 means the
conflict remained verbal, and there was no physical action, such as when the mayor of Eyl arrived in Garowe in 2008 to criticize
the Puntland government for not responding to earlier concerns about commercial vessels fishing illegally in Somali waters.59 Level
2 signifies mid-level intensity—some action was taken (such as an arrest or abduction), but there was no physical harm done to
humans. One level 2 event in Somali waters was the seizure of two Egyptian vessels by the Somaliland Coast Guard on January
4, 2007.60 The boats had violated a previous agreement, failed to pay required fees, and had been in an area where fishing was
banned. Level 3 involves physical harm (injury, sexual assault, or fatalities). For example, the 2008 hijacking of the Omani fishing
vessel M/V Asmak 1 in which the engineer died in captivity was coded as a 3. Over half (54 percent) of fisheries dispute events
were assigned a violence score of 2 (see Figure 3). Approximately one-fourth (26 percent) of FDEs were verbal altercations (level
1), and 20 percent of events involved injury or death of an actor (level 3). Thirteen percent of FDEs involved at least one fatality
(Figure 4).
20
40
60
80
100
PERCENT OF EVENTS INCLUDING DRIVER
FOREIGN
FISHING
GROUNDS
LIMITS
ILLEGAL
FISHING
WEAK
GOVERNANCE
PIRACY
FISH STOCKS
ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE
MARGINALIZATION
OPERATIONAL
SCALES
POVERTY
GEAR
EFFICIENCY
INSURGENT
LOCATION
FOOD
INSECURITY
MARKETS
INCREASED
PRESSURE
FIGURE 2. CAUSES OF FISHERIES DISPUTE EVENTS (FDES) IN THE SOMALI REGION FROM
1990 TO 2018.
was a
factor in57%
UNLICENSED
FISHING
of Somali Fisheries
Dispute Events
LICENSE
GOVERNMENT
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10 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
FIGURES 3 & 4. THE LEVELS OF VIOLENCE ASSIGNED TO FDES (LEFT) AND TYPES OF VIOLENT
OCCURRENCES (RIGHT) IN FDES IN THE SOMALI REGION FROM 1990 TO 2018.
The most common actors in Somali fisheries conflicts were foreign fishers, who were involved in one-third of Somali FDEs. Other
frequent actors were security forces (police, military, resource security, and international security units), government (local, state,
and federal), and pirates, who participated in 17 percent, 16 percent, and 14 percent of FDEs, respectively (Figure 5). Figure 6
shows that foreign fishers were the most common actors in conflict in 2009, the height of piracy. Domestic fishers were noticeably
involved in the late 1990s and early 2000s, corresponding to the era when domestic and foreign fishers conflicted with each other.
The next significant conflict cluster, from 2007 to 2010, was between pirates and foreign fishers. In order to understand which
actors were commonly coming into conflict with each other, we categorized the pairs of actors in a dispute, also known as an
“actor dyad” (Actor A versus Actor B) (Figure 7). Notable in this figure is the conflict between foreign fishers and resource security
forces in the late 1990s. There were no formal resource security sectors, like marine park authorities or rangers, in the 1990s, so
the sections representing resource security from 1998 to 2001 in Figure 6 signify the informal groups of fishers who considered
themselves maritime coast guards in the absence of official government infrastructure. Figure 7 also reflects the anarchic state
that existed in the Somali region for over a decade. Federal government actors did not get involved in fisheries conflict until 2007.
FIGURE 5. TYPES OF ACTORS PARTICIPATING IN FISHERIES DISPUTE EVENTS IN THE SOMALI REGION.a
a Rebel actors include those affiliated with organized opposition groups.
VIOLENCE SCORE 1
26%
VIOLENCE SCORE 2
54%
VIOLENCE SCORE 3
20%
Physical harm
Verbal, no action
Action taken, but no physical harm
PERCENT OF EVENTS
10
20
30
PERCENT OF TOTAL EVENTS
FATALITIES INJURIES SEXUAL ARRESTS ABDUCTIONS
ASSAULT
FOREIGN
FISHERS
31%
SECURITY
FORCES
17%
GOVERNMENT
16%
PIRATES
14%
DOMESTIC
FISHERS
10%
OTHER
8%
REBELS
4%
FDE ACTOR
GROUPS
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Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 11
FIGURE 6. SOMALI FISHERIES DISPUTE EVENT ACTOR PARTICIPATION BY YEAR, 1990–2018.
Because there can be more than one actor dyad in each event, this figure reflects difference total annual events compared to
Figure 1 and Figure 7.
0 10
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
20 30 40 50 60
Domestic Fishers Regional Government International Government Police Pirates Other
Foreign Fishers Local Government Federal Government Military Resource Security Rebels Fishing Village
International Security
NUMBER OF ACTOR-EVENTS
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12 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
FIGURE 7. THE PAIRS IN CONFLICT (ACTOR DYADS) IN OUR FISHERIES DISPUTE EVENTS IN THE
SOMALI REGION, 1990–2018.
Because there can be more than one actor dyad in each event, this figure reflects difference
total annual events compared to Figure 1 and Figure 6.
Fisheries conflict over the whole period was most intense in Puntland, although all areas of the coast showed periods of high
intensity (Figure 8). Awdal and Jubbada Hoose, the administrative regions on the borders with Djibouti and Kenya, respectively,
have higher conflict intensity than the other regions in their states. The Federal Republic of Somalia has disputed maritime borders
with both neighboring nations. Individual fisheries dispute events (blue dots) on the map cluster around major fishing towns, such
as Bosaso, Eyl, Hobyo, Mogadishu, and Kismayo. We also investigated the breakdown of conflict by federal member state, seen in
Figure 9, to learn if there were any strong relationships between actors, drivers, and locations. Puntland was the most common
location for conflict in each FDE cluster. Puntland has the most productive fishing grounds and is where piracy was most prevalent.
Events that occurred in unknown locations were common during the height of piracy (the second cluster). Most of these events
were hijackings of fishing vessels that received limited media coverage, so details were sparse. Foreign warships became much
more prevalent in 2010, driving conflict in the central regions (Figure 9). These warships were stationed there to help disrupt
piracy and escort foreign aid vessels to the Mogadishu port, but many reports during this time cited ongoing harassment directed
toward domestic fishers operating in the same waters as the warships (see Box 5).
NUMBER OF ACTOR-EVENTS
25
35
15
5
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Other
Foreign Fishers vs. Pirates
Foreign Fishers vs. Government
Government vs. Government
Foreign Fishers vs. Military
Foreign Fishers vs. Domestic Fishers
Foreign Fishers vs.
Resource Security
Annex 150
Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 13
1
2
3
0.00 – 0.00
0.00 – 2.39
2.39 – 2.47
2.47 – 2.56
2.56 – 2.80
FISHERIES DISPUTE
EVENT VIOLENCE
AVERAGE FISHERIES
CONFLICT INTENSITY
FIGURE 8. THE LOCATIONS OF FISHERIES CONFLICT IN THE SOMALI REGION FROM 1990 TO 2018.
FDE violence captures specific conflict events. Regions are color coded by average fisheries conflict intensity on a scale of 1 to
3 over the 28 years we investigated: 1 signifies an inconvenience for fishing communities, 2 signifies a major problem for the
communities, and 3 is assigned when fishers are afraid to fish.
Annex 150
14 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
20
25
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
15
10
5
NUMBER OF EVENTS
Puntland
Unknown
Central
Jubaland
Somaliland
Southwest
FIGURE 9. THE FREQUENCY OF SOMALI FISHERIES DISPUTE EVENTS BY STATE, FROM 1990 TO 2018.
The administrative regions composing each state are as follows: Puntland, Central, Jubaland, Somaliland, and Southwest.
Events were assigned to the regions on the modern map, regardless of dates of declared statehood - which ranged from 1991
to 2016. There were no fisheries conflict events found in the inland regions.
BOX 4. PRIVATE CONTRACTED ARMED SECURITY PERSONNEL
In response to hijackings and the kidnap-for-ransom method in Somali waters, commercial vessels began employing private
contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) in 2010 to protect themselves during transit through the region. Before PCASP, the
primary methods for combating piracy were naval operations and adherence to the suggested planning and operational measures
for ship operators and masters as outlined in the shipping industry’s Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia
Based Piracy, Version 461 (these include ship protection measures such as installing barbed wire, water cannons, and other antiboarding
devices on vessels).
These two solutions provided moderate success, but the problem of piracy continued. As a result, flag states began allowing the
use of professionally trained private security aboard commercial vessels transiting through the waters around the Horn of Africa
and in the Western Indian Ocean. The first private security teams were made up of qualified protection personnel from British and
American contractors. These highly effective teams became an integral factor in deterring piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian
Ocean. Reports like this one from March 2010 became frequent: “Armed private guards aboard two Spanish tuna trawlers, the
Taraska and Ortube Barria, repelled a pirate attack approximately 100 NM southwest of the Seychelles. There was an exchange of
gunfire, but no one was hurt and there was no damage.”62 However, this had repercussions for Somalis: fishers have feared being
mistaken for pirates by freelance contractors since PCASP teams first arrived in their waters.
As targeted pirate attacks decreased, boat owners placed less value on their armed guards’ security training, and the PCASP
labor pool expanded to include more inexperienced, thus cheaper, guards for hire. Though pirate attacks became less frequent,
the regular use of PCASP became accepted practice by most vessels navigating high-risk waters. Today, fishing vessels interested
in licensing opportunities in Somali, Nigerian, and Philippine waters are unwilling to sign fishing agreements without permission
for private security. The expanded scope for PCASP combined with the decline in training increases the risk that interactions with
fishers become dangerous for Somalis.
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Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 15
BOX 5. HARASSMENT BY INTERNATIONAL WARSHIPS
Pirates often disguised themselves as fishing crews while operating at sea (see Box 5), leading to cases of mistaken identities
against real fishing vessels. Following the arrival of the international naval coalition in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean,
Somali and Yemeni fishers began reporting harassment from warships. During 2007-2011, this problem was acute.
Fishers in Lower Jubba (the southern region) said American and French ships chased them and tore their nets.63
Fishing families left coastal areas for fear of being caught between authorities and “those aiding pirates.” Local
fishers stopped taking their boats on the water because they were afraid of being targeted by warships.64
Somali and Yemeni fishers were afraid to fish far from the coast because marine forces arrested them and accused
them of piracy.65
Approximately 75 miles off the coast of Yemen, an Indian naval vessel approached a Yemeni fishing vessel and
forced all fishers to hand over their weapons and jump into the sea. Though the fishers said they did not have any
weapons, they were forced to tread water for two hours before they could climb back on board. All of their fish
spoiled.66
The French Navy stopped and questioned three fishing boats off the coast of Bari (Puntland). The French forces
opened fire on the fishers, killing two men and injuring four.67
Foreign navy warships were accused of paralyzing the coastal fishing sector and causing panic among residents.68
Fishers in Puntland complained of harassment by foreign warships.69
The Al Shabaab Lower Shabelle governor, Sheikh Muhammed Adballah, issued a warning to warships in Lower
Shabelle (the state south of Mogadishu) waters that a special unit of fighters was mobilized to fire on warplanes
and ships that harass local fishers.70
A Russian helicopter fired at Yemeni fishers in seven boats near Qusay’ir Village (Yemen) and forced them to board
the Russian destroyer RFN Marshal Shaposhnikov. The fishers were robbed of their boats, money, identification,
GPS units, and clothes and sent back to shore on a single boat.71
Members of an Indian Navy warship stopped a crew of 17 Yemeni fishers, boarded their vessel, beat 11 men, and
forced 2 men to jump into shark-infested waters.72
Yemeni fishers held a sit-in demonstration demanding the countries that destroyed their boats pay them
restitution. They argued warship abuse cost them YER 30 million in damages from searches and seizures and the
forces in the region are often as dangerous as the pirates themselves.73
AMISOM (African Union’s Mission in Somalia) troops blocked fishers in Banaadir (Mogadishu) from going into the
high seas by chasing and shooting at them. At least one local fisher was killed.74
Fishers in Bari Region (Puntland) said the foreign warships sometimes deliberately ran over their fishing nets,
aimed hot water at them, and sometimes arrested them over suspicions of piracy.75
AMISOM troops denied fishers permission to fish along Mogadishu’s coast.76
Fishers in Kismayo (the southern region) said that warships destroyed a number of their fishing nets and forced
them not to fish.77
NATO forces killed at least three Somali fishers and injured three others in an airstrike in Hobyo (the central
region). The fishers complained that warplanes taking off from foreign ships often target their fishing boats.78
Residents from Kudha and Raskamboni (the southern region) stopped fishing in areas near Kismayo out of fear and
concern for their safety. Kenyan planes and other warships sunk a number of fishing boats.79
Kenyan warships killed up to 20 Kismayo fishers.80
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
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16 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
V. CONCLUSIONS
In the Somali region, fisheries conflict has emerged from unmanaged competition for access to fish stocks. While these events are
reported more frequently in later years of our study (e.g., after 2005), there is not a clear increase in conflict events. Rather, fisheries
conflict has clustered, in time, around distinct periods of foreign fishing and has been exacerbated by institutional instability. First,
foreign fishing in the late 1990s resulted in conflict with domestic fishing vessels and a response by Somali fishers. Second, pirate
attacks against foreign fishing vessels occurred during the mid-2000s, during the height of piracy, and resulted in the deployment
of international warships. Third, in the past few years, conflict between domestic fishers and foreign vessels has resumed, and the
government has responded with institutional reforms to reduce illegal fishing. The presence of foreign vessels, illegal fishing, and
unclear maritime boundaries are the three primary causes of conflict in the Somali region. But in contrast to the primary drivers
of fisheries conflict in Tanzania,81 this research shows that Somali fisheries conflict is aggravated more by institutional instability
than by the health of fish stocks. And despite the attention from the media, piracy contributed to conflict less often than weak
governance institutions over the past three decades.
Historically, weak fisheries governance in the Somali region has manifested as an absence of fisheries laws and regulations, poor
data collection, low stakeholder participation, lack of fisheries infrastructure, and shortage of trained personnel.82 Our findings
show this institutional instability, especially during the 1990s and 2000s, placed subsistence fishers in defensive positions without
a trusted system of protections for them or the resource on which they depend. Decades of limited governance and accountability
have left Somali fishing communities hesitant to rely on formal mechanisms for management. But community trust can be built
when management is effective, when the distribution of benefits and sacrifices is fair, when the judicial process is efficient, and
when authorities can actively enforce laws and regulations.83 While significant progress has been made (see below), fishing
communities can be better integrated into this progress.
In Somali waters, unclear or changing maritime boundaries, overlapping jurisdiction
of fisheries ministries (state versus federal), and decentralized authority among the
states have made it difficult for resource users to distinguish illegal from legal fishing.84
From the shore or from artisanal fishing boats, Somalis have been unable to tell if a
foreign vessel is properly licensed. Insufficient enforcement capacity (low surveillance,
regulatory compliance, probability of detection, and severity of penalties) has enabled
illicit foreign fishing in Somali waters.85 In the 1990s, there were 200 illegal foreign
vessels fishing along the Somali coastline, some of them using prohibited methods like
trawling, which destroys marine habitats.86 By 2005, there were approximately 700
illegal foreign vessels.87 The visibility of these vessels has contributed to mistrust and
anger at the presence of foreign vessels in Somali waters.
But fisheries governance in the Somali region has shown changes for the better, and continued progress toward effective management
and oversight can build a more stable and secure maritime and fishing environment. In the past five years, governance of Somali
waters has taken important steps. The formal declaration of EEZ boundaries in 2014—while disputed by neighboring countries—
The presence of foreign
vessels, illegal fishing,
and unclear maritime
boundaries are the
three primary causes
of conflict in the Somali
region.
1990s
Fisheries conflict has clustered
around distinct periods of foreign fishing
and has been exacerbated by institutional instability.
late 2000s 2010s
mid- late
Foreign vs
domestic fishers
Pirate attacks
led to international warships
deployment of
on foreign fishing vessels
Foreign vs
domestic fishers
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Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 17
signaled to foreign fleets that the Federal Republic of
Somalia is claiming domain over internationally recognized
boundaries. Also in 2014, the Somali government joined
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), taking on
the voluntary role for monitoring and reporting catch of
commercially important HMS in its waters. That same year,
the Federal Government of Somalia updated its national
fisheries law, outlining clearer laws for fishing by both
domestic and foreign fishing vessels.
More recently, the federal member states and the Federal
Government of Somalia have been cooperating on
mechanisms for collecting data and managing fisheries
resources. Efforts to train fisheries officers, collect and
analyze fisheries data, and work with local communities
on mechanisms of fisheries cooperative management have
attracted the attention of the international community. The
creation of a formal mechanism for issuing legal licenses to
foreign fishing boats—specifically, those longline and purse
seine vessels targeting HMS and in compliance with IOTC
mandates—can reduce confusion over what vessels are
fishing legally. It also facilitates data collection by requiring
logbook entries from licensed vessels. While licensing
does not alleviate concerns of local communities about
overfishing or competition with industrial vessels, this is an
important first step in creating functional maritime domain
awareness needed to reduce fisheries conflict in Somali
waters. Finally, partnerships between the government
and fishing communities are also growing through joint
workshops, the biannual Somalia Fisheries Forum, and new
initiatives on local data collection.
These growing partnerships are important for building trust in fishing communities. Compliance by fishers with laws and regulations
stems from trust in the governing body.88 Consequently, including fishers themselves in the management process encourages
effective compliance with laws governing domestic fishing. Cooperative management (also known as co-management) presents an
opportunity to build both management capacity and government legitimacy because it is a community-driven fisheries management
partnership between the government and resource users. Co-management provides an effective governance structure for conflict
resolution and community decision-making. While co-management does not regulate foreign fishing, partnership between
resource users and government can support information sharing and coordinated enforcement against illegal fishing. Fishers can
bring concerns regarding illegal fishing to government authorities, rather than taking matters into their own hands.
Once issues of weak governance are improved, fisheries conflict may still result from
declining fish stocks.89 The nets of illegal trawlers in Somali waters have entangled
turtles and dolphins and destroyed sensitive habitats. The lack of data collection
means the health of fish stocks in Somali waters is highly speculative. There are
anecdotal reports that fishers have faced declining yields, suggesting fish stocks are
declining. More research and data collection are needed to better understand and
address these risks. Additionally, the adverse effects of unbridled IUU fishing have
created both the perception and the reality of declining fish stocks.90 The perception
of decline in fish stocks generates frustration and concern about sustainability.
Lacking effective enforcement against IUU fishing, this also erodes trust in the
government. And a real decline in fish stocks has implications for resiliency of Somali
fishing communities. In 2017, for example, the town of Bendar Beyla, which had traditionally relied on livestock and fishing, had
to rely exclusively on the fishery due to a drought that increased food and water prices.91 If fish stocks decline, even in the face of
improved governance and a future with fewer illegal foreign vessels, fisheries conflict will remain a possibility.
A Somali fisher holding his catch. Partnerships between fishers and government
bodies can support information sharing and enforcement against illegal fishing.
Photo: Jean-Pierra Larroque, One Earth Future.
The Somali fisheries sector
would benefit from data
collection, community
input to management
systems, and strong
government support for
resource sustainability.
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18 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
Enhanced fisheries management measures can help prevent fisheries conflict and support institutional capacity in the Somali
region. In particular, the Somali fisheries sector would benefit from data collection, community input to management systems,
and strong government support for resource sustainability. In conflict and post-conflict zones like the Somali region, addressing
domestic instability takes priority over issues of long-term ecological sustainability. But once the security context stabilizes, the
Somali region will face threats to community resilience from overfishing and resource depletion, just like most other fishing
nations around the world. Recognizing this threat, the Somali region has the opportunity to prevent the kinds of fisheries conflict
driven by competition over finite marine resources by implementing cohesive, sustainable management practices before stocks
are overfished.
A fisher carries his catch ashore at the fish market in Bosaso.
Photo: ©FAO/Arete/Will Baxter.
Annex 150
Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 19
ENDNOTES
1 Ministry of Natural Resources, “A Review of the Somali Fisheries
Law (Law No. 23 of November 30, 1985), in Accordance
with Article 79, Paragraph (d) of the Federal Constitution of
Somalia” (Mogadishu, Somalia: Federal Republic of Somalia,
2014).
2 Abdi Latif Dahir, “China Will Start Fishing along Somalia’s
Coastline Just as Piracy Makes a Comeback,” Quartz Africa,
December 24, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1506419/somaliagives-
fishing-license-to-31-china-vessels/.
3 “Somalia: Piracy Top on Agenda in Maritime Meeting,” Africa
News, November 14, 2005.
4 Ali Musa Abdi, “Somali Pirates Free South Korean Fishing Boat
after Ransom Paid,” Agence France-Presse, July 29, 2006.
5 Aaron S. Arky, “Trading Nets for Guns: The Impact of Illegal
Fishing on Piracy in Somalia” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA, 2010).
6 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Debunking the Piracy Myth: How Illegal
Fishing Really Interacts with Piracy in East Africa,” RUSI Journal
156, no. 6 (2011): 26–31.
7 “Kenya Charges US-Seized Somali Ship Attackers with Piracy,”
Agence France-Presse, February 3, 2006.
8 “Somalia: Livelihoods—and Lives—at Risk in Puntland,” Africa
News, August 24, 2009.
9 Abdurrahman Warsameh, “Fishing Is a Livelihood for Many in
Somalia’s Capital,” Xinhua News Agency, April 7, 2011.
10 African Development Solutions, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated
(IUU) Fishing in the Territorial Waters of Somalia (Nairobi,
Kenya, 2015).
11 “As Piracy Is Contained, Somali Fishermen Again Compete with
Illegal Vessels in Their Waters,” ABC Transcripts (Australia),
August 15, 2016.
12 “Somali Women Fight the Drought by Fishing in the Sea as Famine,
Cholera Loom,” EFE Newswire, April 21, 2017.
13 Richard B. Pollnac, Kifle W. Hagos, Brian R. Crawford, Abdi
Mohamed Dahir, Hussein Haji Yusuf, and Abdirashid Mohamed
Hussein, “Chaos, Conflict and Change: The Reemergence and
Evolution of Fishery Governance in the Small Scale Fisheries of
Somalia,” Ocean and Coastal Management 162 (2017): 1–9.
14 U. Rashid Sumaila and Mahamudu Bawumia, “Fisheries, Ecosystem
Justice and Piracy: A Case Study of Somalia,” Fisheries
Research 157 (2014): 154–163.
15 Laura Angela Bagnetto, “Somalia: Chinese Deal Angers Fishing
Communities, Sparks Concerns over Sovereignty and Piracy,”
RFI, February 8, 2019, http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20190207-Somalia-
Chinese-deal-angers-fishing-communities-sparks-concerns-
over-sovereignty-and.
16 Mary Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in a
Shattered State (London: Zed, 2012), 9.
17 Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, “Federal Republic
of Somalia,” https://mfmr.gov.so/en/.
18 “Marine Regions,” http://www.marineregions.org/.
19 World Bank, “Land Area (Sq. Km),” https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/AG.LND.TOTL.K2.
20 Sarah M. Glaser, Paige M. Roberts, Robert H. Mazurek, Kaija
J. Hurlburt, and Liza Kane-Hartnett, Securing Somali Fisheries
(Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future Foundation, 2015).
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 “Somalia Fishguard in the Hot Seat,” Indian Ocean Newsletter,
April 10, 2015.
25 “As Piracy Is Contained, Somali Fishermen Again Compete with
Illegal Vessels in Their Waters,” ABC Transcripts (Australia),
August 15, 2016.
26 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture, “Global Capture Production,”
http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-capture-production/
en (accessed September 5, 2019).
27 “INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,” PAP Newswire, March 31, 2006.
28 “U.S. Navy, Suspected Pirates Clash,” CNN.com, March 18,
2006.
29 “Yemenis Take Big Risks Fishing in Waters,” Africa News, September
19, 2007.
30 “Govt. Demands Return of Six Ships,” Africa News, July 3, 2007.
31 “Yemenis Take Big Risks Fishing in Waters.”
32 “Puntland Releases Yemeni Fishermen,” Africa News, May 10,
2007.
33 Ahmed Al-Haj, “Big Mistake: Pirates Caught after Attacking German
Naval Ship off Somalia,” Canadian Press, March 30, 2009.
34 “French Navy Prevents Pirate Attack off Somali Coast,” Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, January 2, 2009.
35 Al-Haj, “Big Mistake.”
36 Alyssa Rallis, “Yemen Lost $350US Mil. to Piracy, Says Report,”
IHS Global Insight, July 17, 2009.
37 “Piracy Threatens Fishermen in Yemen,” Colombo Times, November
28, 2009.
38 “Eighty-One Yemenis Deported from Northwest Somalia for
Illegal Fishing,” Xinhua News Agency, February 6, 2009.
39 Laura Kasinof, “Yemen’s Fishermen Caught between Somali
Pirates and Pirate Hunters,” Christian Science Monitor, June 17,
2009, 6.
40 “Somali Fishermen in Danger Due to Illegal Fishing,” BBC Monitoring
Africa, January 27, 2010.
41 “Pirates Threaten Lives and Livelihoods of Yemeni Fishermen,”
Thai News Service, March 1, 2010.
42 Sarah M. Glaser, Colleen Devlin, Joshua E. Lambert, Ciera Villegas,
and Natasia Poinsatte, Fish Wars: The Causes and Consequences
of Fisheries Conflict in Tanzania (Broomfield, CO: One
Earth Future Foundation, 2018).
43 Hansen, “Debunking the Piracy Myth.”
44 Matthew Fisher, “Warships Deter Modern-Day Pirates: If the
Coast of Somalia Is the Wild West, Then the Canadian Navy Is
Acting as Travelling Sheriff,” Edmonton Journal (Alberta), July
14, 2008, A3.
Annex 150
20 | Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters
45 “Livelihoods—and Lives—at Risk in Puntland,” Africa News,
August 24, 2009.
46 Neil Mackay, “SOS as Pirate Motherships Take to the High Seas
Seeking Cargo and Hostages; Royal Navy Called in as Death Toll
and Number of Attacks by Somali Brigands Reach New Highs,”
Sunday Herald (Glasgow), November 13, 2005, 13.
47 Arky, “Trading Nets for Guns.”
48 “Tension in Coastal Town after Pirate Clashes, 1 Killed,” Africa
News, February 14, 2008.
49 “Hijacked French Yacht Did Not Anchor in Eyl—Mayor,” Africa
News, April 7, 2008.
50 Ibid.
51 “Residents and Sandbank Stymie Pirates’ Plan,” Africa News,
November 19, 2009.
52 Mustafa Haji Abdinur, “Defiant Somali Pirates Await EU Navy
Force,” Agence France-Presse, December 6, 2008.
53 “Tanzania Can Now Prosecute Piracy Cases—Minister,” BBC
Monitoring Africa, January 4, 2014.
54 “Fears Loom over Return of Piracy Northeastern Somalia,” BBC
Monitoring Africa, October 14, 2015.
55 Catrina Stewart, “Somalia Threatened by Illegal Fishermen
after West Chases Away Pirates; Flotillas from Yemen, Iran and
South Korea Are Breaching International Maritime Law and
Plundering the Country’s Rich Fishing Grounds,” The Observer
(London), November 4, 2015.
56 Hansen, “Debunking the Piracy Myth.”
57 “Clashes between Somali Fisherman, Foreign Vessels,” Xinhua
News Agency, October 7, 1997.
58 “Puntland Leader Speaks Out on Illegal Fishing, Calls as ‘National
Disaster,’” Africa News, June 2, 2014.
59 “Hijacked French Yacht Did Not Anchor in Eyl—Mayor,” Africa
News, April 7, 2008.
60 “Somaliland: Egyptian Vessels Seized for Illegal Fishing,” BBC
Monitoring Africa, January 5, 2007.
61 Available at https://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
bmp4-low-res_sept_5_20111.pdf.
62 “Spanish Fishing Boats Repel Pirate Attack: Owners,” Agence
France-Presse, March 19, 2010, https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy.
net.ucf.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:
7Y24-NGM0-Y95B-G2Y1-00000-00&context=1516831.
63 “U.S. Warships Threaten the Lives of Fishermen,” Africa News,
January 29, 2007.
64 “Tension in Coastal Town after Pirate Clashes, 1 Killed,” Africa
News, February 14, 2008.
65 “Somalia Piracy Began in Response to Illegal Fishing and Toxic
Dumping by Western Ships off Somali,” Democracy Now!, April
14, 2009.
66 Kasinof, “Yemen’s Fishermen Caught between Somali Pirates
and Pirate Hunters.”
67 “High Seas Shootout Kills Two off Somalia,” Agence
France-Presse, November 1, 2009.
68 “Al-Shabab Mobilizes Fighters to Attack Foreign Ships from
Somalia Coast,” BBC Monitoring Africa, April 1, 2010.
69 “Somalia: Fishermen from Puntland Conclude Training in Libya,”
BBC Monitoring Africa, January 3, 2010.
70 “Somalia’s Al-Shabab Warns Foreign Warships against “Terrorizing”
Residents,” BBC Monitoring Africa, April 1, 2010.
71 “Anti-Piracy Forces off Yemen Playing Pirates with Fishermen,”
Arab News, May 6, 2010.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 “Fishermen in Mogadishu Complain of Harassment by AU
Troops,” BBC Monitoring Africa, July 5, 2010.
75 “Fishermen in North Eastern Somalia Complain of Harassment
by Foreign Warships,” BBC Monitoring Africa, December 21,
2010.
76 “Somalia: Fishermen Complain about Harassment by Amisom
Soldiers,” BBC Monitoring Africa, January 21, 2011.
77 “Somali Fishermen Accuse Foreign Naval Forces of Harassment,”
BBC Monitoring Africa, January 30, 2011.
78 “Somali Fishermen Complain of Harassment by International
Anti-Piracy Force,” BBC Monitoring Africa, April 23, 2011.
79 “Somali Fishing Boats Reportedly Being Sunk by Kenyan Forces,”
BBC Monitoring Africa, November 16, 2011.
80 “Somalia’s Al-Shabab Claims Killing Kenyan Navy in Attack on
Warships,” BBC Monitoring Africa, November 21, 2011.
81 Glaser et al., Fish Wars: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries
Conflict in Tanzania .
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 African Development Solutions, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated
(IUU) Fishing in the Territorial Waters of Somalia, 7.
85 Pollnac et al., “Chaos, Conflict and Change.”
86 Judith Achieng, “Environment-Somalia: Local Fishermen Battle
Foreign Trawlers,” Interpress Service, March 26, 1999.
87 “Seafarers Group Accuses EU Vessels of Illegal Fishing in Somali
Waters,” Xinhua News Agency, August 11, 2007.
88 Rachel Turner, Jane Addison, Adrian Arias, Brock J. Bergseth,
Nadine A. Marshall, Tiffany H. Morrison, and Renae C. Tobin,
“Trust, Confidence, and Equity Affect the Legitimacy of Natural
Resource Governance,” Ecology and Society 21, no. 3 (2016):
18.
89 Jessica Spijkers, Gerald Singh, Robert Blasiak, Tiffany H. Morrison,
Philippe Le Billon, and Henrik Österblom. “Global patterns
of fisheries conflict: Forty years of data,” Global Environmental
Change 57 (2019): 101921.; Glaser et al., Securing Somali Fisheries.
90 Glaser et al., Securing Somali Fisheries.
91 “Somali Women Fight the Drought by Fishing in the Sea as Famine,
Cholera Loom,” EFE Newswire, April 21, 2017.
Annex 150
Rough Seas: The Causes and Consequences of Fisheries Conflict in Somali Waters | 21
21 | Why Govern? The Strategic, Functional, and normative Logics of Global Governance
ONE EARTH FUTURE
303.533.1715
SECURE FISHERIES
CONTACT US
One Earth Future (OEF) is a self-funded, private operating foundation seeking to create a more peaceful world through
collaborative, data-driven initiatives. OEF focuses on enhancing maritime cooperation, creating sustainable jobs in fragile
economies, and research which actively contributes to thought leadership on global issues. As an operating foundation, OEF
provides strategic, financial, and administrative support allowing its programs to focus deeply on complex problems and to
create constructive alternatives to violent conflict.
o n e e a r t h f u t u r e . o r g
s e c u r e f i s h e r i e s . o r g
Secure Fisheries is a program of One Earth Future. Secure Fisheries works with local, regional, and international stakeholders
to strengthen fisheries governance, combat illegal fishing, and promote sustainability in fragile and post-conflict regions as
a pathway towards greater peace and stability.
[email protected] 525 Z ang St . Br oomf ield, C O 80021
Annex 150
Annex 151
“Causes of maritime piracy in Somalia waters”, Marine Insight, 20 May 2018
HOME » MARITIME PIRACY » CAUSES OF MARITIME PIRACY IN SOMALIA WATERS
Causes of Maritime Piracy in Somalia
Waters
By Raunek | In: Maritime Piracy | Last Updated on October 13, 2019
Somalis over the years have lived under the most trying circumstances imaginable, facing acute poverty,
lawlessness and anarchy. Of course, there have been a lucky few who had defected from their homeland
and escaped the rigors of the civil war.
However, so far, no one has paid any heed or notice to what has transpired over the years at Somalia
except for a few journalists and international aid workers. Hence, what exactly is the root cause of
radicalism in Somalia? There has always been a correlation between poverty, the vicious cycle of
violence and anarchy, and the same reasons make Somalia water as one of the most badly affected
maritime piracy areas.
Finding the Root Cause
The inhabitants of Somalia are mostly Sunni Muslims. Those who did not defect to other lands had to
endure destitution, prolonged drought, and desertiÞcation and soil erosion. Many Somalis are nomads
who eek out their meager livelihood from their ßocks, but natural disasters have wiped out humongous
Winter Nebulus
-63%
-74%
-71%
lawlessness and anarchy. Of course, there have been a lucky few who had defected from their homeland
and escaped the rigors of the civil war.
However, so far, no one has paid any heed or notice to what has transpired over the years at Somalia
except for a few journalists and international aid workers. Hence, what exactly is the root cause of
radicalism in Somalia? There has always been a correlation between poverty, the vicious cycle of
violence and anarchy, and the same reasons make Somalia water as one of the most badly affected
maritime piracy areas.
Finding the Root Cause
The inhabitants of Somalia are mostly Sunni Muslims. Those who did not defect to other lands had to
endure destitution, prolonged drought, and desertiÞcation and soil erosion. Many Somalis are nomads
who eek out their meager livelihood from their ßocks, but natural disasters have wiped out humongous
portions of their livestock, leaving them stranded with no alternative income to support their families. A
Winter Nebulus
-74%
-71%
tiny percentage of the population who are farmers had to witness the decrease of their yield of crops due
to soil erosion, lack of fertilizers and instability.
Annex 151
Image Credits: nautilusint.org
The income gap between the minority elite and the poor have widened tremendously. In Somalia, they
have the freest liberated open market economy in the world, with no central bank to control money
supply, set interest rates or control inßation. conomic policies are balanced by demand and supply.
hose who have ideas and resources galore are thriving entrepreneurs minting ta free proÞts, while the
majority can hardly make both ends meet. The remittance from the Somali Dias pore Community and aid
from international humanitarian organizations keep the economy going.
Somali Sea Coast and the Business of Piracy
Somalia has the longest coast in Africa but Somalis have never exploited the potential of their seas for
various reasons. hose who had ventured out to sea were out muscled by illegal foreign Þshing trawlers
and they depleted the stock of Þsh in these territorial waters and polluted it by dumping nuclear and toic
wastes. dversity prompted the Somalis to test new ways of making money and former Þshermen oined
hands with the militia and unemployed youth to hijack vessels and demand ransom. This was the start of
piracy in Somalia.
These pirates of Somalia transformed this into a sophisticated business venture that makes use of
modern technology and global positioning devices to track their next prey. The piracy in Somalia is a
major threat to the busiest shipping lines in the world but even though super powers have joined hands to
put an end to this piracy, it is a daunting task since the territorial waters are too huge to police. It is an
indicator of the limitation of conventional war machine against the threats of this century.
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IrreAdsponsible Government, Unattended People, and Eradicating Piracy
Somalia has not had an effective central government for almost two decades now. The weak government
is battling with insurgency to secure the capital and is preoccupied with internal wars and foreign lands
waging a proxy war. The pirates in Somalia handle the most effective institutions in the country. They
reinvest the ransom money procured from hijacking and piracy to plan out their next move. They
effectively out muscle the regional government and offer a glimmer of hope to the unemployed youth of
Somalia by paying them handsomely for aiding them in piracy. Piracy in Somalia is expected to grow
drastically in the years to come.
Image Credits: ukchamberofshipping.com
Annex 151
waging a proxy war. The pirates in Somalia handle the most effective institutions in the country. They
reinvest the ransom money procured from hijacking and piracy to plan out their next move. They
effectively out muscle the regional government and offer a glimmer of hope to the unemployed youth of
Somalia by paying them handsomely for aiding them in piracy. Piracy in Somalia is expected to grow
drastically in the years to come.
Image Credits: ukchamberofshipping.com
he international community has a huge moral responsibility to Þnd a lasting solution to the piracy in
Somalia. Steps should be taken to restore authority, credibility of the central government and think of
ways to create alternative employment for the youngsters through non government organizations, UN
agencies, regional and local administration. The pirates of Somalia can be retrained, registered and
given employment as coast guards to protect Somalia territorial waters from illegal foreign Þshing
trawlers. thers can be provided with Þshing euipment and given preferential market access where they
can sell their catch. This will help in boosting the income and prosperity of the local economy.
If the root cause of this piracy is not tackled very soon, Somalia will become a country of pirates and a
radical state. Radicalism cannot be rooted out by military force but the hearts and minds of the
youngsters should be won by educating them, providing them a source of income and making them a
part of the main stream society.
Tags:
About Raunek
Raunek Kantharia is a marine engineer turned maritime writer and professional
blogger. After a brief stint at the sea, he founded Marine Insight in 2010. Apart from
managing Marine Insight, he also writes for a number of maritime magazines and websites.
Annex 151
Annex 152
“Somali fishermen struggle to compete with foreign vessels”, VOA News, 20 May 2018
Africa
Somali Fishermen Struggle to
Compete with Foreign
Vessels
By Jason Patinkin
May 20, 2018 05:30 AM
Each morning, fishermen in the northern Somali port city of Bosaso pull in their
catch of tuna, marlin, and more.
The waters off northern Somalia are some of the richest in Africa. As
businessmen and women on the beach haggle over the shining piles of fresh fish,
the daily catch looks like a rich haul.
But all is not well here for local fishermen. Many of them complain about larger,
foreign boats that enter Somali waters, outfishing the locals.
WATCH: Somali Fishermen Struggle to Compete with Foreign Vessels
Annex 152
“Now there is illegal fishing, fish stealing, and so on," explains boat captain
Mohammed Elias Abdiqadir. He said such foreign fishing boats come from Iran,
while others in Bosaso accused Yemenis of fishing in Somali waters.
"We don’t have a powerful government who can stop these illegal fishermen who
are creating problems," said Abdiqadir.
Foreign boats in Somali waters have been a problem for years. Some of them
operate with no license at all. Others buy permits from Somali authorities,
though at times under questionable circumstances.
Bossaso port, the economic hub of northern Somalia, in late March 2018. (J.
Patinkin/VOA)
From protectors to pirates
A decade ago, Somali fishermen took up arms against the foreign boats, hoping
to retake their waters from outsiders, but some of the Somali vigilantes then
became pirates, hijacking commercial vessels plying the waters off the Horn of
Africa.
At one point, pirate gangs were seizing more than 40 vessels per year and
holding hundreds of sailors hostage for ransom.
Annex 152
An international naval effort has mostly stamped out the pirate menace, and
Somalia has started to build fledgling local navies, including the Puntland
Maritime Police Force, which patrols the waters off Bosaso.
But neither has managed to rid the area of foreign boats.
Abdiqani says part of the problem is that the foreign vessels are larger and have
better technology than the local crafts, which are mostly small, fiberglass skiffs.
“They fish in the deep ocean, and they have long nets and better tools than us,"
he said.
Until the foreign boats are completely gone, many experts say the threat of a
return of piracy will remain, as out-of-work young men seek economic
opportunities in criminality.
Last year, for instance, pirates launched a string of attacks on commercial
vessels off Puntland's long coastline.
Puntland Maritime Police Force on patrol off the coast of Bossaso in northern
Somalia in late March, 2018. The PMPF has been tasked with fighting piracy,
illegal fishing, and other criminal activity. (J. Patinkin/VOA)
?Somalia's fledgling fish industry
But the challenges for Somalia's fishing industry do not only lie offshore.
Fishermen use old fishing technology. Bosaso's port needs more modern
facilities to prepare fish in a sanitary environment to export. And there's yet to
be a strong supply chain for exporting Somali fish abroad.
Annex 152
But a new program by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
hopes to give these parts of Somalia's fledgling fishing industry a boost.
On the outskirts of Bosaso, women have been trained to process fish meat into a
dried fish product to be sold in inland Somalia.
The women, dressed in bright yellow aprons, work on sanitary tables, where
they butcher fresh fish steaks and slice them into fine strips to dry.
Despite attracting flies, the bright sun naturally cures and disinfects the flesh.
All the fish the women process have been caught by local youth, who themselves
were trained by the FAO in deep-sea fishing techniques, and given larger, betterequipped
boats that can reach the most profitable species.
The women receive payment, and also get to take home fresh fish each day to
feed their families. They also can stay near home to work, instead of searching
for employment in the center of Bosaso town.
Women slice fresh fish in thin strips to dry for eventual sale as part of a Food and
Agriculture Organization program to boost Somalia's fishing industry, in late
March 2018. (J. Patinkin/VOA)
“This job works for me fine, because my home is here," explains Daawo Sheikh
Mahamoud, who recently started working at the fish processing station. "Before,
my kids were neglected and neighbors used to care for them for me, but now I
can take care of them while doing the work in the morning."
Annex 152
Michael Savins, an Australian fisheries and boatbuilding expert who designed the
program, says it employs more than 100 people, including fishermen at sea and
processors on land. He hopes the number will increase to 500 by the end of this
year.
The idea, he explains, is to employ local Somalis throughout the entire value
chain, and eventually start selling Somali fish internationally.
"There would be nothing better than the youth from the community catching the
fish with good handling and good quality and so forth on board, and landing
those fish back into their community for processing," Savins explained. "Then
we'd have a really good benefit, a real holistic approach, for each community, self
sustained you might say, with capture, processing, and marketing."
While Somalia struggles to take control of its waters, programs like this one
could help keep Somali youth from going back to piracy.
View full gallery
RELATED STORIES
Africa
Somali Forces Shoot and Kill
Iranian Sailor in Indian Ocean
Somali regional officials say the Iranian captain
of a fishing boat was killed and another sailor
was injured after security forces opened fire
during an operation in the Indian Ocean.
Officials said the shooting occurred after
Puntland Maritime Police Forces spotted two
Annex 152
Annex 153
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Annex 154
“Somali perspectives on piracy and illegal fishing”, Oceans Beyond Piracy,
available at: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/publications/somali-perspectives-piracyand-
illegal-fishing (last accessed: 21 December 2020)
Map of Somalia. Tim Schommer / One Earth Future Foundation
Somali Perspectives on Piracy and Illegal Fishing
Discussions of Somali piracy typically have focused on how piracy has affected the international community, but have rarely incorporated the local
perspective. OBP conducted a series of interviews[1] along the Somali coast in order to give a voice to residents' attitudes towards piracy, and bring to light
local perceptions of the current situation, including in traditional piracy hotspots.
Summary
Essential findings from interviews with Somalis living near the coast were as
follows:
Lack of economic opportunity was identified as the principal driver of pirate
recruitment
Illegal fishing by foreign vessels was characterized as the fundamental grievance
that sparked piracy and provides ongoing justification for it
Locals resent the international navies, believing they are in Somali waters
specifically to protect illegal foreign fishing
Attitudes towards naval forces are much more positive in areas where they have
established direct, cooperative relationships with coastal communities
There is widespread agreement that without changes to the underlying
conditions, piracy will return
Background
The rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia captured the world's attention in 2010. Years later, the origins, drivers, current threat and future outlook of Somali
piracy remain disputed. Furthermore, the discussion has generally not included the perspective of Somalis themselves. This is an important gap: not only
do locals have a unique vantage point to assess the situation, no one else can speak with authority to the motivations of those who turned pirate, or might
do so someday.
In order to begin filling this gap, OBP and its partners surveyed coastal residents. Most interviews were conducted by an OBP partner in the state of
Galmudug—the historical center of Somali piracy, the area from which most remaining pirate groups deploy, and where piracy hostages are still held.
Search
Annex 154
Pirates board the MV Iceberg in 2010. Photo: United Nations Office of Drugs and
Crime.
A Somali fishing shop. Photo: Jean-Pierre Larroque / One Earth Future Foundation.
Participants were drawn from community leaders, women's groups, government, youth groups, business associations, and local fishers.
Current State of Piracy
"I don't think pirates can re-organize themselves for the time being to
capture ships".
Maryan, Community Chairlady
All those interviewed agree that pirate activity has greatly diminished since its
peak. Pirate groups have been displaced from many communities and forced
into small patches of territory, for which the Somalis interviewed credit
international navies and community pressure. Most, though not all, respondents
feel that pirates are currently incapable of hijacking and holding hostage
commercial vessels.
Drivers
Some questions can be meaningfully answered only from a local perspective.
What are the drivers of piracy? Why do youths become pirates?
Without exception, every respondent specifically cited one or more of the
following: unemployment, lack of education, poverty, and hunger. Notably, all
reasons given were exclusively economic in nature; ideological, nationalistic, or clan-based concerns were never mentioned. According to those
interviewed, piracy is strictly a response to a lack of economic opportunity.
Illegal Fishing
One additional, overriding driver of piracy was pointed to by every single
respondent, and generally characterized as the fundamental grievance: illegal
fishing[2]. The perceived impact of illegal fishing can hardly be overstated, and
the topic dominated responses in a large majority of interviews.
"Illegal fishing and extreme poverty are the main factors that made
fishermen and youths get involved in piracy as an alternative way of
getting their daily bread."
Nor, Fisher
According to coastal residents, extensive illegal fishing inflicts damage in several
ways. Most obviously, "foreign trawlers"[3] directly compete for fish with local
communities, including those where fishing is the traditional, and only, livelihood.
Depleted stocks may deny locals not only scarce income, but food.
"Last night 20 families in Lebed did not have dinner. Their livelihood
depends on fishing and they will not find in the sea what they put in it. The Lebed community is not in a position to take action against [the
foreign trawlers]."
Nor, Fisher
The trawlers not only compete with locals for catch within fisheries, but seek to deny them access outright, with aggressive, armed guards serving as a
powerful deterrent. Locals generally cannot identify the originating states of the foreign fishing vessels or the nationalities of their crews, because it is too
dangerous to approach them on the water. This prevents residents from fishing in areas where trawlers are operating, which may be the richest fishing
grounds.
"Lot of the illegal fishing, they have a gun...I asked some fishers [what country the illegal trawlers come from]. They say, we didn't come near
to them. We have to be far away.
Abdi, Development Worker
These fears are grounded in tales of trawlers confronting local fishing vessels without provocation, endangering fishers and destroying their equipment.
The most commonly reported form of this was trawlers stealing or cutting locals' fishing nets. Aside from the physical danger, the economic impact is
significant: replacing a single net might cost a fisher a month's income or more, and some report having several nets destroyed in a single encounter[4].
"[There is] a lot of attacking [of] small boats. And sometimes they destroy also nets, fishing nets.
"I talk to communities there, they say, "We don't know what we can do." They are hopelessly. Can see ships illegally fishing, and sometimes
they say, every day they destroys, destroy our net. They don't, they don't care. And trash our community."
Abdi, Development Worker
There is little doubt amongst Somalis that conflicts like these provided the original impetus for what became the piracy phenomenon. In the local telling,
illegal fishing, and the economic damage it inflicted, left traditional fishing communities so angered and impoverished that they began attacking the illegal
Annex 154
Joint anti-piracy exercise by Chinese and Danish warships in the Gulf of Aden. Photo:
China Military Online.
fishing vessels, acting as a sort of militia coast guard. However, criminal gangs subsequently saw the profit potential and started hijacking more valuable
commercial ships unconnected to illegal fishing.
"Hunger, unemployment, and illegal fishing are the main factors which made our youth get involved in piracy. The only job they have is fishing
and their fishing nets were destroyed or taken by trawlers. That is why most of the fishermen turned into pirates."
Ali, Fisher
"The main factor that made them get involved in piracy was that their fishing equipment was destroyed or taken away by the trawlers. Initially
[piracy] was a popular uprising against illegal fishing, but later it was taken over by gangs who changed the whole course."
Mahdi, Government Official
International Navies
On the basis of such stories of abuse and attacks, coastal residents express
resentment and hostility towards illegal fishing vessels—and this resentment
often extends to the international community's most visible presence along the
coast, the warships deployed on counter-piracy operations. Most respondents
expressed the belief that the international naval forces are in Somali waters
specifically to protect foreign trawlers.
"I see the international navies have a hidden agenda, which is to support
those looting our resources."
Yusuf, Fisher
"The international navies in our sea are there for their interest. They say
we are guarding your sea, but the reality is they are engaged in the
exploitation of our resources in the sea. They are protecting those
trawlers in our sea. If we decided to act against those, they would
defend them."
Qamar, Midwife
This is not to say that Somalis do not recognize the effectiveness of the navies
in halting piracy—a development for which many respondents expressed approval or gratitude. However, the very success of international navies against
piracy increases resentment against ongoing illegal fishing.
"They apprehend pirates and hand them over to foreign countries for trial. We are very satisfied that they arrested pirates, but why they don't
apprehend those doing illegal fishing in our sea?"
Nor, Fisher
"They capture pirates but they don't capture those taking or destroying our fishing nets. When fishing season comes, you can see tens of the
trawlers are in our sea taking our marine resources and no one will help us against them."
Yusuf, Fisher
Sentiments towards the international navies were not universally or exclusively negative. Attitudes were much more positive or nuanced in those areas
where interactions between naval forces and local communities extended beyond counter-piracy, and perceived protection of trawlers. Conducting
trainings, providing medical care, donating practical items like outboard motors, and other such activities help counter the perception that the navies are
there to hurt rather than help Somalia.
"As the Hobyo community, we have a good relationship with the international navies, particularly those from Denmark. We call them if we
receive information that pirates are heading to Hobyo. When pirates see that international navy helicopters are patrolling around Hobyo they
go back to Elhur. They also provided medical check-ups to 100 Hobyo residents."
Sharif, Businessman
"I have been cooperating with the international navies, particularly those from Denmark, for the past three years. Because of the relation we
have with them, piracy on the ground was weakened and they left Hobyo to Elhur coastal village and Harardhere district, which is under
Alshabab control. It would be very good if their mandate included illegal fishing and toxic dumping."
Mohamud, Government Official
Outlook
A central question, for both Somalis and the international community, is of course: what is the future of piracy in Somalia? On the one hand, everyone
agrees that piracy against large merchant vessels has been suppressed. The naval forces, with both ships and helicopters, simply make operations too
difficult. On the other hand, though, there is equally widespread agreement that without changes in the underlying conditions—most importantly rampant
illegal fishing—piracy will return. The only item for debate is whether that resurgence will wait for the departure of the navies.
"Pirates may reorganize themselves if poverty and illegal fishing are not addressed."
Qamar, Midwife
"They are now in hibernation, but they may re-organize themselves for two reasons. The first is widespread unemployment among youth in
the coastal areas. The second is the IUU fishing in the coastal area, which has made life difficult for those who depend on fishing."
Mahdi, Government Official
Annex 154
Beached vessel in Hobyo, Somalia. Photo: Oceans Beyond Piracy.
Illegal Fishing Vessel. Photo: A Fisher in Bander Balya, Somalia.
Beach in Hobyo, Somalia. Photo: Panoramio.com
"I don't think they can re-organize themselves for the time being as long
as the international navies are present in our sea."
Ali, Fisher
"When piracy was in its highest in 2012, the IUU fishing was the lowest
and that time our fishermen were getting their enough daily catch, but
now, the piracy is its lowest and the IUU fishing is its highest, and our
fishermen don't get any fish because the trawlers take or destroy their
fishing nets. That is why they are on the verge of another popular
uprising against the trawlers, which may again turn into piracy."
Mahdi, Government Official
Solutions
All respondents emphasized that piracy can only be eliminated permanently by addressing its root causes through development projects—an economic
solution to an economic problem. Highlighting again the economic importance of fishing specifically and productive employment opportunities more
generally, respondents in coastal areas consistently requested or recommended the provision of fishing boats, gear, and associated equipment like freezer
and dock facilities.
"Coastal communities should receive development projects aimed at improving their living conditions such as boats, fishing equipments,
freezers, basic education, and vocational trainings."
Mohamed, Former Government Official
"The international community should provide development projects to promote their living standard and deter youth from piracy."
Sharif, Businessman
Conclusion
Across many interviews, respondents paint a remarkably consistent picture. The
piracy phenomenon began as an armed response to illegal fishing. This "popular
uprising" was subsequently hijacked by criminal gangs interested strictly in
profit, who attacked other, unrelated vessels. Nonetheless, so long as illegal
fishing persists and curtails already-scarce economic opportunities, particularly
employment for coastal youths, the potential for piracy will remain. International
navies have been effective at treating the symptoms, by making pirate
operations untenable, but can be maintained only at great cost and do nothing
to address the underlying condition. Somali piracy has been suppressed, not
solved.
Ominously, so long as this remains the case, a resurgence of piracy off the coast
of Somalia cannot be ruled out—and indeed is seen as an inevitability by many
locals.
"I believe the international navies represent a temporary solution for the
piracy problem. The international community spent billions of dollars in
the sea while they did not spend one dollar on the ground to address the
root causes of the piracy which are poverty, unemployment, and illegal fishing. I'm sure piracy will come again if they leave."
Mohamed, Former Government Official
Annex 154
[1] Interviews were conducted in Somali or English. Responses given in Somali have been translated, while those in English—not the respondents' native
language—are transcribed exactly.
[2] What respondents describe as "illegal fishing" might be better characterized as IUU fishing—that is, illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing. The
uncertainty of the regulatory situation and applicable legal regime in the various Somali regions and the EEZ undeniably blurs the lines between these
categories. However, for clarity this article adopts the terminology of those interviewed. Whether they are technically correct about the legal status of a
given fishing boat (for example, some vessels may in fact possess a license to fish, but obtained it from an issuer whose licensing authority is questionable),
the perception of illegality by Somalis is unambiguous.
[3] While trawlers are in fact only one particular type of fishing vessel, the term was commonly used in interviews to describe any large, industrial fishing
ship; that colloquial rather than technical usage is maintained here.
[4] Repondents indicated that an individual fisher can earn approximately $200 to $400 per month—when the fishing is good—while a single net reportedly
costs $270 to $370, depending on quality.
Top image - Somali Dhow in harbor. Photo by Jean-Pierre Larroque / One Earth Future Foundation
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Type of Document:
Subject:
IUU Fishing
Region:
Somalia
Author:
Peter Kerins
Project Team:
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Volume VII - Annexes 149-185